Encyclopædia
of
Religion and Ethics
Encyclopaedia

Religion and Ethics

Encyclopaedia

Religion and Ethics
TO

SIR JOHN MAURICE CLARK, BARONET

PUBLISHER

AND

FRIEND
PREFACE

In issuing this, the twelfth, volume of THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS, I wish to thank those who have assisted me in the work.

And first let me name the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. CLARK, and their Staff, above all Sir JOHN M. CLARK, Bart., to whom I have taken the liberty of dedicating it. The Printers also, Messrs. MORRISON & GIBB LTD., deserve the thanks of all concerned, and mine most of all; and especially must their able and accurate Readers be remembered.

What shall I say of my accomplished and loyal Staff? Besides Dr. Selbie and Dr. Gray, whose names are on the title-page, I must mention Mr. J. F. Grant and Mr. T. Riach. Not less deserving than these are the two sisters Miss M. C. Macdonald (now Mrs. Laburn) and Miss D. R. Macdonald (now Mrs. Dow), to whom most of all is due the minute accuracy of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA. With them let me name my Secretary, Miss H. Robertson, who was with me at the planning of the Work and has guided its course to the end. I must also mention our indispensable Librarian, Miss E. M. Mitchell, and Miss B. Wisely, the Typist, whose work has often won the admiration of the authors of articles.

Many scholars have aided with their contributions and with their counsel. I cannot name them. But I must say one thing. The ENCYCLOPÆDIA would not have been what it is if I had not had in every department of study covered by it at least one man upon whom I could rely for advice.

The names of the translators have never appeared. The translations from the French have for the most part been made by my assistants. The German translations are almost all due to the Rev. ALEXANDER GRIEVE, M.A., D.Phil. Mr. ALBERT BONUS, M.A., has translated nearly all the Italian work. Either Professor W. R. MORFILL or Dr. E. H. MINNS has been responsible for the Russian translations. A few articles written in Danish were translated by the Rev. JOHN BEVERIDGE, B.D.

The editing of a work like THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS is undoubtedly difficult, but it has brought me into touch with so many men of ability and generosity, and has enabled me to make so many friendships, that the pleasure of it has far outweighed its pain.

An Index Volume is in course of preparation.

THE EDITOR.
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

ABELSON (JOSHUA), M.A., D.Lit. (London).
Rabbi, Cardiff; author of Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature, Jewish Mysticism, Maimonides on the Jewish Creed.
Usury (Jewish).

ABRAMS (ISRAEL), M.A. (Lond. and Camb.), D.D. (Heb. Union Coll., Cinseih.).
Reader in Talmudic and Rabbinic Literature in the University of Cambridge; formerly Senior Tutor in the Jews' College, London; editor of the Jewish Quarterly Review, 1888-1908.
Symbolism (Jewish), Talmud, Targums.

ADAM (DAVID STOW), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Church History and Systematic Theology in Ormond College, University of Melbourne.
Theology.

ADENY (WALTER FREDERIC), M.A., D.D.
Late Principal of Lancashire College, and Lecturer on History of Doctrine in Manchester University; author of *The Greek and Eastern Churches*, and other works.
Toleration, Waldenses.

ALEXANDER (ARCHIBALD BROWNING DRYSDALE), M.A., D.D. (Glasc.).
Minister of the United Free Church at Langbank; formerly Lecturer on Ethics and present Assessor to Chair of Ethics and Practical Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of *A Short History of Philosophy*, and other works.
Wealth.

ALEXANDER (HARTLEY BUEB), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Nebraska; author of *vol. x. (North American)* of The Mythology of All Races.
Worship (Primitive).

ANESAKI (MASAKI), M.A., D.Litt., LL.D.
Professor of the Science of Religion in the Imperial University of Tokyo; Professor of Japanese Literature and Life in the University of Harvard, 1913-15; author of *Buddhist Art in its Relation to Buddhist Ideals*, *Nichiren*, the *Buddhist Prophet*, *Sun, Moon, and Stars* (Japanese), *Tathagata, Transmigration* (Buddhist), *Vows* (Buddhist).

ANGUS (SAMUEL), M.A., Ph.D.
Professor of New Testament and Historical Theology in St. Andrew's College, University of Sydney; author of *The Environment of Early Christianity* (1915).
Zealots.

ARNOLD (THOMAS WALKER), C.I.E., Litt.D., M.A.
Professor of Arabic, University of London, University College; author of *The Prophets of Islam*; English editor of *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

Late of the Hongkong Civil Service; author of *Things Chinese*, *The Chinese at Home*.
Tonsure (Chinese).

BARNES (THOMAS), M.A. (Oxon.).
Vicar of Hitherstone, Staffordshire.
Trees and Plants.

BARTLETT (JAMES VERNON), D.D.
Professor of Church History in Mansfield College, Oxford; author of *The Apostolic Age* (1900); joint-author of *Christianity and History* (1917).
Worship (Christian).

BARTON (GEORGE AARON), A.M., Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of Biblical Literature and Semitic Languages in Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania; author of *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, *Ecclesiastes* in the *International Critical Commentary*, *The Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing*, *Archeology and the Bible*, *Suicide* (Semitic and Egyptian).

DE BEAUMONT (LOUIS-LEOPOLD MARTIAL BAYNARD), D.Litt.
Sometime Fellow and Examiner of the Royal University of Ireland; Fellow of the Linnean Society; Member of the *Société Astronomique de France*.
Swedenborg.

Late Principal of Lancashire College, Manchester; sometime Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; author of *The Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets*, and other works.
Usury (Hebrew).
<table>
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<th>Authors of Articles in This Volume</th>
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<tr>
<td>Besant (Annie).</td>
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<tr>
<td>President of the Theosophical Society; author of Reincarnation, and other works.</td>
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<td>Theosophical Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackman (Aylward Manley), D.Litt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formerly Laycock Student of Egyptology at Worcester College, Oxford; Oxford University Nubian Research Scholar, 1919; formerly Scholar of Queen's College.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worship (Egyptian).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Box (George Herbert), M.A., D.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, King's College, London; Hon. Canon of St. Albans; author of The Book of Isaiah translated in accordance with the results of Modern Criticism (1908), The Ezra Apocalypse (1912), The Virgin Birth of Jesus (1906), The Gospel according to St. Matthew, revised ed. ('Century Bible', 1929).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of the Wesleyan Methodist Church at Southport.</td>
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<td>Wesley.</td>
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<td>Broad (Charles Dunbar), M.A., Litt.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bristol; formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.</td>
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<td>Time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bryant (Mrs. Sophie), D.Sc. (London), Litt.D. (Dublin).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly Headmistress of the North London Collegiate School; author of Educational Ends, How to read the Bible in the Nineteenth Century, Moral and Religious Education, and other works.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraton (Antoine).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professeur à l'École des Langues orientales vivantes et à l'École Coloniale, Paris; Ancien Membre de l'École Française d'Études Orientales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongking.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canny (Maurice A.), M.A. (Oxon.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Manchester; editor of the Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun, Moon, and Stars (Hebrew).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnoy (Albert Joseph), Docteur en Philosophie et Lettres (Louvain).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Greek and General Linguistics in the University of Louvain; Professor in the University of California, 1918.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yazidis, Zoroastrianism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author Name</td>
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<td>Dow (John) M.A.</td>
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<td>Edwards (Edward) B.A. (Wales and Cantab.), M.R.A.S.</td>
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<td>Edwards (James F.)</td>
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<td>Fallaize (Edwin Nicholas Collingford), B.A. (Oxon.)</td>
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<td>Farbridge (Maurice Harry), M.A.</td>
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<td>Fu (Tung), M.A.</td>
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<td>Garber (Richard), Ph.D.</td>
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<td>Gardner (Alice), F.R.Hist.S.</td>
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<td>Gardner (Ernest Arthur), Litt.D.</td>
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<td>Gardner (Percy), Litt.D., LL.D., F.S.A.</td>
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<td>Gaster (Moses), Ph.D.</td>
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<td>Geden (Alfred S.), M.A. (Oxon.), D.D. (Aberd.)</td>
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<td>Glazebrook (Michael George), D.D.</td>
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<td>Goodman (Paul)</td>
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<td>Gray (Louis Herbert), M.A., Ph.D. (Columbia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GRIERSON (Sir GEORGE ABRAHAM), K.C.I.E., Ph.D. (Halle), D.Litt. (Dublin), I.C.S. (retired).
Fellow of the British Academy; Honorary Member of the American Oriental Society; Honorary Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bengal; Foreign Associate Member of the Société Asiatique de Paris; Hon. Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Superintendent of the Linguistic Survey of India.
Tulasi-Dasa.
GRIERSON (HERBERT JOHN CLIFFORD), M.A., LL.D.
Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh; editor of The Poems of John Donne.
Vondel.
GRIEVE (ALEXANDER JAMES), M.A. (Oxon.), B.A., D.D. (Lond.).
Principal of the Lancashire Independent College, Manchester; assistant-editor of Peake's Commentary on the Bible.
Vows (Christian).
HAGAR (STANSBURY), B.A., LL.B.
Counsellor at Law; Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Anthropological Association; Executive Officer of the Departments of Ethnology and Astronomy in the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (American).
HALDANE (ELIZABETH SANDERSON), C.H., LL.D.
Author of The Life of James Férrier (1899), Life of Descartes (1901); joint-translator of Hegel's History of Philosophy (1892), and The Philosophical Works of Descartes (1911-19).
Voltaire.
HARADA (TASINUKI), D.D., LL.D.
Formerly President of the Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.
Suicide (Japanese).
HARRISON (JANE ELLEN), LL.D. (Aberd.), D.Litt. (Durham).
Staff Lecturer and sometime Fellow of Newham College, Cambridge; author of The Religion of Ancient Greece (1905), Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (1907), The Theocracies: a Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (1912).
Titans, Under World (Greek).
HAETLAND (EDWIN SIDNEY), LL.D., F.S.A.
President of the Folklore Society, 1899; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1906; President of Section I (Religions of the Lower Culture) at the Oxford International Congress for the History of Religions, 1908; author of The Legend of Perseus, Primitive Paternity, Ritual and Belief. Totemism, Twins.
HASTINGS (ANNE WILSON), M.A.
Utilitarianism.
HENKE (FREDERICK GOODRICH), M.A., Ph.D.
Truman D. Collins Professor of Philosophy and Education in Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania; Member of the Royal Asiatic Society (North China Branch); author of A Study in the Psychology of Ritualism. The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming.
Wang Yang-ming.
HILL (GEORGE FRANCIS), M.A., (Oxon.), F.B.A.
Keeper of the Department of Coins and Medals in the British Museum.
Token, Treaties.
HILLEBRANDT (A. F. ALFRED), Ph.D. (Munich), L.L.C.X.
Ord. Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the University of Breslau; Corresponding Member of the Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, and of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences; Geheimer Regierungsrat.
Worship (Hindu).
INGE (WILLIAM RALPH), D.D.
Dean of St. Paul's; author of Christian Mysticism (1899), Studies of English Mystics (1906), Personal Idealism and Mysticism (1907), Faith and its Psychology (1898).
Synderesis.
JACKSON (A. V. WILLIAMS), Ph.D., L.H.D., L.L.D.
Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York; author of Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran; Persia, Past and Present.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (Iranian).
JAMES (EDWIN OLIVER), B.Sc., B.Litt. (Oxon.), F.C.S. (Lond.).
Vesey of Holy Trinity, Reading; Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Member of Council of the Folklore Society; Secretary of the Anthropological Section of the British Association; author of Primitive Ritual and Belief. An Introduction to Anthropology, and other works.
Tutelary Gods and Spirits, Water, Water-gods (Primitive and Savage), Yawning.
JENKINSON (MRS. CONSTANCE), F.R.A.I.
Somerville College, Oxford; Diploma in Anthropology, Oxford.
Tatting.
JOHNS (CLAUDIE HERRMAN WALTER), M.A., Litt.D., D.D.
Late Master of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, and Canon Residentiary of Norwich; author of Assyrian Deeds and Documents of the 7th Century B.C., Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters, the Schweich Lectures on The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew People.
Usury (Babylonian).
JOHNSON (HUMPHREY JOHN T.), B.A. (Oxon.). Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
Sweat, Sweat-house.
JOHNSTON (REGINALD FLEMING), C.B.E., M.A. (Oxon.).
Tutor to H.M. the Emperor Hsian T'ung; formerly District Officer and Magistrate, Wentaiwei (administered the Government 1917-18); author of From Peking to Mandalay (1908), Lion and Dragon in Northern China (1910), Buddhist China (1913), Letters to a Missionary (1918).
Vows (Chinese), War, War-gods (Chinese), Worship (Chinese).
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Jolly (Julius), Ph.D. (Manich), Hon. M.D. (Gottingen), Hon. D.Litt. (Oxford); Ord., Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the University of Würzburg; formerly Tagore Professor of Law in the University of Calcutta; Geheimer Hofrat.</td>
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<td>Tonsure (Hindu), Vows (Hindu).</td>
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<td>Jones (Rufus M.), M.A., D.Litt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Philosophy in Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania; author of Social Law in the Spiritual World (1904), Studies in Mystical Religion (1909), Spiritual Reformers (1914), The Inner Life (1918).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theurgy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph (Morris), Senior Minister of the West London Synagogue; author of Judaism as Creed and Life (1910).</td>
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<td>Vows (Jewish).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keith (Arthur Berrideal), D.C.L., D.Litt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrister-at-Law; Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the University of Edinburgh.</td>
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<td>Suicide (Hindu), Trinitari.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kennett (Robert Iatch), D.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge; Canon of Ely; Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge; Examining Chaplain to the Bishops of Ely and Manchester.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tophet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keswick (Nora).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newnham College, Cambridge; formerly Lecturer in English in the University of St. Andrews.</td>
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<td>Teutonic Religion.</td>
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<td>Kilpatrick (Thomas B.), M.A., B.D., D.D.</td>
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<td>Suffering.</td>
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<td>Kinnaid (Hon. Emily), C.B.E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acting Vice-President of the Y.W.C.A. of Great Britain, and Vice-President of the World's Y.W.C.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young Women's Christian Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Krotheber (A. L.), A.M., Ph.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the University of California.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zuni.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laird (John), M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the Queen's University of Belfast; author of Problems of the Self, A Study in Realism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langdon (Stephen Herbert), M.A., B.D., Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Assyriology and Comparative Semitic Philology in the University of Oxford; Member of Council of the Royal Asiatic Society; author of Neo-Babylonian Royal Inscriptions (V.A.B. vol. iv.), Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms, A Sumerian Grammar, Babylonian Liturgies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word (Sumerian and Babylonian), Worship (Babylonian).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lester-Garland (Lester V.), M.A., F.L.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loeve (Herbert Martin James), M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer, Exeter College, Oxford; sometime Curator of Oriental Literature in the University Library, Cambridge, and Director of Oriental Studies, St. Catharine's College, Cambridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship (Jewish).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyttelton (Hon. E.), M.A., D.D., D.C.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean of Whitefriars College, Chelsea; formerly Headmaster of Eton College.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetarianism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rector of St. Saviour's, Bridge of Allan; Hon. Canon of the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, Cumbie; Examiner in Comparative Religion and Philosophy of Religion, Victoria University, Manchester; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of St. Andrews; author of The Religion of the Ancient Celts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teuth, Temples, Thithis, Tonsure, Underworld, Vampire, Virgin Birth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDowell (Arthur Anthony), M.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. (Leipzig).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford; Fellow of Balliol College; Fellow of the British Academy; Fellow of the Royal Danish Academy; Keeper of the Indian Institute, Oxford.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vedic Religion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>McFaraday (John Edgar), B.A. (Oxon.), M.A., D.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of Old Testament Language, Literature, and Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of Messages of the Prophets and Priestly Historians, and other works; editor of Davidson's Hebrew Grammar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vows (Hebrew).</td>
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<tr>
<td>McIntyre (James Lewis), M.A. (Edin. and Oxon.), D.Sc. (Edin.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology to the University of Aberdeen; Lecturer in Psychology, Logic, and Ethics to the Aberdeen Provincial Committee for the Training of Teachers; formerly Examiner in Philosophy to the Universities of Edinburgh and London; author of Giordano Bruno (1905).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mackenzie (Donald), M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of the United Free Church at Tain; Assistant Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, 1906-1909.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synaerism, Transcendentalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly Principal of Wilson College, Bombay, and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bombay.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vallabha, Vallabhacharya.</td>
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<td>MARGOLIOUTH (Georgie), M.A. (Cantab.)</td>
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<td>Marfoos (Eugène), Docteur en Théologie</td>
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<td>Moffatt (James), D.D., D.Litt., Hon. M.A. (Ox.).</td>
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<td>Morgan (William), D.D.</td>
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<td>Moultoun (James Egan), D.D.</td>
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<td>Mutch (William James), A.M. (Wisconsin), B.D., Ph.D. (Vale)</td>
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<td>Nallino (Carlo Alfonso).</td>
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<td>Neilson (George), L.L.D.</td>
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<td>Nicholson (Reynold Alleyne), M.A., Litt., L.L.D.</td>
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<td>Oeffele (Baron Felix von).</td>
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<td>Oltramare (Paul)</td>
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<td>Orr (James), M.A., D.D.</td>
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<td>Ottley (Robert Laurence), D.D.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

Owen (Mary Alicia), President of the Missouri Folklore Society; Counsellor of the American Folklore Society; admitted to Tribal Membership with the Indians, 1892.

Voodoo.

Paterson (William P.), D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh.

War.

Patton (Walter Melville), M.A., Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and History of Religion, and Director of the Library, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

Suicide (Muhammadan), Sunnites.


Transmigration (Greek and Roman).

Vows (Greek and Roman).

Petrie (William Matthew Flinders), D.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Edin. and Aberd.), Litt.D. (Camb.). Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy; Edwards Professor of Egyptology in the University of London.

Transmission (Egyptian).

Pinches (Theophilus Goldridge), LL.D. (Oxon.), M.R.A.S., Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archaeology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.

Sumero-Akkadian, Tammuz.

Pope (Robert Martin), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).

Author of Introduction to Early Church History, and other works.

Western Church.

Poussin (Louis de la Vallée), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Lögo), en langues orientales (Louvain).

Professeur de sanscrit à l'Université de Gand; Membre de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Hibbert Lecturer (1918); Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société Asiatique; Membre correspondant de l'Académie impériale de Petrograd; Correspondant de l'École Francaise d'Extrême-Orient.

Suicide (Buddhist), Tantrism (Buddhist), Worship (Buddhist).

Price (Ira Maurice), Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago; author of The Monuments of the Old Testament, The Great Cylinder Inscriptions A and B of Cutha, and other works.

Toltec.

Reid (James Smith), M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., Fellow and late Tutor of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge; editor of the Academic and other works of Cicero; author of Municipalities of the Roman Empire.

Worship (Roman).

Reyon (Michel), LLD., D.Litt., Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; formerly Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; author of La Shinshûsû, Worship (Japanese).


Todas.

Robinson (Henry Wheelock), M.A. (Oxon. and Edin.).


Rose (Herbert Jennings), M.A. (Oxon.), Professor of Latin, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth; sometime Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford.

Suicide (Introductory), Thrace.

Rose (Horace Artheur), I.C.S. (retired), Superintendent of Ethnography, Punjab, 1901-06; author of A Glossary of Punjab Tribes and Castes, and other works.

Uaas.

Ross (William), M.A., B.D., Minister of the United Free Church at Edinburgh.

Voluntarism.

Rouse (William Henry Denham), M.A., Litt.D., Headmaster of the Perse Grammar School, Cambridge; University Teacher of Sanskrit; President of the Folklore Society, 1904-06.

Tithes (Greek), Votive Offerings (Greek).

Sapir (Edward), Ph.D., Chief of Anthropological Division, Victoria Memorial Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.

Vancouver Island Indians.

Schiller (Ferdinand Canning Scott), M.A., D.Sc. (Oxon.).

Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; author of Riddles of the Sphinx (new ed., 1919), Humorium (1903), new ed., 1912), Studies in Humanism (1907), 1912), Plato or Protogoras (1903), Formal Logic (1912), etc.

Telepathy, Value.


Valentinism.

Seaton (Mary Ethel), M.A. (Lond.).

Sometime Lecturer at Girton College, Cambridge.

Swan-maidens.
SEIGMAN (Mrs. Brenda Z.), London.
Veddas.

SEIGMAN (Charles G.), M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Professor of Ethnology in the University of London;
President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1915;
author of The Melaenismus of British New Guinea; joint-author of The Veddas.
Veddas.

SHOREY (Paul), Ph.D., L.L.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt
Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of
Art and Letters.

Summum Bonum, Theognis.

SHOWMAN (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin;
Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898-1900; author of
The Great Mother of the Gods (Dissertation), 1901, With the Professor, 1910; translator
of Ovid's Heroides and Amores (Loeb Classical Library), 1914.

Taurbolium.

SIXES (EDWARD ERNEST), M.A.
Fellow, Senior Tutor, and Classical Lecturer of St. John's College, Cambridge; author of
The Anthropology of the Greeks, and Hero and Leander, translated into verse from the Greek;
editor of Asclepius's Prometheus Vinctus, the Homeric Hymns, etc.

Torch (Greek and Roman).

SMITH (CHARLES RYDER), B.A., D.D. (Lond.),
Professor of Systematic Theology in Richmond
College, Surrey; author of The Bible Doctrine of Society in its Historical Evolution.

Theocracy.

SMITH (VINCENT AETHEUR), M.A., Litt.D.
Late of the Indian Civil Service (retired);
author of Asoka in 'Rulers of India,' Early
History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Akbar the Great Mogul,
Oxford History of India.

Vaisali, Vikrama Era.

SOARES (THEODORE GERALD), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Preaching and Religious Education,
and Head of the Department of Practical Theology, in the University of Chicago.

Sunday Schools.

STEVenson (Mrs. Sinclair), M.A., Sc.D.
Of the Irish Mission, Rajkot, India; sometime
Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford;
author of Notes on Modern Jainism, The
Bites of the Twice-born.

Svetambaras, Worship (Jain).

STOKES (George J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland;
author of The Objectivity of Truth.

Universality.

SWANTON (John Reed), Ph.D.
Ethnologist in the Bureau of American

Tlingit, Tsimshian, Wakashan.

TAKAKUSU (Jyun), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr.
Phil. (Leipzig).
Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.

Yuan-Chwang, Fa-Hian, and I-Tsing.

TAYLOR (ALFRED EDWARD), M.A. (Oxon.),
D. Litt. (St. Andrews).
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the United
College of SS. Salvator and Leonard, St.
Andrews; late Fellow of Merion College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy;
author of The Problem of Conduct (1901), Elements of Metaphysics (1906), Various
Socratica (1911).

Theism.

TESSITTO (Dr. L. F.),
Late of Udine, Italy; editor of the Uvases-
mala of Dhammadas.

Yogis (Kauphata).

THOMAS (EDWARD JOSEPH), M.A. (St. And. and
Camb.), B.A. (Lond.).
Under-Librarian of Cambridge University;
editor of Buddhist Scriptures; joint-editor of Mahadandaes and Jataka Tales.

Sun, Moon, and Stars (Buddhist).

THOMAS (NOETHER CREWHIDGE).
Elève diplômé de l'Ecole pratique des Hautes
Études; Corresponding Member of the Société d'Anthropologie de Paris; Member of
Counsell of the Folklore Society; author of Thought Transference, Kinship Organisa-
tion and Group Marriage in Australia.

Transmigration (Introductory and Primi-
tive).

THUESTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.
Joint-editor of the Westminster Library for
Priests and Students; author of Life of St.
Hugh of Lincoln, The Holy Year of Jubilee,
The Stations of the Cross.

Xavier.

URQUHART (FRANCIS FORTESCUE), M.A.
Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford.

Ultramontanism.

URQUHART (WILLIAM SPENCE), M.A., D.Phil.
Senior Professor of Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College, Calcutta; Fellow and
Member of Syndicate of Calcutta University.

Theosophy.

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., L.L.D.,
F.L.S., F.R.A.I., M.R.A.S, M.F.L.S.,
M.S.B.A., Lt.-Colonel I.M.S. (retired).
Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; Hon. Correspondent of the Archaeological Survey of India; author of The Buddhism of Tibet, Bhasa and its
Mysteries.

Swat or Udypna, Tibet.

WATT (HUGH), M.A., B.D.
Professor of Church History in New College,
Edinburgh.

Zwingli.

WELSFORD (ENDY ELDER HANCOCK).
Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge.

Sun, Moon, and Stars (Tentonic and
Balto-Slavic).
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Title and Affiliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Werner (Alice), L.L.A.</td>
<td>University Reader in Swahili and Bantu Languages, School of Oriental Studies,</td>
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<tr>
<td>(St. And.)</td>
<td>London; Goldsmiths' Scholar, Newnham College, Cambridge, 1878-80; Mary Ewart</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Travelling Scholar, 1911-13; formerly Associates' Fellow, Newnham College, Cambridge;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>author of <em>The Language Families of Africa, The Native Races of British Central Africa;</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>translator of <em>An Introduction to the Study of African Languages.</em></td>
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<td>Zanetalb and the Swahili People.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whitacre (Elred), O.P.</td>
<td>Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Hawkesyard Priory,</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sac. Theol. Lector)</td>
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<td>Whitley (William Thomas)</td>
<td>Honorary Secretary and editor of the Baptist Historical Society; Member of the</td>
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<td>Wilde (Norman), Ph.D.</td>
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<td>Williams (Norman Powell)</td>
<td>Chaplain Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(M.A., B.D.)</td>
<td>Lecturer in Theology at Exeter and Pembroke Colleges; Examining Chaplain to the</td>
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<td>Bishop of Newcastle.</td>
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<td>Wogihara (Unrai), Ph.D.</td>
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<td>Workman (Herbert B.), M.A., D.Lit.</td>
<td>Principal of Westminster Training College; Member of the Board of Studies in the</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sac. Theol. Lector)</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology, London University; author of <em>The Dawn of the Reformation,</em></td>
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<td><em>The Letters of John Hus, Persecution in the Early Church, and Christian Thought to the</em></td>
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<td>Yapf (Sir Arthur Keysall), K.B.E., Officier de l'Ordre de la Couronne (Belgium), Wen Hu (China)</td>
<td>National Secretary of the Y.M.C.A.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youngert (Sven Gustaf), Ph.D., D.D.</td>
<td>Professor of Philosophy and History of Religion at Augustana College and Theological Seminary, Rock Island, Ill.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vows (Teutonic).</td>
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**CROSS-REFERENCES**

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<td>Washing</td>
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<td>Word of God</td>
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<td>Zeus</td>
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<td>Zoaar Society</td>
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<td>Zodiac</td>
<td>Sun, Moon, and Stars</td>
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# Lists of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.H.</td>
<td>Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622)</td>
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<td>Amer.</td>
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<td>Apoc.</td>
<td>Apocalypse, Apocalyptic</td>
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<td>Alco Testament</td>
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<td>AV</td>
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<td>Authorized Version margin</td>
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<td>f.</td>
<td>and following verse or page</td>
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<td>Prayer Book</td>
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<td>Textus Receptus, Received Text</td>
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## II. Books of the Bible

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<td>Genesis</td>
<td>Ca = Canticles</td>
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<td>Ex</td>
<td>Exodus</td>
<td>Js = Isaiah</td>
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<td>Lv</td>
<td>Leviticus</td>
<td>Jer = Jeremiah</td>
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<td>Nu</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>La = Lamentations</td>
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<td>Dt</td>
<td>Deuteronomy</td>
<td>Ezek = Ezekiel</td>
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<td>Js</td>
<td>Joshua</td>
<td>Dn = Daniel</td>
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<td>Jg</td>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>Hb = Hosea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ru</td>
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<td>Jl = Joel</td>
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<td>1 S</td>
<td>1 Samuel</td>
<td>Am = Amos</td>
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<td>2 S</td>
<td>2 Samuel</td>
<td>Ob = Obadiah</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 K</td>
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<td>Obadiah</td>
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<td>Hag = Hagai</td>
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<td>Ec</td>
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<td>Mazi = Malachi</td>
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### Apocrypha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1 Es</td>
<td>1 Esater</td>
<td>To = Tobit</td>
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<td>2 Es</td>
<td>2 Esater</td>
<td>Jth = Judith</td>
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### New Testament

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<tr>
<th>Book</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mt</td>
<td>Matthew</td>
<td>1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2</td>
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<td>Mark</td>
<td>Thessalonians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>Luke</td>
<td>Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2</td>
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<td>Jn</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Timothy</td>
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<td>Ac</td>
<td>Acts</td>
<td>Tit = Titus</td>
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<td>Ro</td>
<td>Romans</td>
<td>Philem = Philemon</td>
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<td>Co</td>
<td>Colossians</td>
<td>Col = Colossians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gal</td>
<td>Galatians</td>
<td>1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eph</td>
<td>Ephesians</td>
<td>1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, 3 John</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ph</td>
<td>Philippians</td>
<td>Jode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colossians</td>
<td>Rev = Revelation</td>
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III. FOR THE LITERATURE

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Benninger = Heb. Archäologie, 1894.
Darenberg-Saglio = Dict. des ant. grc. et rom., 1886–90.
Denninger = Enchiridion Synbolorum, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
Deussen = Die Phöbos d. Upasnochads, 1899 (Eng. tr., 1906).
Dougherty = Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. 1888.
Holder = Alttestlicher Sprachschutz, 1891 ff.
Howitt = Native Tribes of S.E. Australia, 1904.
Jubainville = Cours de Litt. celtique, i.–xii., 1833 ff.
Lagrange = Études sur les religions semitiques, 3 vols. 1904.
Lane = An Arabic-English Lexicon, 1863 ff.
Lepsius = Denkmäler aus Aegypten u. Ägyptiern, 1849–60.
Lichtheimer = Lichtheim, 1876.
Muir = Orig. Sanskrit Texts, 1885–72.
Munro-Arnold = A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language, 1894 ff.

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Aca
démie des In-
scriptions et Belles-Lettres.
GBC = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopedia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Parnell).
CIM = Census of India (MacCulloch).
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscrip. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Graecarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum. 2d ed.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticae. 3d ed.
COS = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng.
tr. of KAT*; see below].
CR = Classical Review.
CR = Classical Review.
CRQ = Church Quarterly Review.
CSFR = Folklore Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DAZL = Dict. d'Archeologie chrétienne et de
Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-
Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-
Cheetham).
DCC = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPAP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWF = Denkschriften der Wissenschaft.
Wissenschaften.
EBI = Encyclopaedia Biblica.
EBR = Encyclopaedia Britannica.
EI = Encyclopaedia Islamica.
EBR = The English Review.
EP = Expositor.
ERR = Expository Times.
FRK = Fragmenta Historiae Graecorum (coll.
C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLK = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archeologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Gottliebische Gesellschaft.
GGN = Gottliche Gesellschaft (Nachrichten
der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften
zu Göttingen).
GIA = Grundzüge d. Indisch-Arischen Philologie.
GIP = Grundzüge d. Iranischen Philologie.
GV = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVG = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAT = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiae.
HGL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land
(A. Rib), 1892.
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJF = History of the Jewish People.
HL = Hibbert Lectures.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscrip. Graeci (publ. under auspices of Berlin
Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscrip. Graeci Antiquissimi. 2d ed.
(1885); new
edition (1908–09).
IE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAF = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JASE = Journal of the Anthropological Society of
Bombay.
JASB = Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JTBS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JDB = Journal des Débats.
JDTA = Jahrbücher für deutsches Altertum.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGO = Journal de la Société Asiatique.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHE = Journal of Hebrew Studies.
JLS = Journal des Lettres et Sciences de l'Art.
JPA = Journal of Philology.
JPT = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPS = Journal of the Presbyterian Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRSA = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRSA = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of
Bombay.
JRAA = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of
Korea.
JRG = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
JTAS = Journal of Theological Studies.
KAT* = Die Keilschriften und das AT (Schrader),
1883.
KAT* = Zimmern-Winkler's ed. of the preceding
(really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB = KEBS = Keilinschriften Bibel (Schrader),
1889 ff.
KG = Kleininschriften und die Geschichte
jahresarb., 1878.
LCBI = Literarisch Centralblatt.
LPA = Literaturblatt für Oriental Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LV = Legend of Perseus (Harlind).
LSS = Leipzig'ser sem. Studies.
M = Maimonides.
MAB = Memoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et
Belles-Lettres.
MBAB = Monatsbericht des Berliner Akad. d.
Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Pertz).
MGJ = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüd.
ische Volkskunde.
MGS = Monatshefte für Geschichte und Wissen-
schaft des Judentums.
MT = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas
(Westermarck).
MN = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des
deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MV = Mittheilungen und Berichte der vorderascarischen
Schule.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des
Judentums.
NBA = New Bulletin di Archeologia Cristiana.
NCO = Nineteenth Century.
NHW = Neue hebräischen Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NK = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NS = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastics Sacra.
OTJ = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W.
Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PBE = Polychronie Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PFFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.
PFEFJ = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.
PFG = Patrologia Graecia (Migne).
PGB = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PRB = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PEN = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog–Hauck).
PEE = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PE = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PES = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PESA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.
PTS = Patristic Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAN = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAL = Revue d'Asiatic Society.
RAS = Revue d'Asiatic Society.
RASS = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
REEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
REC = Revue Critique.
RCL = Revue Celtique.
RCH = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RLL = Revue de l'histoire des Religions.
RMM = Revue du monde musulman.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPA = Revue Philologique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RSE = Revue sémitaire d'Épigraphie et d'Histoire ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSH = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RTAPh = Revue de l'histoire et de la philosophie.
RTB = Recueil de Travaux.
RVT = Revue de l'histoire et de la philosophie.
RVT = Recueil de Travaux.
RWW = Religion und Gesellschaftliche Versuche und Vorleitungen.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.

SBAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
SBB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SEB = Sacred Books of the East.
SEOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-voL. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien und Kritiken.
SM = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
SWM = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
TSAI = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TI = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
TLJ = Theologische Zeitschrift.
TJK = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TJH = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TSR = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TB = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
TT = Texte und Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
ZAS = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZATZ = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZUP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina- Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Kultursachforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft.
ZFAP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkswissenschaft.
ZVR = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechts- wissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as KAT, LOT, etc.]
SUFFERING.—I. INTRODUCTION: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEM.—Suffering, as a feature of life in this earth, is too obvious and too familiar to need description. It is physical, mental, and spiritual. Suffering is alike superficial. Suffering is all but universal. From the point where, in the evolutionary process, a brain is developed, suffering is an unvarying element in experience. It appears in endless variety. Some of it belongs to animals in their natural conditions as an accompaniment of their life-story or as a consequence of their predaceous habits. It is, however, in human life that suffering most abounds. A great deal of human suffering is what we term roughly ‘physical pain’, though, in point of fact, the suffering of a self-conscious being must be radically distinct from that of a living creature in whose sentient life the thought of personality has not yet dawned. Physical pain is found in many degrees of intensity, from that which is easily bearable, at least by persons in normal health, to that which is appalling to look upon, and must constitute an unimaginable anguish. If we pass from physical suffering to that which is mental and moral, we are overwhelmed by the mass and the magnitude of the agonies that are the lot of mankind. From the sorrows of childhood, deeper than the observer can calculate, to the stony griefs of age, untold and ungauged, there is a range of suffering beyond all enumeration and conception, baffling the imagination, affronting the intelligence.

The worst feature of human suffering is the chaotic nature of its distribution. If strong men alone were sufferers, we would comfort ourselves by noting the gladness of little children; but children suffer, often with an intensity which seems too awful for the tender frame to endure and yet survive. If the guilty alone suffered, we might have some kind of theodicy to fit the facts; but the innocent suffer; they are the greatest sufferers. If we had to consider only our own pains, we might find a reason for them, or at least we could retreat to the fastness of our unapproachable soul. When, however, it is the pain of others that confronts us, we feel that our explanations are an impertinence. The clue to their sufferings is not to be found in any supposed rationale of our own.

The deepest element in the problem of pain is that so much suffering is meaningless, as far as our most careful thought can discern. After we have noted causes the removal of which would certainly reduce the quantity of pain in the world, after we have seen the ends which it may be supposed to serve, there remains a surplusage of pain unaccounted for by our largest theory. It is this surplusage that forms the heart of the mystery of suffering. If there is any meaningless pain in the world, it cannot, surely, be the best of all possible worlds. How can a world crossed by such a wondrous sinister be the expression of wisdom, power, or goodness?

'The dilemma of Epicurus is still with us: if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then he is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if he has both the power and the will, whence then is evil?'

II. THE LEADING ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTION.—

1. Pessimism.—Frankly and definitely, suffering is so wide-spread and so intense that the verdict

of open-eyed and unprejudiced observers must be
that the world is an intolerable place to live in,
and that life is an unendurable burden.
The classical example of this solution of the problem of pain
is to be found in the history of Buddhism, where
the Buddha's "Four Noble Truths" — pain, the origin
of pain, pain's destruction, and the eightfold holy way
—are the first three of the four noble truths. The first concerns
the result of direct observation. Suffering prevails. Life is
worthless; illness, old age, and death manifest this universal wretched-
ness to its source in 'thirst,' the desire which attaches the soul
to worldly objects and leads to 'becoming' — an infinite series of
suffering, containing a careful account of the steps by which
the extinction of desire is to be accomplished. Among these
means is the 'wisdom'; and Buddhism ethic has a mild lustre
of its own. The crows of the procedure, however, is contempla-
tion. Schopenhauer's "path" includes art, but otherwise is
scarcely an improvement upon Buddha's. The issue for both
is the same—the cessation of desire, the abandonment of the
will to live.
To discuss the philosophy of pessimism (p.v.),
would be wasted labour. The Buddhist psy-
chology, with its rigidly optimistic sensationalism,
has no parallel to the school's. Schopenhauer's
dependence on Kant does not give his system commanding authority. The real strength of
pessimism, or the final demonstration of its weak-
ness, may be sought in the two 'Noble Truths'—
the empirical method. The first question to be
asked is as to the validity of this method and as to the
certainty of the first 'Noble Truth' regarding the
existence of it. Can the wortlessness of
life be established by any enumeration of details?
The question is not as to the possibility of balanc-
ing the pessimist's instances by others of a more
wholesome nature. Optimism cannot be established
by such means. The real question is as to the
method itself. The pessimist inference from the
facts of pain is not really drawn by more generaliza-
tion. It rests on a preconceived theory of values,
by which all the facts of life are tested. Pessimism
is simply disappointed hedonism. If the highest
good is pleasure, life is certainly not worth living,
for pleasure in any guise is not to be had, on any
terms whatever, in human existence, to such a
degree as to counterbalance the damming facts of
pain. If the Creator was bound to secure for His
creation a supernatural happiness, He certainly has
failed to do so. His power has not been equal to
His good intentions. If He exists, we must
conceive of Him as exult in omnipotence, or even
chance as sovereign, however, it is of all
ethical theories the most precarious. If appeal
be made to experts in living, the answer will be
returned that happiness is not the chief good for
man and cannot be conceived as the chief end of
creation. That place of eminence belongs to moral
goodness.
Our question as to the world, accordingly, must be
Is it as framed and ordered that moral good-
ness is being wrought out therein, not merely in
spite of, but actually by means of, the suffering
that is to be found in all human life? It is to be
observed, however, that the answer might be
enough to refute pessimism, and yet leave a crux
for theism. We might be quite convinced that
virtue is the highest good for man, and we might
venerate the pessimists. Yet virtue grows to its
maturity through the discipline of pain; still, if
there remains a margin of suffering that bears no
relation at all to character and cannot be related to
the happiness of the individual soul, there remains
open to doubt. It may even become necessary to maintain
that optimism cannot be established by argument, at all,
and that thelem is warranted by some other process than that of
logical demonstration. In that case the challenge
of suffering may be met; but not otherwise. After
we have refuted a theoretic pessimism, we have to
recognize the fact of pain. Before one irrelevant
pang our best thought is engaged, and there is
nothing to say. Our speech would be a worse
irrelevancy.
2. Stoicism. — Another answer to the challenge of
suffering is to accept it, and while pain is real
and may be very acute, it is one of those indifferent
things which a wise and strong man may neglect,
not allowing it to disturb him in any way. The
Stoic philosophy is the elaboration of this answer,
by means of a full apparatus of metaphysic, psy-
chology, and ethic. Stoicism, however, is more
than a philosophic theory. It is an attitude to
life. It reappears in no other condition; when the
insistent evils and disorders of the world drive men
to the inner region of their own souls, to find there
a refuge nowhere else discoverable. The circum-
stances under which classical Stoicism was most
familiar. It was an age of individualism. No relief
or satisfaction could be found in any form
of life open to man in the world of that day. Men
could not go into the world and find a part
of their own moral nature. They could not lose
themselves in the activities of city or nation and
in the very process of such devotion achieve their
own highest welfare. And this for two reasons:
no city or nation was left standing in its independ-
ence; and the soul of man had grown so great
in its needs and capacities that it could no longer be
satisfied within the limits of external activities, however
intense and vivid these might be. Man had discovered himself. He knew now
that nothing less than the universe would meet his
need and afford a satisfying life. Here, then, is
the Stoic gospel. Here, in this aspect, optimism.
It believes in a principle which underlies all phen-
omena and is moving through all events to com-
plete victory. This principle is the life of all that
is, both within man and beyond him. It is a
principle of reason and of harmony. It is inher-
ently good; and its supremacy is the highest
welfare of the world and of man. The ethical
ideal for man is to be in harmony with his
nature or with reason; or, speaking religiously,
it is harmony with the will of God. The ancient
Stoic doctrine of providence has the fervor of
intense religious conviction. It is the teaching
that such a glowing optimism should have
any room for a theorethic acknowledgment of the
facts of pain and evil. It is to be noted, however,
that the ultimate reason has been reached in
Stoicism too easily. It is, after all, a negation of
the vast and confusing facts of a miserable and
perplexing experience. It is the bare affirmation
of an abstract principle which ought to be the
truth of all things and, in point of fact, is repro-
duced in scarcely any of them. Reason is every-
thing; and yet reason is nowhere. Stoic optimism
is a faith; but the Stoic estimate of facts is dark
and pessimistic. What, then, is man to do, poised
as he is between reason, which is his true nature,
and a world in which things and events are so irra-
tional! What attitude is he to take towards such
brute facts as hunger and cold, oppression and
oppression, cruelty, bereavement and grief? The Stoic
answer is serene and hard. The wise man will
choose reason. He will not miss his chance, for
choice brings him a good of which no power in
man or in things can rob him. He is in indefeas-
ible possession of the absolute best. His harmony
with reason sets him in a charmed circle, into
which nothing irrational and evil can ever enter. Pain racks his body; but he makes no complaint. Death robs him of wife or child; but they are not himself. Evil afflicts his friends; but that cannot invade the citadel of his own peace. We read the aporias and counsels of an Epicurean sage. Very specially so, as inhuman! It ought to be noted, however, that this attitude of complete detachment towards pain and evil is an advance upon a view such as Stoicism, which regards them as obstacles in the way of a perfect life. The Stoic they are not obstacles. The perfect life has simply nothing to do with them. The wise man will not court them; but he will not negotiate, nor even to disturb his serenity. He will make their occurrence in his experience the occasion of manifesting his consistency with reason. He will even benefit by their presence, insomuch as he believes them to serve as obstacles to his strength and enable him to gain a yet greater superiority over them. But, in themselves, they have no relation to his inner life, which is composed of other things, and bearing nothing to the nature of his being. Pain and evil serve no end of reason, and the supreme principle of the universe has no relation to them. Man, in union with that principle, has no duty to rebel against, as we act to something to which our reason and affection, but to refuse them the tribute of an emotion. It is not on these lines that the worth of life can be vindicated or an idealist construction of the universe be established. The Stoic conclusion is mere negation, abstraction, and emptiness. It is good only for defiance; but defiance is not victory over pain; and far less is it transmutation of evil into the norm of a greater good.

Yet is it good, even for defiance? Stoicism has too easily assumed that man can choose the reason of the universe and identify himself with it. A painful doubt develops on the point that man has not his own obstacle to his being identified with God? In abandoning all things finite and particular, will he not need also to surrender himself? Thus the axe is laid to the root of Stoic pride, and the Stoic supreme principle turns out to be a counsel of despair. In the might of my self I am to defy the world. But who am I? The very essence of finitude, the very scene of contrast with the reason which is the norm of the universe. My utmost willing, then, is weakness. Upon my resistance falls the doom of inaptitude and impotence. Victory is turned to defeat. Self-confidence is no longer possible; for self is the secret of failure. When Stoicism has reached this point, it is ready for a philosophy, or a religion, which shall start where it ended and make the condition of man's achievement the highest point of human self-assertion and his self-surrender. The challenge of suffering might now be met in a different way—not by resistance, but by acceptance. Pain might become, not an obstacle in the path of the perfect life, not even a thing indifferent to man's inner good, but the opportunity and the instrument of his death to self, and therefore, also, of his complete self-realization. Stoicism began with optimism and ended in man's self. It might be possible to reverse the process and to lean our optimism upon a deeper view of evil than an empirical pessimism had ever reached. Such a standpoint might be found in Epicurus. It might be possible to reverse the process and to lean our optimism upon a deeper view of evil than an empirical pessimism had ever reached.

3. Meliorism. A nobler answer to the challenge of suffering than that offered by Stoicism was very prevalent during the recent war. The world, it is admitted, is full of virulent evils and untold sufferings. These things are not to be explained. They are to be fought. They are not to be endured but as a temporary and transitory state of an almighty and sovereign Disposer of events. They are evil, and only evil, continually. Judged by the human conscience, they exist only to be resisted, resisted with the utmost strength of the spirit, and so they are. They are a challenge to love, sympathy, honour, to be met by sacrifice, by service, and above all by unending war. All intelligences are summoned to take part in this war for peace, this struggle for the abolition of suffering. Among the hosts engaged in this life-and-death conflict some individuals, both man and superman, occupy the position of leadership, as in strategy as in the actual fighting. Commander-in-chief of this army is God. He is not what absolutism, or orthodoxy theism, has conceived Him to be. He is not the ineradicable ground of all beings, the omnipotent and omniscient mind by whose unalterable decree all things in creation are predetermined. He is a finite being, though of course His resources both in power and in wisdom are far more than ours. He is in this fight, which is no shadowy and spectral combat, but is for Him as for man tragically real, a genuine life or death struggle. We can indeed scarcely imagine His being detached or in any way from our own, but He has not yet won. Nay, He cannot win unless He secure the cooperation of man. In this tremendous conflict human beings cannot be neutral. If they are not for Him, they are against Him, slackers, traitors, or open enemies. He sends out a great call for volunteers; and all who have a spark of generosity or heroism will rally to His side. They will fight with the splendid courage which comes from sympathy with the oppressed and tortured everywhere, and with the desperate energy of those who see the issue plainly. They are fighting for their all, for the very life of humanity, and humanity's radiant and high-souled Leader. Every rookery pulled down, every disease routed, every social wrong redressed, is a battle won in the long campaign, a stage to the final, allcomprehensive victory. The heroism of our age is being eliminated. Progress is being made. The end, if not in sight, is reasonably secure.

But the practical value of meliorism must rest ultimately on the validity of its presuppositions. If these are invalid, their results cannot be permanent. Now the presuppositions of meliorism are mainly three: (1) the universe is conceived as growing in time, its life is strictly speaking unpredictable; (2) God Himself is avowedly a finite being, in time, sometimes described even as 'young,' with a future before Him in which He has still to make good; (3) the conflict is, in the nature of the case, uncertain, though every successive victory and the inexhaustible resources of intelligences, human and superhuman, give ground for hope that in the end the conflict will be ended. All these presuppositions are disputable. Not one of them has won universal consent. Together they constitute a huge hypothesis. It regarded as more than the mere sheer dogmatism; and dogmatism are but 'iron ration's' at best, and are soon exhausted.

The error both of Stoicism and of meliorism lies in trying to turn what is partial into an absolute. Because a man is summoned to oppose the evil that is in the world with all his might, it is supposed that he can 'carry on' till the victory is his. Suppose, however, that this rough dualism between the good man and the wicked world does not represent the real situation. Suppose that the real source of evil is not without, but within, and that
the conflict that is being waged in the world is the image and the outcome of a moral struggle for that which man's nature demands. Then the result will be, as happened in the history of Stoicism, that self must give up its self-sufficiency and must seek the true and the good, not by self-assertion, but by self-denial, and in the admission of virtue and knowledge the disclosure and the communication of one who includes the universe in His consciousness and His control. Then the fighter may carry on without anxiety and without self-confidence, because the victory has been won already; not by himself, but by the Power which is working in him, whose servant and vehicle he is. The end of such a war is a certain victory, though it can be reached only through a sacrificial ministry.

It ought to be added that melliorism makes no pretention of being a philosophy of life. It is a moral theory, and it is not even a moral theory of a very good sort. It would be tempting to say to the sufferers. His pain is utterly irreducible. Pain necessarily belongs to the finite. As long as he exists he must suffer; and in his suffering process, he will have ceased to be. Pantheistic optimism is thus pessimistic in its estimate of life. (2) If evil is an illusion, because it is finite, so must good be also, for it too is finite. Good and evil are, in fact, meaningless. For the Absolute they do not exist. Optimism and pessimism, accordingly, are philosophies of the unreal, and are in the strictest sense alike, not contrary. This treatment of the problem of pain is due to the error which turns the unity of thought against the manifold of experience and regards the universe as the only real, while the particular is condemned as the illusory.

The philosophy of Leibniz has been dealt with in this Encyclopaedia* and needs no further exposition here. Leibniz stands at the opposite pole from pantheism, yet he, like many to whom his own ruling principle of thought constantly leads him. The principle of sufficient reason, as he interprets it, is the same as that of identity and contradiction. Advancing from the seemingly perfect explication of the principle of identity is the highest principle of truth. All appearance of difference is mere illusory, due to the disability of a finite consciousness. From this point of view man’s own soul has only to be solved; but the solution is purely pantheistic.

The criticism of Hume, and the yet more destructive work of Kant, have made the dominance of an abstract Absolute impossible for modern thought. The principle of freedom is too strongly entrenched in the convictions of men ever to be relegated to the sphere of the negative and the illusory. This may make a pantheist think that man's problem can no longer take the position of pantheism, and so affirm the soli reality of good as to destroy the possibility of evil. Its proof must now consist in arguing that evil is inseparable from the highest good in this sense, that the highest good is attainable only through the conquest of evil. This argument consists fundamentally in a special reading of the facts of human life. It may be presented as a deduction from an idealistic philosophy, or it may appear as an induction from data empirically reached. Fundamentally it is a judgment of value, as intuition of the significance of life, and is not reached by either the a priori or the a posteriori method.

There is no evil except for a rational being, who is capable of willing a good which he identifies with the absolute good, but who is always constrained by the inferiority of his own life to will a lesser good. The possibility of willing this lower good is inseparable from the existence of rational subjects, who only come to an understanding of the goodness of the higher through experience of the lower. It is just as high a duty to will evil as to will good. There is in man a power by which it makes ineffectual how there should be a universe, containing beings who realize what is the meaning of their own life and of the whole, unless these beings pass through the lost and painful process by which the absolutely good is revealed as that which can overcome the deepest depths of their nature.

Watson, from whom these words are quoted, develops them into a view of human life and history which shows that, the higher the conception of the good, the deeper will be the insight into evil. The man who knows himself a sinner knows that no sin is alien to him. He is the supreme sinner of the universe, the chief of sinners; and in the act in which he confesses and dies to his sin the violated order is rectified; and the guilt which he so profoundly acknowledges is lifted to the shoulders of Another, and he is free for ever. Watson does not in this passage explicitly apply this principle to the conception of an absolute good, as indicated through a deeper pessimism than Buddha or Schopenhauer ever knew, to the pangs of nature and the physical woes of men. Plainly, however, the one principle is the same. The evil man can suffer is the division within his own spirit. Let his breach with the Absolute be healed, and his breach with nature cannot fail to be healed likewise. The truth of nature is spirit. If the unity of spirit rise triumphant above the dualism that a false assertion of freedom has wrought, there can be left nowhere in the universe any element of difference, and therefore of evil, which is not in process of being transcended in the realization of the ultimate good.

Many writers who do not adhere to Watson's type of idealism base their ethical view of the universe on the facts which he emphasizes. The world was certainly not framed to produce the pleasure of all sentient creatures or the happiness of human beings. The highest good is moral good, and moral good can be attained by man only through a process of discipline. A world which made goodness easy would make true goodness impossible. By work, by suffering, and by temptation, human character is perfected. The theistic and optimistic inference is more securely drawn from a world with imperfections, in conflict with which character is ripened. If this were not the case, neither physical nor moral evil was present. It is possible to believe that the Cretser of such a

* See art. LEIBNIZ and PANTEISM AND OPTIMISM.

world is good and wise and almighty, whereas such a faith would be valueless if the world were a machine for turning out a bad result. This does not mean, of course, that for every pain we suffer we can allege a moral purpose. Physical suffering comes to us through our place in a cosmic order whose laws are beyond our comprehension, and may which may be delayed, but which stands in no reasonable doubt. One difficulty lies in the path of such modest optimism, viz. the fate of the individual. Most upholders of the idea of personal immortality. It is granted that the general optimistic estimate requires that there shall be a balance of good for the individual as well as for the race, in the long run, and by any theory of the causes of pain, not more link in a chain. But in the vast majority of individuals this balance is not struck within time and space. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate another sphere, in which the wrongs and misfortunes of this world shall be rectified and their memory lost in the realization of perfect good.

An argument such as this, which turns upon the highest good, moral worth, and the function of pain in realizing it in the history of individuals and of the race, is intellectually unanswerable. The conclusion of the whole matter is:

All's right with the world!

That is to be noted, however, that, when we have solved the problem of pain, from the point of view of the apologist, suffering still remains a mystery for the sufferers. No amount of arguments can alter their perception of their experience. Their pain cannot be transmuted into joy by telling them that, in the final result, there will be for them a preponderance of good. They will continue to suffer, and before their anguish sinks back ashamed. They need to be introduced to the experience of a suffering within which they are comprehended and of a good through which their is guaranteed.

Optimism must submit to the test of fact. The fact in this case is pain; and pain is insusceptible by a process of reasoning. Over against every phase of the argument stands the intractable pain, or, rather, there stands the piteous army of the sufferers. Optimism appears satisfactory only when we stand back from the facts, in the midst of them, and our philosophy is smitten into silence. A world, with pain in it—and such pain!—cannot be the best of all possible worlds.

Of course, Omar Khayyum's aspiration is ridiculous. We cannot 'great this sorry scheme of things entire,' cannot 'tabor and toil' and 'remold linears into the desired shape.' None the less, we turn from the fact that the optimist can say to the patient suffering, 'Is it all worth while?' and the patient answers 'Things' in it are conscious of a lamentable gap. The key does not fit the lock. Suffering remains a mystery and a challenge to thought.

5. The Christian doctrine of providence. It cannot be doubted that Jesus had the whole fact of pain present to His mind. He lived in the midst of pain. He never presented itself to Him as a problem. Certainly He made no explicit reference to the questions with which Job wrestled. His compassion flowed forth unhindered by any suspicion of the causes of pain. He never viewed suffering as other than a great evil. He devoted a large part of His ministry to its alleviation. But He never stood before it confounded or puzzled. He counted the cost of persecution to the apostle, He never replied by argument. He lived in unbroken communion with God, and faced all the problems of life from that position of perfect acquaintance. He knew God. He knew that God's love gathers into its compass all the suffering of man and of the whole sentient creation. The good will of a God whom He knew as the Father cannot be doubted. He knew love can be not doubted. In this faith Jesus lived and died. He revealed to men its divine object, and gave them the verification of experience. Christianity is an experience of pain is part of the life hid with Christ in God. Its secret is an experience.
SUFFERING

physical evil before it has dealt with the graver problem of sin. It presses on to the tremendous fact of breach with God, confident that, if that has been met and healed, no other discord can remain final and unredressed. 2) Physical evil is a small part of pain which permeates throughout the universe. In spite of this parallelism, however, Christianity and idealism stand apart. Christianity is an idealism, no doubt. But idealism is not Christianity.

The vital question for both is the reconciliation of man and God. How is it achieved? Idealism answers, in an idea. Christianity ventures its all on an historic fact. Idealism parades the consciousness of guilt and declares that there already is the reconciliation. The consciousness of guilt is possible only to a soul fundamentally at one with God. In awaking to a sense of guilt man knew himself reconciled at once to God and the universe. The spiritual unity is gained; the union of all experience is thereby guaranteed. Christianity deepens the diagnosis and makes the cause within man. In man man has the universe against him. It reacts to his sin in perpetual judgment, registering in his character and his career, in loss and defeat and pain, the consequences which man’s attack upon the universal order has brought upon him. This automatic reaction does not stand apart from the will of God. It reflects one aspect of the divine mind regarding sin and suffering, one part of the divine dealing with it. But sin is not the ultimate reality of the moral world; and judgment is not the whole mind and will of God. The ultimate in God and in the universe is love. The reconciliation is accomplished not in an idea, but in the action of God. The love of God goes into action coincidently with the sin of man. It is true that God’s experience of time must differ from ours in a manner necessarily inconceivable by us; so that it is not improper to speak of an eternal act of love and an eternal atonement. But the standpoint of Christianity is definitely historical. Sin is not a sick soul that bears the marks of the disease. Bearing is in time also. Love can reconcile the world to God only if it pass to the world’s side and in the world realize experimentally the whole meaning of sin. It must enter into the life of humanity in an experience more tragic than any penitent sinner ever passed through. ‘Christ died for our sins’ (1 Co 15:3). It is the first, the only, Christian gospel. In the account of the passion of a life crowned by the Cross, Christ is not another than God. He is God, in a temporal experience, manifesting an eternal fact. Love has gone to the utmost limit of sin and suffering and has returned bearing the fruits of that unimaginable agony in a world reconciled, mankind redeemed, sin and evil judged, exposed, broken. The fact of sin—that is pessimism. The fact of Christ—that is optimism. Christianity confronts the world of sin and suffering with the deeper suffering of divines sin-bearing love. All else that it has to say is an inference from that fundamental fact. Its doctrine of providence consists in developing the significance of that fact for the varied discipline of life.

'The Christian faith in providence is an immediate inference from the Christian experience of redemption, and it is an inference from a vast and unqualified as the redeeming love on which it is centred.'

To be reconciled to God is to be reconciled to life. To be at one with God is to be at home in the universe. The reactions of the order without which the universe would not now live in harmony set like a tide toward our perfecting. *All things work together for good to them that love God.* Love has taken the place of fate. Possessing it and being possessed by it, we possess all things. We cross every chaos, even the ultimate gulf of death, and find ourselves still in a region where love is king.

The NT is a lyric; but it is not a freak of poetic fancy. It is the song of a victory won, the record of an experience, not the less reliable that it is amazing, an inference which is strictly logical, from the greater to the less, though it surpass all calculation. 'He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for all us, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?' (Ro 8:32).

(b) The Christian attitude towards suffering.—

(1) Pain means obstruction of life. It is essentially evil. It is not the intention of God that any of His sentient creatures should suffer. It is not possible to say to every sufferer, 'God sent you this; He has laid this affliction upon you.' This judgment upon suffering as evil will be assailed from many points of view, scientific, ethical, and religious. Suffering, it will be said, is inevitable, as an element in the evolution of the world. It was experienced by innumerable sentient creatures milleniums before a different plan of life was contrived. Before the first sin was committed, before the first pain was suffered, suffering, it will be argued, is a splendid moral discipline. It is, therefore, a good, of which no man can complain but which he is called upon to endure. In this connection it is necessary to reply that the Author and Object of Christian faith, the Revealer and the Organ of the infinite love, did not think so. He steadfastly set Himself to reduce the pain of His creatures. So far as we know, He never met a case of pain which He did not relieve, if the conditions were present for His doing so. In such action He Himself suffered exceedingly. He was once tempted in all points as we are, but He was in no wise tempted. 'His anger was against His own sin; and He suffered such suffering to be necessary to the fulfillment of His redeeming vocation (Mr 4:27). But His doing so cannot be construed as an approval of pain. Rather was it a judgment upon pain as an evil to be removed at any cost of pain. This judgment, moreover, was not an implicit hedonism. It would be ridiculous to make such a suggestion regarding the teaching of Jesus. He never taught that it was a primary concern of God’s love to keep His creatures immune from suffering. He absolutely denied that the crown of life was pleasure. But this is not to say that He regarded the condition of the world as abysmal. He occupied a new and higher view of the religious mind of Israel in looking upon the world as standing in intimate and vital relation with human life. There is a strict relevance between these two. If there be evil in man, there will be pain in nature. Nature stands so near to spirit that it thrills responsive to the breach that sin has wrought between the human spirit and the divine. Paul is enlisting the same idea inherited from the OT, and reinterpreted through the death and resurrection of the Redeemer, when He speaks of the ‘sighing of creation,’ of its subjection to present suffering and its share in the hope of redemption (Ro 8:19). There is suffering in nature; and there is suffering in man as part of nature. And all suffering— in nature or in little children, in the exodus and illustration of that which, in self-conscious and self-destructing man, is sin. Dogmatism regarding the origin of sin and suffering is forbidden. To appeal to predestination for a theory is to bring the Eternal within the limits of time. We have no need to appeal to origins. We have to do only with meanings and values. And this is the meaning which Christianity puts on pain. It means intensely; and it means evil. The first thing to be done with it is
not to discuss it or apologize for it, but to relieve it, if possible, and at least administer the healing of sympathy which it demands. And this, thanks be to Christianity with respect to pain: it is not God's will for His creatures that they should suffer; it is His will that pain shall be abolished from His universe by the ultimate victory of the Cross. 

(2) Pain is not an unanswerable challenge to theism. It is not inconsistent with the supremacy of love. Love has won an eternal victory in an event which occurs repeatedly in the history of the Church. Pain has finished its victorious battle. It has transmitted the foulest crime of man into the instrument of the divine redemption. It has done this greatest thing. How and in what order? He who redeems from sin will not be baffled by suffering. It is to be noted carefully that Christian thought, in claiming that God is not hindered by the existence of pain, is not passing from ethical to non-ethical considerations, giving up love to take up power. What Christian experience finds in the Cross of Christ is not an event which is done with, like the punishment of the Greek conception of the absolute. It is the historic revelation of that which is in essence timeless, and endures through all time, and triumphs in all history, viz., the atoning and victorious Cross. This is the supreme revelation of the divine immannence. God is present in all pain. He suffers in all suffering. He is the chief sufferer in the world. 

Theology has never done anything but guard against the surest afflication of faith: 'In all their affliction he was afflicted.' The incarnation of God in Christ is the deepest truth of the divine relation to the world. Nicene orthodoxy is not orthodoxy by definition. Mishto, and to the Greek conception of the Absolute, it ascribes divinity to One who, nevertheless, has an experience of which God is incapable. But the God whom faith finds in Christ is the God of all. He is present in all that sin has wrought, and His suffering is the redemption of the world. Christianity meets the challenge of pain, not by anxious computations of the amount of good which may be extracted from the agonies that fill the records of time, but by the unveiling of the suffering of God. The Cross is the only Christian apologetic. Only through the suffering of God is it tolerable to suffer. Since the very nature of God is to be revealed in His pain in it is His world, reconciled to Him, and carrying within its tragic history the energy of omnipotent redeeming love. We time-determined consciousness-segregates experience, but we know Him with an estimate that is sure and pierces the inevitable mists of time. God is love. This we know. For the rest we can afford to wait.

(3) Christianity sets out in the name and in the same order: He who redeems from sin will not be baffled by suffering. It is to be noted carefully that Christian thought, in claiming that God is not hindered by the existence of pain, is not passing from ethical to non-ethical considerations, giving up love to take up power. What Christian experience finds in the Cross of Christ is not an event which is done with, like the punishment of the Greek conception of the absolute. It is the historic revelation of that which is in essence timeless, and endures through all time, and triumphs in all history, viz., the atoning and victorious Cross. This is the supreme revelation of the divine immannence. God is present in all pain. He suffers in all suffering. He is the chief sufferer in the world. 

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The primary task of suffering is to open the way to the victory. 

Three lines of action are prescribed by the consciousness of redemption. (1) The employment of pain. It is here that optimism is most at home, but it is not the answer to the suffering challenge to pain. It is absolutely true that in a sinful world the perfecting of love is wrought through suffering. We are to meet the suffering as we endure, and so make them subservient to the development of moral stature. We are bound to accept and earn in this subject of pain the opportunity of an employing it passes with the passing moment. We are to bear the thoughts which find expression in Ugo Fosca's 'Sermon in the Hospital':

1 While we suffer, let us set our souls To suffer perfectly: since this alone, The suffering, which is this world's special grace, May have been rendered to us.

All this is to be accepted, rejoiced in, and practised. The only reservation to be made is that such considerations of pain do not vitiate optimism as a theory. The data are not broad enough. The victory over pain must first be won before specific sufferers can be attacked to diminish or eradicate their suffering. This is the paradoxe of the higher life of man. Apart from this sure hope of a significant life, widespread indifference to pain in nature and history would rout the most confident optimists.

(6) The mastery of conditions. This is the sphere of organized ministry. All such service, whether operated by idealists or materialists, Christians or non-Christians, proceeds on the supposition that the conditions of human life are abnormal, and that, before full vigorous life can be enjoyed, these conditions must be improved. Another presupposition, however, has to be made if such ministerial aid to sufferers is to be completely successful, and is to be rendered, not merely with skill and fidelity, but with the energy of perfect confidence. We must be certified that in rendering such help we have the universe on our side, that resident within it are forces capable of carrying sentient creatures to such complete and harmonious existence of action as shall be a perfect victory over pain. No alteration of conditions will be of any avail in social service or in medical work, unless there is this assurance of energy, which may come to us either through these channels. Apart from this, we shall not escape the verdict of pessimism on our most abundant efforts. Many will appeal to 'Nature'; but Christianity knows nothing of personified abstractions. It goes deep into experience, and finds the living God in the phenomenon of suffering, and perceiving the energy of His Spirit through channels of human ministry. Such an experience of the Great Physician is an inescapable obligation of combating pain of every kind, wherever it shows its desolating presence. The Christian worker, without question, is in the minority, at all of any creed, or none, who will do this work and become conscious or unconscious instruments of love, suffering and victory.

(6) The direct exhibition of the ultimate care of pain, viz., the love of God in Christ. This is not an act of unreasoning emotionalism. It is sober fact, verified in innumerable instances; God's love does heal pain. If the love of God were regnant in all human life, if each soul's pain were at leastGattan to the hope that, if there were no pain whatever to be endured, would remain? This is not an abstract speculation; it is a conception which our Other answer is artituated by the fact that the human soul is as real and yet is absolutely sure, and admits of boundless practical application. We must make thorough work of the physicality of solidarity. Soul and body, external and internal, race and race, humanity and nature: the universe is organic to the core. It lives from the centre. By the lines of solidarity pain has penetrated to the last filament of the vast web of life. By the same lines of solidarity the healing of pain will go spreading through the entire creation which now walks with eager longing for the revelation of the sons of God. Man's part in this comprehensive conquest of pain corresponds to his place and function in the world. In him the meaning and value of the world are concomitantly apprehended and stirred. By him too they have been grievously mistaken, and the forces which should have filled the world with the peace and joy of functions manfully combined and perfectly fulfilled were hindered, and the world of man and nature has been put to illimitable torture. It is merited when a man sees in the pain of innocent children, of wronged womanhood, and even of the creatures beneath our rank, the sign and seal of his own sin, the issue of his mighty evil in which he is contemned. It is the simple truth. Therefore man has special work to do in the healing of pain. He has to receive the healing love which love can bestow on his own hurt experience, allowing it unhindered exercise as he is reconciled to God and to life. He has to become the conscious organ of that healing to all who suffer. He is never to inflict pain except in so far as pain, in the conditions under which we live, (themselves abnormal), is the instrument of moral or physical benefit. He is to be ceaselessly the channel of the love of God to mankind simply by his own Christian life. The union of man, one living in the divine love becomes source and centre of healing to the souls and bodies of all around. The evidence is mass of daily experience. Yet the power of love is not a bare physical force. It requires conscious appropriation and direction. Love that heals is not magic. It is effective as a vocation, accepted and fulfilled. The specific task of suffering is to open the way to the victory.
slow in its recognition of these evident duties—slower, and less confident, in respect of the second than of the first. Yet it is in prayer that the function of Christ in the deity we must center. 

By prayer man enters the sanctuary of the divine immannence. In prayer the indwelling love finds another home and eludes, a new centre from which to work. Prayer is the spiritual energy which is saving the world. Prayer provides God with the conditions without which an omnipotence that is moral, and not physical, dare not and cannot work. The question will be asked, Does this mean that any given pain can be relieved by prayer? The answer must be that dogmatism and prediction are forbidden by the organic structure of the universe. No man sins by himself or suffers by himself, and no man is redeemed for himself alone. It is impossible to cut a man out of the texture of his existence and operate on him as though he were an unrelated atom moving in empty space. We have no calculus by which to work out the measurements of the individual's sins and sufferings or to forecast the immediacy and completeness of his deliverance. An honest answer must not 'limit God.' He certainly does not fling about His powers, healing at haphazard. But with equal confidence we may affirm that His healing power is available beyond any measure in which use have permitted it to operate. The ordo salutis here is fixed and cannot be altered: first the reconciliation, then the healing; first the faith which commits itself totally to God in Christ, then the faith that refuses no gift of God. 

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The gift of the Spirit is not magical, and there is nothing stereotyped in the activities produced by them. It would be ridiculous to infer from the presence of a certain gift in the NT communities that it must be perpetual in the Church of all ages. The gifts were created for use. If the use ceased, the gift was withdrawn. But is it fair to regard healing as a sporadic and passing manifestation of the Spirit's presence? Healing of the world's pain is certainly part of the world's redemption. Is it proper to make a distinction here and say that we will have healing in the forgiveness of sins, but draw the line at the relief of pain? It may be that seers which we justly condemn for their absurd metaphysic and their ridiculous jargon, and for faults graver still, have such influence as belongs to them because they have been bold enough to rely on a healing power which belongs to the love that was, in Christ, the reconciliation of the world. It may be that the Church has to learn in this matter from those whom, quite justifiably, it has excluded from its fellowship. In any case, the conquest of pain is the work of omnipotent atoning love: and in prayer man co-operates with God in healing the hurt of humanity and of the world. 

Christian faith is more than conqueror of pain and can do much more for the sufferer than relieve him of his distress. Christianity teaches the transmutation of pain. Those who love God find that all things, pain included, work together for their good. As they go deeper into the experience of suffering, they make a still more wonderful discovery. In their pain they are not alone. They meet in that sequestered place Another, and He too is a sufferer. These two pains, theirs and His, draw together into the unity of one experience—He in them, and they in Him; their pain His. 

His pain theirs. This is not to escape from pain. It is to take out of pain the element which makes it an evil. When the self is surrendered to the power of the suffering, which is sin, that sin, is taken out of it. It becomes straightway part of a life-fellowship with redeeming love. It undergoes a complete transmutation. It has been taken up into the pain that is the price of the world's redemption. There is no question of diminishing the value of love's redeeming deed on the Cross of Christ. But the method of triumphant love, as we have already seen, is that of the method of Calvary. The sufferings of Christ rise like a tide in the souls of His people (Phil 3:20, Col 1:24). Their sufferings take on the quality of His. They are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear. We are not on that account less hard to bear.
not be, if the price paid were merely human pain. But within the human pain is hid the anguish of crucified love. It is part of 'the reproach of Christ.' Because the infinite love shares this pain, it is transcendent. It becomes part of the price which God pays. Nothing could apologize for, not any, nor benefit wrung from tortured bodies and slaughtered souls, if He merely looked on from a throne of omnipotence. But a God who suffers is immune to all such criticism and does not need our condescension.

The suffering of love has redeemed the world and has not lost its redeeming power. Confessedly, this is a faith, not a theory. It is not the less, but the more, sure on account of its unction. It is no precarious inference from insecure premises. Its premises are the love and suffering of God, revealed in the ministry and the Cross of Christ, and accepted by us as the condition of restoration of the human race. Faith is not an act finished in a spasm of emotion. It is the assumption of an attitude towards God and towards life, warranted and established by God's redeeming action. Faith, says a great Christian teacher, 'is the whole being and attitude of the soul as determined by the very essence of love in Christ. That love, and that love alone, evokes it, and on that love and that alone, it rests.' Therefore, Christian optimism is not a document which can be signed, sealed, and delivered to a suffering world to solve the whole problem of suffering. It is the outcome of an experience. Experience cannot be finished, gathered up, and put aside. It lives and grows from a centre. Those who will know the force of its demonstration must occupy the central standpoint. As that is reached in the act of self-commitment to the appeal of suffering love, it can be retained only in the continued action of communion with God. Faith in divine providence is not easy. Did any serious thinker ever imagine a state in which faith would rest on an argument? Faith is a post held in the midst of a furious attack which never ceases. It can be held only in prayer. Prayer is at once condition and co-operation with God. In both aspects it carries with it confirmation of faith. Without it faith withers and dies. As we live by receiving the divine love and by acting in the power of it, even to the last limit of love, the men who suffer reveals itself as still within the compass of a sovereign purpose which through pain is passing to its victory. And prayer is the consummation of the gift of the risen One, the inward and outward giving. Prayer, therefore, conveys the final proof of divine providence. In the prayer the darkness of suffering comes into the light of divine vision. Love is seen, no heart to pity. It is the privilege of creatures whose consciousness is other than human. It upholds those who are not conscious of its operations. Beneath their pain there is a divine experience of which they are part. Christ's love is withheld from pessimism, only because it holds for the profoundly the truth of the divine immanence. Only so is it withheld from blasphemy, as it beholds the agencies of the cruel world. Men suffer and find a cure in amazement. All the more earnestly does it lay upon those who have received the Divine consolations the duty of ministering to those who suffer. Their fulfillment of this duty consists in making themselves the vehicles of redeeming love. They have nothing of their own to give. The comfort they can give is simply the love that the world has accepted and is complete. God has no comfort to give if He is uncertain of victory. Love is triumphant over sin and suffering; therefore both sin and suffering will cease to be. The final divinity of Christianity to a suffering world is the promise of an immortal hope: 'There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away."

The derivation of the name ‘Sufi’ (Muhammadan mysticism) has long been a subject of dispute. Most Sufis favour the theory that it is derived from suf (‘purity’) and that the Sufi is one of the elect who have become purified from all worldly delusions. Others connect it with gaff (‘rank’), as though the Sufi were spiritually in the first rank in virtue of his communion with God; or with sufi (‘bend’), referring to the origin of Sufism from Arab sufi (‘people of the bench’), a title given to certain poor Muslims in the early days of Islam who had no house or lodging and therefore used to take shelter on the covered bench beside the mosque built by the Prophet at Medina. As Quashâr and other Sufis admit, none of these explanations is etymologically defensible. There is, however, an argument of the derivations proposed by the Sufis themselves which does not dispute the principles of etymology. The author of the oldest extant Arabic treatise on Sufism, Abû Naṣr al-Sarrânî, declares that in his opinion (which, naturally, is not based on philological grounds) the word ‘Sufi’ is derived from suf (‘woollen’), ‘for the woolen remnant is the habit of the prophets and the badge of the saints and elect, as appears in many traditions and narratives. Thus, we find among the famous remark of Sclager, “qod quidam Sofi a flocco lanae dictum nolunt, hos leuis est ipso flocco laene,’ it was perceived by some European Orientalists in the 18th century, that this derivation was what Relâke pronounced it to be—sola una et grammatico ipsum roque congrua. Meanwhile its claims to acceptance were challenged by Joseph von Hammer, who in his Gesch, der schönen Rede anat. Persiens, asserted that the Sûfis are related to the ancient gymnosophists of India and that the Arabic words Sûf? (mystic) and gâfî (pure) belong to the same root, like the Greek voxgós and ἡγήσις. This unlucky sentence might cast doubt on von Hammer’s competence as a philologist, but his suggested equation of ‘Sûfi’ with ἡγήσις was, at first sight, plausible enough. Although rejected by Tholuck, it has been championed in comparatively recent times by Adalbert Merx. In 1894 the question was finally settled by Th. Nöldeke, at that time Professor of Arabic in the University of Straßburg. He pointed out that the word ἡγήσις is unknown in Arabic and therefore could scarcely be expected to occur in Arabic. On the other hand, both Aramaic and Arabic had the words sôphrâh and sôphrâh, and in the latter language the s is represented by classifier (س), as is almost invariably the case in Greek words which have been Arabicized not by ṣâd (ص). If ‘Sûfi’ were of Greek extraction, its initial ṣâd would be at least abnormal. Further, we have no positive ground for regarding the derivation from ἡγήσις as probable in itself, whereas the derivation from suf is confirmed by tradition and is the more common. ‘Sûfism’ implies derivation from ‘Sûfi’, whereas the corresponding Arabic words tasawvur and ṣâfîr are collateral formations from suf, which is also the common root of both suf and suf. 2 Kûh al-Lumâ, ed. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1916, p. 90 f. 3 Timms, 540, 1911, note 1. 4 See Simm. 30 f. 5 See i.e. S. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik, 371. 6 ZDMG civ. [1891] 45 f.

The authority of Oriental tradition. Nöldeke then cites a number of passages showing that, in the first two centuries of Islam, garments of coarse wool were worn by the common people and especially by those who followed an ascetic way of life. The words i btâ 7-qâfi (‘the cloth himself in wool’), occur frequently in the early literature and signify that the person to whom they are applied has renounced the world and become an ascetic; at a later period, when asceticism passed into mysticism, lâbân 7-qâfi generally means ‘he became a Sîfâ.’ In Persia too the ascetic is often called muhâmâna, i.e. ‘wearing a woolen garment.’ The old Middle Persian, who clothed themselves in wool, borrowed this practice from Christian hermits or monks. When Hamâm b. Salâma († 902) came to Baṣra, he said to Farqad al-Basri, ‘He who appears in a woolen garment, ‘Put off this (emblem of) Christianity.’ Such garments are described as stâh al-arba’mân, ‘the dress of the Christian ascetics.’ A hadith pertains to the prophet states that Jesus Himself used to wear them.

We are told by Ja’âmī that the name ‘Sûfi’ was first borne by Abû Hashim of Kûfa, a contemporary of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwân. According to Quashâr, it came into usage before 318 H. (930 A.D.) Al-Sarrânî mentions the view that it was invented by the people of Baghdad. Although the circumstances of its origin are obscure, it seems to have gained currency during the period of transition from asceticism to mysticism, about the end of the 4th or 5th centuries, and may possibly mark some stage in that process. No weight can be attached to the apocryphal traditions which seek to prove that the appellation existed in the Prophet’s time or even throw it back into the pre-Islamic age. The Sûfis of the 3rd and 4th centuries, who claimed to be the true spiritual descendants of Muhammad, considered themselves fully justified in fabricating evidence in support of their assertion. So far as is known, no Sufi writer is aware, the first Arabic writer to use the word ‘Sûfi’ is Ja’âmî of Baṣra († 902), who refers to the Sûfis amongst the pious (al-Sûfîn mina l-musulûn) and enumerates the names of several who were famous for their seclusion.

In the present article the terms ‘Sûfi’ and ‘Sûfism’ are to be understood in their ordinary sense, viz. as equivalent to ‘Muhammadan mysticism’ and ‘Muhammadan mysticism.’ Ancient Sûfism, however, had strong ascetic tendencies, while the mystical element might be insignificant; and there have always been Sûfis of an ascetic and devotional type whom we should hesitate to describe as mystics in the proper meaning of the word. In Persian and Turkish poetry ‘Sûfi’ sometimes bears the sense of ‘hypocritical poet’ or ‘dissolute free-thinker’ and may be used as a term of reproach by poets who are themselves Sûfîs of a different sort.

The Origin and early development. The beginnings of mysticism in Islam take us back to the great ascetic movement which arose, largely under Christian influence, during the 7th cent. A.D. This is reflected in the biographical works containing notices of eminent Sûfis, which include the names of many of those early ascetics. The movement, though extreme in certain directions, was mainly orthodox. It is characterized by
intense religious exaltation, an overwhelming consciousness of human frailty, boundless fear of God and the eternal punishment to His will. There was no organized monastic life, though some ascetics wandered to and fro accompanied by a few friends or held prayer-meetings in which they studied the Qur'an and discussed their spiritual experiences. But the ascetics have been described as an anti-trinitarian party who laid stress on the higher aspects of asceticism, regarding it as essentially an inward feeling, whereas the Syrians were more concerned with the external form.1 Hassan al-As'iri (q.v.) said that it consisted in humility and was not a matter of dress and food. Examination of what is involved in the first article of the Muslim creed called 'the belief in the oneness of Allah' and associate nothing with Allah—gradually led to the view that true asceticism is incompatible with any selfish desire, even with the desire to undergo the utmost privations and austerities for the sake of winning paradise, and that it must culminate in a disinterested love of God.2 Thus the old asceticism, rooted in fanatical exaggeration of religious observances, gave way to a doctrine which in the end threatened to make all observances unnecessary. But this consequence did not show itself immediately. The Sufis of the 2nd cent. were still orthodox Syriacs, they cultivated poverty, self-abasement, resignation. If they loved God, they feared Him more, and on the whole they were in a high religious position as we see from a picture which shows them at prayer side by side with Jews and Christians. They stood midway between asceticism and theosophy, or gnosticism. The word that best describes their attitude is 'quietism' (rifā').

Special mention may be made of Eshagh b. Adham, a prince from Balh, whose legend is connected with the story of Buddha. His name, Shaqiq, also of Balh, who developed the doctrine of 'trust in God' (hadhad). But those at Adham, a solitude woman who was born at Bagh and died at Jerusalem, and Ma'rūf al-Karkhi, a native of Bagh. The two last-named forebode the great and ethical mysticism which is characteristic of the succeeding age, although it may be doubted whether all the sayings and verses attributed to Baha’u’s subject of divine love are genuine. Ma’ruf is the author of the first recorded definition of Sufism, 'to grasp the verities and to renounce which is in the hands of God’s creatures.'

During the 3rd cent. Sufism enters decisively on a new course. The ascetic and quietistic spirit though still strong, is overcome by speculative and pantheistic tendencies which had hitherto remained in the background but now assert themselves with increasing boldness. Theism is the dominant and vital part which thus becomes play in the future development of Sufism, it is a mistake to identify their triumph with the origin of Sufism. Nor is it a mistake to describe them as an entirely foreign element which grew out of Sufism from outside and rapidly transformed it, so that all at once it became different in kind. The germs of Sufi pantheism are to be found in the Qur’an.

'The earth will be treading (kabīl) except the face (reality) of Allah,' says Abu Hamid in 'The Early Development of Mohammadanism', p. 187.

Certainly the Muslim mystics might have arrived independently at the conclusion that Allah is the only real being. He is conceivable that this notion may have come into Islam from outside; on the other hand, speculation on the doctrine of the divine unity appears sufficient to account for its development and indeed for its origin. Had there been no one, says the Koran, the heavens and the earth must have come to grief; but if any attempt be made to define the word God metaphorically, speculation quickly leads to the idea of a godhead like the truly existing or the necessarily existing; even with the former the difference between God and man is that the former is eternal, the latter transient. The relation between God and matter immediately suggests questions: Is matter independent of God, or not? The former proposition leads to pantheism, the latter only is consistent with real monothelism. If, then, God is not outside matter, He must be a whole being in itself; and the most thoughtful of the Sufis, accepting this conclusion, based on it a series of inferences from the basic doctrines of Islam as say that could have been evolved.3

Theoretically, there is no reason why the Sufis should not have reached their pantheistic goal in some such fashion as this, and probably they often did, although in most cases it was truth grasped intuitively from mystical experience rather than the result of philosophical reflexion. But, in seeking to explain how they advanced from quietism to pantheism, we are thrown on the assumption that they were wholly impervious to non-Islamic ideas. The influence of Christianity, Neo-Platonism, and Buddhism is undeniable. It was in the air and inevitably made itself felt. Of its extent and importance we have ample evidence, although the materials at our disposal seldom enable us to trace it out in detail. In short the new Sufism of the 3rd cent. in every period of its history, is the product of diverse forces working together—speculative developments of the Muhammedan monothestic code, Christian asceticism and pantheism, Greek and Indian philosophies. Until recently the problem has been attacked on the wrong lines. Many former investigators held the view that this great movement, which drew its birth from all classes and races in the Muslim empire, could be adequately explained by pointing to one definite source (e.g., the Vedanta or Neo-Platonism) or by formulating theories which are at best half-truths (e.g., that Sufism was a reaction of the Aryan mind against a Semitic religion forcibly imposed on it). It is now, the present writer thinks, recognized that, instead of searching in vain after a single cause, we must be content to study the various influences by which the Sufi doctrine was moulded, to place them in due order and connexion, and to distinguish as far as possible what was contributed by each. Various influences constitute the environment in which the doctrine developed, and among them are to be reckoned all political, social, and intellectual conditions which favoured the growth of mysticism, such as the devastating civil wars of the Umayyad period, the sceptical and rationalistic currents that ran strongly in the early Abbasid age, and particularly the bitter sectarianism and barren dogmatism of the ulama.

The main features in the evolution of Sufism in the 3rd cent. may be set forth as follows.

The older Sufis had sought to bring every word, act, and thought of their lives into harmony with the divine will—an ideal which expressed their conception of Allah as a transcendent personality, 'the Lord of created beings'; and which they attained by means of asceticism. This theory and practice naturally produced (1) the doctrine of divine love, which is the highest positive form of quietism, and (2) ecstasy, which is frequently a result, either involuntary or intentional, of ascetic exercises. Although the early Sufis were more or less orthodox, their relation to Islam being not unlike that of the medieval Spanish mystics to the Roman Catholic Church, a result of which the doctrine and ecstasy was bound to come into conflict with Islam sooner or later. Râbi’a declared that she had no

fear of hell or hope of paradise, and that she could not love the Prophet because her love of God absorbed her so entirely that neither love nor hate of anything in the world had any meaning for her. The barrier between Allah and His creatures was gradually broken down. The definition of divine unity (tawhid) became pantheistic; the unique presence of the deity, however, beyond human reach, was transformed into the real Being (al-Ilaq) revealed in all created things, the mystic’s true self, which he finds by losing his individual consciousness in ecstatic self-abandonment. This doctrine, however it may be disguised, is the essence of Sufism, and the historical circumstances of its origin justify the statement that it was at least partially derived from sources outside of Islam. Merx, indeed, seems to go too far when he calls it ‘Greek’ and connects it specifically with the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, though it is clear that it has been influenced both by them and by the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a Neo-Platonic treatise of which an Arabic version appeared before the end of the 3rd century. But at this epoch little can have been borrowed directly from books. What makes the influence of Hellenism certain is the fact that in Western Asia and Egypt the Sufi theosophy arose on a soil long saturated with Hellenistic culture, and some of its leading exponents were non-Arab Muslims belonging to the subject nationalities.¹

One example will suffice. The mystical knowledge of God possessed by the term *muwalad* or spiritual knowledge, i.e., immediate knowledge resulting from apocalyptic vision, is defined in this sense by several Sufis of the 3rd cent., but we owe the first important speculations on its nature to Dhu Thabit, a Persian of about 880 A.D., of whom his Persian biographer, Abū al-‘Abbas, says: *He is the head of this sect (the Sufis); they all descend from and are related to him.* That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; yet it shows the significance of the man. Now, Dhu Thabit na’īn was a Copt or Nubian by race; he is described as a philosopher and alchemist, i.e., a student of Greek wisdom; during his life he was regarded by many as a zainid (free-thinker). Here we have plain indications that, as soon as Islamic mysticism began to develop, it drew inspiration from the doctrine concerning ‘a godless or higher knowledge which can be taught with safety’—as Dhu Thabit also says—‘only to the “perfect” or “fully initiated.”’¹¹ While Dhu Thabit na’īn conceived the Sufi’s supreme experience as a super-intellectual God-given knowledge, peculiar to those who ‘see God with their hearts’ and ultimately involving complete unconformity (for no one knows God, the more he is lost in Him); he never makes use of the term *frukt*, which is associated with the mysticism of Mecca, especially with Bāyazīd, Abu Ḥazīm, and Bāyazīd of Sīlahr. This is best rendered by ‘passing-away;’ it may be applied to the disappearance of evil qualities or, in its pantheistic sense, to the fusion of the ego with the being of the whole individual self in union with God. Possibly the term was derived by Muslim mystics from a Coptic misconceived term quoted above, but in Eastern Persia where it first came into prominence, it must have been deeply colored by the Indian idea of *sākri*; the definition of *frukt* as the definition of *fana* as the definition of the moral state, and of the means by which the extinction of all passions and desires is brought about, agrees so exactly with the definition of *sākri* that Buddhist influence cannot be denied. As regards the pantheistic aspect of *fana,* the Vedanta and similar forms of Indian thought surely suggest themselves. Here again the lives and sayings of representative Sufis, in conjunction with other historical evidence, provide the only trustworthy clue. Bāyazīd was a native of Khurāsān. His grandfather was a Zoroastrian and his master in Sīlahr a Kūrd. He learned the mystical doctrine of *passing-away* (fana) in the divine unity from Abu ‘All of Sīlahr. He knew the Indian practice of ‘watching the breath’ (*prāna*) and described it as the Moslem’s ‘highest state.’¹³ The character of his pantheism is probably reflected in the utterances which his legend records, even if their authenticity may be questioned—for example,

¹ Idee und Grundlinien, p. 189.

¹ Many illustrations of the close parallelism existing between the Gnostic and Indian religious philosophy and those of early Sūfis will be found in the introduction to Bar Hebraeus’s *Book of the Dove,* tr. J. W. Wenzel, Leyden, 1910, p. xxii ff.


¹² *The Mystics of Islam,* p. 29.

¹¹ *The Mystics of Islam,* p. 16 ff.


¹ ‘I went from God to God, until they cried from me to me, “O Thou!”’

¹ ‘Verily, I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me. Glory to me! How great is my majesty!’

¹ Nothing is better for man than God; without aught, having no asceticism, no theory, no practice. When he is without all, he is with all.”

¹ ‘Creatures are subject to states, but the gnostic has no state, because his vessel is obliterated and his individuality (hidwan) pass away in the individuality of Another and his traces are effaced by Another’s traces.’

¹ At this time earnest Sūfis did not openly indulge in the language of ‘delegation.’

¹ The doctrine underlying it was esoteric, reserved for adepts in theosophy, who usually were more discreet than the Sufis about the necessity of keeping their mystical theories in close touch with the religion which they professed. Consequently the Qur’ān and the Sunna were proclaimed to be the standard to which and only speculation but also spiritual feelings and states must conform.

Let us now consider the methods whereby a reconciliation was effected and take a general survey of the relations existing between Sūfism and Islam.

3. The Law, the Path, and the Truth.—The Qur’ān contains a few passages from which it can fairly be argued that Muhammad was no more a mystic than any other prophet of the same or similar mystical order. That book as a whole is no better fitted than the Pentateuch to form the basis of a system of mysticism. Nevertheless, the Sufis, adopting the Shi‘ite principle of intellectual interpretation (*ta‘wil*), were able to prove to their own satisfaction that every verse and word of the sacred text hides treasures of meaning which it reveals to the elect and which flash upon the inward eye in moments of rapt meditation. So much being granted, one can imagine that it was easy to show Qur’ānic authority for any mystical doctrine which suited them. In this way the Sūfis saw that the Qur’ān was already the esoteric teaching of the Prophet communicated by him to his son-in-law, Ali b. Abī Ṭalib. From the same principle it follows that the Sufi interpretation of Islam admits an endless variety of divergent and even contradictory beliefs and practices, all of which *ex hypothesi* are equally valid in kind, though not in degree, since the meanings of the Qur’ān are in- finite and reveal themselves to each mystic in proportion to the spiritual capacity with which he is endowed. Hence the Sūfis are not a sect, and there is no uniform body of doctrine constituting what is called ‘Sūfism.’² The many-sidedness of the term is exemplified by the innumerable attempts made to define it.² Similarly, the attitude of the mystics to the various stages of the Muslim religious law depends on a subjective criterion. Some punctiliously fulfilled their ritual obligations, while at the same time they recognized that forms of worship have only a relative value in comparison with ‘the works of the heart,’ or are altogether worthless except as symbols of spiritual realities. To make the pilgrimage, e.g., is to journey away from sin; to put on the pilgrim’s garb (*ihrran*) is to cast off with one’s everyday clothes all sensual thoughts and feelings. This is a well-known doctrine of the Ismā‘īlīs, from whose the Sūfis seem to have borrowed it.² Others are anomalous, whether they be free-thinking and living dervishes, genuine mystics like the Ma‘āmī described by Ḥujwīrī,² who were the encouragement of the Sūfis to cease to identify a mystic’s conduct with that of an ascetic living in a bare cell for the mere sake of suffering, or whether they be free-thinking and living dervishes, genuine mystics like the Ma‘āmī described by Ḥujwīrī,² who were the encouragement of the Sūfis to cease to identify a mystic’s conduct with that of an ascetic living in a bare cell for the mere sake of suffering, or
morality in a phantom world. Many Sufis, however, insist that, normally at any rate, perfect realization of the Truth (haqiqat)—i.e., the consummation of mystical knowledge—requires not only complete observance withObscurity of the Law (sharift'at) but includes it as a facet or aspect of the whole. This view will be better explained if we give a brief account of its ethical and psychological bearings.

The Sufis regarded themselves as a peculiarly favored class, possessing an esoteric knowledge of the Qur'an and the apostolic traditions, and using technical expressions which no ordinary Muslim could understand. This fostered a feeling of brotherhood, and it was not long before traces of organization began to appear. Eminent mystics gathered round them groups of disciples (mawlā), first for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Sufis were teaching. The Path corresponded to the those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director, is a disciple (shahid) was looked upon with suspicion. The authority of the shahid was absolute. It lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Mujriyār mentions a three-years' probation.

The first year is devoted to the service of the people (i.e., the Sufis), the second year to service of God, and the third year to watching over his own heart. He can serve the people, only when he places himself in the rank of servants and all others in the rank of masters, i.e., he must regard all, without exception, as being better than himself and his heart as duty to serve all of them. He can serve God, only when he cuts off all his selfish interests relating either to the present or to the future life, and worships God for God's sake alone. . . . And he can watch over his heart, only when his thoughts are collected and every care is dismissed, so that in communion with God he guards his heart from the assaults of heedlessness.

On taking the vow of initiation, the novice was invested by his shahid with the khirga or murjagai, a garment made of pieces of cloth stitched together, which in later times superseded the wooden dress worn by the original Sufis. This ceremony marked his admission to the Sufi brotherhood. Occasionally a Sufi might be invested with two spiritual directors. This is called the Path of the twin masters. According to this view, the Path has no fixed and uniform character; its details are determined by the individuality of the teacher. The tarīqas of the dervish orders exemplify this divergence. Broadly speaking, the various purifications of mediaval Christian mysticism. Hunger, solitude, and silence are the chief weapons employed in the war against the flesh (nafs). The ascetic and the ethical life is reduced into a practice of the sentences (maqāmat), which the learner must traverse, making himself perfect in every one of them advancing to the next. They vary in number and order, but the first place is occupied by the most solemn (taqwa), i.e., turning away from sin towards God. The moral ideal of the Sufis is unsellishness, whether it take the form of renouncing worldly possessions (zāhl), or the practice of the sentences (maqāmat), or the war against the flesh (nafs), or the moral virtue in word and deed without regard for the good opinions of others, pate, piety, humility, charity, or trust in God and single-hearted devotion to His will. These are the fruits of the Path, but its true end is attained by means of the twin masters and by the strict observance of the Path which predisposes and prepares the disciple for ecstatic experiences. It may be that he will never reach that end; ecstasy is an incalculable gift of divine grace and cannot be striven for. But the Sufis had a method of their own for producing the state of mind in which ‘revelation’ of the unseen was most likely to occur. They called it dhikr (‘recollection’), set the highest value upon it, and deemed it the cornerstone of practical religion. The simplest form of dhikr is the continual repetition of the name Allah or of some short litany, accompanied with intense concentration on the subject of God. Concentration might be assisted by other means, such as flagellation and holding the breath, until the sense of personality gradually disappeared in a state of trance.

The first stage of dhikr is to forget self, and the last stage is the effacement of the thicket in the act of thought, without consciousness of thought, and such absorption in the object of thought as precludes return to the subject thereof. Consequent performances are divided into three stages, namely, the length of time introduced at an early date, and their demoralising effect on neophytes is noted by Hujwīrī. Such prayer-services, as is well known, play an important part in the ritual of the dervish orders.

A general view of Sufi psychology, so far as it bears on the ecstatic life, may be drawn from Qushairī or from the more systematic treatment of the subject by Ghazālī in the second half of his Ihya.

There are four nafs which, taken together, compose the sensual, spiritual, and intellectual nature of man: (1) nafs, the appetitive soul; (2) nafs, the spirit; (3) qabāl, the heart; (4) 'ulūd, the intelligence. The qabāl is the soul of the body and soul of the spirit. It is the seat of all evil and all good, and is wholly evil; its mortification by means of asceticism is the Sufi's holy war (jihād). The qabāl and the khalq (to which Qushairī adds the innān, the innards of the qabāl) are the proper organs of the mystical life and are not clearly distinguished from one another. Qabāl, as used by Sufis does not signify the heart of flesh, but 'a transcendentality' or non-material essence whereby the realities of all beings are perceived and reflected as a mirror. Hence the phrase euis coeur is also used in the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. But the power of the heart to perceive and reflect spiritual realities depends on its purity. It is veiled in greater or less degree by sense impressions—sin, egoism, book-reading, traditional faith, etc.: and, in proportion as these veils are removed, its vision of reality becomes more perfect. God alone can purify it, but the need for purification with the aid of the khalq is asserted by those Sufis who follow the Path and attach particular importance to the communion of reason with the spirit by means of meditation (ma'sūqīyat), by which the heart is purged of every evil except the knowledge of God. The 'soul' of the Path, which belong to the mystic's practical religion, are subordinate to the 'states' (shababīn), which belong to his inner life. The terms state and ecstatic denote a spiritual disposition or experience, which God causes to pass over the heart; it is not subject to human control, but comes and goes as God wills; usually it is transient, but it may abide permanently. The classification of the states is pairs of opposites —e.g., hope and fear, expansion and contraction, presence and absence—answers to psychological facts familiar to students of mysticism. Passively yielding to the divine influences which swing him to and fro in an ascending scale, the Sufi is 'the son of his time,' dominated by the 'states' in which he finds himself as the moments, oblivions of the past and thought of the future. The highest 'states' are ecstatic, and the term 'sufi' is often synonymous with ecstasy, though it had not this special sense originally.

Here we come back to the point at issue between Sufism and Islam. Through ecstasy the Sufi reaches the plane of the Truth (haqiqat), but is not one with God. The person thus enraptured is one with God. The person thus enraptured

2. Tadhkdīr al-mulūk, i. 131, 7.
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(majdhib) is a saint (wali); no further testimony is required, since the doctrine that a saint who violates the law is thereby shown to be an impostor applies only when the ecstatic fit has subsided. And in any case, it was argued, a divinely inspired man must not be judged by standards by which an ordinary man is judged; that, of course, would involve giving the Prophet a licence to violate the law. To whom a separate section is sometimes allotted in standard hagiographical works. In accordance with the theosophic character of Muslim saints, their miracles (muqaddas martyrdoms) are described, not as wrought by them, but as granted or manifested to them; and, while the higher Sufis declare that ‘reliance on miracles hinders the elect from penetrating to the inner shrine of the Elect, and that the greatest miracle is the substitution of a good quality for a bad one, the popular wali cannot, even if he wishes, avoid the reputation of being gifted with powers which Muslims call ‘extraordinary’ and Europeans ‘supernatural.’ The saints form an invisible hierarchy by which the order of the world is maintained. At their head stands the qudd (axis), under him interior godliness (fayd), activity (majdhab), send, abrid, adalat or bukhdala, etc.—the numbers of each class increasing in proportion to its distance from the qudd. Probably this idea was taken over by the Sufis from the Stoics and Imajalis.

The Sufi theory of ecstasy recognizes two aspects of the experience of oneness with God. These aspects are symbolized by such negative terms as jahd (a ‘throwing away’ from individuality), fayd (‘self-loss’), sidik (‘intoxication’), with their positive counterparts baqqa (‘abiding in God’), wasit (‘finding God’), and ash (‘sobriety’). In the controversy which arose as to the relative values of the ecstatic state and the subsequent return to consciousness it is easy to discern the same motives as ranged Sufis on opposite sides in regard to the question, Were they antinomian or not. From the standpoint of pure Sufism there is nothing beyond the supreme negation of self, when ‘the mortal disappears’ and religion no longer exists, but logic compels those Sufis who are more than nominal Muslims to set the life in God against and above the death to self, and to find the highest mystical experience in the state of conscious circaration which succeeds the moment of ecstasy.

*The full circle of deflection must comprehend both the inward and outward aspects of Deity—the One and the Many. the Truth and the Law. It is not enough to escape from all that is creaturely without entering into the eternal life of God the Creator as manifested in his works. To abide in God (baqqa), after having passed away from selfhood (fayd), is the mark of the Perfect Man, who not only journeys to God, i.e., passes from purity to unity, but in and with God, i.e., continuing in the imitative state, he returns with God to the phenomenal world from which he set out, and manifests unity in plurality. In this descent he brings down and displays the Truth to mankind while fulfilling the duties of the religious law. However, they may seem to clash with its letter. Still, a

1 Qur'an, xviii. 64-65.
and duality, as an external object. He brought forth from non-existence an object of His own, endowed with all His attributes and names. This divine image is Adam, in and by which the universe was created. It is clear that God is the ultimate source of all existence and that all things are dependent on Him. However, the absolute, in its essence, is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable for us; we must seek knowledge of it through His names and attributes. It is a substance with two accidents, eternity and omnipotence, and its unity is the source of the name and attributes.

The essence of God is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason.

An important school of Sufis, whose watchword is 'the unity of being' (wahdat al-wujūd or tawātūr), hold that reality is one, that all apparent multiplicity is a mode of unity, and that the phenomena of the world are the manifestation of the real. Their views may be illustrated by giving some account of a work entitled The Man perfect in Knowledge of the Last and First Things by Abū al-Karīm al-Jilī, a mystic of the thirteenth century A.D. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason. The essence of God is unknowable by human reason.

The simple essence, apart from qualities and relations, is called the darkness (al-andām). It develops consciousness by passing through three stages which modify its purity and simplicity. The first stage is oneness (huwa’idh), the second is ‘He-ness’ (humudh), the third is ‘I-ness’ (humudh). By this process of descent absolute being becomes the subject and object of all thought and reveals itself as divinity with distinctive attributes embracing the whole series of existence. While every appearance displays some attribute of reality, man is the microcosm in which all these attributes are united, and in him alone does the Absolute become conscious of itself in all its diverse aspects. This can only mean that the Absolute, having completely realized itself, becomes the medium of human nature, or, in mystical language, that God and man become one in the perfect man—the divinely rapt prophet or saint, who perceives the divine immutability as a mediator between man and God and corresponds with his metaphysical function as the unifying principle by which the opposed terms of reality and appearance are harmonized. Therefore the upward movement of the Absolute, from the sphere of manifestation to the unmanifested, and from the unmanifested back to the unmanifested, is the spiritual ascent and through the unitive experience of the soul; and so we have exchanged metaphysics for mysticism. Jilī recognizes three phases of this experience and runs parallel, as it were, to the three-headed or triune oneness. He-ness, I-ness—traversed by the Absolute in its descent to consciousness, viz. the illumination of the names, the illumination of the attributes, and the illumination of the essence. The perfect man is the final cause of creation, the preserver of the universe, the quūb ( ‘axis’ ) on which all the spheres of existence revolve. He is a copy made in the image of God—a type of the essence with its two correlated attributes, divinity and humanity. Hence his real nature is threefold, as Jilī expressly declares in the following verses:

"If you say that he is the essence to One, you are right; or if you say that it is Two, it is in fact Two; or if you say, ‘No, it is Three,’ you are right, for that is the real nature of man in truth.

"Coming from a Muslim, who identifies the absolutely perfect man with the prophet Muhammad, this Trinitarian doctrine is very remarkable; but we must remember that Jilī was greatly regarded as a great master of the Logos, the Light of God which existed before the creation of the world, and for the sake of which all things were made. The Logos is manifested in every age by the prophets and saints, who alone are actually perfect, though all men are potentially so.

Other Sufis enumerate five different planes of existence (haqadd al-khanam), which is the fully true. Being as it descends, and many adopt the Neoplatonic scheme of emanation.

The theory that all existence, thought, and action are really divine leads to consequences from which the Sufis do not shrink. In the first place, the universe must be essentially good. Even infidelity and sin are effects of the divine activity and belong to the divine perfection. Satan himself glorifies God, inasmuch as his disobedience is subordinate to the eternal will. Yet some attributes, i.e. some aspects in which God shows Himself, such as majesty and wrath, are relatively less perfect than others, such as benevolence and mercy. What men call evil is privation, not-being. In relation to the One, who has no opposite, it is nothing; it appears only in the phenomenon of dualism, where things are manifested as contraries. Similarly, all religious beliefs must be essentially true. God, as Ibn al-Arabi says, is not limited by any one creed.

To summarize Jilī once more: the different forms of worship result from the variety of names and attributes by which God reveals Himself in creation. Every name and attribute possesses its own characteristic effect; e.g. God is the true Guide (al-Haqq); but He is also the Middle (al-Mashīf), for the Qur’ān says: ‘Allah shall lead into the way of error.’ If one say of His names, which have remained inexpressible, His self-manifestation would not have been complete. Therefore he sees His prophets, in order that those who followed them might worship Him as the One who guides mankind to salvation, and that those who disobeyed them might worship Him as the One who leads mankind to destruction. He is the truth or essence of every belief. The Sufis worship the being who permeates each atom of the material world; dualists adore the Creator and creature in one; magians (fire-worshippers) in which all names and attributes pass away, just as fire destroys all natural properties and transmutes them to its own nature; those who deny the existence of a Creator really worship Him in respect of His He-ness, in which He is potentially real, but not actually creative. It follows that all men are saved in the last. But Jilī, as a mystic, is obliged to make distinctions.
The Sufis were poets who used the language of mysticism to express their spiritual insights. They believed that the path to God could be achieved through the cultivation of the heart and the inner life. This is evident in the following passage:

"The Sufi poet is not directly concerned with metaphysics. He believes his heart be wholly filled by the sublime conceptions of all-embracing Unity and all-conquering Love which form the real basis whereon all the rest is built. He has seen how the Truth is the one source of all existence, diffused throughout the universe through emanation after emanation; how the Primal Intelligence, itself rayaed out in turn the Primal Soul; how the Divine Names cast their light upon the darkness of god-being, each atom of which mirrors-like reflects one. He sees how the Adorable Attributes of the Truth are reflected in the existence of hell and the devils, and how the Beautiful Attributes are reflected in that of Paradise and the angels. He further sees how Min reflects all the Attributes, Awful and Beautiful alike, and is thus the Microcosm, summing up the universe in himself. He thus sees how it is the Truth alone that is acting through all things, and moreover how this action is a never-ceasing, never-passing process, every existent atom being each instant clothed with a fresh phenominal efflux radiated from the Primal Substance, Existent, Emanated, Emanated from the one uninterrupted line, even as an unbroken circle of fire is seen if a single spark shall be whirled quickly round. But the poet may not rest content with the mere perception of these high mysteries; indeed that very Love which has revealed them to him impels him to seek reunion with him.

God, as the poets conceive Him, is the eternal Beauty which by the necessity of its nature desires to be loved, manifests itself for the sake of love, and is the real object of all love. Even earthly love is a type of the love leading to reality. The soul, being divine in its essence, longs for union with that from which it is separated by the illusion of individuality, and this longing compels it to pass away from selfishness and to rise on the wings of ecstasy, is the only means whereby it can return to its original home. Love transcends into pure gold the base phenomenal glory of which every creature partakes. While reason is dualistic, love unites by transcending thought.

"He comes, a moon whose like the sky ne'er saw, awake or dreaming, crowned with eternal flame no food can lay. Lo, from the flux of thy love, Lord, my soul is swimming, Arid ruined all my body's house of clay!"
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Wherever Beauty dwells, such is its nature and its heritage. From Everlasting Beauty, which emerged from the eternal splendor of purity to shine upon the worlds, and all the souls which dwell therein.

Each speck of matter did He constitute a mirror, causing each one to reflect The beauty of His Visage. From the rose Flashed forth His beauty, and the nightingale, Baholding, loved madly. From that fire The candle drew the luster which beguiles The eyes. Beware I say not, "He is All-Beautiful, and We His lovers." Thou art but the glass, and His face confronting it, which causes Its image on the mirror. He is alone is manifest, and Thou in truth art but a shadow. Pure love, like beauty, coming but from Him Reveals itself in thee. If steadfastly Thou castest Pagoda, thou wilt at length perceive He is the mirror also; He alone. The Treasure and the Casket. "I" and "Thou" Have here no place, and are but phantasies.

Love is the essence of all religions:
Soul of mine, then dawning Light: be not far, O be not far! Love of mine, thou Vision bright: be not far, O be not far!

See how well my Turban fitting, yet the Parsee circumscribes his Cord and Wail I bear light: be not far, O be not far!
True Parsees and true Brahman, a Christian, yet a Mussulman, They have no light by light: be not far, O be not far!
In all Mosques, Pagodas, Churches, I find one Shrine alone; Thy Face is there my sole delight: be not far, O be not far!
Thou dost shield me, thou dost guide me in the desert, in the darkness: and to solve the problems of evil and predetermination.
The "word" compulsion makes me impatient for love's sake; 'Tis he who loves not that is fettered by compulsion. This is the common ground with God, not compulsion. The shining of the sun, and not a dark cloud.

The lyric poetry of Sufism reaches its highest mark in pantheistic hymns describing the states of fa'āl (negation of individuality) and faqīd (affirmation of universal consciousness).
Lo, for to myself am unknown, now in God's name what must I do?
I am not in the Cross nor in the Crescent, I am not a Mussulman nor a Jew.
Nor West nor East is my home, I have kin nor with angel nor graces.
I am wonted not of fire nor of ham, I am shaped not of dust nor of dew.
I was born not in Asia, nor in Spain, nor in India, where five rivers are, nor in Iria nor Khorasan I grew.
Nor world nor that world I dwell, nor in Paradise, neither in Hell.
Not from Eden and Rāwān I fell, not from Adam my lineage I drew.
In a place beyond uttermost Place, In a tract without shadow of trace.

Soul and body transcending I live in the soul of my loved One a\n
Though many of these poems are exquisite in form and elaborate in style, it is difficult to regard them as products of conscious literary art, and the present writer is inclined to accept the statement that the odes of Jalāl al-Din Rūmī, Ibn al-Farīd, and others are often composed under the influence of ecstasy and are in fact analogous to what is known as "automatic writing." Their rhythm and melody, combined with the symbolic form in which they are sometimes cloaked, give them a strange power of communicating to the reader the same feeling of rapture by which their composer was inspired; and the effect is greatly enhanced when they are chanted with an accompaniment of music, as is customary among Sufis engaged in dhikr.

While students of this poetry cannot ignore the conventional rules of interpretation which assign a fixed allegorical meaning to a large number of words that are commonly used in a different sense, such a method may easily be pushed too far. Ibn al-Farīd's commentary on the Ṣūra'yun al-Ṣaḥīḥ is one that even the most dogmatic and sometimes unable to explain its meaning. The ecstatic element appears only at intervals and seldom with its intense passion in narrative romances, which depict the soul's love of God and its ultimate union with Him as the story of two human lovers—e.g., Yâsîn and Zulaiḥâ, Lalâ and Majnûn, Salâmân and Asâlî—and didactic poems, of which the Maṣna'î is the most celebrated.

LITERATURE.—This art is supplementary to, and should be read in connection with, the art. Ascendit (Mussulman). In the present writer's opinion it would be impossible to consider a historical or critical work on the subject, since adequate materials are not yet available. Further information may be found in: The doctrines of individual Sufis will be found in the art. "And al-Qâdir al-Jâmil, Abd al-Rahmân, Hâlli, ibn Turâf, Jalîl, Ahmad Rûmî, Muhammad, Sa'id al-Ma'inî, and others, are generally known by the title of the Adab al-Ma'inî, the Sûfi." See also art. Bikhshbâz (Muhammad), the Disciple with a Shadow (Mussulman), and the praises of the Maṣna'î, the most celebrated.


REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

SUGGESTION.—Suggestion is the production of a reaction by an ideational process, but without deliberation on the part of the subject thereof. The term applies also to any attempt by the subject or by another person to produce such a reaction. A suggestion is any idea or image that determines, or is used for the purpose of determining, the outcome of such a non-deliberative process.

The qualification ‘by an ideational process’ is intended to differentiate suggestion from primary instinct-acts. Such acts, though they may be secondarily initiated by an idea or mental image (as when a letter makes me angry with the writer of it), require as their primary stimulus nothing like an appropriate semi-presentation. Suggestion, on the other hand, is primarily ideational. The most typical suggestions are those that are conveyed by language. Gesture, in the broad sense of significant bodily motions, postures, and inarticulate vocalization, comes next. Natural phenomena act suggestively only when they have antecedently acquired a meaning, as when one associates poison ivy, or quickens one's pulse upon hearing distant thunder.

The term ‘reaction,’ as here used, refers to both psychical and bodily responses. It includes beliefs, hallucinations, perceptions, attitudes (with their affective and emotional aspects), stimulation of involuntary muscles and of certain glands, particular contractions of voluntary muscles and mimic muscles, even extended chains of such contractions, and finally, in all these fields, inhibitions and functional paralyses as well as stimulations.

A reaction is ‘deliberate’ when it is made after attention has been given to alternatives, and with the alternatives in view. Associated with the idea that defines any alternative is a tendency towards something beyond itself as merely this idea now present. Because of these associated tendencies ideas may be said to compete with one another and therefore to involve inhibitions as well as positive stimulations. In deliberation there is a mental inhibition of two or more competing ideas, wherefore popular thought correctly conceives that pause or postponement is a mark of deliberate conduct and of deliberate belief. Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence, or relative lack, of such competition, inhibition, and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the inhibitions appropriate to the given situation, and focused or ‘narrowed down’ to some one idea or coherent chain of ideas. Thenceupon the associated tendency that has just been referred to is automatically inhibited.

How such associated tendencies should be conceived has been a matter of debate. W. McDougall, emphasizing the subconscious character of the connexion here involved, and also the close relation of suggestion in general to physiological phenomena, is of the opinion that any adequate analysis of suggestion must rest at last upon a theory of the subconscious mind. William James used the phrase ‘ideo-motor action’ to designate what he regarded as a mental law, namely: 4

4 Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is the object; and awakens in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an opposition movement which is conceived simultaneously to the mind. On the other hand, E. L. Thorndike opposes to the ‘ideo-motor’ theory, and by implication to McDougall also, the following far simpler theory: any image may produce a movement in either of two ways—by imaging an object that awakens an instinctive response, or, under the ordinary law of habit, by reinstating something that has previously been associated in the subject’s experience with the suggestive idea. The reason why the idea of bending my first finger produces actual bending, according to Thorndike, is that the two—the idea of the bending and the actual bending—have been experienced together heretofore.

The very first flexions of the finger, it may be added, occurred reflexly, without any antecedent idea thereof. Just as, if the sight of a glass of water upon my dinner table induces me to drink water that I do not want, habit is clearly the explanation. 1

This theory enables us to bring all the psychical and physical manifestations of suggestion under the same two heads, habit and instinct.

Both are found in Antony’s handling of the Roman riddle. The opinion of the artesians concerning Caesar’s death was quickly reversed by the saying of the god Jupiter: ‘Bring attention back again and again to essentially the same point, i.e., by narrowing attention so that the old attitude of admiration for Caesar the conqueror was reinstated. In addition, Antony arouses various instincts, as when he works upon curiosity until the crowd demands to hear the will that he pretends to withhold.

It is evident that suggestion is not an exceptional, rare, or abnormal phenomenon, but an all-present fact of all mind whenever alternatives are upon the ideational level. In hypnosis competing ideas may be inhibited to an extraordinary degree, but there is no fixed line of division between the intermediate stages of hypnosis which is evidently brought on and fully normal mental action. Similarly the ordinary effects of cheerful or of gloomy expectation are merely heightened in the extreme and truly remarkable facts of suggestive therapeutics. 2

The process of suggestion has, as such, no particular relation to the truth or the falsity of what is suggested. One may arrive by suggestion at true beliefs or false, and at equally correct or incorrect attitudes and conduct. Suggestion is an ordinary device of oratory and of preaching, as it is also of advertising and of salesmanship. Recent works on ‘business psychology’ presuppose what may fairly be called a technic that is parallel to that of physicians who employ psycho-therapy. Thus far the ethical aspects of influencing buyers by suggestion have not been examined as carefully as the technic.

If any one should doubt whether the deliberate influencing of men to act without deliberation is ever justifiable, the following three cases would have a bearing. (1) There are numerous cases in which the ends of deliberation are defeated by the process of deliberation itself, as when too meticulous weighing of possible consequences or an overwrought insistence upon complete certainty prevents the action that a situation calls for. One way to get such a person over his ‘dead centre’ is precisely to offer him the alternatives until action ensues. (2) When an instinctive capacity for noble emotions and attitudes has become dull from disuse, one simply lacks considerations that are needed for deliberation. A psychological pre-condition of all deliberation is appreciation of the pertinent alternatives. What is to be done for a man, then, whose habits preclude any feeling of the force of a pertinent alternative? The obviously rational procedure is by processes of suggestion to narrow his attention upon some object that may awaken an instinctive response of the desirable sort, and then to lead him to include this fresh experience among the data of his deliberate thinking. (3) Whether we will or not, a large factor in education, particularly in the development of standards and ideals in the young, is suggestion emanating from adults, especially...

2 Principles of Psychology, II, 520.
3 Art. Hysteria.
4 Art. DISEASES AND MEDICINE, HYPOPNOIA, PSYCHO-THERAPY.
ally parents and teachers. A purely rationalistic education is a psychological impossibility. Hence it is only of the greatest importance to determine some measures for determining the sorts of suggestion to which pupils shall be exposed. M. W. Reastinge argues for careful, deliberate planning of this part of the curriculum.

On the other hand, suggestion is, on the whole, a process of repetition or of maintaining some status quo ante rather than a process of criticism and revision. Under the influence of suggestion alone one merely drifts with social currents, or follows a leader, or imitates one's own past, or at best applies a recognized standard or sets free a dimmed innate capacity. In this standard, on the other hand, one must attend to alternatives. It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to suppose that truly ethical action requires nothing but deliberation. Ethical situations are made real to us, especially situations that call for reform, by some kindling of elemental processes that include strong satisfactions or their opposites. Thus it comes to pass that great sermons commonly interweave strong suggestions with analysis and even argument.

To exhibit the whole significance of suggestion in its full complex, we need a catalogue of practically all forms of deeply felt experience. Primitive fears connected with tabu and with spiritualism were propagated from individual to individual and from generation to generation by suggestion. The same is true of the rejoicing that accompanied some of the ceremonies. Priesthoods acquired and retained their power by narrowing the attention of worshippers by means of sense stimulation and, under the influence of suggestion, by teaching. The mystics of all ages have practised auto-suggestion under the name of contemplation or interior prayer. Modern revival campaigns are at present trying to use the same means to organize preaching, singing, personal work, and advertising of various kinds upon a strictly suggestive basis. Not the least item is the careful preparation of the public mind, sometimes for weeks in advance of the first public meeting. Finally, such experiences as 'the jerks,' 'the power,' 'speaking in tongues,' and 'interpretation of the gospels in the person of God' are usually initiated by a spontaneous auto-suggestion which is then imitated (by oneself and by others) without deliberation, but often with support from images of Scripture. The idea of a baptism with fire has similarly fulfilled itself here and there.

The phenomena of suggestion reach their climax in human masses, whether crowds (which involve spatial propinquity) or a public whose opinions and attitudes are formed by common reading matter or even by statements passing from mouth to mouth. It is a fact of common observation that in a crowd one may act like a different person, accepting as truth what one could not ordinarily believe, and conducting oneself contrary to one's ordinary standards. The mechanism whereby crowd suggestion acquires this remarkable power is as follows. (1) Certain instinctive capacities are strongly stirred by the massing of appropriate stimuli. Man has a gregarious instinct, is peculiarly influenced in the movements of his fellows, and is sensitive to their approvals and disapprovals. Here is the basis for a quickening or excitation of the mind through the mere presence of others, as also for watching and following others, and for the suppression of individual inhibitions, the deliberate group achieves its unity precisely by inviting the expression of competitive ideas, and by spreading them out for inspection and uniformed selection. The democratic, in popular government, is an organ for essentially
the same type of deliberation on the scale of the local community or of the nation.

LITRAWEER. — A. Binet, La Sensibilité, Paris, 1900.

We are inclined to consider the Individual and Sex Differences in Suggestibility, University of California Publications in Psychology, 1916, 6, p. 3.


SUHRAWARDI. — Suhrawardi, a small town in the Jîbâl province of Persia, has given its name to two celebrated mystics whose lives, characters, and opinions present a remarkable contrast, although both were born in the same decade. Of Shihâb al-dîn 'Umar b. 'Abdallâh al-Suhrawardi (A.D. 1144–1234) it is enough to say that he was a Shi'î of the conventional type, that he convinced and preached in Bagdâd under the influence of his patronage, and that his writings include a well-known treatise on Ŝâ'ism the 'Asrîf al-ma'dârîf — and a polemical work directed against the study of Greek philosophy, which he decried to mystical philosophy, led the wandering life of a dervish, and finally settled in Aleppo. While some of his earlier books were written under the influence of Aris, Suhrawardî was at heart a Platonist, as is shown by the table and contents of his chief work, the Hâšâbatà Lùshârî (Philosophy of Illumination) — whence the school of mystics who follow him are called Shi'âqûs (al-shi'âqûgrî). Being an enthusiast as well as a bold and original thinker, he made no attempt to disguise the anti-Islamic tendency of his doctrines. It cannot be denied that his conception of spiritual power was a true original and valuable one, and that he was the real founder of the mystic system of thought in Persia. The name of 'martyr' (shahid) was refused to him; he is generally known as Suhrawardî al-maqtul ('Suhrawardi the slain') or al-Shaikh al-maqtul.

His theory of illumination he combines Neo-Platonic and Persian ideas. The source of all things is the Absolute Light (al-mûr al-qâhir). That which is visible requires no definition, and nothing is more visible than light, whose very nature consists in manifestation. The Primary Light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible, The 'not-light' (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an independent source. It is a mere negation of the Primary Light, and as such, cannot be negated. The relation between them is not that of contrast, but of existence and non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own negation — Darkness, which it makes to shine in order to be itself. This Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not change of place; it is due to the loss of illumination which constitutes its very essence. The number of illuminations which proceed to produce motion is unlimited; the illuminations of inner brightness become in their turn the sources of other illuminations; and the scale of their diminution, by way of knowing the principle that what is lower in the scale of being loves what is higher, the soul longs to be united with the formless.

We may distinguish two illuminations, i.e. modes of being of the Primal Light: (1) pure, i.e. abstract, formless, spiritual, and immaterial, derivative, possessing form. The pure light is self-conscious substance (spirit and soul), knowing itself through itself, for 'whatever knows itself must be pure light.' The accidental light is related to the pure light as effect to cause and only exists as an attribute in association with the illuminated object (body), which is not matter in Aristotle's use of the term, but merely the negation necessarily implied in the nature of the light.

The experimental fact of the transformation of the primary elements into one another points to this fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being.

It is of two kinds: (a) dark substance, (b) dark forms, i.e. qualities; and the combination of these two makes up the material body.

The darkness is nothing but the absence of light, and light is identical with reality, the substance and forms of the universe consist of illuminations diffused from the Primal Light in infinite gradations of intensity. It follows that everything partakes of reality in proportion to the radius which it receives and towards which it ever moves with 'a lover's passion, in order to drink the living water of the original fountain of Light.' This perpetual flow and ebb of desire produces the revolutions of the heavenly spheres, the processes of nature, and all human activities.

Murai (First Intelligence) is less perfect than the Primal Light (Cod), in contemplating which it becomes conscious of its imperfection, whence there arises in it a darkness that is the ground of mortality in the sensible world. While the entire universe is eternal as emanating from the eternal light, but contingent if regarded as the object of irradiation, some illuminations are simple, others complicated and therefore interior. The intelligences, the celestial spheres, the souls of the heavens, time, motion, and the archetypes of the elements belong to a higher world, which may be called eternal in contrast with all below it, though in the relation existing between them not posteriority but parallelism is implied. Suhrawardî, like Plato, conceives a world of Ideal essences that it was revealed to him mystically—in which every kind of sublunary thing exists as a substance in itself. The wise men of Persia (Zoroastrians), he says, gave names to many of these pure lights (Ideas); e.g., they named the Idea of water Khuradî (May), that of trees Murâdî (July), and that of fire Arbûlîshît (April).

As each species is endowed with its distinctive qualities and preserved by its guardian Idea—'the lord of the species' (rabbû 'l-nâ'î)—so the Idea of the human body is 'the holy spirit' or universal Reason, while bodies individually are types of rational souls. The soul does not exist before the body. Being pure light, it imparts illumination to the body through the medium of the animal soul. It operates with the five external and the five internal senses of which it is the source of the ideal archetype. Thus vision, knowledge, memory, imagination, etc., are essentially not passive functions but illuminative acts of the soul. The rule of the principle that what is lower in the scale of being loves what is higher, the soul longs to be united with the formless.

1 Suhrawardi Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, London, 1894, p. 112. 2 Suhrawardi recognizes only three elements, fire being regarded as hot air.

3 Iqbal, p. 139.

world of light, and it advances towards this end according as it seeks to become perfect in philoso-
phy and the practice of virtue. By so doing it de-
velops a mystical perception (dhânya) (which clears all doubts away, Dhânya, as Subhrawardi tells us, forms the basis of the speculations set
forth in the Hitkamat 'l-i'khbarî. In one passage he
seems to hint that he himself is the gâthî, the
mystic root of the Sufi hierarchy; for he asso-
crates that the philosophy of illumination was
taught by Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and the
Zoroastrian sages, and that the world is never
without some one who possesses the doctrine and
can expound it with authority; that person, he
adds, is God's vieserent (khalifat Allah) on the
earth.2 Attainment of fanaêt unites the soul with
God, but does not mean that one subsistence is
absorbed in another. No two souls can be
completely alike.

'The individual souls, after death, are not united into one
soul but their effects from each other in proportion to the
illumination they received during their companionship with
physical organisms... Some souls probably come back
now and then in order to come up their deficiencies. The
doctrine of transmigration cannot be proved or disproved
from a philosophical standpoint; but it is probably a
probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the
soul. All souls are those eternally journeying towards some
certain source, which calls back the whole universe when this journey
is over, and starts another cycle of being to reproduce in
almost all respects the history of the preceding cycle.1

Subhrawardi agrees with Ghazali in holding that the
world could not be better than it is. Evil is
a negation depending on the motion and darkness
which, as we have seen, are involved in the nature
of light; it is associated with the effects and does
not proceed per se from the First Cause; if it
existed per se, it would not be evil. In his clear
and sympathetic exposition of the Ikhâriq philo-
sophy Sînîkî Muhammad Iqâl calls attention to
Subhrawardi's intellectual independence and to the
skill with which he moulded his Neo-Platonic
materialism into a thoroughly Persiaean system of
thought, uniting speculation and emotion in perfect
harmony. Mystic and as a (sense) pantheist he
was, and he regards the external world as real and
never loses touch with it.

1 No Persian thinker is more alive to the necessity of explaining
all the aspects of objective existence in reference to his
fundamental principles.2

LITERATURE.—Besides the references given in the art., M.
Horton, Die Philosophie der Einheitung nach Gurban, chibhatun gen
Philosophie und deren Geschichte, xvii., Berlin, 1912; A. von Krenner, Gesch. der herrenlichen Wiss.

REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

SUCIDE.

SUCIDE (Introductory).—Before attempting any
discussion of suicide from the standpoint of
ethics or religion, we should note that in many
cases—probably the majority, among civilized
peoples—either no moral judgment can be passed
upon the act or at least great allowance must be
made for the mental condition of the agent.
Lunacy not infrequently involves such complete
loss of the sense of self-preservation that the
patient, even where analgesia is not present, will
murder or kill himself, apparently without any
idea of what he is doing.

In respect, modesty and the instinct of self-
preservation are quite absent; and the result is
various absurd, criminal, or indecent acts, including
suicide for a trivial reason or move at all.2 Again,
dementia paranoides, or chronic paraneurpathial,4
although like many forms of mental disease it
generally produces intense and unreasonable attach-
ment to life,5 often involves accesses of wild, self-
directed fury, such as that in which Guy de
Maupassant tried to kill himself.6 But the most
typical examples are those of melancholia. We
quote part of Tannâ's admirably lucid account:

But in cases of melancholia the most horrible and
anguishing nature, which are represented to the patient's mind
as simple possibilities, and repeated as favourite images on
account of their hideousness, become transformed into a most
obscure. The obsession, meeting with but slight resistance in
an exhausted or sickly brain (i.e. one not quite deprived of will-power), becomes so imperative as to drive
the patient inexorably to the commission of acts corresponding to
its dictates, and murder in its most horrible forms.3

The state in which these acts occur—the raptus
melancholici—is quasi-unconscious. But suicide
often takes place in less advanced cases than this,
when the effect is highly irresponsible, but
is actuated by motives of the importance of
which his disease greatly exaggerates. A preliminary
symptom of the raptus is preserial anxiety—a
sort of horrible intensification of that uneasy
'sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach' which
often attacks a healthy man when frightened or
anxious.4 Now, as a normal subject may be
tempted, by the depression arising out of a real
misfortune, to take his own life, so a melancholic
suffering from this intense and abnormal feeling
of anxiety must be driven in a quasi-normal way to commit suicide. Objectively
he has no sufficient motive, but subjectively his
hopeless depression, the morbid nature of which he
is unable to realize, presents itself as a way
worthy of being carried out and fulfilling his wish.5
Still more typical are those suicides of melan-
cholics which are inspired by altruistic motives,
the patient believing that his death will in some
way greatly benefit his friends—e.g., that he is
misery-poor and must relieve his family of the
burden of supporting him;6 or that his life is
demanded in expiation of a fancied crime, or the
like. Such unfortunate are well aware of what they
are doing; their delusion consists simply in
believing that they have an adequate motive.
Often their action has a kind of personal nobility,
emanating from a devotion to an ideal which in itself
is lofty enough, although the ideal is imaginary and
the form which the devotion takes morbid. It
has been suggested that in those cases the disease
has exaggerated and distorted the instinct of self-
sacrifice, which is a normal constituent of the

1 Iqâl, p. 147 f.2. 2 P. 149.
3 This is merely a rough description of the nature of the two
symptoms; the psychological are without exception, the first
preserial, the other epipsychic.
4 Tannâ, p. 516; Mercier, Emotion et Insanité, p. 362.
5 Mercier, p. 351; the suicide was really very well off.
6 It might also be described as a distortion of the moral sense,
or, at least, if the term were extended, the guilt sense is described as a
crude form of self-preservation, etc.). See W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd,
London, 1913, especially p. 184.
SUICIDE (Introductory)

sexual emotions, especially in women. Hence such suicides are particularly common among adolescents. As there is admittedly a close connection between sexual and religious emotions, especially in their more exaggerated and morbid forms, we may put some at least of the religious suicides (see below) in this category. 1

1 The cases of this kind the patient's insanity is easily recognizable; and even in those instances where a melancholic supposed to be cured relapses and ends his life in a suicidal act—or possibly feigns recovery in order to carry out, when left unguarded, his purpose of self-destruction—need have no hesitation in pronouncing him at least partly irresponsible. 2 It is less easy to pass judgment on the numerous class of neurasthenics. A characteristic feature of the mental state of these sufferers is that impulses, often of the most absurd or criminal nature, haunt and obsess the insane man; and, while the patient knows perfectly well that these impulses are not true—they differing from the melancholic—he is not always strong enough to control them.

The most vivid description known to us of this condition occurs, not in a technical work at all, but in two out of the stories of one who seems himself to have been a neurasthenic and classical sufferer, and who has given us an insight into the normal human mentality.—Edgar Allan Poe. 3 This author represents two men, both of whom have been merely thinking of killing a pet animal, for no other reason than that the acts are insanely driven by motive; and the writings of aliens 4 give many actual cases of the same kind. Clearly, then, when a neurasthenic's obsession is suicidal, if he yields to it, he cannot either be responsible for the act or be expected to know what he is doing or imagines that he has good reasons for his act, or be judged like a normal man who decides, on more or less rational grounds, that he wishes and his life.

It is still harder to pass satisfactory moral judgments on the rather numerous persons, apparently recovering in order to carry out their more rational suicide—and, as an inadequate one—a small injury, real or supposed, to honour, or even so trivial a cause as a wager.

Suicide on the basis of some amount to a sort of epidemic. When one member of a family has ended his life, the example of the ways of the weapon that he used, or even that he had been known to drive a relative to follow his example, until many as seven of one household have died by their own hands. Larger epidemics, extending throughout an entire city, or even wider, 5 have not been unknown in ancient or modern times, and are frequently associated with religious mania. These are probably hysterical, as hysteria is easily communicated and often produces, especially among women, suicidal attempts at suicide. 6

To all these classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances of persons who are sane for the greater part of their lives, but, as a result of violent nervous shock, disease, grief, excesses of one sort or another, etc., become temporarily unbalanced to a slight degree. These cases are so many that it is questionable whether any one whose life is of normal length is absolutely free during every waking moment of it. 7 We need not doubt that the charitable verdict of the average coroner's jury, "involuntary will and mind," is in a large percentage of cases quite in accordance with medical facts.

But our primary interest is in the act of one who seeks to lose his own life. The question whether such a deed is justifiable, and, if so, when and under what circumstances, has been answered in the most various ways by peoples of different degrees of culture, from the lowest savages to members of the highest civilizations, ancient and modern. Some account of these answers has been given elsewhere. 1 We propose now to consider the attitude toward suicide of the religions, savage and civilized, and by the leading schools of moral philosophy.

1 Religion.—Various faiths have taken every conceivable view of suicide, from recommending it to resolutely and uncompromisingly opposing it. As the grounds for the former view are less obvious to us, it is well to begin by briefly discussing them. First in the list stand those fanatic beliefs, including degrading forms of Christianity, whose votaries have been impelled to kill themselves, often in most painful ways, to attain a blissful immortality or to avoid something which they regarded as polluting.

Russia furnishes us with some remarkable examples. Thus at Trampol, in 1826, twenty-eight persons burned themselves alive to escape the census, which apparently they regarded as such, that a more widespread epidemic occurred in 1866, in which year many Russian souls looked for the appearance of Christ. To escape him and enter heaven, suicide was strongly urged by certain wrong-headed and often wholly criminal persons, both fanatic and lay. 1 Whole communities huddled with entangled children, and men and women, of the gospel of death, and hastened to put its precepts into practice, . . . At Kamsk impaled itself on a spiked stake; there it was 'cold'; there it was 'burnt'; and killing a pet animal, for no other reason than that the acts are insanely driven by motive; and the writings of aliens give many actual cases of the same kind. Clearly, then, when a neurasthenic's obsession is suicidal, if he yields to it, he cannot either be responsible for the act or be expected to know what he is doing or imagines that he has good reasons for his act, or be judged like a normal man who decides, on more or less rational grounds, that he wishes and his life.

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1 For other forms of mental disease resulting in suicide during menstruation, see Irregular Impossibility see Taniz, pp. 301 (Alcoholism, 603, et seq., epilepsy.

2 See "The Imp of the Perversion" and "The Black Cat" in Tales of the Arabian Nights, and Arapesh, especially the opening paragraphs of the former.

3 See Taniz, in Taniz, p. 580 ft.

4 Taniz, p. 331.

5 See Tiele, at Milesian; see Pitarch, de Millennia Veritatis, p. 456. I am indebted to Miss W. A. Barber for her help in the translation of this and other passages from the Taniz.

6 Taniz, p. 585.

7 Mercier, p. 131.

8 See Taniz, p. 331.

9 See Tiele, at Milesian; see Pitarch, de Millennia Veritatis, p. 456. I am indebted to Miss W. A. Barber for her help in the translation of this and other passages from the Taniz.

10 Taniz, p. 585.

11 Mercier, p. 131. 1

12 See Tiele, at Milesian; see Pitarch, de Millennia Veritatis, p. 456. I am indebted to Miss W. A. Barber for her help in the translation of this and other passages from the Taniz.

13 Taniz, p. 585.

14 Mercier, p. 131.
lower strata of human history we have numerous examples of savages who regard suicide as perfectly justified. In the (a) land and the (b) land will in the next world have a body in the same state as his present one.1 This naturally leads to the conclusion that voluntary death is much preferable to mutilation or disease and therefore it will avoid a naimed or helpless life after death. Such suicides are practically examples of euthanasia (q.v.). Or (b) suicide may, at least in some cases, be reported as occurring in a more than usually pleasant lot in the next world, not merely avoiding an unpleasant one. Obviously such ideas are not widespread or unqualified, or they would result in the extinction of the peoples holding them. They mostly take this form:—wife, vassal, or slave—so closely bound to his or her superior that death cannot sever the tie; therefore, just as in any earthly journey the vassal will faithfully attend his lord, so, when his lord dies, the most honourable course is to follow and continue to serve him. Such fiduciary may not be expected, result in due honour among the Wends.

So at the death of a king of Benin his favourites and servants used to compete with each for the privilege of being buried in the body in order that they might attend and minister to him in the other world, and the first to be dead was determined by lot,2 with no doubt as being both a solemn and willing. Similarly among the early Germans3 infamia in conueniam, quum saepe propter superstitionem principalis suo exae recisesset; and among the higher-class civilization Kurnok noblest were capable of similar devotion to their king.4

But this is hardly a religious idea; more definitely connected with religious belief is the Hindu savas (q.v.). Religious opposition to suicide is to be found in all, or nearly all, strata of civilization. Probably the chief, if not the only, excuse for an excusing primitive races is simply the dread of the ghost. The self-destroyer must have been greatly wronged or troubled in some way, or he would not have acted as he did; therefore his ghost would be an unusually troublesome and revengeful spirit, like that of all Sanskara—to borrow the convenient Greek term. Hence, either he must be appeased by the death of his enemy, if known, or by offerings of some kind, or else he must be punished deservedly. A natural way to accomplish this is to mutilate or destroy the corpse—so as to make it as medicinal as a supposed vampire. Well-known survivals of this are the Athenian practice of severing its right hand and the custom, not of severing the head, but of cutting away the body. Such treatment, originally a mere precautionary measure, would easily enough generate the belief that the act of destroying the body destroys something extraordinary, i.e. strongly displeasing to whatever deity the community worships. It should be noted, however, that among some peoples in a not very advanced stage of culture suicide is objected to on religious grounds, but no such drastic methods of treating the corpse are in vogue. The Kamai and Torose hold that those who die by their own hands live miserably in the next world; but the bodies are not burned or mutilated, nor likely fear of them shown, unless their unceremonious burial on the spot where they are found may be taken to be a precautionary measure indicating fear.

This vague idea of suicide as a crime has been taken over by several higher religions and explained by their mythology and eschatological beliefs. Thus for any uncorrected and logical form of Buddhism it is clearly forbidden, since it violates the first of the five funda-

mental precepts, ‘Kill not any living thing.’1 A religion—it can scarcely be called a philosophy—

which presents certain striking parallels to that of Gautama gave an elaborate justification of the prohibition of suicide. To the Orphic-Pythagorean the present life was a penance which took the form of imprisonment; therefore to kill one’s self was to atone, or to vainly, to escape the just penalty.2 This view, with various modifications, was taken up by Plato, and reappears in the theological teachings of later philosophy.3 The native Roman religion perhaps condemns suicide originally and in theory at least. Servius4 tells us that the dies mortuus oranum made the body of one who had wounded himself to be cast forth unburied; and the later Servius Danielis adds on the authority of Cassius Lepidus that the idea of the disgracefulness of suicide dates from the time of Augustus. More noteworthy is a quotation from Varro,5 confirming the statement that suspension were denominated suicide.

We have no hint, however, that the various suicides of legend and history were otherwise than honourably treated. Possibly the objection was not to suicide in general, but to hanging, regarded as infames. At any rate, the rhetorical discussions of the subject quote many religious authorities.

The opposition of Christianity has from an early date been of the most determined kind. It is true that nothing in the NT directly justifies such an attitude, but certain Patristic writings make it obvious that by their time the discussion had taken the form of an inquiry whether self-destruction was ever allowable. Thus St. Augustine6 deliberates at considerable length whether the doctrine of purgation (petitio), as he repeatedly calls it, may be counted in the case of a man whose honour is in danger, or in any case; and he arrives at a negative conclusion. His reasons are chiefly that either violence is an act which precludes the possibility of repentance,7 and (b) that it is a form of homicide, and therefore a violation of the sixth commandment,8 as a matter of general law, or special to that commandment, which have been recognized. He suggests, as in such cases as that of Sansom a special law for the case of the general law, which nevertheless remains in full force for all ordinary persons. This remains in substance the position of orthodox Catholicism. It is not insignificant that in the most ancient of all medieval works on eschatological subjects, although the possibility of repentance at the very moment of a violent death is admitted, the examples are chosen from persons killed in battle or by assassins.9 Nor has the orthodox Protestantism been any less emphatic; indeed, its rejection of the doctrine of purgatory makes it still more uncompromising in condemnation of suicide and less hope-
ful with regard to the future destiny of suicides. Judaism in its later forms strongly denounces self-destruction, but the OT says nothing which could reasonably be held to justify this, unless we adopt the Augustinian view of the nature of the evil commandment. Probably the Hebrews, until late post-Exilic times, must be counted among those races to whom suicide is simply one of the various pernicious forms of death and calls for no special comment. 2

2. Ethics.—All the different views of suicide taught by various religions re-appear, with additions and re-arrangements, in various ethical systems. The religious side of Plato’s views has already been mentioned. Both he and Aristotle objected to self-destruction as cowardly and an offence against good order, and particularly we find much discussion of suicide in the later schools, notably Stoicism, and a decided tendency to condone or even commend it. Its most whole-hearted upholders are those who deny personal immortality, or at least human immortality; for they readily embrace the idea—as the old heathen did—of the happy future and frequently appearing in poetry—that death is the care for all life. 4 A thoroughgoing exponent of this view was the Insulan author of ‘Mimesis of Life’ was Hegesias the Cyrenee, according to Cicero, was forbidden by King Ptolemy to lecture on that topic, owing to the number of suicides which took place among his hearers. 5 Less extreme doctrines were prevalent among the Stoics who before the time of Posidonius generally denied personal immortality and without exception refused to admit that death was an evil or life a good. Both being ‘indifferent,’ since neither to a virtue or a vice, it follows that sometimes one and sometimes the other is preferable, since it fits even the perfectly wise man to kill himself if it will benefit his friends or his country, or will free him from great pain or intolerable disease. 6 Suicide for trifling reasons, however, was condemned.

Perhaps the most memorable member of this school, puts the matter thus in an imaginary dialogue with his pupils: Epictetus, we can never endure to be bound to this wretched body. Let us, for our own sakes, let us enter heaven free of these chains that weigh us down. 7

And in the signal and the sign you free from this your service, you shall depart to Him; for the present, endure to live in the place where He has stationed you. . . . Wait, do not depart unreasonably. 8

Another passage indicates what he means by a ‘reasonable’ departure. 9 ‘The room is smoky. If only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke, I will go. Remember this: keep fast hold on it—the door is open. . . . You must live in Cyrenae. ’ Very well. But Cyrene seems to me a very smoky room. So I will depart to a habitation in which no one can prevent me dwelling; a habitation which is open to everyone. 10 The Epicureans did not indeed recommend suicide in general; but that death, although an evil, is not one which can touch or harra us is one of their fundamental principles. When we are, death is not present; when death is present, then we are not, says the founder of the sect. 11

1 Josephus, Ant. vi. 9. This view probably had great influence on early Christianity.
2 See art. EUTHANASIA.
6 T. D. II, 344. 7 Sophocles (Eg. 83). Hegesias’ teachings won him the resentment of the Stoics. 8 Diog. Laert. vi. 126; 7 Diær. t. r. 10. 12 cf. Tac. Ann. 16.
9 A rocky inlet in the Egean—the Roman Sibyls.
10 Diog. Laert. x. 125; cf. Lucr. iii. 580 ff.

The suicide of the ordinary unphilosophical man, Lucullus stigmatizes as self-contrary, since it is caused by fear of the very death which it courts. The Cynics professed to be absolutely indifferent to life and death as to everything else, and were accused of killing themselves by extraordinary methods for little or no reason while some Skeptics were equally insensible. In Rome, where originally suicide appears to have been rare, the famous deaths of Cato, Timarchus, and others were for the most part inspired by Greek teaching, generally Stoic. Medieval ethics added nothing new.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of modern times to the rational treatment of the matter is the consideration noticed in the opening paragraphs of this article, that many suicides are non-moral and entirely the affair of the sick mind in mental diseases. Apart from this, and considering only cases where the agent is fully rational, the characteristic feature of the ethical discussions of the subject is the elimination of the theological elements in the arguments. Hume's famous statement 'Of Suicide' being the last important work to pay them much attention. Perhaps the school most nearly favourable to suicide is Utilitarianism; for, starting from its definition of a good act as one which increases the sum total of human happiness (identified with pleasure), one can easily imagine cases where the death of a man by his own hand would cause little or no pain to others and would be more or less completely a source of pleasure to many. The more metaphysical schools disapprove of it, either as an insult to humanity in general as embodied and as exemplified in the form of life (Kant) or as a final tendency, arising from a contemplation of such medical facts as those already mentioned, to regard自杀 from the field of ethics—a view which we believe to be an exaggeration of a truth. The general trend of non-theological thought on the part of the modern educators is towards a view between the extreme latitude towards suicide represented by Stoicism and the extreme rigidity of the Kantians. That self-destruction is now and then justified by circumstances is admitted by most; and it is quite as widely admitted that those circumstances must be of an extreme and unusual kind to make the act anything else than cowardly and otherwise immoral.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works given under EUTHANASIA, the following may be cited: E. TANZI, A Text-book of Mental Diseases, Eng. tr., London, 1869; C. MERCIER, SIAM SPIRITS AND SPIRITS, tr., London, 1860 (short popular account); J. G. FRASER, Euthanasia, Ed., 1811-14; J. S. MILL, Utilitarianism, 1863 (many subsequent edns.).

H. J. ROSE.

SUCIDE (Buddhist).—1. Introduction.—We are concerned in this article with religious suicide and the Buddhist views thereof, not with the various kinds of suicide mentioned in Buddhist literature, interesting as they may be. 1 The position of the old Indian ascetics in regard to suicide may be summarized as follows. While the majority of sects were addicted to rapid methods of suicide—throwing oneself down from a mountain, etc.—the Jains (and probably also the disciples of Gauḍa) considered those methods vulgar and evil. 2

1 De Rer. Nat. ii. 79 ff.
2 Luc. Vit. Asc. 10 (p. 550); exhib. lâvâ, pada kikâna under the epigraph a epigrâne doezer apôthèse. 3
6 See art. SUCIDE (Greeks and Romans) and note the chimerism of the Latin, as compared with the Greek. Suicide is suicide. The word ‘suicide’ itself, although of Latin derivation, is impermissible as a Latin compound.
7 First published in his Essays and Treatises, London, 1777.
8 Actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. The famous dictum of J. S. Mill. Cf. Copleston’s treatise.
9 See, e.g., Mathâsana, ii. 109; a husband, threatened with separation from his wife, kills her and commits suicide, in order that they may be married and live in their next birth.
SUICIDE (Buddhists)  

who thus kills themselves are reborn as demons.  
While practising starvation, the Jain must avoid any desire for death (marrakabapada). 2: Renounce all food and drink, I patiently wait for my end. 

2. Buddhism condemns asceticism. — Any austerity which is likely to weaken body or mind is forbidden. The Jains and many others saw in asceticism and physical pain (dukkha, tapas) a factor that makes for purification from sin: suicide by starvation is the ascetic act par excellence. 2 While vocal sins are destroyed through silence (mauna) and mental sins through *respiratory restraint,* bodily sins are destroyed through starvation (abhoya) and lust is crushed through mortification. Buddhism had better methods of crushing lust and destroying sin—the realization of the non-substantiality of the Ego, the experience in trance (dhyana) of a happiness which has nothing to do with pleasure and destroys in a man any infatuation for pleasure. It was thus enabled to dismiss suicide. 

3. Buddhism condemns suicide. — There is a celebrated text:  

A monk who preaches suicide, who tells man: “Do away with your body; it is evil, it is bad, it is inferior, it is not better,” in fact preaches murder, is a murderer, is no longer a monk.  

A man must live his allotted span of life. He cannot avoid, by suicide, the sufferings which are the result of his former evil deeds; nor can he win sooner, by a voluntary death, the reward of his good deeds. Everything comes to him who waits. To that effect Buddhism employs to Pāyāsi the simile of the woman who cuts open her body in order to see whether her child is a boy or a girl.  

It seems also that suicide from religious motives is not effective. Buddhists object to ‘thirst for non-existence’ (vihāvavartana), as they object to ‘thirst for existence’ (bhavanavatā). A saint must abide in inexistence, with life, can sacrifice life, without caring for death. He will not commit suicide in order to reach nirvāna sooner. Is not suicide a desperate act of disgust and despair, disgust of existence, desire of rest?  

4. Buddhism admits suicide. — We have therefore good reason to believe that suicide is not an ascetic act leading to spiritual progress and to suicide. It is that no saint or arhat is a spiritually perfect being—will kill himself. But we are confronted with a number of stories which prove beyond dispute that we are mistaken in these two insinuations. On the one hand, suicides may be in certain cases the actual cause or the occasion of the attainment of arhatship, although in other cases it may be premature and sinful. On the other hand, arhats commit suicide. 

In illustration of the first point, we may quote the stories of the attempted suicide of (1) Sīhā, (2) Sappadapata, and (3) Vakkali; for the second the suicide of (4) Vakkali and (5) Godhika.

1. The girijadana or bhagupati is pājojanavasikhi (H. Jacobi, Ausgewählte Erklärungen in Mahāvīra, Leipzig, 1886, p. 27; A. Weber, Fragmente der Bhagavata, Berlin, 1885-86, p. 290).


3. Viped, death, voluntary or not, destroys sin (see J. J. Meyer, Hindu Tales).

4. See, e.g., Mr. Jackson, iii. 205; SBE i. 1910, a. &c. ‘Suicide,’ the reference is to the last Liberal and Mr. Sirks and Mr. Allardyce.

5. Pārijātika, iii.; see SBE xiii. 1881; 4. Nīla-Nīla, iii.; 177; Dialogues of the Buddha, 216 (SBE lii. [London, 1916]), 1. 2. 1 Sīhā was distressed at not obtaining spiritual progress after seven years of endeavour. She said: ‘What have I to do with this wretched life (pājojanavā)? I will die through hunger’. But, just as the rope was tied round her neck, she was turning her thoughts towards enlightenment (samyāma), as was her former habit. She attained arhatship and at the very moment the rope loosened from her throat and fell.  

2 The story of Sappadapata is in the same collection. This monk was overpowered by passion (klesa) and never obtained concentration. This distressed him so much that he was about to commit suicide with a sword. Just as he began his act, the sword, when he suddenly realized the inward vision, 2 

3 Vakkali was free from all craving at the Buddha, and the excessive importance which he attached to the physical body—a putrid body (pathikā)—of the Master was as obstacle to his spiritual advance. In order to create in him a ‘holy fear’ (parāsāya), the Buddha commanded him to go. Desperate at being no longer able to see the Master, Vakkali decided to commit suicide by throwing himself down from a mountain, saying: ‘What have I to do with this life, if I can no longer see Him?’ At this moment the Master appeared and presented him thus ‘destroying the conditions of his reaching the Path (sarnavipasana).’  

4 Vakkali was suffering from a painful illness. Bhagavat came to comfort him and said: ‘Your death will be a holy one, an auspicious one (ṣapāloka).’ When the Master had gone, Vakkali uttered for the last time the Buddhist profession of faith (universal transitoriness) and took the sword.  

5 Godhika was unable because of disease to remain in a certain state of meditative concentration. He thought: ‘I will sacrifice myself with a sword.’ Māṇa approached the Buddha and told him: ‘Your disciple wants to die; he has resolved to die. Prevent him.’ How could one of your disciples die while he is not yet an arhat? But, as it is explained in the Aṭṭhakathābuddhiyapakā, Godhika reached arhatship after he had begun cutting his throat. It is said: ‘Those who take the sword are without regard for life; they will get insight (vījñāna) in the ring of life itself.’ Thus act the seven ones (sabba), they desire not life; having removed thirst and the root of thirst (that is, ignorance), Godhika is at rest.”

5. The nirvāna of the great saints. — Vakkali was an arhat, but, as he did not possess the power of ‘loosening the anusāsana of life,’ he had, in order to die, to take the sword. On the other hand, Sākyamuni and, in later sources, a number of saints—e.g., Mahāpajapati Gotami in the Aṭṭhakathā—possess such a power. The Sanskrit Aṭṭhakathā 7 tells us that it belongs only to saints who have reached the nirvāṇa without resits.  

In the case of Sākyamuni we have to deal with a voluntary death; in the case of Mahāpajapati, who has to obtain permission of Sākyamuni before she resolves to die, we have to deal with a voluntary death of a slightly different character. The Pratyekabuddhas also sacrifice themselves for themselves when the ‘time’ has arrived; their method is to rise a few cubits above the ground and burn themselves. We can easily understand that a Buddha, when he has set in motion the wheel, when he has elected two chief disciples—briefly, when he has done what he had to do—is duly authorized to enter into the final rest. The case of an arhat is not different; the arhat also has achieved what he had to achieve—i.e. he has removed the slightest kind of desire. If he is not, like a Buddha, capable of abandoning life in a quiet way, there is no reason why he should not have recourse to more drastic methods.

6. Mahāyāna praises and deprecates suicide as self-surrender and worship. — The saint of the new Buddhism must, before reaching enlightenment, millions of lives in charity, worship, and meditation. ‘Abandoning one’s existence’ (atmanas tyāgāth, atmanahvandayoga) is to be looked upon as the best self-sacrifice. Boeddista says: ‘It is better than to give alms; and also as the best  

1 Tīrīkhyātī, 77.  
2 Tīrīkhyātī, 608.  
3 Ib. 350; Dhammapada’s Commentary, 351; also Asgūrata’s Commentary.  
4 Sānyutta, iii. 123.  
5 Cf. Kathāvatthu, i. 2.  
6 The Ākoṭa-patipada deals with suicide in SBE xxii. 13, and Vol. i. 3.  
7 Pārijātika, iii.; see SBE xiii. 1881; 4.  
worship, for to burn one's body as an offering is certainly more meritorious than to kindle lamps at a shrine. We may refer (1) to the story of the future Sakyamuni giving his body to feed a starving tigress, and (2) to the legend of Bhairajyharaja, who offered his body—distilled with all his wits—so to feed the starving tigress, that the tigress became a bodhisattva, some of which are told in the canon of ancient Buddhism (Charjirajputa, Jatak). The new scriptures are inexhaustible on this topic.

In accordance with the principles of the new Buddhism and the Légende dorée of the eternal Buddhism, self-surrender culminating in voluntary death has been held in honour in various Buddhist countries. It happened, on a minister of the presidency of the Great Vehicled Buddhist Church in Japan, the "burning of the skull" is an essential part of ordination as a future Buddha—a symbol of the holocaust for which human courage is nowadays inadequate. The pupil is said that Indians abashed from suicide and, in general, from self-torture. Whether this statement be accurate or not, it does not believe it to be quite applicable to Buddhists, for from the present strong deprecation such practices. One of the chief aims of Sāntās in his Sākṣinamuchchaya, a Comparison of the Rules of the Discipline of that vast Vehicular Church is to elucidate this point: In what measure is a disciple—a beginner—to imitate the heroic deeds of the bodhisattva of old? The disciple is ready, willing, and resolved even to burn himself for the sake of another, not to mention sacrificing his limbs and body; but he must avoid any mistake in the realization of his resolve. The question is whether in such and such a case sacrifice or self-denial is really useful to our fellow-creatures; whether there is not some other means of procuring universal welfare. To sum up, the sacrifice of one's body is not in accordance with the spiritual needs of a beginner.


1. Legendary suicides. The earliest definite mention of suicide in Greek literature is the case of Epikastes (Tokaste), the mother of Oedipus of Thebes, in the Nekyia. Oedipus tells how in Hades "I saw the mother of Oedipus, fair Epikaste, who wrought an awful deed in ignorance of mind, marrying her own son. And he had slain his father and he married her. And presently the gods made it known to men. Then he in lovely Thebe endured sorrow and ruled over the Kadmeans by the grievous counsel of the gods. But she went to the house of Hades, fastening a high hooze from the lofty hall, hidden by her widows and to her she left sorrows in the aftertime full many, even all that the Erinyes of a mother bring to pass."

The precise motive for suicide is not very clear indicated here, but rather Homer does not distinguish clearly between the horror of Epikaste at the revolting nature of the situation in which she unwittingly had been involved, and the self-sacrifice in the face of her deed becoming known. But the essential points are that (1) suicide presents itself to Homer as the natural and fitting act when life has lost all that makes life worth living, and (2) no blame attaches to suicide in itself. 1 New ed., London, 1910. 2 Hom. Od. xi. 371 ff.
But the most famous and indeed the typical herculean hero of the Iliad, who does not mention his suicide explicitly, but it is clearly alluded to in Od. xi. 548 ff., where Odysseus expresses his regret at having obtained the arms of Achilles:

\[
\text{οὐχὶ \ νῦν θαλάσσων \ Αἰαὶς \ αὐτὸν \ νοῦς \ γεῖτον,} \\]

\[
\text{Ἀττικὴν \ οὐ \ εἰς \ αὐτὸν \ φιλογένθησαν \ τὰ \ ἀρmanentα \ τοῦ \ Αχιλλείου.} \]

His suicide was recounted in the Athênikos of Arktinos in connection with the award of the arms of Achilles to Odysseus. 1 It is to be noted that so far there is no indication that the death of Aias was mourned by the Greeks equally with that of Achilles, the Little Iliad 2 told of the withholding of burial honours. But even so there is nothing to indicate that the suicide in itself was considered blameworthy. It is an act quite in accordance with the haughtiness and self-sufficiency which characterize Aias in Homer, and of which the famous 'silence of Aias' in Od. xi. 553 ff., so admired by the author of the treatise On the Spondees, 3 is a fitting expression. The suicide of Aias is the typical act of a great soul which cannot brook dishonour.

A motive of the less heroic kind which prompts to suicide is the desire to feel sorry for the dead. The feeling is one familiar to Homer. 'If I lose thee, it were better for me to go beneath the earth,' says Andronomachus to Hektor, 4 in the same spirit, in which Aias is extolled for his death beyond all else he has grieved him and brought him to untimely age. She is in grief for her glorious son perished by a miserable death (καθῆται μετ' ὀνείρου πόλεμου), so may some person who dwells here friendly to me and doing friendly deeds. 5

The natural inference from these words is strongly confirmed by the reference to her in Od. xi. 84 ff. and 197 ff. The later story said frankly that she hanged herself. 6

The list of such suicides is a long one.

Achilles himself, as is mentioned in the Iliad, has a sort of temporary reconciliation with his son when he left for Crete, carrying the annual tribute of the Athenians to the Minotaur, that, if Theseus was successful in slaying the monster, a white serpent shall be hoisted upon the returning vessel. 7 Theseus forgot to take down the black sail which the ship was flying, and Alcmena, thinking that his son had perished, threw herself from the rock on which he was keeping watch into the sea (αἰγίαν) which thereunto bore his name. 8 Ephione, daughter of Hades, hanged herself when she found the dead body of her father, 9 Ixion committed suicide when his daughters had hanged themselves. 10 When Eurydice throws herself on the funeral pyre of her husband, her father Hades threatens to commit suicide by starvation. 11

A special case of suicide to avoid shame is that to escape sexual dishonour.

Legend told how the Lapidaker received its name from Leukatia, who, to escape the unwelcome advances of Apollo, plunged into the sea off the island of Leukas. 12 Passanias tells us 13 how the daughters of Sisyphus of Leukas hanged themselves near the Mount of the Violence offered them by certain Lacedaemonians.

Suicide, in the sense of self-devotion for one's country, has always been a prominent feature in patrician saga. Kodos, the last king of Athens, is a famous example.

The Lacedaemonians, under pressure of famine, resolved to invade Attica. But first they consulted the Delphic oracle as to their prospects of taking Athens and, receiving an answer that they would be successful if they did not kill the Athenian king, marched on the city. Glaucias, a Delphian, secretly communicated to the Athenians the purport of the oracle. Kodos thereupon dressed himself as a beggar and stole out of the besieged city and proceeded to gather firewood. When two enemy scouts approached him, he slew one of them with his hatchet, whereupon the other, taking him for a beggar, drew his sword and slew him, thus rendering the capture of Athens impossible. 14

There is the similar story of Macaria, daughter of Herakles and Deianeira. 15 That such a death was deemed a glorious one is sufficiently attested.

2. Heroic suicide.—The motives which in the Homeric poems seem mainly to be regarded as prompting to suicide are of a heroic nature—the sense of dishonour suffered or impending, the devotion of a high soul, or the personal sorrow of a personal bereavement. The sense of the common ills of humanity is by no means ignored—τοις ἱματίας ἰσόν ἔχειν θανάτον. 16 But there is no pessimism. Wherever the evil is indulged in it is seen human life, at least it is a good thing to enjoy the sun, and the darkest shadow that falls about Homeric life is the sense not of its burden but of its brevity. Life at any level is to be preferred to the sunless realms of Hades. 17

But with the rise of reflection, as witnessed in the poetry of the age succeeding the Homeric, we have a view of life which is far less builtin. We are led to conceive the present to be an age of iron, thrown into darker relief by the picture of a happier golden age gone by. 18

That life is an evil has become a commonplace. τάκτων μή μὴ σιδάρως σιδήρως ὁμορραγεῖ; is a doctrine which becomes a hackneyed phrase of later poetry—τοῦ μὲν δὲ παρασκευής ὑπαξιόντος, κρατεῖται εἰς σοφι τὸν σιδήρως ὁμορραγεῖ; The logical consequence of this view of life is that man is justified in ending what he cannot mend. Whether, in fact, this pessimistic view of life actually induced an increased practice of suicide is more difficult to establish. But in any case motives of a less heroic kind seem now to be recognized as worthy causes of suicide. Thus poverty is expressly recognized by Theognis as a sufficient cause.

The historians.—In the historians of the 5th cent. suicide is not a particularly prominent feature, and belongs in general to one or other of the types already noticed.

Herodotus relates the legend of Nitokris, who, in order to escape punishment for her misdeeds, committed suicide by leaping into a room full of ashes. 19 Arion is compelled by the fury of the Phaeacians to commit suicide, with the prospect of being buried ashore, or to jump into the sea. 20 The daughter of Mykerinas, being violated by her father, hanged herself from grief. 21 Shana was the mother for the suicide of Sparagripus, leader of the Massegaeti, who in a state of intoxication were surprised and killed or captured by the Persians. 22 And we have the parallel stories of Othryades, who, aiming to return to Sparta, was killed and his body thrown to the sea, and of his son, who was killed himself at Thyreai, 23 and of Pantctes, who, having suffered the disaster at Thermopylae, on his return to Sparta, being held in dishonour, hanged himself. 24

Lycurgus and Lysib. 25


2. Μετ' οὖν οὐκ εἰς Αἰαὺς φιλογένθησαν τὰ ἀρmanentα τοῦ Αχιλλείου.

3. Μετ' οὖν οὐκ εἰς Αἰαὺς φιλογένθησαν τὰ ἄρματα τοῦ Αχιλλείου.

4. Od. xi. 110.

5. Od. xii. 299.


8. Theogn. 167 ff.


12. Lycurg. c. Lysib. 84 ff.


16. Od. xii. 390 ff.

17. Works, 171 ff.

18. Ar. Suppl. 245 ff.

19. Od. xii. 390 ff.

20. Th. ii. 331 f.

21. Th. i. 151 ff.

22. Th. i. 492 ff.

23. Th. ii. 331 f.

24. Th. i. 151 ff.

25. Th. ii. 331 f.
Another late legend is that of Hero and Leander, the subject of the poem by Musaeus entitled Ρομακες ήρωας του Μουσαίου. Leander of Abydos swam the Hellespont nightly to visit his beloved Hero, the princess of Aphrodisa at Sardis. Being caught in a storm, Leander was drowned. But on the morrow Leander was found as if alive, being washed up by the waves to the shore. He is said to have been carried back to the place where he fell, being washed up for thirteenth time, when the lamp was extinguished by the storm. Now morning his dead body was washed ashore, and Hero threw herself from her tower to join him in death. 

The motives of such suicides are not always identical and no doubt were sometimes complex. Sometimes it was the last sacrifice of devotion, a tradition become a religion, like the Indian satis or our own proud tradition that the captain goes down with his ship.

Where the suicide considers himself responsible for another's death, his own death may appear to be due as an act of atonement.

But without any such complications, we have the devotion of those who, truly and in their lives, in death would not be divided. When Kastor is slain by Idas, his brother Polydeuces cries: Our Father, Son of Kronos, what release shall there be from sorrow? Give me also to die with him, O Lord. Honour is departed for him who is heir of friends. And the more one knows of the religious thoughts of the Greeks, the less is one inclined to disparage the influence of the motive to which Plato alludes—the hope of a blessed reunion hereafter: Ere now for human love, for death, and love, and love, and love. He was gone willingly to the house of Hades, drawn by the hope that in the world beyond they might see and be with those they loved.

In describing the execution by compulsory suicide of Thersamenes in 408 B.C., he says: When, being compelled to die, he drank the hemlock that was brought to him, he was said that he threw what was left of it as in the game of cotabos, crying, This this for the fair Kritias! This the first occurrence of the word εκείνος in the history of the Greeks, the only one in Xenophon. When the practice of execution by compulsory poisoning was introduced in Athens, we do not know, nor when hemlock first became the recognized poison. But it was used for this purpose, we may with probability suppose, first became regular in the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C. Even in the orators, however, references to it are surprisingly rare. It is not mentioned in Antiphon, the last tragic poet of Athens, except once.

Lysias refers to it twice. It is not found in Demostenes, Lycurnus, Dinarchus. The advantages of hemlock-drinking over other more


R. II. 5; cf. the case of Socrates (n. xii. 3).

Holl, iv. vii. 38. 1.

1223.

Hered. i. 65.

Pind. V. i. 767.

Plato, 66 A.

Plato, 516.

C. C. 207f., 17, and Her. 416b. v. v. 119. 66b. (Or. 19) 24.
cumbrous methods of suicide are referred to in the Frogs of Aristophanes (405 B.C.). It was the method used by the Athenian women whom the shameful conduct of the characters of Euripides drove to suicide, according to Sophocles, whose play what they would-be benefactor. His daughter, Erigone, guided to the spot by his faithful dog Mair, hanged herself on a branch. Then there broke out among the Athenian women an epidemic of hanging, which abated only when the Athenians discovered the cause and instigated the Alcmaeon festival in honour of Erigone.

Plutarch tells of a similar outbreak at Miletos which, obscure in origin, was generally attributed to atmospheric conditions:

'A strange and terrible affliction once came upon the maidens of Miletos, from some obscure cause—most likely it was conjectured that some poisonous and ecstatic temperament of the atmosphere produced them in a mental upset and frenzy. For there fell suddenly upon all of them a desire of death and a mad impulse towards hanging. Many hanged themselves before they could be prevented. The words and the tears of their friends, the persuasions of their friends, had no effect. In spite of all the ingenuity and cleverness of those who watched them, they succeeded in making away with themselves. The plague seemed to be of an unusually character and beyond human remedy, until on the motion of a wise man a resolution was proposed that women who hanged themselves should be carried out to burial through the market-place. The vindication of this resolution not only checked the evil but altogether put an end to the passion for death. A great evidence of the high character and virtue of the women was this striking occurrence and the fact that they who were fearless in face of the two most awful things in the world—death and pain—could not support the appearance of disgrace nor bear the thought of shame after death.'

Suicides, in whose time hemlock as a means of suicide appears to have come to vogue was a native of Ceos, and we have seen above that Theophrastus ascribes to the Cens certain improvements in the method of preparing that poison. There is evidence that at some period suicide by drinking hemlock was a recognized practice—if not a legal regulation—in Ceos for persons who had passed the age of 60. Strabo (63 B.C.—A.D. 22), speaking of Julius, the chief town in Ceos, birthplace of Simondes and his nephew Bacchylides, says:

'νομίζω τε γαρ ἡ δεκαπεντάχτετη ἡμέρα, ἄνεφοι καὶ ὡματικοὶ καὶ Ἑμπληκόντες [632-609 π.Χ.] "τὸ καθίσαμεν πόλις Ἑμπληκόντες, ἤ δεκαπεντάχτετην ἡμέρα, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπάρχοντα. Προστά εὑρεμόν, ὦ σύ, ὑμνοὶ, τούτοις ὑστεροῖς ἡμῖν ἀπειλήθηκεν ἡμεῖς, τῶν αὐτῶν ἑμπληκόντων καὶ παρακλημένων δε σώσθαι τῇ Ἀτρειδείᾳ, φροντίσατε ταῦτα τούτα τούτα ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀκολουθήσει, ἡμών μὲν πάντα, τούτων δὲ κατακτήσας παρακαλῶ.

Stephanus of Byzantium writes to the same effect. So too Eleian. So too the Roman author who wrote under Tiberius, attests a similar practice for Massilia and tells of the Ceans practice as he had actually witnessed it. In Thebes, too, the treatment of suicides attracted some remark. In Athens such differential treatment as we hear of is of a religious rather than of a legal nature. The suicide as a victim of violence belongs to the class of those whose spirits 'walk.' According to a statement in Suidas, suicides and other victims of violent and untimely death were buried in a special place. We find a similar ordinance given by Plato. To the same order of ideas belongs the Athenian custom of burying the land which wrought the

Servius and Probus on Vergil, Georg. ii. 399; Hygin. Fab. 120; Ariston. a. d.; Pellen, i. 25; Hesych. s. v. Alcestes and "Among"; Rhetorica Magna, ed. F. Syburg, Leipzig, 1815, s. v. Alcestis; schoel. Hom. II. xxv. 3; Athen. xiv. 651 E. P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P. on the other and ancient writers on the subject is P.
S U I C I D E (Greek and Roman)

seems to have used the term, afterwards so familiar in the Stoics, ἀγαθοφοροῦμαι, to denote suicide. Diogenes is said to have recommended suicide to Antisthenes.

According to Diog. Laert. vi. 18, when Antisthenes was lying upon his deathbed, Diogenes visited him, carrying a dagger; and, when Antisthenes said, 'Who will deliver me from my troubles?', Diogenes, showing him the dagger, said, 'This.' There is a similar story in Diog. Laert. vi. 74, where, on one occasion Sosippos, driving in his carriage to the Academy, saw Diogenes and wished him good-day (quae eis), to which he replied that he would not wish him the same τὸν οὖν diaphthon τοῖς τοῖς πυρίνοις λόγοις τοῖς τοῖς πυρίνοις λόγοις.

On the other hand, the Academic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean schools were all opposed to suicide, at any rate in theory.

With regard to the Academics it may suffice to quote the story of Carneades, who, when he heard that the Stoic Antipater had committed suicide by drinking poison, exclaimed: 'Give me, too, too much.' And, when his friends said, 'What?'

'At least brute' (ζώοντος), he said.

The Peripatetics hold that the excellences of the soul are superior to the excellences of the body and other external excellences; yet they aim at the other excellences, first, as desirable for their own sakes, and, next, as being useful πρὸς τὸν ἰδίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν πλῆθος καὶ δι καὶ πρὸς τὴν θεωρείαν. παράρεισον γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς βασιλεύοντι καὶ ταῖς ἀπολώνεντι ταῖς διάφοροι σκέψεις. Their attitude to suicide is thus in sharp contrast to that of the Stoics.

As regards the Epicureans, believing as they did in the extinction of the soul at death, self-destruction was looked on as harmless, and it might well seem that life at any level was at least worth something, and it would be folly to cast that away for the nothingness of the grave. It would seem that the Epicureans, when they themselves particularly in pointing out the folly of committing suicide through fear of the terrors of death.

'Death, that most dreaded of ills, is nothing to us. For while we are not death is not: and when death has come, we are not.

Death, then, is nothing to the living nor yet to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter no longer exist. The crowd, to be sure, at one time shrinks from death in the world of evils, at another choose it as a refuge from the miseries of life. But the wise man neither declines life nor shrinks from death, since life is not distasteful to him, nor does he think it an evil not to be lived.'

The Cynics seem in general to have been opposed to suicide. Theodorus, counting the world his country and disbelieving in friendship, held that even suicide was for the country was unjustifiable. Χείρισια, on the other hand, preached suicide so frankly as to earn the title of Ἀφθονίαρχος, and with such success as to provoke the interference of the Stoics.

7. Religion.—From the religious point of view suicide was regarded always as a crime, a violation of the social order. We have seen that Orphic teaching condemned suicide. But it is impossible to regard this condemnation as limited to so confined a circle. The more one reflects on the evidence, the more one is forced to the conclusion that much which we ascribe to the Orphics is really part of the general tradition—part of the popular belief. The sort of doctrine which Plato ascribes to one at a moment to the mystics he at another ascribes to popular belief. In any case the belief in immortality is described in the Ἄργων as among τὰ ψυχομετρά, among the popular beliefs. And popular belief certainly differentiated between the fortune after death of the suicide and of those who died a natural death (ἡδύς or μακρόπορος, mortes suas). Already in Homer it is difficult to account for the position of Antikles, the mother of Odysseus, on any other supposition than that

2. Il. iii. viii. 5.
3. Il. iii. viii. 53.
5. Il. vii. 236.
7. Il. vii. 236.
9. Il. vii. 236.
15. Phaedo, op. Cit.
17. Phaedo, op. Cit.
20. Phaedo, op. Cit.
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67. Phaedo, op. Cit.
SUICIDE (Greek and Roman)

she is a suicide and thus not admitted immediately to the realm of Hades. We have seen above that, according to the Greeks, the dead, or those who had been deprived of certain rites of burial. The same feeling is at the bottom of the practice of severing the right hand of the suicide and burying it apart from the rest of the body. So in our own country suicides used to be buried at the marches in a no man's land: or, if in the churchyard, the body must be passed over by the wall and not enter by the gate. As popular religion regarded with horror all shedding of blood, all intercourse with the natural bounds of life, so it regarded with a peculiar horror the shedding of kindred blood. The Greek language hardly distinguishes between self-murder and murder of kin. The suicide belongs to the class of the victims of violent and untimely death: θανάσεως (or, in late use, θανάσιμος) — the death on birth or in age, the unborn victim of abortion, regarding the fate of whom the popular mind was peculiarly sensitive. It seems probable that these religious taboos, as such, arose relatively late, when the idea was the really active motives at all periods of ancient Greece in condemning the practice of suicide.

3. Suicide under the Empire.—That suicide was extremely prevalent under the Empire, at any rate among the higher ranks of society, cannot be doubted. Nor are the causes which condemned it to this state of affairs difficult to conjecture. The most important were probably chiefly two: on the one hand the decay of religious belief and on the other the great popularity of a school of philosophy which was favourable to suicide. With regard to the first, however, it is to be remarked that it does not appear that even in Republican times suicide, for sufficient cause, was considered to be inconsistent with piety. The Stoic teaching suited in general the typical Roman character, and, in particular, the Stoic teaching in regard to suicide found ready acceptance among the educated classes under the Empire. In this matter the Stoic position appeared even to men who in other respects were at variance with the Stoics. In one sense the Stoic doctrine was merely a logical development from the position taken up by Plato. Even Plato had admitted suicide when some compelling συγγεγένεσις — some ineluctable constraint of circumstances — forced a man to end what he could not mend. The nature of this συγγεγένεσις or, as the Romans called it, necessitas or necessitudo, was so indefinite as to be capable of a very various interpretation. It only remained for later Stoics like Panaitios (c. 140 B.C.) and Posidonius (c. 130-60 B.C.) to interpret it in the sense of an external compulsion, but of an inner overpowering impulse. By this interpretation the whole philosophical anti-suicide position was undermined. It is clear that such a notion fell to be a disgraceful thing to commit suicide: the only thing worth considering was how to commit suicide with such bravery or bravado, such fortitude or such parade of fortitude, as would most appeal to the imagination. The morality of suicide was no longer in dispute: given such a situation as either from the individual point of view or from the point of view of his relation to the State appeared intolerable, then suicide was the obvious and expected course of action.

The pages of the writers of the Empire teem with suicides, and a glance at some of these will help to illustrate what was the current view of voluntary death.

Pliny the Younger, writing to Titus Aristides, as eminent lawyer whom he describes as inferior to none of the philosophers, "cassate, politea, judicia, fortitudinis," tells how, being affected by "longa et pertinax valetudo," he became sick. When the first symptoms appeared he resolved to end his own life. "You would be surprised, were you present, at the patience with which he bears this illness, holding out against pain, resisting the temptation to consult the physicians, enduring the unbelievable heat of fever while motionless and warmly covered. He lately summoned me and a few other special physicians."

Servius on this passage tells us that certain posthumous penalties attached to this form of suicide:

Some scholions to cassata suavitatem libris et alique vitam illius, mercurio abierant. . . . Classics autem Hirts (the oldest Roman annotator) says: "Tartarinus suum cum cæcum populos facere coegisset et ob hanc informam sese suspicissime acerbae, lucentia corpora sors crudel affligit: tunc primus parum habuit et mortem eet se sciencere." Et Varro ait: "Suspendisse quibus insta sit sua non sit, suspensis caelatis velut per chiasmationes mortis parentem." It is clear in any case that the grounds on which this particular kind of suicide was condemned were religious or vv. 1-22.

The meaning of these scholia we have seen above in connexion with the Athenian festival of the Alca;

31

1 Od. vi. 321.
2 Pliny. Pyth. ii. 36 R.
3 Ovid. Trag. 1606.
6 See Cic. Pro Sexto, 45, pro Scipion. 11 ff.
7 Livy. viii. 91, f. x. 22.
8 Ib. l. 67.
9 Ib. 577; cf. Ovid, Fasti, i. 741 ff.
friends and requested us to consult his physicians about the issue of his illness, with the intention of voluntarily departing from life, if his illness were incurable, while on the other hand, if it were curable, he would bear up and face it; for so much, he thought, was due to the necessities of his wife, the tears of his daughter, even to his friends, that he should not by voluntary death abandon our hopes, if only they were not vain. Such conduct I consider eminent courage and praiseworthiness. For to rush to death under the influence of an impulse and an instinctive feeling is no more than to rush in fear and, still more, to rush to death under the motives for and against, and then, as reason advises, to accept or reject the policy of life or death, is that the conduct of a great soul.

In A.D. 101 the poet Silius Italicus committed suicide by abstention from food. Pliny says: "It has just been announced that Silius Italicus has ended his life by starvation (suumus) in his Neapolitan villa. Bad health was the cause. He had developed incurable tumour and, weary of it, he betook himself to death with irreproachable firmness. Up to his last day he had been happy and fortunate, with the exception of the deaths of the younger of his two children."1

In Ep. iii. 16 Pliny celebrates the heroic conduct of Arriva, who, when her husband Cecina Postus was condemned for his share in the conspiracy of Serbinianus against Claudius in A.D. 42, encouraged her husband to commit suicide, first stationing herself in front of the dagger thrown to her husband with the words 'Paete, non dolet.' This famous suicide is the subject of an epigram of Martial.

A somewhat similar story is told in Pliny.2 A special interest attaches to the type of suicide mentioned by Pliny in Ep. iii. 9.

Cecilius Claeusius, proconsul of Bactria A.D. 96-90, was accosted by a man who, having anticipates his own death by a written suicide note, "falsely accused him of being a man of notorious evil intentions. Intimation is conveyed, more or less explicitly, to the party concerned that his death is desired. The advantages of this form of compulsory suicide over actual execution were apparently purely aesthetic, but probably the main advantage was that it seemed to make the guilty person his own judge and executioner and thus relieved the emperor of the clearance problems associated with an actual execution. This method left to a man his 'choice of death'—what was known as 'liberum mortis arbitrium,' or merely 'mortis arbitrium.'"3

Other examples of compulsory suicide recorded in the Annals of Tacitus are Silanus,4 Poppea Sabina,5 Silvanus,6 Narcissus,7 Julius Montanus,8 Thrasea Postumus,9 Scribonius,10 Potidamus,11 Valerius Asiaticus,12 Arruntius,13 Anteus.14

Three examples may be selected as being the suicides of notable men with regard to whose last moments we possess detailed records—the poet Lucan, the emperor Nero, and the sextus Scæneus.

The suicide of Lucan in A.D. 65 is thus described by Tacitus:15

Exim Um. M. Anael Lucan comediam imperat (sc. Nero). Ita profusissima sanguine, ut Frigores petesacuisse, et pulsilium ab extremis cedere spiritum, fervido adhuc et compote mentis pector, intellectu; recordavi satis se compassu, quo vulneratum nilime, per elusmus mortis imaginem chias trasacturus, versus ipsius conscripsit (Phars. iii. 620-662), saepe illi suprema vox fuit.16

The suicide of Nero has often been described.17 The account given by Suetonius18 is too long to quote. The story of Scæneus's death is told in Tacitus, Ann. xxv. 60-63.

It appears that in those moments every suicide was more or less a posterior, who was expected to make his suicide remark remarkable by some remarkable word or act. Hence Tacitus remarks: 'Senecon ... et

1 Ep. iii. 7.
2 Ep. iii. 14.
4 Ann. vi. 29.
5 lib. 1.
6 lib. 16.
7 lib. 141, 4, lib. 18, iii. 15, 17.
8 Digesta Respons., lib. 23.
9 Ep. iii. 9.
10 Ep. iii. 9.
11 Ep. vi. 29.
12 Ep. vi. 35.
13 Ep. vi. 11: circitum mors. ad se imporabat, ut voluntariae, nec per praedictam, ut voluntariae.
14 Dac. Donn. 8.
15 Tac. Ann. xxx. 23.
16 Tac. Ann. xxv. 60-63.
17 Ep. iii. 19.
18 Ep. vi. 22.
19 Ep. vii. 11.
20 Ep. vi. 23.
21 Ep. vi. 18.
23 Ep. vi. 70.
24 Cfr. Sueton. Vit. Luc. 1: 'imperatru autem mortis libero arbritio, codicilium ad patrem de conscillis libellus dixit, quem Clodius Saulus exuvavit: epulataque largiter, brachia ad securdas renas erigit praeludia.'
The individual point of view was much insisted upon in the later Stoicism. The same set of circumstances might in a given case lead to suicide, in another not. A situation of intolerable shame, for instance, might be for an ordinary man, a sufficient ground for suicide. Yet it might be the duty of another man, whose life was essential to the State, to reject the temptation. A man's death must be in consonance with his life.

Fugitive, according to Lucian, οἱ σκευεσμένοι τοῖς τετέλεσθαι τοῖς τετέλεσθαι αἰσθήματι τοῖς τετέλεσθαι. 

This doctrine of 'propriety' is expanded in a well-known passage of Cicero's De Officiis, which is of course based upon Anaxarchus.

III. CONCLUSION.—Our review, then, of the history of suicide among Greeks and Romans shows that at all times the only valid motives against the practice of suicide have been, in the main, not ethical but religious. And consequently the penalties attached to suicide are not so much civil as religious. They affect a man's condition not here but in the hereafter. The withholding of the rites of burial, the severance of the right hand, and so forth, all belong to the religious circle of ideas. When religions change, the right hand becomes a symbol of meaning and are not replaced by other values then, as in the case of the Cynics, there was no antagonism to suicide. When, on the other hand, the life hereafter was considered to be of importance, then in comparison with that after life the life here seemed of little account, there was an obvious impulse to suicide. But that impulse was resisted and concerted so much the invention of Plato on the ground of a higher law, a great mystery which demands that we should think again of our prison-house till God shall please to set us free; by the Neo-Platonists because suicide is ipso facto detrimental to the soul. The whole question is admirably put in Macrobius, Comm. in Somni. Scip. i. 13. 

Hec Platonicæ sectae semina alius Pictorius exsequitur. Oportet, inquit, animam post hominem liberam corporis passionibus invinant. Quam qui de corpore vestro extrudio, liberae esse non potest. Qui enim sibi sua sponte necem comparat, antiqui nuncios, saepe alios consensum at hoc descendit aut odio; quae omnia in tepidum habereat; ergo eis ante tuis servum purum, loco impudendi aequi, quod ex eo aerius exorat, sectatur. Deinde mortem debere ali animae corporis solutionem esse, non vivum, extra animam corpusque usque ad inferioris animae, in quod infecta manos est, pervagatur: non contra illa anima, quae quod in hac vita in vita corpora philosophiae mortis dissolventur, adhuc extantiae corporis cadet adierit inanceram.


A. W. MAIR.

SUIQUE (Hindi) — I. Vedic. — In view of the devotion to life and its pleasures which marks the Bràhmanas, and which is reflected in the disapproval therein implied of the practice of satti, it is not surprising that no trace of the custom of religious suicide can be found in that text. Nor in the later Sanskrit and the Brahma-sûtras is there any clear recognition of such a usage, unless we accept the suggestion of Hillebrandt that the consecration ceremony (dikṣa), which is an essential preliminary to the most important of all religious acts, is simply a faded form of the older practice of suicide by fire. While it is true that the generation of heat in the man who undergoes the rite is an important feature of it, the purpose of this practice is nothing but the fasting which constitutes even a more essential
element of the ceremony, may much more naturally be deemed to be to produce the psychological condition best suited for the performance of the sacrifice. There are, however, in the Brahmanas two doctrines which undoubtedly pave the way for the sacrifice from religious motives. In the first place, there is developed the conception that the proper sacrifice is that of a man's self, and that other forms of offering are substitutions; in the second, place, it is claimed that the latest of the great Brahmanas, the Sātapatha,⁵ the closing act of both the puruṣa-mātha and the sarvamātha, the human and the universal sacrifices, is the giving away of the self as the whole of his possessions, including in the latter case even the land, and his wandering into the forest, doubtless as a preliminary to an early death. The teaching of the Upāṇisads, which is the first, is laid down in a compact form, and it may enter upon the great journey, or choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning by fire, or by a hero's fate. Earlier evidence (and better proof of usage) is afforded by notices in the Divyāmāna in the Vasiṣṭha⁴ it is expressly stated that the world of Brahma is obtained by entering the fire; and in Apiṣṭha⁴ an interesting discussion which ends with a defence of secular life and death, as the view that in one view the ideal was for an ascetic first to live on fruits, roots, grass, and leaves only, then on those things alone which become spontaneously detached, then on water and air, and then on fire. With the testimony of Vasiṣṭha accords the record of the death on a pyre erected by his own wish of Kalana, an Indian follower and friend of Alexander, who fell ill at Pasargadae and decided on death, despite the opposition of the king, rather than alter his mode of life.⁷

2. Buddhism and Jainism.—It is characteristic of the general sanctity of Buddhism in its earliest form that the Buddha appears to have disapproved of suicide, as he disapproved of all excesses of ascetic fervour. But it would be surprising if the influence of the religion on Buddhism. The code of Jainism had not had its effect in making suicide reputable in certain communities. Not only is the duty of self-sacrifice deemed to excuse the action of the bodhisattva in committing suicide with the definite aim of being reborn as the fish whose flesh alone can save the people from disease, but self-destruction appears to be approved if undertaken with the desire of securing rebirth in such a condition as will permit entry into the Buddhist order.⁶

While this attitude is exceptional in Buddhism, Jainism frankly recognizes and commends religious suicide. It is dealt with at length in the Āyāra, the first Jāgisa, and the preliminaries are described in detail in the Ārya-prajñā-kārthika and the Śvetāmbara, the second and fourth of the Pāmas in one reckoning. But suicide is not permitted promiscuously; it is allowed to those ascetics who have acquired the highest degree of perfection, and it in essence consists of giving up begging, and lying down in a duly chosen place for death by voluntary starvation, by drowning, by fire, or by a hero's fate. Frequent mention is made of death being thus brought about by a month's abstinence (kālemāsa); this fate is recorded of the Tirthākara Pārvā, and Arīstānī, the latest of the great Tirthākara, of the layman Anābha, and of all those celebrated in the Udayaṃpada. At this supreme moment of his career the ascetic must not long after rebirth; in this world or as a god; he must not wish to live on or desire sensual pleasures, but equally he must not seek for death to come more swiftly. The final condition thus reached by the sage (sannātātta) is one of complete mental and physical reality, as it appears to the practical individual it is supposed to be the pannabhāsī, the last of the eight stages of man's existence as taught by Gosiḍa Makhākitha.² The popularity of the practice is attested by notices of Jainism: in 1712 thus died the great scholar and statesman Hemachandra, followed in a short time by his patron Kuminaprārāja; in 1212 a monk at Abhirabha, who had acquired full insight, may enter upon the great journey, or choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning by fire, or by a hero's fate. Earlier evidence (and better proof of usage) is afforded by notices in the Divyāmāna in the Vasiṣṭha it is expressly stated that the world of Brahma is obtained by entering the fire; and in Apiṣṭha an interesting discussion which ends with a defence of secular life and death, as the view that in one view the ideal was for an ascetic first to live on fruits, roots, grass, and leaves only, then on those things alone which become spontaneously detached, then on water and air, and then on fire. With the testimony of Vasiṣṭha accords the record of the death on a pyre erected by his own wish of Kalana, an Indian follower and friend of Alexander, who fell ill at Pasargadae and decided on death, despite the opposition of the king, rather than alter his mode of life.⁷

3. Hinduism, medieval and modern.—Hinduism stands firmly on the position that it is an religious suicide, while censuring ordinary forms of self-murder. Manu expressly permits a Brahmā, in circumstances explained (doubtless correctly) by the commentator of the Pāchasāstra, as of religious rites done by learned men. Mikhaila-tantra fully recognizes the wickedness of suicide; nevertheless the prince Duryodhana himself resolves to die by starvation, and for this purpose as the ceremony is a religious rite, done by learned men. A now aspect of suicide appears in connexion with the development of the devotion paid to the sectarian deities which is characteristic of Hinduism, for suicide now means not so much an abjuration in an impersonal and often with a very personal deity. The idea is reflected in the mythical account of the history of Mīrā Bīr, the

3. See F. G. Schneider, The Minor Upāṇisads, Madras, 1912, 39, 3001. The great journey is probably wandering on without food, death takes place.
4. xxiv. 4.
5. H. J. 30. 2.
6. A. A. 30. 2. A similar case is recorded of an Indian scribe who formed part of an embassy to Augustus in 28 B.C., and accompanied his court to Athens; but he had not the courage of his friend, and Strabo, xive, 1. p. 7293.
8. B. K. S. Iyengar, 166, 182.
12. N. coll. 20f.
devotee of Kṛṣṇa in the time of Akbar, who is recorded to have disappeared into a fissure which showed a sudden and complete change of her chosen divinity when she was paying homage to him at Dvārakā. Similar considerations doubtless prompted some of the comparatively rare suicides which took place during the time of Akbar and Jagannātha at Puri. Neither Chaitanya, to whose teaching the fame of the shrine was largely due, nor any of his followers appears to have encouraged or approved of any of these acts of self-sacrifice. A similar state of mind seems to have been made to it in the elaborate account of the car-procession by Kṛṣṇadāsa or by Abūl Faʿlā. It is not impossible that the conception may have been borrowed from Saiva Saivism, some fusion of the fire cults having taken place at Puri, but Chaitanya's own end was mysterious, and in his lifetime he had sought mystic union with the god in ecstatic trances through the intense vehemence of his spiritual devotion and the visions of sacred scenes that were the privilege of those who stood beneath the wheels of the car of Jagannātha can hardly be deemed unnatural or surprising.

The wide-spread nature of the custom, and its prevalence both with and without Brahmanical sanction, are attested by H. T. Colebrooke from personal observation just at the opening of the 19th century. The local custom of following the holy car-processions is frequently repeated to prevent the practice of suicide on the island of Sāgar, at the mouth of the Ganges, where, in pursuance of vows, not only were children cast into the sea to be devoured by sharks but grown-up persons voluntarily undertook the same fate. This practice was confined to the lower castes, as was also the custom by which men used annually to hurl themselves from a precipice in the mountains south of the Narmadā, sacred to Kāl Bhairava, in fulfillment of vows undertaken at an earlier period. This rite was carried out by mountaineers; great concourses gathered at the place on the new moon of Pūrī, as the day appointed for the ceremony, and it is significant of the passion for public recognition as part of the motive of such suicides that the man meditating this fate was wont to publish publicly his intentions, and, attended by a band of musicians, to promenade in the neighbouring towns collecting alms. On the other hand, not only did the practice of cast (v.c.) flourish under Brahmanical auspices, but the custom of suicide by drowning at the specially holy spot of the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges was approved, while the practice of lepers coming together in the temple of Dākinī, and at the moment of its religious character, though it is of course impossible to prevent suicide on the part of those who regard such a fate as a logical outcome of the religious convictions which they hold.

So far as religious suicide has been approved in India, it is significant that it has been in cases of men who have lived a full life and acquired a high measure of ascetic power, and that suicide in other cases has never been condoned and has instead been strongly condemned. There is obviously comparatively little essential distinction between the practice of austerities to a pitch which deprives the ascetic of all material and mental activity, and the actual termination of life; an intermediate stage is furnished by the cataleptic condition which the Yogi seeks to induce, and of which the most famous case is that of Hartita, who even survived burial for considerable periods. But in its essence the practice can hardly be traced to any origin other than the effort to supply a rational ground for old and inhuman usage by which the aged head of a family might be cast out to die, when he became too old to rule or bo of service to his kindred—a usage for which there is reason to believe the Rigveda. In place of the violent removal of the elders there was substituted the doctrine that in old age it was the duty and privilege of a man to adopt a hermit's life, unless he preferred to forego the use of his own will an existence which had become burdensome. The essentially popular character of the practice is proved conclusively by the pertinacity with which the tradition held on from the earliest period, though the doctrine of the sanctity of life as adopted by them otherwise would have forbidden approval of the custom.


SUICIDE (Japanese.—Japan is known as a country in which an unnumbered number of people commit suicide. According to the latest statistics, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics of the Japanese Government, the number of deaths by suicide in the ten years preceding 1915 was as follows:

Year | Population | Number of Deaths | Deaths by Suicide | Suicides per One Million Inhabitants
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1905 | 47,078,200 | 1,001,661 | 9,412 | 197
1906 | 48,104,761 | 1,067,283 | 9,480 | 191
1907 | 48,685,824 | 1,039,447 | 9,685 | 193
1908 | 50,264,471 | 1,051,994 | 10,363 | 207
1909 | 51,684,341 | 1,094,284 | 10,773 | 213
1910 | 52,756,304 | 1,043,906 | 10,753 | 207
1911 | 52,331,723 | 1,057,296 | 10,773 | 207
1912 | 53,362,592 | 1,077,577 | 11,942 | 225
1913 | 54,142,441 | 1,101,215 | 12,756 | 234

The same returns give the number of deaths by suicide according to sex and age, as shown on Table 1. According to the methods employed, the number of deaths is as shown on Table 2. Some of the principal causes of suicide are shown on Table 3.

Among the methods of suicide used by Japanese the following three are unique and worthy of description:

1. Harakiri ('belly-cutting'), more commonly known as Seppuku or Seppu-ndo.
2. Ikarai or Ikarai-sugi, or 'cutting the veins and arteries'.
3. The latest is the ipek or 'breaking the head'.

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### Table 1

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<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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...and widely practised during the Sengoku period of internal strife. During the Tokugawa period the practice developed into a complicated system with much etiquette and formality.

...it was not mere suicide. It was an institution, legal and ceremonial, invented in the middle ages, by which warriors could expiate their crimes, apologize for error, escape from disgrace, redeem their friends or prove their sincerity. 1

The most notable historical case of hara-kiri is that of the 47 Ronin, in 1708. The daimyo Asano had been obliged to commit hara-kiri to stave for an unjustifiable attack upon Kira, a nobleman in the Shogun's palace. A band of devoted followers, after long effort, avenged their master by assassinating Kira. They gave themselves up to justice and, under sentence, committed hara-kiri at the

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SUICIDE (Jewish) 37

homes of the dosim to whom, in groups, they had been entrusted. Their bodies were buried with respect at a Buddhist temple in Tokyo; and to this day many admirers of their chivalrous loyalty pay homage at their tomb.

When the puppet regime was selected in some garden facing a residence, sheltered at the back and sides by curtains of white cotton. Within the curtained enclosure were placed two mules, the future cremation vehicle. The condemned seated himself upon the mattress in the presence of superintending witnesses, with a kinsman or special friend to act as an assistant. He was copied in special garments, and, after certain formal ceremonies, was handed a short sword with which to make the horizontal cut through the abdomen. The cut having been made, it was the duty of the assistant to quickly vomit, that the agony of death might be short.

Though harakiri is no longer recognized as a form of public execution, the method is still not uncommon among those who seek to avoid the humiliation of public condemnation and punishment or the supposed disgrace of capture by the forces of an enemy in battle.

Differently (the act of cutting off the fingers of two parties) is the death together of unhappy lovers who seek escape from the difficulties of their earthly lot and entrance upon a happier life in the next world. For the accomplishment of this singular and frequent method, the lovers often tie themselves together with a strong rope. So common was this form of suicide among the lower classes during the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) that in the latter half of this period special regulations forbidding it, refusing formal burial to the bodies, and condemning to shame or exile any one who might survive the attempt. At present shinji is of smaller account in recent years than other forms of death, such as poison or mutilation beneath trains, have been employed.

(3) Junshi is suicide upon the death of one's lord or superior, who dies unexpectedly, leaving him in the next world. In ancient times this was an act of loyalty required by custom, until the emperor Suinin (29 B.C.-A.D. 70) ordered the substitution of clay images for the bodies of attendants and favourite animals. Junshi was revived during the feudal period, not as a requirement, but as a voluntary custom whereby loyal followers, through harakiri, expiate their devotion to their masters.

The drowning of almost the entire Taira clan in the western sea at the downfall of that clan and the junshi of hundreds of the family of Hojo Takedo at the end of his life are among the most striking manifestations of this junshi spirit. The custom was forbidden by the Shogunate in 1744, and, before the opening of the Meiji era, had become uncommon; but the term continued to be used.

Of these the most startling in recent times was the death by harakiri of General Negi and his wife, at the time of the funeral of the emperor Meiji, in Sept. 1912.


TASUKU HARADA.

SUICIDE (Jewish).—Only a very few cases of suicide are recorded in the OT. The ancient Hebrews were, on the whole, a naive people, joyous with life, and they lost few lives with the natural instinct of self-preservation. Nor are all of the few instances recorded on the ordinary level of suicidal occurrences. The case of Saul is the only one which, in the modern mind at any rate, excites loathing and reproablation. The suicide of Zimri (1 K 16:10) and of Abimelech (killed at his own request by his armour-bearer [Jg 9:49]) only leaves us cold; whilst, on the other hand, the death of Samson (Jg 16:31) and of Saul and his armour-bearer (1 S 31:1-13) inspire us with a sense of awe and a certain kind of admiration rather than any other feeling.

But, when later the people of the Dispersion became more and more affected by some of the evil influences around them, and the difficulties and perplexities of existence kept on increasing, a much less wholesome attitude towards life made itself perceptible. And, as cases of suicide became more frequent, it was at last found necessary to give a name to the evil. A suicide was thus, in exact legal terminology, described as 'one who purposely destroys himself.' In accordance with a general Rabbinical principle of legislation, an effort was, moreover, made to find support in the Scriptures for the new ideas and enactments which the practice of suicide brought in its train. In Midrash Rabba, 34, the prohibition of suicide is thus derived from the wording of Gn 9, the little word הָדַם כַּעַל הַשָּׁמָ脐 ('and surely your blood') being taken to include self-destruction. Dt 4 (Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul, lest thou forget the law which thy God commanded thee; and so sin) has been considered capable of similar interpretation, and some would even include suicide in 'Thou shalt not kill,' contained in the Ten Commandments. An indignantly rejected suggestion to crown one's sovereign with the crown of personal ruin is also by some discovered in Job 29 (cf. 7:5).

Considering some confusion of ideas which the elaborate treatment of the subject by J. Hamburger may produce in the reader's mind, it seems necessary to state that the Rabbinical, like the Christian and general, conception of the act entirely excludes submission to a death of martyrdom from even the category of condoned or permissible suicide, so long as the victims do not, under the stress of fear or suffering, lay violent hands on themselves (or, by mutual consent, on one another).

The difference between an act of self-destruction during martyrdom and martyrdom pure and simple is illustrated by the striking case of Hannah B. Tevundon, who, whilst suffering the pangs of death by fire during the Hadian persecutions, is reported to have replied to his discoursing visitors, 'I should open his mouth, so that the fire should enter it and consume me more quickly.' In these words: He who has given life should take it away, but let not a man destroy himself.' (though, on the other hand, he allowed the executioner to heap up the flames and otherwise hasten his end).

We must, therefore, limit ourselves to cases in which the act of death is in the life story and not the term itself, sinfully inflicted, though a division into different categories is at the same time necessary. Concerning suicide induced by the martyr spirit of patriotism we find instructive information in Josephus, where both sides of the argument are forcibly stated from the points of view of warriors, philosophers, and men of the world.

In the speeches addressed to the Jewish garrisons of Masada their commander Eleazar lays special stress on their resolve, made long ago, 'never to be servants to the Romans, nor to any other than God himself,' and then exclaims to their Basta: 'for their punishment for their last sins from none other than the Defter, as executed by our own hands;' and, on finding that his words had not yet produced the desired effect, he adds, among other things, the further argument that death 'saves our souls their liberty, and sends them by a removal into a place of purity, where they are to be immisible to all sorts of misery.'

The term may be from the Latin seppulcrum (a grave), and in the modern mind at any rate, excites loathing and reproablation. The suicide of Zimri (1 K 16:10) and of Abimelech (killed at his own request by his armour-bearer [Jg 9:49]) only leaves us cold; whilst, on the other hand, the death of Samson (Jg 16:31) and of Saul and his armour-bearer (1 S 31:1-13) inspire us with a sense of awe and a certain kind of admiration rather than any other feeling.

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SUICIDE (Muhammadan) — SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian)

The final result being that 900 persons (i.e. the whole garrison, including women and children, with the exception of two women and five children) died rather than yield themselves up to the Romans. (The spirit of the act is, of course, similar to that of the destruction of St. Peter’s basilica in 1870, and of the destruction of Buda in 1849.)

Josephus’s own attitude towards suicide, under similar conditions, is revealed in B. J. iii. viii.

In the speech which, after the fall of Jotapata, he addressed to the man who had taken refuge with him in a cave, he compares a suicide to a pilot ‘who, out of fear of a storm, should shirk his duty and leave his own ship to perishes. ’ It is a wicked and pernicious act to cast out one’s body the soul which God and committed to it, and extorts them not to endeavour, by an act of self-destruction, ‘to run away from God, who is the best of all masters.’

A somewhat analogous, though much more pitiable, class is well represented by the case of 409 captive boys and girls who, when they understood that they were being carried off for a life of shame, determined to end their lives by drowning. To quote another category belong a certain number of persons who are reported to have committed suicide under the stress of acute remorse for certain acts of their lives. In such case, again, is the attitude of the executioner of Hanniah b. Tenedyoun, already referred to, who, on receiving from the dying martyr the promise of future bliss, is said to have destroyed himself in the flames in which the latter was flayed, in order to enter at once on his inheritance. Rabbinic leniency by way of accepting excuses for young suicides is shown in the cases of certain children who, after having destroyed themselves, because they lay under a threat of punishment from their respective fathers.

The judgment of a person who, in our own legal phraseology, has been provided with a ‘fato de si libra’ in marriage to God (c. xix. 1), though a person who recklessly endangers his life is subject to judicial chastisement (Mish. 3. 4). With regard to the treatment of the body of a suicide, there is a mention in the Mishnah (Beb. 9. 7) of the necessity of the custom which demanded that the remains should lie exposed till sunset. In Shanhahb, ii. 11, it is enacted that one should neither read one’s garments for a suicide nor bury the shoulder or engage in any other formal mode of mourning. Care is taken, however, not to offend the feelings of the relatives of the dead. Those present at the funeral, if they uncover themselves in a row and receive the necessary order of service. The general rule, indeed, is that one does everything required by respect for the living, but omits all the rest. There has also been a rule of burying a suicide away from the regular line of graves, but this is not always observed.

It should be mentioned in conclusion that statistics comparing the prevalence of cases of suicide among modern Jews with those of other races and denominations are given in JE, s.v. ‘Suicide.’

Lit. — The literature has been listed in the article.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

SUICIDE (Muhammadan). — There is no specific reference to the Qur’ân which forbids suicide, though it would seem that the terms which bear upon the taking of human life in general are sufficiently clear as to their purpose to include any kind of wrongful killing in private life. The following verses women and five children) consented to die rather than surrender.

The manner in which Josephus finally disposed of death, while all the rest were made prisoners, is not stated in any source.

The translation is R. H. Palmer’s, SEE vi. (1900).

1 See II., s.v. ‘Suicide.’


3 Also illuminated in, e.g., Vörösházi, 325.

4 See also II., s.v. ‘Suicide.’

V. WALTER M. PATTON.

SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian). — Among the ancient Hamite-Semitic peoples the love of life was strong. They were (with the possible exception of the Egyptians) still in the earlier and less reflective stages of civilization, and consequently showed little of that melancholy which leads to frequent suicide.

1. Semitic. — Among the Semites not only was the love of life strong, but their primitive religion was a worship of the goddess of life. Most of their deities of later time were gods that were in some form closely associated with the idea that life was divine. Their general attitude towards life was one of joyous interest in objective things. Their philosophical and reflective powers never attained any great degree of vigour. There are, accordingly, no cases of suicide on record except where...
the deed was committed in order to avoid a form of death that was considered particularly disgraceful.

An early and classical example of this is the suicide of King Saul of Israel (2 S 18:31). When his army was defeated by the Philistines, Saul said to his armour-bearer: 'Draw thy sword, and thrust me through; lest these uncircumcised Philistines come to bear me about, and abuse me.' Naturally the armour-bearer was afraid to do this, so Saul fell upon his own sword and died. So the deed was not committed, but the name of the man who found himself. To him, as to many in all ages, it is a sort of badge of the warrior's death. Philistine foreigners did not bear the sacred mark of circumcision; they were doubly unclean. He took his life in order to avoid dying by such unclean hands after having been tortured by them.

A second case is that of Saul's armour-bearer. When he saw that his king had committed suicide, he followed the example of his master. His motive may have been in part the same as Saul's: he may have been in part desirous of逃生 of his chief. At all events the armour-bearer, like Saul, took his own life only when a death which he regarded as disgraceful was inevitable.

Closely analogous to the suicide of Saul was the death of Abimelech, the son of Gideon (Jg 9:5). Abimelech had made himself king of Shechem and a small territory about it; he sought to erase his dominion by the conquest of Abimelech, who, a mile and a half miles to the north-east of Shechem. In attacking the city, the armour-bearer, like Saul, took his own life.

A similar case in the Macaristan period is reported in 2 Mac 14:30. Abimelech, who had been appointed by Titus, and then by Nicanor, as a successor of his father, was betrayed and killed. Thus, he committed suicide.

At least two instances are recorded among the Hebrews, in which traitors committed suicide.

Abishaph, one of David's trusted advisors, betrayed his master and conspired with Absalom. When his plot was discovered, he sought to make the base of his head and broke his skull. He then committed himself to his own army to thrust him through, lest it should be given to Lichas, Saul's armour-bearer, to take advantage of it. He committed suicide (2 S 17:25). Similarly Judas Iscariot, the betrayer of Jesus Christ, when his armour-bearer was killed, committed suicide (Mt 27:5). Possibly his effort to end his life in this manner was made, for another account (Ac 18:10) implies that he, like Abishaph, died from being disembowelled.

Conscience, then as now, sometimes drove traitors to their own lives. Both the reasons for suicide which can be traced in ancient Israel operated in the case of Shammash-shum-ukin, king of Babylon, 665-648 B.C.

He headed an extensive conspiracy against his brother and successor, Ashur-bani-pal, king of Assyria. When Ashur-bani-pal, perceiving the force of his allies, besieged him, Shammash-shum-ukin, reduced to extremity, threw himself into a burning pit rather than fall into the hands of his brother. This rebellion had exposed him, in case of capture, to the kind of barbarous torture inflicted by the Assyrians. He then gave his armour-bearer to the less painful death of a burning pit. Shammash-shum-ukin might, however, have faced this, as many another had done, it not been for an accursed conscience.

The cases cited sufficiently reveal the ancient Semitic attitude towards suicide. It was resorted to only in extreme cases.

2. Egyptian. — The attitude of the ancient Egyptians towards suicide was in general like that of the Semites. The love of life was strong in them, and their conception of the life beyond such that it presented to them deterrents of various kinds. The inscriptions present us with two sources of information on the subject, one practical, the other theoretical.

In the reign of Ramses III. (1198-1167 B.C.), a conspiracy against the life of the king was formed in the karum, in which a number of high officials were implicated. The king appointed a commissioner (Imhotep) to try to suppress the movement. From the records of this commission we learn that at least seventeen persons, who were found guilty, were left to themselves and permitted to take their own lives. It was in a way compulsory suicide.

Death by their own hands was, however, apparently regarded as less humiliating than death at the hands of an executioner. An eighteenth person, when found guilty, committed suicide, apparently to the regret of the commission. It appears from this record that the punishment of high and formerly trusted officials was probably accomplished by the ancient Egyptian government in this way.

An interesting document written during the Middle Kingdom (2100-1800 B.C.), which has been entitled by Erman and Breasted 'The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Own Soul,' indicates that, in the middle of Egyptian feudal development, as the failure of old religious forms to satisfy increased and a sense of the injustices of life attained power, suicide was contemplated by some as an escape from life's ills.

The beginning of the papyrus is lost, but from what remains clear that a certain man of gentle spirit (his name is lost) fell sick. He was forsaken by his friends, even his brothers left him uncared for. Deserted by all, he was robbed by his neighbours. His former good deeds were forgotten. Although a wise man, when he would please his own case, he was thrust aside. His name, which should have been revered, was de-famed. He then determined to take his own life, but, as he stood on the brink of the grave, his soul shrank back in horror and refused to accompany him. The dialogue then begins. The misanthrope: 'What would you have done in your last moments? You would have killed yourself. The soul's first reason for not going with him was the fear that there would be no tomb to dwell in after death. The misanthrope: 'How would death affect the misanthrope an opportunity to expose to the world the beauty of his soul the utter futility of all such preparations. The soul had confessed death by burning, but had then shrunken from it, for it would be no suffering to stand by the blud and make the mortuary offerings. He urged his soul to undertake these duties itself, but then the soul refused death in any form, declaring that, even when the great pyramids and endowed mortuary services, their tombs were in time neglected and permitted to fall into ruins, that they were in no better case than the poor. His soul urged that it was wrong not to follow the god's command of have your name not be forgotten, so that the world would remember his name. The misanthrope then proceeds to demonstrate that life, instead of being an opportunity for pleasure, it was far more intolerable than death. He then, in four poems addressed to his soul. The first of these pictures the unhappy state of the misanthrope and that the full human happiness might be held by the world. The second sets forth the corruption of society. The third, which speaks of death as a god, releases, justifies suicide. It runs as follows:

1 Death is before me to-day
Like the recovery of a sick man.
Like going forth into a garden after sickness.

2 Death is before me to-day
Like the educt of the wind.
Like sitting under a sail on a windy day.

3 Death is before me to-day
Like the educt of lotus flowers.
Like sitting on the shore of drunkenness.

4 Death is before me to-day
Like the course of a freshet.
Like the return of a man from the war-galley to his house.

The fourth poem contributes to the argument in favour of suicide by expressing the conviction that the 'beyond' which is unattainable in this world will be experienced.

He who is yonder Shall seize (the calf) as a living god,
Inflicting punishment of wickedness on the door of it.

He who is yonder Shall stand in the celestial barques,
Causing that the choosers of the offerings there be given to the temples.

He who is yonder Shall be a wise man who has not been revealed,
Praying to He when he speaks.'

This document shows how world-weary Egyptians looked at suicide 4000 years ago. An interesting feature of the point of view is that it betrays no fear of the hereafter.

1 Ancient Records of Egypt, iv, p. 466.

2 For a more complete account of it see J. H. Breasted, Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, pp. 106-108.

3 As translated by Breasted, p. 265.

4 In Eem, p. 197.
consciousness that self-destruction is wrong. In this respect it is striking contrast to the Talmud. Rabbi Eliezar says that God willed to remove your own blood from you—a clear recognition of the sinfulness of suicide. The Egyptian misanthrope, so far from betraying any such consciousness, seems to have felt that the fact that he lived beyond his days was enough to qualify the justice that is denied him here, but also assist in the establishment of justice, is a reason for hastening by his own hand his release from life’s intolerable conditions.


SUKKAR.—See RUKHAR.

SUMATRA.—See JAVA, BALI, and SUMATRA.

SUMERO-AKKADIANS.—1. The term.—The ethnic expression Sumerio-Akkadian does not occur in the inscriptions, but, as the compound Kungi-Uru, translated by the Semitic Sumur u Akkad, Sumer and Akkad, is found, it is a proper name for the主播 population which of old occupied the alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates, where they flowed into the Persian Gulf.

2. The derivation of the names.—Many suggestions have been made as to the origin and meaning of Kungi (or Kingi-Ura) and Sumur and Akkad, but it must be admitted that both these points are matters of opinion. J. D. Prince 1 suggests that it may be a combination of kins (long form of kis), land, and gi, read, ‘land of seeds’ being an appropriate designation of Babylonia.” In the lists, however, Kungi or Kingi is rendered simply by matu, country, and here stands for ‘the country in the north.’ 2 This being the case, it is probable that the above forms are derived from kinnu, the name of the first character, suggesting that kins may have been the unclassified form. As to Uru, that is the pronunciation given to the characters bar, superimposed, when they are used for Akhad. This group also stands for the highlands of Armenia and of Palestine, and therefore indicates a mountainous region. 3 That the Akkadian Semites (not as formerly supposed, the Sumerians) came from some such region is quite possible, and that may be the meaning of Ura. Akkad, however, is probably shortened from Akkadu, one of the names of the old capital of the northern district of Babylonia. In 1898 A. H. Suzuki was named as one of the cities of Nimrod’s kingdom, after Isbel (Babylon), but Aphabet mark was used to come into prominence before the great capital city. In addition to Kingi, Sumur is also expressed by the character of the same form, which, however, is pronounced kinnu, the land of the holy tongue or language, meaning the land inhabited in religious services of the temples and exalted as sacred from prehistoric times. The connexion of Sumur with the OT Shinar (Shinar) is still uncertain. Suggestions will be found in J. B. H. iv, 504, that which makes it a changed form of Shingi-Ura, for Kungi-Ura, being the name of the original city.

3. The earthy paradise.—The tract wherein lay Erdu, the good city, and the land of Tilman, which, traditionally enjoyed, in the beginning, the happiness and innocence of the golden age, seemingly always appealed to the imagination of the Babylonians as being at that time the most desirable abode on earth. It was this, apparently, which led to the designation of Adam’s first dwelling place as a garden eastward, in Eden (Gn 2)—i.e., the edinu (Sumerian edina), which, however, seems not to occur as a place-name except in the compound Sippur-edina (‘Sippur of the edens’) and in the river name id edina, ‘the river of Eden’, or ‘the river of Idin.’ Nevertheless, the idea always existed, and probably increased among the Babylonians, that their land was the site of the paradise of old time. This theory, moreover, is in a measure vindicated by the fact that the erek, which often stands for Babylon or Babylonia, may be an abbreviation of Erdu, and Tia-dur, ‘the abode’ or ‘the grove of life,’ probably refers to the wonderful vine tree of Idin. In fact, support for the theory is advocated by Friedrich Delitzsch, 4 and treated of by scholars and theologians before and since. 5

4. Ethnic position.—As remarked above, it is probable that the Akkadians (the Semitic inhabitants) came from some mountainous district, and it may have been originally an early stream from the west (the Amorite or Palestinian highlands, which preceded the Semitic race, and who, having installed himself at Babylon, made that city the capital of the land. But both races were apparently, in their origin, mountaineers, as is suggested by the fact that the Semitic word kur is the common word for both mountain and country. If de Lacour’s contention 6 (afterwards followed up by C. B. Bahr) is correct, that the Semarians, both tongue and writing, is an oblique eye, and that the Semitic scripts which may have been changed from a prehistoric race from the Near East, of the Sino-Mongolian origin, it is possible that the type, representing a lake or reservoir with the characters for ‘to run,’ ‘to flow,’ within the Semarians may, therefore, have come from a mountainous region where lakes and ponds are common and rivers were common sinistrors or torrents. The word kur, which stands for both country and mountain, and seems to be a picture of the Semarians, supports this theory, but support theory for ‘date-palm, gishime, worm, the fruit-tree’ in a special sense, somewhat negates this evidence.

In the list of names known as ‘Sylabary’ we gather from the first entry that the Semarians thought of the heavens (a) as the abode of the deity (dinur). They believed also in spirit (gishim, waca, etc.), and made offerings (gishim) to the gods. To appear all appearance they lived in houses (dom) not tents, and those houses had doors (gid-pal) furnished with bolts and bars. The houses were situated in streets (sia), which formed cities (a), which, in turn, which were protected, at least in Babylonia by boundary stones. It was apparently not until the ‘temple (sia) they had dogs, and the dogs were faithful and guardian. They also possessed goats, sheep, oxen, and swine. They did not at first know the use of the sea (esna) being the cause of their extreme poverty. Naturally they knew of wool (goj), and it would seem

1 Baba Gamma, 91b.
3 There is apparently another variant form for Kungi, via Kukki, but this may be due to a pun (see PSBA xxx., [1915] 150).
4 If, however, Kur stands for a reservoir or waterway, Kur would indicate the watershed of the Tigris and the Euphrates, see 8 below, § 6 (c).
5 See below, § 6 (c).
6 See 6 below, § 6 (c).
7 See below, § 6 (c).
8 See below, § 6 (c).
that linen (kat; Semiticized as kith) was one of the fabrics which they produced. They had pots (dok, lut) and dishes (halan), and used ovens (udum). Apparently the only kind of bread was unleavened. Sometimes gold being described as the "day-bright" and the "reed-bright" metals respectively (i.e., gold and silver). Tin was known as "gal, the "heaven-metal." - was meteoric. Tin was called nigel or nage, and was probably originally an Egyptian word. They knew of fire, and used braziers, and a modification of the character for "fire," expressed in Sumerian by the sign muz, showing the composition of the metal and the completion of pottery and the like by its means.

6. Languages and literature. — (a) There has been much difference of opinion as to the existence of the non-Semitic Sumerian language as distinguished from the Semitic Akkadian. Halevy and his followers have even contended that it was merely an "allography" — an invention of the Semites expressing their own language in another way. Such an expression as "to pour out speech" (qu-de), however, for "to call," "annonce," is probably too foreign to the Semitic mind to admit of such an idiom replacing the common Semitic vocabulary, - so also, "set the breast" (qub-ri) for "to resist." Sumerian, moreover, has an involved and more widely differing grammatical construction. The complex sentence, with its verbal incoherence, and the occurrence of case-endings, the use of "postpositions" instead of prepositions, and other peculiarities, stamp Sumerian as being a language which Semitic is not. To Semitic, however, there seems to be no connexion with old Chinese, there seem to be many analogies with regard to both characters and words, but the theory has not been very generally accepted.

(c) Most of the Sumero-Akkadian legends and mythical stories have been dealt with in the following:

BABYLONIANS and ASSYRIANS and HEROES and HERO-GODS (Babylonian). It is naturally difficult to distinguish the national distinction, and most or all of them have a more or less Sumerian foundation. Among the distinctive Sumerian legends of Babylonia may be classed that of Aloros and his five successors, as well as that of Adapa, Tammut, and Euedoreschus. From their names it seems that the ancestors of the hero of the Flood were Sumerian, and the origin of the legend of the Flood is now proved to be, notwithstanding that his names, Atra-hasis, and Ut-napishtim, are Semitic. It is shown by the very noteworthy earlier version in the Pennsylvania University Museum, 2 which has the Sumerian rendering.

In this text the mother-goddess (Nin-tu, Aruru, and Zarpanitum) are some of her names) speaks certain words which she had created. Before the Flood — five great cities existed, viz., Eredu, the paradise-city, protected by the god Ea; Dur-k, the fortress of Bish, which was once the god Papil-barsag, who apparently became its patron; Enuma Elish, which is given the sun-god, and became the great temple of the cni of the city; and Sippar, now Babylon. Nineveh, the ancient city of the Babylonian Noah's birthplace, is related to the god Sippar or Sukur. It will be noted that in this list of primitive Babylonian Sumerian-Akkadian cities there is none which can be identified with the cities of the biblical Creation-story, in which the Flood is typically created, but also that the waters which inundate the cities wherein men are to dwell, it may be supposed that these deities were not only the guardians, but also the builders of the foundation without which the earth could not exist.

At the time before this deluge, the gods, generally, being without form, were small, and the water, being without form, was small. Thus, it is unnecessary to go upon any valley of Eridu where the Flood reached to its waist, as it did not reach the land of Akkad, to its ankles, as it did not reach the land of Ur.

In the final column, the generation of the god Utu is described in a list of the gods of the Gilgamesh-legend, 4 beholds the destruction of the temple of the world, which he had created, and the gods invoke the compound deity (sine and behelot) to prevent the Flood from taking place. At this point, Utu-sinnur (the "heaven or soul" of remote days) is an archetypal-god of the god Ea, went through certain rites and ceremonies, apparently the object of saving mankind from the threatened destruction, but without effect.

At the powerful wind-storms as one rushed forth — a water-flood, raging over the land, and the flood had been carried away by wind-storms over the upraised water, the Utun the mound came forth again, on and, and the earth solided day. The mighty hero, the hero Utu, the light to shine within itself and, the mighty Utu, the light truth, the light to shine in the face of the Utu, the light to shine the light to shine, the light to shine.

In the final column, Utu-sinnur and his companions journeyed on the earth and heaven and the soul of earth, to be saved, he who was saved, he who was saved.

An analogous legend is that of Utu in which one of the strangest records of the Creation and the Flood is found. It was at Nippur (Niffer) and was first translated by Stephen Langdon. 5

1 See Err. vi. 442 f.
3 HD. iv. 538, var. for Bem 30: "The goddess" Map call out, making her voice resound.
4 The Simyehu (or Simehnu) of Lucian's De Sans, 12 (see the Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute, London, 1913, p. 30)
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It begins with a description of Tilman, the glorious and pure (or holy). There Enki (Ever) and his spouse, Damkina (Daniel), had their home. The original condition of Tilman was that of the world during the traditional golden age of the Gods. The people who lived in this happy land were not afflicted by sickness and old age, nor, apparently, did crime exist. The happy state of things, however, was seemingly not to last, for Enki, the water-god, announced his intention to destroy the field (probably meaning the whole district) unless mankind made haste to last for nine periods of a month. Each, during which mankind would disappear like better when it was time to make sacred things. One man, man, who was faithful to the deity, and for him, according to Langdon's translation, "Enki the king" waited on a boat. The context seems to show that the person or persons whom Enki favoured was Utu, used by the deity owing to his faithfulness. After the gap which occurs here Utu seems to be engaged in gardening, work, he becoming, like Noah, an agriculturist.

After another gap certain plants, possibly cultivated by Utu, are spoken of, and it is stated which of them he (probably Utu) might or might not eat. One of the forbidden plants was langdon as regards the classics, but this is doubtful. The parallel between this story and the Creation-stories in Genesis, where Adam is forbidden to eat of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, is noteworthy, though what is attributed to the first man in the one is attributed to a prototype of Noah in the other. The list of plants on trees, and they apparently did not confer either life or wisdom.

Among other Sumerian legends may be noted the story of Enil and Ninlil, the elder Bel and Beltis, the legends of Merodach, the legend of Tammuz, and probably that of Isttar's descent into Hades to seek him. The myth of Una or Inanna, the goddess of love, Nergal and Ereshkigal, Enlil and Tispaek, and the Luggu-sarpens, together with others of which the names only are known, may be added.

But before leaving Sumer, there are many historical documents, of which the most noteworthy are the inscriptions of En-anna-tum (Sîdæ des Vautours), En-anna-tum (cones, Una-kakina (cones), Gudea (statues and cylinder), with numerous others. As to Sumer, this is probable that detailed histories of the kings existed, and a fragment of one dealing with Sua-Engur and his son Dungi is known. This is the period (2500 B.C.) when the transformation of the Sumerian states into a Sumerian Akkadian collection of nations may be said to have taken place.

There are also numerous temple records and accounts, inventories, lists, a few letters and contracts, and chronological lists and mathematical tablets. The Sumerian lists of words are accompanied by Semitic Akkadian, rendering. These, as well as the lists of names (places and men), are generally classified.

(d) From a religious point of view, the Akkadian legend (and to some extent the Semitic) seems improbable that the accounts of the Creation and the Flood first published by George Smith were Semitic compositions, though based upon Sumerian originals. This is implied by the fact that most of the names, especially those of deities (Anu, the heaven-god, Enlil, the elder Bel, Ea and Damkina, the god and goddess of the waters, Merodach, the king of the gods. Ansar and Kibla, a son of hears and the host of earth, etc.), are Sumerian, though Tiamat (Tiawath), the dragon of chaos, Kingu, her spouse, and Mammun, their son, are Semitic-Akkadian.

Historians dominated in the religion of the Sumero-Akkadians may be realized when it is remembered that Sumerian names in their pantheon exceeded enormously an Assurnish origin — such as Bel and Bétta (Beltis), which 1915, p. 32, 27. Instead of Utu (the), the name was at first read as Tagtug (the), which is a transcription of the two characters by which Utu is written in.

E. v. 64a, 520; JER. 1931, ii. 178 52, 575 50, (numerous additions by Langdon).

1 J. p. 644.
2 J. p. 648.
3 J. p. 649.
5 See J. S. Babrot.
everything that passed on the earth. They were therefore the gods of judgment and justice, and appeal was made to them that the sign or pronouncement asked for might be true.

In the matter of morals the Sumero-Akkadians were probably not better than their neighbours, but there is one point which is worthy of note, viz., that in their literature, so far as we are acquainted with it (with the exception of a few or two others), immoral or obscene passages are exceedingly rare. Moreover, it is in the same legend of Gilgames that the greatest hostility to the goddess is shown, the hostility which brought upon that hero all the misfortunes which afterwards befall him. Slavery seems to have been in full force among the Sumero-Akkadians, but there is no proof that slaves were sold individually or as a whole, there is no doubt that they had a high opinion of learning and the advantages to be gained therefrom. To appear among the Sumerians or the Semitic people was to have arrived at knowledge which, to them, occupied the place of Holy Scriptures, and to be acquainted with the history of their land, which enabled them to judge of the dealings of their gods with their rulers during their long existence as a nation. In many ways, the knowledge of the methods of legal procedure enabled their scribes to employ themselves usefully by drawing up applicable contracts; and those who made a specialty of such things could read the signs in the heavens and make known all kinds of omens, thus earning the gratitude of their fellow-citizens and their own living by giving the oracles of the gods. Whatever their defects, their records exhibit them as worthy people, equal in social progress to all their contemporaries at the early age at which they flourished.

9. Early Semitic domination.—Whether the Sumerians or the Akkadians entered Babylonia first is another uncertain point, but it is to be noted that the earliest documents in the Sumerian language and the earliest records refer to Sumerian kings. Legends, ritual-texts, hymns, contracts, etc., and word-lists are all Sumerian at the earlier periods, and, when the documents came to be written in the Semitic language, the Semitic text always preserved the Akkadian or Semitic. Their entry into the country must have taken place about 3000 B.C. or earlier, but the Semitic-Akkadians probably became prominent only about 2500 B.C.

The Semites, however, were certainly numerous in the country at an earlier date, and were steadily growing in power. Sargon of Agade or Akkad, as his name afterwards became, reigned about 2800 B.C. (Nabonidus' date for this ruler is equivalent to 3800 B.C.), and he was certainly not the first ruler of Semitic race. The presence of such Semitic-looking names as Gilgames and Gudea, the Semites, who reigned before the mythical Etana,1 notwithstanding that we have to make allowance for the inordinate lengths of their reigns, probably takes back Semite (Akkadian) domination in Babylonia to a period which can hardly be later than 4000 B.C. In that case we may carry back Sumerian deminution to 4000 or 5000 B.C., and even 8000 B.C. has been spoken of.

In the Sumero-Akkadian rule—

(a) The large states.—The number of states into which Babylonia was divided until the time of Hammurabi's dynasty (c. 2000 B.C.) is uncertain, but it cannot have been less than 40 or 50.


This, naturally, only shows that each state had its own ruler, and claimed independence from all its neighbours. As may be imagined, the total number of states varied, and different rulers aimed at conquest of the strong by the weak and to the gradual absorption of their smaller neighbours by the larger or more predominant centres of civilization. The name of each little state was generally that of its capital, and it is thus that we have the kingdoms of Agade or Akkad, Kiš, Uruk or Erech, Ur, Ur and Ia, Mura, Larsa, Lagas, Ka-dingir and Babylon, Nippur, and many others. Apparently after the Kassite conquest of about 1700 B.C. Babylonia was called Kar-Duniya, 'the district of the foot of the world,' but the older name of Anunnappar, about 2800 B.C., has also been applied to it, and that by non-Babylonians, only after the time of the Chaldaean dynasty to which Merodach-baladan belonged. As has been remarked above (§ 3), the usual name for 'country' was An, but another largely used is the word, which generally stands for 'people.' This identification of the land with its people implies a strong sense of nationality in the minds of the non-Semitic Sumerians, but was less pronounced in the minds of the Semite-Babylonians after the time of Nebuchadnezzar.

(b) The smaller foundations.—Though the capitals and larger cities (as understood in those days) were numerous, there were many smaller centres and settlements, sometimes founded by prominent agriculturists or traders, and sometimes the seats of various deities, the names of which have been applied to them, and which were religious foundations. Among the former may be mentioned the city of Idi-Urtas (At Idi-Asur) and the upper city of Eshana, as the usual name for the lower city of Eshana. The city of Dilmun, while the cities of Ar-Ratib and Al-Madai, such as the 'Garabi-district' (in Kar-tutum, district) (Karatub), the Enki district (Enki), the new Broad-street district (Kar-sila dagala), etc. These 'districts' were applied for the reception of the temple revenues, paid in kind.

II. The Sumero-Akkadian view regarding their native land.—The idea gained by the study of the inscriptions is that the people of Babylonia (and probably of Assyria also) looked upon their dwelling-place as a holy land. Every state, every foundation, had its deity, and visits to the holy places were meritorious acts.2 First and foremost, apparently, we have the paradise-city Eridu, the abode of the god Ea—the city whose ideograph was sometimes used, in later times, to express the action of the land of Babylon in general.3 Next came the great capital, Babil (Sum. Ka-dingir), the gate of God—probably a folk-etymology brought about by the name Babilum, the Babylon word for Babylon (with Bataluma) in the triliteral form. Near Babylon was Guda (Cuba), the city of the god Nergal, and Dailem, the ancient Dulmu, where Ur (one of the names of An-urta) had its seat. Settlements were Mutha and Muru, where the god Muru (Hadad or Rimmon) was worshipped, Qait, the seat of the god Qattu, and Lasuma, that of the god Lasum, the swift runner. These similar names of the cities and their patron-gods remind us of Assyri, the old capital of Assyria, the centre of the worship of the national god Assur, and Nineveh.
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imitated from the Babylonian Nina, the former the city of the goddess Nin-lil as the goddess of war, and the latter that of Nina, her Babylonian prototype. Greatly favouring the gods, Babylonia was held to be greatly favoured by them—hence, perhaps, the reputation of the land as the district of the whilom Paradise (see § 3).


SUMMUM BONUM.—Modern ethical philosophy has at various times sought its constitutive principle in the will of God, the law of duty, the problem of the origin of the moral sense, the ideas or ideals of perfection, personality, progress, and evolution. For ancient ethics the ultimate reference was to the idea of good.

1. Definitions and early ideas of the good.—In its original sense it is the term of general approval which no developed language lacks. Etymology cannot help us to a closer definition, for the etymology of ὑπόσκεψις is not known and cannot be identified with the ὑπόσκεψις of good or evil. The connotative psychology of primitive man is of no avail, for it is uncertain, and in any case Homer was already far beyond that stage. In Iliad 14.107-110 the term is used in a sharp distinction between moral good and other good or desirable things. There is abundant evidence in and out of Greek literature for the unmediated good as an element of life and as a fountain of growth and hope.

A unifying definition of good will always remain either a more or less plausible generalization from extant literature or an arbitrary deduction from metaphysical first principles. The Platonic Euthyphro and Lysis may serve as anticipation of all such attempts, though the one nominally discusses the good and the other the primal object of love or friendship (the ἀγάπη). The Euthyphro leads to the imposse of the problem debated by scholasticism: Does God love holiness (or the good) because it is holy, or is it holy because God loves it? The Lysis refers all particular loves to the primary love or end which seems to be the good. But what intelligible motive in the gods can be supposed to the good save as a remedy against evil? Indeed, at the end of the dialogue the difficulty is evaded by renaming the good, in anticipation of Stoic terminology, the σωφρόνος, the 'own', the 'proper' (or, as Emerson sometimes renders it, the 'friendly'), and by calling evil the 'alien'. The association in the Lysis of the good with the end or purpose dominates all later discussions and is the basis of most modern definitions from Schopenhauer to Herbert Spencer and William James. It is of course not explicit in pre-philosophical literature.

2. Homer.—In Homer we find the ethical meaning of the word existing side by side with its immoral or half-moral use in the sense of brave or well-born. This has been and will be denied. But it is the only reasonable interpretation of such passages as the Achilles' saying 'Every good and sensible man loves and cherishes his own br bile'. The fact that Homer also speaks of a good meal, and of the smelal of which the worse sort is

3. Socrates and Xenophon.—The Xenophontic Socrates identifies the good with the useful: 'If you ask me for a good that is good for nothing, I do not know it, nor have I any use for it.' There is no proof that this is a genuine report of distinctive Socratic teaching and no presumption that Xenophon had any ideas on the subject which he did not pick up from Plato.

4. Plato.—Plato's doctrine of the good has been obscured by the unnecessary mystery that has made of its allegorical elaboration in the imagery of the sun, the divided line, and the cave in the Republic. The essential meaning of this allegory is demonstrably quite simple. It is merely the postulate that ethical, political, or social science presupposes the conscious apprehension of some co-ordinating purpose and final end of all endeavors. In the lack of such a vision of the idea of the good, the so-called statesman is only an empiric and a rhetorician. The statesmen of Plato's republic must possess this vision and this insight. They can attain it only through the scientific and philosophical education which he prescribes and the practical experience of affairs with which his countrymen must be supplemented. Further, the other than this Plato does not wish to define the idea of the good except through the implications of the entire moral and social ideal embodied in the Republic and the Laws.

Plato's is the earliest and most effective presentation of these ideas. But so obvious a thought has of course occurred to many other moralists.

10 But to prove that moral rules are not innate or self-evident, since their 'truth' plainly depends upon some other antecedent . . . from which they must be deduced. Hilding expressed it thus: 'Every ethical reasoning has validity only so far as the disputants recognize a definite primordial value which determines all more.

11 Robert May, On the moral philosophy of the word and its synonyms, in the Scholastic, 'Athl. der alemen Griechen, L. 290 ff., and art. ETHOS. In this matter, as in all study of Greek philosophy, entire precision is attainable only by thinking in the Greek terms, if need be, transliterated.

12 ἀθανάτος (as in Roqgot, 384 A; cf. Herodotus, reg. 52, 57, 61; in Herodotus, ed.: Bevan, Oxford, 1877, 325).

13 Met. 945 a 5.


15 Met. 843 b 5.

16 Rep. 571 C., 661 B, 729 D.

17 Mem. 18 b, 3.

18 758 a 1 ff., 509 D 1 ff., 514 b.


21 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

22 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

23 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

24 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

25 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

26 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

27 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

28 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

29 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

30 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

31 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

32 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

33 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

34 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

35 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

36 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

37 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

38 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

39 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

40 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

41 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

42 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

43 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.

44 Rep. 506 c, 533 D.
special goods. In the words of G. Lowes Dickinson: "For we are in a dilemma; and if we are to choose to do either, we must do it by some system of assumption about the goods." Whether by accident or design, the writing of G. H. Chesterton's Heretics is an admirable statement of Plato's postulate that we must know the good before we can rightly know or do anything else. The conception pervades all doctrines practically.

If these and countless other modern writers still find occasion to dwell upon this elementary truth, the reason why we are tempted to insist that it is too simple to constitute the underlying significance of Plato's allegory. The difficulty is in the prevailing quest for sublier or more mystical interpretations to obviate the need for the demonstration that this in fact was Plato's essential meaning. It is then, as we shall see later, mere misapprehension when modern scholars identify the idea of good with God, confuse its plain ethical and theologically analogical psychological implications with the metaphysical problems common to all Platonic ideas, read it into its ethical application in the Republic all the teleological developments of the Timaeus.

A great misunderstanding, Plato's doctrine of the good is his entire ethical and social philosophy as collected from the minor dialogues, from the discussion of the utilitarian hedonism in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Laws, and from the close psychological analysis of the same problem in the Philebus and the 9th book of the Republic, 583 B ff. Throughout the minor dialogues the indefinable good is the standard that all tentative definitions of the virtue or exaggerated claims of the sophists fail to pass. The phrasing of Republic, 505 B ff., is equivalent to a reference to these discussions. The virtue of Socrates is to try to define, the ability of which you boast, must be a good, Socrates urges, and the interlocutor is unable to show that it is always and unconditionally good. The consistency and essentiality of this method point directly to the idea of good in the Republic as the symbol of an absolute good, and to the Platonic guardians' knowledge of it as distinguishing them from the sophists, the philosophers, and their pupils who Socrates puts to confusion.

The other approach to the problem of the good is through the hedonistic utilitarian controversy. Is the good pleasure or is it something higher—virtue, knowledge, or commonwealth with God? The Socrates of the Protagoras formulates the obvious hedonistic utilitarian argument in a way that leaves nothing for Epicurus and very little for Bentham and Mill to add. The eloquent rejection of this point of view in the Gorgias and Phaedo is an inconsistency only for critics who fail to observe by what nice distinctions Plato's ideal are guarded or who refuse to interpret the apparent antinomy by the psychological of the Philebus and the conclusion of the whole matter in the Laws. The measured preponderance of pleasure might arguably be the good if the pleasures were really measurable and rightly measured or if what the multitude call pleasures were really pleasant. Plato's final feeling is aptly expressed in the words of Matthew Arnold:

"That joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life inevitably moves, let not the reader... confuse his mind by doubting. The real objection is to lose and to value few of what constitutes happiness. Pleasure and utility are bad words to employ because they have been so used as to suggest..."

1 The Meaning of Good, Glasgow, 1901, New York, 1907, P. 199.
2 Locuton, 1926, p. 53.
3 See in particular the preface to The Cream of Wild Oats, and In the Two Paths: the passage beginning: "If you will tell me... perhaps I may be able to tell you what Bradford can ultimately produce" (sect. lii. § 57). 4 Republic, 505 B, Philae, p. 209, page 176.
5 731. i. at Classical Philology, Oct. 1912, p. 354.
6 743. 4.

Plato did not object to the Greek equivalent of utility, but Cicero set σωτερία, see Cicero, De finibus, 4, 34, 7, vol. 1. In L. 738 A, Plato substitutes εὐπρᾶς, but to make his meaning clear he, in a sentence which Epicurus might have written, allows follow.

To return to the idea of the good, the Socratic censure of Anaxagoras in Phaedo, 98, is sometimes misunderstood. What Plato plainly says is that a teleological explanation of the universe in terms of the good would most completely satisfy his feeling. He is unable to find or to construct such an explanation and so falls back upon a different thing, the right and second best method of the ideas—a kind of working logic which precedes both the speculative physical hypotheses of the pre-Socratics and the hope of a teleological interpretation. In spite of this, interpreters persistently identify the doctrine of ideas with the method of teleological deduction from the good. The Timaeus does attempt such a deduction, but so clearly and in the form of poetry and as a probable tale. There is the transference of this line of thought to the idea of good in the Republic. Amid the 'demonic hyperboles' of the Republic passage, 609 C, there may be phrases that suggest that the dependence of the physical universe on the idea of good and the subordination of all other ideas to this sumnum genus. But the main emphasis and purpose of the passage is to stress the ethical and metaphysical significance of the idea of good as we have already met it in the minor dialogues. Plato does not say that all other ideas are included in the good as a logical sumnum genus, nor that the mathematicians and the sciences are to be deduced from the idea of good. He says that, rightly studied, these disciplines will quicken the mind's eye for the apprehension of all abstract truth and so ultimately for that of the idea of good. In other words, the sociologist and the statesman must be prepared for their tasks by the severest scientific and philosophical education which the age affords.

Space fails to show how every significant part of the allegory confirms our simple and rational interpretation. The idea of good is the touchstone by which all human institutions originate in the founder's purpose or idea of good and are, as Coleridge often said, best understood in the light of their purpose. Good they were intended to be, and could be extended to the physical universe by the teleology of the Timaeus and the Phaedo. God's idea of good in the Timaeus is the cause of the world, so far as necessity permitted; and we understand the world best when we apprehend His designs. But the Republic is not directly concerned with these applications, and we distort Plato's meanings when we force on him the systematic metaphysical construction from which he abstained.

The comparison of the idea of the good with the sun is of great interest for the theory of the history or subject of art, and we do not detain us here. Nor can we delay for the enormous influence of this passage in the history of Neo-Platonism.

2 Cf. Sirvey, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 72. Classical Phil., x. 355; Joel, introd. to his tr. of the Philebus; Seneca, Epist. 45. 15: 'ego tam honestae re ac securae quemque maiorum nominem acceptum'.
3 609 B.
4 69 B.
5 96 A.
6 611 A., 584 C, 620 C, 611 D, 625 C, 527 A, 629 B.
8 69 D. B.; cf. also the Philodemian passage in Aristophanes, ds Celo, 289a, 1–10.
mysticism, and superstition. In Apuleius’ *P Ptonikis sýdyrpo* actually occurs in a context which might cause it to be mistaken for a swear word.

6. The idea of good and God.—The identification of the idea of the good with God could do no harm if taken merely as religious poetry. The goodness of God is His chief attribute both as the final criterion in the theological canon of the *Republic* 2—so the Stoics held that God was the cause of good only, never of evil—and positively in the teleology of the *Timaeus*. Plato is perhaps not too far out of his way to assert that the identification in such passages as Rep. 505 C and 517 B. God and the idea of good are both expressions of the highest ethical ideal, and the language which Plato used of both, as Emerson and Arnold would put it, an eulogism threw out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind aspires and feels after. 3 As Epicetus says, "God is beneficent, but the good also is beneficent. It is natural therefore that the true nature of the good should be in the same region as the true nature of God."

But in a more practical sense the two ideas came to Plato in different trains of thought and as symbols of distinct traditions, and they cannot be identified without wresting the Platonic texts from their proper context of their commentator and attributing to him a system of metaphysics which he did not care to construct. 4 By the same methods of interpretation one could identify God and the idea of good in the philosophy of Jesus with the aid of Mt 19:17, Mk 10:22, Lk 18:23.

7. The minor Socrates.—We shall make only brief reference to the so-called minor Socrates. The fundamental theory of the Cyrenaic hedonism differed little from that of Epicurus and of the Socrates of the Platonic *Protagoras*, though special points of distinction were laboured in the schools. 5 The alleged doctrine of Aristippus, that only the pleasure of the present moment counts, perhaps because the next may never come, is a temperamental attitude rather than a philosophy. This attitude was illustrated by many anecdotes, and strongly appealed to Horace. 6 Walter Pater’s *Renaissance* and the chapter on the ‘New Cyrenism’ in *Marins the Epicurean* commend the Cyrenaic *sumnum bonum* to an aesthetic generation in the form: ‘Be perfect in regard to what is here and now.’ 7 Burn always with this hard, gem-like flame. Cyrenism is only a cruder, harsher anticipatory form of Stoicism. Aristiatheus is said to have affirmed toil and hardship (νεκρός) to be the good and to have prayed, ‘Let me be mad rather than free.’

We do not know enough about the ‘Megarians’ to interpret Euclid’s pronouncement that the one is good, although Gomperz 8 undertakes to interpret it.

8. Aristotle.—The first sentence of Aristotle’s *Ethics* and the first sentence of the *Politics* repeat as a truism the main thought that emerges from the Platonic quest for the good. Aristotle recognizes that the problem of ethical theory is to ascertain and define the nature of this good that all action and choice presuppose. As he proceeds, Aristotle seems to repudiate the debt to his teacher, to the 55th page of the *Ethics* testifies, by his insistence on metaphysical objections to the theory of ideas in general and so to the idea of good in particular. 9 The polemic has of course no relevance to the ethical problem. And, while Aristotle contemplates asks, 10 ‘How would a weaver or a carpenter be profited by knowing the absolute idea of good?’, he forgets that he himself has just borrowed the Platonic imagery of the unifying crafts, or rather, to prove that a generalized conception of the good will be practically helpful. 11 As Sir Thomas Browne aptly puts it, ‘Aristotle, whilst he labours to refine the ideas of Plato, falls upon one himself; for his summun bonum is a chimera, and there is no such thing as his felicity.’ Aristotle himself admits that the synonymy happiness, ευσκεεία, which he substitutes for the good, is only a blank cheque. 4 Happiness is of course, as Plato said before him and Pope after, ‘our being’s end and aim.’ Cicero, while repudiating pleasure, assumed happiness to be the end as a matter of course. 5 And Leslie Stephen says: ‘Good means everything which favors happiness, . . . nor can any other habit even be assigned to the words.’ It depends upon your conception of happiness or your definition of pleasure whether, with Epicurus, Bentham, and Herbert Spencer, you add pleasure as a third synonym or with Plato, Cicero, Coleridge, Hume, Macaulay, Arnold, and Jowett, protest that to do so is either to confuse the right use of language or to suggest a false ideal of happiness. The definition of happiness with which Aristotle fills out the blank cheque is somewhat abstract and impotent conclusion of so elaborate a discussion. What hinder’s us, he asks, from pronouncing happy the man who energies in accordance with complete virtue? He is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not through any chance time, but for a complete life? Later philosophers interpreted the Aristotelian definition of happiness as a limiting concept between Epicurean hedonism and the severe idealism of Plato’s *Gorgias* and the Stoics. Cicero sometimes argues that in theory there can be no adequate sanction for virtue except on the Stoic principle that nothing else is a good. 9 Sometimes he affirms that in practice the Polyartes, who recognize external goods, give no larger place to them in their own lives than do the Stoics, who evade this concession by a change of terminology and demonstrate at the same time that mankind call goods not goods, but ‘preferred.’ 10 Otherwise Aristotle’s contribution to our topic is slight. He is not deeply interested in the fundamental problem. 11 He reviews the hedonistic controversy, in substance concerning with Plato, but unable to refrain from a tone of condescending superiority in his pupil’s pursuit of edification. 12 The poetical allegory of the idea of the good in the *Republic* would of course be unsympathetic if not incomprehensible to him. But the statement of an eminent scholar, that he never alludes to it, overlooks the fact that Plato’s distinction, there between the method of pure dialectic and that of the sciences 13 is one of Aristotle’s fundamental ideas recurring throughout his writings. In the end Aristotelianism, in this matter as in others, comes back to an extreme form of the Platonism which it begins by repudiating. In Neo-Platonic interpretation and in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the Renaissance the desire by which the Aristotelian first mover moves the heavens is the yearning of all creation towards him as the supreme good. This interpretation, supported by our master and two or three ambiguous...
ous verbs in the Aristotelian text, was blended with the poetical doctrine of Platonic love as the aspiration for ultimate beauty 1 identical with ultimate good. But this theme would demand a volume.

9. The post-Aristotelian schools.—The summum bonum was one of the two or three chief topics of debate in the post-Aristotelian schools. Cicero tells an amusing story of a Roman proconsul who proposed to convene a world's congress of philosophers and settle the question once for all.

Locke argues from the diversity of human tastes that 'the philosophers of old did in vain inquire whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or corporeal happiness, realism, naccal, and many others. But, as Mill says, the question concerning the summum bonum is the same as that concerning the foundation of morality. And it is idle to expect men to cease discussing that. Horace, e.g., was no metaphysician. He is good maga ad nos pertinere, et non est modo rei.

and he sums up this necessary knowledge in the three problems: (1) Divinis honis, an sint virtus, 'beast,' was the ordinary man's conception of the difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic good; (2) Quibus ad sanitatem, or utilitates, quas rerum, tractabat, nos, the other extreme of the antireligious trend, which sheltered the ethics of the Epicureans as an ideology which the ancient world does not valorize, that they are the enemies of his opponents; (3) Et quae minimizing the summae que ad rei.

Locke's impotence of the problem is perhaps a survival of Renaissance dualism. The literature of the bonitas pars as seen in Alberti's report of the treatise of al-Farabi.

The title of Cicero's De Finibus exhibits the confusion of the 'good' with the 'end,' and Cicero resumes for all practical purposes the net outcome and the influence on modern literature of the post-Aristotelian discussion of the summum bonum.

10. The Epicureans.—The Epicureans revived the thesis of Plato's Protagoras and insisted that pleasure 'rightly and honestly' is the only consummable end for a sentient creature. They then, like modern utilitarians, devoted themselves to the rationalization of the sentiment in the terminology of the ethical values—what the Epicurean in Cicero styles 'ad eam accommodatae' Torquatos nostros,' his own example of the Roman virtue into the theory. They also, like their modern analogues, complained bitterly of the critics who had misunderstood their mysticism, but Cicero, who thinks that he knows the meaning of the Greek 

'vagia, a perfect synonym of the Latin voluptas,' the idea of the Epicurean summum bonum may be discussed in a corner, but no one would dare proclaim it to a large audience.24 And the heroic deeds of Greeks and still more of Roman worthies who gave their lives for their country are sufficient proof that 'the quadrupedation of men will not prevail.

11. The Stoics.—The Stoic doctrine is more sympathetic to the moralist and the orator and has the further interest of a strictly defined and ingeniously elaborated scientific system. In essence

it is the old paradox of the Socrates of the Gorgias, that nothing is really good except the good moral life. All other so-called values are non-existent or insignificant when weighed against this. 'Sunt enim Socrates pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,' says Cicero in Lettercius, 44, and in the Tusculanum, v. 12, he takes for the text of the entire doctrine a single sentence of Plato's Menexenus.1

In the refutation of Epicurean hedonism and the working out of the theory the supreme end was reduced, and the schools and sects of philosophy were minutely classified by the various 'ends' or principles of the supreme good which they adopted.2 The demonstration that pleasure is not the end and the detailed deduction of Stoic ethical principles could take their start from the idea of the nature and the life accordant with nature3 or from the abbreviated formula, the consistent life.4 The argument from nature, as set forth in Cicero,5 presents striking analogies both with the 17th and 18th cent. philosophy of 'self-love' and with the modern logic of evolution. It is the beginning, of animal or human activity.6 The earliest and fundamental conception of utilitarianism is not towards pleasure, but towards self-preservation.7 The pleasure is, so to speak, a by-product. Upon this superstition lies the foundation of the highest, the spiritual and moral life, because of the pure and unmixed life. The conservation of the self becomes the end. And it makes little in practice whether all other ends are annihilated or merely dwindle to insignificance in comparison with this. Thus Cicero sometimes treats the entire suppression of the moral or lower self as a fallacy of Stoic paradox8 and sometimes as a refuge of Stoic ethics and as an indispensable condition of absolute and disinterested virtues.

12. The sceptics.—The various schools of sceptics impartiallyneas for the whole of human knowledge. But they did not for that reason admit that they lacked a moral ideal or the conception of the supreme practical end. Their scepticism was a means to the end of tranquility or imperceptibility of soul and the guidance of life by reasonable probability.

13. Developments of Platonism: the ascetic ideal.—In the Greek-Roman empires the eclectic literature of moral and religious education discloses all these points of view and ideas, but retains little interest in the dialectic of the schools and the philosophic theory of ethics. The cumulative influence of Platonism reveals itself not only in the softening and refinement of Stoic technicality and paradox, but also in the increasing prominence of another ideal, if not idea, of good—the ideal of detachment from the world and the feigned approach to God through the ideal of a spiritual and contemplative life. Plato's Phaedo and the eloquent digression of the Theaetetus are the earliest explicit Greek examples of ascetic ideal. It is a human mood of temperance and renunciation and reaction. The opposition of the theoretical and the practical life was debated in the Antiope of Ennippides.3 And recent researches have attributed to Pythagoras the three types of life associated with the tripartite psychology of Plato's Republic and employed as an ethical commonplace in the beginning of Aristotle's Ethics. These threefold principles are the whole of life and the summum bonum was the happiness embodied in or to be attained by the wise man.10 The latent and ill-defined conflict between the theoretical conception of the ethical life and the personal ideal of salvation and happiness is apparent already in Plato and Aristotle. The artist Plato paints the two companion pictures of the Socrates of the

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If, as in von Arlin, 63 146-71, the collections 'de sapientia et insipientia,'
SYMPOSIUM and the Socrates of the Phaedo and leaves their reconciliation to the ingenuity of modern interpretation. Will the sage take part in politics? To this question of the later schools the idealist Plato answers: 'Only in the politics of his own city, the city of God.' But Plato's practical decision appears in the prescription of the Republic that the philosopher must descend into the cave to help his fellowman; or, in his journeys to the court of Syracuse, and in his devotion of the last years of his life to the laborious composition of the Laws.

In Aristotle the contradiction is disguised, but pervades the entire Ethics. Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, but it finally appears that there are intellectual as well as moral virtues, and the highest activity is the pure contemplation of thought which the student may enjoy interrupted only by the external. The life in accordance with ethical virtue is secondary. The Stoic sage is distinguished from the Cyrenaic and Epicurean in Hellenic or Hellenistic by his immersion in political activities.

Chrysippus said that Aristotle's theoretic life was only a form of hedonism. The literature of Stoicism harps on the word *atarassies*, as the literature of to-day harps on the words 'social' and 'socialized.' And many modern critics have taken the Stoics at their own estimate and praised Stoicism on this score as against Platonism. But Cicero points out that, in this case, the Academy and the Lyceum were the chief schools of oratory and political science. And Seneca says epigrammatically:

'Sempiter barbaro nemo ad rem publicam accedit, nisi nemo non mittatur.'

14. Neo-Platonism.—The divorce between culture and life in the declining period of the Greek-Roman empire confirmed these tendencies, and

NEO-PLATONISM, the predominant philosophy of the last three centuries, constructed its system and its ideal out of the eloquent passages of the Phaedo, the Gorgias, the Republic, and the Republic, and the orators that preach purification from sin or sensuality, flight from the world, concentration of the mind upon itself, and assimilation of the human to the divine as the way of salvation and of God. These conceptions were blended with the doctrine, derived from the Platonic Symposium and Aristotle's Metaphysics, of the upward striving and aspiration of all creatures towards the primal source of the good and the beautiful, God.

It is not a practicable final philosophy of the supreme human good for any race of men in whom the will to live persists. It is only the beautiful legacy which the dying philosophy of Greece bequeathed to the idealism and the religious poetry of the world:

'1. 1* In mind of One all-pure,
   As first imagined lay
   The sacred world;
   2. In waking on a world which thus-wise springs!
   In waking on life's dream!
   3. By lonely present to the all-pure rous
   (Only this can this can)
   The colourless dream
   (Of life remain)!

With this poetic interpretation of Matthew Arnold we may compare the last words of Plotinus' Enneades, ἤφθασα μετ' Ἡράκλεως, with Plato, Thetis 176 B, ἠφθασα δὴ ἥρακλεως θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, and with the closing words of Emerson's last essay, 'Illusions,' in his Conduct of Life: 'They alone with him alone.' But the final good of Plato and of Greece in her prime is rather that of Tennyson's 'Ancient Sage':

'Let be thy will
And help thy fellow men.'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

PAUL SHOREY

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introduction).

In every quarter of the globe the star-studded heavens have attracted the attention and challenged the curiosity of mankind. Very especially was this the case in the low-laying plain of Babylonia, with its pellicluid atmosphere, and hence the study of astronomy and astrology, while practically universal, reached a remarkably high stage of development in that region. On the one hand, the fixed stars, of various degrees of brilliance, are ranged immovably in groups that stamp themselves upon the visual organs; while, on the other, the moon, the sun, and the five visible planets seem to be constantly changing their respective positions. Such phenomena were interpreted by primitive man in a subjective and anthropomorphific fashion, and his notions regarding them were still in vague when genuine scientific

2 Ἰβ. 529 B, 539 B. The ingenious suggestion that this is the Orphic *sarkarbos* exemplifies again the danger of over-stressing Plato's imagery as against his meanings.

1101 a 5, Plut. Rep. 519 D E.
1101 A 2, 1137 B, 320, 325.
2. 1137 B A.
3 Rep. 113, 151, Hic. p. 54.
4 De Tranquillitate Animæ, I. 7.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS

Hebrew (M. A. Canney), p. 80.
Jewish.—See INTRODUCTION.
Semitic.—See INTRODUCTION.

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the elongations of the two inferior planets, Mercury and Venus, never reached beyond a certain limit, and that these bodies traversed the zodiac as if held within the magic circle of the sun. The moon and the three superior planets were less restricted in their motions. It was therefore quite in keeping with the imaginative and symbolizing proclivity of the primitive intellect to regard the Sun, Mercury, and Venus as a family, travelling, in relatively close company, like nomads in the ecliptic. Of this family the Sun came to be regarded as the father, Venus as the mother, and Mercury as their son. The other planets were looked upon as mere vagrant males, who, on occasion, however, might act as a disturbing influence in the union of the Sun and Venus.

In speculations of a still earlier period it was the sun and moon alone that formed the marriage relationship, the sun being usually the husband and the moon the wife; only in exceptional cases were the positions reversed. Once more, too, the relations between sun and moon were represented as homosexual and pederastic. But in the ancient Orient and in Egypt the septet of planets had already drawn on its two sides an astral comparison with the two greater luminaries that the idea of a marriage between sun and moon hardly left a trace behind.

Zw. 5. It is the remote ages the periods of revolution peculiar to the several planets had been studied, with results which led to their being arranged in the following sequence (with the earth, of course, in the centre of the universe)—Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. The sun’s superiority in size was enough of itself to give him the median position. The planets named beneath the sun ranked as morning and evening stars, or in other ways; and of the twofold characteristic thus exhibited one aspect might be regarded as good and the other as evil. The three last-named, or exterior, planets formed a triad by themselves, and they appeared to the observer as less under the control of the sun than his own family or the moon. The middle amongst them was occupied by Jupiter, who might thus be deemed their king; and the latter, too, according to Oriental ideas, was good. But as the sun, the giver of life and light, was likewise good, it followed that Mars and Saturn must be evil—by the addition of a rather crude and natural, even yet unretorted to, as, e.g., in the counting of one’s coat-buttons, in ideas about even and odd, and in other primitive superstitions. Mars with his relatively short period of revolution became the youthful turbulent demon, while the slowly-revolving Saturn was figured as the hoary-headed begetter of evil.

Not only, however, do men look upwards towards the planets, but the planets themselves look downwards upon men and events on the earth. They were even supposed to impress their own characters upon earthly affairs, intervening therein as their nature prompted. In the case of the sun and the moon such action was obvious to all, and by analogy it was attributed to the other five planets as well. These ideas were so simple and natural that, at the time when, in the oldest civilized lands, such as Babylonia and Egypt, the earliest scientific observations and records of the planetary motions were collected, they had permeated all study of the subject. The consequence was that these naive ideas continued to mingle with the subsequent results of genuine astronomical inquiry.

Aboriginal men, upon a fresh vein of ideas when he divined a mutual connexion between the lustre of the stars and that of the metals. The metals with which he was acquainted were being closely seven in number, it was natural to associate with them the seven fixed stars or the fixed planets. The parallels were as follows: the Sun with gold, the Moon with silver, Mars with iron, Mercury with quicksilver, Jupiter with tin, Venus with copper, and Saturn with lead. At an earlier than the medieval, and even until modern times, the metals were indicated by the planetary symbols. Then alchemy attached special symbols to other substances, and as alchemy and astrology were intimately connected with each other throughout their entire course, it may be well to give a list of the symbols used by alchemists in the Middle Ages:

- ⊙ gold, ☼ silver, ♦ iron, ♣ quicksilver, ♢ tin, ♧ copper, ♤ lead, ♦ antimony, ⊠ lime, ⊤ sulphur, ⊥ tartar, ⊠ salt, ♤ salt-petre, ⊤ sulphuric acid, ♦ ammonia, ☼ distillate and sublimate, ♤ precipitate.

We have thus sketched the main lines of thought by which the planets came to have their particular significance in astrological speculation. More remote considerations must here be left aside. So far as it to say that, in the final scheme of astrology, Mercury became the lord of wisdom, cunning, artifices, and crafts, and was linked the bi-sexual; Venus became the lady of love; Mars, the lord of war and violence generally; Jupiter, the ruler of gods and men; Saturn, the lord of cruelty andrucineulser. The Sun, Jupiter, and Saturn were propitious by day, and the Moon, Mars, and Venus by night. The planets infected with their own qualities such as were born under their influence, but in certain situations their normal action might be completely reversed.

2. The ecliptic and the zodiac.—Civilized man is still affected by the variation of times and seasons, and in a yet higher degree was this the case with primitive man. The latter could hardly remain inattentive to changes of temperature and weather in their connexion with day and night, or with summer and winter, or, again, with the varying position of the sun and the moon. His interest in the chase and his sexual relations obliged him to take notice of the fluctuating brightness of the moon by night. He noted that the period of menstruation coincided with that of a lunar revolution. In the life of primitive man, accordingly, there was no concern of importance but was somehow related to the movements of the sun or the moon. As soon, however, as the planets came to be regarded as endowed with personality, the interventions of sun and moon in human affairs began to be thought of as the conscious and voluntary actions of higher beings, whose purpose it was to bring the fortunes of nations, monarchs, and individual human beings into continuous correlation with their own particular activities in the higher sphere.

The planets Venus and Mercury, being represented as respectively the wife and the son of the sun, must inevitably, according to human notions, exert an influence upon the actions of the being personified as husband and father. To this so, it was impossible to leave Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn out of account. Now these five smaller planets, equally with the larger two, confined their movements to a portion of the firmament. The only difference between the circular paths of the sun and the moon and the

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paths of the smaller planets is that the latter exhibit certain peculiar convolutions, which were called cælycides, and may be illustrated by a curved line as follows: \[\text{Diagram}\]. The orbits of the sun and the moon, no doubt, also showed many deviations from the path of simple revolution in the observer's point of view. But the only change which a dweller upon the earth could discern in the smaller planets was the shifting of their several positions among the fixed stars, an increment or decrement in apparent magnitude. Investigation of these planets, therefore, did not reach beyond investigation of their paths in the firmament.

Almost about one-half of all the stars are visible. The great mass of these lie in the broad equatorial girdle of the heavens between the sun and a point 180° E. of the sun. The lines bounding the stars of the circumpolar vault and those of the southern hemisphere are not constant, but fluctuate inversely. The stars, however, that come into consideration in regard to the planetary orbits travel from east to west, passing below the horizon once a day. Before sunrise the other half of the stars, i.e., those lying between the sun and 180° W., are within the field of view. Thus, an examination of the sky made twice in one night, viz., shortly after sunset and shortly before sunrise, will embrace practically every important phenomenon in the starry heavens. These accordingly were the two times of astronomical observation to which prime importance was ascribed throughout antiquity, and in relation with which all observations were brought.

In the course of one night, then, primitive man could see all the stars visible in our latitudes. One of the few exceptions was formed by the stars which happened to be situated in the sun's meridian for the time being. Their light was lost in the sun's beams, and they were meanwhile invisible. After sunset and before sunrise, moreover, there was a short period of twilight, causing a degree of obscurity such that brighter stars remained visible only when they were over 12°, and fainter stars only when over 15°, E. or W. of the sun.

In virtue of the sun's movement in the zodiac, the observer of the morning and the evening sky might witness the following phenomena. On a particular evening of the year a star, especially one situated in the zodiacal belt, would be visible for a few minutes after sunset, and on the following evening would not be seen any more. Now, such a star remained invisible for a certain time every year, and the astralogue spoke of it as being 'combusct,' i.e. dissolved in the overpowering beams of the sun. Then, after a period of 24 to 30 days, according to its brilliance, the same star reappeared shortly before sunrise. The star's disappearance from the evening sky in the west was termed its heliacal setting, and its reappearance in the morning sky to that of its heliacal rising.

In the astrology and astronomy of both East and West throughout the entire ancient era the heliacal rising of various groups of stars was carefully noted and employed in registering the date of events. So far, the earliest known instance of this, found more than once in historical records, is the heliacal rising of Sirius, the \[\alpha\] of the Egyptians, which was pronounced Σωση, and translated ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἱεροῦ, by the Greeks. By this means, long before the building of the pyramids was initiated, the beginning of the sidereal year, as well as a particular era of about 1500 years, at the end of which the first day of the sidereal year coincided with that of the tropical year. Halfway through the period of invisibility the star and the sun lie in the same meridian. The corresponding proximity of a star to any of the planets but the sun is called a conjunction, and every conjunction was astrologically of great importance. But when the sun, mercury, and a planet coincident pair, the occurrence is known as the comical rising of the star in question. It is to this comical rising, not as in ancient times to the heliacal rising, that a prominence is attached by modern scientific astronomy.

The Egyptian sacred year was subsequently adopted by the Romans as the Julian year, with the intercalation of a day in every fourth year. This computation allowed for the fact that the sun seems to move forward some \[\frac{1}{4}\] of his orbit every day. This might have suggested a division of the ecliptic into 365 parts, only to be rejected as thus involved. What was actually done, however, was to divide the great circle into 360 parts, involving a still larger error of adjustment. The calculation of the years for the moon wa arranged into twelve months--of which we shall treat more fully below--together with many other things, were thereby greatly simplified. But the sun's orbit of 360 degrees, with the moon at a 26° degree, left only 35 days of every year out of account. Now we speak of a summer solstice and a winter solstice, meaning thereby the two points at which the sun passes his great declination north and south respectively. Originally, however, the residual 54 days were divided between the two solstices, the sun being actually represented as passing in his declination, so that he could still traverse the 360 degrees of the ecliptic in 360 days. In the ancient Egyptian calendar this whole redundant period was transferred to the time just anterior to the heliacal rising of Sirius, five days being inserted in ordinary, and six in leap (or tetraptych) years. In the early Roman calendar the intercalation was made at the winter solstice. To the Babylonian calendar, which, with a displacement of the year's beginning, is still in use as the Jewish calendar, we must return when we deal with lunar computations. Be it noted here, however, that for astrological and astronomical purposes the Babylonians placed the compensatory interval for the most part at the beginning of spring, but sometimes at the beginning of autumn.

The time at which this yearly intercalation was made was dependent in the main upon the fixing of the zero meridian in the movable vault of heaven. The points through which this zero line might be conveniently drawn were, of course, many. Once it was fixed, astronomy and astrology were brought into harmony, and a definite instant established for commencing the day. The Babylonians began the day with sunrise, and the year with the spring equinox. Thus placing the zero of the ecliptic upon the first point of Aries, among the Jews the day began with sunset, and the civil year with the autumn equinox; and, had the Jews studied astronomy independently, they would have drawn the zero of the ecliptic through Libra. In the early Roman, as in our modern, calendar the day is reckoned from midnight, and the year from the winter solstice; here, therefore, the zero would lie in the first point of Capricornus. The Romans, however, as classical writers inform us, borrowed their astronomy and astrology from Babylon, and accordingly it is the Babylonian zero point that is found among the Romans, as also in later developments, and even in the astronomy of the present day. The Egyptians dated their year from the rise of the Nile on the 19th of July, and the corresponding zero meridian passed through Vegeta. With this, however, the beginning of the day did not harmonize, for, according to notes found in the Mantelpavians and other hieroglyphic texts,
the Egyptian day was reckoned from sunrise. This
dislocation likewise is probably due to Babylonian
influence of a very remote date.
It has been seen that the ecliptic, and indeed the
circle generally, was divided into 360 degrees, to
correspond approximately with the sun’s daily
change of position among the stars throughout one
year; as long as the division was found in
conveniently small, and the ecliptic was then ported
ion out into constellations, each having an arc
of 30 degrees, and three subdivisions of 10 degrees,
or 10 arc minutes. This was the mode of divi-
sion carried out in two ways.
In the first place, at any given time some-
thing like one-twelfth of the ecliptic was ‘com-
bust’; and, secondly, each of these twelfths was
traversed by the sun in about the same time as
the moon required for one complete revolution.
In this way the annual course of the sun was
furnished with the 12 zodiacal signs of the ecliptic.
Moreover, in the earliest times the synodic
period of the moon was divided into three, viz.
waxing, dominant, and waning moon, and this
division was adhered to by later astrology. New
to each of these synodical thirds of the moon’s
course over the heavens are a triad of the sun extend-
ing to some 10 degrees, and thus in time arose the
division of the ecliptic into 36 deccanates.
The trisection of the moon’s period just noted probably later led to the institution of
weeks of ten and five days. It does not appear,
however, from what we have so far learned of
ancient Eastern history, that these measurements
had any practical significance. It was only in
astronomy and astro-mythology, with its historical
legends, that the 36 deccanates (or the 72 semi-
deccanates) were actually made use of. This chro-
ometer idea of the day being divided into six parts,
was in vogue throughout Babylonia and Egypt, if not else-
where. A final vestige thereof was the Egyptian
practice of assigning 401 udabiti for the dead—
365 for the days of the year and 36 as guardsians
for the ten-day weeks. In astronomy of the higher
type, to the time of Kepler, calculations were
made by means of the degree and, above all, of the
deccanate; and the moon from her tenth to her
twentith day was always spoken of as being in
her domain. In general, however, the method of
reckoning which superseded all others, for both
astronomical observation and astrological inter-
prediction, was that of the use of the 12 zodiacal
signs, although these were variously designated in
the several civilized lands of antiquity. It like-
wise forms the foundation of the Babylonian
scheme of months, as appears from the following parallelsim: Libra, taṣirīt (Bab.), Tishri (Heb.),
followed by Scorpio, araq-summa (Bab.), Mar-
cheshvan (Heb.); then Sagittarius, kēstanum (Bab.),
Kislev (Heb.), etc. The names of the months were
also indicative of their meteorological conditions;
thus, e.g., the winter rainy season was symbolized
by Capricornus (originally the marine animal
Hippocampus guttulatus), Aquarius, and Pisces,
all in some way connected with water.
Here, moreover, we again meet with the practice
of portioning out good and evil, or rather male
and female, alternately as astrologically the zero point
of this distribution lay between Cancer and Leo,
approximating, therefore, to that of the Egyptian
Sirius-year. Leo, Libra, and Sagittarius came to be
regarded as male; Virgo, Scorpio, and Capricornus
as female. It is worthy of remark that as a result
of this law of alternation the astrologer was actu-
ally forced for thousands of years to speak of
Taurus and Gemini as female. Then the constellation
of the zodiac were also allotted severally to the
planets; thus Cancer was assigned to the moon,
Leo to the sun, Gemini and Virgo to Mercury,
Taurus and Libra to Venus, Aries and Scorpio to
Mars, Sagittarius and Pisces to Jupiter, and Capri-
cornus and Aquarius to Saturn. The particular
planet was called the ‘lord of the mansion’ belong-
ing to its respective sign or signs. Tradition tells
us, however, that there were other ‘gods (or lords)
of the mansion.’ Those of the Egyptians have
been transmitted to us not only by the reports of
Marcus Manilius, but also by an allusive notice
found in the Ebers Papyrus; some of their names
likewise survive in the Coptic designations of the
months. A comparison of the various lists shows
that in the course of thousands of years the
tradition remained unaltered, though in that of
Manilius there is a dislocation to the extent of one
zodiacal sign.

The ecliptic of the sun is traversed approxi-
ately also by the moon, viz. the arc described by the moon in one
day. In order to correspond, therefore, with the
moon’s period of 360 degrees, it was divided into
360 degrees, and thus in time arose the
division of the ecliptic into 36 deccanates.

The various locations of the five smaller
planets were usually designated by the 12 zodiacal signs
into which the sun’s path is divided, as is specifi-
cally shown in the night maps of Egypt by the Berlin
Demotic Papyrus p. 8279.

3. Spherical astronomy and the astrological
houses. — Observations of the astral motions
within the scope of natural vision are desig-
nated spherical, and when these have been duly
adjusted they are, by way of contrast, called cos-
meal, while the actual occurrences themselves are
spoken of as sidereal. Modern scientific astronomy
must always take the direct spherical
observations as its starting-point, only then pro-
ceeding to elaborate its way towards the higher
levels of knowledge. The astrology and astronomy
of the ancient world never got beyond the
spherical stage. Hence it was necessary from the outset
to lay down fixed bearings for observational purposes,
such as would be furnished by two lines, one
run
1 If we take the planets, therefore, in the reverse order of their propinquity to the earth, viz., Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun,
Venus, Mercury, and Moon, and suppose that each planet in turn
passes over an hour of the day, then, e.g., Saturn passes over the first hour of the particular day, he will pass over the
8th, 15th, and 22nd hours; the 2nd hour accordingly will fall to Jupiter, the 9th, 16th, and 23rd to Mars, and the
21st hour to the Sun; hence Saturday is followed by Sunday, and
so on.

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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory)

In connexion with nearly all ancient systems of religion are found sacred edifices of great age whose longitudinal axes lie exactly east and west. The determination of this east and west line, i.e., the parallel of latitude, was thus one of the early triumphs of the human mind. The oldest known instrument employed for the purpose was the gnomon, which afterwards developed into the gnomon of the sun-dial, and, indeed, the sundial itself. The gnomon was a vertical shaft fixed in the centre of a circle. In the morning, and again in the evening, the shadow of the pillar extended a considerable distance beyond the circle, while for the hour or two before, as also for an hour or two after, the extremity of the shadow lay within the circle, therefore, to mark the two points at which the shadow, forenoon and afternoon, terminated precisely upon the circle. The straight line joining these two points supplied an accurate east and west alignment, which could thus be secured on any sunny day at any season of the year. The use of the gnomon, in some form or other, seems to be common to primitive and the older civilized peoples.

Simple trial and observation showed that a stationary point was to be found in the north pole of the firmament and the star lying nearest to it. The direction of the meridian line through any given point of observation could then be ascertained by the following expedient. Two herosopes stood face to face upon a line lying roughly north and south. The observer on the south, holding up before him the split rib of a palm leaf, moved it into such a position as enabled him through the fissure to see the pole star directly above the crown of his companion's head. Then the observer on the north, looking through the slit, saw all the then culminating stars from the southern point of the horizon upwards, and in this way projected his meridian upon the celestial vault.

The east and west points of the horizon, and the meridian of the observer, having been ascertained, the earliest facts of observation regarding the paths of the planets could be brought into relation therewith. The fixed stars, indeed, never varying in their positions relative to one another, also rose and set at constant distances from the east and west points respectively. On the other hand, the sun, moon, and the nearer planets rose and set at points never twice the same successively, and sometimes north, sometimes south, of due east and west. As regards the sun, the most northerly point of rising and setting was reached as he entered Cancer, and the most southerly as he entered Capricorn, while his rising and setting were due east and due west respectively twice a year, viz., as he entered Aries and Libra. The extreme limits of his northerly and southerly movements in the ecliptic were called the tropical points, and the two constellations concerned came to be known in astrology and astronomy as the tropical constellations of the zodiac. Corresponding results were established with reference to the other planets.

But there is likewise an apparent daily revolution of fixed stars and planets alike around the position of the observer, each of them crossing his meridian once in every 24 hours; while if they lie in the equatorial circle the intersection takes place exactly 6 hours after they rise in the east, and 6 hours before they set in the west. Hence the observer's celestial equator, too, is always laid out in 12 segments corresponding to the 12 constellations of the zodiac. If we disregard the sun's daily eastward movement of one degree, we find that every two hours the zodiac changes its position relatively to the equator by one whole zodiacal sign of 30 degrees. Now the intermediate positions of the signs during these two hours being left out of account, the observer's celestial equator was once for all divided into 12 apparently stationary parts, each of these having its own meridian. The illustration below shows an equatorial section traversing the horizon and the celestial sphere. These parts were called 'houses,' and all the conditions found within them were treated as if stationed in their respective middle lines. Now, as the enumeration of the houses began in the east, and then proceeded downwards under the eastern horizon, i.e., according to the order in which the phenomena of each successive house would appear above that horizon, the due east point fell exactly in the middle of the first house, the due west point in that of the seventh, the meridian in that of the tenth, and the opposite meridian in that of the fourth.

All primitive astronomical and astrological study of the sky was occupied, and indeed necessarily occupied, with the rising, culmination, and setting of the heavenly bodies, with the passage of planets, normal stars, and constellations from one house to another, and with the mutual positions of the planets as measured by the houses they happened to occupy at any given time.

It would appear that these houses were sometimes divided in two, as, e.g., in Egypt in the time of King Seti; and this led quite naturally to the division of the day into 24 hours, and eventually to the arrangement of the dial-plate of our clocks. For more exact observations, however, each house was subdivided into three decanates, and each decanate into ten degrees, the advantage of this being that the sphere of the observer had the same number of parts as the ecliptic, while the boundary lines defined the parts of each coincided every four minutes.

This method of parceling out the sun's apparent daily course must have been instituted at a very remote period, in an age indeed when the astronomer had not yet grasped the idea of a circular orbit, but still thought of the solar path as a square. In the figure representing the horizon this quadrilateral was retained, and it has remained in use till modern times, and, in fact, till the present day. To this method of delineating the stellar paths in
the horoscope by means of the square we shall frequently have occasion to return, as a considerable number of symbols relating to God and the world were also involved. In interpreting the horoscope the various positions were so far as possible brought into relation with the first house, and with the latter as starting-point the astrologer, applying the rules of the science as in the case of the exterior planets, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, alternately assigned to the other houses an essential character of benefit or bane. This new house was unfavourable, the eleventh favourable, the tenth—apart from its special position—unfavourable, the ninth favourable, the eighth supremely unfavourable, and so with the rest. This mode of interpretation was also arrived at along another line of thought, and, being thus supported by two ostensibly proofs, it was believed to be established beyond dispute. The second proof in question was that supplied by the 'aspects,' of which we shall treat presently.

The plan of indicating position by means of zodiacal signs and houses could at best give approximate results. For the sake of simplicity it was assumed that the boundary lines of the several signs always coincided with those of the several houses, and that accordingly at the end of a Babylonian double-hour each sign moved instantly into the next house. Thus we have one less than that of the house which it had vacated. For all further deductions within the limits of plane geometry, the entire contents of any particular zodiacal sign were regarded as concentrated in the middle point of the sign and the house then congruent therewith.

The enumeration of the astrological houses from the east downwards into the west is said to derive from the observation that the rays of light would cut the earth again above the horizon, so that account is first of all taken of the invisible regions of the stellar heavens, had its origin in the fact that the attention of the astrologer was primarily directed towards the rising of the stars, and accordingly the houses were numbered in the order in which the stars contained in them at any given time appeared to be rising.

4. Aspects. — The term aspect is rarely used in astrology to denote the relative positions of the houses and zodiacal signs, or of the stars situated in the houses at any given time. Planets in the same sign and the same house were said to be in conjunction; planets in opposite signs and houses, in opposition. The other possible relations amongst the celestial phenomena were defined with reference to regular inscribed polygons. Thus, if a planet were situated in the twelfth or the second house, then the line joining the middle point of either of these houses and that of the first house would form one side of a regular inscribed dodexagon; in which case the planet in question was said to be in dodecagonal aspect to the east point, or 'horoscope' in the original sense. As in the same way planets in the eleventh and third houses furnished the side of a regular hexagon, their aspect towards the east or the horoscope was sextile. Similarly planets in the tenth and fourth houses were in quartile or square, and those in the ninth and fifth were in trine. The line joining the middle point of the eighth or the sixth house with the east point was not a constituent part of any regular figure within the circle, and suggested at best a cross dodexagon, formed thus, which was regarded as the vocation of all order. But as conjunction and opposition were reckoned amongst the regular aspects, the eighth was the only visible house having no aspect towards the horoscope. The principle of alternate enumeration likewise pronounced this house unfavourable. In the astrological application of spherical astronomy it therefore signified the house of death.

Prior to the stage now reached, the exclusive concern of the astronomer had been to map out the heavens with such precision as would enable him to fix his observations by means of a verbal record. His conception of aspects, however, i.e. of the relations of the stellar positions to the horoscope, led him to assign values to the stellar positions themselves, and as soon as these came to be represented as anthropocentric or concenetric, the initiative was given to the study of Natoal Astrology. Nevertheless we must emphasize the fact that the original scheme of the horoscope was depicted as a square, and that, before it became possible for astrology to speak of regular polygons, the conception of the sun's apparent diurnal motion as a circle must have come to the front. Thus the very language of astrology shows it to have been a kind of expression born where thought met with astronomy at all. Even in the Middle Ages a distinction was still maintained between Natural Astrology and Positive Astrology. The former dealt with the natural, and especially the benefic influence of the planets upon meteorological changes—wind, storm, hurricane, thunder, flood, and earthquake. It was accordingly bound up with the naive and fantastic weather-lore of primitive man, and is to some extent still evident in scientific meteorology. In regard to the latter it is even yet frequently true that sub indice lis est.

Positive or Judicial Astrology, on the other hand, was concerned from the earliest times with the supposed influences of the planets upon the fortunes of men and nations. It is now regarded by all sober minds as merely a form of superstition, as something that the race has finally left behind. In Judicial Astrology it was no longer merely the aspect of a star to the horoscope, i.e. the east point, that was of importance, but also the aspect of two planets with respect to each other. If one planet, for example, was situated in the eleventh house and another in the eighth, the two were said to be in trine aspect. Here again, moreover, we find the alternate distribution of good and evil: conjunction was good; adjacent aspect or aspect in dodexagon was evil; sextile was good; quartile relatively evil; trine specially good; absence of regular aspect was specially evil, and opposition relatively good.

Since the line between the eighth or the sixth house and the east point did not form a regular polygon, these two houses were deemed of inferior value. For the anthropocentric mind of the astrologer it was therefore a short step to regard them as houses of misfortune. The eighth house thus became the house of death, and the sixth the house of pains. We shall see later that in the reciprocal relations between the macrocom and the microcom the left arm became a synonym for the house of death and the left leg for the house of pains, and that in consequence these bodily parts themselves came to be regarded as of evil omen.

As emphasis was laid likewise upon the mutual correspondence of east and west—an idea that was corroborated by the principle of alternate numbering—the twelfth and second houses were counted.
The astrological conception of the world.

5. The astrological conception of the world.

As humorous advances that have been made within modern times in the study and practical application of the natural sciences, as well as the great contrast that obtains between the ancient and the modern scientific point of view, are matters of common knowledge. It is impossible to understand the theories of nature held by the ancients without a clear conception of the difference between their own and our views. Consequently the ideas, ninth, fifth, and third houses were reckoned unfavourable; while the eighth, seventh, and first, respectively evil. These symbolic interpretations, however, were sometimes set aside, sometimes even reversed, especially those connected with the invisible half of the sky.

The tenth house, as in which the stars culminated, was supposed, by a very natural symbolism, to preside over dignities and offices, while the fourth house, lying directly beneath us, came in similar fashion to be associated with parents and ancestors, as those who had passed into the underground, and inferentially with all the other ties of kinship. On the ground of a certain analogy with the eighth house, i.e. that of death, the twelfth became the house of eminence (κοινωνία), and, by a further extension, that of the house of poverty. As the second house, however, was situated in the sky belonging to the under world and therefore opposite to ours, it became the house of wealth. In the same way the sixth house, that of sickliness (or, according to another interpretation, that of service), became the house of health. Next to the house of death, the sixth house, the seventh house of the tutelary deity, while the eleventh, adjacent to the house of eminence, became that of friendship (διαφωτισμός).

On the ground of similar considerations the third became associated with children, and the fifth the house of children. Finally, as the first house was specially associated with the querten of the astrological oracular, the seventh belonged to the quarten counterpart, i.e. the house of the ordinary course of things, with its own elements.

The designations of the various houses were therefore as follows: (1) life, (2) riches, (3) brothers, (4) parents, (5) children, (6) health, (7) marriage, (8) death, (9) religion, (10) dignities, (11) friendship, and (12) eminence. But this arrangement gave only the general scheme of astrological prognostication, and in the course of thousands of years various changes were introduced. Our information regarding any particular era of astrological speculation is defective, and we speak only in a general sense when we say that the system was so fixed that the system detailed above remained essentially unchanged.

It was all along recognized, moreover, that the scheme must be specially adjusted to special circumstances. Thus in the case of Solomon the invalid himself, and it was about him, therefore, that the first house supplied information. The counterpart was meanwhile not the wife, but the disease itself, upon which accordingly much weight was cast by the seventh house. The tenth house, in which the stars culminated over the patient, symbolized the physician, while the fourth, lying directly beneath in the under world, signified death. Account was also taken, of course, of the eighth house as the house of death, and of the sixth as the house of health. The houses of friendship, eminence, riches, brothers, and children were set up in a similar manner, and the twelfth was especially associated with the invisible half of the sky.

5. The astrological conception of the world.

It is of interest to note that the symbols used in astrology for the four cardinal points were simply the triangles corresponding to the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth houses respectively. But while, according to the expedient already noticed (p. 659), the positions of the stars in the equinoctial were determined by the observer on the north, the Ecliptic of the cardinal points was fixed by his fellow on the south. The horizon was therefore determined by the opposite pole of the sky, and the...
four houses in question took a reverse form, so that $\Delta$ came to mean north, $\nabla$ south, $\nabla$ east, and $\nabla$ west. With this exception, however, all further inferences were drawn from the proper form of the horoscope, i.e. from the figure as presented to the observer on the north.

The tenth house, as the summum colum, and the fourth, as the innum colum, embraced everything in the world above and the world below respectively. The upper world as a whole, however, consists of the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth houses. In the hieroglyphic script of Egypt, accordingly, heaven is represented by the exterior boundary of these five houses, thus:

which, of course, according to the Egyptian practice in such matters, is only a contour, and really stands for $\nabla$. The same proportions and angles are likewise retained in the Egyptian representation of the goddess of heaven, who broods over the earth-god—a phenomenon which will meet us again when we treat of Egypt. The under world was represented, of course, by the same figure inverted. Now we find two different ideas attaching to each of the houses numbered ten and four. According to one conception the summum colum contains the heavenly upper ocean, from which rain falls (וֹרָקָה פָּנֵי in the Biblical narrative of the Deluge), while the innum colum embraces both the ocean of the under world and the subterranean water from which the fountains of the deep are fed (גָּן לֵוֶת; also the sources of the Nile in Hierotheus). According to the other conception there lies above us first of all air, then fire; and beneath us, first earth, then water.

Now the latter theory furnished also the alchemic symbols of the elements—symbols which are still written by doctors in old-fashioned mysterious receipts, and were in common use among physicians and apothecaries a hundred years ago. Thus, for example, $\nabla$ signifies terra sigillata; $\nabla$ lumbrie. $\nabla$ luma = lumbrii terrae; $\nabla$ for. $\nabla$ aqua foraminum aurantiocrorum; or something was to be boiled leni $\Delta$, i.e.

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To this day the device $\nabla$ displayed upon rustic inns indicates the licence to sell brandy.

This combined symbol $\Delta$ was used not only in alchemy but also in the Kabbalah, where it represented the Star of David. It became, in fact, a symbol for God (just as the fire-eye, i.e. $\Delta$, was employed in Christian symbolism to signify the Holy Spirit); for, by the rules of the Kabbalah, the combination of the principal consonants of $\nabla$ ('fire') and $\nabla$ ('water') yielded the word $\nabla$ ('heaven'), which in its turn was the cabalistic equivalent of $\nabla$ ('God'). Thus the term God could be expressed by the secret sign $\nabla$ as the synthesis of fire and water. In the synagogue all pictorial representation of God was forbidden, nor was it allowable to give utterance to the tetragram $\nabla$ unless absolutely necessary. In the same way, therefore, as the word $\nabla$ had to be resorted to as the oral designation of God, the symbol $\nabla$ came to be used in the architecture of the synagogue as His graphic designation. This figure, moreover, not only contains within itself the symbols of the four elements, interlaced with one another, but, besides the upper and lower triangles signifying fire and water respectively, it also shows four extra-mundane triangles, which could thus be regarded on cabalistic principles as metaphysically symbolizing the four consonants of the tetragram. Hence, even in passages of ancient Christian works where we might expect such phrases as 'with God,' we actually find the cabalistic device $\nabla$ signifying $\nabla$.

According to the astrological theory of the world, however, not only the perpendicular section through the universe, but the surface of the earth itself, was thought of as quadrate, since the cube, as the ideal geometrical figure, was the accepted symbol of the world as a whole. This idea finds frequent expression even in later cabalistic writings treating of the origin of salt, which, of course, also crystallizes in cubic form. The scheme of the horoscope, accordingly, became a comprehensive map of the world as well. As previously explained in
connexion with the points of the compass, the horoscope was in this case constructed, as it were, from the opposite point of view. In the centre was the star from which each nativity was sought to claim for its own territory, and as the site of the national sanctuary. The figure also supplied the four pillars, viz. N.E., N.W., S.E., and S.W., and the middle lines on the chart. Of these the best known was the S.W. pillar, as it was there that Atlas had been relieved by Hercules.

