Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

EDITED BY

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VOLUME XII

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TO

SIR JOHN MAURICE CLARK, BARONET

PUBLISHER

AND

FRIEND

PREFACE

In issuing this, the twelfth, volume of The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, I wish to thank those who have assisted me in the work.

And first let me name the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, and their Staff, above all Sir John M. Clark, Bart., to whom I have taken the liberty of dedicating it. The Printers also, Messrs. Morrison & Gibb Ltd., deserve the thanks of all concerned, and mine most of all; and especially must their able and accurate Readers be remembered.

What shall I say of my accomplished and loyal Staff? Besides Dr. Selbie and Dr. Gray, whose names are on the title-page, I must mention Mr. J. F. Grant and Mr. T. Riach. Not less deserving than these are the two sisters Miss M. C. Macdonald (now Mrs. Laburn) and Miss D. R. Macdonald (now Mrs. Dow), to whom most of all is due the minute accuracy of the Encyclopædia. With them let me name my Secretary, Miss H. Robertson, who was with me at the planning of the Work and has guided its course to the end. I must also mention our indispensable Librarian, Miss E. M. Mitchell, and Miss B. Wisely, the Typist, whose work has often won the admiration of the authors of articles.

Many scholars have aided with their contributions and with their counsel. I cannot name them. But I must say one thing. The Encyclopædia would not have been what it is if I had not had in every department of study covered by it at least one man upon whom I could rely for advice.

The names of the translators have never appeared. The translations from the French have for the most part been made by my assistants. The German translations are almost all due to the Rev. Alexander Grieve, M.A., D.Phil. Mr. Albert Bonus, M.A., has translated nearly all the Italian work. Either Professor W. R. Morfill or Dr. E. H. Minns has been responsible for the Russian translations. A few articles written in Danish were translated by the Rev. John Beveridge, B.D.

The editing of a work like The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics is undoubtedly difficult, but it has brought me into touch with so many men of ability and generosity, and has enabled me to make so many friendships, that the pleasure of it has far outweighed its pain.

An Index Volume is in course of preparation.

THE EDITOR.

PREFACE

In issuing this the twelfth volume of this Encyclopædia we feel that we
I will it least place the best treatise but in the work.

And just in the same the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, will then [illegible]
show all as done of Clark, that is without any notice the liberty of dedication
to. The Editors are Messrs. [illegible] & Clark, [illegible] the [illegible] is all
[illegible] [illegible] at all, and especially [illegible] and [illegible]
[illegible]

We shall have of my [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and
the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
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Theosophical Society.

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Unitarianism.

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Tungus, Turks, Yakut.

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Typology.

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Tonsure (Buddhist), **Wheel of the Law, Wisdom Tree.**

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Transmigration (Teutonic).

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Sun, Moon, and Stars (Celtic), **Transmigration** (Celtic), **War, War-gods** (Celtic).

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Usury (Christian).

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Worship (Parsi).

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Tukaram.

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Sun, Moon, and Stars (Primitive).

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Swine, Symbolism (Semitic).

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Transmigration (Indian), **Vaisesika, Vedanta, Yoga, Yogis.**

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Superstition.

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Symbolism (Greek and Roman).

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Transmigration (Jewish), **Water** (Hebrew and Jewish), **Zohar.**

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Sun, Moon, and Stars (Hindu), **Symbolism** (Hindu), **Tantras, Upanisads.**

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Wisdom.

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Tushes and other Pagan Tribes of the Caucasus.

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Tulasi-Dasa.

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Titans, Under World (Greek).

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Totemism, Twins.

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Wang Yang-ming.

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Token, Treaties.

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Temperament.

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Syrian Christians, Unction (Christian).

MACLER (FRÉDÉRIC).
Ancien Attaché à la Bibliothèque Nationale; Lauréat de l'Institut; Professeur d'Arménien à l'École des Langues orientales vivantes.
Syrians.

MAIR (ALEXANDER WILLIAM), M.A. (Aberd. and Camb.), Litt.D. (Aberd.).
Sometime Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh; editor of *Hesiod*.
Suicide (Greek and Roman), **Worship** (Greek).

MARETT (ROBERT RANULPH), M.A., F.R.A.I.
Fellow of Exeter College, and Reader in Social Anthropology in the University of Oxford; author of *The Threshold of Religion*.
Supernaturalism, Tabu.

MARGOLIOUTH (DAVID SAMUEL), M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A.
Fellow of New College, and Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford; author of *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, *Mohammedanism*, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*.
Symbolism (Muslim), **Wahhabis, Zaidi.**

MARGOLIOUTH (GEORGE), M.A. (Cantab.).
Member of the Board of Studies in Theology and Examiner in Hebrew and Aramaic in the University of London; formerly Senior Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS in the British Museum.
Suicide (Jewish).

MÉNÉGOZ (EUGÈNE), Docteur en Théologie.
Professeur honoraire de la Faculté de Théologie protestante et de l'Université de Paris; auteur de *Théologie de l'Epître aux Hébreux*.
Symbolo-Fideism.

MERCER (SAMUEL ALFRED BROWNE), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago; author of *Extra Biblical Sources for Hebrew and Jewish History*, *The Ethiopic Liturgy*, *Sumero-Babylonian Sign List*, *Ethiopic Grammar*, *Assyrian Grammar*; editor of the *Anglican Theological Review*, the *Journal of the Society of Oriental Research*, and the *Biblical and Oriental Series*.
War, War-gods (Semitic), **Water, Water-gods** (Babylonian, Egyptian).

MOFFATT (JAMES), D.D., D.Litt., Hon. M.A. (Oxon.).
Professor of Church History in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of *Critical Introduction to New Testament Literature*, and other works.
Syncretism, Therapeutæ.

MORGAN (WILLIAM), D.D.
Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Canada.
Trust.

MOULTON (JAMES EGAN), D.D.
Late President of Tubou College, Tonga.
Tongans.

MUTCH (WILLIAM JAMES), A.M. (Wisconsin), B.D., Ph.D. (Yale).
Professor of Philosophy and Education in Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin; formerly Minister of the Congregational Church at New Haven, Connecticut; Lecturer on Religious Education in Yale University; author of *Christian Teaching*, and other works.
Training (Religious).

NALLINO (CARLO ALFONSO).
Rome; author of *Sulla costituzione delle tribu arabe prima dell' islamismo*.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (Muhammadan).

NEILSON (GEORGE), LL.D.
The Stipendiary Magistrate of Glasgow; author of *Trial by Combat*.
Torture.

NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALLEYNE), M.A., Litt.D., LL.D.
Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge; sometime Fellow of Trinity College; author of *A Literary History of the Arabs* (1907), the *Tarjuman al-Ashwaq* of Ibn al-Arabi, with translation and commentary (1911), *The Mystics of Islam* (1914).
Sufis, Suhrawardi, 'Umar al-Khayyam.

ODGERS (JAMES EDWIN), M.A., D.D.
Fellow of University College, London; formerly Lecturer and Tutor, Manchester College, Oxford.
Universalism.

OEFELE (Baron FELIX VON).
Neuenahr, Germany.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (Introduction).

OLTRAMARE (PAUL).
Professor of the History of Religions in the University of Geneva.
Theosophy.

ORR (JAMES), M.A., D.D.
Late Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of *The Christian View of God and the World*, *David Hume* in the 'Epoch Makers' series.
Supralapsarianism.

OTTLEY (ROBERT LAURENCE), D.D.
Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; author of *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1895), *Aspects of the Old Testament* (1905), and other works.
Temperance.

OWEN (MARY ALICIA).
President of the Missouri Folklore Society; Councillor of the American Folklore Society; admitted to Tribal Membership with the Indians, 1892.
Voodoo.

PATERSON (WILLIAM P.), D.D., LL.D.
Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh.
War.

PATTON (WALTER MELVILLE), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Biblical Literature and History of Religion, and Director of the Library, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.
Suicide (Muhammadan), **Sunnites.**

PEARSON (A. C.), M.A., Litt.D.
Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge; editor of *Fragments of Sophocles*, Euripides' *Helena*, *Heraclidæ*, and *Phœnissæ*, *Zeno and Cleanthes: Fragments.*
Transmigration (Greek and Roman), **Vows** (Greek and Roman).

PETRIE (WILLIAM MATTHEW FLINDERS), D.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Edin. and Aberd.), Litt.D. (Camb.).
Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy; Edwards Professor of Egyptology in the University of London.
Transmigration (Egyptian).

PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archæology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.
Sumero-Akkadians, Tammuz.

POPE (ROBERT MARTIN), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).
Author of *Introduction to Early Church History*, and other works.
Western Church.

POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Liége), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professeur de sanscrit à l'Université de Gand; Membre de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Hibbert Lecturer (1916); Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société Asiatique; Membre correspondant de l'Académie impériale de Petrograd; Correspondant de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient.
Suicide (Buddhist), **Tantrism** (Buddhist), **Worship** (Buddhist).

PRICE (IRA MAURICE), Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago; author of *The Monuments of the Old Testament*, *The Great Cylinder Inscriptions A and B of Gudea*, and other works.
Toltecs.

REID (JAMES SMITH), M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.
Fellow and late Tutor of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge; editor of the *Academica* and other works of Cicero; author of *Municipalities of the Roman Empire.*
Worship (Roman).

REVON (MICHEL), LL.D., D.Litt.
Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; formerly Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; author of *Le Shinntoïsme.*
Worship (Japanese).

RIVERS (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1911; author of *The Todas*, *History of Melanesian Society*, *Kinship and Social Organisation.*
Todas.

ROBINSON (HENRY WHEELER), M.A. (Oxon. and Edin.).
Principal and Professor of Systematic Theology and Hebrew in Regent's Park (Baptist) College, London; author of 'Hebrew Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthropology' in *Mansfield College Essays*, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament.*
Tongue.

ROSE (HERBERT JENNINGS), M.A. (Oxon.).
Professor of Latin, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth; sometime Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford.
Suicide (Introductory), **Thrace.**

ROSE (HORACE ARTHUR), I.C.S. (retired).
Superintendent of Ethnography, Punjab, 1901–06; author of *A Glossary of Punjab Tribes and Castes*, and other works.
Udasis.

ROSS (WILLIAM), M.A., B.D.
Minister of the United Free Church at Edinburgh.
Voluntaryism.

ROUSE (WILLIAM HENRY DENHAM), M.A., Litt.D.
Headmaster of the Perse Grammar School, Cambridge; University Teacher of Sanskrit; President of the Folklore Society, 1904–06.
Tithes (Greek), **Votive Offerings** (Greek).

SAPIR (EDWARD), Ph.D.
Chief of Anthropological Division, Victoria Memorial Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.
Vancouver Island Indians.

SCHILLER (FERDINAND CANNING SCOTT), M.A., D.Sc. (Oxon.).
Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; author of *Riddles of the Sphinx* (new ed. 1910), *Humanism* (1903, new ed. 1912), *Studies in Humanism* (1907, 1912), *Plato or Protagoras?* (1908), *Formal Logic* (1912), etc.
Telepathy, Value.

SCOTT (ERNEST FINDLAY), B.A., D.D.
Professor of New Testament Literature in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; author of *The Fourth Gospel: its Purpose and Theology*, *The Apologetic of the New Testament*, *The Kingdom and the Messiah.*
Valentinianism.

SEATON (MARY ETHEL), M.A. (Lond.).
Sometime Lecturer at Girton College, Cambridge.
Swan-maidens.

SELIGMAN (Mrs. BRENDA Z.), London.
Veddas.

SELIGMAN (CHARLES G.), M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Professor of Ethnology in the University of London; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1915; author of *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*; joint-author of *The Veddas*.
Veddas.

SHOREY (PAUL), Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of Art and Letters.
Summum Bonum, Theognis.

SHOWERMAN (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898–1900; author of *The Great Mother of the Gods* (Dissertation), 1901, *With the Professor*, 1910; translator of Ovid's *Heroides* and *Amores* (Loeb Classical Library), 1914.
Taurobolium.

SIKES (EDWARD ERNEST), M.A.
Fellow, Senior Tutor, and Classical Lecturer of St. John's College, Cambridge; author of *The Anthropology of the Greeks*, and *Hero and Leander, translated in verse from the Greek*; editor of Æschylus's *Prometheus Vinctus*, the *Homeric Hymns*, etc.
Torch (Greek and Roman).

SMITH (CHARLES RYDER), B.A., D.D. (Lond.).
Professor of Systematic Theology in Richmond College, Surrey; author of *The Bible Doctrine of Society in its Historical Evolution*.
Theocracy.

SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A., Litt.D.
Late of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of *Asoka* in 'Rulers of India,' *Early History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Akbar the Great Mogul, Oxford History of India*.
Vaisali, Vikrama Era.

SOARES (THEODORE GERALD), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Preaching and Religious Education, and Head of the Department of Practical Theology, in the University of Chicago.
Sunday Schools.

STEVENSON (Mrs. SINCLAIR), M.A., Sc.D.
Of the Irish Mission, Rajkot, India; sometime Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford; author of *Notes on Modern Jainism, The Rites of the Twice-born*.
Svetambaras, Worship (Jain).

STOKES (GEORGE J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland; author of *The Objectivity of Truth*.
Universality.

SWANTON (JOHN REED), Ph.D.
Ethnologist in the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.; President of the Anthropological Society of Washington, 1916.
Tlingit, Tsimshian, Wakashan.

TAKAKUSU (JYUN), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr. Phil. (Leipzig).
Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.
Yuan-Chwang, Fa-Hian, and I-Tsing.

TAYLOR (ALFRED EDWARD), M.A. (Oxon.), D. Litt. (St. Andrews).
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the United College of SS. Salvator and Leonard, St. Andrews; late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; author of *The Problem of Conduct* (1901), *Elements of Metaphysics* (1903), *Varia Socratica* (1911).
Theism.

TESSITORI (Dr. L. P.).
Late of Udine, Italy; editor of the Uvaesamala of Dharmadasa.
Yogis (Kanphata).

THOMAS (EDWARD JOSEPH), M.A. (St. And. and Camb.), B.A. (Lond.).
Under-Librarian of Cambridge University; editor of *Buddhist Scriptures*; joint-editor of *Mahāniddesa* and *Jātaka Tales*.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (Buddhist).

THOMAS (NORTHCOTE WHITRIDGE).
Élève diplômé de l'École pratique des Hautes Études; Corresponding Member of the Société d'Anthropologie de Paris; Member of Council of the Folklore Society; author of *Thought Transference, Kinship Organization and Group Marriage in Australia*.
Transmigration (Introductory and Primitive).

THURSTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.
Joint-editor of the Westminster Library for Priests and Students; author of *Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln, The Holy Year of Jubilee, The Stations of the Cross*.
Xavier.

URQUHART (FRANCIS FORTESCUE), M.A.
Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford.
Ultramontanism.

URQUHART (WILLIAM SPENCE), M.A., D.Phil.
Senior Professor of Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College, Calcutta; Fellow and Member of Syndicate of Calcutta University.
Theosophy.

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., F.R.A.I., M.R.A.S., M.F.L.S., M.S.B.A., Lt.-Colonel I.M.S. (retired).
Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; Hon. Correspondent of the Archæological Survey of India; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet, Lhasa and its Mysteries*.
Swat or Udyāna, Tibet.

WATT (HUGH), M.A., B.D.
Professor of Church History in New College, Edinburgh.
Zwingli.

WELSFORD (ENID ELDER HANCOCK).
Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge.
Sun, Moon, and Stars (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

WERNER (ALICE), L.L.A. (St. And.).
University Reader in Swahili and Bantu Languages, School of Oriental Studies, London; Goldsmiths' Scholar, Newnham College, Cambridge, 1878–80; Mary Ewart Travelling Scholar, 1911–13; formerly Associates' Fellow, Newnham College, Cambridge; author of *The Language Families of Africa*, *The Native Races of British Central Africa*; translator of *An Introduction to the Study of African Languages*.

Zanzibar and the Swahili People.

WHITACRE (ÆLRED), O.P., Sac. Theol. Lector.
Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Hawkesyard Priory, Staffordshire.

Thomism.

WHITLEY (WILLIAM THOMAS), M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.T.S.
Honorary Secretary and editor of the Baptist Historical Society; Member of the American Historical Association; author of *Roman Catholic and Protestant Bibles*, *Missionary Achievement*; editor of *A Baptist Bibliography*, *The Works of John Smyth*.

Trappists.

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Professor of Philosophy in the University of Minnesota.

Welfare.

WILLIAMS (NORMAN POWELL), M.A., B.D.
Chaplain Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford; Lecturer in Theology at Exeter and Pembroke Colleges; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Newcastle.

Tradition.

WOGIHARA (UNRAI), Ph.D.
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Vasubandhu.

WORKMAN (HERBERT B.), M.A., D.Lit.
Principal of Westminster Training College; Member of the Board of Studies in the Faculty of Theology, London University; author of *The Dawn of the Reformation*, *The Letters of John Hus*, *Persecution in the Early Church*, and *Christian Thought to the Reformation*.

Wyclif.

YAPP (Sir ARTHUR KEYSALL), K.B.E., Officier de l'Ordre de la Couronne (Belgium), Wen Hu (China).
National Secretary of the Y.M.C.A.

Young Men's Christian Association.

YOUNGERT (SVEN GUSTAF), Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Philosophy and History of Religion at Augustana College and Theological Seminary, Rock Island, Ill.

Vows (Teutonic).

CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

Topic.	Title of Article.
Sulpicians	Religious Orders (Christian).
Supper	Eucharist.
Sutra	Literature (Vedic).
Suttee	Sati.
Svastika	Cross.
Swan	Animals.
Swastika	Cross.
Taborites	Hussites.
Tai	Ahoms, Burma.
Taimiya	Ibn Taimiya.
Taittiriya	Literature (Vedic and Classical Sanskrit).
Talaings	Burma.
Tapuyas	Brazil.
Tartarus	Eschatology, State of the Dead (Greek).
Tatars	Turks.
Teaching	Education.
Templars	Religious Orders (Christian).
Temple Society	Friends of the Temple.
Testament, New	Bible.
Testament, Old	Bible.
Thankfulness	Gratitude.
Theodoret	Antiochene Theology.
Theriomorphism	Lycanthropy.
Thomas à Kempis	Brethren of the Common Life.
Thomas, St. (Christians of)	Nestorianism.
Thread (Sacred)	Initiation (Hindu, Parsi).
Tobacco	Smoking.
Tuatha Dé Danann	Celts.
Vajapeya	Abhiseka.
Vegetation	Agriculture.
Vijaya	Durga.
Vikings	Teutonic Religion.
Virgines Subintroductæ	Agapetæ.
Vision	Ecstasy.
Washing	Feet-washing, Purification.
Week	Calendar.
Wends	Slavs.
Wergeld	Blood-feud.
Westminster Assembly	Councils and Synods.
Westminster Catechism	Catechisms.
Westminster Confession	Confessions.
Wills	Inheritance.
Wills (Muslim)	Law (Muhammadan).
Word of God	Logos.
Work	Economics, Employment.
Works (Good)	Merit.
Yuga	Ages of the World (Indian).
Zeus	Greek Religion.
Zoar Society	Communistic Societies of America.
Zodiac	Sun, Moon, and Stars.

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.
f. = and following verse or page.
ff. = and following verses or pages.
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J" = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–05.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 ([2]1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
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Daremberg-Saglio = *Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886–90.
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Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 3 vols. 1875–78, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–88.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 ([2]1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
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Holtzmann-Zöpffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*[2], 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 1904.
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*[2], 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Aegypten u. Aethiopien*, 1849–60.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–96.
Muir = *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, 1858–72.
Muss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
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Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, 1881 ff.
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Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–94.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*[2], 1856.
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Schaff-Herzog = *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–75.
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Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894.
Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*[3], 1885–96.
Spencer-Gillen[a] = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
Spencer-Gillen[b] = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*[3], 1891 [[4]1903].
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–74.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*[2], 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*[2], 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philology.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopædia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscrip. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI = Encyclopaedia of Islām.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HL = Hibbert Lectures.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscrip. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908–09).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT² (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³ = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MVG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE[3] = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REG = Revue des Études Grecques.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RGG = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RMM = Revue du monde musulman.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RVV = Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeitungen.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
SBB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien und Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte und Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*[3], *LOT*[6], etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

S

SUFFERING.—I. *INTRODUCTION: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEM.*—Suffering, as a feature of life in this earth, is too obvious and too familiar to need description. Sentimentality and denunciation are alike superfluous. Suffering is all but universal. From the point where, in the evolutionary process, a brain is developed, upward through all ranks of being, suffering is an unvarying element in experience. It appears in endless variety. Some of it belongs to animals in their natural conditions as an accompaniment of their life-story or as a consequence of their predaceous habits. It is, however, in human life that suffering most abounds. A great deal of human suffering is what we term roughly 'physical pain,' though, in point of fact, the suffering of a self-conscious being must be radically distinct from that of a living creature in whose sentient life the thought of personality has not yet dawned. Physical pain is found in many degrees of intensity, from that which is easily bearable, at least by persons in normal health, to that which is appalling to look upon, and must constitute an unimaginable anguish. If we pass from physical suffering to that which is mental and moral, we are overwhelmed by the mass and the magnitude of the agonies that are the lot of mankind. From the sorrows of childhood, deeper than the observer can calculate, to the stony griefs of age, untold and ungauged, there is a range of suffering beyond all enumeration and conception, baffling the imagination, affronting the intelligence.

The worst feature of human suffering is the chaotic nature of its distribution. If strong men alone were sufferers, we would comfort ourselves by noting the gladness of little children; but children suffer, often with an intensity which seems too awful for the tender frame to endure and yet survive. If the guilty alone suffered, we might have some kind of theodicy to fit the facts; but the innocent suffer; they are the greatest sufferers. If we had to consider only our own pains, we might find a reason for them, or at least we could retreat to the fastness of our unconquerable soul. When, however, it is the pain of others that confronts us, we feel that our explanations are an impertinence. The clue to their sufferings is not to be found in any supposed rationale of our own.

The deepest element in the problem of pain is that so much suffering is meaningless, as far as our most careful thought can discern. After we have noted causes the removal of which would certainly reduce the quantity of pain in the world, after we have seen the ends which it may be supposed to serve, there remains a surplusage of pain unaccounted for by our largest theory. It is this surplusage that forms the heart of the mystery of suffering. If there is any meaningless pain in the world, it cannot, surely, be the best of all possible worlds. How can a world crossed by such a bar sinister be the expression of wisdom, power, or goodness?

'The dilemma of Epicurus is still with us: if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then he is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if he has both the power and the will, whence then is evil?'[1]

The challenge to theism is direct. There is probably little theoretic atheism among ordinary men and women. But it is certain that in multitudes of cases faith has suffered shipwreck on the rock of meaningless pain. To this form of unbelief women are peculiarly prone. Suffering appeals to their sympathy. Their acquaintance with it is wide and intimate. They feel, more deeply than men, the waste and cruelty of it; and they are accordingly brought to doubt the existence of a God who is at once almighty and all-merciful. In their case, too, scepticism means more than it does to the majority of men. It is not merely the abandonment of a theory. It is the ruin of a life, through the loss of the hope which alone makes life endurable. In all ages the pressure of this problem of pain has been felt. It may even be said to be the driving force in all philosophy and in every great religion.

How shall man be reconciled to life? What view of the world must be taken if man is to live worthily in it? What estimate of life must be held if it is to be at least endurable? How are the facts of suffering to be adjusted to the sense of value and the inspiration of hope, which are the mainsprings of fruitful labour?

II. *THE LEADING ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTION.*—1. **Pessimism.**—Frankly and definitely, suffering is so wide-spread and so intense that the verdict

[1] W. R. Sorley and others, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life*, p. 48.

of open-eyed and unprejudiced observers must be that the world is an intolerable place to live in, and that life is an unendurable burden.

The classical example of this solution of the problem of pain is the doctrine of Buddha, which, in the heart of the 19th cent., was reproduced by Schopenhauer. Pessimism must always be substantially the same. It is interesting for its verdict, not for its discussions. Buddha's 'Four Noble Truths'—pain, the origin of pain, the destruction of pain, and the eightfold holy way—are the conclusion of the whole matter. The first contains the result of direct observation. Suffering prevails. Life is worthless and miserable. The second traces this universal wretchedness to its source in 'thirst,' the desire which attaches the soul to worldly objects and leads to 'becoming'—an infinite series of new existences, with a monotonous repetition of birth, pain, and despair. The third points out the means of deliverance from life and from suffering, viz. cessation of desire. Let desire cease; then the thread of life will be snapped; then the fountain of suffering will cease to flow. The fourth is Buddha's plan of salvation, containing a careful account of the steps by which the extinction of desire is to be accomplished. Among these morality has its place; and Buddhist ethic has a mild lustre of its own. The crown of the procedure, however, is contemplation. Schopenhauer's 'path' includes art, but otherwise is scarcely an improvement upon Buddha's. The issue for both is the same—the cessation of desire, the abandonment of the will to live.

To discuss the philosophy of pessimism (*q.v.*) would be wasted labour. The Buddhist psychology, with its rigidly atomistic sensationalism, has gone to the scrap-heap. Schopenhauer's dependence on Kant does not give his system commanding authority. The real strength of pessimism, or the final demonstration of its weakness, must be sought elsewhere. Pessimism pursues the empirical method. The first question to be asked is as to the validity of this method and as to the certainty of the first 'Noble Truth' reached by means of it. Can the worthlessness of life be established by any enumeration of details? The question is not as to the possibility of balancing the pessimist's instances by others of a more cheering nature. Optimism cannot be established by such means. The real question is as to the method itself. The pessimist inference from the facts of pain is not really drawn by mere generalization. It rests on a preconceived theory of values, by which all the facts of life are tested. Pessimism is simply disappointed hedonism. If the highest good is pleasure, life is certainly not worth living, for pleasure in any guise is not to be had, on any terms whatever, in human experience, to such a degree as to counterbalance the damning facts of pain. If the Creator was bound to secure for His creatures a surplusage of pleasure, He certainly has failed to do so. His power has not been equal to His good intentions. If He exists, we must conceive of Him as shorn of His omnipotence, or even 'gone mad.' Hedonism, however, is of all ethical theories the most precarious. If appeal be made to experts in living, the answer will be returned that happiness is not the chief good for man and cannot be conceived as the chief end of creation. That place of eminence belongs to moral goodness.

Our question as to the world, accordingly, must be: Is it so framed and ordered that moral goodness is being wrought out therein, not merely in spite of, but actually by means of, the suffering that is to be found in all human life? It is to be observed, however, that the answer might be enough to refute pessimism, and yet leave a crux for theism. We might be quite convinced that virtue is the highest good for man, and we might vindicate the position that virtue grows to its maturity through the discipline of pain; still, if there remains a margin of suffering that bears no relation at all to character and cannot be related to the chief end of creation, the theistic conclusion remains open to doubt. It may even become necessary to maintain that optimism cannot be established by argument at all, and that theism is warranted by some other process than that of logical demonstration. In that case the challenge of suffering may be met; but not otherwise. After we have refuted a theoretic pessimism, we have to recognize the fact of pain. Before one irrelevant pang our best theorizings sink abashed. We have nothing to say. Our speech would be a worse irrelevance.

2. Stoicism.—Another answer to the challenge of suffering is to the effect that, while pain is real and may be very acute, it is one of those indifferent things which a wise and strong man may neglect, not allowing it to disturb him in any way. The Stoic philosophy is the elaboration of this answer, by means of a full apparatus of metaphysic, psychology, and ethic. Stoicism, however, is more than a philosophical theory. It is an attitude to life. It reappears in noted personalities, when the insistent evils and disorders of the world drive men to the inner region of their own souls, to find there a refuge nowhere else discoverable. The circumstances under which classical Stoicism arose are familiar. It was an age of individualism. No relief or satisfaction could be found in any form of life open to man in the world of that day. Men could not go into the world and find the counterpart of their own moral nature. They could not lose themselves in the activities of city or nation and in the very process of such devotion achieve their own highest welfare. And this for two reasons: no city or nation was left standing in its independence; and the soul of man had grown so great in its needs and capacities that it could no longer be satisfied within the limits of civic or national activities, however intense and vivid these might be. Man had discovered himself. He knew now that nothing less than the universe would meet his need and afford a satisfying life. Here, then, is the Stoic gospel, which is at once a philosophy and a message of salvation. The ultimate reality is reason. We may speak of Nature or of God. In any case there is one principle at work in the world and in man. Stoicism is, in this aspect, optimism. It believes in a principle which underlies all phenomena and is moving through all events to complete victory. This principle is the life of all that is, both within man and beyond him. It is a principle of reason and of harmony. It is inherently good; and its supremacy is the highest welfare of the world and of man. The ethical ideal for man, accordingly, is consistency with nature or with reason; or, speaking religiously, it is harmony with the will of God. The ancient Stoic doctrine of providence has the fervour of intense religious conviction. It is strange at first sight that such a glowing optimism should have any room for a theoretic acknowledgment of the facts of pain and evil. It is to be noted, however, that the ultimate reason has been reached in Stoicism too easily. It is, after all, a negation of the vast and confusing facts of a miserable and perplexing experience. It is the bare affirmation of an abstract principle which ought to be the truth of all things and, in point of fact, is reproduced in scarcely any of them. Reason is everything; and yet reason is nowhere. Stoic optimism is a faith; but the Stoic estimate of facts is dark and pessimistic. What, then, is man to do, poised as he is between reason, which is his true nature, and a world in which man and things are so irrational? What attitude is he to take towards such brute facts as hunger and cold, oppression and cruelty, bereavement and grief? The Stoic answer is serene and hard. The wise man will choose reason. He will be absolutely sure that this choice brings him a good of which no power in man or in things can rob him. He is in indefeasible possession of the absolute best. His harmony with reason sets him in a charmed circle, into

which nothing irrational and evil can ever enter. Pain racks his body; but his body is not his reason. Death robs him of wife or child; but they are not himself. Evil afflicts his friends; but that cannot invade the citadel of his own peace. We read the aphorisms and counsels of an Epictetus with a shudder. So calm, so logical, so inhuman! It ought to be noted, however, that this attitude of complete detachment towards pain and evil is an advance upon a view such as that of Aristotle, which regards them as obstacles in the way of a perfect life. To the Stoic they are not obstacles. The perfect life has simply nothing to do with them. The wise man will not court them; but he will not allow them to disturb his serenity. He will make their occurrence in his experience the occasion of manifesting his consistency with reason. He will even benefit by their presence, inasmuch as his conquest of them will invigorate his strength and enable him to gain a yet greater superiority over them. But, in themselves, they have no relation to his inner life, which is complete without them and does nothing to them. At this point our admiration for the Stoic attitude reaches its highest.

Here also our criticism begins. The reason, which is the Stoic's God, and highest good, is not positively related to the manifold experiences of life. It is not in and through them that reason is revealed in its own inner wealth, and that man attains the fullness of his being. Very specially, pain and evil serve no end of reason, and the supreme principle of the universe has no relation to them. Man, in union with that principle, has no duty with regard to them, save to repel them and to refuse to them the tribute of an emotion. It is not on these lines that the worth of life can be vindicated or an idealist construction of the universe be established. The Stoic conclusion is mere negation, abstraction, and emptiness. It is good only for defiance; but defiance is not victory over pain; and far less is it transmutation of evil into the means of a greater good.

Yet is it good, even for defiance? Stoicism has too easily assumed that man can choose the reason of the universe and identify himself with it. A painful doubt develops. What if a man's self be the main obstacle to his being identified with God? In abandoning all things finite and particular, will he not need also to surrender himself? Thus the axe is laid to the root of Stoic pride; and the Stoic gospel turns out to be a counsel of despair. In the might of my self I am to defy the world. But who am I? The very essence of finitude, the very acme of contrast with the reason which is the harmony of the universe. My utmost willing, then, is weakness. Upon my resistance falls the doom of ineptitude and impotence. Victory is turned to defeat. Self-confidence is no longer possible; for self is the secret of failure. When Stoicism has reached this point, it is ready for a philosophy, or a religion, which shall start where it ended and make the condition of man's achievement of the highest good, not his self-assertion, but his self-surrender. The challenge of suffering might now be met in a different way—not by resistance, but by acceptance. Pain might become, not an obstacle in the path of the perfect life, not even a thing indifferent to man's inner good, but the opportunity and the instrument of his death to self, and therefore, also, of his complete self-realization. Stoicism began with optimism and ended in pessimism. It might be possible to reverse the process and to lean our optimism upon a deeper view of evil than an empirical pessimism had ever reached. Such a stage beyond Stoicism is found in one direction in Neo-Platonism, and by another path in Christianity.

3. Meliorism.—A nobler answer to the challenge of suffering than that offered by Stoicism was very prevalent during the recent war. The world, it is admitted, is full of virulent evils and untold sufferings. These things are not to be explained. They are to be fought. They are not to be accepted as an irresistible fate or as the appointment of an almighty and sovereign Disposer of events. They are evil, and only evil, continually. Judged by the human conscience, they exist only to be resisted, defeated, banished from the experience of the race. They are a challenge to love, sympathy, honour, to be met by sacrifice, by service, and above all by unending war. All intelligences are summoned to take part in this war for peace, this struggle for the abolition of suffering. Among the hosts engaged in this life-and-death conflict some individuals, both human and superhuman, occupy the position of leadership, as well in strategy as in the actual fighting. Commander-in-chief of this army is God. He is not what absolutism, or orthodox theism, has conceived Him to be. He is not the inscrutable ground of all being, the omnipotent will, the omniscient mind by whose unalterable decree all things in creation are predetermined. He is a finite being, though of course His resources both in wisdom and in power are far more than human. He is in this fight, which is no shadowy and spectral combat, but is for Him as for man tragically real, a genuine life or death struggle. We can indeed scarcely imagine His being defeated ultimately; but He has not won yet. Nay, He cannot win unless He secure the co-operation of man. In this tremendous conflict human beings cannot be neutral. If they are not for Him, they are against Him, slackers, traitors, or open enemies. He sends out a great call for volunteers; and all who have a spark of generosity or heroism will rally to His side. They will fight with the splendid courage which comes from sympathy with the oppressed and tortured everywhere, and with the desperate energy of those who see the issue plainly. They are fighting for their all, for the very life of humanity, and humanity's radiant and high-souled Leader. Every rookery pulled down, every disease routed, every social wrong redressed, is a battle won in the long campaign, a stage to the final, all-comprehensive victory. Suffering is being eliminated. Progress is being made. The end, if not in sight, is reasonably secure.

But the practical value of meliorism must rest ultimately on the validity of its presuppositions. If these are invalid, their results cannot be permanent. Now the presuppositions of meliorism are mainly three: (1) the universe is conceived as growing in time, its future, strictly speaking, unpredictable; (2) God Himself is avowedly a finite being, in time, sometimes described even as 'young,' with a future before Him in which He has still to make good; (3) the issue of the conflict is, in the nature of the case, uncertain, though every successive victory and the inexhaustible resources of intelligences, human and superhuman, give ground for hope. It is not too much to say that each one of these presuppositions is disputable. Not one of them has won universal consent. Together they constitute a huge hypothesis. If regarded as more than this, they become sheer dogmatism; and dogmas are but 'iron rations' at best, and are soon exhausted.

The error both of Stoicism and of meliorism lies in trying to turn what is partial into an absolute. Because a man is summoned to oppose the evil that is in the world with all his might, it is supposed that he can 'carry on' till the victory is his. Suppose, however, that this rough dualism between the good man and the wicked world does not represent the real situation. Suppose that the real source of evil is not without, but within, and that

the conflict that is being waged in the world is the image and the outcome of a more devouring strife that rages in man's own soul. Then the result will be, as happened in the history of Stoicism, that self must give up its self-sufficiency and must seek the true and the good, not by self-assertion, but by self-surrender, and see in its attainment of virtue and knowledge the disclosure and the communication of One who includes the universe in His consciousness and His control. Then the fighter may 'carry on' without anxiety and without self-confidence, because the victory has been won already, not by himself, but by the Power which is working in him, whose servant and vehicle he is. The end of such a war is not uncertain, though it can be reached only through a sacrificial ministry.

It ought to be added that meliorism makes no pretension of having solved the problem of pain. It knows no more than any other theory why pain should ever be; and it cannot be blamed for refusing to face the question. A graver defect, however, is its inability to provide hope or comfort for those sufferers who are not taking part in the successive victories, or are not directly benefited by them. In this war, as in all wars, it is the non-combatants who suffer most. But really the metaphor breaks down altogether. Where time is the whole of reality, there can be no 'repatriation' of those who have been overwhelmed by the powers of evil. Some meliorists believe in immortality. But their faith is not a certain conclusion from their presuppositions; nor does meliorism require such a faith for its completeness. It is concerned only with the progress of humanity. Its soldiers get their fill of fighting, and this is all the pay they ask for. Those who have never had a chance to fight, who have been crushed by forces too great for them, have no compensatory advantages offered them. At this point meliorism lapses below Stoicism. It has no resource against pessimism. A world with such hopeless, meaningless pain in it had better never have been. The meliorist 'God' escapes the condemnation and contempt even of the most ordinary intelligence, only because, to do him justice, he is not creator of the world, and is not responsible for its blemishes. We stand, as does 'God' also, in the midst of a circumambient fate, unintelligible, inaccessible, whose blind decree can be neither modified nor served, which is liable at any moment to intervene disastrously in our affairs and turn our most brilliant victory into mockery and despair.

4. Optimism.—The most perfect optimism would be a thoroughgoing pantheism. If finitude is really an illusion which disappears from the point of view of the Absolute, evil cannot be held to exist. Ascend to the point of view of the Absolute, and forthwith evil is seen to be mere seeming. The idea that it exists is the mistake of those who attribute to things finite a reality which does not belong to them.

This sounds convincing. But two remarks immediately occur. (1) Who shall ascend to the height of the Absolute? How shall the finite leap to the Infinite? Practically, pantheism has nothing to say to the sufferer. His pain is utterly irremediable. Pain necessarily belongs to the finite. He is bound to the finite. As long as he exists he must suffer. When suffering ceases, he will have ceased to be. Pantheistic optimism is thus pessimistic in its estimate of life. (2) If evil is an illusion, because it is finite, so must good be also, for it too is finite. Good and evil are, in fact, meaningless. For the Absolute they do not exist. Optimism and pessimism, accordingly, are philosophies of the unreal, and are in the strictest sense alike nonsense. Of course this treatment of the problem of pain is due to the error which turns the unity of thought against the manifold of experience and regards the universal as the only real, while the particular is condemned as the illusory.

The philosophy of Leibniz has been dealt with in this *Encyclopædia*[1] and needs no further exposition here. Leibniz stands at the opposite pole from pantheism; yet it is pantheism to which his own ruling principle of thought constantly leads him. The principle of sufficient reason, as he interprets it, is the same as that of identity and contradiction. A complete analysis would be a perfect explanation. The principle of identity is the highest principle of truth. All appearance of difference is mere illusion, due to the disability of a finite consciousness. From this point of view the problem of evil may be solved; but the solution is really pantheistic.

[1] See artt. LEIBNIZ and PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.

The criticism of Hume, and the yet more destructive work of Kant, have made the dominance of an abstract Absolute impossible for modern thought. The finite has come to its rights. The principle of freedom is too strongly entrenched in the convictions of men ever to be relegated to the sphere of the negative and the illusory. This means that modern optimism can no longer take the position of pantheism, and so affirm the sole reality of good as to destroy the possibility of evil. Its proof must now consist in arguing that evil is inseparable from the highest good in this sense, that the highest good is attainable only through the conquest of evil. This argument consists fundamentally in a special reading of the facts of human life. It may be presented as a deduction from an idealist philosophy, or it may appear as an induction from data empirically reached. Fundamentally it is a judgment of value, as intuition of the significance of life, and is not reached by either the *a priori* or the *a posteriori* method.

'There is no evil except for a rational being, who is capable of willing a good which he identifies with the absolute good, but which is in reality in antagonism to it. But, inasmuch as the possibility of willing this lower good is inseparable from the existence of free subjects, who only come to the clear consciousness of the higher through experience of the lower, it is just the high destiny of man and the infinite perfection of God which make it inconceivable how there should be a universe, containing beings who realize what is the meaning of their own life and of the whole, unless those beings pass through the long and painful process by which the absolutely good is revealed as that which can overcome the deepest depths of evil.'[1]

Watson, from whom these words are quoted, develops them into a view of human life and history which shows that, the higher the conception of the good, the deeper will be the insight into evil. The man who knows himself a sinner knows that no sin is alien to him. He is the supreme sinner of the universe, the chief of sinners; and in the act in which he confesses and dies to his sin the violated order is rectified; and the guilt which he so profoundly acknowledges is lifted to the shoulders of Another, and he is free for ever. Watson does not in this passage explicitly apply this profound conception of an optimism, vindicated through a deeper pessimism than Buddha or Schopenhauer ever knew, to the pangs of nature and the physical woes of men. Plainly, however, the one problem lies within the other. The deepest evil man can suffer is the division within his own spirit. Let his breach with the Absolute be healed, and his breach with nature cannot fail to be healed likewise. The truth of nature is spirit. If the unity of spirit rise triumphant above the dualism that a false assertion of freedom has wrought, there can be left nowhere in the universe any element of difference, and therefore of evil, which is not in process of being transcended in the realization of the ultimate good.

Many writers who do not adhere to Watson's type of idealism base their ethical view of the universe on the facts which he emphasizes. The world was certainly not framed to produce the pleasure of all sentient creatures or the happiness of human beings. The highest good is moral good, and moral good can be attained by man only through a process of discipline. A world which made goodness easy would make true goodness impossible. By work, by suffering, and by temptation, human character is perfected. The theistic and optimistic inference is more securely drawn from a world with imperfections, in conflict with which character is ripened, than it would be from one in which neither physical nor moral evil was present. It is possible to believe that the Creator of such a

[1] John Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 459.

world is good and wise and almighty, whereas such a faith would be valueless if the world were a machine for turning out mechanical perfection. This does not mean, of course, that for every pain we suffer we can allege a moral purpose. Physical suffering comes to us through our place in a cosmic order whose laws operate with absolute impartiality.

Would we prefer that it were otherwise? Yet in such a world, and in such a world alone, can the highest good be realized. As matter of observed fact, the good is making progress towards a victory, which may be delayed, but which stands in no reasonable doubt. One difficulty lies in the path of such modest optimism, viz. the fate of the individual. Most upholders of this view take refuge in the idea of personal immortality. It is granted that the general optimistic estimate requires that there shall be a balance of good for the individual as well as for the race, seeing that the individual is an end in himself, and not a mere link in a chain. But in the vast majority of individuals this balance is not struck within time and space. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate another life, in which the wrongs and sufferings of this world shall be rectified and their memory lost in the realization of perfect good.

An argument such as this, which turns upon the supremacy of moral worth, and the function of pain in realizing it in the history of individuals and of the race, is intellectually unanswerable. The conclusion of the whole matter is:

> 'God's in His heaven—
> All's right with the world!'

It is to be noted, however, that, when we have solved the problem of pain from the point of view of the spectator, suffering still remains a mystery for the sufferers. No amount of argument can meet their need. What they require is an experience. Their pain cannot be transmuted into joy by telling them that, in the final result, there will be for them a preponderance of good. They will continue to suffer, and before their anguish argument sinks back ashamed. They need to be introduced to the experience of a suffering within which theirs is comprehended and of a good through which theirs is guaranteed.

Optimism must submit to the test of fact. The fact in this case is pain; and pain is insoluble by a process of reasoning. Over against every phase of the argument stands the intractable pain, or, rather, there stands the piteous army of the sufferers. Optimism appears satisfactory only when we stand back from the facts. Stand in the midst of them, and our philosophy is smitten into silence. A world, with pain in it—and such pain!—cannot be the best of all possible worlds.

Of course, Omar Khayyam's aspiration is ridiculous. We cannot 'grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,' cannot 'shatter it to bits' and 'remould it nearer to the heart's desire.' None the less, we turn from the best that the optimist can say to the contemplation of a universe which contains such 'things' in it and are conscious of a lamentable gap. The key does not fit the lock. Suffering remains a mystery and a challenge to theism.

5. The Christian doctrine of providence.—It cannot be doubted that Jesus had the whole fact of pain present to His mind. He lived in the midst of suffering. Yet it did not present itself to Him as a problem. Certainly He made no explicit reference to the questions with which Job wrestled. His compassions flowed forth unhindered by any theory of the causes of pain. He never viewed suffering as other than a great evil. He devoted a large part of His ministry to its alleviation. But He never stood before it confounded or paralyzed. If He was conscious of its challenge to theism, He never replied by argument. He lived in unbroken communion with God, and faced all the problems of life from that position of perfect acquaintance. He knew God. He knew that God's love gathers into its compass all the suffering of man and of the whole sentient creation. The good will of a God whom He knew as the Father cannot be impugned. The victory of His love cannot be doubted. In this faith Jesus lived and died. He revealed to men its divine object, and gave theism the verification of experience. Christianity is the reproduction of this proof. It is a life 'hid with Christ in God.' Its secret is an experience. This experience is not a mystic rapture, to be attained in rare moments by those who have leisure to cultivate the conditions leading to such remote and perilous heights. It may be reached by children. It can be reached only by those who consent to become as little children. It is peculiarly accessible to sufferers. It is reached in the act by which man surrenders his separateness of will and commits himself trustfully to the divine love as it meets him in the chiefest of all sufferers. Such an experience cannot be translated directly into a theory of pain. It contains more than any theory can express. All noble idealism seeks to interpret its fullness; and, apart from it, no philosophical solution can be more than an attractive speculation.

The Christian doctrine of providence (*q.v.*) articulates the leading ideas which are implicit in this experience, and by means of them seeks to exhibit the relation of God to the history of the world. It does so, however, under the distinct understanding that the experience of communion with God, while it is central and all-comprehensive, cannot be drawn upon to provide ready-made answers to the questions which intellect may raise regarding the course of nature and of human life. The divine love is the highest reason. The Logos is love incarnate in the life of the Son of God. But this does not mean that a book could be written, solving, on the whole and in every detail, the mystery of pain. No reasoning process can reach the sanctuary where God at once comforts and remakes the soul that pain has shattered. The Christian is an optimist, but not a theorist. He knows God. He has seen Him in Christ. God is love. That is the secret. There is no truth outside of love, no power that can withstand love. It dominates the universe. It is almighty. When it is reproduced in man, it is the greatest thing in the world. The doctrine of providence simply says, in different connexions, that the divine love is sure of itself, knows its own design, is baffled by no obstacles, overcomes all enemies, is moving to an end, guaranteed in Christ, which is none other than God's perfect communication of Himself in and to a universe which responds with the 'Amen' of absolute faith and unhindered devotion. Christian optimism blends the confident assertion of love's supremacy with an unashamed agnosticism. Its key unlocks the mystery of suffering. Yet the Christian does not employ this key to meet the question of why and wherefore, either as to the presence of pain in the world at large or as to any individual affliction. He bears witness to the fact of love. The acceptance of that fact introduces the sufferer to an experience in which all questionings are transcended in a great possession. Christianity accordingly stands apart from theoretic optimism. It does not, of course, impugn the function of pain, by which philosophers and poets have sought to establish their hopeful conclusions. It can use such instances of beneficial pain as illustrations of its own central truth. It doubts, however, their adequacy to establish, by intellectual demonstration, results so magnificent. It is in full sympathy with their spirit. But it rests its optimism on a different basis; and it presents its results not so much to those who contemplate suffering from without, in order to satisfy their questions, as to those who know it from within, that they may know it better and enter through it into fellowship with God.

(*a*) *The ground of Christian optimism.*—The Christian doctrine of providence stands at one point in profound and significant agreement with such an idealism as is presented in the writings of Caird and Watson. It believes that the problem of pain is part of the wider and deeper problem of moral evil. It does not stay to discuss the fact of

physical evil before it has dealt with the graver problem of sin. It presses on to the tremendous fact of breach with God, confident that, if that has been met and healed, no other discord can remain finally unresolved. Nature finds its truth in man. Physical suffering has its analogue in the division which exists between the human soul and God. Reconciliation with God will be the final solution of a mystery of pain which reverberates throughout the universe. In spite of this parallelism, however, Christianity and idealism stand apart. Christianity is an idealism, no doubt. But idealism is not Christianity. The vital question for both is the reconciliation of man and God. How is it achieved? Idealism answers, In an idea. Christianity ventures its all on an historic fact. Idealism pursues the soul to its deepest consciousness of guilt and declares that there already is the reconciliation. The consciousness of guilt is possible only to a soul fundamentally at one with God. In awaking to a sense of his guilt, man knows himself reconciled at once to God and the universe. The spiritual unity is gained; the unification of all experience is thereby guaranteed. Christianity deepens the diagnosis and exhibits a different remedy. In sin man has the universe against him. It reacts to his sin in perpetual judgment, registering in his character and his career, in loss and defeat and pain, the condemnation which man's attack upon the universal order has brought upon him. This automatic reaction does not stand apart from the will of God. It reflects one aspect of the divine mind regarding sin and carries out one part of the divine dealing with it. But sin is not the ultimate reality of the moral world; and judgment is not the whole mind and will of God. The ultimate in God and in the universe is love. The reconciliation is accomplished not in an idea, but in the action of God. The love of God goes into action coincidently with the sin of man. It is true that God's experience of time must differ from ours in a manner necessarily inconceivable by us; so that it is not improper to speak of an eternal act of love and an eternal atonement. But the standpoint of Christianity is definitely historical. Sin is in time. Sin-bearing is in time also. Love can reconcile the world to God only if it pass to the world's side and in the world realize experimentally the whole meaning of sin. It must enter into the tragedy of human life in an experience more tragic than any penitent sinner ever passed through. 'Christ died for our sins' (1 Co 15^{3}). It is the first, the only, Christian gospel. In the action and passion of a life crowned by the Cross Christ is not another than God. He is God, in a temporal experience, manifesting an eternal fact. Love has gone to the utmost limit of sin and suffering and has returned bearing the fruits of that unimaginable agony in a world reconciled, mankind redeemed, sin and evil judged, exposed, broken. The fact of sin—that is pessimism. The fact of Christ—that is optimism. Christianity confronts the world of sin and suffering with the deeper suffering of divine sin-bearing love. All else that it has to say is an inference from that basal fact. Its doctrine of providence consists in developing the significance of that fact for the varied discipline of life.

'The Christian faith in providence is an immediate inference from the Christian experience of redemption, and it is an inference as vast and unqualified as the redeeming love on which it rests.'[1]

To be reconciled to God is to be reconciled to life. To be at one with God is to be at home in the universe. The reactions of the order with which we now live in harmony set like a tide towards our perfecting. 'All things work together for good to them that love God.' Love has taken the place of fate. Possessing it and being possessed by it, we possess all things. We cross every chasm, even the ultimate gulf of death, and find ourselves still in a region where love is king.

[1] J. Denney, *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 330*f.*; see also pp. 1, 3, 177–179.

The NT is a lyric; but it is not a freak of poetic fancy. It is the song of a victory won, the record of an experience, not the less reliable that it is amazing, an inference which is strictly logical, from the greater to the less, though it surpass all calculation. 'He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?' (Ro 8^{32}).

(*b*) *The Christian attitude towards suffering.*—(1) Pain means obstruction of life. It is essentially evil. It is not the intention of God that any of His sentient creatures should suffer. It is not possible to say to every sufferer, 'God sent you this; He has laid this affliction upon you.' This judgment upon suffering as evil will be assailed from many points of view, scientific, ethical, and religious. Suffering, it will be said, is inevitable, as an element in the evolution of the world. It was experienced by innumerable sentient creatures millenniums before man appeared on the earth, before the first sin was committed. Suffering, it will be urged, is a splendid moral discipline. It is, therefore, a good, of which no man can complain that he has had too much. It is sufficient to reply that the Author and Object of Christian faith, the Revealer and the Organ of the infinite love, did not think so. He steadfastly set Himself to reduce the sum of pain. So far as we know, He never met a case of pain which He did not relieve, if the conditions were present for His doing so. In such action He Himself suffered exceedingly. He made no moan. He recognized such suffering to be necessary to the fulfilment of His redeeming vocation (Mt 8^{17}). But His doing so cannot be construed as an approval of pain. Rather was it a judgment upon pain as an evil to be removed at any cost of pain. This judgment, moreover, was not an implicit hedonism. It would be ridiculous to make such a suggestion regarding the teaching of Jesus. He never taught that it was a primary concern of God's love to keep His creatures immune from suffering. He absolutely denied that the crown of life was pleasure. But this cannot be construed to mean that He regarded suffering as a good, or asceticism as the ideal of life, or sorrow as the soul of religion. It does imply, however, that He regarded the condition of the world as abnormal. He occupies the point of view of the religious mind of Israel in looking upon the world as standing in intimate and vital relation with human life. There is a strict relevance between these two. If there be evil in man, there will be pain in nature. Nature stands so near to spirit that it thrills responsive to the breach that sin has wrought between the human spirit and the divine. Paul is enlarging the same idea inherited from the OT, and reinterpreted through the death and resurrection of the Redeemer, when He speaks of the 'sighing of creation,' of its subjection to *ματαιότης* and its share in the hope of redemption (Ro 8^{18-22}). There is suffering in nature; and there is suffering in man as part of nature. And all suffering, in nature or in little children, is the exposition and illustration of that which, in self-conscious and self-determining man, is sin. Dogmatism regarding the origin of sin and suffering is forbidden. To appeal to predestination for a theory is to bring the Eternal within the limits of time. We have nothing to do with origins. We have to do only with meanings and values. And this is the meaning which Christianity puts on pain. It means intensely; and it means evil. The first thing to be done with it is

not to discuss it or apologize for it, but to relieve it, if possible, and at least administer the healing of sympathy. This, then, is the first position of Christianity with respect to pain: it is not God's will for His creatures that they should suffer; it is His will that pain shall be abolished from His universe for evermore.

(2) Pain is not an unanswerable challenge to theism. It is not inconsistent with the supremacy of love. Love has won an eternal victory in an event which occurred in time. Love has snatched victory from defeat. It has transmuted the foulest crime of man into the instrument of the divine redemption. It has done this greatest thing. How shall it not accomplish all lesser things in the same order? He who redeems from sin will not be baffled by suffering. It is to be noted carefully that Christian thought, in claiming that God is not hindered by the obstacle of pain, is not passing from ethical to non-ethical considerations, giving up love to take up power. What Christian experience finds in the Cross of Christ is not an incident, an act over and done with, like the punishment of a criminal. It is the historic revelation of that which is in essence timeless, and endures through all time, and triumphs in all history, viz. the atoning love of God. The Cross is the supreme revelation of the divine immanence. God is present in all pain. He suffers in all suffering. He is the chief sufferer in the world.

Theology has never done justice to the surest affirmation of faith: 'In all their affliction he was afflicted.' The incarnation of God in Christ is the deepest truth of the divine relation to the world. Nicene orthodoxy is not orthodox enough. Misled by the Greek conception of the Absolute, it ascribes divinity to One who, nevertheless, has an experience of which God is incapable. But the God whom faith finds in Christ is the only God there is. He suffers in all that sin has wrought, and His suffering is the redemption of the world. Christianity meets the challenge of pain, not by anxious computations of the amount of good which may be extracted from the agonies that fill the records of time, but by the unveiling of the suffering of God. The Cross is the only Christian apologetic. Only through the suffering of God is it tolerable to suppose that a world with pain in it is His world, reconciled to Him, and carrying within its tragic history the energy of omnipotent redeeming love. We time-determined consciousnesses cannot pretend to understand God; but we know Him with an estimate that is sure and pierces the inevitable mists of time. God is love. This we know. For the rest we can afford to wait.

(3) Christianity sets out in the name and by the power of a victory already won, on its age-long vocation—the conquest of sin and suffering. To accept at God's hands the deliverance He has wrought by pain is to be committed to a perpetual war with pain. The campaign is world-wide. The battles are innumerable. The fundamental strategy is to utilize for every instance of pain the energy of love, which is the very nature of God and is available and adequate for the redemption of man. In this matter it may be that Church theology and Church policy have lagged behind the actual experience of Christians and have failed to push home the victory.

Three lines of action are prescribed by the consciousness of redemption. (i.) The employment of pain. It is here that optimism is most at home. Browning has rung out the answering challenge to pain. It is absolutely true that in a sinful world the perfecting of souls is won through suffering. We are to react on the pains we endure, and so make them subservient to the development of moral stature. We are bound to be swift and earnest in this subjection of pain to our uses; for the opportunity of so employing it passes with the passing moment. We are to lay to heart the thought which finds eloquent expression in Ugo Bassi's 'Sermon in the Hospital':

'While we suffer, let us set our souls
To suffer perfectly: since this alone,
The suffering, which is this world's special grace,
May here be perfected and left behind.'[1]

All this is to be accepted, rejoiced in, and practised. The only reservation to be made is that such considerations do not establish optimism as a theory. The data are not broad enough. The victory over pain must first be won before specific sufferings can be attacked in detail and made to yield booty to the conqueror. This is the paradox of the higher life of man. Apart from this sure base in triumphant love, the flood of irrelevant pain in nature and history would rout the most confident optimism.

(ii.) The mastery of conditions. This is the sphere of organized ministry. All such service, whether operated by idealists or materialists, Christians or non-Christians, proceeds on the supposition that the conditions of human life are abnormal, and that, before full vigorous life can be enjoyed, these conditions must be improved. Another presupposition, however, has to be made if such ministerial aid to sufferers is to be completely successful, and is to be rendered, not merely with skill and fidelity, but with the energy of perfect confidence. We must be certified that in rendering such help we have the universe on our side, that resident within it are forces capable of carrying sentient creatures to such complete and harmonious exercise of function as shall be a perfect victory over pain. No alteration of conditions will be of any avail in social service or in medical work, unless there be this fountain of energy, discharging itself for ever through these channels. Apart from this, we shall not escape the verdict of pessimism on our most abundant efforts. Many will appeal to 'Nature'; but Christianity knows nothing of personified abstractions. It goes deep into experience, and finds the living God, triumphant over pain, and pouring the energy of His Spirit through channels of human ministry. Such an experience of God binds upon those who share it an inescapable obligation of combating pain of every kind, wheresoever it shows its desolating presence. They are the fellow-workers, without question or criticism, of all of any creed, or none, who will do this work and become conscious or unconscious instruments of love, suffering and victorious.

(iii.) The direct exhibition of the ultimate cure of pain, viz. the love of God in Christ. This is not an extravagance of unreasoning emotionalism. It is sober fact, verified in innumerable instances; God's love does heal pain. If the love of God were regnant in all human life, how much of the world's pain would remain? This is not an abstract speculation; it is a question whose answer cannot be arithmetically complete, and yet is absolutely sure, and admits of boundless practical application. We must make thorough work of the category of solidarity. Soul and body, man and man, race and race, humanity and nature: the universe is organic to the core. It lives from the centre. By the lines of solidarity pain has penetrated to the last filament of the vast web of life. By the same lines of solidarity the healing of pain will go spreading through the entire creation which now waits with eager longing for the revelation of the sons of God. Man's part in this comprehensive conquest of pain corresponds to his place and function in the world. In him the meaning and value of the world are consciously apprehended and uttered. By him too they have been grievously mistaken, and the forces which should have filled the world with the peace and joy of functions normally operating and perfectly fulfilled have been hindered, and the world of man and nature has been put to illimitable torture. It is not morbid when a man sees in the pain of innocent children, of wronged womanhood, and even of the creatures beneath our rank, the sign and seal of his own sin, the issues of a mighty evil in which he is confederate. It is the simple truth.

Therefore man has special work to do in the healing of pain. He has to receive the healing which love can bestow in his own experience, allowing it unhindered exercise as he is reconciled to God and to life. He has to become the conscious organ of that healing to all who suffer. He is never to inflict pain except in so far as pain, in the conditions under which we live (themselves abnormal), is the instrument of moral or physical benefit. He is to be ceaselessly the channel of the love of God to man. Simply by being in the communion of God, one living in the divine love becomes source and centre of healing to the souls and bodies of all around. The evidence is matter of daily experience. Yet the power of healing is not a bare physical force. It requires conscious appropriation and direction. Love that heals is not magic. It is effective as a vocation, accepted and fulfilled. The specific task of love belongs to the manifold opportunities of life, and these are innumerable. They include all ministries of help. In particular, two great obligations rest on all in whom love is doing its reconciling and healing work. One is witness, the other is prayer. The Church, called into being by love's deed, has been

[1] H. E. Hamilton King, *The Disciples*[8], London, 1887, p. 191.

slow in its recognition of these evident duties—slower, and less confident, in respect of the second than of the first. Yet it is in prayer that the function and high privilege of humanity do chiefly consist. By prayer man enters the sanctuary of the divine immanence. In prayer the indwelling love finds another home and citadel, a new centre from which to work. Prayer is the liberation of the spiritual energies that are saving the world. Prayer provides God with the conditions without which an Omnipotence that is moral, and not physical, dare not and cannot work. The question will be asked, Does this mean that any given pain can be relieved by prayer? The answer must be that dogmatism and prediction are forbidden by the organic structure of the universe. No man sins by himself or suffers by himself, and no man is redeemed for himself alone. It is impossible to cut a man out of the texture of his existence and operate on him as though he were an unrelated atom moving in empty space. We have no calculus by which to work out the measurements of the individual's sin and sufferings or to forecast the immediacy and completeness of his deliverance. At the same time, our answer must not 'limit God.' He certainly does not fling about His powers, healing at haphazard. But with equal confidence we may affirm that His healing power is available beyond any measure in which men have permitted it to operate. The *ordo salutis* here is fixed and cannot be altered: first the reconciliation, then the healing; first the faith that commits itself absolutely to God in Christ, then the faith that refuses no gift of God.

The experience recorded in the NT is normative. First, believers owned Jesus Lord, then they received the Spirit. The love to which they committed themselves lived on in them, and wrought mightily. No complete catalogue of such operations could be given. But among the lists that are given we read of healings (1 Co $12^{9, 28}$). The gifts of the Spirit are not magical, and there is nothing stereotyped in the activities produced by them. It would be ridiculous to infer from the presence of a certain gift in the NT communities that it must be perpetual in the Church of all ages. The gifts were created for use. If the use ceased, the gift was withdrawn. But is it fair to regard healing as a sporadic and passing manifestation of the Spirit's presence? Healing of the world's pain is certainly part of the world's redemption. Is it proper to make a distinction here and say that we will believe in the forgiveness of sins, but draw the line at the relief of pain? It may be that sects which we justly condemn for their absurd metaphysic and their ridiculous jargon, and for faults graver still, have such influence as belongs to them because they have been bold enough to rely on a healing power which belongs to the love that was, in Christ, the reconciliation of the world. It may be that the Church has to learn in this matter from those whom, quite justifiably, it has excluded from its fellowship. In any case, the conquest of pain is the work of omnipotent atoning love; and in prayer man co-operates with God in healing the hurt of humanity and of the world.

(4) Christian faith is more than conqueror of pain and can do much more for the sufferer than relieve him of his distress. Christianity teaches the transmutation of pain. Those who love God find that all things, pain included, work together for their good. As they go deeper into the experience of suffering, they make a still more wonderful discovery. In their pain they are not alone. They meet in that sequestered place Another, and He too is a sufferer. These two pains, theirs and His, draw together into the unity of one experience—He in them, and they in Him; their pain His, His pain theirs. This is not to escape from pain. It is to take out of pain the element which makes it an evil. When the self is surrendered to the love of God in Christ, the sting of pain, which is sin, is taken out of it. It becomes straightway part of a life-fellowship with redeeming love. It undergoes a complete transmutation. It has been taken up into the pain that is the price of the world's redemption. There is no question of diminishing the value of love's redeeming deed on the Cross of Christ. But the method of triumphant love remains. The ages reproduce the method of Calvary. The sufferings of Christ rise like a tide in the souls of His people (Ph 3^{10}, Col 1^{24}). Their sufferings take on the quality of His. They are ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial. They are not on that account less hard to bear. Were shame and spitting, thorns and nails, less painful because Jesus bore them as part of His obedience? Suffering borne with Him is suffering still. It is, however, bearable, and far more than bearable. It is utterly changed. It is not a fate, but a vocation, the highest service that a soul can render to God or man. Its evil is blotted out. It is a moment in the being of the highest good. This does not mean that in every suffering a believing man will be conscious that it is good. The pain may inhibit the sense of joy, even as it did with Jesus on the Cross. But none the less is it received and retained by the servant of God as the crown of his ministry, even as Jesus refused to come down from His Cross.

Perhaps James Hinton overstrains the thought when he suggests that our feeling of pain in sacrifice is due to the lack of a perfect love in us. Sacrifice is pain; but in deepest anguish we know it preferable to the best that the world can give.

> 'Remembering these things . . . what should we consider the presence of pain in the world to mean? . . . Does it not mean that a world in which so much of pain is present, is adapted—was altogether made—to be the scene of an overpowering, an absorbing love? . . . The reason we are made, or seem as if we were made for pain, is that we are made for love. . . .
>
> What is the happiness God has meant us for, the happiness to which human nature is fitted, to which it should aspire? Should it be that from which the painful is banished, or that in which pain is latent? Should pain be merely absent, or swallowed up in love and turned to joy? . . .
>
> The pain that is latent in man's bliss is latent, too, in God's; in His most as He is highest: and that great life and death to which the eyes of men are ever turned, or wandering ever are recalled, reveals it to us. . . .
>
> All pains may be summed up in sacrifice; and sacrifice is—of course it is—the instrument of joy.'[1]

This is a nobler optimism than that which rests its case on the fruitage of benefit out of pain. Browning, who is the poet of the one, has not missed the other:

> 'I think this is the authentic sign and seal
> Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad,
> And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts
> Into a rage to suffer for mankind,
> And recommence at sorrow: drops like seed
> After the blossom, ultimate of all.'[2]

The mystery of pain, then, is hid with Christ in God and becomes the open secret of the universe. All pain is a symbol of the suffering of God, and fulfils the function of sacrifice. These innumerable untold and incalculable pains of nature and of humanity are drawn into the compass of the atoning suffering of God. The sign of the Cross is upon a world of sin. The ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial quality of suffering begins very early in the history of the world. Its presence is ever more closely marked as the scale of being rises. It can be traced in each stage of the 'ascent of man.' It can be followed along the whole course of that river of blood and tears which flows through human history. It is useless to make computations, and ask, Was even redemption worth such a price? It would

[1] *The Mystery of Pain*[2], pp. 37, 38, 39, 40, 52.
[2] *Balaustion's Adventure.*

not be, if the price paid were merely human pain. But within the human pain is hid the anguish of crucified love. It is part of 'the reproach of Christ.' Because the infinite love shares this pain, it is transmuted. It becomes part of the price which God pays. Nothing could apologize for God, not any benefit wrung from tortured bodies and slaughtered souls, if He merely looked on from a throne of omnipotence. But a God who suffers is immune from our criticism and does not need our defence. The suffering of love has redeemed the world and has not lost its redeeming power.

Confessedly, this is a faith, not a theory. It is not the less, but the more, sure on that account. It is not a precarious inference from insecure premisses. Its premisses are the love and suffering of God, revealed in the ministry and the Cross of Christ, and apprehended in the act which commits the soul to their redeeming power. Faith is not an act finished in a spasm of emotion. It is the assumption of an attitude towards God and towards life, warranted and established by God's redeeming action.

Faith, says a great Christian teacher, 'is the whole being and attitude of the soul as determined by the sin-bearing love of God in Christ. That love, and that love alone, evokes it, and on that love and that alone, it rests.'[1]

Therefore, Christian optimism is not a document which can be signed, sealed, and delivered to a suffering world to solve the whole problem of suffering. It is the outcome of an experience. Experience cannot be finished, gathered up, and put aside. It lives and grows from a centre. Those who will know the force of its demonstration must occupy the central standpoint. As that is reached in the act of self-commitment to the appeal of divine suffering love, it can be retained only in the continued action of communion with God. Faith in divine providence is not easy. Did any serious thinker ever imagine a state of mind in which faith would rest on an argument? Faith is a post held in the midst of a furious attack which never ceases. It can be held only in prayer. Prayer is at once communion and co-operation with God. In both aspects it carries with it confirmation of faith. Without it faith withers and dies. As we live by receiving the divine love and by acting in the power of it, even to the last limit of devotion, the world where men suffer reveals itself as still within the compass of a sovereign purpose which through pain is passing to its victory. And prayer is the concentrated power of that life, the life of receiving and of giving. Prayer, therefore, conveys the final proof of divine providence. In prayer the darkness of suffering comes into the light of divine victorious love.

(5) Lastly, the Christian view of pain is available for comfort. Comfort for such suffering as the world is full of cannot consist in words.

'The philosopher's generalisations falter, and only the professional pietist, babbling about all being for the best, keeps on talking. His observations are highly admirable. But even faith is almost ashamed of them. It is better to say nothing. There is simply nothing to be said.'[2]

The only offer of comfort that will not insult the sufferer comes from the love of a God who can and does suffer. This is the knowledge we have of Him. Where suffering is He is, in the fullness of a power won by His own pain. Outside of Him there is no comfort. A world without suffering love at the heart of it would be an atheistic world. The last word regarding it would be unrelieved pessimism.

Comfort is the work of God within the soul. It is direct, immediate, as the divine Spirit enfolds the human in the unity of a mutual indwelling. Its action is beneath the eye of the observer; and it fulfils its mission when there is no eye to see, no heart to pity. It is the privilege of creatures whose consciousness is other than human. It upholds those who are not conscious of its operations. Beneath their pain there is a divine experience of which theirs is part. Christianity is withheld from pessimism, only because it holds thus profoundly the truth of the divine immanence. Only so is it withheld from blasphemy, as it beholds the agonies of the world. Even so, it is dumb with amazement. All the more earnestly does it lay upon those who have received the Divine consolations the duty of ministering to those who suffer. Their fulfilment of this duty consists in making themselves the vehicles of redeeming love. They have nothing of their own to give. The comfort they can give is simply the comfort they have received, and that is the love of God. Whatever they say and do will be effective as it bears witness to, and is the medium of, this—the only medicine for human hurt. In many cases silence will be the most perfect human vehicle of the divine comfort.

The Christian view of pain does not warrant the conclusion that in the case of the individual all suffering will cease. The organism is disordered, and the elimination of pain cannot take place at haphazard. The doctrine of divine providence, however, rests on the eternal victory of love, of which the time-development of the world contains the progressive achievement. It, therefore, becomes a prediction of that which will emerge out of time—the complete reconciliation of the world.

Without this, comfort in suffering would be incomplete. God has no comfort to give if He is uncertain of victory. Love is triumphant over sin and suffering; therefore both sin and suffering will cease to be. The final message of Christianity to a suffering world is one of an immortal hope: 'There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away.'

[1] Denney, *Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 295.
[2] Carnegie Simpson, *Facts of Life*, p. 72.

LITERATURE.—See references in artt. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM and GOOD AND EVIL; and art. 'Pessimism' in *EBr*[11]. Almost all volumes dealing with the philosophy of religion, or with Christian apologetic or dogmatic, have discussions of the topic. A selection of English works is here appended. J. Sully, *Pessimism, a History and a Criticism*[2], London, 1892; John Tulloch, *Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion*, Edinburgh, 1884; Robert Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*[5], do. 1894; W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, do. 1907; E. Naville, *Le Problème du mal*, Lausanne, 1868, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871; A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, London, 1902; J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Oxford, 1917; John Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, Glasgow, 1907, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, 2 vols., do. 1912; E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1893, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 2 vols., do. 1904; A. C. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*[2], Edinburgh, 1899; J. Oswald Dykes, *The Divine Worker in Creation and Providence*, do. 1909; Horace Bushnell, *The Moral Uses of Dark Things*, New York, 1868; Henry Jones, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, London, 1891; J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, Edinburgh, 1912; P. Carnegie Simpson, *The Facts of Life*, London, 1913; C. F. D'Arcy, *God and Freedom in Human Experience*, do. 1915; R. L. Ottley, *Christian Ideas and Ideals*, do. 1909; B. H. Streeter and others, *Concerning Prayer*, do. 1916; F. J. Foakes-Jackson and others, *The Faith and the War*, do. 1915; [L. Dougall], *The Christian Doctrine of Health*, do. 1916; W. R. Sorley and others, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life*, Cambridge, 1916; J. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*[3], Edinburgh, 1897; A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World*, New York and London, 1907; G. J. Blewett, *The Christian View of the World*, New Haven, U.S.A., and London, 1912; William James, *Pragmatism*, London, 1907; A. B. Bruce, *The Moral Order of the World*, do. 1899, *The Providential Order of the World*, do. 1897; C. C. Everett, *Theism and the Christian Faith*, New York and London, 1909; W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, Edinburgh, 1906; G. C. Workman, *At Onement*, London, 1911; Henry Drummond, *The Ascent of Man*, do. 1894; W. S. Palmer, *Providence and Faith*, do. 1917; Douglas White, *Forgiveness and Suffering*, Cambridge, 1913; W. F. Cobb, *Spiritual Healing*, London, 1914; Frank Ballard, *Why does not God intervene?*, do. 1912; James Hinton, *The Mystery of Pain*[2], do. 1907; J. H. Brookes, *The Mystery of Suffering*, New York, 1905; P.

Laurent, *The Mission of Pain*, Eng. tr., London, 1910; V. C. Harrington, *Problem of Human Suffering*, New York, 1899; J. Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, London, 1917; J. E. McFadyen, *Jesus and Life*, do. 1917; G. Steven, *The Warp and the Woof*, do. 1917; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1918.

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SUFFERING MESSIAH. — See JESUS CHRIST, vii. 514, MESSIAH, viii. 574ᵃ.

ṢŪFIS. — **1. Derivation and meaning.** — The derivation of the name 'Ṣūfis' (Muḥammadan mystics) was long a subject of dispute. Most Ṣūfis favour the theory that it is derived from *ṣafā* ('purity') and that the Ṣūfi is one of the elect who have become purified from all worldly defilements. Others would connect it with *ṣaff* ('rank'), as though the Ṣūfi were spiritually in the first rank in virtue of his communion with God; or with *ṣuffa* ('bench'), referring the origin of Ṣūfism[1] to the Ahl al-ṣuffa ('people of the bench'), a title given to certain poor Muslims in the early days of Islām who had no house or lodging and therefore used to take shelter on the covered bench outside the mosque built by the Prophet at Medina. As Qushairī and other Ṣūfis admit, none of these explanations is etymologically defensible. There is, however, among the derivations proposed by the Ṣūfis themselves one which does not violate the principles of etymology. The author of the oldest extant Arabic treatise on Ṣūfism, Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, declares that in his opinion (which, naturally, is not based on philological grounds) the word 'Ṣūfi' is derived from *ṣūf* ('wool'), 'for the woollen raiment is the habit of the prophets and the badge of the saints and elect, as appears in many traditions and narratives.'[2] Notwithstanding the facetious remark of Scaliger, 'quod quidam Sofi a flocco lanae dictum uolunt, hoc leuius est ipso flocco lanae,' it was perceived by some European Orientalists in the 18th cent. that this derivation was what Reiske pronounced it to be—'sola uera et grammaticae ipsique rei congrua.' Meanwhile its claims to acceptance were challenged by Joseph von Hammer, who in his *Gesch. der schönen Redekünste Persiens*,[3] asserted that the Ṣūfis are related to the ancient gymnosophists of India and that 'the Arabic words Ṣūfi (mystic) and *ṣūfī* (pure) belong to the same root, like the Greek σοφός and σαφής.' This unlucky sentence might cast doubt on von Hammer's competence as a philologist, but his suggested equation of 'Ṣūfi' with σοφός was, at first sight, plausible enough. Although rejected by Tholuck,[4] it has been championed in comparatively recent times by Adalbert Merx.[5] In 1894 the question was finally settled by Th. Nöldeke, at that time Professor of Arabic in the University of Strassburg. He pointed out[6] that the word σοφός is unknown in Aramaic and therefore could scarcely be expected to occur in Arabic. On the other hand, both Aramaic and Arabic have the words σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, and in the latter language the σ is represented by *sīn* (س), as is almost invariably the case in Greek words which have been Arabicized, not by *ṣād* (ص). If 'Ṣūfi' were of Greek extraction, its initial *ṣād* would be at least abnormal. Further, we have no positive ground for regarding the derivation from σοφός as probable in itself, whereas the derivation from *ṣūf* is confirmed by the authority of Oriental tradition. Nöldeke then cites a number of passages showing that, in the first two centuries of Islām, garments of coarse wool were worn by the common people and especially by those who followed an ascetic way of life. The words *labisa 'l-ṣūf*, 'he clad himself in wool,' occur frequently in the early literature and signify that the person to whom they are applied has renounced the world and become an ascetic; at a later period, when asceticism passed into mysticism, *labisa 'l-ṣūf* generally means 'he became a Ṣūfi.' In Persian too the ascetic is often called *pashmīna-pūsh*, *i.e.* 'wearing a woollen garment.' The old Muslim ascetics who clothed themselves in wool borrowed this practice from Christian hermits or monks. When Ḥammād b. Salama († A.D. 784) came to Baṣra, he said to Farqad al-Sanjī, who appeared before him in a woollen garment, 'Put off this (emblem of) Christianity.'[1] Such garments are described as *ziyy al-ruhbān*, 'the dress of the Christian ascetics.'[2] A *ḥadīth* put in the mouth of the Prophet states that Jesus Himself used to wear them.

We are told by Jāmī[3] that the name 'Ṣūfi' was first borne by Abū Hāshim of Kūfa, a contemporary of Sufyān al-Thaurī († A.D. 778). According to Qushairī,[4] it came into vogue before A.H. 200 (=A.D. 815). Al-Sarrāj mentions the view that it was invented by the people of Baghdād.[5] Although the circumstances of its origin are obscure, it seems to have gained currency during the period of transition from asceticism to mysticism, about the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijrah, and may possibly mark some stage in that process. No weight can be attached to the apocryphal traditions which seek to prove that the appellation existed in the Prophet's time or even throw it back into the pre-Islāmic age. The Ṣūfis of the 3rd and 4th centuries, who claimed to be the true spiritual descendants of Muḥammad, considered themselves fully justified in fabricating evidence in support of their assertion. So far as the present writer is aware, the first Arabic writer to use the word 'Ṣūfi' is Jāḥiẓ of Baṣra († A.D. 869), who refers to 'the Ṣūfis amongst the pietists' (*al-Ṣūfiya mina 'l-nussāk*) and enumerates the names of several who were famous for their eloquence.[6]

In the present article the terms 'Ṣūfi' and 'Ṣūfism' are to be understood in their ordinary sense, viz. as equivalent to 'Muḥammadan mystic' and 'Muḥammadan mysticism.' Ancient Ṣūfism, however, had strong ascetic tendencies, while the mystical element might be insignificant; and there have always been Ṣūfis of an ascetic and devotional type whom we should hesitate to describe as mystics in the proper meaning of the word. In Persian and Turkish poetry 'Ṣūfi' sometimes bears the sense of 'hypocritical pietist' or 'dissolute free-thinker' and may be used as a term of reproach by poets who are themselves Ṣūfis of a different sort.[7]

2. Origin and early development.—The beginnings of mysticism in Islām take us back to the great ascetic movement which arose, largely under Christian influence, during the 7th cent. A.D.[8] This is reflected in the biographical works containing notices of eminent Ṣūfis, which include the names of many of those early ascetics. The movement, though extreme in certain directions, was mainly orthodox. It is characterized by

[1] 'Ṣūfism' is the more correct form. 'Ṣūfism' implies derivation from 'Ṣūfi,' whereas the corresponding Arabic words *taṣawwuf* and *ṣūfī* are collateral formations from *ṣūf*, which is the common root of both.

[2] *Kitāb al-Luma'*, ed. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1916, p. 20 *f.*

[3] Vienna, 1818, p. 346, note 1.

[4] *Sufismus*, p. 30 *f.*

[5] *Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, p. 37 *f.*

[6] *ZDMG* xlviii. [1891] 45 *f.*

[1] *'Iqd*, Cairo, A.H. 1293, iii. 348.

[2] Sha'rānī, *Lawāqiḥ*, i. 45.

[3] *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, ed. W. N. Lees, Calcutta, 1859, p. 34.

[4] *Risāla*, Cairo, A.H. 1318, p. 9.

[5] *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 22.

[6] *Kitāb al-bayān*, Cairo, A.H. 1313, i. 138.

[7] Cf. E. J. W. Gibb, *Hist. of Ottoman Poetry*, London, 1900–09, i. 25 *f.*

[8] See art. ASCETICISM (Muslim).

intense religious exaltation, an overwhelming consciousness of human frailty, boundless fear of God, and utter submission to His will. There was no organized monastic life, though some ascetics wandered to and fro accompanied by a few friends or held prayer-meetings in which they studied the Qur'ān and discussed their spiritual experiences. Baṣra seems to have been the centre of an anti-ritualistic party who laid stress on the higher aspects of asceticism, regarding it as essentially an inward feeling, whereas the Syrians were more concerned with its external forms;[1] Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (*q.v.*) said that it consisted in humility and was not a matter of dress and food. Examination of what is involved in the first article of the Muslim creed—the command to associate nothing with Allāh—gradually led to the view that true asceticism is incompatible with any selfish desire, even with the desire to undergo the utmost privations and austerities for the sake of winning paradise, and that it must culminate in disinterested love of God.[2] Thus the old asceticism, rooted in fanatical exaggeration of religious observances, gave way to a doctrine which in the end threatened to make all observances unnecessary. But this consequence did not show itself immediately. The Ṣūfīs of the 2nd cent. were usually orthodox and law-abiding. They cultivated poverty, self-abasement, resignation. If they loved God, they feared Him more, and on the whole their mysticism lacked positive qualities as well as distinctive theories. They stand midway between asceticism (*zuhd*) and theosophy, or gnosis (*ma'rifat*). The word that best describes their attitude is 'quietism' (*riḍā*).

Special mention may be made of Ibrāhīm b. Adham, a prince of Balkh, whose legend is modelled on the story of Buddha;[3] Shaqīq, also of Balkh, who developed the doctrine of 'trust in God' (*tawakkul*);[4] Rābi'a al-'Adawīya, a saintly woman who was born at Baṣra and died at Jerusalem;[5] and Ma'rūf al-Karkhī, a native of Baghdād.[6] The two last-named foreshadow the ecstatic and enthusiastic mysticism which is characteristic of the succeeding age, although it may be doubted whether all the sayings and verses attributed to Rābi'a on the subject of divine love are genuine. Ma'rūf is the author of the first recorded definition of Ṣūfism, 'to grasp the verities and to renounce that which is in the hands of God's creatures.'[7]

During the 3rd cent. Ṣūfism enters decisively on a new course. The ascetic and quietistic spirit, though still strong, is overpowered by speculative and pantheistic tendencies which had hitherto remained in the background but now assert themselves with increasing boldness. Notwithstanding the dominant and vital part which these tendencies play in the future development of Ṣūfism, it is a mistake to identify their triumph with the origin of Ṣūfism. Nor is it less a mistake to describe them as an entirely foreign element which flowed into Ṣūfism from outside and rapidly transformed it, so that all at once it became different in kind. The germs of Ṣūfī pantheism are to be found in the Qur'ān:

E.g., xxviii. 88: 'Every thing is perishing (*hālik*) except the face (reality) of Allāh'; lv. 26 f.: 'Every one on the earth is passing away (*fānī*), but the glorious and honoured face of thy Lord abideth for ever'; and ii. 109: 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allāh.'

Certainly the Muslim mystics might have arrived independently at the conclusion that Allāh is the only real being.

'It is conceivable that this notion may have come into Islam from outside; on the other hand, speculation on the doctrine of the divine unity appears sufficient to account for its development and indeed for its origin. Had there been more gods than one, says the Koran, the heavens and the earth must have come to grief; but if any attempt be made to define the word "god" metaphysically, speculation quickly leads to something like the truly existing or the necessarily existing; even with Homer the difference between God and man is that the former is eternal, the latter transient. The relation between God and matter immediately suggests questions: is matter independent of God, or not? The former supposition leads to polytheism, the latter only is consistent with real monotheism. If, then, God is not outside matter, He must in a way be identical with matter; and the most thoughtful of the Ṣūfīs, accepting this conclusion, based on it a series of inferences as unlike the original doctrines of Islam as any that could have been evolved.'[1]

Theoretically, there is no reason why the Ṣūfīs should not have reached their pantheistic goal in some such fashion as this, and probably they often did, although in most cases it was a truth grasped intuitively from mystical experience rather than the result of philosophical reflexion. But, in seeking to explain how they advanced from quietism to pantheism, we cannot proceed on the assumption that they were wholly impervious to non-Islāmic ideas. The influence of Christianity, Neo-Platonism, and Buddhism is an undeniable fact. It was in the air and inevitably made itself felt. Of its extent and importance we have ample evidence, although the materials at our disposal seldom enable us to trace it out in detail. In short the new Ṣūfism of the 3rd cent., like Ṣūfism in every period of its history, is the product of diverse forces working together—speculative developments of the Muḥammadan monotheistic idea, Christian asceticism and mysticism, Gnosticism, Greek and Indian philosophies. Until recently the problem has been attacked on the wrong lines. Many former investigators held the view that this great movement, which drew its life and strength from all classes and races in the Muslim empire, could be adequately explained by pointing to one definite source (*e.g.*, the Vedānta or Neo-Platonism) or by formulating theories which are at best half-truths (*e.g.*, that Ṣūfism was a reaction of the Aryan mind against a Semitic religion forcibly imposed on it). It is now, the present writer thinks, recognized that, instead of searching in vain after a single cause, we should endeavour to study the various influences by which the Ṣūfī doctrine was moulded, to place them in due order and connexion, and to distinguish as far as possible what was contributed by each. These influences constitute the environment in which the doctrine developed, and among them are to be reckoned all political, social, and intellectual conditions which favoured the growth of mysticism, such as the devastating civil wars of the Umayyad period, the sceptical and rationalistic currents that ran strongly in the early 'Abbāsid age, and particularly the bitter sectarianism and barren dogmatism of the *'ulamā*.

The main features in the evolution of Ṣūfism in the 3rd cent. may be set forth as follows.

The older Ṣūfīs had sought to bring every word, act, and thought of their lives into harmony with the divine will—an ideal which expressed their conception of Allāh as a transcendent personality, 'the Lord of created beings,' and which they attained by means of asceticism. This theory and practice naturally produced (1) the doctrine of divine love, which is the highest positive form of quietism, and (2) ecstasy, which is frequently a result, either involuntary or intentional, of ascetic exercises. Although the early Ṣūfīs were more or less orthodox, their relation to Islām being not unlike that of the mediæval Spanish mystics to the Roman Catholic Church, a religion of love and ecstasy was bound to come into conflict with Islām sooner or later. Rābi'a declared that she had no

[1] *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo, A.H. 1310, i. 129.
[2] Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*, p. 167 f.
[3] See art. 'Ibrāhīm b. Adham' in *EI*; Goldziher, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 132 f.; Nicholson, in *ZA* xxvi. [1911] 215 f.
[4] See art. Asceticism (Muslim).
[5] See von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, p. 64 f.; R. Dozy, *Essai sur l'hist. de l'islamisme*, tr V. Chauvin, Leyden, 1879, p. 318 f.; Nicholson, *A Literary Hist. of the Arabs*, London, 1907, p. 233 f.
[6] See *JRAS*, 1906, p. 306 f.
[7] *Ib.* p. 331.

[1] Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*, p. 180 f.

fear of hell or hope of paradise, and that she could not love the Prophet because her love of God absorbed her so entirely that neither love nor hate of any other thing remained in her heart. The barrier between Allāh and His creatures was gradually broken down. The definition of divine unity (*tauḥīd*) became pantheistic; the unique personality of Allāh, far above and beyond human reach, was transformed into the one real Being (*al-Ḥaqq*) revealed in all created things, the mystic's true self, which he finds by losing his individual consciousness in ecstatic self-abandonment. This doctrine, however it may be disguised, is the essence of Ṣūfism, and the historical circumstances of its origin justify the statement that it was at least partially derived from sources outside of Islām. Merx, indeed, seems to go too far when he calls it 'Greek' and connects it specifically with the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite,[1] though it may well have been influenced both by them and by the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, a Neo-Platonic treatise of which an Arabic version appeared before the end of the 3rd century. But at this epoch little can have been borrowed directly from books. What makes the influence of Hellenism certain is the fact that in Western Asia and Egypt the Ṣūfī theosophy arose on a soil long saturated with Hellenistic culture, while some of its leading exponents were non-Arab Muslims belonging to the subject nationalities.[2]

One example will suffice. The mystical knowledge of God peculiar to the Ṣūfīs is denoted by the term *ma'rifat* = γνῶσις, i.e. immediate knowledge resulting from apocalyptic vision. It is defined in this sense by several Ṣūfīs of the 3rd cent., but we owe the first important speculations on its nature to Dhu 'l-Nūn of Egypt († A.D. 859), of whom his Persian biographer says: 'He is the head of this sect [the Ṣūfīs]: they all descend from and are related to him.'[3] That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; yet it shows the significance of the man. Now, Dhu 'l-Nūn was a Copt or Nubian by race; he is described as a philosopher and alchemist—*i.e.* a student of Greek wisdom; during his life he was regarded by many as a *zindīq* (free-thinker). Here we have plain indications that, as soon as Islāmic mysticism began to develop, it drew inspiration from the doctrine concerning 'a gnosis or higher knowledge which can be taught with safety'—as Dhu 'l-Nūn also says—'only to the "perfect" or "fully initiated."'[4] While Dhu 'l-Nūn conceived the Ṣūfī's supreme experience as a super-intellectual God-given knowledge, peculiar to those who 'see God with their hearts' and ultimately involving complete unconsciousness ('the more a man knows God, the more is he lost in Him'), he never makes use of the term *fanā*, which is associated with the name of his contemporary, Abū Yazīd, or Bāyazīd, of Bisṭām. *Fanā* is best rendered by 'passing-away'; it may be applied to the disappearance of evil qualities or, in its pantheistic sense, to the passing-away of the whole individual self in union with God. Possibly the term was derived by Muslim mystics from a verse in the Qur'ān[5] quoted above, but in Eastern Persia, where it first came into prominence, it must have been deeply coloured by Perso-Indian ideas.[6] The definition of *fanā* as a moral state, and of the means by which the extinction of all passions and desires is brought about, agrees so exactly with the definition of *nirvāṇa* that Buddhistic influence cannot be denied. As regards the pantheistic aspect of *fanā*, the Vedānta and similar forms of Indian thought readily suggest themselves. Here again the lives and sayings of representative Ṣūfīs, in conjunction with other historical evidence, provide the only trustworthy clue. Bāyazīd was a native of Khurāsān. His grandfather was a Zoroastrian and his master in Ṣūfism a Kurd. He learned the mystical doctrine of passing-away (*fanā*) in the divine unity from Abū 'Alī of Sind. He knew the Indian practice of 'watching the breaths' (*pās-i anfās*) and described it as the gnostic's worship of God.[7] The character of his pantheism is probably reflected in the utterances which his legend records, even if their authenticity may be questioned—for example,

'I went from God to God, until they cried from me in me, "O Thou I!"'

'Verily, I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me. Glory to me! How great is my majesty!'

'Nothing is better for man than to be without aught, having no asceticism, no theory, no practice. When he is without all, he is with all.'

'Creatures are subject to states, but the gnostic has no state, because his vestiges are obliterated and his individuality (*Anniyāt*) passes away in the individuality of Another and his traces are effaced by Another's traces.'

At this time earnest Ṣūfīs did not habitually and openly indulge in the language of 'deification.' The doctrine underlying it was esoteric, reserved for adepts in theosophy, who usually were more discreet than Bāyazīd and Ḥallāj. They saw the necessity of keeping their mystical theories in close touch with the religion which they professed. Consequently the Qur'ān and the Sunna were proclaimed to be the standard to which not only speculation but also spiritual feelings and states must conform.

Let us now consider the methods whereby a reconciliation was effected and take a general survey of the relations existing between Ṣūfism and Islām.

3. The Law, the Path, and the Truth.—The Qur'ān contains a few passages from which it can fairly be argued that Muḥammad had in him something of the mystic, but that book as a whole is no better fitted than the Pentateuch to form the basis of a system of mysticism. Nevertheless, the Ṣūfīs, adopting the Shī'ite principle of allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*), were able to prove to their own satisfaction that every verse and word of the sacred text hides treasures of meaning which God reveals to the elect[1]—meanings which flash upon the inward eye in moments of rapt meditation. So much being granted, one can imagine that it was easy to show Qur'ānic authority for any mystical doctrine whatsoever and to maintain that Ṣūfism was really the esoteric teaching of the Prophet communicated by him to his son-in-law, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. From the same principle it follows that the Ṣūfī interpretation of Islām admits an endless variety of divergent and even contradictory beliefs and practices, all of which *ex hypothesi* are equally valid in kind, though not in degree, since the meanings of the Qur'ān are infinite and reveal themselves to each mystic in proportion to the spiritual capacity with which he is endowed. Hence the Ṣūfīs are not a sect, and there is no uniform body of doctrine constituting what is called 'Ṣūfism.' The many-sidedness of the term is exemplified by the innumerable attempts made to define it.[2] Similarly, the attitude of the Ṣūfīs towards Muḥammadan religious law depends on a subjective criterion. Some punctiliously fulfilled their ritual obligations, while at the same time they recognized that forms of worship have only a relative value in comparison with 'the works of the heart,' or are altogether worthless except as symbols of spiritual realities. To make the pilgrimage, *e.g.*, is to journey away from sin; to put on the pilgrim's garb (*iḥrām*) is to cast off with one's every-day clothes all sensual thoughts and feelings. This is a well-known doctrine of the Ismā'īlīs, from whom the Ṣūfīs seem to have borrowed it.[3] Others are antinomian, whether they be free-thinking and free-living dervishes, genuine mystics like the Malāmatīs described by Hujwīrī,[4] whose fear of men's praise caused them deliberately to act in such a way as to incur reprobation, or gnostics supremely indifferent to the shadow-shows of religion and

[1] *Idee und Grundlinien*, p. 18 f.

[2] Many illustrations of the close parallelism existing between the leading ideas of Hellenistic religious philosophy and those of early Ṣūfism will be found in the introduction to *Bar Hebraeus's Book of the Dove*, tr. A. J. Wensinck, Leyden, 1919, p. xxxix f.

[3] Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, p. 36.

[4] W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* (*BL*), London, 1899, p. 81.

[5] lv. 26.

[6] See Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, p. 163; Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 16 ff.

[7] *Tadhkirat al-auliyā*, i. 162, 10; cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *The Yogāvacara's Manual* (*PTS*), London, 1896, p. x.

[1] Cf. *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 72 f.

[2] See *JRAS*, 1906, p. 330 ff.; Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, p. 166.

[3] Cf. *Kitāb al-Luma'*, p. 172 f. (Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 91 f.) with Browne's *Literary Hist. of Persia*, ii. 241 f.

[4] *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. Nicholson, p. 66; cf. M. Hartmann, *Der islamische orient. Berichte und Forschungen*, Berlin, 1899-1910, i. 156 f.

morality in a phantom world. Many Ṣūfīs, however, insist that, normally at any rate, perfect realization of the Truth (*ḥaqīqat*)—*i.e.* the consummation of the mystical life—is not only compatible with observance of the Law (*sharī'at*) but includes it as a facet or aspect of the whole. This view will be better explained if we give a brief account of its ethical and psychological basis.

The Ṣūfīs regarded themselves as a peculiarly favoured class, possessing an esoteric knowledge of the Qur'ān and the apostolic traditions, and using technical expressions which no ordinary Muslim could understand. This fostered a feeling of brotherhood, and it was not long before traces of organization began to appear. Eminent mystics gathered round them groups of disciples (small at first) for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Ṣūfīs were trained. It was generally held that for those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director (*shaikh, pīr, murshid*), was looked upon with suspicion. The authority of the *shaikhs* was absolute. It lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Hujwīrī mentions a three years' probation.

'The first year is devoted to service of the people [*i.e.* the Ṣūfīs], the second year to service of God, and the third year to watching over his own heart. He can serve the people, only when he places himself in the rank of servants and all others in the rank of masters, *i.e.*, he must regard all, without exception, as being better than himself and must deem it his duty to serve all alike. And he can serve God, only when he cuts off all his selfish interests relating either to the present or to the future life, and worships God for God's sake alone. . . . And he can watch over his heart, only when his thoughts are collected and every care is dismissed, so that in communion with God he guards his heart from the assaults of heedlessness.'[1]

On taking the vow of initiation, the novice was invested by his *shaikh* with the *khirqa* or *muraqqa'a*, a garment made of pieces of cloth stitched together, which in later times superseded the woollen dress worn by the original Ṣūfīs. This ceremony marked his admission to the Ṣūfī brotherhood. Occasionally a Ṣūfī might be invested with two *khirqas* by different *shaikhs*, as happened to Abū Sa'īd ibn Abi 'l-Khair. The veneration which the *shaikhs* inspired in their disciples is well known. Dhu 'l-Nūn went so far as to say that the true disciple should be more obedient to his master than to God Himself.[2] The rule, method, and religious practice inculcated by the *shaikh* and followed by the disciple constitute the Path (*ṭarīqa*). Accordingly, the Path has no fixed and uniform character; its details are determined by the individuality of the teacher. The *ṭarīqas* of the dervish orders exemplify this divergence. Broadly speaking, the Path corresponds to the *via purgativa* of mediæval Christian mysticism. Hunger, solitude, and silence are the chief weapons employed in the war against 'the flesh' (*nafs*). The ascetic and ethical discipline is divided into a progressive series of 'stations' (*maqāmāt*), which the learner must traverse, making himself perfect in every one of them before advancing to the next. They vary in number and order, but the first place is usually occupied by 'repentance' or 'conversion' (*tauba*), *i.e.* turning away from sin towards God. The moral ideal of the Ṣūfīs is unselfishness, whether it take the form of renouncing worldly possessions and desires, sincerity in word and deed without regard for the good opinions of others, patience, humility, charity, or trust in God and single-hearted devotion to His will.[1] These are the fruits of the Path, but its true end is attained by means of exercises in spiritual meditation and recollection which predispose and prepare the disciple for ecstatic experiences. It may be that he will never reach that end; ecstasy is an incalculable gift of divine grace and cannot be extorted. But the Ṣūfīs had a method of their own for producing the state of mind in which 'revelation' of the unseen was most likely to occur. They called it *dhikr* ('recollection'), set the highest value upon it, and deemed it the corner-stone of practical religion.[2] The simplest form of *dhikr* is the continual repetition of the name Allāh or of some short litany, accompanied with intense concentration on the thought of God.[3] Concentration might be assisted by other means, such as flagellation and holding the breath, until the sense of personality gradually disappeared in a state of trance.

'The first stage of *dhikr* is to forget self, and the last stage is the effacement of the thinker in the act of thought, without consciousness of thought, and such absorption in the object of thought as precludes return to the subject thereof.'[4] Concerted performances of *dhikr*, with music and dancing, were introduced at an early date, and their demoralizing effect on neophytes is noted by Hujwīrī.[5] Such prayer-services, as is well known, play an important part in the ritual of the dervish orders.[6]

A general view of Ṣūfī psychology, so far as it bears on the ecstatic life, may be obtained from Qushairī[7] or from the more systematic treatment of the subject by Ghazālī in the second half of his *Iḥyā*.[8]

There are four terms which, taken together, comprise the sensual, spiritual, and intellectual nature of man: (1) *nafs*, the appetitive soul; (2) *rūḥ*, the spirit; (3) *qalb*, the heart; (4) *'aql*, the intelligence. The *nafs*, being the seat of the passions, is wholly evil; its mortification by means of asceticism is the Ṣūfī's holy war (*jihād*). The *qalb* and the *rūḥ* (to which Qushairī adds the *sirr*, the inmost ground of the *qalb*) are the proper organs of the mystical life and are not clearly distinguished from one another. *Qalb*, as used by Ṣūfīs, does not signify the heart of flesh, but 'a transcendental subtlety' or non-material essence whereby the realities of all things are perceived and reflected as in a mirror. Hence the phrase *oculus cordis* has equivalents in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. But the power of the heart to perceive and reflect spiritual realities depends on its purity. It is veiled in greater or less degree by sensuous impressions—sin, egoism, book-learning, traditional faith, etc.; and, in proportion as these veils are removed, its vision of reality becomes more perfect. God alone can purify it, but the need for co-operation with the act of divine grace is asserted by those Ṣūfīs who follow the Path and attach particular importance to the methods of recollection (*dhikr*) and meditation (*murāqabat*), by which the heart is purged of everything except the thought of God. The 'stations' (*maqāmāt*) of the Path, which belong to the mystic's practical religion, are subordinate to the 'states' (*aḥwāl*), which belong to his inner life. The term 'state' (*ḥāl*) denotes a mood of feeling, a spiritual disposition or experience, which God causes to pass over the heart; it is not subject to human control, but comes and goes as God wills; usually it is transient, but it may abide permanently. The classification of *aḥwāl* in pairs of opposites—*e.g.*, hope and fear, expansion and contraction, presence and absence—answers to psychological facts familiar to students of mysticism. Passively yielding to the divine influences which swing him to and fro in an ascending scale, the Ṣūfī is 'the son of his time,' dominated by the 'state' in which he finds himself at the moment, oblivious of the past and without thought of the future. The highest 'states' are ecstatic, and the term *ḥāl* is often synonymous with ecstasy, though it had not this special sense originally.

Here we come back to the point at issue between Ṣūfism and Islām. Through ecstasy the Ṣūfī reaches the plane of the Truth (*ḥaqīqat*), where he is one with God. The person thus enraptured

1 *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. Nicholson, p. 54.
2 *Tadhkirat al-auliyā*, i. 131, 7.

1 See R. Hartmann, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Ḳuschairī*, p. 44 ff.
2 See art. ASCETICISM (Muslim).
3 Cf. D. B. Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 255 f.
4 *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, 161, 18.
5 *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, 429.
6 Cf. E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[6], London, 1871, i. 309; Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, New York, 1911, p. 160 ff.; J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes, or Oriental Spiritualism*, London, 1868.
7 R. Hartmann, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Ḳuschairī*, p. 69 f.
8 Summarized in Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 220 ff.

(*majdhūb*) is a saint (*walī*); no further testimony is required, since the doctrine that a saint who violates the Law is thereby shown to be an impostor applies only when the ecstatic fit has subsided. And in any case, it was argued, a divinely inspired man must not be judged by appearances; his knowledge of unseen things may justify him in doing what religion and morality condemn: the story of Moses and Khadir[1] illustrates this. Ecstasy not being confined to one sex, the Ṣūfī legend includes a long roll of women, to whom a separate section is sometimes allotted in standard hagiographical works. In accordance with the theopathetic character of Muslim saints, their miracles (*karāmāt* = χαρίσματα) are described, not as wrought by them, but as granted or manifested to them; and, while the higher Ṣūfism declares that 'reliance on miracles hinders the elect from penetrating to the inmost shrine of the Truth,' and that 'the greatest miracle is the substitution of a good quality for a bad one,' the popular *walī* cannot, even if he wishes, avoid the reputation of being gifted with powers which Muslims call 'extraordinary' and Europeans 'supernatural.' The saints form an invisible hierarchy by which the order of the world is maintained. At their head stands the *quṭb* ('axis'), under him inferior grades of sanctity—*nuqabā*, *autād*, *abrār*, *abdāl* or *budalā*, etc.—the numbers of each class increasing in proportion to its distance from the *quṭb*.[2] Probably this idea was taken over by the Ṣūfīs from the Shī'ites and Ismā'īlīs.[3]

The Ṣūfī theory of ecstasy recognizes two aspects of the experience of oneness with God. These aspects are symbolized by such negative terms as *fanā* ('passing-away' from individuality), *faqd* ('self-loss'), *sukr* ('intoxication'), with their positive counterparts *baqā* ('abiding in God'), *wajd* ('finding God'), and *ṣaḥw* ('sobriety'). In the controversy which arose as to the relative values of the ecstatic state and the subsequent return to consciousness[4] it is easy to discern the same motives as ranged Ṣūfīs on opposite sides in regard to the question, Were they antinomian or not? From the standpoint of pure Ṣūfism there is nothing beyond the supreme negation of self, when 'the mortal disappears' and religion no longer exists; but logic compels those Ṣūfīs who are more than nominal Muslims to set the life in God against and above the death to self, and to find the highest mystical experience in the state of conscious clairvoyance which succeeds the moment of ecstasy.

'The full circle of deification must comprehend both the inward and outward aspects of Deity—the One and the Many, the Truth and the Law. It is not enough to escape from all that is creaturely without entering into the eternal life of God the Creator as manifested in His works. To abide in God (*baqā*), after having passed away from selfhood (*fanā*), is the mark of the Perfect Man, who not only journeys to God, *i.e.* passes from plurality to unity, but *in* and *with* God, *i.e.* continuing in the unitive state, he returns with God to the phenomenal world from which he set out, and manifests unity in plurality. In this descent . . . he brings down and displays the Truth to mankind while fulfilling the duties of the religious law.'[5]

Such a compromise could not restore the balance effectually. The Ṣūfīs might do homage to the Law, but they ranked it below the Truth and even below the Path. And, if the Truth is above the Law, yet not in contradiction with it, the view was plausible that, when a man has attained to the Truth, all his acts and words are holy and in harmony with the spirit of the Law, however they may seem to clash with its letter. Still, a *via media* had to be secured, even at the price of illogical concessions on both sides.

A Persian Ṣūfī, writing in the 5th cent., laments that his contemporaries 'give the name of "law" to their lusts, call their own senseless fancies "divine knowledge," the motions of the heart and affections of the animal soul "divine love," heresy "poverty," scepticism "purity," disbelief in positive religion "a passing away from self," neglect of the Law of the Prophet "the mystic path."'[1]

In A.D. 1045 Qushairī published his famous 'Epistle on Ṣūfism' (*Risāla fī 'ilm al-taṣawwuf*), recalling to his fellow-mystics how in past times great Ṣūfīs spoke and behaved as good Muslims and set an example of piety which their unworthy successors had almost forgotten. That these protests were not made in vain was due above all to Ghazālī.[2] He fused the traditional and mystical elements into one mass. His work was lasting because it took shape not so much from the force of his mind as under the pressure of a searching spiritual experience: he had worked out and solved the problem in himself before he gave the result in his books. Fifty years after the appearance of Qushairī's *Risāla* Ghazālī resigned the professorship of theology and canon law which he held in the Niẓāmīya college at Baghdād and went into retirement as a Ṣūfī. He has told us in pages as fascinating as Newman's *Apologia* how his studies and meditations at last made his conversion inevitable, through what struggles he shed off philosophy, scholasticism, and legalism, and gained the certainty that the central truth of religion lies in the inner life of the soul.[3] By frankly accepting the main Ṣūfī position Ghazālī gave a new meaning to Islām and an assured place within its fold to many earnestly religious men and women whom the formalists would have driven out if they could. Henceforth Islām is in large measure a mystical faith. But Ghazālī always remained a Muslim in two essential points: (1) his reverence for the religious law, (2) his view of the nature of God. He shut the door against pantheism by insisting on the dogma that the Divine Being is personal, unique, distinct from all other beings. In so far as the human soul has these attributes, it is capable of knowing God; but it can never be identified with God. Our knowledge of God depends on His will to make Himself known through revelation to prophets and saints whom He created. This left Allāh spiritualized and brought near to men's hearts, but still Allāh, not the All in One. It may be said that Ghazālī belongs to Islām rather than to Islāmic mysticism, and that, inasmuch as he is not a pantheist, he is not a typical Ṣūfī. This seems true. On the other hand, while Ṣūfīs who are pantheists often use language implying belief in a personal God, such belief is by no means inconsistent with the full theory of *fanā*, or at least may be sincerely combined with it.

4. God, man, and the universe.—Upon the foundation of experimental mysticism the Ṣūfīs built a theology and a philosophy of which the forms are as various in content and expression as the materials are diverse in origin. It is a notable fact that the oldest scheme of this kind—which has recently been made accessible through the publication of the *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn* of Ḥallāj[4]—was derived from the Christian doctrine of two natures in God.

According to Ḥallāj (*q.v.*), the essence of God's essence is love. Before the creation God loved Himself in absolute unity and through love revealed Himself to Himself alone. Then, desiring to behold that love-in-aloneness, that love without otherness

1 *Qur'ān*, xviii. 64–80.
2 Cf. E. Blochet, 'Études sur l'ésoterisme musulman,' *JA*, 9th ser., xx. [1902] 49 ff.; Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 214.
3 Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolegomena*, tr. M. de Slane, Paris, 1862–68, iii. 104 ff.; cf. H. S. Nyberg, *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-'Arabī*, Leyden, 1919, introd., p. 113.
4 Cf. Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 184 f.
5 Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 163.

1 Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 8.
2 See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Muslim).
3 See *al-Munqidh min aḍ-ḍalāl*, tr. Barbier de Meynard, *JA* VII. ix. 5 ff.; D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903, p. 215 f.
4 See Literature.

and duality, as an external object, He brought forth from non-existence an image of Himself, endowed with all His attributes and names. This divine image is Adam, in and by whom God is made manifest. Ḥallāj, however, maintains a certain distinction between the divine and human natures. Even in their mystical union some personality survives: divinity (*lāhūt*) is infused in—not confused with—humanity (*nāsūt*), as wine in water; hence the 'deified' man cries, '*Ana 'l-Ḥaqq*,' '*I* am God.'[1] The markedly Christian flavour of the Ḥallājian doctrine, together with its author's use of the heretical term *ḥulūl* ('infusion' or 'incarnation'), condemned it in Muslim eyes, and later Ṣūfis take care to give it a monistic interpretation; Ibn al-'Arabī, *e.g.*, reduces the *lāhūt* and *nāsūt* to correlative and interchangeable aspects of the one reality. Yet the magnitude of the debt which Ṣūfism owes to Ḥallāj can hardly be overestimated. His doctrine, though formally rejected, introduced and established in Islām the revolutionary idea that there is a principle of difference in the Absolute itself.

An important school of Ṣūfis, whose watchword is 'the unity of being' (*waḥdat al-wujūd* or *ittiḥād*), hold that reality is one, that all apparent multiplicity is a mode of unity, and that the phenomenal is the outward manifestation of the real. Their views may be illustrated by giving some account of a work entitled *The Man perfect in Knowledge of the Last and First Things* by 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, a mystic of the 15th century A.D.[2]

The essence of God is unknowable *per se*; we must seek knowledge of it through its names and attributes. It is a substance with two accidents, eternity and everlastingness; with two qualities, creativeness and creatureliness; with two descriptions, uncreatedness and origination in time; with two names, Lord and slave (*i.e.* God and man); with two aspects, the outward or visible, which is the present world, and the inward or invisible, which is the world to come. Pure being, as such, has neither name nor attribute; only when it gradually descends from its absoluteness and enters the realm of manifestation do names and attributes appear imprinted on it. The sum of these attributes is the phenomenal universe, which is phenomenal in the sense that it shows reality under the form of externality. Although the distinction of essence and attribute must be admitted if we are to think of the universe at all, the two are ultimately one, like water and ice. The so-called phenomenal world—the world of attributes—is no illusion; it really exists as the self-revelation or other self of the Absolute. It expresses God's idea of Himself; for, as Ibn al-'Arabī says,

'We ourselves are the attributes by which we describe God; our existence is merely an objectification of His existence. God is necessary to us in order that we may exist, while we are necessary to Him, in order that He may be manifested to Himself.'

The simple essence, apart from all qualities and relations, Jīlī calls 'the darkness' (*al-'amā*). It develops consciousness by passing through three stages which modify its purity and simplicity. The first stage is oneness (*aḥadīyat*), the second is 'He-ness' (*huwīyat*), the third is 'I-ness' (*anīyat*). By this process of descent absolute being becomes the subject and object of all thought and reveals itself as divinity with distinctive attributes embracing the whole series of existence. While every appearance displays some attribute of reality, man is the microcosm in which all these attributes are united, and in him alone does the Absolute become conscious of itself in all its diverse aspects. This can only mean that the Absolute, having completely realized itself in human nature, returns into itself through the medium of human nature, or, in mystical language, that God and man become one in the perfect man—the divinely rapt prophet or saint—whose religious function as a mediator between man and God corresponds with his metaphysical function as the unifying principle by which the opposed terms of reality and appearance are harmonized. Therefore the upward movement of the Absolute, from the sphere of manifestation back to the unmanifested essence, takes place in and through the unitive experience of the soul; and so we have exchanged metaphysics for mysticism. Jīlī recognizes three phases of this experience running parallel, as it were, to the three stages—oneness, He-ness, and I-ness—traversed by the Absolute in its descent to consciousness, viz. the illumination of the names, the illumination of the attributes, and the illumination of the essence. The perfect man is the final cause of creation, the preserver of the universe, the *quṭb* ('axis') on which all the spheres of existence revolve. He is a copy made in the image of God—a type of the essence with its two correlated attributes, divinity and humanity. Hence his real nature is threefold, as Jīlī expressly declares in the following verses:

'If you say that it (the essence) is One, you are right; or if you say that it is Two, it is in fact Two;
Or if you say, "No, it is Three," you are right, for that is the real nature of man.'[1]

Coming from a Muslim, who identifies the absolutely perfect man with the prophet Muḥammad, this Trinitarian doctrine is very remarkable; but we must remember that the Ṣūfis generally regard Muḥammad as the Logos, the Light of God which existed before the creation of the world, and for the sake of which all things were made.[2] The Logos is manifested in every age by the prophets and saints, who alone are actually perfect, though all men are potentially so.

Other Ṣūfis enumerate 'five different planes of existence (*ḥaẓarāt-i khamsa*), which loses in true Being as it descends,'[3] and many adopt the Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation.[4]

The theory that all existence, thought, and action are really divine leads to consequences from which the Ṣūfis do not shrink. In the first place, the universe must be essentially good. Even infidelity and sin are effects of the divine activity and belong to the divine perfection. Satan himself glorifies God, inasmuch as his disobedience is subordinate to the eternal will. Yet some attributes, *i.e.* some aspects in which God shows Himself, such as majesty and wrath, are relatively less perfect than others, such as beauty and mercy. What men call evil is privation, not-being. In relation to the One, who has no opposite, it is nothing; it appears only in the phenomenal world, where things are manifested *per contraria*. Similarly, all religious beliefs must be essentially true. God, as Ibn al-'Arabī says, is not limited by any one creed.

To summarize Jīlī once more: the different forms of worship result from the variety of names and attributes by which God reveals Himself in creation. Every name and attribute produces its own characteristic effect; *e.g.*, God is the true Guide (*al-Hādī*); but He is also the Misleader (*al-Muḍill*), for the Qur'ān says: 'Allāh shall lead the wicked into error.' If any one of His names had remained ineffectual and unrealized, His self-manifestation would not have been complete. Therefore He sent His prophets, in order that those who followed them might worship Him as the One who guides mankind to salvation, and that those who disobeyed them might worship Him as the One who leads mankind to perdition. He is the truth or essence of every belief. Idolaters worship the being who permeates each atom of the material world; dualists adore the Creator and creature in one; magians (fire-worshippers) the unity in which all names and attributes pass away, just as fire destroys all natural properties and transmutes them to its own nature; those who deny the existence of a Creator really worship Him in respect of His He-ness, in which He is potentially but not actually creative. It follows that all men are saved at the last. But Jīlī, as a Muslim, is obliged to make distinctions.

[1] *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn*, ed. Massignon, p. 129 *f.*

[2] See Shaikh Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. 150 ff.; Nicholson, 'The Ṣūfī Doctrine of the Perfect Man,' in *The Quest*, viii. [1917] 545 ff. A more adequate account of Jīlī's work will be found in the present writer's *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (in the press).

[1] *Al-insān al-kāmil*, Cairo, A.H. 1300, p. 10, l. 21 *f.*

[2] Tor Andrae, *Die person Muhammads*, Stockholm, 1918, p. 333 ff.

[3] See E. J. W. Gibb, *Hist. of Ottoman Poetry*, i. 54 *f.*

[4] Cf. Nicholson, *Selected Poems from the Dīvānī Shamsi Tabrīz*, Cambridge, 1898, p. xxxii f.

The more completely and universally the idea of God is presented in any form of worship, the more perfect that form must be. Religions revealed through a prophet contain the fullest measure of truth, and among these the most excellent is Islām. Non-Muslims, although their felicity is ultimately assured, suffer retribution: in the case of those who acknowledge no prophet, because they invented forms of worship for themselves; and, in the case of Jews and Christians, because they altered the one revelation brought by all the prophets from Adam to Muḥammad. Jīlī finds in Christianity the nearest approach to his own monistic interpretation of Islām. Christians (he says) recognize the two complementary sides of true belief concerning God, viz. that from one point of view He is above all likeness, while from the other point of view He reveals Himself in the forms of His creatures. Their mistake lies in the limitation to which they have subjected the principle that God becomes manifest in this way. God said in the Qur'ān, 'I breathed my spirit into Adam'; and here the name Adam signifies every human individual. The worship of those who behold God in man is the highest of all. Something of this vision Christians possess, and their doctrine about Jesus is a bridge that will lead them at last to the knowledge that mankind are like mirrors set face to face, each of which contains what is in all; and so they will behold God in themselves and declare Him to be absolutely One.

5. Ṣūfī poetry.—Among the practices devised by the Ṣūfīs for the purpose of stimulating religious emotion there is none more potent than that which they name 'audition' (*samā'*), *i.e.* listening to music and song.[1] Countless stories are told of Ṣūfīs who were thrown into ecstasy on hearing a few lines of verse chanted inadvertently by a singing-girl or with intention by one of themselves. Such verses were usually erotic, but not mystical; the allegorical sense was not given by the poet but was supplied by the hearer. In Ṣūfī poetry, of course, it is otherwise; here the poet's meaning is mystical, however sensuous may be the form in which it lurks. And often the two kinds are so like each other superficially that, unless we have some clue to the intention of the writer, we cannot easily decide whether we are reading an ode of human love or a hymn addressed to the Deity.[2] If it be asked why the Ṣūfīs make such large use of erotic and bacchanalian symbolism, the answer is that they could find no analogy more suggestive and better adapted to shadow forth the states of enthusiasm and ecstasy which their poets describe.

'Wine, torch, and beauty are epiphanies of Verity,
For it is that which is revealed under all forms soever.
Wine and torch are the transport and light of the knower;
Behold The Beauty, for it is hidden from none.

. . . . . .

Wine, torch, and beauty, all are present;
Neglect not to embrace that Beauty.
Quaff the wine of dying to self, and for a season
Peradventure you will be freed from the dominion of self.
Drink wine, for its cup is the face of the Friend;
The flagon is His eye drunken and flown with wine.'[3]

This poetry is the chief glory of Persian literature. It may be studied in the quatrains attributed to Abū Sa'īd b. Abī'l-Khair,[4] in the poems of Farīdu'ddīn 'Aṭṭār,[5] Jalāl al-dīn Rūmī (*q.v.*), and Jāmī,[6] or in the *Gulshani Rāz* of Maḥmūd Shabistarī. Whinfield's edition of the last-named work[7] is provided with explanatory notes and may be recommended as the best introduction to the subject. In Arabic this *genre* of poetry takes a more conventional form, which is not so attractive to Western readers, but the odes of Ibn al-Fārid[8] are exceedingly fine, while those of Ibn al-'Arabī,[1] in spite of their recondite style, contain some passages of great beauty. Of the Turkish Ṣūfī poets the most interesting is Nesīmī,[2] a fervent admirer of Ḥallāj and a member of the sect known as Ḥurūfīs, who derive their title from the mystic significations which they attach to the letters of the alphabet and to combinations of these.[3]

The Ṣūfī poet is not directly concerned with metaphysics.

He 'lets his heart be wholly filled by the sublime conceptions of all-embracing Unity and all-conquering Love which form the real basis whereon all the rest is built. . . . He sees how the Truth is the one source of all existence, diffused throughout the universe through emanation after emanation; how the Primal Intelligence, itself rayed out from the One, rays out in turn the Primal Soul; how the Divine Names cast their light upon the darkness of not-being, each atom of which mirror-like reflects one. He sees how the Awful Attributes of the Truth are reflected in the existence of hell and the devils, and how the Beautiful Attributes are reflected in that of Paradise and the angels. He further sees how Man reflects all the Attributes, Awful and Beautiful alike, and is thus the Microcosm, summing up the universe in himself. He thus sees how it is the Truth alone that is acting through all things, and moreover how this action is a never-ceasing, never-pausing process, every existent atom being each instant clothed with a fresh phenomenal efflux radiated from the Source of Existence, and being again stripped of it, so that the whole contingent universe is momentarily being annihilated and re-created, though the successive acts of destruction and renewal follow one another in such swift succession that they are wholly imperceptible, and all appears as one uninterrupted line, even as an unbroken circle of fire is seen if a single spark shall be whirled quickly round. But the poet may not rest content with the mere perception of these high mysteries; indeed that very Love which has revealed them to him impels him to seek reunion with the Truth.'[4]

God, as the poets conceive Him, is the eternal Beauty which by the necessity of its nature desires to be loved, manifests itself for the sake of love, and is the real object of all love. Even earthly love is a type of spiritual, a bridge leading to reality.[5] The soul, being divine in its essence, longs for union with that from which it is separated by the illusion of individuality, and this longing aspiration, which urges it to pass away from self-hood and to rise on the wings of ecstasy, is the only means whereby it can return to its original home. Love transmutes into pure gold the base phenomenal alloy of which every creature partakes. While reason is dualistic, love unifies by transcending thought.

'He comes, a moon whose like the sky ne'er saw, awake or dreaming,
Crowned with eternal flame no flood can lay.
Lo, from the flagon of thy love, O Lord, my soul is swimming,
And ruined all my body's house of clay!

When first the Giver of the grape my lonely heart befriended,
Wine fired my bosom and my veins filled up,
But when his image all mine eye possessed, a voice descended:
"Well done, O sovereign Wine and peerless Cup!"

Love's mighty arm from roof to base each dark abode is hewing
Where chinks reluctant catch a golden ray.
My heart, when Love's sea of a sudden burst into its viewing,
Leaped headlong in, with "Find me now who may!"'[6]

The following passages further illustrate the manner in which this principle is applied by Ṣūfī poets.

Love is the final cause of creation:

'In solitude, where Being signless dwelt,
And all the universe still dormant lay
Concealed in selflessness, One Being was,
Exempt from "I"- or "Thou"-ness, and apart
From all duality; Beauty Supreme,
Unmanifest except unto Itself
By Its own light, yet fraught with power to charm
The souls of all . . .
But Beauty cannot brook
Concealment and the veil, nor patient rest
Unseen and unadmired: 'twill burst all bonds
And from its prison-casement to the world
Reveal Itself . . .

[1] Cf. D. B. Macdonald, 'Emotional Religion in Islam as affected by Music and Singing,' *JRAS*, 1901, pp. 195 ff., 705 ff.; Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, p. 393 ff.
[2] See Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 102 ff.
[3] *Gulshani Rāz*, ed. and tr. E. H. Whinfield, London, 1880, p. 78 f.
[4] Text and Germ. tr. by H. Ethé in *Sitzungsberichte der k. bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, Philos.-philol. Classe, lxxix. pt. 2 [1875] p. 145 f., lxxxix. pt. i. [1878] p. 38 f.; cf. E. G. Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, ii. 261 ff.
[5] *La Poésie philosophique et religieuse chez les Persans, d'après le Mantic uttaïr, ou le Langage des oiseaux*, ed. and tr. Garcin de Tassy, Paris, 1864.
[6] *Yūsuf und Zulaikha*, tr. R. T. H. Griffith, London, 1882.
[7] London, 1880.
[8] Cf. Grangeret de Lagrange, *Anthologie arabe*, Paris, 1828, p. 25 ff.; Nicholson, *Lit. Hist. of the Arabs*, p. 393 ff.

[1] *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*, ed. and tr. Nicholson, London, 1911.
[2] Gibb, i. 336 ff.
[3] See E. G. Browne, in *JRAS*, 1898, p. 61 ff.; C. Huart and Feylesouf Rizā, *Textes persans relatifs à la secte des Hourouûfis*, London, 1909.
[4] Gibb, i. 65 f.
[5] See Gibb, i. 20 f., 63 f.
[6] *Dīwānī Shamsi Tabrīz*, p. 342.

Wherever Beauty dwells,
Such is its nature and its heritage
From Everlasting Beauty, which emerged
From realms of purity to shine upon
The worlds, and all the souls which dwell therein.
. . . . . .
Each speck of matter did He constitute
A mirror, causing each one to reflect
The beauty of His visage. From the rose
Flashed forth His beauty, and the nightingale,
Beholding it, loved madly. From that fire
The candle drew the lustre which beguiles
The moth to immolation . . .
Beware! say not, "He is All-Beautiful,
And we His lovers." Thou art but the glass,
And He the face confronting it, which casts
Its image on the mirror. He alone
Is manifest, and Thou in truth art hid.
Pure love, like beauty, coming but from Him
Reveals itself in thee. If steadfastly
Thou canst regard, thou wilt at length perceive
He is the mirror also; He alike
The Treasure and the Casket. "I" and "Thou"
Have here no place, and are but phantasies
Vain and unreal.'[1]

Love is the essence of all religions:

'Soul of mine, thou dawning Light: be not far, O be not far!
Love of mine, thou Vision bright: be not far, O be not far!
. . . . . .
See how well my Turban fitteth, yet the Parsee Girdle binds me;
Cord and Wallet I bear light: be not far, O be not far!
True Parsee and true Brahman, a Christian, yet a Musulman,
Thee I trust supreme by Right: be not far, O be not far!
In all Mosques, Pagodas, Churches, I do find one Shrine alone;
Thy Face is there my sole delight: be not far, O be not far!'[2]

The same principle enables the Ṣūfī poet to solve the problems of evil and predestination.

'The more a man loves, the deeper he penetrates the divine purposes. Love is "the astrolabe of heavenly mysteries," the eye-salve which clears the spiritual eye and makes it clairvoyant.'[3]

Through love we can discern that evil, so far as it has any real existence—and in relation to God it has none—is a good in disguise or, at the worst, a necessary condition for the manifestation of good.[4] As regards predestination, perfect love implies identity of will and thus abolishes the conflict between freedom and necessity.

'The word "compulsion" makes me impatient for love's sake;
'Tis he who loves not that is fettered by compulsion.
This is close communion with God, not compulsion,
The shining of the sun, and not a dark cloud.'[5]

The lyric poetry of Ṣūfism reaches its highest mark in pantheistic hymns describing the states of *fanā* (negation of individuality) and *baqā* (affirmation of universal consciousness).

'Lo, for I to myself am unknown, now in God's name what must I do?
I adore not the Cross nor the Crescent, I am not a Giaour nor a Jew.
East nor West, land nor sea is my home, I have kin nor with angel nor gnome,
I am wrought not of fire nor of foam, I am shaped not of dust nor of dew.
I was born not in China afar, not in Saqsīn and not in Bulghār;
Not in India, where five rivers are, nor 'Irāq nor Khorāsān I grew.
Not in this world nor that world I dwell, not in Paradise, neither in Hell;
Not from Eden and Rizwān I fell, not from Adam my lineage I drew.
In a place beyond uttermost Place, in a tract without shadow of trace,
Soul and body transcending I live in the soul of my Loved One anew!'[6]

Though many of these poems are exquisite in form and elaborate in style, it is difficult to regard them as products of conscious literary art, and the present writer is inclined to accept the statement that the odes of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Ibn al-Fāriḍ, Ibn al-'Arabī, and other Ṣūfī poets were often composed under the influence of ecstasy and are in fact analogous to what is known as 'automatic writing.'[1] Their rhythm and melody, combined with the symbolic form in which they are clothed, give them a strange power of communicating to the reader the same feeling of rapture by which their composer was inspired; and the effect is greatly enhanced when they are chanted with an accompaniment of music, as is customary among Ṣūfīs engaged in *dhikr*. While students of this poetry cannot ignore the conventional rules of interpretation which assign a fixed allegorical meaning to a large number of words that are commonly used in a different sense, such a method may easily be pushed too far. Ibn al-'Arabī's commentary on the *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq* shows that even the author of a mystical ode is sometimes unable to explain its meaning. The ecstatic element appears only at intervals and seldom with its first intensity in narrative romances, which depict the soul's love of God and its ultimate union with Him as the story of two human lovers—*e.g.*, Yūsuf and Zulaikhā, Laylā and Majnūn, Salāmān and Absāl—and didactic poems, of which the *Masnavī* is the most celebrated.

[1] Jāmī, *Yūsuf ū Zulaikhā*, tr. E. G. Browne, in art. 'Ṣūfīsm' in *Religious Systems of the World*, p. 328 f.
[2] Tr. after Rückert by W. Hastie in *The Festival of Spring, from the Dīwān of Jelāleddīn*, Glasgow, 1903, p. 3.
[3] Whinfield, *Masnavi-i Ma'navi: the Spiritual Couplets of Maulana Jalālu-'d-dīn Muhammad-i Rūmī*[2], London, 1898, Introd. p. 28.
[4] Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 96 f.
[5] Whinfield, *Masnavi-i Ma'navi*, p. 26.
[6] *Dīwān Shamsi Tabrīz*, p. 344.

LITERATURE.—This art. is supplementary to, and should be read in connexion with, the art. ASCETICISM (Muslim). In the present writer's opinion, it would be premature to aim at giving a historical conspectus of the subject, since adequate materials are not yet available. Further information concerning the doctrines of individual Ṣūfīs will be found in the artt. 'ABD AL-QĀDIR AL-JĪLĀNĪ, 'ABD AR-RAZZĀQ, ḤALLĀJ, IBN ṬUFAIL, JALĀL AL-DĪN RŪMĪ, MUḤYĪ AL-DĪN IBN AL-'ARABĪ, ASH-SHA'RĀNĪ, and SUHRAWARDĪ. See also artt. BLESSEDNESS (Muhammadan), COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Muslim), DERVISH, and LOVE (Muhammadan).

(1) *General.*—F. A. G. Tholuck, *Sufismus sive Theosophia Persarum pantheistica*, Berlin, 1821; E. H. Palmer, *Oriental Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1867; E. G. Browne, art. 'Ṣūfīsm,' in *Religious Systems of the World*, London, 1892, p. 314 ff.; I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 139–200; D. B. Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, Chicago, 1909; R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, London, 1914; Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, tr. R. A. Nicholson, do. 1911.

(2) *Origin and early development.*—A. von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 52 ff.; E. G. Browne, *Literary Hist. of Persia*, London, 1902–06, i. 296 ff., 416 ff.; A. Merx, *Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, Heidelberg, 1893, p. 25 ff.; I. Goldziher, 'Materialien zur Entwickelungsgesch. des Ṣūfismus,' *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vol. xiii. [1899] no. 1, p. 35 ff.; R. A. Nicholson, 'An Historical Enquiry concerning the Origin and Development of Ṣūfīsm,' *JRAS*, 1906, p. 303 ff.; D. S. Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (*HL*), London, 1913, p. 167 ff.; Shaikh Muhammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, do. 1908, p. 96 ff.; H. Frank, *Beitrag zur Erkenntniss des Sufismus nach Ibn Khaldūn*, Leipzig, 1884; L. Massignon, *Kitāb al-Tawāsīn*, Paris, 1913; D. S. Margoliouth, 'Notice of the Writings of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, the first Ṣūfī Author,' in *Trans. of the Third Internat. Congress for the Hist. of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, i. 292 ff.; R. Hartmann, *Das Ṣūfitum nach al-Kuschairī*, Hamburg, 1914; *Al-Kuschairī's Darstellung des Ṣūfitums*, Berlin, 1914; I. Goldziher, 'Neuplatonische und gnostische Elemente im Ḥadīth,' *ZA* xxii. [1908] 317 ff., *A Buddhismus hatása az Iszlamra*, Budapest, 1903, tr. T. Duka, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 125 ff.; E. H. Whinfield, 'Hellenism and Muhammadanism,' *JRAS*, 1905, p. 527 ff.; R. A. Nicholson, 'The Goal of Muhammadan Mysticism,' *JRAS*, 1913, p. 55 ff.

(3) *Doctrine.*—Most of the important European books and papers on Ṣūfism have already been mentioned in the present art. or in the various artt. enumerated above. These titles are not repeated in the list which follows. M. Schreiner, 'Beiträge zur Gesch. der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam,' *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 513 ff.; E. Blochet, 'Etudes sur l'ésoterisme musulman,' *JA*, 9th ser., xix. [1902] 489 ff. and xx. [1902] 49 ff. (concerning the different grades of Ṣūfīs, the *quṭb*, and the inferior saints); I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, Halle, 1888–90, pt. ii. pp. 277–378 (worship of Muslim saints); H. Ethé, 'Der Ṣūfismus und seine drei Hauptvertreter,' in *Morgenländische Studien*, Leipzig, 1870, p. 95 ff.; W. H. T. Gairdner, 'Al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-Anwār and the Ghazālī-Problem,' in *Der Islam*, v. [1914] 121 ff., "*The Way*" *of a Mohammedan Mystic*, Leipzig, 1912; E. H. Whinfield, *Lawā'iḥ* of Jāmī, Persian text with Eng. tr., London, 1906; F. A. G. Tholuck, *Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*, Berlin, 1825.

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[1] Cf. the testimony of Madame Guyon and Blake, cited in E. Underhill, *Mysticism*[4], London, 1912, p. 78 ff.

SUGGESTION.—Suggestion is the production of a reaction by an ideational process, but without deliberation on the part of the subject thereof. The term applies also to any attempt by the subject or by another person to produce such a reaction. 'A' suggestion is any idea that determines, or is used for the purpose of determining, the outcome of such a non-deliberative process.

The qualification 'by an ideational process' is intended to differentiate suggestion from primary instinct-acts. Such acts, though they may be secondarily initiated by an idea or mental image (as when a letter makes me angry with the writer of it), require as their primary stimulus nothing but an appropriate sense-presentation. Suggestion, on the other hand, is primarily ideational. The most typical suggestions are those that are conveyed by language. Gesture, in the broad sense of significant bodily motions, postures, and inarticulate vocalization, comes next. Natural phenomena act suggestively only when they have antecedently acquired a meaning, as when one avoids poison ivy, or quickens one's pace upon hearing distant thunder.

The term 'reaction,' as here used, refers to both psychical and bodily responses. It includes beliefs, hallucinatory perceptions, attitudes (with their affective and emotional aspects), stimulation of involuntary muscles and of certain glands, particular contractions of voluntary muscles and muscle-systems, even extended chains of such contractions, and finally, in all these fields, inhibitions and functional paralyses as well as stimulations.

A reaction is 'deliberate' when it is made after attention has been given to alternatives, and with the alternatives in view. Associated with the idea that defines any alternative is a tendency towards something beyond itself as merely this idea now present. Because of these associated tendencies ideas may be said to compete with one another and therefore to involve inhibitions as well as positive stimulations. In deliberation there is mutual inhibition of two or more competing ideas, wherefore popular thought correctly conceives that pause or postponement is a mark of deliberate conduct and of deliberate believing. Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence, or relative lack, of such competition, inhibition, and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the ideas appropriate to the given situation, and focused or 'narrowed down' to some one idea or coherent chain of ideas. Thereupon the associated tendency that has just been referred to is automatically instated.

How such associated tendencies should be conceived has been a matter of debate. W. McDougall, emphasizing the subconscious character of the connexions here involved, and also the close relation of suggestion in general to 'psychic phenomena,' is of the opinion that any adequate analysis of suggestion must rest at last upon a theory of the subconscious.[1] William James used the phrase 'ideo-motor action' to designate what he regarded as a mental law, namely:

'Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind.'[2]

On the other hand, E. L. Thorndike opposes to the 'ideo-motor' theory, and by implication to McDougall also, the following far simpler theory: an idea may produce a movement in either of two ways—by imaging an object that awakens an instinctive response, or, under the ordinary law of habit, by reinstating something that has previously been associated in the subject's experience with the suggestive idea. The reason why the idea of bending my first finger produces actual bending, according to Thorndike, is that the two—the idea of the bending and the actual bending—have been experienced together heretofore. The very first flexions of the finger, it may be added, occurred reflexly, without any antecedent idea thereof. Just so, if the sight of a glass of water upon my dinner-table induces me to drink water that I do not want, habit is clearly the explanation.[1]

This theory enables us to bring all the psychical and physical manifestations of suggestion under the same two heads, habit and instinct.

Both are found in Antony's handling of the Roman rabble. The opinion of the artisans concerning Cæsar's death was quickly reversed, not by the weighing of pros and cons, but by bringing attention back again and again to essentially the same point, *i.e.* by narrowing attention so that the old attitude of admiration for Cæsar the conqueror was reinstated. In addition, Antony arouses various instincts, as when he works upon curiosity until the crowd demands to hear the will that he pretends to withhold.

It is evident that suggestion is not an exceptional, rare, or abnormal phenomenon, but an omnipresent fact of all mind whenever its reactions are upon the ideational level. In hypnosis competing ideas may be inhibited to an extraordinary degree, but there is no fixed line of division between the incipient stages of hypnosis gradually brought on and fully normal mental action. Similarly the ordinary effects of cheerful or of gloomy expectation are merely heightened in the extreme and truly remarkable facts of suggestive therapeutics.[2]

The process of suggestion has, as such, no particular relation to the truth or the falsity of what is suggested. One may arrive by suggestion at true beliefs or false, and at ethically correct or incorrect attitudes and conduct. Suggestion is an ordinary device of oratory and of preaching, as it is also of advertising and of salesmanship. Recent works on 'business psychology' present what may fairly be called a technic that is parallel to that of physicians who employ psycho-therapy. Thus far the ethical aspects of influencing buyers by suggestion have not been examined as carefully as the technic.

If any one should doubt whether the deliberate influencing of men to act without deliberation is ever justifiable, the following three considerations would have a bearing. (1) There are numerous cases in which the ends of deliberation are defeated by the process of deliberation itself, as when too meticulous weighing of possible consequences or an overwrought insistence upon complete certainty prevents the action that a situation calls for. One way to get such a person over his 'dead centre' is precisely to narrow his attention to one of the alternatives until action ensues. (2) When an instinctive capacity for noble emotions and attitudes has become dull from disuse, one simply lacks considerations that are needed for deliberation. A psychological pre-condition of all deliberation is appreciation of the pertinent alternatives. What is to be done for a man, then, whose habits preclude any feeling of the force of a pertinent alternative? The obviously rational procedure is by processes of suggestion to narrow his attention upon some object that may awaken an instinctive response of the desirable sort, and then to lead him to include this fresh experience among the data of his deliberate thinking. (3) Whether we will or not, a large factor in education, particularly in the development of standards and ideals in the young, is suggestion emanating from adults, especi-

[1] See art. HYPNOTISM.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 526.

[1] See Thorndike, 'Ideo-Motor Action,' *Psych. Rev.* xx. [1913] 91-106.
[2] See artt. DISEASE AND MEDICINE, HYPNOTISM, PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICS.

ally parents and teachers. A purely rationalistic education is a psychological impossibility. Hence it is a custom of educators to take at least some measures for determining the sorts of suggestion to which pupils shall be exposed. M. W. Keatinge argues for careful, deliberate planning of this part of teaching.[1]

On the other hand, suggestion is, on the whole, a process of repetition or of maintaining some *status quo ante* rather than a process of criticism and revision. Under the influence of suggestion alone one merely drifts with social currents, or follows a leader, or imitates one's own past, or at best applies a recognized standard or sets free a disused instinctive capacity. To judge a standard, on the other hand, one must attend to alternatives. It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to suppose that truly ethical action requires nothing but deliberation. Ethical situations are made real to us, especially situations that call for reform, by some kindling of elemental processes that include strong satisfactions or their opposites. Thus it comes to pass that great sermons commonly interweave strong suggestions with analysis and even argument.

To exhibit the whole significance of suggestion in religion would require an historical catalogue of practically all forms of deeply felt experience. Primitive fears connected with tabu and with spiritism were propagated from individual to individual and from generation to generation by suggestion. The same is true of the rejoicing that accompanied some of the ceremonies. Priesthoods acquired and retained their power by narrowing the attention of worshippers by means of sense stimuli of various sorts focused upon some point that required no deliberation. The mystics of all ages have practised auto-suggestion under the name of contemplation or interior prayer. Modern revivals have produced a sense of sin, conversion (reversal of attitudes and of likes and dislikes), and 'assurance' or the 'witness of the Spirit' chiefly by suggestion. Indeed, managers of revival campaigns at the present day are accustomed to organize preaching, singing, personal work, and advertising of various kinds upon a strictly suggestive basis. Not the least item is the careful preparation of the public mind, sometimes for weeks in advance of the first public meeting. Finally, such experiences as 'the jerks,' 'the power,' 'speaking in tongues,' and 'interpretation of tongues' present as a whole cases of suggestion. They are usually initiated by a spontaneous automatism which is then imitated (by oneself and by others) without deliberation, but often with support from passages of Scripture. The idea of a baptism 'with fire' has similarly fulfilled itself here and there.[2]

The phenomena of suggestion reach their climax in human masses, whether crowds (which involve spatial propinquity) or a public whose opinions and attitudes are formed by common reading matter or even by statements passing from mouth to mouth. It is a fact of common observation that in a crowd one may act 'like a different person,' accepting as truth what one could not ordinarily believe, and conducting oneself contrary to one's ordinary standards. The mechanism whereby crowd suggestion acquires this remarkable power is as follows. (1) Certain instinctive capacities are strongly stirred by the massing of appropriate stimuli. Man has a gregarious instinct, is peculiarly interested in the movements of his fellows, and is sensitive to their approvals and disapprovals. Here is the basis for a quickening or excitement of the mind through the mere presence of others, as also for watching and following others, and for subordinating, even forgetting, one's own ideas in the presence of a sentiment generally held by the mass. (2) A crowd usually assembles under the influence of some common thought. Even when this is not the case, conversation tends to produce a common thought. Moreover, under the stimulus of the excitement already referred to, some individual—either one with relatively few inhibitions or one with strong convictions, or even a designing demagogue—is likely to speak aloud. This often precipitates the thinking of the entire mass. It is now as if each one were suggesting to every other one the idea that has come to expression. Thus sentiment rolls up like a snowball. (3) This narrowing of attention, as already indicated, involves an equally strong inhibition upon ideas that would ordinarily appear as competitors. Therefore strong, impulsive action occurs spontaneously and appears to the subject to be natural and justifiable. A crowd is incapable of fine discriminations and of skill; its acts tend towards the simplicity and crudity of instinct; and therefore, in this case, a human association easily acts less socially (as far as ends and consequences are concerned) than its members would do if they faced the same moral issue severally.

All that has just been said applies also to masses that are unified by means of the public press. Our present means of communication are so swift and so all-pervasive that men feel the presence of one another almost the world over at almost the same instant. Communities that are a thousand miles apart get the same news, often word for word, at about the same hour; the effect of the news in one community now becomes an item of news in the other; action as well as idea thus spreads. This is the process whereby a whole nation rises to succour sufferers from earthquake or from fire, or to repel an invader. Thus, too, political opinions as well as fashions of dress and of speech spread with great rapidity.

A study of suggestion as a means of governing men in the State as well as in the Church will show that one of the basal differences between types of organization lies in the degree to which suggestion, as compared with deliberation, is officially used. At the tribal level of organization common action is secured to a great extent by suggestion of the crowd type, as in dances and other ceremonies, and in the personal leadership of the chief. In the monarchical State, as in sacerdotal religion, men are ruled partly by direct command (which is, under some conditions, a potent mode of suggestion), and partly by pageantry and other sensuous or sentimental appeal that ever reawakens a traditional attitude of loyalty. The underlying psychical principle of democracy, on the other hand, is deliberate group action. A deliberative group is one in which unity is sought, not by withdrawing attention from alternatives, but by mutual incitement to pause and weigh alternatives before acting. This type is most fully developed in bodies that have formal rules of order. Here, as a preliminary to each common act, the entire group pauses, the chairman saying, 'Are there any remarks?' Then, as if challenging each individual to full, deliberate self-expression, he asks, 'Are you ready for the question?' This procedure has been devised so as to prevent action under suggestion. Whereas the crowd becomes a unit by the suppression of individual inhibitions, the deliberative group achieves its unity precisely by inviting the expression of competing ideas, and by spreading them out for inspection and unforced selection. The ballot, in popular government, is an organ for essentially

[1] *Suggestion in Education*[2].

[2] See H. S. Dyer, *Revival in India*, London, 1907, ch. iv. and p. 76.

the same type of deliberation on the scale of the local community or of the nation.[1]

LITERATURE.—A. Binet, *La Suggestibilité*, Paris, 1900; Warner Brown, 'Individual and Sex Differences in Suggestibility,' *University of California Publications in Psychology*, 1916, ii., no. 6, pp. 291-430; G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago, 1916, chs. viii. and x.; A. S. Edwards, 'An Experimental Study of Sensory Suggestion,' *AJPs* xxvi. [1915] 99-129; H. L. Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, New York and London, 1917, ch. xii.; W. James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., New York and London, 1890 and later editions, ii. 522-530, and ch. xxvii.; M. W. Keatinge, *Suggestion in Education*[2], London, 1911; W. D. Scott, *The Psychology of Advertising*, Boston, 1908, ch. vi., *Influencing Men in Business*, New York, 1911, chs. v. and vi.; E. L. Thorndike, 'Ideo-Motor Action,' *Psych. Rev.* xx. [1913] 91-106; C. L. Tuckey, *Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion*[6], London, 1913; W. Wundt, *Hypnotismus und Suggestion*, Leipzig, 1892, reprinted from *Philosophische Studien*, vol. viii. pt. i. The *Psychological Bulletin* publishes annually an annotated list of new publications on suggestion. See also the annual *Psychological Index* under division VIII. 2.

GEORGE A. COE.

SUHRAWARDĪ.—Suhrawardī, a small town in the Jibāl province of Persia, has given its name to two celebrated mystics whose lives, characters, and opinions present a remarkable contrast, though both were born in the same decade. Of Shihāb al-dīn 'Umar b. 'Abdallah al-Suhrawardī (A.D. 1144-1234) it is enough to say that he was a Ṣūfī of the conventional type, that he lectured and preached in Baghdād under court patronage, and that his writings include a well-known treatise on Ṣūfism—the *'Awārif al-ma'ārif*—and a polemical work directed against the study of Greek philosophy, which he dedicated to the khalīfah al-Nāṣir.[2] His contemporary, Shihāb al-dīn Yaḥyā b. Amīrak al-Suhrawardī (A.D. 1153-91), after studying jurisprudence and theology at Marāgha, devoted himself to mystical philosophy, led the wandering life of a dervish, and finally settled in Aleppo. While some of his earlier books were written under the influence of Aristotle, he was at heart a Platonist, as is shown by the title and contents of his chief work, the *Ḥikmatu 'l-ishrāq* ('Philosophy of Illumination')—whence the school of mystics who follow him are called Ishrāqīs (*al-ishrāqiyūn*). Being an enthusiast as well as a bold and original thinker, he made no attempt to disguise the anti-Islāmic tendency of his doctrines. It cannot be denied that from the orthodox standpoint they were detestable; and, though at first he found an admirer in al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, the son of Saladin, he was condemned and executed by order of that prince in 1191. The name of 'martyr' (*shahīd*) was refused to him; he is generally known as Suhrawardī al-maqtūl ('Suhrawardī the slain') or al-Shaikh al-maqtūl.

In his theory of illumination he combines Neo-Platonic and Persian ideas. The source of all things is the Absolute Light (*al-nūr al-qāhir*). That which is visible requires no definition, and nothing is more visible than light, whose very nature consists in manifestation.

'The Primal Light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities created by two distinct creative agencies. . . . The relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own negation—Darkness, which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not change of place; it is due to the *love* of illumination which constitutes its very essence. . . . The number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations of intenser brightness become in their turn the sources of other illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these illuminations are mediums, or in the language of theology angels through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance from the Primal Light.'[1]

We may distinguish two illuminations, *i.e.* modes of being, of the Primal Light: (1) pure, abstract, formless; (2) accidental, derivative, possessing form. The pure light is self-conscious substance (spirit and soul), knowing itself through itself, for 'whatever knows itself must be pure light.' The accidental light is related to the pure light as effect to cause and only exists as an attribute in association with the illuminated object (body), which is not matter in Aristotle's use of the term, but merely the negation necessarily implied in the nature of light.

'The experimental fact of the transformation of the primary elements[2] into one another points to this fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being.'[3]

It is of two kinds: (*a*) dark substance, (*b*) dark forms, *i.e.* qualities; and the combination of these two makes up a material body. Since darkness is nothing but the absence of light, and light is identical with reality, the substance and forms of the universe consist of illuminations diffused from the Primal Light in infinite gradations of intensity. It follows that everything partakes of reality in proportion to the radiance which it receives and towards which it ever moves 'with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more of the original fountain of Light.' This perpetual flow and ebb of desire produces the revolutions of the heavenly spheres, the processes of nature, and all human activities. The abstract light (First Intelligence) is less perfect than the Primal Light (God), in contemplating which it becomes conscious of its imperfection, whence there arises in it a darkness that is the ground of plurality in the sensible world. While the entire universe is eternal as emanating from the eternal Light, but contingent if regarded as the object of irradiation, some illuminations are simple, others compound and therefore inferior. The intelligences, the celestial spheres, the souls of the heavens, time, motion, and the archetypes of the elements belong to a higher world, which may be called eternal in contrast with all below it, though in the relation existing between them not posteriority but parallelism is implied. Suhrawardī, like Plato, conceives a world of Ideas—he declares that it was revealed to him mystically—in which every kind of sublunary thing exists as a substance in itself.[4] The wise men of Persia (Zoroastrians), he says, gave names to many of these pure lights (Ideas); *e.g.*, they named the Idea of water Khurdād (May), that of trees Murdād (July), and that of fire Ardibihisht (April).

As each species is endowed with its distinctive qualities and preserved by its guardian Idea—'the lord of the species' (*rabbu 'l-nau'*)—so the Idea of the human body is 'the holy spirit' or universal Reason, while bodies individually are types of rational souls. The soul does not exist before the body. Being pure light, it imparts illumination to the body through the medium of the animal soul. It operates with the five external and the five internal senses, which correspond to powers residing in the ideal archetype. Thus vision, knowledge, memory, imagination, etc., are essentially not passive functions but illuminative acts of the soul. Obeying the principle that what is lower in the scale of being loves what is higher, the soul longs to be united with the formless

[1] Cf. G. A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, ch. viii.

[2] Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, i. 440; von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, p. 99.

[1] Shaikh Muhammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908, p. 127 *f.*

[2] Suhrawardī recognizes only three elements, fire being regarded as hot air.

[3] Iqbāl, p. 133.

[4] Carra de Vaux, 'La Philosophie illuminative d'après Suhrawerdi Meqtoul,' *JA*, 9th ser., vol. xix. [1902] p. 72.

world of light, and it advances towards this end according as it seeks to become perfect in philosophy and the practice of virtue. By so doing it develops a mystical perception (*dhauq*) which clears all doubts away. *Dhauq*, as Suhrawardī tells us, forms the basis of the speculations set forth in the *Ḥikmatu 'l-ishrāq*. In one passage he seems to hint that he himself is the *quṭb*, the mysterious head of the Ṣūfī hierarchy,[1] for he asserts that the philosophy of illumination was taught by Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Zoroastrian sages, and that the world is never without some one who possesses the doctrine and can expound it with authority; that person, he adds, is God's vicegerent (*khalīfat Allāh*) on the earth.[2] Attainment of *fanā*[3] unites the soul with God, but does not mean that one substance is absorbed in another. No two souls can be completely alike.

'The individual souls, after death, are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship with physical organisms. . . . Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make up their deficiencies. The doctrine of transmigration cannot be proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint, though it is a probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which calls back the whole universe when this journey is over, and starts another cycle of being to reproduce in almost all respects the history of the preceding cycles.'[1]

Suhrawardī agrees with Ghazālī in holding that the world could not be better than it is. Evil is a negation depending on the motion and darkness which, as we have seen, are involved in the nature of light; it is associated with the effects and does not proceed *per se* from the First Cause; if it existed *per se*, it would not be evil. In his clear and sympathetic exposition of the Ishrāqī philosophy Shaikh Muḥammad Iqbāl calls attention to Suhrawardī's intellectual independence and to the skill with which he moulded his Neo-Platonic materials into a thoroughly Persian system of thought, uniting speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. Mystic and (in a sense) pantheist as he was, he regards the external world as real and never loses touch with it.

'No Persian thinker is more alive to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in reference to his fundamental principles.'[2]

LITERATURE.—Besides the references given in the art., M. Horten, *Die Philosophie der Erleuchtung nach Suhrawardī* (*Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, xxxviii.), Halle, 1912; A. von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 89 ff.; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, Berlin, 1898-1902, i. 437.

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SUICIDE.