6. Anthropomorphic nomenclature of the sphere.—The square horoscope was not the only expedient resorted to in setting forth the relations of the stars, as another method was also in use among the Egyptians. From a time anterior to Menes until the final period, the high priest of Heliopeolis was known as the chief astrologer. We may note in passing that this office was held by Potifi-heres (of which name the literal Greek translation was Heliodoros), the father-in-law of Joseph (Gen. 41). Tables of observations made in Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty are still extant, and in these are recorded the dates at which the fixed stars crossed the middle lines of the houses, i.e., the beginnings of the double hours. The astrologer on the north found the meridian of the place of observation by looking through the slit of the palm-leaf rib above the bals crown of his companion. The middle meridians of the first and seventh houses were given by the horizontal line, while the observer found those of the eleventh and ninth houses by lines projected over his companion's right and left eyes respectively, and in similar fashion those of the twelfth and eighth houses by lines above the right and left elbows. It is probable that the sixth house was in like manner associated with the left knee, and the second house with the right.

From this point of view the left arm corresponded with the house of death and the left leg with the house of sorrows, and on this account there eventually arose a superstition of aversion to using the word 'left' at all. In particular, all actions performed by the left hand came to be regarded as unlucky; so well be the case that mankind was right-handed rather than left-handed before astrology asserted its sway, but the ban thus laid upon the left extremities of the body was further reinforced for excluding the left side and especially the left hand from all actions of great and critical moment.

7. Applied astronomy and astrology.—Alike in the greatest and in the smallest affairs of life uncivilized man is affected by the changes incident to the day and the season, by the phases of the moon by night, and by the ebb and flow of the tides. Hence the observation of sun and moon with a view to a standard measurement of time, or, in other words, to the construction of a calendar, was a vital condition of all progress in civilization. But as the periods of the earth's rotation about its axis (i.e. the apparent diurnal movement of the sun), of the moon's revolution, and of the sun's apparent annual revolution, are incommensurable with regard to each other, the early attempts to frame a serviceable calendar were attended with no small difficulty. As the lunar month made more impression upon the primitive mind than the annual, efforts were made in the earliest calendars to base the latter upon an integral number of the former, and all sorts of expedients were tried in order to harmonize the two periods. At a further stage in the growth of civilization the determination of the true solar year became the subject of inquiry, the length of the true lunar month being then left out of consideration. Here, again, however, the practical difficulties, and the difference between the calendars of Western Europe and Eastern Europe (Russia) shows that these difficulties have not yet been overcome. Among Christians are supported those who believe in a disparity between Babylon, with its cyclically adjusted lunar year, and Egypt, with its solar year, or, rather, its two unequal solar years. Other civilizations employed other types of calendars. A purely lunar calendar is still in use among Muhammadans.

The outstanding periodic phenomena of the apparent courses of sun and moon were registered in these calendars, and were celebrated as occasions of joy or sorrow according to their influence upon human life. In such feasts and fasts the moon and the stars not only pleased the eye, but by all, people, as, indeed, was continued to be revered as divine or heroic beings even after the particular days connected with their movements by astrology and astronomy had been duly set down in the artificially corrected as adjusted calendars of ancient and modern civilized peoples.

8. Lunar, solar, and planetary deities.—The ascertainment of such varying influences of the moon and the sun as the human mind could extract from the calendar was undoubtedly a forward step in the mental development of primitive man. But the notion that the movements of moon, sun, and planets were effected by powerful and capricious beings, more or less endowed with free will, was an open door to all illusion. The religion and mythology of the lowest races are permeated with this idea. Amongst more highly civilized peoples, again, we find a stock of myths of like purport, which, partly indigenous and partly exotic, forms a kind of illicit religion or superstition, and which shows many points of contrast with the teachings of the Christian cult. In periods distinguished by a high state of civilization this supplementary religion finds acceptance only amongst the lowest and least enlightened races of the people, while at times, as among the Hindus, at a low ebb, it extends its sway over the leading classes as well.

In cases, however, where a relatively advanced and purified religion was also found its way into a region already civilized, the old representations of sun and moon as personal beings, as also the narratives that had grafted themselves upon their festivals, deified rather than explained, gave new and strange impressions of the process we may name the Metamorphoses of Ovid in the Roman religion, the stories of the Thousand and One Nights in Islam, and Grimm's domestic and popular tales in Christianized Germany.

But it was also possible that a fusion might take place between the older and the newer narratives. Thus, apart from the sphere of religious history as such, there are many mediæval kings and heroes whose actual experiences, on the one hand, stand forth in the clear light of history, but whose legendary adventures, on the other, show unmistakable derivations from a narrative about the moon and the sun. The same process has been at work practically everywhere; we trace it not only in the Nebuchadnezzar and the Thera, but also in connexion with all the great figures who as gods or prophets occupy the supreme place in the various systems of religion. Popular imagination, in fact, clinging as it does to the ancient legend, was made in the old narrative around which it thrown them; it may fix upon Confucius, Buddha, Zarathushtra, Jesus, or Muhammad. Even the older religions, with deities unmistakably of planetary origin—the Babylonian...
Shamash, the Egyptian Re, the Greek Apollo—show such secondary deposits from various astro-
mythological sources.

The displacement of this secondary astro-
mythological element from the Christian system of thought has now become one of the prime tasks of theological criticism. It is no longer possible for the theologian to reach the transcendental idea of such an analysis, and the extent to which the work of elimination shall be pursued depends entirely upon whether the individual theologian leans more towards monotheism or to the more liberal side. In regard to Confucius, Buddha, Zarathustra, and Muhammad, as also in regard to the Alexander romances, the Christian theologian concedes the rights of the method without hesita-
tion. Further, the OT and the Life of Jesus have from ancient times been the nuclei of a mass of legendary stories (the Talmud, etc.; Gospels of the Infancy, etc.), which all theologians have for centuries regarded as apocryphal; and it cannot be disputed that the study of astro-mythology has rendered valuable service in throwing light upon the origin of these spurious additions to the lives of the leading personalities of our religion. Once more, there is a group of writings which, though reeked apocryphal by evangelical Churches, are still included in the Roman Catholic canon; and, as much be expected in the case of the astro-
mythological theory upon these writings is esti-
mated by the two great parties within Christianity in precisely opposite ways. And when at length the theologian is brought to bear the astro-
mythological elements in the OT, and to the life of Jesus as given in the evangelical records, the theologians who concede its rights in these domains are fewer still in number. The expected bearing of the astro-
mythological theory upon these writings is esti-
mated by the two great parties within Christianity in precisely opposite ways.

Theological criticism seems to undermine the his-
tority of the Biblical narratives, and to leave nothing but a mass of mythical stories about the planets, the stars, the moon, and the sun. Theological criticism, therefore, is the study of the history of Israel. The logical result of the process appears to be the subversion of every constituent of Christianity save its ethics.

Taken in this sense, the comparative study of astrology and astro-mythology rests upon an im-
pregnable foundation. The implications of its results, as was said in another critique of this nature, well be brought into harmony alike with the most rigid orthodoxy and the broadest liberalism. Hence it cannot be non-suited by either of the warring schools; it is reconcilable even with certain justifications of its critics. Just as comparative philology is an ideal and impartial science, so must the comparative study of myths assume a like impartiality; and the indispensable framework of study is formed by the planetary deities of astrology.

9. Prophetic astrology.—From the theological point of view, prophetic astrology must be regarded as a by-way towards superstition, and, indeed, as one of the main sources of superstition. It was evolved by gentle gradations from what we may call 'calendar astronomy.' Primitive man dis-


cerned parallelism not only in the processes of nature, but also in the human life. He may, even in the forms and organs of animals read analogies and homologies, and many other fields of observation presented similar correspond-
ences. But by far the most obvious and unmistak-
able cases of parallelism were those which subsisted between the motions of the sun and the moon, on the one hand, and the periodic variation of the tides, of light and shade, and the passage of the seasons, on the other. Hence arose the notion of planetary deities or angels—beings who acted according to highly complicated laws, ordained either by themselves or by a superior power, and

who sought to bring all events, great and small alike, within the range of parallel uniformities. Where the trend of thought was polytheistic, the planets were regarded as gods; whereas, it was towards monotheism, they were but the messengers of a Divine will beyond them; or, as the case might be, an inevitable fate was supposed to hang over the gods themselves.

From the standpoint of the ancient astrologer, the supreme function of all learning was the ob-
server of certain simple phenomena and the drawing of inferences bearing upon a parallel series of facts otherwise veiled. The primary task of astrology was to ascertain the positions of the planets in relation to one another, to the zodiacal signs, and to the houses, and then to make deductions therefrom. This was astrology properly so called, and it required for every particular case a direct reading of the sky. A cloudy night, how-
ever, rendered the task impossible, and the Koyunjik inscriptions, dating from the time of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal, yield evidences for a continuous series of actual observa-
tions. From these we learn that, however, therefore, the complexity of the planetary movements, the periodic repetition of essential phenomena had been calculated for each particular planet. Thus the astrologer could look back upon the past and predict covering every particular sequence of planetary movement, and could substitute these for direct observation. It is true that, owing to trifling in-
accuracies in the data thus supplied, this practice was avoided for thousands of years; but at length the momentous step was taken. From the time of the Assyrians astrology reached its maturest development. From the time of the Assyrians astrology reached its maturest development, and the natural sciences were pursued in the study. Our earliest evidence for this procedure date from the period of the Persian monarchies.

So far as astronomy itself is concerned, this was a progressive movement; but, from the standpoint of observational science, it was a backward step. It issued finally in the determination and mathe-

matical calculation of the planetary orbits by Kepler. But, in our estimate of Kepler's dis-
coveries, we must always bear in mind that he was still under the spell of the astrological conception of the universe. From this standpoint, Kepler's discoveries supplied the key to all events of history, and had exalted astrology to the level of a perfect and independent science of simple calculation, while in reality he had given the death-blow to its pre-
tensions.

From the time of the earliest attempts to draw up a calendar—through the period of the Sun-
crarians and Zoroastrians to the days of Kepler—astrology underwent no essential change, save that it gradually abandoned the methods of direct observa-
tion of the heavens in favour of, first, a partial use of tables containing earlier observations, and, finally, a purely arithmetical determination of the positions occupied by the planets at any given time. Astrology, be it remembered, was a study of international importance. Wherever, therefore, in the history of any civilized country we can trace some slight advance in astronomical science, we find corresponding records, practically contemporaneous, in all the civilized countries of that era. Additions to men's knowledge of the stars were valued only as ancillary to the determination of the planetary positions. As all the available evidence goes to show, however, astrologers, throughout their entire career, had but one method of adapting this knowledge to oracular ends—the method, namely, of symbolical interpretation, with a more or less clearly realized principle of alternation of signs in the main, the positions of the planets were made
the basis of prognostications of the unborn future, but they were also used as a means of filling up lacunae in the knowledge of the past and the present.

10. Astrology and medicine.—In the ancient Orient, astrology, religion, and therapeutic art went hand in hand. In the conviction that all things in the universe proceeded in parallel lines, men spoke of a macrocosmos (primarily the world as unity) and a microcosmos (primarily the human body), and sought for far-reaching analogies between them. Thus—to take one of many examples found in Sasskrut literature—the Vedas and their allied texts exhibited attempts to establish an exact equivalence between the number of the bones in the human body and that of the days in a year. Simple as would have been the error, if single pieces, not including the factitious, could, as the twentieth part of 360, be used for purposes of speculation. The method was applied in every field, and things which did not harmonize in fact were arbitrarily made to do so.

In the ancient East the therapeutic art was based upon the two fundamental postulates of air in motion and liquid in motion, and it was supposed that in the human body the air passed along the arteries, while the liquid traversed the veins. The solid substance of the body (its earthly constituents) and its native heat (its igneous constituents) were regarded as forming a fixed and constant mass: earth and fire, in fact, were probably never considered in their physiological aspects until the Hellenistic period. The astrological ideas hitherto discovered in Babylonian and Egyptian texts show that air and liquid alone were taken into account. In the further development of these notions, special prominence was given to the air by the pneumatists, and to the blood (i.e., liquid, and a mixture of the four principal humours, viz. water, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) by the hematists. We cannot enter into the particulars of the antagonism maintained between the two schools for several thousand years, an antagonism which we can trace in the period when the Pyramids were built, and which, in the reign of Cleopatra, the Egyptian woman to whom the heavens were assigned, the secret of which has been revealed to the Hellenistic astronomers, and which was illustrated by the figure of the heavens used as the ground-plan of the normal horoscope. The science of astrology employed a polar projection in its construction of the heavens, and to this arrangement corresponds the system of regular polygons designed to represent the relative positions of the planets in the circular horoscope.

Another way of dispensing with direct observation of the heavens was to watch the forms assumed by certain substances when suddenly placed under new conditions, as it was supposed that the forms thus produced were determined by the configuration of the planets at the time. Oil or melted tar was dropped into water, or water into oil, and the diviner took note of the resultant forms. We possess two comprehensive lists drawn up in the reign of King Hammurabi of Babylon for the expected changes in the stars and their formations. This mode of divination still survives in the superstitious practice of dropping molten lead upon a cold surface.

A further reformer of the science of nature found in the Pesantehuch, the Jahwistic sections (of Genesis in particular) represent the pneumatic, and the Elohistic portions the hematomorphic point of view, whereas the Priestly Code exhibits no scientific tendency at all. The pneumatists regarded the nose as the most important organ of the body. We may recall the numerous phrases formed with ye in the OT, and the larger part of the blood, plays a prominent part in the OT and the Talmud. Among the Babylonians and Etruscans, again, as also among the various peoples influenced by them, hasanpeshi took the special form of divination by interpreting the dreams. The cuneiform texts which contain no fewer than fourteen different texts referring to divination by the nose.

According to the hematomists, life was concentrated in the liver, the heart, or heavy organ, which, accordingly, together with the blood, plays a prominent part in the OT and the Talmud. Among the Babylonians and Etruscans, again, as also among the various peoples influenced by them, hasanpeshi took the special form of divination by interpreting the dreams. The cuneiform texts which treat of this hematology are without number, and have been read and translated mainly by Jastrow.

In the ancient East, and even in Greece, the pneumatists were the chief of the religious specialists in astrology, omens, and all that we now brand with the name of superstition. To dreams, above all, they attached great importance, while the pneumatists flourished in the time of Plato and the writings of Hippocrates, declared dreams to be unworthy of consideration. The pneumatists seem to have borne the reputation of being enlightened by persons, or by the presence of deity itself, as the case with the pneumatist Sostrates as delineated by Aristophanes. From certain fragmentary indications we may perhaps gather that in the main Christians of the early centuries were pneumatists in their knowledge of nature.

From the mental standpoint of the hematomatist every actual group of relations amongst the planets was mirrored itself in all synchronistic events and conditions, and thus the entire horoscopes would be reproduced in the variations and peculiarities found in the liver—the central organ—of the newly-born sacrificial animal. An expert examination of the liver, it is believed, would take the place of a direct observation of the sky. The practice of hematology was diffused, and diagrams illustrative of the art are still extant. The method adopted by the hematomists was to portion out the liver in what may be called a tragi-symphose by means of a rightangled system of ordinates, a device reminding us of the square sections shown by the extant Egyptian projection of the heavens made in the time of King Seti, and likewise of the square figure used as the ground-plan of the normal horoscope. The science of hematology employed a polar projection in its construction of the circulatory fields, and to this arrangement corresponds the system of regular polygons designed to represent the relative positions of the planets in the circular horoscope.
The dates given are themselves products of astrological speculation, and have not been historically established, but they are nevertheless worthy of notice. On the 24th of June, B.C. 7 (or previously), took place the conception or birth of Jesus. On the 5th of May, B.C. 6, the Magi turned their faces toward Jerusalem; in the sanctuary they found the child Jesus. Between the 24th of June, B.C. 6, and the 25th of November, B.C. 6, occurs the visit of the Magi to King Herod. After the 25th of November, B.C. 6, the Magi notice the reappearance of the stellar configuration at the annunciation. On the 27th of December, B.C. 6, the stellar configuration becomes stationary (διότι τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ), and the Magi worship the infant at Bethlehem.

Now the locus of the sun on 15th of April, B.C. 6, can be re-constructed thus:

![Diagram of celestial configuration]

and supplies the following spatelesmata capable of interpretation:

1. The horoscope of the day appears (with sunrise).
2. Aries is in the ascendant.
3. Mars, as lord of the house of Aries, presides over the birth.
4. The sun is in the ascendant.
5. Saturn is in the ascendant.
7. Mercury in the ascendant.
8. Mars in the ascendant.
9. Aries is in the ascendant.
10. Mars in the ascendant.
11. The sun enters the eighth house.
12. Venus is in the twelfth house.
13. Mercury in the house of Mars, and likewise in immediate proximity to Mars.
14. Saturn is in his reversion, or 'detrition.'
15. The sun in his reversion, or 'exaltation.'
16. The moon in her reversion.
17. Venus in her reversion.
18. Venus in her reversion.
19. Venus is matutina (morning star).
20. Jupiter is in proximity to his house places.
21. Jupiter is in his reversion (adventus trigonalis) with his house Sagittarius.
22. The sun is in trine with his house Leo.
23. Saturn's motion is direct.
24. Mars is direct.
25. Venus is retrograde.
26. Mercury is direct.
27. Mercury is in conjunction.
28. Mercury in immediate proximity to the sun.
29. Mercury is invisible.
30. Mars is not combust.
31. Mars is not combust.
32. Mars is not combust.
33. The terrestrial triangle contains Mars only, its nocturnal lord, situated in Taurus.
34. Mars is in opposition to his house Scorpion.
35. The moon in trine with his house Cancer.
36. The moon is in its home.
37. The trigon of fire contains its lord conjunct in Aries.
38. The trigon of water contains its nocturnal ruler, the moon.
39. Venus are in trine.
40. Venus are in trine.
41. Venus are in trine.
42. Saturn and Jupiter are in conjunction.
43. Conjunction in Aries, and is thus conjunctio matutina, and dominates the entire horoscope.
44. This conjunctio matutina was preceded by a conjunctio trigonali, occurring in Pisces (Indian)
45. Saturn and Jupiter are in conjunction with Mercury.
46. Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury.
47. Mercury and Mars are in different houses, but close together.
48. Saturn and Venus are in the same relation.
49. Jupiter is in conjunction with Mercury.
50. Venus is in conjunction with Mercury.
51. Venus is visible.
52. Venus is visible.
53. Jupiter is visible.
54. Jupiter is visible.
55. Saturn is in conjunction with Mars.
56. Saturn is in conjunction with Mars.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory)

13. The development of astronomy and astrology among the various peoples. — The foregoing sections have shown that primitive peoples constructed their calendars by direct observation of the heavens. Similarly, it is amongst those primitive peoples, as indeed we might expect, that the first attempts to divide the sky into decanates and degrees were made. The Babylonians, who were the first to enumerate the zodiacal signs, could interpret only in part at the present day, as our information regarding ancient modes of astrological interpretation is at best fragmentary. According to rules still extant, interpretations and judgments, no doubt, have also been made in certain particulars. So far, however, as we can test the interpretations of this house of signs, it corresponds with the modern system of the signs of the zodiac.

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which would in general quite invert the first interpretation. Extensive tables of ephemerides and a fragment of planetary divination according to the different houses, together with corresponding dream-tables, have survived from the age of Augustus. We possess even horoscope-texts drawn up in the Imperial period. Our minor records of later Egyptian astrology are thus fairly numerous. Greek-Roman astrologers of the entire geographical and historical range, until the establishment of the world-empire and its swift decline, never produced such monuments as we find in the great empires of the East. Observatories of colossal proportions, attached to primeval temples containing archives by which the positions of the planets might be traced and tested for centuries and millennia, were never the work of Greece and Rome. Among the Etruscans, therefore, and subsequently among the Romans, it was the surrogates of astrology that occupied the central place. Apuleius explicitly asserts that the Chaldeans were the founders of astronomy and astrology. But, so far as the Romans concerned themselves with the study, they appealed to the works of that famous Egyptian, called Sosachepo, and his astrologer Ptolemy of Saïa. At a later period Claudius Ptolemaeus (A.D. 100-178) was regarded as the final authority in our twin sciences, and beside him we catch a somewhat legendary Hermes Trismegistus. But, as has been already indicated, the claims of astrology were not left unchallenged in this period. About the year A.D. 200, C. Ptolemaeus, after a work in six books ρώμα μεθοδικώς, of which the fifth was directed ρώμα αστρολόγους. He refutes his contention by a sketch of the entire system of knowledge possessed by these men. His work provides valuable materials for a thoroughgoing digest of the astrological texts in the library of Sardanapalus.

In this later period, however, astrology has maintained some degree of progress in the Far East. Among the Chinese and Japanese, occult art, in the modern 'fengshui,' seems rather to have taken the form of geomancy. Just as in the Zen, astrology gave birth to hepatoscopy, so in China and Japan the interpretation of the planets in the celestial vault has been transformed into divination by the carving of divinatory symbols. Similarly the Gypsies have developed a system of fortune-telling from the open hand; and the designation of the convexities of the palm as 'mounts' of the various planets shows that this practice also is a surrogate of astrology.

LITERATURE. The significance of astronomy and astrology for the interpretation of the religious conceptions of the ancient East, as also for the exegesis of the Bible, has been only recently recognized. There is as yet no comprehensive work dealing with the subject. Contributions to the study have come mainly from the hand of H. Winkler (especially in Jena, Kämpfe um den alten Orient, Leipzig, 1907), of whom A. Jeremias (Die Fas.

babyloniens, der alte Orient und die Assyrische Religion, Leipzig, 1907) has proved an able ally. Fugitive essays have appeared in considerable numbers, principally in publications of the Forderung des Geschichtliche Gesellschaft and the Orientalistische Literaturzeitungen. Among them, the study of the title of the hierarch, or 'great in vision,' already alluded to. A hierarch of this order is named in the Bible (Gn 41:4) as the father-in-law of Joseph—that Joseph who was himself an interpreter of dreams (Gen 40:13, etc.) and practised the art of divination by bowls (44:14-16), referred to in connexion with Hamurabi. On the
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Primitive).

Knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies is possessed in varying degrees by most primitive peoples. In the earlier stages of civilization, the fixed observation which is necessary to arrive at a reasoned explanation, which is the foundation of astronomical science, is not possible through lack of proper means of recording its results, nor is it called for by the practical requirements of life, except perhaps by hunting. For an agricultural people, however,foreknowledge of the recurring seasons becomes essential, and it is necessary that some means should be found to mark the proper seasons for performing the operations to ensure the food supply. In the stars, with their regular motions of rising and setting, primitive man has found the earliest and most certain calendar. In default of a theory based upon a series of observations, the supposed movement of the sun round the earth, the phases of the moon and the motion of the stars, the meteor shower, and the stars have been explained by formula composed of material drawn from the texture of man’s religious beliefs. The celestial bodies, equally with his fellows and material surroundings, he considers to be animated with a personality like his own, though more powerful. Starting from this fundamental assumption, primitive man has fashioned for himself, in his legends, a fairly complete explanation of the celestial phenomena which come under his observation.

1. Sun and moon.—It is almost universal among primitive races to believe that the sun and moon should be regarded as alive and quasi-human in nature. Their sex differs among different races, but the moon is more commonly male and the sun female. Both are between varying in character, is also recognized. Among the Dieri of Australia the sun is the daughter of a Dieri woman, who after her birth sank into the earth in shame. The natural history of Flerks River Bay say that the sun is a woman who has a lover among the dead. Each night she descends among the dead. At her rising she appears in a red kangaroo skin, given her by her lover. A Tasmanian legend relates that the sun is a woman who was digging yams and reached the West; after wandering round the earth she came back to the other side, and has done the same ever since. The Wurumjeri say that the sun is the sister of every man. This may be compared with the story of the origin of the sun told by the Arunta. At Alice Springs there is a tradition that in the Alcheringa the sun came out of the earth at a spot now marked by a stone in the coal field for Bandicoot people, in the form of a spirit woman, accompanied by two other Panunga women, who were sisters, the elder of whom carried a child. The spirit woman does this every day, visiting the old spot at night and rising in the morning. A medicine-man could see her in the hole, but not a person with ordinary vision. The two women say: a string held by her lord. The moon is a woman, the wife of Moyang Bertang, who sits in the moon making nooses for men.

(a) Origin and movements of the sun.—The origin of the sun, as related in the Tembeh legend of Sam-mor and his battle with Naing, has advanced beyond the anthropomorphic stage. When Sam-mor had impressed Naing, he rolled the earth with which he had fought into a ball, and thus in the sun, still revolves round the mountain to watch Naing. This conception of the sun as an inanimate object is probably an influence, since it has a parallel among the Galilean peoples of Central America, if not in the hawk and the coyote, after jostling one another painfully in the darkness which then2

Secondly, the sun and moon should be regarded as alive and quasi-human in nature.
sun, burn your wood, burn your internal substance, and go down.' The sun now burns his fuel in a day, and goes below for fresh firewood (R. Brough Smyth, _Afterglow_, 439). In Melanesia (the Malagasy hero went to Qong ('night') and begged assistance. The latter put him to sleep, and, in twelve hours or so, crept up from the horizon and sent the sun sprawling to the West (Cottington, _I.A.,_ Feb. 1881). In a Brazilian myth, a man ('the great serpent') who owned night sent it in a gourd to his daughter on her marriage; the messengers opened the gourd and let it out.

Various explanations are given of the sunset. The simplest is that the sun sinks into a hole, occasionally the hole from which he arose. The Dieri say it sinks into a hole near Lake Eyeve, and it is near to the eastern end of the Earth, in the same manner as it was believed to do in ancient Egyptian belief. Not infrequently the sunset myth takes the form of a legend of a personal hero plunging into the ocean. The Malay believe in Hina-nui-te-po, 'Great Daughter of Night,' and thus brought darkness and death into the world. Since then the sun descends in a gigantic boat every night to battle with Hina-nui-te-po every night. An explanation of sunset is that Maui took fire, and when it burnt him he plunged into the sea. Among the Basutos, all sunset is attributed to a monster. He also was swallowed, but cut his way out. The Zulu story of the rescue of Princess Utombe is of a similar character.

2. Movements of the moon. The moon occupies a prominent place in primitive folklore for which her periodical growth, diminution, and disappearance, phases more marked than those of the sun, and as a result, the moon regularly and predictably unit to be responsible. Like the sun, the moon is regarded as a living person. Allusion has already been made to the variation in the attribute of sex to the moon among different peoples. One or two further instances which illustrate other points of lunar mythology may be added. Among the Arunta the moon is a big man (eta omburuca). They say that, when there was no moon in the sky, a giant climbed on top of a tree to pick grubs. His sons made a canoe and took him away. He said, 'Do not run away or you will die. I shall die, but will rise again in the sky.' He grew up and died, reappearing as the sun. When the sun dies periodically, when he is not visible, he goes away to his two wives who live in the west. A second legend of the origin of the moon, which is found among the same tribes, relates that the moon was a man who climbed in the hollow of his shield, who hid it in a cleft of the rocks during the day. Once it was stolen from his shield while lying on the ground. He pursued the robber but could not catch him, so he hunted an islander man. The Federations make the moon grow, the sun, as the moon became visible, go away to his two wives who live in the west. Among the Dieri, the sun is a big man that came to the earth, and there is a gourd in which he was captured. The moon is a man who commands the gourd. When the sun wants to build a house, he asks the moon to bring him bricks, which are sent to him in a gourd. The moon, in turn, asks the sun to send him a fish. The sun refuses, and the moon is angry. The moon then sends a fish to the sun, who is happy to receive it. The sun then sends a fish to the moon, who is also happy. They continue to exchange fish, and the sun and the moon become friends.

The moon protects the souls of the dead who visit the moon from wild beasts. The Mantras believe the dark spots on the moon to be a tree. The Malay believe in a moon hanyan, a man who sits a hunchbacked, plaiting a fishing line. When the line is finished, he will fish up everything on earth, but a rat always gnaws away the line. This belief also occurs in Sumatra. The Malays also say 'the moon is great with a mouse deer,' and belief possibly derived from the Sanskrit idea of the hare which was taken up into the moon for protection. In Mexico it was said that the gods smeote the moon in the face with a rabbit (Sahagan, viii. 2); in Zululand and Tibet a hare was translated to the moon. The connexion between the hare and the moon is also found among the Namaquas of South Africa. The hare was sent to men to confer upon them a return to life after death, but by a mistake in the message made them mortal. In Fiji the same point of human mortality was argued between the moon and the rat. The latter prevailed.

The Wotjoba rank also connect the moon with a resurrection after death. When all animals were men and women, the moon was not great with a mouse deer, and the dead came to life. An old man said, 'Let them remain dead;' none then came to life except the moon. The connexion is obviously suggested by the necessity for finding an explanation of the phases of the moon. Various explanations are current. The Maasai say that the sun carries the moon in his arms when he is tired. After carrying her for two days, he leaves her in his setting-place. On the fourth day she is visible to donkeys. On the fifth day men and cattle see her again. The Wimbo say that the moon did not die periodically until the moon disappeared. The Nurelli. The natives of Cover Bay held that the moon was a dissipated woman who spent her time among the men, but when she was wasted away they drove her out. While she is in seduction she feeds upon nourishing roots and becomes plump again (Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 452).

2. Stars. The belief of the stars are great men and divinities translated to the heavens occurs among nearly every people in the world. Stars are grouped together in constellations which represent persons, many of them large, sometimes including one or more of the constellations of our astronomy. The inhabitants of Torres Straits include in their constellation Tagai—a hero who stands at the head of a canoe holding a spear and a bunch of fruit—the Southern Cross, Scorpio, Sagittarius, Corvus, and stars of Lupus and Centaurus. The 'Shark' includes the Great Bear and Arcturus and Gemma. In New Zealand Orion's Belt is Maori's Elbow, while the Southern Cross is identified with the stern of the canoe of Taramate. Among the Warunjjerri of Australia a and c Cruix and a and Centauri and other stars are the sons of Bunjil, the latter himself being Altair. Two stars on either side of him are his wives, who belong to the black swan totem, while his brother Nungur and his wife are Arrows and adjacent stars. Bunjil and his sons were translated to the sky in a whirlwind. The whole group is intimately connected with the totemic system, Bunjil or Fund-jel being an Australian King and Arcturus and other stars are the sons of Bunjil, he being Pointing in the morning. Every child
conceived at this stone belongs to the Evening Star totem, although it is in the lizard totem country, and any child conceived near the stone is a lizard. Orion's Belt is a group of young men dancing corroborees. Jupiter, the "foot of day" (Ginsong-Bearp), was a chief among the old spirits, a race translated before the appearance of man. Among the Eskimos of Greenland, Orion's Belt is the Lost Ones, a number of seal hunters who lost their way home. The Pleiades, an extremely important group of stars for primitive peoples, were known to the Indians of North America as the Dancers, to the Lapaps as a company of virgins, and to the Australians as a group of girls playing corroboree. The Arunta believed them to be women who went up into the sky and have remained in that condition dup. The Arunta were also convinced that some young women were digging yams, the crew stole their yam sticks. They were swept into the air, by Bellin-Bellin let the boys and men and women fire the end of their yam sticks. Another version says that the group is Bunji-Hone's daughter and two men who were turned into women by Bunji-Hone in marriage sticks from his daughter. The almost unvarying association of the Pleiades with women among different races is remarkable. It thus appears that the legends which ascribe an animate origin to the stars and constellations contain the germs of conceptions which have been utilized by modern astronomy in mapping out the heavens.

The Pleiades were translated human, divine, and "semi"-divine beings. Allusion has already been made to the Malay and Sakai belief that stars are elefs in a supercunibent rock. To the Manizas, in the story, after separating his father and his mother, stuck stars all over his father's body. Maui, after slaying his sons, placed an eye of each in the heaven as the morning and evening star respectively—a story which seems to indicate the transition stage between the two groups of animate and inanimate origin. It is not surprising to find the stars regarded as the moon's children. The Manizas say that once the moon and moon's children went for a walk, and many children, the stars. They agreed to devour them. While the sun did as agreed, the moon hid her children, producing them afterwards. The sun, being in a great rage, человек не работался in the moon but could not catch her, though sometimes she succeeds in bitting her, causing an eclipse. The same story is told by the Hos of Chota Nagpur. In this story, however a girl threw a hatchet at the moon and cut her into two.

For practical purposes among most primitive peoples the stars perform a more important function than the sun. By their rising and setting the times of the feasts and ceremonies are determined, and among agricultural peoples their movements serve as a calendar by which the various operations in cultivation are regulated. In the Torres Straits, Tagai marks the time for new yams and the migrations of turtle; Seg, the time for another kind of yam. The Murray Islanders also use Tagai as a mark in navigation. The rising of the constellation Dorgai, which coincides with the North-West Monsoon, is the time to 'make dance.' The natives of Borneo, especially the Dayaks, watch for the Pleiades to determine when to prepare their ground for planting. When it is estimated that the wet season is approaching, men are sent to the forest to watch for the rising of the Pleiades. The Kayans of Borneo measure the length of the sun's shadow by means of a marked stick with the same object (C. Hose, *JRSA*, Straits Branch, Jan. 1905). The importance of such observation of sidereal phenomena is evident when it is remembered that in tropical regions the seasons bring little or no sign of change to serve as the farmer's calendar. The Masai recognize that the rainy seasons are determined when they see the Pleiades, while in the Society Islands the year is divided into two halves, *Maturi-i-iina* and *Maturi-i-raro* according as this constellation is visible above the horizon after sunset or not. In fact, over nearly the whole world the rising of the Pleiades is the beginning of the year or a cycle, marks the time for feasts, and is an occasion of ceremonial observance. It may be recalled in passing that Pentreath found that the Hee tampon and the old Eredethum had been ascribed to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May day; and in Britain, it is suggested, while Stonehenge appears to have been built in connection with the solstices, the 'Hurlers' in Cornwall on *priona faica* evidence seem to have been built in relation to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May night and the 'Pole' of the sun at the summer solstice. The 'Hurlers', in Cornwall, the "priona faica" evidence seem to have been built in relation to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May day; and in Britain, it is suggested, while Stonehenge appears to have been built in connection with the solstices, the 'Pole' of the sun at the summer solstice. In some cases the use of the stars as a calendar is not immediately obvious, but is a matter of interpretation. In Australia, Yuree and Wanjel Castor and Pollux, the "rain在家", were sacred to the aborigines, and the mirage was the smoke of the fire they roasted him. Marpee-Kurrk and Neeloke (Arcturus and Lyra) designate the "ocean of the loan bird" and taught the aborigines to use them for food. As Tylor points out, these legends and their analogues may fairly be interpreted as indicating two stages in the development of the clag, eggs may be found, the great heat expected, and so forth.

3. Signs and omens. — The train of thought underlying all the conception of the stars seems to have been peculiarly adapted to foster the magical conceptions and analogies upon which astrological reasoning is based. Omens and signs, favourable and unfavourable, are and have always been the object of constant observation in the past of savage and semi-civilized people. It is, therefore, not surprising that peculiar powers in controlling human events should be attributed to those heavenly bodies which are considered as endowed with powers similar to but greater than those possessed by human beings. Even when a stage has been reached at which the magic powers of the witch no longer gain ascendancy in the minds of the people, the moon or the first star of the evening to grant a wish remains as evidence of a time when the favour of the heavenly bodies was essential to success. Lacking the knowledge necessary to the possible scientific cartography of astrology, primitive races never attained the heights of judicial astrology. Yet the belief that, for instance, a child born under Leo would possess qualities usually associated with a lion is one with which a savage would find himself in full sympathy. The Malays possess an elaborate system by which the year is mapped out into lucky and unlucky periods depending upon a rotation of days, each associated with deities, planets, and lucky and unlucky colours, and are acquainted with the use of the magic squares. But their astronomical science has been borrowed from the Hindus and Arabs. In the case of races which may truly be described as primitive, the gnomon of the science rather than the science itself is found, while vestigial traces of these primitive beliefs linger in the popular folklore of civilized countries. The belief that the weather changes with the phases of the moon is found among the Ewe people of the Gold Coast, where a certain number of days' rain is said to accompany each of the four changes of the moon. At these times they are forbidden to take purgatives, and children and cattle are born. At the rising of *Eze* (Orion) rain
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falls for seven days in accordance with the number of stars in the group; three days' rain follows the rise of Aldebaran (Aries), when the Pleiades are prominent in the sky, indicating the direction of the rising sun. The Pleiades, being particularly beneficial to farmers, who call this time 'Ladorpe,' 'animal chop grass' ('P. Fr. Müller, 'Folkloristische Evhetekle' (Ge-Dialekt), Globus, III, 1901). These beliefs, however, may be regarded as generalizations from imperfect data assisted by magic, rather than as originating in a magical connexion. A less doubtful case of interest is that of the Irish, who believe that the phenomena occurs in the widely distributed belief, still common in European folk-lore, that fertility of crops and success in an enterprise depend on an action undertaken under a waning moon. The Lithuanian wean boys on a waxing, and girls on a waning moon, believing that in the one case it provides strength, in the other, slenderness and grace.

An instance of a belief which most nearly approaches judicial astrology is quoted by Tylor ('Prim. Cult.' I, 129) from Shortland. The Maoris who believed in a waxing and a waning moon, believing that in the one case it provides strength, in the other, slenderness and grace.

LITERATURE.—No comprehensive study of primitive astrology on scientific lines has been made; reference to astronomical knowledge and few identifications of stars before European influence will be found scattered in works dealing with individual races. General principles of study will be found in E. Tylor, Prim. Cult. 4 vols., 1906, and A. Lang, Myth., Rel. and Rites, 1909. See also Sir N. Lockyer, Days of Astronomy, 1884. For the Pueblo Indians, see Andre, Gaza, Globus, iv. 2, 1897. Some instances here quoted are taken chiefly from W. H. Searle, Kula, Mapiq, 1907; Blagden, Fagan, Races of the Malay Peninsula, 1905; J. H. Hewitt, Nat. Tr. of S.B. Aust., 1909; Spencer-Gilley, Nat. Tr. of Cent. Africa, 1903; and A. C. Haddon, Head Hunters, 1901. For the Hopi and Zuni Indians, see Pfuhl, The Zuni, 1905; Sir G. Grey, Polygenetic Mythology, 1884;

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (American).—1. SOURCES.—A large part of our knowledge of the astrology and astronomy of the American Indians is derived from their traditions as reported by early European and American missionaries and travellers. These writers had the advantage of contact with the various tribes before European influence had extensively modified their modes of thought, but they paid little attention to astronomical traditions. The few constellations mentioned by them are seldom identified by the Indians, and the identifications are frequently indefinite or incorrect. A number of works by native authors give tribal tradition in authentic form, but little astronomy.

In Mexico and Yucatan a few codices, which escaped destruction at the hands of the Spanish priests, contain many complex astronomical symbols of which little is definitely known as yet, but from which, undoubtedly, much will eventually be learned. They are supplemented by hieroglyphs on structures and monuments. In Guatemala there is the Popol Pu, or 'Book of the People' (ed. and tr. Brassey, The Book of the People, Paris, 1881), and in Peru Salamanca's Spanish account of Ayamar Calchaquies and Antiquities (tr. Markham, A Historie Society, 1877). These manuscripts either are of pre-Columbian origin or represent pre-Columbian material with slight European modifications. They include some myths and legends having an astronomical basis (cf. also Brinton, Annals of the Catchiques, Philadelphia, 1885; and Three Religions of the American Indians, ed. Murnin de la Ropaz, Madrid, 1775). Unfortunately, early scientific travellers have often shown indifference towards astronomical phenomena, and even when they recognized the importance of this subject and are collecting material which, in some of the long contact between Indians and Europeans, affords sufficient evidence of native origin.

In North America these traditions are supplemented by a few native sources. The best known are the Chippewa traditions collected amongst the Ojibcas, Pawnees, and Hidatsas (Dorsey, in S. F. Soc. Miss. MS., 1889-90, and Boulding, in Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, ill. 57 f). The two first are intimately associated with the twin suns and stars. Essentially the same tradition is repeated by the Ojibcas and the Hidatsas. The Pawnees, however, are the only tribe who have identified the Pleiades with the sun and other stars, and the origin of the Pleiades has been traced back to the Pleiades of Scoirops. The Pawnee chart shows the Pole Star, Great and

Little Bear, Northern Crown, Orion, Hyades, Pleiades, Milky Way, and probably Capella, 8 of the Pleiades and some stars or constellations the Scoirops (Scoirops) and its Heads (Antares), the Deer (Cancer), which is pursued by the Dog, a Woman bearing a child, the Crab, Beezle and the Tail, and other objects. The winter counts of the Western tribes represented each year by a small incised figure. In the plains the sun is pictured upon a buffalo hide. Naturally they include astronomical phenomena. That of Lone Dog, for example, presents the majestic shiner of 1832, and the year 1825. The figures of the altars of Pueblo secret societies furnish numerous stellar symbols, as is shown by the researches of C. F. N. Gleason in REV. JAPL, and Amer. Anthropologist. Tablets inscribed with astronomical information have been found at Bantam, Illinois, Michill, Co. North Carolina, and in Missouri. Exceopting the rayed solar face, crescent moon, and morning and evening stars, the figures upon these tablets have not been satisfactorily deciphered.

The Mexican calendar represents another and an elaborate source of astronomical symbolism, to which considerable study has been directed (see CAUACAN (Mexican)). Inscribed stones of astronomical significance have also been found in the Chichina region of America. The symbols seem to correspond to those inscribed with the rays of the sun and moon, Orion, Zephyr, Hercules, and other figures, but they are associated with symbols of European origin.

A most valuable source of astronomical information in the Pueblo chart is that of Cusco, which contains the ruling stars, which are identified at the beginning of the 17th century. With the exception of a prudential reference to the symbol of the Southern Cross, this chart presents only native concepts. It gives symbols of the sun and moon, morning and evening stars, southern pole, Coal black, Milky Way, and all the zodiacal signs; and the Pleiades are recorded in the Almanac du Congres des Ameriquains, Paris, 1905, p. 271 f. 2. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.—The use of gnomons, natural and artificial, was widespread in America. Amongst many of the tribes there are still old men who delight in determining the season and the time of day by their position and direction of the solar shadows. The Pueblos have measured and named the sunrise points on the eastern horizon so as to divide the year into two periods of six months, and the time of the equinox and is determined with great care. The Zunis used as a gnomon an erect sandstone slab adorned with a solar effigy (Dellenbaugh, North Americans of Yesterday, New York, 1901, pp. 363, 365; Powno, Annual Car¬monies at Walshy, Leyden, 1895).

At Chajumtepec, in 1775, a stone was found under which these crossed arrows pointed accurately to the equinoctial and solstitial rising points (Bollett in Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London, p. 210 f). The main doorways of the chief temple of Cuzco fronted the north-east, so that at the June solstice the rays of the rising sun would penetrate into the temple and illuminate the solar plate at the opposite end, thus recalling the temples of Egypt and Greece; and the early Christian cathedral, which was oriented with an astronomic point on the day of the saint to which it was dedicated. It is not unlikely that the orientation of Mexican and Peruvian structures will enable future investigators to determine the calendar of their construction by means of the method so brilliantly pursued by Lockyer in Egypt and Peru. Corin in Greece (Lockyer, Days of Astronomy, London, 1894). Bollett has shown that the monumental gateway of Tiahuanaco probably served as a solar dial.

1. See Proceedings of the American Academy of Sciences: J. P. McLean, The Moon's Moon, pp. 397-403. North Americans of Antiquity, New York, 1880, p. 28. W. B. Bees, who made the most extensive study, described the Chippewa and Inuit, tablets, attempted a full explanation of both. He makes the former wholly and the latter partly astronomical, but his interpretation is more convincing than the latter's. He also accepts the present stage of our knowledge. A copy of his privately printed notes is deposited in the Peabody Museum, Cambridge, Avenpon, Iowa. One is in the author's possession.

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sides of the pyramids of Mexico and Central America are often aligned to the cardinal points. In Mexico, Nobel describes a perpendicular shaft in the pyramid of Xochicalco which permitted the rays of the zenith sun to fall upon an altar in an interior chamber. The shadow cast by the steps of the pyramid of Papantla were observed for calendar purposes (Humboldt, Researches, ii. 87), and a similar use of the steps and platforms at Cuzco known as the 'Monkeys' Dance.' Mrs. Zelia Nuttall, moreover (Boas Anniversary Volume, New York, 1906, pp. 290-299), points out various pictographs in the Mexican codices which represent priests observing the stars to determine the time. The different divisions of time were marked by the sounding of drums or trumpets in the temples. The priests used various methods to fix the position of the constellations. They observed them through the doorway of the temple, which was elevated above the surrounding country, sometimes placing forked or bifurcated sticks within the five brighter stars to ascertain the position more exactly, and sometimes using a peculiar figure representing the drawing-up limbs of a seated man for the same purpose. A possible use of rows of upright stones was that of the Nazca lines. The Peruvians are also said to have noted the solstices and equinoxes by means of the shadows cast by certain columns. Those on the equator would show no shadow at the equinoxes and would cast no shadow on the summer and winter solstices. The Peruvian temples of the sun and moon are supposed to have been used for similar purposes. It has been suggested that the temple of the sun at Cuzco was used as a solar observatory.

In Guatemalan diviners were called upon to determine the propitious dates for each month. As soon as a child was born, it was brought before the diviner, who, observing the day of birth, told the child's future. In some cases, the diviner told the child's future by pointing to the stars. The diviner would then indicate the time of day, month, and year when the child would return to the diviner. The diviner's predictions were based on the observation of the stars, and the stars were believed to be the guardians of the stars.

The Peruvians also used the stars for divination. The 'columns' of the Inca temple at Cuzco were said to have stone carvings of the constellations. People used to visit these temples to seek guidance from the stars. The Inca temple at Cuzco was also used for astronomical purposes. The temple was thought to have been a place where the Inca and his advisors could observe the stars and make predictions about the future.

Ritual.-The ceremonies of the various tribes also include astronomical features; in fact many of their elements seem to have originated in the wish to imitate on earth the aspects and movements of the celestial world. The initiations of the Ajusco (de la cruz) and the Totonac (de la cruz) are both based on the movements of the sun and moon. The Aztecs believed that the sun was the most important god, and the moon was considered to be the symbol of fertility. The Aztecs used the moon to predict the weather and the seasons, and to determine the best times for planting and harvesting. The Aztecs also used the moon to predict the future, and to determine the dates for festivals and ceremonies. The Aztecs believed that the moon was a guide to the movements of the stars and the planets, and that it was a sign of the power of the gods. The Aztecs were also skilled astronomers, and they used their knowledge to predict the movements of the sun and moon, and to determine the best times for planting and harvesting. The Aztecs believed that the sun and moon were the symbols of the power of the gods, and that they were the keys to understanding the movements of the stars and the planets. The Aztecs used their knowledge of the heavens to predict the future, and to determine the dates for festivals and ceremonies. The Aztecs believed that the movements of the sun and moon were the symbols of the power of the gods, and that they were the keys to understanding the movements of the stars and the planets. The Aztecs used their knowledge of the heavens to predict the future, and to determine the dates for festivals and ceremonies.
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Myths of the New World, New York, 1888, American Hero Myths, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 110. Among the Cherokees, prior to the contest, the opposing teams made a circle, and in the use of magic formulas, and the issue was supposed to depend upon the amount of magical power thereby developed (Mooney, in T.R.B.Eng., p. 314 f.) In Yucatan and Central Mexico last court itself represented the celestial field. The game was won by the player who drove the ball through a stone ring upon which two interlaced serpents, symbols of the eternal years, were sculptured. The Popol Vuh describes contests at this game, the results of which determined the control of Xibalba, or Shadow Land; and Mrs. Nuttall asserts that the birds symbolized the six moons of the annual observatories. The Araucanes saw the divinities in the will of the result of the game, and used it to decide the fate of those accused of crime.

Through the doorway of their temple huts, once common in the South-western United States, formed a terrestrial imitation of the celestial hunter, as in Peru, and foot-races also symbolized the chase. In Mexico, the Mexican name of those who fly the celestial revolution was symbolized by four men masked as eagles who circled about a pole at the end of four cords wound round it (Chavin, El libro de Historia, Mexico, 1844; Nuttall, op. cit. p. 24 f.).

Dances in North America reflect the celestial imagery on both dice and board. The Mexican game of Patolli uses a crukform board representing the four celestial regions, through the divisions of which a stone marker progresses like one of the celestial bodies (Sabaghun, op. cit. vi. 8; Culian, American Indian Games in T.R.B.Eng.; Nuttall, op. cit. p. 82, 87). A serpent-dance in which the dancers imitated the motion of the serpent existed until recently among the Micmacs and other Northern tribes, and in Peru. In the North the dance of the serpents was also noted of the Pleiades across the sky (Hagar, in Congress international des Americistes, New York, 1902, and J.A.F.L. xiii. 1902 f.). The famous serpent-dance of the Hopis, figured on Mexican and Central American monuments, was a rain-making ceremonial performed in August under the sign of the Tiger Sun (Leo). The well-known mural paintings in the Temple of the Tiger at Chichen Itza is a similar ceremony also dedicated to the Tiger Sun. In the Mandan buffalo-dance, twelve dancers divided into groups of four represented the cardinal points, and danced in mimicking the twelve regions and months. Two of the middle four were painted black and dotted white to represent the night sky and the stars. The other two, painted red, personated the day (Culian, Smithians Reports, p. 360), and the movement represented alternating day and night. The Natchez ceremonially gathered to watch the rising and setting celestial sun through the year, and the dance of the spirals to earth over the Milky Way in spring and fall. At the end of each fifty-two years' period the Mexicans expected that the midnight culmination of the Pleiades would mark the end of the cosmos, or its renewal for a like period. All fires were extinguished, and the advance of the Pleiades towards the critical point was observed from the summit of a certain mountain called 'Hill of the Star.' The stars having passed the meridian, the fires were re-kindled upon the summit, from which fires were re-lighted elsewhere, and the people gave themselves over to rejoicing (Sabaghun, op. cit. tom. i. lib. 4, tom. ii. lib. 7; Torquemada, Monarquia

Indiana, tom. ii. 292-295; Boturini, Idea, pp. 18-21; Cavigeri, Storia antica del Messico, tom. ii. pp. 62, 84, 85; Mendieta, HE, p. 101; Acosta, Historia de las Indias, pp. 398-399). In Peru as in Mexico this date marked the entrance of the sun into the sign of the dead, symbolizing death, destruction, and renewal.

The rising of the morning star, the Pleiades, and Gemini was hailed with songs and dances by many tribes. In Mexico there was an annual sacrifice of a human being, who enacted the yearly course of the sun. He ceremonially ascended the steps of the teocalli, or god-house, to represent the sun climbing from the south to the northern solstice. At the moment when the sun reached the meridian he was slain, and his body was hurled down the steps to represent the declining course of the sun after the northern solstice (Hagar, Peruvian Astronomy).

Similarly, among the Chibchas a human victim fastened on a pole was annually slain at the beginning of each year by a ceremonial procession of people masked and costumed to represent the various zodiacal figures (Duque, in Bolletin, Anthropological Research, p. 47).

About the time of the December solstice, though in recent times not every year, the Skild Pannwe sacrificed a maiden to the morning star. There is no reason to doubt the date of the beginning of this very remarkable and suggestive ritual, which is described in art. PANNWE, vol. ix. p. 699.

In similar obstacle legends among the more advanced tribes familiar with the American Indians there are indications that the astronomical symbolism was itself used to typify as the ultimate meaning the progress of the human soul (cf. Dorsay, in Congress international des Americistes, XV. session, Quebec, 1907, p. 66-70, and Natalie Curtis, The Indians' Book, New York, 1907, pp. 192, 103; the deductions are the writer's, and will be found further developed in his Peruvian Astronomy).

A monthly ritual is known to have existed among the Pueblos, Mexicans, Mayas, Central American tribes, Peruvians, and probably the Chibchas. Among all of them the names of these festivals referred to some attribute of the zodiacal asterism through which the sun was supposed to be passing at the time.

The plan of the Peruvian temple of Cacha, or 'the messenger,' as well as the remarkable legend connected with it, points to a ceremonial procession enacting the yearly course of the sun within the building. The importance of the stellar events in Peru is indicated by the fact that the Peruvians made images of all their constellations.

5. Mythology and star-lore. — The arch of the sky was generally regarded as a kind of transparent roof, over which the heavenly bodies walk. The Chinooks on the north-west coast and the Peruvians represented it by two oblique lines meeting in an acute angle by the arches that was a symbol of the sky and possessed a similar symbol.

On the Peruvian box the sky is seen as a woman's breast. It forms the clothing of the Huichol eagle-goddess and of the wife of the Pavan Spirit of Life, and is symbolized by the concave interior curve of some Central American and Pueblo vases (Dorsay, op. cit. p. xvii; Stevenson, op. cit. p. 234). Above the sky dwells the Sun Father, with his wife the Moon Mother (who is sometimes also his sister), attended by the divine pair of the morning and evening stars, and surrounded by their stellar children.

The sun and moon are regarded as the progenitors of the stars and of mankind, but seldom or never as the supreme celestial powers. They

1 Collection of A. F. Chamberlain; Hagar, Peruvian Astronomy, Bulkamphax Chart.
were the objects of a celestial cult existing practically everywhere in America, in which, at different times and places, sun, moon, and various constellations were regarded as inhabiting the heavens and occasioning more than a relative change of influence. Nor is there much evidence of conflict between the votaries of the various aspects of the astronomical cycle. The devoted, or at least unknown in the natural religions of America; such tortures and persecutions as existed in Mexico, for example, had little or no connexion with religious or theological differences. In Mexican tradition two men, one of them lepers, threw themselves into a fire and came out respectively the sun and the moon.

The gender of the sun and moon is sometimes reversed. A legend found in almost identical form among the Eskimos, the Cherokee, and the Amazon tribes personifies the moon as a man who secretly visited his sister at night. She, desiring to identify her unknown visitor, rubbed upon his face some black substance, which produced the lunar spots. A similar legend occurs among the Caddo (Dorsey, Traditions of the Caddo, Washington, 1905, pp. 11-12). The Iroquois saw in these spots an old woman who each month stirs this bowl of honey with her cat (dog?) seated beside her. The Mexicans interpreted them as resulting from the embraces of a fox enamoured of her beauty; the Mexicans as a form of a rabbit, with which the gods struck the face of the moon, wishing to lessen its beauty, which formerly was as great as that of the sun. According to the Mexicans, the moon is always running after the sun, but never overtakes him. The divine being Quetzalcoatl made his son the sun; the god who gave the moon to the Maya (Phillips, op. cit.). The Onas of Patagonia make the sun pursue the moon (his wife) because she overheard some of the secrets of the male secret society. In terror she sprang off a cliff, the sun followed, and both jumped into the sky, where the pursuit continues (Barclay, in Geographical Journal, xxii. 62). In Corvichan tradition the sun, moon, and stars were shot up in three boxes, which were opened by the hero Yehl, wherupon they escaped to the sky (Deans, in A.A.O.J. x. 111).

In higher Peruvian symbolism, the sun was tied by an invisible cord to the invisible pole of the sky and was driven round it like a llama by the power of the Universal Spirit, although generally, after it had flown over the sky, he was thought to enter a cave in the west and to proceed by a subterranean passage to emerge next morning in the east. An equally interesting explanation of the origin of night and day is found in the Wichita legend (schooled by the Caddo) of the three deer, who are three stars, pursued by a fourth, which is a hunter who will overtake them at the end of the world. One deer is white, representing day, one black, representing night, one half black and half white, representing alternate day and night. The last was wounded, whence we have day and night (Dorsey, Myth. of the Wichita, Washington, 1904, pp. 21, 25-28, Traditions of the Caddo, pp. 13-14).

Among the Peruvian coast tribes, according to Gutiérrez, the sun plunged into the western ocean and dried up the waters with his heat both where he entered and where he emerged—whence, apparently, the tides. In numerous North American legends the sun is visited by terrestrial travellers, whom he receives kindly, and to whom he often imparts supernatural powers. The Mexicans described how he was once caught in a snare which a heron had devised for him. This legend, which is also Polynesian, probably refers to the solstice, when the Indians generally thought of him as seated or resting, since they observed that for several days at these seasons he moved neither north nor south at his rising, but appeared at the same point on the horizon. The Maya accordingly called these precessions with some confusion of time the Mexicans, Mayas, and Peruvians refrained from labour in imitation of the solar repose. The Maya symbolized the June solstice by a tortoise, that of December by a snail, because of the egress and motion of these animals (Forstemann, "Commentary on Maya MSS" in Peabody Museum Papers, vol. iv. no. 1, p. 45, Cambridge, 1904; Schellhas, "Representation of Deities of the Maya Manuscripts," id. no. p. 115, Cambridge, 1906). The Peruvians represented the sun as a bearded man in the prime of life, who impressed his footprint on a rock to mark the height of his position. This affords an explanation of a world-wide type of solar legends. Throughout America the solar rays were symbolized by hair. In Peruvian art the sun becomes the conventionalized face of a man upon which appear marks called tears by some, but perhaps having a pathological meaning. The Mexican hero Cítli shoots three arrows at the sun and succeeds in wounding him. The enraged sun returns one arrow, which pierces Cítli's forehead (Menéndez, op. cit., p. 77). The sun is the Spider Woman of some western tribes, the Ojibwa Wigwam of the sun; the Hopis enjoyed the sight of burning crystal which he carries, while the Kutenai Coyote manufactures the sun out of grease made into a ball (Chamberlain, in A.A.O.J. xvi. 69). In Peru an oval spot, the Sign of the Falling Spirit, ultimately manifested in fire, earth, air, and water, was called the image of the true sun, of which the solar orb was only the reflection. The sun, says the Blas de Lezama, was the child of the Creator, and his light was that part of his divinity which the Creator had imparted to him. It was considered sacrilegious to look at his face; but early writers give several accounts of Inca rulers (particularly Huayna Capac) who did so, and who declared their scepticism of the supremacy of an object which never rested, but eternally moved upon its track like a driven animal, whose face the clouds obscured. From the nature of their light, gold was sacred to the sun and silver to the moon.

Elfuegos or sunbeasts attacks made by some insect or animal upon the object embedded. In accordance with a world-wide custom, a terrific noise was made to frighten away the attacking monster, although it is believed that the sun and moon were fighting. To induce them to cease, red-skinned people were sacrificed to the sun and albino to the moon. The Peruvians thought the sun was angry when his face became obscured, while under like conditions the moon was believed to be ill. If her light disappeared altogether, she was dead and would fall from the sky upon earth, killing every one upon it. Dogs were beheaded, as the moon was thought to be fond of them because they had rendered her a certain service, and it was hoped that their cries would induce her to uncover her face. A similar custom existed in Mexico (Tixtliaczocitl, Hist. des Chichimeques, Paris, 1840, cap. 6; Oviedo, Hist. gen. y nat. de las Indias, Madrid, 1561, xxix. 5; Pedrálzaga, Hist. del Nueva Reyna de Granada, Antwerp, 1885, v. i., vii. 6; Garcia, op. cit. xi. 1).

The altruistic spirit of the Pueblo community may be seen in the legend that the moon was once as bright as the sun, sometimes imparts supernatural powers. The Mexicans described how he was once caught in a snare which a heron had devised for him. According to the Sioux, the diminishing of the moon is caused by the nibbling of field mice, who thus prevent it from growing too large and injuring the earth (Red Man, xvii. no. 45). The profile face of the woman in the moon is figured on the Salamayhua
chart. The Osages and the Mexicans seem also to have observed her. As the sun, being a male, wandering among the forms of men, the female moon is the guardian of women, to whom appeals for help were addressed in childbirth.

According to the Micmacs and Ojibwas, the stars are the lights of camp-fires before the wigwams of the dwellers in the land of the sky. Here and there we see them grouped in villages, and the brightest represent the largest fires before the dwellings of the chiefs. By other North American tribes they are described as birds that fly to the sky at night, by the Mexicans as eyes. Some Rumanian tribes regard them as rifts in the canopy of the eternally glowing sky-land (Soler, *Cerca Vaticana*, London, 1902, p. 44; Hagar, *Micmac Star Lore*, MSS; Néry, *Land of the Amazons*, London and N.Y., 1901, p. 47). These simple and primitive notions exist among the names of animals, plants, and frequently of inanimate objects.

In America the American tribes find single stars named after individual objects, and groups forming true constellations; but probably nowhere in America is a constellation recognized which has been identified like the Great Bear, to such a degree that the derivation of the name is not really apparent from the alignment or other features. The morning and evening stars were naturally the most important of the stellar hosts. One of the legends of the Creeks, Peruvians, and others, the morning star appears before the first rising of the sun. It is the great star, the warrior, or messenger who goes before the sun on the command of his solar master. Its advent was hailed with incense and dances. It was widely symbolized by an equal-armed red cross. An Ojibwa legend makes it an older sister, who at her own desire was borne by the winds into the eastern sky, whilst her brother ran up a high mountain to hunt. So according to Diórdos Siculus, the divine youth Hephaestus went to the summit of a mountain at night to study the stars and a great wind carried him into the sky, where he became the evening star (Scholecraft, *Hauswatha Legends*, Philadelphia and London, 1856, p. 90 f.).

Among the Cayugas the morning star was the errand man selected by the moon to be his assistant chief and to call the people together. He used to go early during war expeditions, long before dawn, to the mound in the midst of the people, so that the enemy would not find them. That is the reason why he gets up so early now. Morning Star has three brothers, Evening Star, North (Polo) Star, and South Star. Their father's name was Great Star, and he was the chief of the people (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Cado*, pp. 7-8, 15).

In America the evening star was usually regarded as a woman. As a woman, it dwells high, in Peru the female maize-grinder, the torch in the west, while among the Micmacs it is leader of the stellar tribe. Its symbol is frequently a white cross. It is the mother of all things to the Skidi Pawnees, who keeps a garden in the west in which the sun rests at night, where the corn is always ripe and much buffalo meat is stored (Scholecraft, op. cit. p. 137; *Cushing, Zool. Folk Tale*, New York, 1901, p. 378; *Cushing, Zool. Folk Tale*, New York, 1901, p. 378; *Cushing, Zool. Folk Tale*, New York, 1901, p. 378; *Dorsey, Traditions of the Skidi Pawnees*, pp. xv, 5; Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on *Cult and Symbol*, pp. xv, 5). As the converse, the medicine men believe that the evening star would go back a long distance upon the trail and warn his people if the enemy approached (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Cado*, p. 16).

The identity of the planets, whether the morning or the evening star, was recognized in Peru, Mexico, California, and parts of South America. The Peruvians made Mercury the ruler of merchants, travel, and messengers. The Amazon tribes call it *Deprived of Fish*, since it is believed to cause a scarcity of food fishes. Venus, in Peru, governed the daughters of the rulers, and women generally, dawns, dawns, and flowers; Mars, war and soldiers; Jupiter, public matters and food supplies, and to him they offered firstfruits. The Peruvians placed Venus alone of all the stars in the domain of the sun, evidently because it alone is sometimes visible in the full solar light. Because of its brilliant rays they called it Chasca, *Curling Hair*. Because of its beauty they said that the sun himself permitted it to wander far from its presence—a poetical interpretation of the fact that Venus never departs as far from the sun as the major planets. They also called this planet Chasqui, the 'Messenger,' because its swift passage from star to star suggested the swift running messenger upon the highways (Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on *Cult and Symbol*). In the codices it is our source of numerous symbols, in the temple of Mexico by a high column in the sky, and in the myths it is identified with Quetzalcoatl. The Californian Indians say that the sun has two daughters, Mercury and Venus. Twenty men kill them, and after fifty days the day is over (Mendieta, *op. cit.* pp. 82, 83; Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 53; Emerson, *Indian Myths, Legends, and Traditions*, Boston, 1885, p. 491; Néry, *op. cit.* p. 251; *Exposition Codex Telleriano-Remensis* in Kingsborough, *Mexican Antiquities*, 121).

The Milky Way in North America generally, and among the Guaranís of Paraguay, was the path of spirits, over which the souls of the dead passed between this world and the sky-land of the hereafter. Those of the good follow the broader and easier arm, those of the evil-doers the narrow and difficult arm. It is the Cherokee and Pueblo *Way of Meal,* the Micmac *Ancient Trail* and *Way of Reeds,* the Californian *Backbone of the Sky,* the Pawnee *Dust raised by Buffalo Racing.* A Zuñi legend calls it the *Great Snow Drift of the Skies* (Stevenson, *op. cit.* p. 25; Cushing, *op. cit.* p. 581; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnees*, p. 57; Hagar, *Cherokee Star Lore* in *Boas Anuversary*, 1897, p. 39). In Peru and at Zuñi, as among the ancient Samoanians, it is associated with a gigantic cephalic serpent. On the Osage star chart it is figured as a river, and it appears as a celestial stream in the mythology of the Peruvian and Amazon Indians. In Peru, as in the legends of the Ojibwas and Creeks, and as in the Euphratean region, China, and Japan, this river is associated with the passage of souls. The Creeks and the Kutenais call it the *Galaxy the Way of the Dog,* the tribes of the *Galunia the Way of the Tapir* and the *Path of the Bearers of White Clay* (Brett, *Indian Tribes of British Guiana*, New York, 1852, p. 107; Chamberlain, in *AAOJ* xvii. 69).

In the sand paintings of the Mission Indians of California the outer circle is called *Our Spirit,* a name of the Milky Way. The whole world rests on the Milky Way. A gate or door to the north permits the escape of the soul at death.

The Creeks recognize two dog stars, Sirius and Antares. In spite of the identical name of the former in our tradition, this is probably a native name, for it is explained by a Cherokee legend which bears close resemblance to an Indian analogue. In its two dogs act as guardians of
Cherokees also relate that the seventh Pleiad fell to earth, leaving a fiery trail. He became a bearded man, who warned them of the coming flood. So in Peru the approach of the Pleiades to the meridian caused the Incas to warn their shepherd of the coming of the annual deluge or rainy season in November. In Mexico the six tezontecuex, or stars which fall at the deluge, seem to have been Taurid meteors (Mooney, in 27 R.E.B., p. 621; Explanation Códex Telleriano-Remensis). If people will look at these stars (the Pleiades) the Pawaee sings, 'they will be their share.' Many tribes actually did use them as a guide by night (Morgan, League of the Iroquois, Rochester, N.Y., 1857, ii. 106). Everywhere the Pleiades are a peaceful, beneficent, and friendly star; and there are some indications in Peru and elsewhere that they were once regarded as being (or having special influence over) the home of souls.

The pole star of the Northern Hemisphere is the star which does not walk. This star seems to have been observed by all, or nearly all, the northern tribes. It is the Ojibwa 'Man who walks behind the Lon,' a disappointed lover, who, metamorphosed into a firefly, flew into the sky; in another version of the tale of the lightning snake, suggest an association with the group of small mounds on 'the Way of the Dead' at Teotihuacan, for these mounds are traditionally regarded as an abode of the dead, and from some of them have been exhumed large and erect rattle figures, which were evidently used as altars.

Another important aspect of the group is that of the dancers, suggested by the twinkling of the closely grouped stars. The whole stellar world follows the group, as they perform their cosmic dance across the sky; and so on earth their rising was hailed by Brazilian Indians as the spring. The Micmacs, and probably many other tribes, with an imitative song and dance referring more or less directly to the eternal procession of the heavens.

The Iroquois, Housatunnaks, and Cherokees have, or had, an explanatory legend which describes how a group of boys, while dancing, ascended to the sky and became the Pleiades. Among the Caddo there are seven brothers who played all night long. Being scolded by their mother and refused food, they danced round the house, gradually rising from the ground until they reached the sky, where they talked and worked. They disappeared in spring, when work time begins (Dorsey, Traditions of the Caddo, p. 64). The Blackfeet believe that they ascended because their father was killed by a buffalo. As an aid to the good hunt, the yellow skins of the buffalo calves they had slain. In revenge they determined to go away each year when the buffalo calf skins became yellow. This occurs in May, when the Pleiades are hidden in the sunlight. The Kiowas call the Pleiades 'the Star Girls,' and they are probably represented by the dancing stellar maidens who descend to earth in the poetic legend of Algonquin. The seventh Pleiad appears in the Cherokee and Iroquois legends, in the former as a boy who is knocked down with a pole before reaching the sky; in the latter as a star whose light is dimmed because of his desire to return to earth (James Mooney, letter to author; R. W. Wilson, A.A.O.J. xv. 1912, p. 172; Sergeant, House- tunnuck Indians, Boston, 1753; Domenech, Deserts of North America. London, 1860; Schoolcraft, Hiawatha Legends, p. 116 ff.; Mrs. Erminie Smith, in R.E.B., p. 96).

Another star, perhaps the seventh, is attributed to the group, thus including one star which, though of the ninth magnitude while its companions are of the third and fourth, may be seen by one with strong sight or in a clear atmosphere.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Buddhist)

The astronomical ideas found in Buddhism do not form an integral part of the system, but have developed in close relation with Hindu theories. The problem is rather to determine what stages of development are to be found in the canonical and later books.

Thibast divides Indian astronomy into three periods: (1) that of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, (2) the middle period with a fully developed native Indian system, (3) the third period, showing Greek influence. The Buddhist scriptures cover a long time, some of them containing references to the Greeks, but it is to the middle period, and rather to the early stages of this, that the astronomical notions of these works belong. They are in the main the same as those which we find in the Pārāśāra. The Buddhists had two important uses for astronomy: the sacrifices and astrology, neither of which was countenanced by the Buddhists. The latter had so special a motive for paying close attention to astronomical theory beyond that required for determining the periods of the lunar month with its fast-days, the period of Retreat in the rainy season, and the divisions of the day. According to Vīsoka, ii, 217, a monk who lives in the forest is to learn 'the positions of the lunar signs (naksatras), either the whole or one section, and is to know the cardinal points.' At the end of the ordination service the process of 'measuring the shadow,' i.e., calculating the time of day, is performed in order to determine the seniority of the monk, and he is instructed in the length of the seasons and divisions of the days.

1. Position of sun and moon.—The heavenly bodies that we see are the vehicles of gods, who have been thus reborn through their merit, and who are associated with them. In the Rigveda, for example, the ocean is called by the goddesses and the husbands of the gods, with the guardians of the ten quarters as world-protectors. When sun and moon occur together, the moon is always mentioned first.

In the scriptures there is no systematic description of the heavenly bodies, but the account given in the Sārasvatīyātra corresponds to scattered notices in earlier works and probably underlies them. The earth, a flat disk, is 1,203,450 leagues (yojanae) in diameter and 3,610,360 in circumference. In the centre is Mt. Meru, rising 84,000 leagues above the surface of the earth, and round it circle the sun, moon, and stars, shining in turn on the four continents round Mt. Meru. Night is caused by the sun passing to the other side of Mt. Meru. The diameter of the moon is 49 leagues and the circumference 147; of the sun 50 and 150 respectively. As the sun is as the vehicle (yātra) of the god, so the god is one league higher in position than the moon. It is of crystal outside, gold within, and hot within and without. The moon is of silver outside, of jewel within, and cool within and without.

The sun has three paths—āgāviti, nāgāviti, and gōviti—according to its apparent course in the ecliptic during the seasons along the equator, and above or below. This fact appears to be referred to in the Sīlānī, where the sun and moon are spoken of as going along their paths or out of their paths. Whether there was any early theory 1. Astronomie, Astrologie, und Mathematik, Strassburg, 1890, p. 4.

3. Dīpika, 11, 189.
5. The ratio of the diameter and circumference of a circle is thus 1:1:5, 3, 5:3. This illustrates the rudimentary character of Buddhist astronomy.
6. Hengler, op. cit., p. 371. This illustrates the rudimentary character of Buddhist astronomy.
7. We should expect the sun to be outside, but the text is the text.
of the cause of revolution, apart from the choice of the god of the luminary, is not clear. The Chinese sources of A. Rémusat state that five vortices of winds are supposed to gather the sun's rays in the required directions, and five other vortices similarly move the moon.1

2. Eclipses. —Eclipses are due to the asura Rekhasthāna's swallowing the sun's mānasa, and periodically swallows the sun and the moon. The legend of Rahu is the monster's head, severed when he was drinking the ambrosia produced at the churning of the ocean, appears not to be by a Buddhist, nor even ancient Hindu. It is absent from the account of the churning in the Vīṇga Purāṇa.2 Buddha-ḥoṣa describes Rahu not as a head, but as having a complete body, of which he

3. Planets. —The stars also are said to move along and out of their paths.4 The term here used for star is mukkata (Skt. mukkata), and probably refers to the planets, as Buddha-ḥoṣa understands it in this context.

The only planet distinctly mentioned in the Sutras is Oṣahī-

4. The lunar zodiac. —The term nakatsra has been from late Vedica times applied especially to 27 or 28 constellations lying roughly along the ecliptic and forming a lunar zodiac; and from the Buddhist use of many of them as proper names it may be inferred that they were known to the earliest Buddhists. They are as follows:

(1) Anuvaya (sa, y, Arieta), (2) Tharani (26, in 41 Arieta), (3) Kāthi (Pilas), (4) Rohi (Huyes), (5) Magas (L, D, Origenes), (6) Pahissas (Sammati), (7) Puspa (Huyes, Oliver, (8) Phusa (or Tis, l, c, S, C, Canor), (9) Anukal (e, s, e, r, a, s, Huyes), (10) Aparah (Oliver), (11) Putha and Uttar-phugamni (L, B, D, Loe), (12) Hariv (L, H, B, D, Loe), (13) Putha, s, e, o, h, S, C, F, (14) Spela (Arcorura, 15) Nāl (Arcorura), (16) Yakkha (Lībra, 17) Anurakha (L, H, B, D, Loe, 18) Jethū (Arcorura, 19) Na (Scopec, etc.), (20) and (21) Putha and Uttara-saitha (e, s, c, Sgripar), (22) Putha (Ephr), (23) Sarvagha (Aguria), (24) Dhanīrā (or Savicthā (Dolphin), (25) Sakhacca (Buddha), (26) Putha and Uttara-bhāphala or prajapad (the square of Pagua), (27) Revati (C Pictor, etc.), (28)

No. 22 in this list is not in the Abhidhammapuggadipī. It was only stated in Hindu astronomy, but the existence of Abhū (Skr. Abhū) in the Buddhist system may be inferred from the statement that the number of nakatsra is 22, and from the existence of Abhū as a proper name.3 It also occurs in Mahāyāna, 166, and in the list of Rémusat.3

References to other fixed stars than nakatsra are rare in all Hindu literature. The descent of the Heavenly Ganges, a myth relating to the Milky Way, is referred to in the caon, but never in any astronomical connexion. In Jātaka, vi, 97, seven sages are mentioned, but not those which Hindu mythology gives to the seven rasa, after whom the seven stars of Ursa Major are named. The name Sakṣa, 'the cart,' in Dīgha, ii, 354, is probably a name of Robinson, as suggested by S. Konow.7 It is so named by several Hindu astronomers.4

5. Months. —The moon in the course of a year may be full in any of the nakatsra, and we find such expressions as Vaiśeṣikaparigata, 'full-moon when the moon is in Vaiśeṣik; but there had been established earlier than Buddhism a system of twelve lunar months, with names derived from certain of the nakatsra. These are:

(1) Chitta (Mar.-Apr.), (2) Vaiṣkha (Apr.-May), (3) Jethū (May-June), (4) Asali (June-July), (5) Vāra (July-Aug.), (6) Prakāsha (August-September), (7) Kātha (September-October), (8) Maga (October-Nov.), (9) Punja (November-December), (10) Panha (December-January), (11) Magha (January-February), (12) Phagba (February-March). These names were later applied in Hindu systems also to the twelve solar months, but in the caon the reckoning appears to be always lunar, as well as in the Oeyn system.

The month is divided into two parts (pakkha), the dark (kāla) from full to new moon, and the light (nīka, jīthu) from new moon to full. Whether the names of the months are of Buddhist origin is not clear, but the fact that the dark half is mentioned first and that the months of retreat began after a full-moon day and ended on a full-moon day, suggests that the full-moon day was the end. Both methods were in use by the Hindus in Vedica times, as they are at the present day.

6. The week. —The division of the half month at the eighth and fourteenth or fifteenth day easily led to the reckoning of seven days as a usual period (saṅkha), but there is no trace in the Pall writings of the system (no doubt non-Indian in origin) of naming the week from names of the sun, moon, and planets. These names occur in the order of the days of the week as the first seven of the nine planets in Mahāyāna, 164.

7. The year. —In Anugāraha and in many other Buddhists in the year is reckoned as the number of 360 days, and is the extant number in use in the Vedica period.4 The number 30 is probably obtained by adding together the 15 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would be sometimes 29 and sometimes 30, as the synodic lunar month is rather over 29 days. There must have been a mode of intercalating months to bring the lunar months and solar year into harmony from time to time, as in the case of the Hindu systems, but the process is unknown. The modern Siamese have a year of 354 days, the months being alternately of 29 and 30 days. In every third year, the seventh year (seven times in 19 years) the eighth month is reckoned twice, the fifth or sixth and fifth year one day is added to the seventh month, bringing the lunar year into harmony with the solar year.

The Hindu systems have two modes of beginning

1 Mahāyāna, pothamhow, d'hist. et de litt. orientales, Paris, 1849, p. 82.
2 Bk. i, ch. 9. This work (2) 1245) was the chief source of the astronomical data in B. C. Ghidelines, Dictionary of the Full Language, London, 1876, but it is based largely on Hindu sources, and forms no independent evidence for Buddhist astronomy. The nine planets are the moon, sun, five greater planets, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, and Mercury.
4 Dīgha, l. 10.
5 Mahākānta, 8, 44.
6 Vinivasatthā, l. 1.
7 Vīraṅga, Āgaddhī, The Hagi, 1912, l. 190.
8 From Abhidhammapuggadipī, 55-56. Exact identifications of the constellations, such as the one given in Sunyatta, 54, 9, are commonly made in Sunyatta, tr. E. Burgess, New Haven, 1906, p. 324.
10 Mahānādaya, 395; Jātaka, Com. p. 476.
Like later works of this kind, it shows the influence of Greek astrology in the names of such terms as quarter, and the names of the 12 signs of the zodiac (Pisces, Scorpio, etc.) along with those of the nakshatras.

**Literature.** The sources and authorities are given throughout the article.

**EDWARD J. THOMAS.**

**SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Celtic).**

I. Very little is known about the astrology and astronomy of the Celts. The Druids, as we learn from Cassar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 14), discussed and transmitted to their disciples many quatrains regarding the stars and their motion. They had observed the course of the moon, and by it they regulated their calendar. Their months and years began with the Great Day of the Moon (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250); they counted by nights (Cassar, vi. 135); and their cycle was one of thirty years (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250).

The discovery of the calendar of Coligny has made it possible to determine these general ideas for the Gallo-Roman period. This calendar gives a year of 364 days, divided into twelve months of twenty-nine and thirty days alternately. To establish agreement between the two methods of calculating the solar year a month of thirty days was intercalated every two and a half years. At the beginning of every fifth year there was complete agreement between the two methods of calculating the day of the year.

Astrology, properly so called, does not seem to have been practised by the pagan Irish. But in the Lives of Saints there are to be found some superstitions practices derived from the observation of the stars. The foster-father of Columcille goes to ask a prophet when he should begin to teach the child to read. The prophet, after having examined the heavens replies that he must begin immediately (Lives of Saints, Life of St. Colman, l. 812). Manannan mac Lir used to know by studying the sky when there would be fine weather and when bad (Corí ma Ghlas, p. 114).

The scientific observation of stars was also in use among the ancient Irish. Long observes the stars to ascertain when midnight comes (Masa Uad). Since the dates on Irish astronomy are fixed at the beginning of the solar month, the age of the moon, the flood of the tide, the day of the week, and the chief festivals' saint's days. Perhaps in the ancient Irish and Welsh texts there are traces to be found of the primitive Celtic calendar. The year was divided into two halves or into four periods of three months, the month being divided into two parts. The periods of time most in use were those of three nights and three days, or nine nights and nine days, while the most common cycles were those of three years and of seven years. In Armorician Brittany and in Wales the names of the complements day served to convert the lunar year into a solar year (Brit. gorsadewn, Welsh dydd dyddon) have been preserved. Several popular superstitions are attached to these days. Thus a medical manuscript mentioned contains a list of unlucky days, and in Irish literature there are numerous examples of births delayed in order that they may take place on a lucky day, or of disasters which might have been prevented if an undertaking had not been engaged in on an unlucky day.

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2. Pliny, l. 107.
3. There is no reason for thinking that the year ever began with Savna. The recurring phrase Konami sidhmeidhain does not mean the full moon of Kattika 'In the fourth month,' but 'at the Chaiturmaya festival.' See J. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, in *Ptolemy Texts* pt. l. (O.S.E. xliii. 1933) p. 350, in *Jatke**, vi. 221; *Dysgyniog*, xiv. 1. On the Chaiturmaya, or 'Your month' celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FEASTS (Hindu).
4. See the Commentaries on *Satta Nipada*, 355, p. 192, and *Vinapta Vatika*, v. 5, 6.
5. Pliny, l. 115; *Jatke*, l. 66; *Com. on Satta Nipada*, 366.
7. See also art. CALENDAR (Buddhist).
9. *Jatke*, vi. 221; *Dysgyniog*, xiv. 1. On the Chaiturmaya, or 'Your month' celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FEASTS (Hindu).
12. See also art. CALENDAR (Buddhist).
13. In this context it should be noted that the later developments of Buddhist astrology are given. See also Jeffreys, Hinduism and Buddhism, pp. 171-180. See also Ant. H. C. U. U. Flora, *The History and Doctrine of Buddhism* popularly illustrated, pp. 171-180. *Kotrepp, Demonic Worship, and the Book of the Dead, Planetary Incantations of Ceylon*, London, 1830; *Ptolemy Texts*, pt. I. (O.S.E. xliii. 1933) p. 350. On the Chaiturmaya, or 'Your month' celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FEASTS (Hindu).
2. The Gallic god Belenos had been assimilated to Apollo as a healer rather than as a sun-god. We have no evidence of worship of the stars among the Gauls except a few dedications to the sun and the moon. The god Belenos (A. Holthoer, Antike Mythologie, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896–1913), and the mention of the worship of an image of the sun (A.S. 4 Sept., ii. 197 C). No conclusion can be drawn from the representations of stars on the shields of the Orange-arch, from the roulettes dug out in so great a number, or from the wheel that is an attribute of a Gallo-Roman god assimilated to Jupiter; for the stars may be ornamental or armorial bearings, and the wheel may be a divination-wheel or a symbol of the thunder as well as a symbol of the sun. Some customs of the ancients may be connected with the beliefs relating to the stars—e.g., the gathering of the mistletoe and the beginning of the years and months on the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 290), the dread of the Asiatic Galatians during an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. v. 78).

The evidences of the worship of the sun and the moon in ancient Ireland are not numerous. The most important text is in the Confesseis (§ 60) of St. Patrick, in which he alludes to worshippers of the sun. G. Keating (History of Ireland, ed. D. Comyn and P. Dinnane, 1603–1608, bk. i. § 129) says that the spring festival of the Druids was named Ma Gréine, 'Son of the Sun,' because his god was the sun. A passage of Corneille's Gloire (p. 54) tells us that Irish pagans used to carve some pictures—e.g., the sun—on the altars of their idols, and Keating (ii. 11) relates that in Colomseille's time a priest of Tirconnell who had set up images of the sun and the moon in the church was carried off by a devil. The king of Ulster, Loegaire, swore by the name of the elements—the earth, the sun, and the wind (W. St. Borens, Eoc. xii. (1692) 261 ff.).

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Chinese).—I. INTRODUCTION.—The Chinese view of the sun, moon, and stars taken as a whole may be likened to the primitive heaven, or its chief characteristic, the thread of astronomy, the thread of religion, and the thread of astrology. Astronomy means here the observation of the heavenly bodies and the truths deduced from astronomical and the practical purpose. It may therefore be called 'observational' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'physical' or 'descriptive' astronomy, founded by Galilea after his invention of the telescope, and it may also be called 'practical' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'theoretical' astronomy, founded by Newton on the hypothesis of the law of gravitation. The religious view of the Chinese concerning the heavenly bodies may be called astrological, and their astrological view may be called religious in the comprehensive sense of the term. But a clear line of distinction can be drawn between them. The idea of deity or God is always present and predominant in the religious view, whereas it may be vague and even absent in the astrological view. The latter is concerned chiefly with the influences of the heavenly bodies upon men, while the former is concerned chiefly with the relation of God to men as revealed in the heavens. The interest of astronomy to the Chinese (A. Holthoer, Antike Mythologie, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896–1913), and the mention of the worship of an image of the sun (A.S. 4 Sept., ii. 197 C). No conclusion can be drawn from the representations of stars on the shields of the Orange-arch, from the roulettes dug out in so great a number, or from the wheel that is an attribute of a Gallo-Roman god assimilated to Jupiter; for the stars may be ornamental or armorial bearings, and the wheel may be a divination-wheel or a symbol of the thunder as well as a symbol of the sun. Some customs of the ancients may be connected with the beliefs relating to the stars—e.g., the gathering of the mistletoe and the beginning of the years and months on the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 290), the dread of the Asiatic Galatians during an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. v. 78).

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II. THE ASTRONOMICAL ASPECTS. — The

Chinese are great believers in their ancient observatories, with which the ancient views and beliefs is to a great extent to be credited with their modern ones as well. The great antiquity of Chinese astronomy has been admitted by many of the modern scholars of both the last and the present century. A sort of calendar was invented by Fu Hsi (2807 B.C.) as a result of observations of the phenomena of the sky. The reformation of the calendar and the rectification of intercalation are attributed to Hwang Ti, or the Yellow Emperor (2807 B.C.). In the record called Shu K′i of Sat Ma Chien, China's most ancient historian (2nd and 1st centuries B.C.), it is recorded:

"Hwang Ti commanded the king of Wei to take charge of the observation of the sun, Yin Chang the observation of the moon, and Yi Chu the observation of the stars."

He is also said to have brought into use the lunar cycle of nineteen years, by which the conjunctions and oppositions of the sun and moon can be calculated, and the intervals of the seasons regulated. This was more than 2000 years before the introduction of the same system among the Greeks by the astronomer Seleucus. The Annals of the Bamboo Book tell us that at the time of the reign of Tung Hsiu (beginning 2515 B.C.) the conjunction of the five planets was observed by the Chinese in the constellation called Yin Shih or Shih. It has been carefully calculated and asserted by the French astronomer Jean S. Bouman that such a conjunction did take place on 29th Feb. 2449 B.C., which would be the 65th year of Tung Hsiu's reign. In the time of the emperor You (2556 B.C.), the Chinese already knew the exact, or almost exact, number of days in a year, had a way of determining solstices and equinoxes, and had in use an intercalary system and some instruments for the survey of the heavens, and the knowledge of the five planets and of the twelve zodiacal signs, and most probably of the 28 stellar divisions.

In the Canon of Yaou, the first book of the Shu King ("The Canon of History"); we read:

"Thereupon Yaou commanded He and Hsiao to have reverence to the great heavens, and to calculate and delineate the movements and appearances of the sun, the moon, the stars, and the sidereal spaces; and to do so respectfully to the seasons to the people."

He separatedly commanded the second brother Ho to reside in the west, in what is called the Dark Valley, and there respectfully to convey the setting sun, and to adjust the completing of the habitations of the autumn. "The night," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is Hsiu; therefore the state exactly determines mid-autumn. The people begin to feel cold at night; and birds and beasts cannot have their coasts in good condition, and their cozy corners; and the costs of birds and beasts are down and they are thin.

The emperor said, "Ah! you, He and Ho, a round year consists of three hundred, sixty, and six days. By means of an intercalary month do you sit the four seasons, and complete the determination of the year. Therefore, in exact accordance with this, regulate the various offices, all the works of the year will be fully performed.""

In the 'Canon of Hsuan,' the second book of the Shu King, it is recorded that, having accepted the throne, he refused to be addressed by the emperor Yaou, the emperor Hsuan examined the gem-adorned sphere and the gem transverse tube in order to regulate the seven directors or planets.

Both the commandments of Yaou and the examination of Hsuan are supposed to have taken place at the beginning of their reigns. The observation of the heavens then must have been of great importance. According to another book of the Shu King, called "The Punitive Expedition of the Prince Yin," in the reign of King Tsung Kang (2139-2146 B.C.) there were astronomers who failed to forecast an eclipse of the year 2138 B.C. (7), and it was considered such a great crime that the prince of Tsing, who was then commander-in-chief of the imperial armies, received orders from the king to punish them with the imperial forces. The Chinese then commenced their observations of eclipses from a time not later than the 22nd cent. B.C., though some European scholars regard the eclipse of the sun on 20th Aug. 775 B.C., recorded in the Shu King ("Book of Osiris"), as the earliest recorded eclipse in all history. In Ma Twan Lin's Encyclopaedia more than 660 eclipses of the sun are recorded from 2108 B.C. to A.D. 1925. There are many other kinds of heavenly phenomena which have been keenly observed by the Chinese from a very early period as well. From 611 B.C. to A.D. 21 alone comets are recorded 372 times, as shown in Williams' Observations of Comets, while the number of sunspots were observed and recorded by the Chinese not later than A.D. 301, i.e., 1308 years before the first observed discovery of solar spots by Galileo in A.D. 1610 and 28 years before you may have been exactly determined. The people begin to disperse; and the birds and beasts become sick and quiet.

He further commanded the third brother Ho to reside at Nankou, and arrange the transformations of the summer, and respectfully to observe the extreme limit of the shadow. "The day," he said, "is at its longest, and the star is Ho; you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people are more dispersed; and the birds and beasts have their feathers and hair thin, and change their coats."

1 See Williams, Observations of Comets, Introduction.
2 A large collection of ancient documents, discovered A.D. 2737, see James Legge's tr. in Chinese Classics, Hong Kong, 1861-76, vol. iii. pt. 1.
3 One of the 28 stellar divisions determined by a, &c, and other stars in Pegasus, extending north and south from Cygnus and Pegasus Australis and east and west 17° and comprising part of Capricornus and Aquarius.
5 N.B. There has been heretofore a Board of Astronomy since the time of Hwang Ti.
6 N'eau is a space of heavens extending over 112° and embracing the seven constellations of the southern quarter. The stars in N'eau are, according to the view held by Chinese scholars and adopted by Legge, the stars of James Legge, John Williams, etc., the star Tsun Huwo, corresponding to our Huygen's Planet, is supposed to be the messenger of the stars. The name Hsuan is recorded in the Shu King.
7 Central star of the seven constellations of the eastern quarter, corresponding to the heart of Scorpio.
8 He separately commanded the second brother Ho to reside in the west, in what is called the Dark Valley, and there respectfully to convey the setting sun, and to adjust the completing of the habitations of the autumn. "The night," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is Hsiu; therefore the state exactly determines mid-autumn. The people begin to feel cold at night; and birds and beasts cannot have their coasts in good condition, and their cozy corners; and the costs of birds and beasts are down and they are thin."
9 The emperor said, "Ah! you, He and Ho, a round year consists of three hundred, sixty, and six days. By means of an intercalary month do you sit the four seasons, and complete the determination of the year. Therefore, in exact accordance with this, regulate the various offices, all the works of the year will be fully performed.""
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12 "The day," he said, "is at its longest, and the star is Ho; you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people are more dispersed; and the birds and beasts have their feathers and hair thin, and change their coats."
we have here the earliest record of a shower of those meteors.1

III. DIVISION OF THE STARS.—1. The 28 sīsū or shēs.—In common with the Hindus, Arabs, Greeks, Egyptians, Syrians, Russians, and Copts, the Chinese have the division of the ecliptic into 28 mansions, which are called sīsū or shēs. According to the interpretation of Sun Ma Kuan, a great scholar of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1279), shē has the meaning 'to reside (or to stop) somewhere,' and sū means 'an abode,' and both words express the idea of the sun, the moon, and the five planets in their revolution residing in turn in the divisions of the sphere indicated as the 28 abodes. This meaning is very similar to that of the Hindu nakṣatras ('stars' or 'asterisms') and the Arabian manāsīl al-kūnār ('lunar mansions'). There is, according to Knobel's calculation, a concordance of the determinants of the sīsū, the nakṣatras, and the manāsīl in fifteen divisions, of the sīsū and the nakṣatras in four divisions, of the sīsū and the manāsīl in five divisions, and of the nakṣatras and the manāsīl in four divisions. This remarkable resemblance attracted the attention of many Western scholars and seemed to them a sufficient reason for presuming that the Chinese received them from the ancient Chinese astronomers; another opinion is that the Babylonians were the originators; while still others say that the origin is to be found in Central Asia or some part of Persia. Regardless of these conclusions, this system of division is supported by satisfactory evidence.

But there are differences as well as resemblances between these three systems, and the Chinese division has its own peculiarity. The Chinese divisions are very unequal in the angular intervals and therefore cannot present the daily stations of the moon, as the Hindu divisions do. They are measured on the equator rather than on the ecliptic. According to G. Schlegel,2 there is no connexion at all between the Chinese asterisms and the lunar zodiac. Some of the names of the 28 sīsū were known to the Chinese as early as the time of the emperor Youn (2355 B.C.), while the earliest Babylonian record concerning the lunar mansions and the earliest Hindu record of the nakṣatras numbered after the Vedic deities are much later than that.3

The nakṣatras, in their recent forms at least, are apparently assimilated to the Chinese sīsū, and the western system of junction stars is undoubtedly an imitation of them.4

J. B. Biot and his son were the first to demonstrate the identity of the Chinese sīsū and the 28 lunar mansions of the Hindus and Arabs. They concluded that this arrangement of celestial divisions was invented by the Chinese and borrowed from them by the Hindus and Arabs for purely astronomical purposes.

'To this day,' says J. J. M. de Groot, 'no considerations of importance have cancelled these views [of Biot], and though they have been rigorously combated by Weber, Max Müller, and other authorities of renown, yet it seems that most investigations of oriental astronomy silently subscribe to them.'5

1 Journals of the British Astronomical Association, xxi. 327-345.
3 Observatory, xxxii. (1909) 157.
4 According to Agnes M. Clerke's art. 'Zodiac' in E.D.N., the above view of Chinese invention and the nascent wave of Indian derivation. The nakṣatras in their recent organization were taken by the Chinese from the Chinese sīsū. 'The whole system of junction stars,' she says, 'was doubtless an imitation of the sīsū; the choice of them by the Hindu astronomers of the 6th century A.D. was plainly instigated by a consideration of the Chinese, compiled with a widely different intention.'

2. The twelve kungas.—Besides the division of the lunar cycle into 28 unequal mansions, the Chinese, in common with the Hindus and Western nations, divide the zodiac into twelve equal parts as follows:


These names are found in Chinese books written several centuries B.C.—e.g., Tao T'ouan, Erh Y'a, etc. The Hindu zodiac signs, which are probably of Greek origin, entered China at a much later date.

3. The four quarters and the five kungas.—The Chinese divide the heavens into four quarters. The eastern quarter is called Tsang Lung ('the Blue Dragon') and is associated for astrological purposes with the season of spring, the planet Jupiter, the element wood, the colour blue, the taste sour, and the virtù of irrigation. The southern quarter is called Chih Niao ('the Red Bird') and is associated with the season of summer, the planet Mars, the element fire, the colour red, the taste bitter, and the virtù of heat. The western quarter is called Pe Hwu ('the White Tiger') and is associated with the season of autumn, the planet Venus, the element metal, the colour white, the taste salty, and the virtù of brightness. The northern quarter is called Tsien Wu ('the Black Warrior,' or 'the Black Torteise,' as it has also been interpreted) and is associated with the season of winter, the planet Saturn, the element water, the colour black, the taste salty, and the virtù of wisdom.

In Ssü Ma Chien's Ssü K'i the stars are divided into five kungas, or palaces—middle palace, eastern palace, southern palace, western palace, and northern palace. The middle palace consists of the northerand circumpolar stars, and the other four are like the four quarters stated above. This system of division is followed by Pan Ku in his History of the Later Han Dynasty.

4. The three yunans and the two kunas.—The three yunans (palaces or stellar spaces) are (1) Ts'a Hsiao Yuan (the Middle Palace), consisting of the northern circumpolar stars, (2) Tai Hsiao Yuan (the Upper Palace), consisting of stars in Leo, Virgo, and Corvus, etc., and (3) Tien Ssün Yüan (the Lower Palace), bounded by two chains comprising Hercules, the upper part of Ophiuchus, etc. The two kunas, or kinds of officers, are (1) tsung kuan, the internal officers, consisting of groups of stars inside the equator, and (2) suet kuan, the external officers, consisting of groups of stars outside the equator. This system of the division of the heavens is peculiarly Chinese and is very ancient. In the Tien Wen, consisting of eight chapters, written by Wu Hian, an astronomer of the Yin (or Shang) dynasty (1766-1122 B.C.), the astronomer assigned to the Middle Palace four seats, consisting of eight stars, to the Upper Palace one seat, consisting of one star, to the Lower Palace four seats, consisting of eight stars, to the internal officers five seats, consisting of 24 stars, and to the external officers nineteen seats, consisting of 93 stars. In the Tien Wen, written by Kan T'e, an astronomer of the state of Ts'i, and the Tien Wen, written by Hsi Hsia, an astronomer of the state of Wu (both astronomers lived about the 4th cent. B.C.), the method of division is identical with that of Wu Hian, but the numbers of officers and stars are greatly increased. Adding these estimates together, we get 283 officers, consisting of 1464 stars.

5. The three yunans and the 28 sīsūs.—There is a
popular book consisting of 31 songs by Tan Yuan Tao and Fu Tzen Ko. It divides the stars into three yuan and 28 sius. There are in all 193 yuan, or officers, consisting of 1457 stars. The stars which have been named by the Chinese are not many more than this, except in the book of Chang Heng, which gave 320 yuan, consisting of 2500 stars, and, besides these, 11,520 stars. This system of division is for the most part that of the P'ei Yüen or Fu Tz'en Ko.

IV. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS.—I. Animistic view. The animistic view which the Chinese took of many things in nature is seen in their attitude to the sun, moon, and stars. Many of them regard the heavenly bodies not as merely inanimate bodies, but as dwelling-places of spiritual beings or as spiritual beings themselves; e.g., there is, it is said, a cock in the sun and a hare in the moon, the palace of angels; the hare is said to be sitting under a tree pounding medicine in a mortar. Those spiritual beings have superhuman powers, though the supreme power is not attributed to any of them, but to Tien, Shang-ti, or God alone. Hence the movements and appearances of the heavenly bodies are not regarded as mechanical, lifeless, or inevitable, for within or behind them there are supernatural beings which will may be the will of the heavenly bodies, of the spiritual beings who dwell in them, or of God, the Supreme Ruler.

II. Comparison of the heavens with the earth. In the heavens there are the sun and the moon; correspondingly on the earth there are the yang and the yin, the two contrary conceptions applied to phenomena mental and physical. Yang is the male principle, associated with heat, day, etc., and yin is the female principle, associated with cold, night, etc. Hence the sun is called the great yang, and the moon, and the stars small yang. It is also said that the sun is the 'crystallization of the yang' and the moon the 'crystallization of the yin.' The five planets are said to correspond to the five elements of the earth, and therefore Mars is called 'the planet of fire,' Mercury 'the planet of water,' Venus 'the planet of metal,' Jupiter 'the planet of wood,' and Saturn 'the planet of earth.' Similarly, the different stars and constellations are believed to correspond to the various portions of the surface of the earth. In the chapter called Tien K'ouen ('The Heavenly Officers') in the Shu Ching Ch'iu, in which all the beliefs mentioned above may be found, we read: 'The twenty-eight sius or constellations correspond to the twelve chow, or provinces; . . . . The source of this (saying or belief) is remote antiquity indeed.'

It is a popular saying in China that 'the stars of the heavens above and the configurations of the earth beneath correspond with each other.' A great number of stars,—e.g., the twenty stars constituting the two chains of the Tien Sen Yüan, or the Lower Palace—are believed to correspond to certain countries in China and are given the names of these countries.

In some of the ancient books the heavens are said to be spherical and the earth square, the heavens dynamic and the earth static. There are also ancient stories or mythologies which represent the heavens as having a hollow place in the north-west round which all the stars revolve, and the earth as having a hollow place in the south-east towards which all the winds run.

3. Comparison of the heavenly bodies with men. Heaven, earth, and men are believed to be the three great powers or genii in the universe. The heavenly bodies are regarded not merely as separate individuals, but as having a society like that of men. As the Chinese state was an empire, so the heavenly society was believed to be an empire.

The coin of significant poetical or mythological names for the heavenly bodies was probably to render easier the task of discriminating and remembering them. Many stories grew round those names, which are regarded by some as fables and by others as true. According to the names of the stars in the Tai VI Yuen, the Upper Palace, or the northern polar star (Polaris) is where the emperor is. The reason is quite plain, as Confucius said: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue is like the northern polar star, which keeps its place and all the other stars incline towards it.'

The Great Bear, or the Spoon, as it is called in China, is said to be the imperial chariot, and its motion round the northern polar star is said to be the emperor viewing his empire in all directions. Names of some of the other stars are: the Empress's Palace, Crown Prince, Prince, Princess, Guards, Civil and Military Officers, Law-Court, Priests, Armoury, Storehouse, Kitchen, Bed, Canopy, etc.

4. Relation between the heavenly and the earthly empires. These two empires are not separated from each other, another world of communication. Tien, or Shang-ti, the Supreme Ruler, governs both, but the heavenly one more directly. The ruler of the earthly empire used to be called Tien-tsan, 'the son of Tien (or God),' and Enthronement was to be regarded as the appointment of God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. Therefore, when the Son of Heaven was good and his empire was governed, auspicious phenomena used to appear from God in the heavens, and, when he was bad and his empire in disorder, threats used to appear. There are many heavenly phenomena which are regarded as God's threats—e.g., the appearance of the Connor of Odes refers to an eclipse of the sun of the date 29th Aug. 775 B.C., which was carefully verified by John Chalmers. The sun was eclipsed.

A thing of very evil omen,
First the moon looked small,
And then the sun looked small,
Henceforth the people
Will be pitied indeed.
The sun and moon together evil,
By not keeping their proper paths;
All through the kingdom there is no [good] government.
Because good men are not employed.
For the moon to be eclipsed,
Is a small matter.
But now the sun is eclipsed,
How dreadful is that!

In the Confucian classic called Tsuen T'ou (Springs and Autumn)" the eclipse of the sun which took place on 20th April 610 B.C. is recorded. The writer says:

'On the occasion of an eclipse of the sun, the Son of Heaven should not have his table spread as lavishly as usual, and should have drums beaten at the altar to the spirits of the land, while the feudal princes should present offerings of silk to the spirits of the land and have drums beaten at their courts, thus manifesting their own service of the spirits and so teaching the people to serve their rulers, according to the respective rights of each, as was customary in ancient days.'

The word 'eclipse' used here is the same as the word 'ext.' The eclipse of the sun or the moon is described, in some of the Chinese stories, as the sun or moon being eaten by a certain animal, and the beating of drums is said to frighten the animal away.

The sun in the heavens is also said to correspond to the ruler on the earth; e.g., when the people wished the death of Kie, the tyrant (reigned 1818-1753 B.C.), they said: 'Let the sun, why expirieth thou not?' Let us serve thee together with thee.' Therefore the eclipse of the sun is generally regarded as a threat from God to the emperor. There are

1 Anecdote, bk. ii. ch. 1.
numerous examples, and the edict of the emperor Mao Tse Tung (1893-1976) after the eclipse of the sun in 233 is most illuminating:

'We have heard,' says the emperor, 'that if a sovereign is ruled by his ministers, he is a king; if he is ruled by the people, he is a lord. These are divine reprimands sent to him to recall him to a sense of duty. Thus, eclipses of the sun and moon are manifest warnings for the ruler to not act without reasonable thought. Ever since Wu ascended the throne, Our inability to consolidate the glorious tradition of ancient China has carried the great banner of the work of civilization has now culminated in a warning message from on high. It behooves Us in this command for permanent reform, in order to avert impending calamity.

The relationship, however, between God and man is that of father and son; and a father, about his child's health, would not be désiré de le mettre a l'issue du présent avec une main de l'écume. It is a part of Our duty to act in accordance with certain memorials advising that the Grand Astrologer be instructed to offer up sacrifices on this occasion. To ye governors of districts, and other high officials of State, seek rather to rectify your own hearts; and if anyone can devise means to make up for Our shortcomings, let him submit his proposals to the throne. 1

Comets, even more than eclipses, are regarded as God's threats. When the comets appeared in 524 B.C., travelling eastward towards the Milky Way, an officer said: "This is a broom to sweep away the old, and give us new. God often makes us such figures that Thy anger from the skies will suffer from calamities by fire. 2 The stars or the spiritual beings who dwell in them sometimes descend from the heavens, either by themselves or by the will of the god of war, born on earth, and go back to their positions in heaven after their earthly life.

In The Analects of the Bamboo Books there are the following legends:

1. "The story of Kwang Tzu (293 B.C.) was called Tu Piao. She witnessed a great flash of lightning, which surrendered to Chiu (or Double) of the Great Bear with a brightness that lighted all the country about her, and therewith became pregnant."

2. "His father was called Lin Tse. She witnessed a star like a rainbow come flying down the stream to the islet of Hua. Thereafter she dreamed and received it, and was moved in her heart, and bore Shou-Hsun (the emperor Che, 293 B.C.)."

3. "He witnessed the Fau Kwang star (or Beumbe) go through the moon like a rainbow, when it moved itself in the palace of Yen-Ping, after which she was called Si-Chi. His mother was called Si-Ki. She saw a falling star which went through the constellation Mao, and in her dream her thoughts were moved till she became pregnant, after which she swallowed a spirit's pearl, ... and gave birth to Yu (king 2255 B.C.) in the palace of Shu No.

There are 28 heroes in Chinese history who were believed to be the 28 zizis, or constellations, da.-

Among various sacrifices there are sacrifices to the sun, moon, and stars. We do not know when these rites began, but they have been performed unabated since the 23rd cent. B.C. down to the time of the present Republic of China. In the 20th book of Li K't, called Ki Fa ("The Laws of Sacrifices"), it is said:

With a blazing pile of wood on the Grand altar (the Emperors, from Emperor Shun 2555 B.C. to King Wu 1123 B.C.) ascended to Heaven 1 by burning the victims in the Grand mound, they sacrificed to the Earth. (In both cases) they used a red victor. 3

By burning a sheep and a pig at the altar (of Great brightness), they sacrificed to the seasons. (With the sun they sacrificed to the (spirit) of cold and heat, at the pit and the altar, using gold by calumets and round disks.) They sacrificed to the sun, at the (altar) called the royal palace; to the moon, at the (pit called the) light of night; to the stars at the honoured place of gloom; to the spring flood: to the fire, on the burnt offerings of the honoured altar of rain; to the (spirits of the) four quarters at the place of the four pits and altars; mountains, forests, streams, valleys, hills, and mounds, which are able to produce clouds, and occasion winds and rain, were all regarded (as dominated by) spirit. 4

In the 21st book of Li K't, called Ki I ("The Meaning of Sacrifices"), it says:

The sacrifice is the suburb of the capital was the great expression of the things of Heaven. For the people to Heaven, the gods are addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated. The sovereigns of Hsi (dynasty, 2040-1586 B.C.) presented it in the dark. Under the Yin dynasty (1796-1122 B.C.) they did so at moon. Under the Kau (dynasty, 1125-221 B.C.) they sacrificed all the day, at dawn, at mid-day, and at night.

They sacrificed to the sun on the altar, and to the moon in the hollow;—to mark the distinction between the (god) of the one and (the brightness) of the other, and to show the difference between the high and the low. They sacrificed to the sun in the east, and to the moon in the west,—to mark the distinction between the (the) forbidding (of the former) and (the) withdrawing (of the latter), and to show at what time of their (relative) position. The sun comes forth from the east, and the moon appears in the west; the day is long, the night is now, long; short, when the one ends, the other begins, in regular succession—thus producing harmony of all under the sky. 5

These are the sacrifices at the equinoxes; that to the sun at the vernal equinox in the eastern suburb, and that to the moon at the autumnal equinox in the western suburb. These ceremonies were performed under each dynasty, and can also be found in Ta Tung Tung Li ("The Ritual of the Manchu Dynasty"). The former is called Chow I. 6 "The Morning Sun," and the latter Si Yae, "The Evening Moon."

In the dynasty of Chin (255-206 B.C.) they sacrificed to what they called the eight gods, i.e. the god of the heaven, the god of earth, the god of war, the god of the sun, the god of the moon, and the god of the four seasons. In Han Shu ("The Book or History") of the early Han dynasty) (206 B.C.—A.D. 25) it is said: "There were such eight gods in the ancient times, but their origin is unknown."

In the dynasties after the China dynasty different temples were built for their sacrifices. Even at the present day temples connected with the sun, moon, and stars can be found in different places. In Peking there is the famous Tien Ten ("Temple of Heaven"), and in it there are altars of the sun, of the moon, of the 28 constellations, and of some other stars and groups of stars. In the Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) sacrifices were offered in the Temple of Heaven once every spring and once every autumn. Even since the establishment of the Republic of China (1911), a grand sacrifice was offered in the Temple of Heaven by Yuan Shi Kai, the first Chinese President.

The 15th of the eighth lunar month is a Chinese holiday called Tung Tze Tung ("the mid-autumn holiday"). The moon is said to be at its fullest and brightest on this evening if it is visible, whereas this need not be so on the same date of other lunar months. A family festival used to be, and in some places still is, held in Chinese houses on that evening. The offerings to the moon consist chiefly of fruits, and the ceremony is similar to that of Chinese ancestor-worship. On this holiday schools are closed, and farmers cease work for a few days. Relatives and friends exchange presents, chiefly

1 Red was the special colour of victims under the Chow dynasty.

2 For p. 129.

3 For p. 129.
estables, and invite each other to dinner on one or more of the days following the mid-autumn holiday.

With regard to the sacrifices to the stars we read in Yu Yı, an ancient dictionary, one of the
Thirteen Confucian Classics: 'The sacrifice to the stars is called Pu.' Even in our day tablets of stars can be found in public temples and private houses in different provinces.

II. Purpose of sacrifices. The significance of these sacrifices is not merely religious, nor is their religious significance always the most prominent. Sometimes these rites were used for political purposes by the rulers. This is the case not only in ancient times; there was a time in our present century when Shinzō Reijo Mondai (The Problem of the Utilization of Religion) said: "In the period of religious toleration, all these activities are seen not only as the expression of religious faith and devotion, but are also used for political purposes.

The following passages in Ia KI may show that they are not always so.

As sacrifices are the most important ceremonies or rites, let us first indicate the purposes for which they are offered.

The rites to be observed by all under heaven were intended to promote the harmony of the universe (the Creator of all); to promote (the honouring of) spiritual Beings; to promote the harmonious use (of all resources and appliances) of government; to promote righteousness; and to promote humanity. They promote the return to the beginning, securing the due consideration of their originator. They promote (the honouring of) spiritual Beings, ensuring the giving of honour to the gods, thereby establishing the regulations (for the well-being of) the people. They promote righteousness, and thus there are no obstacles and contradictions between high and low. They promote humanity, in order to prevent occasions of strife. Let these three aims be of great concern to statesmen, the regulation of all under heaven, and though there may be some extravagant and perverse who are not in order, they will be few.

There are two other passages, one of which indicates the objects to whom sacrifices should be offered and the other the purposes of the sacrifices. According to the Institutes of the state, "the things about sacrifices, sacrifice should be offered to him who had (good) laws to the people; to him who had laboured for the death in the discharge of his duties; to him who had strengthened the state by his laborious toil; to him who had boldly and successfully met great calamities; and to him who had washed off great evils."

Sacrifices were for the purposes of prayer, of thanksgiving, or of purification.

The sun, moon, and stars fall under none of the above five classes except that in later dynasties some stars were sacrificed to for the power of warding off evil. With regard to the three purposes that of thanksgiving seems to be the sole motive for which the Chinese sacrificed to the sun, moon, and stars.

The Chinese were grateful to the sun, moon, and stars, and expressed their gratitude by means of sacrifices, because, says a passage: "As to the sun and moon, the stars and constellations, the people look up to them. The phrase look up to (fan yang) in this case has an ethical meaning, as when we speak of looking up to a great man with a view to moulding our behaviour on his.

There seems to be other reasons why the Chinese should be grateful to the sun, moon, and stars, especially to the sun for its great and various benefits—but the fact is that they attribute these benefits to Tien, God, rather than to the heavenly bodies themselves. Although the sacrifices to these bodies are sometimes an indirect way of expressing their gratitude to God.

7. Sun-worship, moon-worship, and star-worship. Is there a place for moon-worship or star-worship in China? The answer to this question depends upon what we mean by the term 'worship.' If by worship we mean the 'adoration,' assimilation, prayer, thanksgiving, or other devotional acts performed in honour of the Supreme Being or God, it is certain that there is no such worship in China, and perhaps also that such worship has never existed there. None of the heavenly bodies is conceived by the Chinese as the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is, for them, Tien, God, and God only. Nor can we find such worship in China if we take the term 'worship' to mean (1) the 'prostration which arises in presence of a superior being on whom we are absolutely dependent and when we feel the need of 'fear or reverence,' or (2) the feeling and act of 'worship' without any feeling of primary submission and fealty, and (3) the attitude of the weak to the strong on whom they are absolutely dependent. The Chinese do not regard themselves as absolutely dependent on any of the heavenly bodies or on the spirits dwelling in them, but they regard the heavenly bodies or their indwelling spirits as dependent on Tien, God, as they themselves are. It is more correct to say that they believe these heavenly bodies to possess powers which do not belong to men, but they also believe that men have powers which these bodies do not possess. There is no need of affectionate dependence on any of the heavenly bodies as magicians have the power of controlling spirits.

There are certain passages which have been regarded as evidence of sun-worship in China. In the 9th book of Ia KI, called Kiao Tōh Siong (The Single Victim at the Border Sacrifices), a passage says:

'As the (Great) border sacrifice be (he, the Son of Heaven) welcomed the arrival of the longest day, it was a great act of thanksgiving to Heaven, and the sun was the oldest object considered in it.'

Legge, commenting on this says:

'The sun became for the time the 'spirit-table' of Heaven. Pang Kieh says: (The Son of Heaven) was welcoming the arrival of the longest day, and therefore he regarded the sun as the residence (for the spirit) at the time of the spirit of Heaven, this spirit could not be seen; what could be looked up to and held were only the sun, moon, and stars.'

The present writer need not give his own translation here, but he must point out that the idea that the sun was regarded as the residence of the spirit of Heaven is not implied either in Fang Kieh's commentary or in the text.

With reference to the passage in the book on the meaning of sacrifices, namely:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the greatest expression of the gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated,'

Khun Hko, a Chinese commentator, says, according to Legge:

'Heaven is the great source of the (the course of nature and duty), and of all the visitant bodies which it hangs out, there are none greater than the sun and moon. Therefore, while the object of the suburban sacrifice was a grateful acknowledgment of Heaven, it was also chosen as the resting-place for its spirit (or spirits). The idea in the institution of the rite was deep and far-reaching.'

1. The Century Dictionary of the English Language, London, 1889, xxiv. 'Worship.'
2. SBE xxvi. 427, n. 4
3. SBE xxiv. 465, n. 4
4. Ia KI, xx. 9, 290.
The same remark may be made on the translation of this passage, viz. that there is neither in the text nor in the commentary the idea that the sun was chosen as the resting-place of the spirit (or spirits). The ultimate purpose in both these cases was to explain the meaning of sacrifices to Heaven, but not to the sun or the spirit of the sun. Heaven is invisible, and they thought that for the object of sacrifice something visible in the world must be chosen as a symbol. Neither of these two cases therefore can be regarded as an example of sun-worship. There does not seem to be any other case.

Legge says concerning the last example:

'It must be borne in mind that the rites described in the text are those of former dynasties, especially of that of Rau. I cannot bring to mind any passages in which there is mention made of any sacrifices to the sun or sun-spirit in connection with the great sacrifice to Heaven, or Shang Ti, at the service on the day of the winter solstice in the southern solstice.'

Hence it is only by taking the term 'worship' in a very comprehensive sense, and by ignoring the purpose of the sacrifices, that we may say that the fact that sun-sacrifices were offered to the sun implies that they worshipped it. It is the same with regard to their worship of the moon and the stars. In whatever sense we may be justified in saying that some of the earlier people worshipped sun, moon, and stars, such worship occupies a very insignificant position in China compared with the worship of other natural phenomena or the spirits of them. If by sun-worship, moon-worship, or star-worship is meant one who regards the sun or moon as the only or the supreme object of worship, we may say with conviction that the Chinese are not, as they have never been, sun-worshippers, moon-worshippers, or star-worshippers.

**SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew):**

The Hebrew conception of the universe, as we find it in the OT, is not scientific in the modern sense of the term. The cosmology of the Hebrews (see art. Cosmology (Hebrew)) is characterized by the simplicity and naivety of primitive folk. The attitude of mind is one of awe and wonder, not of critical inquiry; and to pry closely into the secrets of the divine government is felt to indicate a want of reverence, and even to be dangerous. Moreover, it would be natural to a people which seems to have had an innate genius for religion to think, everywhere it was pressed beyond the stage of quite primitive ideas of the universe, and it itself constituted the whole of true science or knowledge.2 We need not expect, therefore, to find in the OT any inking of the modern science of astronomy. The Hebrew shepherds without doubt, like the Phenician mariners (cf. Fliny, HN vii. 57), closely observed the sky, and learned from the scrutiny many lessons of practical value for their every-day life. It is equally likely that at an early date the Hebrews were wont to worship the stars and planets. There are later traces of this worship in the OT (cf. 2 K 23:4). And, besides

1 Jb 33:30; Ps 19:4; 24:2.

2 On this point Laurie Magnuss's *Religio Latii* (ed. 1897) with the many arguments, has been argued elsewhere (W. H. Hudson, *Laws of Psychic Phanomena*, 1907) that ignorance of, or indifference to, what we term science might (or ought to) constitute the laws of the moral and spiritual life.

3 It is almost unnecessary to suppose that the idea of worshipping the stars and planets was borrowed, though, of course, the Hebrews came more and more into contact with people who were addicted to this worship.3 Further, it is possible that they came under direct Babylonian and Egyptian influence in a manner similar to that of the JS (see art. See art. See also Chapters on the History of the OT, p. 383). CT. the proper names ἱή (Jgs 10:16) and ἱή (I K 4:6), derived from ἱή, sun; τῆ, the Palmyrene ἱή, and the Biblical ἱή, Jerobo, derived from ἱή, moon. CT. also Beth-shemesh, a place sacred to the sun-god. Commentators have seen in Mal 3:9 (47) the conception of a winged solar disk such this, the figures suggested by various constellations no doubt gave rise to a number of curious fables and fancies. On the other hand, the OT, as we have it, a collection of much-edited writings, preserves few traces of the astronomical and astrological lore of the Old Testament, and it is likely, if it is followed in the course of their national development the study of the stars and planets became more and more associated with the idolatrous practices of surrounding nations; and, further, that sun-worship in the OT was not intended to avoid, or even to remove, references to astronomy and astrology (cf. Dt 18:11). This would account for the fact that most of the references preserved in the OT are of a very general and popular kind.

The chief planets are, of course, alluded to frequently. The sun (-share') is spoken of as ruling by day (Ps 136:7), and is often referred to as coming forth (from one chamber) in the morning and going in (to another chamber) in the evening; Its magnificence (Jgs 5:20) and its wonderful power for good (Dt 33:25) or for evil (2 K 4:42); cf. Ps 121:2) impressed the Hebrews, as they have impressed all peoples, with its majesty. The Hebrews, as they have compared to a sun (Ps 84:1).3 There are four words for 'moon' in the OT. Yareth is used especially in poetry (Ps 57, 5, 142, etc.). To this word in Is 24:3 the word 'moon' is rendered in English. The word yareh, rendered 'a month,' yareh, a word which is common to all the Semitic languages, though not in frequent use in the OT. Another word, lachannah, which occurs only three times (Is 24:3, 5, 26:3), designates the moon as the 'white one' or the 'pale one.' Rarer still is a word kosor (perhaps connected with the Assy. kwul, 'headress' or 'cap'), which denotes the full moon (perhaps clothed in the splendour of its tiares). The most common word is hodesh, which means 'new moon,' and also 'month.' Thus the new moon was regarded as marking the beginning of the month and the use of yareth, yareh, and hodesh for both moon and month shows that among the Hebrews the month and year were lunar. The moon rules the night (Ps 136:7), and, like the sun, is a power for good (Dt 33:25) or for evil (Ps 121:2). Its pale brilliance made it the emblem of beauty (Ca 6:6). In a few passages reference seems to be made to eclipses (Am 8:9, Is 38:30, Job 29:7). And we are once told that 'the sun stood still,' (Josh 10:12), until the nation had avenged itself on its enemies (4 Jos 10:12). In late literature there are several allusions to the worship of the sun (Ezk 8:20, 26:20; cf. that 2 K 23:4).

Other planets are mentioned more incidentally. Thus, in all probability, Venus as the Morning Star is referred to in Is 14:12 under the name ἵθη, ἀθη, or ἅθη, ἀθη (lit. 'the glittering one,' though it should be mentioned that some expositors have seen in the term an Arabian name for the moon (οὐ, batal). W. Loyt (PPE, s. v. Stern) argues that the Arabic word means 'new moon,' which would be unsuitable; as we find among the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians. But the present writer has not been able to follow the lead of the Manch. Egyptian and Oriental Survey, 1917, pp. 67-70) that the word, usually translated 'wings,' has a cognate meaning. The meaning may be 'skirt's' rather than 'wings,' and the figure that of the glorious robe that flows from the sun.1 In Jgs 14:12, the word translated 'sun' is not shemesh, but hēres (cf. Is 18:18, and the place-names in Jgs 12:12, Jgs 10:35). It is probable that in Jgs 14:12 the text is incorrect.2 The name Sinâ is probably derived from Sin, the name of the moon-god in Babylonian. In lxx Sinâ is described as 'the mountain of Elion,' i.e. the sacred mountain. This suggests that it had long been sacred.

The writer of the text of this article is not known, but has been understood (so L. Schrader, L. Schrader, *Handcommentar, 1899). Other expositors (es. W. H. Bennett, *Joshua*, 1907) regard the passage as poetic and figurative (and so Jgs 10:35).

Another designation of Venus is melkoth hashahamonin hâs 727, 727, the queen of heaven; mention being made of cakes which were baked for her (Isa 7:17).
smaller stars surrounding or adjoining a star of the first magnitude might in several cases be described as its children. The Pleiades not being probable, some scholars agree with the Vulgate of Job 9 in thinking that "ayish" might be the name of the Hyades (so, e.g., Hoffman, Schiaparelli); and this view has the support of the Syriac (Pesh., sw.) and, moreover, the constellation is suitable as being one of the four meteorological importance. Eleazar in Hebrew "daš" means "moth." Friedrich Delitzsch has suggested that it may have the same meaning here, since the name "moth" (sw) seems to have given a start to a star by the Assyrs-Babylonians (see T. G. Finches in Hastings' DB, s. v. "Astronomy."). Now, the Hyades, a great red star of the first magnitude (Aldebaran) and five stars of the fourth magnitude, resemble our letter α or the Greek Δ. And Schiaparelli points out (p. 58) that in the butterfly stage, when the moth is at rest, its wings are not held detached from the body, as happens with most other butterflies, but spread themselves over it in such a way as to form a cloak, more or less similar (according to the several species into which the animal can be divided) to an inconceivable triangle. The suggestion is that to the author of the passages in Job, "daš" meant "moth," which was a name for the Hyades. In that case, assuming the identity of "δας" and "ayish," the "children" of "ayish" would be the minor Hyades which surround Aldebaran. Against this it might be urged that it is easier to explain "δας" as short for "ayish" than to account for "δας" as the original form, and that "moth" does not seem a likely name for a constellation (especially the Hyades, apart from its form). The question of identification cannot be decided definitely. But, as the Pleiades has to be excluded (see below), there are reasons for thinking that the Great Bear is intended. The Great Bear was no doubt as well known to the Hebrews as to other ancient peoples; but it would not be in the least surprising to find mention of it in the OT, the references to astronomy being so few.

1. yk, daš, or better wyk, "ayish," as in Job 38, and better still wyk, "ayish," as suggested by the Syriac (Pesh.). In Job 9 LXX has "lĕstĕm," Vulg. "Hyades;" in Job 38 LXX "lĕstĕm," Vulg. "Vesper." Modern expositors have found the word in the latter case in the Great Bear, the Pleiades, Hyades, or the Northern and Southern Crown. "δας" in Job 9 has to be taken in connexion with the other passage, 38, in which, according to the Massoretic text, it is said: "or dost thou guide "ayish" with her young?" (םָיָה יָעָשׁ). It is noteworthy, too, that "δας" in Arabic corresponds to the Great Bear. "δας" is called neš, the 'ber,' and that the three tail stars of Ursa Major are called barad neš, 'children of the bear' (i.e., in this case, 'mourners'). It is true that geographical correspondences can be established between the two words, but the Arabic phrase "children (or daughters) of the bear" is suggestive as regards "ayish" and her children. It might seem natural to expect to find a striking constellation like the Great Bear mentioned in Job 9, and it would be fitting that it should be assigned the first place, though it may be mentioned in passing that the Hebrews thought of this constellation not as a Great Bear, but as a lioness with her young (cf. with Ewald, Arabic "ayath," and see A. Dillmann's Commentary). But there is some force in the argument that "ayish" can hardly be Ursa Major, because the constellations in Job 38 are referred to on account of their meteorological importance. Some expositors therefore (e.g., M. A. Stern, Nödeke, Schrader), have claimed that "ayath" would certainly suit the Pleiades. The great objection to this is that there is very good reason to think another Hebrew term (see below) designates that constellation. The "children of "ayish" were certainly suited the Pleiades, which are sometimes represented as a hun with its chickens. But, on the other hand, the

1. Jenson, however, thinks (JE, s. v. "Astronomy") that there is little ground for supposing that any star or planet is represented as having a name in Isaiah.
2. For כִּי, however, it is better to read כִּי (and dost thou console "ayish" for her children?). See, further, below.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew)

heaven and the Orions thereof').

This seems to indicate that primarily kēblēm was used to denote stars of the first magnitude, in distinction from lesser stars (so Salm. 104:2). In any case it is pretty generally agreed that kēblē represents Orion. It is one of the most brilliant constellations, and did not fail to arrest the attention of the ancients.

3. יָרָד, kēblē, 'literally, a "group," a cluster,' cognate with Arabic kāma (ץ), 'to heap up.' In Job 9:10 LXX has Δήλος, Vulg. 'Arcuramus,' Pesh. and Targ. in Am 2:7:7, 11:10:11:12 in Am 5:8:8 and Targ. מַפָּר, Most of the ancient authorities, in fact, understand the Pleiades by kēblē. Several modern expositors, however, prefer to think of Sirius (e.g., G. Hoffmann).

But the word itself suggests that we are to look for a compact cluster of stars, and, of course, we must seek for one that early attracted attention. The Pleiades, as Schiaparelli says, is the best known of such clusters, 'and also the only one which has in consequence of its conspicuousness, starred the ancients with universal attention at every time and among all peoples' (p. 63). The expression 'the bands of kēblē' in Job 38:32 is no doubt to be understood metaphorically.

The Arabic name for the Pleiades, tharāyān, also means 'cluster,' and Bar Ali mentions it as an explanation of kēblē. The word kēblē itself has also been connected with the Arab. kāmāt, 'house,' and the Aramaic kēblē, 'family.' In either case the same name would suit the Pleiades.

It should be noted, further, that, according to some ideas found in the Talmud (Brakhot 48b; Rosh ha-Shanah, 11b), God brought the flood by causing kēblē to set instead of rise in the morning, and by removing two stars from it. This is given as an explanation of Rabbi Joshua. According to R. Eliezer, the changes took place at a season when kēblē was set to rise in the morning, and what God did was to make kēblē rise in the morning on the day in question and lose two stars. This caused the flood. According to Stern, the darkness did not exactly coincide with the rising and setting of the Pleiades, and seem to prove that in the time of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer (beginning of 2nd cent. A.D.) the Jews identified the Pleiades with kēblē. It is further represented in the Talmud (ib.) that God afterwards set things right by taking away two stars from aqīlah to diminish its rain-producing force.

According to Drossen, the Hebrew word is used in 4 Thess. 1:7-8, kēbāl, 'the chambers of the south.' The LXX renders ταῦτα Νηρών, Vulg. 'interiora Austri.' We seem to require mention of another definite constellation. This has given rise to the suggestion that the phrase designates the bright star Canopus or the constellation to which it belongs (so Stern). Other expositors regard the text as corrupt, and, emending מַפָּר, see in the first word some uncertain constellation, and in the second (מַפָּר= الشخصية) Gemini, 'the Twins.' But we are not obliged to find in מַפָּר a special constellation. 'Chambers (or store-houses) of the South' night, as K. Bulde says ('Hih', in W. Nowack's Handkom. zum AT, 1886), denote a whole group of constellations in the southern sky, especially the Crab, etc. It thinks that the author of Job cannot have known anything of the stars of the southern hemisphere, but that it was known to him, as one who had travelled, that the farthest visible to the author of Job depends upon the date of the book, which is uncertain.

In Job 38:32 we find another different astronomical term. The passage is as follows:

'Dost thou bind the bands of kēblē, or loose the cords of kēblē?'

'Dost thou bring out mazzātērōd in his season, or dost thou lead out aqīlah with her young?'

We have already dealt with three of the terms which occur here. We have now to consider—

5. מַצָּז, mazzātērōd. The Vulg. has 'Lucifer,' Pesh. יָרָד, Targ. יָרָד, the word may come from יָרָד, which means literally 'the scatter,' and be applied to powder (Ex 39:30), hair (Ezek 9:16, 30), etc. Mazzātērōd would then mean 'scatterers' or 'sprinklers,' the reference being to rain. On this supposition, Stern and Hoffmann understand the Hebrew to be meant, since the heliacal rising of their chief star, Aldebaran, announces the season of rain. Gesenius derived the word from מַצָּז, nēzar (Arab. نذر), and explained it as 'astra praemontinum.' Another suggestion is that it is derived from מַצָּז, zāher, mazzātērōd being for mazzātērōd, and meaning the stars which shine with a special lustre, the planets, either all of them or the brightest and most striking. But the word is more commonly regarded as identical with mazzātēth (mē, in 2 K 23:29, the interchange of l and r presenting little difficulty. The LXX has μασωποῦ in both cases. In 2 K mazzātēth has been supposed by some expositors to mean 'the signs of the zodiac.' Being apparently a loan-word from Assyr. mazātēth or mazātēth, 'station, abode (of gods), which, again, is from mazāē, 'to stand.' But in the passage in question it would be more natural to find mention of the planets, since the stars as signs of the zodiac, mazzātēth in (Rabbinic mazzātēth means 'planets' as well as 'signs of the zodiac'). Mazzātēth would be the stars and planets regarded as 'stations' (Assyr.) of the great gods (plerōth, s. mazzātēth).'

1. Cf. A. B. Davidson, 'Job,' in Cambr. Bibl., 1893: 'probably the great spaces and deep recesses of the southern hemisphere, with the constellations which they contain.'

2. Stern, in his note on מַצָּז, suggests that mazzātērōd would derive the latter from מזָּז, הָרָד, 'to scatter,' would be the stars taken from the Hyades, and are referred to in the next clause as 'its children.'
It is not necessary, however, to regard mazzārōth and maszālōth as identical. We have found reason to think that another word denotes the Hyades as a constellation. That does not prevent us from supposing that mazzārōth may be a further description of some of the stars in this group. The word mazzārōth has also been identified with the Great Dog, whose chief star is Sirius. This, as the brightest of the fixed stars, is the closest heavenly body, and for reasons as well, everywhere attracted the notice of the ancients.

It must be noted further that in Job 37:2 another word occurs (כָּזַיָּךְ, maszārīm) which bears some resemblance to mazzārōth. The passage runs: 'Out of its chamber comes the whirlwind, and cold out of maszārīm.' This word might also come from זַיָּךְ, 'to scatter.' On that assumption, it has been supposed to mean 'scattering' or north winds. Another suggestion, however, is that it is a corruption of the Babylonian mulūr, 'the northern (star)' (so EBI, e.g., 'Mazzaroth').

A more recent conjecture is that of Schiaparelli (p. 69 ff.). He suggests that the correct pronunciation of כָּזַיָּךְ is mizār or mizārang, i.e., the plural of a base in pā'el, māzār, which is referred to in Is 30:4 and Jer 15:8 as an instrument for winnowing. Schiaparelli points out that the arrangement of the stars of the Great Bear is such that they might be thought to resemble a winnowing fan. To the ancient Chinese these stars actually suggested a ladle, which, with its cavity and handle, is very like a winnowing fan. The plural mizārang would indicate more than one instrument, and Schiaparelli therefore thinks that the word might designate the Great Bear and the Lesser Bear; and in that case, of course, the dual mizārang would be a still more suitable description. The fact that the Phoenicians used the Lesser Bear when at sea to find the direction of the north is noteworthy in this connexion. The suggestion is very ingenious. But unfortunately mizār is not the term which denotes a winnowing instrument of the shape required. The word for that is rahāth (the other term mentioned in Is 30:4). Māzār is apparently the midrār of modern Syria, a pitchfork with four or five prongs, and the Great Bear can hardly be said to resemble that.

7. Some expositors have found yet another reference to astronomy in the תַּמָּאָר, náhmār, or 'starred,' of Job 25:3. Meaning literally 'the shining serpent,' they have been supposed to refer to the Dragon between the Great and the Little Bear. There is nothing in the context, however, to indicate that the author had any star or constellation in mind.

The OT contains very few definite references to astronomy, though the prohibition in Dt 18:10 shows that it was practised. We can hardly say that there was no astrology among the ancient Hebrews, in spite of the present allusions are fated and due to Assyro-Babylonian influence. In Is 47:1 (post-Exile) we read: 'Ye let them deliver thee, the dividers (דִּיוֹן) of heaven (כָּזַיָּךְ), the gazers on stars (כָּזַיָּךְ וֹסִי), those who make known each new moon (כָּזַיָּךְ יָסִי), from the things that are coming upon thee.' The term translated 'dividers' occurs here only, and LXX and the whole phrase of διαργοντες αποστηματα, it has been connected with an Arabic word 'to divide' (habara, lit. 'to cut into large planks'), a meaning which suits very well, since the Babylonians divided the sky for astrological purpose into signs of the zodiac. 'Those who make known each new moon' (or the 'monthly prognosticators') would be persons, like the present astrology, who noted lucky and unlucky days, preparing monthly

1 See the conjecture made above on p. 28, note 4.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hindi)

and expels diseases and all the subtle and dreaded influences of darkness. The beneficent offices of physician and healer of bodily ills, which later on spread to the Avins, are in the first instance those of Surya himself.

There seems no reason to reject or doubt the statement of Saikāra in the 16th cent. that in his time there existed distinct deities of the sun-worshippers, the Sauryas, of one at least of which the members were accustomed to carry branded on their forehead and breast the symbol of their deity. They have, however, all died out and been forgotten. Not many temples dedicated to the worship of the sun have survived, nor is it probable that at any period in Indian history they existed in any considerable number. That at Komarak in Orissa is worth a visit, and architecturally of the most interest. It is, however, neglected and ruinous, and attracts no worshippers. There is another at Gaya, and a small but much-frequented shrine at Benares, where the fire-sacrifices is offered in honour of the sun.

Among the non-Aryan peoples of India and the sub-tribes, who may be described as on the borders of Hinduism or worship surrounding and confused by the Dravidians and Kolaris the sun is widely invoked as Paramesvar, the creator and preserver, and is worshipped with prayer and sacrifice. The form of the god is a white cock, whose head is struck off at the village shrine. He is Srāg Nārāyan (Surya-Nārāyan), and the traders in the bazaars draw images or statues of this form. The Hindu calendar records its association with the cult. By many the Holī festival in the north of India is believed to have been instituted originally in order to propitiate the sun-god. He is invoked also to avert or to heal diseases, and on the occasion of an eclipse the tom-toms are beaten and other ceremonies observed to rescue the deity from the powers of evil. The same conception, that worship and sacrifice are efficacious to protect from the disaster from the object of worship, may perhaps be recognized in the special frequency of sun-ritual and adoration in the winter season among some northern tribes, at a time when the sun's divine influence is considered to be weak. A sacred meal is partaken of in his honour, and this must be eaten without salt. A similar ritual is observed when the sun enters or leaves the zodiac.

There are races and peoples in India at the present time who believe themselves to be descended from the sun.

2. The moon.—From the earliest times in India it would appear that the moon has been a popular subject of traditional story and mythology, but, so far as is known, there never existed any formal moon-cult of sectarians. A late work of the 17th cent. mentions 'moon-worshippers' and 'star-worshippers.' It is improbable, however, that any special sect was in the writer's mind. Worship of the moon in one or other of her aspects, either alone or in conjunction with other rites, is common in India at the present day, and such worship has in all probability never been intermitted. There are, however, no exclusive votaries or sects who make the moon their chief deity. In this respect, therefore, the popular worship of India is in contrast with the established cults of ancient Babylonia and other countries.

The literature Soma (q.v.) is identified with the moon and in one passage at least the waning of the moon is caused by the god Siva; this is confirmed by the nectar (amrita) which the Soma and the Agni are identified with its phases.

1 See art. SAUKRAṬA, SAUKRA, or SAUKRA.
2 See art. SURA (Hindi).
3 Rigveda, x. ixvii. 5.

representing the new and full moon respectively; so also Varuna and Mitra are deities of the waxing and waning moon.1 As usual among primitive peoples, the moon is the lord of the night and of darkness. A title of Siva is chandra-dhāraḥ, 'he whose crest is the moon,' i.e. the moon-bearess, and in this sense the办公楼, who represents the sun. The ancient lunar dynasty of India (chandradvāraka), whose capital was at Hastinapura, or Delhi, about 50 miles west of the modern national capital, claimed descent from the moon.

The moon also (Soma) was one of the treasures recovered at the churning of the ocean, together with the amrita (nectar). Elsewhere it is enumerated among the first vestiges of the universe. He is lord of the planets and of stars, of offerings and of penances.2 More often he is regarded as one of the nine planets and is associated with them in worship, but especially with the sun. The departed go to the moon, and there is the abode of the spirits or of the dead in the smoke of the funeral pyre. A more popular title or a more popular ritual for him as with Gaudhipāt, or oasis, 'lord of plants.' Agriculture is general in his protection and is subject to his influence.

The phases of the moon are often decisive for the work of the fields; and the economy of the household, with its various anniversaries and important events, is similarly determined by the moon's position and aspects. The title 'lord of plants' is probably derived from the more temperate countries, of collecting medicinal herbs, etc., by the light of the moon. In this character he is a god of healing, and for certain diseases—e.g., leprosy—to gaze at the reflection of the moon in water or oil is an important and efficacious remedy. The periods of new and full moon are especially dangerous owing to the increased activity of the spirits at these times in some parts of the country. The conch-shell is a symbol of the deity of the moon. Among some of the primitive Kolaris tribes, instead of being regarded as a male divinity, the moon is mythologically the wife of the sun, and the stars are their children.

3. The stars.—The principal stars and constellations are known to the Hindus by names which are recognized as belonging to the reverse, especially in their relation to family and individual happiness or misfortune.

Thus the Pole-star is known as the 'station, although the same title is given to some of the nakṣatras (see below). The seven stars of the Great Bear are seven rīs, translated to the heavens. Canopus also is a rī, Agastya, the sage and reputed evangelist of S. India. The Pleiades are the six Aźviti, 'sriebhujas,' the singers of Skanda, the god of war, who bear from the title of Karteṣyika. Orion represents the head of Rāhu in the form of an antelope's or stag's head (nagākṣaṇa), struck off by Siva, etc. The constellation of the dragon especially to the planets and the constellations or groupings of stars known as nakṣatras; and the star, planet, or constellation under which a man is born gives insaluble indication of his future lot. In parts of North India the new stars are the cattle that the moon tends in the character of shepherd.

The full number of the planets is nine, but sometimes only seven or five are enumerated. There is a temple at Benares dedicated to the nine planets, where flowers and other offerings are presented. The complete number includes the sun and moon, and the others in order are Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, with Rāhu and Ketu. The last represent the ascending and descending nodes of the moon's orbit.

Rāhu is the cause of eclipses, when he swallow the sun or moon, and this he is said to do to avenge the loss of his head, which was cut off by Vivasvāna as a punishment for his having slain and drunk part of the nectar from the ocean. By incarnation the anūrya he becomes immortal, and his wrath is perpetually exhibited in the eclipses, when the village folk seek to propitiate him with various rites. Rāhu is therefore known as the bodiless, and there exists at Benares a shrine dedicated to him under this form. Ketu is the procreative principle of the universe, and in the Purāṇas they are all described as deities, each with his own car, that of Mars being ridden with eight red horses. The days of the nakṣatras, of which one is named from them.

Some of the planets are favourable and some malevolent; but all need to be propitiated and their favour if possible secured before a marriage or other important event in the household. The omission of the dāni or sākṣi-kāśmā or consecration ceremony, would most certainly result in harm and disaster.

1 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. iv. 4. 17.
2 Vaivasvāna, etc.
3 Ṛgveda, x. xxv. 1.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Iranian)

 Astronomy received much attention in ancient Persia, as is obviously implied by the current tradition that the Magi, the sacerdotal class of the Medes and Persians, were highly skilled in divination, an art which depended largely upon a knowledge of the heavenly bodies, astrology and astronomy being sister sciences in antiquity. The part which the veneration of the sun, moon, and stars played in the national religion of early Iran is well known (see Gurmukhi, the Zoroastrianism, and some of the Greeks regarded Zoroaster as much in the light of a professed astrologer and star-worshipper as in that of a wise man and prophet: cf. Xenophon, Anab., ii. 10, xii. 4, arborpeteryx or arborelupis; Scholastik on the Platonic Alchebaides, i. 122; Clementine Homilies, ix. 3-6, Recognitiones, iv. 27-29; Snellius, Lexicon, s. v. arborpeteryx, Zoroastrianism—all collected in Jackson, Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran, New York, 1909, pp. 226-273). The Avesta and the Pahlavi books, especially the Bundahish and Din-i Mainy-i Khwar, contain frequent allusions of an astronomical nature; and Persian literature, after the Mahammad conquest of Iran in the 7th cent., contains similar references. These three sets of sources furnish our chief supply of information, supplemented by data drawn from Babylonia and Assyria, as well as by other material.

1. Conception of the universe.—The ancient Iranians naturally based their astronomical system upon a conception of the universe. It is probable that in the earliest times the shape of the earth was regarded as round and flat, although it is not altogether clear whether the Avestan word has a spherical or an oval shape. This concept of the universe may have been circular, or whether it actually meant spherical (Yast, v. 38, x. 96, xvii. 12). It is almost certain, however, that in later times the solar system and the stars were known, and that the ancient Persians, being familiar with the positions of the planets and the phases of the moon, were able to predict eclipses and other phenomena of the heavens. The Pahlavi astronomers, who were acquainted with the works of the Greek astronomers, were able to make accurate calculations of the movements of the planets and the moon, and to predict eclipses and other phenomena of the heavens. The Pahlavi astronomers, who were acquainted with the works of the Greek astronomers, were able to make accurate calculations of the movements of the planets and the moon, and to predict eclipses and other phenomena of the heavens.

2. Sun and moon.—In the Zoroastrian ritual, as preserved in the Avesta, both the sun (hvan) and the moon (meh) receive high veneration individually, and each has a special hymn of praise devoted to its glorification (Yast, vi. 1-7, vii. 1-7; Nyutth, i. 1-10, ili. 1-11). A similar degree of reverence was accorded them during Parthian and Sasanian times, as is shown by the Pahlavi texts themselves and by allusions in the Greek and Latin classics (e.g., Philo, Melito, i. 3-4; Din-i Mainy-i Khwar, vii. 1-3; Din-i Dinik, i. 31, 6, the former translated by West in SBE v. 297-298, and the latter by Peshoton Sanjana, Bombay, 1875, i. 47, and tr. p. 48; cf. also such classical writers as Strabo, Ar. x. 12, p. 732-733; comp. Ds. xxi. 6, xvii. 5; Dic. Chrysostomus, Orat. Berytina, xxvi.; and Nicomachus Damascenus, frag. 66, iv. 401, ed. Müller). The supremacy of the sun among the heavenly bodies is naturally emphasized in the Avesta (e.g., Yast, vi.), and its various positions in the heavens are described in Bundahish, v. 1-7, and Sazyat tâ-sâyat, xxi. 1-7. The latter passage there the sun is regarded as being the most important of the planets, and it is described as being the guide of the universe.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Iranian)

Zoroaster, Bonn, 1831, p. 52) states that they originally bore the name of two lights afterwards given designations of good omen. At the same time it is not impossible that we have in their nomenclature a transmigration of the Babylonian names of the planets, Namag, Namag, Istar, Nini, as may be surmised from the equations, Marduk (lord of the gods) = Atharshedu = Jupiter; Nergal (god of war) = Vartah = Mars; and Ishtar = Anahita = Venus; or, as it seems more probable, between Tishtrya (Sirius) and Tir (Mercury) compare the note by Gray, *ERE* I. 789; and, for the Babylonian names of the planets, consult Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 124–129; Jaastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 370, 454–466. This parallel, in any case, is of interest because the Sanskrit names given by the Hindus to the planets show no likeness to the Babylonian (cf. Weber, *Vorlesungen über indische Literaturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1876, p. 207 f.). Shooting stars are alluded to in the *Yast (vii, 8) under the name of kordōn stārā, a designation which is connected with the Ural Major, called Haptō-irina (cf. *Yast (vii, 12), with seven signs*); cf. *Yast (vii, 12), with the asterisk, and the name of the special stars, though their interpretation is open to question (see Kuk, *Stars mentioned in the Yast* in *Zaroteh*, ii. 7–22, Bombay, 1924). In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundâšihn* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 64,000 (or 6,480,000, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 5000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muntheckgarii K. Kharegert, *Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings,* in the *Sir Jamsetji Jezaboh Madrasah Journal of Oriental Research*, English edition, pp. 125–154; and also Moultoun, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, pp. 23–27, 210–213, 273–281.

4. Planets, meteors, and comets.—In contrast to the fixed constellation figures, the planets, meteors, and comets were held by Zoroastrians to be disturbers of the established order of the universe, and consequently to be of Ahrimanian origin and evil nature—a point of view directly opposed to that of Babylonia, where the planets were looked upon as distinctly beneficent in character (cf. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 373). To the planets Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Sun (the only five then known, but making seven with the sun and the moon, by the side of which they were usually mentioned) there were given, respectively, in the Sāvestan the epithet names of Šahrâm, Ahrâman, Ahrâmah, and Kēsin, derived from divine names, including the name of the god Ahura Mazda himself, because these beneficent powers of the heavens, as the significant influence exercised by the planets (*Bundâšihn*, v. i. 1–2; *Sûkand Gûmânîvijâr*, iv. 1–5; Zāt-Sparvan, ii. 10, iv. 7–10, iv. 1–4; and consult the list in al-Biruni, *Book of Elucidation of the Sciences of the Heavens and the Earth*, ed. by Gaetje, *Zoroastrianism*, p. 172). The Persian treatise *Ulnamâl Iâlam* (tr. Vullers, *Fragmente über die Religion des
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5. Signs of the zodiac.—The names of the twelve signs of the zodiac, as least in Sassanian times, correspond in concept with those familiar to us through the Greek and Latin designations, and are paralleled likewise with the Babylonian, from which, like the Indo-Germanic zodiac in general, they are believed to be derived. The signs of which their names are translations—a phenomenon precisely paralleled in India and in other Asiatic countries (see Ginzel, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 76–86). Thus in Pahlavi we find Vāra (Ram, Aries), Tērē (Taurus), Dō-pahta (Twilight, Gemini), Kalakau (Crab, Cancer), Sēr (Lion, Leo), Khukak (Maedien, Virgo), Târduk (Balance, Libra), Gazdum (Scorpion, Scorpio), Nīmaasp (Half Horse, Centaur or Sagittarius), Vuhik (Goat, Capricorn), Dūš (Waterpot, Aquarius), Malik (Fish, Pisces). The names of the twenty-eight lunar mansions, as recognized in the divisions of the astronomers (Ph. x̣ṛṭḥāk-ā-hāmārānḵ), are given in the *Bundâšihn* (ii. 3); but the reading of the various designations is not uniformly certain, and the individual identification of the names remains, therefore, uncertain, even when compared with those in the Sogdian and Khorasanian list, given by Thackston about A.D. 1000 (see Schefer, *Zoroastrian Memoral Volume*, Bombay, 1909, pp. 216–227.

6. Prediction of events.—Like the reference in the preceding paragraph to the minor subdivisions used by the astronomers (*Bundâšihn* 3), there are kindred allusions in Sassanian literature to the calculations of the astronomers or to the com-
tations made by astrologers' with regard to observing favourable or unfavourable conjunctions of the stars (e.g., Dāštān-i Dinik, bkh. 3; Sekand Gāmānī, Fīrūz, iv. 267-280, 5th-6th c. Middle Persian, ed. A.H. Sayyid), is represented as consulting on grave matters with his 'wise men and constellation-knowers' (dānakās va axtar-nāmār, in the Pahlavi text Kārman 4, in Fīrūz, iv. 2-5, 5th-6th c., ed. Darab Pardesang Sanjana, Bombay, 1898, pp. 10-11, 15-16), and their knowledge of the position of the stars at the moment enabled them to predict to him future events. In a Pahlavi work dated A.H. 3, translated by Wes, SBE xxiv., 9-11, there is a specific allusion to a astronomical tables' (Wb. 24, cf. Arab. ṣība, and the Bk. obser. Cey.), of which Melitenotes, ed. Usener, Ad hia Storia Astronomical Symbols, Bonn, 1874, p. 14), which were constructed by 'the great Shatro-vara.' See, more fully, art. Sun, Moon, and Stars (Middle Persian), p. 264 below. The passage cited mentions the tables alongside of those of Ptolemy and of the Hindus.

7. Astronomical works. — Some of the works from which these citations have been drawn above, like the one last quoted, actually belong to the early Muhammadan period of Persia, even though written in Pahlavi. Astronomy, influenced by Arab science, continued to be highly prized in the land. Some notable scientific achievements of the great savant and chronologist, al-Birūnī of Khiva (973-1048), are sufficient to prove that fact, and it is certain that the positions of the heavenly bodies must have played an important part in the calendar and establishment of the new Jala'lan era, in 1079, by the Seljuk sultan, Jalal-al-Din Malikshah, under the direction of a mathematician named Abu'l Muqe'lu al-Iṣfahānī and his companions, who were headed by the well-known astronomer poet, Omar Khayyam. Omar, in fact, had been summoned to Merv by the sultan, four years previously, to make observations in the region of the Taurus mountains, and there he constructed the Zūg-i Malikshāh, 'Astronomical Tables of Malikshāh,' which were employed in the calendar reform. The names of two of his colleagues, mentioned upon the title page, seem to be Ahvārī and Māmūn ibn Najīb al-Wasītī (see Browne, Literary History of Persia, London, 1906, 131, n. 3). A section of a large work composed in 1092-1093 by K. Khan and entitled Qolṣār Namāz (sh. 24) was devoted to 'astrology and mathematics' (ed. Teheran, 1295 A.H.; tr. A. Querry, Paris, 1857; cf. Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. ii. 271). The Persian poet Ahvārī, of the 19th c., was a great astrologer, and a conjunction of the planets in the sign of Libra, calculated to take place on September 16, 1186 (or in October of the preceding year, according to other accounts), led him to predict dire calamities for that day; but happily they did not occur (see Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. i. 368; Horn in JfrP ii. 282-283). In the 13th c., the Mongol ruler Hulagu Khan, grabbing the Chingiz Khan, established a celebrated observatory at Maragha, in Transoxiana, Western Persia, the building of which was begun in 1259, and traces of its ruins are still to be seen (cf. W. C. Johnson, Persian Life and Customs, New York, 1895, p. 77). Hulagu's astronomer-royal was the learned Naṣr-al-Din of Tūs (1291-1274), whose Zūg-i Rūḍānī, or almanac and astronomical tables, was used up to science (see Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. ii. 484-488). The names of several other medieval Persian astronomers, with a mention in the Byzantine treatise of Theodorus Melitenotes, referred to above (ed. Usener, pp. 13-14), are best known among the astronomical tables, however, are those of Ulugh Begh, grandson of Timur and founder of the capital of the Timurid, gand, in which city he died in 1449. These tables, written in Arabic, were translated into Persian and were made accessible in Europe through the Latin version (ed. Venusti, London, 1652), and again by Hyde in Persian and Latin (Oxford, 1665), and more recently by Baily (London, 1843) in Memoirs of the Royal Astronomical Society, xiii., iii. 6-5, 1865). The present status of astronomical studies in Persia itself, one of the largest meteorites in the world is preserved as a curiosity in the Shah's palace at Teheran, is datable to the beginning of the 19th c., when the Pahlavi text known as the "Sunday" or "Monday" is supposed to have been revealed for the first time, and Persia must still wait a renaissance before independent work in studying the heavens is done by those of native birth.

8. Influence of the heavenly bodies. — The astrological aspects of Persia's early studies of star lore have already been indicated above. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that 'judicial astrology,' or the attempt to determine scientifically the influence of the heavenly bodies upon the destiny of human events, was often regarded more highly than natural astrology, or astronomy in our sense, which confined itself to determining the motions and positions of the stars, sun, and moon, in order to gain more strictly scientific results, as we regard them.

In some of the paragraphs given above there have been allusions to the part played by the sun and the moon in the development of the world and in advancing the welfare of mankind (e.g., Yašt, vi. 15-5; Bundokša, vii. 2-4, and elsewhere). The influence of the sun entered into the sphere of human activity by exercising a kindly sway over the earth. Thus the great rain star Tishtya, aided by Satsavas in the Avesta Yašt, vii. 15-22; that Yašt, i. 15, 22) and the demon of drought, when invoked by men, and confers blessings upon his faithful worshippers. The victorious star Avesta (Yašt, xx. 1) repulses the evil influences, and Hapat-Atum (Ugar Majo) is effective even in tempering the torrent of the souls in hell, a region located in the North (Maing-i Khart, xix. 15-21; Sekand Gāmānī, Fīrūz, iv. 21-23), and the constellations just named are regarded in the Pahlavi book Sāyāt lā-Sāyāt (xiv. 5-6), which was written about the 7th c., but contains older material, as exercising an influence upon the sacrifice during the time of their ascendance. In another chapter of the same work (Sāyāt lā-Sāyāt, xxi. 1-7), a specifically fortunate character is ascribed to the shadow of the moon-day and afternoon sun when occupying certain positions in the zodiacal signs, and in Dastagān-i Dinik, vi. 9, the stars are synonymous with destiny. The malign influence ascribed to the planets has been sufficiently indicated above, and need not be referred to again in this section.

Sufficient reference has likewise been made to the part played by astrology, and horoscopes both in the Middle Persian and Persian times. We need only recall the allusion to the last of the Persian kings, Ardash, and his astrologers (Kārman, ii. 4-5, iii. 5-6), and we have the authority of the great Khosrovanian scientist al-Biruni for the fact that the Persian astrologers, like others, held that the zodiacal sign of Cancer was the 'horoscope of the world,' that is, the 'horoscope of the world' (al-Biruni, Chronology, transl. by Dastur, p. 30). A good illustration, in the 17th c., of ephemerides tables that were used also for horoscopic purposes may be found in a work translated from the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with a Latin commentary,
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Japanese).

In the ancient mythology of Japan the sun-goddess plays the most important rôle, while the moon-god, her brother, occupies an insignificant place, and almost nothing is told about stars. The commonly accepted story is that the sun-goddess (Amaterasu, ‘the heaven-shining deity’) and the moon-god (Tsukuyomi, ‘the ruler of the moonlight night’) were born, together with the storm-god (Susano-o-w, ‘the swift-impetuous’), of the couple who were the progenitors of the Japanese archipelago. In this story the creation of these deities is conceived evidently as a generative act, whereas another version makes the emergence of the two deities from the ‘white copper’ mirrors the work of the male progenitor alone. Perhaps a more interesting version of the story is that the sun and the moon were produced out of the eyes of the progenitor, when he was washing in order to purify himself from the stains with which he had been contaminated on his visit to the infernal world after the death of his consort. Though there are these different versions, the common trait and predominant factor in the story is that the sun-goddess is considered to be the supreme ruler of heaven and earth, and also the progenitor of the ruling family, who claim to have handed down from the goddess herself the three insignia of the throne (see below). Now the relation between the sun-goddess and the moon-god is based on the natural phenomenon that the two are visible alternately by day and by night. The story is as follows:

The sun-goddess once commissioned her brother, the moon, to go down from their heavenly abode to earth to see Umemo-chi, the wife of a peasant, for the sake of food. When the latter entertained the moon with the food-stuffs taken out of her body, the moon became so enraged and flew to the goddess of food. The sun-goddess was so displeased with her brother’s wantonness that she took him a wicked duty: ‘I must not see thee face to face.’ Hence the sister and brother appear alternately in heaven.2

The intention of the story is evident, but, at the same time it shows a characteristic of the sun-goddess as the matron of agriculture, which played a great part in the myths and worship of the goddess.4 Thus, in contrast to the prominent rôle played by the sun-goddess, the moon plays a very inferior part, and a much smaller part is played by the stars. A star-god is mentioned in the ancient myth, but his rôle is quite ambiguous, while a festival in honour of certain stars (the stellar constellations called the Herdsman and the Weavermaid) was derived from China. All other stories and worship of stars are much later and were introduced chiefly through Buddhist agency.

1 See Nikongi: Chronicles of Japan, tr. W. G. Aston (Proc. Japan Soc. of London, Suppl. to vol. I [1890], p. 111); and, for the later stories, pp. 20, 21, etc.

2 Kojiki, or Records of Ancient Japan, tr. B. H. Cook (London, Suppl. to vol. II [1887], pp. 42-44). This version is preserved also in Nikongi, p. 21, and in connection with the conception of life and death, see art. Life and Death ('Shin') in Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge.

3 Nikongi, p. 32.

4 As in the case of the other branches of Japanese literature, so for astrology the Musulman peoples made use of the Arabic language.

though some of them may have been derived from other sources—Hindu, Persian, or Chinese. The most prominent star-worship is that of the Pole star, together with the life of the ignorant and superstitious folk of Persia, and it still survives, though it is gradually disappearing, among the Zoroastrian Persians of India (cf. Karaka, History of the Jews, London, 1884, i, 160-162).

LITERATURE. For a translation of the Avesta and the Pahlavi books consult the versions by Darmesteter and West in SBE, vols. xxxv., xxxvi., xxxvii., and by Mills, c. xxxi.,likewise the French translation by Darmesteter, Le Zend-Avesta, 8 vols., Paris, 1880-1888. The more important single works on the subject have been given in the course of the article.

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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Japanese).

By Beck, in his Ephemerides Persarum per totum annum, Augsburg, 1696 (especially ch. iii., iv., vi.). Even to-day the astrologer's art in existing a horoscope is an important part of the life of the ignorant and superstitious folk of Persia, and it still survives, though it is gradually disappearing, among the Zoroastrian Persians of India (cf. Karaka, History of the Jews, London, 1884, i, 160-162).

LITERATURE. For a translation of the Avesta and the Pahlavi books consult the versions by Darmesteter and West in SBE, vols. xxxv., xxxvi., xxxvii., and by Mills, c. xxxi., likewise the French translation by Darmesteter, Le Zend-Avesta, 8 vols., Paris, 1880-1888. The more important single works on the subject have been given in the course of the article.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.
arum, and thence came the name of astrologia judiciae or astronomia judiciaria, astrologia, as opposed to astrology (astronomia) quadriradiata (quadriradialis). Thus in the denomination of astrology among the Muslims there is a concept somewhat different from that contained in the Greek term ἀστρολογία, a science of the fulliment of astrological prognostications. The astrologer is usually called by the same name as the astronomer, viz. munajjam (much more rarely nasiyaj'); sometimes, however, he is called by the special word akhbāmā (plan ahbámiyah, sibāh ghiyād akhba- 1āmā). It was only in the 19th cent. that the distinction between munajjam, 'astrologer,' and jumāk, 'astronomer,' was introduced into Arabic (at least in Egypt and in Tunis). 2. Divisions.—The Muhammedans usually arrange the science of astrology under five principal heads: (a) The fundamental principles of astrology, viz. the different divisions of the ecliptic, the properties of the various celestial places and of individual planets, the methods of determining the ascendant and the 12 celestial houses (bayyāt, 'doms'), the planetary conjunctions, etc. (b) Prognostics of a universal character (al-akhbām al-umār al-alam, viz. those which refer to the zodiacal signs, the dynamism of the different planets, and the signs, in the words of the Arabs tasāwī fi 1ām al-alam, 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' since a great part of these prognostics is deduced from the planet which has the dignity of 'significating' the moment of the sun's transit over the meridian of the observer, the moment when the sun enters Aries, i.e. at the beginning of each tropic year. This universal part of astrology is subdivided into three sections: (1) predictions drawn from the various kinds of planetary conjunctions (girānāt, qiṭirānāt), (2) predictions based on the 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' (3) predictions relating to the 'mutatio aenar' (taghāyyur al-bayyāt), i.e. to meteorological phenomena, and which are deduced from the lunar stations, or from the heliacal rising of Sirius, etc. (c) Individual prognostics relating to the vicissitudes of individuals, derived from the planet or the 12 celestial houses which happen to be the signifier at the moment of birth, and then from the 'significator' at each revolution of successive tropic years. This part of astrology Ptolemy calls yarīyāt al-fayyāt, and the Arabs al-munṣūdī, 'nativitates.' (d) Musa大幅度, 'interrogations' (ta'jarāt), or that part of astrology which is concerned with replies to questions, e.g., the circumstances of a distant relative, the author of a theft, the hiding-place of a runaway slave, etc. The 'interrogations' are always connected by the Muhammedan astrologers with the division of the heavens into 12 dots. The astrologers who follow the pure tradition of Ptolemy do not admit the 'interrogations.' (e) Abu'ādār, 'elections,' i.e. the choice of the propitious moment for doing any particular thing. The most common method is that of determining such a moment by seeking in which of the 12 celestial 'dots' the moon is found at that particular moment. This was also very probably the method employed by the Greeks; but along with this some Muhammadan astrologers use another method, of astrigent origin (but also attributed to Dorotheaus), which consists in deducing the fitting moment for action from the place which the moon then occupies in one of the 28 lunar stations or mansions (māznāt). The 'elections' also are not admitted by the astrologers who follow Ptolemy's teaching. 3. Place among the sciences.—The science of the stars, says Ptolemy at the beginning of his Tetrabiblos, or Quadriradialis (quadriradiata)," is the first of the sciences, for two parts: the first studies the appearances of the motions of the heavenly bodies either with respect to each other or with respect to the earth; the second seeks to deduce from these phenomena, from those appearances, the changes which take place in the sublunar world. The first part is a science which stands by itself, and can be studied independently of the second; this, on the contrary, cannot do without the first. This conception that astrology is but the sister of astronomy, a branch, that is to say, of the 'science of the stars,' which is the basis of the other sciences, is still maintained by the great historian philosopher Ibn al-Bayātī (Proleg. vi. cap. 13; M. G. de Salme's Fr., Paris, 1892-98, iii. 122 f.). Astrology, however, is, as classified in a different way by the major philosophers, divided in two great categories: (a) sciences which relate to religious law (ulūm al-shariyyah), that is to say, in addition to theology and canon law, the learning which serves as an introduction to them, namely, grammar, lexiconography, rhetoric, poetry, history, etc.; (b) intellectual or philosophical sciences (ulūm al-aqīqiyyah or hikma) which the author of the Maqāṣid al-ulūm, thinking of the contrary, calls 'ulūm al-ajam, 'foreign sciences.' The intellectual or philosophical sciences in their turn are divided for the most part divided into the three sections 1 already fixed by the later Greek philosophers, and by the Neo-Platonic expounders of Aristotle (e.g., Ammonius, Simplicius, and John- nes Philoponos), namely: (a) metaphysics (al-hikma al-ithliyyah, demonstrativa, theoremativa); (b) natural sciences (al-hikma al-tabiyyah, natural philosophy, physis); (c) mathematical sciences (al-hikma ar-rigidiyyah, mathematizes). These last correspond to the concepts of Boethius, namely, arithmetica, geometry, astronomy, and music; on the other hand, the natural sciences are subdivided into eight fundamental parts, named for the most part after the names corresponding Aristotelian works, namely: Aeusætatio physica, Generatio et corruption, Calamum et mundum, Meteorum, Mineralia, Vegetalum, Animalium, de Animis. Aliviṣna (E.) uses al-ulūm al- aqīqiyyah, in Tsārātī, Constantinople, 1298 A.H. [=A.D. 1881], p. 71 ff.), Muhammad al-Akfānī as-Sahāwi (Iρašāl al-φiρi, ad. A. Sprenger, Calcutta, 1849; the author died in 1749. [B. A. D. 1349], Bāji Jalīlah (in the introduction to his Lexicon bibliographici et encyclopedici,2 and others consider astrology as one of the 7 or 9 fūrā, 'secondary branches' of the natural sciences, placing it, that is to say, beside medicine, pharmacy, astronomy, interpretation of dreams, alchemy, the science of talismans, etc. This same classification of the natural sciences is found in al-Ghazālī (505 A.H. [=A.D. 1111]), who, in his Tḥāfūt al-
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan)

(falâsîf), Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 63 f., refers to it as common amongst the Musalman peripatetics, and approves of it.

Avâroodos, in the Tahâfut al-tahâfut, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 121, also corresponding to Aristotelian teaching, the eight fundamental parts of the natural sciences; but he denies that the so-called derived branches are sciences. Medicine, he says, is an art (gimāriyya), not a science; it has a practical and not a theoretical character; accordingly astrology is included in the same category with divination from the flight of birds and from the movement of the stars (nabâs), with divination in the form of vaticinations (kashânah), with physiognomy and with the interpretation of dreams, all being arts which have as their aim the prediction of the future, but not the formation of science, either theoretically or practically; however it may be supposed that one may sometimes derive some practical advantage from them.

A curious classification is given in a meditated book de Inteagrationibus (Fil-maasīb) of the astrologer Yaʾqūb al-Qāqārīnī, who lived in the 3rd cent. A.H. (9th A.D.) According to the catalogue of the Arabiana MSS of the Museum Vossianum, there is a second, Verschiedene der arab. Hand−
schriften, Berlin, 1887-99, v. 275, no. 8377), he maintains three degrees (marādī) of science: theology, medicine, science of the stars; the last being based not on divination, but on deduction from analogy; occupies a place between the other two.

4. Sources.—(a) Greek.—These are represented by the classic (if we may call it so) astrology of the Alexandrian School (apart of Aquitania) of Ptolemy, by the writings of Donoetho Sidonius (1st cent. A.D.), which go back to the Greco-Egyptian tradition; by the great eclectic compilation of Vettius Valens (2nd cent. A.D.), and by the book of the 'deceni,' the 'interrogations,' and the nivities of Antiochus of Athens (2nd or 3rd cent. A.D.), which appears especially to follow the Babylonian tradition; by the Kapetou, or Cent-
bologian, falsely attributed to Ptolemy; by some works ascribed to the mythical Hermes; and by an author whose name (Himos?, Zimos?) is cited by Arabic writers in a form so corrupt as to be unrecognizable. Of another Greek writer, Teucer or Teucer of Babylon, the Arabs had knowledge through Iranian sources.

(b) Indian.—The Musalman writers mention seven or eight Indian astrologers, whose names, however, it has not as yet been possible to identify with the corresponding Sanskrit. The most im-
portant is K.n.k.h. or K.n.k. who, according to some Arabic writers, appears to have come to Baghdad to the court of the khâlif al-Manṣūr, bringing thither astronomical books of India, and, according to others, making known Indian astro-
nomical lore. The Arabs attribute to him writings on the mawādīr (that is, on the method of ascertaining a facultious ascendant of the nativity), on the nivities, and on the conjunctions of the planets; it is therefore plain that he had also treated of the part of Indian astrology called in Sanskrit horā or jātaka, which arose through Greek influence. This confirms a conjecture of P. Boll (Sphaera, Leipzig, 1906, p. 414 f.), who, from the citations contained in the Introductorium of Abū Maʾshār

1 For details see the present writer's Arabic lessons on the origins of astrology among the Arabs ('Tiṣn al-falâsīf, tāʾlīqah, and other astronomical treatises'; pp. 156-59 (Iranian sources), 205-520 (Greek sources), etc.

2 Muhammadan astrologers were also acquainted with the astrology of Vettius Valens through an Arabic translation of a Parthian version of the book de Revolutionibus which had reached us in a Latin translation.

(or Almumassar), infers that K.n.k.h had before him materials of distant Greek origin for his re-
presentation of the figures arising in the heavens together with their 'deceni.' Common Muslim astrologers cite simply the 'Indians' (al-Indn), without particular names of authors. We must further add that the influence of Indian astrology made itself felt sometimes through Italian writings and oral teaching, as is apparent from some Indian words which have passed into Arabic terminology in an Iranian form—e.g., darī-
jān (Ind. drēkkhānān).

(c) Persian.—These are in the Pahlavi language or Middle Age Persian. The writings of Teucer of Babylon (second half of the 1st cent. A.D.) on the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'deceni,' reached the Arabs through a Persian version, where the name of the author, on account of the ambiguity of the Pahlavi writing, was afterwards spelt by the Persians and Arabs (Tinâkâh, etc.). Hence the name Teucer of Babylon in the Introductorium of Abū Maʾshār, which the other source was Buzurjmihr's commentary on the astrological 'Aṣbākhā, of Vettius Valens; the Pahlavi translation of the Greek title was āsthāh, selected, which became in Arabic al-aḍžāh, and was afterwards variously and strangely corrupted by Arabic writers. The Musalman also cited as a source of astrological teachings the mythological Zoroaster (Zâhâbush in Arabic writings) in modern Persian writings, whose name indeed was already frequently found in Greek astrology of the 4th and following centuries. A fourth source is the book on 'nativities' written by the Almizghar, son of Zâdanfarri; but we lack information about this personage, whose name is corrupted into Almizghar in the Latin version of Alcatibus (al-Qublī), and into Andruczag in the Latin version of the Jewish Ibn 'Ezrâ en nativities (which always draw on Arabic sources). Those astrological writings which are ascribed by the Arabs to Jâmâb the Wise (the trusted coun-
selor of the mythical king Nâshāq) seem to be late Musalman falsifications.

We do not know exactly when all these works hitherto mentioned were first translated into Arabic, but it is certain that the great majority of them were known in the second half of the 8th cent. A.D., that is, when Musalman culture began. If the indication placed at the end of the most celebrated 'Ard mûšūk (a work on the nativities of Hermes (MS in Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan) is true, this book would seem to have been translated in the month Dhu l-qaḍa, 125 A.H., namely, in September 743 A.D., while the Amerâyān Khâfî, which has already been mentioned in the writings of Mā sh āʾ Allah (Mussâhala) in the second half of the 5th cent., all the other Greek writers mentioned above are merely cited by the astrologers of the 9th century. As has already been said, the writings of the Indian K.n.k.h seem to have been known at Baghdad in the time of the khâlif al-Manṣūr; and about the middle of the 9th cent., we have already several small astrological works of Al-
Kindī (Alchinhus) formed expressly on Indian models. It does not seem that the Persian books were translated by members of the family

1 In the Latin version of Abūâbâl-Hāri Abînâm, De natura astrorum seem to be Musal-
man falsifications—e.g., the book de Revolutionibus which had reached us in a Latin translation.
Nawbati, known by their translations from Pahlavi into Arabic (A.D. 775-780), who in the 9th
whose head was astrologer at the court of
al-Mansur; and in any case the antiquity of
Iranian influence in astrology is attested by the fact that in the works of these scholars,
according to the Latin translation of John of Seville,
technical terms of Iranian origin are freely used:
e.g., alyhdyog (alhidyag), alochooden (al-baduduq),
almasbaf (al-fandhush). Side by side with the written sources there was,
without doubt, the oral tradition of the peoples
converted to Islam. Among the Syrians Christi-
anity had almost suffocated astrology, although
Bardeanes (134-222) had reconciled Christian
dogma with an attenuated form of predestination
by means of the stars; all the same we know that
Harran, the ancient Carrhae, special astrological
institutions for the Muslims also other pagan sciences.
It is further probable that Theophilos, son of
Thomas, a Christian of Edessa who was astrologer
of the Khalif al-Mahdi (A.D. 775-780), and who has
been cited by sof exact mathematical astronomers as
an authority on the subject of ‘electiones,’ again
took up with Syrian oral tradition. In the same
manner it is natural that there were absorbed into
Musulman astronomy the吠命des of the Arabana
centres (tending to paganism) of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, of the Egyptians,
etc. Finally, we must not forget the Judaic ele-
ments, which were not part in the first ages of
Musulman astrology; in fact, among the principal
writers on astrological matters in Arabic in the
2nd and 3rd centuries of the Hijra are the Jews
5. Special character.—The civilized peoples
over whom the Arabic domination of the 7th, 8th,
and 9th centuries extended, viz. Greeks, Copts,
Syrians, Persians, and Indians, had already
imagined all the possible fundamental combina-
tions concerning the influence of the stars over
mundane events; consequently it was impossible
for the Musulman astrologer to find out anything
substantially new. On the other hand, the
principal justification of astrology consisted pre-
cisely in presenting itself as the solely preser-
vative of age-long experience that had taught
the wise of preceding generations. The office of
the Musulman astronomers consequently was reduced
to a choosing of what seemed suitable among the
many byzance of their predecessors and at times to a harmonizing of elements of
diverse origin, amplifying and completing particular points on which it was easy to give free
rein to fancy. All this, as we have said, was done
with the widest eclecticism. But, though nothing
really original is met with in the field of astrology
properly so called, there is, all the same, a
point on which Arabo-Musulman astrology is far
superior to other astrologies, including the Greek,
and represents a real progress. This consists of
a wide and continued application of spherical
astronomy which was unknown by whatever
ascensions; rough tables, useful for a determined
terrestrial latitude, are also employed for different
litudes; the latitudes of the planets are neglected
in the calculation of the radiations (‘projectores
diurni, meteoris ah. shu’a’). Among the
Greeks we seek in vain for a clear exposition of
the method of determining mathematically the 12
houses, only in some of the hinges of the system.
Al-Farabi, himself, teaching minutely in the Tetrabiblos how
the ‘projectio’ was calculated, somewhat neglects the latitude of the planets. Characteristic
is the fact that Ptolemy, in the Almagest, occupies
himself with three problems useful only to astro-
logers (inclination of the earth, ascensions of the
centres with respect to the ecliptic and to the horizon,
position of the stars with respect to the sun
in consequence of the daily motion of the sphere,
appearances and eclipses of the sun and the
ewobjects with respect to the solar rays), and which even in
astrology are of very small importance; and, on
the other hand, he does not make the slightest
allusion to other problems of spherical astronomy
which would be of capital importance for apoteo-
smatics. Musulman astronomers, on the contrary,
teach exact calculations, and often even prepare
tables for all the mathematical and observational
astronomy.
6. Ptolemy concerning astrology.—From Islam
astrology at first had a much less unfavourable
reception than from Christianity. The latter had
to combat in the teaching of astrology the world of pagan ideas and cults; it had to contend
against the concept of necessity, which excluded
Christian free will. In the 7th and 8th centuries
A.D., however, the pagan elements of astrology
were completely modified; they were so entirely
hidden under a verbal formalism as to be no longer
recognizable; and, on the other hand, orthodox Islam, with its doctrine of predestination,
which excluded the freedom of human actions,
as, at bottom, not very far removed from the
etwopa of the Stoics and of many astrologers
of antiquity. When we consider that the
Musulman theologians had no need whatever of
the sciences which did not appear to have any
relation to the religious content of Islam, we
easily understand how astrology had been able to
advance unimpeded through the first stages almost
up to the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra. It
is not, therefore, astonishing that Al-A’ Ma’amar,
writing his Introductionis in 949 A.D., among the
various categories of astrologers, mentions nothing
whatsoever of opponents influenced by strictly religious reasons, and he makes his defence of astrology to consist (Intro-
ductionis, i, 5, fol. 1 v.-2 b. 2 v.) in a formal
form of the arguments with which Ptolemy (Tetrab. 1, 3)
2 Introductionis, i, 4 (Augsburg, 1490, fol. a 7 v.-b 2 v).
had already maintained the material and moral advantages of foreseeing the future, even if this should appear to be adverse to us. The 'philosopher of the Ambris', al-Kindi, who died a little after 870 A.D., regards astrology as an integral part of philosophy (izhāf al-ru'ūs); he seeks its basis not only in the four mathematical, but also in the physical and metaphysical doctrines; and he opposes it to many popular prejudices. Al-Kindi's arguments are the only ones who endeavoured to reduce to a completely rational and systematic form the principles and the methods of astrology. But matters soon underwent a change. Towards the end of the 9th cent., the Hijra the knowledge of Aristotle's teaching grew more diffuse and profound, and in this there was no place for astrology; hence the philosophers commenced to make it acceptable. On the other hand, the theologians were not slow to see in the influence attributed to the stars over human actions a menace to the severe and monothetic conception of Islam. Consequently, arguments concerning the duration of Islam became an evident danger to dogma. Thus the polemic against astrology became very acute.1 2

1 A confutation which we possess is that of Abu 'l-Qasim 'Isa ibn 'Ali, drawn up in the first half of the 10th cent., and preserved in a work of the Ibn al-Balkhi theologian, Ibn Qayyim al-Jaujaji, after 1030.2

After an exordium in which he admits that the stars may have some influence on such natural phenomena as climate and temperature, he denounces the practice of foretelling the future by their means, he divides his dissertation into three distinct parts. The first has reference to the discordance among astrologers as to their principles. He questions the nature of the influence of the stars, and an exposition follows of several fundamental principles for astrological calculations on which the various writers disagree—e.g., the method of determining the planetary term, the 'significant' day (dawr, dayyam), the 'passing day' (ru'mut), the male and female political signs. The second part consists of the examination of many principles which are affirmed by the astrologers, but which are repugnant to good sense (mustahabbah). In the third part 'Isa ibn 'Ali cites some of the arguments adopted by the astrologers in favour of their science, and relates them.

Contemporary with 'Isa ibn 'Ali is the famous philosopher al-Farābī (p. 790), who, as a profound student of Aristotle, could not but be opposed to astrology. We have a work of his against astrology, which, however, is not so vigorous a confutation as we should have expected from such a philosopher and contains some childish things. This is explained by the fact that the work is merely a series of notes, published by a disciple just as he found them.

The philosophers contemporary with al-Farābī did not all share his hostility to astrology; in fact the schools which had been less subject to Aristotelian influence, favoured it, as was already the case with al-Kindi.

With reference to this a special place is held by the Hikmat al-Asāsī, 'Gnomon Compendium', who Boethius recommended to the students of astrology towards A.D. 950-960, and whose writings set forth the philosophical doctrines of the heretical Bituriges, a branch of whom were the Carmelites (al-Qarawīyān), who probably formed the end of the 9th cent. A.D. (970 A.D.) caused political disorders in the Iraq, and who founded an independent kingdom in N.E. Arabia which lasted until after A.D. 974 (L.D. 1081-93). The Carmelites had reaped great advantage from astrological predictions based on the theory of the planets' signification.3 One can therefore understand that the Hikmat al-Asāsī not only admitted, with Aristotle and other Arabic philosophers, that the changes (genesis and corruption) of the solar world were consequent upon celestial movements, but also that the planets foretell the future and have a direct influence upon the will and the moral character. The great encyclopaedic work of the Hikmat is imbued with those astrological ideas, among which the theory of planetary conjunctions occupies the principal place.

Favourable to astrology also are those other philosophers who lead up to Abu Sulayman Muhammad ibn Tahir ibn BahSame al-Sijistani al-Maqrizi, who, in the second half of the 10th cent., gathered about him at Bagdad a number of learned men for the purpose of discussing the fundamental principles and summaries of many of these discussions were collected in the Kitāb al-agbāt of Abu 'l-Qaysim al-Ta'Zi, a Syrian philosopher, mystic, and Jurist (after 400 A.D. [A.D. 1000-1010]), about whose orthodoxy there is some suspicion. A record of a meeting in reference to astrology is preserved almost entirely in the work already cited of Ibn Qayyim al-Jaujaji.2 Some of those present had attacked astrology, declaring it absurd and false, after so much study and effort on the part of its supporters, it does not succeed in modifying those events which overwhelm both the wise and ignorant; and the ignorants who rose up several questioners to refute these arguments, and they set themselves specially to explain how planets can influence in spirit the truth of astrology, and that, in any case, the efforts of astrologers to discover the laws of the stars are always noble. Their defence of practical astrology is somewhat weak, and is probably the last that has been made in the field of philosophy.

Avicenna (q.v.; 428 A.D. [A.D. 1097]) continues against astrology, not only in his encyclopaedia, akh-Shifa, 'The Recovery of the Health of the Soul', and in the an-Naṣīḥah, but also in a special work of which a full resume was made by Mehran.2 He demonstrates that astrology has no foundation, and proceeds to show that, even admitting its theoretical truth, it would be impossible for men to acquire a knowledge of it.

Averroes (q.v.), or Ibn Rushd (965 A.D. [A.D. 1168]), is also a decided adversary of astrology, as appears from the severe judgment referred to above (§ 3) and from some passages of his comments on Aristotle. But it would be unjust to judge the whole of Avicenna from the review of the philosophers, who after the 10th cent. A.D. are all in agreement on this question.

We have already seen the attitude of al-Jahuzi. We may add here that Ibn Hazm († 1064 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), who fiercely opposed the scholastic or speculative theology of al-Ash'ari in Spain, gives his ideas on astrology in Al-Faqīd, 'F. al-'ilm al- sālih wa-l-ahwāh' wa-n-nihāya.2 He divides those who believe that the future can be foretold by means of the stars into two classes: (1) misbelievers and polytheists, and (2) persons who, while they do not believe in predestination, are fluently those who maintain that the stars and the

1 Cf. the quotations in M. Steinshneider, ZDMG xiv. (1891) 134; and ch. x. and xl. of the anonymous Latin pamphlet De erroribus philosophorum (written in the second half of the 13th cent.), ed. F. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabantii, Louvain, 1909-11, pp. 13-14.

2 E.g., Theophilus, son of Thomas, the astrologer of the third 'Abbadid khalif (see above, § 4), maintained that the reign of Islam would last only 900 years (Ibn Haldun, Fudhils, II. ii. ch. 12, tr. de Slane, II. 222 ff.). The philosopher al-Kindi calculated that the majority of the kings of the Arab caliphate would be 960 years (see O. Loth, 'Al-Kinād als Astronom', in Monatsh. für Geschichte und Literatur an H. L. Liescher, Leipzig, 1873, pp. 399-390), as did also al-Chirist, p. 129.

3 Men like al-Jahuzi († 1055 A.D., 990 A.D.) and the famous theologians al-Qarawi († 1083 A.D., 990 A.D.) and al-Mazari († 1023 A.D., 990 A.D.) were declared enemies of astrology.

4 Ibn Rushd. Lippert, p. 234 f., he died on Friday, 22 Bahab II., 508 A.H., i.e., 26th March, 1020 A.D., cf. also al-Chirist, p. 129.

5 I.e., the sect, cited in the preface of the Libellus ignotissimi ad magisterium judiciorum astrologi, which al-Qarawi had written in memory of his benefactor, the archbishop of Aleppo, who refused from 323 to 390 A.D. (A.D. 949-907).

6 Cairo, 1255-5 A.D. [A.D. 1805-07], II. 150-196.

7 R. P. Mayor, 'Achārīn, ch. 1, ch. 14. The astronomical details, tr. P. Diesterhel, Leyden, 1892, pp. 170-196 (pp. 194-194 of the text published in 1892).—See also the preface of the Libellus ignotissimi, in the same work by R. P. Mayor, 1892. The meaning and interpretation of some technical terms of astrology, so that his version is not always perfect.

8 See also a brief account by W. Goldscheider, 'Stellung der alten islamischen Chronisten zu den antiken Wissenschaften' (A.D. E.Wad, 1915), pp. 33-35.

heavenly spheres are intelligent beings, agents, of eternal duration, and disposing of earthly things either with their own will or who hold that the stars and the celestial spheres, whilst without intelligence, have been created and established by God as indicators of things which are to take place.

The present of Ash'arite dogmatic theology, al-Ghazâlî († 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]), opposes astrology in his Ḥiyâ' ālām ad-dîn, "The Revival of Religious Sciences in the Age of Ignorance," which can be found in the books of the famous Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taimiyyah († 723 A.H. [A.D. 1323]).

But the most vigorous and complete condemnation of astrology is contained in the Ḥiyâ' ālām ad-dîn († 511 A.H. [A.D. 1122]) of the most noted theologians of the Ḥanbalite school. Only the famous work of Pico della Mirandola, *Adversus astrologos*, can pass through the pages of the confrontation written by this Muhammadan theologian, whose impassioned polemics press upon the adversary with an infinity of subtle distinctions and prove the force of his dialectics.

In the theological world perhaps the sole defender of astrology is Fârûq ad-dîn ar-Râzî († 696 A.H. [A.D. 1296]), cited above. Famous especially for his commentary on the Qur'ân, he composed also many theological, philosophical, and astrological works, and studied medicine and mathematics. Without doubt his confidence in astrology is due to his cultivation of the sciences, and this confidence already appears in his commentary on the Qur'ân.

No theologian seems to have followed Fârûq ad-dîn ar-Râzî in his opinions about astrology, and his predecessors, polemics about astrology could no longer reckon on any novelty of a ducumentary character. The considerations developed by the great philosopher of history, Ibn Ḥalîl († 808 A.H. [A.D. 1406]), in his historical *Prolegomena*, are alone deserving of notice.

**Astronomy in common life.**—The four orthodox schools of jurisprudence and the Shî'ite school were already in existence when the war of the philosophers and theologians against astrology began. Accordingly, the anathema launched against it in the name of religion did not occupy much space in Muhammadan law, notwithstanding the fact that this had its chief foundation in revelation. The Quran does not contain any jurists of a later age, however, we meet with open hostility to astrology. In Muhammadan law the buying and selling of useless things is forbidden; therefore some jurists teach that one may not sell or buy books of astrology. Another legal prescription does not admit the testimony of misbelievers; therefore some jurists, regarding the astrologer as a misbeliever, deny him the right of acting as a witness. But, before theological anathema smote it, astrology was deeply rooted among all lay classes of society. The courts of the 'Abâsid khâls at Baghdad and of the numerous small dynasties which arose in the Muhammadan world after the 3rd cent. of the Hijra received astrologers with great favour and consulted them on affairs of State as well as on trifling matters of daily life. At the


3 Cairo, 1320-22 A.H. (A.D. 1897-99), l. 323-325. 4 Ed. al-Harîrî, *Ḥibbar al-Mu'alalâq*, Caire, 1292-93 A.H. (A.D. 1875-76), l. 445. 5 The Arabic and the Persian are called indifferently *Horâs*.

1 Foundation of Baghdâd in A.D. 762, and at that of al-Mahdiyyah (in Tunisia) in 916, the astrologers, summoned for the purpose are those who hold that the stars and the celestial spheres, whilst without intelligence, have been created and established by God as indicators of things which are to take place.

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Finally, the Jewish astronomical literature of Europe, in which a conspicuous place is occupied by the works of Abraham Zacuto († 1383), is based exclusively on Arabic sources.

LITERATURE—There is no work setting forth the content and historical development of the Arabic astronomical and bibliographic notices of individual astrologers reference may be made to H. Suter, Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber (Berlin, 1846). In Andahamzad, J. (ed.), 1987, Geschichte der Astronomie, 10. 1987, p. 187-188. The mathematical side of Muhammadan astronomy and astrolabe is set forth in the present writer's annotations on al-Battālī, al-ṭabīt. Opus astronom.; 3 vols., Milan, 1590-1567. Beyond two or three small and bibliographic notices of no importance, printed or lithographed in Cairo, and the dissertation of al-Kindī, published by D. L. Webbe (see above, p. 29), there are no old, or complete astronomical works in the original text; there are, on the other hand, editions of Medieval Latin versions (15th-16th cent.), seven of which have been cited in the course of the article.

II. ASTRONOMY.—1. Name. The names "īmān (or sindāt) al-nujum, "science (or art) of the stars," "īmān (or sindāt) at-dānim, "denotation both astronomy and astrology. For the former science Averroes 1 adopts the expression sindāt an-nujum at-tālī-mīsīyyah, "mathematical art of the stars," which is found also in the original Arabic of the de Scientiis of al-Fārābī, where Gerard of Cremona translated it by "astronomia doctrinalis," misled by the double signification of the adjective ta-līmīsī, "observation." 2 This speech of astrological observation is designated by Averroes 3 as sindāt al-maqūl, "experimental art of the stars." Special names of astronomy are ʻīmān al-ḥašāch, "science of the heavenly sphere (universe)," 4 al-īmān al-ghārīsh, "science of the celestial sphere," 5 the branch of astronomical longitudes which deals with the construction, and especially for instruments for determining the time, and use for the purpose of regulating the times of the religious services (in the mosques, is named ʻīmān al-miqāṭ, "the science of the time appointed (for the canon prayer)," and he who cultivates it is called ʻāmuṣyād, 6

2. Scope. The Greek and Muhammadan conception of astronomy does not exactly correspond to the modern conception. Al-Fārābī says in his treatise de Scientiis 7 that astronomy has for its object the study of the celestial bodies and of the earth from these three points of view: (a) number, figure, order, and respective position of the spheres and of the celestial bodies; their magnitudes and distances from the earth; immediate relations of each with the rest and their consequences with regard to the stars themselves (conjunctions and oppositions, eclipses, etc.); (b) magnitude of the inhabited part of the earth (limits of the world and its corollaries); determination of geographical co-ordinates; effect of the rotation of the celestial sphere on the inhabitants of the earth; (c) parts having different latitudes (varying length of the day, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.). This conception of astronomy is found also in later writers, 8 with the sole difference that the study of the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies and spheres comes to be considered under a category (d) separate from (a). According to Avicenna, the astronomers' studies: (a) the parts of the universe as far as regards their figure, their respective positions, their magnitudes, and their distances from each other; (b) whether studies the motions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies, the estimate (μακρύς) of the globes, of the axes (κύλινδρος) and of the circles (εἴκοσι) on which those motions take place. All this is contained in the Almagest. 9

The limits of astronomy are well defined by Ibn Haldūn († A.D. 1406): 10

Astronomy consists of the study of the celestial bodies and of the earth from these points of view: (a) number, figure, order, and respective position of the spheres and of the celestial bodies; their magnitudes and distances from the earth; immediate relations of each with the rest and their consequences with regard to the stars themselves (conjunctions and oppositions, eclipses, etc.); (b) magnitude of the inhabited part of the earth (limits of the world and its corollaries); determination of geographical co-ordinates; effect of the rotation of the celestial sphere on the inhabitants of the earth; (c) parts having different latitudes (varying length of the day, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.). This conception of astronomy is found also in later writers, with the sole difference that the study of the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies and spheres comes to be considered under a category (d) separate from (a). According to Avicenna, the astronomers' studies: (a) the parts of the universe as far as regards their figure, their respective positions, their magnitudes, and their distances from each other; (b) whether studies the motions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies, the estimate (μακρύς) of the globes, of the axes (κύλινδρος) and of the circles (εἴκοσι) on which those motions take place. All this is contained in the Almagest. 9

(1) Prophecies, etc., vol. xiv. (T. de, Isaac, 1847). 2 See above, ch. 1. 3 This has reached us only in the Latin version of Gerard of Cremona. 4 But relating to the mathematical sciences has been translated into German by W. Wiedemann, Das Alhazen. der Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften, 11. Hildesheim, 1940. 5 The al-Khwarizmi and al-Battalī are both added, in the 14th and 15th cent. respectively. 6 See above, p. 29. 7 The name is found in the Arabic of the quaternion, al-ʻīmān al-ghārīsh, Calcutta, 1949, p. 84. 8 According to the Index of the chapters given in the catalogues of the Arabic MSS in Oxford and Berlin. 9 See above, ch. 1. 10 The Almagest, translated by Thomas of Merton, is the standard text of the 13th cent. (ed. of 1256). 11 To which we may add the Latin translation, made in the 13th cent. by Abaelard of Bath, of Maslama al-Majriti's recension of the tables of al-Khwarizmi, ed. with an excellent German commentary by H. Suter, 1914. 12 13
3. Relation to Islam.—Muhammadan religious ritual bases some of its prescriptions on elements of an astronomical character. The hours within which prayers, declarations, and ritual fasts were to be valid depend on the latitude of the place and on the epoch of the solar year; further, the legal time for the night prayer is between the end of the afternoon and the beginning of the evening twilight for the place and season. The ritual prayer is not valid unless the face is turned in the direction of Mecca; hence the necessity of solving the astronomical geographical problem of the knowledge of the South of Mecca. The beginning and the end of the month assigned to the fast are determined not by the civil calendar, but by the actual appearance of the new moon, and the beginning of the daily fast is given by the morning twilight. Finally, special ritual prayers are prescribed at eclipses of the sun and moon, for which it is well to be prepared in time. All this presupposes a correct knowledge of the new and third elements of which the moon has values of celestial bodies and motions; at least they invite reflection on the goodness and providence of God. Astronomy thus becomes an ally of religion.

4. Greece.—On the other hand, the first element of an exclusively practical character is due to the Arabs before Islam. Like all other peoples who dwell in hot countries and are compelled to prefer night to day for travelling, the Bedouins made use of the stars for guiding their wanderings and for calculating horoscopes. Even the stars, which the ancient astronomers undertook to measure, were not considered as mere points in space, but the entire field of the heavens was occupied with the stars; the heavens were divided into two parts, the north and the south, and the stars were grouped in such a way that the sun and moon could be situated in them. Thus, in the 16th and 17th centuries, Arabic writers on astronomy still occupied themselves with the lunar Tables of Timbuktu, a work of the 15th century by Ibn Bashakhmish, the son of a Jewish astronomer, who lived at Timbuktu.

5. Sun, Moon, and Stars (Muhammadan).

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1 For details see Nallino, "Il mulki del falki," pp. 314-316, 318-321 (for Arabic sources), 180-186 (Italian), 185-188 (Persian), and 324 (Egyptian).

2 Alois Muehl and Antonius Jaussen have found this usage still in use among the Bedouin of Sinai. E. W. Glassop indicates it for the Yemen.

3 The term corresponds only approximately to the "kalender" of the Indians.

4 So al-Qirin. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qitri (a source of authority) has 150-175.

5 Astronomers (e.g., Habash, an-Nalwi, Ibn asc-Samir) wrote contemporaneously books based on Indian method and works, and books with Graeco-Arabic elements on other bases, or on the artificial cycles of years constructed in imitation of those of the Indians. For one of the characteristics of the Muslim astronomers, books of India are their representation of the mean motions of sun, moon, and planets by the number of their revolutions in the arithmetical means of millions of years: at the beginning of the rising and setting of the stars, the mean sun, moon, and planets were in con- junction again at the same point. Further, many treaties composed by the Arabs gave the rules of the mean motions for the motion of the earth (sini al-Rubii), supposed to be the central motion of the inhabited earth (sini al-Rubii). In the first place, those books in India the Arabs also derived their first knowledge of trigonometrical sines, of course in the form employed in India, i.e., as ratios of sine and for the radius of sine.

6 (c) Iran.—A few years after the introduction of Indian astronomy, and before the end of the 5th century, there was translated into Arabic the Pahlavi work entitled Zii Sator, "Astronomical Tables of the 1st Kind," although the majority of theologians and jurists are not content with pure calculation for the appearance of the new moon, but require the actual sight of the phenomenon. In perpetual fact the religion of Islam must be a real stimulus to scientific study. This explains also why the Muhammadans have undertaken so much research into the complex phenomena of the moon's motion, and into the conditions of visibility of the new moon—phenomena which were almost entirely neglected by the Greek astronomers. On the other hand, many passages of the Qur'an are devoted to the question of which God has endowed the heavens with celestial bodies and motions; at least they invoke reflection on the goodness and providence of God. Astronomy thus becomes an ally of religion.

7 (d) Greek.—Last in chronological order is the influence of Greek astronomy. At the beginning of the 4th century A.D., a rich patron, of the family of the Demetrias, Tychis Ibn Haddad (7th A.D. [8th A.D.]), caused the Almagest to be translated into the first line into Arabic. But this book, full of difficulties and obscurities, could not, at first, compete with easier and more practical works of Indian and Persian origin. It acquired influence later, when the mathematical preparation of the Muhammadans was more advanced, and when better translations appeared. In the first half of the 9th century, also Arabic translations were made of the Geographia, the Tetrabiblos, the Hypothenese Platoniser, the Apparitio (basa) Sidusmum, and the Planophilium of Ptolemy; the Palaez Manuscript of Alex- andria; the book of Aristarchus on the magnitudes and distances of the sun and moon; the Almagest of Geminus; two treatises of Arithmacus; three of Theophrastus and a work of Hypaleos on the ascensions. To the 5th century also belongs the first translation of the famous tables of Ammonius, of which we still find traces in the 11th century, when they were remodelled by al-Zarqali, to pass afterwards into medieval Latin literature under the names of the Hilmans, Hilmans, etc. Finally, there appear to have been translated in the same century a book of Ptolemy on the magnitudes of Aratus and a book on the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies, which, if really attributed to Ptolemy, is known by the Arabs under the name of Kitab al-nsahind.

5. Some astronomical teachings.—We may here refer to some special points which have an importance for the history of the Greek and for the development of celestial phenomena. The only system received by the Muhammadan peoples was the geocentric, Aristotelian philosophy, the authority of Ptolemy, and the requirements of astrology were un- surmountable obstacles to the development of a heliocentric system, which, in any case, could not have been demonstrated by irrefutable reasons or, in the absence of telescopes, have procured any real advantage to astrology. The absence of telescopes kept Muhammadan astronomers from understanding the many other planets than those already known to the Greeks. The mode, too, of representing their motions is the same as in the Greeks, viz., by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; nor

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1 This Indian idea also occurs in some Arabic works which are not astronomical—e.g., Ibn Qutaid, Liber politi et postura, ed. M. de Goeje, Leipzig, 1869, p. 361.
do the modifications of certain parts of the planetary theories of Ptolemy introduced by some (e.g., al-Farghani and al-Battani). But it depart much from this principle. Only among writers who are philosophers rather than astronomers do we meet with theories that approach those of Ptolemy. In any case, among them all, the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic doctrine of the circular form of celestial motions reigns supreme, for the elliptic orbit indicated by Ptolemy for Mercury is more a graphical construction on the lamina of the astrolabe, and not a theoretical representation.

(a) Number of the spheres. — The number of the spheres, or, as it were, of what in the Middle Ages in Eratosthenes was called ‘heavens,’ is eight in Aristotle and Ptolemy, viz. seven for the planets (including the sun and the moon) and one for the fixed stars. This number of eight is preserved by the first Arabic astronomers — e.g., al-Farghani and al-Battani, for whom, however, these ideal spheres, created to satisfy the requirements of physics and not those of astronomy properly so called, had no practical importance. Still the number of eight, combined with the Aristotelian theory of solid spheres in which the heavenly bodies are infixed without being able to move themselves, did not cease to be the common teaching of the Ptolemaic system. Aristotle, who was ignorant of the motion of the precession of the equinoxes, and who consequently held that the fixed stars are really immovable, assigned to the eighth sphere the apparent diurnal motion of the celestial vault from east to west, a motion which the eighth sphere impressed also on all the others. But Ptolemy, accepting the account of Hipparchus in the precession of the equinoxes on account of which the fixed stars have a slow and continued increase of longitude, came implicitly to attribute to the sphere of Saturn itself naturally subjected, like all the planetary apoceses, to the motion of the precession; then the eighth sphere, no longer containing the stars, would only have had the office of impressing the diurnal motion on the spheres below. This solution was actually given by Muhammadan writers, some of whom indeed took advantage of it for reducing the number of the spheres to seven, if we compare with the seven heavens of the Qur'an; but this was never accepted by the astronomers. Therefore, when Ibn al-Haitham († 1039) introduced into pure astronomical teaching the doctrine of the solid spheres of Aristotle, it was necessary for the physical reasons set forth above to add a ninth sphere without stars,

impressing on the other spheres diurnal motion. This ninth sphere, accepted by all the later astronomers, e.g., al-Adîn and Ibn Tufail, is the greatest sphere, 'the sphere of the spheres,' 'the smooth sphere' (al-falâk al-‘alâ'), 'the sphere of the zodiac,' 'the supreme sphere.' In general also the philosophers agree with Aristotle in considering these nine spheres; Avicenna, however, under the influence of Aristotle, cannot bring himself to exceed the number of eight. In the theological controversies the nine spheres did not find many opponents, in spite of the 'seven heavens' discussed in Qur. ii. 27; it was held that the specification of the number seven did not imply the negation of the number nine. Several theologians saw in the eighth and ninth spheres respectively the 'seat' (kurris) and the 'târîn' (arâf) of God mentioned in the Qur'an.2

Double were not wanting, however, concerning the unity of the sphere of the fixed stars. Faḫr ad-dîn ar-Râzî informs us that Avicenna, in his book sah-shî, declared: 'Up till now it has not been clear to me whether the sphere of the fixed stars be a single sphere or be several spheres, placed one above the other.' And Faḫr ad-dîn ar-Râzî adds that the hypothesis of the single sphere for all the fixed stars rests only on the assumption of the equality of their motions, but that this equality is not at all certain. He further expresses himself that the equality of the motions were a certainty, he would not deduce from it the necessity of a single sphere to which all spheres are infixed in it. In face of these criticisms, one comprehends the skepticism of Najm ad-dîn al-Haṣan an-Nasâ'î, in the introduction to one of the ancient or of the modern is the number of the heavens quite certain, either by the force of reasoning or by the way of traditions.3

(b) Order of the planets. — The order of the planets followed by almost all the Muhammadan astronomers is identical with that of Ptolemy, although they recognize, together with the Greek astronomers, the lack of absolute order in the case of the two inferior planets and the sun. Without telescopes they could not see the transits of Venus and Mercury across the sun or determine the parallaxes and other particulars of the supposed motion of the planets situated above the moon. Some Arabic authors believed that they had perceived transits of Venus or of Mercury across the sun; but what they really saw was solar spots.4 On the other hand, the postulates of astrology continued in the Muhammadan age to guarantee, from lack of scientific reasons to the contrary, the Ptolemaic system: moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, and not Saturn, and perhaps al-Battani had in mind the possibility of this hypothesis when he entitled ch. ii. of his book al-ʾâbî, thus: 'Of the motion of the fixed stars, whether they move, as the sphere, or whether the sphere moves with them.' Another solution of the difficulty would have been to suppose the fixed stars to be infixed in the convexity of the sphere of Saturn itself naturally subjected, like all the planetary apoceses, to the motion of the precession; then the eighth sphere, no longer containing the stars, would only have had the office of impressing the diurnal motion on the spheres below. This solution was actually given by Muhammadan writers, some of whom indeed took advantage of it for reducing the number of the spheres to seven, if we compare with the seven heavens of the Qur'an; but this was never accepted by the astronomers. Therefore, when Ibn al-Haitham († 1039) introduced into pure astronomical teaching the doctrine of the solid spheres of Aristotle, it was necessary for the physical reasons set forth above to add a ninth sphere without stars,
tion undecided and declares that he chooses the excellent value found by himself (25° 35'), since that is the observed value with the eyes; the other, on the contrary, was received through the information of others. 1 Some, less prudent, declined the theory of libration 2 from the discrepancies as to the obliquity of the ecliptic combined with those relative to the precession of the equinoxes. But the continued series of observations left no doubt by the 13th cent. that the obliquity of the ecliptic is not in accord with the regular diminution, 3 which therefore came to be admitted by all the astronomers; in Europe, on the other hand, we must come down to Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) to see it. It is one of the greatest discoveries which lasted through the greater part of the 17th century. The Muslim astronomers had no means of determining whether this diminution was within what limits it was contained, 4 Abū ʿAlī al-Hassān (c. 1290), who had accepted the hypothesis of az-Zarqālī as to libration, believed that the obliquity oscillated between a maximum of 23° 33' and a minimum of 25° 33'; Fakhr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, who admitted a continuous diminution on account of which the ecliptic will coincide one day with the equator, thought it will depart from it again, so that the Tropic of Cancer will pass over the south and that of Capricorn to the north. Naṣīr ad-dīn al-Tūsī († 1274 A.D.) confined himself to setting forth all possible hypotheses as to the continu- 4 ity or the periodicity of the diminution, without giving preference to any.

(d) Procession of the equinoxes. — The procession or precession of the equinoxes in ancient times was the uniform motion of the equinoxes caused by the change in the longitude of the fixed stars (as calculated precisely from the point of the vernal equinox or the first point of Aries) with respect to the equator, and was due to the motion of the Earth in its orbit around the Sun. This motion caused the equinoxes to shift gradually, and the zodiacal constellations to progress around the celestial sphere at a rate of about 50.26 arcseconds per year. The equinoxes are the points where the Sun crosses the celestial equator from south to north at the beginning of the spring and fall equinoxes. The precession of the equinoxes is a consequence of the precession of the Earth's axis, which is caused by the gravitational forces of the Moon and the Sun. The equinoxes are the reference points for the division of the sky into the twelve signs of the zodiac.

(f) Motion of the solar apogee. — Ptolemy (followed by all the later Greeks) posited that the equinoxes move along the ecliptic in a small circular motion about the apogee of the Sun. He calculated the angular velocity of this motion to be about 50.26 arcseconds per year. This motion is called the precession of the equinoxes, and is due to the slow motion of the Earth's axis as it revolves around its own axis at a rate of about 15° per 360 years. This motion causes the vernal equinox to drift westward along the ecliptic, gradually moving away from the position it occupied when the solar system was formed. The precession of the equinoxes is a consequence of the movement of the Earth's axis, which is caused by the gravitational forces of the Moon and the Sun. The equinoxes are the reference points for the division of the sky into the twelve signs of the zodiac.

1 Ed. Nallino, i. 12.
2 qurūb, i. 12.
3 This was already the opinion of Ibn al--Ujandāj, about A.D. 1000.
4 In the second half of the 18th cent., celestial mechanics had been able to establish the fact that it is a question of a very slow precession contained within limits of less than 15°.
5 Maqāsīd al-ḥarbī, i. 290, ii. 97.

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motion of the fixed stars and of the planetary apogees, i.e., to the displacement of longitude due to the precession of the equinoxes. But the solar apogee has also another very small proper motion in longitude. It is true that De Leurey, in 11464 yearly. This motion must have escaped the Muhammadan astronomers. The determination of the longitude of the apogee is not easy and, in the modern world, pendulum-clocks, being lacking, could not be effected with absolute certainty in the minutes of arc; on the other hand, there was no term of comparison with ancient observations. One understands, therefore, why the majority of Muhammadan astronomers did not give to the solar apogee any other motion than that of the precession, attributing the small discrepancies to the imperfections of instruments and observations. It seems that Thabit ibn Qurrah, however, had dared to affirm the existence of a proper motion. Al-Biruni1 informs us that Thabit, author of a tractate on the inequality of the solar year, had determined 365 days, 6 hours, 12 minutes, 51 seconds, as being the length of the year which we call anomalistic, i.e., the time which the sun takes to return to its own apogee. If, then, the same anomaly holds if we base the whole of our information which Regiomontanus and Copernicus seem to have derived from the De motu octava sphaera (cited above) determined the length of the anomalistic year as 364.9, 9 m., 54.9 s., it is plain that he must have attributed to the solar apogee a small proper motion added to that of the precession.2 Certainly the values found by Thabit are correct, since, according to the moderns, the anomalistic solar year is 365.24, 12 m., 20.0 s., and the sidereal year 365.25, 6 h., 9 m., 10.7 s. It is beyond doubt that al-Zarqalli determined with great exactness (1256) every Julian year) the proper motion of the apogee, as distinguished from that due to the precession; and he therefore supposed that the centre of the eccentric of the sun moved over a very small circle, and by this was also settled the variation of the eccentricality of the solar orbit. Among us the proper motion of the apogee was discovered only in the 16th cent. by Kepler and Longomontanus.

(g) Third lunar inequality.—We need not notice other modifications of special points of Ptolemaic doctrines. It will be enough now to make a reference to another great work by the astronomer from 1538 to 1547 in the Academy of Sciences of Paris without any definite conclusion being arrived at, viz.: Is the discovery of the variation or third lunar inequality to be found in the Almagest? (1956) as L. C. Sédillot maintained, rather than to Tycho Brahe? There would have been no reason for this dispute if that part of the Almagest relative to the movements of the moon had been better studied, and if the analogous discussions in the works of other Arabic astronomers had been examined with care. Carra de Vaux3 has demonstrated that the hypothetical theory of the variation was nothing else than the πρόνoια of Ptolemy, i.e., the difference between the true and the mean apogee of the epicycle by which difference the mean anomaly is corrected so as then to calculate the simple equation of the moon. Al-Battani opportunistically calls it ‘equation of the anomaly.’ It is curious to note that no one has observed that already in 1645 Bollardus (L. Boullian) had recognized that the πρόνοια corresponded to about half of the ‘variaión’ of Tycho Brahe, and that consequently the tables of Ptolemy for the moon were sufficiently near to the truth.

6. Opposition to Ptolemy.—The various modifications of the doctrines of the Almagest never were, however, abandoned the Arab astronomers. We know, for instance, that by Ptolemy for the representation of the motions of the sun and planets, viz., a combination of eccentric circles and epicycles. This permitted the representation of the observations of the planets, and the exactness of which astronomical instruments were capable before the discovery of pendulum-clocks and telescopes; it was further obedient to the Aristotelian principle that celestial motions are circular only. Practical astronomers therefore did not feel the need of theories based on different geometrical principles. The difficulty arose only from a physical point of view, since the idea of numerous circular motions round an imaginary point was repugnant to the principles of Aristotelian physics. It was precisely in the name of Aristotle’s laws that the battle began among the Arabs of Bursa in the 12th cent., against the eccentrics and epicycles of Ptolemy; but their opponents were philosophers.4

The first of these was Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn as-Sa’idigh, known by the name of Ibn al-Hajj (d. 1102), who was said to have explained the celestial motions by means of eccentrics only, rejecting the epicycles altogether. He was influenced by the physics of Aristotle; but we have no particular account of his system.5 After him we find Abu Bakr ibn Tufail (c. 1180), famous in Europe for his Philosophia nova, who is said to al-Hirljij that he had found a theory of these motions quite different from that of Ptolemy rejecting both eccentrics and epicycles, and that he had promised to put it in writing. But it seems that the promise was not fulfilled, for in 1195 Ibn Tufail probably influenced his friend Averroës (c. 1180), who affirms6 the physical impossibility of the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy. The astronomers, concluding, assign an eccentric to the moon because, since she is eclipsed now and now is one and the same point, since they suppose that she traverses the cone of shadow at different distances with regard to the earth.7 This may happen also on account of the diversity of her position, if we suppose that the poles of the lunar sphere move around the poles of another sphere. If God shall prolong our life, we will investigate the astronomy of the time of Aristotle, since this seems not to contradict physics; it consists of motions which Aristotle calls uniform (i.e. spirals). I believe that this motion consists in this, that the poles of one sphere move about the poles of another.

Although Averroës did not complete his exposition, still he had gained a notable part of the hypothesis of Eudoxus (c. 400-356 b.c.), which he used for the first time reconstructed by G. Schiaparelli in 1757, Averroës, like Eudoxus, allows only spherical concentric with the earth; he admits that the line actually be the apparent result of two contrary circular motions—one of the sphere of the planets, and the other, an opposite direction, of another sphere whose axis is inclined in respect of the axis of the first sphere; finally, the line actually corresponds to the inverses of Eudoxus, in the form of prisms, to the Greek geometers, belongs to the category of spiral lines (cycloids), and, according to modern geometers, would be

2 De Leurey, traduction du texte de Ptolémée par les philosophes arabes jusqu’au xviie siècle, J.A. xvi. (1909) 438-440; but this article is insufficient from a mathematical-astronomical point of view.
4 See, e.g., reč. x. 30 (Aristotelis Opera omnium cum Averrois Codicibus commentarius, Venice, 1652, v. fol. 118r.-119r.).
5 Ed. cit. viii. fol. 215v.-216r.
6 Thus the Latin translator in the commentary on the Metaphysics renders the Arabic adjective латунь ‘spiral,’ in the form of a spiral or of a screw.
7 And, in fact, this was the hypothesis of Eudoxus.
8 I.e. the motion of the liberated of the epicycle in the hypothesis of the Spaniard as-Zarqalli (see above, § 5 (9)).
9 Cf. also ed. cit. viii. fol. 229v. (on Metaphys. xii. 45).
le be a semispheric as described on a spherical superficies instead of on one. The semicircular or the hypotenous of Eudoxus's some special conditions, of which Aversos does not seem to have thought; one does not understand, then, how the Arabian philosophes might claim to have solved the problem of the heliocentric hypothesis as well, which could be made to the system of conicocentric spheres, via the definitions by which the distance of the celestial bodies from the earth always equal it did not permit of an explanation of the variation of the size of the sphere. The celestial sphere (falanak, plur. falkat) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel planes in the two superficies having the same centre.2 In this, as he himself says, he drew his inspiration from the Hypotheses Planetarum in Eudoxus's work in authority; in fact, as we see from a passage of Naṣīr ad-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, he followed the Hypotheses also in expanding how the celestial motions can be represented, and also by supposing simple equatorial zones of those complete spaces, so that the spheres of the epicycles become, as it were, tambourines (dīf) rotating on their own axes, and the other spheres like arms.3 This second form of representation was soon abandoned, as contrary to the principles of natural philosophy.

Muhammadan writers agree with Aristotle in holding that the spheres and the celestial bodies are a simple unique substance, different from the four elements of the sublunar world, and forming a fifth element. The solidity also of the spheres, by reason of which the stars remain fixed within them, and by which the motion of the sphere is accepted by almost all, except a few theologians who, to support a strict literal meaning of a passage of the Qur'an, maintain that the stars move within the spheres like fish swimming in water. The ideas of the majority of writers after the 4th cent. of the Hijra are those set forth in the dogmatic theology of al-Baḍīw († 1286) as follows:

1. The spheres are transparent; since if they were coloured, our eyes could not possibly see that which is within them. They are neither hot nor cold; since otherwise the heat and cold would dominate in the elements of the sublunar world on account of their conformity to it. They are neither light nor heavy; since otherwise there would be a tendency to rectilinear motion.6 They are neither moist nor dry; otherwise the facility or difficulty of taking certain forms or of attaching themselves would be manifestly rectilinear motion. They are not capable of quantitative motion; since, if the convexity of the external superficies were to increase, it would be necessary that there should be a void above it, which is absurd; and the same says for the contrary, since if this were to increase it would be necessary that one sphere should enter into another or that between the two there should be a void.7 So also it is proved by Aristotelian reasoning that the motion of the spheres must be circular.

The greater number of Muhammadan philosophers accept the peripatetic doctrine that the spheres and the stars are living beings, rational, operating by their own will; that the spheres have souls which exist in their bodies as our souls in our bodies; and that, as our bodies move under the impulse of our souls towards the ends we have in view, so also do the spheres, which have as their end the serving of God. This doctrine is for the most part repudiated by the theologians: al-Ghazāli († 1111) does not deny the possibility of it, but affirms that we are incapable of knowing if; on the other hand, Ibn Hazm († 1064), Ibn Qayyim

7 Celestial physics.—As is said above,3 celestial physics, according to Muhammadan and Greek writers, lies outside the field of astronomy; its problems are discussed in books of metaphysics, of physics in an Aristotelian sense, and of theology, or at least in special works, of which the greater part are now either lost or unedited.

Like Ptolemy, the most ancient Arabic astrono- mers, the writers of the ninth and tenth centuries, did not define the celestial spheres and limit themselves to considering them in the mathematical aspect of ideal circles representing the movements of the heavenly bodies. Of the Arabian mathematical writers.

5 Of the book of al-Bīrūnī there has been published only an obscure Latin tr. (Venice, 1531) made from a Hebrew version. The Arabic text was made in 1117 at Tarsus by Michael Scotos, and it is not certainly, as is also the Arabic text.

6 This was already maintained by the Rāwīn as-Safi'ah the middle of the 13th cent. (see their Ra'sī, Bāzār, 1306-07 a.n., II. 28-29) and by Faraj ad-Dīn as-Rāzī, Muqāf al-ghalīb (in Ra'sī, Bāzār, II. 29-30, Commentary on al-ṣ哪f, 1167, on Qur. xxii. 60). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentrics and equant.

4 This is the period of time in which, according to Ptolemy, the Sun in the zodiacal accomplishes the circumference, proceeding towards the east.

2 The duration of the heliocentric sidereal revolution of Saturn is set at 18 years, as already mentioned, the hypothesis of the revolution of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the same time.

8 See § 1.

The Aristotelian conception of solid spheres was introduced for the first time 4 into a purely astronomical treatise by Ibn al-Haitam; and, in his undated commentaries, he maintained the definition which was accepted afterwards by all the other writers of elementary treatises: 'A celestial sphere (falanak, plur. falkat) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel planes in the two superficies having the same centre.'
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al-Jauziyyah († 1330), and many others absolutely deny the existence of intelligent beings in the heavenly bodies. The philosophers of the peripatetic school and several theologians (e.g., al-Baidawi) hold that the movers of the celestial souls and consequently of the planets are pure intelligence. Concerning their origin al-Farabi, Avicenna, and their followers maintain a Neo-Platonic emanatory theory: from the first principle emanates the first intelligence, and from this are derived all the nine spheres by means of successive triads always composed of intelligence, soul, and body, until one arrives at the final or active intelligence from which is derived all the material of the sublunar world. This theory is vigorously opposed by al-Ghazzali and the other theologians.

The question of the marks on the moon is either neglected or only hinted at in the works hitherto published. The idea that mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers. Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Fa' kūr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, however, affirms the contrary.

There are those who believe that there exist on the surface of the sun spots, in the same manner as there are marks on the surface of the moon. These spots were actually seen on some occasions, but were erroneously believed to be transits of Mercury and Venus across the sun. The comets and the other meteors (in an Aristotelian universe) were the subjects of observations and of numerous monographs. But, judging from the little that we know about them, Muhammadan writers followed in this matter the theories set forth by Aristotle in his books on meteorology.

8. Conclusion.—The importance of Muhammadan astronomy in the history of science has been variously judged; sometimes Muhammadan astronomers have received excessive praise, sometimes unjust criticism, as if they had done nothing but preserve and transmit to Europe Greek science, improving it only in minor details. This harsh verdict is due not only to very imperfect knowledge of the Arabic writings on astronomy (of which the greater part is still unedited), but also to the fact that no one has attempted to take the special conditions of astronomy in the glories period of Muhammadan culture. The system invented by the Greek geometricians, and completed by Ptolemy, for representing all the celestial motions had mathematically all the precision that could be desired or attained by the use of the best instruments; it produced no sensible discrepancy between theory and the result of observation. The elliptic orbits of Kepler would have given the theory greater perfection than it received from the complicated system of eccentrics and epicycles; the latter indeed had the advantage of preserving the Pythagorean and Aristotelian principle, which denied any but circular movement in the heavens. One must not forget that even in the heliocentric system of Copernicus the motions of the planets were still explained by means of combinations of epicycles—combinations which were in several cases less perfect than those employed by the Ptolemaic astronomy. To change the method of geometrical representation would therefore have been whimsical—a mathematical trick, which no datum of observation would have justified; and, in fact, those Arabs who wished to eliminate the eccentrics and the epicycles were philosophers rather than astronomers, and they propounded their hypotheses from data based only on Aristotelian physics.

It is thus easy to understand how it was that, e.g., the astronomers of the khilaf al-Ma'mun and their successors saw no necessity for drawing from their observations of the movement of Venus the final conclusion that Venus revolved round the sun. From the point of view of such phenomena as could be always observed without telescopes, this second hypothesis had no higher value than that which made Venus revolve round the earth. In a word, celestial appearances gave no cause to shake the foundations of the geocentric system, which agreed very well with every religious notion, and which was supported by the authority of both Aristotle and Ptolemy, reinforced by a very potent element in the Muhammadan mind that had venerated the Earth and mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers. Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Fa' kūr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, however, affirms the contrary.

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8. Conclusion.—The importance of Muhammadan astronomy in the history of science has been variously judged; sometimes Muhammadan astronomers have received excessive praise, sometimes unjust criticism, as if they had done nothing but preserve and transmit to Europe Greek science, improving it only in minor details. This harsh verdict is due not only to very imperfect knowledge of the Arabic writings on astronomy (of which the greater part is still unedited), but also to the fact that no one has attempted to take the special conditions of astronomy in the glories period of Muhammadan culture. The system invented by the Greek geometricians, and completed by Ptolemy, for representing all the celestial motions had mathematically all the precision that could be desired or attained by the use of the best instruments; it produced no sensible discrepancy between theory and the result of observation. The elliptic orbits of Kepler would have given the theory greater perfection than it received from the complicated system of eccentrics and epicycles; the latter indeed had the advantage of preserving the Pythagorean and Aristotelian principle, which denied any but circular movement in the heavens. One must not forget that even in the heliocentric system of Copernicus the motions of the planets were still explained by means of combinations of epicycles—combinations which were in several cases less perfect than those employed by the Ptolemaic astronomy. To change the method of geometrical representation would therefore have been whimsical—a mathematical trick, which no datum of observation would have justified; and, in fact, those Arabs who wished to eliminate the eccentrics and the epicycles were philosophers rather than astronomers, and they propounded their hypotheses from data based only on Aristotelian physics.

It is thus easy to understand how it was that, e.g., the astronomers of the khilaf al-Ma'mun and their successors saw no necessity for drawing from their observations of the movement of Venus the final conclusion that Venus revolved round the sun. From the point of view of such phenomena as could be always observed without telescopes, this second hypothesis had no higher value than that which made Venus revolve round the earth. In a word, celestial appearances gave no cause to shake the foundations of the geocentric system, which agreed very well with every religious notion, and which was supported by the authority of both Aristotle and Ptolemy, reinforced by a very potent element in the Muhammadan mind that had venerated the Earth and mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers. Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Fa' kūr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, however, affirms the contrary.

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Indeed, we must come down to the time of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) to find observers and observations of the Sun, Moon, and Stars. Tycho was a great astronomer of the Middle Ages. Further, by founding trigonometry in a modern sense and developing it to a high degree, they furnished astronomical science with an excellent instrument.


SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic)

1. Teutonic.

Archaeological evidence. The world-wide symmetrical sun wheel occurs in the earliest Scandinavian rock-carvings. Red representations of horses and ships, which may have solar significance, are also found. In 1802 a curious object, apparently named with the sun-cult, was discovered near Trundholm in Sweden. It is a representation of a disk, having gliding on one side and spiral ornamentation on the other, with a horse in front of it, both horse and disk being drawn on a waggon.

2. Solar myths. Sun and moon, day and night, summer and winter, are personified in the myths of the older Edda. The Valkyrie Sigdrífa invokes Day and the sons of Day, Night and her kinswoman. Various passages from Grimnmál, Vafþrudnismál, and Völundar saga are summarized by Snorrí.

Nights, who was of Jotun race, married Dellingi, who was of Aesir race, and their son was named Day. Then Alfrick took Night and her son Day and set them up in heaven and gave them two steeds and two chariots and they were to drive round the earth every twenty-four hours. The earth is bewedded by the three which falls each morning from the sky of Brimnaf, the horse of Night. Day's steed is called Skínthi and he lights up the whole world with his rays. The chariots are said to be of the same make. They were given to the gods by the god Thor.

The gods lived in the world of Aesir, in the world of Men, and in the world of Elves. The world of Aesir is the world of the dead, the world of the living, the world of the unborn. The world of Men is the world of the living, the world of the dead, the world of the unborn. The world of Elves is the world of the dead, the world of the living, the world of the unborn. The world of Aesir is the world of the living, the world of the dead, the world of the unborn. The world of Men is the world of the living, the world of the dead, the world of the unborn. The world of Elves is the world of the living, the world of the dead, the world of the unborn.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic)

Hrafnkell's love for Freyja is shown in front of her, and he will catch the moon, and so it must be.1 'Skoll is the name of the wolf, with furious the glancing goddess to froinwood. Another called Hati, some say he roves before the fair brids of heaven.'2 Sun and moon will be involved in the final world-catastrophe.

"Then said Hléd: 'Of what race are these wolves [i.e. Skoll and Hati]?' Har said: 'They are the sons of the sons of many Jotuns and all in the form of wolves, and it is said that at the rate of these wolves, there shall come one mightier than all, called Moon-slayer and he ... in demon's form shall slay the moon. He shall fill himself with the bodies of the doomed men and the gods shall lose the gods' wheel with red blood; the sunshine shall be black, and all the weather theresc slas during the following summer.'3

'Whence comes a sun, in the smooth sky, When Freyr (i.e. a monstrous wolf) has overtaken this one, One daughter slain, shall the Einboim (i.e. the sun) bear. Before Fenrir overtakes her. The maiden shall ride on the mother's path.

After the Powers have perished.'4

3. Sun-worship.—Our knowledge of the religious practices of the Teutons is very meagre, and it is difficult to say how far the stories told in the two Eddas formed part of a living religion, even among the Scandinavians. We have, however, various references to the sun-cult from other sources. Proceeding in order, we begin with the island of Thule (i.e. Scandinavia) the sun does not appear for 40 days at the winter solstice. At the end of this period messengers are sent up into the mountains to watch for the rising sun. They send word to the people below that the sun will shine upon them in five days; thereupon begins 'the greatest feast of the inhabitants of Thule.'5

The position of the sun on the zodiacal signs, taken from the horoscope in the Thule, shows that the sun is slowly rising in the east. The sun is a symbol of life, and the sun-god is a deity of fertility. The sun-god is often depicted as a bearded man, wearing a crown, and holding a staff. This symbol represents the power of the sun to bring warmth and light to the world. The sun-god is also associated with the concept of life and growth, as the sun provides the essential energy for plants to grow and flourish. In many cultures, the sun-god is also associated with the concept of death and rebirth, as the sun sets and rises each day, symbolizing the cycle of life and death. The sun-god is often depicted as an old man, representing the wisdom and experience gained through the cycle of life. The sun-god is also associated with the concept of power and control, as the sun provides the energy necessary for all life on Earth. The sun-god is often depicted as a powerful figure, with a staff or spear, symbolizing the power and authority of the sun.
4. The daughter of the sun.—A favourite theme of the Lettish folk-songs is the wooing of the daughter of the sun by the sun or by God, the sun providing the dowry, often most unwillingly.

   "Why are grey steeds standing
   By the house-door of the sun?
   They are the grey steeds of the son of God,
   Who wroes the daughter of the sun.
   They thrust out the hand
   Of the great water.
   To the daughter of the sun.
   The sun cries bitterly
   Standing on the mountain.
   Whose soul shall not weep?
   She sorrowed for the little maiden,
   She sorrowed for the dowry.
   For the chest which is laden
   With gold and silver gilt."

This is a good example of a sunrise or sunset myth. The daughter of the sun is the red glow which is in the sky when the planet Venus appears, but soon afterwards melts into darkness or the full light of day. The "dowry" seems to be the rays of the sun which light up the edges of the clouds and the tops of trees and mountains. The sun prepares the dowry herself, gilding the edge of the forest of pines. The daughter of the sun is almost certainly identical with the goddess mentioned by Lasciuc. "Ausa des est raditum solis, vel occumbentis venus luminis absenteeis natura." 1

5. Dear Maria.—Mannhardt considers that the name Maria has been substituted for that of various pagan deities, but it is also possible that she was a particular goddess, perhaps the Perkuna tete (i.e. the aunt of Perkun) mentioned by Lasciuc: "Perkuna tete is the mother of thunder and lightning; who receives into a bath the weary and dusty sun, and sends her out again next day washed and shining." Maria also presides over a bath-chamber: "Behind the mountains smoke is rising.

According to Praetorius, the Nodrians worshipped a star-god Suweigungdunka, who is evidently the Sunixtix worshipped by the Sudavians in Samland and equated with Sol in the Constit. Synod. Evangelii of 1530. Lucas David 2 calls Sunixtix the light of minds and mentions him as one of the four deities who were invoked at agricultural festivals. 3 This deity seems to have been worshipped in both male and female form: "They more constantly worshipped their godhead Suweigungdunka, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided." 4 It is perhaps the maiden who weaves star-coverings, mentioned in one of the folk-songs, and also the goddess whose place has been taken by dear Maria, and who was also known as the aunt of the thunder-god. The underlying idea may be that she is a goddess of fire, like Maria.

6. Cult.—We know little of the sun-cult of the Baltic peoples, although we know from Peter von Dusburg 5 and Erasmus Stela 6 that sun, moon, and stars were worshipped as important deities.

   1 ZE vii. loc. cit.
   2 Ib.
   3 De Ditis Sunavalorum, in Republ. sac. Status regni Poloniae, Liezland, Lewinie, etc., Leyden, 1627, ch.
   4 Annos, in Lith. Annua, a word which is connected with Skr. usha, Gr. ηος, Lat. Aurora, O.E. Easter, all of which (with the possible exception of Easter) denote goddesses of the dawn.

SUNDAY. 1. History of Sunday before the Christian era.—Only three times in the NT is there any reference to a religious observance of Sunday. St. Paul urged his converts to convert to put aside money for charity every Sunday (1 Co 16). Shortly after writing this he preached at a service held at Troas, which is mentioned as if it were a regular institution (Ac 20). Thirty years later, perhaps, the author of the Apocalypse wrote: "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day" (Rev 1). Though not quite conclusive, the evidence makes it probable that the observance of Sunday began among St. Paul's churches, which were predominately Gentile. Now we cannot suppose that Gentile Christians, who were taught by St. Paul to protest against having the Sabbath imposed upon them, would yet accept from the Jews a whole system of religious regulations. The day was important, therefore, to inquire how far the week was recognized in the Greco-Roman world independently of the Jews.

The week originated in Babylon, where it was invented for astrological reasons, but came to be used as a civil division of time. At first each month began with a fresh week, so that there were two or three odd days at the end. This was too inconvenient to last; and the weeks, enunciated from the month, ran on in an unbroken series. The gradual diffusion of Babylonian astrology carried a knowledge of the week into W. Asia, then into Egypt, and later still into E. Europe. The Israelites, when theyinvalled Canaan, found it established there and adopted it, as they did many other elements of Amorite culture; but the emphasis laid upon the Sabbath was their own.

In considering the recognition of the week in Europe it will be convenient to trace the evidence backwards. We may begin with Dio Cassius. He wrote soon after 150 A.D., and so late that he was aware of the Christian church, and was critical of it. He says: "The designation of the days to the seven planets originated in Egypt, but has spread over all the world in comparatively

   5 P. 84.
   6 ZE vii. loc. cit.
   7 Ib.
   8 Deutum Prasunicam, edit. p. 129, hs. 171, p. 83.
   9 Prasunicam Chronic, edit. K. Hennig, Kölln, 1913, l. 58.
   10 Ib. p. 91.
   11 Praetorius, p. 30.
   12 Schedae Antonii (Lithuanian, and among the Poles of Livonia) 1632.
   13 Scriptores Rerum Prasunicarum, Lepzig, 1631-74, l. 53.
   14 Ib. iv. 254.

Praetorius 1 tells us that Praxia (a historian of the 16th cent.) had observed that the Nodrians did honour to their gods by worshipping the different phases of the moon at various stages of their agricultural work.

In the course of his missionary journeys among the Lithuanians Jerome of Prague met with a people who worshipped the sun and who had a strange cult of a huge iron hammer. The priests justified this cult by telling Jerome that formerly the sun had been invisible for many months because a king had imprisoned it in a tower. The signs of the zodiac brought help to the sun, and broke the tower with the huge hammer, and restored the liberated sun to men, and therefore all that had been an instrument by which mortals had received light was worthy of veneration. 2 According to Randal Harris, the signs of the zodiac here stand for the Heavenly Twins or 'Sons of God': "These and similar cases all arise out of the same theme, that the Sun (or the daughter of the Sun) has been carried off, or swallowed or imprisoned, and must be recovered." 3 They use the hammer, the weapon of the thunder-god, because sacred twins are universally considered as children of the sky or thunder-god. In one of the Lettish songs they are described as "workmen of Perkun."

LITERATURE.—(I) See works cited in art. NATUR (Tentacular).

SUNDAY—See PHALALISM, i. 823.
SUNDAY

recent times. The ancient Greeks, at any rate, knew nothing of it: but now it is established not only among all other peoples but even among the Romans, who already regard it as more or less a national institution. 1

In the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr, writing for heathen readers, speaks of Saturday and Sunday (ἡ Κυριακή, τὸ Ἰησοῦν ἡμέρα) as if they were familiar names to all. 2 Near the end of the 2nd cent. Josephus boasted:

"Nor is there any city of the Greeks, nor any barbarian city, nor any nation, where our custom of resting on the seventh day has not prevailed." 3

That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; but it would have been meaningless unless division of time into weeks had been so familiar that any one might know which day was Saturday. The belief that such was the case in the 1st cent. is supported by a picture which was found at Herculanenum, and therefore painted before A.D. 70. It contains the heads of the seven planetary deities in the order of their days—Saturn, Apollo, Diana, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus. Numerous references in Latin literature assure us that the Jewish Sabbath was well known as early as the Christian era. But on 30 4 to our purpose which implies familiarity with the week. Such are the passages in Tibullus, 5 Ovid, 6 and Martial, 7 which mention the observance of Sabbaths by Romans. But more remarkable is the fact that Horace, 8 writing about 30, represents an ordinary superstition—a mother, making a vow for next Thursday (Jovis dies) and could describe how he himself attempted to escape from a bore by pleading that it was a special Sabbath. 9 Neither the vow nor the plea would be intelligible without the week as a familiar background.

2. Sunday in the primitive Church.—It was therefore not only the Jewish proselytes among St. Paul's converts, but all his Greek and Roman disciples, who reckoned their time by weeks and therefore found a weekly day of worship natural. To such, again, as were Jews by race it seemed actually part of the order of nature. That is why we may well suppose, St. Paul's protests against the observance of the Sabbath or of any fixed days 10 were but partially successful. The Sabbath, indeed, was given up by the churches which he founded. But, as a concession to his converts' habit of mind, another day of the week was chosen for worship. There could be no question what the choice should be, for the Lord's resurrection had given the first day of the week an unquestionable priority.

The name of this day which was current in the Roman Empire was 'the day of the sun' (ἡ Δυτική ὡρα, dies solis). The Jews, who avoided all use of heathen terms for either days or months, called it the first day of the week (σὰρξ Σαββατοκύριακος), and the earliest Christians followed their example. But a mere number was felt to lack distinction, and very soon an appropriate name was found, which contrasted alike with Sabbath and Sunday. The first day of the month, at least in Asia Minor, was usually called the 'Emperor's Day' (Σαββατοκύριακα). 11

Now the early Christians, partly by way of challenge, applied to their Lord many of the official terms which were consecrated by the greatness of the lord of the earth. So it was probably not without reference to the term Σαββατοκυριακά that they entitled the first day of the week Κυριακή, the 'Lord's Day.' 12 So a name was rapidly established. The narrative of the Apocalypse, writing about A.D. 90, uses it without explanation. To Ignatius 13 (c. A.D. 110) it was a matter of course and a basis for argument. When the empire became Christian, the name entirely displaced 'the day of the sun' for all who spoke Greek or Latin. 14 The name remains to this day in Greek; and in the Romance languages we find derivatives of dies Dominicus, dies Domenica, and so on. But the Northern peoples, who in accepting the week from the heathen Romans had named the days after the corresponding Northern divinities, were more conservative. In England Sunday (A.S. Sundaeg), in Germany Sonntag, in Sweden Söndag, have resisted all attempts to substitute either Lord's Day or Sabbath.

3. Observance in the Church before A.D. 321.—The records tell us very little about the manner in which Sunday was observed during the first three centuries, except that it was the day on which Christians assembled for worship. After St. Paul, who is quoted above, our first witness is the younger Pliny. His famous letter, written to the emperor Trajan in A.D. 104, tells how the Christians in his province of Bithynia held a service early in the morning 'on a fixed day' (stato die) and a common meal late in the evening (dies Neronianae 110) insists upon the contrast between the Lord's Day and the Sabbath. 2 A little later the Teaching of the Apostles ordains:

Καὶ κύριος ὖν ὁ Κύριος ὅν οὐκ ἔχειν ἡμέρα ἄνω και ἐχάριστος ἐπὶ μινῆς ὅταν ἔχειν τῆς ἀκελάντητος ἡμέρας ἡμῶν Κύριος θυσία ἀργών τῆς συνάντησε. 3

A simple service, before or after the day's work, was the only observance possible for a community in which most of whose members occupied very humble stations, while many were slaves. As the Christians advanced in numbers and in social position, they were able to command the time for a long service. Justin Martyr, writing about A.D. 170, describes one which must have occupied at least two hours; for it includes readings from the Bible, sermon, prayers, and Eucharist. 4 And, since Melito, bishop of Sardis, just about the same time published a treatise On the Lord's Day, we may conclude that the services were being systematized. 5 How important they were considered is partly shown by Tertullian's attack upon cowardly bishops, who excused themselves for fleeing from persecution on the ground that in such times they could not assemble a congregation or celebrate the Sunday rites: 'Sed quomodo colloquentes, iniquis, quomodo Dominica sollemnissima celebrabilis? 6 From that time onward the position of Sunday as a holy day was unquestioned; and we need trace its history no further.

Just at that point we find the first suggestion of a Sunday holiday. Two sentences of Tertullian are worth quoting, both written while he was still a Catholic. In Sunday worship, he says, Christians avoid every trace of gloom, and even put aside business which might interfere with prayer ("differentia eiusmod negotia, ne quern diabolo locum demus") 7 And, when he tells the Christians that they have more festivals in the year than the heathen, he implies that Sunday, like a Roman festival, is more or less a holiday: 'Si quid et carnis indigestum est, habes, non domum tuum dies tantum ... sed et festas ... Nam his dies semel annua dies quisque festus est, tibi octavus quince dies.' 8 It is to be observed that he compares Sunday with heathen festivals rather than with the Sabbath. So long as Jewish Christianity remained a power, or the hostility of Jews a thing to be feared, Gentile the emperor, the lord of the earth. So it was probably not without reference to the term Σαββατοκυριακά that they entitled the first day of the week Κυριακή, the 'Lord's Day.' 11 So a name was rapidly established. The narrative of the Apocalypse, writing about A.D. 90, uses it without explanation. To Ignatius (c. A.D. 110) it

1 Hist. Rom. xxxiii. 18. 2 Apol. p. 67.
2 C. Epis. Epiphanii, ii. 42. 3 II. iv. 7.
3 Acts Antit. i. 415. 4 II. i. 69.
6 Ad Magn. 9. 7 Epp. ad Traj. 96. 8 Ad Magn. 9.
years more. The Apostolic Constitutions, e.g., recognized a parallel observance of the Sabbath and Sunday. And the Council of Nice (325) which conferred the dignity of a definition on the observance of the Sabbath, marks it as a festival and a day of worship, while the observance in the East, was Western in its observance of Sabbath in the East was a reason for keeping Sunday clear of Sabbath observances elsewhere. The fusion between East and West was Western in its observance of Sabbath. Accordingly (Chrysostom (340-407)) says that the Lord's Day is cultivated and treated with putting away evil thoughts and acquiring true knowledge; and Origen (c. 240) apologizes for the common observance of the Sabbath in the East. He isidden with the weakness of the weaker brethren. They, 'being either unable or unwilling to keep everything, require some sensible memorial to prevent spiritual things from passing altogether away from their minds.'

A hundred years later Athanasius wrote to the same effect: 'We keep no Sabbath day (but) we keep the Lord's Day as a memorial of the beginning of the second creation.'

St. Jerome follows in the same line. He tells how his party of recluses at Bethlehem attended Church services on Sunday, but otherwise pursued their usual occupations. St. Augustine, while insisting upon the festal character of Sunday—Dies tamen non judaeus sed Christianus resurrectiones Domini declaratur erat ex illo habere coepti festivitatem as pronounces that the Fourth Commandment is in no literal sense binding upon Christians. His words seem framed to exclude the idea of any transference of obligation from the Sabbath to Sunday.

Monsanto in favour of a day of rest.—While the leaders of the Church gave no sanction to the idea that Sunday was the heir of the Sabbath, that idea was all the more gaining power among the mass of the Christian people. In the West, Sunday was combined with the observance of the Lord's Day in the manner in which in many cases involved the abandonment of regular work. How steadily popular opinion was moving in the direction of a Sunday holiday may be inferred from a resolution passed in 305 by the Council of Iliiberis in Spain, making the observance of the Lord's Day compulsory and ordaining that failure to attend the services shall be punished with excommunication.

The Sabbatarian movement, therefore, like that for the worship of the saints, came from below. Theologians long resisted it, but at last yielded, and sought for reasons to justify a practice which the people had adopted. Among these we do not usually find either the duty of observing the Fourth Commandment in the spirit or the social need (recognized in Deuteronomy) of a day of rest and recreation. The reasons alleged are of a mystical and symbolical character, such as would naturally suggest themselves to the theologians in difficulties. And yet the very contrast which they draw between the Sabbath and the Lord's Day show the influence of the popular pressure, and prepare the way for the identification of the two which was to come in the 9th century.

St. Ambrose, e.g., describes how the first day has succeeded to the dignity which formerly belonged to the seventh: 'Ut enim Dominica dixit coepit procedere quo Dominus resurrexit: Sabbatum, quod primum erat, secundum habebi coepit a primo. Prima enim requiri sequitur, secunda successit.' St. Cyprian expresses the same idea more fully. Writing on 1 Oc. 125, he says that the first day of the week was well chosen for acts of celebration, because 'evens itus is the Lord's Day.' He thus actually carries back the Sunday rest into the year 57. And, when he writes about 10 Oc. 141, he asserts that 'octoemth every day alike' has reference only to the rest of the Sabbath, while the Lord's Day is still the Lord's Day and the Sunday, by the manner of his time, is not surprising to find him once coming very near to the

later Sabbatarian view. In the 10th Humilt on Gn he writes: 'God from the first teaches us symbolically to set apart one whole day in the week to devotion and to the study of the word.' Examples might be given from other writers. But these are enough to indicate the double process which was going on. While the official position of the Church was hostile to Sabbatarianism, the writers could not altogether suppress all traces of the popular opinion which was steadily moving towards it.

5. Constantine's decree of A. D. 321.—Parallel to the Christian movement in favour of a Sunday rest there seems to have been another, which was quite independent. The matter is obscure, and we must rely in part upon conjecture. As the social and industrial organization of the empire advanced under the PAX Romana, the spurious festivals of the ancient calendar became more and more inconvenient. The efficiency of labour depends largely upon recreation; but holidays at irregular intervals are not effectual for recreation; and interfere sadly with organization. We can imagine that the heathen often reflected upon the contrast, to which Tertullian points, between the regular weekly festival of the Christians and their own uncertain celebrations; and they may have wished that they could exchange their inconvenient holidays for a regular rest on the 'day of the sun.' Some such process of thought in the popular mind is required to account for the change of which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree.

Though he was doubtless influenced mainly by the wishes of his Christian supporters, it was not 'the Lord's Day' in the vulgar sense with which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree. Though he was doubtless influenced mainly by the wishes of his Christian supporters, it was not 'the Lord's Day' in the vulgar sense with which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree.

There has been much speculation about Constantine's motives. Eusebius would persuade us that they were wholly religious, others that social and political considerations determined his action; but we have not sufficient evidence to decide the question. One thing is certain. The edict of A. D. 321 marks an epoch in the history of Sunday. It was the parent of a double series of legal enactments and conciliar decrees which had great influence—both for good and for evil—upon the life of all Europe during many centuries.

6. Later imperial decrees.—With regard to the imperial decrees, it is important to remember that they affected an ever-decreasing area. The laws of Theodosius the Great, which forbade all litigation and the spectacles of the theatre and the circus on the 'Dies Solis quem Dominum rite dixere maiores' (386), affected mankind from Spain to Mesopotamia. But its reiteration by Leo and Anthemius (469) was addressed only to Turkey, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. The chief importance of those later decrees is that, enshrined in Justinian's Code, they set up a standard for the new nations which gradually rose out of the flood of barbarian invasion.

7. Decrees of Church Councils (500-600).—On the other hand, the decrees of Church Councils had an immediate influence not only in the areas which they represented but also to some extent throughout the former Roman Empire, for the Church maintained a large degree of unity. It is therefore worth while, therefore, to examine the Council of Laodicea (263), ordering men to work on the Sabbath, bade them ρως Κυρίῳ πρεσβύτερω, et με δύομαι, σχολήν ὡς χριστιανον, but also how the Council of Orleans (538), while protesting

1 Cod. Jur. b. m. liti. xii. 3. 2 Vitae Chret. iv. 13-51.
against an excessive Sabattarianism, forbade all field work under pain of censure; and the Council of Macon (685) laid down that the Lord’s Day ‘is the day of perpetual rest, which is suggested to us by the type of the seventh day in the law and the prophets,’ and ordered a complete cessation of all kinds of business. How far the movement had gone by the end of the 2nd cent. is shown by a letter of Gregory the Great 1 (pope 590—604) protesting against the prohibition of baths on Sunday.

Sabbatarian movement (600—800).—It was a rigid instance of how the people to demand, and commanding councils to grant, that Sunday should be a day of rest as well as of worship. Up to the end of the 6th cent. the resultant changes in law and custom, in spite of some extravagances, were on the whole beneficial. But in the darkness of the next two centuries other influences came into play. The ceaseless wars and disorders which lowered the standard of civilization both in the Eastern Empire and in Western Europe threw all initiative into the hands of military or ecclesiastical authorities. Changes were no longer made in response to the people’s demand, but were imposed upon them by rulers who were guided not by a desire of practical benefit, but by monastic theory. Thus an edict 2 of Clotaire III. (c. 660) forbids service labour on Sunday.

‘Quaestio hie prohibet et sacra scriptura in omnibus contra dicta.’

Among the laws of Ioe, king of Wessex (c. 660), we find the following:

‘Ich non servemus’ work on Sunday by his lord’s command, let him be free; and let the lord pay xxx shillings as “wite.” But if ‘the servem’ work without his knowledge, let him suffer in his hide, or is “hide-gild.” But if a freeman work on that day without his lord’s command, let him forfeit his freedom, or sixty shillings; and be a private doing liable to death. 3

9. The Christian Sabbath from 800 to 1500.—

(a) Decrees of rulers and councils.—Though the decrees of the 7th and 8th centuries were obviously part of a Sabattarian movement, the term 4 Sabbath was not applied to Sunday until Alcuin in 800.

‘Ocuus observationem nos Christianos ad diem domini consecravit sanctissimam.’

Under his inspiration the new feeling, long felt in society, was crystallized in Charlemagne’s decree of A.D. 789, which forbade all ordinary labour on Sunday as a breach of the Fourth Commandment. The aim of the edict was to forbid agriculture and commerce, which Constantine had expressly permitted, and the holding of markets, which Constantine had appointed in order to encourage country people to attend the church. The provision was: ‘Provisione pietatis et bene-quaedam mundana die solis peripetio anno constituta.’

From that time onward the identification of Sunday with the Sabbath was taken for granted, and from that principle deductions of increasing severity were drawn by princes and ecclesiastics.

Among the decrees which were issued by princes for their own dominions we may mention that of the emperor Leo (c. 960) which forbade agricultural work in the Eastern Empire, and that of Edgar the Peaceable (A.D. 968) which extended the Lord’s Day from 3 p.m. on Saturday to Monday’s dawn. More interesting, because of wider influence, are the pronouncements of leading churchmen. In the 12th cent., e.g., Bernard of Clairvaux maintained that the Fourth Commandment required the Sabbatical observance not only of Sundays but also of holy days. The doctrine of Eustace of Avila, a learned canonist, laid down the law of the Christian Sabbath with a fullness of detail which rivals that of the Fathers.

1 Bp. xii. 3.
2 5 Hervin. Hist. of the Sabbath, ii. 137.
3 A. W. Hadden and W. Stubbins, Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents illustrating the History of England and Ireland, Oxford, 1892-78, iii. 215. The resolution of the Council of Clovesho (747), which is sometimes quoted, applies only to monasteries.
4 ‘Ich non servemus’.
5 J. Bruttr, Inscriptiones antiques, Amsterdam, 1707, clxiv. 2.
6 Sumeri, II. i. q. cit. art. 2.

Pharasians. And the precepts of the learned were enforced and illustrated by the multitude by striking miracles. Decrees—ranging from forbidding the Lord’s Day to the reading of books—which had fallen upon those who profaned Sunday or Saint’s Day by labour. 1

For five hundred years after Charlemagne Church Councils were much occupied with questions of Sunday observance. The following examples may perhaps be sufficient for the purpose of illustration:

A.D. 592.—The Council of Paris re-enacts the prohibition of ploughing, marketing, and law business on Sunday. 2

1009.—A Council at Hexham (near Lambeth) forbids markets, fairs, hunting, and ordinary labour. 3

1159.—A Synod of Bourges forbids travelling, except in cases of necessity or necessity. 4

1220.—The Synod of Lyon forbids all admittance to the church and prayer on Sunday. 5

1241.—The Synod of Valladolid ordained ‘quod nullus in diebus Dominicae et Festivis agere solus, aut manum artificia exercere praeuniat, nisi ursque necessitate, vel evidenter pietatis causa.’

(b) How Sunday was observed.—What was the effect of all these exhortations? The constant repetition of the law, and the severity with which they had not been obeyed. But particular evidence is not wanting. In 1229, e.g., the prior of Walsingham, who held a market on Saturday and Sunday, granted half the profits to Sir William de Clare in exchange for other rights. And the records tell not only of journeys which emperors and kings made on Sunday, but also of three emperors who were crowned in St. Peter’s at Rome in that day, causing thereby an immense amount of labour. 6 Sunday, therefore, was not generally observed with anything like the strictness which Church authorities enjoined. Yet it was to a large extent observed as a holiday and a day of worship. How were the hours of leisure spent? In all the decrees of Councils and pronouncements of individuals, down to the 15th cent., there is no prohibition of any recreation except dancing, the singing of ribald songs, theatrical performances, and races in the circus. 7 The last two prohibitions of the emperor Leo soon became needless, for theatre and circus ceased to exist. So from 900 till the Reformation there was practically no limit set to the amusements of the people on Sunday. What use was made of that liberty we may infer partly from the decrees of Councils in the 16th cent. and partly from the Puritan reaction which soon began in England.

10. The Roman Catholic Sunday in the 16th century.—The Council of Cologne 8 (1536) decrees:

‘Cupimus his diebus prohiberi mundinae, claudi cauponae, vitari comissiones, christianae, eunupiae, ilia, lunae impudicae, chorose plenas insanias, colloquia prava, cantilenae turges, breviter consuetum in annis conversari.’

The Council of Milan 9 (1539) complains that: Sunday is commonly profaned by markets, open shops, hawking, dancing, sports, conjuring, and theatrical performances. The Council of Rheims (1535) decrees:

‘Nemo ludus at chores det operam. Ventidiones quaramque rerum, his exceptis quae ad divinum cultum et victa necessarium pertineant, mundinae publicae, noxias et antiquas, ne faust diebus festas. Ludos estime theatrales, etiam praetexta consuetudini, prohibere.’

The Council of Narbonne 9 (1609) protests against the profanation of Sunday by dancing, singing,

1 Council, Parisiensis, c. 59; H. Spelman, Concilia, London, 1729-54, i. 158; Miraculae de St. Benoit, vi. 10, 38.
2 Heylin, ii. 5, l. 17.
3 Ibid., i. 9, § 7.
4 Ibid., i. 9, § 7.
5 Spelman, op. cit.
6 Le Consuetudine antiquis, iii. cap. i.
7 F. G. Blomefield, Topographical Hist. of Norfolk London, 1800-10, ii. 271.
8 Ibid., i. 9, § 10.
hunting, hawking, markets, public feasts, and revelling, and allows none but travellers to be served in the inns. These quotations prove that the Counter-Reformation led the authorities of the countries which remained Roman Catholic to recognize a duty with regard not only to Sunday labour but also to Sunday recreations. They seriously endeavoured to check the complacency which had been allowed for many ages and had doubtless increased with the advance of material prosperity in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is difficult to estimate how far they succeeded in reforming the manners of the people. Peter Heylin, sub-dean of Westminster, whose History of the Sabbath is the most valuable book on the subject, is an important witness, for he travelled on the Continent very soon after the close of the 16th century. He sums up his impressions in these words:

'Nor is their discipline so severe as their Canons neither. Some of their laws as Ex 20:10 as historical, they could not rest the institution of Sunday on either of the traditional grounds. They could not identify it with the Jewish Sabbath; nor could they admit that an ecclesiastical rule of observance, however venerable, was of unchangeable validity. Yet both feeling and reason urged them to maintain its obligation. Luther, Calvin, and the various cæthecians and confessions put forward much the same reason for this effect on which I could observe, which I was amongst them, is solemnized after the same manner as with us in England; repairing to the Church, both at Mass and Vespers, riding abroad or walking forth to take the air, or otherwise to refresh themselves, and following their home affairs in such leisure times as were not destined to the publick meetings; the people not being barred from travelling about their lawful business, as occasion is, so they regularise these days as they did in the publick.

But Heylin, as an advocate, looks only on the fair side; and undoubtedly (as the decrees of the Counsels imply) there were many regions in which Sabbath was spoiled both by needless labours and by the costomest amusements.

11. The Protestant Sunday in the 16th century.

The Reformers of the 16th century were in a difficult position, for, although they regarded both the New Testament and Ex 20:10 as historical, they could not rest the institution of Sunday on either of the traditional grounds. They could not identify it with the Jewish Sabbath; nor could they admit that an ecclesiastical rule of observance, however venerable, was of unchangeable validity. Yet both feeling and reason urged them to maintain its obligation. Luther, Calvin, and the various cæthecians and confessions put forward much the same reason for this effect on which I could observe, which I was amongst them, is solemnized after the same manner as with us in England; repairing to the Church, both at Mass and Vespers, riding abroad or walking forth to take the air, or otherwise to refresh themselves, and following their home affairs in such leisure times as were not destined to the publick meetings; the people not being barred from travelling about their lawful business, as occasion is, so they regularise these days as they did in the publick.

The Fourth Commandment was abrogated by the New Testament; and ideally there should be no distinction between days. Christian nature requires a day of rest from labour the soul demands leisure for joint worship: therefore a day must be set apart in all ages. We cannot do better than follow the tradition which sets apart the first day of the week.4 Sound as that argument was, it had an unfortunate effect upon the minds of a generation who had been accustomed to rest upon absolute law and were not ready to accept reason in its place. To a vast number of Protestants Sunday appeared to have lost its authority; and there was a decided slackening of its observance. Heylin thus describes the state of things in the latter part of the century:

'There was no restraint on Sundays in the afternoon, from any kind of servile work, or daily labours; but that men might and did apply themselves to their several businesses, as on other days. As for the greater towns, there is scarce any of them, wherein there are not Faires and Marts, Men (as they use to call them) upon the Sunday; and those as much frequented in the afternoon as were the Churches in the morning. And so that in general the Lord's day is not otherwise observed with them, than as half holiday is with us. . . . For recreations, last of all, there is no question to be made, but that where working is permitted, and most kinds of business, a man may lawfully enjoy himself and his honest pleasures; and without danger of offence pursue those pastimes by which the mind may be refreshed and the spirits quickened.5

This is true, he says, of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and part of Poland.

In England, where religious changes were far 1 Vol. 17. 2

less violent, the observance of Sunday in the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth was considerably stricter.

Both The Institution of a Christian Man (1557) and the queen's Injunctions (1559) lay down excellent principles. And yet one of the Homilies, published in 1558, sorrowfully confesses: 'The Lord was more disheartened and rejoiced to see no Sunday served on Sunday than upon all the days in the weeks besides.' King James's proclamation of 7th May 1615 is a significant confirmation of the conclusion that he formed 'that there had been in former times a great neglect in keeping the Sabbath day', he orders 'that there should be no Bull-baiting, Enterludes, common Plays, or other like disorderly or unlawful Entertainments of any sort whatever, or used at any time hereafter upon any Sabbath day.' And this was not because James was accustomed to great strictness in Scotland, where up to 1600 observance was on the whole less precise than in England. The early Calvinists were not Sabbatarians, and John Knox himself played bowls on Sunday.


Till the reign of James I, as we have seen, England and Scotland kept pace with the movements on the Continent. But throughout the 17th cent. our island was the scene of a dramatic struggle which had no parallel elsewhere. The extreme Protestant type of mind has a natural affinity to the O.T., and the Calvinists and other Puritan sects early felt the attraction. By a process somewhat like that which led to the rise of the Anglican Church, the Puritan Sabbath, and their steps were hastened by repulsion from the scandal of the 16th cent. Sunday. The movement, of which the Publick Use of Both Stages are obscure, came to a head in the publication of a remarkable book.

Nicholas Bowd, a Suffolk clergyman, in his Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti, or the True Doctrine of the Sabbath (1656), boldly and crudely claimed for Sunday the authority and the observances of the Jewish Sabbath, maintained that they should be enforced by the State. The book had an immense vogue. It was translated and circulated on the Continent, where it exercised much influence. In England, accepted as an inspiration by some and as a challenge by others, it gave rise to a literary controversy which continued for a hundred years. The first reply to it was James's Book of Sports (1655), which proclaimed liberty for the people to enjoy their traditional pastimes on Sundays, building and bear-baiting. This was followed by the Sunday Observance Act (1663), which forbade men to go outside their own parishes in search of amusement on Sunday. The Book of Sports was republished by Charles I in 1663, with a special admonition to justices of the peace: 'Look to it, both that all disorders there may be prevented and punished, and that all neighbourhood and freedom, with maiming and lawful exercises, be used.'

In 1635 Francis White, bishop of Ely, published an official defence of this view; and in 1638 Heylin supported it with The History of the Sabbath, a book which shows much ability and learning. The controversy was still bitter in 1642, when 120 books on the subject were published in the next hundred years. Other weapons were used besides the pen. In 1643 Parliament ordered the Book of Sports to be burned by the hangman and imposed the Puritan Sabbath upon the ever-increasing area which their troops commanded. In 1648 they formally adopted the Westminster Confession and the Long Parliament's and the Shorter Catechisms. One quotation from the last-named must suffice.

'Q. 60. How is the Sabbath to be sanctified? A. The Sabbath is to be sanctified by a holy resting all that day even from such worldly employments and recreations as are lawful on other days; and spending the whole time in the public and private exercises of devotion; and what is to be taken up in the works of necessity and mercy. By successive enactments (1644, 1650, 1656) the same Parliament proscribed every kind of Sunday recreation, even 'vainly and profanely' walking for pleasure. At the Restoration the pendulum swung the other way. The court, the cavaliers, and the High Church clergy were quick to strike out a violent reaction; and the return of the Prayer-book service on Sunday morning was accompanied by trading, open theatres, and ostentatious frivolity.

1 The full title of this work is The Kingdom's Decree concerning his Subjects concerning Lawfull Sports to be Used. London, 1618.
in the afternoon and evening. To what lengths the court may be moved from Macanlay's description of Charles II.'s last Sunday night. There were many protests; and the battle of the books continued, Bishop Pearson, John Owen, and Richard Baxter being among the combatants. In 1662, when the compromise was effected. The Sunday Observance Act regulated trade, labour, and travelling in a reasonable way, making ample allowance for 'works of necessity.' At the same time the Sunday Observance Act of 1662 was revived and came to be recognized as the standard by which amusements were to be regulated. Both acts were observed with varying degrees of strictness at different times and in different places. But it is a just tribute to their reasonableness that both remained in force until the year 1871, though they were modified in some details; e.g., in 1699 forty watermen were allowed to ply on the Thames, in 1710 coxes and chairies received part mission to stand for hire, and in 1794 bakers to sell bread at certain hours. From the Revolution to the death of Queen Anne a higher standard prevailed, both of attendance at church and of obedience to the law. Under the Georges, though no change was made in the law, and though the same literary controversy continued, there was a steady decline in both respects. About 1790 the Evangelical Revival, following the movement led by John Wesley, produced a considerable change in opinion and observance. How much need there was for improvement may be inferred from three actions of Bishop Porteous, who was a leader of the new school. He supported the institution of Sunday Schools, which began in 1780 and soon spread over the country. He persuaded the Prince of Wales to transfer the meetings of his rowdy 'Sunday Club' to a week-day. And he drew up the Sunday Observance Act of 1781, which enacts that any place of public entertainment or debate where a charge is made for admission may be deemed a disorderly house. Passed in order to check bear-baiting and infidel propaganda, this act has been used of late to impede Sunday concerts and lectures to working-men. For many years it was undoubtedly of great value, helping to restore the credit of Sunday in the public eye. But, when the rapid growth of the great towns, due to the industrial revolution, presented new problems, this law combined with the restrictions of travelling to cause mischief. The mass of the industrial population, cooped up in towns which were sometimes manufacturing centres, had no meetingplace but the street or the public-house. This evil became serious in the latter part of the 18th cent., but its full development was not seen till the 19th.

(6) Scotland.—Scotland very early in the 17th cent. adopted the theory of the 'Christian Sabbath' and applied it to social life with the ruthless logic which is characteristic of Calvinism. The Westminster Confession was adopted by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1647, before Parliament had passed it; and it has remained the formal standard of faith to the present day. So long as it was enforced by public opinion—i.e. till about 1870—the Scottish Sunday was observed with amazing vigour. Not only were ordinary recreations disallowed; a ban was put even upon books and music, except such as were recognized as religious in the narrow sense. No recreation remained; not even the whisky-drinking, the old rigour remains; but in the greater part of the country, as will be explained below, the last fifty years have witnessed a great change.

(c) America.—The American colonies differed in their practice. The more southerly States, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, were inclined to English views of Sunday. The New England States, founded by Puritans, kept very close to the Scottish standard; but their coast towns were influenced by English practices, and their Western border by the practical necessity of being imposed by their Indian neighbours.

(d) Protestant Europe.—Nicholas Bowdoin's book was translated into several Continental languages and exercised a considerable influence. In Holland and Switzerland a strong Sabbatarian party grew up; and in Protestant Germany his doctrine found vigorous advocates. But on the whole the Sabbatarians failed; and the observance of Sunday, especially in Germany, fell much below the standard in England. Sunday labour was very rare, and Sunday amusements were very coarse.

(e) Roman Catholic Europe.—In Roman Catholic countries, during the same centuries, Sunday was so much eclipsed by the Saints' Days that it ceased to be observed with any kind of strictness. While the Saints' Days were real holidays, labour on Sunday was the rule rather than the exception. Till near the end of the 18th cent. the priesthood were powerful enough to secure a general attendance at mass; but the rest of the day was usually given to ordinary occupations. If in Spain Sunday was more a day of rest than in France or Italy this was because it was the day set apart for bull-fights.

13. From the French Revolution to 1848.—The French Revolution marks an epoch in the history of Sunday observance. It took place in a week of ten days, though ephemeral and rather absurd, was a practical challenge to tradition, whose effects were permanent. The questions which it raised frightened some men into reaction, but excited others to free speculation. And it gave prominence to one fact, which no Government could afford to ignore for long. In every country there was an increasing number of citizens who did not acknowledge the Christian sanctions for Sunday, for whose rules for Sunday observance must rest on social rather than religious grounds. The recognition of this fact gradually affected the administration of the existing laws; and it may be accounted for the complete absence of legislation between 1780 and 1850. In England the repulsion caused by the Revolution combined with the Evangelical Revival to render Sunday observance much stricter. The laws of 1672 and 1731 were rather rigidly enforced, and public opinion (among the minority who had votes for Parliament) was on the whole Sabbatarian. For the middle class and for all the people in country districts the movement was largely beneficial. The churches were filled; the sense of duty was strengthened; and habits of reflexion were induced. On the other hand, for the growing multitudes in the great towns the restrictions imposed by law became ever more cruel. Negotiated by the Church, they had few places of worship and little will to enter them. They wanted means of getting into the country and opportunities of reasonable recreation in the town; but these were denied them, and nothing was left but the public house. It was not till about 1850 that their needs were recognized. The active controversy which was carried on about Sunday concerned only the reasons for observing it. Several distinguished writers took part in the discussion, but they did not more than reproduce the well-worn arguments of the 17th cent. on either side.

1 The present writer was threatened with prosecution in 1857 for lecturing to a Sunday Society in Bristol.
In France, though Napoleon re-established the Church, the spirit of the revolution was never quite subdued, and the public mind could not be restored. It remained to a large extent a day of trade and of labour, as well as of social amusements. In Spain and Italy there was no systematic movement in the same direction, but French ideas, there was a marked decline. If we may judge by the books which were published there between 1780 and 1788, public opinion was more and more adverse to strictness based on religious grounds and not yet alive to the social reasons in favour of a day of rest, the observance of it, therefore, resting mainly upon tradition, naturally failed to maintain its hold.

The United States continued the division of opinion which had existed among the colonies of New England. The South proceeded to New England and the Western States, which were gradually peopled by emigrants from New England, remained Sabbatarian, while the Southern States, led by the Quakers of Pennsylvania, generally adopted the more liberal view. Between 1839 and 1850 many books were published on both sides, but no legislation resulted.

14. From 1848 to 1914.—From 1848, the 'year of revolution,' we may date a new phase of the Sunday controversy. Suddenly the masses of the people, especially in manufacturing towns, acquired a new consciousness and began to be regarded with a new interest. The consequences were not long in making themselves felt. Hitherto it may be said that the churches and the legislatures had, on the whole, worked in harmony. Since 1848 there has been a gradual divergence. For, while the churches were slow to admit the possibility of change, the legislatures, more and more influenced by popular opinion, tended to favour the claims of those who wished to make the Sunday a day of leisure and to be required by new social conditions. At the same time an agitation began in some countries in favour of limiting the Sunday labour which vast numbers felt to be oppressive. These two elements were mixed in very different proportions in different countries.

(a) England.—In England, where Sunday labour was already severely limited, the main question was the trade unions. Here, as in some other countries, arose about two points. Should railway travelling be allowed on Sunday? And should the new Crystal Palace be open to the public on Sunday afternoon? The instances could not have been better chosen, for their discussion involved all the main principles which were at stake. Twenty years passed before any legislative result came of the debate. In 1871 an Act was passed requiring the consent in writing of the chief officer of a police district, or of two magistrates, before a prosecution for Sunday trading could be instituted under the Act of 1877. Since then the Sunday Observance Act has been a dead letter. And an Act of 1875 had limited the Sunday attendance of the chapel of 1781. That did not end the debate. In 1875 the Sunday League was formed to advocate the opening of museums and picture galleries and other means of rational recreation on Sundays. In spite of several societies started in opposition, the Sunday League has gradually effected a great and beneficial change.

But the real crux of the situation is connected with travelling. Nothing has done so much to alter the habits of the people as the rapid increase in means of communication. The railway, the steamer, the tramcar, and the motor-car have successively helped to empty the towns on Sunday. They have answered a real need, and the demand for more seats has created a new craving for fresh air and change of scene, which finds satisfaction in the week-end habit of the richer folk and in the excursion train for the poorer. The desire for such recreation is natural in 1850, 1880, and 1910. At the same time it is responsible for two serious evils. (1) Those who spend Sunday away from home rarely devote any part of it to worship, and those who remain at home feel themselves thereby excused from attending at church. Consequently the number of those who enter any place of worship on Sunday forms an increasingly small percentage of the population. (2) Every added facility for travel on Sunday involves additional labour on the part of a large class of workers. The railways, the tramways, the restaurants, the bands, and the news agencies are so heavily tasked on Sunday that few of their employees enjoy anything like a day of rest.

Intent upon claiming what they considered their right to recreation and convenience, the mass of the people did not see what was happening. The satisfaction. Shops were increasingly opened, trains ran in ever-increasing numbers, and a large number of subsidiary industries were obliged to join the movement. Then contractors who were in a hurry took to Sunday work; and there was a real danger that the industrial population might lose their day of rest. About the beginning of the 20th century, the trade unions and other bodies began to realize the danger, and a movement began to protest; and so a check was imposed upon the movement. In the first year (1914-15) of the Great War it seemed as if the national necessity might obliterate Sunday rest. Munition factories and many others were opened on Sunday, and double pay was offered for work on that day. But the result was uniformly a diminished output. Many of those who worked on Sunday for double pay spent the extra money in drink on Monday and Tuesday; and it was found that all seven days did so with rapidly falling energy. After two years Sunday work was generally abandoned; and it may be hoped that the nation has taken the lesson how to act.

(b) The Continent.—On the Continent during the latter half of the 19th century the same causes produced even more marked effects. In the eighties and nineties a stranger could hardly tell from the aspect of the towns whether the day was Sunday or not. But at last even the 'anti-clerical' Governments, which had looked on complacently at a change which diminished religious observance, became aware that it was causing immense social mischief; while on behalf of the overstrained workers urgent claims were made for a legal day of rest. Between the years 1895 and 1910 laws were passed, in almost every country of Europe, which were intended to secure a weekly holiday for every working-man. Even in France, where the secularist influences were strongest, it was judged necessary to insist upon Sunday as the normal day of rest, all substitutes in special cases being regarded as a dispensation. The triumph of this movement was a marked change in the aspect of the towns. In the year 1913 no factories were working on Sundays, and few shops were opened. Thus in a large measure Sunday observance has been restored, but with a difference. It is now popularly regarded, not primarily as a response to the religious need of worship, still less as subservience to a divine command, but as the condition of wholesome life for the working-man.

15. The present state of the question.—The foregoing narrative should help us to discern the principles upon which Sunday observance ought to be based, and perhaps to determine the proper mode of observing the day by which it may rightly be enforced or encouraged.

Why is Sunday to be observed? It is easier for us to answer this question than it was for the theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, and that for two reasons. At the same time it is responsible for two serious evils. (1) Those who spend Sunday away from home rarely devote any part of it to worship, and those who remain at home feel themselves thereby excused from attending at church. Consequently the number of those who enter any place of worship on Sunday forms an increasingly small percentage of the population. (2) Every added facility for travel on Sunday.

1 See the return made to the House of Lords on the subject in 1911.
OT has removed a difficulty which they could never fully meet. So long as the story of the creation is in Genesis 1 and 2 and the account of the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai was regarded as historical, the question had to be faced: How can a divine command, directly given to men, be abrogated? The answer for us is plain: No such commands were ever given, and the stories which record them are legends. The Sabbath was made for man; and, under the guidance of Providence, it was made by man for Saturday, in its turn, was made by man and for man. Man, therefore, is lord both of the Sabbath and of Sunday. It is from the experience of men, both as individuals and in societies, that the reasons must be drawn which determine the manner in which Sunday is to be observed.

(a) The new reasons for observing Sunday.—These reasons are evidently of two kinds, answering to the conditions required for bodily vigour and spiritual health. While the former may be regarded as especially the concern of the State and the latter of the Church, the mutual influences of body and mind are so close that it is hard to draw a line between the sphere of politics and that of religion. It is all the harder because ancient thought and practice was certain that the Church cannot ignore this, no State has ever had the courage to ignore this. The division is necessary. The reasons given by the Reformers and may satisfy both of general application and may satisfy both the Church and the State. Since three hundred years of controversy have added nothing substantial to them, we may be content with restating them in a more detailed form. The need of bodily rest at short intervals is a fact of human nature which all civilized nations have recognized by instituting public holidays. The more complex the social and industrial organization, the more important it becomes that such holidays should recur at regular intervals. The sporadic festivals of the ancient Roman calendar and the Sunday of the Church system of modern Italy could not be tolerated in an industrial society; for production depends upon regularity of labour and the efficiency of labour upon regularity of recreation. Constantine’s decree of A.D. 321, therefore, not only conferred upon the individual and satisfied a requirement of the Church, but also solved economic and social problems which were growing very difficult. Its wisdom is proved by the fact that, in spite of occasional protests and experiments, the Sunday holiday has remained the rule of civilized countries ever since. The well-being of the people, which is the proper object of government, demands more than mere cessation of work at sufficient intervals. The life of the citizen is incomplete, and his value to the State is small, unless he cultivates his mind, develops family affection, and enjoys social intercourse. All these functions require leisure—no merely the tired hours after a day’s work, but whole days when the time can be disposed of at will. In days of leisure, also, that personality has the best chance of development. The State, therefore, has a responsibility not only for appointing holidays, but also for preventing such misuse of them as may diminish their value to the citizen and to the community. On the other hand, experience proves such responsibility to be of a negative rather than a passive character. The State can remove obstacles to a right course of action, but cannot compel the individual to walk therein. If any peculiar commandments are laid down for the weekly holiday, they must issue from a religious authority, which appeals only to spiritual sanctions, and affects only those who acknowledge its right. The Christian Church is such an authority, and has strong reasons, besides those just mentioned, for requiring its members to observe Sunday. Putting aside the mistaken claims for Sunday, which originated in the dark ages and were so hotly urged in the 17th cent., there remain some which areneauir to the spiritual life of the individual requires a recurrent leisure time, in which he may read or meditate, may do acts of charity, and commune with his friends, with nature, or art. It requires, also, regular opportunities of joining in common worship, without which his membership of a Church becomes unreal. The former demand might be satisfied by times of leisure peculiar to himself. But the latter involves regular holidays which are common to all. Nor can it be a matter of indifference whether these holidays fall on Sundays. The power of association and tradition is enormous: no man can escape from it, and no Church can ignore it. To substitute another day would be to waste the accumulated associations and traditions of nearly 2000 years which are concentrated on Sunday. For on the Lord’s Sunday rose from the dead; on that day, ever since, His divinity for the Church cannot be lost. On that day they have joined in the feast of His love. Luther did not state the whole case when he wrote: ‘Because Sunday has been appointed from the earliest times, we ought to keep to this arrangement, that all things may be done in harmony and order, and no confusion be caused by unnecessary novelities;’ for he ignored one of the strongest impulses in human nature.

(b) The mode of observance.—Assuming the above reasons for the observance of Sunday, we have to consider, from the point of view of Church and State, what ought to be the manner of its observance. The action of the State in such matters, as we have indicated already, is mainly negative. It has to protect the worker against the oppression of broken labour, to secure for him a regular period of recreation, and to prevent other persons from interfering, whether by force or by bribery, with his reasonable use of his leisure time. That task is not so simple as might appear. Every right, when pressed, imposes a duty on some one else. The right to food involves the Sunday labour of the milkman; the right of the public to enjoy works of art encroaches upon the leisure of the custodians; the right to peace and quietness of the rail and green fields compels the toll of the railwayman. These classes also have their rights, which must somehow be safeguarded. To adjust conflicting claims in the interest of the people as a whole is a work of much insight and patience; nor can it be accomplished once for all, since every enlargement in the tastes and interests of the many involves a fresh tax upon the minimisations of a few. In Britain, happily, men came to be acquiring a general agreement about the main principles of such accommodations. No man should be required or encouraged to work on Sunday except for the benefit of a large number. The railwayman, the customs officer, the musician who plays in a band, is engaged in a work of charity, if he is not adding a seventh working day to his week for the sake of profit. No such plea can be made by a manager who makes profit by the performances of others, or of a tradesman who opens his shops on Sunday. A partial exception is rightly made in the case of those who supply the public with needed refreshments. But even that requires careful watching;
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and the Government has long recognized the duty of limiting the sale of intoxicants to certain hours of the day.

The action of the Church, on the other hand, is positive and compulsory: it is to prevent the use of the leisure which is secured to them by the State. The primary duty which it inculcates upon all is that of attendance at public worship, for which the Sunday rest was originally instituted. But it also inculcates for the whole community, which are not spent in such attendance. In the past such guidance took form mainly of prohibitions. We have seen that, when the prohibitions were few, the result was licence; and, when they were multiplied, Sunday became a day of gloom and boredom. Not to speak of the Scottish 'Sabbath,' which has become proverbial, the restraints were mischievous enough in England till past the middle of the 19th century. The children of pious parents might not play on Sunday except with a Noah's ark. Boys and girls might not take exercise, but sat wearily still. Their elders, lectured to by the 'religious' books or 'sacred' music, took refuge in sleep. Much harm was done to the cause of religion by such observances, and still more by the opposition which Churchmen raised in Portugal to the practice, and for allowing rational entertainments for the artisans of the great towns.

A better spirit now prevails. But, while there is little of coercion by Church authority, there is very little of positive suggestion. The time has come when the Christian Church as a whole must formulate something like a programme, instead of leaving Sunday progress to individual experiment. Some such statement of principles as the following, if issued by any authority, would relieve many troubled consciences and prevent much revolt.

(i) Sunday is the day for Christians to join in worship. No man spends it well who does not habitually unite with his neighbours in praise and prayer.

(ii) Sunday is a day of recreation. Recreation means different things for different people, since an essential feature of it is change. The manual labourer will rest his body; the brain worker will seek exercise; both alike will be the better for a visit to a picture gallery, or a concert, or a talk on politics.

(iii) Sunday is the festival of family life. It is the only day on which most fathers can see much of their children. Unless some hours of the day are employed in cultivating family affection, its ties will be dangerously relaxed.

(iv) Sunday is the day for meditation. The average man, if he does not devote some part of Sunday to reading or thought about anything, is apt to become a slave to routine and no longer possesses his own soul.

(d) How far observance can be enforced.—By what means can the due observance of Sunday be promoted? The primitive Church punished some offenders with corporal punishment; the medieval Church employed the method of penance on a large scale. Both these weapons are now out of date; and they were never of much use for promoting what is best. In proportion as her rules advance from 'thou shalt not' to 'thou shalt,' the Church is less and less able to use any kind of compulsion. She cannot, in fact, compel her members to-day; she can only persuade them through the teaching of ministers and the opinion of neighbours.

The State, on the other hand, just because its commands are nearly all prohibitions, whose object is to protect the rights and interests of the community, can and must use compulsion. Every breach of positive law can be measured and punished by fine or imprisonment. Yet the main influence is really that of public opinion and police, who administer the law, will always be strict or lax according to the general feeling of the society in which they live. The best means therefore of securing a proper observance of Sunday is to educate public opinion.

Robert Cox, The Literature of the Sabbath Question, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1855. A few of them are historical, but the mass are arguments for and against the obligation of the Sabbath, in which the same ideas (very few) recur over and over again. The following short list gives specimens of the writings of different countries and denominations. But as the Sunday School has produced far more books than all the other countries put together.

(i.) 12th century.—Thomas Aquinas, Exposition of the Commandments.

(ii.) 15th century.—Martin Luther, Larger Catechism and other books; John Calvin, Institutes, bk. ii, ch. viii.; Philip Melanchthon, The Apology for the Augsburg Confession; A Confutation of Unwritten Verities; Richard Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, v. 89-91.


Royles and Honeyman treat the subject historically and with much ability. Parts of the history are well treated in articles and special chapters: Smith's D.C.A., e.g. 'Lord's Day'; Venn's, e.g. 'Sunday'; Ridge Religion with Legislation; Paton, e.g. 'Sabbath trader'; H.B.B., e.g. 'Lord's Day' and 'Sabbath.' There is also a good chapter (ch. viii.) in Whittaker, Democracy and Liberty, 2 vols., London, 1896.

SUNDAY SCHOOLS.—I. Origin.—The history of the Sunday School is not the history of religious education. The latter has always existed; the前者 is a modern institution. The Sunday School is a voluntary lay organization conducting religious instruction in classes on Sunday, generally but not always in church buildings, generally but not always as part of a church service. The informal instruction that was probably given by teachers in the early Christian communities was somewhat akin to the activity of the Sunday school teacher. But the catechetical schools which flourished in the post-apostolic Church were entirely different. Moreover, the regular catechizing of children, which was always the duty of the minister, albeit a duty very much neglected in many centuries, was not a part of the Sunday school.

Indeed, if it had been thoroughly effective and well developed, there might never have been a Sunday School. The failure of the clergy to the systematic and organized education of the children made the Sunday school necessary. Thus the Scottish clergy, who were more successful in the training of children, regarded the new institution at first as a threat to their superiors. The Sunday School is to be sought in the sporadic efforts of earnest men and women to supply some elementary instruction to children who were neglected by the Church. The most notable instance of such efforts was the Sunday School Union of Robert Raikes at Gloucester; the name 'Sunday School' seems first to have been attached to his

1 See art. CATHEDRAL, CATHEDRALS.
institution; and there was genetic connexion between Raikes's enterprise and the whole school movement that succeeded.

2. The period of beginnings.—(a) Robert Raikes and the first Sunday schools.—The national duty of general education was not fully recognized in England until fifty years ago. In the 18th cent. education was the privilege of the well-to-do. Even the many benefactions which had been provided from time to time for the education of the children of the middle classes. Moreover, with the development of the factory system, the children had been forced into labour at a very early age, with the result that they grew up in hopeless illiteracy. Among a number of efforts to remedy this intolerable condition the most significant was that of Robert Raikes, editor of the Gloucester Journal. He was a man of generous sympathies, interested in various efforts to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate. His attention was attracted to the vicious conduct of the 'young pagans' who were employed in the factories during the week, but who were at leisure on Sunday, and who naturally employed their single holiday in the only rough recreation which they understood. Believing that their ignorance was responsible for their depravity, he gave a number of them instruction in Bible reading and secured four women at one shilling per day to instruct them in reading and the Church Catechism. The date of this simple enterprise, which was soon copied in numerous towns, is usually set at 1780. Sunday schools became so popular that attention was given to them in the Gentleman's Magazine, and the various letters in that once influential periodical still remain our most important source of information regarding the beginning of the movement. Wesley, in his itinerary, soon came upon Sunday schools in various places, and with fine insight immediately saw their possibilities.

(b) The Sunday school in America.—The American churches were accustomed to hold services in the morning and afternoon. There was an 'intermission' of an hour or more, during which a simple lunch was eaten. Naturally this period was often used for the catechetical instruction of the children, for whom the somewhat solemn services provided little that was appropriate. There is no evidence that any such practice had occasioned appreciation of religious instruction among the children. The teaching of children took place in the schools, in the family, and in connection with the pastoral visits of the minister. A large proportion of the children were of course altogether neglected. The period of the Revolutionary War was not favourable to religious education, and the strong influence of France tended decidedly away from religion. In the general desire of the churches to meet this condition, they turned with interest to the new institution of the Sunday school, which had been introduced into the United States from England. It was not in America primarily (though it was to some extent) a school held on Sunday for illiterate children who could not be instructed on weekdays, but rather a school conducted by the Church for religious instruction on the day set apart for that purpose. Thus from the beginning the Sunday school in America was more closely related to the Church than it was for a long time in England. This is not to say that there was not considerable opposition in the South as well as in the North from those who felt the danger of the intrusion of inexpert laymen.

(c) Sunday school organizations.—Within a few years of the establishment of the Raikes schools organizations for propagating the institution came into existence.

William Fox, a London merchant, had had in contemplation a large plan for the gratuitous instruction of the poor. When he learned of the Raikes scheme, it seemed to him more practical than his own more ambitious project. He went to London in 1781, and in forming, in 1788, the Society for the Establishment and Support of Sunday Schools. In 1792, the society was organized in the United States, and in 1805 in other Scottish cities. In 1810 the Hibernian Sunday School Society was organized in Dublin. The funds for the establishment of new schools, and the payment of teachers, for the purchase of Bibles, spelling-books, etc. The practice of paying teachers, although common, was not for many years, very soon gave way to the volunteer system, with the spread of the new institution. A number of people were giving their services in the Sunday schools of London felt the necessity of mutual help and conference, and they organized in 1806 the Sunday School Society for this purpose. This organization became the most significant means of developing the Sunday school in Great Britain.

Organization began in America with the First-Day or Sunday School Society at Philadelphia, in 1791. It was undenominational in character and philanthropic in purpose. The visit of Albert May of London in 1811 greatly stimulated interest in Sunday school organizations. Many of them were formed in American cities. After a number of federations of these had been made, the desire for a national nondenominational union resulted in the organization of the American Sunday School Union, which has continued to do effective work to the present time.

(d) Lessons and methods of teaching.—The earliest Sunday school teaching was of the most primitive sort. Many schools on both sides of the Atlantic were obliged to give much of their time to the simplest lessons in reading and spelling. Religious instruction consisted of the memorizing of Scripture, hymns, and catechism, the teacher simply listening to the recitation. Soon some simple plans of lessons were prepared, with some practical appreciation of child religion. Helps to the teacher were the Sunday School Repository, or Teachers' Magazine, which began in London in 1815, and the American Sunday School Magazine, started in 1824.

3. Development of the Sunday school in America.—(a) Denominational organizations.—The definite adoption of the Sunday school by the Church in America is seen in the steps taken by American churches to adapt the denominations subsequent to the American Sunday School Union to supervise and extend the work within their own churches. For example, in 1827 the Sunday School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized in New York City; Baptist and Congregational associations starting in 1828 developed into the American Baptist Publication Society in 1834; and the Sunday School and Sabbath School and Publishing Society in 1838. The superior church bodies of other denominations undertook similar responsibilities.

(b) The Sunday school as a pioneer religious agency.—It is easy in the light of our modern educational science to criticize the poor endeavours of early religious education, but no history of the wonderful development of the Mississippi valley would be adequate which failed to recognize the social significance of the little Sunday schools that went far ahead of the organized Church into the pioneer communities.

In 1829 the American Sunday School Union established its first western headquarters at Cincinnati, and in the following year resolved at its annual convention to undertake the organization of a Sunday school in every destitute place in the Mississippi valley. Funds were raised, and clerical missionaries were appointed, and a notable advance was made. The next missionary in the course of a life of arduous journeying organized over 1500 new schools. As it was said of old that where ten Hebrews lived there should be a synagogue, so it came to be the expectation in America that, wherever three or four Christian families were neighbours, a Sunday school should be established. At first in the farm-house, later in the school-house or in the court-house. Very many churches of the West had their origin in the activities of a few of the Labouremen. From religious work by the organization of a little Sunday school.

(c) The International Sunday School Association.—The convention system has been characteristic of the American movement. Annual conventions were held before 1820. Springing from the annual meeting of the American
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Sunday School Union, a national convention of Sunday school workers was called in 1832. After a very successful session this body adjourned to meet the following year. Numerous state and county conventions met in the succeeding years, until in 1859 a third annual convention was called. The fourth did not meet until after the Civil War, in 1869, and by that time the noted Illinois leaders, E. W. Evans, Edward Eggleston, J. H. Vincent, and D. L. Moody were prominent. While this convention was not called international, there were delegates from Canada and from the British Isles. The same was true of the fifth convention of 1872, at which the uniform lessons were adopted. The movement then became definitely organized as international, with delegates from all the states and provinces of North America. An official body was gradually developed, which supervised the extension of the system to state, county, and township conventions, meeting annually and leading up to the great triennial gathering. At the eleventh such meeting it was resolved to incorporate under the name ‘International Sunday School Association.’ This was done in 1907, headquarters being established at Chicago. A completely articulated organization exists under an executive committee, with a general secretary and a corps of superintendents over the various divisions and departments.

(d) The development of the lesson system.—As an improvement on mere memorizing, the ‘limited lesson’ system came into vogue about 1825. Two years later Albert Judson published a question-book, which supplied some notes and explanations of the selected lessons. In the same year the American Sunday School Union issued the Union Question-Book, which was followed annually by others covering a considerable portion of the Bible. Various schemes followed, the result partly of private enterprise, partly of denominational zeal. There was no adequate direction, and Sunday school leaders felt the need of some unity of effort. After much discussion the convention of 1872 voted to issue a uniform system of lessons for all Sunday school pupils. A lesson committee was appointed, and great enthusiasm was developed in the scheme. The co-operation of the British Sunday School Union was secured, and the lessons became practically universal. Noted writers prepared lesson-helps and commentaries; great teachers‘ meetings were held for the exposition of the lesson of the forthcoming Sunday, and the public press frequently devoted a column on Saturday to this topic. After twenty years of great external success the educational value of the uniform lesson was seriously called in question. The subject was warmly debated in conventions. At last, in 1909, the convention decided, while continuing the uniform lesson, to authorize its lesson committee to prepare a thoroughly graded course, to be used by schools as desired. This has since been done, and a series of text-books has been prepared by the various denominations upon the lessons thus outlined.

(e) Teacher training.—It has been recognized that most Sunday School teaching has been very unsatisfactory. Efforts have been made almost from the beginning to effect improvement. The institutes held since 1837 for public school teachers were continued, until to-day those published by the various denominational societies and prepared by educational experts are of very high grade. A summer school has been established at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, where instruction for professional and lay workers is carried on during the vacation season.

(f) The Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations. The activity of the various denominations in Sunday school work has very markedly developed during the last thirty years, until there has grown up a professional body of editors and secretaries representing the more definitely Church point of view. These leaders, feeling the need of a common expression of the denominational responsibility for religious education, organized in 1910 the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations. Annual meetings are held, at which important problems of educational policy and administration are discussed. The existence of such a representative body naturally raised the question of future responsibility for the making of the lessons for the Sunday school world. The lesson committee has therefore been reconstituted, and now consists of eight members selected from the international general board, eight members selected by the council, and one member selected by each denomination having a lesson committee.

The emphasis on religious education.—The last quarter of a century has been marked by a growing emphasis upon the more serious educational responsibility of the Church. This was seen in the demand for the graded curriculum. In addition to the international lessons, several very significant courses of study have been produced, notably the Constructive Studies of the University of Chicago Press, the Completely Graded Series of the standardized Scribner, and several series of various denominations. In 1903 was organized the Religious Education Association to promote the educational ideal in religion and the religious ideal in education. The Association holds annual conventions or conferences, conducts studies and surveys, publishes a magazine, gathers in its offices in Chicago all significant material on religious education, and conducts an extensive correspondence of advice and stimulus on problems in this field. Several denominations have established Boards of Religious Education, which are undertaking the supervision of the entire educational work of the Church. Leaders of great prominence are elected as secretaries. In some cases these boards are preparing new and specially graded curricula.

The numerous agencies of religious education are being co-ordinated in the more progressive churches under a professional director of religious education. He is becoming the educational minister of the Church. Some colleges and universities and most theological seminaries have established chairs of religious education, by means of which a trained professional force is being developed and scientific work in religious education is being undertaken. An extensive literature has already been produced, both technical and popular.

4. British developments.—(a) The Sunday School Union.—The parent society in London developed into a nation-wide enterprise. In 1821 there were four metropolitan auxiliaries and sixty provincial unions, besides the Sunday School Society of Ireland and the Sabbath School Union of Scotland. The reports of that year show 4000 schools with 38,000 teachers, and 900,000 scholars. In 1853 infant schools were added for children, which were taken from a school age, as in 1811 Thomas Charles of Balas, the Welsh Methodist leader, had already established adult schools. The latter subsequently became known as senior classes, and in time both infant and senior branches became parts of the national organized school. The Union celebrated its jubilee in 1853 by inaugurating a fund for the erection of

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a permanent building. In 1892, at the time of the International Exhibition in London, a general Sunday school convention was held, attended by delegates from all over the British Isles, as well as from the United States, and the Colonies. British Sunday schools were accustomed to meet in the morning and in the afternoon, and the Union had prepared annually a double series of lessons. Beginning with 1874, the British Sunday School Union co-operated with the American Sunday School Union in the production of the international series of lessons.

In 1890 was celebrated the centenary of Sunday schools throughout the United Kingdom, and a great convention was held in London to which delegates came from all over the world. As a result of this enlarged interest, the Union modified its constitution so as to become thoroughly national in character, representation to the counties being extended in 1890.

During the last thirty years the Union has developed a very significant philanthropic work, including country homes for poor scholars, a home of rest for lady teachers, a children’s convalescent home, etc.

(b) Educational work. In the second quarter of the 19th cent. a forward movement in the science and art of pedagogy began in Scotland. David Stow organized the Glasgow Normal School for the training of teachers. Believing that the same principles could be applied to religious education, he published in 1826 a training system. The Union published in 1837 Popular Education, or a Normal School Manual. In 1856 a training class was organized at Finluc. An attempt was made in 1861 to establish a college for Sunday school teachers, but it was found more feasible to develop a system of standardizing examinations. The college was finally established in 1899, and the examination system adapted to this organization. In addition to the publication of lessons and the encouragement of teacher training, the Union has developed a considerable literature for teachers and scholars, a separate building being required for this phase of its work.

5. World Sunday school work.-The Sunday school spread naturally through the English-speaking world. Various efforts were made, beginning about 1815, to establish it on the continent of Europe but with slight success. The convention in London in 1862, at the earnest solicitation of Albert Woodruff, undertook a continental propaganda. Sunday schools were established in all European countries. This movement was promoted by the world’s conventions which met in London in 1886, in St. Louis in 1893, in London in 1898, in Jerusalem in 1904, in Rome in 1907, in Washington in 1910, in Zurich in 1912. At Rome the World Sunday School Association was organized, with American and British sections. Missionary work in China, India, S. Africa, and Europe was assigned to the British section; in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, S. America, and in the Muslim fields to the American section. The Association reported at Zurich the world Sunday school membership as 30,015,067, with 310,057 schools, and 2,699,058 officers and teachers.

6. Non-Protestant Sunday schools.—The Roman Catholic Church has adapted the Sunday school to its system, though without relinquishing the control by clergy leadership. In the Hebrew Reformed Synagogue the Sunday school, generally under paid teachers, has become very effective. Among the Latter-Day Saints an excellent system of religious education has been developed, including the Sunday school. The Christian Science churches have established Sunday schools especially for children.


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even greater degree was probably the notoriously untrustworthy manner in which traditions were preserved. He preferred to resort directly to the Qur’an and, where it was not explicit, to decide according to his own view of what might fairly be inferred from its teaching as bearing on the question in hand. This method of obtaining direction involved two principles: (1) that the party of the sunnah for a long time viewed with distrust, viz., ra’y, or independent personal judgment, and qiyas, argument from the analogy of known cases to unknown situations in new cases. Both of these were thought to imply disrespect towards inspired authority. Abū Hanīfah went farther than this in the readiness which he showed to depart from the written authority of the Qur’an and the direction given by the sunnah. Even when these gave a clear decision, or where the principle of qiyas gave a definite instruction, the situation might suggest a broader view or a wiser course of action. To follow such a suggestion was a duty. The principle here implied is termed istiḥāṣ, preference, or asking for the better thing. It involves personal independent judgment (ra’y) to a greater degree than the other methods; and it is still more inconsistent with the early view of the party of the sunnah (Abūl-’Sunnah). Malik ibn Anas († 179 A.H.) lived in the atmosphere of tradition at Medīna, and tradition had more weight with him than with his contemporaries. But the traditionalists were being forced at the rate he knew and for the purposes of which he was aware; there was room for a principle of decision in legal and doctrinal questions which would protect Islam against injury through capricious or irrational judgments. Malik, therefore, admitted the rule of istiḥāṣ, the seeking of the public welfare, which might override the dictation of the Sacred Book and the sunnah. The strict party of the sunnah opposed this rule, as it had the liberal practice of Abū Hanīfah; both allowed too much room to ra’y. To men accustomed to earlier conditions, when the absence of a sunnah which might cover all cases left room for decision on other grounds, the mere multiplying of traditions did not afford a sufficient reason for surrendering methods of obtaining guidance which had been followed when traditions were not available. Meanwhile the uninformed masses of Islam were strongly inclined to the simpler method of appeal to external authority. Qiyas, istiḥāṣ, istiṣlaḥ, and ra’y were too human, and the authority which Malik placed in the final reserve of Islam largely depended on whether free scholarship (ra’y) or authority (sunnah) became the ruling factor in the community, whether the need of the Muslims was to be conceived according to the view of intelligent leaders or to that of the great body of the people with its clinging to old-established ways.

3. The Muʿtazilite reaction.—The traditional and rationalist tendencies both went on developing, and the mutual antagonism between them was intensified. The rationalist party became recognized as a party which favoured ra’y, lent it the prestige of the rationalist and humanist culture, and regularly employed the Aristotelian method of arriving at truth. The earlier khalīfahs of the Abbāsid dynasty had been interested in the things, but they became established and official, and the khalīfah al-Ma’mūn († 218 A.H.). In the last year of his reign he instituted an inquisition against the rationalists. This inquisition (al-Miḥna) went on for sixteen years (218-234 A.H.), and while it lasted, the orthodox suffered severely and their leaders were often under peril of death. This period of persecution, with the strenuous controversies which it witnessed, settled the characteristic marks of the later Sunni belief and also brought out and sharpened the weapons by which rationalism sought to destroy the positions of the ‘Ahlu’-sunnah. The latter applied to their opponents the name Muʿtazilah, ‘disissenters’ or ‘heretics.’ It was a name which had been used in a favourable sense of pious ascetics or hermits, but in the late 2nd century A.H. it was given an unfavourable significance and came to mean heretics. On the one side were the ‘Ahlu’-sunnah, and opposed to them were the ‘Ahlu’-ra’y, the Muʿtazilah. The fundamental question for both parties was the true conception of God. Was the will of the Creator the rule of the whole universe? Would the secondary, contingent things be understood in terms of the primary, absolute? This was a question which was to be answered in both parties by the concept of God as the ultimate reality or the ‘real’ one. Was God the one funda mentality, the one active power, or the one form, whereas the external world was a temporary, accidental creation, the products of God’s will? The answer which the Muʿtazilah put forward was that the world was eternal, and that the real was not the secondary, contingent, but the primary, absolute, which was the property of God. This was an essential difference, and the Quraṭan answered it with another: God’s will could not be depended upon, so that the secondary, contingent things were of less importance than the primary, absolute. The Quraṭan answered it with another: God’s will could not be depended upon, and the secondary, contingent things were of less importance than the primary, absolute. On the other side were the ‘Ahlu’-sunnah, and opposed to them were the ‘Ahlu’-ra’y, the Muʿtazilah. The fundamental question for both parties was the true conception of God. Was the will of the Creator the rule of the whole universe? Would the secondary, contingent things be understood in terms of the primary, absolute? This was a question which was to be answered in both parties by the concept of God as the ultimate reality or the ‘real’ one. Was God the one fundamental mentality, the one active power, or the one form, whereas the external world was a temporary, accidental creation, the products of God’s will? The answer which the Muʿtazilah put forward was that the world was eternal, and that the real was not the secondary, contingent, but the primary, absolute, which was the property of God. This was an essential difference, and the Quraṭan answered it with another: God’s will could not be depended upon, so that the secondary, contingent things were of less importance than the primary, absolute. The Quraṭan answered it with another: God’s will could not be depended upon, and the secondary, contingent things were of less importance than the primary, absolute.
remains to be noticed. The party of the sunnah held the characteristic Arab view that the will of Allah is the all-determining source of change and activity in the world. The ‘party of ‘aqil allowed man the capacity to initiate action and placed upon him the responsibility for his choices. Because of their attitude on this special point, the Mu'tazilah are classed as Qadarites (believers in free will). Their argument attacked the orthodoxy, particularly on the ground that they held man responsible for his acts and nevertheless denied that he was free. Freedom he might seem to have, but it was only illusory; in reality his acts were created by God, without whom nothing happened. This orthodoxy contented the Mu'tazilah, who repudiated as involving injustice to man and also as implying an insulting impeachement of God's justice.

4. Re-establishment of orthodoxy.—The Mu'tazilite controversy was summarily terminated by the khilafah al-Mutawakkil in 234 A.H. He reversed the liberal policy of his predecessors, declared the doctrines that they had championed to be offences against the State, and proclaimed the orthodoxy views to represent the official opinions which alone would be tolerated in Islam. This official endorsement of the 'Ahlus-Sunnah has been maintained in Islam down to the present. The doctrinal boundaries of the persecuted orthodox are held by both Sunnites and Shi'ahs, and the Sunnī khilafah has regularly stood sponsor for them. There is no doubt that the Mu'tazilite khilafah of the Milna period represented a relatively small minority in the Muslim world of their time and that al-Mutawakkil was wise not to continue his support of their views in the face of an adverse popular sentiment. Tradition and Qur'an retain their hold upon the masses, by their directness and their clear mandatory accent appealed as mere reflective opinion could hardly hope to do. The great body of Islam ranged itself behind the orthodox khilafahs, and the Mu’tazilah tend to disappear little by little. The free-thinking teachers notwithstanding give the traditional theologians a great deal of trouble, in spite of the smallness of their numbers. It was easy to make a system based on literal interpretations appear ridiculous when attacked by means of keen dialectic, and the orthodox tenacity of the Mu'tazilah was a result of their conviction from first to last that to in order to escape discomfort when they were forced to evade rather than answer the attacks made upon them. It will be readily understood that the man who enabled them to injure genuine defeat upon their opponents, Abūl-Hasan al-Qari, would seem to the orthodox to be almost a prophet when he arrived.

5. Abūl-Hasan al-Ash'arī.—Al-Ash’arī had been long trained in the views and arguments of the Mutakallims, and there is some plausibility in the legend which represents him as using their method against his own teacher al-Jabībī to the confiscation of the latter. He had apparently come to see that the Aristotelian logic was valuable, not for the discovery of truth, but for making explicit the significance of propositions which were taken for granted and for the confusion of false arguments. It became clear to him that religion could not be built securely upon kalam, a formal science. The foundation must be in revelation through inspired men and media, through prophecy and that part of which is kalam of their logic, the party of the sunnah had founded Islam upon the true basis, that tradition was a genuinely trustworthy medium of communicating revealed guidance from age to age, and that the consensus of the Muslim community (ijmā' expressed through its leaders was more reliable than the judgment of the individual Mutakallim, al-Ash'ārī returned to the orthodox faith which he seems to have inherited from his forbears in the first instance. He came back converted through his own employment of kalam against itself, and naturally he made use of the weapon from that time (300 A.H.) forward to dispute the views of the Mu’tazilah and to develop into a system the orthodox doctrine.

6. The principle of consensus.—The principle of consensus operated more largely from the days of al-Ash'ārī onward. It was Ash-Shāfi’ī († 204 A.H.) who first made extensive use of it in his teaching and was prepared to accept it as a guide where the Qur'ān and sunnah failed to afford direction. His preference for ijmā' was approved only with reserve by the rigid Ḥanbalite orthodoxy of the 3rd century. Al-Bukhari's strictness in the criticism of hadiths and his refusal to give an opinion on the human utterance of the Qur'ān are possibly alike based upon an employment of the ijmā'. The principle has a bearing upon the division of Islam into Sunnites and Shi'ahs. In the days of the early Al-Sharī'ite school this division, which is based, not upon dogmatic differences of a genuine religious character, but upon a divergent view of the khalifah, has not yet taken shape, and the ijmā' embraced the whole Muslim community. When the division came, it was recognized that the 'Ahlus-Sunnah lay beyond the confines of the Orthodox empire as organized under the Safawīs (A.D. 1602), and that ijmā' had a sense and a binding force in Sunni Islam which it did not have in Persia. The Persian Muslims readily accord the name Sunnites to their rivals and accept Shī'ah as a proper term by which to describe themselves. Ijmā' especially a Sunnite principle and has guided the leading movements and changes of Sunni Islam during many centuries. There is no need of its use among the Shi'ahs, where appeal is made to the inspired authority of the imāms as it is voiced through their mujaddides.

In spite of the fact that the Hanbalite school, so powerful in the 3rd cent. of Islam, is now almost a negligible quantity, al-Ash'ārī, the founder of the Sunnite theological system, was an ardent Hanbalite after his conversion and died in that faith (330 A.H.). It is necessary to say, however, that the views which are now held by all the Sunni schools are the founder's views as somewhat liberalized by the school after his death. There is evidence to show that the core of the Muslim society from which all the various schools of thought emerged from the Mu'tazilah was modified through the very kalam influence which he brought with him. In the line of al-Ash'ārī's thought to employ himself devotedly apologetic purposes, but his followers gave much more scope to the principle of the consensus than he seemed to do. The 'Six Correct Books' of traditions (Kitāb Sittah), of which the two great Sahīhs of al-Bukhari and Muslim are the essential authorities, contain only generally accepted evidence as to the sunnah, but in the application of the sunnah the principle of consensus was used, in accordance with the scholastic method introduced by al-Ash'ari, has made it possible to leave behind the strict systems of law held by the triumphant Hanbalite school of the 3rd Muslim century. That kind of unchanging orthodox would not have preserved the unity of Islam as it has been preserved among the Sunnites. Modern Hanbalites are the consistent successors of the early Hanbalite school before al-Ash'ārī, but they exert little influence. Sunni Islam is an Islamic society which the views of the Christians and the moderate views of the Malikīs and Shāfi'is have had less and less difficulty in holding their ground, so that in opinion and practice unity and even a large measure of uniformity have come to prevail. The end of this century is the end of the era in which the admission of the kalam method and the broader understanding of the Sunnī doctrine. The schools differ, as they have always done, in the extent to which they recognize certain liberal principles and attitudes of mind. Analogies (iṣlah) and judgment (qiyās), which form personal opinion (fikr), and which are only special tasties, or preference for a better view, play a large part in the administration of Hanbalite law. Feeling that, in many important matters, and a small part in the Shāfī'i communities of Islam. But the difference is within the region of fikr and not within that of religious opinion.

7. Triumph of Ash'arite theology.—The process of liberalizing the orthodox system of al-Ash'ārī must have been somewhat rapid in the century
following his death. Towards the end of the 4th cent. A.H., there seems to have been a disposition to allow kalām to run riot in Baghdad, where we read of a legal and theological account of religion by the monks of the time realized painfully that they had parted company with accepted orthodox views. Men like Ibn Tufail and Averroes (q.v.) in the late 8th cent. A.H. made a deliberate effort to adopt the problem of Ultimate Reality in such a way as to be satisfied that he enjoyed contact, response, and fellowship with it. He was convinced that what he sought could not be given by an acceptance of truth on mere external authority, a point to which, in spite of his dependence upon kalām, al-Shārīṣī still held. He saw that the Mutakallimīn could proceed to their conclusions only as they took for granted certain propositions which they did not prove, and that, when they had said all, the seeker had in possession only a system of logical inferences and not at all an experience of the ultimately real. Not because it was a last resort or because he was in despair of finding anything better, al-Ghazālī turned to Ṣūfism. He made a full and sympathetic trial of the Ṣūfi discipline, after having tried other ways, and was convinced that the Ṣūfis (q.v.) had solved the problem of the soul's quest. Man craved a satisfying revelation and a satisfying communion with God; he received both through habitual conformity to the Ṣūfi ideal and persistent openness to receive higher communications. Al-Ghazālī was sufficiently Ṣūfī who was ready to give due weight to reason within its own limits, and who recognized the ethical and religious duties of the common life. His pre-eminent gifts and virtues—for he was one of the finest characters as well as one of the greatest minds which Islam has produced—have made his solution of the religious problem exceedingly influenceful down to our own day. Ṣūfism became a power far beyond the bounds of the dervish organizations; the extreme dependence upon rationalism was checked; the emotional factors in human nature were provided for with due regard to ethical and religious con- duc. Probabky no teaching since the days of the Prophet has afforded to Muslims a better illustration of the possibilities of their own faith. Sunnites generally admit a great indebtedness to him, and his words are standard text-books in the training of orthodox theologians (ulama).

9. Sunnites and Shi‘ahs.—The distinction be- tween Shi‘ahs and Sunnis has its roots in the dispute between the ‘Ali and his party and the Ummān, which is traced back to the khalīfah ‘Uthmān’s assassination (35 A.H.). In its origin it has nothing to do with the religion founded by Muhammad, but rather is occupied with the political question of the succession to the leadership of the Muslim community. At first the ‘Aliis on their side claimed that they were the legitimate khalīfahs because they were descended from the Prophet’s daughter Fatimah and his cousin and intimate companion, ‘Ali. The Unayyads on their part claimed a nomination by the Prophet that they were the most suitable to themselves and as a further title claimed kinship with the Prophet as being of the Hashimite family. Later the ‘Aliis stood for the claims of descent against all claims of right to office as a popular choice. This difference still marks off the Shi‘a political theory from that held among the Sunnites.

(a) Theory of the khalīfah.—This is, moreover, an old standing difference between the Sunnites and Shi‘ahs as to the functions of the khalīfah. Among the Sunnites the khalīfah is a political ruler essentially, while from the first the ‘Ali party regarded the Prophet’s successor as a religi- ous guide and therefore preferred to designate him as the imām of the Muslim community. It was assumed that his physical descent from the Prophet secured to him not merely divine rights, but also a divine endowment of grace and wisdom. No such assumption was held by the Sunnites with relation to their khalīfahs. They were chosen from among the believers and could claim no supernatural qualities. The authority of all khalīfahs is conferred by the Muslim community and carried with it no implication of pre-eminent saintliness or infallibility. The Sunnite attitude towards the khalīfah differs greatly from that of the Shi‘ahs towards the imāms. The personal qualities and public influence of the khalīfahs have been largely determinative of the respect shown to them. Among the Shi‘ahs the office halls the occupant, and the imām is regarded with the deepest religious veneration. The Sunnite khalīfah by law are required to be of the Prophet’s tribe, the Qurāsh; the imāms were chosen from the still more narrow circle of the Prophet’s immediate family.

Since the twelfth imām Muhammad ibn al-Hanāfī disappeared in the middle of the 3rd cent. A.H., the line of visible imāms has been suspended, but there is a general reason why the Sunni khalīfah should be interrupted, as it has always been possible for the Muslim community to find an eligible candidate and to nominate him as khalīfah, but it did not interpose a physical hindrance. The sultāns of Turkey have in fact been accustomed to be the khalīfahs of the Ottoman Empire, and it was to the claim of the khalīfahs in this capacity that the Mustawakkil made a claim. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between the titles claimed by the Ottoman sultāns, and the right of the sultāns to make the claim. The sultāns have thus held the khalīfahs of the Ottoman Empire and the sultāns have been recognized by the community as the religious leaders of the community. The sultāns have claimed the title of khalīfah as a political right, and have been recognized as such by the community.
SUNNITES

make successor by the Shi'a sect also. For 'Ali and his suc-
cessors in his capacity demand the utmost respect on account of
their reputation for either piety or learning, though they do not
admit the Shi'a claim of supernatural gifts or divine rights
as belonging to them.

(b) Enmity between Sunnites and Shi'a.s.—The intense hatred between Sunnis and Shi'a.s as dis-

tinct sects dates from the time when the Shi'a.s were con-

sidered a separate political organization by the

foundation of the Safavid empire of Persia in
A.D. 1502. The fault in this mutual bitter feel-
ing is greater on the Shi'a side than on that of the

Sunnites, but the treatment of Persian pilgrims to

Mecca has been an enduring irritation, and in earlier
times the military aggression of the Turkish

sultans gave occasion for resentment in Persia.

As has been pointed out above, there are many

individual Muslims of Shi'a. connexion in the

Turkish empire, and, either because of an acquired

indifference or because of their practice of
taqiyah (concealment of faith), they suffer no

personal inconvenience at the hands of their Sunnite

neighbours. The proposal of Nadir Shah in the
18th cent., that a reunion of Islam should be

brought about by admitting the Shi'a.s to fellowship with

the Sunnis as a fifth orthodox school, was promptly

repudiated by the world-ambition of that ruler and was met

by vigorous and successful opposition on the part of

the Persian mujahidin and mullahs.

c) Position as to the summah.—The difference

between the Sunnites and the Shi'a.s does not

consist in the acknowledgment of the sunnah of

the Prophet by the former and its denial by the

latter. The title of the Sunnis to have the oldest

and the most highly respected body of tradition

is not questioned, but the Shi'a.s also have their

sumnah, whose authorities are the acknowledged

hadith collections of the sect. Resting upon these

recognized standards, the Shi'a.s claim that they alone have the genuine sumnah, while

the Sunnite version, they allege, has been perverted

so as to furnish arguments against the claims of

'Ali and his sons to the succession of the Prophet.

The corruption of the sunnah for any such purpose

by the Sunnites is exceedingly unlikely, while the

evidence of the manipulation of traditions by the

Shi'a.s to support their own side is considered to

be fairly clear. In the interpretation and populariza-

tion of the sunnah to new relations the Sunnites

are guided by the consensus (ijma') and analogy

(qiyas), while the Shi'a.s claim to be alone rightly

guided in their following of the literal text; but, as

in the Shi'a.s have enjoyed the infallible instruction of the

imams in the person or in the line since the line

has been suspended by the inerrant communication

of their word and will through the mujahidin.

According to the sunnah view, there can be no

mujahidin in Islam since the death of the last great

orthodox founder in the 3rd cent. A.H. The term

as employed in Sunni circles is limited to the great

imams of the earlier centuries who founded the

four orthodox schools and laid on indisputable

foundations the theology and law of Islam.

Since their day no teacher's opinions have justified them-

selves as a permanent basis for faith and life.

10. Changes in Sunnite Islam.—In theory

Sunnite Islam is tied up to the Shi'a system, and

because of that it is thought to be fated to

intellectual stagnation. The facts show that from

the time of al-Shafi'i himself there was some

modification of the founder's positions, and with

the contribution made by al-Ghazali one may say

that the modification amounts to a materially

altered view of the law and the introduction of a new

and revolutionary emphasis which laid stress upon

intuitive and emotional factors in religious experi-

ence. The necessities of the historical situation

have repeatedly rendered nugatory the theoretical

requirements of Sunnite orthodoxy. Where

Muslims live under Christian governments, as in

India, the law of the khilafah has to yield place to

the obligations of political loyalty, the duty

imposed by the jihâd is in most cases unfilled, and

the zakât must be modified, especially as to the

authority to whom it is to be turned over and the

mode and purpose of its distribution. With

the universal recognition of saint-worship and the

cult of relics, the dogma of the unity of God

and the law against idolatry (shirk) are violated,

and the sufficiency of the canonical authorities,

the 'Ulama', and the 'Ulema', is called in question. It

may be recalled that one fruit of the modern liberal

movement in India is the rise of the Ahmadiyah

sect, whose founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, now

recognizes the importance of facts in the position of

the Indian Muslims and declared that the duty of the

jihâd was not binding any longer. The practical

effect of the Shi'a teaching when fully developed is a

pantheism which is in contradiction with the

hard, clear-cut monotheism of the Ah'ârîte theo-

logy. It is a pantheism leading to a looseness of

the positive bonds of conduct which the orthodox

teaching imposes. The righteousness of the Shi'a

may become extravagantly mechanical and vio-

lently anti-social, so much so that public regulation

may be called for, as is the case in Egypt. Enough

has been said to show that Sunnite Islam, however

immoderately it may be carried in theory, has

been admitted into its system under the compulsion of facts vastly

important modifications, some of which have

seemed to contain unrecorded potentialities of

disintegration.

II. Detailed differences between Sunnites and

Shi'a.s.—A few points in which Sunnites and

Shi'a differ require to be mentioned.

(a) The Sunnites do not accord to 'Ali and his sons the degree

of veneration which the Shi'a sects of Muhammad implied. This holds

ture even if the Sunnite Muslims of India do not scruple to participate in the ceremonies of the Shi'a festivals, though

(b) There is some confusion of the orthodox feast of the 'Ashura, which falls on the tenth day of Muharram, with the

Shi'a feast, which extends from the first to the tenth day of that

month. The motive of the respective feasts is, however, entirely different. The 'Ashura commemorates the death of

Adnan, the son of Adam and Eve on the tenth day of Muharram, while the tenth day of the Shi'a ceremonies is simply the

ceremony of the washing of the arm upwards to the foot with

Shi'a's the process is reversed. In the washing of the foot the Sunnite ritual is done; in the washing of the

Shi'a the same; hence its name.

(c) To perform the 'abâd by proxy is not permitted by

the Sunnites, while it is not uncommon among their rivals. This

permission, if granted, would violate the condition that

a Shiah who must perform the 'abâd at least once during his

lifetime. (d) The Sunnite recognition of the principle of taqiyah

is limited to cases of extreme personal danger when it is at most permitted to

dissemble one's religious convictions in order to preserve

one's life. The Shi'a sects do not view taqiyah as limited to

situations of personal risk, and, where it applies, they do not merely

permit a resort to taqiyah, but strongly recommend the

employment of it. Especially where the interests of religion may

be supposed to be in jeopardy, the Muslim of Shi'a faith will

feel the use of taqiyah to be a moral obligation.

In all that has been said in the foregoing

description of the Shi'a position it should be

kept in mind that in all Muslim countries, whether

Sunnite or Shi'a, there is another authority, viz., the

constitutional law (usfur or 'adâh). This differs accord-

ingly to the established conventions of different

places. It is not a distinctive feature of the Sunnites and need not be more fully treated

in this article.

The power of the 'ulama among the Sunnis is
SUPER naturalism

very great, though as a class they are not viewed with the superstitious generation or even fear with the Persian Shi'ah and the sect of the mulahuhs, to all the mujahids, and to the large class of sayyids who are to be found in Shi'ite regions. The influence of the 'ulama has been conserved by the sheikhs, which, though strongly opposed to Muslim theology and law, is often comprehensive within those limits. This learning is constantly on call in the service of the Muslim community. The wrong to distinguish between two things so that it might have been owing to a certain measure of accommodation which has made large room for such a phenomenon as the Sufi movement—a movement whose elements of wonder and emotion-all have proved to the satisfaction of the masses that Islam was still a medium of supernatural power and divine life. Along with this they have admitted to the curriculum of theological studies in all the leading schools the works of the great mystics, particularly those of the nasiir, al-Ghazzali. The tacit or explicit approval of the cult of saints, endowed as it is by public funds, may be an anomaly, but for the orthodox leadership it is the very essence of power. More potent than any other factor is the fact that the consensus (ijma') is realized only through the 'ulama and that no cause has been so effective in bringing about a positive policy and the initiation of new lines of action as the voice of the 'ulama declaring the mind of the universal Muslim community. The ijma' is being prepared by the training which the candidate for the learned calling receive, whether it be in the Azhar University at Cairo, in the schools of Constantinople and India, or in the ancient seats of learning like Bokhara. It is a long mechanical process aiming at fixing rigidly the position of traditional orthodoxy in the thoughts and sympathies of the student and cultivating in him a fanatical devotion to the authority of the past, especially of the primitive age of the faith. It is natural that, when his opportunity to lead comes, he should adjust himself as an obedient part of the whole traditional system.


SUPER naturalism.—Super naturalism is the attitude that has the supernatural for its object. The term is used by anthropologists to express the fact that primitive magic and primitive religion alike rest on belief in supernatural powers. In such a context it is convenient to have a word such as 'supernatural' that may be equated now with 'magical' and now with 'divine.' For the savage respects the human magician on account of his continual intercourse with the supernatural world, and, on the other hand, must be allowed to possess a rudimentary notion of certain supernatural beings who may be fittingly called gods, though not in the full sense in which we use the word.1 Frazer describes a general tendency among savages to claim 'powers which we should now call supernatural,2 on the ground that 'a savage hardly conceives the distinction commonly drawn between human and supernatural beings between the natural and the supernatural.'3 F. B. Jevons, on the other hand, warns us against 'the error of imagining that there was a time when man did not distinguish between natural and supernatural.' This error may take the form of saying either that to primitive man nothing was supernatural or that everything was supernatural. He goes on to say:

1 Primitive man took to himself the credit of his successful attempts to work the mechanism of nature for his own advantage, but when the machinery did not work he ascribed the fault to some overruling supernatural power.

The objection of E. Durkheim, that to recognize breaches in a habitual order does not amount to the recognition of breaches in an order conceived as necessary after the manner of modern science,3 is surely somewhat hypercritical in such a context. An objection of another kind, since it does not dispute the facts, but merely re-forms the terminology, is that of J. H. Leuba,4 who in naming the belief in supernatural power would call attention to the power rather than to the supernatural quality attaching to it, and hence would substitute for 'supernatural' the term 'dynamism,' originally used by A. van Genne5 to describe the 'impersonalist' theory of mana as contrasted with the 'personalist' theory of animism. Now there is much to be said for the view that the positive content of supernaturalism receives its fullest conceptual expression in terms of the mana type. But the mental attitude in question has its negative side as well as the positive side connoted by mana, since it is called forth by the frustration of reasonable expectation; so that, as Jevons says, 'where the natural ended, the supernatural began.'

Again, this mental attitude is not so predominantly intellectual that it can be suitably designated by means of any mere concept that it generates. For the rest, anthropological terminology is, happily, in a somewhat fluid condition, and may be varied without inappropriacy in response to the needs of different theoretical purposes. It will suffice here to give a brief account of the chief aspects of the mental attitude under consideration.

1. Emotional aspect.—The emotional constituents of the magical-religious sentiment have been subjected to psychological analysis with results that show it to be, even in its simplest forms, exceedingly complex. 'Awe is perhaps the word in our language that expresses its many-sided nature most fully, and awe is defined by W. McDougall as 'a tertiary compound of fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling.' 9 Round the object provided by the supernatural, fear, admiration, and submissiveness in varying degrees are organized into a mood, whether, in addition, that object be on the whole hated or loved, and consequently take rank as a manifestation of evil or good supernatural power. Thus the sentiment is excited equally by magic and religion, the sorcerer, like the god, being 'surrounded by a halo of mystery and an atmosphere of awe.' To appreciate the

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3. Practical aspect. — Seeing, then, that the savage may be said to live out his ideas rather than to think them out, it is in the sphere of his actual practice as regulated by external use and want that we are likely to meet with the clearest indications of his mental tendencies. Primitive supernaturalism will declare itself primarily in a group of traditional activities through which the appropriate feelings and thoughts may be expressed. The question, then, is how far there is a distinctive province of behaviour corresponding to the interest in the supernatural. Now, there can be no doubt that among some of those who are occupied with the magic-religious sides of the social life is made as with a hatchet. Thus we are told of the Central Australian: ‘From the moment of his birth, his life is sharply divided into two parts. He has first all that we may speak of as the ordinary life, common to all men and women, and associated with the procuring of food and the performance of corroborees, the peaceful monotony of this part of his life being broken only by the excitement of a fight. On the other hand, the man who gradually becomes of greater and greater importance to him, and that is the portion of his life devoted to matters of a sacred or secret nature. As he grows older he takes an increasing share in these, until finally this side of his life occupies by far the greater part of his thoughts.’

B. Malinowski, however, referring to this passage, raises a doubt whether such a bipartition of activities is a universal feature of primitive society. He instances Veddas and Melanesians, in whom religious and secular interests and pursuits seem to blend into each other without perceptible break. But, when Durkheim states that ‘the division of things into sacred and profane lies at the base of all religious organization,’ he can hardly intend to affirm that a religious organization worthy of the name is to be found among all mankind. It is surely enough if the generalization hold good in the typical case. Moreover, this theory of the ‘two worlds’ of the sacred and the profane, though convenient in certain contexts — as, e.g., to explain those rites of passage whereby a man during initiation, or a woman at child-birth, enters a condition of tabu and passes out again into ordinary life — need not be pressed too hard, seeing that sacredness is to some extent relative, so that, e.g., a man may be tabu to strangers without being so to his friends. All that need be assumed here is that certain activities tend to be organized about the interest in the supernatural as embodied in a specific tissue of feelings and beliefs. The magic-religious life is unlimited in its claim on human endeavor, and in its ulterior use for individual welfare may be well-nigh all-pervasive. But the mental attitude that it cannot be continuously maintained. Whenever the tension is relaxed, ‘nature’ in the shape of the effortless rule of habit, is busy making good the strain.

LITERATURE. — See the works cited in the footnotes.
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to accept unverified statements as to spiritual or moral influences on the material world. The origin of the most potent and widely spread superstitions has already been discussed under various headings. It seems therefore more suitable here to consider superstition as an abstract quality, and to regard it in its psychological and historical aspects.

Two points may be noted for the purpose of clearing the ground of any unnecessary subjective way in which the word is commonly used. No man is ready to acknowledge himself as a superstitious person, but almost every one is ready to recognize superstitious beliefs in others. We find that mass of a particular race, culture, and tone of mind brand as superstitious the religious or ceremonial practices of an alien people, while charging such people with incredulity if they are not ready to receive new doctrines equally superstitious from their own standpoint.

What is religion to you is superstition to me, and vice versa, is a tacit assumption against which we must be on our guard. Overestimating those beliefs in connection with mystics (g.g.), True, the mystic who regards all things and persons as being what reality they have to a divine and supernatural life or element is likely to have a strong desire to find traces of the spiritual and eternal manifestd or is through the fact of the material and human; the pagans the be atable mystic, by very reason of his belief in the spiritual nature of ultimate reality, is the less liable to give credence to fanciful and grotesque stories from a past world. Faith, the greatest of mystics, was eminently sane and reasonable. If the same critical force with which the Neo-Platonists, the reason most must that some of them were less mystical because more materialistic, were wrong, however, it was only from the circumstance that many minds (especially of a snaity or poetic order) attach a symbolic meaning to certain material phenomena. This was the case of the Egyptians regarding their pyramids, but it is their intrinsic value. Hence we have the interesting fact that, in the higher religions of an advanced race, we may have what seems to be an almost complete disconnection between the ordinary and the extraordinary, the stoning and the poetic, in the one hand, and the sudden destruction of 'superstitions' which have, for the uneducated, been valuable from their association with religious thought and feeling, on the other against the confusion of symbol and reality, which tends to materialize and cheapen, in the way of modern historical research.

The superstitions mind, then, is one that is not educated to discern the character of evidence, or that has not patience to suspend judgment in the presence of unfamiliar phenomena. If it is objected that such a view is not powerful and (in some directions) well trained intellects have coincided with a superstitious bias, these exceptions would seem due to a want of mental balance.

2. Historical aspects. Turning from the individual to society and to historical progress, we may say that, roughly speaking, superstition declines as the view of the universe becomes more scientific. True, there are two sciences—perhaps of all sciences—is attended by eruse hypotheses which lend themselves to strange vagaries of thought. This is specially evident in the pseudo-science of alchemy, whence emerged the science of chemistry. Even the earliest efforts of the great men of ancient thought were not without such vagaries, yet the Greek philosophers had in them the root of the matter—a whole-hearted desire after truth. Therefore they progressed, and their progress belonged to the Western world.

When, in May, 585 B.C., in the midst of a battle between Lydians and Medes, there occurred this 'total eclipse of which European science foretold what it should believe,' the date was 'to have a dear interest for Europe than the warfare.' The historian Herodotus, father of Greek, and father of European philosophy and science, had studied astronomy in Egypt; and he was able to warn the Ionians that they could not tell the day or the hour—the sun would be darkened.'

This does not, of course, imply that the Greeks had already become, or were ever to become, what we should call scientific people. But to bring so uncanny an occurrence as a darkening of the sun within the range of calculable events was to cut the ground beneath many superstitions. Yet Greek religion and Greek life abounded with superstitions. The religion of the Olympians was bound up with beliefs about the gods which Plato would have excluded from his ideal city, and the old-world ritual which survived in popular ceremonies was yet more favourable to unreasonable fancies and actions. The Athenians were by far the least intellectual of the Greeks, yet their pro-

1. The 'overshooting of the mark' by the sceptics is suggested by E. Bovain, Stoics and Skeptics, London, 1912.

2. See art. Neo-Pythagoreanism.


conspicuously from its original form, and on the other hand may bring it within the reach of minds unaccustomed to deal with abstract ideas. These accusations are somewhat, though not as many hard-headed and constructive thinkers at most epochs of the Middle Ages as there have been earlier or later. But apart from the mixture of races and consequent multiplication of superstitions in the declining Empire, with the deficiency of mental culture in the leaders of the barbarian races, there was a great force arising to control speculation—that of ecclesiastical authority. This, however, must be considered on two sides. The worst kinds of superstitions, or at least the most conspicuous kinds, especially in Eastern Europe, were distinctly discouraged by the Church; and the monasteries, at least, and the like. And there can be little doubt that many of the heresies crushed out by the mediæval Church were accompanied by superstitions vagaries. Such facts in point of time the suppression of free thought, especially as directed to Church doctrine and ritual, must have tended to the growth of Stoaæus in Plutarch’s sense. Of course, when we speak of the suppression of free thought, we do not mean the mere timidity of persons suffered from not being allowed to think freely. Probably the number who thus suffered was comparatively very small. But many more must have lived in perpetual fear of the unseen. The terrors of the Judgment Day and of the world to come are very familiar objects of mediæval art, and it is difficult for us to see how far they were practically mitigated by the harrowing setting forth of the more comforting and spiritual elements in Christianity, with which they were, perhaps not quite consistently, associated.

The Renaissance and the Reformation are commonly regarded as having given the death-blow to superstition—so far, at least, as their influence extended. It is certain, however, that the indiscriminate cult of antiquity, which in some sections of Christendom was accompanied by the Renaissance, contained or encouraged superstitious fancies and observances of a novel kind. And as to the Reformation even in Protestant countries, practically a good deal of superstition formed part of the newly established doctrines and usages, and the sway of spiritual authority was by no means removed. The great movement towards mental and spiritual emancipation is generally taken as beginning in the 18th century. It is to be noted that the battle waged on behalf of human reason was not confined to the world of thought and opinion. Political institutions, social divisions, industrial methods, and moral conventions were all submitted to the test of right reason, and, if they failed, to be extirpated forthwith. The bitterness with which the contest was carried on, and which reached its culminating point in the excesses of the French Revolution, was partly due to the belief that superstitions practices had been maintained chiefly by those who profited by them—from the medicine-men of a savage tribe to the officers of an established church and hereditary hierarchy. Although there is, of course, some ground for such a supposition, as a partial explanation of the evil in question, its wholesale acceptance shows a very deficient com-

prehension of human nature. Without intelligible reasons, man is always desirous of knowing more than he can know about the spiritual world, and he will more readily believe in that which has a traditional, if not actually a divine, sanction. And the exact nature of the government and institutions which right reason would command has, of course, been distinguished from the necessary appartuses of the religion with which they are associated.

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4. Influence of education. The great agency making for the reduction of superstition during this century and the last is popular education. True, our elementary education can hardly as yet be called scientific, nor is modern secular education of the highest sort compatible with belief in the spiritual significance of life and even in a possible communion with non-material beings, but inconsistent with fanatical and trivial interpretations of natural phenomena as determined by preternatural agency.

If there should ever be a resuscitation of superstition in this generation or the next, it would probably be due, not to a defect in the scientific faculty, but to the expectations lately raised within the bounds of scientific investigation. Experts in psychology, especially those who have devoted themselves to what is technically called psychical research (p. 37), have, to many sane and scientific minds, proved the possibility of telepathy, thought-transference, and other processes which, fifty years ago, would certainly have been set down as superstitions. More than this, some persons of scientific mind and education believe that they have actually established and conducted a means of communication between living and dead. When the persons engaged in these investigations are convinced, they are inclined to accept their evidence, as we should on any other point of expert investigation. But in this field the ‘media’ used are of such uncertain character, the conditions and possibilities of communication so deeply veiled in obscurity, the desire to attain to fellowship with the departed so intense, that it is as well to approach all such problems with the most suspicious caution. There may be, as has often been said, a ‘superstitious fear of superstition.’ But, while suspending judgment on the result of the inquiries of experts, the non-expert may be in danger of falling into a superstitions habit of mind such as tends to upset entirely the mental balance.

LITERATURE. For primitive superstitions see the works mentioned in the article ENLIGHTENMENT, ENCYCLOPÆDIA. For the philosophy and history of the question see the various histories of philosophy and W. E. Hart, History of Rationalism, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1897; A. W. Benn, History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols., 1906; J. M. Masson, l'Épistémic, Épicurean and Post, do, 1907; Plutarch, Moralia, including de Superstitione, tr. into very vigorous English by G. S. Hopkins and T. McD. Arnold, Literature and Dogma, do, 1853, chs. on 'Aberglaube invading' and 'Aberglaube re-invading.'
SUPRALAPSARIANISM.—The term supralapsarianism is used in Calvinistic theology, in contrast with sub- or infra-lapsarianism, to denote a view of the divine decrees in which, for the manifest good of His world, there is a certain portion of mankind to eternal life, and another portion to destruction, regarding both simply as creatures, and antecedently to any consideration of the Fall and sin. It is not meant that Calvin himself actually held out without regard to character or condition; but, in the order of decrees, it is first determined who are to be embraced in the one class, and who in the other; then the means are appointed—including creation, the Fall, sin, redemption—by which the end in each case is to be attained. So harsh a view of the divine procedure has always been in the highest degree repellent to Christian minds; accordingly, the great majority of Calvinists have shrunk from it, and contented themselves with the milder sublapsarian view, which affords an election of God from the mass of mankind, regarded as already fallen.

On its historical side, the question is raised whether Calvin himself is to be classed as a supralapsarian or a sublapsarian. Subsequent view, but the truth seems to be that, when Calvin wrote, the question had not distinctly emerged, and the emphasis which he continually lays on election is no objection from a subjective or speculative standpoint. It is grounded on the sinner's own evil, fairly warrants the more unqualified form. The doctrine inclined more to sublapsarianism. On the other hand, Beza, Calvin's successor, Gassner, the colleague and opponent of Arminius in Holland, Twissie, the protagonist of the Arminian controversy, naturally sought to fasten this view on all Calvinists. It is really, however, an extreme opinion, and the bulk of Calvinists, as already said, were satisfied to place themselves aloof from it. Turrill, evidently states and defends the sublapsarian position in his Institutes. The Synod of Dort is commonly condemned its canons on sublapsarian lines. The Westminster Confession, in certain of its clauses, to the stronger view of Archibald, Usber, (author of the Irish Articles), and of a few members of the Assembly, but the tone of the debates in that body sufficiently shows that the prevailing opinion was sublapsarian, and the confessional statement, taken as a whole, is of this character. The stronger view has, indeed, no symbolic sanction.

Cunningham, in his discussion of the subject, claims that the controversy is one of "no great intrinsic importance," but this can hardly be allowed.

A doctrine of this kind, which bids us think of beings not preconceived of as even created (therefore only as possibilities) not to say as sinful—set apart for eternal blessedness or misery, according to another predestination—has of the purpose that purpose, which is to no less of logical consistency will ever get the human mind to accept, and which is bound to produce revolts against the whole system with which it is associated. It cannot even be conceded, though it has often been contended, that this is the most logical form of the predestinarian doctrine. The end, it is argued, comes necessarily first in order of thought; then the means are devised which are to accomplish it. In the case of moral destiny, we are disposed to say, this is the precise inversion of the fact. There can be no legitimate consigning of a moral being to wrath, save as he is in some way viewed as deserving of that wrath; even in order of thought, therefore, the consideration of moral state must precede the sentence of rejection. If the reply is made that the sin itself is viewed in Calvinism as foreordained, this is double-talk true, but only in the sense in which everything event in life is certain to be, viz. by God's decreeing to admit it into His providential plan and to overrule it for the ends of His wisdom. It is a totally different

1 See art. CALVINISM.
2 See Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, p. 266.
3 See art. CALVINISM, ELECTRON, PRESELECTION.
4 Cf. Schaff, Hist. of the Creeds of the O., i, 455.
5 Hist. Theology, Edinburgh, 1867, ii, 439, Reformers and Theologians, Selections, p. 332.
the following legend to account for the actual cleavage:

A monk named Śivabhūti had been given a most beautiful boon by the king in whose service he had been at the time of his initiation. His spiritual preceptor warned him that it was impossible to use the boon in the manner ordained, and advised him to give it away; but he refused to do so, so his preceptor took the extreme step of tearing up the blanket in its owner's absence. Śivabhūti, when he returned and saw what had happened, was so angry that he declared that, if he could not have the one possession which he valued most, he must have the other, and would wander the entire nakedness like the Lord Mahāvīra himself; and he then and there started a new sect, that of the naked Dīgamba.

This very human legend of the Śvetāmbara (the 'White-clothed') tells of their unclothed rivals not only accounts for their nakedness, but also goes on to explain another difference between the two sects; for, when Śivabhūti's sister wanted to join his order, seeing that it was impracticable for a woman to go about nude, he roundly told her that it was impossible for a woman to become a nun, or to obtain mokṣa (q.v.) without rebirth as a man, and thus laid down for all time a distinctive tenet of the Dīgamba. Important as these legends are, it must be remembered that they are quoted only as illustrative of the Jain point of view, for their confirmation is sadly to seek, and the legends compiled by Chandālośa with the faith are essentially open to suspicion.

2. Distinctive tenets and practices.—We are on firmer ground when we notice the main differences between the two sects at the present day. We are already prepared for the fact that the Śvetāmbara list of sacred books is not accepted by the Dīgamba; and, that, since they hold that no woman can attain mokṣa, the Dīgamba will not admit the Śvetāmbara tradition that Mahāvīra's mother had fourteen wonderful dreams; the Dīgamba say that she had sixteen; while the legend of the removal of the enmity of Mahāvīra from Devanandavā to Trisālā is a Śvetāmbara one.

The lists of the heads of the community since Śivabhūti are very different. The Śvetāmbara generally arrange their philosophy in nine categories; the Dīgamba arrange very much the same philosophy under seven heads. One point of divergence on which they lay great stress is that, according to the Śvetāmbara, a tīrthaṅkarā needs food to support him until he dies; while the Dīgamba believe that, once a tīrthaṅkarā has attained omniscience, he has no further need of means.

There are also differences in actual practice. A Śvetāmbara ascetic may keep a loin-cloth, a shoulder-cloth, and a blanket to wear. Indeed, including these and his brush, mouth-cloth, and wooden vessels, he is allowed to retain fourteen possessions in this world, whereas a Dīgamba is absolutely nude and, though provided with a brush and peacock's feathers, has to live entirely in the jungle. The Śvetāmbara laymen complain that these ascetics are too much in the public eye; this complaint is, of course, never brought against a Dīgamba ascetic, whose lack of clothing internes him for life in the wilder-names.

There are also different rules about begging for the ascetics of the two orders, and the Dīgamba ascetics have no upāsāra. Again, the Śvetāmbara idols have glass eyes inserted in the marble, wear a loin-cloth, and are bedecked with jewels, whereas the austere Dīgamba idols are nude and are represented as being dead to the world, with eyes cast down. There is naturally little resemblance in the installation ceremonies of their idols. The ordinary worship differs also. The Śvetāmbara, when performing the eightfold worship, offer flowers and fresh fruit to their idols, and so on great festivals the Tibetāmbaras wear their white robes; but the Terāpānti Dīgamba never offer flowers or fresh fruit; in their stead they use cloves, dry coco-nut, sugar, and rice.

There is another very interesting difference. A Dīgamba Jain has no private idol in his own house, but, if a Śvetāmbara is a wealthy man and lives far from a temple, he may have his own private chapel. This chapel is separate from the house and can be entered only by persons in a state of ceremonial purity. In the chapel, if he can afford it, he may have a pratiṅka (an image of any one of the twenty-four tīrthaṅkaras that an astrologer selects for him), or he may have a siddha chokha (a tray on which are depicted the leading points of the Jain faith). The householder offers the eightfold worship to the pratiṅka, but only washes and wipes the siddha chokha and not the tīrthaṅka. A plain sheet of wood paste. An instructed Śvetāmbara would never ask a boon even of the idol in his own house: he would only stir himself up future efforts by meditating on it. But if, as often happens, an uninstructed Śvetāmbara does ask a gift, his prayer would be answered not by the tīrthaṅka (who as a matter of fact does not even hear it) but by the yakṣa in attendance on the tīrthaṅka.

3. Śvetāmbara sects.—The modern division of Śvetāmbara Jains is into Śhānakavāsi and Derāvāsi. The Śhānakavāsi are a non-idol-worshiping sect, which arose about A.D. 1474. Excepting on the crucial point of idol-worship, they do not differ much from other Śvetāmbara Jains.

At the present time the chief sects among idol-worshiping (Derāvāsi) Śvetāmbara are the Tapāgacchha (whose ascetics use red alms-bowls, and whose laymen in their devotions first confess their sins of walking and later their sins of trading), the Karanara-gacchha (whose ascetics use black alms-bowls, and whose laymen first confess their sins of trading and then their sins of walking), and the Afhala-gacchha and the Pāyachanda-gacchha, whose divergences are very slight.

It must be remembered that these are only spiritual distinctions and do not interfere with the freedom of marriage between different sects. The chief castes among the Jains are Osavālā, Porvādā, Śrīmālī, and Śrī Śrīmālā, which are each divided into two sections, Dāsā and Vīśā. It is impossible for members of these different castes to intermarry: thus an Osavālā Kararāta could never marry an Osavālā Śhānakavāsi, for, though the sect differs, the caste is the same, but a Dāsā Osavālā could never marry a Vīśā Osavālā, and still less could any Porvādā marry any Osavālā. It is interesting to notice, however, that any Jain could dine with any other Jain, Śvetāmbara or Dīgamba, whether Osavālā or Śrīmālī; but they would not interdine with any Brahman convert to Jainism.

LITERATURE.—Through the kindness of Jain friends the writer was given an opportunity of translating this art. to the leading Tapāgacchha Śvetāmbara Sadhu in Mumbai, in his upāsāra, when the principal Śhānakavāsi Jain pājita were also present; the art. has thus had the advantage of criticisms and suggestions from both parties at first hand. See also A. F. R. Hoernle, Annual Address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, in J. ASB., Calcutta, 1906; and Notes on Modern Jainism, Oxford, 1910, and The Heart of Jainism, do. 1915.

MARGARET STEVENSON.

1 Cf. art. Worsur (Jain).
2 Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism, p. 97.
SWAN-MAIDENS.—See Zanzibar.

SWAN-MAIDENS.—The beautiful and poetic myth of swan-maidens is of early origin and, in varying forms, of very wide diffusion. The central idea of the myth is that certain beings, half-mortal, half-supernatural, have the power of metamorphosis; in the bird-world with this are two secondary ideas: (1) that this power is dependent on the possession of a magic attribute, which was generally a bodily covering, such as a feather coat, robe, or veil, but sometimes merely a ring or a wild flower; (2) that either this being, when in human form, or her captor is subject to a tabu of some kind. There are so many variations on these themes that it is impossible to do more than refer briefly to some of the most significant versions.

1. In Oriental folk-lore.—Oriental folk-lore furnishes many instances of bird-maiden stories. In India, one finds the very early myth of Urvashi, embedded like a jewel in the dual ritual of the Satapatha-Brâhmana.

The apsara, or nymph, Urvashi loves one of the lunar race of kings. His wife, who has been told that she must never look upon him naked. By a trick played by the gandâras, supernatural beings who desire the return of their former home, she swears to Urvashi, that if she vanishes, Purâwâsâ, seeking her, finds her and her companions swimming on rivers and lakes, and turns them into apsaras. 'They appear to him,' i.e., assume human form, but in response to his pleading Urvashi replies: 'I have passed away like the first of dawn... I am like the wind, difficult to catch.' Finally, however, she relents, and the couple are re-united.

In the Vikramârûpâ of the poet Kalidâsa, a drama based upon the Urvashi story, the bird-maidy has almost disappeared, except for Urvashi's power of flying and for the constant references to swans throughout the act. Her change into human form depends merely upon the laying aside of a veil, in itself probably a stage convention for invisibility; the marital tabut, which Lang 2 characterizes as a relic of 'a traditional Aryan law of nuptial etiquette,' assumes a quite different form.

The myth re-appears in one of the finest tales of the Thousand and One Nights, that of Hasam of Basoreh. Hasam is the hospitality of a family of princesses; when obliged to leave them, they conjure him not to open a certain door. He disobeys, and finds a fair pavilion and a hanging garden. When he enters, he is transformed into a bird, and then he is restored to his hostess, who is told that this is the 'daughter of the soverign of the Jana. He has an army of women, smite with swords, and many other gifts of every kind. If she dreams of a golden cap which comes to her head, she shall be found a prince worth your love.'

2. In classical tradition.—Classical tradition does not seem to have preserved any swan-maiden tale in a complete form, but that the main idea was a familiar one is evident from the Cynoepus myths, the bird-transformation of the companions of Diomedes, the story of Leda, and the symbolic connexion of swans with Apollo, with the Muses, and with Aphrodite. 3 Modern Greek folk-lore represents the Nereids as flying maidens, similar in many points to swan-maidens. 4 Slavic.—Slavic folk-lore bears frequent testimony to the myth. The South Slavs were naturally more influenced by late Greek and by Oriental tradition, and the Bulgarian samodives, and the Serbian vilas, like the Greek Nereids, resemble the swan-maidsens; e.g., the vilas are associated with water and have the power of flying. 5

The Polish fairy-tale of the prince and the twelve geese-princesses shows that the myth in its simplest form was known to the Western Slavs. 6 The most important Russian example is the tale of 'Sweet Mikhail Fokin and the white swan'; this begins in fairly conventional style, although without the feather dress, but the white swan takes the shape of a rider, is captured and killed for his beauty, and is finally transformed into the bride of the prince.

Celtic.—Old Celtic tradition has two beautiful and elaborate swan-maiden tales, as well as an episode in the story of Etain, wife of Eochaid, who is carried off by the hero-god Midir in the form of a swan. 7

The story of the 'Children of Lór,' one of 'the three most sorrowful tales of Erin,' is an example, with Christian 'over-lay,' of that variant of the myth in which the bird-maiden is deprived of her human aspect by magic. The four royal children, metamorphosed for 900 years, retain their powers of human reasoning and speech, and have the gift of singing 'infantile music as which the men of the world would sleep, and there shall be no music of the world its equal.' 8

This power of song is turned to account in the Christian episode which concludes the tale. 9 The 'Dream of Oengus' conforms more closely to the regular swan-maiden type, so much so that J. A.MacCulloch 10 dismisses it as of no mythological or religious value; its artistic value, however, is very great.

The god Oengus is smitten with love for a dream-maiden, the original of whom proves to be Caer, a princess who spends every alternate year in the form of a swan. Oengus, having once seen her in mortal form, succeeds in discerning her in swan-guise from among her 150 competitors and quickly changes her golden caps around her heads.' He woos and wins her, and finds that she is a little girl who merely sings, while he is the one who really sings. This is of much beauty as to lull to sleep all his hearers for three days and three nights.

5. Teutonic.—The Teutonic races bear the distinct characteristic of having developed the swan-maiden myth most elaborately, and of having enriched it by connecting it with other supernatural ideas. Traces of the symbolic importance of swans are found in the primitive myths of the life and death 11164.

4. Contrast with this Hartland's idea (p. 200) that the swan-maiden must always employ an intermediary to oblige her role.
6. Atlantia, iv (1933) 111 ff., tr. E. O'Curry.
7. The Religion of the Ancient Celts, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 82.
both of the world and of individuals; thus the two swans of all the swan-kind, the pair that float on the Urtharbrunnr of the old Norse cosmogony,1 may be contrasted with the swan that lived, according to Finnish myth, on the river of Tuoni or Death.2 In later folk-tale we find a swan living on the mid-Atlantic, as the Harpy in the Odyssey, by flying by a ring in its beak; when it drops it, the end of the world will come.3 Popular saying still remembers the bird as one of omen and divinity.4 In Iceland, swans are not stocks, such as the bringers of new-born children,5 while, on the other hand, the sight of a swan in flight may betoken death,6 and swans are often leaders of the spirit-host.7 The ideas of animal shape-changing and of the external soul favoured the development of the swan-maiden myth in folk lore. The Scandinavian North, as one of the chief haunts in Europe of the wild swan, showed itself especially alive to the beauty and significance inherent in the myth; Grimm,8 influenced perhaps by the legends of the 'goose-footed woman,' "la reine pédaque," and "Berthe aux grands pieds," thinks that the goose supplanted the swan in legend, but this seems hardly proved. The power of flying and the possession of a feather coat were attributes of many gods in the Norse pantheon. The swan-maidens of the Scandinavians appears to have been married into the Norse one hand and the Valkyries on the other, who themselves often have traits in common. The connexion of swans with augury and with the Urtharbrunnr, the home of the Norms, prepares us for the former aspect; the power of 'riding through the air' possessed by the Valkyries prepares us for the latter; and we have already seen the bird-maidens as warriors-maidens in the story of Hasan of Bassorah.

The swan-maidens of the Nibelungenlied are Norma also; as swan-maidens they appear to Hagen 'like birds,' and they fall into his power when he takes their garments, but they are also 'wise women,' and one gives him prophetic warning.9 The maidens of the Völsunga saga10 are conventional swan-maidens with their 'swan-costa,' but they are also Valkyries, for they appear disguised. Again, the hero Helgi is helped in battle by a hisse, a rebirth of the Valkyrie Brava, who lovers singing above him.11 Fríðryk the king, of Denmark, is given helpful warning before a battle by the song of three swans.12 After this it is not surprising to find also traces of a connexion between swan-maidens and the sjöliga, or female guardian-spirit; thus the sjöliga of a beautiful woman appears as a swan.

6. The swan-knight.—The swan-knight seems to have been monopolized and localized by Teutonic mythology, although there are some traces of the idea in classical legend. As in the Cynicus myth already mentioned,13 and although the Teutonic myth appears to have fused with Celtic Arthurian legend. The popularity of the charming tale of Helyas, knight of the swan, and supposed ancestor of Godfrey of Bouillon, is attested by the numerous versions of it in various languages.

In the popular German fairy-tale the enchanted brothers owe their restoration to human form, not to the prowess of their brother, as in Helyas, but to the devotion of a sister. Of the other swan-knights of Brabant, the fate with the Grail legend has brought Leobengrin, son of Parival, most into prominence

and popularity. The fact that the swan-bird arrives from an unknown land in a stiff, and departs in the same way, has led Grimm1 to trace the beginning of the Teutonic swan-knight myth to Scyl and Scyld, semi-divine founders of the Danish race, of whom a similar tale is told, although the connexion with the bird-myth is very obscure.

7. Interpretations.—The interpretations of the swan-maiden myth have been various; the earlier school of mythologists saw in them nature-heroes, the swan-maiden being the white cloud, her captor the storm-spirit.2 Others have explained the swan-maiden, who is half-swan, as the moon, and who in the end is almost always lost to her captor, and the swan-knight, who must not reveal his name or place of origin, as denizens of the world of the dead or of the islands of the blessed.3 A more prosaic view takes into account merely the totemistic aspect which the myth shows in common with all animal shape-changing tales, points to the swan-maidens and swan-knights as founders of clans, and compares them with such figures as Mélusine of Luigan.4 The most modern theory brings the tabu into prominence, the overshadowing of other aspects, and adds the wide evidence now forthcoming of marital tabus among primitive peoples. The main piece of corroboration is the symbolic connexion between swans and women has been found in the rites enforced on seceding girls among the American Indian tribes; it is for the same appeal of the myth, none of these theories have power to detract from, but all serve only to enhance, its elusive and poetic beauty.


M. E. SEATON.

SWÁT or UDYANA.—This is a famous principality in Independent Eastern Afghanistan, between the latter country and Kashmir, to the south of Chitral and the Pamir. It receives the name of Swat from the river, which is said to be the Sukawara (Swasta, in Sanskrit), which joins the Kabul branch of the Indus above Peshawer. Its literary name of Udyana (in Prakrit, Ujiana) is ascribed to its garden or park-like appearance; for it is exceptionally richly cultivated, and possesses a beautiful Alpine valley. Through this Indo-Seythian country country descends for his invasion of India, crossing, it is generally supposed, the Malakan Pass, which is on the main route to the Indian plains; but Swat is best known for its fame as an ancient centre of Buddhism. It is thickly covered with the ruins of Buddhist monuments and temples, richly decorated with some of the finest sculptures of the Greco-Buddhist or so-called Gandhara (q.v.) type of art. These sculptured friezes and terra-cottas date chiefly between the 2nd and 5th centuries A.D., and a collection of several hundred of these are in the present writer during the Chitral expedition of 1895, and is now preserved in the Calcutta and Peshawar museums.6 The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hian, who visited the country c. A.D.

1 189-190.
2 192-193.
3 194-195.
4 196-197.
SWEAT, SWEAT-HOUSE.

Sweat, a colourless fluid containing about 2 per cent of solid matter, is a secretion of the sudoriferous glands. Its chief function is to regulate the heat discharge of the human body. It is connected with some curious and interesting magical and magic customs in various parts of the world.

Primitive man regards sweat, like blood, saliva, hair, and nail-parings, as a medium both for setting sorcery in motion against an enemy and for working the more harmless forms of magic. Codrington says that among the Melanesians the belief prevailed that a leaf with which a man has wiped the perspiration from his face may be employed to work mischief against him. 1 A like belief is found among the Negroes of N. America. 2 Some of the natives of N.E. New Guinea take elaborately prepared drops of their sweat from being made use of by a sorcerer; on leaving a camping-place, they stab the ground all over with their spears. 3 Some of the most curious uses to which this exudation of the human body has been put are illustrated by a group of customs connected with love magic.

A cake, an apple, or a sweetmeat impregnated with the sweat of the giver is a powerful philtre throughout the greater part of northern and central Europe, from Carn Gorm to the Garphaths. 4 A Hungarian girl who is not yet at Christmas-time, bakes a cake, takes it to bed with her for one night, and then bestows it on a youth whom she wishes to fall in love with her. 5 W. E. Paton says that in three Nuer states (confessors' mansions) of the Orthodox Church, which are, he believes, less than three centuries old, women are accused of rubbing dough on their bodies, and giving it to eat to men in whom they wish to arouse satanic love. 6

The victim of such love magic can, however, have recourse to a counter-charm of the same character. It was narrated that if a man who, under the influence of a philtre, was forced to love against his will, would put on a pair of shoes, and wear them out by walking in them, and then drink wine out of the right shoe, where it could mingle with the potion already there, he would promptly be cured of his love, and hate take its place. 7

A similar idea underlies the superstition prevalent among the Negroes and Indians of N. America, and also in Belgium, that, if the owner of a dog wishes to make the animal faithful to him, he should give it some bread which has been soaked in his sweat. 8 In the island of Tutu, in the Torres Straits, men drink the sweat of renowned warriors to acquire courage. 9

The mythology of ancient Egypt seems to have acquired a sacramental virtue to the sweat of Osiris. In the pyramid libation-formula the libations appear to be his sweat; and in the ritual of Amon the incense is suspended over the crystal drops of it. 10 A song quoted by A. Erman speaks of the Nile as the sweat of Osiris' hands. 11 The Negroes of Jamaica identified a man's luck with the perspiration of his hands, and believed that if the latter were wiped away, the former would disappear. 12

2. The sweat-house.—The ceremonial use of vapour baths is a custom of great antiquity and wide geographical distribution, being both in N. America and in N. Europe. In the former continent it was probably known to every tribe north of Mexico, though along the north-west coast it has been superseded by sea-bathing.

2 E. S. Hartland, L.P. II. 74.
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The type of the ordinary sweat-house seems to have been everywhere the same. Willow rods or other plant stems were stuck into the ground and bent or fastened with withes into a hemispherical or oblong frame-work, which generally was large enough to accommodate several people. A hole was dug conveniently near the door into which stones, usually heated outside, were dropped by means of forked sticks. These were sprinkled with water to generate steam. A temporary cover of blankets or skins made the enclo sure tight.

In each tribe there were certain prescribed rules for the construction of the sweat-house. In some cases, however, the chambers were used for this purpose. Sometimes it was used as a kind of men's club like the Pueblo kivas.
women being permitted to enter it for certain ceremonial purposes, but not for sweating. Among the Pueblo tribes on the Puebloan plateau, the women were not even permitted to gather wood for the holy fire to be kindled in the sweat-house. In California, where sweating always had a religious significance, some of the tribes used the sweat-house as a sleeping place for adolescent males. Hallucinogenic drugs were usually spent in the sweat-house, and then the bather plunged into a stream, if there was one at hand.

Among the Eskimos, hot air was used in place of steam and in Zulu, and probably in the Pueblos generally, hot stones near the body furnished the heat. Some tribes lit the fire in the sweat-house in autumn and kept it alive till spring. Bancroft says of the Northern Californians:

"A fire is built in the centre of the sweat-house in early fall and kept burning all the following spring, as much attention being given to it as ever was paid to the sacred fires of Heatia."2

Sweating in N. America was practised for three purposes: (1) religious — such as purification and the propitiation of spirits, preparation for war, and on arrival at puberty, when it was usually attended by searing and mutilation; (2) therapeutic, by the shaman, who stood outside and invoked the spirits believed to cause the disease (among the Plains Indians shamans who officiated at these ceremonies had usually to pass through the sweat-house themselves for preparation of purification); and (3) social and hygienic — a number of persons would enter a sweat-house for the purpose of enjoying the luxury of a bath (among certain tribes this became an almost daily requirement, and was perhaps a degeneration).

The sweat-bath is also used by the Eskimos of Bering Strait, among whom the men and boys indulge in it about once a week, or once in every ten days during winter, but with this people it does not appear to possess a religious significance.

Among many tribes the sweat-house had its own guardian spirit or manitu (q.v.). Among the Lillooets of British Columbia, "men who had the spirit of the sweat-house for their guardian spirit were regarded as having a sweat-house of elk skin supported on wands, and inside it they placed four large stones, which were heated to make the steam for the bath."4

It was believed among the Algonquins that a man when in the sweat-house might acquire medicine. Among the Sioux, a Fox Indian, relating his experiences during a sweat-bath, once said:

"Often one will cut one's self only through the skin. It is done with a wooden knife, and the operator thrusts the knife into the man to make the man to pass into the body. The manitous comes from the place of the abode in the stone. It comes caused by the heat of the fire, and proceeds out of the stone when the water is sprinkled on it. It comes out in the steam, and in the steam it enters the body.wordpress.reuters.com. It moves up and down, and all over and inside the body, driving out everything that inflicts pain. Before the manitous returns to the stone, it imparts some of its nature to the body. That is why one feels so well after having been in the sweat-lodge."3

Among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia, when a boy reached the age of puberty, he went through certain ceremonies to obtain a guardian spirit.

In the sweat-bath he prayed to the spirit of sweat-bathing under the title of "Sweat-bathing Grandfather Chief," begging that he might be strong, brave and agile, lucky, rich, a good hunter, a skilled fisherman, and so forth.8

The Ojibwa (q.v.), an Algonquin tribe, had a secret society called the 'Miids wiwin,' or society of the shamans. For four days before initiation into it a candidate would purify himself in the sweat-bath.

1 In all ceremonies, prophetical or medico-magical, great reliance is placed on the vapor-bath. It is...
however, disappointed in this expectation, since among the aborigines of N. Siberia it is not
in digenous, but is in use only among those tribes which, like the Yakuts, have already received
many elements in their culture from the Russians. We seem, then, to be led to the conclusion that
the sweat-bath originated independently in both Europe and America. It seems to have originated
in a more southerly latitude than N. Siberia. The vapour-bath appears to be one of those insti-
tutions which were originally indulged in for hygienic purposes, and which, according to their
beneficial results, came to be connected in the mind of primitive man with mysterious unseen
powers, and hence were used in connexion with religious rites. Now, however, the sweat-bath
seems to be regarded as a germs of a peculiar character.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnote.

H. J. T. JOHNSON.

SWEATING.—See ECONOMICS.

SWEDENBORG.—I. Life and works.—Emanuel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm on
29th Jan. 1688. He was the second son of Jesper Swedenborg, Bishop of Uppsala, and professor
in the University of Upsala. The family was en-
nobled by Queen Ulrica Eleonora in 1719, when the
patronymic of Swedenborg was changed into the
magnificent Scarafinius.

Little is known of Swedenborg's childhood. After completing his studies at Upsala in 1709, he
began an extended foreign tour, and was in England in 1711, 'studying Newton daily and very
anxious to see and hear him.' 1 We gather from one of his letters to his brother-in-law, Dr. Ericus Benedixus, that
medicine was not the occupation on which he most of his interest. He wrote of his conversations with Flamsteed, Halley, and other well-known men of science, but his copious references to the works of Dryden, Spenser, Milton, Shakespeare, and others show that his scientific studies did not prevent him from suffering delighted at the English literature. Swedenborg spent nearly two years in London and Oxford. He afterwards visited Holland, France, and Germany, working all the time at a number of inventions. One of them was 'the plan of a certain ship which its men was to go under the surface of the sea, and attack the greatest damage to the fleet of the enemy.' Another of his inventions was a magazine air-gun to discharge 80 or 70 shots in succession without reloading. He also devised a flying machine, but the great Swedish engineer, Christopher Polhem, expressed the opinion that, with respect to flying by artificial means, it was about the same thing as trying to make a perpetual motion or to make gold.

In 1718, Swedenborg was appointed by King Charles XII. extraordinary assessor at the Royal Board of Mines, an appointment which caused him to decline the offer of a professorship of anatomy at the University of Upsala. In the same year his family, Swedenborg had a seat in the House of Nobles of the Swedish Parliament, but his interest in science, always greater than in politics, led him in 1721 to go abroad to study the mines and manufactures of other lands. It was during this journey that he began a treatise on physics and chemistry, at
Amsterdam, a second edition of his New Method of finding the Place and Distance of Places by Geographical
Observations on Geology and Mineralogy. But the work which won for Swedenborg a European reputation was his Opera Philosophica et Mineralia in 3 vols., with numerous copperplates, published at Dresden and Leipzig in 1724 at the expense of his patron, the
Duke of Brunswick. In the first volume of that work, the
Principia, Swedenborg gives an elaborate theory of the origin of the visible universe and propounds his nebular hypothesis. This theory has been often attributed to Kant and Laplace as the original authors, but Swedenborg's theory appeared in the
Principia in 1743, while Kant's Natural History of the Heavens was published in 1755, and Laplace's Système du Monde in 1766, as has been shown by Arber in his Introduction to the Latin reprint of Swedenborg's Cosmologia. Soon after appeared the
Economy of the Animal Kingdom (1740-41) and The Animal Kingdom (1749), in which are given the results of Swedenborg's extensive labours in anatomy and physiology. In 1745 his Works of Philosophy were published in Stockholm, and the surprising transition of his author's mind from plain scientific philosophy to the question of general is generally considered a formation of mysticism, but what the author himself would have described as spiritual perception. A great change has come over him. His Works of Philosophy are full of strange and interesting opinions on all things of life and see things of the other life.

Swedenborg gives the year 1745 as the date of the opening of his spiritual life, and it was in April 1745, according to his

2 In (I. Correspondence with Benedixus.

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own statement, that he was fully admitted to intercourse with angels and spirits, not by any process analogous to what is
usually termed spiritualism (q.v.), but by having been conduced directly, while remaining normally conscious of everything about him on earth. He was virtually in a spiritual state in which such a mental state would be received, when made known to the world, and he anticipated it in his first theological work in these words: 'I am well aware that many people will say that it is impossible for any one to converse with spirits and angels during his life-time; but I have intimated that there is room for such intercourse to be more familar; some, that I have invented such relations in order to gain credit; whilst others will make other objections. For all these, however, I care not, I have seen, heard and felt.'

In 1747 Swedenborg resigned his position on the Royal Board of Mines and devoted himself to the new work to which he believed himself to have been divinely called. His vast work, the Areopag Celesia, was completed in 3 vols. in 1756. Then followed, among others, The Earths in the Universe (1758), The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrine (1758), Heaven and Hell (1753), perhaps the best known of all his books, On the Intermediate between the Soul and the Body (1780), Divine Love and Wisdom (1765), Divine Providence (1764), The Apocalypse Revealed (1706), Conjugial Love (1768), the theological work to which Swedenborg's name is attached, and lastly The True Christian Religion (1771).

It is interesting, and in a sense very significant, to find that, while Swedenborg was fully occupied with the publication of so many theological works, he yet found time and freedom of mind to attend to mundane affairs. In 1763 he wrote several papers on scientific subjects in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Arts of London. In 1770, at Amsterdam his New Method of finding the Longitude of Places on Land and Sea. Count Hopken has stated that 'the most solid and best written memoirs at the Dutch Assem-

bly were published on matters of finance were presented by Swedenborg.' 1

The last political document bearing Swedenborg's name is an address to the Diet entitled 'Frank Views concerning the Maintenance of the Country and the Preservation of the

1 For the letters he dictated, and was actually put to a test, see Swedenborg's 'Areopag Celesia,' c. xlii. 202. Swedenborg's last words postulate, 'God is a man.' Of course, he does not

1 Areopag Celesia, § 60.

2 Talbot, ii. 406.
mean that God is a man in a physical sense. His real meaning is simply that, if we think at all about God, we must do so by means of symbols derived from our highest human experience. But if these symbols do not correspond, in an infinite Reality, to what they represent, as finite symbols, to us, then all these conceptions are not merely imperfect and inadequate, but actually false. We are then obliged to conclude that there is a fundamental antinomy in the constitution of the human mind, so that the Power from whom it proceeds has so constructed it that it must think about that Power, and think about it falsely. Surely, Swedenborg considers, what the human mind must think should be, at least, an approximate symbol or representation of a fact. If we doubt this, the grounds upon which we believe any philosophical, ethical, or spiritual truth are undermined.

Thus, to think of God as a divine man would simply mean, for Swedenborg, to think of Him as being infinite love and wisdom, as He is apprehended by us by means of symbols derived from the highest of human faculties, the intellect and the will—those faculties by which we are made ‘in the image of God.’ But Swedenborg seems also to have conceived of man as the profound comparison between this conception of God as a divine man in His essential nature and the rational interpretation of a possible incarnation in time. In reading Swedenborg it may be useful to remember that there is an idealism, quite his own, at the basis of his philosophical views and consequently of his theology. This enables one to understand much that lies hidden behind his realistic language when he deals with spiritual matters for which our human vocabularies have only weak and inadequate expressions.

(6) The world.—This should be particularly remembered in his treatment of the creation of the world. Swedenborg has attempted to correlate two apparently irreconcilable ideas—the idea of a personal God distinct from the universe, and the idea of an immanent Creator. He has done it by means of his doctrine of ‘discrete degrees.’ He holds that there are substances of many orders composing the universe. The primary, self-existent substance is the infinite God from whom all finite substances originate. But, these substances are related to each other in an order constituted by degrees named ‘discrete degrees’ in distinction from ‘continuous degrees,’ because they are plans of existence entirely separate from each other and incapable of being resolved one into another. A continuous degree is merely a variation of being or quality on its own plane, as from heavier to lighter, or from denser to rarer. It is only a question of more or less. Discrete degrees, on the other hand, are never of the same forms or qualities of being, and, moreover, they involve the relation of cause and effect. Hence Swedenborg says: ‘Nothing, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been known of discrete degrees but only of continuous degrees; yet without a knowledge of both kinds of degrees nothing of cause can be truly known,’ for ‘seeing from effects alone is seeing from fallacies.’ He means that fallacies arise, not from a failure to distinguish between cause and effect, as, e.g., between matter and spirit, but from the fact of regarding them as differing by continuous degrees only and not by discrete degrees. For thus cause is never lifted above the plane of effect, nor spirit above the plane of matter.

It is maintained therefore that in everything of which there is cause and effect, there are called end, cause, and effect, and these three are to each other according to discrete degrees. In creation the natural or material world is the effect, of which the spiritual world is the cause, and God is the end. The first act of creation, not in time but in order, is the presence of the Divine of a finite emanation of love and wisdom from Himself. This is conceived as a spiritual sun of incomparable splendour, a manifestation so intense that the finite mind could not bear its light and had to be insulated by intermediate stages. Thus, successive discrete degrees separated not in space but in the quality of their spiritual constitution, produce the higher and the lower heavens; other discrete degrees form the angelic forms according to their receptibility of love and wisdom.

Similarly, the affections and thoughts which constitute the life of men are not, as it seems to us, self-generated, but pass into their minds out of the spiritual world, in a clearer or more obscure manner, always according to discrete degrees and in the order of cause and effect. In the world of matter a different law operates. Matter is derived not directly from spirit, but from the natural sun, which, according to Swedenborg, is not only the centre and support of our solar system, but also the proximate cause of its existence. From the activity of this world, or of the earth, are ultimately produced, by discrete degrees, the atmospheres and matter itself out of which the physical world is formed. The material substances, conceived as inert in themselves, arise from the other as an effect upon by spiritual forces. But there is nothing of God in them as the ultimate of creation, since their life has ended in in-life, and love and wisdom have ended in forms of motion. Of course, this does not mean that God is not present in this ultimate of creation.

This doctrine is intended to exclude the incomprehensible idea of a creation ex nihilo, whilst it is meant also to provide against a pantheistic interpretation of the universe. It inevitably presents the difficulties which are inseparable from any theory of emanation.

(6) Man.—Theology of Swedenborg, as it deals with man, his nature, and his destiny, cannot be understood apart from his view (or, as he would insist, apart from the doctrine that he was divinely commissioned to make known to the modern world) of the real meaning of God’s Word as we have it in the letter of Holy Scripture. More than 150 years ago Swedenborg had foreseen the difficulties and objections which criticism might bring forward against the doctrine of a divine revelation. ‘It is in the mouth of all,’ he says, ‘that the Word is from God, is divinely inspired and therefore holy. But yet it has been unknown hitherto where within it its Divinity resides. The man who worships Nature instead of God may easily fall into error concerning the Word, and say within himself when he is reading it: “What is this? Is this divine? Can God who has infinite wisdom speak thus?”’ Yet Swedenborg never lost his faith in a divine revelation, and one of the principal objects of his theology is to show that the difficulties which create so serious a stumbling-block in many minds are due to the fact that they are looking in the Bible for what its letter does not and cannot explicitly manifest. He affirms that the Word contains throughout a spiritual meaning which alone gives the true and full sense of God’s revelation to man. Plato, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others have attempted to discover a spiritual sense in the Bible, but Swedenborg’s conception proceeds on entirely different lines. He holds that the spiritual is the divine truth itself as it exists in God. It is the very form of God, and the medium of communication and conjunction with Him for the
angels in the heavens and for men upon earth. But truth in this divine form is utterly incomprehensible to any finite mind. To render it at least partly intelligible it must descend through the discrete degrees already described, and assume successively lower and lower forms of expression adapted to the comprehension of the various grades of finite intelligence. On earth it presents itself to us as the letter of our Bible, or rather as the original texts from which that letter has come to us.

How then are those texts written? They are written in pure 'correspondences,' i.e. in symbols derived from nature. Every natural object is conceived to be the effect, and therefore the expression, of spiritual causes. Those effects 'correspond' to those causes; hence their capacity, when properly understood, to reveal the spiritual meaning contained in them.

The first result of this principle is that man is thus enabled to know the true canon of the sacred Scriptures. Those books which are so written as to present a correspondential spiritual meaning are really 'the Word.' The other books possess devotional and even doctrinal value, but they are not 'the Word.' In this fact, Swedenborg declares that the only books of the Word in the Bible are, in the OT, the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings, the Psalms, the Prophets from Isaiah to Malachi; in the NT, the four Gospels and Revelation. The Epistles form therefore no part of what Swedenborg strictly calls 'the Word.' But he valued them highly, and he frequently quotes them.

In the letter, as we have seen, Swedenborg recognizes a human element manifested in the language and feelings of the writers of the various books of the Bible; it is only the spiritual sense that is entirely and solely divine. Hence many of the difficulties raised by the higher criticism would be no difficulties for him; e.g., instead of a creation in six days in the book of Genesis, he reads there the earliest condition of man and the gradual development of his psychological constitution; his growth in a knowledge of good and truth, of love and faith, and of divine things; and finally his introduction to a celestial perception of divine truth itself. It is a conception of the regeneration of man, called to reach his spiritual destination through knowledge, trial, faith, and love, and Swedenborg sees that such a conception has a sublime meaning for us which it could not have had for the men who lived when the letter was written. It would have been an unintelligible revelation for most of them. Therefore the full meaning of the letter as contained in the spiritual sense was not given to them. There is, according to Swedenborg, a grave spiritual danger in the premature disclosure to any mind of divine Truth.

But what is man? He is, says Swedenborg, made to be at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. He is not life, but a recipient of life from God. And God grants man a sense that the life which he feels within himself is his own and not that of another. In every man's soul there is an inmost or supreme degree into which the divine of the Lord proximately flows; hence it is that man can receive intelligence and wisdom and speak from reason, and from this also comes the fact that his soul is endowed with immortality.

The will rather than the understanding constitutes the man. Swedenborg rejects the idea of angels having been created by the Father or the Son, and he also holds that there is no personal Devil or Satan, but that that name signifies the whole society of evil spirits.

The life of man cannot be changed after death, for the spirit of man is such as belongs to his state of infernal love cannot be changed into heavenly love, 'because they are opposite.' The problem of evil, as presented by Swedenborg, is explained by man's freedom with which God has endowed man, and it is because God 'wherewith changeth not' will not withdraw that gift that man's love remains what it was even after death. If he has deliberately made evil his good and good his evil, then he is his own devil, and does not desire heaven. He could find no ease there, and would long for his congenial surroundings and associates. He is not sent to hell; he goes there of himself, and would be happy there, if an evil soul could find permanent happiness anywhere. But he inevitably meets with sufferings and punishments, inflicted not by God or His agents, but chiefly by the evil spirits his associates. What happens under our eyes here upon earth continues in hell. For evil breeds evil always and everywhere. This conception is sad, but certainly drawn from life.

Are then those sufferings eternal? It is difficult to interpret definitely the teaching of Swedenborg on that point. How far 'those sufferings may be mitigated,' says Howard Spalding, 'we are not told, but a careful study of all that Swedenborg has said on the subject suggests that they may be so greatly modified as to cease to be acutely felt.' It is remarkable that, according to Swedenborg, there is no absolute destruction of evil even in heaven, for nothing which has formed part of the spiritual nature of man can ever be annihilated. Spirits therefore—yes, angelic spirits—carry with them into heaven the perverted organic forms in which their evils resided. They are even permitted to experience from time to time a sense of their evils, but not uselessly, for by those alternations of state spirits are kept in continual spiritual progress. Thus the regeneration of man, begun on earth, continues to eternity.

Of heaven we are told that God Himself is heaven, and that His presence to each human spirit brings heaven into him, but always in a degree which depends on a certain faculty of reception acquired on earth by man's conscientious endeavour to make what he truly believes the rule of his life.

There has been a tendency, more or less defined, to class Swedenborg among the mystics, but this seems to be due to an imperfect understanding of his system. His conception of life in heaven should suffice to show how little he has in common with mysticism past or present.

The fulfilment of God's purpose in creating the world is a fundamental doctrine in Swedenborg's theology. That purpose, we are told, was, by making man in His own image and endowing him with the faculties of freedom and rationality, to prepare him for that conjunction with God which constitutes the angelic heaven. In this sense, the creation means infinite love seeking by love to cause love to arise freely between the Creator and His rational creature. But the misuse of rationality and freedom has led to evil being chosen and loved instead of good; hence sin, whose effect is the weakening of true freedom, and the obscuring of that interior light within us which is rationality. Then it is that the love which had created man has also come to save him. By His intervention the Lord did not cease to reconcile His Father..."
to man, for God in Christ, as Swedenborg says, is the one only God who is love itself and does not need to be reconciled. It is man, who needs to be reconciled to God. The Lord came and, as to His human nature, was born, lived, suffered, and died 'for us,' not 'instead of us.' He came to enable man to do that which, through sin, he had lost. He came to manifest His infinite love for man, and thereby give to him for ever a definite object of intelligent faith, worship, and love. Man is said to be saved by the blood of Christ, in this sense, that His blood is the symbol of divine truth, and the shedding of His blood is the symbol of the imparting of His spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. The Atone ment, for Swedenborg, is thus really an at-one-ment, the reconciliation of man to God by the love and power of God. It was accomplished by the Lord taking upon Himself man's nature, enslaved by sin, from the Blessed Virgin Mary, sustaining in His own person the assaults and temptations of the powers of darkness and gradually subduing them. For this work the Lord laid down His life, i.e., the life in Him of all that was not in perfect agreement with the infinite perfections of His divinity. When this was done, 'consummated,' the Lord Jesus Christ was no longer, even as to His human nature, the Son of Mary. He was the 'only begotten Son of God,' the perfect manifestation of the infinite, invisible Father. This process, called glorification, was completed after His resurrection, when the Lord 'put off' from the inhuman nature all its hereditary tendencies to evil and sin, and 'put on' from the Father the divine humanity subsisting in the essential divinity within Him. This is the supreme type of man's own regeneration by which, having put off hereditary tendencies to evil and his actual sins, he puts on from the Lord, in the degree that he has thus put off evil, a new regenerated and spiritual humanity, a spiritual mind. No real regeneration can be attained except in accordance with the principle that a 'saving faith' is 'a faith which worketh by love.' Salvation by 'faith alone' is rejected and condemned by Swedenborg in innumerable passages in his works.

It is important in connexion with this subject to understand his idea of 'the Church.' The essential Church for him is constituted by a genuine love of goodness and truth and by the spiritual relation established with the Lord in the minds of men. The true Church is therefore invisible, but, so far as it is a true Church, it can never pass away. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the disclosure by the Lord of further truths called for by new conditions in the world of human thought and experience, and needed to establish a higher level of spiritual life. Nor does it exclude the possibility of the loss of, or the corruption of truths previously held, rendering necessary the institutionalisation of a new Church. In order to restore what has been lost, and to incorporate new truths which the Church in the past was not ready to receive. The assertion, therefore, made by the doctrine of Swedenborg that a 'New Church' has been instituted, involves, as they would insist, no disparagement of the former Christian Church so far as it is really the Lord's. The members of the New Church, of Swedenborg, have not at present time considered an entire misconception to imagine that Swedenborg is the founder of a 'New Church.' He himself always repudiated any such pretension. He considered himself a mere instrument through whom new truths needed in the Church were communicated to the world. His chief point always was that the Church and religion is another. The Church is called a Church from doctrine; religion is called religion from a life according to doctrine. Hence his wellknown saying: 'All religion is related to life, and the life of religious is related to religion.'


L. B. De Beaumont.

Swine—The swine plays a prominent part in many ancient and modern religions. The word 'pig' is unlovely to the Scottish fisherman, and on hearing it he will feel for the nails in his boots and mutter 'Could iron.' The pig of certain villages on the north-east coast of Scotland consider the words 'sow,' 'pig,' and 'swine' very unlovely; should any one be so unwise as to utter these words while the line is being baited, the line will surely be lost. The Gallo-assen, having noticed that, whilst men suffer from itch, caused by treading on the fallen fruit of the arem pome, the wild boar, which is fond of the fruit and runs freely among it, is not liable to such a disease, argue that the fruit treats the pig as a real friend, and, if one by guining can impress the fruit that he is a pig, it will treat him in the same way. The pig was offered by the Romans and Greeks as an expiatory sacrifice. Cato advises that, before thinning a grove, the Roman farmer should offer a pig to the god or goddess of the place. The grain distributed as prizes in the Eleusinian games in Greece was grown on the Larion plain near Eleusis; this plain was so sacred that no dead body was allowed to touch it, and, whenever a defilement occurred, a pig was offered as a sacrifice. The Carls abstained from pig's flesh because, like most primitive races, they believed that the physical and mental qualities of the human being depend largely upon the food which he eats; therefore, if they were to eat the flesh of pigs, they would lose small eyes like those of a pig. Similarly Zuni girls abstain from eating pig's flesh because they fear that by eating it they might gradually come to resemble the ugly pig in appearance. But there are other reasons why primitive man abstains from pork. The Kai of N.E. New Guinea find that pigs are the worst enemies of the crops; therefore, if a field-labourer were to eat pork, the dead pig in his stomach would attract the living pig into the field. Swine's flesh was forbidden to all the Semites except the Babylonians, but it is an open question whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean. As early as the time of Hammurabi pork was a highly valued food among the Babylonians and frequently formed part of the temple offering. By

5. Lucian, de Dea Syr. 84; cf. Aristides, op. Altheim, iii. 55 (A. Mehlske, Fragmente Conciliorum Conciliorum, Berlin, 1832-37, il. 68).
the inspection of pigs various omens were derived, and in the official lists special provision is even made for pigs. For example the Haranimans sacrificed swine's flesh once a year and ate the flesh. 1 By the Syrians the swine was regarded as sacrilegious, and it was specially sacred to Aphrodite. 2 To the Greeks the attitude of the Jews towards swine was difficult to understand. 4 In I 65 66 7 we are told that some of the Jews used to meet secretly to eat swine's flesh; it has been suggested therefore that the swine was revered rather than branded as unclean, as it was by the Egyptians. 8 We are told that it was not eaten because it was divine. To the Egyptians the pig was very loathsome. 9 Swineherds were forbidden to enter a temple and even to marry among themselves. If a man even touched a pig, he immediately stepped into a river to wash off the taint. Pig's milk caused leprosy. These prohibitions prove that the Egyptians originally regarded the pig as sacred, for the belief that the eating of a sacred animal produces leprosy and that the effect caused by touching a sacred object is removed by washing was current among many ancient tribes and religions. 6 Later, however, the pig became loathed upon with horror and was regarded as the Egyptian devil and the embodiment of Set or Typhon and enemy of Osiris. Typhon, in the form of a pig, injured the eye of Horus, who burned him and ordained that a pig was to be sacrificed, seeing that Ra, the sun-god, had declared the pig to be an abominable beast. We find in various religions that the animal sacrificed to a god because he is the god's enemy was originally the god himself. Now, we read that Typhon was hunting a boar when he discovered and mangled the body of Osiris, and that for this reason pigs were sacrificed once a year. It has therefore been suggested that originally the pig was a god, and that he was no other than Osiris. 9 We have already seen that the Kai of New Guinea abstain from pork because they regard the pig as the enemy of the crope, so that we can understand why the Egyptians should have identified their corn-god Osiris or his enemy Typhon with a wild boar. It might also be noted that pigs were sacrificed to Osiris on the very day on which he is recorded by tradition to have been killed. Further, the pig was sacred to the corn-goddess Demeter and was often associated with her. In art she is represented as accompanied by a pig. 2 At the Thesmophoria, the swine festival, some sacred vaults, which are described as the caves of Demeter and Persephone, 10 It seems that the pigs were intended to represent Persephone and her descent into the lower world. An ancient legend tells that, when Pluto carried off Persephone, Eubules, a swineherd, was herding his swine near the spot, and his herd were engulfed in the cave into which Pluto and Persephone had vanished. The Thesmophoria has analogies in the folk-cults of N. Europe. In certain districts of Courland the pig is the corn-spirit, whose power of fertility lies in his tail; therefore, when barley is sown for the first time in the year, the sower sticks a pig's tail into the field, believing that the ears of corn will grow as long as the tail. The idea that the pig is an embodiment of the corn-spirit can further be seen from the Scandinavian custom of 'Yule boar.' This is a leaf prepared from the last sheaf in the form of a pig. 2 4 The idea that a pig's blood at Christmas and kept till sowing-time, when it is given to the plough-horses in the hope that it will be the means of securing a good harvest. 2 4 In this connexion it is of interest that a phallic connexion between Tamuun and the Assyrian god of the winter, and of vegetation, and the Chinese and Turkish words for pig. He also cites the evidence of classical writers 9 that 'the Jews did not use swine's flesh because it was sacred inasmuch as by turning up the earth with its snout it taught men the art of ploughing.' 14 In some parts of White Russia it is believed that the bones of a pig preserve the corn from hail, whilst in other places the ribs are thrown into the seed-bag among the flax-seed because they cause the flax to grow well and tall. The Altars of Minahassa in N. Celebes was said that a pig's blood causes inspiration, and at one of their festivals the priest drinks a pig's blood and thereupon is able to prophesy as to how the rice-crop will turn out. 2 5 The inhabitants of Car Nicobar rub themselves over with pig's blood to cause them to escape from any devils of which they may be possessed. 2 6 In the same way the Greeks cleansed a homicide by sprinkling him with pig's blood and beating him with a laurel bough. The Karens of Burma believe that a bad harvest is caused by adultery, and, in order to atone for this, those detected in adultery must buy a pig, scrape out furrows in the ground with each foot, and then fill them with the pig's blood. 2 7 Some Yabim believe that after death their souls will be turned into swine, and they therefore abstain from swine-flesh lest they should thus be eating the souls of their relatives. The people of Tamara (off the coast of New Guinea) also abstain from pork because the souls of the dead transmigrate into the bodies of pigs. The worshippers of Adonis did not eat pork because their god had been killed by a bear. In old Attica there is a custom called the cry 'Hyia Attis,' raised by the worshippers of Attis, meant 'Pig Attis.' 14 In Fiji a huge pig is presented to those who are initiated into manhood. At Maewo, new pigs into the market, and, in New Hebrides, fifty days after the death of a wealthy man pigs are killed, and the point of the liver of the pig is cut off. The brother of the deceased goes to the forest and calls out the dead man's name, saying 'This is for thee to eat,' the idea being that, if pigs are not killed for the benefit of the dead man, his ghost has not proper existence. 15 It should be noted also that the pig is very often represented by a cowry-shell. Malinowski, in an

1 En-Nedin in D. Chwolson, Die Sabaeer und der Sabeanen, St. Petersburg, 1855, ii, 42.
2 The pig was also sacred to Aphrodite at Argos (Athen. iii. 40) and in Pamphylia (Strabo, iv. 17).
3 Pictarch, Symposium, iv.
5 Pict. de Jj. et Osoi, § 2; Herodotus, ii, 47, etc.
6 Seven practices of Negroes in the worship of their spirits, see Lycceur, Les Idees de Mort, Paris, 1914, p. 17.
9 V. Kolosz, Geschichte und Philologie, Leipzig, 1873-75, pl. ii.
10 F. C. Movers, Die Phnoticeder, Berlin, 1841-46, i. 220.
12 For further details concerning this and similar customs throughout various parts of Europe see L. F. Panzer, Beitrag zur deutschen Mythologie, Munich, 1848-55, ii. 619; J. J. Janin, Rhymologisch-Theologische Dictionary der Scottish Mythology, London, 1867, iii. 260f.; Mannhardt, Antike Wald- und Feldskulen, Berlin, 1877, p. 197.
13 Callistatus, op. Cit. Symp. iv. 5.
14 G. J. Ball, 'Tammuz, the Swine God,' PBA. xv. (1894) 105f.
16 V. Solomon, 'Extracts from Diaries kept in Car Nicobar,' JAF xxiv. (1903) 277.
SYMBOLISM (Christian).

It is proposed in this article to indicate the more important of the emblems and personifications in which Christian belief has found spontaneous expression. The literary images which are meant to be symbolic, but which have not embodied themselves in pictorial or material shapes, are excluded from view. An attempt may be made, however, to connect the emblems which call for notice with the language of the New Testament.

When the subject is thus defined, the field to be surveyed is at once seen to be as clear and vast as it is exact. The first may be five Christian centuries, and separate themselves for our purpose markedly from the centuries which follow. For the symbolism of the earlier period we have the definite and varied testimony offered by the early church paintings and inscriptions of the Roman catacombs. With the light thus obtainable we are able to see the hopes with which the Christians of Rome during this formative period lived. Their dead ascended to heaven, and became, in the mind of the first Christian, the means by which the soul might be saved. The meaning of this is that the soul of the deceased had been transfigured by faith, and was now in a state of eternal blessedness. This belief was the foundation of the Christian hope, and was the source of the confidence which enabled the first Christians to bear hardship and suffering.

SYMBOLISM (Jewish).

The Jewish people were a people of the book, and their religion was expressed in symbols. The most important of these symbols were the Aaronic priesthood, the Temple, and the Law. The Aaronic priesthood was the symbol of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and the Temple was the symbol of the Church. The Law was the symbol of the moral code of the Jews.

SYMBOLISM (Greek and Roman).

The Greeks and Romans also used symbols in their religion. The most important of these symbols were the zodiac, the gods and goddesses, and the myths. The zodiac was used to represent the seasons of the year, and the gods and goddesses were symbols of the forces of nature. The myths were stories that explained the creation of the world.

SYMBOLISM (Hindu).

The Hindus also used symbols in their religion. The most important of these symbols were the gods and goddesses, the Vedas, and the caste system. The gods and goddesses were symbols of the powers of nature, and the Vedas were the sacred texts of the Hindus. The caste system was a symbol of the social order.

SYMBOLISM (Semitic).

The Semitic peoples also used symbols in their religion. The most important of these symbols were the gods, the prophetic tales, and the sacred texts. The gods were symbols of the powers of nature, and the prophetic tales were stories that explained the creation of the world. The sacred texts were the books that contained the words of the gods.

SYMBOLISM (Islamic).

The Islamic people used symbols in their religion. The most important of these symbols were the Koran, the Hadith, and the Prophet. The Koran was the sacred book of the Muslims, and the Hadith were the sayings of the Prophet. The Prophet was the symbol of the divine will.

SYMBOLISM (Christian).

The symbol of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is perhaps the most important symbol in Christianity. The resurrection symbolizes the victory of life over death, and the hope of eternal life. The resurrection is also a symbol of the victory of faith over unbelief, and of the victory of light over darkness.

The symbolism of the later centuries has the
same general character. As sin and misery increase on the earth, fear plays a larger part in the Christian's life. The temple of the lost becomes more conspicuous than the joys of the blessed. A final judgment of all mankind displaces the earlier individual judgment and assumes a truly terrifying aspect. The figure of Christ becomes more stern and awful, and, as it does so, the person of the Virgin Mother takes His place as the Tokener of the dead, the restorer of the blind, and the healer of the sick. He waits for His disciples beyond death to lead them into the heavenly pastures. Such are the subjects and implications of the symbolism.

(2) OT types. Scenes from the OT which were especially held to typify this deliverance recur with great frequency on the tombs. These are the salvation of Isaac, when he was about to be slain in sacrifice by Abraham, the salvation of Noah in the Ark, the restoration of Job to his former prosperity (Job 42:1-24), the rescue of Jonah from the jaws of the sea-monster, and the preservation of the three Hebrew youths in the flaming furnace. Some features in the symbolism of these paintings deserve particularly to be noted. In the representations of Abraham's contemplated sacrifice it is the rescue of Isaac from death that the painter desires to symbolize. This is plain from the attitude in which Isaac is represented when the design of the picture permits. He appears with extended arms—a posture of prayer or adoration of which more is said below. This is also the attitude of Noah as he stands in the Ark, and of the three children in the furnace. There is no suggestion in the paintings of the theological motives which the subject implies. There may also be observed that the Deity is represented here, as generally or often in the earliest Christian art, by an outstretched hand. No attempt is made to delineate His features. There are no representations of the Trinity such as we find afterwards. Of all Biblical types Jonah has been the most frequently chosen by those painters. He forms the subject of 120 separate pictures which have come to light. It is to be observed that he does not here appear as a type of the resurrection of Christ, as he does in Mt 17:2. Nor is it the repentance of the Ninevites at his preaching (Mt 12:40) that the painters wish to symbolize. He is represented as an example of God's saving power. Sometimes he forms the subject of three or four connected pictures. We first see him standing on the deck of the vessel and about to be cast into the sea. We then see the monster vomiting him out towards the land. He next appears resting under the gourd, which takes the form of an arbour like those in paradise. There pile among them, where he reclines in an attitude of dejection, his head resting on his hand.

(b) The sacred infancy. The divine childhood is depicted on a number of tombs. One of the most beautiful paintings in the catacomb is the picture in the Priscilla cemetery of the Christ-child on His mother's breast. The mother bends slightly forward as if to suckle the child. The child's hand is spread out over mother's breast, but the face, with wonderful eyes, is half turned towards the spectator. Above the heads of mother and child two stars are indicated in an oblique direction. To the left stands a man in mantle and sandala who has come to meet the infant, who is in his left hand a written roll and with his right points to the star above. This figure probably represents Joseph (who, as far as is known, does not appear in early Christian art) as the foster-father of the infant. It is more evidence that God told the prophet to whom Christ was preached (Mt 11:10). It is this power of God to save from death and harm that finds expression in the paintings of the catacombs. Christ appears as the Son of God foretold by prophetic voices.

SYMBOLOGY (Christian)

depicted is the visit of the Magi. They are generally represented as three in number, although the painter may be led by the exigencies of space to increase the number or reduce them to two.

The distinctive determination of their number as three, their designation as kings, the ascription to them of proper names (Kaspar, Melchior, Balthasar), the differentiation of their ages— to this legendary web antiquity only contributed the first threads. Its elaboration was completed by Buresse in the Middle Ages.1

The Annunciation (A.L. 187) forms the subject of two paintings, one belonging to the end of the 2nd and the other to the 3rd century.2 Mary is seated. The angel, in the form of a man, makes the announcement standing, as a visitor who has just entered the house. The relative postures of the two figures can be explained without the supposition of an intention to claim for Mary a higher dignity than for the angel. The two paintings may presuppose, but cannot be held to go beyond, the Gospel narratives.

On the other hand, Mary’s perpetual virginity finds constant expression in medieval art. The Office provides many images of a solemnity which are applied to Mary. She is the ‘fons signator,’ the ‘hortus conclusus,’ and the ‘turris’ of the Song of Solomon (4:5, 12:4, 5). The Christianized Physiologus—a kind of bestiary, or book of animals real and fabulous, with allegorical explanations—supplied the legend of the unicorn, a fabulous animal which could be tamed only by being caught in the horn of a pure virgin. Each 45 provides the symbol of the barred door, Jg 6:26 that of Gideon’s fleece watered by the dew from heaven. The number and variety of these symbols show the value assigned to the doctrine of Mary’s perpetual virginity by the medieval Church.

(c) The Divine Healer.—The Gospel miracles, of which there are numerous representations in the catacombs, are evidences of God’s desire to release humanity from its plagues. In the heavenly city of the Apocalypse there was to be neither sorrow nor death (Rev 21:4). To this divine purpose the healings of Christ bore emphatic witness. His ministry was a short-lived anticipation of the Messianic Age (Mt 11:1). The beneficent power, then displayed in a few instances, would hereafter be seen in the fullness of its strength. It is an evidence of the authority rapidly acquired by the Fourth Gospel that the miracle most frequently represented in the catacombs is the raising of Lazarus (50 examples have been discovered). We remember how both the sisters greet the Saviour with the words, ‘if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died’ (Jn 11:21). We are intended to regard the presence of Christ as incompatible with death, or at least with its bellowing power. Other healings which may with certainty be identified are that of the paralytic (Mk 2:5), in which the man appears walking with his bed on his shoulder, and that of the blind man, where we see Christ touching with His finger the man’s closed eyes. Another unmistakable scene is the cure of the issue of blood (Mk 5:25 and 8). The woman comes behind the Saviour as He walks with two disciples, and kneels that she may touch the hem of His robe. Other paintings have no distinctive features which would justify certain identification.

(d) The Cross.—The absence from the earlier catacombs of what has now become the distinctive Christian emblem is full of significance. The use of the cross as a separate symbol appears to date from the campaign of Constantine against Maxentius (A.D. 312), when Constantine put the cross upon the shields of his soldiers. Previous to this date we find the cross mentioned in one inscription1

1 Von Sybel, p. 292.
4 Schultze, P.R.E.S. xvii. 392.
5 The three forms of the cross in later symbolism—decussanti, or St. Andrew’s cross, X; commodius, Tan or Egyptian cross  and emisissent—see art. Cross.

3 See D.C.A. s.v. Crucifixion.
4 Schultze, P.R.E.S. xvii. 392.
from the wolf, even at the price of his own life. It is added by Christ in a subsequent verse (v. 28): 'And I give unto them eternal life: and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.' Both representations of the Good Shepherd are intended to transport the mind beyond death. The painters wished to indicate the power of Christ over death. Those who died, no less than those who lived, were under His care. The shepherd of his pasture.'

Thus, where a landscape is indicated in the paintings it is invariably that of the garden or park which typifies paradise. The image, so understood, would appear to have passed into the early burial prayers of both the Greek and the Latin liturgies. Thus, when A. P. Stanley 2 points to the frequent image of the Good Shepherd as an evidence of the Joyfulness of early Christian feasts, he must remember that the shepherd in these pictures are in all probability those who have passed from the vicissitudes of the world into the safe haven of eternal rest.

Orphans. In another painting of an orans. In another painting two of the blessed move eagerly forward to welcome a new arrival, who advances in the same attitude of devotion. We find no representation in the catacombs of a general judgment of mankind. Nor do the paintings, as archaeologists of all schools agree, give any indication of belief in an 'intermediate state' or a period between death and judgment. All those who die in Christ are conceived as passing at once from their death-beds into heaven. 3

When we pass into the subsequent centuries, death and judgment assume terrifying shapes. The destructive power of the Judge is personified by a man who wounds the garden of life or fells its trees, or (after Rev 6) as a rider with drawn bow, above all as an encased old man who finally reaches the form of a skeleton with scythe and hour-glass. The dance of death appears to have originated in the plagae known as 'the Black Death.' It quickly gained a wide popularity, which it retained far beyond the Middle Ages. The soul, leaving the body, was regularly represented by a human figure, naked and sexless, emerging from the mouth. In pictures of the Last Judgment popular imaginations of hell took the place of the earlier representations of paradise. Hell was symbolized by the open mouth of a monster (after the leviathan of Job 41), into which men and women, masters and servants, priests and people, were thrust. Devils in every shape did their work of derision and torture under the supervision of the prince of hell. To him the popular imagination transferred everything it knew of monsters, and thus there arose the being of many shapes and names with goat's horns, cloven hoof, bat's wings, and a tail. He even took the form of a blackbird, and, as such, flew into the mouth of Judas at the Last Supper, and whispered into the ear of Pilate as he sat in judgment. Popular humour may well have had its share in shaping these fancies. 4

2. The heavenly state. — St. Paul represents Christ as the second Adam, who undid the consequences of the first Adam's transgression (Rom 5). By the early Christians, and most faithfully, it seems to have grown (to the departed) that, redeemed from death, released from his sins, reconciled to the Father, brought home on the shoulders of the Good Shepherd, he may enjoy the society of the blessed. 5

have been originally Persian and to have been introduced into Greek literature by Xenophon. The Greeks seem to have passed it on to the Hebrews.

It appears in the OT only in writings subsequent to the Greek period (Ec 2:1, Ca 9:3, Neh 2:19), and bore the meaning of a park with trees, shrubs, and fruit, and was wild animals, and was surrounded the residences of eastern potentates. Such parks were commonly enclosed by a wall or trellis-shaped fence. Trees, shrubs, flowers, and the like, resembling those in catacomb paintings are invariably symbols of paradise. On the threshold we meet with the figures known as orantes. These are forms, male or female—the latter are much more numerous than the former—standing with arms either fully extended or bent at the elbows, and with opened hands. The orantes give rise to questions which are still in debate. When, in the first place, are these figures intended to represent? Against the supposition that they are either likenesses of the departed or intended to represent their souls, there is only to have place the fact that a female orants often appears painted on the tomb of a man, and also to mention that the orantes appear to have been sometimes executed before the tombs were filled. It seems therefore most natural to regard the orantes as ideal figures, poetic representations of the blessed dead. Again, what is the meaning of the outstretched arms and open hands? Are we to understand the attitude as one of prayer, one of adoration? And, if it be prayer that is symbolized, for what do the suppliants pray? The answers to these questions are not altogether clear. According to the opinion of Wilpert, the orantes are praying for the salvation of their own souls, and for that of others. In some of the inscriptions we find the survivors asking for the prayers of the departed. On the other hand, we meet with the attitude in several cases where Catholic or sub-Catholic orantes are praying for the deliverance from death the recipient appears so often in the attitude of orantes. So Noah stands in the Ark, and Daniel among the lions, and the three children among the burning bush. Yet in each of these cases the deliverance has already been granted. If anything is asked for, it can only be the extension of something beginning. So the orantes appear to stand in an attitude of wonder and recognition. In the highest Christian prayer every orant seems to be with the divine. The lifting up of the hands was a Jewish as well as a Christian practice (Is 26:19; 30:10).

3. The heavenly feast. The Christian who buried their dead in the catacombs had two sacraments, both of which are frequently symbolized in the paintings. In baptism the believer was admitted by the number of the elect. He became a 'saint' in the original sense of that word. On the tombs we find representations both of the baptism of Christ by His forerunner and of the Church's baptism. There are also three pictures of a fisherman, seated on the bank and drawing a fish out of the water with his hook. The figure may point to baptism and to the words of Jesus addressed to the disciples: 'Come ye after me, and I will make you fishers of men' (Mt 4:19). It is good to know that it would supply another reason for the adoption of the fish as a Christian symbol.

In the Catacombs the believer partook of the bread which came down from heaven, of which he ate indeed (Jn 6:35). In it he had the prophecy of the heavenly feast. When Jesus took leave of his disciples he told them that he was about to go from them, which he would drink with them in the Kingdom of God (Lk 22:17). The orantes are often depicted seated and raised by the prophetic words. Despondency gave way to renewed confidence when it became clear that God had not 'allowed his holy and his vineyard to be defiled' (Ps 80:8). So day by day and continuing steadily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread at home, they 'with gladness and singleness of heart' (Acts 15:23). It is no longer possible to mark the steps by which this early 'breaking' of bread passed into the Church's Eucharist. It is enough to recognize that what afterwards became the ecclesiastical rite originally formed part of the celebration of the corporate feast of the Christian Church. If the presence of the heavens is shared, as we can well believe, more vividly realized during these feasts than at any other time, the disciples would naturally associate them with the peace of joy which awaited them hereafter. The fellowship of the Eucharist would provide the mould for the shaping and molding of the institution of future happiness. They might recall the

Ethical assurances: 'Blessed be he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God' (Lk 14:16), 'Blessed are they which are hidden to the marriage supper of the Lamb' (Rev 19:9), 'To him that overcometh, to him will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth save he that receiveth' (Rev 2:17). It isprofitless to dwell upon the inconsistency of picturing Spiritual Banquets as part of the Deity of the Lambly appeals only to man's bodily appetites. For in the new world which, whether it be peopled by corporeal or incorporeal beings, is in any case to be viewed from the viewpoint, the most accustomed equally with the most material, becomes obsolete. An instrument intended for a region surrounded by an atmosphere is useless when the atmosphere is removed. Thus the most spiritually-minded Christians, restricted by limitations from which they cannot escape, as they do, to associate heaven with the 'thoughts of that which is to come, the song of them that are there.' Heaven's heavenly happiness is frequently represented by the image of festal joy. The scene of the feast is marked, by the customary indications, as paradise. The guests are to be seen, generally if not always, behind the roll which is the recognized symbol for the cushions used at feasts. Often attendants accompanying a dish or holding a bacon crustine. In one series of four pictures these attendants take the form of two female figures who are designated by inscriptions as 'Irene' and 'Agape.' They are appealed to by the guests to supply warm water or to eat the wine ('Irene, de olla; 'Agape, vagina nobilis'). One of the figures seems to symbolize the peace of heaven, and the other the love from which the Christian love-feast derived its name, and which is expressed in the benediction of the guests. The food indicated in these pictures consists invariably of bread and fish. Sometimes also cakes are provided. The rolls, round and round leaves, appear either in front of the cushion-roll or on either side of it. The miraculous feeding of the thousands was plainly the model. The scroll is another symbol of meditation, by St. John (Rev 22:1) with the 'bread of life,' was an anticipation of the heavenly feast. Similarly prophetic was the Church's Eucharist, which in some of the paintings is to be seen depicted and made a symbol of its heavenly antitype. It need only be added that the 'feast' of the Church was well perhaps as for the reason given above, appears to have established itself as a symbol for a Christian disciple, long before the acrostic was discovered: ἀριθμὸς ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ τιμίων εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν.

It will appear from the foregoing summary that, while Christian symbolism points persistently on towards an ideal condition, conceived beyond death, the hope thus expressed is sustained by experiences which are prized for their own sake, and also as earnest things of yet to come. Eternal life, the ultimate blessing of the Fourth Gospel, is there represented as both present and future. So the Messianic kingdom of the earlier evangelists was yet to come, while it was also 'within' or 'among' the disciples who walked with Jesus and saw God in him. The Church which continued His ministry in the ages that followed was likewise a prophet of what was yet to be, and also a teacher of men amidst the dangers and obligations of actual life. Thus in the Middle Ages, while the three theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) appear repeatedly on church porches, pulpits, and monuments, the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) also assume their symbolic shapes. The Church is a teacher of common-place morality, while at the same time she must bear witness to truths whose validity cannot be demonstrated by everyday experience. The Christians who built the catacombs tell us in many inscriptions of the central hope with which they consigned their dead to their tomb. Their desire was that the departed might 'see God' ('Vivat in Deo,' 'Vives in eternum,' 'Deum videre cupias vidit'). Such is the hope expressed in the following inscription: "Sidus autem vitae monstrantis, Venit, 1880, and M. S. B. of ancient orantes cristianas, 3 voles, Rome, 1864-77; V. Schmidt, Archolog. Studien über altchristliche Monumente (Vatican, 1880), and Schneller, in PF 35, 1888, 361. 3 The Ephesus, in Pf 35, 1888, 361. 4 "Symbilarii," in PNF 35, 1888, 361. 5 "Quis dixit?" in PNF 35, 1888, 361. 6 "O sacrum convivium, o sacrosanctum convivium!")

SYMBOLISM (Greek and Roman).—A symbol is a visible or audible thing which stands for some thought, emotion, or experience, interpreting what can be really grasped only by the mind and imagination by something which enters into the field of observation.

So far as Greek and Roman religion are concerned, we need speak only of two kinds of symbols—symbolic representation by means of actions or words and symbolic representation in art.

Religion, taking its rise in experience and belief, tends, as it becomes less literal and less insistent, to give rise to symbolism; and this is true also of that lower kind of religion which is called magic. When primitive men thought that by certain actions and words they could compel spiritual powers to do their bidding, or when they thought that the painting of animal forms on the walls of their caves gave them power over the animals depicted, they had not yet reached the stage of symbolism, but had taken the first steps towards it; when they poured water on the ground to propitiate the gods they thinned that there was an actual causal connexion between the ritual act and the fall of rain. But just as, when religious beliefs decays, the feelings which gave rise to it often find scope in the field of poetry, so, when the notion of the power of sympathetic magic grows less, the actions and ceremonies to which it led are often continued in symbolism.

I. GREEK.—1. In local cults.—The local cults of Greece, which went on at a lower level, and in a more conservative key, than the religion of poetry and of philosophy, preserved a great deal of symbolism. Even in Athens the great festivals embodied such traces of primitive religion. At the Dionysian festival young girls, impersonating bears, danced a bear-dance in honour of Artemis. At the Diastia the priest who struck down the sacrificial ox was accused of murder and in turn accused his instrument, the axe, which was condemned and solemnly cast into the sea. In the worship of the dead flowers and fruits gradually took the place of the more serious offerings of an earlier time. With the dead were buried, not, as in primitive times, real armour and ornaments, but only symbolic offerings, money of gold-leaf, animals of terra-cotta, and the like. Sometimes these objects were early depart on the tomistone. The terrible human sacrifices once brought to the stern deities were commuted into sacrifices of animals, sometimes clad in human fashion, or mere images of human beings. Naturally, in the mysteries, where the survivals of primitive religion were most rife, that symbolism was most prominent. Mere ceremonial ablutions took the place of actual immersions as a ceremony of purification. The sacred meal which the deity shared with his votaries became a mere ceremonial tasting of some special food. At Eleusis, in the great mysteries, the votaries emptied two vessels filled with water, turning to east and west as the priest said, "Sky pour rain; earth bear grain."

The suppliants who visited the cave and oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia, before he went into the presence of the hero, drank from two springs, that of oblivion and that of memory, to exemplify that he was to forget the past and to remember the revelation which was to come to him. Originally, in all probability, the water of these springs was supposed to have some actual effect on the votary, as had the spring in the cave of the Clarian Apollo at Colophon on the priest who drank of it before soothsaying. But in the time of Pansannius the action had become merely ritual and symbolical.

The sacred marriage was common to several cults in Greece. When the notion of the deity was somewhat crude, women were shut into the temple, to stand in the same sexual relation to him in which, according to the cult, all mankind stood to Apollo. But, as time went on, such dedication became only symbolical, the place of the victim being sometimes taken by the wife of the priest.

As the mystery religions spread and their outlines hardened, a new element came in, which was destined to take further development in Christianity—the element of authority. Symbolic rites were practised, not on the ground of mere tradition, but by ordination of the recognized hierophants of each cultus, who claimed a divine communication. This element, however, scarcely belonged to the earlier religious view of either Greeks or Romans, among whom authority in religion was scarcely recognized apart from tradition. Cults had an open field and freely competed one with another, except those with which the safety of the State was supposed to be connected.

It seems that almost all ritual which does not appeal to the intelligence is in character symbolic. And the notable feature in symbolic ritual is that, since it appeals mainly to the emotions, it may be interpreted or understood in a great variety of ways. At the mysteries of Eleusis, e.g., some of the votaries might regard the whole proceedings as a sort of spell to cause fertility; some might be genuine worshippers of the great goddesses Demeter and Persephone; some might, like Bacchos, find in the ritual a promise and pledge of a life beyond the grave. Everything depended on the religious outlook, the exalted or materialist beliefs of the votary himself.

"Aristotle," says Synesius, 2 is of opinion "that the initiates learned nothing precisely; but that they received impressions, were put into a suitable frame of mind."

Thus symbolic ritual has a great attraction for persons of emotional temperament, while it is distasteful to those of strongly developed intelligence, who like definite views. Compared with clear doctrine, it is like music compared with painting. It was by no means well suited to the minds of the more cultivated Greeks.

2. In art.—In early relief on the Art of symbolism appears in two forms: in representing by some simple figure an idea such as a quality or attribute of one of the deities and in representing the whole of anything by depicting some characteristic part of it.

A few symbols of the deities seem to have been taken over by the Greeks from the pre-historic peoples whom they displaced in Crete and Hellas. Such is the double-edged axe, which is found in the palace of Cnossus in Crete in the third millennium B.C., in scenes of cultus, and which belongs to a male or female deity of the people. This axe became among the Greeks a symbol of Dionysus. The snake also appears as an attribute of a goddess of Crete frequently represented, and later was inherited by the Greek Erinys. But most of the symbols of the gods of the Greek pantheon seem to be more immediately derived from the art of the nations of Syria and Mesopotamia. Most of these symbols were displaced by growing anthropomorphism. This statement requires some explanation.

On early bronzes and terra-cottas found on Greek sites, dating from the 7th or 6th cent., the goddess Artemis is figured as winged and holding in her two hands lions, panthers, or swans. On the chest of Cypselus, a

1 ii. xxxix.
7th cent. work preserved at Olympia, Pausanias¹ saw such a figure, which surprised him by its size. It was strictly symbolical; the wings were not for flight, but only to typify swiftness; the lions were added to show the power of the goddess over animals, whose mistress (ε̊ρήμα) she was. We can trace this representation step by step through Greek art and see how in narrower times the swiftness of the deity was indicated by her stature and slenderness of build, her power over animals by the stag or dog who accompanied her. A similar transformation takes place in the case of Zeus. On early coins of Elis an eagle appears as a substitute for the god; later he bears the eagle in his hand. Later still, as in the great statue of Pheidias, a golden eagle was an adornment of the sceptre of Zeus. Thus, as time went on, merely outward symbols tended to disappear or at all events to become unimportant; and the meaning which they had conveyed was expressed in the type of the deity. Certain symbols, however, held their ground. The thunderbolt of Zeus, indicating him as the lord of storms (Zeus bétos), is usual in the 5th century. To express this feature in the type of the deity would not be easy. The bow, as symbol of the ways of the sun-god,² was usual in the hand of Apollo in archaic representations; later the lyre is far more usual. Even wings do not altogether disappear, but they mostly lose their merely symbolic character and are used for flight, as in the case of Victory and Eros, an innovation ascribed to the sculptor Archermus of Chios (c. 570 B.C.). The god Hermes, even in late art, carries wings on his cap or his hea—a survival of archaic symbolism.

Coins furnish us with many examples of symbols belonging to the deities. In the 7th and 6th centuries the obverse of electrum and silver coins usually presents some very simple symbolical device—a griffin at Teos and Abdera, a thunderbolt at Olympia, a wolf at Argos, an owl at Athens; and then, after the archaic period, this type is usually banished to the reverse of the coin, and in its place we have the head of the deity to whom the type belongs. It must, however, be observed that when sculptors speak of a symbol on a coin, they use the word in a technical sense, to indicate not a symbolical type, but one of those small and subsidiary devices often placed in the field of a coin by magistrates who were responsible for its issue—a device probably often taken from the private signet of such magistrates.

Another phase of symbolism is found when in artistic representation a part is taken to stand for the whole. This often appears on Greek vases and reliefs. Pausanias³ observes that, in the painting representing Hades by Polygnotus at Delphi, the grove of Persephone is represented by one tree. So on vases a temple or a house is often represented by a single column, a river by a swimming fish, a sea-shore by a shell, and so forth. It is probable that this was how the scenes in tragedies were represented on the background of the stage. It is really a sort of shorthand, and altogether parallel to the process by which in Egypt and elsewhere picture-writing came into being.

Symbolical or allegorical impersonations are to be found in Greek art at all periods, though more often in archaic art and that of Hellenistic times than in the greatest period. On the chest of Cypselus, in the 7th cent., we are told by Pausanias⁴ that in the Nemean Games, carrying two boys, one white and one black, who represented Sleep and Death respectively. Justice as a beautiful figure scourged Injustice, who had the form of an ugly woman. Fates, with teeth and claws like a wild beast, claimed Polynices as a victim. Even in the great age we find figures of Virtue, Nemesis, Opportunity (Kaûmê). But it is in the Hellenistic age, in the great cities of the East, that symbolic personalities most abound. In the celebrated procession of Ptolemy II. of Egypt¹ we have figures of the Year and the Seasons; in that of Antiochus IV. of Syria² we find statues of Night, Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning, and Noon. On the coins of Alexandria under the Romans we find a remarkable set of fanciful figures—Euthenia (Prosperity), Kratesis (Dominion), and the like.

The great Ionian cities of Asia Minor appear on monuments of the Roman age in the persons of the legendary Amazons whom they claimed as their foundresses. Smyrna on coins carries a double-axe and has a prow of a ship at her feet; Cyme holds a dolphin and a trident; Teos, a city renowned for vines, carries the thyrsus of Dionysus; Ephesus carries the heads of corn, and so forth. In each case the attributes embody the situation or the produce of the city. In a noted Pompeian painting we have well-characterized impersonations of Egypt, China, Asia, and Africa. The list might be almost indefinitely lengthened.

Symbolism in Greece, in the great period, often takes fine poetic forms, as when the sun-god in his chariot on the pediment of the Parthenon represents the East in the morning, or boys plunging into the sea represent the setting stars on a fine vase in the British Museum. In the same age rivers are represented by man-headed bulls, as on the coins of Gela and Catana in Sicily; nymphs have cows' horns; Alexander the Great appears on the obverse of his general Lysimachus with the ram's horn of Ammon.

But, in spite of such examples as these, there is a broad line of distinction between the use of symbolism in Oriental art—the art of Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, and India—and the use in Greek art. Oriental art is content with adding symbols to the human forms of deities, without caring for their beauty or appropriateness. In Egypt and Babylon we find human bodies joined to the heads of all kinds of animals—lion, bull, jackal, hawk, and so on. And in Indian figures of deities represent them with several heads, many arms (each arm having some attribute), necklaces of skulls, and the like. Oriental art tries to represent in this way qualities and attributes which sculpture or painting could not otherwise portray—elements of mysticism, mythological tales, or sometimes the ideas of pantheistic religion. Greek art avoids monstrous forms as a rule, though it inherited a few specially suitable for artistic development, such as the Centaur. And it does not attempt to portray, in sculpture or in painting, anything which lies outside the scope of those arts. Exquisite in form and clear in meaning, its creations do not carry us beyond sense and intellect, do not appeal to the mystical tendencies of men. Thus Greek symbolism has no wide limits.

II. ROMAN.—I. In cult and law. In Roman religious ceremonials the symbol held a large place. This was natural, as in quite the early times of the republic there was an invasion of Greek religion and Greek deities, which caused the old rustic religion of the Roman people to survive only in the form of ritual, the meaning of which was lost and the great degree obscured. Hence the State cultus of Rome was divorced alike from belief and from morality, and so long as the magistrates performed

exactly the ceremonies handed down by their ancestors, it mattered little what meaning they attached to those ceremonies or what beliefs they held in religion. Whether he were a Roman, a Trojan or a Nero, was always pontifex maximus and represented to the gods the State in its religious capacity. Hence the Romans were extremely careful in which they they wore the toga or the cap called apo, as to their exact position in relation to the points of the compass, and as to the attitude in which they stood when they were sacrificing. All these details had no doubt some meaning in their origin; but whether we are unable usually to discover what it was, but even the Romans did not know: they blindly followed the tradition, with an uneasy feeling that, unless they did so, some great calamity would overtake the State. Most of these ritual customs were probably derived from the Etruscans, a people at a low level of culture, but exact in all matters of a religion which seems scarcely to have risen above the level of magic.

When an official conducted a sacrifice, he sprinkled the victim with wine and threw over it salt meal; then he made a ritual movement symbolical of the killing of the victim. It was done by attendants. Like the Greeks, the Romans contrived to put in the place of human sacrifices the mere offering of substitutes and symbols. In the Christian Church, when we have on Roman monuments the symbolism of Ephesus and Alexandria. Allegorical and symbolic figures, such as Pudicitia, Ubertas, Annona, appear abundantly on the Roman coins; but they can have had but little serious worship. In short, while symbolism is of importance in relation to Roman cultus, it is unimportant in earlier Roman art, requiring a concrete poetical imagination of which the Romans were destitute.

There was a good deal of symbolism or symbolic ritual in the customs of Roman law; e.g., if a man purchased a slave, he laid hands on him (mancipium) in the presence of witnesses and weighed out at the same time to the seller a piece of money which was accepted as a symbol of the price, quas pretii loco, as Gaius says. We need not be surprised that in the ritual symbolism made its way into Christianity in Rome, since it had become a recognized part of the routine of daily life. 2. In art.—In the time of the Roman domination, as the religion of Mithras and other mystery cults spread from east to west through Europe, the range and power of symbolism increased. We may especially trace on tombstones of the period of the empire, alike in Italy, Gaul, and other regions, a growth of religious symbols mainly having reference to the life beyond the tomb, which was taking an ever larger place in men’s thoughts and hopes. Some of the mythological scenes which the Greeks had depicted on their tombs, from mere artistic and decorative motives, seem to have been re-interpreted in a more mystic fashion. Such were the rapes of women and the combats of men; and more especially scenes from the lives of Hercules and Orpheus and other heroic persons who had won immortality by great deeds, or had descended to Hades and returned. Some ordinary figures of earlier art— the griffin, the lion, the bull, the cock—became associated with them and with immortality.

The Mithraic shrines of northern Europe contain

1 G. Wimova, Religion und Kultur der Römer, Munich, 1909, p. 322.
2 Th. p. 353.
3 i. 119.

SYMBOLISM (Hindu).

reliefs in which symbolism seems to run wild, though we know so little about Mithraism that our interpretation of such reliefs is usually conjectural. On this subject the works of Franz Cumont are authoritative. It is impossible here to discuss the question of the symbolism on later pagan tombs. A good account of it will be found in M. W. Arthur Strong’s Apotheosis and After Life (1910). This writer goes too far in interpreting almost all the scenes and figures on such tombs in reference to the future life. It is obvious that, unless we keep in restraint the tendency to read mystic meanings into painted and sculptured scenes, we may drift back into the fancy world of Creuzer, who traced the influence of the mysteries everywhere on Greek vases and Roman reliefs.

We are on safer ground in speaking of contemporary Christian art, because here we have a literature for comparison. In the early Christian art of the catacombs and of sarcophagi there is even an increase of symbolism, as compared with contemporary pagan works. This is natural, because the Christians commonly adopted pagan types, only giving them a fresh meaning; e.g., the peacock, which in Greek art belonged to Hera, was adopted by Christians as a symbol of the resurrection, probably because the flesh of the peacock was supposed not to decay. Orpheus became an emblem or symbol of Christ. The fish, the sheep, the vine became symbols of a new and new significance. Probably in many cases the meaning would not be realized by the pagan artist who was called in; and it was safer that the knowledge should be confined to the society. This symbolism in the early Christian art is apt to degenerate into a mere conceit: a man carrying a couch refers to the miracle of the healing of the paralytic man; a cock beside Peter to his denial of his Master, and so forth.

The use of symbols in the later Neo-Platonic philosophy is so closely connected with their use in Christianity that it need not be here treated. See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

LITERATURE.—There is no recent work which deals methodically with Greek symbolism. Roman symbolism is treated in Mrs. Arthur Strong, Apotheosis and After Life, London, 1915.

F. GARDNER.

SYMBOLISM (Hindu).—Of all religions of the East, the home of type and imagery, Hinduism makes the most use of symbols. It has formally declared the ultimate truth to be unknowable and indefinable. In all its schemes of teaching it seeks to make definite approach to the reality by suggestive type or symbol—an approach that can never find its goal, but can only draw nearer and nearer, as it points upward, like the ancient Greek philosophers, to the symbol or likeness which most fully and faithfully reflects the true, and embodies the largest part of a reality which in its entirety is incomprehensible by the human mind and inexpressible in the language of men. The symbol is the necessary and helpful intermediary between the inadequate capacity of the mind of the would-be worshipper and the incomprehensible nature and fullness of the Unknown whom he adores. A complete and adequate description therefore of the Hindu use of type and symbol would require an almost complete exposition of Hindu belief in its many varieties and ramifications. Whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of this the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine are sufficient illustration. All, however, that is practicable within the limits of an article is to indicate the motive or motives that more or less consciously and arrowedly have prompted the use of the symbol, to set forth in the briefest possible

1 Cf. art. SYMBOLISM (Christian).
manner its historical relations in the religious scheme and cult, to define its necessary limits, and to draw up a convenient scheme to represent a few of the more important types which have occupied a considerable place in the belief and profession of the adherents of the faith. A mere enumeration of the symbols employed would be a large and probably intractable task.

1. Use and purpose of symbols.—The use and purpose of the symbol is twofold: (1) to set forth in visible or audible likeness what cannot be really or clearly represented in the physical eye or ear, even clearly conceived by the limited faculties of the human mind. All language is in the last resort symbolic, and religious language in an especial degree, for it endeavours to present a mystery, a reality too deep for words. The Hindu faith had in its service a language of the utmost delicacy and flexibility, with a vigorous and fertile growth and an almost unlimited vocabulary, and found itself in a world of tropical luxuriance, with a tropical wealth of beauty and suggestive-ness. It was not to be wondered at that it became profuse in type and symbol and laid under contribution all the facts and phenomena of nature to serve in the illustration of the worship. Even the great gods had their resemblances, animal or material forms, in which they presented themselves embodied to human sight, which served to recall to the deity, whose mind and character they more or less inadequately reflected. Other more rare and refined symbols were presentative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblem of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. The wise man does not worship the shape, the clay or wood or stone, but is thereby reminded of the invisible substance or reality which they each represent.

(2) The image or symbol serves the purpose also of providing in material and suitable form a convenient object of reverence, to meet the religious need of those whose minds, through darkness and ignorance, are unable to grasp the conception of an unseen formless deity. Such men, if left without a visible object to which their reverence and fear may be directed, subsist, will wander in a maze of doubts, disquiet, and unbelief. It is better that they should worship erroneously, worship a thing, than that they should not worship at all. There is much that might be urged in favour of the Hindu view that regards the worship of the external symbol as a stepping-stone to higher, dearer forms of belief; it is a view unacknowledged perhaps but not unknown to other faiths. And in Hinduism, whatever may be said of or claimed by the wise and instructed thinker, the pājū of the multitude to the image of the god is reverent and sincere. In some respects also and within definite limits the Indian contention has justified itself that the symbol has proved a sign and post and a guide to better, higher thoughts and to a truer worship of Him whom no form can express or language describe.

2. The most important types.—(c) The most important symbols are those of the Brahmān, the undefinable and unknowable origin and source of all. Of the Brahmān only signs and types can be employed, for the primary source and sustainer of the universe is beyond thought or word. His names or titles are symbolic: kirāvangarba, the golden germ, that was in the beginning; svayambhū, the self-existent one; svakarṣaṇī, the uprooter of things; and many others. The authors of the Upaniṣads especially attempt to set forth in symbolic terms the being and nature of that which in the last resort they are obliged to confess is beyond knowledge. Prajñā, the breath, or vāyu, the wind, is a frequently recurring type; and it seems to have been felt that by its mysterious and elusive character the prajñā was peculiarly fitted to represent the essence eludes comprehension. The breath, prāṇa, is Brahmā. A similar type is the abhās, the all-pervading and all-surrounding ether, 'omnipresent and unchanging in the heart. Mānas also, the mind or will, is with the abhās a specific form or type under which the Brahmān is to be meditated on or worshipped. The mystical syllable Om, the most widely venerated syllable in the world, is the highest symbol of Brahmān, and its utterance with understanding of its significance secures the accomplishment of every wish. Om is also a symbol of the Hindu triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and each of the three sounds of which the word is composed represents one of these deities. To the Buddhists also the word is a symbol of much significance, forming part of the secret six-syllabled formula which every Buddhist cherishes in his memory which makes a constant part of his invocation and prayer.

A more comprehensive and suggestive symbol of the Brahmān is given in the compound saccidānanda, a kind of universe, with several modes or aspects, as sat, 'being,' chit, 'thought,' and ānanda, 'bliss.' This more re- refined and abstract symbolizing represents a later phase of speculative thought and marks a forward step in the progress of philosophical insight. As a type or symbol it is less inadequate than the sun in the heavens (āditya), the material ākāsa, the golden parva in the eye, or even than mānas, or the significant name ātma itself. In its further course, moreover, speculative thought denied that even in saccidānanda any positive implication concerning the Brahmān did or could reside. The Brahmān transcended all symbols and assertions, comprehended both being and not-being (sat, satā), thought and not-thought (chit, atichit), bliss and its contrary (ānanda, anānanda), or rather he was above and beyond all, the unsearchable and unknown.

(b) Each of the great gods has an animal or material form or object which represents him to the eyes of men, by which he is symbolically known. The more popular gods have many symbols. The 'vehicles' of the gods are practically symbols of their presence and power—the goose of Brahmā; Garuḍa, the monstrous eagle of Viṣṇu; the ōla (Nandī) of Śiva; the fabulous sea-monster (makara) of Varuṇa, who is a white man and is described as makaravīra, 'he whose steed is the makara,' riding, with the head and fore-legs of an ante-lope and the body and tail of a fish; the peacock of Kārttikeya, the god of war; the monkey of Hanumān; the deer of Vaiśravaṇa; the elephant Afravata of Indra, produced with other sacred and marvellous objects at the churning of the ocean; the buffalo and dogs of Yama; and many others. Of the well-known Hindu triad Brahmā hardly possesses any emblem or type except his sacred goose—an indication of how little the first member of the triad attracted to himself the thought and worship of the Hindus. Of the popular Viṣṇu there were many symbols, some of which are always represented on the images or pictures of the god. The most frequent and characteristic is perhaps the chakra, or discus;
the club and conch-shell also which he carries are indicative of his authority and power. The suspicious mark (ārītattā) usually represented on the beak of birds, in the form of a curl of hair, and the three-pronged or trident-like mark made with white or coloured earths on the foreheads of his worshippers are symbolic, the latter of devotion to the service of the deity. The sacred tulasi plant in the courtyard of the dwelling is the mark of the deity's presence and protection, and in it centres the worship especially of the women of the household. The śilāgrāma also, the sacred amonite-stone, is a famous and well-known symbol.

The symbolic types or presentations of the rival deity, Siva, who in almost equal degree with Viṣṇu holds the affection and regard of the Indian peoples, were equally numerous. The most important are the bull Nandi, on which he rides, and the ḍōga, or phallus. Every Saivite temple has its sacred bull, which roams the courtyards and streets unmolested and receives practically divine honours. The ḍōga is the commonest emblem of the god and the stones, great or small, which represent him have this form or are roughly shaped to it. Two of these stones are said to bear a pre-eminently holy spot, that at Benares, where Siva was worshipped as Viṣēvāra, πατρόποξος, the lord of all; and the idol in the temple at Somnath, destroyed by Mahbud of Ghazni in his iconoclastic incursions, is this own. The trident also is borne by Siva, a type of government and authority; and the crescent moon depicted on his forehead has a special significance, recalling the sovereignty which was assigned to him when the moon was recovered from the depths of the ocean.

Similarly the wives of the great gods have each their symbols—the trident and skull of Kāli, the lōcū of Sarasvatī, wife of Brahmā, and also of Lakṣmi, wife of Viṣṇu.

In a late writing the Gāyatrī is said to refer the triad of gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Siva, and also the three Vedas.

(c) Under sacred trees in the vicinity of Indian villages will often be found the images or symbols of the grāmādevatā, the village deities who watch over its interests and care for the inhabitants; and in the village fields the clay or pottery steeds of Ayanar (q.v.), the tutelary deities of the fields, on which he rides by night to pursue and rout the demoniac powers.

(d) There are symbols also of a more general import. In India such objects are not always easy to classify. The pāṇḍā, or ball of cooked rice, used at the commemorative services for deceased relatives and offered to the pīṭha, represents symbolically the share which the departed still have in the family life. The most important and widely recognized symbol of this character is probably the sacred footprint, which typifies both the presence and the authority of the god. In the courtyard or vicinity of many, perhaps most, Hindu temples there is the print of a foot on the ground, often of large size, with sacred symbols engraved on the sole, which differ according to the deity commemorated. To these there is sometimes a legend attached, which gives its supposed history and describes the occasion on which it was impressed. The well-known footprint on Adam's Peak in Ceylon is believed by Saivites to be that of Siva. By Buddhists it is the muni's footsteps of the Buddha are regarded with reverence.

(e) In many parts of India the symbols of the sun and moon and the planets may be seen. The two first are represented by a disk or crescent, made of metal. The signs of the planets in their order are as follows: of Budha, or Mercury, a bow; of Sura, or Venus, a square; of Mangala, or Mars, a triangle; of Vṛshaqapati, or Jupiter, a lotus; of Śāri or Saturn, an iron scimitar or sword; of Kāl, a mābāra; and of Ketu, a snake. The last two symbols are usually cut in iron; the square of Sura is silver or silvered, and the bow of Budha is gilt.

(f) Hindu coins and seals also bore symbols, which were numerous and diversified. Besides figures of gods and goddesses, the commonest emblems were the type easily more or into the elephant or bull; power; the umbrella, royal dignity and right; the crescent, a lunar dynasty; a thunderbolt, spear, or other weapon, armed might. Others also with these indicative of the authority or claims of the sovereign by whom they were designed.


A. S. GEDEN.

SYMBOLISM {Jewish}.—Symbolic actions as well as symbolic ideas occur in the old literature of the Jews frequently. The prophets often made use of symbolic ideas—e.g., the basket of fruit in Am 5, the vineyard in Is 5, the almond-trees in Jer 1, the dry bones in Ezk 27, and the broken image in Zech 9. Equally frequent are symbolic actions—e.g., the rending of mantles (Is 15, 1 K 11), the discharge of arrows from a bow (2 K 13, 28), the casting of stones (Ps 60, Jos 5, Ru 4). The former type easily parable, the latter into parables; possibly we should say that they emerge from this literary and magical arts. Symbols, in any case, have frequent historical connexion with them, and the religious interpretations, though they tend to transcend their origin under the transforming influence of higher conceptions. Most important, therefore, for the present article is the association of symbolic ideas with religious ceremonial. Prominently the Sabbath is described as a symbol, sabbath, 1 similarly with the rite of circumcision (Gn 17), the phylacteries (Dt 6), the Passover (Ex 13), natural phenomena such as the rainbow (Gn 9, cf. Gn 14 in the Rabbinitic commentaries).

It was accordingly easy for later Judaism to apply symbolic meanings to many of the Biblical institutions. Philo, throughout his life, interprets such interpretations, but the method is much older. Thus in the Letter of Aristides (which can scarcely be later than the 2nd cent. b.c.e. and may well belong to a much earlier) the enactments of the ceremonies of the Jewish religion are explained symbolically.2 But by Philo's age symbolic interpretation had so fully developed that the Alexandrian allegorist felt impelled to rebuke those of his brethren who neglected the ceremonial acts because they regarded them merely as symbols of real things.3 Though this is a real danger to a ceremonial religion, on the other side it can gain its justification by idealizing institutions the original significance of which is outworn or unknown. Ancient rites may have been derived from primitive tabus, and yet they have retained permanent acceptance by the process of symbolization. Some remarkable letters Maimonides (e.g., dealt with certain acts of worship, such as consecration (as practised by Muhammadans in the 17th century). Probably such acts were derived from the customs of exposing parts of the body, but, contends Maimonides,4 they no longer mean anything religious.

1 See art. SABBATH (Jewish).
2 1 Macc. 3:10-106.
4 Rabbin. She'edhech we-Ipparshah ("Letters"), Constantimpele, 1870, fol. 88, ff.
of the kind and have become symbols of humility. Present representatives do not entirely depend on past origins. A similar principle might undoubtedly be very widely applied to the history of religious ceremonial, which often becomes ennobled by the newer ideas read into it by progressive ages. And, conversely, when an institution is lost (as with the Biblical sacrifices), the whole system may be retrospectively idealized by symbolical adaptation. When, after the destruction of the Temple, prayer and fasting for the preservation of the fabric displaced sacrifice, the latter shared in the moralizing process. But the relation went deeper. Fasting was sacrifice: the loss of bodily tissue corresponded (in the Rabbinic conception) to the offering of a sacrificial animal on the altar. The table at which the ordinary meals were eaten became a veritable altar, and the partaking of food was in the Jewish home associated with a variety of customs, derived in large part from the same range of symbolism. It has often been claimed, moreover, that the dietary laws, besides being included in the law of holiness, or rather because of that inclusion, were a training in control of the appetites and restraint of appetite. Maimonides also offers a utilitarian view, that the forbidden food was unwholesome; thus showing that, though the utilitarian and the symbolical interpretations are in a sense rival theories, they may be syncretized by a skilful moralist.

Another aspect of the same phenomenon is presented by symbolic survivals. Acts which were once literal are retained as rites. Many current Jewish marriage customs are of this nature. The bridal canopy, so picturesque a feature of a Jewish wedding, was originally the marriage chamber. Then the Scriptural application of the marital state to the relation of God to Israel led to symbolic results, among them the appointment of a bridegroom of the Law on the feast of Rejoicing at the end of Tabernacles. It is not quite clear why a glass is broken at Jewish weddings; it is probably a memento mori. Funerary customs are also marked by symbolic survivals. Some of these are Kabalistic in origin, and it is not always easy to discriminate the symbolic from the superstitious. Many symbolic customs arose in memory of the destruction of the Temple. Historical associations are also responsible for many a symbolic rite. Draping the synagogues in shtuf, on the fast of the 9th of Ab is an instance in point. The shofar, or ram’s horn, was thus connected with events and anticipations, with Sinai in the past and the Messianic age in the future. According to Se’adiah, the shofar symbolized ten ideals: (1) creation, (2) repentance, (3) revelation, (4) prophecy, (5) destruction of the Temple, (6) the binding of Isaac, (7) immunity of danger, (8) day of judgment, (9) restoration of Israel, and (10) reurrection. In this manner many rites were saved from becoming obsolete. The phylacteries worn on the head typify service of the mind; on the hand, the service of the body. The former represents the recognition of the Godhead, the latter the restraint of lust.

Jewish symbolism is also illustrated in ecclesiastical art, and in colours. Thus the blue thread on the fringes (Nu 15:38) is the colour of the sea, the sky, the divine throne of glory. The symbolism of art was everywhere-going. The Crown of the Law is a frequent ornamental mantle on the scrolls, and so is the Shield of David. On ancient Jewish coins, too, symbols were employed; so also with tombs. The prevailing custom now is to avoid sepulchral emblems. This accords with the oldest rule, for the sippurim of the Talmud was only a mark warning wayfarers against incurring ritual impurity by contact with the tomb. Yet the action of Simon, who carved panoplies and (possibly) ships on the pyramidal tombs at Modin (1 Mac 13:32), can scarcely have been isolated. Outside Palestine the Jews of the first centuries of the Christian era certainly adopted the Greek habit of inscriptions and introduced symbols, such as an oil vessel, the seven-branched candlestick (symbolical of the soul (Pr 20:17)), the ram’s horn (Messianic), and an ear of corn (type of plenty). These emblems are parallel to those on the Macedonian coins and to those favoured by Jews in the late medieval period. At that late date symbols appear descriptive of the dead, as stretch-out palms as in act of benediction (for priest), evergreen branch, lotus, lily, bathed Levite, a harp for a musician, a crown for a goldsmith, and so forth. In the 18th cent. Jews, like their Christian neighbors, used symbolical signs for business and businesses. Thus the Rothschild family still exemplifies the custom in its name (‘Red Shield’). Ornamental coat-of-arms are found on tombs in the oldest Jewish burial-ground of the Sephardic Jews in London. Such customs are no longer in vogue. There has been a growth, however, of symbolism in synagogue decoration in the form of glass windows mostly without human or animal figures. In the Talmud a good deal of legal symbolism was taken over from ancient Biblical as well as from Roman law. Some of this is still retained.

Returning to the more religious aspect of the subject, we may say in general that in the Mishnah symbolism is the soul of Jewish ceremonial. Many particulars of the sacrificial system, the ritual of the Temple, synagogue, and home, are treated in this manner. Take, e.g., the rites of Tabernacles—the boaring of palm-branch, citron, willow, and myrtle of the brook (Lv 23:40). The palm is the spine, the citron the heart, the myrtle the eye, the willow the mouth, so that, in the synagogue liturgy, the citron stones for heart sins, the palm for stiff-necked pride, the willow for foul speech, the myrtle for lusts of the eye. In another version the old homilists explain the ‘four kinds’ as symbolizing four types of character. The citron has both scent and taste, so there are men who study and perform; the palm-date has taste but no scent, so there are men who study but do not perform; the myrtle has scent but no taste, so there are men who perform but not on the basis of study; the willow has neither scent nor taste, so there are men who neither study the law nor perform good deeds. The Holy One did not destroy these, but bade all be united into one bundle, the better elements atoning for the less.

2. T.B. Ber. 50b.
4. T.J. iii. 44.
5. Cf. on this point M. Friedlander, The Jewish Religion, p. 456; M. Joseph, Judaism as Creed and Life, p. 194. In modern studies (and in textbooks) the tendency (often subtilized) is to explain symbols on utilitarian grounds.
6. Cf. B. I. Bloom, Some Notes on the Sibylline Books, Am. Journ. of Theol. 25, pp. 80-81. (This is now quite generally accepted for the life-giving power of the Citron, and the Tree accordingly appears in synagogue decorations.
good. In this manner symbolism is tarned to the cause of humanism.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are cited in the course of the article. See particularly M. Friedländer, The Jewish Religion, London 1931, pp. 328 ff., 335, 344, 366, 487; M. Joseph, Judaism as Creed and Life, do. 1908, Intro., ch. 1; and there are also several pages of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book, ed. I. Abrahams, London, 1914.

I. ABRAMS.

SYMBOLISM (Muslim).—The Islamic languages appear to have no exact equivalent for the word. When it signifies a badge indicative of office, party, or community, the nearest would be shāfār, or in certain cases ghiyār; where what is meant by it is a veiled expression for an idea, the Arabic rendering would be kīndyān.

Islam as a religious system has nothing corresponding to the Christian cross. Muhammad seems to have adopted the Roman eagle as the standard for his armies,1 but the flag of the later (Abbasid) caliphate was 'like any other, only black in colour with the legend in white, "Muhammad is the Apostle of God."2 Those borne by various factions and regiments differed in colour and at times in the wording of the legend; thus the Abbasid, coloured black, the 'Alawi, green, the Umayyad white; the flag of the Zanjí pretender of the year 255 A.H. was a strip of silk with a Qur'anic legend in red and green;3 in the processions of the sultans of Tunis, Turkey,Persia, Iran, red, yellow, and green flags were carried;4 those of the different tribes differed in legend;5 the flags of the different divisions of the Ottoman army were red, yellow, green, white, red, white, green, and white.6 The Muhammadan colour in India is green,7 which by an ordinance of the Mamluk Sultan Sha'ban of 775 A.H. on the turban indicates descent from the Prophet.8 There is no more common error than the assumption that the crescent (or rather crescent and star) is an Islamic symbol, and even approved writers on Oriental subjects are apt to fall into it.9 It was certainly in pre-Turkish times sometimes used as an ornament on the minaras or mosques;10 and on flags—e.g., that of the Fatimids of Egypt, accompanied by a lion of red and yellow satin,11 and that of the Almohads (A.D. 1150)12—and on the sedan-chair of a Zanjíd princess.13 As such the crescent had been employed on the Roman senatorial shield—a practice for which Plutarch14 offers a variety of reasons. The current view of its adoption by the Turks is well presented by F. T. Elworthy:15

1 A. von Kremer, Cultures des, Orient, Vienna, 1875-77, i. 81.
2 Mikawishii, tr. D. S. Morganthau, I. 198.
3 Tabari, Chronique, ed. M. J. de Goeye, Leyden, 1879-80, iii. 774.
4 Galashaiby, Suhh al-Asha, Cairo, 1915, i. 143.
5 J. W. Zinckeim, Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, Gotha, 1868-69, i. 371.
7 Ibn Iyásu, History of Egypt, Cairo, 1913, i. 227.
8 Kaye and Malleson, iii. 90: 'From the time when Mahmud of Ghazni had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindus.' Al-Biruni, Chronology of Ancient Nations, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 265, compares with the Chinese crescent the cross the comparison of the name Muhammad with the human figure.
9 In a case about A.D. 1729 in the mosque of Sayyid in Yemen (Kharraz, The Pearl-Strings, tr. J. W. Redhouse, Leyden, 1906-08, 189).
10 Galashaiby, iii. 474.
13 Quatrend, Rom, p. 361. VOL. XII.—10

1 Keroains, the daughter of the moon goddess Is-1

1 Keroains, supposed to have been not the froundress, but the mother of the founder, of Byzantium, seems to have been an inference from the Golden Horn and so to have no place in this inquiry. Further, it seems correct to say that the crescent and star figure, though rarely, on coins of Byzantium, but as one of numerous ornaments,12 and that no ancient author mentions any connexion between this emblem and the city. The signa Christi Constantinopolis, according to A. Gebroys, who asserts that the Turks 'neque insigniis uturunt neque coronis,' were quite different. The earliest mention of it in English literature is said to be in the book of English Poesy by G. Puttenham (1589),4 who ascribes its introduction to the sultan Selim I. (1512-20), with the notion of increase and brightness, though it has been observed that the crescent is not that of the new but that of the waxing moon, while rising in its wake is the morning star of hope; from Puttenham's time the antithesis between it and the cross has been common in English and French literature. F. Sansovino,5 however, supposes it to have been the ancient emblem of Bosnia, adopted by Muhammad II. when that country was conquered in 1463. This is declared to be an error by Zonaras, who speaks of a golden crescent inherited from the Seljunks, and displayed on all the flags and standards of various, Moglio, etc., appearing on the earliest flags of the Janissaries. With von Hammer-Purgstall it is a silver crescent which, with the two-pointed sword of 'Umar, gleamed on the blood-red flag of the earliest Janissaries; in the authority to which he refers the Janissaries' flag displays the sword without the crescent; what appears on the flag of the cavalry is evidently a horse'shoeshoe rather than a crescent, with no star. It is worth noticing that the Seljuk chronicler Ibn Bibi10 compares the shoe of the sultan 'Ali-adin's horse to a crescent and its nails to stars; whence the symbol may originally belong to cavalry regiments. Its occurrence, however, on certain Byzantine coins is remarkable, and seems to have some connexion with its later employment by the Turks, who have not often introduced it on coins.

The symbols of royalty in use at the Islamic courts were similar to those found on coins. In Umayyad times the khalifah on accession received a red, a signet, and a scroll.11 The red was doubtless the Prophet's, 'in Abbasid times a new khalifah received not only the Prophet's signet, which was a silver ring with a bezel of Chinese iron with the legend 'Muhammad is the Prophet of God,' but that of his predecessor, with a ruby inscribed with the khalifah's name.12 The Abbasid khalifah also wore a crown,13 against Arab usage,14 and indeed the etiquette of their court was closely modelled on that of the Sassanians, as appears from the recently published handbook of it by Jahâb of Isrâ'il.15 A crown was worn by the Fâmilids of

3 Autre descriptions, Basel, 1577, p. 3.
6 Hist. universelle dei Saraceni, Venice, 1665, i. 67.
7 Ibn Iyásu, History of Egypt, Cairo, 1913, i. 227.
8 Kaye and Malleson, iii. 90: 'From the time when Mahmud of Ghazni had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindus.' Al-Biruni, Chronology of Ancient Nations, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 265, compares with the Chinese crescent the cross the comparison of the name Muhammad with the human figure.
9 In a case about A.D. 1729 in the mosque of Sayyid in Yemen (Kharraz, The Pearl-Strings, tr. J. W. Redhouse, Leyden, 1906-08, 189).
10 Galashaiby, iii. 474.
13 Quatrend, Rom, p. 361. VOL. XII.—10

1 Keroains, the daughter of the moon goddess Is-1
SYMBOLISM (Semitic)

Egypt also. In their processions there were borne a rod, a special sword (said to have been made of meteorite), an inkpot, a lance, a target (said to have belonged to the Prophet's uncle Hamzah), a horse-shoe-shaped ruby, and a lacquered shield, all in a pitch. The last of these was a common emblem of royalty, and figures, e.g., at Indian courts, where the sovereign in the 16th cent. was attired in a white qaba, made of a shirt-tied with strings on the one side, and a little cloth on his head coloured oftentimes with red or yellow. The qaba appears in the attire of the Buwayhid Muizz al-Daulah (10th cent.), and, with a black robe, a belt, and a sword, it formed the distinguishing dress of a vizier. Apparently the belt symbolized some sort of subordination, as an Indian prince whom Yamin al-Daulah gave a robe of honour had to be compelled to put on this portion of it.

Homage to a newly-appointed sovereign was (at any rate in early times) indicated by a shake of the hand, the meaning of which is shown by the term 'handshake,' a word derived from a Persian or Turco-iranian language. In later times homage was indicated by kissing the ground before the ruler; this practice, originally alien to Islamic ideas, had become familiar before the end of the 14th Islamic century. To a newly-appointed vizier (or emir) food was sent in the 4th cent. from the khallifah's table, probably signifying that he had become a member of the royal household. The practice of offering such a person fragrant herbs is said to have been a purely Persian or Dailidite rite, the sense of which is not clear.

Owing to Islamic objection to the linen's art, symbols, which is very scanty in its architecture, and where found appears to be borrowed. The great mosque of Cordova exhibited in the carvings of its lattices the peculiar form of the Indian cross, the meaning of which is unknown, whereas the cresting of the walls, originally painted scarlet, is typical of flame, and, brought from Persia, symbolized the faith of the Ghebers, worshippers of fire. Probably in such cases the Muslim worshippers and spectators were quite ignorant of the signification. The same is likely to be true of the ornaments to be found on other works of art, such as pottery and textiles. Certain creatures are indeed habitually associated with particular ideas, chiefly on etymological grounds—e.g., the raven with parting—but there is little scope for their employment in art. The symbolism of magical or quasi-magical rites in use in some communities, e.g., the figures representing either a double hand or the spittle of the male palm, indicative of fertility, painted in Tunis on the walls of the house where there is to be a wedding is probably not Islamic.

The practices of Islamic ritual are tralitigious, though taken from many different communities; their symbolic interpretation is therefore conjectural, and is the subject of considerable speculation. Several pages are devoted by the mystic Ibn 'Arif to the meaning of the postures of prayer (salat):

The raising of the hands implies that whatever was theretofore has flown away; it is as though the Almighty, when he commanded this, said. 'When thou standest before Me, stand as a poor mendicant, who owns nothing; fling away everything that thou possessest, and stand empty-handed, setting it behind thee; for I am in front of thee.' Moreover since the seat of power, by raising his hands he confesses that the power is God's, not his own; be he raises them to the chest he is thinking that God is in front of him; he raises them to his ears is thinking that God is above him. Sitting in prayer is the attitude of the slave before his master, and a posture which he may not adopt without the master's leave, etc.

Similar speculations on the meaning of the ceremonies of the pilgrimage are to be found in the work of Ghazali; the special garments worn by the pilgrim, e.g., are to remind him of the grave-clothes wherein he will meet his Maker.

Besides explaining much of the Qur'an as elaborate symbolism the Sufis (q.v.) developed a system of their own, or rather a number of systems; and there are numerous collections of odes in Arabic and Persian which, ostensibly dealing with love and wine, are traditionally interpreted as dealing with the doctrines of pantheism. Illustrations of the style will be found in the commentary of H. Wilberforce Clarke on his translation of the Divan of Hafiz, where we are told that 'breeze' signifies the bonds of love and union with the Desired One is attained, 'bell' signifies the angel of death, 'dark night' the world, 'wave' the excess of divine knowledge, etc., whereas in some cases the same term is variously explained; thus 'narcissus' may signify the life of man before he is brought into the world, the pure existence of God, the vision of God, or inward results of joy in respect of deeds. These interpretations are not always very convincing; but in some works of the kind the symbolism is either interpreted by the author himself, or is sufficiently clear or conventional to leave no doubt of the meaning; an example is to be found in the Masnavi of Jalal al-Din Rumi.

The employment of symbolic acts, either to emphasize language or in lieu of it, is common with Oriental peoples, but not specially Islamic. The same parable has a tendency to do duty through many centuries. Ibn al-Athir records (A.H. 442) how, when an Arab tribe proposed to take Kairawan, they selected as their commander a man who offered to pursue the following plan: taking a carpet, he unfolded it, and then said to the others, 'Which of you can get to the middle of this carpet without treading upon it?' They declared it to be impossible. He showed them that the carpet had to be rolled up from the edge, meaning that the army had gradually to be composed of the weaker. According to W. G. Palgrave, Ibrahim Pasha obtained the command of an expedition against Nejd eight centuries after by solving the problem of the carpet.

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

SYMBOLISM (Semitic).—The extent to which symbolism exists in OT literature is very doubtful. In the case of the Babylonians and Assyrians, however, our knowledge is much more definite and is obtained chiefly from a study of cylinder-seals, the Babylonian boundary-stones, and the monoliths of Assyrian kings. On the Babylonian kuwurrus, or boundary-stones, the emblems of the gods are grouped together, and in one case the name of the god with whom the emblem is associated is inscribed by the side, thus giving us definite data on which to base our conclusions.

The Hebrew word for symbol, 468, is most probably connected with the root, 365, 'to describe with a mark,' and with Assyr. 468. Some scholars have suggested a connection between Assyr. 468 and Heb. 777.

1 Qalqashandi, III. 472.
2 Rubles of this shape adorned the coronation of the supposed Qur'an of Nebuchadnezzar, carved before the Altar of Trajan (E. G. Scott, Inscriptions of the Votive Empire in Europe, Philadelphia, 1894, II. 304).
3 V. A. Smith, Akbar, the Great Mogul, Oxford, 1917, p. 57.
5 Miskawalhi, ii. 165.
7 See Bilal, ed. H. F. Amelens, Beirut, 1904, p. 456, etc.
8 Earlier examples are Agdash, p. 20 (time of Amin); Tabari, iii. 365; and the Stone of Tangeris.
9 Miskawalhi, i. 136, 223, 361, ii. 15, 28.
10 Bl. H. F. Scott, ii. 966.
14 See the tr. by H. W. Whinfield, London, 1898.
15 Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, London, 1855, ii. 45.
1. The symbolism of religious life.—The Temple as the centre of the religious life of ancient Israel should be kept in mind. So treated first, Solomon’s temple was specifically built in order that Yahweh might dwell there, the ark, the symbol of the presence of the deity. In the second Temple, the adytum being empty, the presence of the deity was symbolized by the continuous burning of the fire of the Day of Atonement ritual, and the shewbread. Among the Semites the god was symbolically represented as a nobleman dwelling in his palace, and W. M. Flinders Petrie compared the Temple of Egypt, the symbol of the presence of the deity. The temple of Melkarth of Tyre and also the temple at Hierapolis had two similar pillars in front of them, and, as these were symbols of the deity and Solomon’s temple was constructed on the same plan. According to the principle, it had been the case that the Temple was built on a mountain. This really brings us to another question. Was there any connexion between the idea which represented Jehovah’s home on a mountain and the ‘high places’ referred to in the OT? From the standpoint of the Deuteronomistic historian, the high places were legitimate places of worship until the building of the Temple at Jerusalem. It is to be noted also that the high places are said to have been built on hills, and it has therefore been suggested that they were artificial mounds taking the place of natural high places such as the summits of hills and mountains. This is the view of the historian of Babylonian houses, which had been learned from Babylonia. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Babylonian temples was their enormous size. In Gn 11:2, we read that the people met together in the land of Shinar and decide to build a city and a tower that shall reach up to heaven. To the Babylonians a temple was at all a ‘high place’, and there is a symbolic reason to account for this conception. Jensen has shown that the Babylonians regarded the earth as a huge mountain. In fact the earth was actually called E-Kur, ‘mountain house’. Later they began to identify one particular part of the earth—later the earth dwelling of the god, so that the temples which were built later were known as ‘mountain houses’. The height of the temple thus symbolized the mountain which had formed the original home of the deity. The same idea can be seen by sketching the history of Mt. Zion. The sanctuary on the mountain existed before the settlement of the Hebrews. Just as His people the Hittites possess the early settlers of Caanan, so Jehovah possesses the god of Zion. Mt. Zion is now regarded as His home and He therefore reveals Himself to His people from the mountain (Ex 19:2). We can thus see the symbolic idea which suggested the sipparu in Babylonia, the high places in Canaan, and the sacred temple in Jerusalem.

The very names ‘ark of Jehovah’, ‘ark of God’, suggest that the ark contained an object which in some manner symbolized the God of Israel. In the Assyrian temples a statue of the god took the place of the ark in the Holy of Holies, and it has therefore been suggested that the ark with the cherubim over it was a symbol of Jehovah. The custom of carrying about an ark as a symbol of the deity is found in other Semitic religions. In Babylonia the gods were carried about in ships in solemn procession, and in Egypt the ark with its images were placed in boats. Reman suggests that the ark in the Egyptian ark-boat, and there is not sufficient evidence to warrant such a suggestion. Cheyne suggests that the symbolic meaning of the brazen serpent caged and learned from Babylonia. He thinks that the brazen oxen in Ex 25 were copies of the oxen which stood in Babylonian temples as symbols of Marduk. M. Benzinges has suggested that the snake, serpents, and the oxen, given as symbols by the Israelite tribes and that Nebuchadnezzar may have been its sacred symbol (Gn 49:1). The two pillars Jachin and Boaz which stood in front of the porch of the Temple were probably symbolic. The temple of Melkarth of Tyre and also the temple at Hierapolis had two similar pillars in front of them, and, as these were symbols of the deity and Solomon’s temple was constructed on the same plan. According to the principle, it has been the case that the Temple was built on a mountain. It is possible that the brazen lavers and the sea of the Temple symbolized the clouds. As to the sea and oxen, W. H. Koster’s finds here a symbolic trace of the Babylonian myth of the struggle of Marduk and Tiamat—the sea representing Tiamat and the oxen Marduk. Seeing that the Babylonian creation-myth determined the form of the Israelites’ cosmology, this view has received general support, although there is no direct reference to it in the OT. H. P. Smith suggests that the twelve oxen were symbols of the twelve constellations and that the sea was a symbol of the ocean from which the earth is watered. The ornamental figures on the smaller lavers he also regards as symbolic. The bull was sacred to Jehovah, the lion was sacred to Astarte, whilst the palm-tree is represented with a symbolic meaning in Phoenician art. The ornamentation therefore suggested a syncretistic purpose in building the Temple.

Although there is not the slightest reference in the OT to any symbolic meaning of the tabernacle, scholars, both ancient and modern, have actually suggested that both in its structure and in its appurtenances it symbolized various religious truths. The Heb. yq̄bal, ‘dwelling, the dwelling place of God, was, among His people’, ‘tent of meeting, represented the idea that God met His people there; whilst the name yq̄b̄al, ‘tent of the testimony’, constantly called to mind that the tabernacle inscribed on the tables of the ark bore witness to the covenant between Jehovah and His people. But there are other ideas symbolized by the tabernacle. The innermost chamber, the Holy of Holies, was the dwelling-place of the deity Himself. This could be entered by the high-priest alone, and only once a year—on the Day of Atonement. In this chamber everything was made of gold and decorated with beautifully-made fabrics, whilst the vestments of the high-priest were conspicuous by their gorgeous finery. This gave expression to the thought that God’s most holy minister and His chief abode should be adorned with becoming dignity and splendour. On the other hand, in the Holy Place, which could be entered by the priesthood only, the furniture was of gold, whilst the outer pillars, which were taken, no doubt, as belonging to the sanctuary, were of brass. The court, which was for the people, had
only brass. The covering for the Holy of Holies was made of costly materials with figured cherubim; the curtain at the door of the Holy Place was without cherubim, and that at the court was simply made of white linen. We can thus see how the costliness of the adornments of the different parts symbolized their sacredness; the more sacred a chamber was, the more sumptuously was it adorned.

"Together the curtains are designed to form the earthly, and, with the altar and the stove of the heavenly dwelling-place, the heavenly, dwelling-place of the God of Israel." 1

The sacrificial system of the Hebrews symbolized self-surrender and devotion to the will of God, the need of forgiveness, and the blessing of divine fellowship. The peace-offering with its communion-feast showed the idea of fellowship between God and man; the _tomid_, or continual offering, symbolized Israel's pledge of unbroken service to Jehovah; whilst the sin-offering with its sprinkling of blood showed that one of the conditions of cleansing oneself from sin was to place oneself summissively before God. The care taken in the preparation of the aromatic compounds of the incense as they were to be burnt (Ex. 30:1-34) it appears that incense was regarded as a spiritual symbol of prayer. Prayer regards the incense as a symbol of the fact that Jehovah was present with His people and was a frequent offerer of their daily bread. Circumcision was a tribal badge and showed that the patient had been admitted a member of the tribe, whilst the Sabbath symbolized the completion of the work of creation. In Ex. 31:18 it is actually described as an everlasting symbol (םיִשְׁתָּחַר) between Jehovah and Israel. The long hair worn by the Nazrite symbolized his consecration for some special service. In ancient religions the offering of one's hair, like the offering of one's blood, symbolized the making of a covenant between the worshiper and his god. The frontlets, or _šafáhôth_ (Ex. 13:19), were badges worn upon the forehead and arm to show that the worshipper belonged to a certain religious community, and as a worshipper of the national deity was subject to his help and protection. Fire occurs as a symbol of the divine presence (Ex. 20:3 etc.). It was also regarded as a purifying agent (_is Is^5^:4^6^), and to pass through fire was therefore a symbol of purification. Would not this explain why sacrifices were burned before they could be accepted? Water was another source of symbolical purification. Ablutions were so common among the Hebrews that it is difficult to distinguish washings performed for the sake of the body and those with a symbolical significance. Anointing2 denoted the consecration of a person or even of an inanimate object (such as the tabernacle and its appurtenances or the stone at Bethel). In Ps. 23:5 it is referred to as a symbol of prosperity and joy, and the consecration of the priest was a symbol of mourning (2 S 12:30). The word _ashēri_, which appears very often as a name for Astarte (1 K 18:19, 2 K 21:7 etc.), came to be used as a substitute of the goddess of the goddess (De 27:7, Ex. 34:21 etc.). The _Hammanim_ were most probably symbols of the sun-god, who is called in Phoenician inscriptions _ṣ̄ēr_2, and the messiah- _bōth_ were symbols expressing gratitude for a 1 Jastrow, _Synonymic Lexicon of the Old Testament_, (SDB, p. 85).

2 Cf. the custom among later Jews of fasting to the doorpost a small box containing certain texts from _OT_, and the custom of Jews of appointing year after year some protection to the entrance of houses (L. W. King, _ZA_ xl. (1896) 59-69).

3 For the origin and significance of the rite see A. H. Kasha, Säbæl, in Klein, _Handwörterbuch des bibl. Altertums_, 1932-34.

4 See also a popular saying in the Genizah " _ṣ̄ēr_ bōth, the roof, the guard of the house of the gods, will guard you." 3337 (Rashi on Deut. 26:10). 4 G. A. Barton, "The Semitic Art Cult," _Hebraica_, ix. (1897) 125-126, xi. (1903) 72.


6 Only of the temple at Jerusalem, as has been pointed out by many commentators, but the whole sanctuary, except the Temple, on the other hand, is mentioned by Josephus (Antiquities of the Jews, ix. 205). 1 John, p. 274.

7 1 John, p. 294.

8 2 John, p. 294.


10 These symbols can be studied most conveniently from the _Mémoires de la députation en Perse_ (1835-1837).

11 In OT the horn was a symbol of power and its exaltation signified victory (1 K 22:11, 2 Sam 12:30 etc.). divine revelation (Gr. _σημεῖον_ 311 etc.). As to bull symbolism, it most probably originated among the Hebrews themselves (and was not borrowed from the Egyptians, as hitherto supposed). The Hebrews being an agricultural race, it was natural that they should look upon the bull as a symbol of strength and power. But bulls were not uncommon in Solomon's temple may have been due to the influence of Phoenician worriers. For among the Phoenicians Baal was represented as a bull. The horns of the altar are regarded by some scholars as symbols of ancient bull-worship. The _ziggurates_, or temple towers, of Babylonia consisted usually of three, four, or seven stones, no doubt on account of the symbolic sacredness attached to these numbers. The quadrilateral shape of the _ziggurates_, with the four corners towards the four cardinal points, symbolized the four quarters over which the Babylonian kings held dominion. The lions (symbols of Nergal) and the bulls (symbols of En-lil) which stood at the entrances of Assyrian temples probably symbolized the means which the gods had at their disposal for punishing man. The names of the temples symbolized the character of the gods to whom they were dedicated. The temple of Nergal was called 'the house of love,' that of Shamash was called 'the house of the universal judge.' The basin of the temple known as _apu_ represented the domain of Ea, the water-god. The _ziggurates_ and the basin thus became 'living symbols of current cosmological conceptions.'

We may now turn to the symbols of the gods themselves. The symbol of Ramman, the storm and thunder-god, was a lightning fork, whilst an axe represented the destruction which storm and thunder bring in their wake. His nature as a solar deity was also symbolized by a bull. Sin had a crescent, either by itself or with a disk. Since the moon at certain phases suggested the appearance of a horn, he was represented as an old man with a flowing beard, and wearing a cap on which were the horns of the moon. The horn was thus regarded as his crown and came to symbolize his power. This explains why the Assyrian kings adorned themselves with a horned crown as a symbol of divinity. Anu symbolized the abstract principle of dry land and sky. His nature was equated with the fires and emoluments. Such expressions as 'flight of heaven and earth,' by which Ninib was known, symbolized his beneficent character as a solar deity. But the fiery rays of the sun might also be destructive, and he was therefore represented also under the form of a lion. Ea's symbol consisted of a ram's head which projected from a frame. This symbol occurs on the Babylonian relief and the Esarhaddon stele is that an boundary stones his symbol is usually an animal with the head of an antelope and the lower part of a fish. As the water-god of Babylonia, fountains were sacred to him, and thus was regarded as the god of fertility. He was the Oannes of Berossus—half man, half fish—who came out of the water to instruct the people. The symbol of a fish was therefore suggested either by the idea of fertility or by the fact that water was regarded as the source of life.
The staff by which he is represented symbolizes still the staff of a writer or a ruler’s sceptre. The solar god Marduk symbolizes the sun of spring which brings about the growth of vegetation and the revival of nature. As a warrior-god his symbol is a spear, and as a storm-god he is represented by a heralded cloud. Sometimes he is represented by the symbol of a dog, and in a lexicalographical tablet there is a reference to four dogs of Marduk. As the goddess of love and the mother of mankind, she was represented by a female figure with her breasts exposed and a child on her left arm suckling her breast. She symbolized every feminine phenomenon of the Babylonian pantheon. She was the mother of the gods and the mother-goddess, and was therefore prayed to in hymns as ‘helper and heavenly midwife.’ As goddess of the passions she was represented on seal-cylinders as nude, with the distinctively feminine parts particularly emphasized. In the astrological system she was identified with Venus and regarded as a symbol of light. Sometimes her symbol is a star of various shapes.

Nergal, symbolized the hot sun of mid-summer, was represented by a lion; Nusku, the fire-god, by a lamp; and Nisgusu by an eagle. Hommel connects the name Bau of the Gula temple with that of Bau, a name for an image symbolizing the watery depths of the universe. On one of the inscriptions of Nabu-pal-iddin Shamash is represented as seated in his shrine; before him is a table resting on a wheel, and attached to the wheel are corn-hold by two male figures which direct its course. These figures represent the messengers of Shamash, Malik and Banene, who occupy the position of chariot-drivers. The sun’s movement across the heavens is indicated by a symbol symbolized by the wheel, which was thought of as a drive (cf. Ps 19:6). On seal-cylinders his beneficent character is symbolized by the manner in which he pours forth streams of water from jars placed on his shoulders. But the most common symbol of Shamash is a sun-disk.

The chief symbol of Ashur was a standard which consisted of a pole surrounded by a disk enclosed within two wings. Above the disk was the figure of a warrior shooting an arrow. The terra-cotta images of Bel found at Nippur represent him as an old man with a flowing beard, a real ‘father’ of the people. The personification of the personified nature whose seat and sphere of action is the inhabited world. Together with Ann and Ea, therefore, he symbolized the eternal laws of the universe.

2. The symbolism of common life. — A Hebrew slave who refused to take advantage of the liberty open to him after seven years’ service had one of his ears bored with an awl and pinned to the door to show that he was in future to be devoted to the service of that house (Ex 21:6). Elevation to a position of superiority was symbolized by placing a crown on the head (2 S 14:5, 2 K 11:13 etc.). The worshipper spread out his hands in prayer to show that he desired to obtain divine mercy and help (Ex 29:28, 1 K 8:62 etc.). Washing of the hands was a symbol of innocence. In Dt 21:4 the heifer’s neck was broken to show that the murderer deserved the punishment, which was the elders of the city by washing their hands showed that they were free from the guilt. Hostility towards a person is shown by gnawing with teeth (Ps 39:10 etc.); ill-feeling by clapping the hands (Ex 6:21, 21:22), or by spitting in the face (Nu 12:4, Dt 23:5); and anger by gnashing the teeth (Ps 35:16, Job 19, La 3:6 etc.). The brow of a man, which was probably looked upon as a symbol of authority, and to place it upon a man’s shoulder showed that he was appointed steward (Is 22:20). Covering a head with a veil is a symbol of submission or acting as her protector (Ezk 16). The father of a new-born child acknowledged it as his offspring by placing it upon his knees (Job 3:3). In a Babylonian poem describing the wickedness wrought by the evil spirits they said to snatch the child from the knees of a man. The use of salt as a condiment and the piquancy which it gives to insipid articles of diet caused it to be regarded as a symbol of life. An abundance of salt has the effect of preventing the growth of vegetation, and therefore the ploughing of a city with salt denoted that it was condemned to eternal destruction (Jg 9:24). It was a mark of reverence to cast off the shoes on approaching a sacred person or place (Ex 3:4, Jos 5:2). To appear barefoot was a sign of great emotion or of mourning (2 S 15:31, 20:30 edes; +Ne 6:40). Shoes meant to give up a legal right (Ru 4:4). The taking of an oath was symbolized by placing the hand upon the thigh of the adjuror (Gn 24:47), or by lifting up the hand towards heaven (Gn 14:24). As kissing was a means by which parts of the body of different persons came into contact, it was naturally a symbol of affection and reverence (Gn 27:26, Ex 18:10, Ru 1:1 etc.). Various symbolisms were used in mourning. It was the custom to show that the mourner’s grief for the departed was so great that he was ready to give up all the pleasures and conveniences of life (Gn 37:7, 2 S 3:30). The tearing of one’s garment denoted that the mourner’s dearest friend had been torn from him (Gn 37:24, 44:13 etc.). The mourner went about barefoot and bareheaded (2 S 16:24, Ezk 24:4), sat in ashes and sprinkled ashes upon his head (Jer 6:18, La 3:6 etc.), and practiced various mutilations of the body (Jer 16:5 etc.). Shaving the head (as among the Arabs at the present time) was also a sign of mourning. The making of a covenant was symbolized by the man stretching out his hand between the parts of an animal cut into pieces, and thus showing that he was ready to be similarly treated if he failed to keep his promise (Ge 15:7 etc.).

Light represented to the Orientals the highest human good. The most joyful emotions and pleasing sensations are described under imagery derived from light (1 K 11:8, Ps 97:2 etc.). It was only natural that there should follow a transition from corporeal to spiritual things, so that light came to typify true religion and the happiness which it brings. Sin, wickedness, chaos, were represented by darkness. The lion was a symbol of strength (Jl 1). Kneeling was a mark of homage to a superior, and is therefore referred to as an attitude of worship (2 Ch 6:9, 1 K 8:64).

In Babylonia it was customary to present gifts to the girl’s parents. According to some scholars, this symbolized the purchase of the bride—a practice which existed in earlier times. Various symbolics were connected with the marriage ceremony, but their meaning is obscure. The officiating ministers bound sandals on the feet of the newly-wedded pair, gave them a leather

2 On a Phoenician gem the gazelle is figured along with the sacred dove as a symbol of the zonastate (W. H. Smith, Onomastica, and Marriages in Early Arabia, London 1903, p. 227 f.).
6 Cf. the Babylonian expression mish gate.
7 H. Jastrow, West, Earth, and Ashur-Symbols of Mourning among the Ancient Hebrews, J.A.O.S. xx (1900) 125-150.
SYMBOLISM (Semitico)

girdle, and fastened it to a pouch of silver and gold. The first of these ceremonies may have symbolized the marriage-contract between them. We are told in the Code that, if a maid behaves insolently towards her mistress, the latter may put an abuttu on her and reduce her to slavery. The adoptive parent may do the same with a disobedient son. What the abuttu was is unknown. Jensen has suggested that it was some kind of incised mark which acted as a symbol of theft (cf. the mark on Cain’s forehead [Gn 4:15]). The repayment of a debt or the dissolution of a partnership was symbolized by the breaking of a tablet. Mutiny is often referred to as a punishment for crime, and the form of mutiny was symbolical of the offence itself. For striking a father the hand was cut off; for ingratitude evidenced by speech the tongue was cut out; as a punishment for unlawful curiosity the eye was torn out; and as a mark of disobedience the ear was often cut off. The cutting short of the hair was a mark of degradation. The city walls were regarded as a symbol of shelter. Swearing by the gods and the king was a means of sanctioning an agreement. When a contract was made, both parties and witnesses added their names to it. And this was authenticated by impressing the seals or making a mark on it. The Code states explicitly that a woman was not a wife without bonds. This was a marriage-contract which symbolized an official acknowledgment of the union. An artisan symbolized his adoption of a child by teaching him a trade. The penalty of breaking a contract was the payment of two or more white horses to the god. The exact meaning of this symbolism is unknown, but there is doubt suggested purification and innocence. In Babylonian magic there was a symbolical tying and loosening of knots according as the sorcerer wished to strangle his victim, or to release him from any demon by which he had been captured. If a magician wished to rid himself of an object, he would burn or torture an image of it, believing that the victim would meet with the same fate as his image. By seizing the hands of Bel, the Assyrian kings legitimized their claim to the Babylonian throne.

3. The symbolism of numbers and colours.—It is doubtful whether the Hebrews used symbolic numbers in OT times. On the Moabite Stone and the Siloam inscription the numbers given are invariably in words. But this does not exclude the possibility that numerical symbols, which were employed by the Babylonians and Egyptians, were also used by the Israelites. In S. Arabian and Phoenician inscriptions also the numbers are partly written and partly indicated by figures. The numbers most commonly used with a symbolical meaning are three, four, and seven.

White symbolized purity and innocence. It represented light, which impressed the Hebrew mind not only by its brilliance and beauty, but by its divine symbolism and profound moral connotation (Lv 16:22, Dn 7:2, Ps 104). As black absorbs all colours and thus buries the light, it symbolized death, humiliation, mourning (Mal 3:2, La 2:9, etc.). Blue, representing the colour of an unclouded sky, symbolized revelation (Ex 24:10). It was the first of the colours used for the curtains of the sanctuary, and the Israelites were commanded to have a ribbon of blue thread hanging on the edge of their garments in order to remind them of Jahveh (Nu 15:38). Red, as the colour of blood, repre-

1 The Code says that, if a father repudiates his son, 'he shall make his son's name void.' 'Yard' simply means 'enclose' and may refer to the city walls, as a symbol of shelter (C. H. W. Johns, Bob. and Asy. Laws, Contracts, and Letters, Edinb. 1904, p. 423).

2 Cf. art. Numbers (Semitico).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Hammurabi says that he 'bedecked the grave of Malik with green,' the colour of resurrection (introduction to his Code of Laws).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\] Jeremiah, 1:100.
that it was not loss of speech but an injunction to refrain from reproving his co-religionists any more. The present writer is therefore inclined to agree with R. Simend, A. Kuenen, and E. Hübner in regarding symbolism as being merely symbolical visions in the mind of the prophet and as not having been performed externally.


MAURICE H. FABERIDGE.

SYMBOLO-FIDEISM 1 is the name given to the theology taught in the second half of the 19th cent. at the Protestant Faculty of Paris by Professor Auguste Sabatier and his pupils, and is an essentially modern concept of the faith handed down by a large number of their pupils and disciples. It has also been called the theology of the Paris school.

As its name indicates, this theology has two aspects: (a) symbolism, which deals with religion as a thing of the people, in its point of view of its form, and (b) fideism, which deals with it from the point of view of its content. Sabatier devoted himself specially to the former and Ménéguzo to the latter. Both are inseparable and interdependent. Together they form a theology with a distinct character of its own.

The basis of symbolism is the psychological observation that the essence of things escapes us, and that we know only their manifestations in the form of images, figures, and symbols. We cannot, e.g., know what God is in Himself. We know Him only by the more or less anthropomorphic representations in which we frame Him in our thought. This we express by the terms ‘Father,’ ‘Lord,’ ‘Master,’ ‘Captain,’ ‘Sovereign,’ ‘King,’ or by emblems bringing out one or other of His attributes, etc. These symbols are without doubt the expression of a living reality, but the conformation of our brain is such that it cannot grasp that reality naked; our mind can apprehend it only when it presents itself in the garment of a more or less sensuous representation. This observation holds good in regard to all religious data, and is borne out in the most subtle dogmatic systems. The task of the theologian is to lay bare the eternal truth from under its contingent manifestations and its historical formulae; moreover, these formulae are subject to the laws of historical evolution.

A name the Deity, it is the name ‘Father,’ habitually used by Jesus Christ, that best suits the religious man’s conception of the Supreme Being—perfect, just, merciful, eternal, all-embracing; religion as immanent, on whom man feels himself absolutely dependent, while at the same time conscious of liberty and responsibility before Him. On the ideas of liberty and responsibility depend those of sin and penalty, while in the mind of these ideas are pardon and salvation. A lively conviction that we are created for life and not for death, for happiness and not for suffering, rouses us to aspirations after salvation. We desire life, happy life, eternal life. The whole idea of salvation is summed up in these words. How are we to attain this life, this salvation? Conscience repudiates the efficacity of words as being merely symbolical visions in the mind of the prophet and as not having been performed externally.

1 In recent years the word ‘fideism’ has frequently been used alone.
SYMPATHY

religious journals and theological reviews. Its adversary has also published a number of polemical pamphlets. These are referred to in the writings mentioned below.


EUGÈNE MÉNÉGOZ.

SYMPATHY.—Sympathy, as the etymology denotes, is ‘feeling with’ others. Two persons feeling alike do not, however, make a true sympathetic couple unless the feeling of one has partly caused or is reinforcing the feeling of the other. The perfection of mutual sympathy is reached when similar feelings originate spontaneously in the two and reinforce each other. Any relation, however, in which there is a mutual reinforcement of feeling, however originated, is one of mutual sympathy.

2. Emotional contagion.—The primary fact in sympathy is that the feeling of one person can, on occasion, cause similar feeling in another. In its primitive manifestations this occurs without reflexive consciousness of self or other, and certainly without distinction of persons in respect of its origin. This is shown in the contagion of popular excitement—e.g., panic, war-frenzy, the intensified emotions of public meetings, the excitement, the furious hatred, the boundless affecion, that mark the excited crowd. The emotion, or its manifestation in some, excites similar emotions latent in the others, and with the help of sympathetic re-inforcement the emotional disturbance in each is abnormally increased. Probably it is only those who, from the beginning, have some set against the prevalent emotion that maintain a normal level of affect. For they have no sympathetic outburst to augment their willpower; they must be themselves short-lived, and, as the cause of excitement is withdrawn, the persons affected by contagious feeling return to their ordinary emotional level. The disposition of the other's state of mind may even be one of indifference to the popular frenzy in which they took part. It may, indeed, be one of revulsion if they have been drawn, as sometimes happens, into a condition of which in their normal moods they disapprove. Such revulsion would happen, e.g., if an advocate of peace found that he had been drawn by follow-feeling into a demonstration of war enthusiasm. The hot fit is followed by a cold fit. Hence, the instability of popular acclamation, the apparent superficiality of feeling which appears when people liable to sympathy of this primitive unreflective kind are massed together. The most suitable material for the typical ‘fickle mob’ is a town, whose population sympathetically sensitive and intellectually immature.

The short-lived character of the feeling thus contagious prevails in the nature of the case, because there is no settled identification of self-conscious personality with it. I feel in sense, but not feel myself as feeling: I do not take that feeling to pertain to me. It is on me and moves me, but it does not enter into any relation to that total of ideas, impulses, feelings, and desires which is me. It may be a mere motive excitement, moving me blindly to action, or it may take possession of me completely with fixed idea and over-mastering mood, acting instead of me and overpowering me. In either case I come out of it, and in the latter case as one recovered from a madness that is very like, no doubt, befell Parisians in the broad violence of the Terror.

2. Self-conscious sympathy.—When self is identified with the feeling which nevertheless is ascribed to another we have what is properly called self-conscious sympathy. The development of self-consciousness goes hand in hand indeed with the exercise of sympathy. We learn to know ourselves, and to become all that we are capable of becoming as self-conscious persons, by our dealings with our fellows, and pari passu with our conscious recognition of ourselves in the society of other selves. In so far, however, as we are clearly conscious of self, we are prepared to set bounds to the operation of primitive sympathy. A new condition of feeling, discontinuous with my previous state so as to preclude its origination in me, is roused in me by sympathetic contagion. It is to the self an invasion from without. As a feeling, moving me but not mine, it must be referred to a neighboring conscious self, who is manifesting it independently. Our first concern, however, is its treatment by the self which is uninvaded. One should realize with the total state of this self enter into it as an element in its development: the sympathy of children with parents and other elders plays a large part in the building up of their personality. Confidence in the elders who give the lead to sympathy predisposes to acceptance of their guidance. The emotional being of the child is educated in this way. If of average delicacy, it takes the form suggested to it by its society. On the other hand, the suggested feeling may be out of harmony with the character as already formed; thus the brave man may feel the horror communicated to him by the panic-stricken multitude, but he overcomes it as no possible part of himself. When the feeling thus communicated to us takes strong hold, the repulse by a strong character is correspondingly emphatic. In sensitive natures this gives rise to a peculiar sense of revulsion, as towards something put into us against our will; and the transference of this revulsion to the source of contagion is probably the chief element in personal antipathy. Between this attitude of abhorrence towards the induced emotion and willing receptiveness of it, as extremes, lie all degrees of being moved by a feeling from which, as outside, the disposition of our own personality, we nevertheless withhold ourselves. Whether we admit the feeling to influence over us, or harden our will against it in a sort of self-defence, it appears to us essentially, and throughout its action, as the feeling of another person with which in a measure we feel.

This definite ascertainment of the feeling to another is the second characteristic feature in sympathy, and gains prominence with the developing consciousness of self and of other selves.

3. Control of sympathy.—In passing it may be noted how large a part in life is played by the partial hardening against the contagion of social feeling. This control of sympathetic contagion is essential to the preservation of self as a self-consciousness of character. It is not only that undesirable emotions—e.g., of hatred, fear, envy—should be suppressed, but that the self should be self-possessed though sensitive members of the excited crowd. Experience soon reveals the self that is free, even in the ordinary physical

1 Common self-possession, as in the man who is not liable to the contagion of feeling, must be distinguished from the excellence of sympathy under control. Probably this is one of the virtues of the born leader.
sense, requires much systematic control of emotion, whether initiated sympathetically or otherwise. An emotional nature loosely controlled is morally unstable and makes for a nervous break-down in consequence of the over-distraction to the ends which it subserves. The precise definition of those ends belongs to the subject of ethics: the average man conceives them simply as the happiness of personal health for himself and his associates, together with some service in furtherance of the common weal. It may be that the rank and file of modern humanity suffer from lack of vitality and variety in the emotional life, but for the moment we are not concerned with them. Persons of the sympathetic cast are—under modern conditions more especially—liable to so much emotional invasion as must result in nervous exhaustion if not systematically kept in check. It is interesting to note how the habit of control over sympathy develops with experience from youth to maturity: the first great sympathetic grief overwhelms us as if it were our own; later we learn to separate the emotion into the actions required to assuage the sufferings of our friend: later still, to those who are overtired, callousness may come, with the exhaustion of either physique or moral. Most of these characteristics apply to all feeling, however initiated. Sympathetic feeling differs from other feeling as being specially liable to increase of control by development of the element of otherness in it. This is of a piece with another useful psychological truth, namely that the tension of any violent feeling may be relieved by treating it as an object of imagination or thought. Tennyson's lines bear on this point:

"Like wise the imaginative, we, That loved to handle spiritual state, Diffused the shock thro' all my life, But the present broke the blow."

In constructing a story, an essay, or a poem which depicts the emotion as affecting imaginary persons, the sense of its personal attachment is obscured: it is projected more or less, i.e. indirectly, into the other-consciousness of the non-existent. Similarly, but as of course and instinctively, we project our sympathetic feelings back into the other self and, although still feeling them, are as a rule much relieved by the stop that is placed on the disturbance of the emotional personality in general by the sharp dissociation of the new feeling from those immediately pertaining to the self; it is the other person's feeling, and, though it disturbs me, I limit that disturbance by knowing it as something which has not its origin, and is therefore not necessarily permanent, in me. This control of the sympathetic disturbance further and is furthered by practical activity in relief of the other's distress.

4. Identification with the 'other.'—The exceptions indeed in this case explain the rule. When the sympathy is wholly or even mainly to a much beloved, it may affect us more than if it were of our own origin. This, no doubt, is what is meant when it is said that another person is dearer to us than ourselves. The consciousness of the beloved person's consciousness is in this case so established as part of our own that the projection of the feeling into it does not in the least dissociate the self from the feeling. So far as the beloved person feels, we go on feeling it and being further disturbed by it all the time. Indeed there appear to be, in cases of intense affection when the self identifies itself passionately with the other, two ways in which the sympathetic feeling may become more disturbing than the equivalent primary feeling would be. (1) In projecting it on the beloved, the illusion created by the habit of affection which, so far as the imagination is concerned, may greatly exaggerate its force and significance: the finger-prick which, in spite of instinctive tears, is a trifle to the baby may bulk large in the distress of his parents. (2) Each person has an intimate sense of the power and results with himself by means of which he bears his troubles and controls his emotional being generally. About the beloved other, however intimately known, he is never quite so sure, and thus, no matter how equal things may otherwise be, the sense of mystery breeds, as it were, a germ of fear that heights pain and, by release from it, also heights joy. This goes, moreover, with the essential fact that love at its strongest exceeds self-love in destroying the welfare of its object. The heightening in this way of feeling sympathetically experienced may perhaps be discriminated introspectively as an additional element of ourself-concern of objective consequence. Such concern is given to their own emotions by none but moral people. And indeed even in the lover-like relation to which this tender anxiety necessarily belongs it may be exaggerated as to be morbid concern of self for the other. For this reason it is often well that persons who get too much on one another's mind—as we say—should be sometimes associated with the consciousness of self. There are, of course, all degrees of dependence on one another in this respect. A man may go through life without one associate in whose welfare he has any genuine lasting interest, capable of sympathy but never in danger of being shaken by it. Most persons, however, have friends with whom does penetrate into them, as well as move from themselves. Some men are, in the absence of contrary cause, friendly to all their associates: these are universally sympathetic also, in proportion to their primary sympathetic sensitiveness.

Friendliness, however, is not always to identify oneself with another, must be carefully distinguished from the primary capacity to feel as others feel. When they are combined, we have the sympathetic nature as popularly understood. But an unfriendly man may be sensitive to another's feelings, in which case he not only projects them on the other but sharply dissociates himself from all interest in him. It is as if he said, 'I know what you feel; I feel you feeling it; but it is nothing to me.'

5. Insight and sensitiveness.—Apart from unfriendliness, however, this cool dissociation of self from interest in the other, combined with sympathetic sensitiveness, explains the gift of neutral or cold insight which plays so large a part in the intuitive knowledge of men. Intellectual constructiveness, which bodies forth an idea of the man's character as shown by his actions, is the ordinary substitute for intuition; and in some ways it is a safer guide. The intuitive, e.g., may mistake his man by overrating the significance of a transitory mental attitude. He is also likely to eke out his intuitions by specula-

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1 In Memoriam, LXVIII.
tions and imaginings into which all sorts of error may creep. If he abounds in self-confidence, he is a dangerous guide: but, if he treats his gift humbly as a useful auxiliary, it will serve him in good stead and increase his power of winning affection.

A person of sympathetic bent may have experiences of cool insight, but with this difference that, since in such case he does not identify himself with the other, he is moved to change the state of the other rather than into identification with him. Thus the orator feels that his audience is puzzled or hostile: they do not convert him, but he is not indifferent, so he puts out his strength to express himself and make them feel his feeling. The more learned lecturer, on the other hand, only tries to show and make them see his meaning. The orator is the speaker whom the Americans call 'magnetic '; he makes his hearers feel as he does, at least for the time. But the beginning which he makes is at the other end of the coil, by insight into the feeling which is theirs but not his. This is the getting into sympathetic touch. By showing this sympathy on neutral ground or even in respectful dissent, he fixes the attention of his hearers. His interest in them interests them in him: then the position is reversed, the mind of the speaker shown, and the original attitude of the audience merged in the new state by which they are identified with him. This kind of thing happens every day on a small scale in the experience of sympathetic people. To understand, to be interested though in disagreement, to persuade—these are the means, and in this order, by which one person transforms the mental attitude of another. The more instinctive the process is, the better the sympathetic operation by its natural impulse to mutual identification of mental content.

6. Affinity of character.—In so far as the sympathy turns upon friendliness of disposition, persons may be characterized as sympathetic generally, i.e., in relation to all sorts of other persons. In so far, however, as it depends on primary contagion of feeling, affinities of character must profoundly affect the relation between any pair. Racial type, e.g., is a basis of such affinity, and the mutual intelligibility of two compatriots, while partly arising from like habits of expression and community of associations, turns also on functional capacity to feel alike. In whatever way we explain the prime fact of emotional contagion, it is evident that no one can communica
cate as another a feeling of which the latter is constitutionally incapable. The fearless man cannot feel like the coward, nor the liberal man like the mean. Each can only see that the other acts in a manner directly opposite to himself and recognizes the corresponding state of mind as a mystery. To sympathize with another, we must be able to feel like him. Some would say, further, that we must have felt on our own origin as he now feels; but that is not so certain, though perhaps it generally happens so. Our capacity to sympathize, therefore, is at least limited by the possibilities of our character. How far these are limited, or how far they may be extended beyond our present experience of them, we never know. Certain it is that in human society we run up now and then against mysteries, persons with whom after much acquaintance we always seem to us as if they were feeling their way through life at the other side of a high wall over which we cannot see, through which we cannot hear, them. At the same time, we meet others with whom, in trifling things and large, we find ourselves in tune, so much in tune that diversities of aim and opinion, though standing out the more clearly, do not mar the general harmony. But mental conditions are so complex that likeness of condition between two minds must generally be of a very partial kind.

7. Similarity and association.—Another influence to the same effect which enters into these cases is natural similarity in habitual reaction. This is best seen in racial affinity: the stock of native gesture due to heredity, including facial expression, intonations of voice, and a multitude of unconscious and often unacknowledged tiny movements that have no verbal equivalent and are available for that involuntary play of subtle signs which is the veiled language of sympathy. Whether contagion of feeling originates with instinctive imitation of feeling-signs or not, its development in relation to the complex psychoses of the adult is dependent on the swift interpretation of their secret signs. Human beings are indeed so profoundly interesting to each other when they really show themselves that an easy mutual intelligibility is often almost equivalent to friendship at first sight.

Intelligibility follows also on intimate association, and this is favourable to the sympathetic relation. A common stock of experiences, habits, and even feelings is formed by association in life, and the result is similar to that of congenital affinity, though lacking the charm of its ever-recurring, ethical affinity, it is to be noted, is not limited to cases of similar racial type. It is a happy accident of human development which may be encountered at any turn.

8. Sympathy in education.—The value of sympathy as an element in the development of moral life is too large a subject to be treated here. A few words, however, may be devoted to (1) the teacher's use of sympathy in education, and (2) the training of sympathy in the child.

(1) The teacher's use of sympathy, like that of the orator described above, begins in his own sympathy with the learner's state of mind and ends in the achievement of the learner's sympathy with his. The teacher's sympathy requires as a starting-point, therefore, some demonstration on the child's part, and to evoke this in as good a form as possible for his purpose—by any form rather than none—must be his first care. By entering into the child's mind thus shown to him he establishes the contact of sympathy, and by maintaining this contact he learns where he will provide him to the possible levels of the child throughout. It is no such much in regard to the method of individual lessons as in respect of his general influence, for the teacher's tact is shown. A mistake of intellectual method is a small matter compared with an error in the procedure of moral discipline. It is quite possible to keep in touch with the child's sympathies, even when punishment seems to estrange him for a time.

(2) In the training of sympathy the first requisite is to encourage its manifestations when they occur spontaneously, and to suggest conduct which is the natural expression of interest in others. The tendency to sympathize with joy as well as with sorrow—Mitfrel as well as Mitleid—should be called out. All this belongs to the development of the sympathetic nature, which, however, also stands in need of disciplinary training. This, for the most part, life supplies, and the educator should be wary lest he interfere unwisely and too much. The delicate process of control and moderation by which each self sets limits to its sympathies had better be left to itself; and, as a rule, it is dangerous to train the young to repress, otherwise than by more fully expressing, their nature. Discipline trains to the control of one function for the sake of fulfilling another more perfectly. Thus, emotion is in general controlled by using it to subserve the voluntary and intellectual life.
Thought and conduct are the antidotes to hysteria and emotional riot. As regards sympathy, in particular, we should be chiefly concerned to develop the voluntary and, second to that, the involuntary kind. The barren sympathy with suffering, e.g., which does not go on to some confirming act is morbid because it ends in useless emotional disturbance. Doing in accordance with the occasion is the habit to which sympathy should be most carefully trained. Its other requisite is that it should be intelligent, and this is often a much-needed lesson. A useful sympathy others requires imagination and reflection sufficient to construct a true ideal of what they want. This intelligent apprehension of another's case is of inestimable value in making the fellow-feeling, as well as the friendly action, fit.

Persons who are ‘too sympathetic to be of any use in trouble’ are persons who, by neglecting to help their fellows as need arose, have let themselves get into a habit of being overwhelmed by painful fellow-feeling. The remedy is to do something for the prime sufferer. This is the natural course in the case of an unspoil'd will.

SYNAGOGUE.—See WORSHIP (Hebrew) and (Jewish).


SYNCRETISM.—I. Untechanical use of term.

The term ‘syncretism’ has a very curious record. It is as old as Plutarch, who seems to have coined it, or at any rate to have made it current. In his essay on brotherly love he observes that even brothers and friends who have quarrelled prefer to associate with one another, in face of a common danger, rather than to fraternize with the foe; which is a Cretan precedent and principle.

‘For, although the Cretans were frequently at faction and feuds, they were nevertheless the most peaceful of all nations, and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them. This they called “syncretism” (συνεκτικός).

By ‘syncretism’ in this political sense, therefore, we understand the instinct of self-defence which sinks private differences before a threatening peril on the outside. The ‘syncretists’ close their ranks; they like quarrelling among themselves, but they would rather exist than indulge in fatal internecine strife at home.

After Plutarch the term became submerged. Fourteen centuries later it re-appears in the pages of Erasmus, who was in his own way, especially when the way ran through the Adagia, a ‘syncretist’ of the reconciling order, averse to feuds. Erasmus sets down the reference to Plutarch, and he also employs the term in his correspondance.

Erasmus says writing from Louvain (22nd April 1530) to Melanchthon, hoping that scholars of all parties will close their ranks against the barbarians qui sunt quattuor octo conscriptos. Aequum est nos quoque ovibus concruminare.

During the next century and a half the term is taken up and spread through Europe by members of the Reformed and of the Roman Church, sometimes as an appeal, more often as a taunt; theologians who endeavoured to reconcile extremists were dubbed ‘syncretists,’ and ‘syncretism’ was indiscriminately applied to all irenic proposals, whether these were the product of a Laudian indifference or of a genuine love for moderation. In passing from the humanists to the theologians, the term was applied to the whole spectrum of considerations which continued to cling to it. ‘Syncretist’ became almost a synonym for ‘hybrid.’ It was derived from συνεκτικός, and the supposed etymology corroborated the connexion of the term with all that was heterogenous.

This is the predominant meaning of the term in ordinary French. In technical English it also denotes a fusion of a more or less illegitimate or artificial kind. Thus Hallam says of Giordano Bruno: ‘What seems most his own . . . is the syncretism of the tenet of a pervading spirit, an Animism Mundial, which in itself is an imperfect theism, with the more pernicious hypothesis of an universal Monad."

2. Philosophical and ecclesiastical applications.

In the history of philosophy ‘syncretism’ has been applied to the harmonizing efforts of those who, like Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th century, refused to allow their love of Plato to be identified with any depreciation of Aristotle. The controversy between the Aristotelians and the Platonists had been sharpened by the impetus given to Platonic studies after the fall of Constantinople. Parliament ran strong, and the more moderate men failed to draw the rival schools together.

‘Throughout all the tangles of this complicated controversy, a threat or guilt of heresy by the same and imperious temper of Bessarion."

What happened in 15th century. philosophy was repeated on a larger scale in the theology of the 17th century. The ‘syncretistic controversy’ of that age rose out of the efforts made by G. Calixtus (1506–1559), a distinguished scholar at Helmstädt, to draw the Lutherans and the Reformed Churches together. ‘A plague’ of both your houses, he cried, like Mercutio. But it was Mercutio’s dying cry of indignant protest. Calixtus lived and worked to check the plague. He was acutely sensible of the harm and danger to Christianity which the sharp internal divisions within the Church produced. But his broad, catholic temper met with little response among his contemporaries. The controversy lasted even after his death, assuming political, as well as theological, form.

The ‘syncretistic’ party in the Church failed, however, to carry its principles into effect. Even well-meaning and wise attempts to emphasize the fundamental Christian principles held by various Reformed Churches, or by all the Reformed Churches in common with the Roman Church, were suspect in that age of hardening division and widening cleavage. Men were told that the Roman Church would be well advised to subordiante their private idiosyncrasies in the Reformed Church; or Christians in both Churches were reminded that the menace of outside heathenism should make them close their ranks. But ‘syncretism’ of this kind was generally branded as a betrayal of principles or as an attempt to secure unity at the expense of truth. The ‘syncretistic controversy’ was a quarrel over peace, and such quarrels are not the least bitter upon earth. What the ‘syncretists,’ in Plutarch’s sense of the term, called a harmony, their opponents called a ‘hybrid.’

The Roman Church had a ‘syncretistic’ controversy of its own, an eddy in the turbulent dispute over the relations between grace and free will, which poured from the last quarter of the 16th century. ‘Syncretism’ is the term applied to the system of belief which endeavoured to harmonize the views of the Thomist and the Molinist parties by assuming two sorts of efficacious grace, which are held together by prayer.

3. In comparative religion. Syncretism as men like Calixtus and Zwinger called it, still retained something of the practical sense which

1 De Prereto amores, 16.
Plutarch had originally attached to the expression. But this is lost in the technical, modern application of the term to a phenomenon in the history of religion, i.e., to the fusion of various religions in doctrine or in cult. Here 'syncretism' denotes generally preferential reception of foreign religions or deities, either one set adopted and more or less thoroughly the principles of another or both are amalgamated in a more cosmopolitan and less polytheistic shape. Such movements in the religious world are often preceeded and accelerated by a new philosophical synthesis as well as by a political re-arrangement, but the outcome invariably is a unification of deities, which, as J. Toutain has pointed out, proceeds on one or other of two lines; either two deities of different religions are assimilated by comparison or several deities are grouped together in a fresh synthesis. The motives for this re-statement are drawn from the dawning conception that the idea of religion is no longer adequate by itself, that others possess like features, possibly of superior efficacy and appeal, and that such features can be incorporated without detriment to the essential part of the principle in question. The study of comparative religion exhibits this phenomenon in a variety of shapes and stages, but it is specially prominent during the first four centuries of the Christian era.

The tendency to this syncretism or amalgamation of deities and cults had been in operation long before the rise of Christianity. When one tribe conquered another, or when two tribes or nations formed a political alliance, there was a strong movement towards fusing their gods. The foreign power, especially if it were dominant, fascinated many of its subject or weaker neighbours. An exchange of deities might be made, out of courtesy. Similarities in ritual were developed, and stress was laid on what was common to the two religions. Now and then the gods were identified, and this was specially easy in the primitive days when certain gods were still nameless powers; men were invited to recognize their own gods under the names of foreign deities or to welcome the latter as a sign of connexion between Israel and Canaan is an illustration in point, and an equally familiar one is the influence of Assyrian rites upon the religion of Israel under kings like Manasseh and Amon, when syncretistic influences were specially powerful in consequence of the political situation. The phenomenon is by no means confined to the history of Israel's religion in the ancient world. For different reasons syncretism, or, as some prefer to term it, 'theocracy' (θεικρατία), was rife at one period in Greek orientalizing to Oriental influences, and as late as the 8th cent. of our era a similar blending took place in Japan.

But it is in the history of Judaism, particularly during the two centuries preceding the Christian era, that the elements and issues of syncretism are most clearly marked. The main impetus of this syncretism came from the political re-adjustment after Alexander the Great. The Seleucid period witnessed a contact between the East and the West, round the Mediterranean led the way, and the fusion of Babylonian with Greek and Roman deities and to a ferment of Oriental religions feeling throughout the Graeco-Roman world, but also to movements which, in spite of the vigorous reaction led by the Maccabees and their supporters, affected some circles in Judaism itself. The Hellenizing tendency was fostered by Jewish writers like Eupolemus and Artapanus. It went hand in hand with the allegorizing of Homer and of the OT and with the Stoic philosophy of the Logos. As the tendency to syncretism was innate in Egyptian religion—the spread of the Serapis-cult is only one later instance of this—and Alexandria formed the centre of activity not only for the amalgamation of Egyptian and Greek or Syrian cults but also for speculative Judaism under the spell of the new ideas of cosmopolitanism, it is not surprising that it took a direction in the direction of a syncretistic Judaism, which should assimilate and employ current Greek ideas of a cosmopolitan, cosmic character. The exponent of this syncretism is Philo.

Un syncretisme dans lequel sont admis tous les éléments, en particulier péripiatiques et ptoleméens, qui s'accordent avec les idées socratiques et platoniciennes, caractérisant la religion du monde, tel en serait la définition la plus exacte des vues cosmologique de Philon. 7

Philo's aim was not to blend Judaism with Hellenism. He adhered to his religious inheritance. But he endeavored to enrich and safeguard it by re-stating it in terms of the current religious philosophies of his day.

As Judaism on the whole resisted this Phoenic speculative tendency, so did Christianity in the main resist the later Gnostic movement with its syncretistic impulse during the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Syncretism was partly an evidence of weakness and partly an indication of weakness at that period. So far as it meant a readiness to set the new faith in a positive relation to the elements of truth in contemporary cults and mysteries, so far as it breathed a spirit strong enough to assimilate vital data from its new soil and yet preserve its distinctive characteristics, it was healthy. In this respect it carried on the work of the best apologists, linking the Christian tradition to the new situation and proving that the faith was too vital to remain a Semitic cult. But there was another side to syncretism, and to this the Church was keenly, if not always wisely, alert. The fascination of the movement lay in its cosmopolitan appeal—an appeal which was the more seductive that already, within paganism itself, the movement had made headway, as we see from the tone of men like Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Numenius, and from a specific phenomenon like the transformation which had come over a deity such as Istar in the popular piety of the age. The


4 C. F. B. Stade, Bibliae Theologie des AT, Tübingen, 1905-11, p. 97.

5 P. Centlivre, Early Church and its Relations to the Roman Empire, London, 1910, i. 396 f.

6 P. Centlivre, Early Church and its Relations to the Roman Empire, London, 1910, i. 396 f.


8 E.R.E. vii. 438 f.


18 E. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, d. 1915, f. 61 f.


33 E. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, d. 1915, f. 61 f.

34 E. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, d. 1915, f. 61 f.


37 E. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, d. 1915, f. 61 f.

38 E. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, d. 1915, f. 61 f.
SYNDERESIS

passion of the time was for a vague monothelism, which should reflect and answer the unity of the empire. A cosmopolitan syncretism, in the 3rd cent., began to overlay the earlier national religions and to embrace the Syro-Hellenic cults in a synthesis which regarded all deities as so many varied expressions of the One, and all rites as more or less acceptable forms of approach to this central, all-pervasive Deity. The individual found his theistic mode of adoration to be less and less distinct. Diodcs of Thrace, and a mix of Hellenic and the Oriental, generalised a salvationism. A man like Macrobeus voices this in the 4th century. It underlay the pagan reaction of Julian, which was its last serious challenge to a reacclimatisation of Christianity. For, although the Church admitted elements which were of semi-polytheistic character, in the worship of the saints, the exploiting of miracles, and even the adoration of the emperor, nevertheless formally the sense of Christianity decided against syncretism. The Gnostic and later of the Neo-Platonist shape.

This is the paradox of the situation. Christianity proved by its exclusiveness that it was not, and was not to be, a merely "sacred" faith, in the sense of a syncretistic derivative. At the same time, it not only assimilated bravely and wisely many elements organic to its growth, but also admitted, as we see, e.g., in its later Egyptian popular development, some semi-pagan features which were a handicap ultimately to its successful advance. The syncretistic situation was at once an opportunity and a risk for Christianity. The opportunity was seized, and the risk was sometimes too much for the faith. Still, the environment did not mould Christianity as it moulded movements like Mithraism and Neo-Platonism. The catholicism of that age suffered from the desire to conciliate the natural man, but it had more in it than an indiscriminate selection or an anxious imitation, such as syncretism usually exhibited.

The tendency of syncretism, other than broadly viewed, was to henotheism or pantheism rather than to monothelism. It is true that syncretistic movements meant a break away from polytheism. The first corollary of a truly pantheistic religion is not so much toleration of many forms of worship, as a tendency towards the abandonment of a single syncretistic system. The one God is the same for all. What, then, does the name give them this matter?" Such is the theme of a book like the Saturnalia of Macrobus, and it is the principle of the religious synthesis underlying Plutarch's philosophy of things. But, as the arguments of a Neo-Platonist like Iamblichus show, this serene indifference was not incompatible with ideas which were henotheistic rather than monothelistic, and the popular cravings proved too much for even a monothelistic principle in Christianity. Pope's opening lines in "The Universal Prayer":

1 The expansion of the imperial organisation, the mixture of nationalities in the capital, and the flooding of them by Oriental elements, the heightened intercourse, the prolonged residence of the bishops in the provinces and their persecution by foreigners; finally, since the 3rd century, the advent of emperors who were foreigners and unfamiliar with the national spirit of Rome—all these produced the syncretism of religions" (P. Wernigand, Die hellen.-röm. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judenismus und Christentum. Tübingen, 1912, p. 153).


SYNDERESIS

*Father of All!* In ev'ry Age,
In ev'ry Clime ador'd,
By Saint, by Savage, and by Sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord! —

It is as though the syncretistic aspiration in its exalted and abstract form, but syncretism, like Catholism, appealed to lower as well as higher cravings. The adoration of a Deity like this left the heavens strangely bare for those who had been accustomed to a richer variety of worship, and thus the syncretistic tendency became as it allowed these heavens to be repopulated by a host of spirits and saints. Syncretism, in practice, almost invariably fostered mythology. Sacred and saints, so less than savages, yielded its place in this direction. It was found quite compatible, in pagan syncretism, to unite a reverence for the One with some special adoration of one or more favourite, traditional deities. And it is a question how far even the Christian Church of the 4th cent., e.g., which had rejected in earlier days the hospitable syncretism of a monarch like Alexander Severus, tolerated, for the sake of the opened and popular appeal, forms of adoration which were, strictly speaking, out of line with essential monothelism.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been noted during the course of the article; the syncretistic controversy is discussed by J. A. Doon, Hist. of Protestant Theology, Eng. tr. Edinburgh, 1871, II. 177 ff.; K. Loew, CR xiv. 331 ff.; P. N. C. P. M. of Egypt, PEP xiv. 343 ff.; and J. Pfeiffer. Hist. of Sects, Heresies, Sectarian Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought, London, 1914, p. 545 ff.

JAMES MOFFATT.

SYNERESIS.—The word synderesis, which has no classical authority, should mean 'preservation'. In scholastic and mystical theology it appears, often in the corrupt forms syneresis or synderesis, in a sense which is hardly justified by the etymology of the word. Syntesis is used in later Greek in the sense of 'observation', and the word is quite compatible with the analogy of syntesis. The first example is in Jerome: "Quatuorque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant syntesis, quae scientia conscientiae, in quo quodquicumque . . . hominem cogitare, et qua . . . nosse possimus similiter?" (Letter 196). The words are, however, secondarily connected, and used as "intelligentia, signification, recognition, recognition of the sense—consequences of the word. We may, therefore, take the summary of the word as the spark of the resurrection of a spirit to the soul which cannot be extinguished."

It is in the Itinerarium he defines syntesis as "apex mentis seu scientiae." Hermann of Freising speaks of it as a power or faculty in the soul, wherein God works immediately, without means and without intermission. Ruysbroeck defines it as the natural will towards good, intended in us all, though weakened by sin. "God's mind is similar language, saying that the spark (so Eckhart speaks of it) is a part of the soul in which the soul is not extinguished by sins. The mind in the soul which cannot be extinguished was created with the soul in all men, and is a clear light in them, striving in every way against sin and impelling steadfastly to virtue, and pressing back the source from which it came. In Thomas Aquinas's syncretism is the highest activity of the moral sense. The cognitive power in man has three faculties—"the simple intelligence or natural light, which comes from God Himself; the understanding, which is the frontier between the two worlds; and the Syncretism is the effective one."

1 W. Pater notes this in Marcus Aurelius: "To his pious recognition of that one orderly spirit, which has a place in the scheme of the whole soul, diffused itself throughout the world. He was able to set up a new moral order, outside foreign ones" (M. E. Leopold, London, 1897, p. 169).

2 In Itin. I. 1.

3 Itinerarium mentis ad Deum, I.

4 Brevisitatem, ii. 11.
futility answering to the first of these, and contemplation is its corresponding activity. The word also occurs in Alcuin, Magnus and Alexander of Hales. Eckhart sometimes seems to identify syneresis with the Fünkeln or Genster, and with the intellectus agens or die oboe Verum; but his character of his philosophy is such as to make the ‘spark’ supra-rational and uncreated; he even says: ‘Dies Fünkeln, dass ist Gott.’

In the earlier writings syneresis is usually thought of as the remnant of the soulless state of man before the fall, while in the bolder thought of the school of Eckhart it becomes the seat or organ of divine immulance and of the highest personal insination. The position of an impenetrable ‘soul-centre’ may be traced back to the Neo-Platonists.

SYNDICALISM.—See SOCIALISM.

SYNERGISM.—1. General meaning of the term and its Scriptural support.—The term ‘synergism’ (συνεργεώ, συνεργή, ‘to co-operate, to work together’) became definitely fixed as terminus technicus in theology in the 16th century. It was applied to the later views of Philip Melanchthon and his followers on the question as to the relation between the Holy Spirit and man’s will in regeneration. This view, broadly stated, is that the human will can and does cooperate with the grace of God as a means of regenerating man, and that it is the position expressed in the sentence ‘Homo convertitur non sola’.

The human will was, it is true, not regarded as the primary cause (hence synergism differs from Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism); that was unreservedly assigned to God’s Spirit and to the preaching of the Word, but the energy of the human will was given a place, and its assent an essential place, in the act of regeneration. The elevation of this view caused unusual heat among theologians, because its truth or falsehood affected the whole realm of theological truth—the effects of the fall on human nature, the nature and working of God’s divine grace and man’s will in regeneration or conversion. Its general usage is to describe the objective co-operation of Christian brethren in the furtherance of God’s kingdom on earth.

In 1 Cor 3:9 (κυριος συνεργησεν) the co-operation referred to is that between men in their outward labours for God, not a co-operation between them individually or collectively with God, however true that may be in itself; and at any rate it refers to post-conversion experience, not to pre- or simul-conversion relations. In 2 Cor 3:6 the reference is to men already regenerated, and the same is true of Ex 23, if Sēbō is the true text—God works in all things for good with those who love God. Does this verse imply that the Word is primary in conversion? It does not directly refer to salvation, but places in conversion the fact that the active elements involved therein and their relationships. Again, in 1 Tim 2:5 the co-operation of the ascended Lord with the heralds of the gospel is spoken of in regard to miracles. What the Word is in Scripture is never used of man’s natural faculties or capacities (before conversion) working together with the Spirit of God to effect regeneration, which is the social and proper theological application of the term.

The term ‘synergism’ is to be rejected or to be defended from Scripture, it must be by reference to the truth of Scripture, and not to its letter.

2. The origin and development of synergism in Melanchthon’s doctrine.—The earlier writings of Melanchthon betray no synergistic tendencies. On the contrary, he expresses himself rigidly determinist than even Luther’s. The religious man is profoundly conscious of his dependence on God’s grace. He does not dream of co-ordinating or equating his own freedom with the grace of God, as, e.g., in the phraseology of the Barmen Confession. This is true even of those who are legitimately called synergists. ‘Arminians usually pray like Calvinists,’ said Charles Hodge, adding, what is equally true, that ‘Calvinists usually regard the election of Arminians’; i.e., they appeal to men as responsible voluntary agents. The difficulty arises when one or other of these aspects of experience is made the deciding factor in the act of a theological system. Truth is largely a matter of proportion and balance. To begin with, Melanchthon’s, whose mind was eminently of a systematic cast, worked out his system under the dominating influence of the experience of divine dependence. The Holy Spirit teaches us, he says, that all things happen necessarily by predestation, and therefore there is no such thing as freedom of our will. To maintain freedom of the will was to detract the grace of God from its unique supremacy. This was his position in the first edition of his Loc. Communeorum, and it was even more rigorously held in his Commentary on Romans and Corinthians. Free will he regarded as a scholastic fiction emanating from carnal wisdom and obscuring the blessings brought to us by Christ. It made men robbers of their own salvation and consequently undermined the immediacy of Christian assurance and froze the stream of personal devotion to the Redeemer. Melanchthon resolutely applied this conception of predestination to all events, physical and moral, outward and inward:

‘Si ad praedestinationem referas humanam voluntatem non est externa, est interna operis aliqua est libertas.’ Since man is born a child of wrath, it follows that he is born without the Spirit of God, and therefore ‘nihil nisi carnalis sapit, amat, quosque.’

Man has no power over his inward affections, and, though Melanchthon admits that in outward things he has some freedom, even here the power of will seems to vanish. Thus Melanchthon, applying a transcendental conception, predestination, to the facts of human life, as he read them or understood them from Scripture, came to assert that no real causality existed anywhere but in God’s will, and that the external, immediate and as immediately an act of God as the calling of Paul. The repugration of the damned is as properly and in the same sense the effect of God’s will as the salvation of the elect. We are not to think of certain events as determined while others are allowed. All things immediately flow out of God’s will necessarily. All questions as to the rightness of God’s procedure he silences by regarding these questionings as issuing from man’s carnal inquisitiveness.

It follows from this position that man could contribute nothing to his own conversion. He could not repent of himself, and sanctified will has no spiritual value.

1 Homo per vires naturales nihil [potest] nisi peccare. Carnales quidem per naturas vires fit, Socratis constantia, Zenois moderationis nihil nisi carnis affectus sunt.

At this stage we see Melanchthon planted firmly on the experience of God’s free grace which gave its strength to the new outlook of the Reformation, combating the popular Roman Catholic view according to which man’s free will is aided by certain ecclesiastical rites contributed by others. He must be by reference to the truth of Scripture, and not to its letter.

3 Wittenberg, 1522.
4 Zab. 1921, p. 97.
something to man's salvation—a view which cut the vital nerve of personal trust in Christ as the sole Redeemer and opened a door by which the whole mechanism of merit was overthrown. Melanchthon's authority as ultimate source of redemptive assurance could be reinstated. Melanchthon, however, was extravagant in his elaboration and application of the truth of man's dependence on God. He confused in the interests of a theoretical dualism the theoretical and the moral, and left no moral bridge between nature and grace. He raised a spiritual feeling—of supreme importance, no doubt—the position of absolute sovereignty over man and nature and over God Himself. It was impossible that this could be the final resting-place of one like Melanchthon to whom the ethical interest was so important and who was of a mediating spirit.

3. Melanchthon's synergism and its effect on his theological outlook.—Melanchthon's interest, we have said, was mainly practical. Accordingly his interest laterly in predestination was that of the custodian of morals. He desired to safeguard God's moral purity from any slip that might be cast upon it by the dogmas of his own nature from the paralyzing effect of a moneristic determinism. His early statements were extravagant. Now he emphatically declared that God could in no sense be regarded as the author of sin. Evil was permitted by Him, but it was abhorrent to His nature. He therefore felt obliged to give up the dogma of an eternal decrees of predestination. The cause of man's sin was in man himself, and the hardening of his heart was due to wilful disobedience and perversity. Man's own responsibility for his spiritual state was emphasized. The offer of God's grace was universal. Original sin was a fact, yet man was free. Accordingly he found in Melanchthon's editing the original Augsburg Confession an interest.

Art. 18, which originally read, 'Justitia spiritualis is effected by the Holy Spirit which is poured into the heart of man,' he altered to read, 'Justitia spiritualis is effected in us when we are helped (adjut怎麼) by the Holy Spirit.' The same alteration, 'adjutorium,' was made in art. 29. He prepared the Leipzig Interim in the same spirit: 'Although God does not justify men through their merits, nevertheless the meritorious and yet unmerited same time to free us on a block but draws him so that his will co-operates, provides him has come to years of discretion.'

Melanchthon's position is clearly stated in the revised edition of his Loci (published in 1533) in a sentence that became famous and stereotyped in after controversy:

'In his example videmus conjuncta has causa, verbum, Spiritum sanctum et voluntatem non sana omissas, sed reoperationem influentiae sanctae spiritus, ut, in his other editions: 'his concursus causa causae, causa, verbum Dei, Spiritus sanctus, et humana voluntas assensum nec repugnante, verbo Dei. Osi or, facit, inquit, ingens mundi, sperante, sed cum mens humana, sed sanctissimam, non repugnat, non indicet difficulty, sed adjutatio Spiritus sancti, admissum in hoc certamine voluntas non est eterica.'

There is little doubt that Melanchthon applies this to the act of conversion, and his view was that the positive aspect of the will was essential, although, as Herrlinger points out, he maintained at times that the help of the Holy Spirit was necessary to enable the will to accept the gospel. While he does not make it at all times quite clear whether this assent was itself the result of the working of God's Spirit or due to the natural energy of the will, yet he seems certainly to maintain that something must be granted to the will itself, and here is the point on which the socratic controversy hinges. This dubity is noticeable also in some of his followers. One of them, Peletius, interprets his master as teaching that the will was a causa subordinata, after the Holy Spirit in the Word had roused it up the soul.
ultimately due not to election—for even God fore-saw something in the elect which conditioned His election—not to reprobation, but to man himself. The difficulty which confronted Melanchthon was just to determine what constitutes responsibility, and, even if his solution is defective and open to verbal criticism, as it certainly is, it is a merit that he recognized the problem in its seriousness and that he tried to solve it on moral grounds.

Melanchthon's Synergism also affected his practical outlook. To those who defended civil and social outrage because they were sinners, and who would remain sinners unless changed by a divine act which they could do nothing to initiate, he sternly said that man in spite of original sin had liberty in outward actions, the reason could control the will, and the will the bodily movements. No man could say, like the servant of Zeno, that he was accursed to sin by fate. It is clear that his soul loathed this Manicheism, as he called it, and his safeguarding of predetermination from those who so understood it was clamorously demanded by the circumstances of the age and of many ages since. It does surely as immediately a datum of Christian experience that the sinner is responsible for his sin as that he ascribes his salvation to God's grace.

Melanchthon did not take a prominent part in the Majestas controversy, which arises over George Major's statement that 'good works are necessary for holiness,' by various utterances and pamphlets that whilst maintaining the Lutheran position that justification is of grace alone, he was anxious to show that a holy life was the inevitable consequence and the test of the reality of a justified life. Melanchthon's statement that 'good works are necessary for holiness' he characterized as a 'deceiving' (täuschende) doctrine.  

4. The synergistic controversy. — Melanchthon's statements concerning free will were ambiguous and so hesitating that men, accustomed to the breezy statements of Luther on the same subject, felt as if he attributed to the will more than he actually expressed, and his acceptance of Erasmus's formula gave this feeling a colour of truth. Luther on this point was definite:  

In gesellschaftlichen und göttlichen Sachen was der Seelen Heil betrifft, da ist der Mensch wie die Salzmühle, wie Loth's Welt, ja wie ein Kolten und Stein, wie ein bunt Bild, das wider Augen noch Mund weder Sinn noch Herz berührt.  

What Luther advocated with zeal Melanchthon admitted with reserve. Controversy was therefore inevitable, and it broke out violently, occasioned by two dissertations of Pfeiffer, a Leipzig professor and disciple of Melanchthon. He tried to answer the question why one man under the preaching of the Word became converted and another did not, and the decisive factor, he maintained, was that one willingly assented and the other did not. The difference cannot be ascribed to a difference in the activity of the divine will; therefore the difference lies in man himself. We must therefore attribute a certain synergy to our will. Man even now in his fallen state is not as a statue or a stone, nor is he purely passive, for, if that were the case, there would be no difference between the pious and the impious, the elect and the damned. Frell and David, God would become a respecter of persons, and the author of humanity in the impious and the damned. On the other hand, the human will has not the power to effect spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit moves through the Word of God, and the mind thinking, and the will not resisting but complying under the Spirit's influence—all these are the causes which concurrently converted.

Pfeiffer's defence and explanation of Melanchthon's views called forth violent opposition especially from Amsdorf and Flacius. The former (see above) said that, according to Pfeiffer, man could prepare and equip himself for conversion by the natural powers of his free will without the aid of the Holy Spirit. Verbally this was incorrect, but essentially it had an element of truth in it. Flacius appealed to Luther's words and declared that man was worse than a stock or stone because he offered resistance to God's Spirit. The will therefore does not co-operate; it opposes and resists. Every one knows that this criticism, though inferiously expressed, is in touch with reality and speaks the truth. As regards regeneration, man is absolutely passive—he is spiritually dead; the image of God is not only wholly obliterated, but is transformed into the image of Satan. Man then contributes nothing positive to his own conversion; any contribution of his is negative and resisting.

Pfeiffer replied to Amsdorf and incidentally mentioned Flacius. He declared himself more explicitly as holding that the unconverted will had the power of either obeying or resisting God's offer in His Word. Thus the controversy raged, the new university of Jena contending for the old position of Luther and violently opposing the synergistic movement, which was stoutly advocated by the faculties of Leipzig and Wittenberg. At last, at the instigation of Flacius, an attempt was made to silence opposition by authority. John Frederick II., Elector of Saxony, was appealed to, and by his command a Book of Confutation and Condemnation of all prevalent heresies was published at Jena in 1559. Of its nine divisions the sixth was devoted to the refutation of synergism. Those who taught that man had power in his will to co-operate with the grace of God in conversion were stigmatized as overthrowers of the grace of God, and were held to maintain that man can do anything by his free will in accepting or rejecting grace. Human nature is wholly adverse from God and hostile to God and is subjected to the tyranny of sin and Satan.

In a similar strain the orthodox Lutherans—Amsdorf, Wigand, Tilman Hesshusen, etc.—spoke and wrote against synergism and deduced this anthropologically from their predestinarian views, the last-named saying that, in one respect,  

'God did not wish that all men should be saved, for He did not elect all. God's will acts in one uniform way on men just as on stocks and stones.'  

Melanchthon raised his voice against this determinist delirium and declared that it is absurd to talk of conversion until the will consents, that to reject God's grace is an act of will and not an act of God, and that human nature had at least power in outward actions. An attempt was made to make the book binding on teachers and preachers, but without success. Even in Jena, the citadel of orthodoxy, Pastor Hugel read aloud from the pulpit the document from the pulpit, and Strigel raised his voice on the synergistic side. Both Strigel and Hugel were imprisoned, and it looked as if synergism were doomed in Jena, for the university was strengthened in the orthodox interest by the appointments of Wigand and Judex to professorial chairs and by the recall of Melianus, all of whom were strong champions of orthodoxy. However, the prisoners were set free after an imprisonment of less than six months, and a further attempt was made to settle the dispute by public discussion. This disputation lasted from 2nd until 5th August, 1559, and occupied the sittings. The interest for us centres in the positions defended and refuted regarding free will and God's grace.

To begin with, Strigel maintained that the substance and qualities of human nature were not obliterated by the fall nor altered, but only hindered in their activity. His position he made clear by a curious physical illustration. A magnet, he said, cannot attract iron unless it be smeared with onion-juice, yet it retains its magnetic properties, and it can attract though smeared with goat's blood. It is the same magnet in both cases, but its activity is hindered in the one
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case and not in the other. So by the fall man's nature is not destroyed, but only weakened. He is like him who fell among thieves and was left half dead, half alive, or like one weakened by disease but not dead like a corpse.

Strigel is here aiming at a distinction which seems to be problematic—that between formal freedom and material freedom or that between natural ability and moral ability, a distinction largely used by Jonathan Edwards but in currency before his day.3 According to this distinction, man has what he pleases and wills what he pleases. That is the very meaning of will—it is not compelled from without; but, though man has this natural ability, as a matter of fact he does not will the good spiritually simply because he does not want to—he lacks moral ability.

Seeberg contends that Strigel was groping after this distinction, but did not adequately express it.4 That is certainly true of him at this Web discretion. He did not make his meaning clear, but afterwards he distinguished very clearly between efficacia (bōnas) or facultas, on the one hand, and capacitas or aptitud, on the other. Man has lost the first through the fall, and the Holy Spirit restores to the will the bōnas or efficacia or faculty of believing, which was lost by the fall. At this disputation, however, Strigel did not make his meaning clear.5 When asked by Flacius what the human will would do in cooperation with the Holy Spirit before or after conversion, he hesitated and said that to him conversion was not a point but a line, not the beginning of the Christian life but the whole of it.

It is evident from reading the disputation that Strigel really wished to attribute power to the will, but at the same time to ascribe the chief place to the Holy Spirit—so that syneresis is an unfortunate term to use of factors that cannot be equated. He repeated the Melanchthonian formula: ‘Concurrent in conversione habeas: Spiritus sanctus movens corda, vox Del, voluntas hominis quae vocit divinae assessorit,’ a sentence which is ambiguous; and on this point no decision could be reached. On the other hand, Flacius went so far as to say that the very substance of the soul was altered by the fall and by sin, and that therefore man was purely passive, or active only in hostility to God. Peace could not be restored by public controversy. In a few months the Saxon and the Illyrian were driven from the country, and Flacius, a man of unchastened erudition, died in his fifty-fifth year at Frankfurt-on-Main. Strigel also left and died in Heidelberg at the early age of forty-five.

5. The Formula of Concord.—After various unsuccessful attempts at a solution of this and other disputes the Formula of Concord6 appeared, and, as it became an authoritative standard of the Lutheran Church, its position on this topic must be stated here.

The problem is dealt with in art. 1 and 2 of the Formula, and, while so personal names are mentioned, the views of contending parties are very clearly kept in mind. In the 1st art., dealing with original sin, a clear distinction is drawn between actual transgressions (actualia delicta) and the hereditary sickness of the soul. Man's nature is in all its parts poisoned by inherited sin, and for this condition man is guilty and condemned by God's law, so that by nature men are the children of wrath, and from this state they can be saved only by the unmerited grace of Christ. How this corruption is transmitted is described. God creates every soul afresh, but because of physical generation from corrupt seed the hereditary disease of

1. It is used by Twisse, Howe, and very clearly by Isaac Watts, the famous hymn-writer.
3. See the same, II. 357.

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In the Reformed Church the same problem arose, though it was approached somewhat differently. The distinctive feature of the Calvinistic system is its logical consistency; every doctrine is discussed not only by itself but in the light of the whole system. A regulative principle in Calvinism is the sovereignty of God; and, when man's regeneration was viewed in the light of this principle, it was recognized that God's grace acted differently on men who were regenerate and on those who are not. That is obvious, but whence the difference? It was due to the determination of God. God, who had elected some, did so as not a bare matter of decree or quiescent foreknowledge or fortuitously waiting on their faith, but energetically through a series of efficient means—the redemptive mission of His Son, the preaching of the Word, the irresistible working of the Holy Spirit; and these were effective all along the line in the case of the elect, leading them from spiritual death to grace and glory. Now, in the case of the unregenerated it was a sufficient proof that this divine redemptive causality had no place, that it did not fall into this line of regeneration. It was non-existent there; therefore it was wholly non-existent. God did not elect them; the redemption of His Son was not purposefully undertaken on their behalf. Thus the question of the will is so embedded in the logical coherence of the system that to moot it is to raise the question of the validity of the system as a whole, and that is what happened in the case of Arminius, and especially—for Arminius himself did not attribute regenerating power to the will—in the case of his followers Simon Bishop (Episcopius), Philippus Van Limborch, and Ahrans. The objections of Calvinism, as far as the subject of this article is concerned, were directed mainly against what was called irresistible grace and the extent of the Attonement.

The Arminians—for we may leave the Socinians out of account; W. Robertson Smith has aptly described them as 'Pelagians of the intellect'—held that grace worked similarly on all, the difference from which conversion arose being due not to God's grace but to man's own will. To them irresistible grace (or, more properly, efficacious grace) meant necessity, and so the responsibility for the final damnation of them that fell on God. Again, they maintained that by the Attonement the possibility of salvation was opened to all, and they vehemently rejected the doctrine of the eternal reprobation of some, as it were, strenuously did afterwards. The Synod of Dort attempted to settle the problem, but in the Reformed Church as in the Lutheran it keeps constantly emerging. Here even more than in the Lutheran Church, which diffusely refrained from applying predetermination theories to its anthropological and eschatological views, the problem is an acute one, for the question of God's moral character is raised, and it is from this quarter, rather than from the sphere of religious psychology, that the opposition emerges, and here its strength lies. Hence we find that Calvinistic apologists have largely been a defense against what is regarded as misunderstandings, perverted rationalizations, and unwarrantable inferences.

In regard to efficacious grace the Calvinist did not mean that God's grace did violence to the human will by outward or inward compulsion, or that it was a matter of mere will, which always has worked and does work voluntarily, but that grace affected the disposition of man in such a way that the resistance of the will was changed into willingness. It was not the obedience of the will that made grace efficacious, but much more the efficacy of grace that made the will not only in act but in disposition obedient.

Some Calvinists, notably the school of Samur, agreed with the Arminians that the Attonement was intended for the elect only; but the Arminians contended further that it is left to the free will of man either to concur with or to reject this intention. The Calvinists felt that, while this opened a possibility of reversion to all, it made the Attonement remain for none; the Attonement thus became itself a contingency rather than a reality, and they could not understand a purpose of God which could thus be frustrated. To leave the future of mankind hanging on the slender thread of the free will—even if that thread was not itself an illusion—seemed too precarious to be consistent with a purposive God, and rendered the salvation of the regenerate itself problematic, a denial of the perseverance of the saints. Hence the position that the Attonement was meant for those who are saved or to be saved, and that grace is efficacious in the case of the elect, and so the empirical fact that some are not saved is itself a proof that in God's secret purpose the Attonement was not meant for them.

Here also, as in the Lutheran Church, and as in the internal disputes on this question between the Jesuits and the Jansenists in the Church of Rome, as well as in the disputes between Rome and Reformers on this point, we see the question at issue in spite of many cross currents in the discussion itself. The Calvinistic and Arminian problem is even more illuminating than the Lutheran because it is more conscious of the pervasive nature of the issue. It is a matter not of anthropology simply, but of theology in all its bearings. A survey of the discussion, in spite of the changed outlook of our own day, reveals the palpable dangers on either side, and at least teaches us where we are not to search for an adequate solution.

The problem is not an accident of history, but a fundamental problem of thought, perhaps the problem which goes deepest of all—the relation between God and man. It goes deeper and higher than the question of man's place in nature or man's place in history; it is the question of man's place in relation to God.

7. Conclusion. What, then, is the significance of the synergistic controversy for modern Christianity? It is evident that many of the preconceptions accepted by both parties alike, whether we look at the discussion as handled by Augustine and Pelagius and Pelagianism, or by Calvin and Arminius, or by Jansenist and Jesuit, are antiquated. The march of natural science has raised anew the whole question of the nature of man, and the problem is now whether man's nature can be explained from below as a development of life in general. Alongside of the activity of science has gone a prodigious wealth of philosophical speculation dealing with the nature of man, his place in the universe, and the value of his experience and his ideals. The profound changes also in the structure of society, the emergence of democratic ideals, and the resultant application of new categories and the explanation of the significance of human life have changed the outlook considerably. The more direct activities of Christianity itself, its vast missionary ideals and efforts, the investigations into the psychology of the Christian life, the insight into what is permanent in Christian experience as distinct from what is accidental or subsidiary—in short, the main currents of modern thought and life—have altered the Christian theology till the old landmarks are submerged, and history and reflexion alone make us certain that the unity of experience is a reality and that the problems of the spirit change not,  

1 Cf. also the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church.
however much the outlook may change. It is on this changed background and in the light of these tendencies that the problem of synergism can alone be approached.

(c) Modern Christianity in all its schools has had to fight against a naturalistic conception of man. From this point of view we can appreciate the emphasis laid by the early Greek theologians on man's freedom. Whatever may be thought of their view of freedom, the important point is that as against fatalism Christianity asserts that freedom has a real meaning as applied to man. So all Christian schools to-day, whether they be historically affiliated with Augustine or Pelagius, emphasize freedom as against physical necessity or direct determinism. Freedom has a meaning in regard to man that it has not in regard to matter.

It is necessary to bear this point in mind because naturalistic necessitarians too often claim the Augustinian and the Calvinist as on their side, whereas they are working on a different level of experience altogether. This is brought out clearly by the following considerations.

1. According to Calvinism and Arminianism alike, man was originally created in the image of God, and his final end is to glorify God and to enjoy his presence. This theory of freedom rather than any change brought about by sin and subsist as an inalienable characteristic of human nature.

A lady once said to me, "The more I see of myself, the more I see myself as my sin." I said to her, "And you do not see deep enough. There is something far more precious than your sin; and your sin is improperly yours. It is a blot in your being, which, if you do not get rid of it, will never cease to be unnatural to you. No; the image of God is more precious yours, though you had no share in the production of it." 1

2. It has always been held that man is responsible for his sin. He has formal freedom, nor can he plead ignorance as a non-responsible being in the sense that he can become non-voluntary in his actions or place himself beyond the claims of the moral law on his character. Whatever his actual condition due to sin, these things hold true. His reason, conscience, and will always act rationally, morally, and volitionally. Again, the question here is not whether we agree with the content of this nature as explained by different schools of Christian thought. We may consider that the Arminian view gives too much, and the Calvinistic view too little, real freedom; but the important point is that from the general Christian standpoint man is not explained in terms of mechanism, however subtle or refined in form. The synergistic controversy has no meaning either for opponent or for defender if the naturalistic view of man is true. The theory of T. H. Green 2 as to the relation of the character to volitions is simply Calvinistic psychology in a philosophical dress, but its whole motive is to overthrow the naturalistic conception of man.

(b) Synergism becomes a real problem when man's freedom is viewed in the light of God's activity. We are so accustomed to defending liberty against material necessity in our age that we are apt to forget that the real problem of freedom emerges on the religious plane. What meaning and content are we to give to man's freedom, not now as against nature, but as against God Himself? Two main streams of thought emerge in history on this question.

1. The Pelagian, looking almost exclusively at man's free power of initiative, became jealous even of God's interference. Man on this view is a creature and largely, if not wholly, his own creator. His sin is a bare act of will, undetermined by what went before and unaffected by what comes after. His will is in unconditional, for the character is the result of acts of will; but an act of will can alter it easily. His merit is his own, and his salvation is his own. God never gets inside the admixture of man's free spirit, and free will is primarily the power of choosing between alternatives.

2. To the Augustinian the problem was far more complicated. He recognized that man was organically related as a part of a past. The influence of the past affects his will and disposition as the character. He does not begin as a moral neutral or moral unit. Sin is more than a bare act of will. When a man becomes self-conscious, it is there not simply as the result of a wrong choice, but as the fruit of a vitiated disposition and itself a source of vitiation. The characteristic of moral awakening is the discovery of our bondage. We become conscious of our need of freedom more than of the fact that we are free. The interposition of God is not regarded as a violation of freedom, but welcomed as the restorer and succourer of true freedom itself, which to the Augustinian meant acting in accordance with the highest. This deeper view of man led Augustine to the certainty of pre-individual iniquity—racial evil—as it led Kant to posit a supra-temporal ground or things raised to phrases like original sin, the guilt of Adam's transgression, the fall of Adam, supra-temporal fall, and it is right to aim at verbal accuracy if possible, but it is essential that the repudiation of inadequate pharisaism should not be accompanied by the rejection of the realities bodied forth by inaccurate phrases.

We have the same tendencies in philosophy in our day represented by pluralism and monism, and by absolute idealism. The former is so alive to the importance of the individual that in its extreme and logical forms it makes the individual eternal a parte ante, and, if God is recognized, it is as a primus inter pares; the latter is so conscious of the claims of God that it tends to annihilate the personal life of the individual a parte post. The problem as to how a man can act against God's will is insoluble intellectually, and the Calvinist has great difficulty, in spite of his insistence on man's accountability and God's holiness, in saving himself from the pitfall of pantheism where sin is factorized into something diachronic, something from what it is to the conscience. Yet, however sinful man's state may be, however the sinner may be alive to the deep-seated nature and wide extent of this disease, he accepts responsibility for his. He cannot devolve the responsibility on Adam or on circumstances. That is the moral attitude. The intellect may attempt to explain sin either scientifically as a residuum from our animal origin or philosophically as due to finitude or as a necessary stage in our development; but every explanation that explains away the moral attitude is itself unsatisfactory. Pantheism, material, philosophical, or theological, suffers shipwreck on the conscience. But, on the other hand, though we are compelled to recognize centres of activity acting contrary to God's will, it is impossible to give them the self-subsistence and existence of God. Even in sinning they depend on Him and are within the scope of His control. The Christian doctrine of creation—creation in time, for creation has no other meaning in regard to dependent beings—saves from pantheism and pluralism alike. While all subsist in God, personalities have a limited power of self-antagonism to God, but they do not compel God to disobey His character as Source and reason of all.
SYRIANS (or Arameans)

and races, which are also so clearly dependent on their historical setting, are of God. It is this inalienable immanence of God that accounts for the presence of high ideals among men however sinful, for the unstained and lack of harmony in the life of man of which Pascal speaks so eloquently, and it is this inalienable immanence of God that accounts for the possibility and essentiality of a reformation. The Augustinian tended to view man's original constitutive nature as made in God's image as an axiomatic human ancestor, and to leave man as he now is nothing more than a second creation. A logical distinction was made an absolute distinction in rerum natura. The divine image in man was practically regarded as a fulgur appearing once in Adam for a brief space, but now no more; but sin has meaning only when the inalienable immanence of God in man is fully recognized. The Church has never agreed to the Placidian view of human nature as itself sin; but its language has often been perilously near it, and, when it has, protests have been raised, as in New England, where the amiable qualities of man have been emphasized until the need of salvation has been minimized or evaporated. On the ground that the divine creation, we understand that man has freedom which, alas, has been exercised against God Himself, though given by God and intended by Him to coincide joyfully with His own.

How to reconcile God's holy omnipotence and foreknowledge with this human fact seems an insoluble problem. We must give content to God's preestimating activity; it is not enough to posit a non-interfering divine knowledge; otherwise there is no guarantee of the ultimate success of God's purposes. But, on the other hand, we must not look on God's absolute decrees as the moral cause of sin; neither as acting mechanically in man, and certainly not as an insurmountable barrier to the recovery of his true freedom, and that in a moral way.

The syngist fought against a view of God which made Him in the case of some men the obstacle to salvation, withholding His grace from some, and making remission of sins for others who were the syngist was right. Here again the Christian doctrine of the new creation is the safeguard. God is not only inalienably immanent in man by virtue of the first creation; He is also redemptively active in man through Christ. That is mainly right in his psychology of conversion.

God's grace is efficiently active, and the consent of the will is the result of that activity; yet He is active in harmony with man's true being, and man's consent is voluntary. Man does not simply accept the offer of grace by the power of his unaided will and so convey it into the soul. His will is never unaided; grace comes into the soul as a power of God moulding the will itself. The acceptance itself is not the cause of its presence. The supremacy of grace and its efficiency is maintained by the religious consciousness on self-examination, but the acceptance itself is an act of will.

The miracle here also is not that a man's will should be effectually moved to harmonize with God's redemptive activity; the miracle is that some men should resist even this. It is not to be thought that their resistance is due to the fact that God withholds or withdraws His gracious activity. He must use it only gingerly. The gospel offer is to all, even the Calvinist says, and it is a bona fide offer; it is more, for the cost to God—what we mean by the Atonement—is so real and so great. The activity of God is an energy penetrating into man. God does not deal with the sinner simply in the way of punishing him;

He deals with him in a redemptive way. How can this fact of man's resistance, again, be reconciled with God's omnipotence in grace? Many, like Schleiermacher, find refuge in final universal salvation, in a probation extending beyond this life. But God's omnipotence is a reality which recognizes now man's power of resistance because it values man's freedom. This resistance does not annihilate the divine omnipotence, nor does it rob God of His character as Creator and Redeemer, were the resistance in this lifetime.

The value of synergism is in its denials. It is wrong to regard God's activity as doing violence to this initiative of man. The weakness of synergism is that it tends to regard this activity in man as separate from God to begin with and as only co-operating with God. The relation between them is more intimate. God Himself is present from the outset in this freedom; and when, as in Christian experience, the soul awakens to the presence of God, then it is felt that God has done so much in Christ, and is doing so much, that it is joyfully acknowledged that the will's power is His, and the renewal of it is His. It is not an acquisition of the will so much as the welcome deliverance and liberation of the whole personality. Religion in its strength emphasizes God, and in so doing frees man into the liberty of joyful service.


C. E. Luthardt, Die Lehre vom freien Willen, Leipzig, 1893, gives a detailed history of the controversy, and its development; also Die Arbeiten Melanchthons im Gebiete der Moral, Leipzig, 1884; Flotow, De syngismo Melanchthoni, Trarslaw, 1857, is a special handling of the subject referred to by G. Kremser, who has written much on the various antagonists in the syngist controversy; see Scholtz, also PEP-xv. 239 f.; E. F. Fischer has a treatise on Melanchthon's teaching on conversion (Melanchthon's Lehre von der Bekehrung), Tübingen, 1905; and Paul Thackeart, Die Entstehung der Lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre, Götttingen, 1910, pp. 530-551, is an excellent summary.


D. MACKENZIE.

SYNODS.—See COUNCILS AND SYNODS.

SYRIANS (or Arameans).—I. General introduction. —The Hebrew 'Aram' is rendered in the LXX by Ζωπα, 'Syria.' We may therefore for granted that originally the words 'Arameans' and 'Syrians' were synonymous. At a later time 'Syrian' and 'Assyrian' were used indiscriminately; Αραμέας = Ζωπα = Ζωπα. According to Gn 10, Aram was one of the five sons of Shem, and, according to Gn 10, Aram became the father of Uz, Hul, Gether, and Mash. The Arameans, or Syrians, are therefore Semites. A complete study of the Arameans would include that of all the races whose language has been spoken, and religions come within the Syrian scope. But our purpose here is to consider only the pagan Arameans. We shall not touch upon Western (i.e. Biblical) Arameans, rural quotes preserved in the OT and the NT, nor the Egyptian papryi and ostraca, particularly those of Elephantine, nor the Jewish dialects

represented by the Tarqums, the Megilloths, and the Jerusalem Talmud, nor Samaritan, nor the fragments of Christo-Palestinian literature. All these are of the greatest importance from the point of view of the study of the language, as well as philologically, but are outside the scope of this article. The same remark applies to the different branches of Eastern Aramean, which includes the Babylonian Talmud, the literature, language, and culture of the Manicheans, Mandaeans, and Harranians (q.v.). We shall also leave untouched the study of Syriac (language and literature) and the chief Neo-Aramean (Christian) dialects.

The best known of the pagan Arameans are the Palmymes (q.v.), the Nabateans (q.v.), and the Syrians of Damascus and of the region north of Syria. We get our information on these races from the OT, ancient inscriptions, and Latin and Greek coins and documents.1

The ethnic arami, ἀραμ, 'Aramean,' is found in 2 K 1, 2b, Gv 35, 29, Dn 20. Its fem. is aramī, ἀραμία in 1 Ch 714. The plur. is aramīm, ἀραμίμ in 2 K 5, 32. The corresponding Greek of the LXX is respectively ἀραμιή, ἀραμιών, the noun "Armenia," i.e., "Mesopotamia, ἀρμενικός λαός νῦν Σύρος" (Dn 9, 6), etc.; Σύρος (Dn 6, 10); Σίρια (Dn 9, 7); Σίρια (Dn 9, 25).

The adverb ἀραμ, 'Aramean,' is translated by the LXX Σύρως in 1Sam 36, 2; 1 K 12, 24, De 24, 2 El 6.

The OT gives the following information on the pagan Aramaeans.

Arama Žobah (Zobah), ἁγέως (LXX ἅγεως Ζώβαχ), in 1 S 14, 2, 2 b 32, 1, 1 K 11, 35. This expression means an Aramaean king. Zobah is a town of north Syria. The town of Zobah was situated in Lebanon, according to 1 Ch 12, 38.

Arama Maʿaṣ inih (Massuh), ἁγέως (LXX ἅγεως Μασσαύης) (1 K 15, 19); according to Dt 34, 11, Maʿaṣit dwell beyond the kingdoms of Og; they were not numbered among the descendants of Manasseh (cf. 1 Jos 15, 11, 2, 2 Chr 34).

Arama rebeth Rebhed (Beth Rebhed), ἁγέως (LXX ἅγεως Ρεβεθ) (1 K 16, 24), in 1 S 17, 9, 14, and is Aramaean, i.e., supplied mercenaries to the sons of Ammon when fighting against Joab, King David's general. They took to flight before Joab, who re-entered Jerusalem in triumph. Rebhed is said to be in the north of Palestine, in the region of Labash, or Dan (1 G 16, 10).

Arama Naharaim (Nahor), ἁγέως (LXX ἅγεως Ναβραυάς), is identified by the LXX with Mesopotamia (Gv 24, 2), Dt 22, 2, Ch 109, "Syria of the two rivers." This is a mistake. Naharaim means 'frontier of the country,' and corresponds to the Marshes of the Tigris-Amara region and to Nabirus in the Egyptian inscriptions; it is extended along the two banks of the middle Euphrates. At the time of the Khali the name Naharaim was sometimes given to the country lying between the Balih and the Orontes.2

Padam Arama (Padan-aram), ἁγέως (LXX ἅγεως Παδανομήνων), in 1 K 16, 20, 23, 24, is Aramaean, i.e., supplied mercenaries to the kings of Asa and of Judah. This fact is significant.

2. Damascus.— Aaram Damāsak, ἁγέως (LXX Ζώπα Δαμασκόω), in 2 S 5, 14, 1 Ch 18, 29, is Syria of Damascus, which came to the help of Hadadezer, king of Zobah; David slew 22,000 Syrians and put garrisons in Syria of Damascus (Syria-Damascus).

In the course of time Syria (Araram) comprised numerous divisions, the chief of which, besides those mentioned above from the Bible, were: Batania, or country of Bashan, Commagene with its capital Samosata, Currheshites with Cyrrhus as capital, Chaldeans with its capital Chaldei (Halae-Alep), Cœle-Syria with Helipolis (Baalbek) as capital, Seleucid, or Tetrapolis, with Seleucia, Antioch, Laodicea, and Apamea as principal towns, Chaldices with its capital Chalchih, (Kinnarim), etc. In many cases we have not enough information about these divisions to treat them separately. The best plan will be to give a


résumé of the details supplied by history, inscriptions, and other documents, grouping them round Damascus and the Damascus.

The god who received most worship was Hadad, whose consort was the Syrian goddess of Artages. This god was also called Ramôn or Ramman. These two names appear as early as 3000 B.C. in the cuneiforms. This deity does not appear in Phoenician texts. Hadad is represented in the same way in Syria and Mesopotamia. He is the god of lightning and thunder; he shakes the mountains; he is beneficent when he sends the rain which fructifies the earth; he is the destroyer when he sends floods and inundations. According to the inscriptions of Senjirli, Hadad was the first of the gods of northern Syria in the 7th cent. B.C. His chief sanctuary was at Hieropolis (Mabbug, Manbij), near the Euphrates. He was specially worshipped by the agricultural populations of Syria as the protector-god of the harvests. In time his cult became confused with that of the sun; his head was then ornamented with rays; this identification is particularly noticeable in Helipolis (Baalbek), where the cult of Hadad and that of the sun are one and the same. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Optimus Maximus; he received various local denominations (Dolichemmes, Hadaranes, Helipoliopolitanus), but he can always be recognized by the fact that he is represented with the bull or that he is mentioned along with his consort, the Syrian goddess Artages. A third personage is usually connected with these great gods, regarded as their son or their daughter. These three together form the triad known as the diosyris. They are represented in a great many Syrian towns—Rhoesus, Raphen or on the Lebanon (in Greek-Roman times). But the principal sanctuary of the Syrian gods, after Hierapolis, was Damascus, and the Bible mentions kings of Syria in the 9th cent. B.C. with theophoric names, such as Ben-Hadad, Tabrimmon. It is even possible that this cult of Hadad exercised a certain influence on some Israelite centres, which would explain the representation of Jahweh by a young bull. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Damascus. In all probability Jupiter Helipoliopolitanus, the god of Helipolis (Baalbek), should be identified with him.

The consort of Hadad is Artages, the great Syrian goddess—also under the names Allât and Venus—who must not be confused with Astarte, the Phoenician goddess. Coins of Hierapolis call her 'Ate or 'Astar.' She was a great goddess, with her head surrounded with rays. The symbol of Artages was composed of the crescent moon in conjunction with the solar disk.

Besides the divine couple, Hadad and Artages, the Syrian pantheon included other deities, of secondary rank, several of whom had a purely local character.

Reshef, or Rashuf, was the incarnation of thunder and lightning. He was often represented as a soldier armed with spear, mace, bow, and shield; he carried on his helmet a gazelle's head surmounted by two sharp horns. Reshef also met with in Phoeonia and in Cyprus. He was in later times identified with Apollo. Some scholars regard him as a Phoenician rather than a Syrian deity.

The inscriptions also mention Rekub-El, 'the charioteer of El,' who is probably an importation into Syria of the charioteer of the sun-god of the Assyrians. El was an important deity, but did not occupy the first rank in the Syrian pantheon. El was worshipped in Syria, as in Assyria and among the other Semitic races.

Alongside of sun-worship the Syrians devoted a very special cult to the moon-god. Of two
Neirab inscriptions (6th cent. B.C.) mention Sahar, Shamash, Nikkal, and Nusk, the latter omits Shamash, the sun, and mentions only Sahar, Shamash, and Nikkal. Sahar, the moon-god, was the chief deity of Harrân. His wife, Nikkal, corresponds to Nin-gal, the great lady, wife of Sin, the Assyrian moon-god. Their son, Nusk (Nusku in Sumerian), represents fire, according to some scholars, and, according to others, he personifies the crescent moon.1

The stele of Telma (an oasis in the north of Arabia) names three Aramaean deities: 2) Salam, Singalla, and Asihr, gods of Telma. Lagrange2 proposes to identify Salam with Salmu, the dark, the dark planet, i.e. Saturn. According to other writers, the word salam, image, statue, means the ideal of the local god (halât) of Telma; Singalla is of Assyrian importation and denotes the great Sin; Asihr corresponds to the Asherah of the Canaanites.

An inscription recently discovered by Poggio in the region of Aleppo, but probably the oldest Syrian inscription, mentions not only Zakir, king of Hamath and La'ash, but also a new deity, the god Alur (800 B.C.), probably a local god, the presumed fact of Hazarak, for in the continuation of the text the important part is ascribed not to Alur but to Barak Shamain.

Of the three Semitic inscriptions that of Hadad, the thunder, mentions the gods Hadad, El, Reshef, Rekbuk-El, Shamash, who acceded to Panamum what he asked them. Lagrange3 calls attention to the fact that no goddess figures in this list. The second inscription, dated after that of Panamum, dates from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III (754–727 B.C.) and mentions the gods Hadad, El, Rekbuk-El, Shamash, and all the gods of Judah. The third one, called that of Barrekkub, dates from the same period, but does not mention any deity, except that Barrekkub declares that, on account of his loyalty, his lord Rekbuk-El and his lord Tiglath-Pileser have pleased him on his father's throne. When Zenobia was taken captive to Rome, the cult of the Syrian gods penetrated to the great city with her (or before her). This fact is now duly established by the discovery of a sanctuary to Janiculus in the gardens of the Sarra villa. The Linear inscriptions dedicated to the Syrian god Adad (Hadad) of Lebanon on a small white marble altar. There is also an inscription dedicated 4) dios syris at Spalata.

4 P. Camret, Les Cultes d'Asie Mineure dans le paganisme romain, 1907, 2 vols.
11 1931, p. 190–49.

3 The Nabateans.—According to some scholars, the Nabateans were Arabs who used Aramaean as their literary language; according to others, they were pure Arameans who in those regions mingled on the one side with the southern populations of Arabia, while to the north they became masters of Trans-Jordan as far as Damascus. The oldest Nabatean inscriptions (1st cent. B.C.) contain no Arabisms; afterwards, at the beginning of the 1st cent. of our era, Arab influence makes itself clearly felt, especially in the regions of Beshara and Medain Saleh.

The Nabatean sources now in our possession are inscriptions, which are published in the second part of CIS, and coins, which have been studied most recently by B. Dussaud and H. Dussaux. An almost unbroken succession of kings, from Obadas I (90 B.C.) to Malichus III (A.D. 106). But before these dates a Nabatean race was known which in 312 B.C. was powerful enough to gain the victory against Antigonus. After this victory the Nabateans, an essentially trading people, occupied the north of Arabia, the country of Edom, and the Damascene. F. H. Vincent has gathered together 11 that is known about the pantheon of the Nabateans; they honoured the sun, to whom they built an altar on their houses, and to whom they offered libations and burned incense. The following are the principal deities. Dasshaib intended to occupy the first rank and to be the god of the king. Then came Allat (fem. of Allah) and Manâthu or Manâvat. The god Hobal belonged originally to Syria, and Muhab and Ma'mur are almost unknown. Qaysa was perhaps the ancient national god of the Edomites. The names of the goddesses Vaghra and Tads are from a doubtful reading as well as those of Nashbâ and Eiger. The Syrian god Beal Shamun was also adopted by the Nabateans. The Nabateans erected temples to their gods. The temple comprised a small building to contain the statue of the god, a sacred enclosure (sarmas), votives, steles, and niches.

Whether the Nabateans were strongly Aramaic Arabs or real Arameans, they gave a very large place in their pantheon to the deities and cult-objects of Aramaean or Syrian origin. See, further, art. NAHARAN.

4. The Palmyrenes.—See art. PALMYRENSIS.


7 F. 494.

6 CITE III, 1927.
5. Syrian cult.—In their pantheon, as in their religious practices, the Arameans had naturally very close relations with the Assyro-Babylonian cults on the one hand and with those of Phoenicia and Egypt on the other. They united the local agrarian cults, in conjunction with the worship of sun, moon, and stars, preferably on high mountains or sharp mountain-peaks, regarded as the abode of the gods. They worshiped sacred trees (the tree of life) and plants. They also rendered worship to sacred springs, and Palmyra possessed a specially consecrated river, whose Tyche was venerated. Certain sacred rivers had miraculous powers; if the offering sank to the bottom of the water, it was approved by the deity; if it floated, it was not approved.

As among the rest of the Semites, sacred enclosures have been found among the Arameans, known as haram, and much used among the Arabs. The boundaries of the haram were fixed by steles, several of which have been recovered during the course of excavation.

We have little information concerning the after life among the Semites in general, and the Arameans in particular. Like the ancient Hebrews, they probably had Sheol, the kingdom of the dead. From the Hittites and Neith inscriptions, which are very important funerary texts, we learn that the Arameans believed that a part of the dead person survived, called nephesh, 'soul.' It was a material principle, to which they had to offer food and drink.

Among the most venerated objects of worship we must mention the sacred stones, or bêtsa, which assumed various aspects. The presence of the god was materialized by a stone placed in the sacred enclosure. The inscription of Hadad shows that the Arameans worshiped the nisht, a hewn stone or statue. A Palmyrene inscription shows among the Arameans the use of the maspekhal (q.v.), in the sense of 'stele.' And they distinguished between the funerary stele, naftah, 'soul,' of pyramidal form, and the votive stele, meqida (whence our word 'mosque,' through Arabic), which meant the place in which the deity was worshiped.

As regards the personnel of the cult, we hear of the priest, koner, attached to the service of such-and-such a shrine. It was he who offered the holocaust. Barbers played an important part, both in performing the ritual incisions and in shaving the heads of those who dedicated their hair to the deity in connection with vows. There were also sexiers, who were more especially with keeping the accounts of the temple. Sacred prostitutes were not lacking in the Aramean cults; and lastly we must mention the familiars of the temple, who rendered services to the faithful who came to worship or make vows, and who lived in the surroundings of the temple, finding their food in the remains of the meals offered to the gods.

6. Calendar.—The Aramean calendar is fairly well known: the Nabateans and Palmyrenians employed the Seleucid era, and for a very long time the Syrians made their year begin in autumn. The names of the months of the Palmyrene inscriptions are all known: Tisheh, Kapun, Kalub, Thib, Shabi, Adar, Nisan, Ir, Sion, Qinian Ab, Elul. Those of the Nabateans are the same, except the second and tenth, which are not known. This information rests upon fragmentary times. The ancient names of the months have not yet been brought to light by the oldest inscriptions (Senjirî and Neirûb).

SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.—In their pantheon, as in their religious practices, the Arameans had naturally very close relations with the Assyro-Babylonian cults on the one hand and with those of Phoenicia and Egypt on the other. They united the local agrarian cults, in conjunction with the worship of sun, moon, and stars, preferably on high mountains or sharp mountain-peaks, regarded as the abode of the gods. They worshiped sacred trees (the tree of life) and plants. They also rendered worship to sacred springs, and Palmyra possessed a specially consecrated river, whose Tyche was venerated. Certain sacred rivers had miraculous powers; if the offering sank to the bottom of the water, it was approved by the deity; if it floated, it was not approved.

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FEODRÉ M. MACLÉR.
than some dialects of 'English' now current in the British Isles are from one another. The Edessa Slavonic is a form of commerce in the history of the Euphrates, and was used far and wide for literary purposes. But, though this was, and is, the written language, other dialects of Syriac were spoken and literature throughout a very wide district, from the Mediterranean to the eastern limits of Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Adiabene (east of the Tigris), and southwards to the borders of Egypt and Arabia.1 There were many Syriac dialects. They were not the lineal descendants of classical Syriac, but were rather in the position of sisters or nieces of that language.2

Syriac gradually gave way, vernacularly and to some extent liturgically, to Arabic after the Muhammadan conquest, though it has had locally a considerable influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of the Arabic which supplanted it.3 The only Christians who have habitually been the East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldean), among whom it is practically the only language used (though many of the Mosel Uniates also speak Arabic), the Jacobites of Jbel Tigr, and the people to the north of Melela near Damascus. The other Jacobites and the Maronites now ordinarily use Arabic for their vernacular. The Malabarese have probably never used Syriac vernacularly—unless the immigrants from Persia used it for a while (see below, § 9)—but have always spoken an Indian dialect. It may be noted that many Jews in E. Turkey and Persia have a vernacular closely akin to the spoken languages of the Nestorians; and the language of the Mandesans (q.v.), or so-called 'Christians of St. John,' if they still exist, is another branch of Aramaic. In the early ages of Christianity the literary language of Syria proper was Greek (see below, § 3), but Syriac was the popular language there till after A.D. 500. It should be remembered that Antioch itself was a Greek, not a Syriac, centre. The city was predominantly Greek, though Syriac was the language of numerous monks in it and its neighbourhood, and of the country people.4

All the above-mentioned Christians use classical Syriac as their liturgical language; and many of them use it still as their literary language, as all did till the Middle Ages. It will thus be seen that the prayers in the Church services are only imperfectly, if at all, understood by the majority of the worshipers. In Syria proper, however, many of the prayers are said in an Arabic translation, so as to be intelligible to the people; they are then written in Syriac characters, and this combination of Syriac and Arabic is called Carshuni (Syr. garashnī).5 But those services which are the bishop's own—e.g., ordination—are in Syriac only, as are all the prayers which are said inaudibly by the priest.

The vernaculars differ from classical Syriac in different degrees. The East Syriac vernacular dialects, which vary a good deal among themselves, differ from it perhaps as much as Italian from Latin, while the Ma'ula dialect has retained more of the older grammar and is less analytically developed.6 This last vernacular is particularly noticeable as being preserved by those who are so far isolated from other Syriac—

2. Parrot, ii. 409.
3. F. C. Burkitt, Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire, p. 19.
4. ibid. p. 570.
5. T. Nöldeke, Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache, p. xxxv.
6. Ibid. p. 244.
9. See Parrot's sketch of this dialect.

speaking Christians. Ma'tula (called Solucia by the Turks) is a village of some 1000 inhabitants, situated on a high plateau above 5000 ft. above sea-level, north-east of Damascus; while two neighboring villages, these three, most of the inhabitants have become Muslims within the last 250 years, also speak Syriac vernacularly. Ma'tula consists essentially of two divisions; half are of the Uniat Melkite rite (see below, § 6), half of the Greek Orthdox rite. Each division has its ancient monastery.1 The local inhabitants are immigrants from the east, from the district of Singar or Singar (west of Melela), which is now largely an Arabic or so-called 'devil-worshipers'; but this tradition is of very doubtful value.2

Of all the Syrian Christians, whether they have lost their own vernacular or have retained it, it may be noted that their clergy are supposed all to be able to read and write and understand classical Syriac; and most of them can do so, and can even, with some difficulty, speak it. But this is now only as a foreign language.

There are some differences of pronunciation. The East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldean) say ʕa when the West Syrians (Jacobite) and the Maronites say ā (e.g., melkā, melbā, 'a king'), the former being the older sound, preserved to us in transliterations like Talitha (Syr. Tālitha). The consonant vālā (vāli) is not seen or heard in the current Syriac, and it is sometimes quite replaced by kālā (kâli), a corruption of the Arabic kalā (kuulā) 'be present at.' The East Syrians hardly ever aspirate p (except when it is used to form a diphthong), and many of them never aspirate r or s; so sometimes pronounce the vowels ‘bēthā’ (bēthā) and ‘bēthah’ alike as sā, the sound being produced only by a jëdāt from the lips. The letter qētā (qēthā) is often pronounced with a or aspirated b or p. One point with regard to transliteration of Syriac words into Roman characters must be mentioned. European Orientalists usually write twice a medial consonant in certain verbal formations and in words derived from them, as in 'ehārā (ehāra) 'he arranges,' e.g., 'Addā (Adā) 'he arranges.' The Syriac themselves, however, diallize double letters, and in their vernacular admit them only in a few (chiefly foreign) words, and then in such cases they pronounce each letter distinctly, like the d's in 'mid-day.' On the other hand, there is no sufficient compensation for not doubling a medial consonant by converting a preceding short a into a long one. Most of them pronounce aspirated Rāp (Rhā) and Kēthā (Kēth) alike.

3. Syrian Christianity in early times.—In considering the spread of Christianity in these regions before the theological controversies of the 5th cent., caused the divisions which exist to this day, we are faced with the difficulty that legends are the traditional groundwork of the religious history. It is not easy to estimate the amount of truth or falsehood that underlies the legends; but there is no doubt that all these regions were largely Christianized at an early period.

(a) The Roman province of Syria.—Here we are not troubled with legend. In the 1st cent. of our era the province extended to the Euphrates, and was conjoined with Cilicia.2 Antioch was the civil metropolis, and was likewise the headquarters of Syrian Christianity; there the disciples were first called 'Christians' (Acts 11:26). The Jews and Syrians were both represented at Antioch (see above, § 2). There is no evidence as to the extent to which the Church services were conducted in the Aramaic vernacular rather than in Greek; but probably, at a time when the worship was in the main extemporaneous, both languages were used. Though most of the people, perhaps, understood Greek, even if it was not their mother tongue, yet experience shows that the last vernacular gives way to the language of commerce and public life is that of religion. It is therefore probable that Syrian Christians in the Roman province to a large extent were whipped in their vernacular from apostolic times onwards. But Greek was the literary language. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch at the beginning of the 2nd cent., wrote in Greek (he calls himself 'the bishop of Antioch'); and Syrian Christians, after the Severan Emperors (Rom. 16; see § 8), who spoke the 'church in Syria,' and God as he speaks in his stead).
the same. The Antiochene school of theology was clearly a Greek school.¹ A trace of the mixture of the Greek and Syriac elements may be seen in the Pilgrimage of Sibylla (‘Etheria’), a work probably of the 4th cent., which describes the mission of the bishop of Jerusalem as knowing Syriac (‘siriste’), but as always speaking Greek and having his sermons and the lectures interpreted into Syriac by a presbyter who stood by.

In the 4th cent., when the provincial organization of the Church was promoted, Antioch was one of the great centres, and its bishop was called a ‘mopoloxyn’; the corresponding word is found in canon 19 of the Council of Antioch in essenca (AD 341), and the name itself is cited in canon 6 of Nicea (AD 325), which says that the rights formerly possessed by Antioch must be preserved to it. Thus Antioch had long exercised some sort of jurisdiction over the church in other languages. Yet the Apostolic Constitutions, a Greek work written in Syria c. AD 375, does not mention metropolitan churches, any more than the other ‘Church Orders’ do. This is important in connexion with the supposed dependence of Seleucia-Ctesiphon on Antioch, for which see below (c).

(b) Edessa. — This famous city of Mesopotamia, called in Syriac Ur-hal (now Urfa), was the capital of the province of Orthoene (a Greek name derived from ‘Ur-hal’). Edessa was the Greek name for the city. The kingdom was independent till AD 216, when it was incorporated in the Roman empire. According to the well-known legend of Abgar and Addai, Edessa was Christianized in the middle of the 1st cent.; the legend is given in full in the Doctrine of Addai (see below, § 4), and in a shorter, and perhaps more original, form by Eusebius,⁴ who says that his account was translated from the Syriac. Edessa is represented as a heathen city, which worshipped the doctrine (the Doctrine tells us) Bel and Nebo, though Burkit suggests that these names come from a purloin of the OT and from a real historical reminiscence.⁵ Abgar,⁶ the heathen king or toparch of Edessa, sends messengers to our Lord, and a correspondence ensues; after the Ascension the apostle ‘Judas Thomas’ sends Addai (called by Eusebius Thaddaeus, and said to be one of the Seventy) to Abgar to teach him the faith.⁷ Addai does many mighty deeds; one of his converts was Aggal, who became the ‘king’ of the king, and he was made bishop⁸ by Addai as his successor. Addai died a natural death at Edessa, but Aggal was afterwards martyred by the son of Abgar; and, as he could not convert him, his successor Pfall is said by reason of his sudden death, the latter was sent to Antioch and was ordained by Serapion the bishop, and was ordained by Serapion the bishop. The king of Assyria, sent messengers to King Abgar to learn about all these matters. Such is the legend. As we have it, it is of the 4th cent., though clearly based on one that is a good deal older; R. A. Lipsius¹⁰ concludes that the extent correspondence between our Lord and Agbar was manufactured by A.D. 200. What is the extent of truth in all this it is not easy to say. The mention of Serapion (bishop of Antioch, AD 190-210) gives us a date for Pfall, and Lipsius¹¹ regards the latter as the first historical bishop of Edessa. But there is no need to dismiss Addai entirely to the realms of myth. If the Edessenes were casting about for an early founder of their Church, they would be much more likely to fix on the great apostle ‘Judas Thomas,’ whose tomb was claimed for Edessa in the middle of the 3rd cent. (see below, § 5), than on the unknown Addai. It seems to be likely, therefore, that Addai (probably a Palestinian Jew) was the first preacher of the gospel at Edessa, perhaps early in, or about the middle of, the 2nd century. The real Abgar who favored Christianity may have been Abar-Khuri, the independent king of Edessa. Burkit¹² suggests that the consecration of Pfall by Serapion of Antioch represents a movement for closer union with the ‘Western’ (Greek) Christianity, and perhaps means a break in the episcopal succession.

In the 2nd cent. Bardaisan (Bardasanes) was born at Edessa in AD 135-223;¹³ he is reckoned as a Syrian Gnostic (though this is doubtful), and was a most learned man, a great hymn-writer,¹⁴ and author of a polemic against Marcion. All his works have perished except the extant Syriac treatise de Fato, which is usually thought to be his; Eusebius¹⁵ tells us that he wrote a book with that title. Burkit assigns the de Fato (which is called in the MS the Book of the Laws of Countries) to Bardaisan’s disciple, Philip, on the strength of the work itself; but many think that the attribution to ‘Philip’ (a very unusual Syriac name) is only a literary device, and that Bardaisan himself is the real author. He certainly is the chief speaker in the dialogue, which is between a Christian and a heathen, and turns largely on the question why God allowed man to sin. Eusebius¹⁶ and Epiphanius¹⁷ say that Bardaisan was originally a follower of Valentinus, and Epiphanius makes him always a Christian. The fullest biography of this erratic writer is by Michael the Syrian, Jacobite patriarch of Antioch (1166-99), but his details cannot be entirely trusted. The school of Bardaisan survived his death, and remained in opposition to the orthodox party; Rabula is said to have converted the remnant of it.¹⁸

One of the most famous of the Edessenes was Ephraim (Epiphron) the Syrian (born c. 308, +375). He came from Nisibis¹⁹ to Edessa and founded or reorganized a monastery there, which became the great university of the East, though for a while after his death it fell under Arian influences. He was a dean only, but he has been ordained by Basil of the Cappadocian Cæsarea, and to have declined advancement;²⁰ his own statement, that he had ‘the talent of the priesthood’ (which I do not contradict this, for in Syriac ‘priesthood’ means all orders of the ministry). He was a most diffused writer, and achieved a great fame in posterity.²¹

In the 5th cent. the most famous Edessenes were two of the bishops of Edessa. Rabbanî (bishop from 411 to 435) was the son of a heathen priest and of a Christian mother. He was converted

1 Early Eastern Christianity, p. 25 ff.
2 See F. X. A. Horta, in DCB 1, 250 ff., for the date.
3 See J. H. Heins (Syrian Christian).
4 IE, p. 20.
5 Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire, p. 14.
7 Loc. cit., 7. H. A. IV.
8 Burkit, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 189.
9 As appearances both from the Syriac (Nephoron, an. Nepor) and from the Greek, the middle t is long, contrary pronunciation. The word forms the eastern Greek hexameter in the epitaph of Abdenos; see the restoration in Lightfoot, Ignatius and Polycarp, p. 456. Burkit has pointed out to the present writer that the obscure pronunciation with short / and perhaps comes from the Armenian form of the Syriac, but the Armenian.
10 Socinian, IE, III, 14; 215.
11 For Ephraim see also Theodoret, IE, IV, 23, and Jerome, de Vir. Illust. 115; for a very unsatisfactory view of his ecclesiastical powers see Burkit, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 69 ff.
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after he attained to manhood; and he became a great ascetic, and the friend of Cyril of Alexandria. At the close of his life he resided at Cæsarea, and was known to have been a friend of Nestorius. The other famous bishop was his successor, Isaurus (bishop from 435 to 457), who was inclined to favour Nestorius (see below, § 5).

During all this period the Church seems to have made much progress. Eusebius says that bishops from 'the whole of Syria and Mesopotamia' attended the dedication of Constantine's great church at Jerusalem in 339.

The Byzantine empire.-A great deal of light has been thrown on early Syrian Christianity in Persia by the recent publication of the works of Nestorian writers. Formerly we had to rely mainly on the traditions of Jacob, the historian of the ancient church of Antioch.

The two sets of accounts correct one another and disprove more than one myth; and Neale's narrative in his History of the Holy Eastern Church requires much correction in this respect.

One of the materials of that of Abgar and Edessa already mentioned. Marz, disciple of Addai, travelled from Edessa and evangelized the Bashi (i.e., what became later the eastern part of Asiatic Turkey, as well as the modern Persia), penetrating as far as the province of Fars. Marz is not mentioned by the Synod of Nicea (holding at Constantinople, 325), which, however, is the best

that Christianity extended from Edessa into Persia. Nor is Marz mentioned in the liturgy lately published and very valuable History of Mahili Zha (lit. 'Christ has created'), of the 6th century, which states that Addai was the apostle of Adabamu and Am학생, and that this apparently contradicts the Doctrina, which makes Addai live and die at Edessa, and that he ordained Pidjiku as bishop.

The Nestorian Sinhaddha, or Book of Canons Law, names as the 'converters' of that region Thomas of the Indians and Chinese' (Sinlya), 'Bartholomew, that is Nathanael, of the Hebrews,' 'Addai, the head of the Seventy, the teacher of Addai and Marz of Mesopotamia' (and all Persia). This is all clearly mythical, but perhaps not entirely without foundation. The legend is:

Some consider that there was no Christianity, or at least no organisation of Christianity, east of the Tigis before the Sassanid empire was destroyed by a revolution, A.D. 225. This is perhaps correct rather too far. If there was nothing before the third decade of the 3rd cent., to build upon, it is unlikely that so early a writer as Mahili Zha could have given us such details; he could not have invented Pidjiku out of nothing. It is quite probable that there were Christians in Assyria in the 2nd cent., for 'Ittis,' the disciple of Justin Martyr, tells us that he was born 'in the land of the Assyrians.' This must be discounted by the fact that he probably wrote only in Greek, though many think that his Dialæconos (for which see below, § 4) was written in Syriac; and that he may therefore have been of Greek parentage, and have been converted to Christianity when in the West. We learn nothing of the fact that he laboured in Syria and Mesopotamia. In any case there was no bishop at Seleucia-Ctesiphon, the west-capital of the Persian empire, situated on the Euphrates near the Persian Gulf, until the end of the 3rd century. It was the first known bishop of that city; he was consecrated c. 230.

Another legend is much later, and professes to account for the existence of a patriarch at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. It is given by some Arabic writers, and in the Sinhaddha, and is to the effect that two men went from Persia to Antioch to receive baptism in 235. According to the first writer, one of them was crucified as a Persian spy, as was Sibra (perhaps, Sibra, lit. 'crosb', still a common name), the bishop of Antioch, while the other escaped to Jerusalem and was consecrated there, returning with a letter confessing the patriarchate on the Church in Persia. The Sinhaddha does not name Sibra, but says that two patriarchs, one of the East and one of the West, were consecrated on the doors of the church of Antioch, and it gives the pretended letter of the 'Western patriarch' to the 'Easterns,' begging on the latter a patriarchate, and abolishing the See of Antioch and sending him his patriarchs to Antioch to be consecrated. The first patriarch, it says, was either Papa or Shaplin; it does not profess to be certain. This Shaplin was probably the bishop of Adabamu, east of the Tigirs and between the two Zahi, who was a contemporary of Papa. The legend is a late forgery. The earlier sources, like Mahili Zha, know nothing of the story, despite the fact that they speak about the life of Abu Aljulub, the bishop who is said to have escaped. The whole is doubtless a fiction, and it is improbable that the Persian Christians ever depended for their bishop on the Church of Antioch, though they doubtless received

their Christianity from Edessa, and Edessa possibly received it from Antioch. The idea of patriarchates, it need hardly be said, belongs to a much later time than these pretended events. The East Syriac ('Chaldaean' or 'persian') metropolitan see is commemorated by the

c. A.D. 410. There is no early evidence of Antioch exercising jurisdiction over the Church in Persia. This was condemned by his brother bishops; he appealed, successfully, to Edessa, and perhaps to Nisibis.

An important event for the Church occurred in A.D. 297, when five Persian provinces were ceded to the Roman emperor. This strengthened the ecclesiastical ties between East and West. The cession made Nisibis a Roman city. It is the most famous bishop at that time was Mar Mattai, who was born there towards the end of the 3rd century. Ephraim was his disciple, and was baptized by him. James himself was a great author of Syrian works.

It is remarkable that, though James was present at Nicea in A.D. 325, the East Syriac knew nothing officially of that council till the Synod of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in A.D. 410, when they freely accepted the Nicene decrees and creed.

To this day they use a rather peculiar version of the longer form, the so-called 'Constantinople' creed, which came into general use (see below, § 9). The Arian controversy did not come to the Church of Persia, and the following may be seen in the fact that Aphrahat, whose Homilies (see below, § 4) are a continuous exposition of the Christian faith, does not mention Arianism at all, though he lived in his time which that heresy was prevalent in the 'West.'

The principal East Syrian bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon after Papa and before the Nestorian period were Simeon Bar Sabaté (martyred under Sapor II.), Yabakalah (prom. Yavakalah), and Daddishi. Of other bishops may be specially mentioned Aphrahat (Aphrâhat), in the 4th cent., whose see was perhaps Mar Mattai, near Mosul (see below, § 9), and Marutha (early 5th cent.), bishop of Maïpharqat or Martyropolis, north of Nisibis, author of the Book of Martyrs (see below, § 8).

Marutha often acted as adviser to the Persian king and as ambassador to the Roman emperor. The Sinhaddha mentions an earlier Marutha, who was (it says) present at Nicea, but it is probable that he did not exist, and that the statement is due to a confusion.

The period was marked by many personal quarrels, a feature of later history also, and by the great persecution under King Sapor II. (c.A.D. 373), which lasted some 40 years and resulted in the destruction of many martyrdoms. The Persians, as usual, did not take kindly to any alien influence that favoured the Church and at another persecution, it is important to notice that even in the early days the political conditions tended, quite apart from theological considerations, to separate the East Syriac from the rest of Christendom. It was the policy of the Persian authorities when they tolerated Christianity to separate it as much as possible from that in the Roman empire. Another persecution, at the instigation of the Magians, whose religion was that of the State, broke out under King Bahram (Varanes) V., c. A.D. 420. Theodore 7 makes it arise under his predecessor Yazdegird, though continued under Bahram, but Sasan ais more accurately that it arose after Yazdegerd's death.

The title of the bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, c. A.D. 400, was 'the Catholicos of the East,' and this title is still preserved by their successors. The title 'Patriarch' was added a little later, at the Council of Daddishu, held A.D. 424 at 'Markabata of the

1For his Biblical work see below, § 4.
2Vit. Const. iv. 43.
3Gen. Intro. i. 139 ff.
4This is here quoted in the MS form used by the Nestorians themselves. It is incorporated in a larger collection given by Chubat (Syriac Orientation).
5For instance, in the Sinhaddha, or Book of Canons Law, 'To the Greeks,' 42.
6Harv. xiv. 1.
7The 'West' means what we should call the 'Near East.'
8For Papa see above.

1W. A. Wigram, Introd. to the Hist. of the Assyrian Church, p. 257.
2The provinces reverted to Persia in 392.
3For notices of him see Theodore, H. E. ii. 29, and Gennadius, de Script. Ecei. 11 (continuation of Jerome's de Vm. Script). 4I. 3. 5.
5Wigram, ch. iii.
6Sorbonne, H. E. ii. 10 ff.
7HE iv. 26.
8HE vii. 18.
Arabic. This council firmly established the independence of the 'Eastern' patriarchate.

4. The Syriac Bible and early Syriac literature.

Before the doctrinal divisions of the 5th century, there was considerable activity in Syriac literature, all written in what we call 'classical Syriac.' See above, (2).

The Gospels were current in Syriac in five forms. (a) The four 'Gospels separate' (Syr. Evangeliya da-Matthei, da-Marki, da-Luki, da-Joanni), now generally called the Old Syriac, known to us by two MSS: the Curetonian, discovered in Egypt in 1842, and ed. by Curton in 1858; and the Sinaitic Syriac, a palimpsest discovered by Mr. Gibson in the monastery of Mount Sinai in 1863. Both of these have the above Syriac title, which distinguishes them from the Diatessaron (see below). Both are perhaps of the 4th century. The Curetonian has the same type of text as the Sinaitic, but differs from it in many details. (b) The Diatessaron of Tatian (2nd cent.), sometimes called by the Syrians the Mixed [Gospels], is a harmony of the four Gospels, and is known to us through a commentary on it by Ephrem handed down in Armenian translation, by quotations in Aphraates, and by an Arable translation of the Harmony itself made in the 4th century. (c) The Diatessaron of Tertullian is mentioned in the Doctrina Adda., (c) The Pahittā, or 'simple' version, so called to distinguish it from the complicated recension of Thomas of Harqel (see below), is the version still used by Syrian Christians. The name is first found in the 8th or 9th century. This version, which is now often called 'the Syriac Vulgate,' contains the whole Bible, OT and NT (not including the Apocrypha), and is known to us through a commentary on it by G. H. Gilliam. It appears that Tatian's Harmony was at one time in popular use among the Syrian Christians, but early in the 6th cent. Rabbbil, bishop of Edessa (see above, § 3), and Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, were instrumental in its being abolished and destroyed in favor of the 'separate Gospels.' Burkit's theory has been very generally accepted, viz. that the Pahittā Gospels are a revision of the 'separate Gospels' made by Thomas of Harqel, under the direction of Rabbbil: that the Diatessaron was written in Greek (see above, § 3), probably at Rome, by Tatian, and translated into Syriac in his lifetime, c. AD 180. (d) The Diatessaron of Aphraates, ed. c. AD 200, the translator being familiar with the Diatessaron. These views are contradicted by Gwills, who is inclined to assign a much earlier date to the Pahittā Gospels; he objects that Burkit's theory is not adequately attested, does not explain the disappearance of the 'Old Syriac,' and does not account for the acceptance of the Pahittā in the 6th cent. by Nestorians and Jacobites, and by the East Syrians after. The fact of the East Syrians were not necessarily Nestorian in Rabbbil's time, or indeed for a long time after him (see below, § 8), appears to the present writer adequately to account for their being ready enough to accept such a version of the Gospels in place of the Diatessaron.

(d) Recensions of the Pahittā were made by Philoxenus, bishop of Mahbub (Hippoteles, near the Euphrates), c. AD 586 (not now extant), and by Thomas of Harqel ('Harqot,' 4th cent.). In both of these writers were Monophysites, and it appears that the only dissatisfaction with the Pahittā that made itself felt was among the Jacobites, and not among the Nestorians. But even among the Jacobites that version remained supreme.