SUICIDE (Introductory).—Before attempting any discussion of suicide from the standpoint of ethics or religion, we should note that in many cases—probably the majority, among civilized peoples—either no moral judgment can be passed upon the act or at least great allowance must be made for the mental condition of the agent. Lunacy not infrequently involves such complete loss of the instinct of self-preservation that the patient, even where analgesia is not present, will mutilate or kill himself, apparently without any idea of what he is doing. So in *dementia præcox* 'self-respect, modesty and the instinct of self-preservation are quite absent'; and the result is various absurd, criminal, or indecent acts, including suicide for a trivial reason or none at all.[4] Again, *dementia paralytica*, or chronic periencephalitis, although like many forms of mental diseases it generally produces intense and unreasoning attachment to life,[5] often involves accesses of wild, self-directed fury, such as that in which Guy de Maupassant tried to kill himself.[6] But the most typical examples are those of melancholia. We quote part of Tanzi's admirably lucid account:

'In some cases of melancholia scenes of the most horrible and sanguinary nature, which are represented to the patient's mind as simple possibilities, and repeated as favourite images on account of their hideousness, become transformed into a *motor obsession*. The obsession, meeting with but slight resistance in an exhausted and abulic brain (*i.e.* one almost if not quite deprived of will-power), becomes so imperative as to drive the patient inexorably to the commission of acts corresponding to it, such as . . . suicide in its most horrible forms.'[7]

The state in which these acts occur—the *raptus melancholicus*—is quasi-unconscious. But suicide often takes place in less advanced cases than this, when the patient is not wholly irresponsible, but is actuated by motives the importance of which his disease greatly exaggerates. A preliminary symptom of the *raptus* is precordial anxiety—a sort of horrible intensification of that uneasy 'sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach' which often attacks a healthy man when frightened or anxious.[2] Now, as a normal subject may be tempted, by the depression arising out of a real misfortune, to take his own life, so a melancholiac suffering from this intense and abnormal feeling of anxious misery is not infrequently driven in a quasi-normal way to commit suicide. Objectively he has no sufficient motive, but subjectively his hopeless depression, the morbid nature of which he is unable to realize, presents itself as a good reason for wishing to be dead and fulfilling his wish.[4] Still more typical are those suicides of melancholiacs which are inspired by altruistic motives, the patient believing that his death will in some way greatly benefit his friends—*e.g.*, that he is miserably poor and must relieve his family of the burden of supporting him,[5] or that his life is demanded in expiation of a fancied crime, or the like. Such unfortunates are well aware of what they are doing; their delusion consists simply in believing that they have an adequate motive. Often their action has a kind of perverted nobility, arising from a devotion to an ideal which in itself is lofty enough, although the ideal is imaginary and the form which the devotion takes morbid. It has been suggested that in these cases the disease has exaggerated and distorted the instinct of self-sacrifice,[6] which is a normal constituent of the

1 See art. SOFIS. 2 Carra de Vaux, p. 68 f.
3 See art. SOFIS.
4 Tanzi (*A Text-book of Mental Diseases*, p. 640) gives a case (p. 641) of a patient who believed that he was invulnerable and killed himself in trying to prove it. An apparently unmotived suicide is described on p. 662.
5 Tanzi, p. 231. 6 *Ib.* p. 519. 7 *Ib.* p. 513.

1 Iqbāl, p. 147 f. 2 *Ib.* p. 149.
3 This is merely a rough description of the nature of the two sensations. Physiologically they are quite distinct, one being precordial, the other epigastric.
4 Tanzi, p. 514; Mercier, *Sanity and Insanity*[2], p. 350.
5 Mercier, p. 351; this suicide was in reality very well off.
6 It might also be described as a distortion of the social sense, or herd-instinct, which some would regard as primary (like self-preservation, etc.). See W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*[2], London, 1919, especially p. 18 ff.

sexual emotions, especially in women. Hence such suicides are particularly common among adolescents. As there is admittedly a close connexion between sexual and religious emotions, especially in their more exaggerated and morbid forms, we may put some at least of the religious suicides (see below) in this category.[1]

In most cases of this kind the patient's insanity is easily recognizable; and even in those instances where a melancholiac supposed to be cured relapses and ends his life in a suicidal fit—or possibly feigns recovery in order to carry out, when left unguarded, his purpose of self-destruction—we need have no hesitation in pronouncing him at least partly irresponsible.[2] It is less easy to pass judgment on the numerous class of neurasthenics. A characteristic feature of the mental state of these sufferers is that impulses, often of the most absurd or criminal nature, haunt and obsess the imagination; and, while the patient knows perfectly well that these impulses are not rational—thus differing from the melancholiac—he is not always strong-minded enough to control them.

The most vivid description known to us of this condition occurs, not in a technical work at all, but in two of the stories of one who seems himself to have been a neurasthenic and clearly regarded such impulses as part of the normal human mentality—Edgar Allan Poe.[3] This author represents two men, one as betraying a fatal secret, the other as killing a pet animal, for no other reason than that the acts are insanely devoid of motive; and the writings of alienists[4] give many actual cases of the same kind. Clearly, then, when a neurasthenic's obsession is suicidal, if he yields to it, he cannot either be regarded as an ordinary lunatic who does not know what he is doing or imagines that he has good reasons for his act, or be judged like a normal man who decides, on more or less rational grounds, that he wishes to end his life.

It is still harder to pass satisfactory moral judgments on the rather numerous persons, apparently sane but perhaps really neurasthenic, whose suicides have a motive, but an inadequate one—a small injury, real or supposed, to honour, or even so trivial a cause as a wager.

Suicides of this kind sometimes amount to a sort of epidemic. When one member of a family has ended his life, the recurrence of the anniversary of his death, the sight of the weapon that he used, or some such casual association has been known to drive a relative to follow his example, until as many as seven of one household have died by their own hands.[5] Larger epidemics, extending through an entire city, or even wider,[6] have not been unknown in ancient or modern times, and are frequently associated with religious mania. These are probably hysterical, as hysteria is easily communicated and often produces, especially among women, 'theatrical attempts at suicide.'[7]

To all these classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances of persons who are sane for the greater part of their lives, but, as a result of violent nervous shock, disease, grief, excesses of one sort or another, etc., become temporarily unbalanced to a slight degree. These causes are so many that it is questionable whether any one whose life is of normal length is absolutely sane during every waking moment of it.[8] We need not doubt that the charitable verdict of the average coroner's jury, 'suicide while of unsound mind,' is in a large percentage of cases quite in accordance with medical facts.

But our primary interest is in the act of one who, being perfectly sane, takes his own life. The question whether such a deed is justifiable, and, if so, when and under what circumstances, has been answered in the most various ways by peoples of different degrees of culture, from the lowest savages to members of the highest civilizations, ancient and modern. Some account of these answers has been given elsewhere.[1] We propose now to consider the attitude taken by religions, savage and civilized, and by the leading schools of moral philosophy.

1. Religion.—Various faiths have taken every conceivable view of suicide, from recommending it to resolutely and uncompromisingly opposing it. As the grounds for the former view are less obvious to us, it is well to begin by briefly discussing them. First in the list stand those fanatic beliefs, including degraded forms of Christianity, whose votaries have been impelled to kill themselves, often in most painful ways, to attain a blissful immortality or to avoid something which they regarded as polluting.

Russia furnishes us with some remarkable examples. Thus at Tiraspol, in 1897, twenty-eight persons buried themselves alive to escape the census, which apparently they regarded as sinful. But a more wide-spread epidemic occurred in 1666, in which year many Russian zealots looked for the appearance of Antichrist. To escape him and enter heaven, suicide was strongly urged by certain wrong-headed and often wholly criminal persons, clerical and lay. 'Whole communities hailed with enthusiasm the gospel of death, and hastened to put its precepts into practice. . . . At first the favourite mode of death was by starvation. . . . (But) death by famine was attended by some obvious disadvantages. It was slow; it opened the door to repentance: it occasionally admitted of rescue. Accordingly death by fire was preferred as surer and more expeditious. . . . The mania in its most extreme form died away towards the end of the seventeenth century, but during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cases of collective suicide from religious motives occurred from time to time.'[2]

Many of these people, and other such religious suicides, were undoubtedly in a condition of hysteria, if not actual paranoia. We have a parallel to such self-destruction in the most horrible of the rites of Kybele—that which took place on the *dies sanguinis*, at least in its earlier form.[3] On this occasion the devotees of the goddess, wrought up to a pitch of frenzy by an exciting and elaborate ritual, not only wounded themselves, but performed the act of self-emasculation, thereafter joining the ranks of the *Galli*. Turning now to medical evidence, we find[4] such mutilation named along with suicide and manslaughter as typical of some forms of lunacy. We have thus two closely related acts, both involving loss of the instinct of self-preservation, arising, not from ordinary mania, but from a temporary insanity artificially produced and due to a perverted or degraded religious instinct.

But religious suicides are not always maniacs. We need only allude in passing to the innumerable cases, familiar from Frazer, of divine kings and other incarnate deities who kill themselves or are killed, either after a fixed period has elapsed or when their bodily vigour begins to fail. Indeed, these can hardly be called suicides in the strict sense, since the killing is, in intent, merely the first act of a process of reincarnation. That the god should be destroyed is never thought of; it is simply desired to provide him with a new and more desirable fleshly covering. Nor can one justly class as maniacs those persons who hold that by killing themselves they can attain future happiness—an idea not uncommon in some forms of Buddhism—or will return to life in this world stronger or wiser than before.[5] However erroneous their belief may be from the point of view of any sound theological or metaphysical system, it is not a delusion in the medical sense, but often the perfectly logical result of their tenets. In the

[1] See Mercier, pp. 354-357.

[2] For other forms of mental disease resulting in suicide during more or less complete irresponsibility see Tanzi, pp. 321 (alcoholism), 603 f. (epilepsy).

[3] See 'The Imp of the Perverse' and 'The Black Cat' in *Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque*, especially the opening paragraphs of the former.

[4] Several examples in Tanzi, p. 540 f.

[5] Tanzi, p. 231.

[6] *E.g.*, at Miletos; see Plutarch, *de Mulierum Virtutibus*, p. 249 *b*, *c* (wholesale suicide by hanging of the young women 'from some obscure cause'); cf. Aulus Gellius, xv. x. 1 f.

[7] Tanzi, p. 585.

[8] Mercier, p. 131.

[1] See art. EUTHANASIA.

[2] Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 44 f., quoting I. Stchoukine, *Le Suicide collectif dans le Raskol russe*, Paris, 1903; cf. Tanzi, p. 731 f.

[3] Vividly described by Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 223 ff.; cf. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912, p. 321 ff.

[4] Tanzi, p. 513.

[5] Examples of both in *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 42 ff.

lower strata of human history we have numerous examples of savages who regard suicide as perfectly justifiable (*a*) because the deceased will in the next world have a body in the same state as his present one.[1] This naturally leads to the conclusion that voluntary death is much preferable to mutilation or long and wasting illness, since it will avoid a maimed or helpless life after death. Such suicides are practically examples of euthanasia (*q.v.*). Or (*b*) suicide may, at least in some cases, be reputed as honourable and therefore as procuring a more than usually pleasant lot in the next world, not merely avoiding an unpleasant one. Obviously such ideas are not wide-spread or unqualified, or they would result in the extinction of the peoples holding them. They mostly take this form: a dependent — wife, vassal, or slave—is so closely bound to his or her superior that death cannot sever the tie; therefore, just as in any earthly journey the vassal will faithfully attend his lord, so, when his lord dies, the most honourable course is to follow and continue to serve him. Such fidelity will, it may be expected, result in due honour among the dead.

So at the death of a king of Benin 'his favourites and servants used to compete with each other for the privilege of being buried alive with his body in order that they might attend and minister to him in the other world,' and 'the first to die was deemed the happiest,'[2] no doubt as being the most prompt and willing. Similarly among the early Germans 'infame in omnem vitam ac probrosum superstitem principi suo ex acie recessisse';[3] and in a higher civilization Persian nobles were capable of similar devotion to their king.[4]

But this is hardly a religious idea; more definitely connected with religious belief is the Hindu *sati* (*q.v.*).

Religious opposition to suicide is to be found in all, or nearly all, strata of civilization. Probably the chief, if not the only, reason for this among primitive races is simply the dread of the ghost. The self-destroyer must have been greatly wronged or troubled in some way, or he would not have acted as he did; therefore his ghost will be an unusually troublesome and revengeful spirit, like that of all βιαιοθάνατοι—to borrow the convenient Greek term. Hence, either he must be appeased by the death of his enemy, if known, or by offerings of some kind, or else he must be rendered harmless.

A natural way to accomplish this is to mutilate or destroy the corpse—in fact, to treat it much as mediæval Europe did a supposed vampire. Well-known survivals of this are the Athenian practice of severing its right hand,[5] and the custom, not long discontinued in England, of driving a stake through the body. Such treatment, originally a mere precautionary measure, would easily enough generate the belief that the act of the deceased was something extraordinarily wicked, *i.e.* strongly displeasing to whatever deity the community worshipped. It should be noted, however, that among some peoples in a not very advanced stage of culture suicide is objected to on religious grounds, but no such drastic methods of treating the corpse are in vogue. The Kayans of North Borneo hold that those who die by their own hands live miserably in the next world; but the bodies are not burned or mutilated, nor is any fear of them shown,[6] unless their unceremonious burial on the spot where they are found may be taken to be a precautionary measure indicating fear.[7]

This vague idea of suicide as a crime has been taken over by several higher religions and explained by them in the light of their ethical and eschatological beliefs. Thus for any uncorrupted and logical form of Buddhism it is clearly forbidden, since it violates the first of the five fundamental precepts, 'Kill not any living thing.'[1] A religion—it can scarcely be called a philosophy—which presents certain striking parallels to that of Gautama gave an elaborate justification of its prohibition of suicide. To the Orphic-Pythagorean the present life was a penance which took the form of imprisonment; therefore to kill one's self was to attempt, quite vainly, to shirk a deserved penalty.[2] This view, with various modifications, was taken up by Plato, and reappears in the theological teachings of later philosophy.[3]

The native Roman religion perhaps condemned suicide originally and in theory at least. Servius[4] tells us that the *libri pontificales* bade the body of one who had hanged himself to be cast forth unburied; and the later *Servius Danielis* adds on the authority of Cassius Hemina that the idea of the disgracefulness of suicide dates from the time of Tarquinius Superbus. More noteworthy is a quotation from Varro,[5] confirming the statement that *suspendiosi* were denied the regular funeral rites. We have no hint, however, that the various suicides of legend and history were otherwise than honourably treated. Possibly the objection was not to suicide in general, but to hanging, regarded as *infamis*. At any rate, the rhetorical discussions of the subject[6] quote no native religious scruple.

The opposition of Christianity has from an early date been of the most determined kind. It is true that nothing in the NT directly justifies such an attitude, but certain Patristic writings make it obvious that by their time the discussion had taken the form of an inquiry whether self-destruction was ever allowable. Thus St. Augustine[7] deliberates at considerable length whether such a crime (*scelus*), as he repeatedly calls it, may be condoned in the case of a woman whose honour is in danger, or in any case; and he arrives at a negative conclusion. His reasons are chiefly: (*a*) that suicide is an act which precludes the possibility of repentance,[8] and (*b*) that it is a form of homicide, and therefore a violation of the sixth commandment,[9] not justified by any of the exceptions, general or special to that commandment, which have been divinely established,[10] and aggravated by the fact that the person thus killed has done nothing worthy of death.[11] Hence suicide to avoid violation is at best the commission of a greater sin to escape a lesser.[12] But even St. Augustine himself was obliged to admit the possibility of exceptions, since in his day several persons who had taken their own lives were recognized officially as martyrs—an indication, even if other proofs were lacking, that the opposition to suicide was of gradual growth. He suggests[13] that in such cases as in that of Samson a special divine ordinance superseded the general law, which nevertheless remains in full force for all ordinary persons. This remains in substance the position of orthodox Catholicism. It is not insignificant that in the most splendid of all mediæval works on eschatological subjects, although the possibility of repentance at the very moment of a violent death is admitted, the examples are chosen from persons killed in battle or by assassins.[14] Nor has orthodox Protestantism been any less emphatic; indeed, its rejection of the doctrine of purgatory makes it still more uncompromising in condemnation of suicide and less hope-

[1] See, *e.g.*, T. C. Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 159; W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, do. 1911, p. 120; for these and other examples cf. *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 10 ff.; and for classical survivals of this belief see Verg. *Æn.* vi. 427, 446 ff., 494 ff.; Lucian, *Menippus*, 470, 472, and elsewhere.

[2] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 139 f.

[3] Tacitus, *Germ.* 14.

[4] Xen. *Anab.* i. viii. 29; Herod. viii. 118.

[5] Æschines, *in Ctes.* 244.

[6] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 40, 201.

[7] Cf. the reluctance to have anything to do with the dangerous corpse of a woman dying in child-birth (*ib.* p. 155).

[1] See Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, London, 1889, p. 126.

[2] See Plato, *Phædo*, 62 B; cf. Philolaos, *ap.* Clem. Strom. iii. 433 (fr. 23 Mullach), and artt. PYTHAGORAS, THRACE.

[3] Plato, *Phædo*, *loc. cit.*; cf. Cicero, *de Senect.* xx. 73, *pro Scauro*, iii. 4.

[4] On Verg. *Æn.* xii. 603.

[5] *Ib.*

[6] *E.g.*, Cic. *pro Scauro*, iii. 2 ff., *Tusc. Disp.* i. xxxiv. 83 f., etc.

[7] *De Civ. Dei*, i. xvii. ff.

[8] Ch. xvii. 'Quoniam (Iudas) Dei misericordiam desperando exitiabiliter paenitens, nullum sibi salubris paenitentiae locum reliquit: quanto magis a sua nece se abstinere debet qui tali supplicio quod in se puniat non habet.'

[9] Ch. xx. [10] Ch. xxi. [11] Ch. xvii.

[12] Ch. xxv. 'Quis ita desipiat ut dicat: "Iam nunc peccemus, ne postea forte peccemus"? . . . Nonne satius est flagitium committere quod paenitendo sanetur, quam tale facinus ubi locus salubris paenitentiae non relinquitur?'

[13] Ch. xxvi.

[14] Dante, *Purgatorio*, v. 52 ff.

ful with regard to the future destiny of suicides. Judaism in its later forms strongly denounces self-destruction,[1] but the OT says nothing which could reasonably be held to justify this, unless we adopt the Augustinian view of the meaning of the sixth commandment. Probably the Hebrews, until late post-Exilic times, must be counted among those races to whom suicide is simply one of the various possible forms of death and calls for no special comment.[2]

2. Ethics.—All the different views of suicide taught by various religions re-appear, with additions and re-statements, in various ethical systems. The religious side of Plato's views has already been mentioned. Both he and Aristotle[3] objected to self-destruction as cowardly and an offence against the State, which thus loses a citizen. Plato also declares it unnatural, since a man is his own closest friend. But both are willing to allow it in some cases—incurable pain, or disgrace so great as to make life no longer worth living. The flood of individualism which resulted from the overthrow of the old political life by the Macedonian conquest swept away the second of the above arguments; and consequently we find much discussion of suicide in the later schools, notably Stoicism, and a decided tendency to condone or even commend it. Its most whole-hearted upholders are those who deny immortality, or at least personal immortality; for they readily embrace the idea—as old as Homer and frequently appearing in poetry—that death is the cure for all ills.[4] A thoroughgoing exponent of this view and insister upon the miseries of life was Hegesias the Cyrenaic, who, according to Cicero, was 'forbidden by King Ptolemy to lecture on that topic, owing to the number of suicides which took place among his hearers.'[5] Less extreme doctrines were prevalent among the Stoics, who before the time of Posidonios generally denied personal immortality and without exception refused to admit that death was an evil or life a good. Both being 'indifferent,' since neither is a virtue or a vice, it follows that sometimes one and sometimes the other is 'preferable' (προηγμένον); hence it is 'reasonable' for even the perfectly wise man to kill himself if it will benefit his friends or his country, or will free him from great pain or incurable disease.[6] Suicide for trifling reasons, however, was condemned.

Epiktetos, perhaps the most lovable member of this school, puts the matter thus in an imaginary dialogue with his pupils: 'Epiktetos, we can no longer endure to be bound to this wretched body! . . . Let us go whence we came; let us at length get free of these chains that weight us down.' . . .

'Wait for God, sirs; when He gives the signal and sets you free from this your service, you shall depart to Him; for the present, endure to live in the place where He has stationed you. . . . Wait, do not depart unreasonably.'[7]

Another passage indicates what he means by a 'reasonable' departure:[8] 'The room is smoky. If only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke, I will go. Remember this, keep fast hold on it—the door is open. . . . "You must live in Gyara."[9] Very well. But Gyara seems to me a very smoky room. So I will depart to a habitation in which no one can prevent me dwelling; a habitation which is open to everyone.'

The Epicureans did not indeed recommend suicide in general; but that death, although an evil, is not one which can touch or harm us is one of their fundamental principles. 'When we are, death is not present; when death is present, then we are not,' says the founder of the sect.[10]

[1] Josephus, *BJ* III. viii. 5. This view probably had great influence on early Christianity.

[2] See art. EUTHANASIA.

[3] Plato, *Laws*, 873 C, D; Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* v. 1138a7, with J. Burnet's note.

[4] Homer, *Il.* v. 61 ff.; Soph. *Philoct.* 797; cf. *Oed. Col.* 1225 ff.; Eur. *Heracl.* 595 f.

[5] *Tusc. Disp.* I. xxxiv. 83. Hegesias's teachings won him the surname of πεισθάνατος.

[6] Diog. Laert. vii. 130.

[7] *Dissert.* I. ix. 16.

[8] *Ib.* I. xxv. 18.

[9] A rocky islet in the Ægean—the Roman Siberia.

[10] Diog. Laert. x. 125; cf. Lucr. iii. 830 ff.

The suicide of the ordinary unphilosophical man, Lucretius stigmatizes as self-contradictory, since it is caused by fear of the very death which it courts.[1] The Cynics professed to be absolutely indifferent to life and death as to everything else and are accused of killing themselves by extraordinary methods for little or no reason,[2] while some Skeptics were equally insensible.[3] In Rome, where originally suicide appears to have been rare,[4] the famous deaths of Cato, Thrasea, and others were for the most part inspired by Greek teaching, generally Stoic. Mediæval ethics added nothing new.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of modern times to the rational treatment of the matter is the consideration noticed in the opening paragraphs of this article, that many suicides are non-moral and entirely the affair of the specialist in mental diseases. Apart from this, and considering only cases where the agent is fully rational, the characteristic feature of the ethical discussions of the subject is their elimination of the theological elements in the arguments, Hume's famous essay 'Of Suicide'[5] being the last important work to pay them much attention. Perhaps the school most nearly favourable to suicide is Utilitarianism; for, starting from its definition of a good act as one which increases the sum total of human happiness (identified with pleasure),[6] one can easily imagine cases where the death of a man by his own hand would cause little or no pain to any one and would be more or less completely a source of pleasure to many. The more metaphysical schools discountenance it, either as an insult to humanity in general as embodied and exemplified in oneself (Kant) or as a final assertion of the will to live (Schopenhauer). There is also a tendency, arising from a contemplation of such medical facts as those already mentioned, to remove it altogether from the field of ethics—a view which we believe to be an exaggeration of a truth. The general trend of non-theological thought on the part of the ordinary educated man is towards a compromise between the extreme laxitude towards suicide represented by Stoicism and the extreme rigidity of the Kantians. That self-destruction is now and then justified by circumstances is admitted by most; and it is quite as widely admitted that those circumstances must be of an extreme and unusual kind to make the act anything else than cowardly and otherwise immoral.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works given under EUTHANASIA, the following may be cited: E. Tanzi, *A Text-book of Mental Diseases*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; C. Mercier, *Sanity and Insanity*², do. 1905 (short popular account); J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, do. 1911-14; J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, do. 1863 (many subsequent edd.).

H. J. ROSE.

SUICIDE (Buddhist).—**1. Introduction.**—We are concerned only with 'religious suicide' and the Buddhist views thereon, not with the various kinds of suicide mentioned in Buddhist literature, interesting as they may be.[7] The position of the old Indian ascetics in regard to suicide may be summarized as follows. While the majority of sects were addicted to rapid methods of suicide—throwing oneself down from a mountain, etc.—the Jains (and probably also the disciples of Gosāla) considered those methods vulgar and evil.[8] Men

[1] *De Rer. Nat.* iii. 79 ff.

[2] Luc. *Vit. Auct.* 10 [p. 550], καὶ τέλος, ἤν σοι δοκῇ, πολύποδα ὠμὸν ἢ σηπίαν φαγὼν ἀπόθανε.

[3] Pyrrhon, *ap.* Stob. *Flor.* cxxi. 28.

[4] See art. SUICIDE (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.

[5] First published in his *Essays and Treatises*, London, 1777.

[6] 'Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure' is the famous dictum of J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. ii.

[7] See, *e.g.*, *Majjhima*, ii. 109; a husband, threatened with separation from his wife, kills her and commits suicide, in order that they may be husband and wife in their next birth.

[8] See *Kathakośa*, tr. C. H. Tawney, London, 1895, p. 8.

who thus kill themselves are reborn as demons.[1] While practising starvation, the Jain must avoid any desire for death (*maraṇāśaṃsā*):[2] 'Renouncing all food and drink, I patiently wait for my end.'

2. Buddhism condemns asceticism.—Any austerity which is likely to weaken body or mind is forbidden. The Jains and many others saw in asceticism and physical pain (*duḥkha, tapas*) a force that makes for purification from sin: suicide by starvation is the ascetic act *par excellence*.[3] While vocal sins are destroyed through silence (*mauna*) and mental sins through 'respiratory-restraint,' bodily sins are destroyed through starvation (*abhojana*)[4] and lust is crushed through mortification. Buddhism had better methods of crushing lust and destroying sin—the realization of the impermanence of pleasure and of the non-substantiality of the Ego, the experience in trance (*dhyāna*) of a happiness which has nothing to do with pleasure and destroys in a man any infatuation for pleasure. It was thus enabled to disqualify ascetic methods.

3. Buddhism condemns suicide.—There is a celebrated text:

'A monk who preaches suicide, who tells man: "Do away with this wretched life, full of suffering and sin; death is better," in fact preaches murder, is a murderer, is no longer a monk.'[5]

A man must live his allotted span of life. He cannot avoid, by suicide, the sufferings which are the result of his former evil deeds; nor can he win sooner, by a voluntary death, the reward of his good deeds. Everything comes to him who waits. To that effect Buddha employs to Pāyāsi the simile of the woman who cuts open her body in order to see whether her child is a boy or a girl.[6]

It seems also that suicide from religious motives is not effective. Buddhists object to 'thirst for non-existence' (*vibhavatṛṇā*), as they object to 'thirst for existence' (*bhavatṛṇā*). A saint must abide in indifference, without caring for life, without caring for death. He will not commit suicide in order to reach *nirvāṇa* sooner. Is not suicide a desperate act of disgust and desire, disgust of existence, desire of rest?

4. Buddhism admits suicide.—We have therefore good reason to believe (1) that suicide is not an ascetic act leading to spiritual progress and to *nirvāṇa*, and (2) that no saint or *arhat*—a spiritually perfect being—will kill himself. But we are confronted with a number of stories which prove beyond dispute that we are mistaken in these two important conclusions. On the one hand, suicide may be in certain cases the actual cause or the occasion of the attainment of *arhat*ship, although in other cases it may be premature and sinful. On the other hand, *arhats* commit suicide.

In illustration of the first point, we may quote the stories of the attempted suicide of (1) Sihā, (2) Sappadāsa, and (3) Vakkali; for the second the suicide of (4) Vakkali and (5) Godhika.

(1) Sihā was distressed at not obtaining spiritual progress after seven years of endeavour. She said: 'What have I to do with this wretched life (*pāpajīvita*)? I will die through hanging.' But, just as the rope was tied round her neck, she was turning her thought towards enlightenment (*vipassanā*), as was her former habit. She attained *arhat*ship, and at this very moment the rope loosened from her throat and fell.[1]

(2) The story of Sappadāsa is to the same effect. This monk was overpowered by passion (*kilesa*) and never obtained concentration. This distressed him so much that he was about to commit suicide with a razor or a sword, when he suddenly realized the inward vision.[2]

(3) Vakkali was fond of looking at the Buddha, and the excessive importance which he attached to the physical body—a putrid body (*pūtikāya*)—of the Master was an obstacle to his spiritual advance. In order to create in him a 'holy fear' (*saṃvega*), the Buddha commanded him to go. Desperate at being no longer able to see the Master, Vakkali decided to commit suicide by throwing himself down from a mountain, saying: 'What have I to do with this life, if I can no longer see Him?' At this moment the Master appeared and prevented him from thus 'destroying the conditions of his reaching the Path (*maggaphala*).'[3]

(4) Vakkali was suffering from a painful illness. Bhagavat came to comfort him and said: 'Your death will be a holy one, an auspicious one (*apāpika*).' When the Master had gone, Vakkali uttered for the last time the Buddhist profession of faith (universal transitoriness) and took the sword.[4]

(5) Godhika was unable because of disease to remain in a certain state of meditation. He thought: 'If I were to take a sword.' Māra approached the Buddha and told him: 'Your disciple wants to die; he has resolved to die. Prevent him. How could one of your disciples die while he is not yet an *arhat*?' But, as it is explained in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Godhika reached *arhat*ship just after he had begun cutting his throat.[5] It is said: 'Those who take the sword are without regard for life; they achieve insight (*vipassanā*) and reach *nirvāṇa*.' 'Thus act the strong ones (*dhīra*); they desire not life; having removed thirst and the root of thirst (that is, ignorance), Godhika is at rest.'[6]

5. The nirvāṇa of the great saints.—Vakkali was an *arhat*, but, as he did not possess the power of 'loosening the *saṃskāras* of life,' he had, in order to die, to take the sword. On the other hand, Śākyamuni and, in later sources, a number of saints—*e.g.*, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī in the *Apadāna*—possess such a power. The Sanskrit *Abhidharma*[7] teaches that it belongs to the saints who have reached the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* ('*nirvāṇa* without rests').

In the case of Śākyamuni we have to deal with a voluntary death; in the case of Mahāpajāpatī, who has to obtain permission of Śākyamuni before she resolves to die, we have to deal with a voluntary death of a slightly different character. The Pratyekabuddhas, like Śākyamuni, decide for themselves when the 'time' has arrived; their method is to rise a few cubits above the ground and burn themselves.

We can easily understand that a Buddha, when he has set in motion the wheel, when he has elected two chief disciples—briefly, 'when he has done what he had to do'—is duly authorized to enter into the final rest. The case of an *arhat* is not different; the *arhat* also has achieved what he had to achieve—*i.e.* he has removed the slightest kind of desire. If he is not, like a Buddha, capable of abandoning life in a quiet way, there is no reason why he should not have recourse to more drastic methods.

6. Mahāyāna praises and deprecates suicide as self-surrender and worship.—The saint of the new Buddhism must, before reaching *nirvāṇa*, spend millions of lives in charity, worship, and meditation. 'Abandoning one's existence' (*ātmanas tyāgaḥ, ātmabhāvatyāga*) is to be looked upon as the best self-sacrifice, for to give one's body is better than to give alms; and also as the best

[1] The *giripadana* or *bhṛgupāta* is *pāpajanacheṭṭhiya* (H. Jacobi, *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Māhārāṣṭrī*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 2; A. Weber, *Fragment der Bhagavatī*, Berlin, 1865–66, p. 206).

[2] On Jain suicide see J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*, Eng. tr., London, 1909; Uvāsagadasāo, ed. and tr. A. F. R. Hoernle, Calcutta, 1888–90, §§ 57, 89; *Āchārāṅgasūtra*, i. 7. 5–8, tr. H. Jacobi, *SBE* xxii. [1884] 74–78; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 291; G. Bühler, *Ueber die indische Sekte der Jaina*, Vienna, 1887, p. 12. As concerns Gośāla, see Uvāsagadasāo, app. ii. p. 23 (suicide is permitted to ascetics who have reached the highest degree of perfection).

[3] Violent death, voluntary or not, destroys sin (see J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*).

[4] See, *e.g.*, *Majjhima*, i. 93; *SBE* 1. [1910], *s.v.* 'Suicide,' the references to vols. xxii. and xlv.

[5] *Pārājika*, iii.; see *SBE* xiii. [1881] 4.

[6] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, ii. 331; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 350 (*SBB* iii. [London, 1910]).

[1] *Therīgāthā*, 77. [2] *Theragāthā*, 408.

[3] *Ib.* 350; Dhammapada's Commentary, 381; also Aṅguttara's Commentary.

[4] *Saṃyutta*, iii. 123. [5] Cf. *Kathāvatthu*, i. 2.

[6] The *Milindapañha* deals with suicide (see *SBE* xxxv. [1890] 273 ff.), but does not mention Godhika and Vakkali. See J. P. Minayeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, tr. R. H. Assier de Pompignan, Paris, 1894, p. 223; *Saṃyutta*, i. 120, iii. 123; Dhammapada's Commentary, v. 57 (i. 434); Kathāvatthu's Commentary, *ad* i. 2.

[7] *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. vi.

worship, for to burn one's body as an offering is certainly more meritorious than to kindle lamps at a shrine. We may refer (1) to the story of the future Śākyamuni giving his body to feed a starving tigress,[1] and (2) to the legend of Bhaiṣajyarāja, who, dissatisfied with his previous worship although painful and extravagant, filled his body with all sorts of oil and set it on fire.[2]

The *bodhisattvas* of the past have practised in that way many heroic deeds (*duḥkara*), some of which are told in the canon of ancient Buddhism (*Chariyapiṭaka*, *Jātaka*); the new scriptures are inexhaustible on this topic.

In accordance with the principles of the new Buddhism and the *Légende dorée* of the eternal Buddhism, self-surrender culminating in voluntary death has been held in honour in various Buddhist countries. It happens (or it used to happen) that Chinese monks beg for fuel, build a funeral pyre, sit cross-legged on it, cover their head with linen soaked in oil, and set themselves on fire. With some branches of the Chinese Mahāyāna, the 'burning of the skull' is an essential part of ordination as a 'future Buddha'—a symbol of the holocaust for which human courage is nowadays inadequate.[3]

The pilgrim I-tsing says that Indian Buddhists abstain from suicide and, in general, from self-torture.[4] Whether this statement be accurate or not—A. Barth did not believe it to be quite accurate—the theologians of the Great Vehicle strongly deprecate such practices. One of the chief aims of Śāntidesa in his *Sikṣāsamuchchaya*,[5] 'A Compendium of the Rules of the Disciple of the Great Vehicle,' is to elucidate this point: In what measure is a disciple—a beginner—to imitate the heroic deeds of the *bodhisattvas* of old? The disciple is ready, willing, and resolved even to commit sin and to burn in hell for the sake of another, not to mention sacrificing his limbs and body; but he must avoid any mistake in the realization of his resolve. The question is whether in such and such a case sacrifice or self-denial is really useful to our fellow-creatures; whether there is not some other means of procuring universal welfare. To sum up, the sacrifice of one's body is not in accordance with a wise estimate of the spiritual needs of a beginner.

LITERATURE.—See, in addition to the sources cited in the footnotes, L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Quelques Observations sur le suicide dans le Bouddhisme ancien,' *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres de l'Académie de Belgique*, 1919, pp. 685–693; A. Rémusat, *Foé Koué Ki*, Paris, 1836, p. 272; J. Legge, *Fā-hien's Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, Oxford, 1836, p. 86; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886, p. 39; E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues, extraits du Tripitaka chinois et traduits en français*, Paris, 1910, i. 207, 265, *passim*; E. Huber, *Le Sutralamkara de Açvaghoṣa*, French tr., Paris, 1908, pp. 126, 440; *Abhidharmakośa*, ii. 10, v. 7.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

SUICIDE (Chinese).—Suicide is at least not uncommon in China. Literature and history supply illustrations. In a Chinese novelette the heroine commits suicide on the grave of her betrothed lover to avoid the marriage arranged for her with his rival, and that rival thereupon takes his own life in order to pursue in the other world at once his quest for his bride and vengeance on her lover. Among some eight hundred biographical notices in W. F. Mayers's *Chinese Readers' Manual*,[1] 27 instances of suicide are recorded—generals after defeat, a tyrant to escape his impending doom, a dethroned ruler, statesmen whose advice, like Ahithophel's, has been rejected, or who desired to enforce their counsel by this last proof of their earnestness, a captive to avoid exile, hopeless prisoners, ministers who, having incurred imperial displeasure, were allowed to die thus rather than by the hands of the executioner, a rebel whose plot was discovered, women to avoid a marriage deemed by them to be shameful, an upright servant rather than commit a murder enjoined on him, a minister of justice under whose subordinates capital punishment was unduly frequent, those moved by loyalty to a deceased master, by grief for the death of father or son, or by shame for a son's treachery.

In addition to suicides on such occasions as these, some of which will be noted as peculiarly Chinese, cases also occur in which misery (*e.g.*, hopeless leprosy) drives to suicide. More frequent are cases in which suicide is committed in an access of passion, sometimes with the view of involving one's adversary in legal proceedings in this world, or less frequently with the hope of harassing him by visitations of the vengeful ghost.

Hanging, leaping down a well, and opium poisoning have been perhaps the most common methods of suicide; the last may diminish in frequency under the present opium restrictions.

In the absence of accurate statistics it is impossible to estimate the ratio of deaths by suicide to the total population. The general impression, probably well founded, is that suicide is much more frequent than in Great Britain. This greater frequency, if it is assumed as fact, may be accounted for by the low value put on individual life, a tendency to ungovernable rage, and the fact that social and religious feelings do not rigorously inhibit suicide, but rather in certain circumstances (*e.g.*, where marriage is being urged on a widow or a bride whose betrothed bridegroom has died) approve it.

LITERATURE.—*The Encyclopædia Sinica*, Shanghai, 1917, London, 1918; J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, New York, 1865, London, 1866; A. H. Smith, *Village Life in China*, Edinburgh, 1900; *Records of the General Conference of Protestant Missionaries*, Shanghai, 1890, pp. 329–333.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

SUICIDE (Greek and Roman).—I. *GREEK.*—Under the name 'suicide' we here include all forms in which the individual kills himself intentionally, whether he acts of his own free will or under compulsion, and whether the end of his action be selfish or altruistic.

1. Legendary suicides.—The earliest definite mention of suicide in Greek literature is the case of Epikaste (Iokaste), the mother of Oidipus of Thebes, in the *Nekyia*.[2]

Odysseus tells how in Hades 'I saw the mother of Oidipodes, fair Epikaste, who wrought an awful deed in ignorance of mind, marrying her own son. And he had slain his father and he married her. And presently the gods made it known to men. Then he in lovely Thebe endured sorrow and ruled over the Kadmeans by the grievous counsels of the gods. But she went to the house of Hades, fastening a high noose from the lofty hall, holden by her woe. And to him she left sorrows in the aftertime full many, even all that the Erinyes of a mother bring to pass.'

The precise motive for suicide is not very clearly indicated here, or rather Homer does not distinguish clearly between the horror of Epikaste at the revolting nature of the situation in which she unwittingly finds herself and her shame in the face of her deed becoming known. But the essential points are that (1) suicide presents itself to Homer as the natural and fitting act when life has lost all that makes life worth living, and (2) no blame attaches to suicide in itself.

[1] *Jātakamālā*, i., tr. J. S. Speyer, *SBB* i. [1895].
[2] *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, xxii., tr. H. Kern, *SBE* xxi. [1884].
[3] See J. J. M. de Groot, *Le Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, Amsterdam, 1893, pp. 50, 217, 227. It is recorded that in the Japanese sect of Sukhāvati religious suicide was not unknown. In 1422 a large company of persons, after hearing a stirring sermon by a zealot to the effect that paradise may be gained solely by calling on the name of Amitābha, committed suicide by walking into the sea while repeating the 'Namu Amida Butsu.'
[4] *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 197 f. (ch. xxxviii. f.); A. Barth, *Journ. des Savants*, 1898, p. 541.
[5] *Bibl. Buddhica*, i. [Petrograd, 1902].

[1] New ed., London, 1910.
[2] Hom. *Od.* xi. 271 ff.

But the most famous and indeed the typical heroic suicide is that of Aias. Homer does not mention his suicide explicitly, but it is clearly alluded to in *Od.* xi. 548 ff., where Odysseus expresses his regret at having obtained the arms of Achilles:

ὡς δὴ μὴ ὄφελον νικᾶν τούσδε ἐπ' ἀέθλῳ·
τοίῃν γὰρ κεφαλὴν ἕνεκ' αὐτῶν (the arms of Achilles) γαῖα κατέσχεν,
Αἴαντ', ὃς κτλ.

His suicide was recounted in the *Aithiopis* of Arktinos in connexion with the award of the arms of Achilles to Odysseus.[1] It is to be noted that so far there is no mention of madness or of an attack by Aias upon the herds. These incidents were, however, recounted in the *Little Iliad* of Lesches.[2] Also, whereas in *Od.* xi. 555 it is emphasized that the death of Aias was mourned by the Greeks equally with that of Achilles, the *Little Iliad*[3] told of the withholding of burial honours. But even so there is nothing to indicate that the suicide in itself was considered blameworthy. It is an act quite in accordance with the haughtiness and self-sufficiency which characterize Aias in Homer, and of which the famous 'silence of Aias' in *Od.* xi. 553 ff., so admired by the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*,[4] is a fitting expression. The suicide of Aias is the typical act of a great soul which cannot brook dishonour.

A motive of a less heroic kind which prompts to suicide is excess of sorrow for the dead. The feeling is one familiar to Homer. 'If I lose thee, it were better for me to go beneath the earth,' says Andromache to Hektor,[5] in the same spirit in which David cries, 'Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!'[6] There is not in Homer any express mention of suicide for this reason, but Antikleia is referred to in terms which are hardly consonant with any other explanation than that she died by her own hand.

Eumaios says to the disguised Odysseus: 'Laertes still lives, but evermore he prays to Zeus that life may perish from his limbs within his halls; for he mourns exceedingly for his son that is gone and for his wedded wife, whose death beyond all else hath grieved him and brought him to untimely age. She in grief for her glorious son perished by a miserable death (λευγαλέῳ θανάτῳ): so may none perish who dwells here friendly to me and doing friendly deeds.'[7]

The natural inference from these words is strongly confirmed by the reference to her in *Od.* xi. 84 ff. and 197 ff. The later story said frankly that she hanged herself.[8]

The list of such suicides is a long one.

Aigeus, father of Theseus, had arranged with his son when he left for Crete, carrying the annual tribute of the Athenians to the Minotaur, that, if Theseus were successful in slaying the monster, a white sail should be hoisted upon the returning vessel. Theseus forgot to take down the black sail which the ship was flying, and Aigeus, thinking that his son had perished, threw himself from the rock on which he was keeping watch into the sea (Ægean) which thenceforth bore his name.[9] Erigone, daughter of Ikarios, hanged herself when she found the dead body of her father.[10] Skedasos committed suicide when his daughters had hanged themselves.[11] When Evadne throws herself on the funeral pyre of her husband, her father Iphis threatens to commit suicide by starvation.[12]

A special case of suicide to avoid shame is that to escape sexual dishonour.

Legend told how the Leukadian rock received its name from Leukatas, who, to escape the unwelcome attentions of Apollo, plunged into the sea off the island of Leukas.[13] Pausanias tells us[14] how the daughters of Skedasos of Leuktra hanged themselves to escape the violence offered them by certain Lacedæmonians.

Suicide, in the sense of self-devotion for one's country, has always occupied a prominent place in patriotic saga. Kodros, the last king of Athens, is a famous example.

The Lacedæmonians, under pressure of famine, resolved to invade Attica. But first they consulted the Delphic oracle as to their prospects of taking Athens and, receiving an answer that they would be successful if they did not kill the Athenian king, marched on the city. Cleomantis, a Delphian, secretly communicated to the Athenians the purport of the oracle. Kodros thereupon dressed himself as a beggar and stole out of the besieged city and proceeded to gather firewood. When two enemy scouts approached him, he slew one of them with his hatchet, whereupon the other, taking him for a beggar, drew his sword and slew him, thus rendering the capture of Athens impossible.[1]

There is the similar story of Makaria, daughter of Herakles and Deianeira.[2] That such a death was deemed a glorious one is sufficiently attested.[3]

2. Heroic suicide.—The motives which in the Homeric poems seem mainly to be regarded as prompting to suicide are of a heroic nature—the sense of dishonour suffered or impending, the devotion of a high purpose, or the intolerable sorrow of a personal bereavement. The sense of the common ills of humanity is by no means ignored—τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν.[4] But there is no pessimism. Whatever the evils that darken human life, at least it is a good thing to enjoy the sun, and the darkest shadow that falls athwart Homeric life is the sense not of its burden but of its brevity. Life at any level is to be preferred to the sunless realms of Hades.[5]

But with the rise of reflexion, as witnessed in the poetry of the age succeeding the Homeric, we have a view of life which is frankly pessimistic. Hesiod conceives the present to be an age of iron, thrown into darker relief by the picture of a happier golden age gone by.[6]

That life is an evil has become a commonplace. πάντων μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον[7] is a doctrine which becomes a hackneyed phrase of later poetry—τὸ μὲν δὴ παντάχοῦ θρυλούμενον, κράτιστον εἶναι φημὶ μὴ φῦναι βροτῷ.[8] The logical consequence of this view of life is that man is justified in ending what he cannot mend. Whether, in fact, this pessimistic view of life actually induced an increased practice of suicide is more difficult to establish. But in any case motives of a less heroic kind seem now to be recognized as worthy causes of suicide. Thus poverty is expressly recognized by Theognis[9] as a sufficient cause.

3. The historians.—In the historians of the 5th cent. suicide is not a particularly prominent feature, and belongs in general to one or other of the types already noticed.

Herodotus relates the legend of Nitokris, who, in order to escape punishment for her misdeeds, committed suicide by leaping into a room full of ashes.[10] Arion is compelled by the ferrymen either to commit suicide, with the prospect of being buried ashore, or to jump into the sea.[11] The daughter of Mykerinos, being violated by her father, hanged herself from grief.[12] Shame was the motive for the suicide of Spargapises, leader of the Massagetai, who in a state of intoxication were surprised and killed or captured by the Persians.[13] And we have the parallel stories of Othryades, who, ashamed to return to Sparta when his company was killed, slew himself at Thyreai,[14] and of Pantites, who, having survived the disaster at Thermopylai, 'on his return to Sparta, being held in dishonour, hanged himself.'[15]

1 Cf. Proclus in *Epicorum Græc. Fragmenta*, ed. G. Kinkel, Leipzig, 1877, p. 34, 8 ff.
2 Cf. Proclus, *Ep. Gr. Fr.* p. 36.
3 *Ep. Gr. Fr.* p. 40; Eustath. *Il.* p. 285, 34.
4 [Longinus] ix. 2: ἡ τοῦ Αἴαντος ἐν Νεκυίᾳ σιωπὴ μέγα καὶ παντὸς ὑψηλότερον λόγου.
5 *Il.* vi. 410:
6 2 S 18[33].
7 *Od.* xv. 353 ff.
8 Hygin. *Fab.* 243.
9 Plut. *Thes.* 22; Diod. iv. 60 *f.*; Hygin. *Fab.* 242; Suidas, *s.v.* Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος; Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 74.
10 Apollod. iii. 14, etc.
11 Paus. ix. xiii. 3.
12 Eurip. *Suppl.* 1105 *f.*
13 Serv. on Verg. *Æn.* iii. 279.
14 ix. xiii. 3.

1 Lycurg. *c. Leokrat.* 84 ff.
2 Paus. i. xxxii.; Eurip. *Herakleidai.*
3 Paus. ix. xvii. 1.
4 *Il.* xxiv. 49.
5 *Od.* xi. 488 ff.
6 Works, 174 ff.
7 Theognis, 425 ff.
8 Eurip. *Bellerophon*, frag. 287, 1 *f.* (A. Nauck); cf. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1227 *f.*
9 173 ff.
10 ii. 100.
11 *Ib.* i. 24.
12 *Ib.* ii. 131.
13 *Ib.* i. 213.
14 *Ib.* i. 82.
15 *Ib.* vii. 232.

In Thucydides we read how in 427 B.C. the Corcyrean democrats 'went to the temple of Hera and, persuading some fifty of the suppliants (belonging to the oligarchic party) to stand their trial, condemned them all to death. The majority refused to come out, and, when they saw what was going on, destroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple where they were, except a few who hanged themselves on trees or put an end to their lives in any other way they could.'[1] Again in 425 B.C. the oligarchs of Corcyra were entrapped into a large building from which they were led forth in groups of twenty for execution. When those in the building got to know what was happening, they refused to come out. Then the Corcyrean populace broke a hole in the roof through which they showered tiles and arrows at those within. 'The prisoners tried to shelter themselves as best they could. Most of them put an end to their own lives. Some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them; others strangled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips torn from their own clothes. This went on during the greater part of the night, until in one way or another, by their own hands or by missiles from the roof, they all perished.'[2] Thucydides knows, too, the story that Themistokles poisoned himself: λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν.[3]

In Xenophon, *Hell.* VI. ii. 36, we have the familiar motive of shame. Krinippos, when the Syracusan fleet under his command was captured by Iphikrates (373 B.C.), ὑπὸ λύπης θανάτῳ αὐθαιρέτῳ ἀποθνήσκει. So *Hell.* VII. iv. 9, when the invading Arkadians were attacked in camp by the Eleans, whom they defeated, the Elean hipparch, who was held responsible for the attack, committed suicide (364 B.C.).

But the suicide which is more prominent in Xenophon is of the romantic type, described as ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἐπισφάξαι ἑαυτόν, where love faithful unto death refuses to be comforted otherwise than by sharing the fate of the beloved. 'Cyrus himself died, and eight of his best followers fell over him (ἔκειντο ἐπ' αὐτῷ). And Artapates, the most faithful of his staff, when he saw that Cyrus had fallen, is said to have leapt from his horse and thrown himself upon him. And some say that the king ordered him to be slain over Cyrus (ἐπισφάξαι αὐτὸν Κύρῳ); but others say that he drew his sword and killed himself over him (ἑαυτὸν ἐπισφάξασθαι).'[4] We have the same motive in the story of Pantheia, so beautifully told by Xenophon.[5]

The emotional value of this motive has made it very prominent in literature, as, indeed, it has everywhere and at all times been actually a very common cause of suicide.

It is familiar to the OT.[6] Already in Homer Antilochos holds the hands of Achilles, lest in his grief for Patroklos he should cut his throat;[7] and, even if suicide is not meant, Andromache's anguish for Hektor almost makes her die.[8] Most familiar perhaps of all is the case of Laodamia, the wife of Protesilaos, to whom she had been married just before his departure for Troy. There Protesilaos was the first to leap ashore and, after slaying many Trojans, was killed by Hektor. After his death his wife grieved for him so much that Hermes for pity brought back Protesilaos from the dead. At first Laodamia, thinking he had actually returned from Troy, rejoiced, but when he returned to Hades ἑαυτὴν ἐφόνευσεν.[9] As this legend is enshrined for us in the verses of Wordsworth, so Tennyson has told the story of another who was faithful unto death: Oinone, the beloved of Paris, whose story is unknown to the epic cycle and to the tragedians. When Paris died, she either hanged herself[10] or threw herself into his funeral pyre.[11]

[1] iii. 81. [2] iv. 48. [3] I. 138.
[4] *Anab.* I. 8. [5] *Cyrop.* vii. 3.
[6] 1 S 31[4f.]; see art. SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian).
[7] *Il.* xviii. 33 f. [8] *Ib.* xxii. 473 f.
[9] Apollod. *Epit.* iii. 30: ξίφει διεχρήσατο ἑαυτήν; Eustath. on *Il.* ii. 700; cf. Ovid, *ex Ponto*, III. i. 109 f.
[10] Apollod. III. xii. 5. 4, vi. 1-3; Lycophron, 57 ff.; Konon, 23; Parthen. *Erot.* 4.
[11] Q. Smyrn. x. 262, 484; Ovid, *Her.* 5.

Another late legend is that of Hero and Leander, the subject of the poem by Musaios entitled τὰ καθ' Ἡρὼ καὶ Λέανδρον. Leander of Abydos swam the Hellespont nightly to visit his beloved Hero, the priestess of Aphrodite at Sestos across the straits, being lighted by a lamp which Hero set upon her tower by the seashore. He attempted the passage one stormy night, when the lamp was extinguished by the storm. Next morning his dead body was washed ashore, and Hero threw herself from her tower to join him in death.[1] Pausanias[2] remarks of three heroines, Marpessa, Kleopatra, and Polydora, that they all committed suicide in this way: προαποθανοῦσαι κάρα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑαυτὰς ἐπικατέσφαξαν.

The motives of such suicides are not always identical and no doubt were sometimes complex. Sometimes it was the last sacrifice of devotion, a tradition become a religion, like the Indian *satī* or our own proud tradition that the captain goes down with his ship.

Xenophon tells how in 388 B.C. Anaxibios the Spartan, falling into an ambush, said to those by him: '"Gentlemen, my duty is to die here. As for you, seek safety before we engage the enemy." Then he took his shield from his armour bearer and fell fighting at his post. But his favourites (τὰ παιδικά) abode with him, and twelve of the Lacedæmonian harmosts who had come from the cities died with him fighting.'[3] Haimon in the *Antigone* of Sophocles had all along determined to die with Antigone,[4] but the actual suicide is complicated by his futile attempt to slay his father and becomes outwardly an act of disappointed rage.[5]

Where the suicide considers himself responsible for another's death, his own death may appear to be due as an act of atonement.

Thus Kallirrhoe, having by her unkindness brought about the suicide of her lover Koresos, repented and out of pity for him and shame for her conduct killed herself,[6] precisely as Adrastos, when he accidentally killed the son of Croesus, 'stood before the dead and submitted himself to Croesus, holding out his hands and entreating him to slay him over the dead (ἐπικατασφάξαι τῷ νεκρῷ) since for him life was no longer tolerable (οὐδέ οἱ εἶναι βιώσιμον).'[7]

But, without any such complications, we have the devotion of those who, lovely and pleasant in their lives, in death would not be divided. When Kastor is slain by Idas, his brother Polydeukes cries: 'Our Father, Son of Kronos, what release shall there be from sorrow? Give me also to die with him, O Lord. Honour is departed for him who is bereft of friends.'[8] And the more one knows of the religious thought of the Greeks, the less is one inclined to disparage the influence of the motive to which Plato alludes—the hope of a blessed reunion hereafter: 'Ere now for human love, for dead wife, for dead son many a man has gone willingly to the house of Hades, drawn by the hope that in the world beyond they might see and be with those they loved.'[9]

4. Compulsory suicide.—A special interest attaches to Xenophon, *Hell.* II. iii. 56. In describing the execution by compulsory suicide of Theramenes in 403 B.C., he says: 'When, being compelled to die, he drank the hemlock (τὸ κώνειον ἔπιε), it was said that he threw what was left of it as in the game of *cottabos*, crying, "This for the fair Kritias!"' This is the first occurrence of the word κώνειον in the historians and the only one in Xenophon. When the practice of execution by compulsory poisoning was introduced in Athens we do not know, nor when hemlock first became the recognized medium. The use of hemlock for this purpose, we may with probability suppose, first became regular in the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C. Even in the orators, however, references to it are surprisingly rare. It is not mentioned in Antiphon. Andocides mentions it only once.[10] Lysias refers to it twice.[11] It is not found in Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Dinarchus. The advantages of hemlock-drinking over other more

[1] Musaios, *op. cit.*; Stat. *Theb.* vi. 542; Verg. *Georg.* iii. 258; Ovid, *Her.* 17, 18.
[2] IV. ii. 5; cf. the case of Skedasos (IX. xiii. 5).
[3] *Hell.* IV. viii. 38 f. [4] 751.
[5] 1234 f. [6] Paus. VII. xxi.
[7] Herod. i. 45. [8] Pind. *Nem.* x. 76 ff.
[9] *Phædo*, 68 A. [10] *De Pace*, 10.
[11] *C. Eratosthenem*, 17, and Περὶ δημ. τ. τ. Νικίου ἀδελφ. (*Or.* 18) 24.

cumbrous methods of suicide are referred to in the *Frogs*[1] of Aristophanes (405 B.C.).

It was by drinking hemlock that Socrates died in 399 B.C.[2] It was the method used by the Athenian women whom the shameful conduct of the characters of Euripides drove to suicide, according to Aristophanes.[3] It is difficult to resist the conclusion that in the stress and excitement and anxiety of the closing years of the Peloponnesian war suicide had assumed a prominence hitherto unknown, and it would appear that this phenomenon was not unconnected with the interest in the preparation of speedy and painless modes of putting an end to life. Incidentally it may be noted that Attic hemlock was reputed to be specially effective.[4] Theophrastus tells us of the discovery by Thrasyas of Mantineia of a ῥᾴδια καὶ ἄπονος ἀπόλυσις in which the juices of hemlock (κώνειον) and poppy (μήκων) and other such herbs were made up in a dose of small bulk, weighing about a drachma, the effects of which were incurable and which, moreover, would keep and retain its potency for an indefinite period.[5] No doubt, also, the fact of having at their disposal a convenient and not too painful means of terminating life induced, as in our own time, many rash persons to attempt their lives. It is interesting to note that Menander wrote a play with the title Κωνειαζόμεναι. Hence there was developed the interest in antidotes of which we have evidence.[6] Theophrastus has much to say of antidotes.[7] In particular it is interesting, in view of the attitude of the people of Ceos to suicide, to notice that to them is attributed an improved method of preparing hemlock.[8]

The story of the death of Theramenes points in the same direction. When in our own country death by the axe of the headsman was a common fate, it became a point of honour with his victims that they should take leave of life like gentlemen. Montrose, we are told, went to the scaffold clad in rich attire 'more becoming a bridegroom than a criminal going to the gallows.' Such conduct is the true analogue to the dying libation of Theramenes. Socrates had the same idea:

'What about making a libation with this cup?', he says to the jailer, 'May I or not?', and, that not being feasible, he yet drank the cup of death 'easily and cheerfully' as one who toasts a friend.[9]

And, as meaner victims of the axe imitated the conduct of Montrose and others, and the grand manner degenerated into the bravado of the desperate and callous, so we have a degenerate echo of the heroic in the story told by Ælian and Athenæus of the devotees of debauchery who, having drained the cup of pleasure to the lees, ended by throwing away the cup, and concluded life's banquet with a toast.[10]

5. Legal aspect.—So long as suicide does not become so frequent as to threaten seriously the well-being of the community, the State has no motive to intervene by legislation against it. At no time does Athenian law define suicide as a penal offence. The only outbreak of which we hear in Attica suggesting an epidemic of suicide is that which legend connected with the origin of the Aiora, or swing-festival.

[1] 116 ff.

[2] Plato, *Phædo*, 57 A: τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιον; cf. 57 B, 116 D, 117 A. Though Plato does not name the poison, it is clear from the symptoms described that it was hemlock. Ælian, *Var. Hist.* i. 16, calls it merely τὸ φάρμακον; Diodor. xiv. 37: πιὼν κώνειον ἐτελεύτησεν; Diog. Laert. ii. 42.

[3] *Frogs*, 1050 f. [4] Plutarch, *Dio*, 58.

[5] Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* ix. xvi. 8.

[6] Plato, *Lysis*, 219 E: 'I mean, for example, if a father knew that his son had drunk hemlock and thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine.' Cf. Nicander, *Alexipharmaca*, 186.

[7] ix. xvi. 6. [8] *Ib.* 9. [9] Plato, *Phædo*, 117.

[10] Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 23; Athen. xii. 537 C.

Legend told how, when Dionysos first came to Attica with the new gift of wine, he was hospitably entertained by Ikarios, to whom he revealed his intoxicating boon. Ikarios gave of the wine to some shepherds, who in their vinous frenzy killed their would-be benefactor. His daughter, Erigone, guided to the spot by his faithful dog Maira, hanged herself on a tree. Then there broke out among the Athenian women an epidemic of hanging, which abated only when the Athenians discovered the cause and instituted the Aiora festival in honour of Erigone.[1]

Plutarch tells of a similar outbreak at Miletos which, obscure in origin, was generally attributed to atmospheric conditions:

'A strange and terrible affliction once came upon the maidens of Miletos, from some obscure cause—mostly it was conjectured that some poisonous and ecstatic temperament of the atmosphere produced in them a mental upset and frenzy. For there fell suddenly upon all of them a desire of death and a mad impulse towards hanging. Many hanged themselves before they could be prevented. The words and the tears of their parents, the persuasions of their friends, had no effect. In spite of all the ingenuity and cleverness of those who watched them, they succeeded in making away with themselves. The plague seemed to be of an unearthly character and beyond human remedy, until on the motion of a wise man a resolution was proposed that women who hanged themselves should be carried out to burial through the market-place. The ratification of this resolution not only checked the evil but altogether put an end to the passion for death. A great evidence of the high character and virtue of the women was this shrinking from dishonour and the fact that they who were fearless in face of the two most awful things in the world—death and pain—could not support the appearance of disgrace nor bear the thought of shame after death.'[2]

Theramenes, in whose time hemlock as a means of suicide appears to have come into vogue, was a native of Ceos, and we have seen above that Theophrastus[3] ascribes to the Ceans certain improvements in the method of preparing that poison. There is evidence that at some period suicide by drinking hemlock was a recognized practice—if not a legal regulation—in Ceos for persons who had passed the age of 60. Strabo[4] (63 B.C.–A.D. 23), speaking of Iulis, the chief town in Ceos, birthplace of Simonides and his nephew Bacchylides, says:

παρὰ τούτοις δὲ δοκεῖ τεθῆναί ποτε νόμος, οὗ μέμνηται καὶ Μένανδρος [342-291 B.C.] "καλὸν τὸ Κείων νόμιμόν ἐστι, Φανία· ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ζῆν καλῶς, οὐ ζῇ κακῶς." Προσέταττε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νόμος τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας κωνειάζεσθαι, τοῦ διαρκεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν τροφήν· καὶ πολυρκουμένους δέ ποτε ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, ψηφίσασθαί φασι τοὺς πρεσβύτας τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποθανεῖν, ὁρισθέντος πλήθους ἐτῶν· τοὺς δὲ παύσασθαι πολιορκοῦντας.

Stephanus of Byzantium[5] writes to the same effect.[6] So too Ælian.[7] Valerius Maximus, who wrote under Tiberius, attests a similar practice for Massilia and tells of the Cean practice as he had actually witnessed it.[8]

In Thebes, too, the treatment of suicides attracted some remark.[9] In Athens such differential treatment as we hear of is of a religious rather than of a legal nature. The suicide as a victim of violence belongs to the class of those whose spirits 'walk.'[10] According to a statement in Suidas,[11] suicides and other victims of violent and untimely death were buried in a special place. We find a similar ordinance given by Plato.[12] To the same order of ideas belongs the Athenian custom of burying the hand which wrought the

[1] Servius and Probus on Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 389; Hygin. *Fab.* 130, *Astron.* ii. 4; Pollux, iv. 55; Hesych. *s.vv.* Αἰώρα and Ἀλῆτις; *Etymologicon Magnum*, ed. F. Sylburg, Leipzig, 1816, *s.v.* Αἰώρα; schol. Hom. *Il.* xxii. 29; Athen. xiv. 618 E, F. For this and other swinging rites cf. *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, Note B, p. 277 ff.

[2] Plut. *Mulierum Virtutes*, 249 B-D.

[3] *Hist. Plant.* ix. xvi. [4] x. 486.

[5] *De Urbibus*, *s.v.* Ἰουλίς.

[6] Cf. Heracleid. *Polit.* 9, and the epigram of Meleager, *Anthologia Palatina*, vii. 470, where the deceased is made to say that at an advanced age (κάρτα πρόσβυς) ἦλθον Αἴδαν αὐτοθελεί, Κείων γενεάμενος κυλίκων.

[7] *Var. Hist.* iii. 37. [8] Val. Max. ii. 6.

[9] Zenob. *Prov.* vi. 17; Phot. *Lex.* s. Τί οὐκ ἀπάγξω ἵνα Θήβησιν ἥρως γένῃ;

[10] See Plato, *Laws*, 865.

[11] *S.v.* Κυνήγιον: ὅτι ἐν τῷ Κυνηγίῳ καλουμένῳ ἐρρίπτοῦντο οἱ βιαιοθάνατοι.

[12] *Laws*, 873 C.

deed apart from the suicide's body.[1] Josephus, in mentioning the custom, adds the unsatisfactory reason that the hand was regarded as alien to the body.[2] It is more natural to connect the practice with the idea of the soul of the suicide 'walking'—'perhaps to prevent his ghost from attacking the living.'[3]

6. Philosophy.—As regards the attitude of the philosophic schools, the teaching of the Pythagoreans condemned suicide. According to Orphic or Pythagorean doctrine, the soul is undergoing in the body a penitential discipline for ante-natal sin.[4] Hence suicide is an unwarranted rebellion against the will of God on the part of the individual, whom it behoves to wait until it please God to set him free.

Plato, if we may infer his position from the *Phædo* and the *Laws*, condemns suicide on grounds which we would characterize as religious. Religious, too, are the grounds on which Aristotle appears to regard suicide as reprehensible.[5] Aristotle treats suicide as an offence not against the individual, but against the State, and that of a religious kind, as involving the city in pollution and requiring therefore penalties of a religious nature. No doubt Aristotle had in view such ceremonial observances as the severance of the right hand and the like, to which we have referred above.

Stoic teaching was decidedly favourable to suicide. Life and death being for the wise man indifferent (ἀδιάφορα), morally neither good nor evil, the question of suicide resolves itself for him into a decision whether life or death is in a given case preferable. Life in accordance with nature being the Stoic ideal,[6] when the conditions essential to that ideal are no longer fulfilled, suicide becomes a reasonable deliverance (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή).

Thus suicide may be demanded by a man's duty to his country or his friends or by a condition of severe pain or of physical disablement or incurable disease.[7] The paradox of the Stoic position is that the question of 'to be or not to be' is decided not with regard to virtue or vice, but with regard to the ἀδιάφορα, the 'indifferent' things. It is a question of τὰ καθήκοντα and τὰ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.[8] Hence it may be proper (καθῆκον) for the happy to commit suicide, for the unhappy to remain in life.[9] Goodness or badness *per se* has no bearing on the question.[10] There is, indeed, little that differs from the Platonic position in the statement of their doctrine in Diogenes Laertius.[11] But the danger of the Stoic doctrine lay in the facility with which comparatively trivial discomforts might be held to justify suicide.

Zeno (*c.* 300 B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school, is said, according to one account, to have taken his own life because he had stumbled and wrenched his finger.[12] Cleanthes, his successor, having developed a gum-boil, refrained from food by the advice of his doctors for two days. The treatment was successful, and the doctors relaxed the regime and allowed him πάντα τὰ συνήθη, all the usual foods. But Cleanthes, having gone so far in the path of death, persisted to the end.[13]

For the Stoic the length or brevity of life was a matter of indifference.[14]

The Cynics, too, favoured suicide. Antisthenes seems to have used the term, afterwards so familiar in the Stoics, ἐξαγωγή, to denote suicide.[1] Diogenes is said to have recommended suicide to Antisthenes.

According to Diog. Laert. vi. 18, when Antisthenes was lying upon his deathbed, Diogenes visited him, carrying a dagger; and, when Antisthenes said, 'Who will deliver me from this trouble?', Diogenes, showing him the dagger, said, 'This.' There is a similar story in Diog. Laert. iv. 3, that on one occasion Speusippos, driving in his carriage to the Academy, met Diogenes and wished him good-day (χαῖρε εἰπεῖν), to which he replied that he would not wish him the same ὅστις ὑπομένεις ζῆν τοιοῦτος ὤν.

On the other hand, the Academic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean schools were all opposed to suicide, at any rate in theory.

With regard to the Academics it may suffice to quote the story of Carneades, who, when he heard that the Stoic Antipater had committed suicide by drinking poison, exclaimed, 'Then give me too to drink!' And, when his friends said, 'What?' 'Athol brose' (οἰνόμελι), he said.[2]

The Peripatetics hold that the excellences of the soul are superior to the excellences of the body and other external excellences, yet they aim at the other excellences, first, as desirable for their own sakes, and, next, as being useful πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν κοινωνικὸν βίον καὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεωρητικόν. παραμετρεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς.[3] Their attitude to suicide is thus in sharp contrast to that of the Stoics.

As regards the Epicureans, believing as they did in the extinction of the soul at dissolution, it might well seem that life at any level was at least worth something, and it were folly to cast that away for the nothingness of the grave. It would seem that they occupied themselves particularly in pointing out the folly of committing suicide through fear of the terrors of death.

'Death, that most dreaded of ills, is nothing to us. For while we are, death is not; and when death has come, we are not. Death, then, is nothing to the living nor yet to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter no longer exist. The crowd, to be sure, at one time shrink from death as the worst of evils, at another choose it as a refuge from the miseries of life. But the wise man neither declines life nor shrinks from death, since life is not distasteful to him, nor does he think it an evil not to live.'[4]

The Cyrenaics seem in general to have been opposed to suicide. Theodoros, counting the world his country and disbelieving in friendship, held that even self-sacrifice for one's country was unjustifiable.[5] Hegesias, on the other hand, preached suicide so frankly as to earn the title of ὁ Πεισιθάνατος,[6] and with such success as to provoke the interference of Ptolemy.[7]

7. Religion.—From the religious point of view suicide was regarded always as a crime, a violation of the social order. We have seen that Orphic teaching condemned suicide. But it is impossible to regard this condemnation as limited to so confined a circle. The more one reflects on the evidence, the more one is forced to the conclusion that much which we ascribe to the Orphics is really part of the general tradition—part of the popular belief. The sort of doctrine which Plato ascribes at one moment to the mystics he at another ascribes to popular belief. In any case the belief in immortality is described in the *Apology* as among τὰ λεγόμενα, among the popular beliefs. And popular belief certainly differentiated between the fortune after death of the suicide and of those who died a natural death (θανάτῳ εἱμαρμένῳ, *morte suâ*). Already in Homer it is difficult to account for the position of Antikleia, the mother of Odysseus, on any other supposition than that

[1] Aischin. *c. Ktes.* 244: ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν.
[2] *BJ* iii. 5.
[3] *GB*², pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 220 n.
[4] Philolaos, *ap.* Clem. *Strom.* iii. 3, p. 186. Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 493 A, *Cratyl.* 400 C.
[5] *Eth. Nic.* v. 11 (1138ᵃ).
[6] τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (Cleanthes, *ap.* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 132).
[7] Diog. Laert. vii. 130.
[8] Stob. ii. 226; Plut. *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1042 D.
[9] Plut. *loc. cit.*
[10] Plut. *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1039 E, *de Comm. Not.* 1063 C–D; Cicero, *de Fin.* iii. 18.
[11] vii. 130. [12] *Ib.* vii. 28 ff. [13] *Ib.* vii. 176.
[14] Cic. *de Fin.* iii. 14.

[1] Cf. Athen. iv. 157 B; Plutarch, *de Stoic. Repugn.* 1039 E, 1040 A, and *de Comm. Not.* 1063 C, D; Diog. Laert. vi. 24.
[2] Diog. Laert. iv. 64 f.; Stob. *Flor.* cxix. 19.
[3] See Stobæus, ii. 264–266.
[4] H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Berlin, 1887–1908, iii. 60, tr. A. E. Taylor; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* xxiv. 22, lxx. 8; and the eloquent protest of Lucretius, iii. 79 ff.
[5] Diog. Laert. ii. 98. [6] *Ib.* 86.
[7] Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 34; cf. Plutarch, *de Amore Prolis*, 497 D.

she is a suicide and thus not admitted immediately to the realm of Hades.[1] We have seen above that, according to one tradition, the dead Aias was deprived of certain rites of burial. The same feeling is at the bottom of the practice of severing the right hand of the suicide and burying it apart from the rest of the body. So in our own country suicides used to be buried at the marches in a no man's land: or, if in the churchyard, the body must be passed over the wall and not enter by the gate.

As popular religion regarded with horror all shedding of blood, all interference with the natural bounds of life, so it regarded with a peculiar horror the shedding of kindred blood (αἷμ' ἐμφύλιον). Ixion, who first introduced this crime—ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρώτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμιξε θνατοῖς—won for himself a choice woe.[2] The supreme case of 'kindred blood'—which is the term used by Sophocles to denote the patricide of Oidipus[3]—is suicide. The Greek language hardly distinguishes between self-murder and murder of kin. The suicide belongs to the class of the victims of violent and untimely death—ἄωροι βιαιοθάνατοι (or, in late usage, βιοθάνατοι)—the murdered, the dead on birth or in nonage,[4] the unborn victim of abortion,[5] regarding the fate of whom the popular mind was peculiarly sensitive. It seems probable that these religious grounds, and not any speculative theories, were the really active motives at all periods of ancient Greece in condemning the practice of suicide.

II. *Roman.*—**1. Heroic suicide.**—What we may call the heroic type of suicide—committed either to escape intolerable shame or for great causes which seem to demand the sacrifice of the individual life—was thoroughly consonant with the character of Republican Rome. Such suicides were a prominent feature in the early history of Rome, and the tradition of them undoubtedly exercised a powerful influence upon later conduct.[6]

The typical example of self-sacrifice for the fatherland is that of the Decii. According to modern authorities, the story is true only of the younger Decius. But, in any case, both are enshrined in Livy's matchless prose. The elder, P. Decius Mus, devoted himself in 337 B.C. in a battle with the Latins near Mount Vesuvius, when he was in command of the left wing. A precisely similar story is told of the younger Decius, who at the battle of Sentinum in 295 B.C. devoted himself to death, charging into the densest ranks of the Gauls, where he fell.[7]

Suicide to escape intolerable dishonour is illustrated by the story of Lucretia, the victim of the *mala libido*[8] of Sextus Tarquinius. Her story is too familiar to be told here.[9]

2. Penalties of suicide.—We have seen that suicide by hanging was regarded by the Greeks as a shameful type of death. When Oidipus discovers the nature of his sin, he can find no stronger words to describe his deeds than to say that they are κρείσσον' ἀγχόνης, *i.e.* such as even suicide by hanging could not expiate. The Roman feeling seems to have been precisely similar. If we quote the case of Amata, wife of King Latinus, it is mainly on account of the interesting matter preserved by Servius in his commentary on the passage. Vergil tells us that

'Regina ut tectis venientem prospicit hostem,
Incessi muros, ignes ad tecta volare:
Nusquam acies contra Rutulas, nulla agmina Turni:
Infelix pugnae juvenem in certamine credit
Exstinctum; et, subito mentem turbata dolore,
Se causam clamat, crimenque, caputque malorum:
Multaque per moestum demens effata furorem,
Purpureos moritura manu discindit amictus,
Et nodum infoelis leti trahe nectit ab alta.'[1]

Servius on this passage tells us that certain posthumous penalties attached to this form of suicide:

'Sane sciendum quia cautum fuerat in pontificalibus libris ut qui laqueo vitam finisset, insepultus abiceretur. . . Cassius autem Hemina [the oldest Roman annalist] ait: "Tarquinium Superbum cum cloacas populum facere coegisset et ob hanc iniuriam multi se suspendio necarent, iussisse corpora eorum cruci affigi: tunc primum turpe habitum est mortem sibi consciscere." Et Varro ait: "Suspendiosis quibus iusta fieri ius non sit, suspensis oscillis[2] veluti per imitationem mortis parentari."'

It is clear in any case that the grounds on which this particular kind of suicide was condemned were religious or mystical rather than ethical.

3. Suicide under the Empire.—That suicide was extremely prevalent under the Empire, at any rate among the higher ranks of society, cannot be doubted. Nor are the causes which contributed to this state of affairs difficult to conjecture. The most important were probably chiefly two: on the one hand the decay of religious belief and on the other hand the great popularity of a school of philosophy which was favourable to suicide. With regard to the first, however, it is to be remarked that it does not appear that even in Republican times suicide, for sufficient cause, was considered to be inconsistent with piety. The Stoic teaching suited in general the typical Roman character, and, in particular, the Stoic teaching in regard to suicide found ready acceptance among the educated classes under the Empire. In this matter the Stoic position appealed even to men who in other respects were at variance with the Stoics. In one sense the Stoic doctrine was merely a logical development from the position taken up by Plato. Even Plato had admitted suicide when some compelling ἀνάγκη — some ineluctable constraint of circumstances—forced a man to end what he could not mend. The nature of this ἀνάγκη, or, as the Romans called it, *necessitas*[3] or *necessitudo*, was so indefinite as to be capable of a very various interpretation. It only remained for later Stoics like Panaitios (*c.* 140 B.C.) and Posidonios (*c.* 130–46 B.C.) to interpret it in the sense not of an external compulsion, but of an inner overmastering impulse. By this interpretation the whole philosophic anti-suicide position was undermined. It was no longer felt to be a disgraceful thing to commit suicide: the only thing worth considering was how to commit suicide with such bravery or bravado, such fortitude or such parade of fortitude, as would most appeal to the imagination. The morality of suicide was no longer in dispute: given such a situation as either from the individual point of view or from the point of view of his relation to the State appeared intolerable, then suicide was the obvious and expected course of action.

The pages of the writers of the Empire teem with suicides, and a glance at some of these will help to illustrate what was the current view of voluntary death.

Pliny the younger,[4] writing of Titus Aristo, an eminent lawyer whom he describes as inferior to none of the philosophers 'castitate, pietate, iustitia, fortitudine,' tells how, being afflicted by 'longa et pertinax valetudo,' he contemplated taking his own life: 'You would be surprised, were you present, at the patience with which he bears this illness, holding out against pain, resisting the temptation to quench his thirst, enduring the unbelievable heat of fever while motionless and warmly covered. He lately summoned me and a few other special

[1] *Od.* xi. 85 f. [2] Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 30 ff.
[3] *Oed. Tyr.* 1406.
[4] Plato, *Rep.* 615 C: τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γεγομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων.
[5] See S. Reinach, 'Ἄωροι βιαιοθάνατοι, in *ARW* ix. [1906] 312–322, and S. Wide, in *ARW* xii. [1909].
[6] See Cic. *Pro Sestio*, 48, *pro Scauro*, iii. 1 ff.
[7] Livy, viii. 9 f., x. 28. [8] *Ib.* i. 57.
[9] *Ib.* 57 f.; Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 741 ff.

[1] *Æn.* xii. 595 ff.
[2] The meaning of these *oscilla* we have seen above in connexion with the Athenian festival of the Aiora; cf. Verg. *Georg.* ii. 387 ff.
[3] Tac. *Ann.* vi. 23. [4] *Ep.* i. 22.

friends and requested us to consult his physicians about the issue of his illness, with the intention of voluntarily departing from life, if his illness were incurable, while on the other hand, if it were merely to be difficult and tedious, he would bear up and bide his time; for so much, he thought, was due to the entreaties of his wife, the tears of his daughter, even to us his friends, that he should not by voluntary death abandon our hopes, if only they were not vain. Such conduct I consider eminently high and praiseworthy. For to rush to death under the influence of an impulse and an instinctive feeling is no more than what many have done: but deliberately to weigh the motives for and against and then, as reason advises, to accept or reject the policy of life or death, that is the conduct of a great soul.'

In A.D. 101 the poet Silius Italicus committed suicide by abstention from food. Pliny says: 'It has just been announced that Silius Italicus has ended his life by starvation (*inedia*) in his Neapolitan villa. Bad health was the cause. He had developed an incurable tumour and, weary of it, he betook himself to death with irrevocable firmness. Up to his last day he had been happy and fortunate, with the exception of the death of the younger of his two children.'[1]

In *Ep.* iii. 16 Pliny celebrates the heroic conduct of Arria, who, when her husband Cæcina Pætus was condemned for his share in the conspiracy of Scribonianus against Claudius in A.D. 42, encourages her husband to commit suicide, first stabbing herself and then handing the dagger to her husband with the words 'Pæte, non dolet.' This famous suicide is the subject of an epigram of Martial.[2]

A somewhat similar story is told in Pliny.[3]

A special interest attaches to the type of suicide mentioned by Pliny in *Ep.* iii. 9.

Cæcilius Classicus, proconsul of Bætica A.D. 98–99, was accused of extortion and anticipated judgment by death—presumably suicide: 'Ille accusationem vel fortuita vel voluntaria morte praevertit; nam fuit mors eius infamis, ambigua tamen: ut enim credibile videbatur, voluisse exire de vita, cum defendi non posset; ita mirum pudorem damnationis morte fugisse, quem non puduisset damnanda committere.'

References are frequent under the Empire to the forestalling of judgment by suicide. In a well-known passage[4] Tacitus explains the motives, referring to the year A.D. 34, as being dread of the executioner and the desire to secure certain posthumous advantages which the suicide had over the condemned in respect of the disposal of his person and his property. Normally, it appears, the goods of a condemned person were confiscated, and he forfeited the rites of burial. The suicide, on the other hand, did not forfeit the rites of burial, and his testamentary dispositions remained valid. These advantages constitute what Tacitus calls the 'pretium festinandi.'[5] In practice, however, there seems to have been considerable variation in the treatment of the goods of such a suicide. In the time of the Republic apparently his goods were confiscated as a matter of course.[6] It is clear from the evidence of Tacitus himself that even under the Empire suicide before sentence did not always save the suicide's goods from confiscation.[7]

The perplexities of the question and the various distinctions made may be seen in Justinian, *Dig.* xlviii. 21: 'DE BONIS EORUM QUI ANTE SENTENTIAM VEL MORTEM SIBI CONSCIVERUNT VEL ACCUSATOREM CORRUPERUNT,' where § 3 forms an important document with regard to suicide:

'Persons accused of or caught in crime who, through fear of the charge hanging over them commit suicide, have no heirs. Papinianus,[8] however, writes that, when guilty persons who have not been accused commit suicide, their goods are not forfeited to the *fiscus*. For it is not the fact of guilt that is liable, but the fear of the guilty conscience is held in the case of an accused person as tantamount to a confession of guilt. Therefore, for the confiscation of the goods of suicides, it is required that they must either have been accused or caught in the criminal act. According, however, to the rescript of the emperor Pius, the goods of a person who, lying under an accusation, commits suicide are confiscated only if the crime of which he was accused was such that, if condemned, he would have suffered either death or deportation. He likewise held that a person who was accused of a petty theft, even if he committed suicide by hanging, was not in such case that his goods should be taken away from his heirs, any more than they would have been taken from himself, had he been convicted of theft. Therefore the goods of a suicide are to be forfeited only if the charge in which he was implicated were of such a nature that conviction would have entailed the loss of his property. If, on the other hand, a person committed suicide from weariness of life or impatience of pain or the like, he was entitled, according to Antoninus, to have a successor. According to a rescript of the emperor Hadrian, if a father, accused of killing his son, committed suicide, it must be held that his suicide was due rather to grief for the loss of his son, and therefore his goods were not to be confiscated. This distinction is on the same level as the inquiry whether a person who commits suicide without being guilty is liable to any penalty on the ground that he has passed sentence on himself. For in any case suicide is punishable save when it is due to weariness of life or intolerance of some grief. And rightly so: for, if a man did not spare himself, much less will he spare another. It is forbidden by imperial mandates to confiscate the goods of persons who have died in prison or on bail, while the issue of their case is still uncertain. We have to consider, in the case of a person who has died by his own hand without reasonable cause while under accusation, whether, if his heirs are prepared to take up his case and maintain the innocence of the deceased, they are to be heard and his goods not to be confiscated until the charge is proved; or whether in any case they are to be confiscated. But a rescript of the emperor Pius to Modestus Taurinus laid down that, if the heirs are prepared to undertake the defence, the goods are not to be confiscated, until the charge is proved.'

Other examples of this type of suicide in Tacitus are P. Vitellius,[1] M. Æmilius Scaurus,[2] Plancina.[3] L. Piso died before his trial by a *mors opportuna* which was probably suicide.[4]

A notable feature of the Empire is the use of compulsory suicide as a means of execution. Intimation is conveyed, more or less explicitly, to the party concerned that his death is desired. The advantages of this form of compulsory death over actual execution were apparently partly æsthetic, but probably the main advantage was that it seemed to make the guilty person his own judge and executioner and thus relieved the emperor of the *invidia* which necessarily attached to an actual execution. This method left to a man his 'choice of death'—what was known as 'liberum mortis arbitrium,'[5] or merely 'mortis arbitrium.'[6]

Other examples of compulsory suicide recorded in the *Annals* of Tacitus are Silanus,[7] Poppæa Sabina,[8] Silvanus,[9] Narcissus,[10] Iulius Montanus,[11] Thrasea Pætus, Soranus Barea and his daughter,[12] Valerius Asiaticus,[13] Arruntius,[14] Anteius.[15]

Three examples may be selected as being the suicides of notable men with regard to whose last moments we possess detailed records—the poet Lucan, the emperor Nero, and Seneca.

The suicide of Lucan in A.D. 65 is thus described by Tacitus:[16]

'Exim M. Annaei Lucani caedem imperat [sc. Nero]. Is, profluente sanguine, ubi frigescere pedes manusque, et paulatim ab extremis cedere spiritum, fervido adhuc et compote mentis pectore, intellegit; recordatus carmen a se compositum, quo vulneratum militem, per eiusmodi mortis imaginem obisse tradiderat, versus ipsos rettulit [*Pharsal.* iii. 635–646?], eaque illi suprema vox fuit.'[17]

The suicide of Nero has often been described. The account given by Suetonius[18] is too long to quote. The story of Seneca's death is told in Tacitus, *Ann.* xv. 60–63.

It appears that in those times every suicide was more or less a *poseur*, who was expected to make his suicide remarkable by some notable word or act. Hence Tacitus remarks: 'Senecio . . . et

1 *Ep.* iii. 7. 2 i. 14. 3 *Ep.* vi. 24.
4 *Ann.* vi. 29. 5 *Ib.* 6 Cf. Livy, iii. 58.
7 Tac. *Ann.* iv. 19 f., ii. 31 f., iii. 15, 17.
8 *Digesta Responsa*, bk. xvi.

1 *Ann.* v. 8. 2 *Ib.* vi. 29. 3 *Ib.* 26.
4 *Ib.* iv. 21; cf. Livy, vi. 1: 'iudicio eum mors adeo opportuna, ut voluntariam magna pars crederet, subtraxit.'
5 Suet. *Domit.* 8. 6 Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 33.
7 *Ib.* xv. 32. 8 *Ib.* xi. 2. 9 *Ib.* xv. 71.
10 *Ib.* xiii. 1. 11 *Ib.* xiii. 25. 12 *Ib.* xvi. 33.
13 *Ib.* xi. 3. 14 *Ib.* vi. 48. 15 *Ib.* xvi. 14.
16 *Ib.* xv. 70.
17 Cf. Sueton. *Vit. Luc.*: 'Impetrato autem mortis libero arbitrio, codicillos ad patrem de corrigendis quibusdam versibus suis exaravit: epulatusque largiter, brachia ad secandas venas medico praebuit.'
18 *Nero*, 49.

Quinctianus et Scaevinus . . . mox reliqui coniuratorum periere, nullo facto dictove memorando.'[1]

A notable feature of those suicides is the frequency with which the wife shares the suicide of the husband or even by example prompts him to death—*e.g.*, Sextia,[2] Pompilia,[3] Seneca's wife, as just mentioned, and Arria, wife of Pætus.

Suetonius, as the historian of the emperors, naturally has numerous suicides, some of which present interesting features.

In his life of Augustus[4] we have a curious case (in 42 B.C.): 'patrem et filium pro vita rogantes sortiri vel dimicare [i. 9, trial by combat] iussisse [sc. Augustus] ut alterutri concederetur; ac spectasse utrumque morientem, cum patre, qui se obtulerat occiso, filius quoque voluntaria occubuisset nece.'

'Quin et Artabani, Parthorum regis, laceratus est literis, parricidia et caedes et ignaviam et luxuriam obicientis, monentisque, ut voluntaria morte maximo iustissimoque civium odio quam primum satisfaceret.'[5]

'Alios [other senators], cum clam interemisset, citare nihilo minus ut vivos perseveravit, paucos post dies voluntaria morte periisse mentitus.'[6]

The attitude of at least the educated world of the time may be described as an advanced Stoicism, and the permissibility of suicide under certain circumstances was accepted at Rome not merely by professed Stoics but also by adherents of other philosophical schools. We cannot do more here than summarize and illustrate the chief aspects of the question of suicide as it presented itself to the chief exponents of later Stoicism.

In the first place, whereas to Plato suicide had seemed to be permissible only, if at all, under compulsion (ἀνάγκη) of an external nature, this compulsion is now so interpreted that suicide becomes in fact not so much the involuntary act of the unwilling victim of circumstances as the voluntary assertion by the individual of his freedom. The liberty of the 'wise' man consists precisely in this that he is entitled to 'withdraw himself' (ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν) when he finds his liberty hampered by his environment. Already Cicero had interpreted for the Romans this phase of later Stoicism:

'Et constat Stoicos, praesertim inter Romanos, in eo quod vitae se subducere liceat morte voluntaria (ἐξαγωγὴν dicere solebant) vel libertatem sapientis cerni putasse.'[7]

This is the prevalent doctrine under the Empire.[8]

Hence the man who finds it no longer possible to obey God, or, in other words, to live as his nature requires, is to perceive precisely in this fact an intimation from God that it is time to depart from life.[9]

Again, Plato had felt the difficulty that, while on the one hand it was better for man to depart and be with God, it was yet held to be unlawful to hasten that departure by one's own voluntary act. Now the conviction of the nothingness of this present life as compared with the after life for which it is a preparation has become an additional motive for suicide, no longer hampered by any other restraint than that the individual must convince himself that God gives the signal for him to depart.[10]

In the end, then, to be or not to be becomes purely a question for the individual. Suicide is not to be the rash act of a momentary impulse, a temporary confusion of values. It is to be determined upon or rejected after due deliberation. Nothing indeed is more striking in the accounts of suicides under the Empire than precisely this formal weighing of the considerations for and against.

[1] *Ann.* xv. 70. [2] *Ib.* vi. 29. [3] *Ib.* xv. 63.
[4] Ch. 13. [5] *Tiberius*, 66.
[6] *Caligula*, 26. For other cases of suicide cf. *Galba*, 3, *Jul. Cæs.* 36, *Claud.* 31.
[7] *De Fin.* iii. 60.
[8] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* xii. 10; Epictetus, *Dissert.* i. 24: τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον· μέμνησο ὅτι ὁ θύρα ἔστηκας.
[9] Cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* iii. 24. 101.
[10] Cf. *Ib.* i. 9. 16; Seneca, *Ep.* cii. 23.

The individual point of view was much insisted upon in the later Stoicism. The same set of circumstances might in a given case demand suicide, in another not. A situation of intolerable shame, for instance, might be for an ordinary man a sufficient ground for suicide. Yet it might be the duty of another man, whose life was essential to the State, to reject the temptation. A man's death must be in consonance with his life.

Peregrinus, according to Lucian, ἔδη βούλεσθαι χρυσῷ βίῳ χρυσῆν κορώνην ἐπιθεῖναι· χρῆναι γὰρ τὸν Ἡρακλείως βεβιωκότα, Ἡρακλείως ἀποθανεῖν.[1]

This doctrine of 'propriety' is expounded in a well-known passage of Cicero's *de Officiis*, which is of course based upon Panætius.[2]

III. *CONCLUSION.*—Our review, then, of the history of suicide among Greeks and Romans shows that at all times the only valid motives against the practice of suicide have been, in the main, not ethical but religious. And consequently the penalties attached to suicide are not so much civil as religious. They affect a man's condition not here but in the hereafter. The withholding of the rites of burial, the severance of the right hand, and so forth, all belong to the religious circle of ideas. When religious values ceased to have any meaning and were not replaced by other values, then, as in the case of the Cynics, there was no antagonism to suicide. When, on the other hand, the life hereafter was so emphasized that in comparison with that after life the life here seemed of little account, there was an obvious impulse to suicide. But that impulse was resisted and decried —by Plato on the ground of a higher law, a great mystery which demands that we remain in our prison-house till God shall please to set us free; by the Neo-Platonists because suicide is *ipso facto* detrimental to the soul. The whole question is admirably put in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* i. 13:

'Haec Platonicae sectae semina altius Plotinus exsequitur. Oportet, inquit, animam post hominem liberam corporeis passionibus inveniri. Quam qui de corpore violenter extrudit, liberam esse non patitur. Qui enim sibi sua sponte necem comparat, aut pertaesus necessitatis aut metu cuiusquam ad hoc descendit aut odio; quae omnia inter passiones habentur; ergo etsi ante fuit his sordibus pura, hoc ipso tamen, quod exit extorta, sordescit. Deinde mortem debere alit animae a corpore solutionem esse, non vinculum, exitu autem coacto animam circa corpus magis magisque vinciri. Et revera ideo sic extortae animae diu circa corpus eiusve sepulturam vel locum, in quo iniecta manus est, pervagantur: cum contra illae animae, quae se in hac vita a vinculis corporis philosophiae morte dissolvunt, adhunc extante corpore caelo et sideribus inserantur.'

LITERATURE.—K. A. Geiger, *Der Selbstmord im klassischen Altertum*, Augsburg, 1888; E. Durkheim, *Le Suicide*, Paris, 1897; R. Hirzel, 'Der Selbstmord,' in *ARW* xi. [1908]; A. Buonafede, *Histoire critique et philosophique de suicide*, Paris, 1762.

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SUICIDE (Hindu).—**1. Vedic.**—In view of the devotion to life and its pleasures which marks the *Rigveda*, and which is reflected in the disapproval therein implied of the practice of *satī*, it is not surprising that no trace of the custom of religious suicide can be found in that text. Nor in the later *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* is there any clear recognition of such a usage, unless we accept the suggestion of Hillebrandt[3] that the consecration ceremony (*dīkṣā*),[4] which is an essential preliminary to the most important rites, is in reality a faded form of the older practice of suicide by fire. While it is true that the generation of heat in the man who undergoes the rite is an important feature of it, the purpose of this practice, as of the fasting which constitutes even a more essential

[1] Lucian, *Peregrin.* 33.
[2] Cicero, *de Officiis*, i. 111 ff., tr. G. B. Gardiner, London, 1899.
[3] *Ritualliteratur* (= *GIAP* iii. 2), Strassburg, 1897, p. 125.
[4] See R. Lindner, *Die Dīkṣā oder Weihe für das Somaopfer*, Leipzig, 1878.

element of the ceremony, may much more naturally be deemed to be to produce the psychological condition best suited for the performance of the sacrifice. There are, however, in the *Brāhmaṇas* two doctrines which undoubtedly pave the way for the approval of suicide from religious motives. In the first place, there is developed the conception that the proper sacrifice is that of a man's self, and that other forms of offering are substitutes;[1] in the second place, in the latest of the great *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Śatapatha*,[2] the closing act of both the *puruṣamedha* and the *sarvamedha*, the human and the universal sacrifices, is the giving away by the performer of the whole of his possessions, including in the latter case even the land, and his wandering into the forest, doubtless as a preliminary to an early death. The teaching of the *Upaniṣads*, which emptied empirical life of all true reality, held out union with the infinite as the result of knowledge, and glorified the cessation of existence, must have tended to the same result, but the logical conclusion of their thought is not expressed in any of the older *Upaniṣads*, and it is only in such late works as the *Jābāla*[3] and *Kaṇṭhaśruti*[4] *Upaniṣads* that it is expressly laid down that the *sannyāsin*, who has acquired full insight, may enter upon the great journey, or choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning, by fire, or by a hero's fate. Earlier evidence (and better proof of usage) is afforded by notices in the *Dharmasūtras*: in Vasiṣṭha[5] it is expressly stated that the world of *Brahman* is obtained by entering the fire; and in Āpastamba,[6] in an interesting discussion which ends with a defence of secular life and aims, it is admitted that in one view the ideal was for an ascetic first to live on fruits, roots, grass, and leaves only, then on those things alone which become spontaneously detached, then on water, then on air, and finally on ether alone. With the testimony of Vasiṣṭha accords the record of the death on a pyre erected by his own wish of Kalanos, an Indian follower and friend of Alexander, who fell ill at Pasargadæ and decided on death, despite the opposition of the king, rather than alter his mode of life.[7]

2. Buddhism and Jainism.—It is characteristic of the general sanity of Buddhism in its earliest form that the Buddha appears to have disapproved of suicide, as he disapproved of all excesses of ascetic fervour. But it would be surprising if the influence both of Brāhmanism and of Jainism had not had its effect in making suicide reputable in certain communities. Not only is the duty of self-sacrifice deemed to excuse the action of the *bodhisattva* in committing suicide with the definite aim of being reborn as the fish whose flesh alone can save the people from disease, but self-destruction appears to be approved if undertaken with the desire of securing rebirth in such a condition as will permit entry into the Buddhist order.[8]

While this attitude is exceptional in Buddhism, Jainism frankly recognizes and commends religious suicide. It is dealt with at length in the *Āyāra*,[9] the first *Aṅga*, and its preliminaries are described in detail in the *Āurapachchakkhāṇa* and the *Saṁthāra*, the second and fourth of the *Painnas* in one reckoning. But suicide is not permitted promiscuously; it is allowed to those ascetics who have acquired the highest degree of perfection, and it in essence consists of giving up begging, and lying down in a duly chosen place to await death by hunger and thirst. Frequent mention is made of death being thus brought about by a month's abstinence (*kālamāse*); this fate is recorded of the Tīrthakaras Pārśva and Ariṣṭanemi,[1] of the monk Khandaga,[2] of the layman Ambada,[3] and of all those celebrated in the *Uvāsagadasāo*. At this supreme moment of his career the ascetic must not long after rebirth in this world or as a god; he must not wish to live on or desire sensual pleasures, but equally he must not seek for death to come more swiftly. The final condition thus reached by the sage (*samāhipatte*) is one of complete mental and physical collapse. Practically identical with it appears to be the *pannabhūmi*, the last of the eight stages of man's existence as taught by Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta.[4] The popularity of the practice is attested throughout the whole history of Jainism: in 1172 thus died the great scholar and statesman Hemachandra, followed in a short time by his patron Kumārapāla;[5] in 1912 a monk at Aḥmadābād, though in perfect health, starved himself to death by a fast of 41 days; and in the following year a nun at Rājkot, having previously weakened herself by austerities, died after two or three days' fast. Suicide, however, is still not permitted to others than ascetics, and non-religious suicide is regarded with especial horror by the Jains, as they disapprove of all taking of life. The problem of reconciling these two views is solved as little by the Jains as by the Brāhmanical schools.

3. Hinduism, mediæval and modern.—Hinduism stands firmly on the position reached in the *Dharmasūtras*, which permits religious suicide, while censuring ordinary forms of self-murder. Manu[6] expressly permits a Brāhman, in circumstances explained (doubtless correctly) by his commentators as disease or great misfortunes, to walk straight on in a north-easterly direction subsisting on water and air until his body sinks to rest, and declares that a Brāhman who has got rid of his body by any of the means practised by ancient sages obtains the world of *Brahman*; and Medhātithi interprets the methods in question as drowning oneself in a river, leaping from a height, burning, or starvation. The *Mahābhārata*[7] fully recognizes the wickedness of suicide; nevertheless the prince Duryodhana himself resolves to die by starvation, and for this purpose, as the ceremony is a religious rite, dons old garments and holy grass, drinks water, and applies his mind to devotion, though his purpose is eventually defeated.[8] An interesting tale,[9] which appears also in the *Pañchatantra*,[10] is that of the hunter for whom a pigeon roasts itself as a guest-offering; the wife of the bird declines to survive her husband, and the hunter, saddened by their sacrifice, repents and himself ends his life by fire. A new aspect of suicide appears in connexion with the development of the devotion paid to the sectarian deities which is characteristic of Hinduism, for suicide now means not so much absorption in an impersonal absolute as union with a very personal deity. The idea is reflected in the mythical account of the history of Mīrā Bāī, the

[1] A. B. Keith, tr. of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, pt. i. p. cvi ff.
[2] xiii. vi. 1 ff.
[3] 5; cf. P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣhads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906, p. 382.
[4] See F. O. Schrader, *The Minor Upaniṣads*, Madras, 1912, i. 39, 390 f. The great journey is probably wandering on without food until death takes place.
[5] xxix. 4.
[6] ii. ix. 23. 2.
[7] Arrian, *Anab.* vii. 3. A similar deed is recorded of an Indian sage who formed part of an embassy to Augustus in 20 B.C., and accompanied his court to Athens; but he had not the excuse of disease (Dio, liv. 9; Strabo, xv. i. p. 720).
[8] J. S. Speyer, *Die indische Theosophie*, p. 276 f. Cf. art. SUICIDE (Buddhist).
[9] i. vii. 6 ff.

[1] *Kappa Sutta*, 168, 182.
[2] *Bhagavatī*, ed. A. Weber, Berlin, 1866, p. 300.
[3] *Oravāiya Sutta*, 100.
[4] Buddhaghoṣa's comm. on *Digha Nikāya*, ii. 20.
[5] G. Bühler, *Über das Leben des Jaina Mönches Hemachandra*, Vienna, 1889, p. 50 f.
[6] vi. 31 f.
[7] xii. ccxcvii. 31 f.
[8] iii. ccli. 20 ff.
[9] *Mahābhārata*, xii. cxliii. 10 ff.
[10] T. Benfey's tr., Leipzig, 1859, ii. 247 ff.

devotee of Kṛṣṇa in the time of Akbar, who is recorded to have disappeared into a fissure which showed itself for a moment in the image of her chosen divinity when she was paying homage to him at Dvārakā. Similar considerations doubtless prompted some of the comparatively rare suicides which took place during the *yātrās* of Viṣṇu as Jagannātha at Purī. Neither Chaitanya, to whose teaching the fame of the shrine was largely due, nor any of his followers appears to have encouraged or approved this form of worship; no allusion is made to it in the elaborate account of the car-procession by Kṛṣṇadāsa or by Abu-l Faẓl. It is not impossible that the conception may have been borrowed from a Śaiva sect, some fusion of the two cults having taken place at Puri, but Chaitanya's own end was mysterious, and in his lifetime he had sought mystic union with the god in ecstatic trance, so that the occasional suicides of ardent devotees beneath the wheels of the car of Jagannātha can hardly be deemed unnatural or surprising.[1]

The wide-spread nature of the custom, and its prevalence both with and without Brāhmanical sanction, are attested by H. T. Colebrooke from personal observation just at the opening of the 19th century. In 1802 the legislature intervened to prevent the practice of suicide on the island of Sāgar, at the mouth of the Ganges, where, in pursuance of vows, not only were children cast into the sea to be devoured by sharks but grown-up persons voluntarily underwent the same fate. This practice was confined to the lower castes, as was also the custom by which men used annually to hurl themselves from a precipice in the mountains south of the Narmadā, sacred to Kālbhairo, in fulfilment of vows undertaken at an earlier period. This rite was carried out by mountaineers; great concourses gathered at the place on the new moon of Phālguna, the day appointed for the ceremony, and it is significant of the passion for public recognition as part of the motive of such suicides that the man meditating this fate was wont to proclaim his intention publicly and, attended by a band of musicians, to promenade in the neighbouring towns collecting alms. On the other hand, not only did the practice of *satī* (*q.v.*) flourish under Brāhmanical auspices, but the custom of suicide by drowning at the specially holy spot of the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges was approved, while the practice of lepers consenting to burial alive was promoted by the grant of obsequies which were otherwise denied. The Śaivas also allowed suicide by cutting the throat before the image of Bhavānī in the temple of Vindhyāvāsinī, near Mirzapur. Interference with these rites was gradual, but the final adoption of the principle of treating as a criminal offence participation in a ritual suicide has deprived the act of much of its religious character, though it is of course impossible to prevent suicide on the part of those who regard such a fate as a logical outcome of the religious convictions which they hold.

So far as religious suicide has been approved in India, it is significant that it has been in cases of men who have lived a full life and acquired a high measure of ascetic power, and that suicide in other cases has never been authorized and has instead been strongly condemned. There is obviously comparatively little essential distinction between the practice of austerities to a pitch which deprives the ascetic of all mental and physical activity, and the actual termination of life; an intermediate stage is furnished by the cataleptic condition which the Yogi seeks to induce, and of which the most famous case is that of Haridās, who even survived burial for considerable periods.[1] But in its essence the practice can hardly be traced to any origin other than the effort to supply a rationale for the old and inhuman usage by which the aged head of a family might be cast out to die, when he became too old to rule or be of service to his kindred—a usage for which there is clear evidence in the *Rigveda*.[2] In place of the violent removal of the elders there was substituted the doctrine that in old age it was the duty and privilege of a man to adopt a hermit's life, unless he preferred to terminate of his own will an existence which had become burdensome. The essentially popular character of the practice is proved conclusively by the pertinacity with which the Jains have maintained it from the earliest period, though the doctrine of the sanctity of life as adopted by them would otherwise have forbidden approval of the custom.

[1] See art. JAGANNATH.

LITERATURE.—For the question of the *dīkṣā* see A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Breslau, 1891-1902, i. 482 f., *Deutsche Litteraturzeitung*, xvi. [1895] 74; H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 398 f., *ZDMG* xlix. [1895] 176; A. B. Keith, tr. of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, Cambridge, Mass., 1914, p. cxiv f. For Buddhism see L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, p. 325 ff. The Jain views are given and explained by H. Jacobi, *Gaina Sutras*, pt. i. [*SBE* xxii.], Oxford, 1884, p. 68 ff., pt. ii. [*SBE* xlv.], do. 1895, p. 24; A. F. R. Hoernle, in his ed. of the *Uvāsagadasāo*, Calcutta, 1890; Lewis Rice, *Inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belgola*, Bangalore, 1889, p. 15 ff.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, London, 1856, ii. 331 ff.; Margaret Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915. For Hinduism generally see A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882; H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, do. 1862, vol. i.; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, do. 1896, *Epic Mythology* (=*GIAP* iii. 1b), Strassburg, 1915; J. S. Speyer, *Die indische Theosophie*, Leipzig, 1914. The facts as to the *yātrā* of Jagannātha are examined in detail by W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 132 ff., 306 ff., *The Indian Empire*[3], do. [1893], p. 276 ff. The observations of H. T. Colebrooke are given in a paper quoted by T. E. Colebrooke, *The Life of H. T. Colebrooke*, London, 1873, p. 178 ff.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

SUICIDE (Japanese).—Japan is known as a country in which an unusually large number of people commit suicide. According to the latest statistics, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics of the Japanese Government, the number of deaths by suicide in the ten years preceding 1915 was as follows:

Year.	Population.[3]	Number of Deaths.	Deaths by Suicide.	Number of Suicides per One Million Inhabitants.
1905	47,078,296	1,001,661	9,413	197
1906	48,164,761	955,256	8,906	184
1907	48,819,630	1,016,798	9,180	188
1908	49,588,804	1,029,447	9,595	193
1909	50,254,471	1,091,264	10,553	210
1910	50,984,844	1,064,234	10,773	213
1911	51,753,934	1,043,906	10,753	207
1912	52,522,753	1,037,016	11,128	212
1913	53,362,862	1,027,257	11,942	223
1914	54,142,441	1,101,815	12,705	234

The same returns give the number of deaths by suicide according to sex and age, as shown on Table 1.

According to the methods employed, the number of deaths is as shown on Table 2.

Some of the principal causes of suicide are shown on Table 3.

Among the methods of suicide used by Japanese the following three are unique and worthy of description:

(1) *Harakiri* ('belly-cutting'), more commonly

[1] R. Garbe, *Sāṁkhya und Yoga* (=*GIAP* iii. 4), Strassburg, 1896, p. 47.

[2] viii. ii. 2; H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 328; cf. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, i. 395.

[3] Populations in Korea, Formosa, and Saghalien are not included.

TABLE 1.

Age.	Sex.	Year.									
		1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
1–16 . .	Male	82	84	83	79	135	131	135	108	122	141
	Female	108	64	90	80	103	115	116	91	111	100
16–20 . .	Male	201	244	258	309	299	316	345	379	344	388
	Female	383	381	373	440	409	405	399	356	449	413
20–30 . .	Male	1105	1277	1318	1494	1568	1527	1597	1683	1767	1855
	Female	929	971	1019	1015	1069	1021	1058	1102	1213	1231
30–40 . .	Male	825	785	909	894	965	1019	1022	1015	1131	1214
	Female	480	461	515	504	573	543	587	560	580	641
40–50 . .	Male	903	774	773	821	918	881	834	861	998	1049
	Female	402	365	406	398	388	418	408	485	479	479
Over 50 .	Male	2607	2252	2122	2226	2608	2756	2569	2657	2913	3210
	Female	1379	1241	1308	1261	1383	1428	1421	1452	1592	1724
Unknown .	Male	9	6	5	4	94	171	209	212	206	221
	Female	—	1	1	—	41	42	53	67	37	39

TABLE 2.

Method.	Sex.	Year.									
		1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
Hanging .	Male	3593	3337	3296	3427	3861	3909	3666	3769	4123	4376
	Female	1591	1516	1573	1517	1637	1616	1578	1621	1791	1814
Drowning .	Male	1148	984	921	1087	1183	1247	1222	1245	1318	1516
	Female	1685	1510	1536	1574	1698	1693	1746	1770	1810	1927
Stab-cut .	Male	186	193	201	239	265	243	269	276	325	343
	Female	95	87	112	108	117	118	86	103	127	126
Fire-arms .	Male	117	127	121	143	150	158	132	136	149	144
	Female	8	13	9	12	16	12	8	9	13	10
Poison . .	Male	124	137	170	171	223	260	349	346	347	375
	Female	58	68	103	112	107	137	186	206	190	226
Railway .	Male	—	—	—	—	698	804	821	930	1017	1105
	Female	—	—	—	—	294	307	343	403	465	436
Otherwise .	Male	564	644	759	830	207	190	252	213	202	219
	Female	244	290	379	380	98	89	95	101	65	88
Total . .	Male	5732	5422	5468	5897	6587	6811	6711	6915	7481	8078
	Female	3681	3484	3712	3703	3967	3972	4042	4213	4461	4627

TABLE 3.

Cause.	Year.									
	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.
Mental disease . . .	4563	4312	4298	4174	3784	3622	3421	3358	3276	3453
Physical pain . . .	1676	1514	1640	1835	2109	2155	2146	2224	2460	2669
Poverty	1192	984	1005	1017	891	824	771	837	897	875
Jealousy	340	373	428	485	327	257	264	234	232	235
Remorse	274	271	226	232	230	165	156	173	157	193
Family trouble . . .	248	278	334	330	227	251	248	268	321	382
Fear of punishment . .	86	64	102	91	167	185	195	213	219	214
Anxiety	42	65	68	55	163	229	238	219	232	199
Business failure . . .	162	116	128	136	177	187	184	189	252	304
Dissipation	51	81	86	95	203	147	184	215	185	197

called *seppuku*, was, until the promulgation of the new criminal code in 1873, a method of punishment frequently required of offenders from the nobility and the military class. The laws of the Tang period in China, which for several hundred years had been the model of the Japanese legal system, recognized three forms of capital punishment: beheading, strangulation, and self-execution. The last was allowed to offenders of rank, that they might escape the shame of public death at the hands of others. The criminal laws of Japan allowed self-execution to members of the royal family and to others above the fifth court-rank, except in case of high treason. *Harakiri* dates from the Taira and Minamoto period in the 12th cent. and was widely practised during the Sengoku period of internal strife. During the Tokugawa period the practice developed into a complicated system with much etiquette and formality.

'It was not mere suicide. It was an institution, legal and ceremonial, invented in the middle ages, by which warriors could expiate their crimes, apologize for error, escape from disgrace, redeem their friends or prove their sincerity.'[1]

The most notable historical case of *harakiri* is that of the 47 Ronin, in 1703. The *daimyo* Asano had been obliged to commit *harakiri* to atone for an unjustifiable attack upon Kira, a nobleman in the Shogun's palace. A band of devoted followers, after long effort, avenged their master by assassinating Kira. They gave themselves up to justice and, under sentence, committed *harakiri* at the

[1] T. Harada, *Faith of Japan*, New York, 1914, p. 129.

homes of the *daimyos* to whom, in groups, they had been entrusted. Their bodies were buried with respect at a Buddhist temple in Tokyo; and to this day many admirers of their chivalrous loyalty pay homage at their tomb.

For the purpose of *harakiri* a site was usually selected in some garden facing a residence, sheltered at the back and sides by curtains of white cotton. Within the curtained enclosure were placed two mats covered with a mattress of light blue. The condemned seated himself upon the mattress in the presence of superintending witnesses, with a kinsman or special friend to act as an assistant. He was clothed in special garments, and, after certain formal ceremonies, was handed a short sword with which to make the horizontal cut through the abdomen. The cut having been made, it was the duty of the assistant to behead the sufferer, that the agony of death might be short.

Though *harakiri* is no longer recognized as a form of public execution, the method is still not uncommon among those who seek to avoid the humiliation of public condemnation and punishment or the supposed disgrace of capture by the forces of an enemy in battle.

(2) *Shinju* or *aitaishi* ('dying between two parties') is the death together of unhappy lovers who seek escape from the difficulties of their earthly lot and entrance upon a happier life in the next world. For the accomplishment of *shinju* drowning has been the most frequent method, the lovers often tying themselves together with a strong rope. So common was this form of suicide among the lower classes during the Tokugawa period that in 1723 the Shogunate issued special regulations forbidding it, refusing formal burial to the bodies, and condemning to shame or exile any one who might survive the attempt. At present *shinju* is of frequent occurrence; and in recent years other forms of death, such as poison or mutilation beneath trains, have been employed.

(3) *Junshi* is suicide upon the death of one's lord or master with the idea of following him into the next world. In ancient times this was an act of loyalty required by custom, until the emperor Suinin (29 B.C.–A.D. 70) ordered the substitution of clay images for the bodies of attendants and favourite animals. *Junshi* was revived during the feudal period, not as a requirement, but as a voluntary custom whereby loyal followers, through *harakiri*, expressed their devotion to their masters. The drowning of almost the entire Taira clan in the western sea at the downfall of that clan and the *junshi* of hundreds of the family of Hojo Takatoki at the end of his career are among the most striking manifestations of this *junshi* spirit. The custom was forbidden by the Shogunate in 1744, and, before the opening of the Meiji era, had become uncommon; but solitary cases have occurred from time to time. Of these the most startling in recent times was the death by *harakiri* of General Nogi and his wife, at the time of the funeral of the emperor Meiji, in Sept. 1912.

LITERATURE.—*Encyclopædia Japonica*, vol. vi., *s.v.* 'Seppuku (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1914; B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], London, 1902; *Annual Report of Statistics of the Japanese Imperial Government* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1917.

TASUKU HARADA.

SUICIDE (Jewish).—Only a very few cases of suicide are recorded in the OT. The ancient Hebrews were, on the whole, a naive people, joyously fond of life, and not given to tampering with the natural instinct of self-preservation. Nor are all of the few instances recorded on the ordinary level of suicidal occurrences. The case of Ahithophel (2 S 17[23]) is the only one which, in the modern mind at any rate, excites loathing and reprobation. The suicide of Zimri (1 K 16[18]) and of Abimelech (killed at his own request by his armour-bearer [Jg 9[54]]) only leaves us cold; whilst, on the other hand, the death of Samson (Jg 16[30ff.]) and of Saul and his armour-bearer (1 S 31[4ff.]) inspire us with a sense of awe and a certain kind of admiration rather than any other feeling.

But, when later the people of the Dispersion became more and more affected by some of the evil influences around them, and the difficulties and perplexities of existence kept on increasing, a much less wholesome attitude towards life made itself perceptible. And, as cases of suicide became more frequent, it was at last found necessary to give a name to the evil. A suicide was thus, in exact legal terminology, described as 'one who purposely destroys himself.'[1] In accordance with a general Rabbinic principle of legislation, an effort was, moreover, made to find support in the Scriptures for the new ideas and enactments which the practice of suicide brought in its train. In *Midrash Rabbāh*, 34, the prohibition of suicide is thus derived from the wording of Gn 9[5], the little word את in ואך את דמכם ('and surely your blood') being taken to include self-destruction. Dt 4[9] ('Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently') has been considered capable of a similar interpretation, and some[2] would even include suicide in 'Thou shalt not kill,' contained in the Ten Commandments. An indignantly rejected suggestion to commit suicide rather than suffer is also by some discovered in Job 2[9-10] (cf. 7[15]).

Considering some confusion of ideas which the elaborate treatment of the subject by J. Hamburger[3] may produce in the reader's mind, it seems necessary to state that the Rabbinic, like the Christian and general, conception of the act entirely excludes submission to a death of martyrdom from even the category of condoned or permissible suicide, so long as the victims do not, under the stress of fear or suffering, lay violent hands on themselves (or, by mutual consent, on one another).

The difference between an act of self-destruction during martyrdom and martyrdom pure and simple is illustrated by the striking case of Hananiah b. Teradyon, who, whilst suffering the pangs of death by fire during the Hadrianic persecutions, is reported to have replied to his disciples' suggestion that he should open his mouth, so that the fire should enter it and consume him more quickly, in these words: 'It is right that he who has given life should take it away, but let not a man destroy himself' (though, on the other hand, he allowed the executioner to heap up the flames and otherwise hasten his end).[4]

We must, therefore, limit ourselves to cases in which the act of death is, in the literal sense of the term, self-inflicted, though a division into different categories is at the same time necessary. Concerning suicide induced by the martyr spirit of patriotism we find instructive information in Josephus, where both sides of the argument are forcibly stated from the points of view of warriors, philosophers, and men of the world.

In the speeches addressed to the Jewish garrison of Masada[5] their commandant Eleazar lays special stress on their resolve, made long ago, 'never to be servants to the Romans, nor to any other than God himself,' and then exhorts them to receive their punishment for their past sins from none other than the Deity, 'as executed by our own hands'; and, on finding that his words had not yet produced the desired effect, he adds, among other things, the further argument that death 'affords our souls their liberty, and sends them by a removal into their own place of purity, where they are to be insensible to all sorts of misery,'

[1] המאבד עצמו לרעת (*e.g.*, at the beginning of *Sēnāḥōth*, ii.). The terms החונק את עצמו ('one who strangles himself') and ההורג את עצמו ('one who kills himself') are also used. The act of suicide is represented by איבוד עצמו לרעת.

[2] See J. L. Saalschütz, *Das mosaische Recht*, Berlin, 1846–48, p. 550.

[3] Art. 'Selbstmord,' in *Realencyclopädie*, Talmudic part.

[4] T.B. *'Abōdāh Zārāh*, 18*a*.

[5] *BJ* VII. viii. 6 f.

the final result being that 960 persons (*i.e.* the whole garrison, including women and children, with the exception of two women and five children) consented to die rather than yield themselves up to the Romans. (The spirit of the act is, of course, the same as caused the self-destruction of Razis, as related in 2 Mac 14[37-46]; and with the occurrence at Masada may be fitly compared the typical mediæval instance of the death of a large number of Jews in York in the year 1190.)

Josephus's own attitude towards suicide, under similar conditions, is revealed in *BJ* III. viii.

In the speech which, after the fall of Jotapata, he addressed to the men who had taken refuge with him in a cave, he compares a suicide to a pilot 'who, out of fear of a storm, should sink his ship of his own accord,' reminds them that it is a wicked and perfidious act to cast out of one's body the soul which God had committed to it, and exhorts them not to endeavour, by an act of self-destruction, 'to run away from God, who is the best of all masters.'[1]

A somewhat analogous, though much more pitiable, class is well represented by the case[2] of 400 captive boys and girls who, when they understood that they were being carried off for a life of shame, determined to end their lives by drowning. To quite another category belong a certain number of persons who are reported to have committed suicide under the stress of acute remorse for certain acts of theirs.[3] A different case, again, is that of the executioner of Ḥananiah b. Tĕradyon, already referred to, who, on receiving from the dying martyr the promise of future bliss, is said to have destroyed himself in the flames in which the saint had died, in order to enter at once on his inheritance. Rabbinic leniency by way of accepting excuses for young suicides is shown in the cases of certain children who had destroyed themselves because they lay under a threat of punishment from their respective fathers.[4]

The judgment of a person who, in our own legal phraseology, has been proved a *felo de se* is, in the main, left to God (לשמים),[5] though a person who recklessly endangers his life is subject to judicial chastisement (מות מרחת).[6] With regard to the treatment of the body of a suicide, there is a mention in the speech of Josephus referred to of the custom which demanded that the remains should lie exposed till sunset. In *Sĕmāḥoth*, ii. 1,[7] it is enacted that one should neither rend one's garments for a suicide nor bare the shoulder or engage in any other formal mode of mourning. Care is taken, however, not to offend the feelings of the relatives of the dead. Those present at the funeral, therefore, form themselves in a row and recite the necessary order of service. The general rule, indeed, is that one does everything required by respect for the living, but omits all the rest. There has also been a rule of burying a suicide away from the regular line of graves, but this is not always observed.[8]

It should be mentioned in conclusion that statistics comparing the prevalence of cases of suicide among modern Jews with those of other races and denominations are given in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

LITERATURE.—The literature has been indicated in the article.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

SUICIDE (Muhammadan).—There is no specific text of the Qur'ān which forbids suicide, though it would seem that the texts which bear upon the taking of human life in general are sufficiently clear as to their purpose to include any kind of wilful killing in private life. The following verses will indicate the bearing of the Qur'ān upon the subject:[1]

'It is not for any soul to die, save by God's permission written down for an appointed time' (iii. 139; the reference is to him who 'dies or is killed'). 'It is not for a believer to kill a believer save by mistake' (iv. 93). 'And whoso kills a believer purposely, his reward is hell, to dwell therein for aye; and God will be wroth with him, and curse him, and prepare for him a mighty woe' (iv. 95). 'He respites them until a stated time; and when their time comes they cannot put it off an hour, nor can they bring it on' (xvi. 63).

The attitude of Muhammad has no doubt been correctly interpreted by *ḥadīths* which Bukhārī accepts as genuine:

'Whosoever shall kill himself shall suffer in the fire of hell,' and 'shall be excluded from heaven for ever.'[2]

At the present time, and for many centuries past, there has been unanimity of opinion throughout Islām that suicide is a violation of a divine command contained in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet. A tradition relates that Muhammad refused to bury a suicide, and his example has established a law to that effect in Islām. In spite of the law, however, it is customary to accord the funeral rites in such cases.

It is difficult to obtain statistics covering suicide in Muhammadan countries, but all authorities who treat of suicide in an exhaustive way agree that in those countries the practice is almost unknown. It is clear from the statistics presented in scientific works on suicide that the physical environment of different peoples offers no adequate explanation of the varying ratio of suicides among them, while difference of religious belief as between groups always results in a varying proportion of suicides. The regions of Islām show few suicides precisely because of the nature of the Muslim's belief in God and the future life. The right attitude for the Muslim is *islām*, an acceptance of life's events as settled by divine appointment, of death as fixed as to both time and manner, and of the hereafter as a pre-arranged order of retributive rewards and penalties distributed according to the individual's attitude of acquiescence in the arrangement of life and destiny or of revolt against it. Suicide is an act of revolt against God, and the perpetrator of the act risks the wrath of God and the indescribable penalties of the Fire. Whatever else Islām may lack in the way of ethical influence, its sense of obligation to make acceptance of Providence the cardinal factor in obedience to God has been an effective determinant of conduct, and its doctrine of future retribution has been efficacious in strengthening this virtue of active resignation to the will of God.

LITERATURE.—Most of the leading treatises on suicide contain a brief reference to the Muslim attitude on the subject. In none of these works is there any attempt really to cope with the question, the available materials not permitting any well-founded conclusions as to the extent and causes of the phenomenon. The most useful general discussion is found in *RGG* v., *s.v.* 'Selbstmord.' See also *DI*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

WALTER M. PATTON.

SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian).—Among the ancient Hamito-Semitic peoples the love of life was strong. They were (with the possible exception of the Egyptians) still in the earlier and less reflective stages of civilization, and consequently showed little of that melancholy which leads to frequent suicide.

1. Semitic.—Among the Semites not only was the love of life strong, but their primitive religion was a worship of the goddess of life. Most of their deities of later time were gods that were in some form closely associated with the idea that life was divine. Their general attitude towards life was one of joyous interest in objective things. Their philosophical and reflective powers never attained any great degree of vigour. There are, accordingly, no cases of suicide on record except where

[1] The manner in which Josephus finally escaped death, whilst all his companions save one lay slain around him, will be found described in *BJ* III. viii. 7.

[2] Recorded in T.B. *Gittin*, 57b.

[3] See, *e.g.*, *Genesis Rabbāh*, ch. 40; T.B. *Qiddushin*, 81b; Rashi in the mention of Beruriah (a doubtful case, however) in T.B. *'Abōdāh Zārāh*, 18b.

[4] *Sĕmāḥoth*, ii. 4 f.

[5] Maimonides, *Mishneh Tōrah*, *Hilkhōth Rōṣēaḥ*, ch. ii.

[6] *Ib.* ch. xi.

[7] Also embodied in, *e.g.*, *Yōrēh Dē'ah*, § 345.

[8] See Hamburger, end of art. 'Selbstmord,' where references relating to this point are given.

[1] The translation is E. H. Palmer's, *SBE* vi. [1900].

[2] See *DI*, *s.v.* 'Suicide.'

the deed was committed in order to avoid a form of death that was considered particularly disgraceful.

An early and classical example of this is the suicide of King Saul of Israel (1 S 31[4]). Israel's armies had been defeated by the Philistines. Saul said to his armour-bearer: 'Draw thy sword, and thrust me through therewith; lest these uncircumcised come and thrust me through, and abuse me.' Naturally the armour-bearer was afraid to do this, so Saul fell upon his own sword and ended his life. Clearly the deed would not have been committed but for the desperate straits in which the king found himself. To him, as to many in all parts of the world, the foreigner was unclean. Philistine foreigners did not bear the sacred mark of circumcision; they were doubly unclean. He took his own life in order to avoid dying by such unholy hands after having been tortured by them.

A second case is that of Saul's armour-bearer. When he saw that his king had committed suicide, he followed the example of his master. His motive may have been in part the same as Saul's; it may have been in part despair at the death of his chief. At all events the armour-bearer, like Saul, took his own life only when a death which he regarded as disgraceful was inevitable.

Closely analogous to the suicide of Saul was the death of Abimelech, the son of Gideon (Jg 9[54]). Abimelech had made himself king of Shechem and a small territory about it; he sought to enlarge his dominion by the conquest of Thebez, a city some miles to the north-east of Shechem. In attacking the city he drew near to the wall, whence a woman threw a millstone on his head and broke his skull. He thereupon commanded his armour-bearer to thrust him through, lest it should be said of him that a woman slew him, and the armour-bearer obeyed. Abimelech did not actually die by his own hand, but, since the death-wound was inflicted by his own command, it was practically suicide.

A similar case in the Maccabæan period is reported in 2 Mac 14[37-46]. A certain Razis, imprisoned in a tower in Jerusalem, which Nicanor was besieging, when he saw that resistance was useless, fell upon his sword. As the wound thus inflicted was not fatal, he threw himself from the tower. When that did not kill him, he disembowelled himself.

At least two instances are recorded among the Hebrews in which traitors committed suicide.

Ahithophel, one of David's trusted advisers, betrayed his master and conspired with Absalom. When he saw that David had eluded the traitors and that civil war would follow, he hanged himself (2 S 17[23]). Similarly Judas Iscariot, the betrayer of Jesus Christ, when he saw that, as a consequence of his deed, Jesus was arrested and condemned, went and hanged himself (Mt 27[5]). Possibly his effort to end his life in this manner failed, for another account (Ac 1[18]) implies that he, like Razis, died from being disembowelled.

Conscience, then as now, sometimes drove traitors to end their own lives. Both the reasons for suicide which can be traced in ancient Israel operated in the case of Shamash-shum-ukin, king of Babylon, 668–648 B.C.

He headed an extensive conspiracy against his brother and suzerain, Ashur-bani-pal, king of Assyria. When Ashur-bani-pal, having defeated Shamash-shum-ukin's army and the forces of his allies, besieged him, Shamash-shum-ukin, reduced to extremity, threw himself into a burning pit rather than fall into the hands of his brother.[1] His rebellion had exposed him, in case of capture, to the kind of barbarous torture inflicted by the Assyrians on rebels—a prospect that might well drive a man to the less painful death of a burning pit. Shamash-shum-ukin might, however, have faced this, as many another had done, had it not been for an accusing conscience.

The cases cited sufficiently reveal the ancient Semitic attitude towards suicide. It was resorted to only in extreme cases.

2. Egyptian. — The attitude of the ancient Egyptians towards suicide was in general like that of the Semites. The love of life was strong in them, and their conception of the life beyond such that it presented to them deterrents of various kinds. The inscriptions present us with two sources of information on the subject, one practical, the other theoretical.

In the reign of Ramses III. (1198–1167 B.C.) a conspiracy against the life of the king was formed in the *harim*, in which a number of high officials were implicated. The king appointed a commission to investigate the matter and to try the criminals. From the records of this commission we learn that at least seventeen persons, who were found guilty, were left to themselves and permitted to take their own lives.[2] It was in a way compulsory suicide.

[1] Cf. *KB* ii. 191.
[2] See J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. §§ 414–454.

Death by their own hands was, however, apparently regarded as less humiliating than death at the hands of an executioner. An eighteenth person, when found guilty, committed suicide, apparently to the regret of the commission.[1] It appears from this record that the punishment of high and formerly trusted officials was probably accomplished by the ancient Egyptian government in this way.

An interesting document written during the Middle Kingdom (2100–1800 B.C.), which has been entitled by Erman and Breasted 'The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Own Soul,'[2] indicates that, in the *mêlée* of Egyptian feudal development, as the failure of old religious forms to satisfy increased and a sense of the injustices of life attained power, suicide was contemplated by some as an escape from life's ills.

The beginning of the papyrus is lost, but from what remains it is clear that a certain man of gentle spirit (his name is lost) fell sick. He was forsaken by his friends; even his brothers left him uncared for. Deserted by all, he was robbed by his neighbours. His former good deeds were forgotten. Although a wise man, when he would plead his own cause, he was thrust aside. His name, which should have been revered, was defamed. He then determined to take his own life, but, as he stood on the brink of the grave, his soul shrank back in horror and refused to accompany him. The dialogue then began. The soul's first reason for not going with him was the fear that there would be no tomb to dwell in after death. This afforded the misanthrope an opportunity to expose to his soul the utter futility of all such preparations. The soul had counselled death by burning, but had then shrunk from that, as there would be no surviving friend to stand by the bier and make the mortuary offerings. He urged his soul to undertake these duties itself, but then the soul refused death in any form, declaring that, even when the great built pyramids and endowed mortuary services, their tombs were in time neglected and permitted to fall into ruins, so that they were in no better case than the poor. His soul urged that it was good for men to 'follow the glad day and forget care.' The misanthrope then proceeds to demonstrate that life, instead of being an opportunity for pleasure, is far more intolerable than death. The demonstration is embodied in four poems addressed to his soul. The first of these pictures the unjust abhorrence in which the speaker's name was held by the world. The second sets forth the corruption of society. The third, which speaks of death as a glad release, justifies suicide. It runs as follows:[3]

'Death is before me to-day
[Like] the recovery of a sick man,
Like going forth into a garden after sickness.

Death is before me to-day
Like the odour of myrrh,
Like sitting under a sail on a windy day.

Death is before me to-day
Like the odour of lotus flowers,
Like sitting on the shore of drunkenness.

Death is before me to-day
Like the course of a freshet,
Like the return of a man from the war-galley to his house.

Death is before me to-day
Like the clearing of the sky,
Like a man 'fowling therein toward' that which he knew not.

Death is before me to-day
As a man longs to see his house
When he has spent years in captivity.'

The fourth poem contributes to the argument in favour of suicide by expressing the conviction that in the 'beyond' that justice which is unattainable in this world will be experienced.

'He who is yonder
Shall seize (the culprit) as a living god,
Inflicting punishment of wickedness on the doer of it.

He who is yonder
Shall stand in the celestial barque,
Causing that the choicest of the offerings there be given to the temples.

He who is yonder
Shall be a wise man who has not been repelled,
Praying to Re when he speaks.'[4]

This document shows how world-weary Egyptians looked at suicide 4000 years ago. An interesting feature of the point of view is that it betrays no

[1] *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. § 456.
[2] For a more complete account of it see J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 188–198.
[3] As translated by Breasted, p. 195.
[4] *Ib.* p. 197.

consciousness that self-destruction is wrong. In this respect it is in striking contrast to the Talmud. Rabbi Eleazar says that Gn 9[5] means that 'I [God] will require your own blood from you'[1]—a clear recognition of the sinfulness of suicide. The Egyptian misanthrope, so far from betraying any such consciousness, seems to hold that the fact that in the world beyond he can not only attain the justice that is denied him here, but also assist in the establishment of justice, is a reason for hastening by his own hand his release from life's intolerable conditions.

LITERATURE.—K. Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, New York, 1918, p. 484; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1906–07, iv. 217–221; A. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, in *ABAW*, Berlin, 1896; J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912.

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SUKHARS.—See RUKHARS.

SUMATRA.—See JAVA, BALI, AND SUMATRA.

SUMERO-AKKADIANS.—**1. The term.**—The ethnic expression 'Sumero-Akkadian' does not occur in the inscriptions, but, as the compound *Kengi-Urg*, translated by the Semitic *Šumer u Akkad*, 'Sumer and Akkad,' is found, it is a perfectly legitimate name for the mixed population which of old occupied the alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates, where they flowed into the Persian Gulf.

2. Probable derivation of the names.—Many suggestions have been made as to the origin and meaning of *Kengi* (or *Kingi*)-*Ura* and *Šumer u Akkad*, but it must be admitted that both these points are doubtful even now.

J. D. Prince[2] suggests that it may be a combination of *kên* (long form of *ki*), 'land,' and *gi*, 'reed,' 'land of reeds' being 'an appropriate designation of Babylonia.' In the lists, however, *Kengi* or *Kingi* is rendered simply by *mâtu*, 'country,' and here stands for 'the country' in the sense of 'our native land.'[3] This being the case, it is probable that the above forms are nasalized from *kigu*, the name of the first character, suggesting that *kiki* may have been the unweakened form. As to *Ura*, that is the pronunciation given to the characters $^{bur}_{bur}$, superimposed, when they are used for *Akkad*. This group also stands for the highlands of Armenia and of Palestine, and therefore indicated a mountainous region.[4] That the Akkadian Semites (not, as formerly supposed, the Sumerians) came from some highland district is quite possible, and that may be the meaning of *Ura*. *Akkad*, however, is probably shortened from *Agadé*, one of the names of the old capital of the northern district of Babylonia. In Gn 10[10] *Accad* is named as one of the cities of Nimrod's kingdom, after Babel (Babylon), but *Agadé* seems to have come into prominence before the great capital city. In addition to *Kingi*, Sumer is also expressed by the characters *Eme-ku* ^{ki}, which have, perhaps, to be pronounced *Eme-laḫ*, '(the land of) the holy tongue (or language),' meaning the idiom used in the religious services of the Babylonian temples, and esteemed as sacred from pre-historic times. The connexion of Sumer with the OT Shinar (*Shin'ar*) is still uncertain. Suggestions will be found in *HDB* iv. 503 f., that which makes it a changed form of *Shingi-Ura*, for *Kingi-Ura*, being the best.

3. The earthly paradise.—The tract wherein lay Eridu, 'the good city,' and the land of Tilmun,[5] which traditionally enjoyed, in the beginning, the happiness and the innocence of the golden age, seemingly always appealed to the imagination of the Babylonians as being at that time the most desirable abode on earth. It was this, apparently, which led to the designation of Adam's first dwelling-place as 'a garden eastward, in Eden' (Gn 2[8])—*i.e.* in the *êdinnu* (Sumerian *edina*)—which, however, seems not to occur as a place-name except in the compound Sippar-edina ('Sippar of the *eden*') and in the river-name *id edina*, 'the river of Eden (or of the plain).' Nevertheless, the idea always existed, and probably increased among the Babylonians, that their land was the site of the paradise of old time. This theory, moreover, is in a measure supported by the fact that Ê, which often stands for Babylon or Babylonia, may be an abbreviation of *Eridu*, and *Tin-dir*, 'the abode' or 'the grove of life,' probably refers to the wonderful vine therein. Many things, in fact, support the theory advocated by Friedrich Delitzsch,[1] and treated of by scholars and theologians before and since.[2]

4. Ethnic position.—As remarked above, it is probable that the Akkadians (the Semitic section of the inhabitants) came from some mountainous district, and it may have been originally an early stream from the west (the Amorite or Palestinian highlands) which preceded that of Hammurabi, who, having installed himself at Babylon, made that city the capital of the land. But both races were apparently, in their origin, mountaineers, as is suggested by the fact that the Sumerian word *kura* is the common word for both 'mountain' and 'country.' If de Lacouperie's contention[3] (afterwards followed up by C. J. Ball[4]) is correct, that Sumerian, both tongue and writing, is an early form of Chinese, then their Mongolian origin would seem to be proved. The likeness of certain Sumerian words to Turkish suggests that they may have been a pre-historic race from the Far East, of Turko-Mongolian origin. Traces of oblique eyes are to be found in the small head from Tel-loh (Lagaš in S. Babylonia), given in de Sarzec;[5] and another example is the bearded male head in relief.[6] Good grounds for the theory exist.

5. Evidence of the Syllabary as to the probable original home of the Sumerians.—It was long ago noted that the absence of a special ideograph for 'river' implies that such a thing, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, did not exist in the country of their origin. This, in fact, seems to be true, as the compound ideographic group for 'river' shows the sign for 'water' (*a*) followed by a square representing a lake or reservoir with the character for 'to run,' 'to flow,' within. The Sumerians may, therefore, have come from a mountainous region where lakes and ponds were common, and rivers were mountain-streams or torrents. The word *kur*, which stands for both 'country' and 'mountain,' and seems to be a picture of three mountains, supports this. On the other hand, the existence of a character for 'date-palm,' *gišim-mar*, 'the fruit-tree' in a special sense, somewhat negatives this evidence.

In the list of characters known as 'Syllabary *b*' we gather from the first entry that the Sumerians thought of the heavens (*ana*) as the abode of the deity (*dingir*). They believed also in spirits (*gidim*, *utuk*, etc.), and made offerings (*sigisse*) to the gods. To all appearance they lived in houses (*é*), not tents, and those houses had doors (*giš-pal*) furnished with bolts and bars. The houses were situated in streets (*sila*), which formed cities (*uru*, dialectic *eri*). Their fields were more or less rectangular, and were protected, at least in Babylonia, by boundary-stones. It was apparently not until they had settled in their new home that their fields were called 'water-centres' (*a-šag*). They had dogs, and the dogs were faithful but quarrelsome. They also possessed goats, sheep, oxen, and swine. They did not at first know the horse, the ass (*anšu*) being the common beast of burden. Naturally they knew of wool (*sig*), and it would seem

[1] *Baba Qamma*, 91*b*.

[2] *Materials for a Sumerian Lexicon*, Leipzig, 1905–08, pt. ii. p. 206.

[3] There is apparently another (variant) form for *Kingi*, viz. *Kibêgi*, but this may be due to a pun (see *PSBA* xxxv. [1913] 155).

[4] If, however, $^{bur}_{bur}$ stands for a reservoir or waterway, would indicate the watershed of the Tigris and the Euphrates—see § 6 (*b*).

[5] See below, § 6 (*c*).

[1] *Wo lag das Paradies?*, Leipzig, 1881.

[2] See also *PSBA* xxxiii. [1911] 161, xxxv. [1913] 154 f.; *ExpT* xxix. [1918] 181 ff., 288; and cf. art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic), vol. ii. p. 704[b].

[3] See 'Babylonia and China,' in *Babylonian and Oriental Record*, i. [1886–87] 113, 'The Old Babylonian Characters and their Chinese Derivates,' *ib.* ii. [1887–88] 73; cf. also pp. 149 ff., 184 ff., 221 ff., 251 ff.

[4] See 'The New Accadian,' in *PSBA* xii. [1890] five papers, 'Ideograms common to Accadian and Chinese,' *ib.* xiii. [1891] three papers.

[5] *Découvertes en Chaldée*, Paris, 1884–1912, pl. 25, no. 1.

[6] *Ib.* pl. 21, no. 6.

that linen (*kat*, Semiticized as *kitû*) was one of the fabrics which they produced. They had pots (*duk*, *lut*) and dishes (*banšur*), and used ovens (*udun*). Apparently the only simple ideograph for a metal was *urudu*, 'copper,' silver and gold being described as the 'day-bright' and the 'reed-bright' metals respectively. It is supposed that the only iron at first known—*an-bar*, 'the heaven-metal'—was meteoric. Tin was called *nigga* or *nagga*, and was probably originally pronounced *anagga* (Semiticized as *anaku*). They knew of fire, and used braziers, and a modification of the character for 'fire,' expressing the word 'new' (*ge*), suggests the purification of the metals and the completion of pottery and the like by its means.

6. Languages and literature.—(*a*) There has been much difference of opinion as to the existence of the non-Semitic Sumerian language as distinguished from the Semitic Akkadian. Halévy and his followers have even contended that it was merely an 'allography'—an invention of the Semites for expressing their own language in another way. Such an expression as 'to pour out speech' (*gu-de*), however, for 'to call,' 'announce,' is probably too foreign to the Semitic mind to admit of such an idiom replacing the common Semitic *nabû*—so, also, 'to set the breast' (*gab-ri*) for 'to resist.' Sumerian, moreover, has an involved and more widely-differing grammatical construction. The complicated system of verbal incorporations, the absence of case-endings, the use of 'postpositions' instead of prepositions, and other peculiarities, stamp Sumerian as being a language which Semites would be most unlikely to invent. Concerning its connexion with old Chinese,[1] there seem to be many analogies with regard to both characters and words, but the theory has not been very generally accepted. Many admit, on the other hand, that Turkish contains a certain number of similar roots, such as *mal* (*wal*) and *ol* in *olmak*, 'to be'; *ara* and *yuru* in *yurumek*, 'to go'; *du* and *de* in *demek*, 'to speak,' etc. Turkish, however, with its longer history, has naturally developed many new forms, and the numerals differ, but perhaps it is recognizable as a very late relative of Sumerian in its pronouns.

(*b*) Akkadian is now accepted as the correct designation of the speech of the Semites of Babylonia, derived from what was apparently the most ancient Semitic settlement in the tract, viz. the kingdom of Agadé. Akkad, as already remarked, was called by the Sumerians *Ura*,[2] and the ideograph *bur*, by which it is expressed, is suggested by J. D. Prince[3] as referring to the two rivers which were regarded as 'the life of the land,' viz. the Tigris and the Euphrates. There is some uncertainty as to the division in which the Akkado-Assyrian language should be placed, but it may, perhaps, be regarded as the bridge connecting the Aramaic and the Canaanitish forms of Semitic speech. Its verbal conjugations belong to the former, whilst the consonantal system of its roots resembles that of the Semitic languages to which Hebrew belongs. In the use of the words, however, Akkado-Assyrian struck out a line of its own.

Thus 'hand' is not *tîdu* (Heb., Arab., etc. *yad*), but *qâtu*; 'man' is not *îsh*, as in Hebrew, but *awêlu*; 'servant' is not *'ebed* or *'abd*, but *wardu*, the comparatively rare *abdu* having been borrowed at an early date from W. Semitic speech. On the other hand, the roots of the words for 'God' (*ilu*) and 'lord' (*bêlu*) are the same as in the other Semitic tongues. The Heb. *melek*, 'king,' and *sar*, 'prince,' are represented in Semitic-Akkadian by *šarru*, 'king,' and *malku*, 'petty king' respectively. 'House' (*bîtu*) and 'street' (*sûqu*) are from the same roots as in the other Semitic languages, but in Akkadian a temple was simply a 'house' (*bîtu*), whilst the other Semitic languages used the word *hêkal*, from Sum.-Akk. (*h*)*êkallu*, 'palace'—(*h*)*egala*, 'great house,' in Sumerian. Similarly the Sumero-Akkadian word for 'city' was *âlu*, but the Hebrews used the Sumerian dialectic '*ir*, which appears as *yeru* (for *êru* or *ûru*) in the name of Jerusalem.

(*c*) Most of the Sumero-Akkadian legends and mythical stories have been dealt with in the artt. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS and HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Babylonian). It is naturally difficult to distinguish the nationality of each legend, but most or all of them have a more or less Sumerian foundation. Among the distinctively Sumerian legends of Babylonia may be classed that of Alorus and his five successors, as well as those of Alaparus or Adapa, Tammuz, and Euedoreschus.[1] From their names it seems that the ancestors of the hero of the Flood were Sumerian, and the origin of the legend of the Flood itself is now proved to be so, notwithstanding that his names, Atra-ḫasis and Ut-napištim, are Semitic. This is shown by the very noteworthy earlier version in the Pennsylvania University Museum,[2] which is written in the Sumerian language, without any Akkadian rendering.

In this text the mother-goddess (Nin-tu, Aruru, and Zêr-panitum are some of her names) speaks of certain people whom she had created. At that time—long, probably, before the Flood—five great cities existed, viz. Eridu, the paradise-city, protected by the god Êa; Dûr-Kîš, 'the fortress of Kîš,' which preceded Babylon as foremost city of the land; Larancha, allotted to the god Papil-ḫursag, who apparently became its patron; Zimbir (Sippar), which was given to the sun-god, and became the great centre of his worship; and Suruppak, now Farq, the Babylonian Noah's birthplace, allotted to the god Suruppak or Sukurru. It will be noted that in this list of primitive Babylonian (Sumero-Akkadian) cities there is no mention of 'Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh' (Gn 10[10]). As in the case of the bilingual Creation-story,[3] in which Merodach and Aruru not only create, but also construct the cities wherein men are to dwell, it may be supposed that these deities were not only the guardians, but also the builders of the foundations of which they were now appointed patrons. A fracture of the tablet here makes an unfortunate gap, and, when the inscription is again readable, we have, instead of the Creation, an old version of the Flood-story. The mother-goddess, here called Nin-tu ('lady of reproduction'), like Maḫ in the 11th tablet of the Gilgameš-legend,[4] bewails the destruction of the people whom she had created, and the gods invoke the compound deity Ana-Enlila ('heaven and welkin') possibly to prevent the Flood from taking place. At this point Zi-û-suddu ('the being [or soul] of remote days'),[5] an anointing-priest of the god Êa, went through certain rites and ceremonies, apparently with the object of saving mankind from the threatened destruction, but without effect.

'All the powerful wind-storms as one rushed forth—a water-flood raged over the [hostile]. After the water-flood had raged over the land for seven days and seven nights—after the mighty boat had been carried away by wind-storms over the swollen waters, Utu [the sun-god] came forth again, on heaven and earth shedding day. Zi-û-suddu opened a window of the mighty boat—the hero Utu maketh his light to shine within the mighty boat. Zi-û-suddu, the king, prostrateth himself in the presence of Utu—the king sacrificeth an ox, slaughtereth a sheep.'[6]

In the final column Zi-û-suddu and his companions conjure Ana-Enlila, 'by the soul of heaven and the soul of earth,' to be well disposed towards them. This favour was duly accorded, and the twofold divinity, as in the Gilgameš Flood-story, conferred immortality upon him. Afterwards, to make good the ravages of the tempest, which had slain so many of the human race, 'the seed of mankind' was taken up, and made to live again in the land of Tilmun,[7] the district at the head of the Persian Gulf, which at that time extended much farther inland than now.

An analogous legend is that of Uttu (?)—probably one of the strangest records of the Creation and the Flood in existence. It was found at Nippur (Niffer) and was first translated by Stephen Langdon.[8]

[1] See above, § 4.
[2] See above, § a.
[3] Pt. iii. p. 352.

[1] *HRE* vi. 642 f.
[2] See Arno Poebel's *Historical and Grammatical Texts* in *Publications of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum*, vol. iv. no. 1 (Philadelphia, 1914), p. 7 ff.; T. G. Pinches, in the *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, London, 1915, pp. 307-312.
[3] *ERE* ii. 314[a].
[4] *Ib.* iv. 551[a], var. for line 10: '(The goddess) Maḫ called out, making her voice resound.'
[5] The Siaythes (for Sisydes) of Lucian's *de Dea Syria*, 12 (see J. Garstang, *The Syrian Goddess*, London, 1913, p. 50).
[6] The sacrifice seems to take place whilst the patriarch was still in the ark, and not after its inmates had come forth. But perhaps two acts of sacrifice were recorded.
[7] See *ExpT* xxix. [1918] 181.
[8] *The Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood, and the Fall of Man*, Philadelphia [1915]; see notice by A. H. Sayce, *ExpT* xxvii. [1916] 88 ff.; also S. Langdon, *ib.* p. 165 ff., and Pinches in the *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*,

It begins with a description of Tilmun, the glorious and pure (or holy). There Enki (Ea) and his spouse (Damkina) had their home, and on that account the original condition of Tilmun was that of the world during the traditional golden age of the Greeks. The people who lived in this happy land were not afflicted by sickness and old age, nor, apparently, did crime exist. This happy state of things, however, was seemingly not to last, for Enki, the water-god, announced his intention to destroy the field (probably meaning the whole district) by means of a flood. This was to last for nine periods of a month each, during which mankind would disappear like butter when it melts. There was one man, however, who was faithful to the deity, and for him, according to Langdon's translation, 'Enki the king' waited on a boat. The context seems to show that the great and pious personage whom the god thus favoured was Uttu, saved by the deity owing to his faithfulness. After the gap which occurs here Uttu seems to be engaged in gardening-work, he having become, like Noah, an agriculturist.

After another gap certain plants, possibly cultivated by Uttu, are spoken of, and it is stated which of them he (probably Uttu) might or might not eat. One of the forbidden plants Langdon regards as the cassia, but this is doubtful. The parallel between this story and the Creation-story in Genesis, where Adam is forbidden to eat of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, is noteworthy, though what is attributed to the first man in the one is attributed to a prototype of Noah in the other. But Uttu's plants were not trees, and they apparently did not confer either life or wisdom.

Among other Sumerian legends may be noted the story of Enlil and Ninlil, the older Bel and Beltis,[1] the legends of Merodach,[2] the legend of Tammuz, and probably that of Ištar's descent into Hades to seek him.[3] The myth of Ura or Nergal, the god of plague and death, Nergal and Ereš-ki-gal,[4] Enlil, Tišpak, and the Labbu-serpent,[5] together with others[6] of which the names only are known, may be added.

But besides the legends there are many historical documents, of which the most noteworthy are the inscriptions of É-anna-tum (*Stèle des Vautours*), En-anna-tum II. (cone), Uru-ka-gina (cones), Gudea (statues and cylinders), with numerous others.[7] As the dynasty of Ur seems to have been Sumerian, it is probable that detailed histories of the kings existed, and a fragment of one dealing with Sur-Engur and his son Dungi is known. This is the period (2300 B.C.) when the transformation of the Sumerian states into a Sumero-Akkadian collection of nations may be said to have taken place.

There are also numerous temple-records and accounts, inventories, lists, a few letters and contracts, and chronological lists and mathematical tablets. The Sumerian lists of words are unaccompanied by Semitic-Akkadian renderings. These, as well as the lists of names (places and men), are generally classified.

(*d*) From a religious point of view, the Akkadian legends are most valuable and interesting. It seems not improbable that the accounts of the Creation and the Flood first published by George Smith were Semitic compositions, though based upon Sumerian originals. This is implied by the fact that most of the names, especially those of deities (Anu, the heaven-god, Enlil, the older Bêl, Ea and Damkina, the god and goddess of the waters, Merodach, the king of the gods, Anšar and Kišar, the host of heaven and the host of earth, etc.),[8] are Sumerian, though Tiamat (Tiawath), the dragon of chaos, Kingu, her spouse, and Mummu, their son, seem to be Semitic-Akkadian. How Sumerian dominated in the religion of the Sumero-Akkadians may be realized when it is remembered that Sumerian names in their pantheon exceeded enormously those of Semitic origin —Šamaš, the sun, Bêl and Bêltu (Beltis), which generally stand for Merodach and his spouse, Nabû, the teacher, and his spouse, Tašmêtu[m], 'she who hears,' Addu (Assyr. Adad) or Rammânu (Hadad or Rimmon), and certain other descriptive divine names which possibly came into existence only after the Sumerian cult had conquered. Everything tends to show that the Sumerian element of the population preponderated in religious matters, as in the literature and the art of the Sumero-Akkadians.

7. Social life.—Sumerian influence in the land of the Sumero-Akkadians was, in fact, evident in every phase of their life.

The system of government was by a 'great man' (*lugal*) or 'king' (Sem. *šarru*), who had under him various officers, and was represented in the more important civic centres by a 'head-man' (*ig-sag*, Sem. *iššaku*, 'he who is head')—viceroy or mayor. To lighten the work of the supreme ruler, the tablets indicate that he had numerous 'servants,' or royal or vice-regal secretaries, whose cylinder-seals appear (generally beautifully-engraved specimens of intaglio art) on the documents written or drawn up on the king's or the *iššaku's* behalf. During the time of the dynasty of Babylon the *iššaku* had sunk to the position of administrative officer—probably something like a mayor.

Other officials were the superintendent (*nubanda*), often, apparently, the king's treasurer and palace-steward, and the business-agent (*damgar*), who acted sometimes as superintendent of the women's house or harim. Naturally, there were business-agents of various kinds, and belonging to the same class were apparently the messengers and ministers, political and other. These two classes of officials had to do with the transport of 'drink, food, and oil,' and apparently acted as political ministers. The number of documents referring to the transmission of goods, etc., suggests the existence of something analogous to posts as early as 2300 years B.C. Passing over the *nimgir*, 'director' or 'governor,' of whom there were several grades, and the *ga-šu-du*, 'grain-measurer' (Lau) or 'cup-bearer' (Zimmern), we have the *sag-nanga*, 'district-chief,' the *nimgir-abzu*, director of reservoirs, springs, or watercourses, the *mume*, distributors of rations, etc. Among the humbler civil servants were the carriers, labourers, gardeners, scribes, barbers—tonsure-cutters of the religious orders and apparently also hair-dressers (Sum. *šui*, Akkadian *gallubu*)—a few of them being women. Connected with the royal and temple domains were also smiths, shoemakers, carpenters, tailors or cloth-workers, goat-herdsmen, shepherds, ass-herdsmen, boatmen, gate-keepers, and various others.