Some characteristics of the Pahittā may here be mentioned. The MSS. of the Greek Bible in the 5th century, in ten volumes, show practically the same text. Some of them are as old as the 8th cent., the oldest c. AD 450. One rather noticeable difference between the 'Old Syriac,' and the Pahittā Gospels occurs in the Lord's Prayer, where the former has 'our continual bread,' the latter 'the bread of need.' Another difference is in the gender of 'Holy Spirit.' The term 'spirit' being feminine in Syriac, the older writers make 'Holy Spirit' feminine also, and Aphraates speaks of the Holy Ghost as 'our mother,' just as the Gospel according to the Hebrew speaks of him as our Lord's mother. But from the time of the Pahittā onwards 'Holy Spirit' is made masculine by a grammatical revolution, though in Luke 4:16 and John 1:14-15 there is a survival of the original usage, the feminine being retained.

Hitherto we have considered only the Gospels. There is no extant text of Acts or the Epistles older than the Pahittā, but quotations in Aphraates and in Ephraim's Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, now extant only in an Armenian translation, are of some slight help. In Aphraates and in the Doctrina Adda., there is no clear reference to any of the Catholic Epistles. The Doctrine of Addai, the Mosaic Canon, and the Scripture are, on the contrary, a Scriptural canon to the Law and the Prophets, the Gospel, St. Paul's Epistles, and Acts. Thus the Pahittā stands alone. Aphraates does not principally Catholic Epistles, shows an advance on the way to a fuller canon. The Pahittā OT was not revised by Rabbbil, and is undoubtedly the same as that perhaps dating from the end of the 3rd cent. The translator had a good knowledge of Hebrew, though he was little acquainted with the Septuagint. Burkit thinks that he must have been a Jew, and that he made his translations for the Jews, who had probably settled at OT. Perhaps the Pahittā was the centre. The OT quotations of Acts of Judas Thomas, the Doctrine of Addai, the Mosaic Canon, and the genuine works of Ephraim (of all these see below) are largely preserved with the Pahittā, but their Gospel quotations do not do so, nor do they resemble the Greek. But it is perhaps that the Syriac was late in the 6th cent.

The 'Old Syriac' having thus almost entirely disappeared, the 'Old Syriac' Gospels appear to be later than the Pahittā OT, as the translator of the former, translating directly from the Greek, uses Hebrew proper names (sometimes) directly from the Hebrew, as does the Pahittā translator of the OT. The Old Syriac Gospels were translated into Greek before Jerome's time.

(d) Aphraates, the Persian martyr and sage, wrote his Commentaries A.D. 387-345. Their theological attitude calls for some remark in view of their aloofness from Hellenistic influence. There is no special difference between him and 'Western' writers in the presentment of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in Aphraates, as Jerome, the bishop of Emesa, is in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy

2 See above, § 3. (c) The 'Old Syriac' was the version used in the Eastern Empire, e.g., and Ephraim, ii. 13-22.
3 Burkit, Evang. ii. 115.
4 Es. ii. 4.
5 Syr. Evang. ii. 4.
6 Ephraim, ii. 5.
7 Ephraim, ii. 4.
9 Burkit, Evang. ii. 5.
10 Sinaitische Studien, i, 182-192.
11 Early Eastern Christianity, p. 97.
12 De Fr. illustr. § 115.
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Gnostic. In the Syriac Acts there is no inner circle to whom alone the whole truth is taught.1

But the doctrine of the sacraments must be noticed. The teaching about the eucharist, indeed, is more or less that of the Greek-speaking Christians. The body and blood of our Lord are received by the faithful. Fasting communion is enjoined, but special fasting habits are not said to be from sin. Yet this seems to be only the complement and groundwork of the literal fasting. One passage,2 however, is thought by Burkitt3 to show that Apherases considered the sacramental gift generally to be only for ascetics, and not for the married laity. This conclusion has been much disputed. At least it is certain that Apherases favoured the postponing of baptism till after marriage, just as Constantine postponed it till the end of his life. The same tinge of ultra-asceticism is seen here that appears in the Acts of Judas Thomas (see below and §9). But there is no evidence that this was more than the private opinion of individuals, or that the original East Syrian Church as a whole considered full membership to be incompatible with anything but the ascetic life.

(6) The Syriac Doctrina Apostolorum (or Edessan Canon) was written c. A.D. 350 and is a kind of "Church Order." As is the case with many books of that class, it puts injunctions into the mouth of the apostles, and it is of great interest as telling us of the spirit and customs of the East Syrian Church in the 4th century. It makes Addai the apostle of Edessa, and Aqar,4 a maker of silks, the apostle of Persia, Assyria, Armenia, Media, the countries round Babylon, the Hittites and the Cæsars, as far as the borders of the Indians and as far as the land of Gog and Magog. This shows that the East Syriacs at a very early date were a missionary church. The story of Martyrology may be dated c. A.D. 350. It is found in the MS (dated 411) mentioned below. It mentions Habbith the deacon, as well as Shamuna and Guria (on whom a maternal homily is extant), but not Aqar, Shararib, or Barsamyna (see below). (7) Abba (Abba, pron. Awa), the disciple of Ephraim, wrote a commentary on the Gospels, of which only a few fragments remain. (8) Cyrillina wrote his poems c. 364. (9) The Martyrology of Barsamyna and of Habbith, and (10) the Acts or Hypomnema of Shararib, are said to have been written in the 4th century. (11) The de Fato of Bardaisan (it has also been supposed to be written by Bardaisan’s brother, Eusebius) gives a list of the 36 Syrian heroes. (12) The Acts of the Edessene Church are supposed to be the acts of the 36 Syrian martyrs in the 3rd cent., or possibly Baradaian himself, or at any rate one of his school. The Syriac origin of this work is maintained by T. Noldeke and F. C. Burkitt5 and others. The Acts contain the well-known and familiar theological and hymnic narration, but the hymnic element is very much more prominent. The Acts, while unorthodox, are probably not Gnostic, being very different from the Greek Acts of John, which are thoroughly

5 West Syrians or Jacobites. — We now proceed to consider the division of the Syrian Church which resulted from the Christological controversies of the 5th century. It is not necessary here to repeat the accounts of those controversies which have already been given in this Encyclopaedia; but we may discuss the general historical peculiarities of the different Syrian bodies which separated from one another and from the ‘Western’ Church of Constantinople and Rome.

The Syriac Monophysites may be considered first. In Syriac proper there was a constant contention between them and the Orthodox for more than a hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), and the patriarchs of Antioch and Seleucia and sometimes Orthodox and Monophysite. The most famous of the latter was Severus, who maintained possession of Antioch itself from A.D. 513 to 518; he was an author, and wrote in Greek. He was a great admirer and imitator of Ignatius of Antioch, and wrote to the Romans, the Ephesians, the Colossians, the Philippians, the Thessalonians, the Grecian Christians, the Corinthians, and the Smyrneans.

The Syriac Monophysites are called Jacobites from Jacob Baradai (Baradaius), or Zannala, a monk of a monastery near Edessa, who came to Constantinople c. A.D. 540 to plead the cause of Monophysitism. After remaining there fifteen

1 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 76-79.
2 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' p. 51.
3 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' p. 125 ff.
4 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' p. 150.
5 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
6 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
7 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
8 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
9 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
10 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
11 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
12 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
13 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
14 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
15 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
16 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
17 Burkitt, 'Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire,' pp. 150.
years, he was consecrated bishop by the imprisoned Monophysite bishops in the capital, and sent to Syria to organize his sect. He consecrated Sergius to succeed Severus, and thus the Black to succeed Sergius. He is said to have ordained two patriarchs, 99 bishops, and an enormous number of clergy. He is often called bishop of Edessa, but Bar Hebraeus says that it was a bishop with an imputed title. John of Ephesus was his episcopal see. He died in 373, and after his death the Monophysites were driven from Antioch. The term ‘Jacobites’ was a nickname, given by the Orthodox, but the Jacobites themselves readily accepted it, tracing it, however erroneously, to the apostle James, to whom also they ascribe their principal liturgy. Their controversy with the Greeks, like the controversy of the East Syrians, was not only theological; it was largely tinged with national differences. Indeed both were to a considerable extent contests between Syriac thought and Hellenistic culture.

In the case of the Muhammadians conquered Palestine, Syria, and the East; and at first the new rulers favoured the Jacobites as the rivals of the Greeks. The principal writer of this period was James (Jacob of Edessa; 708), who was a poet, composer, and author. The work of Greek, of C. A.D. 350, now extant only in Syriac.

The Jacobite patriarchs have continued to this day (at any rate from the 19th cent., or, according to Neale, from the end of the 19th cent.) to style themselves ‘of Antioch,’ though they transferred their residence to various places—among them to Malatia on the Euphrates, to Amid, and finally (in the 12th cent.) to the monastery of Deir-al-Za’far in Mardin, where they have been ever since. Perhaps the most eminent Jacobite of all history was Gregory Bar Hebraeus, or Abulafa (†1398), a man of Jewish parentage, who became a convert to Christianity and afterwards morphian or metropolitan of Msqul, having formerly held other sees. He wrote many works, and his Chronicle (which may be read in Asseman) is a valuable history. He seems to have been greatly esteemed even by his Nestorian opponents, whom he attended in the number in large numbers; he died at Marapia (south of Tabriz), but was buried in the monastery of Mar Mattai on Jebel Maqlab (Syr. Ephrath, a day’s ride north-east of Msqul, and his grave is still shown there. His Chronicle is, for his age, fairly trustworthy, but when he deals with Nestorian matters it should be compared with the writings of that body.

A less known Jacobite writer was Dionysius Bar-salib (Syr. Șilib, pron. șlīw). He also called James, metropolitan of Amid, a theologian and commentator, probably of the 11th century. He knew the organization and customs, ecclesiastical and liturgical, than we do of those of the Nestorians, of which we have been fully informed in the later quarter of a century.

For the modern Jacobites the best short account is to be found in O. H. Parry’s Six Months in a Syrian Monastery, which has been largely drawn upon in the description which follows. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of the patriarch; the morphian, who since the 12th cent. has had his see at Mar Mattai (see above) or in Msqul itself; and bishops of Jerusalem, Damascus, and Homs (Emessa), Edessa, Ascalon, Mardin, and Nisibis (now Fararan; see above, §3) and Madan, Aleppo, and Tur Abdin (Jebel Tur). There are also some bishops without sees, as at Mar Mattai, where, when the present writer visited the monastery in 1887, the congregation consisted of one bishop and one monk. The patriarch is elected by the people, and the election is confirmed by the bishops resident near Mardin; it is common for the morphian to be the chief position. The patriarch, or more rarely the morphian, consecrates all the bishops, who must be either monks or widowed priests; those chosen from the monks are called morphian geographical; those chosen from the widowed priests are called assim (tricurus), and are of slightly lower rank, not being eligible for the patriarchate of morphian. Each bishop is the presbyter of Mar Mattai (‘my lord’) before his name. The patriarch and the other bishops are recognized by the State as judges for their own people, especially in minor matters, and in questions of marriage and divorce. The canonical age for the ordination of bishops is 35, and for deacons 20; but this age has never been kept as a fixed rule. Bar Hebraus was ordained bishop at 20; deacons are ordained as little boys, but they are not allowed to read the Psalms in classical Syriac. The parish priests, who are chosen by the parish councils of deacons and laymen, must be married men; if their wives die, they enter a monastery or elsewhere become priests. A second marriage is not allowed to them. They must let their beards grow, but they shave their heads completely. The leading priest in a large town is often made a cheiripresbyter, but he is not a bishop, and cannot ordain. There are many deacons in each village; they are engaged in secular work during the week—as they are indispensable for the celebration of the eucharist. Minor orders are practically obsolete.

Several ground plans of churches may be seen in Parry’s Die Monache, at least in most cases, stands in anapse, not (as among the Nestorians) attached to the east wall, and there are only for bishops and clergy behind. This is also the usual Greek custom. The whole sanctuary in Syrian churches, Eastern and Western, is called the ‘altar’ (Syr. mošk), though this name is sometimes also given to the holy table itself. The latter is usually of stone, though in some of the Jacobite churches it is of wood. There are side chapels with ‘altars,’ north and south of the sanctuary—the churches face east. At Mar Mattai, there is another chapel at the north side for the burial of bishops, called bešel qaddah (‘house of the saints’). Between sanctuary and nave there is a stone wall or screen. The nave sometimes contains playful doors, and always with a veil. There has no furniture except one or two lestari (altar cloths) placed under a baldachino. The Jacobites, like the Nestorians, do not allow images in their churches, but have a great veneration for the cross.

Monasteries are common; the monks are often laymen, though they are sometimes in holy orders. The monasteries are under the rule of the diocesan bishop except where they contain the tomb of a patriarch or of a morphian; in that case they are directly under the patriarch. Nunneries seem to be obsolete. The technical Syriac term for the monastic life, among both the Jacobites and the Nestorians, is ‘sacredness,’ ‘sacredness.’

The eucharistic liturgy ordinarily used is that of St. James, a translation of which in the Jacobite form, is given in Brightman’s Liturgies Eastern and Western, i. 69 ff. The Syrian Jacobites, Maronites, Uniat Syrians, and Malabar Jacobites all use the same liturgy with some variations, and leavened bread is used, and must be baked for each occasion. The leaven is handed down from remote ages, as among the Nestorians. The eucharist is reserved for the sick, but only for communion on the same day. Little children (who are confirmed immediately after baptism) are not communicated.

1 For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORMONIA (Christian), §12.
2 Parry, Die Monache, 1880.
4 Syr. assim (see the Nestorian Sinaidadda, vi. 2, can. 7, etc.).
5 A list of other Jacobite liturgies see Brightman, I. p. 181 ff.

1 Asseman. Bibl. Or. ii. 287.
3 Asseman. ii. 244 ff.
4 Rampoldi, Geogr. Or. ii. 453.
The antidoron or eucharistic bread not consecrated (Syr. bāḥrākāth = ḍōvyōra) is distributed after the service. The obdurate wears a cloak, amices, undivided stole, yellow shoes, a maniple over each arm, and a chasuble split down the front, and buckled with silver at the neck. The vesting takes place in the side chapel, where also the elements are prepared. There are in some churches daily vesting, in others no special vestment (except girdles, and often, for the deacons, stools) at the daily offices. These last have not been published, and exist in manuscript only. One of the great features of Jacobite worship is the peculiar addition of "who was crucified for us to the Trisagion ("Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us"), which is used at many of the services. The addition was first made by Peter the Fuller (f. A.D. 477), and was eagerly adopted and retained as a test of Monophysitism. Baptism is not allowed to be administered in private houses. The child at baptism is signed with moros, or unguent (which is consecrated once a year by the patriarch), anointed all over the body with oil (which has been libation by the moros), immersed in water thrice up to the neck, clothed, and confirmed. Confession before communion is recommended in the catechism. Some of the canons are more strict, and insist on confession before communion on Mammady Thursday, Christmas, and Pentecost. The fasts are somewhat severe. Besides Lent and Advent, both of which are strict fasts, there are (a) the Fast of the Ninevites, three days in spring, said to have been instituted owing to a plague in the 6th cent., and strenuously maintained also by the East Syrians; (b) the Fast of the Apostles, after Pentecost; and (c) the Fast of Mary, August 1-15. Wednesday and Friday are fasts in each week, from sunset to sunset.

The Jacobites are to be found chiefly in Mesopotamia and northwards to Harpot and Diarbekr, but there are also a good many of them near Damascus and a certain number around Mosul. The largest numbers are perhaps to be found in the hill region of Jebel Tar (Arab. ALSO Tar' Abidin; Syr. Tar' Abhdin), N. of the line Mardin—Nisibis—Jezireh. In this district Syriac is still spoken vernacularly. Here are some of their oldest and most interesting churches are situated. It is always difficult to reckon numbers in Turkey; but Gibson's estimate of from fifty to eighty thousand is certainly too low. We may perhaps put the total Turkish Jacobites at rather less than 200,000.

Certain communities of Jacobites have become Unit; see below, § 6. Jesuit missionaries first came to Mesopotamia in 1546. In 1648 the patriarchate was fixed at Aleppo, and the patriarchs took his title from that place. The Syrian Christians in that neighbourhood mostly belong to that jurisdiction.

6. Mekites and Unics.—The former name, which is derived from Syr. malākā ("king"), a word used also, like shevêlo, for an emperor, was invented

1 But the ancient and authoritative Jacobite statement of faith (in the form of our sainted Faith), published by the Syrian Patriarchate Education Committee in English (The Ancient Syrian Church in Mesopotamia, London, 1903), emphatically states (p. 24), "The Monophysite with this addition is addressed to the "Only-begotten Son", and not to "the Three blessed Persons" (p. 10). This very clear statement is quite free from Monophysitism.

2 They are quite free from Monophysitism. It denies that the divine nature of our Lord was concomminged with the human nature, so that the two natures became comminated and changed so as to give rise to a third nature, and asserts that the two natures became united in indivisible union without confusion, union, or transmutation, and that they remained two natures in an unalterable unity.

3 For early Syrian baptisms see below, § 8.

4 For the Jacobites in India see below, § 9.

The Syrian Unics use the liturgy of "St. James"; the rubrics are often in Garshuni; the rite has a large number of interesting characters, the audible prayers both in Syriac and in Garshuni, the insalubrious in Syria only. The Chaldaic Unics use the liturgy of "Addai and Mari" with some amendments; their daily services are considerably abbreviated. See above, § 5. The Unics of the Nestorians, and in the case of the long festal Night Service about six-sevenths are omitted.

7. Maronites.—These Syrian Christians of the Lebanon derive their names from their teacher John Maro, or Maron, a learned monk, who was named patriarch of Antioch, perhaps early in the 8th century. He has often been confused with an earlier Maron, called by Gibbon a 'saint or savagery of the fifth century', whose relics were greatly venerated. In the time of John Maron the Monothelite controversy was still going on, and these Lebanon Christians espoused that cause. They were thus in opposition to their Christian neighbours, and later, to Christians in the Mahumudan authorities; and they received the nickname "Mardages" or "Rebeis" (Syr. marāḥē). In 1188 they renounced Monothelitism under the influence of their patriarch, Armeq, and were united with the West, then numbering about 40,000 souls. At that time the connexion with the West
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was through the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. After the dissolution of that kingdom in the 14th century, relations with Rome were at times broken off, but they were resumed, and still continue. In the year 1584 Pope Gregory XIII. founded a college and seminary for the education of Syrian clergy, and this institution has the honour of having in the 18th century educated the learned brothers J. S. and J. A. Assemani, to whose literary labours scholars and bishops indebted for a knowledge of Syrian Christianity. The Maronites subscribed the decrees of the Council of Trent in 1726. They are allowed to retain their own liturgical customs, and use the Syriac 'St. James' and other paraphrases. The rubrics in the printed books are in Carashuni; some of the formulae are in Carashuni and Syriac. The Maronite clergy may marry. They also elect their own patriarch, who still takes his title from Antioch. He lives at the monastery of Qanoun (خانج), in the Lebanon, and has under his jurisdiction bishops at Alice, Tripoli (in Syria), Byblos, Tiberias, Baalbek, Heliopolis, Damascus, Berytus, Tyre and Sidon, and in Cyprus. Their numbers are difficult to estimate. Gibbon gives 150 priests and 100,000 souls, but they probably number 150,000, as is suggested by the number of the monasteries of the order. They have suffered much from their feuds with their neighbours, the Druses, and in the year 1866, after great massacres of the Maronites, the British and French governments intervened for their protection.

8. East Syrians, or Nestorians.—We may now take up the history of the Church in the Persian empire from the middle of the 5th century. The first great event for the East Syrians after the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431, was their final expulsion by the emperor Zeno from the school of Edessa and the consequent founding of the school of Nisibis, A.D. 482. Ibas (Syr. Hppha, prn. Hppha, lit. 'given'), Bishop of Edessa, who was strongly Dryophyst, had been condemned by the Latrocinium, or 'Robber Synod,' of Ephesus in 440, but was acquitted and restored to his see by the Council of Chalcedon two years later, after having anathematized both Nestorius and Eutyches. During his lifetime the Monophysites made no way at Edessa, but after his death in 457 they became predominant there, and after a long struggle expelled their opponents. This was a decisive event in the Persian Church. Although up to that time it had had no direct dealings with Nestorianism, its tendency was mainly Dryophyste, and the influx of Nestorianism from the west greatly strengthened that tendency. Nevertheless it is a mistake to suppose that the Persian Church at some definite date in the 5th century espoused Nestorianism and was therefore cut off from the Catholic Church. The process was a gradual one. The principal influence in the latter half of the 5th century was that of Bar Sohm (Baresmas, lit. 'son of the fast'), bishop of Nisibis, who had taught at Edessa and, as now, in the vacancy of the catholicon, organized the East Syrian Church in a Nestorian sense; he must not be confused with his namesake of the Latrocinium, who was a Monophysite. There was some opposition to 'Nestorian' doctrine, especially from the monks of Mar Mattai (see above, §5), who to this day are Jacobites. The patriarchs of the Syriac Church, which was on the Council of Ephesus, see art. NESTORIANISM.

485 to 496, went to Constantinople on a mission from the Persian king, and there declared that his Church knew nothing of Nestorius; he was admitted to communion by the Orthodox, having anathematized Bar Sohm. We may perhaps discount his statement as an Oriental Machiavel; but the incident shows that the separation was not yet complete. Still later, good relations with Constantinople took place in the time of Mar Abba (pron. Awha) the Great, a contemporary of Justinian (see above, §5). This prelate, a convert from Manichaeism, was orthodox from 540 to 552, having been a teacher at Nisibis, and having visited Jerusalem, Egypt, Greece, and Constantinople in the time of Justinian. In his Catholicate, as it would seem, the Council of Chalcedon was accepted by the East Syrian Church. The Simonhadda quotes with approval one of its canons, and dates the council as 25th October, 763 of Alexander, i.e. A.D. 452 (sic); the session of that day was particularly solemn, and was attended by the emperor and empress; it ended the principal work of the council.

One of the first matters discussed in this period was the marriage of bishops and clergy. A council was held in 454 at Beth Lapath (also called Bethamoun, near the present town of Khirbet Marun, in northern Shemia); it allowed them to marry, and even permitted a second marriage to clerical widowers. This was confirmed in a council held by Astartas in the following year. Several patriarchates were married: Babhal (pron. Bbhal), catholics from 406 to 506, his successor, Sylph, and Elias, Paul, and Elias, 5th century. But Mar Abba set his face against episcopal marriages, himself declining to marry; and after his time it became rare. The present rule is that a bishop must be a 'bonum' (monk), but see below, and may not marry or have married, and must never have eaten flesh-meats; nor must he be married at any time during her pregnancy. There is evidence that the rule against eating flesh-meats did not hold in the 7th century. It is noteworthy that Ebedjesus (see below) in his Simonhadda passes over the question of episcopal marriage in silence, and does not refer to the decrees which permitted it.

The definite official adoption of Nestorianism, or of what was taken for such, was decided at the beginning of the 7th century, when the East Syrians, formally repudiated the term 'Theotokos,' and adopted the phrase 'two persons, one person, one person.' The adoption of Nestorianism had two effects: it put an end to the persecution of the Nestorians by the Persian government, and it gave rise to a new and vigorous missionary activity among the Persians and other Western races.

Monasticism was at one time a most flourishing institution among the East Syrians. Thomas of Marga (see below) gives us a graphic description of his own monastery, and we have some information in Sogeram, in P. Bedjan's Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum, and elsewhere. The most important event in the history of the Order is the foundation of Mount Læs (near Nisibis) by Deir-el-Za'afaran (near Marzib; see above, §5). He is said to have been the teacher of James of Nisibis. His Life is included in

Wigram, p. 170.

3 Ps. 119. 21.

4 Heid. Hist. of the Council of the Church, Aug., tr., ii. 333 ff.

5 Wigram, pp. 175, 176, 122; Budge, Book of Governors, l. p. cxivff.

6 Cf. Jg. 8:20.

7 Wigram, p. 349. Eusébius (HE HE 12) says that James the Just was 'boly from his mother's womb,' that he did eat flesh (flesh), i.e., he was a Nazirite, though abstaining from flesh was not part of a Nazirite's vow.

8 The Simonhadda (vii. p. 27) says that bishops were usually chosen from among the monks.

9 Wigram, p. 235. But the latest investigations show that the Simonhadda has been misread. This makes the phrase, if redundant, at least quite orthodox.

10 Heb. vi. 34, very short.

11 See pp. 245, 247.

12 For an account of the institution see Budge, Book of Governors, l. p. cxivff.
Canon Law," now in constant use by the Nestorians, though many of its provisions have become obsolete.\footnote{1}

The missions of the East Syrian Christians have been far extended. Their work in India is attested in the 6th cent. by Cosmas Indicopleustes (see below, § 9). Gibbon remarks\footnote{2} that the barbaric churches, from the Gulf of Persia to the Caspian Sea, were in a state of utter obscurity.\footnote{3} The missionaries extended their labours to Sogdiana, Ceylon, Turkestan, and even to China, where the Nestorian monument of St. ng-an-fu, dated A.D. 781 ('1092 of the Greeks'), is found, and where their activity, which also gave rise to the legend of Prester John (\textit{q.v.}), a supposed priest-king in Tar- tary. Wherever they carried their teaching, they used Syriac as their liturgical language, even though it was not that of the people.\footnote{4} Thus the Malabarese have always used Syriac liturgies. This great activity swelled the numbers of Syrian Christians exceedingly, and the Nestorians and Jacobites together are said to have been more numerous than the Greeks and Latins together.\footnote{5}

Under Muhammadan rule East Syrian Christianity was alternately favoured and persecuted. Under Tamerlane (\textit{Timur the Lame}) in the 14th cent. it was almost annihilated. Only a remnant survived and is still to be found in the mountains of Kurdistan in E. Turkey, in the upland plains of Tabaristan, in the north-west of the present Persian kingdom, especially in that part which is now called in Europe Armenia, and in the low-lying plain of Mosul (Nineveh). The patriarch, who after the foundation of Baghdad (A.D. 762) had left Seleucia-Ctesiphon for that city, later removed to the north, but disputes as to the succession divided the patriarchate. The Nestorians themselves are now under the rule of Mār Shimun (these two words are pronounced as one and are accented on the first and last syllables), who lives at Qāhānīs in the almost inaccessible mountains which surround the Great Zab, a beautiful retreat near the small town of Julmerk. Each successive patriarch takes the name 'Shimun' (Simon), whatever his baptismal name. The East Syrian of the Mosul plain, now called Chaldeans, have been united with Rome since 1680, when they were received by Pope Innocent XI. Their head ('patriarch of Babylon') bears the name of Mār Eli'yā (Elijah). He has several bishops, each styled metropolitan, under him. He retains the title ('of Babylon') which the Nestorian patriarchs often used when they lived at Seleucia-Ctesiphon; he is also named the 'patriarch of Babylon'.\footnote{6} There were at one time patriarchs at Amida (Diarbekr), who also were united with Rome; these bore the name Mar Joseph.

All the East Syrians speak Syriac vernacularly, though many of those in the Mosul plain speak Arabic also. It is common to hear the sailors on the Tigris steamers talking vernacular Syriac, these being Chaldean Uniates. The total number of Nestorians and Uniates combined is, or was till lately, perhaps about 300,000.

A detailed account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Nestorians is given in Maclean-Browne, \textit{The Catholicos of the East, the Ch. ix.} The patriarch, or catholicos, has under him a marjōri, or metropolitan, who bears the dynastic name of Mār Hak, and several bishops, the number varying considerably from time to time. The present method of filling bishoprics (including the patriarchate) is that for each bishop to bring up one or two boys or young men, his nephews or relatives, as potential successors. Such a one is called the \textit{vārti-kēri} (keeper of the diocese). The question of eating meat or marrying the bishop nominates the one who is to succeed him.\footnote{7}

\begin{itemize}
  \item For a list of the works of Ebedjeus see Asseman, \textit{Bibl. Or. l. xiv.} S. 582l. G. P. Bodiger (\textit{Nestorians and their Rituels}, ii. 280ff) gives an English translation of his best known work, the \textit{Marṣaḥīd} ('Pearl'), and (ii. 361ff.) of his catalogue of authors and their works, chiefly East Syrian. Among the principal writers see \textit{Oryx} (Syriac Christian).\footnote{8}
  \item vi. 49.
  \item Renan, \textit{Lett. Or. ii.} 563.
  \item Girbon, vi. 60.
  \item Brit. Mt. 1. The above remarks and much of what follows apply to the time before the Great War.
\end{itemize}
whom he wishes to succeed, but in theory the people elect from among the ‘keepers of the east.’ In the 15th century, the catholicos made an application to the catholicos to members of his own family. This was an innovation, though perhaps not a very remarkable one; and it is now only on account of a more or less frequent practice among the bishops; but the metropolitan consecrates the catholicos.1

In most villages there is at least one priest, in some several; and in larger towns and cities a number. Occasionally a priest is made an archdeacon (archiprestes), but this is now only an honor, not involving special duties. Formerly there were choropiscopi and periodentae (‘visitors’); there are also still diocesan bishops, but at least as old in Syrian Christianity as Rabbanite (5th cent.), as bishops of Galilee.2

The East Syrian Book of Historical Intelligences enumerates nine orders in three divisions: (1) the episcopate; (2) the presbyterate; (3) the deaconate; (4) the sub-deaconate; (5) the lectorate; (6) the deacon; (7) the sub-deacon; (8) the lector; (9) the sub-deacon; (10) the lector. These are said to correspond to the apostolic hierarchy (as given by pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and others) of (1) archbishops, bishops, priests, deacons, subdeacons, readers, (2) deaconesses, subdeaconesses, readers, (3) deaconesses, subdeaconesses, readers. These are thus a sort of symbolic consecration of the bishops; but this is now only an honor, not involving special duties. The ceremony of consecration is often referred to in the services. The procession of the clergy is led by the patriarch, who is vested in the vestments of the bishop, and is very difficult to keep in position. The priests’ stoles, like those of the West, do not differ in shape from those of the deacons; mantles and amices are not worn. Private confession, though often referred to in the services, is not in use. The priests are often referred to in the services as ‘the apostles of the Lord,’ and are in the East Syrian Books, Wednesdays and Fridays do not in practice begin (what we call) the evening service, but they end at sunset; all Eastern Christians reckon the day as beginning and ending at sunset, and our ‘Sunday evening’ is their ‘Monday evening.’

The chief liturgy used by the Nestorians is that of the apostles Addai and Mari.1 This liturgy has many early features, especially a form of eucharistic invocation of the Holy Spirit which is not as fully developed as that in most of the Great Liturgies. It prays that the Holy Ghost may come and rest on the oblation, and bless and sanctify it, that it may become the body of Christ, the remission of sins, etc.; and it does not explicitly mention the change in the elements. But the most curious feature is the absence of the words of our Lord at the Last Supper, when after ‘blessing’ or ‘giving thanks’ He gave the sacrament to the disciples (‘This is my body,’ etc.). Naos argues that of the words of Addai and Mari must have originally had these words. But this is a precarious assumption; there are instances of at least the partial omission of the words. This liturgy in no way refers to the Nestorian controversy; it is the last form of the liturgy of the East Syrian Church. On the last day of the year the anaphora of Addai and Mari is not used, but that of Theodore the Interpreter (of Mopsuestia) or that of Nestorius is substituted, the first part of the liturgy, and the ending, being common to all three. All these anaphoras date, in some form, from very early times; the first probably, in its earliest shape, was compiled before A.D. 431; the other two are certainly not the work of the bishops after that date. They are all named, but are the work of East Syrian authors. The author of Nestorius’ must have had a Byzantine liturgy before him, as many traces of that rite are preserved in it. These anaphoras are quite distinctly of the Eastern, not of the Byzantine, family of liturgies. They seem to have been compiled before Narsai (end of 5th cent.), though doubtless many more modern additions have been made to them.

Eucharistia do not occur very often among the Nestorians—some five or six times a year as a rule, though in a few churches weekly eucharists are the custom. The people communicate, as they pray, standing, the mothers holding up the very little children in their arms to receive. All receive in both kinds separately (the species of bread in their hands), except the very little ones, for whom the celebrant dips a small portion of the consecrated bread in the chalice and then puts it in their mouth. Reservation for the sick is not allowed. The eucharistic bread is leavened. All services, without exception, are sung; but no instrumental music is allowed.

The baptismal customs do not differ greatly from those of the Jacobites.2 The service is closely modelled on the eucharistic liturgies, than which

1 For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINA,
2 See also the monography of the Bishop of Damascus.
3 See also the monography of the Bishop of Damascus.
4 See also the monography of the Bishop of Damascus.
5 For a ground plan see Maclean-Browne, p. 103, for plans of two other famous churches see pp. 291, 292.
6 For a description see Maclean-Browne, p. 267 ff.

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3 For a tradition according to the holding down of the leaven see Maclean-Browne, p. 247.
4 For a description see Maclean-Browne, p. 267 ff.
it is certainly later. There is, however, no kiss of peace. The triple immersion is absolutely total. As with all Easterns, the presbytery confirms, and lays his right hand on or over the neck of the one (whether of the consecrated oil) at the point is not explicitly mentioned in the servicebook, but it is customary for the priest when signing the epiphany with the sign of the cross, to do so with his thumb which he has dipped in the oil. There are now no interrogations or re- membrances, though they are allowed to hand of the 5th century. At Narai, where the reembrances have special reference to hereos. Private baptism is 2. not in practice, allowed; if a village has no church, a child must be carried to another village which has one. Thus some children die unbaptized, though this is not likely that a person would grow up without baptism. Sponsors are considered as being akin to their godchildren, and the relationship is a bar to marriage.

The non-liturgical services are of great interest, and are extremely long, at least in theory. They consist mainly of hymns and anthems. The number of the East Syrian liturgy is reflected in the frequent mention of them by name in these anthems. The calendars of different churches are much alike, and in some respects unique. Most of the saints’ days fall on a Friday, and suit very well with the arrangement of the ecclesiastical year, which is divided into periods of about seven weeks each, more of less—Advent, Epiphany, Lent, Easter. The ‘Apostles’ (after Pontecost), ‘Summer’, ‘Elijah’, ‘Moses’, and the ‘Hallowing of the Church’. A few of the holy days, however, fall on fixed days in the month, as Christmas (Dec. 25), Epiphany (Jan. 6), St. George (April 24, etc.), St. Cyril and St. Julitta (July 15 and Dec. 22), St. Peter and St. Paul (July 29), St. Mary (Aug. 15), Holy Cross Day (Sept. 15), not as elsewhere.

The twelve apostles are commemorated together on a Friday before Lent, the four evangelists on another, the Greek doctors (Diodorus, Theodore, Nestorius) on a third, the ‘Syrian doctors’ (especially Ephraim, Narasi, Abraham (of Kashmir), see above) on a fourth. On other Fridays are commemorated St. James the Lord’s brother, St. Mary, St. John Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul (a part of the Christmas), Mar Abba, or else the patron saint of the church, St. Stephen, the forty martyrs of Sebaste, all the departed, the Seventy, and some others.

The choir is divided into two parts, and according as the first or the second choir begins the anthem the week is called ‘Before’ or ‘After’, ‘Before and After’ (Syr. Qaddān u-Wathāq) being thus taken for the name of the ordinary book of daily services. The propers for Sundays, fasts, and festivals are of very great length, and are contained in the books called Hāddā (‘cycle’) and Gazzā (‘treasure’), two enormous MS volumes, and some others. These two are not published; but the complete East Syrian service for the Epiphany is given in English in Conybeare-Maclean, Ritualis Armenorum, p. 238 ff. (from a MS in the Library of the P. Jacobinda Fide in Hoagel, with the cues all filled in), and a part of these two books is published in Syriac in the Brevisarium Chaldaeum. The Psalms are said (at least in theory) all through twice a week, and the whole Psalter is recited on festivals of our Lord. In the litanies, which are numerous, and one of which is said at almost every service, the ruing patriarch, metropolitan, and bishops, are commemorated by name.

The marriage-service and the burial-service for

laymen (anūḏā) have been published in Syriac.1 The burial-service for the clergy (birūnātā) is much longer and more elaborate than that for laymen. These burial-services are principally and consist partly of dialogues between the departed and the mourners, or between the departed and those already in Sheol. After the funeral the kiss of peace is given, at least in the cathedrals and bishoprics. All sing in line and kiss the hand of the departed, or a cross laid on his breast, and so take leave of him.2 Badger gives an English translation of the baptismal, marriage, and ordination-services, and of the burial-service for priests.

9. Christians of Malabar, or of St. Thomas. Ancient tradition, in which, however, we can have little confidence, makes St. Thomas the apostle the first teacher of Christianity in India. The legend is told in the Syriac Acts of Judas Thomas (see above, § 4), which, curiously enough, makes Thomas (lit. ‘twin’) the twin-brother of our Lord. J. R. Harris sees here traces of the influence of the Heavenly Twins on Christian legend.3 The Ethiopic legend of St. Thomas4 is still fuller. Our Lord divides the world into twelve portions, and Thomas is to build them willingly, but encouraged by our Lord, he goes, guided by Peter and accompanied by Matthias. Jesus appears in the form of a rich man, who sells Thomas as a slave, the price being given to the poor and needy. Peter and Matthias return.

Thomas is set to work as a stonemason, carpenter, and physician; but he afterwards explains that the buildings which he undertook to build were the souls which he used to Christ. He appoints a bishop, priests, and deacons, and departs in a cloud, having been miraculously clothed with the skin which had been flayed off him. According to another account, he was pierced by soldiers’ spears and died. The opposition is said to have been largely due to his preaching asceticism, and persuading wives to forsake their husbands. The Acts of Judas Thomas says that the relics of the apostle were transferred to Edessa (A.D. 292). It has been suggested by some that the name ‘Christian of St. Thomas’ comes from another Thomas than the apostle. This later nameake, Thomas Cumamana, is variously assigned to the 4th or the 9th century. Another legend connects Panteus of Alexandria (c. A.D. 250) with India, where, it says, the apostle Bartholomew had already preached. Pantenus is said by Dr. Conybeare to have found there a copy, in the Hebrew language, of St. Matthew’s Gospel, and to have left it behind him.

The first certain historical testimony to the existence of Christians in India is that of the Alexandrian merchant who afterwards became a monk, and whom we know from his Indian travels as Cosmos Indicopleustes. He travelled far, and his Cosmogoria (Topography of the Whole World) in twelve books, still extant, is a valuable historical piece of evidence, though it is marred by the erroneous geographical conceptions of the day. The first six books may be dated c. A.D. 547, the rest c. 560. Cosmos’s other works are not now extant. He travelled in India and Ceylon, and describes ‘Malvi’ (identified with Malabar) on the Indian coast, the centre of the pepper trade. He

1. See Under Literature at end of this article.
8. See art. Encyclopaedia.
testifies to a large number of Christian churches on the coast of India and in Ceylon and Socotra, whose clergy, he says, were ordained by the Persian bishops, whose jurisdiction the Church had had many martyrs and a large number of monks. Thus we may gather that the Christians of St. Thomas were the result of the activities of the Church of the Persian empire (see above, § 8), and that their Christianity had begun long before Cosmas's time, probably in the 4th century. The name 'Nestorian' is thus obscure. 

Immigrations of Christians to Malabar from Baghfaith and elsewhere occurred twice in the 9th and 9th centuries, and the immigrants inter-married with the native Christians. The later of these immigrants, the Malabarese Nestorian priests (bishops), Mar Sapor and Mar Peruz. The name of the Malabarese Nestorian Church spread to the West, and King Alfred of England sent ambassadors to that country. The converts were protected by the king of Cochin. They had their bishop at Angamala, and he was styled 'metropolitan of India,' having in his jurisdiction 1400 churches and 300,000 in converts.

A theory has lately been put forward by P. L. Geogreese, a native Malabar Syrian, in a tract entitled 'The Syrian Church of St. Thomas,' to the effect that the Malabarese were Jacobites till the 15th century, when they became Nestorians for a hundred years. It is agreed that their Church was originally founded by St. Thomas; but besides the Catholics of the East in the pre-Nestorian period; but this writing maintains that there was a movement towards the Jacobites, not on the Nestorian. The only argument of any importance adduced in favour of this theory is that the existence of the Jacobites in the region of Malabar was anachronistic, in accordance with the ideas of the 10th century. There is no evidence to warrant this view. The two run thus: (a) in the inscription by the cross (was) the suffering of this God. He who is the true Christ, and God above, and Guide ever since'; (b) 'Let me not glory save the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ who is the true Messiah and God above and Holy Ghost.' The words are square brackets are in Syriac. Geogreese admits that 'Guide Ever since' is the first; he interprets the latter as a corrupt form of the Cross inscription. These are said to be anti-Nestorian. But is this the case? The 'Nestorian' of the Persian empire never failed to assert that He who Died upon the cross was God. The existence of Malabar in the 10th century is clear enough, and it is quite possible that there was a movement towards the Jacobites.

Thus the inscriptions mention a liturgy of 'Diodorus' as being in use. These are in the Monophysite or Jacobite Church of the region, and it is maintained, the liturgy in use was non-Nestorian, i.e., Jacobite. That would indeed have been remarkable if the Jacobites had not been the only ones of one of the liturgies after the real father of Nestorianism. Renan did suppose that 'Diodorus' is here a mistake for 'Diodorus,' bishop of the Syro-Nestorian Church. The name Diodorus and Theodore, this is very unlikely. Geogreese agrees that the Nestorians of the Tigris valley at the end of the 15th century, and the beginning of the 16th century had bishops in Malabar, on a request of deputes who had come thence, and he maintains that these converted Malabar from Jacobism to Nestorianism. It does not appear to the present writer that Geogreese has proved his theory, but there is positively this amount of truth in it, that certain of the Malabarese Christians, who have unfortunately always been conspicuous for quarrelsomeness (like their spiritual ancestors), may have had dealings with the dissentient Jacobites of the Tigris valley, or with the Western Jacobites, before the 16th century. Thus a very general use is said to have gone to the Monophysites of Alexandria to ask for a bishop for 'India' (Malabar) A.D. 602.

An ecclesiastical revolution was effected by the Portuguese in Malabar, subsequent to the synod of 1569. They established the Inquisition at Goa in 1569. The Synod of Diamper, in the south of Cochin, held in 1599 under Alexius de Menezes, Archbishop of Goa, united the Malabarese, then estimated at about 200,000 souls, to Rome, and rooted out all traces of Nestorianism. Cliebrity of the clergy was enforced, and made retrospective. All old books and liturgies were destroyed, or radically altered, so that probably there does not now exist a single complete copy of the liturgies as used before the synod. Renan d escribes the Portuguese as the only living persecutors and critics of the Nestorians, and their censors incessantly condemned things which had nothing to do with Nestorianism. The liturgies which they found to be principally used were principally used were in English, by Melchisedec and the Church of Diamper. Yet this cannot be altogether the case, as it contains the names of Nestorius, Diodore, and Theodore, as well as of Ephraim, Abraham, and Nasai (see above, § 8), and the phrase 'Mother of Christ' for 'Mother of God' (see below). Neale gives some of the prayers in what was probably the original order, but indicates by numbers the order in the form approved at Diamper.

The change from ancient customs was effected only after great opposition on the part of the Malabarese themselves, who rallied under their bishop, Mar Abraham († 1597). It was his death that made the Synod of Diamper and the real union with Rome possible.

It is interesting to notice the changes of custom and of liturgy affected at Diamper. Up to this time the Malabar Christians had had but a single bishop at a time, hence for the chiasm at confirmation to be consecrated by a priest (catanar) rather than, as elsewhere in the East, by a bishop; indeed, the Malabarese were accused of not having had confirmation at all, though this is clearly a mistake. The chief changes in the eucharistic liturgy made at Diamper were the following. The pope's name was substituted for that of the patriarch of Alexandria. The names of Nestorius, Diodore, Theodore, and other 'Nestorian' fathers, those of Cyril (of Alexandria) and others were substituted. The phrase 'Mother of God' replaced 'Mother of Christ.' Where, before the consecration, the words 'the body,' 'the blood,' occurred (as often in Eastern liturgies by anticipation), the words 'bread,' 'wine,' were substituted. In the 'Nicene' creed the phrases 'God of God, Light of light, very God of very God,' which were said to have been wanting in the Malabar form, were inserted; probably what is meant is that the first two of these phrases were wanting, but they do not occur in the Nestorian creed (see above, § 3). The phrase 'consummatum est' was substituted for 'Son of the essence of the Father,' the usual equivalent in Syria. Neale unfortunately does not give the text of the creed in his Malabar liturgy. The host was ordered to be elevated at the consecration. But the chief change was a reversal of prevalent Oriental conceptions of liturgy. The epiësis, or invocation of the Holy Ghost, was moved from its place after the narrative of the Last Supper and placed before it, the wording being altered so as to make the episode refer only to a good reception of the sacrament. For these changes see Howard, p. 40; but two of his statements appear to be doubtful. The Portuguese censors probably found no narrative of the Last Supper as such in St. Thomas's words at all, as they would be using on 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8); they probably therefore inserted them from one of the other anaphoras, though not in the place where

1 H. 565. 2 From the Latin of J. F. Beauchot, Hist, eccles. Malabarensis. 3 Liturgies of St. Mark ... and the Church of Malabar, p. 129 ff. 4 Ib. p. 121. 5 Howard, p. 20. 6 For a double invocation in the Egyptian rite, one before and one after the narrative of the Last Supper, see art. Invozion (Liturgical), § 4.
they are found in those anaphoras, but in the place which they thought most suitable. The other statement, that the Portuguese altered the wording of the epistle, is also doubtful, for, as Neale gives it, 'Addat and Mari,' which, as we have seen, is of a somewhat early type, throwing most of the emphasis on the effects and purpose of the consecration, for the benefit of the consecrating rather than the one changed in the bread and wine. The history of the changes at Diaram fully justifies Renaudot's dictum quoted above, and shows that the Portuguese sensors were quite ignorant of liturgical science.

The Portuguese changed the episcopal see from Angamala to Craangonar on the coast, so that it might be more accessible to them, and that they might have a greater hold on the native Church. But during the whole time of their rule in India they aroused constant opposition from the Malabarese, whom the terrors of the Inquisition were never able entirely to subdue.

In 1665, after more than 60 years of Portuguese rule, the Malabarese were enabled by the Dutch conquests in India once more to assert their independence, induced thereto by the murder of Theodore, a bishop sent from Babylon. The Dutch expelled the Jesuits from Malabar soon after 1663. But the Malabarese were not united among themselves, and about half remained in obedience to the Roman Church, while the rest became independent of it. These last gladly accepted Gregorius, Monophysite bishop of Jerusalem, who came from the Jacobite patriarchate at Mardin in 1685. Gregorius consorted with Thomas as metropolitans, and since then the Malabarese have been in the main Jacobite. This change of front appears remarkable at first sight. Yet we must remember that in their origin neither the Malabar Church nor her mother, the East Syrian Church, was Nestorian, for both existed before Nestorianism was propounded. And, though many East Syriacs were genuinely Nestorian, it is very doubtful if their Church was consistently and officially so; still less certain is it that the Malabarese were strongly imbued with that doctrine. Hence we can understand why they grasped at the first chance that was stretched out to help them in getting rid of the Western authority which was imposed on them, but under which they had never rested content.

In the year 1700 and afterwards Nestorian bishops were sent, but they only secured the allegiance of a minority. In the 19th century the history is one of constant litigation between rival parties. The Nestorians of Malabar, after many lawsuits, won recognition in the courts and part of the endowments. In the year 1850 they obtained a bishop from Mar Shimun, the Nestorian patriarchos (see above, § 8). Later, another was sent, but he was murdered by robbers on the journey. In 1907 Mar Shimun consecrated Mar Timotheus (Amineleh), now holds office. There are now perhaps 300,000 Syrian Christians, all told, in India; the majority are Jacobite and have since the 17th cent. adopted the Jacobite liturgies and customs. The metropolitan usually consecrates his own successor, from the family in which the archdiasconate has been hereditary. The archdeacon is called robosan. The eucharist is only rarely celebrated; the laity must communicate at least three times in the year, but there are often eucharists without lay communicants. The churches are plain, consisting of nave and chancel without transepts. There is one altar, the so-called 'side altar' being used only, as in the Nestorian churches, for holding a cross, or books, or the like. The altar is by 6 ft long and 3 ft (or 4 ft) wide, sometimes of stone and sometimes of wood. It stands out from the east wall, as in the Jacobite churches of Mesopotamia, in contrast to the Nestorian altars. At the eucharist the altar is covered with a white cloth, and has a frontal. On it are placed a wooden cross (often with the figure of our Lord painted on the wood), two candlesticks, a bookstand, a slab of wood or marble for the chalice and paten to rest upon, a 'sponge' of silk for wiping the priest's fingers and for cleansing the chalice after the service, and three veils for the chalice and paten. The bread is leavened, and must be prepared on the day it is used; each bread is round, and stamped with a cross. It is called variously ouranion ('Oblation'), 'first-begotten,' 'the Seat,' 'the Body,' the 'Bread' (is 69). These are common Syrian names elsewhere for the eucharistic bread. The naves of the churches have earthen floors; they have no furniture except two bells inside the church; a gallery is often placed at the west side of the nave. The narthex, on the other hand, has a picture; this is probably a relic of Portuguese influence. There is always a veilt at the chancel arch, which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. Externally the churches have a flat adoration; the west front has three storeys, and is whitewashed. The roof is high-pitched, that of the chancel being always higher than that of the nave. The vestments worn seem to be rather like those of the Jacobites of Mesopotamia (see § 5), and are more elaborate than those of the Nestorians. At the eucharist the celebrant wears special shoes, whereas the Nestorians take their shoes off; also a black sere or coarse cotton robe (perhaps a sort of cassock), a white linen albe, a stole in one piece with an opening for the head, girdle, maniple, chasuble (or cope) of silk damask, and cap. At ordination the clergy receive the tonsure, as do the Nestorians, the latter, however, only cutting off some of the ordinand's hair in the form of a cross. As in the worship of all Syrian Christians, much incense is used at the eucharist and other services.

In some externals, especially in the matter of vestments, the Nestorian Malabarese seem to have assimilated their customs to those of their Jacobite neighbours.

20. Modern missions. — Besides the Jesuit, Dominican, and Lazarist missions to the Uniat bodies mentioned in § 6, there have been during the last 80 years various missions to the Jacobites and Nestorians. The American Presbyterian and Congregational Boards of Missions have long had missionaries among them; the Archbishop of Canterbury's educational Assyrian Mission has worked among the East Syriacs since 1888; and later the Russian Church sent a mission to them. Similarly missionaries from the West have laboured among the Malabarese in India. To all these missions we are largely indebted for a knowledge of the people, and for the publication of the Bible in classical and vernacular Syriac, of patristic texts, and of other liturgical and educational works.


TABERNACLES.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

TABU.—The word ‘tabu’ is properly an adjective and appears to mean literally ‘marked off’ (perhaps from Polynesian ‘tabu,’ ‘mark,’ ‘public’) and is applied equally to persons and things, it signifies that casual contact with them is forbidden as being fraught with mystic danger. Custom enjoins a negative or precautionary attitude towards such persons and things. The supernatural influence with which they are temporally or permanently charged. In short, they are ‘not to be lightly approached,’ and that always for some magical reason. They are native to the Pacific region, but has been adopted, with some modification of meaning, to designate a fundamental category of comparative religion. Thus, as in regard to the cognate term mana (q.v.), it is advisable to confine the term to its more generalized sense.

I. Local meaning of tabu.—(a) Cook’s discovery of tabu.—“Taboo,” used indifferently as an adjective, noun, or verb, was introduced into English (British) during the 16th century from the word, in 1777, at Tonga. Hence, by the way, the popular

1 See J. Cook and J. King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1777-80, London, 1784, l. 296, and passim.

London, 1850, Patrornate of Antioch, do. 1872, a posthumous fragment; E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1818, 1912; H. Beazley, Early Eastern Christianity (the Syriac-speaking Church), do. 1894, Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire, Cambridge, 1895, (both for the early period).

II. THE JACOBITES for their doctrine see Literature given under art. MONOTHELETISM.—J. W. Etheridge, The Syriac Churches, London, 1846; O. H. Parry, Six Months in a Syrian Monastery, do. 1880; J. M. Neale, The Patrons of Alexander, 2 vol., do. 1842 (chiefly for the ‘Jacobites’ of Egypt, but this is scarcely a correct designation for the Egyptian Monophysites); Cf. J. Heer, R. H. Hist. of the Community of the Church, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1872-96, ill. 440 ff.; Jacob of Edessa (8th cent.), and Jacob of Nisibis (8th cent.), in the Syriac in Assemani, Bibl. Ort. or. l. 479 ff., English in Brightman, as above (vii).

III. MINORITANS (for their former doctrine see Literature given under art. MONOTHELETISM).—J. W. Etheridge, as above (ii). F. J. Bliss, in PEFQS, 1898, p. 74 ff., 1897, pp. 71 ff., 129 ff., 207 ff., 308 ff.

IV. THE NESTORIANS (for their doctrine see Literature given under art. MONOTHELETISM).—J. W. Etheridge, as above (ii). F. J. Bliss, in PEFQS, 1898, p. 74 ff., 1897, pp. 71 ff., 129 ff., 207 ff., 308 ff.

The English of Mr. Bliss in the two last-named articles is not always clear. His presentation of the Jacobite and Minorite doctrines, and their development, is not especially illuminating. The composite nature of the history of the Syriac Church in the Syriac and English, 2 vols., London, 1903.


VII. LITURGICAL BOOKS USED BY SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.—(a) Translations.—F. E. Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western, do. Oxford, 1896 (pass. Eng. tr. of Syriac St. James, [West Syrian] and ‘Addai and Mari’ [East Syrian], and a Latin translation of an East Syrian liturgy in fragments first published by G. Buckel); J. P. Mergenthaler, Liturgia of ‘Addai and Mari’ (with two other East Syrian liturgies and the baptismal service), London, 1903; E. Reuss, Liber missarum, 2 vols., Frankfurt-on-Main and London, 1847, vol. ii. (Latin tr. of several Syriac, but also Western); A. J. Maclean, East Syrian Daily Offices, London, 1894 (Eng. tr.) and East Syrian Epiphany Rite (Eng. tr. in one volume, with F. C. Conybeare’s Rituals Armenorum, Oxford, 1903; G. P. Badger, as above (iv), (Eng. tr. of East Syrian liturgies, etc.); G. H. Howard, as above (vii); F. G. Maclean, as above (vii).

(b) Syriac texts.—For the Nestorians the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Assyrian Mission has published from the old MSS: Tākhākh (the three anaphoras, baptismal service, etc.), London, 1890; Gādām-6-Walsh (Daily offices), do. 1892; Liturgica Parzil, do. 1891; Lectionary Tables, do. 1894; Sinplōth (calendar tables), do. 1894; Būrākā (marriage service), do. 1892; Avdēla (burial service for laymen), do. 1892; Balūṣā (service for the Forgiveness of the Nieces), do. pt. i., 1894, pt. ii., 1902. For the Unified Chaldeans the Latin editions have published similar works, especially Liber paschæmorum, Hororum Dinarorum, Ordinis Soecici Exordii et Hymnorum Baptematis, Paris, 1881; Liber missarum, mundi, Paris, 1889; and Dionysius Syllogos, do. 1798. An old but general collection of texts and Latin translations is J. A. Asseman’s Codex Liturgiae Ecclesiae Orientalis, Paris, 1794, vol. i, 2 (Thomistical liturgies, baptismal offices, ordination services, etc.) For a fuller bibliography of Syriac liturgies see B. Graes, as above (Introduction).

VII. For SYRIAC TEXTS of each work by Syrian Christians see W. Wright, Short Hist. of Syriac Literature, London, 1904.

A. J. MACLEAN.
found walking about, they would be knocked down with clubs, nay, 
maled, that is, killed.1

Indeed, Captain King (who carries on the story 
after Cook’s death) is perplexed to decide how far 
the ‘implacable and scrupulous obedience’ of the 
natives in regard to the prohibitions laid upon them—
as when Karakakoa Bay was tabued, at 
the request of the navigators, while the remains of 
Captain Cook were being committed to the deep— 
was in ‘religious principle’ and hence 
not to ‘the civil authority of their chiefs’.2 

The whole account, however, makes it clear that king, 
chiefs, priests, and the gods themselves, formed 
one undivided theocracy, whereof tabu constituted 
the chief instrument, at once spiritual and temporal 
in its nature and effects. More especially, it en-
sured a complete control of the economic situation. 
Thus at Tonga the special officer who ‘presided 
over the tabo’ was a remarkable food-controller:

He and his deputies inspected all the produce of the island; 
taking care that every man should cultivate and plant his 
plot; and ordering what should be set, and what not. 
By this wise regulation, they effectually guard against a famine; 
a sufficient quantity of ground is employed in raising provisions; 
and every article, thus raised, is secured from unnecessary waste.3

For the rest, tabu was the corner-stone of the class-system, ensuring the subjection of women 
and of the lower orders to the chiefs, and of all to the king, whose very name was tabu on 
penalty of death.4

(6) Primary connexion of Oceanic tabu with a 
thecocratic system. Here, then, in this instance of 
the religious with the civil forms of authority, 
we have the distinctive mark of tabu as understood 
in its local sense. R. Taylor’s definition of it, as 
‘a religious observance established for political 
purposes’,5 hits off what is at any rate its leading 
aspect in Oceanica. In the Polynesian islands a 
class of chiefs with a social influence proportionate to 
their mana, or supernatural power, was everywhere 
recognized; and in the Eastern groups at 
any rate there were supreme potentates who might 
fairly be termed kings, though sometimes, as at 
Tonga in Mariner’s day, the religious head of 
the community might be said to reign while the war-
chief, his inferior in the hierarchy, actually 
governed.6 On the other hand, no chieftainship 
proper is to be found in Melanesia. Here, how-
ever, the various societies exercise a tumultuous 
but none the less forcible, control over affairs by 
means of tabu; while, conversely, ‘in cases where 
the English word taboo can be employed there is 
always a Melanesian sanction to prohibit.’7 
Thus there is every reason to suppose that 
throughout the Pacific we have to do with customs 
belonging to a single type. This view is supported 
by the remarkable fact that, despite the diversity 
of tongues obtaining in this wide area, the word 
tabu in one of its dialectical forms, as well as 
the complementary term mana, is in general use. But, 
if the name and name of the institution are 
uniform, so presumably will be the origin. On the 
strength of this argument, W. H. E. Rivers has 
recently tried to show that tabu in its Oceanic 
distribution stands everywhere alike for the 
prestige acquired by the authority exercised by 
an immigrant folk—his so-called ‘Jones people’— 
in its dealings with an indigenous population of 
markedly inferior culture.8 It is interesting to 
speculate how a system of tabus may have 
developed on the spot under stress of such 
culture-contact—how, for instance, barbarians, 
already worshipping gods and respecting private 
property, might come to impose their will on 
magic-haunted communistic savages, for whose 
threats rational procedure was for ever furnished 
as the grounds of obedience. On the other hand, 
if the immigrants came from Indonesia, as the 
theory assumes, it is also possible that they brought 
some form of the custom with them ready-made, 
since the Indonesian ponun is ‘exact equivalent to 
the “taboo” of the Pacific islanders.’

Thus in Timor the custom of “tabu” called here “ponum,” is in very general, fruit trees, houses, crops, and property of all 
alls sorts, being protected from depredation by this ceremony, 
the reverence for which is very great. A palm branch is placed in the 
open door, showing that the house is tabooed; it is an 
effective guard against robbery than any amount of locks 
and bolts.

This mode of indicating a tabu is similar to the 
Oceanic. Thus, when Cook wished to set up his 
observatory in the Sandwich Islands, the priests 
tabued the place for him by setting up wands;9 
and the soli, or tabu-marks, of the Banks group in 
Melanesia usually consist of the leaves of some 
plant.10 It may well be that, that the property-
mark, with its implication of a transferable curse, 
came into Oceanica along with the chiefs of the property 
and ownership. It certainly was most effective in pro-
tecting property—far more so than the guns which the early mariners discharged at the thievish 
islamers with a like object in view.

(6) Secondary development of tabus in Oceanica. —

It remains to note that, whereas the essence of tabu in its local signification consists, as has been shown, in a theocratic form of government, which 
in its turn may have developed by way of an 
apotheosis of lordship, the ramifications of the 
notion are endless and cover the whole religion of 
Oceanica, at any rate so far as it is taken in its 
negative aspect, namely as a system of tabus. 
The theocracy could consecrate a site, or devote 
a victim, or appropriate a house or canoe, 
or betroth a woman, or proclaim a rest-day for men 
or a close-time for games, all these being cases of 
the communication of tabu by a ritual act of 
imposition, such as could at will be neutralized 
by a ceremonial removal.11 On the other hand, many 
tabs were inherent rather than acquired, such as 
those associated permanently with women, 
strangers, the sick, and the dead, or for the time 
being with the woman in child-birth or the warrior 
on a campaign. The world-wide distribution 
of similar beliefs concerning an infectious impurity 
which makes it dangerous to touch souls that they can be 
referred in the mass to an immigrant culture or 
treated as mere reasons of state, the by-products 
of the administrative scheme. At most we may 
say that, in so far as the direction of affairs was 
centralized and deliberate, they were incorporated 
in the political machine and to a like extent 
became subject to manipulation. Thus, at Hawaii 
in 1819, King Kamehameha at one stroke abrogated 
the law of the tabu of the tabu; though only, let us note, 
to make way for la tabu, the British Sunday.12 So 
much, then, for the local or Oceanic sense of tabu 
with its special connotation of a theocratic system 
of control; more or less conscious organized 
body of sanctions backed by the joint authority 
of Church and State. 

2. Scientific meaning of tabu.—(a) Tabu as an 
aspect of rudimentary religion.—For the purposes 
of the science of comparative religion it is 
convenient to drop the implication of a human 
sanctuary and to insist solely on the supernatural

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3. Rivers, I. E. E. 
4. In his In the Pacific Ocean, 1837—39, L. 303. 
5. ib. 672. 
6. Rivers, I. E. E. 
7. In his In the Pacific Ocean, 1837—39, L. 353. 
9. Rivers, I. E. E. 

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or mystic aspect of the penalties in store for the tabu-breaker. Under one head a large variety of aversions characteristic of the less advanced peoples, of whom it has been said that they have no king but custom. Just as their respective codes are largely automatic, so, correspondingly, the rule itself has imputed to it a no less automatic power of self-maintenance and self-vindication. Indeed, so necessary is it for good order and security to bring the sanction normally attributed to a tabu that it is safer to deny the name altogether to prohibitions deriving their force mediatly from a god or his earthly representative and to distinguish these as religious interdicts or bans. Tabu, in short, is to be understood as meaning 'unlucky to meddle with' rather than forbidden by edict human or divine. It belongs to what may be termed the perceptual (Lévy-Bruhl would say 'prelogical') stage of religion, when values are massively apprehended without analysis of their grounds. At this stage emotion of the collective or mobbish sort is not directed, as regards both the excitative and the inhibitive processes that govern the social life. Now of all the emotions fear is inhibitor-in-chief, having in virtue of its haunting quality a special power over the human mind. Experience teaches that the primary source of fear is the unfamiliar or strange as such; and this kind of fear in varying degree is always present as an element in that complex emotion of awe or reverence which is the root of religion. Tabu, then, stands for the whole mass of such fear-inspired inhibitions in so far as they proceed directly from the religious emotions, as it regulates the social tradition in the relative absence of reasoned direction. These we have as an integral part of the psychological clue to a vast variety of customary ainstienses—'negative rites,' as they may be called—of which the particular conditions are a matter for historical treatment in detail.

(b) Tabu and the notion of contagion.—It may next be noted that emotions are infectious. It is, indeed, the leading principle of mob-psychology that emotions are propagated more readily than ideas, their external manifestations lending themselves to unintelligent imitation. Moreover, fear is, perhaps, the most infectious of all. Hence the fear-inhibition embodied in tabu always implies an infectious unlikeliness or taboo of some kind on neighboring persons. As A. van Genep in his analysis of the fady (=tabu) of Madagascar shows, the institution rests on two notions, one that of tohina, 'contagion.' 1 'Everything,' says Jeovna, 'which comes in contact with a tabooed person or thing becomes itself as dangerous as the original object, becomes a fresh centre of infection, a fresh source of danger to the community.' 2

Jeovna goes on to discriminate between 'things taboo,' the primary sources of such contagion, and 'things tabooed,' in which the tabu-infection is not inherent but derivative. 3 A single thing tabooed might infect the whole universe, as he says with pardonable exaggeration; 4 but in practice the transmissible fear is strictly limited in its possible effects, being confined to certain channels prescribed by convention. Meanwhile it is not always easy to draw the line between the two classes. The clearest cases of 'things tabooed' are those in which, as in Oceania, a divine chief tabus something hitherto common, or nos-say, a hunting-ground—and then after a time restores it to the customary use. But when Jeovna accepts at its face-value the Polynesian explanation that the tabu on the sick is due to the fact that they are possessed by an evil spirit, and therefore pronounces them 'tabooed but ... not taboo,' 5 it is at least arguable that a 'pre-anistic' basis must be sought for the belief; for what more perceptibly contagious than cerebral lapses (and precisely the stranger and more alarming) forms of disease? It is surely no mere superstition to suppose that sickness—nay, as it were, death itself—is 'catching.' On the other hand, it is hardly profitable, in deference to the theory that the emotions of man afford the best criterion of his instincts, to regard 'things taboo' as so many danger-signals to which mankind has an innate predisposition to attend. Tabus need rather to be studied in relation to their proximate conditions, which are not biological but historical. In other words, tabus are primarily matters of custom, forming part of the social inheritance, not of the individual heredity.

(c) Tabu and the notion of supernatural power.—The other notion on which the tabu of Madagascar rests, according to van Genep, 6 is that of mana, or supernatural power. The person or thing is not to be trifled with, because liable to react with a force of unknown range and degree. There is a spiritual electricity that must be isolated lest it blast all. Now, if religion were all fear, such mana would rank as wholly bad, since fear is a shrinking from evil. But other primary constituents of the religious mood make rather for interest, receptivity, approach, communion. For reckless self-assertion, indeed—for what the Greeks knew as ἀφεσις—there is always the devil to pay. But fear tempered with wonder and submissiveness, and thus transmitted into reverence, is the forerunner of love. So mana has its good side as well, though from the standpoint of tabu this helplessness remains, so to say, in reserve, being a consummation that lies beyond the shadow of the fear-inhibition as such. Meanwhile to an advanced theology that has clarified its concepts by the method of antithesis the savage apprehension of mana by way of tabu seems blurred and equivocal, an experience of something monstrous, half-devil and half-god. And that there is some such ambiguity in the value perceived cannot be denied. The sacred and the abominable, the pure and the obscene, the hallowed and the accursed all stand in the same perturbed awareness of the object. Nevertheless, rudimentary religion has gone a long way towards defining in practice, if not in theory, the good and the bad manifestations of the hidden power. Thus the novice at initiation or the warrior on a campaign is tabu that he may seek and find grace in the self-concentration that ensues after spiritual crisis overcome. On the other hand, the criminal is tabu because his very soul is attainted: wherefore, as the words of his doom, 'Sacer esto,' imply, he cannot touch water and fire lest he sully their purity with his foulness.

(d) Tabu as a source of personal religion.—At this point it may be observed that the institution of tabu is not only the main organ of social discipline at the lower levels of culture, but likewise the seed-bed of personal religion. The latter function hinges on the fact that to be tabu with respect to society is at the same time to be tabu in relation to oneself. The external signs of this self-regarding attitude of precaution are often too indistinguishable, as when a man cannot feed himself, or must scratch his head with a stick, or needs to snuff up the holiness that exudes from his fingers. But an inward-seeking view reveals a profit to be derived from this in such practices. The mana to be derived is just that part of a man that he feels to be most

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1 Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar, p. 17.
3 Ibid. p. 61 f.
4 Ibid. p. 61 f.
5 An Intro. to the Hist. of Religion, p. 70.
6 Loc. cit.
to see whether the passivity induced is of the pregnant order. As an ingredient in a 'rite of passage' to a higher plane of experience, the chrysalis stage of the soul is symptomatic of development. If, on the other hand, the will to win through be somehow displayed on the face of triumph; too much safeguarding has destroyed; the husk has stifled the germinal process.

(f) Methods of studying tabus in detail.—This cursory sketch of tabus aims at no more than a generalized view of institutions as it bears on the earlier growth of the spirit of religion. A fuller treatment might be based on the study of the particular systems of tabus native to the various ethnic areas—as has here been attempted only in regard to the Pacific region—when many differences of detail and shades of local colour would doubtless come to light. In defence of the present method, however, it can be urged that it deals with tabus on the ethnological principle would well-nigh involve a survey of religions on the same distributive plan, since every savage people has a religion and every savage religion has its tabus. Nay, more: savage religion tends to become the reflection of the social life itself; so that a regular panorama of cultures may seem to be the eventual outcome of such a method. Another way of dividing up the subject (but one again that is too far afield) would be that of distinguishing certain main departments of activity typical of primitive society as a whole and showing how each is conditioned by its own set of special tabus. The food-interest, e.g., is governed by one vast network of ritual controls, the sex-interest by another. Indeed, the critical stages of every vital process are hung about with such customary danger-signals. Sometimes affinal tabus can be shown to correspond to facts; more often they appear arbitrary, sheer aberrations of fancy, due to false analogy or what not, that have been incorporated in the tribal lore by a historical chance. Thus, however detailed our study of tabus, we are not likely to arrive at the explanation of minor features. For these reasons it has seemed preferable here simply to enlarge on the general principle that, at the primitive level, the object of religious belief or worship is always tabu, just as it is always mana as well; and that, moreover, tabu forms the hither aspect of the religious experience, inasmuch as fruitination is the essential ingredient of the ritual aspect of religion may lead to atrophy of the ideas and beliefs through which the religion has been built up.

(g) Tabus from the standpoint of civilization.—Tabu being properly an institution of savagery, it would hardly be in point to consider at length its ultimate consequences for civilization as apart from its survivals in folk-lore, which indeed are numerous. But a word about such after-effects may be added by way of conclusion. We must not look for them solely within the sphere of religion as it is now. With the gradual substitution of a rational for an emotional system of controls, there has come about a decentralization of authority whereby disciplines once merged in an all-pervasive religious sanction have been invested with quasi-independent functions. Polities to-day deals with the divine right of kings, law with the sacredness of property, morals with the virtues of temperance and chastity, and so forth. In all such cases the tendency is to lose the validity to the old-world sentiment of tabu. Reason prefers to rest its case on grounds of so-called common sense. At most the immediacy and seeming unconditionality of the tabu might elicit the sympathies of certain schools of ethical thought. As for modern religion, while it hesitates to adopt a rationalist outlook, it is naturally anxious to purge its traditional rites of the mildew of ancient superstition. On all sides, however, so far as the influence of a philosophy of man makes

worse the saving—the will for power. Such power may be coveted for temporal ends. Savage savages are not more disinterested than the rest of their kind. But at least it is proximately envisaged as a spiritual power. At least it is the sort of power that comes with and after the exercise of the ethical or the exercise of humility. Is there good evidence, too, that a sense of unworthiness consequent on the violation of his self-regard as—say, his vows—enough to do the office on the part of the primitive wonder-worker? There can be no doubt, then, that the experience both of the sense of inspiration and of its withdrawal is often perfectly genuine; and, again, that the due safeguarding of such a gift is a lesson first acquired in the school of tabu. Further, not to lay exclusive stress on the ecstatic experience peculiar to the religious genius, the whole development of personality, so far as this comes about by way of reverence and reflexion, arises largely out of the tabu condition. No other such opportunity is afforded in the gregarious life of the savage tribesman for that self-communing whereby man eventually becomes master instead of slave of the sense-world. Self-respect, again, is nourished on privacy; the king or priest must keep his distance from the profanum vulgus, lest he make himself cheap not only in their eyes but in his own. For the rest, tabus stand for the etiquette of savage life, and by encouraging mutual consideration enables manners to ripen into morals, the end of which is freedom.

Dangers of the over-development of tabus.—Hitherto the fruitfulness, the educative value of tabus as a factor in religion of the conceptual or rudimentary type has been chiefly signalled. After all, the inhibition of impulsive methods of human advancement and such inhibition may be overcome, with paralysis of the will to live as a consequence. Tabus such as represents negation, and a religion made up mostly of negations is necessarily sterile. Denial, even self-denial, cannot but be soul-destroying, if taken as an end in itself. Hence a meticulous scrupulosity is a sign of degraded religion. Nothing, e.g., is so characteristic of the drivel-cult of the Todas as the web of tabus in which every action of the priest-darayman is emmeshed, and Rivers not without good reason comments: 'The Todas seem to show us the bed of ritualism: the ritual aspect of religion may lead to atrophy of the ideas and beliefs through which the religion has been built up.'

^1 Cf. kapahau, to put on airs of distance or separation from others, with mana, to be without comfort, in E. Tregear, The Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary, Wellington, N.Z., 1899, p. 455.

itself felt, there is of late manifested a deeper interest in the emotional life, more especially as it is treated in the Talmud. All alike agree that, with its study of the crowd and in individual psychology with its doctrine of the submersion of the conviction is growing that society and mind alike are contained from above—so far as from above—that reason is at best a constitutional ruler whose authority rests not on force but on consent. It may be, then, that, examined from this point of view, the primitive institution of tabu will be found to embrace in the modern sense of order that to-day are as active as ever beneath the surface of a changed custom. Experience, which is experiment, has doubtless taught us to reject many a freakish usage dear to the old order; but this experience, which in its most critical form is science, bids us seek beneath the accidents of history for those essential laws whereby our racial sense of direction is continuously maintained.

LITERATURE.—(1) For tabu in Oceania see the works cited above, early authorities such as Cook and Mariner being especially enlightening, since the original social system has long been gone, at any rate in Polynesia; compare also Th. Watzl and G. Gerland, Anthropologie der Naturvölker, Leipzig, 1856–72; G. Hagen, Theol. Zeitschrift, 1875, 1878, 1886; Fr. G. Turner, Samoa a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before, do. 1839; E. F. Brown, by a Paheka Maori, do. 1884; and, since the same cultural influences presumably extend to Indonesia and the Malay region (including Madagascar), see also W. S. W. W. Smith, The Borderlands, Tales at Table from Madagascar, Paris, 1904, brings the local into relation with a general interpretation. (2) For a world-wide review of the facts about tabu see J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 12 vols., London, 1911–16, esp. vol. iii., Taboo and the Biology of the Soul, and for his general theory, vol. i., The Magic Art, i. 111 ff., also Psyche's Tabu, do. 1915. The subject being germane to any systematic account of primitive religion, it is hard to draw up a list of authorities, but the following, in addition to those already quoted in the text, will be found useful: W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, London, 1884; E. Crawley, The Mistic Home, do. 1887; Louis Pauwels, Formes Élémentaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1912, esp. p. 407 f.; and, on special aspects of tabu, Crawley, Ps. vi. (1887) 130 ff.; H. Westermarck, Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco, London, 1914; H. Webster, Rest Days: A Study in Early Law and Morality, New York, 1916. For a psychological study of tabu see R. R. Marett, The Threshold of Religion, London, 1914; E. S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, do. 1919.

TAHITIANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TALISMAN.—See CHARMS AND AMULETS.

TALMUD.—Two great works are known under the title 'Talmud'—a word (תלמוד) which denotes primarily 'teaching' and secondarily 'learning.' The former is the Palestinian and Babylonian recensions, both of which are, in form, commentaries on the text of the Mishnah (משנה). The Mishnah ('repetition,' hence oral teaching by repeated recitation) was completed about A.D. 200. The Talmud consists of the Mishnah with the Gemara (גמרא). It represents the scholastic activities of the Jewish Rabbis from the beginning of the 3rd to the close of the 5th century A.D. The history of the compilation of the Talmud has been dealt with in many treatises and essays. It is not the design of the present article to add to these or to reconsider the critical literary problems involved. Two practical questions will occupy us: (1) the attitude of the outside world to the Talmud, and (2) the causes and nature of the permanent value of the Talmud within Judaism.

1. The Talmud in history. In the 1st century which saw the completion of the Talmud, the Rabbis from the beginning of the 3rd to the close of the 5th century A.D. The year 553, the Emperor Justinian was called upon to make a journey which arose from two sections of Jewry in the Byzantine realm. Whereas some were desirous of publicly reading the Scriptures both in Greek and in Hebrew, others wished to use the Hebrew only. Justinian ordered the prefect of Asia to bring him the books of the imperial decision in favour of the use of Greek (the Synagogue might use Greek if it preferred it to the Septuagint), or of other vernaculars. Justinian, as a rule, was as Latin in the Italian provinces. The emperor, more over, forbade any attention to the reading of the Scriptur. The opening words of the rescript explain Justinian's intention. The Jews, he suggested, should read their Scriptures with an eye to the hidden meaning and see in them a prophetic announcement of Christianity. Hence the emperor would naturally curb the popularity of the Rabbinic exegesis, which of course would confirm the Jews in their refusal to admit Christological interpretations. Thus Justinian, who introduced drastic legislative enactments against the Jews, was also among the first to attempt interference with the free use and spread of their literature.

We must here confine our attention to that phase of interference which concerns the Talmud. It was not till the 1st century that the Talmud assumed practical shape. Paris, in the year 1444, was the scene of the first public burning of copies of the Talmud. Before that date the Rabbinic doctrines had been assimilated in the de Inquisitione Judaerorum of Agobard; but from the Paris incident onwards these assaults became far more frequent and dangerous. Nicholas Donin of La Rochelle had, while a Jew, been excommunicated by the Rabh Yahiel of Paris because of his denial of the validity of the Rabbinic tradition. This occurred in 1255; he subsequently joined the Franciscans, and in 1259 he formally laid an accusation against the Talmud before Pope Gregory IX., who addressed bulls to many lands (including England) ordering the seizure of all copies of the Talmud pending a public inquiry. In France the matter was seriously taken up. Charges of blasphemy, immorality, particularism, and absurdity were formulated; a public dispute between Donin and four Rabbis was ordered. The humours and fulminations of such debates have been satirised in Heine's poem 'Disputation.' But the consequences were deplorable. The Talmud was condemned; many copies of it were burnt; and popular outbreaks against the Jews resulted.

Within a few years similar scenes were enacted in Barcelona. Here again the attack originated with a Jewish convert to Christianity, Pablo Christiani. He instigated a public debate between himself and Nahmanides in 1265, as to the attributes and coming of the Messiah, and the Rabbi was sentenced to exile because his defence of Judaism was pronounced blasphemous. In 1264 Christiani induced Pope Clement IV. to appoint a Commission of censors, who expunged all those passages which appeared derogatory to Christianity. In particular, as time went on, Talmudic references to ancient paganism were mistrusted as being attacks on the Church. This charge was brought forward by yet another erstwhile Jew, Geromin de Santa Fé, who engineered a public dispute in Tortos in 1410, and, like Christiani, was permitted to the verdict of the most intricate problems of Biblical exegesis in relation to Messianic belief. The practical outcome again
was not a settlement as to the significance of 1Sa 33, but the confiscation of copies of the Talmud. Of much greater issue was the controversy which raged round the Talmud at the beginning of the 16th century. Owing to the part taken by Reuchlin (q.v.) in this incident, the Talmud became the battleground between the orthodox and non-orthodox Jews, between the Hasidim and the humanists. Again the protagonist in the attack on the Talmud was one who had left the Synagogue for the Church. It must not, however, be thought that the pressure of the converts has invariably assumed this guise. In the recent assaults made on the Talmud by representatives of modern anti-Semitism (q.v.), powerful among the defenders of the fair name of the Rabbinic system were such famous Judeo-Christian scholars as Daniel Chwolson and Paulus Casel. The opponent of Reuchlin was of a different type. We know very little as to the antecedents of Johann Pfefferkorn, of whom Erasmus said that from a bad Jew he became an execrable Christian ("ex scleratore Judeo sacerlatissima Christianus"). For no reliance can be placed on the insinuations made by his detractors that in his day Pfefferkorn had added to the respectable calling of a butcher the disreputable career of a burgher. All that we know is that Pfefferkorn was animated by a strong animosity towards his former co-religionists, that his antipathy far exceeded his learning, and that he found support for his campaign among the Dominicans of Cologne. Though the Jews had been excluded from that city in 1429 and only regained rights of free domicile there with the coming of the French in 1798, Cologne remained during the 15th and 16th centuries the headquarters of the campaign against Jewish books. It would be impossible to recite the details of the oft-told tale of Pfefferkorn's pamphlets and Reuchlin's rejoinders; or of the seizure of Hebrew books in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1509, their restoration, and the long-drawn-out struggle that ensued in Rome. Nor is it of any importance to us now whether or not Pfefferkorn wrote the works that bear his name. The whole incident would have been forgotten but for certain facts. In the first place, this battle of the books gave rise to the famous satire, the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum, the first part of which appeared at Tübingen towards the end of 1414. The effect of this rather savage satire was considerable. As an exposure of obscurantism it remains one of the most masterly efforts ever put forward on behalf of humanism. The struggle between Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn became, in short, elevated to a higher plane. Reuchlin, once for all, struck the true note when he protested against the destruction of a literature because elements of it were distasteful to certain of its critics. 'If the Talmud contains errors,' he said, 'let us render them innocuous by studying to sift the chaff from the grain. Do not burn the Talmud, but read it.' It is to Reuchlin that we owe the foundation of Hebrew chairs in the universities; the first Hebrew text printed in Germany was the edition of seven Psalms used by Reuchlin in 1512. The study of Hebrew in Christian Europe commenced with him, was taken up by his immediate successors, and has never since been relinquished.1 Reuchlin's devotion to Rabbinism began with his interest in the Kabbalá. But Hebrew was the passion of his life. And there is no doubt that to him the Talmud was a book of the Bible which led to the publication of a complete printed edition of all its tomes. There were, as we shall see, printed editions of parts of the Talmud available in 1510, when he wrote that 'he would like

2 A Book of Essays, p. 317.
with man—the Talmud must be conceded a high place.

In the main, then, the Talmud retains its worth because it has so thoroughly absorbed the prophetic concept of the logos as the communion of religious life. But life is not altogether expressible in terms of conduct. There is the intellectual side. Now, for long intervals, the Talmud was the main means by which Judaism lived and invigorated its mind. Some of the greatest Talmudists of the Middle Ages were indeed also devoted to science and philosophy, in the technical sense of those terms. But there were masses of Jews who knew no other intellectual interest than the Talmud and the allied literature. The nature of the Talmud saved them from stagnation. For the Talmud is a work of most manifold interest. It concerns itself with every phase of human activity. To read it intelligently—and it was assuredly so read—was a liberal education in the arts and sciences and the philosophies. So wide is its range that a student of the Talmud is perforce acquainted with very many subjects which nowadays are regarded as distinct disciplines. The mind of the student was kept alert; his attitude never became scholastic; at every point he was in contact with the actualities. It was a useful function of the Talmud to maintain this alertness, so that to con over its pages was not identical with losing oneself in an obsolete past. The Talmud breathes with vital freshness.

This enables us to understand why the Talmud has never been superseded by the codes founded upon it even by authorities so competent and able as Moses Maimonides and Joseph Karo. The codes omit the very element which makes the Talmud so important, so unique. The codes reduce ritual and religious conduct to rule; the decisions are stated in precise paragraphs; they are anonymous. But the Talmud presents processes as well as results; there is little of rule in it, less of precision; and the dicta are largely associated with the names of their authors. We see the religious evolution in action. And, just as it is in action in the older book, it remained in action in the modern life. The claim often put forward by recent Talmudists that their beloved tomes represent a progressive Judaism is well founded. Codes have an air of finality, while the key-sotes of the Talmud is continuity.

For the Talmud, after all, comes into line with the newer theory of the evolution of religion. The essence of the Talmud, it has been said, was to obscure the difference between Scripture and Tradition. This may be true, but modern criticism tends to obliterate the distinction. The Scripture is itself a traditional evolution, so line newer theories hold. The Talmud in essence anticipated this theory, not in the direction of belittling the divine character of the written text, but in the direction of magnifying the human part in the authorization of the message. Man has his part to play in bringing the Law into operation—in interpreting it, which is often another term for expanding it.

We can here merely mention the beauty of the Talmud, its felicities of thought, its flights of fancy, its parables, its poetry. The Jew did not merely feed his mind on the wit of the Talmud or his spirit on its idealism. His heart and imagination found their nourishment there also. From its pages the liturgy derived some of its choicest prayers. In germ, the Talmud already contains the mysticism which later ages grew up so luxuriantly in Judaism. That this mysticism rarely became antimanic was due almost entirely to the Talmud, which more than permitted—for it encouraged—individualism as well as communism in the religious life. Our present point, however, is that volumes could be compiled (volumes have been compiled) out of the fine gems presented in a literary form which is unlike that of any other work—unlike in grotesqueness as well as in efficiency.

In the presence of these merits the attacks on the Talmud failed. Partly they were theological, partly moral, partly social. Rishonim was cast on its trivialities; fault was found with its religious conceptions; objection was taken to its attitude to Gentiles. These unfavourable criticisms were not all unfounded, for the Talmud contains much of inferior value, and bears the marks of the different ages and strata of thought in which it grew up. Nevertheless, some of the attacks on the Talmud were absolutely false; in others the assailants confused the attitude towards the Rome which destroyed the Temple with the attitude to the Rome which became the seat of the papacy. Often, too, overmuch importance was attached to the older dicta of isolated Rishonim. When, however, it was protested by Donin in 1339, and by Romano in 1553, that it was the Talmud that confirmed the Jews in their obstinate fidelity to the Synagogue, the Jews came to take an affectionate regard for its spirit. Written in style far removed from modernity, the Talmud is one of the most modern of books.


I. ABRAMHS.

TAMIL-SPEAKING PEOPLES. —See DRAVIDANS.

TAMMUZ. —Tammuz was the West Semitic form of the name of the great Asiatic nature-god, typifying the changing seasons in their relation to man's needs, desires, and passions, though the last-named were far from being so pronounced in connexion therewith as the other two aspects. For its meaning, and also other names of Tammuz, see §§ 7, 10, below.

1. The old view of the legend of Tammuz. — Prior to the successful reading of the Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions the legend of Tammuz was regarded as being exclusively West Semitic, owing, apparently, to the scene of the god's activities being located, in the then extant records, in Syria. There was considerable difficulty, however, in finding an acceptable root by which the name of the god might be explained.

2. Its most familiar versions. — According to the classic legend of Tammuz, his mother had unnatural intercourse with her own father, urged thereto by Aphrodite, whom she had offended. Pursued by her father, who sought to kill who sought to kill the child, he fled into the sea, where he was born in a tree, from whose trunk Adonis (the Greco-Syracuse name of Tammuz) was in due time born. So charmed was Aphrodite with the beauty of the infant that, placing him in a cist, she
handed him to Persephone to take care of. The goddess of the underworld, however, when she found what a treasure she had in her keeping, refused to part with him again. Zeus was therefore appealed to, and he decided that for four months, every time Adonis should be left to himself, four should be spent with Aphrodite, and the remaining four with Persephone. A variant account, however, agrees with the Babylonian legend in making him pass six months with Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone) and six with Ištar, or Aphrodite. The classic versions represent Adonis, or Tammuz, as being passionately fond of hunting, and undeservedly therefrom by the fiercest quarry. His end was tragic, as he was slain through the tusk of a wild boar piercing his groin (see § 14).

3. The Syrian versions.—The centre of the Syrian worship of Tammuz was probably Gebel; in any case, Balih (‘the district’, as Aphrodite seems to have been called in the extreme west of Asia) was believed to have migrated thither from her realm of Cyprus for love of Tammuz (Tammuz). But before Tammuz she had loved Ares (Mars), and duly aroused the jealousy of her husband Hephæstus. In this Tammuz is described as the son of Cuthar, king of the Phœnicians, to whom, when she fled from Cyprus, Balih came and made all the villages around subject. It was not the irresponsible act of a wild boar, however, that caused the death of Tammuz, but the jealousy of either Aphrodite’s husband Hephæstus or her lover Ares, who came and slew Tammuz on Lebanon whilst he was hunting wild boars.

The Syrian lexicographer Bar Bahbl also gives the legend as he had heard it: ‘Tammuz was, as they say, a hunter, shepherd, and chaser of wild beasts; who when Balihah loved him took her away by force from her husband. And when her husband went forth to seek her Tammuz slew him, but was himself slain later on by a wild boar which he encountered in the wilderness, and his father made a great weeping for him in the month named after him.’

The Rabbinical references to Tammuz are more curious than instructive with regard to the history and development of the myths concerning him.

One (that of Rabb Solomon Isaaci, or Rakhi), commenting on Ezek 8:4, in order to connect the root of the same name with the Chaldean ahu, ‘to make holy’, describes it as ‘an image which the women made hot in the inside, and its eyes were of lead. And they said, this is the image of the head of the burning, and it seemed as if it went; and they (the women) said, “He saith for offerings.”’

This and other varying traditions concerning Tammuz, however, seem to belong to the Christian era.

4. The worship of Tammuz in Syria.—In all probability the mourning for Hadadrimmon mentioned by Zopherah, (15:1) is a reflection of the lamentations for Tammuz, with whom this deity is said to have become identified; and in a passage in Amos (8:9) the Israelites lament for an ‘only son’. The most notable Lady, ‘the most notable’ (which some in the text read as ‘the mistress’), for some time, was a reflection of the mourning for his bereaved spouse or lover. When Belil, his sister, in the Babylonian legend, says, ‘My mother, only one, do not cause me pain’ (by leaving the land again), we (above p. 165) (see § 6 below), we have perhaps a better parallel. Byblos, the Biblical Gebal, was the centre of the worship of Tammuz in Syria, where, in the month of June, the festival of the naked sun-god was held, and lasted for seven days. ‘Gardens of Adonis’ —flower-vases planted with seeds which sprang up quickly, and as quickly, owing to lack of moisture, faded away—were prepared by the mourning women as emblems of the early death of the youthful Adonis. Thronges of wailing women filled the streets and the gates of the temple, tearing their hair, disfiguring their faces, and gashing their breasts.

The Gallic—emasculated priests of Ashtoreth, the spouse of Tammuz, took part in the mourning for the bridegroom of her youth. These days of mourning were followed by days of rejoicing for his resurrection, during which a papyrus-head came over into the Mediterranean from Alexandria—an emblem of the severed limbs of Osiris, which, gathered up by Isis, his incommensurable spouse, after he had been disembowelled by Typhon, had of old arrived at Gebal. Thus did the legend of Tammuz assimilate itself with the Egyptian myth of the sun-god Osiris.

5. Tammuz in Babylonia, his birth-place.—So far Babylonian sources have furnished but few details of the Syrian and the Greek versions of the myth of Tammuz. In all appearance the legend had not been carried from Syria to Babylonia, as might be expected, but one which the ancient people wrote down in its original form it must have been of considerable antiquity. According to the archaic list of royal names discovered at Nippur (Niffer), and now preserved in the museum of the University of Pennsylvania, Dumas-zi, as the Babylonians called Tammuz, was a king of Ereš and ruled for 100 years. His predecessor was the god Lagal-banda, who reigned for no less than 1200 years, whilst his successor was the half-divine and only half-historical king of Ereš Supuri, Gilgames, who ruled for 180 or possibly 180 years. According to this record, Tammuz was a fisherman (Sumerian ta-šu-ki)—the fisherman, is, a site of the river near the mouth of the river, and it was only natural that a maritime people, such as the southern Babylonians were, should make Tammuz a fisherman. In that part of the land he was evidently the god of the fruitfulness of the teeming waters, just as, in inland, he was god of the fruitfulness of the fertile Babylonian plain.

6. Ištar’s search for Tammuz in Hades.—Outlines of this legend are given in the articles BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS and HEROES and HERO-GODS. From this text we see that Tammuz was, at the time of Ištar’s descent, in the underworld with Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone), whether he had descended in accordance with the decision of the gods of the Bel—Merodach—Zues. This legend likewise shows that Tammuz had become the lover of Ištar, or, as the record puts it, ‘the husband of her youth.’ The sacrifices which she was willing to make on his account are noteworthy, for at each of the seven gateways of the land of No-Return she parted—under protest—with an article of apparel or adornment, until she appeared in the presence of the queen of the region perfectly naked. As things went wrong on earth owing to the absence of the goddess of love, Samas, Sin, and Ištar bestrewed themselves and secured her release. Here the subject suddenly changes, and the name of Tammuz appears in the text for the first time.

1 See Zep 9:15-16. 2 PERI 11:50. 3 LXX. vi. 406.
Clothe him with a festive garment, let him strike up with the flute of the lioness.

Let the joyous dances, [let] the crowned one ... [Then] Belili sat down; her instrument,

A particular form of filled [her] lap? [When] she heard her brother's voice, Belili smote her instrument.

Her 'eye-stones' filled her thoughts (?) .

'My brother, only (one), do not cause [the] pain (?).'

On the plays of the lioness, they play along with him the tambour of chaldéon (?).

The musicians and the women-musicians will play along with him.

May the dead (?) arise and smell the incense.'

Belili, mentioned here as the sister of Tammuz, appears also in the list of gods in connexion with Alalu, as forms of the deities of the heavens. ANU and ANATU. The flute of Tammuz, like the divine vine at Eridu, was of lapis-stone, emblematic of the blue sky, and it is not unlikely that the other objects mentioned—Belili's 'eye-stones' and the 'tambour'—were of precious and similarly symbolic materials.

7. Other Babylonian references to Tammuz. The first place ought probably to be assigned to the lists of gods, which furnish us with some of his names, and the deities with whom he was identified. The transcription of the group standing among the Semitic deities, for Tammuz is 'Dumuzi', though a longer form, 'Dumuzi-da', is often found. The commonly accepted rendering of this group into Semitic Babylonian is mardu šamk, the true (or 'right') son. Of the lists in which the name is found the most important is probably that trilingual text (two dialects of Sumerian and Semitic Babylonian equivalents) published in WAT ii. p. 59. In that inscription his character as a sung god is indicated by the fact that his name comes towards the end of the section referring to the sun-god Shamash, after Kettu and Mešsari, that deity's two attendants. After this comes Tu-zi-tu (Mardu-zi), in standard Sumerian and rendered by šama-na, i.e., transferring Dumu-zi into the Semitic Babylonian column—and from the next line we see that he bore in Sumerian also the name of U-lub-zi (U-lub-zi), probably meaning 'the lord of the righteous covenant, or the like. The next line, which begins a new section, has the name of Sir-du, dialectic Sir-tum, the mother of Tammuz. Other deities in this section are 'the lady of the plain', Ishtar, and 'the lady of the gods'. A section giving further names of these goddesses follows, and then comes the final section of the tablet, beginning with Ereshki-gal, the queen, claiming her as Allat, the Babylonian Persephone. Important as showing the feminine aspect of Tammuz, which is also visible in the Syro-Greek view of the deity, is the list in which he is called Ama-sumgal-an, 'the peerless mother of heaven', which may be one of the aspects of the planet Venus, described as 'male at sunrise'. Another name, En-mersi, dialectic for Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagash, identifies Tammuz with that deity and stamps him specifically as the great god of agriculture.

8. The abodes of Tammuz in Babylonia. The chronological list preserved at Philadelphia, U. T, shows Tammuz a king of Erech seem to indicate that his native place was a city expressed by the characters Ha-a. In the incantation published in WAT iv. p. 15, however, Eridu

1 Possibly poetical for such as idea of 'crystal tears' filled her body'.

2 Possibly 'crystal tears'—evidences of the grief she felt when Tammuz descended into the underworld.

3 One form Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum, London, 1893, pl. xxiv. p. 113, line 6.

4 See Basset, 'Babylonian', 4, 4.

5 WAT ii. 54, 249.

6 See WAT ii. 55, 11; and see ExpT xxxv. (1918-19) 1675.

7 WAT ii. 54, 11, 34 and 35. For references to his temple at Lagash see i. below.

8 See j. above.

9 Tammuz seems to have been his chief city, of which, therefore, Ha-a may have been a suburb or even another name:

In Eridu a black vine grew—in a sacred spot it was made.

Its substance was white-faced lapis-blue, planted in the Deep.

Erech's path in Eridu is filled with fruitfulness—

His seat is the central place of the earth.

His abode is the bed of Enur (the Abyss).

In his holy house, which is like a forest, [his] shelter is set—no man can enter therein.

In the midst of it is Semech (and) Tammuz (Dumuzi-zi), between the mouth of the rivers (or canals) on both sides.

Here follow the names of the waterways in question: Kangu, Iq'gangu, and Ka-mak-tu, though the true total seems to have been four. Instead of 'the god Šašaš (and) Tammuz' we might read 'the sun-god Tammuz', which would correctly describe his position in the Babylonian pantheon. The Sumerian original has expressed the name of Tammuz by the feminine Anu-sumgal-an. The connexion of Tammuz with the vine of Eridu, the Paradise-city, stamps him here likewise as one of the gods of fertility, and it is owing to this that he is so closely connected with the god En, to whose nourishing streams the fruitfulness of the land was due. It is noteworthy that Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagash, who was identified with him, bore also the name of Ur, the husbandman.

9. Tammuz as the herdsman. It has already been noted that Dumu-zi, or Tammuz, was called the fisherman (ša-ha = ba-šar), but later he appeared as 'the herdsman.' This view of the deity is referred to in another inscription:

'The milk of a yellow goat which has been brought forth in the holy fold of Tammuz (Dumuzi-si),

The milk of a strong goat—may he give thee with his holy hand.

Four it then into the skin of an undefiled she-goat.

Asa-appu the unsalutary ('glorious goes of the god Enlil'), has caused it [to be eaten with his sacred hand.]

Nerodach, son of Eridu, has given the inscription—

May Nin-šu-kududdu, the lady of the mild fountain, make him (the sick man) holy, make him pure.'

The inscription of the milk of the yellow goat, and the flour of the undefiled she-goat's skin.

The antiquity of the association of Tammuz with the flocks in Babylonia is shown by the noteworthy text in The Amherst Tablets, i. London, 1908) no. 119, where 'fleece' is expressed by the phrase 'listen and the lady of the gods.' A section giving further names of these goddesses follows, and then comes the final section of the tablet, beginning with Ereški-gal, the queen, claiming her as Allat, the Babylonian Persephone. Important as showing the feminine aspect of Tammuz, which is also visible in the Syro-Greek view of the deity, is the list in which he is called Ama-sumgal-an, 'the peerless mother of heaven', which may be one of the aspects of the planet Venus, described as 'male at sunrise'. Another name, En-mersi, dialectic for Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagash, identifies Tammuz with that deity and stamps him specifically as the great god of agriculture.

10. The Babylonian hymns to Tammuz. At least two lists of these existed, and they may have formed the oracles of some of those chant by the Hebrew women, as well as by the Phoenicians and the other nationalities who accepted or adopted the cult. The following will show their nature:

'The cow and her lamb he taketh; the goat and her kid he taketh; the ewe and her lamb he smiteth down; the goat and her kid he smiteth down.

Arose thou, go, hero, the read of 'No-return.'

Alias, hero, I warrior, Un-anti;

Alias, hero, hero, my god Dumu;

Alias, hero, son—my faithful lord;

Alias, hero, Gu-siimm the bright-eyed;

Alias, hero, Gi-nagir, lord of the net;

Alias, hero, overseer, lord of prayer;

Alias, hero, thou who [ar] my heavenly light.'


4 See 3 above.

5 Tammuz visited not only the under world, but also the heaven of Anu; see ERE vi. 643.

6 Cf. Zimm 914.
towards the theories which were held as to the creation of the universe, to the universe, to the legend, teaching connected with Tammuz dealt only with the announcement of what had been brought into existence by the Creator. Regarded as a sun-legend, it was recognized that 'the kindly fruits of the earth' were due to his rays, and to the fact that he brought back their accompanying warmth were withdrawn or reduced, the growth of vegetation ceased.

12. The reflex-influence of the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia and Assyria.—That this enthusiastic worship of the Babylonian Dumuzid, under the name of Tammuz, had influence in Babylonia and Assyria, sympathetically related as they were with the Western Semites, is but natural; and its greater importance in the countries of its adoption than in the land of its origin is also easily comprehensible. This was due to the fact that the Babylonians had, from the date of the rise of Babylon, accepted Mordechah, who was also a sun-god, as their supreme deity. Tammuz therefore continued to represent specifically one of his forms, and thus remained invariable as chief of their pantheon, whose construction, as a philosophical system, his position of supremacy would have destroyed.

13. The development of the legend farther west.—In all probability more than one version of the legend was nastly transmitted, and doubtless some of them, after the manner of all legendary stories, were also published and disseminated, with the worship, westwards. Representing the summer sun, with all its warmth and its vivifying and productive power, Tammuz was regarded as the god who passed the six months between the beginning of autumn and the end of winter in the under world. As the planet Venus seems to follow the course of the sun, her disappearance with the winter was interpreted as due to her desire to rescue him from this prison-house, but, as her movements do not coincide with the seasons, she generally had to come forth without him. When the time for his release came, therefore, he had to return to earth unaccompanied by his spouse.

In the West the legend was modified, and Tammuz-Adonis there appears as the son of the Cypriote king Cinyras and as beloved of the goddess Aphrodite. He died, it was said, in the forest of Lebanon, killed by the wild boar tymphifying winter; and since the time of that catastrophe the river Adonis, near the Nahr Ibrahim, 'Abraham's stream', flows yearly, when it is reddened by his blood. The name Adonis is the Greek form of the Phoenician Adon, 'lord', which was deity, in common with many others, bore. In the Semitic hymns (mostly in the dialect) it is constantly called the 'lord', and, it is probably owing to this, at least in part, that Adon (Adonis) became one of his names.

14. Tammuz in Cyprus.—According to Ovid, the scene passes, in part, from Assyria (Syria) to Cyprus. Kinyras, king of that island, had, by an incestuous connexion with his daughter Myrrha, a beautiful son named Adonis. The child was brought up by the nymphs and harbored the manhood when he became the lover of Aphrodite. One day, notwithstanding this goddess's applications, he was hunting in the forest of Lebanon and was wounded by a boar sent by Ares (Mars), who was jealous of the divine youth. Aphrodite, hearing of this tragedy, filled the forest with her lamentations and tried to revive him, but without success. From the blood of the dying Adonis the anemone had its birth, and the river Adonis was thenceforth reddened yearly by his blood.

15. The legend of Tammuz in Greece.—According to Pausanias (6th cent.), Adonis was the son of a princess of Assyria (Syria), Myrrha or Smyrna, 1
whom Aphrodite had inflamed with a violent love for her father Theias. Myrrha profited by her father's drunkenness and the darkness, but, when afterwards Theias found out what had taken place, he was so enraged that he attacked his daughter, sword in hand. Myrrha fled, praying the gods for protection, and the divinities who had been the cause of her ruin, recognizing that she had acted solely to blame, changed her into the tree which, since that time, has borne her name. Nine months later the tree opened and gave birth to the beautiful Adonis. Aphrodite took charge of him and, placing him in a vessel, handed him to Persephone to take care of.

Other variants of the legend of Tammuz are recorded, but, as they are apparently later developments and seem not to bear upon the origin of the myth, it is needless to speak of them here. How far the above or any other variants may be founded upon further details from Babylonian is uncertain and will not be known until the Babylonian legend of Dumu-eida comes to light.

16. Why did the legend vary?—Not only was Tammuz faithful in fulfilling his fate and passing a part of his existence in the under world, but he was also faithful in the farming, as the god of agriculture, the fruits of the earth to perfection in their season. The climates of Babylonia and of Syria are so different that any legend common to both was bound to be, in its province, to differ; hence the variations in that of Tammuz noted here. According to G. Rawlinson,1 increasingly heavy showers fall in Babylonia, in November and December, raising the river-levels. As spring advances, the showers become lighter and fewer until about May, when summer weather arrives. From May to November rain is very rare indeed, and the sun's rays are only tempered at morning and evening by the grey mist. For five months, therefore, Babylonia is a land of drought. With this description the month-list of Lagash, whose principal deity was Nin-Irissu—identified with Tammuz—seems to agree,2 but it is the common calendar of later days that is the most instructive. In this it would seem that it was the fourth month, Su-(u)numma, 'perfection of seed,' or the like (June-July), that ended the time of productiveness, and that this month was called Du'uzu, the West Semitic Tammuz, as the month of the god's greatest fruitfulness. The month next following, Bibi-gar, apparently means 'making heat' (= Hebr. Ab), whilst the 6th month, Adarsu, Ab-adarsu, the Kish, the month of Istar, generally regarded as that in which Istar descended to Hades in search of her lover. Its Heb. name Elul (in Babylonian, Ululu) probably means 'grief' and seems to express the common Semitic sound of mourning and distress. In Marcheswan, the 8th month, the opening of the water-channels took place and was succeeded by the rainy-clouds of November-December (the Heb. Chislev). The 11th month, January-February, was 'the month of seed' and probably marks the time when sowing became general. Finally came the 1st and 2nd Adars (Feb.-March), in Sumeriian Segrar-kud and Dir-sarru-kud, the two grain-plant cutting months, when the seedlings were cropped to encourage the increase of sprouts. Roughly, the 12 months of the year fall into three groups of four each, Nisan to Tammuz marking the growth and perfection of the grain, Ab to Marcheswan practically barren owing to the great heat, and Chislev to Adar the season of the harvest and the pruning of the crops. It is probably to this that the three periods of the year of Tammuz—with Istar, with Ereš-kī-gal or Persephone, and at his own disposal—are due, the division of his year into two periods of six months each being apparently Western.

17. Tammuz in the late Assyrian inscriptions.—In these documents there are certain names which testify to the popularity of the god—not, however, under the name of the Tammuz, but under that of Adon. The Assyrian form appears as Adumu, and the names containing it may be divided into the specifically Syrian and the Assyro-Elamite—but the latter apparently imitations, or translations from Syriac into Assyrian, while often apparently Imitations of the Assyrians. Among these are Adumu-apla-iddina, 'Adon has given a son'; Adumu-nadin-apli, 'Adon, giver of a son'; and Adumu-apla-iddina, 'Adon, protect the land.' The purely Syriac names seem to be Adanu-zi(h), perhaps 'my lord hath sprinkled'; Adanu-ta and Adani-tur, 'my lord is my rock' (Heb. rāb); Adani-ia, my lord liveth (93'); Adani-iqall, 'Adon is my lord,' is West Semitic and belongs to about 860 B.C. (he was king of Siana), but all the rest fall between 680 and 660 B.C.

Whether, with Vellay, the gods of the countries into which the worship penetrated may be regarded as having become identified with Tammuz or not is doubtful. If correct, it was due to the fact that Tammuz, under the name of Adon, 'lord,' was designated by a word which could be applied as a title to any god, whether the Merodach of the Babylonians, the Moloch of the Syrians, or the Hadad of the Amorites. It is this, in all probability, that caused Tammuz to be, in a measure, identified with the Adonai of the Hebrews—that more general divine name which, with them, replaced the all too sacred Jehovah (Jeovah) of their own monothism.

18. The Tammuz-cult and its contemporary creeds.—Naturally, the idea of a kind of martyr- god, dying, it may be, for the good of mankind, notwithstanding the difficulty of bringing Tammuz into this category, has to be taken into consideration. The most striking parallel, perhaps, is the Osiris of the Egyptians; and the Babylonian Merodach, who died in order that mankind might be preserved from his divine blood being worth- worthy. As Merodach, the 'steer of day,' was a sun-god, it is not unlikely that he was regarded as dying daily and as being reborn that men might live. The sun as so much as Tammuz, however, to be reborn not so much that men might live, but because he fell under the evil influences of the spouse of Nergal, the god of battle, disease, and untimely death. Vellay contends that Jesus Christ, like Tammuz, was a sun-god and, also like him, descended into Hades; but there are so many fundamental differences in the career of the mythical sun-god of 4000 or 5000 years B.C. and the Christ of history that comparisons may well be set aside. The half-mythical Babylonian ruler, with his 100-year reign, comparing so unfavourably with his predecessor's 1200, may easily have had a misadventure in the hunting-field which gave birth to the nature-myth which the Babylonians, Syrians, and Greeks have handed down to us.

TANJORE.—1. History.—Tanjore (Tamil Tanjavur, ‘city of refuge’) is the capital of the District of the same name in the eastern portion of the Madras Presidency; it is situated in 10° 47’ N. lat., 79° 9’ E. long.; in 1811 the population was 60,341. The District formed part of the ancient Chola kingdom, where the capital was at Raja raja, and the kingdom reached the zenith of its power under Raja raja I. (A.D. 983-1011). During the 13th cent. it passed under the rule of the Hoysala Ballalas of Dorasamudra and the Pandyanas of Madura. An independent Nayak dynasty was established in the 16th cent., which was displaced by a Maratha kingdom about 1674. It was occupied by the British in 1778 and finally ceded to them in 1798; the royal family, who were pensioned, became extinct in 1855.

2. The temple.—Tanjore owes much of its importance to the great temple built by King Raja raja I., who was a devoted Saiva, but tolerant of other religions. It is known as Brihadisvara and Brihatisvara, said to mean ‘temple of the great god,’ or Raja raja Isvara, after its founder. Ferguson writes:

“In nine cases out of ten, Dravidian temples are a fortuitous aggregation of parts, arranged without plan, as accident dictated at the time of their erection. . . . The one great exception is probably Tanjore, to be found there. The Great Pagoda there was commenced on a well-defined and stately plan, which was persevered in till its completion.”

The temple was entered by a fine gateway (gopuram), which is said to cast a shadow on the ground, the outer court, used as an arsenal by the French in 1779, is 500 ft. long and 250 broad, and is surrounded on all sides by a cloister. The main shrines stand to the west, and above it rises to a height of about 200 ft. a magnificent tower, decorated with pillars and statues. The summit is crowned by a single block of granite, weighing 80 tons, said to have been raised to its present position up an inclined plane commencing at a village four miles distant. An interesting feature of the tower is that the carvings are generally of a Vaishnava type, while the ornamentation of other parts is Saiva. Another curious fact is that one of the figures on the north side of the tower represents a European; the popular belief is that it is the figure of a Dancer who assisted in the building or that it was erected to foretell the British occupation. It is probable that both the European figure and the Vaishnava ornamentation were erected by one of the Nayak princes, and that he was helped by some Dravidian who acquired Tranquebar in 1695. The base of the great temple and many of the other buildings are covered with inscriptions which have been translated, nearly all of them belong to Raja raja and his successors.

Another noteworthy building is the temple of Subrahmanya, god of war, younger son of Siva, with a colossal figure of Nandi, the bull of Siva, a perfect gem of carved stone-work, the moulding of the stones in the most exquisitely delicate and elaborate patterns is as clear and sharp as the day it left the sculptor’s hands.

The temple, though beautiful, is not considered particularly sacred. The legendary cause of this is that the Sivaite saint Appar was refused admission to it, and that therefore it was not celebrated in his hymns or those of the other three Sivaite poets. A peculiarity about it is that Siva is admitted to the apartment next the shrine, from which in most temples he is excluded, and that Vaishnava [a hunting, fishing, iron-making, and cultivating caste] who are usually not admitted at all, here come as far as the great bull.

3. Tiruvâdi.—Tiruvâdi (Tiruvâyâr, ‘the five holy rivers’), six miles N.W. of Tanjore, is a place of great sanctity, said to be holier than Benares by one-sixteenth, where pious Hindus desire to die and where the soul is believed to enter the body of the river. It has a fine temple, called Paschimnâsâvara, ‘Lord of the five rivers,’ which contains inscriptions of Raja raja and his successors.

TANNAIM.—See JUDAISM.

TANTRAS.—In the series of sacred books of the Hindus the Tantras occupy the fifth or sixth place. According to their character and contents they are fourth in the order of inspiration and authority, the degrees being druti, smrti, purânî, and tantrî. They are also known as a fifth or the fifth Veda by those who regard them as authoritative and observe the ritual which they enjoin. In neither case is the series entirely chronological or consecutive. Those which succeed and are in part dependent on the Purânas, are also in parts unrelated to the latter and of greater antiquity. Their date, however, it is impossible to determine with any accuracy. The existing treatises are probably for the most part at least reproductions with additions and variations of older works which are no longer extant. In their present form they are usually ascribed to the 6th or 7th cent. of our era, but they may be considerably later. Tantrik usages and popular formulas were current and practised in a much earlier age; they belong to a type of thought that is primitive and among primitive peoples varies little in the course of the centuries. Until recent years little was known of these works outside of India. A few have now been made accessible in translations, but the greater number are as yet unexplored.

The same tantra signifies a ‘web’ or ‘warp,’ then a continuous or uninterupted series, and in religious usage an orderly rule or ritual. The word was then further applied to the doctrinal theory or system itself, and finally to the literary work or treatise in which it was set forth. In the last sense the word is not found in the Amaranada, the great Sanskrit dictionary, which is known to the Chinese pilgrims. The Maâhâbhârata also contains no reference to the Tantras or to any religious system founded upon them. All these facts are confirmatory of the comparatively late origin of the existing books. Sankara enumerates the titles of 64 Tantras, comparatively few of which can be identified at the present day. The best-known of these treatises and the most worthy of study are perhaps the Tantra-râvâdâs, Sâksînâsâ, Rudrâyâmala, Kâlîkâ, Kulârâvâ, Tantrâtattva, and Mâhinârâjâ. Translations of the two last have been published by Arthur Avalon. Parts of the Hitopâdâsa also are known as Tantras.

Traditionally the authorship of these works is attributed to Shiva, who was an incarnation of the Hindu trinity, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva.

1 Hemingway, l. c. 271. For an account of the temple with illustrations see Ferguson, p. 342 f. Ehrh. xiv. 486; V. A. Smith, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Oxford, 1911, p. 262.

2 Hemingway, l. c. 280 f.; Ferguson, p. 347 : Ehrh. xiv. 487.

3 Based on Macdonell, but with much uncertainty, which, no. 59; see Hist. of Sanskrit Literature, London, 1906, p. 467; cf. also T. Zochonis, Die indische Winteroehrle, Strassburg, 1897, p. 18 f.

4 For further titles see Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dict., s.v., and Brahmanism and Hindutva, p. 287.
They are therefore to be regarded as equally the revelation of the three supreme divinities. In form, however, they are dependent on Siva alone, who in dialogue with his wife Durga, or Kali, reveals them by teaching the doctrine of the three or four sects, which are to be received and practised by his worshippers. This authoritative or ‘higher tradition’ is further said to have been delivered from his central or fifth mouth. As such it is pre-eminently sacred and also the root of the mystical science. It is forbidden to the general public, and its several treatises are unknown. They bear the name also of Agamas, and as such are sometimes distinguished from Nigama, the text of the Vedas, Dharmasastras, and other sacred books. The Indian commentator, Kalikka Bhåta, asserts that revelation (kriti) is two-fold, Vaidik and Tantrik. In the popular knowledge and belief they have practically superseded the Vedas over a large part of India, where religious practice and ritual are guided by the teaching of the Dharmasastras, Purågas, and Tantras. A native writer and exponent of these works in Bengal asserts that ‘the Tantras are the alphabet and almost half our medicine.’ They are the Såstras, the scriptural authority and rule for the present age, the kaliyuga, and it is therefore incumbent on all orthodox Hindus to follow their directions. In particular, the Tantras are the religious text-books of the Såkta and of their various sects. There are different Tantrik schools, with variant traditions, the distinctions between which are little understood outside of their immediate circle of adherents. The ritual of the Tantras of the Dakhnî school is in harmony with the Vedas, while that of the Våmâchâris is intended only for Sôdras. Their influence unquestioningly extends far beyond those who profess to accept their authority. Wilson quotes a passage from one of these treatises which claims that ‘many a man who calls himself a Saiva or a Vaishnava is secretly a Sâkta, and a brother of the left-hand.’ Even the Jains of N. India are said to have adopted formulae and rituals from the Tantras, and the Lâmas or corrupt Buddhism of Nepål and Tibet owes much to the same source.

The teaching of the Tantras, as of the Purågas, is essentially based on the bhakti-marga (q.v.), which is regarded as superior to the karma-marga and jñåna-marga of the Brahmanas and Upaniåads. Adoration of a personal deity is inculcated, especially of the wife of Siva, who is worshipped as the source of all regenerative power. In all these writings the female principle is personified and made prominent, to the almost total exclusion of the male. Ultimately their doctrine is derived from the philosophy of the Såkñhi-Yoga, with its theory of puruåga and prakåti, with special emphasis on the mystical side of Yoga teaching and practice. While the Purågas also every Tantras should theoretically discuss in order five subjects—the creation and destruction of the universe, the worship of the gods, the attainment of supernatural power, and union with the Super Self. But in reality their contents are almost entirely magical and mystical, but they range over a wide variety of subjects, scientific, religious, medical, speculative, etc., and are interested in all that concerns human need and destiny. One at least of the more important Tantras expounds in metaphysical terms the nature of the Supreme Brahman, who is nishkåla and sakåla, i.e., with or without prakåti, nirguna and sarga; in the beginning only the nishkåla Brahman existed, etc. The nature of mantras also is enjoined, and numerous examples are given; their essence consists in certain mystical and secret letters or syllables which they contain and manifest. A Tantrik, when writing, is taught the employment of mystic diagrams (yantras), sacred circles (āriñjaka), spells, charms, and amulets (kavachas) symbolical movements and crossing of the fingers (mudrás), etc.

Together with all this, which appears to us so meaningless and puerile, there is undoubtedly much that is of historical interest in the Tantras, and that is of value for the interpretation and interrelation of Hindu doctrine. They are generous and broad in their sympathies, recognize no distinction of caste or sex, for men and women equally compose humankind, and they forbid the practice of some Tantrik, and in one particular view, the rites and doctrine which they inculcate are to prevail until the close of the kaliyuga.


TANTRISM (Buddhist).—A complete study of Buddhist Tantrism would include the description and the history of its rites, its deities, and its doctrines, practically the exposé of the many problems which confront the historian of medieval India. Buddhist Tantrism is practically Buddhism of Tibet, as Hinduism is of India. This work will not attempt such a study. The present writer intends only to provide a definition of the chief topics.

Buddhists were not quite clear as to the specific meaning of the word tantra, ‘book.’ The Tibetan canon distinguishes the Sûtra (Måd) and the Tantra (Rgyud), but a number of texts are classified in both sections: the limits between Sûtra (i.e. Mahåyåna-sûtras) and Tantra are not fixed. On the one hand, topics which are essentially Mahåyåna—e.g., hymns to bodhisattvas (störas), resolutions to become Buddha (prapñhånas)—are met with in Tantra; on the other hand, Mahåyåna-sûtras include a number of fragments and often whole chapters which would constitute by themselves so many Tantrik texts.

A good example is found in the Mahåyåna-paññas as a part of the true Law, which contains a whole chapter of dharmas, on talismanic words, invocations in litany form to a female deity, a devotion to a female power; ‘giantesses’ are related to the professions of the Sûtra and of its readers. There are good reasons for believing that this chapter is a late addition: such an addition testifies that the spirit of Mahåyåna had penetrated into the Tantrik literature with the spirit of Tantra, or rather that the Tantrik syncretism made little distinction between Mahåyåna and Tantrism properly so called.

Tantrik books, by assuming the title of Sûtra, secured authority. The Kårana-yåhya is styled Mahåyåna-sûtras śravyanmargah, ‘the book of the followers of Mahåyåna.’ As a matter of fact, the introductory section is written according to the pattern of a Mahåyåna-sûtras; it does not pretend to relate, as

\[\text{footnote:} \text{Ch. xxx.}\]
TANTRISM (Buddhist)

Tantras do, the dialogue of a god with a goddess; it preserves the old phrase, ‘Thou hast I heard,’ followed by the mention of the place, Sravasti, and the complexion of the audience of bodhisattvas. But, when we consider the chief topic of the book, viz. the glorification of Avalokiteśvara as the owner of the science in six edifices, and the general fact that the author has written what we should like to style a Sātra. In many cases the Tibetan scholars were not deceived by mere titles; e.g., although the Swarnaprabhāsottamā, styled Sātra, it is not in the Mdo, but in the Raygud, so that the Sinhalese and the Chinese recensions of this celebrated book are to be found. But the fact remains that Mdo and Raygud overlap in a great number of cases.

These confusions or ‘overlapping’ are accounted for by the fact that a number of speculations, beliefs, and practices which reach their full development in the Tantrik or last period of Buddhist thought were not known during the former period—e.g., the use of talismanic spells. Again, the Westerns establish a close connexion between the term ‘Tantrism’ and the worse forms of Hinduism (or Buddhist) paganism—magic, theatre, left-hand practices, and so on. And for these reasons left-hand practices are properly Tantrik, and not to be found in Buddhism outside Raygud; but these practices are not the whole of Tantrism. Tantras, with the Hinayanas as with the Buddhists, covers a large field. We find in the Raygud the texts which are concerned with worship, whether it is ‘Tantrik’ worship or Mahayanaist worship, including the building of domestic stūpas, the erection of images, and the consecration of idols, the stotras or hymns, the daily offering, Worship, with the whole of the religious practices, is a Tantrik topic. The Pali Canon’s Resolution of Peace Conduct, is reckoned a Tantra, because the recitation of this prajñādhāna is one of the daily duties of a Buddhist devotee of the Great Vehicle; from the point of view of the Western definition of ‘Tantra’ this text is absolutely non-Tantrik; it is free from any tinge of idolatry, it breathes the most lofty spirit of the Great Vehicle. Litanies, lists of 100 names, whether of Prajñāpāramitā, Avalokiteśvara, or Mahājñāni, are also Tantras. Litanies may be used for Tantrik or non-Tantrik worship. We know that the Mahāyānasamayagiti, ‘Collection of the Names of Mahājñāna,’ is susceptible of a twofold interpretation: the first is a gnostic or purely philosophical one, the second sees its way to give to the most decent phrases the worst Tantrik meaning.

Therefore, in order to draw a general outline of the history of Tantrik ideas in Buddhist literature and life, we must disregard the traditional divisions as embodied in the Tibetan catalogues or the Western theories on the subject, and build a classification of our own.

I. EARLY BUDDHISM.—The Old Buddhism, as preserved in the Pali canon and in the Sanskrit Hinayāna literature, has a number of features which are not specifically Buddhist, which are alien to the noble eightfold path, which, to put it otherwise, are more or less Tantrik or open the way to Tantrism properly so called. Let us mention a few topics. (1) There is a general belief in the mystic power of the ‘statements of truth’; Skhyamuni praises the use of half-truths in his large place in the more recent Sinhalese Buddhism (parītā, paritta, pirit). (2) In the earliest documents respect is paid to a number of deities or Non-Hindus beings and their cults, which are friendly; there is an ‘orthodox’ way of dealing with them, but ‘unorthodox’ worship is the natural result of fear. Vajrapāni is regarded as the ‘guardian angel’ of Skhyamuni, and the Nadabuddha of the Church. He is the pattern of the ‘Dharmapālas’ of a later age. (3) The worship of relics, the building of stūpas, pilgramages, and idolatry are old features of Buddhism. (4) Last, not least, the earliest machinery of meditation or trance is akin to the more intricate machinery which constitutes the basis of the Yogasutras. Buddhist ‘meditation’ is simply Hindu yoga more or less transformed. The ‘insight into the truth’ (sattadakshināna), which is the only and the sufficient means to nirvāṇa, practically implies (a) the meditation on loth-someness (saddhiksabha), which the ascetic, often in a dwelling in the forest, ‘provides his bones’—i.e. fancies that his flesh is rotten and falls, and sees only the bones behind, until the whole world appears to him as full of skeletons—and thus succeeds in crushing desire; (b) the restraint of breath (prāṇayāma), counting the expiations and inspirations, in order to render thought more tractable and to direct it towards the Buddhist truths; (c) the Śamānas, abhikūtikāduḥsana and kāsinas, prolonged contemplation of disks of earth, etc., by which (d) a number of supernormal states are induced, the so-called dhyānas (jhāna), or ‘trances’ and abhikūtikāduḥsana, or ‘ecstasies.’ According to the Pali and Sanskrit theologians it is only when absorbed in those supernormal states that a man is susceptible of rightly understanding the four Buddhist Truths (sattabhūtakasaya) and thus progressing towards nirvāṇa. Now it is quite safe to state that meditations on corpses, restraint of breath, the diverse methods of inducing trance, and the trances themselves have been borrowed by Buddhism from Hindu yoga. Buddhism established, more or less artificially, a strong connexion between those archaic devices of yoga and its own spiritual aim, nirvāṇa. But Buddhism did not ignore, and the theory of the distinction of the ‘temple’ and the ‘forest’ indicates that the discipline of yoga, while it may be made ‘supermundane’ (lokottarā), i.e. utilized for the conquest of nirvāṇa, also provides a man with many ‘mundane’ (lokika) advantages: he who lives in cemeteries acquires power over the bhūtas and the manifold spirits who haunt these places; he who restrains the breath masters thought and body; he who practises trance becomes the possesser of magical powers and secures re-birth amongst gods. In short, a man who practises yoga becomes a yogin, or a Siddha, an owner of ‘perfections’ or ‘powers’ (sidhi). It is clear that the position of Buddhism is not a safe one. Let us state it in plain words. A monk must perform in a Buddhist spirit, i.e. for the sake of nirvāṇa, a number of rites and meditations which confer the most precious ‘mundane’ advantages; he must disregard these advantages—indeed, all Indian, is the surest mark of holiness—while he perfectly knows that he can enjoy them when he likes. We may be sure—even if there were no documents to this effect—that many of the early

Christianity were not strong enough to resist so powerful a temptation; e.g., they performed miracles for 'vain glory.' In such cases they acted as 'mummers' yogis'; technically they followed the rules that later constitute the Yoga-tantra.

II. MAHÀYÀNA.—In Mahàyàna bhakti, or devotion, and pōjîa, or worship in the Hindu guise, increase.

Mahàyàna is, like Hinayàna, a thoroughly Buddhist discipline, viz. a way to nirvàna; the disciple of Mahàyàna is a candidate for Buddhahood (Buddha-phaladhâna), because Buddhahood alone reach nirvàna; he will become a Buddha by acquiring the wisdom and accumulating the merit of a Buddha. But an essential feature of the doctrine is that the candidate for Buddhahood cannot succeed without the help of the Buddhas and of the future Buddhas nearing Buddhahood; this help is secured through bhakti. The early Buddhist paid worship to Sâkyamuni, to the rules, to the holy places, but there was little or no bhakti in his respectful behaviour. Now the objects of worship are so many living gods, so many bhogrovams, quite different from Sâkyamuni, very different from the Hinayàna. The Hinayàna is entitled to the bhakti of the faithful. As hath been pointed out several times, bhakti is seldom free from elements which easily take a Tàntrik shade. To mention only one point: a man will be saved by remembering at death the name of Avalokiteśvara or of Kârttikeya. The names of the Buddhas or the bodhisattvas, the mystical formulas in which they have themselves placed a wonderful force, acquire a role in the sanctification of the devotee. Bhakti has exalted the gods to a degree that bhakti is no longer necessary. Sántideva, an orthodox divine of the Mahàyàna school, praises without reservation the use of dharmarîja for the pardon of sins. The schools of the Mahàyàna known as the Sûkhàvatī sects place the highest spiritual advantages at the command of the man who knows how to worship Amitâbha.

Every form of pōjîa, including the circumambulation of a stûpa, offering flowers to a stûpa, giving food to the monks, etc., was considered very useful from the beginning. A treatise like the Adhikarita-vyāsa and a vast literature of the primitive liturgy; it gives a description of the many acts of worship which a Mahàyànist devotee, a 'beginner' (sādhanayûna), was expected to perform. Some of these offerings, wonderful advantages to be obtained by acts which easily assume a mechanical character, so many features which give to Tàntrism its specific aspects. A daily observance was the eightfold high pōjîa (āstavîdhi anuvattà pōjîa), a sort of worship 'in spirit and truth': confession of sins to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas—to the Buddha who has a special claim to the title of 'Buddha of confession'—resolve to become a Buddha, 'application of merit' (pūraṇamāna), etc. That this eightfold pōjîa often becomes a mere ritualistic performance—a special kind of dâhàrana—is proved by the fact that it is a part of the sàdhana-s (see below). It is well known that Mahàyàna is prompt to admit any sort of spells that provide 'mundane' advantages—of course it objects to 'black magic.' From our point of view, it is more important to observe that Mahàyàna worship is a number of beings which are not Buddhists at all, but ordinary Mahàyàna devotees. The dangerous origins of Vajrayâna are not forgotten; he nevertheless acquires a high rank in the pantheon; as he is the destroyer of the enemies of the Law, he is probably one of the first gods worshipped under a 'choleretic' aspect. Female figures—e.g., the Târis—are associated with the Buddhas, but this is not in this association any tinge of properly so called Tàntrism. The same can be said of Harîtit, the former goddess of smallpox, the account of whose avatars is one of the most curious and the best known pages in the religious and iconographic history of Buddhism. Her worship, both in the monastic and in the popular mîlînâ, gives a correct idea of the Mahàyànist and of the half-Tàntric methods of worship.

III. Tàntrism proper.—Tàntrism, properly so called, bears a twofold character: on the one hand, it is a systematization of the vulgar magical rites and it has existed under this form for many centuries in India and in Buddhism itself, to be practised without its philosophy; on the other hand, it is a 'thêurgy,' a highly developed mysticism styled Vajrayâna; under this form Tàntrism is an innovation in Buddhism.

Tàntrism has its professionals, the sorcerers (yogin, siddha), and its laymen, the cliëntèle of the sorcerers, also all the Hindus who worship deities or idols of the Tàntrik type. The sorcerers, who are at the same time magicians or adepts of the Vajrayâna, constitute a number of schools; there are many rival secret traditions characterized by different sets of formulas, deities, and of theories.

Tàntrism deals with only two points which deserve special notice: (1) the methods of sàdhana, (2) the vajrayoga. To be complete, it would be necessary to study a number of vīśi, or rites, many of which are part of the Tàntrik daily cult and have been adopted by Mahàyànist Buddhism.

2 See Accademia Osservante, series iii. (Arany), pl. 2, Oxford, 1890.
8 The latest authority on the subject is A. Pouc'h, L'Art gréco-buddhique du Gandhara, Paris, 1905-08, 8, 48-54.
10 A glance at the catalogue of the Rûpâyana will show the variety of the sūtras.
to the theory of universal voidness (śūnyatā), but they develop the concepts of tathatā, tathāgatagarbha, etc., and result in an undisguised monism. While the Mahāyāna school recognizes the existence of the Buddha, as a sentient being, he is not considered a god or a deity. The "future Buddhas," that all beings are "embryos of tathāgatas," the two Tantrik schools maintain that all beings are vajrasattva, the unique Vajrasattva. They also maintain that the nature of vajrasattva is immanent in all beings and can be actualized by appropriate meditations and rites.

Now the left-hand school conceives the nature of vajrasattva according to which all beings in the right-hand school is nearer the Veddarīst or Yoga tradition: on the one hand the traditions of the Mahākālántantra, etc., on the other hand the Church of the Mahāvīraśānakāhāskāmbodhī, the Vajrākṣāka etc.—the modern Japanese sect of Shin-gon-āshū.

In the Tantras of the Śaṅkara type we have to deal with a Buddhist adaptation of Śaivism and Śāktism. The Tantras preserve, but the true nature of vajrasattva is his fourth body, the body of bliss (ānanda, sukhanivesa, mahānabhiṣkāya), the body of vajra; it is with that, the Śaṅkara school elevates bhavatācārya eternally embraces his bakti, Tārā or Bhagavatī.

From this exotic conception of the nature of the being or the divine being it follows that, in order to attain the true divine nature, the ascetic must perform the rites of union with a woman (yogini, muḍrā) who is the personification of the bhagavatī, who is Bhagavatī herself; as it is said, bhūtvadānīya yoddhayākitsattva, bhuddhaoṣadī bhāvābhāvānānītva, "Buddhahood abides in the female organ." This truth was discovered by Śākyanunī, who, according to the Chaṇḍamahārāṣṭrapāla, conquered Buddhahood by practising the Tantrik rites in the hārin. The most conspicuous topic of this literature is what is called the arāṇīyā, worship of women; disgustingly practices, both obscene and criminal, including incest, are a part of this pāṇiā, which is looked upon as the true heroic behaviour (dakṣakara-charyā) of a bodhisattva, as the fulfilment of the perfect virtues. Buddhist mythology and mysticism are freely mixed with bhaktas: the semen is the five Buddhas, etc. The leading idea that "everything is pure to a pure man, orthodox to a heretic, is often expressed. "Lust is to be crushed by lust. . . . Do strenuously that which is condemned by fools, united with your chosen deity, intent upon the purification of the soul, it is inauspicious to be I-stirred with the poisonous fire of love provide their lovers, ascetics of pure mind, with all the fruit of love. . . . Enjoy all the pleasures of love without fear. Do not fear; you do not sin."

We may add two remarks. (1) Some moral rules are to be observed even in the ceremonies (chakras) that are provided for the thorough enjoyment of the sex (napyag, "most, madhya, "alcohol," mādavā, "sexual union"). A modern Sāṅkara work, the Mahānārayanaśastra, explains that "the ascetics should drink so long as their eyes do not roll and mind is not agitated. Beyond it, drinking is like that of a beast. The right of sripalēkṣas or tattvaśākṣas is to be given to any woman, but with one's own wife; so far, good, but there are two sorts of marriages, one for life, the other contracted for the purpose of the rites and lasting only till the completion of the rites. (2) Secret rites are the business of a few "devotees."

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1 We meet the formulas, Bhugatām bhagavatāṣṭhāppiṣṭhitām.

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On the whole and for the largest number of its adherents, Tantrism is simply Buddhism.

According to the left-hand Tantrism which we have described, the rites of union (maithuna) are not effacingly by themselves: before practising these, the seeker for esoteric wisdom must be "purified" in a threefold respect; he must possess the body, the voice, and the thought of a tathāgata. This threefold purification constitutes the Tantrism of the right hand.

One may speak of "consecrations" (abhishekā), "marking" (yātra) which consecrates the different limbs of the body, "prayers" (japa) which purify the voice. The most intricate part of the right-hand purification consists of the kapāla, or the" head" which is made by six processes: the "refining" (vidyā); the "attuning" (āśrayā); the "consecrating" (abhiprāpti) which associates with five wisdoms, with the five dhātus (earth, etc., etc.; the Buddha, Vajra, and Padma class of formulas, etc. We depend on the description of the teaching of the right-hand, which is too minute and obscure to be thoroughly intelligible. The opinion of the present writer is that a number of schools are to be distinguished: there are branches which are connected with radically different ritual, and which are the means to the actualization of the nature of a tathāgata; some other branches praise ritualistic performances, especially "interventions of the gods," some will admit the rite of union, but with a female described as a jñāna-mātrikā, a mental female.


TAOISM.—Taioism is one of the three "Teachings" (San só) of China, the others being Confucianism and and like Buddhism, it claims to be a native

I. Lao-te.—The primary source for our knowledge is the "Lao-Te" (Le Bouddhisme Japonais, Paris, 1893, pp. 104-105).


3 This phrase has never been met in any Sanskrit book.


6 Mudrā has a twofold meaning.

book of about 5000 characters, usually divided into two parts, "Concerning Tao" and "Concerning Teh," comprising 81 chapters, is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), an older contemporary of Confucius. Lao-tse, surname Li, name Er (= "ear"), also known as Tan, a character which implies some aural peculiarity, is said to have been an official at the court of Chow and to have been visited on one occasion by Confucius, who after the interview compared him in his lofty incomprehensibility to a soaring dragon. Despairing of the world, Lao-tse retired from office and disappeared through the Western passes, the guardian of which induced him before leaving to compose the Tso-te King as a record of his teaching. This account of him was later supplemented by "miracles" — e.g., his prolonged gestation, which entitled him to be called "old boy," as his name Lao-tse might also be translated. Si-ma Ch'ien (78 B.C.), who gives the more sober account of Lao-tse, gives also the names of his son and grandson and of the great-grandson of this grandson. He tells us further that about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. a book of Lao's was written with the guidance of the great queen Empress of this Han emperor. The emperor King (156-143 B.C.) is said to have made it a "classic." Still further back than Si-ma Ch'ien we hear of the writings of Han Fei († 230 B.C.), and Ch'ang-wu (4th cent. B.C.) many quotations from Lao-tse (or Lao Tan) which are to be found in the Tso-te King. According to Legge, the first two of these authors quote the whole or parts of 71 out of the 81 chapters of that book. On a review of the evidence thus summarized, Legge concludes that he does not know of any other book of so ancient a date at which the authenticity of the text is so well substantiated.

Criticism, however, has been busy both with Lao-te and with his book. Founding upon the name Lao-te, which may mean equally well "old thief" or "old philosophers," an extreme criticism has resolved him into a number of ancient thinkers, some of whose sayings are preserved for us in the Tso-te King. For this view there is no ground except the ambiguity of the name. A less drastic criticism, of which H. A. Giles is representative, allows that at a remote period Lao-te lived and thought and taught, and that some fragments of his teaching are preserved in the Tso-te King, in which we have less of these fragments pieced together by not a skilful forger of the 2nd cent. B.C. with padding of his own. It is not at all necessarily to be a party to this extreme line of criticism, however, by which it is attempted to establish this conclusion is somewhat crude. The external evidence summarized above at least does not go so far as to show that it is warranted by the occurrence in early Taoist writings of sayings attributed to Lao-tse, and of sayings attributed to Lao-Tze himself. Using and sayings attributed to Hwang-ti which do appear there, or by the evidence adduced from the Tso-te King itself repetitions, quotations, late characters, rhyme), while the discrimination of what is admitted as genuinely from Lao-te from what is rejected as compiler's padding is too subjective to be convincing. In favour of the earlier date of the Tso-te King it may be noted that, in its general type of teaching and in the avoidance of technical terms current in later Taoist authors it leaves on the reader the impression that it belongs to a less developed stage of Taoist thought than is found in them. The Tso-te King, however, still awaits a thorough application of sound critical principles. Indian influence on such the matter and the form of the Tso-te King has been asserted by some. The truth of this assertion cannot be considered apart from the general archæological question of the intercourse between China and India. There is a certain congruence between the mood of the Tso-te King and Buddhism, not so much as to require the dependence of one on the other in its explanation, and the present state of our knowledge hardly warrants the assumption of contact with Indian thought early enough to account for the Tso-te King, unless that book is dated later than all the other evidence which exists for the arrival of Indian influence on the early Taoists is not probable. It is curious that in Tso-te King, ch. 39, § 3, there is an illustration taken from a chariot and its parts as if to be used to explain the word "victory." Davids" quote a close parallel as having been used by Nagasena, the founder of the Mahayana school of Buddhism, to explain the word "victory" which taught the beginning of our era. It is to be noted, however, that the same argument, only with a horse instead of a chariot as illustration, is found in Chinese literature.

It is not difficult to cull from the Tso-te King admirable ethical maxims.

1 Lao-tse, London, 1875, p. 97.
The virtues commended lie in the line of self-suppression. For the inward state of which they are the outward tokens lies in the suppression of all desire, that is, in the act of renunciation, i.e. freedom from desires. Corresponding to this inner freedom from desires is the outward life of non-action (wenn wen wai), i.e. absence of self-determined action for particular ends. Hence the world is an ethical danger (12), for it is by the world that we are drawn out into desire and action away from the stillness of our inner being, which it should be our object to keep (5), though this true type of life is unattractive except to the sage (35). He attains this life by a process of aulcensure of motives, by which he arrives at a childlike state of spontaneity and tenderness, in which there is also exemplified the paradoxical possession of security and strength (10, 29, 28, 55). This ethical ideal is supported by various arguments. Thus in ch. 13 the argument seems to be that man is in a position to enjoy what the world regards as honour is to be exposed to what the world regards as calamity. That which makes me a possible subject of either is just that I am an object to my life. The sage thereby treats his person as if it were alien from him. He never identifies his happiness with this or that, so never loses his happiness. Having no private ends, his private ends are realized (7). Again, it seems to be argued that as ideas suggest their contraries—e.g., a fast to know beauty is also to know ugliness—the same, seeing that everything is dogged by its opposite as by its shadow, refrains from all positive action (2). From the external world Lao-tse gathers illustrations, both negative and positive, of his teaching. The short-lived storm of wind and rain suggests the futility of violent action. Water in its fluidity and taking the lowest place exemplifies absence of self-determination and humility, while, as it also benefits all things and wears away that which is hard, it illustrates the paradoxical issue of yin wui ("Do nothing") in yin wui wui ("There is nothing that is not rooted in piety"). Specifically his illustration to be found in vegetable life, which in obedience to an inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth, culminating and again subsiding (16). The Taoistic life is therefore a life of equable indifference, outwardly of non-action, devoid, i.e., of action for chosen ends; moved in obedience to an inward spontaneity rather than motivated by outward inducement; a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-determined. Hence the sage is simple (19) with the simplicity of unweighted wood as contrasted with the definiteness of a carved bean; i.e., he is free from self-determination. Again, he grasps 'the one' (22), withdrawing himself from the manifoldness of self-determination along particular lines and holding to 'the one,' i.e. the principle which Lao-tse knows as Tao.

The metaphysics of the Tao-Teh King centre in this conception of Tao. In many passages Tao has the significance of the 'key-word' of the instruction for the way the world is to be understood (1). He is the invisible, the ineffable, the nameless, the origin of heaven and earth (1), the one which when we attempt to define it, becomes nothing (14, 55); and we must avoid the temptation to ask the name for it, we must not ask the who or the what (14). In the Taoist formula "If God (4) becomes nameless as in relation to the universe that springs from it (1), in an order which may be partly known (42); and not only is it the case (67); and not only is it the case (67) that it is a being which over all beginnings (21), reaching everywhere (25, 3) and doing everything, while it is nonetheless (67). To these might be added, but for the considerations mentioned below, the famous "Recompense injury with kindness" (63).

Summing up what we have here, we may say: (1) transcendental existence Tao is something quite indefinite, which Lao-tse struggles to express by negatives; (2) from this indefinite ground the universe of the external world is derived from Tao as mother and not creation by Tao as agent; (3) Tao is immanent in the world, working in an unobtrusive way, producing and bringing to perfection individual existences. On the whole, we perhaps come nearest to the meaning of Tao when we say that it is pure being (most abstract of categories) endowed with spontaneity, the ultimate essence and impulse of all definite things. Obviously this conception of Tao implies Tao as excluding all idea of its equation with God. In ch. 4 Lao-tse says of Tao, 'I do not know whose son it is; it appears to be before God (7). There can be no doubt that with Lao-tse Tao is the ultimate ground of all definite existences, Ti among them, while, by saying that he did not know whose son Tao was, he lets us see that, having arrived at his conception of Tao, he feels that he is in the line of logical abstraction there is no going further than 'being' which is nothing, he yet dimly felt that it did not explain itself. The only other theory in the Tao-Teh King capable of a theistic interpretation is Tienn, Heaven. In some instances of its use a near approach is made to what we mean by Heaven when we use it as equivalent to Providence. In this, its highest, use it is not merely the physical sky, but a power supreme in the world of visible things obscurely connected with the sky, which is the supreme exemplar of Tao, but, even so, posterior and subordinate to it. Tao is to Lao-tse the ultimate and determining fact.

His metaphysics, as thus explained, explains his ethics. The ground of existence being a perfectly indefinite spontaneity, a light of nature, a light of the Tao, for which, for no reason assigned, the multiplicity of the world emanates, by the immanence of which the world is and is moved—all this agrees with the ethical doctrine of abstinence from self-determination and of simplicity, i.e. of the Taoistic life, in obedience to inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth, culminating and again subsiding (16). The Taoistic life is therefore a life of equable indifference, outwardly of non-action, devoid, i.e., of action for chosen ends; moved in obedience to an inward spontaneity rather than motivated by outward inducement; a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-determined. Hence the sage is simple (19) with the simplicity of unweighted wood as contrasted with the definiteness of a carved bean; i.e., he is free from self-determination. Again, he grasps 'the one' (22), withdrawing himself from the manifoldness of self-determination along particular lines and holding to 'the one,' i.e. the principle which Lao-tse knows as Tao.

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TAOISM

new meaning, since it is the outcome of Tao (51). This is the Te (teh) or Taoist
ends (38). This is the Teh which is the result of
effort, self-conscious teh. Teh in the Taoist
sense is usually distinguished by some epithet—
mysterious, large, living, lasting, etc. As the out-
come of Tao it is activity devoid of self-determina-
tion, the expression of the spontaneity of the
immanent Tao. The various virtues commended
by Lao-tze are as aspects of, or approximations to,
this teh. The various things that we call the
famous maxim ‘Remissence injury with
teh,’ where it is a mistake to translate teh by ‘kind-
ness.’ The maxim is no more than a precept of
indifferent self-possession: ‘Be a Taoist, even
though provoked’ (cf. 5).
Lao-tse’s practical teaching is completed by his
speculations on physiology and politics. As to
the former, it is asserted that the Taoist adept
attains to ‘lastingsness’ (7, 16, 44, 50). There is
no place of death in him, and so he passes through
dangers unscathed (50). Hints are also given of
a death which is not destruction, implying a
personality in spite of death which is true long
life (33). This thought, however, is not developed.
With the other form of longevity appears to be
accompanied a certain management of the breath
(10, 52, 57). Though of an explicit Taoist view,
there is a connexion with later Taoist develop-
ments.
In Lao-tse’s politics, as in his ethics, there are
attractive thoughts—e.g., the protest against
luxury in the court alongside misery among the
people (53) and the detestation of war (31). The
Taoist method of government is laissez-faire.
The sages’ duty does nothing, and everything comes
right of itself (52, 57, 56). Logically Lao-tse’s
teaching implies that a right society would be the
centre of a universal sway (49, 57, 77), but it is hinted
that the influence of a sage becomes effective only
when he has the advantage of high place (56). Here
Lao-tse is in line with Confucius, who asserted
that his principles would transform the world if
only he could find a ruler wise enough to give him
office. In describing the society which would
come to being under Taoist influence, Lao-tse’s
texts picture small stay-at-home communities devoid
of letters and of luxury, content with what
is theirs and utterly incurious of what is not. As
men within a Taoist society say, ‘Each one another are
to act Taoistically. The right way is one for men and for States (61).
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else—our essence which would realize itself if it
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If we put away these, then we know it and are
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qualified being, origin of things, and in them as
essence and spirituality.

2. Taoism before Lao-tse.—The question has
been raised whether Taoism existed prior to Lao-
tse. That there was such an early Taoism is
argued from the Agreements congruencies in the
Tao-Teh King from earlier Taoists, the persistent
reference of Taoism not only to Lao-tse but also
to the least semi-mythical Yellow Emperor
(55, 56, 57, etc., of the words of Hwa-wang-ti) can be to a term for ‘Taoist’
teaching, and the allusions in the Tao-Teh King
and other Taoist writings to an age when the
world moved on Taoist principles. It has also
been argued that, as where Te (teh) ends
now, it also contains allusions to a monistic and ideal-
istic strain in pre-Confucian speculation, and that
a doctrine of that from which the dual principles
derived (Tao) was well known. Hence, it is claimed, the I-King, the doctrine of
Tao, and some strongly held ethical principles
intuitively known were the materials on which
Confucius and Lao worked, Lao appropriating the
monistic sayings that we call the I-King,
chief reliance on the doctrine of Tao as handed
down from the Yellow Emperor. In the same
line E. H. Parker says that there is little doubt
that Lao-tse simply gave a name of (Tao) to a loose
group of ethical principles already for many
centuries spread far and wide over China and already
well known as the maximes of Hwang-ti, and that
every single thought in the Tao-Teh King had
been foreshadowed, usually word for word, in the
book of History, Book of Rites, Record of Rites,
Book of Changes, Book of Odes, or other very
ancient text. Among these other ancient works
Parker puts the volume attributed to Kwan-tse,
which he dates from the 7th cent. B.C. In spite
of all that is here said, it may still be reasonably
maintained that there is no conclusive evidence
that Lao-tse did not deny a certain originality to
Lao-tse in developing a new quietistic conception
of how human affairs once presumably were, and
ideally should be, regulated. There may have
been a floating group of ethical principles which
Lao-tse took over, but it is the reasoned quietism
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Certainly this would be proved if we found Lao
quoting ‘from some sage anterior to himself who
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1 Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th ed., p. 482.
2 Studies in Chinese Literature, p. 33.
3 Gilson, China Review, xiv. 276.
5 R. Johnson, Oriental Religious : China, Boston, U.S.A.
1977, p. 81.
long consecrated by use in the Book of Changes and the Book of Ritual. In the Book of History, or elsewhere we may meet with phrases such as ‘The Son of Heaven acts as the people’s Father and Mother, and as such is the King of the world,’ or ‘That the Prince of a State should hold high in his mind is the Mystery (T’ao) of Heaven. But such things do not prove the existence of Taoism as a scheme of thought prior to Lao-tse. Nor, when we read in the Tao-Teh King, ‘Thus we can say that the ancients meant nothing by the expression ‘Bend and survive,’ is it quite legitimate to annotate, ‘That Lao’s allusion to more ancient philosophy.’ There is no evidence that the ancients grounded this maxim on a metaphysical Tao. The I-King does in parts contain indications of what may be called Taoist philosophy; but this very fact leads Legee to put the origin of these parts posterior to Lao-tse in the 5th or 4th cent. B.C. Kwan-tse may be dated in the 7th cent. B.C., but the work ascribed to him is suspected of being a forgery of a later date. In the present state of our knowledge it is probably right to say that the existence of a Taoist philosophy prior to Lao-tse is not proven. The Tao-Teh King may still be taken as the earliest example of Taoist thought.

3. Diffusion of Taoism.—The history of Taoism immediately subsequent to Lao-tse is obscure. Somewhat later its development can be traced in a succession of authors.

4. Lieh-tse.—The earliest of these may be Lieh-tse (= Lien, 5th cent. B.C.), but the authenticity of the work ascribed to him is doubtful. According to him, the whole of things is in permanent transformation. The ultimate basis of all is a vague something which differentiates itself into ch’i, hsing, and chih. The second and third terms may be translated ‘form’ and ‘matter’ respectively, though we must beware of assuming an exact equivalence to these terms as used elsewhere (e.g., in Greek philosophy). Ch’i is more difficult to translate. Giles gives as its meanings ‘the vivifying principle or aura of Chinese cosmogony: breath, vital fluid; force; influence.’ The state of things when these three were in an undifferentiated and therefore imperceptible condition is called ‘chaos,’ whether this is or is not to be identified with the ultimate origin and basis of things. Progress is made from chaos by an evolution vaguely indicated, in the final stages of which the pure and light portions form ‘heaven,’ the pure and heavy portions form ‘earth,’ and ‘man’ appears as the vehicle of their harmonious ch’i. The general ethical temper is quietist, based now on ignorance, now on fatalism. Another root for it is found in the subjectivity of knowledge, and the absence of any criterion of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, though this is hinted at rather than developed. Along with this may be noted a disclaiming of any discrimination in worth between waking and dreaming experiences. Views of death are given which are perhaps not quite consistent. On the one hand is put the question, which might suggest Buddhist influence, ‘When the individual man is exhausted, he returns to its root, where do I survive?’ On the other hand, it is asked whether death may not be another birth. Lieh-tse makes much use of analogy: ‘man is a piece of wood, of which seem to have been treated by Taoist writers as the stock property of their school. The magical side of Taoism shows in Lieh-tse considerable development as compared with the Tao-Teh King. The secret of it is such a selfless identification with the life of nature as brings the Taoist into harmony with all its forces, animate and inanimate. The alleged immunity of a man from illness is an instance. The accident is used to illustrate the still higher immunity which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the ‘heavenly’ (i.e. ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘self-determined’) element of his constitution.

5. Chuang-tse.—The most brilliant of the Taoist writers is Chuang-tse (c. 330 B.C.). In him as little as in the Tao-Teh King is there any systematic exposition of a system of philosophy. In the course of his views he uses various literary devices— anecdote, allegory, and imaginary conversation. In some places he handles somewhat freely not only Confucians, but even more ancient writers, such as Yao and Shun. How little historical accuracy or consistency is regarded is shown by the fact that Confucians is also introduced speaking in quite a Taoist vein. It is not easy to see the drift and relevance of all Chuang-tse’s chapters, but the reader cannot fail to find a characteristic attitude towards reality. As in the Tao-Teh King, the metaphysical basis of everything is Tao, which is the explanation of all things is not itself a thing. It is more abstract than non-existence, which is made definite by its opposition to existence, and so it may be called non-existing non-existence. To call it Tao is quite possible. From this absolute indifference all existences, including spirits and God, have come. No explanation is given of this coming into existence of definite things, though, to be consistent with the general scheme of things, the hints of the illusory nature of all knowledge coming through the senses. The truth of things is perceived by the spirit, and Taoist adepts, when most in touch with reality, are in a trance, their bodies like rotten tree-stumps and their minds like slaked lime. One may notice also the incoherent scepticism based on the relativity of knowledge and the predominance of dreaming. A paragraph more quoted perhaps than any other from Chuang-tse, though by no means the most central to his position, is that in which he hesitates to decide whether he is Chuang-tse dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is Chuang-tse. Since Tao is, really is, the truth of life is to be found in the above mentioned trance when self-consciousness and self determination are completely lost. But, as in the Tao-Teh King, so here, things are taken for granted, with Tao as their spontaneously operating essence; and in accordance with this assumption the ethical ideal is with Chwang as with Leo a life of spontaneity. There is inculcated an abscision of all definite volition and an indifferent yielding of oneself to the course of nature. Hence follows a characteristic radicalism, in the Book of History, which is regarded as natural and therefore as little to be feared as birth. The Taoist is independent of all accidents, which are of no importance in comparison with the independent worth of self as an expression of Tao. It is only false that it differentiates between this and that outward state. If all self-determined effort is a departure from the truth of life, it follows that the devotee of virtue and the worker of iniquity fall under the same condemnation. Hence results a paradoxical levelling down of moral distinction. A similar strain of thought appears in Yang-tse, the hereiarch whom

1 Parker, p. 70. 2 E.g., Appendix, iii. 3 A Chinese-English Dict., London, 1912, s.v.
Menciun criticized, and is there regarded as con
gument high in the teaching of Lao-Tzu.
(c) Han Fei-tse and Hwainan-tse.—Other writers reckoned as belonging to the Taoist school are Han Fei-tse († 230 B.C.) and Hwainan-tse († 122 B.C.). The writings of the former are preserved in 65 chapters, two of which (21 and 22) are entitled 'Explanations of Lao' and 'Illustrations of Lao.' Apparent quotations from the Tao-Teh King occur elsewhere in his writings. Han Fei-tse has a hard, undisguisedly physicalistic character. His book is ethical, political, and is marked by shrewdness rather than by loftiness of tone. One sympathizes with the Chinese student who protests against his being classed as a Taoist and explains what he regards as the degenerate nature of his teaching as due to a perversion to a scheming selfishness of such sayings of Lao-tse as 'When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a previous expiration' (36) and 'The sage wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them' (66). Hwainan-tse is a more genuine Taoist than Han Fei, but his writings in their fanciful analogies and extravagant statements give evidence of a progressive deterioration of Taoism. Ethically he is superior to Han Fei. In at least one statement of his fundamental ethical position there is a clear distinction to orthodox Confucianism: in accordance with the nature (hsing) is called Tao, and this nature is to be distinguished from the passions (yu). Tao-Teh King. Later Taoist literature is voluminous and reflects that medley of subjects which make up Taoism, such as the search for immortality (which Chen Hsiang follows and who makes annals), the annals of the passions and of alchemy, amulets, the observance of fasts and sacrifices, ritual and charms, and the multiplied objects of worship. Much of present-day popular hortatory literature may be reckoned as Taoist. Probably the most popular of all Taoist writings is the Te Hwa of Lao and Zou, which dates from the Sung dynasty. According to the original text, retribution takes effect in this world. The practiser of virtue indeed not only may receive earthly happiness but also may hope as the culmination of his reward to become immortal. As a basis for an afterlife suffering in his person and fortune, and, if at his death guilt still remains unrequited by punishment, judgment extends to his posterity. Of this retribution Heaven and spiritual beings are recognized as the agents. In the illustrative anecdotes added in many editions to the original text the stage of retribution includes the other world and successive rebirths in this world. The inculcated morality has many excellent details, but extends also to tabus—e.g., striding over a well or leaping over food.

5. Present-Day Taoism.—Chang Tao-ling (A.D. 34) has been regarded as the founder of present-day popular Taoism, which is not unfairly described as a mass of superstitious magic. The earlier literature, however, makes it evident that before his time Taoism had yielded to the love of the marvellous. Chang Tao-ling or the Taoist who suffers in his person and fortune, and, if at his death guilt still remains unrequited by punishment, judgment extends to his posterity. Of this retribution Heaven and spiritual beings are recognized as the agents. In the illustrative anecdotes added in many editions to the original text the stage of retribution includes the other world and successive rebirths in this world. The inculcated morality has many excellent details, but extends also to tabus—e.g., striding over a well or leaping over food.

6. State relations.—During its long history Taoism has experienced a considerable vicissitude of political favour and disfavour. In the pre-Ch'in

2. Consequences and its Bites, J. Belen, p. 100.

on China as Taoist popes. After the introduction of Buddhism into China Taoism shows very evident traces of Buddhist influence, which was particularly potent in the 3rd and 6th centuries A.D. In its religious literature and practices it follows Buddhist models and borrows ideas from Buddhist texts. Its temples, priesthood, and monasteries. Giles's statement, that the celibacy of Taoist priests has been strictly enforced since the 10th cent., is subject to qualification. Eitel says that Taoist monks or priests do not take the vows of celibacy. They may keep their families outside the cloister walls and spend the whole time between meals at home. Doolittle distinguishes two classes of Taoist priests. A Christian no omen in the names and titles of objects of Taoist worship has also been traced by some (e.g., Wiegier). Many of the best known objects of popular worship are members of the Taoist pantheon; e.g., Yu Huang Shang-ti, who is the Supreme Taoist god, is also he to whom the great name Shang-ti 'suns phrase' would be most readily referred by the ordinary Chinese. Tao-tse is himself worshipped as one of the 'Two Pure Ones' whose images are prominent in every Taoist temple, the two others being Yu Hwang and Pan Ku. Taoism has produced a plentiful crop of legends and fairy-tales, the influence of which is seen in Chintamani.
times the various schools of Chinese thought seem to have been allowed free play. With the Ch'in dynasty, the first emperors' Confucianism, Taoism was in favour, and it continued to enjoy imperial patronage under the early Han dynasty. Thereafter its political relations were chequered; e.g., in the 6th cent. it was in favour of Buddhism, while in the 8th cent. it was honoured by the emperor Hsian Tsung. After other such vicissitudes it was by the late Manchu dynasty reckoned along with Buddhism and Christianity as a heterodox teaching in contrast to the sacred teaching of Confucius. See also Art. MYSTICISM (Chinese).


F. J. MACLAGAN.

TAPAS.—See ASCETICISM (Hindu).

TARGUMS.—Though the term 'Targum' was used by Jewish authorities to designate the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into any language, it is particularly interesting as the Aramaic renderings (cf. Ezr 4). Aramaic versions were used liturgically; the Hebrew text was read from a scroll, and this was followed by the Aramaic, recited by the official called metempsycos.

This custom continued to the 10th cent., and was in parts maintained beyond that date. It is possible that the famous rescript of Justinian was directed against the liturgical use of the Targum.

The most widely read of the Targums was that ascribed to Aquila, who lived in the 2nd century. Aquila really rendered the Scriptures into Greek, but his name became associated also with the Aramaic version. Onqelos is a translation of the Pentateuch only, and it is known as the ‘Babylonian Targum,’ not so much because of its language, as because of its official adoption in the Babylonian Jewish academies. Thus, though edited in Babylonia, Onqelos is dialectically Palestinian. Onqelos probably includes elements of common Aramaic, which were derived from oral tradition; some of it, on the other hand, is obviously of literary origin. Onqelos went through various re-editions, so that the extant text is not usually referred to an earlier period than the 4th or 5th century. The ‘Palestinian Targum’ (known also as the ‘Targum of Jonathan’), though later than the earliest re-edition of Onqelos, contains elements older than the latter. The most remarkable theological characteristic of the Targums is the avoidance of anthropomorphisms. They are thus paraphrases rather than translations, though in very large part Onqelos is literal enough.

Similarly there were two Targums to the Prophets: the ‘Babylonian’ (ascribed to Jonathan, son of Uzzil), which originated (despite its Babylonian use) in Palestine and the ‘Palestinian’, which is fuller of homiletic elements. As selections were read from the Scriptures (haftorah) in the synagogues, these Targums also partook of an official character.

On the other hand, there were no such official Targums to those parts of the Bible from which no haftorah were derived. Hence these Targums in Palestine (ascribed to Jonathan and the ‘Palestinian’, which is fuller of homiletic elements. As selections were read from the Scriptures (haftorah) in the synagogues, these Targums also partook of an official character.

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The Second Targum to Esther) are of greater interest for folk-lore than for exegesis. The Targum to the Song of Solomon is of no importance.

LITERATURE.—See full list of authorities in HDB p. 653. Add W. Bacher, Die älteste Terminologie der jüdischen Schriftauslegung, Leipzig, 1896, p. 244 ff., and his art. in JJE, I. ABRAHAMS.

TARTARS.—See TURKO-TARTARS.

TASMANIANS.—See AUSTRALASIA, POLynesia.

TATHÄGATA.—Whatever it may have meant originally, or from whatever source it may have been derived, Tathätägata is an epithet of Buddha used to express his very personality. It is, first of all, an appellation to specify his dignity as an enlightened being and a teacher of men and gods. He is the one who has realized the four truths according to reality (yathābhartt), and consequently, mastered the way to the realization of the truths. Sensation, perception, and thoughts are all under his own control. He is free from the bondage of the six senses and attachment to their objects, because they are not his masters, as they are with the common people, but he is master over them. Thus he is beyond all the limitations of the intellectual attainments. In order to express these superhuman excellences of Buddha's personality, the Buddhists from the earliest time used to call their master the Tathägata with a special reverence. In this use, therefore, the appellation signifies nearly the same thing as Ságata ('the one who has given blessed'). Here Tathätägata means the one who has gone (gatt) from the realm of attachment to the other beyond according to reality (tathā, which means the same as yathābhartt).

But the virtue of a Buddha does not consist in attaining this position for himself alone. He teaches the people the Way to the same attainment and guides them in its realization. He is the Master who, having himself reached the castle of fearlessness, shows the way to others and leads them to the same. The Tathätägata is not only sure that he is the perfectly enlightened one and has thoroughly overcome the miseries of existence, but also easily sure that he is the real answer of the Truth and the Law. With this confidence he turns the supreme wheel of the Law and roars a lion's roar in the assemblies of beings. Thus the Tathätägata is the enlightened one who knows the Way and reveals that Way by teaching with which he himself has become the 'thus-gone.' He practices as he preaches (yathā-vati tathā-kari) and v necesita. Though this explanation of the term is, as we know it, certainly far-fetched, it is quite natural that the Buddhists saw in their Master a being without any falsehood and self-deceit. The association of the appellation with the very personality of an unerring Master of the Way to the final emancipation is undeniable. A stanza which is said to have been uttered by the disciples at the death of the Master is another testimony to this association.

It reads: 1

1 See Neighbour, nno. 107 and 123 (tr. K. E. Neumann, ill. 83, 291), and Sangyutta, xxii. 94, xxx. 150 (PTS ed. iii. 1891, iv. 1937).

2 See Sangyutta, xxx. 90, xiv. 2 (PTS ed. iv. 64, 88).

3 See Sangyutta, xiii. 21 (PTS ed. ii. 17), and Aggnttan, iv. 9 (PTS ed. ii. 9).

4 See Sangyutta, vii. 7 (PTS ed. i. 191), xxi. 38 (PTS ed. i. 329), cf. Aggnttan, vi. 28 (PTS ed. iii. iv. 15), Maruttan, iii. 15 (PTS ed. i. 372), Sudhamma-ympatikas (SBE xx. 1201). See also Rettikoso, 112 (PTS ed. p. 112), Aggnttan, iv. 23 (PTS ed. ii. 31), cf. below, Lotus, 11 and Makkhæn (ed. Sénart, Paris, 1890, ii. 360, 365, etc.).
The Master, such a Master as he is (gautā ēkātiko), without and within and without, the Tathāgata... is gone.1 Thus-gone is the Master who has seen the way and revealed it to us, according to reality.

To the Buddhists their Master was the ‘thus-gone’ or ‘thus-destined’ (translation of Edmunds) to the ‘perfection’ (determinative, endete, Neumann) in wisdom and its realization, in short, the ‘truth-winner’ (Rhy’s Davids). The appellation was certainly a self-designation of Buddha, more used by his disciples to express their confidence in the Master.

So far the empirical aspect of the concept. We must now take up the metaphysical side of the idea conveyed by or attached to the term. The Buddhists were, probably in Buddha’s lifetime, nearly realizing for themselves the truth that the revealer of the Way must be at home in it, and that therefore he is the Way itself. They said: ‘The laws (dhāmanā) are real and not otherwise as they are, and these are perfectly known by the Tathāgata.’2 Here ‘the laws’ mean not only Buddha’s teaching, but the things taught in his teaching and their essence. Hence the saying: ‘He, the Blessed One, knows having known (the laws), sees having seen, born of Light, born of Wisdom, born of Truth (dhāmanā-sakti), and born of Brāhma; He is the one who reveals and tells, the One who gives immortality, the Lord of Truth, the Tathāgata.’ Here we have translated the dhāmaṇa by ‘truth,’ i.e. the truth expressed in Buddha’s laws.

The ideas here formulated cannot be called metaphysical speculations; still they show a tendency to base the faith in the Master on the transcendental entity of the Truth, not only revealed to us by him, but also represented personally by him. The foundation and elaboration of these ideas must proceed to a further development of Buddhological (so to speak, in analogy with ‘Christological’) speculations. The fact of the foundation and elaboration of the speculations of the Master; thought and clear conception must follow it. And it is quite natural that the Buddhological ideas were always closely associated with the appellation Tathāgata. These thoughts may be studied from three aspects or phases of their development. They are: (1) the relation of the Tathāgata to the Truth (dhāmaṇa) which he revealed, (2) the communion of the Tathāgata with the many other Tathāgatas, and (3) the eternity of the personality of the Tathāgata.

(1) The term dhāmaṇa (in both singular and plural) is a very flexible one. But the various aspects of the concept itself may be seen when viewed as centering in the person of the Master. The dhāmanā (plural) are qualities of things, both physical and mental, which are transient, but subject to the laws. These laws make up existence, and our attachment to and thirst for them are the causes of the miseries of life. Misery, its genesis, its extinction, and the way of release from it—these truths have been revealed by the Tathāgata according to reality (yathābhātāt). Thus our emancipation from the miseries is possible only by realizing to ourselves the laws according to reality. These are the laws of the Tathāgata, the dhāmaṇa or the Tathāgata. Therefore the laws have their root, light, and basis in the Blessed One.3 Buddha is the king of the laws. On the other hand, however, Buddhahood is attainable only by the comprehension of these laws. Hence it is true also that Buddha is the protector of the laws, who, leaning upon the laws, reveres, honours, and adores them. The Law and its revealer are mutual in their relations. He who

1 Dīgha, no. 34; cf. below, ch. ii. of the Lotus.
2 Sutta 116 (PTS ed. 182; Sannyata, xxxv., 116 (PTS ed. iv. 94); cf. below, ch. vi. of the Lotus.
3 See Sannyata, xxiv. (PTS ed. iii. 229-237), etc.
4 See Abottura, iii. 14 (PTS ed. i. 189), v. 139 (PTS ed. iii. 150), etc.
5 Sutta 92 (PTS ed. p. 91); Sannyata, xxii. 87 (PTS ed. iii. 129).
7 Sannyata, iv. 5 (PTS ed. i. 137).
9 See Sannyata, xxvi. 43 (PTS ed. iii. 166), 44 (PTS ed. iii. 314), etc. Abottura, vi. 26 (PTS ed. iii. 314); cf. the Lotus, esp. ch. ii. (GSE xxiv. 49, 54, etc.);
11 Dīgha, no. 16.
13 A whole chapter called the Aṣṭamahā Sannyata, xxiv. 16, is devoted to the question of the Sannyata, xxii. 581, xii. 16-18, xii. 1-10; Mahāsūtra, nos. 65, 72, etc.
14 Sādhananā-samākāra, GSE xxiv. 16-18.
16 The dhamma is not merely a phenomenon or an instruction; it is in reality the Truth, the Law, by virtue of which the Master and his followers, and consequently the Buddhahs of the past and future, have attained or shall attain Buddhahood.
17 According to a story in the Sūtra of Burnouf, Tathāgata (tāthāgata, ‘thus-come’) means the one who has come thus, in the same manner as his predecessors, the Buddhahs of the past; it is, on the other side, tathā and gata, ‘thus-gone,’ and means the one who has set out or departed as they. The oneness of enlightenment and Law among the Buddhahs of the past and of the present is an idea as old as the history of Buddhism, and the development of its philosophy has always had a close relation with the idea. The Tathāgata (plur.) lead men by the right law (saddharmā)4—these are the words believed to have been spoken by Buddha himself to his tempresses. This and similar passages, speaking of the Tathāgatas and the Law, indicate the communion of the Tathāgatas, or the unity of Buddhahood in the same truth. Not only has the Law been proclaimed by the Law-born Buddhahs,4 but they all have one and the same road to tread. This one road (ācārā) consists in nothing but reverence towards and realization of the Law. Herein lies the very essence of the teaching of all the Tathāgatas, or, speaking metaphysically, their entity—dhāmaṇa or dharmamāṇa svarūpaṃ.4 In this concept of the essence of Buddha’s teaching or Law, and consequently of his personality as the Law-born, the Buddhist philosophers have found a metaphysical basis for their faith in Buddha as the dhāmaṇa-born. They were to find, by the help of this idea, a metaphysical and philosophical unity of all the Tathāgatas. It is quite natural that Nāgarjuna, the Mahāyānist philosopher of the 2nd cent. A.D., founded his theory of Buddha’s dharmakāya, or dharmamāṇa,5 on this concept of dhāmaṇa and the authority of the verses speaking of the ācārā, above referred to.

(2) This point gives us a key to the concept of Buddhological speculation on the eternity of the Tathāgata’s life. Whether the Tathāgata exists after his bodily death or not is a question that had been asked from very early times in Buddhist history. Buddha is said to have neither affirmed nor denied it. It must be remembered that every time this question is asked Buddha is named by the epithet Tathāgata. Whatever this connexion may have implied, we see that the question is affirmed on the metaphysical basis in the Mahāyāna text, and that here again the appellation Tathāgata comes most conspicuously to the front. We have two most important texts, which devote each a whole chapter to the question of the duration of the Tathāgata’s life (Tathāgata-dharmatā-vijñāna)—the Lotus of the Law6 and the Golden Light.7
In summing up these ideas we may see that with the Buddhists the Tathāgata has meant the personal aspect of the dharma. To found metaphysical ideas upon faith in the person of the Tathāgata has always been the task of Buddhist orthodoxy, even in its phases of development in the East. But, in addition to this, we should consider two currents of thought which flowed beside the central one. (a) One of them is the theory that denies personality in the Tathāgata or anything else. It may be designated the theory of 'no-soul' (lokstoppeda) and is represented by the Discourse-conqueror and other texts of the so-called Prajñā class. There the person of Buddha remains as the preacher of the sermons, and the epithet Tathāgata remains also; but nothing is allowed to be defined, any definition or qualification being thought to be a limitation, which means the same thing as illusion. Thus the texts which assert the omniscience of the Tathāgata deny to him any ascribable quality (lokstoppeda). 'Tathāgata means one who does not go to anywhere, and does not come from anywhere.' Here we see that the very idea of the Tathāgata is to be found in the midst of thorough negations, the identity of the Tathāgata and the Law is asserted. This is indeed a testimony to the tenacity of the idea.

(b) Another current, opposite to the above, may be called the 'philosophy of the Tathāgata.' In its theoretical aspect this doctrine cannot be distinguished from orthodoxy, being founded upon the idea that all the dharmas are realities, which are realized in the person of the Tathāgata. But in its practical aspect it looks to a Tathāgata beside the historical Buddha. Amitābha, the lord of the Sukhāvatī, or Vasāja-guru, the lord of the Eastern paradise of Kāśī, and buddhas in the Tusānān heaven, is the object of their adoration and their hope of salvation. The cult of the Tathāgatas in various heavens is found also in the Lankāvatāra, and it has proved to be useful for propaganda. Buddhism of this kind, whichever may be its Tathāgata and ideal heaven, is founded upon the belief that any Buddha or saint is the manifestation of the one Tathāgata. This philosophy of the dharma-takṣaṇa is a natural outcome of the early Buddhist concept of dharma and is in conformity with the faith that every dharma is the manifestation of Buddha's wisdom (providence), so that the cult of the Bodhisattva on earth is the religion of adoring this or that Buddha as the being of compassion or as our saviour is not only in accordance with the philosophy, but also has a very sympathetic aspect of faith and piety. But the defect of this system lies in its losing concentration of faith in the historical Tathāgata and therefore in its running sometimes to an extreme pantheism.

To sum up the results: Buddhist philosophy started with the ideal of release from the miseries of life in conformity with the real nature of things (dharma). As the reality, so the existence (yathā dharmacakī tathā sattā). This yathā sattā has been revealed by the Tathāgata, whose personality consisted in yathā-viḥi tathākāri. This Buddha's personality is inseparable from the metaphysical entity of dhamma, and vice versa. The idea of the Tathāgata has, in this way, become the pivot around which both philosophical speculations and religious faith have moved and developed.
TATI BUSHMEN.—1. Race and distribution.—The Tati Bushmen, called by the Beechman Missionaries of the Missionary Society of South Africa, the Montebelo Amvilo, are a branch of the Bush people of S. Africa, with whom they have many characteristics, both morphological and linguistic, in common.

The Bushmen in general were formerly spread over most large part of S. Africa than they occupy at present. Traces of their occupation, such as paintings, weapons, and implements, have been found far beyond their present limits. It is believed that at one time they occupied practically the whole continent and vere driven by other peoples into their present territory. They are considered therefore by most anthropologists to be the true aborigines of S. Africa. In their legends they speak of a time when they were the only inhabitants of S. Africa. Paintings in the W. Sudan, in the caves of Algeria, and in Central France are strangely reminiscent of the Bushman paintings of Rhodesia or Cape Colony. The Grimaldi race, who inhabited some of the European caves in Aurignacian times, may have been either the ancestors or the allies of the people who crossed over into Europe probably as slaves of the Cro-Magnon race. The Bush people are now confined to the country west of the U. S. W. The eastern-river, the Zambezi, the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean, and not many in the Transvaal. So far as is known, there are none north of the Zambesi.

From the Bantu traditions they must be recently extinct in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The Bushmen are divided into many different tribes and clans, speaking languages differing widely from one another, but all of the same general type. According to Meinboh, the Bushman tongues are purely isolating and have their closest relations among the isolating languages of the W. Sudan. While this is true to a certain degree so far as the language of the Tati Bushmen is concerned, it is too sweeping a generalization in the present state of our knowledge. The Tati Bushmen inhabit the country between the Zambezi and the Crocodile Rivers, from the Transvaal and S. Rhodesia to the Cape of Good Hope.

Leather arm and leg-rings, together with fillets of skin round the head, into which are stuck ostrich egg shells and other feathers, are also worn. Clothing is scanty and generally consists of the skin of an animal thrown over the shoulders in cold weather. The women wear a small piece of skin with fringes in front, while the men are content with a narrow piece of skin passed between the legs and tied round the waist with string or cord. Children of both sexes go naked. In warm weather to prevent the sun from blistering the skin, and in winter to keep out the cold, they smear the body with fat, often rancid, so that they smell very offensively. Weapons of war in the chase are spears, bows and arrows, and throwing-sticks. The tips of the arrows are smeared with poison made from the Bushman’s poison bush (Adansonia sebifera) and the Amaryllis (Amaryllis disticha), mixed with snaked poison, and in some cases with poisonous ants. The food of both sexes consists of the flesh of animals, locusts, larve of ants, called Bushman rice, gum, and various tubers and seeds. For the collection of tubers an implement called the ikhosi or imbue is employed. It is a stont stick about 3 ft. long, upon which a round flat stone with a hole in the centre is fastened about 9 ins. from the end. This is the well-known digging stick, which is also used to excavate graves.

2. Culture and organization.—The Bushmen,
or more rarely scenes of war and domestic life. The drawings of the wild animals are in many cases really well executed, though one can trace in places the gradual evolution of the art of painting. A fresco recently discovered in the Maboko Hills near Bulawayo is remarkable for its artistic merit. There is not much perspective in most of the paintings, while the execution as a whole reminds one of the paintings of the Old Stone Age. Certain paintings of figures are supposed to have a mythological significance, as they cannot be connected with animals or circumstances of the present day. Some caves were called after particular paintings—e.g., the Cave of the Great Serpent, the Cave of the Lion—and hence were held in a certain degree of reverence by the people. To such caves they would periodically return, as to a rallying-point to talk over their wild adventures. It has been suggested that the art of the Bushman is due to sympathetic magic, that this was the idea underlying it—in other words, that the Bushman painted the animals on the walls of his cave-dwelling to give him power over them in the field. While this is possible, and may be probable in some cases, there is not any good evidence of it. It has been maintained that the Bushman paintings usually depict animals desirable for food, and that noxious animals are conspicuous by their absence. So far as Bushman paintings are concerned, this is not true. If animals such as lions, leopards, snakes, and rhinoceros are to be considered noxious animals, they occur often enough on the paintings. But such animals are not undesirable as food to the Bushmen, as they eat practically all game, and certainly would not refuse to eat the flesh of a lion, unless it happened to be the totem of the hunter. On the whole the paintings reflect no more than the ordinary life of the people plus the caprice of the particular artist. At intervals of leisure—and the Bushmen, when food was plenty, had much of that—the scenes of the past would rise up in their minds, and they would attempt to visualize them by painting them on the rock, and by constant practice the faculty of drawing improved. The colours employed were yellow, brown, red, and sometimes white, and blue. Some of these paintings and figures, as some are quite modern, as certain of the artists are or were recently alive. The faculty of drawing and painting was said to be hereditary in certain families. The theory has been advanced that painters and sculptors belonged to different tribes, but there is no good reason for accepting this.

The Bushmen are passionately fond of dancing, more especially at full moon and at certain seasons of the year. Fires are lit outside their caves, and dancing is kept up all night, or until the performers are exhausted. Some of these dances, in which the performers paint their faces and bodies, are of a religious nature. Some of them are more or less coarse. Songs are sung by the leaders, and the other performers join in the chorus. The motions are not at all graceful. Some dances are executed with curious hand movements. The eland bull dance, the baboon dance, the bee dance, and the frog dance—and each has its own peculiar tune. The dancers give very good imitations of the animal in its different attitudes. The instruments used to accompany these dances are stringed instruments similar to an ordinary bow, with a tortoise-shell as a sound-box variously called kopen, kangen, and iyora, 'reed,' 'flutes,' and 'drums.' The players have various articles made of the skin of the inside of the springbok's ear, with small pebbles inside to make as much sound as possible. Circumcision dances are performed after the boys have undergone the ceremony.

These are of a distinctly religious character. Bushman music is, as might be expected, of a very primitive character—the melancholy and monotonous repetition of a few notes. It does not usually consist of more than six tones (which do not belong to our scale), but the strangeness and wildness of the melody give it a peculiar charm. There are other tunes which do not advance, especially those sung by the Natal Bushmen. Harmony does not exist.

The Bushmen have an extensive range of terms for family relationships, both male and female. Some of these are connected with duties; e.g., a mother-in-law must not see her son-in-law or mention his name; he, on his part, must not mention hers. The same rule applies to some other relations also. A woman must avoid mentioning the name of her husband or any of his near relatives. There are different terms for these relationships, but the system among the Bushmen is not nearly so perfect as that among the Australians.

Marriage is usually a very simple matter among the Bushmen, some of whom are monogamists and some polygamists, according to their individual or worldy position. Two young people very often simply go off and live together, but usually the young man has to prove his prowess by going into the veld and slaying some wild animal—the stronger and fiercer he can find—and presenting the whole or a selected portion to the girl's father. Among some tribes this is considered indispensable before asking the hand of a girl in marriage. If the present is accepted, the marriage is complete. Sexual intercourse before marriage, while looked upon as a crime, is very often practised. Divorce too is simple. A man or woman leaves his or her partner and goes off with some one else. The custody of the children does not cause much trouble, as the young people are accustomed to fend for themselves at an early age. Parental control is thus exceedingly weak. Marriage usually takes place within the clan, but a man cannot marry a woman of the same family as his own—i.e., bearing his own surname. So far as we know, a man cannot take his own sister to wife, because of his totem, but he may take his sister-in-law. Although there is much freedom in the intercourse of the sexes, incest and adultery are regarded as crimes and are punished by death, usually by retaliation on the part of the injured person and his relatives. Especially witchcraft is a crime against the Bushman moral code and are punished by fines, expulsion from the tribe, or even death in the case of persistent offenders. The old people, when too infirm to follow the family in its wanderings or unable to procure food for themselves, are left to die.

4. Totemism and Religion.—As has been remarked, totemism exists among the Bushmen, especially among those tribes that have had long contact with the Bantu peoples, but they are too much the children of the wild to have developed it to any extent. Some call themselves the Zebra clan, or the Eland clan, or the Duiker clan, and, while they avoid killing and eating these animals or certain portions of them, they are not at all strict about this matter when pressed by hunger. In the case of the Duiker clan, the members may eat all of the animal except the heart. Those clans whose totem was the buffalo did not scruple to eat every portion of them, although they might not eat every portion of a wild buffalo, even though they looked upon oxen as tame buffaloes.

They believe in a spirit which the northern tribes call Thora, and the southern Kung or Kagen.
TATI BUSHMEN

W. H. I. Bleek, 1 J. M. Orpen, 2 and others think that "Kang is simply the mantis insect, for which the Bushmen use a similar mantis-like symbol, and which seems to be great force in this contention. While it may be true of the Bushmen of Cape Colony, it is certainly not true of the Tati Bushmen. They send the rain, the lightning (of which they are very much afraid), good weather, bad luck, and plenty. They are not very clear as to whether he is a person or not, but he is usually spoken of with dread, as a malevolent spirit, with whom it is advisable to keep on good terms. They also say that he made the animals, but they are not sure if he made the first men. The Tati Bushmen reverence the mantis to a certain extent, and do not like killing it if they can help it. All Bushmen have a great dread of death, and in common with many peoples believe that it is due to witchcraft by an enemy. Arbousset 3 speaking of the Bushmen of Basutoland of his day, says that they looked upon death as a sleep. It is difficult to ascertain what they do really think on the subject as they are not unwilling to speak of it at all. They also believe in some form of future life, but do not know what it is really like. They imagine that it does not differ much from the present life. This is shown by the burial customs of some tribes, who bury their dead into the surrounding bush to be devoured by wild animals, but generally they bury the bodies in a hole or cleft in a rock, which they carefully wall up, or they excavate a round hole about 3 or 4 ft. deep and place the dead man at the bottom in a sitting or lying position, with the legs doubled up to the chin, and in each case beside him some food and his weapons. It is generally the custom in a funeral feast afterwards, desert the locality, and never mention the dead man's name. Why they keep silence regarding the departed they cannot explain. Some tribes place the dead with his face to the rising sun; others observe no such custom.

The Tati Bushmen have no regular priests, but they have certain individuals, whom they call doctors, who possess a considerable knowledge of the properties and uses of wild plants, and thus exercise great influence over the people. This knowledge is sometimes confined to certain families, who jealously guard it. They have a cure for all ills, deadly poisons and have antidotes for them. Malicious poisoning does not often occur among them. Bushman doctors profess to cure malaria, typhoid, blackwater fever, dysentery, and other diseases, and, according to reliable information, are often successful. Most of the plants which they use are employed in religious ceremonies or in ordeals and trials for witchcraft. In fact, much, if not all, of the Bushman practice of medicine has a religious significance.

The Tati Bushmen, in common with most other Bushmen, practise circumcision. At present they perform the rite according to the Botshwa custom. Boys are operated upon about the age of twelve years, development being rapid with them. As a stone knife was formerly employed and still is by most tribes— a matter of necessity at first, but now a matter of custom, or of hygiene, as the knife is thrown away and a new one made for each ceremony. A number of boys of approximately the same age are operated upon at once. The method is as follows. The Machan is drawn forward over the boy's face, it will stretch and then cut off with one slash of the knife. It quickly retracts and so prevents excessive bleeding, and usually heals rapidly. It is not known for certain whether the girls underwent the rite or not. The southern Bushmen cut off the last joint of the little finger of the right hand in the case of boys, and of the left hand in the case of girls. This was a religious ceremony, but whether it took the place of circumcision or was additional thereto is still uncertain. Cutting off the joints of one or more fingers was also practised as a sign of mourning. The Tati Bushmen, whatever they may have done in the past, do not now practise finger-cutting.

5. Omens.—The great factor in the life of the Bushmen is their divining bones, commonly but erroneously called dice. The Bushmen would undertake no expedition without consulting them. They are four and sometimes five in number, and designated male and female. The female bone is usually longer than the male. They are made from the hoofs of animals, bone, horn, wood, or even the stones of wild fruits. Sometimes they are ornamented with designs on back or front. To consult them a man would clear a small space of ground, rub the bones with various kinds of medicine, blow upon them, and then cast them upon the ground. From their positions and conjunctions he divines what he wants to according to certain laws. If the result is unfavourable, it is useless for him to persevere in his object. Divination is also practised by means of the shoulder-blade of a springbok, and by certain other animals, such as the mantis, lion, jackal, and snake.

6. Spirits.—The Bushmen personify some animals and look upon them as men in another state of existence. They also believe that men, like witch-doctors, can assume animal shapes at will and compel other people to do the same. This, they say, is to have power over such victims. It has been held to indicate a belief in the re-illumination of souls, but the point is very doubtful. They certainly believe in transformations of animals. The Tati Bushmen thoroughly believe in the existence of spirits, usually of a malevolent character, and, when closely questioned, admit that they can change their shapes at will, but they do not seem to believe that these spirits can be born again into another animal shapes. Lightning, wind, eddies of dust, and smoke phenomena are looked upon as spirits. This is probably a relic of primitive man's belief that the animals and things about him were not different from himself—certainly to some extent the Bushman view. There are spirits of rivers, fountains, and thermal springs known to the Bushmen and much revered by them.

7. Mythology of the heavenly bodies.—The Bushmen have no regular system of mythology in the sense that the ancient Greeks or the modern Hindus have, but they have the elements of such. They are said to have worshipped the heavenly bodies and are therefore to be included among those people who attained to sideral worship. Among the Tati Bushmen no special ceremonies are connected with these bodies, although it is evident from numerous tales in which the sun and moon appear that a considerable degree of reverence is paid to them. The new moon figures in many of their tales.

The moon is the shoe of the mantis. Her waxing and waning is explained as her dying and coming to life again. The Tati Bushmen have some of these tales in a more or less modified form; e.g., one speaks of the moon's face in a pool of water. The Bushmen do not know why the sun is hot, and why there is no heat in the south; the southern Bushmen: the sun is, spoken of as a little boy by the wayside; sometimes he is said to have been thrown into the sky by some children while he was asleep. When the moon is spoken of as being cut by the sun and after death

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1. A Brief Account of Bushman Folk Lore, p. 6 ff.
3. T. Arbousset and F. Damas, Relation d'un voyage d'exploration au nord-est de la Colonie du Cap de Bonne-Espérance, p. 504.
TATUING

1. Antiquity and distribution.—Both these modes of personal decoration are of considerable antiquity and of wide distribution. Tatuings have been traced among people of greatly varying culture, from the aborigines of Australia, who adorn their bodies with cicatrices, to the Polynesians and Japanese, who have derived the practice from the Oceanic people.

At a very early stage man no doubt felt a desire for personal decoration and learnt to use pigment for this purpose; and it is possible that tatu was resorted to as a means of giving a permanent character to the designs thus made to beautify the body at a stage prior to the use of clothes.

Archaeological evidence can, unfortunately, give us no direct proof of the existence of such a custom as tatu in prehistoric times, but it is well known that Aurignacian man was skilful in the use of colour. Déchelette suggests that the finely pointed implements found in Magdalenian deposits may have been used for tatu. Referring to the practice among primitive peoples of cicatrisation and tatu, he says:

"Les premiers habitants de l'Europe préhistorique s'ornaient le corps à l'aide de tatouages effectués de manière à rendre impossible de distinguer nettement pour cette période les séries de cicatrices de la peau corporelle simple et le tatouage. Ce fut là un fait dû à des raisons indéterminées mais décisives pour la survie de l'homme dans la préhistoire, pour l'époque néolithique et le commencement fort au moins de l'âge du bronze."

In the pre-dynastic tombs of the old Egyptians excavated by Flinders Petrie, de Morgan, Amelunxen, and others, some rude human figures have been found bearing marks that suggest the use of tatu—e.g., the female figure discovered at Tebt.

In the second Théban empyre the Egyptians tattooed themselves on the breast or arms with the names or symbols of deities, but decorative tatu marks are rare on Egyptian remains of the classical period. The prohibition in Ly 14b, 35b, 'To make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor any marks upon you,' indicates that the Jews had seen these practices carried on by the heathen nations among whom their lot was cast, and perhaps had themselves adopted them.

There are many classical allusions to tatu in Europe. Herodotus writes of the Thracian women being tattooed as a sign of nobility. 1}

Cook says that the men of the Dacians and Sarmatians marked their bodies ('corpora sua inscribunt'). That tatu was known to the Pictones and other tribes of Gaul is shown by the evidence from coins. 2}

Chinese tradition says that the heroine Tschaife found tatu among the Ainu of Japan, who indeed practised it to this day. In China it ceased at a very early time to be a desirable mode of decoration and survives only as a method of imposing a distinctive mark. A. T. Sinclair says that 'among the ancient natives in the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, tattooing was general if not almost universal.' It was also practised by the early inhabitants of S. America, as notably among the coastal tribes of Ecuador and ancient Peru. 3}

G. Elliot Smith finds it along the coast-lines of a great part of the world and includes it in the culture-complex of the 'hellolithic' track. 4}

It was first introduced to the Tahitian word tatau, a reduplicated form of the root *ta*,'to strike.' It was used by Captain Cook in the account of his visit to Tahiti:

"Both sexes paint their bodies, Tattou as it is called in their Language. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins in such a manner as to be indelible." 5

Cook was thus the first to introduce the word to the European idiom. Many writers since his time have included in the general term 'tatu' the practice of marking the skin with cicatrices; the two processes are, however, very different.

Tatu proper is the insertion of pigment under the skin by means of a needle. A practically permanent stain is produced, while cicatrisation is the marking of the body, either by cutting or burning the skin in such a way as to cause scars forming small depo- sitions of dead tissue into the skin and keeping the wounds open, so that keloids, or raised scars, are formed, which stand out prominently from the surrounding tissue.

4. H. M. xxi, 1.
not tattoo themselves. W. J. Joest goes so far as to say that no race or people exists that has not had the custom of either painting or tatuing the body. On the other hand, some investigators have failed to find traces of cicatrisation or tattoo among certain primitive tribes, such as the Vedda of Ceylon, the Maoris of New Zealand, the Tatu Bushmen, and others; but this negative evidence does not rule out the possibility that such practices were once known to these people and have been lost. Cicatrisation is mainly confined to dark-skinned races, while tattoo proper prevails with those of lighter colour. Thus we find cicatrisation in Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, Fiji, and other parts of Melanesia, in Torres Straits Islands, among the Papuans of New Guinea, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakai), the Andaman Islands, and in negro Africa. It has been superceded in S. America by tatu proper, but has been observed among the Caribs of Guiana and in Brazil. The light-coloured races who have practised tatu proper include the Maoris of New Zealand and the inhabitants of the other islands of Polynesia. It is also found in Melanesia, Micronesia, the Malay Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, India, among the Tibet-Burman peoples in general (but rare in Tibet), and in Japan. It is also found in Algeria, in Egypt, among the For, the Tushali, the Namqua Hottentots, and other tribes, but it is by no means so widely distributed in this continent as cicatrisation. On the other hand, tatu proper was very prevalent in the New World, especially among the Indian tribes of N. America, such as the Iroquois, the Pricked Pawnees, the Delaware, and others. It is used extensively at the present day among the Huichols of the N.W. American coast, and also by the Eskimo, and in S. America, notably among the Mundurucu and Guaycurus tribes.

Tatuing is said to be one of the chief occupations of the Oriental gypsies. Sinclair found that most of the taking among the lower orders in Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and some parts of Persia was done by them. They also take themselves, and in this they differ from European gypsies, for these do not wear tatu marks. Hence their tattooing is an easy mode of identifying Oriental gypsies, who are often seen in all parts of Europe and America. At the present day tatuing persists in Europe among the lower classes. Louvois made a comparative study of tatu among soldiers and criminals, and considers tatuing to be prevalent among the latter. He noted that the design in criminal tatu are often extremely complex and of a cynical and obscene character. There was a considerable retardation of tatuing among the soldiers and sailors serving with the British forces in the recent war. A revival, too, took place in 1850, but tatuing ceased to be a penal offence and came once more into vogue, with the result that it is now an elaborate art. Apart from these and similar isolated revivals, tatua is, on the whole, rapidly declining, especially in Polynesia, once the centre of a highly developed system of tatua. This change is due, no doubt, in a great measure to the action of the missionaries, who have discouraged the practice, because of the oryes that often accompanied the tatuing operations.

2. Methods and implements.—The methods and implements used to produce these marks on the body vary considerably in different parts of the world and often reflect the cultural conditions of the people among whom they have been found. It is impossible here to do more than indicate briefly some of the more striking variations of the processes which have been recorded and which are examples by way of illustration.

(a) Cicatrisation.—In Central Africa prominent keloids are formed by chipping a piece of flesh, which is raised and held by a pellet of tow till the wound is healed. A. L. Curracallludes to ‘dandies of the Upper Ubangi and Equitorial Congo’ who undergo this operation as a means of obtaining the prominent belly of the one arm, which gives them a fine expression. Irritant substances are sometimes rubbed into the incisions to prevent the wounds from healing too rapidly. Among the Bagas, a Bantu people on the lower Congo, the arm is exposed to the smoke of the mountain. At Ms. Elgon, the girls use a crescent-shaped flesh hook sharpened to a needle point at one end. Scars are formed on the forehead and stomach by pinching up the flesh between charcoal and finger and running the hook through it; fine dust from a wood fire is then rubbed into the wounds. Natives from the interior of Mozambique wear marked rings on the forehead.

These are formed by making vertical incisions in the skin, rubbing in a medicine, and then binding tightly with a cloth, so that wrinkles are formed in the line of the incision.

Cicatrisation begins with the Andamanese at the age of eight and continues at intervals until the sixteenth or eighteenth year is reached. It is usually done by women, who use a flake of quartz or glass held between the forefinger and thumb. The arms and back are marked first, while fasting, and afterwards the chest, abdomen, and legs, but never the face; the special tribal marks are, in some tribes, made by men with a knife. Bread is not eaten while the wounds are healing; and the northern tribes have certain ceremonies connected with the operation. The aborigines of Central Australia cut the skin with flakes of flint or glass and rub in ashes or the down of the eagle-hawk. At Port Essington (N. Territory of Australia) scars are formed by burning the flesh with a red-hot stick. In N.W. Queensland they are made by lighting charcoal on the flesh and allowing it to burn there. The implements used in Melanesia differ in different islands; e.g., in the Solomons the circular or chevron-shaped cicatrices worn on both sexes is made with the claw of the flying fox, while in Florida Island the pattern is 'marked out in circles with a bamboo, and the skin is cut with the bone of a bat's wing.' The keloids and scars called koto, which are customary in New Britain, are made with obsidian flakes.

(b) Tatu proper.—A method which seems to suggest a combination of cicatrisation and tatu proper is that of cutting the flesh and rubbing in pigments in the wounds. Livingstone says of the Makoa (Makua) of Central Africa, who have double lines of keloids on the face: ‘After the incisions are made, charcoal is rubbed in and the flesh pressed out, so that all the cuts are raised above the level of the surface. The charcoal gives a bluish tinge to the skin,’ and the ornament shows brightly in persons of light complexion, who by the by are common. The Ainu women of Yezo (Japan) cut gashes on the face with a sharp knife and rub in soot from burnt birch-bark, which 1

1 Descent of Man, London, 1871, ii. 389.
2 W. F. Bichet, 'Wissen und Leben in, Berlin, 1876, p. 45.
3 C. G. and D. B. Seigmann, 'The Veddas,' Cambridge, 1911, p. 117.
5 S. D. Sower, 'The Talu Bushmen,' /.R.A.I. xlvill, p. 1917. 44.
6 J. H. M. J., 'New South Wales, x. (1906) 301.
7 J. H. M. J., 'Central Australia,' in 5th Century Practice of Medicine, London, 1897, ill. 350 ff.
14 J. B. J., 'The Maoris, Native Tribes of the N. Territory of Australia, London, 1874, 1. 38.'
produces a bluish-black effect. This method has also been observed in some of the islands of Micronesia.

The implements used for pricking the skin range in complexity from such simple natural objects as thorns, fish spines, cactus spikes, shells, and bones, to a pattern of the Burehweyes of the Bureweye tribes and the steel and electric needles of Japan and Europe in use at the present day. The Roro-speaking tribes of British New Guinea obtain the desired effect by very simple means. The operator, who is generally an old woman, applies colouring matter—soot mixed with water—with a fragment of wood or nail at one end to form a coarse brush. The colour is pricked in by means of a prickler having one or more thorns set at right angles to its long axis; these thorns are driven into the skin by tapping the prickler gently with a small wooden mallet. The women of these tribes are tattooed from head to foot, but the operation takes place at intervals, and there is a regular order in which the different parts of the body must be tattooed; thus the hands and arms are done in childhood, and later the tattoo is gradually increased until marriageable age it is applied to the buttocks, legs, and last of all to the face. The Polynesian method of tattooing is generally to trace the design on the skin first with charcoal and then to fill in the part with a solid, adze-shaped implement furnished with a serrated bone edge. The skin is perforated by hammering or tapping this implement with another made of wood and shaped like a pillar, but the ways and means employed vary a good deal in the South Sea Islands, and the operation is often accompanied by much ceremonial and feasting, and the keeping of certain tabus. Among the Fijis, while being tattooed, are tabu sida, and are kept in seclusion, for they must not see the sun. In New Zealand a very strict tabu has to be observed by the person undergoing the process; he may not communicate with any one not in the same condition, nor may he touch his food. The Maori chief had to be fed through a special funnel during the process, which entailed a good deal of ceremonial of a somewhat religious character. The Maori tatu, or tattoo, was of two kinds, of which the older method was a cutting into the skin with a small chisel-like tool made of sea-bird's wing-bones, shark's teeth, stones, or hard wood of different sizes and shapes. The edge of the chisel was applied to the skin and tapped by a small mallet, which sometimes had a broad flattened surface at one end used to wipe away the blood. This chiselling process was superseded by prick tattoo, which was done with small-toothed or serrated implements dipped in colouring matter obtained either from charcoal mixed with oil or dog's fat or burnt and powdered resin. In Borneo the design is pressed on to the skin with a tatu block dipped in pigment made from a mixture of soot and sugar-cane juice. The needle points of the prickers, which are also charged with pigment, and then driven into the skin by tape from a striker. Among the Kayans the men carve the designs on the blocks, but the tatu is done by women. The artists are under the protection of a tutelary spirit to whom sacrifices must be made, and the operator has to avoid certain foods. The women are tattooed in a hut built for the purpose; their male relatives are dressed in bark-cloth and must remain indoors until the operation is completed; in fact it cannot be commenced unless their men-folk are at home.

It is prohibited to tatou women at seed-time, or if a dead body lies unburied in the lagoon, dreams, such as 'a dream of floods, foretelling much blood-letting, will also interrupt the work.' In Burma the outline of the desired pattern is roughly sketched on the skin with a camel's hair brush and is then tattooed with needles close together, which merge into a rough line. The prick is of an unusual kind, being two feet long and weighted at the top with a brass or lead figure; the pigment is contained in a style four inches long, which fits into a hollow pipe and is thus joined to the weighted end. In Japan steel needles of four different sizes are used; the effect of shading is produced by tying rows of needles together. Sepia, vermillion, and Prussian blue are used in the designs, which are very ornate. In some parts of N. America the pigmented effect is obtained by running a needle-like implement through the skin threaded with some material coated in pigment. This method was followed by the Salish tribes, who used a 'needle of fish-bone or a cactus spike, which passed a thread coated with charcoal under the skin,' or sometimes the charcoal was carried on an unthreaded needle, 'which was thrust under the skin in a horizontal direction.' The Eskimo use a needle and thread smeared with soot or gun-power. Thus, speaking of the personal appearance of the Greenlanders, D. Cutting says:

So one... is a firearm, and from her cheeks, chin, hands and feet, has been threaded by a string smeared with soot, which when drawn out leaves a black mark. This mother performs this painful operation on her daughter in childhood, fearful that she will else attract a husband. This custom obtains among the Indians of North America, and various Tartar tribes, where both sexes practise it; the one to heighten their charms, the other to inspire terror. 3. Patterns.—A detailed study of the patterns would doubtless yield results of considerable ethnological interest as pointing to the migrations and culture-context of peoples. Plynters Petrie has drawn attention to the resemblance between the Algerian patterns described by Lucien Jacquot and those on the female figure found at Tutuk and on the Libyans in the tomb of Seti 1. (X11th dynasty, 1500 B.C.). The dominating designs in Algeria are a cross and a figure resembling a fly, which are thought to be degenerate forms of the swastika—a device widely distributed in Africa and elsewhere, and of great antiquity, as is shown by its appearance on a leaden figure in the second city of Troy (about 2500-2000 B.C.) and by its prevalence in ancient Crete. The designs in favour among the Fijian tribes on the north-west islands of Fiji appear to be similar to those on their boats, house-fronts, pillars, and monuments, and include family crests and totemic symbols such as the thunder-bird, wolf, bear, codfish, and so on. There is a great variation in the patterns of the Polynesian tatu, for almost every island has some distinctive characteristic of its own. The Marquesans, e.g., tatu in broad straight lines. Many of their signs suggest a hieroglyphic system which can be interpreted only by their priests; in Anaa, however, sea-urchins and quiant zoophytes are well represented on the leg and thigh. The Marquesan women have a design somewhat resembling a griddon tatu on their lips. In Tahiti the patterns are simpler, but of greater taste and elegance than those of the Marquesas Islands.

3 E. Williams, Fiji and the Fiji Islanders, London, 1907, p. 146.
5 E. Williams, Fiji and the Fiji Islanders, London, 1907, p. 146.
8 Siwe Yee J. (G. Scott), The Burmanz, London, 1866, pp. 41, 42.
9 Chamberlain, 5. p. 401.
12 L. Anthropologist, xi. (1900) 436.
13 Les Tabouages des indigénè de l'Algérie, L'Anthropologie, x. (1900) 543.
The coco-nut tree is a favourite object, and figures of it and flowers also occur, as well as stars, circles, and lozenges. The Maori tatu stands out in striking contrast to that of the rest of Polynesia, its chief feature being the blending of spirals and sweeping curves, which follow the conformation of the human form, the face being generally completely covered. This prevalence of curved lines suggests Melanesian influence; for Polynesians, the tatu has no independent character. Melanesian tatau is often asymmetrical, perhaps because it is done at different times and by different artists. Here again the patterns are very diverse and suggest, as regards some islands, Polynesian influence. Each of the three principal centres of tatu proper in New Guinea has peculiarities of design and execution; thus, curved lines prevail in Humboldt Bay instead of the broader stripes of the south coast, and in the central district the designs used in tatu resemble those on the pipes and gourds, which show a preponderance of straight lines over curves and an absence of human or animal forms. The Motu (Port Moresby) and kindred tribes are said to have a geometrical art, and their tatu is angular in character, but there seems to be no evidence that many of their designs were naturalistic in origin and form.\(^2\)

In the Admiralty Islands the men wear cicatrices on chest and shoulders in the form of circlet form of the size of half-a-crown. Tatu proper is mainly confined to the women, who have rings round the eyes and all over the face, and diagonal lines on the upper part of the front of the body crossing one another so as to form lozenge-shaped spaces.\(^1\)

Complex social designs are worn by the women in Borneo. The fingers and feet are done at the age of ten, the forearm at eleven, the thighs partly at twelve, being finished at puberty; it is thought to be done after marriage. The men have isolated designs, such as the dog design, in elongated or rossette form—a device prominent in Kayan art and one that can be traced in the shoulder tatu of many of the tribes including the Barawans (Sarawak). The most primitive tatu in Borneo is that of the Uma Long women of Batang Kayan; it is stipped on the forearm only—in irregular dots. Indigenous patterns are done on the arms and legs, and cover the cheeks, the corners of the mouth and the chin.\(^2\)

The thigh tatu in Borneo produces the effect of tight-fitting breeches, and resembles that found among the Burmese and some of the Naga tribes. The latter have a tattoo called ad, of continuous lines across the forehead, round and underneath the eyes, over the cheeks, to the corners of the mouth and the chin. Rows of spots follow the outside lines, and two fine lines mark out the nose in a large diamond space. With the Nagas both sexes tatu, but some tribes do not mark the face, and have the tatu placed on the breast, shoulders, back, wrists, and thighs.\(^3\) The Burmese tatu generally from the waist to the knees, but among the Shans it extends from the neck to the feet. The designs include mystic squares, triangles, and a variety of animals. The Burmese jungle style was to cover the skin with a new layer of skin, providing an inedible effect; the new style is distinct in outline.\(^4\) Perhaps the most highly developed tatu is that of the Japanese, who cover the body with fantastic figures of dragons, birds, lions, and figures in an manner that recalls the patterns on their silks.

4. Use and significance.—(a) Magico-religious.—The use and significance of these marks were manifold, and they have played an important part in the life of primitive man, since they had a magico-religious as well as a social aspect. Their spread use, even at the present day, as a magical protection against sickness and other misfortunes shows a very general belief in their supernatural efficacy. The Yui tribe of S.E. Australia wear vertical electrizations tattooed on the arm in chieftain's character. The Woodlaut scars are made with red-hot stones on the arms and shoulders in imitation of smallpox marks to ward off that disease.\(^5\) The Andamanese believe that electrization is good for rheumatism, toothache, headache, paralysis, epilepsy, and phthisis; it is resorted to for these and other ailments when all else fails. The Todas use it to cure the pains caused by milking buffaloes. Tatu proper is a remedy for rheumatism much in favour with the men of the Halba caste, who work on the lands in the south of the Raipur District and the Kanker and Bastar States in India; its action is probably that of a counter-irritant.\(^6\) The Gonds and Baigas have a number of designs for the protection of different parts of the body, including a figure of the monkey-god Hanuman to give strength, and one to assist digestion, of the foot-god to cure pain, and so on.\(^7\) The Burman has similar safeguards; these are: they are a protection against wounds and assure freedom from pain and are sufficiently potent to procure even the favour of princes. The only tatu worn by the Burmese women is a love-charm in the form of a triangle between the eyes or on the lips or tongue; it is done with the ‘drug of tenderness,’ a mixture of vermilion with herbs and other ingredients such as the skin of trout-spotted lizards.\(^7\) The Shans tatu boys as a test of courage, but special designs are added to prevent injuries or other mishaps. In Borneo the Kayan men wear a special tatu on the wrist called lukut, which keeps away illness. The lukut is a much-valued bead, which was formerly fastened on the wrist of the sick man to ‘tie in’ the soul; but, as the bead was liable to be lost, a tatu representation of it was made instead. The Aim women are tatu on the lips and around the base of the nose to keep away the diseases of women, which are thus led to believe they are the wives of the gods, since these are all tatu in this manner. If an epidemic occurs in a village, the women must tatu each other; they also use tatu as a remedy for falling eyesight.\(^5\)

Many races believe that the efficacy of tatu marks extends beyond the present life to that of the next, where they serve as marks of identification—e.g. Nagas of Manipur, Kayans of Borneo, N. American Indians, and many others—or as a guide, or as currency enabling the traveller to accomplish his journey.

The Bhavés, who inhabit the wild hilly country adjoining Chotâ Nagpur, say that tatu marks remain on the soul after death, and that they show them to God, probably for purposes of identification.\(^7\)

Women of the Brâhman caste believe that after death they will be able to sell the ornaments tatu on their bodies and to subsist on the proceeds, and in Africa a similar belief is found among the Eko women, who think that in the next world they can exchange their scars for food, and that the ghost is able to remove them one by one for this purpose.

1 Howitt, p. 744.
2 H. O. Forbes, 'On the Ethnology of Timor-laut,' JAF xii. (1883) ii. 10.
4 IB, ii. 384-387.
5 Bshaw Vose, p. 48.
6 Batchelor, p. 23 f.
7 R. V. Russell, p. 363.\(^2\)
often very elaborate and resemble those on the tetum-posts that encircle the outside of the houses. A. C. Haddon records an instance of the use of cicatrization to represent the totemic device in the Torres Straits, where he saw some women wearing it cut into their faces. And it was said that the men wore it cut into the shoulder or calf of the leg.¹

The Kavuya Indians of California formerly used the tatoo designs worn by a landowner as a property mark by cutting or painting them upon stakes and posts marking the boundaries. It was customary for the Maidu women to have a red spot tattued on the forehead by which, if taken prisoners in war, they could be identified by friends and so ransomed.²

A curious use of tatoo occurs in the well-known story in Herodotus of the slave who was sent from Susa to Aristagoras of Miletus by his master with instructions that he was to be shaved, and that Aristagoras should look at his head; this being done, it was found that a message had been tattued on the man's head, urging Aristagoras to revolt against the Persians.³

Cicatrization and tatoo proper are included in the puberty rites and initiation ceremonies of many primitive peoples. In an account of one of these ceremonies in Australia Spencer and Gillen report:

"The final ceremony of initiation to manhood in the Grubuma tribe is called Wiyarm, and the same name is applied to any man who has passed through it. The most important part of the ceremony consists in an image being carved in a tree, and in the middle of the neck and four or six others down each side of the back.⁴"

In the Marquesas Islands tatoo proper was the principal initiatory rite.

In Samoa 'until a young man was tattooed, he was considered in his minority. He could not think of marriage, and he was constantly exposed to tattuing parties and to the taunts of his elders and of low birth, and having no right to speak in the society of men. But as soon as he was tattooed he passed into his majority and considered himself entitled to the respect and privileges of mature years.'⁵

It is sometimes marked the admission to secret societies, as in the Banks Islands (Melanesia), where at the performance of the hole-hole ceremonies the head of the tamate design adopted by members of the society is tattued on the wrist, a part of the body highly valued. Mary H. Kingsley says of the initiation of boys in Africa:

"The boy, if he belongs to a tribe that goes in for tattooing, is tattooed, and handed over to instructors in the society's secrets and formularies.⁶"

In New Zealand tatooing began with both sexes at puberty, the women being tattued chiefly on the lips and chin. Chiefs and important individuals were tattued at marriage, not only in New Zealand, but also among the Eskimo, the Chukchi, the Indians of the Pacific Coast, and in Syria, Egypt, and Tunis. Women are usually tattued at puberty. This is not, however, always the case, for in some of the islands of Fiji and among the Todas of the Nilgiris it is deferred until they have borne children, while with some races it is begun in infancy and completed at marriage. Only women are tattued among the Chukchi, most Californian tribes, the Ainu of Japan, and in many parts of India. In the Omaha tribe of N. America tattued marks on women signified great honour and equalled that of a chief. Bachofen saw in the limitation of tatoo to women among the Thracians an expression of their distinction and good social position.⁷ This is contrary to the view taken by Plutarch, who said that the Thracians tattued their men as a punishment to avenge the murder of Osseus. In

¹ Evolution in Art, London, 1895, p. 222.
³ A. F. Ellis, The Telling People of the Slave Coast, London, 1890, p. 146.
⁵ Polynesian Researches, III. 364.
Melanesia, where tatu is mainly confined to women, their social position is very inferior, whereas in Polynesia it is comparatively good, and the tatu is seldom worn by them. But it is questionable whether there is any necessary correlation between the tattuing of women and their position in the social scale. The limitation of tatu to one sex or the other may be due to the fact that the women in the South Seas may be connected with the migrations of different peoples.  

The social rank and profession of men are often indicated by their tattuing, as in the case of the Maori chief who wore a complicated face tatu, and the Creek Town king who was marked in blue with figures of the sun, moon, and stars, animals, landscapes, and even battle-scenes. It has already been noted that priests sometimes had distinctive tatu marks. In some parts of India they serve as an indication of caste. All Gowari men—a herdsmen caste of the Maratha country—are tattooed with a vertical line on the forehead, the possession of this mark securing admission to the caste feasts.

Among some Indians of Brazil the excommunicated, or banished, were tattooed, so that they would not be able to leave a permanent mark there; and this was the star and gate, the tattuing of the gates of hell. There were some who cut gashes in their breasts, arms and thighs, on these occasions, and rubbed a black powder in, which left a mark which indicates a corpse.

The wearing of tatu marks proved a convenient method of recording, among other things, great achievements demanding personal valour and skill. The Kayans of Borneo, who have a very artistic style of tatu, use it chiefly for ornament: so do the women in the Celebes, and the men among the Batak in Sumatra. It is possible that in the Torres Straits it may be connected with the migrations of different peoples. But it is questionable whether there is any necessary correlation between the tattuing of women and their position in the social scale. In fact both sexes in many parts of the world attach to it considerable aesthetic value. In regard to cicatrization among the Andamanese, Man says that it is primarily for ornament and secondarily to prove connections with other tribes. It seems evident that in the Torres Straits islands it was adopted as a means of acquiring a certain accepted standard of beauty, for Haddon says that the women had a yellowish tatu mark from the breasts becoming too pendulous. This fashion is also found on the neighbouring coast of New Guinea and was observed by Soligman among the Otai, an Australian tribe on the east coast of Cape York.

In contrast with the opinions expressed in the writings of Tait-Gerland and others in reference to the religious significance of tatu, Jones and Westermarck see in it only an expression of man's vanity and love of adornment: "At present tattooing is everywhere regarded exclusively, or almost exclusively, as a means of decoration, and Cook states expressly that, in the South Sea Islands, at the time of their discovery, it was in no way connected with religion." 4 Westermarck admits, however, that it has been made to serve many other purposes, but adds: "No one can say that tattooing is not used to leave a permanent mark there; and this was the star and gate, the tattuing of the gates of hell. There were some who cut gashes in their breasts, arms and thighs, on these occasions, and rubbed a black powder in, which left a mark which indicates a corpse.

Wundt suggests that the marks at first serve magical protection against evil spirits because of the black ink becoming mere decorative, and were used to mask the personality of the wearer more strikingly, as in the case of prisoners, who wore them to increase their terrifying aspect. 5 On the other hand, E. B. Green thinks the priority should be given to the taste for embellishment, and that the marks only later came to have a tribal or social significance: "Summarizing the results of our investigations of the significance of primitive scarification and tattooing, we find that the marks serve partly as tribal tokens and have perhaps as such sometimes a religious meaning, although this cannot be proved for any tribe. But in other and the largest number of cases the scars and tatu marks are for ornament." 6

5. Origin and development. — Many theories have been put forward to account for the origin and development of the practice of thus marking the human body; as regards the origin, however, they must remain, for lack of evidence, little more than mere speculations. Instances have been known of involuntary tatu occurring among mechanics and other workmen, who have accidently grazed or cut themselves whilst working with charcoal or other colouring matter. Primitive man may have arrived at the notion of tatu by accident, such as the pricking of a finger by a half-burnt splinter or some kind of fire. The unusual mark thus made might well excite his interest and so lead to an attempt at imitation and to elaboration and invention. Herbert Spencer thought that the practice arose from the custom of making blood-offerings to departed spirits, and that the marks thus made expressed submission to or close union with them, and become in many instances tribal marks, as they would of course become if they were originally made when men bound themselves by blood to the dead founder of the tribe. 7 In this connexion F. B. Jevons writes:

'The marks or scars left on legs or arms from which blood had been drawn were probably the origin of tattooing, as has occurred to various anthropologists. Like most other ideas, we may add, that of tattooing must have been forced on man; it was not his own invention, and, being a decorative idea, it must have followed the laws which regulate the development of all decorative art... So the scars were left by the art of the people of that country, from which all other tattooing was derived, and each tribe went on developing them in their own way."

1. Rivers, i. 436-438.
3. Schlegmann, Melanesia, p. 130.
TAUROBOLIUM

M. Neuberger regards tatu as one of the popular customs that result from primitive therapeutics: "Smearing the skin with earth led to painting the body, and scarification of wounds and rubbing in the earth or root (according to whether the wound was fresh or unhealed) increased its development into tattooing." 1 Wundt and Joest, on the other hand, adopt a purely artistic view of the subject: "These processes both have a precise significance in the stages of primitive art, and in tatu he recognizes two types, the body being a crude system of mere simple marks often inspired by spiritualism, the natural lines of the body, and the other a stage in which the skin is treated as material to work on—just as sand or rock is used for drawing upon—until the simpler marks are replaced by fantastic symbols. Copans points out the practical importance of replacing temporary marks by permanent ones, if they have a special meaning attached to them: "It seems that the primitive man was not content with his marks and the sense that they brought to him, but he wanted others to see them, to gain thereby a new sort of dignity, and to be able to replace them by more lasting signs." 2

Concerning the origin of tatu, or Maori tatu, native tradition says there are four first settlers, whose faces for battle with charcoal, and later these warlike decorations were made permanent to save trouble. "Hence arose the practice of carving the face upon the body with two dimensions." 3

How difficult and well-nigh impossible it is to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the early history of such a custom may be gathered from the admission of W. Ellis, who, after many years of personal contact with the early observation of the, natives of the Polynesian islands, said in reference to their tatu: "Although practised by all the classes I have not been able to trace its origin." 4

Lemminkäinen—"This is indicated in the potsherds. In addition to the works there mentioned the following may be consulted: C. Riese and R. Shelford, "Materials for a Study of Tatu in New Guinea," J.A.I., 1905, 53; W. Bocklandt, "Oud Tatuering," 6th, 1872; A. Laassacque, Les Tatuages, Paris, 1890; C. Marquet, Die Tätowierung beider Geschlechter in Samoa, Berlin, 1890; Otto Finsch, "Über die Verbreitung und die Stellung der Tätowierung in der Ost-Aziatische Welt," Zentralblatt der Anthropologie, 1900, 12; G. von Dübner, "Das Tatuieren in Japan," 1890; A. Kramer, "Das Ornament der Künster und der Tätowierung auf den Marshallinseln," 1904, new ser., 1, 11 (1904). Valuable information has also been obtained from an unpublished essay by W. O. Hahn, Tatuering as a Means of Emotional Expression.

Constance Jenkinson.

TAUROBOLIUM. — The taurobolium, a sacrifice performed in conjunction with the cult of the Great Mother of the Gods, was not limited to it, but was one of the most peculiar and most celebrated rites of the last two centuries of paganism. A striking description of it is put by the Christian poet Paulinus of Nola, in the 4th century, into the mouth of one of his characters, Romanus the Martyr (Peristephanos, x. 1009 ff.). The high priest of the Great Mother, a golden crown on his head, his temples richly bound with fillets, his toga worn cineto Gabino, descends into a deep foss which is completely covered by a platform of planks pierced by a great number of fine holes. On to this platform is led a huge bull, beset with garlands of flowers, his front gleaming with gold. His breast is pierced by the consecrated spear, and the torrent of hot, steaming blood floods the covering of planks, the streams through the thousand chinks and perforations on the expectant priest below, who throws back his head the better to present cheeks, ears, lips, nostrils and even tongue and eyes, to the purifying baptism. When life has fled and left cold the body of the slain bull, and the flames have removed it, the priest emerges and, with hair, beard and vestments dripping with blood, presents himself to the expectant throng of wives and widows, who salute and do obeisance to him as to one who has been purified.

There were two principal motives which prompted

1 Hist. of Medicine, tr. E. Phayer, London, 1910, 1, 2.
2 Cognitio gratia, 6, 33.
3 Robley, 3, 2.
4 Polynesian Researches, 1, 302.
TEETH.—TELEOLOGY

It spread throughout the Empire, and maintained its importance up to the fall of the last
celebration known occurring at Rome in 394.

LITERATURE.—E. Esperandieu, Inscriptiona de Lectore, 1899, p. 94 ff.; Zippel, Festschrift zum Doctorjubiläum Leicht.
11, 1911, p. 157; T. Condon, "La Vase du Chateau de Bellono," in RHLIB, vi. no. 2, 1911; H. Hopfing, Attis, seine
Mythen und sein Kult, 1903, pp. 182 ff., 291.

TEETH.—1. Ornament and trophy.—Among both pre-historic and savage races teeth of animals and
human beings are used as an ornament, usually strung together as a necklace, headgear, or
girdle. Such ornaments are already found among burials remains of Solontouan, Magdalenian,
and Azilian horizons, the corpses having been buried wearing them. In a ceremonial burial of
thirty-three skulls in the grotto at Ofnast, on the
upper Danube, the skulls were ornamented with
stag's teeth and shells. Among savages the custom of wearing teeth is well-nigh universal;
and, while it may simply serve as an ornamental
purpose, the intention often goes further. The
teeth are worn as a trophy. Thus, among the
tribes of the N.W. Amazon, necklaces are made of
the tusk and other animal bones bored and threaded, or of human teeth bound into a necklace with fibre string. These denote the
skill of the wearer as a hunter, or his bravery in
war, and the human teeth, which are those of an
enemy, are 'a visible and abiding token of
completed revenge,' and are buried with the
owner. Sometimes the larger animal teeth are
ornamented with lines or carved. 4 Analogous
to the wearing of teeth as a trophy, is the use of savages, 'let their teeth be
broken,' and the Psalmist's words, 'Break their
 teeth' (Ps.), 'Thou hast broken the teeth of the
ungodly' (Ps.). The suggestion is that of enemies
as ferocious beasts deprived of their power to
tear and rend. Men doubtless used their teeth in
early times as a weapon, as savage men and
cannibals still do. Divine images are known to
have actual teeth set in their mouths, possibly
as a trophy or offering. 2

Possibly teeth worn by men also served the purpose of a totem, as having connection with the
qualities of the animal or person from whom they
were taken, or as protecting the wearer from similar animals in time to come. On the
other hand, a person's own tooth might serve as
some sort of lucky charm, very probably a tooth shed by a child was so used and protected him from pain. 3 Where teeth are knocked out at initiation, they are sometimes carefully preserved, or regarded as sacred, or used for magical purposes.

Teeth taken from a corpse were used to cure toothache or for magic, and those of an old
woman were used as a fertility charm in the yard
garden by the New Caledonians. 5

2. Matilation of the teeth.—Filing the teeth to a point either singly or in pairs, and knocking out
certain teeth as a ceremonial act, usually at
58 ff., 114, 115.
5 See art. CHIMES AND ANIMALS (Introductory and Primitive), vol. iii, p. 329 ff.
6 M. Diederichsen, An Account of the Aborigines, tr.
S. Corderidge, London, 1822, i. 353.
7 See art. CHIMES AND ANIMALS (Introductory and Primitive).
8 M. Diederichsen, An Account of the Aborigines.

initiation, and the purposes which these practices serve, have been already discussed. 1

Staining the teeth is practised by several lower tribes—e.g. in S. America and Indonesia—as well
as at higher levels—e.g. in China (applying lac
to the teeth). 2

3. Teeth as relics.—Teeth of Christian saints have often formed relics, and in early Buddhism
the four canine teeth of Gautama were among
a "seven great relics." One of these teeth has been
famous in Ceylonese Buddhism as the Daladala.
Its miraculous preservation from every means
taken to destroy it by a hostile Indian king, and
its ultimate arrival in Ceylon in A.D. 312, are the
subjects of a long narrative, and the Chinese traveller Fa-hian describes the procession of the relic as he saw it in 405. At a later time the Portuguese are believed to have destroyed it, though the Ceylonese allege that they only
destroyed a counterfeit and that the real tooth
is the one still preserved at Kandy in a shrine.
It is probably not genuine.

4. Teeth in myth and legend.—Greek myth
told how Kadmos, having slain the dragon guarding the spring Areia, at the suggestion of Athene scattered its teeth on the earth like grain. From the
teeth sprang armed men called Spartoi ('scattered') from the manner of their birth. A similar myth was told of Jason. 4

In the 16th cent. a report that a child had been born with a golden tooth in Silesia caused much anxiety in Germany, being regarded as a
portent. The physician Horst in 1566 published
the result of his astrological researches on the
subject, and declared that the tooth symbolised a golden age, preceded by the expulsion of
the Turks from Christendom. 2

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the notes.

J. A. MACULLOCH.

TEETOTALISM.—See ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.

TEINDS.—See TITHES.

TELEOLOGY.—I. INTRODUCTORY.—I. The
term.—The word 'teleology' (Mod. Lat. teleologia,
Germ. Teleologie, Fr. teleologie) appears to have
been devised by Christian Wolff in 1726. He felt
the need of a term to designate the branch of
natural philosophy which had to do with ends
(Aristotle's τέλος or οὗ τέμενα) or final causes (the
causa finalis of the schoolmen) as distinguished
from efficient causes (causa efficax). For Wolff, accordingly, teleology signified the study
of ends or final causes in nature, and more pre-
cisely the explanation or interpretation of natural
phenomena in the light of the concept of end or
final cause. In popularising Leibniz's philosophy,
he set explanation based on final cause side by
side with explanation by efficient cause. Presum-
ably Wolff derived teleology directly from τέλος,
'an end,' but, as J. Burnet has remarked, 4 the
word is properly derived in the first instance from τέλος, 'complete.' Thus, etymologically
regarded, it does not bear the implication, which
it has historically, of an external end; and the

1 See art. AUTHORITY, vol. ii. p. 284 ff.
2 Whiffen, p. 88; Stoll, p. 366; J. Deniker, The Races of Man,
82, 1587.
4 For a connexion of these myths with the preservation of
the teeth knocked out at initiation rites as a possible vehicle of reincarnation, being practically implausible, and also
they look like 'seed-corn,' see Jane E. Harrison, Themis,

2 H. C. Buckle, Hist. of Civilization in Europe, London,
1864, I. 306; E. Spranger, Hist. de la médecine, tr. A. J. L.

p. 346, note 1.
prevailing 'organic' use of it in modern thought is justified.

2. The concept.—As already indicated, the concept of the organic is primarily and in the literal sense. It attached itself primarily to that organic view of nature which was developed in the ancient Greek philosophy as against the mechanical view. According to the mechanical view, the whole is the product of the parts by their mutual interaction. According to the doctrine, the whole is ideally prior to the parts and constitutes the explanation of their mechanical actions and reactions. This leads to a doctrine influential not only in the sphere of natural philosophy but in the spheres of political and social philosophy as well, and it led to the teleological interpretation of nature as a realm of ends or final causes. As the whole was an unchangeable form, it gave to all movement a purpose and goal; and in the light of its purpose and goal the movement itself was most deeply interpreted. This ancient opposition between the mechanical and teleological viewpoints, as represented by Democritus and Aristotle respectively, set a problem which runs through the whole history of philosophy. The fundamental question was: Are natural processes subordinate to a conscious rational purpose, or is the world to be explained and interpreted by mechanical principles alone? That is the deeper philosophical issue in its most clear-cut form. There is a narrower issue, which has assumed increasing definiteness in modern times. The fundamental question here belongs to scientific method rather than to metaphysics and is most prominent at the present time in the dispute between mechanism and teleology in biological theory. Are the characteristic problems of biology (e.g.) capable of solution by means of the mechanistic category, or must teleological factors also be postulated?

II. HISTORICAL. — A. ANCIENT PERIOD. — I.

Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 B.C.) has been hailed as the father of teleology, but he is so only in a qualified sense. His explanation of nature—to judge from the fragments of his Iep revered by Simplicius and from the references in Plato and Aristotle—appears to have been virtually a mechanical explanation on the basis of a quantitative atomism, nor is it even certain that his First Cause of motion was an immaterial or incorporeal essence. The movement and order of the universe he ascribes to an absolute and necessary mind, intelligence, reason), which by an initial impulse impels a rotary motion to the pre-existent chaos in which ‘all things were together’. But, once the rotary motion was set up by mind, it apparently had little else to do. It may be that a thoroughgoing teleological view of nature is logically involved in the Anaxagorean doctrine of mind, which is represented as omnipresent and omnipotent) was regarded as a spiritual or a corporeal essence, as mind or mind-stuff. On the other hand, it is altogether probable that Anaxagoras did not carry out the full implications of his doctrine. Soocrates in the Phaedo 2 complains that in actual explanations he called in only mechanical causes—‘airs, ethers, waters, and such like absurdist’; and Aristotle in his Metaphysics 3 (in a passage remarkable for its perspicuity) allows, of the passions from the Phaedo) charges him with making use of mind merely as a deus ex machina, to account for the formation of the cosmos or for phenomena that he could not explain on mechanical grounds. Similar objections, as J. Adam 4 reminds us, were afterwards urged against Descartes and Newton. But, however, we may interpret the Anaxagorean concept, we cannot but recognize its significance in the history of philosophy. It is, however, impossible to say whether Diogenes followed up his affirmation of purpose or design in nature any further than Anaxagoras appears to have done; and this difference between them remains, that, whereas with Anaxagoras the teleological inference is in the direction of theism, with Diogenes it is definitely pantheistic.

2. Diogenes of Apollonia. — The teaching of Anaxagoras was apparently influential upon his contemporary Diogenes, who attributes ἔν αὐτός to his primary substance, air, inasmuch as all things are disposed in the best possible manner—a phrase which sends one's mind to Leibniz and his theological optimism. It is, however, impossible to say whether Diogenes followed up his affirmation of purpose or design in nature any further than Anaxagoras appears to have done; and this difference between them remains, that, whereas with Anaxagoras the teleological inference is in the direction of theism, with Diogenes it is definitely pantheistic.

3. Socrates. — The teleology of Socrates (c. 470 B.C.) was to be found in the Phaedo and the Memorabilia. (a) The Socrates of the Phaedo expresses himself as mightily pleased with the book of Anaxagoras in which ἔναν is affirmed to be the cause of all things, but as disappointed with the failure of Anaxagoras to transcend the mechanical view. He is dissatisfied with the view that everything finds itself as it is because it is best for it so to be. He has grasped the distinction between mechanical and final causes in nature, and discovers only in the latter a true ground of explanation. To rely upon mechanical causes would be as absurd as to say that the real reason or final cause of his sitting in prison was certain bodily dispositions, and not his mental resolve to abide by his sentence, as the best thing he could do. Had this not seemed the best, then by the dog these muscles and bones would have been off to Megara or the Scythian frontier long ago. (b) Consistently with this representation in the Phaedo, the Memorabilia 5 is found affirming an immaterial Reason in the world, and consistently too with the general doctrine of the Platonic Socrates concerning the individual and the State (which Adam would sum up as 'necrocracy,' or the supremacy of Not or Reason). (c) At the same time the Anaxagorean concept receives in the Memorabilia a development from one-sided that it becomes difficult, if on no other ground than this, to believe in the representations of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon respectively as both even essentially historical. W. Windelband 6 suspects the influence of Cynicism and Stoicism upon the petrified and stereotyped construction of the world in any case it is an exclusively anthropocentric teleology that is here formulated. The whole world of nature is said to yield traces of design, as appears in particular from the wonderful adaptations of means to end in the structure of the human body, in man's psychical constitution, and in the phenomena of external nature; and, furthermore, all is designed towards the one end of the advantage and well-being of men. (c) The Socrates of the Memorabilia gave perhaps the first formal exposition of the 'argument from design.' Formally, and often naively, he argues from the evidence of design in nature to the existence of a beneficent and beneficent Deity (σωθετικόν καὶ ὀλυμποίον). This anthropocentric teleology, with the theistic inference associated with it, impressed itself strongly upon subsequent religious thought.

4. Plato. — (a) The teleology of Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.) is so far indicated in what has been said regarding the Socrates of the Phaedo, but it has a deeper philosophical setting that is usually be found in
Socrates. In keeping with his ethical and social philosophy, Plato seeks in his metaphysics to interpret the real in terms of the end or ideal of the Good. Ethics is for him the foundation of metaphysics, as it came to be for Lotze, and reality yields in effect to the change of the highest principle of unity or the idea of the Good, by which all the others are explained, is developed more fully in the Republic. 2 The Good of all others in itself, is the final cause of every event and change, and to the idea of the Good all the other ideas are teleologically subordinate. The Good, as we may learn from a famous passage of the Laws, is the perfection of the whole; and the preservation and perfection of the whole is the Good in itself. We look upon the world, says J. Hutchinson Stirling, as 'a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart.' 3

Metaphysical principles to the interpretation of nature, Plato is hardly liable like the Socrates of the Memorabilia to the charges of externality and anthropocentricism, but it is true that such a teleology may be found, is, in its details at least, 'mythical.' In consistency with his theory of Ideas, Plato could not have claimed more for his account of the phenomenal world than that they were 'likely tales' (εικόνες ἡμῶν). In any case he does not, even in the Timaeus, press upon particular instances of adaptation in nature, nor does he encourage the notion of adaptations as demonstrating the existence of an idea. The Timaeus, as indeed in the Phaidon in non-mythical form, a teleological interpretation is offered of the teleological constitution of the world. Is offering it, Plato would apparently overcome the dualism between the ideal and the phenomenal which is inherent in his theory of Ideas (Nous being the final cause of his represented: as bringing order and harmony out of the moving chaos of not-being (μηδενία), in accordance with the pattern of the Good, and in so far as natural necessity (δυναμική) allows. Thus natural necessity comes into play when divine activity according to ends falls as a principle of explanation, and something is yielded to Democritus. But, while the teleological explanation involves a reduction of divine activity, and is so far on the lines of the thesis of the Democritus the Timaean is the self-moving mover who fashions the world—is not identified with the Good, nor is he to be equated with the God of modern theism.

5. Aristotle.—(a) While it may be allowed to Plato that no ultimate explanation of anything is possible apart from the discovery of its final cause, we have to turn to Aristotle (q.v.) for a more adequate recognition of mechanical causes as principles of explanation, and this although Aristotle himself, as the protagonist of the organic and teleological view of the universe. In the endeavour to overcome the Platonic dualism of ideas and things, Aristotle gives an even more thoroughgoing interpretation of the Anaxagorean Nous than is to be found in Plato. With Plato he believes in the real existence of the form or idea, but he cannot think of it as separate from the world. It exists in the world and in things. Reality is a process of development on which the change from more imperfect to less imperfect being is to be interpreted in the light of the Nous, which in things that are not eternal is the moving form or final state of actualization and development. The moved matter, which is the primal state of potentiality (δυναμική), exists for the sake of the form. 3 The individual is both form and matter, being form in relation to what is lost in it or the aiming of things that move in relation to what is higher. The marble is form in relation to the materials composing its substance, and matter in relation to the statue which it is the basis for. The ethical idea of the Good is apprehended. His conception, already adumbrated in the Plato, of a 'Jacob's ladder of science' (as E. Czrkl calls it), beginning with the lower, and reaching through the highest principle of unity or the idea of the Good, by which all the others are explained, is developed more fully in the Republic. 2 The Good of all others in itself, is the final cause of every event and change, and to the idea of the Good all the other ideas are teleologically subordinate. The Good, as we may learn from a famous passage of the Laws, is the perfection of the whole; and the preservation and perfection of the whole is the Good in itself. We look upon the world, says J. Hutchinson Stirling, as 'a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart.' 3

(c) Much more clearly than in Plato we find in Aristotle, especially in the de Partibus Animalium and other biological works, the recognition of the double authority of teleology and organicism in nature, especially in organic nature, which does not operate with the refractory medium of matter. As a metaphysical formalism he is content with a teleology of causation—material or mechanical (δυναμική) and formal or final (δυναμική), and the formal or final cause comes first, being the reason which determines the whole process. The mechanical causes are the servants and instruments of the final causes. Thus in Aristotle both teleology and organicism are factors in the explanation of nature, though the Platonic principle predominates. Thus it is that Aristotle has succeeded in reconciling Plato and Democritus, that by his cosmological and teleology he mediates between the onto-teleology of the theory of Ideas and the mechanical associated with the atomistic hypothesis. Owing to his scientific limitations, notably in connection with the mechanics of the heavens, Aristotle pushed explanation by final causes further than his general principles warranted. Frequently resting upon final causes alone, he at once Rendered the progress of his own scientific thought and lent his authority to the narrow and one-sided finalism of the later school. 4

(b) Aristotle's organic or teleological doctrine, based on the metaphysical concepts of form and matter, strikingly anticipates certain modern positions in biological and psychological science. Applied, e.g., to the conception of the organism, L. J. Henderson assures us, 5 a complete formulation of the biological principle of organization. Aristotle conceives of the living thing as an autonomous unit, having the teleological principle within, and with every part functionally related to every other and existing as the servant of the whole. Thus is the implication, we are told, of his comparison of the organism to a well-governed commonwealth, in which, once order is established, the individuals duly play their parts and a separate monarch is no more needed.

6. The Stoics.—(a) Among the so-called sects that came after Plato and Aristotle the Sceptics (q.v.) had no contribution to make in teleology. If causality was suspect with them, as with Hume in a later age, 6 also was finality. The contribution of the Epicureans (q.v.) was distinctly negative. Epicurus is to be classed with Luctipus and Democritus, of whom Aristotle said that they 'rejected design and referred all to necessity.' But the Stoics (q.v.) recognize the necessity of a teleology. There was one philosopher indeed, an Aristotelian, who came near to Stoicism in his opposition to the mechanical explanations of the atomists; but, on the other hand, the Stoic Epicurus 7 who satiates it, he threw away the keystone of the Aristotelian teleology.' This was Strato of Lamppus, who denied the existence of pure form as of

1 The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers (Gifford Lectures), Glasgow, 1904, I. 129.
3 Philosophy and Theology (Gifford Lectures), Edinburgh, 1880, 292.
4 Cf. also R. Adamson, The Development of Greek Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1909, p. 185.
5 "De Generations Animalium, v. 18.
6 Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, p. 308.
pure matter, declaring form to be always immanent in matter, and thus reducing the Aristotelian system into a consistent naturalism. Stoicism may also be described as naturalism, but it was at the same time a pantheistic system. The old dualism of form and matter, which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Anaxagoras, and had failed to throw off, gave place to an eclectic and somewhat facile monism, in which one eternal substance manifested itself as spirit (Hvym stpepanxv) and matter (ptw xwv). It was essentially a tautological explanation of the world that was given by Stoicism, because, although every particular phenomenon was said to be determined by natural necessity, as Democritus had maintained, natural necessity was not based, as with the atomists, on quantitative differences and initial movements, but depended on the vital activity of the whole.

In carrying out its teleology, Stoicism made much of the beauty, order, and harmony of the world and the adaptations of means to end, especially in organic nature, as manifestations of the rational unity and ideal meaning of things. The evils of the world, which offered even more difficulty on the material hypothesis than in the Epicurean and Aristotelian systems, were optimistically explained as instruments or components of cosmic movement, and it was said that they would be recognized as such, if the individual could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation of ends to means, whether to externally and aprioristic centrum, as in the teaching attributed to Socrates in the Metaphysics, or to the cosmological center, as in the teaching attributed to Socrates in the Metaphysics, was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the use to carry man's burdens.

Yet another prominent Stoic teleology, such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruent with Stoic principles.

If the teleological objectivism is possibly influenced by Stoicism, Cicero's De Natura Deorum indubitably is. There is the inference to God from the order and beauty of the world is eloquently set forth in a well-known passage—reminiscent perhaps of Plato's story of the Cave—attributed to Aristotle, where is depicted the idea that the products of nature would be made on men whose dwellings had been underground, on their first beholding the glorious spectacle of earth and sea and sky. It has been suggested that in the argument for the being of God contained in the De Natura Deorum it is Aristotle we have chiefly before us; e.g., the comparison, in several passages, of the world to a furnished or inhabited house or a adorned and decorated temple of the gods (a comparison which is to be found also in writers like Philo the Jew and Minucius Felix the Christian apologists) is said to have come from Aristotle. This suggestion is to Joannes philosophers who are jealous for the purity of the Aristotelian doctrine of the end, especially as Cicero in the De Natura Deorum makes the prototype, in the ancient world, of Paul's Natural Theology and the Bridgewater Treatises.

Teology of history.—While in the ancient Greek philosophy a teleology of nature was ex post facto, and as it were, in the form of religious period of the ancient world and within the early Christian Church the idea of a teleology of history gained ground. The opposition in the Gnostic view of history to the OT religion as the revelation of an inferior Deity led to the view of history which has established itself as the truly Christian. It fastened upon the Pauline doctrine of the pedagogical function of the Law, which gave to the Law a distinctive place in a teleological series of divine processes, and the whole course of the ages was interpreted in the light of the great divine plan of redemption culminating in Jesus Christ. With Irenaeus the teleology of nature is ancillary to the teleology of history, as thus expounded from the Christian standpoint. At the hands of Augustine the whole conception receives an impressive treatment, and the human race as regarded as a teleological unity as being destined to receive entrance into the catholic or universal Church (civitas Dei). This teleological view of the world as the scene of the great religious conflict in Jesus Christ still prevails in Christian theology, in which the teleological principle of history is sometimes described as Christological or Christocentric.
TELEOLOGY

Thus Bacon throws off the two thousand years' bonds in which has lainDemocritus and Lucretius across the path, and then follows out. But, while vindicating physical causation as the one form of causation of which physical science need take cognizance, he conserves the metaphysical and religious interests which proceeded along with the Platonic and Aristotelian teleology. It was incredible to him that this "universal frame" should be "without a Mind." He failed, however, to appreciate the importance of the Aristotelian concept of organization in biology, as also—but this was the legacy of the schools—the philosophical depth of the essential Aristotelian doctrine of the end.

3. Hobbes and Descartes. (a) Hobbes (1651), following Bacon and Galileo, tried to liberate philosophy from the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas and forms and to substantiate the mechanical view materialistically, in which he associated himself from the ultimate positions of the ancient atomistic philosophy. Mechanical explanation was not ultimate explanation. But his rejection of final causes in nature was on theological rather than epistemological grounds. We may legitimately enough, he thought, attribute ends or purposes to God, but we cannot hope to discover these, as they are hidden "in the inscrutable abyss of His wisdom." Here, as in Bacon, there is a clear distinction between the scientific and the metaphysical and religious interest in final causes—a distinction which became clear only in the modern period of science.

(b) For the same reason between mechanism and teleology in scientific explanation, Descartes possesses considerable significance, not merely because of his peculiar vitalistic theory that the soul was an essential part of motion, or because of his law of conservation of quantity, but chiefly because of his law of conservation itself. In the effort to reach the true principle of mechanical causation, he arrived at the belief that God conserved in things a whole, which he introduced into things at the creation; so that in virtue of this initial disposition the necessary world-process was at every stage teleological. This was a short-lived theory, but his principle of conservation marks a notable advance in the teleology of nature.

4. Spinoza. (a) The most vigorous, as it was the most uncompromising, attack upon final causation in nature came from Spinoza (1651). In explaining a particular phenomenon we cannot, he said, go beyond the particular attributes of the one divine substance, be it the attribute of thought or of extension, under which the phenomenon appears to us. For, while the attributes are parallel to each other, there is no interaction between them. Thus Spinoza's monism, including the movements of the human body, are only explainable in physical terms. Matter cannot be grounded in mind. There can be no ends or purposes in nature.

(b) From the incompatibility of the doctrine with his fundamental principle, two main objections are urged by Spinoza against final causes. The first is Bacon's objection—attachment of final causes hinders the investigation of nature: recourse to the will of God in the explanation of natural phenomena, and in particular of untoward phenomena like tempests and earthquakes, is a reduction of ignorance (scimus ignoramus). The secrets of nature are with those who abandon final causes and believe in the Providence of God, which, as dealing with the essences and properties of things, demands not accidental knowledge. The other objection is that the method of explanation by final causes encourages false anthropocentric conceptions of God. A God who works purposively, or for some purpose, is not a God who works in nature and lacks perfection of being. It implies defect in God that He should be in need of anything. Nor have we any right to infer distinctions

1 Essay, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'
principle, implying the complete rationality of existence, philosophy would for Leibniz have ceased to be, as indeed for Descartes or Spinoza. But Leibniz gave the principle a characteristic twist. He regarded it as the foundation of the contingent truths of natural science, just as the principle of contradiction was the foundation of the necessity truths of mathematics and logic. So that the conservation of force or energy and the equivalence of cause and effect in the world must be teleologically explained as dependent upon the divine wisdom and order.

(c) In biology, as in physics, Leibniz advanced the teleological problem. He is said to have established the truth that biological organization is compatible with the mechanistic theory, but in assigning the organism to a kind of "divine machine" or "natural automaton" he still comes short of the Aristotelian teleology.

6. Rationalistic theism.—(a) In the 18th century, Leibniz's theology was more influential than his monadology. There appears to be a certain looseness of connexion between the two, and it was accentuated by Wolff's effort to systematize and popularize the master's doctrines. In Wolff the harmony of the world is no longer an immanent order, but an order externally imposed by God; and the world's chief end is utility and advantage for man and beast—especially utility for man. This externality impressed itself upon the "popular philosophy" that arose in Germany about the middle of the century, and it is the basis of a remarkable and many-sided growth of natural theology or teleological physics and organics, the aim of which was to multiply the evidences of design in nature in the interests of the teleological idea. It is the foundation of materialism and determinism. There were astro-theologics, litho-theologics, phyto-theologics, insecto-theologics, ichthyo-theologics, and numerous others. As among the Stoics, the idea of utility and a teleology that was often beaten out into petty trivialities (Nützlichkeitskränerei).

(b) In France Fénelon had already written eloquently on natural theology on similar lines, although later the materialism of d'Holbach and the scepticism of Bayle were to cut at the root of the popular theology, and Voltaire was to pour contempt upon its anthropocentrism and shallow optimism.

(c) In England, too, natural theology was early developed on the lines of a speculative utilitarianism, beginning in the 17th cent. with the works of the deistnaturalist Ray (on whom Milton drew his Paradise Lost), and of Boyle, Barow, and Parker, continuing with Derham and many others through the 18th cent., and receiving classical exposition in the case of Hume. So exhaustive had the teleology of nature been discussed that the Scottish divine Thomas Chalmers, in the first Bridgewater Treatise, turned to mental as distinguished from physical teleology, discoursing on the adaptation of nature to mind and on adaptations within the mind; while Mcosh laid the emphasis on moral teleology, inferring from the moral order a moral Governor.

(d) Notice should be taken of a universal view of teleology held by the English deists Shaftesbury, who rose above the particular views that so largely prevailed in the deistic in the orbit of the circle of his time. His was an organic teleology, and in the beauty and perfection of the world he found a proof of the existence of God. Not only does the unity of the world point to a universe, but beauty lies not in matter, but in form or formative power, which must work with design.

7. Hume.—(a) The speculative sincerity of David Hume (q.v.) was probably not so great as his speculative genius. In the Treatise of Human Nature 1 he reduced the world to a mere complex of sensations—not an ordered complex, which could be ascribed to a divine Author; and yet in his theological writings, notably in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, he was apparently assuming order and purposiveness in the universe. If the tendency of recent interpretations of the Dialogues is to be trusted, we may even regard Hume as submitting to the logic of what is there called a "genuine theism," and as accepting the essential core of the argument from design as its rational basis. We may hear Hume himself speaking through Cleantus, the rationalistic theist, when it is maintained that at every turn we are obliged to have recourse to the hypothesis of design in the universe; or through Philo, who is sceptical and naturalistic in tendency, when he admits that all objections to the hypothesis of design appear mere "cavils and sophisms" to those who realize the beauty and fitness of final causes.

(b) None the less the criticisms of the teleological inferences which are put in the mouth of Philo are of great historical interest and importance. Cleantus, who states the theistic contribution from design to natural religion mainly turns, compares the world of order to a great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of minute engines, which, even in their most minute parts, are all adjusted to each other with marvellous accuracy. This universal adaptation of means to ends so resembles the naturalistic view of the works of God that we are led by all the rules of analogy to infer that the Almighty must not be a mere contemplator of the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties. Philo replies, in Hume's own sceptical vein, that the principle of analogy is not a sure basis of argument. For if we depart from the similarity of the cases. Can we really speak, e.g., of analogy between Nature and the generation of the universe? And why should thought, design, intelligence, be made the model of the world? If it is valid to say that, because the world resembles a machine, it arose from design, is it not at least equally valid to say, because the world resembles an animal, it arose from generation? And why go beyond nature in search of a transcendent cause? To take one step beyond the mundane system is to be forced to go on in an infinite progression. For the ideal world, into which the material world is traced, is itself to be traced into another ideal world, and so on. May is not be that there are forces in nature by means of which, even after a booching and bungling of many worlds throughout an eternity, this orderly and harmonious system was struck out? At most the argument from design can only prove the existence of a being in time and space, fashioning a given material, and all pretension to ascribe infinity to the Deity or even perfection in His finite capacity must be renounced. Can we even pretend to decide from the phenomena of nature as to whether the Deity is one or many? (A similar reference to the limitations of the argument is found in the Englishman's Understanding, 2 in which the criticism is in the form adopted and made famous by Hume.)

(c) By the objections thus urged by Philo a strong impression is made upon Cleantus, who is also led to admit, in view of the problem of evil, that the Deity might have had mistaken terms of benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity—an old position of the Greek theology with which we have been familiarized in recent thought. The carefully formulated conclusion of the Dialogues, that (as Philo says) the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence, may not have represented in Hume's mind the whole of 'genuine theism,' but it dealt a destructive blow to the rationalistic theology of his time, with its deistic implications, its petty teleology, and its hedonistic view of life.

(d) On the scientific or philosophical side, however, Hume made a positive contribution to the problem of natural teleology. The idea goes back far as Empedocles, and is expressed in Leibniz, that in nature the principle holds of the survival of the fit. In the Dialogues, as we have seen, Hume gives expression to this principle, and he does so in respect of both inorganic and organic nature. Described as the tendency towards equilibrium or equilibration, it is recognized in modern physics and biology as teleological in character; but, when Hume speaks of it further as perhaps original in materialism he at least suggests the idea that there is a deeper and

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1 See art. DEMOCRACY, vol. 1.
4 See art. THEISM, § 3.
6 London, 1748.
more original teleology in nature than ordinary mechanistic theory suspects. So that with Hume the teleological appearance of nature is perhaps more than a postulate of the reflective or subjective judgment, as it is with Kant.

8. Kant.—(a) In his early work on Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens Kant acknowledged the great value of the arguments drawn from the beauties, harmonies, and perfections observed in nature, and was particularly impressed by the starry heavens, to establish the existence of a supremely wise and powerful Creator. At the same time he rose above the popular teleology. In a later pre-critical work on The Only Possible Proof of the Being of God he declares himself impressed with the physico-theological argument, but, like Hume's Philo, he doubts the validity of the inference to a Creator who is perfectly wise and good. In the Critique of Pure Reason a similar criticism appears, with a famous tribute to the physico-theological argument as 'the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.' The argument at the best, however, cannot take us beyond the great power and wisdom of the Author of the universe; and it can prove, not a Creator, but no Creator at all. A judgment is necessarily limited by the character of His material. Contingency belongs not to the matter but to the form of the world. The attempt to show that matter is contingent and dependent upon a principle of intelligence is to fall back upon the cosmological proof, which in its turn rests upon the ontological, with the consequence that the claim of the physico-theological to be a pure induction from experience is in fact falsified by its arguments. In the propensities of the human mind to view the order and purposiveness of nature as though they were the products of intelligence and a propensity for which on the principles of the critical philosophy there can be no real basis.

(b) We need not dwell on Kant's views in his pre-critical writings of the teleological principle. It is sufficient to note that they were on the lines afterwards developed in the Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason he justifies, as against Hume's scepticism, the mechanical or scientific view of nature as subject to causation. In the Critique of Practical Reason he vindicates the teleological view of the spiritual life as a realm of moral freedom and independence. From the critical standpoint therefore the doctrine of nature and the concept of mechanical causation are not original in its own sphere, and mechanism and teleology be far reconciled. In the Critique of Judgment he seeks to overcome the dualism—in his own phrase, to bridge the gulf—between nature and the moral order, which he had regarded to begin with as closed systems, independent and separate. He realized that the sensible world of things and persons is but one aspect of reality, and the supersensible world of moral values but another, and that the two must be interrelated. Accordingly he draws attention to certain things belonging to both, as a mechanism in which we cannot describe adequately without that notion of purpose or end which has its proper sphere in the supersensible world of spirit. One of these is the phenomenon of beauty, the other that of organic character.

9. Hegel.—(a) In the course of his examination of the critical philosophy Hegel (q.v.) dealt with Kant's view of the physico-theological proof. He agrees with Kant as to its inadequacy as a rational or logical argument. The conception of causality as, like that of cause in the cosmological proof, cannot express the true nature of the relation of the world to God. At the same time the argument represents a further stage, the first stage being represented by the idea that God is the cause of all things. Hegel regards this process whereby in the hidden or implicit logic of religious thought reaches the full apprehension of God as spirit or self-conscious intelligence. Kant might have allowed this, but for the rigidity of the distinction he drew between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, which made it impossible for thought to pass from the one to the other. But the distinction is only relative, and from the ultimate standpoint the two worlds are one. (b) As for the critique of the teleological judgment, here again Kant's doctrine is vitiated by the view of the phenomenal and the noumenal as abstract opposites. Yet Kant indicates, if indirectly, the right principle of cosmic interpretation. For it is impossible to distinguish the categories of mechanical and teleological causation as being constitutive character of the organic or teleological principle. Internal

Notes:

5. Riga, 1780.
6. Riga, 1781.
adaptation or design is no less constitutive than the principle of mechanical causation. To overcome, says Hegel, the opposition of phenomena and noumenon, we must follow the development of the idea from the realm of nature to the realm of mind and thence to the unity of nature and mind in the idea of God, in whom the world is seen to be a rational system.

12. Schelling: The Philosophy of Nature. — (a) If Kant promoted the movement of German idealism, he also promoted—perhaps indirectly rather than directly—the new German humanism. We shall take occasion later to speak of the teleological or organic view of history associated with the names of Schelling and Hegel, who carried forward the work of Bosseuet and Montesquieu, of Herder (q.v.) and Lessing (q.v.). Meantime we refer to another aspect of the humanistic movement, viz. the teleological or organic view of nature which was upheld under the leadership of Schelling by the so-called philosophers of nature. For Schelling, as for Plato and others among the ancients, there was a world-soul which as an inner principle of life united all differences in nature in a single organic system. It was felt by the new humanists, as J. T. Mezr1 puts it, that in the Kantian and more particularly the Fichtean philosophy the details of the setting of the theatre of nature were forgotten in the interest of studying the style and the emotions of the actors. (b) Under the shelter of the humanistic movement, it should be noticed, there was a renaissance of vitalistic theories in biology (which term was first used in this period by T. H. Huxley) to cover the whole of the science of life. Though the biological implications of the Critique of Judgment are difficult to grasp, vitalism could readily appeal to Kant’s philosophical antipathy against any teleological theory of life. For, while Kant handed over the inorganic realm to the mechanical theory (in this only sanctioning a fait accompli), he had maintained along with the teleological unity of nature as a whole the Aristotelian concept of biological organization. So at least it was generally thought, despite the metaphysical distinction he drew between the determinants and the reflective or teleological judgment as constitutive and regulative respectively. It is a distinction indeed which science cannot but ignore. When science employs teleological concepts such as adaptation or design, it gives them the same validity as the concept of mechanical causation.2

11. Lotze. — (a) The humanistic movement soon lost its force. The vitalistic theories which had received their impulses from it, and which culminated in Johannes Müller, fell into comparative neglect, and the mechanical view of life was once more dominant. The most solid, according to H. Driesch,3 of all the attacks upon the older vitalism was made by Lotze (q.v.), whom he describes as a statistic teleologist in physiology in that he believed in the irreducibility of the category of the organism, but a dynamic teleologist or vitalist in biology in that he believed the soul to be productive of absolutely new mechanical movements. (b) But the significance of Lotze for teleology lies not so much in his work in the domain of biology as in his philosophical system. In his science and philosophy, which since Leibniz and Kant had been going separate ways, meet once more. For he combines the mechanical view of nature with a teleological metaphysics (which he holds Schelling also did). It is his aim to show, as he says in the Introduction to the Microcosmus,


same time how completely subordinate the significance of the mission which mechanism has to fulfill in the structure of the world. In his scientific materialism he was at one with the great body of the scientific thinkers of his age. In his speculative teleology he had affinities with Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Herbert. Following Leibniz, he was led to conceive of the world as a plurality of real spiritual elements, but in mutual interaction according to the principle of immanent as distinguished from transrene causality. In his endeavours to account for the causal relation and the reciprocal interaction of the elements, he was led, by a similar process of thought to that which Spinoza went through, to the idea of a universal all-embracing principle, which for religion has the value of God. Under the influence of Herbert and the Kantian criticism, he utilized the principle of human analogy in interpreting the inner reality of nature, which he regards as the instrument of a purpose, viz. the purpose of supreme good, though it is by a practical conviction rather than a logical or rational process that we pass from the world of things and forms to the world of values. So it is that Lotze reaches his teleological interpretation of nature.

12. Darwin. — (a) At first sight it would appear that the theory of biological evolution associated with the name of Charles Darwin so strikingly vindicates the mechanical principle of nature as the idea of teleology altogether, not only from scientific explanation but also from philosophical interpretation. Certainly, as Darwin himself realized, the doctrine of natural selection gave a fatal blow to the argument from design as expounded by Paley.

"We can no longer argue," he says, "that the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell is designed by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man."

Paley had not appreciated the metaphysical difficulties involved in the notions of an external designer or creator and of special external adaptations, and he laboured under the limitation that he believed with the orthodox science of his time in the fixity or immutability of species. If species were not fixed and permanent forms but the results of processes determined by necessity or chance, then Paley’s argument was still further discredited. There appeared to be no more design in the principle of natural selection than in the course which the wind blows.

(b) But, while the Darwinian theory was subversive of the teleological argument in its popular form, which was deistic or rationalistically theistic, it was not really anti-teleological in the Aristotelian and post-Kantian sense. No doubt the principle of natural selection is itself fortuitous or non-teleological, and that despite the teleological flavour of the terms ‘selection,’ ‘fitness,’ by which it is expressed; so that J. Ward, borrowing a ‘plain’ term from Herbert Spencer, would describe the principle in the mechanistic language as one of ‘equilibration.’ Moreover, in the hands of ultra-Darwinians natural selection of random variations has been employed as an exclusive explanation of the mechanism and transformation of species, and, so employed, may properly be described as anti-teleological. But Darwin himself did not urge natural selection as an exclusive principle. He recognized in evolution other factors besides, both non-teleological and teleological (e.g., in the last edition of the Origin of Species he makes a

1 Microcosmus, Eng. tr. 4, Edinburgh, 1894, vol. 1, p. xvi.
3 Paley, engr. in 1800.
4 The Realm of Ends (Gifford Lectures), Cambridge, 1911, p. 301.
point of saying that natural selection is "aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts." Ward contends that this, the Lamarckian factor, like the factors of heredity and environment, is "a factor teleological in the sense that it presupposes psychical activity, conscious or at least sentient, directed to the end of the satisfaction of needs or desires. Whether the Lamarckian is a real or supposititious factor in evolution is a point with which we are not here concerned. It might be added, however, that the anti-Darwinian theories of evolution are more favourable to the teleological idea than the Darwinian and ultra-Darwinian theories; also that Darwin's general theory of organic evolution, like the general cosmogonic theory of Kant and Laplace, is being increasingly recognized as not inconsistent with an ultimate teleology, profounder, subler, and less rationalistic than Paley's."

"Unless the cosmos itself," says Wade, "is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must infer that order and meaning to the individual, informing Life and Mind." 1

13. Lachelier. In Merz's opinion Lachelier's "short book, Du Fonnement de l'induction," is a corner-stone in the edifice of modern thought. 2 Lachelier faces the problem of the contingent (or the collocation of things in space) which, along with the continuous, is discontinuous, is involved in the Lotzean formula, that "the things which surround us are the material in which, the laws of nature the forms through which, the world of values, or the Ideas, are, or have to be, realized." 3 Following Cournot, he took up into his philosophy the old distinction between nature passively conceived and nature hypostatized or taken actively (natura naturalis, natura naturans). The possibility of indiscernibility of the two rests, he says, on the recognition of both these aspects of nature, which are complementary. From the one standpoint nature is a mechanical or serial unity in which the antecedent determines the consequent; from the other, it is a teleological, systematic, or harmonious unity in which the whole determines the existence of the parts. Efficient causes and final causes are both needed in the inductive process. Nature is at once a science, for ever producing effects from causes, and an art, for ever setting about new inventions. As there is a principle of regularity in nature, so there is a principle of harmony or law. The contrast of mechanism with teleology, as Bossanquet has put it, "is rooted in the very nature of totality." 4 We shall see that this philosophical position of Lachelier has been fruitful in the scientific investigation of the problem of universal teleology.

III. SYSTEMATIC.—A. TELEOLOGY IN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION.—1. Description, explanation. (a) In proceeding from the historical to the systematic discussion, it will make for convenience of treatment to distinguish three aspects of teleology. Historically they have been closely associated, and it is impossible to separate them in any rigid fashion. They may be named, however, the descriptive, the explanatory, and the interpretative. If one hesitates to set up the triad, one hesitates more as to the terms by which to designate them. For description, explanation, and interpretation are ill-defined terms in current usage, although perhaps because they circulate so freely in discussion of the world and its meaning. By descriptive

1 P. 211, quoted by J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism (Gifford Lectures), 2 vols., London, 1898, I, 280.
3 Parts, 1931.
4 Hist. of European Thought, iii, 620.
5 Id., 616.
6 The Principle of Individuality and Value (Gifford Lectures), London, 1912, p. 155.
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(c) When we pass from organic to inorganic nature, we meet no longer with the appearance of purposiveness, because in inorganic nature there are, to the eyes of sight at least, no individual beings. Yet, if we were to indulge the 'pathetic fallacy,' we should find even upon inorganic nature, upon the air, the sea, a rock, as responsive to our varying moods and thus as so far teleologically constituted.

(d) But, if purposiveness may not be discerned in the inorganic world, it is recognizable in products of art and man's devices which are composed of inorganic elements. To our fancy a piece of machinery is often informed with life and purpose, like the mechanism of Samuel Butler's satire of Erewhon, but the purposiveness resides not in the parts but in the processes they subserve. A machine, as Driesch says, is distinguished from other human devices, is apt enough, especially when the Deity is deistically conceived as purely transcendent. On the other hand, it is also the reason why the comparison is inept from the standpoint of realism or naturalism, and why from such a standpoint mechanism as applied to the world is not a particularly happy term.

(e) Nor should it be forgotten that under descriptive teleology may be included the recognition of order, beauty, and adaptations in nature as a whole. These things are upon that empirical level of reality which has been attained by the unreflective processes of common sense, and are not so much appreciated by all; but they form the sufficient basis of the traditional argument from design. For order, beauty, adaptation, all speak the language of teleology.

3. The argument classically expounded in the ancient world by the Stoic Lucilius Balbus in Cicero's De Natura Deorum, and in the modern world by Paley in his Natural Theology, is a double one, but is not essentially strengthened, by the multiplication of curious instances of extrinsic and intrinsic adaptation derived from the scientific order of nature. It is sufficiently based, as it already was, on the fact of the empirical order. As an integral part, nay the very marrow and substance, of the old natural theology of Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, the sciences, thegeometry, the mechanics, and beyond these, the aesthetic and ethical, have contributed to its deistic favour, its hedonism, its antiquated pre-evolutionary science, its old-fashioned teleology; and apart from its limiting historical associations it is liable, as Hume and Kant made it abundantly clear, to the charge of being essentially fallacious. In inferring divine purpose from the teleological appearance of nature, it is guilty, as Hume and Kant made it abundantly clear, to the charge of being essentially fallacious. Obviously it must be restated in a profounder way, if it is to retain validity.

The essence of the argument, says R. Flint, is that order implies intelligence; it is an argument not from but to design, and it is only to be regarded as part of a great cumulative argument.

G. T. Ladd admits that the argument is properly an argument from universal order, and he is careful to insist that it is not the universal order of the universe in general that the argument, from the 'ordinarily totality' of the universe he would postulate a world-ground conceived of as absolute will and intelligence. But that is a different man, with his eye only upon the universal order, uses the argument without hesitation or logical scruple. When his mind beholds the chain of causes 'confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.' Nor need the man of science, with his deeper appreciation of nature's order, be hesitant to follow the 'plain man.'

'The Logos,' says A. C. Thompson, 'is at the core of our system, implicit in the nebula, as now in the dewdrop. It sleeps for the most part through the evolution of plants and animal life, but awakens to joy for ever. It slept as the child sleeps before birth. It became more and more ascribe among higher animals, as the inorganic world is more and more its will. It became articulate in self-conscious man, and stands in his science.'

'There is...something,' says D'Arcy W. Thompson, 'that is the order of the cosmos and the beauty of the world, that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man...you may call it Entelechy, you may call it the Harmony of the World, you may call it the Hora, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or you may call it, as it is called in the story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men—you may call it the Spirit of God.'

B. TELEOLOGY IN SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION.

1. Cosmology.—(1) Mechanical explanation.—The teleological appearance of nature and the forms of life, considered above, has set a problem which science no more than man philosophy can afford to ignore. In cosmology, however, narrowly interpreted as the science of inorganic nature, teleology is not required as a principle of explanation. In fact, whether the cosmic order is to be found in the fundamental original state of the universe, or in the temporal reference, i.e. from the standpoint of cosmography or from that of cosmology, the inorganic world is not teleological, for physical science at least has not found the apparatus or the permanent purposiveness. In its formulations of the things and processes of the inorganic world it would employ only the mechanistic terms of kinematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry, and there was a period of intense activity in the mechanistic terms exclusive in this sphere. Whether it may also do in the spheres of biology, psychology, and sociology is another question. In cosmology it has no use for the category of end or purpose, or for that matter for the categories of cause and substance, but assumes the working only of the non-spontaneous, the automatic, the mechanistic. It may possibly be that such real categories as substance and cause (whether efficient or final) are, in Mach's phrase, tinctured with 'fealism,' but the exact sciences as such are by no means committed to a materialistic or mechanistic standpoint. Materialism and naturalism are ultimate positions, and scientific explanation is not necessarily that ultimate explanation which we would incline to criticism for its deistic or its inorganic standpoint.

In point of fact, exact science increasingly recognizes the abstract and artificial quality of its explanations, as it realizes increasingly the distinction between conceptual formulation and perceptual reality. Its formulas have been variously characterized as symbols or counterfoils of reality, as a kind of conceptual shorthand, as economics of thought, as convenient hypothetical summations, or, in J. Royce's favourite metaphor, as the ledger entries and balances of a particular method of book-keeping. It is open to science, as he truly remarks, to reject by other methods of book-keeping. 4 Gravitation, by design, and cannot be explained as a mere appearance of some more genuine process of nature.

2. Collocations.—In view of the foregoing, we may allow that the theoretical explanation, if abstract and hypothetical, reigns supreme and alone in the physical domain. While therefore Chalmers strengthened the case for physico-theology by reviving the distinction between the

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1 Bacon, Essays, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'
3 Life and Finite Individuality (two symposia of the Aristotelian Society), London, 1913, p. 54.
4 The World and the Individual (Gifford Lectures), 2nd ser., New York, 1921, p. 218.
laws and the dispositions or collocations of matter, he placed his argument in jeopardy when he said that 'the main evidence for a Divinity lies, not in the phenomena of the world, but in the dispositions and the collocations.'

But what would become of this main evidence for a Divinity,' remarks J. Ward, 'if the laws of matter themselves explained its collocations?' Yet, although science has been gathering the collocations of matter, the knowledge of nature the problem of order still remains. As in the biological sphere, so in the cosmological there is an ultimate collocation or configuration to be acknowledged which the natural laws cannot explain. Says L. J. Henderson:

'The forms and states and quantities of matter and energy in the nebulas determine the resulting solar system.'

So that we may affirm the universe possesses an original teleological character.

(2) Fitness of the environment. — (a) But it is possible to discover an explanation of the order of nature beyond the laws of uniformity. Henderson believes that positive thought has found a clue. He points out that, if the scientific or mechanistic origin of the natural order is to be explained, it must be through principles that account not merely for the general character of orderliness in the phenomena of nature and the universe, but for the specific and fundamental diversity which Herbert Spencer declared necessary to the 'higher generality, clearly, are to be sought not so much in the laws of nature as in the processes which change them. According to Henderson, the properties of the elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and of their compounds water and carbon dioxide, which have been the basis of life and organic evolution, are properties that are not accidental or determined but are an indirect influence to the environment, explaining the evolution of the various organs by a kind of mechanical composition of the external with the internal. To the extent that the evolution of effects we must appeal, continues Bergson, to some inner directing principle. How Bergson's sympathy with the neo-vitalism of Driesch and Reik appears, though he is more interested in their critical work than in their constructions. Turning to neo-Lamarckism, which explains the adaptation of the living being to adapt itself to its organic environment, it is the only form of the later evolutionism capable of admitting, as it actually does with Cope, 'an internal and psychological principle of development.' Wiesmann's 'creative environment' is considered as the aforesaid universal ensemble of properties is uniquely favourable to the existence of organisms which connect the world of physics and chemical consistency—of numerous, diverse, stable systems. In fitness for systems no other elements and compounds even approach hydrogen, carbon, oxygen and water and carbon dioxide. In short, the arrangement of the properties matter among the elements makes the diversity of the evolutionary process possible.

(b) It is Henderson's opinion, following up these results of the chemico-physical research, that, as according to the law of probability, it is a between the properties and the properties in the properties cannot be due to mere contingency, the properties can only be regarded as a preparation for the process, or, in other words, as an indication of the environment. Hence there must be a fundamental relation between them—that like that between physiology—which connects the properties and the properties in the environment, and expresses the fact that the collocation of properties unaesthetically proceeds to which they are unquestionably related to the internal environment. Consequently, the teleological organisation is teleological and non-teleological, so with the connection between the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen and the process of evolution. This is the positive contribution Henderson has to offer towards the vast problem of the contingent set for natural science by Lotze and Laischte, and he goes to strengthen the philosophical position that mechanism and teleology are both at the foundation of the natural order.

2. Biology. — (1) Evolution. — (a) The term 'evolution' (q.v.) is itself teleological in its primary meaning, and denotes more than mechanistic process; but so long as the teleological claim to be made that the mechanistic (i.e. physico-chemical) explanation of the collocations of dispositions may be found sufficient in natural science. Possibly the evolutionary process is mechanismically determined and through and through by natural selection, interpreted as non-teleological (whether working upon so-called fortuitous variations or upon variations themselves subject to the law of probability), or by natural selection supplemented by other factors, it is possible that the evolutionary process may be teleological rather than non-teleological, as some 1

2 Naturism and Agnosticism, I. 47.
4 Vol. XII. — 15
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and dynamical teleology. Whereas in statical teleology the processes of life are judged to be purposive in virtue of a given machine-like order or form underlying them, in dynamical teleology it is in virtue of their possession of a peculiar autonomy; and dynamical teleology appears as Drisch's some form of vitalism. We suppose L. J. Henderson, who is a mechanist, might then be also named a statical teleologist; for, while on the whole he persuaded that organization, in the sense of the autonomy of the mechanism, is a more important procedure than adherence to what we shall call the 'realistic' or vitalist procedures, he also persuaded that the teleological concept of organization to be found in biology and in the meteorological cycle, is a necessary biological category, and that a mechanistic physiology is at fault in not recognizing this.

But, though he thus believes, we are not to take him as an irreducible peculiarity of the vital phenomenon, he is not a dynamical teleologist in the neo-vitalist sense. He might allow that organisms, like machines, are inert expressions of a purposiveness; he would not allow that they are acted up by purpose.

(d) The anti-mechanists also fall into two main groups. In the first are the neo-vitalists, of whom Drisch is the most prominent representative. They contend that biological processes are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of the organism, but that some non-physical principle (like Drisch's of teleology or unifying causality) impresses itself upon those processes, to suspend, regulate, or control the physical and chemical reactions. With such a principle it works, the outcome of events, experimentally considered at least, is no longer determinate.

Bergson's elan vital is such another non-perceptual determiner. Now, as Bergson realizes, the contention of neo-vitalism is relevant and weighty on the critical side, but on its positive side is beset with difficulties. Even granted the existence of the mysterious non-mechanical semi-psychical entity postulated in the theory, it is impossible to say where and how it works in the biological processes. In recent constructions, no doubt, there is none of the crux evidenced by Mollers on the old vitalism when he declared the cause of sleep to be the 'dormitive virtue' (which reminds one of the Johnsonian legend that the noise of wheels was once attributed to the learned doctor to the strangeness of circulatory motion). All the same the conception of neo-vitalism remains mystical in quality, and biological science is reluctant to entertain it. And views, such as Drisch formulated, which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent sui generis, non-spatial, albeit acting into space, non-material, but logically belonging to nature, may have a strange fascination for the metaphysician, but will hardly retain a place for itself in the world of scientific explanation. We are assured, moreover, that the second law of thermodynamics, which entelechy is said to be capable of suspending, will hold even in the obscure cases in morphology on which Drisch founded his theory. We are also assured that the non-physical something which is supposed to play this role of suspending in physical and chemical processes is invariably dependent upon the existence of physical and chemical conditions, yet it is not explained what part these conditions play in bringing about the actual results. Vitalism sets itself a hard task indeed in seeking to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the mechanical and metaphysical explanations.

(3) Biologie. (a) Even as a scientific hypothesis neo-vitalism stands ready on the way to occupy an intermediate position. The issue now seems to lie between some kind of mechanism and a form of teleological theory even more anti-mechanistic than neo-vitalism. But a better name, the theory may be called biology. It is the biological as distinguished from the mechanical theory of life. It is vitalistic in a sense, for it regards it as impossible to explain away all the existentially biological phenomena in physical and chemical terms. For it the autonomy of life is more than a static conception involving a teleological and non-mechanical relationship between mechanical things and processes. The autonomy of life is a dynamical conception, involving a dynamical teleology. But it is the living organism itself, and not some directive force within it, as in properly vitalistic theories of life, that is in activity. The organism exists as such, and its structure and activities are the expression of its existence.

(b) Here, as is claimed by J. S. Haldane, a protagonist of the biological theory of life, we have a good working hypothesis, necessary to biologists, and capable of overcoming the failures of the physico-chemical conception. Everything seems to depend on something very different from physico-chemistry applied to life, his phenomena differ, not merely in degree, from physico-chemical phenomena. Although physico-chemistry has much to teach us concerning the origin and destiny of the material and energy in the body, it fails to throw light upon the apparently teleological ordering of that material and energy. The inadequacy of the former, in fact of any explanation appears when we enter into the deeper problems of the organism's activity, not to say fundamental problems, such as reproduction and heredity. Animal heat, respiration, circulation—to take these examples from physiognomy—all contain teleological (or physiological) elements that are not reducible to physico-chemical analysis. Life is a unity of structure, environment, and activity, and is not reducible into mechanism. Separate a living part from its environment, or suspend its activity, and you alter it completely. What therefore matters in energy and force to physics, or the atom to chemistry, the living organism is to biology.

(c) Haldane is in favor of opinion that, inconsistent with each other as are the biological and the organic-physical theories of life (in the sense that he would as soon go back to the mythology of his forefathers as to the mechanistic physiology), a common meeting-ground between biology and physico-chemical explanation, explanation of both the physical and the organic-physical mechanism and biology is sharply revealed, but with it we seem to be carried beyond the universe of discourse of natural science.

(d) It appears to us that in their bearing upon scientific explanation the differences between the mechanist or static teleologist and the biologist or dynamical teleologist (if we may wrest Drisch's terms to our own use) is not so very radical after all. It is significant that Henderson accepts the mechanistic hypothesis as a principle of the whole, consistent with the evidence, and that Haldane advocates the biological hypothesis on account of the unsatisfactoriness of the ordinary mechanistic (i.e. physico-chemical) explanation. Both accept the principle of organic autonomy, and are good Aristotelians (as indeed Drisch is also), and possibly they would unite upon the formula: 'Not brute man or vitalism, but mechanism is the mechanism of teleology.' This is a thesis admirably supported by J. S. Haldane, The New Physiology, London, 1912, p. 157.

3 The New Physiology, p. 42.
4 The History and Theory of Vitalism, p. 5; cf. also The Science and Religion of the Greeks, Lectures, Edinburgh, 1909, ii. 150.
5 Creative Evolution, p. 41, note.
6 J. Henderson, in Philosophical Review, xxi. no. 6 (1915), p. 175.
by E. F. Alfred Hoernlé, who would make the particular point that in biology teleology not only is compatible with mechanism but is "logically dominant" over it. Teleological terms are required, he says, not as substitutes for physico-chemical terms but as claiming teleological categories of the structures and processes of life, which—as he goes on to say—cannot be reduced to exclusively physico-chemical terms without disregard of the difference, on the one hand, between so strikingly, between the living and the dead.

(5) In an intimate and eloquent discussion of mechanism and vitalism J. Arthur Thomson makes it abundantly clear that biology is as product so much more than a descriptive or methodological theory. It distinguishes itself from mechanism in demanding ultra-mechanical categories, but what these categories should be is not as yet determinate. He himself describes the organism as Bergsonian language as a 'historic being which has traded with time, and has estranged within itself past experiences and experiments, and which has over ever its concrete how best towards the future.' Hesitating to interpalate with Driesch and the positive vitilis a new agency or directive activity, he is content to say that the organism reveals new and transcendingly mechanical formulation.

3. Psychology.—(1) Body and mind.—(a) If the teleological standpoint is required in the scientific explanation of the world of organic nature, it is also required in respect of the world of mind or consciousness. The world of mind is the native sphere of teleological activity. A very abstract view of it can dispense with teleological categories. According to W. R. Sorley's analysis, the contrast between a purely mechanical and a purposive system lies not in that the former is consistent with the law of causation and the principle of the conservation of energy, yet as the result of a purpose or mental idea there is a liberation of energy passing from the potential to the kinetic form, and the law of causation thereby overthrown, not mechanically, the direction of the movement. Therefore it is not to account completely for the activity of a purposive system to describe it in merely mechanistic terms. When this position is challenged (as it is in psychology as well as in biology), as not fitting into the mechanistic hypothesis, the discussion passes inevitably into the speculative sphere.

(b) In psychology the mechanistic position founds upon the Cartesian law of psycho-physical parallelism, which represents the relation between brain-processes and psychical changes as one of not interaction but of contiguity, and it usually takes the form of the parallelistic hypothesis known as conscious autonomy (the special mechanism hypothesis of H. H. Huxley, in which inner or conscious states are accounted for as collections of primary psychological factors which principles as are embodied in this form of psycho-physical parallelism, the appearance of purpose or ideal direction is an illusion, and the supposed purpose either belongs to a different order or level of reality or is simply a result or effect, however vaguely conceived, of some neuro-psychological organization. On the free alternative, every neurosis has its causes, but they cannot affect each other. On the second alternative, every neurosis has its psychosis, but the neuroses cannot react even a very little upon the psychosis. Either, then, the mechanistic theory does not apply to consciousness or the principle of the conservation of energy breaks down. The mechanist must either give up his case or overthrow the foundations of his faith. If this line of argument laid down by J. Ward is valid, then we are free to turn from the mechanistic hypothesis to one that allows full value to teleological appearance of conscious life, say, the animistic theory which has so long persisted in human thought and for which W. Mcgregor has made out a recent time, or the double-aspect theory with which the name of G. Lloyd Morgan may be associated, and which J. Arthur Thomson favours as in line with his teleological contentions, largely based on a study of behaviour, that the organism is a psycho-physical unity.

(2) But the working scientist need not commit himself to any speculative position on the problem of the relation between what we call body and what we call mind. If he is of opinion that psychology is more than physiology, or biology is more than physico-chemistry, he can at least affirm a descriptive or methodological 'psychologism,' transcending merely biological concepts and claiming teleological categories of his own, exclusive and irreducible. A merely physiological psychology, averts J. S. Haldane, is as inadequate as a mechanical physiology. A conscious organism, which rests not in time nor space but also in time, and in its temporal reactions joins itself at once to the actual past and the potential future, shows itself to be more than a mere organism, such as we commonly regard a plant as being. The relation to its environment, which is established through perception and volition, is no mere external relation, as in the case of a mere organism. There is a real connection between the external world and the internal organic world. The environment is 'teleologically determined' by our organic needs, and but for this teleological determinism the world of our conscious experience would lack unity and coherence. To regard therefore the psychical aspect of living things, especially human beings, and to describe their behaviour in other than psychological terms is to deal unduly in abstractions.

(b) If we may extend the argument of J. Arthur Thomson, in which this idea of the autonomy both of biology and of psychology is summed up, there is not one science but several. There is the physical order of nature—the inorganic world—I alone mechanism is dominant (always on the assumption, as W. R. Sorley remarks, that qualitative differences are really reducible to quantitative differences of molecular and infra-molecular structure). There is the biological order—life the world of organisms—where mechanism is in logical sub-ordination to teleology; and there is the psychical order of nature—the world of mind—where purpose is dominant. In biology the primacy of the biological standpoint, and in psychology the primacy of the psychological standpoint, is to be maintained.

(3) Discontinuity.—It may be thought that discontinuity of the categories makes against a unified theory of nature, such as mechanism offers. If a unified theory of nature does not require, says Hoernlé, 'the reduction of all universals to one kind, or the restriction of all variables to one type of values,' but may be achieved by 'the correlation of different types or groupings or levels of phenomena.' It is such a correlation, or cumulative integration, that is here supported. Nor need exception to it be taken in the name of ultimate or metaphysical unity. The categories of mechanical, biological, and psychological mind, which are fundamental hypotheses of natural science, are, in the wider view of philosophy, only provisional. It is possible, as J. S. Haldane has hinted, that the principle of continuity may yet be amply vindicated even in the scientific order of nature, and that without surrender to the mechanistic hypothesis. From his own standpoint of philosophical idealism he can say that the categories are the forms which the riches of the spiritual world assume in their progress towards the truly real.

4. Sociology.—(1) Two functions of psychology. A. E. Taylor speaks of two functions of psychology. The first, which is not its proper function, but which it exercises pending the majority of cerebral physiology, is the forth mental processes as mechanical uniformity of experience. The other function is to treat of purposive activities and adjustments, and thereby to afford a suitable terminology for the sociological sciences, and in particular ethics and history: But the working scientist need not commit himself to any speculative position on the problem of the relation between what we...
the teleological symbols supplied by psychology, ethical appreciation in current and historical interpretation
would be impossible. With this remark let us pass to the consideration of the teleological method in ethics and history.

(2) Ethics.—The teleological standpoint has its
platonic ideal just as teleological symbolism necessarily enters into the appreciation of
conduct. Among the possible divisions of ethical theories a fundamental one is into the teleological and
eudaemonistic. In the first case the moral standard is represented by the idea of good or
value, in the second by that of duty or right. The teleological theory, which is found in Greek
philosophy and is taken as a task by the Sartorius
or, as F. Paulsen,1 borrowing an Aristotelian term,
phrases it, of 'energism.' With Aristotle as with
Plato the ethical end or ideal was the good person-
ally realized in social and personal life, or rather not
or still fruition of human powers and capacities.
In modern ethical theory both the hedonistic and
energetic forms of the teleological method have been
revived. The formal or normative method is older
than the other, as attaching itself to the legalistic
stage of religion. Through Judaism it entered
into theological ethics, and it received classical
exposition at the hands of Kant, the fundamenta-
ideas, which he original mentioned, with its original principle of the
good will. As against a Kantian formalism and
in favor of the teleological standpoint in ethical theory, it has often been urged that norms
and motives of action are not abstract and tran-
scendental principles but, as psychology and history
teach us, generalized rules of the will which grow
out of individual and social experience, and their
values consist not in defining but in their power of
promoting the ethical.2

(3) History.—(a) The teleological principle has
also been applied to the interpretation of the pro-
cesses of history. We have already noticed a
teleological view of history took shape under the
influence of Christianity, receiving various expres-
sions in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. But
it was not until Lessing and Herder, or rather not
or still Hegel, that history was reflectively and
intimately treated in the light of the Aristotelian
principles of continuity and development.

(b) We may distinguish in this connection three types of
history: the empirical, the teleological, and the
history of ideas. J. S. Mill recognized the principle of con-
tinuity, but in his 'inverse deductive' method he applied
to historical development the organizing principles of
Democritus and Descartes, treating history as a kind of
sequence of events and their motives and actions as
causes and effects, and the course of events as a rigorously
determined sequence. Against this view it may be maintained that the hypot-
thesis of mechanical causation is irrelevant in the sphere
of history and of sociology in general, as in the sphere
of psychology in its most characteristic aspect. Psychical
events are not duly appreciated by means of subpersonal categories.
A similar criticism is applicable to Herbert Spencer's theory of
history. Although Spencer, like another Comte, applies the
idea of organic or superorganic evolution to the interpretation of
the historical process he never really breaks with the conces-
sion—f. fixed probably in his mind, says J. T. Mertz, 'through his
engineering education'—that change and progress in society,
as in nature and mind, are explicable on mechanical principles.

(c) The second type of historical theory is represented by
Hegel himself, for whom the course of events is a continuity,
not of mechanical causation but of evolutionary development.
It is a teleologically determined movement, but it is teleologically
conceived, the end dominating the process. 'As the germ
carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flower
and the form of the fruits, so the first vestiges of mind virtually
contain the whole history.' The history of society for
Hegel is the history of the Idea, and the whole process is
fixed in all its stages. Through human interests and actions
the final purpose of history is carried out, but the
process itself—such is the absolute cunning of reason—is
beyond and external to human interests and actions.3

(3) Hist. of European Thought, iv, 519, note 4.
(4) Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. 1844, p. 21, quoted by
Gallywaa, p. 5.
(5) Cf. J. Ward, Realm of Ends, p. 149.

C. TELEOLOGY IN SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION.

1. Universal teleology.—As we view the world
in its totality and seek to discover its meaning, we pass
from empirical description and scientific or
logical explanation to spiritual, i.e., philosophical
and religious, interpretation. Here we are face to
face with the metaphysic as a quest of teleology,
which is the aspect it has chiefly presented in
history. The need of a philosophical interpre-
tation of the world has always been more or less
consciously realized, and in recent years there has
been a renewal of interest in the investigation of
nature, mind, and spirit. Philosophy and
religion alike welcome the tendency among
natural scientists to make incursions into what science
has for long regarded as the province of theology
metaphysics—e.g. the increasing recognition that no more than materialism does
naturalism preach the last words on the perennial
metaphysical problems. This has been largely due
the liberating influence of biology,4 and is marked
among biologists. We have already noticed
the idealistic position of J. S. Haldane, and Driesch
has advanced beyond a conceptual phenomenon,
having even formulated a critical metaphysic
which leans to theism.4 The new and wider
scientific outlook is well reflected in the significant
postscript to the great work of the geognostic and
geological, and biological processes in his remarkable book, The Origin of the Earth;5

2 Ensthn. of Ends, pp. 43.
2. Teology and naturalism.—(a) It is the essence of naturalism to construe the phenomena of life and thought as due to mechanistic and non-teleological conceptions which serve in physical science. But we are persuaded that this leads to the world to be interpreted as if the only way of life is thereby disregarded. Mechanism is an undeniably excellent methodological principle, but is inadequate as an ontological dogma. Moreover, with the mechanistic dogma teology cannot live. As a philosophical principle it has been the contention of theologians from Aristotle onwards that meaning and purpose underlie all material and mechanical processes, that mind or spirit is ideally prior to matter and more fundamental to reality. Hence it can be said, ignores the distinction implied in Lous's remark that 'the machinery which produces the image of a phenomenon is not identical with the meaning of this image.'

(b) The counter-contention of spiritual philosophy is to be justified on epistemological grounds, as by J. Ward in Naturalism and Agnosticism. Ward, boldly with Kant that the intellect makes or fashions, though it does not create, nature. He shows that the fundamental principles of knowledge, unity, causality, and regularity have a metaphysical presupposition of nature, and that nature itself as one and uniform is teological, being found conformable to human intelligence and amenable to human ends. The unity of nature in a rational and coherent scheme of things, that confronts the human reason by universal reason, in which idealism or spiritualism has always consisted. It is the fault of naturalism, as Pringle-Pattison expresses it, that it makes light of the principle of analogy, that it is a force that substantiates the antecedents in abstraction from their consequents.

3. The essence of teleological interpretation.—Teological interpretation is then confessedly anthropomorphised, r.e, as F. C. S. Schiller would say, humanistic. It rests upon the general epistemological principle of analogy, and is itself a particular instance of it. According to the theologian, the worlds of nature and history are to be interpreted after the analogy of the purposeful life of which man is conscious in himself. Since Hume and Kant, at any rate, the analogical character of the teleological principle has been widely recognized. We saw it in Lotze, who believed none the less that the category of end or purpose afforded a definite clue to the nature of ultimate reality. We may see it in Bergson, who, however, regards the category of end or purpose as applicable only to the lower scientific order of reality. Yet, as H. Hörfeld 9 points out, Bergson himself actually employs the principle of analogy along with that of intuition. With him intuition is only the first step towards the interpretation of reality. As the mechanism proceeds by analogy in taking the oneness of man to be the model of finalism in making it respond to a preconceived plan, so is it not so by analogy to understand life as an élan, a thrust, an effort? But in this instance, it must be admitted that the analogy is drawn not so as finalism from the intelligent self-conscious life, but from the spontaneous and semi-conscious psychical life. While there is force in this criticism of Bergson's position, it does not follow that Bergson's philosophy of life is thereby discredited. All metaphysics, as Leibniz said, is founded on analogy.