Though it may be held that these details are of but little importance, they all tend to show how highly organized were the Sumero-Akkadians at an exceedingly early date, and the social and industrial system which they had initiated naturally formed the foundation of those of the Babylonians and the Assyrians later on. One list of late date (perhaps a copy of an earlier one) from Nineveh contained, when complete, about 190 official titles or designations, some of them ethnic, like 'the Itu'ite,' 'the Assyrian secretary,' 'the Aramæan secretary,' etc. Priests and temple officials, judges and law-court officers, were also to be found with the Sumero-Akkadians, as with the Babylonians and Assyrians at all times.

8. Ethical character.—The numerous names of men compounded with those of deities show, independently of the temple worship and ceremonies, how religious the Sumero-Akkadians were. Each city had its favourite deity, and every man worshipped the form or aspect, shown by the appellation chosen, of the deity whom he regarded as his or his family's special protector. In addition to their religious tendencies, however, they were exceedingly superstitious, and fond of incantations and charms, of the efficacy of which they were never in doubt.[1] Every disease or sickness was capable of being cured by these means, and in all probability other advantages which men are accustomed to seek could be attained by the same means. Among these may be classed the destruction of one's enemy by melting away his waxen effigy, the cutting off of his life by the cutting of a string or thread symbolizing it, and the like. When seeking a sign, they generally appealed to the deities Šamaš and Hadad, whose rays and wind, penetrating everywhere, revealed to them

1915, p. 312 f. Instead of Uttu (?), the name was at first read as Tagtug (?), which is a transcription of the two characters by which it is expressed.

[1] *ERE* vi. 644b; also *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 185 ff., 575 ff. (numerous additions by Langdon).

[2] *Ib.* p. 644 f.

[3] *Ib.* p. 645a.

[4] *Ib.*

[5] *Ib.* p. 645b.

[6] *Ib.* p. 644b.

[7] See F. Thureau-Dangin, *Inscriptions de Sumer et d'Akkad*, Paris, 1905.

[8] See art. SABAOTH.

[1] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Assyro-Babylonian).

everything that passed on the earth. They were therefore the gods of judgment and justice, and appeal was made to them that the sign or pronouncement asked for might be true.

In the matter of morals the Sumero-Akkadians were probably not better than their neighbours, but there is one point which is worthy of note, viz. that in their literature, so far as we are acquainted with it (with the exception of the legend of Gilgameš and one or two others), immoral or obscene passages are exceedingly rare. Moreover, it is in the same legend of Gilgameš that the greatest hostility to the goddess Ištar or Venus is shown—hostility which brought upon that hero all the misfortunes which afterwards befell him. Slavery seems to have been in full force among the Sumero-Akkadians, but there is no proof that slaves were ever ill-treated. Ruthlessness in war was also not one of their failings, as far as their records are preserved, and they were probably the superiors of the Assyrians at all times in that respect. As a nation, whether the states be taken individually or as a whole, there is no doubt that they had a high opinion of learning and the advantages to be gained therefrom. To all appearance it was a meritorious thing to know the mythology which, to them, occupied the place of Holy Scriptures, and to be acquainted with the history of their land, which enabled them to judge of the dealings of their gods with their rulers during their long existence as a nation. In like manner, a knowledge of the methods of legal procedure enabled their scribes to employ themselves usefully by drawing up contracts; and those who made a specialty of such things could read the signs in the heavens and make known all kinds of omens, thus earning the gratitude of their fellow-citizens and their own living by the fees of those whom they served. Whatever their defects, their records exhibit them as worthy people, equal in social progress to all their contemporaries at the early age at which they flourished.

9. Early Sumerian dominion.—Whether the Sumerians or the Akkadians entered Babylonia first is another uncertain point, but it is to be noted that the earliest documents are in the Sumerian language, and the earliest records refer to Sumerian kings. Legends, ritual-texts, hymns, contracts, etc., and word-lists are all Sumerian at the earlier periods, and, when these documents came to be translated, the Sumerian text always preceded the Akkadian or Semitic. Their entry into the country must have taken place about 5000 B.C. or earlier, but the Semitic-Akkadians probably became prominent only about 2500 B.C. The Semites, however, were certainly numerous in the country at an earlier date, and were steadily growing in power. Sargon of Agadé or Akkad seems to have reigned about 2800 B.C. (Nabonidus's date for this ruler is equivalent to 3800 B.C.), and he was certainly not the first ruler of Semitic race. The presence of such Semitic-looking names as Qalumu^{m} and Zuqakip, 'the scorpion,' who reigned before the mythical Etanna,[1] notwithstanding that we have to make allowance for the inordinate lengths of their reigns, probably takes back Semitic (Akkadian) dominion in Babylonia to a date which can hardly be later than 4000 B.C. In that case we may carry back Sumerian dominion to 4500 or 5000 B.C., and even 8000 B.C. has been spoken of.

10. Babylonia under Sumero-Akkadian rule.—(*a*) *The large states.*—The number of states into which Babylonia was divided until the time of Hammurabi's dynasty (*c.* 2000 B.C.) is uncertain, but it can hardly have been less than 40 or 50. This, naturally, only shows that each state had its own ruler, and claimed independence from all its neighbours. As may be imagined, the total of these states varied at different times, owing to conquest of the strong by the weak and to the gradual absorption of their smaller neighbours by the larger or more predominant centres of civilization. The name of each little state was generally that of its capital, and it is thus that we have the kingdoms of Agadé or Akkad, Kiš, Unug or Erech, Uriwa or Ur, Isin, Muru, Larsa, Lagaš, Ka-dingira or Babylon, Nipri or Nippur, and many others. Apparently after the Kassite conquest of about 1700 B.C. Babylonia was called Kar-Duniaš, 'the district of the lord of the world,' but the older name of Akkad, derived from the state of which Sargon the Babylonian was the ruler about 2800 B.C., clung to it even in the time of Aššur-bani-âpli, 'the great and noble Asnappar,' about 650 B.C. The name of Chaldæa seems to have been applied to it, and that by non-Babylonians, only after the time of the Chaldæan dynasty to which Merodach-baladan belonged. As has been remarked above (§ 4), the usual word for 'country' was *kur*, but another largely used is worthy of notice, viz. *kalama*, written with the character *un*, which generally stands for 'people.' This identification of the land with its people implies a strong sense of nationality in the minds of the non-Semitic Sumerians, but was less pronounced in the minds of the Semitic-Babylonians after the time of Nebuchadrezzar.

(*b*) *The smaller foundations.*—Though the capitals and larger cities (as understood in those days) were numerous, there were many smaller centres and settlements, sometimes founded by prominent agriculturists or traders, but in many cases they were religious foundations. Among the former may be mentioned the city of Idi-Uraš (*âl Idi-^{d} Uraš*) and the 'upper city of Elnanu' (*âl Elnana êlû*) of tablet 23 of the Relph collection,[2] where also we find Larsa and Pulukku (*Larsa ^{ki}, Dûr âl Pulukku ^{ki}*, 'the fortification of the city Pulukku') mentioned. No. 26 of the same collection refers to the cities of men named Amat-ili, Sin-nûr-mâti^{m}, etc., the 'Taribu^{m}-district' (*kar taribu^{m}*), the '(god) Enki-district' (*kar ^{d} Enki*), the 'new Broad-street district' (*kar sila dagala-ge*), etc. These 'districts' were apparently instituted for the reception of the temple revenues, paid in kind.

11. The Sumero-Akkadians' view regarding their native land.—The idea gained by the study of the inscriptions is that the people of Babylonia (and probably of Assyria also) looked upon their dwelling-place as a holy land. Every state, every foundation, had its deity, and visits to the holy places were meritorious acts.[3] First and foremost, apparently, we have the paradise-city Eridu, the abode of the god Ea—the city whose ideograph was sometimes used, in later times, to express the land of Babylonia in general.[3] Next came the great capital, Bâb-ili (Sum. *Ka-dingira*), 'the gate of God'—probably a folk-~~etymology~~ brought about by the name *Babila^{m}*, which was possibly (with *Babala^{m}*) the true form. Near Babylon was Gudua (Cutha), the city of the god Nergal, and Dailem, the ancient Delmu, where Uraš (one of the names of En-urta) had his seat. Other foundations were Muru, where the god Muru (Hadad or Rimmon) was worshipped, Qatan, the seat of the god Qatnu, and Lasima, that of the god Lasimu, the swift runner. These similar names of the cities and their patron-gods remind us of Aššur, the old capital of Assyria, the centre of the worship of the national god Asshur, and Nineveh,

[1] See *ZayT* xxvii. 518^{a}. For the legend of Etana see *ERE*, vol. ii. p. 315^{a}, vol. vi. p. 644^{a}.

[1] *PSBA* xxix. [1917] 90 f.

[2] See *ERE*, vol. x. p. 12.

[3] See § 3.

imitated from the Babylonian Nina, the former the city of the goddess Istar as the goddess of war, and the latter that of Nina, her Babylonian prototype. Greatly favouring the gods, Babylonia was held to be greatly favoured by them—hence, perhaps, the reputation of the land as the district of the whilom Paradise (see § 3).

LITERATURE.—L. W. King, *A Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, and the works mentioned at the end of the art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS. See also artt. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Assyro-Babylonian), FAMILY (Assyro-Babylonian), CONSCIENCE (Babylonian), DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).

T. G. PINCHES.

SUMMUM BONUM.—Modern ethical philosophy has at various times sought its constitutive principle in the will of God, the law of duty, the problem of the origin of the moral sense, the ideas or ideals of perfection, personality, progress, and evolution. For ancient ethics the ultimate reference was to the idea of good.

1. Definitions and early ideas of the good.—In its broadest acceptation 'good' is simply the term of general approval which no developed language lacks. Etymology cannot help us to a closer definition, for the etymology of ἀγαθός is not known and cannot be identical with that of *bonus* or of 'good.' The conjectural psychology of primitive man is of no avail, for it is uncertain, and in any case Homer was already far beyond that stage. It is obvious that primitive man did not draw our sharp distinction between moral good and other good or desirable things. There is abundant evidence in and out of Greek literature for the unmoral specification of good to courage in war, high birth, wealth, and other objects of approval or desire.[1] A unifying definition of good will always remain either a more or less plausible generalization from extant literature or an arbitrary deduction from metaphysical first principles. The Platonic *Euthyphro* and *Lysis* may serve as anticipatory illustrations of all such attempts, though the one nominally discusses holiness and the other the primal object of love or friendship (the φίλον). The *Euthyphro* leads to the *impasse* of the problem debated by scholasticism: Does God love holiness (or the good) because it is holy, or is it holy because God loves it?[2] The *Lysis* refers all particular loves to the primary love or end which seems to be the good.[3] But what intelligible motive is there for loving the good save as a remedy against evil?[4] Near the end of the dialogue the difficulty is evaded by renaming the good, in anticipation of Stoic terminology, the οἰκεῖον, the 'own,' the 'proper' (or, as Emerson sometimes renders it, the 'friendly'), and by calling evil the 'alien.'[5] The association in the *Lysis* of the good with the end or purpose dominates all later discussions and is the basis of most modern definitions from Schopenhauer to Herbert Spencer and William James. It is of course not explicit in pre-philosophic literature.

2. Homer.—In Homer we find the ethical meaning of good already existing side by side with its unmoral or half-moral use in the sense of brave or well-born. This has been and will be denied. But it is the only reasonable interpretation of such passages as Achilles' saying: 'Every good and sensible man loves and cherishes his own bride.'[6] The fact that Homer also speaks of a good meal, and of the menial services which the worse sort render to the good,[1] need not signify more than does our own language about a good dinner or the best citizens. The abstract use of the neuter ἀγαθόν, 'a good thing,' is also found in Homer and in Hesiod's *Theogony*.[2]

3. The pre-Socratics.—The philosophic discussion of the good begins with Socrates. But a few passages of the pre-Socratics might be regarded as anticipations. Several fragments of Heraclitus suggest the idea of the relativity of the good eloquently developed by the Platonic *Protagoras*.[3] And Aristotle says that Empedocles' use of the opposites love and hate is equivalent to the doctrine that good and evil are the causes of things.[4] Later philosophy found the beginnings of a classification or scale of goods in the famous scolium:

> 'Health is the best when all is done,
> The gift of beauty is next in worth,
> The third is riches fairly won,
> To be young with comrades is the fourth.'

It is with latent reference to that that Plato affirms with emphasis that not even health takes precedence of the virtue or good of the soul.[5] It may be the highest of popular or so-called goods. It is not the good.

4. Socrates and Xenophon.—The Xenophontic Socrates identifies the good with the useful: 'If you ask me for a good that is good for nothing, I do not know it, nor have I any use for it.'[6] There is no proof that this is a genuine report of distinctive Socratic teaching and no presumption that Xenophon had any ideas on the subject which he did not pick up from Plato.

5. Plato.—Plato's doctrine of the good has been obscured by the unnecessary mystery that has been made of its allegorical elaboration in the imagery of the sun, the divided line, and the cave in the *Republic*.[7] The essential meaning of this allegory is demonstrably quite simple. It is merely the postulate that ethical, political, or social science presupposes the conscious apprehension of some co-ordinating purpose and final test of all endeavour.[8] In the lack of such a vision of the idea of good, the so-called statesman is only an empiric and a rhetorician. The statesmen of Plato's reformed republic must possess this vision and this insight.[9] They can attain it only through the scientific and philosophic education which he prescribes[10] and the practical experience of affairs with which it must be supplemented.[11] Further than this Plato does not wish to define the idea of good[12] except through the implications of the entire moral and social ideal embodied in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.[13]

Plato's is the earliest and most effective presentation of these ideas. But so obvious a thought has of course occurred to many other moralists. Locke[14] uses it to prove that moral rules are not innate or self-evident, since their 'truth . . . plainly depends upon some other antecedent . . . from which they must be deduced.' Höffding[15] expresses it thus: 'Every ethical reasoning has validity only so far as the disputants recognize a definite primordial value which determines all more

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[1] See art. THEOGNIS.
[2] 10 A.
[3] 220 B.
[4] *Lysis*, 220 E ff.; cf. T. Gomperz's observation (*Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1901–12, ii. 149) that 'in nearly all philosophies of any vogue the technical terms denoting "the supreme good" were words of negative import.'
[5] 221 E; cf. also *Symp.* 205 E.
[6] *Il.* ix. 341; cf. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, i. 289.

[1] *Od.* xv. 324.
[2] For the further pre-philosophic history of the word and its synonyms see Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, i. 290 ff., and art. THEOGNIS. In this matter, as in all study of Greek philosophy, entire precision is attainable only by thinking in the Greek terms, if need be, transliterated.
[3] *Protag.* 334 A; cf. Heraclitus, frag. 52, 57, 61, in *Heracliti reliquiæ*, ed. Ingram Bywater, Oxford, 1877.
[4] *Met.* 985 a 8.
[5] *Rep.* 591 C, *Laws*, 661 B, 728 D.
[6] *Mem.* III. viii. 3.
[7] 508 A ff., 509 D ff., 514 ff.
[8] See *Rep.* 519 C; and P. Shorey, in *Classical Philology*, Oct. 1914, pp. 351, 366; *Meno*, 91 A, *Euthydem.* 291 B, 291 D E, *Protag.* 318 E with *Rep.* 428 B, *Protag.* 329 D ff., *Gorg.* 455 B with 504 D, 507 D, 508 D E with *Laws*, 635 E.
[9] *Rep.* 504 C, 534 D.
[10] *Ib.* 533 A.
[11] *Ib.* 519 B C, 539 E.
[12] *Ib.* 506 D E.
[13] *E.g.*, the sketch, or ὑπογραφή, of *Rep.* 504 D is the system of the definition of the virtues given in bk. iv.
[14] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. i. ch. iii. § 4.
[15] *Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., New York, 1905, p. 165.

special goods.' In the words of G. Lowes Dickinson:[1] 'For we must live or die; and if we are to choose to do either, we must do so by virtue of some assumption about the Good.' Whether by accident or design, a witty page of G. K. Chesterton's *Heretics*[2] is an admirable statement of Plato's postulate that we must know the good before we can rightly know or do anything else. The conception pervades all Ruskin's preaching.[3]

If these and countless other modern writers still find occasion to dwell upon this elementary truth, there is no presumption that it is too simple to constitute the underlying significance of Plato's allegory. The difficulty is in the prevailing quest for subtler or more mystical interpretations to obtain a hearing for the demonstration that this in fact was Plato's essential meaning. It is then, as we shall see later, mere misapprehension when modern scholars identify the idea of good with God, confuse its plain ethical and political interpretation by the introduction of the metaphysical problems common to all Platonic ideas, or read into its ethical application in the *Republic* all the teleological developments of the *Timæus*.

Apart from this misapprehension, Plato's doctrine of the good is his entire ethical and social philosophy as collected from the minor dialogues, from the discussion of utilitarian hedonism in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Laws*, and from the closer psychological analysis of the same problem in the *Philebus* and the 9th book of the *Republic*, 583 B ff. Throughout the minor dialogues the undefinable good is the test that all tentative definitions of the virtues or exaggerated claims of the sophists fail to pass. The phrasing of *Republic*, 505 B f., is equivalent to a reference to these discussions. The virtue which we are trying to define, the ability of which you boast, must be a good, Socrates urges, and the interlocutor is unable to show that it is always and unconditionally good. The consistency and symmetry of this method point directly to the idea of good in the *Republic* as the symbol of such an absolute good, and to the Platonic guardians' knowledge of it as distinguishing them from the politicians, the sophists, and their pert disciples whom Socrates puts to confusion.

The other approach to the problem of the good is through the hedonistic utilitarian controversy. Is the good pleasure or is it something higher—virtue, knowledge, or communion with God?[4] The Socrates of the *Protagoras* formulates the obvious hedonistic utilitarian argument in a way that leaves nothing for Epicurus and very little for Bentham and Mill to add. The eloquent rejection of this point of view in the *Gorgias* and *Phædo* is an inconsistency only for critics who fail to observe by what nice distinctions Plato's affirmations are guarded or who refuse to interpret the apparent antinomy by the psychology of the *Philebus* and the conclusion of the whole matter in the *Laws*.[5] The measured preponderance of pleasure might arguably be the good if pleasure were really measurable and rightly measured[6] or if what the multitude call pleasures were really pleasant.[7] Plato's final feeling is aptly expressed in the words of Matthew Arnold:

'That joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life inevitably moves, let not the reader . . . confuse his mind by doubting. The real objection is to low and false views of what constitutes happiness. *Pleasure* and *utility* are bad words to employ because they have been so used as to suggest such views.'[8]

Plato did not object to the Greek equivalent of utility, but he did to ἡδονή, as Cicero did to ἡδονή, *voluptas*. In *Laws*, 733 A, Plato substitutes χαίρειν, but to make his meaning clear he, in a sentence which Epicurus might have written,[1] allows ἡδίων.[2]

To return to the idea of good, the Socratic censure of Anaxagoras in *Phædo*, 98, is sometimes misunderstood. What Plato plainly says is that a teleological explanation of the universe in terms of the good[3] would most completely satisfy his feeling. He is unable to find or to construct such an explanation[4] and so falls back upon a different thing, the safe and second best method of the ideas—a kind of working logic which renounces both the speculative physical hypotheses of the pre-Socratics[5] and the hope of a teleological interpretation.[6] In spite of this, interpreters persistently identify the doctrine of ideas with the method of teleological deduction from the good. The *Timæus* does attempt such a deduction, but avowedly in the form of poetry and as a probable tale. There is nothing to justify the transference of this line of thought to the idea of good in the *Republic*. Amid the 'demonic hyperboles' of the *Republic* passage, 509 C, there may be phrases that suggest the dependence of the physical universe on the idea of good and the subordination of all other ideas to this *summum genus*.[7] But the main emphasis and purpose of the passage is to stress the ethical and political significance of the idea of good as we have already met it in the minor dialogues. Plato does not say that all other ideas are included in the good as a logical *summum genus*, nor does he say that mathematics and the sciences are to be deduced from the idea of good. He says that, rightly studied, these disciplines will quicken the mind's eye for the apprehension of all abstract truth and so ultimately for that of the idea of good.[8] In other words, the sociologist and the statesman must be prepared for their tasks by the severest scientific and philosophical education which the age affords.

Space fails to show how every significant part of the allegory confirms our simple and rational interpretation.[9] The idea of good is the cause of both existence and knowledge because all human institutions originate in the founder's purpose or idea of good and are, as Coleridge often said, best understood in the light of their purpose—the good they were intended to accomplish. This could be extended to the physical universe by the teleology of the *Timæus* and the *Phædo*.[10] God's idea of good in the *Timæus* is the cause of the world, so far as necessity permitted; and we understand the world best when we apprehend His designs. But the *Republic* is not directly concerned with these applications, and we distort Plato's meanings when we force them into the systematic metaphysical construction from which he abstained.

The comparison of the idea of the good with the sun is of great interest for the study of the history of religion, but need not detain us here.[11] Nor can we delay for the enormous influence of this passage in the history of Neo-Platonism,

[1] *The Meaning of Good*, Glasgow, 1901, New York, 1907, p. 189.

[2] London, 1905, p. 33.

[3] See in particular the preface to *The Crown of Wild Olive*, and in *The Two Paths* the passage beginning: 'If you will tell me what you ultimately intend Bradford to be, perhaps I can tell you what Bradford can ultimately produce' (lect. iii. § 87).

[4] *Rep.* 505 B, *Phileb. passim*, *Theæt.* 176.

[5] 733 f.; cf. *Classical Philology*, Oct. 1914, p. 364.

[6] *Laws*, 733, 734 A B.

[7] Cf. ἀγενητος in *Rep.* 576 A, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 b 19; *Rep.* 586 A ff., 583 B.

[8] *God and the Bible*, popular ed., New York, 1883, p. 141.

[1] 734 A; cf. H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 64, 72; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, London and New York, 1910, p. 172.

[2] Cf. Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 22, *Class. Phil.* x. 335; Jowett, introd. to his tr. of the *Philebus*; Seneca, *Epist.* lxvii. 15: 'Ego tam honestae rei ac severae numquam molle nomen imponam.'

[3] 98 B. [4] 99 C. [5] 96 A B.

[6] 100 C. [7] 509 B, 517 B, 532 A.

[8] 511 C, 534 C, 520 C, 521 D, 525 C, 527 A, 529 B.

[9] Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 225 ff.

[10] 97 D E; cf. also the Platonizing passage in Aristotle, *de Cælo*, 288 a, 1–10.

[11] Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 223 f.; A. C. Pearson on Soph. frag. 752.

mysticism, and superstition. In Apuleius 'Platonis τὸ ἀγαθόν' actually occurs in a context which might cause it to be mistaken for one of a list of demons.[1]

6. The idea of good and God.—The identification of the idea of the good with God could do no harm if taken merely as religious poetry. The goodness of God is His chief attribute both as a negative criterion in the theological canons of the *Republic*[2]—so the Stoics held that God was the cause of good only, never of evil—and positively in the teleology of the *Timæus*. Plato is perhaps not unwilling to hint at the identification in such passages as *Rep.* 508 C and 517 B. God and the idea of good are both expressions of the highest ethical ideal, and the language which Plato used of both is, as Emerson and Arnold would put it, an ejaculation 'thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.'[3] As Epictetus says,

'God is beneficent, but the good also is beneficent. It is natural therefore that the true nature of the good should be in the same region as the true nature of God.'[4]

But in fact the two terms and the two ideas came to Plato in different trains of thought and as symbols of distinct traditions, and they cannot be identified without wresting the Platonic texts from the plain purport of their contexts and attributing to him a system of metaphysics which he did not care to construct.[5] By the same methods of interpretation one could identify God and the idea of good in the philosophy of Jesus with the aid of Mt 19[17], Mk 10[18], Lk 18[19].

7. The minor Socratics.—We shall make only brief reference to the so-called minor Socratics. The fundamental theory of the Cyrenaic hedonism differed little from that of Epicurus and of the Socrates of the Platonic *Protagoras*, though special points of distinction were laboured in the schools.[6] The alleged doctrine of Aristippus, that only the pleasure of the present moment counts, perhaps because 'the next may never come,' is a temperamental attitude rather than a philosophy. This attitude was illustrated by many anecdotes, and strongly appealed to Horace.[7] Walter Pater's *Renaissance* and the chapter on the 'New Cyrenaicism' in *Marius the Epicurean* commend the Cyrenaic *summum bonum* to an æsthetic generation in the form: 'Be perfect in regard to what is here and now.' 'Burn always with this hard, gem-like flame.'

Cynicism is only a cruder, harsher anticipatory form of Stoicism. Antisthenes is said to have affirmed toil and hardship (πόνοι) to be the good and to have prayed, 'Let me be mad rather than feel pleasure.'[8]

We do not know enough about the 'Megarians' to interpret Euclides' pronouncement that the one is good,[9] though Gomperz[10] undertakes to interpret it.

8. Aristotle.—The first sentence of Aristotle's *Ethics* and the first sentence of the *Politics* repeat as a truism the main thought that emerges from the Platonic quest for the good. Aristotle recognizes that the problem of ethical theory is to ascertain and define the nature of this good that all action and choice presuppose. As he proceeds, Aristotle seems to repudiate the debt to his teacher, to which every page of the *Ethics* testifies, by his insistence on metaphysical objections to the theory of ideas in general and so to the idea of good in particular.[11] The polemic has of course no relevance to the ethical problem. And, when Aristotle contemptuously asks,[1] 'How would a weaver or a carpenter be profited by knowing the absolute idea of good?', he forgets that he himself has just borrowed the Platonic imagery of the unifying σκοπός, or aim, to prove that a generalized conception of the good will be practically helpful.[2] As Sir Thomas Browne aptly puts it,

'Aristotle, whilst he labours to refute the ideas of Plato, falls upon one himself: for his *summum bonum* is a chimæra, and there is no such thing as his felicity.'[3]

Aristotle himself admits that the synonym happiness, εὐδαιμονία, which he substitutes for the good, is only a blank cheque.[4] Happiness is of course, as Plato said before him and Pope after, 'our being's end and aim.'[5] Cicero, while repudiating pleasure, assumed happiness to be the end as a matter of course,[6] and Leslie Stephen says:

'Good means everything which favors happiness . . . nor can any other intelligible meaning be assigned to the words.'[7]

It depends upon your conception of happiness or your definition of pleasure whether, with Epicurus, Bentham, and Herbert Spencer, you add pleasure as a third synonym or with Plato, Cicero, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Macaulay, Arnold, and Jowett, protest that to do so is either to confuse the right use of language or to suggest a false ideal of happiness. The definition of happiness with which Aristotle fills out the blank cheque is a somewhat lame and impotent conclusion of so elaborate a discussion. What hinders us, he asks, from pronouncing happy the man who energizes in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not through any chance time, but for a complete life?[8] Later philosophers interpreted the Aristotelian definition of happiness as a trimming compromise between Epicurean hedonism and the severe idealism of Plato's *Gorgias* and the Stoics. Cicero sometimes argues that in theory there can be no adequate sanction for virtue except on the Stoic principle that nothing else is a good.[9] Sometimes he affirms that in practice the Peripatetics, who recognize external goods, give no larger place to them in their own lives than do the Stoics, who evade this concession by a change of terminology and denominate what the rest of mankind call goods not goods, but 'preferred.'[10] Otherwise Aristotle's contribution to our topic is slight. He is not deeply interested in the fundamental problem.[11] He reviews the hedonistic controversy, in substance concurring with Plato, but unable to refrain from a tone of condescending superiority to Plato's pursuit of edification.[12] The poetical allegory of the idea of the good in the *Republic* would of course be unsympathetic if not incomprehensible to him. But the statement of an eminent scholar, that he never alludes to it, overlooks the fact that Plato's distinction there between the method of pure dialectic and that of the sciences[13] is one of Aristotle's fundamental ideas recurring throughout his writings.

In the end Aristotelianism, in this matter as in others, comes back to an extreme form of the Platonism which it begins by repudiating. In Neo-Platonic interpretation and in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the desire by which the Aristotelian first mover moves the heavens is the yearning of all creation towards him as the supreme good. This interpretation, supported by one metaphor and two or three ambigu-

[1] *Apol.* xxvii.
[2] 379 C.
[3] *God and the Bible*, p. 22; cf. *Rep.* 506 E: ἀπαγγελλομένη τι εἶναι.
[4] *Discourses*, 281.
[5] Cf. Shorey, 'Idea of Good,' p. 188 f., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17.
[6] Diog. Laert. ii. 88 f.; Cic. *de Fin.* i. 11; Gomperz, ii. 215.
[7] *Sat.* ii. iii. 100 ff., *Ep.* i. i. 18, xvii. 14, 23.
[8] Diog. Laert. vi. 104.
[9] *Ib.* ii. 106; Cic. *Acad.* i. 42.
[10] ii. 173-175.
[11] *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 11 ff.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1097 a 8.
[2] *Ib.* 1094 a 24; cf. Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 102.
[3] *Religio Medici*, pt. ii. § 15.
[4] *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 22.
[5] Cf. *Sym.* 205 A.
[6] *De Fin.* ii. 27.
[7] *The Science of Ethics*, London, 1882, p. 42.
[8] *Eth. Nic.* 1101 a 14.
[9] *De Fin.* ii. 18 f., iii. 11, v. 26-28, *Tusc.* v. 8, 15.
[10] *De Fin.* iv. 26.
[11] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Greek).
[12] *Eth. Nic.* 1172 a 30-35.
[13] *Rep.* 510.

ous verbs in the Aristotelian text, was blended with the poetical doctrine of Platonic love as the aspiration for ultimate beauty[1] identical with ultimate good. But this theme would demand a volume.

9. The post-Aristotelian schools.—The *summum bonum* was one of the two or three chief topics of debate in the post-Aristotelian schools.[2] Cicero tells an amusing story of a Roman pro-consul who proposed to convene a world's congress of philosophers and settle the question once for all.[3]

Locke[4] argues from the diversity of human tastes that 'the philosophers of old did in vain inquire whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation.' Locke's argument has been used against the utilitarian reference of all things to 'happiness' or pleasure by Coleridge, Hazlitt, Macaulay, and many others. But, as Mill[5] says, the question concerning the summum bonum is the same thing as that concerning the foundation of morality. And it is idle to expect men to cease discussing that. Horace, *e.g.*, was no metaphysician. He is interested only in

'quod magis ad nos
pertinet, et nescire malum est,'[6]

and he sums up this necessary knowledge in the three problems: (1) 'Divitiis homines, an sint virtute beati,' which was the ordinary man's conception of the difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic good; (2) 'Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos,' the compatibility of disinterested friendship with Epicurean principles — a question much debated between the Epicureans and their opponents;[7] (3) 'Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid ejus.'

Locke's impatience of the problem is perhaps a survival of Renaissance distaste for the scholasticism of the mediæval literature *de bonitate pura* as seen in Albert's report of the treatise of al-Farabi.

The title of Cicero's *de Finibus* exhibits the continued association of the 'good' with the 'end,'[8] and Cicero resumes for all practical purposes the net outcome and the influence on modern literature of the post-Aristotelian discussion of the *summum bonum*.[9]

10. The Epicureans.—The Epicureans revived the thesis of Plato's *Protagoras* and insisted that pleasure 'rightly understood' is the only conceivable end for a sentient creature.[10] They then, like modern utilitarians, devoted themselves to the revaluation or the restatement in their terminology of all ethical values—what the Epicurean in Cicero[11] styles 'ad eam accommodare Torquatos nostros,' 'fit our examples of Roman virtue into the theory.' They also, like their modern analogues, complained bitterly of the critics who had misunderstood their meaning.[12] These tactics irritate Cicero, who thinks that he knows the meaning of the Greek ἡδονή, a perfect synonym of the Latin *voluptas*.[13] The Epicurean *summum bonum* may be discussed in a corner. No one would dare proclaim it to a large audience.[14] And the heroic deeds of Greek and still more of Roman worthies who gave their lives for their country[15] are sufficient proof that 'the quadruped opinion will not prevail.'[16]

11. The Stoics.—The Stoic doctrine is more sympathetic to the moralist and the orator and has the further interest of a strictly deduced and ingeniously elaborated scientific system.[17] In essence it is the old paradox of the Socrates of the *Gorgias*, that nothing is really good except the good moral will. All other so-called values are either non-existent or insignificant when weighed against this. 'Sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,' says Cicero in *Lucullus*, 44, and in the *Tusculans*, v. 12, he takes for the text of the entire doctrine a single sentence of Plato's *Menexenus*.[1]

In the refutation of Epicurean hedonism and the working out of the system the supreme end was variously defined and deduced, and the schools and sects of philosophy were minutely classified by the various 'ends' or principles of the supreme good which they adopted.[2] The demonstration that pleasure is not the end and the detailed deduction of Stoic ethical principles could take their start from the idea of nature and the life accordant with nature[3] or from the abbreviated formula, the consistent life.[4] The argument from nature, as set forth in Cicero,[5] presents startling analogies both with the 17th and 18th cent. philosophy of 'self-love' and with the modern logic of evolution. Pleasure is not the end, because it is not in fact the beginning, of animal or human activity.[6] The earliest and fundamental *conatus* of all sentient life is not towards pleasure as such, but towards self-preservation.[7] The pleasure is, so to speak, a by-product.[8] Upon this supervenes in the rational animal man the recognition that the true self, the higher self, is the spiritual and moral self. The conservation of this self then becomes the end. And it matters little in practice whether all other ends are annihilated or merely dwindle to insignificance in comparison with this.[9] Thus Cicero sometimes treats the entire suppression of the animal or lower self as a fallacy of Stoic paradox[10] and sometimes as a rebuke of Peripatetic compromise and as an indispensable condition of absolute and disinterested virtue.

12. The sceptics.—The various schools of sceptics impartially assailed all dogmatic systems. But they did not for that reason admit that they lacked a moral ideal or the conception of the supreme practical end. Their scepticism was a means to the end of tranquillity or imperturbability of soul and the guidance of life by reasonable probability.

13. Developments of Platonism: the ascetic ideal.—In the Græco-Roman empire the eclectic literature of moral and religious edification reproduces all these points of view and ideas, but retains little interest in the dialectic of the schools and the philosophic theory of ethics. The cumulative influence of Platonism reveals itself not only in the softening and refinement of Stoic technicality and paradox, but also in the increasing prominence of another ideal, if not idea, of good—the ideal of detachment from the world and the flesh and approximation to God through the lonely purity of a spiritual and contemplative life. Plato's *Phædo* and the eloquent digression of the *Theætetus* are the earliest explicit Greek expression of this ideal. It is a human mood or temperament of renunciation and reaction. The opposition of the theoretic and the practical life was debated in the *Antiope* of Euripides.[11] And recent conjecture attributes to Pythagoras the three types of life associated with the tripartite psychology of Plato's *Republic* and employed as an ethical commonplace in the beginning of Aristotle's *Ethics*.[12] Thenceforth philosophy was the way of life, and the *summum bonum* was the happiness embodied in or to be attained by the wise man.[13] The latent and still unresolved contradiction between the social conception of virtue and this personal ideal of salvation and happiness is apparent already in Plato and Aristotle. The artist Plato paints the two companion pictures of the Socrates of the

1 Cf. Emerson, *Nature*, ch. ii.: 'God is the all-fair.'
2 Cic. *Lucullus*, 9, 42 f. 3 *De Leg.* i. 20.
4 *Human Understanding*, bk. ii. ch. xxi. § 55.
5 *Dissertations and Discussions*, New York, 1882, iii. 300.
6 *Sat.* II. vi. 71 ff. 8 *Ib.* i. 4, 9.
7 Cic. *de Fin.* i. 20, ii. 26.
9 The fragmentary Greek texts are most conveniently consulted in Usener's *Epicurea*, and von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1903–05. The more significant of these texts are correctly translated in R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*.
10 Epicurus in Hicks, p. 171. 11 *De Fin.* i. 10.
12 See, *e.g.*, Epicurus in Hicks, p. 172; Usener, pp. 64, 88; Cicero, *de Fin.* i. 11, ii. 7.
13 *De Fin.* ii. 4, 33; cf. i. 5.
14 *Ib.* ii. 22–24, iv. 9, v. 22. 15 *Ib.* i. 7, ii. 19, 35.
16 Emerson, 'Montaigne, or The Skeptic,' in *Representative Men*. Emerson, like Cicero, is thinking of the close of the *Philebus* or of *Republic*, 586 A; cf. *Acad.* i. 2; *de Fin.* i. 21, ii. 33: 'bestiis . . . quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis.'
17 *De Fin.* iii. 8, 22, v. 28.

1 230 E.
2 Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 11; cf. *Lucullus*, 42, *de Fin.* v. 7, *Tusc.* v. 30.
3 *De Fin.* iii. 9, iv. 11.
4 Von Arnim, i. 45; Diog. Laert. vii. 89.
5 *De Fin.* v. 11, 13. 6 *Ib.* i. 16, ii. 11, iii. 5.
7 *Ib.* iii. 5, iv. 7, v. 9.
8 Diog. Laert. vii. 94: ἐπιγεννήματα; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1174 b 32: ὡς ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος.
9 *De Fin.* iv. 12, v. 24, 30, *Tusc.* v. 17.
10 *De Fin.* iv. 11, 14 f.
11 Reconstructed from the quotations in Plato's *Gorgias*, 485 E ff.
12 1095 B 15.
13 Cf. in von Arnim, iii. 146–71, the collections 'de sapiente et insipiente.'

Symposium and the Socrates of the *Phædo* and leaves their reconciliation to the ingenuity of modern interpretation. Will the sage take part in politics? To this question of the later schools the idealist Plato answers: 'Only in the politics of his own city, the city of God.'[1] But Plato's practical decision appears in the prescription of the *Republic* that the philosopher must descend into the cave to help his fellowman,[2] in his journeys to the court of Syracuse, and in his devotion of the last years of his life to the laborious composition of the *Laws*.

In Aristotle the contradiction is disguised, but pervades the entire *Ethics*. Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue,[3] but it finally appears that there are intellectual as well as moral virtues,[4] and the highest activity is the pure contemplation of thought which the student may enjoy interruptedly and God eternally.[5] The life in accordance with ethical virtue is secondary.[6] The Stoic sage is distinguished from the Cyrenaic and Epicurean in Horace[7] by his immersion in political activities.

Chrysippus said that Aristotle's theoretic life was only a form of hedonism.[8] The literature of Stoicism harps on the word κοινωνικός, as the literature of to-day on the words 'social' and 'socialized.' And many modern critics have taken the Stoics at their own estimate and praised Stoicism on this score as against Platonism. But Cicero points out that in fact the Academy and the Lyceum were the chief schools of oratory and political science. And Seneca says epigrammatically:

'Quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, at nemo non misit.'[9]

14. Neo-Platonism.—The divorce between culture and life in the declining period of the Græco-Roman empire confirmed these tendencies, and Neo-Platonism, the predominant philosophy of the last three centuries, constructed its system and its ideal out of the eloquent passages of the *Phædo*, the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Theætetus* that preach purification from sin or sensualism, flight from the world, concentration of the mind upon itself, and assimilation of the human to the divine as the way of salvation and of good.[1] These conceptions were blended with the doctrine, derived from the Platonic *Symposium* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, of the upward striving and aspiration of all creatures towards the primal source of the good and the beautiful, God.

It is not a practicable final philosophy of the supreme human good for any race of men in whom the will to live persists. It is only the beautiful legacy which the dying philosophy of Greece bequeathed to the idealism and the religious poetry of the world:

'If, in the silent mind of One all-pure,
At first imagined lay
The sacred world;

. . . . . .

O waking on a world which thus-wise springs!
. . . O waking on life's stream!
By lonely pureness to the all-pure fount
(Only by this thou canst) the colour'd dream
Of life remount!'[2]

With this poetic interpretation of Matthew Arnold we may compare the last words of Plotinus' *Enneades*, φυγή, with Plato, *Theæt.* 176 B, φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, and with the closing words of Emerson's last essay, 'Illusions,' in his *Conduct of Life*: 'They alone with him alone.' But the final good of Plato and of Greece in her prime is rather that of Tennyson's *Ancient Sage*:

'Let be thy wail
And help thy fellow men.'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

PAUL SHOREY

SUN, MOON, AND STARS.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introduction).—In every quarter of the globe the star-studded heavens have attracted the attention and challenged the scrutiny of mankind. Very especially was this the case in the low-lying plain of Babylonia, with its pellucid atmosphere, and hence the study of astrology and astronomy, while practically universal, reached a remarkably high stage of development in that region. On the one hand, the fixed stars, of various degrees of brilliance, are ranged immovably in groups that stamp themselves upon the visual organs; while, on the other, the moon, the sun, and the five visible planets seem to be constantly changing their respective positions. Such phenomena were interpreted by primitive man in a subjective and anthropomorphic fashion, and his notions regarding them were still in vogue when genuine scientific inquiry entered the field, so that until about 1500 A.D. astrology and astronomy remained an inextricable mass of confusion.

1. The seven planets.—In the northern regions of the Old World every object was regarded by the primitive mind not merely as personal, but also as sexual. In the north-east the twin concepts of *Yang* and *Yin* long survived amongst the Chinese as a philosophical formula, classifying all existing things as male (= good) or female (= evil). Persian dualism retains the twofold principle in its most incisive form. In the Middle Ages, Christian ideas were for a time excessively influenced by the antithesis of God and Satan, though here the sexual dichotomy characteristic of the primitive mind has disappeared.

Now this tendency of the aboriginal mind towards sexual personification left some of its earliest deposits upon the observation and study of the stars. Even the simplest observations of the planetary movements brought to light the striking fact that

[1] *Rep.* 592 A B.
[2] *Ib.* 529 E, 519 B. The ingenious suggestion that this is the Orphic καράβασις exemplifies again the danger of over-stressing Plato's imagery as against his meanings.
[3] 1102 a 5 ff.
[4] 1103 a 5, *Ethics*, bk. vi.; Plato, *Rep.* 518 D E.
[5] 1177 a 12, 1178 b, *de Cœlo*, 292 a 22.
[6] 1178 a 9.
[7] *Ep.* i. i. 16 *f.*
[8] Hicks, p. 54.
[9] *De Tranquillitate Animi*, i. 7.

[1] On this aspect of Plato's own philosophy *cf.* E. Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, p. 440 ff., and O. Apelt, *Platonische Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 147 ff., 'Der Wert des Lebens.'
[2] Matthew Arnold, 'In Utrumque Paratus' (*Poems*, ed. London, 1881, i. 70).

the elongations of the two inferior planets, Mercury and Venus, never reached beyond a certain limit, and that these bodies traversed the zodiac as if held within the magic circle of the sun. The moon and the three superior planets were less restricted in their motions. It was therefore quite in keeping with the imaginative and symbolizing proclivity of the primitive intellect to represent the Sun, Mercury, and Venus as a family, travelling, in relatively close company, like nomads in the ecliptic. Of this family the Sun came to be regarded as the father, Venus as the mother, and Mercury as their son. The other planets were looked upon as mere vagrant males, who on occasion, however, might act as a disturbing influence in the union of the Sun and Venus.

In speculations of a still earlier period it was the sun and moon alone that formed the marriage relationship, the sun being usually the husband and the moon the wife; only in exceptional cases were the positions reversed. Occasionally, too, the relations between sun and moon were represented as homosexual and pederastic. But in the ancient Orient and in Egypt the septet of planets had already attained to such prominence in comparison with the two greater luminaries that the idea of a marriage between sun and moon hardly left a trace behind.

Even in the most remote ages the periods of revolution peculiar to the several planets had been studied, with results which led to their being arranged in the following sequence (with the earth, of course, at the centre of the universe)—Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. The sun's superiority in size was enough of itself to give him the median position. The planets named before the sun alternated as morning and evening stars, or in other ways; and of the twofold characteristic thus exhibited one aspect might be regarded as good and the other as evil. The three last-named, or exterior, planets formed a triad by themselves, and they appeared to the observer as less under the control of the sun than his own family or the moon. The middle place amongst them was occupied by Jupiter, who might thus be deemed their king; and the king as such, according to Oriental ideas, was good. But as the sun, the giver of life and light, was likewise good, it followed that Mars and Saturn must be evil—by the principle of alternation, namely, which is even yet resorted to, as, *e.g.*, in the counting of one's coat-buttons, in ideas about even and odd, and in other primitive superstitions. Mars with his relatively short period of revolution became the youthful turbulent demon, while the slowly-revolving Saturn was figured as the hoary-headed begetter of evil.

Not only, however, do men look upwards towards the planets, but the planets themselves look downwards upon men and events on the earth. They were even supposed to impress their own characters upon earthly affairs, intervening therein as their nature prompted. In the case of the sun and the moon such action was obvious to all, and by analogy it was attributed to the other five planets as well. These ideas were so simple and natural that, at the time when, in the oldest civilized lands, such as Babylonia and Egypt, the earliest scientific observations and records of the planetary motions were collected, they had permeated all study of the subject. The consequence was that these naive ideas continued to mingle with the subsequent results of genuine astronomical inquiry.

Aboriginal man came upon a fresh vein of ideas when he divined a mutual connexion between the lustre of the stars and that of the metals. The metals with which he was acquainted being precisely seven in number, it was natural to associate with them, not the fixed stars, but the seven planets. The parallels were as follows: the Sun with gold, the Moon with silver, Mars with iron, Mercury with quicksilver, Jupiter with tin, Venus with copper, and Saturn with lead. Hence in mediæval, and even until modern, times, the metals were indicated by the planetary symbols. Then alchemy attached special symbols to other substances; and as alchemy and astrology were intimately connected with each other throughout their entire course, it may be well to give a list of the symbols used by alchemists in the Middle Ages:—

☉ gold, ☾ silver, ♂ iron, ☿ quicksilver, ♃ tin, ♀ copper, ♄ lead, ♂ antimony, ♆ lime, ♎ sulphur, ♕ tartar, ⊖ salt, ⦶ saltpetre, ⦶ sulphuric acid, ✻ ammonia, ⌒ distillate and sublimate, ⌣ precipitate. As will be shown in dealing with the horoscope, the symbols of the four traditional elements were derived from the two 'houses' known as ὑπόγειον and μεσουράνημα respectively.

We have thus sketched the main lines of thought by which the planets came to have their particular significance in astrological speculation. More remote considerations must here be left aside. Suffice it to say that, in the final scheme of astrology, Mercury became the lord of wisdom, cunning, artifice, and craft, and was likewise bi-sexual; Venus became the lady of love; Mars, the lord of war and violence generally; Jupiter, the ruler of gods and men; Saturn, the lord of cruelty and truculence. The Sun, Jupiter, and Saturn were propitious by day, and the Moon, Mars, and Venus by night. The planets infected with their own qualities such as were born under their influence, but in certain situations their normal action might be completely reversed.

2. The ecliptic and the zodiac.—Civilized man is still affected by the variation of times and seasons, and in a yet higher degree this was the case with primitive man. The latter could hardly remain inattentive to changes of temperature and weather in their connexion with day and night, or with summer and winter, or, again, with the varying position of the sun in the sky. In his ingathering of marine products for daily food and his cruising expeditions off the coast he became aware of the connexion between the ebb and flow of the sea and the course of the moon. His interest in the chase and his sexual relations obliged him to take notice of the fluctuating brightness of the moon by night. He noted that the period of menstruation coincided with that of a lunar revolution. In the life of primitive man, accordingly, there was no concern of importance but was somehow related to the movements of the sun or the moon. As soon, however, as the planets came to be regarded as endowed with personality, the interventions of sun and moon in human affairs began to be thought of as the conscious and voluntary actions of higher beings, whose purpose it was to bring the fortunes of nations, monarchs, and individual human beings into continuous correlation with their own particular activities in the higher sphere.

The planets Venus and Mercury, being represented as respectively the wife and the son of the sun, must inevitably, according to human notions, exert an influence upon the actions of the being personified as husband and father. But, this being so, it was impossible to leave Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn out of account. Now these five smaller planets, equally with the larger two, confined their movements to a certain narrow belt of the firmament. The only difference between the circular paths of the sun and the moon and the

paths of the smaller planets is that the latter exhibit certain peculiar convolutions, which were called epicycles, and may be illustrated by a curved line as follows: . The orbits of the sun and the moon, no doubt, also showed many deviations from the path of simple revolution about the observer's own point of view. But the only change which a dweller upon the earth could discern in the smaller planets was the shifting of their several positions among the fixed stars, and their concomitant variations in apparent magnitude. Investigation of these planets, therefore, did not reach beyond investigation of their paths in the firmament.

After sunset about one-half of all the stars are visible. The great mass of these lie in the broad equatorial girdle of the heavens between the sun and a point 180° E. of the sun. The lines bounding the stars of the circumpolar vault and those of the southern hemisphere are not constant, but fluctuate inversely. The stars, however, that come into consideration in regard to the planetary orbits travel from east to west, passing below the horizon one after another, so that just before sunrise the other half of the stars, *i.e.* those lying between the sun and 180° W., are within the field of view. Thus, an examination of the sky made twice in one night, viz. shortly after sunset and shortly before sunrise, will embrace practically every important phenomenon in the starry heavens. These accordingly were the two times of astronomical observation to which prime importance was ascribed throughout antiquity, and into relation with which all observations were brought.

In the course of one night, then, primitive man could see almost all the stars visible in our latitude. One of the few exceptions was formed by the stars which happened to be situated in the sun's meridian for the time being. Their light was lost in the sun's beams, and they were meanwhile invisible. After sunset and before sunrise, moreover, there was a short period of twilight, causing a degree of obscuration such that brighter stars remained visible only when they were over 12°, and fainter stars only when over 15°, E. or W. of the sun. In virtue of the sun's movement in the zodiac, the observer of the morning and the evening sky might witness the following phenomenon. On a particular evening of the year a star, especially one situated in the zodiacal belt, would be visible for a few minutes after sunset, and on the following evening be seen no more. Now, such a star remained invisible for a certain time every year, and the astrologer spoke of it as being 'combust,' *i.e.* dissolved in the overpowering beams of the sun. Then, after a period of 24 to 30 days, according to its brilliance, the same star reappeared shortly before sunrise. The star's disappearance from the evening sky in the west was termed its heliacal setting, and its reappearance in the morning sky to the east its heliacal rising.

In the astrology and astronomy of both East and West throughout the entire ancient era the heliacal rising of various groups of stars was carefully noted, and employed in registering the date of events. So far, the earliest known instance of this, found more than once in historical records, is the heliacal rising of Sirius, the of the Egyptians, which was pronounced Σῶθις, and translated τὸ ἄστρον τὸ τῆς Ἴσιος, by the Greeks. By this means, long before the building of the pyramids, was indicated the beginning of the sidereal year, as well as a particular era of about 1500 years, at the end of which the first day of the sidereal year coincided with that of the tropical year. Half-way through the period of invisibility the star and the sun lie in the same meridian. The corresponding proximity of a star to any of the planets but the sun is called a conjunction, and every conjunction was astrologically of great importance. But when the sun is one of the coincident pair, the occurrence is known as the cosmical rising of the star in question. It is to this cosmical rising, not as in ancient times to the heliacal rising, that special prominence is attached by modern scientific astronomy.

The Egyptian sacred year was subsequently adopted by the Romans as the Julian year, with the intercalation of a day in every fourth year. This computation allowed for the fact that the sun seems to move forward some $\frac{1}{365}$ of his orbit every day. This might have suggested a division of the ecliptic into 365 parts, only a trifling error being thus involved. What was actually done, however, was to divide the great circle into 360 parts, involving a still larger error of adjustment. The calculation of the yearly period and its division into twelve months—of which we shall treat more fully below—together with many other things, were thereby greatly simplified. But the sun's orbit of 360 degrees, with a day for each degree, left some 5¼ days of every year out of account. Now we still speak of a summer solstice and a winter solstice, meaning thereby the two points at which the sun reaches his greatest declination north and south respectively. Originally, however, the residual 5¼ days were divided between the two solstices, the sun being actually represented as pausing in his declination, so that he could still traverse the 360 degrees of the ecliptic in 360 days. In the ancient Egyptian calendar this whole redundant period was transferred to the time just anterior to the heliacal rising of Sirius, five days being inserted in ordinary, and six in leap (or temple) years. In the early Roman calendar the intercalation was made at the winter solstice. To the Babylonian calendar, which, with a displacement of the year's beginning, is still in use as the Jewish calendar, we must return when we deal with lunar computations. Be it noted here, however, that for astrological and astronomical purposes the Babylonians placed the compensatory interval for the most part at the beginning of spring, but sometimes at the beginning of autumn.

The time at which this yearly intercalation was made was dependent in the main upon the fixing of the zero meridian in the movable vault of heaven. The points through which this zero line might be conveniently drawn were, of course, many. Once it was fixed, astronomy and calendar were brought into harmony, and a definite instant established for commencing the day. The Babylonians began the day with sunrise, and the year with the spring equinox, thus placing the zero of the ecliptic upon the first point of Aries. Among the Jews the day began with sunset, and the civil year with the autumn equinox; and, had the Jews studied astronomy independently, they would have drawn the zero of the ecliptic through Libra. In the early Roman, as in our modern, calendar the day is reckoned from midnight, and the year from the winter solstice; here, therefore, the zero would lie in the first point of Capricornus. The Romans, however, as classical writers inform us, borrowed their astronomy and astrology from Babylonia, and accordingly it is the Babylonian zero point that is found among the Romans, as also in later developments, and even in the astronomy of the present day. The Egyptians dated their year from the rise of the Nile on the 19th of July, and the corresponding zero meridian passed through Sirius. With this, however, the beginning of the day did not harmonize, for, according to notices found in the Mantelpaviane and other hieroglyphic texts,

the Egyptian day was reckoned from sunrise. This dislocation likewise is probably due to Babylonian influence of a very remote date.

We have seen that the ecliptic, and indeed the circle generally, was divided into 360 degrees, to correspond approximately with the sun's daily change of position among the stars throughout one year. These divisions, however, were found inconveniently small, and the ecliptic was then portioned out into constellations, each having an arc of 30 degrees, and three subdivisions of 10 degrees, or decanates. This division came about in two ways. In the first place, at any given time something like one-twelfth of the ecliptic was 'combust'; and, secondly, each of these twelfths was traversed by the sun in about the same time as the moon required for one complete revolution. In this way the annual course of the sun was furnished with the 12 zodiacal signs of the ecliptic. Moreover, in the earliest times the synodical period of the moon was divided into three, viz. waxing, dominant, and waning moon, and this division was adhered to by later astrology. Now to each of these synodical thirds of the moon's course corresponded a movement of the sun extending to some 10 degrees, and thus in time arose the division of the ecliptic into 36 decanates.

The trisection of the moon's period just noted probably led in very remote times to the institution of weeks of ten and five days. It does not appear, however, from what we have so far learned of ancient Eastern history, that these measurements had any practical significance. It was only in astrology and astro-mythology, with its historical legends, that the 36 decanates (or the 72 semi-decanates) were actually made use of. This chronometry, no less than that explained above, was in vogue throughout Babylonia and Egypt, if not elsewhere. A final vestige thereof was the Egyptian practice of assigning 401 *ushabti* for the dead—365 for the days of the year and 36 as guardians for the ten-day weeks. In astrology of the higher type, to the time of Kepler, calculations were made by means of the degree and, above all, of the decanate; and the moon from her tenth to her twentieth day was always spoken of as being in her domain. In general, however, the method of reckoning which superseded all others, for both astronomical observation and astrological interpretation, was that of the well-known 12 zodiacal signs, although these were variously designated in the several civilized lands of antiquity. It likewise forms the foundation of the Babylonian scheme of months, as appears from the following parallelism: Libra, *taśritu* (Bab.), Tishri (Heb.), followed by Scorpio, *araḫ-samna* (Bab.), Marcheshvan (Heb.); then Sagittarius, *kislimu* (Bab.), Kislev (Heb.), etc. The names of the months were also indicative of their meteorological conditions; thus, *e.g.*, the winter rainy season was symbolized by Capricornus (originally the marine animal *Hippocampus guttulatus*), Aquarius, and Pisces, all in some way connected with water.

Here, moreover, we again meet with the practice of portioning out good and evil, or rather male and female, alternately. Astrologically the zero point of this distribution lay between Cancer and Leo, approximating, therefore, to that of the Egyptian Sirius-year. Leo, Libra, and Sagittarius came to be regarded as male; Virgo, Scorpio, and Capricornus as female. It is worthy of remark that as a result of this law of alternation the astrologer was actually forced for thousands of years to speak of Taurus as feminine. Then the constellations of the zodiac were also allotted severally to the planets; thus Cancer was assigned to the moon, Leo to the sun, Gemini and Virgo to Mercury, Taurus and Libra to Venus, Aries and Scorpio to Mars, Sagittarius and Pisces to Jupiter, and Capricornus and Aquarius to Saturn. The particular planet was called the 'lord of the mansion' belonging to its respective sign or signs. Tradition tells us, however, that there were other 'gods (or lords) of the mansion.' Those of the Egyptians have been transmitted to us not only by the reports of Marcus Manilius, but also by an almanac notice found in the Ebers Papyrus; some of their names likewise survive in the Coptic designations of the months. A comparison of the various lists shows us that in the course of thousands of years the tradition remained unaltered, though in that of Manilius there is a dislocation to the extent of one zodiacal sign.

The ecliptic of the sun is traversed approximately also by the moon, and in relation to the latter it was measured by a unit of the sun's course, viz. the arc described by the moon in one day. In order to correspond, therefore, with the moon's period of 28 days, the ecliptic was divided afresh into 28 lunar stations. But as the sun, during the moon's sidereal period, has moved onward by about two lunar stations, astrological calculation assumed a period of about 30 lunar stations, *i.e.* the time between one new moon and another, as the measure of a month. In order to delimit these stations, however, the astrologer did not portion out the ecliptic in a fresh series of constellations, but distinguished each of the 28 by a dominant star in the ecliptic. In contradistinction to the older method of dividing the 30 days of the moon's synodical period in three, there arose subsequently the plan of dividing its sidereal period in four. Once in each of these quarters each of the seven planets was recognized as the lord of a lunar station, the order of sequence being the same as that in which, in the horoscope of the hours, the planets became lords of the ascendant at sunrise.[1] Thus came about the division of the sidereal month of 28 days into four weeks of 7 days, with Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn as successive lords of the lunar stations in each week. This astrological scheme of naming the days of the week after the rulers of the lunar stations still survives throughout Christendom, while, on the other hand, the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments entirely avoid the use of such designations, distinguishing the days of the week by ordinal numbers alone.

The various locations of the five smaller planets were usually designated by the 12 zodiacal signs into which the sun's path is divided, as is specially shown in regard to Egypt by the Berlin Demotic Papyrus, p. 8279.

3. Spherical astronomy and the astrological houses. — Observations of the astral motions within the scope of natural vision are designated spherical, and when these have been duly adjusted they are, by way of contrast, called cosmical, while the actual occurrences themselves are spoken of as sidereal. Modern scientific astronomy likewise must always take the direct spherical observations as its starting-point, only then proceeding to elaborate its way towards the higher levels of knowledge. The astrology and astronomy of the ancient world never got beyond the spherical stage. Hence it was necessary from the outset to lay down fixed bearings for observational purposes, such as would be furnished by two lines, one run-

[1] If we take the planets, therefore, in the reverse order of their propinquity to the earth, viz. Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon, and suppose that each planet in turn presides over an hour of the day, then, if, *e.g.*, Saturn presides over the first hour of a particular day, he will also preside over the 8th, 15th, and 22nd hours; the 23rd hour accordingly will fall to Jupiter, the 24th to Mars, and the 1st hour of the new day to the Sun: hence Saturday is followed by Sunday, and so on.

ning east and west, the other north and south, through the observer's own position.

In connexion with nearly all ancient systems of religion are found sacred edifices of great age whose longitudinal axes lie exactly east and west. The determination of this east and west line, *i.e.* the parallel of latitude, was thus one of the early triumphs of the human mind. The oldest known instrument employed for the purpose was the stile, which afterwards developed into the gnomon of the sun-dial, and, indeed, the sun-dial itself. The stile was a vertical shaft fixed in the centre of a circle. In the morning, and again in the evening, the shadow of the pillar extended a considerable distance beyond the circle, while for an hour or two before, as also for an hour or two after, midday the extremity of the shadow lay within the circle. It was necessary, therefore, to mark the two points at which the shadow, forenoon and afternoon, terminated precisely upon the circle. The straight line joining these two points supplied an accurate east and west alignment, which could thus be secured on any sunny day at any season of the year. The use of the gnomon, in some form or another, seems to be common to primitive and the older civilized peoples.

Simple trial and observation showed that a stationary point was to be found in the north pole of the firmament and the star lying nearest to it. The direction of the meridian line through any given point of observation could then be ascertained by the following expedient. Two horoscopers stood face to face upon a line lying roughly north and south. The observer on the south, holding up before him the split rib of a palm leaf, moved it into such a position as enabled him through the fissure to see the pole star directly above the crown of his companion's head. Then the observer on the north, looking through the slit, saw all the then culminating stars from the southern point of the horizon upwards, and in this way projected his meridian upon the celestial vault.

The east and west points of the horizon, and the meridian of the observer, having been ascertained, the earliest facts of observation regarding the paths of the planets could be brought into relation therewith. The fixed stars, indeed, never varying in their positions relative to one another, also rose and set at constant distances from the east and west points respectively. On the other hand, the sun, the moon, and the five smaller planets rose and set at points never twice the same successively, and sometimes north, sometimes south, of due east and west. As regards the sun, the most northerly point of his rising and setting was reached as he entered Cancer, and the most southerly as he entered Capricorn, while his rising and setting were due east and due west respectively twice a year, viz. as he entered Aries and Libra. The extreme limits of his northward and southward movements in the ecliptic were called the tropical points, and the two constellations concerned came to be known in astrology and astronomy as the tropical constellations of the zodiac. Corresponding results were established with reference to the other planets.

But there is likewise an apparent daily revolution of fixed stars and planets alike around the position of the observer, each of them crossing his meridian once in every 24 hours; while if they lie in the equatorial circle the intersection takes place exactly 6 hours after they rise in the east, and 6 hours before they set in the west. Hence the observer's celestial equator, too, is always laid out in 12 segments corresponding to the 12 constellations of the zodiac; and if we disregard the sun's daily eastward movement of one degree, we find that every two hours the zodiac changes its position relatively to the equator by one whole zodiacal sign of 30 degrees. Now the intermediate positions of the signs during these two hours being left out of account, the observer's celestial equator was once for all divided into 12 apparently stationary parts, each of these having its own meridian. The illustration below shows an equatorial section traversing the horizon and the celestial sphere. These parts were called 'houses,' and all the conditions found within them were treated as if stationed in their respective middle lines. Now, as the enumeration of the houses began in the east, and then proceeded downwards under the eastern horizon, *i.e.* according to the order in which the phenomena of each successive house would appear above that horizon, the due east point fell exactly in the middle of the first house, the due west point in that of the seventh, the meridian in that of the



tenth, and the opposite meridian in that of the fourth. All primitive astronomical and astrological study of the sky was occupied, and indeed necessarily occupied, with the rising, culmination, and setting of the heavenly bodies, with the passage of planets, normal stars, and constellations from one house to another, and with the mutual positions of the planets as measured by the houses they happened to occupy at any given time.

It would appear that these houses were sometimes divided in two, as, *e.g.*, in Egypt in the time of King Seti; and this led quite naturally to the division of the day into 24 hours, and eventually to the arrangement of the dial-plate of our clocks. For more exact observations, however, each house was subdivided into three decanates, and each decanate into ten degrees, the advantage of this being that the sphere of the observer had the same number of parts as the ecliptic, while the boundary lines defining the parts of each coincided every four minutes.

This method of parcelling out the sun's apparent daily course must have been instituted at a very remote period, in an age indeed when the astronomer had not yet grasped the idea of a circular orbit, but still thought of the solar path as a square. In



the figure representing the horoscope this quadrate form was retained, and it has remained in use till modern times, and, in fact, till the present day. To this method of delineating the stellar paths in

the horoscope by means of the square we shall frequently have occasion to return, as a considerable number of symbols relating to God and the world were evolved therefrom. In interpreting the horoscope the various positions were so far as possible brought into relation with the first house, and with the latter as starting-point the astrologer, applying the principle of even and odd as in the case of the exterior planets, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, alternately assigned to the other houses an essential character of benefit or bane. Thus the twelfth house was unfavourable, the eleventh favourable, the tenth—apart from its special position—unfavourable, the ninth favourable, the eighth supremely unfavourable, and so with the rest. This mode of interpretation was also arrived at along another line of thought, and, being thus supported by two ostensible proofs, it was believed to be established beyond dispute. The second proof in question was that supplied by the 'aspects,' of which we shall treat presently.

The plan of indicating position by means of zodiacal signs and houses could at best give approximate results. For the sake of simplicity it was assumed that the boundary lines of the several signs always coincided with those of the several houses, and that accordingly at the end of a Babylonian double-hour each sign moved instantaneously into another house, whose number was one less than that of the house which it had vacated. For all further deductions within the limits of plane geometry, the entire contents of any particular zodiacal sign were regarded as concentrated in the middle point of the sign and the house then congruent therewith.

The enumeration of the astrological houses from the east downwards towards the west, then eastwards again above the horizon, so that account is first of all taken of the invisible regions of the stellar heavens, had its origin in the fact that the attention of the astrologer was primarily directed towards the rising of the stars, and accordingly the houses were numbered in the order in which the stars contained in them at any given time would reach the eastern horizon and become visible.

4. Aspects.—The term 'aspects' was used in astrology to denote the relative positions of the houses and zodiacal signs, or of the stars situated in the houses at any given time. Planets in the same sign and the same house were said to be in conjunction; planets in opposite signs and houses, in opposition. The other possible relations amongst the celestial phenomena were defined with reference to regular inscribed polygons. Thus, if a planet were situated in the twelfth or the second house, then the line joining the middle point of either of these houses and that of the first house would form one side of a regular inscribed dodecagon; in

which case the planet in question was said to be in dodecagonal aspect to the east point, or 'horoscope' in the original sense. As in the same way planets in the eleventh and third houses furnished the side of a regular hexagon, their aspect towards the east or the horoscope was spoken of as sextile. Similarly planets in the tenth and fourth houses were in quartile or square, and those in the ninth and fifth were in trine. The line joining the middle point of the eighth or the sixth house with the east point was not a constituent part of any regular figure within the circle, and suggested at best a cross dodecagon, formed thus, which was regarded as the violation of all order. But as conjunction and opposition were reckoned amongst the regular aspects, the eighth was the only visible house having no aspect towards the horoscope. The principle of alternate numeration likewise pronounced this house unfavourable. In the astrological application of spherical astronomy it therefore signified the house of death.

Prior to the stage now reached, the exclusive concern of the astronomer had been to map out the heavens with such precision as would enable him to fix his observations by means of a verbal record. His conception of aspects, however, *i.e.* of the relations of the stellar positions to the horoscope, led him to assign values to the stellar positions themselves, and as soon as these came to be represented as anthropocentric or concentric, the initiative was given to the science of Judicial Astrology. Nevertheless we must emphasize the fact that the original scheme of the horoscope was depicted as a square, and that, before it became possible for astrology to speak of regular polygons, the conception of the sun's apparent diurnal motion as a circle must have come to the front. Thus the very language of astrology shows it to have been a kind of excrescence, not inherently connected with astronomy at all. Even in the Middle Ages a distinction was still maintained between Natural Astrology and Positive Astrology. The former dealt with the actual, and especially the baneful, influence of the planets upon meteorological changes—wind, storm, hurricane, thunder, flood, and earthquake. It was accordingly bound up with the naive and fantastic weather-lore of primitive man, and is to some extent still in evidence in scientific meteorology. In regard to the latter it is even yet frequently true that *sub iudice lis est*.

Positive or Judicial Astrology, on the other hand, was concerned from the earliest times with the supposed influences of the planets upon the fortunes of men and nations. It is now regarded by all sober minds as an extravagance of the human intellect, as something that the race has finally left behind. In Judicial Astrology it was no longer merely the aspect of a star to the horoscope, *i.e.* the east point, that was specified and appraised, but also the aspect of two planets with respect to each other. If one planet, for example, was situated in the eleventh house and another in the eighth, the two were said to be mutually in quartile. Here again, moreover, we find the alternate distribution of good and evil: conjunction was good; adjacent aspect or aspect in dodecagon was evil; sextile was good; quartile relatively evil; trine specially good; absence of regular aspect was specially evil, and opposition relatively good.

Since the line between the eighth or the sixth house and the east point did not form the side of a regular inscribed polygon, these two houses were deemed of inferior value. For the anthropocentric mind of the astrologer it was therefore a short step to regard them as houses of misfortune. The eighth house thus became the house of death, and the sixth the house of pains. We shall see later that in the reciprocal relations between the macrocosm and the microcosm the left arm became a synonym for the house of death and the left leg for the house of pains, and that in consequence these bodily parts themselves came to be regarded as of evil omen.

As emphasis was laid likewise upon the mutual correspondence of east and west—an idea that was corroborated by the principle of alternate numbering—the twelfth and second houses were counted

unfavourable. In primitive plane geometry the inscribed triangle and hexagon were deemed pre-eminently regular figures, and once more the alternate enumeration gave the same result. Consequently the eleventh, ninth, fifth, and third houses were reckoned favourable; while the tenth and fourth, again, were relatively evil. These symbolical interpretations, however, were sometimes set aside, sometimes even reversed, especially those connected with the invisible half of the sky.

The tenth house, as that in which the stars culminated, was supposed, by a very natural symbolism, to preside over dignities and offices, while the fourth house, lying directly beneath us, came in similar fashion to be associated with parents and ancestors, as those who had passed into the under world, and inferentially with all the other ties of kinship. On the ground of a certain analogy with the eighth house, *i.e.* that of death, the twelfth became the house of enmity (κακοδαίμων), and, by a further analogy, the second became the house of poverty. As the second house, however, was situated in the sky belonging to the under world and therefore opposite to ours, it became the house of fortune and riches, and for the same reason the sixth house, that of pains (or, according to another interpretation, that of service), became the house of health. Next to the house of death came the ninth as the house of the tutelary deity, while the eleventh, adjacent to the house of enmity, became that of friendship (ἀγαθοδαίμων). On the ground of similar considerations the third became the house of brothers, and the fifth the house of children. Finally, as the first house was specially associated with the querent of the astrological oracle, the seventh belonged to the querent's counterpart, *i.e.* in the ordinary course of things, wife or husband.

The designations of the various houses were therefore as follows: (1) life, (2) riches, (3) brothers, (4) parents, (5) children, (6) health, (7) marriage, (8) death, (9) religion, (10) dignities, (11) friendship, and (12) enmity. But this arrangement gave only the general scheme of astrological prognostication, and in the course of thousands of years various changes were introduced. Our information regarding any particular era of astrological speculation is defective, and we speak only in a general sense when we assert that from first to last the system detailed above remained essentially unchanged. It was all along recognized, moreover, that the scheme must be specially adjusted to special circumstances. Thus in the case of sickness the real querent was the invalid himself, and it was about him, therefore, that the first house supplied information. The counterpart was meanwhile not the wife, but the disease itself, upon which accordingly light was cast by the seventh house. The tenth house, in which the stars culminated over the patient, symbolized the physician, while the fourth, lying directly beneath in the under world, signified medicine. Account was also taken, of course, of the eighth house as the house of death, and of the sixth as the house of health. The houses of friendship, enmity, riches, brothers, and children were not supposed to wield any influence upon the course of the disease. Nor was much importance attached, in such cases, to the symbolism of the sun's planetary family; and, in fact, according to Greek accounts of Egyptian astrology, neither Venus nor Mercury was taken into consideration at all.

5. The astrological conception of the world.—The enormous advances that have been made within modern times in the study and practical application of the natural sciences, as well as the great contrast that obtains between the ancient and the modern scientific point of view, are matters of common knowledge. It is impossible to understand the theories of nature held by the ancients without a clear conception of the difference between their fundamental standpoint and our own. According to the older view of the world, which can be traced backwards for 5000 years before Christ, and which still held unquestioned sway for 1000 years after Christ, all natural objects issued in parallel lines from certain primary causes of universal operation. Modern science, on the other hand, assumes that the various groups of physical phenomena proceed by differentiation from certain primordial forms. While the ancients, therefore, looked upon the diversity of things as original, and their common elements as due to external influences, the moderns assume that the properties which objects have in common are inherited from a single primary form, and that their differences have been produced by external conditions, such as, *e.g.*, the struggle for existence.

The two conceptions, however, are not held stringently apart, nor does history show a rigid line of demarcation between the later and the earlier. Even in Genesis (10[12f.]), for instance, we have a table of nations which stands in complete agreement with the modern point of view, more particularly in the circumstance that it traces back the ancestry of all mankind in a series of converging lines. Much more in accordance with the ancient conception, on the other hand, is the Greek Deluge-story of Deucalion, according to which human beings were generated spontaneously from stones acted upon by the formative powers present in the air.

The theory of parallel processes may be called the 'ancient astrological,' or, again, the 'Oriental astrological' view of the universe. It had its birth amongst the early civilizations of the East, and its leading science was astrology; nor is it yet a spent force among certain Asiatic peoples of to-day. Now even our modern science, with its discovery of steam-power and its remarkable utilization of electricity, does not enter so profoundly into contemporary experience as did the ancient astrological conception into the life, thought, and feeling of the distant past.

Perhaps the most effective resistance to the more harmful issues of the astrological theory of the universe was made by the peoples living around the Mediterranean. But the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are likewise free from the evil outgrowths of that view. Nevertheless, we must remember that even the Biblical writers were children of their time, and could therefore hardly avoid expressing their thoughts in terms of the recognized philosophy of their age. Hence, just as we have come to recognize that the thorough-going study of Biblical Hebrew cannot dispense with the philological investigation of Arabic, Ethiopic, Babylonian, Syriac, etc., so we are now beginning to realize the impossibility of understanding the tenor of Biblical modes of expression apart from a knowledge of the astrological conception of the world common to the Babylonian, the Egyptian, and other ancient civilizations.

We must again refer to the square form of the horoscope, as furnishing the ground-plan of this theory of the world. The figure shows us the link which the theory had with astrology, and also with other two occult sciences, viz. Alchemy and the Kabbala.

It is of interest to note that the symbols used in astrology for the four cardinal points were simply the triangles corresponding to the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth houses respectively. But while, according to the expedient already noticed (p. 52[a]), the positions of the stars in the ecliptic were determined by the observer on the north, the fixing of the cardinal points was effected by his fellow on the south. The horoscope was therefore seen by the latter from the opposite point of view, and the

four houses in question took a reverse form, so that △ came to mean north, ▽ south, ▷ east, and ◁ west. With this exception, however, all further inferences were drawn from the proper form of the horoscope, i.e. from the figure it presented to the observer on the north.



The tenth house, as the *summum cœlum*, and the fourth, as the *imum cœlum*, embraced everything in the world above and the world below respectively. The upper world as a whole, however, consists of the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth houses. In the hieroglyphic script of Egypt, accordingly, heaven is represented by the exterior boundary of these five houses, thus:  , which, of course, according to the Egyptian practice in such matters, is only a contour, and really stands for  . The same proportions and angles are likewise retained in the Egyptian representation of the goddess of heaven, who broods over the earth-god—a phenomenon which will meet us again when we treat of Egypt. The under world was represented, of course, by the same figure inverted. Now we find two different ideas attaching to each of the houses numbered ten and four. According to one conception the *summum cœlum* contains the heavenly upper ocean, from which rain falls (אֲרֻבֹּת הַשָּׁמַיִם in the Biblical narrative of the Deluge), while the *imum cœlum* embraces both the ocean of the under world and the subterranean water from which the fountains of the deep are fed (מַעְיְנוֹת תְּהוֹם; also the sources of the Nile in Herodotus). According to the other conception there lies above us first of all air, then fire; and beneath us, first earth, then water.

Now the latter theory furnished also the alchemistic symbols of the elements—symbols which are still written by doctors in old-fashioned mysterious receipts, and were in common use among physicians and apothecaries a hundred years ago. Thus, for example, ▽*sigill.* signified *terra sigillata*; *lumbric.* ▽*restr.*=*lumbrici terrestres*; ▽*flor.* ⊙*rant.*=*aqua florum aurantiorum*; or something was to be boiled *leni* △, *i.e.* *leni calore*. Distilled alcoholic liquors were known as 'burnt water,' and were denoted by a combination of the symbols for water and fire, thus  . To this day the device  displayed upon rustic inns indicates the licence to sell brandy.



This combined symbol  was used not only in alchemy but also in the Kabbala, where it represented the Star of David. It became, in fact, a symbol for God (just as the fire-eye, *i.e.*  , was employed in Christian symbolism to signify the Holy Spirit); for, by the rules of the Kabbala, the combination of the principal consonants of אֵשׁ ('fire') and מַיִם ('water') yielded the word שָׁמַיִם ('heaven'), which in its turn was the cabalistic equivalent of אֱלֹהִים ('God'). Thus the term God could be expressed by the secret sign  as the synthesis of fire and water. In the synagogue all pictorial representation of God was forbidden, nor was it allowable to give utterance to the tetragram יהוה unless absolutely necessary. In the same way, therefore, as the word אדוני had to be resorted to as the oral designation of God, the symbol  came to be used in the architecture of the synagogue as His graphic designation. This figure, moreover, not only contains within itself the symbols of the four elements, interlaced with one another, but, besides the upper and lower triangles signifying fire and water respectively, it also shows four extra-mundane triangles, which could thus be regarded on cabalistic principles as metaphysically symbolizing the four consonants of the tetragram. Hence, even in passages of ancient Christian works where we might expect some such phrase as 'with God,' we actually find the cabalistic device  signifying יהוה.

According to the astrological theory of the world, however, not only the perpendicular section through the universe, but the surface of the earth itself, was thought of as quadrate, since the cube, as the ideal geometrical figure, was the accepted symbol of the world as a whole. This idea finds



frequent expression even in later cabalistic writings treating of the origin of salt, which, of course, also crystallizes in cubes. The scheme of the horoscope, accordingly, became a comprehensive map of the world as well. As previously explained in

connexion with the points of the compass, the horoscope was in this case constructed, as it were, from the opposite point of view. In the centre was the navel of the world, which every nation sought to claim for its own territory, and as the site of the national sanctuary. The figure also supplied the four pillars, viz. N.E., N.W., S.E., and S.W., upon which the heavens are supported. Of these the best known was the S.W. pillar, as it was there that Atlas had been relieved by Hercules.

6. Anthropomorphic nomenclature of the sphere.—The square horoscope was not the only expedient resorted to in setting forth the relations of the stars, as another method was also in use among the Egyptians. From a time anterior to Menes until the final period, the high priest of Heliopolis was known as  , *i.e.* 'chief astrologer.' We may note in passing that this office was held by Poti-phera (of which name the literal Greek translation was Heliodoros), the father-in-law of Joseph (Gn 41[45]). Tables of observations made in Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty are still extant, and in these are recorded the times at which the fixed stars cross the middle lines of the houses, *i.e.* the beginnings of the double-hours. The astrologer on the north found the meridian of the place of observation by looking through the slit of the palm-leaf rib above the bald crown of his companion. The middle meridians of the first and seventh houses were given by the horizontal line, while the observer found those of the eleventh and ninth houses by lines projected over his companion's right and left eyes respectively, and in similar fashion those of the twelfth and eighth houses by lines above the right and left elbows. It is probable that the sixth house was in like manner associated with the left knee, and the second house with the right.

From this point of view the left arm corresponded with the house of death and the left leg with the house of sorrows, and on this account there eventually arose a superstitious aversion to using the word 'left' at all. In particular, all actions performed by the left hand came to be regarded as unlucky. It may well be the case that mankind was right-handed rather than left-handed before astrology asserted its sway, but the ban thus laid upon the left extremities of the body undoubtedly supplied a further reason for excluding the left side and especially the left hand from all actions of great and critical moment.

7. Applied astronomy and astrology.—Alike in the greatest and in the smallest affairs of life uncivilized man is affected by the changes incident to the day and the season, by the phases of the moon by night, and by the ebb and flow of the tides. Hence the observation of sun and moon with a view to a standard measurement of time, or, in other words, to the construction of a calendar, was a vital condition of all progress in civilization. But, as the periods of the earth's rotation about its axis (*i.e.* the apparent diurnal movement of the sun), of the moon's revolution, and of the sun's apparent annual revolution, are incommensurable with regard to each other, the early attempts to frame a serviceable calendar were attended with no small difficulty. As the lunar month made more impression upon the primitive mind than the actual solar year, endeavours were made in the earliest calendars to base the latter upon an integral number of the former, and all sorts of expedients were tried in order to harmonize the two periods. At a further stage in the growth of civilization the determination of the true solar year became the subject of inquiry, the length of the true lunar month being then left out of consideration. Here again, however, the residual fraction of days provided difficulties, and the difference between the calendars of Western Europe and Eastern Europe (Russia) shows that these difficulties have not yet been overcome. In the pre-Christian era there was a disparity between Babylon, with its cyclically adjusted lunar year, and Egypt, with its solar year, or, rather, its two unequal solar years. Other civilizations employed other types of calendar. A purely lunar calendar is still in use among Muhammadans.

The outstanding periodic phenomena of the apparent courses of sun and moon were registered in these calendars, and were celebrated as occasions of joy or sorrow according to their influence upon human life. In such feasts and fasts the moon and the sun were, first of all, personified, and they still continued to be revered as divine or heroic beings even after the particular days connected with their movements by astrology and astronomy had been duly set down in the artificially corrected and adjusted calendars of ancient and modern civilized peoples.

8. Lunar, solar, and planetary deities.—The ascertainment of such varying influences of the moon and the sun as could be registered in the calendar was undoubtedly a forward step in the mental development of primitive man. But the notion that the movements of moon, sun, and planets were effected by powerful and conscious beings, more or less endowed with free will, was an open door to all illusion. The religion and mythology of the lowest races are permeated with this idea. Amongst more highly civilized peoples, again, we find a stock of myths of like purport, which, partly indigenous and partly exotic, forms a kind of illicit religion or superstition, and which shows many points of contrast with the teachings of the recognized national cult. In periods distinguished by a high state of civilization this supplementary religion finds acceptance only amongst the lowest and least enlightened ranks of the people, while at times, when culture is at a low ebb, it extends its sway over the leading classes as well.

In cases, however, where a relatively advanced and purified form of religion found its way into a region already civilized, the old representations of moon and sun as personal beings, as also the narratives that had grafted themselves upon their festivals, degenerated into mere legends. As illustrations of the process we may name the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid in the Roman religion, the stories of the Thousand and One Nights in Islām, and Grimm's domestic and popular tales in Christianized Germany.

But it was also possible that a fusion might take place between the older and the newer narratives. Thus, apart from the sphere of religious history as such, there are many mediæval kings and heroes whose actual experiences, on the one hand, stand forth in the clear light of history, but whose legendary adventures, on the other, show unmistakable deposits from the personifying narratives about the moon and the sun. The same process has been at work practically everywhere; we trace it not only in the *Nibelungenlied* and the *Iliad*, but also in connexion with all the great figures who as gods or prophets occupy the supreme place in the various systems of religion. Popular imagination, in fact, clinging as it does to the ancient legends, is quite indifferent as to the figure around which it throws them; it may fix upon Confucius, Buddha, Zarathushtra, Jesus, or Muhammad. Even the older religions, with deities unmistakably of planetary origin—the Babylonian

Shamash, the Egyptian Rê, the Greek Apollo—show such secondary deposits from various astro-mythological sources.

The disengagement of this secondary astro-mythological element from the Christian system of thought has now become one of the prime tasks of theological criticism. It is no longer possible for any earnest scholar to reject the fundamental idea of such analysis, and the extent to which the work of elimination shall be pursued depends entirely upon whether the individual theologian leans towards the more orthodox or the more liberal side. In regard to Confucius, Buddha, Zarathushtra, and Muhammad, as also in regard to the Alexander romances, the Christian theologian concedes the rights of the method without hesitation. Further, the OT and the Life of Jesus have from ancient times been the nuclei of a mass of legendary stories (the Talmud, etc.; Gospels of the Infancy, etc.), which all theologians have for centuries regarded as apocryphal; and it cannot be disputed that the study of astro-mythology has rendered valuable service in throwing light upon the origin of these spurious additions to the lives of the leading personalities of our religion. Once more, there is a group of writings which, though reckoned apocryphal by evangelical Churches, are still included in the Roman Catholic canon; and, as might be expected, the bearing of the astro-mythological theory upon these writings is estimated by the two great parties within Christianity in precisely opposite ways. And when at length the theory is applied to certain constitutive elements in the OT, and to the life of Jesus as given in the evangelical records, the theologians who concede its rights in these domains are fewer still in number. The explanation of this, of course, is that such criticism seems to undermine the historicity of the Biblical narratives, and to leave nothing but a mass of mythical stories about the planets, which have crystallized around certain more or less unreal figures in the history of Israel. The logical result of the process appears to be the subversion of every constituent of Christianity save its ethics.

Taken in this sense, the comparative study of astrology and astro-mythology rests upon an impregnable foundation. The implications of its results, as was said above, may quite well be brought into harmony alike with the most rigid orthodoxy and the broadest liberalism. Hence it cannot be non-suited by either of the warring schools; it is reconcilable even with the aims of its critics. Just as comparative philology is an ideal and impartial science, so must the comparative study of myths assume a like impartiality; and the indispensable framework of this study is formed by the planetary deities of astrology.

9. Prophetic astrology.—From the theological point of view, prophetic astrology must be regarded as a by-way towards superstition, and, indeed, as one of the main sources of superstition. It was evolved by gentle gradations from what we may call 'calendar astronomy.' Primitive man discerned parallelism not only in the processes of nature, but also in the State and in human life; nay, even in the forms and organs of animals he read analogies and homologies, and many other fields of observation presented similar correspondences. But by far the most obvious and unmistakable cases of parallelism were those which subsisted between the motions of the sun and the moon, on the one hand, and the periodic variation of the tides, of light and heat during the day, and of the seasons, on the other. Hence arose the notion of planetary deities or angels—beings who acted according to highly complicated laws, ordained either by themselves or by a superior power, and who sought to bring all events, great and small alike, within the range of parallel uniformities. Where the trend of thought was polytheistic, the planets were regarded as gods; where it lay towards monotheism, they were but the messengers of a Divine will beyond them; or, as the case might be, an inevitable fate was supposed to hang over the gods themselves.

From the standpoint of the ancient astrologer, the supreme function of all learning was the observation of certain simple phenomena and the drawing of inferences bearing upon a parallel series of facts otherwise veiled. The primary task of astrology was to ascertain the positions of the planets in relation to one another, to the zodiacal signs, and to the observer himself, and then to make deductions therefrom. This was astrology properly so called, and it required for every particular case a direct reading of the sky. A cloudy night, however, rendered such direct readings impossible. Now, the Kouyunjik inscriptions, dating from the time of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal, yield evidences for a continuous series of actual observations. From these we learn that, notwithstanding the complexity of the planetary movements, the periodic repetition of essential phenomena had been calculated for each particular planet. Thus the astrologer could fall back upon tabulated records covering every particular sequence of planetary movement, and could substitute these for direct observation. It is true that, owing to trifling inaccuracies in the data thus supplied, this course was avoided for thousands of years; but at length the momentous step was taken. No doubt, it still remained necessary to bring certain recorded positions to the test of actual observation; but, with these exceptions, the researches of the practical astrologer were thenceforth pursued in the study. Our earliest evidences for this procedure date from the period of the Persian monarchy.

So far as astronomy itself is concerned, this was a progressive movement; but, from the standpoint of observational science, it was a backward step. It issued finally in the determination and mathematical calculation of the planetary orbits by Kepler. But, in our estimate of Kepler's discoveries, we must always bear in mind that he was still under the spell of the astrological conception of the universe. It was his firm belief that his discoveries supplied the key to all events of history, and had exalted astrology to the level of a perfect and independent science of simple calculation, while in reality he had given the death-blow to its pretensions.

From the time of the earliest attempts to draw up a calendar—through the period of the Sumerians and Akkadians—to the days of Kepler astrology underwent no essential change, save that it gradually abandoned the method of direct observation of the heavens in favour of, first, a partial use of tables containing earlier observations, and, finally, a purely arithmetical determination of the positions occupied by the planets at any given time. Astrology, be it remembered, was a study of international importance. Wherever, therefore, in the history of any civilized country we can trace some slight advance in astronomical science, we find corresponding records, practically contemporaneous, in all the civilized countries of that epoch. Additions to men's knowledge of the stars were valued only as ancillary to the determination of the planetary positions. As all the available evidence goes to show, however, astrology, throughout its entire career, had but one method of adapting this knowledge to oracular ends—the method, namely, of symbolical interpretation, with a more or less clearly realized principle of alternation. In the main, the positions of the planets were made

the basis of prognostications of the unborn future, but they were also used as a means of filling up *lacunæ* in the knowledge of the past and the present.

10. **Astrology and medicine.**—In the ancient Oriental view of the world, astrology, religion, and therapeutics went hand in hand. In the conviction that all things in the universe proceeded in parallel lines, men spoke of a macrocosm (primarily the stellar world as the province of Deity) and a microcosm (primarily the human body), and sought for far-reaching analogies between them. Thus—to take one of many examples found in Sanskrit literature—the Vedas and their allied texts exhibit attempts to establish an exact equivalence between the number of the bones in the human body and that of the days in a year. Simple as would have been the task of enumerating the bones accurately, they were purposely numbered wrongly, so that the desired numerical relations might be educed; the lower jaw, for instance, was said to be composed of eighteen single pieces, not including the teeth, just because this number, while purely factitious, could, as the twentieth part of 360, be used for purposes of speculation. The method was applied in every field, and things which did not harmonize in fact were arbitrarily made to do so.

In the ancient East the therapeutic art was based upon the two fundamental postulates of air in motion and liquid in motion, and it was supposed that in the human body the air passed along the arteries, while the liquid traversed the veins. The solid substance of the body (its earthy constituents) and its native heat (its igneous constituents) were regarded as forming a fixed and constant mass: earth and fire, in fact, were probably never considered in their physiological aspects until the Hellenistic period. The astrological references hitherto discovered in Babylonian and Egyptian texts show that air and liquid alone were taken into account. In the further development of these notions, special prominence was given to the air by the pneumatists, and to the blood (*i.e.* liquid, and a mixture of the four principal humours, viz. water, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) by the hæmatists. We cannot enter here into the particulars of the antagonism maintained between the two schools for several thousand years, an antagonism which we can trace in the period when the Pyramids were built, and which, again, moved the hæmatist Aristophanes to the mortal hatred wherewith in the *Clouds* he arraigned the pneumatism of Socrates before the Athenian populace. Suffice it to say that, in all references to the facts of nature found in the Pentateuch, the Jahwistic sections (of Genesis in particular) represent the pneumatic, and the Elohistic portions the hæmatic, point of view, whereas the Priestly Code exhibits no scientific tendency at all. The pneumatists regarded the nose as the most important organ of the body. We may recall the numerous phrases formed with אַף in the OT, and the large noses of the singers in the chorus of the *Clouds*. Even amongst the inscriptions from Nineveh, which must, on the whole, be reckoned to the hæmatic school, the present writer has found no fewer than fourteen different texts referring to divination by the nose.

According to the hæmatist, life was concentrated in the liver, the כָּבֵד, or heavy organ, which, accordingly, together with the blood, plays a prominent part in the OT and the Talmud. Among the Babylonians and Etruscans, again, as also among the various peoples influenced by them, haruspicy took the special form of divination by inspection of the liver. The cuneiform texts which treat of this hepatoscopy are without number, and have been read and translated mainly by Jastrow. In the ancient East, and even in Greece, the hæmatists were for the most part firm believers in astrology, omens, and all that we now brand with the name of superstition. To dreams, above all, they attached great importance, while the pneumatists, on the other hand, as is shown by the writings of Hippocrates, declared dreams to be unworthy of consideration. The pneumatists seem to have borne the reputation of being enlightened persons, or sometimes even atheists, as was the case with the pneumatist Socrates as delineated by Aristophanes. From certain fragmentary indications we may perhaps gather that in the main the Christians of the early centuries were pneumatists in their knowledge of nature.

From the mental standpoint of the hæmatic astrologer every actual group of relations amongst the planets mirrored itself in all synchronistic events and conditions, and thus the entire horoscope would be reproduced in the variations and peculiarities found in the liver—the central organ—of the newly-born sacrificial animal. An expert examination of the liver could therefore quite well take the place of a direct observation of the sky. The practice of hepatoscopy was extensively diffused, and diagrams illustrative of the art are still extant. The method adopted by the Babylonians was to portion out the liver in what may be called oracular squares by means of a right-angled system of ordinates, a device reminding us of the square sections shown by the extant Egyptian projection of the heavens made in the time of King Seti, and likewise of the square figure used as the ground-plan of the normal horoscope. Among the Etruscans, however, hepatoscopy employed a polar projection in its construction of oracular fields, and to this arrangement corresponds the system of regular polygons designed to represent the relative positions of the planets in the circular horoscope.

Another way of dispensing with direct observation of the heavens was to watch the forms assumed by certain substances when suddenly placed under new conditions, as it was supposed that the forms thus produced were determined by the configuration of the planets at the time. Oil or melted tallow was dropped into water, or water into oil, and the diviner took note of the resultant forms. We possess two comprehensive lists drawn up in the reign of King Ḫammurabi of Babylon for the express purpose of interpreting these formations. This mode of divination still survives in the superstitious practice of dropping molten lead upon a cold surface.

A further variety of oracle was found in dreams, to which reference has already been made. Dreams also were believed to run parallel to the facts of astrology, and might, therefore, be substituted for the latter. But, as dreams were held to have their origin in the blood, their significance was conceded by the hæmatists only.

Finally, every unaccountable phenomenon of nature—from the movement of an animal to a monstrous birth—everything, in short, that touched human life at any point, came to be associated with planetary influence, and might become the basis of divination. The library of Sardanapalus contains thousands of tablets in which such superstitious ideas and practices are expounded with the most precise casuistry. They seem to have been regarded as the supreme and final expression of wisdom, and might relate to matters a thousand years old. But these fallacious issues of man's search for knowledge, involving such a prodigal expenditure of energy in collecting data, find their ultimate explanation in the fundamental misconception of astrology, viz. that the incidents of life, being dependent upon the contemporaneous con-

figuration of the planets, must exhibit a parallel order in their occurrence, and that accordingly valid inferences regarding either of the parallel series may be drawn from the other. The underlying conception of the whole procedure, however, was that of the astrologer, and hence we find that in the system of divination by bowls which was practised in the time of Hammurabi, the instantaneous formations of dropped grease were regarded as yielding actual knowledge of the planetary deities.

11. Subsidiary tables.—The various substitutes for astrological diagnosis might become, and, indeed, necessarily became, very important, as it was often difficult to determine the requisite facts concerning the planets. We must remember that the problem usually set before the astrologer was to draw the horoscope of the birth or conception of an individual at a time when years had elapsed since these events, and by this means to forecast the future. His task was, in short, to re-construct the astrological conditions of a past event, and he had in consequence to refer to tables or lists of earlier astronomical observations. As regards the sun and the moon, the information he required was furnished by the calendar, but special lists were necessary for the five smaller planets. An extensive table of this kind, written in the Demotic character of Egyptian, and dating from the reign of Augustus, has been preserved. The Julian emperors, let us remember, used to settle their retired soldiers in Egypt. Colonies of veterans thus established in the Fayum would be largely drawn from those who had been born in the reign of Augustus. It was therefore necessary that the astrologer who practised his art in this province should possess lists of the successive positions of the planets during that reign. The example before us is but the transcript of a transcript: whole lines are wanting, and figures have been misread. We may thus infer that such lists were produced in great profusion to meet the needs of astrologers in the various districts and villages. In order to make the proper entries in the horoscope required, the astrologer needed simply to know the zodiacal signs in which the several planets were situated at the time, and accordingly the information supplied by the astrological lists regarding any particular planet was confined to the day of the month on which it entered a new sign. The ancient lists of ephemerides were thus neither more nor less than astrological tables.

For predictions of a general kind the astrologer constructed 'nativities,' while for cases of sickness he drew horoscopes of the *κατάλυσις*, *i.e.* the inception of the disease, and otherwise adapted his art to special circumstances. He had to be informed of the day, month, and year of the critical event. The signs occupied by the smaller planets at the given date were then noted down from lists like that of the Berlin Papyrus 8279; the moon, together with the day indicating its age, was inserted in the proper sign according to the calendar of the lunar cycle, its lunar station being also fixed by established rules; the sun was placed according to the date. The next step was to arrange these particulars systematically in the twelve houses, the exact hour of the event, or, failing that, the time of sunrise, being used as the determining point. From this, again, the positions of the planets relative to one another, to the eastern point, and to the different zodiacal signs, were deduced and interpreted.

12. The horoscope of Jesus Christ.—As an illustration we shall take the horoscope of the conception of Jesus, according to the form in which we are able to re-construct it from the Demotic table of the planets in the Berlin P. 8279. The dates given are themselves products of astrological speculation, and cannot be regarded as historically established, but they are nevertheless worthy of notice. On the 24th of June, B.C. 7 (or previously), took place the conception or birth of John the Baptist. On the 15th of April, B.C. 6, 5 a.m., the annunciation to Mary (instead of the conception of Jesus), and, at the same time, the observation of this 'nativity' by the Magi. Between the 24th of June, B.C. 6, and the 25th of November, B.C. 6, occurs the visit of the Magi to King Herod. After the 25th of November, B.C. 6, the Magi notice the re-appearance of the stellar configuration at the annunciation. On the 27th of December, B.C. 6, the stellar configuration becomes stationary (*ἀστὴρ ἔστη*), and the Magi worship the infant at Bethlehem.

Now the horoscope of the 15th of April, B.C. 6, can be re-constructed thus:



and supplies the following apotelesmata capable of interpretation:

(1) The horoscope of the day appears (with sunrise). (2) Aries is in the ascendant. (3) Mars, as lord of the house of Aries, presides over the birth. (4) The sun is in the ascendant. (5) Saturn in the ascendant. (6) Jupiter in the ascendant. (7) Mercury in the ascendant. (8) Saturn in the ascendant, and above the horizon. (9) Saturn is intercepted between the favourable planets Venus and Jupiter. (10) Mars in the second house. (11) The moon enters the eighth house. (12) Venus is in the twelfth house. (13) Mercury in the house of Mars, and likewise in immediate proximity to Mars. (14) Saturn is in his *ταπείνωμα*, or 'detriment.' (15) The sun in his *ὕψωμα*, or 'exaltation.' (16) The moon in her *ταπείνωμα*. (17) Venus in her *ὕψωμα*. (18) Venus is *matutina* (morning star). (19) Jupiter is in proximity to his house Pisces. (20) Jupiter in trine (*adspectus trigonalis*) with his house Sagittarius. (21) The sun in trine with his house Leo. (22) Saturn's motion is direct. (23) Jupiter is direct. (24) Mars is direct. (25) Venus is retrograde. (26) Mercury is direct. (27) Mercury is combust. (28) Mercury in immediate proximity to the sun. (29) Mercury is invisible. (30) Mars is not combust. (31) Mars is nevertheless invisible, and is, in fact, entering upon its invisible period of three months. (32) Mars is separated from the sun by Mercury. (33) Saturn is separated from the sun by Jupiter, though the latter is combust. (34) Jupiter is combust. (35) Jupiter is separated from the sun by small planets. (36) All the morning stars are visible. (37) All the evening stars are invisible. (38) Mars is situated in his nocturnal triangle. (39) The terrestrial triangle contains Mars only, its nocturnal lord, situated in Taurus. (40) Mars is in opposition to his house Scorpio. (41) The moon in trine with her house Cancer. (42) The moon is in her domain. (43) The trigonum of fire contains its lords conjoined in Aries. (44) The trigonum of water contains its diurnal lady Venus. (45) The trigonum of water contains its nocturnal ruler, the moon. (46) The moon and Venus are in trine. (47) The trigonum of air is empty. (48) Saturn and Jupiter are in conjunction. (49) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus *conjunctio maxima*, and dominates the entire horoscope. (50) This *conjunctio maxima* was preceded by a *conjunctio magna*, occurring in Pisces (indicating the astrological necessity for the forerunner, John the Baptist). (51) Saturn is in conjunction with the sun (but cf. 33). (52) Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury. (53) Mars and Mercury are in different houses, but close together. (54) Saturn and Venus are in the same relation. (55) Jupiter is in conjunction with Mercury. (56) Venus is visible. (57) Saturn is visible. (58) Jupiter is visible. (59) Saturn has no aspect with the moon. (60) Saturn is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus. (61) Saturn is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but triply intercepted.

(62) Jupiter has no aspect with the moon. (63) Jupiter is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but intercepted by Saturn. (64) Jupiter is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but doubly intercepted. (65) The sun has no aspect with the moon. (66) The sun is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but doubly intercepted. (67) The sun is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars, but intercepted once. (68) Mercury has no aspect with the moon. (69) Mercury is in *adspectus confinis* with Venus, but triply intercepted. (70) Mercury is in *adspectus confinis* with Mars. (71) Mars is in opposition to the moon. (72) Mars is in trine aspect with Venus. (73) Full moon is just past. (74) No planets are in quartile with each other. (75) Of the tropical signs only Aries is occupied, but it contains four planets. (76) All the planets except the moon are clustered near the sun. (77) All the planets except the moon and Venus are under the influence of the sun (Mars as lord of the sun's house). (78) Jupiter emerges from the sun's beams. (79) Hence the *conjunctio maxima* also emerges. (80) All the visible planets and the moon are situated in the diurnal sky. (81) All invisible planets are in the nocturnal sky. (82) The lord of Saturn's house is Mars. (83) The lord of Jupiter's house is Mars. (84) The lord of the sun's house is Mars. (85) The lord of Mercury's house is Mars. (86) The lord of Venus's house is Jupiter. (87) The lord of the moon's house is Mars. (88) The lord of the house of Mars is Venus. (89) The horoscope, *i.e.* Aries, is masculine. (90) The other occupied houses are feminine.

Several points of detail may be left out of account. By making the horoscope more precise, and dividing it into decanates and degrees, we might multiply indefinitely the ninety particulars given above. These data of the positions occupied by the planets were known as *apotelesmata*. The ninety *apotelesmata* enumerated here can be interpreted only in part at the present day, as our information regarding ancient modes of astrological interpretation is at best fragmentary. According to rules still extant, interpolations and adjustments, no doubt, have also been made in certain particulars. So far, however, as we can test the interpretations of this horoscope, it corresponds with the evangelical narratives of the life of Jesus even in its smallest details.

13. The development of astronomy and astrology among the various peoples.—The foregoing sketch makes it evident that primitive peoples constructed their calendars by direct observation of the heavens. Similarly, it is amongst these primitive peoples, as indeed we might expect, that we find the first steps of the transition from astronomy to astrology. Thus, in the interior of some of the larger South Sea Islands, as, *e.g.*, Borneo, a primitive astronomy and astrology are found amongst the aborigines, while the inhabitants of the sea board, as also of the smaller islands, exhibit a higher development in the science of the stars, partly because their nautical interests demanded a more thoroughgoing observation of the heavenly bodies, and partly because they were influenced by the higher standard of culture attained by the Asiatic races, as is shown, for example, by the fact that the Malay language contains words borrowed from Chinese, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. Of the pictorial writing of ancient Mexico, part of the calendar is all that has hitherto been deciphered; but even this suffices to show striking correspondences between the civilizations of America anterior to its discovery by Columbus and those of the ancient Asiatic races, and not least in astronomy and astrology. The development of these sciences already attained in the Babylonian period or later in the time of Alexander the Great is practically the same as now prevails throughout China, in part of Japan, and, above all, in India.

In the West, likewise, the results of astronomical inquiry were still encumbered with the old superstitious conceptions. The earliest successful attempts to eliminate these conceptions and their effects from astronomy were made about A.D. 1500. It is true that at the zenith of Roman civilization the educated classes tried to throw the lumber of astrology overboard. Certain of the Church Fathers wrought strenuously to oust it from its place. But, on the one hand, the vexed question regarding the date of Easter, which was simply a consequence of combining the lunar calendar of Babylon with the solar calendar of Egypt, and, on the other, the attempt to fix a year for the birth of Christ, gave astrology once more a certain adventitious prestige in Christian life and theology. Fresh vantage ground was also won for it in the secular learning of the Middle Ages by the Western drift of Islām and the Jewish Kabbala. As a matter of fact, the astronomy of the West, and, in particular, the coalescence of astronomy and astrology in the later culture of Western lands, is a development or an importation from the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East.

Until the time of Kepler, astronomy was always bound up with astrology, and its progress was for the most part of a meagre kind. This may seem incredible so long as we confine our investigation to a short period abounding in records, but it is always unsafe to argue from the silence of the earlier records that the apparently fresh facts set forth in the later constitute an actual advance. No candid observer in the field of astrology could fail to notice that, while this or that forecast might happen to be correct, yet in many cases the configuration of the planets, however skilfully interpreted, could not be reconciled with the facts of experience. Certain details of astrological procedure were, therefore, constantly being left behind, as in an ever-seething witches' caldron; and, on the other hand, long disused methods were once more resorted to. This was especially the case when, in periods of unrest, races and civilizations were shaken and mingled together. Detailed research in a narrowly circumscribed period may thus produce the illusion of rapid development in a science which, in its leading features, really remained unchanged from age to age.

The fundamental tenets promulgated by astrology as inviolably true were manifold. From the fourth house, as it seemed, welled up the subsoil water and the springs which fed the rivers, while from the tenth house came the rain. Now when primitive man found the moon in either of those houses he anticipated a flood. But the moon was evidently connected also with the occurrence of menstruation, which was regarded as a periodic overflow of blood. The astrological explanations of these phenomena tended to corroborate one another so fully that the sovereignty of the moon over the liquid element was deemed indisputable. An example of a different kind is furnished by the horoscope of disease, or rather of the *κατάκλισις*. Here the invalid was the querent, and his malady the quesited, and information regarding them was supplied by the first and seventh houses respectively. Now, in the regular horoscope the sixth house was significant of pain and the eighth of death, and thus the entire western section of the sky from 45° above the horizon to 45° below it was the region of disease. In this expanse, however, the sun, distinguished among the planets as the source of heat, is situated between three and nine o'clock p.m., and this again is the time when the invalid shows symptoms of fever. An easy explanation was thus provided for the increase of febrile temperature, while on the other hand the validity of the science was demonstrated once more. Astrology simply abounded in spurious proofs of this type.

Thus the leading principles and ideas of astrology were looked upon for centuries as incontrovertible. Its failures were attributed to points of secondary moment, save in cases where it seemed more convenient to change the time premised by a whole double-hour, and so to shift the entire horoscope by one house—an artifice

which would in general quite invert the first interpretation. Corrections and alterations were thus made in matters of detail, while among the more progressive peoples the general tendency was towards over-refinement in interpretation and an ever-expanding casuistry.

Accordingly there was no real development in the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East within historic times. The extant evidences of the inscriptions go as far back as the period of Sargâni-šar-ali and Narâm-Sin. From the reign of the former eight short texts are all that have as yet been brought to light, and from that of the latter sixteen only, all of the same date. It is not to be expected, therefore, that we shall trace all the details of later astrology in such meagre records. It is surely sufficient for our purpose that the later period, the archives of which may quite well extend backwards to the monarchs just named, yields a mass of evidence to show that astronomy and astrology had by this time reached the status of a closed and rounded system. Inscriptions from the age of Hammurabi make it clear that full instructions had already been drawn up for the practice of divination by cups in connexion with planetary configurations. From a period about a thousand years before Christ come the inscribed boundary-stones, the dates of which are indicated by their arrangement of the planetary symbols. Thereafter the richest vein of astrological records is found in the library of Sardanapalus. We learn from these that there was a system of observatories covering the whole kingdom, that there was an established scheme of relays for the professional astrologers and of serial reports regarding their work, and that a State library had been established for the purpose of supplying all needed information in astrology and the auxiliary arts of divination. It is to be regretted that as yet only the *Reports* of the astrologers and the instructions regarding hepatoscopy have been properly edited. The cuneiform texts of the period between Sardanapalus and the beginning of the Christian era are not so rich in relevant information. The astronomical texts of this epoch, however, have found a thoroughly capable editor in Kugler, whose labours were based on the preparatory studies of Strassmaier and Epping, but who, unfortunately, engaged as he was with the productions of a relatively short period, has failed to grasp the subject in its entirety. A final residuum of Babylonian astrology was the perfunctory knowledge of 'the science of the Chaldæans' current in the days of the Roman Empire. From the beginning of our era astrology and astronomy languished on in the various Asiatic countries, but they were borne westwards by the Arabs. Mesopotamia always remained more or less of a *terra incognita* for countries influenced by Græco-Roman civilization.

On the other hand, Egypt became permanently merged in the Roman Empire, and, at a later period, in the Byzantine Empire. It was Egypt, therefore, that brought Babylonian astronomy and astrology into real contact with the West. Even in the most remote times, in a period, it may be, anterior to the First Dynasty, astrology, religion, and medicine were combined as one science at Heliopolis. The high priest of Heliopolis, officially invested with the star-spotted panther's skin, was all along the supreme State astrologer until the imperial age of Rome, and he bore the title of 'great in vision' already alluded to. A hierarch of this order is named in the Bible (Gn 41^{45}) as the father-in-law of Joseph—of that Joseph who was himself an interpreter of dreams ($40^{8ff.}$ etc.), and practised the art of divination by bowls ($44^{5, 15}$), referred to in connexion with Hammurabi. On the wall of a tomb dating from the reign of Seti I. we find lists of stars, times of culmination, etc. Extensive tables of ephemerides and a fragment of planetary divination according to the different houses, together with corresponding dream-tables, have survived from the age of Augustus. We possess even horoscope-texts drawn up in the Imperial period. Our minor records of later Egyptian astrology are thus fairly numerous.

Græco-Roman civilization throughout its entire geographical and historical range, until the establishment of the world-empire and its swift decline, never produced such monuments as we find in the great empires of the East. Observatories of colossal proportions, attached to primeval temples containing archives by which the positions of the planets might be traced and tested for centuries and millenniums, were never the work of Greece and Rome. Among the Etruscans, therefore, and subsequently among the Romans, it was the surrogates of astrology that occupied the central place. Apuleius explicitly asserts that the Chaldæans were the founders of astronomy and astrology. But, so far as the Romans concerned themselves with the study, they appealed to the works of an assumed Egyptian king called Nachepso and his astrologer Petosiris of Sais. At a later period Claudius Ptolemæus (A.D. 100–178) was regarded as the final authority in our twin sciences, and beside him we catch a glimpse of the somewhat legendary Hermes Trismegistos. But, as has been already indicated, the claims of astrology were not left unchallenged in this period. About the year A.D. 200 the famous physician Sextus Empiricus wrote a work in six books πρὸς μαθηματικούς, of which the fifth was directed πρὸς ἀστρολόγους. He prefaces his confutation by a sketch of the entire system of knowledge possessed by the Χαλδαῖοι, and in this he provides valuable materials for a thoroughgoing digest of the astrological texts in the library of Sardanapalus.

In this later period, however, astrology has maintained some degree of progress in the Far East. Among the Chinese and Japanese, occult art, in the modern 'fengshui,' seems rather to have taken the form of geomancy. Just as in the Near East astrology gave birth to hepatoscopy, so in China and Japan the interpretation of the planets in the celestial vault has been transformed into divination by the carapace of the tortoise. Similarly the Gypsies have developed a system of fortune-telling from the open hand; and the designation of the convexities of the palm as 'mounts' of the various planets shows us that this practice also is a surrogate of astrology.

LITERATURE.—The significance of astronomy and astrology for the interpretation of the religious conceptions of the ancient East, as also for the exegesis of the Bible, has only recently been recognized. There is as yet no comprehensive work dealing with the subject. Contributions to the study have come mainly from the hand of H. Winckler (especially in *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*, Leipzig, 1907), of whom A. Jeremias (*Die Panbabylonisten, der alte Orient und die aegyptische Religion*, Leipzig, 1907) has proved an able ally. Fugitive essays have appeared in considerable numbers, principally in publications of the *Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft* and the *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*; Hinrichs (Leipzig) has also issued a number. At first the new exegetical theory encountered very strong opposition, but afterwards seemed to have won a general assent; more recently, however, the work of Kugler, already referred to and appraised, has given it a partial reverse. K. Sudhoff (*Iatromathematiker, vornemlich im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Breslau, 1902) and the present writer, starting from the history of medicine, have studied the ancient astronomy and astrology, and have arrived at the same results as Winckler, though by a very different path. The present writer has also written numerous essays on the subject, and these have appeared in various periodicals, medical, philological, and theological, esp. *Die Angaben der Berliner Planetentafel*, p. 2279, Berlin, 1903, *Das Horoscop der Empfängnis Christi*, do. 1903. These publications are based upon cuneiform and hieroglyphic (or demotic) texts which have only recently become accessible.

The leading work for the discovery of the relevant cuneiform texts is C. Bezold, *Catalogue of the Cuneiform Tablets in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum*, 5 vols. The shorter texts are to some extent accessible in Thompson, *Reports of the Magicians and Astronomers of Nineveh and Babylon* (1900). Outgrowths of Oriental astronomy and astrology are found in the writings of Claudius Ptolemæus, Claudius Valens, Paulus Alexandrinus, Julius Firmicus Maternus, and Marcus Manilius, and also in the works of opponents, such as Sextus Empiricus, Cicero (*de Divinatione*), Horace, Juvenal, Pliny, and, in the 15th and 16th cents., Hieronymus Cardamus and Pico de Mirandola. Boll, *Sphæra*, is a modern comprehensive work dealing with classical astrology and astronomy, but the author had not the requisite data for a corresponding treatment of the ancient East. The latest cuneiform texts from the period of the Persian kings and the Seljûks have been utilized by Kugler in vol. i. of a work to be completed in 5 vols. E. Stucken, *Astralmythen* (Leipzig, 1907), admirably depicts the process by which the myths and legends of the various races of mankind grow out of the same original astrological conceptions, and arranges the stupendous mass of materials according to their affinities with the Biblical narratives regarding Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Esau, and Moses. A short manual of astrology by Ernst Mayer, entitled *Kurzes Handbuch der Astrologie*, and giving technical information about the placing of the horoscope, was published by Dekker (Berlin, 1891). A vast aggregation of data relating to the vestiges of astrology in Asia and the South Seas may be gleaned from the *Mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, in *Der Janus* (*Archiv für Gesch. der Medicin*), and in the publications of Sanskrit scholars. The attempt to furnish a more detailed bibliography than the present is always confronted with the difficulty of knowing which of the manifold ramifications of our subject the reader is interested in. In one or other of the leading works here cited, however, the student will find a more complete list of works relating to the particular field of inquiry with which he is concerned.

F. VON OEFELE.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Primitive).—Knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies is possessed in varying degrees by most primitive peoples. In the earlier stages of civilization that continued observation which is necessary to arrive at a reasoned explanation, which is the foundation of astronomical science, is not possible through lack of proper means of recording its results, nor is it called for by the practical requirements of a population which lives chiefly by hunting. For an agricultural people, however, foreknowledge of the recurring seasons becomes essential, and it is necessary that some means should be found to mark the proper seasons for performing the operations to ensure the food supply. In the stars, with their regular motions of rising and setting, primitive man has found the earliest and most convenient calendar. In default of a theory based upon a series of observations, the supposed movement of the sun round the earth, the phases of the moon and the motion of the stars, the shape and character of the sky, have been explained by formulæ composed of material drawn from the texture of man's religious beliefs. The celestial bodies, equally with his fellows and material surroundings, he considers to be animated with a personality like his own, though more powerful. Starting from this fundamental assumption, primitive man has fashioned for himself, in his legends, a fairly complete explanation of the celestial phenomena which come under his observation.

1. **Sun and moon.**—It is almost universal among primitive races that both sun and moon should be regarded as alive and quasi-human in nature. Their sex differs among different races, but the moon is more commonly male and the sun female. Relation between them, varying in character, is also recognized. Among the Dieri of Australia the sun is the daughter of a Dieri woman, who after her birth sank into the earth in shame. The natives of Encounter Bay say that the sun is a woman who has a lover among the dead. Each night she descends among the dead. At her rising she appears in a red kangaroo skin, given her by her lover. A Wotjobaluk legend relates that the sun is a woman who was digging yams and reached the West; after wandering round the earth she came back to the other side, and has done the same ever since. The Wurunjerri say that the sun is the sister of every one. This may be compared with the story of the origin of the sun told by the Arunta. At Alice Springs there is a tradition that in the Alcheringa the sun came out of the earth at a spot now marked by a stone in the country of the Bandicoot people, in the form of a spirit woman, accompanied by two other Panunga women, who were sisters, the elder of whom carried a child. The spirit woman went up into the sky, and she does this every day, visiting the old spot at night and rising in the morning. A medicine-man could see her in the hole, but not a person with ordinary vision. The two women settled among the Bandicoot people, and originated a local sun totem. This totem may be compared with the sun totem of the Incas. The sun has a definite relation to each individual member of the various divisions, belonging itself to the Panunga division, as did the two women. Among these people a ceremony connected with the woman and the child is performed, in which symbols of the sun are worn.

The Masai say that the sun married the moon, and they had a fight. Each damaged the other. The sun was so ashamed that he became bright, in order that people might not be able to look at him. The moon was not ashamed, and it is possible to see that her mouth is damaged and that one eye is missing.

It is interesting to note that, while the sun is a man and the moon a woman, the Masai word for sun, *eng-oloñg*, is feminine, and *ol-apa*, 'the moon,' is masculine. The Bushman story goes that the sun was an old man, from whose armpit light radiated; some children threw him up in the sky, where he stuck.

Occasionally both sun and moon are feminine. Among the Mantras the sun is a woman, who is continually being pulled by a string held by her lord. The moon is a woman, the wife of Moyang Bertang, who sits in the moon making nooses for men.

(*a*) *Origin and movements of the sun.*—The origin of the sun, as related in the Tembeh legend of Sam-mor and his battle with Naing, has advanced beyond the anthropomorphic stage. When Sammor had imprisoned Naing, he rolled the fire with which he had fought into a ball, and this, as the sun, still revolves round the mountain to watch Naing. This conception of the sun as inanimate is probably due to external influence, but it has a parallel among the Gallinomeros of Central California, where the hawk and the coyote, after jostling one another painfully in the darkness which then prevailed, collected two masses of inflammable substance; the hawk then flew up into the sky with them, and lighted them with flint. They give light as the sun and the moon. The Wurunjerri believe that the sun was made by Puppu-imbul, one of the race inhabiting the earth while everything was dark. This personage, it is hardly necessary to point out, belongs to the race of demiurges of which Prometheus is the type.

The sun did not always cross the sky in the same leisurely manner as at present. The great feat of Maui, the Maori hero, was that he tamed the sun. According to one version, he beat him so unmercifully that he lamed him, and he has walked slowly ever since. In Samoa the sun had a child by a Samoan woman, who trapped the sun by a rope made of vine. Another Samoan lassoed the sun, and made him promise to go slowly. The same or an analogous explanation is found in Aztec folk-lore and in North America. On the other hand, in Australia and in Melanesia the sun did not set. In the myth of the aborigines of Victoria, Norralie decided that the sun should disappear at intervals, and addressed it in an incantation, 'Sun,

sun, burn your wood, burn your internal substance, and go down.' The sun now burns his fuel in a day, and goes below for fresh firewood (R. Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria*, iv. 430). In Melanesia Qat (the Melanesian hero) went to Qong ('night') and begged assistance. The latter put him to sleep, and, in twelve hours or so, crept up from the horizon and sent the sun crawling to the West (Codrington, *JAI*, Feb. 1881). In a Brazilian myth, a man ('the great serpent') who owned night sent it in a gourd to his daughter on her marriage; the messengers opened the gourd and let it out.

Various explanations are given of the sunset. The simplest is that the sun sinks into a hole, occasionally the hole from which he arose. The Dieri say it sinks into a hole near Lake Eyre, and in the night travels underground to the East, in the same manner as it was believed to do in ancient Egyptian belief. Not infrequently the sunset myth takes the form of a legend of a personal hero plunging into the body of a personal night. Maui was caught in the mouth of Hine-nui-te-po, 'Great Daughter of Night,' and thus brought darkness and death into the world. Since then the sun descends into the under world, and repeats the battle with Hine-nui-te-po every night. An explanation of sunset is that Maui took fire, and when it burnt him he plunged into the sea. Among the Basutos, all men but Litaolane were devoured by a monster. He also was swallowed, but cut his way out. The Zulu story of the rescue of Princess Utombende is of a similar character.

(*b*) *Origin and movements of the moon.*—The moon occupies a prominent place in primitive folklore for which her periodical growth, diminution, and disappearance, phases more marked than those of the sun, may not unreasonably be held to be responsible. Like the sun, the moon is regarded as a living person. Allusion has already been made to the variation in the attribution of sex to the moon among different peoples. One or two further instances which illustrate other points of lunar mythology may be added. Among the Aruntas the moon is a big man (*etwa oknurcha*). They say that, when there was no moon in the sky, a man died and rose again as a boy. The people ran away. He said, 'Do not run away or you will die. I shall die, but will rise again in the sky.' He grew up and died, reappearing as the moon. Since then he dies periodically. When he is not visible, he goes away to his two wives who live in the west. A second legend of the origin of the moon, which is found among the same tribes, relates that the moon was carried by a blackfellow in the hollow of his shield, who hid it in a cleft of the rocks during the day. Once it was stolen from his shield while lying on the ground. He pursued the robber but could not catch him, so he shouted that the moon should go up into the sky and give light to the people during the night. In South-East Victoria in one myth the moon is an old man who climbed a tree to pick grubs. His sons made the tree grow to the sky, where he became the moon. The Dieri say that there was once no moon; the old men held a council, and a *mura-mura* gave them a moon in order that they might know when to hold their ceremonies. The same reason for the moon's existence is given among the Todas.

The marks on the face of the moon are explained in various ways. The Eskimos say that these marks are the ashes which were smeared on his face by his sister the sun, when he tried to embrace her. Among the Besisi it is said that their chief ancestor Gaffer Engkoh once fell to earth and climbed back to the moon by means of a festoon which he plaited. His comrade Porang Aliyan ascended with Engkoh, but the latter slipped back quickly, taking his rope with him. Porang now dwells in the moon, protecting the souls of the dead who visit the moon from wild beasts. The Mantras believe the dark spots on the moon to be a tree. The Malays see in the moon a banyan tree, under which sits a hunchback plaiting a fishing line. When the line is finished, he will fish up everything on earth, but a rat always gnaws away the line. This belief also occurs in Sumatra. The Malays also say 'the moon is great with a mouse deer,' a belief possibly derived from the Sanskrit idea of the hare which was taken up into the moon for protection. In Mexico it was said that a god smote the moon in the face with a rabbit (Sahagun, viii. 2); in Zululand and Tibet a hare was translated to the moon. The connexion between the hare and the moon is also found among the Namaquas of South Africa. The hare was sent to men to confer upon them a return to life after death, but by a mistake in the message made them mortal. In Fiji the same point of human mortality was argued between the moon and the rat. The latter prevailed.

The Wotjobaluk also connect the moon with a resurrection after death. When all animals were men and women, the moon used to say, 'You up again,' and the dead came to life. An old man said, 'Let them remain dead'; none then came to life except the moon. The connexion is obviously suggested by the necessity for finding an explanation of the phases of the moon. Various explanations are current. The Masai say that the sun carries the moon in his arms when she is tired. After carrying her for two days, he leaves her in his setting-place. On the fourth day she is visible to donkeys. On the fifth day men and cattle see her again. The Wiimbaio say that the moon did not die periodically until so ordered by Nurelli. The natives of Encounter Bay held that the moon was a dissipated woman who spent her time among the men, but when she wasted away they drove her out. While she is in seclusion she feeds upon nourishing roots and becomes plump again (Brough Smyth, *op. cit.* i. 432).

(*c*) *Eclipses.*—An eclipse, whether of the sun or of the moon, is at all times regarded with dread; it is almost universally believed, at the early stages at least, to be caused by a monster who devours, or attempts to devour, the luminary. See art. PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, vol. x. p. 368 f.

2. Stars.—The belief that the stars are great men and divinities translated to the heavens occurs among nearly every people in the world. Stars are grouped together in constellations which represent persons, many of them large, sometimes including one or more of the constellations of our astronomy. The inhabitants of Torres Straits include in their constellation Tagai—a hero who stands at the head of a canoe holding a spear and a bunch of fruit—the Southern Cross, Scorpio, Sagittarius, Corvus, and stars of Lupus and Centaurus. The 'Shark' includes the Great Bear and Arcturus and Gemma. In New Zealand Orion's Belt is Maui's Elbow, while the Southern Cross is identified with the stern of the canoe of Tamarete. Among the Wurunjerri of Australia α and β Crucis and α and β Centauri and other stars are the sons of Bunjil, the latter himself being Altair. Two stars on either side of him are his wives, who belong to the black swan totem, while his brother Nurong and his wives are Antares and adjacent stars. Bunjil and his sons were translated to the sky in a whirlwind. The whole group is intimately connected with the totemic system, Bunjil or Pund-jel being an Australian demiurge. At Alice Springs in Australia the Aruntas say the Evening Star is a woman who went into the earth at a spot marked by a white stone at Temple Bar in the Macdonnell Range, leaving her *churinga* behind. Every child

conceived at this stone belongs to the Evening Star totem, although it is in the lizard totem country, and any child conceived *near* the stone is a lizard. Orion's Belt is said to be a group of young men dancing corroboree. Jupiter, the 'foot of day' (Ginabong-Bearp), was a chief among the old spirits, a race translated before the appearance of man. Among the Eskimos of Greenland, Orion's Belt is 'the Lost Ones,' a number of seal hunters who lost their way home. The Pleiades, an extremely important group of stars for primitive peoples, were known to the Indians of North America as 'the Dancers,' to the Lapps as a company of virgins, and to the Australians as a group of girls playing corroboree. The Aruntas believed them to be women who went up into the sky and have remained there ever since. A legend of the Wurunjerri runs that, when some young women were digging yams, the crow stole their yam sticks. They were swept into the air, when Bellin-Bellin let the whirlwind out of the bag, and the stars are the fire on the end of their yam sticks. Another version says that the group is Bunjil's daughter and two men who were turned into women by Bunjil's son, each receiving yam sticks from Bunjil's daughter. The almost unvarying association of the Pleiades with women among different races is remarkable. It thus appears that the legends which attribute an heroic and human origin to the stars and constellations contain the germs of conceptions which have been utilized by modern astronomy in mapping out the heavens.

Stars, however, are not always translated human, divine, and 'semi'-divine beings. Allusion has already been made to the Malay and Sakai belief that stars are clefts in a superincumbent rock. Take-mahuta, in the Polynesian story, after separating his father and his mother, stuck stars all over his father's body. Maui, after slaying his sons, placed an eye of each in the heaven as the morning and evening star respectively—a story which represents a transition stage between the two groups of animate and inanimate origin.

It is not surprising to find the stars regarded as the moon's children. The Mantras say that once the sun and moon, who were both women, had many children, the stars. They agreed to devour them. While the sun did as agreed, the moon hid her children, producing them afterwards. The sun, being very angry, now pursues the moon but cannot catch her, though sometimes she succeeds in biting her, causing an eclipse. The same story is told by the Hos of Chota Nāgpur. In this story, however, the sun threw a hatchet at the moon and cut her in two.

For practical purposes among most primitive peoples the stars perform a more important function than the sun. By their rising and setting the times of the feasts and ceremonies are determined, and among agricultural peoples their movements serve as a calendar by which the various operations in cultivating the soil are regulated. In the Torres Straits, Tagai marks the time for new yams and the migrations of turtle; Seg, the time for another kind of yam. The Murray Islanders also use Tagai as a mark in navigation. The rising of the constellation Dorgai, which coincides with the North-West Monsoon, is the time to 'make dance.' The natives of Borneo, especially the Dayaks, watch for the Pleiades to determine when to prepare their ground for planting. When it is estimated that the wet season is approaching, men are sent to the forest to watch for the rising of the Pleiades. The Kenyahs and Kayans of Borneo measure the length of the sun's shadow by means of a marked stick with the same object (C. Hose, *JRAS*, Straits Branch, Jan. 1905). The importance of such observation of sidereal phenomena is evident when it is remembered that in tropical regions the seasons bring little or no sign of change to serve as the farmer's calendar. The Masai recognize that the rainy season is approaching when they see the Pleiades, while in the Society Islands the year is divided into two halves, *Matari-i-inia* and *Matari-i-raro* according as this constellation is visible above the horizon after sunset or not. In fact, over nearly the whole world the rising of the Pleiades is the beginning of the year or a cycle, marks the time for feasts, and is an occasion of ceremonial observance. It may be recalled in passing that Penrose found that the Hecatompedon and the old Erechtheum had been ascribed to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May day; and in Britain, it is suggested, while Stonehenge appears to have been built in relation to the rising of the sun at the summer solstice, the 'Hurlers' in Cornwall on *prima facie* evidence seem to have been built in relation to the heliacal rising of the Pleiades on May morning B.C. 1600 approximately.

In some cases the use of the stars as a calendar is not immediately obvious, but is a matter of interpretation. In Australia, Yuree and Wanjel (Castor and Pollux) pursue the Kangaroo (Capella) and kill him at the beginning of the great heat, and the mirage is the smoke of the fire they roast him by. Marpean-Kurrk and Neilloan (Arcturus and Lyra) discovered the ant-pupa and the eggs of the loan bird and taught the aborigines to use them for food. As Tylor points out, these legends and their analogues may fairly be interpreted as indicating the seasons when the pupa and eggs may be found, the great heat expected, and so forth.

3. Signs and omens.—The train of thought underlying primitive astronomical theory would seem peculiarly adapted to foster the magical conceptions and analogies upon which astrological reasoning is based. Omens and signs, favourable and unfavourable, are and have always been the object of constant observation in the past of savage and semi-civilized people. It is, therefore, not surprising that peculiar powers in controlling human events should be attributed to those heavenly bodies which are regarded as endowed with powers similar to but greater than those possessed by human beings. Even when a stage has been reached at which the magic powers of the witch no longer gain credence, belief in the power of the moon or the first star of the evening to grant a wish remains as evidence of a time when the favour of the heavenly bodies was essential to success. Lacking the knowledge necessary for the pseudo-scientific cartography of astrology, primitive races never attained the heights of judicial astrology. Yet the belief that, for instance, a child born under Leo would possess qualities usually associated with a lion is one with which a savage would find himself in full sympathy. The Malays possess an elaborate system by which the year is mapped out into lucky and unlucky periods depending upon a rotation of days, each associated with deities, planets, and lucky and unlucky colours, and are acquainted with the use of the magic squares. But their astrological science has been borrowed from the Hindus and Arabs. In the case of races which may truly be described as primitive, the germ of the science rather than the science itself is found, while vestigial traces of these primitive beliefs linger in the popular folk-lore of civilized countries. The belief that the weather changes with the phases of the moon is found among the Ewe peoples of West Africa, where a certain number of days' rain is said to accompany each of the four changes of the moon. At these times they are forbidden to take purgatives, and children and cattle are born. At the rising of Ezā (Orion) rain

falls for seven days in accordance with the number of stars in the group; three days' rain follows the rising of the group Atielo, while the star Toro is peculiarly favourable to huntsmen, who call this time *Ladorgbe*, 'animal chop grass' (P. Fr. Müller, 'Folkloristische Ewhetexte' (Gē-Dialekt), *Globus*, lxxix. Jan. 17, 1901). These beliefs, however, may be regarded as generalizations from imperfect data assisted by magic, rather than as originating in a magical connexion. A less doubtful case of intimate relation between celestial and terrestrial phenomena occurs in the widely distributed belief, still common in European folk-lore, that fertility of crops and success in an enterprise depend on an action undertaken under a waning moon. The Lithuanians wean boys on a waxing, and girls on a waning moon, believing that in the one case it provides strength, in the other, slenderness and grace.

An instance of a belief which most nearly approaches judicial astrology is quoted by Tylor (*Prim. Cult.*[4] i. 129) from Shortland. The Maoris when besieging a 'pa' believed that the result could be foretold by the relative position of Venus and the moon; if the planet were above the moon, the foe would conquer; if below, the home force would be victorious.

LITERATURE.—No comprehensive study of *primitive* astronomy on scientific lines has been made; reference to astronomical legends and a few identifications of stars known to the natives will be found scattered in works dealing with individual races. General principles of study will be found in E. B. Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[4] 2 vols., 1904, and A. Lang, *Myth, Rit. and Relig.* 1899. See also Sir N. Lockyer, *Dawn of Astronomy*, 1894. For ceremonies connected with the Pleiades see R. Andree in *Globus*, lxiv. no. 22. Instances here quoted are taken chiefly from W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900; Skeat-Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906; A. W. Howitt, *Nat. Tr. of S.E. Aust.*, 1906; Spencer-Gillen, *Nat. Tr. of Cent. Aust.*, 1898; A. C. Haddon, *Head Hunters*, 1901; A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, 1905; Sir G. Grey, *Polynesian Mythology*, 1855.

E. N. FALLAIZE.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (American).—**1. Sources.**—A large part of our knowledge of the astrology and astronomy of the American Indians is derived from their traditions as reported by early European and American missionaries and travellers. These writers had the advantage of contact with the various tribes before European influence had extensively modified their modes of thought, but they paid little attention to astronomical traditions. The few constellations mentioned by them are seldom identified, and the identifications are frequently indefinite or incorrect. A number of works by native authors give tribal tradition in authentic form, but little astronomy.

In Mexico and Yucatan a few codices, which escaped destruction at the hands of the Spanish priests, contain many complex astronomical symbols of which little is definitely known as yet, but from which, undoubtedly, much will eventually be learned. They are supplemented by hieroglyphs on structures and monuments. In Guatemala there is the *Popol Vuh*, or 'Book of the People' (ed. and tr. Brasseur de Bourbourg, Paris, 1861), and in Peru Salcamayhua's Spanish account of Aymara Quichua antiquities (tr. Markham, Hakluyt Society, 1873). These manuscripts either are of pre-Columbian origin or present pre-Columbian material with slight European modifications. They include some myths and legends having an astronomical basis (cf. also Brinton, *Annals of the Cakchiquels*, Philadelphia, 1885; and *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, ed. Ximenez de la Espada, Madrid, 1879). Until recently even scientific travellers have often shown indifference towards astronomical traditions, but ethnologists now recognize the importance of this subject and are collecting material which, in spite of the long contact between Indians and Europeans, affords sufficient evidence of native origin.

In North America these traditions are supplemented by a few valuable star charts. Three have recently been collected amongst the Osages, Pawnees, and Huichols (Dorsey, in *9 RBEW*, p. 378; *Field Columbian Museum Report*, xi. pl. 72; Lumholtz, in *Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History*, iii. 57 ff.). The two first are intimately associated with the ritual of the tribal secret societies. The Osage chart represents the Hyades, Pleiades, morning and evening stars, sun and moon, and probably the Milky Way and part of Scorpio. The Pawnee chart shows the Pole Star, Great and Little Bear, Northern Crown, Orion, Hyades, Pleiades, Milky Way, and probably Capella; that of the Huichols depicts as stars or constellations the Scorpion (Scorpio) and its Heart (Antares), the Deer (Taurus?), which is pursued by the Dog, a Woman bearing a child, the Crab, Beehive, Humming Bird, and other objects. The winter counts of the Western tribes represented each year by some important event, which is pictured upon a buffalo hide. Naturally they include astronomical figures. That of Lone Dog, for example, presents the meteoric shower of 1833, a comet, and a solar eclipse. The altars of Pueblo secret societies furnish numerous stellar symbols, as is shown by the researches of Cushing and Fewkes in *RBEW*, *JAFL*, and *Amer. Anthropologist*. Tablets inscribed with astronomical characters have been found at Rockford, Illinois, Mitchell Co., North Carolina, and in Missouri. Excepting the rayed solar face, crescent moon, and morning and evening stars, the characters upon these tablets have not been satisfactorily deciphered.[1]

The Mexican calendar stones present another and an elaborate source of astronomical symbolism, to which considerable study has been directed (see CALENDAR [Mexican]). Inscribed stones of astronomical significance have also been found in the Chibcha region of Colombia. The symbols seem to correspond with those ascribed to the Chibcha calendar and constellations by Duquesne (cf. Bollaert, *Antiquarian Researches*, London, 1860; also Humboldt, *Researches*, and Lemly, in *Century Mag.*, 1891, p. 885). A circular gold 'zodiac' from Cuzco presents a solar rayed face surrounded by twelve unknown symbols (Bollaert, *op. cit.* p. 146; Markham, *Cuzco and Lima*, London, 1856, pp. 107–108; Winsor, *Critical and Narrative History of America*, Boston, 1884–1889, i. 235). A wooden box from the west coast of South America figured by Kingsborough (*Mexican Antiquities*, London, 1831, iv.) presents Peruvian symbols of the sun and moon, Orion, Taurus, the Pleiades, and other constellations, but they are associated with symbols of European origin.

A most valuable source of astronomical knowledge is the Peruvian star chart of Salcamayhua, a pure-blooded Aymara of the ruling class, who wrote during the first quarter of the 17th century. With the exception of a prudential reference to the symbol of the Southern Cross, this chart presents only native concepts. It gives symbols of the sun and moon, morning and evening stars, southern pole, Coal Sack, Milky Way, and all the zodiacal asterisms (cf. Hagar, in *Compte Rendu du Congrès international des Américanistes*, Paris, 1900, p. 271 ff.).

2. Scientific knowledge.—The use of gnomons, natural and artificial, was wide-spread in America. Amongst many of the tribes there are still old men who delight in determining the seasons and the time of day by the position and direction of the solar shadows. The Pueblos have measured and named the sunrise points on the eastern horizon so as to divide the year into two periods of six months, and the time of the equinox is determined with great care. The Zuñis used as a gnomon an erect sandstone slab adorned with a solar effigy (Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday*, New York, 1901, pp. 305–306; Fewkes, *Annual Ceremonies at Walpi*, Leyden, 1895).

At Chapultepec, in 1775, a stone was found under which three crossed arrows pointed accurately to the equinoctial and solstitial sunrise points (Bollaert, in *Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London*, i. 210 ff.). The main doorway of the chief temple of Cuzco fronted the north-east, so that at the June solstice the rays of the rising sun would penetrate into the temple and illumine the solar plate at the opposite end, thus recalling the temples of Egypt and Greece; and the early Christian cathedrals oriented to the sunrise point on the day of the saint to whom they were dedicated. It is not unlikely that the orientation of Mexican and Peruvian structures will enable future investigators to determine the dates of their construction by means of the method so brilliantly pursued by Lockyer in Egypt and Penrose in Greece (Lockyer, *Dawn of Astronomy*, London, 1894). Beebe has shown that the monolithic gateway and a large stone platform at Tiahuanaco probably served as a solar dial. The

[1] See *Proceedings of Davenport Acad. of Sciences*; J. P. McLean, *The Mound Builders*, Cincinnati, 1879, p. 118; Short, *North Americans of Antiquity*, New York, 1880, p. 38. W. S. Beebe, who made a special study of the Davenport and Piqua tablets, attempted a full explanation of both. He makes the former wholly and the latter partly astronomical, but his interpretation of the latter stands little chance of acceptance in the present stage of our knowledge. A copy of his privately printed notes is deposited in the Davenport Academy, Davenport, Iowa. One is in the author's possession.

sides of the pyramids of Mexico and Central America are often aligned to the cardinal points. In Mexico, Nobel describes a perpendicular shaft in the pyramid of Xochicalco which permitted the rays of the zenith sun to fall upon an altar in an interior chamber. The shadows cast by the steps of the pyramid of Papantla were observed for calendar purposes (Humboldt, *Researches*, ii. 87), and tradition indicates a similar use of the steps and platforms at Cuzco known as the 'Monkeys' Dance.' Mrs. Zelia Nuttall, moreover (*Boas Anniversary Volume*, New York, 1906, pp. 290–299), points out various pictographs in the Mexican codices which represent priests observing the stars to determine the time. The different divisions of time were marked by the sounding of drums or trumpets in the temples. The priests used various methods to fix the position of the asterisms. They observed them through the doorway of the temple, which was elevated above the surrounding country, sometimes placing forked or bifurcated sticks within the doorway to define the position more exactly, and sometimes using a peculiar figure representing the drawn-up limbs of a seated man for the same purpose. A possible use of rows of upright sticks is also indicated.

The Peruvians are also said to have noted the solstices and equinoxes by means of the shadows cast by certain columns. Those on the equator were held most sacred, because at the equinox they cast no shadow (Garcilasso de la Vega, *Commentarios reales de los Incas*, vi. 22). These columns have never been found, but circular stone sun-dials, called *intihuatana*, 'the sun tied up,' exist on the Carmenca hill at Cuzco, where the 'columns' are said to have stood, and elsewhere. A shadow is cast thereon by a small erect stone, which, Squier suggests, may rightly have been known as the *inti rucana*, or 'sun-finger.'

Alleged telescopic tubes have been found in the mounds of the United States and in Peru (Bollaert, *op. cit.* pp. 213, 276; du Gourcq, in *Popular Science Monthly*, xlv. 832), but were probably used by the physicians, who in the latter country were expert in sucking poison from wounds and diseased tissues. The Mexican astronomers, however, seem to have employed obsidian mirrors in their observations (Nuttall, 'Fundamental Principles of New and Old World Civilization,' in *Peabody Museum Publications*, ii., Cambridge, Mass., 1901).

The more advanced American nations, such as the Mayas and Aztecs of Mexico, and the Aymaras and Quichuas of Peru, seem to have attained an astronomical knowledge nearly, if not fully, equal to that of any people prior to the invention of telescopes; they had learnt all that could be learnt by the unaided eye. Their principal practical incentive to stellar observation was the accurate determination of seed-time and harvest, this being elaborated into a calendar. They do not seem to have attained to the heliocentric system, but they knew the cause of the lunar phases, and distinguished the five brighter planets. The Mexicans estimated their synodic periods accurately, and the Peruvians observed the sun-spots (Humboldt, *Vues des Cordillères*, ii. 302, *Researches*, ii. 173; Salcamayhua, *op. cit.* p. 131; du Gourcq, *op. cit.* p. 825), large spots being sometimes visible to the naked eye through the mist or light cloud (*garua*) which is of common occurrence in Peru. In some myths the sun and other celestial bodies, and even the earth, are represented as balls or globes. This does not necessarily imply either European influence or exact knowledge. It may be an analogy derived from the supposed hollow ball of the sky.

3. Astrology.—A system of astrology was undoubtedly in vogue in America. The *Tonalamatl*, or book of lucky and unlucky days, included in the Mexican codices, indicates the propitious and unpropitious times for performing certain actions. In the Codex Vaticanus a human figure appears surrounded by the day signs, which have also zodiacal associations. The commentator says that the influence of month signs upon the moment of birth was an established belief.

'The Mexicans,' says Sahagun (*Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*, iv. Introd.), 'take much care to know the day and hour of birth of each person in order to conjecture his destiny, life, and death, but they do not base their prognostications upon the positions of the stars.' Nevertheless, the stars warn a god that he must go away in five years (H. Phillips, jun., in *Proc. of American Philosophical Soc.* xxi. 617 f. [Philadelphia]). In Guatemala diviners were called upon to determine the propitious date for each monthly festival. As soon as a child was born, it was brought before the diviner, who, observing the day of birth, told what the child would be and what disposition it would show. He announced these things after consulting a book which contained the month and day signs (Ximenez, *Las Historias del origen de los Indios de Guatemala*, Vienna, 1857, pp. 158–160). In Peru one class of priests devoted themselves to divination by observation of the stars, and the chief priest dwelt away from the Inca capital that he might observe them and meditate more freely upon them. In the solitude of the mountain deserts lived priests who contemplated and adored the stars 'almost without ceasing.' People visited them to learn about lost articles, absent friends, and future events. Even the wild tribes of Eastern Peru regard some constellations as propitious to man, others as hostile (Lorente, *Hist. del Peru*, Lima, 1860, p. 229; Markham, *Cuzco and Lima*; von Tschudi, *Travels in Peru*, New York, 1854, p. 288; 'Relacion anonima,' in *Tres relaciones de antigüedades peruanas*, pp. 157, 164, 178).

It is said that the coming of the Spaniards had been predicted many times by these observations. Atahualpa's general is quoted as saying to his ruler just before the arrival of the Spaniards became known: 'My lord, I watched the stars last night, and saw in them the presage of a great calamity.' Later, Atahualpa himself declared that the appearance of a comet in the Sword of Perseus presaged the death of a man of high rank, and that a similar sign had been seen in the skies a short time before the death of his father, Huayna Ccapac. He was murdered soon after. A diviner, by observing the appearance of the moon, is said to have foretold to Huayna Ccapac the civil war between his sons and the destruction of the Inca rule. Comets and a thunderbolt which fell upon that Inca's Cuzco palace occasioned analogous predictions. Similar prophecies in Mexico were not so clearly attributed to the stars (Garcilasso, *Commentarios reales*, tr. Markham, Hakluyt Society, v. 28, ix. 14; Humboldt, *Views of Nature*, London, 1856, p. 429; Prescott, *Conquest of Peru*, bk. ii. ch. 6).

4. Ritual.—The ceremonials of the various tribes also include astronomical features; in fact many of their elements seem to have originated in the wish to imitate on earth the aspects and movements of the celestial world. The imitations of animals in the dances of the primitive tribes arise among those more advanced to elaborate figures, dances, and processions reflecting the orderly movement of the sun and stars across the sky and the progress of time and of the seasons. The American Indians as a whole are a thoughtful and religious race, much given to ceremonials. Even their games and sports, even their ordinary details of domestic life, are made part of the religious ritual to be ceremonially performed, and from the grandest to the most insignificant details of their ritual much is based upon astronomical symbolism.

In the various ball games found from one end of the continent to the other, the movement of the ball originally represented that of the sun (Brinton,

Myths of the New World, New York, 1868, *American Hero Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 119). Among the Cherokees, prior to the contest, the opposing teams were carefully instructed in the use of magic formulæ, and the issue was supposed to depend upon the amount of magic power thereby developed (Mooney, in 7 *RBEW*, p. 301 ff.). In Yucatan and Central America the ball court itself represented the celestial field. The game was won by the player who drove the ball through a stone ring upon which two interlaced serpents, symbols of the eternal years, were sculptured. The *Popol Vuh* describes contests at this game, the result of which determined the control of *Xibalba*, or Shadow Land; and Mrs. Nuttall asserts that the ball courts were also used as astronomical observatories. The Araucanians saw the divine will in the result of the game, and used it to decide the fate of those accused of crime.

It is probable that the annual ceremonial hunts, once common in the South-western United States, formed a terrestrial imitation of the celestial Hunter, as in Peru, and foot-races also symbolized the solar journey. In the Mexican game of 'those who fly' the celestial revolution was symbolized by four men masked as eagles who circled about a pole at the end of four cords wound round it (Clavigero, *Historia*, ed. Mora, Mexico, 1844; Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 24 f.). Dice games, common in North America, reflect the celestial imagery on both dice and board. The Mexican game of Patolli uses a cruciform board representing the four celestial regions, through the divisions of which a stone marker progresses like one of the celestial bodies (Sahagun, *op. cit.* vi. 8; Culin, 'American Indian Games' in 24 *RBEW*; Nuttall, *op. cit.* pp. 82, 87). A serpent-dance in which the dancers imitated the motion of the serpent existed until recently among the Micmacs and other Northern tribes, and in Peru. In the North the dance symbolized the movement of the Pleiades across the sky (Hagar, in *Congrès international des Américanistes*, New York, 1902, and *JAFL* xiii. 92 ff.). The famous serpent-dance of the Hopis, figured on Mexican and Central American monuments, was a rain-making ceremonial performed in August under the sign of the Tiger Sun (Leo). The well-known mural paintings in the Temple of the Tigers at Chichen Itza represent a similar ceremony also dedicated to the Tiger Sun. In the Mandan buffalo-dance, twelve dancers divided into groups of four represented the cardinal points, and doubtless also the twelve regions and the months. Two of the middle four were painted black and dotted white to represent the night sky and the stars. The other two, painted red, personated the day (Catlin, in *Smithsonian Report*, 1885, p. 359), and the movement represented alternating day and night. The Natchez ceremonially gathered to watch the rising and setting solstitial sun through the doorway of their temple. The sun-dances of various tribes dramatize the progress of time and the seasons. The nocturnal Iroquois feast of the dead seems to have celebrated the return of the spirits to earth over the Milky Way in spring and fall.

At the end of each fifty-two years' period the Mexicans expected that the midnight culmination of the Pleiades would mark the end of the cosmos, or its renewal for a like period. All fires were extinguished, and the advance of the Pleiades towards the critical point was observed from the summit of the mountain called 'Hill of the Star.' The stars having passed the meridian, a fire was kindled upon the summit, from which fires were re-lighted elsewhere, and the people gave themselves over to rejoicing (Sahagun, *op. cit.* tom. i. lib. 4, tom. ii. lib. 7; Torquemada, *Monarquia Indiana*, tom. ii. 292-295; Boturini, *Idea*, pp. 18-21; Clavigero, *Storia antica del Messico*, tom. ii. pp. 62, 84, 85; Mendieta, *HE*, p. 101; Acosta, *Hist. de las Yndias*, pp. 398-399). In Peru as in Mexico this date marked the entrance of the sun into the sign of the dead, symbolizing death, destruction, and renewal.

The rising of the morning star, the Pleiades, and Gemini was hailed with songs and dances by many tribes. In Mexico there was an annual sacrifice of a human being, who enacted the yearly course of the sun. He ceremonially ascended the steps of the *teocalli*, or god-house, to represent the sun climbing from the south to the northern solstice. At the moment when the sun reached the meridian he was slain, and his body was hurled down the steps to represent the declining course of the sun after the northern solstice (Hagar, *Peruvian Astronomy*). Similarly, among the Chibchas a human victim fastened on a pole was annually slain by the arrows discharged by a ceremonial procession of people masked and costumed to represent the various zodiacal asterisms (Duquesne, in Bollaert, *Antiquarian Researches*, p. 47).

About the time of the December solstice, though in recent times not every year, the Skidi Pawnees sacrificed a maiden to the morning star. There is no reason to doubt the indigenous origin of this very remarkable and suggestive ritual, which is described in art. PAWNEE, vol. ix. p. 699[a].

In similar obstacle legends among the more advanced tribal families of the American Indians there are indications that the astronomical symbolism was itself used to typify as the ultimate meaning the progress of the human soul (cf. Dorsey, in *Congrès international des Américanistes, XVe session*, Quebec, 1907, ii. 66-70, and Natalie Curtis, *The Indians' Book*, New York, 1907, pp. 102, 103; the deductions are the writer's, and will be found further developed in his *Peruvian Astronomy*).

A monthly ritual is known to have existed among the Pueblos, Mexicans, Mayas, Central American tribes, Peruvians, and probably the Chibchas. Among all of them the features of these festivals referred to some attribute of the zodiacal asterism through which the sun was supposed to be passing at the time.

The plan of the Peruvian temple of Cacha, or 'the messenger,' as well as the remarkable legend connected with it, points to a ceremonial procession enacting the yearly course of the sun within the building. The importance of the stellar cult in Peru is indicated by the fact that the Peruvians made images of all their constellations.

5. Mythology and star-lore.—The arch of the sky was generally regarded as a kind of transparent roof, over which the heavenly bodies walk. The Chinooks on the north-west coast and the Peruvians represented it by two oblique lines meeting in an acute angle. Possibly the 'Maya arch' possessed a similar symbolism.[1] On the Peruvian box the sky is seen as a woman's breast. It forms the clothing of the Huichol eagle-goddess and of the wife of the Pawnee Spirit of Life, and is symbolized by the concave interior curve of some Central American and Pueblo vases (Dorsey, *op. cit.* p. xviii; Stevenson, *op. cit.* p. 24). Above the sky dwells the Sun Father, with his wife the Moon Mother (who is sometimes also his sister), attended by the divine pair of the morning and evening stars, and surrounded by their stellar children.

The sun and moon were regarded as the progenitors of the stars and of mankind, but seldom or never as the supreme celestial powers. They

[1] Collection of A. F. Chamberlain; Hagar, *Peruvian Astronomy*, Salcamayhua Chart.

were the objects of a celestial cult existing practically everywhere in America, in which, at different times and places, sun, moon, and various constellations seem to have assumed predominance without occasioning more than a relative change of influence. Nor is there much evidence of conflict between the votaries of the various aspects of the astronomical cults. Sectarianism was almost unknown in the natural religions of America; such tortures and persecutions as existed in Mexico, for example, had little or no connexion with religious or theological differences. In Mexican tradition two men, one of them leprous, threw themselves into a fire and came out respectively the sun and the moon.

The gender of the sun and moon is sometimes reversed. A legend found in almost identical form among the Eskimos, the Cherokees, and the Amazon tribes personifies the moon as a man who secretly visited his sister at night. She, desiring to identify her unknown visitor, rubbed upon his face some black substance, which produced the lunar spots. A similar legend occurs among the Caddos (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, Washington, 1905, pp. 11–12). The Iroquois saw in these spots an old woman who each month stirs a bowl of hominy with her cat (dog?) seated beside her. The Peruvians interpreted them as resulting from the embraces of a fox enamoured of her beauty; the Mexicans as a form of a rabbit, with which the gods struck the face of the moon, wishing to lessen its light, which formerly was as great as that of the sun. According to the Mexicans, the moon is always running after the sun, but never overtakes him. The divine being Quetzalcoatl made his son the sun, the god of water made his the moon (Phillips, *op. cit.*). The Onas of Patagonia make the sun pursue the moon (his wife) because she overheard some of the secrets of the male secret society. In terror she sprang off a cliff, the sun followed, and both jumped into the sky, where the pursuit continues (Barclay, in *Geographical Journal*, xxii. 62). In Corvichan tradition the sun, moon, and stars were shut up in three boxes, which were opened by the hero Yehl, whereupon they escaped to the sky (Deans, in *AAOJ* x. 111).