4. Pragmatic teology.—Pragmatism (q.v.) claims to be different from other philosophies in respect of the clearness of its consciousness that teology is more than a methodological postulate. It is astounded at the misunderstanding revealed in recent criticism 9 that it assumes a teleological constitution of the universe guaranteeing in medial fashion satisfaction to human desires and needs—an assumption out of keeping, the pragmatist adds, with the true empiricism which pragmatism generally professes. In reply F. C. S. Schiller 9 insists that, while the pragmatist makes use of the teleological principle, it is not for him an explanation of the universe. The former, going to prove good and to be found favourable to his desires. He is a heuristic teologist. He assumes comensurability between the supreme reality and human faculty, and then acts upon the assumption in hope that the universe, according to his naturalistic view, the universe is blind to good and evil and indifferent to human interests. Perhaps, as C. A. Richardson 4 suggests, it is the preoccupation of logical pluralism with the objective side of experience that leads him to look upon the notion of teology with doubt and suspicion. But more likely the attitude arises out of a personal conviction or resolution of character.

5. Teology in personal idealism.—(a) Where personal idealism means spiritual pluralism of a theistic type, the concept of purpose applied to the interpretation of the universe yields a conclusion that satisfies. Consider first how thoroughly an application of this concept is embodied in personal idealism. It conceives reality, as in the monadism of Leibniz and Lotze, as consisting of a plurality of experiencing subjects or spiritual centres of experience. In this it builds upon the analogy in respect of purposiveness between human persons and the lower forms of organic life, and upon the conjecture that even inorganic matter is composed of purposive individuals. Like organic species arrested in their evolution, or apparently so, these exhibit the minimum of spontaneity and the maximum of habit, according to Kahlke, whose ideas are expressed by J. Ward, 'Routine presupposes antecedent living purpose.' The essential nature of the monads or spiritual individuals is affirmed to be their self-activity, involving self-determination (conscious, subconscious, or unconscious) in

6. A. Richardson, Special Pluralism, p. 53.
7. Id. vii., 464, 'Methodological Teology.'
reference to ends. Thus spirit and spontaneity, which naturalism banishes from the world, are recognized in this pantheism throughout the whole vast range of experience. But that coherent experience may be made possible, a sympathetic rapport or responsive sympathy is, as with the Neoplatonists, postulated in the monads.

(b) With this theory of personal idealism advances from its pluralistic base to its final theistic position, in which the world-ground is also theologically, exegetically, and synthetically the same unity implies unity in the plurality, and unity implies a unifying principle, and the unifying principle is best stated not in the abstract terms characteristic of absolutism, but in terms of that consative unity, that striving after the realization of ends, which is given at once in the most simple and the most complex individual existence; and in terms, moreover, of conscious and self-conscious activity, according to the theological principle of the interpretation of the lower by the higher. Further, if we describe the world-ground as an ultimate self-conscious will, we are not to think of it as in absolute idealism, as a purely immanent principle. Though God gives unity or system to the plurality of monads, He is not Himself the unity in which they subsist. There is a problem of distinction of the self-conscious monad, and a medium of union, in virtue of which it belongs to itself and does not merely enter into other selves. So it is that G. Galloway, e.g., presses to a theistic conclusion.

(c) The map of reality consists, according to this theistic argument, of simple monads interacting within a common medium or environment, which is grounded in a transcendent self-conscious will, as is claimed. This theory offers a better key to the understanding of unity and individuality than absolute idealism or natural realism can supply. It is a brave attempt at any rate (and this is true of particular points) to justify the teleological view of the universe on metaphysical grounds. Whether it yields too much to the voluntaristic psychology we do not pretend to judge; but we appreciate its consistency with the thesis of this monadistic hypothesis of the world, in which the teleological character of the world is felt.

*'At the heart of religion and morality,' says Siebeck, 'is the feeling that the existence and development of the world is not an indifferent matter, but is designed to realize a highest Good.'

When therefore ethical theism, with its religious conception of God as the absolutely good, is set beside the metaphysical theism of the pluralist, this approach to reality, it seems possible to state a conclusion in terms such as these. (1) In the language of philosophy: though individual existences and personal spirits have a being for themselves and are variously endowed with spontaneity, the development of experience remains in the control of the world-ground. (2) In the language of theology: though the actions of the creature are not absolutely foreordained or predesigned but manifest spontaneity and freedom in various degrees, they fall within the providential government of God. (3) In the language of both philosophy and of theology, and in Galloway's concluding words, if the world have its ground in a self-conscious and ethical will, which comprehends and sustains all the individual centres of experience, faith in a providence, faith in the government of things, is sufficiently justified.

6. Teleology of desism.—(a) While it may be said from the humanist side that the development of the universe towards the goal of spiritual personality, it is difficult to conceive of the world-process sub specie aterius. The deistic con-
ception of it, however, is an easy target for criticism. Its view of the world has been described as 'hetero-
teleic.' The world is regarded as a sphere of divine purpose, but divine purpose is as it were imposed upon it from without. There is an inherent dualism in this, as J. S. Mill realized.

(b) In the traditional form of the 'argument from design,' where the setting is deistic, the divine Artificer fashioned the world to its present form out of an already given matter; or else, as in the ecclesiastical form of the 'argument from efficiency,' the created out of nothing by divine power, then shaped by divine wisdom and benevolence. But this initial dissociation of matter and form is inconceivable, and has been 'as much a bag and a chimeras.' The idea of such an internal necessity should be replaced by that of internal or immanent purpose. God is not beyond or even alongside His world, says a truer theism; He is within it as immanent life; within the finite element of contrivance, with external adaptation of means to end, may rightly fall away from the idea of purpose as applied to the nature of the infinite experience. Such an idea is being handed over, as virtually in deistic theology, to mechanical necessity; and the inorganic becomes essentially related or adapted to the organic, and both inorganic and organic respond to the whole cosmic process. It is the strength of idealistic interpretation that it can thus dispense in the cosmic reference with the 'theistic Demiurge' and associate itself with what has been called an 'autotelic' view of the world-process. When purpose is no longer thought of as superinduced in creation and providence upon particular events of the world, but is intrinsically applied to the world in its totality, we learn to appreciate Kant's ideal of nature as a complete teleological system, in which the intuitive or perceptive understanding the distinction of means and end is transcended, and the whole appears as the unity of the ends and the members as the differentiation of the whole.

(c) If the notions of contrivance and external adaptation are to be dismissed as unduly anthropomorphic, is the notion of a preconceived plan to be retained, or is the so-called plan but the nature of the process of the whole? It would be easier for the personal idealist or theistic pluralist to retain the notion than for the absolutist. It was the

1 Ward, Realm of Ends, p. 70.
2 Bouquet, Principles of Individuality and Value, p. 133.
conviction that God cannot be regarded, except by the logical imagination, as devising schemes and selecting methods that lead Spinoza, from his standpoint of abstract monism or singularism, to repudiate the principle of human analogy altogether and to deny of God the faculties of intellect and will. The same, as being expressed in the outwearing of finite plans and purposes, could not be predicated of the eternal Being. There is danger as well as truth in such a position, but what we are here at liberty to say is that Spinoza's views are not incompatible with the essential idea of theology. He renounces externalism and anthropocentrism, but none the less he looks upon the world as a significant whole, necessitated indeed, but necessitated by the divine nature itself, which is the nature of the whole.

'It is the idea,' says Pringle-Pattison, 'of the divine necessity as that which has existed and is the sole force acting within the universe like a fate which it upholds, that constitutes the difference between a theistic and a non-theistic doctrine.'

c) In support of Spinoza's objection to the notion of a pre-existent cosmic plan, it is pointed out that the conception of purpose therein involved is even inapplicable to human action, being of the highest kind and most marked by the conjunction of articulation in production. We may therefore grant it to A. D. Lindsay, a sympathetic interpreter of Bergson, that, if the world is a purposive system, it possesses a unity or individuality in time as well as in space. According to Bergson, the rejection of radical finalism—such as Leibnitz's—as being only an inverted mechanism, as implying that things and beings realize a programme previously arranged ('Tout est donné'), is the very substance of our world, and there is no stuff more substantial or more resistant.

(d) The force of what Bergson here essentially contends for is acknowledged by idealistic thinkers. If the course of the world is preformed and predetermined—the dull rolling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago—and is indeed not much to choose between naturalism and idealism. In this connexion it is significant that naturalism and idealism, like fatalism and predestinarianism, often meet and, like rightness, are each one, but each other. It is also significant that the crusade of spiritual pluralism, in its various forms, against the absolutist systems is for the redemption of the spiritual values sold by them—treacherously sold, says F. C. S. Schiller—into the bondage of naturalism. If then we abandon radical finalism with its illusion of preformation and predeterminedness, shall we say that 'the history of the universe is the history of a great adventure'? So C. F. D'Arcy puts it, in sympathy with the Bergsonian view.

e) Where idealism differs from Bergsonism, if not from Bergson himself, is in holding that the advent is not in the experience of the absolute but in the experience or from the standpoint of the finite subject. Moreover, for a theistic idealism there are bounds to the scope of the advent. But Spinoza's theistic universe is fundamentally ethical. It is the very heart and core of theistic faith that an eternal purpose of good is working itself out in the world. In terms of

modern Christian theology, the world is the scene of the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

(f) It is but to state the complementary side of this faith to affirm that the world must possess value and real existence for the divine experience, and that the divine experience the time-process must enter somehow. The purpose which God possesses in Himself is independent of time, which is not as in Bergsonianism an ultimate reality, but sets itself on the side of the infinite purpose in which it is being realized. How time is retained and yet transcended in God we do not know, nor can we. Yet we are not without a clue. In mystical contemplation and in artistic enjoyment the sense of time, as we are told, may almost vanish from the consciousness; and it is claimed that the life of the philosopher or artist bears in this respect some kind of analogy to the divine life. It is at least suggestive of the idea for which Pringle-Pattison contends, that purposive activity is the concrete reality and time only the abstract form. If this be so, then Bosanquet's criticism of teleology, in the sense of 'aiming at the unfilled,' is far more suitable. Such a teleology, he says, gives undue importance to time and to the last term of a time-sequence. But, says Pringle-Pattison:

'The last term is only important because in it is most fully revealed the nature of the principle which is present throughout. It is precisely this linkage of the first term with the last, and so on, to a point of inflection and, to that extent, the transcendence of the mere time-sequence in the conception of an eternal reality, that seems to me to be expressed by the profound Aristotelian idea of roles or End.'

(g) The question may be raised here whether the purpose that may be attributed to the infinite ground of the universe is to be regarded as conscious or unconscious. On this question Bergson would appear to range himself in the succession of Schopenhauer (q.v.) and von Hartmann, with this difference that for them the gates of the future are closed. Undoubtedly the via media of unconscious purpose avoids the difficulty of explaining how one self-consciousness may exist within another, the finite within the infinite, but it possesses inherent difficulties of its own. It has to account for inorganic arrangement and process, and for the transition from the unconscious to the conscious and self-conscious, nor can it explain the ends, nor the vital impetus should tend in one direction rather than another.

'H.' as W. R. Sorley says, summing up an illuminating discussion, 'purposes are ascribed to conscious agents for the interpretation of organisms, and if organisms are held to have arisen out of inorganic material, then there is good reason to postulate that the process which led to organic and purposive life was itself animated by purposes, not individual nor merely racial purpose, but universal purpose acting, moreover, not after the fashion of impulse but in the manner of mind or consciousness.'

This theistic postulate of universal conscious purpose is to be justified in face of the facts of dysteleology, yet it appears a more reasonable postulate than that of unconscious purpose, and more hospitable too of human experience in the realms of fact and value.

8. Teleology and value.—The category of end or purpose, when paired of its finite incidence of preconceived plan and external adaptation of means to end, tends to pass into the category of worth or value (q.v.). In the teleological view of the universe the end, which is the nature of the whole, is an ethical end worthy of attaining, i.e. worthy, so to speak, of enlisting the desire

1 Pringle-Pattison, p. 352.
2 Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 139ff.
3 P. 352.
4 See Art. PERFECTION AND OPPORTUNITY.
and effort of the Absolute. And may we not attribute desire and effort—conative activity—to God? Nay we well may. And therein the Infinite Experience conation and its correlative satisfaction are to be found, that, as Bosanquet 1 strikingly puts it, 'the contradiction of a conation co-existing with freedom must necessarily be realized.' It seems to us that we must say this if the world is to be regarded as truly a 'vale of soul-making,' in which Providence rules and not fate, the concurrence of the living God and eternal decree, and in which spiritual values are created and realized. It is our belief that God is thus present and active in the process of the world, and that the true insight into Him, is not the pre-existent Creator of the deistic theology, nor the static timeless Absolute of acosmic pantheism, but the eternal Redeemer of the religious consciousness.


WILLIAM FULTON.

TELEPATHY.—Telepathy, 'feeling from afar,' is a term coined by F. W. H. Myers on the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, to express the apparently supernatural transmission of information from mind to mind in 'thought-transference' experiments and the like, just as 'telepathia' was suggested to cover the alleged facts of clairvoyance and clairaudience. It was defined as 'communication between one mind and another otherwise than through the known channels of the senses.' As thus defined, the motion was in the first place not free from vagueness. For, as a certain amount of telepathically obtained known senses was admitted to occur under exceptional conditions, and this could be so extended as to amount to miracle, while it yet in a way explained away miracle, it was not clear how hypathesthesia was related to telepathy. Secondly, the definition was essentially negative, a declaration of ignorance, which suggested no agency or adequate cause for the phenomena it described. Now this was neither satisfactory nor a very strong or stable position logically or empirically. Even if the difficulty about the nature of hypathesthesia is not raised, and if it is admitted that the possibilities of communication through the senses may be taken as fairly completely explored, we may develop such a definition in one of two directions. We may imagine some unknown sort of vibration, radiation, or 'brain-wave,' as a physical explanation of the phenomena alleged, undeterred by the facts that positive support has yet been found for any such agency, and that, unlike physical forces, it would appear to be indifferent to distance; or else we may conceive telepathy as essentially psychical in its nature, and shall then tend to exalt it into a fundamental 'law' of spiritual being, as Myers himself subsequently inclined to do. But, so conceived, it is manifestly a challenge to further exploration of the spiritual world of which it claims to be a law; and yet it proves rather a double-edged weapon for believers in a spiritual world. It enables them indeed to hold that every mind, incarnate or not, can in principle communicate directly with any other mind, and yet it seems to formulate this possibility so broadly as to render it almost impossible for a discerning mind to authenticate it for itself by communicating information. For any verifiable subjective experience, to speak normally, or have been, known to incarnate minds; and if any living mind can 'tap' any other, and if knowledge can leak' subconsciously from any mind to any other, and if we may entertain the somewhat fanciful but not unsupported hypothesis that all knowledge may be pooled in a vast 'cosmic reservoir' before it bubbles up in individual minds, the telepathic hypothesis can evidently be used to discredit nearly all the prima facie evidence in favour of 'spirit-communication.' Accordingly the opponents of this belief have made great play with it, even while leaning also that the evidence for telepathy is itself insufficient to establish it as a vera causa. 1 This objection the believers endeavour to meet in various ways. They point out that the proof that telepathy is a fundamental psychic law, cannot be resorted to its operations in living minds. They argue, however, that unrestricted telepathy between incarnate minds, even in such alone, is unreasonably improbable, and quite unanswerable. Lastly, they try to develop methods of experimentation which avoid this objection, because the information communicated, though verifiable e post facto, can be shown never to have been, as a whole, in the possession of any living mind. Hence the importance of 'cross-correspondences' between the information received through several channels and dovetailing into a coherent message; by this method some striking successes have been recorded, though different minds will long continue to vary widely in the estimation of their weight. Again, certain sorts of prediction may lend explanation by telepathy. At present, however, no agreement, either about the nature of telepathy or about the degree to which it may be taken as a fact in nature, can be said to exist. More evidence is still required, and, until it is obtained, opinions will be determined not so much by the evidence itself as by the bias with which it is regarded.
TEMPERAMENT

Pierre Janet, and experiments at close quarters, though without contact between the "perceipient" and the "agent," in guessing such things as cards and numbers, in reproducing diagrams and figures, etc. The transition to the 'spontaneous' evidence is mediated by a few rare cases in which the experiential projection of a phenomena of our own, on the strength of which it becomes possible to conceive the ordinary 'ghost' as an apparition telepathically projected by the dying or the dead. In general, the transfer of information has an emotional interest which is generally lacking in experiments of the first class, and this may conceivably account for their apparent capacity to override the obstacle of distance, which so sparsely differentiates them from the former. Still it should be remembered that to ascribe these phenomena to telepathy is a hypothesis which is possible only if telepathy is established independently by experimental evidence. Accordingly it is on this that the real stress falls. Now, as regards this evidence, it may be said in general that its character is very similar to that for other supernormal phenomena. Much of it is bad, some respectable, none beyond cavil. Its quality is not better than that of the best evidence for some of the most extreme phenomena, such as 'uhuru' and 'tuvrul,' telepathy, synchronisation, observation, lapses of attention, errors of memory, coincidence. The ultimate reason for these defects is that there plainly does not exist as yet any real experimental control of the phenomena and their conditions, so that the evidence cannot be accumulated at will; crucial experiments cannot be made, and the pragmatic test cannot be used to apply the doctrine of the direct intercommunication of minds and to distinguish the real from the alleged phenomena. As, however, the situation occurs commonly enough in the beginnings of a science and sometimes lasts for centuries, it is no disproof of the reality of what is now provisionally called 'telepathy'; it may well be dispersed by pertinent and concerted investigation, and in any case the matter should not be left in its present ambiguity.

LITERATURE.——This is largely the same as given in art. Psychic Phenomena. The expeditions to Mount Everest may be mentioned in addition E. Boirac, La Psychologie inconnue, Paris, 1913, and E. Boirac, L'Esprit en l'homme, Les élémens de l'occasion psychique, do, 1917, Eng. tr., Our Hidden Forces and The Psychology of the Future, New York and London, 1918; the art. by F. C. Hansen and A. Lehmann in "St. A. C. G.," 1917, p. 197; C. E. M. Kay, "A. Lehrbuch der klinischen Phlebotomie;" E. Parish, Hallucinations and Illusions, London and New York, 1917; J. H. Coutts, Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A., 1911; L. T. Tead, "A Technique for the Experimental Study of Telepathy and other Alleged Clairvoyant Processes, 1917. All but the first of these attack the historical evidence, with some success, while the last two confess also (almost) complete failure in repeating the cases and number-guessing experiments of the Society for Psychical Research.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

TELUQU - SPEAKING PEOPLES. — See DEAVIDANS.

TEMPERAMENT. — The doctrine of the temperaments is at once one of the oldest and one of the most persistent and popular efforts to classify the diversities of mental character in relation to bodily characteristics. It has always been recognized that the strength of type of mind, and that some of these differences are inborn, and, practically at least, unmodified throughout life. It was natural that these should be locked for mainly in the feelings and emotions, which appear more dependent upon the bodily constitution and less under individual control than either cognition or will. The temperament is accordingly a permanent disposition to certain forms or degrees of feeling, so far as such disposition is dependent on the inherited organic constitution. The number of temperaments has been variously given as two, three, four, six, eight, and even much larger numbers, but on the whole the classic four has held the field down to our own day, as if it corresponded to a natural way of classifying and explaining some ultimate differences in mind or body, or both.

This number was derived originally from the four elements of Empedocles, fire, earth, water, and air, and the four qualities, warm and cold, dry and moist; on these in turn was formed Hippocrates' theory of the four cardinal humors of the body—blood, phlegm, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic. Occasionally physiologists have suggested other terms for the phlegmatic and the melancholic, as 'lymphatic' and 'nervous,' lymph and nerve being at least known constituents of the body; but the names as well as the number of the old four have kept their ground. For the Greeks the temperament meant a mixture or union of one or two of these qualities, or humours; the same or similar sources of error, fraud (in the shape of codes, collusion, and mendacity), malobservation, lapses of attention, errors of memory, coincidence. The ultimate reason for these defects is that there plainly does not exist as yet any real experimental control of the phenomena and their conditions, so that the evidence cannot be accumulated at will; crucial experiments cannot be made, and the pragmatic test cannot be used to apply the doctrine of the direct intercommunication of minds and to distinguish the real from the alleged phenomena. As, however, the situation occurs commonly enough in the beginnings of a science and sometimes lasts for centuries, it is no disproof of the reality of what is now provisionally called 'telepathy'; it may well be dispersed by pertinent and concerted investigation, and in any case the matter should not be left in its present ambiguity.

LITERATURE.——This is largely the same as given in art. Psychic Phenomena. The expeditions to Mount Everest may be mentioned in addition E. Boirac, La Psychologie inconnue, Paris, 1913, and E. Boirac, L'Esprit en l'homme, Les élémens de l'occasion psychique, do, 1917, Eng. tr., Our Hidden Forces and The Psychology of the Future, New York and London, 1918; the art. by F. C. Hansen and A. Lehmann in "St. A. C. G.," 1917, p. 197; C. E. M. Kay, "A Lehrbuch der klinischen Phlebotomie;" E. Parish, Hallucinations and Illusions, London and New York, 1917; J. H. Coutts, Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A., 1911; L. T. Tead, "A Technique for the Experimental Study of Telepathy and other Alleged Clairvoyant Processes, 1917. All but the first of these attack the historical evidence, with some success, while the last two confess also (almost) complete failure in repeating the cases and number-guessing experiments of the Society for Psychical Research.
TEMPERAMENT

As E. B. Titchener has put it, 'the man who thinks quickly and acts strongly is choleric, the man who thinks slowly and feels weakly, sanguine. The phlegmatic thinks slowly and acts slowly, the melancholic thinks slowly and feels deeply.'

The classification does not adequately explain, however, the fact that the feelings of the sanguine are predominant; the bright and the dark temperaments. In order to explain 'the tendency of one or other of the two great opposites of the life of feeling, which gives colour and direction to the whole disposition.'

'This opposition is more fundamental than that upon which the fundamental conditions for the preservation of the individual.

More recently an interesting attempt to analyse the different types of temperament has been made by Narziś Achi; he finds that it is mainly on the strength or weakness of the determination, along with the persistence or rapid falling away of the determining forces, that the feelings, the associations, and generally the whole mental life depends; accordingly he makes these characters the basis of his five temperaments:—

a fifth, the reflective (resonance) temperament.

Whatever the ultimate characters may be, mental or physical, they must be such as exercise a decisive influence upon the life, intelligence, and character, of the individual. The facts that the pure temperament is rare; that it makes, as Volkmann says, 'an almost uneccy impression,' when it does appear, the fact that the whole or the whole part of the temperament (however illogical such mixture may be); that the old terms have lost all meaning; and that the scientific analysis is still to seek—these facts, which have led many psychologists to drop the doctrine of the temperament altogether, do not dispose of the existence of broad and deep differences of mental type, mainly in the spheres of feeling and action, for which some names, and a scientific analysis, must be found.

The organism, through the afferent nerves, sends from its every part a stream of influence to the brain; to the functions of every tissue there correspond impressions and feelings which may or may not reach or effect separate consciousness, but which produce a mass-effect in the connate sense, or organic sensibility, and in the general feeling-tones which correspond to it. This is the basis of the self-feeling: it is the inner subjective aspect of the temperament. There is, as Henle says, a tonus, or degree of tension, in every nerve, even when the muscles which it contracts or the sense-organs from which it is impressed are 'at rest'; it differs in degree in different individuals; for each individual it varies from time to time, under varying conditions of health, fatigue, etc., but there is a relatively constant value for each below which it does not fall, so long as the nerves have life. Where the tension is high, the response of feeling and action will be energetic and rapid; where it is weak, low, and slow. This is the oedematous temperament. The tonus is the physiological fact corresponding to the mass-feeling—vague and indefinite as it necessarily is—out of which the different moods of the individual, and his emotions, his sensations, his actions, his dreams, and the simplest feelings of sensory pleasure and 'unpleasure,' emerge like waves on the sea. Like all feelings, the temperamental feeling is both an individual condition of action, and a cause of bodily expression and action; like all feelings, it influences alike the intensity, the quality, and the course of thought. Hence the detailed descriptions of character which we find in the older and even in some of the later writers on temperament are not without interest.

Johannes Müller, according to the phlegmatic as the highest type—the ideal temperament—finds that when a man, with a well-developed intelligence, his phlegm enables him to accomplish results impossible to others, even with their livelier feelings and desires; easily retaining control of himself, he can be induced to act 'of which he would repent on the morrow'; he can obtain in all security the chances of the success of what he undertakes; and, as the decisive moment, he is master of himself, wherever it is not a question of sudden decision and energy; 'he feels his little, but bears them patiently, nor is he embarrassed by the loss of others, speed and quickness of choice often gives others an advantage over him; but, when he has time before him, he arrives quickly at the goal, while others, keeping mistakes upon mistakes, are lost in endless side-issue.' On the other hand, Müller finds that the species of phlegm characterized by lassitude, apathy, insensibility, irresolution, ennui, slowness of intelligence, and the like, is not a useful element of the individual.

The choleric has a remarkable power of action, both in energy and in persistence, under the influence of passion; his passions inflame at the least obstacle; his pride, his jealousy, his desire of vengeance, his thirst for domination, know no bounds, as long as his passion moves him. His reflection little, acts without hesitation, on the spur of the moment, because he is convinced that he is right, and above all because such is his will. He easily turns aside from error, but for the great storm of his passion to his own ruin and that of others. With the melancholic, pleasure is the dominant temper of his life; he is sensitive, quiet, and quiet, with frequent exaltation, and a short duration of any mood. Sympathetic and friendly to others, but without particularizing, is the melancholic temperament; too quick to anger, again quickly to regret; prodigal of promises, but equally ready to forget them; credulous and confident, he loves to listen, but he is indifferent to the achievements of others; indulgent to the faults of others, he claims the same indulgence for his own; easy to appease, frank, open, amiable, social, incapable of interested calculation. With the melancholic, sadness is the prevailing tendency; his exaltation is equal to that of the sanguine, but the sensitiveness is frequent and more durable than those of pleasure. The sufferings of others call out his sympathetic feelings, for himself he is fearful, undecided, distrustful; a triste woman and offenders him; the slightest obstacle discourages him, and renders him incapable of reasoning to overcome it. The melancholic are full of melancholy, and his sufferings appear to him beyond all consolation.

In their Psychology in the Schoolroom T. P. G. Duxer and A. H. Garlick venture to describe, on behalf of teachers—from whom it is necessary to know their pupils' temperaments—not only the mental but also the external physical appearance of the types. The sanguine, lively, excitable, quick to anger, and not deeply roused, with feeling generally uppermost in his character, has the circulatory and respiratory systems well developed, has red hair, blue eyes, skin fair, and face animated. The choleric, self-reliant and confident, with will uppermost, has the muscular system well developed, hair and skin yellow, complexion sometimes sallow, face impassive. The phlegmatic or phlegmatic, mind heavy and torpid, somewhat slow to anger, patient, patient, and slow, has the abdomen large, face round and expressionless, lips thick, body generally disciplined, not inclined to exertion, with the feet cold, head cool, hand calm, with great love of poetry, music, and nature, and marked indifference to the practical affairs of life, his head large, eyes bright and expressive, figure slender and delicate, movements quick.

It may be doubted whether teachers would be well advised to guide their treatment by such physical characters as these, when noted in their pupils. Nor has the attempt been very successful to look in the different temperaments for predisposition to certain diseases. By itself, the differences of temperament are clearly marked.
It is especially in the melancholic, nervous, or, as it is called in extreme cases, the 'nervous', that the tendency to insanity is marked. T. S. Clenoton gives a striking description of such a nervous temperament.

'The man of this temperament is in body small, shabby, tending towards a dark complexion, thin skin, with delicate features, a well-shaped head, a quick, bright, almost glossy eye, a short, thin, curling and sensitive, feeling pain keenly and torments is subject to depression and melancholia. His moods are incessantly active. He is quick in mind and body, imaginative, keen, sensitive, ever alert, fine in the grain, subtle, fond of intellectual work, not resolved in decision because he sees there are two sides to every question, often artistic in feeling, ambitious, and with an ill-concealed contempt for fools. Whom run down, this man is 'ill to do with.' When he grows old he gets thin, dyspeptic, irritable, and often melancholic. The diseases he is specially subject to are nervous and mental.'

In religious psychology also the temperaments are of considerable importance, owing to the great suggestibility of some (the sanguine and melancholic) as compared with others, the greater excitability of the sanguine and choleric; the brooding tendency of the melancholic or nervous, the insusceptibility of the phlegmatic, and the excessive sensibility of the sanguine and choleric.

The relative permanence of the temperament in the individual is not inconsistent with some gradual change over long periods of time, although there is no doubt that the temperament is that part of our mental and physical endowment which requires greatest effort or most violent and prolonged change of circumstances to modify. It has been thought that broadly the different stages of individual development and of racial evolution are marked by changes of temperament. Childhood is sanguine, youth sentimental or nervous, mature age choleric, and old age phlegmatic. The temperaments of primitive races are less obvious, but they seem to move from the phlegmatic and choleric (Negroes, Malaysians) to the melancholic and sanguine (Mongolian, Caucasian); in Europe we have the sanguine Frenchman, the choleric Spaniard or Italian, the phlegmatic German, and the nervous Briton.

Women on the whole are sanguine or nervous, men choleric or phlegmatic. These are of course mere rough approximations. It has also been remarked that there has been a change in fashion in temperaments, or in what has been regarded as the ideal temperament: at one time the sanguine, it became the melancholic (in the days of Byron), later the phlegmatic or indifferent, to-day perhaps the choleric—the man of energy. Character in the highest sense of the word is something very different from temperament; the latter has to do with the form and manner, the quantity and degree of mental life, character with its quality, the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic values which that life recognizes and parses; temperament gives the foundation on which character must build—it sets the problems which the training and the making of character have to solve; whatever may be the ideas of popular classification of the four temperaments, the individual differences themselves on which it is based—differences of sensibility to impressions and to feelings, of strength and quickness of reaction, of energy and endurance—must be the main concern. It is for such differences and their measurement that the modern individual psychology is directing its attention; and from it we may hope in time to obtain a scientific account of temperaments.


TEMPERAMENT.—There is much difference of opinion among writers on moral theology as to the true relationship between the three virtues of sobriety, moderation, and temperance. Each has had its claims to be the cardinal virtue, and includes the others, advocated by representative writers; but there seem to be very strong reasons why temperance should be regarded as the inclusive virtue, the chief being that it has held a place from early times among the 'cardinal' or principal virtues. From the first, Plato seems to accept this grouping of virtues as based upon a current classification, and it passes through Aristotle and St. Thomas and Christian theology; the 'temperance' of Cicero may be accepted as typical:

'Temperancia est rationis in libidinis, aliaque in alius non receso impetus animi, sive et moderna nominis, Epicteti partis sunt, continentia, elementa, modestia.'

Plato shows a tendency to identify 'temperance' with 'continence' in Rep. iv. 480E he defines 

ψυχροσθείνων as follows:

κόρος θεός τοις νησίσανθοι καὶ ἱφτανόν τοῖς εἰδώμασιν ἐναίσθησιν ἐπιμήκης.

Aristotle, however, defines the word as μεταχεῖα τρωτή καὶ διαφόρον καὶ διαφόρων διώμονας ἐπιμήκης.

The temperament man (ψυχροσθείνων), says he, does not feel the pressure of inordinate desires; the continent (ἐνωπικος) feels, but holds desire restrained.

So Cicero: 'Continentia est, non quae cupiditatis consilia gubernationis regiter.'

In the NT the word ψυχροσθείνων occurs only in 1 Th 4:5 (ψυχροσθείνων in 1 Th 4:5 Ti 2:4), ἐνωπικος occurs in Ac 2:36, Gal 5:2, 2 P 1; ἐνωπικος in Co 1 Th 2; ἐνωπικος in Ti 1.

The general idea of temperament or moderation as an element in all virtue is peculiarly Greek, and it reappears in Christianity.

'Temperance,' says Aquinas, 'is a cardinal virtue because that moderation which is common to all the virtues is peculiarly dispraiseable in the case of temperance.'

This has been pointed out elsewhere.

'Temperance,' says Augustine, 'is a virtue corresponding to each of these relationships, as is implied in Tit 2:8, 9, 1 Th 4:5, 2 P 1; 1 Th 1:6; 1 Th 2; 1 Th 2:7; 1 Th 2:8; Tit 2:12.'
true self-love, duty to self, necessarily takes. It is the spirit of discipline, or rather the spirit of love consecrating itself—body, soul, and spirit—to God.

The function of temperance consists in restraining and moderating the desires wherever we yearn for those things which are apt to turn us away from God and to overthrow the supremacy of the rational faculties in man. Temperance implies the control of appetite at those points where its demand is most important and spiritual. Where, therefore, (modesty) means self-control in matters of less difficulty, temperance is concerned with the instincts and passions which in average human nature are the strongest and the least easy to restrain.

The following points seem to be worthy of special note.

1. The aim of the 'temperate' man is positive, not negative. He aims not merely at the subjugation of his lower nature, but at the cultivation of moral and spiritual power. Temperance is the virtue of the man of high ideals who strives to win a sovereign self-mastery. It implies 'no monotonous restraint, but an ordered use of every gift.'

The temperate man faces life and uses its gifts and blessings in the temper of an athlete training for a contest (1 Co 9,27). Self-control must not only cut off superfluities but also serve as a watchful against any form of self-indulgence that may bring him under the power of the world or of his lower nature (1 Co 6,11). He is not hindered or overpowered by circumstances, but controls them; he makes them subservient to his spiritual progress; he maneuvers through them upwards and onwards to God.

So Augustine describes temperance as 'that action whereby the soul with the aid of God extricates itself from the love of lower (created) beauty, and wings its way to true stability and firm security in God.'

2. Temperance holds a very prominent place in the earliest Christian teaching (cf. Ac 24,20). In the Acts of Thucola the substance of St. Paul's teaching is described as λόγος θεοῦ πρὸς ἐγκυρίαν καὶ ἀκροβατίαν. In the early Christian usage of the word ἐγκυρία was probably identified with sexual purity, and was gradually extended to include any form of world-renunciation and mortification of the body. The words ἐγκυρία, ἐγκυρώθεσθαι occur frequently in Hermas, but already the tendency is to connect them with the temper of self-control or temperance in general. It includes control of appetite in the sphere of sex, food, and drink; but also the temper of moderation in expenditure, of sobriety in judgment and self-esteem, of self-restraint in matters of speech, etc. There follows a list of virtues in respect of which the ἐγκυρία is in fact an archetypal and inclusive virtue. It is coupled with ἀνάξιος in Fis. ii. 3. It has a saving virtue. The 'first commandment' is ἢν ἐγκυρίη, ἡς ἐν τῷ πνεύμα καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ ἐγκυρίῳ. Self-control is a fundamental duty because it is directly involved in that conflict between flesh and spirit which is the condition of our mortality and the occasion of moral victory or defeat. So Augustine asks:

'Cui peccato collabente non halemus necessarium continentiam, ne committamus... Universali ergo continentiam nobis opus est ut declinemus a male.'

3. Temperance or self-control forms part of the fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5,22). 'Walk in the spirit and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh.' As a gift or endowment of the Spirit it was supremely manifested in our Lord.

'Where the cross of Christ is set up, there is no power to be found if not in the life of Christ? Those alone are temperate who strive to imitate His life... whose life is the mirror of temperance.'

It is self-control that Augustine is speaking of when he exclaims, 'Da nobis et jube quid vis.' The presence of the Spirit in man gives him liberty—the true freedom which consists not in following the impulses of the lower nature, but in fulfilling the will of God. Accordingly in Eph 5,23 St. Paul seems to imply that the one infallible safeguard of temperance is the realization of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the soul.

4. The sin of intemperance is wrongly limited to one particular form of excess. It may include want of restraint in work, in intellectual speculation, in the use of the faculty of speech. On this last point much stress is laid by some Christian monastics (e.g. the fact that the habit of loose, uncontrolled speech pays the way for the lapse from truth, purity, or good faith. It 'defies the man' (Mt 15,19). It hinders or weakens that power of controlling the 'whole body' (Ja 3,3) which is essential to Christian perfection. St. James implies that the 'sovereign sway of the Christian conscience must be exercised even in what seems a small sphere, and thence gradually extended to the whole field of human nature till man becomes aion solo dono.'


R. L. OTTLEY.

TEMPLES.—A temple, in the original sense of the Latin word templum, meant a rectangular space marked out by the altar for the purpose of his observations, which were taken within a rectangular tent. An extended sense gave it the meaning of a consecrated place or building, within which sacred rites were performed. In this sense it was applied to the house of a god, though, strictly speaking, this meaning belonged to the ordo. In its primitive sense templum corresponds to the Gr. ἱερός, a place marked off as sacred to a god, in which a ναός, house of the god, might be erected. As we shall see, an enclosed consecrated space often precedes an actual temple in our sense of the word, viz. a temple of a god, a structure containing his image, and sometimes an altar, though not infrequently the altar stands outside the god's house (as in Greece) but within the sacred place, in the open air, as it did before any house for the god was erected. As images became more decorative and costly, it was natural to provide a house for them, though this might be done for a quite primitive image or even a fetish. Less often, however, the chamber or house of the god contained no image; it was merely a place where he might invisibly dwell or where he might visit...
from time to time. 1 Where a god has his image in such a place, those of other deities may also stand there or in subsidiary chambers connected with it. In the popular sense of the word, 'temple,' while it is connected with worship, is not usually a most elaborate structure.

The priests alone enter it; the laity may worship only within the precincts, if even there. Temples vary from the simplest and smallest buildings, as they mostly were at first, to the most elaborate and vast structures.

In studying the origin of temples, no single source for all can be found, as this differs in different regions. Examples could have no temples, while they might have tribal sacred places, or sacred tents carried in their wanderings. With the advent of a more fixed mode of life and permanent dwellings, a similar dwelling for the deity became necessary, as seen in 2 S 7. A variety of primitive temples is known, and it could have been only in the course of a long period of time that the more elaborate buildings were adopted. Generally speaking, the intermediate stages are not always discoverable.

1. Origin of temples. — (a) Sacred places.

Among savages, and probably also among most groups of Indian tribes, part of the rites of worship are carried on in the open air, sometimes because no images of deities exist, or, where they do, they are not always enclosed within walls, and sometimes because such places are connected with natural objects. Sacrifices are simply laid on sacred stones, or cast into the waters, or into the fire, or hung upon trees. 2 We may take places in the open air among many of the lowest tribes (Veddas, Australians, Moundus and other Dravidian tribes, Melanesians, Sakal, and Jakun), as well as among tribes at a higher level (some American tribes). This is often the result of a nomadic life, yet even now nomads carry sacred images with them 4 or have a teat for these or for other sacred things. 5 Such open places for worship tend to become sacred to the preserved irrelate for cult purposes, and there images are set up.

Examples of this are found among the Sakal, Jakun, Mipdas, Fijier, and Indians of California. 6

(b) Temple necessary where a sacred tree or stone stands in such a place. Sometimes sacred places are associated with the traditional appearance of spirits, gods, or ancestors, and must therefore be holy. The idea that religious gathering takes place in a certain spot is enough to give it sanctity, and the gathering becomes recurrent there. Such sacred places will usually be marked by images or symbols, or by boundary-stones forming an enclosure. 7 Sacred groves, often with a structure over them, and places of sepulture also become recognized places of cult.

The name preference for open-air worship in a recognised sacred place is found among the Chinese,—e.g., in the cult of the Altar of Heaven, which dates back to early times when the genius foci was worshipped at an altar under a tree. 8 The practice is also found in the primitive cult of the Indo-European race in some of their conceptions of deity, not distinguished from these of savages. The sacred stone, the sacred tree or grove, the sacred spring, were places of cult and usually possessed an altar. The limits of the region were marked by boundary-stones, and within these stood and altar or stone or post in which the deity resided. In India, too, there were no temples nor indeed permanent sacred places for cult—probably a result of earlier nomadic conditions prevailing after the people had become settled—and to some extent this is the case even now when temples have existed for centuries. So in early Rome there were holy places but no temples; and in ancient Persian religion there were neither images nor temples. 9 The custom and method of building temples as we know them from the Romans first from the Etruscans and then from the Greeks. The temples and Celes also worshipped first in the open air, and in their case the earlier cult is especially associated with the sacred tree or grove, though a spirit or god might be worshipped also on a mountain top, in a cave, or of a holy well. 10 Gauls the evidence of Lucan is interesting in the passage where he describes a sacred grove near Marsilia. The grove was taken to the people: even the priest stood there at midday or midnight, lest he should meet its sacred guardian. The trees were worshipped with sacrificial blood, but there were also altars, and the images of the gods were inscribed trunks of trees. The marvels of the grove are of a mythical kind. 11

While sacred groves were the principal places of worship, and had been to build in both Chaldaea and Transalpine Gaul. The Bell had a temple to which were stored the spoils of war and the Isitrites (Isaurians) had a similar temple. 12 Plutarch speaks of the temple where the Arethusa hung Caesar's sword, and Dio Cassius of temples and sacred places. 13 The temple of the Naunite (Naumite) women, unroofed and re-roofed in a day, must have been a simple building. 14 In Gallo-Roman times elaborate temples were built after Roman models, as well as smaller shrines at sacred springs. 15

1. Sacred groves existed among the Teutons, as many passages of Tacitus show. 16 What we figure to ourselves as a hulh and walled house, resolves itself into a temple edifice or into a holy place unbounded by human hand, embowered in the soft-grown trees.

2. The use of the sacred grove continued during many centuries. But in these groves simple temples also stood, and are referred to by Tacitus, while sacrificial rites were performed in a holy place untouched by human hand, embowered in the soft-grown trees.

3. The Latin names used for these are famatus, casuis, and templum. The first was probably a mere hut in which the sacred image; the second more elaborate building, whether of wood or of stone.

4. The grove is thus a primitive holy place, which may have as an accessory a small structure for the image which later became the more elaborate temple.

This worship in groves, which might become the seat of a temple, is also found among lower races.

The village shrine among the Dravidian tribes of India is an example. Under a sacred tree or grove stood a heap of stones or a mound; this may be replaced by a mud platform or a mud hut with a thatched roof, or by a small building of masonry with a dressed roof and platform. These form an abode for the deity and are thus a primitive kind of temple.

5. The early Semitic sanctuaries was a sacred place associated with a temple or with the continued presence of a spirit or divinity. This might be at a tree, a stone, on a hill, or in a cave.

These holy places were sacred territory enclosed by boundary stones or walls, with altar and table, or some other "high place," or hethel, as its name denotes, was on a height, and in the enclosed space or court there were the altar, the ophelthul, and the millahul.[50] the sacred tree, while connected with these were 'houses,' probably of the priests, which sometimes contained images (1 K 17:9), though these were also enclosed in tents (2 K 23: 16, 10). These houses or tents represent a primitive temple within the hethel, and, though no clear traces of actual temples have been met with in excavations, these may have been the original Canaanite temples as those at El Herihel and Jans (Ag 69).


3. Lucan, Pharsalia, B 597.

4. Livy, liv. 24. 2; Polibius, ii. 22.

5. Plut. Caes. 25; Plut. Soc. v. 27.

6. Strabo, iv. 6. 4. 27.

7. See art. Errata, XI, 4. 11.


12. W. Crooke, The N.W. Provinces of India, London, 1897, pp. 236, 244, 246, Native of India, 875.

13. P. S. Loius, Ind. 9, 12, 20.


15. R. E. Tyrer, 212.

16. A tent was used as a sanctuary in the temple of Beller in Ararat, and elsewhere (D. A. Cheshow, Die Siboter und der Siborhine, St. Petersburg, 1856, f. 253), and by the Carthaginians as a portable shrine (1606. Xl. 65).
graves of priests in pre-historic Egypt, where offerings were made. They gave place to mud houses, and these again to structures of stone. A temple was nothing more than another for the statues of the deposed and a table for offerings.

Furneary chapels were parts of the tomb-structure, but, where pyramids were built, this chapel or temple was erected outside the pyramid, and in it gifts and offerings were made. Sometimes they developed into large temples, and for furneary chapels, lands were attached to them for their maintenance.4

(c) Caves and temples. — Caves occasionally served as scenes of a cult, and by their shape and enclosed space may have suggested the structural temple. The caverns of mid-Malagasy Indian times, which contained elaborate paintings of animals or even of human figures, have been regarded as the scenes of religious or magical rites, but of this there is no direct evidence.5 Where cave-dwellers used part of the cave as a shrine for an image or fetish, it might easily through conservatism still be regarded as the dwelling of a god, when men no longer used it for a dwelling. It might become a temple or be associated with a temple built above it. Caves used for burial purposes would doubtless also acquire a sacred character and be used for commemorative rites.

Thus some of the Cannaanite 'high places' are associated with caves, which may have been abodes of the living or holes in the earth or places, and which, it has been conjectured, were used for sacrificial purposes or for the worship of the god. Natural or artificial grooves also constituted the earliest Phoenician temples.6 An example of god incarnate in animal shape inhabiting a cavern or tomb of temple, like the Fijian nangata presently to be referred to. Some have regarded such a cavern as the enclosure of a temple as dedicated to the sun or other heavenly bodies.7

Akin to these are the sacred stone enclosures, or nangata, of the Fiji islanders, now existing only in the

These formerly presented the form of a rough parallelogram enclosed by flat slabs of stone, divided into three compartments by cross walls carved respectively the little, great, and sacred nangata, the last enclosing the sacred fire bowl. Trees stood in the enclosure beneath, while the sacred nangata was the male temple, a belted-roofed hut. Here the forekiness of youths circumscribed on behalf of a sick parent were offered to ancestral gods with prayers for the patient's recovery. In the nangata the 'ancestral spirits are to be found by their workmen, and thither offerings are taken on all occasions when their aid is to be invoked,' and here first fruits are presented to them. They were also used in the elaborate initiation ceremonies, the object of which was the introduction of the candidates to the ancestral spirits.8

Where large chambered tombs exist, as they do in many parts of the Orient, they have been used for worship of the dead, either at the time of the burial or at stated intervals thereafter. To this extent, therefore, they form temples, and sometimes they contain conventional images of the dead like the human figures roughly sculptured on the walls of rock-hewn tombs in France.9 The structures built over graves may be no more than large huts, of logs and thatch, like those built over the graves of kings and chiefs among the Banyoro and Baganda, but these are regarded as temples, with priests and attendants, where the spirits of the dead are consulted.10

In Fiji certain temples of a primitive kind are associated with graves and with the cult of the kalakuta or ancestor-gods.11 Not unlike these are the tots of reed and grass built over the

For the more elaborate Canaanite temples see art. Ashurnasirpal (Naghippen), in Encyclopædia Lipp, d'Es.), 811, 93.

See art. ALBAN, £ 8, BIBLE, 93.

For the Deut. Ezech. 7, 7, 2. 4: 1: 3, 303; 2: 1: 3, 305. For art. ASHUR.

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or, as also with the Rayans, stand before them.2 The Vélakas
set their round, or clan-god, on a shelf in the cut-house.3 In
higher religions the household shrine is on the roof, in
other larger religions, or corresponds to the prytoologyum of the Greeks
and the curia of the Romans.

Religious dances or sacred dramatic plays are held in the
villages or in the 'assembly-house' of the Californian tribes, which
may consist of a circular dome
shaped structure or a mere brushwood enclosure.1 To the
later the ceremonies are connected with the fire-ceremony of the Warrumunga
troop, in which certain men maintain fire
for the continuous singing of the accompanying heathen.
Among many American Indian tribes, especially in the
south-west, religious dances are often dances with a sacred
house, as with the Hupa, which does not differ in construction
from other houses in the village. Here sacred dances take
place and traditions are connected with the house.4 With the Pueblo
tribes the kiva serves at once as sacred council-house, medicine-
lodge, and temple of the members of a mystery society. In
some districts such of ancient date are circular; more generally
they are square and often below the surface of the ground.
The pre-historic kivas of Colorado and Utah are of similar type.
Women might not enter the kivas except to give food to
husband or sons. Kivas are often very large, but the
openings are small, and entrance is gained by a ladder up to
the roof, where another ladder descends to the interior. The walls are often
decorated with symbolic paintings and are surrounded by a bench.
At
one time kivas were houses in which the symbolic objects of the society
were placed, and before it a dry sand 'painting,' representing
gods and forces of nature.4 Corresponding to these are the sacred
houses or club-houses of the Aborigines, which are
the nearest approach to temples in those regions.
Examination of the 'sacred houses' of the Solomon
Islands; in the tores of New Britain, etc.—a sacred enclos
with which the dregae and masks were prepared and members of the society met, whence the speech
personae of the ceremonies emerged, and which no woman
or uncircumcised man might enter. A similar approach is found in the
sacred house of the Biaray Archipelago, a similar construction to the tores,
but with a circular or oval enclosure containing images and veils by the fire
or magician alone, and in the house used in the festival at Aotolabé,
where an ancestor-cult is practised.8 The
structures of the middle region have no sacred
house in the same regions on a sacred significance, and contain no sacred objects, and symbols
connected with ancestor-worship, and sometimes masks, drums,
and flutes connected with the mysteries and concealed from the
outsider. These houses are often used for the worship of ancestors.9

(c) The house-shrine as temple.—Still another
aspect of the primitive temple, sometimes suggesting
a point of departure for more excessive temple
structures, is the hut or house of a corner which is
designed as a place or shrine for an image or
sacred objects. This custom is well-nigh universal, and
is common in many temples of every age.

Among the Banyankole in each hut is a special place
for fetishes, consisting of a mound of earth a foot high, bested
which is often enclosed.10 With Gold Coast tribes the
shrub containing a spirit has an honoured place in a corner
of the hut, and is protected by the fire.11 In the
Yoruba, the house-god Oṣunra, represented in human form, is
set up at the door, and hot springs in the wall for the
fetish.12 Here and there in Melanesia and Papua images
are kept in houses, or, as in certain islands of the
western end of New Guinea, in a separate room of the house in
which miniature wooden houses are placed for the souls to
reside in. Offerings are made to them. In the chief's house are
shrines for the souls of all who have died in the community.
'Such a house might almost be described as a temple of the dead.'12 Among the Ramanas images are kept in the huts,

1 EER. 3056, III. 1439, 1440.
2 Spencer-Gilchrist, p. 827. (See EER. 289.)
3 EER. vi. 289.
4 F. S. Debenham, North Americans of Yesterday, New
York and London, 1901, p. 253 f.; F. W. Hodge, in HAI. 170;
5 T. F. Gmelin, p. 788.
6 F. Ratzel, The History of Mankind, tr. A. J. Butler,
7 G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, London, 1910,
P. 461.
8 Tb. p. 92f. (See EERK. 348.)
9 F. Barkhorn, Tater, A. 82;111 (1903) 20, 427 f.; M. J. Frincke,
Missions und Hochstaplerschaften in Female
xxxII. (1902) 229; H. Zahn, in Neumann, III. 301, 308; et EERK
(1901) 347, 348, 301, 308.
11 H. Ling Roth, Great Benin, Hailsham, 1908, pp. 106, 171; et
EERK. 1901, P. 197.
14 Hone-McDougall, H. 7, 19.
15 Abercrombie, I. 104.
16 C. W. Hobley, Religions of the 1-Kamba and other East
African Tribes, Cambridge, 1910, p. 96; et EERK. II. 358.
18 A. B. Ellis, The Rice-growing Peoples of the Slave Coast
of Western Africa, London, 1890, p. 49.
19 Ib. p. 57.
20 Ling Roth, p. 160.
and others for his ghost. Similar temples for divinities and for the royal jaw-bone existed among the Bunaga, Bayuoro, etc., and these with the Baganda the creator-god had no temple. In Melanesian temples are not common, but in the Admiralty Islands wooden, thatched huts of a bird's-nest shape, with carved door-posts representing male and female figures, serve as temples. The doorway is closed by a hurdle. Skulls of pigs and turtles are attached to the rafters, as well as balls of human hair. A mystery was always made about the principal temple, which contained images, and was sometimes open, sometimes closed. In Fiji each village had one or more temples (buro), built on a mound faced with stone rubble-work. Their roofs were high-pitched, with a projecting ridge-pole, and the height of the structure was twice its breadth. Each buro had two doors and a fire-place, and contained images, jars, boxes, mats, etc. This temple roof hung long, and piece of bark cloth reaching to the floor at one of the corner-posts, and marking the holy place which none but the priest approached to be inspired by the god, who descended by this cloth. The dead were sometimes buried in the buro, but the building was only used for worship on special occasions and often became ruinous in the interval. It served also as a council-house and chief's club-house. Burens were also deposited in memory of the dead, and had an altar for offerings. In the district of Tumleo, New Guinea, paraus, or temples, built of wood and standing on piles, are found. They consist of two stories and have high gables, and are approached by ladders with hand-rails carved in the form of crocodiles and ape-like figures. Nothing but drums and flutes are found in the paraus, and these, played by men, signify the presence of the spirits, for whose worship the temples exist. A certain degree of mystery attaches to the paraus; no woman or child may enter them or loiter in their vicinity.

(c) In certain parts of Polynesia—Society and Sandwich Islands—the temples, or marae, were enclosures open to the sky and they were of three classes: national, local, and domestic.

The national temple, called tabata-tena-tea, perhaps because of their wide-spread sanctity, were depositories of the chief images and the places where great festivals were held. Each of them was composed of several marae, some with inner courts for the images, others with sacred dormitories for the chief, and others with Ancestral shrines. About the structure was a stone wall on two sides. In front was a fence, and at the back a pyramidal structure often of large size, about 30 ft. by 40 ft. At Anahau the structure was 270 ft. long, 94 broad, and 70 high. Steps led to the top, which was a sacred space area of 160 by 100 ft. Within the enclosure were the priest's houses, and trees grew both within and around it, forming a dark grove. Offerings were placed in the marae. Men alone usually took a part in the festivals, but on the completion of the year women and children also attended, but were not allowed to enter the sacred enclosure. Domestic marae were those belonging to the different districts; the domestic marae were for the family gods. In both these, as well as in the royal marae, the dead were deposited, and were there under the guardianship of the gods. In other districts—e.g., Ranco—temples resembled the beehive thatched huts, or, again, the village house where the chiefs met served as a temple. In some cases groves as well as temples were used as places of sacrifice.

(d) Among the coast Veddah temple structures exist. One is 12 ft. by 10, roofed, and facing eastwards, with the roof carried forward beyond the front wall and door. Outside this structure are a long pole, a well, and a tree with a platform, and just outside the door stands an altar. The interior is decorated with cloths and branches on the occasion of a ceremonial dance, but when no dances are held the garments are kept within. Some of the village Veddahs have temples of bark or of mud resembling their own huts. In these the shaman dances, and the masks of the spirits are kept.

(c) With the Todas, worships of the sacred buffalo, the dairy forms the temple or sacred place, with its ceremonial vessels and other things, which are preserved there; and provisions are made to prevent their contamination by the touch or look of unauthorized persons. Relics of heroes are also stored in them. These temple-dairies have usually two rooms, and are of the same form as the native huts.

(f) As an example of various stages in the evolution of temples from simple to highly elaborate, over a large area, we may cite those known in N. and S. America. Most of the new tribes, and some of the more advanced (Hurons, Iroquois), had no temples. But usually there were sacred spots or shrines where ceremonies were performed, sacrifices offered, and images set up.

Among the Hopi such places were called palahks, 'prayer-houses,' and often had nothing to mark them but prayer-sticks—sticks with features attached. Others were simply natural marks of stones—e.g., the sun shrine with an opening to the direction of sunrise at the summer solstice—by a stick stuck in the natural mark on a rock. To these correspond the sites on which are erected bowers or lodges for the public performances of mystery societies in other tribes, often containing an altar with sacred objects. More elaborate shrines also exist among the Hopi and will be described later. In S. America corresponding to such shrines is the secret spot where the tolosa, or sacred trumpet, of the Omocho tribes is kept, so that women and children may not see it. With other tribes the insignia of a palahk are taba and are kept in a special shed or hut, which is also used as a place where he may be committed. It is called a 'spirit-house' and is taba. Here also may be mentioned the special 'medicine-lodge' of many tribes, erected for the performances of the shaman, corresponding to that found among the Ural-Altaic tribes of N. Asia.

Among other tribes—e.g., the Omas—the sacred structure consisted of three sacred tents, or tiqis, which were carried from place to place, like the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.' They consisted of poles tied together at the top, arranged in a circle, and covered with bison skins. They sheltered the three sacred objects—the sacred pole, the sacred buffalo-skull, and the sacred bag. The household tent as a shrine containing an altar is also sporadically found—e.g., among the Shoshones, when each tent has an altar, a mere hole in the ground, in which sweet gum is burned.

With the Apache, and other tribes, sacred caves took the place of temples, where religious rites (tahes to women) were performed, or where visions were obtained. In Florida the Apalachees had a cave-temple on the missions, Onazi, 900 ft. long, with an altar and images. Images also stood at the entrance, which faced eastwards, so that the earliest beams of the sun fell upon it. More elaborate still was a cave-temple of the Wirracutes of Oregon. There was to celebrate rites by the followers of a culture-hero Wiwpecoonu, but was later turned into a structure with galleries, halls, and apartments. Into it the priests descended to perform sacrifices and ceremonies hid from the vulgar eye.

Among the Chichous the temples, each of which was dedicated to a god, were mere huts with clay walls, containing small stools on which idols were set. The floor was covered with grass, and mats hung on the walls. Those of greater importance had the distinction of having their chief posts set on the body of a sacrificed slave. Small shrines also existed.

3 See ERE I, 856.
4 See § 1 above.
5 J. W. Fewkes, in HAIf II, 558.
7 J. W. Fewkes, in HAIL I, 237.
8 J. W. Fewkes, in HAIL I, 559; Müller, p. 69; ERE II, 859.
9 T. Müller, p. 69.
10 NK II, 211; for other cave-temples see Müller, p. 184.
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throughout this region, as hills or by lakes.1 Among some California tribes structural temples, or maungw6, in honour of a god Chimpichinich, consisted of an oval enclosure, four or five in number, with inner divisions formed by branches, stakes of wood, and mats, and containing a hurdle surrounded by a wall of brushwood. The temples of the Natchez, one at each village, which stood on mounds, were huts about 30 ft. square, and were somewhat elaborate in structure. They


took the form of a rectangle, with a somewhat curved roof, in some cases with a dome. In the Mississippi region, among the Fox Indians, or in S. America, with the Tupi-Aranas.2 Among the Huichols are temples (pillas), god-houses,3 and sacred caves, though the difference between the first two is not clear. The temples are larger than the god-houses, and were used by the Huichols for shamanistic ceremonies. Chairs are placed for the deities invisibly present. Images are kept in sacred caves in the Uruapan, in miniature temples there.4 In the Pueblan region the more elaborate shrines were the so-called "great buildings." They consisted of sealed stone chambers, sometimes with symbols painted on them, and they contained symbols and symbolic representations of supernatural beings. Among the Hopi the shrine of the deity is in a sealed chamber which is her image, seated. Every November a stone is removed, and offerings are placed in the shrine, while every 25 years the image is carried in procession, and sacrificed. Permanent objects (images, stones, carved slabs, etc.) and temporal objects (burner-neck, pollock, stones, bowls of water, clay images) are placed in the court. The council-house, men's house, the kiva, etc., as serving the deity, is an ancient institution, and is placed either in or near the temple.5


2 NR II 406.
3 Delaunay, p. 207; ERB IX 109.
4 Asenjo, p. 250; John Smith, Flor de Israel, in Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrims (Hakluyt Soc. Ex. Ser.), p. 500.
5 Lembrecht, Ueber Meeres-11, 247, 487, 131, 300.
6 Lembrecht, Ueber Meeres-11, 247, 487, 131, 300.
7 J. W. Fewkes, in HAI E 559.
8 Miller, in H. B. Schoolcraft, Information respecting the Indian Tribes of the United States, Philadelphia, 1835-57, 94.
9 Although in the city of Monex, in Purchas, xv. 341 ff.; Schoolcraft, v. 28.

rule, the temple was strictly a lofty altar with a chapel for the image. Under the Incas the chapel increased in size, culminating in the temple of Sacsayhuaman, which was made elaborate by the addition of other buildings.1 Certain remains of temples in Peru, however, show a greater architectural complexity than those described by early Spanish travelers.

The Mexican temples, tocoalli, "abode of the gods," may be described as gigantic altars on which were placed the temples for the images. There were many smaller temples in each city, varying much in size.

The larger tocoalli had a great outer court capable of holding a crowd of people. Within this space stood priests' houses, sanctuaries, and chapels for lesser gods. These formed a pyramidal structure of earth faced with brick or stone, rising in stages, three to six in number, each with a platform, to a height of 50 to 100 feet. Stairways, differently arranged, rose from the base to each platform, and thence to the top. Sometimes the stairway rose directly from base to summit up one of the faces of the pyramid; or it ascended at one of the angles to the first platform, at another angle to the second, and so to the top, in order that a religious procession in ascending might form a circuit of the structure. The platforms had palisades on which were stuck the heads of human sacrifices. In front of them stood a tower or chapel, or sometimes two, containing the image of the god or gods to whom the temple was dedicated. In front of them stood the great stone of sacrifice and altars on which perpetual fires were burned. The great procession of priests at the religious festivals would find the high priest who directed their eyes to the tocoalli, as it is called.8

The practice of placing temples on pyramidal structures is also found among the peoples of the whole area of Central America, but here the buildings were of a more ambitious kind, with elaborate architecture and sculpture.9

The museums of the Mississippi Valley are as though to be of Mexican or Mayan origin, but is it now accepted that they are the work of Indian tribes—Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, Chippewas, etc. Nor is it proved that every pueblo was crowned by a temple or altar.1 Whether these were sacred enclosures, sacrificial and temple mounds, as is sometimes suggested, or simply, if it were possible, by investigation and legitimate inductions.2 Houses were built on or near the mounds, but occasionally travelers speak of a temple on a mound, and a case is made of great height, and the temple was a simple structure like that of the Natchez.3

3. Miniature temples.—Among many African tribes there is a custom of making a small hut for the spirits, about 2 ft. high. This stands in the village or outside, and offerings are made at it. This is supposed to contain an image of a spiritual being, and is a kind of temple of the dead, whose spirits are supposed to visit it.

In Uganda the hut is a veritable sanctuary, with a sort of altar for offerings.3 In New Guinea some tribes use small huts set up in the forest for the use of ancestral spirits, or those within inner rooms of their own dwellings; others place the skull of the dead man in an unroofed hut.4 Similar miniature structures for ancestral ghosts are found in Indo-China and among the Dyak.5

4. Temples in the higher culture.—In higher civilizations the temple usually has a prominent place in religious life, and is architecturally of great importance. But here also it was evolved from simple structures, though these as well as the intermediate stages cannot always be traced in archeological sequence or from historical evidence. The series of articles on Architecture deals with the structure of such temples and their religious purposes, and it is unnecessary here to do more than offer a few general remarks.

(a) The great temples of ancient Egypt were proceeded in pre-historic times by a simple structure of dried mud or a hut of wicker-work, not differing much from human dwellings and probably


1 Reville, The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru (HD), London, 1894, p. 215.
2 Joseph Acosta, in Purchas, xvi. 315 ff.; Reville, p. 47; NR II 377, 380; see art. AMERICA (Amer.).
3 See art. ARCHITECTURE (Amer.), MNR IV, 436 ff.
6 Fraser, The Belief in Immortality, I. 315 ff.; ERB IX 359.
7 ERB VIII 239, et 239.
TEMPLES

resembling African native temples. The house was sometimes square, sometimes domed, and stood on a platform of earth to save it from inundation. Within it was the image of the god, and the only opening for light was the doorway or portico, with a mast at each side. In front was a court fenced with a palaistra.

The hut gave place to a stone building, but, when additional rooms were built round the central 'house of the god,' and the temple became the seat of the gods of the household, with its spacious open court, pylon, courts for the worshippers, pillared hall, and altar. The process of priestly oracles, etc., was elaborated, the dark central chamber of the temple, accessible to the higher priesthood only, remained as a constant feature, and contained the divine image of the sacred animal. The door was solemnly sealed with papyri and clay at night, and as solemnly opened in the morning, before the service began. The temple had once been the temple itself was now the inner sanctuary of a wide-spread temple, with all its multiform buildings and chambers over which the sacred animal was supposed to preside. The height of the Egyptian temple diminished from front to back.1

(b) The great temples of Babylon had probably originated as a structure of simple kind, one oblong in shape, with a recess for an image. Excavations show that the great temples stood in a court with a vestibule, flanked by chambers.

The temple building consisted of a long outer hall, opening into another one with the holy place, or parabasis, where stood the image of the divinity and an altar. The holy place was separated from the altar by a passage occupied by a priest for special religious purposes. An altar stood in the court and perhaps in the outer hall also. The names of temples are many, and some of them show their great sanctity: "the house of the shining mountain," "the temple of the serpent," etc., which stand beside the important temple, situated within the sacred enclosure, where stood many temples dedicated to various gods, as well as the houses of priests—a grouping of religious buildings found in the larger cities of the East. The temple was a stately tower or pyramid, consisting of a series of diminishing and superimposed cubes. These were numbered, and each represented a mythical mountain of the world. Where it consisted of seven storeys, these represented the seven sones of the earth. Each storey was reached by an inclined pathway or a flight of steps, either directly up the face or diagonally across it, until the top, which formed a broad platform, was reached. On the platform stood a chamber for the god, containing a couch and throne, and perhaps an image. As with the Mexican teocalli, processions winding up the tower could be plainly seen below, and, while the Egyptian temple in its grandest development was spread over a large area, the Babylonian, as far as the reports were concerned, aimed at reaching a lofty elevation, and represented in miniature the structure of the universe. It seems to have been regarded also as the grave of the god to whom it was dedicated, and persons of importance were sometimes buried round it.2

Both Egyptian and Babylonian temples were endowed with lands which yielded large revenues. Hence, outside their religious purpose, they had great economic influence on the nations of antiquity. In the Babylonian temple area also, as the priests were administrators of the law, there were courts of justice, chambers where national archives were stored, and even banks.

The Greek temple was preceded by the tiara, the open sacred place with its δαράς of the deity, altar, and other σάκρα. In the Αίγιος religion the sacred cave served as a temple where the Mother Goddess was worshipped, as in the double cave (upper and lower) of Dicte in Crete, where a rich store of cult objects has been found in recent years.3 Palaces had their domestic chapel or shrine, plain and of small size, with a ledge at one end for images and sacred objects. The ruler was a priest-king, and in one instance, that of the palace of Knossos, 'the Place of the Double Altar and the Double Palace' the whole building has the character of a temple.4 Free-standing shrines or temples also existed, like that discovered at Gournia, a small enclosure 12 ft. square, in the heart of the town, in which were found many images and cult objects.1 With the perfecting of the divine image, a house to shelter it became necessary, and the earliest type was no more than a rectangular oblong cella, or σάκρα. To this was soon added an additional chamber, with open front and a couple of columns supporting an architrave, the corners of which were festooned and attached to the ends of the side walls. These columns were at first of wood; the earliest stone columns date from the 6th cent. B.C. Throughout the whole period of Greek religion the rectangular cella remained as the central part of all Greek temples, though it was sometimes prolonged back and front with additional chambers, or surrounded by single or double rows of columns, while these were sometimes also introduced within the cella. Vitruvius, indeed, classifies temples according to the arrangement of the columns in relation to the cella.5 The temples of the gods faced eastwards, and opposite the entrance stood the temple of the priest or priestesses. A priest, if the god. The cella also contained an altar or altars, votive offerings, and treasure, the last being also stored in the chamber behind the cella. The temples were sometimes square buildings where houses for the image, and hence were often kept closed. They were decorated with sculpture and painting both within and without. The temple stood within a temple, where a temple was placed, and where the worship was carried on.6

(d) The Roman templum, as already shown, was originally a rectangular space of ground marked off by a augustus, on which a temple was pitched for religious purposes, like the 'medicine-hut' of the shaman. Strictly speaking, the house of a god was the odea, but the word templum was now applied to such a structure, inaugurated by the augurs, and usually of larger and more complicated structure than the odea. In the earliest times divine dwellings were unknown. The grove, the cave, the hearth, were the earlier sacred places, or the sanctum, a small place consecrated to a god, enclosed by a fence or wall, but roofless, with an altar and possibly an image. The Romans, in erecting houses for the gods, were influenced by the Etruscans and the Greeks. In many cases the temples were of wood, oblong, with one or more chambers and an open portico. The Roman temple had also a central cella, but of much smaller size and in many cases taking probably a result of Etruscan influence. The structure of temples, whether simple or elaborate, was generally determined by Greek architecture, though there were differences in detail as to the site. Circular temples were also built; these had become common in Greece from the 4th cent. B.C., though it is not impossible that the form may be copied from the early Italian house.

Before building a temple, a space of ground was liberatus et estrictus by the augurs, and consecrated by the pontifex. When the building was erected, it was dedicated to a god. In such instances, however, a building might be consecrated to religious use without dedication, as a result of the act of the augurs. In other instances, however, the temple was dedicated to a god. In the temple were sacred, or odea sacra, like the temple of Veles.7 Outside the temple stood the aula, and within burned the sacred fire. In the temples were stored votive offerings, gifts, treasure of all kinds, as well as the images of the gods.

(e) During the Vedic period in India, as has been seen, there were no temples. No trace of temples in the pre-Buddhist period is known, but, if any existed, they must have been of wood, as they still are in Burma, the use of stone in

1 [References are provided with page numbers and are not shown here in full.]
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architecture not having been introduced until Asoka's reign, as a result of contact with the West. The stūpa, the name that is now known for the first time in Buddhism. The primitive sacred object in Buddhism was not an image, but a relic. This at first was not set in a temple, but enclosed in a stūpa, or tope (Sinhalese dāgala)—an elongated hemispherical chamber built on a base, the exterior often richly carved or ornamented, and crowned with a square capital and the chastrītra, or umbrella. Many stūpas contained a reliquary, but were erected as commemorative objects. A path fenced by a railing surrounded the stūpa, for circumambulation. The stūpa was decorated with flags, streamers, and flowers; and it was the chief religious edifice of early Buddhism. Another religious edifice was the chaitya, a name applied to any religious monument—e.g., a stūpa with relics—but also restricted to a building corresponding to a temple or church, the 'chaitya hall,' with pillar halls and an apse containing a stūpa and an altar.

The earliest known structural building of this type—e.g., at Ter, Bāli—appears to be an apsidal chapel with high barrel-vaulted roof. In front is a square hall, or mandapa—a perhaps a later addition, lower in height, with a flat roof supported by columns. The façade above the roof has a niche containing a stone image, which was probably originally of wood. Within the apse stood a dāgala, now replaced by a Vaisāgīa image. Chaityas of this type must have been common in India. Buddhism made use of rock-cut chambers as an early time for chaitya halls, which sometimes had stairs.

A third structure was the vihāra—a hall where the monks assembled, with cells at the sides for sleeping. The vihāras were later used as temples and became the centre of monastic buildings grouped around them. They usually stood beside chaityas, though they came to be furnished with chapels in which religious services could be performed as well as in the chaitya.

During ten centuries from Asoka's time onwards chaitya halls and vihāras were excavated all over India. In early examples at Bāli the chaitya halls are merely elongated chambers, sometimes with a cell or apse at the farther end for the dāgala with its relic. Others are more elaborate. The façade of the cave represents the exterior of a wooden chaitya in all its details. The interior is apsidal. Pillars are cut in the sides, and in the apse is the dāgala, which now has the image of Buddha in front of it. Some of these caves are larger and were intended to receive their carving both within and without, and are also pillared structures with sides. The cave vihāras have a central apsidal cell with cells at the sides for monks. Beyond the hall are one or more inner sanctuaries for images of Buddha. These are later additions. Here again the architecture and sculpture are developed by simple to highly elaborate. The earliest free-standing vihāras were probably simple halls with cells attached, and were sometimes of a storied pyramidical form, each successive storey decreasing in size, and giving a series of pillared halls one above the other, with cells for the monks on the terrace. This architectural structure supplied a form for all the later temples of southern Hinduism. Attached to great monasteries, as at Pahāvāra, was a court, or vihāra, with cells, and images, and beyond that, opening from it, a circular or square court surrounded by similar cells, and with a stūpa in the centre. These belong to the period of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

One of the earliest known temples, or chaityas, is at Bodh Gaya, in front of the Bo-tree of Buddha's enlightenment. Frequently restored, it was probably erected in the 5th cent. and is 100 ft. high by 60 ft. wide. It is rectangular with an elongated pyramidical form of nine storeys, each with exterior niches. In the interior cells contained originally an image of Buddha. Such a nine-storied tower-temple is unknown in India, but is found frequently north of the Himalaya.

Hindu temples doubtless owe much in their inception to Buddhism, and are of great variety in style and ornamentation. But there are two principal groups, one in Southern India of the so-called Dravidian style, and one Northern India, each of which shows great uniformity in general style. In S. India the structure consists of the temple proper, or vimana, the vehicle of the gods—a square building with a pyramidal roof which may have only one storey, or may be a multi-storied vihāra of Buddhism. In this is the square cell containing the chief image of the god, and lit only from the doorway. Between the wall of the inner cell and the outer wall is the procession path. The mukhāpadā (Skr. mandapa) precede the entrance, and are usually larger than the vimana. Vimana and mantapams (Skr. mandapa) stand in a walled enclosure with gate-pyramids, or ghats, corresponding to the Egyptian pylons and often very imposing. Within the enclosure stand a pillared hall, priests' dwellings, tanks, and other structures. These temples are devoted to the Vaishnava and Saiva cults, and are not otherwise distinguishable apart from the sculptures and images. The earliest examples of the vimana show its derivation from the Buddhist apsidal chaitya hall. The ape for the relic-shrine has become a cell for an image and is entered by a door. In another early example the circular ape has given place to a cell with altar and image, surmounted by a tower, and the hall in front, distinct from the cell, is pillared. Cell and pillared nave or mantapam are reproduced in all Jain and Hindu temples of later date, together with the storied tower. The enormous size and elaborate architectural and sculptural design of these buildings make them still marvellous rivals of the cathedrals of Europe. Some, besides the original enclosure with its gate-pyramids, have a second or even third external enclosure, with ghats, shrines, porches, cells, etc. The vimana in itself corresponds to the ordinary Hindu village temple, and in some examples has either been such a temple or is little more imposing than one of these. Sometimes two or even three vimanas, dedicated to different divinities stand within the central enclosure. In S. India the largest group or conglomer of temple buildings is at Srirangam. There are seven enclosures, leading gradually to the central shrine, and the three surrounding the central enclosure are crowded with temples, porches, halls, etc., while in each wall there are two or three gopuras of great height. The idea is that each investing square of walls ... shall contain the worshipper by regular gradations to a central holy of holies. While the temples of this kind are of comparatively late date, others of earlier date, but presenting the same general features, have been found in the midst of the solid rock and excavated internally, so that they are monolithic temples. The chief examples are the raths (ratha=vimana) at Mamallapuram and the beautiful eulisā at Ellora.

The Northern temples (Fergusson's 'Indo-Aryan style')—e.g., in Orissa—are characterized by a pyramidical curvilinear tower on a polygonal base in which is the central shrine, often quite small. The interior plan is square, and in the Orissan examples there are no pillars, or these are found only in modern additions. In front is a square porch with pyramidal roof, and sometimes in front of this again additional porches. The enclosing wall is always insignificant, if it is present at all, and has no gopuras. Other shrines are always subordinate to the towering temple proper with its porch. Even the more elaborate temples preserve these essential features—e.g., the Kanadarya Mahadeva, or temple of Siva, at Khajuraho.

In all Hindu temples the inner cell or shrine with its image is the central focus, around which all the other parts are grouped, and to which, however elaborate, they are all subordinate. The cell is cubical, of small dimensions, unornamented,
and unlit save by the doorway, and is too sacred to be entered by any but the priests. The external building surrounding the cell is of the most elaborate workmanship, often of a kind which offers little due to the method of producing it. In some districts enormous numbers of temples exist, and stand on a plinth on which are built shrines of the five Dhyan-buddhas. Others are lower and flatter, and others again stand on a structure with successive roofs. Buddhism in Nepal is mingled with Saivism, and the characteristic temple is a square structure of several decreasing storeys divided by sloping roofs. Some are mounted on a pyramidal stepped platform. These buildings are of wood and stone.

In Burma the stūpas (taxis) are bell-shaped and stand on a series of platforms, and are crowned with a conical finial. The temple are of square form with projecting porches. In the thick of the walls are narrow corridors with niches in which are images of the Buddha. A series of storeys arranged pyramidal and crowned with a slender steeple forms the roof. Ancient Buddhist temples in Siam have a rectangular outer enclosing wall, within which is the hall, also rectangular, with a porch. The interior is divided by pillars into a nave and single or double aisle. Within are the high altar and image of Buddha. Behind the altar stands a stupā, or pillar, with Fishāras, or mahā ka and kāranuras are buildings similar to the but, but smaller, where the laity come to pray or hear sermons. The but is accessible only to the priests. This monastic is a rectangular basin flatter, and enclosing a huge image of Buddha. One enclosure sometimes contains several of these structures, erected from time to time by devout Buddhists.

The earliest Chinese religious art had no temples, and apparently the general use of these is due to Buddhism. With few exceptions the temples of the three religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, are mainly of one type, though they differ in details. The religious to which each is dedicated can be discovered only from their interior decorations and the images which they enshrine.

Buddhist temples are enclosed by a wall with an ornamental gateway, the temple has a series of porches or halls, opening from each other. Two of these form antechambers to the main structure with its altar and images of the three Buddhas, facing the entrance, and stalls for the monks. Before the images stands the table for offerings, with lamps and flower-vases. Beyond this another hall contains a dānapal, and a small one enshrines the image of Kwan-yin. Within the enclosure are the various buildings for monks, pagodas, drum-tower, bell-tower, and other structures. The roof has the characteristic form of all Chinese buildings, concrete, with projecting eaves, but more elaborately decorated than is secular buildings. Confucian temples are of the same general plan, the central Hall of Great Perfection containing the tablets of Confucius, his disciples, and the twelve sages. Tables for offerings stand before these. Taoist temples contain the images of the Three Precious Ones, in imitation of the three images of Buddhist temples.

In Japan, as in China, the earlier worship was in a consecrated enclosure open to the sky. Tradition assigns the first temples to a period near the beginning of the Christian era. Shintō temples are not large and conform in structure to the architecture of an age when tools were few and primitive. The quality of the wood used in the structure is of more importance than ornamentation and carving, whereas the carvings on Buddhist

1. Ferguson, I, 277 f.; H. A. Oldfield, Sketched from Nepal.
2. I. A. Oldfield, Sketched from Nepal.
5. See § 2 (f) above.
described by P., and containing the Ark, was probably never more than an ideal priestly construction projected upon the past. The Ark was later kept in a 'house' or temple at Shiloh (1 S 3:13), which may have been destroyed by the Philistines, who carried off the Ark. On its recovery, it was kept from time to time in private houses, and possibly in a tent (2 S 7), as it was so kept later by David at Jerusalem (2 S 6ff.; cf. 11 Kin). Tents were also used after the settlement in Canaan of the 'high places' (2 K 23, Ezk 16, 'sewn high places').

What the 'house' at Shiloh was like we have no means of knowing, but probably it was not elaborate. Micah's image of the ark and other religious objects were kept in an apartment of his house (Jg 17:18). When captured by the Danites, these were placed in a sacred cave at Lehi (1 S 20:4). At Bethel there was a sanctuary by the priest's priesthood, containing an ephod and a table of holy bread (1 S 2).

Tent and high place were succeeded by the Temple built by Solomon. It stood within a great court as one of a series of buildings, including the palace, and was thus dominated by the latter, to some extent, though it was itself the chief building. It had its own 'court of the temple,' surrounded by a wall of stone and cedar.

The Temple was an oblong structure of stone, faced on the porch, in front of which stood two bronze pillars called Jachin and Boaz, like Stone and Zion in front of other Semitic temples. The porch, exclusive of the porch, which was of equal breadth with the altar, was 100 cubits long, 20 broad, and 20 high. It was divided by a partition with doors into a Holy Place ('hekal') and the Holy of Holies ("debar") or the inner dark chamber 20 cubits each in direction, leaving a space of 10 cubits above it. The interior walls were faced with cedar, carved, and ornamented with gold, and the floor was of cypress. Between the walls of the structure and the outer wall, running round the sides about a height of 20 cubits, the upper stories of rooms for treasure and Temple ornaments. In the Temple were above these, there were latticed windows. The Oracle, or Most Holy Place, the 'adytum,' was the dwelling of Jehovah, and contained the Ark with the cherubim. In the Holy Place stood the altar of burnt-offering, and near it a brazen sea supported by twelve oxen, as well ten smaller lavers on which the priests gathered for worship in the court, though it is called 'the priests' court.' The Holy Place was for the priests alone—a suggestive difference, appearing now for the first time.

Thus the main features of the Temple were common with those of Syrian and Phoenician temples of the period—porch, outer chamber, and adytum—though some have suggested Egyptian influences in its construction.

Ezekiel's ideal Temple has the same division of inner and outer sanctuaries and porch, but there and here within inner one for the priests, and outer for the laity; and the sacred building was to be entirely dissociated from all secular buildings, and was also to be shut out from Jerusalem by the laws of the Zadokites.

Zerubbabel's Temple of the restoration period had an outer court with walls and gates, and an inner court in which stood the altar of unhewn stones, and perhaps a laver. Into the inner court the laity appear to have had access for a time at least. The Temple itself had a Holy of Holies, but was unique among temples in possessing no representation or symbol of deity, the Ark having been lost. The presence of deity, however, was marked by the ritual of the Day of Atonement. The Holy of Holies was separated from the Holy Place in a curtain, and this chamber contained the table of showbread, altar of incense, and seven-branched candlestick. The Holy Place was entered by a curtain.

Herod's Temple, built about 30 B.C., was on a larger scale than any of its predecessors, but the general plan was the same.

A large outer court—the court of the Gentiles—was surrounded by porticoes or colonnades with multiple pillars, built against the enclosing battlemented wall. Within the area, on a raised platform, was a second court surrounded and an enclosing wall with nine gates, and with chambers and porticoes on the inner side. Within this court was the temple building, surrounded by a brestwork of stone enclosing the court of the priests. Within this court priests only could enter, and even they were offered a sacrifice which required his presence. The Temple of this inner area was preceded by a series of steps leading to the temple building. In the hekal, which was open only to the priests, stood the table of showbread, altar of incense, and seven-branched candlestick. The debar was empty and quite dark, and was entered by the high-priest alone on the Day of Atonement. In front of the porch outside stood the altar of burnt-offering and the laver. The building was of white marble, and the eastern front and part of the walls were covered with gold. The debar was 20 cubits square; the hekal 40 cubits long, 20 broad, and 40 high. The porch was 100 cubits long, 70 broad, and 20 in depth, and extended on both sides beyond the Temple, with its side buildings, by some 15 cubits. Herod had raised many pagan temples throughout his dominions, and he erected this for the Jews in his capital partly as a matter of policy.

5. Conclusion. A general survey of temples shows that the essential part is the cella, or chamber, for the image of the god, and that all other additions are made by way of increasing the splendour of the temple or as adjuncts to it, this remains constant, and is indeed its most important feature. It is the holy place, that is to say, a holy place, ever enshrined by the priests. The temple of the Eleans forms an exception, for apparently there all was open to the worshippers. But generally worship takes place in the temple only as a place of meeting, the image being enshrined in the cella, which is very often dark and unlit by windows. The Jewish synagogue, the Muhammadan mosque, and the Christian church are not strictly temples, for the temple is a place including a divine image, but places of public prayer. Yet even in the mosque the recess, or mihrab, indicating the direction of the kabah, towards which the worshipper prays, has a certain parallel to the cella with its image which the worshippers also face. The great mosque at Mecca also contains the kabah with the sacred black stone, and the kabah is an old but reconstructed sanctuary within the mosque. In the Christian church the altar and the sanctuary with the altar are not ordinarily open to the laity assembled in the nave, but yet they approach the altar at the Holy Communion.

Certain temples are national shrines, like the Pantheon at Rome, the kabah at Mecca, and similar great temples in important centres. Pilgrimages are often made to temples, and temples form asylums whither criminals flee for safety. Frequently there is much symbolism connected with the temple, and attention is paid to the direction in which it faces, most temples facing the east or the place of the rising sun. Very often in connexion with one great temple there will be a series of lesser shrines for other divinities, all forming a group of sacred buildings within the area. The area is usually enclosed by a wall with gates, which are often most elaborate, and where the pillars and pales stand about it, and it is often decorated with flags and streamers. It is interesting also to notice how frequently with the change of a religion the old sacred places and successive buildings occupy the old site, or the same temple serves for new deities.


1 Jos. B. V., v., And. xvi. 51; Mishnah, br. Middod.
TEUTONIC RELIGION


J. A. MacCulloch.


TEN COMMANDMENTS.—See Deuteronomy.

TENDAI.—See Philosophy (Japanese).

TERAPHIM.—See Images and Idols (Hebrew).

TEUTONIC RELIGION.—1. INTRODUCTION.—2. Position of the Teutonic peoples.—We have no detailed information (and indeed little historic evidence of any kind) relating to the Teutonic peoples before the time of Julius Caesar (58 B.C.). For the first one and a half centuries A.D., however, a comparatively large amount of evidence is obtainable. During this time the area occupied extended from the Rhine to the Vistula. From the Roman empire it was separated by the rivers Rhine and Danube and by a fortified line connecting these two rivers. On the north and southeast of the Teutonic area cannot be determined with any precision—the plain of Hungary was occupied largely by Sarmatian peoples, but it seems probable that the Teutonic peoples extended into the basin of the river Dnieper. In the north they undoubtedly occupied the kingdom of Denmark and considerable portions of the Scandinavian peninsula.

From the 3rd to the 6th century, the Teutonic peoples extended their dominions considerably to the south, east, south, and west. The Goths conquered a large portion of S. Russia, and from about 339 to 270 the Romans had to give up to them their territory of Dacia (north of the Lower Danube); moreover, about the same time the Alamanni entered the Black Forest region. During the 4th century, bands of warriors, in ever-increasing numbers, began to enter the Roman service, and towards the close of the 4th century the Teutonic peoples, of which the most important were: (1) Visigoths, who occupied Spain and Spain after 418; (2) Ostrogoths, who occupied Italy, 489-553; (3) Vandals, who crossed the Rhine in 406, and in 429 passed over into Africa, which they held for over 100 years; (4) Burgundians, who crossed the Rhine shortly after the Vandals and in 443 occupied S. France; (5) Alamanni, who went into Alsace and Switzerland about the same time; (6) Bavarians, who occupied the Alpine regions farther east, probably about the same date; (7) Franks, who conquered and occupied successively one part after another of Gaul from 428 onwards, becoming supreme by their victory over the Visigoths in 507; (8) Langobardi, who, after occupying for some time the part of Italy now known as Austria and the Alpine regions to the south, passed into Italy about 668 and brought the greater part of the peninsula under their dominion; (9) English, who conquered and occupied most of the southern half of Britain from about the middle of the 5th century onwards.

Before the end of the 8th century, a new series of movements began among the Northern peoples, an activity almost entirely maritime and lasting throughout the 9th and 10th centuries; this period was commonly known as the Viking Age. While it lasted, large numbers of piratical adventurers settled on the coasts of the Scottish islands, of Ireland, of the Netherlands, and of N. France. The last named, occupied by the Vikings under the leadership of Hrothgar, son of Rognvald, officer of Harold the Fair-haired, king of Norway, because after 911 the earldom of Normandy. From 886 onwards a large part of England too came under Scandinavian rule, though this domination was only temporary. In 970, however, those Norwegian chieftains who were unwilling to accept the sovereignty of Harold the Fair-haired began permanently to settle in Iceland, and more than 100 years later, in 985, Greenland was colonized from Iceland. Contemporaneously with these events were similar movements in the Baltic, probably emanating mainly from Sweden. The establishment of the Russian kingdom (traditional date 859) was due to such bands of adventurers. In the East we hear of raids by parties of Scandinavians as far as the Caspian.

2. The Conversion of the Teutonic peoples.—As conversion was in general due to direct contact with the Romans, we find those Teutonic peoples first converted to were settled within the territories of the empire. Before the middle of the 4th century the conversion of the Goths by Wulfilas to the Arian form of the Christian religion had begun and was practically the sole mission of the next generation. From them this religion must have spread very rapidly to the Gepide in E. Hungary and to other neighbouring peoples, since the Vandals appear to have been converted by the missionaries sent to their country by King Theodebert I. (572-584); the Arians at the beginning of the 6th century, and the English in the 7th were converted to Catholicism. It was due largely to the efforts of Irish and English missionaries that between the 6th and 7th centuries the Christian religion reached the Continent (except the Danes), viz. Alamanni, Bavarians, Old Saxons, and Frisians, were converted. In the 8th century, after great difficulty Charlemagne enforced the adoption of Christianity throughout the territory of the Old Saxons who had been conquered by him. Among the Danes and the Swedes missionary enterprises met with some temporary success, especially in the 9th century. During the 9th and 10th centuries the Danish kings, Harald II and his brothers (960-975) were Christians, but the country was very little affected till the time of Olaf Tryggvason (995-1000), to whom conversion was really due. Many of the Scandinavians settled in the British Isles were converted before the close of the 9th century, and these countries had become entirely Christian in the course of the 10th century. Some of the early settlers of Iceland had been converted to Christianity in the British Isles, but it was abandoned by their descendants and not established in the island till 1000. The traditional date of the establishment of Christianity in Sweden was 1063 but it was only towards the close of the 11th century that the heathen religion was entirely abolished. The adoption of Christianity by the Romans dates from 883.

3. Authorities.—(1) The little information which we possess relating to the religion of the Teutonic peoples during the period before their invasion of Roman territories in the 4th century is derived from the writings of Cassiodorus—especially from his Gallicanae originum, written in the 6th century. Some little evidence is also furnished by Roman inscriptions. Still less information is to be obtained from the period during which the Teutonic peoples living on the Continent were converted, though a few scattered notices are preserved in the writings of Ammianus Marcellinus (late 4th century), of Jordanes (6. 660), and especially of Propertius (about the same
date). In the 8th and 9th centuries a little evidence is to be derived from laws and capitularies in which heathen practices are prohibited, and survivals of heathen practices are commonly mentioned in the writings of a much later date. The mythological authors of the 7th and 8th centuries, on the other hand, are Greek and Latin, in the 7th mainly Latin, and in the 8th both Greek and Latin. On Gothic, with whom the connection to us is of Langobardic and connected with Norse times in the Origo gentis Langobardorum, an anonymous work dating probably from the 7th century, we have nothing at all. There is, in the 8th and 9th centuries, a gradual development of the world of heathen mythology, and the works of art which have come down to us is of Langobardic origin and connected with Norse times in the Origo gentis Langobardorum. The earliest of these are in Latin and date probably from the 4th century.

(2) England. England contains most of the evidence available, which is the little, is contained in the writings of Bede (735), who in the *Chronicles* attached to the *De Eoatim Temporibus* of St. Chad at the end of the 10th century. The earliest of these is the *De Excidio et Confligatione Britonum* (c. 1090), much of the information in which is obtained from Icelandic sources. Bede himself acknowledges this in his reference to the men of *Thurgesio*.

Their stories, which are stocked with attestations of historical events, are in the main preserving, and have woven together a small portion of the present work by following their narratives.

Some important evidence from earlier times is also to be obtained from inscriptions and sculptured monuments of the heathen period.

(4) Norway and Iceland. (a) For the religion of Norway and Iceland, we have the *RUNES* from runic inscriptions. No other large body of evidence from the Icelandic sagas, the evidence of which varies greatly in value. First in importance are the *Indingsagir* (*Stories of the People of the North*), which probably date from the 13th century, though a few may be slightly older. These are based on oral sagas—stories preserved by tradition in a more or less fixed form of words—from the latter part of the 10th and early 11th centuries. Among these special mention may be made of the *Ynglingasaga*, *Volsunga Saga*, *Forsauwaga Saga*, and *Grímnismál*. These sagas are written in a style which is distinctly Norse, and are entirely Norse in origin.

The above account of Norse mythology is given in Snorri Sturluson's *Edda*. The Edda, as we shall see below, is a collection of poems which numbers several thousand lines. The text is divided into two parts, the *Prose Edda* and the *Poetic Edda*. The *Prose Edda* contains a number of stories and poems which are not found in any other collection, and which are not included in the *Poetic Edda*. The *Poetic Edda* contains a number of poems which are found in other collections, but which are not found in the *Prose Edda*. The *Prose Edda* contains a number of poems which are not found in any other collection, and which are not included in the *Poetic Edda*. The *Prose Edda* contains a number of stories and poems which are not found in any other collection, and which are not included in the *Poetic Edda*.
represented as having eight legs in Norse mythology, and we find a clear representation of such a horse on an engraved monument at Tjängvide, Götländ. The riding valkyrjur too (one of the most picturesque conceptions of Norse mythology) might well have been recorded as the creation of Norwegian poetry, had we not met with the same conception on a Swedish inscription at Röök; indeed with great probability it may be traced also in Anglo-Saxon jewels are associated with Friyja, apparently as her guardian, points in this direction.

Another difficulty which confronts the student is that at first sight there appears to be an irreconcilable discrepancy between the account of Norse mythology given by Snorri and the references to religious beliefs and observances recorded in the Æltestas Sögur. The former represents Othin as the chief and most important god of the Norse pantheon; and the early poems of the Edda and of the skalds agree with this representation. The Æltestas Sögur, on the other hand, scarcely records a single instance of worship of Othin. In them Thor is by far the most prominent deity, and after him Freyja. It is only in the Fornaldar Sögur and in the other sagas relating to the legendary period that we find Othin prominent. The explanation of this fact is probably that the worship of Othin did not exist to the same extent among the different classes of the population; the former was the god of the royal families and of their military followers, while the latter was the god of the free population in Iceland. Kingship never existed in Iceland, and very few settlers appear to have been of royal blood, and consequently the god of this class of society, though still celebrated in poetry, does not seem to have received any actual worship.

Lastly, one characteristic of Norse mythology may doubtless be accounted for by the fact that so much of our information is drawn from Iceland. In peculiar contrast to the mythologies of other peoples, the Norse deities are not associated with particular localities, and herein no student can fail to contrast Norse and Greek mythologies. Freyja indeed is traditionally associated with Uppland, and there are indications which connect Gýf with Sjælland; but these instances are rare. The homes of the gods mentioned in the Edda poems—Breidhöllur, the home of Balder, Hlíðar, the home of Heimdallr, etc.—seem to be purely mythical. Some evidence is to be found in place-names, however, that various deities were connected with localities in Norway, Sweden, and Iceland; and also with districts in other Teutonic lands. The reason for this comparative absence of local association is obviously to be found in the fact that by their emigration the colonists were cut off from the ancient sanctuaries of their race.

II. GODS, SPIRITS, AND MYTHICAL BEINGS.

Since Norse literature offers an abundance of material for the study of its mythology and religion, it seems almost unnecessary to say, as the basis of any description of Teutonic mythology and religion. In the following account under each heading an attempt will be made to show also how far the testimony available for the mythology of the Teutonic peoples is corroborative or discordant. In the first place, it is convenient to distinguish between (1) beings essentially mythical and (2) beings or phenomena in themselves natural, but regarded mythologically.

1. BEINGS ESSENTIALLY MYTHICAL.—This class consists of the following: (a) Nòsar (sing. nòs), and mòsr (sing. mòsm), (b) jòtar (sing. jóturnn), (c) dèorvar (sing. dèorvur), (d) norvar (sing. norr), (e) valkyrjur (sing. valkyjrj), (f) fylgjur (sing. fylglj), (g) landsvettir, (h) such impersonal conceptions as Heimdallr’s ash.

1 Cf. Du Chaillu, The Viking Age, I. 58.
2 Cf. Ynglings Saga.
3 Cf. Bragi, 1.
4 Cf. Ynglings Saga.
5 The story of the relationship of the two sets of gods is told most fully in Ynglings Saga, 4. There had been a war between them, which was eventually settled by an exchange of hostages. Njóthr and his children were given as hostages to the Æsir, and Æsir accompanied by Njóthr was sent as a pledge to the Æsir. This story, in part at least, is known to early poetry. In Futhark, 31, it is suggested that the Æsir were successful, while in Ynglingsmál, 30, we are told that Njóthr had been given as hostage to the Æsir, and that he would return home to the Æsir at the next Ragnarök.

Apart from the Æsir the divine mythology is confined to the Æsir, in which term all the gods collectively are included. With them there are goddesses, known comprehensively as døyer, the chief of whom is Frigg, wife of Æsir. Often Freyja of the Æsir is included with them.

Besides the Æsir and the Æsir, we find two deities who belong to neither class and who are never brought into connexion with the Norse pantheon, viz., Thórr and Ægir. Their worship was very important in Norway during the last years of the heathen age, especially under Earl Hákon of Lathar, who ruled from 935 to 965, and who was specially devoted to their cult. Of myths connected with them we have no mention in Norse literature except what is apparently a confused reminiscence in Skuli Sigmundsson, 45. Their story is told only by Saxo, who says that Ægir (Thorgerth) is the daughter of Cúse (i.e. Gussi), king of the Lapps, and wife of Helgi, the eponymous hero of Helgaland. It is generally believed that these deities were venerated throughout, and their character is Finnish (Lappish) rather than Norse.

Under the lordship of Æsir the gods form an organized community, which is evidently modelled on the fashion of the ancient Scandinavian community. They have a council of twelve, whose duty it is to keep up the sacrifices, to deliberate on the conduct of the country, and to judge between man and man. Councils and meetings are found in many early Scandinavian countries, and there can be little doubt that in heathen times they had religious as well as judicial functions. In Grímnismál, the gods are said to meet daily at Yggdrasill’s ash. From the same poem we learn that each of the gods had a home of his own, the names of which are apparently mythical and generally adapted to the character of the god, Breidhöllur for Balder, Alþeðr named as a tooth gift (at tannfr) to Freyja, etc. The most frequently mentioned is Æsir’s home of Valhöll (‘the hall of the slain’), where he, together with the valkyries, entertains hosts of slain warriors, who pass their days in combat and their nights in feasting. In Yggdrasill, 23, some verses are quoted indicating that Njóthr loves living by the sea-shore, while his wife Sál, daughter of Thjazi, a jòtunn, prefers to dwell in her father’s home, the mountains. Wherefore a compact is made by which they divide their time between the two places—Njóthr’s home is called here

1 Cf. Grímnismál, 30, 51; Grímnismál, 17.
2 Cf. Grímnismál, 6.
3 Heimdallr’s father is not mentioned, but he is said to be the son of nine mothers, whose names are enumerated in the closing stanza of Ḟyndiljáth.
4 See art. Ge (Teutonic).
5 Tr. G. Elson, p. 97 ff.
The association of Freyr with Upsala does not belong to this category. Besides their individual homes, the gods collectively are said to inhabit Asgard. Their meeting-place is called Yelta-olir. In Óðin's saga, the Æsir and Vanir are in agreement about the war when the Wæterns met in a forest clearing. The significance of this (together with Yggdrasil's ash and the fact that évir originally meant 'wood') is seen below, § 17.

A totally different account of the gods is given by Snorri, curiously enough, in the early chapters of Ynglingsaga. Here they are represented as dying and being succeeded in the leadership of the gods by Ívarr, whose reign was marked by prosperity and peace. The latter on his death was succeeded by his son Freyr, whose reign was that of the same character. Freyr was succeeded by his sister Freyja, and she in turn by Frey's son, grandsons, etc., who are no longer represented as gods. This story is no doubt of denotive origin, but the association of Freyr with Upsala is ancient and traditional. In Saxo he is represented as instituting the earliest sacrifices and is said to be the ancestor of certain Swedish warriors. Ynglingsaga itself is largely based on an ancient poem Ynglinga, which traces the ancestry of the ancient Norwegian royal family through the Swedes to Frey, who is no doubt to be identified with Frisco of Adam of Bremen's account.

There are many stories relating the appearances of the gods to men. These occur most frequently in the Péturaka Saga, and the deity most mentioned is Óthin.

(b) Danish and Swedish. On examining non-Norse sources, we find a number of the Norse gods mentioned by Saxo, including Woden (Othin), Freyr, Frigg, and Óller (Ulir), as well as Balder and Hoder (Höðr), who, however, are by him represented as demi-god and human being respectively. It is not always clear how far Saxo draws on contemporary sources, but there can be little doubt that these deities were known to him from Danish tradition. Freyr is constantly associated with Upasla and Sweden, and Saxo is also the only author who gives the story of Óller (Ulir). With Óthin, the home of the gods is sometimes called Byzantium, which apparently is used to translate Asgard.

With regard to Swedish beliefs, we have important evidence in Adam of Bremen's description of the sanctuary at Upsala. This contained the images of three gods, Thor, Woden (i.e. Óthin), and a deity Frisco, who is in all probability to be identified with Frey. No story of the deities is, however, recorded from Sweden. In much earlier times we have a short account of the religion of the people of Thule (i.e. Scandinavia) written by Procopius, who says that only deity specially mentioned by him is Ares, and it is not clear whether by this name we are to understand Óthin or Wotan. An early trace of worship of Freyr may be preserved in the name Freyn(n)—the god among the Wargi of N. E. Holstein.

(c) English. —For the mythology of the heathen English we have little or no information except that to be obtained from names. The A.S. word òos, corresponding to the O.N. Òes, occurs as the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet (though here apparently its meaning is forgotten). It also is to be found very frequently in personal names, as in Óswald, and the plural form occurs only in the genitive òes in an A.S. charm. The form òés- does not occur, except rarely in personal names—e.g., Wanraed—unless this is the possible origin of the prefix òes- in òessec (‘epileptic’).

1 Gyf. 24
5 See art. Gás (Celtic.)
6 Gothic War, II, 15.
7 Cl. Helmodt's, Chron. Saxonicum, 153, 73, 86.
8 These are represented, str. 68, Gústav der thronenden der einsteins, Poesie, ed. K. P. Wülcher, Leipzig, 1883-90, 1, p. 215.

Othin's name also is preserved—A. S. Woden— as the ancestor of all the royal families except that of Essex, which traces its genealogy to a Certain Ótain. His name is mentioned in the ‘Wednesdays’, (as translation of ‘Mercurius’). Þunor (O. N. Thor) is known only from ‘Thursday’, (where his name is used to translate ‘Jupiter’), and from certain place-names, e.g., Thunresleah and Thunresfeld.

The name of Fri (i.e. Frigg) is preserved only in ‘Friday’ (as translation of ‘Venus’), and Ti (Týg) (O. N. Tyr) occurs in ‘Týsdraca’ as translation of ‘Mars,’ and, like Òs, is the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet. His name is preserved also in ‘Tuesday’. In Bede's account of the heathen English calendar two months (corresponding to March and April) are said to derive their names from goddesses called Rheda (Rêd) and Eostre (Eotre). The existence of these deities has been doubted by some modern writers. We also find a reference, in a charm which appears to be a mixture of Christian and heathen beliefs, to Òma (‘Mother of Earth’), with which we may compare Samse Mafl (Leiftis).

Lastly, mention may be made of Ing, the name of one of the letters in the Runic alphabet. In the verses dealing with Òing he is said to have been seen first among the East Danes, but afterwards he went over the sea, his ear being speeded by him.

(d) German. —With regard to German mythology, a fragment relating to gods is preserved in one of the Mersburg charms, in which he is said to have ridden to the forest when the portion of the latter's horse was dislocated. Various deities tried by their incantations to put it right, but none succeeded. The names of Wodan and his sister Volla, and Sinthgund and her sister Sunna. The only other myth recorded occurs in certain Langoardic writings and is rather striking.

The two tribes of Vandal and Langobard (then called Wiminel) appealed to the gods for victory in their war with each other. The Vandal approached Wodon, who replied: “Whoever I shall first look upon when the sun rises, them will I give victory.” The Wiminel appealed to Frig, wife of Woden, who gave counsel that as soon as the wiminesol of the Wiminel should come with their husbands and let down their hair about their faces, like beards, the gods would be appeased, women, he said: “Who are these Longbeards!” And Frig replied: “As thou hast given them a name give them also victory.” And he gave them victory.

Apart from these references, the gods are known from the names of the weeks: Donar (O. N. Thor); A. S. Thunor) throughout the German area; Fris (Frigg, Frír) at least in the greater part of Germanic area; Wodan (Othin, Woden) only in the northwest and in Holland; Ti (Ti, Tír) only in the south-west. Occasional references to the gods are also found in lives of missionary saints. Thus the worship of Wodan among the Alamanni is mentioned in John's Life of Columbanus, while in other cases German deities are no doubt intended by old names such as Jupitier. In a formation used for baptism and commonly supposed to have come from the region of the Old Saxons (though the language is rather peculiar) the convert is required to adjure Wodan and Thunor and Saxnot together with other monsters (Unhoden) associated with them. This Saxnot is doubtless to be identified with the name that stands at the head of the genealogy of Essek. Lastly, in Aeluin's Life of St. Willibrord we hear of a god called Fesite. He was worshipped on a certain island, called after him and identified

2 Cf. Thundersleigh in Essex and Thundersfield in Surrey.
3 Cf. ‘Pulls’ of Norse mythology.
4 Origo gentis Langobardorum.
by Adam of Bremen with Halogaland.¹ Grimm and others have identified this deity with Forsete, the son of Balder,² last discrepancies in the spelling of the two names offer difficulty.

In Gothic no names of deities have been preserved, unless we place in this category the name of the rune letter Enguz (A.S. Ing). The word anaiz, however (O.N. æsir), is mentioned by Jordanes in a curiously interesting connexion. He states that the Goths called their chiefs by names analogous to whose good fortune they thought they owed their victory.

'Ron purose hem sed saemde id est ans.'³ In earlier times Tacitus,⁴ though unfortunately he seldom mentions Teutonic gods by their native names, does mention Mars and Mercurius among the deities of the Germans, and in the Germanic specially mentions Mercurius as the deity most worshiped by them. There can be no doubt that the deities mentioned are the later Zin and Wodan (N. Tir and Othin). In ch. 9 he mentions Hercules and in Annals, i. 12, a grove sacred to him. It is not so easy to ascertain the identity of this deity. Soce, however, modern writers believe Dorn (O.N. Thorr, A.S. Thunor) to be intended; others think the reference is to a tribal deity.⁵ In the same chapter Tacitus states that some of the Suevi worshiped with the symbol of a ship. Here again we are left in doubt as to the nature of the deity. Perhaps we may include the 'tempulum Tamfama' mentioned in Annals, i. 51, and 'Iucum quen Baduhamne vacant' in iv. 73, if these be the names of deities.

In a Norse grove in which Cætor and Pollux are worshiped under the name of deities. The full account, however, of a Teutonic deity is that of Nethurs,⁶ who was worshiped by certain maritime peoples. Including the English and whose sanctuary was situated on an island, the position of which is not clearly stated by Tacitus but is probably to be placed in the S.W. Baltic. It is to be observed that the name Nethurs is identical with the O.N. Njöðr, and, in spite of the difference in sex, we need scarcely doubt their original identity. Rites similar to those which Tacitus describes in connexion with Nethurs are associated with Freyr, son of Njöðr.

Apart from Tacitus, practically the only references to Teutonic deities occur in inscriptions upon altars raised by soldiers in the Roman army. Besides Mars, these inscriptions sometimes record a deity Nehalennia with the prow of a ship, and this may possibly be connected with the grove already referred to with the Island of Tacitus. In the introduction to Germ. 2 Tacitus states that in their ancient poems the Germans traced the origin of their race to a god called Tisico ('god of the ships'). He was Manus ('man', and he again had three sons from whom three groups of peoples were named and descended. Ingsevones (or Ingsevi), Brumjones, Isaevones. These group-names are mentioned also by Finny the Elder, and a genealogy of the kind classifying Teutonic and other peoples is found in Morowington times. We have no trace of the ancestors of any god or hero called Isico. Gebh, and it is some slight evidence for an Irmin. The name Ingsevones (or Ingsevi) is undoubtedly to be connected with A.S. Ing, who is associated in tradition with the Danes and with the title Ingsevones. Used in Benno's of the king of the Danes. It is further to be noticed that in Norse the god Freyr and his descendants sometimes bear the title Yngvi, the full name of the god being Yngvi-Frey or Ingmar-Frey. His descendants—among the kings of Sweden—are known collectively as Ynglingar. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy between Norse and English tradition, the former connecting the name with Denmark, the latter with Denmark. Whatever may be the explanation of this, the association of the word with Frey, the son of Njöðr, seems to point to some connexion with the worship of Njöðr—a conclusion which is confirmed by the fact that the Tacitus, with whom Finny is substantially in agreement, describes Ingsevones as 'proximal ocean.'

2. Jötnar.—(a) Norse.—Giants or monsters play an important part in the stories of Norse mythology. When viewed collectively, they are called jötnar. For instance, we have the grímnir ('frost-giants') and bergrisar ('cliff-giants'). Most often, however, they appear singly, and the corresponding feminine form of the word jötna is gygr. Unlike the æsir, they do not appear to form an organized community as a whole, though sometimes individual jötnar (like Thrym,¹ Lord of the dead) were venerated in the several monasteries under their dominion. The home of the giants is known as Jötnheim, lying, according to early story, far to the north-east, remote from Asgard, the home of the æsir. The general characteristics of the giants were huge form and superhuman strength.

The story of Skyrminn¹ tells dramatically how huge and strong a giant was conceived to be by the gods. For the god Thor took refuge one night in the thumb of one of his groves, and, when he attempted to kill the giant with a blow of his hammer, proceeded to bind its hands and feet, and when the god Thor took refuge one night in the thumb of one of his groves, and, when he attempted to kill the giant with a blow of his hammer, proceeded to bind its hands and feet, and

Although the giants may have had monster shapes, it seems clear that sometimes the giantesses were deemed very beautiful, as in the case of Gerthu, to whose radiant beauty Freyr lost his heart.

It is necessary to distinguish between anthropomorphic and theriomorphic giants. Although difficult to draw a definite line between them e.g., Lokhi has theriomorphic children. Many of the former class are mentioned in myth, the best known being Thrym, Hymir, Hrungr, Geirröth, and Thjalbi, all of whom fight with Thor, and are slain by him. Sometimes the jötnar are on friendly terms with the æsir: Brykko, a giantess, attended Baldr's funeral, and was allowed to have a share of the ashes through a appeal to her strength that the funeral ship was able to be launched. Further, we find a number of marriages between gods and giants: Njöðr married Skati, the daughter of Thjalbi,² Freyr married Gerthu, daughter of Gymr; and even Thor, despite his general reputation, married the giantess Sif, who was, for his home, Jan-Saxa. This giantess, with others, including the daughter of Geirröth, appears as the mother of Bialatini in Hymiskvitha, but this part of the story (Fotoph Hafsd) is commonly believed to be a late composition. The giants too are often presented as wanting. For instance, when Thjalbi carries off Hildum, and Freyja was saved for by Thjalbi. It may here be mentioned that anthropomorphic giants often had their hare's fur, and so the form of animal. In the incident referred to above Thjalbi assumes the form of an eagle, and in Vafthræmudla, 37, the wind-demon Bjarvægl is described as a jötna in the shape of an eagle.

Although the giants are presumably gifted with tremendous physical strength, they are not always lacking in intelligence, for we have the incident of Othin's visit to the giant Vafthrænirn in order to learn of his store of wisdom.

The chief theriomorphic jötnar are the Mithgarthorinur, or Jornundagardr, the home of those who are born of the sea, both of whom together with Hel are said to be the offspring of Lokhi and the giantess Angrboða ('she who bodes distress'). Mithgarthorinur is represented in Gelzaeg as a place with walls, gates, and a defensive serpent stretching round the earth. In Hymiskviða, 23, Thor goes fishing and catches it on his hook. Fenrisulfur is a wolf which the gods succeed after great difficulty in fettering, though not until he has bitten off Tyr's hand, which has been placed in the mouth as a pledge of the good faith of the gods.² At the end of the world he will burst his bonds and attack the gods in conjunction with Mithgarthorinur, Lokhi, Surtr (a fire-demon), Hurngr, and Frey, among other monsters. Although usually found in the company of the æsir, it would seem that Lokhi belonged to the jötnar. Here also we should perhaps mention Týr, also called Elur, a man being, who is on friendly terms with the gods and visits them.³ From Íslendinga Sögur, ii. 17, it seems clear that he was the son of Fornjor, and in Hymiskviða, 1, ² he is described as a 'cliff-dweller', an epithet which is elsewhere synonymous with jötna. His wife is called Rau, ¹ Cf. Gyf. 45. ² According to Hilagjaf, she was later also the wife of Othin.

³ Cf. Gyf. 34. ⁴ Cf. Loksaves (prose introduction); Bragærothu, 55.
and is said to have a net in which she catches all who pass under it. There is a suggestion too from the story in Frothsöga Saga, 6, that a man fearing death by drowning would do well to carry gold on his person in order to be received well in the halls of Bálr.

Apart from mythological works monsters are not infrequently mentioned both in the Íslendinga Sögu and in sagas of the kings, as well as in the Forseta Saga. They are usually called ríttir or jötnar.

As we may refer to the two demons (male and female) at Stand Hugrur in the north of Iceland encountered by Grettir, the female demon who at Stand Merchant in a cave in the mountains of Iceland; and the monster Brúl and his mother in the form of a black cat encountered by Ömr Storfrósh in the Saga of Old Trjóggøs.

In these Forseta Sögu which deal with the north of Norway, viz. Kvitl Saga Haenga and Grímma Saga Lóthlóksa, monsters are frequently mentioned. It may be noticed that ThorgerÐur HólgaburÞr once appears among them, and Saxo's Danish History abounds with such stories. Tales like these recall Procopius's remark: 'The yews are more the abode of Thule. . . worshiping gods and demons in heaven and in air and in sea and certain other deities which are said to be in the waters of springs and rivers.'

As we have said the house of Mimir. His story is given in Yfingsaga Saga, 4, where the seer send him with Hoenir as pledge. Othinn then says he will cut off his head and return it to the seer. Othinn then smears himself with gold to preserve his head. When he is cut off his head and returned to the seer, it is found that under the roots of Yggdrasil's ash is Mimir's spring, which is hidden in the darkness and the darkness.

It is perhaps to their connection with rocks that the word for earth is 'deygr-dýgr.' In Norse literature this word is used to denote a great rock, viz. deygr-hagr.

On most occasions the dwarfs appear in human form, though small, in Íslendinga Sagas. The shape of a dwarf is described in this form by Luth, who describes the purpose. It is from him that Loki gets the gold required to ransom himself and his companions, Othinn and Hoenir, from Broaðharn, and this incident afterwards plays an important part in the Yfingsaga. Andart withdraws into the stone and curses all who shall possess the gold.

Possibly, too, 'Mimingus, sylvanar satyrs' mentioned by Saxo are associated with dwarfs, and possibly this Miming is identical with Vóðar or Völand, the most famous of all smiths.

The word corresponding to O.N. deygr is to be found in all languages of the Téutonic peoples extant. O.H.G. züggr, A.S. duerga. In A.S. literature we find a charm against a dwarf. Dwarfs also figure in German folk-lore. Thus in the Seyfriedlaithe the treasure which the hero won after killing the dragon belonged in reality to some dwarfs, sons of Njóting.

4. Alfarr. — For these see art. Demons and Spríthr (Téutonic), vol. iv. p. 634.

5. Norðr. — For these see art. Doon, Doon Mitrus (Téutonic).

6. Valkyjurr. — (a) Norse. — Valkyries, or 'choosers of the slain,' were supernatural maidens sent by Othinn to determine the course of battles and to choose warriors for Valholl. They are also known as valkyrjar, skaldomyrjar, and skyrmeyrjar, and in Íslendinga Saga, 31, the phrase is not an interpretation; they are called valkyrjar by the Edda. In Grímsnœdlit's work he mentions them mainly to one aspect of the valkyrjar—their duties in Valholl, for Othinn is represented as being in the poem as crying to his maidens to bear him the ale as they do to the einherjar, when they are feasting in the hall. Here we have the names of thirteen Valkyries given.

Snorri's interest in this stanza from Grímsnœdlit's work, expanding it in prose and adding that Othinn sends these maidens to battle. He specially mentions.

1 For Ymir, the primal giant out of whose flesh the world was made, see Cosmogony and Cosmology (Téutonic).

2 Grímsnœdlit, ch. 65.

3 Saga of Old Trjóggœs (Íslendinga Saga), 152.

4 Véðsœgal, 15 (from Yfingsaga, 29).

5 Gylf, 15 (drawn from Yfingsaga, 29).

6 Gylf, 15 (drawn from Yfingsaga, 29).

7 Íslendinga Saga, 15; also Hervarar Saga, 2.

8 See Art. Demons and Spríthr (Téutonic), vol. iv. p. 638.

9 Snorri Sturluson, Heimskringla (Íslendinga Saga, 15).
Guthr, Rosta, and Skuld, the youngest norn, as undertaking the work. It is this function of the Valkyries that the poet of Völsunga deals with in str. 31 of the poem. He gives us a picture of a band of Valkyries, six in number and named, equipped and ready to ride into battle, with their arms to help other fighters. In Norse literature we learn that they were seen riding through the air and over the sea ('lógr ok lógi'), white and shining with their helmets, shields, and spears—a splendid company of maiden-warriors. With the Valkyries may perhaps be compared the Slavic conception of the Ríða, who was thought to ride a seven-year-old stag and bridle him with snakes. The characteristic, attributed to her by the Slavs, of disemboguing fatal darts at men while in the air is especially interesting when compared with a similar reference in an A.S. charm.

Other Valkyries, who became the wives and lovers of heroes, and are represented as human in origin, although included by Othin among his battle-maidsens, are mentioned below. From a story in Saxo we hear of maidens called 'nymphae sylvestres,' who seem to be Valkyries. Hoderus (O.N. Bilgar), the enemy of Balder, was hunting in a wood when he was met by a maiden who was greeted by certain wood-maidsens. She told him that it was their lot to dispose of the remnants of war and that often they secretly assisted their friends in battle, and gained for them the victory. Since the Valkyries were so closely bound up with the fate of warriors and the issue of battles, it is clear that they cannot be entirely dissociated from the norns. The close relationship between the two conceptions is clearly seen in the poem given in Njáls Saga, 158.

Moreover, in Gylf. 36 Skuld, the 'youngest norn,' is included among the Valkyries. In contrast with the norns, however, the Valkyries are in Norse mythology associated chiefly with Othin, whose messengers they are, though in one passage quoted from Saxo they seem to assist Hoderus, who is an enemy of the gods.

In the accompanying prose account of certain Durmt people saw women riding twelve to a bower, and, looking within, they saw that they had set up a loud battle. They recognized the Ríða, then, and marvelled at the serpent which lay between the horse and the sword. The word 'skald' is not mentioned in the latter example, but there can be little doubt that the lines refer to them.

(c) German. In German the word does not occur, though the idea does in the Merseburg charm, where they are called diži. They are represented as fastening bonds, holding back the host, and tugging at the fetters.

7. Peggar. For these see art. Soul (Teutonic).

8. Landv defeat. Just as the fylgjar preserved the individual, so the landvdeut preserved over the country as its tutelary spirits. A certain number of references are to be found to them in Norse literature, not the least interesting being the references mentioned in the Landnámabók, iv. 7, which ordered that figure-heads of ships were to be removed on approaching the island, lest they should frighten the landvdeut with their 'yawn heads and gaping mouths.' In Egil's Saga, 57, Egill turns a curse against the landvdeut of Norway in order to force them to drive away King Erík and Queen Gummírh, from whom he was fleecing. Sometimes landvdeut seem to favour certain individuals. It was the case with Björn, the he-goat whom they accompanied to the assembly, while his brothers were accompanied by them when hunting and fishing.

The landvdeut seem not always to be very clearly distinguished from the fylgjar of individuals; e.g., in the Saga of Olaf Tryggvason (Heimskringla), 36, it seems to be suggested that the landvdeut of Iceland seen by the wizard are connected in some way with the great gods of the land. The word vaettir (pl. vaettir) is identical with A.S. wëht, 'creature,' etc., although the latter has not the specialized meaning of Old Norse. For the idea itself we may refer to the genus tecii of the Romans.

9. Yggdrasils' ash. — Our information for Yggdrasil's ash is mainly derived from Völsunga, 19, 20, 27, and Grímnismál, 29-30. References also occur in Fjölsvinnsndli, 13-18. From Völsunga we learn that the ash Yggdrasil stands ever green over the well of Úrðr ('Fate'), and that it falls into the well, Bifrost, and to each and every of the three. In Grímnismál not only do we learn that the acer go daily to the judgment-seat under the ash, but we are given many details about its appearance.

In Gylf. 36 Snorri adds that in the spring of Úrðr dwelt two swans, from whom are sprung all birds of that race, and also from the branches of the ash dump a sort called 'lögk of the bees feed. The ash is sometimes called Yggdrasill, Ask Yggdrasila, Láðrathr, Mjótvithr, and Mimaethr, seem to be names for the same tree. In both Grímnismál and Fjölsvinsnndli we have indications that the ash is being gradually destroyed: a hart bites it from above, it rots in its side, and Níðhöggr gnaws it from beneath. And. According to Völsunga, 47 f., when the last days come, it will shiver and crumble. The ash itself is described as hanging on the tree of which no one knows from whose roots it proceeds.

A similar conception to that of a world-tree is certainly to be found among other Teutonic peoples—e.g., among the Old Saxons, who worshipped the Irmensil. Several features in Adam of Bremen's description of the tree beside the temple of Upsala also recall Yggdrasill's ash.

10. Natural things viewed mythologically. — 1. Day and night. — From references in Fylgráðhinsmndli, 13, 35, Night, the daughter of Níðr, is depicted as driving across the sky her chariot and horse Hrímfaxi, from whose bit falls the spume which makes the dew in the valleys. Of Day we are only told that he is born of Dellingr.

In Gylf. 10 Snorri gives further genealogical details. The celestial region, 30 f., is given a list of names by which Night is known among the gods and gods. In the document Hverrei Noregr Bygsthi we find a genealogy traced back to Swan the Red, son of Dagr, son of Dellingr, and of Sól, daughter of Mundilfari. For the peculiar date of Night and Day, we may compare

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1 Cf. Landnámabók, ii. 12. 2 Cf. Skáldskaparmál, 36. 3 Cf. skáld. 134 to Adam of Bremen. 4 See art. Sökn, Mose, and Swans (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).
Greek mythology, especially the allusions to the chariots of the Sun and the Moon. For these see art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

3. Rainbow.—To the old Norse people the rainbow was the bridge built by the gods to span the space between earth and heaven. Bifröst or Ásbrót was its name, and it was triple-hued. Though it was made with cunning and of great strength, Snorri tells that the day will come when it will be broken. This bridge is referred to as Bifröst in the Elder Edda, though it is not explicitly identified with the rainbow. In Gylf. 27 Heimdallr is named as guarding it against the frost and cliff giants.

4. Winds and seasons.—In Vafthruthnismál, 27, 37, references are made to the winds and seasons. The winds, according to the poet, arise from beneath the wings of the giant Hraunegul who sits at the end of heaven in the likeness of an eagle. In Vafthr. 27 Vindsvarl is said to be the father of Winter and Svæðförðr of Summer. In Gylf. 18 f. Snorri goes further and explains that the difference between Summer and Winter is to be accounted for by the difference of parentage, for each has inherited the disposition of his father.

5. Thor.—In the preceding paragraphs we have been dealing with mythological conceptions which are scarcely distinguished from the natural bodies or phenomena which have given rise to them. There can be no doubt, howev.
said to have complained that the Swedes blamed him for bad weather. Nor was it peculiar to the North. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, xxviii. 5. 14, it was customary among the Burgundians to depose their kings in time of famine and to prevent a military disaster.

II. The dead.—Norse literature shows by constant reference that to the dead were attributed supernatural powers. Among those most commonly referred to is that of bringing prosperity and abundant harvests.

In Ynglinga Saga, 12, the god Freyr is said to die, but his death is not announced to his subjects the Swedes. His dead body was preserved that prosperity might abound in the land. A similar story is told about Halfdan the Black, for his body after death was cut into four pieces, which were buried in different parts of the kingdom, so that all sections of the land might have plentiful years. A similar belief underlies the story of Olaf Geirstadhblótt and that of Guthmundr, who after death was thought by his people to be a god, and was therefore worshipped. Yet another example is to be found in Landnámabók, l. 14, where Thórrskír Snjórr is mentioned as being worshipped after death. A curious instance of worship of the dead is of Verginga Saga, 2, where the missionary Thorgaldr is taken by a heathen Kodran to see a stone in which the necromancer (or-maker of spi-maker) of the latter is said to have dwelt for a long time. Kodran averred that, when the missionary had sprinkled the stone with holy water, his ancestor had come out and complained that the water had seared his little children.

12. Vgdradr’s ash.—This is a very complex conception, as may be seen from the variety of phenomena attached to it. The descriptions indeed are hard to visualize and are apparently inconsistent. Sometimes the ash seems to spread over the whole world; sometimes again it is represented as a definite locality to which the gods ride or walk to hold their court. If the tree called Laeráthir in Grímsmóði, 25 f., is to be identified with the ash, as seems probable, it must be regarded as standing near to Othin’s hall. Now it was, and indeed still is, the custom for country houses in the North, especially in Sweden, to have standing by their door a tree known as vadráðr (“protecting tree”), on which the welfare of the house is supposed to depend. Such trees were doubtless revered as sacred in heathen times, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the original conception of Vgdradr’s ash may have been that of a vadráðr of the divine community. In Völuspá the reference to the ash seems to point to a tree on which the destiny of the gods, independently of that to an all-comprehending world-tree. That its origin is to be found in actual trees is rendered probable by the Irmensal, which likewise was all-comprehending (“universalis columna . . . quasi sustinens omnis”), for this was a real tree, or rather a tree-trunk, in spirit of the property assigned to it. Further, the adjectives mentioned in Grímsmóði and Gylfaginning—the harts, snakes, etc.—link it with grove sanctuaries. We may refer particularly to those of the Lithuanians and Prussians, especially to the sacred one at Komove. It was forbidden to injure any birds or animals in such groves. The description of the sacred oak at Komove furnishes an interesting parallel to Vgdradr’s ash from real life. In the North itself we can find parallels for all the features involved; e.g., snakes seem to have been worshiped from the Northern sanctuaries before the date of our records, yet a very interesting analogy in some respects is furnished by the description of the sacred tree at Upsala in skaldic 189 as mentioned by Birnir’s History.

III. COSMOLOGY.—See art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Teutonic).

iv. ESCHATOLOGY.—See art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).

D. E. MARTIN CLARKE.


5 Redeolph of Foulds, MGHI Transl. ii. 670.

III. WORSHIP.—The Teutonic festivals are treated separately under the headings FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Teutonic). There are also separate articles on SACRIFICE (Teutonic) and HUMAN SACRIFICE (Teutonic). The various superstitions are covered under the headings DIVINATION (Teutonic), MAGIC (Teutonic), and ORDINAL (Teutonic). It remains in this section to speak of prophecy and the priesthood.

1. Prophecy.—According to Tacitus, Hist. iv. 61, numbers of women among the Germans were considered to possess the gift of prophecy 'in consequence of which many were revered as goddesses,' though he denies elsewhere that the veneration paid to them was so great as this. One of the chief of these prophetic women was known as Veleda, a prophetess of the Bructeri, who ruled over considerable territory. To increase the honour in which she was held, she lived at the top of a high tower, and questions and responses were conveyed between her and the public by a near relative 'like a messenger who had converse with the gods.' The name Veleda, strictly speaking, does not appear in another name but a Gaulish word for 'prophetess.' We may here mention the story of the older Drusus, who in his last campaign was met on the banks of the Elbe by a woman who appeared to have prophesied to him the manner of his death even as it afterwards came about. According to Strabo, the Cymbri had prophetesses who practised divination with slaughtered prisoners.

2. Priesthood.—(a) Priest.—(i.) In Norway, and especially in Iceland, the duties of the priest were performed by the political leader of the people. During the colonization of Iceland the more important of the chief very near out from Norway built their own temples, not infrequently of the wood of which their temples had been made in Norway.

Thus we read in Erbyggja Saga, 4, that Thórrskír of Mostr built a temple to Thor of such wood. To this temple all the men in his own district had to pay a tax called 'temple-loci,' but the chief himself paid for the upkeep of the building and performed all the necessary duties in connection with the temple and the temple services, while at the same time exercising judicial authority over the people of the neighbourhood. Again in Heafnsbók’s Saga Prophec obstacle, we are told that Hrafnkel raised a great temple in Albydhal, where he made offerings to Freyr of the half of all the best things that he had. Hrafnkel settled the whole of the valley of the Albydhal and was in such condition that he should be regarded as their chief and exercise the authority of priest over them.

The priest was called goði, and his office goðorth. In each goðorth was a consecrated place set apart for the thing (gathering of the people). Small settlers who were not of sufficient substance and authority to build temples of their own joined one or other of the goðorth so as to have the benefit of the temple services and the temporal protection of the goði. So inseparable was the political function from that of the priest in Iceland that the goðorth formed the essential point for the foundation of the constitution of Iceland. The title of goði continued in existence after the adoption of Christianity, although now it had lost all religious significance and was now rather more than a magistrate (þógsmaðr). It is interesting to observe that the goðorth was a hereditary office and could even be bought and sold like any other property.

This combination of priestly with secular authority existed also no doubt in Norway, whence the original priests of Iceland came, though—and here is a difference from Iceland—the power of the
local chief in Norway was subordinate to that of kings. The word *gðth* is occasionally applied to local chiefs—e.g., to Thorhaddr the Old, who was *hopp-gðth* at Maerum in Trondhjem—and on several occasions we hear of priests in his household who formerly possessed temples in Norway. The *Saga of Hakon the Good* (Heimskringla), 16, gives an account of a great sacrificial feast at Hlathir of which Earl Sigfrit swears the whole cost himself; and from the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvesson* (Heimskringla), 75, we learn that it had been the custom of Olaf’s predecessors to offer sacrifice in Trondhjem. In poetry we sometimes meet with such expressions as *biðr veikála* (‘guardian of the altar’) applied to kings of the past. In all cases, here as in Iceland, it is clear that no exclusively priestly class existed, and that priestly duties were in all cases combined with temporal powers.

For Denmark very little evidence is available. On three Runic inscriptions found in Fyn, and dating approximately from the 9th cent., the word *bát* (i.e., *gðth*) is found in combination with some proper name to form a compound word. Hróulf and All are said to have been *miðvikáth* (‘sacrificial priest’) and *sælumvikáth* (‘sacrificial priest’) respectively. Women were also employed to women belong. 6 Solviri are the names of men; but it seems at least equally probable that they are place-names. If this is so, Hróulf and All may have been local chieftains, like those on the west coast of Norway. It is also possible that Saxo, who frequently refers to the laws and customs of heathen times, makes no references to a priestly class in Denmark.

For Sweden the evidence is more abundant. Adam of Bremen states in connexion with the great temple at Upsala:

‘Assigned to all the gods they have priests to present the sacrifices of the people.’

It does not necessarily follow from this, that the duties of these persons were of an exclusively priestly nature. Elsewhere the evidence seems rather to point to a union in Sweden, like that in Norway, of priestly duties with secular authority.

Thus we read in the *Ynglinga Saga*, 47, that a famine which arose in the days of the legendary king Olaf Tryggvason was attributed by the people to the neglect of priestly sacrifices; and even towards the end of the 11th cent., we read in *Hersevara Saga*, ad fin., of one Blótveinn (*sacrficing-Blótman*) obtaining the throne in virtue of his promise to offer sacrifice on behalf of the people, which he actually fulfilled. He was described as *blótvein* (‘sacrificial priest’) by the poet Snorri, and it will be remembered that the native dynasty, the Ynglingar, traced their origin to the chief priest of the god Freyr.

Thus, while the evidence is perhaps less direct and convincing for Sweden than for Norway, it seems on the whole to indicate a close union from the earliest times between secular and religious power.

(ii.) Except in Tacitus references to priests among the Teutonic peoples are of rare occurrence. In later times we read in the *History of Ammianus Marcellinus* 8 that the priests of the Burgundians were presided over by a chief priest who held his office for life. Jordanes states that the priests of the Goths were of noble extraction.

(iii.) We learn from Bede 7 that the priests of the Christian Church were not to bear arms and to ride except on mares. Heathen priests are also referred to, 8 perhaps the most interesting instance being that of Coilt.

Edition 9 in his description of the shipwreck of Wilfred off the Sussex coast, refers to the ‘principes sacerdotum idolatrasiae’ standing before the country-people on a high mound and by his magic arts seeming to cast fetters on the hands of the people of God.

1. 45. 2. Landn. iv. 6.
4. ib. 27.
5. 44. 5. Finn Av. April 26.
6. 19. 6. 5. 14.
7. 8. 7. 7. 15. 8. v. 16, and elsewhere.
8. 9. 8. v. 12, ch. 13.
9. 9. 9. 7. 11.
10. 7. 10. 10. 4. v. 12.
11. 6. 11. 4, v. 19.
12. 7. 12. 5. 10.
13. 5. 13.
14. 4. v. 10.

(iv.) Among the Teutonic peoples of the Continent in ancient times the priest seems to have combined to a great extent spiritual with temporal powers. According to Tacitus, his duties were threefold: (1) the cost of building and maintaining the temple, and the operations of war; (2) the duties in connexion with the tribal assembly and with the proclamation of an oracle; and (3) the guardianship of the sacred groves, symbols, and other holy objects, with which they were concerned in the public sacrifices. They had doubt duties also in connexion with the public sacrifices. Indeed it may be said that their functions as a whole were essentially of a public character. There is little or no trace of any mystical relationship existing between the priest and the god, or of any peculiar spiritual qualification in the priest such as we find noted, e.g., in the case of prophetesses like Velesia, or in the account of the Druids given by Diodorus Siculus.

(b) Priestess.—(i.) In Iceland the word *gýthia* (‘priestess’) occasionally occurs, and seems to be restricted to the female descendants of the families of Iceland (i.e., those who held *gðth*).

In *Kristn. Saga*, 2, we are told of a woman Frithgerðr who was ‘in the temple offering sacrifices to Freyr, and she was the author of the Christian faith held by the term *gýthia*, however, is not applied to her, and it is possible that she was only acting as deputy for her husband. Mention is made in *Vegþætr* Saga, 10, of a woman called Steindr in *Hypatius* who was a *hóþth-gýthia* (‘temple-priestess’) and who owned a *hóþth*-*kelf* (*public temple*) and claimed temple-toll. When she wished to enforce the civil authority of the god Freyr, she was to apply to her kinsman Brodd-Helgi for help. But that she was conscious of her full religious responsibilities seems to be borne out by the amusing account given in *Kristn. Saga*, 5, of a ‘flying’ between Thangindr, the priest, and the kinsman of the god Freyr and the mother of the poet Helgi, who is without doubt to be identified with the *hóþth-* *gýthia* of *Vegþætr* Saga. Here we are told that, after she had preached heathenism to Thangindr salts, at some length, she made the startling announcement that ‘Thor challenged Christ to fight in single combat, but he dared not fight against Thor’.

Beyond this, references to priestesses in the old Scandinavian countries seem to point to persons of a different character, though these references are not very satisfactory.

In *Sturlunga Saga* 8, 2, we are told of a man *hóþth-gýthia* in a temple, which, however, was not a temple of a known god. In *Sagas*, 6, we are told that the goddess Freya was a *bót-gýthia* (‘sacrificial priestess’), and that after Freya’s death she kept the temple and sacrifices at Uppsala. Here also we may mention the story of Gunnarr Helming, who is related in ch. 173 of the *Saga of Flateyri* (Flateyri) to have persuaded the god Freyr after destroying his idol. Freyr’s image was kept in a temple in Sweden, and his shrine is said to have been attended to by a young and beautiful woman who was known as his wife, and to whom he was said to make an annual progress through the land, driven in a chariot. This person is not actually called a priestess (gýthia), but at all events she apparently had charge of the sanctuary and interpreted the answers of the god. We may here compare the account of Freya, who in *Ynglinga Saga*, 13, is said to have upheld the sacrifices at Uppsala after the death of Freyr.

(ii.) We have no definite evidence for the existence of priestesses in the strict sense of the term among the other Teutonic peoples. Tacitus speaks of ‘numbers of women of prophetic power’, but these recall the solar rather than the priestesses of the North. The former existence of a priestess may, however, perhaps be inferred from the account of the sacred grove of the Nahanarval, which is said *10* to have been under the charge of a priest ‘muliebris ornatu.’

IV. TEMPLES AND SANTUARIES.—(a) Iceland.

—(i.) In Iceland the temples formed centres of jurisdiction, one belonging to each of the 24 districts. The last duty was carried out by the king; *et. Germ. 44*.
Theom." One of the fullest descriptions of such temples which we possess occurs in Eyrbyggja Saga, 4.

Here we are told that Thórrólf of Mostr set up a great temple to Thor on the island of Mostr, and it was the temple of Thor’s river. There was a door in the wall near one end. Inside stood the high-seat pillows containing the pegs which were called elves or ‘elves’ (högg).’ On one of these pillows the image of Thor was carved.

The interior of this temple was a very holy place. At the entrance to the temple there was an annex in the form of a small altar, and thereon lay a jointless ring weighing twenty ounces on which all oaths are said to have been sworn. The priest wore this ring on his arm at all solemn occasions. On the altar stood also the sacrificial bowl wherein was the klettins which served as a sprinkler, wherein was sprinkled the blood from the bowl which was called klaut. That was the blood which was shed by such creatures as were sacrificed to the gods. In the annex round about the altar stood the gods ranged. To this temple all men had to pay tribute, and they were under an obligation to make sacrifices. Anyone who did not perform such sacrifice was considered a heathen, and every man now takes with his chieft, and the god’s kept up the temple at his own cost so that it should not fall out of repair, and in it he upheld the sacrificial feast.

Some additional details are furnished by the description of the temple at Kjalarnes in Kjalnesinga Saga, 2, 4.

This temple was 60 ft. in breadth, and, like the one built by Ingimundr in Vatnsela, 100 ft. in length. Thor was the god most honored in this temple. The inner sanctuary was circular, like the hull of a ship. Thor stood in the middle of it, and other gods on both sides. In front of them stood a stall with a great massive stone. On it stood the altar. On there was a fire. In the altar was never allowed to die down. They called it the ‘consecrated fire,’ and there was also a great ‘ring’ of silver. The temple priest wore it on his arm at all solemn occasions. Men took oaths on it in all law-suits. On that altar there lay also a great stone of some sort, and on it was pounded the blood which came from the cattle which were sacrificed to Thor or to the men of his race. They called it klaut, and the bowl they called klaut-boll. Men and cattle were sprinkled with the klaut, but the cattle which were sacrificed were used for entertaining the company when the sacrificial feasts were held. The men who were sacrificed were sunk in the pool which was outside by the temple and there was called boll, ‘sacrificial spring.’ The temple was surrounded by a wooden fence too high to climb, and both the temple and the fence contained doors that locked. Finally we are told that the beams of the temple were very old.

Thorhádl the Old, like many another, took the temple-wealth and high-seat pillows from his Norwegian temple and used them for his temple in Iceland. We are also told that Jörunn gðóth raised a temple in Sveringestah, 4. Numerous other instances might be cited.

In Kristna Saga, 5, heathen sacrifices are mentioned as being offered in a temple at Hvamm. In Hafrsfjall Saga Frægurplót, 4, we are told that Helgolón raised a great temple to Frey in Ælthóll. This temple stood on a rock above a deep pool in the river and contained images of the gods which had some kind of relation to the image of Frey in them. A temple dedicated to Frey is also mentioned in Fjoga Gímu Saga, 5, as being ‘on the sea, near the harbour of Helgadalsstaðir.’ In ch. 24 of the same saga we read that there were three temples on Eyjarfrðr. In ch. 25 we have reference to one of theapestas, which are the castling mentioned above. In the temple in Diupadale on Eyjarfrðr whoever took the oak-tree took in his hand the silver ring which was reddened in the blood of the cattle sacrificed and which weighed only three ounces. Possibly the ring of Tómar (Thor’s) which was carried off from Dublin by King Charles Mahalé II. in 994 was one of the sacred rings upon which oaths were sworn. Here we may compare the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 7 where the oath-rings are represented as the most binding form of engagement known to the Danes.

(ii.) Not only the temple itself, but also the land round about, was regarded as sanctuary.

Thus in Eyrbyggja Saga, 4, we are told that Thórrólf of Mostr held as sacred a hill in the precincts of his temple on Thoranes. Here the thing of the men of the Western Firths was held. One was allowed to use his eye cutter unbawed and no blood was to be shed there. Thorólf’s sons preserved the sanctuary of the temple and could ; and, when they had been defiled with bloodshed by the Kjalnings, the place was declared unhailed and the thing removed to another part of the promontory, where the dýmrinsr is still pointed out to travellers—’That was one of the holiest of places.’

A curious tradition of sanctity is found in Landnámabók, ii. 16.

Theorhi the Deep-Minded was a Christian. She was accustomed to say her prayers at Cross-hills. She had crosses raised there for she was baptised and a good Christian. Members of her family afterwards showed great reverence for that hill. A húgg was made there when they began to offer sacrifices. Thor thresholded the hill, and all was burned when they died.

(b) Norway.—(i.) From Eyrbyggja Saga, 15, we learn that, before Thórrólf of Mostr left Norway for Iceland, he had charge of Thor’s temple on the island of Mostr, and it was a great friend of Thor. The framework of this temple was transferred bodily to Iceland, and another is said to have been the temple in the Saga of Olaf Tryggvason, 1 as containing a large temple dedicated to Thor. Guthramar of the Dales also possessed a temple dedicated to Thor. His possession was a great friend of Earl Hákon of Hållh. They had a temple in common in Guthbrundsda, which contained figures of Thor and of Hákon’s patron goddesses, Thorgerth and Irpa. Thorgerth is described as being as tall as a full-grown man and having a hood on her head. Thor was seated in his car, and all were adorned with clothes or ornaments and had gold Thor corpses. This temple and Earl Hákon’s temple at Hållh are mentioned in the same inscription. In 1229, when Earl Hákon first took possession of Norway, 2 he commanded throughout his whole kingdom that the temples should be maintained. Another is said to have been the two chief temples in Norway. 3 When Earl Hákon first took possession of Norway, he commanded throughout his whole kingdom that the temples should be maintained and, another, when the eminences of the emperor Otto had overthrown the temples of S. Norway, Earl Hákon caused them to be rebuilt and the heathen sacrifices to be re-established.

Some interesting details of one of his temples (in Arkadale) are given in Færeby Saga, 23.

It stood in the midst of a wood and was surrounded by a paling and adorned with gold and silver and was lighted with several glass windows. Inside near the door was a figure of Thorgerth Hólgapallr, beautifully adorned. The same story occurs in the Saga of Olaf Tryggvason (Plategárð), 239, where we are told that Olaf stripped Thorgerth of all her gold and silver and fine clothes and carried the idol at his horse’s tail, finally beating it to pieces with a club and burning it along with the image of Frey.

Olaf Tryggvason systematically destroyed Hákon’s temples and despoiled the idols. He took from the door of the temple at Hållh the large gold ring that Hákon had had made, and burnt the image of Thor which it contained. 4 In 1048, on his invasion expedition to Inner Trondhej he despoiled the temple at Maer, which contained many idols fixed on staflar, in the midst of whom sat Thor, ‘an image of great size, all adorned with gold and silver.’ 5 A curious and interesting account of a temple and image dedicated to Balder in the district of Soga is mentioned in the Saga of Æfrthof the Bold. 6 It has been the custom to cast doubt on this evidence, but the details are not obviously fictitious, and it is difficult to imagine why they should have been invented. The account is at least as reliable as that of Kjalnesinga Saga, 3 which is usually accepted as probable.

(ii.) The word hof (‘temple’) frequently occurs in association with the word hógar. 10 What exactly the hógar was we do not know. From Hvinjuljóth, 10, the hógar seems to have been made of stone. He made me a hógar built of stones. Now, this heap of stones is said to be glass. But in Grímnismál, 11, Njótr is said to rule over húttínbruðan hógar (‘high timbered hógar’).

1 Cf. Vatnsela Saga, 15.
2 Plategárð, 243.
3 Cf. Saga of Olaf the Holy (Heimskringla), 115.
4 Cf. Ísland, in v. 6.
5 Cf. also 9, 19.
6 Cf. Ísland, in v. 6.
7 Cf. ch. 1 and passim.
8 Sub an. 387.
9 Cit. ih, p. 10.
10 Cit. cf. Hjalmar Pálsson Hjörnes forsetum, 4.
The phrase ‘högfyr’ and ‘hof high-timbered’ occurs also in Óðins saga, 2. It has been suggested that the word ‘high-timbered’ is merely conventional and that the högfyr was a stone structure as opposed to the wooden temples so common in Norway and Sweden. But see Óðins saga, 29, where we are told that Oddr ‘burnt a hof and broke a högfyr’; but in the preceding verse both höf and högfyr are spoken of as being ‘burnt.’ Hof and högfyr are spoken of in one of the old sagas of the Ólf. Tryggvason (Formanns saga). But in ch. 141 of the same saga we are told that the king commanded ‘hof and högfyr to be broken and burnt.’ The högfyr is frequently mentioned in connexion with women.

Thus in Gyll. 14 the goddesses are said to inhabit ‘a högfyr which was a very fair house. It was called Vinogis.’ In Óðins saga, 1, Sturkathl is said to have carried off Álfróðr as she was in the act of reddening the högfyr by night after the great disast. After the death of Álfróðr, her relatives made a högfyr on the hill where she had set up her crosses.

The word is still traditionally connected with high places in popular speech. Thus, when the land lies deep in snow, the Icelanders say ‘only the highest höggar jut out.’ And in the Norwegian patois a dome-shaped mountain is called a högfyr. Perhaps the word is of an older form of religion when places of worship were more primitive than the carefully constructed hof. It is obviously connected ultimately with the O.H.G. hrarw. (c) It will be seen that there are obvious discrepancies in regard to the use of the term högfyr. It appears in some cases to have been a cairn, but in others a building capable of habitation. Sometimes the name is Skog, as in the midland in the North is thingvellr, which must originally have meant ‘wood of the assembly,’ velr being cognate with O.S. veoald and O.H.G. veold (‘forest’). Moreover, in the old name for the place of assembly, the corresponding A.S. hærgey or also perhaps used for ‘grove.’ Such sacred woods or groves were probably common in early times, since many place-names are compounded with the word sundr (‘sacred grove’). Moreover, in the old name for the land of Luddr, the corresponding midland in the North is thingvellr, which must originally have meant ‘wood of the assembly,’ velr being cognate with O.S. veoald and O.H.G. veold (‘forest’).

The legendary sanctuary at Óglevåg, near Trondheim, is probably connected with a holy grove, and is no doubt identical with the sacred grove of the name of the tree by Valhall, Ódhins dwelling-place, mentioned in Skjáldspenning, Skíaldskaparmál, 31. It is in a forest clearing that the gods meet to decide the fate of the Óðins saga, 32. According to a myth told among the Navajo Indians under the name of Yggdrasil’s ash. Perhaps we may also instance Tomar’s wood, which was situated near Dubn. It has been suggested that this was the ‘sacred grove’ of Thor.

It is noteworthy that the two great assembly places, Frósta and Gaula, are both on peninsulas. Sacred islands also have been known, as can perhaps be inferred from the recurrence of such names as Njarðrey, Vé-yey, Thorsay, and possibly Halogaland.

(c) Sweden.—(i.) The great temple of the Swedes was at Upsala.

The Swedes have a most magnificent temple which is called Uppsala [Upsala] not far distant from the city of Sidnora (Sigtuna). In this temple, which is fitted (literally with gold, they worship the statues of three gods. Thor, the most powerful of them, has his seat in the midst of the couch (c), while Woden and Fræko occupy places on either side of him. Woden then represents as armed, just as our people represent Mars, while Fræko is represented as an athlete, and his foot stands on the ground with hills round it like a theatre.

That temple is surrounded by a golden chain which hangs over the roof (c) of the building, and the gleam of which is visible to worshippers at a distance. The tallest pillar stands on a ground with hills round it like a theatre.”

(ii.) In the (contemporary) school of 1348 we have an interesting account of a holy grove which stood beside the temple, and which contained an evergreen tree of great sanctity.

‘Near that temple there is a very large tree stretching out its branches afar and always green both in winter and summer. No one knows what kind of tree it is. There also is a spring in which it is the practice of the heathens to do sacrifice by sinking living man in it. If he does not reappear, the prayers of the people will be fulfilled.

The description of Yggdrasil’s ash, which is said to overshadow Asgard, is no doubt derived from the Upsala evergreen which is described in the story of the home of the gods is surely derived from some Northern sanctuary, in all probability the identical sanctuary at Upsala.

There are many other references to this sanctuary in both Norse and Danish authorities, and it was in fact the most famous one in the North. In Ynglings saga, 12, and in Saxo, ii. 90, its establishment is attributed to the god Freyr, who in the former is represented as having the tree at Upsala. This is no doubt also the scene of the story of Gunnar Helmingr, although in this story the place is not actually mentioned.

In Jómnarvíkings saga, 12, we are told of a temple in Gotland which contained 100 gods and also temple treasure and temple servants to offer the sacrifices, but, apart from the great temple at Upsala, we knew little of the heathen temples of Sweden.

(d) Denmark.—No records of Danish temples appear to have been preserved. The chief sanctuary of the Danes seems to have been Lappo, though we do not doubt a sanctuary of great antiquity. It is the home of the famous kings of the 6th cent., Hróarr and Hrolfr Kraki (the Hothagar and Hrothwulf of Beowulf). In Ynglings saga, 5, it is said that Hrkr had been the home of the goddess Gifon and her husband Skjöldr, the eponymous ancestor of the Skjöldungar (A.S. Seylingas), the Danish royal family. Like Upsala, the locality is remarkable for its barrows, some of which date from the earliest times.

The existence of ancient sanctuaries in the old Danish kingdom is also implied by some of the place-names; e.g. in the midland in the North is thingvellr, which must originally have meant ‘wood of the assembly,’ velr being cognate with O.S. veoald and O.H.G. veold (‘forest’).

Cf. also Véborg (mod. Viborg; ‘sanctuary town’) and Helganes (‘holy promontory’) in Jutland; Odhins or Składhine (‘sanctuary’) on the island of Fyn, and Hilêse, besides many other Danish (and Norwegian and Swedish) place-names.

(e) England.—In England the worship of idols and the existence of heathen temples were well known to Bede. In A.D. 601 Pope Gregory sent a letter to the abbot Mellitus urging that, while he is to destroy the idols in England, he is to leave the heathen temples standing that they may be consecrated for purposes of Christian worship. He says expressly, ‘It is their custom to slay many oxen in sacrifice to devils. The East Anglian king Redwald, who had been converted to Christianity on a visit to Kent, is said to have had in the same temple an altar for Christian worship and an altar at which to offer victuals to devils, and his son Eanchoheret is said to have been the first of the English kings who commanded the idols throughout his country to be destroyed.’ When the Northumbrian Council decided to allow Christianity, the high priest of the Heathen, Confessor, rode to the sanctuary of Gudamun on the Derwent, cast a spear into it, and commanded his companions to destroy and set fire to it with all its precincts.

References of a historical character to sanctuaries in this country are rare, however. But such place-names as Thunrealeah, which must originally have

1 Gyll., 15.
2 Cf. also Składskaparmál, 31.
3 Harl. 12.
4 Ibid., 8.
5 Harl. 16.
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meant 'grove of thunder,' perhaps indicates the existence of groves sacred to the thunder-god among the ancient English, and there are other reminiscences of heathen worship no doubt preserved in such place-names as Thurnsfeld and Wednesby.

In Beowulf, 175, we hear of offerings made act hagarytrafam, which perhaps means 'shrines' covered with cakes. The word hagary, identical with Norse hógr, is of frequent occurrence standing alone, and is used to translate various Latin terms such as fanum and idolum. There are other passages in which the word seems to mean a 'grove,' as in German, and it is not uncommon in place-names e.g., Harrow. A number of other words which appear in Christian usage were presumably applied at first to heathen sanctuaries e.g., woodpeck (altar).

The Continent.—(i). References to temples on the Continent are rare. In the 6th cent., a Frankish temple was destroyed by Radegund, wife of Chlotar. Gregory of Tours describes a temple at Cologne which contained figures of the gods and in which sacrificial feasts were held. The Frisians seem to have had temples, but the notices are not always clear.

(ii). The word fanum, by which these sanctuaries are usually denoted, is also used of the Irmensul, which, according to Thietsmar of Merseburg, was an immense stone, carried on a pillar worshipped by the Old Saxons in a place called Eresburg. According to the Vita S. Alcex, 3, this pillar was set up aloft in the open.' In their own language they call it 'Irmenus, quod latine dictum universalis columna, quasi sustinens omnium.' It was cut down in the year 712 by Charlemagne, who spent three days destroying the sanctuary and carried off much gold and silver.

An account of the heathen practices of the Old Saxons condemned in the Indiculus Superstitionum et elsewhere we hear of sanctuaries connected with woods, of springs connected with sacrifices, and of various stones which were venerated as holy. The chief sanctuary of the Frisians was that of Eisle's Land. According to Aelinius' Vita S. Willibrordi, 10, it took its name from the god who dwelt there.

For fanum of this god were "constructed" (constructa) on it. This was held so sacred by the country folk that no one dared to touch the cattle or anything else that fed there. He also mentions a sacred spring on the island.

Adam of Bremen identifies this land with the island of Heligoland. In the Vita S. Bonifatii, 23, we read of a sacred oak of gigantic size, the robor Jovea, which was cut down by the saet amid the clamorous protests of the heathen.

There is no doubt that sacred trees and groves were of frequent occurrence among all the Teutonic peoples of the Continent. In the Translatio S. Alexandri, 3, we are told that the Saxons worshipped trees and streams. Claudian speaks of 'groves grim with ancient religious rites and oaks resembling barbaric divinity.'

The O.H.G. word horus, like the O.N. hógr and A.S. hagry, presents some difficulty, being used sometimes to gloss nemus, locuses, sometimes fanum, delubrum. It has been suggested by Mogg that the lack of clear distinction between the terms for the natural and the artificially constructed sanctuary is due to the utilization of old sanctuaries as sites for new temples.

(iii). References to Teutonic temples in earlier times, in the works of Tacitus, are rare and doubtful. In Ann. i. 51 it is stated that Germanicus raised the temple and the temple which they called the temple of Tamfana and which was most frequented by those tribes. Again, in Germ. 40 mention is made of the templum of Nerthus, but it is not unlikely that the word is used loosely for 'sanctuary' the holy grove or sacred place on the ocean, the home of the goddess Nerthus, who visits the nations in a consecrated car covered with a garment.

One priest alone is permitted to touch the temple. He is able to perceive when the goddess is present in her sanctuary and accompanies her to the utmicrevore as she is drawn along by cows. It is a season of rejoicing and festivity wherever the delicus go to be received. They do not under- take hostilities or take up arms; every weapon is put away; peace and quiet are then only known and welcomed until the goddess, weary of human intercourse, is at length restored by the same priest to her temple. Afterwards the car, the garments, and, if you are willing to believe it, the deity herself, are cleansed in a sacred lake. This rite is performed by daves who are instantly swallowed up by its waters.

The indications given by Tacitus are too vague to enable the site of this sanctuary to be fixed with any certainty, but it is not impossible that it was the Daish sanctuary of Leire. In that case Nerthus may have lived on as Gifjorn. Her name, however, is identical with that of the Norse god Njothr.

According to Germ. 9, 'the Germanic deities to be inconstant with the majesty of the gods to confine them within walls or to represent them after any semblance in any way. They own no fixed abode; in their dwellings they dedicate groves and woods and call by the names of gods that invisible thing which they see only with the eyes of faith.'

Sacred groves and woods are frequently mentioned by Tacitus in other places. Arminius' forces assemble in a wood sacred to Hercules. Civilians bring his army together in a sacred wood. According to Germ. 48, the Nahanarvivk had a grove of oaks called sancta. It was in these groves that they kept the sacred symbols. Here also were reared the sacred white horses which were never allowed to do work for mankind, but were employed to draw the sacred cars, when their neighing was carefully observed by the priest and king of the state.

According to ib. 39, the Semnones had a wood of immemorial antiquity and holiness. Here on certain occasions they met embassies from all the kindred peoples (the various branches of the Suevi) to celebrate their barbaric rites by the slaying of a man. The grove was held in reverence, and no one was allowed to enter unless he had the right to offer animals to the chains to signify his own humility and the power of the grove.


For material on burial customs and archaeology in general see Ellis, ed., 'Germans' and 'Scandinavians,' and 'Germans' and 'Scandinavians,' with the bibliographies appended.

Convenient ed. of most Norse works, both prose and poetry, are published by Sigurdur Kristjansen, O. Sveinsson, ed. of all the early poetry tr. is contained also in the Corpus Poemsicorum, etc., by G. Vigfsson and J. E. Fock, 2 vols., Oxford, 1899 (scanned). There are several German and Scandinavian critical ed. of the Edda poems and of many

1 Cf. also ch. 7, and Ann. I. 61.
2 Ann. I. 7, S. 72, 1. 193.
4 See Art. I. S. 232 (Teutonic and Slavic).
or companies carried valuable goods or large amounts of gold and silver, and then with much skill and cunning contrived to win their confidence. They would then travel with them, it might be for days or even weeks, until the whole tribe were favourable to their purpose, when, at a signal, they suddenly set upon the unsuspecting party, strangled them all in a few minutes, buried their bodies, dismembered them, and used them in straining their victims. Similar methods were practised on the rivers. One of the most extraordinary features of their history is the almost unbroken immunity which they enjoyed: it was only very rarely that a Thag was caught and punished for his crimes.

Thags believed their profession to be a religious duty, and all that they did was done under the sanction of religion. They were fully convinced that the goddess Kali, the wife of Siva, called also Durga and Bhawani, had commanded them to strangle and to rob, and had laid down all the rules which they followed in the course of their operations. Many Believers that Thags, when there was a Brahman in a gang, he conducted the ceremonies. The neophytes, whether the son of a Thag or a new accession, was initiated in an impressive religious ceremony called the white rite, with a thorn nail, an oath of absolute fidelity to the brotherhood. Before starting on the season's operations each gang met in a suitable place, and took part in a solemn act of worship. As soon as possible after every successful operation another religious ceremony was carried out. Once in seven days at least the goddess was worshipped, and on the greater occasions animals were sacrificed in her honour. They would not start on a journey, admit a new member, or decide upon an act of murder unless the goddess granted them favourable omens. In every ceremony she was worshipped, and to her their prayers were offered. No image was used; but the pickaxe for digging the graves of their victims, solemnly consecrated, stood for the goddess, and was believed to be filled with her power and inspired by her to guide them. In every ceremony the offerings of pur (i.e. coarse sugar) and water were made to the pickaxe; over it every oath was taken; and at all times it was regarded with the utmost reverence. And fear. On every occasion when pur and water were offered to the pickaxe, every fully qualified Thag also ate of the pur and drank of the water. At the close of each gang every man received a share of the gains, and the first historical information about them from the end of the 13th cent.; but clear and full knowledge did not become available until the time when the organization was put down, about 1830. At that time there were thousands of Thags, well organized and extremely successful. They were all men of intelligence and capacity, most of them Hindus of good caste or respectable Muhammadans. Religion controlled their operations down to the last detail. How far back the fully organized confederacy reaches we cannot tell; but scattered fragments of information make it probable that in all essentials the conspiracy had been the same for several centuries.

2. Description.—Thags were ostensibly most respectable men, engaged in business, farming, or some other occupation. The second quarter of the 19th century. Their history is full of incident and varied interest; here the religious and ethical aspects of the subject must be dominant. The term Thag, all that the old Arabic root *thag* comes from a Sanskrit root *sthag* meaning 'conceal,' which in the modern vernaculars becomes *thay* and means 'deceive.' The earliest reference to them is in the 12th cent. and the first historical information about them from the end of the 13th cent.; but clear and full knowledge did not become available until the time when the organization was put down, about 1830. At that time there were thousands of Thags, well organized and extremely successful. They were all men of intelligence and capacity, most of them Hindus of good caste or respectable Muhammadans. Religion controlled their operations down to the last detail. How far back the fully organized confederacy reaches we cannot tell; but scattered fragments of information make it probable that in all essentials the conspiracy had been the same for several centuries.

3. Sources of the system.—The religious and political conditions of medieval India provided the soil and the seed from which this extraordinary organization grew. The following facts require to be realized.

(a) In all parts of India to-day there exist criminal tribes, i.e. tribes whose regular caste-occupation is the commission of crime. In each case there is a belief that some deity has imposed on the tribe the particular type of crime which it practices and has also laid down the rules under which it is followed. It is therefore the duty of every member of the tribe to make the practice of the crime habitual, and to obey all the religious rules which are laid down for his guidance. In the same way that his deity looks upon the crime, so, he regards himself as a religious man. A proportion of the gains is regularly dedicated to the god or goddess who gave the tribe its criminal profession. A few of these tribes profess to carry on a mercantile business and dedicate their gains to some deity (Muhammadan saint); but they are probably old criminal tribes which have undergone a shallow conversion to this community, and a number of primitive people of very low social standing.

(b) All the chief forms of Hindu ancestry declare that the Supreme is exalted far above the petty distinctions of human

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morality. The idea is to make Him truly absolute, to sever Him in the most decisive way, not only from the earthly and the physical, but from all human conditions as well. Thus from the very fact that in Himself He is completely separated from both good and evil, it becomes possible to acknowledge that He is in contact with all human activities, and that these activities are the cause of both. Hence to suggest that God should bid men do what we call wrongs to the Hindu to be not only quite natural but also inevitable.

(1) The Śākta sect of Hinduism, which worships the wife of Śiva, coupled with Durgā, Kali, Shakti, or simply the goddess (Devi), and possesses a philosophical theology, falls into two sub-sections: the Badarachārs and the Left-hand sects. The Left-hand sect has a cult which contains several extraordinary features. Only one need be mentioned here, viz., that for many centuries neither animal nor human sacrifice was offered. In 1880 the British Government prohibited human sacrifice, but until then it was common in the chieftains of the goddesses in North and Central India. According to the ritual law, only males could be sacrificed to her.

(2) In the worship of the goddess in the homes of the people, pots, pieces of metal, and diagrams are more often used than images; and both images and symbols, when duly consecrated, are believed to be filled with the presence and power of the god.

(3) In modern India there are many groups of ignorant Muhammadans who take part in Hindu worship. They not only join in the general festivals, but also visit Hindu temples and make offerings to the god, in order to secure immunity from disease; and, when duly consecrated, are believed to be filled with the presence and power of the god.

These facts enable one to realize that, in medieval India, there might readily appear a community organized on the basis of the worship of the goddess and the practice of murder and robbery. At first it would differ but little, if at all, from an ordinary criminal tribe; and the first Thags would be the ignorant Hindu who had been worshipers of the goddess before they formed the society to strangle and rob unwary travellers. To pass from participation in human sacrifice before the altar of the goddess to the murder of the sons of her victims for her on the high roads would be a violent change. Nor would the thoughtful Hindu be shocked by the doctrine that the goddess had ordered the programme of murder. Hindu theology provides a substantial basis for this.

Further, the fundamental doctrine on which the worship of the Devi rests is full of blood and horror. The story in that document of her struggle with a demon named Raktabijja and her final triumph over him was made by Thags the starting-point of the tale in which she commands the original Thags to strangle men.

The ritual law that only males should be sacrificed to her is clearly the symbol of the rule that Thags must not kill women. It would also seem quite natural to devotees of the goddess to use the pickaxe as a symbol instead of an image, and they would naturally believe that the power and the will of the goddess were present in it.

Nor need we wonder that Muhammadans, in order to become Thags, were willing to participate in Hindu worship, since so many are to-day accustomed to supplement Muslim rites with the cult of Hindu divinities.

(4) India has usually been ruled, not by one Imperial Government, but by a multitude of petty states, each of which sought only to secure peace and order within its own narrow territory. Nor has the individual Indian ever felt it to be his duty to go out and perform the well-being of the Indian people as a whole. If, therefore, some of the subjects of one of these small states pursued a certain type of crime outside the limits of the state and brought back large gains, whereas they gave considerable percentages to the Government, on the one hand, and, on the other, both Government and people were usually only too willing to acquiesce in the arrangement, and to do all that was possible to protect the men who brought them so much prosperity.

These and similar facts account for the almost universal immunity which the Thags enjoyed. They were found all over India, were closely bound to the local authorities by oath and interest, and were usually only too well able to take prompt vengeance on any who molested the brotherhood.

Thugs therefore were able to function successfully, not only because they were armed with pickaxes, but also because they enjoyed immunity from persecution and punishment. Thus only an Imperial Government using wide powers could successfully grapple with them.

4. The rise and fall of Thagi.—It seems clear that the Thag conspiracy was originally a Hindu organization, and we have already suggested, and that it came into being before the Muhammadan conquest of North India (1193-1293). In his Śīrṣa-khaṭṭarita the Hindu poet Mankha or Manjaka (d. P.S.) compares the thievish spring to a Thag. Clearly by this time the community was already well known.

If the community was very successful, it would soon attract indigent Hindus of high caste, and then there would be no difficulty for the Brahmans who would be eager to enter. It seems probable that, after the Muhammadan conquest, during one of the many periods when anarchy was wide-spread, the strangers found unusual opportunities for their depredations, and waxed so rapidly rich that many Muhammadans became Thags and readily acquiesced in the established cult of the goddess.

The great success and the wonderful immunity from punishment which the movement enjoyed would be to them clear proof of its divine origin. There is conclusive evidence that Muhammadan Thags looked back with great veneration to Nizâm al-Dîn (d. 1328), the elder brother of the famous Ali Shamsu dîn, who lived at Delhi in the first quarter of the 14th cent., and that they regarded him as one of the founders of the system. This fits in perfectly with our theory that, at a time when the Muhammadan conquest, numerous Muhammadans joined the community. It is probable that the event occurred about A.D. 1300. The story that Muhammadan Thags were all the sons of seven famous tribes may also have a historical root.

The confederacy lived and flourished for many centuries, and was still extremely prosperous at the moment when it had the immediate attention of the British Government in India. In 1829 special officers were appointed to investigate the system, and a serious campaign was started for the destruction of the whole organization. Within seven years the work was done. The success of this great effort is mainly due to the devotion and genius of Captain, later Major-General, Sir W. H. Sleeman.

Religious and ethical character of the Thags.

Those Europeans who had extended intercourse with Thags, during the period when the British Government were endeavouring to put the system down, gave very vivid descriptions of the kind of men they were.

(a) Every Thag was fully convinced that the goddess had created the system, and that the inhabitants saved Thags from punishment or disaster, so long as they obeyed the rules she had laid down for their operations. They were also immediately convinced that the consecrated pickaxe was so filled with the presence of the goddess as to be able to guide the Thags in their wanderings and to bring dire disaster on every one who disobeyed.

(b) No Thag ever showed the slightest compunctions of conscience for his crimes. Sleeman writes:

"A Thug considers the persons murdered precisely in the light of victims offered up to the Goddess; and he remembers them, as a Priest of Jupiter remembered the oxen, and a Priest of Jupiter sacrificed the children sacrificed upon their altars. He meditates his murders, not without misgivings, but meditates them with an empty heart, without any emotion of pity, and he remembers them without any feelings of remorse. They trouble not his dreams, nor does their recollection ever cause him inquietude in darkness, in solitude, or in the hour of death."

Never did the strength of religious faith or the extraordinary domination which religious exercises over men's moral nature find clearer illustration.

LITERATURE.—W. H. Sleeman, Ramnasastra, or a Vocabulary of the Language used by the Thags, with an Appendix.

1 Garbe, Beiträge, p. 187.
3 Sleeman, Ramnasastra, p. 11.
4 Th. p. 7 f.
THEISISM.—See Ionic PHILOSOPHY.

THANESAR.—Thanesar (Sktr. स्तहसेवरा, sthāṣēvarā, a local name of Siva, ṣēvarā, 'lord'); also sthāṣeṣvarā, sthāṣā, 'shrine,' and ṣēvarā) is a sacred town in the Karnali District of the Panjabc, lat. 29° 59' N.; long. 76° 50' E., on the banks of the river Sarsawati (g.v.). The Chinese pilgrims, Huien-Tsang, describes it under the name of Sa-ča-nil-si-la-so, the centre of the Hindu Holy Land (Dharakshetra, Kurukshetra) and gives the local legends. It has been identified with the Osto-balasara or Bhatangaisara of Poloem. In A.D. 1014 it was sacked by Mahmud of Ghazni. The most famous shrine which that dedicated to Chakravati, Visṣu, 'lord of the disks.' The state is said to have been taken to Ghazni to be broken up and trodden under foot. It was finally desecrated by Aurangzeb. Enormous crowds of pilgrims visit the place to bathe at eclipses of the sun.


THANK-OFFERING.—See SACRIFICE.

THEATRE.—See DRAMA.

THEFT.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

THEISM.—1. Definition. The word 'theism' (Fr. théisme, Germ. Theismus) is a purely modern formation, implying a non-existent Greek theos and an equally non-existent verb θείω (on the analogy of θειώ, θείω, and the like). As there is a certain vagueness about the meaning of the word in current English, it is necessary to begin this article with a convention as to the sense in which 'theism' will be employed in what follows. The word will be used throughout as a name for a philosophical theory as distinct from a practical religious faith. Perhaps the faith and the theory are never absolutely disjointed, but they are at least logically distinct. If the former be true, whether any man wholly untouched by the spirit of adoration and wholly devoid of love to God has ever been a genuine theist in philosophy, and again whether one can be in earnest with a philosophical belief in God without being led on to regulate his life by that belief. But it is at least possible to practise love of God and trust in God without making any conscious attempt to find a speculative explanation of the world. There are many who, in George Tyrrell's phrase, share the faith of Simon Peter without concerning themselves about his theology. The present article will be exclusively concerned with the philosophical conception of God as the ultimate ground of things. Current usage seems to require a further distinction. It seems necessary to discriminate theism not only from atheism (q.v.), the denial that God exists, and scepticism or agnosticism (q.v.), the refusal to answer any question about the ultimate ground of things, but also from deism (q.v.), the latter way, also treats God as the ultimate ground. We shall probably not depart far from the implications of current language if we agree to define theism as the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (a) intrinsically complete or perfect and (b), as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship. Belief in a ground of things which is not intrinsically complete and perfect, and consequently no adequate object of adoration, but at best of respect and admiration, would at the present day probably be described by every one as deism rather than as theism. Thus the suggested definition in fact coincides with the famous formula of Anselm, that God is id quo manis cogitari non potest, 'the being than which none greater can be thought.' It is evident that theism, thus understood, is incompatible with polytheism (q.v.) and also with any doctrine, theological or metaphysical, which asserts a plurality of independent and equally ultimate 'realms,' whether in the form of a dualism between God, the good principle, and an immaterial evil principle (Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism (see)), or between God and matter, or in that of an ultimate plurality of unoriginated 'realities' or 'persons,' or in any other shape. All such doctrines involve the denial that there is any object which answers to the definition id quo manis cogitari non potest. For this reason the various modern theories of a finite or limited deity are inconsistent with strict theism. For a deity limited by restrictions arising outside his own nature is manifestly not the source of all reality other than himself, and thus not God in the sense in which we are using that word. And, if the 'limitations' are asserted to be self-limitations, due to the nature of God Himself (that is, in the philosophy of Hastings Rashdall), we have to face a dilemma. Either the presence of these limitations in the deity is a defect, and the deity is therefore not God in our sense at all, or their presence is not a defect, and there is then no sense in calling them restrictions or limitations, as it is in calling absence which would, in this case, be the defect. It is mainly on the ground of alleged difficulties in the notion of the divine Omnipotence that these theories are recommended. But the difficulties seem due to misunderstanding. Omnipotence means only power to do whatever is consistent with God's own perfection. It is no real limitation of the divine power to hold, as most theologians and philosophies of God, that God cannot do what is in itself absurd—e.g., cannot make a false proposition true or make virtue vanish into viciousness. The old Stoic boast that the sage is in one respect more powerful than God, because he can put an end to his existence if he grows tired of it, is a mere self-parody.

It is perhaps, more important to be clear on the point that theism, as defined, is equally inconsistent with the type of philosophic monism called by James Ward 'singularity.'—the theory that there is only one existent, the Absolute, and that this single existent is the true subject of all significant propositions. If we mean by God a being from whom all else that exists derives its being and who can be worshipped, then the belief in God necessarily implies belief in the real existence of beings who can worship God. To say that God is the source of existence implies that God is not all that exists. From the point of view it is, no doubt, proper to call God, the being from whom all others are derived, the Absolute or unconditioned being, but only on the condition that the Absolute is not equally with that really exists. The undivided source of existence may, in virtue of its unique intrinsic completeness or perfection, be called the ens reale, en arca reale, but the very use of such a phrase implies that there are other ens realia.

It will probably be readily admitted that the ipse dixit doctrine of Spinoza cannot be reconciled with the most distinct representatives of singularism; in

1 Propædia, ch. 2.
our own times shown any desire to claim the name of theists. It should be recognized that the popular language about a popular "immortal" soul is not the same as opposed to the "transcendent God" of orthodox Christian theology, is equally incompatible with genuine theism, inasmuch as it conflicts with the recognition of any transcendental, immanent source of existence and the dependent existents. It is just this distinction which is lacking, however, and, for this reason, it may be taken as a fair test of the theism of a philosopher whether his way of conceiving the relation of the God to the world is consistent with the real meaning of the divine transcendence.

2. Philosophy and theism.—If we look at the history of European philosophy, it may be said that in the main the general trend of philosophic thought, even independently of the influence of the principal religions, has been theistic, at least from the time of Plato to our own day. Even the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, when all the qualifications with which it is sanctified by its author are taken into account, has not really affected theistic tendency and might be said, apart from its blunders about dynamics, to be little more than a crude reproduction of the "negative theology" which is really one-half of the orthodox Christian doctrine of God. As will be shown directly, this tendency to theism is a direct consequence of the permanent influence of Plato on all subsequent developments in philosophy. Apart from materialism (q.v.), which has never produced a philosopher of the first rank, the main antitheistic influence in modern European philosophy has been that of Spinoza (q.v.), which has stealthily affected metaphysical thought, perhaps even more outside than within the professionally philosophical schools, from the time of Jacobi and Lessing down to the end of the 19th century.

This is partly accounted for by the powerful attraction exercised by the naturalistic strain in Spinoza's doctrine on the devotees of physical science, partly by the tendency of many of the most prominent 19th century representatives of the Hegelian line of thought to interpret Hegel (q.v.) in a Spinozistic sense. Whether the Spinozistic interpretation of Hegel is the true one is a subject of question, and it has been rejected by many eminent Hegelian students as Hutchinson Stirling and C. H. H. Hartt. In the case for a definitely theistic interpretation, in the other for a version which has more affinity with the monism of Leibnitz (q.v.) than with Spinoza's singularism.

But in the main Hegel has become, at least in the English-speaking world, through the work of philosophers with strong metaphysical sympathies, more than that the influence of Hegelian ways of thinking has been definitely hebetarianized. Even among professing Christian theologians allegiance to Hegel is almost inextricable from the doctrine of God which at least compunctions exist.

More ephemeral has been the influence excited in the last half of the 19th century by the pessimistic atheism of Schopenhauer (q.v), and in the last twenty or twenty-five years by the brilliant, if incoherent, anti-Christian polemics of Nietzsche (q.v.). Both the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the antitheism of Nietzsche are, however, too little reasoned and too obviously matters of personal temperament to be regarded as of permanent philosophical importance. The influence of Hegel, also, and still more that of Spinoza, would seem to be for the present a spent force. In the present state of philosophy there is the most formidable rival to theism as an explanation of the world appears to be the thoroughgoing rationalist pluralism of the "new realism" represented at its best by the writings of William James, and Russell and G. E. Moore. Of this doctrine, as well as of the supposed objection to theism arising from the evolutionist's alleged vision of Nature as "red in tooth and claw," sometimes a real animalistic theism may be formulated. Plato expressed by Plato in his writings. To call Plato the creator of philosophical theology does not, of course, mean that the belief in God is an invention of Plato. As has often been remarked, the general trend of the best Greek thought on the problems of human conduct and destiny—as represented, e.g., by such poets as Homer and Euripides—is in the direction of a vague monism. And it is not unreasonable to suppose that an earnest practical faith in God was characteristic of Pythagoras and of Socrates. Even the most unreasonable scepticism about the historical good faith of Plato's accounts of his master cannot obscure the fact that Socrates was the prototype of his life toward the execution of a mission to which he believed himself to have been called by God and died as a martyr to his calling. But this, so far as we know, was a matter of personal religious conviction rather than of speculative theory. Even Plato himself does not attempt a formal philosophical statement and justification of the belief in God until we come to the meagre legacy of his old age, the Laws. In his best known earlier writings, e.g., the Republic—great stress is laid upon the importance for the formation of moral character of an adequately adequate conception of the divine nature. God need not be conceived as perfectly good, and current religion must be purged of everything which suggests that there is anything unethical in his character or that his dealings with men have anything outside their true good. It is just because God is perfectly good (Republic, Thucydides) the end of life may be said to be 'to become like God.' God fashioned the world and made it for the world because it would be unworthy of his goodness to make it otherwise (Timaeus). True piety is to be a 'fellow-worker' with God (Euthyphro). We are God's sheep and He is the good shepherd. The souls of the righteous are in the hands of God, and when they depart from us it is to be with Him (Phaedo). But this is, of course, the language of religion, not of science, and we are made to understand the difference by the simple fact that nearly all that is said of God, outside the Laws, beyond the one emphatic statement about His perfect goodness, is conveyed in 'myths,' i.e., in imaginative stories, as to which we are cautioned that we cannot undertake to pronounce on their strict truth. Nor is any attempt made to prove either the existence or the perfect goodness of God. In particular the story of creation is such a thing as, as we are explicitly warned, not to be taken as scientific truth, but as a tale which is the most probable that can be told about matters which lie outside the region within which scientific knowledge is possible. If we did not possess the Laws, it would be legitimate, as in fact it is not, to doubt whether Plato did not agree with Kant that reasoned scientific knowledge of God is impossible, though on grounds which are not identical with Kant's. In the tenth books of the Laws, however, we have a formal proof of God's existence, wholly devoid of any features of mythical colouring, which is expressly declared to be a "proof."
The main argument, the main principle of which had been already anticipated in the Phaedrus, is as follows. The most universal characteristic of things is motion and change. Now, motions are of two kinds, (a) impressed, and (b) original or spontaneous. Or, to use Plato's own phraseology, there are motions which are able only to move something else (impressed or communicated movements), and there are motions which move themselves as well as other things. And native or spontaneous movement is logically prior to impressed or communicated movement. He cannot
regard all movements as impressed or communicated without falling into an impossible logical regressus in indeterminatum. Further, 'motion which moves itself' is precisely what we mean when we talk of the movement of the soul for the κίνει κατ' αὑτόν καὶ μόνον. It is just when we see a thing manifestly capable of internally initiated movement or change that we feel bound to say that the change is a moving 'by itself' or 'a soul'. It follows, then, that souls and their various 'motions' (judgment, volition, hope, desire, and the like) are prior to bodies and their motions or changes. All bodily processes are derivative acts as facts as anything else. 'Motions' of the soul, and it is just for this reason that Plato explicitly denies the doctrine, often imputed to him by the uncritical, that 'matter can be the principle of evil'. Further, as souls in the degree of their goodness, are sources of orderly and beneficent motions; evil souls, of disorderly and evil motions. Now, the great recurrent motions which order the universe (the periodic motions of the heavenly bodies) are all regular and orderly and belong to the class of the 'good' motions. Hence they must be due to good souls. (It had been carefully proved, but the doctrine was not that passage that all apparent irregularities and anomalies in these motions are only apparent and disappear as our science becomes more adequate.) If, then, we define God as a perfect being, we may say that, since the great motions of the universe are all perfectly orderly, they must be caused by God. God, however, cannot be the only soul, or 'movement that moves itself'. For, though the magnitudinem naturae exhibit perfect regularity, there are also irregular and destructive motions, such as those, e.g., of disease or those due to a wicked will; and these are just as undeniable as anything else. Thus the facts of the universe bear witness to the existence of souls which are not wholly good. There must be at least one 'bad' soul, which is not God, and there may, of course, be as many more as are required to account for the observed facts. The transcendence of God is thus safeguarded.

Plato's language about the 'bad' souls has been misunderstood both in ancient and in modern times. Plutarch thought that he had discovered in Plato's words the doctrine of an ultimate evil, and has written a good and an evil world-soul. The view did not find favour with the Platonists of antiquity, but has been revived in modern times by Zeitler, from the weight of words that have been written about what he undeservedly considered the incorrectness of Plato's thought. In the Laws or any where else Plato does say is merely that all motions cannot be due to a single soul; there must be at least two, the 'beneficient' and 'that which has power to effect the contrary result.' The whole context suggests that the bad souls of which he is thinking are chiefly those of passionate and ignorant men, which, of course, are numerous. It should further be noted that, in the passage of the Laws containing the theological argument, Plato speaks throughout in the plural of 'gods,' giving the soul which moves the sun as an example his meaning. This is, however, a mere consequence of the fact that the legislation of the Laws is designed for an ordinary Greek community. It is assumed that the State religion of the colony will recognize 'gods many,' and Plato's object is to substitute the heavenly bodies, or rather the souls which move them, as types of regularity and beneficence, for the morally evil. And the justification of anthropomorphic deities of actual Greek culture. Of Plato's personal conviction of the unity of God there can be no real doubt. The unity of God, 'the best soul,' follows in fact, as we may see from the Timaeus, from the unity of the universe. The universe is one and is a rational system; therefore, there is a rational process. That a Greek writer for Greeks should allow himself to speak of 'deus' explicates itself; what is really significant is that Plato uses 'deus' so frequently, and just when he wishes to be most impressive, of deus.²

From the goodness of God, since God is a soul (ψυχή), it follows that everything in the world is governed by a wise and beneficent Providence, and that God's dealings with man are perfectly and inexorably just. Thus the tenth book of the Laws definitely creates 'natural theology' as a branch of philosophy for the first time and indicates once for all its main doctrines—the existence and goodness of God, the reality of God's providential government of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and the corruption or change after death and destiny and his works. These doctrines together make up what was known as 'natural' or 'philosophical' theology, as distinct from both 'poetic' theology—and the stories told of the gods by the poets—and 'civil' theology, which consists in knowledge of the cultus prescribed by the State.¹

The question whether Plato's theology amounts to a complete theism is not without its difficulties. On the one hand, there is, no doubt that, as Herodotus has said, Plato regarded his doctrine of God as the central thing in his whole system. It is precisely the activity of God, the perfectly good soul, that connects the world of 'becoming' or 'unbecoming'—Nature, the world of all that we call empirical existence, with the system of stuff. The reason why there is a world of 'things' at all is just that God, the perfectly good soul, acts and does them. Hence the perfect activity of a perfectly good soul, of course, has a perfect knowledge of 'the Good,' and its activity consists in reproduction or 'imitation' of the Good. Hence that activity is the fact of their existence to God, as they owe it also to Him that they are what they are. Still it does not appear that the Platonic God is all that later theists...the Supreme Good is an existent, though a perfect one, and beyond all existents there is the system of 'form' or 'numbers'. This is the pattern (μορφομορφή) after which God makes heaven and earth and all that is in heaven, and is thus something metaphysically prior to God Himself. If we understand by theism the doctrine that God is the sole unconditioned source not only of existents but also of real possibilities, we shall have to say that, in Platonism, the Greek philosophy succeeds in being fully theistic. A word or two may be said about the argument by which Plato establishes the existence of God. It contains in itself the germ of the modern argument—'the proofs of the being of God' which have become traditional. Its presuppositions are two: (1) the universal validity of the principle of causality, and (2) the regularity of the motions—the 'reign of law' in the physical world. From the principle of causality, taken together with the assumption that there cannot be an infinite regress in the causal series, comes the conclusion that there must be an original cause (or causes) of all movements, which is 'self-moving'—i.e., a 'soul' or 'soul'—and from the regularity of the cosmic motions and the systemic interconnection between them it follows that the ultimate 'mover' is the perfectly good soul. Thus Plato's reasoning combines in one argument the principle of the cosmological argument from the contingency of the world to the existence of a First Cause and that of the argument from design, which is not degraded by Plato, as it has often been by modern apologists, into an argument from the alleged adaptation of the world to the personal convenience. As understood by Plato, the

¹ The distinction in this form became fixed in consequence of the fact that it was adopted by the Roman encyclopedist Tertullian who included it in his De Carne et Sanguine. De Carne et Sanguine. The theology of the philosophers was called 'natural', not, of course, with any thought of a contract with 'revelled' Truth, but because it was impotent and true, unlike mythology, which the poets were believed to have invented, and the cults of the State, which, as Hobbes puts it, 'is not philosophy but law.'

argument from design is simply the argument from the intelligibility of the world of actual facts and events to intelligence in the cause which produces and sustains it. Plato's argument is thus an argumentum a posteriori, in the correct scholastic, not in the inaccurate Kantian, sense of the phrase a posteriori; i.e., it is an argument from the characteristic known subject to the character of its cause. That there is a world of mutable things, and that, as scientific insight advances, the processes in this world of mutability are more and more found to exhibit conformity to intelligible laws, are assumed as empirically known truths, and without these empirical premises the demonstration would not work. There is no hint in Plato of the line of thought which at a later date crystallized into the one genuinely a priori argument for the existence of God, the ontological proof, which, if valid, establishes its conclusion without any empirical premises whatsoever.

Aristotle.—Aristotle's doctrine of God, though better known to the modern world than Plato's, is simply the Platonic doctrine rather more precisely expressed and shorn of its ethical and practical applications. With Aristotle, as with Plato, the doctrine of God is absolutely central, and the argument is once more based upon the assumption of the causal principle. Like Plato, Aristotle contends that communicated or impressed motion preserves its original or spontaneous motion, and like Plato he regards ψωγία as the one source of spontaneous movement. But here he is led to make a further refinement. The 'motions of the soul' do not come from a 'degree of motion', and 'degree of motion' is always 'appetition of something apprehended as good (ἀφηνεὶς διὰ νοστή). This apprehension of an object as good is an exercise of ἡνδον, an act of immediate intelligent apprehension. This apprehension is not itself a movement, though it gives rise to motions both of the soul and of the body. We must not then be content to trace back all motions to their origin in the 'movement which can move itself', but behind even this we must look for an 'unmoved mover', an unchanging initiator of all change. Otherwise we shall simply fall into an indefinite regress, and an indefinite regress in the order of efficient causes is unthinkable (the principle of the argument from the 'tangibility of the world'). The unity of the supreme First Mover once more follows from the unity of the actual world of God, which is a scene of 'becoming', in which the potencies latent in things are developed into actuality by the agency of efficient causes which are already themselves developed actualities. Behind every process of development lies the agency of such already developed actualities, and thus, just because there really is something and not nothing, there must be some actual agents which have never developed at all, but have been eternally and immutably active. From Aristotle's point of view, all processes of development depend upon the eternally regular and uninterrupted movements of the heavenly bodies. Hence there must be as many 'unmoved movers' as there are independent astronomical movements. Further, astronomical motions form a hierarchy. Each of the 50 odd concentric 'spheres' which Aristotle postulates to account for the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies has its own proper revolution and its own 'unmoved mover'. But there is one sphere which is never being enclosed by any other, encloses all the rest, and, according to the Aristotelian astronomy (which disagrees on this point wholly from Plato), communicates its movement to the whole world. Hence it is with reason as the ground of things is excluded by Plato's doctrine that νοῦς can exist in a ψωγία (Sophocles, 249 A, Philodemus, 30 C, Timotheus, 30 B) to all the spheres it contains. This is the sphere of the fixed stars, which rotates uniformly on its axis in the period of 24 hours. The 'unmoved mover' of this sphere is consequently God. As that which He moves is one, and its movement is eternal, continuous, and regular, God is also one, eternal, immutable, the First Mover upon whom all motion in the universe depends. So far Aristotle's doctrine is, in substance, the same in the Laws, except that Aristotle has dogmatically committed himself to a particular astronomical theory, that of Eudoxus, which, for sound scientific reasons, did not commit itself to Plato, of his conception of the nature of the First Mover Aristotle departs more widely both from Plato and from true theism. God, as Aristotle describes Him, is not a ψωγία, but a νοῦς. And he infers from his doctrine that the First Mover must be unmoved the conclusion that the divine mind, unlike our minds, because it is unmov ing, must eternally think one and the self-same object. Further, this object must be adequate to occupy the divine mind through eternity. It follows that the object of God's unbroken Sabbath of contemplation is God Himself. 'He thinks Himself and His thinking is a thinking of Himself' (ὁ θεός ἐστι καὶ θεοῦ εἶναι τὸ συνειδέσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ). But in fact, though without the presence of God there could be no motion in the universe, God is supposed to be wholly unaware of the existence of the universe which He moves by being an object of contemplation and, thus it is aware of Him, but He is no more aware of it than the various objects of our human appetitions need be aware of our desire for them, for the world's desire after God is precisely and exactly the 'desire of the moth for the star.' This conception, due apparently to Aristotle's own temperamental inflexibility of mind, has, of course, never struck out of philosophical theology the doctrine of Providence and of the righteousness of God's dealings with man. In fact, since Aristotle held that 'goodness of character' is a different thing from 'goodness of intellect', he is quite consistent when at the end of his Ethics he expressly denies that goodness of character or moral goodness is predicatable of God. God, in fact, becomes in Aristotle what Plato had him to be, if the conditions of human life would allow it—a mere 'magnified and non-national' scientific thinker. In respect of this elevation of all ethical content from the physical world it is certainly hard to say that the Ethics can fairly be said to be the founder of philosophical theism, as Plato was the founder of philosophical theism. It is clear that to Aristotle and his disciple Eudoxus, who identifies the speculative life with the contemplation and worship of God, first Mover was an object of genuine worship and reverence, though the worship of such a being could have no real connection with active good works; but a non-ethical deity, who knows nothing of humanity's needs and aspirations, can never become the centre of an enduring religion. Hence it is not surprising that, while Platonism continued throughout later antiquity to be the creed of educated religious men, Aristotelianism was reduced to simple naturalism within half a century of Aristotle's death by the third head of the school, Strato of Lampsacus.  

5. Epicureans.—The theism of the Epicureans is of no significance for natural theology. For all practical purposes the school were, what their opponents called them, pure atheists, since it was
spiritual deism. It must be remembered that all these writers are later than, and were greatly influenced by, Posidonius of Apamaea (first half of 1st cent. B.C.), who gravely modified the original doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus by contamination with Plato, as his contemporary. Antiochus of Ascalon, who vainly tried to introduce Stoic metaphysics, it is precisely those among the later Stoics, such as Seneca, who can be shown to depend most completely on Posidonius in whom the monism and materialism of Stoicism is represented. To understand the real tendencies of the system, it is important to study it as it was before Posidonius had contaminated it. For this purpose the anti-Stoic essays of Plutarch and the fragment of Stoic doctrine given in the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius are particularly valuable. Indigenous students are H. van Arnim's collection of the complete fragments of the Stoics of the pre-Roman period, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1904-06.

The one really original contribution made by Stoicism to natural theology is the appeal to "innate ideas" and the consensus gentium as an argument for the existence of God. The doctrine of innate ideas (socii homini, notitiis communis) is a consequence of the Aristotelian criticism of Plato. According to the method of thought expounded more specially in the Phaedo and the central books of the Republic, the work of science begins with the provisional assumption of a theory (σύστασις) to account for a group of observed facts. If the observed facts (τὰ φαινόμενα) agree with the results of deduction from the σύστασις, the "appearances" are said to be "saved" by the theory, and it is so far vindicated. It may still, however, be called in question, and in that case will have to be defended by being deduced from some more ultimate premises which the impugner himself admits. It thus becomes a task for science (as it should say, metaphysics), the highest science of all, to make a critical examination of the provisional assumptions (the unproved postulates) of all the other sciences and to discover the assumptions on which unobjectionable presuppositions of all knowledge. Aristotle, insisted, as against this view, that the special postulates of each science must be self-evident when once they have been formulated. For the Stoics, this doctrine, that every science depends upon self-evident universal premises, created a difficulty, as in their theory of knowledge they were, unlike Aristotle, extreme sensationalists, regarding particular sense-perceptions as the foundation of all knowledge. They were accordingly obliged to provide some criticism or test by which those universal propositions which are valid generalizations from sensation may be distinguished from those which are not. An obvious test suggested itself. Generalizations which are made only by certain special groups of men or by particular individuals may fairly be supposed to be due to temperamental, educational, national, or racial bias; those which appear to be made without exception by all men, no matter how widely they differ in temperament, education, national traditions, social institutions, may be presumed to be formed spontaneously, and therefore naturally, i.e. as a consequence of the intrinsic character of the mind. It is thus reasonable to regard these generalizations as true and thus to take the consensus gentium as the best guarantee for the truth of a belief. The Stoic συνήθεις, 'common' notions, are thus innate in the very sense in which Descartes afterwards used the word. It is only the theory that becomes into the world with them already present, but that the formation of them is due to the normal development of intelligence independently of any kind of bias. As the modern formulation of such common notions the Stoics instanced the beliefs, which they held to be common to all mankind, 'that there are gods and that they care for us.' All this passed over, mainly through the xảy, into the natural theology of the 17th century. This explains why modern natural theologians have often been anxious to prove the universal diffusion

1 Diels, p. 725, 26 = Diels, Fragmenta der Vorschriften; Berlin, 1912, ii. 285, 8.
2 Diels, p. 325, 337. 3 Diels, p. 725, topic. 4 Diels, p. 725, 337. 5 Diels, p. 725, 337. 6 Diels, p. 725, 337.
of the belief in God and why their ethics have often laid great stress on travellers' reports which have been supposed to indicate the existence of 'atheistic' savages. The Stoics themselves, in appealing to universal agreement, did not, of course, mean that the sporadic appearance of individual atheists. This could be accounted for as the consequence of individual prejudices due to improper education and 'unnatural' institutions. We may perhaps see demonstrated was merely that belief in God and Providence is too widely diffused to be regarded as anything but a spontaneous and 'natural' conviction. The position taken by apologetics who deny that there has ever been a single convinced and sincere atheist is an exaggeration of the Stoic doctrine.

It may be added that the degradation of the argument from design or 'intentional causality' into the crude form which it assumes in so much of our popular apologetics is mainly due to the extravagant exaltation of man by the Stoic philosophy. With Plato and Aristotle teleology merely simplifies what the world of historical events and processes is so ordered that it realizes an end which has absolute intrinsic worth. It is to the Stoics that we owe the coarsening of the thought into the assertion that man's concommitant and comfort are the intrinsic and absolute good which is the end realized by the cosmic processes. Thus they maintained that plants and animals exist equally to furnish man with food and pleasant luxuries. Forbry's 2 quotes from Chrysippus the statement that 'the gods made us for ourselves and one another, but animals for us, the horses to help us in war and the dog in hunting, leopards, bears, and lions, to please ourselves in value upon. The pig was for eating, the rabbit for hunting, and God mixed it with its flesh like a seasonning to make it readily digestible for us. Shell fish of all kinds and birds he contrived that we might have no lack of soup and entrails.' According to Pindar's ideas, Chrysippus carried things so far that he asserted in his work υπερ θεον that God made beasts to prevent us from sleeping too long and mice to teach us to take proper care of our cupboards.

7. Neo-Platonism.—In any account of the popular theism of antiquity prominence would have to be given to the more Platonicizing Roman Stoics, such as Seneca, and to the earnest defence of the ethical side of theism by writers like Pindarch and his contemporary Maximus of Tyre. From the point of view with which deal with the theistic problem are specially interesting, as his determination to treat Providence and the moral government of the world by God as serious moral issues, free from any critical or acute criticism to be found only of the perfunctory desis of Epicurus but also of the Stoic pantheistic necessitarianism (especially in the essay τοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ ζητοῦσαν, which aims at showing that the materialist, pantheism, and determinism of Zeno and Chrysippus are inconsistent with their moral optimism and professed belief in an ethical Providence). Interesting, however,

2 For a classic statement of the general Stoic view of the place of God in the scheme of things see, besides the famous Ιεράμα of Cleanthes preserved in Stoics, Ec. 1. 2, 12, p. 32, (critical text in von Arno, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, i. 121 ff., also J. Adam, Texte to Illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle, London and New York, 1895, p. 541, the fragment Προφητείαν Αριστοτελεῖα (Stoics, The Fragments of Zenon and Cleanthes, Cambridge, 1911), the eloquent conclusion of [Aristotle] de Mundo, 307, 19 ff.] The latter gives the Protagonist version and betrays Academic influence by ending with a direct quotation from the 'admirable Plato' of Laws, 718 E-719 A. Of philosophical exposition, based mainly on Epicurean ideas, are too well known to require special mention.

3 It is significant, as Bernard has remarked, that the very word 'teleology', as its form shows, is derived not directly from τελειος, but from the adjective τελείω, 'whole,' 'complete.'

4 De Abstinentiis, iii. 30.

5 Cf. Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 37: 'Sed etiam Chrysippus, ut certe sophistica per quam quidem non omnino omnia aliorum causae esse generat pateat.' See fra Reges et personae quae tanta magnitudine ceterum omnia aliorum causae esse generat; talibus exiguis in oppositionibus generat, animantes autem hominum... Ipsi autem hominum est ad mundum contemplandum et imitationem.'

6 De Stoicorum regionum, 1044 C.

as this theological literature is to the historian of Platonism, it cannot be said to add anything of value to philosophical theism. The Neo-Platonic school, founded in Rome by Plotinus (c. A.D. 205-270), worked out for the first time a thoroughly metaphysical theism which provided the philosophical basis for the Christian theism of the whole Middle Ages. For the purposes of the present article it will be most convenient to reproduce the main features of this doctrine as it is presented by the great systematizer of the school, Proclus (A.D. 410-485), in his Συγκεκισμένα Θεολογία, Rudiments of Platonist Theology. 1 In what follows nothing will be quoted from Plotinus which does not form part of the teaching of the whole Neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onwards.

In Plato's own theology, or at least in the statement of it which he gives in his writings, as we have seen, God is not quite all that the Christian theist has usually meant by God. God is the supremely good 'soul' and the source, it appears, of all existents other than Himself. But we are not positively told what is the relation of God to the supreme principles of the Platonic system, the forms ('θόν, 'θέλης) or numbers, and in the mythical picture-language of the Timaeus these forms (or numbers) are not thought of as part of the divine.)

God; they are the pre-existing model or pattern which God contemplates in fashioning the world of finite existents, or, as Plato calls it, the world of 'becoming.' 1 There is no warrant anywhere in Plato for the psychological interpretation which has been put on his language since the time of Philo of Alexandria, which makes the forms into thoughts of the divine mind. This means in modern language that, although God is the source of actuality, He is not unambiguously held to be also the source of all real possibility. In Neo-Platonism the further step is taken. God is thought of as the absolute principle of everything, and the world of existents as dependent on Him not only for its actuality but also for all its possibilities. God is no longer regarded as a soul or even as a mind, but is simply identified as once with the Good which is described in Republic, bk. vi., as the source of 'being and knowledge,' though itself 'on the other side of both being and knowledge, and with the whole of actuality, as Plato regarded as the ὅρα, or formal element, in the forms themselves and as the same thing as the Good. 2 The one thus becomes in Neo-Platoninism a transcendent and immutable source both of actuality and of real possibility (of existences and of 'essences'), is connected with the actual world by the Neo-Platonic theory of causality. The theory is commonly known as that of emanation, and the beneficent and beneficent power of emanation is with Platonism and Proclus only a metaphor, and the

1 There is no good critical edition of this important work. The best detached excerpts of Stoic philosophy, based mainly on Euphranor's and other works, are too well known to require special mention.

2 Metaphys. 1036 a 17: 'Ὤ τὸ πάντοτε οὐκ οὐκ αὑτόν ἐὰν τὸν κόσμον ἀληθῶς μαθήματα καθίστατο, ὡς ἰδιότητα ἀληθείας, τὸν κόσμον ἀληθείας ἀληθείας ἀληθείας.'

3 Here we have the origin of the distinction, which is found in theology, and of the familiar scholastic doctrine that nothing whatever can be added to God, as in the case of the creature, as well as of the proposition Deus est unum esse; i.e., in God the distinction between essence and essencing, valid for every other existent, ceases to have any meaning. It is from this last thought that the famous ontological argument for the being of God was designed to take its origin.
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theory requires to be explained a little more fully, as the remainder involves the entire method of the Middle Ages but is tacitly presupposed in the famous attempt of Descartes to establish the existence of God in the Third Meditation. Causality, as understood by the Neo-Platonists, does not necessarily involve the existence of a producer ( τὸ παράγωγον) and something of which the act is the ( πρώτον) being, which is itself a relative term between substantial terms, not between events. The relation is dyadic and subsists between a producer ( τὸ παράγωγον) and something of which the act is the ( πρώτον) being, which is itself a relative term between substantial terms, not between events. The cause of anything is the ground not merely of the existence of that thing but of its being what it is and having the character it has (κατὰ τὸ γέγονέν αὐτῷ, κατὰ τὸ γέγονέν αὐτῷ, κατὰ τὸ γέγονέν αὐτῷ). Causality is a relation of 'participation' (μέτακδια) or 'likeness'; i.e., the effect (τὸ παράγωγον), since it derives the fact that it is and its whole quality from the cause (κατὰ τὸ γέγονέν αὐτῷ), is like the cause but in a less perfect form.1

The Neo-Platonic theology is strictly creativistic, not in the popular sense of regarding the world as having been made at a divine fiat, but in the sense of the ineradicable philosophical sense of maintaining the causal dependence of everything in the world upon God and upon God alone. What 'really is' and what 'becomes' form a historical sequence of the continuations of the existences containing them, 'eminently' in the One, each member of the hierarchy, according as they are removed from God, exhibiting the wholes in a less perfect way. Proclus adds the further point that the causal activity of the higher principles extends far beyond the level of being on the scale of being than that of those below them.2 The One, or God, as we have seen, is 'above being' and is absolutely simple, not because it is void of character, but just because all perfection is completely and perfectly united and interpenetrant in it.3 The reason why the One creates as it does is that the One is essentially active. It must 'overflow,'4 that which is immediately produced by the 'overflowing' is noes, 'intelligence' or 'understanding.' Or rather, since the fundamental interiority of the One appears to itself, it produces itself in the form of a dualism, it is seen together with the objects it conceives, οἱ ἡγούμενοι, the connected system of scientific concepts. The two are inseparably united as 'bodies' (τὰ σώματα). The One creates all outside itself; for it is not 'behind itself.' But the soul is, 'they are a realm of 'things-in-themselves,' for which Neo-Platonism has no room. As mind or understanding is an imperfect image or mirroring of the divine One, so soul is a further image or mirroring of mind. And mind and soul together make up in the Neo-Platonic the whole system of ἁρμονία, real things. Bodies, the natural world as disclosed through the senses, are images of soul and are properly not ἁρμονία but γνώσις; they are not, they become 'τὰ ἡγούμενα,' they are 'appearances,' though we must remember that they are a reflection of the existences containing them.5 Below these real shadows of real things, just as beneath the stars above the real things themselves, stands that 'shadow of a shade,' ἡμέρα δια θάλασσα, bare stuff,' which neither is nor appears, and, as a mere possibility of something better than itself, cannot be called as a real body.6 Besides being causally dependent on God, the series of ἁρμονία are all interconnected with the One by some sort of 'inversion' or 'reflection.' The effect not merely proceeds from its cause, but is inverted or reflected back into its cause. This is, in fact, a consequence of the identification of the First Cause with the universal Good. For the good of anything is that to

union with which the thing in question aspires, and the universal Good is therefore, according to the old definition, that of τὸ κράτος τῶν, 'that which all things go for.' As all things have their sense in God, so all things find their end or completion in Him. In soul and mind, the process of inversion takes place, as Proclus puts it, ἐν κύριον ἀπερίπτωσις, 'in every act or knowledge.

It is in turning back on their source that all the problems of being are produced. They come by self-knowledge, and are thus inverted into themselves as well as into other things. God gets to know itself in learning to know itself, and so learns its own true nature in contemplation of the One. In both cases self-knowledge is got by reaching out of one's self towards the higher and the transcendence of God, though it is so complete that we may not even pretend the 'being' of Him, in no way interferes with the truth that the whole world 'lives and has its being' in God and has no origin or support but God.3 The monotheism of this philosophy of religion is, of course, more affected by the belief of the Neo-Platonists in an elaborate hierarchy of superhuman beings whom they call θεῶν but the monotheism of Christians by the belief in the various orders of the angelic hierarchy, or that of Milton by his application of the title 'god' to the fallen angels in Paradise Lost.

It should be particularly observed that the Neo-Platonic school, by definitely making the One its God and teaching that the One is 'beyond being,' is committed to them as against pantheism. The world is in the One, but, precisely because the effect is only an imperfect mirroring of its cause, it would not be true to say in the same sense that the One is in the world. The relation between God and the world is that of one-sided dependence. God, or the One, produces τέκνα, πνεύματα, and bodies; they do not produce the One. In fact, in the mythology of the Eleusinian cult, Proclus the ἐγκύκλιος ἐστι occupies the lowest rank among the orders of beings to which he gives the name 'god,' thus corresponding to some of the middle ranks of the mediavel hierarchy of angels.7

Anselm.—As is well known, when the Christian Church began to feel the need of a philosophical foundation for its theology, it sought that foundation primarily in Aristotle and Boethius, and through the influence of the supposedly Dionysius the Areopagite, a superficially Christianized version of the theological and angelological speculations of Proclus. The Neo-Platonic system of the One as the source of all being thus became part and parcel of orthodox Christian thought. It is this conception that St. Anselm assumes in his famous attempt to prove the existence of God by an argument which, in one form or another, has been a centre of philosophical controversy from the date of its first becoming generally known to our own day—the so-called 'ontological proof' of the existence of God. St. Anselm's own formulation of his argument will be found in chs. 2-3 of the little tract, written before he was driven from his monastery at Bee, to which he gave originally the name Fides suae intellectus et audiendi et afterwards that of De essentia. The object of the reasoning is to show that the existence of God is in fact an immediately evident truth. Uncertainty about God's existence is possible only as long as we are unaware of the true meaning of the word Deus. The argument, as given by Anselm, runs thus. By 'God' we

1. The technical phrase of Proclus is that the characters which exist exist γινώσκοντες—i.e., so as to be properly predicable of it—in the effect exist οὐκ ἐγένετο, i.e., so as to be properly predicable of it in the cause. The fundamental way of putting the matter is to say that what exists formaliter—as constituting the forms or essences—in the effect exists eminenter or eminently mode, 'in a more excellent manner,' in its cause. It is in virtue of this doctrine that the philosophical theology of Neo-Platonism and orthodoxy Chalcedon describes a position for God on the outside. Though we may not predicate of God any 'perfection' or 'virtue,' yet, since all creatures are produced solely by God, we may say that their perfections are in God 'in a more excellent manner.' Hence, though we are forbidden to predicate anything univocally of God and a creature, we are permitted to reason per analogiam from beauty, wisdom, power, to the existence of the super-excellent beauty, power, wisdom, goodness in the Creator.

2. This is intended to justify in particular the view that 'bare noes' cannot be produced by mind or soul, is still created by the One, and so to get rid of the dualism of Proclus.

3. So the schoolmen maintain, on the same ground, that each attribute of God, power, wisdom, and the rest, is God.

4. Bodies are incapable of 'inversion into self,' and they are not inverted into their immediate cause, but are emitted, as of τὸ κράτος τῶν, 'that which all things go for.' As all things have their sense in God, so all things find their end or completion in Him. In soul and mind, the process of inversion takes place, as Proclus puts it, γνώσις, 'as a source, or knowledge.

5. When Gregory of Nyssa makes his Neo-Platonic philosopher misquote St. Paul as saying that it is God who 'lives and has its being' in man, he is, in effect, giving the opposite of the doctrine that he is criticizing.

6. For the sources of the preceding paragraphs see Proclus, Institutio Theologica, prop. 1-40 (unity and plurality), 7-14 (causation, the good), 15-30 ("inversion"), 31, 32, 34, 35-40.
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mean ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived.’ It seems that a doubt may be felt about the existence of anything answering to this definition, since Scripture tells us that the fool has said in his heart (i.e. has thought) that there is a God. Anselm, in reply to such a ‘fool’ who doubts, argues as follows. Even the fool who doubts or denies the existence of ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ must understand what the ‘greater’ is. Three things he can doubt or deny that there is such a thing. 1 Thus it is certain that God, as defined, is in intellectu—a phrase which means simply that the words ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ have a definite meaning. But, if God were only in intellectu (i.e., if there were no object answering to the definition), we could think of something greater than God, for we could at least conceive that something was thinkable but real. 2 Thus the argument is that, if ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ exists only in intellectus, ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ is not something than which nothing greater can be conceived, and this is a formal contradiction in terminis. It follows therefore that God cannot be conceived at one’s convenience and at one’s discretion that God cannot be conceived not to exist. How then can it be true that the fool ‘has said in his heart’ that God does not exist? Only in the sense that the fool supposed no sense or mistaken sense to the words ‘God.’ 3 These few lines contain the whole of the famous ‘proof’; the rest of the pamphlet is really taken up with the identification of ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ with the universal God.

Before going any further, it may be well to make one or two reflections on the general character of the argument as given by its originator. This, the second, is the necessity of Anselm’s reasoning is not quite identical with that of Descartes, who gives his own ontological proof in his Pensees Meditation, and it is principally from Kant’s criticism of Descartes’ argument that the ontological proof is known to modern students of philosophy. It will be noted that Anselm expressly presupposes the Neo-Platonic conception of God; it is the One of Photinus and Pelagius of which he undertakes to prove the reality. We should also observe that Anselm for the first time attempts a proof which is a priori in the proper sense of the phrase. The existence of the world is not one of the premises of his reasoning, whereas with the Neo-Platonists the reality of the world is the starting point of all argument. Again, it is no valid retort to Anselm to urge that he depends upon a definition that must be free from all determination, or that he is not simply from a definition, since all definitions are merely conventions about the meaning of a sign. Anselm is not, of course, concerned with the truth of this account of definitions or to maintain that men are not free to attach any meaning they choose to the sign Deus. The real question is whether among all our concepts there is just one, the concept of ‘an x such that nothing greater than x can be conceived,’ which implies as part of its meaning the actual existence of the corresponding object. It seems to the writer of this article that Anselm is at least right in maintaining that, if we can frame the concept ‘thing than which no greater can be conceived,’ we are bound to think of the object thus conceived as actual. To admit that what we are accustomed to think may be false is fatal to all philosophy and all science, and no exception can be taken to Anselm’s argument on the ground that it excludes such an ultimate solipsism. The really difficult question is rather whether there is any such concept as ‘thing than which no greater can be conceived.’ 4

1 Certe ideam ipsa insipienti, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dio . . . intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu est praebendum quod non potest intelligi illud esse (Proslogion, c. 2).
2 Convincitur ergo etiam insipienti esse rei in intellectu aliquid, quo nihilo majus cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligitur; et quod intelligitur in intellectu est. Et certe, id, quo magis cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu simpliciter, sed rei in intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod non est (66, ch. 2).
3 Hoc autem est quod non magis cogitari non potest ut nec cogitari posse non esset: et hoc est in, Domine Deus noster (66, ch. 2).
4 Nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est; licet haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla, aut contra illud, simpliciter, intelligit (c. 2).
5 Hobbies and others raised this question very pertinently when they replied to Descartes’ argument from our possession of an ‘idea of God’ that we possess no ‘idea of God.’

problem is not whether, granting that Anselm’s definition of God has a meaning, the actual existence of God is included in that meaning, but whether the words given as the definition have a meaning at all or are not rather, like the words, e.g., ‘lines so crooked that none crookeder can be conceived’ or ‘rational fraction so small that no rational fraction can be conceived.’ This is the difficulty which we shall find arising in connexion with every version of the ontological argument which has been given by metaphysicians. Whatever we may think on this point, it is plain that a proof of the Anselmian type is not what is ordinarily rendered by proof or demonstration. Its real object is not to deduce the existence of God, though it might be true that Anselm did not have this in mind, but to find a definition of God such that, when the definition is substituted for the definition, the proposition ‘There is one and only one God’ is seen to be self-evident. The real function of the argument is, like that of an Aristotelian ‘induction,’ not to demonstrate something, but to ‘point something out.’

Anselm’s argument was at once subjected to severe criticism by his contemporary Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, in his ‘Apology for the Fool’ (Libre pro Insipiente), a tract which more than sustains comparison for real能men with the better-known criticisms of the Critique of Pure Reason. Gaunilo remarks that it is one of the premises of the Anselmian argument that ad quod nullius cogitari potest exists at least in the intellectus even of the atheistic fool. It is assumed that God exists in intellectus, and the only point discussed is whether a definition of God so understood is self-evident. But what is meant by this statement? It may mean only that the fool understands the meaning of the statement ‘God exists.’ But we understand the meaning of a definition of God, even if we do not consider it to be true. Hence the existence of God is not proved by simply urging that we know what the theist means when he says that God exists. To make the argument valid, it is not enough that the fool cannot understand what the theist means without also seeing that his assertion is true, and Gaunilo denies that Anselm has established this point. Arguing, not as an empiricist, but from Neo-Platonic premises common to himself with Anselm, he urges that in point of fact we have no positive adequate concept of God; and it adds nothing to our information to be told that God is greater than all the things of which we have positive concepts.

So far Gaunilo (who has been oddly mistaken by some modern critics for an empiricist) is simply calling attention to the negative or agnostic side of the theology common to himself with Anselm against the positive, and it is significant of his real purpose, which is that of a mystic rather than of an empiricist, that he attacks the conception of God as ‘than which nothing greater can be conceived’ by the very different phrase ‘than which is greater than all which can be conceived.’ He then concludes as follows: Even if I admit, what is itself questionable, that I understand the meaning of the phrase ‘something which is greater than all which can be conceived,’ Anselm’s argument cannot force me to admit that there really is such a thing. All that the argument proves is that it would be inconsistent to admit that there is such a thing and at the same time to deny its reality, since, if it is not real, it is not greater than things which we consider as real. But the ‘fool’ is not really convicted of this inconsistency, since all that he admits is, at the outside, that he understands the sense of the words ‘something greater than all that can be conceived.’ To make Anselm’s argument cogent, some proof ought to be supplied that this something actually exists. If this proof is once forthcoming, Anselm’s further demonstration that the something in question is all that God is.

1 Neque enim rem ipsam quae Deus est, novit! (Pro Insipiente, c. 3).
2 Nec propter aliter situm in intellecto non constat illud haberi, cum audire intelligere dicantem esse aliquum non esse quem valerent cogitare! (66, ch. 14).
held to be will be valid. It is to illustrate this second point that Gaunilo introduces the reference to the famous lost island by which he is principally remembered. If this lost island were described to me as large and better than any inhabited land, I should readily understand the meaning of the words, and the lost island would be 'in my understanding' in the same sense in which God may be said to be in the understanding of the fool. But it would be idle to entertain a notion that it really exist somewhere in the ocean because it would otherwise not be, as by definition it is, richer than all habitable lands. Finally he contends that it is not, as Anselm had assumed, a *proprium* of God that He can only be thought of as existing. It is true, no doubt, that we who know that God exists cannot think the proposition 'There is no God.' True, but neither can we think any other proposition to be false which we know to be true; e.g., I cannot think it true that I do not exist at this moment, because I know it to be true that I do exist. There may be a sense in which it is possible to think of my own non-existence, but, if there is, it is equally possible, in the same sense, to think of the non-existence of God, even though we know that God does exist. The problem is to discover that part of Hume's criticism that whatever we can think of as existing we can equally think of as not existing, and if sustained is fatal to every argument of the ontological type.

Anselm's reply to his critic is contained in the short *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilionem respondentam pro insipiente*. He points out, naturally enough, that Gaunilo's substitution of the phrase 'that which is greater than everything which can be conceived' for 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' alters the character of the argument, and that Gaunilo's reasoning about the lost island is not a real parallel to his own proof, which, as he insists, is applicable only in the case of the concept 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' What he does not prove, but merely asserts, is that this phrase really has a definite meaning and is not a nonsensical or insignificant sound. On this point he is content to say that even the 'fool' must concede the meaning of the words before he can deny that they stand for a reality.

It is very difficult to follow Anselm here. If his reasoning is sound, it proves only the real existence of God but also the existence (in the Relligenis quaestiones, *principium*) of an equilateral right-angled triangle, fabulous monsters, the greatest of all integers, etc., since it is beyond a doubt that the propositions 'There is no such thing as a round square.' 'There are no fabulous monsters.' 'There is no integer which is the greatest of all integers,' etc., are true; and it may then be argued that, since they are true, round squares, etc., must exist in the intellects of the person who ascerts the proposition. What Anselm is assuming is, as he himself says, that a proposition cannot be understood unless its 'parts' are severally understood. From this he infers that, if 'there is no such thing as a round square' is a significant proposition, a must be a significant term. The assumption is plainly not justified, since my ground for asserting the proposition may be precisely that a has no independent existence. The state of the case, then, seems to be that Anselm's argument certainly proves that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' (or 'that which cannot be conceived in the intellect') exists in re, it also exists in re. But the question whether it exists in intellectum remains undecided.

9. Thomas Aquinas.—The history of the subsequent fortunes of Anselm's theistic argument is a highly interesting one. In the 15th cent., the golden age of scholastic philosophy, it was widely known. Nor was it confined merely to the world of intellectuals. In the main the mediæval philosophers seemed to have been disposed to accept it until it was rejected as a sophism by St. Thomas, whose great authority has ever since discredited it. The principal 13th cent. texts relative to the subject have been edited with an acute commentary by the Benedictine Augustin Daniels. It is a singular fact that, though all the teachers of the second half of the 13th cent. seem to have adopted Anselm's argument, they made their attitude to Anselm's argument clear, no theologian of the 12th cent. appears to have taken any account of it. The most probable explanation of this silence must be that of Daniels, that the circulation of the *Proslogion* and the work unknown to theologians in general until well on into the 13th cent. It is certainly not true, as is sometimes said, that acceptance of the argument was confined to the Oxford and Franciscan schools. Of the fifteen scholastics whose writings are examined by Daniels, three (one of whom is Albert the Great) express no opinion on the validity of the proof, ten (including Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, and Scotus) accept it, only two (Richard of Middleton and St. Thomas) reject it. These facts seem to show that the general position of St. Thomas is that which we should expect from a philosopher whose thought has been moulded by Neo-Platonism and partly by Aristotelianism. He holds that the existence of God can be, and has been, sufficiently proved *a posteriori*, by reasoning from the works of God to their Author, and consequently he accepts as valid both the argument from the necessity of an unmoved First Mover (the Aristotelian argument) and the argument from design, in the wide sense of an argument from final or intentional causality (the Platonic argument from order and intelligibility in the world to an intelligent Creator). But he rejects altogether and on principle the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God *a priori* (from a mere consideration of the content of the concept of God).

The most important of the relevant passages in the works of Thomas are the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae*, qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. His own view on this question is that the proposition is self-evident if the *essentia* of God is once adequately known, but, since in this life we do not behold the *essentia* of God, His existence is not self-evident to our understanding. It is not immediately evident to us that there is anything 'than which a greater cannot be conceived,' or that 'God cannot be thought not to exist'; on this point St. Thomas is in complete agreement with Aquinas. Aquinas's argument, in fact, is a sophism arising from failure to distinguish between that which is notus per se simpliciter and that which is known non sotnentes, evident to us. For *simpliciter* it is self-evident that God exists, since what God is *esse* ('cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est sua summa esse; i.e., God's essence or what is identical'), but because we cannot conceive what God is, it remains unknown relatively to our intellects; i.e., all that would hold is that we cannot think of such an object without absurdity. So Thomas argues against Anselm that there is no logical absurdity in supposing the non-existence of God's essence; and even in such a case he holds that it is self-evident in much the same language in the article of the *Summa Theologiae* already referred to. Thomas's own 'a priori' demonstration of the existence of God can be demonstrated *a posteriori*, by reasoning

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2 Contra Gent. i. 11.
3 qu. ii. art. 2.
pendent of his reversion to the mathematical and mechanical standpoint in physics and would have been equally strong if he had adopted any other type of physical doctrine. The theism of Descartes is, in fact, dictated by two considerations—his unqualified acceptance of the principle of the causal efficacy of God and his adherence to the conception of the 'Perfect Being' as the only adequate object of the understanding, and therefore the 'natural good' of national belief, as used by Kant and the other French Rationalists (cf. Dante's phrase). He is a theist, not because he holds the mechanical view of nature, but for the same more ultimate reason which leads him to hold that view, that he is, in fact, in the whole Platonic succession, a rationalist and consequently regards the knowledge of the 'Supreme Being' as the culmination of science. The actual proofs of theism returned to the idea of the Infinite Being. It must be stated we have the a posteriori proof in the special form of an argument from our possession of the idea of God to the existence of God as the cause of the idea. This is, of course, strictly on Neo-
Platonic lines. In any case, it is the a posteriori proof which turns out to be, in principle, a restatement of the Anselmian argument with a modification which is by now familiar. The well-known argument of the third Meditation runs thus. I have an 'idea' of the 'Perfect' or 'Infinite' Being. My possession of this 'idea' is from an act of reason, and not from some physical or natural explanation. The explanation cannot be that I am myself the Perfect and Infinite Being and that the idea is derived from my immediate awareness of myself, because I am aware of myself as, in many ways, defective and limited. It is not derived from acquaintance with other persons, and no one knows himself so well as himself. Nor is it all no less limited and finite than myself; and it has not been obtained by an imaginative combination of the various perfections I have observed separately in different existent things, for internal simplicity is itself one of the perfections which I think of as constituting the 'Infinite Being'. Nor again is it 'infinite', a merely negative expression. (If it were, it might, of course, be objected that, when I say 'infinite', that word corresponds to the word.) For in the order of logic the infinite is prior to the finite. If I had not already an intelligible concept of infinity, I could not even be aware of my own finiteness. There is thus only one possible cause of my possession of this idea of the Infinite Being. It must be the effect of a really existing Infinite Being, who possesses eminensur or formulator all the perfections which my idea of the Infinite Being contains objectively, i.e., by way of representation. God therefore exists, and my idea of God may be said to be the mark which the Creator has stamped on reality at the greatest moment. It may be added that, to argue the point even more generally, I who have this idea could not exist if the object of the idea did not also exist. For at this time no one considers the existence of the infinite. It may be urged that my parents are my creators, and their parents in turn their creators, we fall into the infinite regress. Thus the mere fact of the existence of any finite thing is proof of the existence of the Infinite Being; i.e., if anything whose existence requires an external cause exists (and the Cartesian deduction assures me of the existence of at least one such thing), there exists also a Supreme Being whose existence requires no external cause (another form of the argument called by St. Thomas the argument from possibility and necessity).

The argument from my possession of an idea of God is Descartes' own substantial contribution to the philosophy of theism. It must be carefully distinguished from the Simple Appeal to the conscious genus. Descartes' critics were not really hitting a blot in his reasoning when they said that savages and atheists do not object to the objection to Descartes' own explanation, that he only meant that, given the knowledge of myself from which I proceed, my analysis is sufficient to lead to the concept of an Infinite Being, is a sufficient refutation. He seems to be equally right in his contention that the concept of an Infinite Being is logically implied in my recognition of my own finitude, just as H. Green remarks, 'the very concept of something possibly better implies the conception of a Best.' The real point of weakness in the argument for our present writer can see, lies elsewhere. Descartes is clearly right in maintaining that the concept of a Being who combines all perfections or excellences in the same individual is a concept not formed by a process of synthesis; it is clearly obtained by
the process of ‘passing to the limit,’ of which mathematical reasoning furnishes so many examples. But we are not really authorized to infer from our ability to conceive the limit of a series of lengths that we are authorized to conceive a given sum a limiting value. Whether a series or a sum has a limiting value is a question that must be decided by a special case: it is notorious that mathematicians down to a very recent date have been repeatedly led into fallacies by the uncontrolled manipulation of infinite series. A given sum of the terms of a series is, if we suppose this sum to be finite, it does not follow of itself that the series consists of existents, since the question of the possibility of forming the sum is one that arrangement of perfection (assuming such perfection to be possible), must have an actual upper limit. Thus, the very point which ought to be proved, and has not been proved. Descartes himself was presumably led to ignore the difficulties by the laxness with which he employs the word idea to cover all the ideas of a system, and the Commentaries When once he has allowed himself to call an idea a judgment, his propositions can have no validity to their meaning be represented as asserting or denying a predicate of a subject is an important question for formal logic; but seems to have no relevance to theology. If there is no predicate in the proposition ‘God exists,’ it must be held, on the same ground, that there is no predicate in such a proposition as ‘Joseph dreams’ or ‘Eau hume’ or ‘The rich man died.’ Per contra, if dreaming is a predicate of these propositions (as Kant, who professed to regard logic as a science created perfect by Aristotle, seems to hold, and presumably did hold), existence is a predicate, in the special case of the case ‘per Pascifl’ existent (whether existence be regarded as a predicate or not) can be asserted to be part of the meaning of a concept whether there is really so much difference as Descartes makes (or at least as Anselm and Descartes may be doubted. Certainly the definition from which Anselm starts

(1) the name of Anselm occurs neither in the Objections nor in Descartes’ Reply. Apparently both he and his critic know the Anselmian argument only at second hand, as through Thomas. Descartes’ point, to be strictly accurate, is that his own argument turns wholly on the contention that concepts in general are predicated of a corresponding object, but the concept of God contains the necessary existence of God.

11. II. — With Spinozas’s attempt to give a pantheistic turn to the Neo-Platonic and Cartesian lines of thought it is not necessary to concern ourselves further than to remark that the whole of the First Part of the Ethics is logically no better than a one long petitio. The first, third, and sixth of the definitions already contain the two assumptions, that God is = substance = cause sui and that cause sui which is defined as ‘that which the nature cannot be conceived but as existing’ exists. Where the whole doctrine has thus been taken for granted by arbitrary definition, it is really superfluous to add anything in the way of ‘proof,’ even if the ‘proofs’ themselves were more free than they are from formal logical fallacy. What Spinoza never evades considering is the question, which is really fundamental, whether the definition of causa sui is more than a ‘meaningless’ one.

One particularly glaring example of Spinoza’s singular carelessness about his initial definitions may be noted. He has been taken from Descartes’ Meditation X, the section of the system, that of causa sui (i.e. ad infinitum of Proclus). Now, by calling a thing a substance or a cause, Proclus means exactly what they said, that it ‘causes’ or ‘produces’ itself (opus omnis). Hence they confined the term ad infinitum to minds (or ‘substances’) and rejected the idea that the One, or God, having no cause, being unproduced, is not ad infinitum; i.e. they, understood the proposition ‘God exists’ in a positive sense. Theologians had done the same thing: as Arnauld said in the De Descartes’ Meditation X, no theologian would admit that God is as positive tanquam causa a causa but that most God must be said to be a in a purely negative sense, i.e. in the sense that He is not an a causa, in Spinoza’s sense (it causas sui). Spinoza succeeds in appearing to satisfy our demand for an object of religious adoration only by a constant equivocation. It defines causa sui (i.e. ad infinitum) in the positive Neo-Platonic sense as ‘id cuius essentia immutabilis est’ (Deo vero esse est quod est), and then asserts of it all that Neo-Platonism had asserted of the uncaused One. To put the point rather differently, it defines God as ‘that whereof the essence implies existence and transfers to God, so defined, what theologians had asserted in the One in whom the distinction between essentia and essentia in essentia is negated. The purpose in the first sentence of the Ethisches: ‘Per causam sui intelligi id cuius natura non potest concebri existendi, sic id cuius natura non potest concebri existendi.’

12. Locke. — Locke’s polemick, which he regards as having an evidence ‘equal to mechanical certainty’ though in science orthodoxy, is in its general character of the Neo-Platonic type. He does not refer to the a priori or ontological argument, and refuses to pronounce any opinion on Descartes’ own special argument from our possession of an idea of God except to remark that ‘It is an ill way of establishing this truth and silence atheists to lay the whole stress of importance a point as this upon that sole foundation.’ (As the context shows, Locke thinks that it would be a true and relevant criticism of Descartes to say that some men have no idea, and others false ideas, of God.) Locke is not quite clear whether Locke regards the certainty of being equal to the certainty with which we have actually perceived facts or the fact of our own existence. He says that we have more certainty of it ‘than of any of our senses having now discovered to us,’ and again that ‘we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else without us.’ This certainty looks as if Locke held (as Descartes did not) that the existence of God is less certain than our own, and
possibly less certain than that of the actual and present sense-perception. But it is also possible to believe that he only means that our certainty in the last two cases is immediate, but that in the first depends on an ability, not found in all men, to follow the steps of deductive reasoning. He may not intend to suggest that, to the man who can perform the deduction, its conclusion is inferior in certainty to any immediate cognition, 'intuitive' or 'sensitive'.

Leibniz's own proof is the usual a posteriori one based on the possibility of causality and the empirical proposition (guaranteed by the cogito) that something (viz., myself) exists. It is also assumed, as usual, that a cause must contain more reality or perfection than any of its effects, as the Neo-Platonists had argued. The argument then becomes this: I exist; therefore I must have a cause; this cause cannot be 'bare nothing'; therefore it is a posteriori existing. Since 'bare nothing' cannot be the cause of anything, therefore the cause of my own existence and that of all other existents must be eternal. (The impossibility of the endless regress and the 'contingency of the world' are not mentioned, but are of course tacitly presupposed.) An effect can exist from cause alone. Therefore an 'eternal cause' must be the most powerful of things. (It is assumed that the cause has not only as much 'substance' as the effect, but more, and further that there can be only one 'eternal cause'—a point which Locke is hardly satisfied by his own argument to assume.) There is instilled in myself, the effect, and therefore there is intelligence (of a higher degree) in the cause. The 'eternal cause', is thus revealed by its effects: and the concept of an eternal cause itself can be recognized in all the causes we meet. This, however, is not sufficient: for even if the concept of 'eternal cause' can be recognized in all the causes we meet, it is not sufficient to show that the concept of God is a genuine concept, i.e. that it contains no contradiction, i.e. that it does not attempt to unite incompatible constituents.1 Leibniz thinks that this can be shown by the consideration that the 'most real being' is necessarily a unique being—having the being of whom no simple positive predicate can be denied. (Any being of whom a positive simple predicate can be denied would neither be the being of whom such a predicate stands.) Now, all complex predicates can be removed from the concept of the 'most real being', and all positive simple predicates are compatible in a single subject just because they are all positive. If any two predicates are incompatible, they can both be removed from the concept of the 'most real being'.

13. Leibniz.—Leibniz's treatment of the subject is far more adequate. In his system, at least as represented in his best known works, the proposition 'God exists' holds a unique position. It is a 'truth of fact', and therefore, like all 'truths of fact', synthetic. But it is the only truth of fact which is capable of demonstration. In general, only 'truths of reason', analytic propositions, admit of formal demonstration, because the demonstration of a proposition is nothing but its analysis into simpler propositions which are seen on inspection to be identities. This is why the 'presupposition of causality' (A is not non-A) is regarded by Leibniz as the supreme principle of all truths of reason. Truths of fact (which all assert actual existence) do not fall under the principles of contraduciturus, but under what are called 'natural reason', and thus, with the one exception of the proposition that God exists, they are not analysable into identities and cannot be formally demonstrated. The anomalous character of the proposition 'God exists' vanishes, however, when we discover from the papers published by Costurt,1 that Leibniz's real view was that all truths are analytic, the only difference between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact' being that the former can be resolved into identities by a finite number of steps of analysis, the latter require (like the extraction of the square root of an integer) that an infinite number of intermediate steps.2 It follows that God, being omniscient, knows all truths of fact a priori (i.e. sees them to be identities), just as Leibniz says more than once that God sees 'from eternity' in the 'notion' of Peter that Peter will repent of his denial, and in the 'notion' of Judas that Judas will die impenitent, and that the distinction between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of sense-perception is a distinction in the nature of things. Leibniz's argument is that a priori knowledge is possible: that the a priori is a priori knowledge is possible, that a priori knowledge is possible, that the a priori is possible. It is a priori, quae sua resolvetur in identitatem, quae est contra naturam veritatis quae semper vel ex verbis, vel ex ratione demonstratur esse existens a priori, quae non necessaria posse possit. In the same way, Leibniz's argument is that a priori knowledge is possible: that a priori knowledge is possible, that a priori knowledge is possible, that the a priori is possible. It is a priori, quae sua resolvetur in identitatem, quae est contra naturam veritatis quae semper vel ex verbis, vel ex ratione demonstratur esse existens a priori.

1 Leibniz's 'principle of sufficient reason' is that objects are not only what we perceive them to be, but also what they are by necessity. This means that everything that exists has a reason or cause for its existence, and that the reason for its existence is necessarily always present.

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Leibniz himself at times explaining why the actual world, rather than any other equally possible world, exists, by ascribing to it what he called the "principle of the greatest perfection" (principium maximi efficiendi) and the "principle of the least effort" (principium minimi actionis).

14. Hume. The most important philosophical treatise on the theistic problem between Leibniz and Kant is unmistakably that of Hume in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (written apparently before 1751, though not published until 1777, three years after the author's death). In judging this work it must be borne in mind that it makes no pretence to expound the theology of the author. It is strictly what it purports to be, a conversation between a supporter of philosophical 'natural theology,' Cleanthes, a violent fideist, Demes, intended as a representative of orthodoxy, and a sceptic, Philo. The responsibility for the presentation of the arguments lies with Hume, and we have no warrant for regarding them as the expressions of Cleanthes or Philo, or Demes. Hume's real position in natural theology, as in philosophy in general, seems to be a logical and philosophical consistency with himself, and with the universe and the data of human experience. Hume abandons from his own sympathies except in the final sentence, where he suggests that the 'opinions' (he is careful not to call them 'arguments') of the 'natural theology' are 'less evident' probably nearer to the truth than those of Philo and of Demes. Hume's real position in natural theology, as in philosophy in general, seems to be a logical and philosophical consistency with himself, and with the universe and the data of human experience. He is neither a sensationalist nor a phenomenonalist. He holds that there are insuperable difficulties in the Cartesian rationalism, and that, on the other hand, sensationalism leads to the conclusion that science is an impossibility. Being unable to accept either Cartesianism or sensationalism, and knowing of no third choice in philosophy, he adopts the sensational attitude of 'certain philosophers' and his 'new system.' There can be no question of seriously regarding principles presupposed in all science as false; at the same time Hume confines himself to understanding and rejecting the assumptions of the religious philosophers from the standpoint of the natural philosopher. Hume's work seems to have been the same. It is probably true, and, as the letter to Elliot shows, Hume is very unwilling to believe that his leaning towards it rests on nothing more solid than emotional bias, but the alleged proofs of theism are open to criticisms which Hume does not know how to refute, and there are appearances which it is hard to reconcile with the theistic hypothesis. We have not as yet, as it seems to be wished, had, convincing proof of its truth, though Hume lets us see that personally he inclines to accept it. His attitude is neither that of a zealous 'indulger' to the general 'pagans.' Neither

In form the Dialogues, like some of Plato's greatest works, are reported conversations. A supposed narrator gives his friend Hermippus of the discussions between Cleanthes, Philo, and Demes. The narrator, it should be observed, is a theist. He says: 'What truth so obvious, so certain, as that it is impossible to be in doubt or in error?...

1. Hume's anti-theism is quite incompatible with Hamilton. There is no sign of irony in this utterance, and its seriousness is all the more probable, because Hume proceeds to dwell on the intellectual difference between the characters of the dialogue, assigning an 'accurate translation' to Cleanthes, and 'a very indifferent orthodoxy' to Demes. His obvious intention is to preclude the reader to find in the same object that, until the discussion is near its end, Demes, the zealot for unreasoning faith, is made to regard Philo as the very author of the whole scheme of the theistic argument. The ultimate correspondence between what Cleanthes says about the impossibility of seriously acquiescing in the orthodox teaching of Plato, and what Hume's own utterances to the same effect in the Treatise of Human Nature further help to indicate that we are to take Philo's estimate of the theistic arguments as Hume's estimate of that of his creator. His function is not to refute Cleanthes, but to call attention to the distinction which, as a result of his philosophical experience of 'world-making,' we are not entitled to say that the order in the world presupposes a world-creating intelligence. Cleanthes has rested his case on the old Platonic argument from 'orderly motion'; but has admitted that the argument is one from analogy. Philo replies that there is a sufficient basis for an analogous argument. He further appeals to the difficulties of the 'ineffective Reggie.'

2. The antithesis of cause, why must not that cause have a more ultimate cause, and so on ad infinitum? Cleanthes declines to consider the problem. 'You ask me what is the cause of the cause; I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my enquiry. Let those go farther, who entertain a more curious or more enterprising.' Philo not unnaturally replies: 'I pretend to be neither; and for that very reason, I should never presume to question to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer.'

3. Philo, it must be remembered, is not a theist, though he professes to regard the nature of God as actually unknown. The point at issue between him and Cleanthes is Hume's thesis that the main of the First Cause is not only a kind but also a "mind like the human," and that the theistic argument is an "experimental proof of the existence of God". In either case the points are what Philo disputes and Demes regards as 'anthropo-sceptic.' Herein, Philo, in fact, with equal consis-

ciency, is of opinion that speculative theism is dependent upon the validity of the 'a priori proof.' If we rely solely on the argument from

3. Hume is personally an orthodox Christian. He is, to be sure, unlikely, but there is no reason to suppose that he was much further removed from orthodoxy than more than one of the prominenent 18th cent. landlordinum bishops or Scotch 'moderates,' and in his philosophy he never commits himself to the same extent as do the orthodoxy, or as orthodoxy was understood in his day. Huxley's anti-orthodoxism is quite incompatible with Hamilton, and is quite inconsistent with Hamilton. There is a certain want of definiteness about the position ascribed to Demes. He is spoken of as a deprecator of the power of reason; on the other hand, he is the champion of the 'simple and subtle argument a priori' and an odd attitude for an irrationalist. Hume does not seem to have distinguished between negative theology, the creation of philosophical rationalism, and the scepticism of the doubting philosophers. The great difficulty arises from sheer distrust of reason. Philo's 'scepticism' is quite another thing, a more declarative form of skepticism, which, if advised, he has not sufficient material for a definitive conclusion.

4. Demes is, in fact, so little of a real theologian that he is un-...

5. Hume's exploitation of Philo for an antithetical purpose rests on the false assumption that it is he who is the real 'hero' of the dialogue...
effect to cause, the known effect is not perfect and we are not entitled to infer that its author is free either from intellectual or moral infirmities. What is certain is that it is not the sphere of men, who follow your hypothesis, to judge whether the universe is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position, I can see no single circumstance, and I refer afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost research into fancy, into the evident characteristics of the divine, as a fact, a 'finite deity,' and a finite deity is as bad as none at all. And, if reasoning by analogy be in place at all, analogy suggests that the Deity in the moral world as an animal dwells in God is, as with the Stoics, the soul, and thus we shall be afforded a world (contrary to the position taken by Cicero, who has tacitly assumed that the thing to be accounted for is his origin). Or, again, if the world is more an animal or vegetable than a watch or clock, why should we not infer that worlds are propagated rather than made? A cockroach is 'be the egg' of a solar system. Dorno, and, of course, comments on the absence of any data for such wild theories. But this is exactly the point on which Philo wishes to fix us, 'we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.' It insists, none the less, that such analogies as we have suggest that intelligence itself is caused by physical generation. Generation, itself an unintelligent process, is explained to be a 'primary act of the Deity,' and by it, 'we assert that the infinite intelligence arise from the former (generation), never the former from the latter.' (It is, of course, obvious that Cicero is here making two very questionable assumptions, that the 'rational soul' is generated like the body, and that, because Cicero is not rational, the growth of the one and the instinctive behaviour of the other are not guided by intelligence at all. 'Experience does nothing to assure us of these necessities.' Philo's answer is plain: he relies on the polemical against the 'a posteriori' argument that makes it clear that Cicero, who denies the existence of the 'unrealism' to be established from the all-perfect or 'most real' being. Argument is the only weapon for dealing with the 'a priori' argument by which the existence of the 'existent' is to be established from the nature of its own nature. The existence of this argument is given to Democritus, the man of traditional theology, and the objections against it are put into the mouth of Cicero, who is the upholder of the argument from design, as well as into that of Philo. We now find Cicero's argument and, when we have hitherto had Democritus and Philo combating against Cicero. The particular arguments by Democritus by Democritus is one which Dorno say: more properly to be called a 'posteriori.' It is, in fact, of words it, a combination of two of the forms of the 'a posteriori' argument as admitted by Democritus—the argument from the fact of motion to a First Mover and the argument from the perception of order. Since the infinities require an intelligible, in arguing from effects to causes, we must come to a First Cause, and, when we ask why the 'succession of causes' should be what it is and not a different series, we are forced to answer that the First Cause is a 'necessary-existential Being,' who carries the SEKAI of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction. (This last clause thus puts in the point of the ontological proof under cover of the argument from design; that the justification for calling Democritus's a posteriori. Or Him perhaps means that his argument is based upon the general principle of causality and not on the special character of the effect under consideration, the actual universe.) Cicero argues against the point or the whole of the above objections. (1) No fact can be demonstrated a priori. 'Whatever we experience, we can also conceive as non-existence. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. (Cicero) There is no being whose existence is demonstrable.' This agrees with Thales in his argument for the origin of all things, except for the fact that Homo disregards the fine distinction between experience and concept and what is evident and not so. (2) We cannot know that 'the Deity is a 'necessary-existential Being.' Cicero says that the same is as at present; and therefore 'the words necessary existence have no meaning' to us. Here there seems to be a direct contradiction between Cicero and Democritus. But on looking more closely we see that Cicero is merely repeating his former objection in fresh words. By a 'necessary existence' he means one that cannot

nothing should exist." (In more modern language, this means that the difference between what is logically impossible and what is possible, there must be predicates of something. Hence there must be something to be the subject of a predicate. If the word 'possible' is to have meaning.) Thus we get back to the point of the proof of 1755. Possibility logically presupposes actual existence as its foundation. Therefore there is something actual, the elimination of which we consider. "This possibility is an unconditional necessity; i.e. there is a 'necessity of being.' Kant then proceeds, as in 1755, to prove that the necessary being is one, simple, immutable, eternal, and, as that which contains the data of all possibilities, is, in fact, the ens realissimum. From these attributes it is inferred that the necessary being is a spirit (Geist), and this completes the proof that God exists.

It still remains for Kant to show that his form of the argument from the possible to the necessary is the only valid theistic proof. The Cartesian proof of the fifth Meditation is set aside on the ground that it is a logical possibility; i.e. Kant allows in this essay, as he does not in the Critique, that the inference to an uncaused First Cause may be valid. It is not clear that "this independent thing is unconditionally necessary," i.e. that it cannot even be thought to not exist, since the demonstration of this turns on the principles of metaphysics, which is not admitted by all philosophers. But, even if the point be conceded for the sake of the argument, it is not proved that the absolutely necessary being is what we mean by God, i.e. is utterly perfect and utterly real. Kant is sure that the point (that the necessary being—the perfect being) we require to prove that, if X is perfect, X necessarily exists, and this is just the ontological argument, with its treatment of existence as one predicate among others, over again (a point on which Kant expatiates more fully in the Critique). The ontological argument is the only valid theistic proof, as Kant calls it, the physico-theological proof here, as in the Critique, comes off better. Like Hume's Philebus (in one of his moods), Kant is convinced that there is such evident system, adaptation, and benevolence in nature that its author must be thought of as Wise, wise, and good. But though the argument deserves to be enforced in the interests of practical piety, it is not enough to prove perfect wisdom or benevolence in the Creator, and therefore enough to prove that He is all we mean by God. The same criticism will meet us again in the Critique.

The argument for the dependence of the world on a 'necessarily existing being' recurs again, in a slightly different form, in a third 'precritical' work—Kant's inanswerable possible thing lies not in what is posited in each case, but in the way in which it is posited. If I think of a thing as possible and then as real, the same complex of predicates and relations is posited in both cases; but in the first case this complex is posited hypothetically (a complex of propositions are true about the thing if it exists), in the second case absolutely—i.e. categorically. I cannot think of anything as possible unless its attributes are all compatible with one another; e.g., I cannot think of a triangle with four sides as possible, but I can think of a triangle with a right angle as possible. The former complex of attributes refers to the data as well as the formal is required to constitute a possibility, 'the internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence' (Urgrund ein Dasein), and 'it is wholly impossible that absolutely
of substances,' is, therefore, a 'totality of contingents'; and 'the world, in virtue of its essence, consists of mere contingents. Moreover, no necessary substance is connected with the world (contingent being at all uniting cause with effect, and therefore not as a part with a whole, since the parts of one and the same whole are connected by reciprocal dependence, a relation which does not admit of a necessary self. The cause of the world, then, is an extra-mundane being and not a 'soul of the world.' And the necessary being which is the extra-mundane cause of the world is one and not many. And the effects of different necessary beings would stand in no relations of reciprocal dependence, since their assumed causes are not reciprocally inter-related. Hence the unity of the substances composing the world in a single system is a consequence of the dependence of them all on one being, and it follows that this one being is not a mere 'architect of the universe' (i.e. *synwoygetos,* but its Creator. Incidentally also the argument removes the ambiguity which had hampered Leibniz's account of the 'pre-established harmony' to God. It definitely makes the harmony itself dependent on God."

This was done by 1779. Kant shows no doubt of the possibility of demonstrating thelms. The argument on which he relies in all the exams examined is one and the same—the Neo-Platonic argument—and rests on the assumption that the world as given is an object for which we are bound by the possibility of its cause and explanation. The proof, as with the Neo-Platonicists, aims at establishing the existence of the 'ground,' the single, internally simple and perfect, extra-mundane source of all the existents which together make up the *aorē.* The peculiar rarity of Kant's special version of it is that it escapes the criticisms which had been directed against Descartes, he sets himself to deduce the existence of a 'being which cannot be thought not to exist,' not from the logical concept of ens realissimum, but from the consideration that, in the universe itself, some combinations of predicators of the same species and some combinations of relations between the same things are possible, and others not. The existence of an actual extra-mundane being once established as a pre-condition of the difference in intra-mundane things between what is possible and what is impossible, the internal unity, simplicity, and perfection of the necessary being are then deduced as consequences of its necessary existence. If this line of argument is not falacious—i.e., if it really proves anything—something 'exists of necessity'—it clearly has the double merit of being free from the objection to the ontological proof, and of being equally unshaken by the considerations urged by Philo and Bruno in Hume against the *a posteriori* proof. If the point that the possible presupposes the actual—is sound, his argument seems to be a complete supplementation of the 'being of God' reduced to its most absolute conclusion. Why, then, did Kant, in his last "critical" years, pronounce the question whether God exists to be a problem? The point is, first of all, that Kant himself formerly claimed 'geometrical certainty,' mere fallacies?

In dealing with Kant's drastic assault on speculative natural theology in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* we may perhaps distinguish two questions which Kant himself naturally treated as one. It is one question whether Kant has proved that the demonstration of theism is impossible on the assumption that the special doctrine of his *Critique* as to the limits of human knowledge is true, but quite another question whether that doctrine is true, and consequently whether Kant has proved the fallaciousness of natural theology unconditionally. The first of these two questions no doubt permits of only one answer. Kant is clearly right when he asserts that all existential propositions are synthetic, at any rate (to repeat the distinction of St Thomas to which Kant himself pays no regard) *quoad nos.* And it follows at once from this single consideration that, if, as the *Critique* maintains, the synthesis in a hypothetical proposition must always in the end be effected by an application of formal 'categories of the understanding' to a material supplied in sensation or sensuous imagination, no synthetic proposition (and, by consequence, no existential proposition) can be affirmed with a necessary self. The cause of the world, then, is an extra-mundane being and not a 'soul of the world.' And Kant expressly makes this a main point in his criticism of the ontological proof. Unfortunately, however, this doctrine, if carried out to its logical consequences, would lead to a result which Kant would have been the first to reject. For it follows that there can be no such sciences as pure arithmetic and pure geometry. The subjects about which synthetic propositions are asserted in these sciences are one and all *Objekte des reinen Denkens* no less than the *ens necessarium* or the *ens realissimum* of speculative theology. No element whatever supplied by sense enters into the mathematician's concept of a circle, a parabola, an integer, or a real number. Kant overlooks this all-important point because he assumes throughout his whole reasoning that, before I can demonstrate a proposition in geometry, I must draw the figure, and similarly that, before I can say what the sum of two integers is, I must count the units of which he supposes the integers to consist. The erroneous character of this 'view has been sufficiently demonstrated by the consequent history of mathematical science, but ought to have been clear to Kant himself. Even if all geometry, as he tacitly assumes, were metrical geometry, he ought to have noted that the invention of co-ordinates had already made the drawing of figures in principle superficial in geometrical science. His conception of arithmetic is even more superficial—in fact, Aristotle's. As Couturat has correctly observed, Kant's examples are all drawn from the demonstration of singular propositions (such as 7 + 5 = 12). If he had asked himself how the truth in the theory of numbers is proved (low, e.g., we prove Fermat's theorem), he would have seen at once the inadequacy of his own theories. Indeed, the consideration of a singular proposition which does not relate to integers (e.g., the proposition 2 + 5 = 3 + 8 = 6 + 16) might have taught him that arithmetic is not the same thing as counting, and even suggested to him that an integer is not a 'collection of units.'

With the discrediting of Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* the famous antithesis between transcendental and empirical has faded accomplis, our task becomes the comparatively simple task of considering whether natural theology as such (as Kant alleges that it does) is an illegitimate use of the principles of pure logic. From Kant's point of view, to be sure, it does. But this is just because Kant assumes that the only legitimate use of logical principles is their employment to order a material given by sense. If the doctrine of his 'Aesthetic' is rejected, and with it that part of the 'Dialectic' in which he apparently tried to show that the mathematical doctrine of infinite series leads to antinomies, it is no longer obvious that what Kant calls a transcendental employment of the principles of logic—i.e., their employment independently of application to the 'manifold of sense'—needs be illegitimate. In fact, it is not clear that the whole of the general theory of arithmetic is not just such an employment of logical principles as 'constitutive of a *Dankbegriff.*' (It is certainly so if, as is probably the case, the series of natural integers can be defined wholly in terms of arithmetical primitive indefinables of logic.) One Kantian paradox, in particular, may be applied in the solution of the antinomies in the assault on the theistic arguments. Kant complains that all the arguments for the 'necessary being' based on the causal principle depend on employing this principle, which is a necessary rule for ordering the appearances of the sensible world, and has no meaning or application in the sphere of transcending the world of sense. It might be a sufficient reason that the one form of causality which we are intimately acquainted is our own volitional activity. In its activity, which is at once efficient and intentional causality, what are connected as cause and effect are connected not to the 'world' at all, and an event such as the sun's rising, for example, is not causally connected to any event in that 'world' at all, and an event such as the sun's rising, for example, is not causally connected to any event in that 'world' at all.
which does belong to it. Kant could not deny the causal
relation between the rational self and events in the Sinneswelt
without refusing the foundations of his own ethics, but the
advent of pure rationality ought to deliver him from attacking
natural theology on the ground that it ‘uses the principle of
causefulness to transcend the world of sense’. He
only escapes open self-contradiction by his monstrous theory,
which is not likely to find a defender at the present
time. His metaphysical reasoning is founded on the
assumption that the real self at all, but a phenomenal self apprehended by an inner sense. From
these two points of departure, the criticism is equivalent to a re-
funcional to absolute sense, and this is equivalent to a re-
usal to admit the validity of any logical inference from the
zeitgeist to the self-contradiction in the conclusion. It is not in itself
any more absurd to hold that examination
of the things and events of the Sinneswelt in the light of the
causal principle in fact reveals their dependence on somon-departmental
which does not belong to that world than it is to hold that a
series of each term is a rational factor can be shown to
have a limit which is not a rational factor. (This is, e.g.,
the case when we represent a surd ‘square root’ as a recurrent
continued fraction. Each of the ‘successors’ is a rational
factor, but the limit of the series is not.) The
general argument is thus invalid. So a priori reason can be given why
the causal principle should not enable us to transcend the world of
sense, and the only real question which remains is whether
the particular arguments of theists will stand scrutiny on their
merits. There is no general logical presumption against
them of the kind Kant imagines.

We are thus brought to the consideration of the
critical power of Kant’s attack on natural theology taken
by itself and apart from its connexion with a
general theory of the nature of scientific know-
ledge. If we confine ourselves to the sections of the
Critique of Pure Reason which profess to make a
complete enumeration of the possible proofs
of the existence of God and to convict each of these
‘proofs’ of fallacy, together with the ‘Critique of
all Speculative Theology’, in which Kant sums
up his results,1 the general line of argument is as
follows. The scientific interpretation of the
world, says Kant, consists in regarding any given actual condition of
things as conditioned and asking for the
antecedent facts which condition it. When they
have been found, science once more requires an
interpretation of them on the same lines, and so
on in indefinitum. Every set of facts has thus to
be regarded by the scientific intellect as condi-
tioned by an antecedent state of things which
has, in its turn, to be discovered. The scientific
‘explanation’ of the world is thus a task which
from its nature, can never be completed. Behind
every set of conditions, however remote, to which we
may arrive there is always a body of still more
remote conditions to be discovered. (The conditions,
in every case, like the facts they condition,
are facts and processes of the Sinneswelt.)

The unending regress from condition to condition
naturally suggests the thought that the
process of explanation would be completed if we
could find something ultimate, itself unconditioned
but the condition of everything else. Thus we
arrive at the notion of a being which ‘exists
necessarily’ and contains in itself the explanation
of everything else, the one and only being which
is not contingent (i.e. a consequence of something
other than itself). Next, it occurs to us that, if
there is such a ‘necessarily existing’ being, it
must, as the condition of everything else, contain
in itself all that is truly real or positive; what
is at all connected with the moral condition.
This theistic argument, however, is no
‘reality of application to ourselves, i.e. would
be without motives.’2 A virtuous man is thus
necissitated to a firm rational belief in theism,
but that which men believe on this speculative
basis falls short of the demonstrative force of the theistic
arguments (which in fact is zero), but the virtuous man’s
immediate conviction of the absoluteness of moral
obligations. This is what Kant meant when he
described himself as abolishing knowledge to make
room for faith.1 If our unfavourable judgment
on the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ is justified,
we plainly cannot concede to Kant that all
speculative theism must be baseless. The theistic
arguments must be scrutinized on their merits,
not condemned en bloc like the generals at
Arginae. With his usual love for formal
schematism Kant urges that there must be three
and only three ways of trying to prove the existence of the Supreme. We may attempt to

1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 611-619.
2 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 617.
3 He must not be understood in a pragmatist sense, for to
mean that the existence of God is a speculation which
a man may accept or decline ‘at his own risk,’ may
adopt ‘because up to the present...’; we can be
drawn from it with its foundation in the convictions that the
law of duty is absolute, and this proposition is admitted by
the good man not as an ‘hypothesis accepted at his own risk
to see whether it works,’ or because he chooses to accept it,
but because, being a good man, he sees it to be true and
certain.
prove the existence of the 'most real being' entirely a priori (i.e. without the use of any 'truth of fact' as a premise) by arguing that existence is included in its very nature—the only way to do this, by departing from the strictly a priori method, employ the single truth of fact, 'something exists,' as one of our premises, and then argue to the conclusion that a 'necessary being' has its own cosmological proof; we include among our premisses specific assertions about the character of the 'something that exists'; i.e. we may argue from the marks of intelligent and benevolent natures in the actual world to intelligence and benevolence in its source—the physico-theological proof. Each of these proofs is now to be shown unsatisfactory. The first is a pure verbal sophism and the second no better, and, as proofs of the existence of God, both the second and third have to be eluded by a silent combination with the first.

The refutation of the ontological proof is one of the best-known passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant speaks of the argument as the 'ontological (or Cartesian) proof.' He explains it in the form in which it has been revived by Descartes, and was apparently not acquainted with its earlier history. The objection to the ontological 'proof' is, simply this, that the proposition 'God exists' can only be got out of the concept of 'God' if existence has already been included in that concept. If not, there can be no proof of it. I.e., of course I can't prove the true proposition, 'If there is such a being as the God thus described, then it exists'; but I am not entitled to assert that there is such a being, and consequently not entitled to assert the consequent of the foregoing hypothetical proposition ('God exists') categorically. It is not a real predicate. The concept 'a hundred dollars' has presence, but the concept of a hundred dollars actually exist in my pocket or not. 'Our concept of an object may coincide with ours of the presence of the object and may go outside it to impart existence to the object.1 Hence the ontological proof is not really a proof of anything. The idea of God represents a most useful idea, but just because it is merely an idea it is wholly incapable of existence. A predicate of what exists by means of itself alone.2 Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and existent concept of the Supreme Being. The present writer does not feel that Hegel's witicism on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension.' The logical investigations which have been made in recent years into the modern 'exact,' or 'symbolic' logic of Frege, Peano, Russell, and others, have made this point clearer than it could have been to the first readers of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is an object of criticism that there is a member of the unit-class of which 'supreme being' is the class-name, though the proposition is not needed for proof. If this is not immediately evident, proof is wanted. In general, Kant could not be inferred from the definition of a class that the class has members, and thus the concept 'existence' or 'most real being' is an exception, we require proof that it is an exception to the rule and that Hegel has so far offered anything in the way of proof. Thus, as against Descartes, Kant's arguments is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive. Nor does he see that the original Anselmian proof fares any better. It is not directly touched by Kant's denial that existence is a predicate, since Anselm does not rest his case on the assertion that existence is a predicate. But Kant's counter-argument can equally be stated without raising this question. Whether existence is a predicate or not, it is equally true that we are not entitled to infer from the hypothetical proposition, 'If there is a God, that God is an existent,' the categorial proposition, 'God is an existent'; and this is what Anselm tries to do. He is only committed, as every defender of the ontological line of argument is, to the attempt to prove that it is irrational to suppose that there might have existed nothing, and that most of those who have tried to turn the edge of Kant's criticism have not attempted so defensively and consciously or unconsciously assumed as a premise the proposition that something can have been content to argue that, since something exists, God exists as well. But they tacitly admit the truth of the contention of Kant and St. Thomas that no purely a priori proofs of God's existence are possible.

Kant's attack on the cosmological proof is more elaborate and, is, in the present writer's opinion, less successful. The reason is that the cosmological proof does not depend in the least on the acceptance of the peculiar theory of knowledge expounded in the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' The proof has been rightly treated as a sophism in all the metrical essays in which Kant deals with the foundations of natural theology. The case of the cosmological argument is different; Kant's own precritical proof, based on the need for an actual ground of the cosmological proof, does not depend on the special critical theory of the limits of human knowledge, and is thus only valid on the assumption that all doctrines of the Critique are accepted. The typical form of the proof as stated in the Critique for examination is this: (a) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being exists; (b) a necessary being must be the object of an existent mind by its concept; the only concept which thus completely determines an object is the concept of the ens realissimum; (c) the concept of the ens realissimum is that of a being by means of which a necessary being can be thought, i.e., a supreme being necessarily exists. Hence the argument proceeds in two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, therefore the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being.

Kant denounces this cosmological argument with special vehemence, as was only natural for one who had built the middle age built it on with perfect confidence and then come to distrust it. His critical objection to the cosmological proof is not in the sense realissimum, but merely as an existent object. But in fact, then, the new argument supplies the missing existential premise, it is no objection at all to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the same as the ens realissimum, the only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premise, which it does not contain the forces of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly fictitious.

The complaint is surely unfair. The objection to the ontological argument did not lie in the concept of the ens realissimum, but merely in the proof, and in fact, the new argument supplies the missing existential premise, it is no objection at all to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the same as the ens realissimum, the only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premise, which it does not contain the forces of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly fictitious.

The real objection is this: the argument proceeds in two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, therefore the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being. Kant's criticism seems wholly unfair. The real objection to the cosmological proof is not in the sense realissimum, but merely as an existent object. But in fact, then, the new argument supplies the missing existential premise, it is no objection at all to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the same as the ens realissimum, the only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premise, which it does not contain the forces of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly fictitious. Therefore the argument proceeds in two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, therefore the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being. Kant's criticism seems wholly unfair. The real objection to the cosmological proof is not in the sense realissimum, but merely as an existent object. But in fact, then, the new argument supplies the missing existential premise, it is no objection at all to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the same as the ens realissimum, the only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premise, which it does not contain the forces of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly fictitious. Therefore the argument proceeds in two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, therefore the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being.
the category of causality from science; (2) that the "cosmological argument" is not an argument from the impossibility of an infinite series of events and, hence, it is not a conclusion, nor of or not. The real bearing of the argument cannot be seen at all, so far as we see, in a first mover, or, like St. Thomas, hold that it can only be known by revelation whether or not a First Mover or 'mover' or 'architect' of the whole universe may be there. The whole history of the world is a mere accident. Things are what they are, and the character of the whole creation and all that is therein, the whole order of the natural world, is the result of the order that actually exists (the natural order) or as the source of an order that ought to exist (moral order). It is only consideration of the latter that really gives us a right to postulate the existence of a Supreme Being; speculative theology, which attempts to establish the existence of God as required to explain the order of nature, is, as we have seen, condemned to failure, because it seeks to prove of the reality of a being which cannot be an object of possible experience. Its value is simply that it shows us that there is no logical impossibility inherent in the notion of a Supreme Being. Thus it forces us to assert that we know that there is no God, or that, if there is, He is not an intelligent being, or that, if there is, He is not an object of possible experience. Its value is simply that it shows us that there is no logical impossibility inherent in the notion of a Supreme Being. Thus it forces us to assert that we know that there is no God, or that, if there is, He is not an intelligent being, or that, if there is, He is not an object of possible experience.
old speculative natural theology, it is even more his purpose to replace it by a positive moral theology, and it is probably true to say that it is primarily due to his influence that in our own time it is largely upon the moral argument that popular atheistic philosophy continues to base itself. As the Kantian moral theology has often been very imperfectly understood by its critics, it is necessary to give the Kantian reaction rather carefully, in order to put in the clearest light the differences between Kant and those who hold that the existence of God remains after all a "pious opinion," suggested, but not established, by the facts of the moral life, or those who hold that it is a doctrine recommended mainly by its comforting character. To appreciate the strength of Kant's position, it is necessary to understand that theism is not in any sense an arbitrary hypothesis tacked on to a system of ethics, or, as Bosanquet calls it, a "survival" of belief in superstitious, but a logically part of practical philosophy. The argument starts from premises which are taken as once for all established in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and the Analytic of Practical Reason. These premises are as follows. The object to which all moral action has in view is the realization of the highest or complete good. The complete good means a state of things in which the reasonable will finds full and complete satisfaction. Such a state of things implies two constituents: virtue (a right state of the will itself), and happiness (by which Kant means, as he says, a condition of things in complete accord with the rational will, i.e. the successful domination of rational will in the universe). If only the first constituent were real, i.e., if the will of every rational being were morally wholly good, this would not be enough to satisfy the demands of the rational will itself. We should not think of a universe satisfactory or rational if it consisted of beings of perfect morality whose volitions were always defeated and disappointed by the course of things. The only condition of things which would satisfy our rational demand for the triumph of the virtuous will would be one in which every rational being should be happy (i.e. should find his volition obeyed), in perpetuity, in the moral goodness of his will. The highest good—the object of the moral will—is thus a union of virtue with happiness, but a union in which the inner virtue of the agent is the condition and cause of his happiness. So the highest good means a condition of existence in which a rational being is (a) deserving of happiness, deserving that his 'will be done, as in heaven so in earth,' and (b) has the happiness which his will deserves as a consequence of his deserving it. (More briefly, the highest good is that the actual order of things should be a moral order.) But—
and here comes in the antinomy which Kant thinks indispensable in a Critique—the principle, as distingished from the object, of the virtuous will is always to act from reverence for the unconditional obligation of the moral law, without any consideration of the results of our conduct. We must, as moral beings, will the highest good, yet we must also, as moral beings, will to do right for its own sake, without even asking the question whether our right actions will result in bringing about this good. We cannot escape from this antinomy, as Kant holds we can from those of speculative reason, by dismissing it as illusory. For we are under absolute obligation to be virtuous, and we cannot be truly virtuous without desiring the highest good, nor yet can we be really virtuous if we allow this desire to affect our will to do right because it is right, regardless of consequences. Thus, if morality is to be more than an empty dream, the union of virtue and happiness must be realized, though we must not set ourselves to realize it by treating virtuous action as a means to it. The realization of the union must be brought about for us, not by us. Now, experience shows abundantly that in the empirically known system of nature there is no dependence of happiness on virtue. The most virtuous man is not regularly the man whose will is most completely virtuous, whose will is done the man whose volitions are morally purest. The union must therefore be effected for us by a supreme power, not our own, in the 'intelligent cause,' in the 'necessity of the course of events so that, if we could see the whole infinite series at once, we should see that every man is happy in proportion to the degree in which he deserves to be happy. Further, since morality demands not merely that we be happy but that the happiness shall be a consequence of their virtue, we could not regard the union of virtue and happiness as effected by a mere blind 'natural tendency' in things. The virtuous man's virtue must be the motive of the disposing power to make him happy—i.e., this disposing power must be thought of as an intelligent and absolutely holy will. Thus it becomes possible of morality that there is an absolutely wise and holy Supreme Being. We have already seen that the speculative use of reason in finding an explanation for natural events theologically is impossible. There is a Supreme Being, though all our attempts to demonstrate the truth of this hypothesis proved to rest on fallacy. The consideration of the pre-suppositions of morality now shows us that, unless there is to be a hopeless conflict between the conception of the highest good and the first principle of duty, such a Supreme Being must really exist and, what is more, must be spiritual. Practical reason then does not introduce us to any new idea; if it did, there might be an insoluble conflict between its suggestions and the results of speculative criticism. It only gives us the right to affirm as a reality what speculative reason itself unavoidably suggests as a possibility, the complete dependence of the world on a Supreme Being, and enables us to determine the character of that Being as far as to say that it combines perfect wisdom, holiness, and power. Beyond this moral theology cannot go. It tells us what God must be if the world is to have moral order, and it tells us nothing more. Kant pushes this consideration so far that he is not content to say with the Neoplatonists and scholastics that we do not know God secundum essentiam suaem. Recurring to his view that an object of possible experience must have some sensible constancy (or intuition), he in effect denies that we have any experience of God at all. 'Mystics' profess to experience the divine, but for that very reason Kant sets them down summarily as 'fanatics' who must not be allowed a hearing.
The value of Kant's moral argument for Idealism seems quite independent of our judgment of the critical philosophy as a whole. The phenomenalism which is the weakest point of the system only affects the metaphysics and perfection of its specific religious experience. It might, indeed, be said with an appearance of plausibility that God as the source of the subordination of nature to the moral order is brought to the difficulty which Kant has created for himself by the abstract formalism of his ethics. No Kantian doctrine has come in for more unsparring reprobnination than the fundamenta of moral worth of an act depends upon its being done for the sake of universal law as such, and is destroyed if any desire for a specific result influences the agent's motives. But, apart from this untenable theory, it may be said, the conflict between the supreme object of virtuous willing and its true principle; the realizaton of the good is at once object and principle. And thus the problem which, according to Kant, is solved for us by the existence of God is not a real problem at all. Yet such criticism surely misses the mark. The problem Kant has in mind still remains when the supreme object of good will has been dismissed. One and the same conviction of the absoluteness of moral values, the right of subordination to control the world, compels us to make the same when our own moral striving a vain effort if the highest good is not realized or realizable, and also forbids us to aim directly at the realization of this highest good by doing moral evil that good may come out of it or leaving the right undone because the consequences of doing right are judged by us to be, in a certain case, bad. It is certain that good often comes out of moral evil, and that moral integrity itself often demands action which leads from results which would not have followed if the agent had been less virtuous. 1 Thus, quite independently of any special Kantian theses in ethics, we are confronted by the dilemma: either the order of things as rightly understood (the intelligible world), is a moral order and realizes the highest good or the highest good is not realized and all moral effort is senseless and fruitless. Kant's unanswerable, in the extreme, the conviction of the absolute value of the good, on which morality is based, is a mere illusion. If this be so, the argument from the reality of absolute moral values to the all-wise, all holy, and all-powerful Supremacy of God as the condition of its judging's holds, exactly on the lines on which Kant has conducted it. It is precisely the same argument, divested of its incidental trappings of Kantian 'critical' phraseology, which Solovyov compresses into a sentence when he writes:

'The unconditional principle of morality, logically involved in religious experience, contains the complete (and or the right relation of all to everything) not merely as a demand or an idea, but as an actual power that can fulfil this demand and create the perfect moral order of God in which the absolute significance of every being is realized.'

15. Lotze.-This article cannot undertake to follow the history of the treatment of the idealist philosophy beyond Kant with any detail. To do so would require a substantial volume, and it does not seem to the present writer that anything which is new in principle has been added to the arguments for or against Idealism since Kant's treatment and development of the moral proof in the Critique of Practical Reason. An exception, however, may be made for Lotze, more particularly on the ground of his. In the section on the general outline of metaphysics, Kant's 1

1 See the entertaining Illustrations of this point in V. Solovyov, The Justification of the Good, Eng. tr., London, 1918, pt. ill. ch. 4. 1

1b p. 180. The whole of Solovyov's book is worth reading as a corrective to Kant's thesis that philosophical theology is exhausted by the one proposition that God exists.

critical repudiation of his earlier position, to vindicate the speculative argument upon which Kant himself relied until advanced middle age. 1

It may seem strange to describe Lotze as resurrecting the particular version of the cosmological argument which finds in God the necessary actual ground of possibility, with the fact that Lotze himself, in the chapter on 'Proofs of the Existence of God' in the Grundrisse der Metaphysik, 1830, and the Professors to have disposed of the cosmological proof in one or two paragraphs of not very profound speculation, it is quite certain that his own argument will show that, though it is not quite identical with any former statement of the cosmological proof, it is entirely following the general line of Kant's argument for the 'being which exists with an absolute necessity. The starting point of Lotze's train of thought was historically determined for him by the necessity of taking up a definite attitude towards the philosophy of Herbart, and to a lesser degree of Hegel; this special concern with the problems raised in the metaphysics of Hegel further accounts for the very marked influence of Leibniz.

Lotze starts with the fact of incessant change or becoming as the most obvious characteristic of the empirical world. The great problem of the metaphysician is to give an intelligible account of the pre-conditions of this universal fact of change. 2 We can neither dismiss change or becoming as a mere illusion (since, even if you deny all change in the objective world, the illusion itself has to be regarded as a process of changes in the inner states of the existents which we call minds or souls) nor resolve the history of the universe into a process of absolute becoming, a wholly without states of discontinuity and statics. This would be fatal to the possibility of all knowledge whatever. Change or becoming, the fundamental condition of all identity and change. This is shown by our success in formulating laws of natural processes. If we find that A is always followed by B we must suppose that the state of things in which A is present is such that, if A is present, B will always follow. In the state of things in which A was present why A should be replaced by B rather than by C, or why C should not replace B; but by finding such reasons we are able to state the laws of change, to show that the changes of state of the various things are intercorrelated by laws according to which we are able to predict, to the corresponding change in another (the occurrence of a state b in D). This interpretation of the facts, Lotze urges, can only be final. If the universe were really a collection of independent existents, or 'things,' how could the occurrence of a change in one of these existents be conditioned by changes in state in the rest? The very fact that, e.g., A only exhibits the change from state a 2 to state a 3 on the condition that certain definite changes occur in a number of other 'things'—in a word, the 'interconnection of things in being' or 'determinate laws'—shows that the universe is not an ultimate plurality. We are bound to think that the commonality of the various 'things' partial expressions or activities. We must amend the statement that the changes of state in a plurality of things are related to each other to formulates into the statement that the one and only real 'thing' has a determinate nature or character, and that the universe maintains in this self-maintenance of the 'living whole,' if Lotze symbolically calls it—that requires that the change of which we speak as occurring in a 'thing' should be compensated in a definite way by connected changes, which we are accustomed to refer to the effect of 'cause' and 'effect.' Strictly speaking, then, every change in any element of M's is correlated with changes in all the rest. But some of these changes may be minimal, and so escape our notice. Hence we are able to accord human purposes to formulate laws which connect a definite change in one element with definite changes in a finite number of others, B, C, and D, and treat all the rest of the elements as a remainder, R, which is irrelevant. The world, then, is not a plurality but a unity-in-plurality. How the unity is effected is more than we can ever expect to know. We may say, 'The unity is the plurality of the concrete the 'is' here is a copula of which the concrete modality

1 Lotze's treatment of the subject is to be found partly in his Metaphysik, latest ed., Leipzig, 1912, Eng. tr. 2 vols., Oxford, 1867; see particularly bk. 1, chs. 6-8, which were the more condensed Grundzüge der Metaphysik, Leipzig, 1833, Eng. tr., Outlines of Metaphysics, Boston, U.S.A., 1856, particularly the chapter on 'The Unity of Being,' chs. 57-78, partly in the Grundrisse der Philosophie, Leipzig, 1884. A longer and more popular exposition of the 'unified' is given in Mikrokosmos, 2 vols., do. 1866-79, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1894, bk. 11, 'The Unity of Things.' Only the general outline of Lotze's view is here reproduced.

1 It must be remembered that Lotze was necessarily unacquainted with Leibniz's most important writings, and that these were mostly unpublished until after Lotze had arrived at his own fundamental doctrines; hence his version of the earlier philosopher's thought is not to be implicitly trusted.

2 This was precisely the problem which had hitherto occupied Herbert and the Herbertians.
is not fully known to us. But it is important to be quite clear on one point of the first importance. The one "living whole," M, is properly described as subject to universal laws. If we think of the world as composed of things subject to general laws of causation, then it is only the laws of self-expression and self-maintenance. Since we are part of the content of M, we cannot think of M as something beyond us, as one member of a class of worlds, and to speculate on the possibility of some other--"possible" worlds, as Leibniz did. Then we may be led, as Leibniz was, into the inebriating problem of why just this world M, and not a different one N, is the world. But the whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as necessary to the actual temporal facts as we call the true laws, is one of these), rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements would be different, and, if we were among these elements, our views as to what alternatives are possible would be different also. It is a radical error in philosophy to confound logical and metaphysical priority.

How can M be the by law required by the theory we cannot say in detail. But we can see, at any rate, that M cannot be material. The only thing with which we are acquainted which can be sensually described for a part of reality is the functions which must discharge for the totality is the soul which at once has or owns a multiplicity of states or activities and is not without them, and is yet aware of its own unity and its distinction from each and all of these states and from the whole M which it thus driven to think of M in terms of spirit. It must be akin to the soul, but must, at least, have all the differences from our souls which result from the consideration that it has no hierarchical is, is a wholly unique, and can meet with no resistance. We are thus led to think of M as a unique and personal being, and, Lotze adds, personal being, as (because its knowledge has not to develop under difficult circumstances) the other a, amphibious (because it is the absolute prior, anterior to all "law" as well as to all fact), and, above all, all-good (Lotze weakens his case on this point by a half-hearted attempt to maintain an idea of good, and to reduce perfect goodness to mere "benevolence") a Platonist would have no difficulty, since the all-wise must have complete knowledge of the good, and to know the good is to act it out. M is also "out of space" and "eternal," since geometricals are, and are what they are as a consequence of M's existing and being what it is. Thus the conception of M with which we began as "the one real being" passes into the conception of the all-wise and eternal God, and the close of our historical retrospect brings us back very much to the central point of Neoplatonism again. It calls for remark that, though Lotze's initial account of M, taken by itself, would suggest a pantheistic or immanence theory, the doctrine, as fully worked out, is definitively theistic. Lotze is careful to note (even when he says that M is the world, by adding that "it is") there has been a unique sense which it has in no other judgment, and is consequently not the "is" which constitutes identity. Later on we find that every soul, being aware of its own unity, is a real individual distinct from the rest of the soul, though it is from the creating and sustaining activity of God that the soul derives this character. And mere animating things are held to be a supernatural hypothesis. There are, according to Lotze, only the one living God and His acts. Some of these acts are souls with a real relation only to their own. In this way, while avoiding the customary theistic language about the transcendence of God, Lotze arranges the same result by maintaining that God is immanent in the world, but that the world is "immunent in God." The limitation of real individuality to souls naturally modifies us of the Neo-Platonic view that souls hold the lowest place is the system of beings, bodies being not beings but things, what become, is, or being the by law of the resemblance with Neo-Platonic is even more marked when Lotze uses his view of M as the metaphysical prior of universal laws or eternal truths as a ground for urging that life, truth, and goodness are not, as the Aristotelian phrasing has it, "naturally prior to" God; God is Himself the concrete Life, Truth, and Goodness.

17. Logical pluralism.—The foregoing statement of the theistic argument as presented by Lotze provides an opportunity for considering the type of ultimate pluralism of which we have spoken as the most serious philosophical alternative to theism. This type of view is best represented in contemporary English philosophy by the writings of Russell and Bertrand Russell, though, as neither of these authors has ever directly attempted to construct a metaphysical system, we must be content to indicate the general view to which their studies in logic, ethics, and the philosophy of science lead. In the case of the latter two, a plurality of the type in question would take issue with the validity of the ground on which he maintains the existence of such a being as M. It would insist on precisely that form of "dualism" which Lotze assumes to be untenable—the "dualism" of actual existence and hypothetical universal laws. It would be maintained that what we actually find the "world" to consist of is a plurality of existing things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. These relations, it would be further said, cannot all be reduced, as Lotze assumes, to reciprocal causal inter-connections. Causal connection is only one of the many types of relation; there are others, such, e.g., as the mere "togetherness" or "comprehension" which language represents by the word 'and,' the "disjunction" symbolized by 'or' else,' and so forth, in which causality is not a component at all. Relations are all "universals," and no relation is an "existent," while "existents" are all individual. We have to accept it as an ultimate fact which permits of no further resolution that specific individual existents stand in certain definite relations to other specific individual existents. To ask why this is so is to ask a question quite as illegitimate as that which Lotze asks as to the nature of "state" is brought about, how one thing can exhibit a succession of different states or first have a relation to a second thing and then lose it—would be declared illegitimate. According to the view which has been most elaborately developed by Bertrand Russell, the proposition that at a certain moment A changes its state from a, to a, or changes its relation to B from B to B, if expressed accurately, only means that the whole duration of A's existence can be resolved into two mutually exclusive classes of moments. In any moment of the one class A has the state a, or stands to B in the relation B, at any moment of the other class A has the state a, or stands to B in the relation B. And, further, every moment of the one class comes before any moment of the other class a, Thus Russell's point of view that a joint class a, a, at which A has both states or both relations, and no moment at which it has neither. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no such process as that which Lotze supposed to take place, and we live, in fact, in a changeless world.

1 In the Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1903. The later work of Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge, 1910 and subsequent years, does not assume this metaphysics.
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...a' being which cannot be conceived not to exist.' Causality, as commonly understood by metaphysicians, likewise disappears. The causal principle reduces to the modest proposition that an observed frequent sequence of an event of the class β on an event of the class α affords no ground for the judgment that in cases not previously observed an event of class β is likely to have been preceded by an event of class α. How likely this conclusion is is then a mere problem in the logical principles of probability. Whether all events have causes or not remains an open question, and must always remain so. It is clear that such a theory leaves no room for theism in philosophy. If it is really the last word of metaphysics, belief in God loses all rational foundation, though it is, to be sure, still possible that the belief may 'happen' to be true. It must further be admitted that the theory has its strong points. It is by no means obvious that a philosopher is entitled to assume as axiomatic such a conviction about the thoroughgoing internecision of all events as Lotze makes the basis of his argument. In what sense or to what degree the 'world' is a unity is a question to which philosophy must find the answer. The interconnection might conceivably be very much looser than Lotze is willing to admit. And it seems clear that the mathematical analysis by which the particular puzzle about change is eliminated is, as far as it is entirely justifiable, even not entirely justifiable.

2 Nor can it be denied that the very same statements to which the principle of causality is reduced is all that is required at any rate for the purposes of natural science.

It still, however, remains a question whether we could possibly be content with a logical pluralism of the kind just described as the final answer to our intellectual demand for a rational explanation of the world. For the present article it must be enough to call attention to a few of the considerations which suggest that such a theory can only be provisional. One may fairly doubt whether it can really be called an explanation or interpretation at all. The system of interrelated existents with which it presents us as the solution of a perennial intellectual problem seems to be simply the problem itself as stated in an unusually abstract way. And it ought to be clear that, when it has been granted to the full that the special problem about the meaning of change has been answered, there is a more fundamental problem which the theory has not yet gone out of account. However true it may be that 'we live in a changeless world'—i.e., that there never is a 'moment' in which anything is 'passing from one state to another' (2)—Lotze's main contention, that the analysis of the universe into relations and existents, which are the terms of the relations, rests on the uncriticized assumption that the successive steps of the logical construction by which we try to make things intelligible correspond exactly to the steps of the real process by which 'being' so to say, constructs itself, has been left unanswered. Logical pluralism, no less than the 'panlogical' or Hegelian, simply asserts that the logically prior and the metaphysically prior are identical. The only difference is that the logic of Hegel is so much inferior as logic. To put the point in the simplest possible way, we cannot avoid raising the question why, out of the infinity of relations open to the study of the logician, some

1 The question is how far does it go? Is an 'instant' more than an 'interval'? This is an important point at which (see note A. N. Whitehead, Readings into the Principles of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge, 1916).

2 Yet it is surely true, as maintained, e.g., by Whitehead, that a 'natural fact about Nature', however we choose to analyse it. 'Nature' is, as Plato called it, a xeícóatjíav.
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the solution of the supreme intellectual problem, the reconciliation of science with life.

These considerations suggest certain further reflections on the limitations of logical pluralism. The whole theory has manifested itself as an exercise in the exclusive interest of pure mathematics and the application of mathematics in the natural sciences, in the name of science, in the name of enlightenment. But there is more in heaven and earth than these sciences take into account. Even within their limits it remains to be seen whether the theory as it stands will really do all that a philosophy of the sciences should. The fundamental difficulty is that it is a consequence of the theory that, as has already been said, the establishment of scientific laws by induction comes to be simply a problem in the theory of probabilities. But the theory of probabilities, taken by itself, seems to give us no ground whatever for attributing to the conclusion of an inductive generalization any finite probability, however small. Science would thus seem to be impossible in principle unless some as yet undiscovered premise for induction, which is not included in the theory of probabilities, can be unearthed and is revealed to be seen whether such a premise, if discovered, is consistent with the rest of the theory. Again, the replacing of the individual existsents of popular common sense and ordinary science by infmite series of hypothetical individuals seems an absolutely necessary consequence of the initial assumption of the theory, and, so far as the things of the external world as conceived by common sense, or the constituents of the physical order as perceived by the physicist are concerned, there might be no difficulty about it. But it is quite another question whether the substitution does not destroy the whole significance of the moral realism of the system of intelligent spirits.

It is not merely that it creates a difficulty in psychology, though surely it does create such a difficulty. The immediate witness of consciousness to our subject as subjects of experience is a fact which no logical theory about the constitution of the world has a right to ignore. It may be that 'the mind thinks not always,' that there are intervals in which each of us is wholly unconscious, though such evidence as we have does not seem favourable to the supposition; but, at least when we are conscious, every conscious act fills an actual interval and yet has its absolutely unitary character. A situation, though a brief one, is necessary to think the simplest proposition, and much more to draw the easiest inference. Yet the thinking of the proposition or the making of the inference is a unitary act only intelligible as the act of a unitary intelligence. It is nonsensical to say that, when I think 'God is,' this thought, as a mental event, is really made up of an infinity of momentary 'mental states' of similar but numerically different minds, or that the 'I' which resolves on a given act and the 'I' which carries out the resolve are each an infinity of different 'I's with a further infinity of still different 'I's between them. Only the elementary blunder in analysis of resolving activity into mere succession can account for the promulgation of such a view. It is still more serious matter that the doctrine is wholly incompatible with the fundamental pre requisities of ethics. This point is capable of being developed in great detail and from more than one side, but in principle it should be enough to say that the denial of the personality is fatal to the conception of personality as having moral worth. If we analyse any act upon which a moral judgment would normally be passed into an infinity of momentary phases, no moral predicate can be attributed to it. Moral judgment for approval or condemnation has no meaning if it be applied to any such single stage; to be significant, it must be passed on the whole act, considered as one, and as an expression in act of the inner will of a subject who is the same from its first inception in thought to its completion. Similarly the notion of duty loses all its meaning with the relegation of permanent selfhood to the realm of illusion. That an act is my duty in the present situation means that it is something not yet done, but which ought to be done and to be done by me. But if 'I' only exist at a mathematical punctum temporis, the proposition that I ought now to do a certain act has no longer an intelligible significance. A merely momentary 'I' can do nothing and can be nothing except just what it is; 'ought' is a category which has no application to it. It is no mere accident that Russell should have dropped significant hints in his latest writings of conversion to the view that moral judgments are only 'subjective,' mere expressions of fundamentally irreligious real outcome of a logical pluralism, put forward as the ultimate truth about what is, is not even that standing dualism of what is and what ought to be of which Lorenz spoke. Kant's moral pronouncement that categories of value (there can be no reason to confine the conclusion to specifically ethical values) are one and all devoid of any real application. For those who cannot accept this result, Kant's moral argument for theism seems to the present writer unanswerable. If it is only that the Good is also the supreme principle of all existence that it becomes possible to understand how what is and what ought to be can form one 'world,' and from the recognition of the Good as the Supreme Being theism follows directly. This seems to be illustrated by the present state of philosophical opinion in our own country. Throughout the thirty years or so, from the seventies of the last century onward, in which Hegelianism, interpreted with a marked Spinozistic bias, was the dominant philosophy in academic circles, there was a natural tendency to make it almost the test of a man's philosophical capacity that his attitude towards the problems raised by the religious life should be an a priori one. But recent events in discréd and as indicative (as indeed it is) of lack of interest in or understanding of the whole realm of personal values; theism as a supposed mark of want of logical thoroughness. The present generation the issues seem to be clearing. Philosophers are certainly tending, though not without exception, to range themselves into two camps. Those to whom the business of philosophy seems to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in providing a logical basis and a methodology for exact science appear to be identifying themselves with the doctrine of logical pluralism and taking up a definitely atheistic attitude which involves the denial of the objectivity of judgments of value; those, on the other hand, who are convinced that the business of philosophy is to make life, as well as science, intelligible, who find it necessary to maintain the logical objectivity they are obliged to maintain the validity of those categories of worth apart from which life would have no significance, are, in the main, declared theists.

15. Objectors may be desirable to add some brief observations on certain types of objections which are often quite sincerely raised against a theistic interpretation of the world. In principle some of these difficulties are novel; most of them find their origin in a consideration of "the Theory of Relativity" would have something to say on this point.

1 See the acute discussion by C. D. Broad, in Mind, new ser., vol. XI, No. 49, 1909, and the criticisms of F. E. J. Cough, Mind, new ser., vol. XLI, No. 165, 1910. Jourdain's criticisms do not seem to take the present writer to affect the soundness of Brod's contentsions.
the ancient world. Popularly these objections are often called "scientific," though their only connexion with modern natural science is that its discoveries enable some of them to be stated in a more impressive way. For the most part they are all summed up in the antithetical assertion of Irenæus that the existing world is too bad to have been created by a loving intelligence, "tanta stat praedita culpa." Thus it is urged that the suffering of the animal creation is too great, the cost of the "struggle for existence" too heavy, to suppose to suit the wish of a benevolent Creator. Or, again, it is said that an allrighteous Creator might have made the human race, in particular, such that it would not be exposed as it is to suffering, to constant struggle with its environment, to the consequences of its own mistakes and wrongdoing. It is then inferred that, if there is a superhuman intelligence behind nature, that intelligence is either deficient in wisdom or wanting in goodness. Now, obviously, criticisms of this kind rest upon premises which may be fairly called in question. One might reasonably doubt whether the pessimistic interpretation of the facts which sees misery predominating everywhere in animal and human life has any real warrant. To an unbiased observer an animal does not seem normally to give signs that it finds its lot intolerable. The suicides that our ancestors knew existed, and still occur, are not common among men, and, unless the stories of the scorpions which kill themselves when surrounded by fire are true, apparently as good as non-existent among the lower animals. The misuse of the metaphorical phrase "struggle" is because it is the process by which species are selected for survival as a "struggle" is too glaring to need more than a word of comment. If competition plays a prominent part in the economy of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as it does in the economy of commerce, it no more follows that the life of every animal, or most animals (and ! vegetables), is one of wretchedness than it follows that all or most business men are hopelessly miserable. Still, of course, it may be said that there is, at any rate, some suffering in the world and that perfect goodness would have prevented none of it; all. Such an argument, however, tacitly assumes that perfect goodness can have only one end, a hedonistic one, and thus permits of the answer that whatever the end that might be, such a thing as complete good would have no ultimate purpose (cf. such a thing as perfect goodness). But, it is true, as has been urged in this article, that speculation and practice alike point to the eternal nature of God as the object in which both find their completion, we have a double exigence of the practical and the speculative reason on the side of theism, and in the presence of such an exigence we are justified in applying Newman's remark that "a thousand difficulties do not amount to one doubt." On the other hand, the great exigence—the specifically religious—is perhaps a more serious objection to theism than any we have yet considered to urge that our whole procedure in looking for a First Cause is vitiated by one obvious fallacy. The world, it might be said, even if it has attained its present structure as the result of processes which are in the last resort reducible to mere distributions of un-intelligent primary constituents, directed by no mind and having no end, still must, of course, have a perfectly determinate structure, and, as we ourselves happen to be included in that structure, of course we inevitably discover adaptations in our environment to our special needs, and are led to fancy that such adaptations are evidence of the direction of the world by an intelligence which aims at supplying our needs. But the real fact is simply that it is not the world that has been adapted to us, but we who have learned and are learning to adapt ourselves to the world. If we did not adapt ourselves, we should not be here, and, if a time ever came when we could not do such 'adjustment' of our 'inner relations' to the 'outer relations' is exhausted, we shall cease to be here. If the actual course of events had been different, all the reactions which we have found to be good, because they further adaptation, might have hindered it, and those which now hinder it might
have furthered it. If in such a state of things there had been reflecting beings at all, they, judging from their standpoint, would have called good all that we think evil, and evil all that we think good. They would have inferred benevolent divine activity from the existence of conditions which we should regard as evil, and let them do what would make them uncomfortable. The existence of such individuals is of much importance in one of these cases as in any other. Nor does the number of such men without a religion seem to be on the increase. In our own day the only effect of persuading men that the Most High is a dream appears to be that they transfer their worship to the demonstrably not most high; we get such quaint aberrations as the Comist worship of 'humanity,' or the elevation of Marxist Socialism into a faith. The one real question is not what certain individuals are unable to feel the necessity of searching for, but what those who do seek find, and quid infienditum? The lives of the 'saints' are the real answer of theism to the last insistent perplexities of the doubter who lurks in each of us. Others, without the theist's faith, have often led noble lives; they have fought a good fight with the unworldliness of a world which they have believed in their hearts to be stupid or malignant; yet the most clear-sighted among them, like Huxley, have confessed that mortal heroism is a losing game, a battle with unresisting forces. Such heroes, after all, do but apply to the universe the saying of the Emperor Marcus about base men: 'The finest revenge is not to become like them;' that is, it is in the nature of things that human good and evil are determined by the conviction that the realm of facts and the realm of values cannot be separated manifestly be futile. It is just the recurrent fear that the 'realm of values' may turn out to be a fiction of our imagination that is, in speculation, the last enemy to be overcome. How is it to be met? The answer, it may be suggested, is the old one, given in the memorable utterance of Pascal: 'Tu ne me chercheras pas si tu ne me possédais. Ne t'inquiète donc pas.' The sentences may be applied to ultimate doubt about the reality of every kind of human value. I am a man tempted to doubt whether there really is any absolute and certain truth, whether all our 'truths' may not be mere 'human' or even 'personal' points of view, sedes sapientiae, sedes errores? Let him be think himself that it is only because he is not acquainted with truths that he can frame the notion of the absolutely true, and only because he has framed the notion that he can raise his doubts. So it is only because we are all along secretly in the supposition that there are things which we ought unconditionally to do that the question whether any given accepted obligation is really unconditional can be made much as in other. If we knew no beauty, we could not of course ask ourselves whether our judgments about beauty rest on illusion. In like manner it is only because the absolutely Good and utterly Adorable has not left Himself without a witness in our hearts that we feel the need of an object to worship and are driven on from the worship of trees, or streams, or animals, or mighty men, or anthropomorphic deities, towards an object in which our adoration can at least find rest because that on which it is directed is adequate to sustain it. Prayer and adoration need no more justification than the questioning attitude towards things which leads to science, or the impulse to make things of beauty which leads to art, or the desire to do right which leads to morality. It is not for nothing that, as the Greeks said, is the only animal who has a god. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we may fairly say that the Stoics appeal to the consensus gentium, though no formal demonstration, still contains a thought which goes to the very root of things. There are of course, individual men who do not feel the impulse to seek for Him whom they may worship with a rationabile obsequium, as there are men with no sense of humour, or men to whom music means nothing, or men who reject, simply because they believe that the difference between right and wrong is anything more than the difference between what society will allow them to do and what it will not let them do, what is to them uncomfortable. The existence of such individuals is of much importance in one of these cases as in any other.

Moab, Milcom ruled. Ammon, Jehovah ruled Israel, and so on. Second or later, however, this kind of theocracy perished in every settled land except one. The gods of such tribes as Edom and Moab passed away, with the tribal independence, before the taking of Assyria, or Babylon, or Persia. In other lands polytheism superimposed on theocracies. There the gods slowly became rather an appendage of the state than its rulers. But in Israel the idea of the sole rule of a single God survived all the vicissitudes of history and was developed, developed. It is the history of the development under which Hebrew thought about Jehovah's rule evolved to meet the varying challenges of national need.

To set this out fully would be to write the whole story of Israel. Here is a narrower question in place: the idea of government by Jehovah being constant in Israel, how did the idea of its method evolve?

The study of the method of any kind of polity turns largely on the nature of its organs, for almost all civilized governments rule through organs. This is peculiarly so with theocracies, since it is only in legend that gods speak directly to their peoples. Josephus himself, in the very passage where he coins the word 'theocracy', speaks, not of Jehovah, but of Moses, as 'our law-giver'. In Israel, as elsewhere, the organs of theocracy that were long associated with the temple were associated with the sanctuary. Horeb, Shiloh, and Bethel are instances. The shrine, so to speak, gave the organ authenticity. When doubt or dispute arose about Jehovah's Law, appeal would be made to the guarding shrine, which was closely associated with the temple. These came to form a priestly class. At the great shrines, too, there soon began to be books of Jehovah's oracles; as there as well there were few men who could write and read books. Traditionally, at least, the original Law had been given, and its first edicts written, at the shrine of Horeb or Sinai. In later times, no doubt, when a Hebrew visited a shrine to learn Jehovah's will, its authoritative exponent, the priest, would not only read the appropriate law, but explain it. Sometimes, again, he would need to extend an old principle to meet a new case. So, little by little, the 'Law of Jehovah' would insensibly grow. For early Israel three things were indissoluble—Jehovah's shrine, Jehovah's book, Jehovah's priest. The three together formed the normal organ of theocracy.

The history of pre-monarchical Israel, however, has traces of two other theocratic organs—the so-called 'judge' and the 'prophet'. Of these a distinctive phrase is used: 'the spirit of the Lord came upon so and so'. This phrase has variants, but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy. There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot. If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. There was perhaps a similar connexion at first between the shrine and 'prophesying'. Before the days of Samuel the

THEOCRACY.—The term 'theocracy' was coined by Josephus, upon the analogy of 'aristocracy' and 'democracy', to denote a certain kind of national polity. Any tribe of states that claims to be governed by a god or gods may be called a 'theocracy'. History has many different types; e.g., the theocratic idea underlies Brahmanism, Islam, the panoply, and the theory of 'kingship by divine right'. Yet there is probably no historical instance of a 'pure' theocracy. Just as the British constitution to-day, while predominantly democratic, has elements of aristocratic character, so of old time the Hebrew commonwealth, for example, while predominantly theocratic, had democratic elements.

Different polities are distinguishable historically, not because a single principle exhausts them, but because the principal of one is dominant within them. The idea of government by God was the dominant one in Israelite polity. In this way it was unique, as Josephus claimed, among the polities of its time. It is the leading instance of theocracy for all times. It is the only one discussed here.

Theocracy came to Israel by survival. The earliest form of theocratic society, so far as anthropology has yet discovered, was the clan or kindred group. This appears to have been world-wide. In religion it was 'heathenistic', a part of the heathenism belonging to a particular clan. He was part of it, and the god was its chief member. His relation to it was too many-sided to be summed up in any one word. In some ways a tribe's god was like a father, in some like a leader, in some like a king. This theory developed among the Semitic races, the relation of the god to the tribe came to be chiefly like that of a king. So, among them as elsewhere, there arose the very 'heathenistic' type of theocracy. Its best-known examples were Biblical: Chemosh ruled

1 The Ark of God was originally a kind of movable shrine.
2 Ex 21:1 and parallel. 1 S 25:39.
3 Deut 12:5, 1 S 13:16.
4 Ex 34:22.
5 Ex. 19:21, Nu 45:1, 1 S 30:15.
6 Nu. 24:7, 1 S 33:19.
7 It is possible that historical study will show that the office of three or more organ of the spirit of Jehovah was filled by an intermediate instead of two, distinguishing the 'judge' from the 'prophet'. For it has been implied that where 'the judge, in the ordinary sense of the word (cf. 1 S 13:3) was a function of the priests in Israel; and this was not confined to priests (e.g., 1 S 4:16, 1 S 25:19). Such a phrase has variants, but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy. There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot. If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. There was perhaps a similar connexion at first between the shrine and 'prophesying'. Before the days of Samuel the
8 Nu 24:7, 1 S 33:19. 10 Nu 24:7, 1 S 33:19. The phrase has variants, but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy. There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot. If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. There was perhaps a similar connexion at first between the shrine and 'prophesying'. Before the days of Samuel the
Theocracy is unique among theocracies because of its

The Exile was a signal proof of their greatness,

In exile, however, Israel believed in the rule of its

Monothesism now entirely supplanted henothesism. While Israel was still Jahweh's peculiar treasure, His theocracy was no longer limited to Canaan, but swayed the world.

Yet the immediate sequel was disappointing. 'Judaism'—to use the name appropriate after the Restauration—to set out to be a pure theocracy. It rebuilt the old shrine; it gathered the ancient books; at length it made the ancient priesthood paramount. Yet it gradually became a splendid failure. The line of prophets dwindled away. The temple was desecrated in vain for kings like David. At last no priest dared, in the Lord's name, to add to His Law. And it seemed clear, besides, that the Lord did not rule the world. The theocracies tend to become

Israel was now a hierarchy, and it looked as though Jahweh would sink to the level of the gods who had done great things for those who did nothing in the present. The Jewish theocracy threatened to 'fossilize.'

Yet it escaped this fate. As the Psalms of the period show, there were always Jews who espoused the creed that their God was still alive, and they knew that His time would come. The book of Daniel bears the same witness in a different way. It is the first apocalypse, and all apocalypses are theocratic. So, again, in its own way, is the book of Ezechiel. The distinctive note of this epoch is not really its consummated ritual or its completed law, but its unextinguished hope. Israel believed that the future, as the past, was in its own hands.

There would be a perfect theocracy yet! The Kingdom of God would come!

There were two leading opinions about the way of its coming, readily separable in thought, though not always separated in fact. The one opinion found its aptest expression in the apocalypses. Broadly speaking, these expected a kingdom based on force, in which the Jew would rule all other nations—a kingdom won and maintained by a superhuman organ of God. This opinion laid hold of the external form of the old theocracy, kingship. It had an element of truth in it, for the NT has an apocalypse. In the interval before the perfect kingdom comes Christ does 'over-rule' all things and men, and this is a theocratic idea. Yet the other opinion is final for Christianity. Its earliest exponents were some of the later Psalms; it lived in the quiet circles that 'waited for the consolation of Israel'; its perfect prophet was Jesus. He accepted the phrase 'the Kingdom of God,' and was looked for as a theocracy, but He gave the phrase His own exposition and laid down the true method of the Kingdom's coming. It has been seen above that from the first a man who was the organ of

1 E.G. 1 S 10.  2 S 106 (the 'book').  3 Cf. A. Smith, Jerusalem, London, 1895, 1. 111 f.  4 Ch. 28 4.  5 Ch. 28 74.  6 The Idea of a Divine monarch with an earthly vice-regent lived a common in the Semitic world (W. Robertson Smith, Beligion of the Semites, sect. ii.).  7 E.G. 1 K 204.  8 S. E. 1 K 1295.  9 Cf. Ezra 29.  

Hebrew 'prophet' was probably hardly more than the wandering saint of other Eastern faiths—a man who lived a separate and so a 'holy' life. In all lands these have had their fraternities, for even where they have not 'official' connexion with the ritual, temples offer the best opportunities for this way of life by which they live. The first band of 'prophets' named in the Hebrew records appears as 'coming down from the high place.' Primitive thought does not readily isolate the different organs of a god's activity. Scholars differ about the degree in which the religion of pre-monarchic Israel surpassed other tribal faiths, but all allow that within the period of the monarchy Hebrewism became unique. In that period all the Hebrew organs named above persisted, but in persisting changed. Every other Hebrew shrine was eclipsed by the Temple in Jerusalem, and at length disappeared. So, too, the Temple became at last the depository of the one recognized book of Jahweh's Law. In Jerusalem, again, the priesthood of Israel ultimately concentrated. At crises in the history of the Slavonic Kingdom the high-priest sometimes played a decisive part, and there is evidence that the Temple had a succession of priest-preachers who surpassed all contemporary priesthodies in the loftiness of their teaching and the purity of their lives. Their permanent memorial is the book of Deuteronomy. It was only at the close of the monarchy that they became utterly corrupt—a fate that also befell the 'sons of the prophets' and even then Jahweh's great witness, Jeremiah, was born a priest. Of the three other theocratic functions found in the times before the kings, two—leadership in war and judgment in peace—which had previously often united in a single person now permanently blent in the king. While, of course, there were inferior captains and subordinate judges, he was both supreme captain and supreme judge. And he was effectively both. A king, unlike the earlier 'saviour,' held permanent office, and, unlike the earlier judge, had power to enforce his decisions. And he was king by the will of God. He was Jahweh's 'son,' as having His mind and acting under His guidance. He was 'the Lord's anointed.' At times even a wicked king fell back upon Jahweh's help at the pinch of the people's need. It is true that one king after another 'did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord,' and so repudiated the righteous God of Israel, but the ideal of a king who, like David, did a will of Jahweh remained a part of the hope of Israel. Ideally the Hebrew monarchy was theocratic.

The chief glory of monarchic Israel, however, was its prophets. There were different indeed from all other 'prophets.' With them the connexion of theocracy with shrines, maintained by the kings, began to loosen. At times, again, the prophet must perforce denounce the priest. Yet the prophets, more than any else, were the true organs of theocracy. 'Thus saith the Lord' was their watchword. They spoke under the impulse of the Spirit. In a sense they kept God alive. It is true that from the time of Elijah, Israel began to refuse their guidance, that at last the Northern Kingdom rejected it altogether, and that even in Judah they became the leaders only of a 'remnant.' But it was just this 'remnant' that

1 E. G. 1 S 10.
2 S 106 (the 'book').
3 Cf. A. Smith, Jerusalem, London, 1895, 1. 111 f.
4 Ch. 28 4.
5 Ch. 28 74.
6 The Idea of a Divine monarch with an earthly vice-regent lived a common in the Semitic world (W. Robertson Smith, Beligion of the Semites, sect. ii.).
7 E.G. 1 K 204.
8 S. E. 1 K 1295.
9 Cf. Ezra 29.
Jahweh was thought of as 'filled with' His Spirit. This was why and how he knew God's will. Moned rather than once it had been discerned, even by OT thinkers, that a perfect theocracy, therefore, could come only if all its citizens, and not a few chosen, possessed the Spirit of Jahweh. This idea is really central in Jesus' teaching, though He was able to teach it only as men were able to bear it. With the Acts of the Apostles it became explicitly the main principle of Christianity. At the same time there began the development of the Christian doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost. There can be a perfect theocracy only when every man acts always under the guidance of the Spirit of God. Here is the justification of Biblical theocratic doctrine. Yet here also is its enthusiasm. For this kind of 'theocracy' does not satisfy the definition given above. It is not a 'theory of national policy.' The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is naturally individual, and as naturally universal, but it is not naturally national. Again, the term 'policy' implies government and its coercions, and one of the marks of the Spirit's sway just is that it is incoercive. Yet the whole of Israel's theocratic idea held a kernel of 'eternal' value. The last human society will be a Kingdom of God.

LITERATURE.—For Josephus' use of the term 'theocracy' see ἹΩΘ. ed., vol. v. (1904) p. 337 (V. H. Staunton); for the facts about the general Semitic notion of theocracy see W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites, London, 1894, etc., and, The Prophets of Israel, do. 1897, etc., ii.; for the development of the idea see the apocryphal literature, see the standard authorities on the religion of Israel, the theology of the OT, and the extra-canonical Jewish books; these authorities on the NT discuss the relation of the idea of the Kingdom of God to the earlier theocratic doctrine. Separate treatment of the subject is unessential.

C. RYDER SMITH.

THEODICY.—1. The term.—Theodicy (Germ. Theodizee, adapted from Fr. théodicee, which is composed of Gr. ἥθις, See 'justice') means literally the (or a) justification or vindication of God. Leibniz appears to have been the first to use the word in its distinctive sense. In a letter written in 1667 he spoke of employing it as the title of an intended work, and in 1716 the work duly appeared. The complete title was, Éssais de Théodicee sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal. Since Leibniz's time the word 'theodicy' has been in common use.

2. The concept.—In modern usage the scope of the term is vague and ill-defined. Sometimes it is employed, as by P. Jane and G. Scailles, as equivalent to natural theology or philosophy of religion. For those writers theodicy comprises the general problem of religion, though it is also understood by them in a more particular sense, as comprising only the central problems of the nature of God and the relation of God to the world. In either of these senses it may escape the charge of being a theory put forward to save the situation. But in the usual sense it does not so readily escape such a charge. For as a rule the term of the use is more in keeping with its literal meaning, and theodicy is understood as the (or a) vindication of the divine providence or government in view of the existence of evil. The 'theodiceman' assumes the validity of the theistic conception of God as powerful, wise, and good, and on this basis seeks to defend the divine administration: he would

3. Origin of the concept.—The need of such a defense and vindication is not felt in primitive religion under polytheism, with its animistic or spiritistic view of nature, because under polytheism the world is subject to a multitude of spirits both good and evil, who limit and beset man and are themselves limited by the natural order. Nor is the need felt even at the polytheistic stage of religious belief, with its multitude or hierarchy of gods as distincted from spirits, and because at this stage thought, if no longer naive and instinctive, is still uncritical, and the gods are conceived as being subject to fate or necessity or as governing a world already given and never properly under their control. At the monotheistic stage of religion, however, where thought is become critical and reflective, the problem of theodicy arises and calls for a solution. Sometimes, as in Persian religion, a dualism in the divine nature is postulated, and the world represented as the scene of a grand conflict between the principles of good and evil, in which good is destined to final triumph; and obviously a dualistic philosophy of religion, if it could be otherwise satisfying, would ease the problem. Under a monistic philosophy of religion, again, the problem is actually to get rid of the problem, by minimizing either evil or even evil itself. The problem of philosophy of evil, and of theodicy may be said to be that of theodicy, or of theology, or of theology, or of theodicy, as this tends to excuse evil, as if it were not evil, as if it were evil, or as if it were wicked. In the course of Christian history the problem of theodicy received distinctive treatment in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall. Whatever may be said as to the form of that doctrine, it stands for a principle which should be acknowledged in theistic interpretations of the world, namely the principle of human freedom and responsibility. It is not without significance that the classical theodicy or theistic apologia of Leibniz bears in its title not only the 'goodness of God' and 'the origin of evil,' but also the 'freedom of man.'

4. Leibniz's Theodicy.—(a) In the problems of theodicy Leibniz had been interested since his boyhood, and he claims to have given more attention to them than most. There are many references to them, certainly, in his correspondence during the last decades of the 17th cent., with Pellisson, Bossuet, and others; and the Essais itself bears ample witness to his long-continued interest in them. It should be remarked, however, that the Essais is not, properly speaking, a systematic presentation of the questions involved in theodicy. It is, in Leibniz's own word, a 'tissu' of what he had said and written in the course of the theological and philosophical discussions, centred in Pierre Bayle's works and especially his Dictionnaire historique et critique, which he carried on with Sophia Charlotte, queen of Prussia.

From a letter of Leibniz written to Sir Thomas Burnett in 1710 it appears that the Essais was compiled at the request of his friends and as a memorial to the deceased queen. The book was extraordinarily popular, and apparently the author finds satisfaction in recording that it was welcomed.
by Catholics as well as Lutherans and Evangelicals.¹ No doubt the *Essai* served its purpose well in an age of theological rationalism, and helped to stem the tide of scepticism which was now beginning to threaten the foundations of religious belief.² But Leibniz’s apologetic does not commend itself so readily in our time.

(6) It will be sufficient for the purposes of this article to indicate a few salient points in Leibniz’s theroe, the chief points illustrating the difference between the older and the newer theism in apologetic method and outlook.

(1) God.—Unlike most recent exponents of a theistic philo-

sophy of religion, Leibniz sees the belief that the being of God could be demonstrated by purely logical or rational proofs. Though he recognized, he did not make much use of, the ontological proof, and the proof, so peculiarly his own, from the “pre-established harmony” is bound up very closely with his monodology; but the cosmological or ato-

mical proof and the proof from the eternal truths are both central features of his theology or religious philosophy and independent of his ontological scheme. In accordance with the principle of the cosmological or ato-

mical proof, Leibniz starts from the idea of a being as contingent and in
ter an Existent which is not contingent but metaphysically necessary. There must be a sufficient reason or cause, he says, for the existence of the whole collection of contingent things which compose the world, and it is to be found in the Substance which causes it or makes it to exist. The reason or cause of its own existence and which is consequently necessary and eternal; and that Substance, or God, must also be to this argument that it is logically fallacious, as containing more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises; as the premises are not necessary, so must also be the conclusion. ⁴ As for the proof from the eternal truths—i.e., truths which involve no root cause or reason of existence in time—it is largely dependent upon Leibniz’s notion of possibility. For Leibniz, the very act of saying Spinoza, the possible was wider than the actual, essence than existence; and he argues that, if the eternal or metaphysically necessary truths are real, and found something existing in time, that existent something must be the metaphysically necessary Being of God, in whom essence is identical with existence, and whose existence is to be actual. Without God not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible.⁵ Against this proof, as handled by Leibniz, it must be said; it is inconsistent in one who regards the possible as wider than the actual, the essential than the existent, to regard truth as dependent upon existence; and that in any case we cannot on the premises reach a necessary Being separate from the existent and actual world. In all such arguments indeed, as R. Russell points out, there is difficulty in avoiding Spinozism.⁶

(2) The world.—In presenting what may be named his theo-

logical optimism Leibniz still moves on the high plane of metaphysical notions and a priori verbal proof, not descending to the lower empirical world, to which Bayle would bring him down. Founding upon the principle of sufficient reason and the eternal truths he states that this is the best of all possible worlds; for, were a better world than this world possible, God could make it in existence. God is absolutely powerful, wise, and good; and His goodness moved Him to create and produce all possible good, His wisdom led Him by a moral sense to the choice of that of the possible forms of existence to execute His great design. It is curious to reflect that the Leibnizian optimism must be associated with the most diverse ethical valuations of life, optimistic, pessimistic, meliorist; which gives point to Schopenhauer’s objection that, even if this is the best possible world, it does not prove that it is a world good enough to have been actualized.⁷ An objection, this, to philosophical grounds, this meeting Leibniz on his own plane, but it is on empirical grounds that the Leibnizian optimism has been most frequently challenged, from Voltaire’s Candide down to the present. Nor could Leibniz himself ignore the empirical aspect of the problem of theology.

(3) Evil.—Accordingly—apart from his metaphysical theory of evil as necessary limitation appertaining to finite existence at the source of both moral and physical evil—we find him emphasizing the instrumental theory, according to which evil, especially physical evil, is to be interpreted as an instrument or means of good. Is advocating this theory be sought to


³ *Das Problem der Widerspruche* (7, Gerhardt, vol. 106.), p. 115.


⁶ *Théodicée, 18* (Gerhardt, vol. 107), 125 (Gerhardt, vol. 107), 228 (Gerhardt, vol. 235 1.).


counter Bayle’s contentions that the strength of Malebranche was due to its conformity with an empirical rather than a priori conception of the world. Even from the empirical standpoint, Leibniz would reply, physical evil may be reasonably accounted for by the theory of instrumental value; and, as for moral evil, it could not be prevented by God with the unavoidable costs of freedom of self-determination which belongs to spiritual beings and not merely to nature. The chief arguments also Leibniz supports his doctrine of optimism, but enough has been said to show that, while his theodicy is forced to recognize the standpoint of experience as real primarily—i.e., his theistic proofs—as metaphysical con-

(c) The difference between Leibniz’s theodicy and the modern attitude in theodicy may now be briefly stated. Leibniz approached the problem of evil with a God whose existence had already been proved, as also His character of absolute perfection in power, wisdom, and goodness; and it was therefore an altogether reasonable pre-supposition on Leibniz’s part that this world as being the creation of such a God was the best possible. No matter what exception might be taken to the case as presented, the case itself was excellent. But nowadays, with the spirit of pessimism abroad in society, and the spirit too, not unakin—of anti-religious agnosticism, the problem of evil has become more acute, and one has learned to sympathize with W. James and others in the feeling that the new empirical evidence and the complacency of his attitude towards, e.g., a dogma like eternal punishment. The ‘charmingly written *Théodicée*’ is even described by W. James as a piece of ‘superficially insincere’; as a ‘cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm.’¹ Such strictures are too severe, but let them be a reminder of the difference in spirit between the old and the new approach to the problem of evil. Even from the empirical standpoint, it should be quite untrue to say of modern exponents of theism that they compose theologies ‘with their heads buried in monstrous wigs.’² The modern theist is conscious of the failure of rationalistic or purely speculative theology to establish its claims, and of the necessity of fundamentally empirical methods in theology if scientific results are to be gained, and he therefore exacts the world of experience in face of evil as an empirical problem, with the view of testing the reasonable-

ness of the theistic faith in God as just, holy, and loving. And he demands, this, by other empirical means. He observed facts of nature and history do not afford an unexceptionable argument for the goodness of God, and that after all the most solid ground of belief in the divine goodness lies in the needs and claims of the human being, the question is doubt there would be a *circulus in arguendo* involved here if such considerations were put forward as a solution of the problem of evil.¹ On the one hand, it is by the faith of religion that God is affirmed to be perfectly good, despite the evil to be found in the world of His creation and govern-

ance. On the other hand, religious faith is based on the power of religion as a solvent, or at least a partial solvent, of the problem of evil; in religion men seek refuge from the various evils that assail, from without and from within—which shows that a non-rationalistic theism could not offer a real solution of the problem of evil. Nor does it profess to do so.

5. Theodicy and philosophical reflection.—It is not necessary that this article should enter into a comprehensive discussion of the problem of theodicy from the side of philosophical explanation. This will be found in the art. GOOD AND EVIL, where it is affirmed with most of students of the subject that every proposed solution either
leaves the old question—‘si deus bonus, unde malum?’—unanswered or raises a new case.' None of the less we should like to express our sympathy with a type of solution—partial as it must be—which is on the lines of Leibniz's theology, but which goes beyond Leibniz in its recognition of human freedom as real, in the sense of implying self-limitation on God's part. Self-limitation does not mean fate, nor freedom unqualified indeterminism. Such a solution is not only consistent with the moral and religious experience of all ages, but also the burden of the mystery of evil; and it lends itself to attractive exposition in the speculative sphere, as in the humanistic or personalistic idealisms which aroused so much interest in the past. Yet it still leaves God, as indeed must every theodicy, ultimately responsible for both physical and moral evil. At the same time the recognition of the instrumental worth of evil somewhat relieves the weight of the divine responsibility. Take it first in connexion with the problem of physical evil. Pain and suffering are no doubt largely retributive and to be accounted for as the wages of individual and racial sin. But retribution is not an end in itself, and the positive rather than the negative purpose of physical evil is being more and more emphasized. Though pain, hardship, and loss moral energy may be stimulated and character moulded and shaped to finer issues. In this aspect of it suffering may be twice blessed, blessed to him who suffers and those brought into contact with him. Take it also in connexion with the problem of moral evil. Here again the instrumental theory applies, and evil may be regarded as for education and discipline. In fact many theists regard moral evil as having been always under the divine control, and interpret it as necessary physical evil to human development. It is the discord without which there could be no union, and in which there could be no light. Through sin man learns his weakness, and his need of strength from on high. Through sin, and his direful effects in society, he learns the meaning of self-sacrifice and the measure of the sacrificial love of God. Christianity looks for the time when man's moral education shall be brought to completion, and his suffering and sin have served their purpose. Yet even all is said, the problem of evil remains.

6. Theodicy and the religious consciousness.—The discussion of the problem of evil on empirical grounds, and in the light of the instrumental theory of value, leads us to a consideration of the religious solution. There is a philosophical theodicy, and there is a religious theodicy. In the first, evil is explained—or an attempt is made to explain it—in the light of the divine goodness; in the second, evil is not explained, nor is there any attempt to explain it—it is simply to be overcome. As Buck has remarked, 'religion does not so much explain as presuppose evil'; and, as P. T. Forsyth so well insists, a religious theodicy is not an answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle. In a religious theodicy it is not man who justifies God's ways, but God who justifies His own ways, and that not by accounting for the world's evil, but by saving men from it. While this is said, religion can no more than philosophy explain the problem of evil. For the individual believer in God and His goodness the problem receives a practical solution through the victory of his faith; he estimates life no more by hedonistic standards, but discovers the Supreme Good in moral and spiritual union with God. From the universal point of view the religious solution of the problem may be stated in terms of the teleological idea. The end or purpose revealed in the universe is the creation of free ethical personalities capable of personal intercourse with God. In this theodicy life is a flawless mirror the divine image and likeness. To that purpose the presence of evil is subservient, and there are traces of it even in animate nature, which we have too often regarded as merely a field of struggle and carnage.

'There is a legitimate scientific sense,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'in which it may be said that Man is part of the system of Nature and the crown of its evolution; and it is assuredly of some significance that he can find in animated nature such correspondences to his ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.'

We might therefore be content to state our theodicy in the following terms, which give due regard to the fact—made clear in modern science—that our world is still in the making, and which also illustrate the newer empirical as distinguished from the older rationalistic way of approach to the problem of evil, viz. with the anthropogenetic tendency in modern theology and religious philosophy:

'While this world is far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless in view of its general constitution it may be regarded as the best possible kind of world in which to have man begin his development, and in which the possibility of evil may exist in the world furnish no good reason for abandoning belief in a God who is both good enough and great enough to meet every real religious need.'


WILLIAM FULTON.

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA.—See Adoptianism, Antiochene Theology.

THEOGNIS.—Theognis is the name attached to a collection of some 1389 erotic, convivial, reflective, and horatian elegiac verses whose chief interest for this article is that they are part of the repertory of Greek ethical commonplace in the half-century preceding Plato and the tragedians. The collection begins with invocations to Apollo, Artemis, and the Muses, and a dedication to a young friend Cynmus, to whom many of the quatrains and couplets are addressed, and whose name may be meant by the seal that perhaps marks their genuineness. But little remains to be said about this certification. Some are addressed to other

3 Line 13.
friends, including a Simonides who may be the poet. 1 After the first 100 lines there is little sequence or coherency of ideas. There are many repetitions, and some of the verses occur in the fragments of Solon, Phocylides, Tyrtaeus, and Minnesinger. These considerations, and the fact that quotations from Plato 2 and in a passage attributed by Stobaeus 3 to Xenophon are susceptible of various interpretations, raise many problems about the composition of the poem, if it be as any scheme a whole, and have given rise to an extensive German literature of hypothesis most conveniently surveyed in E. Harrison's Studies in Theognis. 4 Harrison argues plausibly, if not always quite convincingly, that the poem as we stand form a connected sequence. His book concludes with an excellent chapter on the life and times of Theognis. He was a noble of Nisaea Megara, who apparently at one time was also a citizen of Hyblean Megara in Sicily. He spoke of the terror of the Medes, 5 and is therefore conjectured to have lived to see the invasion of Xerxes. He lived in a time of social and political revolution at Megara, vaguely known to us from three references in Aristotle's Politics 6 and from one passage in Plutarch. 7 His temper was embittered by the temporary triumph of the popular party, the loss of his property, and the treachery of friends which was perhaps the cause of the travels in Euboea, Sparta, and Sicily to which he refers. 8 To these experiences we may trace his pessimism, 9 his cynicism, 10 his harping on the hard condition of poet, that restrains a man to desert to which his will does not consent, 11 his complaint that money makes the man and that mercenary marriages corrupt the breed of men, 12 his emphasis on the virtue of faith 13 or loyalty to wife, club, and mates 14 in times of trial, and his frequent use of the good and other ethical terms in the political or social sense. 15

Too much has been made of this last idea by Theognis's translator J. H. Frere, 16 by Nietzsche, whose own philosophy is largely based upon it, and by Grote, who, however, admits that the ethical meanings are not absolutely unknown. 17 Theognis is merely the chief example, the conveniently quotable locuta classicus, so to speak, for a natural human tendency. We still speak of the better classes as they did in Aristotle's time, 18 and Homer characterizes personal traits that are worse than the worst sort for the good. 19 We cannot infer that the ethical idea was lacking. 20 We can only say that before Plato it was easier to confound pure or absolute ethics with prudential, conventional, tribal, caste, or political morality than it has been since. Much the same may be said of the naive incoherence between Theognis's general commendations of truth, justice, good faith, and kindliness, and his passionate prayers for vengeance, 21 his (perhaps ironical) counsel to set your heel on the empty-headed demons, 22 to be all things to all men, 23 to adapt yourself to your environment with the protective resemblance of the polyline which takes the hue of the rock to which it is clinging, 24 and to flatten and caress the good man, and defend even his enemy, and Plato did not apply the principle to international politics in the Tolstoyan way. Lastly, the erotic verses of Theognis—most of them, at least—are a serious spurious part of the collection, 25 dealing with themes repugnant to modern feeling—seem to us incompatible with the conception of him as a moralist and still more with the use of his elegies as a schoolbook. They were indeed, on the hypotheses of R. Reitzenstein, 26 mainly banquet songs. But, however that may be, Theognis's own use of the verb 'admonish' 27 classes them in some sort with the literature of prudential precepts and moral admonition known by the name of erosphae. 28 And no less a moralist in his own esteem than Isocrates recommends the study and excerpting of them as entirely edifying. At the same time they are in excerpta for school use or otherwise, they were, like Solon and Hesiod, learned by heart by educated Greeks of the 5th cent., and so provide many texts for amplification in Pindar and the Greek drama, and for discussion in Greek philosophy. 29 An exhaustive dissertation on this subject would be of interest, but would require the nicest discrimination. Harrison 30 collects the parallels in Pindar and Bacchylides, some of them perhaps overstrained. It is not easy to determine how many of the resemblances in tragedy are conscious reminiscences. The chorus in Sophocles, Ed. Col. 1292 ff., is clearly an expansion of the melancholy lines 435 ff.:

Not to be born into life were the best for us, creepers on earth's face, Never to lock the sun's burning and pitiless rays: happiest lot of the living is that who quickly to HELL goes. Laid out quiet and stark, wrapped in a mantle of earth. 11

Jebb on Antigone, 622, quotes Theognis, 403, as one of the anticipations of the untraced 'quem Juppiter voluit esse tuum' of Sophocles Ant. 297, echoes Theognis, 221, in the sentiment that the man who thinks that he alone is wise is himself void of wisdom. Soph. frag. 356 repeats the commonplace that health is best and justice the fairest of things; frag. 525 the humorous fancy that even Zeus cannot please all, whether he rains or holds up. 23 But these are only conspicuous examples of an indeterminate list. When Euripides praises the man who is as true to absent as to present friends, 32 we cannot be certain whether he is or is not paraphrasing Theog. 93-95 and the same holds of the coincidence between Phænissos, 449-450, and Theog. 717 f. in the sentiment that

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wealth is all-powerful. Plato's saying that a spirit of reverence (aïkè) is a better inheritance than great riches, is the present writer thinks, a distinct reference to Theog. 409. Isocrates, i. 19, equals Theog. 72, and i. 29, Theog. 105.

The common thread which runs through Greek ethics expressed by Theognis are man's dependence on the gods, and his ignorance of what the future has in store, his duties to the suppliant and the guest, and his obligations to protect the doctrine of the men of wisdom, of nothing too much, and of Xóros and Eón, the late punishment of the wicked, the dangers of slander and of light oaths, the admonition that all true goods are costly, that ill-gotten gains do not abide, that the last for wealth is insatiate, and that the boastful word (ἐγὼ μηδὲν) or the forsworn forecast provokes the gods and invites nemesis, the complaint that shame and reverence are exiled from a degenerate world, and that man must value nothing but wealth.

Other commonplaces, whether of ethics or of criticism of life, are the immortality of song, the praise of patience, the Anacreontic Epic, the Carpe diem, evil communications, in vivo veritas, there is no perfect man, the ingratitude of children, the foible of censoriousness and self-praise, and the generalizes moral maxims that the counterfeitman, his convivial and social precepts, his slight anticipations of later motives of satire, and his somewhat cynical, political, or worldly wisdom do not further concern us here as Sæs and 1181 are in apparent contradiction on the justification of tyrannicides. Theognis apparently does not mention the confounding of the innocent with the guilty, or the jealousy of the gods, this is involved in the nemeses that attaches to the too confident.

As an aristocrat he, like Pindar, emphasized nature against teaching. No teacher can put nature at a distance. A mad, Plato finds a contradiction between this and the admonition to associate only with the good because from them you will learn good only. But it is Theognis's belief that it is easier to corrupt the good than to reform the bad. In lines 155-159 there is a suggestion of the noblest thought of mature Greek ethics, the idea that the mutability of fortune and our common frailty impose the duty of provision for our damnation upon all men.

Especially interesting are Theognis's direct appeals and protests to Zeus. He complains that the prosperity of the wicked casts doubt upon the notion of free choice of the world. This, however, is rather a development of the motive of Melanians's speech in the Iliad, the startlingly new thought which Croesus finds in it. Theognis's prose.

Lassen., 738 B.

2 584, 117, 660.
3 584, 1075-1076.
4 148 f.
5 131, 221: cf. Heriod, Works and Days, 185 f.
6 1105, 121: 336, 184, 491.
7 190.
8 685.
9 421, 1077.
10 125, 1189, 1185.
11 159.
12 122, 1060, 1158.
13 Lassen., 738 B.
14 Lassen., 738 B.
15 336, 337, 346, 635, 636, 637.
16 329.
17 275-278.
18 327.
19 327, 366, 1158.
20 159.
21 275-278.
22 393-439.
23 1157.
24 341, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640.
25 669.
26 235, 335, 444, 555, 561, 637, 638.
27 177.
28 275-278.
29 327.
30 325.
31 148 f.
32 669.
33 393-439.
34 1103.
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than theology and furnishes it with the matter with which it deals. In all departments of human life and activity experience, in which feeling, intuition, and volition are the predominant factors and reason or intuition is as yet implicit, precedes theory or science, which seeks to exhibit and make explicit the reasons, the right or principles of truth and reality underlying and accounting for the experience. Thus the use of numbers in the relations and activities of the practical life precedes the use of speech proceeds the science of language; the use of reasoning in practice precedes the science of logic; and the sailing of the seas in ships precedes the science of navigation. So too the experience and use of religion as a practical factor in life's activities precedes the science of religion, or theology. And, as men may attain considerable efficiency and success in various departments of life without having rationalized or reduced their experience to system and exhibited its underlying principles, so men may live a truly religious life and have a rich and full religious experience without having attained to any very clear or coherent system of theology. But, while a man may be religious without being a theologian, religious experience is necessary to enable a man to be a competent theologian. The fuller and richer the religious experience has been, the more likely is he to prove a trustworthy and satisfactory theologian.

Schleiermacher was so impressed with the importance of the part played by feeling or emotion in religion that he gave it not merely the predominant but the exclusive place. Over against the long prevailing definition of religion as religious knowledge, he defined religion justly as feeling and feeling and knowing and doing homage to God; he defined religious piety as in its essence consisting neither in knowledge nor in action but in a determination of the feeling. The root of all religion he held to be man's feeling of absolute dependence on some power or powers other than himself. But this dictum, while it emphasizes the important truth that the large part played by feeling in religion, if strictly taken, is one-sided and exaggerated, in that it ignores the part played by the cognitive faculty in forming some conception, more or less definite, of the power or powers on which we are dependent, the part played by the will in choosing and adopting means for getting into harmony with that Supreme Power or Being, which are elements characteristic of all religion.

In theology, as distinct from religion, the cognitive faculty, or reason, is predominant. It succeeds religion, and seeks by a right use of reason on the matter of experience furnished by religion to evolve out of it a system of connected and coherent truth to which the term 'science' can be properly applied.

3. Theology and science.—The aim of science in any of its departments is to apply reason, with its powers of analysis and generalization and its laws of inference, induction, and deduction, to the data of experience in that department in such a way as to discover the laws or principles underlying and relating the given facts or data of experience and to unify the entire content of experience in that department into a coherent systematic whole or body of truth such as may be described as knowledge of reality. Inasmuch as theology seeks to deal with the region of religion, the realm of religious experience, it is rightly described as a branch of science. The instrument which the scientist makes use of in ascertaining, analyzing, and systematizing the facts or data of experience in the department selected for scientific investigation is the reason with its powers and laws of perception, conception, evidence, inference, etc. And reason is the instrument made use of by the scientific theologian in investigating the facts and phenomena of religious experience and building up a science of theology not less than is the case in other departments of science. Lack of clearness as to the place and function of reason in theology is apt to lead to confusion and disagreement as to what theology is and what are its aims and scopes. Thus in some quarters it is maintained that theology differs from other sciences in so far as the matter of religion is concerned is given to us by revelation and not by reason as in the other sciences. But this contrast between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge is unsound. Reason is not the source from which, in any case, we get the matter which we build up into science, but merely the instrument by means of which we grasp, analyze, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize that matter which is given to us by revelation from without in experience. This is as true of other sciences as it is of theology. As a matter of fact, the material which we build up by use of reason into the natural sciences, as they are called, such as physics, chemistry, biology, etc., is given to us by revelation from without in experience not less than the matter which we seek to build up by use of reason into a systematic religious science. The fuller and richer that religious experience which the reason must seek to apprehend and co-ordinate into a coherent whole of knowledge of the truth, as is the former. The knowledge got by using reason to grasp, co-ordinate, and systematize the given matter of experience is of the same kind in both cases. In both cases it rests ultimately on a foundation of faith—faith in the reliability of our faculties of knowledge (perception, cognition, inference, etc.) and on the ultimate reasonableness or cognizability of all that is given to us in experience. We go on using our powers of perception, cognition, inference, etc., in reference to what is given to us from without in experience, never doubting that the knowledge thus reached is real knowledge or knowledge of truth and reality, even though we may know and realize that our knowledge in any department of experience is incomplete and leaves room for progress. Thus the physicist may realize that he does not know the ultimate nature of matter, the mathematician may not be able to explain what space and time are, and the biologist may feel that he does not know what, at bottom, life and consciousness are.

But the knowledge, of which there may be no end to the fundamental questions of an ultimate kind, in regard to the data of experience in various departments, does not nullify or render valueless the results of scientific investigation and systematization in those departments. It merely shows that our knowledge of what is revealed to us in experience is as yet incomplete, and that an adequate synthesis of knowledge or metaphysics of being has not yet been reached by us, not that such a metaphysics is unsatisfactory. So too with the data of religious experience. It is the function of theology as a branch of science to collect, examine, analyse, and systematize all that is revealed to us in this department of experience, so as to reach a whole of scientific knowledge in this sphere, as in other departments of experience and knowledge. We must use our reason as far as it will go in synthesizing or giving us rational knowledge of what is given in experience. And, if there are problems of an ultimate kind in this science, as in other sciences, which still remain obscure or indeterminate, the rational knowledge in any such case does not invalidate the knowledge reached by the application of sound scientific method to the data of experience, nor deprive it of the right to be regarded as
science or knowledge of truth. It merely shows that our science in this sphere is incomplete and spurs us on to reach out towards a more comprehensive synthesis of all our knowledge in an adequate metaphysics or philosophy of reality. Science in all its departments is limited and incomplete as knowledge of reality. It leaves unsolved ultimate questions as to the nature and relations of matter and mind or spirit, space and time, life and consciousness. It is the function of philosophy, as the ultimate form of knowledge, to grapple with these ultimate problems and seek a satisfactory solution of them. And it is along the lines of moral and religious experience, and the data furnished thereby, that light on such ultimate problems may most hopefully be looked for.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, began a movement in philosophy which has had far-reaching influence on modern theology as well as on philosophy. His contention is that in unifying the given matter of perceptive experience into an ordered and comprehensive system, or reason or the receptive subject makes use of forms of perception and cognition which are subjective (i.e. belonging to the nature or constitution of the knowing mind), not objective (i.e. belonging to the object or reality as it is in itself apart from its being known or cognized). Kant thus concluded that the world of which we have definite knowledge, through grasping and unifying the given matter of this subjective and objective reality, is a phenomenal world or a world as it appears to a conscious subject endowed with powers of perception and affects of the mind. The will is an actual, real world or thing-in-itself existing exactly thus apart from being perceived or known. Thus exact scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is limited to knowledge of the phenomenal world, or the world of appearance.

The use of those very forms of perception and cognition which give definiteness to our knowledge makes it knowledge of the phenomenal as contrasted with the distinctly real or being-in-itself. All scientific or theoretic knowledge is thus knowledge of the phenomenal only. If there be a noumenal world of reality, and if it be in any way accessible to us, this must be in something other than that of rational knowledge. Kant maintains that access to a noumenal world of reality is gained by us, not through the pure reason but through the practical reason or moral consciousness, by means of which we may and do reach a kind of faith-knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality, which, though not rational theoretic knowledge, such as we have in science, is yet of value for the moral and religious life. This demarcation of the limits of valid, rational, scientific or theoretic knowledge, and differentiation from it of the kind of knowledge got through moral and religious experience or through supernatural divine revelation is characteristic of many theological writers since Kant. The argument of the Critique of Pure Reason is supposed to be conclusive against the possibility of a rational metaphysical or valid theoretic knowledge of ultimate reality. Huxley and Spencer pressed Kant's conclusion into the service of their doctrine that God or ultimate reality is an idea, a concept, rather than an actuality unknowable by man, and that therefore a science of theology is impossible. Hamilton and Mansel endeavored to reconcile the agnostic conclusions of Kant in regard to a rational metaphysics with the acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine as grounded on revelation, not on reason. The Ritschelians accept Kant's conclusions as to the impossibility of a rational, theoretically valid, knowledge of God or ultimate reality, and so rule out all natural theology or rational theology being inconsistent; but, while eliminating all metaphysics from Christian theology as untenable, they seek to retain in large measure the traditional Christian theology as grounded on a divine historic revelation similar to that in Christ, and of which Scripture is the record. As with Kant, they seek to find a grounding for this in the immediate deliverances of the moral and religious consciousness, which furnishes them with a basis for 'value-judgments' where valid theoretic knowledge fails. This sharp differentiation between the kind of knowledge got by making use of reason, our cognitive faculty, in grasping, analyzing, and systematizing the data of perceptive experience in the sphere, say, of physics or chemistry and the kind of knowledge got by using reason in the same way—call it practical reason or what you will—in grasping, co-ordinating, and systematizing the data of moral and religious experience is arbitrary and unconvincing. The world of reality revealed to us in experience and knowledge is the world in which grounds our common knowledge or the moral and religious experience which grounds our religious knowledge—is one whole, and our knowledge of it, however subjective or relative, is capable of being synthesized as one coherent whole. The attempt of the Kantians and Ritschelians to rule out all metaphysics and natural theology as going beyond the proper limits of thought and yet to build up a theology of value-judgments founded on the needs of the moral consciousness or practical reason or on the data of a historic divine revelation, is not satisfying to the inquiring mind that seeks for unity and coherence and consistency in its knowledge. Theology, as the philosophy of religion, is to be looked upon, not as the rival or opponent of rational science, but rather as its copartner and cannot reach to true theology can never come into conflict with true science. For it includes all the data and verified results of true science among its material postulates. It accepts as a whole, tested, analyzed, and systematized by sound scientific methods.

5. Reason and intuition.—Akin to the distinction which Kantians draw between the theoretic reason, which gives us definite knowledge of a phenomenal world, and the practical reason, which gives us vague knowledge of noumenal reality, is the distinction which more recent philosophers such as Henri Bergson draw between reason, or intellect, and instinct, or intuition, as sources of knowledge. Intuition, it is alleged, brings us more immediately into touch with the living flowing stream of reality, of which as individual persons we form a part, and enables us to make ourselves thereto more surely and satisfactorily than reason or intellect, whose forms of thought and processes of inference are adapted to matter that is fixed or static and not the ever-changing creative flux of actual reality or real time. But this contrast or antithesis between intuition and intellect, like that between faith and reason, is unsound. The intuitions are just the implicit form of reason. And it is better in every way for a rational being such as man that what is implicit in consciousness should be made explicit and fitted into the comprehensive synthesis of rational knowledge, which alone deserves the name of knowledge. The only supreme
authority and court of appeal for rational conscious beings is reason based on an ultimate inerradical faith in the reasonableness of our experience, which is the underlying assumption of all science, including theological science. Intuition or instinct as instrument of knowledge is to incur moral and intellectual bankruptcy which is unworthy of a rational being such as man. It is to take a step downwards towards the brutal condition, upwards towards the goal of true personality.

For conscious rational beings the only reality which has or can have any meaning is reality which is, or may be, apprehended by rational consciousness. In the case of reality of which we are, or suppose ourselves to be, dully aware in subconscious apprehension or intuition, it is assumed that to a more perfect or adequate consciousness this would evidence itself as real. Reality for us means reality apprehended or apprehensible by a conscious being. To affirm an unknown reality may mean simply that we are dimly aware of the existence of some power or force which we have not yet been able to adjust to our incomplete synthesis or scheme of knowledge. But to affirm a reality which is, and which must ever remain, inaccessible to every human religion is to affirm a contradiction in terms or to use words without meaning.

Practical reason, faith, intuition or instinct, which would point as the proper guides in theology rather than what they call the pure or theoretic reason, are all forms of conscious apprehensions which enable us to build up the data of experience into something more or less coherent whole of knowledge. The data to be unified and synthesized in a science of systematic theology are not indeed given to us by reason from within, but by others from without, and it is our only proper instrument for the apprehending, co-ordinating, and systematizing of these data.

6. Theology and the Bible.—Some theologians conceive of the task of theology as that of setting forth in coherent systematic form the content of that revelation concerning God, the world, and man of which the Bible is the inspired record. But, while this points to a very important department of theology, it is too much of a view to take of the scope and function of theology as a whole. There are other materials or data for theological construction besides those furnished by the Bible, which must not be ignored by the scientific theologian who takes a wide and comprehensive view of his subject. The revelation of ultimate reality given in the natural world around us with its varied facts and phenomena, which it is the function of natural science to investigate, furnishes material which the theologian must interpret and construe. So too the course of general human history, which it is the function of historical science to present and elucidate in the light of general principles or laws, affords data of experience which are of value for theological construction. And the moral consciousness of mankind generally, that great revelation of which is the special task of the science of ethics, furnishes important material to the scientific theologian to help in the upbuilding of a system of theology. But the revelation given in the history and experience of Israel as a nation and of the outstanding personalities among that people, culminating in the fact of Christ and the foundation of the Christian Church, is of such supreme importance and unique significance in the religious sphere that it is destined to be the special and customary and convenient to distinguish between the general revelation to mankind as a whole in nature and history and conscience, which is treated of under the heading of natural theology, and the special historic revelation culminating in Christ, which is treated of under the heading of specifically Christian theology, and which may be regarded not as something entirely different from natural theology, but rather as reason to intuition or instinct as instrument of knowledge is to incur moral and intellectual bankruptcy which is unworthy of a rational being such as man. It is to take a step downwards towards the brutal condition, upwards towards the goal of true personality.

7. Classification of theological sciences or disciplines; theological encyclopaedia.—Having such a vast and varied material to deal with, theological science has many branches or disciplines with aims and methods differing according to the subject dealt with and the purpose kept in view. To elucidate and classify these various disciplines is the function of what is known as theological encyclopaedia, which itself constitutes a branch of theological study.

Religion as an object of investigation has two aspects: (a) a historical aspect, under which it is to be regarded as a historical phenomenon appearing under various forms among various peoples with characteristics which furnish ample material for historical inquiry and investigation; and (b) a normative or religious aspect, under which it appears as a present inner power of life making claim to truth and to the right to regulate individual and social life. This twofold aspect of religion furnishes us with guidance for classifying the branches of theology, which in turn are divided into two main divisions: (a) the historical or phenomenological branches, including all those sciences which deal with religion on its phenomenological side as an actual appearance in history; and (b) the normative or constructive branches, including those sciences which deal with religion as a present-day reality and power, claiming to be truth by which the practical life of man should be moulded and regulated. The distinction already referred to between natural theology and specifically Christian theology furnishes ground for suitable further subdivision. Reason, however, is our only proper instrument for the apprehending, co-ordinating, and systematizing of these data.

(a) The investigation of religion in its phenomenological aspect may be conveniently sub-divided into (i) a general branch dealing with the phenomenology of the ethnic religions other than Christian that have appeared in history, which will include (1) the history of religions, with a distinctive account of the distinctive features and characteristics of religious beliefs as they have appeared in history, (2) comparative study of religion, and (3) psychology of religion. The investigation can throw light on that; and (ii) a special branch dealing with the phenomenology of the Christian religion. This will embrace, under the general heading of Biblical science, (4) linguistics, or a study of the Biblical languages and the principles of interpretation and exegesis; (5) Biblical introduction, or investigation into text, date, authorship, and historical setting of the various books of the Bible; (6) Biblical history and antiquities; and (7) Biblical theology, which aims at setting forth by means of impartial exposition the ideas as to God, man, and the world and their relations set forth in the different Biblical writings; and under the general heading of ecclesiastical history, (8) Church history, or the history of the spread of the Church, (9) history of doctrine, and (10) symbolic, or the history of the different creeds and confessions in which Christian doctrine has been expressed.

(b) The investigation of religion in its normative and constructive aspect may be sub-divided into (iii) a general branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the principles of natural religion, including (11) the apologetic of religion generally; (12) natural theology, (13) philosophic ethic; (iv) a special branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the
truth of Christianity as the highest and final form of
religion; this embraces (14) the apologetic of
the Christian religion; systematic theology, which
includes (15) Christian dogmatic, and (16) Christian
ecclesiastical theology, which includes (17) homiletic,
(18) liturgical, (19) eschatological, and (20) pastoral
theology, (21) ecclesiastical polity, and (22) evangelistic
theology, or the theory of missions; (v) the final
synthesis of the truths reached in various theological
disciplines of historic and theoretic or normative, which
is the aim of (23) the philosophy of religion, in which
theology reaches its consummation.

3. Method in theology.—The method to be made
use of in dealing with the data of theological
science in its various branches will vary with the
matter dealt with and the purpose or end in view.

In the historical or phænomenological branches
of theology the end in view is simply the ascertain-
ment and accurate presentation of historic fact,
and the methods to be made use of are those which
are appropriate to historical inquiry in general.

(1) Thus in setting forth the history of religions
the investigator must make himself acquainted as
widely as possible, by observation and inquiry,
with the features and characteristics of extant
religions; this may vary in different men or
among men. He must further acquaint himself
with the historic origin and development of these
religions by the study of such books, monuments,
and other records of the time and place of availability.
Careful observation and industrious inquiry and
research are thus the methods most needful for
success in this department of theological science.

(2) In the comparative study of religion the
investigator must use the material furnished by
the history of religions, and seek by analysis,
comparison, and spiritual insight to show the
mutual relations which the religions of all
mankind bear to each other and their grading as manifestations of the common
spirit of religion. This calls for more of specula-
tive thought and philosophic reflection, as regards
method, than the previous discipline.

(4) Biblical linguistics, which is the study of
the languages in which the Bible was originally
written, is just a branch of philology, and the
methods of philological study and inquiry have
here their proper application. Hermeneutics and
exegesis, which deal with the interpretation of
the text of Scripture, may be brought in under
linguistics.

(5) In Biblical introduction the methods of the
lower or textual criticism and of the higher
or historical criticism have here their proper
application. Textual criticism investigates the various manuscripts of the
Bible that have come down to us and the
various readings in the texts of these manuscripts,
and by the practical principles to get as nearly
as possible at the true original text. Historical
criticism investigates the evidences of composit-
eness in different books of the Bible and seeks with
the help of trustworthy knowledge to gain reliable knowledge as to the
composition, date, authorship, and historical setting
or circumstances of the various books of the Bible,
and to estimate their place and function as elements in
a progressive revelation.

(8) Biblical history deals with the history of the
Jewish people and the rise of the Christian Church
as recorded in the Bible, while Biblical antiquities
has to do with the archaeology, chronology, and
geography of the Bible.

(7) Biblical theology includes Biblical psychology,
aiming at unfolding and presenting in a clear
and orderly form the doctrinal conceptions or ideas
presented by the various writers of the OT and NT.
It is the crown and glory of the various branches
of theology and, for those who accept the Bible as the inspired
record of a divine revelation, it is of supreme
importance for furnishing material towards the
building of a comprehensive, normative, systematic
theology. But of itself it is a purely historic dis-

cipline, aiming at the accurate presentation of
historic fact and recorded thought in an impartial
objective way, without meantime taking into
account the bearing of that on permanent norma-
tive religious truth. The methods to be used in
Biblical theology are those of sound philology and
impartial scientific exegesis or interpretation, so
as to make sure that the ideas or doctrines which
forth are those of the various Bible writers them-

(8) Church history, or the history of the spread
of Christianity, aims at recounting accurately the
gradual enlargement of the area, known as Christ-
endom, the conflict of Christianity with

(9) The history of doctrine describes the dogmas,
or body of doctrine, accepted by the Christian
Church, and traces its development along the

(10) Symbolic gives a more detailed attention to
the various symbols—creeds or confessions—
that have been formulated from time to time in the
Church's history than can be given in a general
history of doctrine. These are obviously purely
historical disciplines, aiming at the ascertainment
and accurate presentation of the historic facts for
achievement of which the proper methods to be
used are the methods of impartial historical re-
search and inquiry.

(11) The apologetic of religion in general has as
its function to inquire into the nature and essence
of religion generally and to establish the truth of
the religious view of the world over against all
irreligious, antitheistic, or agnostic views. It aims
to discuss and exhibiting (a) the nature and
essence of religion in general; (b) the nature and
validity of religious belief and the relation of the
knowledge got thereby to the knowledge of natural
objects gained through the ordinary processes of
human thought; (c) the truth and reality of what is
postulated and affirmed in religious belief, as
against atheism, materialism, agnosticism, and
other forms of unbelief; (d) the justification and
existence of God or the ways in which the

(12) The history of the world, or the expansion
of Christianity, records the history and the
development of the various branches of religious
thought and the effect of Christianity on the
development of human society and civilization.
(12) Closely associated with the general apologetic of religion is that systematic presentation of the truths underlying natural religion to which the name of *natural theology* is usually given. Its aim is to set forth in a methodical order all that is known concerning God and the world and man, and their mutual relations, from that general revelation which is given in nature, mind, and history. It is the dogmatic of natural religion, as philosophic theology is its speculative.

(13) Akin to natural theology is *philosophic ethic*, whose aim is to ground a science of practical conduct on the immediate deliverance of the moral consciousness and the knowledge of God and duty derivable therefrom. The ethic of Kant, associated with what he described as a 'religion within the limits of pure reason,' may be taken as illustrative of the aims and methods of philosophic ethic, defective though it may be as a presentation of the results of such ethic, even as his 'religion within the limits of pure reason' is defective as a presentation of the truths of natural theology. In this region of natural theology and philosophic ethic, the aim is to reach not merely historic but permanent normative truth, in which the mind of the rational thinker can find rest and by which person in conduct can be regulated. The methods by which alone, if at all, such results can be reached are those of speculative thought and philosophic reflection on the data of moral and religious experience—not merely of our own personal experience, but of the experience of mankind generally as far as that can be ascertained, analysed, and used as the basis of rational inference, induction, and deduction. A great deal of theorizing, on the data of experience, on which a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophic theology and ethic may be grounded, is given us when we take into account the special revelation, externalizing in the fact of Christ, of which the Bible is the record. Apart from this, indeed, the data on which natural theology and philosophic ethic seek to build are so incomplete that the probable conclusions reached are stronger in fullness of content and convincing power. The new data of experience furnished by this special revelation not only add cogency to the probable conclusions reached by philosophic theism and ethic, but also increase its greater fullness of content and the power to construct normative theology, by which it is enriched and made more satisfying to the mind and heart of man.

(14) *Christian apologetic* has as its function to indicate the nature and essence of the Christian religion, grounded on the historic revelation of which the Bible is the record, and to set forth in order the evidences of its truth. It deals with such questions as these: (a) the idea of revelation, its spheres and modes, and the manner of its apprehension; (b) the reliability of the Bible as a reliable record of fact and experience; (c) the evidences of a progressive revelation of divine things given in the Bible and the significance of the fact of Christ as consummating and completing that revelation; (d) the evidence of the gospel truth of the gospel claims by Christ and his fitness to meet human need and to bring salvation and satisfaction to mankind. Christian apologetic clears and prepares the way for the Christian dogmatic, which aims at setting forth in accurate and systematic manner, and in such a way as to show its consistency with all our other knowledge of truth, the intellectual content of the Christian life as it becomes our invariable possession on the ground of divine revelation through the receptivity of faith. It presupposes and includes the conclusions reached by philosophic reflection in the sphere of theism and natural theology, and gives added cogency and convincing power to them and greater richness and fullness of content to our knowledge of God the supreme reality, as not only intelligent personal Spirit but lovingly loving Father who is known from all eternity. It deals both with (a) theology proper, or the doctrine of God involving an exposition and justification of the Christian conception of God as triune, which was the prominent feature of Greek Christian theology in the 4th cent., when various forms of unitarianism (Monarchianism, Sabellianism, Arianism) were combated by Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers; (b) Christology, or the doctrine of the Person of Christ, to which the attention of the Church was particularly directed after the Council of Nicaea (A.D. 325) by the theories propounded by Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches, which were condemned at the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), Ephesus (A.D. 431), and Chalcedon (A.D. 431); (c) pneumatology, or the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, to which attention was first prominently given by the Church when the views of Macedonius were condemned by the Council of Constantinople; (d) anthropology, or the Christian doctrine of man; (e) hamartiology, or the doctrine of sin, which first came to the forefront in the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius in the 5th cent.; (f) soteriology, or the Christian doctrine of salvation, which, through Augustine and Pelagius, became an important feature in Western theology, receiving fresh development at the hands of Aquinas, in the mind of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, who devoted attention to the redemptive work of Christ and its application to sinful men, and engaging prominently the thoughts of theology in the Reformation period when the doctrines of justification by faith and reconciliation with God came into prominence; (g) ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church and the distinct and prominent place of the Church in the early Church at the hands of Cyprian of Carthage (A.D. 259), who further developed by Augustine in his *City of God* and Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologiae*, and received much attention from Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians at the Reformation and from Ritschl and Anglican High Churchmen in modern times; and (h) eschatology, or the doctrine of the last things, which has occupied a foremost place in recent theological discussion.

(16) *Christian ethic* has as its aim to set forth the content of the Christian life as it works itself out in disposition and action on the part of the self-activity that is rooted in Christian faith. It looks upon the Christian life from the viewpoint of man and his duty, while dogmatic looks upon it rather from the viewpoint of God and His will. Both deal with the same subject-matter, viz. God and man and their relations to one another, but under different aspects or from different viewpoints, so that, while they belong together to systematic theology, they are most conveniently treated as separate or distinct branches of that science. Christian ethic presupposes the conclusions of philosophic ethic, just as Christian dogmatic presupposes those of natural theology. But it adds new fullness and richness of content and new power to philosophic ethic through the new data of moral and religious experience, centred in the fact of Christ, which it contributively attempts to formulate Christian ethic in separation from Christian dogmatic were made by Lambert Danéau, a French Protestant, in 1557, and G. Caélius, a Lutheran, in his *Eptome Theologiae moralis* in 1569. Since the time of Luther and Erasmus this separate treatment of Christian ethic as a branch of theology has been generally followed in Germany, Britain, and America; and numerous works on Christian ethic have appeared in which...
the relevant material is dealt with under different divisions. A convenient division followed in the main by Marrowman and other writers is (I) general introduction, dealing with (a) the definition and scope of Christian ethic, its relation to other disciplines, and its place in a classification of ethical systems; (b) fundamental conceptions of the science—and, norm, and motive; (c) postulates of the science, theological, anthropological, cosmical, and eschatological; (d) the source of our knowledge of the historic and individual ethic, and the means of its realization; (ii.) individual ethic, dealing with the origin and progress of the Christian life in the individual soul and its manifestation in the virtues and graces of the Christian character; (iii.) social ethic, dealing with the realization of the Christian ideal in the various spheres of society—the family, the church, the state or nation.

Practical Christian theology in its various departments treats of the Christian religion from the point of view of its power to expand and to build up Christian life in the church. It includes these disciplines that are concerned with the application of Christian theology in the practical sphere. It is art rather than science.

17. Homiletic deals with the art of sermon-making.
18. Liturgical deals with worship and its forms.
19. Catechetical, or paidistic, deals with the religious instruction of the young.
20. Pastoral theology deals with the duties of the pastoral office.
21. Ecclesiastical polity deals with church government, law, and procedure.
22. Evangelistic theology, or theology of missions, deals with the ways and means of propagating the Christian religion at home and among heathen peoples abroad.

The methods appropriate for use in the building of a scientific normative Christian systematic theology, into which the content of Biblical theology as a historical discipline is taken up and adjusted, are in part the methods commonly made use of by science in general—analysis, classification, inference, induction, deduction, etc.—but partly also the less easily applied methods of philosophic reflexion and speculative thought, by means of which the philosopher must seek to bring unity and consistency into his entire knowledge of the real. The God revealed in the Bible and through Christ and Christian experience—the triune God of Christian revelation—must be related and harmonized through rational thought with the God of the theistic proofs and natural theology, if our theology is to be at once Christian and philosophic.

23. Philosophy of religion, which is the highest stage or form of theology, has for its data the results reached as truth by the use of scientific methods in the previously mentioned theological disciplines; and its aim is to combine these elements of truth in a comprehensive synthesis of knowledge, such as will exhibit the relations of the various aspects or parts of truth and their harmonious combination in an organic whole of truth or reality. Its special function is to harmonize the results reached by reflective thought along the line of philosophic theism and natural theology with the results reached through believing appropriation of the same.

If reason is indeed the means whereby we apprehend and know truth and reality, then we should not rest satisfied until what we accept as reality is shown to commend itself to our reason as reasonable, and so 'worth of all acceptation.' We must therefore strive to make our theology rational or reasonable, if it is to be the expression of truth.
On these truths is based its system of ethics, rational, inspiring, and compelling. In considering this body of truths we are not studying a system invented and published in modern days; we have, on the contrary, what has already been termed the Wisdom-Tradition, handed down through all civilized countries, ancient and modern, by a long succession of prophets, teachers, and writers. It may be traced in the Upanishads, Puranas, and epics of the Vedas, in the Vedanta truths of Hindu philosophy; it underlies many of the Chinese systems, especially Taoism, and is seen in such books as The Classic of Purity and in the writings of Tao-tse; it is found in Egypt, as in The Book of the Dead and the papyri from which its religion has been reconstructed; it appears in the fragmentary records of Assyria and Chaldean; in the Githas and other scriptures of the Parsis; in the Hebrew Scriptures as expounded by the Kabbala and the Talmud; in the Christian, as treated by the early Fathers of the Church, and by such Gnostic writers as Valentinus, Basilides, and a host of others; in Pythagoras and Plato, with the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic schools, with Platonism, Iamblichus, and the Neoplatonists; it is taken up from these by the doctrine of the Saitic mystics, and appears in the Rosicrucian students of alchemy and astrology, in Rosenkreutz, Paracelsus, Bruno, Eckhartianism, Boehme, Eckhart, Vaughan, Bacon, More, Fludd—all these and scores of others, who have assimilated and handed down the Wisdom-Tradition; it has lent its symbols to masonry, and hidden some of its mysteries in masonic ceremonies; it peeps out of Students of mysticism, and through all, we find the Hawaiian legends and Maori traditions, the un-temple of the Maya and Quiches, the magic of the Zafiri and other N. American Indian tales. Theosophy, the modern revival into a coherent and inter-related body of doctrines, separated from non-essential and irrelevant teachings—this is modern, and is the work of the Theosophical Society, a modern association. But the doctrines themselves are scattered everywhere, through all times, in all places.

The test to be applied to a religious doctrine which claims to be theosophical is orthodoxy—whether the doctrine, by and large, is consistent with the divine names, and with the facts already known concerning their nature and power. The doctrine of evolution, as stated by the founders of the society, is thus tested. For all religious doctrine from a single source, the Divine Wisdom, and have as founders divinely inspired men—men who have climbed up the ladder of evolution; they have reached perfection in humanity, and have entered upon the superhuman evolution. Such men we call 'masters,' and we regard them as the guides and directors of the evolution of humanity; the similarities in doctrines and ethics, pointed out by comparative mythology and comparative religion, we regard as due to the fact that all the founders of religion are members of the one lodge of masters, possess the same knowledge, and are guided by the same principles.

The universal—i.e., theosophical—doctrines of religion are: the unity of God; the manifestation of God as a Trinity for the building of a universe; the graded orders of intelligences; a vast hierarchy of beings, forming the inhabitants, visible and invisible, of a universe, or a solar system. The doctrine of reincarnation, taught in all early systems of the world, and with which we are compelled to do business, belongs to the domain of philosophy rather than to that of religion; the immortal soul, or rather the unity, of the spirit belongs also to that domain. A man so incivically treated by a fellow-man, when dealing with intellectually the law of action and reaction—karma—falls under science, as do the constitution of a solar system and of man.

2. Religious teachings. (a) The unity of God, the universal One Existence which is the source of all existences actual and potential, the super-life and super-consciousness in which all lives and consciousnesses inhere, eternal beneath the transitory, changeless beneath the fleeting, unsupported but the support of all, all-embracing, all-containing, the basis of thought and action—this is the central teaching of theosophy as of all religions, the first universal truth of religion.

(b) The Trinity of the manifested God is the second great and universal religious doctrine of theosophy, and therefore of theosophy. Theosophy speaks of the manifested God as the Logos, borrowing the term from Plato, Philo, and the Fourth Gospel.

(c) The hierarchy of beings is the third truth universally accepted before the throne of God; the primary emanations of the Supreme Trinity; the ranks of secondary Logoi, who rule the various worlds, and the Logos of a single solar system. Thus in such a system the vast hosts of spiritual intelligences (the devas, archangels, and angels of religions), the grades of spirits eneased in human bodies, the sub-human intelligences and those not yet aware of their own existence, the grades of beings, and the superhuman evolution of the universe, the fruits of past universes, brought over as seeds for the present.

(d) The fourth truth in theosophy is that of universal brotherhood, the inevitable deduction from the preceding; since there is but one life in all forms, all forms must be inter-related, linked together, and, however unequal they may be in development, they must all be equal, the less the more, the family of man, the human race, is 'of one blood.' The universal brotherhood of theosophy differs from the political conception of 'equality,' the foundation of modern democracy, in that it postulates identity of origin and of potentiality, but recognizes varying degrees of development, the latter yields to the former, the inequality of beings, or ladder of lives. In this freemasonry it resembles it, with its broad division of mankind into the enlightened and the profane, and the subdivisions of the enlightened into the enlightened and the wise, the well-born and the far-seeing, the first and the second grades of officers, uniting the essential equality with a hierarchical order and due subordination. In this both theosophy and freemasonry are in harmony with nature, increasing power going hand-in-hand with increasing knowledge and increasing

1 A. Boullan, The Ancient Wisdom.
responsibility. Wisdom, supported by strength and made manifest in beauty, rules in a true brotherhood, as in nature.

It is interesting to note that these four primary religious truths, though they are the fundamental dogmas of universal religion, are but the intellectual formulation—for the instruction of the people—of the two primary spiritual truths directly contacted by the knower of God, the gnostic, the theosophist. The first three are religious dogmas, expressing intellectually the first spiritual truths; the latter two, expressing in the outer life of the second spiritual truth. The spiritual truths can be known only by individual self-realization; they may be intellectually taught and grasped but cannot exceed until we can realize ourselves in Him. Human thought, though feeble and undeveloped, is of the same nature as divine thought, and increases its power over the world as we grow; thought is the one creative and moulding power, and, as evolving man realizes this, and so clarifies his lower nature that this aspect of the self can work through it, he becomes the master of that lower nature and of his surroundings, the creator and controller of his destiny. By thought, mastering the science of physical nature, he bends it to his will and utilizes it; by thought, mastering the science of the emotions, he builds virtues and destroys vices; by thought, mastering the science of mind, he subdues its turbulent energies into orderly obedience; by thought, directing will and controlling activity, he brings all things, within and without, into subjection to the self, the inner ruler, immortal. Only by such fit rule and due subjection can man attain perfect health of body, emotions, and mind, and reach the highest good. Hence many of the practical theosophical teachings deal with this power and control of thought.

The eternity of spirit—more loosely spoken of as immortality—is an integral part of theosophical philosophy. It is an inevitable deduction from the identity of nature of the human and the universal Self; ‘unborn, undying, perpetual,’ it is eternal as God Himself. The continuity of consciousness is equally inevitable, since the self is conscious and continuous, and in the self must consequently abide all its experiences, of which a successive survey is memory. The extent to which these memories are carried on by the material shews, or bodies, of the self—i.e., the survival of the individual and the person—will be better considered under the constitution of the intermediate world, where he suffers in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and the higher in the heavenly world, where he enjoys in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and converts all these experiences into mental and moral capacities. By this he is transformed; for converted, he returns to earth-life, bringing with him these capacities wrought out of experiences, into new bodies built to express and utilize them. In these he goes through a similar course of suffering, transmuting, and so on and on; each birth brings the fruition of the preceding lives to start the new pilgrimage, and this is the inborn character and temperament mental, moral, physical. Step by step he climbs the ladder, working under inflexible and inviolable laws, until he reaches the stature of the perfect man; he passes through all the classes of the school of life until he has mastered all the lessons. He is asehba—he who has no more to learn. He is then a man, beyond birth and death, ‘fitted for immortality,’ ready for work in the larger life.

4. Scientific teachings.—Theosophy differs from modern science in the fact that it includes under ‘science’ investigations into superphysical worlds. Its methods are the same: investigation by observation of objective phenomena, recording of observations, framing of hypotheses, discovery of invariable sequences (i.e. of natural laws), repeated experiments to verify deductions, and formulation and generalization. The science of observation, but the senses intensified—super-senses, in fact—responding to vibrations of matter finer than that which affects the physical senses. As with modern science, so with theosophy—occult science—it is usually called—there is a body of accepted facts, laid down by recognized experts and largely revered by later experiments, and a fringe of modern discoveries, constantly added to, revised, and modified. The accepted facts have been established by generations of occult experts, and their existence is often referred to in the scriptures of various religions; the more accessible of these are being constantly revised by occult students to-day, but the larger cosmological facts are beyond our reach. Any discoveries made by students are subject to review and modification, as observations are repeated and the instruments of observation are improved.

(a) The constitution of the universe.—The broad outline of this comes from the seers of the past, and is largely confirmed in the scriptures. It is an integral part of theosophical philosophy. It is an inevitable deduction from the identity of nature of the human and the universal Self; ‘unborn, undying, perpetually,’ it is eternal as God Himself. The continuity of consciousness is equally inevitable, since the self is conscious and continuous, and in the self must consequently abide all its experiences, of which a successive survey is memory. The extent to which these memories are carried on by the material shews, or bodies, of the self—i.e., the survival of the individual and the person—will be better considered under the constitution of the intermediate world. The method of the unfolding of this continuous and conscious self in the human kingdom is by re-incarnation. Reincarnation is, in fact, the only doctrine of theosophical philosophy. It is the unbroken chain of birth and death, as Hume said. It means that the self, having unfolded to the human stage, appropriates matter from the three worlds (see below) and builds it into bodies, suitable for life in these worlds, beginning in the stage of barbarism, as a savage of a low type. During earth-life he gathers experiences, pleasant and painful; after death he meets the results of these experiences—the lower in the
true self, the monad, and his consciousness appropriates matter from one of the five worlds below in order that he may know and conquer them. As the continuing "I," he uses matter from the material world through which he passes as aitkadian, Tartarian, and sons of the mental world; this is the "spiritual body" of which St. Paul speaks; it is through this that the hygienic and the evolutionary forces pass to the astral body, and beyond, but is not changed or lost in birth or death; probably even, in an occasional death, and has yet to do with the unconscious. We rule in the heavens, as he says "we have." It is this spirit in the spiritual body which is the reincarnating ego, even in his last reincarnation, and beyond, and is not changed or lost in birth or death; probably even, in an occasional death, and has yet to do with the conscious self of the spiritual body. When the reincarnating ego takes a new birth, it appropriates some of the material of the spirit, for the soul is his body, and the ego is his conscious self, and passes out of this world into the astral body for his "astral body," some of the matter of the physical world for his "physical body." His consciousness, in thinking, sees mental matter; in desiring or remembering, sees astral matter; in acting in the physical world, sees physical matter; these are the "three worlds," in which his evolution goes on, and in which he is affected by birth and death, and is a personality, or person. The astral body is closely related to the brain, though not dependent on it, save for activity in the physical world; the astral body is mainly correlated with the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic ganglia and nerves, and the glands; the three bodies intervene on the other, mutually acting and reacting throughout waking life. In deep sleep consciousness withdraws from the physical body, clothed still in its astral and mental garments, living then in the astral world, and sometimes, on its return, impressing on the physical brain some of the images that pass through the astral body; it keeps in magnetic touch with the physical body. In death this magnetic touch is broken, and the consciousness dwells for a while in the astral world, called often the "intermediate world," in relation to those who have passed away from earth. After a while, the soul of the dead returns to the mental body into the mental world, or heaven, or where he abides for a period. In many centuries, the length depending chiefly on the richness of his intellectual, emotional, and artistic past life on earth. When he has assimilated all the experiences of his nature accumulated on earth, the mental body disintegrates, the consciousness withdraws to the spiritual body, and the ego is born. Thus the ego builds a new body for another reincarnation in the physical world, and returns to earth by birth. Thus the evolution of man is completed, and the three worlds, brooded over by the spirit himself—the spirit gathering the results and unfolding therefrom; he is not a passive agent, but he is in the process of receiving impressions from without and transmitting them to the inner self, the monad. In each reincarnation, the mental body is made up of the living and the dead, etc.—the phenomena to which modern psychology is giving much attention. An increasing number of people are "sensitive," or "psychic," and are using the super-senses, i.e., the senses of the astral body, more or less consciously. The mental body is a living organism, organized by civilized people, but more in relation to its relation to the brain, than as an independent vital force. Consciousness is an ever-increasing world. Consciousness in the mental body is turned, rather than outwardly, turned. The occultist, having by the practice of special concentration, etc., artificially forced the evolution of the astral and mental bodies beyond the normal, is, as regards these, many centuries ahead of his time; he uses the super-senses for life in the astral and mental worlds in his waking consciousness, and thus carries on his investigations in the realm of the physical scientist does in the physical world. The dyes of the three bodies, and the building of new ones for each successive life-period, is the cause of the loss of memory of past lives; that memory is in the reincarnating ego, and is shared in the consciousness when animating a lower body only if, in those bodies, the man has realized himself as one with the higher.

d) The law of action and reaction is universal, and exists in the worlds of emotion, thought, and spirit as much as in the physical world. A man can build his character as scientifically as he can build up his body, and disregard of the mental and moral laws is as destructive of mental and moral health as physical disease is of physical health. The study and utilizing of the laws, summarized above as the conscious law, is the primary business of the believer, and the only way to secure a place in the grand plan of evolution.

(2) Evolution. The monad gradually unfolds his powers by coming into touch with matter through the physical body.

It has passed through the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, until in a highly developed animal the intelligence revolves in the astral, then in the mental, then in the physical world. The stage of that of a root-race, when a considerable number of reincarnating egos are ready to develop a higher consciousness, is the last stage of evolution. This is the first to assume the real human type in the middle period of its evolution—the previous types being embryonic; the surviving remnants of the Lemurian are the negroes and the many negroid peoples scattered over the world. The fourth, or Atlantean, race with its seven sub-races—of which the Toltecs, Maya, and Aztecs, of the Mayan family, the most numerous. The fifth, or Aryans, race has already five major sub-races—the Aryans of India, the Mediterranean Aryans (Arabs, the later higher-class Egyptians, etc.), the Iranians, Huns, and Turco-Europeans—and has yet to develop the diverse varying types aff the reincarnating ego the necessary varieties for their evolution, each ego taking birth in the races and sub-races as often as it is needed that its evolutionary powers shall be utilized. In the advanced parts of the evolutionary world, which last for many millions of years. By strenuous exercises and self-discipline and self-effort, he may add the attraction of the spiritual freedom of mankind, who will teach him how to quicken his evolution, so that he may enter on the path of holiness, pass through its five initiations—or stages of widening consciousness—and become a master. The last of the five initiations opening the gateway to superhuman evolution. He may then pass into other worlds, or enter the ranks of the guardians of the world, as he wills. From the hierarchy of these guardians have come the founders of world-religions, the lesser prophets and teachers being their disciples.

5. The ethics of theology. These are not definitely formulated into any code, but consist of the highest and purest teachings of the world's holiest saints, prophets, and philosophers. All that is sweetest and most lofty in the world's religions, all that is most inspiring and ennobling in the writings of its philosophers and moralists, forms the ethics of theology. It is by the highest ethic he can grasp, he becomes capable of appreciating ethical yet sublimity; the theosophist strives to live by the spirit of Christ rather than by any legal code, and, cultivating love, he is to be enlightened, to be happy. He is speaking, that which works with the Divine Will in evolution is right; that which works against it is wrong; and the best examples of that Will are found in each stage of his development, either during sleep and for a period after death; of one during his heavenly life. The lowest, the physical body, is at present the most imperfectly organized, and therefore the most capable of receiving impressions from without and transmitted to the inner self, the monad. In each reincarnation, the mental body is rapidly becoming self-organized, and its proper senses are developing, so that it is receiving and transmitting many impressions from the astral world, though generally with a lack of sharpness and accuracy; these include the phenomena of second-sight, premonitions, warnings, dreams, etc. the dreams of the living and the dead, etc.—the phenomena to which modern psychology is giving much attention. An increasing number of people are "sensitive," or "psychic," and are using the super-senses, i.e., the senses of the astral body, more or less consciously. The mental body is a living organism, organized by civilized people, but more in relation to its relation to the brain, than as an independent vital force. Consciousness is an ever-increasing world. Consciousness in the mental body is turned, rather than outwardly, turned. The occultist, having by the practice of special concentration, etc., artificially forced the evolution of the astral and mental bodies beyond the normal, is, as regards these, many centuries ahead of his time; he uses the super-senses for life in the astral and mental worlds in his waking consciousness, and thus carries on his investigations in the realm of the physical scientist does in the physical world. The dyes of the three bodies, and the building of new ones for each successive life-period, is the cause of the loss of memory of past lives; that memory is in the reincarnating ego, and is shared in the consciousness when animating a lower body only if, in those bodies, the man has realized himself as one with the higher.

6. The Theosophical Society. This association was founded on 17th Nov. 1875, in New York City, U.S.A., by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and Henry Steele Olcott. The former was a Russian noblewoman, of extraordinary psychic endowments, and these had been trained and cultivated to the highest point by her master, an Eastern occultist; she gave up social rank, wealth, and family to seek her in Tibet, and spent two years with him near Shigatse, at a place near Lahung, returning to the world, she gave the rest of her life to carrying out his directions. In America she met, at the famous Eddy farm-house, a man who had won high distinction during the Civil War, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott, and he became her pupil. She endeavoured first to collaborate with the American spiritualists, but, failing in this, she, with Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society; she became its corresponding secretary, an office which she held for many years, and it his president; its organization is due to him and he remained president until his death in 1907, when the present writer was elected as his successor.

The unit of organization is a lodge, of not less than seven members; when a number of lodges, not less than seven, exist in any territory, they become an theosophical society, which is self-governing, within the wide limits of the general constitution. The central organ of the society is the president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, a general council consisting of the general secretaries, each elected by his own national society, with not less than five additional councillors, chosen by the general secretaries. It meets once a year for a general meeting of subscribers to the "Quarterly Review." In 1878, the first quarterly issue was published, the "Journal of the Theosophical Society," and the "Quarterly Review" was introduced in 1880, a magazine of occult research, philosophy, and religious study. The society has branches in the United States, Canada, England, and throughout the world; but it may not meddle with the business of the states, unless organized as to the "Quarterly Review." The annual report of 1917 showed 19 national societies, 1074 lodges, with 38,673 active members. Round each lodge is gathered a "congregation," a circle, whose members may be hermits, teachers, or helpers, but these are not entered on the rolls. The headquarters of the Society were first in New York; in 1878 the
founders left America for India, and fixed the headquarters in Bombay; in December 1887 they moved to Adyar, a suburb of Madras, and there the headquarters have since remained. The Theosophical Society now possesses over 1,000 acres, with several large buildings, and a library which is known all over the world.

While the Society exists for the purpose of spreading the ideas formulated above, it does not impose belief in them on its members, who, provided they accept the principle of universal brotherhood, are absolutely free to think as they will. Admission to membership is obtained on recommendation of two Fellows of the Society, and the acceptance of the following objects: **

- To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour.
- To encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science.

To investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in them.

The following, written many years ago by the present president, states the general position of the Theosophical Society: **

The Theosophical Society is composed of students, belonging to any religion in the world or to none, who are united by their spiritual interest in every object, by their wish to remove religious antagonisms, and to draw together men of good will, whatsoever their religious opinions, and by their desire to study religions truthfully in the society of others. Their band of union is not the profession of a common belief, but a common search and aspiration for Truth. They hold that Truth should be sought by study, by reflection, by purity of life, by devotion to high ideals, and they regard Truth as a prize to be striven for, not as a dogma to be imposed by authority. They consider that belief should be the result of individual thought and study, and not its antecedent, and should rest on knowledge, not on assertion. They extend toleration to all, even to the intolerant, not as a privilege they bestow, but as a duty they perform, and have no wish to remove ignorance, not to punish it. They see every religion as an expression of the Divine Will, and condemn but in its condemnation, and its practice to proselyte. Peace is their watchword as Truth is their aim.

Theosophy is the body of truths which forms the basis of all religions, and which cannot be claimed as the exclusive possession of any. It offers a philosophy which renders life intelligible and possible, and which demonstrates the justice and the love which guarantees redemption. It puts death in its rightful place as a recurring incident in an endless life, opening the gateway of a fuller and more radiant existence. It restores to the world the Serpent of the Sutras, teaching man to know the Spirit as himself, and the mind and body as his servants. It illuminates the Scriptures and doctrines of religions by unveiling their hidden meanings, and thus justifying them at the bar of intelligence, as they are ever justified in the eyes of intuition. Members of the Theosophical Society study these truths, and Theosophists endeavour to live them. Every one willing to study, to think, to have courage, and to work perseveringly, is welcomed as a member, and it rests with the member to become a true Theosophist.

There have been some offshoots from the Theosophical Society which have become independent of the central organization, but which spread the same truths. There are two international societies, with headquarters in America, and some scattered independent bodies in Germany and Austria.


II. OF WORLD RELIGION AND THE WISDOM—TRADITION.


shats, do., 1900, Dharma, do., 1898.


A. BESANT.

THEO SOFY.—Theosophy has characteristics which relate it closely to religion, and somewhat more remotely to philosophy. It also attempts to determine man's place in the universe and to solve the riddles of life and of death. Like religion, it aims at guaranteeing to its followers a more favorable destiny by showing them the way of healing and salvation. Like philosophy, it proposes to have recourse only to the resources which nature, on the one hand, and the human intellect on the other, place at its disposal, and it is by knowledge that it saves men. But the knowledge which it obtains is not grounded on the observation of facts which are within the reach of ordinary intelligence, or on the development of exceptional clear-sightedness of men on a superior level, and communicated by them to their disciples. There is then a theological knowledge, just as there is a religious and a philosophical knowledge. Besides, it may well be that the content is through- out materially the same. Such a concept, e.g., that of the immortality of the soul may be found in all the world's great religious and speculative marks, which we recognize that a doctrine is theological? Now we know that there is a criterion which makes it possible for us, without risk of error, to distinguish between what is philosophical and what is religious. If a doctrine has been established by means of observation, induction and deduction, it is philosophical; if it is religious if there has been concerned in its origination an intuition operating under the influence of feeling and imagination; it is only at subsequent stages that the ordinary processes of the human intellect intervene. Theosophy also begins with affirmations having an intuitive basis, and its constructions may have great emotional and imaginative value and power. Having established this foundation, it may proceed, like theology, to construct, in accordance with the demands of reason, a system of satisfying coherence. The difference between theosophy and religion lies neither in their ideas nor in their method. It is in the attitude which the religious man, on the one hand, and the theosophist, on the other, asume towards the objects presented. The one hopes to work, by fear, reverence, and adoration, upon the will of powerful beings for his own advantage; the other depends upon himself, upon the immediate efficacy of his own knowledge and action; religion is humble, whereas theosophy is proud.

This self-reliance the theosophist has in common...
with the magician. Both—the one more consciously than the other—admit the existence in the universe of hidden forces, for the control of which knowledge of them is sufficient. Both also shave the tendency to detach themselves from the religious community and break through the tradition officially recognized around them. But we may notice at least this difference between the magician and the theosophist: the one aims at using his power for his own advantage or for the advantage of his fellows; the other is a contemplative, who acts but little except on himself and for his own sake. The theosophical spirit has left a very deep mark upon Indian thought. It is possible to trace its influence from its origin to our own day. India would be for the investigator remarkable if she had maintained the chronological sequence of ideas and systems were unenveloped in darkness which up to the present time has not been penetrated. It is impossible for us to attempt the past unenveloped from the texts from which we derive our information. Many of them are much later than the period when the theories which they set forth were formulated. Under such circumstances it is exceedingly difficult to settle the debt and credit side of the account of each school. Perhaps, however, one result may be considered to be now established: there has been a definite and unceasing tendency. The systems interface with and influence one another. The intuition on which their authors pride themselves consists in perceiving afresh the ‘truths’ which a kind of heresy has tended to fix in the Indian mental. The task of the great philosophical schools has to a large extent been that of systematizing the ideas already worked out in the Upanisads. Buddhism would be unintelligible if it had not had for it, if not in these very schools, at least in antecedent circles bearing a very strong resemblance to them. And the reformers who have appeared in India in such large numbers since the Cyclic Ages have drank at the same source. If, then, we cannot yet dream of giving a strictly historical presentation of theosophical speculations, it is at least not impossible to reach near which the principal lines of development have appeared. We shall follow (1) the development of this thought in circles which are, if not, strictly speaking, Brāhmaṇic, at least closely related to Brāhmaṇism; (2) the Upanisads and the Yoga; (2) the transformation of theosophy into religion (into Jainism and Buddhism); (3) its invasions into popular religions of long standing, with which it has associated itself, not without a certain sacrifice of its own character and significance; and finally

(4) we shall see how modern theosophy in India is dominated by ancient philosophical tradition.

1. The Brāhmaṇic theosophy. (1) The beginnings. The two tendencies which characterize Hindu thought throughout its course appear clearly in Brāhmaṇic circles. The one is the spirit of tradition: the rites and formulas do not show the expected results unless they are repeated just as in the way in which the ‘fathers’ instilled them at the beginning. Nature will not obey the will of man and every addition will be avoided, but an even more necessary requirement is that the sacred acts shall be performed only by those who are in possession of liturgical knowledge, viz. by the Brāhmaṇas. The ārāmaṇa, i.e., the rule, which derives its authority simply from its antiquity, thus gradually extends its domination over men’s minds. It becomes systematized in one of the six dāsana, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Anxious care in observing traditional forms has created the power of the priesthood. The fathers of families have been deprived of their, religious importance to the advantage of the Brāhmaṇas. The gulf between sacred and profane makes itself more and more evident.

Contrariwise, it is the spirit of novelty which manifests itself in the other tendency. During all the Vedic period the treasury of hymns and rites is taking form and being constantly enriched. If the gods have at all intervened it was not through the medium of the priests but through human minds which have absorbed and of ideas which have been transmitted. The gods have ‘seen’ and have communicated their visions to men. The gods would have preferred to have the exclusive proprietorship.

Signs of this dual tendency may be found even in the same texts. We may be sure that, in circles as yet differing slightly from one another, tradition and originality existed side by side with conflict. Did not both of them find their point of departure in the same hymns? Most of the Vedic deities can scarcely be distinguished from the forces and elements in which they reveal their power. They have almost no characterization, and they represent vaguely the divine which permeates the objects and phenomena of nature. Out of this naturalism, so frequently rude in character, there easily emerge the pantheons which were so soon to dominate India theosophy.

Besides, do not ritualists and innovators alike make knowledge the essential condition of religious efficiency? Are not both of them, i.e. the heirs of the magicians who were charged at the beginning with the protection of the sacred rites from the pernicious influence of evil spirits? Finally—and most important of all—do not both believe that there is in every being and in every sacred act a mysterious energy which establishes harmony and co-ordination between man and the universe? And are they not now on the earth, like the ‘fathers’ of ancient times and the gods in the heavens, the depositaries and the agents of this mysterious force, creator of order and of life? When there is the thought of turning the sacred power of the sacrifice to the benefit of the individual, with a view to assuring him of happiness beyond the grave and guaranteeing him against a second death which would be final, there are here the essential elements of theosophic doctrine—desire for deliverance from suffering and death, hope to succeed by personal effort, confidence in the saving efficacy of knowledge. It is characteristic of the authors of those old treatises who were far from

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1 See art. INSPIRATION (Hindu).
having broken their connexion with the traditional cult. But they love to give the sacred actions a symbolic interpretation which will relieve them of their mechanical and formal character. A still more significant thing is that they manifest a well-marked esoteric tendency: usually a long time is spent in appealing to the master before he consents to reveal the supreme truth, and the disciple is under obligation not to transmit it himself except to a person of exceptional merit, who is a well-qualified person. The method of discovery is always intuition; thought proceeds by abrupt illuminations. Moving impetuously and boldly, it puts assertions side by side with one another without concerning itself about their contrariorness. It does not demonstrate; it is content to illustrate by beautiful metaphors and arresting similes.

In an as yet vague form the idea of the essential unity of the universe was implicitly contained in the Brahmanic theory of sacrifice. There is now posited the existence of a Being in which all that is finite. This one infinite and indivisible is called Brahman. The name of the energy which manifests itself in the sacred action. It is also designated the Atman, i.e., the self or the soul of all that lives.

Thus the theme is stated which the Upanisads go on to develop and repeat without interruption.

Finally, Brahman is the reality not only of the individual and of phenomenal existence, but also of transcendental existence. For there are two forms of Brahman, the one corporeal, the other incorporeal: the one mortal, the other immortal; the one changeable, the other immutable; the one manifested (sat), the other unmanifested (tattat). Thus the individualized form the soul could not have the blues which is the exclusive prerogative of the Absolute being. The limited Ego is in contact with the non-Ego, and is unhappy with the myriad alternations of pleasure and of pain, of impermanence and the vanity of finite things. In truth, 'he who is in touch with himself is suffering.' This misery is born individuality and lasts equally long. The active self, the jiva, is involved, through its activity, in a series of existences of which each one is determined as to its quality by the quality of the existence which has preceded it. 'According as a man acts, according as he conducts himself, so is he reborn.' 'Through good work a man is reborn in a good state, through evil work in an evil state,' and so on, indefinitely. If the life is evil, it is because the man in his ignorance believes himself a person and says, 'I am such and such a one.' This thing belongs to reality. But when a man seeks to transcend the life of existence, he says, 'I am not such and such a one.' This thing belongs to the Absolute.
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doubt except in affirming its existence—"I am Brahman," provided that "I" am demanded of every quality and of all consequence, everything which constitutes my individuality. In this way I am Brahman, being absolute, could not have parts.

Not only is this the only relation between the subject knowing and the object known; it is also the relation which emerges between the subject and the world and the names and forms. To this cosmic power of Brahman, entirely, the name māyā is given. Māyā (g.) signifies the alternation which takes place between the Absolute and the relative, the Absolute which pass from the category of the Absolute into those of time, space, and cause—

as well as the relative which affects the absolute Being and the self only in appearance. Māyā modifies on the one hand Brahman and thus creates the world; but it modifies also in the other and in the individual Ego, the Self. Thus the entity of the Absolute becomes the absolute Brahman; the unqualified Brahman becomes the qualified Brahman, the effect Brahman; the lower Brahman, the lower Ego of the Absolute entity has also the same name of God, Iswara; but this God, His attributes, and the world which the lower Brahman creates, preserves, and destroys, do not exist save in virtue of nescience; all is phenomenal, illusory. From the point of view of the Ego, the individual causes no effect; neither Iswara nor world; neither agent nor act; but only being unchangeable, indeterminate. Under the influence of māyā, the Ego becomes a Self. The Self becomes individualized through everything which serves as a substratum, or more closely speaking, by the presence of causes, and the faculties of knowledge. But the attributes of the Self have no more reality than those of Iswara. Truly speaking, the Self is not a product; it is incomprehensible, infinite, one.

For practical purposes and provisionally, both the world and the individual exist. To both of them even Śāṅkara pays considerable attention. Both are subjects and objects of action. Their destiny is determined by the actions, and action can be annulled; this is the universal law; or, at least it cannot be annulled by anything but the law of the universe. Action produces life, and life produces action. The Self which acts will be reborn for action, and, again, for rebirth. The chain of causes and effects has not had a beginning. How could it have an end? Fortunately, cause and effect, act and result, are the very condition of the possibility of life. The chain of effects, the self-produced, knowledge will destroy. "As long as nescience has not been abolished, the individuality of the self is not abolished, and the individual soul continues to be the sphere of good and evil. The individual can, by a knowledge of Brahman, escape from karmic and cyclic entanglements. As I have discovered how he may attain this by a pure spiritual discipline, he can, through the force of that discipline, and by a kind of spontaneous effort, reach the perfect vision, i.e., he can perceive the immensity of himself and thus have an intimation of his identity with the supreme Self. This vision destroys in him the remnants of personality and dissipates the mirage of the individual soul. He is saved there is Brahman, and in consequence he is, in an absolute sense, being, thought, and bliss.

(4) The Śāṅkhyā. — The Śāṅkhyā (g.) is of ancient origin, for its influence upon primitive Buddhism cannot well be disputed. The main pronouncements of the school are, however, of later date and are consequent to the birth of Buddha. Fortunately there are other works—e.g., the Mahābhārata and some ancient Buddhist writings—which mark out the path of development from the classical forms of the Śāṅkhyā. As we now have it, the Śāṅkhyā, realistic and atheistical, is Brāhmaṇian. It has no difficulty in including the Veda among the standards of knowledge. It may be that, originating outside of Brāhmaṇism, it was at a later date recognized by the latter, and has paid for this advantage by an adherence, more or less nominal, to the authority of revelation. Nevertheless, as we find in it the unbend of the antecedents of several essential doctrines of this system, it is more probable that it has originated from the same circles as those in which the ancient Upaniṣads elaborated. Its genesis can be explained if it is regarded as a product of reaction against the radical idealism which is implicit in the Upaniṣads and develops in the Vaiśeṣika.

The Śāṅkhyā posits the absolute reality of the empirical world. If it is said that the world of things is the theatre of a personal drama, it is because the idea of that which is impersonal, its answer is that a thing is not real only at the moment when it manifests itself; it has also a reality, and it exists independently of that in its cause. For the effect is already to be found in its entirety in the cause. To assert that a thing is substantial implies that things when they are in the subtle state is to assert that they are already substantial. The ordinary man is unable to see

them in their causes because his senses are too gross. If, by ecstasy or as a reward of exceptional exercise of his power of vision, he will perceive the subtle as easily as the gross.

Whether subtle or gross, the world is essentially composite and changing. No every complex thing implies a simple being for the sake of which it is formed. Everything that changes changes only for the sake of an immutabile Being. Thus, over against a world of matter, a world of pure energy, the Śāṅkhyā philosophy posits a simple and stable substance, with which the prakṛti, which is the sphere of becoming, it contrasts the prakṛti, which is being, 

everything that changes and lives, the object, the act and the organs of knowledge, the抗拒, which includes the ego as well as the ego, since, in the living being, the ego must nourish itself like the ego, in order to sustain life and growth.

The change which emerges in the physical and psychical universe is a regular evolution, taking the form of a determination, a growing complexity, an increasing materiality. In its creative aspect evokes the gross out of the subtle. At the dissolution of the world the gross resolves itself into the subtle. The Śāṅkhyā, which has minutely described the successive phases of the evolutionary process, posits 4 principles (tattvas) which are arranged in order, from the prakṛti, the common foundation of all phenomenal existence, to the gross elements and their combinations. It is because of the prakṛti not simple that it has been able thus to produce all the things of the physical and mental world. It is composed of three factors, themselves substantial, which are called prakṛti. These are sattva, rajas, and tamas, goodness, passion, and darkness. It is by its presence in infinitely varying quantities that things effect mutations.

The 13 tattvas which in the evolution emerge prakṛti at the one end and the gross elements at the other unite to form the 'characteristic tattvas' which are divided into three: the sattva tattvas, which determine sattva as a substratum; the rajas tattvas, which determine rajas as a substratum; the tamas tattvas, which determine tamas as a substratum. The sattva tattvas are divided into three kinds, which distinguish individuals from one another. While the gross body is destroyed by death, the sattva tattvas pass from birth to birth and constitute the identity of the individual in the series of its existences. In every life it becomes richer or poorer according to what has been produced, knowledge will destroy. "As long as knowledge has not been destroyed, the individuality of the self is not destroyed, and the individual soul continues to be the sphere of good and evil. The individual can, by knowledge of Brahman, escape from karmic and cyclic entanglements. As I have discovered how he may attain this by a pure spiritual discipline, he can, through the force of that discipline, and by a kind of spontaneous effort, reach the perfect vision, i.e., he can perceive the immensity of himself and thus have an intimation of his identity with the supreme Self. This vision destroys in him the remnants of personality and dissipates the mirage of the individual soul. He is saved there is Brahman, and in consequence he is, in an absolute sense, being, thought, and bliss.

The puruṣa, or the soul, is directly the converse of those of grosser substances simple, immutable, inactive, unproductive, without change. It is a kind of knowledge, and because some are free and others are still bound, it follows of necessity that there is an infinity of souls. But the puruṣa is in itself independent of all individualization to such an extent that we can always speak of it in the singular. The puruṣa is light and undetectable, has no existence, having anything to illumine; it thinks without even having any object of knowledge.

Being and becoming, both infinite, are not placed simply over against each other. There is a relation established between them which explains creation, knowledge, and intuition. The neighbourhood of the puruṣa in fact causes in the prakṛti an excitation which leads in it to a corresponding subtle body in connection with each puruṣa. But the subtle body is only the substratum of the conscious soul. That emerges in virtue of the consciousness, which is the form in which is expressed the relation between the puruṣa and prakṛti. In the death of the puruṣa, the puruṣa is consumed, and this creation has no other end than to make knowledge possible for the soul—which knowledge necessarily eventuates in salvation.

A slow and elaborate process is necessary to break the bond and express suffering. This is the main intention—not to destroy actual suffering, which on other grounds would be impossible, but to make it absorb its own germ or in the persistent dispositions stored in subtle forms in the internal organs. The slow internal struggle brings a man from the natural state—i.e., the moral state—to absolute health, and the physical man may prepare the ground, but it is knowledge which is truly efficacious. By means of pradžnā, the perception of the distinction, we may arrive at an assertion of the truth; I am not; nothing is mine; this is not me." One thus gets a direct perception of the distinction, and this is all that is necessary. To establish this distinction is to destroy the bond and to see the puruṣa in its absolute reality as a sort of subtle structure and no other substance than itself; there is no further association with the subtle body, no reflection cast by it; the soul is healed.
The \textit{prārthī} also derives advantage from a deliverance which, in effect, supersedes saving in so far as it is not felt except for so long as the \textit{prārthī} is illumined by the soul. As it would not be creative except in relation to the soul and its salvation, it ceases to be active and returns to the original equilibrium of the \textit{purusā}. Moreover, this healing has no value except for the liberated soul. *Since, notwithstanding the infinity of time, there are still souls not liberated, there will be much to all eternity.*

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It might be asked if in the history of Indian theosophy the place of the Yoga (q.v.) is truly next to the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, if its affinities are not in an altogether different direction and with the group of systems which, though they adopted many theosophical ideas, were obviously theistic and devotional in tendency. Does it not make a place for God, for that \textit{lāvara} who is a soul apart, a unique Being, eternal, all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing, exposed to no suffering, to no desire or change? Does not this God show an infinitely benevolent activity on behalf of men desirous of salvation? Does He not vouchsafe spiritual vision to His elect? Does not the \textit{yogī}, to obtain salvation, surrender himself to God with that feeling of complete abandonment which is called \textit{śamānābādha}? Finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place? What have the recognized means for purifying the body and delivering the soul from the organ of the body, with the pursuit of \textit{pīṭhāna}, the knowledge which brings salvation?

It is easy to answer these objections. First of all we may remark that the rôle attributed to the so-called scheme of salvation which is called \textit{śamānābādha} is finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place? What have the recognized means for purifying the body and delivering the soul from the organ of the body, with the pursuit of \textit{pīṭhāna}, the knowledge which brings salvation?

The Yoga, dearest of all, essentially emphasizing the permanent conditions of meditation and saving ecstasy, would naturally disregard study and reflexion, since neither of them was of service in securing the marvellous powers for which the \textit{yogī} was ambitious. But, as in Brāhmaṇism itself it had adopted very nearly in its entirety the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya, there was really no need to indicate the acquisition of knowledge as among the demands imposed by the need for salvation. This acquisition could have been considered as implicitly prescribed from beginning to end. In any case it is interesting to point out that in an \textit{Upaniṣad} greatly influenced by Yoga ideas, the \textit{Maitreyā Upaniṣad}, the examination of reflexion had a place among the members of Yoga. Perhaps we have in this a proof drawn from a period before the Yoga became entirely one with the Sāṅkhya. One other characteristic the Yoga shows itself faithful to the theosophical spirit. It rests upon very ancient beliefs closely related to magic. The remarkable manifestations of patience, will-power and strength appear in the presence of supernatural faculties and imply in their possessors a new acquisition of energy. Besides, the accomplish-

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Before leaving Brāhmaṇic theosophy, we may point out that in more than one characteristic it is very closely connected with Western occultism (q.v.). Our theosophists have, like the Vedāntists, a marked tendency towards monism; their anthropology has borrowed much from the Brāhmaṇic philosophy; they authorize exercises which are not without analogy to those prescribed by the Yoga.
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Perhaps because the Jainas appeal to omniscient teachers, they have pronounced a theory of knowledge that forbids any absolute affirmation or denial. Every proposition has a relative value only (ānekaññedika); a thing is not thus; in a way it is this; I can say that a thing is not, that it is, and that it is not, that it cannot be known except in relation to the totality of the universe, the individual, and the session of the individual, and aims at maintaining among its adherents the unity of discipline and of life.

Two religions have sprung from the movement of thought which we find permeating the old Upanishads, viz. Jainism and Buddhism. Seeing that they are born in the same spiritual environment, it is not strange that they should have many characteristics in common. Their doctrines, their legends, their rules of life, have an unmistakable air of family relationship. The worship itself, in its outer forms, is so similar in various particulars that from the outside one might easily confuse the two systems; witness only the tale of Ávaghosa in which one finds King Kanishka worshipping a Jain idol and the story of the monk who is Buddhist.

Jainism and Buddhism are both products of the process of crystallization which was a feature of the period of the ancient Upanishads. Besides Brâhmanism practising strict observance of rites and a monopoly of the priestly caste, a new sect called the Jains has been familiar with what one might call wandering pantheism. The teachers, accompanied by their disciples, go from place to place, not settling down anywhere except during the rainy season. They speak the Prakrit, and their parinirvāyasakas, in the course of instructing their pupils, discuss the most diverse subjects. The groups are not closed. Round about a knot of faithful disciples there gathers a numerous body of adherents and friends. If Jainism and Buddhism have been able to transform themselves into Churches, the reason is that they have understood better than the rest of the people how to attach the laity by solid bonds and to organize the community in fixed rules. There is no doubt that Jainism is prior to Buddhism. Buddhists themselves do not hesitate to admit the fact. But Jain writings are not likely to be anterior, and very much so—to those of Buddhism. It may well be that, if there has been borrowing, the Jains have been the debtors. If we begin with them, it is not in order to speak of the religions of the ancient Buddhists, but rather, on the whole, the Jainist Church has remained more faithful to the theological tradition of the Upanishads.

(1) Jainism.—Jainism (g.v.) has all the characteristics of a theosophical religion. It puts at the centre of its teaching the doctrine of karma (g.v.), and shows itself chiefly interested in human destiny. It aims at delivering men from the misery of saṃsāra. It demands that the individual should be the instrument of his own regeneration. It searches for the saving truth beyond phenomena and sensible perception, and, as a consequence, asserts the authority of persons endowed with exceptional faculties of vision and knowledge. It places itself outside the Brâhmanic tradition. Nothing more is known of this Jainism. Sâkara sees in this a reason for its condemnation. Because it opposes to Vedic tradition a new rule, this theologian accuses it of not being 'revealed'. And yet Jainism also makes it a doctrine of faith in the words of an omniscient master, who made known the way of emancipation, who has triumphed over the world of death, and who, because of this, has received the surname of Jina (*the Victorious*).

As the ocean has only one savour, the savour of water, so the doctrines which I teach and the rule which I have only one savour, that of salvation. 2 Buddha wishes to save men, not from sin, but from the error of thinking that the soul is eternal. He summons all men to salvation. The gate of immortality is open for all beings. Let him who has ears, hear the Word and believe. 3 He rejects the authority and traditional knowledge of the Brâhman. In a letter addressed to one who had asked him a question, the Buddha declared that if the other had not seen the man in the middle does not see, the last does not see. Such are the discourses of the Brâhman. Their faith is what is 'eternal'; that is to say, that which is eternal. He makes salvation a personal matter for each individual. He be your own refuge, be your own guide for yourselves for a lamp or a refuge. 4 You must yourselves make the necessary effort. A Buddha is only a teacher.

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1 Sarvananda Sutrās, p. 29. 2 Chândogya, iv. 4. 3 Majjhima Nâtipa, i. 170. 4 Pā. ii. 169 ff.

1 Ḍīgha Nâtipa, ii. 135 (= Mahâparinirvânasūtra, ch. ii.).

5 Dharmakâya, v. 23.
Therosophy is constructed almost entirely from materials borrowed from the Brahmanical schools, nurtured in the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

The method of salvation which Buddha preached to his followers includes rules of life and truths of an intellectual character. But since it is well understood that his teaching has but one saviour, there is no hint that men should acquire or practise virtue because it is self-rewarding, or because they seek for knowledge because of the practical or intellectual satisfaction which knowledge brings. Morality and learning, in intention at least, are looked at only from the narrow point of view of salvation. Thence come the limits within which they move. In fact, Buddha did not wish to teach either morality or science, but only a therapeutic of the will and a therapeutic of the intelligence. When once a man is freed from moral evil and from error, he may work onwards towards salvation.

(a) Therapeutic of the conduct.—Only a soul purified by moral discipline can recover with the teaching of the Law. The most formidable enemy of salvation is the desire for sensual enjoyment, which is one of the four great passions, in all the lists of deplorable, infections, obstacles, and hindrances. It is against sensuality that men have chiefly to struggle. Hence the importance of infusing into the mind a sense of controlling power over the senses. Of all the virtues vigilance is most characteristic of Buddhist training.

(b) Therapeutic of the intellect.—Knowledge is not less necessary than good conduct. Like good conduct, it has its own objective value. In therapeutics closely connected with Brahmanism knowledge is a working out of deliverance in a form which has become a science of deliverance because of the lessons which God, the world, the soul, and human destiny have of knowledge directly efficacious for salvation. But the point of view of Buddhism, as of his earlier disciples is quite different. That which they want to do is to deliver the mind from an unfavourable thought which troubles itself, even if this means that they have to lose what does not suit them in a false way. It can be understood how different are the conditions under which the spiritual struggle presents itself according as one admits or denies the existence of eternal and immutable beings, whether immanent or transcendental or both. Buddha’s aim is to show what beings there are that behave themselves in a different way. In us and outside of us we reach nothing but dhāraṇa, not because of our mental incapacity, but because neither in us nor outside of us is there anything but dhāraṇa. The constituents of dhāraṇa are not hung, as it were, upon a substance of which they are the momentary phases; they are themselves the whole reality. Primitive Buddhism is thus at the opposite pole from the idea of substance.

The later disciples of Buddha deliberately abandon the prudent agnosticism of their Master. Their speculations are concerned with the transcendental world; Buddhism, viz. the later philosophy, constitutes dhāraṇa. In the movement of aggregates, or of combinations of aggregates, does not take place by chance, or without any system. One cannot determine the condition of every new combination, and this is the quality of the antecedent combination. Conceptions individuals, who alone are interested in the theory of salvation, the causal combination is an agent, and his action produces results of two kinds; it manifests itself externally as the immediate cause of phenomena, and internally as a modification of the door hindrance of the action. Karma may be defined as the reaction of the act upon the subject. This reaction takes place generally at the destruction of the body (nirbhaya) in such a way that the binding force of one individual life reappears in another individual life. As Buddhism has been always a hypothesis not connected with visible forms of existence, it does not post a subtle body as the vehicle of karma, or an liver as the controller of results. Even at a distance it is through the body that he is considered. Moreover, it furnishes in Buddhism the function of explaining the cosmological differences which are found among men, and of awakening in the hearts of the faithful the feeling of their moral responsibility.

The therapeutic doctrine specifically Buddhist.

The same cannot be said of the two sets of rules the discovery of the...... 1

The craving for existence and for the cessation of existence are the causes of suffering. 1 ‘The suppression of suffering consists in the destruction of the craving by the comprehension of desire.’ 2 We arrive at suppression by following the Noble Righteous Path—right knowledge, right, will, right action, etc. The ultimate significance of the Ten Noble Virtues is to explain suffering without having recourse to any principle except those recognized by Buddhism, viz. the law of necessity, karma, and the Noble Truths. Through one causal link after another, the life of suffering is connected with its deepest source, viz. ignorance. In this way there is excluded the notion of a soul which would be essentially and incurably suffering. There is eliminated also the interference of a God who imposes the suffering upon his creatures; if this misery comes from outside, it would be in the power of God to put an end to it. It does not belong to the ego as a permanent substance, and, since the older therapeutics had shown that man could not find God except in and through the ego, Buddhism, in denying the dāna, is compelled also to deny Brahman, the original and imminent cause of the universe.

If Buddhism is a therapeutics, it is much more a religion. Religion aims at satisfying much more varied needs than does an essentially intellectual doctrine. Religion is a manner of living, and not only a manner of thinking. The necessities of life and of controversy soon compelled Buddhism to extend considerably the range of its practical and dogmatic teaching.

In ethics Buddhism was far from confining itself to the limits imposed by the demands of salvation. In seeking to give the greatest possible effective force to its moral pronouncements, Buddhism does not take the trouble to coordinate systematic generalizations with the lessons while the soul, the body, the human destiny there is a body of knowledge directly efficacious for salvation. But the point of view of the Buddhist, as of his earlier disciples is quite different. That which they want to do is to deliver the mind from an unfavourable thought which troubles itself, even if this means that they have to lose what does not suit them in a false way. It can be understood how different are the conditions under which the spiritual struggle presents itself according as one admits or denies the existence of eternal and immutable beings, whether immanent or transcendental or both. Buddha’s aim is to show what beings there are that behave themselves in a different way. In us and outside of us we reach nothing but dhāraṇa, not because of our mental incapacity, but because neither in us nor outside of us is there anything but dhāraṇa. The constituents of dhāraṇa are not hung, as it were, upon a substance of which they are the momentary phases; they are themselves the whole reality. Primitive Buddhism is thus at the opposite pole from the idea of substance.

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1 Mahāvīra, t. vi. 20. 2 Ib. t. vi. 21.
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aspires to become bodhisattvas and believe in religious solidarity. It was enough for the first to transform a sinner into a saint; the others having already done so, the sinner following in the footsteps of Buddha, should become a saviour. It can easily be understood that the way of the arhat and the career of the bodhisattva separated themselves perceptibly from one another.

(a) The way to arhatship. - Conversion makes the Buddhist a new man. He "enters into the current." By an energetic and healthy asceticism he destroys in himself the adverse principles. Two roads to the goal now open up before him. The one is through a series of spiritual exercises. Meditation and intense concentration secure in him servicable tranquillity (simhatha). No more of attachment, no more of desires; the very desire and its desire devolution. The results of the liberation of the heart are clear vision (cipsuyavaca) and wisdom (vijayavaca). The other way is that of enfranchisement (vatsa.)e. The path to the awakening is by ecstatic contemplation (ayatana). From ecstasy to ecstasy the monk rises in eight stages (the simhathas) to a state of being which is neither thought nor the absence of thought. It is the suspension of volupctuous ideas, of discursive ideas, of joy, of breathing: the abolition of the world of forms by that of space, and of the world of space by that of knowledge; of the world of knowledge by that of the non-existence of things, and of that of there in which neither are ideas nor the absence of ideas. Arrived at this last stage, the eyes enter into possession of superiors powers (the six skandhads). But it is not higher. A ninth and last ascent leads to the 'disappearance of all conscious perception,' to 'the awakening,' to samadhi. When one has taken the way of wisdom or of enfranchisement, one becomes an arhat (q. c.), saint. The arhat has done 'that which he had to do.' When he has a feeling of guilt left behind without and within, the last thought or his last aggregate giving rise to a further thought or a further combination.

(b) Brahmalahap. - At the Ideal is higher, the method is more complicated. The career of the bodhisattva (q. c.) differs a great deal from that of the Buddhist. There are seven stages for them to emerge in the man the 'thought of illumination' (bodhicitta). He must keep to the vow of doing everything to arrive at the goal and of working for the welfare of his fellow men by an act of will he must 'assign' to the advantage of another his actions and the fruit of his actions (karmavina), each corresponding to a spiritual world (a bhuma). At the end of this long ascent the bodhisattva obtains finally the illumination which makes him a budha, i.e., a liberator of creatures, an ultra-phenomenal being still sojourning for a time in the plane of duality.

For arhat and bodhisattva the eventuality is the same—nirvana (q.c.), extinction. What does it matter that neither Buddha nor his authorized disciples have a what nirvana is? If one knows that it is the abolition of suffering and death, of relative and individual existence, that is enough to make it an infinitely desirable state. If Buddha has gained control over natures of the most diverse qualities, it is just because he has left them the liberty of imagining a nirvana concomitant to their needs and their aspirations.

Let us take a look backwards. We may agree that Buddhism has certainly characteristic marks of a theosophical system. It regards ignorance as the source of all the evil of living, and knowledge as the panacea of suffering. It seeks to deliver its adherents from the fear of death. It endeavours to upset the Brahmanical methods of salvation. It denies that texts or doctrines have any direct value for salvation, and it affirms the value of the operation of the internal concentration and ecstatic meditation. It demands that every man should be the architect of his own salvation, and, even though it multiplies the ascents, it teaches less emphasis for the individual in the necessity of personal effort. It teaches that knowledge is power, and that spiritual excellence manifests itself outwardly in extraordinary faculties. It breaks through the traditional framework, and it is the first that makes the proclamation towards his regeneration and so to

arrange matters that this labour shall fill his whole life.

3. Introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions. - Buddhism in its different forms was only one of the forms of the religious life; in every period there was also the popular current, powerful, infinitely varied, and mobile. Just as in the sacerdotal tradition minutely elaborated rises occupy the principal place, so in the popular current, the gods are central in the popular religion, and the worship which is given to them, mixed throughout as it is with superstitions and gross practices, answers more fully to the idea which is generally held of devotion and of piety. These two religious contents have not existed side by side without exerting an influence upon each other. We have here to do only with the influence exerted by the theosophy of Brahmanism. This influence is only a particular illustration of the growing preponderance which the sacerdotal caste obtained in all the moral life of India, and of which the Buddhist writings themselves give unmistakable evidence. Nothing is more natural than this primacy. The Brahmanical families had at their disposal two powerful forces, tradition and cohesion. In a society which was crumbling to its foundations they formed a solid group, cemented by community of interest and of ambitions and reinforced by the habits of knowledge and of virtue. Popular forms of worship were mingled without and within without thought or his last aggregate giving rise to a further thought or a further combination.

We have in the Mahabharata (q.c.) excellent evidence of the appropriation by Brahmanism of materials which were without doubt independent. This document is all the more significant because it shows clear traces of successive accretions, and because its slow elaboration was so rapid that during the many centuries when the Brahmanas were gradually establishing their spiritual domination. We may regard the poem as completed, in the form in which we know it, at the time when Brahmanism was triumphant, i.e., in the 4th or 5th cent. A.D. And this voluminous encyclopaedia of the traditional knowledge of the Hindus is something more than a witness; it was also one of the agents, perhaps the most effective of all, in the expansion of Brahmanism in India. Before, during, and after the composition of the great epic, a mass of writings emerge to illuminate or supplement its evidence—sectarian Upansidas, Dharmakutasras (as the first of which we may regard that which bears the name of Manu), Puranas, books written in prose or in verse by the numerous reformers of Hinduism or under their influence. Unfortunately the investigation of this rich literature has not yet been completed.

By gaining entrance into works definitely popular, the ideas whose development we have hitherto followed in the texts of a school or in the monastic literature began to exert a powerful influence upon the general thought of India; and nothing proves more effectively the plasticity of religious thought than the faithfulness with which conceptions originally monistic and atheistic persist, almost
unchanged, in sects permeated with the most ardent devotion. As in the ancient theosophy, the soul is hastened by the thought of death: 'Every being is in fear of death.' Some men are afraid of death, and this is the fear of the fearer. The world is under the attack of Mṛtyu. How does thou not think of it? Do thou know whether thou will have to do to-morrow, or to-morrow the morning? thou shalt have to do to-morrow. Death does not trouble itself with what thou has done or with what thou has done to others. It is a man that is a wolf, not a wolf that is a man. 1

There is no moment to lose: 'The days pass away; life runs away. Save yourself and run.' 2

The new religious conceptions bring home to men the necessity and the way of salvation: 'Let a man search for a remedy through the suppression of suffering and let him apply it without any further perusing. Then he will be free from misery.' 3 The individual life which is full of suffering and death; it is necessary to get deliverance from it: 'Death has two syllables, for it is known, everything that I consider as my own. Brahman has three syllables, not nāma, for in it nothing is mine.' 4 There is always the same hate of the body and its fugitive pleasures: 'Let one become ascetic, abandon this thinking body, full of filth and urine, subject to old age and disadvantage, the abode of maladies, burnt by fire, perishable.'  

All the joys which arise from contact with the world are a source of suffering; they begin: they end; the wise man does not find in them any pleasure. There is nothing more interesting than to mark the persistence of the ancient ideas and the traditional formulas. The new idea has destroyed the old affection is there. Brahman is the essence of the whole world. Strengthening your soul by your soul, vanquish the enemy who resides in the body, and be free from the laws of the world. 5

The yogi is he who finds within himself his happiness, within himself his pleasures, within himself his light. 6 Let a man extort all his strength from the body, and suffer not the self to be overwhelmed, for no man has any other friend than himself, or any other enemy than himself. 7 Salvation is still the result of knowledge; a knowledge which is acquired by concentration of the mind.' Knowledge is the best vessel for traversing the sea of samsāra.' 8 To know Brahman is to obtain peace which has as its final result nirvāṇa; 9 it consists to become Brahman.

As may be seen from the last passages, it is the solution of the Vedanta which obtains most favour of all those proposed by the Brahmanical schools. The resource is had readily to the Sākṣākhyā when one wishes to analyze the universe and the soul, or to the Yoga for teaching as to the practice of concentration and ecstasy; but the theory of mokṣa remains essentially monistic and pantheistic. As far as is possible to gather from the great epic, it is concerned, the doctrine which is adhered to is not the radical monism of Sankara (which was indeed later than the centuries during which the Maṇḍūka was composed, and partly redacted), but the monism of the Upaniṣads and of Bādaryānava: the world of names and forms is real, but it is Brahman who is the reality of reality. The Bhagavad-Gītā does not doubt on this point:

"Others offering me the sacrifice of knowledge, give to me worship as to a being at once universal and individual, who, under all forms, pervades every being, and in every being. 11"

"I am the knowledge of the world, the support of the world, the refuge of the world. 12"

"He is the knowledge that through which is seen in all beings the one Imperishable Being, a whole in every particular being." 13

"The knowledge of goodness is that through which is seen in all beings the one Imperishable Being, a whole in every particular being." 13

"The knowledge by which thou wilt perceive all beings without exception in thyself and then in me, will for ever give thee a refuge from error." 13

"In the Brahman, in the ox and the elephant, in the dog and also in the color of the flesh of the dog, the wise man sees only one and the same beautiful person, in everything and in everything in me, is never far from me, and I am never far from him." 13

"God is immanent in all beings, but He is not confounded with them; He is the principle of life which anoints them, the principle of all spirituality. Finally, He is not only immanent; He is also transcendent. Things are in Him, but He is not in them. The world of phenomena does not exist.

1 Mahābhārata, III, 2, 40.
2 Bh. iii, 219, 18.
3 Laws of Manu, vi, 676.
4 Bh. ii, 301, 15.
5 Bh. iv, 5, 65.
6 Bh. iii, 219, 25.
7 Bh. iv, 5, 27.
8 Bhagavad-Gītā, v. 22.
9 Bh. vi, 27.
10 Bh. vi, 2.
11 Bh. vi, 5.
12 Bh. xvi, 2, 107.
13 Bh. xxv, 35.
14 Bh. xvi, 13.
15 Bh. xvi, 18.
THEOSOPHY

The great Vaishnavite and Saivite sects are, quite as much as Sikhism, impregnated with theosophy. Their appearance is in itself evidence of an individualism in revolt against the excessive pressure of a religious tradition. Those who assert the authority of the Vedas are ridiculed. The framework in which the divine is placed is broken; no great importance is any longer attached to the name which the gods bear—Siva or Viṣṇu, the latter of whom is called Vishnu, and the most exalted name of Hinduism. The human framework is also broken; the religious value of caste is denied, and all men are called to salvation. The distinction between the sacred and the profane is abolished. Generally the first concern of the reformers is to put Sanskrit on one side in favour of an exclusive use of the popular language.

'The whole world for me,' says Nānak, 'is a sacred enclosure. Whoever loves the truth is pure.' All food and drink which come from God are pure.

The mechanical and the excessively ritualistic elements in the old religion are removed. Religion tends to become more human, more closely connected with ordinary life; the Bhagavad-Gītā has already expressed something approaching a sense of solidarity, and the idea of the soul of Hinduism is the idea new in India. Moreover, religious tolerance becomes almost universal. Royal inscriptions prove that Brahmanism, Jainism, Buddhism, Saivism, and Vishnuism, in the same cities, lived in the same families, and the sovereigns extend their favours to all the communities. Is it not clear that religion has become an affair of the individual, and that the sacred is not the respect bound to follow the example of his father?

Unfortunately the sects which were originally the boldest very soon fall into the old errors, or, rather, errors in seemingly attractive opposition to the prevailing ideas. The popular language takes on, in its turn, a sacred character. Caste and restrictions about food recover all their influence. One returns to the old formalism and to the grosser superstitions; and the work of reform, to which men constantly address themselves, has always to be done over again.

Their admission into the popular religions was not a clear gain for theosophical ideas. They must have been in every way a hindrance to religious thought, by setting the theosophical ideas in place of the old religions. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, everything that is merely a heritage from the past, a survival, is theosophical. The elements which are of the same stamp, although of different origin. The religious emotion and the fervour of feeling which spring up in hearts full of adoration do not come from the Upanisads or their derivatives. Far from celebrating the triumph of theosophical ideas in India, the sectarian writings rather indicate their failure, since they make salvation depend on the love and grace of a personal and transcendent God.

4. [Theosophy and ancient Indian philosophy.

In dealing with the introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions we have been tracing what might be described as a waning of the influence of theosophical ideas. And in the sectarian writings theosophical elements are largely overlaid by materials gathered from other sources. But the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of theosophy in India; and this is to be associated with a great extent with the teachings of Madame Blavatsky, and Mrs. Besant. The authority of the Gītā, and in the sectarian writings theosophical ideas are largely discarded, but Mrs. Besant is still a living force and her followers are numerous. Indeed India can claim a larger number of theosophists than any other country in the world. The latest available report (1917) shows 385 Indian lodges, with a total of 750 members, among whom are some outstanding personalities. Their literary activity is great, at least in quantity, and the flow of publications from the headquarters at Adyar, near Madras, is unceasing and influential. The implicit influence of theosophical ideas is even more important than that which is explicitly allowed, and theosophical literature is frequently to be found in the hands of thinking men who would disclaim any connexion with a theosophical society. The popularity of theosophy is not, however, always due to purely theosophical causes.

Theosophy in India glories in having no creed, and thus claims to appeal to men of all creeds and to interpret for them the hidden values of their respective religions. But, though it is without a creed, theosophy has a threefold aim which is stated by Mrs. Besant, as follows:

(1) To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity; (2) to encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; (3) to investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.

The popularity of theosophy at the present time in India is largely due to a judicious combination of these three aims. Unless we give a very wide and free interpretation to the term 'universal brotherhood,' theosophy will be particularly theosophical, but they are universally acceptable, and they thus strengthen the appeal of the third—the only properly theosophical enterprise. The first aim affords an easy transition from religious to political activity and a reinforcement of the former through the popularity of the latter. The second itself inculcates justice, non-violence, and the like; and the third, particularly theosophical, but they are universally acceptable, and they thus strengthen the appeal of the third—the only properly theosophical enterprise.

It calls forth the retrospective tendency which seems to be inherent in all theosophy and thus enables theosophy to serve itself as the heir of the ages. Emphasis is laid upon the idea of a hidden tradition which is traced through the mists of medieval Europe, through the lore of the Knights Templar and the mystics, through Freemasonry and the speculations of alchemists and astrologers, until the ultimate one is reached, the White Brotherhood, a vague and indefinite society which Madame Blavatsky alleges to have existed from time immemorial in the mountains of Tibet, and to have delegated one, their ancient sister, to be known as her Master during a period of many years. This mystic brotherhood is believed still to have operative power and to have charge not only of the education and development of the human race, but also of cosmic evolution. Their doctrines embody the truths which are said to be the basis of all religions; but, on investigating the matter more closely, we find that they are, in a very special manner the fundamental principles of Indian thought. Theosophy thus gives a universal importance to Indian philosophical speculation and a new and inevitable enhancement of the prestige of Indian thought. It levies contributions from all the most important Indian systems, taking from the Upanisads the doctrine of a fundamental unknowable and characteristic Unity, and the identity of the human and the divine; from Buddhism the idea of the great spiritual advancement consists in a gradual detachment from the processes of the phenomenal world; from Buddhism the idea of karma and transmigration; and from Yoga the concept of various occult methods by which freedom of thought and

spirit may be won. Further, by an application of its ideas of graded being and of development extended over many generations, it is able to allow a moderate amount of justification even to the grosser forms of the popular religions, and thus carry farther the process of infusing theological ideas into the cults of the people which, as pointed out, had but moderate success in earlier centuries.

As in Indian philosophy generally, so in theosophy the ultimate point of出发 is unknown and unknowable ground of all things, acquiring character as a Logos with the triple functions of will, wisdom, and activity. This differentiates itself into the human monads, having a similar triality. The human monad descends through various grades of being until it reaches the causal body, which has also a slightly lower mental aspect, uniting it with the grades of being of which even an ordinary man may be aware, and for some three decades of personality as we know it. The mental body has as its appropriate sphere the heavenly world, but the soul as it proceeds downwards enters also the astral world or the world of emotion and desire, and finally reaches the physical world. Over and over again there is reincarnation reaching downwards ultimately to the physical world, and in each incarnation the soul is unformed, leading, if rightly used, to the development of the soul. The supreme aim of the soul is to rise upwards to its original source, and the degree of success will be due to the use it has made of the experiences of each incarnation. The working of the law of kamma is inexorable. A man will receive the fruit of the deeds done in the body, according to his good or his evil will be the duration of the period spent on each plane before another incarnation takes place. The aim of the whole process is to get rid of the separating sheaths of personality and reach absorption in the Absolute.

Theosophy is thus definitely committed to the doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration, with, on the one hand, its plausible explanation of the inconclusiveness of the world is the insatiability of moral consequences, its distant prospect of negative salvation, and, on the other hand, its ethical weakness arising out of its tendency to fatalism and the contrast between a deterministic, and its lonely outlook as it traces the succeeding phases of individual development and promises reunion with those we love only in a 'togetherness' of enlightened vision. What was the object of our love altogether disappears.

The doctrines of theosophy claim a scientific basis in experience, but this experience is found to be very different from the experience of the ordinary man. It is dependent on the development of our latent powers, by the use of which we may acquire that knowledge which is already possessed by the masters of the human race. The adepts or initiates, and which may give to us a wonderful penetration into the hitherto undiscovered laws of nature. It is at this point that theosophy differentiates itself of most completely from the Old World. Once make the initial assumption that the operation of these powers is possible and that the latent faculties can be exercised, and all is easy. We may attain a wonderful amount of detailed knowledge of nature, and that it is shaped like an egg, that various physical processes are performed by the vibrations of thought and desire, the vibrations of unselfish affection producing bodies of pale rose colour, intellectual effort resulting in yellow bodies, devotional feeling in blue, etc. We may discover also

acts on a higher ethical level—e.g., that our prayers produce beings functioning as guarding angels and that our thoughts evinced in actual astral existences, fulfilling the purposes into which our vague wishes would have been transformed, and thus had opportunity of realizing our desires. In short, with an almost total disregard of the law of parsimony and of the rule against the multiplication of entities, we may explain many of the mysteries of our present life and many of the hitherto unexplained problems of nature by simply transferring the difficulty to a higher plane and 'discovering' beings personally responsible for what previously appeared to be a mysterious occurrence. It is at least doubtful whether in modern theosophy in India distinguishes sufficiently between subjective imagination and the controlling power of objective facts, and this considerably lessens the force of the rebuke which it administers to our materialism, diminishes the value of its insistence upon the power of thought and prayer, and weakens its encouragement to explore farther than has yet been done the phenomena of spiritualism and telepathy as well as the more weighty experiences of the mystics of all ages.

Conclusion—The history of theosophical ideas, far more than the exhibition of a method, is intended to establish the spiritual unity and continuity of India. Moreover, we have here an excellent field of observation for any one who wishes to know the meaning of theosophy, its principles, its aspirations, its method, and its influence. With the idea that Indian theosophy is typical of this form of thought, we shall rapidly pass in review its principal characteristics.

(a) The most obvious quality is its concentration on the self, which not only occupies the first place in its scheme of thought, but also concerns itself with the Ego as if it were the only existence—as if everything else existed only for the service and convenience to it. This theosophical individualism is both proud and exclusive. The vulgar intelligences, concerned with superstitions and traditional practices, are despised, and with justification the precious truth is guarded for a small number of the elect. 'There is nothing in common between popular religion and knowledge.' 1 As if to show clearly the exacting character of the religion, a verse in the Mahabharata 2 says that the gods, women, and the worlds have only one divinity, one guru only, but that the Brahmans have two. After character which was the object of our love altogether disappears.

(b) It is always flattering to belong to a privileged group; esotericism was an attractive element in theosophy. And there were others. Those who were terrified by threatening death and mysterious destiny, those who were shocked by the spectacle of physical and social injustice, found in the doctrine of karma, avatara, and moksha just the solution fitted to give them moral serenity and courage to live. All the theosophical systems teach some way of salvation; they deliver their followers from the painful prospect of a second death, from an interminable series of lives poisoned by the expectation of death.

(c) Another advantage: truth is not arrived at slowly and patiently by study and reflection; it is grasped at a single lesson. Once the premises have been given by intuition, a vigorous dialectic can construct a system whose scientific appearance has an element of attractiveness for persistently intellectual minds eager to 'know.'

(d) The intuitive method is not the method of an apparently trustworthy; it is also very fruitful.

1 Sakkaras, p. 329; cf., e.g., Com. on the Vedanta-Sutra, p. 829.
2 Mahabharata, i. 95. 7.
It reveals that which neither analysis nor induction could reveal—the supersensible world. Theosophy thus gives satisfaction to the mystical needs in human nature. Then, when one knows that the sensible world is only an insignificant part of being, that, side by side with the very limited realm of knowledge, there is an infinite transcendental world, one resigns oneself easily to the most glaring logical impossibilities.

Finally, the laws of material nature are not valid except for material bodies. Theosophy has been also a discipline of sublimation and de-materialization. Marvellous perceptions and an indefinite enhancement of intellectual and active powers of man, which India has always held in the highest esteem.

If we now ask what theosophy in fact did for individual and social life in India, we find that it has been both beneficial and disastrous. On more than one occasion it has vindicated the rights of the individual and struggled against authorities altogether dependent upon superficial tradition. Theosophically at least, it has placed itself outside of social distinctions. It has made salvation a personal affair of the individual. It has opened the eyes of men to the feeling of the oneness and continuity of all human occupations and the vanity of sensual pleasures and temporal possessions. It has taught them to seek for happiness in the contemplative life and in peace of heart. But it has also taught them also the virtuality and the possibility of progress in human affairs. It has created a school of pessimism. Its followers have searched for the absolute and the absolute only, and when life can be found only the relative and the partial.

They have thought it possible to arrive by a leap at truth, when in fact nothing has really been secured by this intuitive method and everything is to be begun over again. It has lowered the dignity of virtue by making it a means and not an end. In condemning action and individualizing salvation, it has shown itself dangerously anti-social. Frequently, these bitter fruits have not been produced, for it has, on occasion, neglected its fundamental principles. Buddhism, e.g., has preached the highest virtues without making them the instrument of salvation. In Buddhism, side by side with theosophy, there is a large dose of humanity.


Mrs. C. Stevenson, *The Heart of Judaism, 1907*.


**THERAPEUTE**.—The Therapeutae1 were a radical offshoot of the movement in pre-Christian Judaism which threw up an order like the Essenes (q.v.): but, unlike the Essenes, they were purely an Egyptian phenomenon, a religious sect, or, better, a prophet, existing in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, and particularly on the low hills to the south of Lake Mareotis, leading the life of studious recludes and organized on something like a monastic lines. Outside Egypt, indeed outside this district, they are never heard of. They were a local development.

**1. Source of information.**—The only authority for the subject is a short treatise de Vita Contemplativa (περὶ βιωτῆς ψυχικῆς ἡ λύπη [διεργάσι] or, better, *περὶ λυπῆς ἡ ἐν πνεύματι τῆς σωματικῆς*), included in the works of Philo. It is first quoted by Eusebius.2 The author of this treatise, who was a Christian, lived in the Church drew his attention, and evidently the attention of others, to a tractate which offered striking precedents and parallels for the contemplative discipline of Christians, and the general opinion came to be that the Therapeutae were really Christian monks. This anachronism can be traced from Eusebius and Epiphanius onwards; it flourished right down to the beginning of the 17th century, when the French scholar, B. de Montfaucon, published his *Livre de Philon de la vie contemplative,* etc., traduit sur l'original grec, avec observations, où l'on fait voir que les Tebais ont été Chrétien (Paris, 1709). So completely had the Therapeutae been identified with the origin of Christian monachism that even by the 6th cent. vita therapeutica had become the Latin equivalent of *sacrosanctum filium.*

This unhistorical interpretation did one service; it preserved the Philonian treatise. But it was responsible for vehement discussion between Protestant and Roman Catholic—dis- cussion which was so prejudiced that it threw next to no light upon the Therapeutae (except, of course, to disprove the Eusebian ecclesiastical contention): it was also responsible for an avenging scepticism in the 19th century. To suppose,3 on the evidence of Eusebius and Jerome, that Philo revisited Rome c. a.d. 41, is impressed or converted by St. Peter, and returned to join this eschatological sect of St. Mark's Church in converting near Alexandria, was to expose de Vita Contemplativa to unjust suspicion in a more critical age. The same theory provoked an equally naive scepticism. It is not creditable, but it is hardly surprising, to find that in the 19th cent. the Therapeutae were almost looked upon as a mere fiction. Some Jewish scholars, especially Gaster,4 seemed as anxious to disavow any connexion with the apostles as any other. This is not to say that Catholics were to dub them monks; they attempted to rid Judaism of these recluses by relegating them to the 3rd cent. or, as Jewish monks, the treatise belonged to the Egyptian, not to the Jewish, school. Other writers5 also dated the treatise c. a.d. 405, i.e., in the period of the Philo-revival, and more properly regarded it as a Jewish sketch of some ideal, ascetic community. It was reserved for P. E. Busbisch7 to twist the stray threads of this specious evidence into the Therapeutae had ever existed except in the imagination of a Christian c. a.d. 300, who ingeniously used Philo's name and authority to create a monastic community in the first half of the 1st cent. A.D. This aberration of criticism carried away many writers great and small. French and English scholarship, however, came to the rescue, in L. Mass侦探的's study of Roman's decisive judgment, and F. C. Conybeare's work.8 P. Wendland reinforced the defence,9 and the historical authenticity of the

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1 See *RE* vii. 7624.
2 *EB* ii. 17, 18, 27.
3 As the de Phil. Oem. is indubitably Philo's, the only logical course is to explain this panegyric on Christian monks as to make Philo himself a Christian when he wrote it.
4 *EB* iii. 18.
7 *Le Traité de la vie contemplative et la question des Therapeutae,* 1882, viii. 532-35.
11 *Philosophy of the Contemplative Life,* 1874, iii. 532-35.
treasures was finally vindicated. Whether it was composed by Philo, or a temporary Jew is another and a subordinate question. The important point is that the treatise is a pre-Church document, a description of actual rewards in the Judaism of Egypt about the end of the 1st cent. B.C., or the opening of the 1st cent. A.D. Comparene's edition is the one in standard authority on the Greek text. His translation is followed in this article. Both he and Maslebale have made out conclusively that the de Vita Post-

2. Characteristics.—According to Philo, the Therapeutae are part of a movement which is known outside Egypt—the more or less organized semi-

3. Religious significance.—A complete renunciation of the world, resembling that demanded by Jesus in Lk 18th, lay at the foundation of the Therapeutic society. What they abjured was money rather than matter. In the austerity of their zeal they voluntarily handed over their property to others, since absorption in money-making and the cares of this life is a great hindrance to one who desires to possess the kingdom of heaven. The Therapeutae were more wide-awake in the morning than they were at the beginning of the day. They lived in the spirit, and in the morning. As soon as they rose and warmed their beds, they set about their work of prayer, and for the setting of judgment to see with. Then they separate to resume the ordinary day's contemplation in their separate cells. Such, says Philo, is the method of life practised by these true citizens of heaven and the universe.

The term "citizens" is deliberately chosen. They abjure citizens, he means, but none the less, indeed all the more on that account, these riches belong to a higher peltier.

1 In JQR v. (1896) 765-769.
2 Philo is trying not only, as he does elsewhere, to show that the religious tendency is Greek as well as Jewish, but to link the Therapeutae to the wide-spread phenomenon of cultus dei (theaum), as their name of 'devotees' (Deipnosophist) permitted.
3 In this way he seems to interpret it to his readers, just as he had already (Vit. Com. I. 1) contrasted them with the inferior "philosophers" of Greece on the one hand, and with the slyly Egyptian worshipers of animals on the other. His attempt to explain the word of the "healer" of the soul is equally unhistorical. So far as it is not the official title of the community, it means what it means in Greek, "one who cures on the left side of the room the women also reline. The younger servants walk under the older men, for the Therapeutae (like the Essenes) decline to be served by slaves; they deem any possession of servants what-

1 EEE v. 396.
2 De Vit. Com. 9.
3 Is this omission accidental? Or was prayer regarded as a part of private devotion (cf. EEE v. 391)?
4 De Vit. Com. 10.
5 A trait of popular religions worship in Egypt (cf. EEE v. 396). 

6 M iriam, in some quarters of early mystical literature, is the counterpart of Lk, and she plays an important part in the Therapeutae speculations, as Reitzenstein points out (Pomander, Leipzig, 1904, p. 130 n.). Her popularity among the Therapeutae is probably another of the primitive syncretism (Ac 249), with whom Ruesch (Rf II. 17) would join them on this account. But the Therapeutae did not pool their funds for the benefit of the community.
7 Lightfoot (St Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon) London, 1802, pp. 42-270 to their Christian worship; but the Therapeutae did not practise syn-worship any more than the Essenes did (see EEE v. 396, note 4).
8 Unlike the seven years of Eusebius (ibid. 242), with whom Ruesch (E 199) 17) would join them on this account. The Therapeutae did not pool their funds for the benefit of the community.
9 De Vit. Com. 2.
10 De Abrav. A. Epstein in EEE xxii. 1911 14 f., 29f., as well as on the similar institution among the Apmian Jews (Palsima).
of the odium humani generis for which Jews were blamed by the outside world. Philo always protested against the people who withdrew into seclusion, simply because they lacked public spirit. He also anticipated the criticism which might be passed on the Therapeute, that they acted from a morbid misanthropy. Hence his defence and admiration of them. The Therapeute, in fact, realized for Philo what he had always dreamt of, a small (only a small) number of Socrates of spiritual athletes, acting from the highest of motives, carrying out a counsel of perfection, and capable of making the supreme renunciation in order to attain the highest vision of God and truth. To them he applied his favourite Platonic metaphor of the wealth with eyes (i.e. the mystic rapture of the soul enriched with the vision of truth); no wonder, when they possess this inward treasure, that they abandon their blind wealth (τοὺς τυχλοὺς πλοῦτος) to blind worldlings! For their renunciation does not empty life. It is not a mere negation; it is the soul surrendering to a higher passion for God (ἐν τῷ ἐμπαθέτει ἀγῶνι), which enriches life past dreams of avarice. The Therapeute are recluse and students, but their spirit is in the highest order of moral excellence. They protected themselves and their society from all moral protection against an attack of robbers (which was a common experience of such communities). Plainly, they acted to self-defence when occasion required, but they cared not for the world between them and the Essenises were patent. The Therapeute confined themselves to a life of a money-making, though unambitious, and to maintain the number of men and women who had been born and wealthy, and who lived in a Chartreuse-like contrast; they were not only the number seven, and yet not only kept the seventh day strictly but also celebrated a special festival after every 49 days, out of their reverence for that perfect number and its multiple (700). The character of the number seven, and the devout of mysticism. The Therapeute appealed to Philo more than the Essenises did, because they were on old Jewish laws, adherents of the Mosaic, a sect not regarded capable of attaining the highest of contemplative ecstasy without abandoning the holy duties prescribed by the Torah.

A third feature of Philo which pleased the Therapeute was his freedom from angry controversy and flashy rhetoric. With his eye not only upon the quarrels of Greek sages at their symposia but also upon the rabbinic disputants at Jerusalem, he held the unostentatious style practised by the Therapeute speakers, of the rapt attention shown by the audience, and of the respectful demeanour of the gathering—exciting the very virtues which Paul recommended to the showy, noting Christians at Corinth (cf. 1 Co 14th, the Philo loves them for their quiet demeanour. The Therapeute never wasted their time over the sages. They gazed plentifully that, as through a glass, into the mystical significance which held them spellbound. Their wisdom was pure and peaceable; it combined plain living and high thinking, and the simplicity of their tempers.

All this, added to their philosophic aspirations

1 Cf., e.g., de Mut. Nom. 4.
2 De VR. Corn. 2.
4 Ch. 1 1. 31, 9.

1 Leipziger Zeitschrift für Geschichte (cf. Phil. Corn. 9).
2 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. xx, note 163.
4 JQR vii. 706.
5 R. J. (1905) 19-23.
6 Abravas, Leipzig, 1891, pp. 136 f., 145 f.
Nor is the book of Wisdom distinctly Therapeutæ, as some thought.  

The emphasis on seclusio and on barrenness, rather than on the more common feature of purity, certainly suggests that Wisdom emanates from some inner circle or set of Jewish priests, but there are no indications that point decisively to the Therapeutæ, not even in those places where, as in 3:24, Wisdom is not in praise of celibacy, and, even if it were, the tendency to exalt celibacy in Wisdom is not confined to the ascetic substitution of the sexes among the Therapeutæ. 2. 3\f\f simply echoes the common reflexion that life is measured by its content of work, and Wisdom has nothing particularly to do with, or to command, in this context to the Therapeutæ regulation 5 that seniority was reckoned by the years spent within the society. The allusion in 7:26, 28 to the wise man being wedded to Wisdom (τὸν σωφρὸν εὐσεβῆ... ταῖς ἐφοδίαις καὶ τοῖς ὑποδήμασιν ἱεροῖς) resembles the description of the non-moral recluses in the de Philo Contemplativae, 8 for the most part aged virgins, that have preserved intact their chastity... because of their zeal and longing for Wisdom; with whom they were anxious to live, in order to bring forth not mortal children but the immortal progeny which the god-enamoured soul is alone able to bring forth of itself. 4 But this metaphorical description applies in the one case to men, in the other to women, and it is too general and common (cf., e.g., Sir 139, Pr 97) to be confined to the Therapeutæ; in de Philo Contemplativae, S. Philo is speaking as he speaks elsewhere. 5 Finally, the Therapeutæ custom of offering prayer at sunrise (see above) was not peculiar to them among the Jews, so that Wis 10:28 (one should be before the sea in giving thanks to thee, and one should plaud with thee at the first hour of light) is but an echo of these recluses, the less so, that nothing is said about their outward position by the writer of Wisdom, who is simply moralizing about the story of the immortals. 9

5. Origin.—In view of the various Oriental and Hellenistic influences which were playing upon the later Judaism towards the close of the 1st century, it is a phenomenon, like the existence of the Therapeutæ, with their celibacy, their aversion to social life, their absorption in a divine separated, and their mystical speculations, all carried out in accordance with the most holy counsels of the prophet Moses, 6 is not altogether surprising.  

The societies of the Essenes and the Therapeutæ, 7 belong, just as the Greco-Ptolemaic and modern Hellenistic ascetics belong to Judaism quite as much as any of its more formal institutions. 8

It is still less surprising to find such a gild or monastic community in Egypt. The soil of Egyptian popular religion was full of monastic germs; there were men and women recluses in the Therapeutæ at Memphis, whose objects even embraced both study and mystical dreams; the very name of Therapeutæ was connected with the worship of Isis, 9 which had also its mystic raptures, combined with an emphasis on asceticism and celibacy; the climate itself, and the dry, barren deserts, stretching away from the cities and towns, invited those who had reclusive tendencies. It was in Egypt that the monastic movement of the Church first developed its most distinctive forms, centuries later, and the development was no more surprising upon the basis of primitive Christianity than that of the Therapeutæ or of the Essenes upon the basis of pre-Christian Moais. One of the most suggestive parallels to the Therapeutæ discipline is to be found in the contemporary account of the Egyptian philosopher-priests which lived by their Chreia, the Egyptian Ἰερουσαλημ. It is quoted by Perpûrr, 10 and some sentences...

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3 H. de P. 1. 4: 1. For they do not regard as elders who can count their years and are merely aged, but, on the contrary, they have been elevated to an infanta, in case they have been late in embracing the vocation.
4 This is the Philo who had written so extraordinarily about Therapeutæ (see the note below).
5 E.g., in Origen, 131.
6 De Virt. Cont. 8.
7 Compare, in Phœnicians and the Greeks, Cambridge, 1901, p. 132.
8 See the Cynicus Inscription, e.g., quoted by A. Mordau, in Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions, xxvii. (1871), 256f.
9 De Abstin. iv. 6-8.
10 De Virt. Cont. 8.
THURYGE

was not marked. A trait like the presence of the ‘nuns’ is almost sufficient by itself to justify disagreement with the verdict of Mansel:

'The Therapeutae appear to have sprung from an union of the Alexandrian witch cult, pagan Buddhist devores, . . . in their sacced life, in their mortifica-
tions, in their sorcery, teaching, in their mystical contemplations, we may trace at least a sufficient affinity to the Indian mystics to indicate a common origin.'

The Neo-Platonists, and perhaps the Essenes more or less unconsciously developed features which owed their origin to the original suggestion to Buddhist sources. One of the main reasons for hesitating to admit even this possibility is the fact that Buddhist influence on Gnosticism, two centuries later, appears to be almost unrecognizable, although Gnosticism might be expected to show more than an affinity with this line of Indian religious practice and speculation.

LITERATURE.—Besides what has been noted in the course of the text, the following may be quoted: the remarkable contributions which the interminable discussions of the subject have thrown up: the notes of H. de Valois (Valeo-

None of the older dictionary or encyclopedia articles deserves mention. The main help has been given by criticism of Philo-
sis, by H. de Valois (Valeo-
sis), the great 17th-century editor of Eusebius; Thomas Browne, Dissertation de Therapeutis Philo-

THEURGE.—Thurine (Thureau) — the direct working of God, a system that is concerned with systems of mysticism and theosophy. The word itself is not often used by those who claim that supernatural effects are produced through them by those who use them. The term Thurine is often used to describe the mikuliscous effects to good 'spirits,' whom God uses for His purposes, and they call this system of divine working 'magic,' frequently 'white magic,' as distinguished from 'black magic,' which is supposed to be the work of diabolical spirits. Vaughan has given a good definition of it. He says:

'the Thurine would be the term Thurinus to characterize the mysticism which the ancient Therapeutae, known by the Greek name, so that when the name is applied to any Christian who claims a mission, great care must be taken not to identify it with the black art, by help from beneath, but as white magic, by the means of salutation, magic or angel, or such. Thus Thurine mystic is not content, like the theosophic, with either feeling or preaching; nor, like the theosophic,

1 See G. Faber, a survey and verdict in his Buddhism under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite, and above all through contact with the pagan world and its wide-spread belief in magic, the Christian Church unconsciously absorbed a multi-form faith, and many, if not most, of the Church's greatest leaders, saints who have been glorified, the Virgin Mary and her divine Son, can and do work wonders, it is believed, for faithful worshippers. Water and bread and wine and other elements of nature are by miraculous divine grace transformed into other elements, substances, become, in fact, the real divine presence, and supply to the recipient supernatural powers, which seek mightily within the soul. Many Roman Catholic saints and many 19th and 20th cent. mystics believed themselves possessed of special theurge powers. Stigmata of nail-prints were believed to be divinely produced in the hands and feet of Francis of Assisi, of St. Francis of Assisi, of St. Francis of Assisi.

2 Hours with the Mystics, i. 36.

6 See Hours with the Mystics, i. 36.
selves and to soar above the earth in moments of possession. Others had the miraculous gift of shedding tears in extraordinary measure or of emitting fragrant odours from their body in periods of ecstasy, or underwent profound physical transformations or radiated light like a self-luminous body. The entire field of thurigic phenomena is thus intimately bound up with the psychology of hysteria and auto-suggestion. Automatism, one of many typical forms of scientifically recognized. It seems to the 'subject,' when parts of his own body perform functions without his conscious volition, as though some foreign person had entered and possessed him and were using his hands or his feet or his lips. Where the results are beneficent and constructive, it seems natural to believe that divine power has come to his assistance and is working a miracle work through him, so that thurigic appears, to persons of this type, to rest upon facts of experience.

An immense revival of thurigic came in with the rise of humanism and during the period when science was emerging from the stage of superstition and pseudo-science. This revival was due, in large measure, to the influence of Neo-Platonism and of the Jewish mystics, both of which the early humanists studied with zeal and enthusiasm. Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) gave great prominence to the symbolical, mystical, thurigic Kaballah, and he also glorified the writings of the Neo-Platonists. W. J. T. Long quotes the following passage from Pico's *Apology* which illustrates the mental attitude of the first humanists:

"One of the chief charges against me is that I am a magician. Have I not myself distinguished two kinds of magic? One, which the Greeks call *opios", depends entirely on alliance with evil spirits, and their service is rendered with regard to horror, and to be punished; the other is magic in the proper sense of the word. The former is an instrument to the evil spirits, the latter makes them serve him. The former is neither an art nor a science; the latter embraces the deepest mysteries, and the knowledge of the whole of Nature with her powers. While it connects and combines the forces scattered by God through the whole world, it does not so much work miracles as come to the help of working nature. Its researches into the sympathies of things enable it to bring to light hidden marvels from the secret treasure-houses of the world, just as if it created them itself. As the countryman traces the vine upon the stem, so the magician discovers the earthly objects to heavenly bodies. His art is beneficent and Goethe, for it brings men to wonder at the works of God, by which nothing conduces more to true religion."

Longchamp (1453-1529) carried the study of the Kaballa and of Neo-Platonism still farther and laid the basis for the thurigic and magic which swarms in the writings of Cornelius Agrippa of Neimegen, Paracelsus, and Valentine Weigel, etc., in a distinctly less degree, Jacob Boehme. All these theosophically-minded thinkers believed that it was possible to come into possession of direct divine wisdom or light and thereby to discover the secret of the universe and to use the secret in marvellous thurigic ways. Longchamp expressed this view, in 1617, in a passage which is translated in the appendix to the *Three Books of Occult Philosophy* by Henry Cornelius Agrippa. He says:

"God, out of love to his people, has revealed the hidden mysteries to some of them, and these can find in the dead letters the living spirit. For Scripture consists of single letters, visible signs, which stand in a certain connection with the angels as celestial guides and as emanations from God. By the pronunciation of the one, the others are also affected; but with a true concatenation of the words the whole connection of the earth with the heavenly, these signs, rightly placed is connection with each other, are a way of putting him into immediate union with the divine. This is the way by which are bound to satisfy his wishes in his own."

A still better account of the thurigic operations which are believed to work through those who catch the divine secret and find the light is given in *Christian Mysticism*, p. 280, *Miscellanea*. J. W. F. Whitehead, Chicago and London, 1886, p. 521.

"This is true and sublime Occult Philosophy. To understand the mysterious influences of the intellectual world upon the celestial, and of both upon the terrestrial; to learn to dispose and act ourselves so as to be capable of receiving the superior operations of these worlds, whereby we may be enabled to operate wonderful things by a natural power—to discover the secret counsels of men, to increase riches, to overcome enemies, to procure the favour of man, to preserve health, to prolong life, to renew youth, to foretell future events, to see and know things once many miles off, and such like as these. These things may seem incredible, yet read but the ensuing treatise and thou shalt see the possibility confirmed both by reason and by experience of those who possess them."


*E. M. Jones.*

**THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES.**—See Confessions.

**THOMISM.**—1. Name. Broadly speaking, Thomism is the name given to the system of philosophy and theology founded by St. Thomas Aquinas (q.v.). Strictly speaking, it is the name given to a group of opinions taught by St. Thomas and held by what is known as the Thomist school, which is mainly but not exclusively composed of Dominicans. 2. Historical survey. The foundation of Thomism is incontestable due to the personal influence of St. Thomas Aquinas. It should not, however, be forgotten that Albert the Great did much to prepare the way for the birth of the new system, so that the names of both master and pupil will ever remain inseparable in the great work. Although there were many points of contact between the minds of Albert and Thomas, the genius of the one was entirely different from that of the other. Mind; Thomas was more critical than Albert's. The latter does not possess his subject quite perfectly; there is a lack of precision in details and a certain want of synthesis necessary to unify his knowledge. On the contrary, Thomas possesses his matter perfectly; above all, he has a power for order; his precision is finer and his analysis firmer; his vision is more penetrating and more embracing; and his power of analysis is on equal footing with his power of synthesis. Albert revealed to his age an intellectual world unknown to it; Thomas with the deboas of the intellectual world of the ancients created a new one. Both aimed at incorporating Aristotle into Christian philosophy and theology. Albert's endeavour has had the merit of initiative, but it remained incomplete and only provisional; Thomas with a magician's hand forwarded the work and produced a masterpiece which he embellished with a finish un dreamed of by Albert.

Before the time of St. Thomas several attempts had been made to organise the sum of human knowledge, but nothing of any great value had been the result. The work of reformation undertaken by St. Thomas was so vast and complicated that it is not surprising that he was at first a little hesitating and diffident; but, as he advanced in
years and learning, his vision became clearer, and at the age of thirty he took up a position that, with regard to most things, was definite and final. Being perfectly familiar with all the problems discussed by philosophy and theology, and having carefully weighed the truth of the respective solutions and examined the systematic points of view already attempted, he saw that a perfect system necessarily demanded the unification of the whole of his philosophical effort into a single system of knowledge which he bequeathed to the world was due to his sublime metaphysical sense. It is because St. Thomas surpassed the host of thinkers of his time as metaphysician that he produced a unique work.

In philosophy he is the first to proclaim the autonomy of reason; and he has produced his philosophic works without once having recourse to an authority other than experience and reason to establish his conclusions and defend them. Starting from the 'seasible' world as from a secure basis, St. Thomas passes to the region of the absolute, to the highest and purest Intellectualism. In theology he proclaims the autonomy of revelation. At the outset he maintains the impossibility of a real conflict between the natural and supernatural orders which had come to be accepted as of truth. God. Thus he synthesizes natural and supernatural, nature and grace, faith and reason. To assimilate his thought it is necessary to understand, above all, the functioning of his general synthesis, and especially of his metaphysics, which rules the whole economy of his work. Eclecticism has no meaning with regard to Thomistic doctrines; therefore the strength reside essentially in the marvel of its unity and solidarity.

3. Progress of Thomism. — The Dominican order gradually took up the teaching of St. Thomas, but not without opposition; some of its members were still imbued with the doctrines of Augustinism, and these could not be converted to a new system in a day.

Robert Kilwinry, archbishop of Canterbury, and a friend of St. Thomas's theory of the unity of substantial form, on 18th March 1277.

A few years later, however, the English Dominicans were among the most resolute defenders of this doctrine in Germany Ulrich Engelbert de Strasbourg († 1277) inclined towards Augustinism, and the Neo-Platonism of the Arabs. Eckhart († 1277) was much inclined towards Neo-Platonism. The Dominicans of Paris (1315) was an Augustinian strongly influenced by Avicenna; the latter never hesitated to combat the doctrine of St. Thomas.

In France the great adversary of the new system was Durand de Saint-Pourrain. In Italy Ubertus Guidi was punished by the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Arezzo in 1315 for attacking St. Thomas; and the General Chapter of Puy (1344) censured Thomas of Naples for opposition to St. Thomas. Many chapters of the Dominican order encouraged and promoted Thomistic doctrines. Worthy of mention are the General Chapters of Paris (1258), of Saragossa (1259), of L'etola (1259), of Carpentras (1265). So great indeed was the attachment of the Dominicans to the Summa Theologica that the celebrated Spaniard Arnauld de Villeneuve († 1321) wrote a work against the Dominicans in the Lombard. In the Summa Theologica, in which he accuses the Dominicans of preferring the study of the Summa to that of the Bible. Two centuries later Erasmus formulated the same reproach.

4. Introduction of St. Thomas's writings as textbooks in schools. — At the end of the 13th century the Bible was the principal text, and the Sentences of Petrus Lombardus was the theologian's text par excellence. The Dominicans introduced the reading of the Summa Theologica, i.e. according to the thought of St. Thomas. Other schools following this example taught the Sentences 'in via Alberti,' 'in via Durandi,' 'in via Scoti,' etc. Not until the end of the 15th century did the Dominicans substitute entirely the Summa for the Sentences.

5. Thomistic polemics. — The fights sustained by the Dominican order during the end of the Middle Ages in defence of their school were (1) to make a good stand against Augustinism, and (2) to defend certain doctrines special to Thomism.

(a) General. — In favour of Augustinism a great reaction was made by the Friars Minor in a work composed by William de la Mare. The Oxford Dominicans replied in a work known as the Corruptorium. A further work Contra Thometum was published by two Oxford Dominicans, William de Machesfeld and Richard Knappwell. At the end of the 13th century another general defence of Thomism was written by Robert de Bologna, Apologeticus pro St. Thomas. Last of all a great work (unfinished) was written by a celebrated Thomist, Herve Noel de Neddelle, master at the university of Paris and master-general of the Dominicans, Defensa doctrinae St. Thome Herenius Natalis.

Other important works written towards the end of the Middle Ages are Defensiones theologice des Thomae Aquinatis by John Capronius († 1614), who was the 'princeps Thomaistae,' and Cleomenes Thomistae contra modernos et Scotiacos by Pierre Nicer († 1493). Diego de Durante (1293), the illustrious protector of Christopher Columbus, wrote two polemical works in defence of Thomism, of which the most famous is: Novissimae definitionis Doctoris beat. Thomas de Aquinis super quatuor libros Sententiarum quattuor responsiones postulatitum et utilisissimae (Seville, 1289).

(b) Special. — (1) St. Thomas formulated the theory of the unity of the human person by making the intellectual soul the only form of the human composite. At the same time in a work (at Paris) which held the unicity of intellect for the human species, and against Augustinism, which held the plurality of forms, several treatises were written by Thomists, by Aurea de Tarantaise, Gilles de Lessines, William de Machesfeld, Thomas de Sutton, Jean de Faenca, etc. The General Council of Vienne defined the Thomistic doctrine on this matter, which was further confirmed by the 6th Council of Florence (1439), the 6th of Pisa (1515), and by Pope Pius IX. in a letter to the archbishop of Cologne (15th June 1867).

(2) The question of the nature of religious poverty and its practice by Christ and the apostles was hotly discussed between the Dominicans and the Friars Minor. The discussion became so disastrous that Pope John XXII. condemned as erroneous and heretical the doctrine that Christ and the apostles did not possess anything, or did not perform acts of proprietorship, viz. buying and selling; etc. (12th Nov. 1323, Oem inter nonnullatos).

(3) There was another theological combat between the Dominicans and the Minor with regard to the blood of Christ shed during the Passion. The Minors said that it ceased to be united to the divinity of Christ, the Dominicans that the union did not cease. Eventually Pope Pius II forbade both parties to discuss the question further.

(4) The Dominicans strenuously fought against the nominalism of the 14th cent. of which Durand de Saint-Pourrain and William Ockham were the leaders.

1 Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1705-06, ill. 515.
3 Veneti, 1618.
4 All the literature of this quarrer is to be found in a 365 in the Bibliothèque de Paris (Cod. 1328), to which we refer to Benedict XIV., de Sermonum Dei beatissimatis et benedictis (Paris, 1752), bk. II., ch. 30.
5 See art. REALISM AND NOMINALISM.
7. Thomism and the Council of Trent.—Thomists held an important part in this council. The Thomist school had grave interests at stake on account of the doctrine regarding the justification of sin. The most active was the Jesuit, François de Vitoria, who in his

1 Sent. vi. cl. vi.

THOMISM

5. The Averroists against which Albert the Great and St. Thomas fought was renewed again at the beginning of the 16th cent. in Italy. Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan, published a commentary on the de Anima of Aristotle (Florence, 1509). A few years later the Council of Lateran (1513) condemned the teaching of Averroism on the point, and further enacted that professors of philosophy should solve contrary arguments, which Cajetan held only theologians could do. [223]

6. In the 14th cent. disputes concerning the Immaculate Conception arose. St. Thomas undoubtedly leaves the question unsolved, but he was at great pains to show that the Church had not excluded from the redemption St. Thomas says that the precise moment of sanctification is unknown; he therefore never propounded the question whether Mary was sanctified at the very instant of conception. He believed it better to be silent on this point, although, had he followed his personal inclination, he had without doubt concluded in the affirmative, as his first declaration witnesses in IV. Sent. 1, dist. xiv. q. 1, art. 3, ad 3. But his superior theological sense did not let him, in presence of the silence of tradition and the negative position of many theologians, and the reserved attitude of the Church. The endeavour to drag St. Thomas to the negative or positive side is to force his meaning, since he voluntarily abstained from either.

8. The presence of Thomism.—In the 14th and 15th centuries there was an intellectual decadence in philosophy and theology. Thomism could not altogether abstract itself from the influence of the time. However, even in the 15th cent., there was notable vitality among Thomists like John Capreola, St. Antoninus of Florence, and Jean de Torquemada. At the end of the 15th cent. the intellectual and spiritual revolution manifested itself in the 16th cent., and continued for two centuries afterwards. In 1551 the General Chapter of the Dominicans ordered the text of St. Thomas’s writings to be used as text-books in all its schools. Hence at this time the great commentaries began to be written. Cajetan wrote from 1507 to 1522; Conrad Kollin on the Prima secundae (Cologne, 1519); François de Vittoria (whose commentaries remained in MSS) and Barthélemy de Medina from 1577 to 1578; Benez from 1584 to 1594; Sylvester Ferraria in the Summa contra Gentiles (Vatican, 1574). The humanist movement of the 16th cent. had a great influence on certain Thomists. François de Vittoria took the lead; of his disciples the most famous was Melchior Cano (+ 1589), whose work, de Locis Theologicis, is a tribute to the humanist movement by its purity and beauty of style. Two new doctrines issued from the humanist state of thought; Ambrose Catharin (+1533) put forward new theories on predestination and grace; and Barthélemy de Medina formulated probationist. Thomists combated the former doctrine; whilst in answer to the desire of Pope Alexander VII. they combated strongly probationist doctrines.

9. Thomism and Molinism.—See art. MOLINISM: also see below § 12.

10. Thomism and probabilism.—The theory of probabilism (q.v.) was unfolded by Barthélemy de Medina, a Dominican, in his Expositione fundamenti scolastici (Liguriae, 1568). The Jesuits generally adopted this new theory. But, since the case with which any opinion could be made probable, provided the contradictory was made probable, led to grave abuses, Alexander VII. asked the Dominicans to combat strongly the probabilist doctrines. This they did, and from that time no Dominican theologian has written in favour of this doctrine. La Croix de France, however, published works in favour of the theory of probability.

11. Neo-Thomism and the revival of Scholasticism.—At the beginning of the 19th cent. Scholasticism (q.e.) began to revive, and there followed a revival of the teaching of St. Thomas, as expressed in the Constitutions of Pope Leo XIII. (4th Aug. 1879) set up St. Thomas Aquinas as the great model and master of Catholic philosophy and theology. From that time all schools have studied the works of the master and have endeavoured to make his thought their own. The endavour to keep in touch with the progress of modern science, and to show that the fundamentals of Thomism are in perfect accord with the latest discoveries of science, was set on foot, not, as is sometimes supposed, by the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain University, but by the Thomist Saneverede, one of the most learned and vigorous promoters of the movement. This is evidenced by his work, Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata. This great movement has been fostered and aided by the Jesuit Supérieur de Philosophie, founded by Cardinal Mercier at Louvain. Certain Revues are now published in which the teachings of Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scolasticism are combatted and dealt with.

12. Essence of Thomism.—Thomism is above all a system of philosophy and theology. Now a

detail from the Summa, iii. qu. lxxxv. art. 5. The decree numbers six acts preparatory to justification. They are the same in nature, number, and order as in the Summa (loc. cit.). Also, in the following chapter of the decree the causes of justification are exactly those given by St. Thomas in the Summa, 1. ii. qu. exil. art. 4, and ii. ii. qu. xxiv. art. 3.

1 See art. Jansenism.
system necessarily implies harmony and solidarity among the doctrines of which the system is built up. In proportion as a system lacks unity, so much is it less of a system. Many philosophers and theologians have endeavoured to give systems of knowledge to the world, but on examination is found that they lack the first essential of a system, viz., solidarity of thought. These systems are like a sewing up the elements of a Frankenstine's monster. The Thomist system, established at the outset in metaphysics, is applied without exception to the fundamental doctrines in every department of Thomist philosophy. It is as a whole and on the whole draws a single conclusion which is in any way at variance with the principle, although he may hold all other doctrines of the Thomist system, ceases ipso facto to enjoy department.

14. The application of the principle.—(a) In metaphysics.—The Thomist doctrine of real distinction between essence and existence in created things, wherein existence is primary, essence and existence as an act, is an application of the principle; likewise the real distinction between substance and its accidents, whereby substance is conceived as in potentiality to the accidents which are its acts or perfections; likewise the doctrine concerning the nature of dimensive quantity, the essence of which is not that it actually extends the parts of a corporeal substance in place, i.e., in triple dimension, but that it distills the parts of that substance within the substance itself (which internal parts are only potentially distributed in triple dimension by dimension quantity), and that it has the capability of potentiality or potentiality and in fact extending those parts in place according to triple dimension. Upon this doctrine the nature of dimensive quantity is founded the doctrine of the real presence of the whole of Christ is that of a consecrated Host; also the doctrine of the virgin birth of Christ, of His passing into a room, the doors being shut, etc. Likewise the important doctrine of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, is an application of the aforesaid fundamental principle. An analysis of that which begins to be (effect) must have a reason (cause) for its inception shows the underlying great principle.

(b) In psychology.—The doctrine of the unity of the human composite, viz., that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, and that it is the only form, is an application of the same principle. The ‘prime matter,’ a pure potentiality, which is informed by the intellectual soul (or act) receives from this act all that makes it body, and human body, and living. Through the same principle it follows that the faculties of intellect and will are really distinct from the substance of the soul, because they are the acts or perfections of the soul, which in regard to them is potentiality. As a consequence it also follows not only that every faculty is really distinct from its object as potentiality to act, but also that, in regard to it as object, every faculty is passive, not active. Hence the important doctrine that the human intellect is a passive, not active, power or faculty, in that it receives, and does not make, its object of thought as object.

Further (and this is most important from the point of view of Thomism versus Molinism), the human will, which is the faculty of choice, must ultimately be moved to the very act of choosing by something which is in act; and the reason is that, before the act of choosing (given everything necessary for this action save this action itself), the will is in a state of potentiality, therefore be ‘moved’ by something outside it to the state of perfection which is ‘choosing.’ Only God, the actus purus, can move the will to the very act of choosing. If one else did this, the will ipso facto would cease to be free. This is the Thomistic doctrine of physical premotion, which is a rigorous application of the aforesaid fundamental principle. It calculated thus: Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.

This is the fundamental principle of the entire Thomist system; established at the outset in metaphysics, it is applied without exception to the fundamental doctrines in every department of Thomist philosophy. It is as a whole and on the whole draws a single conclusion which is in any way at variance with the principle, although he may hold all other doctrines of the Thomist system, ceases ipso facto to enjoy department.

(c) In cosmology.—In this department of applied metaphysics the fundamental question concerns the precise nature of body, as body. Applying the aforesaid principle, Thomism concludes that
body, as body, is a composite of two principles, one of which is substantial form and the other prime matter. Prime matter is a pure potentiality of which the substantial form is the act; and between the two, as a consequence, there is a real distinction.

(d) Natural theology.—The classic proof for the existence of God, viz. from the existence of motion in the world, is nothing more than a rigorous application of the same principle. Motion is here taken in its widest sense, encompassing not only local motion but every kind of ‘passing from potentiality to act.’

(e) In ethics.—All the doctrines concerning habits and their formation, of the passions, of virtues and vices, of laws, etc., have their mainstay in the same fundamental principle.

(f) In theology.—For the existence of God see above (d). It is only necessary to run through the Summa to see that the same principle is fundamental in the doctrines concerning revelation and concerning inspiration (in which is implied the doctrine of cause and effect, and in particular of instrumental causality). By an understanding of the same great principle it is concluded that God alone is pure act with no admixture of potentiality whatsoever, whilst everything created contains both potentiality and actuality. Consequently God is identical with His essence and not only that God’s essence is identical the same as His existence, but that His intellect and His will, His attributes of unity, goodness, truth, His knowledge and love are identical with His essence. The same grand principle underlies the whole of the doctrine concerning the mystery of the Trinity in persons in God. A further application is to be found in the treatise on the local principles, whose existence is really distinct from their essence, whose minds and wills are really distinct from their substance, etc. Thus through the whole of the Summa one finds the same principle applied. It will be necessary to take only two more cases in order to show the solidarity of Thomistic doctrines. According to St. Thomas, the sacraments are the instrumental causes of grace; they are not mere channels through which grace is infused into the soul; they are real, physical, instrumental causes which produce or induce grace into the soul. The soul in regard to the sacramental grace that imparts is a potentiality (potentia obducentialis), and grace is the act. The final instance we shall take to illustrate the application of the instrumental principle of Thomism concerns the doctrine of actual grace. Just as in the natural order it was concluded that the human will is physically premoved by God to the act of choice, so in the supernatural order an actual grace is nothing more than a physical premotion in that order. Hence the Thomists speak of ‘gratia effcax ab intrinsecō,’ a grace intrinsically or of its very nature efficacious, and not of grace, intrinsically indifferent, to be made efficacious by consent of the will to accept, or to remain inefficacious by refusal of the will to accept. Thus Thomism, by a relentless logic, applies the great principle to the doctrinal act of God and to every metaphysical act. Hence the theory subverts the doctrines of God as the Prime Mover of all things, of causality, and of the great metaphysical principle: Potentiality, which is real pre-existent in its act, cannot ever become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act. In short, for the sake of a difficulty in applied

metaphysics (i.e. the freedom of the will under God’s physical premotion), Molina’s and Suarez’s principle already established in metaphysics, just as he who, on account of some difficulty in mixed mathematics, gainsays a principle of pure mathematics.

Any conclusion other than the one drawn above wrecks a system of the whole of knowledge in the mind of the Thomist. It is owing to the perfect consistency of application of the grand fundamental principle to every department of knowledge that Thomas bequeathed to the world a sublime system remarkable for its perfect unity, harmony, and solidarity of thought.

Ix.: For the history of Thomism generally: Dictionnaire d’Apologetique, s.v. ‘Freyes trochon, leur doctrine’ (P. Mandonnet); OE, s.v. ‘Thomisme.’ For the progress of Thomism: Acta capiitorum generalis ordinis Praedicatorum, Rome, 1838-1904, ed. B. M. Reichert, il. 196-291 (the Dominican order).


Concerning the nature of religious poverty: D. M. in Bibliotheca de Paret, Cat. 1290, fol. 1-78; Benedict XIV., de Serorum Dei Beatissimae et beatorum Canonizati Hoc, bk. ii. ch. 30, in Opera, Venice, 1758.


Concerning the nature of religious poverty: K. Werner, Die nemiqismetricer in der Scholastik der spateren Mittelalter, Vienna, 1882.


ALFRED WHITACRE.

THRACE (Grecia, Grecy).—Thrace was the name given in classical times to the mountainous region lying north of Greece proper, the inhabitants (Grecies, Gréciers, Grecyes) were a barbarous people, having no close affinities to the Greeks in language, customs, etc., but were very considerably, beginning early and continuing fairly late. In particular, they appear to have been partly responsible for the remarkable change in the spirit of Greek religion which took place about the beginning of the classical epoch or shortly before it. This change must not be thought of as something evolutionary, akin, e.g., to the conversion of most of N. Europe from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism at the Revolution; for the large majority, probably if not certainly, religious beliefs and practices remained little if at all of actual grace. To the mind of St. Thomas, in spite of the apparent difficulties, this doctrine is the only proper conclusion. For Thomism the theory of Molina or Suarez, with its various difficulties in that for purely metaphysical reasons the theory subverts the doctrines of God as the Prime Mover of all things, of causality, and of the great metaphysical principle: Potentiality, which is real pre-existent in its act, cannot ever become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.

In short, for the sake of a difficulty in applied

1 Cf. Summa, t. qu. ii. art. 3, Prima via.

2 See above (6).
towards the Thracians, while not unfriendly, is clearly that of
considered as barbarians; and this is certainly justified. They are, he tells us, a numerous race, of
considerable political importance in the European
sector. That Thracian and Phrygian stocks were
associated, even in early times, is shown by their
arguing drawn from their religious and social
organization, implies us to believe that this is substantially
mixture, and that these, or the majority of them, remained politically independent, protected
only by their numbers and the fierce nature of their
country; Rome, after much trouble, succeeded in subduing
them, the ferocious Dacians finally yielding to Trojan. They
remained in an independent state, even after the
usurpation of the Parthians. Some 200 years later a
Slovak invasion swept over the country, and from
that time begins the history of what ultimately became
the Balkan peoples.

Ethnology.—The Thracian races fall, broadly speaking,
to two groups—north and south. In the north, the
inhabiting the region of the Haimos and Strymon, included,
belonging to the Indo-European family, mentioned the
Bulgar, Thynoi, Bithynoi, Saka, Doli, and Phrygians; the
former or
or

The Thracian races form the more noticeable number of peoples,
individually more important than the tribes just mentioned. Besides
the powerful Dacian themselves, we must account among them the
more formidable Dacians (Dacae, Dacans, also), who are often
confused with them, and the Agathysroi, whose name seems to
indicate that they were held in no great esteem by their
Scythian neighbors (the first two syllables are probably to be
connected with Zend ahas, "bad"), and who appear from Herodotus' tables to be practised among
them, and converted to Christianity. On the whole, the northern
region shows certain cultural affinities with the Germanic tribes, the southern with
the Greek, though not to any marked or immediate degree, with the
Phrygians.

Language.—As the Thracian seem to have had no knowledge
of writing, the few inscriptions we have from Thrace are
lawful, and the facts of their native tongue remain, however,
a number of glosses, some 36 of which we may take as genuine
Thracian words; about 20 names of plants given as Thracian by
Horace are similar in form and a considerable number of proper names, both
of persons (including deities) and of places. From this it appears that the
Thracian, of the European group, having as its nearest ancient
congeners the Phrygian and Armenian. Traces appear of two distinct
infiltrations of this type, the xenics being presumably the blending of
two races; and this we may consider along with the fact reported
by Herodotus that the cult practised by their chthonians differed from
that of the common people.

Material culture.—It has been pointed out that Homer
does not mention the Thracian culture as being inferior to
the Trojan; the Thracian tribes included a city of their giving; in the
son of Antenor was brought up in Thrace and married there; 6 Thracian in his home with a strong Thracian contiguity. 7

From the other hand, some of them at least trade with the Greeks. 8
No hint is given that they are in any sense savage; in particular,
there is no passage of this type which would show that they
were particularly barbarous. 9

But there is no need to suppose, as Hellig does, that the
Thracians of that day, under Phrygian or other foreign
influence, were enjoying a short period of 'bouthean' culture which brought them for a time to higher levels than they ever afterwards attained. 10 The true attitude of the Thracians seems to be that
Homer knows nothing of the later division between Greek and
barbarian, but refers to the Thracians as a people who were not a highly
civilised people themselves. A race which lived under the
rule of foreign barons, practised the blood-feud, allowed
for occasional maltreatment or otherwise ill-treated a dead foe,
was not quite free from the custom of human sacrifice, and buried
depth, having in the funerals of the historical Thracians, 11 besides
keeping up the old custom of bride-price and having only
very rudimentary manufactures and handicrafts, was not
much superior to the Thracians of historical times. The
difference was that the Greeks developed with marvellous rapidity in the
next 200 years or so, while the Thracians remained backward. 12

Passing to classical authors of the later periods, we find
the chief account of Thrace in Herodotus. 13 His whole attitude

1 See below § 5 (A).
2 The present writer holds the view of Andrew Lang, van Leen, and other scholars that the Homeric poems are
the work of one man, and he would put their date above the
12th century B.C. The Homeric poems are

11 References to Homer is cited in the notes. For fuller authorities see Tomasek, Die
alten Thraker, f. 111 ff.

12 At the same time it must be confessed that none

Between Greeks as a whole and Thracians as a whole no

13 Territorial and political boundaries are mostly

state authors — e.g., Her. Od. 11. xxv. 22. The writer is of opinion that the

14 Herod. iv. 74, iv. 75, viii. 70.

15 References in Zambosch, i. 119, ii. 416.

16 Cf. Hom. II. ix. 456.

17 iii. 301 and elsewhere.

18 Ed. Vitr. Altis, i. 20, 21. Simple wearings and

19 Plut. Qest. Rom. 250 B; Paus. iii. xiv. 9; Arnob. adv. Nat. iv. 25. Such a sacrifice, however, is not wholly unknown elsewhere in Greece.
of the above features are conclusive against his Greek origin. Among a people brave enough, but not very educated or given to proper songs, the war-god might well remain 'functional'—too important to be altogether neglected, too unpopular to develop. Among the traditional friends of Troy are also Apollo, Athena, and at times Zeus himself; not much can be made from a single feature of an obscure ritual; and the references to Thrace need mean no more than that the Thracians, being war-like, are an obscure cult of a war-god. And we must remember that the cult of Ares is very old in Athens and Boiotia, and that his name is not only possibly derived from an Aryan root, which in itself proves nothing, but has a characteristically Greek formation.

We conclude therefore, on the whole, that the Thracians did not originate the Greek cult of Ares, but had from very early times a war-god of their own, about whose ritual we must be content to remain ignorant. It is worth mentioning that Herodotus seems to speak of him as an ocular god in one obscure passage.

(6) Dionysios. The case of Dionysos is very different, and there is little serious doubt that here Herodotus and the numerous later authors who speak of this god as Thracian are literally correct. The chief arguments in favour of this statement are as follows:

(1) Philological.—The first two syllables of the name are supposed to be connected with the Thracian tribe-name that. Further, a Phrygian inscription gives us the formula με ἔως ἐν θεός, which almost certainly means 'by heaven and earth.' We thus have a god with a name of which the first part has close Thracio-Phrygian affinities, while the rest is certainly not Greek, whose mother is apparently the earth-goddess of the Thracio-Phrygian stock.

(2) Tradition.—Strabo definitely calls the cult of Dionysos Thracian. On my first visit to the seat of the god at all, it is in connexion with the Thracian king Lykurgos; and his cult is called Thracian far more positively than that of Ares by authors of all ages. Moreover, all tradition is agreed that he is not genuine Greek. It is true that the usual birth-legend (not the 'Orphic' story; see below) makes him a Thracian; but even there he is disowned by his kin and has to win his way into prominence against the vehement opposition of Peithon;7 and while many similar tales indicate that his cult had to force an entrance into Greece, it is true that many, if not all of these, are misinterpreted ritual tales; but that they were persistently misinterpreted in the same way, as stories of persecution, starvation, etc., is surely not real opposition, but rather the interpretation if not the stories themselves.

(6) Facts of cult.—On the one hand, very early Greek agricultural festivals either are not Dionysia, like the Attic Thesmophoria, or present Dionysos as an obvious intruder, like the Nemeia. On the other hand, the Thracio-Phrygian region is the home of all manner of orgiastic nature-cults,8 and one may have an some sort of wild worship of Dionysos which we have good reason to suppose primitive, viz. the Oracle, is Thracian and hardly Greek at all.9 He seems always to have been a wine-god as well as a god of nature in general, and a wine-god we find him in Thrace, which was a wine-growing country. Further, he is connected in cult with Baltuskos, who is probably Phrygian.

From Thrace, then, his cult spread through Greece some time, probably not very long, before the dawn of Greek history. In Homer he is apparently a foreign god, little known and not much regarded; of the five mentions of the god, five of which are certainly interpolations, one10 is unimportant, the others come in the story of Lykurgos. When we come to the Homeric hymns, however, he is a well-known and important deity, and his cult is full of references to him. It would appear then that somewhere after the downfall of the Homeric (Achillean) culture, and during the period of reconstruction, of which very little is known, his worship crossed the border and was carried, it is no longer possible to say exactly how, or by whom,11 to all parts of Greece, meeting with considerable opposition, but finally establishing itself as part of the state religion and becoming largely civilized in the process, though remnances of its original barbarism, such as the well-known one in Italy,12 were always possible.

No detailed description of the cult of Dionysos in Thrace has come down to us from antiquity; but it is not difficult to frame one from various scattered notices,4 from the wilder and more savage features of his Grecian cult, from the old Thracian worship still to be found in N. Greece, and from what we know of similar rites elsewhere.

We learn, firstly, that the most prominent feature of the cult was the orgia, or orgies, held normally, if not always, at night. In this the worshippers worked up into a state of frenzy by dancing and shouting (hence the numerous names of the god, such as Eulios, Iakehos, and perhaps Bakchos,13 which are derivable from ejaculations or from words meaning 'shout' or 'cry'), to the accompaniment of savage music. They were dressed in the skins of wild animals—we hear especially of fawn- and fox-skins (wipbwrn, fiyoung) and carried the thyrsos, a spear-like implement covered with the sacred ivy, or the nearchus (leamn-wand). It is obvious that for an imaginary people, not highly civilized and susceptible to strong sexual emotion, and therefore to nervous emotion of all kinds, including religious enthusiasm,14 the violent exercise under the stimuli of deconstructions of their mountainous country in the clear night air would of itself produce an abnorrmal condition; and this seems to have been further encouraged by the free use of wine and perhaps other artificial stimulants.

The result was, at least in many cases, and particularly among their women, a condition of frenzy, involving anasthesia, abnormal strength and endurance, and other such symptoms, followed by fainting and exhaustion. The natural explanation, to any one at that stage of culture, was that the worshippers were possessed by their god (livoq, duxoq); and therefore we find them called by his name (Đuxoq, Đuxoq).

That Dionysos himself was present was 1

1 The odd ritual of Ares Teumvchevos (Paus. viii. xvii. 4, 5) may point to Amazonianism, which is not Greek. But this is exceedingly doubtful.
2 The forms Απες (Hom. Iouc) and Απες (Alk.) indicate a stem in -ap-; cf. apby8 and apbly8. The root is akin to Gr. r 8, 'roar.' See G. A. M. Fermul in CHR xIII. 200.
3 II. 70, 71, or reprod. rtes alpouq ev Íp poc crc Ípocrc pcrpocrc.
4 The context is corrupt, and it is uncertain who are referred to, quite possibly not Thracians at all.
5 The counter-theory, that he is a Cretan deity, is supported by J. K. Harrison (Prolegomena, ch. viii.). The arguments for its reduce to (a) the fact that a cult of a god of this type did exist in Crete from very early times and remained so powerful that the cult itself was then absorbed by (b) certain very primitive features of Cretan Thracian ritual. But, in view of the overwhelming evidence as of Thrace, these phenomena are of little weight. The former is common to many localities; the latter is naturally explained by supposing that the worship of Dionysos was in Cretan Crete was so little in favour in Crete because it was so like the native worship, and so was but little modified. The worship Dionysos may have been a thunder-cloud or the like are too absurd to deserve more than passing mention. These two views are incompatible, but possibly connected with the holy mountain Nysa, which is variously located but apparently Thracian in Homer.
6 See Hdt. iv. 30; Plut. Alex. 2.
7 Hom. v. 190.
8 The best known form of the legend is that given in Euri- perpendicular. In this the final birth of Dionysos, from the thigh of Zeus, does not take place in Thess.
10 For a multitude of quotations, we refer the reader for detailed authorities to the authors cited in the Literature at the end of this article.
11 The root is perhaps Κύτος (Curto), in both names, Iakehos being a diminutive of Cyno. It is derived from a word meaning 'shout' or 'cry.'
12 The present writer holds religious and sexual emotion to be essentially the same; see, e.g., W. James, Passions of the Mind. Experience, London, and New York, 1902, p. 20. The frequency of 'conversions' and the like during adolescence, and the regular employment by mystics of all nationalities of erotic metaphors are among the facts supporting this view.
a commonplace, familiar to us from many literary and artistic representations of the rites, from Euripides to Thucydides. The skins with which the worshippers dressed were those of animal avatars of the god; and the exaltation of the rite was the tearing in pieces and devouring of one of these animals.

It is far from impossible that in some cases the victim was a man or a child. That the Getai practiced a form of human sacrifice we know from Strabo. Thucydides refers to Dionysos ἀνατέρα.[1] the legends of Pentheus, etc., point the same way; and in the modified Dionysiac ritual of Tenedos the cows whose calf is to be the victim is tended like a woman, and the calf when torn has its back put on it before being killed.

We have so far quite a normal ritual of a vegetative deity, of the kind familiar from the Golden Bough. But it is clear that by early spring (the time of most of the festivals),[2] we do not hear so much, but there are traces of it. In the legend of Lykurgos already referred to the king pursues the god into the sea—the thing is much the same in the legend of Syneo; we are therefore, in view of these facts and on the analogy of all similar ritual elsewhere, justified in supposing that his death was part of the ceremonial of the spring, and that it was strengthened by the curious relics of Dionysiac worship found in Thrace by R. M. Dawkins,[3] in which the death of one of the characters in the mummers' play is a prominent feature. Closely allied with this went the ceremony representing his birth and cradling in the Mevor, or winnowing-fan. The last detail, however, marking him definitely as a corn-god, is Greek rather than Thracian.[4]

In the ritual of Dionysus the forms of the god change bewilderingly. We have reason to suppose that he had been conceived as bull, goat, kid, sheep, serpent, stag, and even pig,[5] for all these animals were sacred in ancient and modern times, and were thus identified with the others as well. But the fact that he is always human, and he had human avatars, as might be expected from the human sacrifices.

1. Divine kings; Lykurgos, Pentheus, Rhazes, Orpheus.—Several of the legends seem to indicate that in Thrace, as elsewhere, there existed kings of the type familiar from the investigations of J. G. Frazer,—incarnations of the local god, who ended by being sacrificed, possibly devoured. As the Greeks probably never had had this sort of king—certainly had forgotten it—they naturally concluded that none of the Greek deities had been known in Thrace.

2. Bacchus; Endymion; the 'Bacchi and Ariadne' in the National Gallery.

3. Pentheus, xii, 13. See below, p. 49.

4. See Endymion. Nat. Anim. xii. 34. The Thracian rite seems to have been based, as is normal sacrifice, on that of the ancients, and thus on the legend of the god. The origin of the legend of the god.

5. For a few examples see art. Festivals and Feasts (Greek), and art. Bacchus.[6]


9. A selection of the relevant passages will be found in C. S. v. 368.

10. Above mythological figures exactly correspond to the Brazerian type. Lykurgos periscepses Dionysos; but the form which he assumes is probably a natural one of the god, but a whirl of bull's hide, a fertilizing februm like the hide thongs of the Roman Luperci. He is not torn in pieces by the god's followers, but in one way or another (the legend varies in detail) is torn captive, or at least prisoners, and imprisoned in a cave. Pentheus opposes the Balchais and is torn in pieces by them. Orpheus is a royal priest of Dionysos and is torn in pieces by the Thracian women. For which the mythologizers assign sundry fanciful reasons.[1]

Rheses is a vague figure, but it has been urged that he name may be connected with res (Gothic raie) and the royal Thrace. After his death he appears—the exact sense and meaning are matters of dispute—to be represented by the author of the play bearing his name as becoming an oracular deity or semi-god (deipno-μαινς) of somewhat Dionysiac type.[4] Add to all this the facts that the Getae priest-kings was called 'god' and that we get as a royal name of frequent occurrence the word Kotys, which is a by-form of Kotyon, and the cult of Dionysos and other gods of the same kind in Thrace had at its head in early times[2] a priest-king who was the incarnation of the deity and crowned by being violently put to death to make way for a fresh incarnation.

(d) Orpheus.—Of the persons mentioned in the last section one is of such importance as to deserve separate treatment, viz. Orpheus. Concerning this priest-king the traditions of antiquity are fairly constant. He is a more or less historical figure;[3] he existed some time before the Trojan War;[4] he was a Thracian,[5] son of Callirho, and a priest of Dionysos, usually Kalliope, sometimes Polymnia. He was a magician, a 'theologian' in the Greek sense of the word, a marvellous musician. His home, when exactly localized, is generally said by our earlier authorities to have been Mt. Pangaios in the district of Rhodope, shrine, where later writers locate him on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebro. After various adventures, the most notable of which was his escape in later literature from Vergil's handling of it in the Georgics, he was

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[3] See Rzeho, i. 161, who rather too confidently assumes Rhesus to have been a fabled god. W. Leist (JHS xxxiv. [1915]) [1] does not go as far in the opposite direction. On the whole the present writer is of opinion that Rhesus may really have been a half-forgotten king of some Thracian tribe, who after his death was supposed to give oracles. The ancient evidence is to be found in J. x.; [Eur.] Rhæs. 955 ff.; Polyan. vii. 83.
[5] Presumably not in historical times, as one can hardly suppose that none of our authors would have mentioned it in that case.
[6] For an isolated expression of doubt see Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 38 (101), 'Orpheum postem docet Aristoteles nonquam falsus,' which from the context is almost certainly a denial of Orpheus' existence. But Aristotle may merely have meant to deny his authorship of the 'Orphic' poems.
[7] A contemporary with Orpheus, as says, according to most versions of their story—girt. Thesp. pyth. iv. 176, and Apollodorus.
[9] Boreas is perhaps the nearest Greek equivalent of the 'nec' or 'prowession,' and greatly resembles the 'toe' of the Beowulf (420). It signifies a form of life depending on certain religious or philosophical principles and is applied especially to the Orphic or Pythagorean bodies.
[10] I.e., not a writer on the theological basis of religion in general, or of any particular religious philosophy in particular, but one who is influenced by the nature, relationships, etc., of deities. In this sense Hesiod, e.g., is a 'theologian' (θεολόγος).
torn in pieces by a band of women, possessed by real or pretended Dionysiac frenzy.1

From this is said to Hades that all this may have some historic foundation—i.e., that the legends regarding him go back to some real happenings in connexion with the ritual of Dionysos. The whole of this descent into Hades, and presumably also his resurrection in a new incarnation, may have taken place, not once but many times.2 But tradition claims that all these forgotten personalities into one picturesque figure, the founder and Messiah of a religion of mystical other-worldliness.

The chief tenets, so far as we can reconstruct them, are as follows:4 At the end of a long succession of deities4 comes Dionysos-Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone.5 This god, while an infant, was beguiled by the Titans, who gave him a mirror and other toys and then tore him in pieces and devoured him, all but his heart, which was saved by Athené. The god was re-created by his father, who swallowed the heart and re-took the child; the Titans were destroyed by the thunderbolt, and from their ashes sprang man. Man is therefore a creature of mixed origin, containing a divine principle (Dionysos) and an evil one (the Titans). The main object of his existence is to grow up, and later to be educated so as to be completed in one lifetime. To further it, however, it is necessary to live in strict ritual purity, avoiding the use of meat, wearing white garments, shouting out words of prayer and songs, and observing the condition of women in child-birth,6 and practising chastity;7 all these being observances well known in ancient ritual and not peculiar to Orphism. In addition, it seems that the whole life is to be lived in a high degree of asceticism, and this is embodied in a more or less definite ethical code.8 Side by side with all this went, as might be expected, a popular form, in which a sort of begging friar dragged a throng of loyals in the world, so to call them, ‘persuading not only individuals but cities, says Plato,9 ‘that their sins can be purged with sacrifices and pleasant merry-making;’ i.e., performing quasi-magical rites, effective as opere operato, quite independently of the moral condition of the person concerned, at prices proportioned to the wealth or superstition of their clients.

To the higher forms of Orphism. After a life spent in moral and ceremonial purity the soul of the Orphic believer was rewarded in Hades, apparently for 1000 years,10 or ten times the supposed maximum length of a human life, while those who had sinned, but not beyond remedy, were punished for the same period. After this came reincarnation, not necessarily in human form. The mode of these was apparently as the koinés, or cycle of reincarnations.11 Release from this could be obtained by a series of good lives on both sides of the grave—all the good acts which mankind has done were apparently the process being known apparently as the koinés, or cycle of reincarnations.12 Release from this could be

This theology, and much besides, was embodied in a large literature, attributed either to Orpheus himself or to his pupil Mousaios,13 the oldest parts of which probably date from the 6th cent. B.C., while the latest representatives, the Hymns and Orphic Apotelesma, are about 1000 years later.14 Of this the greater part has perished, and especially the earliest and most valuable part; and we have of undoubted and fairly early Orphic origin only one set of disputations, the so-called Petelia Tablets, gold plates found in Orphic graves in S. Italy. It appears from these that a pious Orphic was in the habit of burying his child, directing friends to take the body to him in Hades, to aid him to secure final bliss, since no doubt it was charitable to suppose that the life just completed was the last of the series of good lives required to qualify for escape from the underworld. The tablets present the following picture of Hades. The soul, apparently after long and thirsty wanderings, travels along a road flanked on either side by springs. Avoiding the left-hand spring,6 it addresses the guardians of the right-hand one, declares itself to be holy, and begs for a drink to assuage the cold water which forthw forth from the lake of Memory.15 The request is granted, and the soul is hailed as having 'endured that which aforetime it had never endured.' It addresses Persephone and the other deities of the underworld and is admitted into their society.

The poem to which all these tablets go back is of unknown authorship and date, but it is evident that it or something like it stands behind the passages of Pindar and Plato already cited and also behind much that is to be found in other authors, mostly late. The connecting link is to be found in Pythagoreanism, which, it would seem, found Orphism already established in S. Italy, and incorporated much of its teaching. The whole is on a confusion between the two systems so complete that it is practically hopeless, with our imperfect documents, to say definitely with regard to any eschatological passage that it is purely Orphic or purely Pythagorean. Through the Pythagorean exiles who reached Greece proper after the dispersal of their communities in Magna Graecia the higher forms of the doctrine became known to Plato, in whom consequently we find side by side strong Orphic-Pythagorean influence and hearty contempt for Orphic charlatanism. Not dissimilar is the attitude of Aristophanes, who, on the one hand, makes comfortable words such as 'stornes' meaning ‘atonement for her (Persephone's) ancient grief’5 at the murder of S. of the name Zagreus.

1 The word is found in the Petelia Tablets and elsewhere in Orphic literature. This account of Orphic eschatology is put together largely from Pind. Od. ii. and frag. 80-110. In the latter we take the word snares, as meaning ‘atoning for her (Persephone's) ancient grief’5 at the murder of S. of the name Zagreus.

2 From the myth of Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone, the source of Orphic thought is doubtful.

3 The tablets have Πλωτος μὲν ἐφ' ἀκολούθησιν δημιουργον ἐκ τῆς ἄμμος ἀναγείρειν, ὡς ἐκ φυκών ἅτρα. The confusion is natural enough in a religion which has much to say of the deceased (spares) and also claims divine ancestry for all men. Ordinarily, a Greek sharply differentiated between the dead, who did not die at all, and a hero, who had been an ordinary man but continued to live in some way after bodily death.

4 Petelia Tablet, frag. 303 C, 304 E, and commentators.

5 Onomakritos ed. and interpolates Musaios in the time of Hippiarchos, son of the same, in Orph. frag. 80-110. Orphic writings falsely called pre-Homerico, Herod. ii. 81. 9 Text and tr. by G. Murray in J. E. Harrison, Prooem., appendix.

6 Probably Latin, of which a soul drinks before reincarnation. The finally purified soul has no need to forget.
hand, parodies private mysteries of the Orphic type, and in the Clouds and, on the other hand, draws in the Frogs on the same type of ideas for his half-serious picture of the other world.

Another problem which we cannot solve with any great exactness is the amount of non-Thracian thought which goes to the making of Orphism as we know it. The very name of the founder is in doubt, for, while to some it appears a Thracian name, others point to the occurrence of Greek connotations which may also be Greek. As to the doctrines, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Thracians produced so elaborate and quasi-philosophical a system of reintegration; this is rather the result of later Greek reflection. Also, the Thracians, though the details of it are not definitely non-Hellenic.

Exact what form the Orphic religion took, in its externals and how long it remained a potent force, cannot be very precisely determined, still less can we say to what extent its asceticism and its mendicant life were seriously affected by it. With regard to the first point, however, it would appear that Orphism had but little organization. There was, and could be, no Orphic State any more than there is today. There was, and could be, no doubt a considerable number of Orphic congregations (θιασοί), there was no central authority to connect them, nor were there any right to suppose that they were connected with each other in doctrine and practice. It was as if there existed a form of Freemasonry in which each lodge was a law unto itself, and there was no definite common ritual and no recognized means of communication between the lodges. It was a particular or Orphic documents were still being written in the 4th cent.

A.D., but, like other productions of that epoch, they show unmistakable traces of syncretism, and of Orphism we have little or nothing outside of literature. Therefore, on the whole, we are disposed to attach less importance than Dieterich does to the undeniable coincidences between Orphic imagery, e.g., of certain Greek and Christian writings; we would look for the source of that imagery, and the many common points of ritual and belief in Christian and non-Christian cults, to the numerous Hellenized Oriental faiths rather than to Orphic proper, holding that the language which once was chiefly, if not peculiarly, Orphic had become common property, while Orphism itself had become very much an Orphic, this we cannot be considered as settled beyond reasonable doubt.

1 See Schaebe, Hist. Lit. 2 or 3, Orphi, given as a Laconian name in Ser. de Verq, loc. cit. viii. 2 in the Bataevian name 2 Orpho-vantis. See also the wild story of the foundation of Orphicism in its wording, 5. 4. 4. 12. 14/2. Finally appearing as the Christian Orphtismion; cf. the 'water of life' of the NT.

We may now consider briefly the moral value of the Dionysic and Orphic. The former is immoral in the obvious sense is not likely. It is true that Livy, e.g., makes out Dionysiac orgies to have been horrible riots of lust and violence, but he is speaking of a late form of the Dionysiac cult far from its native place, and has all the Roman prejudice against any secret conventicle—the same prejudice which later gave rise to the same tales about the early meetings of the Christians. But in a broader sense we may say that all Dionysiacs were immoral, for they were true to Hellenism, replacing its clear envisagement of the facts of life with a misty other-worldliness, sure to lead to intellectual decay, however the first florishing of its mysticism might be in such a mind as that of Plato. Not till the notion of the ancient world did such doctrines really become prevalent, and the overthrow of the Pythagorean communities, primarily political, may be thought of as also an unconscious revolt against a force tragi-cular to Greek civilization.

(6) Artemis.—Here we need have no doubt that Herodotos is not to be taken too literally. All we have any reason to believe—since of a Thracian origin of the cult of Artemis properly so called we have not the faintest evidence that so monstrous a nature-goddess was worshipped in that country.

We can give at least two names of such deities. Kotyo, or Kotys, though generally spoken of as Pyrgian, was also there was to some extent naturalized in Greece in fairly early times, was Bendis, whose cult is mentioned together with that of Kotyo by Strabo. Of the details of her worship, we hear chiefly that it was noisy. Probably the long delay before the torch-race mentioned by Plato fits well enough with any deity equated with the torch-bearing Artemis, but is by no means peculiar to her; and of the native worship of her we hear chiefly that it was noisy. Probably not a score of such female personifications of the fertility of nature, worshipped with orgiastic rites not unlike those of Dionysos himself, possibly in connexion with him (which is more likely, from the few facts mentioned in the next paragraph), we suggest that he means Hermes Chthonios and identifies with him one of the deities after the pattern of Zalmoxis.

(f) Hermes.—With regard to Herodotos' statement that the Thracian kings especially venerate Hermes, we are not aware that any very convincing explanation is offered, but, in view of the facts mentioned in the next paragraph, we suggest that he means Hermes Chthonios and identifies with him one of the deities after the pattern of Zalmoxis.

(g) Zalmoxis. —Our chief authority for this deity is again Herodotos, who informs us that the
Getai worshipped him, and so exclusively that they regarded no one else as a true god, even the heathen deities, whom they themselves created or named. They never in part in the rationalistic story told of him, that he was a slave of Pythagoras, who, returning home, taught a variant of his master's philosophy, and lived on the preceding relatives until the immortality of the faithful. To prove this, he disappeared for a time, hiding in an underground room; after three years he returned, and so made every one believe that he had been in Hades and was come again. It is noteworthy that the same story is told of Pythagoras himself; and it smacks strongly of the tales, Greek and other, of supernatural persons who live in caves or under mountains and thence return occasionally or in some way intervene in human affairs. With this story we must join the decided suspicion of Herodotus himself; that Zalmoxis is a local deity, not a mortal at all, and the statement of Strabo that he was worshipped in an ἄγνωστος χώρον in Mt. Kogalmenon. He is clearly, like Dionysos himself, a god belonging to the under world, but not excluded from the surface of the earth, on which we may perhaps suppose the myth, he was thought to appear every year, as Dionysos from dead men. As he received a curious sacrifice, if sacrifice is the proper term to apply to what seems to have been rather a sort of fantastic messenger service. Once every four years the Getai chose a man by lot, whom they tossed in the air and caught on spear-points. If he died, he was deemed to have become immortal; if not, the god had rejected him, and he was disgraced. Before the tossers, he was chosen as the only ones of the people to the deity—a curious form of the idea, found among many races, that the dying can take to the dead the mandates of the living.

(6) Religious practices. Besides the cult of deified gods, we have a few facts relative to the general religious attitude of the Thracians. In particular, we have Herodotus' description of the funeral ceremony, which sounds oddly like Homer's account of the funeral of Patroclus. The corpse, if of an important man, lies in state three days, during which mourning and sacrificial feasts go on. Towards the close of this period there comes the actual funeral, when the body is buried or burned, a mound raised, and games of various kinds, the principal one being a single combat, are celebrated. This was the custom of the Thracians, and it indicates at any rate high honour paid to the dead. The duel especially as με κακός means 'their god', which would involve a contradiction in terms: 'They threaten the god they believe in because they don't believe in him.' The correct translation is one of course, 'Heaven' or 'Zeus': cf. lxxv. 11.: ταναγρόοι [Strabo, ii. 4. 2], and many other passages in which δεκα means 'sky' or 'heavenly bodies.'

1 Herrnippus, ap. Dug. Laert. viii. 41. This story is perhaps imitated from the one in Herodotus, which probably is an invention of the Greeks of the Pontus.
2 Examples in Boehe, i. 112 ff.
3 lxxv. 50.
4 vii. 288.
5 His festivals were regularly triestic, i.e. in alternate years, by Greek influence. Did this originates in a custom of shifting the cultivation every other year, vouch for by Horace, Od. iii. 24, 'nec cultura placet longior annis,' as occurring among the Getai? Among a people backward in agriculture the practice may well have varied, the period of cultivation lasting for one, two, or three years in different districts according to the richness of the soil. The author owes this suggestion to Farnell.
6 Cf. v. 5.
7 The word rathrionpous (this becomes their stock epithet): v. 5.
8 v. 8.
9 The idea is particularly common in modern Greek ballads.
10 The exact idea given to these facts depends upon the interpretation of ἀγαπε in general. The present writer holds that they do not originate in funeral ceremonies, or other religious solemnities, though they are often associated with both. The duel, however, is, like the Homeric gladiatorial shows, definitely a sacrificial rite in this case.

may reasonably be thought to be a form of blood-sacrifice. This, in some forms of the worship of the Etruscan tribes, was practiced; beyond Krestone, we are told, lived a race which practised sati; the favourite wife, chosen, it would seem, after careful examination of the claims of the whole hātis of the next-of-kin at the tomb and then buried with her husband. The Tauroi made a death a subject of rejoicing, and mourned at a birth. We see, then, that the whole of Thracian religion was permeated by the idea of the vast importance of the future life.

(6) Summary. General characteristics of Thracian religion. We find in Thrace a religion of a barbarous kind, but by no means incapable of development into something higher and more spiritual. The chief marks of barbarism, besides the revolting character of some of the rites, were (a) the largely magical character of much of the ceremonial, unconnected with anything either ethical or spiritual, and tending rather to excite than to elevate the feelings, and (b) the general absence of all traces of the idea of the after-life. Gods such as Zalmoxis live underground, occasionally intervening for the bodily good of their worshippers and rewarding the faith of the faithful. As it is in the case, the ordinary practice was that one gathers from the rationalizing story of Zalmoxis already quoted, in which he is represented as fasting the Thracians, and the taunt of Plato that the inferior sort of Orphics comes forth into external drunkenness the highest possible felicity. This is not to say that Thracian religion was always of a sensual character. It is noteworthy that the northern races, or most of them, had a reputation not only for courage but also for virtue and even for superhuman powers.

Thus the Getai are the bravest and most righteous of the Thracians; the holy Hyperboreans live somewhere near the Thracian region; and in and near the neighbouring Scythian country are the sacred and ascetic Apligplai, the seat of the Nézios, and the Nézios, who are all magicians, besides the Apligplai, who are of Amazonian stock; and the glorious shade of Achilles haunts various localities of the Scythian region. A great part at least of this persistent attribution of sainthood or magical distinction to the northern districts may well have for its justification the natural complement of the strong sexuality of those races—asceticism, which, as we have already seen, was a strong feature of Orphism. Another reason no doubt is simply the fact that many of these peoples were distant and unknown. Yet another is, quite likely, the existence, not of whole nations, but of castes, which were priestly. We have already seen how the Thracian priest, certain, and other tribes probably, had divine kings, and this often enough, as in Egypt, means the domination of a sacerdotal clan or caste.

To sum up, therefore, Thrace had, so far as we can learn from the observations of its nearest neighbors in classical times, a religion predominantly chthonian, other-worldly, orgiastic, gloomy, often cruel and barbaric, but not un-spiritual—a sharp contrast with the materialism of the characteristic Greek cult of the Olympic deities.

TIBET.—The Tibetans are entitled to be regarded as one of the most 'religious' peoples in the world. They regard all living things as divine— not only the belief in spiritual beings, but also the binding influence of that belief, as formulated by their Church, for the better regulation of their worldly actions in everyday life, and for procuring for them by pious observance of the inculcated maxims the satisfying hope of a higher position in the life after death. Not only is the proportion of the population in Tibet which devotes its life to religion greater than that in any other country, being at least about one to eight of the population—monks, nuns, non-celibate priests, and neopagists—but the life of the laity is also dominated and pervaded by their religion to an exceptional extent.

1. Climatic environments.—The peculiarities in the climate and physical character of Tibet, and in its development, between the two great civilizations on either side, the Indian and the Chinese, from both of which it has derived the elements of its composite form of Buddhism, explain to a considerable extent the peculiarities of its religion. The vast semi-arid solitudes with the rigorous nature of the climate have impressed themselves visibly on the religion of the country. And Nature has contributed, by the massive physical barriers she has erected against access to that land, to maintain to the present day the isolation of that country from the rest of the world, and thus to preserve the more ancient and archaic forms of religion and superstitions. Perched on the summit of the great plateau of Central Asia, and stretching across over twenty degrees of longitude, in the palearctic region, from the Himalayas to the Kun-lun mountains and Western China, it includes the loftiest tableland on the surface of the earth. Although generally called a plateau, it is in fact covered with innumerable hills and mountains, cut up by ravines, the stretches of level land being relatively few and far apart. The general elevation of the permanently inhabited tract seldom falls below 11,000 feet above sea-level, while a very great extent of the country exceeds 18,000 feet, which is about the limit there of perpetual snow. Its highest border lies along the Himalayas, rising in mountains, the Himalayas in the north, the Kun-lun in the south, from which its surface slopes gradually eastwards into China—a feature explained by the fact that in not very remote geological times the land of Tibet formed part of the bottom of the Tethys Sea of the Pacific; and the writer has picked up fossil shells on the Tibetan side of the Himalayas which were of the same species as those he obtained from similar strata.

2. Popular religion.—Living in such a rigorous climate and isolated amidst such severe surroundings, the Tibetan builds his daily fears and hopes on his religion, and, despite its ineradicable devil-worship, it is not without its elevating and inspiring influence. The current of Buddhism which runs through its tangled paganism has brought to the Tibetan most of the little civilization which he possesses, and has raised him correspondingly in the scale of humanity, lifting him above a life of semi-barbarism by setting before him higher hopes and aims, by giving milder meanings to his demonist mythology, by discommodating sacrifice of animal lives, and by inculcating universal charity and tenderness to all living things. Their Buddhism, unlike that of the Burmese, is not, however, an educational factor in secular teaching or in the mysteries of their religion; for the Lamas, while living on the laity by their ministrations as priests, restrict their learning to themselves, like the Brahmins and most priests in the world, and they contemptuously call the laity 'the dark (ignorant) people' (mi-naag-pa) and 'the worldly ones' (hijig-retan-pa), though they condescendingly formations on the outskirts of Peking. This also explains why the Mongolic racial elements and the Chinese forms of civilization predominate in Tibet, and why China has maintained for so long its suzerainty there.

Geographically, it is usual to divide Tibet latitudinally into North (Chang-su and Szechuan), the North-land comprising all the Northern and Central and much of Western Tibet, and the South comprising South and South-Eastern Tibet. This division is also generally followed by the Tibetans themselves, though they erect Central and South-Western Tibet (U-Tsang), with their twin centres of Lhasa and Tsashihunpo, into a separate, and for them, their country, which they call Bod (pronounced Po-t). The former division they call s-To'i-Bod (pronounced Ti-Po't), or 'Upper Bod,' which is the origin of our modern name 'Tibet,' derived from the phonetic spelling of medi eval European travellers to whom only this northern division was accessible, and latterly applied by Europeans to the whole of Bod, though wrongly so. This is also the source of the Chinese name for the country of Ts'u-Fan, or 'the land of the Tu-barbarians of the West.'

The northern division, or Chang, through its extreme altitude, has a terrible climate and is uninhabited for the greater part of the year, being mostly used as summer-grazing grounds by nomad shepherds and traversed by miners and caravans of merchants at that season. It consists of a series of parallel mountain-ranges running east and west, with muddy valleys intervening. In these depressions lie a great number of lake-basins, many of which have no outlet, and when dry their water is salt, and some of their shores are white with borax crystals. It is an altogether treeless region, interspersed with grassy tracts used for summer pasturage. On the other hand, Central and more especially South-Eastern Tibet, which are of considerably lower elevation, are traversed by the Brahmaputra, and upper reaches of the Irrawady, Mekong, and Yangtze, and many mountains and rivers and their tributaries are for a considerable part wooded, enjoy a less rigorous climate, and are the seat of most of the settled population. But the total population of the whole country is probably not more than 3,500,000—i.e., a little less than the entire population of Scotland. Snow falls more or less, even at Lhasa, in every month of the year.

1 This is the estimate of W. W. Rockhill (Land of the Lamas, p. 250), and it generally agrees with that of the present writer.
TIBET

also call them 'the givers of alms' (stgmin-phas), at the time of the passing of the headmen and leading Lamas with whom they came into intimate contact. The spirit of consideration for others expresses itself in many grateful acts of genuine politeness and kindness. Tibetans usually present a stirrup-cup of wine to the departing visitor or traveller, bidding him God-speed and adding, 'May we be able to present you with another as welcome on your return.' The seller of an article other than eatables usually gives his blessing to the buyer in terms such as these: 'May good come upon you,' 'May you live long,' 'May no sickness happen,' 'May you grow rich,' to which the buyer replies with 'Thanks'—Thag-ri-chu rna thig-’bras rgya-ma, 'the thunder-bolt of long life,' Dolma (spelt sgrol-ma, the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit name Tārā, the Indian goddess of mercy); and the practice of this religious habit is also seen in the names of various places.

The common oaths or plights of asseveration are mainly Buddhist in character. The oath most commonly used is, 'By the powerful Saint' (sksamnyi, i.e. Buddha), or 'By the three Holiest Ones'—the Buddhist Trinity.

The non-Buddhist Tibetans, however, are also conscious, and reflect their pre-Buddhist cult, the shamanistic Bon. The physical environment of their life, in their rigorous cold, greatly impress the people; a few of the better-known Jātakas in manuscript copy or in block-printed booklets form, with the manuals of ritual and divination, the chief books of those Tibetan laity who are able to read; and they also form the subject of the chief dramas enacted by the laity.

This widespread belief in metempsychosis also influences the people in the treatment of their cattle and other dumb animals. They treat these exceptionally humanely, and life is seldom wantonly taken. The taking of animal life unnecessary, even for food, is largely prohibited, and, although in such cases animal food is an essential staple of diet, the professional butchers are stigmatized as sinners and are the most despised of all classes in the country. Yet human prisoners are at times cruelly tortured, mutilated, and, possibly in some measure after the example set by the Chinese, and possibly in some measure as a deterrent from crime among a rather lawless people. But nearly every crime, even the most heinous, the murdering of a Lāma, may be condoned by a fixed scale of fines; and, when the fine is not forthcoming, the punishment is inflicted, and the prisoner, if not actually killed, is set free, mutilated or maimed (as there are no prisons), to serve as a public warning to other evil-doers. Many of the maimed and blind beggars who swarm around Lhāsas are said to have lived so long that they were intelligent and gentle. 1 2

1 See below, p. 3; 2 Treas of Tibet, Tibet, and China, p. 185.

Similarly Rockhill and others have described many of the laity of the headmen and leading Lamas with whom they came into intimate contact. The spirit of consideration for others expresses itself in many grateful acts of genuine politeness and kindness. Tibetans usually present a stirrup-cup of wine to the departing visitor or traveller, bidding him God-speed and adding, 'May we be able to present you with another as welcome on your return.' The seller of an article other than eatables usually gives his blessing to the buyer in terms such as these: 'May good come upon you,' 'May you live long,' 'May no sickness happen,' 'May you grow rich,' to which the buyer replies with 'Thanks'—Thag-ri-chu rna thig-’bras rgya-ma, 'the thunder-bolt of long life,' Dolma (spelt sgrol-ma, the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit name Tārā, the Indian goddess of mercy); and the practice of this religious habit is also seen in the names of various places.

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1 See below, p. 3; 2 Treas of Tibet, Tibet, and China, p. 185.
tuits of wool and tiny flags; and they are induced in devil-dancing antics and incoherent chants.

In Eastern Tibet, however, where they are free to practise their cult, the Bon priests live in large flourishing monasteries, which they call gun-paz, like the Lamaist establishments; and they have many images of gods and saints and demons generally resembling in appearance those of Lamaism, but bearing different names. Their chief god they call gshen-ra-ge Mi-bo, who is reputed to be a deified priest analogous to the Lamaist Padma Sambhava. They have bulky printed and MS books of ritual, which Rockhill found to consist of a Samantabhadra jay-hra for the most part interspersed with other meaningless words. The present writer observed that the words in some of their MSS, which are written in the Tibetan script, were the Lamasite Sanskrit words spelt backwards: the lotus-jewel formula of the Lamas 1 was spelt 'Muh-em-pid-mi,' thus, while attesting their borrowing from Lamaism, emphasizing their anti-Lamaist character. The samantabhadra on which they use extensively, is invariably figured with its ends or 'feet' turned in the reverse direction to that of the samantabhadra proper (the feet of the latter turn to the right in the direction of the sun's course), and thus indicate the Bon cult to be of a lunar character, which is evident not only from the bloody sacrifices, but also from the predominance of the dragon-worship therein.

A significant glimpse into the original character of the Bon cult is obtained from the Chinese annals of the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. (i.e. before the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet), where the rites of the Tibetans are described:

*The officers (Tibetan) are assembled once every year for the lesser oath of fealty. They sacrifice sheep, dogs, and monkeys, first breaking their legs, and then killing them afterwards, exposing the intestines and cutting them into pieces. The officers having been warmed in wine, the priests make sacrifices of heaven and earth, of the mountains and rivers, of the sun, moon, stars and planets, saying: "Should your hearts be unchangeable, and your thoughts dissolvent, the gods will see clearly and make you like these sheep and dogs." Every three years there is a grand ceremony, during which all are assembled in the middle of the night on a raised altar, on which are spread savoury meats. The victims sacrificed are men, horses, oxen, and asses, and prayers are offered up in this form: "Do you with all one heart and united strength cherish our native country. The god of heaven and the spirit of the earth will both know on what day you call on them; and if you break this oath, they will cause your bodies to be cast into pieces like unto these victims."

Even in the Buddhist period, in the 8th century A.D., similar bloody rites were celebrated by the professing Buddhist king of Tibet in concluding a treaty with the Chinese.

The attire of the Bon priest in his special celebrations 2 is a coat of musl garment, from the shoulders of which project small flags, and a high-crowned hat bordered by effigies of human skulls and ornamented by flags and tufts of wool; a sword and shield are in the hands to fight the demons. (The black-hatted devil-dancers are of the Bon sect.) On ordinary occasions they wear a red robe, and occasionally have human skulls embroidered on their dress. Their hair is worn shaggy, and not tamed like the Lamas. They offer on their altars wool and yak hair, and images of men and animals made of dough, presumably as shown by the present writer to the head of the sacrificed animal of the primitive cult.

Whilst the present-day Bon religion has acquired many of the externals of Lamaism, many of the elements of the old Bon religion have been incorporated into the latter, just as so many of the pagan rites of Roman and Celtic heathendom have...
been incorporated into the later Christianity. The reformed Lāmaist Church of the Yellow-hat sect employ many rites which are transparently Bon, such as the necromantic expelling of the death-deity and the demon from the body, and with much of their divination-ritual. The unrefined Red-hat sects practise the old Bon rites to a much greater extent, including the erection of masts attached to dogs’ and sheep’s skulls, to ‘bar the door’ to the earth- and sky-deities.

4. Lāmaism and its sects and rites.—The various aspects of Lāmaism and its sects and rites have already been described in previous articles.


TIME.—1. Introductory. Temporal characteristics are among the most fundamental in the objects of our experience, and therefore cannot be defined. We must admit that we can in certain cases judge that one experienced event is later than another, in the same immediate way as we can judge that one seen object is to the right of another. A great deal of the immediate judgment in question is when we hear a tune and judge that of two notes, both of which come in our present conscious experience, one precedes the other. Another direct judgment, less arbitrary and later is made in geminate memory. On these relations of before and after which we immediately recognize in certain objects of our experience all further knowledge of time is built.

It must be noticed that the relation, as given in experience, connects what we may call protensive events, i.e. events that have some duration, and not necessarily in memory, in a series of events from which we are not directly aware of events without duration, still less of moments of empty time, and therefore are not directly aware of the relations between such objects. The memory of time, the memory of events and the relations which order them in a series are all known only after a long process of reflexion, abstraction, and intellectual construction. This does not imply that these objects do not exist in nature, still less that they are subjective and arbitrary; all that is meant at present is that they are not the objects of direct awareness. Again we must recognize that the information of before, after, and simultaneous with, as given in experience, are mutually exclusive. Protensive events may very well overlap, and therefore we must recognize that the most general relation between them is that of partial precedence. Of course, when we become familiar with the conception of momentary events and see how convenient it is, we tend to define partial precedence in terms of them and regard them as geometrical points. But the opposite direction must be followed if we want to start with the experienced facts and trace the logical development from them of the scientist of time. We must take the experienced relation of partial precedence as fundamental and define momentary events, moments, and the relation of total precedence in terms of partial precedence and events of finite duration.

That such a course is possible is shown by the fact that it has recently been followed to a satisfactory conclusion by Norbert Wiener in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, and by A. N. Whitehead in his Principles of Mathematics. We may compare the duration of experienced events with the extension of visible and tangible objects, and the relation of partial precedence with the partial overlap. Some of the extended objects in the field of vision. The problem of defining momentary events, moments, and the serial relation of before and after in terms of protractive events is closely comparable to that of defining material points, geometric points, and the relations of before and after on a straight line in terms of extended objects and their partial overlap. The problem for time is, however, easier than that for space, for in the former we have only to deal with a relation that generates a one-dimensional series, whilst with the latter experience tells us how to define a three-dimensional manifold.

2. Time and space.—The analogy between time and space has long been recognized; and it will be useful to consider at this point just how far it goes and where it is supposed to break down. We may consider the likenesses and the alleged differences:

(a) Likenesses. (1) Most objects of immediate experience possess a kind of magnitude called extensity, and such objects have immediately recognizable relations to other objects of the same sense experience along with themselves. Also the parts of any one such object have relations of this kind to the parts of other objects of our experience another kind of magnitude called duration or, in special cases, total precedence, and this relation cannot be recognized immediately. Likewise the parts of a single specious present can be seen to have this relation to each other.

(2) The relations in each case have magnitude. Just as one object in the field of view can be more to the right of another than a third, so one event in the field of experience can be prior to another, and the duration of one event can exceed the duration of another, and the specious present can precede another event by a longer interval than some third one.

(3) In each region there is the same close and peculiar connexion between the kind of magnitude possessed by the terms and the kind of number possessed by the relations. It is possible to say that the interval between two events $A$ and $B$ is as long as the interval between two events $C$ and $D$ just as it is possible to say that the distance between two sticks laid in the same straight line is the same as the length of some third stick.

(4) It is commonly believed that, when the analysis is made into moments and momentary events, all the events in the history of the world fall into their places in a single series of moments. So too it is supposed that, when the analysis is made into momentary events and geometrical points, all the events in the world take their places in a single three-dimensional series of geometrical points.

(b) Alleged differences. (1) It is commonly held that events have temporal relations to other events, but that physical events have no spatial relations. This is denied by a small number of philosophers, notably by Samuel Alexander.

1. We shall consider later what the Theory of Relativity has to say as to the impossibility of separating time and space and as to the notion of a single time-series.
Without questioning the possibility of correlating psychical events with positions in space, we must hold that this alleged difference is a genuine one. If in introspection we do contemplate our states of mind in the same sense as in perception we contemplate other objects, it seems clear that our states of mind show no trace of being extended or standing in spatial relations, but do have duration and relation in space and time. Alexander would, however, deny that we can contemplate our states of mind. If this be so, it would of course be quite possible that we should fail to become aware of the spatial character of our mental states, even though they possess them; but of course we have no right to pass from this merely negative position to the conclusion that they actually do possess them. Alexander's positive reasons are bound up with a large and complex metaphysical theory into which we cannot here enter. In any case the present difference is merely an external one, and would not affect the essential similarity of space and time.

(2) A much more important point is that time is said essentially to involve the distinction between past, present, and future as well as that between here and there and hereafter. If we are to postpone to a future time the achievement of a present object, this is very natural to do. It is said that the past, present, and future are not one, which is necessarily between before and after, lies wholly in the experienced object, and one that rests on the relations between experienced objects and the states of mind in which they are experienced. To begin with, the distinction between past and present remains but may be used equally with that between here and elsewhere in space. Here means near my body; elsewhere means distant from my body. If we want an analogy to the distinction between past and future, we can imagine a distinction between things before and things behind our body. It is true, however, that this analogy is incomplete, and that for an important reason, though one extraneous to the nature of the distinction between states of mind. The reason is that our practical and cognitive relations towards the future are different from those towards the past. We know a part of the past at any rate directly by memory, but we know the future only indirectly by probable inference. There is no analogy to this in space: our knowledge of what is behind our body is of the same kind and of the same degree of certainty as our knowledge of what is in front of it. But we may imagine that a distinction like that between past and future would have arisen for space also, if we had been able to see straight in front of us but had never been able to turn our heads or our bodies round.

The distinction is sometimes drawn that the past is fixed and unalterable, while the future depends, in part at any rate, on our actions, in which case time is not time. But let us suppose that this is the case.

Without involving ourselves in controversies about free will and determinism, we may assume that this is a time in which the distinction between the past and future is not to be made.

Relating to the proposition that a past event is actually false may be much more likely to be true on our present information than that one is actually true. The fact that such a state of affairs does not exist in the categories of the corresponding events. But the existence of a desire for an object does not increase the probability that it actually exists; all that it does is to make it less probable that we shall contain the assertion that we can affect the future for not the past seems to come down to this: (a) that propositions about the future can be inferred to be fairly probably from hypotheses of the past and present, but not conversely, because of our lack of direct acquaintance with the past; and (b) that general laws connecting a desire for an object with the occurrence of an always contain as a consequent and never as an antecedent.

3. Relating to the reasoning about the relation of time to logic. The former brings us to the very important question of the relation of time to logic. If we say of any event that it is present, this proposition will generally be false, and will be true at an at least as a consequence as a result of the event. These are sometimes called eternal truths; they always state relations between universals, and all our prior knowledge is of such propositions. Lastly, there are propositions which essentially involve time, but claim to apply to any time; e.g., whenever I am out without my umbrella, I get wet. Thus, on the face of it, there are three kinds of propositions as regards relation to time: (1) eternal truths, which are independent of time because they deal with the timeless relations of timeless objects; (2) the set of propositions asserting temporal relations between classes of events—these contain an essential reference to time, but not to any particular time; (3) propositions which assert the occurrence of particular events, and which seem to be true at certain times and false at all others, though this is not really so.

There are two points to notice about the last class of propositions. (a) All propositions about events essentially contain a relation to time, and all propositions about particular events essentially contain a reference to the particular time at which the event happens. This reference is not always explicit; but, until this has been done, we cannot say that the verbal expression is a definition of the proposition. (b) We have to distinguish between the time at which a judgment is made and the time involved in the proposition that is judged. Where the latter is not made explicit in the verbal expression of the judgment, it is a convention of language that it is the time in the proposition is intended to that at which the judgment is asserted. Thus, if I say "it is raining," this verbal expression, since it clearly intends to refer to a particular future event, is incomplete and stands for no definite proposition; for it says nothing about the time at which it rains. It therefore seems to be sometimes true and sometimes false. But, as actually asserted, the words would be taken to express my judgment of the proposition. "It is raining at the time at which I say it is raining." And this proposition is timelessly true or false, subject to a further correction which we shall add in a moment. In fact, whenever we are told that a proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false, we mean that we are dealing with an incomplete statement about an event, and that the real state of affairs is that a proposition of the form "it happens at" gives true propositions for some values of t and false propositions for other values. But the proposition itself is a timeless proposition.

It is important to notice that in practice there is always the possibility of any verbal statement about events, no matter how carefully put, being sometimes true and sometimes false. We may be certain that only one unique event answers to any description however complicated, and often there is real ambiguity in practice. Tiko, e.g., the asserted expression is "it is raining." To any reader of this article the
expression remains ambiguous, because he knows the event that is used for dating only by the very ambiguous description. 'The writer's statement of the words "It is raining"'—a description which applies to dozens of different events—ence the difficulty is solved in conversation by the fact that all the manifold circumstances under which the particular conversation takes place go into the description and make it practically unambiguous. In writing, the difficulty is solved practically by using as the origin of dates some event, such as the birth of Christ, whose full description is so complicated that it is almost certain that only one event answers to it. But the theoretical difficulty remains, and so we are tempted to say that any proposition about events is sometimes true and sometimes false, and the proper thing to say is that any verbal expression referring to events, no matter how carefully put, always runs a theoretical risk of ambiguity—i.e., it might have equal propriety to mean what is true, and another of another proposition which is false.

We can now apply these general results to the special case of past, present, and future. The statement 'e is present' is essentially incomplete and ambiguous, for, as we loosely say, it is sometimes true and sometimes false. If we try to give it flesh, then, is to fill in the special time involved in the proposition. We then get 'e is present at t', where t is some definite moment fixed by some system of dating from a known past and future time, and which is our best way of stating that the event has been present and is now past. What this statement means? Assuming that there are such things as moments, it means that e is at the moment t in an analogous way to that in which an object is at a position in space. The statement 'e is present at t' may be compared with the statement 'Mr. Aquith is present at the meeting,' which means that his body is in the place where the meeting is held. In all complete statements of the kind one must understand the word 'is' as standing for a timeless copula, and distinguish it from the 'is' of the present tense, which is contrasted with 'was' and 'will be.' Let me denote the 'is' of the present tense by 'is now.' Then the statement 'e is now present' is an incomplete statement which is interpreted in use to mean 'e is at (or occupies) the same moment as we do, i.e., now.' Similarly, 'e is now past' means 'e is at a moment subsequent to the present moment.' The laws of logic are of course concerned with the timeless copula, and they presuppose that statements containing tenses are reduced in the way suggested.

4. Past, present, and future.—We see, then, that the real source of the distinction between past, present, and future, and of the difference here between time and space, is that our judgments as well as the events judged about are in time, whilst our judgments about things in space are not in any obvious sense in space. These three distinctions correspond to the three possible temporal relations between our judgments and the events which our judgments are about. These distinctions are important, and they have been enshrined in language because they are correlated with important epistemological and psychological differences. Some states of mind are essentially contemporary with their objects—e.g., the immediate awareness of visual or auditory data when open my eyes. Other states are essentially later than their objects—e.g., memories. If we exclude the possibility of prophecy, we may state the important epistemological proposition that all states of mind which give us an immediate experience of an object are contemporaneous with it, and that latter are contemporary with, or later than, their objects.

It is important to notice that these statements are not merely analytic. There is a psychological difference between memories and awareness of contemporary sense-data which is open to introspection (though, of course, there may be marginal cases where the difference fails below the threshold of distinguishability), so that the statement that the former succeed and the latter are contemporary with their objects is a synthetic proposition.

We must, moreover, take into account the facts described later on for the sake of completeness. In the first place, we must say that, if an object be known directly by a state of mind which succeeds it by more than a certain short time t, which seems to be fairly constant for everyone, then the object counts introspectively as a memory, and the object is judged to be past. If the interval between the object and the direct awareness of it be not greater than this constant, the object is judged to be present. To say, then, that an object has been present and is now past means that (a) it is (timelessly) true that it is past and not present, and (b) that my statement 'It is now past' succeeds it by more than t. We have still, however, to consider what is meant by the proper present tense. This seems to mean that, if a state of mind be the object of an act of introspection which succeeds it by less than a certain short period, the state presents a certain peculiar characteristic which it does not present to any later act of introspection. We can now deal with such statements as that only the present exists, or that the present is a mere transition from one infinite non-existent to another, that this phrase has its rhetorical point in confusions. It is perfectly true, of course, that the whole history of the world is not a complex of co-existing parts (in the sense of parts existing at the same time), but a table. Given this, it does not mean that it is not a whole, or that one part of it exists any less than any other part. To say that x no longer exists, or does not yet exist, simply means that it is at present different from its own past, and not that my statement about it. At another moment I may make another statement of the same verbal form about x, and, since this new proceeding to the same proposition that e is at a moment subsequent to the present moment. An event must continue to be, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must necessarily be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be is not merely means that they precede any assertion that I or my contemporaries can make about them; that both were once present merely means that both are contemporary with some assertions made about them.

Mind sensations would lead to misunderstandings, owing to the ambiguities of that word and the widely held belief that sensations do not have objects.
The fallacy which we have to avoid is that of confusing two different co-existences: in one sense the parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those events that occupy the same moment of time co-exist. It is clear that the whole continues to exist that does not exist in the second sense, and it is thought that this prevents it from co-existing in the first. Yet this is necessarily false, since it is admitted that events do have and continue to have temporal relations, and therefore they must form a related whole all of whose parts have being. The confusion is increased by the belief that past, present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time in the same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into the temporal relations of states of mind and their objects.

When it is once recognised that the whole course of events is in a certain sense a totus simul, it becomes easy to see the answer to the famous theological problem: How can God’s foreknowledge of men’s actions be compatible with the freedom of men’s wills? The answer is that whether men’s wills be free or not, every man’s future actions are, as completely determinate as his past ones; this is a mere consequence of the laws of logic. If determinism be held, then experience and the general laws of nature and the particular habits of a man, will enable us to infer with certainty the time when the action of which t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate. These two statements are clearly quite compatible. Finally, in spite of the fact that God cannot infer the future’s from the past, men’s volition is not necessarily at t. He may, without knowing about events previous to a moment t, and about the general laws of nature or the particular habits of a man, will enable us to infer with certainty the time when the action of which t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate.

5. Reality of time.—A great many philosophers have been concerned to deny the reality of time. Their arguments fall into two groups: (1) those that insist the immensity of time, and that events occupy some of them but are distinct from them, and have temporal relations to each other in virtue of those which subsist between the moments they occupy; or (2) that there are no such things as moments distinct from events, but that events really do have direct temporal relations to each other or (c) that there are no moments, and that even events only appear to have temporal relations to each other. It is clearly possible to deny (a) without denying (b). To do this can hardly be called denying the reality of time, but rather be called denying the absolute theory of time in favour of the relative theory. It is only philosophers who deny both (a) and (b) and support (c) who can strictly be said to believe in the reality of time.

It is quite possible, however, that some arguments might be equally fatal to (a) and (b).

It will be well at this point to say what we can about the controversy between absolutists and relativists. The absolute theory strictly means that temporal relations between events are regarded as compounded out of two relations—(l) that of an event to the moment of time which it occupies, and (2) the relation of before and after between moments of time. The relative theory holds that there are no moments, but that temporal relations hold directly between events. Its most important philosophical supporter is Leibniz, though he goes a good way farther in the direction of (a); he is also held, with a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion, by many modern physicists of a philosophical bent. We may say that the relative theory stands at one extreme, and the absolute theory at the other extreme; one we have in mind is that of immediate experience. Here we find, as we have seen, events of finite duration and relations of partial simultaneity.

The relative theory replaces these objects by series of momentary events of no duration, and the relations by those of total precedence and simultaneity. As we have seen, the farther step of introducing a new set of entities, viz., moments which have no duration and stand in relations of partial simultaneity but never of simultaneity, and a new relation, viz., that between a momentary event and the moment which it occupies.

Neither theory has been very acceptable to its supporters: e.g., Newton, the chief upholder of the absolute theory, was mainly concerned with the relation of the time and the desire for a constant time-measure. But the two theories, when thought out, may be reduced to what is stated above. We may say at once that we know of no way of deciding conclusively between the two. But, although momentary and momentary states may exist, we now know that all their objects with incompatible characteristics. Hence there is no obvious reason why temporal characteristics should not also apply to the immediate object of any state of mind. It follows, then, that criticism cannot reasonably be directed against temporal characteristics as such, but only against the description that we give of them in the characteristics of experienced objects, and the conclusions that we draw from them or the constructions that we base on them. And arguments that refer to the infinity of time are really directed against a construction based on what we conceive to be the essential characteristics of the time element which is undoubtedly present in the objects that we expe moment that they directly aware of infinite duration or of the continuity—in the mathematical sense, of time. If we suppose that such criticisms are successful, the conclusion that there is no such characteristic, and that therefore a temporal characteristics (for it is quite certain that at least some of time), or, that time, as an inference or construction extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects to others, is unfair (for this goes much too far). The only justifiable conclusion would be that one particular way of describing and extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects is insufficiently, and that it behoves us to look for a better one. This point has not commonly been grasped by philosophers who claimed to disprove the reality of time.

(ii.) It is thus obviously of importance to be clear as to what is the particular view of time that is attacked by special arguments. The most important distinction for us to make is this: it is possible to hold (a) that there is a notion of moments of time, and that events occupy some of them but are distinct from them, and have temporal relations to each other in virtue of those which subsist between the moments they occupy; or (b) that there are no such things as moments distinct from events, but that events really do have direct temporal relations to each other or (c) that there are no moments, and that even events only appear to have temporal relations to each other. It is clearly possible to deny (a) without denying (b). To do this can hardly be called denying the reality of time or the belief in the reality of time. It is only philosophers who deny both (a) and (b) and support (c) who can strictly be said to believe in the reality of time.

1 The point can perhaps be made clearer by reflecting that a tune has a pattern in time in exactly the same sense as a wallpaper pattern has in space.

We can, of course, remember much that we could not infer.
work can be done by certain logical functions of nothing but
events of finite duration and their relations of partial
precedence. Hence both theories may be said to an
axiom, need not be a sequence and cannot be either
directly or indirectly verified (viz. momentary events in the
relation theory and momentous in the absolute theory), and
the absolute theory is the worse sinner of the two. As
certain logical function of what actually exists (viz. certain classes
of classes of events), momenta do exist; but whether there also
exists anything having the same logical relations but of the
theories, is an inconsistent class of classes is not
is totally impossible to determine. It is, however, often con-
venient to continue to speak in terms of moments, and this
is harmless for the reasons given above.

We can now deal with the special arguments against
time.

The first, based on its supposed infinity commonly
close infinity with endlessness. They generally
proceed on the assumption that what is meant by
the infinity of time is that it has neither a first
nor a last term. But this would be perfectly
compatible with the whole course of time lasting
for no more than a second. The fractions between
3 and 1, arranged in order of magnitude, have
moments last for a longer term, and yet the interval
between any two of them is less than unity. But
all efforts to prove that time or the series of
must have an end fail. So do attempts to prove that
they can! The more
celebrated argument on both sides of this question
is contained in Kant's first antimony. His
argument against the endlessness of time, inter-
preted superficially, amounts to this statement that,
because there are definite points in the time-series—in particular, the point which
we have reached when we read Kant's argument—
to say that the series must have a definite beginning
point. Otherwise, Kant says, the series of events
could have never reached the definite point which
it admittedly has reached. The argument is, of
course, a complete non-sequitur, for it practically
amounts to saying that a series cannot have any
definite term unless it has end points. And this
is sufficiently refuted by considering that the
number + 2 is perfectly definite, although the series
of numbers with signs neither has a first nor a last
term.

Arguments to prove that time or the series of
events in time cannot have a beginning are
perhaps more plausible. It is safe to imagine
psychologically to imagine a first event or a first
moment, because all the events that we can
remember have been preceded by others. Also
then the logical threat of causation in the notion of a first event, which do not
apply to a first moment or to a last event. A
first event is one which no event precedes, though
there may be a sequence. Now, to say that a change
happens at t means that, if the state of the univese
at any two moments t and t' at all moments
between them, it will be in the same state at all
moments between t and t'.

The universe here must be taken to include God, if there
other parts (e.g., in the mind of God). But, of
course, there remains the doubt whether our axiom
about causation be not a mere prejudice mas-
erquading as an a priori law.

It must be carefully noted that, if there be a
first event, there need not be a first moment of
time, and that, if there be a first moment of time,
there need not be a first event. Again, if there
be a first moment of time, and there be a
first event, either
there might be no moment, except the first, that
was not occupied by an event, or there might be a
duration unoccupied by events. These con-
sequences follow from the continuity of time,
and have often been evinced by philosophers
ignorant of the mathematical theory of continuity.

Leibniz based his main argument against the
absolute theory of time on the fact that, if it
falsal to have infinite or continuous series, and
finite, before any event happened. This period
must be definite; and yet, the moments of time
having no intrinsic difference, there is no reason
why it should be ended or limited by one moment
rather than another. If, on the other hand, we
avoid this by assuming that there is an event at
every moment of time, there is no reason for
assuming both that every moment and events, for the series
of events will suffice.

This argument is a sound one assuming that
there are moments, though it certainly cannot
disprove that there were moments, they would doubtless have intrinsic
differences, though we could not discover them;
we must further recognize some ultimate facts,
and one of these might be that every event is preceded by such and such a duration of
time.

We may sum up our conclusions as follows.
Arguments to disprove the reality of time from
its infinity are continued, series, and
therefore prove too much, for they would destroy
the series of real numbers. And we now know
that all such arguments do rest on confusions and
on an insufficient notion of time and continuity.
There is therefore no reason why the
series of moments at any rate should not be
either (a) endless or (b) of infinite length.
The second set of confused with causation
not to the supposed series of moments, because causation is concerned with events
and not with empty time. We saw that, if a
plausible axiom that preceded a first event.
This would not, however, prove
that the whole series of events has lasted for an
infinite time, that is, all previous events knew of
no objection to such a possibility. There is no
more objection to the series of events being end-
less than to any other series being endless—i.e.,
there is none at all. The result is that all danger
of a valid antimony against time vanishes. (1.)
Whether the axiom about change be true or not,
it is equally possible that the series of moments
shall be (a) endless or terminated, and (b) of finite
or of infinite length. (2.) If the axiom about
change be true, the series of events cannot
become a beginning, but may (a) have an end or not, and
(b) be of finite or of infinite length.

(2) Arguments against the reality of time which
turn on the distinction of past, present, and
future may be dealt with shortly. One argument
asserts that the past and the future do not exist,
and that the present is a mere point without
duration. It is then supposed that since no finite duration cannot be real, and this disas-
agreement of the present. An argument of this kind is used
by Leibniz against absolute time, though it would presumably apply to events just as well. It is met, of course, by the consideration that past, present, and future are all after equal reals, and that these characteristics do not belong to events as such, but in virtue of the temporal relations between them and certain psychical events.

A somewhat different argument against the reality of time has been produced by J. M. E. McTaggart.1 His argument is that every event is part of the past, present, and future; it is the attempt to avoid the incompatibility of these predicates by saying that the event has been future, is present, and will be past involves a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. The answer is that, whenever we consider any definite statement about the pastness, presentness, or futurity of an event, we can see that there is no contradiction. Take a definite statement by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is now past and has been present and future. Suppose we interpret this to mean that Queen Anne's death is not the direct object of any awareness (even a memory) which is contemporary with McTaggart's statement, but that it is contemporary with some states of mind (e.g., Lord Bolingbroke's) which precede McTaggart's statement; and that what is asserted is about it (e.g., William III's), which also precedes the statement. Then these three propositions seem to be timelessly true, perfectly compatible, and to contain what is meant in the assertion by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is past and has been present and future.

We may conclude, then, that no satisfactory proof has been offered even that absolute time is uniform in its structure and in their direct temporal relations are unreal.

6. Measurement of duration.—It seems to have been the question of a rate-measurer that led Newton to his theory of time. For his time may vary when the clock, that is, the pendulum, varies. Newton considers a number of periodic events which are roughly isochronous, and compares their rough isochronism with 'absolute time, which flows uniformly. It is an unfortunate way of introducing absolute time. In the first place, it is of no practical use to any one. Whether absolute time flows uniformly or not, we can only observe events and must use them, or processes based on them, as our rate-measurers. Again, the statement that absolute time flows uniformly is thoroughly obscure. Time cannot be said to flow, for this seems to imply that time changes; and this would make time consist of a series of events in time. Nor is it at all clear what Newton meant by uniformity in this connection. Presumably the meaning must be that the moments of time form a series like the real numbers. What we really want to know is whether we can find any periodic process such that the time that elapses between corresponding stages in each repetition is the same. But no essential reference to absolute time is involved here. We must beware of confusing the two statements: (1) there are definite intervals of a certain determinate duration, and this duration is independent of our method of measurement; and (2) there are absolute moments of time, and the interval between any two of these has a definite magnitude. The latter implies the former, but not the reverse. The real problem, therefore, is whether there is a definite interval time between pairs of events, how are we to measure it?

There is a special difficulty in measuring intervals of time between events when we are not measuring the distance between things. This difficulty is in the temporal analogue to superposition. We may carry a rod about with us in space, and we may have fairly good reasons to believe that it has not altered in length. The corresponding procedure in time-measurement is to find some process which is not altered at any moment and can be assumed to have the same period whenever it is repeated. Such processes may be called isochronous. But, even when an isochronous process has been secured, it cannot be used to measure time in the same direct way in which a rod can be used to measure length. A rod will not as a rule fit an exact number of times into what we want to measure; it is therefore divided into a number of equal parts. Similarly we want an isochronous process that can be divided into equal subdivisions which can be easily recognized; i.e., we want a process which is divisible into a number of similar processes which all occupy equal times.

Now, it is not nearly so easy to be sure that a process takes the same time whenever it is repeated as to be sure that a rod keeps the same length wherever we use it; and it is much less easy to divide a process into parts of equal times than to divide a rod into parts that have equal lengths. The recognizable divisions in a process of change are largely fixed for us, while divisions on a rod can be fixed by us with marks without affecting the rod as a whole.

Nevertheless the idea of a process that has to be made, and the peculiar mixture of observation and convention that is involved, are the same in principle for the measurement of time and of space. The fact is that we can make measurements both of length and of time with a certain amount of accuracy. We believe that these judgments are the more accurate the nearer the objects to be compared are in time and space, and the more familiar the circumstances under which they are inspected. Trusting to these immediate judgments, we see reason to believe that both the lengths of rods and the time taken by processes may vary when the rules under which they are to be compared are varied. But we believe that the variation always depends on the fact that change of position in space or time involves change in the relations of the rod or the process to pieces of matter, and that mere changes of position in absolute time and space—if such could be—make no difference. We have learned by experience what are the most important factors that determine change of length or of speed, and we can allow for them. It is found that the periods of recurrent processes are, on the whole, more largely affected by changes in the surroundings than are the lengths of such bodies as steel wires.

Our method of determining an ideal rate-measurer is somewhat as follows. We begin with some process which is sensibly isochronous, g, the swing of a pendulum, or the time taken for a complete rotation of the earth on its axis. We can judge of this isochronism with a certain amount of accuracy by direct comparison in memory, just as we can compare lengths by looking at them. We can go farther than this. Just as we are greatly helped in our comparison of lengths by putting the objects to be compared side by side, so we can use expedients to help our judgment of the isochronism of processes. If we start two pendulums together and their periods are not exactly the same, the divergence will become more and more marked the longer they swing. If no divergence be noted after many swings, we may conclude that each swing of one takes the same time as the corresponding swing of the other. This does not prove that the swing of each is sensibly isochronous; for the period of each may be varying according to the same law. But, if we also find that the period of one of these processes synchronizes with the corresponding period of some other
sensibly isochronous process which is physically very different. It becomes very improbable that there should be any law by which the successive periods of two different processes are altered in precisely the same way. We are therefore justified in concluding tentatively that the successive periods of these sensibly isochronous processes are sensibly isochronous.

The next step is to state all the laws of nature which involve time on the assumption that equal intervals of time are measured by complete periods of a certain physical phenomenon, e.g., p, that, if it be supposed that the successive rotations of the earth on its axis are isochronous, the laws of motion can be very simply stated and are very nearly verified by all the mechanical phenomena that we can observe. So far we are entirely in the region of what can be experienced or rendered very probable from what we experience. But now a conventional element enters. We shall probably find that, when time is measured by an actual physical process and when our laws have been stated in terms of time so measured, a closer investigation shows that there are slight divergences from the laws which cannot but be accounted for by experimental error. The last stage in the determination of the equality of times now begins. We argue that the suggested laws are so simple and so nearly true that the measures of time can be kept the same and that the measures and complicate the laws, but to suppose that the laws are rigidly true but the time-measurer not perfectly accurate; i.e., that successive periods of the same phenomenon are not perfectly isochronous. We therefore erect the laws into principles, define equality of times by them, and apply the necessary corrections to our old time-measurer, whatever particularly arbitrary about this. We believed, to begin with, as the result of direct judgments assisted by the use of such expedients as have been described above, that a certain periodic process is isochronous. We admitted, however, that deviations from isochronism so small as to escape the notice of any direct method are possible. We then stated our laws in terms of time as measured by this process, and found them to be simple and very nearly true but, if they are to retain their simple form and become quite true, a small correction must be made in the assumed isochronism of the process. That is, in the different values we have deduced from our experience; for we admitted all along the possibility of errors too small for direct detection. The procedure has the least trace of arbitrariness if, as is often the case, we can see the physical cause of the lack of complete isochronism in our time-measurer and can fully explain this lack in accordance with the laws which we have erected into principles. This has happened, e.g., with the earth as a time-measurer, where we can explain its small defect from isochronism, when once we have to assume it, by the frictional effect of the air in the act of rotation, or to the laws of mechanics. Even when no physical cause can be detected for the presumed lack of isochronism, it is always possible to suggest a hypothetical one. But, in so far as this has to be done, our procedure does become more arbitrary; and a point may be reached where a full explanation of all the phenomena demands a real change in the form of the laws with or without a change in the time-measurer. This has happened in recent years to the laws of motion, mainly through investigations on the movements of small electrically charged particles with velocities comparable to that of light.

7. Theory of Relativity.—The next point to be considered is the criterion of breforieness, afterness, and simultaneity among events which are not the objects of any one experience. We have seen that in favourable cases we can immediately judge that one event that we experience is after another that we experience. Other people can make similar judgments about events in their experience. But we cannot directly judge the temporal relations of events which we do not directly experience. Matters are on exactly the same footing with spatial relations. I may be immediately conscious of two objects in my field of view and so may another in the same field. And another man may be able to make similar judgments about his visual sense-data. But I may be making this judgment by saying that an object which A experiences is at the right of one which B experiences; or again what is meant by the statement that of two objects which no one experiences—e.g., two atoms—one is to the right of the other. What is needed to be able to date events in a time-series which is neutral as between A's experience and B's, and shall contain events that do not fall into the direct experience of any one. In this problem we must carefully distinguish between two questions which are liable to be confused: (1) How do we come to understand the nature of the relations in the neutral time-series? (2) How do we know with regard to any two definite events, e1 and e2, whether e1 is before or after or simultaneous with e2?

The answer to the first question is that the relations in the time-series which are neutral, as between the same logical properties as those which we directly experience, or at any rate as being capable of definition in terms of the logical properties of those relations, are neutral as experienced by A has a sensuous particularity different from that possessed by one experienced by B; just as it is impossible to say whether the quality of what A sees and that of what B sees are precisely the same when they say that they perceive the same colour, and no available text can detect any discordance between their experiences. But, of course, the sensuous particularity is what is cited when we speak of the relations, and the logical properties of the relations (e.g., transitivity, asymmetry, etc.) are important.

The distinction between the space and time of each man's experience is neutralised if his space and time runs parallel with the distinction between the immediate objects of each man's experience and neutral (or, as we call them, physical) objects. However we may not object to this statement, and whatever we suppose to be the relation between our minds and them, it must be assumed that physical objects are in the neutral space and time, and that their changes take place in the neutral time and make themselves known to us by correlated changes in the immediate objects of our experience.

It is not necessary here to consider how a number of people, M1 . . . Mn, come to agree that certain events, e1 . . . en, in their respective sense-data are all correlated with the same physical event, or it is necessary to notice that they will find, first of all in the case of sound, that, if their physical laws are to give at all a simple and complete account of what they may hear under given circumstances, they must assume that the sounds heard by them people, and all correlated by them with a single physical event, are not in general contemporary with each other. The greatest accuracy and simplicity is introduced into the laws of light by supposing that the hearing of the sounds by the various people takes place at times dependent on the positions of their bodies in physical space and on the spatio-temporal position of the single physical event correlated with all those sounds. This example brings out three very important points. (1) The determination of the temporal
relations between events in the minds or in the immediate objects of the minds of different people can be accomplished only when these events have been correlated in some definite way with supposed neutral physical events; (2) the temporal relations thus assigned are such as to make the laws telling us what sensations to expect in given circumstances as simple and accurate as possible; (3) it follows from these considerations that the determination of the neutral events and positions of physical objects in a neutral space must proceed pari passu.

Suppose, e.g., that we say that the velocity of sound is 300 centimetres per second; (1) we want to connect all the known facts about the sounds which people hear under circumstances that satisfy our definition of sound; (2) we want to do this compatibly with the assumptions which have already been made as to what heard sounds are to be classed together as connected with one physical event; and (3) we want our laws which sum up the known facts and anticipate experience to be as simple as is compatible with accuracy. We find that these ends can best be accomplished by supposing that A's hearing of sa and B's hearing of sb to be both connected with the single physical event S) take place at times \( t_a - t_s \) and \( t_b + t_s \) respectively, where \( S \) is the date of \( S \) in the neutral time-series, and \( t_a \) and \( t_b \) are the respective distances between the place where \( S \) happens in physical space and A's and B's bodies as physical objects, respectively. We must remember that this is as if the correlation of several sounds heard by different people with a single physical event were not only of interest but also determined the assignment of positions in neutral space to physical events and ourselves carried out on the same general principles as the dating of events in neutral time and as the measurement of distances in neutral space. (To be more precise: i.e., we start with instinctive judgments of rough accuracy, and then proceed to a more accurate determination of our terms, guided by the general motive of maximizing the accuracy and simplicity of scientific laws.)

As we have seen, sound is the first and most obvious case where it is necessary to assume different dates for different members of a group of sense-data which are all correlated with a single physical event. The more accurate researches of science necessitate a similar process for dealing with the sense-data of sight, and so the notion of a velocity of light as introduced to define these velocities, once determined, furnish a criterion of before and after among physical events, and, through them, for events in different minds.

Let us denote any moment at which the symbol \( \theta \) is, and an event which happens at the point \( A \) at the moment \( \theta \), by \( \theta \). Let us use the same notation for events and moments at \( B \). Then we can say: A's event \( \theta \) precedes an event \( \theta \) by a certain moment \( \theta \). Again, a signal that reaches \( A \) at \( \theta \) has not left \( B \) until \( \theta \) is later than \( \theta \). Now it is found that we have no reason to believe that any disturbance travels faster than light. It can be shown, that if the above is the criterion of before and after between events, there will be pairs of events in which one is either before or after, or contemporary with the other.

To see this, consider the following case. Let \( \theta \) be the moment at \( A \) at the moment \( \theta \). A signal which leaves \( A \) at \( \theta \) cannot reach \( B \) before \( \theta \), it cannot have left \( B \) before a certain moment \( \theta \). On our criterion, therefore, \( \theta \) is before any moment that is after \( \theta \) and is after any moment that is before \( \theta \). But how are events at \( B \) which happen between \( \theta \) and \( \theta \) related in time to the event \( \theta \)?

Take an event \( \theta \), such that \( \theta \) is between \( \theta \) and \( \theta \). You cannot say that it is before \( \theta \); for a disturbance leaving \( B \) at \( \theta \) would reach \( A \) after \( \theta \). But you also cannot say that \( \theta \) is before \( \theta \), since this would indicate a positive duration between \( \theta \) and \( \theta \). Hence our criterion on the whole does not give a clear picture of the relative positions of events at different places in physical space. We can, if we like, accept this result, and build up our physics on the assumption that physical

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to the two systems. (6) It is possible to find equations connecting the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the people on \( S \) give to any momentary event which they observe with those which the people on \( S' \) give to the same event. These are the celebrated transformations of the Theory of Relativity. They are, as we should expect, perfectly reciprocial, since the relative motion of \( S \) and \( S' \) is a perfectly mutual phenomenon. But (c) they lead to certain rather startling results. Let us consider the direction of relative motion which are judged to be equal by the people on one system will be judged to be unequal by those on the other. The ratio depends on the relative velocity and on the value of the velocity of light which is common to the two systems. (2) Events in different places which are judged to be contemporary by the people on one system will be judged to occur at different times by those on the other system, and the difference of time will depend on the distance apart parallel to the direction of relative motion.

Although the observers on the two systems thus differ in respect of each other. Each has pursued precisely the same plan in setting out his co-ordinates and synchronizing his time-measurers. And it would be quite futile for one to claim that his result are the right ones because his system is at rest and the other is in motion. For the relative motion is completely reciprocal, and neither absolute motion nor any consequence of it can be observed. Lastly, it is equally futile for one to say that he is at rest 'relative to the ether,' while the other is in motion; for we know that no experiment whatever has been able to demonstrate motion of ether relative to the other ether, and this motion may fairly be dismissed as a fiction. The upshot of the matter is that there is nothing to choose between their respective judgments, and that all the consequences of this fact lead to Einstein's set of equations connecting the \( x, y, z, t \) co-ordinates of one observer with those of another who is moving relative to the first. The precise significance of Einstein's principle of the 'Constancy of Light Velocity' has been indicated above, and shown to be connected with the way in which we are forced to lay out a system of co-ordinates and to define simultaneity between events in different places.

Einstein's restricted theory has gained many triumphs. It explains at once what is known as Fresnel's dragging-coefficient for light passing through matter that moves relative to the observer. It also accounts for the change of mass with velocity which is observed when small particles move with speed comparable to that of light. The principle necessitates slight changes in the long-accepted form of some of the laws of nature. Maxwell's equations and the equation of continuity in hydrodynamics do indeed at once and without modification fulfill the conditions of covariance. But the laws of mechanics, as they stand, are not in accord with the principle and need modifications which only become practically important in dealing with the motion of matter with velocities comparable to that of light.

Considerable philosophic importance, in conjunction with the nature of time, attaches to the work of Minkowski.

On the ordinary Newtonian mechanism the form of the laws of nature is unchanged if the three spatial axes be twisted in space about their origin as a rigid body. Now Minkowski showed that the Lorentz-Einstein transformation is equivalent to a twist of the same nature performed on a set of four mutually rectangular axes in a four-dimensional space, and the nature of the axes are the ordinary spatial ones, the fourth is the time axis multiplied by \( \gamma \), the velocity of light, and \( \gamma \), the root of \( 1 \). So far the theory must be regarded as an independent mathematical device, since the fourth axis is imaginary in the mathematical sense, and the angle of solution is imaginary. But, if we do not assume that the geometry of the four-dimensional 'space-time' is Euclidean, a much closer connection can be attached to Minkowski's interpretation of the relativity transformations. If we suppose the geometry of space-time to be hyperbolic (i.e. the geometry of Minkowski's space), the relativity transformation corresponds to twisting a set of four real axes as a rigid body through a real angle relative to the origin. The axes are now \( x, y, z, t \) and \( \gamma \) simply depends on the different units that we use in measuring time and space; so that really we are dealing with a four-dimensional
mandated in which space and time are homogeneous with each other, but whose geometry is not Euclidean but Lobat-
chewski.

The work of philosophical mathematicians since Minkowski's death has consisted largely in de-
veloping the notion that the ultimate data in the world are events in space-time, i.e., events extended both in space and in time. The content of a space-time event present forms an example of such data.

Space and time as used in the sciences only emerge at the end as elaborate mathematical constructions built on the immediately perceptible relations between extended events.

The best exposition of this point of view is con-
tained in A. N. Whitehead's Principles of Natural Knowledge, which begins by setting the criteria of the concept of classical physics and proceeds to elaborate the notions of space, time, and matter from the crude data of sense and their immediately given spatio-temporal relations.

It remains to say a few words about the general-
ized Theory of Relativity. So far we have only con-
sidered observers in uniform relative motion and have laid down a principle of relativity for them. Einstein has occupied himself in the last few years in removing this restriction and thus broached the whole field which fell outside the older theory, into the scope of the Theory of Relativity.

A particle is said to be under the action of no force if it moves uniformly in a straight line and whether it moves uniformly is clearly relative to our spatial axes and to our measure of time. If, e.g., a particle moves uniformly in a straight line relative to the rectangular axes $x$ and $y$, it will not do so relative to axes which rotate about the origin in the $xy$ plane. Accordingly, relative to one set of axes it will be said to be under the action of no force, whilst relative to the second set it will be said to be under the observed accelerations. Now the forces introduced by these mere changes of our axes of reference are in no respect very much like the forces of gravi-
tation. They, like it, affect all forms of matter indifferently and depend only on those not on the special nature of the matter. On the other hand, a genuine gravitational field cannot be altogether transformed away by a suitable change of axes, as a gravitational field can. For any one particle this can be done by choosing axes fixed in the particle, but relative to these axes the other particles in the field will still be accelerat-
ed. Now it seems clear that a mere change of axes could not make any difference to the form of the law of nature and thus, if gravitation were capable of being transformed away merely by a suitable change of axes, the principle of relativity would assert that the presence of a gravitational field makes no difference to the form of the laws of nature. For the reason mentioned above the principle of relativity cannot be taken in this unqualified sense. It may, however, be taken to assert that the form of the law of nature is unaltered in a gravitational field up to a certain (as yet undetermined) order of differential coefficients.

It is now necessary to see the bearing of these results on the constitution of the "space-time" of nature.

It has been proved by Riemann that the metrical geometry of any space is completely determined when the "linear element," i.e., the length of infinitely near points is expressed as a known function of the differentials of the co-
ordinates. Thus a three-dimensional Euclidean space is com-
pletely defined by the equation
ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2
for the linear element. If we accept the metrical properties of four-
dimensional space-time will be completely determined when $dx$, (the interval of any pair of adjacent points in $R$) is expressed as a function of all of the differentials of $dx$, $dy$, $dz$, $dt$, etc. In space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of $dx$, $dy$, $dz$, $dt$ are there of all of the coefficients of $dx$, $dy$, $dz$, $dt$, etc. In space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of $dx$, $dy$, $dz$, $dt$ are

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ds^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{4} a_i dx^i \]

where, $a_i$ are constants.

Any expression of $dx$ corresponds to a curvilinear system. If $g_1$ and $g_2$ correspond to a curvilinear system of axes for describing nature the $g_2$'s will be subject to a set of differential equations connecting them with each other and with the $x$, $y$, $z$, and $t$ of that system. These equations then express the law of gravitation and at the same time express it as a fundamental property of space-time.

It is extremely difficult to render Einstein's theory intelligible without mathematics, and the mathematics needed is somewhat formidable. It is hoped, however, that the above sketch may illustrate that extreme entanglement of time and space and matter which undoubtedly occurs in our crude sense-data and is now seen to persist even in the most refined speculations of mathematical physics. It may perhaps be added that the speculations from the special philosophical interpretations which may be put on it, is not mere idle speculation, but has already explained the anomalies in the peri-
hebion of Mercury, and has correctly interpreted the amount of deviation in a ray of light due to its pas-
ing near a heavy body like the sun.

8. Historically important speculations about time.—Our knowledge of time is now far more to the labours of mathematicians and physicists than to those of professed philosophers. The sharp distinction between time and what changes, and between space and what moves in it and is ex-
tended, is largely due to the development, first of mechanics, and latterly of electrodynamics.

To the Greeks we owe much less with regard to time than with regard to most matters of philo-
osophical or scientific speculation. This may perhaps be ascribed to the late development of the Greek approach to the problems of time was mainly by way of astronomy. Of course, Zen's celebrated arguments have an importance lying on change and continuity, and whatever may have been the real intention of their author, they remained the best discussion on these subjects so closely related to time until the time of the philosophers of infinity and continuity by Descdik and Cantor in the latter part of the 19th century. Timeplays an important part in the Timaeus of Plato; and, although his treatment cannot on the whole be considered sati-
tory, it has the merit of distinguishing time from what is in time.
is that the created heavens have been, are, and will be in all time. This view has something in common with that of Spinoza, who makes things as they really are for ratio timeless, but holds that this timelessness cannot be grasped by imagination, which represents it confusedly as duration through endless time.

Aristotle defines time as 'the number of motions relative to before and after.' Number here appears to be that which is moved along with the movable as a point may be regarded as moving and making up a line. So in a sense there is only one now, though in another sense there are many. This is obviously a very unsatisfactory metaphor, and there seems no reason to think that Aristotle was really clear as to the distinction between time and motion.

This is a system of points in space. But his arguments are entirely inconclusive even to prove that, in order to make the distinction, we must believe in these principles; much less to prove, what the transcendental method always tends to confuse with this, that the principles are true.

Time plays perhaps more, and more important, parts in Kant's philosophy than in any other.

(1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant seeks to prove that time is a form of intuition, the form of intuition of space and time. This seems to mean that, just as we can only perceive physical objects as being in space, though there is no reason to think that things-in-themselves are spatial, so we can only perceive ourselves and our inner life as time-interval. This may be compared with Aristotle's views about the varying lengths of the specious present in various beings.

In modern philosophy the men who have most concerned themselves with time are Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz aimed strongly for the relativistic view of time in his letters to Clarke, who represented Newton and the absolute theory. His arguments turn mainly on the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz carefully distinguished duration from the relation of before and after, and he compared duration to the extension of matter. Leibniz's view is that time is a system of points in space, and that time is the extension of these points by qualities this clearly fails, since 'desire for anything' is clearly a disguised relation. And as an attempt to define before and after it also fails; for it is clear that a proposition that desire for X precedes X again it seems essential to Leibniz's doctrine of the reflexion of one monad of the states of another that we should have some account of the relations between corresponding states in different monads. The state of a monad at a given moment in its own time-series is presumably the reflexion of the contemporary states of other monads; but we are not told what is meant by a time-series or what is the relation to the monads, nor is it clear that this would be consistent with Leibniz's dislike of relations.

The absolute theory of time has never had much philosophical support; there is no doubt that Leibniz had the better of Clarke. Perhaps the best arguments for absolute time and space are to be found in Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. They are not conclusive, and their author has latterly taken a much more relativistic view.

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume insisted that the notion of time comes from the succession of our ideas. But they never made it clear how their temporal relations are connected with the time of actuality. Berkeley, in particular, fails to give any reasonable account of the distinction that we certainly make between the temporal order of our ideas and the temporal order of the objects which we claim to know by them. It is a great merit of Kant to have seized on the importance of this point in his 'analogy of experience,' though the distinction will certainly not bear the superstructure which he built on it. He attempted to prove that the distinction involves the permanence of substance (which he seems to identify with the chemical law of the conservation of mass) and the law of causation among experience-given in sense, even after that has been synthetized by imagination. They have to be mediated through time; thus the category of ground and consequence, which is purely logical, can be applied to the world of sensible experience only after it has been schematized into the temporal form of cause and effect. The whole argument here is confused and weak to a remarkable degree; the principle appears to be that the manifold of sense is provided with temporal characteristics by intuition; that these remain and are elaborated by the synthetic imagination; and that then the categories can be applied if they be first schematized so. He attempts to explain the relation between successive states of the same monad by saying that the earlier ones have the quality of being desired for the later ones. As an attempt to explain relations by qualities this clearly fails, since 'desire for anything' is clearly a disguised relation. And as an attempt to define before and after it also fails; for it is clearly a disguised relation that desire for X precedes X. Then again it seems essential to Leibniz's doctrine of the reflexion of one monad of the states of another that we should have some account of the relations between corresponding states in different monads. The state of a monad at a given moment in its own time-series is presumably the reflexion of the contemporary states of other monads; but we are not told what is meant by a time-series or what is the relation to the monads, nor is it clear that this would be consistent with Leibniz's dislike of relations.

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strength with the wind-god, Vāyu. Vāyu raised so great a tempest that the peak was blown away and fell to earth in its present position. Near this peak the great temple stands. Little can be seen of it now, and no European has ever been allowed to go near it. It is a building of little architectural beauty or importance, but the cultus of the deity is interesting as an example of the amalgamation of local non-Aryan beliefs with orthodox Hinduism. Within a small chamber lighted by lamps is the idol, a stone image of Viṣṇu, seven feet in height. It represents the god as Chaturbhujā, ‘four-armed,’ one of the right hands holding the discus (lāṭakā), one of the left the conch-shell (sankhā), the second right hand pointing to the earth to draw attention to the miraculous origin of the holy hill, while the remaining left hand grasps a lotus. The deity possesses 1088 titles, the most common of which are Śrīniyāsa, ‘dwelling with Śri or Laksāṇi,’ goddess of prosperity, and Venkaṭachalapati, the title of the sacred hill, which has been adopted into Sanskrit from the Tamil va, ‘white,’ kadaim, ‘hill slope,’ thus showing that the deity was adopted into Brāhmaṇism from a Dravidian cult. By visitors from the Deccan and N. India, it is generally known as Śri he in which tribes belong to the subject of change rather than to that of time.


TINNEH.—See DÉNES.

TIPITAKA.—See LITERATURE (Buddhist), vol. viii. p. 89.

TIRUPATI.—Tirapati, vulg. Tripettty (Tel. Tirupati, tiru, Skr. tr. ‘venerable,’ tipati, ‘lord’), a town in Chittoor District, Madras (lat. 17° 38′ N. 84° 13′ E.), is a famous place of pilgrimage, situated on the Tirumalai or sacred hill, usually known to Europeans as Upper Tirupati, in contrast to the lower town at its base. The whole area is considered sacred, and up to 1070 had never been visited by Europeans. Mark Wilks states that he was on duty for eighteen months in the neighbourhood, and, though he frequently climbed the hill, he never once caught even a distant view of the pagoda. The belief that much crime was committed without detection in the holy town led to the issue of an order by Government that it should be under the inspection of the police officials. This at first produced considerable local opposition; but European visits now cause little sensation. The sanctity of this hill-range rests on the legend that it forms part of the sacred mountain. The range has seven principal peaks, each of which is sacred and has a name and legend of its own. One of the peaks, known as Seethachalam, ‘serpent hill,’ takes its name from a legend that it was torn from Meru by Atri Sesha, the primordial snake, who contended in a trial of

1 Hist. Sketches of the South of India, Madras, 1899, I. 596 n.
2 F. Thurston, Ethnographic Notes in S. India, Madras, 1900, p. 302.
3 Thurston, Costes and Tribes of S. India, iv. 310 f.
often pierce the flesh of the bearer, who submits cheerfully to the torture. At the Gangamā festival held at the temple 'language truly filthy and obscene' is used to the goddess herself. The expression is kept in the temple's obscurity.

Abusive language is believed in certain circumstances to bring good luck to the person against whom it is directed. On this theory the obscurity may possibly be regarded as a form of mimetic magic intended to repel the powers of evil from the deity, and thus advance her powers of promoting fertility.

Again, on the road leading up to the temple 'small stones stuck up in the form of a heart, and knots tied in the leaves of the young date palms may be seen. These are the work of virgins who accompany the parties of pilgrims. The knots are tied in order to ensure the tying of the female strings on their necks (as marriage), and the heaping up of stones is done with a view to ensure that they want to them. If the girls resist the hill after marriage and the birth of children, they untie the knot on a leaf, and disarrange one of the hearts. Men cause their names to be cut on rocks by the way side, or on the stones with which the path leading to the temple is paved, in the belief that the same is true of them on.

The hope of recovery from sickness and the desire for male offspring are the chief causes of vows being made to the god. The vow need not be performed immediately on receipt of the blessing. Death merely transfers the obligation to the heir, and it is said that the god is never defrauded. A common offering by women is the hair of their heads, which is shaved off by barbers, more than half the women who visit the temple returning with their heads clean shaven. J. A. Dubois describes a custom of binding the idol in chains of silver, applied with the object of preventing him from leaving the temple. The same writer speaks of the custom of women who desire children passing a night in the temple. He also alleges that at the festival, when the image is taken in procession, the Brahmanas select the most beautiful women as wives of the god; they are branded with a hot iron, and, after serving for some years, are dismissed with a certificate of good conduct which ensures that they want to them.

To Pansania of Titan, according to the local legend of Titan, is brother to the sun, and Pansania himself held that Titan was great at marking sessions of the year. Empedocles holds a less specialized and perhaps juster view; he places side by side 'Gaia and bilowy ocean and air with its moisture, and Ether, the Titan, embracing the Air. The Titan Phaethon is the sun and sun's charioteer: the Titaness Phoebe is the moon; the Titans Atlas and Prometheus are the sky-pillars supporting Ouranos. The Titans are an integral part of that primeval cosmogony, the progeny of earth and sky, imitated in Greece by the anthropomorphic Olympians, but remembered as part of their Indo-European heritage by the Northern Muses who came to Hellas and taught them the lore of the gods.

The etymology of Gigas, 'giant', is uncertain; that of Titan is happily secure, and it throws a flood of light on the function of these sky-potencies of older date and explains in a flash the two Titan myths—(a) the Titanomachia, (b) the rending of Zagreus, which, but for this etymology, must have remained obscure. Three glosses of Hesychius make it certain that Titan means 'Worthy'. They are as follows: τίταν (τίταν) 'older' (the word glossed is from a lost play of Aeschylus); τίταν (τίταν) 'older'; τίταν (τίταν), and τίταν (τίταν) 'the great' (in Aeschylus, Titans, and Homer). Titan is king, 'honoured one', but—and here is the interesting point, or rather series of vitally interconnected points—he is the king of the old order, the king-god or divine king, and as such he is a sky-potency, for one main function of the old king-god was to order the goings of the heavenly bodies and generally to control the weather. Here we have that odd blending of physical phenomena with human and social potencies which lies at the back of most gods and certainly of Zeus himself.

The Titanomachia is at once clear. For on the physical point of view it is, as described in Hesiod, just a half-humanized thunder-storm, Zeus, the new sky- and thunder-god, fighting the old sky-potencies; from the theological point of view it is the new anthropomorphism against the old religion of the king-god or medicine-man who controls the weather. The Olympian religion naturally regarded these old Titan kings as criminals, rebels against high heaven, condemned to Tartarus for their sin ofigen; they are the counterparts of the arch-Titan-Prometheans.

4 Burton, Ethnographic Notes, p. 261.
6 P. 283f.
8 H. J. H. H., 1884-82.
9 J. E. Padfield, The Heads at Home, Madras, 1886, p. 971.

District, Madras, 1881, p. 149 ff., supplemented by later information supplied by the writer. In addition to the authorities quoted, see J. E. Tournier, Precedes en Inde, tr. from ed. of 1874 and ed. V. Ball, London, 1889, II, 343. For various references to the worship of the god among the people of S India see C. F. Tropical, Cates and Tribes, Madras, 1909, I, 195, 533, 856, f. 431, 1125, ill. 1, ii, 42, 461, pl. 310, 325 f.

TITANS.—The Titans, like the Giants (c.f.), are potencies belonging to an early pre-Olympian stage of Greek mythology. The two tend to be confused by late authors, but in origin they are distinct. The Titans are distinguished from Giants by the following well-marked characteristics: (1) they are gods ( genitals), and as such immortal, whereas the Giants are mortal; (2) 'Titans', gods, is a fixed formulary in Hesiod's Theogony; (3) they are sky-potencies (Olympiators) as contrasted with the Giants, who are earth-born (gennai); (4) Titans and Giants alike are to Hesiod the offspring of Earth and Heaven, but the Titans tend skywards, the Giants with their snake-tails earthwards. To Shakespeare Titan is the sun.

And Titan, tired in the mid-day heat, 
With burning eye did hourly overток them. 2

To Pausanias, Titan, according to the local legend of Titan, is brother to the sun, and Pausanias himself held that Titan was great at marking sessions of the year. Empedocles holds a less specialized and perhaps juster view; he places side by side 'Gaia and bilowy ocean and air with its moisture, and Ether, the Titan, embracing the Air. 4

The Titan Phaethon is the sun and sun’s charioteer: the Titaness Phoebe is the moon; the Titans Atlas and Prometheus are the sky-pillars supporting Ouranos. The Titans are an integral part of that primeval cosmogony, the progeny of earth and sky, imitated in Greece by the anthropomorphic Olympians, but remembered as part of their Indo-European heritage by the Northern Muses who came to Hellas and taught them the lore of the gods.

The etymology of Gigas, ‘giant’, is uncertain; that of Titan is happily secure, and it throws a flood of light on the function of these sky-potencies of older date and explains in a flash the two Titan myths—(a) the Titanomachia, (b) the rending of Zagreus, which, but for this etymology, must have remained obscure. Three glosses of Hesychius make it certain that Titan means ‘Worthy’. They are as follows: τίταν (τίταν) ‘older’ (the word glossed is from a lost play of Aeschylus); τίταν (τίταν) ‘older’; τίταν (τίταν), and τίταν (τίταν) ‘the great’ (in Aeschylus, Titans, and Homer). Titan is king, ‘honoured one’, but—and here is the interesting point, or rather series of vitally interconnected points—he is the king of the old order, the king-god or divine king, and as such he is a sky-potency, for one main function of the old king-god was to order the goings of the heavenly bodies and generally to control the weather. Here we have that odd blending of physical phenomena with human and social potencies which lies at the back of most gods and certainly of Zeus himself.

The Titanomachia is at once clear. For on the physical point of view it is, as described in Hesiod, just a half-humanized thunder-storm, Zeus, the new sky- and thunder-god, fighting the old sky-potencies; from the theological point of view it is the new anthropomorphism against the old religion of the king-god or medicine-man who controls the weather. The Olympian religion naturally regarded these old Titan kings as criminals, rebels against high heaven, condemned to Tartarus for their sin ofigen; they are the counterparts of the arch-Titan-Prometheans.

1 H. VI, 386.
2 Neraus and Adonis, 177.
4 THeog., 605 ff.
TITRES—II. Origin and purpose. Tithes are connected, on the one hand, with offerings of firstfruits (q.v.); on the other hand, politically, with tribute and taxation. While taxation often took the form of a tenth, the amount might vary, less or more, though the name "tenth" (decima, desyat) was retained. Voluntary offerings to a deity soon became customary, and even necessary, especially where kings began to impose taxation. The god was thought to be a divine monarch. To keep up his sanctuary was as much an obligation as to keep up the royal person and court. An early example shows this. The people of Tyre and Gathes to Melathor, the god of the city, and the Carthaginians similarly sent their tithes to Tyre. 

W. R. Smith 7 shows that in this case the tithe was as much political as religious. The voluntary, spontaneous, and annual tribute alike, the ritual of a sanctuary became more elaborate, the sanctuary itself more splendid, and the attendant priests more numerous. Why a tithe or tenth should have been fixed on so generally is not clear, but probably it is connected with primitive views about numbers, or with methods of counting—e.g., by fingers and toes. 8

In Babylon, whether the tithe was native or borrowed, its use is found in the tithe-tax (Num. 18:12). In Assyria, it was a tax paid to the lord of the land, and was paid by all, including the king, who assigned to temples founded by him an annual amount from cultivated lands and from the treasury. Numerous tablets concern tithes, and show that the people were taxed in all parts of the temple. The law of the nature of a fixed charge on the land and even became negotiable. Such tablets may be regarded as of the nature of a receipt of payment for tithe, which was generally paid in kind—corn, fruits, dates, flour, oxen, sheep, and asses—though this might be commuted for a money payment. One man sometimes paid it collectively for a group of men, and possibly this signifies a systematic collection of tithe in one district by an authorized person. 9 At the same time Babylonian kings had a tithe of all imports, as had also Persian satraps. In S. Arabia, tithe was used for the erection of sanctuaries and monuments. 8 Cyrus, on the advice of Cresus, caused his soldiers to devote a tenth of their booty to Zeus. 8 The tithe as a tax on land was well known in Greece and Rome, and the payment of a tithe to temples on special occasions was not uncommon. Pausanias gives many instances of this—e.g., a tenth of war-booty being set aside to make an image or a vessel for a temple.

In Egypt there was apparently greater freedom. Temples were usually provided with lands for their upkeep, but the gods expected to receive a share of the produce of these lands, as well as of tribute levied on vassal states and of prisoners who were made slaves of the conquerors. 10 Zoroastrian literature refers to the fourth rank of men—traders, artisans, market dealers, etc. 11 who should pay a tithe to the high priest and to the king. 12 Chinese sacred literature mentions a tenth of the produce of the land as tithe, and of tribute levied; whether as a religious tribute or not is not clear. 13

The Confucian Analects 14 tell how "the Duke Hsueh enquired of Yew Ji, 'What is the tithe?' The poor man answered, 'I am the owner of a vineyard. My income is what I manage to get out of it. My father and grandfather before me have always treated it in the same way. The law of the state has not altered. Can you tell me what is meant by the tithe?" Yew Ji, the high priest, replied, 'You must make up your mind in your own way. This is no matter to be enquired about. ’” 15 He desired to take two tithes, over which the high priest himself was to settle, and the tithe, from the allotments cultivated in common, against which Yew Ji protested. 16

2. Tithes in the Old Testament. Among the Hebrews the relation of tithes to firstfruits 17 is complicated, and opinions differ as to whether they were distinct or not. Firstfruits would naturally vary in quantity. Tithe expresses more or less a fixed proportion. Perhaps the tithe represents firstfruits made systematic, or different names may have been favoured at different times and in different localities. "The Levitical tithe ... as an "heave offering" in Nu 18:32, but the two are apparently separate in Dt 12:17. In the later legislation firstfruits and tithes appear to be distinguished. The tithe, which is not mentioned in the book of the Covenant, appears first in the Northern

1 See art. NUMMAS (Introductory).
3 Ariosto, Orlando, 1513, 1535.
4 W. E. Smith, p. 247.
5 Herod. 1. 89.
6 Maspero, p. 120.
7 Herod. 1. 89.
8 Siu King, v. 7 (G.B.S. 1896) 370 ff.
9 Bk. xii. ch. ix. §§ 1-4.
10 J. Legge, The Chinese classics, Hongkong, 1852-78, l. 112.
11 See art. FIRSTFRUITS (Hieroeb)
TITHES

Kingdom in the time of Jeroboam II, as the material given for a feast at the sanctuary (Am 5:10; cf. 4), though the feast was one for the rich at the expense of the poor. Here it appears as a fixed institution. In 1 Sam 13:15 Jacob promises a tenth of all to God—perhaps a reflexion of later custom, though not necessarily so—and Melchizedec receives a tenth of all (14:20). In 18:16, 17 tithe is paid to the king, and perhaps he devoted this to the upkeep of some sanctuary he had in Shechem. The Deuteronomic Code is not a forced tribute. The tithe of corn, wine, and oil, with the heave offering, free-will offering, and firstlings of herd and flock, are to be brought to the sanctuary and eaten there as a feast with servants and Levite (Dt 12:16ff.). Here the connection with firstlings suggests that the tithe was the firstfruits of produce, or perhaps offerings for public religious services. If, however, the distance to the central sanctuary was too great for the offering to be taken there, it might be committed for meat, and the tithe of it would be brought to the material for the feast at the sanctuary as before (Dt 14:28). Every third year the tithe was to be laid aside to furnish a feast or feasts at home for the Levite, stranger, fatherless, and widow (14:26). Does the tithe here referred to form the equivalent of the firstfruits, the ritual of which, as the forming part of the tithe, is detailed in Dt 26? Probably they are ultimately the same, including an offering of part as firstfruits, and a feast for Levite and stranger; just as in 18 firstfruits are to be given to the priests. If so, the word 'tithe' in 26:1, 'Thou shalt rejoice in all the good which the Lord thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger,' would refer to the feast and be equivalent to the fastening on the tithe of 14:26, while the earlier part of ch. 26 would refer to the offering of part as firstfruits offering.

Is the third year's tithe additional to the tithe given at harvest time, or is it a substitute? The tithe in the third year? Here again opinions differ, but most regard it as a diverting of the usual tithe for the benefit of the local priesthood, who were to be fed by the tithes through the new custom of feasting at the central sanctuary. Others regard it as a second tithe, and this is supported by the LXX, which reads for the year of tithing 'the second tithe.' In the Targum to P, the first of all the firstfruits of every thing is reserved for the support of the priests. There is besides a tax paid to the prince for the support of rufi and feasts out of wheat, oil, and fruits (44:20; 45:1; cf. 59:4). No mention is made of tithes, nor are the payments of the Levites and the priests.

3. Early and medieval Church usage. In the Christian Church the need of supporting the clergy, who were early withdrawn from secular business, was recognized, but the system of tithes was not generally resorted to for several centuries. Once it did become general, tithes were regarded, on the analogy of its use in the Jewish Church, as de jure divini, the value of which was increased by such passages as Mt 10:9, Lk 10:19, 1 Co 9:7—an argument which Selden was the first to show groundless, in his work on the subject. Until the 4th century, little is heard of it, and only a few writers regard the matter from a totally different point of view from that which was later adopted. Ireneus, referring to tithes in the Jewish system, says characteristic ally that Christians, as "those who have received liberty, set aside all their possessions to the Lord's purposes, bestowing joyfully and freely not the less valuable portions of their property." Origen

Neh 10:17, where the tithe is described (cf. 12:15-18), and may be a later addition. It is, however, mentioned as paid to the priests in To 1, by Philo, and in the Book of Jubilees (32:21). The Rabbinic and Apocryphal writers say that in furnishing, along with a second tithe of produce (Lv 27:30), additional, therefore, to the tithe of produce in Nu 18:28—a feast for the tithe and its guests at Jerusalem, as ordained in Dt 18:10. The purpose of the Priests' Coad is probably to stimulate the law of the tithe in Deuteronomy, but later harmonizers did not take this view and spoke of two tithes, and even three, the third year tithe of Deuteronomy being regarded as an additional one. The law of P is reflected in Hezekiah's legislation, which ordered that firstfruits and tithe of produce, sheep, and oxen should be brought, and Nehemiah's remonstrance it was paid (129:3). At a later time the priests themselves collected the tithe, and the subsequent history of the Levites in connexion with it is obscure, while they no longer shared in the tithe, either from the time of Ezra or from that of John Hyrcanus. The Pharisees, as well as the regulations of the Talmud, considered minutely the things to be tithed (Lk 11:43), the former even paying titles of garden herbs—mint,举起, and garlic—(2 Ch 31:16). Hence, if the tithe of animals is in addition to the original law of Lv 27:30, it may have come into force after Nehemiah's time. In Neh 10:19-27, for the priesthood, and firstlings and firstfruits of dough were for the priests, and tithes of produce for the Levites—the latter collected by the Levites under the supervision of a priest, and Levites paid a tithe of the produce (cf. 12:9). The tithe, however, was not always paid to the Levites, as Nehemiah discovered, and they had to cultivate their own land. At Nehemiah's remonstration it was paid (12:9). At a later time the priests themselves collected the tithe, and the subsequent history of the Levites in connexion with it is obscure, though they no longer shared in the tithe, either from the time of Ezra or from that of John Hyrcanus. The Pharisees, as well as the regulations of the Talmud, considered minutely the things to be tithed (Lk 11:43), the former even paying tithe of garden herbs—mint, garlic, and leek. Under the Rabbinic system of three tithes referred to above, the first was collected yearly; the second was due in the first, second, fourth, and fifth years; the third in the third and fourth years. Two were thus taken every year, except in the seventh year, when the land lay fallow. The poor's tithe suggested tithing of earnings, and the rabbinic claims were made for the virtue of tithe; e.g., through it Israelites escape the twelve months' punishment in hell which is the lot of the wicked.