In higher Peruvian symbolism, the sun was tied by an invisible cord to the invisible pole of the sky, and was driven round it like a llama by the power of the Universal Spirit, although generally, after passing over the sky, he was thought to enter a cave in the west and to proceed by a subterranean passage to emerge next morning in the east. An equally interesting explanation of the origin of night and day is found in the Wichita legend (echoed by the Caddo) of the three deer, who are three stars, pursued by a fourth, which is a hunter who will overtake them at the end of the world. One deer is white, representing day, one black, representing night, one half black and half white, representing alternate day and night. The last was wounded, whence we have day and night (Dorsey, *Myth. of the Wichita*, Washington, 1904, pp. 21, 25–26, *Traditions of the Caddo*, pp. 13–14).

Among the Peruvian coast tribes, according to Garcilasso, the sun plunged into the western ocean and dried up the waters with his heat both where he entered and where he emerged—whence, apparently, the tides. In numerous North American legends he is visited by terrestrial travellers, whom he receives kindly, and to whom he sometimes imparts supernatural powers. The Mexicans described how he was once caught in a snare which a hero had contrived for him. This legend, which is also Polynesian, probably refers to the solstices, when the Indians generally thought of him as seated or resting, since they observed that for several days at these seasons he moved neither north nor south at his rising, but appeared at the same point on the horizon. The Mayas accordingly called these days 'the bed of the sun'; and at this time the Mexicans, Mayas, and Peruvians refrained from labour in imitation of the solar repose. The Mayas symbolized the June solstice by a tortoise, that of December by a snail, because of the slow motion of these animals (Forstemann, 'Commentary on Maya MSS' in *Peabody Museum Papers*, vol. iv. no. 1, p. 45, Cambridge, 1904; Schellhas, 'Representation of Deities of the Maya Manuscripts,' *ib.* no. 2, p. 115, Cambridge, 1906).

The Peruvians represented the sun as a bearded man in the prime of life, who impressed his footprint on a rock to mark the height of his power. This affords an explanation of a world-wide type of solar legends. Throughout America the solar rays were symbolized by hair. In Peruvian art the sun becomes the conventionalized face of a man upon which appear marks called tears by some, but perhaps having a pathological meaning. The Mexican hero Citli shoots three arrows at the sun and succeeds in wounding him. The enraged sun returns one arrow, which pierces Citli's forehead (Mendieta, *op. cit.* p. 77). The sun is the Spider Woman of some western tribes, the Ojibwa Wigwam of the Great Spirit, and the Zuñi shield of burning crystal which he carries, while the Kutenai Coyote manufactures the sun out of grease made into a ball (Chamberlain, in *AAOJ* xvii. 69). In Peru an oval plate, the symbol of the All-pervading Spirit, ultimately manifested in fire, earth, air, and water, was called the image of the true sun, of which the solar orb was only the reflexion. The sun, says the Quichua, Blas Valera, was the child of the Creator, and his light was that part of his divinity which the Creator had imparted to him. It was considered sacrilegious to look at his face; but early writers give several accounts of Inca rulers (particularly Huayna Ccapac) who did so, and who declared their scepticism of the supremacy of an object which never rested, but eternally moved upon its track like a driven animal, whose face the clouds obscured. From the nature of their light, gold was sacred to the sun and silver to the moon.

Eclipses were regarded as attacks made by some insect or animal upon the object enshadowed. In accordance with a world-wide custom, a terrific noise was made to frighten away the attacking monster, although the Tlascalans believed that the sun and moon were fighting. To induce them to cease, red-skinned people were sacrificed to the sun and albinos to the moon. The Peruvians thought the sun was angry when his face became obscured, while under like conditions the moon was believed to be ill. If her light disappeared altogether, she was dead and would fall from the sky upon earth, killing every one upon it. Dogs were beaten, as the moon was thought to be fond of them because they had rendered her a certain service, and it was hoped that their cries would induce her to uncover her face. A similar custom existed in Mexico (Ixtlilxochitl, *Hist. des Chichimèques*, Paris, 1840, cap. 6; Oviedo, *Hist. gen. y nat. de las Indias*, Madrid, 1851, xxix. 5; Piedrahita, *Hist. del Nuevo Reyno de Granada*, Antwerp, 1688, v. 1, vii. 6; Garcilasso, *op. cit.* xi. 1).

The altruistic spirit of the Pueblo community may be seen in the legend that the moon was once as bright as the sun, but gave up part of her light that people might sleep at night. According to the Sioux, the diminishing of the moon is caused by the nibbling of field mice, who thus prevent it from growing too large and injuring the earth (*Red Man*, xvi. no. 45). The profile face of the woman in the moon is figured on the Salcamayhua

chart. The Osages and the Mexicans seem also to have observed her. As the sun, being a male, watches over the fortunes of men, so the female moon is the guardian of women, to whom appeals for help were addressed in childbirth.

According to the Micmacs and Ojibwas, the stars are the lights of camp-fires before the wigwams of the dwellers in the land of the sky. Here and there we see them grouped in villages, and the brightest represent the largest fires before the dwellings of the chiefs. By other North American tribes they are described as birds that fly to the sky at night, by the Mexicans as eyes. Some Brazilian tribes regard them as rifts in the canopy of the eternally glowing sky-land (Seler, *Codex Vaticanus*, London, 1902, p. 44; Hagar, 'Micmac Star Lore,' MSS; Nery, *Land of the Amazons*, London and N.Y., 1901, p. 47). These simple and primitive notions existed coincidently with the division of the sky into constellations bearing the names of animals, plants, and frequently of inanimate objects.

Among the American tribes we find single stars named after individual objects, and groups forming true constellations; but probably nowhere in America is a constellation recognized which has become conventionalized like our own to such a degree that the derivation of the name is not really apparent from the alignment or other features. The morning and evening stars were naturally the most important of the stellar host. In the legends of the Cherokees, Peruvians, and others, the morning star appears before the first rising of the sun. It is the great star, the warrior, or messenger who goes in advance to announce the coming of his solar master. Its advent was hailed with incense and dances. It was widely symbolized by an equal-armed red cross. An Ojibwa legend makes it an older sister, who at her own desire was borne by the winds into the eastern sky, whilst her brother ran up a high mountain to hunt. So, according to Diodorus Siculus, the divine youth Hesperus went to the summit of a mountain at night to study the stars and a great wind carried him into the sky, where he became the evening star (Schoolcraft, *Hiawatha Legends*, Philadelphia and London, 1856, p. 90 ff.).

Among the Caddos the morning star was the errand man selected by the moon to be his assistant chief and to call the people together. He used to get up early during war expeditions, long before dawn, to go round the camps and wake the people so that the enemy would not find them. That is the reason why he gets up so early now. Morning Star has three brothers, Evening Star, North (Pole) Star, and South Star. Their father's name was Great Star, and he was the chief of the people (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, pp. 7–8, 15).

In America the evening star was usually regarded as a woman, because it governed the time of family re-union at home, though among the Zuñis it is the twin brother of the morning star. In Mexico it is the Lord who comes with his torch to light the dwellings on high, in Peru the female maize-grinder, the torch in the west, while among the Micmacs it is leader of the stellar tribe. Its symbol is frequently a white cross. It is the mother of all things to the Skidi Pawnee, who keeps a garden in the west in which the sun rests at night, where the corn is always ripening and much buffalo meat is stored (Schoolcraft, *op. cit.* p. 90 ff.; Cushing, *Zuñi Folk Tales*, New York, 1901, p. 378; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, pp. xv, 5; Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on 'Cult and Symbol,' pp. xv, 3). As the converse of the morning star, the Caddos believe that the evening star would go back a long distance upon the trail and warn his people if the enemy approached (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 15).

The identity of the planets, whether the morning or the evening star, was recognized in Peru, Mexico, California, and parts of South America. The Peruvians made Mercury the ruler of merchants, travellers, and messengers. The Amazon tribes call it 'Deprived of Fish,' since it is believed to cause a scarcity of food fishes. Venus, in Peru, governed the daughters of the rulers, and women generally, dawn, rains, and flowers; Mars, war and soldiers; Jupiter, public matters and food supplies, and to him they offered firstfruits. The Peruvians placed Venus alone of all the stars in the dominion of the sun, evidently because it alone is sometimes visible in the full solar light. Because of its brilliant rays they called it Chasca, 'Curling Hair.' Because of its beauty they said that the sun never permitted it to wander far from his presence—a poetical interpretation of the fact that Venus never departs as far from the sun as the major planets. They also called this planet Chasqui, 'the Messenger,' because its swift passage from star to star suggested the swift running messenger upon the highways (Hagar, *Peruvian Astron.*, ch. on 'Cult and Symbol'). In the codices it is represented by numerous symbols, in the temple of Mexico by a high column, and in the myths it is identified with Quetzalcoatl. The Californian Indians say that the sun has two daughters, Mercury and Venus. Twenty men kill them, and after fifty days they return to life (Mendieta, *op. cit.* pp. 82, 83; Nuttall, *op. cit.* p. 53; Emerson, *Indian Myths, Legends, and Traditions*, Boston, 1885, p. 481; Nery, *op. cit.* p. 251; *Explication Codex Telleriano-Ramensis* in Kingsborough, *Mexican Antiquities*, 191).

The Milky Way in North America generally, and among the Guaranis of Paraguay, was the path of spirits, over which the souls of the dead pass between this world and the sky-land of the hereafter. Those of the good follow the broader and easier arm, those of the evil-doers the narrow and difficult arm. It is the Cherokee and Pueblo 'Way of Meal,' the Micmac 'Ancient Trail' and 'Way of Reeds,' the Californian 'Backbone of the Sky,' the Pawnee 'Dust raised by Buffalo Racing.' A Zuñi legend calls it the 'Great Snow Drift of the Skies' (Stevenson, *op. cit.* p. 25; Cushing, *op. cit.* p. 581; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, p. 57; Hagar, *Cherokee Star Lore* [in *Boas Anniversary Volume*, p. 354 ff.]). In Peru and at Zuñi, as among the ancient Sumerians, it is associated with a gigantic celestial serpent. On the Osage star chart it is figured as a river, and it appears as a celestial stream in the mythology of the Peruvian and Amazon Indians. In Peru, as in the legends of the Ojibwas and Cherokees, and as in the Euphratean region, China, and Japan, this river is associated with the passage of souls. The Cherokees and the Kutenai also call the Galaxy 'the Way of the Dog,' the tribes of Guiana 'the Way of the Tapir' and the 'Path of the Bearers of Whitish Clay' (Brett, *Indian Tribes of British Guiana*, New York, 1852, p. 107; Chamberlain, in *AAOJ* xvi. 69).

In the sand paintings of the Mission Indians of California the outer circle is called 'Our Spirit,' a name of the Milky Way. The whole represents the world resting on the Milky Way. A gate or door to the north permits the escape of the soul at death.

The Cherokees recognize two dog stars, Sirius and Antares. In spite of the identical name of the former in our tradition, this is probably a native name, for it is explained by a Cherokee legend which bears no resemblance to its Oriental analogue. In it the two dogs act as guardians of

'the Way of Souls,' at the extremities of which they are stationed, and they must be propitiated with food before they will permit the souls to pass. The Winnebagoes, Ojibwas, and Huichols also recognize a dog star, and the Hindus and Zoroastrians likewise place two dogs upon the way of souls. The Caddos say that a dog gifted with prophetic powers talked with its master, the pair becoming two bright stars in the south (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 25).

The Pleiades are the most conspicuous constellation in the star-lore and ritual of the American Indians, though in North America they share the leadership with Ursa Major. Throughout America they are known as the stars of harvest and of the propitious rains. Their Peruvian name 'Granary' is echoed by the Eskimo 'Sharing-out of Food.' In allusion to their alignment they were generally known as a group of various objects: in Peru 'the Doves,' in Guatemala 'the 400 Young Men,' and in Mexico 'the 400 Rabbits,' patrons of feasting and of intoxication. They are also the Algonquian 'Sweating-Stones,' referring to the seven stones with which the sacred bath of the medicine-man was heated. Their Maya name and Micmac symbol, the rattle of the rattlesnake, suggest an association with the group of small mounds on 'the Way of the Dead' at Teotihuacan, for these mounds are traditionally dedicated to the stars, and from some of them have been exhumed large and erect rattle figures, which were evidently used as altars.

Another important aspect of the group is that of 'the Dancers,' suggested by the twinkling of the closely grouped stars. The whole stellar world follows the group, as they perform their cosmic dance across the sky; and so on earth their rising was hailed by Brazilians, Cherokees, Micmacs, and probably many other tribes, with an imitative song and dance referring more or less directly to the eternal procession of the heavens. The Iroquois, Housatunnuks, and Cherokees have, or had, an explanatory legend which describes how a group of boys, while dancing, ascended to the sky and became the Pleiades. Among the Caddos there are seven brothers who played all day long. Being scolded by their mother and refused food, they danced round the house, gradually rising from the ground until they reached the sky. As they disliked work, they disappeared in spring, when work time begins (Dorsey, *Traditions of the Caddo*, p. 64). The Blackfeet believe that they ascended because their fathers gave to their sisters, instead of to them, the yellow skins of the buffalo calves they had slain. In revenge they determined to go away each year when the buffalo calf skins became yellow. This occurs in May, when the Pleiades are hidden in the sunlight. The Kiowas call the Pleiades 'the Star Girls,' and they are probably represented by the dancing stellar maidens who descend to earth in the poetic legend of Algon. The seventh Pleiad appears in the Cherokee and Iroquois legends, in the former as a boy who is knocked down with a pole before reaching the sky, in the latter as a star whose light is dimmed because of his desire to return to earth (James Mooney, letter to author; R. W. Wilson, *AAOJ* xv. 149; Emerson, *op. cit.* p. 72; Sergeant, *Housatunnuk Indians*, Boston, 1753; Domenech, *Deserts of North America*, London, 1860; Schoolcraft, *Hiawatha Legends*, p. 116 ff.; Mrs. Erminie Smith, in *2 RBEW*, p. 80).

Almost invariably seven stars are attributed to the group, thus including one star which, though of the sixth magnitude while its companions are of the third and fourth, may be seen by one with strong sight or in a clear atmosphere. The Cherokees also relate that the seventh Pleiad fell to earth, leaving a fiery trail. He became a bearded man, who warned them of the coming flood. So in Peru the approach of the Pleiades to the meridian enabled the llamas of Ancasmarca to warn their shepherd of the coming of the annual deluge or rainy season in November. In Mexico the six *tzontemoeque*, or stars which fall at the deluge, seem to have been Taurid meteors (Mooney, in *17 RBEW*, p. 621; *Explication Codex Telleriano-Ramensis*). 'If people will look at these stars (the Pleiades),' runs the Pawnee song, 'they will be guided aright.' Many tribes actually did use them as a guide by night (Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, Rochester, N.Y., 1857, ii. 106). Everywhere the Pleiades are a peaceful, beneficent, and friendly constellation; and there are some indications in Peru and elsewhere that they were once regarded as being (or having special influence over) the home of souls.

The pole star of the Northern hemisphere seems to have been observed by all, or nearly all, the northern tribes. It is the Ojibwa 'Man who walks behind the Loon,' a disappointed lover, who, metamorphosed into a firefly, flew to the sky; in another version a hunter of bears. The Kutenai call it a female grizzly bear; but this apparently refers also to a constellation which includes Ursa Minor and Ursa Major. The Sioux declare that 'all stars walk around the pole star, which is the star that does not walk.' The Micmacs describe it as a bear hidden in a den, about which a group of hunters (Ursa Minor) eternally circle in a vain attempt to discover it. The Pawnees call it 'the star that does not move,' and regard it as the chief of the stars. In the Southern hemisphere the pole is indicated on the Salcamayhua chart as the apex of two slanting lines, which form the sky roof of the world. To it point three stars of the Southern Cross, called the male group, and having phallic attributes. The Maya name of Vega is 'Scrotum Star,' but this star ceased to mark the north pole several thousand years ago. The Peruvians used the Southern Cross to indicate the divisions of the night, the Mayas to indicate the seasons (Emerson, *op. cit.* p. 58; La Flèche in *AAOJ* vii. 106; Chamberlain, *ib.* 1770; Copway, *Traditional History of the Ojibway Nation*, London, 1850, p. 113 ff.; Dorsey, *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, pp. 3–4).

The stars of Ursa Major seem to have been called 'the Bear' by the Indians of practically the whole of British America and the United States. An accompanying legend is found in almost identical form among the various Algonquian tribes, the Housatunnuks, Iroquois, and the Cherokees, but is given most fully by the Micmacs. The four stars of the body of Charles's Wain, or the Dipper, as Americans call it, form the body of the bear. The three following stars, ϵ, ζ, η, with four trailing behind them in the form of a bow (γ, ϵ, η Bootis, and Arcturus), are seven hunters, who are pursuing the animal. The little star, Alcor, close to the second hunter, is the pot in which they intend to cook her meat. Corona Borealis and μ, δ Bootis form the den from which she climbs down in the spring. In the summer she runs across the sky with the hunters in full pursuit; in the fall she is overtaken and shot, and begins to fall over on her back. The blood from her wound causes an eternal stain upon the breast of the foremost hunter, the robin, and, dripping upon the trees of earth, it gives to the foliage its blood-red autumn hues. But the bear eternally returns to life. Through the winter she lives in her den invisible (below the horizon), to issue forth again in spring, and thus eternally to renew the celestial drama. The seasonal features of the

legend correspond accurately with the actual positions of the stars in the early evening. There is good reason to believe that this is a native legend, or at least one of pre-Columbian origin, though the earliest reference to it seems to be by Le Clerq in 1691 (Hagar, in *JAFL* xiii. 92 ff.). In connexion with the hunting concept, it is noteworthy that the Wichitas regard the Great Bear as the patron of those about to engage in war expeditions (Dorsey, *Myth. of the Wichita*, p. 18).

The Blackfeet know the principal stars of Ursa Major as seven boys, all save the youngest of whom (Dubhæ) had been killed by their sister. The Sioux call the four body stars the coffin. It is borne by four men who are followed by mourners. Mizar and Alcor are called 'She who Comes with her Young One Weeping.' The Ojibwas also called these stars 'the Fisher,' and the Zuñis represented them by seven white pebbles in the rites of the 'Priesthood of the Bow.' The Pawnees described Corona Borealis as a circle of chiefs, in whose honour was founded the society of 'Chief Dancers.'

The Belt of Orion among the Point Barrow Eskimos becomes three men who were buried in the snow, the Micmac 'Three Fishermen,' the Zuñi 'Hanging Lines,' and the Patagonian 'Three Bolas,' or round stones with which animals are slain by hunters. The Peruvians, like the Basques and the people of Deccan, call it 'the Steps.' The whole constellation is the Zuñi 'Celestial Hunter' pertaining to the sun. In Peru it is symbolized by crossed arrows, and relates to hunters and hunting. A myth makes it the Promethean figure of a criminal raised aloft for punishment by two condors. It may be connected with the Mexican Citli, 'the Bowman.' The names of a few other constellations and single stars have reached us, but present no features of special interest.

In view of the similar and wide-spread symbolism associated with some constellations in America, a more or less uniform system of celestial symbolism may have existed through a large part of the continent, similar to the primitive symbolism of the eastern continent in some elements, yet unique in others.

Unquestionably many of the symbolical concepts have been transmitted from tribe to tribe for long distances. Many of them are of pre-European, or at least of pre-Columbian, origin, and the analogies which they present with Oriental symbolism must be explained either as like effects of like independent causes or by pre-Columbian intercommunication between the continents. The weakness of the former explanation lies in the complexity and conventionality of the concepts, and in the difficulty of tracing the symbolism to any natural basis. The American zodiacs, for example, reveal analogies with the ancient Oriental zodiacs in every sign, yet in few if any instances, either in the Orient or in the Occident, are we able to explain why these signs were so named or why their symbolical attributes are what they are. The zodiac is older than its seasonal associations; its origin remains unknown, yet we find it in similar form in America and in the Orient. The same argument applies, although perhaps less forcibly, to a large part of the astronomical symbolism of America.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article.

STANSBURY HAGAR.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Buddhist).—The astronomical ideas found in Buddhism do not form an independent system, but have developed in close relation with Hindu theories. The problem is rather to determine what stages of development are to be found in the canonical and later books. Thibaut[1] divides Indian astronomy into three periods: (1) that of the Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas*, (2) the middle period with a fully developed native Indian system, (3) the third period, showing Greek influence. The Buddhist scriptures cover a long time, some of the later containing references to the Greeks, but it is to the middle period, and rather to the early stages of this, that the astronomical notions of these works belong. They are in the main the same as those that we find in the *Purāṇas*. The Hindus had two important uses for astronomy: the sacrifices and astrology, neither of which was countenanced by the Buddhists. The latter had no special motive for paying close attention to astronomical theory beyond that required for determining the periods of the lunar month with its fast-days, the period of Retreat in the rainy season, and the divisions of the day. According to *Vinaya*, ii. 217, a monk who lives in the forest is to learn 'the positions of the lunar signs (*nakṣatras*), either the whole or one section, and is to know the cardinal points.'[2] At the end of the ordination service the process of 'measuring the shadow,' *i.e.* calculating the time of day, is performed in order to determine the seniority of the monk, and he is instructed in the length of the seasons and division of the day.[3]

1. Position of sun and moon.—The heavenly bodies that we see are the vehicles of gods, who have been thus reborn through their merit, and who are associated with the thirty-three gods, but below them in rank.[4] The moon, the sun, and the constellations come as gods in the retinue of Sakka to visit Buddha,[5] and in *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 10, the moon, sun, earth, and the *asura* Rāhu occur along with the guardians of the ten quarters as world-protectors. When sun and moon occur together, the moon is always mentioned first.

In the scriptures there is no systematic description of the heavenly bodies, but the account given in the *Sārasaṃgraha*[6] corresponds to scattered notices in earlier works and probably underlies them. The earth, a flat disk, is 1,203,450 leagues (*yojanas*) in diameter and 3,610,350 in circumference. In the centre is Mt. Meru, rising 84,000 leagues above the surface of the earth, and round it circle the sun, moon, and stars, shining in turn on the four continents round Mt. Meru.[7] Night is caused by the sun passing to the other side of Mt. Meru. The diameter of the moon is 49 leagues and the circumference 147; of the sun 50 and 150 respectively.[8] The sun as the vehicle (*vimāna*) of the god is one league higher in position than the moon. It is of crystal outside, gold within,[9] and hot within and without. The moon is of silver outside, of jewel within, and cool within and without. The sun has three paths—*ajavīthi*, *nāgavīthi*, and *govīthi*—according to its apparent course in the ecliptic during the seasons along the equator, and above or below.[10] This fact appears to be referred to in the *Sīlāni*,[11] where the sun and moon are spoken of as going along their paths or out of their paths. Whether there was any early theory

[1] *Astronomie, Astrologie, und Mathematik*, Strassburg, 1899, p. 4.
[2] *Vinaya Texts*, pt. iii. (*SBE* xx. [1885]) p. 294.
[3] *Upasampadā-kammavācā*, tr. J. F. Dickson, Venice, 1875, p. 13; I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 100.
[4] *Jātaka*, no. 450. [5] *Dīgha*, ii. 259.
[6] Cosmological passages are quoted in R. S. Hardy, *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, London, 1866, appendix.
[7] *Aṅguttara*, i. 227.
[8] The ratio of the diameter and circumference of a circle is thus 1 : 3, as in *Jātaka*, v. 271. This illustrates the rudimentary character of Buddhist astronomy.
[9] We should expect gold outside, but such is the text.
[10] So, but more elaborately, in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, bk. ii. ch. 8.
[11] *Dīgha*, i. 10; cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, London, 1899, i. 20.

of the cause of revolution, apart from the choice of the god of the luminary, is not clear. The Chinese sources of A. Rémusat state that five vortices of wind support and move the vehicle of the sun in the required directions, and five other vortices similarly move the moon.[1]

2. Eclipses.—Eclipses are due to the *asura* Rāhu, who is stationed at the moon's nodes, and periodically swallows the sun and the moon. The legend that Rāhu is the monster's head, severed when he was drinking the ambrosia produced at the churning of the ocean, appears not to be early Buddhist, nor even ancient Hindu. It is absent from the account of the churning in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.[2] Buddhaghoṣa describes Rāhu not as a head, but as having a complete body, of which he gives the dimensions.[3] The Puranic notion of Ketu as the severed body of Rāhu at the descending node, although mentioned in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 164, and implied in *Abhidhānappadīpikā*,[4] 61, among the 'nine planets,' is a late borrowing from Hinduism. Two ancient *suttas* describe the moon and sun as being afflicted by Rāhu and appealing to Buddha, who commands Rāhu to let them go.[5]

3. Planets.—The stars also are said to move along and out of their paths.[6] The term here used for star is *nakkhatta* (Skr. *nakṣatra*), and probably refers to the planets, as Buddhaghoṣa understands it in this context.

The only planet distinctly mentioned in the *Suttas* is Osadhitārakā. That this is Venus may be inferred from its being described as the brightest of the luminaries next to the moon and as appearing in the morning.[7] The Sanskrit recension of the *Digha* passage in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 71, definitely identifies it with Venus by substituting Uśanas, one of the Sanskrit names of this planet, for Osadhi. The name Osadhitārakā is unexplained. The phrase *Osadhī viya tārakā*, 'like the star Osadhi,'[8] shows that it does not mean 'star of plants' (as in *oṣadhipati*, 'lord of plants [or of the *soma*-plant],' a title of the moon). The possibility that *osadhi* is a corruption of *auṣaṣi*, 'star of dawn,' is attractive, but there is nothing in texts or commentaries to support it. The same is the case with the view of Kern that it is a corruption of *osanī* = Skr. *auśanī*, a derivative of *uśanas*.[9]

4. The lunar zodiac.—The term *nakṣatra* has been from late Vedic times applied especially to 27 or 28 constellations lying roughly along the ecliptic and forming a lunar zodiac; and from the Buddhistic use of many of them as proper names it may be inferred that they were known to the earliest Buddhists. They are as follows:

(1) Assayuja (β, γ Arietis), (2) Bharapī (35, 39, 41 Arietis), (3) Kattikā (Pleiades), (4) Rohiṇī (Hyades), (5) Magasira (λ, φ Orionis), (6) Addā (α Orionis), (7) Punabbasu (Gemini), (8) Phussa or Tissa (θ, δ, γ Cancri), (9) Asilesā (ε, δ, σ, η, ρ Hydræ), (10) Maghā (Regulus), (11) and (12) Pubba- and Uttara-phagguni (δ, θ, β, 93 Leonis), (13) Hattha (δ, γ, ε, α, β Corvi), (14) Chittā (Spica), (15) Sāti (Arcturus), (16) Visākhā (Libra), (17) Anurādhā (δ, β, π Scorpionis), (18) Jeṭṭhā (Antares), (19) Mūlā (λ Scorpionis, etc.), (20) and (21) Pubba- and Uttara-asāḷha (δ, ε, σ, ζ Sagittarii), [(22) Abhijī (Vega)], (23) Savaṇa (Aquila), (24) Dhaniṭṭhā or Saviṭṭhā (Delphin), (25) Satabhisaja (λ Aquarii, etc.), (26) and (27) Pubba- and Uttara-bhaddapadā or -poṭṭhapadā (the square of Pegasus), (28) Revati (ζ Piscium, etc.).[10]

No. 22 in this list is not in the *Abhidhānappadīpikā*. It was early omitted in Hindu astronomy, but the existence of Abhijī (Skr. Abhijit) in the Buddhist system may be inferred from the statement that the number of *nakṣatras* is 28[11] and from the existence of Abhijika as a proper name.[1] It also occurs in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 165, and in the list of Rémusat.[2]

References to other fixed stars than *nakṣatras* are rare in all Indian literature. The descent of the Heavenly Ganges, a myth relating to the Milky Way, is referred to in the canon, but never in any astronomical connexion. In *Jātaka*, vi. 97, seven sages are mentioned, but their names are not those which Hindu mythology gives to the seven *ṛṣis*, after whom the seven stars of Ursa Major are named. The name Sakaṭa, 'the cart,' in *Dīgha*, ii. 234, is probably a name of Rohiṇī, as suggested by S. Konow.[3] It is so named by several Hindu astronomers.[4]

5. Months.—The moon in the course of a year may be full in any of the *nakṣatras*, and we find such expressions as *Visākhapuṇṇamā*, 'full-moon when the moon is in Visākhā'; but there had been established earlier than Buddhism a system of twelve lunar months, with names derived from certain of the *nakṣatras*. These are:

(1) Chitta (Mar.-Ap.), (2) Visākhā (Ap.-May), (3) Jeṭṭha (May-June), (4) Āsāḷha (June-July), (5) Sāvaṇa (July-Aug.), (6) Poṭṭhapāda (Aug.-Sept.), (7) Assayuja (Sept.-Oct.), (8) Kattika (Oct.-Nov.), (9) Māgasira (Nov.-Dec.), (10) Phussa (Dec.-Jan.), (11) Māgha (Jan.-Feb.), (12) Phagguna (Feb.-Mar.).

These names were later applied in Hindu systems also to the twelve solar months, but in the canon the reckoning appears to be always lunar, as well as in the Ceylon chronicles.

The month is divided into two parts (*pakkha*), the dark (*kāḷa*) from full to new moon, and the light (*sukka*, *juṇha*) from new moon to full. Whether the month ended with full or new moon is not clear, but the fact that the dark half is mentioned first and that the months of Retreat began the day after a full-moon day and ended on a full-moon day, suggests that the full-moon day was the end. Both methods were in use by the Hindus in Vedic times, as they are at the present day.[5]

6. The week.—The division of the half month at the eighth and fourteenth or fifteenth day easily led to the reckoning of seven days as a usual period (*sattāha*), but there is no trace in the Pāli writings of the system (no doubt non-Indian in origin) of naming the week-days from the names of the sun, moon, and planets. These names occur in the order of the days of the week as the first seven of the nine planets in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 164.

7. The year.—In *Aṅguttara*, i. 213, where the length of a year of the gods is given, it is said to be a year of twelve months, the month being made up of 30 nights (and days). This gives a year of 360 days, and is the exact number in use in the Vedic period.[6] The number 30 is probably obtained by adding together the 15 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would be sometimes 29 and sometimes 30, as the synodic lunar month is rather over 29½ days. There must have been a mode of intercalating months to bring the lunar months and solar year into harmony from time to time, as in the case of the Hindu systems, but the process is unknown. The modern Siamese have a year of 354 days, the months being alternately of 29 and 30 days. In every third or second year (seven times in 19 years) the eighth month is reckoned twice, and in every fifth or sixth year one day is added to the seventh month, bringing the lunar year into harmony with the solar year.[7]

The Hindu systems have two modes of beginning

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[1] *Mélanges posthumes d'hist. et de litt. orientales*, Paris, 1843, p. 83.
[2] Bk. i. ch. 9.
[3] Comm. on *Digha*, no. iv. § 6.
[4] This work (of the 12th cent.) was the chief source of the astronomical items in R. C. Childers, *Dictionary of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, but it is based largely on Hindu sources, and forms no independent evidence for Buddhist astronomy. The nine planets are the moon, sun, five greater planets, Rāhu, and Ketu (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 164).
[5] *Saṃyutta*, i. 50 f., tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in *Kindred Sayings*, London, 1918, i. 71.
[6] *Dīgha*, i. 10.
[7] *Majjhima*, ii. 34.
[8] *Vimānavatthu*, i. ix. 1.
[9] *Verspreide Geschriften*, The Hague, 1913, ii. 250.
[10] From *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, 58–60. Exact identifications of them are given by W. D. Whitney in *Sūryasiddhānta*, tr. E. Burgess, New Haven, 1860, p. 324; cf. *Nakṣatra* in A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912.
[11] *Mahāniddesa*, 382; *Jātaka*, Com. vi. 476.

[1] *Saṃyutta*, ii. 204.
[2] P. 85.
[3] *JPTS*, 1909, p. 13.
[4] H. Kern, note on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, ix. 25, tr. in *Verspreide Geschriften*, i. 217.
[5] Thibaut, p. 12; R. Sewell and S. B. Dikshit, *The Indian Calendar*, London, 1896, § 13; see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Buddhist).
[6] Thibaut, p. 7.
[7] F. J. Wershoven, *Lehr- und Lesebuch der siames. Sprache und deutsch-siames. Wörterbuch*, Vienna, 1892.

the year: (1) with the full moon of Kattika, (2) with the month Chitta.[1] The former is implied in the usual Buddhist reckoning of the three seasons, in which the cold season is always mentioned first.[2] This period was also the end of the Retreat, in which the annual redistribution of robes took place. The second mode of beginning the year is implied in the *Dīpavaṃsa* and in the list of lunar months in the *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, which begins with Chitta.[3]

8. Seasons.—The ancient Hindu seasons are three: *hemanta*, the cold season from Māgasira to Phagguna; *gimha*, the hot season from Chitta to Asalha; and *vassa*, the rainy season from Sāvaṇa to Kattika. These dates, however, would vary from year to year through the irregularity caused by the lunar months and occasional intercalation.[4]

Dīpavaṃsa, xii. 44, calls Jeṭṭha the last of the hot months. *Vassa* in the sense of Retreat does not correspond with the rainy season, but extends over three months of that period. The Hindu subdivisions of the three seasons into five or six[5] are not found in Pāli works, but there are occasional references to autumn (*sarada*) as the early part of *hemanta* and to spring (*vasanta*) as the early part of the hot season.[6] *Mahāvyutpatti*, 253, gives the list of six, and I-tsing[7] also describes other systems of division used in various localities.[8]

9. Astrology.—Indian astrology, as the science of omens drawn from celestial phenomena, is a branch of divination. It is stigmatized in *Dīgha*, i. 10, as a base science and false means of livelihood. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, 927, the monk is forbidden to devote himself to magic (*āthabbana*), to (the interpretation of) the dream, the sign, and the *nakṣatra*. That such a science is possible is generally taken for granted, but in the *Jātaka* there is a tendency to ridicule the belief in lucky *nakṣatras*,[9] omens,[10] names,[11] and sneezing. There is no reason to think that this sceptical attitude is primitive; it is rather the rationalizing of a single individual or of a school. The survival of the belief within orthodox Buddhism is shown in the collection of *suttas* drawn from the canonical books called the *Paritta*, which, among other formulas intended to ward off hostile powers or to win their favour, contains the two *suttas* on the eclipse of the moon and of the sun.[12]

A fragment of a MS of an astrological work in corrupt Sanskrit has recently been discovered in East Turkestan at Khotan.[13] It is shown to be Buddhist by the phraseology, as well as by the reference to the ṛṣi Kharuṣṭa, who makes known to the congregation the knowledge of 'nights, days, moments, planets, half-months and months.'[14] The matter is similar to that in Hindu astrological works, such as: what *nakṣatras* are effective for conception, which are causers of misfortune or success in certain undertakings. There can be little doubt that it is borrowed from some Hindu work, and, like later works of this kind, it shows the influence of Greek astronomy in the use of such terms as *hora*, and the names of the 12 signs of the zodiac (Pisces, Scorpio, etc.) along with those of the *nakṣatras*.

LITERATURE.—The sources and authorities are given throughout the article.

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[1] Whitney, p. 270. [2] *Vinaya*, i. 137.

[3] There is no reason for thinking that the year ever began with Sāvaṇa. The recurring phrase *Komudī chātumāsinī* does not mean the full moon of Kattika 'in the fourth month,' but 'at the Chāturmāsya festival.' See T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, in *Vinaya Texts*, pt. i. (*SBE* xiii. [1881]) p. 324, n. 2; *Jātaka*, vi. 221; *Dīpavaṃsa*, xv. 1. On the Chāturmāsya, or 'Four month' celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hindu).

[4] See the Commentaries on *Sutta Nipāta*, 233, p. 192, and *Vimāna Vatthu*, vii. 5, 6.

[5] Thibaut, p. 11.

[6] *Majjhima*, i. 115; *Jātaka*, i. 86; Com. on *Sutta Nipāta*, 233.

[7] Pp. 101, 219.

[8] See also art. CALENDAR (Buddhist).

[9] 49. [10] 126, 155. [11] 97.

[12] See artt. MAGIC (Buddhist) and DIVINATION (Buddhist), where the later developments of Buddhist astrology are given. See also, for modern Sinhalese Buddhism, E. Upham, *The History and Doctrine of Budhism popularly illustrated; with Notices of the Kappooism, or Demon Worship, and of the Bali, or Planetary Incantations of Ceylon*, London, 1829; for Tibetan, E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, Leipzig and London, 1863; for Chinese, Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 84 ff.

[13] *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan*, ed. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle and others, Oxford, 1916, i. 121.

[14] Cf. *Dīgha*, iii. 85.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Celtic).—**1.** Very little is known about the astrology and astronomy of the Celts. The Druids, as we learn from Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14), discussed and transmitted to their disciples many questions regarding the stars and their motion. They had observed the course of the moon, and by it they regulated their calendar. Their months and years began with the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250); they counted by nights (Cæsar, vi. 18. 2); and their cycle was one of thirty years (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250).

The discovery of the calendar of Coligny has made it possible to determine these general ideas for the Gallo-Roman period. This calendar gives a year of 354 days, divided into twelve months of twenty-nine and thirty days alternately. To establish agreement between the lunar and the solar year a month of thirty days was intercalated every two and a half years. At the beginning of every fifth year there was complete agreement between the two methods of calculation; and probably this was the occasion, as Jullian remarks, on which were offered the quinquennial sacrifices of which Diodorus speaks (v. 32. 6).

Astrology, properly so called, does not seem to have been practised by the pagan Irish. But in the 'Lives of Saints' there are to be found some superstitious practices derived from the observation of the stars. The foster-father of Columcille goes to ask a prophet when he should begin to teach the child to read. The prophet after having examined the heavens replies that he must begin immediately (*Lives of Saints from the Book of Lismore*, l. 812). Manannan mac Lir used to know by studying the sky when there would be fine weather and when bad (*Cormac's Glossary*, p. 114).

The scientific observation of stars was also in use among the ancient Irish. Loeg observes the stars to ascertain when midnight comes (*Mesca Ulad*, 13). Some treatises on Irish astronomy dating from the early Middle Ages have been preserved. They are founded on the system of Ptolemy, and seem to be translations of foreign works. The words used to denote the sun-dial are borrowed from the Latin. Yet the Irish were particularly clever at calculating dates, and in the *Saltair na Rann* it is told that every intelligent person should know the day of the solar month, the age of the moon, the flow of the tide, the day of the week, and the chief saints' festival days. Perhaps in the ancient Irish and Welsh texts there are traces to be found of the primitive Celtic calendar. The year was divided into two halves or into four periods of three months, the month being divided into two parts. The periods of time most in use were those of three nights and three days, or nine nights and nine days, while the most common cycles were those of three years and of seven years. In Armorican Brittany and in Wales the names of the complementary days which served to convert the lunar year into a solar year (Brit. *gourdeziou*, Welsh *dyddiau dyddon*) have been preserved. Several popular superstitions are attached to them. Thus a medical manuscript mentioned by O'Curry contains a list of unlucky days, and in Irish literature there are numerous examples of births delayed in order that they may take place on a lucky day, and of disasters which might have been prevented if an undertaking had not been engaged in on an unlucky day.

2. The Gallic god Belenos had been assimilated to Apollo as a healer rather than as a sun-god. We have no evidence of worship of the stars among the Gauls except a few dedications to the sun and the moon in Gallo-Roman inscriptions (A. Holder, *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896–1913), and the mention of the worship of an image of the sun (*AS*, 4 Sept. ii. 197 C). No conclusion can be drawn from the representation of stars on the shields of the Orange-arch, from the *rouelles* dug out in so great a number, or from the wheel that is an attribute of a Gallo-Roman god assimilated to Jupiter; for the stars may be ornaments or armorial bearings, and the wheel may be a divination-wheel or a symbol of the thunder as well as a symbol of the sun. Some customs of the ancients may be connected with the beliefs relating to the stars—*e.g.* the gathering of the mistletoe and the beginning of the years and months on the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 250), the dread of the Asiatic Galatians during an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. v. 78).

The evidences of the worship of the sun and the moon in ancient Ireland are not numerous. The most explicit text is in the *Confessio* (§ 60) of St. Patrick, in which he alludes to worshippers of the sun. G. Keating (*History of Ireland*, ed. D. Comyn and P. Dinneen, 1902–1908, bk. i. § 12) says that one of the Dê Danann was named Mac Gréine, 'Son of the Sun,' because his god was the sun. A passage of *Cormac's Glossary* (p. 54) tells us that Irish pagans used to carve some pictures—*e.g.* that of the sun—on the altars of their idols, and Keating (ii. 11) relates that in Columcille's time a priest of Tirconnel who had set up images of the sun and the moon in the church was carried off by a devil. The king of Ulster, Loegaire, swore by the name of the elements—the earth, the sun, and the wind (W. St. Boroma, *RCel* xiii. [1892] 52 f.).

LITERATURE.—J. Loth, 'L'Année Celtique' in *Revue Celtique*, xxv. (1904) 113-142; P. W. Joyce, *A Social History of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 464-471; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1907, i. 393, ii. 124, 141.

G. DOTTIN.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Chinese).—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—The Chinese view of the sun, moon, and stars taken as a whole may be likened to a web woven of three different threads: the thread of astronomy, the thread of religion, and the thread of astrology. Astronomy means here the observation of the heavenly bodies and the truths deduced therefrom, chiefly for practical purposes. It may therefore be called 'observational' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'physical' or 'descriptive' astronomy, founded by Galileo after his invention of the telescope, and it may also be called 'practical' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'theoretical' astronomy, founded by Newton on the hypothesis of the law of gravitation. The religious view of the Chinese concerning the heavenly bodies may be called astrological, and their astrological view may be called religious in the comprehensive sense of the term. But a clear line of distinction can be drawn between them. The idea of deity or God is always present and predominant in the religious view, whereas it may be vague and even absent in the astrological view. The latter is concerned chiefly with the influences of the heavenly bodies upon men, while the former is concerned chiefly with the relation of God to men as revealed in the heavenly bodies—*i.e.* God's messages and warnings derived by means of the observation of the heavenly bodies.

The Chinese term for the study of the heavens is *tien wen*, literally 'the system (or order) of heaven.' The term is not limited to purely astronomical knowledge, but has been applied equally to astrological and religious beliefs or views concerning the heavens.

Chinese astronomy has been of much interest to many European scholars, its great antiquity being widely admitted.

'The progress of Astronomy among the Chinese,' says John Williams, 'is a subject of highest interest whether it be considered as recording observations of the heavenly bodies made by one of the most ancient and primitive races of mankind, which appears in extremely remote time to have advanced to a high degree of civilisation; peculiar, however, to itself; and which has preserved the manners and customs established by its early rulers more than two thousand years before the Christian era, in a great measure unaltered to the present day. Or whether the fact that at a period long anterior to the commencement of civilisation among the Western nations, and when almost universal barbarism prevailed among them, astronomy had been carried to a great degree of perfection by the Chinese, as manifested by their still existing records, whose authenticity is not only strongly asserted by that people, but is acknowledged by some of the most eminent European scholars of the present day.'[1]

It has been said by some of the authorities of our own century that the antiquity of Chinese astronomy is 'greater even than that of almost any other nation.'[2] But the study of the heavens in China is not pursuit of knowledge, or astronomical knowledge, for its own sake. Being a highly practical nation, the Chinese, when they seek to know anything, generally have some end or ideal in view to the attainment of which knowledge is merely a means. The present case is not an exception. Having to arrange all their religious ceremonies, social and governmental affairs, and, most important of all, their agricultural work according to the seasons, the Chinese, even at the earliest period of their history, felt the great need of a proper calendar, the formation of which required astronomical knowledge. Apart from this, there were other motives—the religious and the astrological. The latter explains itself, and the former has a double purpose. On the one hand, the Chinese sought to know the laws of the heavens, which were for them, in some sense, divine, in order to apply them to their own conduct, social as well as individual. The doctrine of the imitation of, or the conformation of men's conduct with, the laws of the heavens has been much held by Confucianists, and especially by Taoists, and can be found in most of the Chinese classics. On the other hand, as they believed the celestial phenomena to be God's revelations or warnings to men, they wanted to know them in order to re-adjust their conduct.

Both the astronomical and the religious views of the Chinese concerning the heavens are as old as their history, and it is difficult to tell which is earlier; their astrology is a later development. The Chinese term for 'astrologer' is *êrh tse* or *sing tse*, which may be translated 'the man of sun' or 'the man of stars.' According to the Chinese records, the former term did not occur until the 5th cent. B.C., and the latter is of still later date. Kepler says that astronomy is the wise mother and astrology the foolish daughter. If we may adopt this saying with a little modification, we can regard the astrology of the Chinese as the daughter of their astronomy and religion. These three different views have for thousands of years influenced the Chinese mind, and the astrological view, though the latest, has almost since its birth been the most powerful. Even at the present day among many of the Chinese astronomy has not divorced itself from religion, nor has it disowned or rid itself of astrology, as Western astronomy has since the 16th century.

II. *THE ASTRONOMICAL ASPECTS.* — The

[1] *Observations of Comets*, London, 1871, p. vii.

[2] E. B. Knobel, 'Abstract of a Lecture on Chinese Astronomy,' in *Journal of the British Astronomical Association*, xix. [1908-09] 338.

Chinese are great believers in their ancient classics, so that to deal with their ancient views and beliefs is to a great extent to deal with their modern ones as well. The great antiquity of Chinese astronomy has been admitted by many of the best European scholars of both the last and the present century. According to tradition, a sort of calendar was invented by Fu Hsi (3328 B.C.) as a result of observations of the phenomena of the heavens. The reformation of the calendar and the rectification of intercalation are attributed to Hwang Ti, or the Yellow Emperor (2698 B.C.). In the record called *Ssŭ Ki* of Ssŭ Ma Chien, China's most famous historian (2nd and 1st centuries B.C.), it is recorded:

'Hwang Ti commanded Hi Ho to take charge of the observation of the sun, Yih Chang the observation of the moon, and Yu Chu the observation of the stars.'

He is also said to have brought into use the lunar cycle of nineteen years, by which the conjunctions and oppositions of the sun and moon can be calculated, and the intercalary months regulated. This was more than 2000 years before the introduction of the same system among the Greeks by the astronomer Meton.[1] *The Annals of the Bamboo Books*[2] record that at the time of the reign of Tsuan Hsu (beginning 2513 B.C.) a conjunction of the five planets was observed by the Chinese in the constellation called Yin Shih or Shih.[3] It has been carefully calculated and asserted by the French astronomer, Jean S. Bailly, that such a conjunction did take place on 29th Feb. 2449 B.C., which would be the 65th year of Tsuan Hsu's reign. In the time of the emperor Yaou (2356 B.C.) the Chinese already knew the exact, or almost exact, number of days in a year, had a way of determining solstices and equinoxes, and had in use an intercalary system and some instruments for the survey of the heavens, and the knowledge of the five planets and of the twelve zodiacal signs, and most probably of the 28 stellar divisions.

In the 'Canon of Yaou,'[4] the first book of the *Shu King* ('The Canon of History'), we read:

'Thereupon Yaou commanded He and Ho[5] to have reverence to the great heavens, and to calculate and delineate the movements and appearances of the sun, the moon, the stars, and the zodiacal spaces; and so to deliver respectfully the seasons to the people.

He separately commanded the second brother He to reside at Ye-e, in what was called the Bright Valley, and there respectfully to receive as a guest the Rising Sun, and to adjust and arrange the labours of the Spring. "The day," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is in Neaou;[6] you may thus exactly determine mid-spring. The people begin to disperse; and the birds and beasts breed and copulate."

He further commanded the third brother He to reside at Nankeaou, and arrange the transformations of the summer, and respectfully to observe the extreme limit of the shadow. "The day," said he, "is at its longest, and the star is Ho;[7] you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people are more dispersed; and the birds and beasts have their feathers and hair thin, and change their coats."

He separately commanded the second brother Ho to reside in the west, in what was called the Dark Valley, and there respectfully to convoy the setting sun, and to adjust and arrange the completing labours of the autumn. "The night," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is Hiü;[1] you may thus exactly determine mid-autumn. The people begin to feel at ease; and birds and beasts have their coats in good condition."

He further commanded the third brother Ho to reside in the northern region, in what was called the Sombre Capital, and there to adjust and examine the changes of the winter. "The day," said he, "is at its shortest, and the star is Maou;[2] thus you may exactly determine mid-winter. The people keep their cosy corners; and the coats of birds and beasts are downy and thick."

The emperor said, "Ah! you, He and Ho, a round year consists of three hundred, sixty, and six days.[3] By means of an intercalary month do you fix the four seasons, and complete the determination of the year. Thereafter, in exact accordance with this, regulating the various officers, all the works of the year will be fully performed."'

In the 'Canon of Hsun,' the second book of the *Shu King*, it is recorded that, having accepted the throne which had been often offered to him by the emperor Yaou, the emperor Hsun examined the gem-adorned sphere and the gem transverse tube in order to regulate the seven directors or planets.

Both the commandment of Yaou and the examination of Hsun are supposed to have taken place at the beginning of their reigns. The observation of the heavens then must have been of great importance. According to another book of the *Shu King*, called 'The Punitive Expedition of the Prince Yin,' in the reign of King Tsung Kang (2159–2146 B.C.) there were astronomers who failed to foretell an eclipse of the year 2158 B.C. (?), and it was considered such a great crime that the prince of Tin, who was then commander-in-chief of the imperial armies, received orders from the king to punish them with the imperial forces.

The Chinese then commenced their observation of eclipses from a time not later than the 22nd cent. B.C., though some European scholars regard the eclipse of the sun on 29th Aug. 775 B.C., recorded in the *Shi King* ('Book of Odes'),[4] as the earliest recorded eclipse in all history. In Ma Twan Lin's *Encyclopædia* more than 600 eclipses of the sun are recorded from 2168 B.C. to A.D. 1223. There are many other kinds of heavenly phenomena which have been keenly observed by the Chinese from a very early period as well. From 611 B.C. to A.D. 21 alone comets are recorded 372 times, as shown in Williams' *Observations of Comets*. The spots of the sun were observed and recorded by the Chinese not later than A.D. 301, *i.e.* 1308 years before the assumed first discovery of solar spots by Galileo in A.D. 1610 and 1300 years before the invention of the telescope. 48 observations of solar spots, from A.D. 301 to 1205, are recorded in Ma Twan Lin's *Encyclopædia*, which was published in A.D. 1323, *i.e.* 288 years before Galileo's observation. In the same *Encyclopædia* a great number of instances of the observation of moving or shooting stars are recorded from 1122 B.C. to A.D. 1230. Meteors have been observed, and recorded by the Chinese since, as early as 1578 B.C. The *Bamboo Books* record: 'In the tenth year [of the emperor Kwei of the Hia dynasty, *i.e.* 1579 B.C.] the five planets went out of their courses. In the night stars fell like rain.' Comparing it with the year A.D. 1866, remarks E. B. Knobel, when they had the great display of meteors, the interval gave 104 periods of 33·11 years. Now Leverrier's period for the November meteor is 33·25. Thus it is hardly possible to doubt that

[1] See Williams, *Observations of Comets*, Introduction.

[2] A large collection of ancient documents, discovered A.D. 279; see James Legge's tr. in *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, vol. iii. pt. i.

[3] One of the 28 stellar divisions determined by α, β, and other stars in Pegasus, extending north and south from Cygnus and Piscis Australis and east and west 17° and comprising part of Capricornus and Aquarius.

[4] Legge, *Chinese Classics*, vol. iii. pt. i. [1865] pp. 15–27.

[5] Names of two families which had been hereditary officers of the Board of Astronomy since the time of Hwang Ti.

[6] Neaou is a space of heavens extending over 112° and embracing the seven constellations of the southern quarter. The star in Neaou is, according to the view held by Chinese scholars and adopted by many Western scholars, such as James Legge, John Williams, etc., the star Tsun Hwuo, corresponding to Cor Hydra. After an elaborate calculation Williams says (p. xi) that that star should culminate at sunset on the day mentioned in the *Shu King*. He then says: 'Thus a strong presumptive proof is again afforded of the veracity of the Chinese history as recorded in the *Shu King*.'

[7] The central star of the seven constellations of the eastern quarter, corresponding to the heart of Scorpio.

[1] The central star of the seven constellations of the northern quarter, corresponding to β Aquarii.

[2] The culminating star of the seven constellations of the western quarter, corresponding to the Pleiades.

[3] 'When it it said,' says the editor of Yung Ching's *Shu King* (James Legge's tr.), 'that the year consists of 366 days, we are to understand that Yaou was speaking in round numbers. The period in question is now called the value of the years. It has been differently estimated by the astronomers of successive dynasties.'

[4] II. iv. 9; Legge's tr., London, 1876, p. 229 *f.*

we have here the earliest record of a shower of those meteors.[1]

III. *DIVISION OF THE STARS.*—1. **The 28 siüs or shês.**—In common with the Hindus, Arabs, Babylonians, Persians, and Copts, the Chinese have the division of the ecliptic into 28 mansions, which are called *siüs* or *shês*. According to the interpretation of Ssu Ma Kuang, a great scholar of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1279), *shê* has the meaning 'to reside (or to stop) somewhere' and *siü* means 'an abode,' and both words express the idea of the sun, the moon, and the five planets in their revolution residing in turn in the divisions of the sphere indicated as the 28 abodes. This meaning is very similar to that of the Hindu *nakṣatras* ('stars' or 'asterisms') and the Arabian *manāzil al-kamar* ('lunar mansions'). There is, according to Knobel's calculation, a concordance of the determinants of the *siüs*, the *nakṣatras*, and the *manāzils* in fifteen divisions, of the *siüs* and the *nakṣatras* in four divisions, of the *siüs* and the *manāzils* in five divisions, and of the *nakṣatras* and the *manāzils* in four divisions. This remarkable resemblance attracted the attention of many Western scholars and seemed to them a sufficient reason for presuming that all three systems sprang from a single source. The conclusions arrived at are different. Some hold that the system originated in India and the Chinese borrowed it from there; others are of opinion that the Chinese borrowed from the Arabs; another opinion is that the Babylonians were the originators; while still others say that the origin is to be found in Central Asia or some part of Persia. Unfortunately none of these conclusions is supported by satisfactory evidence.

But there are differences as well as resemblances between these three systems, and the Chinese division has its own peculiarity. The Chinese divisions are very unequal in the angular intervals and therefore cannot present the daily stations of the moon, as the Hindu divisions do. They are measured on the equator rather than on the ecliptic. According to G. Schlegel,[2] there is no connexion at all between the Chinese asterisms and the lunar zodiac. Some of the names of the 28 *siüs* were known to the Chinese as early as the time of the emperor Yaou (2356 B.C.), while the earliest Babylonian record concerning the lunar mansions and the earliest Hindu record of the *nakṣatras* named after the Vedic deities are much later than that.[3]

The *nakṣatras*, in their recent forms at least, are apparently assimilated to the Chinese *siüs*, and the whole system of junction stars is undoubtedly an imitation of them.[4]

J. B. Biot and his son were the first to demonstrate the identity of the Chinese *siüs* and the 28 lunar mansions of the Hindus and Arabs. They concluded that this arrangement of celestial divisions was invented by the Chinese and borrowed from them by the Hindus and Arabs for purely astrological purposes.

'To this day,' says J. J. M. de Groot, 'no considerations of importance have cancelled these views [of Biot], and though they have been rigorously combated by Weber, Max Müller, and other authorities of renown, yet it seems that most investigations of oriental astronomy silently subscribe to them.'[5]

[1] *Journ. of the British Astronomical Association*, xix. 337–345.
[2] *Uranographie chinoise*, The Hague, 1875.
[3] *Observatory*, xxxii. [1909] 187.
[4] According to Agnes M. Clerke's art. 'Zodiac' in *EBr*[11], the *siüs* were of Chinese invention and the *manāzils* were of Indian derivation. The *nakṣatras* in their recent organization were, as far as possible, assimilated to the Chinese *siüs*. 'The whole system of junction stars,' she says, 'was doubtless an imitation of the *sieu*; the choice of them by the Hindu astronomers of the 6th century A.D. was plainly instigated by a consideration of the Chinese, compiled with a widely different intent.'
[5] *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, bk. i. vol. iii. p. 974, footnote.

2. The twelve kungs.—Besides the division of the lunar cycle into 28 unequal mansions, the Chinese, in common with the Hindus and Western nations, divide the zodiac into twelve equal parts as follows:

(1) Ta Liang, Aries-Taurus; (2) Hsi Chen, Taurus-Gemini; (3) Tsun Hseo, Gemini-Cancer; (4) Tsun Go, Cancer-Leo; (5) Tsun Vi, Leo-Virgo; (6) Hseo Sing, Virgo-Libra; (7) Ta Ho, Libra-Scorpio; (8) Sai Mu, Scorpio-Sagittarius; (9) Sing Ki, Sagittarius-Capricorn; (10) Huan Hio, Capricorn-Aquarius; (11) Tsu Tsu, Aquarius-Pisces; (12) Hiang Lo, Pisces-Aries.

These names are found in Chinese books written several centuries B.C.—*e.g.*, *Tso Tsuan*, *Êrh Ya*, etc. The Hindu zodiac signs, which are probably of Greek origin, entered China at a much later date.

3. The four quarters and the five kungs.—The Chinese divide the heavens into four quarters. The eastern quarter is called Tsang Lung ('the Blue Dragon') and is associated for astrological purposes with the season of spring, the planet Jupiter, the element wood, the colour blue, the taste sour, and the virtue of benevolence. The southern quarter is called Chü Niaou ('the Red Bird') and is associated with the season of summer, the planet Mars, the element fire, the colour red, the taste bitter, and the virtue of propriety. The western quarter is called Pe Hwu ('the White Tiger') and is associated with the season of autumn, the planet Venus, the element metal, the colour white, the taste hot, and the virtue of righteousness. The northern quarter is called Hsüan Wu ('the Black Warrior,' or 'the Black Tortoise,' as it has also been interpreted) and is associated with the season of winter, the planet Mercury, the element water, the colour black, the taste salt, and the virtue of wisdom.

In Ssü Ma Chien's *Ssü Ki* the stars are divided into five *kungs*, or palaces—middle palace, eastern palace, southern palace, western palace, and northern palace. The middle palace consists of the northern circumpolar stars, and the other four are like the four quarters stated above. This system of division is followed by Pan Ku in his *History of the Later Han Dynasty*.

4. The three yuans and the two kuans.—The three *yuans* (palaces or stellar spaces) are (1) Tsu Vi Yuan (the Middle Palace), consisting of the northern circumpolar stars, (2) Tai Vi Yuan (the Upper Palace), consisting of stars in Leo, Virgo, Corvus, etc., and (3) Tien Ssu Yuan (the Lower Palace), bounded by two chains comprising Hercules, the upper part of Ophiuchus, etc.

The two *kuans*, or kinds of officers, are (1) *tsung kuan*, the internal officers, consisting of groups of stars inside the equator, and (2) *wusi kuan*, the external officers, consisting of groups of stars outside the equator.

This system of the division of the heavens is peculiarly Chinese and is very ancient. In the *Tien Wun*, consisting of eight chapters, written by Wu Hian, an astronomer of the Yin (or Shang) dynasty (1766–1122 B.C.), the astronomer assigned to the Middle Palace four seats or officers, consisting of eight stars, to the Upper Palace one seat, consisting of one star, to the Lower Palace four seats, consisting of eight stars, to the internal officers five seats, consisting of 24 stars, and to the external officers nineteen seats, consisting of 93 stars. In the *Tien Wen Sing Chan*, written by Kan Te, an astronomer of the state of Tsi, and the *Tien Wen*, written by Hsi Hsen, an astronomer of the state of Wui (both astronomers lived about the 4th cent. B.C.), the method of division is identical with that of Wu Hian, but the numbers of officers and stars are greatly increased. Adding these estimates together, we get 283 officers, consisting of 1464 stars.

5. The three yuans and the 28 siüs.—There is a

popular book consisting of 31 songs by Tan Yuan Tsu of the Sui dynasty (589-617), called *Pu Tuen Ko*. It divides the stars into three *yuans* and 28 *siüs*. There are in all 193 *kuans*, or officers, consisting of 1457 stars. The stars which have been named by the Chinese are not many more than this, except in the book of Chang Heng, which gave 320 *kuans*, consisting of 2500 stars, and, besides these, 11,520 stars. This system of division is followed by Ma Twan Lin and others.

IV. *THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS.*—**1. Animistic view.**—The animistic view which the Chinese took of many things in nature is seen in their attitude to the sun, moon, and stars. Many of them regard the heavenly bodies not as merely inanimate bodies, but as dwelling-places of spiritual beings or as spiritual beings themselves; *e.g.*, there is, it is said, a cock in the sun and a hare in the moon, the palace of angels; the hare is said to be sitting under a tree pounding medicine in a mortar. Those spiritual beings have superhuman powers, though the supreme power is not attributed to any of them, but to *Tien*, *Shang-ti*, or God alone. Hence the movements and appearances of the heavenly bodies are not regarded as mechanical, lifeless, or inevitable, for within or behind them there is a will which causes them. This will may be the will of the heavenly bodies, of the spiritual beings who dwell in them, or of God, the Supreme Ruler.

2. Comparison of the heavens with the earth.—In the heavens there are the sun and the moon; correspondingly on the earth there are the *yang* and the *yin*, the two contrary conceptions applied to phenomena mental and moral as well as physical. *Yang* is the male principle, associated with heat, day, etc., and *yin* is the female principle, associated with cold, night, etc. Hence the sun is called 'the great *yang*,' and the moon 'the great *yin*.' It is also said that the sun is 'the crystallization of the *yang*' and the moon 'the crystallization of the *yin*.' The five planets are said to correspond to the five elements of the earth, and therefore Mars is called 'the planet of fire,' Mercury 'the planet of water,' Venus 'the planet of metal,' Jupiter 'the planet of wood,' and Saturn 'the planet of earth.' Similarly, the different stars and constellations are believed to correspond to the various portions of the surface of the earth. In the chapter called *Tien Kwan* ('The Heavenly Officers') in Ssŭ Ma Chien's *Sŭ-Ki*, in which all the beliefs mentioned above may be found, we read: 'The twenty-eight *siü* or constellations correspond to the twelve *chows*, or provinces. . . . The source of this (saying or belief) is of remote antiquity indeed.'

It is a popular saying in China that 'the stars of the heavens above and the configurations of the earth beneath correspond with each other.' A great number of stars—*e.g.*, the twenty stars constituting the two chains of the Tien Ssu Yuan, or the Lower Palace—are believed to correspond to certain countries in China and are given the names of those countries.

In some of the ancient books the heavens are said to be spherical and the earth square, the heavens dynamic and the earth static. There are also ancient stories or mythologies which represent the heavens as having a hollow place in the north-west round which all the stars revolve, and the earth as having a hollow place in the south-east towards which all the waters run.

3. Comparison of the heavenly bodies with men.—Heaven, earth, and men are believed to be the three great powers or genii in the universe. The heavenly bodies are regarded not merely as separate individuals, but as having a society like that of men. As the Chinese state was an empire, so the heavenly society was believed to be an empire. This can be observed in the names of the stars. The coining of significant poetical or mythological names for the heavenly bodies was probably to render easier the task of discriminating and remembering them. Many stories grew round those names, which are regarded by some as fables and by others as true. According to the names of the stars in the Tai Vi Yuan, the Upper Palace, the northern polar star (Polaris) is where the emperor is. The reason is quite plain, as Confucius said: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue is like the northern polar star, which keeps its place, and all the other stars turn towards it.'[1] The Great Bear, or the Spoon, as it is called in China, is said to be the imperial chariot, and its motion round the northern polar star is said to be the emperor viewing his empire in all directions. Names of some of the other stars are: the Empress's Palace, Crown Prince, Prince, Princess, Guards, Civil and Military Officers, Law-Court, Prison, Armoury, Storehouse, Kitchen, Bed, Canopy, etc.

4. Relation between the heavenly and the earthly empires.—These two empires are not separated from one another without inter-communication. *Tien*, or *Shang-ti*, the Supreme Ruler, governs both, but the heavenly one more directly. The ruler of the earthly empire used to be called Tien-tsu, 'the son of Tien (or God).' Enthronement used to be regarded as the appointment of God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. Therefore, when the Son of Heaven was good and his empire well governed, auspicious phenomena used to appear from God in the heavens, and, when he was bad and his empire in disorder, threats used to appear. There are many heavenly phenomena which are regarded as God's threats—notably eclipses. The *Canon of Odes* refers to an eclipse of the sun of the date 29th Aug. 775 B.C., which was carefully verified by John Chalmers.

'The sun was eclipsed—
A thing of very evil omen,
First the moon looked small,
And then the sun looked small,
Henceforth the people
Will be pitiable indeed.
The sun and moon presage evil
By not keeping to their proper paths;
All through the kingdom there is no [good] government.
Because good men are not employed.
For the moon to be eclipsed
Is a small matter,
But now the sun is eclipsed,
How dreadful is that!'

In the Confucian classic called *Tsun Tsiu* ('Springs and Autumns') the eclipse of the sun which took place on 20th April 610 B.C. is recorded. The writer says:

'On the occasion of an eclipse of the sun, the Son of Heaven should not have his table spread so lavishly as usual, and should have drums beaten at the altar to the spirits of the land, while the feudal princes should present offerings of silk to the spirits of the land and have drums beaten at their courts, thus manifesting their own service of the spirits and so teaching the people to serve their rulers, according to the respective rights of each, as was customary in ancient days.'

The word 'eclipse' used here is the same as the word 'eat.' The eclipse of the sun or the moon is described, in some of the Chinese stories, as the sun or moon being eaten by a certain animal, and the beating of drums is said to frighten the animal away.

The sun in the heavens is also said to correspond to the ruler on the earth; *e.g.*, when the people wished the death of Kie, the tyrant (reigned 1818–1753 B.C.), they said: 'O sun, why expirest thou not? Let us die together with thee.' Therefore the eclipse of the sun is generally regarded as a threat from God to the emperor. There are

[1] *Analects*, bk. ii. ch. 1.

numerous examples, and the edict of the emperor Ming Ti (A.D. 227–239) after the eclipse of the sun in 233 is most illuminating:

'We have heard,' says the emperor, 'that if a sovereign is remiss in government, God terrifies him by calamities and portents. These are divine reprimands sent to recall him to a sense of duty. Thus, eclipses of the sun and moon are manifest warnings that the rod of empire is not wielded aright. Ever since We ascended the throne, Our inability to continue the glorious traditions of Our departed ancestors and carry on the great work of civilization has now culminated in a warning message from on high. It therefore behoves Us to issue commands for personal reformation, in order to avert impending calamity. The relationship, however, between God and man is that of father and son; and a Father, about to chastise his son, would not be deterred were the latter to present him with a dish of meat. We do not therefore consider it a part of Our duty to act in accordance with certain memorials advising that the Grand Astrologer be instructed to offer up sacrifices on this occasion. Do ye governors of districts, and other high officers of State, seek rather to rectify your own hearts; and if anyone can devise means to make up for Our shortcomings, let him submit his proposals to the throne.'[1]

Comets, even more than eclipses, are regarded as God's threats. When the comets appeared in 524 B.C., travelling eastward towards the Milky Way, an officer said: 'This is a broom to sweep away the old, and give us new. God often makes us such signs. The feudal princes will suffer from calamities by fire.'[2] The stars or the spiritual beings who dwell in them sometimes descend from the heavens, either by themselves or by the will of God, are born on earth, and go back to their positions in heaven after their earthly life.

In *The Annals of the Bamboo Books* there are the following legends:

'He's mother (the mother of Hwang Ti, 2968 B.C.) was called Tu Paon. She witnessed a great flash of lightning, which surrounded the star Chu (or Dubhe) of the Great Bear with a brightness that lighted all the country about her, and thereupon became pregnant.'

'His mother was called Niu Tsie. She witnessed a star like a rainbow come floating down the stream to the islet of Hwa. Thereafter she dreamed and received it, and was moved in her mind, and bore *Shaon-Haon* [the emperor Che, 2597 B.C.].'

'His mother was called Niu Chu. She witnessed the *Yaou Kwang* star (or Bemtuash) go through the moon like a rainbow, when it moved herself in the palace of Yio-Fang, after which she brought forth *Tsun Hu* [the emperor, 2513 B.C.].'

'His mother was called *Sis-Ki*. She saw a falling star which went through the constellation Maou, and in her dream her thoughts were moved till she became pregnant, after which she swallowed a spirit's pearl, . . . and gave birth to *Yu* (king 2205 B.C.) in Shih Nio.'

There are 28 heroes in Chinese history who were believed to be the 28 *siüs*, or constellations, descended. A great man on earth may become after death a spiritual being in heaven and dwell in one of the stars. Some stars are named after historical heroes. There are a great many stories, love stories, and mythologies based upon beliefs of this kind.

5. Sacrifices.—We read in the 22nd book called *Ki Tung* ('The Foundation of Sacrifices') of the *Li Ki* ('The Book of Rites'), a collection of treatises on the rules of propriety or ceremonial usages, one of the five Confucian books or canons:

'Of all the methods for the good ordering of men, there is none more urgent than the use of ceremonies. Ceremonies are of five kinds, and there is none of them more important than sacrifices.'[3]

Among various sacrifices there are sacrifices to the sun, moon, and stars. We do not know when these rites began, but they have been performed under each dynasty from the 23rd cent. B.C. down to the time of the present Republic of China. In the 20th book of *Li Ki*, called *Ki Fâ* ('The Laws of Sacrifices'), it is said:

'With a blazing pile of wood on the Grand altar they [the Emperors, from Emperor Shun 2255 B.C. to King Wu 1122 B.C.] sacrificed to Heaven;[4] by burying (the victim) in the Grand mound, they sacrificed to the Earth. (In both cases) they used a red victim.[1]

By burying a sheep and a pig at the (altar of) Great brightness, they sacrificed to the seasons. (With similar) victims they sacrificed to (the spirits of) cold and heat, at the pit and the altar, using prayers of deprecation and petition; to the sun, at the (altar called the) royal palace; to the moon, at the (pit called the) light of night; to the stars at the honoured place of gloom; to (the spirits of) flood and drought at the honoured altar of rain; to the (spirits of the) four quarters at the place of the four pits and altars; mountains, forests, streams, valleys, hills, and mounds, which are able to produce clouds, and occasion winds and rain, were all regarded as (dominated by) spirits.'[2]

In the 21st book of *Li Ki*, called *Ki Î* ('The Meaning of Sacrifices'), it says:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated. The sovereigns of Hsiâ [dynasty, 2205–1766 B.C.] presented it in the dark. Under the Yin dynasty [1766–1122 B.C.] they did so at noon. Under the Kau [dynasty, 1122–255 B.C.] they sacrificed all the day, especially at daybreak, and towards evening.

They sacrificed to the sun on the altar, and to the moon in the hollow;—to mark the distinction between (the) gloom (of the one) and (the) brightness (of the other), and to show the difference between the high and the low. They sacrificed to the sun in the east, and to the moon in the west;—to mark the distinction between (the) forthcoming (of the former) and (the) withdrawing (of the latter), and to show the correctness of their (relative) position. The sun comes forth from the east, and the moon appears in the west; the darkness and the light are now long, now short; when the one ends, the other begins, in regular succession;—thus producing the harmony of all under the sky.'[3]

These are the sacrifices at the equinoxes; that to the sun at the vernal equinox in the eastern suburb, and that to the moon at the autumnal equinox in the western suburb. These had been performed under each dynasty, and can also be found in *Ta Tsing Tung Li* ('The Ritual of the Manchu Dynasty'). The former is called *Chow Zi*, 'The Morning Sun,' and the latter *Si Yüe*, 'The Evening Moon.'

In the dynasty of Chin (255–206 B.C.) they sacrificed to what they called the eight gods, *i.e.* the god of the heavens, the god of the earth, the god of war, the god of the *yin*, the god of the *yang*, the god of the sun, the god of the moon, and the god of the four seasons. In *Han Shu* ('the Book [or History] of the early Han Dynasty') [206 B.C.–A.D. 25] it is said: 'There were such eight gods in the ancient times, but their origin is unknown.'

In the dynasties after the China dynasty different temples were built for their sacrifices. Even at the present day temples connected with the sun, moon, and stars can be found in different places. In Peking there is the world-famous Tien Tan ('Temple of Heaven'), and in it there are altars of the sun, of the moon, of the 28 constellations, and of some other stars and groups of stars. In the Manchu dynasty (1644–1911) sacrifices were offered in the Temple of Heaven once every spring and once every autumn. Even since the establishment of the Republic of China (1911), a grand sacrifice was offered in the Temple of Heaven by Yuan Shi Kai, the first Chinese President.

The 15th of the eighth lunar month is a Chinese holiday called *Tsung Tsiu Tse* ('the mid-autumn holiday'). The moon is said to be always at its fullest and brightest on this evening if it is visible, whereas this need not be so on the same date of other lunar months. A family festival used to be, and in some places still is, held in Chinese houses on that evening. The offerings to the moon consist chiefly of fruits, and the ceremony is similar to that of Chinese ancestor-worship. On this holiday schools, shops, etc., are closed, and farmers cease work for a few days. Relatives and friends exchange presents, chiefly

[1] H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals*, London, 1915, p. 180.
[2] *Ib.* p. 53.
[3] Tr. J. Legge in *The Sacred Books of China*, pt. iv. (*SBE* xxviii. [1885] 236).
[4] On the blazing pile were placed the victim and pieces of jade; in the square mound were buried the victim and pieces of silk.

[1] Red was the special colour of victims under the Chow dynasty.
[2] *SBE* xxviii. 202 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 218 f.

eatables, and invite each other to dinner on one or more of the days following the mid-autumn holiday.

With regard to the sacrifices to the stars we read in *Urh Ya*, an ancient dictionary, one of the Thirteen Confucian Classics: 'The sacrifice to the stars is called Pu.' Even in our day tablets of stars can be found in public temples and private houses in different provinces.

6. Significance or purpose of sacrifices.—The significance of these sacrifices is not merely religious, nor is their religious significance always the most prominent. Sometimes these rites were used for political purposes by the rulers. This is the case not only in ancient times; there was a time in our present century when *Shinkio Riyo Mondai* ('The Problem of the Utilization of Religions') was of great interest to statesmen and politicians in Japan, and the political significance of the sacrifices at the Temple of Heaven performed by Yuan Shi Kai was sufficiently obvious. When the sacrifices are performed by the people, their purpose is sometimes social as well as religious. In any case the idea of keeping up the custom seems to play a great part. Western scholars are apt to take these sacrifices purely as the expression of religious faith and devotion. The following passages in *Li Ki* may show that they are not always so.

As sacrifices are the most important of ceremonies or rites, let us first indicate the purposes for which they are offered.

'The rites to be observed by all under heaven were intended to promote the return (of the mind) to the beginning (=Creator of all); to promote (the honouring of) spiritual Beings; to promote the harmonious use (of all resources and appliances) of government; to promote righteousness; and to promote humility. They promote the return to the beginning, securing the due consideration of their originator. They promote (the honouring) of spiritual Beings, securing the giving honour to superiors. They promote the (proper) use of all resources, thereby establishing the regulations (for the well-being of) the people. They promote righteousness, and thus there are no oppositions and conflictings between high and low. They promote humility, in order to prevent occasions of strife. Let these five things be united through the rites for the regulation of all under heaven, and though there may be some extravagant and perverse who are not kept in order, they will be few.'[1]

There are two other passages, one of which indicates the objects to whom sacrifices should be offered and the other the purposes of the sacrifices.

'According to the institutes of the sage kings about sacrifices, sacrifice should be offered to him who had given (good) laws to the people; to him who had laboured to the death in the discharge of his duties; to him who had strengthened the state by his laborious toil; to him who had boldly and successfully met great calamities; and to him who had warded off great evils.'[2]

'Sacrifices were for the purposes of prayer, or of thanksgiving, or of deprecation.'[3]

The sun, moon, and stars fall under none of the above five classes except that in later dynasties some stars were sacrificed to for the power of warding off evils. With regard to the three purposes that of thanksgiving seems to be the sole motive for which the Chinese sacrificed to the sun, moon, and stars.

The Chinese were grateful to the sun, moon, and stars, and expressed their gratitude by means of sacrifices, because, says a passage: 'As to the sun and moon, the stars and constellations, the people look up to them.'[4] The phrase 'look up to' (*jan yang*) in this case has an ethical meaning, as when we speak of looking up to a great man with a view to modelling our behaviour on his. The Chinese believed that they could adjust their conduct by observing the appearances and movements of the heavenly bodies, which were regarded as God's revelation.

[1] *Li Ki*, xxi. i. 20 (*SBE* xxviii. 219 *f.*).
[2] *Ib.* xx. 9 (*SBE* xxviii. 207 *f.*).
[3] *Li Ki*, ix. iii. 28, in *Sacred Books of China*, pt. iii. (*SBE* xxvii. [1885] 448.
[4] *Li Ki*, xx. 9 (*SBE* xxviii. 209).

There seem to be other reasons why the Chinese should be grateful to the sun, moon, and stars—especially to the sun for its great and various benefits—but the fact is that they attribute these benefits to *Tien*, God, rather than to the heavenly bodies themselves. Indeed their sacrifices to these bodies are sometimes an indirect way of expressing their gratitude to God.

7. Sun-worship, moon-worship, and star-worship.—Is there, or has there been, sun-worship, moon-worship or star-worship in China? The answer to this question depends upon what we mean by the term 'worship.' If by worship we mean the 'adoration, sacrifice, praise, prayer, thanksgiving, or other devotional acts performed in honour of the Supreme Being or God,'[1] it is certain that there is no such worship in China, and perhaps also that such worship has never existed there. None of the heavenly bodies is conceived by the Chinese as the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is, for them, *Tien*, God, and God only. Nor can we find such worship in China if we take the term 'worship' to mean (1) the 'prostration which arises in presence of a superior being on whom we are absolutely dependent and whom we fear or reverence,' or (2) 'the feeling and act of worship' which 'involves primarily submission and fealty,' and 'is the attitude of the weak to the strong on whom they are absolutely dependent.'[2] The Chinese do not regard themselves as absolutely dependent on any of the heavenly bodies or on the spirits dwelling in them, but they regard the heavenly bodies or their indwelling spirits as dependent on *Tien*, 'God,' as they themselves are. It is true that they believe these heavenly bodies to possess powers which do not belong to men, but they also believe that men have powers which these bodies do not possess. What is more, some of them believe that certain men have the power of subjugating the spirits of the heavenly bodies, as magicians have the power of controlling spirits.

There are certain passages which have been regarded as evidence of sun-worship in China. In the 9th book of *Li Ki*, called *Kiáo Teh Sêng* ('The Single Victim at the Border Sacrifices'), a passage says:

'At the (Great) border sacrifice he [the Son of Heaven] welcomed the arrival of the longest day. It was a great act of thanksgiving to Heaven, and the sun was the chief object considered in it.'

Legge, commenting on this, says:

'The sun became for the time the "spirit-tablet" of Heaven. Fang Küeh says: "(The Son of Heaven) was welcoming the arrival of the longest day, and therefore he regarded the sun as the residence (for the time) of the spirit of Heaven. That spirit could not be seen; what could be looked up to and beheld were only the sun, moon, and stars."'[3]

The present writer need not give his own translation here, but he must point out that the idea that the sun was regarded as the residence of the spirit of Heaven is not implied either in Fang Küeh's commentary or in the text.

With reference to the passage in the book[4] on the meaning of sacrifices, namely:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of the gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated.'

Khân Hâo, a Chinese commentator, says, according to Legge:

'Heaven is the great source of tâo (the course of nature and duty), and of all the visible bodies which it hangs out, there are none greater than the sun and moon. Therefore, while the object of the suburban sacrifice was a grateful acknowledgment of Heaven, the sun was chosen as the resting-place for its spirit (or spirits). The idea in the institution of the rite was deep and far-reaching.'[5]

[1] *The Century Dictionary of the English Language*, London, 1889, *s.v.* 'Worship.'
[2] *DPAP* ii. 822.
[3] *SBE* xxvii. 427, n. 1.
[4] *Li Ki*, xxi. i. 18.
[5] *SBE* xxviii. 218, n. 2.

The same remark may be made on the translation of this passage, viz. that there is neither in the text nor in the commentary the idea that the sun was chosen as the resting-place of the spirit (or spirits). The ultimate purpose in both these cases was to express gratitude by means of sacrifices to Heaven, but not to the sun or the spirit of the sun. Heaven is invisible, and they thought that for the object of sacrifice something visible was required. Therefore the sun was chosen as a symbol. Neither of these two cases therefore can be regarded as an example of sun-worship. There does not seem to be any other case. Legge says concerning the last example:

'It must be borne in mind that the rites described in the text are those of former dynasties, especially of that of Kāu. I cannot bring to mind any passages in which there is mention made of any sacrifice to the sun or sun-spirit in connexion with the great sacrifice to Heaven, or Shang Ti, at the service on the day of the winter solstice in the southern suburb.'[1]

Hence it is only by taking the term 'worship' in a very comprehensive sense, and by ignoring the purpose of the sacrifices, that we may say that the fact that the Chinese sacrificed to the sun implies that they worshipped it. It is the same with regard to their worship of the moon and the stars. In whatever sense we may be justified in saying that some of the Chinese worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, such worship occupies a very insignificant position in China compared with the worship of other natural phenomena or the spirits of them. If by sun-worshipper, moon-worshipper, etc., we mean one who regards the sun or the moon as the only or the supreme object of worship, we may say with conviction that the Chinese are not, as they have never been, sun-worshippers, moon-worshippers, or star-worshippers.

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

T. FU.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew).—The Hebrew conception of the universe, as we find it in the OT, is not scientific in the modern sense of the term. The cosmology of the Hebrews (see art. COSMOLOGY [Hebrew]) is characterized by the simplicity and *naiveté* of primitive folk. The attitude of mind is one of awe and wonder, not of critical inquiry; and to pry closely into the secrets of the divine government is felt to indicate a want of reverence, and even to be dangerous. Moreover, it would be natural to a people which seems to have had an innate genius for religion to think, even after it had progressed beyond the stage of quite primitive ideas of the universe, that religion itself constituted the whole of true science or knowledge.[2] We need not expect, therefore, to find in the OT any inkling of the modern science of astronomy. The Hebrew shepherds without doubt, like the Phœnician mariners (cf. Pliny, *HN* vii. 57), closely observed the sky, and learned from the scrutiny many lessons of practical value for their every-day life. It is equally likely that at an early date the Hebrews were wont to worship the stars and planets. There are later traces of this worship in the OT (cf. 2 K 17^{16}).[3] And, besides this, the figures suggested by various constellations no doubt gave rise to a number of curious fables and fancies. On the other hand, the OT, as we have it, a collection of much-edited writings, preserves few traces of the astronomical and astrological lore of the Hebrews themselves. Since in the course of their national development the study of the stars and planets became more and more associated with the idolatrous practices of surrounding nations, later editors would be anxious to avoid, or even to remove, references to astronomy and astrology (cf. Dt 18^{10}). This would account for the fact that most of the references preserved in the OT are of a very general nature.

The chief planets are, of course, alluded to frequently. The sun (*shemesh*) is spoken of as ruling by day (Ps 136^{8}), and is often referred to as coming forth (from one chamber) in the morning and going in (-to another chamber) in the evening. Its magnificence (Jg 5^{31}) and its wonderful power for good (Dt 33^{14}) or for evil (2 K $4^{18f.}$; cf. Ps 121^{6}) impressed the Hebrews, as they have impressed all peoples. Jahweh Elohim Himself might be compared to a sun (Ps 84^{11}).[1] There are four words for 'moon' in the OT. *Yārēaḥ* is used especially in poetry (Gn 37^{9}, Jos 10^{12} etc.). To this word is closely related one of the words for 'month,' *yéraḥ*, a word which is common to all the Semitic languages, though not in frequent use in the OT. Another word, *lebhānāh*, which occurs only three times (Ca 6^{10}, Is 24^{23} 30^{26}), designates the moon as the 'white one' or the 'pale one.' Rarer still is a word *kesé'* (perhaps connected with the Assyr. *kusē'u*, 'headdress' or 'cap'), which denotes the full moon (perhaps the moon-god clothed in the splendour of his tiara).[2] The most common word is *ḥōdesh*, which means 'new moon,' and also 'month.' Thus the new moon was regarded as marking a new period or month, and the use of *yārēaḥ*, *yeraḥ*, and *ḥōdesh* for both moon and month shows that among the Hebrews the month and year were lunar. The moon rules the night (Ps 136^{9}), and, like the sun, is a power for good (Dt 33^{14}) or for evil (Ps 121^{6}). Its pale brilliance made it the emblem of beauty (Ca 6^{10}). In a few passages reference seems to be made to eclipses (Am 8^{9}, Is 38^{8}, Job 9^{7} etc.). And we are once told that 'the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the nation had avenged itself on its enemies'[3] (Jos $10^{12f.}$). In late writings there are several allusions to the worship of the sun (Ezk $8^{16f.}$, Job $31^{26f.}$; cf. 2 K 23^{5}) and moon (Dt 4^{19}).

Other planets are mentioned more incidentally. Thus, in all probability, Venus[4] as the Morning Star is referred to in Is 14^{12} under the name הֵילֵל, *hēlēl*, or הֵילֶל, *hēlāl* (lit. 'the glittering one'), though it should be mentioned that some expositors have seen in the term an Arabic name for the moon (هلال, *hilāl*). W. Lotz (*PRE*³, *s.v.* 'Sterne') indeed argues that the Arabic word means 'new moon,' which would be unsuitable;

[1] *SBE* xxviii. 218, n. 2.

[2] On this point Laurie Magnus's '*Religio Laici*' *Judaica* (1907) will be found suggestive. It has been argued elsewhere (W. Jay Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*[10], 1907) that ignorance of, or indifference to, what we term science might co-exist with a perfect knowledge of the laws of the moral and spiritual life.

[3] It is quite unnecessary to suppose that the idea of worshipping the stars and planets was borrowed, though, of course, the Hebrews came more and more into contact with people who were addicted to this worship. Whether and to what extent they came under direct Babylonian and Egyptian influence is a disputed matter (see K. Marti, *Religion of the OT*, p. 36 ff.). Cf. the proper names שַׁמְשַׁי (Jg 13^{26}) and שַׁמְשַׁי (Ezr 4^{8}), derived from שֶׁמֶשׁ, 'sun'; the Palmyrene ירח, and the Biblical יְרֵחוֹ, Jericho, derived from יָרֵחַ, 'moon.' Cf. also Beth-shemesh, a place sacred to the sun-god. Commentators have seen in Mal 3^{20} (4^{2}) the conception of a winged solar disk such as we find among the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians. But the present writer has pointed out (*Journal of the Manch. Egyptian and Oriental Society*, 1917, pp. 67–70) that the word usually translated 'wings' will bear another meaning. The meaning may be 'skirts' rather than 'wings,' and the figure that of the glorious robe that flows from the sun.

[1] In Jg 14^{18}, Job 9^{7} the word translated 'sun' is not *shemesh*, but *ḥeres* (cf. Is 19^{18}, and the place-names in Jg 1^{35} 8^{13}). It is probable that in Jg 14^{18} the text is corrupt.

[2] The name Sinai is probably derived from Sin, the name of the moon-god in Babylonian. In Ex 3^{1} Sinai is described as 'the mountain of Elohim,' *i.e.* the sacred mountain. This suggests that it had long been sacred.

[3] The writer clearly intends a miracle to be understood (so C. Steuernagel in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, 1899). Other expositors (*e.g.* W. H. Bennett in 'Joshua,' *SBOT*, 1899) regard the passage as poetic and figurative (cf. Jg 5^{20}).

[4] Another designation of Venus is *meleketh ha-shāmayim* מְלֶכֶת הַשָּׁמַיִם, 'the queen of heaven,' mention being made of cakes which were baked for her (Jer 7^{18} $44^{17.25}$).

but, according to Zimmern and Buhl's edition of Gesenius's *Lexicon* (*Handwörterbuch*[14], 1905) it can denote the old moon as crescent.[1] Further, in Am 5[26] we probably have an allusion to Saturn (סִכּוּת, *sikkuth* = סַכּוּת, *sakkuth* = Assyr. *sakkut*; and כִּיּוּן, *kiyyun* = קִיּוּן, *kēvān* = Assyr. *kaivānu*).

The stars, again, are alluded to frequently in a general way; but there are a few references to particular stars or constellations, and these require special attention. The earliest of them is found in Am 5[8]. Since, however, the same terms occur, with others, in passages in the late book of Job which contain more precise references to astronomy, it is best to consider the Job passages first.

In Job 9[9], in a description of God's almighty power as manifested in the marvels of the material world, Job is represented as pointing to God as one

'Who shaketh the earth out of her place,
and the pillars thereof tremble.
Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not;
and sealeth up the stars.
Who alone spreadeth out the heavens,
and treadeth upon the waves of the sea.
Who maketh *'āsh*, *kĕsīl*,
and *kīmāh* and the chambers of the south.'

The context indicates that the terms in the last two lines (עָשׁ, *'āsh*; כְּסִיל, *kĕsīl*; כִּימָה, *kīmāh*; חַדְרֵי תֵימָן, *ḥadrê têmān*) designate particular stars or constellations. We are helped, too, by the fact that three of them occur again (*kīmāh* in Am 5[8], Job 38[31]; *kĕsīl* in Am 5[8], Is 13[10], Job 38[31]; *'ayish* = *'āsh* in Job 38[32]); but there is considerable uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of some at least of the terms.

1. עָשׁ, *'āsh*, or better עָיִשׁ, *'ayish*, as in Job 38[32], and better still עָיוּשׁ, *'āyush*, as suggested by the Syriac (Pesh. ܥܝܘܫܐ). In Job 9[9] LXX has Ἕσπερος, Vulg. 'Hyades'; in Job 38[32] LXX Ἕσπερος, Vulg. 'Vesper.' Modern expositors have found in the word either the Great Bear, the Pleiades, Hyades, or the Northern and Southern Crown. *'Āsh* in Job 9[9] has to be taken in connexion with the other passage, 38[32], in which, according to the Massoretic text, it is said: 'or dost thou guide *'ayish* with her young?' (וְעָיִשׁ עַל־בְּנֶיהָ תַנְחֵם).[2] It is noteworthy, too, that what in Arabic corresponds to the Great Bear is called *na'sh*, 'the bier,' and that the three tail stars of Ursa Major are called *banāt na'sh*, 'children of the bier' (*i.e.*, in this case, 'mourners'). It is true that no philological connexion can be established between the two words, but the Arabic phrase 'children (or daughters) of the bier' is suggestive as regards *'ayish* and her children. It might seem natural to expect to find a striking constellation like the Great Bear mentioned in Job 9, and it would be fitting that it should be assigned the first place, though it may be mentioned in passing that possibly the Hebrews thought of this constellation not as a Great Bear, but as a lioness with her young (cf. with Ewald, Arabic *'ayuth*, and see A. Dillmann's Commentary). But there is some force in the argument that *'ayish* can hardly be Ursa Major, because the constellations in Job 38[31f.] are referred to on account of their meteorological importance. Some expositors, therefore (*e.g.*, M. A. Stern, Nöldeke, Schrader), have thought that *'ayish* represents the Pleiades. The great objection to this is that there is very good reason to think another Hebrew term (see below) designates that constellation. The 'children' of *'ayish* would certainly suit the Pleiades, which are sometimes represented as a hen with its chickens. But, on the other hand, the smaller stars surrounding or adjoining a star of the first magnitude might in several cases be described as its children. The Pleiades not being probable, some scholars agree with the Vulgate of Job 9[9] in thinking that *'ayish* represents the Hyades (so, *e.g.*, Hoffmann, Schiaparelli); and this view has the support of the Syriac (Pesh. ܥܝܘܫܐ).[1] Moreover, the constellation is suitable as being one of great meteorological importance. Elsewhere in Hebrew *'āsh* means 'moth.' Friedrich Delitzsch has suggested that it may have the same meaning here, since the name 'moth' (*sâsu*) seems to have been given to a star by the Assyro-Babylonians (see T. G. Pinches, in Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy'). Now, the Hyades, a great red star of the first magnitude (Aldebaran) and five stars of the fourth magnitude, resemble our letter V or the Greek Λ. And Schiaparelli points out (p. 58) that in the butterfly stage, when the moth is at rest, 'its wings are not held detached from the body, as happens with most other butterflies, but spread themselves over it in such a way as to form a cloak, more or less similar (according to the several species into which the animal can be divided) to an isosceles triangle.' The suggestion is that to the author of the passages in Job *'āsh* meant 'moth,' which was a name for the Hyades. In that case, assuming the identity of *'āsh* and *'ayish*, the 'children' of *'ayish* would be the minor Hyades which surround Aldebaran. Against this it might be urged that it is easier to explain *'āsh* as short for *'ayish* than to account for *'āsh* as the original form, and that 'moth' does not seem a likely name for a constellation (especially the Hyades, apart from its form). The question of identification cannot be decided definitely. But, as the Pleiades has to be excluded (see below), there are reasons for thinking that either the Great Bear or the Hyades is intended. The Great Bear was no doubt as well known to the Hebrews as to other ancient peoples; but it would not be in the least surprising to find no mention of it in the OT, the references to astronomy being so few.

2. כְּסִיל, *kĕsīl*, usually translated 'fool.' In Job 9[9] LXX has Ἀρκτοῦρος, Vulg. 'Orion'; in 38[31] LXX Ὠρίων, Vulg. 'Arcturus'; in Am 5[8] LXX omits, Vulg. 'Orion'; in Is 13[10] (כְּסִילֵיהֶם, their '*kĕsīlīm*') LXX Ὠρίων, Vulg. 'splendor earum.' Some of the Rabbis of the Middle Ages (Saadya, Abulwalid, and others) identified the word with the Arabic *Suhail* and interpreted it in its later sense, Canopus. The preponderating view of the versions is in favour of Orion, a constellation which was popularly thought of as a giant who was bound in chains to the sky. *Kĕsīl* occurs elsewhere in Hebrew with the meaning 'dullard' or 'fool,' and modern expositors commonly think of the giant (Orion) as a fool in the sense of an impious person who had rebelled against God. But the Arabic equivalent of the root (كسل, *kasala*) means 'to be thick, plump,' which suggests that *kĕsīl* itself need not mean anything more than giant (the big, burly one); and, as Cheyne says (art. 'Orion' in *EBi*), *kĕsīl* ought not to be confounded with *nābāl* ('fool' in the sense of impious person). In Job 38[31] there seems to be a reference to some myth current among the Hebrews, the giant being spoken of as bound with cords; but what exactly the myth was is quite uncertain. In Am 5[8] *kīmāh* (see below) and *kĕsīl* are again mentioned together ('seek him that maketh *kīmāh* and *kĕsīl*, and turneth black darkness into morning,' etc.) as well as in Job 38[31] ('Dost thou bind the bands of *kīmāh*, or loose the cords of *kĕsīl*?'). Further, in Is 13[10] we find the curious expression 'their *kĕsīlīm*' (often translated 'the stars of

[1] P. Jensen, however, thinks (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy') that there is little ground for supposing that any star or planet is referred to; the reference in Isaiah is too vague.

[2] For תַּנְחֵם, however, it is better to read תְּנַחֵם ('and dost thou console *'ayish* for her children?'). See, further, below.

[1] It seems certain that the Syriac word does denote the Hyades or the chief star of the group (cf. Barhebræus).

heaven and the Orions thereof').[1] This seems to indicate that primarily *kĕsīlīm* was used to denote stars of the first magnitude, in distinction from lesser stars (*kōkābīm*). In any case it is pretty generally agreed that *kĕsīl* represents Orion. It is one of the most brilliant constellations, and did not fail to arrest the attention of the ancients.

3. כִּימָה, *kīmāh*, literally 'a group, cluster,' cognate with Arabic *kâma* (كام), 'to heap up.' In Job 9[9] LXX has Πλειάς, Vulg. 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. כִּימָא; in 38[31] the renderings of the Versions differ only to the extent that the Vulg. has 'Pleiades'; in Am 5[8] LXX omits, Vulg. has 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. כִּימָא. Most of the ancient authorities, in fact, understand the Pleiades by *kīmāh*. Several modern expositors, however, prefer to think of Sirius (*e.g.*, G. Hoffmann). But the word itself suggests that we are to look for a compact cluster of stars, and, of course, we must seek for one that early attracted attention. The Pleiades, as Schiaparelli says, is the best known of such clusters, 'and also the only one which has in consequence of its conspicuous light awakened universal attention at every time and among all peoples' (p. 62).[2] The expression 'the bands of *kīmāh*' in Job 38[31] is no doubt to be understood metaphorically.[3] The Arabic name for the Pleiades, *thurayya*, also means 'cluster,' and Bar Ali mentions it as an explanation of *kīmāh*. The word *kīmāh* itself has also been connected with the Arab. *kūmat*[un], 'house,' and the Assyr. *kimtu*, 'family.' In either case the name would suit the Pleiades.

It should be noted, further, that, according to some ideas found in the Talmud (*Bĕrakhōth*, 58*b*; *Rosh ha-shanah*, 11*b*), God brought the flood by causing *kīmāh* to set instead of rise in the morning, and by removing two stars from it. This is given as the explanation of Rabbi Joshua. According to R. Eliezer, the changes took place at a season when *kīmāh* is wont to set in the morning, and what God did was to make *kīmāh* rise in the morning on the day in question and lose two stars. This caused the flood. According to Stern, the dates mentioned suit exactly the morning rising and setting of the Pleiades, and seem to prove that in the time of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer (beginning of 2nd cent. A.D.) the Jews identified the Pleiades with *kīmāh*. It is further represented in the Talmud (*ib.*) that God afterwards set things right by taking away two stars from '*ayish* to diminish its rain-producing force.[4]

4. חַדְרֵי תֵימָן, *ḥadrē tēmān*, lit. 'chambers of the south.' The LXX renders ταμεῖα Νότου, Vulg. 'interiora Austri.' We seem to require mention of another definite constellation. This has given rise to the suggestion that the phrase designates the bright star Canopus or the constellation to which it belongs (so Stern). Other expositors regard the text as corrupt, and, emending חדר וחמן, see in the first word some uncertain constellation, and in the second (חמן=תאמן) Gemini, 'the Twins.' But we are not obliged to find in *ḥadrē tēmān* a special constellation. 'Chambers (or store-houses) of the South' might, as K. Budde says ('Hiob,' in W. Nowack's *Handkomm. zum AT*, 1896), denote a whole group of constellations in the southern sky. Dillmann (*loc. cit.*) thinks that the author of Job cannot have known anything of the stars of the southern hemisphere, but that it was known to him, as one who had travelled, that the farther one goes south the more stars and constellations become visible. To those who dwelt in the north these were, so to say, enclosed in the inmost chambers of the vault of heaven, and were therefore invisible. This would explain the expression 'treasure-houses of the South' (cf. Pr 24[4]; Job 37[9]). The word *ḥeder*, coming from a root meaning literally 'to conceal,' in the plural would bear the meaning 'penetralia.'[1] Schiaparelli gives reasons for thinking that the reference is to the imposing constellation found on the charts of to-day 'distributed between Argo, the Southern Cross, and the Centaur'; but whether this was visible to the author of Job depends upon the date of the book, which is uncertain.

In Job 38[31f.] we find another difficult astronomical term. The passage is as follows:

'Dost thou bind the bands of *kīmāh*,
or loose the cords of *kĕsīl*?
Dost thou bring out *mazzārōth* in his season,
or dost thou lead out '*ayish* with her young?'

We have already dealt with three of the terms which occur here. We have now to consider—

5. מַזָּרוֹת, *mazzārōth*. The Vulg. has 'Lucifer'; Targ. שמרי מוליא. The word may come from זָרָה, *zārāh*, which means literally 'to scatter,' but can be applied to powder (Ex 32[20]), hair (Ezk 5[2], Is 30[22]), etc. *Mazzārōth* would then mean 'scatterers' or 'sprinklers,' the reference being to rain. On this supposition, Stern and Hoffmann understand the Hyades to be meant, since the heliacal rising of their chief star, Aldebaran, announces the season of rain.[2] Gesenius derived the word from נזר, *nāzar* (Arab. نَذَر), and explained it as 'astra præmonentia.' Another suggestion is that it is derived from זהר, *zāhar*, *mazzārōth* being for *mazhārōth*, and meaning the 'brilliant' stars which shine with a special lustre, the planets, either all of them or the brightest and most striking. But the word is more commonly regarded as identical with *mazzālōth* (מזלות) in 2 K 23[5], the interchange of *l* and *r* presenting little difficulty. The LXX has μαζουρώθ in both cases. In 2 K *mazzālōth* has been supposed by some expositors to mean 'the signs of the zodiac,' being apparently a loan-word from Assyr. *manzaltu* or *mazaltu*, 'station, abode (of gods),' which, again, is from *nazâzu*, 'to stand.' But in the passage in question it would be more natural to find mention of the planets, and some expositors so interpret *mazzālōth* (in Rabbinic *mazzālōth* means 'planets' as well as 'signs of the zodiac'). *Mazzālōth* would be the stars and planets regarded as 'mansions' (Assyr.) of the great gods (see *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Mazzaloth').[3]

[1] Kittel would read כוכביהם, 'their stars.' But this is not necessary. Nor is it necessary to follow Cheyne in emending the whole of the beginning of the verse thus: עָשׁ וְכִימָה וְכִסִיל, 'the Great Bear, the Pleiades (?), and Orion.'

[2] An old English name for them is 'the seven stars' (AV in Am 5[8]).

[3] The Hebrew has מַעֲדַנּוֹת כִּימָה, *ma'dannōth kīmāh*, which AV translates 'sweet influences,' some such idea being suggested by the root as found elsewhere. It is better, however, to follow many modern expositors, and regard *ma'dannōth* as equivalent to *ma'naddōth*, 'bands' or 'fetters,' from 'ādad, 'to bind' (so Ewald, Dillmann, Duhm, and others). It we translate 'bands,' we may think of the Oriental poets' habit of comparing the Pleiades with an ornament (Ideler, *Sternnamen*, p. 147).

[4] According to Stern, the Talmudists undoubtedly understood the Hyades by '*ayish*. May there not be references to an earlier form of this kind of legend in Job 38[31f.]? The passage might be translated thus (interchanging תקשר and תחתה in ver. 31):

Dost thou loosen the bands of the Pleiades (*kīmāh*)
or bind fast the cords of a giant (-star, *kĕsīl*)?
Dost thou lead forth the rainers (*mazzārōth*) in due season
and comfort the Hyades for its children?

The 'rainers' (from זָרָה, lit. 'to scatter') would be the stars taken from the Hyades, and are referred to in the next clause as 'its children.'

[1] Cf. A. B. Davidson, 'Job' in *Cambr. Bible*, 1893: 'probably the great spaces and deep recesses of the southern hemisphere of the heavens, with the constellations which they contain.'

[2] Stern identifies *mazzārōth* with *mazzālōth*, and would derive the latter from הָזִיל, *hizzīl*, 'to cause to flow.' This, again, would give some meaning equivalent to 'rain-producers.'

[3] P. Jensen (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Astronomy') says that *mazzālōth* may mean either 'planets,' 'signs of the zodiac,' or 'stations of the moon.'

It is not necessary, however, to regard *mazzārōth* and *mazzālōth* as identical. We have found reason to think that another word denotes the Hyades as a constellation. That does not prevent us from supposing that *mazzārōth* may be a further description of some of the stars in this group.[1] The word *mazzārōth* has also been identified with the Great Dog, whose chief star is Sirius. This, as the brightest of the fixed stars, and for meteorological reasons as well, everywhere attracted the notice of the ancients.

6. It should be noted further that in Job 37[9] another word occurs (מְזָרִים, *mĕzārīm*) which bears some resemblance to *mazzārōth*. The passage runs: 'Out of its chamber cometh the whirlwind, and cold out of *mezārīm*.' This word might also come from *zārāh*, 'to scatter.' On that assumption, it has been supposed to mean 'scattering' or north winds. Another suggestion, however, is that it is a corruption of the Babylonian *mišri*, 'the northern (star)' (so *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Mazzaroth'). A more recent conjecture is that of Schiaparelli (p. 69 ff.). He suggests that the correct punctuation of מזרים is *mizrīm* or *mizrayim*, *i.e.* the plural or dual of a word מִזְרֶה, *mizreh*, which is referred to in Is 30[24] and Jer 15[7] as an instrument for winnowing. Schiaparelli points out that the arrangement of the stars of the Great Bear is such that they might be thought to resemble a winnowing fan. To the ancient Chinese these stars actually suggested a ladle, which, with its cavity and handle, is very like a winnowing fan. The plural *mizrīm* would indicate more than one instrument. Schiaparelli therefore thinks that the word might designate the Great Bear and the Lesser Bear; and in that case, of course, the dual *mizrayim* would be a still more suitable description. The fact that the Phœnicians used the Lesser Bear when at sea to find the direction of the north is noteworthy in this connexion. The suggestion is very ingenious. But unfortunately *mizreh* is not the term which denotes a winnowing instrument of the shape required. The word for that is *raḥath* (the other term mentioned in Is 30[24]). *Mizreh* is apparently the *midhrā* of modern Syria, a pitch-fork with six prongs, and the Great Bear can hardly be said to resemble that.

7. Some expositors have found yet another reference to astronomy in the נָחָשׁ בָּרִחַ, *nāḥāsh bārīaḥ*, of Job 26[13]. Meaning literally 'the fleeing serpent,' the words have been supposed to refer to the Dragon between the Great and the Little Bear. There is nothing in the context, however, to indicate that the author had any star or constellation in mind.

The OT contains very few definite references to astrology, though the prohibition in Dt 18[10] shows that it was practised. We can hardly say that there was no astrology amongst the ancient Hebrews, in spite of the fact that the present allusions are late and due to Assyro-Babylonian influence. In Is 47[13] (post-Exilic) we read: 'Yea let them deliver thee, the dividers(?) of heaven (חֹקְרֵי שָׁחַק), the gazers on stars (הַחֹזִים בַּכּוֹכָבִים), those who make known each new moon (מוֹדִעִים לַחֳדָשִׁים), from the things that are coming upon thee.' The word translated 'dividers' occurs here only, and LXX has for the whole phrase οἱ ἀστρολόγοι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. It has been connected with an Arabic word 'to divide' (*habara*, lit. 'to cut into large pieces'), a meaning which suits very well, since the Babylonians divided the sky for astrological purpose into signs of the zodiac. 'Those who make known each new moon' (or the 'monthly prognosticators') would be persons, like the Assyrian and Babylonian astrologers, who noted lucky and unlucky days, preparing monthly almanacs or calendars based on astrological calculations (see Cheyne, 'Isaiah,' *PB*, 1898). In Dn 5[11], according to AV, Daniel became chief of the 'astrologers' (אַשְׁפָּיִן) in Babylon; but the correct translation of the word is 'conjurers' or 'enchanters.'

[1] See the conjecture made above on p. 82[a], note 4.

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MAURICE A. CANNEY.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hindu).—1. The sun.

—Solar worship has been described as the real religion of India. Nor is it difficult to understand how in a land flooded with sunshine, where every phase and function of life is dependent upon the kindly warmth of the sun and his destructive energy and power are felt in the uttermost extremes of heat, it should have been man's primary business to win his favour and placate his wrath. In the ancient verse of the *Gāyatrī* every Hindu begins his day with prayer and ascription of praise to the sun, the giver of light, heat, and fertility. In his mid-day devotion also he remembers and renders homage to the same deity. It is apparently true that at no period in India was the worship of the sun to any great extent exclusive. There are no distinct sects at the present time who reverence the sun alone and bear his name. The essentials of his worship, however, are present everywhere and in all the sects, more or less avowedly, or in disguise, and combined with other cults; and his practical and decisive influence on daily life is universally recognized.

In the *Ṛigveda* Sūrya, or the sun, is worshipped under many names and forms. The three chief aspects under which he presents himself to his worshipper are the rising, culminating, and setting sun. These are not separated or distinguished as three deities, but are varying forms of one and the same god, in each of which he displays himself with different attributes and as exercising different powers. Especially is he reverenced as Savitṛ, the giver and sustainer of life, who each morning wakes the universe and men from sleep. One of his most ancient cults, perhaps the most ancient of all, is under the name Mitra, the Persian Mithras; whence some have conjectured that India derived her solar religion from the West. If borrowing took place on either side, it is probable that in those early days the indebtedness was Persian. As Mitra, the sun was associated as a member with an early triad, symbolized by the sacred syllable *Om*, Agni or fire, Vāyu the wind, and Mitra. This triune aspect also was manifested in the sun as the heavenly fire, and he bore corresponding epithets or titles, as *tripād*, 'three-footed,' *trivikrama*, 'three-stepping,' and others. The last name was appropriated more particularly to Viṣṇu, the sun as the all-pervader, who in three strides traverses the three worlds, earth, heaven, and hell. He is invoked also as Pūṣan, the guardian and preserver of the cattle, the companion of travellers, and guide of the soul on its perilous way to the lower world.

In the mythology Sūrya is the son of Dyaus, the wide-spreading sky, and is described as 'all-creating' and 'all-seeing.' In this aspect his most ancient and significant name is Prajāpati, the 'lord of creation.' He traverses the heavens in his golden car, drawn by seven steeds, of which Uṣas, or the Dawn, is the charioteer; and the Aśvins, twin gods of the morning, are his children. By his power he drives away the demons of sickness,

and expels diseases and all the subtle and dreaded influences of darkness. The beneficent offices of physician and healer of bodily ills, which later are ascribed to the Aśvins, are in the first instance those of Sūrya himself.

There seems no reason to reject or doubt the statement of Śaṅkara in the 10th cent. that in his time there existed distinct sects of sun-worshippers, Sauryas, of one at least of which the members were accustomed to carry branded on their forehead and breast the symbol of their deity. They have, however, all died out and been forgotten.[1]

Not many temples dedicated to the worship of the sun have survived, nor is it probable that at any period in Indian history they existed in any considerable number. That at Konārak in Orissa is the best known, and architecturally of the most interest. It is, however, neglected and ruinous, and attracts no worshippers. There is another at Gayā, and a small but much-frequented shrine at Benares, where the fire-sacrifice is offered in honour of the sun.

Among the non-Aryan peoples of India and the sub-tribes, who may be described as on the borders of Hinduism, sun-worship is much more open and confessed. By the Dravidians and Kolarians the sun is widely invoked as Parameśvar, the creator and preserver, and is worshipped with prayer and sacrifice. The most popular form of offering is a white cock, whose head is struck off at the village shrine. He is Sūrāj Nārāyan (Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa), and the traders in the bazaars draw images or symbols of the sun at the entrance to their booths for good luck.[2] Similar representations or figures may be often seen on pillars. The *nīm*-tree is especially sacred to the sun, and there exists a popular legend or story which records its association with his cult. By many the *Holī* festival in the south of India is believed to have been instituted originally in order to propitiate the sun-god. He is invoked also to avert or to heal disease, and on the occasion of an eclipse the tom-toms are beaten and other ceremonies observed to rescue the deity from the powers of evil. The same conception, that worship and sacrifice are efficacious to avert disaster from the object of worship, may perhaps be recognized in the especial frequency of sun-ritual and adoration in the winter season among some northern tribes, at a time when the divinity may be supposed to be weak. A sacred meal is partaken of in his honour, and this must be eaten without salt. A similar ritual is observed when the sun enters a new sign of the zodiac. There are races and peoples in India at the present time who believe themselves to be descended from the sun.

2. The moon.—From the earliest times in India it would appear that the moon has been a popular subject of traditional story and mythology, but, so far as is known, there never existed any formal moon-cult or sectarian worship. A late work of the 17th cent. mentions 'moon-worshippers' and 'star-worshippers.' It is improbable, however, that any special sect was in the writer's mind. Worship of the moon in one or other of her aspects, either alone or in conjunction with other rites, is common in India at the present day, and such worship has in all probability never been intermitted. There are, however, no exclusive votaries or sects who make the moon their chief deity. In this respect, therefore, the popular worship of India is in contrast with the established cults of ancient Babylonia and other countries.

In the *Ṛigveda* and the early literature Soma (*q.v.*) is identified with the moon, and in one passage at least the waning of the moon is caused by the gods drinking up the nectar (*amṛta*).[3] The great deities Indra and Agni are identified with its phases, representing the new and full moon respectively; so also Varuṇa and Mitra are deities of the waxing and waning moon.[1] As usual among primitive peoples, the moon is a male divinity. A title of Śiva is *chandra-śekhara*, 'he whose crest is the moon,' *i.e.* the moon-bearer, and in this sense he is contrasted with Viṣṇu, who represents the sun. The ancient lunar dynasty of India (*chandravaṁśa*), whose capital was at Hastināpura, or Delhi, about 50 miles north-east of the modern city, claimed descent from the moon.

The moon also (Soma) was one of the treasures recovered at the churning of the ocean, together with the *amṛta* (nectar). Elsewhere he is enumerated among the eight *lokapālas*, or guardians of the universe. He is lord of the planets and of plants, of offerings and of penances.[2] More often he is regarded as one of the nine planets and is associated with them in worship, but especially with the sun. The departed go to the moon, and there is the abode of the *pitṛs*, 'fathers,' whither they are borne on the smoke of the funeral pyre. A more popular title or a more popular ritual for him is as Oṣadhipati, or Oṣadhīśa, 'lord of plants.' Agriculture in general is under his protection and is subject to his influence.

The phases of the moon are often decisive for the work of the fields; and the economy of the household, with its various anniversaries and important events, is similarly determined by the moon's position and aspects. The title 'lord of plants' is probably derived from the practice, common also in other countries, of collecting medicinal herbs, etc., by the light of the moon. In this character he is a god of healing, and for certain diseases—*e.g.*, leprosy—to gaze at the reflexion of the moon in *ghī* or oil is an important and efficacious remedy. The periods of new and full moon are especially dangerous owing to the increased activity of the spirits at these times. In some parts of the country the conch-shell is a symbol of the deity of the moon. Among some of the primitive Kolarian tribes, instead of being regarded as a male divinity, the moon is mythologically the wife of the sun, and the stars are their children.

3. The stars.—The principal stars and constellations are known to the Hindus by name, and are recognized as beneficent or the reverse, especially in their relation to family and individual happiness or misfortune.

Thus the Pole-star is *dhruva*, 'fixed' or 'stationary,' although the same title is given to some of the *nakṣatras* (see below). The seven stars of the Great Bear are seven *ṛṣis*, translated to the heavens. Canopus also is a *ṛṣi*, Agastya, the sage and reputed evangelist of S. India. The Pleiades are the six *kṛttikās*, 'nympha,' the nurses of Skanda, the god of war, who bore from them the title of Kārttikeya. Orion represents the head of Brahmā in the form of an antelope's or stag's head (*mṛgaśiras*), struck off by Śiva, etc. Great regard is paid especially to the planets and the constellations or groupings of stars known as *nakṣatras*; and the star, planet, or constellation under which a man is born gives infallible indication of his future lot. In parts of N. India the stars generally are the cattle that the moon tends in the character of shepherd.

The full number of the planets is nine, but sometimes only seven or five are enumerated. There is a temple at Benares dedicated to the nine planets, where flowers and other offerings are presented. The complete number includes the sun and moon, and the others in order are Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, with Rāhu and Ketu. The two last represent the ascending and descending nodes of the moon's orbit.

Rāhu is the cause of eclipses, when he swallows the sun or moon, and this he is said to do in revenge for the loss of his head, which was cut off by Viṣṇu as a punishment for his having stolen and drunk part of the nectar churned from the ocean. By drinking the *amṛta* he became immortal, and his wrath is perpetually exhibited in the eclipses, when the village folk seek to propitiate him with various rites. Rāhu is therefore known as the bodiless, and there exists at Benares a shrine dedicated to him under this form. Ketu is the progenitor of the numerous tribe of meteors and comets. In the *Purāṇas* they are all described as deities, each with his own car, that of Mars being golden with eight red horses. The days of the week also are named from them.

Some of the planets are favourable and some malevolent; but all need to be propitiated and their favour if possible secured before a marriage or other important event in the household. The omission of the *śānti* or *śānti-karman*, the 'propitiation' ceremony, would most certainly result in harm and disaster.

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[1] See art. SAURAPĀYAS, SAURAS, or SAURYAS.
[2] See art. SYMBOLISM (Hindu).
[3] *Ṛigveda*, x. lxxxv. 5.

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II. iv. 4. 17 f.
[2] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. 22.

Rāhu and Ketu, with Saturn, are deities of ill omen who presage sickness and all kinds of trouble, and to be born when one of these is in the ascendant is a grave misfortune. The remaining planets are propitious, especially Mercury, Venus, and Jupiter, in whose hands are the gifts of wisdom and all knowledge and skill.

In the *Rigveda nakṣatra* is the name for a constellation in general. Universally, however, in later times and technically the *nakṣatras* are the lunar mansions, or stations, through which the moon passes, as the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac. Originally these seem to have been 27 in number, but in the later literature and in astrological calculations more usually 28. Mythologically they are the wives of the moon and daughters of Dakśa, one of the Ādityas. Like the planets, the *nakṣatras* are important and influential deities, whose countenance is sought before undertaking a journey or making arrangements for marriage or other domestic rites. Every Hindu boy's horoscope contains a reference to the *nakṣatra* under which he is born, and he bears a secret name other than that which is given him at the special name-giving ceremony (*nāmadheya*), which is written in the horoscope and is stated to contain always one letter at least from the name of the *nakṣatra* through which the moon was passing at the hour of his birth.

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A. S. GEDEN.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Iranian).—Astronomy received much attention in ancient Persia, as is obviously implied by the current tradition that the Magi, the sacerdotal class of the Medes and Persians, were highly skilled in divination, an art which depended largely upon a knowledge of the heavenly bodies, astrology and astronomy being sister sciences in antiquity. The part which the veneration of the sun, moon, and stars played in the national religion of early Iran is well known (see art. ZOROASTRIANISM), and some of the Greeks regarded Zoroaster as much in the light of a professed astrologer and star-worshipper as in that of a wise man and prophet (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Proœm.* i. 6, ἀστροθύτην; Scholiast on the Platonic *Alcibiades*, i. 122; *Clementine Homilies*, ix. 3-6, *Recognitiones*, iv. 27-29; Suidas, *Lexicon*, *s.v.* ἀστροκομία, Ζωροάστρης—all collected in Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, New York, 1899, pp. 226-273). The Avesta and the Pahlavi books, especially the *Bundahišn* and *Dīnā-i Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, contain frequent allusions of an astronomical nature; and Persian literature, after the Muhammadan conquest of Iran in the 7th cent., contains similar references. These three sets of sources furnish our chief supply of information, supplemented by comparisons drawn from Babylonia and Assyria, as well as by other material.

1. **Conception of the universe.**—The ancient Iranians naturally based their astronomical system upon a geocentric conception of the universe. It is probable that in the earliest times the shape of the earth was regarded as round and flat, although it is not altogether clear whether the Avestan word *skarəna*, 'round' (cognate with the Greek σφαῖρα), signified merely circular, or whether it actually meant spherical (*Yašt*, v. 38, x. 95, xvii. 19). It is almost certain, however, that in later times the globular form of the earth was recognized by the Persian astronomers, possibly influenced by Ptolemy, who was a great authority among the Arab-Persian scientists. The spherical shape may be inferred from two Pahlavi passages which apparently contain the idea of the cosmic egg—a wide-spread notion in antiquity. The first of these passages occurs in the *Dīnā-i Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, xliv. 1-11 (tr. West in *SBE* xxiv. 85): 'The sky is arranged above the earth, like an egg, by the handiwork of the creator Aūharmazd; and the semblance of the earth, in the midst of the sky, is just like as it were the yolk amid the egg.' The second Pahlavi passage is found in the *Dīnkarṭ*, ii. 74. 2 (ed. Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1876, ii. 72): 'The world and the other creatures are placed together in the midst of the sky, like the bird in the midst of the egg; the sky surrounds all, as the egg does the bird' (tr. Casartelli, *Mazdayasnian Philosophy*, Bombay, 1889, p. 107). In the arrangement of the universe the earth was regarded as encompassed by the atmosphere (Av. *vayu*, Phl. *vāi*; or Av. *θwāŝa*, Phl. *spihr*), above which was the sky or firmament (Av. O.P. *asman*, Phl. *Asmān*, lit. 'stone'), beyond which again rose the empyrean realm (Av. *anaγra raŝčā*, lit. 'endless lights'), the abode of Ormazd and his angels. Through a misapprehension of the true facts, moreover, the sun and moon were located beyond the sphere of the stars (cf. Phl. *Arṭā-Vīrāf*, vii. 1-x. 13; *Bundahišn*, iv. 4; *Zāṭ-Sparam*, vii. 6; *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xii. 5; *Gr. Iran. Bund.*, tr. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 310; *Dāṭistān*, ii. 1, xxxiv. 2; Av. *Vendidād*, vii. 52; and consult Jackson, 'Die iranische Religion,' § 66, in Geiger and Kuhn, *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, ii. 671-672).

2. **Sun and moon.**—In the Zoroastrian ritual, as preserved in the Avesta, both the sun (*hvar*) and the moon (*māh*) receive high veneration individually, and each has a special hymn of praise devoted to its glorification (*Yašt*, vi. and vii.); besides, minor litanies and prayers are consecrated to their particular service (*Sīrōzah*, i. 11, ii. 11; *Yašt*, vi. 1-7, vii. 1-7; *Nyāiš*, i. 1-10, iii. 1-11). A similar degree of reverence was accorded them during Parthian and Sasanian times, as is shown by the Pahlavi texts themselves and by allusions in the Greek and Latin classics (*e.g.*, Phl. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, vii. 1-3; *Dīnkarṭ*, i. 51. 6, the former translated by West in *SBE* v. 297-298, and the latter by Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1875, i. 47, and tr. p. 48: cf. also such classical writers as Strabo, xv. 3. 13, p. 732; Ammianus Marcellinus, *Hist.* xxiii. 6, xvii. 5; Dio Chrysostomus, *Orat. Borysthenitica*, xxxvi.; and Nicolaus Damascenus, frag. 66, p. 401, ed. Müller). The supremacy of the sun among the heavenly bodies is naturally emphasized in the Avesta (*e.g.*, *Yašt*, vi.), and its various positions in the heavens are described in *Bundahišn*, v. 1-7, and *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xxi. 1-7. In the latter passage there are to be found special observations of the midday and afternoon shadows with respect to the sun's altitude in the various zodiacal constellations. Solar observations were important in determining the various times of day for performing the sacrifice.

The moon, like the sun, is invoked because of its beneficent influence (*Yašt*, vii. 1-7), and there are several specific allusions to its periodic phases (*e.g.*, *Yasna*, xliv. 3; *Yašt*, vii. 2-4; *Fragment*, viii. 1; *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, lxviii. 1-6, lxxi. 2, tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 210-211, 215). The connexion between the moon and the tides was fully recognized in Sasanian times, and a crude attempt was made to explain it (see *Bundahišn*, xiii. 13-14; *Zāṭ-Sparam*, vi. 14-17). Eclipses, both of the sun and of the moon, were regularly taken into account 'in the calculations of the astronomers,' at least under the Sasanians, as is shown by *Dāṭistān-i*

Dīnīk, lxix. 1-7, and the cause of these obscurations was thought to be the intervention of two bodies that revolve below the two greater lights (*Dāt*. lxix. 1-7; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 46, tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 212-213, xxiv. 132).

3. **Stars.**—There is an abundance of star-lore throughout the entire literature, and particular stars, or groups of stars, are alluded to as guarding the quarters of the heavens into which the Zoroastrians divided the firmament. The chief star in the Avesta, as elsewhere, is called Tishtrya (Av. *tištrya*, Phl. *tištr*), and it is usually identified with Sirius. Tishtrya is regent of the eastern division of the sky, an opponent of the meteors, and the bringer of rain by overcoming Apaosha, the demon of drought (*Yašt*, viii. 1 ff.; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, vii. 1, ix. 2). The fixed star Satavaēsa (Av. *satavaēsa*, Phl. *sat-vēs*, 'having a hundred servitors'), which is possibly to be identified with Fomalhaut, is an ally of Tishtrya, and lord of the southern heavens (*Yašt*, viii. 9, 32, 43, 44; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xiv. 5, vi. 16). The guardianship of the west is entrusted to Vanant (Av. *vanant*, Phl. *vanand*, 'victorious'; cf. *Yašt*, xxi. 1, viii. 12, xii. 16; *Nyāiš*, i. 8; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1; *Mainōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 12; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28-38), while the keeping of the north is consigned to the constellation of Ursa Major, called Haptō-iringa (Av. *haptō-iringa*, Phl. *haptō-iring*, 'with seven signs'; cf. *Yašt*, viii. 12, xii. 28, xiii. 60; *Bundahišn*, ii. 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Mainōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 12; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28-38). The Pleiades (Av. *paoiryaēinī*) are mentioned in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 12), and there are certain other allusions that may contain the names of special stars, though their interpretation is open to question (see Kuka, 'Stars mentioned in the Avesta' in *Zartoshti*, ii. 7-22, Bombay, 1904). In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundahišn* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 6,480,000, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings,' in the *Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume*, Bombay, 1914, pp. 116-158; see also Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, pp. 23-27, 210-213, 279-281.

4. **Planets, meteors, and comets.**—In contrast to the fixed stars and regular constellations, the planets, meteors, and comets were held by Zoroastrians to be disturbers of the established order of the universe, and consequently to be of Ahrimanian origin and evil nature—a point of view directly opposed to that of Babylonia, where the planets were looked upon as distinctly beneficent in character (cf. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 373). To the planets Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn (the only five then known, but making seven with the sun and the moon, by the side of which they were usually mentioned) there were given, respectively, in Pahlavi the euphemistic names *Tīr*, *Vahrām*, *Aūharmazd*, *Anāhid*, and *Kēvān*, derived from divine names, including the name of the god Ahura Mazda himself, because these beneficent powers curb and restrain the maleficent influence exercised by the planets (*Bundahišn*, v. 1-2; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 1-5; *Zāt-Sparam*, ii. 10, iv. 7-10, vi. 1-2; and consult the list in al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 172). The Persian treatise *Ulamā-i Islām* (tr. Vullers, *Fragmente über die Religion des Zoroaster*, Bonn, 1831, p. 52) states that they originally bore the names of demons, but were afterwards given designations of good omen. At the same time it is not impossible that we have in their nomenclature a translation of the Babylonian names of the planets, *Nabu*, *Nergal*, *Marduk*, *Ištar*, *Ninib*, as may be surmised from the equations, Marduk (lord of the gods) = Aūharmazd = Jupiter; Nergal (god of war) = Vahrām = Mars; and Ištar = Anāhid = Venus; on the confusion between Tishtrya ('Sirius') and Tīr ('Mercury') compare the note by Gray, *ERE* i. 798[b]; and, for the Babylonian names of the planets, consult Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 134-139; Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 370, 454-466. This parallel, in any case, is of interest because the Sanskrit names given by the Hindus to the planets show no likeness to the Babylonian (cf. Weber, *Vorlesungen über indische Literaturgeschichte*[2], Berlin, 1876, p. 267 f.). Shooting stars are alluded to in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 8) under the name of *kərəmā stārō*, a designation meaning, perhaps, 'worm stars'; and there are several passages, in both Avesta and Pahlavi literature, which allude presumably to comets (*Yasna*, xvi. 8; *Bundahišn*, v. 2, xxviii. 44, xxx. 17; *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, xxxvii. 55, lxix. 2).[1]

5. **Signs of the zodiac.**—The names of the twelve signs of the zodiac, at least in Sasanian times, correspond in concept with those familiar to us through the Greek and Latin designations, and are parallel likewise with the Babylonian, from which, like the Indo-Germanic zodiac in general, they are believed to be derived, and of which their names are translations—a phenomenon precisely paralleled in India and in other Asiatic countries (see Ginzel, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, i., Leipzig, 1906, pp. 78-88). Thus in Pahlavi we find *Varak* ('Ram,' Aries), *Tōrā* ('Bull,' Taurus), *Dō-patkar* ('Two-figures,' Gemini), *Kalakang* ('Crab,' Cancer), *Šēr* ('Lion,' Leo), *Khušak* ('Maiden,' Virgo), *Tarāzuk* ('Balance,' Libra), *Gazdūm* ('Scorpion,' Scorpio), *Nēmasp* ('Half horse,' Centaur or Sagittarius), *Vahīk* ('Goat,' Capricorn), *Dāl* ('Waterpot,' Aquarius), *Mahīk* ('Fish,' Pisces). The names of the twenty-eight lunar mansions, as recognized in 'the subdivisions of the astronomers' (Phl. *xūrṭak-i hāmārikān*), are given in the *Bundahišn* (ii. 3); but the reading of the various designations is by no means sure, and the individual identification of the names remains, therefore, uncertain, even when compared with those in the Soghdian and Khorasmian list, given about A.D. 1000 by al-Bīrūnī (*Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 227 f.).[2] Possibly some further light may be gained from a study of the terminology used for these asterisms by the Hindus, Chinese, and Arabs, if not by the Babylonians (see Ginzel, *op. cit.* pp. 70-76). Such an attempt has already been made from the Sanskrit side, in comparison with Avestan and Pahlavi, by a Parsi scholar named Anklesaria, in an article entitled 'Asterisms in Iranian Literature' in *Cama Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, pp. 216-227.

6. **Prediction of events.**—Like the reference in the preceding paragraph to the minute subdivisions used by the astronomers (*Bund.* ii. 3), there are kindred allusions in Sasanian literature to 'the calculations of the astronomers' or to 'the com-

[1] The Soghdian names of the planets given by Manichean fragments discovered at Turfan, in Chinese Turkestan, correspond in general to the forms given above (see F. W. K. Müller, 'Die "persischen" Kalendarausdrücke in chinesischen Tripiṭaka,' *SBAW*, 1907, pp. 458-465).

[2] The zodiacal names given by the Turfan fragments (Müller, *loc. cit.*) are identical with those of Eastern Asia, as found in China, Siam, and Cambodia, as well as in Tibet and in Old Turkish inscriptions (Ginzel, pp. 85-87, 404, 411, 452, 501), thus differing entirely from the Babylonian nomenclature.

putations made by astrologers' with regard to observing favourable or unfavourable conjunctions of the stars (*e.g.*, *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, lxix. 3; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 28; *Epistles of Mānuščihar*, II. ii. 9–11; see West, *SBE* v. 11, xxiv. 130, xviii. 212, 333–335, xxxvii. p. xlvii). Ardavān, the last of the Parthians and predecessor of Ardashīr Pāpakān, who founded the Sasanian dynasty in the 3rd cent. A.D., is represented as consulting on grave matters with his 'wise men and constellation-knowers' (*dānakān va axtar-mārān*, in the Pahlavi text *Kārnāmē-i Artakhshīr-i Pāpakān*, ii. 4–5, iii. 5–6, ed. Darab Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1896, pp. 10–11, 15–16), and their knowledge of the position of the stars at the moment enabled them to predict to him future events. In a Pahlavi work dated A.D. 881 and entitled *Epistles of Mānuščihar*, II. ii. 9–11 (re-translated by West, *SBE* xxxvii., Introd. p. xlvii), there is a specific allusion to a set of astronomical 'tables' (Phl. *zīk*, cf. Arab. *zīj*, and the Byzantine Gr. ζῖκι of Theodorus Meliteniotes, ed. Usener, *Ad historiam Astronomiæ Symbola*, Bonn, 1876, p. 14), which were constructed by 'the great Shatro-ayār.' See, more fully, art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan), p. 95[b] below. The passage cited mentions the tables alongside of those of Ptolemy and of the Hindus.

7. **Astronomical works.**—Some of the works from which citations have been drawn above, like the one last quoted, actually belong to the early Muhammadan period of Persia, even though written in Pahlavi. Astronomy, influenced by Arab science, continued to flourish in Iran under Muslim rule. The notable scientific achievements of the great savant and chronologist, al-Bīrūnī of Khiva (973–1048), are sufficient to prove that fact, and it is certain that computations of the positions of the heavenly bodies must have played an important part in the reform of the calendar and establishment of the new Jalalian era, in 1079, by the Seljūk sultan, Jalāl-al-dīn Malikshāh, under the direction of a commission of scholars headed by the well-known astronomer poet, Omar Khayyam. Omar, in fact, had been summoned to Merv by the sultan, four years previously, to make observations in the royal observatory, and there he constructed the *Zīj-i Malikshāhī*, 'Astronomical Tables of Malikshāh,' which were employed in the calendar reform. The names of two of his colleagues engaged upon the reform were Abu'l Muẓaffar al-Iṣfizārī and Maimūn ibn Najīb al-Wāsiṭī (see Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, London, 1906, ii. 181, n. 2). A section of a large work composed in 1082–1083 by Kai-Kā'ūs and entitled *Qābūs-Nāmah* (ch. 34) was devoted to 'astrology and mathematics' (ed. Teheran, 1285 A.H.; tr. A. Querry, Paris, 1887; cf. Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 277). The Persian poet Anvarī, of the 12th cent., was a great astrologer, and a conjunction of the planets in the sign of Libra, calculated to take place on September 16, 1186 (or in October of the preceding year, according to other accounts), led him to predict dire calamities for that day; but happily they did not occur (see Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 368; Horn in *GIrP* ii. 262–263). In the 13th cent. the Mongol ruler Hulāgū Khān, grandson of Chingīz Khān, established a celebrated observatory at Marāghah, in Azarbaijan, Western Persia, the building of which was begun in 1259, and traces of its ruins are still to be seen (cf. Wilson, *Persian Life and Customs*, New York, 1895, p. 77). Hulāgū's astronomer-royal was the learned Naṣīr-al-Dīn of Ṭūs (1201–1274), whose *Zīj-i Ilkhānī*, or almanac and astronomical tables, was a notable contribution to science (see Browne, *Lit. Hist. Pers.* ii. 484–486). The names of several other mediæval Persian astronomers, with a mention of their tables, are found in the Byzantine treatise of Theodorus Meliteniotes, referred to above (ed. Usener, pp. 13–14). Best known among the astronomical tables, however, are those of Ulugh Begh, grandson of Timur and founder of the observatory at Samarkand, in which city he died in 1449. These tables, written in Arabic, were translated into Persian and were made accessible in Europe through a Latin version by Greaves (Gravius, London, 1652), and again by Hyde in Persian and Latin (Oxford, 1665), and more recently by Baily (London, 1843) in *Memoirs of the Royal Astronomical Society*, xiii. 79–125. With reference to the present status of astronomical studies in Persia itself, one of the largest meteorites in the world is preserved as a curiosity in the Shah's palace at Teheran to-day; but there is no astronomer-royal to know its true value, and Persia must still wait a renaissance before independent work in studying the heavens is done by those of native birth.

8. **Influence of the heavenly bodies.**—The astrological aspects of Persia's early studies of star-lore have already been indicated above. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that 'judicial astrology,' or the attempt to determine scientifically the presumed influence of the heavenly bodies upon the destiny of human events, was often regarded more highly than natural astrology, or astronomy in our sense, which confines its investigations to determining the motions and positions of the stars, sun, and moon, in order to gain more strictly scientific results, as we regard them.

In some of the paragraphs given above there have been allusions to the beneficent part played by the sun and the moon in the development of the world and in advancing the welfare of mankind (*e.g.*, *Yašt*, vi. 1–5, vi. 5; *Bundahišn*, vii. 2–4, and elsewhere), while the stars also entered into the sphere of human activity by exercising a kindly sway over the earth. Thus the great rain star Tishtrya, aided by Satavaēsa in the Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 1–62; *Sīrōzah*, i. 13, ii. 13), combats the demon of drought, when invoked by men, and confers blessings upon his faithful worshippers. The victorious star Vanant (*Yašt*, xx. 1) repulses the influence of evil; and Haptō-iringa (Ursa Major) is effective even in tempering the torment of the souls in hell, a region located in the North (*Maīnōg-i Khraṭ*, xlix. 15–21; *Šikand Gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 31–33). The three fixed stars or constellations just named are regarded in the Pahlavi book *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* (xiv. 5–6), which was written about the 7th cent., but contains older material, as exercising an influence upon the efficiency of the sacrifice during the time of their ascendancy. In another chapter of the same work (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, xxi. 1–7) a specifically fortunate character is ascribed to the shadow of the noonday and afternoon sun when occupying certain positions in the zodiacal signs; and in *Dāṭistān-i Dīnīk*, vi. 9, the stars are synonymous with destiny. The malign influence ascribed to the planets has been sufficiently indicated above, and need not be referred to again in this section.

Sufficient reference has likewise been made to the part played by astrology, astrologers, and horoscopes both in Sasanian and in Muhammadan-Persian times. We need only recall the allusion to the last of the Parthian kings, Ardavān, and his astrologers (*Kārnāmē*, ii. 4–5, iii. 5–6), and we have the authority of the great Khorasmian scientist al-Bīrūnī for the fact that the Persian astrologers, like others, held that the zodiacal sign of Cancer was 'the horoscope of the world' (al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 55). A good illustration, in the 17th cent., of ephemerid tables that were used also for horoscopic purposes may be found in a work translated from the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with a Latin commentary,

by Beck, in his *Ephemerides Persarum per totum annum*, Augsburg, 1696 (especially chs. iii.–iv., vi.). Even to-day the astrologer's art in casting a horoscope holds an important place in the life of the ignorant and superstitious folk of Persia, and it still survives, though it is gradually disappearing, among the Zoroastrian Parsis of India (cf. Karaka, *History of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 160–162).

LITERATURE.—For a translation of the Avesta and the Pahlavi books consult the versions by Darmesteter and West in *SBE*, vols. iv., xxiii. ; and v., xviii., xxiv., xxxvii., and by Mills, *ib.* xxxi. ; likewise the French translation by Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892–1893. The more important single works on the subject have been given in the course of the article.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Japanese).—In the ancient mythology of Japan the sun-goddess plays the most important rôle, while the moon-god, her brother, occupies an insignificant place, and almost nothing is told about stars. The commonly accepted story is that the sun-goddess (Amaterasu, 'the heaven-shining deity') and the moon-god (Tsuki-yomi, 'the ruler of the moonlight night') were born, together with the storm-god (Susa-no-wo, 'the swift-impetuous'), of the couple who were the progenitors of the Japanese archipelago.[1] In this story the creation of these deities is conceived evidently as a generative act, whereas another version makes the emergence of the two deities from the 'white copper' mirrors the work of the male progenitor alone. Perhaps a more interesting version of the story is that the sun and the moon were produced out of the eyes of the progenitor, when he was washing in order to purify himself from the stains with which he had been contaminated on his visit to the infernal world after the death of his consort.[2] Though there are these different versions, the common trait and predominant factor in the story is that the sun-goddess is considered to be the supreme ruler of heaven and earth, and also the progenitrix of the ruling family, who claim to have handed down from the goddess herself the three insignia of the throne (see below). Now the relation between the sun-goddess and the moon-god is based on the natural phenomenon that the two are visible alternately by day and by night. The story is as follows :

The sun-goddess once commissioned her brother, the moon, to go down from their heavenly abode to earth to see Ukemochi, the female genius of food. When the latter entertained the moon with the food-stuffs taken out of her body, the moon became flushed with anger and slew the goddess of food. The sun-goddess was so displeased with her brother's wantonness that she said to him : 'Thou art a wicked deity. I must not see thee face to face.' Hence the sister and brother appear alternately in heaven.[3]

The intention of the story is evident, but at the same time it shows a characteristic of the sun-goddess as the matron of agriculture, which played a great part in the myths and worship of the goddess.[4] Thus, in contrast to the prominent rôle played by the sun-goddess, the moon plays a very inferior part, and a much smaller part is played by the stars. A star-god is mentioned in the ancient myth, but his rôle is quite ambiguous, while a festival in honour of certain stars (the stellar constellations called the Herdsman and the Weave-maid) was derived from China. All other stories and worship of stars are much later and were introduced chiefly through Buddhist agency, though some of them may have been derived from other sources—Hindu, Persian, or Chinese. The most prominent star-worship is that of the Pole star, together with Ursus Major. These stars, conceived as one deity, are worshipped by the Buddhists as the protector of the country as well as of individual fortune, while the Shintōists identify them with the Taoist 'palace of iridescent subtlety' (Shi-bi-kyū in Sino-Japanese), where the highest deity of Shintō, the 'eternal-ruling' (Minaka-nushi), is believed to reside. But this Shintō worship is of late origin ; it was specially emphasized by a Shintō theorizer in the early part of the 19th century.

When Buddhism was introduced into Japan (6th cent.) and questions came up as to the relationship between the indigenous deities and the Buddhist pantheon, the Buddhist teachers tried to discover analogies between them and to explain that the Buddhist deities were the original noumena and the native ones their lateral manifestations. The most striking analogy was found between the sun-goddess and the aspect of Buddha's personality conceived in the sun-myth. The difference in gender concerned the syncretist but little, partly because the Japanese language had no genders and partly because the noumenon and the manifestation may take any sex. The result was an identification of the Japanese sun-goddess with Buddha Vairochana ('the illuminator'), and this conception exercised a wide influence on doctrine and worship during the sway of the syncretic Shintō from the 8th cent. down to the middle of the 19th, when the combination was dissolved by force. Among the theorizers of the syncretism we may cite one, Kanera (1402–81), who explained sun, moon, and stars as corresponding to the three insignia of the throne, *i.e.* the sun to the mirror, the moon to the jewel, and the stars to the sword.[1] This eclectic theory was backed by the popular conception of the 'three illuminating bodies' (*San-kō*) and their worship. People even nowadays regard a simultaneous appearance of the three as an auspicious occasion for worship and as a sign of special blessing to the country—*e.g.*, when on an autumn day the clear sky and the comparatively weak light of the sun cause the new moon and a certain star (Venus) to be visible to the eyes. Naturally, various configurations of the celestial bodies were used for methods of divination and predictions. In these methods Hindu, Persian, and Chinese elements may be detected, and their influence is still a living force among the mass of the people.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the footnotes, see M. Anesaki, *Japanese Mythology* (=vol. viii. of *The Mythology of All Races*), Boston, 1920.

M. ANESAKI.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan).—I. *ASTROLOGY*.—1. Name.—Among the Muslims the technical name of astrology is *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *aḥkām an-nujūm*,[2] 'science (or art) of the decrees of the stars,' *'ilm al-aḥkām*, 'science of the decrees.' Sometimes, though rarely, in place of *aḥkām* its synonym *qaḍāyā* is found. Another name is *an-najāmah* (*nijāmah*) or *'ilm an-najāmah*. On the other hand, the names *'ilm* (*ṣinā'at*) *an-nujūm*, 'science (or art) of the stars,' *'ilm at-tanjīm*, mean astronomy as well as astrology, and they also mean both of these sciences taken together. The word *aḥkām* also signifies 'judgments,' 'judicial decisions' ; accordingly the first of the denominations given above was in the Middle Ages translated in the Latin versions of Arabic works by *scientia judiciorum stell-*

[1] See *Nihongi : Chronicles of Japan*, tr. W. G. Aston (*Proc. Japan Soc. of London*, Suppl. to vol. i. [1896]), p. 18 f. ; and, for the following stories, pp. 20, 22, etc.

[2] See *Koji-ki, or Records of Ancient Japan*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain (*TASJ*, Suppl. to vol. x. [1883]), pp. 42–44. This version is preserved also in *Nihongi*, p. 32, and, for its connexion with the conception of life and death, see art. LIFE AND DEATH (Japanese).

[3] *Nihongi*, p. 32.

[4] Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 222 f., where the ritual to the goddess for harvest is cited.

[1] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Japanese), vol. ix. p. 870.

[2] As in the case of the other branches of scientific literature, so for astrology the Musalmān peoples made use of the Arabic language.

arum, and thence came the name of *astrologia judiciaria* or *astronomia judiciorum*, astrology, as opposed to *astrologia* (*astronomia*) *quadrivialis* (or *doctrinalis*), which is astronomy. Thus in the denomination of astrology among the Musalmāns there is a concept somewhat different from that contained in the Greek term [τέχνη] ἀποτελεσματική, 'science of the fulfilment [of astrological prognostications].' The astrologer is usually called by the same name as the astronomer, viz. *munajjim* (much more rarely *najjām*); sometimes, however, he is called by the special word *aḥkāmī* (plur. *aḥkāmiyyūn*, *aṣḥāb ṣinā'at al-aḥkām*). It was only in the 19th cent. that the distinction between *munajjim*, 'astrologer,' and *falakī*, 'astronomer,' was introduced into Arabic (at least in Egypt and in Syria).

2. Divisions.—The Muhammadans usually arrange the science of astrology under five principal heads:

(*a*) The fundamental principles of astrology, viz. the different divisions of the ecliptic, the properties of the various celestial places and of individual planets, the methods of determining the ascendant and the 12 celestial houses (*buyūt*, 'domus'), the planetary conjunctions, etc.

(*b*) Prognostics of a universal character (*al-aḥkām 'alā umūr al-'ālam*), viz. those which refer to the vicissitudes of kingdoms, dynasties, religions, and cities, to wars, epidemics, famines, winds, rains, the prices of goods, etc. This part of astrology, which Ptolemy calls ἀποτελεσματικὴ καθολική, 'universal apotelesmatics,' is usually called by the Arabs *taḥāwīl sinī al-'ālam*, 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' since a great part of these prognostics is deduced from the planet which has the dignity of 'significator' (ἀφέτης, *dalīl*, *haylāj*) at the moment when the sun enters Aries, *i.e.* at the beginning of each tropic year. This universal part of astrology is subdivided into three sections: (i.) predictions drawn from the various kinds of planetary conjunctions (*qirānāt*, *iqtirānāt*), (ii.) predictions based on the 'revolutiones annorum mundi,' (iii.) predictions relating to the 'mutationes aëris' (*taghayyur al-hawā'*), *i.e.* to meteorological phenomena, and which are deduced from the lunar stations, or from the heliacal rising of Sirius, etc.

(*c*) Individual prognostications relating to the vicissitudes of individuals, derived from the planet or other celestial place which may happen to be the 'significator' at the moment of birth, and then from the 'significator' at each revolution of successive tropic years. This part of astrology Ptolemy calls γενεθλιαλογική, and the Arabs *al-mawālīd*, 'nativitates.'

(*d*) *Masā'il*, 'interrogationes' (ἐρωτήσεις), or that part of astrology which is concerned with replies to questions, *e.g.*, the circumstances of a distant relative, the author of a theft, the hiding-place of a runaway slave, etc. The 'interrogationes' are always connected by the Muhammadan astrologers with the division of the heavens into 12 'domus.' The astrologers who follow the pure tradition of Ptolemy do not admit the 'interrogationes.'

(*e*) *Iḫtiyārāt*, 'elections,' *i.e.* the choice of the propitious moment for doing any particular thing. The most common method is that of determining such a moment by seeking in which of the 12 celestial 'domus' the moon is found at that particular moment. This was also very probably the method employed by the Greeks; but along with this some Muhammadan astrologers use another method, of Indian origin (but also attributed to Dorotheus), which consists in deducing the fitting moment for action from the place which the moon then occupies in one of the 28 lunar stations or mansions (*manāzil*). The 'electiones' also are not admitted by the astrologers who follow Ptolemy's teaching.

3. Place among the sciences.—The science of the stars, says Ptolemy at the beginning of his *Tetrabiblos*, or *Quadripartitum*, consists of two parts: the first studies the appearances of the motions of the heavenly bodies either with respect to each other or with respect to the earth; the second seeks to deduce, from the physical qualities of those appearances, the changes which take place in the sublunar world. The first part is a science which stands by itself, and can be studied independently of the second; this, on the contrary, cannot do without the first. This conception that astrology is but the sister of astronomy, a branch, that is to say, of the 'science of the stars,' which in its turn is a part of 'mathematics' (*'ulūm riyāḍiyyah*, *'ulūm ta'līmiyyah*, *ta'ālīm*), is common to all the Musalmān astrologers and astronomers, and is accepted also by some philosophers (al-Fārābī in his *de Scientiis*, and the Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafā', or 'sincere companions' of the 10th cent. in their *Epistles*), by the author of the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, or 'Encyclopædia of the Sciences' (10th cent.), and by the great historian philosopher Ibn Ḫaldūn (*Proleg.* lib. vi. cap. 13; M. G. de Slane's Fr. tr., Paris, 1862–68, iii. 122 f.).

Astrology, however, is classified in a different way by the majority of the philosophers. Musalmān writers commonly divide all science into two great categories: (*a*) sciences which relate to religious law (*'ulūm shar'iyyah*), that is to say, in addition to theology and canon law, the learning which serves as an introduction to them, namely, grammar, lexicography, rhetoric, poetry, history, etc.; (*b*) intellectual or philosophic sciences (*'ulūm 'aqliyyah* or *ḥikmiyyah*), which the author of the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, thinking of their origin, calls *'ulūm al-'ajam*, 'foreign sciences.'[1] The intellectual or philosophical sciences in their turn are for the most part divided into the three sections[2] already fixed by the later Greek peripatetics and by the Neo-Platonic expounders of Aristotle (*e.g.*, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Johannes Philoponus), namely: (*a*) metaphysic (*al-ḥikmah al-ilāhiyyah*, θεολογία, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά); (*b*) natural sciences (*al-ḥikmah aṭ-ṭabī'iyyah*, 'natural philosophy,' φυσική); (*c*) mathematical sciences (*al-ḥikmah ar-riyāḍiyyah*, μαθηματική). These last correspond to the *Quadrivium* of Boethius, namely, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; on the other hand, the natural sciences are subdivided into eight fundamental parts, named for the most part after the titles of the corresponding Aristotelian works, namely: *Auscultatio physica*, *Generatio et corruptio*, *Cœlum et mundum*, *Meteoræ*, *Mineralia*, *Vegetalia*, *Animalia*, *de Anima*. Avicenna (*Fī aqsām al-'ulūm al-'aqliyyah*, in *Tis'rasā'il*, Constantinople, 1298 A.H. [=A.D. 1881], p. 71 ff.), Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Sahāwī (*Irshād al-qāṣid*, ed. A. Sprenger, Calcutta, 1849; the author died in 749 A.H. [=A.D. 1348]), Ḥājjī Ḫalīfah (in the introduction to his *Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopædicum*),[3] and others consider astrology as one of the 7 (or 9) *furū'*, 'secondary branches' of the natural sciences, placing it, that is to say, beside medicine, physiognomy, interpretation of dreams, alchemy, the science of talismans, etc. This same classification of the natural sciences is found in al-Ghazālī († 505 A.H. [=A.D. 1111]), who, in his *Tahāfut al-*

[1] Each of these two great categories afterwards gives place to the distinction between theoretical (*naẓariyyah*) and practical (*'amaliyyah*) science—a distinction which has its origin in Aristotle (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*[3], Tübingen, 1875–81, II. ii. 177).

[2] Other divisions, indicated in the writings of the Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafā', in the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, etc., are useless for our present purpose.

[3] Ed. G. Flügel, 8 vols., London, 1835–58.

falāsifah, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 63 f., refers to it as common amongst the Musalmān peripatetics, and approves of it.

Averroës, in the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 121, admits, as corresponding to Aristotelian teaching, the eight fundamental parts of the natural sciences; but he denies that the so-called derived branches are sciences. Medicine, he says, is an art (*ṣinā'ah*) and not a science; it has a practical and not a theoretical character; accordingly astrology is included in the same category with divination from the flight of birds and from the movement of quadrupeds (*zajar*), with divination in the form of vaticinations (*kahānah*), with physiognomy and with the interpretation of dreams, all being arts which have as their aim the prediction of the future, but which 'are not sciences either theoretically or practically, however it may be supposed that one may sometimes derive some practical advantage from them.'

A curious classification is found at the beginning of the unedited book *de Interrogationibus* (*Fī-masā'il*) of the astrologer Ya'qūb al-Qaṣrānī, who lived in the 3rd cent. A.H. (9th A.D.). According to the catalogue of the Arabic MSS of Berlin (W. Ahlwardt, *Verzeichniss der arab. Handschriften*, Berlin, 1887–99, v. 275, no. 5877), he maintains three degrees (*marātib*) of science: theology, medicine, science of the stars; the last, being based not on observation, but on deduction from analogy, occupies a place between the other two.

4. Sources.[1]—(*a*) *Greek.*—These are represented by the classic (if we may call it so) astrology of the *Tetrabiblos* or *Quadripartitum* of Ptolemy; by the writings of Dorotheus Sidonius (1st cent. A.D.), which go back to the Græco-Egyptian tradition; by the great eclectic compilation of Vettius Valens (2nd cent. A.D.);[2] by the book on the 'decani,' the 'interrogationes,' and the nativities of Antiochus of Athens (2nd or 3rd cent. A.D.), which appears especially to follow the Babylonian tradition; by the Καρπός, or *Centiloquium*,[3] falsely attributed to Ptolemy; by some works ascribed to the mythical Hermes;[4] and by an author whose name (Rīmos?, Zīmos?) is cited by Arabic writers in a form so corrupt as to be unrecognizable. Of another Greek writer, Teucer or Teucrus of Babylon, the Arabs had knowledge through Iranian sources.