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regards tithes as something to be far exceeded in Christian giving, and Epiphanius says that tithing is no more binding than circumcission. Augustine regards the tithe as something forbidden. In the religious field, God, though he and others are prompted also by the finer ideal of freedom in all Christian giving. It was inevitable, however, that, as the Christian Church spread, it should make it necessary to fall back upon rule, based upon legal provision, and the old standard of a tenth was set up, and the Christian priest was endowed with tithe rights to the Jewish priest and Levite. Ambrose and many other Fathers accordingly maintain that tithes should be given, but their views were not generally accepted in the Eastern Church. Even in the West there is evidence that this species of ecclesiastical property was acquired not only by degrees, but with considerable opposition. The merial duty of paying tithe was now generally taught, but, even after it was made a matter of law, tithe was paid reluctantly and irregularly. In A.D. 585 the Council of Magon ordained its payment, while priests were to use it in helping the poor and in redeeming captives. He who refused to pay was to be excommunicated. Other councils enjoined it, but it was not until the time of Charlemagne that it became matter of law. One of his capitularies he ordained it to be paid to churches and clergy. Presbyers had already exhorted strenuously towards its payment as tending to Christian perfection, and doubtless it was now more generally regarded. At the same time it has to be remembered that, apart from ecclesiastical law, under Roman law colonists had to pay a tenth to the State as rent from the ager publicus. The State had always laid its hands on the tenth of the produce of the soil without which no Christian could live. While the ecclesiastical tithe was usually paid to the bishop, who apportioned it, Charlemagne's capitulary regulated its division into the hands of the clergy for the poor, and for the support of church fabrics. In later times tithe was often appropriated to particular churches and monastic foundations. Once the payment of the tithe became legal, excommunication or temporal penalties were decreed against those who refused to pay it. Meanwhile abuses had risen in connexion with the appropriation of tithe. Some places, instead of making the tithe payable to a church, monastery, or diocesan treasury, a proprietor would appropriate it to his own uses or even sell it. It had also become common for ecclesiastics to grant tithes to laymen as an award for service or in recognition of their protection. These were now regarded as evils, and it was set forth as a legal maxim that all tithes are of ecclesiastical origin. Where they had been appropriated by laymen, they were withheld from the Church only by robbery or by feudal grant (decima infundata). No layman could possess tithes without risking his salvation. Hence the Third Lateran Council of 1179 forbade redemption of tithes by laymen as well as transference of them to other laymen. The Council also declared that any one who violated this decree endangered his soul, and a layman deprived of Christian sepulture. As a result of this, many tithes were restored to ecclesiastical use. Towards the 13th cent. tithe was also extended from the produce of the earth, to predial tithe, to all kinds of profit and wages. It was divided by the canons into (1) predial—derived from the fruits of the ground; (2) mixed—of things nourished from the soil, or those due partly to its productiveness, partly to human skill and labour; (3) personal—

4. English law and practice.—In England legislation on the subject seems to date from the latter part of the 8th century. Pope Adrian I. in A.D. 786 enjoined payment in kind on the Anglo-Saxon Church. This was confirmed in later ecclesiastical councils and synods, sometimes by royal orders. The idea that the civil grant of tithe dates from an alleged charter of Ethelwulf (A.D. 800) is now abandoned; and in any case it appears to grant a tenth of the land, not of produce. In King Edgar's reign failure to pay tithe was made legally punishable. The growth of parish churches was attended by their endowment with part of the tithe paid by the landowner, who was usually the founder of the church to the diocesan or monastery treasurer. In course of time, and with the extension of the parochial system, it became a matter of legal presumption that the local tithe was the property of the rector. In many places rectories were the property of monastic establishments, a vicar being appointed to perform the duties of the charge. The Reformation brought about great changes and, while tithes belonging to monasteries, at their dissolution the tithes became the property of the crown. They were now frequently granted to lay proprietor, thus being completely dissociated from their original purpose. The rectorial tithe was the 'greater' tithe, and such tithe or part of tithe as was paid to vicars was the 'smaller.' The greater tithes were generally predial; the smaller were mixed and predial. These distinctions were practically wiped out by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836, although long before that date commutation of tithe paid in kind for a money payment had been general. By the Act of 1836 the tithe, with a few exceptions, was now commuted for a fixed rent-charge, based on a seven years' average of the price of corn—wheat, barley, and oats—the amount being that which, in the opinion of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, after 25th Dec. 1825, and in succeeding years, compute in the same manner as for this septennial average the average price of corn for the preceding fifteen years. The sum payable as tithe rent-charge after 1st Jan. 1836 shall be ascertained on this fifteen years' computation.

5. Teinds in Scots law.—In Scotland tithes are known as teinds, and are almost entirely predial, including decima mixta, and only in exceptional cases personal. They were divided into parsonage and vicarage teinds, the former being leviable from grain (wheat, oats, and barley), the latter from natural grass or bog-hay, certain vegetables, butter, cheese, calves, lambs, herring, etc. Where an incumbent was appointed by the patron, he

1 See Norman, Feudal. 2 See Hoc. 3 See D. N. B. 4 See D. N. B. 5 See D. N. B.
received the whole tithes. In other or 'patrimonial' parishes the tithes belonged to the bishop, or to a religious house, and the vicar who served the parish received stipend out of the tithes, sometimes a small part of the vicarage tithes. While the tithes first became divided in Scotland is not known with certainty, but they are frequently mentioned in charters of the 12th cent., as well as in writs of that period to enforce their payment. Consequently the medieval system of taxation did not regulate this payment and appropriation. Many abuses arose regarding tithes, and the decrees of the Lateran Council were often ignored. Certain ecclesiastical lands and lands which the property of monastic orders were granted freedom from payment of tithes by papal privileges. When such lands were leased to laymen, this exemption also passed to them. In view of the coming Reformation, ecclesiastical landlords made grants to landowners, called titulares, conferring heritable rights to tithes by feu or by long lease. At the Reformation church lands passed into the hands of the crown. In 1567 Parliament passed an act that the crown could divide between ministers and the crown. The rent rolls being made up, this sum was found to amount to over £5000. But, as a result of imperfect returns, remission, and refusal of payments, much less than half of this sum was available. In 1567 Parliament, under the scheme known as the 'assumption of thirds', ordered that the third of the tenth be paid to the ministers and for all time coming to the Church. While Parliament thus recognized the right of the Church to tithes—a proprietary right fully enjoyed by the Reformation clergy—that right was nullified, and tithes had been evicted from their former owners, diverted from their former use, and acquired and dealt with by the crown and nobles as their own property. An Act of 1617 appointed a committee to augment stipend out of the tithes, and a number of stipend holders were so treated. In 1627, as a result of Charles I's intention to receive surrender of alienated church lands and tithes, and of the opposition which he evoked, a commission was appointed to deal with the subject and to make provision for churches. Submissions were made to the king by those who had benefited by grants of tithes or were interested in them, and as a result he issued his 'decree-sarbal', which were confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1633, and commissioners were appointed to deal with the whole matter. Tithes were to be valued at the fifth part of the constant rent which each land payeth in stock and tene (where the same are valued jointly). If, or if valued apart, the commissioners were to declare their value. Titulares of tithes were to sell them to heritors at nine years purchase, but only so far as not already devoted locally to the minister of the parish. The valuation thus made fixed the amount of tithes for all time. Next, and the taxation of stipend was to be paid out of the commuted tithes as a permanent endowment, with a further possible augmentation. Stipend thus forms a paramount claim upon the Church. The tithes were confirmed by Act of the Scots Parliament in 1633, and still continue to regulate the right to tithes and the payment of stipend of the ministers of the Established Church. The whole matter of tithes was vested in commissioners, but was transferred under the Union of 1707, and subsequent Acts to the Lords' Council and Session, acting as a Court of Commission of Tithes. This Court of Teinds deals with all matters regarding tithes, and in particular hears all claims for augmentation of stipend out of the unexhausted or free teinds, where such exist in the possession of the proprietors after payment of stipend. Such claims can be preferred only twenty years after a previous claim has been upheld.

1 In valuing teinds under the Act of 1633, the valuation was made either in grain or in money. Where stipend is payable according to value of grain, it is valued according to fair prices of the county, as determined by a local court who strike the value for the crop and year.

2 A. J. MacCulloch.

TITHES (Greek).—It is difficult to separate tithes (sekédrai) and firstfruits (érastai), since the tithes is only a special form of firstfruit. Many nations and tribes, if not nearly all, have had the custom of setting apart a portion of their goods for the gods; and when, as was sometimes the case, the king or chief was a sort of god, he took his share by compulsion. It seems to have been a wide-spread belief that some sacrifice was due to the local spirits whenever men broke new ground, built a settlement, or bridged a river; and it was certainly common in very early times to leave a portion of the new land to the divine power. Perhaps for the same reason portions of the fruits of the earth were left, or otherwise given to the gods. It is not likely that this portion was always the same part of the produce of the whole; but the tenth was found to be a convenient fraction early and in many nations, among them the Jews. No doubt the decimal numerical had something to do with this choice. In Egypt a few traces are known of the early custom just mentioned—e.g., the sacred groves of Artemis, with game that no men might kill except in a sacred hunt.

The Pelagians are said by Stephanus to have offered the tithes, which in later days they dedicated at Delphi, and Herodotus talks of how the Hyperboreans used to send their annual tithes to Delphi. The tithes is not mentioned in Homer; and the earliest records come with the inscriptions, although legendary tithing is spoken of earlier. When Agamemnon conquered Mycenae, he is said to have dedicated a tenth to the gods. An epic poem, the Eurotios, two lines of which are quoted by Cleomedes of Alexandria, mentions the dedication of tithes at Delphi. The Liparians, on conquering the Etruscans, dedicated the tithes of the spoils at Delphi. After the Persian invasion the Greeks took an oath to tithe all these cities which

3 10 Sept., Berlin, 1862-385, iii. 292.
6 Dea. 8. 65.
7 Statuta, I. 349 (Syburg).
8 Be. 9. 7.
We also read of a butcher, a constable, and others who speak generally of a tithe of their work. Sometimes friends or relatives offer the tithe for another. Some of the female statues of the Acropolis were tithes. See also art. FIRST FRUITS (Greek).


W. H. D. ROUSE.

TLINGIT.—The Tlingit, who occupied the coast of Alaska from Portland Canal to Copper River, were organized into two main phratries and one subsidiary phratal group, and the phratries were subdivided into clans. The character of their country and their manners and customs were almost the same as those of the Haida (q. v.), though the northern towns had not adopted the elaborately carved poles so characteristic of the latter, and their pole houses were constructed in a somewhat different manner.

1. Cosmological beliefs. — The outlines of Tlingit belief were like those of the Haida and indeed of the other tribes of the North Pacific coast. Of course, in the details there were considerable divergences. Like the Haida, they believed that the earth was flat and the sky a solid vault hung above it like an inverted cup and terminated by a solid bar of magic beings. The stars were supposed to be towns and their light the reflexion of the sea. The sun and moon were also occupied by special beings, and more regain was paid to the moon than to the sun. Shooting stars were supposed to be livecoals thrown down by departed spirits, and the northern lights were these spirits at play. Under the earth was an old woman called Old-woman-under-the-earth, who supported a great post, on which the solid land rested. According to one story, she was the sister of four brothers, who were favourite heroes of Tlingit mythology, and who in early days travelled all over the world killing harmful animals, putting things in order, and establishing customs for future generations. One of these brothers, Kashkatch, was a powerful shaman who succeeded where his brothers had failed, and was frequently called upon to restore them to life, while another, Hilkayak, was always getting them into trouble by his impetuous and trifling character. He was suspected of an amour with his own sister, and, when his brothers discovered that their suspicions were well founded, they drove him away, and he became the wielder of the thunder. His sister, overcome with shame, went down into the earth at a place where the extinct crater of Mt. Edgecombe now is, near Sitka, and became Old-woman-under-the-earth. The remaining brothers and their mother turned into rocks while trying to cross the Stikine River, and they may be seen there at the present day. According to the version of this story told at Wrangell, the sister was also turned into rock at that place and Old-woman-under-the-earth was an entirely different person. Old-woman-under-the-earth was supposed to receive food and prayers from human beings, and she was especially fooded when they made the fires on earth which warmed her. When she did not get enough attention from mankind, she became angry and moved her pole, causing an earthquake. Others said that the earthquake was caused by her anger at some persons who were teasing her, and Veni...
aminoff\textsuperscript{1} was told that it was because Raven was angry with mankind and was trying to drive her away in order that the earth might fall into the sea. Though Hilkayak was said to cause thunder, it was more often described, as in the case of the Hawk, as a turn of the wind; the flapping of its wings produced the thunder and the opening of its eyes the lightning; it lived principally on whales, which it carried up into the mountains, and their bones were known as 'kwell ka', or 'skull bones'. The Haida tale that relates that several brothers became wizards in order to rescue their sister from a giant splug which had dragged her up on the side of a steep cliff, and, having learned to fly, saved her from the thunder beings. When a peal of thunder was heard, people shook themselves and jumped into the air, crying, 'Take all my sickness from me.'

2. Supernatural beings.—Except in the general way common to all American tribes, we do not hear much of sky-beings. The 'above-people' of the Haida were said to have been first heard of through the Tingit, however, and the conception of their originates with them, although they did not recognize any special being of that name. The two brothers have been referred to as the originators of culture and customs, but they by no means supplant Raven, whose personality, functions, and attributes were the same here as on the Queen Charlotte Islands. It is ethnographically important to note that he began his career on the Nass River, and, according to some accounts, returned to its head as his final home. In connexion with Raven we have the nearest approach to a supposition that the Tingit was to have possessed, for the heaven-god of the Haida appears to be entirely wanting among them. This personage was called Raven-at-the-head-of-Nass (Muntneya). One story from him that Raven obtained the sun, moon, stars, and euclason to distribute all over the world. Some of the more thoughtful Indians at the present day elevate this being to a position far above that which he occupied aboriginally, but there is no doubt that he always had a real existence. He was called in some stories the 'king of birds,' and Raven was therefore subordinate to him. Up to the present time, however, no account of him has been obtained in the northern Tingit towns—a fact which may indicate that Tsimsian and Haida influence has been instrumental in creating him.

3. The dead.—The regions of the dead are said to be three—one below and two above the plane of earth. The first was the country of the killer-whales, and was for those who had been drowned, and the third, or highest, was for those who had died by disease to the Taxèh's house of the Haida. The approach to this place was through a hole reached by a single log, and was guarded by a person who admitted only those who could perform the prescribed manner. The trail thither was infested by grizzly bears and other animals. All other persons passed after death to the lower sky-country (Sari-kaw). There, which is the heaven, closely to the Gietšgal of the Haida. The person who was to go thither found himself on a trail, and, following it, came to a fork. One of the two paths had been much trodden upon anything that they desired to be lucky. Like the Haida, the Tingit gave food to any thing or any being that they wished to help them, and called to it, mentioning their wants. Everything was believed to have a spirit connected with it. There was one in every trail that a person followed in and everything that he did.

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4. Rebirth.—As among the Haida, belief in rebirth was general so much so that it is said

\textsuperscript{1} Ap. A. Krause, Die Tsimshian Indianer, p. 200.

\textsuperscript{2} See BRV, 473.
that a poor person would wish to die in hope of being reborn in a higher position in life. If a pregnant woman dreamed of some dead relative, it was believed that her child would contain his soul, and in consequence the child was given the relative's name. A belief in four rebirths followed by annihilation has also been recorded, but this was perhaps a distorted rendering of the Haida idea of "Ook." 5.

5. Shamanism.—Shamanism reached its highest development among the Tlingit, and nowhere on the coast were shamans of such exalted social rank, so well thought of, or so powerful. When performing, the Tlingit shaman was dressed much like his Haida counterpart, but he also assumed a wooden mask, and, besides being possessed by one principal spirit, he was, if not possessed, at least accompanied by many smaller ones. The itself were represented on the masks by small figures round the eyes, jaws, ears, etc., of the principal figure, and were supposed to strengthen the corresponding features of the shaman. Still other spirits had charge of his rattles. With each of the masks went a certain number of songs. One of the most popular spirits was the wood-worm, which entered through the skin and ate the flesh. The spirit was represented by a mask with its upper part resembling a bird, but since the bird was the principal figure, beat time for him, and told the other people what to do. This assistant was generally the man who was to succeed to his office. According to Veniaminoff, the successor of the shaman was his nephew's son, but for a son to succeed to his father's position seems to have been the exception. The right to certain spirits might be inherited, and in saying that this seldom happened Krause has gone deeply too far.

Not infrequently the spirit came to a novitate shaman on the death of his predecessor, but often he was compelled to stay as long as two weeks in the grave of the shaman who had been killed. When it finally made its appearance, it usually himself the land-otter, the tongue of which he wrenched out, catching the blood on a little bundle of sticks. He then danced in the air, the smoke from which symbolized the blood that had fallen. As the shaman drew out the tongue, he exclaimed, 'Oh! I am four times very loudly, each time in a different tone of voice. He also notes that none of the sticks in his bundle would burn, and that the smoke rose straight through the air. The remaining part of the bundle, which was then kept in an out-of-the-way place, for, if an uninitiated person were to come upon it, he would lose his reason. The skin of the person thus killed was rolled into the bundle, and when he was killed, he buried the skin in the earth. The part played by land-otters in shamanism and in mythology generally inspired the Tlingit with such respect and dread that before the coming of the Russians, they would not shoot one of them.

If a person could not otherwise succeed in becoming a shaman, he might go at night to the grave of some dead shaman and take from body a tooth or the end of one of the little fingers, and place it in his mouth. A shaman who did not observe certain regulations carefully might be killed by his own spirit, or, on the other hand, he could throw them into one who did not believe in and destroy him.

The great exhibitions or performances of the shamans were undertaken only during the new or full moon. Shamans then called upon their spirits to bring good fortune and health to their town and people. From the morning of the day before that appointed until the following morning none of the relatives of the shaman, and they might eat or drink. They cleansed themselves internally by drinking water and introducing a feather into the throat to bring on vomiting. At sunset all entered the appointed house, which had been thoroughly cleansed and provided with new floor-planks. Then the shaman came out from behind a screen and began to run round the fire, his friends singing all the time, until the spirit came to him.

Veniaminoff divides the spirits that spoke through shamans into spirits from above, land-spirits, and water-spirits. The first were the souls of the dead, who lived in the land-animal, and were the spirits of some kind, but their bodies had died. The land-spirits appeared in the form of land-animals, but were said to be the spirits of those who had died a natural death and who had their dwellings in the distant north. Other spirits appeared in the forms of sea-animals, and were in fact the spirits of those animals. According to Krause, every Tlingit, whether shaman or not, had his own protecting spirit, but this belief does not seem to have assumed the importance which it bears among the inland Indians.

6. Witchcraft.—As shamanism had reached its highest development with the Tlingit, so also had witchcraft, which might almost be described as a diseased shamanism. A wizard accomplished his object by obtaining some portion of the person or clothing of the victim, or by using unburned body, among the ashes of a burned body, or on the body of a dog. When a person was suspected of being a wizard, his hands were bound behind his back and he was imprisoned in an empty hut without food and with nothing to drink but sea-water. There he was kept until he confessed, lost his reason, or died, unless his friends were powerful enough to liberate him. The man who confessed to being a wizard was flung into the sea with the medicine or compound which had caused the illness and to scatter it upon the water, accompanying it with certain formulas. Instead of being imprisoned, a suspected wizard was sometimes bound hand and foot and exposed on the beach for the rising tide to cover him. Sometimes he was dealt with in a still more summary manner. Among other accomplishments, wizards and witches were universally believed to possess the power of flight.

7. Charms, etc.—The principal families and many in humble circumstances kept charms to bring wealth and good fortune. They believed in all sorts of signs, which they extracted from, or rather read into, natural phenomena, and they thought that natural phenomena would be affected by the breaking of this or that taboo. After a person had died, his body was carried through a temporary hole in the ice before the coming of the Russians, they would not shoot one of them.

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1 See Art. Haida, p. 17.
2 Veniaminoff, p. 284.
3 P. 284.
4 P. 285.
TODAS.—The Todas are a small community, about 700 in number, living on the undulating plateau, about 7000 ft. above sea-level, of the Nilgiri hills in Southern India. They are a purely pastoral people, who keep all other occupations. They are provided with the products of agriculture by the Badagas, a Canarese tribe who also live on the plateau, while the Kotas, allied to the jungle peoples of Southern India, furnish their metal work and pottery. Except for these commercial relations, the Todas form a wholly separate community and have few other relations with the Negritos or Kotas. With the Kurumbas, a jungle tribe living on the slopes of the Nilgiris, the Todas have even less frequent relations, and these arise chiefly out of the Toda belief that the Kurumbas are sorcerers.

1. Social organization.—The people are divided into two sections called the Tarthalor and the Teivallo, each of which is strictly endogamous, though irregular unions are allowed between men and women of the two. Each section is divided into a number of exogamous clans. Each clan owns a number of villages, or mad (commonly called mamad), and takes its name from the etumad, or chief of these villages. The villages are small settlements, sometimes consisting of one or two houses with a dairy and buffalo-proof. They are scattered over the hills, but most of the villages of a clan are near one another. Each clan is divided into two divisions called kudur, 'horn,' which should properly be, and usually are, only two in number. These divisions are of importance only in the ceremonies of the clan, and are the polm, by which the sharing of communal expenses, such as those incurred in the repair or rebuilding of the chief dairies of the clan, is regulated. The Todas recognize the existence of the family, or kudup, as a social unit, and this often corresponds with the polm. One clan, the Malgarsol, has an exceptional position in that, though belonging to the Tarthalor, it shares many duties and privileges with the Teivallo.

Descent is almost patrilineal. A man belongs to the clan of his father. The effect of fatherhood is not determined by marriage, however, but by a ceremony of giving birth which takes place at the seventh month of pregnancy. This ceremony is not performed at every pregnancy, but a person is regarded as the child of the man who was the last to perform this ceremony with his or her mother.

The Todas practise polyandry, nearly always of the fraternal type. Formerly this practice was possible in a pure form, owing to the existence of male infanticide. Though girls are probably sometimes killed at birth, the practice is now less frequent. There is still a considerable excess of men, but polyandry is often combined with polygyny, producing a state which may be regarded as a variety of group marriage. In addition to orthodox marriage there is a regular system of marriage in which a woman has communal relations with one or more men called mokhthad-misaid. This kind of union may take place between a Tarthalor man and a Teivallo woman or vice versa, thus differing from marriage proper, which is confined to members of one or more clans. The permissible marriage is between cross-cousins, and this institution is reflected in the nomenclature of relationship which in several respects resembles that of the Tamils. The cross-cousin is classified with the spouse, the mother's brother with the father-in-law, and the father's sister with the mother-in-law. Betrothal in infancy is customary, and this practice is probably responsible for the custom of transferring wives from one man to another which has now become very frequent. The custom seems to have been originally one by means of which a widower could obtain a wife in a community where, through the practice of infanticide, every woman is already bespoken, but it has now become a process set in action whenever one man desires the wife of another.

The people are governed by a council of five men called the poksu, members of which should properly be a Badaga. This council is chiefly engaged in settling disputes arising out of the transference of wives. It is also the business of the poksu to arrange when ceremonies shall be performed, especially those of the more important dairies. There is a headman called moyagen, but he is chiefly concerned with the payment of the assessment to the Government, and the institution is almost exclusively with the buffaloes. On a larger hand, the headship of the clan is certainly an old institution. Its functions are not especially important, and this also holds good of the headship of the kudur and polm.

2. Religion.—The Todas believe in certain superior beings who may be regarded as gods, and speak of them as 1600 or 1800 in number, but these are a mixed Toda and Nilgiri peoples of an indefinitely large number. The two most important are On and Teikiri. On is a male deity who presides over Amnuor, the world of the dead. He is looked upon as the earth, the limits of which are fixed by their buffaloes and to have been himself a dairyman. More important in the minds of the people is Teikiri, a female deity, who is believed to have lived among the Nilgiris and ruled the people. Most of the Toda social and ceremonial life is ascribed to her ordinances. These two deities are not especially connected with hills, but nearly all the others seem to be hill-deities, each being associated with a particular god, associated with the two chief rivers of the district.

The ritual of the Toda religion is concerned almost exclusively with the dairies and the treatment of their milk. The dairies are the temples; the dairymen are the priests; and various incidents in the lives of the buffaloes, such as their movements from one grazing ground to another, the first milking, and the giving of salt, have become the occasion of ceremonial which has a religious character. This ritual stands in a definite relation to the gods, and is mentioned in the formulas of the dairy ritual, the general character of which indicates that they must be regarded as prayers. The names used for these prayers differ from those used in ordinary speech, and form part of a series of expressions called kacarum, in which special names of deities, buffaloes, dairy utensils, and other objects are uttered, preceded by the word idtis, said to mean 'for the sake of.' The dairies and the buffalo-herds form a somewhat complicated organization, especially among the Tarthalor. Every village has a number of buffaloes devoid of any element of sanctity, and their milk is churned in a dairy, also devoid of sanctity, with no special ritual. Most of the buffaloes, however, belong to herds with special names with varying degrees of sanctity, and in many instances in which there are great differences in the elaborateness of the ritual with which the milk is treated and in the ceremonial regulations of the lives of the dairy-herds. This system is connected to the buffaloes of the Tarthalor, the Teivallo having only one variety of sacred buffalo, but the most sacred kinds of dairy of the Tarthalor must be tended exclusively by men of the Malgars clan, which occupies an intermediate position between the two main sections.
The lowest grade of Tardhar dairy is called Tord. Its ritual and ceremonial observances are intended to purify the people and are conducted to the evening milkings and the morning washing. When the dairyman enters the dairy, he bows down and touches the threshold with his forehead, touches certain parts of the body ceremonially, lights the lamp, and utters a prayer before beginning to churn. After churning he holds the churn in his right hand and the ladle in his left hand, uttering the sacred syllable "Oo!". He also repeats the prayer of the dairy after milking.

Each dairyman has his own special features and symbols. The somberness of the milk is broken by the white, and the churning is more complex and more serious. The dairyman, or the woman who milks, is allowed to sleep in the village, and have intercourse with women of other castes.

The highest grade of dairy is the one wherein the Tord is milked from the Taevallol or the Malgars clan. The restrictions on its conduct are numerous and the ritual of washing and shaving is more complex. The milkers wear specific clothes and the milk is delivered to the village by a special bearer, who also carries the milk to the village. The milk is then decanted into special vessels, which are then boiled and consecrated. The milk is then served in a special vessel, which is washed before each milking.

A vessel called mus is kept buried in the buffalo-pen of the chief village of each clan. If this has been tampered with, or if a buffalo has been killed or the bell of the dairy-places is removed, it is considered ritually impure. A new vessel has to be procured and consecrated, the ceremony, however, being considered the consecration of the buffalo.

Another ceremony is performed on the fourteenth day after the last milking of the sacred buffalo, these being conducted on the sanctity of the milk of the sacred buffaloes. At the present time the buffaloes themselves are not regarded with any special veneration, and the cattles are treated as ordinary cattle and are not regarded with any special reverence. The bulls are not shorn, and the milk is not consecrated. Another ceremony called mus is performed on the day of the buffalo-pee of the chief village of each clan (see above).

3. Sacrifice and offerings. An important ceremony is one in which the calf is sacrificed and its flesh eaten, being the principal offering on which a Toda should eat the flesh of a buffalo. At the time of the ceremony, which is regarded as sacrificial, takes place three times a year, and the dairies it should probably be annual, but now takes place more frequently. After a prayer in which the calf is asked to appear to certain deities, and after it has been struck with a log of the tree, the animal is killed by being struck with a log of the tadr tree, the bark and leaves of which are prominent in the dairy ritual. The right forelimb of the animal is separated, being placed near the middle of the fire at which the flesh is roasted and eaten together with the pelvis, feet, and head by the dairymen.

There is an annual ceremony in which a fire is lighted by the palol at the feet of certain hills, the summits of which are believed to be occupied by gods. Clauses are added to the ordinary prayer asking that fruit may ripen and honey abound.
monies now to be described are more occasional and depend on the commission of some act which had placed the dead man in one or another of the different clans. In case illness or some other misfortune upon the offender. In these cases the central feature of the ceremony is an offering to the gods of either a buffalo or a buffalo-calf, a piece of the cloth worn by the mom sacred dairymen, or a ring.

The simplest kind of offering, often made when some mistake has occurred inadvertently in a ceremony, is to kill or part with a buffalo, but allow it to die a natural death. In this case there is little ceremony, the donor simply stating that he is giving the buffalo to the gods while he salutes an elder. A more ceremonial offering of a buffalo-calf is made if a misfortune is ascribed to some serious offence against the dairy, such as stealing milk or its products, quarrelling in the dairy, or going too late in an important state. In this case the calf is given by the offender to the people of the other kudr of his clan. All members of the kudr of the offender have to leave the village for a month, at the end of which, after purification with fasting, the calf takes place on two certain ceremonial stones to be received by members of the other kudr. For minor offences a piece of cloth or a ring is offered with similar rites, the offering passing in everyday cases from the kudr of the offender to the people of the other kudr of the clan. In all cases prayers are offered, which include in some cases supplications for the health of the people and their buffaloes.

4. Divination—The offerings just described are made as the result of the finding of diviners called teoul or god-men. The decisions are given when the diviners are in a frenzy and in a language which is said to be Malayalam. It is believed that they are the utterances of some of the gods. The diviners are often consulted at funerals, usually to determine the cause of death or illness either of men or of buffaloes, or the cause of any harm which has happened to a dairy or its contents. In the case of illness they usually find either that the patient has committed some offence against the dairy or that he is the victim of the sorcery of the Kurumbas.

5. Birth and childhood ceremonies.—Two ceremonies are performed during pregnancy; in the first the wrists of the woman are burnt while she is undergoing seclusion, while the second ceremony is that already mentioned in which the presentation of a baby girl determines the fatherhood of the child. Various ceremonies occur at the end of a period of seclusion which follows childbirth. Until a child is three months old no one but the mother is allowed to see its face, and at that age a ceremony is performed in which the face is uncovered and the child is allowed to look at the sun. Ceremonies are also performed when the name is given, when the ears are pierced, and when a lock of hair is cut, the last ceremony only taking place on the day after the second funeral (see below) of a Tarthal man.

6. Death.—The funeral ceremonies are very elaborate and take place on several different occasions, often separated by many months. At the first ceremony the body is cremated on a pyre, the orthodox position being face downwards. Several rites are performed before cremation, among them being one in which a cloth is given by a near relative of the deceased to men who have married into the family, the cloth being then placed on the corpse by the wife or one of the male relatives of the dead man, if one of the Taivalis. In most Tarthal clans the body is placed before cremation in a special three-roomed dairy. Buffaloes are killed, varying in number in the different clans, and the hind,enden the barber dead man is made to clap one of the horns, and lamentations are uttered in which each person addresses the dead buffalo by the same term of relationship as he would use to the barber. Immediately before the body is burned, it is swung three times over the fire upon a representation of a bier. When the body is consumed, a piece of the skin of the dead man is wrapped with some of the hair in a cloak, for the second funeral ceremony. In the interval these relics are kept in a special village, where they are saluted by any Todas who visit the place. Formerly the body was smoke-dried, after it had been eviscerated, if the cremation ceremony was delayed.

At the second funeral ceremony the earth-throwing rite is repeated. At a Tarthal funeral a ceremony is performed in which the relics are sprinkled with the blood of a buffalo mixed with the bark of the fudr tree. This is done by Teivali man, wearing the cloak in which the remains have been wrapped, after which he touches the remains with a bow and arrow. Buffaloes are killed, as at the first ceremony, and the men dance with a tall pole obtained from the Teivali man. The fire is then lighted at night the final ceremony takes place, in which the relics together with a number of other objects are burned within a stone-circle. The ashes are interred at an opening in the circle, and the grave is covered with a stone. A bell is then rung and a new pot broken on the stone, after which all go away without turning back to look at the resting-place of the dead.

The dead are believed to go to a place called Ammodr in the west and below the earth. The god On presides over this world of the dead, where the people live and work when the life is over on earth. The dead travel to Ammodr by a definite route, which differs in some respects for Tartharol and Teivali. In each case the dead perform acts on the way by which they lose their love of the earth and regain the vigour of health.

The dead have also to cross a bridge of thread, running the risk of falling into a river full of leeches. Those Todas who have offended against the dairy or have been selfish and jealous are thus delayed in their journey to Ammodr. One of the Tarthal clans, that of Taradal, has an Ammodr, distinct from the rest, at Forth in the island, where there are still some Todas settlements.

7. Sacred days and numbers.—Many Toda ceremonies must be performed on definite days of the week, and this is probably connected with an institution in which each clan has one or more days on which a large number of activities are forbidden. Thus, on the madukt, or village day, neither dairymen nor women are allowed to leave the village, and nothing may be sold or taken away. There are various restrictions on coadnut, and funeral and other ceremonies may not be held. Among the Tarthal there are similar restrictions on days sacred to each kind of dairy, so that in a village which has dairies of several different kinds few days of the week are left for the performance of the ordinary activities of life.

Sacred numbers are very prominent in the ritual, three and seven being the most important. Many ritual acts are performed three times, a threefold rite being usually associated in the dairy ceremony, and seven times in the cremation ceremony. "01" This number is also prominent in the funeral rites, especially in connexion with the ceremonial throwing of earth and the swinging of the body over the pyre before it is burned. The sevenfold performance of ceremonial acts only occurs in the
to certain privileges, such as the holy communion, or serving instead of letters of recommendation or other forms of credential.

1. Antiquity. Many vague statements have been made as to the use of tokens or talismans (sympo-

bola, synhemata) for identifying persons who had been initiated into mysteries, but nothing of the

kind has been identified. Tesserae were largely used in Roman times for giving admission to shows or

ingenuity in the distribution of grain (tes-
serrae frumentariae), and some of these bear Christ-

ian symbols (one is extant in ivory bearing

an anchor, two fishes and ΟΩ). The Christian

distribution of alms and also for the control of various

payments due to the personnel of churches and

religious bodies. Such are, e.g., an anonymous

bronze tessera with the busts of the Virgin and St.

Demetrius, and another with God the Father

(insc. Ἅγιος Ἅγιος Ἅγιος) and a bunch of grapes on

the reverse, which, it has been suggested, may have

been used for the payment of almsgivers. The

pieces used for charitable distributions are inscribed

(in Greek) with such texts as 'He that hath pity

upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord,' 'Blessed are

the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.'

2. Méraux of the Roman Catholic Church.
The token, or jeton de présence, issued to the clergy in collegiate churches as a record of their presence at mass, at the canonical hours, and at other offices, in order that they might claim the statutory payment for their services, was mos-


to be formally known as a méreau. The Latin word

merculus (merculus, marculus, etc.) is derived from

merculus, from merus, 'clean.' Other names met with are: plomb (plonc, plommet, plumbeus, etc.), even when made of metal other than lead (plommes de cuivre at Aire in 1557), enseigne, signum, marque, marcel (apollus), monetae capitus, simbolum, etc. Many of

these terms, signifying merely distribution tokens, on the presentation of which a share in funds or privileges could be claimed, were not

confined to the tokens of religious bodies, but extended to all kinds of corporations. It is un-

certain when méraux capitulaires were first intro-

duced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral

church of Tours (1216) of a distributio mera
tinalium does not necessarily refer to such méraux as distinct from ordinary coins, and the

méraux which are mentioned in charters of 1167

and 1173 are passes, or tesserae of identification,

1 Cf. the phrase of Tertullian, di Præscript. xx.: 'dum est

tessera, oportet se hanc esse indicium, et esse signum

identitatis, et esse consensum hospitalitatis.'

TOKUN. — See POLYNESIA.

TOKUN. — In its broadest sense a token is any

portable object serving as a sign or proof of authen-
ticity or credit, by which the issuer guarantees

that the claim indicated by the token will be satis-

fied if its presentation in the proper quarter. In

numismatics it signifies a coin-like piece of metal

or other material representing money of much

more than its intrinsic value, for which money the

issuer undertakes to redeem the token when pre-

sented; it is also loosely applied to tickets admitt-
were given to each of the poor who attended at catechism in preparation for communion, and of one *pataur* to children who were zealous in preparation for their first communion.

The series known as church-*mœreux* are made in usually lead, copper, or brass; the ruder specimens in the baser metal may be cast in moulds, but a large proportion are struck from engraved dies. The sincerest praise for casting the *mœreux* of the parish church of St. Julien at Amboise, which is noted in letters-patent of 1478, are still in existence. Non-metallic substances such as leather or paper were also used, but specimens in such material, if they ever existed, are very rare; a few were made in demolishing a wall of the cathedral of Limoges to indicate that *mœreux* of leather were used there. A few typical inscriptions and types found on *mœreux* may be mentioned. The St. Onor pieces are inscribed 'Moneta Ecclesiae S. Anonumari', with the arms of the chapter, and 'Presentibus abutur'; those of St. Martin of Tours read 'Distributis pro beneficatis'. The series of the St. Chapelle dating from after 1448 reads 'Capella Regni Iisalii Palacios Parisionis'. An ordinance of that year shows that those used for predecessors of the cantor bore a long cross with the crown of thorns on it, those for church and clerks had a royal crown; other kinds then in use were ordered to be withdrawn; such were marked *pia*, *pia* incisa, *pia* incisa, *pia* incisa, *pia* incisa, *pia* incisa, *pia* incisa.

Dates do not appear before the 16th century. The value in most instances cannot be appraised, as the pieces are represented in a number of archives as VI. D. T. ('six deniers tournois'). A series mentioned in the archives of St. Pierre d'Aire (Artois), and described by Sismondi, may be considered the same type.

There were (a) *plombes des matines* or *deniers Marschais*, worth one dundre Parise, distributed daily after matins, and paid from the fund known as *du Marschais*; these occur from 1634 to 1637; (b) *plombes de la Croix* or *de la procession du vendredi* and the *plombes Lansier* or *du territoire*; these represent particular foundations, and were of different values, given to canons, chantry, or other clergy; they are not mentioned after the 17th century; (c) *plombes chanoines*, i.e., *moneta anniversariares*; given to those who assisted at anniversary obituary services; (d) *plombes des heures canonales*, instituted 21 July 1567, distributed to each canon present at the canonical hours; (e) *plombes des rentes*, distributed in the 17th and 18th centuries; the names said to have been those of canons who assisted the celebrant as deacons or sub-deacons; (f) *plombes des jours capitulaires*; (g) *plombes des chapitres spirituels*; (h) *plombes des rentes*, poor priests or clerks employed by canons to take their more arduous duties, as early as 1465; (i) *plombes de la confession* or *du cabinet privé de M. de Guise*; (j) *plombes des chanoines*; (k) *plombes des séries*, from about 1350 down to 1790, for offices of the conformity.

Some specimens of the *moneta anniversariares* have survived; one belonging to St. Pierre d'Aire lies on the obverse a death's head, on the reverse a bone and a key in saltire between three stars. Another inscribed 'Moneta annivseriariurn' has a crowned D between two lilies; on the other side *Requisitum in pace*, the mark of value 'XII.' and three lilies. Yet another is inscribed 'Obit solonen' and dated 1585; and there is a pair of *mœreux* inscribed 'Orato Deum pro vita' and 'Orate Deum pro defunctis' respectively.

A subsidiary use of tokens, more or less corresponding to the use as communion tokens, has at times prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church. There is a tradition that Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's time made use of such tokens in order to distinguish those who conformed from those who did not. Communion certificates in the form of tokens or tickets were given to those going to communion at St. Andrew's, Glasgow, from 1849.

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2 Described in *J. G. below.*
to 1550. At certain churches in Rome communicants at Easter receive them after they have been present.

3. Tokens of the Reformed Church. — The earliest mention of mèroæus (marræus, marræ, merroæ, murræos, murræos) or tokens used in the Reformed Church abroad is in the registers of the Geneva Council; on 30th Jan. 1560 Calvin advised their introduction, but there is no evidence that they were actually used. On 4th Mar., 1560, the French Reformed Church was instructed to follow the example of the English Churches, and on 17th Mar. the English Churches in France should follow the example of the French Churches. On the other hand, the French Protestants immediately adopted Calvin's suggestion, and there are tokens of the Walloon Church at Amsterdam as early as 1558. These tokens (which in the first Helvetic Confession are called tesseræ) were used for quite a different purpose from that of the mèroæus of the Roman Catholic Church; they were certificates, issued to all persons considered after examination of the East satisfactory in regard to religious knowledge and moral character, admitting them to partake of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In 1554, e.g., Mme. Duplessis-Mornay and all her household were refused communion at Montauban because she dressed her hair in her court fashion instead of wearing the Huguenot hood. Extant specimens of these French Reformed Church tokens show to be not earlier than the 17th cent.; they bear appropriate types, such as a chalice, or a shepherd feeding his flock, and the initials of the names of the churches, and sometimes the date: e.g., 1615. No crains rieu, petit troupeau also occur. Copper mèroæus with an angel, shepherd, and the inscription 'In unum condeam reliquum Israel, Mich. 2, or 'Christ est leallaxe, vit, 1646.' Copper mèroæus of the 17th cent. workmanship, were probably made for Protestants in Paris. Another similar piece reads 'Christ habite en os ne cons par fo,' and bears a flaming heart transfixied by two arrows.

The first French church to employ this kind of mèroæus was at Nioues (before 1603). Except at Sedan and Troyes (where it was introduced in 1664), none of the Reformed churches in France is known to have used it. It was especially popular in Poitou, no fewer than 25 churches in that district being represented. Such pieces are common from 1640 to 1680, and are often very rude, being the workmanship of the elders themselves. The material is usually lead, tin, or a mixture, and they are most commonly cast (five moulds are extant), though some are struck. The French Reformed Church in Bavaria began to use mèroæus in 1689, and the same mould has remained in use down to present times.

In England the books of St. Saviour's Church, Southwark, show that communion tokens were used as early as 1559. It was the custom at Southwark to collect Church dues by 'selling the communion'; thus, in 1556, 2000 tokens were sold at 9d. each, and a similar practice prevailed at St. Peter Mancroft, Norwich. At Durham and elsewhere in the 17th cent. it was the custom to take Easter reckonings of such people as partook of the holy communion, and account with them and deliver and receive tokens. The names of communicants were written down, and they received tokens which at the time of the administration of the Eucharist were demanded again. So that it might be known who had paid their Easter offerings and who had failed to do so. The use of tokens in Presbyterian churches in England was derived from Scotland, and are often very rude. The earliest actually bearing a date is of 1724 (Eaton). Tokens are known of the Established Church of Scotland, the Independent Presbyterian party, the Refounded Presbyterian Church, or Camerons, the English Presbyterian Church, the Associate Secession Congregation, the Relief Church, the General Associate Congregation, the United Associate Congregation, the United Presbyterian Church, and the Free Church of Scotland. Printed cards have now, as in Scotland, generally ousted metallic tokens.

But it was in Scotland that the sacramental token was most generally used. By the law of the Church of Scotland, no one was permitted to come to the Lord's Supper unless he had been provided with a communion token, which was issued after examination had shown the would-be communicant to be of good character and properly instructed. The tokens were sometimes kept as certificates of character, serving the same purpose as ancient tesseræ. The Scottish tokens were at first probably written or stamped cards; such 'tickets' were in use as early as 2nd May 1550 at St. Andrews, and continued often to be used after metal tokens were introduced; the word 'ticket' is frequently used indifferently of either. Written tokens were used as late as 1615.

The date of the introduction of metal tokens has not been determined. The use of them has continued in both the Presbyterian Churches and in the Scottish Episcopal Church down to the present day, although in the present century they have been almost entirely superseded by printed cards. Recently established denominations, such as the United Free Church and the Free Presbyterian Church, appear to follow the latter. The metallic tokens are most often made of lead, tin, or a mixture, but brass, iron, copper, and even leather (the last only at the Seccession congregation at Ceres, 1748) have been employed; the Crown Court Chapel, London, and the Presbyterian Church at Charleston used silver tokens, and for the first Reformed Presbyterian Church of New York they were made of ivory. The tokens were sometimes cast in stone moulds, but are sometimes struck from dies. The oldest extant dated piece is of 1648, but a dated one of 1588 is recorded (Glasgow), and at first they were distinguished merely by the initials of the parish (and this occurs as late as 1866); later came the initials of the minister, with 'M.' prefixed. Incuse numerals sometimes indicate the date, and in some cases the number was very large. Religious symbols (heart, burning bush, vine, lily, chalice, and bread) appear towards the end of the 17th century. The Covenanters' conventional tokens bear such as 'Holliness to the Lord,' without indication of parish or date; and texts are common from the beginning of the 18th century. The cross, which is common on Episcopalian tokens, also occurs on some of Presbyterian origin. In some large towns we find the burgh arms and the initials of the deans of gild. Views of churches first appear in the 18th century.

From Scotland the Presbyterians naturally carried the usage, not only to England, but to other countries such as Ireland, where the oldest dated token known to have been struck is one of the Old Presbyterian Congregation of Larne, of the year 1700. Stamps and moulds for many of these Irish tokens are illustrated by G. R. and D. B. 1

4. Monnaies des innocens et des fous. — A curious phase of Church life is illustrated by satirical 'coins' issued by the bishops and other dignitaries (including archbishops, cardinals, and even popes) who were elected by the clergy at the ecclesiastical saturnalia known as the fètes des innocens or fètes des fous. Such festivities flourished, according to documentary evidence, from 16th to the 17th cent., especially at Aniens, but also at other places such as Chartres, Reims, Laon, 

1 See reference under Literature.
TOLERATION.

TOLERATION.—1. The policy. — The word ‘toleration’ in its legal, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal application has a peculiarly limited significance. It commotes a restraining from prohibition and persecution. Nevertheless it suggests a latent disappearance, and it usually refers to a condition in which the freedom which it secures is limited and conditional. Toleration is not equivalent to religious liberty, and it falls far short of religious equality. It assumes the existence of an authority which might have been coercive, but which for reasons of its own is not pushed to extremes. It implies a voluntary inaction, a polite leniency. The motives that induce a policy of toleration are various, such as mere weakness and inability to enforce prohibitory measures, mere indifference, the desire to secure conciliation by concessions, the wish to persuade that ‘force is no remedy,’ the interest in the wealth and humidity that shrink from a claim to infallibility, the charity that endures the objectionable, respect for the right of private judgment.

However lamentable the fact may be, it should not surprise us that greater intolerance has been found in the Christian nations than among any other peoples. Polytheism allows of an indefinitely enlarging pantheon. A level theology admits the existence of separate national gods among the various nations. But monotheism not only denies the existence of any such divinities: it regards the homage offered to them as a profanation from the worship due to the true God. Christianity, therefore, as well as the Judaic, on which it is based, is necessarily intellectually intolerant. The same idea applies to Muhammadanism, which is always an intolerant religion as regards doctrines, even when it is not actively persecuting and faithless. Then both Christianity and Muhammadanism claim to be universal. What the latter calls ‘missionary work’ the former terms ‘apostleship.’ The positive missionary work which this fact implies easily passes over into covert acts for the repression of idolatries and polytheism, contrary as they are to the genius of Islam and Semitic. Add to this the fact that moral earnestness, at its best moralizing, and at its worst mocking, is never altogether absent even from the worst fanaticism, urges the devotees of a missionary religion towards a militancy which the heretical adverse to the moralizing, there is none of them, and if the paganism is not tolerant, this is generally due to resentment against those who have attacked it, its upholders are the real grounds of action. The persecution of the Jews and the adherents of Jahweh by Josephus was occasioned by the prophet’s vehement opposition to the introduction of the rite of the Phoenicians into the Roman religion. The persecution of the Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes was due to their refusal to admit Hellenizing practices into their national life.
2. Indian toleration.—It has been asserted that Hinduism is the most tolerant of religions. This may be true as regards others than Hindus, because, being entirely racial and hereditary, it cannot proselytize. Judaism is also racial and hereditary, but not exclusively so, because it can admit proselytes. Hinduism has no opening for such. Accordingly, it must tolerate alien faiths, unless, like Tibetan Buddhism, it forbids immigration. Akoka, the Constantinian of Buddhism in India (3rd cent. B.C.), had monuments of his legislation cut in stone expressing his liberal treatment of religion as follows:

The king, beloved of the god, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion, whereas this is the root— to reverence one’s own faith and never revile that of others.

The Muhammadan invasion put an end to toleration in India by introducing cruel persecution of Hinduism with a wholesale destruction of the temples; but this was intermittent, the invasions of Turks, etc., taking the form of raids, from the 11th till the 17th cent., when the Moghul empire was established in Delhi. Akbar, the most famous of the Moghul emperors, aimed at combining all the inhabitants of his religion in his own ecleticism. He held disputations in his palace every Friday when Brahmins, Buddhists, and Parsis expounded their views as freely as Muhammadans.

3. Greek toleration.—The toleration of the Greeks for great varieties of religious beliefs may be attributed to their intellectual breadth, but also to the syncretism which admitted a plurality of divinities into its pantheon. Accordingly, as Adam remarks,

There was comparatively little persecution for religious beliefs in antiquity. Religious institutions and ceremonies were carefully guarded; but in respect of dogsma the situation was another. We may take from a remark of the Pausanias Socrates that the Athenians in general cared little what a man believed, so long as he did not attempt to proselytise.¹

The Orphic believers, who, as the same authority states, were 'analogous to modern dissenters,' were tolerated since they showed no sign of abstaining from the religious services which the city ordained. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, were attacked because they used their religious organization for political ends.² The death penalty for heresy appears to have been due mainly to animosity against the philosopher on account of his friendship with proscribed leaders of the aristocratic party. He was seventy years old at the time, and his daring teaching had long been tolerated without any interference on the part of the authorities.

4. Roman toleration.—It was a principle of Roman state policy to allow conquered nations to continue the practice of their indigenous religious rites ('Cujus regio ejus religio'). The old Latin cults were not propagandist, and they admitted of alien rites for alien peoples. Nevertheless difficulties arose, imposing limits on this easy tolerance in several ways: (1) by provincials coming to Italy and even to Rome with a claim to bring their own religions with them; (2) by missionaries of these alien faiths propagating them and by Roman citizens adopting them; (3) by the enforcement of the new state worship of the emperor throughout the empire; (4) by the dread of dangerous magic and the suspicion of immoral and cruel proceedings among the adherents of the foreign cults; (5) by a notion that public calamities had been caused by neglect of the worship of the old divinities ('athism').

But there were differences. The Twelve Tables had forbidden the introduction of new gods into Rome. Nevertheless for commercial reasons the Jews had a dispensation granted them to practise their religion in various parts of the empire, including the imperial city. But the Jews were supposed to be confined to their own quarters in each locality—the ghetto. They spread their ideas, however, especially among women of the upper classes, in particular in Rome and Damascus, where it became the fashion to 'Sabbatize.' At first the Christians obtained tolerance on account of their Jewish origin, and it was not their separation from the Jews that marked which was and became marked that they were interfered with by the authorities; nor was that the case at once even then. The Acts of the Apostles shows us Christians protected by Roman magistrates and police when attacked by Jews. W. M. Ramsay has shown reason for thinking that the tolerance of the Flavian emperors did not assure the protection of the Christians from local outbreaks; Nevertheless, on the whole, previous to the great Decian persecution the authorities were not disposed to initiate active measures against them. When Pliny wrote to Trajan expressing his perplexity at the Christianity of Bithynia and the consequent desertion of the pagan altars, the emperor replied that he was not till ordering him (1) not to seek out the Christians, (2) to discourage informers, but (3) to punish convicted persons who had been brought before him for judgment. This rescript has been described by some as a pernicious order and by others as a degree for the easing of the case of the persecuted Christians. In fact it was both. Evidently Trajan was opposed to active persecution and favoured a policy of leniency; but his clear pronouncement represents a recognition of definitely convicted Christians left no alternative but sentence of death for such people. This was the first formal order to that effect. Previously Christianity was implicitly illegal, henceforth it was to be explicitly illegal. In this respect the rescript was a limitation on the Roman policy of toleration. The persecution which had been carried on with exceptional ferocity at Lyons and Vienne under the gentle Marcus Aurelius was stayed by his worthless son Commodus owing to the intercession of his concubine Marcia, who appears to have been a Christian catechumen. This act of toleration cannot be raised to the level of state policy. It was purely personal in its origin, and it emanated from an unprincipled character.

When the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians, the persecution which he had instigated was brought to an end by his son Gallienus, who issued a rescript in A.D. 290. It has not been preserved. But Eusebius¹ quotes a letter from this emperor to the bishops of Egypt written in the following year, in which he gives directions in accordance with his rescript. He states that he has issued an order throughout all the world encouraging all to come out of their religious retreats and ordering that no one may molest them. Eusebius adds that there is another ordinance addressed to other bishops in


² See Adam, p. 335.
which the emperor grants them permission to recover their cemeteries in which they worshipped (τοίχοι τοῦ προσωπικοῦ). Gallienus’s rescript has been claimed as the first Roman edict of toleration; but Ulterior and Nasact have shown that our knowledge of it does not indicate that Christianity was now made a religio licita. Two things only are ordered: the Christians are not to be molested; but property is to be restored. Since the churches had registered themselves as burial cemeteries, and mutual benefit societies (collegia fratr Harum, collegia tenuiorum), it was in their social relations and with regard to their possession of property that Gallienus was now protecting the Christians. Nevertheless, although Christianity was still illegal, in point of fact, since it was not to be molested, this was a policy of toleration. It cannot be justified on grounds of consistency; but practical policies are often guilty of inconsistency and prove themselves all the more humane for their freedom from legal pedantry. In the line that Gallienus was taking we see the exact opposite to his father’s calculating measures of repression, devised with the deliberate, but now hopeless, design of stamping out Christianity. Gallienus’s mild policy by no means gave to the Christians the legal rights which could assure them against future persecution. They enjoyed in consequence a whole generation of immunity from attack; but all along this was in an unstable equilibrium, since nothing had been done to settle it on a sound legal basis. We might compare the situation to that of the Stuart ‘Indulgences.’ Christianity was not yet a legal religion.

Legalized toleration did not appear till after the last and greatest persecution. It was then seen in two stages. The first of these was spasmodic, insincere, and illogical, but still definite and serious. It was a policy of pressure on the Christians, which bears the name of the senior emperor Diocletian, who had been his reluctant associate in it, seized with death-bed terrors, Issued an edict that to be a pagan one, that was an act of a Roman emperor (April, 311). Galerius first takes credit to himself for endeavouring to bring the Christians back to the ancient order. He recognizes the natural Christian bond and hold their assemblies, provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline. Galerius concludes with the remarkable sentence, ‘and for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god.’

Toleration was not yet the settled policy of the empire. Where it was practised, it was too much subject to the caprice of the individual ruler. Maximian at Rome was openly anti-Christian and Maximian Daza elaborated subtle devices for deconstruction of Christianity; even later, during part of his period of government, Licinius favoured the pagans to the detriment of the Christians. The final stage was reached in the Edict of Milan. That magnificent Magna Charta of religious liberty issued from a meeting of Constantine with Licinius at Milan in the year 312, assured the defeat of Maxentius. Maximian’s erosion of the order of toleration granted by Galerius was an occasion which came to it, but the new emperor was much more statesmanlike than its curious predecessor, resting on a broader basis, breathing a nobler spirit, and establishing a sure policy. It was issued throughout the whole empire in the year 313. The Edict of Milan is the work of the great emperor Constantine, who induced his colleague Licinius to join him in it.

There can be no doubt that Constantine was thoroughly convinced by the enlightened principles that it contains. His colleague’s assent must be ascribed to political necessity, and subsequent events showed that Licinius was no means loyal to it except under compulsion. Unfortunately, the original rescript has been lost, but Licinius’s edition of it, sent out a few months later, has been preserved, both the original Latin by Lactantius, and a Greek translation, slightly differing verbally, by Eusebius. The toleration granted is absolute and unconditional. It is expressly applied to the Christians, for whose benefit it clearly shows that it was primarily intended. But it also includes devotees of all other religions. This went far beyond the spirit of the ancient world, and indeed only occasionally and in the teaching of exceptional and rare minds has such a tolerance appeared until quite modern times, when it has been seen in Cavour’s dictum of ‘a free Church in a free State.’

Constantine did not live up to his own principle. No sooner did he adopt Christianity than he began to patronize it, and his patronage soon took the form of interference and control. The Christian emperors were rarely more tolerant than the Church of their day, and as this Church was stern in the denunciation of heresies, the government stepped in to give effect to the ecclesiastical sentence. Sometimes it went farther, the emperor taking sides and enforcing his own will. If this was not enough to root out heretics, if in favour of heresy, as in the support of Ariusianism by Constantius and later by Valens, or for the protection of heretics, if in favour of pagans, as when the state, the policy of toleration so brilliantly anticipated by Constantine is now buried out of sight, like an unloved birth. The tables are turned, and the party coming to persecute, comes to be itself persecuted. First magical rites are prohibited as dangerous to the State. Then the worship of the old gods is prohibited and their altars and temples are destroyed. The most conspicuous figure in this anti-pagan crusade. On the other hand, it is so to be noted that the Christian emperors never went the lengths in murderous violence to which the persecuting pagan emperors had gone. There was nothing approaching the devastating Decian and Valentinian persecutions. On the other hand, when the death penalty was inflicted this was nearly always for magic and sorcery, not as the suppression of a false doctrine, but for the expiration of a dangerous practice. The persecution of paganism naturally led its champions to preach toleration. Licinius association of the Romans, and after a jibe at their divisions, for which he suggests he has supplied a wholesome corrective, he gives orders that his subjects may again be Christians (τους Χριστιανους) and hold their assemblies, provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline. Galerius concludes with the remarkable sentence, and for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god. Tolerance was not yet the settled policy of the empire. Where it was practised, it was too much subject to the caprice of the individual ruler. Maximian at Rome was openly anti-Christian and Maximian Daza elaborated subtle devices for the destruction of Christianity; even later, during part of his period of government, Licinius favoured the pagans to the detriment of the Christians. The final stage was reached in the Edict of Milan. That magnificent Magna Charta of religious liberty issued from a meeting of Constantine with Licinius at Milan in the year 312, assimilating the defeat of Maxentius. Maximian’s erosion of the order of toleration granted by Galerius was an occasion which came to it, but the new emperor was much more statesmanlike than its curious predecessor, resting on a broader basis, breathing a nobler spirit, and establishing a sure policy. It was issued throughout the whole empire in the year 313. The Edict of Milan is the work of the great emperor Constantine, who induced his colleague Licinius to join him in it.

1 De Morto Pers., 43.
2 H.E., iv. 5.
3 cf. Sir. Apocryphon (Early Church).
4 Ad Sulpicius, 2.
5 See Dion. Inst. v. 19.
influence of the rites of the Church. But with the rise of the Inquisition in the 13th cent., a greater rigour in ecclesiastical discipline crushed out the spirit of tolerance.

7. Toleration in the Renaissance and the Reformation.-The irreligious and pagan habits that accumulated in the Renaissance issued in an easy indifference which favoured as much as possible the personal views of the individual. But the intellectual breadth and view of it engendered went farther and gave rise to a reasoned doctrine of Toleration. Sir Thomas More, while sanctioning the execution of a Protestant, admitted the abstract excellence of the opposite course. Montaigne's scepticism and liberal idea of life made for toleration. On higher grounds Erasmus laboured incessantly for the same end, combining inimitable wit with immense learning, exposing the folly as much as the wickedness of ignorant, narrow-minded persecution. The duty of absolute toleration was insisted on by Castello, a Frenchman, who had been a friend of Calvin when the Reformer was a professor at Basel. Denouncing the execution of Servetus, he argued that, if the end of Christianity be the diffusion of a spirit of benevolence, it is damnable with the worst of religions.

No matter of the Reformers were not advocates of universal toleration; but Zwingli regarded error as not inherently blameworthy and held that it should be tolerated. He went farther and showed a comprehensive appreciation of human excellency apart from religious differences.

Laelius Socinus was a pronounced advocate of religious liberty, and a clear assertion of the principle is put forth in the Socinian Catechism of Ritschow. The German Anabaptists and the Dutch Arminians also advocated this principle.

8. The German Settlement. — The Peace of Augsburg (1555) was arranged between the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans; it excluded the Reformed Church, both Zwinglian and Calvinistic, as well as all the minor sects. Further, this arrangement left it to the princes of the several states to decide which of the two creeds should be adopted and imposed on their subjects. Disagreements between the parties concerned and the exclusion of the Reformed Churches led to the Thirty Years' War. This was not entirely extinguished with the final Peace of Westphalia (24th Oct. 1648), to which there were three parties—the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Reformers. It made provision for none of the minor sects. The princes were allowed to pass from one of the three religions to the other and to require their selected religion to be imposed on their subjects to the exclusion of all other religions, or to admit other religions, as they saw fit. This right was called the *jus reformandi*. It implied a limited and optional toleration.

Subsequently two influences arose to widen the conception of religious liberty: (1) Pietism, which, as both non-dogmatic and charitable, tended towards universal toleration; and (2) the effect of the school of natural law. Pufendorf maintained that no one could be compelled to embrace a religion and held it to be a moral duty that differences should exist within the Church. Christian Thomasius, the typical Illuminist, bases the principle of religious liberty on his fundamental conception of law. He distinguishes morality from law, on the ground that law is enacted by a sovereign, whereas morality cannot be coerced. More is this the case with religion. The difference between the sphere of the prince and the clergy is that it is the duty of the prince to rule, and the clergy should fight heresy with reason, not by appealing to the sword. With the exception of Walther's canon, he has envisaged the same principles in all his works. Thomasius devotes three treatises especially to the exposition of them, viz. the two 'Programmata,' *Programma de tolerandis religiones (1706)*, and *Programma varia testimonia Martinii Lutheri de tolerandis religiones discendi (1717)*, and the more popular work in the vernacular entitled *Das Richt evangelischer*.

9. England and America.—In the 16th cent., under the Tudors, the extreme Puritan party, which had shared with other Protestants in the persecutions of Roman Catholic times, did not obtain religious liberty. But the principle of toleration was maintained by the Baptists and the Congregationalists, although there were some limits to the applications of it. The early Congregationalists would exclude from its privileges both Unitarians and Roman Catholics, the latter as dangerous to true religion and the former from Protestant liberty. But John Robinson, a large-minded man of liberal views, drew up a covenant for the Pilgrim Fathers who sailed in the 'Mayflower' and founded New England. The first article of this covenant conferred equal civil and religious rights on every member of any commonwealth. A little later the colony of Maryland, founded by charter from Charles I., granted toleration to Roman Catholics as well as to Protestants. Its first law runs as follows: 'No person professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be in any way molested or disconvenienced for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof.' The Pilgrim Fathers, who had claimed liberty at home, have been blamed for the inconsistency of intolerance in their own colony when they were settled in America. The defence is that the exclusive theocracy that they established implied that they regarded themselves as a church rather than as a State, and as such would refuse membership to unfrank perceivable types of religion should be adopted and imposed on their subjects. Disagreements between the parties concerned and the exclusion of the Reformed Churches led to the Thirty Years' War. This was not entirely extinguished with the final Peace of Westphalia, to which there were three parties—the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Reformers. It made provision for none of the minor sects. The princes were allowed to pass from one of the three religions to the other and to require their selected religion to be imposed on their subjects to the exclusion of all other religions, or to admit other religions, as they saw fit. This right was called the *jus reformandi*. It implied a limited and optional toleration.

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Ficht in Theologischen Streitgeleit (1656). In these works he maintains that all dissenters are to be excluded, and that they do not disturb the public peace. Frederick William I. of Prussia used the *reformandi* in favour of allowing Roman Catholics to live in his Protestant state, and his son Frederick the Great adopted a policy of toleration for all religions with the cynical idea that, since they were not the same, they could be carried on in the same way that the people of the same city, which were divided among many different nationalities and religious liberty should be conceded. In a rescript of 15th June 1720 he says: 'All religions are equal and good so long as they do not perturb the public peace.' There was a temporary reaction under Frederick William II., after which the right of religious liberty spread first in his state, and his son, the other German states, although the territorial state recognition of the three favoured religions remained—a policy of general toleration, but not of religious equality.

10. The English Problem.—In the 17th cent., neither the bulk of the Presbyterians nor the Episcopal party as a whole had any idea of toleration. Under the early Stuarts Land and the High Church, having the upper hand, persecuted the Presbyterians. Under the Long Parliament the Presbyterians tried to force the Covenant on the whole nation. Cromwell took a wider view and ordered his 'tiers' not to molest Protestant godly men who preached the gospel, whatever their ecclesiastical principles might be, and he gave the Jews a legal footing in England.

At this time the Baptists, the Congregationalists, and others known as Independents or Independents maintained the principle of religious liberty—the last-named body basing it on their doctrine of the inner light, which excluded all ecclesiastical and official interference with the conscience of the individual. The protest of the five Independents at the Westminster Assembly (1643), which was mainly Presbyterian
in composition, maintained the right of religious liberty.

Later, on the Presbyterian side, Richard Baxter laboured for large measures of comprehension, and John Goodwin, generally regarded as a Congrega-
tionalist, but described by Hutnini as 'a Puritan sui generis—a rationalist Puritan,' maintained that every religion, sect, or schism should be tolerated so long as there was no attempt to interfere with the security of the State. Milton, claimed by both the Presbyterian and Congregationalists, but in reality committed to either party, in triumphantly vindicating the freedom of the press, pleaded eloquently for religious toleration. In the Areop.
apagitica he showed that persecution was both unnecessary for the preservation of truth and a hindrance to the discovery of truth. He would tolerate all Protestants, including Socinians, Arminians, and Anabaptists, but not Roman Catholics. On the Anglican Church side the more liberal-minded writers were in favour of toleration and comprehension. Chillingworth affirms that Protestants are inexorable if they do violence to the consciences of others. He holds it to be a great sin to force on other people our own interpretations of Scripture, arguing that this was the case of all the schisms and discord in Christianity. John Hales took a similar line in his tractate Sca
d and Schismatics (1656). Jeremy Taylor, in his famous Liberty of Prophesying (1649), was contending for freedom of speech against the tyranny of the temporal power in Long Parliament.

The reaction at the Restoration and the passing of the Act of Uniformity (1662), followed by the Convocation, Five Mile, and Test Acts, narrowed the Church, and imposed great disabilities on Nonconformists; these were to some extent relieved a little later by James II.'s In
dulgences, but at the expense of the rights of Parliament it did not appear the Revolution. In the Declaration of Breda Charles II. promised to respect tender consciences; but, when well established on the throne, he had not the moral courage to stand to his word.

William III. obtained his invitation to England mainly as the champion of religious liberty. His aim was to bring about an agreement between the Church of England and Protestant Dissenters. While in his own country, he had been profoundly affected by the ideas of the Dutch Arminians. In England his most trusted adviser, Bishop Burnet, had admirably the policy which the king after

II. The Act of Toleration.--The Act of Toleration, which was passed in the year 1689, gave relief to Nonconformists from their chief disabilities; but it did not grant complete religious liberty, much less did it establish religious equality in the eyes of the law. It exempted Nonconformists from the pains and penalties of the Act of Uniformity, the Convocation Act, the Five Mile Act; at the same time it required people who desired to avail themselves of its privileges to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and make a statutory declaration against Roman superstitions, and it ordered Nonconformist ministers to subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England with the exception of three—those referring to the traditions of the Church to the bishops, and to the conscrip
tion of bishops and priests, a fourth exception, that of the article on infant baptism, being allowed for Baptist ministers. Further, it enacted that every Nonconformist place of worship should be certified by a bishop, an archdeacon, or a justice of the peace. Quakers were allowed to make a solemn declaration instead of taking the oaths and were required to declare their belief in the Trinity and in the inspiration of the Bible. Neither Roman Catholics nor Unitarians were included in the con

cessions allowed by the Act. Nonconformity was still illegal, the persecuting laws remaining on the statute-books, and only the exacting of their penalties being forbidden. While this measure was legislatively inconsistent, it was practically serviceable as far as it went. It secured a considerable amount of toleration.

The same year (1689) saw Locke's first Letter Concerning Toleration published anonymously in Holland in Latin. It was translated into English immediately. A second and longer letter, and a third longer still, followed in reply to answering letters. Yet a fourth letter completes the series in Locke's work; this is not finished. The collection has become a literary classic on the subject of toleration. Locke bases his argument on the ground that the rightful sphere of the State is wholly confined to external affairs and does not extend to religion, which is internal. He holds that not only the doctrines and 'articles of faith,' but also the outward form and rites of worship, are out of the province of the civil power. The religious position goes beyond toleration. Logically it in
volves disestablishment, because, if the State is not competent to deal with religious matters at all, it follows that it should not patronize or support a favoured religion any more than persecute a religion of which it disapproves. With regard to persecution, Locke holds that it is anti-Christian, since love of one's country is part of Christianity, and it cannot be maintained that persecutors are actuated by love to their victims in the cruelties which they perpetrate. But, while on these principles Locke would tolerate Jews as well as all Protestant sects, his toleration does not extend to Roman Catholics or atheists. With regard to the former, though he does not name them in his argument on the subject, he says:

'That church can have no right to be tolerated, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, I say, make themselves liable to the protection and service of another prince.'

He would also exclude persons who hold views subversive of society and atheists, who, he considers, are to be included in that category. Thus he regards both these parties as excluded from the State and to be excluded from toleration on political grounds, not for their religious views. Locke carries his ideas of toleration beyond the political sphere to the ecclesiastical, arguing for liberty of thought within the Church. He writes:

'What think you of St. Athanasius's Creed? Is the sense of that so obvious and exposed to every one who sees it; which so many learned men have explained so differently, and yet, what a great many profess they cannot understand? Or is it necessary to your or my salvation, that you or I should believe and pronounce all those damned who do not believe that creed, i.e. every proposition in it? If so, we shall extend to a few of the church of England; unless we can think that people believe, i.e. assent to the truth of propositions they do not as a rule admit.'

Under Queen Anne the toleration that had been obtained by the accession of William and Mary was threatened by the Schism Act, which made it illegal under heavy penalties for any one to keep a
private school or teach in a seminary unless he signed a declaration of conformity to the liturgy of the Church of England and obtained a bishop's licence to teach on production of a certificate that he had taken the communion according to the rites of the Church of England of the preceding year. The queen's death stayed the execution of this drastic measure, and it was repealed in the reign of her successor, George I. From this time onwards toleration with regard to religious views and practices was virtually extended to public schools, colleges and universities, whether as pupils or as teachers, and a host of other national rights and privileges. So it was that under the Georges, and even throughout much of the 19th cent., Nonconformists, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, Jews, and others suffered from various forms of exclusion. The abolition of the Corporation and Trade Acts, Catholic Emancipation, the admission of Jews to Parliament, the permission to dispense with the member's oath extracted in order to meet the case of Mr. Bradlaugh, the throwing open of the universities to Nonconformists, the enlarged foundation of grammar schools, and the extension of popular education generally, irrespective of ecclesiastical distinctions, were all steps beyond mere toleration towards the goal of religious equality—a goal which in several directions its advocates have not yet completely attained.

12. Toleration in France.—The fight for religious liberty which was waged principally in Germany, Switzerland and Holland during the 16th and 17th centuries passed on to France in the 18th century. The Edict of Nantes (1558) had conceded toleration for Protestants; the revocation of that Edict (1685) reversed the earlier policy of toleration. Bayle established the intellectual basis of toleration in his Dictionnaire and in a work entitled Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jesus Christ: Contra-int les d'entre a refutation of the misuse of a text popular with persecutors from the time of Augustin. He holds it to be immoral to compel men to profess religion in which they do not believe, and also irrational, because it discourages the discovery of truth. No one, he maintains, has a right to claim such complete possession of truth as not to need to compare his ideas with those of other men. Montesquieu, in Des lois (1748), argued against the futility of coercion. Rousseau, in his Contrat social, affirms the complete freedom of individual beliefs; nevertheless, holding that intolerance is inherent in Christian doctrines, he endeavours to establish a civil profession of faith in truths indispensable to a well-organized social life, including that of the existence of God. But it was Voltaire who by his severe analysis of any authority in the name of religion in France during the 18th cent. put an end to persecution and secured tolerance for the Protestants.

The ideas of these champions of religious liberty powerfully moulded the spirit of the French Revolution in regard to religion and the universal toleration that has since prevailed in France.

13. The present situation.—A policy of toleration now obtains, as a result of the French Revolution in regard to religion and the universal toleration that has since prevailed in France.

1 Ec. iv. ch. 8.

TOLERATION (Muhammadan).—The idea of the Muslim Church the basis for toleration is found in the saying traditionally attributed to Muhammad: "Peace and salams!" Difference of opinion in my community is a manifestation of divine mercy. In accordance with this principle, it has been possible for the four schools (madhahib) of theologians and jurists to which the Muslims, like the Hindus, the Hindu, and Shafis, to exist side by side, and for each of them to permit difference of opinion even in its midst. There has been
abundance of controversy between these schools, but instances of open violence have been rare. A similar basis for toleration was found in the traditional saying of the Prophet: "My community will be divided into 70 sects, 70 sects," and rendered possible the ample sectarian development in the Muhammadan world. Instances have occurred from time to time of the persecution of one sect by another, but a more characteristic feature of the Muslim Church is that in its freedom allowed the exposition of religious doctrine, and the common sentiment of princes and people has generally condemned intolerance on the part of professed tolerance.

(ii) The recognition of rival religious systems, as possessing a divine revelation, gave to Islam from the outset a theological basis for the toleration of other religions than their own. The rights and duties of each religious community are represented in the Qur'an as forms of the primitive faith given to man and taught by a series of prophets from Adam onwards:

- They who believe in the Qur'an and the Scripture before it: the People of the Book, believe in God, make no difference between His Creations, and follow the religion of truth, which has been sent down to us. Our God and your God is one, and to Him we will all return.

But Jewish and Christian teachers had corrupted the purity of this primitive faith, which Muhammad as the "Seal of the Prophets" came to proclaim anew.

This recognition of a common God is put forward in the Qur'an as the basis for friendly relations with the followers of rival creeds, in the following verses:

- Let those who believe in the Book and the Prophet believe in those who believe in the Book and the Prophet; let them not differ in religion, so long as they are Muslims. Let them alone who wish to differ in religion; but let not there be strife among you as to the religion, which has been sent down to us. Our God and your God is one, and to Him we will all return.

Muslim theologians have found a sanction for the toleration of religions other than Judaism and Christianity in passages such as the following:

- The People of the Book have been guided by the ordinances which they observe; therefore let them not dispute the matter with thee, but let them dispute with those who believe in the Book, and let God determine between them. Verily God is a Most Knowledgeable Judge.

The earliest injunction of toleration in the verse, "Let there be no compulsion in religion," and the principle of tolerance is condemned in the words:

- But if thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the world would have believed together. Wilt thou then compel men to become believers? No soul can believe except by the permission of God.

In harmony with the injunctions of the Qur'an is Muhammad's letter to the bishops, priests, and monks of Najran promising them the protection of God and His apostle for their churches, their religious services and monastic institutions, and freedom from disturbance or any interference with their rights, as long as they remained faithful to their obligations.

He permitted the Jews in Medina to practice their own faith, until their unmanageable hostility led to their expulsion from the city, and he gave instructions to Mu'adh b. Jabal, whom he sent on a mission to Yaman in 10 A.H., that he was not to compel any Jew to abandon his religion:

The teaching of the Qur'an and the practice of the Prophet thus served as a clear basis for toleration of the Christian and Jewish faiths. As mission was made in Naisib and the Sabians in the Qur'an, they also were considered to have received some divine revelation and therefore to be entitled to protection; it is possible that the Harranans (q.v.) and Mandaeans (q.v.) claimed to be Sabians in order to enjoy the same toleration. Their practice of heathen rites naturally gave offence to orthodox Muslim feeling, and the khalifah al-Qahhah (929-934) is said to have consulted the Pope in 929 on the matter, as did Wā米兰, the Sabians should continue to be tolerated or not, and was told that, 'as they were neither Jews nor Christians, but worshipped the planets, they ought to be exterminated; however, the khalifah allowed the Sabians to buy themselves off and disregarded the decision of the first Islamic theologian. About forty years later his successor, Tālib-amanīrallah, promulgated a fresh edict of toleration in favour of the Sabians, guaranteeing them protection for themselves, their shrines and property, and free access to their temples and places of prayer, and the undisturbed performance of the rites of their cult, and if the temple was not destroyed until 1250, and then by the hethen Mongols.

Political expediency, and the desire of the jurists of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra to make the religious law tally with the accepted practices, prompted the extension of toleration to such faiths as were not mentioned in the Qur'an, but were found to have adherents in the rapidly expanding Muslim empire; e.g., when Arab rule was extended into Persia, it was avowed that Muhammad had given directions that the Zoroastrians were to be treated exactly like the Ahl al-kithā ("people of the Book").

The Zoroastrians appear to have been but little disturbed in the exercise of their cult up to the period of the fall of the Abbāsid dynasty. There is even an account of a Muhammadan general (in the reign of Alī) having been converted by a Zoroastrian, and a mu'āfahān was to be a fēdah, they had destroyed a fire-temple in Sogdiana, because they had been treated with favor by the Zoroastrianism of the 20th cent., three centuries after the conquest of Persia, fire-temples were to be found in almost every province.

Even the Manichæans (q.v.), though not entitled to toleration according to Muhammadan law, survived as a separate sect until the end of the 10th cent. (see 11th cent.)

The severe condemnation of idolatry in the Qur'an seems to have made no toleration of idol-worshippers impossible for a Muslim ruler, but steady in the reign of the first caliphs, the toleration of idolatry as such was not discouraged, and the Zoroastrians were permitted to continue their worship, even if removed to another town. The Zoroastrians, however, were not allowed to enter the mosque, and they were compelled to pay jizyāh to the idolatrous—worshippers of idols, fire, and stones—and thus gave them a place among the tolerated cults. The khalifah Uthman, in dealing with the heathen Berbers, followed the precedent of 'Umar in regard to the Zoroastrians, who had promised them to pay jizyāh. In India the Franks appear to have paid jizyāh from the earliest days of Arab domination, and the Christian and Jewish communities were allowed to retain their faith undisturbed, but the building of new temples was held to be illegal. Though during the later Muslim conquests there was an effort, on any inroads by the Muslims into the temples, the settled Muhammadan governments appears often to have respected the state endowments granted by the former Hindu rulers to religious foundations, as was done in the case of the temple of Bramabandā in the province of Sind, where Muhammadan rule was first established in 1050. A monh later date, in the 12th cent., the Muhammadan government of Bengal is said to have raised the large sum of £100,000 a year by licensing the worship of Jāgnāna in orissī, and even before the time of Tālib al-Talib al-Sanjū, usually so notorious for their
toleration towards their Hindu subjects, made grants of money, or even, on occasions, the title of Sivraj, one of the famous sires in S. India. The same tradition survives in present Muhammadan times, and the title of Sivraj still means a rich Hindu, which still assigns revenues for the support of Hindu temples.

Even in such a barbarous country as Baluchistan the Hindus enjoyed religious toleration in consideration of their payment of a fixed tax, and enjoyed this benefit as long as they paid; their religion was tolerated, but not tampered with by their customs.

The non-Muslim living under a Muhammadan government was styled a dhimmi (lit. one with whom a compact has been made), and the conditions under which he lived were supposed to be regulated by the agreements made with the Muslim conquerors as they extended their dominion over various cities and districts. As an example of such an agreement, the conditions may be quoted that are said to have been drawn up when Jerusalem came under Muslim rule in A.D. 638:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate! This is the security, that 'Umar, the servant of God, the commandant of the faithful, grants to the people of Asia. He grants them food, drink, shelter, and security for their lives, their possessions, their churches and their crosses, and for all the things which they love in their religion. Their churches shall not be changed into dwelling-places, nor shall they be destroyed, nor shall they lose their appurtenances, nor shall they be disturbed in any way, and they may enjoy the rights of their religion, and shall not be compelled by any constraint to give up their faith, but in any of these matters, if they are compelled they shall not be harmed.

The theory was that the dhimmi, in return for tribute paid and in consideration of good behaviour, received protection from the Muslim government and immunity for life, property, and religion. Tradition attributes it to the Prophet a warning against the regard of this compact: 'Whoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made (i.e. a dhimmi) and lays on him a burden beyond his strength, he shall be his accuser.

Similarly, 'Ali, when he appointed Muhammad b. Abi Bakr governor of Egypt in 36 A.H., bade him do justice to the dhimmis. In a like spirit, the Turkish code ordains that the dhimmis are not to be disturbed in the exercise of their religion, and that the practice of their religion may vary according to local conditions and the character of the local government; and by the 2nd cent. of the Hijra, when some codification was made of the law relating to the dhimmis, more harsh and intolerant regulations had come into force than those of earlier times. But in the first century of Arab rule the various Christian churches enjoyed a toleration and a freedom of religious life such as had been unknown for generations under the Byzantine government. We have the contemporaneous testimony of the Nestorian patriarch, Isho'yahb III (553–660), who, writing to the prince of Persia, says:

1 Annual Report of the Mysore Archeological Department for the Year 1816, Bangalore, 1917, pp. 73-75.
5 Tabari, l. 2405.
6 Tai, Firdawis, p. 162.
7 Tabari, l. 2247; cf. his Instruction to Ma'qull b. Qays, l. 309, line 14.
8 M. d'Ohsson, Tableau général de l'empire ottoman, Paris, 1820, iii. 44.
9 "The Arabs, to whom God at this time had given the empire of the world, behold, they are among you, as ye know well; and yet they attack not the Christian faith, but, on the contrary, they favour our Christians and bishoprics, and the saints of the Lord, and confer benefits on churches and monasteries."
10 Indeed, the Church to which this ecclesiastic belonged exhibited a remarkable expansion under Muhammadan rule; missionaries were sent from Persia to China and India, both of which were raised to the dignity of metropolitan sees in the 8th cent.; about the same period the Nestorians gained a footing in Egypt, and later spread the Christian faith right across Asia, and by the 11th cent. had gained many converts from among the Tartars. But by the 2nd cent. of the Muslim era the condition of the Christians had become less tolerable. The victorious armies that established Arab rule over Syria and Persia appear to have been little swayed by religious considerations, and under the rule of the Umayyads the Christian and other non-Muslim religious communities seem to have been little regarded except as sources of revenue; but under the Abbasids a change in the attitude of the government made itself felt. The orthodox reaction which supported this dynasty and the union of the spiritual and temporal power which characterises the establishment was to make the administration of the existing laws more oppressive. In the course of the long struggle with the Byzantine empire the Khalifas had had occasion to distrust the loyalty of their Christian subjects, and the truce of 737 with the Byzantines was not improbably one of the reasons for the harsher treatment initiated by Harun al-Rashid (760-809), who ordered the Christians to wear a distinctive dress and give up to Muslims the government posts which they held. But the stipulations of the jurists and theologians were often more intolerant than the actual practice of the government, and it was not until the 9th cent. that the treatment meted out to the non-Muslim population corresponded exactly with the principles which they laid down. Harun's great jurist, Abu Yusuf, leaves no argument to the Ameer of the Ridda (i.e. the Defection, after the death of the Prophet) or to the idolatrous Arabs, except death or the acceptance of Islam, but Catani has proved that the early conquerors had no power to enforce such a principle, and Abu Yusuf does not show that any such alternative was actually imposed on the heathen Arabs.

But protests against cruelty towards the dhimmis are not wanting in the works of Muslim jurists themselves; e.g., Abu Yusuf claims for the dhimmis gentle treatment; they are not to be beaten when called upon to pay jizyah, or to be made to stand in the sun, or to be tormented in any way; and he makes an earnest appeal to his patron, Harun, on their behalf:

1 It is incumbent on the commander of the faithful (may God grant thee his aid!) that thou deal gently with those that have a covenant with thy Prophet and thy confide, Muhammad (the peace and blessing of God be upon him), and that thou take care that they be not wronged or ill-treated and that no burdens be laid upon them beyond their strength, and that no part of their belongings be taken from them beyond what they are duty bound to pay, for it is related of the Apostle of God (the peace and blessing of God be upon him) that he said: 'Whoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made (i.e. a dhimmi) is imposed a burden on him beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser on the Day of Judgment.'

Ibn Qasim al-Ghazzali (1512) maintains that the majority of Muslim jurists hold that the dhimmis must be treated with kindness and consideration and not with contempt; when he concedes to them that which is their own by right:...
TOLERATION (Muhammadan)

Commenting on this passage nearly two centuries later, al-Bīrmāwī (†1694) enters a protest against such fanatical glosses on Qur'ān ix. 29, as are referred to in art. PERSECUTION, and holds that the phrase 'being humbled' implied only conformity to the regulations of Islām in regard to the dhimmis, and that these words give no justification for the rough treatment sometimes inflicted on a dhimmī, even when he paid jizya—e.g., that he should be made to stand with bent head, and back before the collector of the tax, who should slap his face and pull his beard—for (as he rightly says) there is no evidence that the Prophet or any one of the khulafā' acted in such a manner.

A powerful influence in the direction of toleration in a period when feeling was acerbated was the administration of Muhamadan. When was made more precarious and exposed them to the tyranny of local officials, was the extension of the religious orders, especially that of the Qadiyyah, and the popularizing of that mystical presentation of religious thought in which devout Muslims found consolation for the devastations of the Mongol conquests. Abū al-Qādir al-Jillānī (†1166), founder of the order referred to, emphasized the virtues of charity and meekness, and his attitude and that of his followers towards the Christians was one of kindness and sympathy. The tendency of Persian mysticism was opposed to any emphasizing of religious differences, and the teaching of the poet who wrote under the influence of this mysticism was often made for tolerance; a well-known example is the story of Abū l'Abbas Rūhī, in which the patriarch is rebuked by God for refusing his charity to an aged blind man on the ground of his infidelity. But in the present article, attention may rather be drawn to instances of toleration in contrast to the fanatical usage of legislation; e.g., though the so-called Pact of 'Umar forbade the building of new churches, there was a considerable variation of opinion among the Muslim legists themselves on this question, from the more liberal Ḥanafī doctrinal which declared that, though it was unlawful to build new churches and synagogues in Muslim territory, those already existing could be repaired if they had not been destroyed or had fallen into decay, while in villages where the tokens of Islām were still preserved and synagogues might be built, to the intolerant Ḥanbalī ruling that they might neither be erected nor be restored when damaged or ruined. Some legists held that the privileges varied according to treaty rights; in towns taken by force no new houses of prayer might be erected by dhimmis, but, if special treaty had been made, the building of new churches and synagogues was allowed. But, like so many of the teachings of Muslim legists, these prescriptions bore but little relation to actual facts. Schoolmen might agree that the dhimmis could build no houses of prayer in a city of Muslim foundation, but the civil authority permitted the Copts to erect churches in the new capital of Cairo. The fact that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Azīz (717–720) ordered the destruction of all recently constructed churches, and that more than a century later the fanatical al-Muqāwakkhā (847–861) had to repeat the same order, shows how little the prohibition of the building of new churches was put in force; and both Christians and Muslim historians record numerous instances of the erection of new churches, and of the building of buildings of great magnificence. Al-Muqtadir (908–932) even gave orders himself for the rebuilding of some churches at Rāmāh in Būna, which had been destroyed by Muḥammadans during a riot. The Muslim law made death the punishment for apostasy (q.v.), and the convert to Islām was not allowed to return to his former faith, but instances are not unknown of a more tolerant view, vindicating freedom of conscience in such cases.

Even the mad jālīn (906–1030), whose persecutions caused many Jews and Christians to abandon their faith, ordered the churches that had been taken from the Christians to be restored, and the property settled on the churches that had been taken from the Christians to be returned to their old faith. It is stated by more than one Muhammadan writer that Moses Maimonides under the fanatical rule of the Almohades in Spain signed a conversion to Islam, but fled to Egypt and there openly declared himself a Jew. Tension and fear were made for the end of his life a Muslim. On a consular from Spain denounced him for his apostasy, and demanded that the extreme penalty of the law should be inflicted on him for this offence; but the case was quashed by al-Qādī al-Ḥaddī: 'All (one of the most honourable of the Muslim judges and prime minister of Saladin), who authoritatively declared that a man who had been converted to Islam by force could not rightly be considered to be a Muslim. Jewish writers, jealous for the honour of the community, have disputed the accuracy of this story, though it is narrated in its full incidents by Ibn al-Qifti, himself was himself a convert from Islam. Maimonides: but in reference to Muhammadan toleration it is of interest to note that the decision of al-Qādī al-Ḥaddī is respected' without contradiction or sympathy' in the spirit in which the Jewish sheikhs of Germania (1203–1206), discovered that the aide of the Buddha monks who had become Christians at the beginning of his reign (when their temples had been destroyed), only made a protest if he was arrested, he granted permission to all those who so wished to return to Isfahan. The Jews among the Buddhist fellow-countrymen they would be free one more to follow the Buddha' which, if a similar story of some Jews of Lebannon who were so rigorously persecuted by the governor 'that either by force or cunning they were caused to turn Mahometans; but the king (Shāh Abūl Nās. (1642–1667), understanding that only power and fear had constrained them to their Christian faith, turned them to the religion and to live in quiet.' Talmudic Jews who were forced to accept Islam under the oppressive laws of Titu Bar-Ra believed in 1844, were permitted by an imperial firman to return to their own creed three years later.

The practice of Muhammadan governments seems, generally, to have been to leave to each separate protected community the management of its internal affairs, and to permit the religious leaders to administer the law as to marriage, inheritance, etc., in accordance with the practices of the particular faith as accepted by the persons concerned, in some instances in criminal cases also, though, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, there was no obligation to recognize the Muhammadan government to recognize the decisions of such a judge or on the dhimmis to conform to them. But, if an appeal was made to the Muslim judge, he would decide the case on the basis of the Qur'ān and Muslim law, and some jurists held that the State could even insist on the application of Muslim law in cases of inheritance in which the public treasury would thereby derive more benefit than if the special law of the dhimmis concerned.


See T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, pp. 239.

For examples see Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, p. 239.


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were applied.\(^1\) It is recorded of Khayr b. Nu‘aym, a judge in Egypt about the middle of the 8th cent., that, after hearing the cases of the Muslims inside the mosque, he would sit on the steps outside the gate in the afternoon and hear the cases of the Christians and Jews, testing the value of the evidence by inquiring into their credibility among their co-religionists.\(^2\)

An important testimony to the toleration of Muslim rule is the fact that persecuted Christian and Jewish families fled to the Turks rather than to the hands of the fanatical house of Hafezü;\(^3\) and the Protestants of Syria and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than to the laces of St. Stephen’s.\(^4\) The Cossacks, who belonged to the sect of the Old Believers and were persecuted by the Russian State Church in 1726, found in the dominions of the Sultan the toleration which their Christian brethren denied them.\(^5\)

Of toleration in the Muhammadan world generally it may be said that it was more operative in the earlier centuries of the decline of the khilafate or the unhappy period of the Mongol conquests or in modern times when the pressure of Christian Powers exasperated Muslim feeling. The civil governors in some cases have been more tolerant than the clergy, and the regulations of jurists have seldom been put into force with all their rigour; though practice has varied with time and place, the persecutions that have occurred have been excited by some special and local circumstances rather than inspired by a settled principle of intolerance. The judgment of A. de Gobineau is on the whole justified by the facts of history:

> "M’il s’agisse de la doctrine religieuse de la nécessité politique qui souvent a paru et a été en son nom, il n’est pas de religion plus tolérante que la nôtre..."

However, this does not detract from the fact that in some cases Muslim rulers have indeed been responsible for religious persecution.

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\(^1\) REJ xxiv. (1894) 293–211.


\(^3\) Michael the Elder, II. 460–469; Theophanes, Chronographia (Fy civil), 810, 812.


\(^6\) Schefler, p. 46.

\(^7\) J. Jaquessére, II. 482.


TOLSTOI.—1. Early life and manhood.—Lev Nikoláievich Tolstói (1828–1910), novelist, social reformer, and religious mystic, was born on 29th Aug. (O.S.), 1829, at Yamsáy Polyána ("Bright Glade"), the home of the family, in the government of Tula, about 130 miles south of Moscow. Lev was the youngest of four sons. His mother had died when he was five years old. Some years later, the boy went in 1840 to the university town of Kazán in eastern Russia, where he lived under the charge of an aunt, whom he held in grateful remembrance. After two years’ study he left the university without a degree. The blame is usually laid upon the professors, but some portion of it must be attributed to Tolstói’s own dissipated and irregular life. Returning to his estate, he interested himself in the life of his peasants, with the disappointing results recorded some years later in his A Morning of a Landed Proprieter (1856). He admits that he did not know what he was going to do, but that he was aiming at their betterment only from the outside. It was, however, the beginning of that interest in ‘the people’ which led him at last to throw in his lot with the peasants and the poor. In 1861, to escape from the idle dissipation of his class, he fled to the Caucasus, where he wrote his earliest works—Childhood, A Morning of a Landed Proprieter, and The Incarnation—and planned The Confessors, sold ten years later to save a gambling debt.

Childhood (1852), Boyhood (1854), and Youth

(1856) form an autobiographical fragment, thinly disguised under fictitious names. Here, as elsewhere, Tolstoy doubles himself, to bring out the dual nature, the natural and the spiritual in him. He was always conscious in himself. Irénée repays his lower natures, and Tolstoy himself in that struggle between flesh and spirit which ended only with life. There is truth in Leo Wiener's statement that even the Christ of his religious writings is still the image of the author, and that it is Christ-Tolstoy that becomes the final and last stage of his spiritual evolution.\(^1\) This autobiographical fragment reveals Tolstoy as an awkward child, morbidly sensitive to his appearance; a boy, confessing frankly every shade of evil in his heart, such as the rise of sexual feeling; and a youth 'in search of an ideal,' whose one faith was in the possibility of virtuous perfectibility. Beyond this, his mind was hardened by a long attendance at the orthodoxy of the Church, had become dust, ready to crumble at a touch. Yet we see the beginnings of many things which appear and reappear in his writings to come—of a dislike of being rich while others want, a deep hatred of injustice, and the clear poetic vision of Nature and her loveliness.

The Cosacks (1863) represents Tolstoy's revulsion from the unnatural and vicious life of cities and his classes. The natives had their vices, but they seemed naturally and frankly, and thus escaped the deeper corruption of hidden immorality. In contrast with their bold outdoor life, Tolstoy saw himself (the Older one of the story) as a degenerate weakening.

Joining the army in 1851, Tolstoy commanded a battery at Sevastopol; and in his three sketches—Sectumpe in December, 1854; Sevastopol in May, 1855; Sevastopol in August, 1855—we find the seeds of thought that were to fruition in his War and Peace, and many an indignant denunciation of the violence by which nations are governed. The conviction of the sheer wickedness and brutality of war sank deep into his soul and grew with the years. The sketches probably saved his life; for the emperor's orders the young man was removed to the Heiligers. On the fall of Sevastopol in 1855 he was sent with dispatches to St. Petersburg, and his career as a soldier came to an end.

Of this period, and up to his marriage in 1862, Tolstoy could never afterwards think without shuddering. From 1857 to 1861 he travelled in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, England, and Belgium, to study their educational methods, wrote many books on education, and started schools for peasant children on his estate. Yet alongside this generous interest in 'the people' the tides of the passions of the natural man never ceased to flow. His own words in his My Confession\(^2\) frankly reveal this moral duality:

'1 cannot recall these years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to death and lost [in the war of 1853 in Sevastopol]. I shot, stabbed, stoned, beat with fists, cut off hands, and killed by wholesale, wasting the labour of the peasants; I punished them, torturized, and cheated. I led, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder—there was not a crime which I did not commit, and for all that I was praised, and my contemporaries have regarded me as a comparatively moral man. Thus I lived for ten years.'

On 23rd Sept. 1862 Tolstoy married Sofia, second daughter of a Dr. Behr of Moscow, who bore him thirteen children, several of whom died in infancy. Fifteen years of unbroken domestic happiness followed. Tolstoy was busy with his schools, his works on education, the management of his estate, and, above all, the writing of his greatest novels, War and Peace (1864-69) and Anna Karenina (1873-77), in which appears all the problems round which his mind never ceased to work—war with the peasants, the land and the serfs, education, the universal duty of manual labour, and, at the root of all, religion and the ethical duties flowing therefrom. This was the immense question. Tolstoy cast aside the art in which he was acknowledged the greatest living master, and devoted the remainder of his life to moral and religious tales for adults and children, and an examination of the Gospels, the Creed, and the foundations of violence on which he believed the entire system of civil government rested. His literary ambitions had been treason to the deepest convictions of his soul. The literary caste set up to teach what they did not know, and for the sake of his family he had shared their delusions:

'The new conditions of my happy family life completely drew me away from all search for the general meaning of life. All my life during that time was centred in my family, my wife, my children, and, therefore, in cares for the increase of the means of existence. The striving after perfection, which before had given way to the striving after perfection in general, after progress, now gave way simply to the striving after which is unapproachable as possible for me and my family. Thus another fifteen years passed.'

The struggle to break away from this treason to the higher life led to great family unhappiness, and ultimately to his mysterious and tragic end.

2. Ethical and religious ideas. Tolstoy's principal works after his 'conversion' are My Confession (1879-82), Critique of Dogmatic Theology (1880-82), The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated (3 vols., 1880-82), My Religion (1884), What shall we do then? (1884-86), Moral and Immoral Tales, The Kingdom of God is within you (1893), What is Art? (1897), and Resurrection (1899), his last great novel, in which he sums up his indictment of Church and State and the entire system of society. It is from this vast mass of literature that we must now attempt to deduce the religious and ethical convictions into which, with endless vibrations, Tolstoy finally settled.

(1) Tolstoy's fundamental conviction is that the one purpose of life is to know God by bringing all relations of humanity into harmony with His will. In reply to the deers of the Holy Synod which excommunicated him in 1901 he states in an essay:

'1 believe in God, when I understand as Spirit, as Love, as the beginning of everything. I believe that He is in me and in Him. I believe that God's will is most clearly comprehensively expressed in the teaching of the man Christ, when he understands as God and prays to consider the greatest blasphemy. I believe that He is the greatest true good of the fulfillment of God's will, but His will is this: that men should love one another; that we should not judge one another; that as we wish that others should treat us, etc., as, indeed, it says in the Gospel that in this is all the law and the prophets. I believe that the meaning of the life of every man is, therefore, only in the augmentation of love in himself; that this augmentation of love lies the individual man in this life to a greater and ever greater good, and gives after death a greater good, the greater the love is in man, and at the same time more than anything else contributes to the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world, that is, of an order of life with which the now existing discord, deception, and violence will give way to freedom, truth, and brotherly love of man among themselves. I believe that there is but one means for success in love, and that is prayer, not public prayer in temples, but directly forbidden by Christ (Matt. vi. 5-13), but such as Christ has given us an example of,—solitary prayer, which consists in the establishment and strengthening in our consciousness of the meaning of our life and our independence of everything except God's will.'

(2) Tolstoy warns us that, when he calls God 'Father' and speaks of His will, 'he is not to be understood as meaning that God is a person or being. He admits that, when he prays, he is inconsistent with his doctrine of the impersonality of God: it is a necessity forced on him by the fact that he himself is a person. The will of the Trinity is blaspemy. Metaphysical speech conceals God; nothing reveals Him but love in its

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1 My Confession, ch. vi. (Works, xvi. 16).
2 Answer to the Deers of the Synod (Works, xix. 333 f.).
application to human life. The fundamental idea of The Kingdom of God is within you is that God is present in the whole of human life and the power by which man lives and acts upon the world. Whatever approves itself to the God within has divine sanction and right. Since God acts naturally through man, miracles are impossible.

(3) Tolstoy’s conception of Christ passed through many fluctuations. In the Crimean he dreamed of a new Christianity purged of dogma and mysticism. In his brother Nikolay’s funeral he projected a “life of Christ as a Materialist.” After reading a German work on the Gospels he inclined to agree with the author that Christ never existed. In the end, while admitting His existence, he denied indignantly His divinity. “To recognize Christ as God is to renounce God.” On the theory of His divinity the Temptation becomes absurd—“God is tempted by God Himself.” The miraculous Birth is an invention to cover His mother’s shame. The Resurrection is “a trite, contemptible invention,” contrary to reason and need in the invention of others. He sees in the Gospels only “the life of living Christ” only in the sense in which all men live on in the spirits of those who come after them. Jesus is grouped with other great religious teachers of the world as Christ, Lo and behold! These views are asserted with a peculiarity of earnestness: “I am standing with one foot in the grave, and I have no need to feign.” The truth is that Tolstoy had almost a personal interest in thus emphasizing the human side of Christ: he found in it those elements of wavering of which he was conscious in himself. The Temptation, the shrinking of His soul at the visit of the Greeks, the agony in the Garden, the cry “My God, my God” on the Cross, seemed to bring Him nearer to his own weaknesses and vacillations. There was even a moment, he held, when Christ resolved to use violence against violence and advised His followers to sell their garments and buy swords; and it was only in the Garden that He was able to overcome the terrible temptation by prayer.

(4) Tolstoy’s attitude to Scripture settled down into acceptance of nothing that did not commend itself to the God within himself. The OT is nonessential to Christianity. The Church doctrine of the Infallibility of Scripture—myths, miracles, contradictions, are foreign to the spirit of the Church. The Church sees the Gospels in the spirit of the Church. Whatever in Scripture did not harmonize with these few sayings and Tolstoy’s vast private interpretation of them was set aside without scruple as no part of the Church. “In the spiritual life, within the soul, every man must be allowed to apply the meaning of all the other physical laws, for which he had no knowledge, love knowledge.”

(5) In substance, Tolstoy reduces Christianity to five commandments of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount:

(1) Thou shalt not be angry (Mt 5:21–22).—He takes this prohibition absolutely, omitting “without a cause.” It forbids, not killing merely, but the anger from which he himself had been led to look on murder as a natural right. From this passage speaks the penalty of judgment and fire for this sin. Tolstoy replies that He never prescribed this penalty, the mention of which is simply included in the condemnation of it. In his discussion of Mt 23 he does not seem to recognize that Christ’s indignation against life is a breach of His own law against anger, as understood in the absolute sense.

(2) Thou shalt not commit adultery (Mt 5:27–29).—Tolstoy interprets the words in v. 23, “saving for the cause of procreation,” as meaning a social and not a private right. In the case of marriage, the privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over those who were sons of the one Father. It is this privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. It is this privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. It is this privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. In this passage speaks the penalty of judgment and fire for this sin. Tolstoy replies that He never prescribed this penalty, the mention of which is simply included in the condemnation of it. In his discussion of Mt 23 he does not seem to recognize that Christ’s indignation against life is a breach of His own law against anger, as understood in the absolute sense.

(3) Thou shalt not murder (Mt 5:21–22).—Tolstoy interprets the words “saving for the cause of procreation,” as meaning a social and not a private right. In the case of marriage, the privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. It is this privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. It is this privilege which gave him a false sense of superiority over others who were sons of the one Father. In this passage speaks the penalty of judgment and fire for this sin. Tolstoy replies that He never prescribed this penalty, the mention of which is simply included in the condemnation of it. In his discussion of Mt 23 he does not seem to recognize that Christ’s indignation against life is a breach of His own law against anger, as understood in the absolute sense.

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1 Three Letters on Reason, Faith, and Prayer (Works, xvii. 256.)
2 The School at Vyangana Polysten (Works, iv. 208, 310.)
TOLSTOY

absolutely to protect them by force. The worst that can happen to them is his death, whereas to resist is to go contrary to the law of Christ, which is worse than death. We must, therefore, renounce this idea. This idea carries this doctrine to the point of insanity. The natural instinct of an animal is to protect the weak and the defenseless from a drunkard or a madman.

(c) Wage no war (Mt. 26:39-41. Lk. 22:43).-The five commandments of the Sermon on the Mount belong in this circle: (1) loving your enemy; (2) bearing true heart-harbour no anger; (3) man and woman, the family-and (4) the social duties of the child, the弟弟, the brother, the father, the husband, and the master. The fifth commandment is the whole law of the Ten Commandments. It binds the conscience by no oath or promise; (5) relations to the State—resist no evil by force; (6) the human race—regard no man as your enemy. If you make war on you, sult't, do good, and wage no war. It is absurd to say that Christ, who forbids anger to the individual, now allows anger, and murder which is the fruit of anger, to be practiced by the community and nations.

From the Sermon on the Mount, on through War and Peace, The Kingdom of God is within you, and Immovable Planetes, etc., Tolstoy never ceased to strip war of its glory and to hold up its naked brutality, cruelty, and bestiality. Under all its fine names its true purpose is murder. Three causes are named: (1) the unequal distribution of property, that is, the robbing of one class of people by another, (2) the existence of a military class, that is, of people educated and destined for murder, and (3) the lies, for the most part consciously deceptive, religious teaching, in which the young generations are forcibly educated. Tolstoy attacks the wage war—criminal—a sentiment fostered by peasant, who hate their enemies as 'loyalty,' by alliance with or against other nations, based on an unreal love and a common misfortune. There is no such thing as a good patriotism, the aim of all patriotism being that of 1. The education of a nation to the end of making it a stronger power and to the destruction of other nations. The one remedy is the substitution for love of country of love of man, and the refusal of individuals to submit to military service, be the consequences what they may. Tolstoy had a profound distrust of peace congresses and courts of arbitration, because of the substitution of the court of arbitration, against the military violence of the states will be executed by means of military violence. Tolstoy's following his doctrine of human freedom, Tolstoy attacked all current forms of education as the false food of life and ethics. The schools on which we are based on absolute freedom. The children came when they pleased, sat where they liked, were at liberty to speak, had no home lessons to torture them. Yet the order and attention were perfect. The teaching included walks in the fields, explanations of natural sights and sounds, history, folk-tales, stories and parables from the Bible, by far the best instrument of education. Tolstoy wrote a series of tales, which had a great success in Russian schools, but he held that it is the peasant children who can teach us to write, not we them; they are nearer the original harmony of beauty, truth, and goodness that over. The preservation has been a system of destroying that harmony. His views are summed up thus: I am convinced that the school ought not to interfere with that part of the education which belongs to the family; that the school has no right and ought not to reward and punish; that the best police and administration of a school consist in giving full liberty to the pupils to study and settle their disputes as they know best.

He opposed 'popular education' because it was not necessary, but compulsory, based on violence, and hated by both parents and children, who forgot its artificial results as quickly as they could. Schools which are established above and by force are not schools, but a school for the shepherd.

From infant school to university the system was arbitrary, mechanical, and out of relation to life and its needs. To compel all child-natures to pass through a standardization system, without freedom of choice, a tortoise. In fine, education has become an elaborate system of demoralizing child-nature, which is good, in the interests of the world and its end. At an early age it severs the natural bond of parenthood, and of the great mother Nature herself, and it does so in a way which fos ters lying, hypocrisy, and vice, and destroys individuality.

(7) In What Is Art? Tolstoy sweeps aside with contempt all theories of mere aesthetics and art for art's sake, and reduces the criteria of art to the following: (1) art must spring from a genuine feeling in the artist; (2) this feeling must have the power of infecting others with the same emotion; (3) it must have the power of uniting men by this infection of a common hope, joy, love, or whatever it be; if it is such a feeling that divides anger, envy, and hatred, so widely it unites men, the more worthy is it of the name. 'Upper class art,' dependent on an artificial training, springs from no living emotions in the artist, who has to write, paint, etc., to please his rich patrons, who lead idle, artificial, and parasitic lives. Such art grows ever narrower in its appeal, and its patrons ever prouder of its exclusiveness, whereas 'great works of art are only great because they are accessible and comprehensible to every one, like the story of Joseph and the parables of Christ. Whole generations of artists, singers, poets, players, artisans, workmen, are practically serfs for the production of false exclusive art—an art which is simply the expression of the pride, sensuality, and weariness of life of the men and women who pay them.

Art good or bad depends on universal emotions which unify men by infection. What these are is revealed by 'the religious perception' of all human good is contained in 'the fraternal life of all men, our love-union among ourselves.' Hence 'the Christian art of our time can be and is of two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception of man's position in the world, and to his neighbour—religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the greatest feelings of common life, but such always, as is accessible to all men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—universal art. Only these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our time.'

The name of art is denied to emotions which divide men, as patriotism, or religious sectarianism, or the honour given for wealth, education, rank, or profession. The theory has met with much ridicule; but, making allowance for some exaggeration in Tolstoy's dislike of the conventional forms in which every art seeks expression, we may agree with Kropotkin that What Is Art? is a much-needed protest against the over-artificiality into which modern art has drifted.

(8) Tolstoy's doctrine of the future life may be described as a kind of pantheistic immortality. His novels overflow with studies of death and the process of dying. The higher makes meet death with reluctance and complaining, the poor with cheerfulness and faith. Of Natalya, the old stewardess in the home of his childhood, he says: She executed the best and highest act of this life—she died without regrets or fear. During the period of his 'conversion' thoughts of suicide became so strong that he had to hide a rope that hung in his dressing-room and could not trust himself to go out hunting with a gun. There was no meaning in life, no end to which it moved. He was saved from suicide by the discovery that the end was God, God in whom he lived, and moved, and was. The fear of death is a superstition due to the fact that men live in a men's fragment of their own nature and of the world, and this the lower fragment of their carnal and personal being, instead of their rational consciousness in its relation to the whole and of the world, and of God, given to be a ministry of life to the world, and

3 The School at Yagodna Poljenka (Works, iv, 237).
4 On Popular Education (Works, iv, 10).
5 What Is Art?, ch. xi, tr. Cyril Maude, London, 1905 (this tr. Tolstoy in a Preface says I am interested in my views on art only to judge of them by the best in its present shape.) The tr. is from the original MS, and is free from the mutilations of the Russian censor.
6 Christian, ch. xxviii. (Works, i, 180).
it lasts just so long as this ministry is being ful-
ished. The day he died away in suicide when it becomes
unpleasant to us is sinful, partly because just then
is probably the time when this ministration truly
begins. Moreover, it is in this life of universal
ministry that man finds the only true immortality.
People who find in work the only thing that makes life
deliberate sacrifice of all personal ends.
Resurrection and reconnection would be nothing
better than a return to the carnal and personal
relations which are expedient in the life of the
and the only real death is to arrest the movement
at any given point. Live onward beyond the old
self, and life becomes a living part of the growing
good of the world. This is the life eternal
and the only true immortality for man.

3. The last phase.—The life of the great Russian
ended in a mysterious tragedy of conscience. For
many years his life consisted of a struggle to bring
his practice into harmony with his principles by
escaping from his class, his wealth, his family. In My
Religion, written in his fifty-sixth year, he lays
open the false conditions of human happiness:
(1) a life that does not break the link with Nature
—the open sky, sunlight, fresh air, soil, plants,
animals; (2) work, physical labour, giving appetite
and health; (3) a free and living intercourse with all
the various classes of mankind; (4) health, and a
natural and painless death.
These conditions are open most widely to the
people as they now narrow the higher you rise in
the privileged classes, the Tsar, e.g., holding
intercourse with none but a few of his jaiiers.
Hence Tolstoy's later years were one long effort
and the successive efforts of his life. In
his Aryan nature finally struck out the third
condition, the family life. He transferred to his
wife the responsibility of managing his estates,
and, although he continued to live in the family
mansion, it was, as far as possible, as a poor man
working with his hands. It was a compromise
which gave no peace of conscience. More than one
chaplain of his household returned to his
people, and his connection was broken
with the head of his family. In 1888:
On the eve ofLight. (1888). One's sympathies are not
enough to keep him clear of the Tsarist side; the
countess was much for complaining that the burden
of the children, the estates, and the publication of
his books was transferred to her shoulders. In
spite of a true affection between them, they drifted
apart.
Tolstoy's actual departure from his home came about
through the question of the copyright of his works. From
1888-89 the countess, to counterbalance her husband's neglect
of the estates, became the publisher of his writings; and in
1894 she deposited in a public museum for safety large
quantities of his manuscripts, producing evidence afterwards
that they were given her by Tolstoy. This was done, evidently,
to prevent herself from a deliberate attempt by one of his
disciples, V. G. Chertkov, to deprive her of them and of all
control of their publication. In 1893, while having himself
that to make money by his moral and religious writings
was sinful, made public announcement that any one who was free
from the Tsarist side, took a quantity of his work written from
1884 to the time of his death. About the same time he gave
Tolstoy the right of perfect control over his books, both
of his first and of his historical writings. Although this was almost equivalent to
copyright. Tolstoy was reconciled to it, and set a long series of
intrigues to induce Tolstoy to make a will in his own favour
and without the knowledge of the countess, on the ground
that the whole of his estate was deposited in accordance
with his publicly expressed wishes. An unhappy aspect
of his love for the youngest daughter, Alexandra, was in
the intrigue against her mother. After many tentative wills
had been drawn up and signed, a final one was made on 22d
July, 1894, in which the countess herself put the manuscripts
themselves into the full possession of his daughter Alexandra.
As we shall presently state his wish that "all papers not
at the time of his death shall be handed to V. G. Chertkov,
that he may examine such documents and publish what he
may consider his duty to publish." This was signed on the stump
of a tree near Tochertov's house, after a long series of unsuccessful

TOLTECS. 1. Origins.—The beginnings of the
Toltec peoples are enveloped in the fogs of
mythology. Their origin is rather mysteriously
attributed to the acts of a certain hero-god, Quetzalcoatl ("a twin"); composed of two words Quetzalzatl, a plume of green feathers, and coatl, a serpent,
in other words, a plumed-serpent (god). Some wild
speculations and pious conjectures have identified
him with St. Thomas, and others with the Messiah.
Another mysterious hero-god (personage) who
has been closely linked with him is Tezcatlipoca, the
touted founder of the civilization of the Mayas,
time a contemporary and rival people with the
Toltecs.

In the pre-Toltec period of history in Mexico and
Central America the Nahua and the Maya were
the two leading civilizations. Quetzalcoatl, the
plumed-serpent divinity, was the creator of man,1
founder of the Toltec race, the god of the Nahua peoples.
Like the Maya peoples of Yucatan and Central America, the Nahua did not confine

their colonies or activities to any one area of territory, though their main settlement was on the plateau of Mexico, in the 6th and 7th centuries the Toltec Chichimec tribes, representing the Nahua power, migrated from Central America and settled down on the Mexican plateau, in proximity to the wonders of the world that region in the Valley of Mexico, who made their homes in this region the Toltecs were one of the prominent sections, the beginnings of whose separate and independent existence cannot be sharply defined.

In fact, the Toltec society was of the old, name Toltec was new, possibly a term derived from a pre-existing, but obscure, name. This community, for the most part, was the original capital of the empire. The boundary lines of the Toltec sovereignty cannot be fixed, though it probably did not extend of the Aztec domain of later times. It is thought to have extended so far west as to have covered Michoacan, which was conquered by the Aztecs and stretched eastward to the Gulf of Mexico, including also the Toltec territory of Veracruz, Tabasco, and Chiapas, from which the Toltec empire was composed cannot be identified by name with any of the later nations found in Anahuac. Outside the so-called Toltec empire, the peoples, particularly in the south, were regarded as barbarians and were popularly known as Chichimecs.

From the 7th to the 12th century, the Toltec empire was in the main ruled by a confederacy which represented all the powers. A later time between Mexico, Tezcuco, and Tlacopan with capitals at Cuitlapan, Otompan, and Tollan respectively. Each capital in its turn became the dominant force in the confederacy. Tollan, on the river Quitzalapa, is reputed to have reached the highest point in culture, splendor, and fame. It is now represented by the little village of Tula, about thirty miles north-west of the decayed ruins. Tollan was the only one of the three capitals of the confederacy to survive by name the bloody revolution by which the empire was finally overthrown, and to maintain anything of her earlier greatness. The confusion and collection between the numerous reports and records and manuscripts of the native and Spanish writers lays heavy burden upon a historian; but Bauerof and Nadaver are apparent that Chichimec took the first lead in militarism in all centuries of domination in the central plateau of Mexico, based on the representations of Bauerof and Nadaver.

The pre-eminent personage in the beginnings of this new agglomeration of tribes and peoples was Hueman the prophet. It was through his line that a powerful priesthood ruled the destinies of the Toltec empire from its inception to its downfall. The government was in reality a theocratic republic, in which each leader directed his own tribe both in war and in peace, but all were more or less subservient to their spiritual leader in all matters of national import. Seven years after the arrival of these peoples in Tollan the heads of families and chiefs met in assembly and decided to change their form of government, and establish a monarchy, in order to consolidate their strength against any possible future challenge to their rights as a people. On the advice of Hueman, the chiefs sent an embassy to the reigning king of the Chichimecs to ask for a son or other relative to be crowned king over the Toltecs, accompanied by a specific requirement of agreement on the part of the Chichimec king that the Toltecs should ever be a free and independent people, owing no allegiance whatever to the Chichimecs, although the two powers would enter into an alliance for mutual defense and aid. It is said that the Toltecs were then only ready to seize such opportunity, and sent back with the embassy his second son with the request that the king appoint them to be crowned first king of the Toltecs at Tollan under the royal name of Chichihuitl Tlatonco, shining precious stone. This young king, by his splendid intelligence, and ambition, immediately won the admiration and affection of the people. His coronation
magical, and religions, raised its weapons of warning. Quetzalcoatl’s aversion to the shedding of blood is said to have cost him the abandonment of his face, his beard, the ardent wishes of his more warlike friends, and his crossing over to the eastern part of the plateau of Huitzilapan in 815. His successor in Tollan, Naxeez, knew and rendered several of the lesser titles of the Toltecs.

The reign of Nauyotli, or Mitl, the sixth king of Tollan, was marked with great prosperity and peace. His entire energy and strength were devoted to the preservation of the glory of his city, where he reaffirmed and carried out the reforms of his predecessor. Cholula, a rival sacred city, really stirred him to vigorous action, in building greater temples and more attractive shrines to prevent pilgrimages from Tollan to the rival city. He also built superb temples in other provinces to the south outside the boundaries of Anahauac.

Nauyotli, or Mitl, at his death, was succeeded by his queen, Nauhualcatzin, who reigned four years. She moved wonderful wisdom and skill in her direction of public affairs, and her death was greatly lamented by the people. Her successor was Nauyotli, whose reign covered 949 to 973; he was succeeded by Tlacocan, who ruled from 973 to 994, and who was succeeded by Toxcatl, who reigned from 994 to 1000. The result of this period is almost a blank, except that in Colhuacan Quetzalcoatlacoyotl was assassinated in 990, Chichimec Tecuciztlan de Tollan, and the latter in 985 by Totepehu, the second king of that name.

We now approach the period when the Toltec empire was descending the slopes of ruin. The annals of this period are scarcer with the sanguinary struggles between the powerful tribes and bands from the north and north-west and the civil and religious authorities of the empire. The extensive records of the period of the downfall of the Toltec empire are conclusion worse confused. They abound with tales of marvel and mystery, as if intending to throw dust into the eyes of the reader.

Spanish writers still speak of Tollan as the empire, but Nahua documents find in that city the occurrences which caused the destruction of the Toltec power. Whether this is the is not, it seems that a battle was fought between the king of Colhuacan and the king of Tollan, and, while this contest was going on outside the city, a party of invaders was admitted into Tollan. Civil strife followed in the streets between three rival sects, until the city itself was nearly in ruins. The three allied powers fought each other, and an angry battle was carnage a period of famines and pestilence in the land. These events occurred between 1001 and 1005.

Defence was so weakened, the reins of government so loosened, that dependencies took advantage of their opportunity to remain in power and declare their independence.

The other Toltec cities of power, Colhuacan, Otompan, and Texocan, had long been decayed before Tollan. Invaders from the north and north-west, from the powerful Chichimec tribes and Nahua peoples, with one accord and took possession of all their cities and territory. The cities of the confederacy were plundered and burned except Colhuacan, whose king seems to have made a delivering alliance, about A.D. 1000.

The Toltec power was overthrown. The last years of its struggle for existence are inextricably mixed. Plots, intrigues, battles, invasions, assassinations, blocks the escutcheon of the once noble kings of the Toltec empire. Many of the nobility of the Toltecs are said to have migrated before the storm, bemoaning the absence of their families, their treasures, and their other movable wealth. But the Toltec peoples of the humbler classes remained in Anahauac. Some of them are said to have fought the invaders, to have established and maintained independent states, in Colhuacan, and possibly in Cholula. But they finally became the subjects of the invaders, whose language and customs were probably identical with those of the conquered. Even the name of their god, Toci, was not changed.

The Toltecs are inadequate and insufficient in method to clear up the problems that native and Spanish authors pour out on the table of the modern student of ancient Mexico.

1. Nahuatl, p. 275.
4. See art. CALENDAR (Mexico and Mayan).
5. N.R. L. 119.
TONGANS.

1. Introduction. — Tonga — or at least the Tonga of this article — is the name of a group of islands in the Western Pacific, lying to the north of New Zealand, the east of New Caledonia, and the south of Fiji and Samoa. It is sometimes known as the Friendly Islands, the name given by Captain Cook. The Tongans who inhabit this group are a tiny nation of the Polynesian race. Although few in number — about 20,000 only — their nationality is clearly marked, and they can easily be distinguished from their neighbours the Fijians and Samoans. Typical Tongans are tall, large-limbed, of a light coffee complexion, with straight black hair, but a little acquaintance with them shows that there has been an admixture with a race that was short and had receding foreheads. This agrees with their traditions, which state that, when the Tongans came to the group, some five or six centuries ago, it was already occupied by an aboriginal race. Traces of these have been found in one of the volcanic islands, but the vestiges have not been scientifically examined. Still it is clear that the Tongans, and Polynesians generally, have emigrated from a distance; and the most probable theory is that of Fornander, that they came from the head of the Persian Gulf.

Old navigators use to speak of the Tongans as 'the most splendid savages in existence,' and they were certainly the terror of the neighbouring groups, all of which are said to have been once conquered by them. They acknowledge themselves to be mentally inferior to the European; but it cannot be said that they come very far behind; and occasionally students at Tubob College have achieved results that could be equalled only by the best pupils in English schools. A fair measure of the size of their brains may surely be found in their language, which contains, if estimated, at least 10,000 words in use. The verbs have about 20 voices, and the pronouns are developed to such an amazing extent that there are more than 100 ways of saying 'our,' against two in English, 'our' and 'our own.' As the adjectives, too, have many degrees of comparison, and there are more than two articles, shades of meaning can be passed almost to an infinite extent. That the Bible translates well into a language like this is not surprising; but geographical treatises, and such works as Milton's Paradise Lost, can also be readily rendered, &c. &c.

Physically, then, and mentally, the Tongans stand high; and it comes as a surprise that their spiritual development, as represented by their old religion, was low. Their pantheon was a medley, and their theology unredeemed by any gleams of philosophy as in the religion of India.

2. The gods of Tonga may be divided into three classes.

(1) In common with other parts of Polynesia, their great gods comprise the two groups of the Tangaloa and Fau (pronounced Mow-yow; Mow as in mouse). The Tangaloa, which consisted of Tangaloa 'Eiki (Lord Tangaloa), or 'Tangaloa the Elder'), Tangaloa Tufunga ('Tangaloa the Smith, Carpenter, or Artificer, who made axes and built canoes'), and Tangaloa 'Atulongongo ('Tangaloa the Sender-forth-of-sound'). The Maui group consisted of five persons: Maui Motua ('Old Maui,' or 'Maui the Father'), Maui Lea ('Maui the Tall'), Maui Buku ('Maui the Short'), and Maui 'Atalanga ('Maui the Vigorous Planter'). This last had a son called Maui Kijikijik (pronounced Kitkikiti; 'Maui the Violent, the Mischievous'), who was, of course, the grandson of Maui Motua.

There were, however, older gods than any of these. One was called Tama-bo'uli-ala-mafoa (Son-of-the-Darkness-that-can-have-a-dawn'). Some accounts represent him as a god of the sea. Another of the primitive gods was Eitu-matubua ('Eitu-of-the-olden-time'). He is spoken of as the father of the Tongan people. Another of these gods was Fa'atu Viva, the Tangano Satan. Hiku'e'o means 'the echo,' and there is no doubt that this was the original signification of the name; but as it might mean 'watching tall,' the legend grew up that the god of this deity was so tall that when he, the god, went about, the tall kept watch at home. But even now the Tongans, when they hear an echo, say it is Hiku'e'o walking in the woods; and no other explanation was evidently an afterthought.

These with others were the original gods of Tonga. By and by a division of departments took place. To the Tangaloa was assigned the Sky (or Heaven); to the Maui group the Underworld; and to Hiku'e'o the World and Bulotu (Hades). But in order to keep Hiku'e'o in his place, as he was a god that delighted in mischief, a cord was attached to him, and he was held once in which was held by Tangaloa in the sky, and the other by a Maui in the under world, to prevent his leaving Bulotu to damage the world. This division was effected by an older god than any, namely, Taufulivalu, Chief of the Etonceusee ('Upsetter-of-the-land'), who also assigned the sea to Hemoana, and the woods and dry land generally to Lube (the Dove). Hemoana's name is sometimes pronounced Heimana, and the present writer believes that Tongasavale'a spoke of him as Hea-Moana, though he is unable to speak positively on that point. Hea-Moana would signify 'Hea-of-the-deep-sea;' Hemoana would be simply 'the Deep Sea;' Oceans. His shrine was the banded seal snakes. These were the Olympian gods of Tonga; but, with the exception of Hiku'e'o, they were merely worshipped, and few if any temples were erected in their honour. The division is due to the fact that Hiku'e'o was a mischievous god, and must therefore be propitiated.

(2) The second class of gods were an inferior race, who had their shrines in ankylosaurus, birds, fishes, whales' teeth, clubs, and even stones; for these were the gods worshipped by the people, and their temples were to be found in every village. Here are a few of the gods: Tui 'Ahu ('King of the town of 'Ahu'), whose shrine is said to consist of a stone in peculiar shape; Tui Lalotonga ('King of Rosetonga,' or perhaps of the world below Tonga), whose shrine was the dragon-fly; Talini Tubou (the god of the reigning dynasty while yet heathen),
whose shrine was a shark [Mariner renders Talisi Tubou as their deity] that was certainly incorrect; Talisi Tubou was probably the name of a king]; Bulotu Katou (the Plenoma of the Spirit World, who presided over hurricanes, and agricultural destruction), whose shrine was a tree at Kolongo [Mariner mentions several the present writer has never heard of: Tubou Toutai ("Tubou the Mariner"); Tutubu is the familiar designation of the king, and one of his family is usually called Tubu; the name of a spirit; 'Aboalo ("the Fanner"), the god of wind and weather, rain, harvest, and vegetation; Tu'tu Balotu ("King of the Spirit World"). Other gods resided in the turtle, the cuttle-fish, the kingfisher, etc. Fonokitakanga's shrine was a war-club. These were, so to speak, the private gods of the people, and the shrine of each was tabu to its worshippers. Thus the people of Te'ekinu were forbidden to eat the octopus, that being the shrine of their god. In the neighbouring villages, however, it would be freely eaten. In Nomuka one particular family were thus debarred from eating turtle, while the rest of the town were free to partake of that delicacy.

3) In addition to these there were a number of supernatural beings whose position in the Tongan pantheon was clearly marked. They were looked upon as gods, and the term expressive of highest deity was applied to them; but they were never worshipped, nor were temples built to them. On the contrary, they were looked upon with contempt, and their followers freely portrayed and laughed at. It is curious to see these ascriptions of high divinity and expressions of contempt standing side by side. Is it that these were the gods of the inferior races, the Tongans the group in which they landed?

Take an instance or two. Jilli and Faiga'a were two goddesses in this class, who had set the standard of principles in Tonga. The masculine beauty called Bajikote. He, tired of their attentions, placed two large baskets of coconuts leaves, put one goddess in each, and, shouldering them like a Chumash, conveyed them into the bush, and hung them on the branch of a tree, and left them there for two years, until the baskets rotted, and they fell to the ground. They made another attempt on his affections, and he finally got rid of them by inveigling them into his fancy, and leaving them at the bottom of the sea, where they lay until Tongaolo took pity on them, and sent a god to release them, as a reward for his kindness. The same god was 'Aboalo ("the Fanner"), and his name was also added to the list of deities. His image was conveyed in a box, and it was placed in the corner of the room, where it was supposed to ward off the evil eye of the enemy. The object was to make the enemy believe that the house was inhabited by a god, and thus to render it invulnerable.

'Unstingred shellshock shook the skies.'

On the subject of ancestor-worship, Mariner speaks positively (vol. ii. p. 97): 'That there are other Hotoos or gods, viz, the souls of all deceased nobles and mataoobes.' The present writer was disposed to agree with him at first; as it was a custom of the people to go to the cemeteries to pray, even after a sacrifice had been presented at the temple. But further inquiry has convinced him that they did so because they fancied themselves nearer the spirit-world in such places. Intelligent chiefs like Vula, who were acquainted with heathenism, are equally positive in the other direction, and deny that they looked upon the spirits of deceased chiefs as gods. We think the truth lies between the two statements, and that Mariner himself gives us a key to the solution of the question. In vol. i. p. 376, he speaks of Feenow as being frequently inspired by the spirit of a dead chief, and that of the Tonga. Now we can readily understand that in such circumstances Feenow would pray to Manini, and others would join him; so that in time Manini would be looked upon as a god. This would account for such gods as Tu'i Tongo, Tu'i Nuku, Tu'i Vaka, Tu'i Tubou, and others. All the inquiries of the present writer negative the assertion that the spirits of chiefs as a general thing became gods. We may then look upon these as the gods of the Tongans, brought by the Tongans from their original home, and the third class as the gods of the aboriginals whom they conquered. The second class contained also some primitive gods, but was recruited largely from the gods of the Hala, or the spirits of certain deceased chiefs by whom kings and notable personages fancied themselves to have been possessed.

The other point the present writer made special inquiries about was whether the Tongans worshipped the clubs, whales' teeth, animals, trees, stones, etc., before which they placed their offerings, or the god who was supposed to be temporarily residing in them. The answer was decisive. The clubs, trees, etc., were simply the va'e, the god itself was spiritual. Va'e signifies 'a mode of conveyance,' usually a canoe, but also a carrying, or anything by which one is conveyed from place to place.

Probably we may see here a development of their spiritual ideas. The oldest class—Tui, Foa, Hemea—were undoubtedly corporeal. Their bodies performed all the functions of human bodies, and they were inflamed with human passions. But the Tongans had long ceased to pray to them, and scarcely any vestige of their worship remained when the missionaries came. The third class of gods, too, were corporeal, but there are no signs of worship being paid them at any time. These two classes existed side by side long after the introduction of Christianity both had been discarded as objects of worship, which was paid only to the second class. In other words, the Tongans had worked out a theogony, which had, at any rate, this noble feature in it, that God was a spirit, and that they worship Him most worship Him in spirit.

The general Tongan term for supernatural beings is fa'asahoca. This is often shortened into fa'atoca, and when used in the abstract sense ("great") is added fa'atahaatai—the idea conveyed is that of full deity. Fa'aci saihoseo [presumably the Tongan word for 'spirit'] is a spirit, but may be short for fa'asahoca. It is a term of respect, and its use is directed to persons in authority. The term has no reference to the human soul, but is generally applied to the gods of the Tongans. The term for God is 'Hatua. Mariner spells it Hotooa, but there is no h in it. The inverted consonant represents a guttural, a half k which is one of the difficulties of the language. It is not readily recognized by the European ear, and is mostly neglected by foreigners, while being invariable in the Tongan word. The term is used to refer to any deities, and has failed to find any derivation for 'hatua, meaning other than 'God,' and between whom the titles of highest deity are given; and yet, after all, they do but recall the vagaries of the Olympian deities as described by Homer, when 'Unstingred shellshock shook the skies.'

The other great word is 'Kika—'Lord,' which is used in English for both earthly and heavenly lords. Hence it is not so high a term as 'hatua.' Indeed it seems sometimes to mean only 'supernatural.' Thus a corpse is called ka me'a fana eika, which apparently signifies 'a thing belonging to the spirit world.' Probably Mariner was thinking of this when he said (vol. ii. p. 189): 'The human soul after its separation from the body is termed hotooa, i.e. a god or spirit.' He is certainly wrong in that statement. It is clear that 'hatua' was not the original form of the word, which the laws of the language point out to have been devised.

We must not pass over the fact that the members of one of the dynasties of kings were regarded as gods. This was the earliest line of kings, and their title was Tu'i Tonga ('King of Tonga'). They were certainly looked upon, as in some sense divine beings; and instances are on record of prayers being offered to them. Words applied only to the gods were used in addressing them; such as 'Ei, already referred to, ha'de, and 'ata,' used of the movements of deity. The face of the Tu'i Tonga was termed the 'sky,' and to him, as the representative of the gods, were presented the 'first-fruits.' This ceremony (the offering of first-fruits) is described by Mariner (vol. ii. p. 196). When a Tu'i Tonga died, he was said to be 'missing' (hala), and he was buried in a sippurat, or pyramidal
of steps. This was called a langi, or 'heaven'; and many of them rested on rock ledges to tolerate preservation, and excite the wonder of the visitor by the huge size of many of the stones, some of which measure over 20 ft. in length.

Many, probably most, of the names of the Tu‘i Tonga have been preserved, and their history curiously reminds us of the story of the Carolvins and Macravinians in France. One of the Tu‘i Tonga, called Talakana, was murdered, and his son and heir Kanulufonuafakali, from fear or fear, devoted the duties of government on his younger brother, reserving to himself the honours and emoluments of the office. His brother assumed the title of Tu‘i Ha‘a Talakana (‘King of the Talakanas’), and soon got all the power into his hands, the Tu‘i Tonga becoming a roi janétant. After a few generations, however, the Tu‘i Ha‘a Talakana became effete, and the government was handed over to another branch, called the Tu‘i Kanokobuli (‘King of Kanokobuli’), the town in which he lived. This is the title of the present dynasty. Representatives of the other two lines, however, still exist, but the titles are not used. The representative, however, of the Tu‘i Tonga holds even now a quasi-sacred position, and is still addressed as the gods used to be; and words sacred to deity are used for all his movements.

Mariner mentions another semi-divine person called the Vecehi (or Vecehihi), who combined in one person his name as Vecehi and his name as a god, and in both senses. Nothing is known about him.

The word used all over Polynesia for ‘religion,’ ‘worship,’ ‘prayer,’ etc., is lotu. Fortunately this has a meaning in Tonga, and signifies a ‘seeking or something that is hard to find.’ Thus when someone reports that he or she has found lotu loa, e.g. a lotu dai, it means that he has found all over the land looking for food. It is also used for the restlessness of a caged animal seeking an outlet, and for the cry of an animal for its mate or companions. This is not the only word common to Polynesia which finds its meaning in Tongan: Tabu (or taboo), now of world-wide use, signifies in Tongan that something which might be opened is closed. These and other considerations lead one to think that the Tongan language comes nearer than most of the dialects to the original Polynesian tongae.

2. The religious rites of the Tongans were few. There was nothing in their religion corresponding to our idea of worship. If they wanted something—rain, fair winds, good crops, successful fishery—or they wished to prevent some calamity—such as sickness, death, hurricanes, war—they would seek the favour of a god, would offer sacrifices and pray. But to come into his temple, to worship, to sing his praises, to dwell upon his attributes—this was a foreign idea altogether. Hence there was very little in the Tongan religion to cultivate the conscience, or to control the passions, or to elevate the thoughts. Mariner thinks otherwise, and we would gladly believe his favourable report of the Tongan character. But all our information—and much of it goes back to Mariner’s time—contradicts his statements. He even contradicts himself. The Farmer tells us so highly of was a monster of iniquity; and there is no doubt that for centuries theft, murder, lust, treachery, and almost everything in the catalogue of evil, have been rife in Tonga. No man’s life or property, and no woman’s honour, was safe for a day. They never went to their gods empty-handed; a piece of kava root for making the native drink was a stae gaua. Baskets of food, too, were usually brought in addition, and presented to the god or his priest. One of the party would then state the object of their visit, and implore the deity to grant their request, or use his influence with the gods of Bulotu in their favour. Sometimes the priest would remain silent; at other times he would object that their gifts were too small. If he spoke at all, he spoke as the god, being supposed to be ‘possessed by the god at the moment. John Thomas says (Farmer’s Tonga, 128): ‘Often there was another person present, a “friend of the god, who acted as mediator, and addressed the priest on behalf of the offerers.’ Hingano, a chief lady of great age, described to the present writer how she and others would take baskets of food to the door of Tallai Tubobu’s temple in Nuku‘alofa, and address the priest by name, as if they, being present, would implore the god’s favour. Shortly a white (sio) foot would be protruded from beneath a curtain, which they would kiss and then retire. If their object was to deprecate a calamity, as in a case of sickness, the rite assumed a darker aspect. Fingers were cut off, wrapped in banana leaves, and presented; or children were strangled, and their bodies brought as a sacrifice. When prayers were offered to Fonotikango, the sacrifice was always an adult. Generally a man obnoxious to the community was hunted down and killed, and his body brought in a basket and laid before the priest; but Mariner speaks of a man who was killed at one instance. The offerers, clothed in old and dirty mats, and wearing necklaces of chestnut leaves, would squat on the ground at a distance, and weep and beat their breasts. While the priest, holding in his hand a war club, the shrine of the god, would listen to their prayers with his eyes fixed upon the club or upon the ground. Sometimes he would read from a religious book from an ordinary voice, but more often in unnatural tones, as if some one were speaking in him; and frequently he would begin to shake as if in a fit, and to roll about and foam at the mouth and spit lotu, i.e., spittle all over the land looking for food. It is also used for the restlessness of a caged animal seeking an outlet, and for the cry of an animal for its mate or companions. This is not the only word common to Polynesia which finds its meaning in Tongan: Tabu (or taboo), now of world-wide use, signifies in Tongan that something which might be opened is closed. These and other considerations lead one to think that the Tongan language comes nearer than most of the dialects to the original Polynesian tongae.

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4. The Tongans believed in the immortality of the soul. Mariner, Veeson, and Thomas are agreed on this point.

Veeson says (Farmer’s Tonga, p. 131): ‘One day they were conversing about a person that was being killed, and said, “He goes to the island through the sky.” “How can he be killed, if he’s already in that place, when he is dead, and his body here? Did you not bury him some months ago?”’ But all they answered was, ‘But he is still alive.” And one took hold of my hand, and, squeezing it, said, “This will die, but the life that is within you will never die”—with his other hand pointing to my heart.

Mariner and Veeson, too, agree in stating that this immortality is enjoyed only by the upper classes: the souls of the Tu‘as, or common people, die with their bodies. This, no doubt, was the belief of the upper classes, who looked down upon the Tu‘as as little better than animals; but it is no evidence of the belief of the Tu‘as themselves. Thomas says more truly: ‘Of the faith of the common people there was no certainty.’

The island referred to was called Bulotu, and ‘through the sky’ meant ‘over the horizon.’ Bulotu is, the present writer thinks, a primitive Polynesian word, and is the name for Paradise in all the dialects. It was situated west or northwest of Tonga, and could be reached by sail. At least the ballads speak of canoe touching there; but how the disembodied spirits got there is not stated. Mariner tells us (vol. i. p. 101) that Bulotu was believed by the Tongans to be a large island, stocked with all kinds of useful and
ornamental plants in a state of high perfection, and that when these were plucked others would immediately occupy their place. The whole atmosphere was filled with a music of song and dance. song and dance. honey, bees, and the birds of all kinds, and abundance of hogs—all of which were immobilized unless killed to provide food for the gods. At the moment a bird or a hog was killed, another living bird or hog was released. One of the gods gave another account of Bulotu brought by a canoe which村镇 there:  

The crew landed, and proceeded to pluck some breadfruit; but when they were about to eat it, an astonishment, they could no more lay hold of it than if it was a shadow. They walked through the trunks of trees, and passed through the substance of the house without feeling any resistance. They at length saw some of the gods, who passed through the substance of their bodies as if there was nothing there. The gods were supposed to have no canoes, not requiring them; for if they wished to be anywhere, there they are the moment the wills. 

Now, is this again a development? For the ballads, which date from a time long antecedent to the visit of Mariner, give a very different description. According to Tongan, everything in Bulotu was material. Its entrance was guarded by a woman with eight tongues. There was a large canoe for the gods to voyage in, which was called Langotangata (the human-roller), and could not be moved on the sea or on land, unless there was a being human. The same trees grew as on earth: cocoa-nuts, breadfruit, yams etc., and provision was made for the gods' consumption. They had a favourite pastime of fishing. There were evidences for netting wood-pigeons, reeds for shark-catching, ‘ituia to be fished, and gigantic clams to be dived for. Ovens of food were cooked as on earth, and kava was prepared and drunk. The houses had solid posts, and the roofs were constructed in the usual way. One of the halls in Bulotu was panelled with the walls of men's eyes which sparkled and flashed. The edges of these halls were lined with mirrors—a veritable crystal palace. There was a Vaiola, or Fountain of Life, whose waters were so potent that a child plunged into it grew up to manhood in a few moments. There was also a Fai-lofofoanga, or Fountain of Perfumery, and other delights of women (see ‘Voyage of Falmalisi, Tubus College Magazine, vol. iii. p. 39).  

Cosmogony.—The earliest chapters of the Tongan genealogy is somewhat as follows:  

Some old and slime clung together, and were carried away by the sea, and washed up on the island of Total in Bulotu. Bulotu the first, then came a woman. Then a layer of metallic stone called Tongatuamata (Frequent-bow-longago). Suddenly it began to shake, and there appeared thereon a man and a female twin. The man was called Tikiti (Stone) and the female Kele (Stone). Again there appeared a woman, a sea-quake, and other twins sprang out: the male called Atun-gall; (the female Maimama-longona (Vagaries-of-sound). Again the stone produced, and twins sprang out, called ‘Land-turtle’ and ‘Sea-turtle.’ Again the stone sounded and earth-quake, and twins sprang forth, Hamouca (the Sea-snake), and Lube (the Dove).  

They grew up and married, i.e. the first pair and the second and the third. The eldest child of Tikiti and Kele was a son, Tanuitullu (Frequent-turner-of-the-hand). The next was a girl called Havaa-lofofo (Haven-come-thunder). The second pair had a girl called Vele Lahi, the third pair a ‘girl called Vele JIV (mole-signifies ’young’ or ‘desire’; Vele Lahi—Desire the Elder, Vele JIV—Desire the Younger). Sticky and Slimy created a new land called ‘Tonga Mamo’ (Dis-

Tongan boats were ordered Tangaloo ‘Atutongo long to go down and see in what condition the world was. So

Tongans 379

1 They sometimes intensively. This would then mean: ‘com-

2plete-turner’.
of being possessed of no common ability, and of an excellent memory; and, if the present writer has ventured to differ from it, is for the following reasons: (1) the shortness of Mariner's stay,—only one year; (2) his obvious want of acquaintance with the niceties of the language; (3) the considerable time occupied between his leaving Martime and the writing down of his reminiscences; (4) the fact that the present writer's acquaintance with Tongking extends over a period of 40 years; (5) that most of his information was taken down from the lips of the "First of the Bards," a once heathen chief called Tonggawalevi, who composed and sang a great many of their folk-lore and ballads; (6) that he has had access to the unpublished journals of the Rev. John Thomas, Wesleyan minister, who went to Tongking in 1856, and was the first missionary to make a lengthened stay.)

J. EGAN MOULTON.

TONGKING.—Ethnographically Tongking is divided into two parts: South Tongking, the special domain of the Annamese race, and North Tongking, bounded on the north by the Annam-Chinese frontier, on the east by the sea, on the west by the range where the waters separate into the Red and Black Rivers (Song Koi and Song Bo), and on the south by a line bisecting the provinces of Kwang-Yen, Bac-Giang, Thal-Nguyen, Tuyen-Kwang, and Yen-Bay. This Upper Tongking has an area of 54,700 square kilometres, and a population of 374,528, belonging to 26 different ethnic groups. There are no Annamese or Chinese except officials and merchants; the country is peopled chiefly by the Man, Yao, Tung, Miao, Lolo, Muong, and a very small number of representatives of far more ancient ethnic groups, such as the La-tchi (La-ti) and the Ken-Lao.

1. Religion.—The Tai element, most important in point of numbers (239,179 individuals—about 60 per cent of the total population), is divided into numerous sub-groups, the most important being the Tho (68,000), who are found round Cao-Bang, and the Nung (66,000), and the Black Tai (14,500). The Tai have a strong admixture of Chinese and Annamese and are thus closely related to the Siamese and Laosians.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Tai are strong and of a lively disposition, careless, fond of pleasure and play, and extraordinarily indolent. This race seems to be on the decrease; there are few births, and infant mortality is very high. They are not absolutely averse to mixed marriages; their daughters may marry Chinese or Annamese if they choose, and their sons take wives from any variety of the race whatever, even from the Man; these mixed marriages produce a stronger and more vigorous race than the pure Tai.

The Tai live in the plains and low valleys by preference. Their houses are, as a rule, built of clay, and the ground floor being reserved for live stock and poultry, the upper storey for the family. The Nung and several other tribes dress like the Chinese; the rest of the Tai follow the Annamese fashion, but wear much brighter colours—indigo blue is almost universal—silk is also largely used. Rice is the staple food. The Tai also use beans, sweet potatoes, and gourds; pork is their most usual food, and is rarely eaten for feasts; they also eat fish. Tea is their chief beverage, though sometimes they drink much wine or spirit made from fermented grain. The use of tea and beer is practically universal among them; opium is confined to the rich.

The Tai are essentially farmers. They cultivate rice, maize, buck-wheat, beans, peas, sweet potatoes, and sesame. Industry and commerce are practically non-existent owing to the indolence of the race. They can, however, distil alcohol, weave clothes, make rich embroidery, and do fine basket-work. The Tai even spin a little silk.

2. Religion.—On their original animism the Tai have superimposed a confused mixture of Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas, derived from the Chinese and Annamese. A few priests or lettered men have a vague knowledge of the cosmic system of the di-kinh.

They believe that the principal principle of nature gave birth to the male and female principles, from which issued everything and everybody. The male principle is the sun, the sky, and all celestial bodies, as well as the dark moon, the vital and sensual soul of beings. Man has three subtle souls, or ân, which emanate from the male principle, and live eternally, according as the soul is male or female, vegetative, or valid. At death these âns retire to the sky, where they remain until the day of judgment comes, when the âns go to the infernal regions. Here we see the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of the transmigration of souls and their purification by punish- ment. When the soul is freed from the underworld, undergoing long Being, it re-enters a new body. From the seventh year of the birth, the soul has the god of intellect, the supreme Euthist idol.

The great majority of the people, a most superstitious race, confine themselves to the worship of the evil spirits which infest the air and lie in wait for man even in the most insignificant actions of his life. Their religious observances are simple, and consist of the thought and offerings, and especially by the help of more powerful good spirits which are rendered propitiation by devotion worship. Among the good spirits the genius of the heathen and the deity of the village are held in highest honour; of the evil spirits, which have different names in the various Tai groups, the most dreaded are the spirits of people who have died a violent death and the chicken-spirits that insinuate themselves into people, especially women, and give them the evil eye. Of course the Tai believe in white and black magic, spells, lots, and philtres.

Their priests are chiefly sorcerers, who earn their living by offering sacrifices to the spirits, exorcising the sick, and warding off all the evils invoked against man. They also choose the material with which to build villages or houses, the propitious day for beginning any work, etc. Among the Tai they are nearly all connected with an official cult, but there are independent sorcerers and sorceresses.

The only temples that the Tai possess are small rustic pagodas, nearly all dedicated to the tutelary genius of the locality.

Their religious festivals are borrowed from the Annamese; but among certain tribes, particularly the White and Black Tai, there are some festivals which seem peculiar to the race. (1) Kin lao mao (‘drink’, ‘alcohol’, ‘drunk’) takes place in the September. (2) The inhabitants of the village meet in one of their houses for a banquet, which is followed after sunset by music and singing. The feast lasts three days, during which no one may enter or leave the village. (3) King pang (‘to eat bread’) takes place in November in honour of the dead. It lasts three days, with banquets, dancing, and singing. Both men and women take part.

Ancestor worship also exists among the Tai, but only a more or less slavish imitation of Annamese ritualism. It is practised chiefly among the Tho, who preserve the names of their ancestors to the fourth generation, make offerings at prescribed times, and train their children to honour the dead as the protectors of the hearth. Only those who have died a natural death have a place on the family altar; those who have died a violent death, out of doors, have only a small outside altar, usually built in the garden.1

3. Myths and legends.—Among all the Tai is the tradition of a universal deluge, from which the god of the earth saved only a brother and a sister—a poor but pious couple—who shut themselves at his command inside a hollow pumpkin, with some rice for provision. After the subsidence of the deluge, the flood-race of members were born from the union of this couple.

4. Medicine.—The Tai regard nearly every illness as the work of evil spirits, and the best medicine is the sorcerer; the more enlightened members of the race sometimes admit that there are natural ailments which they treat with simples and mineral products borrowed from the Chinese pharmacopoeia.

1 It should be noticed that the Tai know nothing of the property called La’ow ang in Annam. It is said that a small part of the patrimony reserved to meet the expenses of the cult of the dead and the upkeep of the temple; the ruler, after a few months, at most after four years, the Tai have nothing more to do with the tombs.
5. Marriage.—Although the manners of the Tai are not so free and easy as those of the Laoitians, youths and maidens meet freely to sing and play—which often leads to sexual relations; all that Tai morality requires is that there be no tangible proof of these relations, and hence recourse is had to abortive measures or the suppression of children.

The father is the unquestioned head of the family; yet it is only among the highly Annamitized Tai that he chooses a mate for his child; among the Tai of the right bank of the Red River the young people make their own choice. The proposal is made by a go-between; the young man pays a dowry, and the engagement is settled after a sorcerer has compared the genealogical forecasts of the couple, in order to see whether any supernatural influence opposes their union. The engagement is generally long—from three months to three years—and is rather expensive for the fiancé, who is expected to give a great number of presents. The engaged couple are bound to observe the strictest reserve; they are not allowed to take any notice of each other until the wedding-day, while they have complete liberty in their relations with the other young people of both sexes. The marriage-ceremony itself is borrowed from the Annamese.

The outstanding characteristic of marriage among the Tai,—with the exception of the Tho in the west, the Lung and the Tho-Ti,—is the custom of separating husband and wife after the celebration of their union; among some tribes the wife spends a fortnight with her parents and a fortnight with her husband; among others she cannot go to her husband except when invited. This state of affairs comes to an end with the appearance of pregnancy, or, in cases of sterility, at the end of the fourth year of married life, when the wife takes her place at the family hearth. As the separated husband and wife retain complete liberty of behaviour outside with people of their own age, Tai morality suffers some strange drawbacks from this custom. The Tai youths marry usually between twenty-three and twenty-five, the girls between sixteen and eighteen.

The Tho of the west and several other tribes practise marriage by contract also. A poor young man can enter a rich family without paying the usual dowry, on condition that he takes his father-in-law’s name, and lives with and works for his father-in-law. Should he be unable to live apart with his wife, he is liable to pay an indemnity to his father-in-law. A young man can also marry without paying a dowry and without changing his name, by undertaking a contract to serve his wife in his father’s house for a stated number of years—from four to seven. If he dies before the contract has expired, his widow is responsible for his debt. These two forms of marriage, which are not held in high esteem, entail no long engagements and no costly wedding-feasts.

Polygamy is allowed by the Tai, but seldom practised; the number of wives is usually limited to two, only the first having honor and authority at the hearth, the other being practically her servant. Among the White Tai, however, the daughter of a chief has the right of first wife, no matter when she is married. The Tai woman, though she enjoys a life of perfect freedom in her youth, becomes after marriage a sort of beast-of-burden; all the hard work in the fields and in the house falls on her. She has no real individuality till she becomes a mother. Divorce is rare; by right only the husband can seek it; in actual life it is the wife who applies for it. Repudiation is still more rare and is nearly always due to sterility.

6. Birth.—The house of the mother is forbidden to strangers during and for a certain time after confinement. If they did enter, they might themselves be contaminated and bring harm to the child. The confinement is made known to those outside by a branch of a shadlock and a piece of coal among the Tho of the west, by a piece of wood, a knife, and a green branch among the Tho of the east, fastened to the ladder of the house. The first visitors to enter the house of the mother have to pass over a burning brand or a pail of water, into which red-hot iron is plunged. The Tai woman is delivered nearly always in a standing position, holding on to ropes with her hands. The eastern Tho alone light a brazier on the capital bed whither she is afterwards carried. The placenta is secretly buried by the midwife. The birth is announced with libations to the ancestors by the head of the family. A propitious day is chosen for putting the child in the sack that does duty as swaddling. The choice of a name is surrounded with the same superstitions as fears are found among the Annamese, and the same unpleasant designations are chosen.

7. Death and disposal of the dead.—The Tai originally practised cremation and still do so for certain chiefs. As a rule they have now adopted burial. Funeral honours are paid only to men over 20 years of age and to married women. The rites are imitations of those of the Annamese. The medicine-man determines the position of the coffin and the situation of the grave. The deceased is dressed in his best clothes and a pair of new sandals, and is put into a coffin containing about 10 kilogrammes of ashes. On the bier are placed some duck-feathers to help him to ford the rivers of the other world, and a pencil and paper for him to make his wishes known. On the grave the third after death the corpse is placed on a paper catafalque and taken to the cemetery with great ceremony. The one idea at this juncture is to prevent the dead from returning to torment the survivors at home and at the same time to protect him from evil spirits. It is for this purpose that the medicine-man is employed; he brandishes his sword at intervals round the coffin and the mourners, who shoot the roosters both gold and silver paper in order to tempt the evil spirits to stop and gather it up. The coffin is then put into the grave under the protection of the medicine-man’s sword; food is placed on the ground near the grave. The catafalque is burned—a house for the dead in the other world. Among the Chong-Kiai Tai, when the coffin has to cross a river, the children stretch a piece of cloth from side to side for the souls of the dead, to keep them from wandering. Commemorative rites are not observed regularly by the Tai, except where they are very much under Annamese influence.

8. Tabu.—There seems to be only one kind of tabu among the Tai, viz. the entering or leaving a village during a local festival. Strangers are warned to turn back by notices placed outside the village.

II. MAN.—This Chinese name, which means ‘barbarous,’ rude, is applied in Tongking to the ethnic group of the ‘children of Pan-Hu or Phien-Hu," who claim to be descended from the union of the dog Pan-Hu with the daughter of the emperor of China, whose inveterate enemy had been vanquished by Pan-Hu. The Man, or Yao, probably inhabited the high parts forming the basin of the Li-Kiang in the north, and are about 50,651 in number in N. Tongking and much more numerous in the west than in the east. Their various groups have been classified in six great families, issuing, they say, from the six sons of Pan-Hu: the Man Cô, or 'Born Man'; the Man Tiên, or sarapeq
Man; the Man Lan-Tien, or ‘indigo-tinted Man’; the Man Quan Trang, or ‘blue-men of Man’; the Man Quan Co, or ‘short-haired Man’; and the Man Cao Lan, or ‘great rainbow Man’. The Man Co, most numerous and most important, live in the highest parts of the country; lower down are the Man Dien; the Lan-Tien hardly ever are found at an altitude above 300 metres; the others follow by various stages to the borders of the deltaic plains; as a rule, they all find life in the valleys ungenial.

1. Physical characteristics. — The Man are not so tall as the Tai, but are more robust, more intelligent, and much more active. As they have no rice, their staple food is vegetables, and they eat meat sparingly, chiefly pork, rarely buffalo or, never the dog—for this is the totem of their race. They do chew betel, but both men and women smoke tobacco and the rich consume opium.

Their houses are built sometimes on the ground, sometimes on piles, and sometimes half-and-half. A random group of these houses forms a village, and the villages are usually surrounded by a wall. The Man borrow their style of dress from either the Chinese or the Annamese according to their locality. The women’s garments are embroidered on the skirts and wide sleeves with bright red and blue designs so intricate and elaborate that it takes three years to embroider one costume. Their hair-dressing is also elaborate, and is nearly always finished off with a large turban having coloured edging and embroidery. They are very anxious about cleanliness; but they are good blacksmiths, and can make the trinitates that their women use, and also paper from bamboo-fibre. They are good fishers and hunters.

2. Religion. — Their beliefs are like those of the Tai, but even more confused, a few vague notions from the three great religions of China; but the men and the people are animists, though not quite so superstitious as the Tai. Ancestor-worship is held in high honour among them. They have a great flood deified as the Tai. The Man have only a few pagodas dedicated to the tutelary deity of the village. They are nearly always built against a fruit-tree. They have medicine-men who present offerings, exorcise spirits, and work cures. The reputation of these sorcerers varies with the Man Co according to whether they have or have not received complete instruction to the third degree. Among the other tribes initiation generally comprises only one degree. The Man worship deities in sorcery, songs, sacrifices, and incantations. They observe the Chinese feasts with varying regularity. They have also some curious local feasts celebrated with great pomp, especially by the Man Co. The people observe every three years in certain tribes, every five years in others, and commemorates the rescue of the Man race when—as long ago as to be in the region of history—it was shipwrecked in sight of the Chinese coast on its way from an island in the east. The second feast, called ‘the great fast’, comprises five days of extraordinary pomp, and occurs only once in ninety years. We have no data of any value on its origin or symbolic meaning.

3. Medicine. — Their medicine comes from the Chinese, but the Man would not believe in the efficacy of any medicine that was not accompanied by incantations and incense.

4. Metempsychosis. — The Man believe that their neighbours, the Mao, have a third cutting of teeth in their old age, and after death escape from their grave and reappear as tigers.

5. Marriage. — The Man do not attach much importance to virginity. When a child is born before marriage, it is suppressed without a thought of death, which demands a fine for such an offence. Violence is also punished by a fine. The young people themselves, and not their parents, arrange their marriages. The young man makes his choice, then tells his parents, who send a go-between to the parents of the girl. After examining the genealogical forecystals, the go-between may, at a second visit, discuss the amount of the dowry and the presents to be offered by the suitor. The engagement is concluded when the young man himself brings all or some of the presents. All kith and kin between the engaged couple is stopped until the wedding-day. The wedding itself is signalized by the customary banquet; the couple drink a cup of rice-wine together and prostrate themselves before the ancestral altar. They live together after the marriage ceremony. The daughter-in-law must scrupulously avoid touching her husband’s parents, though she serves her father-in-law at table.

The Man are as familiar with marriage by adoption and contract. Among the Man Cao Lan the newly-married couple do not live together until two or three months after the marriage ceremony. Among the Man Quan Trang the marriage is preceded by a term of three years spent by the young man in his future father-in-law’s house, the girl being usually about thirteen or fourteen at this time. The youth may marry her at the beginning of the three years on condition that he indemnifies his father-in-law for the three years’ service which he owes. If pregnancy occurs during this term, the parties are bound to each other; if the youth changes horses before the end of the term, he can leave without paying or receiving anything; if he is dismissed, he can claim an indemnity for the service rendered. After marriage the couple serve seven years in the paternal house of the husband.

Polygamy is practised among the Man; the number of wives is usually restricted to two, the first only having authority in the house. The Man Quan Trang allow polygamy only in exceptional cases. The material status of woman is high among the Man, the men doing all the heavy work; her legal status is different: she is the property of her husband, who can give her away and repudiate her. She, on the other hand, is not allowed to leave him. In cases of adultery the husband has the right to send his wife back to her parents and reclaim the dowry that was paid for her; if he keeps her, he can claim damages.

6. Birth. — From the third month of pregnancy sexual relations cease, and the woman abstains from fat, green vegetables, and garlic. She is not allowed to sew embroidery or outside her house. The Man Lan-Tien believe that if a pregnant woman were the first to cross a new bridge, it would fall; that the touch of such a woman spoils rice and alcohol; the Man Cao Lan, on the other hand, keep her away from these things for her own sake, in case they should cause miscarriage. The birth is announced to outsiders by a bunch of grass hung on the door among the Man Co, by threads stretched across the door among the Quan Trang; no announcement is made among the Lan-Tien. The Man woman is delivered sitting on a little stool. No fire is put under the bed after delivery. The placenta is taken far away and hidden in a hole in a tree or rock; it is buried under the mother’s bed among the Man Lan-Tien; if eaten by an animal, it would bring misfortune on the child. Children born out of wedlock among the Quan Trang belong to the mother; but the father, if known, is liable to pay a fine and give two months’ service free in the house of the mother’s parents to repay them for the loss of work caused by the birth. They practice adoption freely and thus receive into their families many Annamese children as their own.

7. Death and disposal of the dead. — The Man Co used to burn their dead, and this custom still lives west of the basin of the Red River. The Man Lan-Tien used to burn the dead, and this custom still lives west of the basin of the Red River. The Man Lan-Tien used to bury only those over fifty; the Quan Trang buried all the heads of families. The burial rites are copied from the
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Man. — The Man Coo do not make ‘the white silk soul’ or catafalque; a sorcerer of the second degree exorcizes the tree from which the coffin is to be made so that the tree-spirit may not come to torment the dead.

III. PA-TENG. — The Pa-Teng, about 200 in number, live near the Man on the heights separating the Red River and the Clee River (Song-Ka). Their language is distinct from the Chinese, and are really separate linguistically. Their beliefs and customs are practically those of the Man.

IV. MEO. — The Meo, or ‘cats,’ numbering 21,000, live in Cat-Cueng, Dao-Lac, Lao-Kay, and Coc-Len as well as in the provinces of Thai-Nguen and Yen-Bay. They claim to have come originally from the Chinese province of Yun-Nan, Kwei-Chin, and Tse Chua. Their last invasion into Tongking in 1860, was very violent.

1. Physical characteristics. — The Meo are little and squat, very vigorous on their short legs, brave, hardy, and independent; they can be very abnormal, but are inclined to eat and drink heavily. Mains is their staple food; they eat very little meat, and drink a great deal of alcohol, but tobacco is not used and betel is unknown among them. Their rustic huts, of piaf or mud, are dirty to repulsiveness.

2. Religion. — Their traditional beliefs are borrowing from China and are very unprecise and wavering. They dread evil spirits — among others, the souls of beheaded people and of the unburied dead. A vague form of ancestor-worship is praticed in the form of the incalculable and indispensable offerings of food, which are quickly consumed by the survivors. They are familiar with the flood-legend of the couple saved in the hollow pumpkin. Their priests are sorcerers.

3. Marriage. — Paternal authority is not strong. The young people make their own choice of mates, and marriage is accomplished through a go-between. In some districts this is followed by a dowry, and to serve his future parents-in-law for two years before marriage. The Meo marry freely with other ethnic groups. Marriages are always accompanied by dainties, songs, and games; if the bridegroom cannot afford the expense, he may leave it for his father-in-law to bear, on condition that he and his wife give so many years’ work in payment. Marriage by capture is also found, in which a man may marry a girl who has been denied him, and he assumes for his offence by paying a heavy dowry. Polygamy is allowed, but is not practised except when the first wife has no children. In the case of polyandry (the man kills the culprit, but as a rule he content with repudiating his wife and taking back the dowry.

4. Birth. — There is nothing to mark the house on the occasion of a birth; the mother is delivered sitting and remains indoors for 33 days. The placenta is baried in front of the house, if the child is a boy; under the fire-place, if it is a girl.

5. Death and disposal of the dead. — The Meo bury their dead. The watch by the corpse consists of three days’ feasting and dancing; the children of the deceased invite him to join in the banquets, and even slip a piece of food between his teeth. By the side of the corpse, which is dressed in new clothes and fixed in an upright position to a wall of the hut, a dead dog, killed for the purpose, is placed. The two are bound together by a strip of paper going from the dog’s teeth to the deceased man’s wrist. The dog’s duty is to guide his master in the other world. The coffin and the body are taken to the grave separately; the body is carried on a litter and followed by the sorcerer, the family, and the male dead are laid in the ground, the evil spirits. When the grave is filled in, the litter is broken over it, some food (which must be renewed for several days) is placed on the tomb, and the funeral procession returns to a banquet at the deceased’s house.

V. LOLO. — The Lolo, a people almost certainly originating in the Brahmaputra valley, are about 2000 in number in Tongking and live chiefly in the region of Bao-Lac. A

1. Physical characteristics. — Of medium height, muscular and well built, with fine regular features and a copper complexion, they recall to the Western mind the people of Europe. They are luxurious and indolent, marrying only among themselves, but their race is degenerating through the influence of opium. They are mainly rice, maize, vegetables, and greens, meat being reserved for festivals. They make alcohol from fermented maize. They use no beed and very little tobacco, but indulge in opium to excess.

Their houses are built on piles in the rich villages; in poor villages they are wretched huts placed on the ground. In dress the Lolo resemble the Chinese or the Tho according to locality, but their garments (those of the women in particular) are shorter and much more elaborately embroidered. The Lolo are great agriculturists and hunt and fish a little.

2. Religion. — Their beliefs and personal life vary according as their villages are next a Tai, or a Meo clan. Their chief cult appears to be that of evil spirits, and they countenance ancestor-worship, theoretically. They also have the story of the flood and the survival of their ancestors in a pumpkin.

3. Marriage. — Marriage, which takes place during the night, consists of no religious ceremonies, but simply banquets and dances. After marriage the wife lives only two or three nights with her husband, and then returns to her parents until pregnancy privileges her to take her place in her husband’s home. The groom’s parents, on the contrary, may remain in the new home, and the caper paying a double dowry. Adultery is punished by the death of both offenders. Polygamy exists only in theory.

4. Birth. — The rites connected with birth have no peculiarities among the Lolo. Adoption is frequent occurrence, either by free consent or as the result of a bargain, and is the occasion of great festivities.

5. Death and disposal of the dead. — Burial takes place, without ceremony and in presence of relatives only, three days after death. For nine days in the case of a man, eight for a woman, and six for a child, the family keep a fire burning on the tomb, and after that take no more trouble. Certain tribes exhume the dead, after one or three years, with great pomp, and put the head or all the bones into a little wooden box, which is then placed on a neighbouring rock, where the survivors can see it while at work. Their ancestor-worship is very crude. The place of the tablet is often taken by a representation of the deceased, which is left in the stem and little bits of paper, placed against a partition or between the wall and the roof of the hut.

6. Tabu. — Women after puberty are forbidden to eat pork, fish, or any other fish, and even cook their food in dishes which have been used for preparing these foods; hence the necessity of two fire-places and two utensils in a Lolo house.

VI. MUONG OR MON. — The Muong or Mon are an ethnic group centring in the province of Hoa-Binh. They are of uncertain origin, but appear to be closely connected with the Annamese, whom they resemble strongly in physical type, dress, and customs. Their religion is a development of the popular animism of the Annamese.

It should be noted that in one thing they are very different from the Annamese: among the Muong the relations between the sexes before marriage are very free. Whenever a girl becomes pregnant, her family and that of her seducer are made to pay a fine to the village, among the Annamese, the blood-test is applied when the father of a child denies his paternity. Marriage is celebrated according to the Annamese rites. Accoutrements take place on a camp-bed under the usual fire is kept burning, and the house is marked to outsiders, after the delivery, in the
primitive thought is obviously in regard to the faculty of speech, to which it contributes, together with the throat and lips, in the modulation of the voice. The voice, which is called 'voice' is modified by the varying shape of the resonant chamber formed by the mouth. The tongue, however, is not indispensable to speech; Huxley refers to the presence of a tongue in amphibians which remained quite intelligible though the tongue had been completely amputated.

2. Localization of psychical function.—This characteristic of primitive thought concerning the physical organs is frequently illustrated by primitive practices in regard to the tongue. Since the nervous system and the minuter structures of the tissues were unknown to the ancients, the tongue was thought to perform an important function in the faculty of speech, as something residing in it, so that the faculty or its special qualities could be transferred by acquisition or assimilation of the tongues of specially gifted animals or men.

Thus, among the Tlingits of Alaska, the chief of the spirits sends the candidate for shamanism 'a river-oyster, in the tongue of which animal is supposed to be hidden the whole power and secret of shamanism. . . . If, however, the spirits will not visit the would-be shaman, or give him any opportunity to get the outer-tongue as described above, the next step is the touch of a dead shaman, and keeps an awful vigil over night, holding in his mouth the very finger of the dead man, a first touch of power; this constrains the spirits very powerfully to send the necessary oyster.' In Bohemia the tongue of a mace snake, if cut from the living animal, is placed in the mouth of the sick person, and the tongue of a bird of passage will confer the gift of eloquence. 'A North American Indian thought that brandy must be a desirable gift of the hearts and tongues, "because," said he, "after drinking it I feel nothing, and I talk wonderfully."' In S.E. Australia, 'one of the Wailbura was observed to cut the tongue of a dead man, and give it to a little boy, a child of about thirteen months old, and give him a reason for doing so that after eating the tongue his child would soon be able to talk.' When a child is late in learning to speak, the Turks of Central Asia 'will give a dead bird's tongue to the child of certain birds to eat.' The converse is illustrated by the belief that the saliva of a quail touching the tongue of a bird gave it human speech. Among the Nubians, 'before the tongue of any animal is eaten, the lip is cut off; on human analogy they believe that "here is the seat of curses and ill-omen."' It is common custom of hunters to cut out the tongues of animals that they have killed. Perhaps the removal of the tongues is sometimes a precaution to prevent the ghosts of the creatures being told their sad fate to their sympathising comrades, the living animals of the same sort, who would naturally be frightened, and so keep out of the hunter's way. The cannibal practice of eating the tongues of the conquered enemy is partly based on the idea that the localised qualities are in this way acquired.

3. Ordeals.—The idea of the localization of psychical function and its ethical qualities underlies different forms of the tongue ordeal. Lady Anne Blunt records an interesting case of this in connexion with a dispute as to the possession of an eagle and a buffalo, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by placing a live calf being placed upon her tongue. Here the original thought seems to have been that the truth would be elicited when the inherent falseness of the tongue was, if necessary, burnt out. Similarly, in case of theft among certain W. African tribes, use is made of a needle which the operator ... the tongue of each member of the household is succession, to discover the thief, be believing that it will fail to pierce the tongue of the person who committed the theft.' Reference to the tongue-ordeal among E. African natives was recently made in the British House of Commons: A native chief was investigating a case of cattle theft in the presence of
the District Commissioner, Mr. Dundas. The chief called on the accused, one of his people, to go through the native form of procedure. But the accused did not submit to this, and the organizer, Mr. Dundas, did not prohibit this procedure, but took care that the knife was not sufficiently sharp to cause the required wound. The conduct of a different kind is undergone by the medicine-man in certain tribes of Central Australia. The tongue is mysteriously mutilated and remains throughout life perforated in the centre with a hole large enough to admit the little finger. But the student of totemism has to study the frequent practice of mutilating an organ before its special use in order that it may be used with impunity (cf. circumcision, etc., at puberty).

4. Religious usages.—The tongue is not often manifest as a separate offering in the rites of sacrifice.

The Homeric Greeks concluded a feast by casting the tongues of the victims upon the fire, over which they poured the drink-offering. 3 According to some accounts, the tongues of the victims were assigned by the Greeks to Hermes, as the god of speech, or to his human representatives, the heralds. The Yakut made a special sacrifice, for a sick man's recovery, of tongue, heart, and liver, consuming the rest of the most acceptable sacrifice. In the horse-sacrifice of the Shanmish of N. Asia the tongue of the sacrificed animal is torn out in order to make its spirit ascend under the shaman's control.

Honey was placed on the tongue of one who was being initiated into Mithraism, as was the custom with newly-born infants; 5 we may compare this with the ancient Latin custom of hanging honey to those being baptized into the Christian faith. 6 In this connexion may be noticed the miracle of healing ascribed to Martin of Tours, wrought by another means. A dumb child with all other signs of exorcism. 7 The widespread rule of silence (q.v.) during particular religious ceremonies falls beyond the scope of this article, but the idea of the localization of the organ probably underlies the Indian usage recorded by Devendranath Tagore:

'Other elephant seated the Rajapur (religious preceptor of the Raj) dressed in the ascetic's brick-coloured robe, and silent. He made his head descend in wood, lest she should speak.' 8

5. Penalties.—In the light of these illustrations of the fundamental idea of localized function (or 'diffused consciousness'), we may better understand certain barbarous mutilations widely practised by way of penalty or revenge. These have often survived into times relatively more civilized than those of their origin, when the idea that first prompted them has been lost, viz. the idea of penalizing the guilty organ in which the original evil resides.

The Laws of Hammurabi enacts that in certain cases an adopted son may not replace his new parents to have his tongue cut out. 9 According to S Mac, when the seven brethren were being interrogated, being 'commanded to cut out the tongue of him that had been their spokesman,' 10 Judas Maccaeus, 'cutting out the tongue of the impious Nicanaor, and that he would also kill the birds' 11 Maximus and two other opponents of monotheism were dragged from Rome to the place where their tongues and right hands were cut off, before they were driven into exile. 12 Blasphemy for the fifth time was punished by excision of the tongue, according to a law (407) of Philip of Volos (169–150). 13 Evagrius writes of the heretic Nestorius: 'I learn from one who wrote an account of his decease, that when his tongue had been eaten with worms, he departed to the greater and everlasting judgment which awaited him.' 14 The instinct which doubtless created this legend worked also in Fulvia's savage action, when she thrust her needle through the tongue of her dead enemy, Cicero. 15

6. 'Figurative' usages.—The selected evidence already given will prepare us to recognize a deeper meaning in many other liturgical and ritual literature which the modern mind is apt to dismiss as simply figurative and poetical. The Biblical usages will sufficiently illustrate this. The quality of 'a backbiting tongue' is as inherent as that of an 'angry countenance.' (Ps 127) A lying tongue hates those that it wounds (23); the tongue devises wickedness, like a sharp razor (Ps 12); Job asks more literally than most readers suppose, 'Is there injustice on my tongue?' 16 The Servant of Jehovah declares that his Master has given him the disciple's tongue, that he may know how to help the weary by his words (Is 50). In the Messianic future, the cleansing of his lips by the live coal illustrates the principle of the localization of psychical function. So in the NT, when the tongue is said to dwell the whole body, and to be the source of all poison (Ja 3:8), there is a hidden intensity of meaning derived from primitive thought. The importance of this is seen in regard to such a phenomenon as the gift of tongues: it implies that the local and quasi-independent organ has been taken possession of by the Spirit of God. This is more difficult for the modern mind to conceive synthetically than it was for the ancient, largely because we have lost touch with the idea of the localization of psychical function and ethical attributes, and have replaced it by that of the cerebral centralization of consciousness.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *The Boar's Head'; G. E. Lodge, *The Laws of the Corn and of the Wild, London, 1912, ii. 261 (where a number of primitive practices in respect to the tongue are collected in a long footnote); J. B. Mayer, *The Epistle of James*, ed. 1910, p. 219-225, discusses the ethical uses of the word and abuse of the future. See also H. Wheeler Robinson, art. 'Tongue' in *D.A.C.*

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

TONGUES.—See CHRSIMATA.

TONSE.—Tonsure is the shaving or cutting of the hair after a particular fashion as a sign of reception into the clerical order and to the privileges pertaining to the loyalty to the reception of holy orders, and is administered by the bishop or by a mitred abbot or by certain privileged priests in whom its administration has been vested by the pope. At first it was part of the ceremony of ordination, but was separated from it towards the end of the 7th century. The origin of the tonsure is obscure, but from passages in the Fathers it is clear that long hair in men was considered effeminate or worse, and this was particularly true in the case of monks. Epiphanius censures some Mesopotamian monks for their long hair against the Church, and Jerome is particularly indifferent at the custom. 1 A monk's hair had thus to be cut short, though not shaven, as this was the custom with the priests of Isra. 2 The earliest tonsure was probably no more than a close cut of the hair of the entire head, though this may have become a shaving of the entire head after the manner of

3 See art. CHRSIMATA, vol. iii. p. 370.
the Nazirites and those under a vow (Nu 6:6, Ac 21:26). 1 It may also have been adopted by monks as a symbol of a penitential life, since penitents had their hair shorn. This is the Eastern form of tonsure, or that of St. Paul. Bede tells how Theodore of Tarsus, before being consecrated by Pope Vitalian in A.D. 688, waited four months for his tonsure, after which he said that it might be shorn into the shape of a crown (the second or Western form of tonsure, or St. Peter's), 'for he had the tonsure of St. Paul, the apostle, after the manner of the Eastern partakers.' 2 The Petrine tonsure consists in leaving only a circle of hair round a shaven crown, this symbolizing the crown of thorns or the crown of Christ's royal priesthood. It had displaced the Pauline form in the West, and is first mentioned by Gregory of Tours (6th cent.), and was worn by Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 609-640), who sent Augustine to England. 3 It is ordered in the 4th canon of the Council of Toledo (A.D. 633)—that all clerics must shave the whole front part of the head, and leave behind only a circular crown of hair on the lover part. While tonsure arose as a monastic custom, it was soon adopted by all clergymen, particularly before the end of the 8th cent., and the Quinisext Council of 692 appoints it for such lesser orders as readers and singers. A third form, that of St. John—or of St. James, as its upholders claimed—seems to have been peculiar to the Celtic Church, and occasioned great controversy with the missionaries from Rome, who were astonished to find it in use in Britain, and vigorously combated its use. Nevertheless it continued to be used long after the Synod of Whitby (A.D. 664), which decided against it. What precisely its nature was is uncertain. The Irish Druids are known to have used a tonsure, perhaps denoting servitude to the gods, as it was customary for a warrior to vow his hair to a divinity if victory were granted him. 4 The Druidic tonsure seems to have consisted in cutting all the hair on the anterior part of the head from ear to ear, except a small patch at the forehead. 5 This was looked upon as the tonsure of Simon Magus, regarded as the archdruid or Magus. It has been thought that the Celtic Christian tonsure resembled this and was retained through national feelings. But there was apparently some difference, possibly slight, and it is hardly likely that, while other Druidic observances were banned, this was retained retaining all other rules, we are held regarding the Celtic Christian tonsure. (1) It left the hair long at the back, the upper part of the front being shaved so as to leave a band of hair round the forehead from ear to ear. 6 This view was first mooted by Thomas Innes, who says: 'The tonsure of the Scots was not fully round and did not reach the hindmost part of the head, and therefore resembled a crescent or semicircle.' 7 (2) All the front of the head was shaved, to a line from ear to ear, behind which the hair was grown. 1 Each of these forms has strong supporters, but the former is probably confirmed by the word 'bikku' from the original of the Celtic to Simon Magus, by way of contempt, or, for the same reason, to the swine-herd of King Loighe MacNeill. 8 At an earlier time St. Patrick, who was tonsured after the then prevailing Roman manner, viz. the whole head shorn, tried to induce its adoption, but apparently in vain. 4 According to Bede, the community at Iona and the others subject to it accepted the tonsure about A.D. 716, but other Britons did not conform then. 9 The Celtic tonsure, carried by emigrant Britons to Armoric, was known there in the 9th century. The Latin form of tonsure, however, leaves often no more than a circle of hair; with seculars it is smaller. According to the Synod of Placentia (A.D. 1358), it was to be of the breadth of three fingers. Once the tonsure has been received, it must always be retained.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited, see E. Martene, De Antiquis Ecclesiae Ritibus, Venice, 1738; arti, 'Tonsur' in OED., and in H. W. Levison and J. Brown, A Handbook of Christian Ritual, Freiburg i. Br., 1892-1901.

J. A. MACULLOCH.

TONSURE (Buddhist).—There is no mention of tonsure, and no regulation as to the method to be adopted in wearing or not wearing the hair, in the 227 original rules of the Buddhist order of mendicants. But in the Khoudhakas, or collection of subsidiary and supplemental rules, completed at the end of the first century after the Buddha's death, we find the following paragraphs:

1. 'You are not, O bhikkhu, to wear long hair. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a minor breach of the regulations (i.e. of a dukkata). I allow you, O bhikkhu, hair that is two months old, or two inches long.'

2. 'You are not, O bhikkhu, to smooth the hair with a comb, or with a snake's hood (i.e. with an ivory instrument shaped); or with the hand held in that shape, or with pomade, or with hair-oil.'

3. 'I allow you, O bhikkhu, the use of razors, of a hone to sharpen the razors on, of powder prepared with Hippiakka-gumi to prevent them rusting, of a sheath to hold them in, and of all the apparatus of a barber.'

4. 'You are not, O bhikkhu, to have the hair of your heads or on your face cut by an 'ahariya.'

5. 'You are not, O bhikkhu, to have your hair cut off with a knife.'

We should not draw, from the fact of those paragraphs being found among the subsidiary rules, any conclusion that they belong to a later time than the original rules. The subsidiary rules refer quite often to what were evidently older customs in the order, and only legalize and give authority to practices already followed, though not mentioned in the older rules. But we should notice in the first place that there is nothing of scissors. The reason of this is curious; scissors had not then been invented. This is confirmed by an exception to rule 5 above. If a bhikkhu had a sore on the head, and the hair round it could not be removed by a razor, a knife might be used. 7

1 Reeves, Introf. p. 487; Todd, p. 487; Bede, v. 21.
2 The tonsure here referred to was a mere segment with a half circle of hair in front and the hair worn full beard.
3 Bede, v. 21; Rhys, Celtic Britain, p. 74; Innes, p. 177.
4 W. H. Haddan and W. Stubbs, Topical and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland, Oxford, 1869-78, ii. 392, 325.
5 Bede, v. 27.
6 Vinaya, ii. 104, 34, tr. in Vinaya Texts, vii, 63, 153.
7 The word suttha (Vin. i. 215) has been rendered 'scissors' by Sten Konow, JPTN, 1909, p. 66. In a note on the word, the same writer says the term be right. See Buddhaghosa as quoted in Vinaya Texts, iii. 30.
At the present time the bhikkhus in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon hold theoretically to the two-inch rule, but in practice never appear in public without the head and face clean shaved. The numerous sects of Pali bhikkhus in India, China, and Japan have long ago forgotten, if they ever knew, the ancient rule. But we have no exact particulars as to when and where they have enacted and carried out any newer rules of their own.


T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

TONSEUR (Chinese).—1. Confucian.—Confucianism, being a system of ethics, has no priests or monks. The tonsure is therefore unknown in it.

2. Buddhist.—(a) Monks.—The Buddhist tonsure was brought into China by monks from India. The whole head is shaved once a month or oftener. With boys brought up in monasteries, being either dedicated by their parents to a religious life or bought by the monks for that purpose, the tonsure takes place early, but with others the age is often eighteen or twenty. At the reception of a novice, the liturgy directs that the introducer of the candidate shall ask the chapter assembled that the tonsure may be granted. This acceded to, the vows are taken. A rite which is apparently a constant sequel of the tonsure consists of the shaving of the head with from three to eighteen small circular spots. A mutilation of one or more fingers is also sometimes undergone. An explanation of the Buddhist tonsure given by some of the Chinese is that it indicates the desire to put away all things of the world, so that the monk does not claim as his own even his hair.

(b) Nuns.—Aspirants are received at the age of ten into the nunneries, and their initiates continue till they are sixteen. During these years only the front part of the head is shaved, but all the hair is shaved when they become nuns. A woman desiring to become a nun must obtain the consent of parents, husband, or guardians.

1 One of these must act as sponsor to her at the time of initiation, and must hold the razor to be employed over the head of the novice by the priest who is to perform the ceremony.

3. Taoist.—(a) Monks.—Taoist monks shave all about the crown, but the rest of the hair is allowed to grow long and is gathered together into a top-knot fastened by a wooden article like the back of a tortoise. In some cases all the hair is allowed to grow.

(b) Nuns.—Taoist nuns do not shave their heads, but have their hair done up on the top of their heads.

4. Dislike of the tonsure.—Though Buddhism has benefited largely in the past from the favour of emperors, the tonsure has often been very obnoxious to the governing classes in China, who doubtless took it as the outward sign of the celibate priesthood, which severs its connexion with the family, entirely against Chinese ideas of the paramount importance of domestic life. Memorialists inveigh strongly against it. The following are instances:

In L. H. H., p. 524, in a memorial to the emperor requesting the suppression of Buddhism, it was stated that it caused people to
Tonsure (Hindu)—Tophet

The tonsure rite is carefully kept by many castes of the present day, though the time of its performance varies. Thus the Kanoji Brahmins of Poona perform the rite when a boy is from six months to two years old; the Lingayats, after a year; the Vanis, at any time from six months to five years. Sometimes the child is taken to the village temple for the ceremony, or after its performance (see the Bombay Gazetteer, passim; Rai Bahadur L. B. Nath, Hinduism, Meerut, 1899). The tonsure rite is supposed to belong to the common heirloom of Indo-European nations, because similar rites and superstitions occur in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, and, particularly, among some Slavic nations, such as the Sorvians and Bohemians.

TOPEH. Although the OT references to Tophet, the scene of the Moloch sacrifices in the Valley of Hinom, leave no doubt as to its great importance in the popular religion of Judah in the period before the reformation under Josiah, the place itself is mentioned only in the following places: II Chron. 33:7; II Kings 23:15. The place was known as a place of idolatry and it was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 B.C. (Zech. 14:21). The tophet was a place of public worship, where the Canaanites and Hebrews practiced the cult of Moloch. The word tophet is derived from the Hebrew word的意思 (tofeth), which means a place of burning or a place of sacrifice. The tophet was a small temple-like structure or a large circular area surrounded by a wall, where sacrifices were offered to the gods.


tophet, 'tonsure,' is the name of an ancient rite in India, also called chhâdãrãnan or chhâdãrãkarma, chavalam, which is performed on boys, sometimes on girls also, and derives its name from the tuft of hair left on the top of the boy's head (chhâdã). According to the ancient rule, this rite is to be performed when the boy is three years old, and, in the lower castes, in his fifth or seventh year. The boy is dressed in his mother's clothes, and placed on her lap. A barber cuts his hair with a razor, while sacred verses from the Veda are recited. The hair is thrown on a heap of cow-dung, and afterwards dug into the ground (see Hillebrandt, Rituallitteratur der Strassburg, 1897). It is interesting to note that this rite, as pointed out in Germain's monograph on the tonsure rite in Siam, has spread into Siam, together

with other Brahmanical institutions. In India it has been invested with some legal importance, the Sanskrit lawcodes stating that a boy on whom the ceremony of tonsure has been performed in the family of his birth is no longer capable of being affiliated to another person (see John, Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, 1885). The tonsure rite is carefully kept by many castes of the present day, though the time of its performance varies. Thus the Kanoji Brahmins of Poona perform the rite when a boy is from six months to two years old; the Lingayats, after a year; the Vanis, at any time from six months to five years. Sometimes the child is taken to the village temple for the ceremony, or after its performance (see the Bombay Gazetteer, passim; Rai Bahadur L. B. Nath, Hinduism, Meerut, 1899). The tonsure rite is supposed to belong to the common heirloom of Indo-European nations, because similar rites and superstitions occur in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, and, particularly, among some Slavic nations, such as the Sorvians and Bohemians.

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J. JOLLY.

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tion of a great stone altar, it was called by the Hebrew word for 'altar,' not the Araamite. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that such a practice as the sacrifice of the first-born should have been suddenly introduced into Jerusalem after the 8th cent. B.C. When it is considered how hard debased superstitions have died in our own country—if indeed they are dead—we can understand the survival or even the recrudescence in Palestine of aboriginal superstitions, but not the adoption of so terrible a rite as human sacrifice by a people who had reached an altogether higher level of religious thought. The testimony of Philo unless it is recognized that the population of Palestine in the days of the kings of Judah and Israel was not so homogeneous as later writers imagined, it to have been, and that the true-born Israelites were in a minority. In a fusion of races there is, no doubt, a tendency for the higher to be drawn down to the level of the lower. When a man of fairly good intelligence, but not possessed of any strong religious convictions, marries a highly superstitious woman, it is the wife's superstition rather than the husband's intellect that will be the dominant factor in the household. And that the sacrifice of the first-born was a deeply-rooted Canaanite cult is proved not only by the excavations at Gezer, but also by more than one passage in the OT. It is most significant that a document of Peteanecus has his God as compared with Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Ge 22), and that the same document in its legislation (Ex 22:29)1 uses the first-born of men and cattle exactly in the same manner (Ex 20-14). 2 And this law, allowing, if not requiring, the sacrifice of the first-born at one time issued in Jehovah's name is evident not only from Ex 20-14, but also from Jeremiah's protest (7:1); cf. 19) that Jehovah had never commanded or contemplated any such cult. Although Azaz is the first king of Judah of whom it is definitely stated that he sacrificed his first-born, it would be unsafe to conclude that he was the first who actually did so; for what had been done by earlier kings unheeded may well have called forth a vehement protest in the days of Isaiah. Certainly, the prophecies of David as recorded in the books of Samuel are based on a sound tradition, and are not merely what later prophets of the non-reforming party thought David must have done, would there be no difficulty in suggesting that even David had presided over the Moloch cult at the topet in the Valley of Hinnom. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, as the story of the Rechabites proves, certain strains of the population remained till a later period after and uncontaminated by the Canaanite elements, and it is doubtful these non-Canaanite elements that we ought to credit with the attempts made from time to time to abolish the worst of the pre-Israelite superstitions which threatened to swamp the religion of Jehovah. There is no reason to question the statements in the book of Kings that reforms were attempted in the days of Jehoiakim and Jehoshaphat.

While it is not improbable that the method of burning the bodies at the topet in the Valley of Hinnom was the same as that adopted elsewhere, it is by no means clear that either the cult itself or its ritual came from Damascus. It must not be overlooked that the topet, or at any rate the place of the topet—proof of the recrudescence of the topet sacrifices to avert the divine wrath.

Robertson Smith, in discussing the meaning of Is 59, writes as follows:

'1 It appears that Stroph means a pyre, such as is prepared for a king. But the Hebrews themselves did not burn their dead, unless in very exceptional cases, and burial was equally the rule among their Phoenician neighbours, as is plain from researches in their cemeteries, and apparently among all the Semites. Thus, when the prophet describes the deep and wide pyre "prepared for the king," he does not draw his figure from ordinary life, nor is it conceivable that he is thinking of the human sacrifices in the valley of Hinnom, a reference which would bring an utterly disorderly strain into the imagery. What he does refer to is a the well-known Semitic religion, which was practised at Tarsus down to the time of Dio Chrysostom, and the memory of which survives in the Greek legend of Hercules-Melicert, in the story of Sarandalus, and in the myth of Queen Dido.'

But surely at a time when sacrifices were being offered to Moloch, i.e. the king, at the topet, a statement that a topet has been prepared for a king must have suggested the ritual of the Valley of Hinnom; the prophet declares with grim Hebrew irony that the king, or in whose cult, there may have been a recrudescence of it after his death; and beyond the limits of his diminutive kingdom it probably continued considerably later. It is difficult to see why Jerusalem should have published its denunciation of the topet in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, if it had been abolished once for all in the eighteenth year of Josiah. And if, as seems probable, Deuteronomy is to be dated in the 5th cent. B.C., it is hard to see how it was still necessary, at least in some parts of Palestine, to protest against the sacrifice of children (Dt 16:21).

Moreover, the prophecy in Is 30, though based on a genuine event, is probably of late date, and, if Asshur here, as in 11:1 and 19:20 (cf. Ezr 8:2), means the Seleucid empire, the king referred to in the present form of the passage may be Antiochus Epiphanes. It is certainly not impossible that in some outlying districts of Palestine, such as Ammon, Moab, or Edom, the cult associated with the topet held its own down to the 2nd cent. B.C.'


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1 That the skeletons found at Gezer belonged to children who had been sacrificed appears more natural than the explanation offered by G. Fischer (GEF, pt. II, 168), nor is the greater age of some of the children whose skeletons were found in Tel-ta'annik conclusive proof to the contrary. In a sweep of the earth from the first-born must have been a not uncommon custom before it was required by law (Ex 24:4). Parents would endeavour to save their children by substituting some other victim, and, if all went well afterwards, would assume that the god had been appeased. On the other hand, it is obvious that the god had not been contented with the substitute and demanded his real due. See S. Stampfier.

1 'The human holocaust is not burned on an altar, but on a pyre or fire-jump. Compare, G. Fischer, in Der jiid. Homer, London, 1914, 1, 108 f.', nor is the greater age of some of the children whose skeletons were found in Tel-ta'annik conclusive proof to the contrary. In a sweep of the earth from the first-born must have been a not uncommon custom before it was required by law (Ex 14:4). Parents would endeavour to save their children by substituting some other victim, and, if all went well afterwards, would assume that the god had been appeased. On the other hand, it is obvious that the god had not been contented with the substitute and demanded his real due. See S. Stampfier.

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the torch-race was a feature of various festivals, in honour of Promethus, Athene (in the Pantheon), Hephestus, Pan, Bendis, Hermes, and Theseus. It was even held in the festival of the deaf (Erechtheia). The date of its institution is unknown, but it was first held in honour of Promethus, the fire-bringer, at whose altar the competitors lit their torches. As regards the festival of Pan, we know that the race was instituted after the battle of Marathon. At the Benidelus it was run on horseback, and was a novelty in the time of Socrates; elsewhere the race was on foot. The competitors were apparently chosen from the several Attic tribes. The torch was passed from one member of a team to another, at fixed intervals, and the victory rested with the team whose lighted torch first reached the goal—an altar on which fire was kindled with the torch. This procedure gave rise to the famous simile of Lucretius ('et, quasi curseors, vitæ lampada tradunt'), the idea of which is found in Plato. An equally famous line in Eschylus also refers to the race, although the exact point is doubtful.

The Greeks themselves explained the torch-race as a commemoration of the gift of fire by Promethus; but the original motive must have been something more than a mere commemoration. The essential feature seems to lie in the transference of fire from one altar to another at the greatest possible speed. It is probable, moreover, that the underlying idea is the need of carrying fire from a pure source to take the place of a polluted fire. At Athens all fires were extinguished before the race began (at least in the Prometheus), and were rekindled from the new fire. A belief in the pollution of fire is shown in the Argeian custom of extinguishing fire after a death, and rekindling it from another source by sepaktéron. Similarly the fires at Platea were defiled by the presence of barbarians, and new fire was brought from the sacred hearth of Delphi. The attraction of such a rite to the cults of Promethus and Hephaestus needs no explanation—Promethus, too, might well have adopted a torch-race, as being the patron of handicrafts and metal-working, for which fire was a necessity; but more probably she claimed the torch-race as the sacred fire of the head of the city. The race seems less appropriate to the other gods, with the possible exception of Pan. The theory that he was a sun-god cannot be accepted; but fire certainly played a part in his ritual, and an ever-burning lamp was maintained in his cave under the Acropolis. Most probably, however, the Athenians instituted the race in his honour to commemorate his appearance to the runner Pheidippides after the battle of Marathon. Once established, the race became popular, and was attached to other festivals without any special religious fitness.

The Romans had no torch-race, and the torch was less prominent in their ritual than in Greek religion. But the same ideas can be traced in Italy as appear in Greek fire-rites, although it is not always possible to distinguish the indigenous from the borrowed element; e.g. the cult of Diana at Aricia (Nemi) no doubt belongs to a primitive Italian stratum, but it is impossible to say how far Greek influence may have modified its

2 See art. MYRTES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), § 3 (a).
6 Ησιοδος, p. 1898, v. 199; but see also O.C.S. ii, 699.
7 First in Soph. O.D. Tr. 296.
8 O.C.S. ii, 466.
9 Cf. Soph. O.D. Tr. 27.
10 Lucret. ii, 78; Plato, Laws, vi, 770.
11 Agam., 514; 역. & ex. voc. reverendae lucantis.
12 Byington, Astron., ii, 15; And. P.A. 799.
13 Fig. Quest., Grec., 54.
details. In this festival women whose prayers before child-birth the goddess favourably heard bore lighted torches to her shrine. It is difficult
to say whether this custom is a survival of a purifi-
catory rite (Diana representing a forest deity or
the goddess of agriculture) or whether the torch
is only a symbol of the moon-goddess, who was
the natural patron of women in child-birth.
In Greek and Roman private life the torch was
an important feature in marriage, as the bridal
procession took place at night or towards evening.
As early as Homer there is mention of this torch-
light procession. It was the duty of the bride's
mother to light the nuptial torch. In Italy the bride
was also escorted to her new home by torch-light,
under the protection of Juno Domitana or Isterdan.
Hence the god of love, both in Greece and in Rome,
is often represented with a torch—an idea no doubt
assisted by the common conception of love as a
'fire.'
The torch had also funereal associations to the
Roma, being used to light the pile on which the
corpse was burned. Those who applied the torch
averred their faces. The 'two torches' (of marriage and death) are mentioned by Propertius and

LITERATURE.—The  Λαμπραθήσεως has been frequently dis-
cussed—e.g., by A. Mommsen,  Ηερολογία, Leipzig, 1864, p.
287; P. Fuss, in  Parnos, 8, 1897, 406;  P. Fuss, in  Αντικυρία ου
τιγκαταγμάτων, ii. [1927] 457; Darenberg-Saglio, ε.κ.
' Κασπαάνδρασια'; J. R. S. Perrin, in  ΑΠΙΑ ΧΧΙ [1901]
360.
E. E. Skene.
TORRES STRAITS.—See NEW GUINEA.
TORST.—See DELICT.
TORTOISE.—See ANIMALS.
TORTURE.—Quaestio, said Baldus de Periglis, an
interpreter of that word of dire significance in
Roman law, 'is a certain kind of inquisition made
for the purpose of tearing out the truth (i.e. crueleste
veritatem), by means of bodily pain.' Few in-
stitutions have more signally failed to even afford
reasonable excuse for their evil existence as a method
of extracting evidence. Starting from a deep in-
novation of its foundation, manifesting its inherent
viciousness, which no fundamentally
good intention could redeem and no humane after-
thought of qualification and exception could with-
hold from perversity and cruel consequences. Un-
likely as it may seem to all who are in some measure
an appeal to a fairly equal chance, torture was with-
out even the negative virtue of offering a per-
centage of probabilities of right and truth in its
results. It is difficult to think of any principle
which could make it really assist in evoking truth
from reluctant witnesses or reliable confession
from accused persons. The one point of affinity
to ordeal was the resort to torture when there was a
deficiency of direct legal evidence. Its basis in
injustice is shown not only in its penalizing the
innocent and unconvicted, but in the fact that its
applicability was long confined in both Greece and
Rome to slaves—significant of its palpable unfitness
for freemen. It never was universal, though in
ancient use among Assyrians, Egyptians, Medes,
and Japanese; it does not appear in the early laws
of Chinese, Hindus, or Jews. There is no mention
of it in the OT record. The metaphoric heaping
of coals of fire on the head probably refers to
torture, as appears from a Muhammadan penalty of
a live animal laden on a lascivious palm. From a
remote age torture prevailed in Greece for slaves,
and, although freemen were generally exempt, the
exemption was overborne in cases of conspiracy
and murder. Slaves in Athens were subject to
torture in cases civil as well as criminal. At
times the actions were determined by the testimonies
of the opposing litigants put under the pressure of the wheel, the
ladder, the rack, or the burning tile. Grecian
practice has not transmitted any code; that was
reserved for Roman law, which was further
hardened into permanence the crude tradition of
force which it shared with Greece.
In this exposition we are not dealing with
torture as a method of punishment, to which some
speculations give an earlier place than belongs to
the torture of witnesses or accused persons. It is
as a process for obtaining testimony or confession,
chiefly in cases criminal, that torture has histori-
cally played its most unreasoned and baseless part.
In the Roman Republic it had wide currency in
spite of sharply defined restrictions which instruc-
tively exhibit the efforts, too tardily made and not
thoroughgoing enough, to modify and restrain an
institution for which abolition was the only remedy.
And yet credit must be given to the insight and
humanity of some of the distinctions made. The
exemption of freemen gave way to these impulses when
these-majesty was imputed. The general safeguard that there must be vehement
presumptions of guilt before resort to the torture
was clear enough in theory, but was too often in
practice. Most curious fact of all perhaps is the
frankness of the authorities groped in the
Digest on the primary desirability of doing without
torture, on the frailty and peril of external
sources of information, to which some exceptions
were made. The apostle Paul (Ac 22:26) pleaded
with success his right as a Roman freeman for a
protection from examination under the scourge.
Mainly used only in cases criminal, the institu-
tion made good its mandate of relief. It is
also. Exemptions of minors, patricians, priests,
and pregnant women were inapplicable when
charges of treason were made. The direction of
Antoninus Pius that torture was not to be
secure betrayalVal of alleged accomplices was as wise
as it was humane, but the very object of getting
at other culprits came ultimately to be a main
occasion of its employment. The provisions of the
Digest and the Code* systematize several contra-
dictory doctrines 'de quasitionibus' illustrative of a
considerable development. The emperors were
not long in discovering what Dante was to illustrate
by examples, that treason was the worst of crimes.
This was the creed too of Anglo-
Saxon as well as of later feudal criminal law, and
it encouraged violent processes of detection. In
Rome the kind of torture with widest currency
was that of the  equeuleus, or rack, which passed
on as perhaps the worst legacy of Roman law to
medieval Europe.
The abolition of the barbarian ordeal by the
Lateran Council of 1215 left a vacuum which was
partly filled by a still worse expedient—the Roman
method of 'tearing out the truth.' Under the
Salic law ordeal and torture had co-existed, but
the latter for slaves only, the provisions obviously
echoing Roman practice. The Riparian code
apparently contemporaneous ordeal alone. The
renaissance of Roman law explains the return of
the torture after some measure of abeyance. In

1 Pl. xxvii, 492.
2 Hor. Ep., in. 2. 789, 8. 344, 3. 247.
3 Virg. Aen. vi, 354.
4 Plut. Soc. Rom. 47.
5 Her. xxvi, 172.
6 Antiqu. xlv, 13.
7 xviii, 18.
8 iv, 41.
France and Italy it seems to have re-established itself during the 13th century. Continental charters cited by Du Cange gave exemption from torture. Its French name, géhenne, was fit enough. There were many further the brodiequin, the estropade, the chevalet—all used in the question préparatoire, preliminarily in the trial, and in the definitive question préalable after conviction to disclosure and torture. In England, though without place in the common law, it was practised as an abuse notably in the anarchy under King Stephen and in King John’s processes of extracting treasure from the Jews. The peine forte et dure, however, or spitting by pressure of weights to compel a prisoner to put himself ‘upon the country’ or verdict of a jury, appears about 1300. Under Edward II. in 1311 papal inquisitors in the trial of the Templars applied torture admittedly never legally countenanced in England before. Though long without regular sanction in the courts for crime, the practice of torture crept in with what may be called council government under the Tudors. As always, secret courts favoured secret methods, and torture loved the darkness. With Shakespeare and other Elizabethan dramatists, ‘tugging’ and ‘putting’ were household words. Coke might excommunicate the institution from the common law, but Coke and Bacon alike countenanced it in practice when the scent of treason was strong.

In Scotland the law and practice appear to have nearly paralleled the state of things in England. Isolated examples of torture, such as that given by way of punishment to the murderer of James I., may have been nullified by the annual assertions by judicial torture at his trial. So late as 1542 the point of law was established that a confession procured by torture was null. George Buchanan, in his History, states that the Inquisition, with itself had run from the Inquisition, recognizes without censure the obtaining of proofs by torture. The deplorable inhumanities resulting from the witchcraft craze, not only in Scotland but in the seaport towns, which the demonologist James VI., and absolutely paralleled by the like frenzy in England and France, were a distressing combination of the mischiefs of torture with a rehabilitation of the ordeal. The victims were of all ages, old, miserable, and insane; the phthisical and pitiful mania, however, was not merely a British but equally a European crime; its creed on the Continent was of one context with that in Britain. Everywhere the subject of torture was the same methods of pain. It was the last stage of a sort of common law of torture, although the variety of local usage shows a wide range of divergence in detail. In the Covenant time a last outbreak of persecuting zeal revived the decadent engine of violence. A dubious tradition traces the thumbskins in Scotland to a Russian origin. The destruction of torture such as those of Nuremberg, The Hague, and the Tower of London—competitions in horror as they are—unite in a kind of commonplace of malignancy. Authorities on torture in like manner dwell with the same tedious insistence on the indicia, or preliminary evidences needed to justify torture, and on the conditions of its infliction. The Summa Angelica, a great cyclopedia of instruction to confessors, enjoins the interrogation to judges as to confession whether they had put people to torture without sufficient indicia, which was very rightly classified as a deadly sin. Now and again a tractate of law and practice of torture, such as that of Paulus Grassi, breaks away from its companions in the great folio vol. xi. of Zilettus (1584) by its superior realism. Grillandus distinguishes with grim precision the five degrees of torture: now a mere threat, now a suspension on the rack for the space only of an Ave Maria or a Paternoster, now a graver suspension for the space of a Misereur, now for a period which might reach into hours, and, last degree of all, where the victim’s limbs, weighted down, were jerked and twisted till the agony was greater than the amputation of the hand. It is marvelous how men endured such torments, but that they did so is attested by occasional observations by the judges or assessors of court who wrote the treatises. Grillandus, e.g., drawing upon his earlier works at Pisa and at Rome, registers the wonderful case of a most cunning thief whose absolute impassiveness was ascribed to certain words that he whispered when the torture was applied until a slip of paper was found bearing as a charm the scriptural text (well known for its use in amulets) ‘Jesus autem transiens.’ Finally, however, with the charm removed altogether, this stout malefactor defied the torture again by his whispered invocation so that it was necessary to abandon the torture. And still greater cases, the commentator concludes, were seen at Milan and Rome when certain words touching the minor sins of the person being tried had to go through the torment as if he slept. This particular variety of charm was reported to be no less effective as a counter-charm, but Grillandus shows no faith in its potency as an aid to the prosecutor.

An unfortunate feature of torture was its adoption by the inquisitorial courts of the Church for the investigation of charges of blasphemy, heresy, and the like. The Inquisition was a secularized arm of the Inquisition itself, a confession of a secular with a sacred function, in which the analogy of treason to an earthly potentate carried priests of religion to extremes not compatible with the conception of a majesty which, though wounded, was divine? Whatever of error lurked in the concept itself, the tribunal which was its executive of vindication added to the weakness in principle of its powers. The directions of the practice in prosecution. It surely was a blander worse than a crime to adopt methods which doubly branded with public odium courts which were designed by processes of barbarism to suppress the freedom of the human mind. The fact that already by the middle of the 13th cent. papal dispensations to churchmen were needed for irregularities in the use of torture casts a lurid light on the procedure. News that the Inquisition was still in business on the same old principle of the fundamentals of procedure. The refusal of counsel for the accused was a fundamental and far-reaching error in a ‘court of inquisition into heretical depravity,’ which by its very object tended to unite the zeal and interest of both prosecutor and judge against the heretic. The double sanction of royal and ecclesiastical authority sometimes enabled the machinery against heresy to be used for political rather than spiritual ends. Theugs of procedure. The Renaissance had not wholly escaped the persecutions which arose to their evil when it is remembered that the transition period in which the wounding boundary-line came to a stand between Lutheran reform and Roman orthodoxy. In 1532 the Constitutions of Charles V. censured the system which incorporated torture among the fundamentals of procedure. His establishment of the Inquisition in 1550 inaugurated a period of atrocities perhaps worse than any other in human history. Philip II. of Spain found in the Duke of Alva a spirit of
merciless executive in the Netherlands, scarcely less jealous of public liberty than of private creeds, and Althusius' protest for his penalities earned for him not only his downfall but also the execration over since attached to his name. Out of that fierce time apty came its strange definitive and callous expression in a contemporary book, the Praxedis, in which the author obtain by a crouching a councillor under both Charles and Philip in the Netherlands, published in French and Latin in 1554 and repeatedly afterwards, remarkable among one of Althusius' most celebrated works. Suspicions, however, dampened the confidence that in Oriental lands, despite reforms and prohibitions, illegitimate torture is still secretly carried on. One main fact in Europe is perhaps that, while the last two centuries of the Middle Ages and the filthiness of torture, seventeen centuries had passed before its abolition was taken firmly in hand. The many generations of clerical juries and judges did no better than the lay, according the institutions and ‘passing on by the other side,’ if indeed the ecclesiastical tribunals were not the worst offenders. The divorce of the judges from all legislative functions has, however, enabled the party to answer for in checking the critical initiative of amendment sometimes induced by judicial experience. Abolition at last came neither from the logic of the law nor from the impulse of the Church, but from the impassioned zeal of humanitarians.

**LITERATURE.**—H. C. Lea, Superstition and Force, Phila, 1885, pp. 488-490; F. Heilig, Die Tortur, 2 vols., Berlin, 1892; J. Williams, The Torture of the Inquisition, Zweiher, Venice, 1584-86, vol. xii, pp. 303-305, instead, by having drunk, ice, by having been cold, or the thumbstick, by mice or parasites that gnawed the flesh, or by fire intensified by basting the body with oil—these were only a few of at least fourteen species of torments. What wonder that
d. Dammhóër after this enumeration should consider that torture often could most happily (felicissime) be applied to scourging alone? Two pictures complete the impression: one showing a victim girt and twisted with ropes and swung stretched out with weights at his feet, the other an idyllic group of the doctors, knights, priests, old men, children, and prospective mothers, who were happily excusable from torture.

It was a law from which no conceivable evolution could eliminate the initial anomalies (1) of punishing an accused by torture before he was found guilty, (2) of torture after conviction when torture was not a part of the sentence, and when the judge's function was ended and the process was no part of it. These were dilemmas from which no escape was ever devised, and they gave effectual leverage to criticism when—late in the day, it must be owned—the opposition developed energy enough to make abolution of torture a direct object of human propaganda. Illustrous opinions against torture were many; those in its favour were perhaps less illustrious. Augustine, Ulpian, Q uintilian, and Montaigne could be cited on one side, and Demosthenes, Aristotle, Bedin, and Pothier on the other. But the lawyers were indifferent, and their neutrality and acquiescence gave the practice a long lease of life. Roman tradition persisted little shaken in Europe till Boccaccio and Voltaire threw the new intensity into attack on abuses, and the objection to torture passed from being a mere dissent into a positive and earnest movement, and the penal what was at once a fertility and a cruel injustice. From the middle of the 13th century onwards the Continental countries by degrees followed the example of repeat set by Great Britain. The latter had been established in England by the middle of the 13th century; it was abolished for Scotland by statute in 1708. Its extinction on the Continent has been assigned to Prussia in 1740, in Portugal to 1776, in Sweden to 1786, in France to 1789, in Russia to 1801. But the apology of the early unpolitical prisoners underwent grievous


**TOTEMISM.**—I. INTRODUCTORY. —THE WORD 'TOWM' IS DERIVED FROM ODÔDIAM, WHICH IN THE OJIBWA AND COGNATE ALGONQUIAN DIALECTS MEANS 'HIS BROTHER-SISTER KIN.' ITS GRAMMATICAL STEM aôtè, MEANING THE CONSANGUINE KINSHIP BETWEEN UTERINE BROTHER AND SISTER. REPEAL OF THE PREVIOUS LEGALISATION RECOGNISED AS BY BIRTH OR ADOPTION COLLECTIVELY RELATED TOGETHER AS UTERINE BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHO CANNOT INTERMARRY, IS NEVER USED ALONE. THE WORD WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE BY J. LONG IN THE FORM OF TOWM. THIS HE WRONGLY DEFINED AS THE FAVOURITE SPIRIT WHICH EACH OF THE SAVAGES (CHIPPEWA OR OJIBWA) BELIEVES WATCHES OVER HIM; ADDING:

This totem they conceive assumes the shape of some beast or other, and therefore they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal within it, nor think this totem bears.

The first to give an account, accurate as far as it goes, of totemism on the American continent was Peter Jones, himself an Ojibwa chief, but an ordained Wesleyan Methodist minister and missionary to his tribe. He wrote the History of the Ojibway Indians, published without a date in London after his death, which took place in 1856. He says:

"Their belief concerning their divisions into tribes is that many years ago the Great Spirit gave his red children their tootisins, or tribes, in order that they might never forget that they were all related to each other, and that in time of distress or war they were bound to help each other. When an Indian in travelling meets with a strange band of Indians, all he has to do is to seek for those bearing the same emblem as his tribe; and having made it known that he belongs to their tootisin, he is sure to be treated as a relative. Formerly it was considered unfavourable for parties of the same tribe to intermarry, but of late years this custom is not observed. Each tribe is distinguished by certain animals or things, as for instance the Ojibway nation have the following tootisins: the Eagle, Beinordeer, Otter, Bear, Buffalo, Beaver, Catfish, Pike, Birch-bark, White Oak-tree, Bear's Liver, etc. etc. The Mohawk nation have only three divisions or tribes—the Turtle, the Bear, and the Wolf."

What Jones calls a tribe is now usually called a clan or gens, meaning a group, not necessarily localised, of persons regarded as united by a bond of kinship real or fictitious, extended beyond the family properly so called to a brotherhood bearing the same name and including strangers who have been formally inducted into it. This brotherhood or clan may, and frequently does, extend also beyond the boundaries of the local body called by Jones a nation, but now usually known as a tribe.

In the meantime Sir George Grey, then governor of S. Australia, in the account of his travels in W. Australia, drew attention to the similarity between the Australian totemism and the American totem, describing the toogong at some length and giving genealogical lists to illustrate the mode of descent. A series of articles in the Fortnightly Review on the Worship of Animals and Plants by J. F. McLennan was suggested, at all events in part, by Grey’s observations. It was this series of articles, with McLennan’s important but erroneous speculations, which finally brought the subject of totemism before the scientific public of Britain. Among others whose attention they attracted were Lord Avebury (then Sir John Lubbock) and W. Robertson Smith. It was commonly supposed that this system of totemism was used originally by the latter in the speculations embodied in his important work, The Religion of the Semites, that started the controversies incessantly waged on the subject from that day to this.

2. Definition; plan of the article.—Totemism as exemplified in N. America and Australia, where it has been found in the fullest development, is a form of society distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) it is composed of clans or bands of men each united among themselves by kinship real or fictitious, a kinship frequently extending beyond the limits of the locality; (2) the members of the clan are distinguished by the name of some species of animal or plant, or more rarely of some other natural phenomenon, such as the sun, rain, etc.; (3) the species or object which is supposed to be the name of the clan is conceived as being related to the clan, and to every member of it, in some mystic way, often genetically; and in this case every individual specimen of the object, where it is an animal or plant, is regarded as belonging to the clan; (4) each species or object is usually the subject of a religious or quasi-religious emotion, and every individual specimen is subject to tabus or prohibitions in subject to certain limitations, ceremonial or in self-defense, it may not be injured or killed, or (where eaten) is usually not to marry or have sexual intercourse within the clan.

These characteristics are general, but they vary to some extent not merely from area to area, but from tribe to tribe. After detailing a few typical examples, it will be necessary to mention others where totemism seems to be decadent, and then to consider whether it has ever prevailed among peoples where it is not now to be found, and lastly to inquire into its origin. Various influences tending to modify, submerge, or destroy it will be indicated from time to time in the course of the article.

3. Typical examples.—(a) America.—Some fuller accounts than that of Peter Jones are now available concerning the totemism of the Ojibways. They were divided into about 40 exogamous totemic clans, of which the Crane, Catfish, Loon, Bear, Marten, and Wolf were the principal, and the first five appear to have been the original. The other clans are said to have been formed by the segmentation of these. Nearly all the clans are named from species of either land or water. Members of a totem-clan were held to be closely related to all other persons of the same totem, even though belonging to different tribes. We have no information whether the Ojibwa clans regarded themselves as having descended from the totems whose names they bore; but the clans of some other Algonquian tribes claim such descent. Thus, among the Delawareans or Lenape the Tortoise, Turkey, and Wolf clans (the three chief clans of the tribe), among the Saults the Fox, Eagle, Bear, Beaver, Fish, Antelope, and Raccoon clans, among the Menomini the Bear, Golden Eagle, Wolf, and other clans, and among the Ottawas the Carp clan, are specified as tracing their lineage to the animals after which they are named; and in the last-mentioned tribe the Bear clan ascribed its origin to a bear’s paw without explaining the precise nature of the relationship. However this may be, the Ojibwa Bear clan was held to resemble the bear, its totem, in disposition. The members were armed and acknowledged war-chiefs and fighting men of the community; the war-pipe and war-club were committed to their custody. The Crane clan took its name (Bus-in-a-se-see, ‘Eco-maker’) from the loud, clear, ringing cry of the crane; members of the clan were thought to possess naturally a loud ringing voice, and they were the acknowledged orators of the tribe. We are not informed whether in their personal appearance, dress, or ornaments the Ojibwa totem-clans were ordinarily in the habit of imitating the totem-animals, as some other tribes do. The Abenaki, also an Algonquian tribe, wore bear’s ears and the skins of their bears, breasts, and legs. An Ojibwa sometimes had the figure tattooed on him, or carried some

1 J. G. Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy, iii. 464 ff., citing various authorities.
2 J. F. McLennan, Fortnightly Review, 1871, p. 213.
6 J. F. McLennan, Fortnightly Review, 1871, p. 213.
7 Hoffman, p. 65; quoting A. M. Mauw, Hist. des Abenakis, Quebec, 1896, p. 32.
myths one has been preserved by a scientific inquirer relating how the turtle became a man and the progenitor of the Turtle clan. But neither C. I. L. Morgan nor Horatio Hale, to whom we are indebted for many interesting facts concerning the totemic beliefs of the Ojibwa, has told us anything concerning the intimate relations between the totem and its clan, or the aspect in which the totem was regarded by the clan, or the members by one another.

The Iroquois, however, had one custom common to a number of N. American tribes. Each clan had a stock of personal names appropriated to it only, which other clans of the same tribe were not permitted to use; so that, if a person’s name was known, it was possible to say to whom it belonged. To such a length was this custom carried by some tribes that, when the clan organization began to decay, a child could be assigned to another clan than that into which, by hereditary descent, he was born, by the simple process of giving him one of the personal names belonging to the latter clan—at all events if the clan recognized the child and thereby confirmed the choice. The clans of some of the Iroquois conducted the ceremonies for the control of their totems for the common good of the tribe. This was the practice, e.g., among the Omaha. But among the United States among the various tribes of Pueblo Indians.

(6) Australia.—In Australia totemism has been crossed, and among tribes superseded, for exogamic purposes by a system of marriage-clans. The consequent variation in the several languages of the different tribes has introduced a confusing factor into the totemic organization. Among these tribes whose organization has been least affected is the Dieri, inhabiting part of the Lake Eyre basin in S. Australia. They possess a number of clans of which the names of 27 are known. Their totems belong chiefly to the animal world; but the list includes some vegetable totems, and such objects as rain and red ochre. It seems to be common to all the tribes in the Lake Eyre basin, though it is not ascertained whether all the totems are recognized by every tribe. Each tribe, like some of the Iroquois tribes, is divided into two moieties, or phratries, some of the clans belonging to one phratry and the rest to the other. These phratries are called by the Dieri Karurá and Mätiiri respectively; and the Iroquois, not only the clan but also the phratry is exogamous. A Karuru woman must marry a Mätiir woman, and conversely a Mätiir woman a Karuru man; but within the limits of the opposite phratry the mate may belong to any clan. If a man marries a woman of the other phratry and the phratry descend in the female line, the children in all cases taking those of the mother. The Dieri clans do not claim their totemic animals or plants as ancestors. More than one legend accounts for them.

According to one story, the totems (marnur, properly marnur) came out in an unconditioned condition from the earth in the midst of Lake Perigundi and lay on the sandhills around the lake until the warmth of the sun strengthened and raised them up as human beings, whereupon they separated in all directions. Hence the marnur (totemic clans) are now scattered all over the country. According to another story, a malignant race of drowned or supernatural beings, was killed by the people for his misdeeds, but came to life again. He followed footprints, and, finding the people busy fishing, speared his victim and swallowed water, fish, and men. Some escaped, running off in all directions, and to every one as they ran he gave a name. In proof of the story, rocks are pointed out which are said to be the body of the marnur in question, and his teeth.  

According to another story, the people of a certain tribe took up a marnur, and when they reached it they forgot who the clansmen were and threw them into the creek and let them go. When the clansmen reached the creek they could not remember who they were and let themselves be carried away by the current. This is the origin of the story described above, which is a kind of the marnur in question, and his teeth.  

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the natives, was, we know, mistaken in other matters with respect to them. In general throughout Australia the clansmen regard their own totem with reverence.

The Wokalup tribe are explicitly told that the totem-animal is spoken of as 'father.' For example, a man of the Boorong-terra (Frilled-lizard totem) holds that reptile as sacred, and no one not a totem should look at it, but would protect it by preventing another person doing so in his presence. Similarly a man of the lizard-owl totem would not call it 'father,' and likewise hold it sacred and protect it. . . . A man who was lax as to his totem was not thought well of, and was never allowed to take an important part in the ceremonies. In the language of the Wokalupuans, 'slesh,' is used for totem, indicating the close relationship, if not the totem and the totem-clan. Grey, writing of the tribes of W. Australia, reports that 'each family [clan] adopts some animal or vegetable as their crest or sign, or belonging, as they call it, and that 'a certain mysterious connection exists between a family and its belonging, so that a member of the family will never kill an animal of the species to which its belonging belongs, should he find it asleep; indeed he always kills it reluctantly, and never without affecting it a chance to escape. This arises from the family belief that some one individual of the species is their nearest friend, to whom they are like a native would to a sacred vegetable for his kolong may not gather it under certain circumstances and at a particular period of the year.' So far is this belief in a connexion between the totem-clan and its belonging carried that in the Wokalup tribe, when a man could not get a communication from his totem through another, he has been known to kill that beast, bird, or reptile which that man called 'father,' and thus obtain the necessary information. Perhaps this other totem may do the same, if he knew of it. Such is the influence of belief that the killing of a man's totem has been known to hasten his death.

An interesting development of totemism in Australia is the assignment of a number of sub-totems to each totem. Thus in the Wokalup tribe the totem has for its sub-totems the Native Cat, Black Swan, Tiger-Snake, Sulphur-crested Cockatoo, Crow, and Dingoo; and the other totem has similar lists. Where, according to the custom of most aboriginal regulations, the phratries developed into marriage-clans, the sub-totems were attached to the latter. Ultimately the result was to divide the universe between the various classes, and sub-class—a result expressed in diagrammatic form in accordance with the points of the compass by the Wokalup, who buried their dead oriented to agree with the diagram thus obtained. What the reason was for assigning these sub-totems to the different totems has been asserted, but to us it seems arbitrary. At any rate the Australian native extended the regard for his totem to the sub-totems comprehended in the totem-clan or class to which he belonged.

A man of the Bunundik tribe, we are told, 'does not kill or use for food any of the animals of the same sub-division with himself or his totem,' and he 'hunger compels; and then they express their sorrow for having to eat their warjung (friends) or turnang (their flesh). When using the last word they touch their breasts to indicate the close relationship, meaning almost a part of themselves.'

Another custom developed extensively in Australia, but (as already intimated) not unknown among the Sioux in N. America, and elsewhere, is that of the performance of ceremonies by a totem-clan for the purpose of exercising control over the totem—e.g., for multiplying its numbers, especially where it was edible, or for ensuring its capture, or, where it was injurious, for driving it away. Such ceremonies of the Arunta have by the investigations of Spencer and Gillen become the best known; they are perhaps the most elaborate, but by no means the only, ceremonies of the kind. The Bicornis and others perform such ceremonies, though it is not clear in all cases that the performers are confined to members of the totem-clan. From the analogy of cases both in Australia and in the islands of Torres Straits we may probably assume that they are. Whether these ceremonies should be called religious or magical is a question of terminology, though it seems certain that the performers are under the influence of emotional excitement such as we usually connect with religious rites.

Little is known about the relations of the clansmen in Australia among themselves. From vague references by Horwitt and others it would seem that they enjoyed mutual defence and responsibility. But offences were brought before a tribal council, by whose decision blood-revenge was pursued in a quasi-legal manner, and if it was ultimately involved the whole tribe in the blood-feud.

(c) Africa.—Another area in which totemism has been found is that large portion of Africa which is occupied by the Negro and Bantu races. Of the totemism of some of these peoples, particularly of the Negroes, our information is fragmentary. Concerning the Tshi-speaking Negroes of the Gold Coast we have on the whole most information. They are divided into totemic clans, or 'families,' of which the principal are twelve in number, viz., Leopard, Buffalo, Dog, Parrot, Plantain, Corn-stalk, Servant, Red-Earth, Palm-leaf-Grove, Abandzi, and Dumiru or King. The names of the last two clans is uncertain. The last is probably a local variant of the name of the Nezza, or Bush-Cat, clan; and, according to some accounts, Abadzi, which may mean 'cannibal,' is another name of the Ntwa, or Dog, clan. Without certain of the clans little or nothing beyond the name is known, and questions of identity arise on some of these. These difficulties are incidental to traditional lore where we are dependent upon natives who are not familiar with all the clans about which inquiries are made. To the Leopard clan the leopard is sacred, though members of it are reported now to abstain from the flesh of all the felids. No member may kill a leopard; if he were to do so by accident, he would exclaim, 'I have killed my brother,' and would put palm-oil on the wounds. If he sees a dead leopard, he must scatter shreds of white cloth upon it and anoint the muzzle with palm-oil, as a sign of respect and sorrow. If a dead leopard is brought into the town, the members of the clan smear themselves with chalk (a sign of mourning) and wail bitterly. If on a journey a member of the clan were to meet a leopard, he would turn back. The Buffalo, Bush-Cat, Dog, and Parrot clans abstain from eating the totem-animal. The Bush-Cat, it is said, abstain from killing not only a bush-cat, but also a crow, under penalty of sores on their bodies. Formerly, if they found a crow or a bush-cat dead, they would bury it, and with the crow a piece of white cloth, with the bush-cat a piece of speckled cloth. The traditional accounts which have reach'd us of the origin of these clans do not generally claim generic descent from the totem.

One account states that 'people originally came from the earth, sky, sea, mountains, and the animals, etc., that came with them are their totems'; e.g., the Parrot clan came with the parrots on their loads; the Dog clan came from a river with a dog-bread and with a dog-crow; the Crow with a dog-crow.

Other clans, fewer in numbers and conjectured to be of more recent origin, claim that they are descended from an actual animal which possessed the power of assuming human shape at will. In the case of two such clans tales belonging to the Swan Maiden type are told to account for them. The totem-animal is revered. It is addressed as 'grandfather,' at the title of respect used in addressing the kings of Ashanti. It is supposed to be the origin of the clansmen in various ways; and restraint is said to be placed upon it in order to compel it to grant the wishes of the tribe. There are no marks or dresses distinguishing the clans; but, when a member of
the Leonid clan dies, the mourners (clansmen) make spots on their bodies with red, white, and black clay to represent a leopard, and the clay is thrown in the direction of the coffin. In some clans in the Khoikhoi, the Hottentots, and the Herero, the deceased is buried facing east, towards the rising sun. The burial site is shaded by a tree and is marked by a stone or a stake. The burial is a private and community event, with the community providing food and assistance. The mourners may also perform rituals to honor the deceased, such as singing and dancing. The mourning period varies, but it is generally a period of悲伤 and reflection.

But totemism is decedent among the Bechuana, and has been so for a period which probably dates from before the coming of the European. This is partly to the change of the house and on the political conditions, and partly to the keeping of herds of cattle, a custom that seems to have been adopted from the Hottentots.

America, Australia, and Africa are the three chief areas in which totemism has been found widely spread and fully developed. It will be perceived that each of them has its own type, though variations in detail are found among the individual tribes and peoples. The remaining areas are India and Melanesia.

(d) India.—In India totemism is found only among the non-Aryan tribes, and chiefly among the Dravidians. Of these we may take the Orans on the plateau of Chotá Nagpur in Bengal as representing the type. Though they have to a great extent emerged from the hunting and pastoral stages of culture, totemism seems to form the fundamental feature of their social organization in so far as kinship, marriage, and relations of the sexes are concerned. They are divided into a number of exogamous clans distinguished by names supplied by 'the fauna and flora of their past and present habitats'; and to these, with the acquisition of a knowledge of agriculture and the use of metals, a few new totem names have been added. The animal and vegetable names amount in number to 62. There are also (probably of more recent origin) two mineral totems, those of Iron and Salt; two which may be called place-totems, viz. Baudh, an embanked reservoir of water, and Jubb, a marsh or surface-spring; and two which belong to a class known elsewhere, called 'split-totems' as involving tabus of a portion only of an animal or vegetable, and frequently known by the name of that portion. Among the Orans these split-totems are Anvir (rice-soup) and Kispottá (pig's entrails). Sexual union within the totem-clan is reckoned incestuous, though at the present day, if a marriage takes place in which the rule is infringed, a fine is levied. The marriage can be renewed, but the totemic ties are thus legalised. The remaining ordinary totemic tabus are observed. 'An Oran must abstain from eating or otherwise using, domesticating, killing, destroying, making a noise in injury' his totem. A wife, in addition to the tabus of her own clan, is required to observe those of her husband's while she actually resides in his village. Men of the clan whose totem is any kind of tree may not go under the shade of the tree or use its produce in any shape. But some modifications have been introduced where the totem is an indispensable article of diet or household use. Thus members of the Paddy clan abstain only from eating the thin scum on the surface of rice-soup when left standing in a cool place; members of the Salt clan abstain only from taking in the tabus not extending to food or drink in which salt is an ingredient or flavour; members of the Iron clan abstain only from touching iron with their lips or tongue; members of the Pig clan are forbidden only to eat the head of the pig; members of the Bark clan, of which the Orans are a branch, are forbidden to eat the totem, may eat the fruit whole, but not by dividing it in two.

On the other hand, the tabus of some clans have been extended to objects having a real or fancied resemblance to the totem or bearing the same or a similar name. Thus members of the Tiger clan do not have to observe various tabus in reference to the tiger and similar animals. They also must abstain from eating the squirrel's flesh, since the squirrel is striped like the tiger. M. Sarolea (Colonial Survey 1881, p. 100) gives the month of Magh (December-January) because the name Magh is that of a wild cat.

In this case the foreign word bagh points to a late and highly artificial origin for such a tabu, which is obviously due to the timidity of superstition. Other additional tabus have been suggested as due to the flesh of the clans, just as some 'split-totems' may have arisen from the opposite process of the division of clans.

The general attitude of an Orkion to his clan totem is that of a true friend and ally, though some ethnographical practices seem to indicate a more religious regard—at any rate for its efficacy. But totemism is now in decay, as it is elsewhere in the rest of India. An unintentional breach of a tabu is no longer believed to entail any serious consequences, though looked upon with social disapproval. There is no difference between the clans in personal dress or adornment, nor is a man supposed to be a totem until he has reached the age of fifteen.

There are very few traditions of the origin of totem-names. Such as there are do not reveal any belief in the descent of the clan from the totem, but the connexion is that between the totem and the human ancestor of the clan. The Orkions are patrilineal.

(e) Moluccas. — In Melanesia (including New Guinea and the islands west of the Dugong and Turtle clans, for both dugong and turtle were important articles of food on the islands, which are somewhat barren. Members of the clan, however, were not allowed to eat the first dugong or turtle caught, but might partake of those subsequently caught. They performed ceremonies to entice the animals to the island and ensure a good season. The clan could, on the other hand, by magical rites with the contrary intention, prevent them from coming. A mystical relationship was held to subsist between the totem and the clan. He was said to be 'all same as relation, he belong same family.' The Cassowary, Crocodile, Snake, Shark, and Hammer-headed Shark clans were reputed to be truculent and to like fighting. The peaceable clans were the Shovel-nosed Skate, Ray, and Sucker-fish; while the Dog clan was sometimes peaceable and at other times quarrelsome—all like the totem-animal. Certain of the clans, possibly all, had formule which they repeated in a trance, and these were either magical or in the nature of invocations to the totem. The prayer is in some stages of civilization near akin to the spell.

(f) New Guinea. — The foregoing examples will sufficiently indicate the chief characteristics of totemism in the five great areas in which it has been found. It is apparent that in each area totemism was by no means a new phenomenon. It arises in the low condition of savagery and is connected in its typical forms with patrilineal descent. But, even before contact with Europeans, it had begun to assume forms very divergent from what we understand by normal totemism, leading in some cases to degeneration and disintegration.

(g) America. — Among the divergences found in N. America the condition of the coast-dwellers of the north-west are the most remarkable. The Tlingit, inhabiting S. Alaska, are divided into two exogamous phratries or classes, called after the raven and the wolf respectively; and these two phratries are again divided into a number of totemic clans. The members of a clan are believed to be related to one another more closely than to those of other clans even of the same phratrie. They reckon descent through the female and not the male line. But they are not gathered at one place, but distributed as social groups and not geographical. Yet each clan usually derived its origin (and most of them, at the present day, their names) from some village or camp which it once occupied. They seem, however, to have had alternative names (if F. Boss's account is correct) derived from the animal, or one of the animals, which they claimed as a badge. In point of fact the emblems or representations on the north-western coast, generally called totems, are rather badges or crests. The clans of each phratrie, indeed, all use the totem of the phratrie; they also use a number of other badges, some of which are the special property of the clan, or of some under-clan, and are guarded with much jealousy. They carve and paint the badge on the so-called totem-poles erected in front of the dwelling-house, or on a grave. These poles are, however, less frequently erected by the Tlingit than by some of their neighbours. The badge is also exhibited on many other articles of property, worn as a mask or as a disguise at dances, потатches, and funeral ceremonies, and painted on no sufficient evidence that the phratries regulated marriage during recent times; but there is reason to think that they were exogamous on some other of the islands. Members of a clan might not kill or eat the totem; but this did not apply to the Dugong and Turtle clans, for both dugong and turtle were important articles of food on the islands, which are somewhat barren. Members of the clan, however, were not allowed to eat the first dugong or turtle caught, but might partake of those subsequently caught. They performed ceremonies to entice the animals to the island and ensure a good season. The clan could, on the other hand, by magical rites with the contrary intention, prevent them from coming. A mystical relation was held to subsist between the totem and the clan. He was said to be 'all same as relation, he belong same family.' The Cassowary, Crocodile, Snake, Shark, and Hammer-headed Shark clans were reputed to be truculent and to like fighting. The peaceable clans were the Shovel-nosed Skate, Ray, and Sucker-fish; while the Dog clan was sometimes peaceable and at other times quarrelsome—all like the totem-animal. Certain of the clans, possibly all, had formule which they repeated in a trance, and these were either magical or in the nature of invocations to the totem. The prayer is in some stages of civilization near akin to the spell.

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on the faces of the clansmen. It is not now held that the clan or phratry is descended from the totem or animal represented, though it may be suspected that in former times this was believed. At present stories are told by the clan or sub-clan claiming a badge of its acquisition by an ancestor through an adventure with the animal in question, such animal being often conceived as of superhuman power.

As Fraser points out, many of these tales have the true totem or animal represented, though the identification of the clansmen with their totems, which is another way of saying that the present people are supposed to be descended from the totemic animals."

To this it may be added, according to Boas's report, "the animal and a member of its clan are considered one. Thus the wolf gens will pray to the wolves, 'We are your relations; pray don't hurt us.' But notwithstanding this fact, they hunt wolves without hesitation."

The truth is that the more or less permanent settlement of all the tribes along the coast—at least from the Tingit to the Kwakiutl—in villages, and their increasing civilization, have led to the division of the population into clans or tribes and to a continually higher value being set on the crests or badges as marks of rank and wealth, and as symbols, if not guarantees, of descent from a distinguished ancestor. This has resulted in an accumulation of crests, some clans or sub-clans obtaining a larger number than others; and some of the tribes have more than one clan.

"The great majority of Tingit personal names referred to some animal, especially that animal whose emblem was particularly valued by the clan to which the bearer belonged." Of these names many seem to have been peculiar to one or other of the clans. The solidarity ordinarily subsisting between members of a clan is found, among the Tingit, rather between the members of a phratry.

According to the unwritten Tingit law it was incumbent upon everyone belonging to a phratry to house and feed any other member of that phratry who should visit him, no matter from how great a distance he might come; and it was a mark of good manners, therefore of high caste, not to abuse such hospitality.

Any serious collision at a potlatch arising out of the rivalry of opposing parties of dancers was arrested or stayed by the host's people, who rushed between them bearing the emblem of their phratry or making the call of the animal whose name was that of the phratry. When a man died, the funeral ceremonies were conducted by the opposite phratry. The mourning feast was attended by the relatives of the deceased. On the whole it may be conjectured that the two phratries represent original totem-clans, out of which have sprung clans or tribes, whether social or local, have developed. There was also reckoned among the Tingit population a small group at Sanya, called the Naxadli ('People of Nex,' a creek in the neighbourhood), who stood outside both phratries and might marry into both. They bore the Eagle crest or badge and had personal names having reference to the eagle. They were doubtless a small intrusive population, which Swanton, the latest investigator of the Tingit, suggests as perhaps of Athapaskan derivation.

Coming down from north to south along the coast and islands of Alaska and British Columbia, we find the similar organization existing however in detail, among the various peoples, with an increasing emphasis laid on rank and the possession of crests, until we reach the Kwakiutl. The Kwakiutl people of Southwest British Columbia, as they are often called to distinguish them from the Haida, their northern congers, are organized in 'tribes,' which in turn are subdivided into exogamous groups distinguished not, as a rule, by totemic names but by the collective form of the name claimed as that of the ancestor, by geographical names, or by 'names of honour.' The evidence seems to show that they are neither definitely patrilineal nor matrilineal in descent, but in a state of transition, since a child does not belong to any 'clan' or exogamous group of which one of its ancestors belonged at the arbitrary discretion of its parents. Each exogamous group, like the ordinary clan of several of the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, had a number of personal names appropriated to it; and to assign a child to such a group it was enough to give it one of these names. In this way it appears to have become important for a member of the group; it might then belong to more than one at the same time. What was more important in Kwakiutl society was the possession of crests and the privileges that they carried. These were obtained in three several ways: (1) they might be inherited by direct patrilineal descent from an ancestor who acquired them through an adventure in the course of which he obtained the protection and guidance of a mentor, or spiritual helper, for himself and his descendants; direct inheritance of this kind, however, was comparatively rare; (2) more usually they were obtained by marriage; the payment of a bride-price was secured not only by the payment of membership in her 'clan' or exogamous group, the crest and privileges of the bride's father, and a good deal of other property; (3) the third method was to obtain them by killing the owner, as in the case of the position and privileges of the King of the Wood of Nemi. The privileges included not only the use of the crest but also the right to membership in certain societies, the right of exclusive and peremptory validity to prescribe certain dances connected with the ceremonial of the societies. They are, however, not acquired for the benefit of the son-in-law in the case of marriage, but for his successor, whoever he may be. Seeing, moreover, that the number of noblemen is fixed, and there is only one person at a time who perenades the ancestor and has rank and privileges, the person entitled must wait for a vacancy before he can be admitted to them. He may wait in vain; for before a vacancy occurs the owner may change his mind, or even after the person entitled has obtained the priesthood, change his mind and confer them upon some other successor.

This is manifestly not totemism, for the societies operate only during the winter, when they dominate the social organization to the exclusion of the kinship and local groups. It may have been influenced by true totemic conceptions, from which it may even have sprung. But its cause must be sought in the increasing power of wealth, the consequent development of rank, and the desire for display.

The transformation that thus seems to have overtaken totemism among the Kwakiutl is in process also among the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico and Arizona. Here the cause is different. In these tribes, originally organized in totemic clans and phratries with matrilineal descent, the struggle for existence has caused a profound change. This has evolved a sense of dependence upon the supernatural powers and a religious ritual and elaborate ceremonies, partly religious and partly magical, for the protection of the community. The result of these ceremonies appear to have been performed by the appropriate clans, as we have found in other areas. In some cases they are still, as among the Zuuli, but aided and superseded by the priests of the various tribes. For other causes.

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1 Fras. Proc. 59th Meeting of British Assoc. 1889, p. 319.
2 Hrd, II, p. 367.
3 Swanton, B.R.E.W., p. 491.
as among the Hopi, the Snake clan has been superceded for this purpose by an 'order' or society, the members of which were probably at the beginning recruited exclusively from the clan. The rule is not therefore necessarily less strict, embracing others besides members of the clan, though the members of the society are limited. In fact the latest inquiries appear to show that the societies or fraternities have broken away and become quite independent of the clan organization.2

(b) Australia.—Turning to Australia, we find that among the Central tribes the totemic clans have been carried far towards their complete conversion into societies performing magico-religious rites, the object of which is the multiplication of the totemic animal or plant. The Warramunga hold that the totem-clans originated each from a single ancestor, half-beast, or half-plant, from whose body emanated a number of spirit-children; and the descendants of the clan are all animated by these spirit-children. The ceremonies are here performed by the clan in a definite order, representing in dramatic fashion the traditional history of the clan. The Warramunga and the tribes to the north of them are definitely patrilineal with extended clans; but the members of the clan in every generation are believed to be continual reincarnations of deceased ancestors. The Arunta, on the other hand, have ceased to regulate their marriages by totemic exogamy and now regulate them solely by class-divisions consisting of the pristine moieties of the tribe, which have been doubly subdivided, so that they are now eight in number. There are various places in the territory of the tribe which are totemic centres believed to be haunted by the spirit-children of the original ancestors. One of these spirit-children is held to have been every pregnant woman according to the totemic centre near or at which she first felt herself pregnant. In this way the 'clan' of the child is ascertained, and in no case does it depend upon that of the father or mother. The resulting group passing under a totemic name is clearly no true clan.

There is no such thing as the members of one totem [group] being bound together in such a way that they must combine to fight on behalf of a member of the totem [group] to which they belong.

Inasmuch as every death is supposed to be due to witchcraft, revenge has to be taken by somebody. Normally this duty would fall on the clansmen of the deceased. But among the Arunta it would seem to be the members of the local group who undertake it.

'In fact,' say Spencer and Gillen, summing up the subject, 'it is perfectly easy to spend a considerable time amongst the Arunta tribe without even being aware that each individual has a totemic name'; but the fact of his belonging to one or other of the distinct groups is soon apparent.

These groups thus passing under totemic names perform under the direction of the respective headmen from time to time, as the headman concerned decides, the ceremonies known as initiation. These ceremonies are not, like those of the Warramunga, the property of the entire group, but each of them belongs to a specific individual, who alone has the right of performing it or requiring others to do so. One consequence of this is that they are not performed in a definite series: they are fragments and may be given in any arbitrary order. They have ceased to be a representation of the traditional history of the group, they have become mere magical rites. Further, in the tribes south and north of the Central group, consisting of the Arunta and their immediate neighbours, a man is forbidden to kill, injure, or eat his totem. In some of the tribes, though patrilineal, the prohibition also applies more or less absolutely to the totem of the clansman's mother—probably a relic of an older matrilineal condition. Among the Arunta, however, there is no such prohibition. In these tribes members of a totem-group are expected to eat of the totem during the ceremonies; and they have liberty to do so at other times, though only sparingly. The conclusion from this is that the fact that the Central tribes of Australia are finding their way out of normal totemism, and that of these tribes the Arunta and their immediate neighbours to the north (the Kaitish, Umajtura, and others) are the farthest advanced on the road. Their totemic organization is not merely decadent; it is obsolete. Such remains of it as persist are preserved only as societies held together for the performance of certain magical or religious rites and as the carriers of certain religious traditions, but no longer as organic social groups.4

But decadent totemism often takes another course in its decline and development. In many communities it is customary to assemble the growing youths for the purpose of what are generally called the puberty ceremonies. By means of these ceremonies the youths of the tribe are taken from their mothers and the consciousness of the society of women and children, are subjected to tests of courage and endurance, educated in sexual matters and in the customs and traditions of the tribe, and fitted henceforth to take their places as adult and fully admitted members. Such initiation rites are prominent all over Australia. Among the Central tribes they have been developed beyond all others. There has been made very severe, not to say cruel; they have been elaborated into four distinct stages and protracted through years, though not of course continuous during that period. Their performance is everywhere on the important occasions on which the tribe comes together. The members are summoned by special messengers with traditional formalities. But the actual performance of the greater part of them is secret, in the sense that no one is allowed to witness or take part in it who has not previously been in a similar manner initiated.

(c) Africa.—There is evidence of the existence of totemism in W. Africa from the southward in almost all the populations. In many places, however, where it is decadent or obsolete it is replaced by secret societies which dominate or supplement the nominal government. Thus at Old Calabar there is a very powerful society known as Egbe, divided into numerous grades. The king is the head. It has in a rough and ready way the whole administration of the law in its hands.4 Further south, in the cataract region of the Lower Congo, is a secret society known as Nkima. According to the latest researches, it is entered about the age of puberty. The candidates are chosen by the agongo, or medicine-man. The ceremonies take place in the forest, where the camp is jealously guarded from all intrusion. There the candidates remain for a period variously stated as from one to two months. They are painted white, and a narcotic is administered. They are subjected to a number of tests, such as the imposition of a new name and an oath of secrecy, and to flagellation, if not already in that condition. They are taught a new language, and it is believed


by the women and other non-initiated that they are put to death and brought to life again. They are instructed in the religious beliefs and moral rules to which they must in future conform. Various prohibitions are enforced during and after their retirement. If approved for the purpose, they may be fished priests or medicine-men if otherwise they become simply adult men, ready to take part in public life. This is obviously little more than the paibety rites of ordinary totemic peoples. It is probably the result of a conflict between matrilin- 

gial and patrilinial institutions. How that conflict originated is obscure; but it is obviously not unconnected with the introduction of herds of cattle among a hunting and perhaps rudely agricultural people, and the consequent change of mode of life and social arrangement, and the way which they now inhabit is steppe, almost desert, and quite unsuitable 

for agriculture. After the rains there is for a time abundant pasture, which at other seasons 

must be sought in the deep and sheltered ditches 

with which the land is intersected. The change to a pastoral life may be surmised to have occurred when or shortly before they penetrated to their present possessions, not probably more than five or six centuries ago. The consequent development of their institutions is even yet incomplete.

At the other extremity of the area occupied by the Bantu are found the Baganda, the most highly civilization of the two clain was were divided by kings probably descended from a Hamitic stock which conquered the country several centuries ago.

"The Baganda are divided into a large number of totemic clans, the members of which have fundamental totemic ceremonies, since they abstain both from injuring their totem and from marrying a woman of the same clan. Each clan has a principal and a subordinate totem and takes its name from the former. Both totems are sacred to members of the clan, and no one is permitted to kill the latter. Other people, however, may kill or destroy them for a reasonable purpose, without hurting the feelings of members of the clan."

The Baganda trace their lineages back to a male line; but a woman's children were taught in infancy to respect her totems and to avoid them. When they grew up, they adopted their father's totems and ceased to regard those of his mother. Yet they were forbidden to marry into their mother's clan. For these and other reasons it seems clear that descent had originally been reckoned in the maternal line, and that, as in the case of the Herero, although on different lines, the transition had been recently and incompletely effected.

Like the clans of certain N. American tribes, each clan had special names appropriated to its children; and hence the clan to which a man belonged was recognized by his name. The king had a large harem. His children, however, took the totem of his mother; and it was naturally deemed an honour for a clan to give a king's name, not in every case, but by means of the union of one of its female members with the king. From this honour certain clans were excluded for reasons which are now unknown. To obviate some of the excluded clans joined more favoured clans, so that their descendants might marry the king and have children who might be in the succession to the throne. Another reason for the union of clans was to better the position of a despised clan. Clans so associated obtained the right to use the totem of the more honourable clan; yet they were so little regarded as relations by the members of the latter that intermarriage between members of the two clans was prohibited. The Lung-fish clan (the largest of all) was in an exceptional position in that its members were not subject to the rule of exogamy. The totems are usually some species of animal, but occasionally trees and other vegetables are found as totems, besides beads and other articles of human manu-

facture; and 'split-totems' and other anomalous totems (as a tailless or a spotted cow, and rain-water from clouds) are not unknown. Notwithstanding the existence of a system of law and administration of justice, the sense of clan-solidarity remained strong. The blood-covenant was practised and was considered more binding than contracts. Murder was rare; but cases of murder and manslaughter, when they occurred, were taken up by the clan. The clan of a murdered man might accept and share a fine, instead of incurring the stigma of death; and, on the other hand, the clan of the wrong-doer contributed to the payment. 'When a member of a clan wished to buy a wife, it was the duty of all the other members to help him to do so'; when a person got into debt, or was fined, the clan combined to assist him to pay the debt or fine. Thus the totemism of the Baganda, while preserving many of the essential features normally present, departs widely from more typical totemism. The religious aspect, though not quite absent, has fallen into the background before polytheism and the cult of the dead. The kingship and the organization of the kingdom have been imposed by a non-Bantu conquering people, which brought a military class, imperfectly assimilated by the bulk of the people when the English occupied the place. This people probably introduced domestic animals, some of which have become totems; and its influence is perhaps also to be traced in the 'split-totems.' Secondary totems are met with elsewhere, as we have seen.

Totemism is decadent also among the tribes of the Congo. It there manifests itself chiefly in tabus, though totemic tabus are only a few of the tabus observed. Among the Bangala of the Uele, Congo the totem animal may not be killed or eaten. A woman after marriage observes her husband's totem as well as her own. A child born to them takes the totem of both parents, until a council of both families determines which totem it is to take permanently—usually the father's. The Bangala are patrilineal.

(d) India.—In continental India the decadence of totemism has been caused chiefly by the spread of Hinduism, and with it the extension of the caste system. The origin of caste has not yet been entirely cleared up. Within the Hindu system it is a matter of not much importance. As applied to the Dravidian and other races of the peninsula, it is transforming, or has transformed, independent tribes into castes; and by means of legends, some of them double contiguously reasoned to manufacture claims, these tribes have succeeded in gaining reluctant and often strongly contested admission as castes into the Hindu social hierarchy. The Reddi or Kappu, the largest caste in the Madras Presidency, are probably descended from a Dravidian tribe which in the early centuries of our era was powerful in India. They are now a great caste of cultivators, farmers, and squireens in the Tuluu country and rank next to the Brahmanas in Hindu society there. They are divided into a number of sections, for whose names fanciful etymologies have been found, and for some of them no explanations have been invented. Once, and in sections, the Pata Kappus have again severed into two endogamous divisions. But they are said also to have true totemic septs, of which the following are examples:

1. Rameswaram, p. 135 ff.
3. JRAI xl. (1910) 365.

Mancham (cot); members of this sept avoid sleeping on cats; (a) Artigal (Papuanus australi; (b) Arengal (Bactria longifolia); this tree and its products may not touch by the hand of any member of the sept; (c) Fushua (watermelon); the melon may not be eaten by members of the sept.

Moreover, the names of various exogamous Kappu septs are suggestive of totemism, such as the Cow, Grain, Buffalo, Sheep, Powl, Goat, Elephant, as well as various plant-names, though others, such as Cart, Army, Hut, Harrow, Woman's Skirt, Plough, are more doubtful.

This is not an uncommon type of caste. It suggests that the caste in question is a transformed tribe, and that the divisions of the caste originate from totemic clans, each of which retains its original name, and its members use their totemic names and some of their tabus, though other subdivisions have forgotten them or originated in a different manner. The Kappu is a low caste of village watchmen and field-labourers in the Central Provinces, almost certainly of non-Aryan origin. They are divided into numerous exogamous septs, all of which are said to be totemic. The members of the sept usually show veneration in the object from which the sept takes its name. Thus the Barba sept is named from barba, 'pig,' this sept worshiping the pig; the Chirah from chirha, 'bird,' this sept revering sparrows; the Guntur from guntura, 'horse,' towards which the members practice certain observances; the Kegotia from Kegotia, 'sheep,' observed and tabooed by the sept; the San from san, 'hemp,' pieces of which are placed by members of the sept near their family god. The Hammal sept is so called from the moneys and god, and the Vepa sept from Vepa, the god worshipped by it.

In the United Provinces there are also many tribes and castes, probably of Dravidian origin, among whom totemism is traceable. Such are the Agariya of Mizapoor, who have seven septs, all exogamous and apparently of totemic origin: the Markam named from the tortoise, which the members will not eat; the Rane, named after a certain tree which they will not eat; the Param from a tree (Butea frondosa) which they will not cut and whose leaves they will not use for plaiting; the Sanwana from long (lone), which they will not sow or use; the Baragwara from a tree (Ficus Indica) which they will not cut or climb and from the leaves of which they will not eat; the Bazhakwar, said to be named from bang, 'frog,' which the members of the sept will not kill or eat; and the Gidhle, the members of which will not kill or even throw a stone at a vulture (giddi). The Agariya are patrilineal; and they have been deeply influenced in other ways by Hinduism. In fact, they call themselves Hindus in religion, though they worship none of the regular Hindu deities. There are, however, traces of a previous matrilineal condition. They preserved traces of the distinctive marks inscribed on their bodies are probably totemic in origin, but the real meaning has now been forgotten, and they are at present little more than shams to Decorate disease and other minor ills, and for the purpose of mere ornament. The social and political conditions of India are such that almost the only possible relics of totemism consist in the names of the septs and the prohibitions of marriage within the clan and of eating, killing, or using the totem. Hindu influence leads to the ascertainment of descent to human beings rather than to animals or plants, concerning which totems are told to account. To this extent the universal tendency of caste to subdividing into endogamous groups of solidarity is greatly weakened and is daily decreasing in force.

1. E. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of S. India, Madras, 1909, ill. 222 ff.
3. W. Crooke, Tribes and Caste of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh, Calcutta, 1868, 1 1 ff.
4. See H. II. Hinsley, 'The People of India,' ed. W. Crooke, London, 1916, pp. 65-109, for a general consideration of the evidence; and, for the evidence itself, also his Tribes and Castes of Bengal, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1861-68, vol. II, Crookes,
TOMETISM

(e) Melanèsia.—There are signs that totemism was developing in the islands of Torres Straits into an anthropomorphic cult. Traditions are found of culture-heroes associated with various clans. Of these Sigmia and Maree were the island of each; they were a large turtle-shell model representing either a hammer-headed shark or a crocodile; under each of these was a stone in which the spirit, the so-called augud ('totem'), resided. These were not allowed to visit these shrines, nor did they know what they contained; they were secreted in Sigina and Malau, but they did not know that the former was a heron, and that the latter was a turtle. The augud was too sacred to be imparted to uninitiates. When the heroes were addressed it was always by their human names, and not by their animal or totem names.

Each was associated in his animal form with one of the two phratries or groups of totem-clans. Warriors before going to battle prayed to them. Totem-dances were performed in large songs were sung, which were believed to have an effect upon the weather, by the shark-men and crocodile-men, dancing separately and wearing feathers coloured with red earth, to which the name augud was given by the animals to which they belonged. On Mabuni and Morula the hero was Kwoam, a warrior-hero, who himself was called an augud. In the Mabuni group of animal elements, Kwoam was the augud and the augud of every one in the island.

He is said to have made and worn 'two crescentic objects of turtle-shell, which blazed when he went to war or to moonlight, and which he armed with the bow of the cockfish. These objects were named augud ... and they became the tutelary spirits of the two phratries into which the old totem-clans of Mabuni were divided.'

When attacking an enemy the warriors formed into two columns, one of which was called by a head-man who wore the Kwoam emblems.

Like Sigina and Malau, he possessed a sacred shrine. It was situated on the island of Kula; there his crescentic emblems were kept, and there he was taken with certain ceremonies to be born before the appropriate phratry in war.

A similar evolution has been observed in Fiji.

'The people of the interior of the island of Viti Levu form a number of independent communities which may probably be regarded each as the product of a number of divisions and subdivisions, which in the relatively high development of Fijian society have departed widely from the character of the ancestral society. The Viti Levu division eating neither the dog nor a fish called daves, the Kaivoci respecting the snake. Other animals were held sacred in other parts of the island, the people believing in poisonous beings from the tabu animals of the tribe, sometimes from that of the smaller group. Marriage is regulated by kinship alone, and there is no evidence at present of totemic exogamy. It is manifest that this kind of totemism is widely divergent from what is usually regarded as totemism. Nor is this to be wondered at, seeing how far Fijian civilization has progressed. Yet it presents 'the three characteristic features of the institution in descent from the totem, prohibition of the totem as an article of food, and the connection of the totem with the definite unit of the social organisation.'

Tribes and Customs of N. W. Provinces and Ovalau, Fiji, 1903; and the paper referred to in Crooke's refer to in a letter to Crooke's refer to in a letter to Bligh's observations. Cf. also Crooke's observations in B.E. II. 149-150.


5. Th.

6. Frazer, ii. 38-34.


among these hill-tribes that the sacred animals had become gods, which had, however, retained their animal form definitely.' Certain rules of conduct given to the Nadik tribe in the island of Tafa. The spirit qilipago showed an early stage in the evolution of a god from the totem-animal. In the Bebei district in the low country things had come to a step further, and in the spirit of the bird called teena, with a name which usually showed no sign of an animal origin, but in many cases these designations have turned into animals, and is such case the people of the village in question were not allowed to eat the animal. Thus the people of Tafuna, a division of Bau, hated a certain bird called enua, 'the bird that could not be eaten, and here, as in the hills, it was clear that the restriction was applied to the whole people and was not limited to either of the two divisions of which the Tafunan people are composed. In this case no one is allowed to

These are not the only cases which he mentions; but they are probably enough to render the evolution plain.

It is almost unnecessary to remark that totemism may decay, especially when it comes under European influence, by simple neglect.

Thus the Winnebago, a Siouan tribe of N. America, tracing their descent from animals who were transformed into human beings and became ancestors of the various clans, treat the totem-animal in no way differently from other animals, hunting it and eating it if edible. Descent is patriarchal, and a chief is used always to take a name of his father's clan; but this is falling into desuetude. The reckoning of descent has become irregular; and the sacred bundle of the totem is nowpassed outside of clan-possession.

Again, the Diegueno of California were all formerly totemic. Descent is paternal. Clan exogamy is still observed by many of the clans, but not by all. Some, like the Blue Wild-cat clan, regard the totem-animal as brother. But many of the clan names have ceased to be totemic, and the clans have become, or are becoming, mere local groups. The clan-name is frequently taken as a personal or family surname under modern conditions.

Such cases may be found elsewhere than in America.

5. Traces of totemism among non-totemic peoples.—Over a large area of the globe, embracing Europe, the greater part of Asia, S. America, and Polynesia, the north of Africa, and the extreme north of N. America, inhabited by the Eskimo, totemism is now unknown. But among many of the peoples of these regions certain beliefs and practices have been reported which seem to bear traces of a former totemism.

(a) Polynesia.—Rivers' discoveries, just referred to, in Melanesia find their analogies in Tonga and Tikopia.

In the former he learned that "each family had its otaa (a Polynesian word, usual, as regards names, to mean "ancestor"), some of which were animals and some stones, while a man might also be an otaa. Exogamous relations and marriage were the oto, the flying fox, and the pigeon. . . . An animal was never eaten by those whose otaa it was, and I was told, he says, 'that the name itself defines the animal.' Similarly on the island of Tikopia he found a number of animals called atu or "gods" to which the tribe belong to the whole community and may be eaten by no one on the island; others belong to one or two men and are under the control into which the people are divided.' Thus the oto is the otu of the Kava; it is forbidden as food and to take it; but also to the whole people. The Tasmakato may not eat the sea-eel or a bird called rupu—prohibitions limited to this division of the people. The Fangangole may not catch one fish, etc.

The Tanoa may not eat the fresh-water eel, the flying fox, or the turtle, the two latter being also prohibited as food to the whole community, though regarded as especially sacred to the Tanoa. There was also evidence that the Kava was believed to be descended from the oto, the Tarano from the eel, the Tanoa from the flying fox; and it was believed that one man of this division became after death a fresh-water eel, etc.

Thus there is reason to think that totemism had at one time existed and had left traces attributable to no other cause. Elsewhere in Polynesia there are relics more or less distinct of the same conditions.

(b) Egypt.—We are naturally reminded of Egypt. The origin and early development of Egyptian religion are obscure. What we find is that in the earliest period known to us the
TOTEMISM

monuments each nome or district had its own peculiar object of adoration in some animal, which was regarded with indifference or, in consequence of local quarrels, with hostility in the adjacent nomes. Moreover (in spite of changes during the country's long history, in spite of the evolution into higher polytheism and of the syncretism which generally marked the local deities), all deities shared the same attitude towards these animals prevalent to the end. One nome venerated the ibis, one the crocodile, one the cat, one the ram, one the pelican, one the ophycynthus fish, and so on. Some of these and with domesticated animals; in the earliest period, however, domesticated animals do not appear. The monarchy seems to have been introduced by a people which invaded Egypt and conquered the aborigines. The invaders carried the standard of a falcon, from the name of which (heru) that of Horus, later regarded as the last of the gods who reigned over Egypt, is derived. When the objects of adoration took human form, becoming anthropomorphic gods, these were identified with various animals, and are represented on the monuments with the heads of the appropriate animals. The animals remaining sacred, as their numerous mummies attest; and various legends were told to account for their relation to the respective gods. At Babasis, where the cat was venerated, the goddess Bast had her seat; Ombos, where the crocodile was honored, was the sacred town of the crocodile-headed god, Sebek; the ram-headed god, Khnum or Amun-Ra, was worshiped at Thebes, and there precisely was the place where the sheep was revered. As a result of the unification of the country under the kings, syncretism in theology spread, and the various gods tended to be identified with one another, and the animals honored in the different towns. At length the myth and worship of the culture-hero, Osiris, prevailed throughout the land; and his myth included a story of how the various gods were 'disguised in brutish forms,' from the rage of his enemy Typhon. In short, all sorts of devices are adopted to account for the local gods and animals venerated in the different cities and districts, and to unify the religion. These devices were probably known to, or at least accepted by, the educated classes only. All the other classes remained attached to their local deities. The evidence points to the prevalence at one time in the valley of the Nile of a form of totemism, which possibly included various trees and other vegetables (for these, though less prominent than animals, are not unknown in Egyptian religion), and which by a series of steps was slowly merged and elevated into a polytheistic worship tending ever in the minds of the educated more and more to monothelism.

All this was doubtless the result of the agricultural occupations of the people. What were the relations of the members of the clan to one another or to the totem with which the clan was associated? Greek totemists. Andrew Lang pointed out the various remains of animal-worship among the Greek peoples—in Thessaly the Myrmidons claiming descent from the ant and revering ants; in the broad and the island the mice sacred to Apollo Smintheus and a tribe referred to by an oracle as mice; the adoration of the wolf at Delphi and Athens and of the sheep on Samos; the descent of Tennes, the hero of Tenedos, from a swan; the invocation of Hecate as a dog and the sacrifice to her of a dog; the Artemis of Arcadia, identified with Callisto, a nymph who is said to have been metamorphosed into a she-bear, from which the Arcadians claimed descent; the similar tale of the Brauronian Artemis in Attica, served by girls called bears, dancing with the gait of bears and probably in animal garments bearing skin-skins; and a hundred other such myths, rituals, and myths and of the Greeks.

Nor has he been alone in discerning that such cases pointed to a primitive totemism, outgrown and misconstrued before the dawn of written history. The worship of the swine and the cows of Athens has also been examined. The γατος and φαιλπα have been pronounced parallel in all essentials with the organization of the Australian totemic clan and association. There are good reasons for suspecting that originally matrilineal descent was the rule, of which vestiges subsisted down to historical times. Though this view has been challenged, and it is undoubtedly thatagnatic descent prevailed in historical times, the suspicion is not without solid foundation. Probably the prehistoric population of the period called the Mycenaean age was matrilineal and was conquered by a patrilineal military people from the north, who formed the dominant classes in the Homeric age, and under whom Greek society was transformed and reorganized. On the whole we are justified in accepting with L. R. Farnell the theory that various remarkable cults—the Archaic worship of Zeus Lycaeus and of Artemis Calliste, the Attic worship of Zeus Polies, and perhaps some others—can be explained only by a survival of what is in effect totemism. But there are other cults and myths of which the connecting links have been lost may with the more likelihood be assigned to the same origin.

(d) Ireland.—Over the rest of Europe the traces of totemism are still more uncertain. They will be found, as in Greece, if at all, on the side of belief and practices which may be called quasi-religious rather than in social observances such as marriage restrictions; for under the dominance of Christianity and the social ideas, Hebrew and Roman, carried with it society has been shaped for two millennia. In Connemara and the islands off the west coast of Ireland persons bearing the name of Conneely, who are descended from the clan Conneely, an old family of Iar-Connought, claim that they have seal's blood in them, and that is why they are such good swimmers.

A story is told of some members of the clan who at a distant period were changed into seals. Since then, it is said, no Connely can kill a seal, and a seal is never caught without a lock.

Seals are said to be regarded with profound veneration. They are called Conneelys, and are said to be the souls of departed friends. It is told that 'in some places the story has its believers who believe a seal can kill a seal, or a baby of a slaughtered one, than they would of a human Conneely.'

Both is Ireland and in the Scottish islands are stories and customs which point to an extinct totemism as the best explanation; and the same explanation has been offered, with more or less probability, of various beliefs and practices in Wales and England as well as in other European countries.2

(e) W. China.—In W. China among the Lolas, an aboriginal mountain people of Szechwan, there is something more than traces of totemism.

Their surnames always signify the name of a tree or animal, or both tree and animal,1 and these are considered as the ancestors of the family bearing the name. This name is often archaic. Thus the surname Bui-lah-be is explained as follows:—Bui-lah is said to be an ancient name for the citron, which is now known as se-luh. The common way of asking a person what his surname is, is to inquire 'What is it you don't touch?' and a person of the surname just mentioned would reply 'We do not touch the se-luh or citron.' People cannot eat or touch in any way the plant or animal, or both, which enters into their surname. The plant or animal is not, however, worshipped in any way. People of the same surname may marry if there is no obvious reason why they should not. There are, however, three surnames amongst whom intermarriage is forbidden; and an explanation of this is given. There are also groups of two or three surnames who are called comedes, and intermarriage amongst them is favoured.3

The Chinese themselves are on a higher plane of civilization, and totemism is unknown. But from archaic prohibitions its existence has been suspected. Among some other peoples of S.W. Asia and various islands of the Indian Archipelago totemism has been either found or suspected. In Melanesia, and the Polynesian islands a number of superstitious have been ascribed with more or less probability to an original totemism no longer forming part of the social organization.

(f) America.—In Central and S. America also customs and beliefs have been interpreted as traces of totemism. Thus in Peru, where the various clans were localized, each clan worshipped its ancestor, and the tendency seems to have been for such objects of worship to assume the form of an animal, vegetable, or some other natural phenomenon. Each clan, moreover, had a distinctive dress. But our information is too imperfect to permit of a definite opinion on the subject.4 The Bororo of Brazil claim to be araras (a bird with a red plumage) and believe a neighbouring tribe, the Trumal, to be water-animals, while a certain canoe is said to have descended from the jaguar.5 In N. America it was usual for a young man at adolescence, or a man who wished to acquire special powers, to go out into the woods and fast for days in order to acquire a guardian spirit, which usually took the form of an animal. It was revealed to him in a vision in which his austerities culminated; and when it took the form of some animal, a portion or symbol of that animal became his fetish or medicine. Thereafter he obeyed the restrictions and prohibitions believed to have been communicated to him by the vision. There was a tendency among some tribes, particularly the north-west, for the guardian spirits (vida or manitu) to be inherited by his descendants. And some writers have seen in this the origin of totemism.6 A variety of the practice in


Central and S. America is known under the name of naganual (Quechua, 'the knowing one' or 'sorcerer'), in which some natural object, as commonly an animal, is believed to have a parallel relation with a human being, so that for weal or woe their fates are mutually dependent. The naganual is sometimes chosen by divination, and is sometimes the infant at birth, but more often obtained, like a manitu, by fasting and prayer.1 It seems that the nagual is a purely personal acquisition and is not inherited like the sida. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the belief of the Bororo nor the manitu or nagual of other tribes has the marks of true totemism. It has no relation to a clan, nor is it in any way related to the social organization; where the manitu descends, it is only to the children or remotest issue of the original possessor, and in such case the descent has only taken place under the influence of patrilineal kinship.

(g) Australia.—In Australia among the Kumai and some other tribes of the south-east the two sexes have animals respectively regarded as their protectors, with whom the life of individual members of the sex is supposed to be bound up. Fights between the sexes on behalf of their sex-totems often occurred, as a means, or a preliminary, to marriages.3 Here again, and for the same reason, it is the case in naganual and the other American beliefs just referred to, the sex-totems are, whatever their origin, entirely unconnected with true totemism.

b. Origin.—The origin of totemism has been the subject of much discussion and speculation among anthropologists. It is only necessary here to refer to a few of the hypotheses offered. That which is identified with the name of Hill-Tout has already been incidentally dealt with. Though accepted by some American anthropologists, it has not generally found favour on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the totem-animal or vegetable, and for ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use,2 has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Dearden and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of Rivers of the Melanesians, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and childbirth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans derived respectively from ancestors who originated from the animals or fruits.2 Such a theory, however, encounters the same difficulties as the theory which ascribes the origin of totemism to the manitu become hereditary.

Earlier than either of these the old historian, James Fraser had suggested1 that the key to totemism might be to be found in the extraordinary use attached to the

network of totemism, that is, in the belief that living people may deposit their souls for safe keeping outside of themselves in some secure place, where the precious deposit will be less exposed to the risks and vicissitudes of life than while it remained in the body of its owner. This hypothesis, though frequently entertained by native tradition, has not, he frankly admits, been confirmed by further research, inscrutable to the evidence which connects this theory of external human souls in animal bodies with totemism appears to be insufficient to justify us in regarding it as the source of the whole institution.

Andrew Lang, towards the close of his life, was led to emphasize the social aspect of totemism. He advocated a theory similar to that first proposed by Herbert Spencer, and adopted by the German scholar, J. Pflüger, that the origin is to be sought in names. According to this theory, bands of men, having been given names from outside, either by way of distinction or as nicknames, and then the course of social organization, from one generation to another, led first to the preference for wives of another band having a different name, and subsequently to a positive prohibition to marry a woman of the same band and necessarily bore the same name. In other words, to clan-exogamy. The influence of names, and the inevitable tendency to regard a name as a real objective existence belonging to and having a physical connection with the person or thing signified by it, are probably universal in the lower culture. But why these names were appropriated and accepted by the various bands is felt unexplained. Lang apparently agrees with Frazer that the institution of clan-exogamy is distinct from totemism, and that totemism as a matter of fact preceded exogamy. It certainly is a usual, but not quite invariable, accompaniment of it. Lang indeed offers explanations of the origin of exogamy, but it cannot be said that his speculations are more satisfactory than those of previous inquirers.

A. C. Haddon some time ago hazarded a suggestion of the possible origin of one aspect of totemism. It is that there were numerous small human groups in favourable areas, each occupying a restricted range in which a certain animal or plant or group of animals or plants might be specially abundant, and that they consequently utilized these as a food-supply and for other purposes, the superfluity of which could be bartered for the superfluities of other groups. Thus the group that lived mainly on crabs and occasionally turned to crabs might well be spoken of as "the crab-men" by all the groups with whom they came in direct or indirect contact. The group might hold good for the group that dealt in clams or in turtle, and reciprocally there might be sagoo-men, bamboo-men, and so forth. It is obvious that the men who persistently collected or hunted a particular group of animals would understand the habits of those animals better than other people, and personal regard for these animals would naturally arise. Thus from the very beginning there would be a distinct relationship between a group of individuals and a group of animals or plants, a relationship that primitively was based, not on even the most elementary of psychic concepts, but on the most intimate and urgent of human ideas, hunger.

Here Haddon agrees with Lang that the name of the group was probably imposed from without and adopted by the group thus named. Once accepted, the name and the regard for the animal, or whatever was the object signified by the name, would result in a mystical connexion being held to exist between the object and the human group, which might issue in the object being tabooed instead of used as originally, and, on the other hand, in magic being worked to secure a continuous supply of the object. As part of the taboo, or incident to it, exogamy, originating in a prefer-
ence for women of contiguous groups, might be developed.

E. Durkheim, envisaging chiefly the Australian evidence, considers totemism as a religious institution. According to him the evidence which connects this theory of external human souls in animal bodies with totemism appears to be insufficient to justify us in regarding it as the source of the whole institution.

1 A. C. Haddon, Presidential Address to Anthropology Section, "The Urgentie, 1898.
2 Lang, The Secret of the Totem, obs. vi. and vii.
4 Olivier, "Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse" in 1898, pp. 295, 394, 334, etc.
everything. Man did not picture himself as lord of creation. He did not sever himself in thought from other living creatures; he was only a part of a great community. He felt himself closely united with a kind of animal living in his neighbourhood and coming in touch with him. It was no accident that he associated himself with one or other species. Totemism has its various sides—religious, magical, and social. These were in the origin undistinguished from one another. The distinction between them came later, with the development of individualism and analysis.1

In this way Reuterköld would explain the origin of totemism. Without saying that he has completely solved the question, the opinion may be expressed that he has realized the conditions of primitive life and thought sufficiently to define at all events some of the conditions to be fulfilled and so lead to a solution. In endeavouring to explain the attitude towards nature of the tribes of Central Brazil Von den Steinen not only says that they draw no strict line of demarcation between man and brute; he uses the emphatic expression that, to understand it, 'we must think the boundary completely away.' There is thus no impediment to their assimilating themselves to one or another animal form. As we have seen, that they are red arras, not that they will become arras after death, nor that they were arras in a previous existence, but that they are arras here and now. From this attitude of mind we can see all the human modes of life and thought are attributed to the lower animals, and indeed, as frequently in savage tales, it is often impossible to say whether the actors are human or not; if anything also that marriages between the former and the latter are in the tales contemplated without aversion or are even regarded as natural, and that interchanges of shape are quite ordinary incidents. It is in question of naming. Totemism is founded on something deeper than that. It assumes a community of nature between men and other creatures; and the existence of the individual is ignored, except as a small and subordinate part of a group, thought of as a whole. It was part of the organization of society which is bound up with the general concept of the world indicated above—a concept by no means limited to totem peoples, but not always issuing in the same type of organization. How or why particular totems were chosen is a difficult question, but, however interesting, relatively unimportant.

In strict acceptance of the term totemism is not a religion. The respect of the clan for its totem arises out of the attitude of mind just explained. The relation of the clan to its totem assumes a mystical aspect and generates an intense feeling of kinship. This frequently is expressed in the belief that they are descended from the totem-species. As civilization evolves, this belief becomes modified into the shape of a story of the adventure of a human ancestor with the totem-species. Although regarded with reverence and looked to for help, the totem is never, where totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god, or person with powers which we call supernatural. In fact, in that stage of culture totemism usually co-exists with the cult of the dead and often with the worship of other spirits alike essentially so cut. Its connexion with the social organization, on the other hand, is very intimate. Probably beginning in a more or less inchoate recognition of kinship, it develops the civil code and the clan organization and by means of clan-exogamy binds the whole tribe together. Whether exogamy actually precedes totemism in point of time or not, there can be no doubt that the interaction of the two strengthens and develops it, until exogamy is seen as an essential element of totemism in its full force. When, in the course of evolving civilization, totemism begins to decay, exogamy may and often does continue to exist independently. And the cases are numerous where the clan-system and exogamy have arisen and lasted for long periods without any other element of totemism, so far as we know. So various are the forms of totemism that it has been maintained with plausibility that they are due to a fortuitous concurrence of causes which has united elements originally diverse but tending to converge into a system on the whole marvellously similar wherever it obtains, just as the disintegration, and in many cases the dissolution, of the system have historically been due to a concurrence or a sequence of causes of the opposite kind.


E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

TRACTARIANISM.—See OXFORD MOVEMENT.

TRADE.—See COMMERCE.

TRADE UNIONS.—A trade union has been defined as 'a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment.' 1 This definition would not be regarded as an adequate account of the objects of a trade union by many labour leaders of the present time, but it may stand with the proviso that there are large questions of politics and industrial reconstruction which under modern conditions have a direct or indirect bearing upon the improvement of conditions. 2 The underlying basis of the movement is the power of combination, and the progressive realization of this power by the masses of the workers in various countries has gone far to revolutionize the face of civilization. Labour is no longer a suppliant pleading for justice, but a strong man armed, presenting demands which he has the power to enforce. How will that power be used? The time seems appropriate for a consideration of the ethical aspects of the trade union movement.

1 Historical.—Trade unionism, like parliamentary government, is the child of the passionate instinct of the British people for civic freedom. It has been transplanted to the colonies, adopted by the working people of every nation in Europe, carried

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across the Atlantic to America. It pervades the whole world of intelligent white labour, but England was its cradle.

Attempts have been made to trace its descent from the guilds of the Middle Ages, little of which is known, but those institutions are to be regarded as associations of masters rather than of men, and there is little or no evidence of the existence of permanent associations of wage-earners before the 18th century.

It was then that the differentiation between employer and employed became more and more marked until a great gulf was finally set between them by the transformation of industry effected by the introduction of machinery and the institution of the modern factory system of production on a large scale. The trade union movement was a direct response to the change of conditions.

In the early part of the 19th cent., continuous associations of wage-earners generally took the form of friendly societies, with sick and funeral funds attached; but, as the century wore on, and the effects of the industrial revolution, in divorcing the worker from the instruments of production and degrading his position, became more apparent, they inevitably assumed a different character. The members of the clubs had opportunities to talk about questions of wages and conditions of labour, and we find Adam Smith writing:

"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and conversation, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."

This was what the early trade unions appeared to be to the governing classes of those days—"a conspiracy against the public"—and they were only taking the same view as had been taken by the governing classes long before. Combinations of workmen were held to constitute a danger to the State, and from early times a series of statutes had been directed against them. The earliest of these appears to have been the statute 33 Edw. I. c. 1. (1508).

It stamped as conspirators all who do confederate or bind themselves by oath, covenant or other alliance, as relates to extents or combinations to contravene or conspire of workmen or other persons to obtain an advance of, or fix the rate of, wages, or to lessen or alter the hours or duration of the time of working, or to decrease the quantity of work, or to regulate or control the mode of carrying on any manufacture, trade, or business, or the management thereof.

From this it may be seen that labour questions, including the limitation of output, were much the same in the first part of the 19th cent. as they are to-day. The statutes were made to declare combinations or conspiracies of masters, manufacturers, or other persons to be equally illegal; they too were regarded as constituting a danger to the State; and the principle that all combinations, whether of masters or of men, should be suppressed in the interest of the public may be said to underlie most of our earlier industrial legislation. But, as time went on, the tendency was for the laws against labour to be rigidly enforced, while those in its favour were very laxly administered or allowed to fall into oblivion.

The Act of Edward I. was followed by a series of others of the same nature. In the 18th cent., they became more and more frequent with the rise of the new associations. At least fifteen were enacted in the reign of George III. before the year 1800, and at least forty on to declare combinations or conspiracies of masters, manufacturers, or other persons to be equally illegal; they too were regarded as constituting a danger to the State; and the principle that all combinations, whether of masters or of men, should be suppressed in the interest of the public may be said to underlie most of our earlier industrial legislation. But, as time went on, the tendency was for the laws against labour to be rigidly enforced, while those in its favour were very laxly administered or allowed to fall into oblivion.

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legislation of a social character is also needed to improve their position.'

Beyond the outbreak of the war we do not propose to go.
The total number of trade unions in existence at the end of 1913 is given in the Labour Year Book as 1133 with a membership of just under four millions—more than double what they had been ten years before.

2. Moral and economic justification of trade unionism.—No one would be likely to deny that trade unions are a necessary feature of modern industrial life, and most people would admit that they are on the whole a salutary feature. Our forefathers may have been sincere in their belief that the State could not afford to allow such associations to exist, that they constituted a real danger to the public; but in those days there was little knowledge of the conditions under which the 'lower classes' lived and little sympathy with the workers themselves. Moreover, the existing order was taken for granted. It was recognized that there were evils which called for alleviation, but the ideas of the most sympathetic did not get farther than palliation; prevention was beyond their scope. Such attempts as were made in early times to regulate industry by legal enactments were crude; and, when the great crisis of the 18th cent. arrived and there was the most urgent need of strong and intelligent control, there was no one who saw the meaning and implications of the change. The industrial revolution went its way unfettered; the old industrial order was swept away and chaos supervened; whole classes of workers became involved in the condition of unparalleled servitude, poverty, and degradation. But the governing classes failed to realize that, if there was a possible element of danger in the existence of combinations of workers, the existence of such a state of things was a far greater danger and in addition an intolerable disgrace to any civilized country. From the fetters riveted upon us in those evil days we as a nation have been for a century endeavouring with infinite struggles and effort to set ourselves free. The conscience of the public was at last aroused, but long before it was aroused the workers had learnt to help themselves; the State at last awoke to some sort of a sense of its responsibilities, but the driving power which lay behind the various enactments was the power of the associations of workers. This is the first and broadest ground of justification of unionism. It has laid the foundations of a new industrial order, and those foundations were laid in the power of two far-reaching ideas—the realization of the power of combination and the conception of the organization of labour.

Another debt which the country owes to trade unionism is the emancipation of large sections of its population from the cold and selfish individualism of past days. It is a debt which is not generally realized and seldom acknowledged; but no one who knows anything of the actual working of trade unions, or is brought much into contact with their members, can fail to see how strong the bond of fellowship is, how clearly the members realize their dependence upon one another, how ready they are to bear one another's burdens if occasion arises. Trade unionism is full of parochial doxes, but none of them is more striking than that action which appears to be hard and selfish is found sometimes upon investigation to be based upon the most unselfish motives, or that practices which appear to be self-seeking themselves admit to being unjustifiable in theory are invested with a strong moral sanction as the only means for the protection of the weak.

On these two broad general grounds—that it has pointed the way to the establishment of a new industrial order, and that it has recalled us to a sense of a forgotten side of our social order—it may be said that the trade unions have abundantly justified itself. We shall now proceed to consider some of the special manifestations of its activity which have been at different times the subject of criticism.

(a) Strikes.—The strike (g.v.) has always been the trade unionist's most effective weapon. He can do much to protect himself by the method of mutual insurance or collective bargaining, but the strike gives him the power of bringing pressure to bear if he desires to enforce an agreement or to secure an improvement in wages or conditions of labour. The question whether it is a fair weapon is therefore fundamental. At present the right to strike has been practically acknowledged by the law, but the concession has only been gradual. At first all strikes were regarded as conspiracies and illegal; then there came a stage at which the right to strike was tacitly acknowledged, but the courts condemned them on the ground of assumed 'malicious intent'; next attempts were made to discriminate between different kinds of motive; and now the tendency seems to be to uphold the right to strike as such.

The relation between employer and employed has been regarded in law since 1875 as a civil contract between two theoretically free and equal individuals. It is in some cases a contract of very short duration, but it does not differ in nature from longer contracts. A weekly-wage-earner is in this respect in the same position as a highly placed salaried official. He therefore has the right to terminate his contract when he pleases, so long as he does not contravene its terms. But the essence of a strike is that it is the simultaneous termination of many contracts, and it derives its power from the fact that it is inconvenient or even harmful to the employer, and generally meant to be so. Now no one would deny that any worker where wages are inadequate or conditions intolerable has the right to say to an employer, 'I will not work for you for such wages or under such conditions.' Nor will it be denied that many of the workers have a right to express this simultaneously as a joint protest. Finally, it is hard to see how they would be wrong in endeavouring to persuade others to do the same. If these three points are conceded, the right to strike is established in principle.

The strike then, regarded as a protest, is a lawful weapon; but the days are long past when strikes were simply protests. To-day in the majority of cases they are used as weapons of offence. Even as such they are doubtless often justifiable, but weapons of offence are used to threaten or to inflict injury; that is what they are for; and, if it is conceded that the use of such weapons is allowable in industrial warfare, there would seem to be need of some controlling power to see that they are used fairly. A strike may be simply an instrument of those who have him in their pay and the unionisation of wage-earners. Moreover, the whole question has assumed a new aspect in recent years as the result of closer association between different classes of workers and the enormous increase of protest which the strike has derived from their simultaneous action. A strike on a large scale is no longer a mere matter between employers and employed; the whole nation may be affected. An unpleasant feature of some recent strikes has been the frankness by their promoters that it was their deliberate intention to cause such general inconvenience and even injury as would force a settlement in their favour, simply to put an end to them. Such

1 Trade Unions, London, 1913, p. 57.
action is narrow and selfish and is condemned by public opinion. In no civilized country can any one body of men be allowed to hold the nation to ransom at their pleasure. The State is greater than any of its component parts, and is morally bound to take measures to protect the nation as a whole from exploitation by any section of it.

The question of picketing is closely connected with that of strike. A strike really is a device to starve an employer out; its efficacy depends upon the completeness with which his supplies of labour can be cut off. It is therefore of the first importance to the strikers to see that no one else takes their place, and that none of the workers continue their work. Hence an elaborate system of sentries and pickets. There is nothing to be urged against "peaceful persuasion," but it is obvious that, at a time when strong emotions are aroused, such a practice needs careful watching if the persuasion is not to be allowed to degenerate into intimidation or even violence.

The Act of 1889 rendered liable to a fine or imprisonment every person who refused to do or to pay for any work done, or to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a right to do or to abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority. The term "worker" means the person employed. A bricklayer, for example, may not lay more bricks in a day than he employed by another person makes or works. But declared that an employer, when an employer, who is liable to be held into a position of view, because the object of industry is production and the worker who systematically produces less work in order to make himself indispensable is the trade. It is also morally unjustifiable because every one is bound in honour to accomplish to the best of his ability the task which he has taken in hand. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this. On what grounds then is it defended? It is defended on the ground that it is the only protection that can be devised for the weak against the lowering of the wages by unscrupulous employers. It was found that an employer who had already agreed to a certain piece-rate, on finding that the best of his men were earning wages which seemed to him in his short-sightedness to be prostrations, went back upon his word and proceeded to cut the rate, with the result that the slow or weak among the workers were no longer able to earn the weekly wage which he himself had considered as fair when he fixed the original piece-rate. Labour, in order to remove any such excuse for a lowering of wages, resolved that no member of the trade, whatever his strength or speed, should be allowed to outpace the rest. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this, because the need of it will probably disappear. Meanwhile it remains not without a touch of pathos, as an indication of the dislocation which has invested in the eyes of the workers a practice which they would not really defend with the same energy. But it should be realized that industry cannot work in chains.

The policy of limitation of output is sometimes adopted upon less defendable grounds. We do not refer to those cases in which a strike less than he might, or as little as he can contrive, out of personal resentment towards an employer or as a protest against a system which he believes to be unjust. Such cases are not uncommon, but it is doubtful whether any union would deliberately support them with its formal sanction. But matters, it is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that there will not be enough to go round if the standard of production per man is too high. This "lump-of-labour" theory is the complement of the old "wages-fund" theory of the capitalists of the 19th cent., who believed that there was only a certain sum available for wages, and that, if one set of workers got more, it meant that of necessity another set would get less. Both were equally fallacious. There is neither a fixed amount of work nor a fixed sum available for wages; both are elastic. The way to increased wages lies through increased production, for it is out of the value of the product that wages, like salaries and the cost of raw materials, are paid. To limit production is to lessen the fund out of which wages are paid. There is also a belief that, if the best workers are lowered to force the pace, the result will be a subjection of the standard of earnings of the average worker—a "bell-wether" is regarded as an abomination—and the best protection against this is to hold that the output held to be a sort of standardization of output comparable to the standardization of hours and wages in which the workers have found protection and safety. But it seems indisputable that, if the best workers in a trade are circumscribed and shackled, the whole trade must be the worse for it, workers included.

(b) The limitation of output.—There are some things about trade unionism which will never be understood unless they are regarded as projected against a background of injustice and petty tyranny. The deliberate limitation of output is one of them. It has been, and is still, the practice of some unions not to allow their members to do more than a given amount of work in a given time. A bricklayer, for example, may not lay more than a given number of bricks in a day. This practice is unjustifiable from the economic point of view, because the object of industry is production and the worker who systematically produces less work in order to make himself indispensable is the trade. It is also morally unjustifiable because every one is bound in honour to accomplish to the best of his ability the task which he has taken in hand. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this. On what grounds then is it defended? It is defended on the ground that it is the only protection that can be devised for the weak against the lowering of the wages by unscrupulous employers. It was found that an employer who had already agreed to a certain piece-rate, on finding that the best of his men were earning wages which seemed to him in his short-sightedness to be prostrations, went back upon his word and proceeded to cut the rate, with the result that the slow or weak among the workers were no longer able to earn the weekly wage which he himself had considered as fair when he fixed the original piece-rate. Labour, in order to remove any such excuse for a lowering of wages, resolved that no member of the trade, whatever his strength or speed, should be allowed to outpace the rest. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this, because the need of it will probably disappear. Meanwhile it remains not without a touch of pathos, as an indication of the dislocation which has invested in the eyes of the workers a practice which they would not really defend with the same energy. But it should be realized that industry cannot work in chains.