(*b*) *Indian.*—The Musalmān writers mention seven or eight Indian astrologers, whose names, however, it has not as yet been possible to identify with the corresponding Sanskrit. The most important is K.n.k.h or K.t.k.h, who, according to some Arabic writers, appears to have come to Baghdād to the court of the khalīf al-Manṣūr, bringing thither astronomical books of India, and, according to others, making known Indian arithmetic. The Arabs attribute to him writings on the *numūdār* (that is, on the method of ascertaining a factitious ascendant of the nativity), on the nativities, and on the conjunctions of the planets; it is therefore plain that he had also treated of the part of Indian astrology called in Sanskrit *horā* or *jātaka*, which arose through Greek influence. This confirms a conjecture of F. Boll (*Sphaera*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 414 f.), who, from the citations contained in the *Introductorium* of Abū Ma'shar (or Albumasar), infers that K.n.k.h had before him materials of distant Greek origin for his representation of the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani.' But in general, Musulmān astrologers cite simply 'the Indians' (*al-Hind*), without particular names of authors. We must further add that the influence of Indian astrology made itself felt sometimes through Iranian writings and oral teaching, as is apparent from some Indian words which have passed into Arabic terminology in an Iranian form—*e.g.*, *darījān* (Ind. *drekkāna*).

(*c*) *Iranian.*—These are in the Pahlavī language or Middle Age Persian. The writings of Teucrus of Babylon (second half of the 1st cent. A.D.) on the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani' reached the Arabs through a Persian version, where the name of the author, on account of the ambiguity of the Pahlavī writing, was afterwards spelt by the Persians and Arabs Tīnkalūs (also Tankalūsh or Tankalūshā); so that in the *Introductorium* of Abū Ma'shar his teachings were given as 'teachings of the Persians' (*madhhab al-Furs*) and contain also some Persian names of constellations (cf. Boll, p. 415 f.). Another source was Buzurjmihr's commentary on the astrological Ἀνθολογίαι of Vettius Valens; the Pahlavī translation of the Greek title was *vīzīdhak*, 'selected,' which became in Arabic *al-bizīdhaj* and was afterwards variously and strangely corrupted by Arabic writers.[1] The Musalmāns also cited as a source of astrological teachings the mythical Zoroaster (Zarādusht in Arabic writings, Zardusht in modern Persian writings), whose name indeed was already frequently found in Greek astrology of the 4th and following centuries. A fourth source is the book on 'nativities' of [al-]Andarzghar, son of Zādānfarrūḫ; but we lack information about this personage, whose name is corrupted into Alendezgod in the Latin version of Alcabitius (al-Qabīṣī), and into Andruçagar in the Latin version of the book of the Jew Ibn 'Ezrā on nativities (which always draws on Arabic sources). Those astrological writings which are ascribed by the Arabs to Jāmāsp the Wise (the trusted counsellor of the mythic king Gushtāsp) seem to be late Muhammadan falsifications.

We do not know exactly when all these works hitherto mentioned were first translated into Arabic, but it is certain that the great majority of them were known in the second half of the 8th cent. A.D., that is, when Musalmān culture began. If the indication placed at the end of the unedited *'Arḍ miftāḥ an-nujūm* of Hermes (MS in Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan) is true, this book would seem to have been translated in the month Dhū 'l-qa'dah, 125 A.H., namely, in September 743 A.D., while the Umayyad khalīfs were still reigning. The first version of the *Tetrabiblos* is due to Abū Yaḥyā al-Baṭrīq, a translator of the time of al-Manṣūr, the second 'Abbāsid khalīf (136–158 A.H. [A.D. 754–775]); Dorotheus and Antiochus are already mentioned in the writings of Mā shā' Allāh (Messahala) in the second half of the 8th cent.; all the other Greek authors mentioned above are amply cited by the astrologers of the 9th century. As has already been said, the writings of the Indian K.n.k.h seem to have been known at Baghdād in the time of the khalīf al-Manṣūr; and about the middle of the 9th cent. we have already several small astrological works of al-Kindī (Alchindus) formed expressly on Indian models. It is almost certain that the Persian books were translated by members of the family

[1] For details see the present writer's Arabic lessons on the origins of astronomy among the Arabs (*'Ilm al-falak, ta'rīḫuhu fī 'l-qurūn al-wusṭā*, Rome, 1911–12), pp. 189–215 (Iranian sources), 216–220 (Greek sources), etc.

[2] Muhammadan astrologers were also acquainted with the *Anthologiæ* of Vettius Valens through an Arabic translation of a Pahlavī version; cf. below, under (*c*).

[3] The Arabic tr. is rather a paraphrase, which attempts to interpret the theories obscurely indicated in the Greek text.

[4] Some of the works attributed to Hermes seem to be Musalmān falsifications—*e.g.*, the book *de Revolutionibus nativitatum*, which has reached us in a Latin translation.

[1] In the Latin version of Albohazen Haly filii Abenragel, *De iudiciis astrorum*, Basel, 1571, the name of the book is *Yndidech* (p. 149, col. b), *Enzirech* (p. 176, col. a), *Endenadeyg Persarum* (p. 347b), *Endemadeyg Persarum* (348b), *Andilarehprosu* (404b).

Nawbaḥt, known by their translations from Pahlavī into Arabic (cf. *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, pp. 244, 274), whose head was astrologer at the court of al-Manṣūr; and in any case the antiquity of Iranian influence in astrology is attested by the fact that in the works of Mā shā' Allāh, according to the Latin translation of John of Seville, technical terms of Iranian origin are freely used: *e.g.*, *alhyleg* (*alhaylāj*), *alcochoden* (*al-kadḫudāh*), *alimbutar* (*al-jānbaḫtān*).

Side by side with the written sources there was, without doubt, the oral tradition of the peoples converted to Islām.[1] Among the Syrians Christianity had almost suffocated astrology, although Bardesanes (154–222) had reconciled Christian dogma with an attenuated form of predestination by means of the stars; all the same we know that at Ḥarrān, the ancient Carrhæ, special astrological traditions flourished along with other pagan sciences. It is further probable that Theophilus, son of Thomas, a Christian of Edessa who was astrologer of the khalīf al-Mahdī (A.D. 775–785), and who has been cited by several Musalmān astrologers as an authority on the subject of 'electiones,' again took up with Syrian oral tradition. In the same manner it is natural that there were absorbed into Musalmān culture the astrological beliefs and practices of the Aramaic centres (tending to paganism) of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, of the Egyptians, etc. Finally, we must not forget the Judaic element which had a notable part in the first ages of Musalmān astrology; in fact, among the principal writers on astrological matters in Arabic in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Hijra are the Jews Mā shā' Allāh, Sahl ibn Bishr, Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī, and Sanad ibn 'Alī.

5. Special character.—The civilized peoples over whom the Arabic domination of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries extended, viz. Greeks, Copts, Syrians, Persians, and Indians, had already imagined all the possible fundamental combinations concerning the influence of the stars over mundane events; consequently it was impossible for the Musalmān astrologer to find out anything substantially new. On the other hand, the principal justification of astrology consisted precisely in presenting itself as the jealous preserver of that which an age-long experience had taught the wise of preceding generations. The office of the Musalmān astrologers consequently was reduced to a choosing of what seemed suitable among the many principles and methods of their predecessors, and at times to a harmonizing of elements of very diverse origin, amplifying and completing particular points on which it was easy to give free rein to fancy. All this, as we have said, was done with the widest eclecticism. But, though nothing really original is met with in the field of apotelesmatics properly so called, there is, all the same, a point on which Arabo-Musalmān astrology is far superior to other astrologies, including the Greek, and represents a real progress. This consists of a wide and continued application of spherical astronomy and of exact mathematical processes to the methods of astrological research. Among the Greek astrologers the calculations are very rough; arcs of the ecliptic are substituted for arcs of the equator, right ascensions for oblique ascensions; rough tables, useful for a determined terrestrial latitude, are also employed for different latitudes; the latitudes of the planets are neglected in the calculation of the radiations ('projectiones radiorum,' *maṭāriḥ ash-shu'ā'*). Among the Greeks we seek in vain for a clear exposition of the method of determining mathematically the 12 heavenly 'domus,' which, however, form one of the hinges of the astrological system. Ptolemy himself, teaching minutely in the *Tetrabiblos* how the 'directio' (ἄφεσις) is calculated, completely neglects the latitude of the planets. Characteristic is the fact that Ptolemy, in the *Almagest*, occupies himself with three problems useful only to astrologers (inclination of the shadow of the eclipses with respect to the ecliptic and to the horizon, position of the stars with respect to the sun in consequence of the daily motion of the sphere, appearances and occultations of the planets with respect to the solar rays), and which even in astrology are of very small importance; and, on the other hand, he does not make the slightest allusion to other problems of spherical astronomy which would be of capital importance for apotelesmatics. Musalmān astronomers, on the contrary, teach exact calculations, and often even prepare tables for all the mathematical problems required by astrology: determination of the 12 celestial houses, 'directio,' 'revolutiones annorum,' 'profectio,' 'projectio radiorum.' Thus astrology, among the Musalmāns, becomes an art which demands a solid scientific preparation, and which tends to give an ever greater mathematical complication and exactness to its methods of research among celestial phenomena. *E.g.*, the *mamarr* ('passage [of one planet over another],' *almanar*, or 'supereminentia,' of our astrologers) corresponds exactly from an apotelesmatic point of view to the καθυπερτέρησις of the Greeks; but whilst for the Greeks this takes place when a planet is situated to the west of another, viz. has a lesser longitude, for the Arabs the *mamarr* takes place when a planet in its own epicycle is distant from the apogee of the epicycle less than another planet is distant from the apogee of its own epicycle. Consequently, its calculation in Musalmān astrology is not a light matter, and requires the employment of complete planetary tables. We can understand, therefore, why the theory of the *mamarr* of the planets is not only expounded in several treatises of spherical astronomy, but has also given rise to special monographs. The importance of all this is plain: in the Hellenistic world astrology flourishes while astronomy decays; in the Musalmān world of the Middle Ages astrology becomes a potent ally of mathematical and observational astronomy.

6. Polemic concerning astrology.—From Islām astrology at first had a much less unfavourable reception than from Christianity. The latter had to combat in the teachings of astrology an entire world of pagan ideas and cults; it had to contend against the concept of necessity, which excluded Christian free will. In the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., however, the pagan elements of astrology were completely modified; they were so entirely hidden under a verbal formalism as to be no longer recognizable; and, on the other hand, orthodox Islām, with its doctrine of predestination, which excluded the freedom of human actions, was, at bottom, not very far removed from the εἱμαρμένη of the Stoics and of many astrologers of antiquity. When we consider that the first Musalmān theologians took no heed whatever of the sciences which did not appear to have any relation to the religious content of Islām, we easily understand how astrology had been able to advance unimpeded through its first stages almost up to the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra. It is not, therefore, astonishing that Abū Ma'shar, writing his *Introductorium* in 848 A.D., among the ten categories of persons hostile to astrological teaching, makes no mention whatever of opponents influenced by strictly religious reasons,[1] and he makes his defence of astrology to consist (*Introd.* I. 5, fol. b 2 v.–b 3 v.) only in an amplification of the arguments with which Ptolemy (*Tetrab.* I. 3)

[1] Cf. Nallino, *'Ilm al-falak*, pp. 326–332.

[1] *Introductorium*, I. 4 (Augsburg, 1489, fol. a 7 v.–b 2 v.).

had already maintained the material and moral advantages of foreseeing the future, even if this should appear to be adverse to us. The 'philosopher of the Arabs,' al-Kindī, who died a little after 870 A.D., regards astrology as an integral part of philosophy (*ḥikmah, falsafah*); he seeks its basis not only in the four mathematical, but also in the physical and metaphysical doctrines;[1] and he opposes it to many popular prejudices. Al-Kindī was perhaps the only one who endeavoured to reduce to a completely rational and systematic form the principles and the methods of astrology.

But matters soon underwent a change. Towards the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra the knowledge of Aristotle's teaching grew more definite and profound, and in this there was no place for astrology; hence the philosophers commenced to make war against it. On the other hand, the theologians were not slow to see in the influence attributed to the stars over human actions a menace to the severely monotheistic conception of Islām, more especially when later on there filtered into Musalmān theology an opposition to the idea of necessary causality, and the atomistic doctrine of continued creative acts became more prevalent. Moreover, the daring predictions concerning the duration of Islām[2] became an evident danger to dogma. Thus the polemic against astrology became very acute.[3]

The most ancient confutation which we possess is that of **Abū 'l-Qāsim 'Īsā ibn 'Alī**,[4] drawn up in the first half of the 10th cent.,[5] and preserved in a work of the Ḥanbalite theologian, Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, *Miftāḥ dār as-sa'ādah*.[6]

After an exordium in which he admits that the stars may have some influence on such natural phenomena as climate and temperament, but denounces the practice of foretelling the future by their means, he divides his dissertation into three distinct parts. The first has reference to the discordance among astrologers as to their fundamental principles concerning the nature of the influence of the stars, and an exposition follows of several fundamental principles for astrological calculations on which the various writers disagree—*e.g.*, the method of determining the planetary 'termini,' the 'significator' (*dalīl*, ἀφέτης), the 'pars fortunæ,' the male and female zodiacal signs. The second part consists of the examination of many principles which are affirmed by the astrologers, but which are repugnant to good sense (*mustabsha'*). In the third part 'Īsā ibn 'Alī cites some of the arguments adopted by the astrologers in favour of their science, and refutes them.

Contemporary with 'Īsā ibn 'Alī is the famous philosopher **al-Fārābī** (*q.v.*; † A.D. 950), who, as a profound student of Aristotle, could not but be opposed to astrology. We have a work of his against astrology,[7] which, however, is not so vigorous a confutation as we should have expected from such a philosopher and contains some childish reasonings. This is explained by the fact that the work is merely a series of notes, published by a disciple just as he found them.

The philosophers contemporary with al-Fārābī did not all share his hostility to astrology; in fact the schools which had been less subject to Aristotelian influence favoured it, as was already the case with al-Kindī.

With reference to this a special place is held by the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā', 'Sincere Companions,' who flourished in al-Baṣrah towards A.D. 950-960, and whose writings set forth the philosophic doctrines of the heretical Bāṭinites, a branch of whom were the Carmaṭians (al-Qarāmiṭah), who towards the end of the 3rd cent. A.H. (9th cent. A.D.) caused political disorders in the 'Irāq, and who founded an independent kingdom in N.E. Arabia which lasted until after A.H. 474 (A.D. 1081-82). The Carmaṭians had reaped great advantage from astrological predictions based on the theory of the great planetary conjunctions.[1] One can therefore understand that the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā' not only admitted, with Aristotle and other Arabic philosophers, that the changes (generation and corruption) of the sublunar world were consequent upon celestial movements, but also that the planets foretell the future and have a direct influence upon the will and the moral character. The great encyclopædic work of the Iḫwān is imbued with those astrological ideas, among which the theory of planetary conjunctions occupies the principal place.

Favourable to astrology also are those other philosophers who lead up to Abū Sulaimān Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn Bahrām as-Sijistānī al-Manṭiqī, who, in the second half of the 10th cent., gathered about him at Baghdād a number of learned men for the purpose of discussing various subjects. Notes and summaries of many of these discussions were collected in the *Kitāb al-muqābasāt* of Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī, a philosopher, mystic, and jurist († after 400 A.H. [A.D. 1009-1010]), about whose orthodoxy there is some suspicion. A record of a meeting in reference to astrology is preserved almost entire in the work already cited of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah.[2] Some of those present had attacked astrology, declaring it to be useless, since, after so much study and effort on the part of its supporters, it does not succeed in modifying those events which overwhelm both the wise astrologer and the ignorant man. There then rose up several questioners to refute these accusations, and they set themselves specially to explain how predictions can fail in spite of the truth of astrology, and that, in any case, the efforts of astrologers to discover the truth are always noble. Their defence of practical astrology is somewhat weak, and is probably the last that has been made in the field of philosophy.

Avicenna (*q.v.*; † 428 A.H. [A.D. 1037]) contends against astrology, not only in his great encyclopædia, *ash-Shifā'*, 'The Recovery of the Health [of the Soul],' and in the *an-Najāh*, but also in a special work of which a full résumé was made by Mehren.[3] He demonstrates that astrology has no foundation, and proceeds to show that, even admitting its theoretical truth, it would be impossible for men to acquire a knowledge of it.

Averroës (*q.v.*), or Ibn Rushd († 595 A.H. [A.D. 1198]), is also a decided adversary of astrology, as appears from the severe judgment referred to above (§ 3) and from some passages of his comments on Aristotle. But it would be useless to continue the review of the philosophers, who after the 10th cent. A.D. are all in agreement on this question. It is more interesting to consider the position taken up by the theologians, who—from the motives indicated at the beginning of this section—engaged, towards the end of the 9th cent. A.D., in a relentless war against astrological theories.[4]

We have already seen the attitude of al-Jubbā'ī. We may add here that **Ibn Ḥazm** († 456 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), who fiercely opposed the scholastic or speculative theology of al-Ash'arī in Spain, gives his ideas on astrology in *Al-Fiṣal fī 'l-milal wa 'l-ahwā' wa 'n-niḥal*.[5] He divides those who believe that the future can be foretold by means of the stars into two classes: (1) misbelievers and polytheists, and (2) persons who are in error. The first are those who maintain that the stars and the

[1] Cf. the quotations in M. Steinschneider, *ZDMG* xviii. [1864] 134; and chs. x. and xi. of the anonymous Latin pamphlet *De erroribus philosophorum* (written in the second half of the 13th cent.), ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*², Louvain, 1908-11, pt. ii. pp. 18-21.

[2] *E.g.*, Theophilus, son of Thomas, the astrologer of the third 'Abbāsid khalīf (see above, § 4), maintained that the reign of Islām would last only 960 years (Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Proleg.*, lib. iii. ch. liv., tr. de Slane, ii. 222 f.). The philosopher al-Kindī calculated that the duration of the kingdom of the Arabs would be 693 years (see O. Loth, 'Al-Kindī als Astrolog,' in *Morgenländische Forschungen, Festschrift an H. L. Fleischer*, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 263-309).

[3] Men like al-Jāḥiẓ († 255 A.H., 869 A.D.) and the famous theologians al-Jubbā'ī († 303 A.H., 915-916 A.D.) and al-Ash'arī († 324 A.H., 936 A.D.) were declared enemies of astrology.

[4] According to Ibn al-Qifṭī, ed. Lippert, p. 244 *f.*, he died on Friday, 28 Rabī' II., 395 A.H., *i.e.* 28th March, 1001 A.D.; cf. also *Fihrist*, p. 129.

[5] It is, in fact, cited in the preface of the *Libellus isagogicus ad magisterium judiciorum astrorum*, which al-Qabīṣī had written for Saif ad-daulah, prince of Aleppo, who reigned from 333 to 356 A.H. [A.D. 944-967].

[6] Cairo, 1323-25 A.H. [A.D. 1905-07], ii. 156-196.

[7] Al-Fārābī, *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, tr. F. Dieterici, Leyden, 1892, pp. 170-186 (pp. 104-114 of the text published in 1890). Dieterici at some points has not understood the meaning of some technical terms of astrology, so that his version is not always perfect.

[1] Cf. M. J. de Goeje, *Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et les Fatimides*², Leyden, 1886, pp. 115-129.

[2] ii. 185-193.

[3] A. F. Mehren, 'Vues d'Avicenne sur l'astrologie,' *Muséon*, iii. [Louvain, 1884] 383-403, reprinted in 'Homenaje á D. Francisco Codera,' *Estudios de erudición oriental*, Saragossa, 1904, pp. 235-250.

[4] See also a brief account by I. Goldziher, 'Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften' (*ABAW*, 1915), pp. 20-25.

[5] Cairo, 1317-21 A.H. (A.D. 1899-1903), v. 37-40.

heavenly spheres are intelligent beings, agents, of eternal duration, and disposing of earthly things either with or without God. The second are those who hold that the stars and the celestial spheres, whilst without intelligence, have been created and established by God as indicators of things which are to take place.

The preserver of Ash'arite dogmatic theology, **al-Ghazālī** († 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]), opposes astrology in his *Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn*, 'The Revival of Religious Sciences.'[1] And the same attitude we find in the books of the famous Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taimiyyah († 728 A.H. [A.D. 1328]).[2]

But the most vigorous and complete confutation of astrology is contained in the *Miftāḥ dār as-sa'ādah* of **Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah** († 751 A.H. [A.D. 1350]),[3] one of the most noted theologians of the Ḥanbalite school. Only the famous work of Pico della Mirandola, *Adversus astrologiam*, can be compared to the 110 closely printed quarto pages of the confutation written by this Muhammadan theologian, whose impassioned polemics press upon the adversary with an infinity of subtle distinctions which prove the force of his dialectic.

In the theological world perhaps the sole defender of astrology is **Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī** († 606 A.H. [A.D. 1210]), cited above. Famous especially for his great commentary on the Qur'ān, he composed also many theological, philosophical, and astrological works, and studied medicine and mathematics. Without doubt his confidence in astrology is due to his cultivation of the sciences, and this confidence already appears in his commentary on the Qur'ān.

No theologian seems to have followed Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī in his bold interpretations of Qur'ānic passages and of religious traditions. Besides, after the writings of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah and his predecessors, polemics about astrology could no longer reckon on any novelty of argument. The considerations developed by the great philosopher of history, **Ibn Ḫaldūn** († 808 A.H. [A.D. 1406]), in his historical *Prolegomena*,[4] are alone deserving of notice.

7. Astrology in common life.—The four orthodox schools of jurisprudence and the Shī'ite school were already in existence when the war of the philosophers and theologians against astrology became fierce; accordingly, the anathema launched against it in the name of religion did not occupy much space in Muhammadan law, notwithstanding the fact that this had its chief foundation in religious doctrine. Among some jurists of a rather later age, however, we meet with open hostility to astrology. In Muhammadan law the buying and selling of useless things is forbidden; therefore some jurists[5] teach that one may not sell or buy books of astrology. Another legal prescript does not admit the testimony of misbelievers; therefore some jurists, regarding the astrologer as a misbeliever, deny him the right of acting as a witness.[6] But, before theological anathema smote it, astrology was deeply rooted among all lay classes of society. The courts of the 'Abbāsid khalīfs at Baghdād and of the numerous small dynasties which arose in the Muhammadan world after the 3rd cent. of the Hijra received astrologers with great favour and consulted them on affairs of State as well as on trifling matters of daily life. At the foundation of Baghdād in A.D. 762, and at that of al-Mahdiyyah (in Tunis) in 916, the astrologers, summoned for the purpose, indicate the propitious moment for beginning the work. Many writings on apotelesmatics are dedicated to khalīfs, sultans, and princes. In Turkey, even at the beginning of the 19th cent., one of the chief posts at court was that of *munajjim-bāshī*, or chief astrologer; and the case was similar in Persia, in India, and in Muhammadan central Asia.[1] In the *Thousand and One Nights* not only is the astrologer with his astrolabe mentioned several times (*e.g.*, Nights 28 and 50 of the Egyptian edd.), but there is also a complete dissertation on the elements of astrology (Nights 254–257, in the story of the slave girl Tawaddud). Further, the considerable number of old Arabic astrolabes still existing in the East and in South Europe would alone suffice to prove the great diffusion of astrology throughout the Muhammadan world; and it found strong support among the students of astronomy. Cases of persecution of astrologers by the State are extremely rare. Al-Ḥākim, Fāṭimid khalīf of Egypt, who in 404 A.H. (A.D. 1013–1014) prohibited the study of astrology and banished from Cairo those who cultivated it, was an astrologer himself, and that decree of his is one of many acts of madness committed in the last years of his life.

In the Muhammadan countries into which European civilization has penetrated (which with the Copernican system has destroyed the bases of apotelesmatics) astrology has lost its importance and remains the monopoly of the popular classes, among whom it has degenerated into a form of prediction without any serious mathematical and astronomical basis. On the other hand, in countries where there is little or no European influence (*e.g.*, in many parts of Morocco) apotelesmatics still flourish, but accompanied by only rudimentary astronomical knowledge. To-day in S. Arabia the function of the astrologer is exercised especially by the *qāḍī*,[2] *i.e.* by those whose duty it is to see that canon law is observed!

8. Influence on European astrology.—The astrology of the Latin Middle Ages from the beginning of the 12th to the end of the 15th cent. is really Arabic astrology. Its sole sources are Arabic (Albohali, Albohazen, Albumasar, Alcabitius, Alchindus, Almansor, Alphadol, Aomar, Gergis, Hali, Haly Heben Rodan, Messahala, Zahel, and some pseudepigraphical works), or at least translations from Arabic (*e.g.*, the *Tetrabiblos* or *Quadripartitum* of Ptolemy, and the Καρπός or *Centiloquium*); the technical terminology is literal translation or mere corruption of Arabic words. In the 16th cent. the humanists rescued from oblivion the poem of Manilius and the crude compilation of Firmicus Maternus; but this was a mere literary exercise of no importance for the astrology of the 17th century.

In the Byzantine world also Muhammadan astrology leaves deep traces in many versions from the Arabic and from the Persian;[3] so that side by side with the works derived from the classic Greek authors appear those of Ἀρομάσαρ (Abū Ma'shar), Ἀχμέτ (Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf ibn ad-Dāyah), Μεσσάλα (Mā shā' Allāh), Σέχλ (Sahl ibn Bishr), and other Arabic writers. Thus there frequently occur in Byzantine astrological writings Arabic and Persian names of planets or technical terms which no longer correspond to those of classical Greek.

[1] Cairo, 1302–03 A.H. (A.D. 1885–86), i. 27 f. All this passage is copied without indication of its source in ad-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān*, Cairo, 1311 A.H. (A.D. 1893), i. 12 f., *s.v.* 'Asad.'

[2] *Majmū'at al-fatāwā*, Cairo, 1326–29 A.H. (A.D. 1908–11), i. 323–336.

[3] Ed. Cairo, 1323–25 A.H. (A.D. 1905–07), ii. 132–240.

[4] Bk. vi. ch. 26 (tr. M. G. de Slane, iii. 240–249).

[5] *E.g.*, al-Bājūrī, *Ḥāshiyah 'alā Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī*, Būlāq, 1292 A.H., i. 445.

[6] Cf. the quotations in Saḥnūn ibn 'Uthmān al-Wānsharīsī, *Mufīd al-muḥtāj fī sharḥ as-sirāj*, Cairo, 1314 A.H., p. 5.

[1] Cf. *e.g.*, F. Bernier, *Evénements particuliers des états du Mogol*, Paris, 1671, p. 96. See also J. T. Reinaud, *Monumens arabes, persans, et turcs*, Paris, 1828, ii. 367 f. For Persia see *Voyages du chevalier Chardin en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient*, new ed., Amsterdam, 1735, i. 242, iii. 163–165, 174–183.

[2] R. Manzoni, *El Yemen*, Rome, 1884, p. 209; H. von Maltzan, *Reise nach Südarabien*, Brunswick, 1873, p. 164.

[3] The Arabs and the Persians are called indifferently Πέρσαι.

Finally, the Jewish astrological literature of Europe, in which a conspicuous place is occupied by the works of Abrāhām ibn 'Ezrā († 1167), is based exclusively on Arabic sources.

LITERATURE.—There is no work setting forth the content and history of Muhammadan astrology. For biographical and bibliographical notices of individual astrologers reference may be made to H. Suter, *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1900 (completed in 'Nachträge und Berichtigungen zu "Die Math. und Astron.,"' in *Abhandlungen zur Gesch. der mathematischen Wissenschaften*, xiv. [1902] 157–185). The mathematical side of Muhammadan astrology and the explanation of several technical terms are set forth in the present writer's annotations on al-Battānī, *Opus astronomicum*, 3 vols., Milan, 1899–1907. Beyond two or three small pseudepigraphical writings of no importance, printed or lithographed in Cairo, and the dissertation of al-Kindī published by O. Loth (see above, p. 92*, n. 2), there are no edd. of complete astrological works in the original text; there are, on the other hand, edd. of Middle Age Latin versions (15th–16th cent.), several of which have been cited in the course of the article.

II. *ASTRONOMY.*—1. **Name.**—The names *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *an-nujūm*, 'science (or art) of the stars,' *'ilm* (or *ṣinā'at*) *at-tanjīm* denote both astronomy and astrology. For the former science Averroës[1] adopts the expression *ṣinā'at an-nujūm at-ta'ālīmiyyah*, 'mathematical art of the stars,' which is found also in the original Arabic of the *de Scientiis* of al-Fārābī, where Gerard of Cremona translated it by 'astronomia doctrinalis,' misled by the double signification of the adjective *ta'ālīmī*. The astronomy of observation is designated by Averroës[2] *ṣinā'at an-nujūm at-tajrībiyyah*, 'experimental art of the stars.' Special names of astronomy are *'ilm al-haī'ah*, 'science of the form [of the universe],' and *'ilm al-aflāk*, 'science of the celestial spheres.'[3] The branch of astronomy which deals with the construction and use of instruments for determining the time, especially for the purpose of regulating the times of the religious services in the mosques, is named *'ilm al-mīqāt*, 'the science of the time appointed [for the canon prayers],' and he who cultivates it is called *muwaqqit*.

2. **Scope.**—The Greek and Muhammadan conception of astronomy does not exactly correspond to the modern conception.

Al-Fārābī says in his treatise *de Scientiis*[4] that astronomy has for its object the study of the celestial bodies and of the earth from these three points of view: (*a*) number, figure, order, and respective position of the spheres and of the celestial bodies; their magnitudes and distances from the earth; immobility of the earth; (*b*) celestial motions and their consequences with regard to the stars themselves (conjunctions and oppositions, eclipses, etc.); (*c*) magnitude of the inhabited part of the earth and its division into zones or climates; determination of geographical co-ordinates; effects of the rotation of the celestial sphere in regard to parts having different latitudes (varying length of the day, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.). This scheme of the content of astronomy is found also in later writers,[5] with the sole difference that the study of the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies and spheres comes to be considered under a category (*d*) separate from (*a*).

According to Avicenna, the astronomer studies 'the parts of the universe as far as regards their figure, their respective positions, their magnitudes, and their distances from each other; he further studies the motions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies, the estimate (*taqdīr*) of the globes, of the axes (*l. quṭūb*) and of the circles [ideal] on which those motions take place. All this is contained in the *Almagest*.'[6]

The limits of astronomy are well defined by Ibn Ḫaldūn († A.D. 1406):

Astronomy consists of the study of the celestial bodies and motions as they appear to us; 'it is a most noble science, but it does not give, as is often supposed, the form of the heavens and the disposition of the spheres and of the stars as they are in reality. It only indicates that from those motions there result for the spheres these forms and these dispositions. Now, as is known, it is not strange that from one and the same thing there should result necessarily two different things; therefore, when we say that those motions give as a result [those celestial configurations], we seek to argue the mode of existence of the result by means of the necessary cause; a proceeding which does not at all guarantee the truth. Nevertheless, astronomy is an important science, indeed one of the fundamental parts of the mathematical sciences.'[1]

The diversity of criteria and of purposes by and for which the physicist ('naturalis') studies celestial phenomena, in contrast to the astronomer ('astrologus'), is shown also in a passage of Averroës.[2] This conception of the philosophers is shared by the Muhammadan astronomers, for whom astronomy embraces spherical astronomy (with the theory of instruments), mathematical chronology, spherical trigonometry, and geography as based on mathematics (like that of Ptolemy); and it excludes all that for us would enter into the field of stellar physics and celestial mechanics. This is evident from the summary[3] of the best systematic treatise on Muhammadan astronomy, viz. the unedited *al-Qānūn al-mas'ūdī*, composed in Arabic by al-Bīrūnī († A.D. 1048):

(*a*) General notions and fundamental hypotheses for the geometrical representation of celestial phenomena; (*b*) mathematical chronology, conversion of one era into another, festivals of various peoples; (*c*) spherical trigonometry; (*d*) circles of the celestial sphere and systems of co-ordinates; phenomena of the diurnal motion of the sphere with reference to the earth (amplitudes, solar altitudes, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.); (*e*) form, dimensions, etc., of the earth; problems relating to terrestrial longitudes and latitudes; the direction of Mecca with regard to other places on the earth; geography on a mathematical-astronomical basis; (*f*) theory of the sun; (*g*) theory of the moon; solar and lunar parallaxes; (*h*) syzygies, eclipses, appearance of the new moon; (*i*) fixed stars and lunar stations; (*j*) theories of the five planets; geocentric distances and magnitudes of the celestial bodies and spheres; (*k*) problems of spherical astronomy as subserving astrology (calculation of the twelve celestial 'domus,' of the 'applicationes,' of the 'projectiones radiorum,' of the 'directiones' and 'profectiones,' of the 'revolutiones annorum,' of the *mamarr*, of the planetary conjunctions, of the millenary periods).

Muhammadan astronomical writings, almost always in Arabic, can be classified under four groups:

(*a*) General elementary introductions which represent a perfected form of what the *Isagoge* of Geminus and the *Hypotheses* of Ptolemy were for the Greeks; belonging to this category—to cite only writings translated into European languages and edited—are: the *de Imaginationes Sphæræ* of Thābit (or Thābit) ibn Qurrah († A.D. 901), the compendium of Alfraganus or al-Farghānī († after 861), and the compendium of al-Jaghmīnī († 1344–45);[4] (*b*) systematic treatises corresponding in type to the *Almagest*, but more perfect—*e.g.*, the unedited work of al-Bīrūnī cited above; the Latin translation of the *Almagest* of Geber (or Jābir) ibn Aflaḥ, printed at Nürnberg, 1534, would belong to this category if it had not omitted all the mathematical and astronomical tables; (*c*) treatises of spherical astronomy for the use of calculators and observers; these are called *zīj* (plur. *zījāt*, *azyāj*, *ziyajah*); they presuppose a knowledge of the general principles of cosmography and consist essentially of tables for calculation, illustrations of the use of the tables, and indications as to the manner of solving problems of spherical astronomy (for the most part without demonstration); the only treatise of this kind published and translated is that of al-Battānī;[5] of the Persian treatise of Ulūgh Beg only the prolegomena (explaining the use of the tables) and the stellar catalogue have been edited and translated; (*d*) writings on special subjects—*e.g.*, stellar catalogues, treatises on instruments, etc.

[1] Ibn Rushd, *Metaphysic*, Cairo, n.d. [1902], p. 65, l. 3 from end (ed. and tr. by C. Quirós Rodriguez, Madrid, 1919, bk. iv. § 13).

[2] P. 83 (Quirós, bk. iv. § 77). [3] See also above, I. 1.

[4] This has reached us only in the Latin version of Gerard of Cremona († 1187), Paris, 1588. The part relating to the mathematical sciences has been translated into German by E. Wiedemann, 'Beitr. zur Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften,' xi. (*Sitzungsberichte der physik.-medizin. Societät in Erlangen*, xxxix. [1907] 74–101.

[5] *E.g.*, Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Saḫāwī, *Irshād al-qāṣid*, Calcutta, 1849, p. 84 *f.*

[6] *Risālah fī-aqsām al-'ulūm al-'aqliyyah*, in the *Tis' rasā'il*, Constantinople, 1298 A.H. (1881). The same definition is found in the *Chahār Maqālah*, written in Persian about 1160 by Niẓāmī-i-'Arūḍī-i-Samarqandī (tr. E. G. Browne, Hertford, 1899 [extract from *JRAS*], p. 89).

[1] *Prolegomena*, bk. vi. ch. xvi. (tr. de Slane, iii. 145 *f.*).

[2] *Comm. de Cœlo*, bk. ii. ch. 57 (*Aristotelis Opera omnia cum Averrois Cordubensis commentariis*, Venice, 1562, vol. v. fol. 136r.–v.).

[3] According to the indexes of the chapters given in the catalogues of the Arabic MSS in Oxford and Berlin.

[4] *Sullāḥā Haundāyā*, the course of astronomy of Barhebræus, ed. and tr. F. Nau (*Le Livre de l'ascension de l'esprit sur la forme du ciel et de la terre*, 2 pts., Paris, 1899–1900), although written (in 1279) in Syriac by a Christian bishop, belongs to this category.

[5] To which is to be added the Latin translation, made in the 12th cent. by Athelhard of Bath, of Maslamah al-Majrīṭī's recension of the tables of al-Ḫuwārizmī, ed. with an excellent German commentary by H. Suter, 1914.

3. Relation to Islām.—Muhammadan religious ritual bases some of its prescriptions on elements of an astronomical character. The hours within which each of the five daily ritual prayers is valid depend on the latitude of the place and on the epoch of the solar year; further, the legal time for the night prayer is between the end of the evening and the beginning of the morning twilight. The ritual prayer is not valid unless the face is turned in the direction of Mecca; hence the necessity of solving the astronomical-geographical problem of the azimuth of Mecca. The beginning and the end of the month assigned to the fast are determined not by the civil calendar, but by the actual appearance of the new moon; and the beginning of the daily fast is given by the morning twilight. Finally, special ritual prayers are prescribed at eclipses of the sun and moon, for which it is well to be prepared in time. All this presupposes a certain degree of astronomical knowledge; and, although the majority of theologians and jurists are not content with pure calculation for the appearance of the new moon, but require the actual sight of the phenomenon, it is evident that the religious precept must be a real stimulus to scientific study. This explains also why the Muhammadans have undertaken so much research into the complex phenomena of the twilight and of the conditions of visibility of the new moon—phenomena which were almost entirely neglected by the Greek astronomers. On the other hand, many passages of the Qur'ān set forth the benefits which God has vouchsafed to men by means of celestial bodies and motions; at least they invite reflexion on the goodness and providence of God. Astronomy thus becomes an ally of religion.

4. Sources.[1]—(*a*) *Arabian.*—A first element of an exclusively practical character is due to the Arabs before Islām. Like all other peoples who dwell in hot countries and are compelled to prefer night to day for travelling, the Bedawīn made use of the stars for guiding their wanderings and for calculating (approximately) the hours of the night; they were thus familiar with the principal appearances of Venus and of Mercury, the places of the rising and setting of the more brilliant stars, and above all the annual course of the moon determined by noting its position in relation to 28 successive groups of stars called for this reason *manāzil al-qamar*, 'lunar stations.' Further, among the sedentary agricultural tribes, the seasons and many meteorological provisions (especially those for rain) were strictly connected with the annual rising of certain fixed stars[2] or else with the cosmic setting of the lunar stations. Hence, even in the 16th and 17th centuries, Arabic writers on astronomy still occupied themselves with the lunar mansions[3] and their *anwā'*, or cosmic settings.

(*b*) *Indian.*—The Muhammadans owe the first scientific elements of astronomy to India. In 154 A.H. (A.D. 771),[4] there came to Baghdād an Indian embassy one learned member of which introduced to the Arabs the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta*, composed in Sanskrit in A.D. 628 by Brahmagupta. From this work (which the Arabs called *as-Sind-hind*) Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥabīb al-Fazārī drew the elements and the methods of calculation for his astronomical tables (*zīj*) adapted to the Muhammadan lunar year. Almost contemporaneously Ya'qūb ibn Ṭāriq composed his *Tarkīb al-aflāk*, 'The Composition of the Celestial Spheres,' which was based on the elements and methods of the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* and on other data furnished by another Indian scientist (K.n.k.h), who came to Baghdād with a second embassy in 161 A.H. (A.D. 777–778). It seems that almost at the same time there was translated into Arabic under the name *al-Arkand* the *Khaṇḍakhādyaka*, written about A.D. 665 by the same Brahmagupta, but containing elements different from those of his other work. Abū 'l-ḥasan al-Ahwāzī, a contemporary of al-Fazārī and of Ya'qūb ibn Ṭāriq, probably drawing on oral teachings of learned Indians, introduced to the Arabs the planetary motions according to al-Arjabhad (a corruption of Āryabhaṭa, the name of an Indian astronomer who wrote in A.D. 500). These Indian works had many imitators in the Muhammadan world up to the end of the first half of the 5th cent. of the Hijra (11th cent. A.D.); some astronomers (*e.g.*, Ḥabash, an-Nairīzī, Ibn as-Samḥ) wrote contemporaneously books based on Indian methods and elements and books with Graeco-Arabic elements; others (*e.g.*, Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq as-Saraḫsī, Abu 'l-Wafā', al-Bīrūnī, al-Ḫāzinī) adapted elements calculated by the Muhammadan astronomers to great artificial cycles of years constructed in imitation of those of the Indians. For one of the characteristics of the astronomical books of India is their representation of the mean motions of sun, moon, and planets by the number of their revolutions in cycles of millions of years, starting from the supposition that at the beginning of creation sun, moon, and planets were all in conjunction in a given degree of longitude (*e.g.*, at the first point of Aries), taken as the initial point of the celestial sphere, and that at intervals of millions of years they will all be in conjunction again at the same point.[1] Further, many treatises composed by the Arabs gave the roots of the mean motions for the meridian of Uzain (corrupted later into Azin and Arin, the Sanskrit Ujjayinī), supposed to be the central meridian of the inhabited earth (90° E. of the first Ptolemaic meridian). From those Indian books the Arabs also derived their first knowledge of trigonometrical sines, of course in the form employed in India, *i.e.* for arcs of 3° 45′ and for the radius of 3438′.

(*c*) *Iranian.*—A few years after the introduction of Indian astronomy, and before the end of the 8th cent. A.D., there was translated into Arabic the Pahlavī work entitled *Zīk i Shatrozāyār*, 'Astronomical Tables of the King,' a name which became in the Arabic version *Zīj ash-Shāh* or *Zīj ash-Shahriyār*. The original was certainly composed in the last years of the kingdom of the Sāsānids, since the tables were based on the epoch of Yazdagird III. (16th June, A.D. 632); its elements were derived, not from Persian observations, but from Indian books. It appears also that the roots of the mean motions were referred to the meridian of the mythical castle Kangdiz, which Persian epic legend placed in the Far East. The Arabic version met with great favour among the Muhammadans. We know that the astronomer and astrologer Mā Shā' Allāh († at the beginning of the 9th cent. A.D.) made use of it for his calculations, that in the first half of the 9th cent. Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Ḫuwārizmī had deduced from it the equations of the planetary motions, whilst he had drawn the mean motions from the *as-Sind-hind* and other elements from Ptolemy, and that Abū Ma'shar († A.D. 886) used it for his astronomical tables. After the 9th cent. A.D. the *Zīj ash-Shāh* rapidly fell into disuse; but a passage of az-Zarqālī (Arzachel) shows that towards the middle of the 11th cent. some astrologers in Spain still calculated the longitude of the fixed stars according to the tables of the Persians.

(*d*) *Greek.*—Last in chronological order is the influence of Greek astronomy. At the end of the 8th cent. or at the beginning of the 9th A.D. a rich patron, of the family of the Barmecids, Yaḥyā ibn Ḫālid († 191 A.H. [A.D. 807]), caused the *Almagest* to be translated for the first time into Arabic. But this book, full of difficulties and obscurities, could not, at first, compete with easier and more practical works of Indian and Persian origin. It acquired influence later, when the mathematical preparation of the Muhammadans was more advanced, and when better translations appeared. In the first half of the 9th cent. also Arabic translations were made of the *Geographia*, the *Tabulæ Manuales*, the *Hypotheses Planetarum*, the *Apparitiones* (φάσεις) *Stellarum fixarum*, and the *Planisphærium* of Ptolemy; the *Tabulæ Manuales* of Theon of Alexandria; the book of Aristarchus on the magnitudes and distances of the sun and moon; the *Isagoge* of Geminus; two tractates of Autolycus; three of Theodosius; and the little work of Hypsicles on the ascensions. To the 9th cent. also probably belongs the Arabic translation of the astronomical tables of Ammonius, of which we still find traces in the 11th cent., when they were remodelled by az-Zarqālī, to pass afterwards into mediæval Latin literature under the names of Humenus, Armanus, etc. Finally, there appear to have been translated in the same century the book of the constellations of Aratus and a book on the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies, which, falsely attributed to Ptolemy, is known by the Arabs under the name of *Kitāb al-manāẓir*.

5. Some astronomical teachings.—We may here refer to some special points, which have an importance for the history of the general ideas of celestial phenomena. The only system received by the Muhammadan peoples was the geocentric. Aristotelian philosophy, the authority of Ptolemy, and the requirements of astrology were insurmountable obstacles to the conception of a heliocentric system, which, in any case, could not have been demonstrated by irrefutable reasons or, in the absence of telescopes, have procured any real advantage to practical astronomy. The lack of telescopes kept Muhammadan astronomers from becoming acquainted with other planets than those already known to the Greeks. The mode, too, of representing their motions is always that of the Greeks, viz. by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; nor

[1] For details see Nallino, *'Ilm al-falak*, pp. 104–140, 313–323 (for Arabic sources), 149–180 (Indian), 180–188 (Persian), and 216–229 (Greek).

[2] Alois Musil and Antonin Jaussen have found this usage still in vogue among the Bedawīn of Moab. Eduard Glaser indicates it for the Yemen.

[3] These correspond only approximately to the *nakṣatras* of the Indians.

[4] So al-Bīrūnī. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qifṭī (a source of less authority) has 156=773.

[1] This Indian idea occurs also in some Arabic works which are not astronomical—*e.g.*, Ibn Qutaiba, *Liber poetis et poetarum*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1904, p. 503 f.

do the modifications of certain parts of the planetary theories of Ptolemy introduced by some (*e.g.*, Naṣīr ad-dīn and Quṭb ad-dīn ash-Shīrāzī) depart much from this principle. Only among writers who are philosophers rather than astronomers do we meet with theories that supersede those of eccentrics and epicycles.[1] In any case, among them all, the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic doctrine of the circular form of celestial motions reigns supreme, for the elliptic orbit indicated by az-Zarqālī for Mercury[2] is merely a graphical construction on the lamina of the astrolabe, and not a theoretical representation.

(*a*) *Number of the spheres.*—The number of the spheres, *i.e.* of what in the Middle Ages in Europe were called 'heavens,' is eight in Aristotle and Ptolemy, viz. seven for the planets (including the sun and the moon) and one for the fixed stars. This number of eight is preserved by the first Arabic astronomers—*e.g.*, al-Farghānī and al-Battānī, for whom, however, these ideal spheres, created to satisfy the requirements of physics and not those of astronomy properly so called, had no practical importance. Still the number of eight, combined with the Aristotelian theory of solid spheres in which the heavenly bodies are infixed without being able to move themselves, did not easily agree with the other teachings of the Ptolemaic system. Aristotle, who was ignorant of the motion of the precession of the equinoxes, and who consequently held that the fixed stars are really immovable, assigned to the eighth sphere the apparent diurnal motion of the celestial vault from east to west, a motion which the eighth sphere impressed also on all the others. But Ptolemy, accepting from Hipparchus the precession of the equinoxes on account of which the fixed stars have a slow and continued increase of longitude, came implicitly to attribute to the sphere of the fixed stars two motions in opposite directions—one (diurnal) from east to west, and the other from west to east. Ptolemy had no occasion to notice and correct this contradiction, which was soon perceived by the Arabic writers. The contradiction would have been easily eliminated by supposing that the fixed stars moved by the precessional motion within their own sphere, supposed accordingly to be fluid and not solid; and perhaps al-Battānī had in mind the possibility of this hypothesis when he entitled ch. li. of his book[3] thus: 'Of the motion of the fixed stars, whether they move in their sphere, or whether the sphere moves with them.' Another solution of the difficulty would have been to suppose the fixed stars to be infixed in the convexity of the sphere of Saturn, itself naturally subjected, like all the planetary apogees, to the motion of the precession; then the eighth sphere, no longer containing the stars, would only have had the office of impressing the diurnal motion on the spheres below. This solution was actually given by Muhammadan writers, some of whom indeed took advantage of it for reducing the number of the spheres to seven, to conform with the seven heavens of the Qur'ān; but this was never accepted by the astronomers.[4] Therefore, when Ibn al-Haitham († 1039) introduced into pure astronomical teaching the doctrine of the solid spheres of Aristotle, it was necessary for the physical reasons set forth above to add a ninth sphere without stars, impressing on the other spheres diurnal motion. This ninth sphere, accepted by all the later astronomers, was called 'the universal sphere,' 'the greatest sphere,' 'the sphere of the spheres,' 'the smooth sphere' (*al-falak al-aṭlas*), 'the sphere of the zodiac,' 'the supreme sphere.' In general also the philosophers—*e.g.*, Avicenna and Ibn Ṭufail—accept these nine spheres; Averroës,[1] however, under the influence of Aristotle, cannot bring himself to exceed the number of eight. In the theological camp the nine spheres did not find many opponents, in spite of 'the seven heavens' mentioned in *Qur.* ii. 27; it was held that the specification of the number seven did not imply the negation of a superior number.[2] In fact, several theologians saw in the eighth and ninth spheres respectively the 'seat' (*kursī*) and the 'throne' (*'arsh*) of God mentioned in the Qur'ān.[3]

Doubts were not wanting, however, concerning the unity of the sphere of the fixed stars. Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[4] informs us that Avicenna, in his book *ash-Shifā'*, declared: 'Up till now it has not been clear to me whether the sphere of the fixed stars be a single sphere or be several spheres, placed one above the other.' And Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[5] adds that the hypothesis of the single sphere for all the fixed stars rests only on the assumption of the equality of their motions, but that this equality is not at all certain. He further says that, even if the equality of the motions were a certainty, he would not deduce from it the necessity of a single sphere bearing all the stars infixed in it. In face of these criticisms, one comprehends the scepticism of Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī: 'In conclusion, to none of the ancients or of the moderns is the number of the heavens quite certain, either by the force of reasoning or by the way of tradition.'[6]

(*b*) *Order of the planets.*—The order of the planets followed by almost all the Muhammadan astronomers is identical with that of Ptolemy, although they recognize, together with the Greek astronomers, the lack of absolute proofs in the case of the two inferior planets and the sun. Without telescopes they could not see the transits of Venus and Mercury across the sun or determine the parallaxes of the planets situated above the moon. Some Arabic authors believed that they had perceived transits of Venus or of Mercury across the sun; but what they really saw was solar spots.[7] On the other hand, the postulates of astrology continued in the Muhammadan age to guarantee, from lack of scientific reasons to the contrary, the Ptolemaic series: moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. Spain alone had astronomers who departed from this order. Jābir ibn Aflaḥ (*c.* 1140) held it more probable that Mercury and Venus were above the sun on account of their analogy to the superior planets in having epicycles and eccentrics, stations and retrogradations. Al-Biṭrūjī (*c.* 1200), moved by physical reasons connected with his special system of planetary notions, placed the sun between Mercury and Venus.

(*c*) *Obliquity of the ecliptic.*—The obliquity of the ecliptic with regard to the celestial equator is one of the fundamental elements of astronomical calculation. The Greeks, from Eratosthenes (230 B.C.), had assigned to it the constant value of 23° 51′ 20″; *i.e.*, they held it to be invariable. The astonishment of the Arabic astronomers must have been great when they found by their observations an obliquity sensibly less; at first they could not decide whether the discrepancy was due to a real diminution of the obliquity or to a defect in the ancient observations. Al-Battānī leaves the ques-

[1] Cf. below, § 6.

[2] In the *Libros del saber de astronomía*, iii. 280. In any case, the earth there occupies the centre of the ellipse and not one of the foci.

[3] Ed. Nallino, i. 124.

[4] Cf. Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī, *Tafsīr* (in marg. to the *Tafsīr* of aṭ-Ṭabarī), 1st ed., i. 205 (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 27); Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, Cairo, 1308–10 A.H., ii. 60 (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 159).

[1] *Metaphys.*, Cairo, n.d. [1902], p. 66 (ed. and tr. Quirós, bk. iv. § 16).

[2] Niẓām ad-dīn al-Ḥasan an-Naisābūrī, *loc. cit.*; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, i. 260.

[3] See al-Qazwīnī, *Cosmography*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1848, i. 54; the glosses on *Mawāqif* of 'Aḍud ad-dīn al-Ījī; E. W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 8 vols., London, 1863–93, s.v. ''Arsh,' etc.

[4] ii. 59; cf. Avicenna, *Ash-Shifā'*, Teherān, 1303–05 A.H., i. 175 (in the 6th ch. of the 2nd *fann* of the *Ṭabī'iyyāt*).

[5] ii. 59 and i. 259 f.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] See § 7 below.

tion undecided and declares that he chooses the excellent value found by himself (23° 35′), 'since this was observed by us with our own eyes; the other, on the contrary, was received through the information of others.'[1] Some, less prudent, deduced the theory of libration[2] from the discrepancies as to the obliquity of the ecliptic combined with those relative to the precession of the equinoxes. But the continued series of observations left no doubt by the 13th cent. that the obliquity of the ecliptic was subject to a very slow regular diminution,[3] which therefore came to be admitted by all the astronomers; in Europe, on the other hand, we must come down to Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) to see it affirmed in the midst of opposition which lasted through the greater part of the 17th century. The Muhammadan astronomers had no means of determining whether this diminution was continuous or periodical and within what limits it was contained.[4] Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (c. 1260), who had accepted the hypothesis of az-Zarqālī as to libration, believed that the obliquity oscillated between a maximum of 23° 53′ and a minimum of 23° 33′; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī[5] admitted a continuous diminution on account of which the ecliptic will coincide one day with the equator and then will depart from it again, so that the Tropic of Cancer will pass to the south and that of Capricorn to the north. Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī († 1274 A.D.) confined himself to setting forth the eight possible hypotheses as to the continuity or the periodicity of the diminution, without giving preference to any.

(*d*) *Precession of the equinoxes.*—The precession of the equinoxes, on account of which the equinoctial points retreat from east to west along the equator and cause a continuous increase in the longitude of the fixed stars (calculated precisely from the point of the vernal equinox or the first point of Aries), is one of the greatest discoveries of Hipparchus, accepted by Ptolemy. It was accepted by all the Muhammadan astronomers, who, from the first half of the 9th cent., assigned it a value much more exact than that of Ptolemy (36″ yearly), viz. 54″ 33‴; later, a continued series of observations indicated other values still more approximate to the true one. There remained a question which celestial mechanics alone has been able to solve with certainty: Is the precession to be regarded as continuous, so that in many thousands of years the retreating equinoctial points will accomplish the entire circuit of the ecliptic, or is it confined within limits so as to be reduced to one oscillation, more or less great, of the equinoctial points? The first hypothesis, which is the true one, is accepted by Ptolemy; the second was followed by some Greek astrologers after the Christian era, who held that the equinoctial points, after having advanced 8° in 640 years, retreated 8° in a similar lapse of time, returning thus to the primitive point. According to them, the precession was 45″ a year. Finally, it is necessary to note that, while some Indian writers are quite ignorant of the precession, others admit it in an oscillatory form with arcs of 54° or 48° (namely, 27° or 24° from the one part and from the other of ζ Piscium), which they imagined by gross mistakes and not for scientific reasons.

(*e*) *Hypothesis of libration or trepidation.*—The great majority of Muhammadan astronomers held that there was a continuous precession, rightly attributing the discrepancies concerning its value to the imperfection of the observations of the Greeks. We know only three writers of the second half of the 9th cent. who, through Indian influence, accepted the idea of the oscillatory precession in the empirical form of the Greek astrologers mentioned above and of the Indians. On the other hand, Thābit ibn Qurrah († 901) suggested that the discrepancies in the estimate of the annual precession were due in reality to an apparent irregularity of that motion, and that they were connected with the discrepancies relative to the obliquity of the ecliptic. In an epistle which is preserved by Ibn Yūnus he says that he had up till then kept his own calculations private, because he regarded them as uncertain and only provisional. It seems that these secret papers formed the tractate which has come down to us only in two unedited Latin translations under the title *De motu octavæ sphæræ* or *De motu accessus et recessus.*[1] In this tractate Thābit notes that, if all the known observations were exact, there would be a slackening and an acceleration in the motion of precession and in the increase and diminution of the obliquity of the ecliptic. In order to explain these apparently irregular variations, he proposes the following hypothesis:

The eighth sphere, viz. that which contains the fixed stars, has a movable ecliptic, the extremities of whose axis rotate about the equinoctial points of an ideally fixed ecliptic inclined 23° 33′ in respect of the equator; the complete rotation on those two small circles, having 4° 18′ 43″ of radius, is accomplished in 4171½ lunar years. In this period the equinoctial points would seem to accomplish, with a motion not uniform, an oscillation of 21° 30′ (10° 45′ forwards and the same backwards); in a similar time there will take place an unequal variation of the obliquity.

The hypothesis of Thābit was received in its entirety in Europe by Purbachius (1423–62) and by his commentators Reinhold and Nonius. The oscillation of the equinoctial points is called by the Arabs *ḥarakat al-iqbāl wa 'l-idbār*, 'motion of advance and of retreat,' whence the Latin name *motus accessus et recessus*; this was also called in Europe *motus octavæ sphæræ*, in contradistinction to the motion of the ninth sphere, to which was attributed the motion of the continuous precession; finally, since the longitude of the fixed stars underwent the same oscillations of the equinoctial points, it was often called in Europe *trepidatio fixarum*. This does not seem to have had supporters among the Muhammadans of the East after the 11th century. It had greater fortune among the Muhammadans of the extreme West (Spain and Morocco). Towards 1060–70, at Toledo, az-Zarqālī, in order to make his observations agree with those of his predecessors, suggested that the poles of the ecliptic circulated about the equatorial poles, so that the equinoxes advanced by one unequal motion towards the east about 10° and then retreated irregularly by 20°, accomplishing, *i.e.*, an oscillation of 10° forwards and 10° backwards with reference to an equinoctial point ideally fixed. Every arc of 10° would have been passed over in 750 years, so that the complete cycle of the libration would be accomplished in 3000 years. The hypothesis of az-Zarqālī, explicitly denied by Averroës,[2] was accepted by al-Biṭrūjī (c. 1200) in Spain and by Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (c. 1260) in Morocco; it also found great favour among the Jews and Spanish Christians and had an influence on the Hebrews, who, on a basis of Arabic sources, compiled about 1270 the *Tabulæ Alphonsinæ.*[3]

(*f*) *Motion of the solar apogee.* — Ptolemy (followed by all the later Greeks) says that he found the longitude of the solar apogee to be equal to that observed by Hipparchus, and consequently believes that it is immovable at 65° 30′, while the apogees of the five planets move with the motion of the precession. It is a merit of the Arab astronomers of the khalīf al-Ma'mūn (813–833) that they recognized that the solar apogee is subject to the

[1] Ed. Nallino, i. 12.

[2] See below, § (*e*).

[3] This was already the opinion of Ḥāmid al-Ḫujandī, about A.D. 1000.

[4] Only in the second half of the 18th cent. has celestial mechanics been able to establish the fact that it is a question of a very slow oscillation contained within limits of less than 2½°.

[5] *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, i. 260, ii. 59 f.

[1] A suspicion arises, however, that this tractate may rather be by a grandson of Thābit, viz. Ibrāhīm ibn Sinān ibn Thābit, who wrote concerning libration (as al-Bīrūnī and Qāḍizādeh attest).

[2] *Metaphys.* p. 66 (Quirós, bk. iv. § 15).

[3] It must be noticed that these Hebrews combined the hypothesis of Az-Zarqālī with fantastic elements; viz. they admitted a continuous precession accomplishing the circuit of 360° in 49,000 years (*i.e.* just about 26″ 27‴ a year), which precession was to be always corrected on the basis of an inequality accomplishing its own period in 7000 years. They evidently wished to introduce into the hypothesis of trepidation Judaic elements—a thousand jubilary periods of 49 years and a thousand sabbatical periods of 7 years!

motion of the fixed stars and of the planetary apogees, *i.e.* to the displacement of longitude due to the precession of the equinoxes. But the solar apogee has also another very small proper motion in longitude which, according to Leverrier, is only 11·464″ yearly. This motion must have escaped the Muhammadan astronomers. The determination of the longitude of the apogee is not easy and, in times when telescopes and pendulum-clocks were lacking, could not be effected with absolute certainty in the minutes of arc; on the other hand, there was no term of comparison with ancient observations. One understands, therefore, why the majority of Muhammadan astronomers did not give to the solar apogee any other motion than that of the precession, attributing the small discrepancies to the imperfection of instruments and observations. It seems that Thābit ibn Qurrah, however, had dared to affirm the existence of a *proper* motion. Al-Bīrūnī[1] informs us that Thābit, author of a tractate on the inequality of the solar year, had determined 365 days, 6 hours, 12 minutes, 9 seconds, as being the length of the year which we call anomalistic, *i.e.* the time which the sun takes to return to its own apogee. If, then, the same Thābit (if we may rely upon a piece of information which Regiomontanus and Copernicus seem to have derived from the *De motu octavæ sphæræ* cited above) determined the length of the sidereal year as 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 12 s., it is plain that he must have attributed to the solar apogee a small proper motion added to that of the precession.[2] Certainly the values found by Thābit are excellent, since, according to the moderns, the anomalistic solar year is 365 d., 6 h., 13 m., 54·9 s., and the sidereal year 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 10·7 s. It is beyond doubt that az-Zarqālī determined with great exactness ($12\frac{13}{59}$″ every Julian year) the proper motion of the apogee, as distinguished from that due to the precession; and he therefore supposed that the centre of the eccentric of the sun moved over a very small circle, and by this was also settled the variation of the eccentricity of the solar orbit. Among us the proper motion of the apogee was discovered only in the 16th cent. by Kepler and Longomontanus.

(*g*) *Third lunar inequality.*—We need not notice other modifications of special points of Ptolemaic doctrines. It will be enough now to make a reference to a controversy carried on from 1836 to 1871 in the Academy of Sciences of Paris without any definite conclusion being arrived at, viz.: Is the discovery of the variation or third lunar inequality to be ascribed to Abū 'l-Wafā' († 998), as L. A. Sédillot maintained, rather than to Tycho Brahe? There would have been no reason for this dispute if that part of the *Almagest* relative to the movements of the moon had been better studied, and if the analogous discussions in the works of other Arabic astronomers had been examined with care. Carra de Vaux[3] has demonstrated that the hypothetical theory of the variation was nothing else than the πρόσνευσις of Ptolemy, *i.e.* the difference between the true and the mean apogee of the epicycle by which difference the mean anomaly is corrected so as then to calculate the simple equation of the moon. Al-Battānī opportunely calls it 'equation of the anomaly.' It is curious to note that no one has observed that already in 1645 Bullialdus (I. Boullian) had recognized that the πρόσνευσις corresponded to about half of the 'variation' of Tycho Brahe, and that consequently the tables of Ptolemy for the moon were sufficiently near to the truth.

6. Opposition to Ptolemy.—The many modifications of the doctrines of the *Almagest* never abandon the geometrical foundation followed by Ptolemy for the representation of the motions of the sun and planets, viz. a combination of eccentric circles and epicycles. This permitted the representation of celestial motions with all the exactness of which astronomical instruments were capable before the discovery of pendulum-clocks and telescopes; it was further obedient to the Aristotelian principle that celestial motions are circular only. Practical astronomy therefore did not feel the need of theories based on different geometrical principles. The difficulty arose only from a physical point of view, since the idea of numerous circular motions round an imaginary point was repugnant to the principles of Aristotelian physics. It was precisely in the name of Aristotelian natural laws that the battle began among the Arabs of Spain in the 12th cent. against the eccentrics and epicycles of Ptolemy; but their opponents were philosophers.[1]

The first of these was Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn aṣ-Ṣā'igh, known by the name of Ibn Bājah or Avempace († 1139), who is said to have explained the celestial motions by means of eccentrics only, rejecting the epicycles as repugnant to the physics of Aristotle; but we have no particular account of his system.[2] After him we find Abū Bakr ibn Ṭufail (*q.v.*; † 1185–86), famous in Europe for his *Philosophus autodidactus*, who said to al-Biṭrūjī that he had found a theory of those motions quite different from that of Ptolemy rejecting both eccentrics and epicycles, and that he had promised to put it in writing. But it seems that the promise was not fulfilled. The ideas of Ibn Ṭufail probably influenced his friend Averroës (*q.v.*; † 1198), who affirms[3] the physical impossibility of the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy. The astronomers, he continues, assign an eccentric to the moon because, since she is eclipsed now more and now less in one and the same point of the zodiac, they suppose that she traverses the cone of shade at different distances with regard to the earth. 'But this may happen also on account of the diversity of her position, if we imagine that the poles of the lunar sphere move around the poles of another sphere. If God shall prolong our life, we will investigate the astronomy of the time of Aristotle, since this seems not to contradict physics; it consists of motions which Aristotle calls *laulab* [*i.e.* spirals]. I believe that this motion consists in this, that the poles of one sphere move about the poles of another; since then the motion [resulting] is according to a line *leulebia* [*i.e.* spiral], just so is the motion of the sun [combined] with the diurnal motion [of the celestial sphere]. Perchance it is possible by means of such a motion to represent the inequalities which take place in the planetary motions.'

In his commentary on the *Metaphysic*, xii. 47,[4] Averroës does not succeed in forming a clear idea of the system of Eudoxus from the scanty allusions of Aristotle and from the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which is very defective in this part, it not being clear in what manner the 'motus gyrativi'[5] arise from two contrary motions, unless two different poles be supposed.[6] He observes that by this hypothesis one could explain all the appearances of the planets: 'et iste motus, ut mathematici Hispaniæ dicunt, existit in orbe stellato, et vocant ipsum motum processus et reversionis.'[7]

Although Averroës did not complete his exposition,[8] he had guessed a notable part of the hypothesis of Eudoxus (*c.* 409–356 B.C.), which was for the first time reconstructed by G. Schiaparelli in 1875. Averroës, like Eudoxus, allows only spheres concentric with the earth; he admits that the line *laulabī* may be the apparent result of two contrary circular motions—one of the sphere of the planets, and the other, in an opposite direction, of another sphere whose axis is inclined in respect of the axis of the first sphere; finally, the line *laulabī* corresponds to the ἱππωπίδη of Eudoxus, in the form of ∞, which, according to the Greek geometricians, belongs to the category of spiral lines (σπεῖραι), and, according to modern geometricians, would

[1] *Chronology of the Ancient Nations*, Eng. tr., London, 1879, p. 61 f.

[2] The fact that Thābit wrote a tractate to maintain that the solar apogee does move is of no importance, since it is probably merely a confutation of the Ptolemaic immobility.

[3] 'L'Almageste d'Abû 'l-Wéfa al-Būzdjānī,' in *JA* viii. xix. [1892] 440–471.

[1] Cf. L. Gauthier, 'Une Réforme du système astronomique de Ptolémée tentée par les philosophes arabes du xiie siècle,' in *JA* x. xiv. [1909] 483–510; but this article is insufficient from a mathematical-astronomic point of view.

[2] See Maimonides, *Le Guide des égarés*, ed. and tr. S. Munk, Paris, 1856–66, ii. 185 f.

[3] *Comm. de Cœlo*, ii. 35 (*Aristotelis Opera omnia cum Averrois Cordubensis commentariis*, Venice, 1562, v. fol. 118v.–119r.).

[4] Ed. cit. viii. fol. 331v.–332r.

[5] Thus the Latin translator in the commentary on the *Metaphysic* renders the Arabic adjective *laulabī* 'spiral, in the form of a spiral or of a screw.'

[6] And, in fact, this was the hypothesis of Eudoxus.

[7] *I.e.* the motion of the libration of the fixed stars in the hypothesis of the Spaniard az-Zarqālī (see above, § 5, (*e*)).

[8] Cf. also ed. cit. viii. fol. 329v. (on *Metaphys.* xii. 45).

be a lemniscate described on a spherical superficies instead of on a plane. There naturally occur in the hypothesis of Eudoxus some special conditions, of which Averroès does not seem to have thought; one does not understand, then, how the Arabian philosopher thought to save himself from the greatest objection which could be made to the system of concentric spheres, viz. that by making the distance of the celestial bodies from the earth always equal it did not permit of an explanation of the variation of the diameters of the sun and moon.

Another friend and disciple of Ibn Ṭufail, al-Biṭrūjī (a native of Pedroche to the north of Cordova),[1] attempted a complete system as a substitute for the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy,[2] by placing the data of observation of the *Almagest* in agreement with the peripatetic philosophy. He says that, moved by discourses of Ibn Ṭufail to meditate on this question, he had arrived at new theories by a kind of divine revelation. He admits with Ptolemy the nine spheres concentric with the earth; on the other hand, he denies the eccentrics and the epicycles. He finds it to be contrary to natural order that, while the ninth sphere impresses on all the others the diurnal motion of rotation from east to west, the spheres below the ninth should have besides a motion of their own in an opposite direction. In order to remove this contradiction, he conceives a whimsical theory which betrays the inexperience of the author in the field of practical astronomy.

According to him, the movements of the planets and of the fixed stars in longitude take place in reality from east to west, like the diurnal motion of the rotation of the heavens; those movements which astronomers have judged to be from west to east are simply illusory appearances due to the progressive diminution of the angular velocity of the spheres, according as a gradual approach is made from the ninth sphere to the earth.[3] The ninth sphere accomplishes the 360° of circumference in 24 hours and communicates this motion to the spheres below; but the impulse grows weaker from sphere to sphere. That of the fixed stars, which is immediately under the ninth, accomplishes in 24 hours something less than 360°; and this little retardation brings it about that after 36,000 years[4] it has accomplished a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere and appears to be moving very slowly in a direction contrary to it. Under the sphere of the fixed stars comes that of Saturn, considerably slower; it accomplishes in the space of about 30 years[5] a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere. Thus Jupiter loses a whole circuit in 12 years; Mars in two; Venus, the sun, and Mercury in one; and the moon in a little more than 27 days. This, then, is the reason why all the spheres under the ninth appear to move in a direction contrary to it.

For physical reasons, therefore, al-Biṭrūjī believes that the sphere of Venus is to be placed above the sun and that of Mercury below it. There remain to be explained the inequalities of the motions of the sun, moon, and planets. He says that he drew inspiration for this from constructions analogous to that by which az-Zarqālī had imagined the motion of the libration of the fixed stars. While az-Zarqālī made the poles of the ecliptic rotate parallel with the plane of the equator, al-Biṭrūjī, in the case of the planets, made the poles of the planetary spheres move on inclined planes round the poles of the equator or of the ecliptic; from this it results that the planets describe lines *laulabinæ*, *i.e.* spiral, on a spherical superficies. Thus are also explained the stations and retrogradations of the planets. For this part, therefore, we have the partial resuscitation of the hypothesis of Eudoxus. The ideas of al-Biṭrūjī were accepted by a fair number of Christians and Jews in Spain and Provence; and they had also an echo in Italy in the 16th century.

7. Celestial physics.—As is said above,[6] celestial physics, according to Muhammadan and Greek writers, lies outside the field of astronomy; its problems are discussed in books of metaphysics, of physics in an Aristotelian sense, and of theology, or at least in special works, of which the greater part are now either lost or unedited.

Like Ptolemy, the most ancient Arabic astronomers neglect to define the idea of the celestial spheres and limit themselves to considering them in the mathematical aspect of ideal circles representing the movements of the heavenly bodies.

[1] Alpetragius of our mediæval writers.

[2] Of the book of al-Biṭrūjī there has been published only an obscure Latin tr. (Venice, 1531) made from a Hebrew version. The Latin tr. made in 1217 at Toledo by Michael Scotus is unedited, as is also the Arabic text.

[3] This idea was already maintained by the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā' about the middle of the 10th cent. (see their *Rasā'il*, Bombay, 1305–06 A.H., ii. 22–26) and by Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*, Cairo, 1308 A.H., ii. 60 f. (comm. on *Qur.* ii. 159) and vi. 117 f. (on *Qur.* xxi. 34). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentrics and epicycles.

[4] This is the period of time in which, according to Ptolemy, the fixed stars accomplish the circumference, proceeding towards the east.

[5] The duration of the heliocentric sidereal revolution of Saturn is a little less than 29½ years; it is, in the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the revolution of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the zodiac.

[6] See § 1.

The Aristotelian conception of solid spheres was introduced for the first time[1] into a purely astronomical treatise by Ibn al-Haitham; and he, in his unedited compendium of astronomy, gives the definition which was accepted afterwards by all the other writers of elementary treatises: 'A celestial sphere (*falak*, plur. *aflāk*) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superficies having the same centre.'[2] In this, as he himself says, he drew his inspiration from the *Hypotheses Planetarum* of Ptolemy; in fact, as we see from a passage of Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, he followed the *Hypotheses* also in expounding how the celestial motions can be represented, and also by supposing simple equatorial zones of those complete spheres, so that the spheres of the epicycles become, as it were, tambourines (*duff*) rotating on their own axes, and the other spheres like armils.[3] This second form of representation was soon abandoned, as contrary to the principles of natural philosophy.

Muhammadan writers agree with Aristotle in holding that the spheres and the celestial bodies are a simple unique substance, different from the four elements of the sublunar world, and forming a fifth element. The solidity also of the spheres, by reason of which the stars remain infixed within them, and by which the stars are carried round, is accepted by almost all,[4] except a few theologians who, to support a strictly literal meaning of a passage of the Qur'ān,[5] maintain that the stars move within the spheres like fish swimming in water. The ideas of the majority of writers after the 4th cent. of the Hijra are those set forth in the dogmatic theology of al-Baiḍāwī († 1286) as follows:

'The spheres are transparent; since if they were coloured, our eyes could not possibly see that which is within them. They are neither hot nor cold; since otherwise the heat and cold would dominate in the elements of the sublunar world on account of their contiguity to it. They are neither light nor heavy; since otherwise in their nature there would be a tendency to rectilinear motion.[6] They are neither moist nor dry; otherwise the facility or difficulty of taking certain forms or of attaching themselves would be manifested in rectilinear motion. They are not capable of quantitative motion; since, if the convexity of the external superficies were to increase, it would be necessary that there should be a void above it, which is absurd; and the same is to be said regarding concavity, since if this were to increase it would be necessary that one sphere should enter into another or that between the two there should be a void.'[7]

So also it is proved by Aristotelian reasonings that the motion of the spheres must be circular.

The greater number of Muhammadan philosophers accept the peripatetic doctrine that the spheres and the stars are living beings, rational, operating by their own will; that the spheres have souls which exist in their bodies as our souls in our bodies; and that, as our bodies move under the impulse of our souls towards the ends we have in view, so also do the spheres, which have as their end the serving of God. This doctrine is for the most part repudiated by the theologians: al-Ghazālī († 1111) does not deny the possibility of it, but he affirms that we are incapable of knowing it; on the other hand, Ibn Ḥazm († 1064), Ibn Qayyim

[1] This follows from the preface itself of Ibn al-Haitham and from the attestation of Muḥammad al-Akfānī as-Saḫāwī, *Irshād al-qāṣid*, p. 85.

[2] Only the spheres of the epicycles are full, *i.e.* are true globes.

[3] These two forms of hypothesis are always found side by side for every planet, in bk. ii. of the *Hypotheses*, published for the first time (1907) in German according to the Arabic version which takes the place of the lost Greek text (in Ptolemy, *Opera astronomica minora*, ed. Heiberg, p. 113 ff.).

[4] The ancient Arab astronomers—*e.g.*, al-Battānī (l. 124)—leave the question uncertain.

[5] xxi. 34.

[6] According to the Aristotelian theory (*de Cœlo*, i. 8 f.), heavy bodies tend in a straight line towards the centre of the world, light bodies tend to withdraw in a straight line from the centre.

[7] *Maṭāli' al-anwār*, Constantinople, 1305 A.H., p. 262.

al-Jauziyyah († 1350), and many others absolutely deny life and intelligence to the heavenly bodies. The philosophers of the peripatetic school and several theologians (*e.g.*, al-Baiḍāwī) hold that the movers of the celestial souls and consequently of the spheres are pure intelligences. Concerning their origin al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and their followers maintain a Neo-Platonic emanatory theory: from the first principle emanates the first intelligence, and from this are derived all the nine spheres by means of successive triads always composed of intelligence, soul, and body, until one arrives at the final or active intelligence from which is derived all the material of the sublunar world. This theory is vigorously opposed by al-Ghazālī and the other theologians.

The question of the marks on the moon is either neglected or only hinted at in the works hitherto published. The idea that the moon had valleys and mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and so could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers.

Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Faḫr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī, however, explicitly affirms: 'There are those who believe that there exist on the surface of the sun spots, in the same manner as there are marks on the surface of the moon.'[1] These spots were actually seen on some occasions, but were erroneously believed to be transits of Mercury and Venus across the sun.

The comets and the other meteors (in an Aristotelian sense) were the subjects of observations and of numerous monographs. But, judging from the little that we know about them, Muhammadan writers followed in this matter the theories set forth by Aristotle in his books on meteorology.[2]

8. Conclusion.—The importance of Muhammadan astronomy in the history of science has been variously judged; sometimes Muhammadan astronomers have received excessive praise, sometimes unjust criticism, as if they had done nothing but preserve and transmit to Europe Greek science, improving it only in minor details. This harsh verdict is due not only to very imperfect knowledge of the Arabic writings on astronomy (of which the greater part is still unedited), but also to the fact that no account has been taken of the special conditions of astronomy in the glorious period of Muhammadan culture. The system invented by the Greek geometricians, and completed by Ptolemy, for representing all the celestial motions had mathematically all the precision that could be desired or attained by the use of the best instruments; it produced no sensible discrepancy between theory and the result of observation. The elliptic orbits of Kepler would not have given the theory greater perfection than it received from the complicated system of eccentrics and epicycles; the latter indeed had the advantage of preserving the Pythagorean and Aristotelian principle, which denied any but circular movement in the heavens. One must not forget that even in the heliocentric system of Copernicus the motions of the planets were still explained by means of combinations of epicycles — combinations which were in several cases less perfect than those employed by the Ptolemaic astronomy. To change the method of geometrical representation would therefore have been whimsical—a mathematical trick, which no datum of observation would have justified; and, in fact, those Arabs who wished to eliminate the eccentrics and the epicycles[1] were philosophers rather than astronomers, and they propounded their hypotheses from data based only on Aristotelian physics.

It is thus easy to understand how it was that, *e.g.*, the astronomers of the khalīf al-Ma'mūn and their successors saw no necessity for drawing from their observations of the movement of Venus[2] the final conclusion that Venus revolved round the sun. From the point of view of such phenomena as could be observed without telescopes, this second hypothesis had no higher value than that which made Venus revolve round the earth. In a word, celestial appearances gave no cause to shake the foundations of the geocentric system, which agreed very well with every religious notion, and which was supported by the authority of both Aristotle and Ptolemy, reinforced by a very potent element in Hellenistic and mediæval culture, viz. astrology. Giovanni Schiaparelli, in one of his monographs on Greek astronomy,[3] has set forth clearly the decisive influence which astrology, brought into Greece by the Chaldæan Berosus (3rd cent. B.C.) and consequently received with great favour by the Stoics and Neo-Pythagoreans, had in the abandonment of the heliocentric system of Aristarchus. Astrological doctrine, based on the immobility of the earth in the centre of the world, was irreconcilable with any system which made the earth revolve round the sun or round any other body; astrology was thus a very powerful additional obstacle to the abandonment of the geocentric idea. Further, we must not forget that it was only in the 17th cent. that European physics reached clear proofs of the diurnal rotation of the earth and justified elliptic orbits and the heliocentric system, and that the really irrefutable argument for the revolution of the earth round the sun was furnished only in 1728 by the discovery of the aberration of the fixed stars.

An essential condition of all astronomical progress is to have at disposal a long series of methodical observations; and in this matter Muhammadan astronomers were obliged to begin, so to say, from the foundation. Ptolemy was the last Greek observer; but not even all the observations which he says he made are true. In several cases of capital importance—*e.g.*, regarding the obliquity of the ecliptic and the longitude of the solar apogee—he gave as agreeing with his own observations data found about 270 years before his time by Hipparchus, thus causing certain elements to be believed constant which are really variable. In other cases—*e.g.*, regarding the precession of the equinoxes — his observations are very rough. Theon of Alexandria (4th cent. A.D.) and Proclus (5th cent.) do no more than accept Ptolemy's elements, in some ways aggravating his errors; accordingly, during the seven centuries from Ptolemy to the first flourishing of Arabo-Muhammadan astronomy, we have not even one observation which is of use to the science. The first task, therefore, of the Arabic astronomers was to revise all the Ptolemaic elements of the celestial motions; it was a time not to form new theories but to collect the indispensable elements of fact by means of continuous observations more accurate than those of the Greeks. This task was accomplished by the Muhammadan astronomers in a marvellous manner;

[1] *Mafātiḥ al-ghaib*, i. 259, on *Qur.* ii. 27.

[2] On falling stars see present writer's art. in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, viii. [1920] 375–388.

[1] See above, § 6.

[2] They found (contrary to Ptolemy) that Venus has the same longitude of apogee, the same eccentricity, and the same equation of centre as the sun; and so the true longitude of the centre of the epicycle of Venus is always equal to the true longitude of the sun. This was the same as to suppose that the orbit of Venus is an epicycle whose centre is always the true place of the sun and runs over the solar orbit; in other words, it was equivalent to making Venus a satellite of the sun.

[3] *Origine del sistema planetario eliocentrico presso i Greci*, Milan, 1898, § 55.

indeed, we must come down to the time of Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) to find observers and observations comparable to those of the Muhammadan Middle Ages. Further, by founding trigonometry in a modern sense and developing it to a high degree they furnished astronomical science with an excellent instrument for its work.

The influence of Muhammadan astronomy in Europe is so far-reaching that to treat of it at length would be to give the history of some centuries of European astronomy. From the 12th cent. to the end of the 15th the compendiums used in the schools were translated from Arabic or were based on Arabic writings; the astronomical tables and the processes of calculation were derived from Arabic works, among which must be classed (from the point of view not of their language but of their contents) the celebrated tables of Alfonso which were still used by many in the 16th century. Spherical trigonometry in Europe started from Arabic treatises; the famous Regiomontanus himself (1436–76) borrows more than appears on the surface from al-Battānī. Through the influence of these Arabic sources the ancient Latin technical terminology was greatly modified, and not only do Arabic astronomical terms enter into European languages, but Latin words acquire new significations by imitation of corresponding Arabic words. The words 'degree,' 'minute,' 'equation' (in its astronomical sense), 'equation of the centre,' 'argument' (of a table), and some others, owe their technical signification to ridiculously literal translations of Arabic writings. We cannot enumerate all that European astronomy owes to Muhammadan observers; it will be enough to recall that they rendered inestimable services even to writers of the 17th cent.—*e.g.*, Halley—precisely because they offered the only certain means of checking elements determinable only by a comparison with observations separated by long intervals of time. The books of Regiomontanus, Purbachius, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Riccioli, etc., cite the observations which were known to them of their Oriental predecessors. The theory and practice of instruments in Europe has also Arabic sources. Finally, we must not forget the influence exercised by the Arabs in the way of example. They infused into the Christians and Jews of Spain a passion for continued observations and an idea of the perfectibility of astronomical science; from Spain this passion and idea spread through the rest of Europe, preparing the way for modern astronomy.

The conditions of the Byzantine mediæval world were not favourable to the development of the sciences. Nevertheless, Muhammadan culture, which left many traces in Byzantine astrology, had also its part in astronomical studies. In 1323 an anonymous Greek introduced the Persian astronomical tables of Shams ad-dīn al-Buḫārī (Σὰμψ Μπουχαρής), which were at once widely used; in 1346 George Chrysococces made a new redaction of them, preserving at the same time many Arabic-Persian technical terms; and finally, about 1361, Theodore Meliteniotes reproduced these methods and these Persian tables in the third and last book of his Ἀστρονομικὴ Τρίβιβλος, after having set forth in the first and second books the methods and the tables according to Ptolemy and Theon of Alexandria. Thus there was created at Byzantium also a new astronomical terminology different from that of the classic Greek; and sometimes even Greek proper names appeared transformed by their passage through Arabic-Persian sources, as Θαούνης in place of Θέων.

LITERATURE.—There is no satisfactory exposition of the astronomy of the Muhammadan peoples in the Middle Ages; the general histories of astronomy—*e.g.*, those of F. Hoefer, J. H. von Mädler, R. Wolf (the best of all), and Arthur Berry—are inadequate, antiquated, and often erroneous. J. B. J. Delambre, *Hist. de l'astronomie du moyen âge*, Paris, 1819, pp. 1–211, and 513–539, is not a history but an analysis (of very unequal value) of various works of Muhammadan authors; the part devoted to the unedited book of Ibn Yūnus (pp. 76–156) is especially noteworthy, but it has the usual defect of Delambre—instead of the analyzed processes of the author, it substitutes a series of formulæ found by Delambre himself. Useful, but to be used with great caution, is L. A. Sédillot, *Matériaux pour servir à l'hist. comparée des sciences mathématiques chez les Grecs et les Orientaux*, 2 vols., Paris, 1845–49; see also his *Mémoire sur les instruments astronomiques des Arabes*, do. 1841 (*MAIBL, Savants étrangers*, i.). The present writer's Arabic book quoted above, p. 90[a], n. 1, concerns only the earliest period (summary of H. Suter, in *Bibliotheca Mathematica*, III. xii. [1912] 277–282). Many historical notices concerning the development of astronomical theories are to be found in the present writer's commentary on al-Battānī, *Opus astronomicum*, 3 vols., Milan, 1899–1907; short notices are to be found here and there in E. Wiedemann, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften,' nos. iii.–xxxviii. (in the *Sitzungsberichte der physikal.-medizinischen Sozietät in Erlangen*, 1904–1914) and in other small pamphlets by the same author. For biographical and bibliographical notices concerning individual writers see the excellent book of H. Suter, *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1900, and 'Nachträge und Berichtigungen zu Die Math. und Astron.,' in *Abhandl. zur Gesch. der mathemat. Wissenschaften*, xiv. [1902] 157–185. For edd. and tr. of original texts see above, II. 2.

CARLO ALFONSO NALLINO.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic). — I. *TEUTONIC.*—**1. Archæological evidence.**—The world-wide symbol of the sun-wheel occurs in the earliest Scandinavian rock-markings. Rude representations of horses and ships, which may have solar significance, are also found. In 1902 a curious object, apparently connected with the sun-cult, was discovered near Trundholm in Sweden. It is a representation of a disk, having gilding on one side and spiral ornamentation on the other, with a horse in front of it, both horse and disk being drawn on a waggon.

2. Solar myths.—Sun and moon, day and night, summer and winter, are personified in the poems of the older Edda. The Valkyrie Sigrdrifa invokes Day and the sons of Day, Night and her kinswoman.[1] Various passages from *Grimnismál*, *Vafþrúðnismál*, and *Völuspá* are summarized by Snorri:[2]

'Night, who was of Jotun race, married Delling, who was of Aesir race, and their son was named Day.' 'Then Allfather took Night and her son Day and set them up in heaven and gave them two steeds and two chariots and they were to drive round the earth every twenty-four hours.' The earth is bedewed by the foam which falls each morning from the bit of Hrimfaxi, the horse of Night. Day's steed is called Skinfaxi and he lights up the whole world with his mane. 'Then said Gangleri: "Who steers the course of the sun and of the moon?"' Mundilföri had a son Mani and a daughter Sol, whom the gods set up in heaven. 'They let Sol drive the steeds which drew the chariot of that sun which the gods made to light the world, from the sparks which flew out of Muspellheim [*i.e.* the world of fire and heat]. . . . These steeds are called All-Swift and Early-Awake, but under the withers of the horses, the gods set two wind-bellows to cool them, but in some old records that is called "isarnkol" [*i.e.* iron-coolness]. Mani steers the course of the Moon and rules over waxing and waning.'

The belief in the chariot and horses of the sun is very wide-spread; in Scandinavia, judging by the archæological evidence, it must have existed in very early times. We may have a reference to the same idea in Tacitus:

'Beyond the Suiones is another sea, sluggish and almost stagnant, by which the whole globe is imagined to be girt about and enclosed, from this circumstance that the last light of the setting sun continues so vivid till its rising as to obscure the stars. Popular belief adds, that the sound of his emerging from the ocean is also heard, and the forms of horses and the rays streaming from his head are beheld.'[3]

Like most other primitive people, the Scandinavians were struck by the phenomena of the eclipses, which they thought were caused by wolves.

'He who pursues her [*i.e.* the sun] is called Skoll; he frightens her and he will catch her; but he who is called Hati

[1] *Sigrdrifumál*, 2. [2] *Gylfaginning*, x.–xii.
[3] *Germ.* 45. Unfortunately the text is uncertain; some editors read *deorum* for *equorum* in the last sentence.

Hroðvitnison leaps in front of her, and he will catch the moon, and so it must be.'[1] 'Skoll is the name of the wolf, who pursues the gleaming goddess to Ironwood. Another called Hati, son of Hroðvitni, goes before the fair bride of heaven.'[2]

Sun and moon will be involved in the final world-catastrophe.

'Then said Gangleri: "Of what race are these wolves [*i.e.* Skoll and Hati]?" Hár said: . . . "The old giantess rears the sons of many Jotuns and all in the form of wolves, and it is said that of the race of these wolves, there shall come one mightier than all, called Moon-Swallower and he . . . in demon's form shall seize the moon. . . . He shall fill himself with the bodies of doomed men, he shall stain the god's abode with red blood; the sunshine shall be black, and all the weather treacherous during the following summer."'[2]

'Whence comes a sun, in the smooth sky,
When Fenrir [*i.e.* a monstrous wolf] has overtaken this one,
One daughter alone, shall the Elf-beam [*i.e.* the sun] bear,
Before Fenrir overtakes her.
The maiden shall ride on the mother's paths
After the Powers have perished.'[3]

3. Sun-worship.—Our knowledge of the religious practices of the Teutons is very meagre, and it is difficult to say how far the stories told in the two Eddas formed part of a living religion, even among the Scandinavians. We have, however, various references to the sun-cult from other sources. Procopius[4] describes how in the island of Thule [*i.e.* Scandinavia] the sun does not appear for 40 days at the winter solstice. At the end of this period messengers are sent up into the mountains to watch for the rising sun. They send word to the people below that the sun will shine upon them in five days: thereupon begins 'the greatest feast of the inhabitants of Thule.'

The positive side of Cæsar's well-known description of Teutonic religion[5] is probably true. The Teutons may well have acknowledged as gods such things as are 'objects of sight and by whose power they are apparently benefited, the sun, moon, fire,' although these were not their only deities. Observances in connexion with the sun and moon are forbidden in Christian sermons and penitentiaries. St. Eligius (588–659) tells his hearers that no Christian person 'calls sun or moon lords.' In the 11th cent. the *Decrees* of Burchard of Worms mention pagan traditions:

'Id est ut elementa coleres, id est lunam aut solem, aut stellarum cursum, novam lunam, aut defectum lunæ, ut tuis clamoribus aut auxilio splendorem ejus restaurere valeres.'[6]

From Canute's Anglo-Saxon Laws[7] we learn that 'heathenship is to honour heathen gods, and sun or moon, . . . etc.' We have perhaps a trace of sun-worship in *Landnámabók*:

'Thorkell Moon, the law speaker, was of the best conversation of any heathen man in Iceland. . . . He had himself carried out into the rays of the sun in his death-sickness and commended himself to that god which had made the sun.'[8]

We know little of Anglo-Saxon paganism. Bede, however, mentions a goddess Eostur, in whose honour April was called 'Eosturmonath.'[9] The word 'Eostur' is identical with the Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, and Lithuanian names for the goddess of the dawn, or *Morgenröthe*, probably the same being who is referred to in the Lithuanian and Lettish folk-songs as the daughter of the sun.

Throughout Teutonic territory the first and second days of the week are named after the sun and moon. Sunna is mentioned with Wodan and Frûa in the Merseberg charm. Sol is counted as one of the *asynjur*.[10]

It is noteworthy that Snorri (see above) distinguishes between the physical sun and moon and the beings who rule over them and guide their movements. This distinction has been partly preserved in the Old Norse language, where the word *tungl* (A.S. *tungol*, Goth. *tuggls*, 'a star')

[1] *Gylf.* xii. 15.
[2] *Grímn.* xxxix. 88.
[3] *Vafþrúðnismál*, 46 f.
[4] *De Bell. Goth.* ii. 15.
[5] *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 21.
[6] *PL* cxl. 960.
[7] *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, ed. B. Thorpe, London, 1840, p. 162.
[8] i. 9.
[9] *De Temp. Ratione*, 15.
[10] *Gylf.* xxxv. 45.

denotes the actual moon, and Máni the supernatural being who directs his course. The same idea seems to underlie many of the Lithuanian and Lettish folk-songs.

II. *Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian.*—**1. Mythology.**—Our chief knowledge of the solar mythology of the Baltic peoples is derived from Lettish and Lithuanian folk-songs, the most significant of which have been translated and analyzed by W. Mannhardt.[1] In these poems the changes which pass over the face of the sky, especially at dawn and sunset, are viewed as a drama, the chief actors being sun, moon, the daughter of the sun, the sons of God, Perkun, the thunder deity, 'God' and 'dear Maria'—the last two being as frankly pagan as the rest. Often, of course, the poems are confused and inconsistent, and it must be remembered that the terms 'sun,' 'moon,' etc., sometimes stand for the presiding deity, sometimes for the actual sun, etc., personified:

'The Sun, in the apple garden,
Weeps bitterly.
The *golden apple* hath fallen
From the apple tree.'[2]

(Here there is a clear distinction between the deity and the physical sun.)

'The Sun dances over the silver mountain,
Silver shoes she hath on her feet.'[3]

(In this case sun and sun-goddess appear to be one and the same.)

'God,' who was at war with the sun for three nights and three days, is evidently a sky-deity. The sky itself is described as a 'great water' or a mountain:

'The Sun with two gold horses
Rides up the rocky mountain,
Never heated, never weary,
Never resting on the way.'

(In this and in other songs we get the wide-spread myth of the horses of the sun.)

2. The sun.—The sun is called in many of the songs 'daughter of God,' in Lettish sources *saules-maat*, 'mother of the sun.' She is married to the moon, who is, however, an unfaithful husband.

'It happened in the spring-time
That sun and moon did wed,
But the sun rose up early
And from her the moon fled.
The morning star was loved then
By the lone wandering moon,
Who with a sword was smitten
In deep wrath by Perkun.'[4]

The children of the sun and moon are the stars, who are called orphans, because they appear only at night after their mother, the sun, has abandoned them.

3. The sons of God.—The morning and the evening stars play an important part in the folk-songs, sometimes as a single being, sometimes in dual form. In Lithuanian sources they are called Auszrine and Wakarine[5] and are described as the handmaids of the sun.

'"Dear sun, daughter of God,
Who kindles your fire in the morning?
Who spreads your bed in the evening?" . . .
"Auszrine kindles the fire.
Wakarine spreads the bed."'[6]

In Lettish songs the morning and the evening stars are called the 'sons of God'—an epithet exactly equivalent to the Greek Dioskouroi. Like the Dioskouroi and the Aśvins of Indian mythology, the Lettish sons of God are connected with horses:

'Hither rode the dear sons of God
With steeds dripping with sweat.'[7]
'Folks say the moon has no steeds of his own.
The morning star and the evening star
They are the steeds of the moon.'[8]

[1] 'Die lett. Sonnenmythen,' *ZE* vii. 73–104, 209–244, 280–330.
[2] *Ib.* p. 91 ff.
[3] *Ib.*
[4] *Ib.*
[5] Nom. fem. of adjective derived from Lith. *auszra*, 'dawn,' *vakaras*, 'evening.'
[6] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.*
[7] *Ib.*
[8] *Ib.*

4. The daughter of the sun.—A favourite theme of the Lettish folk-songs is the wooing of the daughter of the sun by the son of God, the sun providing the dowry, often most unwillingly.

'Why are grey steeds standing
By the house-door of the sun?
They are the grey steeds of the son of God
Who woos the daughter of the sun.
The son of God stretches out his hand
Over the great water
To the daughter of the sun.
The sun cries bitterly
Standing on the mountain.
Why should she not weep?
She sorrows for the little maiden,
She sorrows for the dowry,
For the chest which is laden
With gold and silver gifts.'[1]

This is a good example of a sunrise or sunset myth. The daughter of the sun is the red glow which is in the sky when the planet Venus appears, but soon afterwards melts into darkness or the full light of day. The 'dowry' seems to be the rays of the sun which light up the edges of the clouds and the tops of trees and mountains.

'The sun prepareth the dowry herself, gilding the edge of the forest of pines.'[2]

The daughter of the sun is almost certainly identical with the goddess mentioned by Lasicius.[3] 'Ausca dea est radiorum solis, vel occumbentis vel supra horizontem ascendentis.'[4]

5. Dear Maria.—Mannhardt considers that the name Maria has been substituted for that of various pagan deities, but it is also possible that she stands for a particular goddess, perhaps the Perkuna tete (*i.e.* the aunt of Perkun) mentioned by Lasicius: 'Perkuna tete is the mother of thunder and lightning; who receives into a bath the weary and dusty sun, and sends her out again next day washed and shining.'[5] Maria also presides over a bath-chamber:

'Behind the mountains smoke is rising.
Who is it bath kindled fire?
Dear Maria heats the bathroom
Where bathe little orphan maidens [*i.e.* stars].'[6]
'I ran down into the valley, into the bath-chamber of dear Maria.'[7]

According to Prætorius,[8] the Nadravians worshipped a star-god Szweigsdukks, who is evidently the Suaixtix worshipped by the Sudavians in Samland and equated with Sol in the *Constit. Synod. Evangel.* of 1530. Lucas David[9] calls Suaixtix the god of light and mentions him as one of the four deities who were invoked at agricultural festivals.[10] This deity seems to have been worshipped in both male and female form: 'They more commonly called this godhead Sweigsdunka, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided.'[11] Is this perhaps 'the maiden who weaves star-coverings,' mentioned in one of the folk-songs, and also the goddess whose place has been taken by dear Maria, and who was also known as the aunt of the thunder-god? The underlying idea may be that she is a goddess of fire, light, and heat.[12]

6. Cult.—We know little of the sun-cult of the Baltic peoples, although we know from Peter von Dusburg[13] and Erasmus Stella[14] that sun, moon, and stars were worshipped as important deities.

[1] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.* [2] *Ib.*
[3] *De Diis Samagitarum*, in *Respublica sive Status regni Poloniæ, Lituaniæ, Prussiæ, Livoniæ, etc.*, Leyden, 1627, ch. viii.
[4] Ausca, in Lith. Auszra, a word which is connected with Skr. *usas*, Gr. 'Ἠώς, Lat. *Aurora*, O.E. *Eostur*, all of which (with the possible exception of Eostur) denote goddesses of the dawn.
[5] P. 300. [6] *ZE* vii. *loc. cit.* [7] *Ib.*
[8] *Deliciæ Prussicæ*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871, p. 23.
[9] *Preussische Chronik*, ed. E. Hennig, Königsberg, 1812, i. 86.
[10] *Ib.* p. 91. [11] Prætorius, p. 26.
[12] See art. NATURE (Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian).
[13] *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, Leipzig, 1861-74, i. 53.
[14] *Ib.* iv. 294.

Prætorius[1] tells us that Bretkius (a historian of the 16th cent.) had observed that the Nadravians did honour to their gods by worshipping the different phases of the moon at various stages of their agricultural work.

In the course of his missionary journeys among the Lithuanians Jerome of Prague met with a people who worshipped the sun and who had a strange cult of a huge iron hammer. The priests justified this cult by telling Jerome that formerly the sun had been invisible for many months because a king had imprisoned it in a tower. 'The signs of the zodiac brought help to the sun, and broke the tower with the huge hammer, and restored the liberated sun to men, and therefore that which had been the instrument by which mortals had received light was worthy of veneration.'[2] According to Rendel Harris, the signs of the zodiac here stand for the Heavenly Twins or 'Sons of God': 'These and similar cases all arise out of the same theme, that the Sun (or the daughter of the Sun) has been carried off, or swallowed or imprisoned, and must be recovered.'[3] They use the hammer, the weapon of the thunder-god, because sacred twins are universally considered as children of the sky or thunder-god. In one of the Lettish songs they are described as 'workmen of Perkun.'

LITERATURE.—(I.) See works cited in art. NATURE (Teutonic). (II.) W. Mannhardt, 'Die lettischen Sonnenmythen,' *ZE* vii. (1875) 73-104, 209-244, 280-330; J. Rendel Harris, *The Cult of the Heavenly Twins*, Cambridge, 1906, *Boanerges*, do. 1913; see also art. OLD PRUSSIANS for further literature.

ENID WELSFORD.

SUN-DANCE.—See PHALLISM, ix. 823.

SUNDAY.—1. History of Sunday before the Christian era.—Only three times in the NT is there any reference to a religious observance of Sunday. St. Paul urged his converts at Corinth to put aside money for charity every Sunday (1 Co 16^2). Shortly after writing this he preached at a service held at Troas, which is mentioned as if it were a regular institution (Ac 20^7). Thirty years later, perhaps, the author of the Apocalypse wrote: 'I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day' (Rev 1^{10}). Though not quite conclusive, the evidence makes it probable that the observance of Sunday began among St. Paul's churches, which were predominantly Gentile. Now we cannot suppose that Gentile Christians, who were taught by St. Paul to protest against having the Sabbath imposed upon them, would yet accept from the Jews a whole system of reckoning time by weeks. It is important, therefore, to inquire how far the week was recognized in the Græco-Roman world independently of the Jews.

The week originated in Babylon, where it was invented for astrological reasons, but came to be used as a civil division of time. At first each month began with a fresh week, so that there were two or three odd days at the end. This was too inconvenient to last; and the weeks, emancipated from the month, ran on in an unbroken series. The gradual diffusion of Babylonian astrology carried a knowledge of the week into W. Asia, then into Egypt, and later still into E. Europe. The Israelites, when they invaded Canaan, found it established there and adopted it, as they did many other elements of Amorite culture; but the emphasis laid upon the Sabbath was their own.

In considering the recognition of the week in Europe it will be convenient to trace the evidence backwards. We may begin with Dio Cassius. Writing soon after A.D. 230, he says:

'The dedication of the days to the seven planets originated in Egypt, but has spread over all the world in comparatively

[1] *Deliciæ Prussicæ*, p. 18. [2] Æneas Sylvius, in *ib.* iv. 229.
[3] *Boanerges*, p. 334.

recent times. The ancient Greeks, at any rate, knew nothing of it: but now it is established not only among all other peoples but even among the Romans, who already regard it as more or less a national tradition.'[1]

In the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr, writing for heathen readers, speaks of Saturday and Sunday (τὴν Κρονικήν, τὴν Ἡλίου ἡμέραν) as if they were familiar names to all.[2] Near the end of the 1st cent. Josephus boasts:

'Nor is there any city of the Greeks, nor any barbarian city, nor any nation, where our custom of resting on the seventh day has not reached.'[3]

That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; but it would have been meaningless unless division of time into weeks had been so familiar that any one might know which day was a Saturday. The belief that such was the case in the 1st cent. is supported by a picture which was found at Herculaneum, and therefore painted before A.D. 79. It contains the heads of the seven planetary deities in the order of their days—Saturn, Apollo, Diana, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus. Numerous references in Latin literature assure us that the Jewish Sabbath was well known as early as the Christian era. But only those are to our purpose which imply familiarity with the week. Such are the passages in Tibullus,[4] Ovid,[5] and Martial,[6] which mention the observance of Sabbaths by Romans. But more remarkable is the fact that Horace,[7] writing about 35 B.C., could represent an ordinary superstitious mother as making a vow for next Thursday (*Jovis dies*) and could describe how he himself attempted to escape from a bore by pleading that it was a special Saturday.[8] Neither the vow nor the plea would be intelligible without the week as a familiar background.

2. Sunday in the primitive Church.—It was therefore not only the Jewish proselytes among St. Paul's converts, but all his Greek and Roman disciples, who reckoned their time by weeks and therefore found a weekly day of worship natural. To such, again, as were Jews by race it seemed actually part of the order of nature. That is why, we may well suppose, St. Paul's protests against the observance of the Sabbath or of any fixed days[9] were but partially successful. The Sabbath, indeed, was given up by the churches which he founded. But, as a concession to his converts' habit of mind, another day of the week was chosen for worship. There could be no question what the choice should be, for the Lord's resurrection had given the first day of the week an unquestionable pre-eminence.

The name of this day which was current in the Roman Empire was 'the day of the sun' (ἡ Ἡλίου ἡμέρα, *dies solis*). The Jews, who avoided all use of heathen terms for either days or months, called it the first day of the week (μία Σαββάτων), and the earliest Christians followed their example. But a mere number was felt to lack distinction, and very soon an appropriate name was found, which contrasted alike with Sabbath and Sunday. The first day of the month, at least in Asia Minor, was usually called the 'Emperor's Day' (Σεβαστή).[10] Now the early Christians, partly by way of challenge, applied to their Lord many of the official terms which were consecrated to the emperor, the lord of the earth. So it was probably not without reference to the term Σεβαστή that they entitled the first day of the week Κυριακή, 'the Lord's Day.' So apt a name was rapidly established. The author of the Apocalypse, writing about A.D. 90, uses it without explanation. To Ignatius[11] (*c.* A.D. 110) it was a matter of course and a basis for argument. When the empire became Christian, the name entirely displaced 'the day of the sun' for all who spoke Greek or Latin. Κυριακή remains to this day in Greek; and in the Romance languages we find derivatives of *dies Dominica* — Dimanche, Domenica, and so on. But the Northern peoples, who in accepting the week from the heathen Romans had named the days after the corresponding Northern divinities, were more conservative. In England Sunday (A.S. *Sunnan Daeg*), in Germany *Sonntag*, in Sweden *Söndag*, have resisted all attempts to substitute either Lord's Day or Sabbath.

[1] *Hist. Rom.* xxxvii. 18.
[2] *Apol.* i. 67.
[3] *C. Apion.* ii. 40.
[4] I. iii. 18.
[5] *Ars Amat.* i. 415.
[6] IV. iv. 7.
[7] *Sat.* II. iii. 290.
[8] *Ib.* I. ix. 69.
[9] Ro 14[5], Gal 4[10], Col 2[16].
[10] A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., London, 1910, pp. 361–366.
[11] *Ad Magn.* 9.

3. Observance in the Church before A.D. 321.—The records tell us very little about the manner in which Sunday was observed during the first three centuries, except that it was the day on which Christians assembled for worship. After St. Paul, who is quoted above, our first witness is the younger Pliny. His famous letter, written to the emperor Trajan in A.D. 104, tells how the Christians in his province of Bithynia held a service early in the morning 'on a fixed day' (*stato die*) and a common meal late in the evening.[1] Ignatius (A.D. 110) insists upon the contrast between the Lord's Day and the Sabbath.[2] A little later the *Teaching of the Apostles* ordains:

Κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ Κυρίου συναχθέντες κλάσατε ἄρτον καὶ εὐχαριστήσατε προεξομολογησάμενοι τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν, ὅπως καθαρὰ ἡ θυσία ὑμῶν ᾖ.[3]

A simple service, before or after the day's work, was the only observance possible for a community most of whose members occupied very humble stations, while many were slaves. As the Christians advanced in numbers and in social position, they were able to command the time for a long service. Justin Martyr, writing about A.D. 170, describes one which must have occupied at least two hours; for it includes readings from the Bible, sermon, prayers, and Eucharist.[4] And, since Melito, bishop of Sardis, just about the same time published a treatise *On the Lord's Day*, we may conclude that the services were being systematized.[5] How important they were considered is partly shown by Tertullian's attack upon cowardly bishops, who excused themselves for fleeing from persecution on the ground that in such times they could not assemble a congregation or celebrate the Sunday rites: 'Sed quomodo colligemus, inquis, quomodo Dominica sollemnia celebrabimus?'[6] From that time onward the position of Sunday as a holy day was unquestioned; and we need trace its history no further.

Just at that point we find the first suggestion of a Sunday holiday. Two sentences of Tertullian are worth quoting, both written while he was still a Catholic. In Sunday worship, he says, Christians avoid every trace of gloom, and even put aside business which might interfere with prayer ('differentes etiam negotia, ne quem diabolo locum demus').[7] And, when he tells the Christians that they have more festivals in the year than the heathen, he implies that Sunday, like a Roman festival, is more or less a holiday: 'Si quid et *carni indulgendum* est, habes, non dicam tuos dies tantum, sed et plures. Nam ethnicis semel annuus dies quisque *festus est, tibi octavus quisque dies*.'[8]

It is to be observed that he compares Sunday with heathen festivals rather than with the Sabbath. So long as Jewish Christianity remained a power, or the hostility of Jews a thing to be feared, Gentile Christians were anxious to repudiate any connexion between the Sabbath and Sunday. The feeling was obviously strong when Ignatius wrote μηκέτι σαββατίζοντες ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζῶντες,[9] and when the author of the *Epistle of Barnabas* described Sunday as ἄλλου κόσμου ἀρχήν.[10] Justin Martyr shows its influence when he derives the sanctity of Sunday from the creation and the Resurrection. Although Jewish Christianity disappeared from the West before the end of the 2nd cent., there is plenty of evidence that some of its traditions persisted in the Eastern Church for two hundred

[1] *Epp. ad Traj.* 96.
[2] *Ad Magn.* 9.
[3] *Didache*, xiv.
[4] *Apol.* I. 67.
[5] Eusebius, *HE* iv. 26.
[6] Tert. *de Fuga in Persecutione*, 14.
[7] *De Orat.* 18(23).
[8] *De Idol.* 14.
[9] *Ad Magn.* 9.
[10] *Ep. Barn.* 15.

years more. The *Apostolic Constitutions*,[1] *e.g.*, recognized a parallel observance of the Sabbath and Sunday. And the Council of Laodicea (363), while condemning a Judaizing observance of the Sabbath, marked it as a festival and a day of worship. Different as was the East from the West, they were in constant communication; and the maintenance of the Sabbath in the East was a reason for keeping Sunday clear of Sabbatarianism in the West. Egypt, intermediate between East and West, was Western in its observance of Sunday. Accordingly Clement of Alexandria (*c.* 200) says that the Lord's Day is celebrated by putting away evil thoughts and acquiring true knowledge;[2] and Origen (*c.* 240) apologizes for the common observance of Sunday as a concession to the feelings of the weaker brethren. They, 'being either unable or unwilling to keep every day in this manner, require some sensible memorials to prevent spiritual things from passing altogether away from their minds.'[3]

A hundred years later Athanasius wrote to much the same effect: 'We keep no Sabbath day (but) we keep the Lord's Day as a memorial of the beginning of the second new creation.'[4]

St. Jerome follows in the same line. He tells how his party of recluses at Bethlehem attended Church services on Sunday, but otherwise pursued their usual occupations.[5] St. Augustine, while insisting upon the festal character of Sunday—'Dies tamen Dominicus non Judaeis sed Christianis resurrectione Domini declaratus est, et ex illo habere coepit festivitatem suam'[6]—pronounces that the Fourth Commandment is in no literal sense binding upon Christians. His words seem framed to exclude the idea of any transference of obligation from the Sabbath to Sunday.

4. Movement in favour of a day of rest.—While the leaders of the Church gave no sanction to the idea that Sunday was the heir of the Sabbath, that idea was all the time gaining power among the mass of the Christian people in the West. Several causes combined to favour its growth. As the passage quoted above from Tertullian indicates, the numerous heathen festivals constantly suggested that a holy day should be a day of rest. Familiarity with the OT, whose authority was unchallenged, insensibly turned men's thoughts in the direction of Sabbatarianism. Increasing leisure and power enabled many Christians to command a day of rest. Greater stress was laid, as time went on, upon the duty of attendance at the Church services, which in many cases involved the abandonment of regular work. How steadily popular opinion was moving in the direction of a Sunday holiday may be inferred from a resolution passed in 305 by the Council of Illiberis in Spain, making the observance of the Lord's Day compulsory and ordaining that failure to attend the services shall be punished with excommunication. The Sabbatarian movement, therefore, like that for the worship of the saints, came from below. Theologians long resisted it, but at last yielded, and sought for reasons to justify a practice which the people had adopted. Among these we do not usually find either the duty of observing the Fourth Commandment in the spirit or the social need (recognized in Deuteronomy) of a day for rest and recreation. The reasons alleged are of a mystical and symbolical character, such as would naturally suggest themselves to theologians in difficulties. And yet the very contrasts which they draw between the Sabbath and the Lord's Day show the influence of the popular pressure, and prepare the way for the identification of the two which was to come in the 9th century.

St. Ambrose, *e.g.*, describes how the first day has succeeded to the dignity which formerly belonged to the seventh: 'Ubi enim Dominica dies coepit praecellere, qua Dominus resurrexit; Sabbatum, quod primum erat, secundum haberi coepit a primo. *Prima enim requies* cessavit, *secunda* successit.'[7] St. Chrysostom (*c.* 390) goes further. Commenting on 1 Co 16[1], he says that the first day of the week was well chosen for acts of charity, ὅτι καὶ ἄνεσιν ἔχει καὶ πόνων ἀτέλειαν. He thus actually carries back the Sunday rest into the year 57. And, when he writes about Ro 14[5], he asserts that 'esteemeth every day alike' has reference only to fasting. The reason of so strange a misconception is doubtless that he regards the observance of Sunday as a matter of course. Although, therefore, he generally contrasts Sunday and Sabbath in the manner of his time, it is not surprising to find him once coming very near to the later Sabbatarian view. In the 10th *Homily* on Gn 1 he writes: 'God from the first teaches us symbolically to set apart one whole day in the week and devote it to spiritual activities.'

Examples might be given from other writers. But these are enough to indicate the double process which was going on. While the official position of the Church was hostile to Sabbatarianism, the writers could not altogether resist the influence of popular opinion which was steadily moving towards it.

5. Constantine's decree of A.D. 321.—Parallel to the Christian movement in favour of a Sunday rest there seems to have been another, which was quite independent. The matter is obscure, and we must rely in part upon conjecture. As the social and industrial organization of the empire advanced under the Pax Romana, the sporadic festivals of the ancient calendar became more and more inconvenient. The efficiency of labour depends largely upon recreation; but holidays at irregular intervals are not effectual for recreation, and interfere sadly with organization. We can imagine that the heathen often reflected upon the contrast, to which Tertullian points, between the regular weekly festival of the Christians and their own uncertain celebrations; and that they wished that they could exchange their inconvenient holidays for a regular rest on 'the day of the sun.' Some such process of thought in the popular mind is required to explain the readiness with which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree. Though he was doubtless influenced mainly by the wishes of his Christian supporters, it was not as 'the Lord's Day' but as 'the venerable day of the sun' that he described the new public holiday:

'Omnes judices urbanaeque plebes et cunctarum artium officia venerabili die Solis quiescant. Ruri tamen positi agrorum culturae libere licenterque inserviant, quoniam frequenter evenit ut non aptius alio die frumenta sulcis aut vineae scrobibus mandentur, ne occasione momenti pereat commoditas coelesti provisione concessa.'[1]

There has been much speculation about Constantine's motives. Eusebius would persuade us that they were wholly religious,[2] others that social and political considerations determined his action; but we have not sufficient evidence to decide the question. One thing is certain. The edict of A.D. 321 marks an epoch in the history of Sunday. It was the parent of a double series of legal enactments and conciliar decrees which exercised a great influence—both for good and for evil—upon the life of all Europe during many centuries.

6. Later imperial decrees.—With regard to the imperial decrees, it is important to remember that they affected an ever-decreasing area. The laws of Theodosius the Great, which forbade all litigation and the spectacles of the theatre and the circus on the 'dies Solis quem Dominicum rite dixere majores' (386), affected mankind from Spain to Mesopotamia. But its reiteration by Leo and Anthemius (469) was addressed only to Turkey, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. The chief importance of those later decrees is that, enshrined in Justinian's Code, they set up a standard for the new nations which gradually rose out of the flood of barbarian invasion.

7. Decrees of Church Councils (300-600).—On the other hand, the decrees of Church Councils had an immediate influence not only in the areas which they represented but also to some extent throughout the former Roman Empire, for the Church maintained a large degree of unity. It is therefore worth while to record not only how the Council of Laodicea (363), ordering men to work on the Sabbath, bade them τὴν Κυριακὴν προτιμῶντες, εἴ γε δύναιντο, σχολάζειν ὡς χριστιανοί, but also how the Council of Orleans (538), while protesting

[1] vii. 23, 36.
[2] *Strom.* vii. 12.
[3] *C. Celsum*, viii. 22 f.
[4] *De Sabbat. et Circumcis.* 4.
[5] *Ep.* cviii. 29.
[6] *Ep. ad Jan.* 22 f.
[7] *In Ps.* 47.

[1] *Cod. Just.* bk. iii. tit. xii. 3.
[2] *Vita Const.* iv. 18-21.

against an excessive Sabbatarianism, forbade all field work under pain of censure; and the Council of Macon (585) laid down that the Lord's Day 'is the day of perpetual rest, which is suggested to us by the type of the seventh day in the law and the prophets,' and ordered a complete cessation of all kinds of business. How far the movement had gone by the end of the 6th cent. is shown by a letter of Gregory the Great[1] (pope 590–604) protesting against the prohibition of baths on Sunday.

8. Sabbatarian movement (600–800).—It was a right instinct which led the people to demand, and emperors and councils to grant, that Sunday should be a day of rest as well as of worship. Up to the end of the 6th cent. the resultant changes in law and custom, in spite of some extravagances, were on the whole beneficial. But in the darkness of the next two centuries other influences came into play. The ceaseless wars and disorders which lowered the standard of civilization both in the Eastern Empire and in Western Europe threw all initiative into the hands of military or ecclesiastical rulers. Changes were no longer made in response to the people's demand, but were imposed upon them by rulers who were guided not by a sense of practical need but by monkish theory. Thus an edict[2] of Clotaire III. (*c.* 660) forbids servile labour on Sunday.

'Quia hoc lex prohibet et sacra scriptura in omnibus contradicit.'

Among the laws of Ine, king of Wessex (*c.* 690), we find the following:

'If a "theowman" work on Sunday by his lord's command, let him be free; and let the lord pay xxx shillings as "wite." But if the "theow" work without his knowledge, let him suffer in his hide, or in "hide-gild." But if a freeman work on that day without his lord's command, let him forfeit his freedom, or sixty shillings: and be a priest doubly liable.'[3]

9. The Christian Sabbath from 800 to 1500.—(*a*) *Decrees of rulers and councils.*—Though the decrees of the 7th and 8th centuries were obviously part of a Sabbatarian movement, the term 'Sabbath' was not applied to Sunday until Alcuin had written:

'Cujus observationem mos Christianus ad diem dominicum competentius transtulit.'[4]

Under his inspiration the new feeling, long fluid in society, was crystallized in Charlemagne's decree of A.D. 789, which forbade all ordinary labour on Sunday as a breach of the Fourth Commandment. In particular it forbade agricultural labour, which Constantine had expressly permitted, and the holding of markets, which Constantine had appointed in order to encourage country people to attend the church services: 'Provisione pietatis suae nundinas die solis perpeti anno constituit.'[5] From that time onward the identification of Sunday with the Sabbath was taken for granted, and from that principle deductions of increasing severity were drawn by princes and ecclesiastics.

Among the decrees which were issued by princes for their own dominions we may mention that of the emperor Leo (*c.* 900) which forbade agricultural work in the Eastern Empire, and that of Edgar the Peaceable (A.D. 958) which extended the Lord's Day from 3 p.m. on Saturday to Monday's dawn. More interesting, because of wider influence, are the pronouncements of leading churchmen. In the 12th cent., *e.g.*, Bernard of Clairvaux maintained that the Fourth Commandment required the Sabbatical observance not only of Sundays but also of holy days. In the 13th cent. Thomas Aquinas lent his immense authority to the same principle: 'Sabbatum . . . mutatur in diem dominicam . . . Similiter aliis solennitatibus veteris legis novae solennitates succedunt.'[6] In the 15th cent. Tostatus, bishop of Avila, a learned canonist, laid down the law of the Christian Sabbath with a fullness of detail which rivals that of the Pharisees. And the precepts of the learned were enforced and illustrated for the multitude by stories of miraculous judgments—ranging from toothache to sudden death—which had fallen upon those who profaned Sunday or Saint's Day by labour.[1]

For five hundred years after Charlemagne Church Councils were much occupied with questions of Sunday observance. The following examples may perhaps be sufficient for the purpose of illustration:

A.D. 829—The Council of Paris re-enacts the prohibition of ploughing, marketing, and law business on Sunday.[2]

853—A Synod at Rome forbids markets and field labour.[3]

1009—A Council at Hexham (? Eingthamense) forbids markets, fairs, hunting, and ordinary labour.[4]

1031—The Council of Bourges forbids travelling, except in cases of necessity or charity.[4]

1050—The Council of Coyac (in Spain) forbids all 'servile work' and all travelling.[4]

1212—The Council of Pamiers commands all parishioners to hear *the whole* of the mass and preaching.[4]

1244—The Synod of Lyons found it necessary to limit the number of holy days, whose increase was causing various abuses.[5]

1322—The Synod of Valladolid ordained 'quod nullus in diebus Dominicis et Festivis agros colere audeat, aut manualia artificia exercere praesumat, nisi urgente necessitate, vel evidentis pietatis causa.'[4]

(*b*) *How Sunday was observed.*—What was the effect of all these exhortations? The constant reiteration of the same orders is general evidence that they had not been obeyed. But particular evidence is not lacking. In 1226, *e.g.*, the prior of Walsingham, who held a market on Saturday and Sunday, granted half the profits to Sir William de Clare in exchange for other rights.[6] And the records tell not only of journeys which emperors and kings made on Sunday, but also of three emperors who were crowned in St. Peter's at Rome on that day, causing thereby an immense amount of labour.[7] Sunday, therefore, was not generally observed with anything like the strictness which Church authorities enjoined. Yet it was to a large extent observed as a holiday and a day of worship. How were the hours of leisure spent? In all the decrees of Councils and pronouncements of individuals, down to the 15th cent., there is no prohibition of any recreation except dancing, the singing of ribald songs, theatrical performances, and races in the circus.[8] The last two prohibitions of the emperor Leo soon became needless, for theatre and circus ceased to exist. So from 900 till the Reformation there was practically no limit set to the amusements of the people on Sunday. What use was made of that liberty we may infer partly from the decrees of Councils in the 16th cent. and partly from the Puritan reaction which soon began in Protestant countries.

10. The Roman Catholic Sunday in the 16th century.—The Council of Cologne[9] (1536) decrees:

'Cupimus his diebus prohiberi nundinas, claudi cauponas, vitari comissationes, ebrietates, sumptus, lites, lusus improbos, choreas plenas insanis, colloquia prava, cantilenas turpes, breviter omnem luxum.'

The Council of Milan (1573) complains that Sunday is commonly profaned by markets, open shops, hawking, dicing, sports, conjuring, and theatrical performances. The Council of Rheims (1583) decrees:

'Nemo lusibus et choreis det operam. Venditiones quarumcunque rerum, his exceptis quae ad divinum cultum et victum necessarium pertinent, nundinae publicae, mercatus et auctiones, ne fiant diebus festis. Ludos etiam theatrales, etiam practexta consuetudinis, prohibemus.'

The Council of Narbonne (1609) protests against the profanation of Sunday by dancing, singing,

[1] *Ep.* xiii. 1.
[2] Heylin, *Hist. of the Sabbath*, ii. 137.
[3] A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, Oxford, 1869–78, iii. 215. The resolution of the Council of Cloveshoo (747), which is sometimes quoted, applies only to monasteries.
[4] *Hom.* 18, *post Pentec.*
[5] J. Gruter, *Inscriptiones antiquae*, Amsterdam, 1707, clxiv. 2.
[6] *Summa*, II. i. qu. ciii. art. 3.

[1] Concil. Parisiense, *c.* 50; H. Spelman, *Concilia*, London, 1639–64; i. 128; *Miracles de St. Benoît*, vi. 10, viii. 32.
[2] Heylin, ii. 5, § 7. [3] *Ib.* ii. 5, § 7.
[4] Spelman, *op. cit.*
[5] *De Consecratione distinct.* iii. cap. 1.
[6] F. Blomefield, *Topographical Hist. of Norfolk* London, 1805–10, ix. 276.
[7] Heylin, ii. 5, § 9. [8] *Ib.* ii. 5, § 10.
[9] See P. Labbe and G. Cossartius, *Sacrosancta Concilia*, Paris, 1670–72.

hunting, hawking, markets, public feasts, and revelling, and allows none but travellers to be served in the inns.

These quotations prove that the Counter-Reformation led the authorities of the countries which remained Roman Catholic to recognize a duty with regard not only to Sunday labour but also to Sunday recreations. They seriously endeavoured to check the licence which had been allowed for many ages and had doubtless increased with the advance of material prosperity in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is difficult to estimate how far they succeeded in reforming the manners of the people. Peter Heylin, sub-dean of Westminster, whose *History of the Sabbath* is the most valuable book on the subject, is an important witness, for he travelled on the Continent very soon after the close of the 16th century. He sums up his impressions in these words:

'Nor is their discipline so severe as their Canons neither. So that the Lord's Day there, for ought I could observe, when I was amongst them, is solemnised after the same manner as with us in England: repairing to the Church, both at Masse and Vespers, riding abroad or walking forth to take the ayre, or otherwise to refresh themselves, and following their honest pleasures, at such leisure times as are not destinate to the publick meetings: the people not being barred from travelling about their lawful business, as occasion is, so they reserve sometime for their devotions in the publike.'[1]

But Heylin, as an advocate, looks only on the fair side; and undoubtedly (as the decrees of the Councils imply) there were many regions in which Sunday was spoiled both by needless labours and by the coarsest amusements.

11. The Protestant Sunday in the 16th century.—The Reformers of the 16th cent. were in a difficult position, for, although they regarded both Gn 2 and Ex 20 as historical, they could not rest the institution of Sunday on either of the traditional grounds. They could not identify it with the Jewish Sabbath; nor could they admit that an ecclesiastical rule of observance, however venerable, was of unchangeable validity. Yet both feeling and reason urged them to maintain its obligation. Luther, Calvin, and the various catechisms and confessions put forward much the same view—to this effect:

The Fourth Commandment was abrogated by the New Testament: and ideally there should be no distinction between days. But human nature requires a day of rest from labour: the soul demands leisure for joint worship: therefore a day must be fixed for all. We cannot do better than follow the tradition which sets apart the first day of the week.[2]

Sound as that argument was, it had an unfortunate effect upon the minds of a generation who had been trained to rest upon absolute law and were not ready to accept reason in its place. To a vast number of Protestants Sunday appeared to have lost its authority; and there was a decided slackening of its observance. Heylin thus describes the state of things in the latter part of the century:

'There was no restraint on Sundays in the afternoone, from any kind of servile work, or dayly labours; but that men might and did apply themselves to their severall businesses, as on other days. As for the greater townes, there is scarce any of them, wherein there are not Faires and Markets (Kirk Masses, as they used to call them) upon the Sunday: and those as much frequented in the afternoone as were the Churches in the forenoone. . . . So that in generall the Lord's day is no otherwise observed with them . . . than an half holiday is with us. . . . For recreations, last of all, there is no question to be made, but that where working is permitted, and most kinde of businesse, a man may lawfully enjoy himselfe and his honest pleasures; and without danger of offence pursue those pastimes by which the mind may be refreshed and the spirits quickened.'[3]

This is true, he says, of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and part of Poland.

In England, where religious changes were far less violent, the observance of Sunday in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth was considerably stricter.

Both *The Institution of a Christian Man* (1537) and the queen's *Injunctions* (1558) lay down excellent principles. And yet one of the *Homilies*, published in 1563, sorrowfully confesses: 'The Lord was more dishonoured and the Devill better served on Sunday than upon all the dayes in the weeke besides.' King James's proclamation of 7th May 1603 is a significant confirmation of this complaint: Having been informed 'that there had been in former times a great neglect in keeping the Sabbath day,' he ordains 'that no Bearebaiting, Bull-baiting, Enterludes, common Playes, or other like disordered or unlawful Exercises or Pastimes be frequented, kept, or used at any time hereafter upon any Sabbath day.' And this was not because James was accustomed to great strictness in Scotland, where up to 1600 observance was on the whole less precise than in England. The early Calvinists were not Sabbatarians, and John Knox himself played bowls on Sunday.

12. The 17th and 18th centuries.—(*a*) *England.*—Till the reign of James I., as we have seen, England and Scotland kept pace with the movements on the Continent. But throughout the 17th cent. our island was the scene of a dramatic struggle which had no parallel elsewhere. The extreme Protestant type of mind has a natural affinity to the OT, and the Calvinists and other Puritan sects early felt the attraction. By a process somewhat like that which took place in the 5th and 6th centuries, they turned towards the Jewish Sabbath, and their steps were hastened by repulsion from the scandals of the 16th cent. Sunday. The movement, of which the early stages are obscure, came to a head in the publication of a remarkable book.

Nicholas Bownd, a Suffolk clergyman, in his *Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, or the *True Doctrine of the Sabbath* (1595), boldly and crudely claimed for Sunday the authority and the observances of the Jewish Sabbath and maintained that they should be enforced by the State. The book had an immense vogue. It was translated and circulated on the Continent, where it exercised much influence. In England, accepted as an inspiration by some and as a challenge by others, it gave rise to a literary controversy which lasted for a hundred years. The first reply to it was James I.'s *Book of Sports*[1] (1618), which proclaimed liberty for the people to enjoy their traditional pastimes on Sunday except bull- and bear-baiting. This was followed by the Sunday Observance Act (1625), which forbade men to go outside their own parishes in search of amusement on Sunday. The *Book of Sports* was republished by Charles I. in 1633, with a special admonition to justices of the peace: 'Look to it, both that all disorders there may be prevented and punished, and that all neighbourhood and freedom, with manlike and lawful exercises, be used.'

In 1635 Francis White, bishop of Ely, published an official defence of this view; and in 1638 Heylin supported it with *The History of the Sabbath*, a book which shows much ability and learning. The controversy was continued, and 120 books on the subject were published in the next hundred years. Other weapons were used besides the pen. In 1643 Parliament ordered the *Book of Sports* to be burned by the hangman and imposed the Puritan Sabbath upon the ever-increasing area which their troops commanded. In 1648 they formally adopted the *Westminster Confession* and the *Longer* and the *Shorter Catechisms*. One quotation from the last-named must suffice.

'Q. 60. How is the Sabbath to be sanctified?—A. The Sabbath is to be sanctified by a holy resting all that day, even from such worldly employments and recreations as are lawful on other days; and spending the whole time in the public and private exercises of God's worship, except so much as is to be taken up in the works of necessity and mercy.'

By successive enactments (1644, 1650, 1656) the same Parliament proscribed every kind of Sunday recreation, even 'vainly and profanely' walking for pleasure. At the Restoration the pendulum swung the other way. The court, the cavaliers, and the High Church clergy led the way in a violent reaction; and the return of the Prayer-book service on Sunday morning was accompanied by trading, open theatres, and ostentatious frivolity

[1] Vol. ii. p. 191.

[2] See Luther's *Larger Catechism*, the *Augsburg Confession*, the (Calvinist) *Heidelberg Catechism*, the *Helvetic Confession*, Calvin's *Institutes*.

[3] ii. 6, § 9.

[1] The full title of this work is *The Kings Majesties Declaration to his Subjects concerning Lawfull Sports to be Used*, London, 1618.

in the afternoon and evening. To what lengths the court went may be learned from Macaulay's description of Charles II.'s last Sunday night. There were many protests; and the battle of the books continued, Bishop Pearson, John Owen, and Richard Baxter being among the combatants. In 1677 a compromise was effected. The Sunday Observance Act regulated trade, labour, and travelling in a reasonable way, making ample allowance for 'works of necessity.' At the same time the Sunday Observance Act of 1625 was revived and came to be recognized as the standard by which amusements were to be regulated. Both acts were observed with varying degrees of strictness at different times and in different places. But it is no little tribute to their reasonableness that both remained in force until the year 1871, though they were modified in some details; *e.g.*, in 1699 forty watermen were allowed to ply on the Thames, in 1710 coaches and chairs received permission to stand for hire, and in 1794 bakers to sell bread at certain hours. From the Revolution to the death of Queen Anne a higher standard prevailed, both of attendance at church and of obedience to the law. Under the Georges, though no change was made in the law, and though the same literary controversy continued, there was a steady decline in both respects. About 1780 the Evangelical Revival, following the movement led by the Wesleys, produced a considerable change in opinion and observance. How much need there was for improvement may be inferred from three actions of Bishop Porteous, who was a leader of the new school. He supported the institution of Sunday Schools, which began in 1780 and soon spread over the country. He persuaded the Prince of Wales to transfer the meetings of his rowdy 'Sunday Club' to a week day. And he drew up the Sunday Observance Act of 1781, which enacts that any place of public entertainment or debate where a charge is made for admission may be deemed a disorderly house. Passed in order to check bear-baiting and infidel propaganda, this act has been used of late to impede Sunday concerts and lectures to working-men.[1] For many years it was undoubtedly of great value, helping to restore the credit of Sunday in the public eye. But, when the rapid growth of large towns, due to the industrial revolution, presented new problems, this law combined with the restrictions of travelling to cause mischief. The mass of the industrial population, cooped up in towns which were almost destitute of churches, had no meeting-place but the street or the public-house. This evil became serious in the latter part of the 18th cent., but its full development was not seen till the 19th.

(*b*) *Scotland.*—Scotland very early in the 17th cent. adopted the theory of the 'Christian Sabbath' and applied it to social life with the ruthless logic which is characteristic of Calvinism. The *Westminster Confession* was adopted by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1647, before Parliament had passed it; and it has remained the formal standard of faith to the present day. So long as it was enforced by public opinion—*i.e.* till about 1870—the Scottish Sunday was observed with amazing rigour. Not only were ordinary recreations disallowed; a ban was put even upon books and music, except such as were recognized as religious in the narrow sense. No recreation remained but whisky-drinking, and a great part of the drunkenness which is still common in Scotland may be traced to an unwise Sabbatarianism. In parts of the Highlands and the Islands the old rigour remains; but in the greater part of the country, as will be explained below, the last fifty years have witnessed a great change.

(*c*) *America.*—The American colonies differed in their practice. The more southerly States, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, were inclined to English views of Sunday. The New England States, founded by Puritans, kept very close to the Scottish standard; but their coast towns were influenced by English practice, and their Western border by the practical necessities imposed by danger from their Indian neighbours.

(*d*) *Protestant Europe.*—Nicholas Bownd's book was translated into several Continental languages and exercised a considerable influence. In Holland and Switzerland a strong Sabbatarian party grew up; and in Protestant Germany his doctrine found rigorous advocates. But on the whole the Sabbatarians failed; and the observance of Sunday, especially in Germany, fell much below the standard in England. Sunday labour was very common, and Sunday amusements were very coarse.

(*e*) *Roman Catholic Europe.*—In Roman Catholic countries, during the same centuries, Sunday was so much eclipsed by the Saints' Days that it ceased to be observed with any kind of strictness. While the Saints' Days were real holidays, labour on Sunday was the rule rather than the exception. Till near the end of the 18th cent. the priesthood were powerful enough to secure a general attendance at mass; but the rest of the day was usually given to ordinary occupations. If in Spain Sunday was more a day of rest than in France or Italy, this was because it was the day set apart for bull-fights.

13. From the French Revolution to 1848.—The French Revolution marks an epoch in the history of Sunday observance. Its new calendar, with a week of ten days, though ephemeral and rather absurd, was a practical challenge to tradition, whose effects were permanent. The questions which it raised frightened some men into reaction, but excited others to free speculation. And it gave prominence to one fact, which no Government could afford to ignore for long. In every country there was an increasing number of citizens who did not acknowledge the Christian sanctions for Sunday, for whom, therefore, any rules for Sunday observance must rest on social rather than religious grounds. The recognition of this fact gradually affected the administration of the existing laws; and perhaps it may account for the complete absence of legislation between 1780 and 1850. In England the repulsion caused by the Revolution combined with the Evangelical Revival to render Sunday observance much stricter. The laws of 1677 and 1781 were rather rigidly enforced, and public opinion (among the minority who had votes for Parliament) was on the whole Sabbatarian. For the middle class and for all the people in country districts the movement was largely beneficial. The churches were filled; the sense of duty was strengthened; and habits of reflexion were induced. On the other hand, for the growing multitudes in the great towns the restrictions imposed by law became ever more cruel. Neglected by the Church, they had few places of worship and little will to enter them. They wanted means of getting into the country and opportunities of reasonable recreation in the town; but these were denied them, and nothing was left but the public-house. It was not till about 1850 that their needs were recognized. The active controversy which was carried on about Sunday concerned only the reasons for observing it. Several distinguished writers took part in the discussion, but they did little more than reproduce the well-worn arguments of the 17th cent. on either side.

[1] The present writer was threatened with prosecution in 1897 for lecturing to a Sunday Society in Bristol.

In France, though Napoleon re-established the Church, the hold of Sunday upon the public mind could not be restored. It remained to a large extent a day of trade and of labour, as well as of social amusement. In Spain and Italy there was no striking change. In Germany, which had been penetrated with French ideas, there was a marked decline. If we may judge by the books which were published there between 1780 and 1848, public opinion was averse to strictness based on religious grounds and not yet alive to the social reasons in favour of a day of rest. Sunday observance therefore, resting mainly upon tradition, naturally failed to maintain its hold.

The United States continued the division of opinion which had existed among the colonies of N. America. New England and the Western States, which were gradually peopled by emigrants from New England, remained Sabbatarian, while the Southern States, led by the Quakers of Pennsylvania, generally adopted the more liberal view. Between 1820 and 1850 many books were published on both sides, but no legislation resulted.

14. From 1848 to 1914.—From 1848, the 'year of revolution,' we may date a new phase of the Sunday controversy. Suddenly the masses of the people, especially in manufacturing towns, acquired a new consciousness and began to be regarded with a new interest. The consequences were not long in making themselves felt. Hitherto it may be said that the churches and the legislatures had, on the whole, worked in harmony. Since 1848 there has been a gradual divergence. For, while the churches were slow to admit the possibility of change, the legislatures, more and more influenced by popular opinion, tended to favour relaxations which were supposed to be required by new social conditions. At the same time an agitation began in some countries in favour of limiting the Sunday labour which vast numbers felt to be oppressive. These two elements were mixed in very different proportions in different countries.

(*a*) *England.*—In England, where Sunday labour was already severely limited, the main question was that of relaxation. In 1851 a lively controversy arose about two points. Should railway travelling be allowed on Sunday? And should the new Crystal Palace be open to the public on Sunday afternoon? The instances could not have been better chosen, for their discussion involved all the main principles which were at stake. Twenty years passed before any legislative result came of the debate. In 1871 an Act was passed requiring the consent in writing of the chief officer of a police district, or of two magistrates, before a prosecution for Sunday trading could be instituted under the Act of 1677. Since then the Sunday Observance Act has been a dead letter. And an Act of 1875 has very much limited the application of the Act of 1781. That did not end the debate. In 1875 the Sunday League was formed to advocate the opening of museums and picture galleries and other means of rational recreation on Sundays. In spite of several societies started in opposition, the Sunday League has gradually effected a great and beneficial change.

But the real crux of the situation is connected with travelling. Nothing has done so much to alter the habits of the people as the rapid increase in means of communication. The railway, the steamer, the tramcar, and the motor-car have successively helped to empty the towns on Sunday. They have answered a real need; for the strain of modern life has created a new craving for fresh air and change of scene, which finds satisfaction in the week-end habit of the richer folk and in the excursion train for the poorer. The desire for such recreation is natural and wholesome. At the same time it is responsible for two serious evils. (1) Those who spend Sunday away from home rarely devote any part of it to worship, and those who remain at home feel themselves thereby excused from attendance at church. Consequently the number of those who enter any place of worship on Sunday forms an increasingly small percentage of the population. (2) Every added facility for travel on Sunday involves additional labour on the part of a large class of workers. The railways, the tramways, the restaurants, the bands, and the news agencies are so heavily tasked on Sunday that few of their employees enjoy anything like a day of rest.

Intent upon claiming what they considered their right to recreation and convenience, the mass of the people did not see what was involved in its satisfaction. Shops were increasingly opened, trains ran in ever-increasing numbers, and a large number of subsidiary industries were obliged to join the movement. Then contractors who were in a hurry took to Sunday work; and there was a real danger that the industrial population might lose their day of rest. About the beginning of the 20th cent. the trade unions and other bodies began to realize the danger; shop-assistants began to protest; and so a check was imposed upon the movement. In the first year (1914–15) of the Great War it seemed as if the national necessity might obliterate Sunday rest. Munition factories and many others were opened on Sunday, and double pay was offered for work on that day. But the result was uniformly a diminished output. Many of those who worked on Sunday for double pay spent the extra money in drink on Monday and Tuesday; and such as conscientiously toiled all seven days did so with rapidly failing energy. After two years Sunday work was generally abandoned; and it may be hoped that the nation has taken the lesson to heart.

(*b*) *The Continent.*—On the Continent during the latter half of the 19th cent. the same causes produced even more marked effects. In the eighties and nineties a stranger could hardly tell from the aspect of the towns whether the day was Sunday or not. But at last even the 'anti-clerical' Governments, which had looked on complacently at a change which diminished religious observance, became aware that it was causing immense social mischief; while on behalf of the overstrained workers urgent claims were made for a legal day of rest. Between the years 1895 and 1910 laws were passed, in almost every country of Europe, which were intended to secure a weekly holiday for every working-man.[1] Even in France, where the secularist influences were strongest, it was judged necessary to insist upon Sunday as the normal day of rest, all substitutes in special cases being regarded as exceptional. The general effect of this movement was a marked change in the aspect of the towns. In the year 1913 no factories were working on Sundays, and few shops were opened. Thus in a large measure Sunday observance has been restored, but with a difference. It is now popularly regarded, not primarily as a response to the religious need of worship, still less as obedience to a divine command, but as the condition of wholesome life for the labouring man.

15. The present state of the question.—The foregoing narrative should help us to discern the principles upon which Sunday observance ought to be based, and perhaps to determine the proper mode of observance, and the means by which it may rightly be enforced or encouraged.

Why is Sunday to be observed? It is easier for us to answer this question than it was for the theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, and that for two reasons. Recent investigations into early Church history, of which the results are summarized above, have removed some prejudices which hampered our ancestors. We now know how gradually the observance of Sunday developed and how late was the theory which connected it with the Sabbath. And the modern study of the

[1] See the return made to the House of Lords on the subject in 1911.

OT has removed a difficulty which they could never fully meet. So long as the story of the creation in Gn 1 and 2 and the account of the giving of the Law on Mt. Sinai were regarded as historical, the question had to be faced: How can a divine command, directly given to men, be abrogated? The answer for us is plain: No such commands were ever given, and the stories which record them are legends. The Sabbath was made for man; and, under the guidance of Providence, it was made by man. Sunday, in its turn, was made by man and for man. Man, therefore, is lord both of the Sabbath and of Sunday. It is from the experience of men, both as individuals and in societies, that the reasons must be drawn which determine the manner in which Sunday is to be observed.

(*a*) *The new reasons for observing Sunday.*—These reasons are evidently of two kinds, answering to the conditions required for bodily vigour and spiritual health. While the former may be regarded as especially the concern of the State and the latter of the Church, the mutual influences of body and mind are so considerable and so intricate that in practice it is hard to draw a line between the sphere of politics and that of religion. It is all the harder because to ancient thought the distinction was unknown, and even in modern times is largely artificial. For the Church cannot ignore the body, nor can the State disregard the interests of the spirit. But happily no sharp division is necessary. The reasons given by the Reformers[1] are of general application and may satisfy both the Churchman and the statesman. Since three hundred years of controversy have added nothing substantial to them, we may be content with restating them in a more detailed form.

The need of bodily rest at short intervals is a fact of human nature which all civilized nations have recognized by instituting public holidays. The more complex the social and industrial organization, the more important it becomes that such holidays should recur at regular intervals. The sporadic festivals of the ancient Roman calendar and the Saints' Day system of modern Italy could not be tolerated in an industrial country; for production depends upon regularity of labour and the efficiency of labour upon regularity of recreation. Constantine's decree of A.D. 321, therefore, not only conferred a benefit upon the individual and satisfied a requirement of the Church, but also solved economic and social problems which were growing very difficult. Its wisdom is proved by the fact that, in spite of occasional protests and experiments, the Sunday holiday has remained the rule of civilized countries ever since.

The well-being of the people, which is the proper object of government, demands more than mere cessation of work at sufficient intervals. The life of the citizen is incomplete, and his value to the State is small, unless he cultivates his mind, develops family affection, and enjoys social intercourse. All these functions require leisure—not merely the tired hours after a day's work, but whole days when the time can be disposed of at will. It is in days of leisure, also, that personality has the best chance of development. The State, therefore, has a responsibility, not only for appointing holidays, but also for preventing such misuse of them as may diminish their value to the citizen and to the community. On the other hand, experience proves such responsibility to be of a negative rather than a positive character. The State can remove obstacles to a right course of action, but cannot compel the individual to walk therein. If any positive commands are laid down for the weekly holiday, they must issue from a religious authority, which appeals only to spiritual sanctions, and affects only those who acknowledge its right. The Christian Church is such an authority, and has strong reasons, besides those just mentioned, for requiring its members to observe Sunday. Putting aside the mistaken claims for Sunday, which originated in the dark ages and were so hotly urged in the 17th cent., there remain some which are undeniable. The spiritual life of the individual requires a recurrent leisure time, in which he may read or meditate, may do acts of charity, and commune with his friends, with nature, or art. It requires, also, regular opportunities of joining in common worship, without which his membership of a Church becomes unreal. The former demand might be satisfied by times of leisure peculiar to himself. But the latter involves regular holidays which are common to all. Nor can it be a matter of indifference whether these holidays fall on Sundays. The power of association and tradition is enormous: no man can escape from it, and no Church can ignore it. To substitute another day would be to waste the accumulated associations and traditions of nearly 2000 years which are concentrated on Sunday. For on the Lord's Day Jesus rose from the dead; on that day, ever since, His disciples have met for worship and mutual comfort; on that day they have joined in the feast of His love. Luther did not state the whole case when he wrote: 'Because Sunday has been appointed from the earliest times, we ought to keep to this arrangement, that all things may be done in harmony and order, and no confusion be caused by unnecessary novelties';[1] for he ignored one of the strongest impulses in human nature.

(*b*) *The mode of observance.*—Assuming the above reasons for the observance of Sunday, we have to consider, from the point of view of Church and State, what ought to be the manner of its observance. The action of the State in such matters, as we have indicated already, is mainly negative. It has to protect the worker against the oppression of unbroken labour, to secure for him a regular period of recreation, and to prevent other persons from interfering, whether by force or by bribery, with his reasonable use of his leisure time. That task is not so simple as might appear. Every right, when exercised, imposes a duty upon some one else. The right to food involves the Sunday labour of the milkman; the right of the public to enjoy works of art encroaches upon the leisure of the custodians; the right to fresh air and green fields compels the toil of the railwayman. These classes also have their rights, which must somehow be safeguarded. To adjust conflicting claims in the interest of the people as a whole is a work of much insight and patience; nor can it be accomplished once for all, since every enlargement in the tastes and interests of the many involves a fresh tax upon the ministrations of a few. In Britain, happily, men seem to be approaching a general agreement about the main principles of such accommodations. No man should be required or encouraged to work on Sunday except for the benefit of a large number. The railwayman, the custodian of a picture gallery, or the musician who plays in a band, is engaged in a work of charity, if he is not adding a seventh working day to his week for the sake of profit. No such plea can be made on behalf of a manager who makes profit by the performances of others, or of a tradesman who opens his shops on Sunday. A partial exception is rightly made in the case of those who supply the public with needed refreshments. But even that requires careful watching;

[1] See above, § 11.

[1] *Larger Catechism.*

and the Government has long recognized the duty of limiting the sale of intoxicants to certain hours of the day.

The action of the Church, on the other hand, is positive. It aspires to guide men in their use of the leisure which is secured to them by the State. The primary duty which it inculcates upon all is that of attendance at public worship, for which the Sunday rest was originally instituted. But it also indicates proper uses for the hours which are not spent in such attendance. In the past such guidance took the form mainly of prohibitions. We have seen that, when the prohibitions were few, the result was licence; and, when they were multiplied, Sunday became a day of gloom and boredom. Not to speak of the Scottish 'Sabbath,' which has become proverbial, the restraints were mischievous enough in England till past the middle of the 19th century. The children of pious parents might not play on Sunday except with a Noah's ark. Boys and girls might not take exercise, but sat wearily still. Their elders, limited to 'religious' books or 'sacred' music, took refuge in sleep. Much harm was done to the cause of religion by such observances, and still more by the opposition which Churchmen raised in Parliament to every proposal for allowing rational entertainments for the artisans of the great towns.

A better spirit now prevails. But, while there is little of coercion by Church authority, there is very little of positive suggestion. The time has come when the Christian Church as a whole must formulate something like a programme, instead of leaving Sunday progress to individual experiment. Some such statement of principles as the following, if issued by authority, would relieve many troubled consciences and prevent much revolt.

(1) Sunday is the day for Christians to join in worship. No man spends it well who does not habitually unite with his neighbours in praise and prayer.

(2) Sunday is a day of recreation. Recreation means different things for different people, since an essential feature of it is change. The manual labourer will rest his body; the brain worker will seek exercise; both alike will be the better for a visit to a picture-gallery, or a concert, or a talk with friends.

(3) Sunday is the festival of family life. It is the only day on which most fathers can see much of their children. Unless some hours of the day are employed in cultivating family affection, its ties will be dangerously relaxed.

(4) Sunday is the day for meditation. The average man, if he does not devote some part of Sunday to reading or thought about matters outside his daily occupations, becomes a slave to routine and no longer possesses his own soul.

(c) *How far observance can be enforced.*—By what means can the due observance of Sunday be promoted? The primitive Church punished some offenders with excommunication; the mediæval Church employed the method of penance on a large scale. Both these weapons are now out of date; and they were never of much use for promoting what is best. In proportion as her rules advance from 'thou shalt not' to 'thou shalt,' the Church is less and less able to use any kind of compulsion. She cannot, in fact, compel her members to-day; she can only persuade them through the teaching of ministers and the opinion of neighbours.

The State, on the other hand, just because its commands are nearly all prohibitions, whose object is to protect the rights and interests of the community, can and must use compulsion. Every breach of positive law can be measured and punished by fine or imprisonment. Yet the main influence is really that of public opinion; for the magistrates and police, who administer the law, will always be strict or lax according to the general feeling of the society in which they live. The best means therefore of securing a proper observance of Sunday is to educate public opinion.

LITERATURE.—Many hundreds of volumes have been written on this subject. A very good account of some 200 will be found in Robert Cox, *The Literature of the Sabbath Question*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1865. A few of them are historical, but the mass are arguments for and against the obligation of the Sabbath, in which the same ideas (very few) recur over and over again. The following short list gives specimens of the writings of different countries and denominations. The English predominate, for England has produced far more books than all the other countries put together.

(i.) *13th century.*—Thomas Aquinas, *Exposition of the Commandments.*

(ii.) *16th century.*—Martin Luther, *Larger Catechism* and other books; John Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. ii. ch. viii.; Philip Melanchthon, *The Augsburg Confession*; Thomas Cranmer, *A Confutation of Unwritten Verities*; Richard Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, v. 69–71.

(iii.) *17th century.*—Nicholas Bownde, *Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti* or *The True Doctrine of the Sabbath*, London, 1595, [4]1606; King James I., *The Book of Sports*, do. 1618; Francis White, *A Treatise of the Sabbath Day*, do. 1635; Peter Heylin, *The Hist. of the Sabbath*, do. 1636; Hugo Grotius, *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ*, Amsterdam, 1627, reprint, Glasgow, 1745, bk. v.; *The Westminster Confession of Faith* and *Catechisms*, London, 1647, 1648; John Cocceius, *Indagatio Naturæ Sabbati*, Leyden, 1658; Edward Stillingfleet, *Irenicum*, London, 1659; Richard Baxter, *The Divine Appointment of the Lord's Day proved*, do. 1671.

(iv.) *18th century.* — Thomas Morer, Κυριακὴ Ἡμέρα, London, 1701; Jonathan Edwards, 'On the Perpetuity and Change of the Sabbath,' Sermons xiii., xiv., xv., in *Twenty Sermons on Various Subjects*, Edinburgh, 1804; Isaac Watts, *The Holiness of Times, Places and People*, London, 1733, Discourse i., 'On the Perpetuity of a Sabbath'; *An Act for preventing certain Abuses and Profanations on the Lord's Day*, 1781; *Decree of the National Convention of France appointing a new Calendar*, 1793; Beilby Porteous, *A Letter to the Clergy of the Diocese of London*, London, 1789.

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Heylin and Hessey treat the question historically and with much ability. Parts of the history are well treated in articles and special chapters: Smith's *DCA*, *s.v.* 'Lord's Day'; *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Sunday' (deals chiefly with legislation); *PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Sonntagsfeier'; *HDB*, *s.vv.* 'Lord's Day' and 'Sabbath.' There is also a good chapter (ch. vii.) in W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, 2 vols., London, 1896.

M. G. GLAZEBROOK.

SUNDAY SCHOOLS.—1. **Origin.**—The history of the Sunday school is not the history of religious education. The latter has always existed; the former is a modern institution. The Sunday school is a voluntary lay organization conducting religious instruction in classes on Sunday, generally but not always in church buildings, generally but not always as part of a church organization. The informal instruction that was probably given by teachers in the early Christian communities was somewhat akin to the activity of the Sunday school teacher. But the catechetical schools[1] which flourished in the post-apostolic Church were entirely different. Moreover, the regular catechizing of children, which was always the duty of the minister, albeit a duty very much neglected for many centuries, was not a precursor of the Sunday school. Indeed, if it had been thoroughly effective and well developed, there might never have been a Sunday school. The failure of the clergy thoroughly to systematize and to develop the religious education of the children made the Sunday school necessary. Thus the Scottish clergy, who were more successful in the training of children, regarded the new institution at first as altogether superfluous. The origin of the Sunday school is to be sought in the sporadic efforts of earnest men and women to supply some elementary instruction to children who were neglected by the Church. The most notable instance of such effort was that of Robert Raikes at Gloucester; the name 'Sunday school' seems first to have been attached to his

[1] See art. CATECHUMEN, CATECHUMENATE.

institution; and there was genetic connexion between Raikes's enterprise and the whole Sunday school movement that succeeded.

2. The period of beginnings.—(*a*) *Robert Raikes and the first Sunday schools.*—The national duty of universal education was not fully recognized in England until fifty years ago. In the 18th cent. education was the privilege of the well-to-do. Even the many benefactions which had been provided from time to time for the education of the poor had become almost universally devoted to the children of the middle classes. Moreover, with the development of the factory system, the children had been forced into labour at a very early age, with the result that they grew up in hopeless illiteracy. Among a number of efforts to remedy this intolerable condition the most significant was that of Robert Raikes, editor of the *Gloucester Journal*. He was a man of generous sympathies, interested in various efforts to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate. His attention was attracted to the vicious conduct of the 'young pagans' who were employed in the factories during the week, but who were at large on Sunday, and who naturally employed their single holiday in the only rough recreation which they understood. Believing that their ignorance was responsible for their depravity, he gathered a number of them into a school and secured four women at one shilling per day to instruct them 'in reading and the Church Catechism.' The date of this simple enterprise, which was soon copied in numerous towns, is usually set at 1780. Sunday schools became so popular that attention was given to them in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and the various letters in that once influential periodical still remain our most important source of information regarding the beginning of the movement. Wesley, in his itineracy, soon came upon Sunday schools in various places, and with fine insight immediately saw their possibilities.

(*b*) *The Sunday school in America.*—The American churches were accustomed to hold services in the morning and afternoon. There was an 'intermission' of an hour or more, during which a simple lunch was eaten. Naturally this period was often used for the catechetical instruction of the children, for whom the somewhat solemn services provided little that was appropriate. There is no evidence that any such practice was at all common previous to the Revolution. The catechizing of children took place in the schools, in the family, and in connexion with the pastoral visits of the minister. A large proportion of the children were of course altogether neglected. The period of the Revolutionary War was not favourable to religious education, and the strong influence of France tended decidedly away from religion. In the general desire of the churches to meet this condition, they turned with interest to the new institution of the Sunday school, which had been introduced into the United States from England. It was not in America primarily (though it was to some extent) a school held on Sunday for illiterate children who could not be instructed on weekdays, but rather a school conducted by the Church for religious instruction on the day set apart for that purpose. Thus from the beginning the Sunday school in America was more closely related to the Church than it was for a long time in England. This is not to say that there was not considerable opposition in the one country as in the other from clergymen who felt the danger of the intrusion of inexpert laymen.

(*c*) *Sunday school organizations.*—Within a few years of the establishment of the Raikes schools organizations for propagating the institution came into existence.

William Fox, a London merchant, had had in contemplation a large plan for the gratuitous instruction of the poor. When he learned of the Raikes scheme, it seemed to him more practical than his own more ambitious project; and he took the lead in forming, in 1785, the Society for the Establishment and Support of Sunday Schools. In 1796 was organized the Edinburgh Gratis Sabbath School Society. Others were formed in other Scottish cities. In 1810 the Hibernian Sunday School Society was organized in Dublin. These societies collected funds for the establishment of new schools, for the payment of teachers, for the purchase of Bibles, spelling-books, etc. The practice of paying teachers, although continued in a few places for many years, very soon gave way to the volunteer system, with the spread of the new institution. A number of young men who were giving their services in the Sunday schools of London felt the necessity of mutual help and conference, and organized in 1803 the Sunday School Society for this purpose. This organization became the most significant means of developing the Sunday school in Great Britain.

Organization began in America with the First-Day or Sunday School Society at Philadelphia, in 1791. It was undenominational in character and philanthropic in purpose. The visit of Albert May of London in 1811 greatly stimulated interest in Sunday school organizations. Many of them were formed in American cities. After a number of federations of these had been made, the desire for a national undenominational union resulted in the organization in 1824 of the American Sunday School Union, which has continued to do effective work to the present time.

(*d*) *Lessons and methods of teaching.*—The earliest Sunday school teaching was of the most primitive sort. Many schools on both sides of the Atlantic were obliged to give much of their time to the simplest lessons in reading and spelling. Religious instruction consisted of the memorizing of Scripture, hymns, and catechism, the teacher simply listening to the recitation. Soon some simple plans of lessons were prepared, with some practical appreciation of child religion. Helps to the teacher were the *Sunday School Repository, or Teachers' Magazine*, which began in London in 1813, and the *American Sunday School Magazine*, started in 1824.

3. Development of the Sunday school in America. — (*a*) *Denominational organizations.*—The definite adoption of the Sunday school by the Church in America is seen in the steps taken by almost all the denominations subsequent to the organization of the American Sunday School Union to supervise and extend the work within their own churches. For example, in 1827 the Sunday School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized in New York City; Baptist and Congregational organizations starting in 1825 developed into the American Baptist Publication Society in 1840, and into the Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society in 1868. The superior church bodies of other denominations undertook similar responsibilities.

(*b*) *The Sunday School as a pioneer religious agency.*—It is easy in the light of our modern educational science to criticize the poor endeavours of early religious education, but no history of the wonderful development of the Mississippi valley would be adequate which failed to recognize the social significance of the little Sunday schools that went far ahead of the organized Church into the pioneer communities.

In 1829 the American Sunday School Union established its first western headquarters at Cincinnati, and in the following year resolved at its annual convention to undertake the organization of a Sunday school in every destitute place in the Mississippi valley. Funds were raised, lay and clerical missionaries were appointed, and a notable advance was made. A single missionary in the course of a life of arduous journeying organized over 1300 new schools. As it was said of old that where ten Hebrews lived there should be a synagogue, so it came to be the expectation in America that, wherever three or four Christian families were neighbours, a Sunday school should be started, at first in the farm-house, later in the school-house or in the court-house. Very many churches of the West had their origin in the activities of a few of the laity who had begun religious work by the organization of a little Sunday school.

(*c*) *The International Sunday School Association.*—The convention system has been characteristic of the American movement. Neighbourhood conventions were held before 1820. Springing from the annual meeting of the American

Sunday School Union, a national convention of Sunday school workers was called in 1832. After a very successful session this body adjourned to meet the following year. Numerous state and county conventions met in the succeeding years, until in 1859 a third annual convention was called. The fourth did not meet until after the Civil War, in 1869, and by that time the noted Illinois leaders, B. F. Jacobs, Edward Eggleston, J. H. Vincent, and D. L. Moody were prominent. While this convention was not called international, there were delegates from Canada and from the British Isles. The same was true of the fifth convention of 1872, at which the uniform lessons were adopted. The movement then became definitely organized as international, with delegates from all the states and provinces of North America. An official body was gradually developed, which supervised the extension of the system to state, county, and township conventions, meeting annually and leading up to the great triennial gathering. At the eleventh convention in 1905 it was resolved to incorporate under the name 'International Sunday School Association.' This was done in 1907, headquarters being established at Chicago. A completely articulated organization exists under an executive committee, with a general secretary and a corps of superintendents over the various divisions and departments.

(*d*) *The development of the lesson system.*—As an improvement on mere memorizing, the 'limited lesson' system came into vogue about 1825. Two years later Albert Judson published a question-book, which supplied some notes and explanations of the selected lessons. In the same year the American Sunday School Union issued the *Union Question-Book*, which was followed annually by others covering a considerable portion of the Bible. Various schemes followed, the result partly of private enterprise, partly of denominational zeal. There was no adequate direction, and Sunday school leaders felt the need of some unity of effort. After much discussion the convention of 1872 voted to issue a uniform system of lessons for all Sunday school pupils. A lesson committee was appointed, and great enthusiasm was developed in the scheme. The co-operation of the British Sunday School Union was secured, and the lessons became practically universal. Noted writers prepared lesson-helps and commentaries; great teachers' meetings were held for the exposition of the lesson of the forthcoming Sunday, and the public press frequently devoted a column on Saturday to this purpose.

After twenty years of great external success the educational value of the uniform lesson was seriously called in question. The subject was warmly debated in conventions. At last, in 1908, the convention decided, while continuing the uniform lesson, to authorize its lesson committee to prepare a thoroughly graded course, to be used by such schools as desired it. This has since been done, and a series of text-books has been prepared by the various denominations upon the lessons thus outlined.

(*e*) *Teacher training.*—It has been recognized that most Sunday school teaching has been very unsatisfactory. Efforts have been made almost from the beginning to effect improvement. The institutes held since 1837 for public school teachers were a challenge to the Sunday school, which was answered by the development of conferences and institutes. The normal class of J. H. Vincent in Illinois in 1857 was a model which many followed. Courses for normal training of increasing scope have been issued, until to-day those published by the various denominational societies and prepared by educational experts are of very high grade. A summer school has been established at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, where instruction for professional and lay workers is carried on during the vacation season.

(*f*) *The Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations.* — The activity of the various denominations in Sunday school work has very markedly developed during the last thirty years, until there has grown up a professional body of editors and secretaries representing the more definitely Church point of view. These leaders, feeling the need of a common expression of the denominational responsibility for religious education, organized in 1910 the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations. Annual meetings are held, at which important problems of educational policy and administration are discussed. The existence of such a representative body naturally raised the question of future responsibility for the making of the lessons for the Sunday school world. The lesson committee has therefore been reconstituted, and now consists of eight members selected from the international association, eight members selected by the council, and one member selected by each denomination having a lesson committee.

(*g*) *The emphasis on religious education.*—The last quarter of a century has been marked by a growing emphasis upon the more serious educational responsibility of the Church. This was seen in the demand for the graded curriculum. In addition to the international lessons, several very significant courses of study have been produced, notably the *Constructive Studies* of the University of Chicago Press, the *Completely Graded Series* of Scribner, and several series of various denominations. In 1903 was organized the Religious Education Association to promote the educational ideal in religion and the religious ideal in education. The Association holds annual conventions or conferences, conducts studies and surveys, publishes a magazine, gathers in its offices in Chicago all significant material on religious education, and conducts an extensive correspondence of advice and stimulus on problems in this field. Several denominations have established Boards of Religious Education, which are undertaking the supervision of the entire educational work of the Church. Leaders of great ability are being selected as secretaries. In some cases these boards are preparing new and specially graded curricula.

The numerous agencies of religious education are being co-ordinated in the more progressive churches under a professional director of religious education. He is becoming the educational minister of the Church. Some colleges and universities and most theological seminaries have established chairs of religious education, by means of which a trained professional force is being developed and scientific work in religious education is being undertaken. An extensive literature has already been produced, both technical and popular.

4. British developments.—(*a*) *The Sunday School Union.*—The parent society in London developed into a nation-wide enterprise. In 1821 there were four metropolitan auxiliaries and sixty provincial unions, besides the Sunday School Society of Ireland and the Sabbath School Union of Scotland. The reports of that year show 4000 schools with 36,000 teachers, and 500,000 scholars. In 1823 infant schools were added for children below the ordinary Sunday school age, as in 1811 Thomas Charles of Bala, the Welsh Methodist leader, had already established adult schools. The latter subsequently became known as senior classes, and in time both infant and senior branches became part of a completely organized school. The Union celebrated its jubilee in 1853 by inaugurating a fund for the erection of

a permanent building. In 1862, at the time of the International Exhibition in London, a general Sunday school convention was held, attended by delegates from all over the British Isles, as well as from the Continent, the United States, and the Colonies. British Sunday schools were accustomed to meet in the morning and in the afternoon, and the Union had prepared annually a double series of lessons. Beginning with 1874, the British Lessons Committee co-operated with the American Committee in the production of the international series of lessons.

In 1880 was celebrated the centenary of Sunday schools throughout the United Kingdom, and a great convention was held in London to which delegates came from all over the world. As a result of this enlarged interest, the Union modified its constitution so as to become thoroughly national in character, representation to the counties being extended in 1890.

During the last thirty years the Union has developed a very significant philanthropic work, including country homes for poor scholars, a home of rest for lady teachers, a children's convalescent home, etc.

(*b*) *Educational progress.*—In the second quarter of the 19th cent. a forward movement in the science and art of pedagogy began in Scotland. David Stow organized the Glasgow Normal School for the training of teachers. Believing that the same principles could be applied to religious education, he published in 1826 a training system. The Union published in 1837 *Popular Education, or a Normal School Manual.* In 1856 a training class was organized at Pimlico. An attempt was made in 1861 to establish a college for Sunday school teachers, but it was found more feasible to develop a system of standardizing examinations. The college was finally established in 1899, and the examination system adapted to this organization. In addition to the publication of lessons and the encouragement of teacher training, the Union has developed a considerable literature for teachers and scholars, a separate building being required for this phase of its work.

5. World Sunday school work.—The Sunday school spread naturally through the English-speaking world. Various efforts were made, beginning as early as 1815, to establish it on the Continent, but with slight success. The convention in London in 1862, at the earnest solicitation of Albert Woodruff, undertook a continental propaganda. Sunday schools were established in all European countries. This movement was promoted by the world's conventions which met in London in 1889, in St. Louis in 1893, in London in 1898, in Jerusalem in 1904, in Rome in 1907, in Washington in 1910, in Zürich in 1913. At Rome the World Sunday School Association was organized, with American and British sections. Missionary work in China, India, S. Africa, and Europe was assigned to the British section; in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, S. America, and in the Muslim fields to the American section. The Association reported at Zürich the world Sunday school membership as 30,015,037, with 310,057 schools, and 2,669,630 officers and teachers.

6. Non-Protestant Sunday schools.—The Roman Catholic Church has adapted the Sunday school to its system, though without relinquishing the control to lay leadership. In the Hebrew Reformed Synagogue the Sunday school, generally under paid teachers, has become very effective. Among the Latter-Day Saints an excellent system of religious education has been developed, including the Sunday school. The Christian Science churches have established Sunday schools especially for children.

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THEODORE GERALD SOARES.

SUNNITES.—1. Distribution. — Islām is at present divided into two great unevenly divided sections. The Shī'ahs (*q.v.*) are found in Persia and among the masses in India; the Sunnites in the Turkish empire as it was prior to the Great War, in N. Africa, Egypt, other parts of Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China, and the East Indies. In India the ruling class is of Sunnite faith; in the Turkish empire there are numbers of Shī'ahs of the better class who make a point of concealing their religious convictions. The Muhammadan population of the world is estimated to be about 221,000,000, and of this total it is reckoned that about 15,000,000 are Shī'ahs; the rest are Sunnīs. The Ibāḍīs (*q.v.*) of E. Arabia and N. and E. Africa are not relatively numerous and are neither Shī'ah nor Sunnite inasmuch as they claim descent from the Khārijite[1] schism of the early Umayyad period. The Zaidites (*q.v.*) of Yemen, though of Shī'ah origin, are on terms of fellowship with the Sunnites of Arabia.

2. The term 'Sunnite' and the early attitude towards the sunnah.—The Sunnite is the follower of the *sunnah* ('form,' 'outline,' 'mode,' 'usage'), or the view and usage of the Prophet. The issue implied in the use of the term is as to how new demands of thought are to be satisfied and new situations are to be met. The party of the *sunnah* contended that, where the Qur'ān did not fully and clearly provide direction, the inquirer should seek trustworthy information as to what Muhammad had said on the subject, what his action had been with relation to it, or what he had approved in others. The *sunnah* of the Prophet would be found embodied in a tradition (*ḥadīth*), and it was of the highest importance that the trustworthiness of traditions should be certified. They were tested, not by their intrinsic probability or by their consistency with other reports, but solely by the reputed reliability of the succession of persons through whom they had been handed down. If the *'isnād*, or chain of guarantors, had no unreliable members, the contents of a tradition were considered to furnish unimpeachable support for the opinion or course of action on behalf of which they had been cited. This mode of arriving at the *sunnah* of the Prophet opened the way to the wholesale fabrication and perversion of traditions to suit the needs of persons hard pressed for arguments on behalf of causes honest or dishonest. Abū Ḥanīfah († 150 A.H.) seems to have felt that tradition as a basis of support was not sufficient. Possibly, as a Persian he lacked the Arab's respect for this mode of proof and sought a more rational method, but what determined his attitude to an

[1] See art. KHAWĀRIJ.

even greater degree was probably the notoriously untrustworthy manner in which traditions were produced. He preferred to resort directly to the Qur'ān and, where it was not explicit, to decide according to his own view of what might fairly be inferred from its teaching as bearing on the question in hand. This method of obtaining direction involved two principles which the party of the *sunnah* for a long time viewed with distrust, viz. *ra'y*, or independent personal judgment, and *qiyās*, argument from the analogy of known cases to secure direction for new cases. Both of these were thought to imply disrespect towards inspired authority. Abū Ḥanīfah went farther than this in the readiness which he showed to depart from the written authority of the Qur'ān and the direction given by the *sunnah*. Even when these gave a clear decision, or where the principle of *qiyās* gave a definite instruction, the situation might suggest a better view or a wiser course of action. To follow such a suggestion was a duty. The principle here implied is termed *istiḥsān*, preference, or asking for the better thing. It involves personal independent judgment (*ra'y*) to a greater degree than the employment of *qiyās* does and is still more inconsistent with the early view of the party of the *sunnah* ('Ahlu-'s-Sunnah). Mālik ibn 'Anas († 179 A.H.) lived in the atmosphere of tradition at Medīna, and tradition had more weight with him than with Abū Ḥanīfah. Still, where traditions were being forged at the rate he knew and for the purposes of which he was aware, there was room for a principle of decision in legal and doctrinal questions which would protect Islām against injury through capricious or irrational judgments. Mālik, therefore, admitted the rule of *istiṣlāḥ*, the seeking of the public welfare, which might override the dictation of the Sacred Book and the *sunnah*. The strict party of the *sunnah* opposed this rule, as it had the liberal practice of Abū Ḥanīfah; both allowed too much room to *ra'y*. To men accustomed to earlier conditions, when the absence of a *sunnah* which might cover all cases left room for decision on other grounds, the mere multiplying of traditions did not afford a sufficient reason for surrendering methods of obtaining guidance which had been followed when traditions were not available. Meanwhile the uninformed masses of Islām were strongly inclined to the simpler method of appeal to external authority. *Qiyās*, *istiḥsān*, *istiṣlāḥ*, and *ra'y* were too human, and hence too feeble and erring. The future of Islām largely depended on whether free scholarship (*ra'y*) or authority (*sunnah*) became the ruling factor in the community, whether the need of the Muslims was to be conceived according to the view of intelligent leaders or to that of the great body of the people with its clinging to old-established ways.

3. The Mu'tazilite reaction.—The traditional and rationalistic tendencies both went on developing, and the mutual antagonism between them was intensified. The rationalistic party became recognized as a party which favoured *ra'y*, lent its approval to Greek philosophy and Christian culture, and regularly employed the Aristotelian method of arriving at truth. The earlier *khalīfahs* of the Abbāsid dynasty had been interested in these things, but they became established and officially approved under the *khalīfah* al-Ma'mūn († 218 A.H.). In the last year of his reign he instituted an inquisition against the traditionalists. This inquisition (*al-Miḥna*) went on for sixteen years (218-234 A.H.), and, while it lasted, the orthodox suffered severely and their leaders were often under peril of death. This period of persecution, with the strenuous controversies which it witnessed, settled the characteristic marks of the later Sunnī belief and also brought out and sharpened the weapons by which rationalism sought to destroy the positions of the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah. The latter applied to their opponents the name Mu'tazilah, 'dissenters' or 'seceders.' It was a name which had been used in a favourable sense of pious ascetics or hermits, but in the late 2nd cent. A.H. it was given an unfavourable significance and came to mean heretics. On the one side were the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah, and opposed to them were the 'Ahlu-'r-Ra'y, the Mu'tazilah. The fundamental question for both parties was the true conception of God. Was the view held by the one party or the other a view which did justice to the unity of the Supreme Being? Was it one which adequately set forth and protected His character as a perfect Being? The Mu'tazilah, as their orthodox antagonists called them, were proud to describe themselves as the 'party of the (divine) unity and justice' ('Ahlu-'t-Tawḥīd wa'l-'adl). They charged the party of the *sunnah* with a contradiction of both these divine virtues.

Connected with these fundamental issues were others of sufficiently vital importance but subordinate to them. The question as to the source of authority for belief and conduct required to be solved. The party of the Qur'ān and *sunnah* insisted upon a literal conformity to these two sources, while the Mu'tazilah demanded that belief and conduct should be consistent with reason, and the method by which the rational view was to be tested was that of the Aristotelian logic. This science was known by the term *kalām* (*q.v.*), and those who relied upon it were designated Mutakallimūn — descriptions without intrinsic stigma, but acquiring in the hands of the orthodox Sunnites the unpleasant implication of heresy and heretics respectively. The Mu'tazilah nevertheless were proud to call themselves 'Ahlu-'l-'Aql, 'the party of reason,' and felt that only by reason could one reach a worthy view of God and of man's duty to Him. The Qur'ān was saved from absurd interpretations and became a real guide for reasonable beings only as it was subjected to a rational process of study. Literal acceptance of the text had led the orthodox to proclaim the dogma of the uncreated and eternal nature of the Qur'ān, and as a party in this early time they applied the dogma even to the letters and words of the book as written and to the sounds of the uttered recitation or reading. It was in the controversy regarding the uncreated nature of the Qur'ān that Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (*q.v.*) appeared as the outstanding champion of the traditional view. When pressed by the Mu'tazilite argument to the effect that the human media and the inanimate records were obviously not unlimited in either nature or duration, his answer was that the book declared itself to be (or, rather, God in the book declared it to be) *kalām Allāh*, *i.e.* the word or speech of God, which was inseparably and uninterruptedly an attribute (*ṣifa*) of God. It could not be dissociated from the thought of God and the divine reason and was therefore eternal. This polemic instantly raised the question of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*). Was the *kalām Allāh* to be conceived as an entity independent as to essence from the being or essence of God? Were all the attributes entities in this sense? On the basis of the statements of the Qur'ān the party of the *sunnah* persistently argued for the affirmative. The Mu'tazilah charged them with giving God a partner (*shirk*). It was polytheism to assert that there were other eternal entities beside God. The Qur'ān text should not be interpreted in such a sense as to violate the unity of God and 'associate' other beings with Him. It should be explained in an allegorical sense (*ta'wīl*) where the literal sense would involve irreverence or what was irrational. The orthodox rejoinder relentlessly attacked the presumptuous setting up of *ra'y* over the *kalām Allāh*. It surely was the greater sin that the creature should venture to set aside the plain words which God had spoken because to him they seemed absurd. The ambiguity of the terms used in the controversy made agreement between the two parties impossible. 'Word of God' meant one thing for Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and a very different thing for his persecuting inquisitors. For him to claim that his Qur'ān was uncreated, and for them to reply that their Qur'ān was created, must necessarily have left each where he was before the argument. The *sunnah* party suffered much ridicule at the hands of their opponents because of their readiness to accept all the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'ān as precise descriptions of fact. They boldly taught that God sat on a throne, possessed sight, smell, hearing, etc., though they grew more cautious as the controversy wore on and pressed for verbal acceptance of the Qur'ān teachings, with a consent to leave questions as to how such things could be with God Himself to make plain later or not to make plain as He chose. It was to be an acceptance 'without seeing how' (*bilā kaifa*, or, contracted, *bilkaifa*). Connected with this subject of the anthropomorphic attributes and acts of God in the Qur'ān is that of the possibility of actually seeing God, as the Qur'ān declares. If the saints see God, it is implied that the anthropomorphic view is literally true; if it is not true, they do not see Him.

One more element in the Mu'tazilite controversy

remains to be noticed. The party of the *sunnah* held the characteristic Arab view that the will of Allāh was the all-determining source of change and activity in the world. The 'party of *'aql*' allowed to man the capacity to initiate action and placed upon him the responsibility for his choice. Because of their attitude on this special point, the Mu'tazilah are classed as Qadarites (believers in free will). Their argument attacked the orthodox, particularly on the ground that they held man responsible for his acts and nevertheless denied that he was free. Freedom he might seem to have, but it was only illusory; in reality his acts were created by God, without whom nothing happened. This orthodox contention the Mu'tazilah repudiated as involving injustice to man and also as implying an insulting impeachment of God's justice.

4. Re-establishment of orthodoxy.—The Mu'tazilite controversy was summarily terminated by the *khalīfah* al-Mutawakkil in 234 A.H. He reversed the liberal policy of his predecessors, declared the doctrines that they had championed to be offences against the State, and proclaimed the orthodox views to represent the official opinions which alone would be tolerated in Islām. This official endorsement of the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah has been maintained in Islām down to the present. The dogmatic beliefs of the persecuted orthodox are held by both Sunnites and Shī'ahs, and the Sunnī khalīfate has regularly stood sponsor for them. There is no doubt that the Mu'tazilite *khalīfahs* of the Miḥna period represented a relatively small minority in the Muslim world of their time and that al-Mutawakkil was wise not to continue his support of their views in the face of an adverse popular sentiment. Tradition and Qur'ān retained their hold upon the masses, to whom their directness and their clear mandatory accent appealed as mere reflective opinion could hardly hope to do. The great body of Islām ranged itself behind the orthodox *khalīfahs*, and the Mu'tazilah tend to disappear little by little. The free-thinking teachers notwithstanding give the traditional theologians a great deal of trouble, in spite of the smallness of their numbers. It was easy to make a system based on literal interpretations appear ridiculous when attacked by means of keen dialectic, and the orthodox tenacity and insistence did not prevent their partisans from feeling an awkward discomfort when they were forced to evade rather than answer the attacks made upon them. It will be readily understood that the man who enabled them to inflict genuine defeat upon their opponents, Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (*q.v.*), would seem to the orthodox to be almost a prophet when he arrived.

5. Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī.—Al-Ash'arī had been long trained in the views and arguments of the Mutakallims, and there is some plausibility in the legend which represents him as using their method against his own teacher al-Jubbā'ī to the discomfiture of the latter. He had apparently come to see that the Aristotelian logic was valuable, not for the discovery of truth, but for making explicit the significance of propositions which were taken for granted and for the confutation of false arguments. It became clear to him that religion could not be built securely upon *kalām*, a formal science. The foundation must be in revelation through inspired men and media, through prophets and sacred writings. Feeling that, in spite of their poor logic, the party of the *sunnah* had founded Islām upon the true basis, that tradition was a genuinely trustworthy means of communicating revealed guidance from age to age, and that the consensus of the Muslim community (*ijmā'*) expressed through its leaders was more reliable than the judgment of the individual Mutakallim, al-Ash'arī returned to the orthodox faith which he seems to have inherited from his forbears in the first instance. He came back converted through his own employment of *kalām* against itself, and naturally he made use of the weapon from that time (300 A.H.) forward to disprove the views of the Mu'tazilah and to develop into a system the orthodox doctrine.

6. The principle of consensus.—The principle of consensus operated more largely from the days of al-Ash'arī onward. It was Ash-Shāfi'ī († 204 A.H.) who first made extensive use of it in his teaching and was prepared to accept it as a guide where the Qur'ān and *sunnah* failed to afford direction. His preference for *ijmā'* was approved only with reserve by the rigid Ḥanbalite orthodoxy of the 3rd century. Al-Bukhārī's strictness in the criticism of *ḥadīths* and his refusal to give an opinion on the human utterance of the Qur'ān are possibly alike based upon an employment of the *ijmā'*. The principle has a bearing upon the division of Islām into Sunnites and Shī'ahs. In the days of the early Ash'arite school this division, which is based, not upon dogmatic differences of a genuine religious character, but upon a divergent view of the khalīfate, had not yet taken place, and the *ijmā'* embraced the whole Muslim community. When the division came, it was recognized that the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah lay beyond the boundaries of the Persian empire as organized under the Ṣafawīds (A.D. 1502), and that *ijmā'* had a sense and a binding force in Sunnite Islām which it did not have in Persia. The Persian Muslims readily accord the name Sunnīs to their rivals and accept Shī'ah as a proper term by which to describe themselves. *Ijmā'* is especially a Sunnite principle and has guided the leading movements and changes of Sunnite Islām during many centuries. There is no need of its use among the Shī'ahs, where appeal is made to the inspired authority of the *imāms* as it is voiced through their *mujtahids*.

In spite of the fact that the Ḥanbalite school, so powerful in the 3rd cent. of Islām, is now almost a negligible quantity, al-Ash'arī, the founder of the Sunnite theological system, was an ardent Ḥanbalite after his conversion and died in that faith (320 A.H.). It is necessary to say, however, that the views which are now held by all the Sunnite schools are the founder's views as somewhat liberalized by the Ash'arite school after his death. There is evidence to show that the cast-iron system into which the great teacher came back at the time of his conversion from Mu'tazilism was modified through the very *kalām* influence which he brought with him. It was probably al-Ash'arī's thought to employ *kalām* for purely apologetic purposes, but his followers gave much more scope to the principle of the consensus than he seems to have thought of. The 'Six Correct Books' of traditions (*Kitābu Sittah*), of which the two great *Ṣaḥīḥs* of al-Bukhārī and Muslim are the most essential authorities, contain the only generally accepted evidence as to the *sunnah*, but in the application of the *sunnah* the principle of the *ijmā'*, used in accordance with the scholastic method introduced by al-Ash'arī, has made it possible to leave far behind the strict views of law held by the triumphant Ḥanbalite school of the 3rd Muslim century. That kind of unchanging orthodoxy would not have preserved the unity of Islām as it has been preserved among the Sunnites. Modern Ḥanbalites are the consistent successors of the early Ḥanbalite school before al-Ash'arī, but they exert little influence. Sunnite Islām is an Islām to which the liberal views of the Ḥanifites and the moderate views of the Mālikites and Shāfi'ites have had less and less difficulty in adjusting themselves as time has passed, so that in opinion and practice unity and even a large measure of uniformity have come to prevail. The Ḥanbalite domination of the Sunnī sect became at once impossible with the admission of the *kalām* method and the broader understanding of the *ijmā'*. The schools differ, as they have always differed, in the extent to which they recognize certain liberal principles and attitudes of mind. Analogy (*qiyās*) and judgment according to personal opinion (*ra'y*, and, in special relations, *istiḥsān*, or preference for a better view) play a large part in the administration of Ḥanifite law, a less important part among the N. African Mālikites, and a small part in the Shāfi'ite communities of Islām. But the difference is within the region of *fiqh* and not within that of dogmatic opinion.

7. Triumph of Ash'arite theology.—The process of liberalizing the orthodox system of al-Ash'arī must have been somewhat rapid in the century

following his death. Towards the end of the 4th cent. A.H. there seems to have been a disposition to allow *kalām* to run riot in Baghdād, where we read of theologians who were willing to argue questions without reference to the traditional authorities of Islām. Even in the West the great thinkers, excluding Ibn Ḥazm (*q.v.*) as almost a sole exception, gave themselves more and more to a philosophical account of religion and at the same time realized painfully that they had parted company with accepted orthodox views. Men like Ibn Ṭufail and Averroës (*qq.v.*) in the late 6th cent. A.H. have one system for the masses and another teaching for the instructed few. Nevertheless one may say that, in spite of excesses, the Ash'arite school had definitely imposed its views and method upon the Muslim world before the end of the 11th cent. of our Christian era. The liberty of thought which al-Ash'arī had secured for Islām had developed by that time a controversial intellectualism which left no place for intuition or mysticism in religion, and orthodoxy was in serious danger of losing the sympathy of the masses. A new emphasis was called for in order to supply a corrective to the general rationalism which prevailed.

8. Al-Ghazālī.[1]—Al-Ghazālī († 505 A.H.) was by nature an intensely religious man to whom the truth was the greatest of all possessions. It was for him life's supreme concern to solve the problem of Ultimate Reality in such a way as to be satisfied that he enjoyed contact, response, and fellowship with it. He was convinced that what he sought could not be given by an acceptance of truth on mere external authority, a point to which, in spite of his dependence upon *kalām*, al-Ash'arī still held. He saw that the Mutakallims could proceed to their conclusions only as they took for granted certain propositions which they did not prove, and that, when they had said all, the seeker had in possession only a system of logical inferences and not at all an experience of the ultimately real. Not because it was a last resort or because he was in despair of finding anything better, al-Ghazālī turned to Ṣūfism. He made a full and sympathetic trial of the Ṣūfī discipline, after having tried other ways, and was convinced that the Ṣūfīs (*q.v.*) had solved the problem of the soul's quest. Man craved a satisfying revelation and a satisfying communion with God; he received both through faithful conformity to the Ṣūfī ideal and persistent openness to receive higher communications. Al-Ghazālī was a moderate Ṣūfī who was ready to give due weight to reason within its own limits, and who recognized the ethical and religious duties of the common life. His pre-eminent gifts and virtues—for he was one of the finest characters as well as one of the greatest minds which Islām has produced—have made his solution of the religious problem exceedingly influential down to our own day. Ṣūfism became a power far beyond the borders of the dervish organizations; the extreme dependence upon rationalism was checked; the emotional factors in human nature were provided for with due regard to ethical and religious conduct. Probably no teacher since the days of the Prophet has afforded to Muslims a better illustration of the possibilities of their own faith. Sunnites generally admit a great indebtedness to him, and his works are standard texts in the training of orthodox theologians (*'ulamā*).

9. Sunnites and Shī'ahs.—The distinction between Shī'ahs and Sunnīs has its roots in the dispute between the 'Alids and Umayyads in the years which followed the *khalīfah* 'Uthmān's assassination (35 A.H.). In its origin it has nothing to do with the religion founded by Muhammad, but rather is occupied with the political question of the succession to the leadership of the Muslim community. At first the 'Alids on their side claimed that they were the legitimate *khalīfahs* because they were descended from the Prophet's daughter Fāṭimah and his cousin and intimate companion, 'Alī. The Umayyads on their part claimed a nomination by the choice of the Muslims themselves and as a further title claimed kinship with the Prophet as being of the Hāshimite family. Later the 'Alids stood for the claims of descent against all claims of right to office because of the popular choice. This difference still marks off the Shī'ah political theory from that held among the Sunnites.

(*a*) *Theory of the khalīfate.*—There is, moreover, an old standing difference between the Sunnites and Shī'ahs as to the functions of the *khalīfah*. Among the Sunnites the *khalīfah* is a political ruler essentially, while from the first the 'Alid party regarded the Prophet's successor as a religious guide and therefore preferred to designate him as the *imām* of the Muslim community. It was assumed that his physical descent from the Prophet secured to him not merely divine rights, but also a divine endowment of grace and wisdom. No such assumption was held by the Sunnites with relation to their *khalīfahs*. They were chosen from among the believers and could claim no supernatural qualifications. Their authority was conferred by the Muslim community and carried with it no implication of pre-eminent saintliness or infallibility. The Sunnite attitude towards the *khalīfahs* differs greatly from that of the Shī'ahs towards the *imāms*. The personal qualities and public influence of the *khalīfahs* have been largely determinative of the respect shown to them. Among the Shī'ahs the office hallows the occupant, and the *imāms* are regarded with the deepest religious veneration. The Sunnite *khalīfahs* by law are required to be of the Prophet's tribe, the Quraish; the *imāms* were chosen from the still more narrow circle of the Prophet's immediate family.

Since the twelfth *imām*, Muhammad ibn al-Ḥasan, disappeared in the middle of the 3rd cent. A.H., the line of visible *imāms* has been suspended, but there has never been a legal reason why the Sunni khalifate should be interrupted, as it has always been possible for the Muslim community to find an eligible candidate and to nominate him, provided circumstances did not interpose a physical hindrance. The *sulṭāns* of Turkey have assumed to be the *khalīfahs* of the Prophet and have taken to themselves the exclusive title pertaining to that office, Emir al-Mu'minīna, 'Commander of the Faithful,' since the time of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1512. As they are not of Arab race, let alone of Quraishite lineage, there is no basis in law for the Ottoman claim. The first *sulṭān* (Selim I.) to assume the title justified his act on the ground of a surrender of his rights on the part of the last 'Abbāsid *khalīfah*, al-Mutawakkil II., who at the time of the conquest of Egypt was attached to the court of the Mamluk *sulṭāns* and was recognized by them as the spiritual head of Islām. The Ottoman *sulṭāns* have retained in their own persons the dual authority temporal and spiritual which the Mamluks had divided, and the principle of the consensus seems to have permitted the *'ulamā* to legalize the departure from the law of the khalifate as settled by the *sunnah*. They have accepted the transfer of the 'Abbāsid rights to Sulṭān Selim as giving a title, and have regarded it as fortified by other considerations, viz. the Ottoman conquest of Muslim domain, the control of the sacred cities, and the possession of relics of the Prophet. The *sulṭān* has made a concession to traditional sentiment in constituting the chief *muftī* in Constantinople as *shaikh ul-Islām*, or highest spiritual authority over all believers. This functionary, nevertheless, derives his power from the *sulṭān* who appoints him, though it is to be admitted that the choice of the *'ulamā* practically settles the appointment. All questions affecting Islām are considered by the *shaikh ul-Islām*, and are subject to his decision as promulgated by a *fatwā* issuing from him. The other conditions recognized by Sunnite authorities as binding in the election of a *khalīfah* are that he shall be of adult years, of sane mind, of free condition, a man versed in the learning of Islām, and a capable administrator who will rule justly. In contrast to the Shī'ahs, the Sunni doctors have always recognized Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān, the first successors of the Prophet, as genuine *khalīfahs* (*al-Khulafā ar-rāshidūn*) together with the fourth *khalīfah* 'Alī, who of course is allowed to be a legiti-

[1] Cf. art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Muslim), § 7.

mate successor by the Shī'ah sect also. For 'Alī and his successors in the imāmate the Sunnīs have much respect on account of their reputation for either piety or learning, though they do not admit the Shī'ah claim of supernatural gifts or divine rights as belonging to them.

(*b*) *Enmity between Sunnites and Shī'ahs.*—The intense hatred between Sunnīs and Shī'ahs as distinct sects dates from the time when the Shī'ahs were constituted a separate political organization by the foundation of the Ṣafawid empire of Persia in A.D. 1502. The fault in this mutual bitter feeling is greater on the Shī'ah side than on that of the Sunnites, but the treatment of Persian pilgrims to Mecca has been an enduring irritation, and in earlier times the military aggression of the Turkish *sulṭāns* gave occasion for resentment in Persia. As has been pointed out above, there are many individual Muslims of Shī'ah connexion in the Turkish empire, and, either because of an acquired indifference or oftener because of their practice of *taqiyah* (concealment of faith), they suffer no personal inconvenience at the hands of their Sunnite neighbours. The proposal of Nādir Shah in the 18th cent., that a reunion of Islām be brought about by admitting the Shī'ahs to fellowship with the Sunnīs as a fifth orthodox school, was prompted by the world-ambition of that ruler and was met by vigorous and successful opposition on the part of the Persian *mujtahids* and *mullahs*.

(*c*) *Position as to the sunnah.*—The difference between the Sunnites and the Shī'ahs does not consist in the acknowledgment of the *sunnah* of the Prophet by the former and its denial by the latter. The title of the Sunnīs to have the oldest and the most thoroughly tested body of traditions is not questioned, but the Shī'ahs also have their *sunnah*, whose authorities are the acknowledged *ḥadīth* collections of the sect. Resting upon these recognized standards, the Shī'ah teachers claim that they alone have the genuine *sunnah*, while the Sunnite version, they allege, has been perverted so as to furnish arguments against the claims of 'Alī and his sons to the succession of the Prophet. The corruption of the *sunnah* for any such purpose by the Sunnites is exceedingly unlikely, while the evidence of the manipulation of traditions by the Shī'ahs to support their own side is considered to be fairly clear. In the interpretation and adaptation of the *sunnah* to new relations the Sunnites are guided by the consensus (*ijmā'*) and analogy (*qiyās*), while the Shī'ahs claim to be alone rightly guided in their following of the *sunnah*, inasmuch as they have enjoyed the infallible instruction of the *imāms* either in person or since the line has been suspended by the inerrant communication of their word and will through the *mujtahids*. According to the *sunnah* view, there can be no *mujtahids* in Islām since the death of the last great orthodox founder in the 3rd cent. A.H. The term as employed in Sunnī circles is limited to the great *imāms* of the earlier centuries who founded the four orthodox schools and laid on indisputable foundations the theology and law of Islām. Since their day no teacher's opinions have justified themselves as a permanent basis for faith and life.

10. Changes in Sunnite Islām. — In theory Sunnite Islām is tied up to the Ash'arite system, and because of that it is thought to be fated to intellectual stagnation. The facts show that from the time of al-Ash'arī himself there was some modification of the founder's positions, and with the contribution made by al-Ghazālī one may say that the modification amounts to a materially altered view-point and the introduction of a new and revolutionary emphasis which laid stress upon intuitive and emotional factors in religious experience. The necessities of the historical situation have repeatedly rendered nugatory the theoretical requirements of Sunnite orthodoxy. Where Muslims live under Christian governments, as in India, the law of the khalīfate has to yield place to the obligations of political loyalty, the duty imposed by the *jihād* is in most cases unfulfilled, and the *zakāt* must be modified, especially as to the authority to whom it is to be turned over and the mode and purpose of its distribution. With the universal recognition of saint-worship and the cult of relics, the dogma of the unity of God and the law against idolatry (*shirk*) are violated, and the sufficiency of the canonical authorities, the Qur'ān and *sunnah*, is called in question. It may be recalled that one fruit of the modern liberal movement in India is the rise of the Aḥmadīyah sect, whose founder, Mirza Ghulam Aḥmad († 1908), recognized the logic of facts in the position of the Indian Muslims and declared that the duty of the *jihād* was not binding any longer. The practical effect of the Ṣūfī teaching when fully developed is a pantheism which is in contradiction with the hard, clear-cut monotheism of the Ash'arite theology. It is a pantheism leading to a loosening of the positive bonds of conduct which the orthodox teaching imposes. The righteousness of the Ṣūfī may become extravagantly mechanical and violently anti-social, so much so that public regulation may be called for, as is the case in Egypt. Enough has been said to show that Sunnite Islām, however immobile it may be in theory, has admitted into its system under the compulsion of facts vastly important modifications, some of which have seemed to contain unrevealed potentialities of disintegration.

11. Detailed differences between Sunnites and Shī'ahs.—A few points in which Sunnites and Shī'ahs differ require to be mentioned.

(*a*) The Sunnites do not accord to 'Alī and his sons the degree of veneration which the feast of Muḥarram implies. This holds true even if the Sunnite Muslims of India do not scruple to participate in the ceremonies of the feast along with their Shī'ah neighbours. (*b*) There is some confusion of the orthodox feast of the 'Ashūra, which falls on the tenth day of Muḥarram, with the Shī'ah feast, which extends from the first to the tenth day of that month. The motive of the respective feasts is, however, entirely different. The 'Ashūra commemorates the completion of creation by the creating of Adam and Eve on the tenth day of Muḥarram, while the tenth day of the Shī'ah ceremonies is simply the crowning day of the whole Muḥarram feast, pointing in particular to the Kerbelā massacre which is supposed to have taken place on that day. (*c*) Generally speaking, the ritual of ordinary worship differs only in the non-essential points. The mode of purification before the *ṣalāt* with the Sunnites includes the washing of the arm upwards to the elbow, while with the Shī'ahs the process is reversed. In the washing of the feet the Sunnite ritual literally washes; the Shī'ah merely rubs or wipes the feet. (*d*) To perform the *ḥajj* by proxy is not permitted by the Sunnīs, while it is not uncommon among their rivals. This permission, if granted, would violate the cardinal Sunnī requirement that a Muslim must perform the *ḥajj* at least once during his lifetime. (*e*) More far-reaching in its social effects is the permission given by the Shī'ah law to contract *mu'ta* marriages. These temporary unions, for a price agreed upon and under conditions of legal contract, are forbidden by the Sunnite codes. (*f*) The Sunnite recognition of the principle of *taqiyah* is limited to cases of extreme personal danger when it is at most permitted to dissemble one's religious convictions in order to preserve one's life. The Shī'ahs do not view *taqiyah* as limited to situations of personal risk, and, where it applies, they do not merely permit a resort to *taqiyah*, but strongly recommend the employment of it. Especially where the interests of religion may be supposed to be in jeopardy, the Muslim of Shī'ah faith will feel the use of *taqiyah* to be a moral obligation.

In all that has been said in the foregoing description of the Sunnite position and practice regard has been had to only those matters which fall within the canon law (*sharī'ah*). It must be kept in mind that in all Muslim countries, whether Sunnite or Shī'ite, there is another authority which has its constituted rights and its organized administration, viz. the customary law (*'urf* or *'adah*). This differs according to the established conventions of different places. It is not a distinctive feature of the Sunnites and need not be more fully treated in this article.

The power of the *'ulamā* among the Sunnīs is

very great, though as a class they are not viewed with the superstitious veneration or even fear which the Persian Shī'ah shows to many of the *mullahs*, to all the *mujtahids*, and to the large class of *sayyids* who are to be found in Shī'ite regions. The influence of the *'ulamā* has been conserved by their learning, which, though narrowly restricted to Muslim theology and law, is often comprehensive within those limits. This learning is constantly on call in the service of the Muslim community. Their influence, moreover, has been much greater than it might have been owing to a certain measure of accommodation which has made large room for such a phenomenon as the Ṣūfī movement—a movement whose elements of wonder and emotionalism have proved to the satisfaction of the masses that Islām was still a medium of supernatural power and divine life. Along with this they have admitted to the curriculum of theological studies in all the leading schools the works of the great mystics, particularly those of the master, al-Ghazālī. The tacit or explicit approval of the cult of saints, endowed as it is by public funds, may be an anomaly, but for the orthodox leaders it also is an instrument of power. More potent than any other factor is the fact that the consensus (*ijmā'*) is realized only through the *'ulamā* and that no cause has been so effective in bringing about change of policy and the initiation of new lines of action as the voice of the *'ulamā* declaring the mind of the universal Muslim community. The *ijmā'* is being prepared by the training which the candidates for the learned calling receive, whether it be in the Azhar University at Cairo, in the schools of Constantinople and India, or in the ancient seats of learning like Bokhāra. It is a long mechanical process aiming at fixing rigidly the positions of traditional orthodoxy in the thoughts and sympathies of the student and cultivating in him a fanatical devotion to the authority of the past, especially of the primitive age of the faith. It is natural that, when his opportunity to lead comes, he should adjust himself as an obedient part of the whole traditional system.

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SUPERNATURALISM.—Supernaturalism is the mental attitude that has the supernatural for its object. The term is used by anthropologists[1] to express the fact that primitive magic and primitive religion alike rest on a belief in supernatural powers. In such a context it is convenient to have a word such as 'supernatural' that may be equated now with 'magical' and now with 'divine.'[2] For the savage respects the human magician 'on account of his continual intercourse with the supernatural world,'[3] and, on the other hand, must be allowed 'to possess a rudimentary notion of certain supernatural beings who may be fittingly called gods, though not in the full sense in which we use the word.'[1] Frazer, indeed, assumes a general tendency among savages to claim 'powers which we should now call supernatural,'[2] on the ground that 'a savage hardly conceives the distinction commonly drawn by more advanced peoples between the natural and the supernatural.'[3] F. B. Jevons, on the other hand, warns us against 'the error of imagining that there was a time when man did not distinguish between the natural and the supernatural. This error may take the form of saying either that to primitive man nothing was supernatural or that everything was supernatural.' He goes on to say:

'Primitive man took to himself the credit of his successful attempts to work the mechanism of nature for his own advantage, but when the machinery did not work he ascribed the fault to some overruling supernatural power.'[4]

The objection of E. Durkheim, that to recognize breaches in a habitual order does not amount to the recognition of breaches in an order conceived as necessary after the manner of modern science,[5] is surely somewhat hypercritical in such a context. An objection of another kind, since it does not dispute the facts, but merely regards convenience of terminology, is that of J. H. Leuba,[6] who in naming the belief in supernatural power would call attention to the power rather than to the supernatural quality attaching to it, and hence would substitute for 'supernaturalism' the term 'dynamism,' originally used by A. van Gennep[7] to describe the 'impersonalist' theory of *mana* as contrasted with the 'personalist' theory of animism. Now there is much to be said for the view that the positive content of supernaturalism receives its fullest conceptual expression in terms of the *mana* type.[8] But the mental attitude in question has its negative side as well as the positive side connoted by *mana*, since it is called forth by the frustration of reasonable expectation; so that, as Jevons says, 'where the natural ended, the supernatural began.'[9] Again, this mental attitude is not so predominantly intellectual that it can be suitably designated by means of any mere concept that it generates. For the rest, anthropological terminology is, happily, in a somewhat fluid condition, and may be varied without impropriety in response to the needs of different theoretical purposes. It will suffice here to give a brief account of the chief aspects of the mental attitude under consideration.

1. Emotional aspect.—The emotional constituents of the magico-religious sentiment have been subjected to psychological analysis with results that show it to be, even in its simplest forms, exceedingly complex. 'Awe' is perhaps the word in our language that expresses its many-sided nature most fully, and awe is defined by W. McDougall as 'a tertiary compound of fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling.'[10] Round the object provided by the supernatural, fear, admiration, and submissiveness in varying degrees are organized into a mood, whether, in addition, that object be on the whole hated or loved, and consequently take rank as a manifestation of evil or of good supernatural power. Thus the sentiment is excited equally by magic and religion, the sorcerer, like the god, being 'surrounded by a halo of mystery and an atmosphere of awe.'[11] To appreciate the

[1] *E.g.*, J. G. Frazer, *GB*, London, 1890, i. 37, [2]1900, i. 137, [3]1911, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 386; R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, do. 1909, p. 11.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 366; cf. p. 374.
[3] *Ib.* p. 357.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 376.
[2] *Ib.* p. 386. [3] *Ib.* p. 51.
[4] *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 181.
[5] *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, p. 36.
[6] *A Psychological Study of Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 84.
[7] *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 17.
[8] See art. MANA.
[9] *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.*, p. 19.
[10] *An Introd. to Social Psychology*[7], London, 1913, p. 305; cf. p. 131.
[11] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 356.

emotional attitude of primitive man towards a universe which, beyond the narrow circle of the daily routine, is almost wholly unknown, yet felt to be pregnant with immeasurable possibilities of weal or woe, one should take stock one by one of the more baffling and startling elements in his experience, as is done, *e.g.*, by W. D. Wallis in his paper 'The Element of Fear [better 'Awe'] in Religion.'[1] Confined by his ignorance to the immediate here and now, the savage attributes mystic powers alike to the stranger at a distance and to those of his own race that are dead and gone. Nor does the familiar present remain unvisited by portents. The sky above him is disturbed by thunderstorm, eclipse, shooting stars, the aurora; earth and sea about him have their haunted pools, their fantastic rocks. Then living nature teems with wonders—trees and herbs, reptiles and fishes, birds and quadrupeds, that look strange or behave unaccountably. Moreover, man is mysterious to himself, with his visions, his seizures, the power of his eye and gesture, his sheer impressiveness, ranging from the majesty of kings to the gruesomeness of witches. For the rest, life is full of accidents and coincidences. Altogether, the savage world provides plenty of scope for that interplay of primary emotions of which awe is the outcome. Be it noted, however, that the essence of supernaturalism does not consist in bare feeling, but attains to expression through every aspect of the mental life at once.[2]

2. Intellectual aspect.—Since supernaturalism has a negative as well as a positive side, embodying a cautious doubt of the unknown combined with an effort to read a meaning into it, primitive thought needs a twofold set of concepts. Negatively the supernatural is *tabu*, positively it is *mana*.[3] Among savages, of course, such notions have not been built up into any systematic theory; nor is it possible to say at what stage of mental evolution they first came into use, though perhaps it would be hard to point to any primitive people that lacks them entirely. Moreover, since the supernatural implies evil power as well as good, ministering to the purposes of the sorcerer no less than to those of the priest, it is to be expected that *mana* will sometimes split up into two notions that stand antithetically for the good and bad kinds of supernatural power.[4] Finally, it cannot be said that rudimentary thought is altogether without an idea corresponding to that of the natural or normal. It seems highly doubtful whether we can credit the savage with a belief in what we call the uniformity of nature, as some have sought to do;[5] indeed, historically, the modern concept of 'nature' would seem to have descended from *mana*, its wonder-working quality having been shed by the way.[6] But in the Polynesian *noa*, the non-sacred, common, or permitted,[7] we have the counterpart, as in the Latin *profanus*, of 'nature' so far as it stands not for mechanism but for routine. We must not, however, look for definiteness in primitive categories, since they are never subjected abstractly and as ideas to reflective examination, but merely embody such more or less arbitrary associations as custom suggests and sanctions.

3. Practical aspect.—Seeing, then, that the savage may be said to live out his ideas rather than to think them out, it is in the sphere of his actual practice as regulated by social use and wont that we are likely to meet with the clearest indications of his mental tendencies. Primitive supernaturalism will declare itself primarily in a group of traditional activities through which the appropriate feelings and thoughts find their satisfaction. The question, then, is how far there is a distinctive province of behaviour corresponding to the interest in the supernatural. Now, there can be no doubt that among some peoples of low culture the cleavage between the secular and the magico-religious sides of the social life is made 'as with a hatchet.' Thus we are told of the Central Australian:

> 'From the moment of his initiation . . . his life is sharply marked out into two parts. He has first of all what we may speak of as the ordinary life, common to all the men and women, and associated with the procuring of food and the performance of corrobborees, the peaceful monotony of this part of his life being broken every now and again by the excitement of a fight. On the other hand, he has what gradually becomes of greater and greater importance to him, and that is the portion of his life devoted to matters of a sacred or secret nature. As he grows older he takes an increasing share in these, until finally this side of his life occupies by far the greater part of his thoughts.'[1]

B. Malinowski, however, referring to this passage, raises a doubt whether such a bipartition of activities is a universal feature of primitive society. He instances Veddas and Melanesians, among whom religious and secular interests and pursuits seem to shade into each other without perceptible break.[2] But, when Durkheim states[3] that 'the division of things into sacred and profane lies at the base of all religious organization,' he can hardly be intending to affirm that a religious organization worthy of the name is to be found among all mankind. It is surely enough if the generalization hold good in the typical case. Moreover, this theory of the 'two worlds' of the sacred and the profane, though convenient in certain contexts—as, *e.g.*, to explain those 'rites of passage' whereby a man during initiation, or a woman at child-birth, enters a condition of *tabu* and passes out again into ordinary life[4]—need not be pressed too hard, seeing that sacredness is to some extent relative, so that, *e.g.*, a man may be *tabu* to strangers without being so to his friends.[5] All that need be assumed here is that certain activities tend to be organized about the interest in the supernatural as embodied in a specific tissue of feelings and beliefs. The magico-religious life is unlimited in its claim on human endeavour, and in its ulterior effects on human welfare may be well-nigh all-pervasive. But the mental attitude that it demands cannot be continuously maintained. Whenever the tension is relaxed, 'nature,' in the shape of the effortless rule of habit, is busy making good the strain.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

R. R. MARETT.

SUPERSTITION.—1. Signification and use of the term.—The word 'superstition' is used both in a concrete and in an abstract sense. We group together as superstitions a number of beliefs, habits, and fancies, tribal and individual, which we regard as not being founded on reasonable conceptions of the world and of human life, necessities, and obligations. The general or abstract term 'superstition' signifies the disposition to attribute occurrences to præternatural or occult influences, and to direct conduct with a view to avoiding mischief or obtaining advantages which such influences are supposed to produce. The precise connexion between the etymology of the word and its ordinary signification is not easy to trace. The prefix *super* seems to imply some excess, and this excess may generally be conceived as an exaggeration of a reasonable belief in some supernatural agents or agencies, with a readiness

[1] *Journ. Rel. Psychol.*, July, 1912, pp. 257-304.
[2] Cf. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1893, p. 453.
[3] Cf. R. R. Marett, 'The *tabu-mana* Formula as a Minimum Definition of Religion,' in *ARW* xii. [1909] 186-194.
[4] For examples see Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*², p. 85 f.
[5] Cf. *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 51, 112, 220; A. O. Lovejoy, *Monist*, xvi. [1906] 381.
[6] Cf. H. Hubert and M. Mauss, in *ASoc* vii. [1904] 72; Durkheim, p. 35.
[7] See E. Tregear, *Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, Wellington, N.Z., 1891, *s.v.*

[1] Spencer-Gillen⁵, p. 33.
[2] *Rep. Brit. Assoc.* 1914, p. 534.
[3] *ASoc* ii. [1899] 19.
[4] Cf. A. van Gennep, *op. cit.*
[5] *Ib.* p. 16.

to accept unverified statements as to spiritual or magical interference in the material world. The origin of the most potent and widely spread superstitions has already been discussed under various headings.[1] It seems therefore more suitable here to consider superstition as an abstract quality, and to regard it in its psychological and historical aspects.

Two points may be noted for the purpose of clearing the ground: (1) the intensely subjective way in which the word is commonly used. No man is ready to acknowledge himself as superstitious, but almost every one is ready to recognize superstition in another. We find that men of a particular race, culture, and tone of mind brand as superstitious the religious or ceremonial observances of an alien people, while charging such people with incredulity if they are unready to receive new doctrines equally superstitious from their own standpoint. 'What is religion to you is superstition to me,' and *vice versa*, is a tacit assumption against which we must be on our guard. (2) Superstition need not be in any way connected with mysticism (*q.v.*). True, the mystic who regards all things and persons as owing what reality they have to a divine and supernatural life or element is likely to have a strong desire to find traces of the spiritual and eternal manifested in or through the form of the material and temporal. But the reasonable mystic, by very reason of his belief in the spiritual nature of ultimate reality, is the less liable to give credence to fanciful and grotesque intimations from a spirit world. Plato, the greatest of mystics, was eminently sane and reasonable. If the same cannot be said of all the Neo-Platonists, the reason must be that some of them were less mystical because more material than he.[2] Some confusion, however, may arise from the circumstance that many minds (especially of a saintly or of a poetic order) attach a symbolic meaning to certain material phenomena or ceremonial acts without any excessive regard for their intrinsic value. Hence we have the interesting fact that, in the higher religions of an advanced race, we may have what seems to be identity in attachment to doctrine and ritual with far-reaching differences in fundamental religious conceptions. Hence the warnings of religious teachers, on the one hand against the sudden demolition of 'superstitions' which have, for the uneducated, been valuable from their association with religious thought and feeling, and on the other against the confusion of symbol and reality, which tends to materialize and crystallize popular religion.

The superstitious mind, then, is one that is not educated to discern the character of evidence, or that has not patience to suspend judgment in the presence of unfamiliar phenomena. If it is objected that some very powerful and (in some directions) well trained intellects have coincided with a superstitious bias, these exceptions would seem due to a want of mental balance.

2. Historical aspects.—Turning from the individual to society and to historical progress, we may say that, roughly speaking, superstition declines as the view of the universe becomes more scientific. True, the birth of many—perhaps of all—sciences is attended by crude hypotheses which lend themselves to strange vagaries of thought. This is specially evident in the pseudo-science of alchemy, whence emerged the science of chemistry.[3] Even the earliest efforts of Ionic thought were not without such vagaries, yet the Greek philosophers had in them the root of the matter—a whole-hearted desire after truth. Therefore they progressed, and their progress belonged to the Western world.

When, in May, 585 B.C., in the midst of a battle between Lydians and Medes, there occurred 'the first eclipse of which European science foretold when it should betide,' the date was to have 'a deeper interest for Europe than the warfare. . . . Thales of Miletus, the father of Greek, and thereby of European, philosophy and science, had studied astronomy in Egypt; and he was able to warn the Ionians that before such a year had passed—his lore could not tell the day or the hour—the sun would be darkened.'[4]

This does not, of course, imply that the Greeks had already become, or were ever to become, what we should call a scientific people. But to bring so uncanny an occurrence as a darkening of the sun within the range of calculable events was to cut the ground beneath many superstitions. Yet Greek religion and Greek life abounded with superstitions. The religion of the Olympians was bound up with beliefs about the gods which Plato would have excluded from his ideal city, and the old-world ritual which survived in popular ceremonies was yet more favourable to unreasonable fancies and actions. The Athenians were doubtless the most intellectual of the Greeks, yet their prosecutions for impiety show both a low standard of religious liberty and a high standard (if the expression may be used) of respect for ancestral religion. Anaxagoras, Pericles, Euripides, above all Socrates, suffered at the hands of their countrymen. True, their cause prevailed in so far that in the next century speculation was more free and scepticism had scope; and, after all, the moderation centred in the maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν seems to have checked any tendency to persecution like that of the Middle Ages and later. Nicias was, in spite of his popularity, blamed by posterity for delaying the retreat of the Athenians before Syracuse on account of an eclipse of the moon. But the point against him, most probably, was not that he was too ill-educated to know the cause of lunar eclipses (since most Athenians would then have been in his company), but that he preferred the almost certain event of annihilation for his army to the exceedingly doubtful risk of supernatural punishment if he neglected the state of the heavens.

Yet, by a kind of paradox, scepticism seems to have overshot the mark, and, by denying the possibility of all certainty, to have opened the way, for people who *must* believe something, to all manner of superstitious habits and practices.[1] The interchange of religious ideas, the foundation and migration of religious societies, and the general disintegration which followed the conquests of Alexander and the advance of Rome meant, to many individuals in many places, a remarkable development and enlightenment of the religious consciousness; but it also meant a recrudescence of Oriental and barbarous superstition. This is found even among the late philosophical sects, notably the Neo-Pythagorean.[2]

As might naturally be expected, in societies comprising men of culture considerably above the rank and file of their contemporaries, we have, from the ancient pagan world, emphatic protests against the mischief wrought by superstition. Chief among these is the great poem of Lucretius (*q.v.*), who sees in superstition, or in popular religion, the most potent source of human ill. The same missionary spirit pervades the treatise of Plutarch περὶ Δεισιδαιμονίας, in which he holds up to contempt the figure of the man who lives in perpetual fear of having, by some trivial action, offended supernatural powers. There is, however, this great difference between the two: that, whereas Lucretius would dispense with the gods altogether, Plutarch (*q.v.*) holds to a faith in the divine beneficence and to the propriety of observing ancestral rites. The most eloquent part of his essay is that in which he shows the absurdity of stigmatizing as blasphemous those who deny the existence of the gods, while tolerating those who spread evil notions as to their malignity and vindictiveness. The same contrast may be noticed in assailants of superstition at various periods: the uncompromising enthusiast would sweep away all religious beliefs and institutions, though he may, like Lucretius, entertain conceptions of the universe which may fairly be regarded as religious. The conservative reformer, however anxious to remove causes of distress and aberration due to mistaken theology, may cling to old habits of piety, and reinterpret ancient traditions in accordance with liberty of thought.

3. Superstition and Aberglaube.—It may be noted that the kinds of superstition opposed by moral reformers are generally those which arise from baseless terrors. There are, of course, other manifestations of the superstitious spirit of a comparatively innocuous kind, such as belief in fairies, superstitions concerning the weather, lucky and unlucky days, and the like. And there is a mass of what may be regarded as superstition about the accretions to almost every system of positive religion, which on the one hand changes it very

[1] See esp. artt. MAGIC, CHARMS AND AMULETS, DREAMS AND SLEEP, EVIL EYE, MYTHOLOGY, PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

[2] See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

[3] See M. M. Pattison Muir, *The Story of Alchemy and the Beginnings of Chemistry*, London, 1902, also artt. ALCHEMY.

[4] J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of Greece*, London, 1900, ch. vi., sect. 1.

[1] This 'overshooting of the mark' by the sceptics is suggested by E. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, London, 1913.

[2] See art. NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM.

conspicuously from its original form, and on the other hand may bring it within the reach of minds unaccustomed to deal with abstract ideas. These accretions are sometimes, in order to avoid the unpleasant connotation of 'superstition,' called by the German name of *Aberglaube*. They consist both of ritual and of dogma, and are hardly ever entirely to be distinguished from the necessary appurtenances of the religion with which they are associated.

The Middle Ages are generally regarded as pre-eminently a time of superstition. The judgment is probably justifiable, though there were as many hard-headed and constructive thinkers at most epochs of the Middle Ages as there have been earlier or later. But apart from the mixture of races and consequent multiplication of superstitions in the declining Empire, with the deficiency of mental culture in the leaders of the barbarian races, there was a great force arising to control speculation—that of ecclesiastical authority. This, however, must be considered on two sides. The worst kinds of superstitions, or at least the most conspicuous kinds, especially in Eastern Europe, were distinctly discouraged by the Church—soothsaying, necromancy, charms, and the like. And there can be little doubt that many of the heresies crushed out by the mediæval Church were accompanied by superstitious vagaries. Still, the fact is patent that the suppression of free thought, especially as directed to Church doctrine and ritual, must have tended to the growth of δεισιδαιμονία in Plutarch's sense. Of course, when we speak of the suppression of free thought, we do not necessarily mean that a very large number of persons suffered from not being allowed to think freely. Probably the number who thus suffered was comparatively very small. But many more must have lived in perpetual fear of the unseen. The terrors of the Judgment Day and of the world to come are very familiar objects of mediæval art, and it is difficult for us to see how far they were practically mitigated by the harmonious setting forth of the more comforting and spiritual elements in Christianity, with which they were, perhaps not quite consistently, associated.

The Renaissance and the Reformation are commonly regarded as having given the death-blow to superstition—so far, at least, as their influence extended. It is certain, however, that the indiscriminate cult of antiquity, which in some sections of society accompanied the Renaissance, contained or encouraged superstitious fancies and observances of a novel kind. And as to the Reformation even in Protestant countries, practically a good deal of *Aberglaube* formed part of the newly established doctrines and usages, and the sway of spiritual authority was by no means removed. The great movement towards mental and spiritual emancipation is generally taken as beginning in the 18th century.[1] It is to be noted that the battle waged on behalf of human reason was not confined to the world of thought and opinion. Political institutions, social divisions, industrial methods, and moral conventions were to be submitted to the test of right reason, and, if they failed, to be extirpated forthwith. The bitterness with which the contest was carried on, and which reached its culminating point in the excesses of the French Revolution, was partly due to the belief that superstitious practices had been maintained chiefly by those who profited by them—from the medicine-men of a savage tribe to the officers of an established church or a hereditary monarchy. Although there is, of course, some ground for such a supposition, as a partial explanation of the evil in question, its wholesale acceptance shows a very deficient comprehension of human nature. Without intelligible reasons, man is always desirous of knowing more than he can know about the spiritual world, and he will more readily submit to authority which has a traditional, if not actually a divine, sanction. And the exact nature of the government and institutions which right reason would commend has, of course, been very differently conceived by socialists or revolutionists of various types. Still, the general recognition that all beliefs and practices ought to have some rational justification was a great point gradually gained. It does not, of course, imply that nothing should be believed without strict logical proof, or that no institution should be maintained that does not evidently serve some useful object. But it does embody the Stoic principle that life should be according to nature and according to reason, and thus it tends to eliminate most of what is injurious either in superstitions with regard to religion or in tame acquiescence in existing governments.[1]

[1] See artt. ENLIGHTENMENT, ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.

4. Influence of education.—The great agency making for the reduction of superstition during this century and the last is popular education. True, our elementary education can hardly as yet be called scientific, and what passes for scientific education may, after all, be superficial and narrow. But all sound teaching, at the present day, may be said to produce something like a scientific view of man and his environment—a view perfectly compatible with belief in the spiritual significance of life and even in a possible communion with non-material beings, but inconsistent with fanciful and trivial interpretations of natural phenomena as determined by præternatural agency.

If there should ever be a recrudescence of superstition in this generation or the next, it would probably be due, not to a defect in the scientific faculty, but to the expectations lately raised within the bounds of scientific investigation. Experts in psychology, especially those who have devoted themselves to what is technically called psychical research (*q.v.*), have, to many sane and scientific minds, proved the possibility of telepathy, thought-transference, and other processes which, fifty years ago, would certainly have been set down as superstitious. More than this, some persons of scientific mind and education believe that they have actually established and conducted a means of communication between living and dead.[2] When the persons engaged in these investigations are careful and scientific, we are inclined to accept their evidence, as we should on any other point of expert investigation. But in this field the 'media' used are of such uncertain character, the conditions and possibilities of communication so deeply veiled in obscurity, the desire to attain to fellowship with the departed so intense, that it is as well to approach all such problems with the most suspicious caution. There may be, as has often been said, a 'superstitious fear of superstition.' But, while suspending judgment on the result of the inquiries of experts, the non-expert may be in danger of falling into a superstitious habit of mind such as tends to upset entirely the mental balance.

LITERATURE.—For primitive superstitions see the works mentioned in the artt. here cited, esp. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], London, 12 vols., 1911-15; E. B. Tylor, *PC*[4], 2 vols., do. 1903. For the philosophy and history of the question see the various histories of philosophy and W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1887; A. W. Benn, *Hist. of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols., do. 1906; J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, do. 1907; Plutarch, *Moralia*, including *de Superstitione*, tr. into very vigorous English by Philemon Holland, do. 1603; Matthew Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, do. 1873, chs. on '*Aberglaube* invading' and '*Aberglaube* re-invading.'

ALICE GARDNER.

[1] See art. RATIONALISM. [2] See art. SPIRITISM.

SUPRALAPSARIANISM.—The term supralapsarianism is used in Calvinistic theology, in contrast with sub- or infra-lapsarianism, to denote a view of the divine decrees in which, for the manifestation of His glory, God is held to destine a certain portion of mankind to eternal life, and another portion to destruction, regarding both simply as creatures, and antecedently to any consideration of the Fall and sin. It is not meant that this purpose is actually carried out without regard to character or condition; but, in the order of decrees, it is first determined who are to be embraced in the one class, and who in the other; then the means are appointed—including creation, the Fall, sin, redemption—by which the end in each case is to be attained. So harsh a view of the divine procedure has always been in the highest degree repellent to Christian minds; accordingly, the great majority of Calvinists have shrunk from it, and contented themselves with the milder sublapsarian view, which affirms an election of God from the mass of mankind, regarded as already fallen.

On its historical side, the question is raised whether Calvin himself is to be classed as a supralapsarian or a sublapsarian. Some incline to the former view, but the truth seems to be that, when Calvin wrote, the question had not distinctly emerged, and the emphasis which he continually lays on election as a choice of some from a sinful mass, and on reprobation as grounded on the sinner's own evil, fairly warrants the more usual opinion that his doctrine inclined more to sublapsarianism.[1] On the other hand, Beza, Calvin's successor, Gomar, the colleague and opponent of Arminius in Holland, Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, and a few others,[2] were conspicuous for their advocacy of supralapsarianism; and the Remonstrants, in the Arminian controversy, naturally sought to fasten this view on all Calvinists. It is really, however, an extreme opinion, and the bulk of Calvinists, as already said, have wisely kept themselves aloof from it. Turretin, *e.g.*, ably states and defends the sublapsarian position in his *Institutio*.[3] The Synod of Dort, in its decision, framed its canons on sublapsarian lines.[4] The *Westminster Confession* leans, in certain of its clauses, to the stronger view of Archbishop Ussher (author of the Irish Articles), and of a few members of the Assembly, but the tone of the debates in that body sufficiently shows that the prevailing opinion was sublapsarian, and the Confessional statement, taken as a whole, is of this character. The stronger view has, indeed, no symbolical sanction.

Cunningham, in his discussion of the subject,[5] claims that the controversy is one 'of no great intrinsic importance,' but this can hardly be allowed.

'A doctrine of this kind, which bids us think of beings not yet conceived of as even created (therefore only as *possibles*)—not to say as sinful—set apart for eternal blessedness or misery, and of the fall and redemption as simply means for effecting that purpose, is one which no plea of logical consistency will ever get the human mind to accept, and which is bound to provoke revolt against the whole system with which it is associated.'[6]

It cannot even be conceded, though it has often been contended, that this *is* the most logical form of the predestinarian doctrine. The end, it is argued, comes necessarily first in order of thought; then the means are devised which are to accomplish it. In the case of moral destiny, we are disposed to say, this is the precise inversion of the fact. There can be no legitimate consigning of a moral being to wrath, save as he is in some way viewed as deserving of that wrath; even in order of thought, therefore, the consideration of moral state must precede the sentence of rejection. If the reply is made that the sin itself is viewed in Calvinism as foreordained, this is doubtless true, but only in the sense in which every event in life is foreordained, viz. by God's decreeing to admit it into His providential plan and to overrule it for the ends of His wisdom. It is a totally different thing to affirm that sin is ordained as a means to the destruction of a being already foreordained to wrath prior to consideration of his sin.

It need only be added that the whole subject assumes a different aspect when fuller justice is done to the Scriptural idea of election as aiming, not at exclusion, but at subsequent wider inclusion.[1]

LITERATURE.—P. Schaff, *A Hist. of the Creeds of Christendom*, London, 1877, pp. 453-455; W. Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1862; C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, London and Edinburgh, 1872-73, ii. 316-320.

JAMES ORR.

[1] See art. CALVINISM.
[2] See Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, p. 366 f.
[3] Loc. iv. qu. ix.
[4] Cf. Schaff, *Hist. of the Creeds*, i. 455.
[5] *Hist. Theology*, Edinburgh, 1862, ii. 435, *Reformers and Theol. of Reformation*, p. 358.
[6] Orr, *The Progress of Dogma*, London, 1901, p. 296.

[1] See artt. CALVINISM, ELECTION, PREDESTINATION.

SURINAM.—See GUIANA.

SURVIVALS.—See RELIGION, vol. x. p. 664, § 4.

ŚVETĀMBARAS.—1. **Origin and history.**—'We,' said a Śvetāmbara once to the present writer, 'are the Catholics amongst the Jains; the Digambaras represent the Puritans'; and that does roughly sum up the difference between the two great sects of the Jains.[2]

Even during the lifetime of Mahāvīra[3] two parties probably existed, for the great Jain hero seems to have formed his community by uniting two different orders of mendicants, the Sthavira kalpa and the Jina kalpa. The Sthavira kalpa wore clothes, but one section of the Jina kalpa did not, going about like Mahāvīra himself, clad only in the four quarters of the sky. This outward and visible difference was symbolic of the differing types of men in the community, and only a strong statesman could have held the two parties together; under any great strain the cleavage was bound to become permanent.

According to the Sthānakavāsī Śvetāmbara tradition, the first crisis arose through a great famine that occurred in the reign of Chandragupta (? 310 B.C.), when 12,000 Jain monks went to S. India under Bhadrabāhu in search of food. These, being the young and vigorous members of the order, were able to carry out their rule in its entirety and so went unclad, whilst the other members of the community, who remained at home under Sthūlabhadra, amounting also, the legend says, to 12,000, were allowed (owing perhaps to age and infirmity) to wear clothes, no matter to which of the two parties they had originally belonged. When Bhadrabāhu returned home after the famine, although he became once more head of an undivided community, he was never able to insist on nakedness as a rule of even a section of the community. The second cause of schism also arose during this famine—at least according to the Sthānakavāsī Śvetāmbara tradition; for it was then, during his leader Bhadrabāhu's absence, that the second in command, Sthūlabhadra, called a council at Pāṭaliputra to collect the sacred books. The council were able to produce only eleven *Aṅga*, but Sthūlabhadra himself supplied the missing twelfth *Aṅga*. Bhadrabāhu on his return was annoyed to find that this council had been held in his absence, and not unnaturally, though irritably, declared that the twelfth *Aṅga* was hopelessly lost. It only remained now for a leader to be found for the malcontents to hive off, and (if the legend be true) irritability had much to do with that leader's decisive action. About forty years after the great famine (according to Tapāgachchha Śvetāmbara tradition, about A.D. 142; according to Sthānakavāsī, A.D. 83; and according to Hoernle, A.D. 79 or 80) the reins of government fell into the weaker hands of a man called Vajrasena, and the community finally divided. The Śvetāmbara quote

[2] See artt. DIGAMBARAS, JAINISM.
[3] See art. ĀJĪVIKAS, § 2 f.

the following legend to account for the actual cleavage:

A monk named Śivabhūti had been given a most beautiful blanket by the king in whose service he had been at the time of his initiation. His spiritual preceptor warned him that it was becoming a snare to him and advised him to give it away; this he refused to do, so his preceptor took the extreme step of tearing up the blanket in its owner's absence. Śivabhūti, when he discovered what had happened, was so angry that he declared that, if he could not have the one possession which he valued, he would keep nothing at all, but would wander in entire nakedness like the Lord Mahāvīra himself; and he then and there started a new sect, that of the naked Digambara.

This very human legend which the Śvetāmbara (the 'White-clothed') tell of their unclothed rivals not only accounts for their nakedness, but also goes on to explain another difference between the two sects; for, when Śivabhūti's sister wanted to join his order, seeing that it was impracticable for a woman to go about nude, he roundly told her that it was impossible for a woman to become a nun, or to obtain *mokṣa* (*q.v.*) without rebirth as a man, and thus laid down for all time a distinctive tenet of the Digambara. Important as these legends are, it must be remembered that they are quoted only as illustrative of the Jain point of view, for their confirmation is sadly to seek, and the legends connecting Chandragupta with the faith are essentially open to suspicion.

2. Distinctive tenets and practices.—We are on firmer ground when we notice the main differences between the two sects at the present day. We are already prepared for the fact that the Śvetāmbara list of sacred books is not accepted by the Digambara, and that, since they hold that no woman can attain *mokṣa*, the Digambara will not admit the Śvetāmbara tradition that Mallinātha (the nineteenth *tīrthaṅkara*) was a woman. But the two sects differ very considerably about the life-story of Mahāvīra.

The Śvetāmbara say that their great saint married and enjoyed life to the full before entering an order, and that, even when he at last decided to do so, he waited till his parents' death, and until he had gained his brother's consent, lest he should grieve any one before receiving initiation, which he obtained in his thirtieth year. The more austere Digambara tradition, however, is that their founder never married; and, having no hesitation about hurting any one's feelings, renounced the world at the mature age of eight. Even the prenatal stories differ, for the Śvetāmbara believe that Mahāvīra's mother had fourteen wonderful dreams; the Digambara say that she had sixteen; while the legend of the removal of the embryo of Mahāvīra from Devānandā to Triśalā is a Śvetāmbara one.

The lists of the heads of the community since Śivabhūti of course differ also. The Śvetāmbara generally arrange their philosophy in nine categories; the Digambara arrange very much the same philosophy under seven heads. One point of divergence on which they lay great stress is that, according to the Śvetāmbara, a *tīrthaṅkara* needs food to support him until he dies; while the Digambara believe that, once a *tīrthaṅkara* has attained omniscience, he has no further need of meals.

There are also differences in actual practice. A Śvetāmbara ascetic may keep a loin-cloth, a shoulder-cloth, and a blanket to wear. Indeed, including these and his brush, mouth-cloth, and wooden vessels, he is allowed to retain fourteen possessions in this world, whereas a Digambara is absolutely nude and, though provided with a brush and peacock's feathers, has to live entirely in the jungle. The Śvetāmbara laymen complain that their ascetics interfere too much in their conferences; this complaint is, of course, never brought against a Digambara ascetic, whose lack of clothing interns him for life in the wilderness.

There are also different rules about begging for the ascetics of the two orders, and the Digambara ascetics have no *upāsarā*. Again, the Śvetāmbara idols have glass eyes inserted in the marble, wear a loin-cloth, and are bedecked with jewels, whereas the austere Digambara idols are nude and are represented as being dead to the world, with eyes cast down. There is naturally therefore a difference in the installation ceremonies of their idols. The ordinary worship differs also. The Śvetāmbara, when performing the eightfold worship, offer flowers and fresh fruit to their idols, and so on great festivals do the Visapanthī Digambara; but the Terāpanthī Digambara never offer flowers or fresh fruit; in their stead they use cloves, dry coco-nut, sugar, and rice.[1]

There is another very interesting difference. A Digambara Jain has no private idol in his own house, but, if a Śvetāmbara is a wealthy man and lives far from a temple, he may have his own private chapel. This chapel is separate from the house and can be entered only by persons in a state of ceremonial purity. In the chapel, if he can afford it, he may have a *pratīmā* (an image of any one of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkara* that an astrologer selects for him), or he may have a *siddha chakra* (a tray on which are depicted the leading points of the Jain faith).[1] The householder offers the eightfold worship to the *pratīmā*, but only washes and wipes the *siddha chakra* and marks it with sandalwood paste. An instructed Śvetāmbara would never ask a boon even of the idol in his own house: he would only stir himself up to future efforts by meditating on it. But if, as often happens, an uninstructed Śvetāmbara does ask a gift, his prayer would be answered not by the *tīrthaṅkara* (who as a matter of fact does not even hear it) but by the *yakṣa* in attendance on the *tīrthaṅkara*.

3. Śvetāmbara sects.—The main division of Śvetāmbara Jains is into Sthānakavāsī and Derāvāsī. The Sthānakavāsī are a non-idol-worshipping sect, which arose about A.D. 1474.[2] Excepting on the crucial point of idol-worship, they do not differ much from other Śvetāmbara Jains.

At the present time the chief sects among idol-worshipping (Derāvāsī) Śvetāmbara are the Tapāgachchha (whose ascetics use red alms-bowls, and whose laymen in their devotions first confess their sins of walking and later their sins of trading), the Kharataragachchha (whose ascetics use black alms-bowls, and whose laity first confess their sins of trading and later their sins of walking), and the Añchalagachchha and the Pāyachandagachchha, whose divergences are very slight.

It must be remembered that these are only spiritual distinctions and do not interfere with the freedom of marriage between different sects. The chief castes among the Jains are Osavāla, Poravāḍa, Śrīmālī and Śrī Śrīmāla, which are each divided into two sections, Dasā and Vīsā. It is impossible for members of these different castes to intermarry: thus an Osavāla Kharatara could marry an Osavāla Sthānakavāsī, for, though the sect differs, the caste is the same, but a Dasā Osavāla could never marry a Vīsā Osavāla, and still less could any Poravāḍa marry any Osavāla. It is interesting to notice, however, that any Jain could dine with any other Jain, Śvetāmbara or Digambara, whether Osavāla or Śrīmālī; but they would not interdine with any Brāhman convert to Jainism.

LITERATURE.—Through the kindness of Jain friends the writer was given an opportunity of translating this art. to the leading Tapāgachchha Śvetāmbara Sādhu in Rājkot in his *upāśro*, when the principal Sthānakavāsī Jain *paṇḍits* were also present; the art. has thus had the advantage of criticisms and suggestions from both parties at first hand. See also A. F. R. Hoernle, *Annual Address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, in *JASB*, Calcutta, 1898; Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910, and *The Heart of Jainism*, do. 1915.

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[1] Cf. art. WORSHIP (Jain).
[2] Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, p. 87.

SWAHILIS.—See ZANZIBAR.

SWAN-MAIDENS.—The beautiful and poetic myth of swan-maidens is of early origin and, in varying forms, of very wide diffusion. The central idea of the myth is that certain beings, half-mortal, half-supernatural, have the power of metamorphosis into bird-form; connected with this are two secondary ideas: (1) that this power is dependent on the possession of a magic attribute, which was generally a bodily covering, such as a feather coat, robe, or veil, but sometimes merely a ring or chain; (2) that either this being, when in human form, or her captor is subject to a tabu of some kind. There are so many variations on these themes that it is impossible to do more than refer briefly to some of the most significant versions.

1. In Oriental folk-lore. — Oriental folk-lore furnishes many instances of bird-maiden stories. In Indian tradition we find the very early myth of Urvaṣī embedded like a jewel in the dull ritual of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*.

The *apsara*, or nymph, Urvaṣī loves one of the lunar race of kings, Purūravas; in wedding him she stipulates that she must never look upon him naked. By a trick played by the *gandharvas*, supernatural beings who desire the return of their former playmate, the promise is broken, and Urvaṣī vanishes. Purūravas, seeking her, finds her and her companions swimming on a lotus-lake in the shape of water-birds. They 'appear to him,' *i.e.* assume human form, but in response to his pleading Urvaṣī replies: 'I have passed away like the first of dawns. . . . I am like the wind, difficult to catch.'[1] Finally, however, she relents, and the couple are re-united.

In the *Vikramurvaṣī* of the poet Kālidāsa, a drama based upon this story, the bird-myth has almost disappeared, except for Urvaṣī's power of flying and for the constant references to swans throughout act iv. Her change into human form depends merely upon the laying aside of a veil, in itself probably a stage convention for invisibility; the marital tabu, which Lang[2] characterizes as a relic of 'a traditional Aryan law of nuptial etiquette,' assumes a quite different form.[3]

The myth re-appears in one of the finest tales of the *Thousand and One Nights*, that of Hasan of Bassorah.

Hasan is enjoying the hospitality of a family of princesses; when obliged to leave him, they enjoin him not to open a certain door. He disobeys, and finds a fair pavilion and a bathing-pool, to which come flying from the desert ten birds, one among which was pre-eminent for beauty. Each bird, as it alighted, 'rent open its neck-skin with its claws, and issued out of it, and lo, it was but a garment of feathers.' After their departure Hasan, who has become deeply enamoured of the fairest bird-maiden, confesses his disobedience to his hostess, and is told that this damsel is 'the daughter of the sovran of the Jans. He hath an army of women, smiters with swords, and lungers with lances, . . . and the plumed skins wherewith they fly are the handiwork of enchanters.' Hasan is advised to steal the feather dress and never again to let it come into the owner's hands; he does so, but after three years the wife by a ruse secures the dress, buttons it on, and flies away. Hasan tracks his wife to the islands of Wāk-Wāk, inhabited by the warrior women, and recovers her.[4]

The story of Janshāh[5] is a slighter tale that begins similarly; but the bird-maidens are only three in number, and are 'as doves, eagle-sized.' The husband's device to secure the feather coat is to place it in a chest, leaden-bound, which is built into the foundations of the palace; but in vain, for the lady traces it by scent and digs it out.[6]

The Wāk-Wāk islands of the former tale have been identified with various Melanesian islands;[7] it is not surprising, therefore, to find the tale of Hasan re-appearing in the Celebes in a modern form, which Tylor quotes in connexion with the heaven-plant myth.[1] Tatar versions of the myth are signalized as being the only ones to represent the bird-maiden as a malignant being, half-vampire, half-fury;[2] in the Tatar poem quoted by J. G. Frazer[3] to illustrate the external soul belief, the hero wrestles with the evil swan-woman for 'moons and years.'

2. In classical tradition. — Classical tradition does not seem to have preserved any swan-maiden tale in a complete form, but that the main idea was a familiar one is evident from the Cycnus myths, the bird-transformation of the comrades of Diomedes, the story of Leda, and the symbolic connexion of swans with Apollo, with the Muses, and with Aphrodite.[4] Modern Greek folk-lore represents the Nereids as flying maidens, similar in many points to swan-maidens.[5]

3. Slavic.—Slavic folk-lore bears frequent testimony to the myth. The South Slavs were naturally more influenced by late Greek and by Oriental tradition, and the Bulgarian *samodivas*, and the Serbian *vilas*, like the Greek Nereids, resemble the swan-maidens; *e.g.*, the *vilas* are associated with water and have the power of flying.[6]

The Polish fairy-tale of the prince and the twelve geese-princesses shows that the myth in its simplest form was known to the Western Slavs.[7] The most important Russian example is the tale of 'Sweet Mikâllo Ivânovitch the Rover' and Mârya the white swan; this begins in fairly conventional style, although without the feather dress, but later it diverges considerably, for Mârya dies, is magically revived, and finally forsakes her husband for another love.[8]

4. Celtic.—Old Celtic tradition has two beautiful and elaborate swan-maiden tales, as well as an episode in the story of Etain, wife of Eochaid, who is carried off by the hero-god Mider in the form of a swan.[9]

The story of the 'Children of Lêr,' one of 'the three most sorrowful tales of Erinn,' is an example, with Christian 'overlay,' of that variant of the myth in which the swan shape is enforced by malignant magic. The four royal children, metamorphosed for 900 years, retain their powers of human reasoning and speech, and have the gift of singing 'plaintive music at which the men of the world would sleep, and there shall be no music of the world its equal.'[10]

This power of song is turned to account in the Christian episode which concludes the tale.[11] 'The Dream of Oengus' conforms more closely to the regular swan-maiden type, so much so that J. A. MacCulloch[12] dismisses it as of no mythological or religious value; its artistic value, however, is very great.

The god Oengus is smitten with love for a dream-maiden, the original of whom proves to be Caer, a princess who spends every alternate year in the form of a swan. Oengus, having once seen her in mortal form, succeeds in discerning her in swan-guise from among her 150 companions 'with their silvery chains and golden caps around their heads.' He woos and wins her, and flies off with her, himself also metamorphosed, and their singing is of such beauty as to lull to sleep all its hearers for three days and three nights.[13]

5. Teutonic.—The Teutonic races bear the distinction of having developed the swan-maiden myth most elaborately, and of having enriched it by connecting it with other supernatural ideas. Traces of the symbolic importance of swans are found in the primitive myths of the life and death

[1] This formula, 'difficult to catch,' recurs in the Welsh tale of the Van Pool, quoted by Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, p. 275 ff.

[2] *Custom and Myth*, p. 76.

[3] Cf. *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, xi. v. 1, tr. J. Eggeling, *SBE* xliv. [1900] 68-74; *Vikramurvaṣī*, tr. E. B. Cowell, Hertford, 1851.

[4] R. F. Burton, *A Plain and Literal Translation of the Arabian Nights*, Benares, 1885, viii. 7-143.

[5] *Ib.* v. 329-381.

[6] Contrast with this Hartland's idea (p. 308) that the swan-maiden must always employ an intermediary to obtain her robe.

[7] E. W. Lane, *The Thousand and One Nights*, London, 1838-41, iii. 523, note 32.

[1] *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*[2], London, 1878, p. 355 f.

[2] A. Schiefner, *Heldensagen der minussinischen Tataren*, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 201.

[3] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 144.

[4] W. Smith, *Classical Dictionary*, *s.vv.* 'Cycnus,' 'Diomedes'; Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*[2], pp. 569-572.

[5] B. Schmidt, *Griechische Märchen*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 133.

[6] F. S. Krauss, *Tausend Sagen und Märchen der Südslaven*, i., Leipzig, 1914, *passim*.

[7] A. H. Wratislaw, *Sixty Folk-tales from exclusively Slavonic Sources*, London, 1889, p. 111 f.

[8] Isabel F. Hapgood, *The Epic Songs of Russia*, New York and London, 1886, pp. 214-231.

[9] H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Irish Mythological Cycle*, Dublin, 1903, p. 182.

[10] With this sleep-bringing power may be compared the trolls' swans that sing the enchanted prince asleep in the Icelandic fairy tale (J. C. Poestion, *Isländische Märchen*, Vienna, 1884, no. vii. pp. 49-54).

[11] *Atlantis*, iv. [1863] 113 ff., tr. E. O'Curry.

[12] *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 82

[13] *RCel* iii. [1876-78] 347 ff., tr. Edward Müller.

both of the world and of individuals; thus the two swans, the progenitors of all the swan-kind, that float on the Urtharbrunnr of the old Norse cosmogony,[1] may be contrasted with the swan that lived, according to Finnish myth, on the river of Tuoni or Death.[2] In later folk-tale we find a swan living on a hidden lake, which maintains the world in equipoise by carrying a ring in its beak; when it drops it, the end of the world will come.[3] Popular saying still remembers the bird as one of omen and augury;[4] in Rügen, swans, not storks, are the bringers of new-born children,[5] while, on the other hand, the sight of a swan in flight may betoken death,[6] and swans are often leaders of the spirit-host.[7] The ideas of animal shape-changing and of the external soul favoured the development of the swan-maiden myth in folk-lore. The Scandinavian North, as one of the chief haunts in Europe of the wild swan, showed itself especially alive to the beauty and significance inherent in the myth; Grimm,[8] influenced perhaps by the legends of the 'goose-footed woman,' 'la reine pédauque,' and 'Berthe aux grands pieds,' thinks that the goose supplanted the swan in legend, but this seems hardly proved. The power of flying and the possession of a feather coat were attributes of many gods in the Norse pantheon. The swan-maiden of the Scandinavians appears to have been merged into the Norns on the one hand and the Valkyries on the other, who themselves often have traits in common. The connexion of swans with augury and with the Urtharbrunnr, the home of the Norns, prepares us for the former aspect; the power of 'riding through the air' possessed by the Valkyries prepares us for the latter; and we have already seen the bird-maidens as warrior-maidens in the story of Hasan of Bassorah.

The swan-maidens of the *Nibelungenlied* are Norns also; as swan-maidens they appear to Hagene 'like birds,' and they fall into his power when he takes their garments, but they are also 'wise women,' and one gives him prophetic warning.[9] The maidens of the *Völundarkvitha*[10] are conventional swan-maidens with their 'swan-coats,' but they are also Valkyries, for they appear helmeted. Again, the hero Helgi is helped in battle by Kára, a rebirth of the Valkyrie Svava, who hovers singing above him.[11] Fridlevus II., king of Denmark, is given helpful warning before a battle by the song of three swans.[12] After this it is not surprising to find also traces of a connexion between swan-maidens and the *fylgja*, or female guardian-spirit; thus the *fylgja* of a beautiful woman appears as a swan.[13]

6. The swan-knight.—The swan-knight seems to have been monopolized and localized by Teutonic mythology, although there are traces of the idea in classical legend, as in the Cycnus myth already mentioned,[14] and although the Teutonic myth appears to have fused with Celtic Arthurian legend. The popularity of the charming tale of Helyas, knight of the swan, and supposed ancestor of Godfrey of Bouillon, is attested by the numerous versions of it in various languages.

In the popular German fairy-tale the enchanted brothers owe their restoration to human form, not to the prowess of their brother, as in Helyas, but to the devotion of a sister. Of the other swan-knights of Brabant, the link with the Graal legends has brought Lohengrin, son of Parsival, most into prominence and popularity. The fact that the swan-hero arrives from an unknown land in a skiff, and departs in the same way, has led Grimm[1] to trace the beginning of the Teutonic swan-knight myth to Scyld and Scēaf, semi-divine founders of the Danish race, of whom a similar tale is told, although the connexion with the bird-myth is very obscure.

7. Interpretations.—The interpretations of the swan-myths have been various; the earlier school of mythologists saw in them nature-myths, the swan-maiden being the white cloud, her captor the storm-spirit.[2] Others have explained the swan-maiden, who is subject to mysterious prohibitions and who in the end is almost always lost to her captor, and the swan-knight, who must not reveal his name or place of origin, as denizens of the world of the dead or of the islands of the blessed.[3] A more prosaic view takes into account merely the totemistic aspect which the myth shows in common with all animal shape-changing tales, points to the swan-maidens and swan-knights as founders of clans, and compares them with such figures as Mélusine of Lusignan.[4] The most modern theory brings the tabu into prominence, to the overshadowing of other aspects, and adduces the wide evidence now forthcoming of marital tabus among primitive peoples;[5] thus a curious piece of corroborative evidence on the symbolic connexion between swans and women has been found in the rites enforced on secluded girls among American Indian tribes.[6] Fortunately for the appeal of the myth, none of these theories has power to detract from, but all serve only to enhance, its elusive and poetic beauty.

LITERATURE.—J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, i. 426–430; W. Mannhardt, *Germanische Mythen*, Berlin, 1858, p. 340 ff.; E. H. Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, do. 1891, chs. vi. and vii.; J. Fiske, art. in *Atlantic Monthly*, xxviii. [1871] 129–144; S. Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*[2], London, 1869, chs. xxi. and xxii.; F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, pp. 54–65, 239–250; A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, ch. iv.; E. S. Hartland, *The Science of Fairy Tales*, do. 1891, chs. x.–xii.; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, tr. B. J. Vos, Boston, U.S.A., 1902, ch. xv.; W. Müller, 'Die Sage vom Schwanritter,' in *Germania*, ed. F. Pfeiffer, i. [1856] 418–440.

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SWĀT or UDYĀNA.—This is a famous principality in Independent Eastern Afghanistan, between the latter country and Kashmīr, to the south of Chitral and the Pamirs. It receives the name of Swāt from the river of that name (the Svastu, in Sanskrit), which joins the Kabul branch of the Indus above Peshāwar. Its literary name of Udyāna (in Prakrit, Ujjāna) is ascribed to its 'garden or park-like' appearance; for it is an exceptionally richly cultivated and well-watered beautiful Alpine valley. Through this Indo-Scythian country Alexander descended for his invasion of India, crossing, it is generally supposed, the Malakand Pass, which is on the main route to the Indian plains; but Swāt is best known for its fame as an ancient centre of Buddhism. It is still thickly covered with the ruins of Buddhist monuments and temples, richly decorated with some of the finest sculptures of the Græco-Buddhist or so-called Gandhāra (*q.v.*) type of art. These sculptured friezes and terra-cottas date chiefly between the 2nd and 5th centuries A.D.; and a collection of several hundreds was made by the present writer during the Chitral expedition of 1895 and is now preserved in the Calcutta and Peshāwar museums.[7] The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hian, who visited the country *c.* A.D.

1 Snorri, *Edda*, ed. E. Wilken, Paderborn, 1877, p. 24.
2 *Kalevala*, rune 14.
3 F. Gottschalck, *Sagen und Volksmärchen der Deutschen*, Halle, 1814, p. 227.
4 Cf. Grimm, i. 437, note 1.
5 E. M. Arndt, *Schriften für und an seine lieben Deutschen*, Leipzig, 1845, iii. 547; cf. in Chinese legend the fostering of the hero Hou Chi by a wild swan (C. F. R. Allen, *The Book of Chinese Ballads*, London, 1891, p. 385 *f.*).
6 F. F. A. Kuhn, *Märkische Sagen und Märchen*, Berlin, 1843, no. 68.
7 W. Müller, 'Die Sage vom Schwanritter,' in *Germania*, ed. F. Pfeiffer, i. 421.
8 P. 1008.
9 *Nibelungenlied*, Aventiure xxv.
10 Stanzas 1–3.
11 *Fornaldar Sögur*, ii. 375 *f.*
12 Saxo Grammaticus, *Hist. Danica*, vi. 178.
13 M. Bartels, 'Isländischer Brauch und Volksglaube in Bezug auf die Nachkommenschaft,' *ZE* xxxii. [1900] 76.
14 Cf. *Æneid*, x. 185–197.

1 368–370.
2 E. H. Meyer, *Germ. Mythologie*, pp. 90, 125.
3 W. Müller, *op. cit.*; Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, pp. 54–65.
4 Cf. art. ANIMALS, § 26.
5 Hartland, pp. 304–322.
6 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 47–50, 90–92.
7 L. A. Waddell, *Report on Archæological Tour in Swat*, Calcutta, 1895, reprint in *Asiat. Quarterly Rev.*, Oct. 1895, and 'Newly Excavated Greco-Buddhist Sculptures from Swāt Valley,' *Trans. of the Oriental Congress*, 1897, sect. i. 245–247.

400, says: 'The religion of Buddha is very flourishing . . . in all there are 500 monasteries, they belong to the Little Vehicle (*Hīna-yāna*) without exception.'[1] But, when Hiuen Tsiang visited the land *c.* A.D. 630, he found that nearly all the convents, some 1400 in number with formerly 18,000 priests, were 'waste and desolate.'[2] It is a striking commentary on Fa Hian's reference to the exclusive prevalence of the 'Little Vehicle' form of Buddhism that as a fact all the sculptural remains are of the 'Great Vehicle' (*Mahā-yāna*).

It was regarded by Fa Hian as the most northerly province of India, and the food and clothing of the people were the same as in India, and this is still the case—the people dress in white. The dimensions of the Swāt country, as described by Hiuen Tsiang at 5000 *li* (about 833 miles) in circuit, show that it in those days evidently included, in addition to the valley of Swāt, also the Chitral and Dard adjoining countries and the mountains on the right bank of the Indus, even beyond the great bend of the river to the south.

It was the native country of Padma-saṁbhava (*q.v.*), the founder of Lāmaism in Tibet; and the notorious prevalence of Śaivite magical rites in the manuals ascribed to that saint in the Tibetan is somewhat in keeping with the old reputation of this country for sorcery. Hiuen Tsiang, in his visit to this land about a century before Padma-saṁbhava's period, writes: 'The science of magical formulas is become a regular professional business with them (the men of Swāt or Udyāna).'[3]

The belief in serpent-dragons of rivers and springs was especially prevalent here. It was at the source of the Swāt river that was located the legendary water-dragon or serpent Apalāla, whose conversion by Buddha is a favourite motive in Buddhist art, both north and south. Hiuen Tsiang refers especially to the 'white water' issuing from this spring, as also does al-Bīrunī about the 11th cent. A.D.,[4] which would doubtless be snow-water rather than glacial, yet it suggests that the river-name Svastu may have originally been derived from *sveta*, or *sweta*, 'white,' which approximates the modern name of that river, 'Swāt.' Confirmation of this ancient water-serpent worship was found by the present writer in a Kharoṣṭhī inscription upon a great boulder at a spring of which the record reads from a rubbing taken by the present writer: 'By the son of Dati, the Thera (Buddhist monk) Nora, a tank was caused to be made for the worship of All Serpents (in) the year 113.'[5] This date, from the palæographic details, is placed about 65 B.C.

LITERATURE.—References are cited in the article.

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SWAZIS.—See BANTU AND S. AFRICA.

SWEARING.—See OATH, PROFANITY.

SWEAT, SWEAT-HOUSE.—Sweat, a colourless fluid containing about 2 per cent of solid matter, is a secretion of the sebaceous glands. Its chief function is to regulate the heat discharge of the human body. It is connected with some curious and interesting religious and magical customs in various parts of the world.

1. Sweat in magic.—Primitive man regards sweat, like blood, saliva, hair, and nail-parings, as a medium both for setting sorcery in motion against an enemy and for working the more harmless forms of magic. Codrington says that among the Melanesians the belief prevails that a leaf with which a man has wiped the perspiration from his face may be employed to work mischief against him.[1] A like belief is found among the Negroes of N. America.[2] Some of the natives of N.E. New Guinea take elaborate precautions to prevent a drop of their sweat from being made use of by a sorcerer; on leaving a camping-place, they stab the ground all over with their spears.[3] Some of the most curious uses to which this exudation of the human body has been put are illustrated by a group of customs connected with love magic.

'A cake, an apple, or a sweetmeat impregnated with the sweat of the giver is a powerful philtre throughout the greater part of northern and central Europe, from Cairn Gorm to the Carpathians.'[4] A Hungarian girl steals meal and honey at Christmas-time, bakes a cake, takes it to bed with her for one night, and then bestows it on a youth whom she wishes to fall in love with her.[5] W. R. Paton says that in three Νομοκάνονες (confessors' manuals) of the Orthodox Church, which are, he believes, less than three centuries old, 'women are accused of rubbing dough on their bodies, and giving it to eat to men in whom they wish to arouse satanic love.'[6]

The victim of such love magic can, however, have recourse to a counter-charm of the same character. 'It was narrated that if a man who, under the influence of a philtre, was forced to love against his will, would put on a new pair of shoes, and wear them out by walking in them, and then drink wine out of the right shoe, where it could mingle with the perspiration already there, he would promptly be cured of his love, and hate take its place.'[7]

A similar idea underlies the superstition prevalent among the Negroes and Indians of N. America, and also in Belgium, that, if the owner of a dog wishes to make the animal faithful to him, he should give it some bread which has been soaked in his sweat.[8] In the island of Tutu, in the Torres Straits, men drink the sweat of renowned warriors to acquire courage.[9]

The mythology of ancient Egypt seems to have ascribed a sacramental virtue to the sweat of Osiris. In the pyramid libation-formulæ the libations appear to be his sweat; and in the ritual of Amon the incense appears to be crystallized drops of it.[10] A song quoted by A. Erman speaks of the Nile as the sweat of Osiris' hands.[11] The Negroes of Jamaica identified a man's luck with the perspiration of his hands, and believed that, if the latter were wiped away, the former would disappear.[12]

2. The sweat-house.—The ceremonial use of vapour baths is a custom of great antiquity and wide geographical distribution, being found both in N. America and in N. Europe. In the former continent it was probably known to every tribe north of Mexico, though along the north-west coast it has been superseded by sea-bathing.

'The type of the ordinary sweat-house seems to have been everywhere the same. Willow rods or other plant stems were stuck into the ground and bent or fastened with withes into a hemispherical or oblong frame-work, which generally was large enough to accommodate several persons. A hole was dug conveniently near the door into which stones, usually heated outside, were dropped by means of forked sticks. These were sprinkled with water to generate steam. A temporary cover of blankets or skins made the enclosure tight.'[13]

In each tribe there were certain prescribed rules for the construction of the sweat-house. In some cases, however, the communal ceremonial chamber was used for this purpose. Sometimes it was used as a kind of men's club like the Pueblo *kiva*,

[1] Ch. viii.
[2] *Si-yu-ki*, tr. S. Beal, London, 1884, i. 120.
[3] S. Julien's tr. of *Hiouen Thsang*, Paris, 1853, confirmed by T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1904-05, i. 226.
[4] *Alberuni's India*, ed. E. C. Sachau, London, 1910, ii. 182.
[5] Cf. J. G. Bühler, *Vienna Oriental Journ.* x. [1896] 55 f.

[1] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 203.
[2] E. S. Hartland, *LP* ii. 74.
[3] J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 213.
[4] *LP* ii. 123. [5] *Ib.* [6] *FL* v. [1894] 277.
[7] J. G. Bourke, *Scatalogic Rites of all Nations*, Washington, 1891, p. 349, quoting S. A. Flemming, *De Remediis*, p. 19.
[8] *LP* ii. 124.
[9] A. C. Haddon, in *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901-12, v. 301.
[10] A. M. Blackman, *ZA* l. [1912] 69 ff.
[11] *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 81.
[12] *FL* xv. [1904] 209.
[13] *Bull. 30 BE* [1910], pt. 2, p. 660.

women being permitted to enter it for certain ceremonial purposes, but not for sweating. Among certain tribes on the Pacific coast women were not even permitted to gather wood for the holy fire to be kindled in the sweat-house. In California, where sweating always had a religious significance, some of the tribes used the sweat-house as a sleeping-place for adult males. Half-an-hour was usually spent in the sweat-house, and then the bather plunged into a stream, if there was one at hand.

'Among the Eskimo, hot air was used in place of steam and in Zuñi, and probably in the Pueblos generally, hot stones near the body furnished the heat.'[1]

Some tribes lit the fire in the sweat-house in autumn and kept it alive till spring. Bancroft says of the Northern Californians:

'A fire is built in the centre [of the sweat-house] in early fall and kept alive till the following spring, as much attention being given to it as ever was paid to the sacred fires of Hestia.'[2]

Sweating in N. America was practised for three purposes: (1) *religious*—such as purification and the propitiation of spirits, preparation for war, and on arrival at puberty, when it was usually attended by scarification and mutilation; (2) *therapeutic*—prescribed by a shaman, who stood outside and invoked the spirits believed to cause the disease (among the Plains Indians shamans who officiated at these ceremonies had usually to pass through the sweat-house themselves for purposes of purification); (3) *social and hygienic*—a number of persons would enter a sweat-house for the purpose of enjoying the luxury of a bath (among certain tribes this became an almost daily practice, and was perhaps a degeneration).

The sweat-bath is also used by the Eskimos of Bering Strait, among whom the men and boys indulge in it about once a week, or once in every ten days during winter, but with this people it does not appear to possess a religious significance.[3]

Among many tribes the sweat-house had its own guardian spirit or *manitu* (*q.v.*).

Among the Lillooets of British Columbia 'men who had the spirit of the sweat-house for their guardian spirit made a sweat-house of elk-skin supported on wands, and inside it they placed four large stones, which were heated to make the steam for the bath.'[4]

It was believed among the Algonquins that a man when in the sweat-house might acquire *manitu*. A Fox Indian, relating his experiences during a sweat-bath, once said:

'Often one will cut one's self only through the skin. It is done to open up many passages for the manitou to pass into the body. The manitou comes from the place of its abode in the stone. It comes roused by the heat of the fire, and proceeds out of the stone when the water is sprinkled on it. It comes out in the steam, and in the steam it enters the body wherever it finds entrance. It moves up and down, and all over and inside the body, driving out everything that inflicts pain. Before the manitou returns to the stone, it imparts some of its nature to the body. That is why one feels so well after having been in the sweat-lodge.'[5]

Among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia, when a boy reached the age of puberty, he went through certain ceremonies to obtain a guardian spirit.

In the sweat-bath 'he prayed to the spirit of sweat-bathing under the title of "Sweat-bathing Grandfather Chief," begging that he might be strong, brave and agile, lucky, rich, a good hunter, a skilful fisherman, and so forth.'[6]

The Ojibwa (*q.v.*), an Algonquin tribe, had a secret society called the 'Midē'wiwin,' or society of the shamans. For four days before initiation into it a candidate would purify himself in the sweat-bath.

'In all ceremonies, prophetical or medico-magical, great reliance is placed on the vapor-bath. . . . It is entered with sacred feelings, and is deemed a great means of purification. Secret arts are here often disclosed between *Medais* [shamans] of high power, which could not be imparted in other places, or positions, believed to be less subject to the influence of sanctifying power.'[1]

When we turn to the Old World, we find a striking resemblance to the American customs in Herodotus's description[2] of the use of the sweat-bath among the Scythians as a means of purification, after mourning. The construction of the sweat-house was, however, simpler than in America. Three sticks were stuck in the ground, leaning towards each other, and around them pieces of felt were tightly stretched. A dish containing red-hot stones was placed inside. Hemp seed was then thrown on to the stones. A close parallel to this custom was found among the Delaware Indians, and is described by Tylor:

'At their festival in honour of the Fire-god with his twelve attendant manitus, inside of the house a small oven-hut was set up, consisting of twelve poles tied together at the top and covered with blankets, high enough for a man to stand nearly upright within it. After the feast this oven was heated with twelve red-hot stones, and twelve men crept inside. An old man threw twelve pipefuls of tobacco on these stones, and when the patients had borne to the utmost the heat and suffocating smoke, they were taken out, generally falling in a swoon.'[3]

The sweat-bath, as used among the peasantry of Great Russia, possesses the nature of a ceremonial purification even at the present day. It is taken weekly on Saturday afternoons, and all kinds of pollution must be avoided till after the service on Sunday morning.[4] Among the northern Finns, for the *savna*, or sweat-bath, a log-hut is used. The bath is frequently taken *en famille*.[5] With this people, however, and also with the Lapps, who make use of the sweat-bath on Saturdays before putting on their clean clothes, it appears to be an entirely secular institution.[6] Vapour baths were in use among the Celtic tribes, and the sweat-house was in general use in Ireland down to the 18th,[7] and even survived into the 19th century. It was of beehive shape and was covered with clay. It was especially resorted to as a cure for rheumatism.[8]

Vapour baths were used by the Greeks and Romans; details for their construction are given by Vitruvius.[9] The sweat-bath, which in England has been miscalled the 'Turkish bath,' being in reality of Russian origin, was introduced into this country by David Urquhart, M.P. (1805–77).

3. Origin and distribution.—The presence of the sweat-bath both in N. Europe and in N. America at once raises the question whether it has originated independently in each of these continents, or whether it has reached them from a common centre of distribution. It is essentially a northern institution, and one belonging to the Mongoloid branch of the human family. M. A. Czaplicka suggests that the Slavs of Great Russia probably borrowed it from the Finns of the Middle Volga. There are many unsolved problems connected with the ethnology of the Scythians, but there appears to have existed among them a Finno-Ugrian element from which most likely the sweat-hut was derived. We should naturally expect to find the sweat-hut in N. Asia, whose inhabitants form an ethnological bridge uniting the Mongoloid peoples of Europe and N. America. We are,

[1] *Bull. 30 BE* [1910], pt. 2, p. 661. [2] *NR* i. 356.
[3] E. W. Nelson, in *18 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. p. 287.
[4] J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 429; cf. p. 414.
[5] W. Jones, 'The Algonquin *Manitou*,' in *JAFL* xviii. [1905] 184.
Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 414.

[1] H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1853–56, v. 423 *f.*, quoted by Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 486.
[2] iv. 73–75. [3] *PC*[2] ii. 417 *f.*
[4] D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, rev. ed., London, 1905, i. 41.
[5] S. Tromholt, *Under the Rays of the Aurora Borealis*, ed. C. Siewers, London, 1885, ii. 102.
[6] P. B. du Chaillu, *Land of the Midnight Sun*, London, 1881, ii. 206.
[7] David Urquhart, *Manual of the Turkish Bath*, London, 1865, p. 62.
[8] See art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Celtic), vol. iv. p. 749[a].
[9] *De Architectura*, v. 10, 11.

however, disappointed in this expectation, since among the aborigines of N. Siberia it is not indigenous, but is in use only among those tribes which, like the Yakuts, have derived many elements in their culture from the Russians. We seem, then, to be led to the conclusion that the sweat-bath originated independently in both Europe and America, or else that it originated in a more southerly latitude than N. Siberia. The vapour-bath appears to be one of those institutions which were originally indulged in for hygienic purposes, but afterwards, owing to their beneficial results, came to be connected in the mind of primitive man with mysterious unseen powers, and hence were used in connexion with religious rites. Now, however, the sweat-bath seems to be regaining its former secular character.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

H. J. T. JOHNSON.

SWEATING.—See ECONOMICS.

SWEDENBORG. — 1. Life and works. — Emanuel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm on 29th Jan. 1688. He was the second son of Jesper Swedberg, bishop of Skara and previously professor in the University of Upsala. The family was ennobled by Queen Ulrica Eleonora in 1719, when the patronymic of Swedberg was changed into the name of Swedenborg.

Little is known of Swedenborg's childhood. After completing his studies at Upsala in 1709, he started on an extended foreign tour, and he was in England in 1711, 'studying Newton daily and very anxious to see and hear him.'[1] We gather from one of his letters to his brother-in-law, Dr. Ericus Benzelius, that mathematics and astronomy absorbed at that time most of his interest. He wrote of his conversations with Flamsteed, Halley, and other well-known men of science, but his copious references to the works of Dryden, Spenser, Milton, Shakespeare, and others show that his scientific studies did not prevent him from becoming acquainted with the best English literature. Swedenborg spent nearly two years in London and Oxford. He afterwards visited Holland, France, and Germany, working all the time at a number of inventions. One of them was 'the plan of a certain ship which with its men was to go under the surface of the sea and do great damage to the fleet of the enemy.'[2] Another of his inventions was a magazine air-gun to discharge 60 or 70 shots in succession without reloading. He also devised a flying machine, but the great Swedish engineer, Christopher Polhem, expressed the opinion that, with respect to flying by artificial means, it was about the same thing as trying to make a *perpetuum mobile* or to make gold!

In 1716 Swedenborg was appointed by King Charles XII. extraordinary assessor at the Royal Board of Mines, an appointment which caused him to decline the offer of a professorship of astronomy in the University of Upsala. As the eldest son of his family, Swedenborg had a seat in the House of Nobles of the Swedish Parliament, but his interest in science, always greater than in politics, led him in 1721 to go abroad to study the mines and manufactures of other lands. It was during this journey that he published a treatise on physics and chemistry, at Amsterdam, a second edition of his *New Method of finding the Longitude*, at Leipzig, and *Miscellaneous Observations on Geology and Mineralogy*. But the work which won for Swedenborg a European reputation was his *Opera Philosophica et Mineralia* in 3 vols., with numerous copperplates, published at Dresden and Leipzig in 1734 at the expense of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick. In the first volume of that work, the *Principia*, Swedenborg gives an elaborate theory of the origin of the visible universe and propounds his nebular hypothesis. This theory has been often attributed to Kant and Laplace as the original authors, but Swedenborg's theory appeared in the *Principia* in 1734, while Kant's *Natural History of the Heavens* was published in 1755, and Laplace's *Système du Monde* in 1796, as has been shown by Arrhenius in his introduction to the Latin reprint of Swedenborg's *Cosmologia*. Soon after appeared the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (1740–41) and *The Animal Kingdom* (1744–45), in which are given the results of Swedenborg's extensive labours in anatomy and physiology. In 1745 his *Worship and Love of God* was published. This work marks the surprising transition of its author's mind from plain scientific and philosophical reasoning to what is generally considered a form of religious mysticism, but what the author himself would have described as spiritual perception. A great change had come over him. His mind, as he himself says, had been opened to enable him to hear and see things of the other life.

Swedenborg gives the year 1743 as the date of the opening of his spiritual sight, but it was in April 1745, according to his own statement, that he was fully admitted to intercourse with angels and spirits, not by any process analogous to what is usually termed spiritism (*q.v.*), but by speaking with them directly, while remaining normally conscious of everything about him on earth. He was quite aware of the scepticism with which such a mental state would be received, when made known to the world, and he anticipated it in his first theological work in these words: 'I am well aware that many persons will insist that it is impossible for any one to converse with spirits and angels during his life-time in the body; many will say that such intercourse must be mere fancy; some, that I have invented such relations in order to gain credit; whilst others will make other objections. For all these, however, I care not, since I have seen, heard and felt.'[1]

In 1747 Swedenborg resigned his position on the Royal Board of Mines and devoted himself to the new work to which he believed himself to have been divinely called. His vast work, the *Arcana Cœlestia*, was completed in 8 vols. in 1756. Then followed, among others, *The Earths in the Universe* (1758), *The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrine* (1758), *Heaven and Hell* (1758), perhaps the best known of all his books, *On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body* (1769), *Divine Love and Wisdom* (1763), *Divine Providence* (1764), *The Apocalypse Revealed* (1766), *Conjugal Love* (1768), the first theological work to which Swedenborg's name is attached, and lastly *The True Christian Religion* (1771).

It is interesting, and in a sense very significant, to find that, while Swedenborg was fully occupied with the publication of so many theological works, he yet found time and freedom of mind to attend to mundane affairs. In 1763 he wrote several papers on scientific subjects in the *Transactions of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Stockholm*, and in 1766 he republished at Amsterdam his *New Method of finding the Longitude of Places on Land and Sea*. Count Höpken has stated that 'the most solid and best written memoirs at the Diet of 1761 on matters of finance were presented by Swedenborg.'[2]

The last political document bearing his signature is an address to the Diet entitled 'Frank Views concerning the Maintenance of the Country and the Preservation of its Freedom,' in which he utters a warning against the revival of an absolute monarchy.

On Christmas Eve, 1771, while in London, he had a stroke of apoplexy and was visited by the minister of the Swedish Church, E. Ferelius. He never completely recovered, and he died on 29th March 1772 in the eighty-fifth year of his age at his residence in Great Bath Street, Coldbath Fields, London. He was buried in the Swedish Church. In 1908 the Swedish Government, having made arrangements for the transfer of Swedenborg's remains to his native country, sent the frigate *Fulpia* to England to bring them home, and in due time they were deposited in the Cathedral of Upsala, close to the resting-place of Linnæus.

2. Doctrines.—The philosophical and theological doctrines professed by Swedenborg may be conveniently considered under three heads—God, the world, and man.

(*a*) *God.*—He has nowhere given any formal arguments to prove the existence of God. He starts at once from the conviction that 'all the principles of human reason unite and, as it were, concentre in this, that there is one God, the Creator of the Universe.' Two principles constitute the essence of God—love and wisdom. His infinity comprehends both immensity and eternity, His immensity having relation to space and His eternity to time. But God with respect to the created world is 'in space without space, and in time without time.' God is life, and all life is from Him. Life itself is uncreatable, but it can be communicated, lent, as it were, to finite beings. God is one absolutely in essence and in person. The Lord Jesus Christ is God, indeed, but He is not another divine person. He is Jahweh manifested in the finite garment of humanity. Yet in Him is a divine Trinity of love, wisdom, and power—the three essentials of His divine nature. Thus the Lord alone ought to be loved supremely and worshipped as our Heavenly Father. To see Him is to see the Father (Jn 12^{45} 14^{9}).

In a sense Swedenborg admits that God, in His essence, is unknowable, but he believes that there is a form of anthropomorphism which is not only permissible in speaking of God, but necessary, because it conveys a profound truth about Him. He asserts that our thinking in human symbols would be baseless and misleading if God Himself were not divinely human. Hence his startling postulate, 'God is a man.' Of course, he does not

[1] R. L. Tafel, *Documents concerning the Life and Character of Swedenborg*, 3 vols., London, 1875–77, i. 200–344 (Swedenborg's first letter from England to Benzelius, Oct. 1710).

[2] *Ib.* i. (Correspondence with Benzelius).

[1] *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 68.

[2] Tafel, ii. 408.

mean that God is a man in a physical sense. His real meaning is simply that, if we think at all about God, we must do so by means of symbols derived from our highest human experience. But, if these symbols do not correspond, in an infinite Reality, to what they represent, as finite symbols, to us, then all these conceptions are not merely imperfect and inadequate, but actually false. We are then obliged to conclude that there is a fundamental antinomy in the constitution of the human mind, so that the Power from whom it proceeds has so constructed it that it must think about that Power, and think about it falsely. Surely, Swedenborg considers, what the human mind *must* think should be, at least, an approximate symbol or representation of a fact. If we doubt this, the grounds upon which we believe any philosophical, ethical, or spiritual truth are undermined.

Thus, to think of God as a divine man would simply mean, for Swedenborg, to think of Him as being infinite love and wisdom, as He is apprehended by us by means of symbols derived from the highest of human faculties, the intellect and the will—those faculties by which we are made 'in the image of God.' But Swedenborg seems also to have discerned some profound connexion between this conception of God as a divine man in His essential nature and the rational interpretation of a possible incarnation in time. In reading Swedenborg it must always be remembered that there is an idealism, quite his own, at the basis of his philosophical views and consequently of his theology. This enables one to understand much that lies hidden behind his realistic language when he deals with spiritual matters for which our human vocabularies have only weak and inadequate expressions.

(*b*) *The world.*—This should be particularly remembered in his treatment of the creation of the world. Swedenborg has attempted to correlate two apparently irreconcilable ideas—the idea of a personal God distinct from the universe, and the idea of an immanent Creator. He has done it by means of his doctrine of 'discrete degrees.' He holds that there are substances of many orders composing the universe. The primary, self-existent substance is the infinite God from whom all finite substances originate. But those substances are related to each other in an order constituted by degrees named 'discrete degrees' in distinction from 'continuous degrees,' because they are plans of existence entirely separate from each other and incapable of being resolved one into another. A continuous degree is merely a variation of being or quality on its own plane, as from heavier to lighter, or from denser to rarer. It is only a question of more or less. Discrete degrees, on the other hand, are never of the same forms or qualities of being, and, moreover, they involve the relation of cause and effect. Hence Swedenborg says: 'Nothing, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been known of discrete degrees but only of continuous degrees; yet without a knowledge of both kinds of degrees nothing of cause can be truly known,' for 'seeing from effects alone is seeing from fallacies.'[1] He means that fallacies arise, not from a failure to distinguish between cause and effect, as, *e.g.*, between matter and spirit, but from the fact of regarding them as differing by continuous degrees only and not by discrete degrees. For thus cause is never lifted above the plane of effect, nor spirit above the plane of matter.

It is maintained therefore that in everything of which anything can be predicated there are what are called end, cause, and effect, and these three are to each other according to discrete degrees. In creation the natural or material world is the effect, of which the spiritual world is the cause, and God is the end. The first act of creation, not in time but in order, is the putting forth by the Divine of a finite emanation of love and wisdom from Himself. This is conceived as a spiritual sun of incomparable splendour, a manifestation so intense that the finite mind could not bear its ardour, were it not tempered by intermediate stages. Thus, successive discrete degrees, separated not in space but in the quality of their spiritual constitution, produce the higher and the lower heavens; other discrete degrees subsist in the angelic forms according to their receptibility of love and wisdom.

Similarly, the affections and thoughts which constitute the life of men are not, as it seems to us, self-generated, but pass into their minds out of the spiritual world, in a clearer or more obscure manner, always according to discrete degrees and in the order of cause and effect. In the world of matter a different law operates. Matter is derived not directly from spirit, but from the natural sun, which, according to Swedenborg, is not only the centre and support of our solar system, but also the proximate cause of its existence. From the activity of this primal sun are ultimately produced, by discrete degrees, the atmospheres and matter itself out of which the physical world is formed. The material substances, conceived as inert in themselves, are nevertheless capable of being acted upon by spiritual forces. But there is nothing of God in them as the ultimate of creation, since their life has ended in no-life, and love and wisdom have ended in forms of motion. Of course, this does not mean that God is not present in this ultimate of creation.

This doctrine is intended to exclude the incomprehensible idea of a creation *ex nihilo*, whilst it is meant also to provide against a pantheistic interpretation of the universe. It inevitably presents the difficulties which are inseparable from any theory of emanation.

(*c*) *Man.* — The theology of Swedenborg, as it deals with man, his nature, and his destiny, cannot be understood apart from his view (or, as he would insist, apart from the doctrine that he was divinely commissioned to make known to the modern world) of the real meaning of God's Word as we have it in the letter of Holy Scripture. More than 150 years ago Swedenborg had foreseen the difficulties and objections which criticism might bring forward as an argument against a belief in a divine revelation. 'It is in the mouth of all,' he says, 'that the Word is from God, is divinely inspired and therefore holy. But yet it has been unknown hitherto where within it its Divinity resides. The man who worships Nature instead of God may easily fall into error concerning the Word, and say within himself when he is reading it: "What is this? Is this divine? Can God who has infinite wisdom speak thus?"'[1] Yet Swedenborg never lost his faith in a divine revelation, and one of the principal objects of his theology is to show that the difficulties which create so serious a stumbling-block in many minds are due to the fact that they are looking in the Bible for what its letter does not and cannot explicitly manifest. He affirms that the Word contains throughout a spiritual meaning which alone gives the true and full sense of God's revelation to man.

Philo, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others have attempted to discover a spiritual sense in the Bible, but Swedenborg's conception proceeds on entirely different lines. For him the Word is the divine truth itself as it exists in God. It is the very form of God, and the medium of communication and conjunction with Him for the

[1] *Divine Love and Wisdom*, no. 187 f.

[1] *True Christian Religion*, no. 189.

angels in the heavens and for men upon earth. But truth in this divine form is utterly incomprehensible to any finite mind. To render it at least partly intelligible, it must descend through the discrete degrees already described, and assume successively lower and lower forms of expression adapted to the comprehension of the various grades of finite intelligence. On earth it presents itself to us as the letter of our Bible, or rather as the original texts from which that letter has come to us.

How then are those texts written? They are written in pure 'correspondences,' *i.e.* in symbols derived from nature. Every natural object is conceived to be the effect, and therefore the expression, of spiritual causes. Those effects 'correspond' to those causes; hence their capacity, when properly understood, to reveal the spiritual meaning contained in them.

The first result of this principle is that man is thus enabled to know the true canon of the sacred Scriptures. Those books which are so written as to present a correspondential spiritual meaning are really 'the Word.' The other books possess devotional and even doctrinal value, but they are not 'the Word.' Guided by this fact, Swedenborg declares that the only books of the Word in the Bible are, in the OT, the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings, the Psalms, and the Prophets from Isaiah to Malachi; in the NT, the four Gospels and Revelation. The Epistles form therefore no part of what Swedenborg strictly calls 'the Word.' But he valued them highly, and he frequently quotes them.

In the letter, as we have it, Swedenborg recognizes a human element manifested in the language and feelings of the writers of the various books of the Bible; it is only the spiritual sense that is entirely and solely divine. Hence many of the difficulties raised by the higher criticism would be no difficulties for him; *e.g.*, instead of a creation in six days in the book of Genesis, he reads there the earliest condition of man and the gradual development of his psychological constitution; his growth in a knowledge of good and truth, of love and faith, and of divine things; and finally his introduction to a celestial perception of divine truth itself. It is a conception of the regeneration of man, called to reach his spiritual destiny through knowledge, trial, faith, and love, and Swedenborg sees that such a conception has a sublime meaning for us which it could not have had for the men who lived when the letter was written. It would have been an unintelligible revelation for most of them. Therefore the full meaning of the letter as contained in the spiritual sense was not given to them. There is, according to Swedenborg, a grave spiritual danger in the premature disclosure to any mind of divine Truth.[1]

But what is man? He is, says Swedenborg, made to be at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. He is not life, but a recipient of life from God. And God grants man a sense that the life which he feels within himself is his own, in order that he may live as of himself. In every man's soul there is an inmost or supreme degree into which the divine of the Lord proximately flows; hence it is that man can receive intelligence and wisdom and speak from reason, and from this also comes the fact that his soul is endowed with immortality.

The will rather than the understanding constitutes the man. Swedenborg rejects the idea of angels having been created as such to people the heavens. All spirits, he believes, whether in heaven or in hell, are from the human race. He also holds that there is no personal Devil or Satan, but that that name signifies the whole society of evil spirits.

The life of man cannot be changed after death, for the spirit of man is such as his love is, and infernal love cannot be changed into heavenly love, 'because they are opposite.'

The problem of evil, as presented by Swedenborg, is explained by the freedom with which God has endowed man, and it is because God 'who changeth not' will not withdraw that gift that man's love remains what it was even after death. If he has deliberately made evil his good and good his evil, then he is his own hell, and does not desire heaven. He could find no ease there, and would long for his congenial surroundings and associates. He is not sent to hell; he goes there of himself, and would be happy there, if an evil soul could find permanent happiness anywhere. But he inevitably meets with sufferings and punishments, inflicted not by God or His agents, but chiefly by the evil spirits his associates. What happens under our eyes here upon earth continues in hell. For evil breeds evil always and everywhere. This conception is sad, but certainly drawn from life.

Are then those sufferings eternal? It is difficult to interpret definitely the teaching of Swedenborg on that point. How far 'those sufferings may be mitigated,' says Howard Spalding, 'we are not told, but a careful study of all that Swedenborg has said on the subject suggests that they may be so greatly modified as to cease to be acutely felt.'[1] It is remarkable that, according to Swedenborg, there is no absolute destruction of evil even in heaven, for nothing which has formed part of the spiritual nature of man can ever be annihilated. Spirits therefore—yea, angelic spirits—carry with them into heaven the perverted organic forms in which their evils resided. They are even permitted to experience from time to time a sense of their evils, but not uselessly, for by those alternations of state spirits are kept in continual spiritual progress. Thus the regeneration of man, begun on earth, continues to eternity.

Of heaven we are told that God Himself is heaven, and that His presence to each human spirit brings heaven into him, but always in a degree which depends on a certain faculty of reception acquired on earth by man's conscientious endeavour to make what he truly believes the rule of his life.[2]

There has been a tendency, more or less defined, to class Swedenborg among the mystics, but this seems to be due to an imperfect understanding of his system. His conception of life in heaven should suffice to show how little he has in common with mysticism past or present.

The fulfilment of God's purpose in creating the world is a fundamental doctrine in Swedenborg's theology. That purpose, we are told, was, by making man in His own image and endowing him with the faculties of freedom and rationality, to prepare him for that conjunction with God which constitutes the angelic heaven. In this sense, the creation means infinite love seeking by love to cause love to arise freely between the Creator and His rational creature. But the misuse of rationality and freedom has led to evil being chosen and loved instead of good; hence sin, whose effect is the weakening of true freedom, and the obscuring of that interior light within us which is rationality. Then it is that the love which had created man has also come to save him. By His incarnation the Lord did not come to reconcile His Father

[1] See *Arc. Cœlest.* no. 3398.

[1] *The Kingdom of Heaven as seen by Swedenborg*, p. 41.

[2] For full details see especially Swedenborg's *Heaven and Hell*.

to man, for God in Christ, as Swedenborg says, is the one only God who is love itself and does not need to be reconciled to His creature. It is man who needs to be reconciled to God. The Lord came and, as to His human nature, was born, lived, suffered, and died 'for us,' not 'instead of us.' He came to enable man to do that which, through sin, he had almost lost all power of doing, namely, to shun evil and to do the Lord's will in a life of righteousness and true holiness. Moreover, God 'became flesh,' not only to effect this work of redemption, but also that He might visibly manifest His infinite love for man, and thereby give to him for ever a definite object of intelligent faith, worship, and love. Man is said to be saved by the blood of Christ, in this sense, that His blood is the symbol of divine truth, and the shedding of His blood is the symbol of the imparting of His spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. The Atonement, for Swedenborg, is thus really an at-one-ment, the reconciliation of man to God by the love and power of God. It was accomplished by the Lord taking upon Himself man's nature, enslaved by sin, from the Blessed Virgin Mary, sustaining in His own person the assaults and temptations of the powers of darkness, and gradually subduing them. For this work the Lord laid down His life, *i.e.* the life in Him of all that was not in perfect agreement with the infinite perfections of His indwelling divinity. When this was done, 'consummated,' the Lord Jesus Christ was no longer, even as to His human nature, the Son of Mary. He was the 'only begotten Son of God,' the perfect manifestation of the infinite, invisible Father. This process, called glorification, was completed after His resurrection, when the Lord 'put off' from the infirm human nature all its hereditary tendencies to evil and sin, and 'put on' from the Father the divine humanity subsisting in the essential divinity within Him. This is the supreme type of man's own regeneration by which, having put off hereditary tendencies to evil and his actual sins, he puts on from the Lord, in the degree that he has thus put off evil, a new regenerated and spiritual humanity, a spiritual mind. No real regeneration can be attained except in accordance with the principle that a 'saving faith' is 'a faith which worketh by love.' Salvation by 'faith alone' is rejected and condemned by Swedenborg in innumerable passages in his works.

It is important in connexion with this subject to understand his idea of 'the Church.' The essential Church for him is constituted by a genuine love of goodness and truth and by the spiritual relation established with the Lord in the minds of men. The true Church is therefore invisible, but, so far as it is a true Church, it can never pass away. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the disclosure by the Lord of further truths called for by new conditions in the world of human thought and experience, and needed to establish a higher level of spiritual life. Nor does it exclude the possibility of the loss or the corruption of truths previously held, rendering necessary the institution of a specific 'New Church' in order to restore what has been lost, and to incorporate new truths which the Church in the past was not ready to receive. The assertion, therefore, made by the disciples of Swedenborg that a 'New Church' has been instituted, involves, as they would insist, no disparagement of the former Christian Church 'so far as it is really the Lord's.' The members of the 'New Church' at the present time consider it an entire misconception to imagine that Swedenborg is the founder of a 'New Church.' He himself always repudiated any such pretension. He considered himself a mere instrument through whom new truths needed in the Church were communicated to the world. His chief point always is, however, that 'the Church is one thing and religion is another.' The Church is called a Church from doctrine; religion is called religion from a life according to doctrine. Hence his well-known saying: 'All religion is related to life, and the life of religion is to do Good.'

LITERATURE.—Benjamin Worcester, *The Life and Mission of Emanuel Swedenborg*[6], Boston, 1907; George Trobridge, *A Life of Emanuel Swedenborg: with a popular Exposition of his Philosophical and Theological Teachings*, London, 1912; John Howard Spalding, *The Kingdom of Heaven as seen by Swedenborg*, do. 1916; Samuel M. Warren, *A Compendium of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg*, do. 1896 (very useful to obtain a first general idea of Swedenborg's voluminous works); *A Dictionary of Correspondences, etc., extracted from the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg*, Boston, 1910; Frank Sewall, *The New Metaphysics*, London, 1888, *Swedenborg and Modern Idealism: a Retrospect of Philosophy from Kant to the Present Time*, do. 1902; Theophilus Parsons, *Deus-Homo*, do. 1871; Edward Madeley, *The Science of Correspondences elucidated*, new and enlarged ed., do. 1902; *Transactions of the International Swedenborg Congress*, do. 1910.

L. B. DE BEAUMONT.

SWINE.—The swine plays a prominent part in many ancient and modern religions. The word 'pig' is unlucky to the Scottish fisherman, and on hearing it he will feel for the nails in his boots and mutter 'Cauld iron.'[1] The inhabitants of certain villages on the north-east coast of Scotland consider the words 'sow,' 'pig,' and 'swine' very unlucky; should any one be so unwise as to utter these words while the line is being baited, the line will surely be lost. The Galelareese, having noticed that, whilst men suffer from itch, caused by treading on the fallen fruit of the *aren* palm-tree, the wild boar, which is fond of the fruit and runs freely among it, is not liable to such a disease, argue that the fruit treats the pig as a real friend, and, if one by grunting can impress the fruit that he is a pig, it will treat him in the same way.[2] The pig was offered by the Romans and Greeks as an expiatory sacrifice. Cato advises that, before thinning a grove, the Roman farmer should offer a pig to the god or goddess of the place.[3] The grain distributed as prizes in the Eleusinian games in Greece was grown on the Rarian plain near Eleusis; this plain was so sacred that no dead body was allowed to touch it, and, whenever a defilement occurred, a pig was offered as a sacrifice. The Caribs abstained from pig's flesh because, like most primitive races, they believed that the physical and mental qualities of the human being depend largely upon the food which he eats; therefore, if they were to eat the flesh of pigs, they would have small eyes like those of a pig. Similarly Zulu girls abstain from eating pig's flesh because they fear that by eating it they might gradually come to resemble the ugly pig in appearance. But there are other reasons why primitive man abstained from pork. The Kai of N.E. New Guinea find that pigs are the worst enemies of the crops; therefore, if a field-labourer were to eat pork, the dead pig in his stomach would attract the living pig into the field.[4] Swine's flesh was forbidden to all the Semites except the Babylonians, but it is an open question whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean.[5] As early as the time of Hammurabi pork was a highly valued food among the Babylonians and frequently formed part of the temple offering. By

[1] J. Macdonald, *Religion and Myth*, London, 1893, p. 91.

[2] M. J. van Baarda, 'Fabelen, Verhalen, en Overleveringen der Galelareezen,' *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, xlv. [1895] 511.

[3] H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinæ Selectæ*, Berlin, 1892-1914, no. 4911.

[4] C. Keysser, 'Aus dem Leben der Kaileute,' in R. Neuhaus, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 125.

[5] Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 54; cf. Antiphanes, *ap.* Athenæus, iii. 95 (A. Meineke, *Fragmenta Comicorum Græcorum*, Berlin, 1839-57, iii. 68).

the inspection of pigs various omens were derived, and in the official lists special provision is even made for the temple pigs. The heathen Harranians sacrificed swine's flesh once a year and ate the flesh.[1] By the Syrians the swine was regarded as sacrosanct, and it was specially sacred to Aphrodite.[2] To the Greeks the attitude of the Jews towards swine was difficult to understand.[3] In Is 65[4] 66[3, 17] we are told that some of the Jews used to meet secretly to eat swine's flesh; it has been suggested therefore that 'the swine was revered rather than abhorred by the Israelites,'[4] and that it was not eaten because it was divine. To the Egyptians the pig was very loathsome.[5] Swineherds were forbidden to enter a temple and even had to marry among themselves. If a man even touched a pig, he immediately stepped into a river to wash off the taint. Pig's milk caused leprosy. These prohibitions prove that the Egyptians originally regarded the pig as sacred, for the belief that the eating of a sacred animal produces leprosy and that the effect caused by touching a sacred object is removed by washing was current among many ancient tribes and religions.[6] Later, however, the pig began to be looked upon with horror and was regarded as the Egyptian devil and the embodiment of Set or Typhon and enemy of Osiris. Typhon, in the form of a pig, injured the eye of Horus, who burned him and ordained that a pig was to be sacrificed, seeing that Ra, the sun-god, had declared the pig to be an abominable beast. We find in various religions that the animal sacrificed to a god because he is the god's enemy was originally the god himself. Now, we read that Typhon was hunting a boar when he discovered and mangled the body of Osiris, and that for this reason pigs were sacrificed once a year. It has therefore been suggested that originally the pig was a god, and that he was no other than Osiris.[7] We have already seen that the Kai of New Guinea abstain from pork because they regard the pig as the enemy of the crops, so that we can understand why the Egyptians should have identified their corn-god Osiris or his enemy Typhon with a wild boar. It might also be noted that pigs were sacrificed to Osiris on the very day on which he is recorded by tradition to have been killed. Further, the pig was sacred to the corn-goddess Demeter and was often associated with her. In art she is represented as accompanied by a pig.[8] At the Thesmophoria it was customary to throw pigs into some sacred vaults, which are described as the 'caves of Demeter and Persephone.'[9] It seems that the pigs were intended to represent Persephone and her descent into the lower world. An ancient legend tells that, when Pluto carried off Persephone, Eubuleus, a swineherd, was herding his swine near the spot, and his herd were engulfed in the cave into which Pluto and Persephone had vanished. The Thesmophoria has analogies in the folk-customs of N. Europe. In certain districts of Courland the pig is the corn-spirit, whose power of fertility lies in his tail; therefore, when barley is sown for the first time in the year, the sower sticks a pig's tail into the field, believing that the ears of corn will grow as long as the tail.[1] The idea that the pig is an embodiment of the corn-spirit can further be seen from the Scandinavian custom of 'Yule boar.' This is a loaf prepared from the last sheaf in the form of a pig. It is usually prepared at Christmas and kept till sowing-time, when it is given to the plough-horses in the hope that it will be the means of securing a good harvest.[2] In this connexion it is of interest to note that Ball finds a philological connexion between Tammuz, the Assyrian god of the under world and of vegetation, and the Chinese and Turkish words for pig. He also cites the evidence of classical writers[3] that 'the Jews did not use swine's flesh because it was sacred inasmuch as by turning up the earth with its snout it taught men the art of ploughing.'[4] In some parts of White Russia it is believed that the bones of a pig preserve the corn from hail, whilst in other places the ribs are thrown into the seed-bag among the flax-seed because they cause the flax to grow well and tall. The Alfoors of Minahassa in N. Celebes believe that a pig's blood causes inspiration, and at one of their festivals the priest drinks a pig's blood and thereupon is able to prophesy as to how the rice-crop will turn out.[5] The inhabitants of Car Nicobar rub themselves over with pig's blood in order to cleanse themselves of any devils of which they may be possessed.[6] In the same way the Greeks cleansed a homicide by sprinkling him with pig's blood and beating him with a laurel bough. The Karens of Burma believe that a bad harvest is caused by adultery, and, in order to atone for this, those detected in adultery must buy a pig, scrape out furrows in the ground with each foot, and then fill them with the pig's blood.[7] Some Yabim believe that after death their souls will be turned into swine, and they therefore abstain from swine-flesh lest they should thus be eating the souls of their relatives. The people of Tamara (off the coast of New Guinea) also abstain from pork because the souls of the dead transmigrate into the bodies of pigs. The worshippers of Adonis did not eat pork because their god had been killed by a boar. It has been suggested that the cry '*Hyes Attis!*', raised by the worshippers of Attis, meant 'Pig Attis!'[8] In Fiji a huge pig is presented to those who are initiated into manhood. At Maewo, in Aurora, one of the New Hebrides, fifty days after the death of a wealthy man pigs are killed, and the point of the liver of each pig is cut off. The brother of the deceased goes to the forest and calls out the dead man's name, saying 'This is for thee to eat,' the idea being that, if pigs are not killed for the benefit of the dead man, his ghost has not proper existence.[9] It should be noted also that the pig is very often represented by a cowry-shell. Malinowski, in an

[1] En-Nedim in D. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 42.

[2] Swine were also sacrificed to Aphrodite at Argos (Athen. iii. 49) and in Pamphylia (Strabo, ix. 5. 17).

[3] Plutarch, *Symposiacon*, iv. 5.

[4] But see R. H. Kennett, *The Composition of the Book of Isaiah in the Light of History and Archæology*, London, 1910, p. 61.

[5] Plut. *de Is. et Osir.*, 8; Herodotus, ii. 47, etc.

[6] Cf. the practice of the Jews of washing their hands after reading the Scriptures, also Lv 16[26]; *Central Provinces Ethnographic Survey*, Allahabad, 1907–11, ii., 'Draft Articles on Uriya Castes,' p. 16.

[7] E. Lefébure, *Le Mythe osirien*, Paris, 1874–75, pt. i., 'Les Yeux d'Horus,' p. 44; E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 496 f., also *Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection*, London and New York, 1911.

[8] J. Overbeck, *Griechische Kunstmythologie*, Leipzig, 1873–78, pt. ii.

[9] F. C. Movers, *Die Phönizier*, Berlin, 1841–56, i. 220.

[1] W. Mannhardt, *Mythologische Forschungen*, Strassburg, 1874, p. 186 f.; also A. Witzschel, *Sagen, Sitten, und Gebräuche aus Thüringen*, Vienna, 1878, pp. 189, 218.

[2] For further details concerning this and similar customs throughout various parts of Europe see F. Panzer, *Beitrag zur deutschen Mythologie*, Munich, 1848–55, ii. 491; J. Jamieson, *Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language*, new ed., Paisley, 1879–82, iii. 206 f.; Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1877, p. 197 f.

[3] Callistratus, ap. Plut. *Symp.* iv. 5.

[4] C. J. Ball, 'Tammuz, the Swine God,' *PSBA* xvi. [1894] 195 ff.

[5] J. G. F. Riedel, 'De Minahasa in 1825,' *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, xviii. [1872] 517 f.

[6] V. Solomon, 'Extracts from Diaries kept in Car Nicobar,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 227.

[7] F. Mason, 'On Dwellings, Works of Art, Laws, etc., of the Karins,' *JASBe* xxxvii. [1868] pt. ii. p. 147 f.

[8] J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 22.

[9] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 282.

account of the natives of Malu Island, off the coast of New Guinea,[1] says that at one of their feasts the natives erect a gallows and ornament it with a white shell called *moto* (the so-called white cowry, *Ovulum ovum*). This shows that they are about to offer pigs for sacrifice, and the number of pigs to be sacrificed is always the same as the number of shells. The association of this shell with pigs is important when it is remembered that cowries are widely known as pig-shells. This fact, and also the passionate tendencies of swine, would be the most plausible explanation of the abhorrence with which they have always been, and still are, regarded in the East.

LITERATURE.—The literature is contained in the article.

MAURICE H. FARBRIDGE.

SYMBOLISM.

SYMBOLISM (Christian).—It is proposed in this article to indicate the more important of the emblems and personifications in which Christian belief has found spontaneous expression. The literary images which deserve to be called symbolical, but which have not embodied themselves in pictorial or material shapes, are excluded from view. An attempt will be made, however, to connect the emblems which call for notice with the language of the New Testament.

When the subject is thus defined, the field to be surveyed is at once seen to admit of a clear division. The first four or five Christian centuries separate themselves for our purpose markedly from the centuries which follow. For the symbolism of the earlier period we have the definite and varied testimony offered by the sepulchral paintings and inscriptions of the Roman catacombs. With the light thus obtainable we are able to see the hopes with which the Christians of Rome during this formative period followed their dead into the unseen world and connected the life that now is with that to which they believed it to be the portal.

Burial in the catacombs and the symbolism to which it gave rise practically ceased before the middle of the 5th century. From that time onwards new images and ideas crowd in upon us, created by the popular imagination in response to the Church's teaching and worship, to legends of the saints, animal fables, and spiritual plays and moralities. Many of these images do not succeed in finding an emblematic expression, but those which do create a symbolism far exceeding that of the previous period in amplitude. We shall give our chief attention to the earlier period, and briefly indicate the later emblems which, either from their permanence or from their inherent significance, seem especially to claim notice.

A review of the entire field brings one decisive feature of the symbolism into prominence. The emblems will all be found to point onwards to a life beyond the tomb. The symbolism is created by a hope or, it may be, a fear whose fulfilment is not expected within the limits of our present existence. The justification of this 'other-worldliness' may readily be found in our records of the life of Christ. His ministry began with the announcement, 'The kingdom of God is at hand,' and was throughout a prophecy of good things to come (Mk 1^{15}). Some of His disciples may at first have believed that they would see these good things before they 'tasted' death (9^{1}). The mere lapse of time was enough to stamp such expectation with the mark of illusion. Every year it became more clear that the realization of the promised kingdom must needs be a slow and gradual process. In another respect also the desired consummation underwent a change. The earth ceased to be regarded, as perhaps it had at first been, as the scene of fruition. The liveliest hope cannot resist the accumulating contradictions of continuous experience. Year by year it became less likely that the kingdom could ever be localized or assume any material shape. The Crucifixion and its sequel had lifted the thoughts of the disciples from the earth and carried them into that heaven which had now become the Master's home. To this heaven they transferred their 'treasure' (Mt 6^{19}), less perhaps from deliberate apostasy than from the reluctant acceptance of undeniable experience, and to it their hearts ascended. Death thus reassumed its normal character, and what lay beyond it became an object of anxious thought or fervent longing. These thoughts and longings form the central motives of Christian symbolism. The blessedness hoped for after death, the means by which it may be reached, and the character of Him who procured and guarantees it—these will be found to be the subjects round which the Christian emblems of all periods gather. From the beginning hope has been the dominant Christian characteristic. The scene of fulfilment and the mode of realization may have shifted. Hope itself has remained.

The symbolism of the catacombs embodies the hopes of future blessedness entertained by those who used these burying-places up to the time when such subterranean burial ceased. Thus the roses, or flowery meadows and shrubs, which appear on so many tombs represent paradise. Its entrance is sometimes indicated by a curtain which is in process of being drawn aside. The Good Shepherd who appears on tomb after tomb may with greatest probability be here regarded as the Lord and Protector of the dead. It is they whom He gathers round Him in the heavenly fields. One of their number is the sheep He carries on His shoulders. The fish, one of the two articles of food with which the thousands were fed (Jn 6^{1-14}), represents the mystical union with Christ, and its fruit incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία). The vine points to the heavenly feast, or to its earthly pledge—the Eucharist. The dove, sipping water from the basin or jar, is the soul refreshing itself from the water of life (Rev 22^{1}). The palms symbolize either the palms borne by the blessed (7^{9}) or the wreaths or crowns of those who have been victorious in the race of life (1 Co 9^{25}, 2 Ti 4^{8}). The anchor indicates the hope of He 6^{19} which enters in 'within the veil.' The ship and lighthouse typify the dangerous voyage across the ocean of life to the haven of safety. The stag is that of Ps 42^{1}, and represents the soul's thirst for God.

The paintings of the catacombs have been fully described by two recent writers. Wilpert, in his *Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, has classified the paintings, reproducing all that are important and giving his interpretations of their symbolism. Von Sybel, in his *Christliche Antike*, has reviewed the subject on the ground provided by his predecessor's labours. He also reproduces many of the paintings and states his own conclusions in a lucid style and with much wealth of learning.

The symbolism of the later centuries has the

[1] *Trans. and Proc. Royal Soc. S. Australia*, xxxix. [1915] 494 f.

same general character. As sin and misery increase on the earth, fear plays a larger part in the Church's symbolism. The torments of the lost become more conspicuous than the joys of the blessed. A final judgment of all mankind displaces the earlier individual judgment and assumes truly terrifying aspects. The figure of Christ becomes more stern and awful, and, as it does so, the person of the Virgin Mother takes His place as Protector and Advocate.[1] She is invested with steadily-growing dignity and is separated more and more from human infirmity. The Church becomes a figure of regal authority. In what has been said[2] to be 'perhaps the finest mediæval personification' —the sculpture on Strassburg Cathedral — she appears as a royal lady, with the crown upon her head and the banner of victory and the chalice in her hand. Elsewhere Christ is seen crowning her from the Cross, or she receives His blood in her chalice. Thus, whether in earlier or in later art, the symbolism alike points beyond the tomb.

We may now proceed to deal in greater detail with the separate symbols. They will be found to gather, for the most part, round two central subjects: (1) Christ, regarded as the author of eternal life, and (2) the heavenly state.

1. The author of eternal life.—Christ is represented in all our Gospels as the giver of eternal life to those who accept and follow Him. The synoptists amply confirm His declaration in the Fourth Gospel: 'He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement, but hath passed out of death into life' (Jn 5^{24}; cf. Mt $10^{32.\,39}$ 19^{29}, Lk $9^{24.\,26}$, etc.). There can be no doubt that, whatever the Kingdom of God may have meant to the first Jewish disciples, it represented an inseparable association with Christ, here and hereafter, as Master and Saviour. To the Gentile world Christ, we may safely say, appeared as, above all else, a deliverer from the power of death. He had taken flesh that 'through death he might . . . deliver all them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage' (He 2^{14}). He had 'abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel' (2 Ti 1^{10}). These and similar passages were probably understood by the earliest believers much as they are by ordinary Christians to-day. They were taken to mean that the faithful disciple would find Christ waiting for him, when death was past, and that Christ would then lead him into a better and happier existence than he had hitherto known, better and happier because it was nearer to God. Christians generally would not perplex themselves then, any more than they do now, with questions regarding the precise nature or locality of this future existence. The 'eternal life' which in the Fourth Gospel is the equivalent of Messianic blessedness was probably understood by the great majority of readers as a life in which the disciple would 'see' God, and which would not come to an end as earthly life does. Far as this is from exhausting the meaning of the word 'eternal,' it is difficult to suppose that the word can ever have conveyed, or does even now convey, to the ordinary Christian more than this simple interpretation. Of this better life, to be known hereafter, Christ had given a foretaste or prophecy during His earthly ministry. The blind then received their sight, the lame walked, the lepers were cleansed, the deaf heard, the dead were raised, and the poor had good tidings preached to them (Mt 11^{5}). It is this power of God to save from death and harm that finds expression in the paintings of the catacombs. Christ appears as the son of God foretold by prophetic voices. His ministry has been heralded by many previous displays of God's saving power. He has actually shown Himself to be the raiser of the dead, the restorer of the blind, and the healer of the sick. He waits for His disciples beyond death to lead them into the heavenly pastures. Such are the subjects and implications of the symbolism.