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(c) "Celt canny."—The policy of limitation of output is sometimes adopted upon less defendable grounds. We do not refer to those cases in which a strike less than he might, or as little as he can contrive, out of personal resentment towards an employer or as a protest against a system which he believes to be unjust. Such cases are not uncommon, but it is doubtful whether any union would deliberately support them with its formal sanction. But matters, it is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that there will not be enough to go round if the standard of production per man is too high. This "lump-of-labour" theory is the complement of the old "wages-fund" theory of the capitalists of the 19th cent., who believed that there was only a certain sum available for wages, and that, if one set of workers got more, it meant that of necessity another set would get less. Both were equally fallacious. There is neither a fixed amount of work nor a fixed sum available for wages; both are elastic. The way to increased wages lies through increased production, for it is out of the value of the product that wages, like salaries and the cost of raw materials, are paid. To limit production is to lessen the fund out of which wages are paid. There is also a belief that, if the best workers are lowered to force the pace, the result will be a subjection of the standard of earnings of the average worker—a "bell-wether" is regarded as an abomination—and the best protection against this is to hold that the output held to be a sort of standardization of output comparable to the standardization of hours and wages in which the workers have found protection and safety. But it seems indisputable that, if the best workers in a trade are circumscribed and shackled, the whole trade must be the worse for it, workers included.
to bargain successfully with an employer. The employer occupies a superior strategic position, and the worker's only hope is in association. It is undeniable that, where large associations of industrialists arose and this is a danger of tyrannous action, and the larger the association the greater the danger; but it is equally undeniable that the circumstances of the time seem to call for such associations, and the danger should be confronted. The advantages to be gained are great, and the danger can be met with the assistance of the legislature and the law-courts.


L. V. LESTER-GARLAND.

TRADITION. — The word 'tradition' means, etymologically, 'handing over.' The conception of tradition, therefore, implies (a) a 'deposit' which is handed over, and (b) 'depositaries,' i.e. persons who are in possession of the deposit, and are commissioned to preserve it and transmit it to successors. Most religious systems claim to bear witness to themselves a deposit, consisting of ceremonial, myth, dogma, or etic, or of some of these elements, revealed by some ultimate divine or quasi-divine authority, and meant to be handed down to posterity by a succession of duly qualified trustees. This article discusses the part which the principle of tradition has played in the history of Christianity.

1. Christian and Jewish tradition. — There is not much uncertainty regarding the attitude of the Founder of Christianity towards the Jewish tradition which he found already in existence. He was Himself a member of the Jewish Church, and disclaimed any idea of being a rebel against it: 'Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil!' (Mt 5:17). It would be generally agreed that His object was, not to abolish the traditional Mosaic deposit or to annihilate the depositary society — the 'congregation of the Lord,' the 'Israel of God' — but rather to develop and expand the then existing Jewish tradition into the Kingdom of God, and to reform and purify the deposit by blending it with the gospel, or 'good news,' of a glorious age to come. In regard to the reform of the deposit, He insisted primarily upon its re-moralization. The classical passage for the Gospel of St. Matthew is the saying about Ceban (Mt 15:10-29, Mk 7:19), with the affirmation, which follows, that it is not the things which go into a man, but those which come out of the man, that defile the man. This may appear, at first sight, to challenge in principle the whole conception of the ceremonial deposit and brusquely to deny any spiritual value to outward observances. It certainly claims an infinitely higher place for ethical values as compared with ceremonial precepts; it might be taken further, to imply that the sole seat of religious authority for a pious Jew lay in his inner life, and that the oral tradition of the Rabbins was comparatively worthless. An even stronger implication as to the transitory nature of the Rabbinical tradition is contained in the saying about the 'new wine' and the 'old wineskins,' which shows that the saying of our Lord was not that which is new, but that which is new in the moral sense:

2. Christ and Christian tradition. — We now approach a question on which opinions are, and have been for many centuries, divided. It seems clear that the Church did not, or at any rate did not, contemplate the eternal permanence of the Jewish tradition; but did He Himself mean to found a new one? Did He design to promulgate a new common sense. This is illustrated by His various sayings on the subject of the Sabbath. The impression which we gain from a review of the teaching of Christ, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, is that His attitude towards the Rabbinical tradition was simultaneously both critical, both conservative and progressive. There are two other pieces of evidence which should be considered in this connexion. Opinions differ as to the amount of Rabbinic material which was assigned to the Fourth Gospel; but it is to be presumed that the exceedingly hostile attitude assumed by the Johannine Christ towards the 'Jews' is at least based upon genuine reminiscences of one side of the teaching of Jesus; and the declaration that the worship of the future was to be conducted neither on Mount Gerizim nor at Jerusalem, but throughout the whole earth, 'in spirit and in truth,' represents a modification of Rabbinical as it is possible to conceive. On the other hand, sayings recorded by Matthew, the specifically Jewish evangelist, seem to represent Jesus as a whole-heir of the former tradition, although a severe critic of the moral shortcomings of its depositaries. 'Not one loca or one vowel point shall pass away from the law until all be fulfilled!' (Mt 5:18). This in turn accords with the characteristic Jewish doctrine of the eternity of the Tōbōh seems to be proclaimed; He adds that, unless the zeal of His converts for the literal observance of the Law exceeded even that of the scribes and Pharisees, they cannot hope to enter into the Messianic Kingdom (5th). The official, as distinct from the personal, authority of the Rabbins appears to be affirmed in the saying, 'The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat, therefore whatever they bid you, these do and observe: but do not ye after their works,' etc. (23rd). Another saying in the same chapter contains the warning that Christ's insistence upon the supreme importance of moral conduct is not meant to imply any contempt for ceremonial minutiæ, in their proper place: 'Ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith: but these ye ought to have done, and not to have left the other undone.' (2). On the other hand, it is fair to say that the element of the hypocritical and quibbling casuistry of the Rabbins recorded by St. Matthew equal in intensity and bitterness the Johannine Christ's most vehement invectives against the 'Jews.' It seems probable that the Rabbinic teaching in this matter represents ironical sayings of Christ, which the first evangelist has misunderstood and taken literally, in accordance with his Judaistic presuppositions.
depository, a body of dogmatic and ethical truth revealed by Himself for the first time? Did He mean to found a society as the guardian of this deposit and its authorized expounder? Did He institute a class of depositories within the society, empowered to decide as to its true contents in cases of dispute? Or did He mean to make a certain body of men, in the faith and principle, with a certain body of the great religions of the ancient world as they had historically grown up, and to propagate, not so much an organized religion as a philosophical principle, in the form or mode of err or a mode of err? In other words—Is Christianity to be regarded as the perfect traditional religion, the crown and flower of that whole process of traditional evolution which may be traced down the centuries, possessing a deposit of immutable truth and authentic, life-giving sacraments, and preserved by a majestic, supernatural society, a Kingdom which is in this world, yet not of it? Or was Christianity, as designed by its Founder, meant to involve a complete break with the past, and an entirely fresh start upon non-dogmatic, non-sacramental, non-eclesiastical lines?

The 'Catholic' view of tradition.—It is a well-known fact that at the present day three-quarters of Christendom would return an unhesitating affirmative to the question, Did Christ institute a Catholic as the Founder of a traditional religion? We may refer to this great majority of Christians as the 'Catholic' part of Christendom—not with the object of begging any controversial questions, but merely in order to have a convenient label for denoting that system of faith and practice which is, in its general outlines, common to the 'pre-Reformation' Churches—i.e. to the Roman, Eastern Orthodox, Coptic, Abyssinian, Armenian, Syrian Jacobite, Chaldean, and Malabarese communions—and which was inherited by them from the ancient undivided Church of the Greco-Roman Empire, of which they are fragments. The 'Catholic' view of tradition maintains that the deposit of faith (depositum fidem) was partly taken over by Christ from the existing Jewish Church and partly revealed by Him to His apostles and other hearers during His earthly life and especially during the 'great forty days,' which, according to St. Luke (Ac 1), intervened between His resurrection and ascension, and during which He spoke of 'the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.' He thus committed to them either by stamping with His own approval certain already existing Jewish beliefs or by Himself revealing fresh truth for the first time—in germ and essence the great doctrines of the orthodox faith and the system of sacraments which He instituted for the salvation of mankind. He told His adherents that they were to consider themselves as being the true Israel, His Ecclesia, which, in some sense, He would build upon Peter as a foundation (Mt 16:18). With this divinely-founded society He promised to be present all the days, even unto the consummation of the age (280), and to it He promises to send the Paraclete, who would guide its members into all truth (Jn 16:13). These promises are interpreted by 'Catholics' as guaranteeing the 'infallibility' of the Church in the interpretation and definition of the authentic contents of the deposit. It is, further, believed that within the Church the special task of preserving (and, when need should arise, of defining) the deposit was committed by Christ to the twelve apostles and to their successors, the bishops.

According to this view, therefore, all that Christ instituted was (1) a deposit [no doubt embodied at first in a body of His, rather than in an exactly formulated creed, and expressed, so far as it was verbally expressed at all, in pictorial rather than logical or metaphysical terms], and (2) a depository class, consisting of the twelve men whom He had designated, in apocalyptic language, as the scribes of the future Kingdom, to speak of Him as having instituted the depository body, the Church, inasmuch as this was conceived of as being, not a new society, but the only orthodox remnant of the old Jewish Church. But in these rudimentary beginnings the possibility of a magnificent development was given. The living force of the Christian tradition spontaneously generated the same complex mechanism for its own preservation and perpetuation as it had seen, endeavouring to struggle into existence, in the fields of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. The first element in this apparatus to appear was the canon of Scripture. At first the only Scriptures which the Christian Church possessed were those of the Jewish Church, or, rather, of the Jewish Church as it existed outside Palestine. The Bible recognized in most parts of the earliest Christian Church was the Septuagint Old Testament, containing the books now called Apocrypha; so that, from the first, the oral tradition, vested in living depositaries (the apostles and their successors), was, to a certain extent, controlled by written documents, believed to embody some at least of the main constituents of the deposit. The Marcionite controversy of the 2nd cent. compelled the Church to form a special apparatus for the purpose of demonstrating the identity of the deposit, as she maintained it, with that committed by Christ to the original depositaries, and refuting the Marcionite claim to possess a secret tradition other than, and opposed to, the ecclesiastical tradition. This apostolic collection became canonized as 'the New Testament' of equal authority and inspiration with the original Scriptures, the 'Old Testament' of the Jewish Church. In the 2nd cent., too, we observe the first beginnings of the baptismal creeds, brief formulae whose threecold structure was derived from the threecold invocation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the solemn words of baptism, and intended to summarize the essentials of the orthodox faith in a form which could be committed to memory by persons of the weakest intellectual capacity. The canon of Scripture and the baptismal creeds were thus the two great contributions of the 2nd cent. to the organization whereby the Catholic deposit was perpetuated and safeguarded against any essential change of content. The great development of apparatus for safeguarding the authenticity of the deposit is to be found in the institution of eccumenical councils—the characteristic invention of the 4th century. In the 2nd and 3rd centuries it had been possible for Hippolytus, Irenæus, and Tertullian to appeal to the unbroken succession of the bishops and to point to their unanimous consent as a proof of the authenticity of the ecclesiastical tradition, as against the alleged secret traditions of the various Gnostic sects. But towards the end of the period of persecution it came to be realized that the bishops themselves, the chief depositaries of the faith, might disagree as to its content; and these disagreements could only be resolved, in Christianity as in Buddhism, by the expedient of summoning a council representing, in theory and in fact, the complete body of chief depositaries, i.e. the whole episcopate of the world. The object of a council was not so much to discover fresh truth as to determine what, as a matter of fact, was the doctrine which had been believed in the Church from the beginning. Hence, though each bishop

1 See art. BIBLE IN THE CHURCH, I. r.f.
2 See art. CONFESSIONS, B.
3 See art. COUNCILS (Christian: Early to A.D. 670).
had, in theory, the right to put before the council that version of the faith which he had received from his predecessors and which had been handed down to his local church from its first founder, the greatest weight was naturally attached to the testimony of the great ‘apostolic sees.’ Complete unanimity in the acceptance of one particular version of the faith would, of course, have stamped it in the minds of Catholic theologians as unquestionably authentic and apostolic; but, if complete unanimity had been possible of attainment, it would probably have been unnecessary to summon councils. The principle was, therefore, arrived at that an overwhelming majority of the depositaries, especially if it included the occupants of one or more of the great apostolic sees, had the same authority as the whole body. This principle is expressed by St. Vincent of Lérins when he says, or implies, that the consensus of ‘paene omnes’ is as good as that of ‘omnes [sacerdotes].’ Hence it follows that a small minority of the depositaries, constituted by the righting up of the authority of the majority, necessarily becomes schismatic. Another famous expression of the right of a majority among the depositaries to decide what is to be held to be a deposit of the faith is to be found in St. Augustine’s celebrated aphorism: ‘Securum iudicium orbis terrarum, bonos non esse, qui se disidunt ab orbis terrarum in quacumque parte terrarum.’

1 It is true that most of the so-called ecumenical councils were not actually representative of the total episcopate of the world. They were a matter of the virtue of their acceptance, immediate or gradual, by the majority of bishops. We are here concerned solely with theory, and need not go into the question as to how far Catholic controversies during the first thousand years of Christianity were merely the reflexion of political, national, or local antagonisms. It is sufficient to note that each of the great decisive doctrinal formulations of the Church, the principle was followed by a split between the majority, which accepted, and the minority, which rejected, it. Thus, after Nicea and Constantinople, a separate, non-juring, Arian Church came into existence among the Goths and other northern barbarians; after Ephesus a non-juring Nestorian Church was constituted in Syria and Persia; after Chalcedon the Monophysite Church, which still includes most of the Christians of Egypt and Armenia, split off from the rest of Christendom. But, whilst splitting, so to speak, these dissentient bodies round its periphery, the ‘great Church,’ the Church of the majority of the depositaries, the Church of the Graeco-Roman Empire, the ‘Melkite’ or ‘Imperial’ Church, as it was descriptively called by the Eastern schismatics, held together round the imperial throne and the great apostolic see of Rome, maintaining its majestic unity unbroken, with the brief exception of the Zenonian and Phociote schisms, for thousand years. In the ‘Great’ or ‘Melkite’ Church, as it stood on the eve of the Great Schism of 1054, the hierarchal structure of the schismatics, towards which the Buddhist and Zoroastrian faiths had been dimly groping their way, had come to fruition in the form of the Melkite Church; in the most imposing and magnificent form which has ever existed upon earth. The Church, the hierarchy, the canon of Scripture, and the ecumenical councils are all there, each fulfilling its harmonious part in the task of preserving, elucidating, and defining the apostolic deposit.

4. The Reformation and tradition.—The Reformation (q.v.) was, in essence and in its earlier stages, a revolt not so much against the authority of the deposit or of its Founder as against the existing depositary class in Western Europe—a revolt occasioned by the corruption and exactions of the pope and the hierarchy. In the first fervour of indignation against the abuses of the clergy it seemed necessary to deny the whole principle of a body of men divinely commissioned to safeguard the Christian revelation. The mental outlook and Weltanschauung of the Reformers was just as scholastic as that of the medieval theologians, and demanded, just as imperiously, a clear-cut body of dogmatic theology as an essential element in religion. Hence, only those elements in the deposit were discarded the rejection of which followed immediately from the rejection of the

1 Commonitorium, iii. 6. 2 C. Epist. Perverm, iii. 24. 3 See art. NEPSOLDES. 4 See art. MONOPHYSITISM. 5 Hee eber est in quo quasertm na dogmata quisque

Invist et parler dogmata quisque sua.
To the former of these objections the Reformers replied by taking the short Palestinian canon of the Old Testament as the rule by the Jewish Church, on the ground that (as Jerome had urged) the Jews must surely themselves know what their own Scriptures were (thus abandoning the primitive Christian tradition which had taken over the longer, Septuagint version from the Christian Jew) and then confirming that, so far as the NT Scriptures were concerned, their authority was manifest on the face of them, in virtue of the sublimity and eloquence of their style which was obviously settled nothing as to the disputed cases of the Epistle of St. James, inasmuch as the question at issue between Luther and his opponents on the subject of this book was precisely this: Were its doctrines to be called 'sublime' or 'penurious'? To the second question, also, no very satisfactory reply was ever given. In logic the orthodox Protestants were compelled to maintain, and did in fact maintain, that the whole system of Nicene and Chalcedonian doctrine could be deduced with unerring certainty from the text of the NT, given a prayerful and reverent spirit on the part of its recipient. But in regard to the enigmatic passages in St. Paul's Epistles (cf. 1 Cor. 11 (156) etc.) and those in which the Logos and the Spirit are apparently identified (cf. 1 Cor. 8 (2), 2 Cor. 3 (7), Rev. 1 (5)) and that fact that Socinians and his followers regarded themselves as 'prayerful' and 'reverent' must have made the orthodox Protestants doubt in their inmost hearts whether nature really was as simple as this; and hence they sometimes show signs of being, unwillingly, driven back upon the conception of a teaching Church as the authorized interpreter of Holy Writ. The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England take up this position which may be interpreted as consistent either with the Catholic view of tradition and Scripture as joint authorities for the truth of the deposit or with the Protestant conception of the book of the Scriptures as the sole authority, independent of any living exponent.

So we are told that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation,' 2 that the three creeds are apparently only to be believed because they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture, 2 that 'General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred,' and that 'things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority,' and that 'things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority in controversies of faith.' 2 On the other hand, 'the Church is one, catholic, apostolic, and infallible in creeds and controversies; she is the only interpreter of Holy Writ.' 2 On the other hand, 'the Church is one, catholic, apostolic, and infallible in creeds and controversies; she is the only interpreter of Holy Writ.' 2 On such a basis, a coherent conception of the relations of tradition to Scripture can be wrought out from these statements, it has been attained by Hooker, whose Ecclesiastical Polity appears to be based on the now antiquated assumption that the Chalcedonian theology can be deduced from the text of the NT as directly and irresistibly as the movements of the heavenly bodies can be deduced from a set of astronomical tables. A characteristic and explicit expression of the thoroughgoing Catholic view within the Anglican Communion is to be found in Thorold's declaration that an indispensable mark of the true Church is 'the preaching of that word and that ministering of the sacraments which the tradition of the whole Church confineth in the sense of the Scriptures to intend.' 2

It is well known that the new Protestantism of the Continent would go much farther than the old in its attack upon the Catholic tradition, and that it would in fact dispute not merely the authority of the depositaries, but that of the deposit itself and the Founder Himself. Its contestations may be summed up under two headings: (1) philosophical and (2) historical. (1)

1 Of the affirmation of the Confession of Würtemberg: 'Catholic Church is one, catholic, apostolic, and infallible in creeds and controversies; she is the only interpreter of Holy Writ,' quoted by E. C. S. Gillingham, Thirty-Nine Articles, London, 1896, p. 513. 2


Recent developments.—Within the sphere of traditional Christianity three additional developments deserve brief mention. These are all, it may be observed, confined to the Western and Latin Church, as in the East the era of petrifaction, which set in with the death of St. John of Damascus and precludes the possibility of development, still holds sway. (1) The first of these is analogous to what may be noticed in the West, viz. the tendency to concentrate the functions of the depositary class in the hands of a single chief depositary or supreme pontiff, South, within the Roman Church, the pope was consecrated by the Vatican Council of 1870 to be endowed, when performing his office of supreme pastor and teacher of Christians, with the same infallibility (p. c.) as that which Catholic tradition attributes to the Church; and this belief is concisely
summed up in the 'I am tradition' of Pins IX.—a remark in which an unfriendly critic might discern a reproach of the priest-king idea. (2)

The second development is the tendency, analogous to what we see in Judaism, with its attempts to form a 'hedge around the Law,' to protect the real deposit by surrounding it with a kind of secondary deposit, an armour. In Judaism this protective armour or integument was supplied by the dicta of the Rabbis. In Latin Catholicism the opinions of theologians have, in practice, come to assume this function. Outside the central nucleus of the deposit, consisting of doctrines which are strictly de fide, there is a fringe, or penumbra, of 'pious opinions' which are praesum de fide, based, not upon the decrees of ecumenical councils, but upon the consensus theologorum. To deny these opinions is not indeed heretical, but may be censured as 'temerarious' or 'offensive to pious ears.' In practice the distinction between the dogmas of the primary deposit and the pious opinions of the secondary does not appear to be very clear; and even local traditions regarding the authenticity and sanctity of particular holy places and objects in prayer may gain a matter of ordinary human evidence, are sometimes treated with as much respect—and criticism of them is as much reviled—as though they belonged to the inner part of the deposit of faith. (3)

The third development represents a reaction against the former two, and is popularly called 'Modernism.' In its extreme French and Italian forms, Modernism (q.v.) is logically identical with the extreme Ritschlian Protestantism sketched above. It denies that Christ meant to promulgate a deposit, or that He had any authority to do so if He had so meant; and regards Him rather as a religious genius, not exempt from the errors and limitations of His age and country, who merely gave the first impulse to a wave of emotional feeling, which has reverberated down the centuries and is still affecting myriads of human souls. This view is, of course, entirely destructive of Catholic traditionalism as described above. In England, Germany, and America, however, the Modernist movement has taken a more moderate form; and, within the Anglican Church, the corresponding movement has raised a very interesting problem—that of the relation between the spiritual contents of the deposit, which the Anglican Modernist would not deny, and the various organizational elements, which have been borrowed by the early Fathers and councils from Greek metaphysics to contain it. Whilst the Anglo-Catholic would maintain that the Church was divinely inspired to choose the right conceptual forms, and that these, having received ecumenical sanction, cannot be discarded by the individual believer, the Anglo-Modernist regards the forms as having no more than a purely human authority, and as capable from time to time of variation or even of supersession. The question of the depositary class does not seem to have been directly raised in these discussions, but it is probable that the Anglo-Modernist would regard the whole Church or Christian people, and not any specialized class within it, as being the depositary.

TRADE. See Drama.

TRAINING (Religious).—Religion is an attitude towards God. It expresses itself in acts of appreciation of values by individuals and groups. These actions are rooted in the basal instincts. They may be few and irregular; they may be many and well disciplined in the whole personality in the presence of eternal values. The differences are determined chiefly by training the inner life to react consistently to higher ideals and motives, and by training conduct to habitual and adequate expression of appreciation.

There is a broad sense in which religious training is a feature of all forms of religion, from primitive animism with favourite incantations up to the cultivated forms of ritual, all transmitted to successive generations, and other educative processes. But this article deals only with the specific types of religious training now practised or proposed in the English-speaking world.

By religious training is meant a systematic effort to preserve, improve, propagate, and transmit religious life, by methods commonly used in education, such as imitation, instruction, discipline, and inspirational and ideal-forming agencies, in correlation with other means of promoting religion. It goes even farther in some minds; and not without justification the claim is made that educational training is not complete or adequately motivated unless in its aim and spirit it leads up into that social purpose which is the chief part of religion (Herbart, Coso).

1 Background.—The types of religious training which now prevail have arisen by connected development (1) out of a long and diversified history of maladjustment between childhood and the Church, and (2) out of numerous artificial theologies and individualistic theories of religion, and (3) out of an utter lack, until recently, of any psychology of religion or of childhood.

The historical record of religious training may be found (a) in the stereotyped forms of worship and religious expression handed down to successive generations through church and family life; (b) in the catechism and confirmation class, where formal drill and authoritative doctrine and precept have long produced educational results of some importance in religious life. (c) A nearer background exists in the modern Sunday schools, first with their memorized Bible lessons, and since 1870 with their uniform lessons taught by rather feeble heterotrophic methods.

2 Theoretical background is found in an individualistic theology. The corner-stones of this theology were the natural sinfulness of every man, the impending judgment of punishment therefor, and the miraculous atonement of Jesus Christ, which made possible the repentance and pardon of the individual sinner. The supernatural factor was magnified; the human ways and means were subordinated, and the ethical discrepancies passed unnoticed. The problem was conceived as judicial on the basis of a retributive penology now discarded in the best judicial practice. The instruction given was not regarded primarily as educative, but rather as dogmatic, evangelistic, and hortatory. No important significance was attached to the teachings of Jesus about the growth of the spiritual.

W. Sanday and N. P. Williams, Form and Content in the Christian Tradition, for an exhaustive comparison and contrast of these points of view.
life or the conditions of the ground into which the seed shall fall.

The social gospel lately found to be so conspicuous in the teaching and life of Jesus was unknown. For lack of it the process of salvation was essentially self-regarding, which is doubtless the main reason why Christianity has been so long and slow in making its way in the world. When the era of modern missions dawned, three significant things happened. (a) The individual gospel was proclaimed from social and really Christian motives, and the result was so good so far as it went, but incommensurate with the effort expended. (b) Actual conditions in mission fields and the emergence of social ideals at home forced an expansion of missionary aims so as to include social service—a gospel which was not always well correlated with the other. (c) As soon as this social gospel had time to reveal its character and possibilities, results became overwhelming; and the missionary prayer is no longer for the opening of doors, as it was a half-century ago, but for teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, and skilled workers, by hundreds to carry a full-orbed Christian civilization into all the lands whose Macedonian calls are coming unsolicited.

(3) Until the last quarter of the 19th cent., psychology was a thing remote from religion. It had not then as now stressed the unity of the self, as against a number of more or less independent faculties bearing little relation to religion. Nor had child psychology been known the extent to which the mind is at first rudimentary, and subject to the continuous and slow changes which the long human infancy makes possible.

Theology and sociology and educational science have found no place in the theory of religion until the last generation, and even yet there are those in every religious body who shudder at the thought of applying scientific methods to the propagation of religion. But it is out of these diverse conditions ancient and modern that a theory and practice of religious education is now rapidly taking shape.

Theological data.—There is a type of religious education which permeates the theoretical background of intellectualism and individualism. Its propositions are arranged in logical order, and not in the order in which they arise in human experience. They are held to be authoritative, and are taught in dogmatic form. Under this theory the service which education renders to religion is to make these formula known, and here the service ends.

Under the other type the service rendered by education to religion is much broader. The knowledge to be imparted is not dogmatic but inspirational; not an end, but a means to spiritual values, not generalized and abstract, but presented concretely and made illuminating to the pupil's present life. This type of religious training includes habits of worship, attitudes towards the natural world, ideals of life, deeds of service, the relations sustained to the smaller and larger groups of one's fellow-men, and, in fact, every form of useful expression which can be given to inner spiritual life.

(1) The theory on which any adequate plan for religious training is based includes the following fundamental ideas as to the development of religion. (a) The presence of the religious life is felt not only in worship and in the conventional forms of religious expression, but especially in character and in social purpose, which subordinates all interests to the supreme values of life. (b) The religious life is a continuous growth, not a thing produced artificially, or judicially instituted at the moment of a passing experience. (c) This growth involves not a special organ or faculty, but the whole person.

(2) The following educational facts and principles are also involved in the theory of religious training. (a) The subject of an educative process is a person with all his inherited equipment of race instincts and family traits, as well as his undeveloped mental, moral, and religious powers. It is the business of education, not to eradicate or supplant any of these, but to develop and cultivate them, and subordinate them to the highest ends. (b) Education is more than instruction. It not only builds up many and rich concepts, which shall serve as a basis for judgment and action by a member of society; but it also takes measures to establish desirable habits, and to create desires of commanding dignity and emotional power. (c) Education uses concrete materials for this purpose. It selects for its use those human experiences best fitted in character and grade to accomplish the particular purpose in view that. The experiences of the race have become very rich in such material, so that the selection and preparation of it is a task demanding the skill of educational experts.

(3) The thing that is aimed at in religious education is (e) to put one as early and as completely as possible in possession of that rich treasure of experience which has come down from the past, and has been gathered from the ends of the earth, especially those parts of it which are richest in their meanings for a man's life in the world with other people and as a worker with God. (b) A further aim is to turn the full force of that experience, in the form of socialized ideals and purposes, as a motive power upon conduct and upon the ordering of the programme of life. This is an individual aim, but it is far more. It enlists churches, homes, and communities in this motivation of conduct for the well-being of society at large. (c) It is believed that the instruction to be gathered from the parable of the soils (Mk 4:18-20) is a lesson of education, in which the minds mellowed by long processes of nurture are taught to each respond quickly and whole-heartedly to the evangel. Such nurture would seem therefore to be the most direct and effectual way of co-operating with the Spirit of God for the evangelization of the world.

3. Content.—Since religion and its promotion are understood to be, to some extent at least, an enterprise in education, it is necessary to choose for such instruction that material which will be most fruitful religiously. Rather vague ideas prevail on this subject, due to lack of critical analysis of the values to be sought, and to incomplete knowledge of how to produce and conserve these values.

The educational reformers of a century ago established the principle of gradation of material—i.e., that the ability of children to understand and master material changes as they grow older. The material must therefore be chosen with reference to this changing ability: e.g., the incident of a boy robbing a bird's nest can be understood and remembered by a five-year-old child, but the moral interpretation of the same incident is better suited for a mind several years older.

The fallacy of catechetical instruction is partly a pedagogical one. It consists in presenting adult abstract conceptions in offering strong meat instead of milk to babes. A similar
fallacy has vitiated much of the Bible teaching in Sunday schools where "uniform" lessons have been chosen for young and old alike. If the children had a story which they could understand and remember on one Sunday, they must feed on Prosecutor's "milk" for several weeks before they might expect another children's lesson. Of course adaptations by editors and teachers could do something to overcome the dis- ciplinary grading, but it is only making the best of a bad case. It is wholly unnecessary for religious instruction to be subjected to these hindrances, now that the principles of grading are understood and have been applied to the materials used in religious training.

There is also a religious fallacy in catechetical instruction, appealing as it does exclusively to the intellect with logical propositions and specially conceived and expressed. The emotional and social aspects of the child's religious life are the least required for the development of ideals and the motivation of social action. The intellectual formulations satisfy better the mature religious needs of adults, and the different needs of children should be provided for.

In selecting and grading the materials for religious education there are a number of considerations to be provided for.

(1) The language of religion must be acquired. As in any field of human experience, the language and the thought develop together. Some terms are advanced and technical, but many are elementary. The history and practice of religion, the reading of the Bible, and the social environment of the child make familiar, in a mental atmosphere, all the elementary concepts of religion, and the words and phrases which express those concepts. They cannot make landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

A properly graded curriculum therefore provides for young children a selection of simple Bible incidents on subjects within their experience, or a like class of subjects taken from biography, literature, and life. For this purpose one may choose stories of religious leader's lives, or events familiar to children, nurtured in such an atmosphere, all the elementary concepts of religion, and the words and phrases which express those concepts. They cannot make landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

(2) The child inherits certain capacities for a moral and religious life. But each individual must shape his concepts of that life from the examples of other experiences seen and heard by him. His education consists in becoming acquainted with these selected experiences of others, in reading meaning into them, and in shaping his own habits, judgments, and ideals, with due notice to the experiences so set before him. This formation of concepts represents a later stage of religious development than the language stage mentioned above, but the later mingles with the earlier stage, and they move forward together. A class of more meaningful experiences is chosen for this purpose, such as the parables of Jesus, tales of moral heroism, events in which service and sacrifice are exemplified, the revelations of motives and of character and of loyalty to persons and to ideals, and the superiority of moral and spiritual values over those values which are chiefly carnal and commercial.

It is therefore the business of religious education to bring into the life of youth an abundance of human incidents rich in moral and religious meaning to present these experiences with sufficient didactic and pedagogical skill to assure them an atmosphere, an emotional vitality, and some permanence; and to give definite guidance to each youth in the construction of his own habits, judgments, and ideals, out of the concrete material furnished to him. The selection of material for this purpose out of the Bible or from other sources is the most responsible and difficult task of religious education. It is also the point at which failure has been most complete in nearly every curriculum thus far proposed for religious training.

(3) While it belongs to the province of science and general education to develop in youth a conception of the causal connectedness of the world and of its unity, consistency, and organization under natural law, it is a well-known fact that this is not generally done. Such reflections arise more frequently in connection with other studies elsewhere, and it is proper that religious education should provide in place of discarded cosmologies a better instruction, which can serve the common people as a credible philosophy of nature. Nothing can do more to disinfect religious faith and moral integrity than lack of a believable philosophy of the world. Such a philosophy is entirely within the mental compass of enlightened youths; and they have a right to it as a support for their faith and as a part of their education. Indeed they will have it. The only uncertainty is as to how good or how poor a philosophy they shall work out for themselves if wise help is withheld from them.

For the few but important lessons on this subject the creation stories and a few other portions of Scripture will serve especially for wise and modern instruction. A few of the great chapters in the history of science are required. These need to be correlated, not only with the names of discoveries and inventors, but with the forward movements in the world's life, and the human values which they have enhanced.

(4) A task of religious education still more important is the interpretation to young minds of the world of human life. We live and die in a world of purpose and meaning, as well as in a world of natural law and causal connection. It is out of this purposive life that real values arise; and it is with those values that religion is concerned. There is no gain for religion in knowledge of the Scripture, or of the facts of nature, and no benefit in formal covenants and ordinances, unless in the human heart there is an ideal which throws over all these things an emotional glow that enriches them with meaning and value. It is a nobler and more helpful thing that is spoken of as the Spirit of God in the human heart taking the things of Christ and showing them to them. Religious teachers generally try to do this. Most expository Bible teaching is so intended. So also is the preaching. But the efforts are generally too deputistic, and the results are not cumulative. A need is felt for a programme or a definite policy, based on a sound philosophy and on educational principles, to give continuity and cumulative effect to the propagation of religion. It can hardly be claimed that such a programme has yet been proposed, although efforts have been made in that direction, and in some cases with gratifying results.

The choice and arrangement of material awaits a fuller agreement upon Christian ideals and the fundamental philosophy of religion. In this task the interpretation of the world of human life is the chief factor. What is called the social gospel has already gone far to supplement and modify the individualistic of the former day. But, "the social gospel," as Walter Rauschenbusch calls his book,1 has not yet formulated itself in popular thinking. In the light of such a theology and philosophy, there is a new way of looking at the virtues and of the unifying principle by which those virtues are correlated in the total social and structural character of society, the place and function of the individual within the structure, and the interactions between the structure and its parts, and a must be determined what the content of a religious education curriculum ought to be, as well as educational aims and values ought to be conspicuous in that material.

(5) The great issues over which men and nations have struggled in the world's history need to be made known to young people, and

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1 New York, 1925.
their meanings interpreted. Such issues were drawn in OT times by the prophets against royal and political dignitaries. Jesus defined an issue between the Pharisees and the movement of the inner life. Every forward step, every reform, every moral and spiritual achievement from that day to this, can be of great service to those whose motives are genuine, their ideals are forming. They are needed as a background for the tasks and problems of to-day, as a guide in defining present and future issues, and as a inspiration to loyalty and sincerity in trying to solve them. Here will appear biographies of men and women who have caught visions of an improved world and have helped to realize those visions. Here also belong the rise and fall of institutions in response to the changing needs of the world. Out of such rich and varied sources are being selected the graded and sifted materials for a curriculum of religious training.

4. Method and organization.—While the history of pedagogy has been progressive, and general education has profited by every improvement, religious training has been slow to take up improved methods. Memorizer catechetical teaching is still common. Histrionic and semi-expository teaching of the Bible is quite general in church schools, the aim being evangelistic and not primarily educative. There is a marked tendency to reconstruct, not only the curriculum in ways already indicated, but also the method and organization. In method these changes consist in a larger use of direct narrative in connection with concrete story material used in the lower grades; the immediate oral reproduction by pupils of the narrative so presented; the increased use of pictorial and graphic representation; and the text-book, substitute for the leaflet, pamphlet, or bare Bible, specially prepared text-books of a more permanent and attractive character.

But the most important tendency is towards methods to be done, as an expression in real life of the moral and religious impulse, as they awaken in childhood and youth. Daily conduct, positions taken on moral issues before associates, minor community betterment, neighborly and charitable work, and worthy social activities in general, offer a welcome field for religious training in this growing aspect. Out of such activities arise deeper and truer thinking and finer emotional responses than any didactic method can produce.

Modern forms of church organization provide for departments of religious training in the local church. This department is free to adopt methods in harmony with improved educational and religious ideas, and to introduce a curriculun something like that outlined above. Only in those local churches where the broad full meaning of religious education has been discussed and appreciated has the reconstruction taken place. But the number of these churches is increasing; they are profiting by experience, and their results are watched and reported.

In several American communions, notably the Protestant Episcopal, the Congregational, and the Presbyterian, important steps have been taken to reconstruct the denominational machinery on educational lines. Numerous officials are employed to propagate the principles and ideals of religious training in the local churches, and to aid in the installation of better systems. These methods are especially successful in those places where the need is most obvious and (3) because these fields are not bound by tradition to antiquated Sunday-school methods.

While the prospect for the future of religious education is best in the direction of denominational organization, there is also a distinct movement on foot for community organization disregarding ecclesiastical divisions or, at least bringing them into co-operation. This plan calls for a local board and a superintendent, who shall inaugurate a school system parallel to the other system or systems in the same community. In the same connection, the material of general education is re-interpreted and given new meaning and dignity from the spiritual aspect. Teachers who have training in the principles of modern education, as well as personal fitness and inspiring leadership, soon make apparent the large possibilities of religious training, both in its own field and in its effects on the whole structure of society.

In Britain and in some other European countries the schools supported at public expense are expected to furnish some instruction of a religious nature. Recognition is made of denominational preferences, and teachers are assigned to groups with this in mind. In France religious instruction is entirely excluded from all public and private schools of general education, and the members of religious orders are disqualified as teachers. This of course does not apply to church schools, which are supported by fees, alms, and other means, and are under the supervision of the state. In the United States America religion is excluded by the laws of the States from the public schools; but entire freedom is given for this instruction under church or community supervision. In some States the pupils are released for one session each week for a half-hour for religious instruction at a public school on condition of spending that time under approved religious instruction, proportionate credit being given if such work is satisfactorily done.

In general it may be said that the ideas and content of religious education have been reconstructed in accordance with modern ideas. The realization of this ideal has been achieved in a limited degree, and the year marks distinct gains. But the progress is retarded (1) by conservative traditions among earnest religious people, who have not seen the value of a religious life conceived developmentally and socially; (2) by inadequate conceptions of, and facilities for, training in religious activity and self-expression, and (3) by lack of united and trained leadership in the re-organization of religious education in local communities. It seems to be the task of Christian colleges to raise up a generation of men and women who have the religious and educational ideas and the ability and enthusiasm to organize them into the life of our time.

A good central organization for the study of religious education, for the compilation of results, and for the promotion of this large interest in the life and thought of the world exists in the Religious Education Association (Henry F. Cope, Secretary, 1440 East 57th Street, Chicago, Ill.). It was founded in 1903 by representatives of all religious faiths. It has held important annual conventions, mostly in American cities. These conventions have done much to shape thought, guide effort, and stimulate experiment. The volumes of the bi-monthly magazine of the Association entitled Religious Education furnish much material in the history and discussion of this subject.

Other related articles in this Encyclopaedia may be referred to as follows: EDUCATION (Moral), CHRISTIANITY, CHURCH, CONFIRMATION, CATECHISMS, BIBLE, SUNDAY SCHOOL.

TRANCE.—See HYSTERIA, DHYANA, YOGA.

TRANSCESSION.—See IMMANKENCE.

1 W. S. Athearn, Religious Education and American Democracy, Boston and Chicago, 1877.

TRANCE.—See Hysteria, Dhyan, Yoga.

TRANSCESSION.—See IMMANKENCE.

1 W. J. Hutch, Graded Bible Stories, Ripon, Wis, 1914.
TRANSCENDENTIALISM.

The term 'transcendental' plays an important part in Kant's "Critique of the Pure Reason"—"transcendental aesthetic," "transcendental analytic," etc.—and throughout the course of the critical philosophy, the term has become familiar in modern thinking and even in popular literature. Kant did not originate the term; but he gave it new vigour and a new orientation.

1. Pre-Kantian transcendentalism. (1) Use of the term in scholastic logic. Before Kant's time "transcendental" and "transcendent" were familiar terms in the scholastic logic and were practically equivalent in meaning, although he sharply distinguished between them. To the scholastic logicians these terms were used of those most general notions that could not be subsumed under the ten Aristotelian categories. They rose beyond or transcended them. Spinoza uses "transcendental" in this sense of the most general notions and gives his view of how psychologically they originate. 1 Strictly speaking, these transcendentalia or transcendentia belonged to a realm above ordinary categorical logical thinking and as such were beyond the province of logic proper.

Various emendations of these transcendental notions are given. Aquinas gives ens, non ens, quodnam, and verum; and very generally these, along with res and abiquid, make up the list of the six transcendentalia. Their interrelations are stated and various subtleties regarding them introduced by different schoolmen. Ena was as a rule regarded as super-transcendental, the rest being passions or modifications of being (passiones entis). This category in scholastic philosophy was pretty much what the 'Absolute' is in modern philosophy. 2

(2) Use of the term in theology. To the schoolmen, however, logic was only the handmaiden of theology, and so we find these terms more or less always moving into the area of theological speculation. These transcendental notions had their reality in the mind of God, who is transcendent par excellence. The passage in Augustine 3 where he posits the transcendental ideas in the divine mind became classical and is quoted by all the great medievalists. It is historically the fusion of Greek thought with Christian experience. Plato speaks of the good (αγαθόν προσωπον) as transcending being (ἐγείρεται ἐπί όλον), and Plotinus uses the phrase often. 4 Transcendentalism is simply the Latinization of ἐγείρεται, 'beyond.' At times this tendency became extreme, as in the case of Erigena and the mystics who speak of God as above all predicates—συναρχητικόν, ἀναρχον, ὀμηρωμένον, above truth, 'above wisdom,' 'above eternity.'

Transcendentalism in theology, then, means the position that God's knowledge and character are perfect, absolute as distinct from man's knowledge, which is imperfect, and from man's virtue, which is immature; as such it is part of the very essence of theology and the unmoveable conviction of religion. But it may become falsified through overemphasis and danger through over-reduction of subtlety. Ordinary living religious experiences speak of the divine in plain speech, ascribing to God organs, actions, passions, movement, change, purposes, and this is done without any feeling of incongruity—even when the divine spirituality is clearly recognized. Transcendentalism becomes over-subtle when it objects to this, and it is usually when religious experience is at a low ebb and beset by foes that this form of transcendentalism gains a hearing. Even in the OT Mr. Maitz points out, 1 we have the beginning of reflective transcendentalism. It is more evident in the Septuagint translation and in the post-Biblical Jewish literature, and it operated dominantly in Philo until God becomes the Great Unknown. In the history of Christian theology we find the superimposition of this metaphysical and mystical transcendentalism on the direct religious thought of the NT. Edwin Hatcher, in his famous Hibbert Lectures, 5 maintains that the great creeds of Christendom buried religion under this metaphysics; and in his zeal he has overstated the case; for transcendentalism in the sense of God's absoluteness is an integral part of religion and of theology, but, when it makes this a mode of throwing discredit on man's knowledge and of underlining man's notions of right and wrong, when it empties God of feeling, purpose, and initiation, then it becomes false and dangerous.

It is better to deal here with the special forms of transcendentalism in this sense, before discussing the Kantian and post-Kantian use of the term, as these forms of thinking have their roots in a soil different from that which is specifically and dominantly under the influence of Kant.

2. Extra-Kantian transcendentalism. Transcendentalism in the theological and philosophical sphere means, in a general way, the recognition of God as exalted in thought and character above man and sensible objects. It is thus connected with phenomenalism, naturalism, and materialism, and, one may say, also agnosticism, for, although the agnostic may grant the existence of such a Being, the concession is of no value either for knowledge or for morality. In this sense every religious view of the world is transcendental. When, however, we ask what the relation between man's knowledge and virtue and God's is, the real problem of transcendentalism emerges, and, according to the answer given, thinkers fall into different classes, which for purposes of clearness may be distinguished as follows.

(1) Extreme transcendentalism. Those who hold that God is utterly incomprehensible to us, and that knowledge and virtue in Him are quite different, not only in quantity but also in quality, from what we mean by these terms, are extreme transcendentalists in the sphere of ontology. Modern examples are Hamilton and Mansel, who, borrowing a Kantian distinction, maintained that our predicated knowledge of God is regressive not speculative truth, that it was given, not to satisfy the reason, but to guide the practice of man, not to tell us what God is in His absolute nature, but what He wills us to think of Him in our present conditioned state. This phase of transcendentalism arose as a protest against what Hamilton calls 'the scheme of pantheistic omniscience so prevalent among the sequacious thinkers of the day.' 6 Speculative theologians have always had leanings towards this mode of reasoning regarding the divine, and its influence can be traced in theology from the days of Origen. While the ordinary religious consciousness, speaks of God as wise and good, and cannot help so doing, theologians, in theory, in reality do not apply to Him, and are to be understood anthropopathetically. He has designed

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to accommodate this revelation to our limited intelligence, but it is, after all, only an accommodation (adnotationes), and the true method of theology is to strip off these predicates and proceed via negationem. The danger here is obvious, viz. forgetting of the truth that man is made in the image of God, and forgetting that this image is not to be stripped off but God and man, and thereby religion and reason alike become unreal and untrustworthy. Under this impulse religious men fall back on an authority which has no basis in our rational or moral nature, or on some occult faculty apart from reason; of others, strictly adhering to the working of the understanding, leave the transcendental sphere of Being alone. Outside the small circle illuminated by the understanding there may be something, but to us it is unknown and unknowable. Agnosticism as regards ultimate reality is the result of this attitude.

(2) Religious transcendentalism.—Others, again, maintain also God's transcendental character, but they hold that man's knowledge is accurate as far as it goes, that in quality, though not in quantity, it is the same as God's, and that morality in man can be determined from what it is in the divine, that the pathway of true knowledge and moral progress leads to God. God's revelation is certainly an accommodation, but this accommodation itself is an education of man by God, progressing in its stages from the transitory to the permanent stages continuity with the earlier, and besides the process is self-correcting. J. B. Mozley gives a very fair view of this position as regards the O.T. God dealt with men as they were, but in such a way as to lead them onwards and upwards. Man makes God in his own image, but it is because God first made man in His image. And the word is, when God speaks of man as incommensurable—indeed every religious mind must do, so that Hamilton has no difficulty in compiling a catena of such passages from various writers, yet maintains that our intellectual and moral strivings are but a returning to the Source whence intelligence and goodness spring. The human mind and heart participate in transcendental knowledge and goodness, and the aim of theology is to ascend by this road to God; only to man the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary to initiate and guide this quest. The method here is not so much that of negation as of eminence (via eminencia), but it differs from pure philosophical or epistemological transcendentalism both in its insistence on the need of grace and in its proper valuation of other aspects of experience besides the pure intellect. It is this that 'Rabbi,' Duncan has in view when he defines transcendentalism as 'the denial of that which renders man's knowledge an inferior kind of knowledge'; and it is in this sense that P. D. Maurice is a transcendentalist when in somewhat exaggerated fashion he fathers on Mansel's theory such frightful consequences.

(3) Epistemological transcendentalism.—Distinct from this again is what one may call pure epistemological transcendentalism, according to which the highest knowledge in man becomes identical with, and indistinguishable from, the divine knowledge. Thus Boethius:

'Sense judges figure clothed in material substance. Imagination figures alone without matter. Thought transcends this again, and by its contemplation of universals considers the type of things by which it is contained in each individual. The eye of the intellect is yet more exalted, for overspreading the sphere of the universal it will behold absolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's mind.'

From the plane of intelligence, according to Boethius, all the contradictions of the ordinary experience are reconcilable. Thus to God they harmonize, and we see that from this point of view no one can fail to notice the similarity between this and the method of modern absolutist transcendentalism, with its solving of contradictions and unification of intuition. This school speaks in such a way as to lead the ordinary reader to suppose that the individual can attain by knowledge to the divine point of view—a claim which it is extremely difficult to distinguish from omnipotence.

(4) Moralistic and mystical transcendentalism.—The term, however, may be applied, and often is applied, to those who are keenly conscious of the limitations of the human mind, and impatient and sceptical regarding its slow ratiocinative processes, but who hold that man's moral nature or his feelings or intuitions can give immediate access to the divine. Typical thinkers of this school are Pascal, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl. They lay stress on the supremacy of the heart—'The heart makes the theologian'—or on the value of feelings or intuitions; and many along the pathway of the subconscious towards God. Thus we have schools of moralistic and mystical transcendentalism. They disapprove reason and logic, and find refuge in the alogical departments of thought. In England transcendentalism combines both mysticism and moralism with a large element of vague eclecticism, but it may, for purposes of classification, be included here.

3. Kantian transcendentalism.—To appreciate modern transcendentalism both in its philosophical and in its more popular application, we must briefly review Kant's Views on this subject. Kant said that there is no great mental crisis, no great intellectual pene-

(1) The factors in knowledge.—To Kant knowledge—mathematics and the physical sciences—involves two factors, one due to the activity of the mind, the other due to sense-data. He did not doubt the fact of knowledge itself, nor did he concern himself with its psychological origin. He found in knowledge a synthesis of these two elements. Nothing could form the subject-matter of knowledge but what came from sense-data, but then sense-experience itself was a chaos without the principles supplied by the understanding and the activity of the mind; even perception itself required space and time—mental forms. To him God, the world, and the soul could not become the objects of scientific knowledge and therefore they were transcendental; i.e., they were outside the limits of possible knowledge. There can be no doubt that Kant had a horror of those who spoke familiarly of God, as if He were an object of sense-perception, and that his real anxiety to mark clearly the boundaries of possible knowledge was largely due to fear of intrusion from this quarter. He thus distinguished between 'immanent principles which apply solely within the limits of possible experience' and transcendental principles which are intended to reach beyond these limits.

Kant did not deny the reality of God, or of the soul, or the ultimate essence of matter, but he did strongly insist that the pure reason got into hopeless difficulties when it tried to apply the principles valid in the sphere of phenomena to those essentially and seemingly universal phenomena. To him we owe the very prevalent modern view that science has its own domain—it includes all knowledge, though not all reality—and religion and morality have their domain; that the march between them should be clearly defined; and that there should be no raids, excursions, or alarms from one side or the other.

(2) Transcendental principles.—Having thus excluded transcendental realities from the domain of the understanding, because there was no scientific knowledge of them, he shows that in knowledge itself there were principles like causality—the categories, in short—which were not due to sense-data. These principles are transcendental (as distinct from empirical) as they mean both that they are not due to sense and that they can be shown to constitute knowledge. Without sense-data they are empty, but sense without them is blind.

Transcendental to Kant then means constitutive

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1 Ruling ideas in Early Ages, London, 1877.
3 Conclusion of Philosophy, tr. H. B. James, London, 1897, p. 182.
4 See § 4 (1) below.
of valid knowledge, and a transcendental inquiry, such as his own critical method, 'concerns itself, not with those objects of knowledge in which we know objects in so far as this may be possible a priori.' What reality in itself may be is not the aim of the critical philosophy to determine. It has content in knowledge which makes it valid and to critical knowledge against the admission of anything which cannot be scientifically known. Kant is not concerned with ontology but with epistemology, and the two to him are not in agreement even sharply distinguished between transcendental and transcendental. He uses the former term in a disparaging sense, while the latter means constitutive of knowledge on the whole.

'The term transcendental,' says H. Adams, 'probably has for English ears, an unpleasant ring, and will suggest metaphysical fancies transcends experience. It must be understood, however, that transcendental method is simply the patient and rigorous analysis of experience itself. For any question or theorem which might pass beyond possible experience, Kant reserved the term transcendental; and the distinction, if it exists, is maintained by all his successors. Neither in Kant nor in Fichte is there anything in the slightest degree resembling what is commonly called metaphysics.'

David Masson traces through all history two tendencies in regard to the origin of knowledge—ones known as transcendental and practical. This may be called empiricism, the other maintaining that there are elements in knowledge, the origin or reason of which transcends or lies beyond the province of our sensations. Historically it is the conflict of these two that we find in the controversy between Locke and Leibniz or between Mill and Hamilton. The transcendental position is summed up in the famous phrase: 'Non sibi sed omnibus rerum meritis in sensu—nisi ipsi intellectus.' There is no doubt that Kant is a transcendentalist in this sense, yet for him transcendentalism meant something different. He is not interested in a priori intuitions. He is dealing with knowledge as it exists, not as it grows, and he finds in what sense alone does not explain, but rather what explains sense, unifying forms or principles, supplied by the mind itself, which give receptivity to sense-data and combine them together into adequate knowledge. Ultimately the formal unity of the mind itself is involved in knowledge. Thus he might agree entirely with the physiological psychologist in his analysis of knowledge and yet maintain the necessity of the unity of the mind.

(3) Pure and practical reason.—Although Kant maintains that God, the world, and the soul as noumenal realities could not be objects of knowledge or constitutive of knowledge—that they were not transcendental in his strict sense of the term—but he allowed that they were present in knowledge regulatively. The mind was constrained to aim at unity, and this striving was due to the regulative influence of these ideas of the reason. It is this part of his system that he himself calls transcendental idealism. As ideas in the mind they were transcendental, though only regulatively so; yet in themselves as realities they are transcendental as far as knowledge goes—they are beyond the bounds of knowledge. Sometimes indeed he speaks of the reality of the material world as the 'transcendental object,' where we might expect him, if he were strict in his own use of terms, to use transcendent. And he speaks of it in such a way as to suggest a substratum which is the outward cause of our perceptions, but for the understanding it is simply z, an unknown quantity.

His transcendental object is the limit which our understanding can reach in dealing with phenomena from the side of the receptivity of mind, just as the transcendental the way in which we know objects in so far as this may be possible a priori. What reality in itself may be is not the aim of the critical philosophy to determine. It has content in knowledge which makes it valid and to critical knowledge against the admission of anything which cannot be scientifically known. Kant is not concerned with ontology but with epistemology, and the two to him are not in agreement even sharply distinguished between transcendental and transcendental. He uses the former term in a disparaging sense, while the latter means constitutive of knowledge on the whole.

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His transcendental object is the limit which our


2 Fichte (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh, 1881, p. 112, note.

3 Recent British Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1885.

4 As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; etra et trans conscientias esse, cetera et trans conscientias esse, the domain of pure philosophy, which is therefore properly entitled transcendental, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and re-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation which, abandoned by all distinct consciousness, because transcending the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as transcendental.

It is clear that Coleridge has no interest in accurately reproducing Kant. To him transcendentalism is just emphasis on the spiritual side of man's nature, and this is the meaning also to Carlyle:

'The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Transcendence is, that with all this Descendentalism, he combines a Transcendentalism, no less superstitious; whereby if on the one hand he degrades man below most animals, except those jacobetis. Gaude, he, on the other, exalts him beyond the visible Heavens, almost to an equality with the gods.'

Under the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, and the general romantic movement of the time,
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trançendentalism came to mean the recognition of supersensible realities, and the spiritual nature of man—that man was more than his omnivorous least, that he owned a harnessed, that he saw brevities. A passage from Coleridge shows the influence of this attitude in the sphere of interpretation:

1. The intelligible forms of ancient poets, the fair humanities of old religion, that should embody the beauty, and the meaning. That had their being in the same, or any mountain. Of forest, by slow steam, or pebbly spring. Of chaste, and watery depths; all these there have vanished;

2. They live no longer in the faith of reason; But still the heart does not need a language.

The faith in 'the light that never was on sea or land,' the vision and the faculty divine, the fight against a crude interpretation of man's spirit as ultimately matter, and the protest against literalism in all forms, characteristic transcendentism at this stage; and this is still the sense of the word in extra-philosophical literature. In New England Emerson and others, rebelling against an orthodoxy that tended to make man wholly a social and political animal, and the will of man necessarily in bondage, and impatience of dogmas derived from a revelation confined to one book, initiated a movement that the name 'transcendentalism' more in 'in the honor, but the term was accepted, and the claim made that the best in the world's thought was here included. Carlyle, who, in spite of his sympathy with Emerson, saw in this movement an extravagant disregard of facts and an enthusiastic transcendentalism, warned Emerson against the dangers ahead:

1. You seem to me in danger of dividing yourself from the fruit of the universe, in which, so long as you is it. You find any

James Martineau—himself a transcendentalist in the Carlyle sense, whose intellectual history is a pilgrimage from the bondage of empiricism—does not take Emerson seriously. No doubt New England transcendentism became extravagant, welcoming the ravings of the Swedenborgian and of the unregulated mystic as possible revelations, yet it never became a system, and its airy optimism is inexplicable and defensible as a protest and a resistance; yet to its influence is largely due the fact that to many, if not to most, in our day transcendentalism means hopeless and unwarranted idealism—unworkable dreaming. It was not patient enough to be lasting, and, with all its boasted catholicity and insight, it was blind to the facts that gave the old orthodoxy its seriousness and its power of rejuvenescence. On the other hand, it was a refreshing and liberalizing movement.

2. Science and transcendentalism.—Kant's influence was felt in a very different quarter: among those whose interests were devoted to science. Thus Hume, the historian of materialism, interpreting Kant, as he thought, confines man's knowledge of reality to the results of science, but contends for a world above this created by our moral and spiritual forces—universal world of ideas, a transcendentism which is like a painted cloud; and this attitude has more or less existed since, differing according to the amount of the individual thinker gives to this beautiful but airy realm. It is found in the historian Buckle, and has been well described as a 'consolatory private transcendentism.' Herbert Spencer's magnificent handling of this idea of the real is an example of this 'private transcendentism.' It is due to a one-sided exploitation of Kant without regard to Kant's moral certainty. To Kant the moral nature of man played man in an intelligible real world, although he left highly phenomenal, with just a glimmer of the noumenal breaking through, but this transcendentism which, as in Lange's case, pretends to be a lawful and finds the phenomenal the real, and the transcendental the vague and the shadowy.

Others more alive to the reality of religion have sought to place this transcendentism side by side with scientific results, while observing all the time of the hostility between the two. Thus W. H. Mallock attempts to hold by the results of science and yet to allow the demands of religion to be made, and this attitude was prevalent in the past century.

In psychology the theory of psycho-physical parallelism exhibits the same tendency—a species of cirecum between phenomenalism and transcendentalism. The results of science are accepted; its principles are unquestioned; and these same facts are explained as if nothing but psychical data were involved. It is a truce born of necessity; a compact that real issues will not be raised on either side. It is not difficult to see how closely related to that cirecum the tendency of science and of the philosopher is to the transcendentalism of religion and held them both without consistently uniting them.

Panisus, one of Kant's most faithful modern disciples, contends that science will yet hold up its claim to explain everything mechanically; yet metaphysics must give to this realm of science an idealistic interpretation. One may be the most rigid materialist at one moment, and yet be wholly transcendental as a philosopher at another. The scientist will never admit any supernatural agent, and the only way of peace is to admit his claim; yet somehow he must hold that all into spiritual reality is the task of the philosopher. It is because of this felt dualism that transcendentalism in its pure form as absolutism claims for itself to be the true heir and rightful corrector and interpreter of Kant.

(3) Absolute transcendentalism.—'Transcendentalism' in modern philosophy is used of that world-view known at times as absolutism, objective idealism, neo-Hegelianism, or rationalism. The term 'transcendentalism' traces this system historically to Kant's theory of knowledge. As we saw above, 'transcendental' to Kant meant at least two things. (a) Those principles in knowledge which in the nature of the case did not originate in sense-experience are transcendental. In this sense of the term Kantianism allied itself with that tendency in British thought which recognized a priori or original data both in knowledge and in morality—what may be generically named intuitionism. Leibniz's famous revision of the empirical formula may be taken as the watchword of this school: 'Nihil est intellectu quod non primum fuerit in sensu nisi primo intellectu.' The controversy between Hume and Reid, between Mill and Hamilton, is one between psychological empiricism and psychological transcendentalism, just as the controversy between the psychologists and the psychologists and the psychologists and intuitionism is a phase of the same in the sphere of ethics. This was the outstanding question in British philosophy for many a day. Masson in his Recent British Philosophy gives a readable account of the state of matters in his time and 'transcendentalism' is used by him of those systems which recognize in the mind more than sense-data. Spencer considers it one of the merits of evolution that it supplies a means of reconciliation between these opposing views. According to him, what was native to the individual was the residuary deposit of racial experience. Thus evolution reconciled empiricism and transcendentalism.

1 The Peculiarities, see ii. Sec. 122 ff.
2 The Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson, London, 1885, H. 11.
3 Masson, p. 249.

1 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, London, 1908.
2 See I 3.
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(4) Modern developments. — Ferrier’s Institutes of Metaphysic\(^1\) was perhaps the first systematic exposition of transcendentalism in our tongue, although others had by that time acquainted themselves at first-hand with the writings of Kantian transcendentalism in Germany—some repelled by it (e.g., John Cairns), others enthusiastic in their advocacy (e.g., Hutchison Stirling, whose Secret of Hegel was an elaborate attempt to make Hegel intelligible to English-speaking students). It was, however, through the teaching and writings of Thomas Hill Green (\textit{g.v.}) that transcendentalism became a philosophical force in Britain. Evolutionism, while it attempted to reconcile naturalism and transcendentalism, did so from below, by trying to relate man’s knowledge and man’s morality with animal life and animal activity in general, but the new transcendentalism, while acknowledging that in one sense man is a part of nature, yet explained knowledge and morality from above. Knowledge, according to this view, is explicable as the reproduction in man of the eternal self-consciousness of God, and morality is the realization of the immanent Eternal. The following passage from William James describes the spread of this movement in Britain:

‘For many years adherents of this view have thought that there was no more deeply interested the British public by their writings. Almost more than any other philosopher, they taught the philosophy of the idea of the kingdom. . . . It follows from their position that scientific authority, were it from nothing else, that Idealism exercises an influence not easily measured upon the youth of the nation upon those, that is, who from the educational opportunities they enjoy may naturally be expected to form the leaders of the nation’s thought and practice. . . .’

Carlyle introduced it, bringing it as far as Chelsea. Then Jowett and Thomas Hill Green, and William Wallace and Lewis Hallewell, and Arnold Toynbee and David Ritchie—to mention but those teachers whose voices are now silent—guided the waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Iris. John and Edward Caird brought it up to the Clyde, Burnham Siding up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey and up the Severn and Dee and Don. They pollute the bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Cam and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German Idealism is the philosophical world of great Britain. The disaster is universal.\(^2\)

‘Transcendentalism’ came to be used of this new movement, although the term was not a favourite one with the idealists themselves. It was used by Henry Sidgwick\(^3\) especially of the teaching of Green; by A. J. Balfour,\(^4\) who contributes a chapter of criticism, and who even then could say:

‘In English-speaking countries it is within the narrow circle of professors; perhaps the dominant mode of thought; while without that circle it is not so much objected to as totally ignored.’\(^5\)

William James used it of all objective idealists, however these may differ among themselves, while Caldwell uses it of Basange’s teaching in his Gifford Lectures, which he describes as ‘the last striking output of British transcendentalism or absolutism.’\(^6\)

(5) Neo-Hegelianism and Christinity.—What gave this philosophy its vogue, to begin with at any rate, in Britain was undoubtedly the fact that to many minis it appeared as a \textit{defensor fidei}. It seemed to supply an answer to materialism and empiricism on the one hand, and a vague pantheism and agnosticism on the other. It could be preached, and was preached often, by men who adopted the familiar phrases of sacrosanct religious thinking which were associated in the public mind with Christian values, and thus it came to be regarded

\(^{1}\) Edinburgh, 1854.


\(^{3}\) A. Pluralistic Universe (II), London, 1900, p. 531.


\(^{5}\) The Foundations of Belief, London, 1892.

\(^{6}\) Ib. p. 137.

Pragmatism and Idealism, p. 14.
as a type of Christian philosophy. Hutchison Stirling found in Hegelianism a new version of Calvinism. Green was another Christianiser of ideas and ideals, from which dualism we are still suffering—witness the controversies concerning the historic Jesus and the eternal Christ. John Caird, afraid of the inroads of Spencianism and Manseilian scepticism and materialism, taught the creation of souls, which, if it means anything, means something new, but he cannot admit the creation of which. Yet, if God existed in the fulness before any person now living existed—if such an assumption is made in regard to the creation of souls, why should the creation as applied to matter be considered incredible? It is futile to try to explain matter as thought-elements, either in the mind of man or in the mind of God. When a philosopher arrives at such a view, it is surely the same course for him to examine his reasoning again.

(7) The problem of personality—The personality of man in this system, as we see from its modern developments, becomes incoherent, or if that danger is avoided, it is at the price of God’s personality that man’s is safeguarded. Thus there are those who, like Bosanquet, lay stress on the Supreme Personality or Individuality. Yet men, as men, are essentially mere men at hocky purposes of being’s life. Others lay stress on man and make God the totality of men—a college or community of spirits, eternal a parte unita, or as a perfect whole. To God, therefore, as a perfect personality, above and apart from men and the world, and yet originating and sustaining both, seems an absurdity to this scheme of thinking.

History is the biography of the Absolute; science the natural history of the Absolute; philosophy the self-consciousness of the Absolute, recalling and arranging its past history of unconsciousness, and discovering thereby the laws of its own thought.

The outcome is seen in a book like Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, in which the Absolute is everything—God, men, nature, spirits good and evil—and yet somehow it is all that in the bliss of an absolutely consistent whole. Personal idealism, pragmatism, and, above all, theism, will never take such a theory seriously.

5. The task of philosophy.—The modern world is alive to the fact that the intellect alone is not man, and that reality is not to be construed solely by its means. Emphasis is now laid on the will and the emotions as well, with the result that the moral life—the idea of the soul—is given its own place. When this is recognized, then it becomes clear that reality is not a perfection which the mind has to mirror, but an ideal which has to be achieved. Nothing is more degrading and more untrue than to think of reality from man’s point of view as a perfect “is”; for the moral life at any rate reality is in ideals—the best is yet to be. Thus even man’s freedom is saved from the cloudland of illusion, and thus only can evil and sin—the root of all our intellectual as well as of all our moral problems—be faced as our moral nature imperatively calls on us to face them.

Our duty in regard to these, unless our whole nature be itself a delusion, is not so much to explain them as to abolish them. To tell us that this very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order is to treat man’s moral nature with insincerity. Transcendentalism has no eschatology, because to it the Absolute—i.e. all that is—is already perfect and cannot be more so; and yet a philosophy or a religion without an eschatology offers nothing to man’s needs, impotent on man’s passion for reformation, and does away with

1 Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1883, p. 2.
2 Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1883, p. 2.
3 A. S. Pringle-Pattison; 2 yet one wonders if his own view of
4 Green, used to delinquency, the term ‘mentalist’ or ‘immaterielism’ is also used by
5 Green, used to delinquency, the term ‘mentalist’ or ‘immaterielism’ is also used by
6 James S. Ferrier.
7 J. Royen, The World and the Individual (Gifford Lectures), New York and London, 1900-01, II. 355.0
8 A. S. Pringle-Pattison.
his felt need of redemption. These are some of the difficulties that most modern thinking men feel in regard to modern transcendentalism, and the recognition of them has led to a very general revolt against the pessimism within the philosophic world itself. Pragmatism, neo-realism, neo-Kantianism, personal idealism, are but some of the phases of this revolt. It cannot be said that these views, any or all of them, are free from difficulties; and at the present moment it is impossible to say what the future may have in store for philosophy. The best we can wish for it is that it may free itself from the tyranny of phrases and become intelligible and interesting; that it may have the humility to attempt to solve real problems that perplex men; that it be freed from its disdain regarding men's abiding convictions; that it abstain from any language which would throw doubt on the great ideals and values of life; and that it realize the necessity of satisfying the heart as well as the head. God, nature, man—these are the realities. Transcendentalism is valuable when the claims of naturalism become exorbitant; but it must not, without becoming false, succumb either to humanism on the one hand or realism on the other.

Literature.—The OED gives an idea of the variety of meanings attached to the word 'transcendental,' and R. Eliot, Wörterbuch der philosoph. Begriffe, 2 vols., Berlin, 1910, gives the philosophical usage. For the pre-Kantian logical usage and the medieval theological usage the Historical philosophy and of Theology must be consulted. For New England transcendentalism see Emerson. Joseph Cook, Transcendentalists, Boston, U.S.A., 1877, is a valuable account of transcendentalism in the interests of orthodoxy. The literature under art. Ockham and Cañizares is instructive for the early influence of German transcendentalism in a popular form in Britain.


D. MACKENZIE.

TRANSFORMATION.—See Metamorphosis.

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Burckitt (M. ANESAKI), p. 429.

Celtic (G. DOTTIN), p. 430.

Egyptian (W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE), p. 431.

Gree k and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 432.

Indian (R. GARBE), p. 434.

Jewish (M. GASTER), p. 435.

Tentonic (B. DICKINSON), p. 440.

however, at times to some extent combined, when a rise or fall in the scale of existence is put down to the merit or demerit of previous births. Both in reincarnation and in transmigration doctrines the life or lives that succeed the human life on earth are sometimes regarded as limited in duration, sometimes as indefinitely prolonged; where some accident interferes with the due course of reincarnation, the lot of the soul may be a kind of third state, neither reincarnation nor annihilation (or absorption), but separate existence (as an evil spirit).

Many widely distributed customs appear to be connected with the belief in reincarnation. Thus, in Africa and America children are buried by the wayside, near the mother, under the eaves, or in other situations that would in the eyes of the natives facilitate reincarnation; in parts of Central Australia and in Africa people are buried in the place of their birth. But it must be recalled that, generally speaking, the common feeling that it is well to be buried with one’s own people implies no more than the view that this is necessary to ensure the solidarity of the family in the future life. The custom of killing the first-born 1 has been explained for some areas by the belief that this child is, in special measure, an embodiment of the father or grandfather; and the abdication of a king, as in Tahiti, in favour of one of his sons in the hope of preventing him from being turned down to the same cause. The belief in transmigration again in certain areas has led to the sacrosanctity of certain species, and the totemism (q.v.) of some regions, such as S. Africa and Oceania, has been referred to this origin.

1 See art. Death and Disposal of the Dead (Introductory and Primitive), § VII. 3 (g).

2 See art. First-borns (Introductory and Primitive), § 3.
A well-developed scheme of reincarnation or transmigration, if we except the anomalous case of the Central Australian tribes, as to whose real beliefs there is some doubt, is generally found only among peoples who either have attained a certain stage of culture, as in India, or have almost certainly been in contact with or influenced by a higher civilization. It is found, for instance, among the W. African tribes. The W. African tribes among which a reincarnation creed has been recorded in more or less detail are the Mandingo, Ewe, Edo, and Ibo. The belief is also known as occurring among the Youngba who live geographically between the Ewe and the Edo; but details of their ideas on the subject are lacking.

1. West Africa.—(a) Mandingo.—As regards the Mandingo, we have only a summarized account of their beliefs, which differs widely from another account from a portion of the area; a summarized account is always liable to mislead, and, in view of the large divergences recorded in other areas in the transmigration creed on a niene, 'dynamic spirit'; the word niene is applied to a genius, niene to a spirit, with the exception of a latter class, that of an animal, a rock, etc. The niene of a dead man can reside wherever it likes—in the corpse, in the hut, in a sacred object, or in the bush where he was living when he was in his home. Certain niene attribute their powers to the possession of the niene of a dead man. The niene of a man for whom the dogs have not been performed may reincarnate itself in a solitary animal, or in a human being, who goes mad. It is therefore clear that, though the niene may be reincarnated, it is by no means invariably the case, and, where reincarnation takes place, it is in reincarnation in which the more easily tribes believe (see below). Side by side with the niene we have the sinu, or life, which passes at death into another body; it is therefore dead, or as it is found in living beings and passes only into another being of the same species, save on rare occasions when it animates the body of a totem. This belief is, in form, on all fours with those of other tribes; but it is hardly possible to speak of reincarnation, which implies some degree of identity, some measure of personality.

According to Montesi, the Khasoneke believe that a soul is a force, or shadow, which goes on to another form; this is a real separation, and it has been worked out by each tribe in its own fashion. There is no reference to give a summarized account of the beliefs of a mass of tribes if such varied ideas have to be regarded as identical.

(b) Ewe.—According to the Ewe belief, every man has two souls, one niene, or spirit-soul, and a luwu kuto, or death-soul; the former is visible when a man casts a short shadow; the latter when he casts a long shadow. The death-soul accompanies a man into the grave and then goes to the land of the dead; the life-soul leaves the body at death and goes sighing mournfully and seeking for a resting-place; each man has also a breath-soul. That the shadow-soul is more than a shade is clear from the fact that sleep is attributed to the absence of the shadow-soul, waking to its return, and dreams to its activity outside the body.

The land of the dead appears to be the same as Amedzowe, the place of man's origin—a land not on earth, but in heaven, where everything corresponds more or less closely to the things of this life. In Amedzowe are rice, corn, cotton, beans, and all that surrounds a man in this life, not, however, in bodily form, but spiritually, so to speak; and the human inhabitants of Amedzowe live and think in these things in their spiritual form. Life in Amedzowe, however, is different from the previous, more than a modification of this world; for, when a child dies soon after birth, a priest may declare that it was a great king in Amedzowe and has died in order to return to the scene of its former glories. Conversely, the things of this world may influence the course of events in Amedzowe; if a man remains ill, he is said to be too long away from the other world; he will fall ill, for the dwellers there prepare to break down his hut, and, to save him, his associates in this world must each bring a blade of grass and lay it on the roof of his hut, which is the symbol of the roof of his spiritual house. In Amedzowe a man has a spiritual aunt (tasi) and other relatives; from her he must obtain permission to leave the world of spirits and come to the world of men. Some of those who come to this world are so dearly loved by their spiritual relatives that they have to give a promise, called goebi, to return after a short time; these are the children who die young; this promise has been personified and is regarded as in some measure an evil genius, for it incites men who break it to evil deeds and especially to suicide or to acts that will bring about a violent death. Generally speaking, the lot of a man in this life and his abilities are determined by the fate announced to him by his tasi; but here, as elsewhere, there is a fundamental contradiction in the creed of the Ewe, for it is said that, as he may be seen below, the akfana, or genius, is also held responsible for a man's lot in this life.

Side by side with this curiously anthropomorphic creed we find the belief that Mawu, the supreme god, is a dweller in Amedzowe and is the king who sits in judgment on the departing soul before it takes up its abode in this world. Not only so, but we find also the view that the lot of man, or at least his term of life, is determined, if not by Mawu, at any rate by Mawu's intercessions with Death, whom he begs to spare one of his earthly children. If, as appears to be the case, the Ewe beliefs are the results of the Yoruba influx, and whose views as to reincarnation at the present day come much closer to those of the Ibo, their neighbours on the east.

There is, however, another side to the Ewe beliefs; this is the spirit akfana, or in the language of the neighbouring Twi, opra; it is often identified with the luwu, but an older and more correct conception seems to be that it is a genius for tutelary spirits. Another name, akfana is the collective name for akfana, all the spiritual beings that surround a man, whether they be evil or good, human or demonic. Westermann connects the word akfana with Efik akama, a promise to return to the other world. If this derivation is correct, the conception of akfana as a tutelary spirit has arisen in the same way as that of its counterpart, goebi, by the personification of a promise; but Efik is a member of a different group of languages and topographically remote; the derivation must therefore be received with caution; it is none the less possible that both words are derived from the same root or form, especially if it should be the case that the reincarnation idea has been introduced from without or fostered in its growth by foreign influence.

Every man has a kia, or, perhaps, properly speaking, one or more, for these akfana figures worshipped by a man are often in duplicate, male and female, in any case with only a single arm, as an indication of the identity of akfana and human being. Children are named more than a modification of this world; for, when a child dies soon after birth, a priest may declare that it was a great king in Amedzowe and has died in order to return to the scene of its former glories. Conversely, the things of this world may influence the course of events in Amedzowe; if a man remains ill, he is said to be too long away from the other world; he will fall ill, for the dwellers there prepare to break down his hut, and, to save him, his associates in this world must each bring a blade of grass and lay it on the roof of his hut, which is the symbol of the roof of his spiritual house. In Amedzowe a man has a spiritual aunt (tasi) and other relatives; from her he must obtain permission to leave the world of spirits and come to the world of men. Some of those who come to this world are so dearly loved by their spiritual relatives that they have to give a promise, called goebi, to return after a short time; these are the children who die young; this promise has been personified and is regarded as in some measure an evil genius, for it incites men who break it to evil deeds and especially to suicide or to acts that will bring about a violent death. Generally speaking, the lot of a man in this life and his abilities are determined by the fate announced to him by his tasi; but here, as elsewhere, there is a fundamental contradiction in the creed of the Ewe, for it is said that, as he may be seen below, the akfana, or genius, is also held responsible for a man's lot in this life.

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TRANSMIGRATION (Introductory and Primitibe)

The subject of this article, the terminology differs in isoto from that of the Ewe, as made clear by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ewe</th>
<th>Edo</th>
<th>Ibo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genius</td>
<td>akum,</td>
<td>chi,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chi,</td>
<td>eni,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>okpori</td>
<td>otu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow (soul)</td>
<td>lua</td>
<td>agpo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breath</td>
<td>agpo</td>
<td>emi,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit</td>
<td>orio</td>
<td>umu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghost</td>
<td>okpori</td>
<td>oru,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>okpori</td>
<td>otu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-world</td>
<td>okpori</td>
<td>okpori,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>okpori</td>
<td>okpori,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadly speaking, chi corresponds to our idea of soul, for the agpo is said to disappear on the day that a man’s body is put into the grave; in the Rukuru country there are traces of belief in a breath-soul (et), which does not, however, correspond to the dya, for et is said to be the soul of the man in Ehin before it comes to this world. Esa (god) is said to take a man’s chi to Ehin. If there is a man with a boy (i.e., et, et). Two chi are usually distinguished, chikehi (chimuno) and etoke, sometimes identified with chi, sometimes distinguished from chikehi with okpori, the et of a childless person. Some say that chikehi is in Ehin, while etoke is on the back of a man’s neck; others say that etoke is a part of the man’s soul, which is on the top of a man’s head; the latter statement was qualified by the addition that there was another etoke. Some say that chimuno comes to earth when a man dies, thus reproducing the idea of alternation already found among the Ewe, others that chimuno lives in Ehin, and is reincarnated in Ehin when a man dies. It is also said that chimuno goes at death to Ehin and returns for sacrifices and offerings; in Ehin the et may lay claim to a woman for whom his earthly counterpart paid bride-price without being able to secure her as a wife. Some say that chimuno is sent by Esa to punish and correct the deceased others that it brings a child to a man, others again that it ‘does things for a man. i.e., is his genius. Chikehi’s functions are equally a matter of opinion; it is on the back of a man’s neck, or he is a servant of etoke and takes sacrifice to him in Ehin, or lives in Ehin and comes to earth when a man dies, or is a man’s shadow in Ehin, where chimuno is also, or etoke responds to et.”

(c) Edo.—The Edo language is closely akin to the Ewe and forms a member of the group of languages named from the best known member, which is spoken in Benin city and the neighborhood. It is somewhat surprising that as regards

1 A personal protective spirit.
2 Evil spirit.
that they are their deceased grandfathers or grandmothers; and the identity of the ancestor is determined by divination. A child that speaks before it opens its eyes is said to be relating what it saw in Owamwo and is at once exposed in the qoqita; it is also asserted that a man who has been unlucky in one existence may decide, on opening its eyes for the first time, to be a new person, that it is the same world in which he was unhappy before, and resolve to give up the struggle, whereupon the new-born child dies on the spot.

The relation between è and afo, west of the Niger, may be compared with that of godchild and godparent; the relation sets up a bar to marriage, and a man may not even marry into the umunna (sept) of his è; two people who have the same è may not marry, nor yet may their children, though apparently a man may marry the fellow kwego of his sister. There is a saying that the child who is one's afo (kwego) should have been the child of a man's own loins; both must be of the same quarter; if the è has no heir of its own, the afo inherits the property. Curiously enough, the onye bi one, the reincarnated person, who is sent into the world by the living, who Vũ, and who ought to stand over to the child in a closer relation than the è, is in point of fact regarded as a comparatively stranger; he may come from another ebo (quarter) or from a different tribe altogether, and his ritual prohibitions do not concern the child, who has to observe those of his è.

There are traces of the view that è and kwego form two links in a continuous chain, at any rate where the è is not a living person, the kwego of one generation being the è of the next; and this affords a satisfactory explanation of the views as to prohibitions. At the same time, it must be remembered that there is properly a personal protective deity, in fact a personal afo, and that the facts are, in other directions, best accounted for on this hypothesis; it must not, however, be forgotten that east of the Niger an afo may be the è, or, according to another account, may itself be reincarnated. East of the Niger also we sometimes find the view that the afo goes to the next world with a dead man, while the ogiri pega that represent it are thrown away; so that here the afo is regarded as the è; it is, at any rate for a time, to some extent represented by the ndi, or ancestral figures. Curiously enough, the umunna (sett) claims to have a collective afo just as it has a collective ndi, though in the nature of things an afo which sends to this world a corporation, not individual human beings, is unthinkable.

West of the Niger there is a good deal of confusion between è and afo, which is properly a genius, and may perhaps originally have been a breath-soul (cf. Kukuruku èti, 'breath'). If this is the case, èti is now none the less distinct from the man, for ceremonies are performed to bring it to the house, and in many cases it is identified with èti. Perhaps two streams of belief flowing together, one placing èti in Owamwo, the other locating afo in this world, have combined, so that ideas associated with èti came to be attached to afo, and vice versa.

It has been pointed out that the words aši and ikega are in all probability connected etymologically; it is by no means unlikely that aši and akalama are from the same root, and we may well be alternative forms of a suffix, and the transition from aši to afo is a well-established phonetic change in W. Africa. There is some reason for supposing that another idea is that of a promise, though in Ewe the term gbi has come to use in that sense, while akalama has become a genius; but further research is needed in other areas before any definite pronouncement can be made. It is tempting to connect the root afo with the Egyptian ka, which was a double of the man and believed to be after death, with the mummy, a denizen of the tomb; but, though there are clear traces of mumification in W. Africa, probably due to Egyptian influence, and though nothing is more probable than that Egyptian ideas in traversing the continent would have undergone fundamental changes, there is no positive evidence to connect any of the beliefs mentioned above with any article of the Egyptian creed. 1 The possibility of Egyptian influence must, however, be kept in mind, for Egyptian evidence produced by L. Frobenius 2 as to Egyptian influence in the present Yoruba area in the 6th cent. B.C. That the terms of the Yoruba language show no connexion with these cited above of so little importance, for there can be little doubt that the Yoruba language has come down from the north and may not have been in occupation of the area in question, if indeed it existed, at the period in question.

2. South Africa.—In many parts of S. Africa, and sporadically in other parts of Africa, there is a belief that the dead are transformed into certain species of animals, or at any rate that they assume this form to appear to the survivors; it has been maintained, not quite convincingly, that some Bantu tribes 3 suppose themselves to be transformed at death into their totems. This belief is, however, definitely reported from the west coast, among the Sena and the Twi, as well as in the north-east of the Congo Free State. Among the Zulus the transformation is supposed to be into a spirit being of certain species; and here doubtless of Indonesian origin; and we see a different lot in the future spirit in an intermediate grade; this is of course a common feature of eschatological doctrine not connected with the theory of moral retribution.

3. Madagascar.—In Madagascar the belief in transformation is also found, though here doubtless of Indonesian origin; and we see a different lot in the future spirit in an intermediate grade; this is of course a common feature of eschatological doctrine not connected with the theory of moral retribution.

4. Central Australia.—According to Spencer and Gillen, the tribes of Central Australia believe that children are reincarnations of their ancestors (totem) and are continually reborn; 4 but the testimony of Strehlow, a witness well acquainted with the language of the Arunta tribe, directly contradicts this; 5 for he maintains that the native belief is that the soul of every man goes to death to the Isle of the Dead, there to be annihilated by a flash of lightning; in certain cases it is believed that a totem-ancestor is himself reborn, but after this reincarnation he does not return.

1 See art. Death and Disposal of the Dead (Egyptian).
2 See Frobenius, Sprach, Berlin, 1912.
3 See Bantu and S. Africa, 6 3, and 31.
4 Spencer-Gillen, pp. 133, 157; Spencer-Gillen, pp. 145, 174.
5 B. G. B., xii. 1907, 256, xii. 1907, 123; see also literature below.
TRANSMIGRATION (Buddhist).—Theoretically Buddhism teaches neither the existence of the soul nor its transmigration, but insists on the revolution, or 'stream (sātāna), of life. In its practical influence on the popular mind, however, this doctrine amounted to much the same as any other doctrine of transmigration. It amalgamated everywhere with the animistic conception of the soul, whether human or other; it inspired the people with the feeling of a certain continuity of life-relationships through various existences; it impressed the popular mind with a degree of Fatalism—the belief that every event in one’s life was the result of past deeds. The doctrine, when formulated, contained more or less sensuous descriptions of the better lives in the heavens, besides horrifying details of paragogial existences; and these aspects of the teaching resulted in the growth of a respectable volume of visionary literature during the course of the history of the religion in various countries. Thus, in spirit of the higher doctrine of the ideal Buddhist perfection in nirvāna, and in spite of the psychological and metaphysical formulations of the teaching of Karma and Chitta, the Buddhist conception of transmigration may be treated in the same category as other doctrines of the same kind.

According to the regular teaching, the asaṅga, or the inordinate revolution of renewed existences produced and prolonged according to the qualities of the Karma (q.v.), which is the matrix as well as the vis a tergo of the enduring existences. It is said repeatedly:

1. No beginning is known of the eternal revolution (asaṅga) of the beings, streaming and flowing to and fro (in the ocean of births and deaths), being covered by ignorance (anubija) and fettered in thirst (teṣā).  

2. In this vast ocean of renewed births there are innumerable streams of existences, conditioned by their respective deeds and retributions, flowing uninterruptedly not only in the continuity of the individual being but also in the solidarity of a group of existences. Now the groups of existences are classified into five gatis (‘courses,’ ‘modes of the heavenly life’) — the heavenly life, the human life, the animal life, the ghostly life, and the hellish life; or into six, by adding the āvara (or furious spirits).  

3. Another classification is that of the asavāra (‘being’) or loka (‘realm,’ the cosmic installation of beings) into three categories—the formless heavens, the heavens with forms, and the material worlds with desires and greed.  

4. In this connexion it is to be noted that the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration emphasized the affinity and solidarity of the Karma and all its consequence within a group of existences, whether a specific world in the cosmic system, the local division of the abode, or the class division in social life; in short, any and every link, material, physical, moral, emotional, intellectual, or social, is the cause and a manifestation of the solidarity of existence due to the common Karma. The principle of the solidarity of the Karma is the expression of the Buddhist faith in the Oneness of the universe, and in the idea of the consequences of conduct, whether good or bad, affecting man for ever.
TRANSMIGRATION (Celtic).—There are two passages which clearly assert the belief in metempsychosis among the ancient Celts. Cæsar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 14) tells us that the principal point in the teaching of the druids is that the souls do not perish, but, after death, pass from one body into another. Diógenes of Phaleron quotes from Pythagorean sources, that the gods of men are immortal and after a fixed number of years begin to live again, the soul entering on another body (v. 32). But is Diógenes giving the teaching of Pythagoras or that of the Celts? If the former, it would be wise to attach only a relative importance to the mention of the immortal soul in the druidic dogma. If the latter, the doctrine of Pythagoras prevails, namely, that the souls of men are immortal and after a fixed number of years begin to live again, the soul entering on a second body (v. 32). It seems, therefore, that the teaching of the Celts was borrowed from the Pythagorean school. Such was, however, a tradition of antiquity. The passage from Diógenes quoted above lacks clearness, but as early as the beginning of the 1st cent., B.C. Alexander Polyhistor (frag. 138 [PHI iii. 290]) wrote that Pythagoras had the Gauls (Tadmor) as disciples. Timagenes (ap. Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 9) seems to connect the organization of the druidic corporations with Pythagorean doctrine, and refers to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells us that there was an ancient custom of the Gauls of lending each other sums which were repayable in the next world, so that, if they died, the friends who had thus lent them money were thereby repaid in the next world. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life, adds that they burn and bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postponed the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time of death. When debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world, there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kin, in the expectation that they might rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-sentined beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (inferos, manes); but Lucan is not content with that superficial assimilation: "Ye sons of Erebos, ye who dwell in the gloom of darkness, at which the souls arrive; the same breath directs their members in another world, and, ye who declare what can be known, death is in the heart of a long life" (Pharsalia, i. 449-450).

There has been an attempt to fix the meaning of 'orbe alio.' In the Latin of the time of Lucan it can mean only 'another region of the earth' and not 'another celestial globe' (see S. Reinach, R.Ceil xxii. [1901] 454).

The commentaries on the few and vague Greek and Latin texts which bear upon the ancient Celtic belief in metempsychosis do not lead to any further precision. In particular, we cannot determine whether the teaching of the Celts was borrowed from the Pythagorean school. Such was, however, a tradition of antiquity. The passage from Diógenes quoted above lacks clearness, but as early as the beginning of the 1st cent., B.C. Alexander Polyhistor (frag. 138 [PHI iii. 290]) wrote that Pythagoras had the Gauls (Tadmor) as disciples. Timagenes (ap. Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 9) seems to connect the organization of the druidic corporations with Pythagorean doctrine, and refers to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells us that there was an ancient custom of the Gauls of lending each other sums which were repayable in the next world, so that, if they died, the friends who had thus lent them money were thereby repaid in the next world. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life, adds that they burn and bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postponed the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time of death. When debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world, there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kin, in the expectation that they might rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-sentined beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (inferos, manes); but Lucan is not content with that superficial assimilation: "Ye sons of Erebos, ye who dwell in the gloom of darkness, at which the souls arrive; the same breath directs their members in another world, and, ye who declare what can be known, death is in the heart of a long life" (Pharsalia, i. 449-450).

There has been an attempt to fix the meaning of 'orbe alio.' In the Latin of the time of Lucan it can mean only 'another region of the earth' and not 'another celestial globe' (see S. Reinach, R.Ceil xxii. [1901] 454).

The commentaries on the few and vague Greek and Latin texts which bear upon the ancient Celtic belief in metempsychosis do not lead to any further precision. In particular, we cannot determine whether the teaching of the Celts was borrowed from the Pythagorean school. Such was, however, a tradition of antiquity. The passage from Diógenes quoted above lacks clearness, but as early as the beginning of the 1st cent., B.C. Alexander Polyhistor (frag. 138 [PHI iii. 290]) wrote that Pythagoras had the Gauls (Tadmor) as disciples. Timagenes (ap. Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 9) seems to connect the organization of the druidic corporations with Pythagorean doctrine, and refers to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells us that there was an ancient custom of the Gauls of lending each other sums which were repayable in the next world, so that, if they died, the friends who had thus lent them money were thereby repaid in the next world. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life, adds that they burn and bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postponed the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time of death. When debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world, there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kin, in the expectation that they might rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-sentined beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (inferos, manes); but Lucan is not content with that superficial assimilation: "Ye sons of Erebos, ye who dwell in the gloom of darkness, at which the souls arrive; the same breath directs their members in another world, and, ye who declare what can be known, death is in the heart of a long life" (Pharsalia, i. 449-450).
TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian).—There are three different ideas which refer to changes of personality: (1) the union with a god, (2) the transmigration of the soul into a new body during life-time, (3) the voluntary metamorphosis of the person temporarily into another form for his own benefit.

(1) The divine union is often stated in the Book of the Dead, as 'I am Ra' or 'I am Thoth'; this was the person entering into such union with the god that he had all the compelling power and safety of the god. Even in the earliest private inscriptions, on the cylinders before the 1st dynasty of the Old Kingdom, there is son, or brother, to a god; or senen, allied, associated, in touch, or united, with a god.

The question of transmigration has been disputed. The Greek authors refer to it in an undoubted belief; but there seems to be no Egyptian text which refers to the idea. Two scenes have been supposed to indicate it; these are judgment scenes (Seti I. sarcophagus and tomb of Ramses III) showing a pig being driven from the judgment. Yet, as referring to justified men, it cannot be the soul driven away as a pig. In most judgment scenes there is present the devouring monster, a blend of hippopotamus and crocodile, waiting to devour the guilty; but no such monster appears where the pig is, and so it seems likely that the pig is the living animal, driven away so as to be quite apart from the justified king. The Greek testimony is so strong that it seems unlikely to have all been derived from the metamorphoses. As all the authors are post-Persian, it is possible that the idea really did blend with Egyptian belief during the Persian occupation, when other Indian ideas came into Egypt, such as asceticism. Transmigration is plainly stated in the Kôr Resmu, of the Persian period, probably about 300 B.C. After this it is natural that the Greek writers, Herodotus, Plato, Theophrastus, Plutarch, and others, should ascribe the belief to the Egyptians of their times, unconscious that it was a new invention.

(3) The belief in metamorphosis (p. 438) is general, as a magical process. The earliest Egyptian tale turns on a wax model being transformed into a living crocodile. The Book of the Dead has a series of magic chapters (78-90) to give power to a person to be transformed into 'whatever form he pleases,' into a golden hawk, a divine hawk, a god, a lily, the god Ptah, a phoenix, a heron, a swallow.

3 W. M. Flinders Petrie, Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity, London and New York, 1890, pp. 43, 47.
4 See passages quoted in Wilkinson, iii. 462-464.
TRANSMIGRATION (Greek and Roman).

I. GREEK.—The notion of transmigration (παραγενεσία), i.e., the passage after death of the human soul from the mortal body to a new incarnation in another body of the same or another species, necessarily rests upon a belief that the soul itself is immortal, or at any rate more lasting than the body. Periplus, who was born about 600 B.C. and is reputed to have been the teacher of Pythagoras— which does not necessarily mean more than that he was earlier in time—has said to have been the first to introduce the doctrine. On the other hand, Herodotus declared that it was the invention of the Egyptians and was derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of Periplus and Pythagoras, who were already dead. It is, however, impossible to accept Herodotus' account, because (1) the best authorities are inclined to doubt whether the Egyptians ever held the doctrines in question, and (2) the Greek evidence indicates that the belief, if not indigenous, goes back to a remote past. Moreover, the notion that Pythagoras was influenced by Indian modes of thought which he became acquainted with in Ionia or elsewhere is altogether unconvincing. The truth seems to be that a belief in the transmigration of human souls into other bodies after death was a relic inherited from the primitive or savage ancestors of the Ionian peoples. It is expressly attributed to the Gauls, and less explicitly to the Thracians and Scyths. In fact it must have developed independently in many parts of the world, without direct transmission from place to place, especially in connexion with the idea that the limited supply of souls necessitates the reappearance of the same soul in various earthly bodies. Thus in popular tales the change of a man into a beast involves the assumption that, though the body is different, the soul remains the same; e.g., in the metamorphosis of Orpheus, whose realization might have been welcomed as a divine instrument of discrimination between the good and the bad. But, although there is nothing to show that the belief struck deep, or was cherished outside specific circles, it was brought into prominence by the religious upheaval which undoubtedly took place in the 6th cent., and became associated with the worship of Dionysus and the Orphic mysteries. Thus the notion that the soul is imprisoned in the body as in a dungeon is attributed by Plato and his commentators to the Orphic mystics. Two famous passages in Pindar presuppose the doctrine of transmigration. In one of these Persephone sends the souls back to earth in the ninth year when they have been purified from their ancient sorrow; and in the other those who have thrice made their abode on either side of death are destined at last to reach the islands of the blest. It seems more likely that Pandar derived this doctrine from the Orphic mysteries than indirectly through the Pythagoreans. This mystical belief and its religious potency are illustrated with remarkable clearness in certain inscriptions on golden tablets found in S. Italy, near Rome, and in Crete, which have been attributed to the 4th or 5th centuries B.C. and published as an Appendix to J. E. Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, Cambridge, 1903, p. 660 ff. One of these contains some words which form part of the appeal of the purifying bath: 'Let the body have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel; I have passed with eager feet to the Circle desired.' This refers to the mystical Wheel of Fortune which in its revolutions symbolizes the cycle of successive lives necessary to be traversed by the harassed soul before its final release. This specific cycle of progress, as well as the more general conception of a στάσις in human affairs, is traditionally attributed to the Orphic-Pythagorean sphere of thought. In the Orphic hymns this has so far developed as to include a statement that an exact reproduction of the movements of the present world-era may be expected when the revolving wheel comes round to the same point again; but it is not easy to reconcile this with the opportunity which, as we have seen, is given to particular souls to obtain a new life. Aristotle's reference to the Orphic poems as an authority for the opinion that the soul enters the body from outside in the process of respiration accords well enough with the doctrine now under discussion. Further, the Orphic prohibition of a diet of animal flesh, evidenced by Euripides and Aristophanes, points in the same direction. In popular estimation transmigration is particularly associated with the name of Pythagoras. Much of what has been established as belonging to the Orphics, the imprisonment of the soul in the body as a retribution for past ill-deeds, the undeviating recurrence of the cycle of existence, the prospect offered of ultimate escape after purification, and the abstinence from a flesh diet—limited, however, by the reservation that it did not apply to the flesh of such animals as are not very clear example, stone inscriptions show no trace of a belief in transmigration, while Euripides refers to a second incarnation as an actual impossibility, whose realization might have been welcomed as a divine instrument of discrimination between the good and the bad. 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offered in sacrifice to the Olympian gods—it is established for the Pythagoreans by not less convincing testimony. It would seem, therefore, that, when founding his brotherhood, Pythagoras approached a subject which was characteristic of contemporary religious asceticism. Nevertheless, the reincarnation of souls in various bodily shapes is so closely associated with the person of Pythagoras that he must be held to have incalculated it with peculiar vigour. This is the matter relating to him, most of which can be traced to the authority of Heraclides Ponticus.3

To this source we owe the famous story that it was permitted to Pythagoras to retain the memory of his previous incarnations, and that he established his credibility on the occasion of a visit to the Hauen at Argos by identifying as his own, before seeing the inscription, the shield of Euphorbis, son of Panthus, which he was bearing when slain by Memnon before the walls of Troy.4 Heraclides was also responsible for the statement that Pythagoras claimed to have lived as Ethalides, the son of Hermes and herald of the Argonauts, before he became Euphorbis, that as Ethalides he obtained from his father Hermes the offer of any gift which he might choose save immortality, and that he received the privilege of remembering his previous fortunes while on the earth and in Hades. After Euphorbis died, he became Pythagoras, and subsequently Pyrrhus, the Delian fisherman, before his final re-birth as Pythagoras.4 Further, Pythagoras declared that after the lapse of several years his soul returned to the light of the sun.5 Accordingly, if the birth of Pythagoras is placed in 572, then he received immortality in 628.6

There is, however, much better evidence in these fables that Pythagoras seriously taught the doctrine in the almost contemporary verses of Xenophanes: they say that once, as he was passing through a plain, he was being beaten and exclaimed: 'Beat him no more; for his soul is my friend's, as I recognized when I heard his voice.' It was therefore his belief that the same soul could dwell in a body as it is in a vessel, and that there is a universal kinship between all living things.7 He did not hesitate to ascribe reasonable souls to animals, holding that the activity of their reason was infected by the invincibility of its own, by its exercise of their physical organs.8 Aristotle describes the possibility of any soul taken at random passing into any body as a Pythagorean fable.9 The punishment of souls for their misdeeds by successive incarnations in corporeal dungeons was a theme developed by the Pythagoreans in a manner hardly to be separated from the Orphic,10 and the results of their joint influence are to be found in Plato's myths.

Empedesoc in his poem entitled 'Purifications (καθαρσία)' took over the doctrine of transmigration from the Orphic-Pythagorean school without misunderstanding to combine it with his philosophical system. Indeed it is difficult to see how it was possible for him to advocate the immortality of the soul consistently with his doctrine that the individuality of the soul is the result of an aggregation of corporeal substances. Thought and consciousness are concentrated in the blood which envelops the heart.11 Aristotle's assertion that, according to Empedesoc, the soul is comprised from all corporeal elements is merely a misconception; and his further remark in the same passage that each of the elements is soul-equality misleading. But, even if the materialism of Pythagoras, esp. Aristotle, in his doctrine of the soul, makes the proposition apply only to the ram and the plough-ox,5 Paulus-Winckler, v. 476.; 6 Hor. od. i. 11. 15. 9 De Anima 1. 3. 607 B. 12 B 7. 13 9 De Anima. 1. 2. 605 B. 13 Vol. XII—28

1 of Empedesoc is somewhat less explicit than it is sometimes represented, logical justiciation is still to seek for his pronouncement concerning the punishment of guilty souls in a purgatory lasting for 30,000 years and his personal experience of the wretchedness of the life of an animal. He passed this latter phase as assayed by its weary passage through air and sea and earth: 'Ere now have 1 been a youth and a maiden, a bush and a dumb fish in the sea.'2 A discrimination of the degree of malignancy is involved in the assignment of the less base souls to the higher forms of animal or plant life: these inhabit the bodies of lions among beasts or appear as bay trees in the world of vegetation.2 The best of them become prophets, identifying with the living chieftains, and at last return as divine beings to the company of the gods.3 As a consequence of this doctrine Empedesoc, like the Pythagoreans, prohibited the sacrifice of living things, a tenet which he held to be of the highest value.4 He thus constituted at least mortally the absence of serious and do not admit of being discussed in detail.

According to the Phaedo,5 those who in this life have failed to emancipate themselves from the burden of the individual element cannot rise to the purer element above, but being dragged down into the visible world, they pass from burial grounds as ghostly apparitions until they are again imprisoned in another body. Of these the sensual become asses or similar animals, the violent and unjust wolves or hares, but those who wish to escape the purest form of human, and who are set free from the egoistic impulses to virtue, have lived an ordinary human life in this world, and in their next incarnation prove themselves just and moderate. Only those who have devoted themselves in this life to philosophy are entirely exempt from any further incarnation and pass to the pure ethereal home destined for them in the upper world.6 In the Phaedrus7 the souls of the dead are shed by the other or otherwise treated according to the measure of their human actions for 1000 years, until the period of reincarnation arrives, when they are allowed a limited area of choice, so that it often happens that the soul of a man comes into life as a beast, and that of a beast which has been formerly been human again emerges into the body of a man. A much more elaborate account is given in the myth of Er the son of Armenius, how a great variety of choice comprising the lives of every animal is offered to the allottee whose time for reincarnation has arrived. The category of which he is destined is determined by lot, but even the soul which drew the last lot had plenty of opportunities for selection left. The narrator of the myth was a witness of the choices made by some of the heroes of antiquity; how Orpheus chose to be a swan, Thamyris a nightingale, Ajax a hen, Agamemnon a dog, and Daedalus a monkey, while Odysseus, who drew the last lot, worried of his former ambition, was delighted to find still available for him the life of an ordinary man free from all anxiety.7 In the Timaeus8 the creator fashions as many souls as there are stars, and distributes one to each star, in order that later, after a period of contemplation, they may be embodied in human form. If during the time of probation the soul lived well, he would return to his ethereal habituation; but, if he failed, he would suffer a new incarnation as a woman; and, if his wickedness continued, he would sink down among the beasts until his corporeal taints had been thoroughly purged away. In the same dialogue Plato explains the evolution of birds and other animals as arising from the deterioration of human souls. Birds, with their feathers taking the place of hair, are developed from men who are harmless but light-minded. The four-footed beasts of the earth were originally men who had never given themselves up to the study of philosophy, and who, as a result, had need of the revolutions in the head, but followed the impulses of those parts of the soul which are situated in the breast.9

Critics have not been entirely agreed as to how far Plato was a serious believer in transmigration, some holding that the entire description was purely a play of fancy, and others that, though it may have credited the successive incarnations

1 1 B 115, 5 Diels. 4 B 146, 147 Diels. 2 B 127, Diels. 12 B 136, 137 Diels. 3 B 140, Diels. 7 69. 8 869. 8 Repub., 617 D—620 D. 10 41, D. 11 Zb. 61 E. 12 See the authorities quoted by J. Adam in his note on Rep., 618 A.
of human souls, he cannot have extended his belief to their passage into animal shapes. It should of course be noticed that all these descriptions of multiple transmigration and immortality relate to a mythical, not a natural history, and are to be understood as right in the way that I have described. But to hold that either this or something like it is the truth in regard to our souls, or in regard to the soul of a man, is in no sense to me, nor that the soul has been shown to be immortal, to be no unreasonable or unworthy suggestion.

So long as this limitation is borne in mind, there is no valid reason for mistrusting Plato's sincerity.

Transmigration does not cohere with the Stoic doctrine of the soul's nature; but there are some grounds for thinking that Poseidonius held the pre-existence and immortality of the soul in the limited sense in which it was possible for a Stoic to affirm them consistently with a belief in the átman. 2 It was, moreover, natural that a Stoic should speak of a periodic re-creation 3 as a consequence of the dogma that every confutation introduces a new era in which the experience of the past will necessarily be repeated. But that either Poseidonius or any of the Stoics believed in a series of successive incarnations within the limits of the current world-period, is notwithstanding the isolated statements of certain of the doxographical sources, quite unlikely. 4

According to Plotinus, the future destiny of the soul depends on the use it has made of its several functions and capacities during each particular incarnation; hence we may not constantly strive upward, not yielding to the images of sense or carnal cravings. 5 Those who have exercised his human capacities again become a man, but those who have lived by sensation alone become animals. 6 If, without yielding to active passion, they have remained immersed in sluggish perversity, they may even become plants. 7 There is always retribution for an ill-spent life; the bad master becomes a slave, the abuser of wealth a pauper, the man who has marrid his mother becomes a woman and is murdered by a son. 8 On the other hand, those souls which are pure and have lost their attraction to the corporeal will cease to be dependent upon body. So detached, they pass to the region of being and the divinity, which cannot be apprehended by a human vision as it is a soul to corporeal.

II. ROMIN.—There is no evidence among the Romans of an indigenous belief in transmigration, but several of their poets acknowledged the influence of Greek speculation, and of Plato and Pythagoras in particular. Horace mentions 9 the idea of a human dream; 20 Ennius, who thought that his soul had once inhabited the body of Homer and earlier that of a peacock; Vergil, in a famous passage, 11 takes more serious notice of Pythagoreanism, when he describes the purification of souls in the underworld, and their return to human bodies after the completion of the cycle of 1000 years. Ovid 12 introduces Pythagoras himself as making an eloquent appeal against the slaughter of animal life, based on the identity of the soul-substance which permeates our bodies and theirs.

LITERATURE.—The best sources of information are the works of H. J. Rose, E. Geiger, and E. B. Zeller mentioned above. For Pythagoras see also Pythagoras; also A. E. Chaigtn, Perplesmc, no. 1-2, Ischia, 1878; and for Plato J. A. Stewart, Myths of Plato, Oxford, 1869; and E. B. Thompson's ed. of Plato, Xen. London, 1877. See also A. G. Pasam.

TRANSFORMATION (Indian).—The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is in India the pre-

114 D.

2 A. Schmeckel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, Berlin, 1880.

3 M. Ant. xl. 1.


5 Rolle, ib. ii. 8, 2. 7. ib. 10. 11. ib. 1. 12 ib. 34.

6 Rolle, ib. 2. 11. ib. 2. 12 ib. 34.

7 ib. vi. 76.

8 Met. xv. 65-143, 573-388.

9 Ptolemy, Dea. Orac. Grav, pp. 175, 271, 19, 274, 19, 64. 13.

10 Rolle, ib. ii. 8, 2. 7. ib. 10. 11. ib. 1. 12 ib. 34.

11 ib. vi. 765.

12 Met. xv. 65-143, 573-388.
the Aryans of India the theory, as it meets us for the first time in the literature, appears already fully formed in the shape of belief in a permanently continued but ever-changing existence. And the different forms which the individual lives are in their rank, and the measure of happiness or misery which they experience is regarded as dependent on moral conduct. At the basis of the Indian conception of transmigration lies the immovable conviction that there is no unmerited happiness and no unmerited misery, that each man shapes his own fortune down to the smallest details. This conviction has given to the Indian people a power to endure suffering which has often enough excited the wonder of foreign observers.

Since the Indian recognized that no explanation of the apportionment of happiness and misery, of joy and sorrow, by the moral state of the individual was to be found in the present life, he concluded that man's fate is determined by his good and evil deeds in a former existence. A moral qualification, therefore, according to this view, attaches to the soul; and this corresponds exactly to the sum of its good and evil deeds, and demands reward or punishment in the next existence, if not in the present.

It is urged then that we endure in the present life the consequences of our own behaviour in the past; the conditions must have been precisely the same in the previous existence; the joy and sorrow that we experienced therein were again the consequences of our own actions in that former life, and so on, without end. For that part of the individual, therefore, which was involved in the cycle of existences no beginning could be assigned. It was thus that quite early in India the theory of the endless pre-existence of the soul was developed; and the doctrine of the soul's eternal duration in the future was inferred according to the law that that which is without beginning is also endless, and in accordance with the ancient popular view of the permanence of personal existence in heaven. The belief in the eternity of soul was followed by belief in the genuine existence of the universe.

Life for the ease-loving Indian was overshadowed by the belief in transmigration. The thought of wandering perpetually through the bodies of men, animals, and plants, of being compelled in each existence to experience more pain than joy, and perpetually to renew the pangs of death, occasionally also to somersault in a time hell—this thought must have been dreadful for the Indian. No wonder the Austrians suffered by the prospect of being able to gain heaven by his merits, and to raise himself to divine honours. For with the very ascent to divine honours no more than a transitory success has been gained. Even the gods, according to the transmigration theory, are involved in the cycle of existence, the sahasra, and must again descend to lower forms of life when their time comes round, that is, when the power of former merit is exhausted through the enjoyment of divine position and honours. The gods, therefore, have ceased to be eternal and omnipotent beings, as they were in Vedic times.

It is therefore, the wheel of existence rolls on without rest or intermission, and hurrles living creatures perpetually to renewed suffering and renewed death. Naturally, then, the question must have been raised whether there is no deliverance, no release, from this continually renewed existence upon earth.

The hypothesis that once in the course of time the previous deeds of a living being may meet with their complete reward or punishment, and that, therefore, the basis for a re-birth may and will disappear, was not made in India. According to the Indian view, when a living being dies there always remains a remnant of merit and guilt still unrewarded and unpunished, from which is derived the germ of a new existence. Even sacrifice and deeds of piety or asceticism cannot deliver from the necessity of renewed birth and death. In the Sotapatha Brahmana it is said that the powers of death which pursue men from one existence to another may be appeased by sacrificial offerings, and that by such offerings release may be obtained from the return of death. This thought, however, is soon abandoned and is supplanted by the conviction that no sacrifices can do more than secure temporary happiness in higher forms of existence.

Since, then, in India it had become the supreme aim of spiritual endeavour to find this release, the issue could not fail to be the conviction that success had been attained; not by the way which had been previously followed and which no longer afforded inward satisfaction, but by the way of knowledge, which, in fact, might be trodden only by a few. In the knowledge of the essential nature of things, which is veiled from ordinary sight, was found the means of deliverance from the pressure of worldly existence. This saving 'knowledge' removes 'ignorance', i.e., the empirical view of the universe which is natural to man, but is mistaken and perverted. In knowledge, the desire to know, which fetters man to existence, and is the cause of all action; as, on the other hand, successful resistance to the desires of the senses promotes the entrance of knowledge. Saving knowledge has the power—to use the technical Indian expression—to consume the seeds of works, and so making impossible for all future time a continuance of migration.

The entire course of thought as hitherto developed is already contained in substance in the ancient Upanisads (q.v.). For them saving knowledge consists in the recognition of the sole existence of the Brahman, the soul of the universe, of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, and especially of the identity of the individual soul, the Atman, with the Brahman. In what way the saving knowledge is conceived in Buddhism, in the religion of the Jains, and in the philosophical systems of the Brahmans (Sâkhyas, Yoga, Mimâṃsâ, Vedânta, Vaisīṣṭika, Nyâya), must be ascertained from the respective articles. Cf. also art. Môku.


R. Garbe.

TRANSMIGRATION (Jewish).—Metempsychosis, or the migration of the soul (Heb. gâlîâl, 'rotation' or 'cycle'), is a doctrine which forms part of a system of esoteric mysticism tolerated rather than approved or furthered by Judaism. Its beginnings are difficult to trace. Whether they were Egyptian or Indian—probably through Gnostic or Manichean intermediaries—this doctrine, no doubt, had to accommodate itself to other Jewish conceptions before it could be assimilated to and modified by the Jewish mind, and it had to undergo such a profound modification as to give to Jewish metempsychosis a character of its own.

The belief in the migration of the soul presupposes the existence of the soul; and a whole esoteric system about the creation of the soul, and the conception of sin and redemption, are the fundamental principles upon which such a doctrine must rest. The relation between spirit and matter, soul and body, must be laid down, as must the question of pre-existence as well as that of the finality of soul and body. An attempt will here be made to do justice to these problems, however succinctly. The questions of punishment and reward, of God's
Justice and mercy, are also involved. It must be borne in mind that any theory, if it was to be accepted by Jews, had to be subjected to a process of close adaptation to the fundamental principles of Judaism, and must not run counter to the Law. Now, if the migration of the soul is to be accepted as a part of philosophic speculation concerning sin and redemption, it has to formulate its theory in accordance with Judaism.

1. Creation of souls.—God is the creator of everything; therefore souls are His creation. But does He continuously create His creation? Does He continually create souls as soon as any human being is on the point of being born? The answer of the believer in metempsychosis is that He does not. His creation came to an end with the close of the sixth day. At the beginning the souls were created. The power of God is thus limited to what He had done on that occasion. Before creating Adam, God had finished the creation of all the souls of man, but, His work of creation being completed by the end of the sixth day, He did not include it, and produced only those evil spirits which hover between the pure divine soul and the earthly matter (the vayikra; see art. Magic [Jewish]).

A distinct line of demarcation is not drawn, however, and, as will be seen, a soul can assume the condition of a demon even after its original creation. The souls created then, are of a limited number, as the creation was only a limited act, and had to come to an end at a definite period of time. These souls are God’s creation, not any emanation from God. This very essential point should be remembered, for it separates Jewish metempsychosish from Buddhism. The souls at the end of the migration are not absorbed into a kind of divine pantheistic fluid; they are conceived as having an individual existence; they live separately and fully conscious of their individuality; they dwell in the heavenly halls or in Paradise in rapt contemplation of the divine majesty; the latter they are allowed to retain at the end of their peregrination through the lower world. The souls of the born and the unborn, of those who have already been in the sublunar world and of the just who have not yet been in that world, are dwelling together in the heavenly halls, or in the treasury of God (Dt 32:4). No clear distinction is made between these two categories of souls. It is all so vague in this world of theosophic speculation that contradiction is not seldom found in schools of thought have sometimes blended their teaching without any successful attempt at harmonizing contradictory views. All that comes is readily accepted, so long as it is not diametrically opposed and so long as it comes as an ancient mystical tradition. Thus the pre-existence of all human souls affects the Messianic eschatology. The soul of the pre-existing Messiah is fully conscious of its own individual pre-eminence in this world. Though a spirit, the Messiah dwells among the other souls, and He is fully aware of the tribulations of the people of Israel; He weeps over their sufferings and anxiously asks the angel who is in His company when the time will arrive for His revelation (M. Gaster, Chron. of Jerahmeel, London, 1899, xx. 9). Moses in his ascent to heaven sees the souls of the greatest pious, of those who have lived upon earth, and of those who are to come to life hereafter—among others David and Agiba (ib.). This view is found also in the book of Apocrypha. Apocalypses, though the theory of migration is not there clearly connected with it.

The one definite outcome is that no new souls are created for such a child that is born, the number of souls being limited. Everything created has a specific purport. Even the angels have not been created without purpose. They are God’s messengers; they carry out His wishes and commands in the heavens above and on the earth beneath; above all, they are created in the purpose of singing to their Master and of praising Him in angelic choirs. Such, then, is the purpose of the entire creation. The angelic action is typical of the human man, the higher spirit, of the creature after the angels. He must by his action approach the divine, and his whole life must be a long-sustained hymn of praise to God. But man, made of the dust of the earth, cannot rise to such perfection unless the divine soul arises up and, unless the divine Law guides him steadily upwards towards heaven. His life is a constant struggle between the grossly material inclinations inherent in his earthly nature and the high spiritual promptings of his divine soul. According to the way in which he inclines, his soul will become more or less contaminated by the contact with matter; it will lose more and more of its spiritual lustre and purity. For man has absolute free will; he is master over his own actions. He is an axiom; otherwise the whole principle of reward and punishment has to be abandoned. And yet, with that naive inconsistency so characteristic of this mystic philosophy, predestination is not excluded. Nothing happens which has not been pre-ordained, yet no attempt is made to bridge this gulf.

2. Incarnation of souls.—The soul may be created for a specific use; they may enter human bodies; but the choice is not left to them, either of the bodies to be selected or of the time of entry and the manner of exit. As soon as a woman conceives (see art. Birth [Jewish]), an angel appears before God with the sperm, and God decrees the future life of the yet unborn babe. Its whole life is then an individual existence; it may be rich or poor, high-stationed or lowly, wise or foolish, long-lived or short-lived, good or bad, pious or wicked; even its future helpmeet is proclaimed in heaven to the joy and satisfaction of the heavenly hosts. In order to obviate too glaring a contradiction in a later version of this legend of the ‘Creation of the Child’ (see Gaster, Jerahmeel, ix. 191.), the moral qualifications of the future man and woman have been omitted. The soul, which is very reluctant to give up its heavenly abode and enter the human body, especially if the shell is that of a wicked one, is forcibly seized by the angel and makes its way through the heavenly gates and the agency of hell, to see the reward for good actions and the punishment for evil deeds. Although the soul forgets it all with entry into this world, yet a dim recollection remains, a subconscious image, which is the guiding principle in elementary recognition of good and evil. Everyone has within himself a standard of right and wrong given to his soul in its premundane existence. Another version (Zohar, ii. 60a ff.) describes the incarnation of the soul in the following manner:

God created all the souls from the beginning, in the very form in which they would afterwards appear in this world. He beheld them and saw that some of them would be wicked. At the time when the soul is to descend, the Lord calls it and says, ‘Go to such and such a place.’ The soul who is to remain here and not be defiled in that other world. The Lord answers, ‘From the beginning thou hast been created for the purpose of getting, destroy, and descend against its will. The Law which helps the soul says to it, ‘See how the Lord had mercy on you. He has given you His precious pearl (the Law) to help you in this world, so that ye may return pure.’ But, if laden with sin, the soul must obtain purification and then it will be able to come down to the lower world. Two rows of angels are waiting for the soul; the good to lead to Eden and the evil to save from punishment the soul migrates from body to body.

3. Life of the soul on earth; migration; escape of evil spirits.—Now the soul begins its course upon earth. It must endeavour to obtain the
absolute mastery over the body and not to become its slave. In the first entry the soul is absolutely pure and without blemish. It is not met by the objection of the Talmud. The principle upheld throughout is that ‘each man dieth by his own sin’ (Ezk 18th). But the weakness inherent in matter soon makes itself felt, and, moreover, there are temptations placed in its way through the evil and the spirit of the evil one. Thus, although they partake of some spiritual character, they are imperfectly compared with the pure soul, and are anxious to drag it down to their own level. Eve, still not able to sustain the root of this attempt of the evil spirits to lead the pure soul away—a desire to frustrate the means of sin and transgression—the divine plan of creation. God has created the world and man in it for His glory. Through trial and trouble man must win the crown of eternal bliss. The finite number of souls forms part of this divine plan. A term is thereby set for man’s spiritualization, for an infinite number of souls might not be that end impossible of being reached. But, as there is a limited number, it is obvious that the desired consummation would set in as soon as the last soul had passed through, or, rather, had entered the last human body. For then all the souls created would have fulfilled their mission upon earth, and all the human beings that had thereby any body would have reached the highest degree of moral development of which they were capable, so that the progress of mankind and of the world would have attained its ultimate goal, or, to put it in the words of the mystics, the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth would then be established, the time reached for the advent of the Messiah. Already in the Talmud the saying is found, ‘The son of David will not come before all the souls in bodies will come to an end.’ The power of the evil spirits would then be entirely broken, and only good would reign in the world. The spirits, therefore, try to entice the soul and delude it by all manner of temptation and sin. The result is that the contaminated soul must be kept out of the heavenly bliss, and the divine plan is effectively checked. Like a ‘shell’ (q’lit-fah, the evil spirits surround the soul, making the material covering still more impenetrable to light and truth, as they are clinging close to the body like an additional covering. In the later development of this system the evil spirit ‘cleaves’ to the body of the person to whom it belongs and may not be obstructed, and the spirit is then called dibbūy. It has entered into a more intimate connexion with the body, and is no longer an outer covering, or q’lit-fah, originating from the other camp, the yiṭtir aḥabāh.

But the demons strive in vain to impede the steady development and unfolding of God’s plan. They may delay its speedy consummation; they cannot indefinitely frustrate it. The soul which has been contaminated can be purified again; the sin committed can be atoned for, and even here the means is given to the soul to achieve its own purification. The soul retains its own conscious-ness and is sensible to its own failings; it realizes the bitterness of punishment and the tragedy of not being allowed to ascend on high and stand again before God in its pristine purity. For it flits about the world as a disembodied spirit, however long it may be on earth, and waiting for the chance of atonement or punishment. This comes to it by being re-embodied, and thus the soul migrates from one being to another. It is not finished, but still there is a new beginning; this new incarnation remembers its former existence or whether it realizes it when it is leaving this second body, and continues its migration until all the blemish has been eliminated. This transmigra-

4. The justice of God.—(a) Theories of rewards and punishments. The migration of souls is made to serve another and still higher and more direct purpose, the justice of God. The task which has haunted every form of faith has been: how to reconcile the happiness of the sinner and the trials and sufferings of the pious and good with the justice of God. Even those who had endeavoured to form a theodicy. Most of them have relegated the solution of this problem to the life after death, finding the answer in rewards and punishments to be meted out in another world filled with bliss and unutterable torments. Such teaching presupposed the eternity of the soul, and in some form or another a combination of soul and body if the latter is to suffer the torment of hell, unless it was supposed that their consciousness, their individual consiousness existence capable of enduring torments as well as rejoicing in heavenly bliss. This is, however, not the place to follow further this extreme extenuation. The question was, after all, a subtle way out of the difficulty, and it was not quite free from a possible reproach of selfishness. The goodness of the soul or the purity of life obtained for the individual soul alone happiness and bliss. No one else was directly benefited by it, except perhaps that such a good and pious man served as an example to others. But the world in general apparently had nothing from him, and his virtuous life lay nowhere except to his own exaltation. Not so with the belief in the migration of the soul. Here, upon earth, in the sight of all, the sinner—whose he might be—had to expiate his sins. Here he had to suffer for the wrong committed, and here obtain, as it were, the pass for the heavenly regions. By this slow purification and reunion with the other purified souls, moreover, a cycle was completed, at the end of which the Messianic period would begin. By his actions the whole world would benefit, and the general progress and welfare of mankind would be hastened and consummated.

Thus the soul of Adam, because he had sinned, had to begin a period of migration through other bodies and thus pass through David, who, by the sin which he committed with the wife of Uriah, impeded the complete purification of Adam’s soul. But, by its final entry into the last descendant, the Messiah would also bring about the dawn of the new world and the consummation of the divine plan when Adam, the first man, was created.

The soul of Abel passed into Moses, or, in another theory, the soul of Adam passed into Moses, who sinned at the rock, and then into David, who sinned with Uriah’s wife, and, finally, into the Messiah, thus linking the first with the last.

There are, as it were, successive incarnations of the same pre-existing soul, and for their sakes the world has been created. There cannot be any doubt that these views are extremely old. Simon Magnus raises the claim of former existence, his soul passing through many bodies before it reaches that known as Simon. The Samaritan doctrine of the leshab teaches the same doctrine of a pre-existing soul which was given to Adam, but which, through successive ‘incarnations’ in Seth, Noah, and Abraham, reached Moses, for whom it was originally formed and for whose sake the world had been created. The element which is absent here is that of migration for the purpose of purification. The latter gives to ‘migration of souls’ a peculiar character. Not only is the world perfected thereupon, but the soul expiates his sin in this world in the new existence in which his soul re-appears. It may enter the body of a pious man, and by his good deeds he will cleanse the dross still adhering to the soul and facilitate its ascent
on high. If the pious suffer, it is only and solely for sins committed in a previous existence, and this suffering is not a punishment for sins not committed, but a purgatory for evil deeds of a former life. The explanation of the prosperous sinner is not quite so clear. Here use had been made of the doctrine of punishment and reward after death. The sinner benefits from the good deeds that he had performed in a previous existence. He hopes now, so that all his reward is eaten up by him in this world, and nothing but punishment is reserved for him in the life after death. This presupposes that the soul of the wicked is beyond redemption in this world, and is sent to Gehinnom for punishment. This seems to be the view taken by the Saba' in the Zohar in the passage quoted above (§ 2). The cycle of the soul is thus broken. It is not made quite clear how it is to be completed; but it seems that, according to some, a soul which has just sunk to this lowest level of contamination, instead of being sent to Gehinnom, becomes an evil spirit in this world, which is anxious to enter living bodies for torment, or for that punishment which starts from the lowest rung of the ladder and is to lead up to the highest without recourse to punishments in 'hell'. Such a soul becomes a dubbq. To exorcize it, to free it from this temporary existence, a quicken has to be applied, and thus start a new cycle of evolution, is a meritorious deed, a real tigqam, an 'improvement' and perfection.

No attempt is made to reconcile these two separate systems of punishment and reward; they are often mentioned side by side in the Zohar and other kabbalistic treatises. In the Targum to Ecc 8:8 the suffering of the pious and the happiness of the wicked have already been explained in a somewhat similar manner, inasmuch as the pious suffer for small sins in order to enter afterwards directly into heaven, and the sinner enjoys the fruit of some good deeds here, so that hereafter he is to go straight to torment and punishment.

(6) Kabbalistic theory. The kabbalist, however, adds and superimposes the new theory of suffering and happiness, not for sins and good deeds performed in the person's lifetime, but for sins done during previous existences. The punishment was expected to fit the crime. Thus, if a man had sinned by his eyes, he would be resorn blind or suffering with his eyes, and, similarly, every other part of the body would then be affected in the manner committed through that part in the previous existence. Moral sins would have to be expiated in a similar manner; for, according to some of the oldest and most accredited teachers, transmigration is not limited to that from one human body to another human body. The soul of the wicked passes also into animal bodies corresponding with the character of the sin. In later schools the transmigration has been extended also to plants, stones, and metals. As an example of the former it may be stated that the soul of an adulterer passes into the body of a female stork, for it is believed that storks punish adultery with death. Thus an explanation was found for the prohibition of mixing various kinds of seeds and the cross-breeding of animals, for they disturbed the normal laws of nature and caused great suffering to the souls of such mixed products. Similarly, the peculiar command of marrying the deceased brother's wife (qiddushin) has its reason and justification in this doctrine of migration. The soul of the childless man cannot return to its source, for the soul has remained barren and is cut short in its earthly career before it has been able to pass through all the stages of purification. Hence the reason why the child born was to be called 'in the name' of the deceased, though it is generally held that the name should bear the same name. In fact, the child of Ruth, which was a restorer of souls to Naomi, did not bear the name of Ruth's dead husband. The new-born babe would receive the soul of the dead and continue his earthly life.

5. Number of migrations. There is a difference of opinion as to how many times a soul would migrate before it had run its entire course. The majority of kabbalists believe that the имениs that no soul migrates through more than three bodies. The real course is that in which the soul has performed the whole of the 613 commandments of the Law, by which alone perfection is attained. For the shortcomings in one existence the soul is punished in the next, and then also performs some good deeds. Others think that the soul passes through a greater number of changes. It is held that the fate of the soul of the sinner is decided after three migrations, at the end of which a thoroughly wicked soul becomes an evil spirit—a demon—while that of the pious may be reincarnated times without number. The first change, the ascent of the soul from the lower to the higher degree of purity and perfection is asserted.

6. Various other theories; purposes of metempsychosis. It is held by the Saba' that the souls of Abel were divided into three categories, which were punished in accordance with the degree of wickedness of which they were guilty. The first lost the unity of language, and were dispersed upon the face of the land; the second,—a more daring category,—were changed into all kinds of animals, and their souls were sent into animal bodies. The third,—the thoroughly wicked section,—were changed into the bodies of Nebuchadnezzar into a wild animal, as told by Daniel (Dn 4:29), lent further countenance to the possibility of a human soul dwelling in an animal body. The rules for slaying special animals and for the blessing by which the cutting is accompanied rest upon the same principle of thereby possibly saving a penitent soul from dwelling too long in the body of an animal. It is liberated by a religious act which assists it in its further migration. All this forms part of the tigqam, the improvement and perfection of the world, the preparation for the Messianic rule. The covenant before the Lord, God with all the souls which He had created: 'Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath: but with him that standeth here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day' (Dt 4:29), for He did not speak only to those who were there, but also to those who were not there on that day, in their material form, i.e., in human bodies.

By this migration of good souls to good men and contaminated souls to sinners and evil-doers a certain affinity of souls was established, which led to the identification of such souls in the various stages. As mentioned before, the soul of Abel or of Adam was that of Moses, and the souls of the ten brothers of Joseph became the souls of the ten martyrs whom the legend describes as contemporaries. In fact, this tendency of recognizing the older souls in more recent bodies developed in the later schools of kabbalistic speculations established by Luria, Vital Calabrese, and others into a regular system. Lists have been drawn up and books have been compiled (Sepher ha-Mitzvot, Frankfurt, 1684), in which the reincarnations of the good and evil men of the past have been duly recorded. Such spiritual genealogies—if we may use such a term—have found their way even into bibliographical and historical compilations. In

1. The Heb. name for stork is 'iddah, which, by a popular etymology, may be explained to mean 'the chosen' or 'the pious.'
addition to the complete reincarnation, there came the doctrine of impregnation ("ibahr"). The soul of a god-woman is sometimes not strong enough to fight successfully the temptations of the world, and another soul is temporarily grafted upon that which he already possesses, so that it is made almost unrecognizable. The idea being runs that the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. The same soul is grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer to the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vehicle of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.

7. Date and origin.—This doctrine of migration is nowhere to be found systematically developed. When, however, it is to be found in the Talmud, the traditions ascribed as well known, and no explanation is given in detail. It has, therefore, been pieced together and reconstructed by the present writer mostly from the Zoharistic literature, viz., the Zohar, the Zohar Hádassah, and the Téqgúsitn, which represents a more or less homogeneous view on migration, whenever it is referred to. While these are by far the majority of thewhole writers, they are by no means the oldest. This brings us to the question of the date and probable origin of this doctrine among the Jews.

All the beginnings of esoteric teaching are lost in the mist of antiquity, and, when such doctrines finally see the light of day, they have, as a rule, a long history behind them. It is, therefore, a fallacy to date the origin of metempsychosis among the Jews from the time when it becomes known publicly in the 9th or 10th century. The masters of the occult science never doubted its Jewish character or its old origin. Was it not part of that heavenly mystery handed down from Adam on through all the ages? Nevertheless they did not undervalue the antiquity of the doctrine, for they endeavoured to find proofs for it in the Scriptures by means of an exegesis which was fantastic in the extreme. A few examples will suffice. They are taken at random from the Zohar, and they are found in large numbers in Maassach ben Israel, "Nishmat Hayyim," bk. iv. chs. 8-10.

"'Till thou return unto the ground' (Gen 3:19) is interpreted to mean that the body alone returns to the ground; the spirit, however, is reborn.

'Vakkél shall I return thither' (Job 13:21) is interpreted literally as meaning 'to the womb,' i.e., being reborn.

'The word which he commanded to a thousand generations' (Ps 20:5) is interpreted to mean that it refers to the same soul passing through innumerable generations, for God's command had been given once to all the souls, and these souls are re-embodied over and over again.

'One generation goeth, and another generation cometh' (Ec 1:4). The fact that the passing away of the generation is mentioned first is a proof that this must have existed before; otherwise it ought to read 'one generation cometh and another generation goeth.'

'Which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive' (Ec 2:26) is interpreted to mean that the living are still uncertain as to the future fate of the migration of their souls.

A proof of the doctrine of the Zohar is also drawn from the following verses: 'Ye shall therefore separate between the clean beast and the unclean,' etc. (Lev 11:41), meaning to be added, not an unclean. 'Shall flocks and herds be slain for them, to suffice them?' etc. (Nu 11:25), is taken to mean the addition of souls. 'O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh,' etc. (Nu 16:30), means also those that are added to strengthen them 'should one man sin,' whose soul proved too weak, as it had no support to draw upon. 'The bough of life' (Pr 14:17) means that a man attaches another soul to himself.

The letters of the name of Adam have been taken as the initials for Adam, David, Moses, and Messiah; hence the saying runs that the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. The same soul is grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer to the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vehicle of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.

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'Which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive' (Ec 2:26) is interpreted to mean that the living are still uncertain as to the future fate of the migration of their souls.

A proof of the doctrine of the Zohar is also drawn from the following verses: 'Ye shall therefore separate between the clean beast and the unclean,' etc. (Lev 11:41), meaning to be added, not an unclean. 'Shall flocks and herds be slain for them, to suffice them?' etc. (Nu 11:25), is taken to mean the addition of souls. 'O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh,' etc. (Nu 16:30), means also those that are added to strengthen them 'should one man sin,' whose soul proved too weak, as it had no support to draw upon. 'The bough of life' (Pr 14:17) means that a man attaches another soul to himself.

The letters of the name of Adam have been taken as the initials for Adam, David, Moses, and Messiah; hence the saying runs that the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. The same soul is grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer to the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vehicle of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.
and Babylon (14th cent.) prepared the way for the development.

Palestine—in a lesser degree the adjoining Babylon—seems to have been throughout the centre of mystical speculations. Thither Nahmanides had gone, and a great school flourished in Akko for several centuries from the 12th onwards. The flight of the Spanish emigrants at the end of the 16th cent. was also towards Palestine. In Safed there arose the school of Luria (1534–72; commonly known in the Talmudic literature as Isaac Ahkenazi, Vital Calabrese, Cordovero, Popper, and others. Among other doctrines, they developed, in the writings Kavvanoth, Eḥ Hasidim, etc., much fantastic accounts of the doctrine of thechain of migration, became one of the prominent features of this school, which led to that of the Hasidim. Remarkable legends of such deliverance are henceforth told. Every pious and great kabalist performed them, none, however, so effectively as the master Luria himself. The history of the deliverance of such a soul in Safed is one of the most vivid autobiographies of a 'wandering soul' (first published in the Emes le-Haim in 1606; translated into English in 1946) and the teaching of divine revelation appears for the first time in that of Luria himself. The belief that certain persons are the yidqul of other persons who have lived before them is still strongly held by those to whom the Zohar is an inspired book and the teaching of divine revelation appears for the first time in that of Luria himself. The belief strengthens in them the concept of God's righteousness, and the conviction that, if the time were hastened for all the created souls to pass through the human body, the advent of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God on earth would be hastened.

LITERATURE.—The books mentioned in the course of this attempt at a systematic exposition of the doctrine of metempsychosis in its first form—form the only literature that can profitably be mentioned. The most useful works are the following: *Manasseh ben Israel, Nishmat Hayim* (1650), *A. Frank, La Kabalah* (Paris, 1892); *A. Jellinek, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Kabala* (Leipzig, 1861-65); *E. Sch. Leibler, Leipzig, 1849*; and *G. Stanger, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Kabala* (Leipzig, 1861-65). These, of course, refer briefly to this apparently unimportant section of Kabalistic Zoharitic speculation. See also literature to art. *Kabala*.

M. GASTER.

**TRANSMIGRATION (Teutonic).—** It is clear that the doctrine of metempsychosis was held by the early Teutonic peoples, though the amount of evidence is limited and for the most part dates from a time when heathen beliefs, if not forgotten, were at least misunderstood. Such evidence as exists is chiefly derived from Scandinavian records. The only reference in early poetry is to be found in Sigurd: *Sarkvaka hinn skomma* (45), where Hogni refuses to hold Brynhild back from self-destruction.

Let no man stay her from the long journey, and may she never be born again (apstrorbin).”

More striking evidence for the belief is furnished by the prose passages contained in Helgakvida Hjörvarðssonar and Helgakvida Hundingsbana, ii. At the end of the former it is said that Helgi and Svaði, the hero and heroine, were born again (endrörbin); in the latter we are told that the hero and heroine, after being dead, were again (endrörbin), and later that both she and her husband Helgi Hundingsbani were born again as Kára and Helgi Haddingjar-kati. A reference is given to Káraljófs, a poem mentioned above, which dealt with the adventures of these persons. Moreover, in the Gautreksa Saga, c. vii, Starkrúf is reviled as an endrörbin junkm, a 'giant' reincarnate; his grandfather Starkrúf is said to have been a jötunn (v. lvi). With the introduction of Christianity metempsychosis came at last to be regarded as 'an old wives' tale.' For a time it still survived among the half-heathen population: to his horror St. Olaf found himself regarded as the reincarnation of a legendary king, one Olafur Geirstaðarson (Flateyjarbók, i. 135).

It is not to be overlooked that in all these cases the men—though not the women—bear the same names in each incarnation. As among certain primitive peoples of the present day, the name is regarded as something more than a mere name for it is intimately connected with the soul of its possessor, so that a child inheriting the name of a dead person necessarily inherits the soul as well. An interesting reference to this belief may be cited from Flateyjarbók, i. 259: "Thorsteinn Uxafot, a follower of Olaf Tryggvason, is visited in a dream by the ghost of a man called Brynjarr; he bestows a treasure on him and asks in return that one of Thorsteinn's children should be baptized under the name Brynjarr, since it desires a Christian reincarnation for its heathen soul.

In the Islendinga Sögur there are no actual references to metempsychosis, though the practice of naming children after lately deceased kinmen (Nyja Saga, c. 89; Eyvindar Saga, ch. 12; Laxdaela Saga, chs. 36, 56) points to the existence of such a belief. But the passage in Skáldinga Saga, ix. 42—’Kóbiinn er ek stór* ok endrörbin—*is no true instance of this kind, since Thorvik Bósvaðr, referred to here, was born in 1226, nineteen years before the death of Hróarlóf, from whom the poet says he has been raised—and accordingly the child is baptized with the name of the dead person (cf. K. Maurer, Zeit schrift des Vereins für Volkskunde, v. 99). Sophus Bugge, moreover, states that he had heard reise upp atte ('raise up again') used in the west part of Telemarken, and the notion of rebirth is certainly known in the Hebrides. (Home of the Earldom Poems, London, 1899, p. 83.) Among the other Teutonic peoples the evidence for anything in the nature of metempsychosis is very meagre. An Anglo-Saxon charm (T. O. Cockayne, Lesebøk, Worterhoring, and Stor Skrift av Eorl Englesom) London, 1898, ii. 63, 68 ff.; C. W. M. Grein, Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Göttergeschichte, Göttingen, 1875-87, i. 326 ff.) advises a woman who cannot bring forth a child to step thrice over the grave of a dead man, using an incantation for the safe delivery of her offspring. It is a question whether the same idea can be traced in certain usages said to be practised in connexion with burial-places of the heathen age in various parts of Northern Europe.

It may be mentioned in conclusion that Appian (Hist. Rom., v., de Rebus Gallicia, 3) describes the Germans who followed Ariovistus as 'searing death because of their hope of rebirth' (καταργοῦντες τα προσθένα δάμα πενθόν). In view of what is said of the Gauls by Dio, v. 23, and Lucan, Pharsalia, i. 454 ff. (with the scholia), it is not unlikely that the reference here is to a belief in metempsychosis, though one cannot deny the possibility that Appian's statement may be due to a misunderstanding of the Valhallan doctrine.


BRUCE DICKENS.

**TRANSUBSTANTIATION.**—See Eucharist.
TRAPPISTS.—Trappists is the popular name for the Reformed Cistercians, or Cistercians of the Strict Observance, now the chief division of the order.

The art. MONTAIGNIC outlines the successive reforms of St. Benedict, Cluni, Citeaux. By 1000 the Cistercians themselves had yielded to the spirit of luxury, despite the restoration in Spain promoted by Martin de Vargas. Though Richelieu and Mazarin furthered many attempts to recall them to the letter of their vows, and though their centralized constitution might have facilitated this, a general reform was refused. Here and there a few abbeys did return to the ideals of St. Stephen Harding, the Jansenist reform of St. Cyr and of Port Royal being well known. Armand-Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé (1629-1700), abbott in commendam of La Trappe from the age of ten, abandoned court life in 1689 and entered one of the reformed abbeys as a novice. Two years later, having again professed, he came to take charge of his own inaccessible Norman abbey. Finding that the few monks who had not shared his experience wished for his ideals, he pensioned them off and colonized the place from other reformed abbeys. The community improved on the original austerities, taking only one vegetable meal daily, abstaining from literature and from speech except for urgent purposes. The ideals were published by de Rancé in his Traité de la sanctité et des devoirs de la vie monastique (1683), and in his posthumous Règlements généraux de l'abbaye de la Trappe (1701); but only a single community of nuns and two Italian monasteries adopted them. For a century they were unimportant, though other Reformed Cistercians undertook missions to Africa which had some temporary success.

The French Revolution broke up the house; the abbey was suppressed, and the premises were converted into a foundry for cannon. This was the real birth of the order. In 1791 Dom Augustin de Lestrage, master of the novices, took a score of monks to Val Sainte, Switzerland, imposing a rule stricter than ever; postulants flocked in; colonies were sent to many lands; a congregation was formed, and Dom Augustin was appointed father abbot. When the Trappists were hunted to Poland, Germany, and Italy, their zeal only increased. A monastery was formed at Stapelholz near Wimborne; a party of monks that wandered through Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois returned to France on the fall of Napoleon, occupying La Trappe and Belle Fontaine; presently five priories were established in France, and a great college at Solignac. Before his death in 1827 Dom Augustin saw abbeys grow up in Belgium and Italy, besides two more in France. One was founded at Coalville in Leicestershire and named after the great Bernard. The soul of his house Alberic was taken in 1848 by an expedition from Le Mellieray in Brittany, which settled in Kentucky and renamed the abbey at an abbey named Gethsemene. Mount Melleray in Ireland sent another colony to Dubuque in Iowa, and both establishments thrive, though all the fathers are aliens. A second Irish abbey arose at Roscrea in Co. Tipperary. Each new district intensified the spiritual life. La Trappe was destroyed by fire in Aug. 1871; 1450 fathers and brothers were again expelled from France in 1889; but the austere ideals were carried on by a new order of Cistercian convents in Austria-Hungary. After two constitutional changes they were formally recognized in 1892 as the Order of Reformed Cistercians, with an abbot-general at Rome; and this success was crowned six years later by the purchase of the original premises of Citeaux. In 1903 they were expelled from France in common with most other congregations; two communities went to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, one to Oregon, one to Brazil; two tiny groups have taken refuge near Kingleybridge and Sze. Citeaux. In 1912 they had attempted to uphold the agricultural ideals of St. Benedict, especially by its Canadian offshoots at La Trappe, where the Ottawa joins the St. Lawrence, at Lake St. John, and at several points in the Prairies. No establishment in England offers even to its eremites any educational, medical, or philanthropic service. Settlements in Japan, China, Turkey, Syria, Asia Minor, Algeria, Belgian Congo, and Natal have undertaken mission work; but no impartial observer has anything to say as to results. The finest Protestant tribute is that an abbey is an asylum for the poor and helpless, the shipwrecked, the conscience of society, the heart of the heart.

Attached to each of the 71 monasteries and branches is a body of brothers who do the rougher field work; in all there are about 2000 of these, and 1600 professed fathers. Twenty-one priories in Citeaux and 2000 monks and lay brothers and novices, the Trappist monasteries still follow the rule of de Rancé as once used at La Trappe, but do not belong to the Reformed Cistercians; they have only 50 members.


TRAVANCORE.—Travancore (Malayalam Thiruvithānuṟṟu, "place where the goddess of prosperity resides"). A native state of the south-west of the Indian peninsula, takes its name from Tiruvanakod, 30 miles south of the capital, Trivandrum.

"It has been truly remarked that "it will be difficult to name another land which, within so narrow limits, combines so many, so varied, and such precious natural blessings."

HISTORY.—Travancore is said to have formed part of the ancient kingdom of Kerala. During the 11th cent. A.D. it was conquered by the Cholas; in the 15th cent. it was invaded by the Pandyanas of Madura. The present kingdom was founded in the first half of the 18th cent. by Marthanda Varma, and in 1795 it became a protected state under the British Government. Since then it has enjoyed prosperity under a well-regulated government, and it has been conspicuous for the practice of order, religious toleration, and encouragement of education.

2. Area and population.—The area of the state is 7,708 sq. mi., and the total area of Travancore in 1900 was 3,489,975, of whom 93.8% are rural and 6.2% urban. The density of the population is high : 492 per sq. mile for the whole area, and 686 if mountains, lakes, and forests are excluded.


cluded. The people are of the usual S. Indian Dravidian type, and there are many characteristic usages, in particular the matrarchial forms of the household and system of marriage.

"Among the Marumakkathayam (Malayalam marriage, 'next,' 'firstborn,' 'child,' 'son,' 'husband,' 'father', 'portion'). Hindus the family is matrarchial, i.e., traces its descent from a common ancestress. The Tarwad [Malayalam taruva, taru, 'village,' 'patru, 'place'], as the family, consists of the sons of the head of the family, the husbands and the descendants of the latter along the female line. The women of the Tarwad (originally 'originators') manage the Tarwad. In such a system the wives and children of the male members have no place. It may happen, however, that a Karanavan may be allowed to bring in his wife and children to live in the Tarwad, but this is not necessary, nor have they any legal status in the family. The male members who are married usually their wives in the houses of the latter. When, however, under modern conditions, they feel able and inclined to support themselves, living apart from the Tarwad, they settle with their wives in houses of their own. In this way the putting up of separate households receives a stimulus. But the Tarwad, as such, is split up only when a partition takes place with the consent of all the members. Among Marumakkathayam Hindus the joint family does not generally continue after the lifetime of the parent, especially the male parent. At the death of the father the sons divide and go live in separate houses with their wives and children, the marriage ceremonies taking place in the original houses.

The unmarried sons, if any, usually live with the mother. In regard to the Nampally Brahmapas, however, the oldest son is not separated, and he and the younger sons live with him the family.

The chief castes are the Nayar (g.v.) honorific plural of Nayan; Skr. naga, 'leader' number 592,335, best known on account of their peculiar music, 'Kumakom.' The Luhvans or Ilavans, who take their name from Izhaim, the Malayalam name for Ceylon, are immigrants from that island, cultivate coco-nut and palmky palms, make the palm leaves, and are distillers.

The Perumals suggest that traders from Arabia arrived as early as the 8th cent. A.D. 2. In more recent times, under the rule of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore (A.D. 1761-1799), compulsory proselytism added large numbers as toddy (Skr. kall, 'palm tree'), and distill country spirits; they number 546,295. The Pulayas (pula, 'pollution'), numbering 183,314, are agricultural labourers. The Tarwads or Sherry cultivate the palmky palm and make coarse sugar. Brhamans number 55,643; among them the most remarkable are the Nambari, Namboodiri, or Namboodari (Malayalam nambo, 'the Vedas, Vedas, teach'; tiri, Skr. skri, 'holy'), who aim at following the original Vedic rites and practise elaborate rules of purification, while they allow the younger sons of the family to enter into polyandrous relations with Nayar woman. 3. Religion.—Classified by religion, the population consists of: Hindus, 2,322,017, 66.37%; Christians, 305,368, 29.36%; Muhammadans, 230,617, 6.61%; animists, 15,417, 0.46%; Jews, Buddhist, and Jain's, 100.

(a) Hindus.—Of the triad, Brahmana, Vigna, Siva, the cult of Vishnu is most popular; in the form of Anumandha, 'the chief, from which the navel springs the lotus.' He is the patron deity of the state, with a famous temple at the capital Trivandrum, which is visited by crowds of pilgrims. Among the minor deities the following are the chief: Vigneswara ('obstacle Lord'), the Ganga or Ganapati of other parts of India; Subrahmanya, Skanda, Kartikkeya, or Velayudha, like Ganesa a son of Siva, the guardian who protects the helpless and of special use to the cult, special to the Tamil and Malayalam peoples; Sasta ('ruler'), Aiyappan or Aiyarar ('honourable father'), the most popular minor deity, chief of the ghosts (bheg), who ride over the land mounted on a horse or elephant, sword in hand, to disperse all obnoxious spirits. Besides these the lower classes worship a host of gods or minor spirits, male and female. Among the few of the goddess Bhadrakali, the males classes as followers of Siva.

1 Census of India, 1911, vol. xxiii. pt. 1, p. 41.

(b) Christians.—These show a notable increase, from 945,542 in 1891 to 903,385 in 1911. The Hindu compiler of the Travancore Census Report for 1911 writes: '. . . it may be remarked here that the degeneration of the socio-economic institution of the Hindu was itself in the acquisition and neglect of the labouring classes, the differentiation of lay and ecclesiastical Hindu bodies in the matter of the reservation of their hiemoral force in the intellectual and moral life of the people, the atmosphere of unsuspecting toleration one breathes in all sides, the great respect and help accorded by the rulers of the State, the status which the religion itself enjoys, and last but not least, the self-sacrificing zeal and devotion of the missionaries as a whole.' The pious in particular—all these gave vigour to the work and assured the results. While natural increase has been unsteady and irregular, propagandist activity has been such as to make it difficult to reduce to definite proportions the augmentation which is so rapid and great it has been.'

The following are the details of the Christian population: Syro-Roman, 293,497; Syrian Jacobite, 302,095; Roman Catholic, 173,724; Congregational, 81,673; Reformed Syrian, 74,866; Anglican, 56,281; Salvationist, 16,794. The Church Missionary Society commenced work in 1816, the London Missionary Society in 1806, the Salvation Army in 1801.

(c) Musulm.—Muhammadan missionaries are said to have visited Malabar as early as A.D. 710. In 1760, the story of the conversation with the Perumals suggests that traders from Arabia arrived as early as the 8th cent. A.D. 2. In more recent times, under the rule of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore (A.D. 1761-1799), compulsory proselytism added large numbers as toddy (Skr. kall, 'palm tree'), and distill country spirits; they number 546,295. The Pulayas (pula, 'pollution'), numbering 183,314, are agricultural labourers. The Tarwads or Sherry cultivate the palmky palm and make coarse sugar. Brhamans number 55,643; among them the most remarkable are the Nambari, Namboodiri, or Namboodari (Malayalam nambo, 'the Vedas, Vedas, teach'; tiri, Skr. skri, 'holy'), who aim at following the original Vedic rites and practise elaborate rules of purification, while they allow the younger sons of the family to enter into polyandrous relations with Nayar woman. 3. Religion.—Classified by religion, the population consists of: Hindus, 2,322,017, 66.37%; Christians, 305,368, 29.36%; Muhammadans, 230,617, 6.61%; animists, 15,417, 0.46%; Jews, Buddhist, and Jain's, 100.

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1 Census of India, 1911, vol. xxiii. pt. 1, p. 41.
TREATIES—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

TREATIES.— Their place in international law and ethics.—The history of treaties, as formal agreements between nations, ratified by the respective governments, throws some light on the development of international ethics; and the formulae and ceremonies connected with the sanctions employed at various times, to give validity to the pacts, are of interest to the historian of religion. Throughout the whole of antiquity the gods presided over all treaty-making, and the oath was a predominant factor; the transition from ancient to modern times is marked by a steady decline of this religious element. For the present purpose the juristic aspect of treaties may be ignored. But it is necessary to define their general position in regard to law. They belong to the sphere of what is known as ‘international law’; but the rules known as international law ‘lie on the extreme frontier of law,’ and it is only more convenient, not necessarily more correct, to treat them as a branch of law rather than as morals. The importance of regarding them as properly a branch of law lies in the fact that there is no fixed authority (unless it be a universal League of Nations) that can lay down and enforce these rules as between nations, and the rules are liable to be broken with impunity by any nation that has the power and the will to defy them. No pact between two nations can bind a third which was not a consenting party. But treaties, which are one of the most important means by which ‘international law’ is laid down, are valuable as a record of the development of morality, for the very reason that they express national opinion in a peculiarly deliberate and published manner. The history of treaties accordingly illustrates the growing sense of nations—which, by a legal fiction or a bold metaphor, are moral persons—for morality in international relations. It also illustrates the constant struggle to discover some means of enforcing the observance of pacts.

Upon a scrupulous fidelity in the observation of Treaties, not merely in their letter but in their spirit, obviously depends, under God, the peace of the world. Pacts sunt servanda in the prevailing maxim of international law, as it was of Roman law.

In the earliest times of which we have record this fidelity was reinforced by religious ceremonies, calling of the gods to witness, with oaths and imprecations. In modern times these religious appeals to the partiality of the gods, the reward of virtue, or the punishment of vice, have vanished from the observance of treaties, and are in part replaced by oaths, one of the chief objects of treaties in modern times has been the establishment of a balance of power in one form or other, or as to make the violation of them aisky undertaking. Finally, the impossibility of obtaining permanent equilibrium between groups of nations has raised the question of a universal League of Nations, which, in the form in which it has assumed in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, may be regarded as the highest development that the treaty has so far reached, since, by creating a determinate authority capable of enforcing the rules, it seeks to merge international law and (so far as law can make men moral) international morality in one.

Previously to this treaty, little has been done in this direction beyond the general recognition that promises and signatures are futile, and that the only security lies in the establishment of a just and stable order. But how to maintain this order in the face of the wrongdoer who, feeling himself strong enough, wantonly violates his word and destroys the peace of the world or breaks the laws of war shall be punishable has seemed an insoluble paradox, since his very act implies an assurance of impunity. W. G. F. Phillimore suggested that each state that is a party to a treaty should contract with each and every other state that is a party, that, in the event of war between any of the states that is a party to the treaty, it will observe towards the state with which it is at war all the agreed rules of the laws of war; and, if the rules are violated, then any other state party to the treaty may consider it an offence against itself that the law has been violated, such violation being considered an indirect injury, by reason of the lowering of the standard of conduct. The weak point of this arrangement is that interference on the side of law and order is merely permissive; it requires to be made imperative, and its scope extended so as to cover the maintenance of the peace of nations, and not merely the observance of the laws of war.

It is generally agreed that ‘international morality—if not international law—once the State becomes the custodian of the life of nations, is beyond its disposal, without giving offence—for example, friendly suggestion, moral suasion—to prevent the outbreak of war, or, when it has begun, to help the contending parties to compose their differences. A war between two nations directly or indirectly connected with our own may be considered as one affecting the international community. There is not and there cannot be any principle of law, of ethics or of religion, prohibiting peaceful states from doing their utmost to bring about a cessation of carnage and devastation.’

The League of Nations converts this negative into a positive injunction to intervene, and renders the offence from the most forcible methods of doing so. For art. 16 of the Covenant of the League declares that any resort to war in breach of its covenants by a member of the League is an act of war against all other members, which is to be met by a complete severance of relations of every kind, personal, financial, and commercial, with the offender, supported by the necessary military force. The provisions of this article may be considered as sufficient to cover the case of a state which is not a member of the League and refuses, in the case of a dispute, to adopt the obligations of membership. It is obvious that even this machinery will not suffice to suppress the ambitions of a state that feels itself strong enough to defy the greater part of the world; but it is equally obvious that such a state will be less ready to take the plunge than it would be if no such machinery existed.

Although the experience of the Great War of 1914–18 dashed the high hopes which were entertained as a result of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, it is unreasonable to regard these proceedings as a mere ‘misprint in the world’s history.’ They were attended by the representatives of nations so numerous and so important that it was possible to say that in the result of their deliberations we have what may be regarded as the common judgment of mankind expressed in the most solemn manner in which an international engagement between nations is capable of expression—on such vital questions as the desirability of substituting arbitration for war. For the first time, too, an international court was established.

1 W. E. Hall, Treaties of International Law, Oxford, 1904, p. 17.
2 R. L. Philimore, Commentaries upon International Law, ii, 56.
3 See art. 9.
4 See art. 9.
to give effect to the principle agreed upon by the conference. Now it is true that this solemn judgment was delayed by the wanton action of a single one among the signatories, and the whole fabric of international relations tottered. But the foundation remains, to which The Hague Conference in 1907, 1910, and 1913 returned, and when a fresh start was made in 1919, the problem of securing adequate sanction for the engagements between the nations by means of a League of Nations was attacked with the more insight and chance of success, because it was known wherein the old conferences had failed.

Among the chief reasons for the failure of treaties to preserve the peace are the misconception of the reasons wherethrough, on the other hand, not not also the establishment of permanent peace, and the lack of elasticity in their terms. If they are drawn merely to settle the questions outstanding at the time, without care being taken not to sow the seeds of fresh conflict by imposing harsh conditions, restraining progress and liberty and ignoring the claims of the peoples concerned, they do not contain temporarily suppress forces which break out with the greater violence at the first opportunity. For the same reason, they should not be so rigidly drawn as to prevent reconsideration in the light of new conditions, and should include the necessary machinery for such reconsideration.

2. Historical development: antiquity. — (a) The earliest treaties of which we have any detailed record are the twelfth treaty of Lagash and Umma, on either side of the Shatt-al-Hai in Babylonia.

Entemena, patesi of Lagash (about 2805 B.C.), records an act of similar date in the time of Meslim, king of Akkad. The actual patesi of Lagash and Umma are not named; the dispute is settled by the gods; the god Enil proceeds over the conference and invites the parties to make the treaty; the boundary is fixed at his command by Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and Ninsun, god of Umma; the king of Umma even Meslim acts only at the command of his goddess Kali. This is obviously an extreme instance of the religious sanction; the parties are supposed to live and move and have their being entirely in their local gods.

A second treaty between the same two cities was made about 2290 B.C. by Enannatum, patesi of Lagash, and Enul, king of Umma, by the plain of Gu-din, which was in dispute, was restored to Ningirsu, god of Lagash. Shines to Enil, Ningirsu, and other gods, and the country is divided by the boundaries of the treaty. The parties took oaths in ratifying the treaty: ‘‘On the men of Umma have I, Enannatum, cast the great net of Enil. I have sworn the oath, and the men of Umma have sworn the oath to Enlil. I invoke the vengeance of Enil on the men of Umma if they alter this word.’’ He also invokes other gods, to whom he has made suitable offerings, to enforce the treaty.

In the third treaty, the terms of which were imposed on Umma by Enlil, king of Lagash (about 2295 B.C.), we have a similar inscription: ‘‘If the men of Umma ever violate the boundary-stick of Ningirsu, or take Ningirsu’s plain, in order to lay violent hands on the territory of Lagash... they may Enil destroy them, and may Ningirsu cast over them his net, and set his hand and foot upon them.’’ The inscriptions recite those which are invoked on the violators of Babylonian boundary-sticks. In such cases the name was regularly employed to secure the validity of legal engagements of all kinds.

(b) The famous treaty between Rameses II. and Khattash (Hatsuish), prince of the Hittites (c. 1300 B.C.) is contained in three copies, of which two are hieroglyphic, at Karnak and in the Ramesseum, while the third is the Hittite-Babylonian version, or rather fragments of two copies thereof, from Boghaz Keui. The two which brought the text of the treaty written on silver tablets, the design of which is described:

On one side 'a figure in the likeness of Setekh, embracing the likeness of the great chief of the Kheta, surmounted by the words: 'The seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens; the seal of the treaty which Khetash... made.' That figure is within the frame of the design is the seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens. That which is on its other side is a figure in the likeness of the goddess of Kheta, embracing the figure of the prince of Kheta, surmounted by the following words: 'The seal of the Sun-god of the city of Arinsa, the lord of the land, the seal of the prince of Kheta, the daughter of the land of Kheta, of the house of Arinsa, the mistress of the land, the vassar of the goddess.' That which is within the frame of the design is the seal of the Sun-god of Arinsa, the lord of every land.

Thus the treaty is reinforced by being placed under the seals of the gods themselves. In addition we find the following invocations, corresponding to similar paragraphs usually attached to other documents which were intended to be permanently valid:

As for the words of this contract... a thousand gods, male gods and female gods of those of the land of Egypt, they are his witnesses to these words: 'The Sun-god, lord of the heavens, and various other gods, including those of the mountains and the rivers of the lands of Kheta and of Egypt, of the sky, of the sea, of the great sea, the winds, and the clouds.' These are invoked to smite the house, the land, and the eyes of the enemy of the treaty, and, as for him who keeps it, to preserve his health, and his life, together with his issues, his land, and his subjects.

(c) The covenants recorded in the OT are for the most part between single persons; but certain forms and ceremonies were doubtless common to such covenants and international treaties. Such were the setting up of a pillar and a heap of stones as witness, the invocation of the God of Abraham and the God of Naoh, Jacob's oath 'by the fear of his father Israel,' and the sacrifice and eating of bread in the mountain, in the covenant between Jacob and Laban (Gen 31:54-55). The treaty between Isaac and Abimelech (Gen 26:29) is similarly accompanied by a feast and oath-taking. In Joshua's peace with the people of Gibeon the princes of the congregation swore by the Lord of Israel (Jos 9:15).

The ceremony of cutting an animal in two and passing between the halves was used by the Hebrews in covenants between God and man (Gen 15:2, Jer 34:12), as by other nations in connexion with purification and oath-taking; but the derivation of the phrase אָרָעָה from this division of a victim is doubtful, and the phrase כַּעַר בָּשָׂר being rather parallel to הָאָרָעָה and פַּעַסְפֵּה or פַּעַסְפֵּה or דָּרְכָּה; whether these phrases refer to the cutting down of the victim, however, seems uncertain.

(d) The writers of antiquity give details of a number of more or less picturesque ceremonies accompanying oath-taking in treaties between less civilized nations. Of these the most important is the blood-covenant.

The Scythians mixed wine with their own blood in a bowl, dipped their weapons into it, took oaths and uttered imprecautions, and finally pledged each other in the matter. The Arabs made the incision with a sharp stone, smeared the blood on seven stones, and invoked God and Allat (Dionysos) and Alil (Urania). The Scythians cut the veins of a horse, and let the blood run over an altar. If it fell on the stone, it was a sign of God's anger; if it fell on the ground, it was a sign of God's favor. The Scythians also cut the veins of a horse, and let the blood run into a vessel, and if it fell on the ground, it was a sign of God's favor.

Ancient Records of Egypt, Chicago, 1906-07, iii. (1906) 373-391; S. Langdon and L. H. Gardiner, Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, iv. (1909) 178-206. The passage quoted is from the Egyptian version, in which the Egyptian name has turned the Sittu-hound into a male deity.

2. E. McLane, bk. p. 41.
3. See art. Dionysus (Artificial).
5. Ep. Herod. ii. 8; cf. i. 74; M. Lyon, Svetlana, i. 14; Nicolleti Chonta, de Isaac Angelo, ii. 536; P. C. xxxix.
6. See, for example, the two treatises, i. 33, quoted above.
blood-covenant was also in use, and treaties were confirmed by oaths taken by the gods and accompanied by the sacrifices of a sow. In a treaty of 544 B.C. the formula is: 'May the gods of the hills and the rivers, the spirits of former emperors and descendants of the gods of our seven tribes and twelve states, watch over its fulfillment. If any one prove unjust to the other, the gods shall forsake him, his life be lost, and his posterity cut off.'

(c) Coming to the Western nations, we find that the international relations depicted in the Homeric poems, though primitive, include the making of treaties, oaths, and, in some cases, the burning of the dead, sacrifices, and feasting. The Greeks and Trojans, in the historical period in Greece we find certain primitive survivals, as when Aristides administered the oath to the Greeks and took it himself on behalf of the Athenians, throwing pieces of hot iron (μέρος) into the sea. But as a rule the oaths are the ordinary ones (φθιμον δρακόν) in the name of the chief gods (δρακόν); or, as in the alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis (420 B.C.), the instruction is that each party should swear its most binding national oath over perfect victima (Σέπτος δρακόν τον μεγατικον κατὰ τέσσερα τελεια). The tendency is to increase the number of gods invoked, in the futile hope of increasing the force of the oath.

In a treaty between Carthage and Philip V in 216 B.C. the following oaths are invoked: Zeus, Hera, Apollo, the Genius (Σεβαστομος) of the Carthaginians, Hercules and Jove, Ares, Triton, Poseidon, the gods of the army (θεον τον σφαιροφεροντος), the Sun, Moon, and Earth, the rivers, harbours, and waters, all the gods who rule Carthage, all the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece, all the gods who preside over the campaign (τον κατα θεον θεους). The Magnesians in allying themselves with Syracusae (468 B.C.) swore by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Ares, Athene Areia, Artemis Tauropes, the Sibyls, the Gods of the gods, the goddesses, and the Good Fortune of King Seleucus. The Sicyonians in allying themselves with Aphrodite Stratoniatis for Apollo and the Good Fortune of the king.

The instructions frequently omit the oath as to the gods in whose names the oaths are to be taken, prescribing merely the nature of the undertaking, as:

'It will fight for the Boiotians who enter into the pact, and will keep the alliance with them faithfully and without guile, showing all zeal according to the pact; and I will bear no ill will because of what has happened in the past.'

The oaths of imprecation frequently accompany the oath; in the simplest form (as in the alliance between Athens and Corcyra in 575 B.C.) it is: 'If I keep the oath, may much good befall me, but be contrary if I do not destroy them sometimes invoked on the perjurer and all his house.' The instructions give some information as to the machinery for administering the oath. The more distinguished the oath-taker, the more solemn was the oath. Frequently the oath was taken en masse; thus in the peace with Selymbria (408 B.C.) the Athenian generals, triarchers, hoplites, and 'any one else who was there' took the oath for Athens, while the whole people of the Selymbrians swore on the other side. Provision was sometimes made to keep the consistencies of the parties alive by a periodical renewal of the oath—c.g., at Olympic and Isthmian festivals—11 or every year (Athens and Dionysius I.)

The gradual moralization of international relations in the Greek world is well illustrated by the treaties of aryia, which have for their object to do away with the rough-and-ready spirit of the primitive type of kingly repressions between individuals or states. The most famous instance is the treaty between (Eantheia and Chaleion (6th cent.), restricting seizures to the open sea, imposing fines for breach of the regulations, and prescribing the proper mode of procedure for trying cases. The Greek attitude to the ethics of treaties does not differ from that of other nations; practice also, as usual, fails to conform to precept, and there is the customary laying of the blame for breach of oath on the other party.

Archidamos before Platea calls the gods and heroes of the Plateans to witness that it was they and not the Lacedaemonians who first broke their oath. The Athenians took the oath not to receive a breach of faith by the Lacedaemonians on the stone on the Acropolis which bore the text of the broken treaty. Again, the Athenians and Celais inscribed on a stone the names of certain people of Ilius who had broken faith and been condemned to death; these people, however, returning, burned the stone; and, finally, the Athenians again provided for the restoration of the stone with the names of the offenders (365 B.C.).

(f) Roman usage shows, as might be expected from the Roman legal genius, a more highly organized conception of international relations. The whole procedure of making treaties was laid down, and carried out by a definite body of officials, the collegium of fetiales, whose function it was to be the guardians of good faith in international relations. This religious body represented the Roman people in all public international acts, such as making war, concluding alliances, and so on. The functions were attributed to one or other of the kings; in fact neighboring communities, such as the Latins and Samnites, had analogous magistrates, so that the institution may have been of Etruscan origin. The derivation of their name is uncertain. There were twenty in the college, one from each curia of the two primitive tribes, Ramnes and Titenses, men of good family, in early days at least of course non-plebeians, who under the name of magister fetialis. A feral mission for contracting a peace consisted of at least two, the pater patratus and the verberarius. The procedure was as follows, supposing that the peace was to be made outside Rome.

The verberarius inquired whether he and the pater patratus were to make peace; if so, he asked leave to have the verberarius (verbera pura, or sugnima), i.e., a piece of turf from the heel of the Capitol, which rendered the person of the mission inviolable (we may compare the legal fiction of the status of embassy in the days of the Republic, when an embassy is considered to be the territory of the nation it represents). The feral mission was carried out in the presence of Jupiter Feretrius, and a fiddle knife (representing Jupiter Lapis, a primitive touch) from his temple. The pater patratus wore priest's clothing, not of linen, and a woollen fillet on his head. The verberarius selected him from his colleagues by touching his head with the sugnima. They proceeded to the place selected, and, in presence of the magistrates, and the feral mission of the enemy, the terms of peace were read, and the pater patratus swore to them on the sceptre of Jupiter Feretrius, calling to witness Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, and all present. He then slew a pig with the fiddle knife, invoking death on the Roman people if they should break the peace. Then he threw away the stone (a detail recalling the throwing away of the axe in the Atic Rhapsody) saying: 'If I withdraw violate my oath, may all others prosper, while Jupiter casts me out, even as I cast away this stone.'

The scene of the swine-sacrifice by fetiales is represented on Roman coins of the time of Augustus commemorating the ancient treaty between Rome and the Galates, and an analogous sacrifice by warriors, evidently engaged in making a treaty of some kind, is also represented on Roman coins, as well as on those of the Illyric revolt

1 C. Phillipson, Internal, Law and Justice of Attic Greece and Rome, I, 367 ff., who adds that amongst the un civilized races of to-day the same spirit of imprecation, and a similar custom among human victims—are the invariable companions of the conclusion of treaties.

2 E.g., II, v. 375 f., 408 ff.

3 Th. iii, 103 f., 208-201, lv. 156 ff.

4 Polib. vii. 9.

5 IG I 56 f., x. 422 B.C.

6 Th. ib. 199 f., 252.

7 Hicks and Hill, Greek Hist. Inscrip. no. 106.

8 See Locrivarcis in Darenwn-Sagoon, s.v. 'Fodusp.'

9 See Locrivarcis in Darenwn-Sagoon, s.v. 'Fodusp.'

10 See Locrivarcis, s. v. 'Fodusp.'

11 Michel, s. v. 'Fodusp.'

12 Hicks-Hill, no. 115, if the restoration is correct.

13 See Locrivarcis in Darenwn-Sagoon, s.v. 'Fodusp.'

14 Polib. vi. 56, 3.

15 Hicks-Hill, no. 118.

16 Varro, de Ling. Lat. v, 15 (86).


18 Hicks-Hill, no. 115, if the restoration is correct.

19 See Livrawarcis in Darenwn-Sagoon, s.v. 'Fodusp.'
against Rome in 91-88 B.C. 1 When Livy 2 describes a similar ceremonial among the Carthaginians, substituting a lamb for a pig, he is perhaps only attributing Roman customs to them; Polybius 3 is careful to distinguish, saying that the Carthaginians swear by their own gods, while the Romans perform the ceremony evidently regarded as a rite of the gods by them as well as by themselves. After the ceremony the fetials signed the text and brought it to Rome, and the whole college pledged itself to secure that it should be duly observed. It is hardly too much to say that the account given of the functions of the fetials reveals as highly organized a system, and as dignified a conception of the legal essence of the treaty, as has ever been realized. But it is a mistake to suppose that this organization is the expression of a high ethical standard. 4

3. Middle Ages and modern times.—(a) The Paz Romana makes records of treaties during the empire scanty. The swearing of oaths lingers on into the modern period.

Balin in Justinian and Choricius (A.D. 561) the 13th article contains the invocation of God and the prayer that God may compensate to him who keeps the peace and may fight on his side, but that he may be the adversary of the deceitful man who seeks to overthrow the pact. The oath taken at the peace of Aquigny between Guinnet, King of Burgundy, and Childerich, king of Austrasia (A.D. 587), is "by the help of God and the indivisible Trinity, and all the things divine, and the awful Day of Judgment." In 842 Louis II. of Germany and Charles II. of France swear "per Dominii Dei annuum et nostrum communes conservations." A treaty made in the 13th cent. by the city of Strasburg with the bishop of Worms in imitation of the oath of the treaties of the League of Nations and the closing formula is simply: "In Faith Whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty." (b) Religious formulae are also used to a considerable degree as introductory clauses from medieval times onwards, but in this feature treaties merely fall into line with all important documents. The commonest introductory formulae are: In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity, etc. in the treaty between Charles the Simple and Henry I. of Germany, 929, or in the Treaty of Vienna, 9 June 1815 and in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. A more florid element is observable in the treaty between Frederick II. and Abu-Zakaria-Yahia, king of the Saracens of Tunisia, in 1231.

1 In nomine Dei misericordia, miserasoriorius. Inopinum cum lumbus Dei maximini et inopinum ille, post eos nonum viventia.

2 The importance of the religious sanction made it a long moot whether nations of different religions could make valid treaties with each other (a point, however, which Grotius decided in the modern sense), or, again, whether all Christian nations to be leagued together against the infidel. In modern times it is recognized that treaties are governed by natural law alone, and the religious element, either in the content or in the phraseology of treaties, has naturally become much less discernible—to such a degree that the profession of Christian principles in the Holy Alliance (29th Sept. 1815) between Austria, Prussia, and Russia marked a deep and justifiable impression of insincerity. In this remarkable alliance (the real object of which was anti-revolutionary) the contracting parties solemnly declares that the present Act has no other object than to publish in the face of the whole world their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which...must have an immediate influence on the Councils of Princes and guide all their steps as being the only means of connecting human institutions and remedying their imperfections.

It is significant that the pope was not invited to join this alliance, and that Britain was prevented from doing so. 1 J. S. Reid, in J.R.S., 1916, 172. 2 Before the Charter agrees Barbyons's Supplement to Dumont's Corps diplomatique, from Chalamseigne onwards Dumont's work is itself, and for the modern period the very special Martens. 3 Dumont, I. 98. 4 Phillipon, Int. Law and Custom of Anc. Gr. and Rome, I. 289.
originally envisaged, or may be "restricted," so that an ally excludes the application of a provision to a case obviously improper (as when, having promised to aid an ally in all its wars, it is asked to join in an unjust war—this principle of extensive or restrictive interpretation assists contracting parties in adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of the treaty).

(b) Since governments are representatives of justice, morality, and religion, it is assumed that a treaty containing an engagement to do or allow that which is contrary to morality or justice is invalid. "Pacta sunt servanda," a maxim of continental, non sunt observanda. Since conventions, treaties are forcibly imposed on a conquered state, it is obvious that this principle provides innumerable opportunities for dispute and repudiation, under the guise of conformity to the law of nations.

(c) How far is a treaty invalidated by the employment of force on the part of one of the parties? To this it is generally agreed to answer that there is no force in the plea that one of the parties can be said, through fear, or in face of superior force, such as would invalidate a private contract, since such treaties are only a way of terminating war, which is entirely determined by force, this equality of advantage, no lesion, can invalidate a Treaty. But it is equally clearly held that treachery or duress exerted against the representative of a state amply justifies the repudiation of a treaty. The classical instance is Napoleon's exaction of terms from Ferdinand VII at Bayonne.

(d) Fraud is also clearly held to invalidate a treaty, for there is no real freedom of consent on the part of the deceived party. The distinction is sometimes a little delicate between positive fraud and suppressio veri. In the negotiations for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1849) Webster suppressed a map which concealed a large number of cause. The map could have been found, as Greville admitted, if the British authorities had caused proper search to be made, and Lord Ashburton agrees that he had no legal cause for complaint. Yet it is to such cases as this that the remark of Hall may be applied: "It is recognized that there is an international morality distinct from law, violation of which gives no formal ground of complaint, however odious the action of the ill-doer may be."

(e) The question of how far a party can liberate itself from obligations has been brought into special prominence by Germany's repudiation of its pledge to Belgium in 1814. To the doctrine that "necessity, when real and bona fide, overrides the obligation of the promise" R. J. Phillimore replies: "It is manifest that the State, like the individual, which takes advantage of every change of affairs to disengage itself from the obligations of a solemn covenant, would be guilty of violating the very essence of that good faith on which the peace of the world depends." So too Hall: "Modern writers, it would seem, are more struck by the impossibility of looking at internal local contracts as perpetually binding, than by the necessity of insisting upon that good faith between States without which there would have been only in it the alternatives of armed suspense or open war, and they too often lay down canons of such perilous looseness, that if their doctrines are to be accepted, an irresponsible government must never be in want of a plausible excuse for repudiating an inconvenient obligation."

Pedants such as those on whom Frederick the Great relied to justify his acts are found to be in all ages and countries. The Conference of London (1871) made the declaration: "It is an essential principle of the laws of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable convention." This declaration, which was signed by all the
leading Powers of Europe, was provoked by Russia's attempt to evade its obligations under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, on the ground that lapse of time had changed the conditions. Although Russia neglected to include the League of Nations or in the treaty with Germany, the case seems to be covered by article 16, which provides for the punishment or punishment of breaches of covenant in general.

(7) How far do honour demand the intervention of one of the guarantors, in the case of a collective guarantee, when agreement is not reached between all parties? Bluntschli holds that each guarantor is bound to act separately in such a case. Lord Derby (in connexion with the Luxembourg Convention of 1867) held that honour (but not necessity) of the legal obligation, to act. It is obvious that this difficulty could be avoided by care in drafting, and that, unless Bluntschli's view be accepted, the collective guarantee is not likely to be very valuable until we have reached a higher code of international honour than prevailed at the present time. The covenant of the League of Nations meets the case by making joint intervention obligatory on all its members.


G. F. HILL.

TREES AND PLANTS.—I. Introductory.

All plants are sacred. This principle of the followers of Zoroaster lies at the root of all plant-lore, all tree-cults. All plants possess the gifts of immortality and holiness. The subject enters into every form of religion, and its ramifications are traceable in different aspects and degrees from the tree of life to the May-pole. It rests on the early knowledge of the gift of life in nature, in the sense of communion and fellowship with the divine centre and source of life. The oak of Mamre, the ash Yggdrasil, the ashehádh, the oak of Dodona, the Ficus ruminalis, the Bodhi-trees, the pine-cones, and the seven-branched candle-stick, even the modern Christmas-tree with its lights and its fruit and its fillets, are instances of the vast area in folk-lore, tradition, and custom which has been influenced by early reverence for the sacred tree.

The sacred tree is thus deeply rooted in the primitive religious ideas of the human race. The spring, the rock, the tree are all visible manifestations of the divine spirit. They are found associated in the most ancient sanctuaries as different symbols of life; and this life, in earth or water or tree, is one with human life. This same divine spirit lives and works in all and manifests itself in each and all. The secret of religion is the recognition of this life as divine; its duty is the obligation of fellowship and worship which comes of this recognition.

In the earliest stage the sacred tree is more than a symbol. It is instinct with divine life, aglow with divine light. It is at once the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This animistic stage is traceable in folk-lore and myth, in traditional survivals in later ritual, and in savage cults in more recent and even modern times. In the history of religion its influence lies behind the historic era. The burning bush, living and aglow with the divine voice, gives a conception of this earliest stage.

In the second stage the sacred tree is planted in holy ground. It is representative of the deity. It is the dwelling-place of the deity. The priest-king is its champion, and is himself the embodiment or incarnation of the god. It is as priest-king at Mamre that Abraham arms his trained servants and leads them against the kings of the earth. It is an archaic survival in an archaic fragment (Gn 14:12). The champion of the tree-god must be loyal to the cult. A new sanctuary must be consecrated by the planting of the sacred tree, though not always of the same tree. The oak of Zeus of Dodona adopted under certain conditions the white poplar and the plane. Abraham, the champion of the oak or the terebinth of Mamre, planted a grove, i.e. a tamarisk, at Beersheba. Agamemnon, as guardian of a sacred tree, and himself enjoying the divine title ἀριστοδόρος and worshipped as a chthonian Zeus in Lonicra, planted a plane-tree at Delphi and another at Caphyne in Arcadia. These plantings are examples of the second, or representative, stage of tree-worship.

The third stage is the symbolic stage. The 'grove,' or ashehádh, the common adjunct of the Canaanite shrine, is the most familiar example of this stage. It was a wooden pillar, representatiive of the living tree of the deity, 'the token of the deity's presence or a magnet for attracting it.' There are traces of it in the sanctuaries at Samaria (2 K 13:2), at Bethel (23:25), and even in the Temple at Jerusalem (29:4). The differentiation of the one deity into the 'gods many and lords many' of local and national cults led to the iconic representation of the tree-god. The stamp takes human or animal form. Hermes, wooden or stone pillars swelling towards the top, were crowned with the head of Hermes. The nude figure of Priapus as protector of gardens was of a similar character. The candelace of Hermes, a wind with a triple shoot, may refer also to his origin as a tree-god. Silvanus is represented in a similar form, with his sacred pine and also with the candelace as a symbol. And in this connection the statement of Panatasis

1 A. R. Cook, CIR xvii. (1903) 277.
2 J. R. Farnell, BBE vi. 278.
and Plyni is significant, that in ancient times the images of the gods were made of wood. And with the differentiation of the deity into the gods of the underworld and the deities of the trees, the last lighted branch of the sacred tree was burned into the trees sacred to the several gods. The oak was specially sacred to Zeus. The Ficus ruminalis of the Palatine was originally the sacred tree of Romulus. Jupiter was associated with the oak on the Capitoline Hill. The cult, in early times as wide as the world, was narrowed when no sanctuary could be dedicated to Apollo which was unfavourable to the growth of his sacred laurel.

Primitive worship was essentially an act of fellowship and communion with the deity. The vestment of the worshipper was the sheep-skin or the goat-skin specially sacred to the deity worshipped, as the white robe of righteousness is the symbolic vestment of the Christian worshipper. This is generally traceable in theriomorphic cults, as in the Lupercalia. But it is traceable also in tree-worship. The victor in the Olympic games was treated as the human representative of the tree-god. He was decked with olive and crowned with a helmet filleted and crested with the twig of the victor’s tree. The English Jack-in-the-Green of the old May-day sports and the Kentish Holly-boy and Ivy-girl of the Shrove-tide revels are reminiscences of this worship.

Sacrifice and worship were closely linked together. In the archaic tradition of Abraham (Gen 15:9) Melchizedek, king of Salem, brought forth bread and wine; and he was ‘ priest of the most high God’ (El Elyon). Sacramental communion with the deity is the essence of the mysteries, and the mysteries belong to the primitive stages of religion: ‘I fasted; I drank the kykeon; I took from the basket.’ This was the touchstone of the saera, the sacramental core of the mysteries of Elenis. They were rites sacred to Demeter the Earth-Mother. She is the Mountain-Mother (q.v.), the mother of the gods, represented with her pillar-shrine, the pillar of her sacred tree. She may be compared not only with Isis, but with Hathor and her sacred sycamore. Hathor nourished the wandering souls in the cemetery of Egypt with food and drink. The Cretan Demeter in her mysteries nourished her mystics in life. The mysteries of Dionysus belong to the same cycle of ideas. Dionysus combined in himself the rites of the beer-god Sabazios of Thrace and the evergreen-angry god Zagreus of Crete. The haoma of the Persians, the soma of the Hindus, the ambrosia of the Olympian gods, were all means of sacramental communion, a partaking of the tree of life.

The sacred tree, instinct with the divine life, is vocal with the word and the will of the deity. A prominent feature of the Zeus-cult of Dodona was its oracle. ‘And the giving of oracles was a chthonian prerogative.’ 2 David is to consult the oracle of the mulberry-trees before he attacks the Philistines (2 Sam 5:11). God called unto Moses from the midst of the bush in Horeb (Ex 3:4). The sacred tree is allight with the wisdom of God. To partake of the acorns of Zeus was to acquire wisdom and knowledge. 28 The burning bush points to the symbolic meaning of the seven-branched candelabrum in the temple. It is a budding and blossoming almond (Ex 37:23-34). The imagery of the rod out of the stem of Jesse, and the Branch growing out of his roots, the setting of the sevenfold gift of wisdom, is another illustration of the same truth (Is 11:1-3; cf. LXX). And this again illuminates the meaning of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen 2:9). The tree of life and the oracle of the God of righteousness, as the seven lamps are ‘the eyes of the Lord... beholding the evil and the good’ (Ps 19:2; cf. Zec 4:9, 2 Ch 18). The tree of knowledge is the oracle of religions and moral wisdom.

2. The animistic stage in tree-worship.—The tracing of this stage in its original simplicity is almost as elusive as animism itself. In prehistoric times it was already buried in higher religious conceptions and revelations, in the higher physical and religious and ethical development of the human race. Jahweh finally triumphed over the tr’lloids, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them. This is the principle in all religious development. The burning bush was not merely the oracle of Horeb; it was the dwelling-place of Jahweh (De 4:33). The fable of the trees and the humble king was spoken by the plain (oak or terebinth) of the pillar that was in Shechem (Jg 9:21). It is a survival of ancient religious conceptions, an apologue or parable in early tree-worship. The story of the thistle and the cedar is another (2 K 14:7).

Tree-worship pure and simple, where the tree is in all respects treated as a god, is attested in Arabia. In the case of the sacred date-palms at Nejran. It was adored at an annual feast, when it was all living with fine clothes and women’s ornaments. 2 The sacred eres in the temple of Isai at Byblos was said to have grown round the body of Osiris. It was a stump wrapped in a linen cloth and anointed with myrrh. It represented the dead god. It is suggested that this explains the mystery of the draping of the osshereth (2 K 23:4). There are similar survivals in Greek ritual. Incense was burned and the tree was decked with fillets and honoured with burnt offerings. Mrs. Philpot gives an illustration of a fruit-tree dressed as Dionysus—another example of draping as part of this early ritual. Cook in his exhaustive monograph on the cult of the oak-Zeus has traced it through all the earliest sanctuaries of the Mediterranean area, especially in Dodona and Crete, and has given his conclusion as follows: 2b

2 Zeus was at each of these cult-centres conceived as a triple divinity (sky-god—water-god—earth-god) dwelling in a sacred oak and served by a priestly-king, who was the guerdon of Zeus himself and whose duty it was to maintain the sun’s heat by magical means.

The Minotaur, the Egyptian horns of consecration, and the axes are also features in this ancient ritual.

This survey of the primitive cult is a key to the early worship of the sacred tree, not only in Celtic folk-lore and Cilician sculpture, but in the survivals of pagan worship. E. Clodd gives a study of the ‘primitive pagans’ of S. Nigeria which sum up the animistic conception of tree-worship.

4. Recent traveller among the ‘primitive pagans’ of Southern Nigeria reports this speech fragmentative. 5a. ‘Yes, we say, this is our life—the big tree. When any of us dies his spirit does not go to another country, but into the big tree; and this is why we will not have it cut. When a man is sick, or a woman wants a child, we sacrifice to the big tree, and unless Oo’wo wants the sick man, our request is granted. Oo’wo lives in the sky, and is the Big God. When any of us dies away from this place, his spirit returns to the big tree.’

Among the Hamitic tribes the crude animism has developed into a sort of polytheism with one highest god, Waq. He is the big god of the big tree of Nigeria.

2 Philpot, p. 25.
5 See art. SHROVE-TIDE.
7 Ps. p. 55.
8 Philpot, pp. 122-127.
9 Philpot, p. 56.
10 Philpot, p. 56.
11 Philpot, p. 38.
12 Philpot, p. 116.
13 Philpot, p. 175 n.
14 Philpot, p. 31.
15 Philpot, p. 31.
17 Phil. xvi. 403.
18 Phil. xvii. 45.
20 Philpot, p. 60.
The tree-cult of the aboriginal Africans is today largely associated with ancestor-worship. This was natural. For the trees of their ancestors acquire a sacred character. The great tree on the verandah of a dead man's home becomes the shrine of his spirit. And it is held that the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship. One tree is hailed with the words: 'Holy art thou, our ancestor.' The facts must be accepted, but the inference may be questioned. The polytheism and the ancestor-worship are both to be traced to the more primitive forms of animism represented in Egyptian evidence as the cult of the Great Spirit or the oak-Zeus. They are both due to the principle of differentiation in the development of religious conceptions.

Anthropomorphism is in some cases preceded by theoanthropomorphism, but theoanthropomorphism is never generated out of anthropomorphism.

All life in primitive ages is one, and in its movement inspires fear, not only the fear of God, but the fear of Isaac (Gen 31). It is Jacob who 'saw the fear of his father Isaac' (Gen 31). And Jacob by his wrestling attained the title of Israel (32). Abraham was the priest-king of Mamre, Melchizedek the priest-king of Salem. At Olympia and probably at Dodona the challenge of the primitive gods was given rise to a regular athletic contest. Minos as priest-king of Crete had a reign of limited duration. He was king for a period of nine years, when he withdrew to the Idean cave to convert with Zeus. Thebes, by its victory over Minos under the guise of Taurus, succeeded to the sun-king's rights as champion of the oak-Zeus. Is it not evident that, behind and preserving the here-cult of Theben and the veneration for Israel, there is the ritual and there are the sacra of the deity, whether Zeus or El Elyon or Jahweh, the Great Spirit of primitive animism?

3. The sacred plantation. The planting of the sacred tree or grove is a further step in the development of tree-worship. The primitive priest-king does it as champion of the tree-spirit, under the conscious guidance of God. Eden is the most familiar example of a sacred plantation (Gen 29). The practice of primitive religions colours the language and imagery of poet and prophet (cf. Nu 24:5, Ps 104:16, Is 58:1). The riddle and parable of Ezekiel has new meaning when read in the light of early ritual:

'Great eagle . . . came unto Lebanon, and took the highest branch of the cedar: He cropped off the top of his young twigs, and cut off the wanton bough thereof; he set it in a city'dwelling; he took also of the seed of the land; he placed it by great waters, and set it in a willow tree. And it grew, and became a spreading vine of low stature.' (Ezek 17:24; cf. Ps 89:35).

In Aegaeart the living tree is represented sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of three, or in groves. It is at times close to an altar, or even growing from it; in one case the goddes sits under it. The palm-tree, the fig, and the cypress are most frequent; but the pine, the plane, and the vine also appear. It may even spring from the buxurica, or 'horns of consecration,' which themselves represent the sacred bull, the theomorphic representation of the oak-Zeus.

At Athens the original cult was that of the oak:

'Nondum laurus erat; longique decentia crina
Tesserae, atque arbor, ut qualibet aere Phoebum.'
There are in the Caryatides, or nut-maidens, traces of a nut-grove, the nuts themselves being known as the acorns of Zeus. Later, after this first stage of substitution, 'Zeus took over the olive.' These

1 Cook, Chil. cxxv. 96.
2 ERE i. 395.
3 Ezk. xxxii. 17; 46:10; 47; 50:11; Jer. ii. 16.
4 Ezek. xxxii. 17; 46:10; 50:11; Jer. ii. 16.
5 Cook, Chil. cxxv. 96.

The tree-cult had grown from a quicken-berry dropped by the Panthia Di Danais, who had brought it from the Land of Promise. It was guarded by a giant named Searcian, who could only be slain by three blows from his own club, and had a single broad fiery eye in the middle of his head. A youth, overcome by Dionysus, the culture-hero of Irish folk-lore. He

1 Cook, Chil. cxxv. 96.
2 ERE i. 395.
3 Ezk. xxxii. 17; 46:10; 50:11; Jer. ii. 16.
4 Ezek. xxxii. 17; 46:10; 50:11; Jer. ii. 16.
dwelt in a boul among the branches and was so great a magician that he could not be killed by fire, water, or weapons of war. Here again is there the sacred tree, the fierce-eyed god, tripod in the chalice, and the contest so typically met with in the legends of the sacred grove. And in Danu (the Welsh Don), the goddess-mother of the Tuatha Dé Dannann, is there not a link with the Demeter of Greek myth, and in the name itself of the oak-Zeus, and of Janna, Diana, Artemis on the slope of the Aventine? She is the earth-goddess, the Dea Dia of the Romans, the Dan of the Dorian Greeks: εἰς τὴν Δώρον τὴν τοῦ Νευροκλέα Βασιλιάς.1

4. The sacred stump.—The Lion Gate at Mycenae is one of the earliest aniconic representations of the worship of the sacred tree. The pillar of which the lions are the supporters tapers downwards like the ancient Herms.2 The subject has been very fully treated in Art. POLES AND POSTS; but some further links may be noted.

Of the thyrse shrines of Chios, with its sacred doves is recognized by Cook as a 'conventional but still aniconic form of a triple tree-Zeus.'3 The Lydian cult of Zeus *arpeagou* was connected with the cult of ISAIA. A coin of ISAIA represents him 'as a bearded god crowned with rays and standing between two oak-trees, on each of which is a bird.'4 In the same city there was a cult of Aphrodite daimona. This cult gave its name to the city of Aphrodisias.5

The coins of this city 'show the leafless trunk of a tree with three branches. Sometimes the three branches rise separately from the trunk, sometimes from the top of a pedestal.'6 They often spring from a single trunk, on either side of which is a naked man wearing a Phrygian cap; one on the left, a double-axe; one on the right kneeling or running, turning his back upon the tree (a feature still preserved in folk-life). Sometimes the face is lighted by two lighted altars.'7

The priest of the Cappadocian cult of Bellona at Rome is represented with a branch in one hand and the two-headed axe in the other—a further link with the oak-cult of Crete.8

Amid the early rites of Etruria and the sacra of Rome there are further associations with this cult. Hermes is represented in a fragment of Aristophanes as *τριεπίθεσις*; so also is Janus on a coin of Hadrian.9 Janus is also represented with a spear; and his title Quirinus is understood in reference to the oak-god. The Sabine *curis*, the oaken spear, the Quinares, the shrine of the oaken spear, are thus related to their Quirinus or Jupiter Quirinus.10 The spear is a variation of the sacred stump. The tree-god is often represented by a post, sceptre, or spear.

The *triglun* associated with Juno Sororia and Janus Curiosis is a symbol of this triple Janus. It consisted of two vertical beams and a cross-bar, the rod form of a cross. The 'ro'ke under which the conquered were forced to march was of three staves or spears, and is also traced to the cult of Janus Quirinus. The door-posts (*jucundo*) were sacred to him, as the threshold was to the Earth-Mother.11

The sprinkling of the blood on the door-posts in Hebrew ritual (Ex 12, Ech 42) and the shaming of the threshold in the vision of Isaiah (Is 69 RV) are examples of the same cycle of ideas—the sacredness of the posts and the threshold as tokens of the Deity.

The *caduceus* is another variation of the sacred rod. It consisted of a triple shoot, the central shoot forming the handle, the two side shoots being folded back into a double knot. The elder lumps are used in the opposite shoots, and the tree is tabu in the folk-lore of the West. It is not lucky to burn it. Judas hanged himself from an elder-bush. The *litus* of the augur is another variation

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1 Hydropolus Magnus, ed. F. Syburg, Leipzig, 1816, p. 60. 2 CIR xvii. 177. 3 Beyfort, pp. 50, 335. 4 Fl. ii. 402. 5 CIR xvii. 403. 6 Beyfort, p. 90. 7 CIR xxxiv. 236, n. 19. 8 Fl. pp. 369, 372. 9 Fl. p. 393.
In Ireland ghosts and apparitions haunt isolated thorn-bushes. To call up the Tolearnia toll near Newlyn, an incantation was necessary, and three dried leaves must be held in the hand, 'one of the salt, one of the oak, and one of the thorn.'

Sing Oak, and Ash, and Thorn, good Sirs,
(All of a Midsummer morn!)
England shall side till Judgment Tide,
By Oak, and Ash, and Thorn!

The creation myth of the Tanganarin natives in Australia holds that Punji fashioned man out of the bark of a tree. Another tree was haunted by a boy; the tabu was broken; the tree was violated; the boy flew away, and death came into the world.

Daphne is the name both of the laurel and of the spirit within it. The name of a palm-tree is not called Tamar, but Ba'al Tamar. The former conception is Indo-European, the latter Semitic.

The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature. The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the two.

Among the nymphs were Philyra, the linden, Rhoea, the pomegranate, Helike, the willow, and Daphne, the laurel. Mrs. Philpot notes:

'In later times an attempt in some cases (e.g., Daphne in Laurin, Leto in Lotum, Dryops in Arbores, Daphne, etc.) to explain the connection by metamorphosis ... but it is extremely probable that this was an inversion of the primitive nexus.'

The classic passages for the oak of Dodona are Hom. Od. xiv. 327 f., xix. 298 f. In Hom. II. xvi. 223 f. the oracle is mentioned; Vergil refers to it in Georg. ii. 15 f. The oak was also sacred to Ceres; before harvest worship must be rendered to her, and the worshipper must be crowned with a wreath of oak. The willow is associated with Hera at Samos, and with Artemis at Sparta. Artemis was the goddess of the nut-tree and the cedar in Arcadia, of the laurel and the myrtle in Laconia.

The laurel is sacred to Apollo; the priest-king Anius is guardian of the tree and the shrine. The olive is specially connected with the cult of Athens at Athens. The pine is associated with Pan and Silvanus, the cedar with the Accadian deity Es, the sycamore with the Egyptian goddess Nut (Hathor). The cypress was sacred among the Persians, and in the West, together with the poplar, it belongs to the cthonian deities. The vine and the ivy were closely connected with the rites of Dionysus, and the ash and the elm appear in Scandinavian mythology as the first man (Ask) and the first woman (Embla), and the ash Yggdrasil is connected with the frost of the gods.

Celtic folk-lore has many points of contact with the ancient oak-cult of the Mediterranean area, with variations due to local developments under northern conditions. The oak of Dodona, the astrigópex, or poplar-feller, at Athens, the corinômos at Phlius, have their representative in the tree-felling god in the Paris monument. The ancient axe-rite of Dodona, Crete, and Etruria appears in the sculptures of Scelelos and other deities in Celtic lands. On the Frier monument the deity is felling an oak-tree on which three cranes, the Tarvos trigaranus, the ball, on the oak-tree, with two cranes on the back and one between the horns, is another variation of the Paris altar.

2 ib. p. 176.
5 Verg. Aen. i. 30. 6 Ovid. Met. viii. 741-743.
7 Verg. Etr. i. 12. 8 Verg. Aen. iii. 79-82.
9 Chaucer, Eneyd, cxxvii ed., Edinburg, 1899, s. t. 'Ask.'
10 Pauls. ii. xii, 3.
11 T. Homer. pp. 154-156.
12 ib. p. 166.
13 Verg. Etr. i. 17.
14 Verg. Etr. i. 17.
15 Ovid. Met. viii. 741-743.
16 Philpot, p. 29.
17 Philpot, p. 29.
18 Philpot, psalmic.
The cult of Cernunnus supplies another link. He is represented in the Cluny Museum with stag's horns, the ring on each horn referring to the sun. In the silver bowl from Gundestrup in Denmark he is depicted as Buddha-like, with Buddha's horns, and on his right a stag and a bull. In a wax tablet at Pesth he is called Jupiter Cernenus; on a Rheims monument he is with a stag and an ox, and as a stag-corn. The presence of the sun-wheel in Paris, and the bull-masks at Saintes, point to his original identity with the Zeus of Crete. In one case he is represented with a horned figure. It is not certainly connected with the horns. In folk-lore he probably survives in Windsor Forest as Herne the Hunter, who walks 'round about an oak, with great rugs'd horns; And there he blunts the tree, and takes the gale, And makes milk-chine yield blood, and makes a chain In a most hideous and dreadful manner.

It is not unlikely that the Horn-dancers of Abbots Bromley in Staffordshire commemorate some early pagan rite connected with the oak-cult of Zeus Cernunnus. Bagot's Park is a celebrated oak-forest. The village-games in old times took place round the 'Oak. Though now held early in September, in Robert Plot's time (1641-96) they took place about Christmas. The dancers wore stag-horns (reindeer, kept in the church). It is mentioned by Worsley that the Pesth tablet of Jupiter Cernenus has also an echo in a modern dance—a horned figure among the mummers of Mohacs on the Danube.

The oak also entered into the ritual of invoking Zeus the rain-god. On the Lycean mountain of Areadia it was a shrine sacred to Zeus, in which a spring to which the priests went in time of drought. He touched the water with a spring of oak and a stag's horn, and the spring would rise and spread fruitful showers over the land. In Brittany the fountain of Barantin in the Forest of Brézéléen served the same purpose. Water was thrown on a slab near the spring, and rain would then fall in abundance, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The well was near the fabled shrine of Merlin, one of the Celtic types of the sun-hero, and it was overshadowed by a mighty stag. Rhys suggests that the spring, the oak, the stag, and the tree all belonged to the Celtic Zeus. There is a similar story connected with the Snowdonian tarn Dylwyn, the Black Lake, where the slab was called the 'Chapel Rock.' The Vale of Clwyd in Flintshire, near Iddesley, a strong spring overshadowed with oak and mountain-ash long known as the Thundering Well. The name alone remains, but it may be grouped among the sites sacred to the Celtic Zeus as rain-god. Within the last few years a Celtic chambered tomb has been discovered within a short distance of the well.

The ash is also among the sacred trees of Ireland. In the parish of Borrisokane, Co. Tipperary, there was in 1833 a huge ash called the Big 'Bell' tree. The name is derived from the word 'Bills,' which occurs in Maghible, 'the plain of the old tree,' the present Moville. This name has been connected by Windish with biile or 'Bell,' king of Hades, the consort of Danu. This Bell represents Cronos in his darker character as Death, and suggests that the Big 'Bell' trees of Ireland folk-lore were ash-trees sacred to the Celtic Cronos. The ash was also sacred to the Celtic Silvanus: "Silvan sacra semelice fraxino." He presided over woodlands, clearings, and gardens.

The white-thorn has also its sacred associations. It is unlucky to cut it down. A "lone thorn" is regarded with special veneration. Christianity took over its sanctity. The Crown of Thorns was said to have been made of white-thorn. An old thorn near Tynalehy, Co. Wicklow, is still called 'Skeagh Padrig,' or 'Patrick's book.' In Britain the "holy thorn" of Glastonbury has similar associations. The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The yew among the Druids was a symbol of immortality. Celtic folk-lore has many other traditions of tree-worship. The first man in Coolemoseen in the parish of Killadown, is called the "honey-tree." A tree in the parish of Kilmactighin is called the "fern-tree," i.e. the alder.

6. Tree-offerings and tree-rites.—The cult of the sacred tree had its offerings and its rites. There are even survivals of the offering of the highest sacrifices. The natures of the Vindhyian uplands of India until lately offered human sacrifices to trees. In the animistic worship of the Atins the worship is vocal. At the close of the harvest festival the head of the bear is set up on a pole, called the pole for sending away; and the skulls of the other animals which are hung up with it are called "divine preservers" and are at times worshipped. This is a link with the bucharia which form so integral a part in the sacrificial tokens of Jewish worship. Plutarch states that the Persians on his return from Crete put in at Delos, and instituted a dance in imitation of the maze of the labyrinth. He danced it round the altar Keraton which was built entirely of the lintel stones of the temple and spread 400 cubits over the ground. According to the ritual of the sun cult, the dance round the Maze or the Jack-in-the-Green festivities within our own memory in May Fair, London, are survivals of the same rites.

The griffins in Assyria and in Asia, in their attitude of devotion to the sun, with head upturned and eyes fixed in the vision of the Temple in Ezekiel, and it was made with cherubims and palm trees, so that a palm tree was between a cherub and a cherub, and the worshipper before it has the right hand raised. Elsewhere it is a tree sacred to Artemis, hung with the weapons of the chase. Wreaths were worn and garlands were carried in various Greek and Roman uses and this use of wreaths points to some analogy with tree-worship in the two pillars before the Temple at Jerusalem. Robertson Smith gives a coin from Paphos with similar detached pillars before a temple, each surmounted above by a dove as in the rude pillar-shrine of Crete. Whether

they were candlesticks or not, they were wreathed in pomegranates. 1 On the eastern gateway of the Buddhist tope at Sānchi the sacred tree is represented as divided into two main branches, like that in Mexico, and there are two smaller trees, one on either side. The central tree is being wreathed in garlands. 2 The Bodhi-tree of Kantharaha breaks into three branches and is also hung with festoons. 3 This custom still survives in the West. Rhys has collected recent evidence from Gāmadhi land of holy wells overshadowed by thorn or other trees, on which were fastened. 4 And the present writer some thirty years ago saw a bush hung with red rings in one of the islands of Aran off Galway. It is one of the last relics of the cult of the sacred tree, like the practice of touching wood to avert a change of luck, still in use in this country.

The tree is also a trophy of victory. As late as the 4th cent. of the Christian era a pear-tree at Auxerre was hung with trophies of the chase and venerated as a god. 5 The Stock-im-Eisen 6 in the centre of Vienna is the stump of a sacred larch, now studded and bound in iron, the last remains of trophies with which it was originally hung. The Irminsul had a similar origin. 7 Romulus celebrated his victory over the Cetinienses by the establishment of the șpola optima in honour of Júpiter Optimus Maximus.

He cut down a great oak that grew in the camp, and hewed it into the figure of a trophy; thus he hastened Aecor's when his army was composed in its proper form. Then he put on his own robes, and wearing a crown of laurel on his head, his hair gracefully flowing, he took the trophy erect upon his right shoulder, and so marched on, singing the song of victory before his troops. 8 This procession was the origin and symbol of future triumphs.

The 8th cent. Gallican poet Venantius Fortunatus, author of the Vexilla regis, who lived when the honour of the sacred tree was still more familiar to the Gauls than the shame of the Cross, lifts up the old faith in his great hymn of the Passion: 9

Rerum cognitum fidei
Jactum est propter dominum

7. The tree of life. — The sacred tree was the source and sustenance of life. Worship, sacrament, and mystic charm are closely linked together. The soma-plant, the Iranian haoma, is the sacred food of the Zend Avesta, and corresponds to the ambrosia of the Greek world. 9 The Vedic āmṛta or soma had in it the principle of life and was withheld from ordinary men: it was, however, to be taken by the initiated. 10 In Sparta, early in the days, the dead were laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive. In the forest land of northern Europe hollowed oaks were used in the burial of the dead. 11 The practice among the Oddfellows of each member dropping a spring of sweet herbs on the coffin in the grave is a survival of the same early rites. In Abyssinia the branches and twigs of the tree of life are used by the pagan Kūnamas as a protection against sorcery and as charms and amulets at childbirth and death. 12 In Babylonia it is more strictly defined. The god Nin-gish-ziwa is master of the tree of life. In time of drought the priest of the Lycoean Zeus let down an oak-branch to the sur-}

1 Cf. 2 Chr. 415. 
2 Philo, p. 15, fig. 8. 
3 Jb. p. 41, fig. 19. 
5 Philo, p. 20. 
6 Schieser, Ostromer. Leipzig, 1890, p. 17; ERE II, 499. 
7 Plut. ed Langborne, I. 98. 
9 ERE II, 139. 
10 Philo, p. 155. 
11 Ib. p. 56. 
12 Ib. p. 265.
1 It has not, however, been hitherto observed though indeed the fact is obvious, that Ἰφίσταμαι is derived from Ἰφάμεα and that the mistletoe was on Greek soil thus intimately associated with the sun god in the sun cult.

An old Staffordshire custom of keeping the mistletoe-boat throughout the year and burning it in the fire under the Christmas pudding has recently been noted. It seems to perpetuate the perpetuation of the sacred fire. The mistletoe represented during the winter the sap of the oak, and this formal burning of it, like the feeding of the sacred fire of Vesta from the oak-grove of the Palatine, expresses the principle of life. It has not been customary to use mistletoe in the decoration of churches at Christmas; but W. Stukeley reports a curious custom from York:

"On the Eve of Christmas Day they carry mistletoe to the high Altar of the Cathedral and proclaim a public and universal liberty, pardon, and freedom to all sorts of inferior and even wicked people at the gates of the city, towards the four quarters of Heaven."

There was in Pultarck's time a shrine of Fortuna Viaria on the Capitol at Rome. This may be the Fortuna Primigenia near the temple of Jupiter, where stood the oak of Jupiter Feretrius.

The rota Fortunae survived till lately at Douai, when about midwinter the censer was filled with charcoal and a wheel called the rota de fortuna was carried in procession before a wicker-work giant known as le grand Gaudan, and other figures of the Twelve Caesars, the entourage of Jupiter. Thus in the public mind it certainly the Druid divinities, whose colossal images of wicker-work are described by Caesar: "All immortals, expressive of the most venerable vimsibus membros vivos hominibus compluerunt: quibus saeasavis, circumventi flammea examinans homines.

The mistletoe-boat and the various customs connected with it are all survivals of the solar cult, and, with the wreaths, axes, spears, cranes, and doves, point to the true meaning of the word mistletoe. The mistletoe-boat is made the type of the Golden Bough:

"Quales sole silvis brunnali frigus vigeat
Progri novis, quum ab eis semel arbo,
Et cruce fera terrae circumdare trucos,
Talis erat species aur frontidentis opaca"

Filius.

The yew was also regarded as a symbol of immortality. The name eborus, mid-Irish iobhar (Teara), enters into place-names and clan-names—e.g., Ebhramach (York), Ebromuain (Yverdon), Ebromna. The last-named is an instance of a tribe or clan taking its name from a tree-deity.

There was in Belgium Mughna in the west of Leinster—"a large yew," and its top known as the whole plain. Thrice a year did it bear fruit: it remained hidden from the time of the Deluge until the day of light on which Con of the House of Muirthemne rode by, and then it was made manifest. Thirty cubits was the girth of that tree, and its height was three hundred cubits. However, Ninias the poet failed that tree.

Cell-er in the Martyrology of Gorman is the "church of yews." And there is an ancient hallowed site in Staffordshire, with only the memory left of its All Saints' dedication, which is now marked by the Haschurch Yews. The churchyard yew is an ancient symbol of the tree of life.

In the story of Eden the command went forth: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat thereof: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." (Gen 2: 17).

No ban is put on the tree of life till the command is broken. Was the tree hidden like the yew of Mughna? Could it be found only by those initiated and instructed, as in the quest of the Golden Bough? It stood in the midst of the garden?

Trees and Plants

The chestnut. The witch of Endor raised spirits from the earth (I S 28:3).

At Delphi the sacred laurel of Apollo grew in the cleft of the rock.  

The chestnut rock-altars on the Aropeans at Athens are carpeted in springtime by the chestnut. Did this suggest the phrase, καρπά τοίνυνος λαμψάμε, in Hom. Od. xi. 339, xxiv. 13? Both passages are assigned to the very latest or Athenian stratum of the Odyssey.

The rustling in the mulberry-trees (2 S 5:11) has its counterpart in the story of Arcas. He consulted an oak, a sapling from Dodona.

“Tu mihi da elios: et inasola moenia regis.
Itretemit, ramisque conus sine flammea motis
Alta dedit quercus.”

The sacred cedar of the Chaldeans was not only the tree of life but "the revealer of the oracles of earth and heaven." The name of Ea, the god of wisdom, was supposed to be written on its core.

The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The mystical fountain known as Colmcil’s Well was overshadowed by nine mystical hazel trees. These were the foci of the richest ceremonial colour and teemed with the knowledge of all that was choicest in literature and art. The nuts fell into the spring, where they were eaten by the salmon, which frequented the spring. Therefore the salmon was the wisest of all things. In the story of Kuhwech, in the Mabinogion, the salmon of Llyn Llyw is stated to have been the first animal created, and its memory to surpass that of the eagle, the owl, the stag, and the blackbird. The source of its wisdom was the many-melodied hazel of knowledge. The culture-god of the Celtic west has been identified with Mercury, and with the Gaulish Godar in Ogam, the god of eloquence and wisdom. His name in Welsh survived in the word ogdd, one skilled or versed in anything. In Ireland he appears as Oges, one of the ancient Geidelic group of the Thana De Danann. He was in a special sense the diviner or discoverer among the gods. The divining-rod is the surviving relic of the tree-oracle, and the hazel is the favourite tree from which it is cut. In France it was the custom to cut it on Wednesday, Mercury’s day. This also points to the association of the hazel with the Gaulish Mercury. He was also called ‘gaiaria’, the god ‘qui vives et semitas commentas est’, and the custom of beating the bounds with a hazel-switch is another link with ancient rites.

Irish literature represents crimson nuts as forming the food of the gods. The crimson berries of the mountain-ash explain its sanctity. It has been suggested that it is the original counsel-tree of the Northern races. In Ireland the mountain-ash and the birch are still held sacred, and in Staffordshire in the 17th cent. Plot states that it was held dangerous to do wanton damage to the tree. It is still, under the name ‘wicky’, a favorite tree in the country districts. Evelyn states that it was held in such veneration in Wales that it was found in every churchyard. It is still found in old burial-grounds in Yorkshire. In Derbyshire a little cross made of the witch-wiggin is held as protection against witchcraft. Rites observed in cutting it belong to the earliest ages of tree-worship. It must be cut on St. Helen’s Day. It must be cut stealthily from a tree never seen before, and carried home by an even way that by which the wood-cutter had gone on his secret and sacred quest. As the care-tree it has been taken over by the Church in the rhyme:

"Care Sunday, care away,
Palm Sunday, and Easter Day."

Care Sunday is Passion Sunday, the Sunday before Palm Sunday.

The holly is the Irish cilena, the Welsh colgen, the O.E. holgen; it is not a variant of ‘holy’. The persistence of its red berries in December and its Christmas associations give it a high place among the trees of the north. It enters into place-names in Ireland, as in Drumrun, New, Drumulien, earl of English, King’s County. More noticeable is the occurrence as a personal name, Mac colgan, bishop of Lusk. The effigy of the Holly-boy in the Kentish Shrove-tide revels may be regarded as a substitute for the oak with its ancient religious association. At the close of the revels it was burned. The Christmas burning of the Yule-log is another link in the same chain, as the burning of the mistletoe-branch is the evidence of the continuity of the sacred fire. The Christmas-blossoming of the Glastonbury thorn and the Christmas-tree (of late introduction in England), with its lights and flowers and fruits, have been associated with the ‘strange blossoming power of nature connected with St. Andrew’s Day’ (30th Nov.). These were transferred in the Middle Ages to the Christmas festival.

Christmas-Eve was given to the memory of Adam and Eve, and this led to the Paradise-play, which formed a prologue to the Nativity-plays. The Cross of Christ was held in ancient legend to have been made of “a tree which had sprung from a slip of the Tree of Knowledge.” In the Paradise-play this tree was brought in laden with apples and decorated with ribbons.

The lights form an integral part of the earlier ideas of this tree-ritual.

In old Icelandic legend there is the story of a mountain-ash at Morthreif which on Christmas Eve was covered with lights that the strongest gate could not extinguish and whose blossoms were its blossoms. In French legend, Percival comes across a tree illuminated with a thousand candles; and in another story Durmals le Galois twice saw a magnificent tree covered with lights from top to bottom.

In Icelandic folk-lore lights are seen in the rowan-tree, and in Celtic folk-lore the scarlet berries of the rowan-tree are the source of wisdom. Is there not here a link between the light of wisdom and the bright fruit belonging to the tree of knowledge? The flames wore the scarlet tuffs in their caps.

“Simoneides tells us that it was not a white sail which Aegeus gave, but a scarlet one, dyed with the juice of the flower of a very souring holm-oak, and that this was to be the signal that all was well.”

The story of Aegeus and Theseus has its parallel in the sign of the ‘scarlet tire’ at Jericho (Jos 19:24).

The rod of Aaron was the rod of the priesthood, and the priest’s lips were to keep knowledge (Mal 1:12).

At the return from Captivity ‘the Tirshaba said unto them, that they should not eat of the most holy things, till there stood up a priest with Urim and with Thummim’ (Ezr 2:61). The breastplate of judgment contained these sacred lots (Ex 28:30). The sacred oracles are in the charge of the priest: for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts (Ezr 7:10).

The rod was the token of this authority; and the rod of Aaron was a rod of almon. The Hebrew word for ‘almon’ is shâdeh, connected with the root ‘to water’. It is the tree of watchfulness, the tree of light. Jeremiah of the priests (Is 29:19).

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Then said the Lord unto me, Thou hast well seen: for I will make my word to perform it! (Jer 1:12). And in the open vision of death it would seem that the blossoming of the almond-tree symbolizes the light of the presence of God (Ec 12:17), the light of wisdom and knowledge: 'Because the preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge' (12).

The early cult of the sacred tree among the Jews left its mark in the Temple of Jerusalem. Robertson Smith notes that, as the two pillars Jachin and Boaz, so also the golden candlestick had associations with this ancient cult.1 The pillars were wreathed with pomegranates; the candlestick was a budding and blossoming almond.

If the former witness to the tree of life, the latter witnesses to the tree of knowledge.

Light was the first of the gifts of life; and it is in the light alone that religion can fulfill the duties of life. A Babylonian seal figured by Mrs. Philpot shows the sacred tree with seven branches, three on the right and four on the left, with a fruiting branch drooping on either side. On the right is a figure sitting with outstretched hand, the head crowned with the horns of a bull; on the left is another figure sitting, without the bull-mask, but with a snake behind it.2 It recalls in some way the story of Eden; but it is also in link in the development of the seven-branched candlestick of the Temple.

The sacred twig, the sacred fire, the priest-king who is guardian and champion of both, and who is also the representative of the majesty of the sun, each and all witness 'at sundry times and in divers manners' to the religions fellowship and communion which man enjoys with the divine spirit. Silent adoration is known for in the presence of the tree of life. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is vocal in the light of divine wisdom:

'And I turned to see the voice that spake with me, and being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks: And in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man, and upon his head a crown of many waters.' (Rev 1:12-13).

This voice is the voice of divine wisdom, vocal at Dodona and Corsusus and Delphi, vocal in the burning bush, and vocal to-day in 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and ghostly strength, the spirit of knowledge and true godliness . . . and the spirit of God's holy fear.' And this fruit of the Holy Spirit is the fruit of the sacred tree.

'And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots: And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him' (Is 11:1).

It is true to-day, as in the earliest ages of animistic religion, that 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Ps 111:10).

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the footnotes.

THOMAS BAINS.

TREE OF KNOWLEDGE, TREE OF LIFE.—See TREES AND PLANTS.

TRIADS.—See TRIMURTI, TRINITY.

TRIMURTI.—Though the Rigveda does not contain the conception of a supreme triune being manifest in three forms (trimurti), which is the Hindu doctrine of the Trinity, it contains elements which have contributed to the formation of that belief. In the first place, Agni as the god of fire has three forms: he is the sun, lighting up the air, lightning in the aerial waters, and fiery on earth. On this idea is based much of the mysticism of the Vedic period, and it is reflected in the ritual by the threefold character of the sacrifices. The word used to pray for is 'May the Straya protect us from the sky, Yata from the air.'

1 P. 407 f.
2 Book of Common Prayer, Order of Confirmation; cf. Is 11:1 LXX.
3 Agni from the earthly regions,1 it appears a tendency to reduce all the gods to manifestations of three chief deities, each representative of one of the three divisions, sky, air, and earth. Yáska2 tells us that his predecessors in Vedica interpretation held that all the gods could be reduced to three: Agni, Vāyu or Indra, and Sūrya, though he himself does not adopt this view. A further step towards the amalgamation of the gods is seen in the Mātrārayati Samhitā,3 which holds that Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya are all sons of Prajāpati, the creator god.

The further development of the doctrine occurs only in the later Upaniṣads as the outcome of the adoption of the principle of the absolute (brahman or ātman). In the Taittirīya A. Upaniṣad Mahānārayaṇa Upaniṣad the highest self (paramātman) is identified with Brahman (by which Brahma is probably meant), Siva, Parvati, and Indra; the identification of Siva is probably a later interpolation, as it spoils the metre, but it is doubtless an old change in the text. In the Mātrārayati Upaniṣad4 Brahman, Rudra, and Viṣṇu appear as forms (tattvān) of the absolute, which itself is incomparable, and again are declared to correspond respectively with the rajas, tamas, and sāttae aspects of the absolute. The same triad is found in other texts such as the Prāṇaṇīhata, Bṛhārātraṇiṇiḥapāya, Nārāyana Upaniṣada and Rāmānujaṇiḥapāya Upaniṣad.

The comparative lateness and esoteric character of the doctrine are shown by the almost total absence of the conception of the trinity, where it appears definitely only in the statement of the Mahābhārata:5

1 In the form of Brahman he creates; his human form (&c. Viṣṇu) preserves; in his terrible form Siva and Rudra will destroy; these are the three states of Prajāpati.

This is the classical form of the doctrine which is repeated in the Harivamsa, in Kalidāsa's Kumārambhaca, and in the later literature. The personality of the trinity is varied slightly according to sectarian preferences; thus in the Saiva view6 the absolute, which is Siva, is manifested as Brāhmaṇa, Viṣṇu, and Bhava, the last a personal form of Siva; the Nimbarkas and other sects7 identify Kṛṣṇa with the absolute, distinguishing him from Viṣṇu as one of the trinity. There is some uncertainty whether the formation of the ultimate idea of a trinity was previous to the conception of Viṣṇu and Siva as merged in a unity, attested by the term Harishāṇa, which appears first in the Harivaṃśa; this view, however, is rendered probable by the fact that the epic appears to have identified Viṣṇu and Siva as equals before it combined Brāhmaṇa with them as their peer. The characteristic later idea recognizes a trinity of the Śaktis, or personifications of the power of the three gods: Viṣṇu or Sarasvati as that of Brāhmaṇa; Śri, Lakṣmi, or Rādhā as that of Viṣṇu; and Umā, Durgā, or Kālī as that of Siva. For this there is no Vedic parallel, though in the ṛīti hymns of the Rgveda a triad of sacrificial goddesses is found in Sarasvati, Jāla, and Bhārati.
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quite possible. It is, however, conceivable that the idea developed under the influence of Mahâyâna Buddhism, with regard to the notable triads of Buddha, Dhyâni-buddha, and Dhyâni-bodhisattva on the one hand, and of the Dharma-, Nirmana-, and Samgha-kâyas of a Buddha on the other. The Buddhist art of Gandhâra, followed by that of Tibet, China, and Japan, is prone to depict groups of three deities, Budhas, or bodhisattvas, and it is to this influence that we may attribute the existence of such sculptures as that from the cave of Ise, in Japan, which presents the three gods in one statue, and affords the inspiration for the ekâ mûrtis trayo devâh of the Matya Purâna, a passage often wrongly interpreted to mean 'One God and three persons.'


A. BERKIEIDALE KEITH.

TRINITARIANISM. — See TRINITY, RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

TRINITY.—1. The term and concept.—(a) The term 'Trinity' (from Lat. trinitas) appears to have been first used by Tertullian, while the corresponding Greek term 'Trinity' (τριάδα) appears to have been first used by Theophilus the Christian apologist, an older contemporary of Tertullian. In Greek Athens, the term in subsequent usage as the term designates the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Spirit.

(b) Although the notion of a divine Triad or Trinity is characteristic of the Christian religion, it is by no means peculiar to it. In Indian religion, e.g., we meet with the trinitarian group of Brahmâ, Siva, and Viṣṇu; and in Egyptian religion with the trinitarian group of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, constituting a divine family, like the Father, Mother, and Son in mediæval Christian pictures. Nor is it only in historical religions that we find God viewed as a Trinity. One recalls in particular the cosmology of the Pythagorean, myth of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality, which was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus; e.g., in the philosophy of Plotinus the primary or original realities are trinarily represented as God or (in number), the One, the Intelligence, the One-May, and the World-Soul or the One and Many. And the religious Trinity associated, if somewhat loosely, with Comte's philosophy might also be cited here: the three elements, the cultus of humanity as the Great Being, of space as the Great Medium, and of the earth as the Great Fœtus.

(c) What lends a special character to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is its close association with the distinctive Christian view of divine incarnation. In other religions and religious philosophies we meet with the idea of divine incarnation, but it may be claimed that nowhere is the union of God and man so concrete and definite, and so universal in its import, as in the Christian religion. As Augustine said, if in the books of the Platonists it was to be found that 'in the beginning was the Word,' it was not found there that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.' It is the very central point of the Christian belief that the Word was manifestly incarnate in Christ, and that He is still revealed in the world as the indwelling Spirit of the Church or community of Christ's founding. This Christian faith in the incarnation of the divine Word (Logos, sôros, yôsis) in the man Christ Jesus, with whom the believer is united through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the distinctive basis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

2. The development of the doctrine.—The limits of this article preclude any attempt to trace in detail the development of the Trinitarian idea from its beginnings in the Bible to its final formulation in the orthodox creeds. In various articles of this Encyclopedia this ground is traversed, such as the comprehensive art, God; the art of particular developments of ancient Christian thought like the Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Cappadocian Theologies; the artt. on individual Christian theologians like Athanasius and Augustine; the artt. on heretical phases of Christological and Trinitarian belief like Arianism, Monophysitism, Nestorianism. It will be convenient, however, to take here a general consensus of the development in question.

(a) The Old Testament could hardly be expected to furnish the doctrine of the Trinity, if belief in the Trinity is grounded (as stated above) upon belief in the incarnation of God in Christ and upon the experience of spiritual redemption and renewal through Christ. It is expected of all Christians, and not only of the disciples of the New Testament, that they will have in the old Testament a sort of a mysterious, ineffable, sort that would discover the doctrine in the literal form, 'Elohim,' of the Deity's name, in the recorded appearance of three angels to Abraham, or even in the 'sanctus sanctissimae' of the prophecies of Isaiah. It may be allowed, however, that the OT ideas of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God are adumbrations of the doctrine, as recognizing the truth of a various self-revealing activity in the one God.

(b) In the New Testament we do not find the doctrine of the Trinity in anything like its developed form, not even in the Pauline and Johannine theology, although a literal witness is borne to the religious experience from which the doctrine springs. None the less Christ is acknowledged as the eternal Son of God and the supreme revelation of the Father, and the quickening and the lifting up of the One, the Intelligence, the One-May, and the World-Soul or the One and Many, is acknowledged to be derived from on high. And so, when the early Christians would describe their conception of God, all the three elements—God, Christ, and the Spirit—enter into the description, and the one God is found to be revealed in a three-fold way. This is seen in the baptismal formula, 'In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' which at least reflects the usage of the apostolic Church, and in which the members of the Trinity are already all three associated together. It is also to be seen in the familiar words of St. Paul, 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost.' This last has been called, and justly so, the great Trinitarian text of the NT, as being one of the few NT passages, and the earliest of them, in which the three elements of the Trinity are set alongside of each other in a single sentence. If the passage contains no formulated expression of the Trinity, it is yet apparent of great significance that, less than thirty years after the death of Christ, a passage of this kind—the name of the Holy Spirit could be employed in conjunction with the name of God Himself. Truly, if the doctrine of the Trinity appeared...
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somewhat late in theology, it must have lived very early in devotion.

(c) The story of the Trinity in ecclesiastical history is the story of the transition from the theological conceptions of the Father as the Creator and legislator, the Son as the Redeemer, and the Spirit as the sanctifier, to the idea of the Trinity in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This transition is marked by a threefold distinction within the divine nature itself. With the transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma the theological statement tends to lose touch with the gracious presence of the Father as the legislator of life; but in the Athanasian Creed, which represents the form which the dogma finally assumed in the West, it appears to have lost the connexion altogether, and to move entirely in the transcendent realm.

Five stages in the dogmatic development may be distinguished. (1) The formal identification of the three persons with the Father of Pauline and Johannine theology with the Logos of Greek philosophy. In the NT the identification is in the practical rather than speculative interest, but in Justin Martyr and the apologists it may be regarded as the first step in the logical process whereby the historical figure of Jesus Christ was caught up into the purely speculative sphere. (2) The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son from the Father, which became primarily as the momentous and the cosmological principle of revelation and not therefore co-eternal with God. This doctrine, due to Origen, which may be expressed in other words as the eternal Fatherhood of God. In the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, in which the Eastern development of the doctrine of the Trinity culminated, the dogma still retains its connexion with its positive ground and basis in the incarnate life of Christ; but in the Athanasian Creed, which represents the form which the dogma finally assumed in the West, it appears to have lost the connexion altogether, and to move entirely in the transcendent realm.

3 See further, art. TRINITARIAN.

3. The statement of the doctrine.—(a) The ecclesiastical doctrine whose stages of development have been indicated may be briefly stated as follows, and the form of statement would commend itself as a whole like to the Western or Roman Catholic and the Protestant Church. For, although the doctrine of the Trinity was the subject of much discussion, dogmatic and speculative, in the Middle Ages and at the Protestant Reformation, and has been since, it has been formulated all along on the lines of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants have yielded formal adherence to these symbols, and the old orthodoxy remains still the new.

(b) There are then (as the statement may run) three Persons (Hypostases) or real distinctions in the unity of the divine Nature or Substance, which is Love. The Persons are co-equal, inasmuch as in each of them the divine Nature is one and undivided, and by each the collective divine attributes are shared. As a 'person' in Trinitarian usage is more than a mere aspect of being, being a real ground of experience and function, each divine Person, while less than a separate individuality, is a distinct hypostatic character or characteristic property (huios). The hypostatic characters of the Persons may be viewed from an internal and an external standpoint, i.e. with reference to the inner constitution of the Godhead or to the Godhead as related to the cosmos or world of manifestation. Viewed as intra, the hypostatic character of the Father is generation (gyeregos), of the Son, filiation, of the Spirit procession; whereas, none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is

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3 Ch. T. R. Strong, p. 170.
4 Ch. T. R. Strong, p. 170.
5 Ch. T. R. Strong, p. 170.
eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost
eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.1 Viewed ab extra (for Love functions externally as
well as internally, is centripetal as well as centrif-
gal, as the hypothesis of the Fatherly Power
made manifest in creation, whereby a world is
provided for beings who should be capable of ex-
periencing fellowship with the divine Love; the
inner life is the grace or gift of creation in redemp-
tion, whereby the alienating power of sin is overcome;
and the hypostatic character of the Spirit in
sanctification, whereby human nature is quickened
and renewed and shaped to the divine likeness.
Yet, while this is said, there is no separation in the
unity of the Godhead, so the one God is manifested
in the threefold work of creation, re-
demption, and sanctification; moreover, each of
the Persons as sharing the divine attributes is
active in the threefold work, if with varying stress
of function. Verify the doctrine of the Trinity
eizl in mysterium.

4. The speculative construction of the doctrine.
—(a) Although the Christian Church soon came
to look upon the Trinity as an incomprehensible
mystery of revelation, which reason might not
probe, her theologians have not refrained whether
in ancient or in modern times from speculating
upon the doctrine. In medieval times, indeed, the
document of the Trinity was the high school of
logic and dialectic.2 Then, as before and since,
reason has often made the principle of analogy
in order to throw light upon the mysterious notion
of tri-personality in the Godhead. It is a principle
that has received classical treatment at the hands
of Augustine, who employed in particular the
analogies of the human self-consciousness and the
relationship of love. It is not pretended, however,
that by such analogies the doctrine of the Trinity
may be rationalized. And, clearly, such analogies
fall on one side or the other to satisfy the conception
of 'three Persons in one Nature.' On the one
hand, the psychological analogy of the self-
consciousness does justice to the unity of the
Nature, but not to the tri-personation of the Persons.
This is as true, it has been remarked,3 of Dorner's
construction founded upon Hegel's 'being in itself, being for itself, and in for itself,'4 as
of Augustine's 'memory, understanding, and will.'5
(an eager of which he found the whole rational
nature expressed), or, as we might add, of his
mind, self-knowledge, and self-love.6 On the other
hand, the social analogy of love does justice,
more or less, to the distinction of the Persons, but
not to the unity of the Nature. In this case the
three elements are those of the loving subject, the loved object, and the mutual love
which unites them. The subject and the object
possess, to be sure, more than sufficient independ-
ence for the purpose of the doctrine, but it is difficult to
see how the love which unites may be accepted as
a distinct person, even in the vaguest sense of that
term. The application of the psychological analogy
may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the
theoretical interest attaching to the traditional
dogma for which the Logos-conception stands,
namely, the explanation of the relations between
God and the world. On the assumption that the
human individual is a microcosm, bearing traces
of the divine Personality upon him, it would seek
to make more intelligible the unity in diversity,
or more precisely the unity in trilicity, affirmed
in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Again, the
construction of the Trinity which is founded upon
the social analogy may be regarded as an attempt
to satisfy the practical interest attaching to the
traditional dogma, namely, the vindication of the
truly divine character of the Person of Jesus Christ.
On the assumption that the love-
created social unit is the real microcosm, it would
make more intelligible the trilicity in unity which
is also affirmed in the orthodox view of the God-
head. Perhaps the social analogy has been the
more influential of the two. It certainly offers a
picture of the inner constitution of the Godhead
that corresponds with the Christian Gospel: 'The
love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in
the Eternal Son; the Father and the Son are for
ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the
bond of the Divine Love.'

(b) In modern constructions of the doctrine of the
Trinity there is a tendency to make much of the
microcosm of human personality as carrying
traces of macrocosmic Reality. God is to be in-
terpreted, it is said, according to the teleological
principle of the highest, and human personality
is the highest thing we know. The result is that,
as C. C. J. Webb7 has indicated, we hear a good
deal nowadays, even in the Christian Church,
of 'the Personality of God,' whereas the history
of the doctrine is that of 'Personality in God.' This
raises the question whether the future of Christian-
ity lies in its associating itself with the modern
philosophical movement of personalism or in the
renewal of its old alliance with Platonism. Into
such a question we may not enter, but we would
cite a recent instance of a discussion of the Trinity
in which human personality figures as the key
to the mystery of the Godhead. It is S. A.
Mc Dow all's8 contention that there is more than
analogy between human and divine personality,
there is also identity in their nature. The Trinity
within us is more than suggestive of the truth
that in God personality is also triune. If we might
borrow the language of Julian of Norwich,9 the
'made Trinity' actually points to the 'unmade
blessed Trinity.' If the Godhead be a Person the
must indeed be a unity, but the unity—the like of
the unity of human personality—is composed of
three persons, which, although not self-existent but
completely interpenetrating and differentiated
from each other by the stress of their individual
functioning.10 Personality, whether in God or in

1 Westminster Confession, ii. 3.
2 Cf. S. A. McDowall, Evolution and the Doctrine of the
3 Adi. Praes. 11 f.
4 Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, vi. 183.
5 Memoria, Intelligenzias, vol. i. ix-xv.
6 de Trin. i. vi.
7 Strong, p. 161.
8 See God and Personality, lect. iii.
10 W. B. Inge, Personal Idealism and Mysticism, London,
1907, p. 28.
man, could not really exist if it did not thus involve an internal manifold. For the elaboration of these positions reference must be made to the book itself. The discussion is cited here only as an illustration of a recent tendency in the application, in Trinitarian speculations, of the principle of analogy.

5. Economic and essential trinity.—(a) The transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of economic doctrine is a matter of great importance in other terms as the transition from the economic or dispensational Trinity (τρισκελέως ἐναλλάξεως) to the essential, immanent, or ontological Trinity (τρισκέλεως ἐναλλάξεως). At first, the Christian faith was not Trinitarian in the strictly ontological reference. It was not so in the apostolic and sub-apostolic ages, as reflected in the NT and other early Christian writings. Nor was it so even in the age of the Christian apologists. And even Tertullian, who founded the nomenclature of the orthodox doctrine, knew as little of an ontological Trinity as did the apologists; his is still the economic or relative conception of the Johannine and Pauline theology. So Harnack holds, and he says further that the whole history of Christological and Trinitarian dogma from Athanasius to Augustine is the history of the development of the doctrine, as he feels it, of the Trinity. He says of the Son, of the substitution of the immanent and absolute Trinity for the economic and relative. In any case, the orthodox doctrine in its developed form is a Trinity of revelation, rather than a Trinity of manifestation, as having to do in the first instance with the subjective rather than the objective Being of God. And, just because these two meanings of the Trinity—the theoretical and the practical, as they might also be described—being sharply distinguished in modern Christian thought, it might well be that the term ‘Trinity’ were employed to designate the Trinity of revelation (or the doctrine of the threefold self-manifestation of God), and the term ‘Trinity’ (cf. Germ. Dreieinigkeit) adopted as the designation of the essential Trinity (or the doctrine of the tri-personal nature of God).

(b) It should be observed that there is no real cleavage or antithesis between the doctrines of the economic and the essential Trinity, and naturally so. The Trinity represents the effort to think out the Trinity, and so to afford it a reasonable basis. The first Christians had with St. Paul a saving experience of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the love of God, and of the communion of the Holy Ghost; and the theologians of the ages have sought to express their experience in logical terms of reason. In the effort they were led, inevitably, to effect an alliance between the gospel of their salvation and the speculative philosophy, and more especially the Platonism, in which they had been trained, while, in making room for the Christian gospel within the world—not altogether hospitable—of the Greek philosophy, they found themselves translating their empirical knowledge of God—the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ—into a doctrine of diversity or multiplicity, as distinguished from merely abstract unity, within the divine Nature itself. In other words, all acknowledged that, for all the high thrown upon it in the Biblical revelation, the divine Nature remained for them a mystery transcending reason.

(c) It is claimed, however, especially by Catholic thinkers, that, logical mystery as the Trinity undeniably is, it not only conserves the spiritual values of the Gospel, but may as well be said to embrace or encase them. The Athanasian Creed, e.g., is declared to be in effect a sublime and magnificent hymn of the Christian faith, having a power all its own to stir and uplift the souls of believers with the assurance of divine redemption in Jesus Christ. That being so, it may be allowed that there is justice in the contention that acceptance of the Trinity does not commit one to the adoption of obsolete formulas or even to the thought, but only to acceptance of the authoritative Christian tradition which the terms of the Greek philosophy served to symbolize, and with whose continued vitality they have become invested.

(d) But in consequence of a wide-spread failure, especially within the Protestant Church, to appreciate the symbolism in which the traditional Christian convictions are embodied, and to recognize in the doctrine of the Trinity of One any more than a sacred mysterious formula, modern Christian theology is thrown back more and more upon the historical revelation in Jesus Christ and the inward experience of believers by that revelation as the practical ground and basis of Trinitarian doctrine, being less concerned with what God is in Himself than with what He has shown Himself to be—less concerned with the Trinity of manifestation with the Trinity of revelation. It is part of the modern empirical movement in theology, chiefly associated with the names of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. When thus employed, historically, as an interpretative Trinitarian experience, rather than theoretically, as a doctrine of reality beyond and even apart from experience, the Trinity may be regarded as summarizing the different ways in which the knowledge of God may be held. (1) He may be thought of as the self-disclosed God and, as such, known to men as the ultimate and absolute Being, whose ways are past finding out. (2) He may be thought of as the self-disclosing God and, as such, known to men in nature and history and, above all, in the character and purposes of Jesus Christ. (3) He may be thought of as self-imparting or self-communicating, and, as such, known to men as indwelling power. God revealed, God revealing, God abiding—in these three ways God makes Himself known, and they correspond to the elements of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost the Christian knows and worships in the Christian experience.

(e) Doublesuch a statement is liable to the charge of Sabellianism (modalistic Monarchianism), but it may readily be defended against such a charge. In Sabellianism the divine nature is an abstract undifferentiated unity known only in three successive moments or manifestations, none of which is complete or permanent; they are but names, and may not be translated into fundamental factors in the divine experience. Here the elements of the Trinity are acknowledged to be rooted eternally in unseen reality, so that God is always the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, although known through the threefold self-manifestation or not known at all in isolated tokens.

(f) In the system of Christian theology the

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1 Middowall, p. 215.
2 Tr. p. 293, 299.
3 Th. iii. 8.
5 C. T. C. 1904.
7 Cf. Iliff, p. 228.
8 Adams Brown, p. 162.
doctrine of the Trinity does not usually fit well into the general doctrine of God, and often bears the character of a doctrine apart. There is much to be said for Schleiermacher's view—in his own words, reflecting, it may be, a Sabellian attitude—that the Trinity fails to be discussed at the end of the dogmatic system. One could not properly speak, he urged, of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit unless the doctrinal content  contained the Christian faith regarding the Son and the Spirit. None the less, it is quite possible vitally to relate the Trinity, conceived scripturally as a Trinity of manifestation, to the general Christian conception of God. (1) There is no difficulty with the doctrine of the Father, who in the new formula as in the old is God in all His fullness of being and life; from which fullness the Son and the Spirit abstract nothing. (2) The doctrine of the Son is not without difficulty in this connection. The old formula rested on the assumption that the divinity of Christ (the Christian conviction of which was the experimental ground of the doctrine of the Son) was to be discovered in the metaphysical constitution of His person, and accordingly by the way of analysis, whereas the new formula founds upon the idea that the divine character of the divine formula also implied that there existed a fundamental difference of nature between God and man, so that the incarnation of the divine Word was nothing if not a stupendous miracle. The new formula allows for what is perhaps the most modern conception of divine immanence, would imply that the divine-human Christ may be reached along the lines of God's normal working in His world. God is to be conceived as always present and active in the world, manifesting Himself continuously in nature and history, yet manifesting Himself supremely and fully only in the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ we have at once true humanity arising out of humanity and true God coming forth from the Godhead. In other words, Jesus Christ is the perfect expression of the divine Nature in terms of human character and life. With such a new conception of the Trinity, and such a new conception of the relationship between the divine and the human, an assured place may be found—it is claimed—for the doctrine of the Son in the modern doctrine of God. (3) The doctrine of the Spirit may also be seen to be fulfilled in the new doctrine of God towards which modern Christian thought appears to be advancing. For the Spirit is but the immanent God Himself, working more freely in the souls of men as righteousness and power because of the new channels of influence He has opened up for Himself through Jesus Christ. In short, God Himself (the Godhead) in the Father revealed; God Himself is in Christ revealing; God Himself is the Holy Spirit abiding. The form of the ancient dogmatic conception may be changed, but the substance of it remains. Still as of old we know God in His Trinity and in each relationship we have very God Himself. Wherefore we may still unite in ascribing glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.

TRITHEISM.

TRITHEISM.—1. Definition—Tritheism (Gr. τριτε, 'three,' and τρίτος, 'third') is the belief in three Gods. As such, it is a form of polytheism, defined as the belief in many Gods or in more Gods than one.

2. Christianity and tritheism.—So far as the present writer is aware, no historical religion may properly be called tritheistic, i.e., having three persons or trinities are found, they are not distinguished from other divinities as true or real gods from idols. (1) On the other hand, the charge of being tritheistic has often been pressed against the Christian religion, as presented in the doctrine of the Trinity. (2) The Christian Church has, however, expressly dissociated itself from Trinitarian views tending to tritheism. (3) Moreover, liability to the charge of tritheism regarded as sufficiently damaging also to speculative constructions of the Trinity. In what follows the writer would expound these three statements one by one.

3. The charge of tritheism.—The charge of tritheism, which has often been made against Christianity, is in a sense justified. For undoubtedly the doctrine of the Trinity has been, and is still, conceived among simple undiscerned Christians in a naively tritheistic way. Sometimes also a naive tritheism is found even in theological statement, as when in so-called transactional theories the Atone-ment is represented as the result of a bargain between the first and second Persons of the Trinity.

(1) The biblical view of God as one, and in particular in the Old Testament, God is represented as one in the unity of His essential nature, and not by the crudities of the un instructed or the aridities of theological pedantry. It is affirmed by the representative minds of Christianity that the conception of tritheism is unjustified, being largely founded upon misunderstanding of the theological terms in which the Trinity is formulated. They would insist that there is a world of difference between the formula, 'There are three Gods,' or even the formula, 'There are three distinct or separate individuals in the class known as God,' and the formula in which the orthodox doctrine may be summarized, 'There are three Persons in one God.' In fact, in the lowest and most bottom assertion of the divine unity. If in the light of the Christian revelation we are led to affirm three eternal distinctions in the Godhead, we must still hold fast to the faith of Israel's prophets and say, 'These three are one.' Admittedly, however, there are ambiguities and associations to mislead in the Trinitarian terminology. In particular, the ambiguity of the word 'person' is allowed to be a source of much misunderstanding. To set forth the true theological meaning of this word should be enough, it would be added, to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity against a charge so obnoxious as that of tritheism. We are

TRITHEISM

reminded in this connexion of how the early Christian thinkers abhorred the suggestion even that in affirming the Trinity they were reinstating heathen polytheism. It should be remembered 1 that there was no word 'person' in the vocabulary of the Greek-speaking theologians, who, as we have seen, assimilated the Trinity to the authoritative form of the Niceno-Constantinople Creed. 'Person' (Lat. persona, 'an actor's mask'), as it appears in the Aristotelian and later philosophy, among other things, to represent the Greek substantive of πρόσωπον. Now 'hypostasis' ("sediment" or 'dregs', lit. 'standing under or beneath', derived from the idea of a primary or fundamental concept) signifies a real concrete existence or actuality in contradistinction to a mere appearance having nothing solid, vital, etc., such as a comet in comparison with the rainbow. Through origens' influence it came to be employed in the theological terminology as the designation of a member of the Trinity, as in the Cappadocian formula, 'Three Hypostases in one Nature or Substance' (τρεῖς ἑπιστάσεις ἐν μία φύσει, aor. τρεῖς ἑπιστάσεις ἐν μίᾳ φύσει). The affirmation of the Trinity as a real independence—a real principle of individualization or distinction—was the Belief of Origen, and ceased to be regarded, as in the Stoeic use, as theologically equivalent to οὐσία or φύσις. It may be that the term 'hypostasis' as applied to the members of the divine Trinity suggested an independence or individuality of too complete a sort, as though the Father, Son, and Spirit were as separate in the class God as Peter, James, and John in the class man; 2 but the suggestion was corrected, at least for speculative minds, by the Logos-Christian teaching deriving from St. John and St. Paul, in which the idea of immanent distinctions in the unity of the Godhead received recognition. On the other hand, the trinitarianism of the later Greek-speaking theologians by the selection, due probably to Tertullian's influence, of the word "person" as the translation of ιδιότης, though person, as its original meaning might show, implied only a temporary and superfluous kind of individuality (an unimportant or partial definition of its own individuality), the sense assigned by which person was often rendered in the later Greek theology, it implied also the dignity and worth of a rational nature. A 'person' in the early centuries of the Latin Church was an individual viewed in a legal aspect (the word itself means a 'person for a party') in a sense as a legal person, as well as the subject of rights and duties, if not as yet in the philosophical sense of something self-conscious and self-determining. 3 This sense which has attached itself to the word in modern times. Yet even the ancient legal and relative associations of 'person' would not have been so closely attached to its theological use, especially in popular thought, and the ambiguity would tend to increase in European languages as the word approximated more and more to the modern philosophical sense of personality. So it is not surprising that there has been a strong tendency in Anti-trinitarianism, especially among the people, that non-Christian thinkers, notably Jewish and Muhammadan, have often viewed the doctrine of trinity in God as virtual or veiled trinitarianism.

4. Trinitarianism as a heresy of dogma. (a) Although aberrations from the orthodox doctrine were in the East towards a modalistic Monarchianism (Sabellianism) rather than trinitarianism, it was in the East—among the Greek-speaking theologians—that a form of trinitianism actually arose to meet with opposition and later orthodoxy. The movement in question illustrates the reaction of Christological discussion and controversy upon the doctrine of the Trinity. Christology lay in the heart of the trinitarian controversy and the development of Christology naturally led to a revision of the dogmatic terms.

(b) As a definite phase in the history of Christian thought the trinitarianism appeared c. A.D. 500 in Monophysite circles, being associated chiefly with the names of John Askoumas and John Philopon. The latter, an Alexandrian philosopher and a distinguished Aristotelian, of whose work entitled Ασκουμικανα δημοσιευματα που με και τον Χριστον ιδαιτερως as consisting of 'one person in two natures' (τρεῖς ἑπιστάσεις ἐν δύο φύσεις), and continued that Christ was a single nature compounded of the divine and human nature. Thus the recent discussion of Trinitarian terminology in C. G. J. Webb, God and Personality (Gifford Lectures), London, 1914, issues the question of trinitarian terminology.

2 Timothy, de Recepta Heretics (PFG xxxvi. 1, col. 61).
3 Ibid. col. 68.
4 In de Fide orthodoxa, for summary discussions of Triumth as a heresy of dogma. Thus, in the recent discussion of Trinitarian terminology in C. G. J. Webb, God and Personality (Gifford Lectures), London, 1914, issues the question of trinitarian terminology.
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14 Timothy, de Recepta Heretics (PFG xxxvi. 1, col. 61).
15 Ibid. col. 68.
TRUST.

In the wide sense of confidence in a
supernatural Power on which man feels himself dependent, trust enters as an element into prac-
tically all religions from the lowest up to the highest.
Savages rely on their fetish to bring them success in the chase, and other peoples on their gods to give them victory in war. But such trust possesses no ethical quality and need not further detain us. Only when the superior and supernatural Power is conceived in more or less ethical fashion can a trust emerge that has ethical and religious value. Religious trust, in the
only sense worth considering, is confidence in and reliance upon the eternal Power on which we hang, as one that is working towards a worthy end and guiding the course of events in wisdom and goodness.
It is the trust that comes to expression in Ps 33:

'If the righteous perish, what
taketh the righteous into the
sky? If the faithful
nearthens reach us to the stars? Thy righteousness is like
the mountains of God. And the children of men take refuge
under the shadow of thy wings.'

Were the facts of life uniformly of a kind to render the
moral purpose and control of God obvious and unmistakable, the exercise of trust would make no
particular demand on our energies. Since, however,
they are far from being so, the world not seldom seems to ride roughshod over man and his
values, trust always carries with it the idea of a
triumph over difficulties. In the Epistle to the
Hebrews it is presented in the light of an act of
heroism: 'He endured, as seeing him who is
invisible' (11th).

Trust of this kind is not of course to be looked for in primitive beliefs or in religions that are merely national. Nor does it emerge with any distinctness in the pantheistic religions of India.
The Indian conception of the world-order and
indeed of the principles of karma and sakhādhr as

The unity of the Godhead—preferred the accusation of
tritheism against Origen's teaching. Yet Origen's
dectrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or
Son entered into a complex of formulae, and as
a follower of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus
mightily championed the unity of the Godhead
against the polytheists (tritheists). Again, in the
mathematics of Origen and Celsus, Eriugena was suspected
of tritheism, and yet it was Abelard's aim and
endeavour to mediate between the extremes of a
tritheism like Rosecellin's and pure modalism, and his
philosophy lay with modalism rather than
tritheism. Once again, if it is not invidious to
select so modern an instance, W. Adams Brown
comments as follows on W. N. Clarke's construc-
tive presentation of the essential Trinity:

'It is hard to see how these "centres of conscious life and activity"
can be distinguished from separate personalities.'

And yet W. N. Clarke so emphasizes the Trinity of manifestation, as distinguished from the Trinity of
essence, as to be far away from its immediate
existence. It all illustrates the fact that, while the
discipline of the Trinity, as set forth in the Nicene-Con-
stantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds, will have
no traffic with truth, it is difficult in its
theological exposition of the dogma to steer a safe
course between tritheism and a Sabellian modalism
(in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are merely
the three "aspects of the one God")—which
serves to give point to Augustine's famous remark
that the alternative to the affirmation of the three
Persons is silence: 'dictum est tres personae, non ut illud dicenter, sed ne tacenter.'

LITERATURE.—See art. TRINITY.

W. FULTON.

(transmigration) is not at bottom ethically, and the
corresponding piety consists not in submission to
that order as something good, but in the desire to escape from it, and when the
goal of absorption in Brahman is attained.
Bhāgavatism, it is true, acknowledges a single
God who is personal and gracious; and in its
conception of bhakti, or devotional faith, as the way of
delivery from the wheel of births and deaths
whereby which the goal of absorption in Brahman is attained.
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is conceived in a way that makes the two practically identical. But what if its object is thought of as a doctrine which must first be assented to before the faith can enter? In such a case, including trust, will contain in addition a purely intellectual element, either intellectual submission, if the doctrine is authoritatively given, or, intellectual insight, if it is the product of a rational process. Adopting the first alternative, the older Protestant theologians in their analysis of faith established notitia and assensus as the necessary preliminaries to fideic. The vice of this solution is that it deploys the faith—or, in other words, of religion—by binding it to an act external to it and without moral quality. The faith described by Paul as trust in God is presented as at bottom subjection to the Church or the Bible as the guarantor of religious truth. And its independence is equally subverted if, adopting the second alternative, we regard it as receiving its object from philosophical reflection. The true solution and the problem lies in the recognition that in faith itself there is a cognitive element, and that its object is given not in the form of a doctrine, but in the form of an ideal value. Face to face with the godhead the individual experiences in the life and cross of Jesus and that are summed up in the conception of a kingdom of the good, we affirm them on the ground of their worth as the manifestation of the eternal Power that works at the heart of things, the eternal Reality on which the universe no less than our human life is founded. Faith is nothing else than just this feeling for the ideal and, above all, the moral values and this affirmation of their cosmic significance. So interpreted, it is one and the same thing with trust in God, for what is trust in God but trust in the good as the central might on which we and the whole universe hang? If there is a difference, it is that in the idea of faith the emphasis falls on the cognitive aspect, and in the idea of trust on the volitional.

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the footnotes and those given in art. Faith (Christian). W. Morgan.

TRUSTS.—See ECONOMICS.

TRUTH.—See ERROR AND TRUTH.

TSI-SPEAKING TRIBES.—See NEGREOS AND W. AFRICA.

TSIMSHIAN.—The Tsimshian belong to the northern group of coastal Indians, but differ markedly from the Haida and Tingit (q.v.) in language. Their social organization is also somewhat divergent, since instead of two chieftaincies they have four—Eagle, Wolf, Kanahda, and Gisipawaduwada—each embracing many small local groups or clans. There are three chief Tsimshian divisions: the Tsimshian proper, living on the lower Skeena River and the coast to the east, the Niska of Nass River, and the Kitkaan of the upper Skeena. The last does not border on the coast and is intermediate between the coast tribes proper and the tribes of the Athapascan lineage. Most of the information that we possess regarding Tsimshian religion is from the Niska, but there seems to have been little difference between their beliefs and those of the other divisions.

1. Cosmological beliefs.—The earth was believed to be flat and circular. It was supported by a man named Amala ('smoke hole'), who lay on his back and held upon his chest a spoon made of the heart of the mountain-goat. This was filled with grease, and in it stood a pole, on which the earth rested. When he became tired, he lifted the pole, and the earth shook. The pole, with the earth on it, was turning round in the bowl of the spoon, the grease in which served to make it revolve easily. Sun, moon, and stars belonged to the sky and did not turn with the pole. This treasure of land and sea lying at the bottom of the pole, was considered sacred. The turning of the earth seems to point to White influence, but the association of grease with the being under the earth is paralleled by something related of the Haida Atlas, Sacred—one-standing-and-moving, and is probably genuinely aboriginal.

2. Supernatural beings.—The supernatural beings, so far as we are acquainted with them, were much the same as those among the Haida (q.v.). They had their supreme heaven-goat called Laha ('on the air'), a perfect counterpart of the Haida Power-of-the-shining-heavens. From the information regarding him gathered by Boas, however, it seems that he approached much nearer to the monotheistic idea of a supreme being.

'Heaven is the great deity who has a number of mediators called Negriq. . . . Heaven rules the destinies of mankind; Heaven taught man to distinguish between good and bad, and gave the religious laws and institutions. Heaven is gratified by the mere existence of man. He is well satisfied with the prayers and prayer, the smoke rising from fires being especially agreeable to him. Murderers, shuddlers, and those who behave foolishly, talking to no purpose, and making noise at night, are especially hateful to him. He loves those who take pity upon the poor, who do not daily embody, bathe and wash their whole bodies before praying. For the same reason they take a positive when they wish to please the deity well. They fast and abstain from touching their wives if they desire their prayers to be successful. They offer everything that is considered valuable—eggs, salmon, deer flesh, cedar bark, good eel-skin lines, etc. The offering is burnt.'

The ethics of this, especially in the matter of acquiring wealth, seems so different from the aboriginal code found elsewhere that it is probable that the native informant's statements were tinged with missionary teaching, and that Heaven, or Laha, was elevated to a position above that which he occupied in earlier days. There can be no doubt, however, as to the existence of a sky-god 'first among equals.'

The Tsimshian prayed less often to their heaven-goat than to the minor deities, or 'mediators,' whom they generally asked for food and fair weather. Sometimes they prayed to the supernatural beings collectively. The most important 'mediators' are stated to have been the sun and moon, spirits appearing in the shape of lightning, thunder, and the wind, and also the grizzly bear, or Hagulak, which may have been originally a Haida conception, since his home was called Helahaid (near the Haida country). In his house he had four bottles called Ignikwam, Warm, Hot, and Boiling. The killer-whales seem to have been his servants, since they were known as 'Hagulak's men.' There was also a one-legged man similar to the Master-hopper of the Haida.

Besides praying to the deities, they would force them to grant his desires by rigid fasting. He had to abstain from food and from seeing his wife for seven days, lying in bed motionless all that time. Then he might rise, wash himself, comb the right side of his head, and paint the right side of his face, after which he might look at his wife. A less rigid form of fasting extended over four days only. To make the ceremony very successful, the man's wife must not speak. If the wife should be untrue to her husband, the effect of the fasting would be destroyed. Whatever wishes were wished, he had been satisfied, and they were appealed to especially to control the

1 Kims., In Rep. of Brit. Association for Advancement of Science, 1839, p. 345 f.
2 See art. Haida, § 19.
weather and bring eelash and salmon. Numbers of tabus governed hunting and fishing, particularly the Tabu of the Eelash, which run into the Narmada River in great numbers and are, or were, a principal source of wealth to the people. The first of these fish to be caught were rustled on a peculiarly small silver plate made of elder-berry wood and with special ceremonies, the Tabu of the Eelash who fished for them would sit for hours laughing and passed to the spirit-world was saved by a per- forated stone hung round his neck as an amulet, which thwarted the endeavours of four shamans to remove his heart. Whether those who had died by violence or drowning went to regions distinct from the others is not recorded. At least at the mortuary feast food was put into the fire for the dead.

4. Shamanism.—Nothing is known of Tsimshian shamans which would in any way distinguish them from those of the Tlingit and Haida, except that their bodies, like those of the common people, were cremated.

5. Witchcraft.—The wizard cast his spell by putting some article taken from the victim into a box containing portions of a human body. Strings were fastened inside this box, and, if the wizard willed it, they would die slowly, he fastened the object some distance above the body itself, but, if he desired him to perish at once, he cut the string, thereby precipitating the object upon the body. Afterwards he had to go round the house in which the person whom he had killed by witchcraft was lying, and later he had to walk round his grave and rub himself, pretending to cry all the time. Unless he observed these rules, he would himself perish.

If it was believed that a person had been killed by witchcraft, the Tsimshian would take out his heart and lay a red-hot stone against it, wishing at the same time that the wizard might die. If the heart burst, it was expected that their wish would be fulfilled; if not, it was a sign that his suspicions were unfounded.

LITERATURE.—Nearly all the available Tsimshian material is contained in P. Boga, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in Reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1899, p. 301 ff., report vi. 65, 1900, p. 561 ff., report vii. 87, 1901, p. 572 ff., and in 38 RfE (1901-1910).

TUKÁRAM.—In Tukárám there culminates an important section of the bhakti school and his verses have all the authority of a 'Veda' for most of the twenty million Maráshi-speaking people of one of India's noblest races, among whom are to be found some of the greatest Indian reformers of the day. Both for his poetic genius and for his unique place in the people's heart he is happily described as 'the Robert Burns of India' who marks the era of the efflorescence of Maháráshtra's people.²

1. Sources. — (a) Biographical. — Two serious difficulties confront the modern biographer of Tukárám. (1) All the Maráshi Líras of Tukárám are drawn almost entirely from a single authority, the post-mortem Maháráshi (1725-90), whose accounts in the Bhakti Líras (chs. xliv.-l.) and the Bhakti Adhikáris (chs. xxv.-xxl.) were written in 1762 and 1774 respectively, more than a century after Tukárám's end in 1690, 'long enough to have 'no authentic and properly sifted account of his life, but only 'a mass of legends and traditions that have gathered round Tukárám.'² and show a distinct 'tendency towards dedication.' Yet we have 'at least some facts of historical accuracy to start with,' and Maháráshi's 'seem to be in every way as deserving of being critically worked out as those of the early Chrisians martyrs to which they often bear a strong resemblance.³

2 See Bhatt, S. (1930).

² A few sources earlier than Maháráshi have been indicated recently by V. L. Bawa. Besides (1) the three poetical works (see below) and (2) the Śikṣás of Banriagesh Bhaiji, the leading disciple of Tukárám, there are (3) a brief life of Tukárám by his grandson, Gopaldas Bhaiji (1774), (4) the autobiography of Bhalnábih, another disciple of Tukárám who dictated his life-story, giving the names of Tukárám's contemporaries who figure prominently both in Maháráshi and Tukárám's own poems,² and (5) a source a century earlier than Maháráshi, a work written by one Nanasiah, a saint who lived in the Ganges Nahaj, but he must be pronounced utterly untrustworthy, though he is followed by a few Maráshi authors.⁴

The investigation concerning biographical material has gone far enough to conclude with safety that, despite much unfitted tradition, 'miracle and wonder-working,' Maháráshi's account has a solid substratum of historical accuracy. Moreover, he uses his sources with discrimination, rejecting what he discovers to be unreliable.⁵

² (b) Autobiographical. — The true text of Tukárám's writings has not yet been critically ascertained, and between the several collections there is a wide difference as to the number of poems included, ranging from 421 in the edition generally accepted to 841 in one described by K. G. Bhandarkar as 'uncritically made.'⁶ Even the former is based on MSS admitted to have been 'corrected,' 'further corrected,' or 'arranged.' The problem remained in abeyance for fifty years until Bawa in 1939-40 edited and published the first two instalments, numbering about 1300 poems, of what he claims is 'Tukárám's Original Original Śikṣá,' written by one of Tukárám's fourteenth disciples, one Bhanúkári, the Olman whom MS B in the institute bears as having lived three years earlier than Tukárám's death. All that can be said at present is that scholars are patiently investigating the problem of a critical text of Tukárám's writings which will obviously all extemporarily and were taken down by at least one or two of his immediate disciples. It is almost certain that every collection contains poems which are not really his, and we are also quite unable to fix their chronological order—a serious disadvantage. They are practically our only source of information regarding his teaching.

The spirit of poetry came to him in a dream, commanding him to complete the unfinished task.

² See Bhaktamārk, ch. 40, 309.
4 Jh. B. 201.
5 Ib. p. 274.
6 See Bhandarkar, Bombay, 1938, (1938) illus.
7 See Bhandarkar, Bombay, 1938.
8 Vaitpayées, Seismism, and Minor Religious Systems, the Sociopatology of Ińsk-Arun Research, Srinagar, 1912, p. 96.
11 His wife Rakhmánám being 'constitutionally asthmatic,' he had married another, Jwikhāli or Avāli, daughter of a well-to-do merchant.
of his great predecessor Nāmadeva, bhakta and poet. In another dream he received his all-important gurus-mantra — Râm-Krishna-Hari, the secret mantras which finally initiated him as a Hindu. This was at the hands of one Bābhuj Chaitanya of the line of Rāghav Chaitanya and Keśov Chaitanya — a possible indication that Tukārām had some connexion with the Chaitanya sect of the Vaiṣṇavas. His writings and ideas seem to have been influenced, for his dealings with Brahmans constitutes the most important part of his life-narrative.

One such story provides an interesting Hindu parallel to the Qatari doctrine of the sacramental significance of every mean. A Chinchwad Bramhan, Charitmani Dev, had invited Tukārām to dine with him, and, the Śrīdā seeds having been laid in the usual way from the Brahmans, Tukārām made the strange request that two more be laid, one for his own god and another for Gāpati, worshiped by his host, his explanation in an autobiographical poem being: 'If you enjoy a meal in faith, God sits down to dine with you.' Another event, one of the most critical in his life, demonstrates Tukārām's reverence for Brahmans, even at the height of his renown. Rāmji Bhalji Bāgh, a Brāhman scholar jealous of the Śrīdā's fame, had not only moved the public authorities against him but had personally enjoined silence upon him. But what of the prayers of Śrīdā, written 'I asked their doleful a skunk! 'Throw me into the river,' was the cruel reply, and into the river the whole bundle went. It was Śrīdā's darkest hour, but, to the astonishment of all, seven days later the sheets were seen floating on the river and were taken out unharmed. When the Yogananda renunciation followed, the poet replying to a gentle verse: 'If your mind is pure your enemies will be your faithful friends and friends for Brahmans' became his lifelong discipline.

The miracles found interwoven throughout Tukārām's life story are viewed as an incarnation. He performs many miracles to help the poor. Vibhābā miracles intervene at every point to vindicate and deliver his faithful devotees. In this legendary mode, his words are unchallenged, unquestionably the account of Tukārām's ascension, on which Mahāpati has expended all his powers, giving rise to the popular Hindu belief that Tukārām was carried away to Vaikuntha (the Hindu heaven) in the car of Viṣṇu. The probability is, as suggested by P. R. Bhandarkar, that he met his death by drowning, in the holy river of his own village, in 1650, whether by what is called jalaśaṇa, the drowning of the enchanted, or in the case of some other Indian śādhus, or whether the constant expectation of God's coming to fetch him away produced an illusion, and in obeying a fancied call from the opposite bank he ran into the river and was drowned, it is very difficult to say. The various traditions concerning Tukārām's influence after death must also be regarded as legendary.

3. Autobiography. — Though there is as yet no critical edition of Tukārām's abhangs in existence, his autobiographical poems are generally accepted, and his self-revelations give the impression of being sincere and genuine. Of his kindness and unselfish service for others, on which Mahāpati dwells so often, he himself tells us nothing, his autobiographical verses being wholly concerned with the personal and spiritual side of things. It is his own religious life that occupies his soul.4 The only English translations of the poems by J. N. Fraser and K. B. Marāthē number over 500, and there are many hundreds more given up to composition, invocation, and aspiration. He tells us but little of his life in the world, though he often dwells on his guilt and misery, which amount, about 300, reveal a sense of sin whose depth is rare in Hindu literature, though his relation to God is personal and pantheistic by turns.

'The fallen of fallen, three fallen am I' (363). 'I am a great fallen sinner,' says Tukārām: 'My service to my redeemer' (326). This conviction of sin is often closely associated with extreme mental depression: 'False is like milk — is thine. False is Tukā, false is his faith. He speaks falsehood to the false' (2536). Sorrows, resulting from the death of parents, from illness and old age, and from business failures, clearly led him to his self-redemption: 'It is well, O God, that I became a banded pl, and was crushed by the famine; this is how I repented and turned to thee' (113). And his dedication was complete: 'Bank, race, colour, creed and caste—all are gone' (790).

Patwardhan has made a 'tentative' effort to depict Tukārām's long inward struggle. That this earnest pilgrim reached some worthy goal would appear from the poems, about 80 in number, under the heading 'Triumphant Happiness' in Fraser and Marāthē.

'I have found a sea of love, an inexhaustible flood. I have opened a treasure of spiritual knowledge; it is the whole treasure of a million sons arisen in thy worshippers' souls' (787).

This, however, is by no means his habitual mood, which is rather one of despising his self-complacency. He has a passion for the many incidents which occur around, and, though he is far too often censorious, sometimes to the point of coarseness, yet he has something to say of constructive worth to his age and people. And he is chiefly as a preacher that he views himself. Though he lays no emphasis on Vedic lore, he has nevertheless a message invested with authority.

'These are not my words: I am a hired servant of Viṣṇu' (1129). Earnest and original in his spiritual knowledge; this is better for there are impostors who eat and drink and who do even worse: Their desires are not for the earth and poverty, and their hair and ashes are a scandal when the mind has no patience and forbearance' (1139). Such people sink themselves and destroy the ship of salvation,' but a true preacher 'rescues others by the sweet perfume of his words.'

4. Experience of bhakti. — To fathom Tukārām's deepest secret we need to explore his experience of bhakti, the 'clinging affection of the heart' for a personal God, though the god in Tukārām's case was a village-idol, surrounded by Puranic gross mythology and superstitious animism. The idol he worshipped was even one 'standing by the side of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva,' but whether Tukārām recognized this plurality of gods at Panhārārā we cannot say. In this unpromising soil Tukārām's bhakti grows, with pantheism and idolatries as twin parasites on the same tree. And, though his bhakti is too often a mere emotion, fugitive and fleeting, with more of longing than of satisfaction, it is yet free from those sensual extravagances that have degraded some forms of Indian bhakti. In Tukārām we probably see Indian bhakti at its best.

If it be asked in what Tukārām's bhakti experience consisted, the answer might be given in the words of the Nārada-bhakti-śivātra: 'surrendering all actions to God and feeling the greatest misery in forgetting God.'

'Tukā has his home in the Inconceivable' (1575). 'Wheresoevery I go, thou art my companion; thou art the mind and guide me. As I walk along, I lean on thee' (2149). 'No particular time is necessary,' says Tukārām, 'for the contemplation of God. It is done when the mind is tired; 'God is ours, certainly ours, and is the soul of all souls. God is near, certainly near, outside and inside.'

His deep sense of sin offered a serious obstacle to the quest of his soul.

1 See L. R. Pāṅgārkar, Śrī Tukārām Caritra, Poona, 1901, pp. 485-519.
2 Two Masters: Jesus and Tukārām, Bombay, 1909, p. 11.
3 An abhang is an Indian metre, somewhat irregular, words changing in number and position, but usual rhyme and metre.
5 The Poems of Tukārām, 2 vols., Madras, 1903-15; the references by simple figures below are to this useful work.

1 See Ferguson College Magazine, vol. 1, no. 3 (1910), pp. 4-16.
3 See also a poetic rendering in J. N. Farquhar, Tamil, Facts of Naṭṭutū Stātas, Calcutta, 1910, p. 71.
4 Narayan O. Chandavarkar, Speeches and Writings, Bombay, 1911, p. 67.
5 Bhandarkar's tr., Vaiṣṇavītika, p. 95.
5. Teaching.—Tukaram is never systematic in his psychology, his theology, or his didactic. He oscillates between a Dvaita and an Advaita view of God and the world, with a pantheistic scheme of things, now to a distinctly Providential, and he does not harmonize them. He says little or nothing of cosmogony, and, according to him, God realizes Himself in the devotion of His worshippers. Likewise, He never has an outside, distinct personality of its own in His realization of Him: "It is our faith that makes thee a god" (1789), he says boldly to his Vitthal. On the other hand, God makes Himself accessible to man's feeble apprehension by means of visibility, the idol thus becoming a proof of divine condensation: "He has embodied himself in forms to suit our pleasure" (1768). Man is a child of God. Indeed, the figure of childhood is pressed sometimes so far as to sacrifice reverence and dignity, the same applying to Tukaram's view of God as Mother, though in the latter he finds a solution of many perplexities. All this deals with man's 'natural' state, but Tukaram's doctrine, sin being viewed variously. It is sometimes a mere breaking of caste rules, sometimes a breach of morality, and again, very often, it is misopia, a word often on his lips which perhaps best rendered by 'self-centredness', though in its essence this is inadequate. We have seen how deep was his sense of sin and what means of salvation were disclosed to him. Brahmanical or mystic intuition and verbal theology were deprecated as much as austerities. Men should waste no time in argument, but throw themselves at God's feet. Specific hindrances to salvation are found in the above misopia, in inferiority feelings by the heart, lack of learning, and suspicion. What the religious idea meant to him we have already seen. More renunciation leads to nothing, and indeed everything is worthless save a personal experience of religion. Tukaram's 'good man' must possess humility, peaceableness, kindness, truthfulness, contentment, and simplicity.

He is mostly despondent of his fellow-men: "I am sick of mankind" (984), and for relief he turns to 'the saints,' about whom he has hundreds of verses, setting forth their calling, character, and service to mankind. At the other end of the scale of creation animals call forth his sympathy. Whether he held to ahimsa is not clear. He did not believe in Reincarnation he accepts (972), but he is not sure whether to prefer mortal rebirth, for the power of God's name can break his karmas. Conscious communion on earth was far preferred to being merged in the unconsciousness of Brahman.

Patwardhan has shown that Tukaram's doctrine of bhakti composed a conception of the Divine Motherhood which gave Tukaram a God of love and tenderness, a sense of human insufficiency which led to conflict between faith and the flesh, devotion thus being frustrated by human frailties, and a defective view of life that was at best one-sided. His end was individual, the peace and bliss and beatitude of the real self of the rest of the restlessly soulless... Tukaram was a pessimist in regard to this world... The Bhakti of the future ought to be broader based, fuller veined, and larger sided. He pointed out that the claim of human need is a rare mood and very seldom expressed in his poems and that there are but few traces of the passion of winning others... It is a defect, however, very largely repaired by his self-forgetful service to the Lord.

6. Relation to Hinduism.—Tukaram acquired in the greater part of the conventional Hinduism of his day while himself living on a loiterer plane. Often therefore he speaks with two voices. Bhandarkar's ceremony he does not condemn, but his heart aspires to something higher. About Vitthal, however, there is no kind of ambiguity, for an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa or Vignī, Vitthal was the biggest half of Tukaram's spiritual life,
though again faith was always the channel. Inwardly he experienced the living God, though outwardly it was an idol he worshipped.

Tukārām was neither a theologian nor a philosopher, but a devout devotee of the monistic religion of his time. Though he worshipped the idol at the place, still he was always before his mind's eye the great Lord of the universe.

In some verses indeed he holds that the stone idol was a mere stoae, neither embodying nor any way representing the divine, the incosistency of such a position he appears to have realized, but he does not solve it. Hence the millions in the Deccan who follow him in idolatrous practices and the thousands who share his theistic aspirations have both much to support them. Hence too a theistic society like the Prathānā Samāj 2 so recently as 20th June 1920 failed to pass a resolution that any member who performs a domestic or any other ceremony with idolatrous rites or worships any idols while performing such rites will ipso facto cease to be a member of the Bombay Prathānā Samāj. 4

A similar ambiguity exists in his references to caste and other places. Caste was accepted by Tukārām as an institution of the Hindu world, and he did not carry to its logical conclusion his conviction that God does not consider a man's caste, all Hindus are equally dear to Him (1777). In personal inward religion Tukārām was democratic enough, but he was too much of the ‘mild Hindu’ to fight the battle of religious rights and privileges.

Tukārām was in no sense a ‘reformer,’ as the word is commonly understood: he was a sage with lofty principles in a degenerate time, a sage who for lack of courage, conviction, or inspiration allowed his protests to lapse after he had uttered them.

7. Influence.—Tukārām has quite a unique place in the inner life of his own people. Besides the Vārkarīs, a pilgrim sect devoted to him, every member of which visits Pandharpur not only at the two annual festivals but on other ekadāsies, or ‘monthly-eleveths,’ named vāris, and whose preaching of equality and disregard of caste have been a valuable counterpart to Brahman domination, there is another movement of great importance. Tukārām is also the leader of the bhakti movement in all its forms and branches: the Gāyatrī, the Jājñū, the Assī, the Valmikiśa, and the others; the bhakta has in his work a form of worship and devotion not found in other religions, and he is the real founder of the bhakti movement.

8. Literature.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. For a fuller treatment of the subject see J. N. Fraser and W. F. Edwards, Life and Teaching of Tukārām, Madras, in the press.

TULASI-DĀSA.—1. Life.—Little is certainly known about the life of Tulasi-Dāsa, commonly pronounced ‘Tulsi Dasa,’ the greatest poet of medieval Northern India, beyond two or three dates and a few accidental particulars mentioned in his writings. A life of the poet is said to have been written by his friend and companion, Virchandha, but it was not referred to by Siva Daisy.
Bubonic plague appeared in India in 1610, and lasted for eight years. The poet seems to have been attacked by it, for one of his minor works, the Banumān Bāhukubha, describes symptoms from some such disease. After temporary relief he had a relapse and died in Benares in A.D. 1623.

2. Works.—More than twenty formal works, besides numerous short poems, have been attributed to Tulasi-Dāsa, but some of these are certainly apocryphal, and others are of doubtful authenticity. The most generally accepted list mentions twelve, viz. six minor and six major. The minor works are the following: (1) Rāma-lokā-Nāhaḥchā, (2) Vairāgya-saṃsādipīni, (3) Baraevī Rāmāyana, (4) Jānaki-māngala, (5) Pārvati-māngala, (6) Bāhukubha. The six major works are (7) Krṣṇa-pātrikā, (8) Vīnu-pātrikā, (9) Gītvīvī, (10) Kavīvīvī, (11) Dāvāvī, and (12) Rāmāchārita-mānasā.

Tulasi-Dāsa was a Śūrā Vaishavā, i.e., while a worshipper of Rāma-chandra, he also adhered to the tradition (smṛti) of ordinary Hinduism and followed the general religious customs of his caste. This involved, among other things, the worship of the god Siva and his attendant gods and goddesses, as well as various observances. During his stay in Ayōdhyā he associated with the Vairāgī Vaishnavas and there composed the first three cantos of the Rāmāchārita-mānasā. Subsequently, being unable to agree with them on points of discipline, he migrated to Benares and there completed the poem.

His devotion to Rāma-chandra as an incarnation of the Supreme is illustrated by the above list of works. With two exceptions (nos. 5 and 7) they all deal directly or indirectly with that deity. No. 7 is a collection of hymns in praise of Krṣṇa, another incarnation of Viṣṇu. No. 5 is a short poem describing Siva's marriage with Pārvati, a subject also treated at some length as an episode in the Rāmāchārita-mānasā. As already stated, Tulasi-Dāsa paid special reverence to Siva as a great and kindly god, although by no means on a level with Rāma-chandra. He was Siva who, out of his love for the world, communicated Rāma's history to Pārvati and thereby made it known to mortals.

A brief notice of each of the works named above will suffice.

(1) Rāma-lokā-Nāhaḥchā.—The genuineness of this is disputed. It is a short poem describing the 'nail-paring' ceremony at the investiture of Rāma-chandra with the sacred caste-thread. This ceremony is a village rite still kept up on such occasions and at weddings in Oudh and Bihār, and the whole poem is in rural style and in rural metre.

(2) Vairāgya-saṃsādipīni ('Kindling of Quietism') describes the true nature of holiness. It advocates vairāgya (absence of passion), and the description of the perfect peace resulting from absolute surrender to the Deity is not without poetic beauty.

(3) The Baraevī Rāmāyana is a summary of the history of Rāma-chandra in the Baraevī metre. It is very short and, as we have it, probably incomplete. It is rejected by independent authorities.

(4) Jānaki-māngala and (5) Pārvati-māngala.—These are two short works celebrating the marriages of Sītā to Rāma-chandra and of Pārvati to Siva respectively. The authenticity of both is doubtful. In no. 4 the order of events differs from that given by the poet in his more important work. The

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1 No fewer than four places claim the honour of being his birthplace. The claim of Rājāpur is that best established. His caste has been a subject of dispute. According to some authorities, he was a Kāanyakubha Brāhmaṇa.
2 Vīnu-pātrikā, 577, 2.
3 Rāmā, 1, 30.
4 Dāvāvī is never a good Brāhmaṇ scholar, and some of his few verses in that language contain grammatical blunders.
6 The whole has been translated by G. A. Grierson in JD xxii. (1897) 199ff.
Pūrṇa-māgala is dated Sambat 1643 (= A.D. 1580).

(6) Rāmāvīra.—This is a collection of verses to be used as omens previous to undertaking a journey or performing any important act. The events are in the main a history of Rāma-chandra in seven chapters, each of seven septads of verses, or 343 in all. The omen is found by selecting a verse by lot—a kind of sorta, Virāgīhā. It is dated Sambat 1555 (= A.D. 1598).

(7) The Kṛṣṇagīthā, the first of the major works, has been already referred to. As its subject demanded, Tulasi-Dāsa wrote it, not in his customary Awadhī, but in the Braj Bhākhā dialect. It is one of the least read of the poet's works, but well repays perusal, as it contains many beautiful passages. He has entirely avoided desecrating religion by that association with eroticism which spoils so much of the literature devoted to Kṛṣṇa.

(8) The Vinaya-patrīkā ("Petition") is one of the most important works of the poet, in which his most intimate feelings towards the Deity and that Deity's relations to the human soul are displayed with a freedom from reticence and poetical fervour that have rarely been equaled.

An interesting legend accounts for its origin. Tulasi, having asked his patron, the Bhākhā, to use this petition to Rāma—"the loving, almighty, God—appealing for His protection. The whole forms a series of prayers, addressed, one to another, to various minor gods as door-keepers and custodians of the Supreme, and then, in an outburst of passionate emotion, to Kṛṣṇa himself. The final verse tells how, as in the case of an earthly monarch, the petition was granted under Rāma's own signature.

The Vinaya-patrīkā is one of the most admired works of the poet, and the difficulties of its language have discouraged many readers. The intense fervour of the writer often carries him into an extremity of passion, bursting forth in an elliptical style very different from the limpid beauty of his narrative poems. Again, the very form of the poem militates against its easy comprehension. It is a petition to a sovereign, expressed in a curtly vocabulary full of high-flown words and phrases. These belong to the language of the case and are here most appropriate, but they do not tend to make the poem comprehensible to any one who is not a Sanskrit scholar. In spite of these surface defects, this admirable work would be read by any one who would become acquainted with the religious history of India. We have here a man whose influence for good over generations of Indians cannot be exaggerated, laying bare the importance of his own rdrdng that at other writers with the same experiences have only dared to hint. It is a book of confessions, but the confessions of a pure and faithful soul.

(9) In the Gitāvādī Tulasi-Dāsa appears in a new character, that of a mārgadhā, or panegyrist. It is a book of songs intended to increase in his readers their love for a tender, loving God. Again, as elsewhere, the love which he teaches is that of a child to his father. For the songs he has used the Braj Bhākhā dialect as the traditional vehicle of expression, and the dominant note is not, as in the Vinaya-patrīkā, passion, but sweetness and charm. In this way he gives the whole history of Rāma-chandra in a delightful style, quite different from that of his formal epic. There is no verse in the book which is not a complete little picture, and most attractive of all are those in the first book, in which he tells of the baby life of his hero and his brothers. It is a true gospel of the infant Rāma.

(10) Different again is the Kaviitiūalī. Here the poet, in the character of a wāndin, or bard, tells of the glory of Rāma, so as to encourage the faithful with a picture of the Deity's power. The language is Awadhī mixed with Braj Bhākhā. No work of Tulasi-Dāsa shows his extraordinary mastery of vocabulary so well as this. His subject is heroic, and, without having recourse to Sanskrit, he remains in the epic style. In the battle scenes the words themselves by their very sound echo the clash of arms and the cries of the combatants, and, in the description of the burning of Lanka, the crackling of the flames and active closes with the sixth book. The seventh, which is nearly half of the whole, consists of a number of short poems in the kṛṣṇa meter written at different times and here collected by their author. They have no direct connexion with the preceding books, and, being full of personal allusions, form a valuable source of information as to the poet's times and experiences. It is here that we learnt about his birth and parentage and about the persecutions to which he was subjected, and from one verse we gather that the date of the compilation was somewhere between A.D. 1612 and 1614. A supplement, in the same metre, is the Hanumān Bāhūka, already referred to, in which he tells how he was attacked by plague.

(11) Dehāvati.—The title means a collection of verses in the dōkā metre, and it is certain what is meant by it. There is a work of this name (see below), but some authorities maintain that the list alludes to a poem called the Rāma Sātasi ("Seven hundred verses [also in this metre] in Praise of Rāma"). Most scholars consider that this was written, not by the poet, but by another author of the same name. It is a rather tasteless production, but, if genuine, is of great importance, as it purports to be the poet's doctrine regarding works as opposed to faith. 1 The difficulty in the way of accepting the work now called the Dehāvati as that referred to in the list is that it is largely composed of verses already occurring in the Rāma-chāritra-mānas, the Rāmāvīra, and the Rām Sātasi itself. Out of a total of 572 verses no fewer than 258 have been so identified, and there are quite possibly more. If genuine, there must have been a nucleus of original verses to which subsequent admirers have added others, so as to compile a kind of anthology of the poet's best dōkā. This is the present writer's opinion, and, if it is correct, the final recension must have been sufficiently long after the composition of the Rām Sātasi for the latter to have become recognized as the work of our poet.

(12) The Rāma-dhānusa ("Lake of the Gestes of Rāma") is commonly called the Tulasi-kyārt Rāmāyanā. This epic, the poet's greatest achievement, and also, in point of time, probably his first, was begun in A.D. 1674, when its author was about 43 years of age, and upon it his fame chiefly rests. It has been described as the Bible of ninety millions of people, and is certainly more familiar to every Hindu of Northern India than our Bible is to the average English peasant. There is not a Hindu of Hindostān proper, whether prince or cottar, who does not know its most famous verses and whose common talk is not coloured by it. Its influence has spread into the language of Indian Muslims, some of whose most ordinary idioms, though they know it not, made their first appearance in this work. 2

The life of Rāma-chandra, centered as an incarnation of the Supreme, is here dealt with in a formal epic. The subject is the same as that of the celebrated Sanskrit Rāmāyanāya of Valmiki, but the epic of Tulasi-Dāsa is in no way a translation.

1 Tr. O. A. Grierson in J. A. A. 1897, 1900. 2 See O. A. Grierson, "Tulasi-Dasa, Life and Religious Reformer," J. R. A. S. 1903, p. 447. Much of what follows is condensed from this paper.
tion of that work. We have an independent story, built on the same foundation, but differing from it in the treatment of episodes and in important details. The author himself states that he has taken his materials from many different sources, and it has been shown that the principal of these, besides Vālmiki's work, were the Adhyātma Rāmāyana (a section of the Brahmaṇḍa Purāṇa), the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa, Vālmiki's Rāmāyana, and the Pṛṇaśīrā-Śāstra attributed to Jayadeva.

As illustrating the estimation in which this poem is held in India, the following popular legend may be quoted. Rāma was described as approving Vālmiki's epic by appending his signature to a copy of it. Thereupon the monkey-god Hanuman, with his nails, wrote another Rāmāyana upon a rock, and took it to Rāma. The latter approved of it also, but said that, as he had already signed Vālmiki's copy, he could not sign another; he had better show it to that poet. He did so, and, as Vālmiki saw that it would eclipse his own work, by a stratagem he induced Hanuman to sing it into the sea. Hanuman, in complying, prophesied that in a future age he would himself inspire a Rāmāyaṇa named Tulasi, who would recite his (Hanuman's) poem in the tongue of the common people and destroy the fame of Vālmiki's epic.

There can be no doubt that its reputation is well deserved. The Rāmcharita-mānas is one of the greatest works of India. It has its peculiarities and its episodes that jar upon European tastes, but, even so, no one can read it without being impressed by its high poetic merit. The various characters are vividly and consistently described, and live and move with all the dignity of a heroic age. The style is most admirably varied. There is the infinite pathos of the passage describing Rāma's farewell to his mother; the rugged, harsh language telling of the horrors of battle; the stately, measured style, when occasion requires it, a sententious, aphoristic method of dealing with narrative, teeming with similes drawn not from the traditions of the schools, but from nature herself; and, subordinating all, a life-giving atmosphere of the purest poetry. To its weakest side is that which, to a Hindu, is its strongest—the character of its hero. To the poet Rāma is necessarily, as God manifest on earth, a perfect character. Even when the old story shows him performing unkindly deeds, Tulasi must call them virtues and plead that the end justifies the means. Or, again, the foulest treachery, such as that of Vibhishana towards his brothers, is exalted because the traitor is accepted and rewarded by the hero. But this is one of the obligations of the story and of the author's view of the divinity of Rāma. The human characters are to our ideas far more sympathetic. There are the impetuous and loving Lakṣmī; Sītā, the ideal of an Indian wife and mother; Bhārata, consecrated and tender, the model of the true bhakti; and Rāvana—the Satan of the epic—destined to failure, and fighting with all his demon force against his fate.

One of the most striking features of the poem is the writer's capacity for seeing things. More than any other literature, Indian poetry has its stock similes—the lotus, the water-lily, the bee, the moon, and so on. Even the best Sanskrit poets often give the impression of being largely the work of the closet, not of the open air. Tulasi-Dāsa employed the same old similes—he would not have been Indian if he had avoided them—but others are his own. Little expressions—the turn of a sentence or an apt

1 E.g., the account of the great battle outside Lakṣkita is quite


3 The authors of the Hindi Nāvarata (pp. 88, 285) point out that Tulasi-Dāsa, like none of the numerous Hindi poets who told the tale of Rāma ever thought of condemning Vibhī-

4 The exception is Kāśīkirti, a court poet who lived amid knightly surroundings. He also has the

5 The work of the world nitya, occasionally he refers to it in terms that can only be interpreted as meaning the influence which holds Rāma from the soul—the

uses of the word in this sense are merely cases of simple metaphor, like and in no way form part of his real teaching. We may attribute this use of the word to its own association with the worship of Śiva. Elsewhere he employs the word in two senses only that "magic," and is the evil force used by demons in their combat with Rāma’s army; in the other it represents a combination of the Gnostic demig瓺 and the Christian ‘Temper’s; it is a personality, a female, and the Devil in one, she leads mankind to sin, but, if a man has true bhakti, he is surely armoured against her, and she cannot approach him.

Above all, Tulāsī-Dāsa taught that the Supreme is a personality. While not denying the existence of the Nirguna Brahma of the Upanisads—a being totally devoid of all qualities, of whom the only thing known is that it is not this or that—he maintained that the idea of such a being was beyond the comprehension of the human mind, and that the only God whom it was possible to adore was the personal (saguna) manifestation of the impersonal ( nirguna). For the practical result of the general adoption of Tulāsī’s religious attitude has been of the greatest importance to Northern India. In the poet’s own time, the worship of Śiva replaced that of Brahma of two alternative religions open to them. One was the crude polytheism of the worship of village godlings, the other was the Kṛṣṇa-cult. The first still exists, but controlled and thrust into the background by Tulāsī’s poetry. What the Kṛṣṇa-cult becomes among the uncultivated masses the religious fate of Bengal has shown. It inevitably tends to become a sex-worship, and its text-books teach the most licentious descriptions of the love adventures of Kṛṣṇa among the herdswomen. All else is lost, and they gradually develop the unnameable horrors of a Śaṅkara-cult. Upper India has been saved from this by Tulāsī-Dāsa.

LITERATURE.—G. A. Grierson, ‘Notes on Tulsi Das,’ JA xxxi. [1889] 99, 129, 167, 225, 239 (this is the only complete account of the poet’s life and works; a few errors in it have been corrected in the preceding pages), Tulasi Dasa, Poet and Religious Reformer, 1845, 1865, p. 447ff.; Gangādāsa, vihari Mīra, Sāyana-vihāri Mīra, and Sukanda-vihāri Mīra, Hindī-Vastra, Allahabad, 1910 (an account in Hindī of the nine great writers in that language); cf. the same authors’ Mīrāvandhu-vināde, Kāhdvīsa, 1913, p. 206ff. (a general history of Hindī literature in the same language). Numerous ed. of all the poet’s works have been published in India, but few of them possess critical value. Two excellent ed. of the Rāmācharitamānas have been published, viz. one issued in 1899 by the Kāhdvīsa Press in Bānāsper, and that issued in 1903 by the Kāhdvīsa-Prachārini Sabha of Bānāsper. Both are critically edited and have elaborate introductions dealing with the poet’s life and writings. For those not familiar with this language the writer can recommend a good ed., with a line-for-line Hindī commentary and much general information, consisting of the poet, by Rāmāvēṣa Sastri, Nirnaya-sagara, Bombay, 1904. The same editor has issued from the Indian Press, Allahabad, 1913, a similar ed. of the Kāhdvīsa of the Kāhdvīsa, which can be recommended to students. It is believed that it is intended to issue all the poet’s works in this series.

G. A. GRIERSON.