(*a*) *OT types.*—Scenes from the OT which were especially held to typify this deliverance recur with great frequency on the tombs. These are the salvation of Isaac, when he was about to be slain in sacrifice by Abraham, the salvation of Noah in the Ark, the restoration of Job to his former prosperity (Job $42^{10.\,12}$), the rescue of Jonah from the jaws of the sea-monster, and the preservation of the three Hebrew youths in the flaming furnace. Some features in the symbolism of these paintings deserve particularly to be noted. In the representations of Abraham's contemplated sacrifice it is the rescue of Isaac from death that the painter desires to symbolize. This is plain from the attitude in which Isaac is represented when the design of the picture permits. He appears with extended arms—a posture of prayer or adoration of which more is said below. This is also the attitude of Noah as he stands in the Ark, and of the three children in the furnace. There is no suggestion in the paintings of the theological meanings afterwards found in Abraham's projected sacrifice. It may also be observed that the Deity is represented here, as generally or often in the earliest Christian art, by an outstretched hand. No attempt is made to delineate His features. There are no representations of the Trinity such as we find afterwards. Of all Biblical types Jonah has been the most frequently chosen by these painters. He forms the subject of 129 separate pictures which have come to light. It is to be observed that he does not here appear as a type of the resurrection of Christ, as he does in Mt 12^{40}. Nor is it the repentance of the Ninevites at his preaching (Mt 12^{41}) that the painters wish to symbolize. He is represented as an example of God's saving power. Sometimes he forms the subject of three or four connected pictures. We first see him standing on the deck of the vessel and about to be cast into the sea. We then see the monster vomiting him out towards the land. He next appears resting under the gourd, which takes the form of an arbour like those in paradise. There may be a fourth picture where he reclines in an attitude of dejection, his head resting on his hand.[1]

(*b*) *The sacred infancy.*—The divine childhood is depicted on a number of tombs. One of the most beautiful paintings in the catacombs[2] is the picture in the Priscilla cemetery of the Christ-child on His mother's breast. The mother bends slightly forward as if to suckle the child. The child's hand is spread out over the mother's breast, but the face, with wonderful eyes, is half turned towards the spectator. Above the heads of mother and child two stars are indicated in an oblique direction. To the left stands a man in mantle and sandals who has in his left hand a written roll and with his right points to the star above. This figure probably represents, not Joseph (who, as far as is known, does not appear in early Christian art), but a prophet, either Isaiah, who pointed to the light of the Messianic age (60^{1-6}), or Balaam (Nu 24^{17}, Rev 22^{16}), who told of the star to arise out of Jacob. If this identification be correct, it is, as von Sybel says,[3] 'one more evidence that at least the earlier Catacomb painting was in no sense historical, but entirely symbolical art.' The picture belongs to the beginning of the 2nd century.

Another incident of the sacred infancy frequently

[1] See art. 'Mary,' in *HDB*.
Schulze art. 'Sinnbilder,' in *PRE*[3] xviii. 392.

[1] Von Sybel, p. 216 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 247.
[3] *Ib.* p. 249.

depicted is the visit of the Magi. They are generally represented as three in number, although the painter may be led by the exigencies of space to increase them to four or reduce them to two.

'The definite determination of their number as three, their designation as kings, the ascription to them of proper names (Kaspar, Melchior, Balthasar), the differentiation of their ages—to this legendary web antiquity only contributed the first threads. Its elaboration was the work of the Middle Ages.'[1]

The Annunciation (Lk $1^{26ff.}$) forms the subject of two paintings, one belonging to the end of the 2nd and the other to the 3rd century.[2] Mary is seated. The angel, in the form of a man, makes the announcement standing, as a visitor who has just entered the house. The relative postures of the two figures can be explained without the supposition of an intention to claim for Mary a higher dignity than for the angel. The two paintings may presuppose, but cannot be held to go beyond, the Gospel narratives.

On the other hand, Mary's perpetual virginity finds constant expression in mediæval art. The OT provides many images of inviolability which are applied to Mary. She is the 'fons signatus,' the 'hortus conclusus,' and the 'turris' of the Song of Solomon (4^{15} 4^{12} 4^{4}). The christianized *Physiologus*—a mediæval bestiary or book of animals, real and fabulous, with allegorical explanations[3]—supplied the legend of the unicorn, a fabulous animal which could be tamed only by being caught in the lap of a pure virgin. Ezk 44^{2} provided the symbol of the barred door, Jg 6^{37} that of Gideon's fleece watered by the dew from heaven. The number and variety of these symbols show the value assigned to the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity by the mediæval Church.[4]

(*c*) *The Divine Healer.*—The Gospel miracles, of which there are numerous representations in the catacombs, are evidences of God's desire to release humanity from its plagues. In the heavenly city of the Apocalypse there was to be neither sorrow nor death (Rev 21^{4}). To this divine purpose the healings of Christ bore emphatic witness. His ministry was a short-lived anticipation of the Messianic Age (Mt $11^{4f.}$). The beneficent power, then displayed in a few instances, would hereafter be seen in the fullness of its strength. It is an evidence of the authority rapidly acquired by the Fourth Gospel that the miracle most frequently represented in the catacombs is the raising of Lazarus (50 examples have been discovered). We remember how both the sisters greet the Saviour with the words, 'If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died' (Jn $11^{21.\,32}$). We are intended to regard the presence of Christ as incompatible with death, or at least with its bereaving power. Other healings which may with certainty be identified are that of the paralytic (Mk $2^{1ff.}$ and ‖), where the man appears walking with his bed on his shoulder, and that of the blind man, where we see Christ touching with His finger the man's closed eyes. Another unmistakable scene is the cure of the issue of blood (Mk 5^{25} and ‖). The woman comes behind the Saviour as He walks with two disciples, and kneels that she may touch the hem of His robe. Other paintings have no distinctive features which would justify certain identification.

(*d*) *The Cross.*—The absence from the earlier catacombs of what has now become the distinctive Christian emblem is full of significance. The use of the cross as a separate symbol appears to date from the campaign of Constantine against Maxentius (A.D. 312), when Constantine put the cross upon the shields of his soldiers. Previous to this date we find the cross mentioned in one inscription in the catacombs, and appearing doubtfully in two ceiling-paintings. Both inscription and paintings belong to the 2nd century. The monogram of Christ  (*e.g.*, ἐν  , δοῦλος ) appears in inscriptions of which some may possibly be anterior to Constantine, but its general use dates from the reign of this emperor. It has accordingly become customary to regard both the cross and the monogram as indicating a date not earlier than the 4th century. It should also be observed that the only known reference to the Passion in the catacombs previous to the 4th cent. is what is believed to be a representation of the crowning with thorns in the Pretextatus cemetery.[1] The absence of any symbol of the Passion from the earlier tombs may readily be accounted for by the fact that their paintings were intended to display, not death, but the victory over death. Even when the cross does begin to appear, it seems to be introduced, not for its own sake, but as a support for the rose-leaves which gather round it. It thus becomes a beautified or transfigured cross. We are reminded of the symbolism of the Passion-narrative in the Fourth Gospel, where we see Christ reigning with sovereign authority from the Cross, and the majesty of the Divine Sufferer shining through the indignities which strive in vain to obscure it. The foliage-crosses of the catacombs—concealed or 'dissimulated' crosses—have indeed been traced to the supposed desire of the Christians to avoid observation. Apart, however, from the fact that such crosses do not begin to appear until the 4th cent., it is difficult to believe that the other emblems which do appear would not have clearly indicated these vaults as Christian burying-places. It seems more natural to suppose that the transfiguration of the Cross effected by St. Paul's theology required much reflexion before it could find emblematic expression. The Cross was at first a stumbling-block (Gal 5^{11}) and only slowly became a symbol of glory (6^{14}).[2]

It will thus have been observed that the earliest representations of the Passion were avowed symbols, suggesting, but not depicting, the sacrifice of the God-man. Realism becomes more pronounced as we travel down the centuries. The crucifix—an inevitable development of the cross—does not appear in churches till after the 7th century.[3] The implements of the Passion (hammer, claws, etc.) become independent emblems towards the end of the Middle Ages, when indulgences began to be attached to their veneration. The lamb with blood streaming from its breast, and carrying the cross or a banner upon which the cross was depicted, became a favourite symbol on the portals of Latin churches. The pelican (taken from the *Physiologus*), who tears open its breast to feed its young, was used to represent the sacrificial death of Christ.[4]

(*e*) *The Good Shepherd.*—The favourite symbol of Christ among those who constructed and used the catacombs was that of the Good Shepherd. This image takes here the place of the crucifix in later art. It appears in two different forms in the Gospels. In Lk 15^{3-7} the shepherd is seen bringing home on his shoulders, 'rejoicing,' a sheep that has been lost. In Jn 10^{1-17} the shepherd leads his sheep to and from the pastures and protects them

[1] Von Sybel, p. 250.
[2] Wilpert, p. 202; von Sybel, p. 252.
[3] See Cahier and Martin, *Mélanges d'archéologie*, Paris, 1847–56, 'Curiosités mystérieuses,' ch. vii. pp. 107–117.
[4] Schulze, *PRE*³ xviii. 392.

[1] Wilpert, p. 226; von Sybel, p. 292.
[2] For the three forms of the cross in later symbolism—*decussata*, or St. Andrew's cross,  ; *commissa*, Tau or Egyptian cross,  ; and *immissa*,  —see art. Cross.
[3] See *DCA*, s.v. 'Crucifix.'
[4] Schulze, *PRE*³ xviii. 392.

from the wolf, even at the price of his own life. It is added by Christ in a subsequent verse (v.[27f.]): 'My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.' Both representations are of frequent occurrence on the tombs. We see the shepherd pasturing his flock, and carrying upon his shoulders a sheep, whose legs he clasps sometimes with one and sometimes with both hands. There seems to be little doubt that this favourite symbol, like the others in the catacombs, is intended to transport the mind beyond death. The painters wished to indicate the power of Christ over death. Those who died, no less than those who lived, were under His protection, 'the sheep of his pasture.' Thus, where a landscape is indicated in the paintings it is invariably that of the garden or park which typifies paradise. The image, so understood, would appear to have passed into the early burial prayers of both the Greek and the Latin liturgies.[1] Thus, when A. P. Stanley[2] points to the frequent image of the Good Shepherd as an evidence of the joyousness of early Christian feeling, we must remember that the sheep in these pictures are in all probability those who have passed from the vicissitudes of the world into the safe haven of eternal rest.

A brief reference may here be made to the emblems which early Christian art adopted from Greek and Roman mythology. We cannot measure the precise significance which these emblems possessed for the Christians who used or looked at them. They may have been little more than the current decorations of the period; or they may have had a distinct didactic purpose, and been intended to suggest that Christ was the reality to which the heathen mythology pointed in unconscious and hesitating prophecy. So Eros and Psyche appear in many of the catacomb paintings, and in five different pictures where we should have expected the Good Shepherd we find Orpheus with his lyre.

(*f*) *The Judge of the dead.*—In some paintings Christ is seen seated upon a raised platform, plainly in the character of Judge. In one of these[2] we see a male figure in the posture of an *orans* between two taller forms, who point to him as if they were his introducers or sponsors. In the background upon a raised pedestal is Christ, who stretches His open right hand over the head of the middle figure, while in His left He holds a roll. In Wilpert's opinion, the middle figure represents one of the dead who has already stood before the judgment-seat of Christ, while the two other figures represent his advocates.

These representations of judgment convey some important suggestions. The face of Christ in the picture described above is grave without being stern. It must be remembered that no authentic likeness of Christ appears to have been preserved by His disciples. The varieties given to His face and figure from the earliest times put this beyond reasonable doubt. Irenæus[4] shows that no trustworthy portrait existed in his day. To the same effect are the words of Augustine.[5] The disciples were thus left to their own insight and skill to depict His likeness. The painters of the catacombs seem to have given Him the typical male head of their time. This type was during the first two centuries a beardless face with the hair closely cut. It was followed in the 3rd cent. by a face, still beardless, but surrounded by long hair falling upon the forehead and down the back. A still later type was a bearded face framed in flowing or curling locks. If the painters were guided by the prevalent fashions of wearing the hair and beard, it is obvious that we cannot infer much from the apparently increasing seriousness of the countenance.[1] The growth of asceticism in subsequent ages had a marked influence. The early effort after beauty was abandoned. Manly beauty was associated in the mind of the monastic Church only with barbarian soldiers. The words of Is 53[2], 'There is no beauty that we should desire him,' shaped the artist's conceptions. The figure of Christ in the Church of Galla Placidia in Ravenna (*c.* A.D. 450), when compared with the portrait to be seen in the Church of Apollinaris in the same city, painted about a century later, shows the transition from the earlier ideal, shaped by the love of beauty, to the ascetic or melancholy conceptions of later art.[2]

These representations seem also to make it plain that the judgment symbolized was individual and thought of as taking place immediately after death. The departed appears at once before the judgment-seat of Christ (2 Co 5[10]). The approving sentence of the Judge is the signal for his immediate entrance into paradise. Thus in one painting[3] we see two figures, one on either side, drawing back a curtain to admit into paradise one of the departed, who stands in the centre in the posture of an *orans*. In another painting two of the blessed move eagerly forward to welcome a new arrival, who advances in the same attitude of devotion. We find no representation in the catacombs of a general judgment of mankind. Nor do the paintings, as archæologists of all schools agree, give any indication of belief in an 'intermediate state' or a period between death and judgment. All those who die in Christ are conceived as passing at once from their death-beds into heaven.[4]

When we pass into the subsequent centuries, death and judgment assume terrifying shapes. The destructive power of death is symbolized by a man who weeds the garden of life or fells its trees, or (after Rev 6[8]) as a rider with drawn bow, above all as an emaciated old man who finally reaches the form of a skeleton with scythe and hour-glass. 'The dance of death' appears to have originated in the plague known as 'the Black Death.' It quickly gained a wide popularity, which it retained far beyond the Middle Ages. The soul, leaving the body, was regularly represented as a little human figure, naked and sexless, emerging from the mouth. In pictures of the Last Judgment popular imaginations of hell took the place of the earlier representations of paradise. Hell was symbolized by the open throat of a monster (after the leviathan of Job 41), into which men and women, masters and servants, priests and people, were thrust. Devils in every shape did their work of derision and torture under the supervision of the prince of hell. To him the popular imagination transferred everything it knew of monsters, and thus there arose the being of many shapes and names with goat's horns, cloven hoof, bat's wings, and a tail. He even took the form of a blackbird, and, as such, flew into the mouth of Judas at the Last Supper, and whispered into the ear of Pilate as he sat in judgment. Popular humour may well have had its share in shaping these fancies.[5]

2. The heavenly state. — St. Paul represents Christ as the second Adam, who undid the consequences of the first Adam's transgression (Ro 5). By the early Christians heaven was pictured as a restored Eden. The word 'paradise' appears to

[1] Von Sybel, p. 242; *ap.* Muratori, *Liturgia Romana Vetus*, Naples, 1760, i. 751: 'We pray God faithfully that He may grant [to the departed] that, redeemed from death, released from his sins, reconciled to the Father, brought home on the shoulders of the good Shepherd, he may enjoy the society of the blessed.'

[2] *Christian Institutions*, London, 1881, ch. xiii., 'The Roman Catacombs.'

[3] Wilpert, p. 394; von Sybel, p. 271.

[4] *Contra Hær.* i. 25. 6.

[5] *De Trin.* vii. 4 f.

[1] Von Sybel, p. 281; Wilpert, p. 106; E. von Dobschütz, 'Christusbilder,' in *TU*, new ser., iii. [1899].

[2] See art. 'Jesus Christ, Representations of,' in *DCA*.

[3] Wilpert, p. 467; von Sybel, p. 267.

[4] Wilpert, p. 430; von Sybel, p. 273.

[5] Schulze, *PRE*[3] xviii. 393.

have been originally Persian and to have been introduced into Greek literature by Xenophon.[1] The Greeks seem to have passed it on to the Hebrews. It appears in the OT only in writings subsequent to the Greek period (Ec 2[5], Ca 4[13], Neh 2[8]), and bore the meaning of a park with trees, shrubs, and grass, and tenanted by wild animals, such as surrounded the residences of eastern potentates. Such parks were commonly enclosed by a wall or trellis-shaped fence. Trees, shrubs, flowers, and the trellised fencing in the catacomb paintings are invariably symbols of paradise.[2]

On the threshold we meet with the figures known as *orantes*. These are forms, male or female—the latter are much more numerous than the former—standing with arms either fully extended or bent at the elbows, and with opened hands. The *orantes* give rise to questions which are still in debate. Whom, in the first place, are these figures intended to represent? Against the supposition that they are either likenesses of the departed or intended to represent their souls[3] we have to place the fact that a female *orans* often appears painted on the tomb of a man, and also to remember that the paintings appear to have been sometimes executed before the tombs were filled. It seems therefore most natural to regard the *orantes* as ideal figures, poetic representations of the blessed dead. Again, what is the meaning of the outstretched arms and open hands? Are we to understand the attitude as one of prayer or one of adoration? And, if it be prayer that is symbolized, for what do the suppliants pray? The answers to these questions are not unaffected by dogmatic interests. According to the opinion of Wilpert, the *orantes* are praying for the salvation of their friends who still remain upon the earth. In some of the inscriptions we find the survivors asking for the prayers of the departed.[4] On the other hand, we meet with the attitude in some cases where it unquestionably symbolizes adoration, or at least the prayer in which entreaty loses itself in submission. Thus in the OT scenes of deliverance from death the rescued appear often in the attitude of *orantes*. So Noah stands in the Ark, and Daniel among the lions, and so the three children appear in the furnace. Yet in each of these cases the deliverance has already been granted. If anything is asked for, it can only be the continuance of something begun. So the new inmates of paradise seem to stand in an attitude of wondering recognition. In the highest Christian prayer entreaty ceases because the human will is one with the divine. The lifting up of the hands was a Jewish as well as a Christian practice (Is 1[15], 1 Ti 2[8]).

3. The heavenly feast.—The Christians who buried their dead in the catacombs had two sacraments, both of which are frequently symbolized in the paintings. In baptism the believer was admitted among the number of the elect. He became a 'saint' in the original sense of that word. On the tombs we find representations both of the baptism of Christ by His forerunner and of the Church's baptism. There are also three pictures of a fisherman, seated on the bank and drawing a fish out of the water with his hook. The figure may point to baptism and to the words of Jesus addressed to the disciples: 'Come ye after me, and I will make you fishers of men' (Mt 4[19] and ‖). If this be so, it would supply an additional reason for the adoption of the fish as a Christian symbol.

In the Eucharist the believer partook of the bread which came down from heaven, and of which he who ate would not die (Jn 6[50]). In it he had the prophecy of the heavenly feast. When Jesus took leave of His disciples, He told them of the new wine which He would drink with them in the Kingdom of God (Lk 22[18]). The Crucifixion shattered for a brief interval the hope raised by the prophetic words. Despondency gave way to renewed confidence when it became clear that God had not 'allowed His Holy One to see corruption.' So 'day by day, continuing stedfastly with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread at home, they [the disciples] did take their food with gladness and singleness of heart' (Ac 2[46]). It is no longer possible to mark the steps by which this early 'breaking of bread' passed into the Church's Eucharist. It is enough to recognize that what afterwards became the ecclesiastical rite originally formed part of the corporate feast of the Christian society. If the presence of the heavenly Christ was, as we can well believe, more vividly realized during these feasts than at any other time, the disciples would naturally associate them with the peace or joy which awaited them hereafter. The fellowship of the earthly feast would provide the mould for their anticipations of future happiness. They might recall the Biblical assurances: 'Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God' (Lk 14[15]), 'Blessed are they which are bidden to the marriage supper of the Lamb' (Rev 19[9]), 'To him that overcometh, to him will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of God' (2[7]). It is profitless to dwell upon the inconsistency of picturing spiritual happiness by an image which appeals only to man's bodily appetites. For in the 'new world' which, whether it be peopled by corporeal or incorporeal beings, is in any case to be the scene of fruition every earthly image, the most attenuated equally with the most material, becomes obsolete. An instrument intended for a region surrounded by an atmosphere is useless when the atmosphere is transcended. Thus the most spiritually-minded Christians, restricted by limitations from which they cannot escape, may well continue, as they do, to associate heaven with the 'shout of them that triumph, the song of them that feast.' In the catacomb paintings heavenly happiness is frequently represented by the image of festal joy. The scene of the feast is marked, by the customary indications, as paradise. The guests are to be seen, generally if not always, behind the roll which is the recognized symbol for the cushions used at feasts. Often attendants appear carrying a dish or holding a flagon or wine-cup. In one series of four pictures these attendants take the form of two female figures who are designated by inscriptions as 'Irene' and 'Agape.' They are appealed to by the guests to supply warm water or to mix the wine ('Irene, da calda'; 'Agape, misce nobis'). One of the figures seems thus to symbolize the peace of heaven, and the other the love from which the Christian love-feast derived its name, and which was one of St. Paul's three abiding things.[1] The food indicated in these pictures consists invariably of bread and fish. Sometimes a number of baskets, filled with small round loaves, appear either in front of the cushion-roll or on either side of it. The miraculous feeding of the thousands was plainly the model in the painter's mind. This miracle, connected by St. John (6[30]) with the 'bread of life,' was an anticipation of the heavenly feast. Similarly prophetic was the Church's Eucharist, which in some of the paintings seems to be expressly depicted and made a symbol of its heavenly antitype. It need only be added that the fish, from its presence in the miracle, as well perhaps as for the reason given above, appears to have established itself as a symbol for a Christian disciple, long before the acrostic was discovered: ἰχθύς = Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Σωτήρ.

It will appear from the foregoing summary that, while Christian symbolism points persistently onwards towards an ideal world, conceived as lying beyond death, the hope thus expressed is sustained by experiences which are prized for their own sake, and also as earnests of things yet to come. Eternal life, the ultimate blessing of the Fourth Gospel, is there represented as both present and future. So the Messianic kingdom of the earlier evangelists was yet to come, while it was also 'within' or 'among' the disciples who walked with Jesus and saw God in Him. The Church which continued His ministry in the ages that followed was likewise a prophet of what was yet to be, and also a teacher of men amidst the dangers and obligations of actual life. Thus in the Middle Ages, while the three theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) appear repeatedly on church porches, pulpits, and monuments, the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) also assume their symbolic shapes. The Church is a teacher of common-place morality, while at the same time she must bear witness to truths whose validity cannot be demonstrated by everyday experience. The Christians who built the catacombs tell us in many inscriptions of the central hope with which they consigned their dead to the tomb. Their desire was that the departed might 'see God' ('Vivat in Deo,' 'Vives in æternum,' 'Deum videre cupiens vidit'). Such is the hope, vague and yet real, changing but steadfast, which has created the Christian symbols of the past, and may be trusted to fashion new ones as the human heart becomes more proficient in the interpretation of its own language.

LITERATURE.—J. Wilpert, *Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, 2 vols., Freiburg i. Br., 1903; L. von Sybel, *Christliche Antike*, Marburg, 1906-09, i.; G. B. de Rossi, *La Roma sotterranea cristiana*, 3 vols., Rome, 1864-77; V. Schulze, *Archäolog. Studien über altchristliche Monumente*, Vienna, 1880, art. 'Sinnbilder,' in *PRE*[3]; C. Cahier and A. Martin [Jesuit Fathers], *Mélanges d'archéologie, d'histoire et de littérature . . . du moyen âge*, 4 vols., Paris, 1848-56, *Nouveaux mélanges d'archéologie, d'hist. et de litt. sur le moyen âge*, do. 1873-75; F. Cabrol, *DACL*, *s.v.*; R. St. J. Tyrwhitt, *DCA*, *s.v.*

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1 See a learned note in von Sybel, p. 161.
2 Von Sybel, p. 167.
3 De Rossi, *Roma sotterranea cristiana*, ii. 324, *Bull. Christ.*, 1867, 1885, quoted by von Sybel.
4 'In orationibus tuis roges pro nobis quia scimus te in Christo' (Wilpert, p. 211; von Sybel, p. 204).

1 Wilpert, p. 470; von Sybel, p. 297; de Rossi, *Bull. Christ.*, 1882.

SYMBOLISM (Greek and Roman).—A symbol is a visible or audible sign or emblem of some thought, emotion, or experience, interpreting what can be really grasped only by the mind and imagination by something which enters into the field of observation.

So far as Greek and Roman religion are concerned, we need speak only of two kinds of symbols—symbolic representation by means of actions or words and symbolic representation in art.

Religion, taking its rise in experience and belief, tends, as it becomes less literal and less insistent, to give rise to symbolism; and this is true also of that lower kind of religion which is called magic. When primitive men thought that by certain actions and words they could compel spiritual powers to do their bidding, or when they thought that the painting of animal forms on the walls of their caves gave them power over the animals depicted, they had not yet reached the stage of symbolism, but had taken the first steps towards it; when they poured water on the ground to produce rain, they thought that there was an actual causal connexion between the ritual act and the fall of rain. But just as, when religious belief decays, the feelings which gave rise to it often find scope in the field of poetry, so, when actual belief in the power of sympathetic magic grows less, the actions and ceremonies to which it led are often continued in symbolism.

I. *GREEK.*—1. **In local cults.**—The local cults of Greece, which went on at a lower level, and in a more conservative key, than the religion of poetry and of philosophy, preserved a great deal of symbolism. Even in Athens the great festivals embodied such traces of primitive religion. At the Brauronian festival young girls, impersonating bears, danced a bear-dance in honour of Artemis. At the Diasia the priest who struck down the sacrificial ox was accused of murder and in turn accused his instrument, the axe, which was condemned and solemnly cast into the sea. In the worship of the dead flowers and fruits gradually took the place of the more serious offerings of an earlier time. With the dead were buried, not, as in primitive times, real armour and ornaments, but only symbolical offerings, money of gold-leaf, animals of terra-cotta, and the like. Sometimes these objects were only depicted in relief on the tombstone. The terrible human sacrifices once brought to the sterner deities were commuted into sacrifices of animals, sometimes clad in human fashion, or mere images of human beings. Naturally it was in the mysteries, where the survivals of primitive religion were most rife, that symbolism was most prominent. Mere ceremonial ablutions took the place of actual immersions as a ceremony of purification. The sacred meal which the deity shared with his votaries became a mere ceremonial tasting of some special food. At Eleusis, in the great mysteries, the votaries emptied two vessels filled with water, turning to east and west and repeating the sacred formula ὕε, κύε ('Sky pour rain; earth bear grain'), which was directed to earth and sky, and was evidently a survival of an ancient magical formula for the production of rain.

The suppliant who visited the cave and oracle of Trophonius at Lebadeia, before he went into the presence of the hero, drank from two springs, that of oblivion and that of memory, to signify that he was to forget the past and to remember the revelation which was to come to him. Originally, in all probability, the water of these springs was supposed to have some actual effect on the votary, as had the spring in the cave of the Clarian Apollo at Colophon on the priest who drank of it before soothsaying. But in the time of Pausanias[1] the action had become merely ritual and symbolical.

The sacred marriage was common to several cults in Greece. When the notion of the deity was somewhat crude, women were shut into the temple, to stand in the same sexual relation to him in which, according to tradition, Cassandra stood to Apollo. But, as time went on, such dedication became only symbolical, the place of the victim being sometimes taken by the wife of the priest.

As the mystery religions spread and their outlines hardened, a new element came in, which was destined to take further development in Christianity—the element of authority. Symbolic rites were practised, not on the ground of mere tradition, but by ordination of the recognized hierophants of each cultus, who claimed a divine communication. This element, however, scarcely belonged to the earlier religious view of either Greeks or Romans, among whom authority in religion was scarcely recognized apart from tradition. Cults had an open field and freely competed one with another, except those with which the safety of the State was supposed to be connected.

It seems that almost all ritual which does not appeal to the intelligence is in character symbolic. And the notable feature in symbolic ritual is that, since it appeals mainly to the emotions, it may be interpreted or understood in a great variety of ways. At the mysteries of Eleusis, *e.g.*, some of the votaries might regard the whole proceedings as a sort of spell to cause fertility; some might be genuine worshippers of the great goddesses Demeter and Persephone; some might, like Cicero, find in the ritual a promise and pledge of a life beyond the grave. Everything depended on the religious outlook, the exalted or materialist beliefs of the votary himself.

'Aristotle,' says Synesius,[2] is of opinion 'that the initiated learned nothing precisely; but that they received impressions, were put into a suitable frame of mind.'

Thus symbolic ritual has a great attraction for persons of emotional temperament, while it is distasteful to those of strongly developed intelligence, who like definite views. Compared with clear doctrine, it is like music compared with painting. It was by no means well suited to the minds of the more cultivated Greeks.

2. **In art.**—In early Greek art symbolism appears in two forms: in representing by some simple figure an idea such as a quality or attribute of one of the deities and in representing the whole of anything by depicting some characteristic part of it.

A few symbols of the deities seem to have been taken over by the Greeks from the pre-historic peoples whom they displaced in Crete and Hellas. Such is the double-edged axe, which is found in the palace of Cnossus in Crete in the third millennium B.C. in scenes of cultus, and which belongs to a male or female deity of the people. This axe became among the Greeks a symbol of Dionysus. The snake also appears as an attribute of a goddess of Crete frequently represented, and later was inherited by the Greek Erinyes. But most of the symbols of the gods of the Greek pantheon seem to be more immediately derived from the art of the nations of Syria and Mesopotamia. Most of these symbols were displaced by growing anthropomorphism. This statement requires some explanation. On early bronzes and terra-cottas found on Greek sites, dating from the 7th or 6th cent., the goddess Artemis is figured as winged and holding in her two hands lions, panthers, or swans. On the chest of Cypselus, a

[1] IX. xxxix.
[2] Aristotle, *Frag.*, ed. E. Heitz, Leipzig, 1869, p. 40.

7th cent. work preserved at Olympia, Pausanias[1] saw such a figure, which surprised him by its strangeness. It was strictly symbolical; the wings were not for flight, but only to typify swiftness, the lions were added to show the power of the goddess over animals, whose mistress (πότνια) she was. We can trace this representation step by step through Greek art and see how in maturer times the swiftness of the deity was indicated by her stature and slimness of build, her power over animals by the stag or dog who accompanied her. A similar transformation takes place in the case of Zeus. On early coins of Elis an eagle appears as a substitute for the god; later he bears the eagle in his hand. Later still, as in the great statue of Pheidias, a golden eagle was an adornment of the sceptre of Zeus. Thus, as time went on, merely outward symbols tended to disappear or at all events to become unimportant; and the meaning which they had conveyed was expressed in the type of the deity. Certain symbols, however, held their ground. The thunderbolt of Zeus, indicating him as the lord of storms (Ζεὺς ὕετιος), is usual in the 5th century. To express this feature in the type of the deity would not be easy. The bow, as symbol of the rays of the sun-god,[2] is usual in the hand of Apollo in archaic representations; later the lyre is far more usual. Even wings do not altogether disappear, but they mostly lose their merely symbolic character and are used for flight, as in the case of Victory and Eros, an innovation ascribed to the sculptor Archermus of Chios (*c.* 570 B.C.). The god Hermes, even in late art, carries wings on his cap or his heels—a survival of archaic symbolism.

Coins furnish us with many examples of symbols belonging to the deities. In the 7th and 6th centuries the obverse of electrum and silver coins usually presents some very simple symbolical device—a griffin at Teos and Abdera, a thunderbolt at Olympia, a wolf at Argos, an owl at Athens; and then, after the archaic period, this type is usually banished to the reverse of the coin, and in its place we have the head of the deity to whom the type belongs. It must, however, be observed that, when numismatists speak of a symbol on a coin, they use the word in a technical sense, to indicate not a symbolical type, but one of those small and subsidiary devices often placed in the field of a coin by magistrates who were responsible for its issue—a device probably often taken from the private signet of such magistrates.

Another phase of symbolism is found when in artistic representation a part is taken to stand for the whole. This often appears on Greek vases and reliefs. Pausanias[3] observes that, in the painting representing Hades by Polygnotus at Delphi, the grove of Persephone is represented by one tree. So on vases a temple or a house is often represented by a single column, a river by a swimming fish, a sea-shore by a shell, and so forth. It is probable that this was how the scenes in tragedies were represented on the background of the stage. It is really a sort of shorthand, and altogether parallel to the process by which in Egypt and elsewhere picture-writing came into being.

Symbolical or allegorical impersonations are to be found in Greek art at all periods, though more often in archaic art and that of Hellenistic times than in the greatest period. On the chest of Cypselus, in the 7th cent., we are told by Pausanias[4] that Night was figured, carrying two boys, one white and one black, who represented Sleep and Death respectively. Justice as a beautiful figure scourged Injustice, who had the form of an ugly woman. Fate, with teeth and claws like a wild beast, claimed Polynices as a victim. Even in the great age we have such figures as Virtue, Nemesis, Opportunity (Καιρός). But it is in the Hellenistic age, in the great cities of the East, that symbolic personalities most abound. In the celebrated procession of Ptolemy II. of Egypt[1] we have figures of the Year and the Seasons; in that of Antiochus IV. of Syria[2] we find statues of Night, Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning, and Noon. On the coins of Alexandria under the Romans we find a remarkable set of fanciful figures—Euthenia (Prosperity), Kratesis (Dominion), and the like.

The great Ionian cities of Asia Minor appear on monuments of the Roman age in the persons of the legendary Amazons whom they claimed as their foundresses.[3] Smyrna on coins carries a double-axe and has a prow of a ship at her feet; Cyme holds a dolphin and a trident; Teos, a city renowned for vines, carries the thyrsus of Dionysus; Ephesus carries poppies and ears of corn, and so forth. In each case the attributes embody the situation or the produce of the city. In a noted Pompeian painting[4] we have well-characterized impersonations of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The list might be almost indefinitely lengthened.

Symbolism in Greece, in the great period, often takes fine poetic forms, as when the sun-god in his chariot on the pediment of the Parthenon represents the East in the morning, or boys plunging into the sea represent the setting stars on a fine vase in the British Museum.[5] In the same age rivers are represented by man-headed bulls, as on the coins of Gela and Catana in Sicily; nymphs have cows' horns; Alexander the Great appears on the money of his general Lysimachus with the ram's horn of Ammon.

But, in spite of such examples as these, there is a broad line of distinction between the use of symbolism in Oriental art—the art of Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, and India—and the use in Greek art. Oriental art is content with adding symbols to the human forms of deities, without caring for their beauty or appropriateness. In Egypt and Babylon we find human bodies joined to the heads of all kinds of animals—lion, bull, jackal, hawk, and so on. And Indian figures of deities represent them with several heads, many arms (each holding some attribute), necklaces of skulls, and the like. Oriental art tries to represent in this way qualities and attributes which sculpture or painting could not otherwise portray—elements of mysticism, mythological tales, or sometimes the ideas of pantheistic religion. Greek art avoids monstrous forms as a rule, though it inherits a few specially suitable for artistic development, such as the Centaur. And it does not attempt to portray, in sculpture or in painting, anything which lies outside the scope of those arts. Exquisite in form and clear in meaning, its creations do not carry us beyond sense and intellect, do not appeal to the mystical tendencies of men. Thus Greek symbolism has no wide limits.

II. *ROMAN.*—1. **In cult and law.**—In Roman religious ceremonies the symbol held a large place. This was natural, as in quite the early times of the republic there was an invasion of Greek religion and Greek deities, which caused the old rustic religion of the Roman people to survive only in the form of ritual, the meaning of which was in a great degree obscured. Hence the State cultus of Rome was divorced alike from belief and from morality, and, so long as the magistrates performed

[1] v. xix. 9.
[2] Homer, *Il.* i. 45.
[3] x. xxx. 6.
[4] v. xviii.

[1] Athenæus, v. 196.
[2] *Ib.* p. 194.
[3] *JHS* ix. [1888] 56.
[4] W. Helbig, *Wandgemälde Campaniens*, Leipzig, 1868, no. 1113.
[5] *Catalogue*, E 466.

exactly the ceremonies handed down by their ancestors, it mattered little what meaning they attached to those ceremonies or what beliefs they held in religion. The emperor, whether he were a Trajan or a Nero, was always *pontifex maximus* and represented to the gods the State in its religious capacity. Hence the Romans were extremely careful as to the way in which they wore the toga or the cap called *apex*, as to their exact position in relation to the points of the compass, and as to the attitude in which they stood when they were sacrificing. All these details had no doubt some meaning in their origin; but not only are we unable usually to discover what it was, but even the Romans did not know: they blindly followed the tradition, with an uneasy feeling that, unless they did so, some great calamity would overtake the State. Most of these ritual customs were probably derived from the Etruscans, a people at a low level of culture, but exact in all matters of a religion which seems scarcely to have risen above the level of magic.

When an official conducted a sacrifice, he sprinkled the victim with wine and threw over it salt meal; then he made a ritual motion symbolical of slaying it, but the actual butchering was done by attendants.[1] Like the Greeks, the Romans contrived to put in the place of human sacrifices the mere offering of substitutes and symbols.[2]

When the Greek deities migrated to Rome, they took with them their recognized symbols; and the native gods, who were largely identified with the immigrants, also adopted these outward signs of inward powers. Thus in art Greek customs went on, as in fact the artists were usually Greek. So we have on Roman monuments the symbolism of Ephesus and Alexandria. Allegorical and symbolical figures, such as Pudicitia, Ubertas, Annona, appear abundantly on the Roman coins; but they can have had but little serious worship. In short, while symbolism is of importance in relation to Roman cultus, it is unimportant in earlier Roman art, requiring a concrete poetical imagination of which the Romans were destitute.

There was a good deal of symbolism or symbolic ritual in the customs of Roman law; *e.g.*, if a man purchased a slave, he laid hands on him (*mancipatio*) in the presence of witnesses and weighed out at the same time to the seller a piece of money which was accepted as a symbol of the price, *quasi pretii loco*, as Gaius says.[3] We need not be surprised that much symbolism made its way into Christianity in Rome, since it had become a recognized part of the routine of daily life.

2. In art.—In the time of the Roman dominion, as the religion of Mithras and other mystery cults spread from east to west through Europe, the range and power of symbolism increased. We may especially trace on tombstones of the period of the empire, alike in Italy, Gaul, and other regions, a growth of religious symbols mainly having reference to the life beyond the tomb, which was taking an ever larger place in men's thoughts and hopes. Some of the mythological scenes which the Greeks had depicted on tombs, from mere artistic and decorative motives, seem to have been re-interpreted in a more mystic fashion. Such were the rapes of women and the combats of men; and more especially scenes from the lives of Heracles and Orpheus and other heroic persons who had won immortality by great deeds, or had descended into Hades and returned. Some ordinary figures of earlier art—the griffin, the lion, the bull, the cock—became connected with the hope of immortality. The Mithraic shrines of northern Europe contain reliefs in which symbolism seems to run wild, though we know so little about Mithraism that our interpretation of such reliefs is usually conjectural. On this subject the works of Franz Cumont are authoritative. It is impossible here to discuss the question of the symbolism on later pagan tombs. A good account of it will be found in Mrs. Arthur Strong's *Apotheosis and After Life* (1915). This writer, however, goes too far in interpreting almost all the scenes and figures on such tombs in reference to the future life. It is obvious that, unless we keep in restraint the tendency to read mystic meanings into painted and sculptured scenes, we may drift back into the fancy world of Creuzer, who traced the influence of the mysteries everywhere on Greek vases and Roman reliefs. We are on safer ground in speaking of contemporary Christian art, because here we have a literature for comparison.

In the early Christian art[1] of the catacombs and of sarcophagi there is even an increase of symbolism, as compared with contemporary pagan works. This is natural, because the Christians commonly adopted pagan types, only giving them a fresh meaning; *e.g.*, the peacock, which in Greek art belonged to Hera, became to Christians a symbol of the resurrection, probably because the flesh of the peacock was supposed not to decay. Orpheus became an emblem or symbol of Christ. The fish, the sheep, the vine, all acquired a new Christian signification. Probably in many cases the meaning would not be realized by the pagan artist who was called in; and it was safer that the knowledge should be confined to the society. This symbolism is apt to degenerate into something like shorthand: a man carrying a couch refers to the miracle of the healing of the paralytic man; a cock beside Peter to his denial of his Master, and so forth.

The use of symbols in the later Neo-Platonic philosophy is so closely connected with their use in Christianity that it need not be here treated. See art. NEO-PLATONISM.

LITERATURE.—There is no recent work which deals methodically with Greek symbolism. Roman symbolism is treated in Mrs. Arthur Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life*, London, 1915.

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SYMBOLISM (Hindu).—Of all religions of the East, the home of type and imagery, Hinduism makes the most use of symbols. It has formally declared the ultimate truth to be unknowable and indefinable. In all its scheme of practice and teaching it seeks to make definite approach to the reality by suggestive type or symbol—an approach that can never find its goal, but can only draw nearer and nearer, as it points successively, like the ancient Greek philosophers, to the symbol or likeness which most fully and faithfully reflects the true, and embodies the largest part of a reality which in its entirety is inconceivable by the human mind and inexpressible in the language of men. The symbol is the necessary and helpful intermediary between the inadequate capacity of the mind of the would-be worshipper and the incommunicable nature and fullness of the Unknown whom he adores. A complete and adequate description therefore of the Hindu use of type and symbol would require an almost complete exposition of Hindu belief in its many varieties and ramifications. Whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of this the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine are sufficient illustration. All, however, that is practicable within the limits of an article is to indicate the motive or motives that more or less consciously and avowedly have prompted the use of the symbol, to set forth in the briefest possible

[1] G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 352.
[2] *Ib.* p. 355.
[3] i. 119.

[1] Cf. art. SYMBOLISM (Christian).

manner its historical relations in the religious scheme and cult, to define its necessary limits, and to select for illustration and comment a few of the more important types which have occupied a considerable place in the belief and profession of the adherents of the faith. A mere enumeration of the symbols employed would be a large and probably impossible task.

1. Use and purpose of symbols.—The use and purpose of the symbol is twofold: (1) to set forth in visible or audible likeness what cannot be really or fully expressed to the physical eye or ear, or even clearly conceived by the limited faculties of the human mind. All language is in the last resort symbolic, and religious language in an especial degree, for it endeavours to present a mystery, a reality too deep for words. The Hindu faith had at its service a language of the utmost delicacy and flexibility, with a vigorous and fertile growth and an almost unlimited vocabulary, and found itself in a world of tropical luxuriance, with a tropical wealth of beauty and suggestiveness. It was not to be wondered at that it became profuse in type and symbol and laid under contribution all the facts and phenomena of nature to serve its religious and priestly ends. All the great gods had their resemblances, animal or material forms, in which they presented themselves embodied to human sight, which served to recall to the worshipper the deity, whose mind and character they more or less inadequately reflected. Other more rare and refined symbols were presentative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblem of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. The wise man does not worship the symbol, the shape in clay or wood or stone, but is thereby reminded of the invisible substance or reality which they each represent.

(2) The image or symbol serves the purpose also of providing in material and suitable form a convenient object of reverence, to meet the religious need of those whose minds, through darkness and ignorance, are unable to grasp the conception of an unseen formless deity. Such men, if left without a visible object to which their reverence and fear may attach themselves, will wander in a maze of doubt, disquiet, and unbelief. It is better that they should worship erroneously, worship a thing, than that they should not worship at all. There is much that might be urged in favour of the Hindu view that regards the worship of the external symbol as a stepping-stone to higher, clearer forms of belief; it is a view unacknowledged perhaps but not unknown to other faiths. And in Hinduism, whatever may be said of or claimed by the wise and instructed thinker, the *pūjā* of the multitude to the image of the god is reverent and sincere. In some respects also and within definite limits the Indian contention has justified itself that the symbol has proved a signpost and a guide to better, higher thoughts and to a truer worship of Him whom no form can express or language describe.

2. The most important types.—(*a*) The most important symbols are those of the *Brahman*, the undefinable and unknowable origin and source of all. Of the *Brahman* only signs and types can be employed, for the primeval source and sustainer of the universe is beyond and above thought or word. His names or titles are symbolic: *hiraṇyagarbha*, the golden germ, that was in the beginning; *svayambhū*, the self-existent one; *viśvakarman*, the artificer of all things; and many others. The authors of the *Upaniṣads* especially attempt to set forth in symbolic terms the being and nature of that which in the last resort they are obliged to confess is beyond knowledge. *Prāṇa*, the breath, or *vāyu*, the wind, is a frequently recurring type; and it seems to have been felt that by its mysterious and elusive character the *prāṇa* was peculiarly fitted to represent that which in its essence eludes comprehension. The breath, *prāṇa*, is *Brahman*.[1] A similar type is the *ākāśa*, the all-pervading and all-surrounding ether, 'omnipresent and unchanging in the heart.'[2] *Manas* also, the mind or will, is with the *ākāśa* a symbolic form or type under which the *Brahman* is to be meditated on or worshipped.[3] The mystical syllable *Om*, the most widely venerated syllable in the world, is the highest *Brahman*, and its utterance with understanding of its significance secures the accomplishment of every wish.[4] *Om* is also a symbol of the Hindu triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and each of the three sounds of which the word is composed represents one of these deities. To the Buddhists also the word is a symbol of much significance, forming part of the sacred six-syllabled formula which every Buddhist cherishes in his memory and makes a constant part of his invocation and prayer.

A more comprehensive and suggestive symbol of the *Brahman* is given in the compound *sachchidānanda*, a kind of triple representation in three several modes or aspects, as *sat*, 'being,' *chit*, 'thought,' and *ānanda*, 'bliss.'[5] This more refined and abstract symbolizing represents a later phase of speculative thought and marks a forward step in the progress of philosophic insight. As a type or symbol it is less inadequate than the sun in the heavens (*āditya*),[6] the material *ākāśa*, the golden *puruṣa* in the eye,[7] or even than *manas*, or the significant name *ātman* itself. In its further course, moreover, speculative thought denied that even in *sachchidānanda* any positive implication concerning the *Brahman* did or could reside. The *Brahman* transcended all symbols and assertions, comprehended both being and not-being (*sat*, *asat*), thought and not-thought (*chit*, *achit*), bliss and its contrary (*ānanda*, *anānanda*), or rather he was above and beyond all, the unsearchable and unknown.

(*b*) Each of the great gods has an animal or material form or object which represents him to the eyes of men, by which he is symbolically known. The more popular gods have many symbols. The 'vehicles' of the gods are practically symbols of their presence and power—the goose of Brahmā; Garuḍa, the monstrous eagle of Viṣṇu; the bull (Nandi) of Śiva; the fabulous sea-monster (*makara*) of Varuṇa, who is then depicted as a white man and is described as *makarāśva*, 'he whose steed is the *makara*,' riding, with the head and fore-legs of an antelope and the body and tail of a fish; the peacock of Kārttikeya, the god of war; the monkey of Hanumān; the deer of Vāyu; the elephant Airavata of Indra, produced with other sacred and marvellous objects at the churning of the ocean; the buffalo and dogs of Yama; and many others. Of the well-known Hindu triad Brahmā hardly possesses any emblem or type except his sacred goose—an indication of how little the first member of the triad attracted to himself the thought and worship of the Hindu. Of the popular Viṣṇu there were many symbols, some of which are always represented on the images or pictures of the god. The most frequent and characteristic is perhaps the *chakra*, or discus;

[1] *Kauś.* ii. 1 f.
[2] *Chhānd.* III. xii. 7-9 (*SBE* i. 46); *Bṛhad.* III. vii. 12, 16, iv. 1. 3.
[3] *Chhānd.* III. xviii. 1 (*SBE* i. 53); *Bṛhad.* IV. i. 6.
[4] *Bṛhad.* V. i. 1; *Kaṭha*, I. ii. 16; cf. Manu, ii. 83.
[5] *Chhānd.* VI. ii. 1, VIII. xii. 4; *Taitt.* ii. 1, iii. 4-6; *Bṛhad.* II. i. 20, iii. 6. The formula itself as a whole is found only in late Upaniṣads; cf. Deussen, *Up.* p. 126 ff.
[6] *Chhānd.* III. xix. 1 (*SBE* i. 54).
[7] *Taitt.* II. viii. 5; *Chhānd.* I. vi. 8.

the club and conch-shell also which he carries are indicative of his authority and power. The auspicious mark (*śrīvatsa*) usually represented on the breast of the god, in form like a curl of hair, and the three-pronged or trident-like mark made with white or coloured earths on the foreheads of his worshippers are symbolic, the latter of devotion to the service of the deity. The sacred *tulasī* plant in the courtyard of the dwelling is the mark of the deity's presence and protection, and in it centres the worship especially of the women of the household. The *śālagrāma* also, the sacred ammonite-stone, is another mystical and well-known symbol.

The symbolic types or presentations of the rival deity, Śiva, who in almost equal degree with Viṣṇu holds the affection and regard of the Indian peoples, were equally numerous. The most important are the bull Nandi, on which he rides, and the *liṅga*, or phallus. Every Śaivite temple has its sacred bull, who roams the courtyards and streets unmolested and receives practically divine honours. The *liṅga* is the commonest emblem of the god, and the stones, great or small, which represent him have this form or are roughly shaped to it. Two of these stones are said to bear a pre-eminently holy character: that at Benares, where Śiva is worshipped as Viśveśvara, παντοκράτωρ, the lord of all; and the idol in the temple at Somnath, destroyed by Mahmud of Ghazni in his iconoclastic raid into India. The trident also is borne by Śiva, a type of government and authority; and the crescent moon depicted on his forehead has a special significance, recalling the sovereignty which was assigned to him when the moon was recovered from the depths of the ocean.

Similarly the wives of the great gods have each their symbols—the trident and skull of Kālī, the lotus of Sarasvatī, wife of Brahmā, and also of Lakṣmī, wife of Viṣṇu.

In a late writing the Gāyatrī is said to represent the triad of gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and also the three Vedas.

(*c*) Under sacred trees in the vicinity of Indian villages will often be found the images or symbols of the *grāmadevatā*, the village divinities who watch over its interests and care for the inhabitants; and in the village fields the clay or pottery steeds of Aiyanar (*q.v.*), the tutelary deity of the fields, on which he rides by night to pursue and rout the demoniac powers.

(*d*) There are symbols also of a more general import, which are not always easy to classify. The *piṇḍa*, or ball of cooked rice, used at the commemorative services for deceased relatives and offered to the *pitṛs*, represents symbolically the share which the departed still have in the family life. The most important and widely recognized symbol of this character is probably the sacred footprint, which typifies both the presence and the authority of the god. In the courtyard or vicinity of many, perhaps most, Hindu temples there is the print of a foot on the ground, often of large size, with sacred symbols engraved on the sole, which differ according to the deity commemorated. To these there is sometimes a legend attached, which gives its supposed history and describes the occasion on which it was impressed. The well-known footprint on Adam's Peak in Ceylon is believed by Śaivites to be that of Śiva. By Buddhists also the numerous footprints of the Buddha are regarded with reverence.

(*e*) In many parts of India the symbols of the sun and moon and the planets may be seen. The two first are represented by a disk or crescent respectively, made of metal. The signs of the planets in their order are as follows: of Budha, or Mercury, a bow; of Śukra, or Venus, a square; of Maṅgala, or Mars, a triangle; of Vṛhaspati, or Jupiter, a lotus; of Śani, or Saturn, an iron scimitar or sword; of Rāhu, a *makara*; and of Ketu, a snake. The last two symbols are usually of iron; the square of Śukra is silver or silvered, and the bow of Budha is gilt.

(*f*) Hindu coins and seals also bore symbols, which were very numerous and diversified. Besides figures of gods and goddesses, the commonest emblems were the trident, denoting empire; the elephant or bull, power; the umbrella, royal dignity and right; the crescent, a lunar dynasty; a thunderbolt, spear, or other weapon, armed might. Others also with these were indicative of the authority or claims of the sovereign by whom they were designed.

LITERATURE.—W. J. Wilkins, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Purānic*[2], Calcutta and London, 1900; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891; W. Crooke, *PR*, 2 vols., do. 1896; V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, ch. x., 'Symbols on Coins and Seals, etc.'; E. J. Rapson, 'Indian Coins,' in *GIAP* ii. 3B, Strassburg, 1898; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, Eng. tr.[3], Oxford, 1906.

A. S. GEDEN.

SYMBOLISM (Jewish).—Symbolic actions as well as symbolic ideas occur in the Hebrew Bible frequently. The prophets often made use of symbolic ideas—*e.g.*, the basket of fruit in Am 8[1], the vineyard in Is 5[1-7], the almond-trees in Jer 1[11], the dry bones in Ezk 37[1-14], and the various figures in Zechariah. Equally frequent are symbolic actions—*e.g.*, the rending of mantles (1 S 15[27], 1 K 11[30]), the discharge of arrows from a bow (2 K 13[15-19]), the casting of shoes (Ps 60[8], Jos 5[15], Ru 4[7]). The former type easily merges into the parable, the latter into charms; possibly we should say that they emerge from these literary and magical arts. Symbols, in any case, have frequent historical connexion with primitive culture, though they tend to transcend their origin under the transforming influence of higher conceptions. Most important, therefore, for the present article is the association of symbolic ideas with religious ceremonial. Prominently the Sabbath is described as a symbol, *ôth*;[1] similarly with the rite of circumcision (Gn 17[11]), the phylacteries (Dt 6[8]), the Passover (Ex 13[9]), natural phenomena such as the rainbow (Gn 9[12]; cf. Gn 1[14] in the Rabbinical commentaries).

It was accordingly easy for later Judaism to apply symbolic meanings to many of the Biblical institutions. Philo, throughout his works, elaborates such interpretations, but the method is much older. Thus in the *Letter of Aristeas* (which can scarcely be later than the 2nd cent. B.C. and may well belong to a century earlier) the enactments as to the animals lawful for food are explained symbolically.[2] But by Philo's age symbolical interpretation had so fully developed that the Alexandrian allegorist felt impelled to rebuke those of his brethren who neglected the ceremonial acts because they regarded them merely as symbols of ideal things.[3] Though this is a real danger to a ceremonial religion, on the other side it can gain appreciably by idealizing institutions the original significance of which is outworn or unknown. Ancient rites may have been derived from primitive tabus, and yet they have retained permanent acceptance by the process of symbolization. In a remarkable letter Maimonides (*q.v.*) dealt with certain acts of worship, such as prostration (as practised by Muhammadans in the 12th century). Probably such acts were derived from olden customs of exposing parts of the body, but, contends Maimonides,[4] they no longer mean anything

[1] See art. SABBATH (Jewish).
[2] §§ 139–166.
[3] *De Migr. Abrahami*, 16 (*Opera*, ed. T. Mangey, London, 1742, i. 450).
[4] *Teshubôth She'elôth we-Iggerôth* ('Letters'), Constantinople, 1520, fol. 55.

of the kind and have become symbols of humility. Present values do not entirely depend on past origins. A similar principle might undoubtedly be very widely applied to the history of religious ceremonial, which often becomes ennobled by the newer ideas read into it by progressive ages. And, conversely, when an institution is lost (as with the Biblical sacrifices), the whole system may be retrospectively idealized by symbolical adaptation. When, after the destruction of the Temple, prayer and charity and fasting perforce displaced sacrifice, the latter shared in the moralizing process. But the relation went deeper. Fasting *was* sacrifice: the loss of bodily tissue corresponded (in the Rabbinic conception) to the offering of a sacrificial animal on the altar.[1] The table at which the ordinary meals were eaten became a veritable altar,[2] and the partaking of food was in the Jewish home associated with a variety of customs, derived in large part from the same range of symbolism. It has often been claimed, moreover, that the dietary laws, besides being included in the law of holiness, or rather because of that inclusion, were a training in control of the appetites and restraint of desires.[3] Maimonides also offers a utilitarian view, that the forbidden food was unwholesome;[4] thus showing that, though the utilitarian and the symbolical interpretations are in a sense rival theories, they may be syncretized by a skilful moralist.[5]

Another aspect of the same phenomenon is presented by symbolic survivals. Acts which were once literal are retained as rites. Many current Jewish marriage customs are of this nature. The bridal canopy, so picturesque a feature of a Jewish wedding, was originally the marriage chamber. Then the Scriptural application of the marital state to the relation of God to Israel led to symbolic results, among them the appointment of a bridegroom of the Law on the feast of Rejoicing at the end of Tabernacles.[6] It is not quite clear why a glass is broken at Jewish weddings; it is probably a *memento mori*.[7] Funeral customs are also marked by symbolic survivals. Some of these are Kabbalistic in origin, and it is not always easy to discriminate the symbolical from the superstitious.[8] So, too, with such ceremonies as *tashlikh*.[9] Many symbolical customs arose in memory of the destruction of the Temple. Historical associations are also responsible for many a symbolic rite. Draping the synagogues in black on the fast of the 9th of Ab is an instance in point. The *shofar*, or ram's horn, was thus connected with events and anticipations, with Sinai in the past and the Messianic age in the future. According to Se'adiah, the *shofar* symbolized ten ideas: (1) creation, (2) repentance, (3) revelation, (4) prophecy, (5) destruction of the Temple, (6) the binding of Isaac, (7) imminence of danger, (8) day of judgment, (9) restoration of Israel, and (10) resurrection. In this manner many rites were saved from becoming obsolete. The phylacteries worn on the head typify service of the mind; on the hand, service of the body. The former represents the recognition of the Godhead, the latter restraint of lust.[1]

Jewish symbolism is also illustrated in ecclesiastical art, and in colours. Thus the blue thread on the fringes (Nu 15^{38}) is the colour of the sea, the sky, the divine throne of glory.[2] The symbolism of art was more thoroughgoing. The Crown of the Law is a frequent ornament on mantles of the scrolls, and so is the Shield of David.[3] On ancient Jewish coins, too, symbols were employed; so also with tombs.

The prevalent custom now is to avoid sepulchral emblems. This accords with the oldest rule, for the *ṣiyyun* of the Talmud was only a mark warning wayfarers against incurring ritual impurity by contact with the tomb. Yet the action of Simon, who carved panoplies and (possibly) ships on the pyramidal tombs at Modin (1 Mac 13^{29}), can scarcely have been isolated. Outside Palestine the Jews of the first centuries of the Christian era certainly adopted the Greek habit of inscriptions and introduced symbols, such as an oil vessel, the seven-branched candlestick (symbolical of the soul [Pr 20^{27}]), the ram's horn (Messianic), and an ear of corn (type of the resurrection). These emblems are parallel to those on the Maccabæan coins and to those favoured by Jews in the late mediæval period. At that late date symbols appear descriptive of the dead, as out-stretched palms as in act of benediction (for priest), ewer as in act of bathing (Levite), a harp for a musician, a crown for a goldsmith, and so forth. In the 18th cent. Jews, like their Christian neighbours, used symbolical signs for houses and businesses. Thus the Rothschild family still exemplifies the custom in its name ('Red Shield'). Ornamental coats-of-arms are found on tombs in the oldest Jewish burial-ground of the Sephardic Jews in London. Such customs are no longer in vogue. There has been a growth, however, of symbolism in synagogue decoration in the form of glass windows mostly without human or animal figures.

In the Talmud a good deal of legal symbolism was taken over from ancient Biblical as well as from Roman law.[4] Some of this is still retained.

Returning to the more religious aspect of the subject, we may say in general that in the Midrash symbolism is the soul of Jewish ceremonial. Many particulars of the sacrificial system, the ritual of the Temple, synagogue, and home, are treated in this manner. Take, *e.g.*, the rites of Tabernacles—the bearing of palm-branch, citron, myrtle, and willows of the brook (Lv 23^{40}). The palm is the spine, the citron the heart, the myrtle the eye, the willow the mouth, so that, in the synagogue liturgy, the citron atones for heart sins, the palm for stiff-necked pride, the willow for foul speech, the myrtle for lusts of the eye. In another version the old homilists[5] explain the 'four kinds' as symbolizing four types of character. The citron has both scent and taste, so there are men who study and perform; the palm-date has taste but no scent, so there are men who study but do not perform; the myrtle has scent but no taste, so there are men who perform but not on the basis of study; the willow has neither scent nor taste, so there are men who neither study the law nor perform good deeds. The Holy One did not destroy these, but bade all be united into one bundle, the better elements atoning for the less

[1] *Num. Rabbah*, 18.
[2] T.B. *Ber.* 55*a*.
[3] Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, tr. M. Friedländer, London, 1885, iii. 25.
[4] *Ib.* iii. 48.
[5] Cf. on this point M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, p. 456; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, p. 194. In modern times there has been a strong tendency (often unhistorical) to explain symbols on utilitarian grounds.
[6] On greeting the Sabbath bride see *Annotated Ed. of Auth. Daily Prayer Book*, pp. cxxiv, 111 (this work may be consulted throughout for liturgical symbolism).
[7] Cf. I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, ch. x.
[8] The best collection of the customs connected with illness and death may be found in Aaron b. Moses, *Ma'abar Yabboḳ*, Mantua, 1626 (often reprinted).
[9] *JE*, *s.v.*

[1] Cf. *Shulḥān 'Arūkh*, i. ch. 25.
[2] Cf. *Sifrē* on the text.
[3] On this see *JE* viii. 251 f. and *Jewish Opinion*, London, Jan. 1919. The Tree of Life (on the basis of Pr 3^{18}) was also a symbol of the life-giving power of the Law, and the Tree accordingly appears in synagogue decorations.
[4] Cf. S. Krauss, *Talmud. Archäologie*, Leipzig, 1910–12, iii. 8. On the symbolism of the shoe see *JQR*, new ser., vi. [1915–16] 1–22.
[5] *Pesiqtā R.*, 28, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1880, p. 178.

good. In this manner symbolism is turned to the cause of humanism.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are cited in the course of the article. See particularly M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, London, 1891, pp. 328 f., 335, 344, 356, 487; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, do. 1903, Introd., ch. i. (end) and *passim*; *JE*, s.v. 'Symbol'; *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, ed. I. Abrahams, London, 1914.

I. ABRAHAMS.

SYMBOLISM (Muslim). — The Islāmic languages appear to have no exact equivalent for 'symbol.' When it signifies a badge indicative of office, party, or community, the nearest would be *shi'ār*, or in certain cases *ghiyār*; where what is meant by it is a veiled expression for an idea, the Arabic rendering would be *kināyah*.

Islām as a religious system has nothing corresponding to the Christian cross. Muhammad seems to have adopted the Roman eagle as the standard for his armies,[1] but the flag of the later ('Abbasid) khalīfahs was 'like any other, only black in colour with the legend in white, "Muhammad is the Apostle of God."'[2] Those borne by various factions and regiments differed in colour and at times in the wording of the legend; thus the 'Abbasid colour was black, the 'Alawid green, the Umayyad white; the flag of the Zanji pretender of the year 255 A.H. was a strip of silk with a Qur'ānic legend in red and green;[3] in the processions of the sultans of Tunis white, red, yellow, and green flags were carried; those of the different tribes differed in legend;[4] the flags of the different divisions of the Ottoman army were red, yellow, green, white, red and white, green and white.[5] The Muhammadan colour in India is green,[6] which by an ordinance of the Mamluk Sultan Sha'ban of 773 A.H. on the turban indicates descent from the Prophet.[7]

There is no more common error than the supposition that the crescent (or rather crescent and star) is an Islāmic symbol, and even approved writers on Oriental subjects are apt to fall into it.[8] It was certainly in pre-Turkish times sometimes used as an ornament on the minarets of mosques;[9] and on flags—*e.g.*, that of the Fāṭimids of Egypt, accompanied by a lion of red and yellow satin,[10] and that of the Almohads (A.D. 1159)[11]—and on the sedan-chair of a Zanjid princess.[12] As such the crescent had been employed on the Roman senatorial shoe—a practice for which Plutarch[13] offers a variety of reasons. The current view of its adoption by the Turks is well presented by F. T. Elworthy:

'Hera, under her old moon-name, Iō, had a celebrated temple on the site of Byzantium, said to have been founded by her daughter Keroëssa, "the horned." The crescent, which was in all antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages the symbol of Byzantium, and which is now the symbol of the Turkish Empire, is a direct inheritance from Byzantium's mythical foundress Keroëssa, the daughter of the moon goddess Iō-Hera.'[1]

Keroëssa, supposed to have been not the foundress, but the mother of the founder, of Byzantium, seems to have been an inference from the Golden Horn and so to have no place in this inquiry. Further, it seems correct to say that the crescent and star figure, though rarely, on coins of Byzantium, but as one of numerous ornaments,[2] and that no ancient author mentions any connexion between this emblem and the city. The *signa Constantinopoleos*, according to A. Geofræus,[3] who asserts that the Turks 'neque insigniis utuntur neque coronis,' were quite different. The earliest mention of it in English literature is said to be in the *Arte of English Poesie* by G. Puttenham (1589),[4] who ascribes its introduction to the sultan Selim I. (1512–20), with the notion of increase and brightness, though it has been observed[5] that the crescent is not that of the new but that of the waning moon, while rising in its wake is the morning star of hope; from Puttenham's time the antithesis between it and the cross has been common in English and French literature. F. Sansovino,[6] however, supposes it to have been the ancient emblem of Bosnia, adopted by Muhammad II. when that country was conquered in 1463. This is declared to be an error by Zinkeisen,[7] who speaks of a golden crescent inherited from the Seljuks, and displayed on all the flags and standards of viziers, beglerbegs, etc., appearing on the earliest flags of the Janissaries. With von Hammer Purgstall[8] it is a silver crescent which, with the two-pointed sword of 'Umar, gleamed on the blood-red flag of the earliest Janissaries; in the authority to which he refers[9] the Janissaries' flag displays the sword without the crescent; what appears on the flag of the cavalry is evidently a horseshoe rather than a crescent, with no star. It is worth noticing that the Seljuk chronicler Ibn Bibi[10] compares the shoe of the sultan 'Ala-addin's horse to a crescent and its nails to stars; whence the symbol may originally belong to cavalry regiments. Its occurrence, however, on certain Byzantine coins is remarkable, and seems to have some connexion with its later employment by the Turks, who have not often introduced it on coins.

The symbols of royalty in use at the Islāmic courts were similar to those found elsewhere. In Umayyad times the khalīfah on accession received a rod, a signet, and a scroll.[11] The rod was doubtless the Prophet's; in 'Abbasid times a new khalīfah received not only the Prophet's signet, which was a silver ring with a bezel of Chinese iron with the legend 'Muhammad is the Prophet of God,' but that of his predecessor, with a ruby inscribed with the khalīfah's name.[12] The 'Abbasid khalīfah also wore a crown,[13] against Arab usage;[14] and indeed the etiquette of their court was closely modelled on that of the Sasanians, as appears from the recently published handbook of it by Jāḥiẓ of Basrah.[15] A crown was worn by the Fāṭimids of

[1] A. von Kremer, *Culturgesch. des Orients*, Vienna, 1875–77, i. 81.
[2] Miskawaihi, tr. D. S. Margoliouth, i. 198.
[3] Ṭabari, *Chronicle*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1879–1901, iii. 1748.
[4] Qalqashandi, *Subḥ al-A'sha*, Cairo, 1915, v. 143.
[5] J. W. Zinkeisen, *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, Gotha, 1840–63, iii. 271.
[6] J. W. Kaye and G. B. Malleson, *Hist. of the Mutiny*, London, 1888–89, v. 82.
[7] Ibn Iyās, *History of Egypt*, Cairo, 1311, i. 227.
[8] Kaye and Malleson, iii. 96: 'From the time when Mahmud of Ghazni had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindus.' Al-Biruni, *Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 298, compares with the Christian symbolism of the cross the comparison of the name Muḥammad with the human figure.
[9] See a case about A.D. 1270 in the mosque of San'a in Yemen (Khazraji, *The Pearl-Strings*, tr. J. W. Redhouse, Leyden, 1906–08, i. 189).
[10] Qalqashandi, iii. 474.
[11] E. Mercier, *Hist. de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berbérie)*, Paris, 1888–90, ii. 100.
[12] Ibn Jubair, *Viaggio*, tr. C. Schiaparelli, Rome, 1906, p. 226.
[13] *Quaest. Rom.* p. 281.

[1] *The Evil Eye*, London, 1895, p. 183.
[2] Provisionally collected by J. H. von Eckhel, *Doctrina Nummorum Veterum*, Vienna, 1792–98, ii. 28.
[3] *Aulæ Turcicæ Descriptio*, Basel, 1577, p. 3.
[4] In *English Reprints*, ed. E. Arber, London, 1868, p. 117.
[5] By G. H. Lancaster, *Prophecy, the War, and the Near East*, London, 1916, p. 151.
[6] *Hist. universale dei Turchi*, Venice, 1568, f. 67.
[7] iii. 273.
[8] *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, Pest, 1827–35, i. 93.
[9] Plate XVII. in Comte de Marsigli's *État militaire de l'empire ottoman*, The Hague, 1732, ii. 53.
[10] Ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leyden, 1902, p. 204.
[11] *Aghani*, Cairo, 1323, vi. 106.
[12] Miskawaihi, i. 329. He also inherited the Prophet's cloak (*burdah*), turban, and throne or pulpit.
[13] *Dīwan* of Buḥturi, Constantinople, 1300, i. 70, ii. 153, etc.
[14] *Mutanabbii Carmina cum Comm. Wāḥidii*, ed. F. Dieterici, Berlin, 1861, p. 380.
[15] *Livre de la Couronne*, ed. Ahmed Zeki, Cairo, 1914.

Egypt also.[1] In their processions there were borne a rod, a special sword (said to have been made of meteorite), an inkpot, a lance, a target (said to have belonged to the Prophet's uncle Ḥamzah), a horse-shoe-shaped ruby,[2] and a canopy or umbrella. The last of these was a common emblem of royalty, and figures, *e.g.*, at Indian courts,[3] where the sovereign in the 16th cent. was attired 'in a white *qaba*, made like a shirt tied with strings on the one side, and a little cloth on his head coloured oftentimes with red or yellow.'[4] The *qaba* appears in the attire of the Buwaihid Mu'izz al-Daulah (10th cent.),[5] and, with a black robe, a belt, and a sword, it formed the distinguishing dress of a vizier.[6] Apparently the belt symbolized some sort of subordination, as an Indian prince to whom Yamin al-Daulah gave a robe of honour had to be compelled to put on this portion of it.[7]

Homage to a newly-appointed sovereign was (at any rate in early times) indicated by a shake of the hand, the meaning of which is shown by the term employed to be agreement over a bargain. In later times homage was indicated by kissing the ground before the ruler; this practice, originally alien to Islāmic ideas, had become familiar before the end of the 4th Islāmic century.[8] To a newly-appointed vizier (or emir) food was sent in the 4th cent. from the khalīfah's table,[9] probably signifying that he had become a member of the royal household. The practice of offering such a person fragrant herbs[10] is said to have been a purely Persian or Dailemite rite, the sense of which is not clear.

Owing to Islāmic objection to the limner's art, symbolism is very scanty in its architecture, and where found appears to be borrowed. The great mosque of Cordova exhibited in the carvings of its lattices the peculiar form of the Indian cross, the meaning of which is unknown, whereas 'the cresting of the walls, originally painted scarlet, is typical of flame, and, brought from Persia, symbolized the faith of the Ghebers, worshippers of fire.'[11] Probably in such cases the Muslim worshippers and spectators were quite ignorant of the signification. The same is likely to be true of the ornaments to be found on other works of art, such as pottery and textiles. Certain creatures are indeed habitually associated with particular ideas, chiefly on etymological grounds—*e.g.*, the raven with parting—but there is little scope for their employment in art. The symbolism of magical or quasi-magical rites in use in some communities (*e.g.*, the figures representing either a double hand or the spathe of the male palm, indicative of fertility, painted in Tunis on the walls of the house where there is to be a wedding)[12] is probably not Islāmic.

The practices of Islāmic ritual are tralatitious, though taken from many different communities; their symbolic interpretation is therefore conjectural, and is the subject of considerable speculation. Several pages are devoted by the mystic Ibn 'Arabī to the meaning of the postures of prayer (*ṣalāt*):

'The raising of the hands implies that whatever was therein has fallen away; it is as though the Almighty, when He commanded this, said, "When thou standest before Me, stand as a poor mendicant, who owns nothing; fling away everything that thou possessest, and stand empty-handed, setting it behind thee; for I am in front of thee." Moreover since the hands are the seat of power, by raising his hands he confesses that the power is God's, not his own; he who raises them to the chest is thinking that God is in front of him; he who raises them to his ears is thinking that God is above him. Sitting in prayer is the attitude of the slave before his master, an attitude which he may not adopt without the master's leave,' etc.[1]

Similar speculations on the meaning of the ceremonies of the pilgrimage are to be found in the work of Ghazālī;[2] the special garments worn by the pilgrim, *e.g.*, are to remind him of the grave-clothes wherein he will meet his Maker.

Besides explaining much of the Qur'ān as elaborate symbolism the Ṣūfīs (*q.v.*) developed a system of their own, or rather a number of systems; and there are numerous collections of odes in Arabic and Persian which, ostensibly dealing with love and wine, are traditionally interpreted as dealing with the doctrines of pantheism. Illustrations of the style will be found in the commentary of H. Wilberforce Clarke on his translation of the *Divān* of Ḥāfiẓ,[3] where we are told that 'breeze' signifies the means whereby union with the Desired One is attained, 'bell' signifies the angel of death, 'dark night' the world, 'wave' the excess of divine knowledge, etc., whereas in some cases the same term is variously explained; thus 'narcissus' may signify the growth of the world, the pure existence of God, the vision of God, or inward results of joy in respect of deeds. These interpretations are not always very convincing; but in some works of the kind the symbolism is either interpreted by the author himself or is sufficiently clear or conventional to leave no doubt of the meaning; an example is to be found in the *Masnavi* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.[4]

The employment of symbolic acts, either to emphasize language or in lieu of it, is common with Oriental peoples, but not specially Islāmic. The same parable has a tendency to do duty through many centuries. Ibn al-Athīr records (A.H. 442) how, when an Arab tribe proposed to take Kairawān, they selected as their commander a man who offered to pursue the following plan: taking a carpet, he unfolded it, and then said to the others, 'Which of you can get to the middle of this carpet without treading upon it?' They declared it to be impossible. He showed them that the carpet had to be rolled up from the edge, meaning that the country had gradually to be conquered and secured. According to W. G. Palgrave, Ibrahim Pasha obtained the command of an expedition against Nejd eight centuries after by solving the problem of the carpet.[5]

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

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SYMBOLISM (Semitic).—The extent to which symbolism exists in OT literature is very doubtful. In the case of the Babylonians and Assyrians, however, our knowledge is much more definite and is obtained chiefly from a study of cylinder-seals, the Babylonian boundary-stones, and the monoliths of Assyrian kings. On the Babylonian *kudurrus*, or boundary-stones, the emblems of the gods are grouped together, and in one case the name of the god with whom the emblem is associated is inscribed by the side, thus giving us definite data on which to base our investigations.

The Hebrew word for symbol, *ôth*, is most probably connected with the root *dwd*, 'to describe with a mark,' and with Assyr. *ittu*. Some scholars have suggested a connexion between Assyr. *ittu* and Heb. אִיתָּה.[6]

1 Qalqashandī, iii. 472.
2 Rubies of this shape adorned the case of the supposed Qur'ān of 'Uthmān, carried before the Almohad Yūsuf (S. P. Scott, *Hist. of the Moorish Empire in Europe*, Philadelphia, 1904, ii. 304).
3 V. A. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Mogul*, Oxford, 1917, p. 37.
4 Description by Ralph Fitch, 1585, *ib.* p. 108.
5 Miskawaihi, ii. 165. 6 *Ib.* i. 166, etc.
7 Ibn al-Athīr, *Chronicle*, A.H. 396.
8 See Hilal, ed. H. F. Amedroz, Beyrut, 1904, p. 456, etc. Earlier examples are *Aghānī*, vi. 29 (time of Amīn); Ṭabarī, iii. 1825 (time of Muhtadī).
9 Miskawaihi, i. 186, 223, 351, ii. 15, 82.
10 *Ib.* ii. 82. 11 Scott, i. 656.
12 A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London, 1914, p. 114.

1 *Futūḥāt Makkiyyah*, Cairo, 1293, i. 551 f.
2 *Iḥyā 'Ulum al-Dīn*, Cairo, 1306, i. 208 f.
3 Calcutta, 1891, i. 2 f.
4 See the tr. by E. H. Whinfield, London, 1898.
5 *Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia*, London, 1865, ii. 48.
6 *BOR* i. [1900] 130.

1. The symbolism of religious life.—The Temple as the centre of the religious life of ancient Israel should be treated first. Solomon's temple was specifically built in order that it might contain the ark, the symbol of the presence of the deity. In the second Temple, the adytum being empty, the presence of the deity was symbolized by the continuance of the altar service, the Day of Atonement ritual, and the shewbread. Among the Semites the god was symbolically represented as a nobleman dwelling in his palace, and W. M. Flinders Petrie[1] has shown that the features and routine of Egyptian temples were similar to those of large households. First came the small chamber symbolizing the mysterious dwelling of the deity himself. The larger hall in front of this could be compared to the audience-chamber where human kings receive their subjects, whilst the larger space in front of the building was primarily a meeting-place for the people. The division of the Temple into a Holy Place and Holy of Holies was also symbolical and corresponded to the heavens and the highest heaven (שָׁמַיִם and שְׁחַק שְׁמַיִם [1 K 8^{27}]), whilst the entrance may have symbolized the earth, Jahweh's footstool (Is 66^{1}). Why was the Temple built on a mountain? This really brings us to another question. Was there any connexion between the idea which represented Jahweh's home on a mountain and the 'high places' referred to in the OT? From the standpoint of the Deuteronomic historian, the high places were legitimate places of worship until the building of the Temple at Jerusalem. It is to be noted also that the high places are said to have been built on hills, and it has therefore been suggested[2] that they were artificial mounds taking the place of natural high places such as the summits of hills and mountains. The explanation of this symbolism can be learned from Babylonia. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Babylonian temples was their enormous size. In Gn $11^{3f.}$ we read that the people meet together in the land of Shinar and decide to build a city and a tower that shall reach up to heaven. To the Babylonians a temple was above all a 'high place,' and there is a symbolic reason to account for this conception. Jensen[3] has shown that the Babylonians regarded the earth as a huge mountain. In fact the earth was actually called E-Kur, 'mountain house.' Later they began to identify one particular part of the earth—a mountain peak preferably—as the dwelling of the god, so that the temples which were built later were known as 'mountain houses.' The height of the temple thus symbolized the mountain which had formed the original home of the deity.[4] The same idea can be seen by sketching the history of Mt. Zion. The sanctuary on the mountain existed before the settlement of the Hebrews. Just as His people dispossess the early settlers of Canaan, so Jahweh dispossesses the god of Zion. Mt. Zion is now regarded as His home and He therefore reveals Himself to His people from the mountain (Ex 19^{11}). We can thus see the symbolic idea which suggested the *ziqqurats* in Babylonia, the high places in Canaan, and the sacred temple mount in Israel.

The very names 'ark of Jahweh,' 'ark of God,' suggest that the ark contained an object which in some manner symbolized the God of Israel. In the Assyrian temples a statue of the god took the place of the ark in the Holy of Holies, and it has therefore been suggested that the ark with the cherubim over it was a symbol of Jahweh. The custom of carrying about an ark as a symbol of the deity has its parallel in other Semitic religions. In Babylonia the gods were carried about in ships in solemn procession, and in Egypt the arks with their images were placed in boats. Renan[1] actually derives the Hebrew ark from the Egyptian ark-boat, but there is not sufficient evidence to warrant such a suggestion.

Cheyne[2] thinks that the symbolic meaning of the brazen serpent can be learned from Babylonia. He thinks that the brazen oxen in 1 K 7^{25} were copies of the oxen which stood in Babylonian temples as symbols of Marduk. I. Benzinger[3] has suggested that there was a serpent-clan among the Israelite tribes and that *Nehushtan* may have been its sacred symbol (Gn 49^{17}). The two pillars Jachin and Boaz which stood in front of the porch of the Temple were probably symbolical. The temple of Melkarth at Tyre and also the temple at Hierapolis had two similar pillars in front of them, and, as these were symbols of the deity and Solomon's temple was constructed on the same principle, it has been suggested that Jachin and Boaz were symbols of Jahweh. It is possible that the brazen lavers and the sea of the Temple symbolized the clouds. As to the sea and oxen, W. H. Kosters[4] finds here a symbolic trace of the Babylonian myth of the struggle of Marduk and Tiamat—the sea representing Tiamat and the oxen Marduk. Seeing that the Babylonian creation-myth determined the form of the Israelitish cosmogony, this view has received general support, although there is no direct reference to it in the OT. H. P. Smith[5] suggests that the twelve oxen were symbols of the twelve constellations and that the sea was a symbol of the great celestial reservoir from which the earth is watered. The ornamental figures on the smaller lavers he also regards as symbolical. The bull was sacred to Jahweh, the lion was sacred to Astarte, whilst the palm-tree is represented with a symbolic meaning in Phœnician art. The ornamentation therefore suggested a syncretistic purpose in building the Temple.

Although there is not the slightest reference in the OT to any symbolic meaning of the tabernacle, scholars, both ancient and modern, have suggested that both in its structure and in its appurtenances it symbolized various religious truths. The Heb. מִשְׁכָּן, 'dwelling,' expressed the idea that God dwelt among His people; אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד, 'tent of meeting,' represented the idea that God met His people there; whilst the name אֹהֶל הָעֵדֻת, 'tent of the testimony,' constantly called to mind that the decalogue inscribed on the tables of the ark bore witness to the covenant between Jahweh and His people. But there are other ideas symbolized by the tabernacle. The innermost chamber, the Holy of Holies, was the dwelling-place of the deity Himself. This could be entered by the high-priest alone, and only once a year—on the Day of Atonement. In this chamber everything was made of gold and decorated with beautifully-made fabrics, whilst the vestments of the high-priest were conspicuous by their gorgeous finery. This gave expression to the thought that God's most holy minister and His chief abode should be adorned with becoming dignity and splendour. On the other hand, in the Holy Place, which could be entered by the priesthood only, the furniture was of gold, whilst the outer pillars, which were taken, no doubt, as belonging to the court, were made of brass. The court, which was for the people, had

[1] Presidential address before the Egyptian Section of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (*Transactions*, Oxford, 1908, i. 186 f.).

[2] W. Gesenius, preface to C. P. W. Gramberg, *Religionsideen des AT*, Berlin, 1829, i. xix-xxi.

[3] *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, pp. 185-195.

[4] Cf. the minarets attached to the Muhammadan mosques, and see K. Herzfeld's monograph, *Samarra*, Berlin, 1907.

[1] *Hist. of the People of Israel*, Eng. ed., London, 1888, i. 123.

[2] *EBi*, col. 3388.

[3] *Hebräische Archäologie*, Tübingen, 1907, p. 392.

[4] *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, ii. [1879] 455 ff.

[5] *OT Hist.*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 166.

only brass. The covering for the Holy of Holies was made of costly materials with figured cherubim; the curtain at the door of the Holy Place was without cherubim, and that at the court was simply made of white linen. We can thus see how the costliness of the adornments of the different apartments symbolized their sacredness; the more sacred a chamber was, the more sumptuously was it adorned.

'Together the curtains are designed to form the earthly, and, with the aid of the attendant cherubim to symbolize the heavenly, dwelling-place of the God of Israel.'[1]

The sacrificial system of the Hebrews symbolized self-surrender and devotion to the will of God, the need of forgiveness, and the blessing of divine fellowship. The peace-offering with its communion-feast showed the idea of fellowship between God and man; the *tamid*, or continual offering, symbolized Israel's pledge of unbroken service to Jahweh; whilst the sin-offering with its sprinkling of blood showed that one of the conditions of cleansing oneself from sin was to place oneself submissively before God. The care taken in the preparation of the aromatic compounds of the incense suggests a symbolic meaning. From Ps 141[2] it appears that incense was regarded as a spiritual symbol of prayer. Bähr regards the shewbread as a symbol of the fact that Jahweh was ever present with His people and was the giver of their daily bread. Circumcision was a tribal badge and showed that the patient had been admitted a member of the tribe, whilst the Sabbath symbolized the completion of the work of creation. In Ex 31[13] it is actually described as an everlasting symbol (אות) between Jahweh and Israel. The long hair worn by the Nazirite symbolized his consecration for some special service. In ancient religions the offering of one's hair, like the offering of one's blood, symbolized the making of a covenant between the worshipper and his god. The frontlets, or *ṭōṭāphōth* (Ex 13[16]), were badges worn upon the forehead and arm to show that the worshipper belonged to a certain religious community, and as a worshipper of the national deity was subject to His help and protection.[2] Fire occurs as a symbol of the divine presence (Ex 20[18] 3[2] etc.). It was also regarded as a purifying agent (Is 48[10]), and to pass through fire was therefore a symbol of purification. Would not this explain why sacrifices were burned before they could be accepted by God? Water was another source of symbolical purification. Ablutions were so common among the Hebrews that it is difficult to distinguish washings performed for the sake of the body and those with a symbolical significance. Anointing[3] denoted the consecration of a person or even of an inanimate object (such as the tabernacle and its appurtenances or the stone at Bethel). In Ps 92[10] it is referred to as a symbol of prosperity and joy, and the cessation of the practice was therefore a symbol of mourning (2 S 12[20]). The word *ashērāh*, which appears very often as a name for Astarte (1 K 18[19], 2 K 21[7] etc.), came to be used as a name for the symbol of the goddess[4] (Dt 7[5], Ex 34[13] etc.). The *hammanīm* were most probably symbols of the sun-god, who is called in Phœnician inscriptions בעל חמן,[5] whilst the *maṣṣēbhōth* were symbols expressing gratitude for a divine revelation (Gn 28[22] 31[13] etc.). As to bull symbolism, it most probably originated among the Hebrews themselves (and was not borrowed from the Egyptians, as hitherto supposed). The Hebrews being an agricultural race, it was natural that they should look upon the bull as a symbol of strength and power. The bulls on the lavers of Solomon's temple may have been due to the influence of Phœnician workmen, for among the Phœnicians Baal was represented as a bull. The horns of the altar are regarded by some scholars as symbols of ancient bull-worship. The *ziqqurats*, or temple towers, of Babylonia consisted usually of three, four, or seven stones, no doubt on account of the symbolic sacredness attached to these numbers. The quadrilateral shape of the *ziqqurats*, with the four corners towards the four cardinal points, symbolized the four quarters over which the Babylonian kings held dominion. The lions (symbols of Nergal) and the bulls (symbols of En-lil) which stood at the entrances of Assyrian temples probably symbolized the means which the gods had at their disposal for punishing man. The names of the temples symbolized the character of the gods to whom they were dedicated. Nabu's temple was known as E-pad-kalama-suma, 'the house of him who gives the sceptre of the world'—no doubt suggested by the staff which formed the symbol of Nabu. Sin's temple at Harran was called 'the house of joy,' and that of Shamash was known as 'the house of the universal judge.' The basin of the temple known as *apsu* represented the domain of Ea, the water-god. The *ziqqurats* and the basin thus became 'living symbols of current cosmological conceptions.'[1]

We may now turn to the symbols of the gods themselves.[2] The symbol of Ramman, the storm- and thunder-god, was a lightning fork, whilst an axe represented the destruction which storm and thunder bring in their wake. His nature as a solar deity was also symbolized by a bull. Sin had a crescent, either by itself or with a disk. Since the moon at certain phases suggested the appearance of a horn, he was represented as an old man with a flowing beard, and wearing a cap on which were the horns of the moon. The horn was thus regarded as his crown and came to symbolize his power. This explains why the Assyrian kings adorned themselves with a horned crown as a symbol of divinity.[3] Anu symbolized 'the abstract principle of which heaven and earth are emanations.'[4] Such expressions as 'light of heaven and earth,' by which Ninib was known, symbolized his beneficent character as a solar deity. But the fiery rays of the sun might also be destructive, and he was therefore represented also under the form of a lion. Ea's symbol consisted of a ram's head which projected from a frame. This symbol occurs on the Bavian relief and the Esarhaddon stele. But on boundary-stones his symbol is usually an animal with the head of an antelope and the lower part of a fish. As the water-god of Babylonia, fountains were sacred to him, and he was regarded as the giver of fertility. He was the Oannes of Berossus—half man, half fish—who came out of the water to instruct the people. The symbol of a fish was therefore suggested either by the idea of fertility or by the fact that he was god of the water. Nabu, as scribe of the gods, was symbolically represented as carrying the tablets of fate and recording the decision of the gods upon them.

[1] A. R. S. Kennedy, art. 'Tabernacle,' in *SDB*, p. 885.

[2] Cf. the custom among later Jews of fastening to the doorpost a small box containing certain texts from OT, and the Babylonian custom of hanging up images of some protecting deity at the entrance to houses (L. W. King, in *ZA* xi. [1896] 50–62).

[3] For the origin and significance of the rite see A. H. H. Kamphausen, art. 'Salbe,' in Riehm, *Handwörterbuch des bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–94.

[4] G. A. Barton, 'The Semitic Ištar Cult,' *Hebraica*, ix. [1893] 131–165, xi. [1896] 73.

[5] A. Bloch, *Phön. Glossar*, Berlin, 1890, p. 22.

[1] M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 653.

[2] These symbols can be studied most conveniently from the *Mémoires de la délégation en Perse*.

[3] In OT the horn was a symbol of power and its exaltation signified victory (1 K 22[11], Jer 48[25] etc.).

[4] Jensen, p. 274.

The staff by which he is represented symbolizes either the stylus of a writer or a ruler's sceptre. The solar god Marduk symbolized the sun of spring which brings about the growth of vegetation and the revival of nature. As a warrior-god his symbol is a spear, and as a storm-god he is represented by a horned dragon. Sometimes he is represented by the symbol of a dog, and in a lexicographical tablet[1] there is a reference to four dogs of Marduk. As the goddess of love and the symbol of creation Ishtar was represented by a female figure with her breasts exposed and a child on her left arm sucking her breast. She symbolized every feminine phenomenon of the Babylonian pantheon. She was the mother of the gods and the mother-goddess, and was therefore prayed to in hymns as 'helper and heavenly midwife.' As goddess of the passions she was represented on seal-cylinders as nude, with the distinctively feminine parts particularly emphasized. In the astrological system she was identified with Venus and regarded as a symbol of light. Sometimes her symbol is a star[2] of various shapes.

Nergal, who symbolized the hot sun of midsummer, was represented by a lion; Nusku, the fire-god, by a lamp; and Nirgusu by an eagle. Hommel[3] connects the name Bau with *bohu* of Gn 1, and suggests that the goddess was a symbol of the watery depths of the universe. On one of the inscriptions of Nabu-pal-iddin Shamash is represented as seated in his shrine; before him is a table resting on a wheel, and attached to the wheel are cords held by two male figures which direct its course. These figures represent the messengers of Shamash, Malik and Bunene, who occupy the position of chariot-drivers. The sun's movement across the heavens, which is here symbolized by the wheel, was thought of as a drive[4] (cf. Ps 19^{6}). On seal-cylinders his beneficent character is symbolized by the manner in which he pours forth streams of water from jars placed on his shoulders. But the most common symbol of Shamash is a sun-disk.

The chief symbol of Ashur was a standard which consisted of a pole surrounded by a disk enclosed within two wings. Above the disk was the figure of a warrior shooting an arrow. The terra-cotta images of Bel found at Nippur[5] represent him as an old man with a flowing beard, a real 'father' of the gods. He personified the various forces of nature whose seat and sphere of action is the inhabited world. Together with Anu and Ea, therefore, he symbolized the eternal laws of the universe.

2. The symbolism of common life.—A Hebrew slave who refused to take advantage of the liberty open to him after seven years' service had one of his ears bored with an awl and pinned to the door to show that he was in future to be devoted to the service of that house[6] (Ex 21^{6}). Elevation to a position of superiority was symbolized by placing a crown on the head (2 S 1^{10}, 2 K 11^{12} etc.). The worshipper spread out his hands in prayer to show that he desired to obtain divine mercy and help (Ex $9^{29, 33}$, 1 K 8^{22} etc.). Washing of the hands was a symbol of innocence. In Dt 21^{6} the heifer's neck was broken to show that the murderer deserved the punishment, whilst the elders of the city by washing their hands showed that they were free from the guilt. Hostility towards a person is shown by gaping with the mouth (Ps 35^{21}, Job 16^{10} etc.); ill-feeling by clapping the hands (Ezk 6^{11} 21^{17} 22^{13}), or by spitting in the face (Nu 12^{14}, Dt 25^{9}); and anger by gnashing the teeth (Ps 35^{16}, Job 16^{9}, La 2^{16} etc.). The key of the door was probably looked upon as a symbol of authority, and to place it upon a man's shoulder showed that he was appointed steward (Is 22^{22}). Covering a woman with one's mantle signified the intention of acting as her protector (Ezk 16^{8}). The father of a new-born child acknowledged it as his offspring by placing it upon his knees (Job 3^{12}). In a Babylonian poem describing the wickedness wrought by the evil spirits they are said to snatch the child from the knees of a man. The use of salt as a condiment and the piquancy which it gives to insipid articles of diet caused it to be regarded as a symbol of life. An abundance of salt has the effect of preventing the growth of vegetation, and therefore the ploughing of a city with salt denoted that it was condemned to eternal destruction (Jg 9^{45}). It was a mark of reverence to cast off the shoes on approaching a sacred person or place (Ex 3^{5}, Jos 5^{15}). To appear barefoot was a sign of great emotion or of mourning (2 S 15^{30}, Is 20^{2} etc.), and to draw off the shoes meant to give up a legal right (Ru 4^{7}). The taking of an oath was symbolized by placing the hand under the thigh of the adjurer (Gn 24^{2} 47^{29}), or by lifting up the hand towards heaven[1] (Gn 14^{22}). As kissing was a means by which parts of the body of different persons came into contact, it was naturally a symbol of affection and reverence (Gn 27^{26}, Ex 18^{7}, Ru 1^{9} etc.). Various symbolisms were used in mourning.[2] Sackcloth was worn to show that the mourner's grief for the departed was so great that he was ready to give up all the pleasures and conveniences of life (Gn 37^{34}, 2 S 3^{31}). The tearing of one's garment denoted that the mourner's dearest friend had been torn from him (Gn 37^{29} 44^{13} etc.). The mourner went about barefoot and bareheaded (2 S 15^{30}, Ezk 24^{17}), sat in ashes and sprinkled ashes upon his head (Jer 6^{26}, La 3^{16} etc.), and practised various mutilations of the body (Jer 16^{6} etc.). Shaving the head (as among the Arabs at the present time) was also a sign of mourning. The making of a covenant was symbolized by the person who gave the pledge passing between the parts of an animal cut into pieces, and thus showing that he was ready to be similarly treated if he failed to keep his promise (Gn $15^{9ff.}$ etc.).

Light represented to the Orientals the highest human good. The most joyful emotions and pleasing sensations are described under imagery derived from light (1 K 11^{36}, Ps 97^{11} etc.). It was only natural that there should follow a transition from corporeal to spiritual things, so that light came to typify true religion and the happiness which it brings. Sin, wickedness, chaos, were represented by darkness. The lion was a symbol of strength (Jl 1^{6}). Kneeling was a mark of homage to a superior, and is therefore referred to as an attitude of worship (2 Ch 6^{13}, 1 K 8^{54}).

In Babylonia it was customary for the suitor to present gifts to the girl's parents. According to some scholars, this symbolized the purchase of the bride—a practice which existed in earlier times. Various symbolisms were connected with the marriage ceremony, but their meaning is obscure. The officiating ministers bound sandals on the feet of the newly-wedded pair,[3] gave them a leather

[1] H. C. Rawlinson, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, London, 1861-84, ii. 56, col. iii. 22-25.

[2] On a Phœnician gem the gazelle is figured along with the star and dove as a symbol of Astarte (W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*², London 1903, p. 227 f.).

[3] *Die semit. Völker und Sprachen*, Leipzig, 1881-83.

[4] See A. Jeremias, *The OT in the Light of the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, i. 116.

[5] H. V. Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century*, Edinburgh, 1903.

[6] Nowack, *Lehrbuch der heb. Arch.*, Freiburg i. B., 1894, i. 177.

[1] Cf. the Babylonian expression *nish kate*.

[2] M. Jastrow, 'Dust, Earth, and Ashes as Symbols of Mourning among the Ancient Hebrews,' *JAOS* xx. [1899] 133-150.

[3] T. G. Pinches, *Notes on some Recent Discoveries in the Realm of Assyriology*, London, 1892-93.

girdle, and fastened it to a pouch of silver and gold. The first of these ceremonies may have symbolized the marriage-contract between them. We are told in the Code that, if a maid behaves insolently towards her mistress, the latter may put an *abuttu* on her and reduce her to slavery. The adoptive parent may do the same with a disobedient son. What the *abuttu* was is unknown. Jensen has suggested that it was some kind of incised mark which acted as a symbol of the person's position (cf. the mark on Cain's forehead [Gn 4^{15}]). The repayment of a debt or the dissolution of a partnership was symbolized by the breaking of a tablet. Mutilation is often referred to as a punishment for crime, and the form of mutilation was symbolical of the offence itself. For striking a father the hand was cut off; for ingratitude evidenced by speech the tongue was cut out; as a punishment for unlawful curiosity the eye was torn out; and as a mark of disobedience the ear was often cut off. The cutting short of the hair was a mark of degradation. The city walls were regarded as a symbol of shelter.[1] Swearing by the gods and the king was a means of sanctioning an agreement. When a contract was made, both parties and witnesses added their names to it. And this was authenticated by impressing their seals or making a nail-mark. The Code states explicitly that a woman was not a wife without 'bonds.' This was a marriage-contract which symbolized an official acknowledgment of the union. An artisan symbolized his adoption of a child by teaching him a trade. The penalty of breaking a contract was the payment of two or more white horses to the god. The exact meaning of this symbolism is unknown, but white no doubt suggested purification and innocence. In Babylonian magic there was a symbolical tying and loosening of knots according as the sorcerer wished to strangle his victim or to release him from any demon by which he had been captured. If a magician wished to rid himself of an object, he would burn or torture an image of it, believing that the victim would meet with the same fate as his image. By 'seizing the hands of Bel,' the Assyrian kings legitimized their claim to the Babylonian throne.

3. The symbolism of numbers and colours.—It is doubtful whether the Hebrews used numerical symbols in OT times. On the Moabite Stone and the Siloam inscription the numbers given are invariably in words. But this does not exclude the possibility that numerical symbols, which were employed by the Babylonians and Egyptians, were also used by the Israelites. In S. Arabian and Phœnician inscriptions also the numbers are partly written and partly indicated by figures. The numbers most commonly used with a symbolical meaning are three, four, and seven.[2]

White symbolized purity and innocence. It represented light, which impressed the Hebrew mind not only by its brilliance and beauty, but by its divine symbolism and profound moral connotation (Lv $16^{4, 23}$, Dn 7^{9}, Ps 104^{2}). As black absorbs all colours and thus buries the light, it symbolized death, humiliation, mourning (Mal 3^{14}, La 4^{8} etc.). Blue, representing the colour of an unclouded sky, symbolized revelation (Ex 24^{10}). It was the first of the colours used for the curtains of the sanctuary, and the Israelites were commanded to have a ribbon of blue fringe on the edge of their garments in order to remind them of Jahweh (Nu $15^{38f.}$). Red, as the colour of blood, represented bloodshed, war, guilt (Zec 6^{2}). Purple was the distinguishing mark of royalty, representing dignity and honour (Est 8^{15}, Jg 8^{26}), whilst green, as the colour of plants—growths to which people look forward in winter—symbolized hope and resurrection.[1] It was also the symbolic colour of the moon.[2]

4. Special symbolisms in OT.—Ahijah tore his garments into twelve pieces in order to show that the kingdom of Israel would be similarly divided (1 K 11^{30-32}). One of the sons of the prophets asked his comrade to smite him, and by his wound thus showed the punishment that Ahab had deserved (20^{35}). Zedekiah, a false prophet, put on horns in order to show that Ahab would push the Syrians as with horns of iron (22^{11}).

In considering the special symbolical actions of the prophetic books, we are confronted with very great difficulty. For scholars are divided in their views as to whether these actions were actually performed in their literal sense or were merely conceived as symbolic visions in the minds of the prophets. It seems almost certain that there are a number of such actions which could not have been performed literally. It is impossible, however, for the present writer to discuss in this brief article the category to which each of these many prophetic symbolisms belongs. But a brief discussion of some of these from the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel may give some indication as to the difficulties in arriving at a definite decision. In Jer 13^{1-11} Jahweh tells the prophet to go to the Euphrates and hide his linen girdle in a rock. After a while he is told to remove the girdle, and he then finds it to be marred. The lesson is that, just as a girdle from its nature clings to a person, so Israel is closely united to Jahweh.

Now, on the one hand, it may seem unlikely that Jeremiah should have undertaken a journey from Jerusalem to Babylon—a distance of about 200 miles—in order to bring out this point to the people. But it is possible that the journey *was* actually performed. (1) We know that the prophet was absent from Jerusalem during part of Jehoiakim's reign, and, as we have no account of his whereabouts during this period, it is possible that he made the journey to Babylon then. (2) In Jer $39^{11f.}$ we are told that Nebuchadrezzar behaved in a most friendly way towards him on the capture of Jerusalem. This can be explained by the suggestion that king and prophet had met previously, and that it was on the occasion of the prophet's visit to Babylon. In Ezk 4^{5} we are told that the prophet lay upon his side for 390 days. How can this be taken literally? Did any person actually count the number of days? In 4^{12} we are told that Ezekiel used human excrement for fuel in baking some barley cakes. Surely it cannot reasonably be suggested that the prophet would have inconvenienced himself by going to such extremes merely in order to bring home to the people some divine message which he could very well have preached in a much more suitable manner. There are some scholars, chief of whom is A. Klostermann, who argue that these symbolical actions *were* performed. The dumbness of Ezekiel (3^{24-27}), they suggest, was due to a temporary loss of speech, and they explain similar performances by somewhat similar suggestions. Against this it may be argued that the prophet here refers to his keeping silent from delivering any prophetic message rather than actual speechlessness. Again, the fact that the prophet had to remain at home, in order to carry out the divine command, suggests

[1] The Code says that, if a father repudiates his son, 'he shall leave house and yard.' 'Yard' simply means 'enclosure' and may refer to the city walls, as a symbol of shelter (C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. and Assyr. Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 42).

[2] Cf. art. NUMBERS (Semitic).

[1] Hammurabi says that he 'bedecked the grave of Malkat with green,' the colour of resurrection (introduction to his Code of Laws).

[2] Jeremias, i. 110.

that it was not loss of speech but an injunction to refrain from reproving his co-religionists any more. The present writer is therefore inclined to agree with R. Smend, A. Kuenen, and E. Hühn in regarding many of the symbolisms of Ezekiel as being merely symbolical visions in the mind of the prophet and as not having been performed externally.

LITERATURE.—Very little indeed has been written by modern scholars on OT symbolism. Among the older works the most important is C. Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen Cultus*, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1837-39. For discussion of prophetic symbolism by modern scholars see F. Giesebrecht, *Die Berufsbegabung der alttest. Propheten*, Göttingen, 1897; F. E. König, 'Zur Deutung der symbolischen Handlungen des Propheten Hesekiel,' in *NKZ* iii. [1892]; E. Hühn, *Die Messianischen Weissagungen*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1899; W. Nowack, *Die kleinen Propheten*, Göttingen, 1897, p. 29; F. Delitzsch, *Iris: Studies in Colour and Talks about Flowers*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1889.

For a study of Babylonian symbolism see W. J. Hinke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I. from Nippur*, Philadelphia, 1907; W. H. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910; P. Jensen, *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890; K. Frank, *Bilder und Symbole der babylonisch-assyrischen Götter*, Leipzig, 1906; J. de Morgan, *Mémoires de la délégation en Perse*, Paris, 1900-05, vii. 137-153; F. Hommel, 'Ursprung des Tierkreises,' in *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, Munich, 1900, ii. 236-268.

MAURICE H. FARBRIDGE.

SYMBOLO-FIDEISM.—Symbolo-fideism[1] is the name given to the theology taught in the second half of the 19th cent. at the Protestant Faculty of Paris by Professors Auguste Sabatier and Eugène Ménégoz, and disseminated since by a large number of their pupils and disciples. It has also been called the theology of the Paris school.

As its name indicates, this theology has two aspects: (*a*) symbolism, which deals with religion more particularly from the point of view of its form, and (*b*) fideism, which deals with it from the point of view of its content. Sabatier devoted himself specially to the former and Ménégoz to the latter aspect. But the two conceptions are inseparable and interdependent. Together they form a theology with a distinct character of its own.

The basis of symbolism is the psychological observation that the essence of things escapes us, and that we know only their manifestations in the form of images, figures, and symbols. We cannot, *e.g.*, know what God is in Himself. We know Him only by the more or less anthropomorphic representation which we form of Him in our thought. This we express by the terms 'Father,' 'Lord,' 'Master,' 'Captain,' 'Sovereign,' 'King,' or by emblems bringing out one or other of His attributes—*e.g.*, Lion, Rock, Banner, Fire. These symbols are without doubt the expression of a living reality, but the conformation of our brain is such that it cannot grasp that reality naked; our mind can apprehend it only when it presents itself in the garment of a more or less sensuous representation. This observation holds good in regard to all religious data, and is borne out in the most subtle dogmatic systems. The task of the theologian is to lay bare the eternal truth from under its contingent manifestations and its historical formulæ; moreover, these formulæ are subject to the laws of historical evolution.

As regards the Deity, it is the name 'Father,' habitually used by Jesus Christ, that best suits the religious man's conception of the Supreme Being—perfect, just, merciful, eternal, all-embracing; a Spirit both transcendent and immanent, on whom man feels himself absolutely dependent, while at the same time conscious of liberty and responsibility before Him. On the ideas of liberty and responsibility depend those of sin and penalty, which in turn suggest those of pardon and salvation. A lively conviction that we are created for life and not for death, for happiness and not for suffering, rouses us to aspirations after salvation. We desire life, happy life, eternal life. The whole idea of salvation is summed up in these words.

How are we to attain this life, this salvation? Conscience replies: By the pardon of our sins. But how is pardon to be obtained? It is with this vital question that fideism is concerned. The term 'fideism' (Lat. *fides*, 'faith') was employed in the religious sense for the first time by Ménégoz in his *Réflexions sur l'Evangile du salut*.[1] Its meaning is most concisely indicated in the phrase: 'We are saved by faith, independently of beliefs.'

The distinction between faith and beliefs is one of the fundamental premisses of fideism. By faith is meant the movement of the self towards God—a movement which implies forsaking sin, repentance. The man who repents and gives his heart to God is saved, whatever his beliefs may be. This statement is opposed to the old orthodoxy, which made adherence to certain official dogmas a condition of salvation. Fideism declares that a man is saved by faith alone ('*sola fide*'). At the same time, it recognizes the value of doctrines. Doctrines are dynamic ideas which make for good when true, and for evil when false. Fideists regard them therefore as pedagogic instruments of the first order. It is for this reason that they attach so much importance to the pursuit of truth and oppose so resolutely doctrines which they consider erroneous. It is only through a great and regrettable misunderstanding that their opponents reproach them with indifference to doctrine; and it is also false to assert, as has been done, that fideists fail to appreciate the intellectual factor in religious faith. Faith, according to their teaching, is an activity of the self in its unity, and therefore must comprise all the elements of the soul's faculties—thought, feeling, and will. But the essential factor in salvation is the inward movement towards God, not intellectual adherence to some doctrinal tenet. Fideists reject the doctrine of salvation by beliefs without thereby denying the spiritual influence of beliefs, as the Reformers rejected the doctrine of salvation by works, while maintaining that good works are obligatory on Christians.

In a general way, and as a result of historical, critical, exegetical, and philosophical studies, fideists have departed from orthodox theology and returned to the simple doctrine of salvation as taught by Jesus Christ, according to their interpretation, to the multitudes in His preaching of the gospel; hence their emphasis on repentance and on consecration of the soul to God as conditions of salvation.

As regards the idea of salvation, they find it in the symbolic interpretation of the primitive Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. This idea has for them two aspects: (1) the entrance of believers at death into celestial happiness, and (2) the gradual establishment of the Kingdom of Justice and Peace on the earth. These two ideas combined constitute in their eyes the Kingdom of Heaven.

The name 'Symbolo-fideism,' which expresses the union of symbolism and fideism, gained currency from two articles by Eugène Ménégoz, signed T. P. ('Théologien protestant') in the *Eglise Libre* (1894, nos. 31 and 33). Auguste Sabatier accepted this title (*Esquisse*, p. 456). It passed into Holland with the thesis by J. Riemens entitled *Het Symbolo-fideisme: Beschrijving en kritische Beschouwing* (Rotterdam, 1900), and into Germany with Gustav Lasch's *Die Theologie der Pariser Schule: Charakteristik und Kritik des Symbolo-Fideismus* (Berlin, 1901).

Symbolo-fideism has given rise to numerous controversies, an echo of which is found in current

[1] In recent years the word 'fideism' has frequently been used alone.

[1] Paris, 1879, § 44.

religious journals and theological reviews. Its adversaries have also published a number of polemical pamphlets. These are referred to in the writings mentioned below.

LITERATURE.—The two principal works of Auguste Sabatier on the subject are the *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, Paris, 1897 (several times re-edited), Eng. tr., London, 1897, and *Les Religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit*, Paris, 1904 (published from MS, after the death of the author), Eng. tr., London, 1904. The writings of E. Ménégoz are collected in *Publications diverses sur le fidéisme et son application à l'enseignement chrétien traditionnel*, 5 vols., Paris, 1900-20. The reader will find in these works references to other works of the same authors. See also Hector Haldimann, *Le Fidéisme; Etude critique de la doctrine du 'Salut par la foi, indépendamment des croyances,'* Paris, 1907; E. Ménégoz, *Religion and Theology*, London, 1908; *Le Salut par la foi, indépendamment des croyances: Anthologie du fidéisme*, by the Comité des publications religieuses libérales de Genève, Geneva and Paris, 1913; A. Delcourt, *Le Fidéisme: La notion intégrale du salut et l'essence de l'Évangile*, Paris, 1914. A. Thiébaut has given an objective and critical exposition of fideism in the *Journal religieux des Eglises indépendantes de la Suisse romande*, 1917, nos. 23-26.

EUGÈNE MÉNÉGOZ.

SYMPATHY.—Sympathy, as the etymology denotes, is 'feeling with' others. Two persons feeling alike do not, however, make a true sympathetic couple unless the feeling of one has partly caused or is reinforcing the feeling of the other. The perfection of mutual sympathy is reached when similar feelings originate spontaneously in the two and reinforce each other. Any relation, however, in which there is a mutual reinforcement of feeling, however originated, is one of mutual sympathy.

1. Emotional contagion.—The primary fact in sympathy is that the feeling of one person can, on occasion, cause similar feeling in another. In its primitive manifestations this occurs without reflective consciousness of the feeling, and certainly without distinction of persons in respect of its origin. This is shown in the contagion of popular excitement—*e.g.*, panic, war-frenzy, the intensified enthusiasm of public meetings, the wild joy, the furious hatred, the boundless affection, that mark the excited crowd. The emotion, or its manifestation in some, excites similar emotions latent in the others, and forthwith by sympathetic reinforcement the emotional disturbance in each is abnormally increased. Probably it is only those who, from the beginning, have some set against the prevalent emotion that maintain a normal level throughout. Such sympathetic outbursts must be themselves short-lived, and, as the cause of excitement is withdrawn, the persons affected by contagious feeling return to their ordinary emotional level. This may even be one of indifference to the popular frenzy in which they took part. It may, indeed, be one of revulsion if they have been drawn, as sometimes happens, into a condition of which in their normal moods they disapprove. Such revulsion would happen, *e.g.*, if an advocate of peace found that he had been drawn by fellow-feeling into a demonstration of war enthusiasm. The hot fit is followed by a cold fit. Hence the instability of popular acclamation, the apparent superficiality of feeling which appears when people liable to sympathy of this primitive unreflective kind are massed together. The most suitable material for the typical 'fickle mob' is a town population sympathetically sensitive and intellectually immature.

The short-lived character of the feeling thus contagiously aroused follows in the nature of the case, because there is no settled identification of self-conscious personality with it. I feel in a sense, but do not feel myself as feeling: I do not take the feeling into myself as mine. It is *on* me and moves me, but it does not enter into any relation to that total of ideas, impulses, feelings, and desires which is *me*. It may be a mere motive excitement, moving me blindly to action, or it may take possession of me completely with fixed idea and over-mastering mood, acting instead of me and overpowering me. In either case I come out of it, and in the latter case as one recovered from a madness. Something like this, no doubt, befell Parisians in the brief violence of the Terror.

2. Self-conscious sympathy.—When self is identified with the feeling which nevertheless is ascribed to another person as origin, we have sympathy proper. The development of self-consciousness goes hand in hand indeed with the exercise of sympathy. We learn to know ourselves, and to become all that we are capable of becoming as self-conscious persons, by our dealings with our fellows, and *pari passu* with our consciousness of them as other selves. In so far, however, as we are clearly conscious of self, we are prepared to set bounds to the operation of primitive sympathy. A new condition of feeling, discontinuous with my previous state so as to preclude its origination in me, is roused in me by sympathetic contagion. It is to the self an invasion from without. As a feeling, moving me but not mine, it must be referred to a neighbouring conscious self, who is manifesting it independently. Our first concern, however, is its treatment by the self which is invaded. Feelings that harmonize with the total state of this self enter into it as elements in its development: the sympathy of children with parents and other elders plays a large part in the building up of their personality. Confidence in the elders who give the lead to sympathy predisposes to acceptance of their guidance. The emotional being of the child is educated in this way. If of average docility, it takes the form suggested to it by its society. On the other hand, the suggested feeling may be out of harmony with the character as already formed: thus the brave man may feel the horror communicated to him by the panic-stricken multitude, but he overcomes it as no possible part of himself. When the feeling thus communicated to us takes strong hold, the repulse by a strong character is correspondingly emphatic. In sensitive natures this gives rise to a peculiar sense of revulsion, as towards something put into us against our will; and the transference of this revulsion to the source of contagion is probably the chief cause of violent personal antipathy. Between this attitude of abhorrence towards the induced emotion and willing receptiveness of it, as extremes, lie all degrees of being moved by a feeling from which, as outside the disposition of our own personality, we nevertheless withhold ourselves. Whether we admit the feeling to influence over us, or harden our will against it in a sort of self-defence, it appears to us essentially, and throughout its action, as the feeling of another person with which in a measure we feel. This definite ascription of the feeling to another is the second characteristic feature in sympathy, and gains prominence with the developing consciousness of self and of other selves.

3. Control of sympathy.—In passing it may be noted how large a part in life is played by the partial hardening of the heart against the contagion of social feeling. This control of sympathetic distraction in general belongs to the preservation of self as maintenance of character. It is not only that undesirable emotions—*e.g.*, of hatred, fear, envy—should be suppressed, as they are by the self-possessed though sensitive members of the excited crowd.[1] Experience soon reveals that the preservation of self, even in the ordinary physical

[1] Common self-possession, as in the man who is not liable to the contagion of feeling, must be distinguished from the subtle excellence of sympathy under control. Probably this is one of the qualities of the born leader.

sense, requires much systematic control of emotion, whether initiated sympathetically or otherwise. An emotional nature loosely controlled is morally unstable and makes for a nervous break-down in course of time. This is the hysteric type, so far as it depends on moral character. It is a main principle of moral health that the emotional life as it increases should be kept more and more strictly in subordination to the ends which it subserves. The precise definition of those ends belongs to the subject of ethics: the average man conceives them simply as the happiness of personal health for himself and his associates, together with some service in furtherance of the common weal. It may be that the rank and file of modern humanity suffer from lack of vitality and variety in the emotional life, but for the moment we are not concerned with them. Persons of the sympathetic cast are—under modern conditions more especially—liable to so much emotional invasion as must result in nervous exhaustion if not systematically kept in check. It is interesting to note how the habit of control over sympathy develops with experience from youth to maturity: the first great sympathetic grief overwhelms us as if it were our own; later we have learnt to throw ourselves outside the emotion into the actions required to assuage the sufferings of our friend; later still, to those who are overtried, callousness may come, with the exhaustion of either physique or morale.

Most of these observations apply to all feeling, however initiated. Sympathetic feeling differs from other feeling as being specially liable to increase of control by development of the element of otherness in it. This is of a piece with another useful psychological truth, namely that the tension of any violent feeling may be relieved by treating it as an object of imagination or thought. Tennyson's lines bear on this point:

> 'Likewise the imaginative woe,
> That loved to handle spiritual strife,
> Diffused the shock thro' all my life,
> But in the present broke the blow.'[1]

In constructing a story, an essay, or a poem which depicts the emotion as affecting imaginary persons, the sense of its personal attachment is obscured: it is projected more or less, *i.e.* thrown out of self-consciousness into the non-ego. Similarly, but as of course and instinctively, we project our sympathetic feelings back into the other self and, although still feeling them, are as a rule much relieved. This relief is no doubt chiefly due to the stop that is placed on the disturbance of the emotional personality in general by the sharp dissociation of the new feeling from those immediately pertaining to the self: it is the other person's feeling, and, though it disturbs me, I limit that disturbance by *knowing* it as something which has not its origin, and is therefore not necessarily permanent, in me. This control of the sympathetic disturbance furthers and is furthered by practical activity in relief of the other's distress.

4. Identification with the 'other.'—The exceptions indeed in this case explain the rule. When the sympathetic feeling is ascribed to a person much beloved, it may affect us more than if it were of our own origination. This, no doubt, is what is meant when it is said that another person is dearer to us than ourselves. The consciousness of the beloved person's consciousness is in this case so established as part of our own that the projection of the feeling into it does not in the least dissociate the self from the feeling. So far as we know what the beloved person feels, we go on feeling it and being further disturbed by it all the time. Indeed there appear to be, in cases of intense affection when the self identifies itself passionately with the other, two ways in which the sympathetic feeling may become more disturbing than the equivalent primary feeling would be. (1) In projecting it on the beloved other, imagination, moved by the habit of affectionate concern, may greatly exaggerate its force and significance: the finger-prick which, in spite of instinctive tears, is a trifle to the baby may bulk large in the distressed imagination of the anxious mother; and the same kind of thing happens in a thousand hidden ways when love prevails, and it happens for pleasure as well as for pain. (2) Each person has an intimate sense of the powers and resources within himself by means of which he bears his troubles and controls his emotional being generally. About the beloved other, however intimately known, he is never quite so sure, and thus, no matter how equal things may otherwise be, the sense of mystery breeds, as it were, a germ of fear that heightens pain and, by release from it, also heightens joy. This goes, moreover, with the essential fact that love at its strongest exceeds self-love in desiring the welfare of its object. The heightening in this way of feeling sympathetically experienced may perhaps be discriminated introspectively as an additional element of anxious concern about subjective consequences. Such concern is given to their own emotions by none but morbid people. And indeed even in the lover-like relation to which this tender anxiety naturally belongs it may be so exaggerated as to be morbid concern of self for the other. For this reason it is often well that persons who get too much on one another's mind—as we say—should be sometimes separated.

The absence of this intimate affection in the case of ordinary associates makes it possible to limit the sympathetic disturbance by instinctively projecting it back into the other mind, consciousness of which is only now and then associated with the consciousness of self. There are, of course, all degrees of dependence on one another in this respect. A man may go through life without one associate in whose welfare he has any genuine lasting interest, capable of sympathy but never in danger of being shaken by it. Most persons, however, have friends sympathy with whom does penetrate into them, as well as move them out of themselves. Some men are, in the absence of contrary cause, friendly to all their associates: these are universally sympathetic also, in proportion to their primary sympathetic sensitiveness. Friendliness, however, as the disposition to identify oneself with another, must be carefully distinguished from the primary capacity to feel as others feel.[1] When they are combined, we have the sympathetic nature as popularly understood. But an unfriendly man may be sensitive to another's feelings, in which case he not only projects them on the other but sharply dissociates himself from all interest in him. It is as if he said, 'I know what you feel; I feel you feeling it; but it is nothing to me.'

5. Insight and sensitiveness.—Apart from unfriendliness, however, this cool dissociation of self from interest in the other, combined with sympathetic sensitiveness, explains the gift of neutral or cold insight which plays so large a part in the intuitive knowledge of men. Intellectual constructiveness, which bodies forth an idea of the man's character as shown by his actions, is the ordinary substitute for intuition; and in some ways it is a safer guide. The intuitionist, *e.g.*, may mistake his man by overestimating the significance of a transitory mental attitude. He is also likely to eke out his intuitions by specula-

[1] *In Memoriam*, lxxxv.

[1] Friendship is in its degree the affectionate interest in another's consciousness of which the extreme has been described, and friendliness is the disposition to be so interested.

tions and imaginings into which all sorts of error may creep. If he abounds in self-confidence, he is a dangerous guide: but, if he treats his gift humbly as a useful auxiliary, it will serve him in good stead and improve with such exercise.

A person of sympathetic bent may have experiences of cool insight, but with this difference that, since in such case he does not identify himself with the other, he is moved to change the state of the other into identification with him. Thus the orator feels that his audience is puzzled or hostile: they do not convert him, but he is not indifferent, so he puts out his strength to express himself and make them feel his feeling. The mere lecturer, on the other hand, only tries to show and make them see his meaning. The orator is the speaker whom the Americans call 'magnetic': he makes his hearers feel as he does, at least for the time. But the beginning which he makes is at the other end of the coil, by insight into the feeling which is theirs but not his. This is the getting into sympathetic touch. By showing this sympathy on neutral ground or even in respectful dissent, he fixes the attention of his hearers. His interest in them interests them in him: then the position is reversed, the mind of the speaker shown, and the original attitude of the audience merged in the new state by which they are identified with him. This kind of thing happens every day on a small scale in the experience of sympathetic people. To understand, to be interested though in disagreement, to persuade—these are the means, and in this order, by which one person transforms the mental attitude of another. The more instinctive the process is, the better, sympathy operating in the pair by its natural impulse to mutual identification of mental content.

6. Affinity of character.—In so far as the sympathetic bent in the full sense turns upon friendliness of disposition, persons may be characterized as sympathetic generally, *i.e.* in relation to all sorts of other persons. In so far, however, as it depends on primary contagiousness of feeling, affinities of character must profoundly affect the relation between any pair. Racial type, *e.g.*, is a basis of such affinity, and the mutual intelligibility of two compatriots, while partly arising from like habits of expression and community of associations, turns also on functional capacity to feel alike. In whatever way we explain the prime fact of emotional contagion, it is evident that no one can communicate to another a feeling of which the latter is constitutionally incapable. The fearless man cannot feel like the coward, nor the liberal man like the mean. Each can only see that the other acts in a manner directly opposite to himself and recognize the corresponding state of mind as a mystery. To sympathize with another, we must be *able* to feel like him. Some would say, further, that we must have felt on our own origination as he now feels; but that is not so certain, though perhaps it generally happens so. Our capacity to sympathize, therefore, is at least limited by the possibilities of our character. How far these are limited, or how far they may be extended beyond our present experience of them, we never know. Certain it is that in human society we run up now and then against mysteries, persons with whom after much acquaintance we never get in touch, who always seem to us as if they were feeling their way through life at the other side of a high wall over which we cannot see, through which we cannot hear, them. At the same time, we meet others with whom, in trifling things and large alike, we find ourselves in tune, so much in tune that diversities of aim and opinion, though standing out the more clearly, do not mar the general harmony. But mental conditions are so complex that likeness of condition between two minds must generally be of a very partial kind.

7. Similarity and association.—Another influence to the same effect which enters into these cases is natural similarity in habit of expression. This is best seen in racial affinity: the stock of native gesture due to heredity, including facial expression, intonations of voice, and a multitude of tiny movements, felt rather than seen—all are available for that involuntary play of subtle signs which is the veiled language of sympathy. Whether contagion of feeling originates with instinctive imitation of feeling-signs or not, its development in relation to the complex psychoses of the adult is dependent on the swift interpretation of their secret signs. Human beings are indeed so profoundly interesting to each other when they really show themselves that an easy mutual intelligibility is often almost equivalent to friendship at first sight.

Intelligibility follows also on intimate association, and this is favourable to the sympathetic relation. A common stock of experiences, habits, and even feelings is formed by association in life, and the result is similar to that of congenital affinity, though lacking the charm of its ever-recurring unexpectedness. Congenital affinity, it should be noted, is not limited to cases of similar racial type. It is a happy accident of human development which may be encountered at any turn.

8. Sympathy in education. — The value of sympathy as an element in the development of moral life is too large a subject to be treated here. A few words, however, may be devoted to (1) the teacher's use of sympathy in education, and (2) the training of sympathy in the child.

(1) The teacher's use of sympathy, like that of the orator described above, begins in his own sympathy with the learner's state of mind and ends in the achievement of the learner's sympathy with his. The teacher's sympathy requires as a starting-point, therefore, some demonstration on the child's part, and to evoke this in as good a form as possible for his purpose—but in any form rather than none—must be his first care. By entering into the child's mind thus shown to him he establishes the contact of sympathy, and by maintaining this contact he leads where he will, provided he keeps to the possible levels of the child throughout. It is not so much in regard to the method of individual lessons as in respect of his general procedure and influence that the teacher's tact is shown. A mistake of intellectual method is a small matter compared with an error in the procedure of moral discipline. It is quite possible to keep in touch with the child's sympathies, even when punishment seems to estrange him for a time.

(2) In the training of sympathy the first requisite is to encourage its manifestations when they occur spontaneously, and to suggest conduct which is the natural expression of interest in others. The tendency to sympathize with joy as well as with sorrow—*Mitfreud* as well as *Mitleid*—should be called out. All this belongs to the development of the sympathetic nature, which, however, also stands in need of disciplinary training. This, for the most part, life supplies, and the educator should be wary lest he interfere unwisely and too much. The delicate process of control and moderation by which each self sets limits to its sympathies had better be left to itself; and, as a rule, it is dangerous to train the young to repress, otherwise than by more fully expressing, their nature. Wise discipline trains to the control of one function for the sake of fulfilling another more perfectly. Thus, emotion is in general controlled by using it to subserve the voluntary and intellectual life.

Thought and conduct are the antidotes to hysteria and emotional riot. As regards sympathy in particular, we should be chiefly concerned to develop first its voluntary and, second to that, its intellectual side. The barren sympathy with suffering, *e.g.*, which does not go on to some comforting act is morbid because it ends in useless emotional disturbance. Doing in accordance with the occasion is the habit to which sympathy should be most carefully trained. Its other requisite is that it should be intelligent, and this is often a much-needed lesson. A useful sympathy with others requires imagination and reflexion sufficient to construct a true ideal of what they want. This intelligent apprehension of another's case is of inestimable value in making the fellow-feeling, as well as the friendly action, fit.

Persons who are 'too sympathetic to be of any use in trouble' are persons who, by neglecting to help their fellows as need arose, have let themselves get into a habit of being overwhelmed by painful fellow-feeling. The remedy is to do something for the prime sufferer. This is the natural course in the case of an unspoiled will.

LITERATURE.—W. Mitchell, *Structure and Growth of the Mind*, pt. iii. London, 1907; James Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, New York, 1897, ch. vi.; William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, London, 1908, *The Group Mind*, Cambridge, 1920; G. Tarde, *Les Lois de l'imitation*, new ed., London, 1900; James Sully, *The Human Mind*, do. 1892, vol. ii. ch. xv.; William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., do. 1891, ch. xxiv. f.

S. BRYANT.

SYNAGOGUE.—See WORSHIP (Hebrew) and (Jewish).

SYNAGOGUE, THE GREAT.—See JUDAISM, vii. 593 f.

SYNCRETISM.—**1. Untechnical use of term.**—The term 'syncretism' has a very curious record. It is as old as Plutarch, who seems to have coined it, or at any rate to have made it current. In his essay on brotherly love[1] he observes that even brothers and friends who have quarrelled prefer to associate with one another, in face of a common danger, rather than to fraternize with the foe; which is a Cretan precedent and principle,

'for, although the Cretans were frequently at faction and feud with one another, they became reconciled and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them. This they called "syncretism" (συγκρητισμός).'

By 'syncretism,' in this political sense, therefore, we are to understand the instinct of self-defence which sinks private differences before a threatening peril on the outside. The 'syncretists' close their ranks; they like quarrelling among themselves, but they would rather exist than indulge in fatal internecine strife at home.

After Plutarch the term became submerged. Fourteen centuries later it re-appears in the pages of Erasmus, who was in his own way, especially when the way ran through the *Adagia*, a 'syncretist' of the reconciling order, averse to feuds. Erasmus sets down the reference to Plutarch, and he also employs the term in his correspondence.

Thus we find him writing from Louvain (22nd April 1519) to Melanchthon, hoping that scholars of all parties will close their ranks against the barbarians: 'Vides quantis odiis conspirent quidam adversus bonas literas. Aequum est nos quoque συγκρητίζειν. Ingens praesidium est concordia.'[2]

During the next century and a half the term is tossed about Europe by members of the Reformed and of the Roman Church, sometimes as an appeal, more often as a taunt; theologians who endeavoured to reconcile extremists were dubbed 'syncretists,' and 'syncretism' was indifferently and acrimoniously applied to all irenical proposals, whether these were the product of a Laodicean indifference or of a genuine love for moderation. In passing from the humanists to the theologians, the term upon the whole acquired disparaging associations, which continued to cling to it. 'Syncretist' became almost a synonym for 'hybrid.' It was derived from συγκεράννυμι, and the supposed etymology corroborated the connexion of the term with all that was heterogeneous.

This is the predominant meaning of the term in ordinary French. In untechnical English it also denotes 'fusion' of a more or less illegitimate or artificial kind. Thus Hallam[1] says of Giordano Bruno: 'What seems most his own . . . is the syncretism of the tenet of a pervading spirit, an Anima Mundi, which in itself is an imperfect theism, with the more pernicious hypothesis of an universal Monad.'

2. Philosophical and ecclesiastical applications.—In the history of philosophy 'syncretistic' has been applied to the harmonizing efforts of those who, like Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th cent., refused to allow their love of Plato to be identified with any depreciation of Aristotle. The controversy between the Aristotelians and the Platonists had been sharpened by the impetus given to Platonic studies after the fall of Constantinople. Partisanship ran strong, and the more moderate men failed to draw the rival schools together.

'Throughout all the tangles of this complicated controversy, a thread of gold is interwoven by the serene and imperturbable temper of Bessarion.'[2]

What happened in 15th cent. philosophy was repeated on a larger scale in the theology of the 17th century. The 'syncretistic controversy' of that age rose out of the efforts made by G. Calixtus (1586–1656), a distinguished scholar at Helmstädt, to draw the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches together. 'A plague o' both your houses,' he cried, like Mercutio. But it was Mercutio's dying cry of indignant protest. Calixtus lived and worked to check the plague. He was acutely sensible of the harm and danger to Christianity which the sharp internal divisions within the Church produced. But his broad, catholic temper met with little response among his contemporaries. The controversy lasted even after his death, assuming political as well as theological forms. The 'syncretistic' party in the Church failed, however, to carry its principles into effect. Even well-meaning and wise attempts to emphasize the fundamental Christian principles held by various Reformed Churches, or by all the Reformed Churches in common with the Roman Church, were suspect in that age of hardening division and widening cleavage. Men were told that in view of the Roman peril they would be well advised to subordinate their private idiosyncrasies in the Reformed Church; or Christians in both Churches were reminded that the menace of outside heathenism should make them close their ranks. But 'syncretism' of this kind was generally branded as a betrayal of principles or as an attempt to secure unity at the expense of truth. The 'syncretistic controversy' was a quarrel over peace, and such quarrels are not the least bitter upon earth. What the 'syncretists,' in Plutarch's sense of the term, called a harmony, their opponents called a 'hybrid.'

The Roman Church had a 'syncretistic' controversy of its own, an eddy in the turbulent dispute over the relations between grace and free will, which poured from the last quarter of the 16th century.[3] 'Syncretic' is the term applied to the system of belief which endeavours to harmonize the conflicting views of the Thomist and the Molinist parties by assuming two sorts of efficacious grace, which are held together by prayer.

3. In comparative religion.—'Syncretism,' as men like Calixtus and Zwingli used it, still retained something of the practical sense which

[1] *De Fraterno amore*, 19.
[2] *Opus Epistolarum*, ed. P. S. Allen, Oxford, 1906–13, iii. 539.

[1] *Introd. to the Literature of Europe*, 4 vols., London, 1837–39, pt. ii. ch. iii.
[2] J. E. Sandys, *Hist. of Classical Scholarship*, Cambridge, 1903–08, ii. 75.
[3] Cf. *CE* iv. 238 f., vi. 713 f.

Plutarch had originally attached to the expression. But this is lost in the technical, modern application of the term to a phenomenon in the history of religion, *i.e.* to the fusion of various religions in doctrine or in cult. Here 'syncretism' denotes generally an unconscious, wide-spread tendency, due to or fostered by some re-adjustment of political relationships or by some clash of civilizations. There is a blending of religious ideas and practices, by means of which either one set adopts more or less thoroughly the principles of another or both are amalgamated in a more cosmopolitan and less polytheistic shape. Such movements in the religious world are often preceded and accelerated by a new philosophical synthesis as well as by a political re-arrangement, but the outcome invariably is a unification of deities, which, as J. Toutain has pointed out,[1] proceeds on one or other of two lines: either two deities of different religions are assimilated by comparison or several deities are grouped together in a fresh synthesis. The motives for this re-statement are drawn from the dawning consciousness that any particular form of religion is no longer adequate by itself, that others possess like features, possibly of superior efficacy and appeal, and that such features can be incorporated without detriment to the essential principles of the particular religion in question. The study of comparative religion exhibits this phenomenon in a variety of shapes and stages, but it is specially prominent during the first four centuries of the Christian era.[2]

The tendency to this syncretism or amalgamation of deities and cults had been in operation long before the rise of Christianity. When one tribe conquered another, or when two tribes or nations formed a political alliance, there was a strong movement towards fusing their gods. The foreign power, especially if it were dominant, fascinated many of its subject or weaker neighbours. An exchange of deities might be made, out of courtesy. Similarities in ritual were developed, and stress was laid on what was common to the two religions. Now and then the gods were identified, and this was specially easy in the primitive days when certain gods were still nameless powers;[3] men were invited to recognize their own gods under the names of foreign deities or to welcome the latter as allies. The connexion between Israel and Canaan is an illustration in point,[4] and an equally familiar one is the influence of Assyrian rites upon the religion of Israel under kings like Manasseh and Amon,[5] when syncretistic influences were specially powerful in consequence of the political situation. The phenomenon is by no means confined to the history of Israel's religion in the ancient world. For different reasons syncretism, or, as some prefer to term it, 'theocrasy' (θεοκρασία),[6] was rife at one period in Greek religion owing to Oriental influences,[7] and as late as the 8th cent. of our era a similar blending took place in Japan.[1] But it is in the history of Judaism, particularly during the two centuries preceding the Christian era, that the elements and issues of syncretism are most clearly marked.[2]

The main impetus to this rise of syncretism came from the political re-adjustment after Alexander the Great. The Seleucid period witnessed a contact between the East and the West, round the Mediterranean basin, which led not only to a fusion of Babylonian with Greek and Roman deities[3] and to a ferment of Oriental religious feeling throughout the Græco-Roman world, but also to movements which, in spite of the vigorous reaction led by the Maccabees[4] and their supporters, affected some circles in Judaism itself. The Hellenizing tendency was fostered by Jewish writers like Eupolemus and Artapanus. It went hand in hand with the allegorizing of Homer and of the OT and with the Stoic philosophy of the Logos. As the tendency to syncretism was innate in Egyptian religion[5]—the spread of the Serapis-cult is only one later instance of it—and as Alexandria formed the centre of activity not only for the amalgamation of Egyptian and Greek or Syrian cults but also for speculative Judaism under the spell of the new ideas of cosmopolitanism, it is not surprising that a step was there taken in the direction of a syncretistic Judaism, which should assimilate and employ current Greek ideas of a cosmopolitan, cosmic character. The exponent of this syncretism is Philo.

'Un syncrétisme dans lequel sont admis tous les éléments, en particulier péripaticiens et platoniciens, qui s' accordent avec l'idée stoïcienne fondamentale de la sympathie des parties du monde, telle serait la définition la plus exacte des vues cosmologiques de Philon.'[6]

Philo's aim was not to blend Judaism with Hellenism. He adhered to his religious inheritance. But he endeavoured to enrich and safeguard it by re-stating it in terms of the current religious philosophies of his day.

As Judaism on the whole resisted this Philonic speculative tendency,[7] so did Christianity in the main resist the later Gnostic movement with its syncretistic impulse during the 2nd and 3rd centuries.[8] Syncretism was partly an evidence of strength and partly an indication of weakness at that period. So far as it meant a readiness to set the new faith in a positive relation to the elements of truth in contemporary cults and mysteries, so far as it breathed a spirit strong enough to assimilate vital data from its new soil and yet preserve its distinctive characteristics, it was healthy. In this respect it carried on the work of the best apologists, linking the Christian tradition to the new situation and proving that the faith was too vital to remain a Semitic cult. But there was another side to syncretism, and to this the Church was keenly, if not always wisely, alert. The fascination of the movement lay in its cosmopolitan appeal—an appeal which was the more seductive that already, within paganism itself, the movement had made headway, as we see from the tone of men like Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Numenius,[9] and from a specific phenomenon like the transformation which had come over a deity such as Isis[10] in the popular pieties of the age. The

[1] *Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris, 1908-11, ii. 227 f. See J. H. Moulton, *The Christian Religion in the Study and the Street*, London, 1919, pp. 253-268 ('Syncretism in Religion').

[2] Cf. *ERE* vi. 232 f.; A. Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1908, i. 33 ff., 312 ff.; J. Reville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, Paris, 1886, ch. iv.; J. Huby, in *Christus: manuel d'hist. des religions*, do. 1912, p. 340 f.; S. J. Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, Chicago, 1914, pp. 71 ff., 191 f.; S. Angus, *The Environment of Early Christianity*, London, 1914, p. 23 ff.; W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, do. 1918, i. 46 f.

[3] Cf. F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, pp. 235 f., 255 f., 300 f.

[4] Cf. *ERE* vii. 441 f., 582.

[5] Cf. B. Stade, *Biblische Theologie des AT*, Tübingen, 1905-11, i. 235 f.

[6] *E.g.*, recently F. Legge, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, Cambridge, 1915, ii. 32 ('the *theocrasia* which was welding all the gods of the mysteries into one great God of nature').

[7] Cf. *HDB* v. 150 f., and *ERE* vi. 421 f.

[1] *ERE* vii. 483; J. Dahlmann, in *Christus*, p. 122 f.

[2] Cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, London, 1913, p. 57 ff.

[3] *ERE* vii. 434[a].

[4] Cf. W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Books of the Apocrypha*, London, 1914, p. 22 ff.

[5] Cf. A. Menzies, *Hist. of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 145.

[6] E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1908, p. 161.

[7] Elsewhere combinations of Judaism and paganism are to be detected, however—*e.g.*, in Asia Minor, in the worship of θεὸς ὕψιστος.

[8] Cf. *ERE* vi. 232 f.

[9] *Ib.* vi. 282[b], ix. 308[b].

[10] Cf. *ib.* vi. 378 f., vii. 434 ff.

passion of the time was for a vague monotheism, which should reflect and answer the unity of the empire. A cosmopolitan syncretism, in the 3rd cent.,[1] began to overlay the earlier national religions and to embrace the Syro-Hellenic and the Western cults in a synthesis which regarded all deities as so many varied expressions of the One, and all rites as more or less acceptable forms of approach to this central, all-pervasive Deity.[2] The individual features of the separate gods and goddesses became less and less distinct. Idiosyncrasies were obliterated, and stress was laid, from the religious as well as from the philosophical and the political points of view, upon the all-embracing unity—generally conceived as a solar pantheism. A man like Macrobius voices this in the 4th century. It underlay the pagan reaction of Julian, which was its last serious challenge to a recalcitrant Christianity. For, although the Church admitted elements which were of semi-polytheistic character, in the worship of the saints, the exploiting of miracles, and even the adoration of the emperor, nevertheless formally the sense of Christianity decided against syncretism of the Gnostic and later of the Neo-Platonic shape.[3] This is the paradox of the situation. Christianity proved by its exclusiveness that it was not, and was not to be, a merely 'syncretistic' faith, in the sense of being eclectic or derivative. At the same time, it not only assimilated bravely and wisely many elements organic to its growth, but also admitted, as we see, *e.g.*, in its later Egyptian popular developments,[4] semi-pagan features which were a handicap ultimately to its successful advance.[5] The syncretistic situation was at once an opportunity and a risk for Christianity. The opportunity was often seized, and the risk was sometimes too much for the faith. Still, the environment did not mould Christianity as it moulded movements like Mithraism and Neo-Platonism. The catholicism of that age suffered from the desire to conciliate the natural man, but it had more in it than an indiscriminate selection or an anxious imitation, such as syncretism usually exhibited.

The tendency of syncretism, when broadly viewed, was to henotheism or pantheism rather than to monotheism. It is true that syncretistic movements meant a break away from polytheism.

'The first corollary of a truly pantheistic religion is not so much toleration of all forms of worship, as a tendency to embrace them all in a single syncretistic system. The one God is the same for all. What, then, does the name they give him matter?'[6]

Such is the theme of a book like the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius, and it is the principle of the religious synthesis underlying Plutarch's philosophy of things. But, as the arguments of a Neo-Platonist like Iamblichus show, this serene indifference was not incompatible with ideas which were henotheistic rather than monotheistic, and the popular cravings proved too much for even a monotheistic principle in Christianity. Pope's opening lines in 'The Universal Prayer'—

[1] 'The expansion of the imperial organisation, the mixture of nationalities in the capital, and the flooding of them by Oriental elements, the heightened intercourse, the prolonged residence of the legions in the provinces and their permeation by foreigners, finally, since the 3rd century, the advent of emperors who were foreigners and unfamiliar with the national spirit of Rome—all these produced the syncretism of religions' (P. Wendland, *Die hellen.-röm. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*[2], Tübingen, 1912, p. 152).

[2] See G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 80 f. 'The reconciled East and West met in Rome to exchange compliments and gods' (J. Martineau, *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, London, 1890–91, ii. 315).

[3] *ERE* ix. 320.

[4] Cf. P. D. Scott-Moncrieff, *Paganism and Christianity in Egypt*, Cambridge, 1913, pp. 126 f., 129 f., 150 f.

[5] Cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, ii. 124 f.

[6] G. d'Alviella, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God* (*HL*), London, 1892, p. 232.

'Father of All! in ev'ry Age,
In ev'ry Clime ador'd,
By Saint, by Savage, and by Sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!'—

echo the syncretistic aspiration in its exalted and abstract form. But syncretism, like Catholicism, appealed to lower as well as higher cravings. The adoration of a Deity like this left the heavens strangely bare for those who had been accustomed to a richer variety of worship, and thus the syncretistic tendency was welcomed as it allowed these heavens to be repeopled by a host of spirits and saints. Syncretism, in practice, almost invariably fostered mythology. Sages and saints, no less than savages, yielded to its spell in this direction. It was found quite compatible, in pagan syncretism, to unite a reverence for the One with some special adoration of one or more favourite, traditional deities.[1] And it is a question how far even the Christian Church of the 4th cent., *e.g.*, which had rejected in earlier days the hospitable syncretism of a monarch like Alexander Severus, tolerated, for the sake of their associations and popular appeal, forms of adoration which were, strictly speaking, out of line with essential monotheism.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been noted during the course of the article; the 'syncretistic controversy' of the 17th cent. is discussed by I. A. Dorner, *Hist. of Protestant Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871, ii. 177 f.; K. Löffler, *CE* xiv. 383 f.; P. Tschackert, *PRE*[3] xix. 243 ff., and in J. H. Blunt, *Dict. of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties, and Schools of Religious Thought*, London, 1874, p. 585 ff.

JAMES MOFFATT.

SYNDERESIS.—The word συντήρησις, which has no classical authority, should mean 'preservation.' In scholastic and mystical theology it appears, often in the corrupt forms *synderesis* or *sinderesis*, in a sense which is hardly justified by the etymology of the word. Τήρησις is used in later Greek in the sense of 'observation,' and συντήρησις may have been coined on the analogy of συνείδησις. The first example is in Jerome:

'Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant συντήρησιν, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, . . . non extinguitur, et qua . . . nos peccare sentimus.'[2]

Bonaventura[3] couples *synteresis* with *intelligentia*, as *intellectus* with *ratio*. Elsewhere he connects *synteresis* with *conscientia*.

'Benignissimus Deus quadruplex contulit ei adiutorium, scilicet duplex naturae et duplex gratiae. Duplicem enim indidit rectitudinem ipsi naturae, videlicet unam ad recte iudicandum, et haec est rectitudo conscientiae, aliam ad recte volendum, et haec est synteresis, cuius est remurmurare contra malum et stimulare ad bonum.'[4]

In the *Itinerarium* he defines *synteresis* as 'apex mentis seu scintilla.' Hermann of Fritzlar speaks of it as a power or faculty in the soul, wherein God works immediately, without means and without intermission. Ruysbroeck defines it as the natural will towards good implanted in us all, though weakened by sin. Giseler uses similar language, saying that the spark (so Eckhart speaks of a *Funkelein* in the soul which cannot be extinguished) was created with the soul in all men, and is a clear light in them, striving in every way against sin and impelling steadily to virtue, and pressing back towards the source from which it came. In Thomas Aquinas *synteresis* is the highest activity of the moral sense. Gerson says that the cognitive power in man has three faculties—the simple intelligence or natural light, which comes from God Himself; the understanding, which is the frontier between the two worlds; and the sense-consciousness. *Synteresis* is the effective

[1] W. Pater notes this in Marcus Aurelius: 'To his pious recognition of that one orderly spirit, which, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, diffuses itself throughout the world . . . he had added a warm personal devotion towards the whole multitude of the old national gods, and a great many new foreign ones' (*Marius the Epicurean*[3], London, 1892, i. 198).

[2] *In Ezech.* i. 1.

[3] *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, i.

[4] *Breviloquium*, ii. 11.

faculty answering to the first of these, and contemplation is its corresponding activity. The word also occurs in Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales. Eckhart sometimes seems to identify *synteresis* with the *Fünkelein* or *Ganster*, and with the *intellectus agens* or *die oberste Vernunft*; but the tendency of his philosophy is to make the 'spark' supra-rational and uncreated; he even says: 'Diess Fünkelein, dass ist Gott.' In the earlier writers *synteresis* is usually thought of as a remnant of the sinless state of man before the fall, while in the bolder thought of the school of Eckhart it becomes the seat or organ of divine immanence and of the highest personal inspiration. The notion of an impeccable 'soul-centre' may be traced back to the Neo-Platonists.

LITERATURE.—W. Preger, *Gesch. der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1874-81; A. Lasson, *Meister Eckhart der Mystiker*, Berlin, 1868; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, London, 1899.

W. R. INGE.

SYNDICALISM.—See SOCIALISM.

SYNERGISM.—**1. General meaning of the term and its Scriptural support.**—The term 'synergism' (συνεργεῖν, συνεργός, 'to co-operate,' 'fellow-worker') became definitely fixed as a *terminus technicus* in theology in the 16th century. It was applied to the later views of Philip Melanchthon and his followers on the question as to the relation between the Holy Spirit (or God's grace) and man's will in regeneration. This view, broadly stated, is that the human will can and does co-operate with the grace of God as a *vera causa regenerationis*. It opposes the position expressed in the sentence 'Homo convertitur nolens.' The human will was, it is true, not regarded as the primary cause (hence synergism differs from Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism); that was unreservedly assigned to God's Spirit and to the preaching of the Word, but the energy of the human will was given a place, and its assent an essential place, in the act of regeneration. The enunciation of this view caused unusual heat among theologians, because its truth or falsehood affected the whole realm of theological truth—the effects of the fall on human nature, the nature and working of God's decrees, the responsibility of the sinner, in fact all Christian anthropology and soteriology.

The term 'synergism' owes its origin to Scripture, but the Scriptural usage of the word operates in a different universe of discourse from the theological. In the NT συνεργεῖν (συνεργός) is never applied to the psychological relation, whatever that may be, whether creative or co-operative, between God's Spirit and man's will in regeneration or conversion. Its general usage is to describe the objective co-operation of Christian brethren in the furtherance of God's kingdom on earth.

In 1 Co 3^9 (θεοῦ γάρ ἐσμεν συνεργοί) the co-operation referred to is that between men in their outward labours for God, not a co-operation between them individually or unitedly with God, however true that may be in itself; and at any rate it refers to post-conversion experience, not to pre- or simul-conversion relationships. In Ph 2^{13} the reference is to men already regenerated, and the same is true of Ro 8^{28}, if ὁ θεὸς is the true text—God works in all things for good with those who love God. It does not directly refer to what takes place in conversion, nor does it state the active elements involved therein and their relationships. Again, in Mk 16^{20} the co-operation of the ascended Lord with the heralds of the gospel is spoken of in regard to miracles. But the word in Scripture is never used of man's natural faculties or capacities (before conversion) working together with the Spirit of God to effect regeneration, which is the specific and proper theological application of the term. If thus synergism is to be rejected or to be defended from Scripture, it must be by reference to the truth of Scripture, and not to its letter.

2. The origin and development of synergism in Melanchthon's doctrine.—The earlier writings of Melanchthon betray no synergistic tendencies. On the contrary, they are in some respects more rigidly deterministic than even Luther's. The religious man is profoundly conscious of his dependence on God's grace. He does not dream of co-ordinating or equating his own freedom with the grace of God as causal in his salvation. This is true even of those who are legitimately called synergists. 'Arminians usually pray like Calvinists,' said Charles Hodge, adding, what is equally true, that 'Calvinists frequently preach like Arminians';[1] *i.e.*, they appeal to men as responsible voluntary agents. The difficulty arises when one or other of these aspects of experience is made the determining factor in the elaboration of a theological system. Truth is largely a matter of proportion and balance. To begin with, Melanchthon, whose mind was eminently of a systematic cast, worked out his system under the dominating influence of the experience of divine dependence. The Holy Spirit teaches us, he says, that all things happen necessarily by predestination, and therefore there is no such thing as freedom of our will. To maintain free will was to dethrone the grace of God from its unique supremacy. This was his position in the first edition of his *Loci Communes Rerum Theologicarum*,[2] and it was even more rigidly expressed in his Commentary on Romans and Corinthians.[3] Free will he regarded as a scholastic figment emanating from carnal wisdom and obscuring the blessings brought to us by Christ. It made men arbiters of their own salvation and consequently undermined the immediacy of Christian assurance and froze the stream of personal devotion to the Redeemer. Melanchthon resolutely applied this conception of predestination to all events, physical and moral, outward and inward:

'Si ad praedestinationem referas humanam voluntatem nec in externis, nec in internis operibus ulla est libertas.' Since man is born a child of wrath, it follows that he is born without the Spirit of God, and therefore 'nihil nisi carnalia sapit, amat, et quaerit.'[4]

Man has no power over his inward affections, and, though Melanchthon admits that in outward things he has some freedom, even here the power of will seems to vanish. Thus Melanchthon, applying a transcendental conception, predestination, to the facts of human life, as he read them or understood them from Scripture, came to assert that no real causality existed anywhere but in God's will, and so the betrayal of Judas is as truly and as immediately an act of God as the calling of Paul. The reprobation of the damned is as properly and in the same sense the effect of God's will as the salvation of the elect. We are not to think of certain events as determined while others are allowed. All things immediately flow out of God's will necessarily. All questions as to the rightness of God's procedure he silences by regarding these questionings as issuing from man's carnal inquisitiveness.

It follows from this position that man could contribute nothing to his own conversion. He could not repent of himself, and so-called morality (pre-conversion) has no spiritual value.

'Homo per vires naturales nihil [potest] nisi peccare. Carnale est quidquid per naturae vires fit, Socratis constantia, Zenonis moderatio, nihil nisi carnales affectus sunt.'[5]

At this stage we see Melanchthon planted firmly on the experience of God's free grace which gave its strength to the new outlook of the Reformation, combating strongly the popular Roman Catholic view according to which man's free will aided by certain ecclesiastical rites contributed

[1] C. A. Salmond, *Princetoniana*, Edinburgh, 1888, p. 177.
[2] Originally published at Wittenberg and Basel in 1521, and ed. T. Kolde, Leipzig, 1900.
[3] Nüremberg, 1522.
[4] *Loci*, 1521, p. 97.
[5] *Ib.* pp. 97–115.

something to man's salvation—a view which cut the vital nerve of personal trust in Christ as the alone Redeemer and opened a door by which the whole mechanism of merits and of an external ecclesiastical authority as ultimate source of redemptive assurance could be reinstated. Melanchthon, however, was extravagant in his elaboration and his application of the truth of man's dependence on God for salvation. He confused in the interests of a theory natural and moral causality, and left no moral bridge between nature and grace. He raised a spiritual feeling—of supreme importance, no doubt—to a position of absolute sovereignty over man and nature and over God Himself. It was impossible that this could be the final resting-place of one like Melanchthon to whom the ethical interest was so important and who was of a mediating spirit.

'Ego mihi conscius sum, non ullam ob causam unquam τε θεολογηκέναι, nisi ut mores meos emendarem.'[1]

Accordingly he was soon convinced, both by the development of his own experience and by the movement of events, of the necessity of defending his position from misconceptions—not now so much from the side of Rome as from pretended followers of free grace itself—and this led him to modify his earlier views. He now came to see that there were many positions previously held by him which he would have to alter. His study of the Greek fathers, whose views on free will were determined by their hostility to Eastern fatalism, and who were very conscious of the moral continuity between nature and grace (often the two were not clearly distinguished by them), influenced his thought, and we find him frequently quoting from Chrysostom: ἕλκει μὲν ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενον δὲ ἕλκει, or from Basil: μόνον θέλησον καὶ θεὸς προσπαρεστί.[2]

The contentions of Erasmus as against Luther undoubtedly influenced Melanchthon also, and the result was emphasis on the will's own activity in conversion.

His increasing familiarity with the classical moralists and the Stoics, but above all his earnest ethical nature, stimulated into protest by the fanaticism of enthusiasts who regarded regeneration as an immediate unmediated *opus operatum*, led him to alter his views or, as he thought himself, to replace the emphasis. Pre-conversion morality was now given a moral valuation. Men were saying that they could do nothing, and so they defended everything that they did or felt inclined to do, however wicked or outrageous. Roman Catholics were thus given an occasion to equate Lutheranism with immoralism in personal life and anarchy in society, and the doctrines of grace had therefore to be set on an ethical basis for the benefit alike of opponents and of adherents. The result was the advocacy by Melanchthon of what became known in the Lutheran Church as synergistic views. It was in his eyes not a capitulation or a palinode, but an ethical rehabilitation of the doctrine of free grace, although it was viewed by genuine Lutherans as a reversion to Pelagianism.

'One egg is not liker another than his synergy is to the Pelagian,' said Matthias Flacius[3] the Illyrian, a champion of Lutheranism, concerning the views of Melanchthon's follower Victorine Strigel. 'Man, they say, can by the natural powers of his free will equip and prepare himself for the reception of God's grace—exactly the teaching of the godless sophists, Thomas of Aquino, Scotus, and their disciples,' said Nicholas Amsdorf of Johann Pfeffinger and Melanchthon.[4]

[1] From a letter to Joachim Camerarius, in *Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. C. G. Bretschneider and H. E. Bindseil, Halle and Brunswick, 1834–60, i. 722.

[2] *Loci*, 1535, p. 376, and elsewhere.

[3] Weimar Disputation, 9th session (cf. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen*, p. 226).

[4] *Öffentliche Bekenntnis der reinen Lehre, des Evangelii*, etc., Jena, 1558.

Synergism, however, is to be understood not from the extreme censures of its opponents, not even from the extreme statements of its advocates, but rather when we look on it as an ethical protest against positions that threatened to submerge the conscience and heart and to disarm the Church in her fight against licence and anarchy. It is therefore necessary to state Melanchthon's position more fully.

3. Melanchthon's synergism and its effect on his theological outlook.—Melanchthon's interest, we have said, was mainly practical, not theoretic. Accordingly his interest latterly in predestination was that of the custodian of morals. He desired to safeguard God's moral purity from any shadow that might be cast upon it by this dogma and at the same time to free man's moral nature from the paralysing effect of a monergistic determinism. His early statements were extravagant. Now he emphatically declared that God could in no sense be regarded as the author of sin. Evil was permitted by Him, but it was abhorrent to His nature. He therefore felt obliged to give up the dogma of an eternal decree of reprobation. The cause of man's sin was in man himself, and the hardening of his heart was due to wilful disobedience and perversity. Man's own responsibility for his spiritual state was emphasized. The offer of God's grace was universal. Original sin was a fact, yet man's will, though it could not initiate a gracious state, could yet adopt an attitude of welcome or of repugnance to God's grace offered in His Word. Accordingly we find Melanchthon editing the original *Augsburg Confession* in this interest.

Art. 18, which originally read, '*Justitia spiritualis* is effected by the Holy Spirit which is received into the heart through the Word,' he altered to read, '*Justitia spiritualis* is effected in us when we are helped (*adjuvamur*) by the Holy Spirit.' The same alteration, *adjuvari*, is made in art. 20. He prepared the *Leipzig Interim* in the same spirit: 'Although God does not justify men through their merits, nevertheless the merciful God does not act on man as on a block but draws him so that his will co-operates, provided he has come to years of discretion.'

Melanchthon's position is clearly stated in the revised edition of his *Loci* (published in 1533) in a sentence that became famous and stereotyped in after controversy:

'In hoc exemplo videmus conjungi has causas, verbum, Spiritum sanctum et voluntatem non sane otiosam, sed repugnantem infirmitate suae'; or, as he expressed it in later editions: 'hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei. Posset enim excutere ut excutit Saul sua sponte, sed cum mens audiens, ac se sustenans non repugnat, non indulget diffidentiae, sed adjuvante etiam Spiritu sancto conatur assentiri in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa.'[1]

There is little doubt that Melanchthon applies this to the act of conversion, and his view was that the positive assent of the will was essential, although, as Herrlinger[2] points out, he maintained at times that the help of the Holy Spirit was necessary to enable the will to accept the gospel.[3] While he does not make it at all times quite clear whether this assent was itself the result of the working of God's Spirit or due to the natural energy of the will, yet he seems certainly to maintain that something must be granted to the will itself, and here is the point on which the synergistic controversy hinges. This dubiety is noticeable also in some of his followers. One of them, Pezelius, interprets his master as teaching that the will was a *causa subordinata*, after the Holy Spirit in the Word had roused up the soul.[4]

Latterly he defined the will after Erasmus as *facultas applicandi ad se gratiam*, and therefore the difference between the saved and the lost is

[1] *Corp. Reform.* xxi. 658.

[2] *Die Theologie Melanchthons*, Gotha, 1879.

[3] See I. A. Dorner, *A System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 171.

[4] See Luthardt, p. 189.

ultimately due not to election—for even God foresaw something in the elect which conditioned His election—nor to reprobation, but to man himself. The difficulty which confronted Melanchthon was just to determine what constitutes responsibility, and, even if his solution is defective and open to verbal criticism, as it certainly is, it is a merit that he recognized the problem in its seriousness and that he tried to solve it on moral grounds.

Melanchthon's synergism also affected his practical outlook. To those who defended civil and social outrage because they were sinners, and would remain sinners unless changed by a divine act which they could do nothing to initiate, he sternly said that man in spite of original sin had liberty in outward actions, the reason could control the will, and the will the bodily movements. No man could say, like the servant of Zeno, that he was compelled to sin by fate. It is clear that his soul loathed this Manichæism, as he called it, and his safeguarding of predestination from those who so understood it was clamantly demanded by the circumstances of the age and of many ages since. It is surely as immediate a datum of Christian experience that the sinner is responsible for his sin as that he ascribes his salvation to God's grace.

Melanchthon did not take a prominent part in the Majoristic controversy, which arose over George Major's statement that 'good works are necessary for holiness,' but by various utterances he indicated that, whilst maintaining the Lutheran position that justification is of grace alone, he was anxious to show that a holy life was the inevitable consequence and the test of the reality of a justified life. Amsdorf's statement that 'good works are harmful to holiness' he characterized as a 'lewd saying' (*unflätige Rede*).[1]

4. The synergistic controversy.—Melanchthon's statements concerning free will were ambiguous and so hesitating that men, accustomed to the breezy statements of Luther on the same subject, felt as if he attributed to the will more than he actually expressed, and his acceptance of Erasmus's formula gave this feeling a colour of truth. Luther on this point was definite:

'In geistlichen und göttlichen Sachen was der Seelen Heil betrifft da ist der Mensch wie die Salzsäule, wie Loth's Weib, ja wie ein Klotz und Stein, wie ein todt Bild, das weder Augen noch Mund weder Sinn noch Herz brauchet.'[2]

What Luther advocated with zeal Melanchthon admitted with reserve. Controversy was therefore inevitable, and it broke out violently, occasioned by two disputations of Pfeffinger,[3] a Leipzig professor and disciple of Melanchthon.

He tried to answer the question why one man under the preaching of the Word became converted and another did not, and the decisive factor, he maintained, was that one willingly assented and the other did not. The difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the activity of the divine will: therefore the difference lies in man himself. We must therefore attribute a certain synergy to our will. Man even now in his fallen state is not as a statue or a stone, nor is he purely passive, for, if that were the case, there would be no difference between the pious and the impious, the elect and the damned, Saul and David. God would become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the impious and the damned. On the other hand, the human will has not the power to effect spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit moving through the Word of God, and the mind thinking, and the will not resisting but complying under the Spirit's influence—these are the causes which concurrently produce conversion.

Pfeffinger's defence and explanation of Melanchthon's views called forth violent opposition especially from Amsdorf and Flacius. The former (see above) said that, according to Pfeffinger, man could prepare and equip himself for conversion by the natural powers of his free will without the aid of the Holy Spirit. Verbally this was very unjust, but essentially it had an element of truth in it. Flacius appealed to Luther's words and declared that man was worse than a stock or stone because he offered resistance to God's Spirit. The will therefore does not co-operate; it opposes and resists. Every one knows that this criticism, though infelicitously expressed, is in touch with reality and spoken out of personal experience. As regards regeneration, man is absolutely passive—he is spiritually dead; the image of God is not only wholly obliterated, but is transformed into the image of Satan. Man thus contributes nothing positive to his own conversion; any contribution of his is negative and resisting.

Pfeffinger replied to Amsdorf and incidentally mentioned Flacius. He declared himself more explicitly as holding that the unconverted will had the power of either obeying or resisting God's offer in His Word. Thus the controversy raged, the new university of Jena contending for the old position of Luther and violently opposing the synergistic movement, which was stoutly advocated by the faculties of Leipzig and Wittenberg. At last, at the instigation of Flacius, an attempt was made to silence opposition by authority. John Frederick II., Elector of Saxony, was appealed to, and by his command a *Book of Confutation and Condemnation* of all prevalent heresies was published at Jena in 1559. Of its nine divisions the sixth was devoted to the refutation of synergism. Those who taught that man had power in his will to co-operate with the grace of God in conversion were stigmatized as overthrowers of the grace of God. It was false to maintain that man can do anything by his free will in accepting or rejecting grace. Human nature is wholly adverse from God and hostile to God and is subjected to the tyranny of sin and Satan.

In a similar strain the orthodox Lutherans—Amsdorf, Wigand, Tilman Hesshusen, etc.—spoke and wrote against synergism and deduced this anthropology from their predestinarian views, the last-named saying that, in one respect,

'God did not wish that all men should be saved, for He did not elect all. God's will acts in one uniform way on men just as on stocks and stones.'[1]

Melanchthon raised his voice against this deterministic delirium and declared that it is absurd to talk of conversion until the will consents, that to reject God's grace is an act of will and not an act of God, and that human nature had at least power in outward actions. An attempt was made to make the book binding on teachers and preachers, but without success. Even in Jena, the citadel of orthodoxy, Pastor Hugel refused to read the document from the pulpit, and Strigel raised his voice on the synergistic side. Both Strigel and Hugel were imprisoned, and it looked as if synergism were doomed in Jena, for the university was strengthened in the orthodox interest by the appointments of Wigand and Judex to professorial chairs and by the recall of Musæus, all of whom were strong champions of orthodoxy. However, the prisoners were set free after an imprisonment of less than six months, and a further attempt was made to settle the dispute by public discussion. This disputation lasted from 2nd until 8th Aug. 1560, and occupied thirteen sittings. The interest for us centres in the positions defended and refuted regarding free will and God's grace.

To begin with, Strigel maintained that the substance and qualities of human nature were not obliterated by the fall nor altered, but only hindered in their activity. His position he made clear by a curious physical illustration.

A magnet, he said, cannot attract iron when smeared with onion-juice, yet it retains its magnetic properties, and it can attract though smeared with goat's blood. It is the same magnet in both cases, but its activity is hindered in the one

[1] *Corp. Reform.* ix. 407.
[2] *Enarr. in Ps. xc.*
[3] *Propositiones de libero arbitrio* and *Quæstiones quinque de libertate voluntatis humanæ*, Leipzig, 1555.

[1] See Luthardt, p. 241.

case and not in the other. So by the fall man's nature is not destroyed, but only weakened. He is like him who fell among thieves between Jerusalem and Jericho, half-dead, or like one weakened by disease but not dead like a corpse.

Strigel is here aiming at a distinction which satisfies many theologians—that between formal freedom and material freedom or that between natural ability and moral ability, a distinction largely used by Jonathan Edwards but in currency before his day.[1] According to this distinction, man does what he pleases and wills what he pleases. That is the very meaning of will—it is not compelled from without; but, though man has this natural ability, as a matter of fact he does not will the good spiritually simply because he does not want to—he lacks moral ability.

Seeberg contends that Strigel was groping after this distinction, but did not adequately express it.[2] That is certainly true of him at this Weimar disputation. He did not make his meaning clear, but afterwards he distinguished very clearly between *efficacia* (δύναμις) or *facultas*, on the one hand, and *capacitas* or *aptitudo*, on the other. Man has lost the first through the fall, and the Holy Spirit restores to the will the δύναμις or efficacy or faculty of believing, which was lost by the fall. At this disputation, however, Strigel did not go so far as that. When asked by Flacius if the human will co-operated with the Holy Spirit before conversion or only after, he hesitated and said that to him conversion was not a point but a line, not the beginning of the Christian life but the whole of it.

It is evident from reading the disputation that Strigel really wished to attribute power to the will, but at the same time to ascribe the chief place to the Holy Spirit—so that synergism is an unfortunate term to use of factors that cannot be equated. He repeated the Melanchthonian formula: 'Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis quae voci divinae assentitur,' a sentence which is ambiguous; and on this point no decision could be reached. On the other hand, Flacius went so far as to say that the very substance of the soul was altered by the fall and by sin, and that therefore man was purely passive, or active only in hostility to God. Peace could not be restored by public controversy. In a few months the party of the Illyrian was driven from the country, and Flacius, a man of undoubted erudition, died in his fifty-fifth year at Frankfort-on-Main. Strigel also left and died in Heidelberg at the early age of forty-five.

5. The Formula of Concord.—After various unsuccessful attempts at a solution of this and other disputes the *Formula of Concord*[3] appeared, and, as it became an authoritative standard of the Lutheran Church, its position on this topic must be stated here.

The problem is dealt with in artt. 1 and 2 of the *Formula*, and, while no personal names are mentioned, the views of contending parties are very clearly kept in mind. In the 1st art., dealing with original sin, a clear distinction is drawn between actual transgressions (*actualia delicta*) and the hereditary sickness of the soul. Man's nature is in all its parts poisoned by inherited sin, and for this condition man is guilty and condemned by God's law, so that by nature men are the children of wrath, and from this state they can be saved only by the benefits of Christ's merit. How this corruption is transmitted is described. God creates every soul afresh, but because of physical generation from corrupted seed the hereditary disease of sin is propagated. Yet God is not the author of sin in either its origin or its development, nor is man's substance converted into sin. Original sin is not to be identified with the essence of man. A clear distinction must be made between our nature (which was created, and which is daily preserved, by God), in which original sin dwells, and that original sin itself which dwells in our nature. To teach otherwise is Manichæism, not Christianity. This is further corroborated by the fact that the Son of God, according to His human nature, is consubstantial with us, His brethren. He took our nature, but it was sinless in Him. Further, God in sanctifying men purifies them from sin, accepting them for Christ's sake. He gives them grace, but He has eternal hostility towards sin itself. Moreover, if original sin were the substance of the soul, the doctrine of the resurrection of believers would be null and void. Thus the *Formula* disposes of the Flacian error. Yet, while all this is so, man before God in his actual fallen state is truly and spiritually dead in all his faculties, as far as spiritual good is concerned. Strigel's illustration of the magnet will not do. Man is not simply surrounded by outward hindrances; he cannot do anything, however small, in his natural state in regard to spiritual things. He has not the capacity 'in rebus spiritualibus aliquid inchoandi, operandi aut cooperandi.'

In the 2nd art., in which we have an attempt at an analytical solution, the relation of man's powers to the Holy Spirit is set forth. In fallen man before conversion there does not remain the smallest spark ('ne scintillula quidem') of spiritual power by which he can prepare himself for apprehending God's grace, or for applying or accommodating it to himself. Rather he resists it. Man is capable certainly of being converted. He is still a reasonable creature, but as regards any real initiative 'hac in parte deterior est trunco, quia voluntati divinae rebellis est et inimicus.' He has a capacity for conversion, but a passive one, and his conversion is purely a work of the Holy Spirit. At the same time it is stated that man by natural reason and will has somehow power to live a decent outward life. Thus the *Formula of Concord*, while strongly opposing the strange view of Flacius as regards the substance of the soul of fallen man, at the same time as strongly opposes the view which would give any power to the will in initiating conversion. Of Melanchthon's three causes it makes the Holy Spirit alone the efficient cause, the will and nature of man being only a subject to be converted, while the Word of God preached or read is the means through which the Spirit works. Great stress is laid on the Word of God as the means of the Spirit's working. Thus God softens men's hearts, draws them, and reveals to them their sin; and, realizing His anger, they feel in their heart contrition which makes them attend to the promises of the gospel, and so faith ('scintillula fidei') is quickened in their soul and 'hoc modo Spiritus Sanctus qui haec omnia operatur in cor mittitur.'

Thus the *Formula of Concord* unhesitatingly rejects synergism. In conversion the real agent is the Holy Ghost, the assent of the will is not a cause, but is itself an effect of the Spirit's working through the Word. Co-operation may be spoken of after conversion, but even then we must not think of God's Spirit and man's will as if they were like horses drawing a load and working side by side. God's Spirit in the converted man works on and through the will.

6. The Reformed position as regards synergism.—The problem of the relation of man's nature to the grace of God was agitated in the Lutheran Church after the *Formula of Concord* and has been a subject of dispute down to the present day.

[1] It is used by Twisse, Howe, and very clearly by Isaac Watts, the famous hymn-writer.
[2] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*, Leipzig, 1895–98, ii. 356.
[3] See *ERE* iii. 849.

In the Reformed Church the same problem arose, though it was approached somewhat differently. The distinctive feature of the Calvinistic system is its logical consistency; every doctrine is discussed not only by itself but in the light of the whole. The supreme regulative principle in Calvinism is the sovereignty of God; and, when man's regeneration was viewed in the light of this principle, it was recognized that God's grace acted differently on men who are regenerated and on those who are not. That is obvious, but whence the difference? It was due to the determination of God. God, who had elected some, did so not as a bare matter of decree or quiescent foreknowledge or fortuitously waiting on their faith, but energetically through a series of efficient means—the redemptive mission of His Son, the preaching of the Word, the irresistible working of the Holy Spirit; and these were effective all along the line in the case of the elect, leading them from spiritual death to grace and glory. Now, in the case of the unregenerated it was a sufficient proof that this divine redemptive causality had no place, that it failed in this link of regeneration. It was non-existent here; therefore it was wholly non-existent. God did not elect them; the redemption of His Son was not purposively undertaken or efficaciously operative in their case. Thus the question of the will is so embedded in the logical coherence of the system that to moot it is to raise the question of the validity of the system as a whole, and that is what happened in the case of Arminius, and especially—for Arminius himself did not attribute regenerating power to the will—in the case of his followers Simon Bischop (Episcopius), Philippus van Limborch, and others. The objections to Calvinism, as far as the subject of this article is concerned, were directed mainly against what was called irresistible grace and the extent of the Atonement.

The Arminians—for we may leave the Socinians out of account; W. Robertson Smith has aptly described them as 'Pelagians of the intellect'—held that grace worked similarly on all, the difference from which conversion arose being due not to God's grace but to man's own will. To them irresistible grace (or, more properly, efficacious grace) meant necessity, and so the responsibility for the final damnation of the lost fell on God. Again, they maintained that by the Atonement the possibility of salvation was opened to all, and they vehemently rejected the doctrine of the eternal reprobation of some, as Wesley so strenuously did afterwards. The Synod of Dort attempted to settle the problem, but in the Reformed Church as in the Lutheran it keeps constantly emerging. Here even more than in the Lutheran Church, which diffidently refrained from applying predestination theories to its anthropological and eschatological views,[1] the problem is an acute one, for the question of God's moral character is raised, and it is from this quarter, rather than from the sphere of religious psychology, that the opposition emerges, and here its strength lies. Hence we find that Calvinistic apologetic has largely been a defence against what is regarded as misunderstandings, perversions, and unwarrantable inferences.

In regard to efficacious grace the Calvinist did not mean that God's grace did violence to the human will by outward or inward compulsion, or that it altered the nature of the will as such, which always has worked and does work voluntarily, but that grace affected the disposition of man in such a way that the resistance of the will was changed into obedience. It was not the obedience of the will that made grace efficacious, but much more the efficacy of grace that made the will not only in act but in disposition obedient.

Some Calvinists, notably the school of Samur, agreed with the Arminians that the Atonement was intended for all mankind; but the Arminians contended further that it is left to the free will of man either to concur with or to reject this intention. The Calvinists felt that, while this opened a possibility of salvation to all, it made salvation certain for none; the Atonement thus became itself a contingency rather than a reality, and they could not understand a purpose of God which could thus be frustrated. To leave the future of mankind hanging on the slender thread of the free will—even if that thread was not itself an illusion—seemed too precarious to be consistent with a purposive God, and rendered the salvation of the regenerate itself problematic, a denial of the perseverance of the saints. Hence the position that the Atonement was meant for those that are saved or to be saved, and that grace is efficacious in the case of the elect; and so the empirical fact that some are not saved is itself a proof that in God's secret purpose the Atonement was not meant for them.

Here also, as in the Lutheran Church, and as in the internal disputes on this question between the Jesuits and the Jansenists in the Church of Rome, as well as in the disputes between Rome and Reformers on this point, we see the question at issue in spite of many cross currents in the discussion itself. The Calvinistic and Arminian problem is even more illuminating than the Lutheran because it is more conscious of the pervasive nature of the issue. It is a matter not of anthropology simply, but of theology in all its bearings. A survey of the discussion, in spite of the changed outlook of our own day, reveals the palpable dangers on either side and at least teaches us where we are not to search for an adequate solution.

The problem is not an accident of history, but a fundamental problem of thought, perhaps the problem which goes deepest of all—the relation between God and man. It goes deeper and higher than the question of man's place in nature or man's place in history; it is the question of man's place in relation to God.

7. Conclusion.—What, then, is the significance of the synergistic controversy for modern Christianity? It is evident that many of the preconceptions accepted by both parties alike, whether we look at the discussion as handled by Augustine and Pelagius, by Flacius and Melanchthon, by Calvin and Arminius, or by Jansenist and Jesuit, are antiquated. The march of natural science has raised afresh the whole question of the nature of man, and the problem is now whether man's nature can be explained from below as a development of life in general. Alongside of the activity of science has gone a prodigious wealth of philosophical speculation dealing with the nature of man, his place in the universe, and the value of his experience and his ideals. The profound changes also in the structure of society, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the consequent application of new categories in the explanation of the significance of human life have changed the outlook considerably. The more direct activities of Christianity itself, its vast missionary ideals and efforts, the investigations into the psychology of the Christian life, the insight into what is permanent in Christian experience as distinct from what is accidental or subsidiary—in short, the main currents of modern thought and life—have poured through Christian theology till the old landmarks are submerged, and history and reflexion alone make us certain that the unity of experience is a reality and that the problems of the spirit change not,

[1] Cf. also the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church.

however much the outlook may change. It is on this changed background and in the light of these tendencies that the problem of synergism can alone be approached.

(*a*) Modern Christianity in all its schools has had to fight against a naturalistic conception of man. From this point of view we can appreciate the emphasis laid by the early Greek theologians on man's freedom. Whatever may be thought of their view of freedom, the important point is that as against fatalism Christianity asserts that freedom has a real meaning as applied to man. So all Christian schools to-day, whether they be historically affiliated with Augustine or Pelagius, emphasize freedom as against physical necessity or direct determinism. Freedom has a meaning in regard to man that it has not in regard to matter. It is necessary to be clear on this point because naturalistic necessitarians too often claim the Augustinian and the Calvinist as on their side, whereas they are working on a different level of experience altogether. This is brought out clearly by the following considerations.

(1) According to Calvinism and Arminianism alike, man was originally created in the image of God, and his final end is 'to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever.' This is deeper than any change brought about by sin and subsists as an inalienable characteristic of human nature.

'A lady once said to me, "The more I see of myself, I see nothing so properly mine as my sin." I said to her, "Well, you do not see deep enough. There is something far more properly yours than your sin; and your sin is improperly yours. It is a blot in your being, which, if you do not get quit of it, will never cease to be *unnatural* to you. No; the image of God is more properly yours, though you had no share in the production of it."'[1]

(2) It has always been held that man is responsible for his sin. He has formal freedom, nor can he ever become a non-moral being in the sense that he can become non-voluntary in his actions or place himself beyond the claims of the moral law on his character. Whatever his actual condition due to sin, these things hold true. His reason, conscience, and will always act rationally, morally, and volitionally. Again, the question here is not whether we agree with the content of this nature as explained by different schools of Christian thought. We may consider that the Arminian view gives too much, and the Calvinistic view too little, real freedom; but the important point is that from the general Christian standpoint man is not explicable in terms of mechanism, however subtle or refined in form. The synergistic controversy has no meaning either for opponent or for defender if the naturalistic view of man is true. The theory of T. H. Green[2] as to the relation of the character to volitions is simply Calvinistic psychology in a philosophical dress, but its whole motive is to overthrow the naturalistic conception of man.

(*b*) Synergism becomes a real problem when man's freedom is viewed in the light of God's activity. We are so accustomed to defending liberty against material necessity in our age that we are apt to forget that the real problem of freedom emerges on the religious plane. What meaning and content are we to give to man's freedom, not now as against nature, but as against God Himself? Two main streams of thought emerge in history on this question.

(1) The Pelagian, looking almost exclusively at man's free power of initiative, became jealous even of God's interference. Man on this view is a bare individual and largely, if not wholly, his own creator. His sin is a bare act of will, undetermined by what went before and unaffected by what comes after. His will is his unconditionally, for the character is the result of acts of will; but an act of will can alter it easily. His merit is his own, and his salvation is his own. God never gets inside the adytum of man's free spirit, and free will is primarily the power of choosing between alternatives.

(2) To the Augustinian the problem was far more complicated. He recognized that man was organically related to the past. The influences of the past affect his will and disposition and character. He does not begin as a moral neutral or moral unit. Sin is more than a bare act of will. When a man becomes self-conscious, it is there not simply as the result of a wrong choice, but as the fruit of a vitiated disposition and itself a source of vitiation. The characteristic of moral awakening is the discovery of our bondage. We become conscious of our need of freedom more than of the fact that we are free. The interposition of God is not regarded as a violation of freedom, but welcomed as the restorer and succourer of true freedom itself, which to the Augustinian meant acting in accordance with the highest. This deeper view of man led Augustine to the certainty of pre-individual iniquity—racial evil—as it led Kant to posit a supra-temporal fall. Objections may be raised to phrases like original sin, the guilt of Adam's transgression, the fall of Adam, supra-temporal fall, and it is right to aim at verbal accuracy if possible, but it is essential that the repudiation of inadequate phraseology should not be accompanied by the rejection of the realities bodied forth by inaccurate phrases.

We have the same tendencies in philosophy in our day represented by pluralism in its many forms and by absolute idealism. The former is so alive to the importance of the individual that in its extreme and logical forms it makes the individual eternal *a parte ante*, and, if God is recognized, it is as a *primus inter pares*; the latter is so conscious of the claims of God that it tends to annihilate the personal life of the individual *a parte post*. The problem as to how a man can act against God's will is insoluble intellectually, and the Calvinist has great difficulty, in spite of his insistence on man's accountability and God's holiness, in saving himself from the pitfall of pantheism where sin is factorized into something different from what it is to the conscience. Yet, however sinful man's state may be, however the sinner may be alive to the deep-seated nature and wide extent of this disease, he accepts responsibility for it as his. He cannot devolve the responsibility on Adam or on circumstances. That is the moral attitude. The intellect may attempt to explain sin either scientifically as a residuum from our animal origin or philosophically as due to finitude or as a necessary stage in our development; but every explanation that explains away the moral attitude is itself unsatisfactory. Pantheism, material, philosophical, or theological, suffers shipwreck on the conscience. But, on the other hand, though we are compelled to recognize centres of activity acting contrary to God's will, it is impossible to give them the self-subsistence that we give to God. Even in sinning they depend on Him and are within the scope of His control. The Christian doctrine of creation—creation in time, for creation has no other meaning in regard to dependent beings—saves from pantheism and pluralism alike. While all subsist in God, personalities have a limited power of self-antagonism to God, but they do not compel God to disown His character as Source and responsible sustainer of all. He creates personalities with the capacity to create themselves. Their endowments and faculties, which vary so much as regards both individuals

[1] John Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*[3], Edinburgh, 1871, p. 124.

[2] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883.

and races, which are also so clearly dependent on their historical setting, are of God. It is this inalienable immanence of God that accounts for the presence of high ideals among men however sinful, for the unrest and lack of harmony in the life of man of which Pascal speaks so eloquently, and it is this that makes salvation possible and essential. The Augustinian tended to view man's original constitutive nature as made in God's image as an affix of an ideal human ancestor, and to leave man as he now is nothing but his sinful organic relations. A logical distinction was made an absolute distinction *in rerum natura*. The divine image in man was practically regarded as a *fulgor* appearing once in Adam for a brief space, but now no more; but sin has meaning only when the inalienable immanence of God in man is fully recognized. The Church has never agreed to the Flacian view of human nature as itself sin; but its language has often been perilously near it, and, when it has, protests have been raised, as in New England, where the amiable qualities of man have been emphasized until the need of salvation has been minimized or evaporated. On the ground, then, of man's original creation, we understand that man has freedom which, alas, has been exercised against God Himself, though given by God and intended by Him to coincide joyfully with His own.

How to reconcile God's holy omnipotence and foreknowledge with this human fact seems an insoluble problem. We must give content to God's predestinating activity; it is not enough to posit a quiescent, non-interfering divine knowledge; otherwise there is no guarantee of the ultimate success of God's purposes. But, on the other hand, we must not look on God's absolute decrees as the moral cause of sin or as acting mechanically in man, and certainly not as an insurmountable barrier to the recovery of his true freedom, and that in a moral way.

The synergist fought against a view of God which made Him in the case of some men the obstacle to salvation, withholding His grace from some, and making remedial provision only for some; and in this the synergist was right. Here again the Christian doctrine of the new creation is the safeguard. God is not only inalienably immanent in man by virtue of the first creation; He is also redemptively active in man through Christ. The Calvinist is mainly right in his psychology of conversion.

God's grace is efficiently active, and the consent of the will is the result of that activity; yet He is active in harmony with man's true being, and man's consent is voluntary. Man does not simply accept the offer of grace by the power of his unaided will and so convey it into the soul. His will is never unaided; grace comes into the soul as a power of God moulding the will itself. The acceptance itself is not the cause of its presence. The supremacy of grace and its efficiency is maintained by the religious consciousness on self-examination, but the acceptance itself is an act of will.

The miracle here also is not that a man's will should be effectually motived to harmonize with God's redemptive activity; the miracle is that some men should resist even this. It is not to be thought that their resistance is due to the fact that God withholds or withdraws His gracious activity or that He uses it only gingerly. The gospel offer is to all, even the Calvinist says, and it is a *bona fide* offer; it is more, for the cost to God—what we mean by the Atonement—is so real and so great that the activity of God is an energy penetrating into man. God does not deal with the sinner simply in the way of punishing him; He deals with him in a redemptive way. How can this fact of man's resistance, again, be reconciled with God's omnipotence in grace? Many, like Schleiermacher, find refuge in final universal salvation, in a probation extending beyond this life. But God's omnipotence is a reality which recognizes now man's power of resistance because it values man's freedom. This resistance does not annihilate the divine omnipotence, nor does it rob God of His character as Creator and Redeemer, were the resistance to be eternal.

The value of synergism is in its denials. It is wrong to regard God's activity as doing violence to this initiative of man. The weakness of synergism is that it tends to regard this activity of man as separate from God to begin with and as only co-operating with God. The relation between them is more intimate. God Himself is present from the outset in this freedom; and when, as in Christian experience, the soul awakens to the presence of God, then it is felt that God has done so much in Christ, and is doing so much, that it is joyfully acknowledged that the will's power is His, and the renewal of it is His work. Salvation is not an acquisition of the will so much as the welcome deliverance and liberation of the whole personality. Religion in its strength emphasizes God, and in so doing frees man into the liberty of joyful service.

LITERATURE.—The lives of the reformers, and the general treatises on the history of the Reformation, all deal with the synergistic controversy. J. W. Richard, *Philipp Melanchthon: The Protestant Preceptor of Germany, 1497–1560*, New York, 1898, gives a good account of Melanchthon in English; cf. Karl Schmidt, *Philipp Melanchthon*, Elberfeld, 1861.

C. E. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen*, Leipzig, 1863, gives a detailed history of the controversy in its origin and development; also *Die Arbeiten Melanchthons im Gebiete der Moral*, Leipzig, 1884; Flotow, *De synergismo Melanchthonis*, Vratislaw, 1867, is a special handling of the subject referred to by G. Kawerau, who has written much on the various antagonists in the synergistic controversy; see Schaff-Herzog, xi. 223 ff., also *PRE*[3] xix. 229 ff.; E. F. Fischer has a treatise on Melanchthon's teaching on conversion (*Melanchthons Lehre von der Bekehrung*), Tübingen, 1905; and Paul Tschackert, *Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre*, Göttingen, 1910, pp. 520–531, is an excellent summary.

The literature on the *Formula of Concord* is relevant to the discussion; cf. F. H. R. Frank, *Theologie der Konkordienformel*, vol. i., Erlangen, 1858; R. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Heidelberg, 1870, p. 171 ff.; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*[4], Halle, 1906. R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Leipzig, 1895–98, as well as other treatises on dogmatics, give relevant sections. See also H. Heppe, *Gesch. des deutschen Protestantismus*, 4 vols., Marburg, 1853–56; I. A. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880–82, iv. 164 ff. For Reformed doctrine see literature under art. CALVINISM, and for the modern problem H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*[2], Edinburgh, 1913. See also artt. CONVERSION, FREE WILL, GRACE.

D. MACKENZIE.

SYNODS.—See COUNCILS AND SYNODS.

SYRIANS (or **Aramæans**).—**1. General introduction.**—The Hebrew 'Aram' is rendered in the LXX by Συρία, 'Syria.' We may therefore take it for granted that originally the words 'Aramæans' and 'Syrians' were synonymous. At a later time 'Syrian' and 'Assyrian' were used indiscriminately: Ἀσσύριος = Σύριος = Σύρος.[1] According to Gn 10[22], Aram was one of the five sons of Shem, and, according to Gn 10[23], Aram was the father of Uz, Hul, Gether, and Mash. The Aramæans, or Syrians, are therefore Semites.

A complete study of the Aramæans would include that of all the races whose languages, manners, and religions come within the Syrian scope. But our purpose here is to consider only the pagan Aramæans. We shall not touch upon Western (*i.e.* Biblical) Aramæan, represented by several quotations preserved in the OT and the NT, nor the Egyptian papyri and ostraka, particularly those of Elephantine, nor the Jewish dialects

[1] Cf. T. Nöldeke, in *Hermes*, v. [1870] 443 ff.

represented by the Targums, the Megilloths, and the Jerusalem Talmud, nor Samaritan, nor the fragments of Christo-Palestinian literature. All those are of the greatest importance from the general Aramæan point of view, religious as well as philological, but are outside the scope of this article. The same remark applies to the different branches of Eastern Aramæan, which includes the Babylonian Talmud, the literature, language, and religion of the Manichæans, Mandæans, and Harranians (*qq.v.*). We shall also leave untouched the study of Syriac (language and literature) and the chief Neo-Aramæan (Christian) dialects.

The best known of the pagan Aramæans are the Palmyrenes (*q.v.*), the Nabatæans (*q.v.*), and the Syrians of Damascus and of the region north of Syria. We get our information on these races from the OT, ancient inscriptions, and Latin and Greek coins and documents.[1]

The ethnic *aramí*, אֲרַמִּי, 'Aramæan,' is found in 2 K 5^{20}, Gn 25^{20}, Dt 26^{5}. Its fem. is *aramíta*, אֲרַמִּיָּה in 1 Ch 7^{14}. The plur. is *aramím*, אֲרַמִּים in 2 K $8^{28t.}$ 9^{15}. The corresponding Greek of the LXX is respectively βαδονὴλ τοῦ Σύρου ἐκ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας, ἀδελφὴν Λαβὰν τοῦ Σύρου (Gn 25^{20}), etc.; ἡ Σύρα (1 Ch 7^{14}); οἱ Σύροι (2 K 8^{28}).

The adverb אֲרַמִּי, *aramí*, 'in Aramæan,' is translated by the LXX Συριστί in Is 36^{11}, 2 K 18^{26}, Dn 2^{4}, 2 Es 47.

The OT gives the following information on the pagan Aramæans.

Aram Ṣoba (*Zobah*), אֲרַם צוֹבָה (LXX τὴν Συρίαν Σουβά), in 1 S 14^{47}, 2 S 8^{3} etc., 10^{6-8}, 1 K 11^{23} etc. This expression means an Aramæan state in the north of Canaan or its capital. The town of Zobah was situated in Lebanon, according to 1 Ch 18^{3}.

Aram Ma'aka (*Maachah*), אֲרַם מַעֲכָה (LXX ἐκ Συριάς Μααχά), in 1 Ch 19^{6}, means a territory at the foot of Mount Hermon (Jos 13^{13}). The name of the people is Ma'akati (Maachathites), מַעֲכָתִי; according to Dt 3^{14}, the Ma'akati dwelt beyond the kingdom of Og; they were not included in the conquest of the descendants of Manasseh (cf. Jos 12^{5} 13^{11}, 2 S 23^{34}).

Aram beth Reḥob (*Beth Rehob*), אֲרַם בֵּית רְחוֹב (LXX Ῥοώβ), in 2 S 10^{6-8}, was a small Aramæan or Syrian kingdom which supplied mercenaries to the sons of Ammon when fighting against Joab, King David's general. They took to flight before Joab, who re-entered Jerusalem in triumph. Rehob is said to be in the north of Palestine, in the region of Laish, or Dan (Jg 18^{28}).[2]

Aram Naharaim (*Nahor*), אֲרַם נַהֲרַיִם (LXX εἰς τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν), is identified by the LXX with Mesopotamia (Gn 24^{10}, Dt 23^{5}, Jg 3^{8}, 1 Ch 19^{6}), 'Syria of the two rivers.' This is a mistake. Naharaim means 'country of the river,' and corresponds to the Nārima of the Tel el-Amarna letters and to Nahrina in the Egyptian inscriptions; it extended along the two banks of the middle Euphrates.[3] At the time of the Khati the name Naharanna was given to the country lying between the Balikh and the Orontes.[4]

Paddan Aram (*Padan-aram*), פַּדַּן אֲרָם (LXX ἐκ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας Συρίας), in Gn 25^{20} $28^{2, 5-7}$ 31^{18} 33^{18} 35^{9} etc. This term, 'field of Aram (?),' perhaps refers to northern Mesopotamia.[5]

2. Damascus.—*Aram Dameśeq*, אֲרַם דַּמֶּשֶׂק (LXX Συρία Δαμασκοῦ), in 2 S $8^{5t.}$, 1 Ch $18^{5t.}$, is Syria of Damascus, which came to the help of Hadadezer, king of Zobah; David slew 22,000 Syrians and put garrisons in Syria of Damascus (Syria-Damascus).

In the course of time Syria (Aram) comprised numerous divisions, the chief of which, besides those mentioned above from the Bible, were: Batania, or country of Bashan, Commagene with its capital Samosata, Cyrrhestice with Cyrrhus as capital, Chalybonitis with its capital Chalybon (Halep = Alep), Coele-Syria with Heliopolis (Baalbek) as capital, Seleucide, or Tetrapolis, with Seleucia, Antioch, Laodicea, and Apamea as principal towns, Chalcidice with its capital Chalcis (Kinnesrin), etc. In many cases we have not enough information about these divisions to treat them separately. The best plan will be to give a résumé of the details supplied by history, inscriptions, and other documents, grouping them round Damascus and the Damascene.

The god who received most worship was Hadad, whose consort was 'the Syrian goddess,' or Atargatis. This god was also called Ramân or Rammân. These two names appear as early as 3000 B.C. in the cuneiforms. This deity does not appear in Phœnician texts. Hadad is represented in the same way in Syria and Mesopotamia. He is the god of lightning and thunder; he shakes the mountains; he is beneficent when he sends the rain which fructifies the earth; he is the destroyer when he sends floods and inundations. According to the inscriptions of Senjirli, Hadad was the first of the gods of northern Syria in the 8th cent. B.C. His chief sanctuary was at Hierapolis (Mabbog, Manbij), near the Euphrates. He was specially worshipped by the agricultural populations of Syria as the protector-god of the harvests. In time his cult became confused with that of the sun; his head was then ornamented with rays; this identification is particularly noticeable in Heliopolis (Baalbek), where the cult of Hadad and that of the sun are one and the same. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Optimus Maximus; he received various local denominations (Dolichenus, Hadaranes, Heliopolitanus), but he can always be recognized by the fact that he is represented with the bull or that he is mentioned along with his consort, the Syrian goddess Atargatis. A third personage is usually connected with these great gods, regarded as their son or their daughter. These three together form the triad known as the *dii syri*. They have sanctuaries in a great many Syrian towns—Rhosus, Raphaneæ on the Lebanon (in Græco-Roman times). But the principal sanctuary of the Syrian gods, after Hierapolis, was Damascus, and the Bible mentions kings of Syria in the 9th cent. B.C. with theophorous names, such as Ben-Hadad, Tabrimmôn. It is even possible that this cult of Hadad exercised a certain influence on some Israelite centres, which would explain the representation of Jahweh by a young bull. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Damascenus. In all probability Jupiter Heliopolitanus, the god of Heliopolis (Baalbek), should be identified with Hadad.

The consort of Hadad is Atargatis, the great Syrian goddess—also under the names Allât and Venus—who must not be confused with Astarte, the Phœnician goddess. Coins of Hierapolis call her 'Ate or 'Atar'ate. She was represented with her head surrounded with rays. The symbol of Atargatis was composed of the crescent moon in conjunction with the solar disk.

Besides the divine couple, Hadad and Atargatis, the Syrian pantheon included other deities, of secondary rank, several of whom had a purely local character.

Reshef, or Rashuf, was the incarnation of thunder and lightning. He was often represented as a soldier armed with spear, mace, bow, and shield; he carried on his helmet a gazelle's head surmounted by two sharp horns. Reshef is also met with in Phœnicia and in Cyprus. He was in later times identified with Apollo. Some scholars regard him as a Phœnician rather than a Syrian deity.

The inscriptions also mention Rekub-El, 'the charioteer of El,' who is probably an importation into Syria of the charioteer of the sun-god of the Assyrians. El was an important deity, but did not occupy the first rank in the Syrian pantheon.

Bel was worshipped in Syria, as in Assyria and among the other Semitic races.

Alongside of sun-worship the Syrians devoted a very special cult to the moon-god. Of two

[1] Cf. Nöldeke, 'Die Namen der aram. Nation und Sprache,' in *ZDMG* xxv. [1871] 113 ff.

[2] Cf. F. de Saulcy, *Dict. topog. abrégé de la Terre Sainte*, Paris, 1877, p. 260.

[3] Cf. *La Bible du centenaire*, Paris, 1916, p. 28.

[4] Cf. G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, ii.

[5] Cf. *La Bible du centenaire*, p. 32

Neirāb inscriptions (6th cent. B.C.) one mentions Sahar, Shamash, Nikkal, and Nusk, the other omits Shamash, 'the sun,' and mentions only Sahar, Nikkal, and Nusk. Sahar, the moon-god, was the chief deity of Harrān. His wife, Nikkal, corresponds to Nin-gal, 'the great lady,' wife of Sin, the Assyrian moon-god. Their son, Nusk (Nusku in Assyrian), represents fire, according to some scholars, and, according to others, he personifies the crescent moon.[1]

The stele of Teima (an oasis in the north of Arabia) names three Aramæan deities: 'Ṣalm, Singalla, and Ashira, gods of Teima.' Lagrange[2] proposes to identify Ṣalm with Salmu, the 'dark,' the dark planet, *i.e.* Saturn. According to other writers, the word *ṣalm*, 'image,' 'statue,' means the idol of the local god (*ba'al*) of Teima; Singalla is of Assyrian importation and denotes the great Sin; Ashira corresponds to the Asherah of the Canaanites.

An inscription recently discovered by Pognon in the region of Aleppo, but probably the oldest Syrian inscription, mentions not only Zakir, king of Hamath, and La'ash, but also a new deity, the god Alur (800 B.C.). He is probably a local god, the *genius loci* of Hazrak, for in the continuation of the text the important part is ascribed not to Alur but to Ba'al Shamain.

Of the three Senjirli inscriptions that of Hadad, the oldest, mentions the gods Hadad, El, Reshef, Rekub-El, Shamash, who accorded to Panammu what he asked of them. Lagrange[3] calls attention to the fact that no goddess figures in this list. The second inscription, called that of Panammu, dates from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III. (754–727 B.C.) and mentions the gods Hadad, El, Rekub-El, Shamash, and all the gods of Jadi. The third one, called that of Barrekub, dates from the same period, but does not mention any deity, except that Barrekub declares that, on account of his loyalty, his lord Rekub-El and his lord Tiglath-Pileser have placed him on his father's throne.

When Zenobia was taken captive to Rome, the cult of the Syrian gods penetrated to the great city with her (or before her). This fact is now duly established by the discovery of a sanctuary to Janicula in the gardens of the Sciarra villa. There we read inscriptions dedicated to the Syrian god Adad (Hadad) of Lebanon on a small white marble altar. There is also an inscription dedicated 'diis syris' at Spalato.[4]

LITERATURE.—Lucian, *de Dea syria*; C. Clermont-Ganneau, *Études d'archéologie orientale*, vol. i. in 2 pts., Paris, 1880–95, *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, do. i. [1888], v. [1902] (the remainder in course of publication); G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, do. 1895–99, ii.; W. M. Ramsay, art. 'Hierapolis,' in *HDB* ii. 379 f.; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905, passim, and pp. 491–510 for the inscriptions in Aramæan dialects; F. Cumont, *Les Cultes d'Asie Mineure dans le paganisme romain*, do. 1906, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, do. 1906; R. Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., do. 1903–05, and artt. 'Hadad' and 'Heliopolitanus,' in Pauly-Wissowa; P. Gauckler, 'Le Bois sacré de la nymphe Furrina et le sanctuaire des dieux syriens, au Janicule, à Rome,' in *CAIBL*, Mar. 1907, pp. 135–159; H. Pognon, *Inscriptions sémitiques de la Syrie, de la Mésopotamie, et de la région de Mossoul*, Paris, 1908; R. Dussaud, 'Le Royaume de Hamat et de Lou'ouch au viiie siècle avant J.-C.,' in *RA* i. [1908] 223–235; R. Savignac, review of Pognon's work in *RB*, 1908, pp. 596–600; A. Legendre, art. 'Syrie,' in *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, ed. F. Vigouroux, Paris, 1891–1912, v. 1930–48; H. A. Strong and J. Garstang, *The Syrian Goddess*, London, 1913 (cf. R. Dussaud, in *RHR* i. [1913] 387 f.).

3. The Nabatæans.—According to some scholars, the Nabatæans were Arabs who used Aramæan as their literary language; according to others, on the contrary, they were pure Aramæans who in the course of their migrations mingled on the one side with the southern populations of Arabia, while to the north they became masters of Trans-Jordan as far as Damascus. The oldest Nabatæan inscriptions (1st cent. B.C.) contain no Arabisms; afterwards, at the beginning of the 1st cent. of our era, Arab influence makes itself clearly felt, especially in the regions of Ḥegrā and Medain Sāleh.

The Nabatæan sources now in our possession are inscriptions, which are published in the second part of *CIS*, and coins, which have been studied most recently by R. Dussaud and have revealed an almost unbroken succession of kings, from Obedas I. (90 B.C.) to Malichus III. (A.D. 106). But before these dates a Nabatæan race was known which in 312 B.C. was powerful enough to gain the victory against Antigonus. After this victory the Nabatæans, an essentially trading people, occupied the north of Arabia, the country of Edom, and the Damascene. F. H. Vincent has gathered together all that is known about the pantheon of the Nabatæans; they honoured the sun, to whom they built an altar on their houses, and to whom they offered libations and burned incense. The following are the principal deities. Dūshara (Dusarēs) seemed to occupy the first rank and to be the god of the king. Then came Allāt (fem. of Allah) and Manūthu or Manavat. The god Hobal belonged originally to Syria. Mutaba and Harisa are almost unknown. Qaysa was perhaps the ancient national god of the Edomites. The names of the goddesses Vagrah and Tada are from a doubtful reading as well as those of Nashbu and Elgē. The Syrian god Ba'al Shamin was also adopted by the Nabatæans. The Nabatæans erected temples to their gods. The temple comprised a small building to contain the statue of the god, a sacred enclosure (*ḥaram*), votive stelæ, and niches for the icons.

Whether the Nabatæans were strongly Aramaized Arabs or real Aramæans, they gave a very large place in their pantheon to the deities and cult-objects of Aramæan or Syrian origin. See, further, art. NABATÆANS.

LITERATURE.—M. de Vogüé, *Inscriptions sémitiques publiées*, Paris, 1869–77, 'Textes nabatéens,' pp. 100–124; C. Clermont-Ganneau, 'Les Noms royaux nabatéens employés comme noms divins,' in *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, i. [1888] 29, 'Le Cippe nabatéen de D'meir et l'introduction en Syrie du calendrier romain combiné avec l'ère des Séleucides,' *ib.* 43, 'La Statue du dieu Obodas roi de Nabatène,' *ib.* ii. [1898] 366, 'Les nouvelles Inscriptions nabatéennes de Pétra,' *ib.* 370, 'Manboug-Hierapolis dans les inscriptions nabatéennes,' *ib.* iv. [1900] 99, 'Le Dieu nabatéen Chai 'al-Qaum,' *ib.* 382; F. H. Vincent, 'Les Nabatéens' in *RB*, 1898, pp. 567–588; R. Dussaud and F. Macler, *Voyage archéologique au Safā et dans le Djebel ed-Drūz*, Paris, 1901; R. Dussaud (in collaboration with F. Macler), *Mission dans les régions désertiques de la Syrie moyenne*, Paris, 1903 (=extract from vol. x. of *Nouvelles Archives des missions scientifiques*); E. Littmann, *Semitic Inscriptions* (*Publications of an American Archæological Expedition to Syria in 1899–1900*, iv.), New York, 1904; R. Dussaud, 'Numismatique des rois de Nabatène,' in *JA* i. [1904] 189, *Monnaies nabatéennes* (=extract from *RN*, 1905, p. 170); M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905; G. Dalman, *Petra und seine Felsheiligtümer*, Leipzig, 1908, *Neue Petra Forschungen und der heilige Felsen von Jerusalem*, do. 1912; J. B. Chabot, *Les Langues et les littératures araméennes*, Paris, 1910, pp. 21–23; A. J. Janssen and R. Savignac, *Mission archéologique en Arabie* (*mars–mai 1907*), i., 'De Jérusalem au Hedjaz Medain-Saleh' (*Publications de la Société des fouilles archéologiques*, ii.), Paris, 1909 (see review by R. Dussaud in *Journal des Savants*, Oct. 1910, pp. 460–474, entitled 'Les Ruines de Hégra'); R. Dussaud, art. 'Pétra' in *La grande Encyclopédie*, Paris, n.d., p. 531 f. ('son importance [de Pétra] nous est surtout connue à l'époque gréco-romaine. Elle est alors la capitale des Nabatéens. . . . Les Nabatéens sont des Arabes. La langue de leurs inscriptions est araméenne, ce qui prouve simplement la diffusion de l'araméen à l'époque gréco-romaine. L'ancien idiome arabe s'est conservé dans les noms propres'); *CIS*, pt. ii. (vol. i. 1 [1893], 2 [1902], 'Inscriptiones nabateae,' no. 157–482, vol. ii. 1 [1907], no. 1472 f.).

4. The Palmyrenes.—See art. PALMYRENES.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the Literature appended to art. PALMYRENES, see L. Double, *Les Césars de Palmyre*, Paris, 1877; L. G. Deville, *Palmyre: souvenirs de voyage et d'histoire*, do. 1894; R. Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., do. 1903–05; J. B. Chabot, *Les Langues et les littératures araméennes*, do. 1910, pp. 19–21; *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique* (published by the commission of the *CIS*), do. 1900 ff.

[1] Clermont-Ganneau, *Études d'archéologie orientale*, ii. 182 f.; Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*, pp. 499–501.
[2] Pp. 501–504. [3] P. 494. [4] *CIL* iii. 1961.

5. Syrian cult.—In their pantheon, as in their religious practices, the Aramæans had naturally very close relations with the Assyro-Babylonian cults on the one hand and with those of Phœnicia and Canaan on the other. They practised the local agrarian cults, in conjunction with the worship of sun, moon, and stars, preferably on high mountains or sharp mountain-peaks, regarded as the abode of the gods. They worshipped sacred trees (the tree of life) and plants. They also rendered worship to sacred springs, and Palmyra possessed a specially consecrated river, whose Tyche was venerated. Certain sacred rivers had miraculous powers: if the offering sank to the bottom of the water, it was approved by the deity; if it floated, it was not approved.

As among the rest of the Semites, sacred enclosures have been found among the Aramæans, known as *ḥaram*, and much used among the Arabs. The boundaries of the *ḥaram* were fixed by stelæ, several of which have been recovered during the course of excavation.

We have little information concerning the after life among the Semites in general, and the Aramæans in particular. Like the ancient Hebrews, they probably had Sheol, the kingdom of the dead. From the Senjirli and Neirāb inscriptions, which are very important funerary texts, we learn that the Aramæans believed that a part of the dead person survived, called *nephesh*, 'soul.' It was a material principle, to which they had to offer food and drink.

Among the most venerated objects of worship we must mention the sacred stones, or bætyls, which assumed various aspects. The presence of the god was materialized by a stone placed in the sacred enclosure. The inscription of Hadad shows that the Aramæans worshipped the *neṣib*, a hewn stone or statue. A Palmyrenian inscription shows among the Aramæans the use of the *maṣṣēbhāh* (*q.v.*), in the sense of 'stele.' And they distinguished between the funerary stele, *nafsha*, 'soul,' of pyramidal form, and the votive stele, or *mesjida* (whence our word 'mosque,' through Arabic), which meant the place in which the deity was worshipped.

As regards the personnel of the cult, we hear of the priest, *komer*, attached to the service of such-and-such a god. It was he who offered the holocaust. Barbers played an important part, both in performing the ritual incisions and in shaving the heads of those who dedicated their hair to the deity in consequence of a vow. There were also scribes, charged more especially with keeping the accounts of the temple. Sacred prostitutes were not lacking in the Aramæan cults; and lastly we must mention the familiars of the temple, who rendered services to the faithful who came to worship or make vows, and who lived in the surroundings of the temple, finding their food in the remains of the meals offered to the gods.

6. Calendar.—The Aramæan calendar is fairly well known; the Nabatæans and Palmyrenians employed the Seleucid era, and for a very long time the Syrians made their year begin in autumn. The names of the months of the Palmyrenians are all known: Tishri, Kanun, Kslul, Ṭbt, Shbṭ, Adar, Nisan, Ir, Sion, Qinian Ab, Elul. Those of the Nabatæans are the same, except the second and tenth, which are not known. This information refers to the Aramæans in Roman times. The ancient names of the months have not yet been brought to light by the oldest inscriptions (Senjirli and Neirāb).

LITERATURE.—Ph. Berger, *Les Inscriptions sémitiques et l'histoire* (a lecture delivered at the Sorbonne), Paris, 1883, (=extract from *Bulletin de l'Association scientifique*, 155); *CIS* i. i. [1889], ii. [1893], iii. [1902], ii. i. [1907]; Ph. Berger, *La Bible et les inscriptions*, Paris, 1890; R. Duval, *Les Littératures araméennes*, do. 1895; G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, do. 1895–99, ii.; A. H. Sayce, art. 'Aram, Aramæans,' in *HDB* i. 138*f.*; T. Nöldeke, artt. 'Aram' and 'Aramaic Language,' in *EBi* i. 276–286; *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique*, ed. by the commission of *CIS* i. (Paris, 1900–05), ii. pt. i. [1907], pt. ii. [1908], pt. iii. [1912], *s.v.* 'Araméen,' 'Nabatéen,' 'Palmyrénien'; R. Dussaud, 'Les premiers Renseignements historiques sur la Syrie' (=extract from the *Revue de l'École d'anthropologie de Paris*, July, 1902, pp. 252–264), *Notes de mythologie syrienne*, 2 pts., Paris, 1903–05; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], do. 1905; A. Lods, *La Croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiquité israélite*, 2 vols., do. 1906; R. Dussaud, 'Un Monument du culte syrien et d'époque perse,' in *RHR* li. [1913] 62–68, art. 'Syrie,' in *La grande Encyclopédie*, do. n.d., xxx. 798*f.*

FRÉDÉRIC MACLER.

SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.—1. Scope of this article.—Much confusion has arisen from the fact that several different bodies of Christians—Jacobite, Maronite, Nestorian, Malabarese, and others—habitually call themselves 'Syrians,' as well as from the fact that the word 'Syria' itself has meant different things at different times. It will therefore be well at the outset to define the scope of this article.

The East Syrians or Nestorians call themselves 'Sūrāyē,' said to be a corrupt form of 'Sūryāyē.'[1] The Syrian Jacobites are in the Syriac vernacular commonly called 'Sūryānē,' by way of distinction (or better 'Sūryānē' or 'Seweryānē').[2]

The name 'Syria' (Syr. Sūriyā, Gr. Συρία or Σούρ, 'e locis Palestinæ maritimis')[3] has been derived from 'Tyre' (Syr. Ṣūr), though it is spelt with a different *s*. It varied in meaning from time to time. In Roman days, at the beginning of our era, it denoted the country west of the Euphrates and north of the Arabian desert, including Palestine and Palmyra, and extending north to the Taurus; though the Roman procurators or the Herods ruled all or part of Palestine, being more or less independent of the governors of the Roman province of Syria. At a later date 'Inner Syria' meant Palestine (and the coast lands to the north thereof), and 'Outer Syria' meant Mesopotamia.[4] The modern Turkish *vilayet* of Syria is only a fraction of the old Roman province, and lies east of the Lebanon, extending from Hama on the Orontes in the north to the Hedjaz in the south, Damascus being the capital, while the *vilayet* of Beirut is west of the Lebanon, and the old Judæa is an independent *sanjak* under a *mutesérif*.[5] Thus the term 'Syrian Christians' has little relation to the term 'inhabitants of Syria.' The most comprehensive definition of the former is 'those Christians who use or have used the Syriac language in their liturgical services or as a vernacular.' It thus includes the Jacobites of Mesopotamia, the Nestorians, the Maronites of the Lebanon, the Syrian and Chaldæan Uniats, and the Christians of St. Thomas in Malabar.

The history of many of these Christians has usually been considered in Europe only as far as it affects their relations with certain heresies, *i.e.* only from one episode (however important) of their annals. These doctrinal questions have already been dealt with in artt. MONOTHELETISM, MONOPHYSITISM, and NESTORIANISM, and will therefore not be referred to in this article except incidentally, and when they are necessary to explain the history or customs of the Syrian Christians.

2. Syriac-speaking Christians.—Syriac is a branch of the Aramaic family of languages. The written or classical Syriac—the Syriac of the liturgies and patristic literature—was the language spoken at Edessa, and was not very distant (though differing somewhat in grammar and vocabulary) from the Aramaic of Palmyra and that of Palestine (the Biblical Aramaic of the OT, or 'Chaldee,' as it used to be called), perhaps not more distant

[1] R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, ii. 2585.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 2586.
[3] *Ib.* ii. 2585.
[4] *Ib.*
[5] *The Geographical Journal*, l. [1917] 13.

than some dialects of 'English' now current in the British Isles are from one another. The Edessa Syriac was the medium of commerce in the valley of the Euphrates, and was used far and wide for literary purposes. But, though this was, and is, the written language, other dialects of Syriac were spoken vernacularly throughout a very wide district, from the Mediterranean to the eastern limits of Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Adiabene (east of the Tigris), and southwards to the borders of Egypt and Arabia.[1] There were many Syriac-speaking monks in Egypt in the 4th cent. and later.[2] Even the Armenian Christians used Syriac till the 4th century.[3] Thus there were many Syriac dialects. They were not the lineal descendants of classical Syriac, but were rather in the position of sisters or nieces of that language.[4]

Syriac gradually gave way, vernacularly and to some extent liturgically, to Arabic after the Muhammadan conquest, though it has had locally a considerable influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of the Arabic which supplanted it.[5] The only Christians who now speak it habitually are the East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldæan), among whom it is practically the only language used (though many of the Moṣul Uniats also speak Arabic), the Jacobites of Jebel Tūr, and the people of Ma'lūlā near Damascus. The other Jacobites and the Maronites now ordinarily use Arabic for their vernacular. The Malabarese have probably never used Syriac vernacularly—unless the immigrants from Persia used it for a while (see below, § 9)—but have always spoken an Indian dialect. It may be noted that many Jews in E. Turkey and Persia have a vernacular closely akin to the spoken Syriac of the Nestorians; and the language of the Mandæans (*q.v.*), or so-called 'Christians of St. John,' if they still exist, is another branch of Aramaic. In the early ages of Christianity the literary language of Syria proper was Greek (see below, § 3), but Syriac was the popular language there till after A.D. 500. It should be remembered that Antioch itself was a Greek, not a Syriac, centre. The city was predominantly Greek, though Syriac was the language of numerous monks in it and its neighbourhood, and of the country people.[6]

All the above-mentioned Christians use classical Syriac as their liturgical language; and many of them use it still as their literary language, as all did till the Middle Ages. It will thus be seen that the prayers in the Church services are only imperfectly, if at all, understood by the majority of the worshippers. In Syria proper, however, many of the prayers are said in an Arabic translation, so as to be intelligible to the people; they are then written in Syriac characters, and this combination of Syriac and Arabic is called Carshuni (Syr. *garshūnī*).[7] But those services which are the bishop's own—*e.g.*, ordination—are in Syriac only, as are all the prayers which are said inaudibly by the priest.

The vernaculars differ from classical Syriac in different degrees. The East Syrian vernacular dialects, which vary a good deal among themselves, differ from it perhaps as much as Italian from Latin, while the Ma'lūla dialect has retained more of the older grammar and is less analytically developed.[8] This last vernacular is particularly noticeable as being preserved by those who are so far isolated from other Syriac-speaking Christians. Ma'lūla (called Seleucia by the Turks) is a village of some 1000 inhabitants, situated on a high plateau about 5000 ft. above sea-level, north-east of Damascus; while two neighbouring villages, though most of their inhabitants have become Musalmāns within the last 250 years, also speak Syriac vernacularly. Ma'lūla consists ecclesiastically of two divisions; half are of the Uniat Melkite rite (see below, § 6), half of the Greek Orthodox rite. Each division has an ancient monastery.[1] The local tradition is that the inhabitants are immigrants from the east, from the district of Singar or Sinjar (west of Moṣul), which is now largely inhabited by Yezīdis, or so-called 'devil-worshippers'; but this tradition is of very doubtful value.[2]

Of all the Syrian Christians, whether they have lost their own vernacular or have retained it, it may be noted that their clergy are supposed all to be able to read and write and understand classical Syriac; and most of them can do so, and can even, with some difficulty, speak it. But this is now only as a foreign language.

There are some differences of pronunciation. The East Syrians (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldæan) say *ā* when the West Syrians (Jacobite) and the Maronites say *ō* (*e.g.*, *malkā*, *malkō*, 'a king'), the former being the older sound, preserved to us in transliterations like Talitha (Syr. *ṭlithā*), Maranatha (Syr. Mārān ethā or possibly Mārānā thā). The East Syrians hardly ever aspirate *p* (except when it is used to form a diphthong), and many of them never aspirate *t* or *d*; almost all of them pronounce the vowels Rbhāṣā (Rwāṣā) and Rwāhā alike as *ū*, the *ō* sound being produced only by a combination of the vowel Zqāpā (Zqapha) with *w* or aspirated *b* or *p*. One point with regard to transliteration of Syriac words into Roman characters must be mentioned. European Orientalists usually write twice a medial consonant in certain verbal formations and in words derived from them, because it is said to be 'virtually doubled' (*e.g.*, 'Addai' for 'Adai'). The Syrians themselves, however, dislike doubled letters, and in their vernacular admit them only in a few (chiefly foreign) words, and in that case they pronounce each letter distinctly, like the *d*'s in 'mid-day.' On the other hand, they sometimes compensate for not doubling a medial consonant by converting a preceding short *a* into a long one. Most of them pronounce aspirated Kaph (*kh*) and Ḥeith (*ḥ*) alike.

3. Syrian Christianity in early times.—In considering the spread of Christianity in these regions before the theological controversies of the 5th cent. caused the divisions which exist to this day, we are faced with the difficulty that legends are the traditional groundwork of the religious history. It is not easy to estimate the amount of truth or falsehood that underlies the legends; but there is no doubt that all these regions were largely Christianized at an early period.

(*a*) *The Roman province of Syria.*—Here we are not troubled with legend. In the 1st cent. of our era the province extended to the Euphrates, and was conjoined with Cilicia.[3] Antioch was the civil metropolis, and was likewise the headquarters of Syrian Christianity; there the disciples were first called 'Christians' (Ac 11[26]). Greeks and Syrians were both represented at Antioch (see above, § 2). There is no evidence as to the extent to which the Church services were conducted in the Aramaic vernacular rather than in Greek; but probably, at a time when the worship was in the main extemporaneous, both languages were used. Though most of the people, perhaps, understood Greek, even if it was not their mother tongue, yet experience shows that the last sphere in which a vernacular gives way to the language of commerce and public life is that of religion. It is therefore probable that Syrian Christians in the Roman province to a large extent worshipped in their vernacular from apostolic times onwards. But Greek was the literary language. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch at the beginning of the 2nd cent., wrote in Greek (he calls himself 'bishop of Syria');[4] Lucian and Dorotheus, Diodorus, bishop of Tarsus, and Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia (both these of Antioch), Chrysostom, Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus—all of the 4th and 5th centuries—did

[1] M. Parisot, in *JA* xi. [1898] 240.
[2] J. B. Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, pt ii., *Ignatius and Polycarp*², London, 1889, i. 327.
[3] F. C. Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 19.
[4] T. Nöldeke, *Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache*, p. xxxv.
[5] Parisot, pp. 240, 246.
[6] Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 45.
[7] Payne Smith, i. 790.
[8] See Parisot's sketch of this dialect.

[1] Parisot, pp. 255–261.
[2] *Ib.* p. 270.
[3] W. M. Ramsay, *A Historical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, London, 1899, p. 277; cf. Gal 1[21].
[4] τὸν ἐπίσκοπον Συρίας (*Rom.* 2; cf. 9, where he speaks of the 'church in Syria,' and God as its shepherd in his stead).

the same. The Antiochene school of theology was clearly a Greek school.[1] A trace of the mixture of the Greek and Syriac elements may be seen in the *Pilgrimage of 'Silvia'* ('*Etheria*'), a work probably of the end of the 4th cent., which describes the bishop of Jerusalem as knowing Syriac ('*siriste*'), but as always speaking Greek and having his sermons and the lections interpreted into Syriac by a presbyter who stood by.[2]

In the 4th cent., when the provincial organization of the Church was promoted, Antioch was one of the great centres, and its bishop was called a 'metropolitan'; the corresponding verb is found in canon 19 of the Council of Antioch *in encæniis* (A.D. 341), and the name itself in can. 6 of Nicæa (A.D. 325), which says that the rights formerly possessed by Antioch must be preserved to it. Thus Antioch had long exercised some sort of jurisdiction over neighbouring sees. Yet the *Apostolic Constitutions*, a Greek work written in Syria *c.* A.D. 375, does not mention metropolitans, any more than the other 'Church Orders' do.[3] This is important in connexion with the supposed dependence of Seleucia-Ctesiphon on Antioch, for which see below (*c*).

(*b*) *Edessa.*—This famous city of Mesopotamia, called in Syriac Ur-hai (now Urfa), was the capital of the kingdom of Osrhoëne (a Greek name derived from 'Ur-hai'). 'Edessa' was the Greek name for the city. The kingdom was independent till A.D. 216, when it was incorporated in the Roman empire. According to the well-known legend of Abgar and Addai, Edessa was Christianized in the middle of the 1st cent.; the legend is given in full in the *Doctrine of Addai* (see below, § 4), and in a shorter, and perhaps more original, form by Eusebius,[4] who says that his account was translated from the Syriac. Edessa is represented as a heathen city, which worshipped (the *Doctrine* tells us) Bel and Nebo,[5] though Burkitt suggests that these names come from a perusal of the OT and not from any real historical reminiscence.[6] Abgar,[7] the heathen king or toparch of Edessa, sends messengers to our Lord, and a correspondence ensues; after the Ascension the apostle 'Judas Thomas' sends Addai (called by Eusebius Thaddæus, and said to be one of the Seventy) to Abgar to teach him the faith.[8] Addai does many mighty deeds; one of his converts was Aggai, who 'made the silks and headbands of the king,' and he was made bishop[9] by Addai as his successor. Addai died a natural death at Edessa, but Aggai was afterwards martyred by the son of Abgar; and, as he could not consecrate his successor Palūṭ by reason of his sudden death, the latter was sent to Antioch and was ordained by Serapion the bishop. Narsai, king of Assyria, sent messengers to King Abgar to learn about all these matters. Such is the legend. As we have it, it is of the 4th cent., though clearly based on one that is a good deal older; R. A. Lipsius[10] concludes that the extant correspondence between our Lord and Abgar was manufactured *c.* A.D. 200. What is the substratum of truth in all this it is not easy to say. The mention of Serapion (bishop of Antioch, A.D. 190–210) gives us a date for Palūṭ, and Lipsius[11] regards the latter as the first historical bishop of Edessa. But there is no need to dismiss Addai entirely to the realms of myth. If the Edessenes were casting about for an early founder of their Church, they would be much more likely to fix on the great apostle 'Judas Thomas,' whose tomb was claimed for Edessa in the middle of the 3rd cent. (see below, § 9), than on the unknown Addai. It seems to be likely, therefore, that Addai (probably a Palestinian Jew) was the first preacher of the gospel at Edessa, perhaps early in, or about the middle of, the 2nd century. The real Abgar who favoured Christianity may have been Abgar IX., the last independent king of Edessa. Burkitt[1] suggests that the consecration of Palūṭ by Serapion of Antioch represents a movement for closer union with 'Western' (Greek) Christianity, and perhaps means a break in the episcopal succession.

In the 2nd cent. **Bardaiṣān** (Bardesanes) was born at Edessa (A.D. 155–223?);[2] he is reckoned as a Syrian Gnostic (though this is doubtful), and was a most learned man, a great hymn-writer,[3] and author of a polemic against Marcion. All his works have perished except the extant Syriac treatise *de Fato*, which is usually thought to be his; Eusebius[4] tells us that he wrote a book with that title. Burkitt[5] assigns the *de Fato* (which is called in the MS the *Book of the Laws of Countries*) to Bardaiṣān's disciple, Philip, on the strength of the work itself; but many think that the insertion of 'Philip' (a very unusual Syriac name) is only a literary device, and that Bardaiṣān himself is the real author. He certainly is the chief speaker in the dialogue, which is between a Christian and a heathen, and turns largely on the question why God allowed man to sin. Eusebius[6] and Epiphanius[7] say that Bardaiṣān was originally a follower of Valentinus, and Epiphanius makes him always a Valentinian. The fullest biography of this erratic writer is by Michael the Syrian, Jacobite patriarch of Antioch (1166–99), but his details cannot be entirely trusted. The school of Bardaiṣān survived his death, and remained in opposition to the orthodox party; Rabbula is said to have converted the remnants of it.[8]

One of the most famous of the Edessenes was **Ephraim** (Ephrem) **the Syrian** (born *c.* 308, † 373). He came from Nisibis[9] to Edessa and founded or reorganized a seminary there, which became the great university of the East, though for a while after his death it fell under Arian influences. He was a deacon only, said to have been ordained by Basil of the Cappadocian Cæsarea, and to have declined advancement;[10] his own statement, that he had 'the talent of the priesthood,'[11] does not contradict this, for in Syriac 'priesthood' (*kāhnūthā*) includes all orders of the ministry. He was a most diffuse writer, and achieved a great fame in posterity.[12]

In the 5th cent. the most famous Edessenes were two of the bishops of Edessa. **Rabbūlā** (bishop from 411 to 435) was the son of a heathen priest and of a Christian mother. He was converted

1 See art. ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY, vol. i. p. 584 ff.
2 vii. 5.
3 A. J. Maclean, *The Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 72 f.
4 *HE* i. 13.
5 So also the *Acts of Sharbil*, for which see below, § 4.
6 *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 17; cf. Is 46[1].
7 Most of the independent kings of Edessa were called either Abgar or Ma'nu.
8 In the Ethiopic *Preaching of Judas Thaddæus in Syria* Thaddæus is associated with St. Peter, not with St. Thomas (E. A. W. Budge, *The Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1899–1901, text and Eng. tr., ii. 357).
9 'Guide and ruler'; so also the *Edessene Canons* (see below, § 4) call the bishop, can. 17 and (?) 24.
10 *DCB* iv. 881.
11 *Ib.* iv. 876.

1 *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 28 ff.
2 See F. J. A. Hort, in *DCB* i. 250 ff., for the date.
3 See art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian).
4 *HE* iv. 30.
5 *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 14.
6 *Loc. cit.*
7 *Hær.* lvi.
8 Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 189.
9 As appears both from the Syriac (Nṣibhin, pron. Nṣiwin) and from the Greek, the middle *i* is long, contrary to the ordinary pronunciation. The word forms the end of a Greek hexameter in the epitaph of Abercius; see the restoration in Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*[2], i. 496. Burkitt has pointed out to the present writer that the pronunciation with short *i* perhaps comes from the Armenian form of the name, 'Mtsbin.'
10 Sozomen, *HE* iii. 16.
11 *DCB* ii. 138 n.
12 For Ephraim see also Theodoret, *HE* iv. 26, and Jerome, *de Vir. illustr.* 115; for a very unfavourable view of his intellectual powers see Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 95 ff.

after he attained to manhood; and he became a great ascetic, and the friend of Cyril of Alexandria. At the end of his life he strenuously opposed Nestorius.[1] The other famous bishop was his successor, **Ibas** (bishop from 435 to 457), who was inclined to favour Nestorius (see below, § 8).

During all this period the Church seems to have made rapid progress. Eusebius[2] says that bishops from 'the whole of Syria and Mesopotamia' attended the dedication of Constantine's great church at Jerusalem in 335.

(c) *The Persian empire.*—A great deal of light has been thrown on early Syrian Christianity in Persia by the recent publication of the works of Nestorian writers. Formerly we had to rely mainly on the accounts of Jacobite authors like Bar Hebræus. The two sets of accounts correct one another and disprove more than one myth; and Neale's narrative in his *History of the Holy Eastern Church*[3] needs much correction in this respect.

One legend is a continuation of that of Abgar and Addai already mentioned. Mari, disciple of Addai, travelled from Edessa and evangelized 'Persia' (*i.e.* what became later the eastern part of Asiatic Turkey, as well as the modern Persia), penetrating as far as the province of Fars. Mari is not mentioned in the *Doctrine of Addai*, which, however, has a hint that Christianity extended from Edessa into Persia. Nor is Mari mentioned in the lately published and very valuable *History* of Mshiḥā Zkhā (lit. 'Christ has conquered'), of the 6th cent., which states that Addai was the apostle of Adiabene and Assyria (this apparently contradicts the *Doctrine*, which makes Addai live and die at Edessa), and that he ordained Pqidhā as first bishop there. The Nestorian *Sūnhādhūs*, or Book of Canon Law,[4] names as the 'converters' of that region Thomas 'of the Indians and Chinese' (*Sīndyē*), 'Bartholomew, that is Nathanael, of the Arammans, Addai of the Seventy, the teacher of Aggai, and Mari of Mesopotamia and of all Persia.'[5] This is all clearly mythical, but is there any truth underlying the legend? Some consider that there was no Christianity, or at least no organization of Christianity, east of the Tigris before the Sasanid empire was established by a revolution, A.D. 225. This is perhaps going rather too far. If there was nothing before the third decade of the 3rd cent. to build upon, it is unlikely that so early a writer as Mshiḥa Zkha could have given us such details; he could not have invented Pqidhā out of nothing. It is quite probable that there were Christians in Assyria in the 2nd cent., for Tatian,[6] the disciple of Justin Martyr, tells us that he was born 'in the land of the Assyrians.' This must be discounted by the fact that he probably wrote only in Greek, though many think that his *Diatessaron* (for which see below, § 4) was written in Syriac;[7] and that he may therefore have been of Greek parentage, and have been converted to Christianity when in the West. We learn from Epiphanius that he laboured in Syria and Mesopotamia.[8] In any case there was no bishop at Seleucia-Ctesiphon, the twin-capital of the Persian empire, situated on the Tigris below Baghdād, till the end of the 3rd century. Papa is the first known bishop of that city; he was consecrated *c.* 280.

Another legend is much later, and professes to account for the existence of a patriarch at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. It is given by Bar Hebræus and other writers, and in the *Sūnhādhūs*,[9] and is to the effect that two men went from Persia to Antioch to receive the episcopate in 190. According to the first writer, one of them was crucified as a Persian spy, as was Ṣlibha (pron. Ṣliwā, lit. 'cross,' still a common name), the bishop of Antioch, while the other escaped to Jerusalem and was consecrated there, returning with a letter conferring the patriarchate on the Church in Persia. The *Sūnhādhūs* does not name Ṣlibha, but says that two patriarchs, 'one of the East and one of the West,'[10] were crucified on the doors of the church of Antioch, and it gives the pretended letter of the 'Western patriarchs' to the 'Easterns,' bestowing on the latter a patriarchate, and absolving them from the duty of sending their patriarchs to Antioch to be consecrated. The first patriarch, it says, was either Papa or Shaḥlūpā—it does not profess to be certain.[11] This Shaḥlūpā was probably the bishop of Adiabene, east of the Tigris and between the two Zabs, who was a contemporary of Papa. The letter of the 'Westerns' is a late forgery. The earlier writers, like Mshiḥa Zkha, know nothing of the story, despite the fact that that historian wrote the life of Abā d'abhūh, the bishop who is said to have escaped. The whole is doubtless a fiction, and it is improbable that the Persian Christians ever depended for their bishops on Antioch, though they doubtless received their Christianity from Edessa, and Edessa possibly received it from Antioch. The idea of patriarchates, it need hardly be said, belongs to a much later time than these pretended events. The East Syrian ('Persian') metropolitanates were organized *c.* A.D. 410. There is no early evidence of Antioch exercising jurisdiction over the Church in Persia. When Papa was condemned by his brother bishops, he appealed, successfully, to Edessa, and perhaps to Nisibis.[1]

An important event for the Church occurred in A.D. 297, when five Persian provinces were ceded to the Roman emperor.[2] This strengthened the ecclesiastical ties between East and 'West.' The cession made Nisibis a Roman city. Its most famous bishop at that time was **James of Nisibis**, who was born there towards the end of the 3rd century. Ephraim was his disciple, and was baptized by him. James himself was a great author of Syriac works.[3]

It is remarkable that, though James was present at Nicæa in A.D. 325, the East Syrians knew nothing officially of that council till the Synod of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in A.D. 410, when they freely accepted the Nicene decrees and creed. To this day they use a rather peculiar version of the longer form, the so-called 'Constantinople' creed, which came into general use (see below, § 9). The Arian controversy did not touch them; and an illustration of this may be seen in the fact that Aphraates, whose Homilies (see below, § 4) are a continuous exposition of the Christian faith, does not mention Arianism at all, though he lived at a time when that heresy was prevalent in the 'West.'

The principal East Syrian bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon after Papa and before the Nestorian period were **Simeon Bar Sabā'é** (martyred under Sapor II.), **Yahbh-alaha I.** (pron. Yāw-alāhā), and **Dādhīshū**. Of other bishops may be specially mentioned **Aphraates** (Aphrāhāt), in the 4th cent., whose see was perhaps Mar Mattai, near Moṣul (see below, § 5), and **Mārūthā** (early 5th cent.), bishop of Maipharqaṭ or Martyropolis, north of Nisibis, author of the *Book of Martyrs* (see below, § 4). Mārūthā often acted as adviser to the Persian king and as ambassador to the Roman emperor. The *Sūnhādhūs*[4] mentions an earlier Mārūthā, who was (it says) present at Nicæa, but it is probable that he did not exist, and that the statement is due to a confusion.

The period was marked by many personal quarrels,[5] a feature of later history also, and by the great persecution under King Sapor II. († A.D. 379), which lasted some 40 years and resulted in many martyrdoms.[6] The Persian kings at one time favoured the Church and at another persecuted it. It is important to notice that even in the early days the political conditions tended, quite apart from theological considerations, to separate the East Syrians from the rest of Christendom. It was the policy of the Persian authorities when they tolerated Christianity to separate it as much as possible from that in the rival Roman empire. Another persecution, at the instigation of the Magians, whose religion was that of the State, broke out under King Bahram (Vararanes) V., *c.* A.D. 420. Theodoret[7] makes it arise under his predecessor Yazdegerd, though continued under Bahram, but Socrates[8] says more accurately that it arose after Yazdegerd's death.

The title of the bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, *c.* A.D. 400, was 'the Catholicos of the East,' and this is still preserved by their successors. The title 'Patriarch' was added a little later, at the Council of Dadhishu, held A.D. 424 at 'Markabta of the

1 For his Biblical work see below, § 4.
2 *Vit. Const.* iv. 43.
3 *Gen. Introd.* i. 139 ff.
4 This is here quoted in the MS form used by the Nestorians themselves. It is also incorporated in a larger collection given by Chabot (*Synodicon Orientale*).
5 ix. 1.
6 *To the Greeks*, 42.
7 E. Nestle, in *HDB* iv. 646.
8 *Hær.* xlvi. 1.
9 ix. 1, 5.
10 The 'West' means what we should call the 'Near East.'
11 For Papa see above.

1 W. A. Wigram, *Introd. to the Hist. of the Assyrian Church*, p. 53 f.
2 The provinces reverted to Persia in 362.
3 For notices of him see Theodoret, *HE* ii. 26, and Gennadius, *de Script. Eccles.* § 1 (continuation of Jerome's *de Vir. illustr.*).
4 i. 3, 5.
5 Wigram, ch. iii.
6 Sozomen, *HE* ii. 10 ff.
7 *HE* v. 38.
8 *HE* vii. 18.

Arabs.' This council firmly established the independence of the 'Eastern' patriarchate.

4. The Syriac Bible and early Syriac literature.—Before the doctrinal divisions of the 5th cent. there was a considerable activity in Syriac literature, all written in what we call 'classical Syriac' (see above, § 2). The Gospels were current in Syriac in five forms. (*a*) The four 'Gospels separate' (Syr. *Ewangeliyōn da-Mpharrshé*), now generally called the 'Old Syriac,' are known to us by two MSS: the Curetonian, discovered in Egypt in 1842, and ed. by Cureton in 1858; and the Sinaitic Syriac, a palimpsest discovered by Mrs. Gibson in the monastery of Mount Sinai in 1893. Both of these have the above Syriac title, which distinguishes them from the *Diatessaron* (see below). Both are perhaps of the 4th century. The Curetonian has the same type of text as the Sinaitic, but differs from it in many details.[1]

(*b*) The *Diatessaron* of Tatian (2nd cent.), sometimes called by the Syrians 'the Mixed [Gospels],'[2] is a harmony of the four Gospels, and is known to us through a commentary on it by Ephraim handed down in an Armenian translation, by quotations in Aphraates, and by an Arabic translation of the Harmony itself made in the 11th cent. by the Nestorian monk Ibn at-Ṭayyib.[3] The *Diatessaron* is mentioned in the *Doctrine of Addai*.

(*c*) The Pshiṭṭā,[4] or 'simple' version, so called to distinguish it from the complicated recension of Thomas of Ḥarqel (see below), is the version still used by Syrian Christians. The name is first found in the 8th or 9th century. This version, which is now often called 'the Syriac Vulgate,' contains the whole Bible, OT and NT (including the OT Apocrypha), less 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and Revelation. Because of its universal acceptance, it may safely be assigned to a date before the divisions of the 5th century. The Gospels in this version have been critically edited by G. H. Gwilliam.[5] It appears that Tatian's Harmony was at one time in popular use among the Syrian Christians, but early in the 5th cent. Rabbūlā, bishop of Edessa (see above, § 3), and Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, were instrumental in its being abolished and destroyed in favour of the 'separate Gospels.' Burkitt's theory has been very generally accepted, viz. that the Pshiṭṭā Gospels are a revision of the 'separate Gospels' made early in the 5th cent. under the direction of Rabbūlā; that the *Diatessaron* was written in Greek (but see above, § 3), probably at Rome, by Tatian, and translated into Syriac in his lifetime, *c.* A.D. 170; and that the 'separate Gospels' date from *c.* A.D. 200, the translator being familiar with the *Diatessaron*.[6] These views are combated by Gwilliam, who is inclined to assign a much earlier date to the Pshiṭṭā Gospels;[7] he objects that Burkitt's theory is not adequately attested, does not explain the disappearance of the 'Old Syriac,' and does not account for the acceptance of the Pshiṭṭā in the 5th cent. by Nestorians and Jacobites alike.[8] The fact that the East Syrians were not definitely Nestorian in Rabbūlā's time, or indeed for a long time after him (see below, § 8), appears to the present writer adequately to account for their being ready enough to accept such a version of the Gospels in place of the *Diatessaron*.

[1] For these two MSS see F. C. Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, Cambridge, 1904. For the date see Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 54, and *Evang.* ii. 13, 28.

[2] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 115. [3] *Ib.* ii. 4.

[4] Usually written in English Peshitta, Peshitto, or Peshito, but all these forms give the ordinary reader an erroneous idea of the pronunciation of the first syllable. Also the first *t* is pronounced quite differently from the second.

[5] *Tetraevangelium Sanctum*, Oxford, 1901.

[6] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 5.

[7] *Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica*, v. [Oxford, 1903] 189 ff.

[8] On this last point see Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 162, and *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 59 ff.

(*d*) Recensions of the Pshiṭṭā were made by **Philoxenus**, bishop of Mabug (Hierapolis, near the Euphrates), A.D. 508 (not now extant), and by **Thomas of Ḥarqel** ('Harklean' version), A.D. 616. Both of these writers were Monophysites, and it appears that the only dissatisfaction with the Pshiṭṭā that made itself felt was among the Jacobites, and not among the Nestorians. But even among the Jacobites that version remained supreme.

Some characteristics of the Pshiṭṭā may here be mentioned. Its MSS, unlike those of the Greek Bible in the 5th cent., all show practically the same text. Some of them are as old as the 5th cent., the oldest *c.* A.D. 450. One rather noticeable difference between the 'Old Syriac' and the Pshiṭṭā Gospels occurs in the Lord's Prayer, where the former has 'our continual bread,' the latter 'the bread of our need.' Another difference is in the gender of 'Holy Spirit.' The noun 'spirit' being feminine in Syriac, the older writers make 'Holy Spirit' feminine also, and Aphraates speaks of the Holy Ghost as 'our mother,' just as the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* speaks of Him as our Lord's mother. But from the time of the Pshiṭṭā onwards 'Holy Spirit' is made masculine by a grammatical revolution, though in Lk 4[1] and Jn 7[39] Psh there is a survival of the older usage, the feminine being retained.

Hitherto we have considered only the Gospels. There is no extant text of Acts or the Epistles older than the Pshiṭṭā, but quotations in Aphraates and in Ephraim's *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, now extant only in an Armenian translation, are of some slight help.[1] In Aphraates and in the genuine works of Ephraim there is no clear reference to any of the Catholic Epistles. The *Doctrine of Addai* expressly confines the Scriptural canon to the Law and the Prophets, the Gospel, St. Paul's Epistles, and Acts. Thus the Pshiṭṭā, admitting as it does the principal Catholic Epistles, shows an advance on the way to a fuller canon.[2] The Pshiṭṭā OT was not revised by Rabbūlā, and is undoubtedly much older than his time, perhaps dating from the end of the 2nd century.[3] The translator had a good knowledge of Hebrew, though he was somewhat influenced by the Septuagint. Burkitt thinks that he must have been a Jew, and that he made his translation for the Jews, who had probably settled at Edessa before it became a Christian centre. The OT quotations of the *Acts of Judas Thomas*, the *Doctrine of Addai*, the *Edessene Canons*, Aphraates, Cyrillona, and the genuine works of Ephraim (for all these see below) agree largely with the Pshiṭṭā, but their Gospel quotations do not do so, rather resembling the 'Old Syriac' and the *Diatessaron*. After Rabbūlā all the quotations but two agree with the Pshiṭṭā, the 'Old Syriac' having thus almost entirely disappeared.[4] The 'Old Syriac' Gospels appear to be later than the Pshiṭṭā OT, as the translator of the former, translating direct from the Greek, uses Hebrew proper names correctly transliterated from the Hebrew, as does the Pshiṭṭā translator of the OT. The Old Syriac Gospel translator could hardly do this unless he had the correct forms of the proper names before him already in use.[5]

Of other early Syriac works, in addition to liturgies, some of which seem in their main features to have been written before the middle of the 5th cent., and in addition also to early Syriac translations of Greek books, the following may be mentioned. (1) *The Disputation with Manes*, by **Archelaus**, bishop of Kashkar in Mesopotamia (3rd cent.?), is now extant only in Greek fragments and in a Latin translation, but was originally written in Syriac. (2) The *Doctrine of Addai*,[6] already mentioned, is a work of the latter part, or, according to R. A. Lipsius,[7] of the beginning, of the 4th cent., giving the legend of Abgar (see above, § 3). (3) The voluminous works of **Ephraim** consist of commentaries, homilies, letters, and hymns.[8] At least one of his works, *On the Holy Spirit*, was translated into Greek before Jerome's time.[9] (4) **Aphraates**, the Persian martyr and sage, wrote his *Homilies* A.D. 337–345. Their theological attitude calls for some remark in view of their aloofness from Hellenistic influence. There is no special difference between him and 'Western' writers in the presentment of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and in Aphraates, as elsewhere, baptism is 'in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy

[1] Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 48.

[2] *Ib.* p. 59. [3] *Ib.* p. 70.

[4] *Ib.* pp. 54–56. [5] *Ib.* p. 73.

[6] Ed. G. Phillips, London, 1876. [7] *DCB* i. 31.

[8] For a list of the works attributed to him of which we have pre-Muhammadan MSS, see Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 113; but some works in later MSS may also be genuine.

[9] *de Vir. illustr.* § 115.

Ghost.' Man is a temple for God to dwell in.[1] But the doctrine of the sacraments must be noticed. The teaching about the eucharist, indeed, is more or less that of the Greek-speaking Christians. The body and blood of our Lord are received by the faithful. Fasting communion is enjoined, but special stress is laid on fasting from sin. Yet this seems to be only the complement and groundwork of the literal fasting. One passage,[2] however, is thought by Burkitt[3] to show that Aphraates considered baptism, and the sacramental system generally, to be only for ascetics, and not for the married laity. This conclusion has been much disputed. At least it is certain that Aphraates favoured the postponing of baptism till after marriage, just as Constantine postponed it till the end of his life. The same tinge of ultra-asceticism is seen here that appears in the *Acts of Judas Thomas* (see below and § 9). But there is no evidence that this was more than the private opinion of individuals, or that the original East Syrian Church as a whole considered full membership to be incompatible with anything but the ascetic life. (5) The Syriac *Doctrina Apostolorum* (or *Edessene Canons*) was written c. A.D. 350 and is a kind of 'Church Order.' As is the case with many books of that class, it puts injunctions into the mouth of the apostles, and it is of great interest as telling us of the customs of the Edessene Church in the 4th century. It makes Addai the apostle of Edessa, and Aggai, 'a maker of silks,' the apostle of Persia, Assyria, Armenia, Media, the countries round Babylon, the 'Huzites and the Gelae, as far as the borders of the Indians and as far as the land of Gog and Magog.' This shows that the East Syrians at a very early date were a missionary body. (6) The *Syriac Martyrology* may be dated c. A.D. 350. It is found in the MS (dated 411) mentioned below. It mentions Ḥabbîb the deacon, as well as Shamuna and Guria (on whom a metrical homily is extant), but not Aggai, Sharbil, or Barsamya (see below). (7) **Abba** (Abha, pron. Awā), the disciple of Ephraim, wrote a commentary on the Gospels, of which only a few fragments remain. (8) **Cyrillona** wrote his poems c. A.D. 396.[4] (9) The *Martyrdoms of Barsamya and of Ḥabbîb*, and (10) the *Acts* or *Hypomnemata of Sharbil*, are accounts of the deaths of three Edessene heroes.[5] (11) The *de Fato* of Bardaiṣān (?) has already been mentioned (§ 3). (12) **Mārūthā** (§ 3) wrote his *Book of Martyrs* early in the 5th cent. to commemorate those who suffered in Persia in the great persecution of Sapor II. (13) The *Life of Rabbūlā* (see above) was written shortly after his death, A.D. 435. (14) The *Acts of Judas Thomas* (the apostle) is a highly interesting religious novel, written by one who was of doubtful orthodoxy, but was perhaps a pioneer missionary in E. Mesopotamia in the 3rd cent., or possibly Bardaiṣan himself, or at any rate one of his school. The Syriac origin of this work is maintained by T. Nöldeke and F. C. Burkitt[6] and others.[7] The *Acts* contain the well-known *Hymn of the Soul*, for an English translation of which see Burkitt's *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 218 ff.; but the hymn is really an independent Syriac composition added to the *Acts*. These *Acts*, while unorthodox, are probably not Gnostic, being very different from the Greek *Acts of John*, which are thoroughly Gnostic. In the Syriac *Acts* there is no inner circle to whom alone the whole truth is taught.[1] (15) Syriac may be the original language of the Clementine story which has been reproduced in the *Clementine Homilies and Recognitions*. An earlier form of the story,[2] perhaps of the 3rd cent., has lately been discovered in Syriac.[3]

There are also several translations of Greek works into Syriac which were made before the great separation of Syrian Christians. Thus the works of Eusebius were so translated very shortly after his death; a MS of a Syriac version of the *Martyrs of Palestine* and the *Theophania* is extant, dated A.D. 411, and this is not the original autograph,[4] and another of the *Ecclesiastical History* is extant dated A.D. 462.[5] Pamphilus the martyr, Eusebius's teacher, had a society, c. A.D. 300, which translated Greek works into Syriac.[6] The Ignatian Epistles were translated into Syriac (the 'Curetonian Syriac Letters') at least in the 5th cent., and, if the six additional letters are not an integral part of this version, probably earlier.[7] It is noteworthy that Syrian Christians, by means of classical Syriac, made many Greek works, philosophical, scientific, and religious, known to the East. Some Greek works are known to us only in their Syriac dress; and even some works in Armenian come to us from the Greek through the Syriac. The principal era of Armenian translations from the Syriac was the 5th century.[8]

5. West Syrians or Jacobites.—We now proceed to consider the divisions of Syrian Christianity which resulted from the Christological controversies of the 5th century. It is not necessary here to repeat the accounts of those controversies which have already been given in this *Encyclopædia*; but we may discuss the general history and the customs of the different Syrian bodies which separated from one another and from the 'Western' Church of Constantinople and Rome.

The Syrian Monophysites may be considered first.[9] In Syria proper there was a constant contention between them and the Orthodox for more than a hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), and the patriarchs of Antioch were sometimes Orthodox and sometimes Monophysite. The most famous of the latter was **Severus**, who maintained possession of Antioch itself from A.D. 513 to 518; he was an author, and wrote in Greek. He was a great admirer and quoter of Ignatius's Epistles.[10] He was the leader of his party till his death c. A.D. 540, after which a double succession to the patriarchate was continuous; and it has been preserved to the present day. The final breach between Orthodox and Monophysites may be said to have occurred in the reign of Justin II., the successor of Justinian. He persecuted the Monophysites, and an account of these troubles may be read in the third book (the only part extant) of **John of Ephesus**, a contemporary. John was Monophysite bishop of Ephesus in the 6th cent., but he wrote in Syriac, and was the first Syriac historian. He was a native of Amida (Diarbekr). For **James of Sarug** († A.D. 521 or 522), who has been thought to have been a Monophysite (but this is very doubtful), and for other early Syrian poets, see art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian), § 1.

The Syrian Monophysites are called Jacobites from **Jacob Baradai** (Baradæus), or Zanzalus, a monk of a monastery near Edessa, who came to Constantinople c. A.D. 540 to plead the cause of Monophysitism. After remaining there fifteen

[1] *Hom.* xvii. [2] *Ib.* vii. 20.
[3] *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 51 f., and so the later *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 125 ff.
[4] Burkitt, *Evang.* ii. 150; Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*², i. 168.
[5] For a summary of these histories of Barsamya and Sharbil see Lightfoot *op. cit.* i. 66 f. Lightfoot remarks that they must not be taken as genuine history.
[6] *JThSt* i. [1899–1900] 280 ff., ii. [1900–01] 429, iii. [1901–02] 94, and *Evang.* ii. 101.
[7] For these *Acts* see further below, § 9.

[1] Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, pp. 76–79.
[2] Edited with translation by A. Mingana, *Some Early Judæo-Christian Documents*, Manchester, 1917.
[3] For most of the above works see W. Wright's *Short Hist. of Syriac Literature*; many of them appear in English in the 'Ante-Nicene Christian Library,' xx. [Edinburgh, 1871], though they cannot all claim to be ante-Nicene.
[4] *DCB* ii. 320. [5] *Ib.* p. 326.
[6] Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*², i. 327.
[7] *Ib.* p. 326. [8] *Ib.* p. 86 f.
[9] For the struggle between Monophysitism and orthodoxy after the Council of Chalcedon, and for the alternately favourable and unfavourable attitude of the Byzantine Court towards the latter, see art. MONOPHYSITISM. With the opponents of Chalcedon in Egypt and in Armenia we are not here concerned.
[10] Lightfoot, i. 178.

years, he was consecrated bishop by the imprisoned Monophysite bishops in the capital, and sent to Syria to organize his sect. He consecrated **Sergius** to succeed Severus at Antioch, and appointed **Paul the Black** to succeed Sergius. He is said to have ordained two patriarchs, 89 bishops, and an enormous number of clergy. He is often called bishop of Edessa, but Bar Hebræus[1] says that he was a bishop with no fixed see. John of Ephesus was his panegyrist. He died in 578, and after his death the Monophysites were driven from Antioch. The term 'Jacobites' was a nickname, given by the Orthodox; but the Jacobites themselves readily accepted it, tracing it, however erroneously, to the apostle James, to whom also they ascribe their principal liturgy. Their controversy with the Greeks, like the controversy of the East Syrians with the Greeks, was not only theological; it was largely tinged with national differences. Indeed both were to a considerable extent contests between Syriac thought and Hellenistic culture.

In the 7th cent. the Muhammadans conquered Palestine, Syria, and the East; and at first the new rulers favoured the Jacobites as the rivals of the Greeks. The principal writer of this period was **James** (Jacob) **of Edessa** (†708), who was a poet, commentator, and letter-writer, and a voluminous translator of Greek works into Syriac. To him, *e.g.*, we owe the knowledge of the 'Church Order' called the *Testament of our Lord*, a Greek work of *c.* A.D. 350, now extant only in Syriac.

The Jacobite patriarchs have continued to this day (at any rate from the 13th cent., or, according to Neale,[2] from the end of the 16th cent.) to style themselves 'of Antioch,' though they transferred their residence to various places—to Malatia on the Euphrates, to Amida, and finally (in the 12th cent.) to the monastery of Deir-el-Za'afaran (the 'saffron monastery') near Mardin, where they have been ever since.

Perhaps the most eminent Jacobite of all history was **Gregory Bar Hebræus**, or Abulfaraj (†1286), a man of Jewish parentage, who became a convert to Christianity and afterwards *maphrian* or metropolitan of Moṣul, having formerly held other sees.[3] He wrote many works, and his *Chronicle* (which may be read in Assemani) is a valuable history. He seems to have been greatly esteemed even by his Nestorian opponents, who attended his funeral in large numbers; he died at Maragha (south of Tabriz), but was buried in the monastery of Mar Mattai on Jebel Maqlub (Syr. Elpeph), a day's ride north-east of Moṣul, and his grave is still shown there. His *Chronicle* is, for his age, fairly trustworthy, but when he deals with Nestorian matters it should be compared with the writings of that body.

A less known Jacobite writer was **Dionysius Bar-ṣalibi** (Syr. ṣlibhi, pron. ṣliwi), also called James, metropolitan of Amida, a theologian and commentator, probably of the 11th century.[4]

We know less of Jacobite organization and customs, ecclesiastical and liturgical, than we do of those of the Nestorians, of which we have been fully informed in the last quarter of a century. For the modern Jacobites the best short account is to be found in O. H. Parry's *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, which has been largely drawn upon in the description which follows. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of the patriarch; the maphrian, who since the 12th cent. has had his see at Mar Mattai (see above) or in Moṣul itself; and bishops of Jerusalem, Damascus or Homs (Emessa), Edessa, Amida, Mardin, Nisibis, Maipharqat (now Farqin; see above, § 3) and Ma'dan, Aleppo, Jezireh (on the Tigris), and Ṭur 'Abhdin (Jebel Ṭur). There are also some bishops without sees, as at Mar Mattai, where, when the present writer visited the monastery in 1887, the establishment consisted of one bishop and one monk. The patriarch is elected by the people, and the election is confirmed by the bishops resident near Mardin; it is common for the maphrian to be promoted to the chief position. The patriarch, or more rarely the maphrian, consecrates all the bishops, who must be either monks or widowed priests; those chosen from the monks are called *maṭrān*, or 'metropolitan,' while those chosen from the widowed priests are called *asqof* (ἐπίσκοπος), and are of slightly lower rank, not being eligible for the patriarchate or maphrianate. Each bishop has the prefix 'Mār' ('my lord') before his name.[1] The patriarch and the other bishops are recognized by the State as judges for their own people, especially in minor matters, and in questions of marriage and divorce. The canonical age for the ordination of bishops is 35, of deacons 20; but this has never been kept as a fixed rule. Bar Hebræus was ordained bishop at 20; deacons are often ordained as little boys, but they must be able to read the Psalms in classical Syriac. The parish priests, who are elected by the parish councils of deacons and laymen, must be married men; if their wives die, they enter a monastery or else become *asqofs*. A second marriage is not allowed to them. The priests must let their beards grow, but they shave their heads completely. The leading priest in a large town is often made a chorepiscopus, but he is not a bishop, and cannot ordain. There are many deacons in each village—they are engaged in secular work during the week—as they are indispensable for the celebration of the eucharist. Minor orders are practically obsolete.

Several ground-plans of churches may be seen in Parry.[2] The altar, at least in most cases, stands in an apse, not (as among the Nestorians) attached to the east wall, and there are seats for bishops and clergy behind. This is also the usual Greek custom. The whole sanctuary in Syrian churches, Eastern and Western, is called 'the altar' (Syr. *madhb'ḥâ*), though this name is sometimes also given to the holy table itself. The latter is usually of stone, though in some of the Jacobite churches it is of wood.[3] There are side chapels with 'altars,' north and south of the sanctuary—the churches face east—and in some cases, as at Mar Mattai, there is another chapel at the north side for the burial of bishops, called *beithâ qaddishê* ('house of the saints'). Between sanctuary and nave there is a stone wall or screen, sometimes with folding doors, and always with a veil. The nave has no furniture except one or two lecterns. The altar is usually placed under a baldacchino. The Jacobites, like the Nestorians, do not allow images in their churches, but have a great veneration for the cross.

Monasteries are common; the monks are often laymen, though they are sometimes in holy orders. The monasteries are under the rule of the diocesan bishop except where they contain the tomb of a patriarch or a maphrian; in that case they are directly under the patriarch. Nunneries seem to be obsolete. The technical Syriac term for the monastic life, among both the Jacobites and the Nestorians, is 'sadness,' 'mourning.'[4]

The eucharistic liturgy ordinarily used is that of 'St. James,' a translation of which, in the Jacobite form, is given in Brightman's *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. 69 ff. The Syrian Jacobites, Maronites, Uniat Syrians, and Malabar Jacobites all use the same liturgy with some variations.[5] Leavened bread is used, and must be baked for each occasion. The leaven is handed down from remote ages, as among the Nestorians. The eucharist is reserved for the sick, but only for communion on the same day. Little children (who are confirmed immediately after baptism) are communicated.

1 Assemani, *Bibl. Or.* ii. 327.
2 Assemani, ii. 244 ff.
3 *Gen. Introd.* i. 152.
4 Renaudot, *Lit. Or.* ii. 453.

1 For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 12.
2 Pp. 328, 332, etc.
3 Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 181.
4 Syr. *abhîlûthâ* (see the Nestorian *Sûnhâdhûs*, vii. 2, can. 7, etc.).
5 For a list of other Jacobite liturgies see Brightman, i. p. lviii ff.

The antidoron or eucharistic bread not consecrated (Syr. *būrkthā* = εὐλογία) is distributed after the service. The celebrant wears albe, amice, undivided stole, yellow shoes, a maniple over each arm, and a chasuble split down the front and buckled with silver at the neck. The vesting takes place in the side chapel, where also the elements are prepared. There are in some churches daily eucharists. There are no special vestments (except girdles, and often, for the deacons, stoles) at the daily offices. These last have not been published, and exist in manuscript only. One of the great features of Jacobite worship is the peculiar addition of 'who wast crucified for us' to the Trisagion ('Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us'), which is used at many of the services. The addition was first made by Peter the Fuller († A.D. 477), and was eagerly adopted and retained as a test of Monophysitism.[1] Baptism is not allowed to be administered in private houses. The child at baptism is signed with *moron*, or unguent (which is consecrated once a year by the patriarch), anointed all over the body with oil (which has been hallowed by the *moron*), immersed in water thrice up to the neck, clothed, and confirmed.[2] Confession before communion is recommended by the canons, but is now almost obsolete. Some of the canons[3] are more strict, and insist on confession before communion on Maundy Thursday, Christmas, and Pentecost.[4] The fasts are somewhat severe. Besides Lent and Advent, both of which are strict fasts, there are (*a*) the Fast of the Ninevites, three days in spring, said to have been instituted owing to a plague in the 6th cent.,[5] and strenuously maintained also by the East Syrians; (*b*) the Fast of the Apostles, after Pentecost; and (*c*) the Fast of Mary, August 1–15. Wednesday and Friday are fasts in each week, from sunset to sunset.

The Jacobites are to be found chiefly in Mesopotamia and northwards to Ḫarput and Diarbekr, but there are also a good many of them near Damascus and a certain number around Moṣul. The largest numbers are perhaps to be found in the hilly region of Jebel Ṭur (Arab. also Ṭūr 'Abdīn; Syr. Ṭūr 'Abhdīn), N. of the line Mardin—Nisibis—Jezireh. In this district Syriac is still spoken vernacularly. Here some of their oldest and most interesting churches are situated.[6] It is always difficult to reckon numbers in Turkey; but Gibbon's estimate[7] of from fifty to eighty thousand is certainly too low. We may perhaps put the total in Turkey at rather less than 200,000.[8]

Certain communities of Jacobites have become Uniat (see below, § 6). Jesuit missionaries first came to Mesopotamia in 1540. In 1646 the Uniat patriarchate was fixed at Aleppo, and the patriarch took his title from that place. The Syrian Christians in that neighbourhood mostly belong to that jurisdiction.

6. Melkites and Uniats.—The former name, which is derived from Syr. *malkā* ('king'), a word used also, like βασιλεύς, for an emperor, was invented in the 10th cent. by the Jacobites for those Christians who adhered to the Council of Chalcedon. It was a nickname, meaning 'royalists,' and implying that they could stand only by the support of the Roman emperor. It may be compared with the nickname 'Erastians' used in this country at the present day; both have a somewhat similar shade of meaning. But the name 'Melkites' was quite readily accepted by those to whom it had been given in derision,[1] and was applied to all those who were in communion with Constantinople, whether Syrian, Egyptian, or Greek. In comparatively recent times the name has been given, and given exclusively, to the Christians of Syria and Egypt who have been drawn from the Orthodox Eastern Church and have been united to Rome. Such, *e.g.*, are the 'Syrian Melkites,' whose liturgical language is, or was, Syriac.

The name 'Uniat' is applied to those Eastern Christians who have been united to Rome, but are allowed to keep their own liturgies, liturgical language, and ecclesiastical customs, especially as to the marriage of their clergy—though in all these respects modifications, sometimes very considerable, have been introduced. The earliest of these 'Uniats' are the Maronites (see below, § 7); but there are also four Uniat Churches of the Græco-Slavonic rite—the Bulgarian, Greek Melkite (formed of Arabic-speaking Orthodox after the Synod of Bethlehem, in 1672), Rumaic or Roumanian, and Ruthenian; there are also the Armenian Uniats; the Syrian Uniats, drawn from the Jacobites in 1646 (see above, § 5); the Chaldæan Uniats, drawn from the Nestorians (see below, § 8); and the Malabar Uniats (see below, § 9). The Uniats have nine Eastern patriarchs. Those of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch live in Rome. In addition there are Uniat patriarchs of Jerusalem (Greek), Antioch (Maronite), Antioch (Greek), Antioch (Syrian), Cilicia (Armenian), Babylon (Chaldæan).[2] European readers are often confused by the fact that there are no fewer than six patriarchs who take their title from Antioch—one Greek Orthodox, four Uniats, and one Jacobite.

The Syrian Uniats use the liturgy of 'St. James'; the rubrics are often in Carshuni (Arabic in Syriac characters), the audible prayers both in Syriac and in Carshuni, the inaudible in Syriac only.[3] The Chaldæan Uniats use the liturgy of 'Addai and Mari' with some amendments; their daily services are considerably abbreviated compared with those of the Nestorians, and in the case of the long festal Night Service about six-sevenths are omitted.[4]

7. Maronites.—These Syrian Christians of the Lebanon derive their name from their teacher John Maro, or Maron, a learned monk, who was named patriarch of Antioch, perhaps early in the 8th century. He has often been confused with an earlier Maron, called by Gibbon[5] 'a saint or savage of the fifth century,' whose relics were greatly venerated. In the time of John Maron the Monothelete controversy was still going on, and these Lebanon Christians espoused that cause.[6] They were thus in opposition to their Christian neighbours, and later, as Christians, to the Muhammadan authorities; and they received the nickname 'Mardaites' or 'Rebels' (Syr. *marīdhē*).

In 1182 they renounced Monotheletism under the influence of their patriarch Aimeric, and were united with Rome, then numbering about 40,000 souls.[7] At that time the connexion with the West

[1] But the ancient and authoritative Jacobite statement of faith (the 'Creed of our Sainted Fathers'), published by the Syrian Patriarchate Education Committee in English (*The Ancient Syrian Church in Mesopotamia*, London, 1905), emphatically states that the Trisagion with this addition is addressed to 'the Only-begotten Son,' and not to 'the Three blessed Persons' (p. 10). This 'Statement of faith' is quite free from Monophysitism. It denies that the divine nature of our Lord was commingled with the human nature, or that the two natures became commixed and changed so as to give rise to a third nature, and asserts that the two natures became united in indissoluble union without confusion, mixture, or transmutation, and that they remained two natures in an unalterable unity.

[2] For early Syrian baptisms see below, § 3.

[3] Several collections of these may be read in H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, i. 475 ff.

[4] *Ib.* p. 487.

[5] Wigram, p. 214.

[6] Parry, p. 169 ff.

[7] vi. 55.

[8] For the Jacobites in India see below, § 9.

[1] Gibbon, vi. 44, note 109.

[2] A. Riley, 'Synopsis of Oriental Christianity,' *The Guardian*, xliii. 947 (27th June, 1888), since reprinted.

[3] Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lvi.

[4] Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 298.

[5] vi. 55.

[6] See art. MONOTHELETISM.

[7] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 154.

was through the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. After the destruction of that kingdom in the 14th cent. relations with Rome were at times broken off, but they were resumed, and still continue. In the year 1584 Pope Gregory XIII. founded a college in Rome for training their clergy, and this institution has the honour of having in the 18th cent. educated the learned brothers J. S. and J. A. Assemani, to whose literary labours scholars are so much indebted for their knowledge of Syriac Christianity. The Maronites subscribed the decrees of the Council of Trent in 1736.

They are allowed to retain their own liturgical customs, and use the Syriac 'St. James' and other anaphoras.[1] The rubrics in the printed books are in Carshuni; some of the formulæ are in Carshuni and Syriac.[2]

The Maronite clergy may marry. They also elect their own patriarch, who still takes his title from Antioch. He lives at the monastery of Qānōbīn (κοινόβιον), in the Lebanon, and has under his jurisdiction bishops at Aleppo, Tripoli (in Syria), Byblus and Botra, Baalbek or Heliopolis, Damascus, Berytus, Tyre and Sidon, and in Cyprus.[3] Their numbers are difficult to estimate. Gibbon[4] gives 150 priests and 100,000 souls, but they probably number about a quarter of a million.

They have suffered much from their feuds with their neighbours, the Druses, and in the year 1860, after great massacres of the Maronites, the British and French governments intervened for their protection.

8. East Syrians, or Nestorians.—We may now take up the history of the Church in the Persian empire from the middle of the 5th century.[5] The first great event for the East Syrians after the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431, was their final expulsion by the emperor Zeno from the school of Edessa and the consequent founding of the school of Nisibis, A.D. 489. **Ibas** (Syr. Ihibha, pron. **ihīwā**, lit. 'given'), bishop of Edessa, who was strongly Dyophysite, had been condemned by the Latrocinium, or 'Robber Synod,' of Ephesus in 449, but was acquitted and restored to his see by the Council of Chalcedon two years later, after having anathematized both Nestorius and Eutyches. During his lifetime the Monophysites made no way at Edessa, but after his death in 457 they became predominant there, and after a long struggle expelled their opponents. This was a decisive event in the Persian Church. Although up to that time it had had no direct dealings with Nestorianism, its tendency was mainly Dyophysite, and the influx of Nestorians from the Roman empire greatly strengthened that tendency. Nevertheless it is a mistake to suppose that the Persian Church at some definite date in the 5th cent. espoused Nestorianism and was therefore cut off from the Catholic Church. The process was a gradual one. The principal influence in the latter half of the 5th cent. was that of **Bar Sōmā** (Barsumas, lit. 'son of the fast'), bishop of Nisibis, who had taught at Edessa, and now, in the vacancy of the catholicate, organized the East Syrian Church in a Nestorian sense; he must not be confused with his namesake of the Latrocinium, who was a Monophysite. There was some opposition to 'Nestorian' doctrine, especially from the monks of Mar Mattai (see above, § 5), who to this day are Jacobites. The catholicos **Acacius** (Syr. Aqaq), who was bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon from 485 to 496, went to Constantinople on a mission from the Persian king, and there declared that his Church knew nothing of Nestorius; he was admitted to communion by the Orthodox, having anathematized Bar Sōmā.[1] We may perhaps discount his statement as an Oriental exaggeration; but the incident shows that the separation was not yet complete. Still later, good relations with Constantinople took place in the time of **Mar Abha** (pron. Awā) **the Great**, a contemporary of Jacob Baradai (see above, § 5). This prelate, a convert from Magianism, was catholicos from 540 to 552, having been a teacher at Nisibis, and having visited Jerusalem, Egypt, Greece, and Constantinople in the time of Justinian. In his Catholicate, as it would seem, the Council of Chalcedon was accepted by the East Syrian Church.[2] The *Sūnhādhūs*[3] quotes with approval one of its canons, and dates the council as '25th October, 763 of Alexander,' *i.e.* A.D. 452 (*sic*); the session of that day was particularly solemn, and was attended by the emperor and empress: it ended the principal work of the council.[4]

One of the first matters discussed in this period was the marriage of bishops and clergy. A council was held in 484 at Beith Laphat (also called Gondisapor, perhaps the modern Shīraz); it allowed them to marry, and even permitted a second marriage to clerical widowers. This was confirmed in a council held by Acacius in the following year. Several patriarchs were married: Babhai (pron. Bā-wai), catholicos from 496 to 505, his successor Sīlas, Elisha, Paul, and Ezekiel, all of the 6th century.[5] But Mar Abha set his face against episcopal marriage, himself declining to marry; and after his time it became rare. The present rule is that a bishop must be a *rabban* ('monk,' but see below), and may not marry or have married, and must never have eaten flesh-meat; nor must his mother have eaten meat during her pregnancy.[6] There is evidence that the rule against eating meat did not hold in the 7th century.[7] It is noteworthy that Ebedjesus (see below) in his *Sūnhādhūs* passes over the question of episcopal marriage in silence, and does not refer to the decrees which permitted it.[8]

The definite official adoption of Nestorianism, or of what was taken for such, must be dated at the beginning of the 7th cent., when the East Syrians formally repudiated the term 'Theotokos' and adopted the phrase 'two *qnomé*, one *parṣopa* (πρόσωπον), two natures' with reference to our Lord.[9] The opposition to the 'Nestorians' of the Monophysite minority in Persia was greatly strengthened by the influx of a large number of captives of the latter persuasion from Syria, in 540 and 573, under Chosroes I.; the influence of Shīrīn, the Christian queen of Chosroes II. (590–628), was latterly in their favour.[10]

Monasticism was at one time a most flourishing institution among the East Syrians. Thomas of Marga (see below) gives us a graphic description of his own monastery, and we have other sources of information in Sozomen,[11] in P. Bedjan's *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum*, and elsewhere.[12] It seems to have been introduced into the East from Egypt by **Mar Awgin** (pron. Ōgīn; = 'Eugenius,' + 363?), who founded the famous monasteries of Mount Izla (near Nisibis) and Deir-el-Za'afaran (near Mardin; see above, § 5). He is said to have been the teacher of James of Nisibis. His *Life* is included in

[1] For a list of these see Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lviii.
[2] *Ib.* p. lvii.
[3] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 154. For their forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 14.
[4] vi. 57.
[5] For the doctrinal controversy which occupied the Council of Ephesus see art. NESTORIANISM.

[1] Wigram, p. 170. [2] *Ib.* p. 188. [3] v. 21.
[4] Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils of the Church*, Eng. tr., iii. 353 ff.
[5] Wigram, pp. 175, 178, 212; Budge, *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxxxii f.
[6] Cf. Jg 13[4f].
[7] Wigram, p. 249. Eusebius (*HE* ii. 23) says that James the Just 'was holy from his mother's womb . . . he did not eat flesh (ἐμψύχων)': *i.e.* he was a Nazirite, though abstinence from flesh was not part of a Nazirite's vow.
[8] The *Sūnhādhūs* (vii. preface) says that bishops were usually chosen from among the monks.
[9] Wigram, p. 258. But the latest investigations show that *qnoma* (= hypostasis) is used in the earlier sense of 'substance,' not of 'person.' This makes the phrase, if redundant, at least quite orthodox.
[10] *Ib.* pp. 242, 247. [11] *HE* vi. 34, very short.
[12] For an account of the institution see Budge, *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxvii ff.

Bedjan's work, but it is remarkable that Thomas of Marga does not mention him. The great organizer of monasticism among the East Syrians was a later monk, **Abraham of Kashkar**, a town between the lower Euphrates and the Tigris. Abraham refounded Mount Izla in the 6th cent., and his canons, which are still extant,[1] are included in the Nestorian *Sūnhādhūs*.[2] His successor as abbot, **Dadhishu**, made canons accepting the doctrines of Diodorus, Theodore, and Nestorius.[3] The rules as to jurisdiction of monasteries were the same as among the Jacobites (see above, § 5); in the 'patriarchal' monasteries the diocesan bishop might not officiate nor be mentioned in the litany.[4] One of the most famous of the monasteries was that of Beith 'Abhé (pron. 'Awé), probably founded by **Jacob of Lāshūm**, a monk of Mount Izla, in the 6th cent.; its situation is uncertain, but probably it was near the Great Zab.[5] This monastery produced from the 7th to the 9th centuries many patriarchs, as well as its famous historian, Thomas of Marga. The monastery of Rabban Hormuzd, about 30 miles north of Moṣul, is close to the village of Alqosh (Elkosh), where the tomb of the prophet Nahum, in a Jewish synagogue, is still shown. The monastery was founded by **Hormuzd of Beith Laphat**, c. 600. He spent the last 22 years of his life there and was buried within it, as were several patriarchs.[6] The number of monks had dwindled from fifty in 1820 to about ten in 1890,[7] a new monastery having been built at the foot of the hills, not far away. When the present writer visited the two monasteries in 1887, there was in the new one a large number of monks, busily engaged. Both the monasteries now belong to the Uniat Chaldæans (see above, § 6). There were also many other monasteries elsewhere.[8]

Monasteries are now quite obsolete among the Nestorians, though a few *rabbans* (monks) live in the world under a private rule, neither marrying nor eating meat, such as the late well-known Rabban Yonan (Jonah) of Qūchānīs.[9]

Among a large number of Nestorian writers the following may be mentioned. Narsai († c. 502), a poet and homilist, called 'the Harp of the Spirit,' went to Nisibis from Edessa on the expulsion of the Nestorians. Ebedjesus says that he wrote 360 homilies; of these 47 have been published in Syriac by A. Mingana, and those on the eucharist and baptism, translated into English by R. H. Connolly, are of the greatest importance for the history of the early East Syrian rite. Mshiḥa Zkha was the writer of a most valuable history in the 6th century (see above, § 3). Ishu'yahbh III. (pron. Īshūyāw), who was catholicos for ten years from 650, was the reputed author or reviser of the ordination and baptismal services, and also of the Ḥudhra (see below).[10] In the earlier Syrian rite of baptism, as evidenced by Narsai, the *Syriac Didascalia*, and some other Syriac descriptions, the anointing seems to have been only before baptism; the post-baptismal anointing was added among the Jacobites in the 5th cent., probably by Severus (see § 5), and among the Nestorians by Ishu'yahbh.[11] **Thomas of Marga**, bishop in the 9th cent. of that city (on the Zab) and metropolitan of Beith Garmai (east of the Tigris), was a monk of Beith 'Abhé (see above); his *Book of Governors*, a monastic history, is most valuable as filling a gap of 300 years in the history, otherwise hardly known. **George of Arbela**, metropolitan of Moṣul and Arbela (south-east of Moṣul) in the 10th cent., wrote a commentary on the services of the Church, which is valuable for the history of the Nestorian liturgies.[12] **Mari Ibn Suleiman** ('son of Solomon') was a chronicler of the 12th century. **Ebedjesus** (E. Syr. 'Abhdishu, pron. 'Ōdishū, lit. 'servant of Jesus'), metropolitan of Ṣubha (pron. Ṣūwā), by some identified with Nisibis,[13] in the 13th cent. compiled the *Sūnhādhūs*, or 'Book of Canon Law,' now in constant use by the Nestorians, though many of its provisions have become obsolete.[1]

The missions of the East Syrians have been far extended. Their work in India is attested in the 6th cent. by Cosmas Indicopleustes (see below, § 9). Gibbon remarks[2] that 'the barbaric churches, from the Gulf of Persia to the Caspian Sea, were almost infinite.' The missionaries extended their labours to Socotra, Ceylon, Turkestan, and even to China, where the Nestorian monument of Si-ngan-fu, dated A.D. 781 ('1092 of the Greeks'), attests their activity, which also gave rise to the legend of Prester John (*q.v.*), a supposed priest-king in Tartary. Wherever they carried their teaching, they used Syriac as their liturgical language, even though it was not that of the people.[3] Thus the Malabarese have always used Syriac liturgies. This great activity swelled the numbers of Syrian Christians exceedingly, and the Nestorians and Jacobites together are said to have been more numerous than the Greeks and Latins together.[4]

Under Muhammadan rule East Syrian Christianity was alternately favoured and persecuted. Under Tamerlane ('Timur the Lame') in the 14th cent. it was almost annihilated. But a remnant survived and is still to be found in the mountains of Kurdistan in E. Turkey, in the upland plains of Azarbaijan in the north-west of the present Persian kingdom, especially in that of Urmi or Urumi (often called in Europe Urmia), and in the low-lying plain of Moṣul (Nineveh). The patriarch, who after the foundation of Baghdād (A.D. 762) had left Seleucia-Ctesiphon for that city, later removed to the north. But disputes as to the succession divided the patriarchate. The Nestorians themselves are now under the rule of Mār Shimūn (these two words are pronounced as one and are accented on the first and last syllables), who lives at Qūchānīs in the almost inaccessible mountains which surround the Great Zab, a beautiful retreat near the small town of Julamerk. Each successive catholicos takes the name 'Shimūn' (Simon), whatever his baptismal name. The East Syrians of the Moṣul plain, now called Chaldæans, have been united with Rome since 1680, when they were received by Pope Innocent XI. Their head ('patriarch of Babylon') bears the name Mār Eliyā (Elijah). He has several bishops, each styled metropolitan, under him. He retains the title ('of Babylon') which the Nestorian patriarchs often used when they lived at Seleucia-Ctesiphon; it is also found in the *Sūnhādhūs*.[5] There were at one time patriarchs at Amida (Diarbekr), who also were united with Rome; these bore the name Mar Joseph.

All the East Syrians speak Syriac vernacularly, though many of those in the Moṣul plain speak Arabic also. It is common to hear the sailors on the Tigris steamers talking vernacular Syriac, these being Chaldæan Uniats. The total number of Nestorians and Uniats combined is, or was till lately, perhaps about 300,000.

A detailed account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Nestorians is given in Maclean-Browne, *The Catholicos of the East*, ch. ix. The patriarch, or catholicos, has under him a *maṭrān*, or metropolitan, who bears the dynastic name of Mār Ḥnān-ishū ('mercy of Jesus'), and several bishops, the number varying considerably from time to time. The present method of filling bishoprics (including the patriarchate) is for each bishop to bring up one or two boys or young men, his nephews or near relatives, as potential successors. Such a one is called in the vernacular *nāṣar kūrsī* ('keeper of the seat'), and is not allowed to eat meat or marry; the bishop ordinarily nominates the one

1 *Book of Governors*, i. p. cxxxiv. 2 vii. 3.
3 *Ib.* vii. 4. 4 *Ib.* vii. 6. 5 Budge, i. p. xli ff.
6 *Ib.* p. clvii ff. 7 *Ib.* p. clxix.
8 For the Jacobite monastery of Mar Mattai near Moṣul see § 5.
9 Maclean-Browne, *Catholicos of the East*, p. 19. The *Sūnhādhūs* forbids monks to marry 'like the rest of the clerks and laymen' or to eat meat in their monasteries (vii. 2, can. 5).
10 Cf. Budge, i. p. lvi.
11 T. Thompson, *The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, Cambridge, 1914, p. 31. See also art. CONFIRMATION, §§ 6, 7.
12 For an account of this book see Connolly, *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, p. 75 ff.
13 But see R. Payne Smith, *Thes. Syr.* ii. 3373.

1 For a list of the works of Ebedjesus see Assemani, *Bibl. Or.* i. 3 ff., 380 ff. G. P. Badger (*Nestorians and their Rituals*, ii. 380 ff.) gives an English translation of his best known work, the *Marganītā* ('Pearl'), and (ii. 361 f.) of his catalogue of authors and their works, chiefly East Syrian. For East Syrian hymn-writers see art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian).
2 vi. 49. 3 Renaudot, *Lit. Or.* ii. 563.
4 Gibbon, vi. 50.
5 ix. 1. The above remarks and much of what follows apply to the time before the Great War.

whom he wishes to succeed, but in theory the people elect from among the 'keepers of the seat.' In the 15th cent. the catholicos made a law restricting the catholicate to members of his own family. This was an innovation, though perhaps not a very recent one. The catholicos consecrates the bishops; but the metropolitan consecrates the catholicos.[1]

In most villages there is at least one priest, in some several; and deacons are very numerous, as the eucharist cannot be celebrated without the assistance of a deacon or of a priest acting as deacon. Occasionally a priest is made an archdeacon (*arkdn*), but this is now only an honour, not involving special duties. Formerly there were chorepiscopi and periodeutæ ('visitors'); these were presbyters, not bishops. The office of periodeuta is at least as old in Syrian Christianity as Rabbūlā (6th cent.), as he mentions it in his canons.[2] The East Syrian *Book of Heavenly Intelligences*[3] enumerates nine orders in three divisions; (1) the episcopate: patriarch (or catholicos), metropolitan, bishop; (2) the presbyterate: chorepiscopus, periodeuta (or archdeacon), presbyter; (3) the diaconate: deacon, subdeacon, reader. These are said to correspond to the angelic hierarchy (as given by pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and others) of (1) cherubim, seraphim, thrones; (2) dominions, virtues, powers; (3) principalities, archangels, angels. Minor orders are now obsolete. There are no longer any deaconesses.

Many of the ecclesiastical customs of the Nestorians are those also of the Jacobites (see above, § 5). But there are some differences. The Nestorian priests and deacons may marry, and if their wives die they may marry again; but the parish priests are not obliged to be married, though as a matter of fact they are hardly ever single men. The churches, which (especially in the mountains of Kurdistan) have exceedingly narrow and low doors, sometimes only accessible by a ladder, and which are often built for security in a cleft of a rock or in some almost inaccessible place, are nearly all of the same pattern. Outwardly they show no sign of Christianity save a small cross beside the church door. They have no towers or spires, such as the Armenian churches have. Internally they have a stone wall reaching to the roof and dividing the nave from the sanctuary; a doorway in this wall is covered with a veil which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. On the nave-side of this wall is a raised pace called *bema* (a name which in other Eastern communions means the sanctuary), and this again is bounded by a dwarf wall with apertures in the middle and at the side, where the clergy stand to communicate the people. This raised pace somewhat corresponds to the Greek σωλέαν.[4] Against the dwarf wall, towards the nave, are projections (said to contain relics) for the cross and for books. The altar is attached to the east wall, and is usually built into a recess therein. It is oblong, not square as among the Greeks. The people stand in the nave to worship, the men in front, and the women behind; there are no seats, and if there is any occasion for sitting, such as a sermon, the people sit on the matted floor. Two other features of the churches may be noticed: a baptistery (also used as a vestry, and usually for baking the eucharistic bread), at the south-east corner of the church next the sanctuary; and a court (often open to the air) on the south side of the nave, where the daily prayers are said in summer. This is the usual arrangement, and is that of the church of Mart Mariam (St. Mary) at Urmi in Persia, which claims to be the oldest church in the world, and to contain the tomb of one of the Wise Men of Bethlehem, built (as the most ancient tombs are) into the wall of this church—in this case at the south-east corner of the nave.[5] The people are called to worship by a wooden board (Syr. *nāqūshā*) hit by a mallet; this is the Greek σήμαντρον.[6] Bells are seldom used to summon to prayer, though there are often strings of small bells hung inside the church.

[1] For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), § 13.
[2] Given in Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 144.
[3] Maclean-Browne, p. 184. [4] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 201.
[5] For a ground plan see Maclean-Browne, p. 301; for plans of two other famous churches see pp. 291, 296.
[6] Neale, *Gen. Introd.* i. 217.

The vestments worn at the eucharist differ somewhat from those of the Jacobites. For a chasuble the Nestorians wear a kind of cope (*ma'āprā*), which has no fastening at the neck, and is very difficult to keep in position. The priests' stoles, like those of the West, do not differ in shape from those of the deacons; maniples and amices are not worn. Private confession, though often referred to in the service-books, is now obsolete. The fasts are the same as those of the Jacobites, but the fasts of the Apostles and of Mary are almost if not quite obsolete, as are some others mentioned in the East Syrian books. The Wednesday and Friday fasts do not in practice begin on (what we call) the evening before, but they end at sunset; all Eastern Christians reckon the day as beginning and ending at sunset, and our 'Sunday evening' is their 'Monday evening.'

The chief liturgy used by the Nestorians is that of 'the apostles Addai and Mari.' This liturgy has many early features, especially a form of eucharistic invocation of the Holy Spirit which is not as fully developed as that in most of the Great Liturgies. It prays that the Holy Ghost may come and rest on the oblation, and bless and sanctify it, that it may become (or be) for us for the remission of sins, etc.; and it does not explicitly mention the change in the elements. But the most curious feature is the absence of the words of our Lord spoken at the Last Supper, when after 'blessing' or 'giving thanks' He gave the sacrament to the disciples ('This is my body,' etc.). Neale[1] argues on *a priori* grounds that 'Addai and Mari' must have originally had these words. But this is a precarious statement; there are other instances of at least the partial omission of the words.[2] This liturgy in no way refers to the Nestorian controversy. On certain days of the year the anaphora of 'Addai and Mari' is not used, but that of 'Theodore the Interpreter' (of Mopsuestia) or that of 'Nestorius' is substituted, the first part of the liturgy, and the ending, being common to all three. All these anaphoras date, in some form, from very early times; the first probably, in its earliest shape, was compiled before A.D. 431; the other two are certainly not the work of the bishops after whom they are named, but are the work of East Syrian authors. The author of 'Nestorius' must have had a Byzantine liturgy before him, as many traces of that rite are found in it. But all three anaphoras are quite distinctly of the East Syrian, not of the Byzantine, family of liturgies. All three seem to have been composed before Narsai (end of 5th cent.), though doubtless many more modern additions have been made to them.

Eucharists do not occur very often among the Nestorians—some five or six times a year as a rule, though in a few churches weekly eucharists are the custom. The people communicate, as they pray, standing, the mothers holding up the very little children in their arms to receive. All receive in both kinds separately (the species of bread in their hands), except the very little ones, for whom the celebrant dips a small portion of the consecrated bread in the chalice and then puts it in their mouth. Reservation for the sick is not allowed. The eucharistic bread is leavened.[3] All services, without exception, are sung; but no instrumental music is allowed.

The baptismal customs do not differ greatly from those of the Jacobites.[4] The service is closely modelled on the eucharistic liturgies, than which

[1] *Gen. Introd.* i. 486.
[2] A. J. Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, pp. 40, 45, *Early Christian Worship*[2], London, 1915, pp. viii, 25.
[3] For a curious tradition as to the handing down of the leaven see Maclean-Browne, p. 247.
[4] For a description see Maclean-Browne, p. 267 ff.

it is certainly later. There is, however, no kiss of peace. The triple immersion is absolutely total. As with all Easterns, the presbyter confirms, and lays his right hand on or over the neophytes; the use of the consecrated oil at this point is not explicitly mentioned in the service-book, but it is customary for the priest, when signing the neophytes with the sign of the cross, to do so with his thumb which he has dipped in the oil. There are now no interrogations or renunciations,[1] though they are alluded to in the 5th cent. by Narsai, where the renunciations have special reference to heresy.[2] Private baptism is not, in practice, allowed; if a village has no church, a child must be carried to another village which has one. Thus some children die unbaptized, though it is not likely that a person would grow up without baptism. Sponsors are considered as being akin to their godchildren, and the relationship is a bar to marriage.

The non-liturgical services are of great interest, and are extremely long, at least in theory. They consist mainly of hymns and anthems.[3] The great number of martyrs in the East Syrian Church is reflected in the frequent mention of them by name in these anthems. The calendar is remarkable, and in some respects unique. Most of the saints' days fall on a Friday, and suit very well with the arrangement of the ecclesiastical year, which is divided into periods of about seven weeks each, more or less—Advent, Epiphany, Lent, Easter, 'The Apostles' (after Pentecost), 'Summer,' 'Elijah,' 'Moses,' and the 'Hallowing of the Church.' A few of the holy days, however, fall on fixed days of the month, as Christmas (Dec. 25), Epiphany (Jan. 6), St. George (April 24, etc.), St. Cyriac and St. Julitta (July 15 and Dec. 22), St. Peter and St. Paul (July 29), St. Mary (Aug. 15), Holy Cross Day (Sept. 13, not 14 as elsewhere). The twelve apostles are commemorated together on a Friday before Lent, the four evangelists on another, the 'Greek doctors' (Diodorus, Theodore, Nestorius) on a third, the 'Syrian doctors' (especially Ephraim, Narsai, Abraham [of Kashkar?, see above]) on a fourth. On other Fridays are commemorated St. James the Lord's brother, St. Mary, St. John Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul (a second commemoration), Mar Abha or else the patron saint of the church, St. Stephen, the forty martyrs of Sebaste, all the departed, the Seventy, and some others.

The choirs are divided into two parts, and according as the first or the second choir begins the anthems the week is called 'Before' or 'After,' 'Before and After' (Syr. *Qdhām ū-Wāthar*) being thus taken for the name of the ordinary book of daily services. The *propria* for Sundays, fasts, and festivals are of very great length, and are contained in the books called *Ḥūdhrā* ('cycle') and *Gazzā* ('treasure'), two enormous MS volumes, and some others. These two are not published; but the complete East Syrian service for the Epiphany is given in English in Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 288 ff. (from a MS in the Library of the Propaganda Fide in Rome), with the cues all filled in, and a part of these two books is published in Syriac in the *Breviarium Chaldaicum*. The Psalms are said (at least in theory) all through twice a week, and the whole Psalter is recited on festivals of our Lord. In the litanies, which are numerous, and one at least of which is said at almost every service, the ruling patriarch, metropolitan, and bishop of the diocese are commemorated by name. The marriage-service and the burial-service for laymen (*'anīdhā*) have been published in Syriac.[1] The burial-service for the clergy (*kūrastā*) is much longer and more elaborate than that for laymen. These burial-services are most dramatic, and consist partly of dialogues between the departed and the mourners, or between the departed and those already in Sheol. After the funeral the kiss of peace is given, at least in the case of priests and bishops. All pass in line and kiss the hand of the departed, or a cross laid on his breast, and so take leave of him.[2] Badger gives an English translation of the baptismal-, marriage-, and ordination-services, and of the burial-service for priests.[3]

9. Christians of Malabar, or of St. Thomas.—Ancient tradition, in which, however, we can have little confidence, makes St. Thomas the apostle the first teacher of Christianity in India. The legend is told in the Syriac *Acts of Judas Thomas* (see above, § 4), which, curiously enough, makes Thomas (lit. 'twin') the twin-brother of our Lord. J. R. Harris sees here traces of the influence of the Heavenly Twins on Christian legend.[4] The Ethiopic legend of St. Thomas[5] is still fuller. Our Lord divides the world into twelve portions, and Thomas's lot is to go to India. Very unwillingly, but encouraged by our Lord, he goes, guided by Peter and accompanied by Matthias. Jesus appears in the form of a rich man, who sells Thomas as a slave, the price to be given to the poor and needy. Peter and Matthias return. Thomas is set to work as a stonemason, carpenter, and physician; but he afterwards explains that the buildings which he undertook to build were the souls which he won to Christ. He appoints a bishop, priests, and deacons, and departs in a cloud, having been miraculously clothed again in the skin which had been flayed off him. According to another account,[6] he was pierced by soldiers' spears and died. The opposition is said to have been largely due to his preaching encratism,[7] and persuading wives to forsake their husbands. The *Acts of Judas Thomas* says that the relics of the apostle were transferred to Edessa (A.D. 232?). It has been suggested by some that the name 'Christians of St. Thomas' comes from another Thomas than the apostle. This later namesake, **Thomas Cannaneo**, is variously assigned to the 4th or the 9th century.[8] Another legend connects Pantænus of Alexandria (c. A.D. 200) with India, where, it says, the apostle Bartholomew had already preached.[9] Pantænus is said by these writers to have found there a copy, in the Hebrew language, of St. Matthew's Gospel, and to have left it behind him.

The first certain historical testimony to the existence of Christians in India is that of the Alexandrian merchant who afterwards became a monk, and whom we know from his Indian travels as **Cosmas Indicopleustes**. He travelled far, and his *Christian Topography of the Whole World* in twelve books, still extant, is a valuable historical piece of evidence, though it is marred by the erroneous geographical conceptions of the day. The first six books may be dated c. A.D. 547, the rest c. 560. Cosmas's other works are not now extant. He travelled in India and Ceylon, and describes 'Mali' (identified with Malabar) on the Indian coast, the centre of the pepper trade. He

1 See art. ABRENUNTIO.
2 Connolly, *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, p. 37.
3 See art. HYMNS (Syriac Christian), § 4.

1 See under Literature at end of this article.
2 Maclean-Browne, p. 297.
3 *Nestorians and their Rituals*, ii. 195 ff.
4 *The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends*, London, 1903, p. 20 ff.
5 E. A. W. Budge, *Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1901, Eng. tr., ii. 319 ff., Ethiopic text in vol. i.
6 *Ib.* ii. 353. 7 See art. ENCRATITES.
8 Howard, *The Christians of St. Thomas and their Liturgies*, p. 15 f.
9 Eusebius, *HE* v. 10; Jerome, *de Vir. illustr.* 36.

testifies to a large number of Christian churches on the coast of India and in Ceylon and Socotra, whose clergy, he says, were ordained by the Persian archbishop of Seleucia, and were subject to his jurisdiction; the Church there had had many martyrs and a large number of monks. Thus we may gather that the 'Christians of St. Thomas' are the fruits of the missionary activities of the Church of the Persian empire (see above, § 8), and that their Christianity had begun long before Cosmas's time, probably in the 4th century.

The subsequent history is somewhat obscure. Immigrations of Christians to Malabar from Baghdād and elsewhere occurred twice in the 8th and 9th centuries, and the immigrants intermarried with the native Christians. The later of these movements was under two Nestorian priests (bishops?), **Mar Sapor** and **Mar Peruz**. The fame of the Malabar Christianity spread to the West, and King Alfred of England sent ambassadors to that country.[1] The converts were protected by the king of Cochin. They had their bishop at Angamala, and he was styled 'Metropolitan of India,' having in his jurisdiction 1400 churches and 200,000 souls in the whole district.[2]

A theory has lately been put forward by P. T. Geevergese, a native Malabar Syrian, in a tract entitled *Were the Syrian Christians Nestorians?*, to the effect that the Malabarese were Jacobites till the 15th cent., when they became Nestorians for a hundred years. It is agreed that their Church was originally founded from Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and that they were under the Catholicos of the East in the pre-Nestorian period; but this writer maintains that thereafter they depended on the Jacobites, not on the Nestorians. The only argument of any importance adduced in favour of this theory is the existence of two inscriptions at Kottayam, a town of Travancore, in Pahlavi, the official language of the Persian empire during the Sasanian dynasty; they are said to be of the 7th or 8th century. One of the inscriptions has a line also in Syriac, in Estrangēla characters, perhaps of the 10th century. The two run thus: (*a*) 'In punishment by the cross (was) the suffering of this One, He who is the true Christ, and God above, and Guide ever pure'; (*b*) ['Let me not glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ] who is the true Messiah and God above and Holy Ghost.' The words in square brackets are in Syriac. Geevergese amends 'Holy Ghost' to 'Guide ever pure' as in the former inscription. These are said to be anti-Nestorian. But is this the case? The 'Nestorians' of the Persian empire never failed to assert that He who died upon the cross was God. The existence in Malabar of an old Jacobite Bible of the 12th cent. or earlier proves nothing in the absence of evidence as to when it was brought there. The suggestion that the Portuguese inquisitors found some liturgical practices existing which showed traces of Jacobite rather than Nestorian influence, though *ex hypothesi* the latter had been predominant for over a hundred years, will hardly bear examination. Thus the inquisitors mention a liturgy 'of Diodorus' as being in use. There is no such known Nestorian liturgy. Therefore, it is maintained, the liturgy in use was non-Nestorian, *i.e.* Jacobite. It would indeed have been remarkable if the Jacobites had named one of their liturgies after the real father of Nestorianism. Renaudot[3] supposes that 'Diodorus' is here a mistake for 'Theodorus,' but, as the Synod of Diamper mentions both Diodore and Theodore, this is very unlikely.[4] Geevergese agrees that the Nestorians of the Tigris valley at the end of the 15th cent. and the beginning of the 16th sent bishops to Malabar, on the request of deputies who had come thence, and he maintains that these converted Malabar from Jacobitism to Nestorianism. It does not appear to the present writer that Geevergese has proved his theory; but there is possibly this amount of truth in it, that certain of the Malabarese Christians, who have unfortunately always been conspicuous for quarrelsomeness (like their spiritual ancestors), may have had dealings with the dissentient Jacobites of the Tigris valley, or with the Western Jacobites, before the 15th century. Thus a deputation is said to have gone to the Monophysites of Alexandria to ask for a bishop for 'India' (Malabar?), A.D. 695.[5]

An ecclesiastical revolution was effected by the Portuguese in the 16th century. They established the Inquisition at Goa in 1560. The Synod of Diamper, in the south of Cochin, held in 1599 under **Alexius de Menezes**, archbishop of Goa, united the Malabarese, then estimated at about 200,000 souls,[6] to Rome, and rooted out all traces of Nestorianism. Celibacy of the clergy was enforced, and made retrospective. All old books and liturgies were destroyed, or radically altered, so that probably there does not now exist a single complete copy of the liturgies as used before the synod. Renaudot remarks[1] that the Portuguese censors incautiously condemned things which had nothing to do with Nestorianism. The liturgy which they found to be principally used was closely related to, or practically the same as, the Nestorian 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8). An English translation of this[2] is published by J. M. Neale,[3] who says[4] that it is given as revised by Menezes and the Synod of Diamper. Yet this cannot be altogether the case, as it contains the names of Nestorius, Diodore, and Theodore, as well as of Ephraim, Abraham, and Narsai (see above, § 8), and the phrase 'Mother of Christ' for 'Mother of God' (see below). Neale gives some of the prayers in what was probably the original order, but indicates by numbers the order in the form approved at Diamper.

The change from ancient customs was effected only after great opposition on the part of the Malabarese themselves, who rallied under their bishop, **Mar Abraham** (†1597). It was his death that made the Synod of Diamper and the real union with Rome possible.[5]

It is interesting to notice the changes of custom and of liturgy effected at Diamper. Up to this time the Malabar Christians had had but a single bishop at a time; hence, perhaps, arose the custom for the chrism at confirmation to be consecrated by a priest (*catanar*) rather than, as elsewhere in the East, by a bishop; indeed, the Malabarese were accused of not having had confirmation at all,[6] though this is clearly a mistake. The chief changes in the eucharistic liturgy made at Diamper were the following. The pope's name was substituted for that of the patriarch of Babylon. For the names of Nestorius, Diodore, Theodore, and other 'Nestorian' fathers, those of Cyril (of Alexandria) and others were substituted. The phrase 'Mother of God' replaced 'Mother of Christ.' Where, before the consecration, the words 'the body,' 'the blood,' occurred (as often in Eastern liturgies by anticipation), the words 'bread,' 'wine,' were substituted. In the 'Nicene' creed the phrases 'God of God, Light of light, very God of very God,' which were said to have been wanting in the Malabar form, were inserted; probably what is meant is that the first two of these phrases were wanting in Malabar, as they do not occur in the Nestorian creed (see above, § 3). The phrase 'consubstantial with the Father' was substituted for 'Son of the essence of the Father,' the usual equivalent in Syriac (Neale unfortunately does not give the text of the creed in his Malabar liturgy). The host was ordered to be elevated at the consecration. But the chief change was a reversal of prevalent Oriental conceptions of liturgy. The epiclesis, or invocation of the Holy Ghost, was moved from its place after the narrative of the Last Supper and placed before it,[7] the wording being altered so as to make the epiclesis refer only to a good reception of the sacrament. For these changes see Howard, p. 40; but two of his statements appear to be doubtful. The Portuguese censors probably found no narrative of our Lord's words at all, as they were working on 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8); they probably therefore inserted them from one of the other anaphoras, though not in the place where

[1] Howard, p. 21. [2] Gibbon, vi. 51. [3] ii. 569.
[4] Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. p. lxxx.
[5] Neale, *Patriarchate of Alexandria*, ii. 88.
[6] Howard, p. 23.

[1] ii. 565.
[2] From the Latin of J. F. Raulin's *Hist. eccl. Malabaricæ*.
[3] *Liturgies of St. Mark . . . and the Church of Malabar*, p. 128 ff.
[4] *Ib.* p. xvi. [5] Howard, p. 26. [6] *Ib.* p. 28.
[7] For a double invocation in the Egyptian rite, one before and one after the narrative of the Last Supper, see art. INVOCATION (Liturgical), § 6.

they are found in those anaphoras, but in the place which they thought most suitable. The other statement, that the Portuguese altered the wording of the epiclesis, is also doubtful, for, as Neale gives it,[1] it agrees exactly with the epiclesis of 'Addai and Mari,' which, as we have seen, is of a somewhat early type, throwing most of the emphasis on the effects and purpose of the consecration, for the benefit of the communicants, rather than on the change effected in the bread and wine. The history of the changes at Diamper fully justifies Renaudot's dictum quoted above, and shows that the Portuguese censors were quite ignorant of liturgical science.

The Portuguese changed the episcopal see from Angamala to Cranganor on the coast, so that it might be more accessible to them, and that they might have a greater hold on the native Church. But during the whole time of their rule in India they aroused constant opposition from the Malabarese, whom the terrors of the Inquisition were never able entirely to subdue.

In 1663, after more than 60 years of Portuguese rule, the Malabarese were enabled by the Dutch conquests in India once more to assert their independence, induced thereto by the murder of Theodore, a bishop sent from 'Babylon.' The Dutch expelled the Jesuits from Malabar soon after 1663. But the Malabarese were not united among themselves, and about half remained in obedience to the Roman see, while the rest became independent of it. These last gladly accepted Gregorius, Monophysite bishop of Jerusalem, who came from the Jacobite patriarch at Mardin in 1665. Gregorius consecrated Thomas as metropolitan, and since then the Malabarese have been in the main Jacobite. This change of front appears remarkable at first sight. Yet we must remember that in their origin neither the Malabar Church nor her mother, the East Syrian Church, was Nestorian, for they both existed before Nestorianism was propounded. And, though many East Syrians were genuinely Nestorian, it is very doubtful if their Church was consistently and officially so; still less certain is it that the Malabarese were strongly imbued with that doctrine. Hence we can understand why they grasped at the first hand that was stretched out to help them in getting rid of the Western authority which was imposed on them, but under which they had never rested content.

In the year 1700 and afterwards Nestorian bishops were sent, but they only secured the allegiance of a minority. In the 19th cent. the history is one of constant litigation between rival parties. The Nestorians of Malabar, after many lawsuits, won recognition in the courts and part of the endowments. In the year 1850 they obtained a bishop from Mar Shimun, the Nestorian catholicos (see above, § 8). Later, another was sent, but he was murdered by robbers on the journey. In 1907 Mar Shimun consecrated Mar Timotheus (Abimelech), who now holds office.[2]

There are now perhaps 300,000 Syrian Christians, all told, in India; the majority are Jacobites, and have since the 17th cent. adopted the Jacobite liturgies and customs.[3] The metropolitan usually consecrates his own successor, from the family in which the archidiaconate has been hereditary. The archdeacon is called *ramban*. The eucharist is only rarely celebrated; the laity must communicate at least three times in the year,[4] but there are often eucharists without lay communicants. The churches are plain, consisting of nave and chancel without transepts.[1] There is one altar, the so-called 'side altars' being used only, as in the Nestorian churches, for holding a cross, or books, or the like. The altar itself is 4 ft. high by 6 ft. long and 3½ (or 4) ft. wide, sometimes of stone and sometimes of wood. It stands out from the east wall, as in the Jacobite churches of Mesopotamia, in contrast to the Nestorian altars. At the eucharist the altar is covered with a white cloth, and has a frontal. On it are placed a wooden cross (often with the figure of our Lord painted on the wood), two candlesticks, a bookstand, a slab of wood or marble for the chalice and paten to rest upon, a 'sponge' of silk for wiping the priest's fingers and for cleansing the chalice after the service, and three veils for the chalice and paten. The bread is leavened, and must be prepared on the day when it is used; each bread is round, and stamped with a cross. It is called variously *Qōrbānā* ('Oblation'), 'first-begotten,' 'the Seal,' 'the Body,' 'the Coal' (Is 6[6]). These are common Syriac names elsewhere for the eucharistic bread. The naves of the churches have earthen floors; they have no furniture except two bells inside the church; a gallery is often placed at the west side of the nave. On the nave-side of the chancel arch there is a space railed off, not unlike the Nestorian *bema* (see above, § 8), but some 12 ft. wide as compared with a 3 ft. width of the *bema*. The churches sometimes have pictures;[2] this is probably a relic of Portuguese influence. There is always a veil at the chancel arch, which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. Externally the churches have little adornment; the west front has three storeys, and is whitewashed. The roof is high-pitched, that of the chancel being always higher than that of the nave. The vestments worn seem to be much the same as those of the Jacobites of Mesopotamia (see § 5), and are more elaborate than those of the Nestorians. At the eucharist the celebrant wears special shoes, whereas the Nestorians take their shoes off; also a black serge or coarse cotton robe (perhaps a sort of cassock), a white linen albe, a stole in one piece with an opening for the head, girdle, maniples, chasuble (or cope) of silk damask, and cap.[3] At ordination the clergy receive the tonsure,[4] as do the Nestorians, the latter, however, only cutting off some of the ordinand's hair in the form of a cross. As in the worship of all Syrian Christians, much incense is used at the eucharist and other services.

In some externals, especially in the matter of vestments, the Nestorian Malabarese seem to have assimilated their customs to those of their Jacobite neighbours.

10. Modern missions. — Besides the Jesuit, Dominican, and Lazarist missions to the Uniat bodies mentioned in § 6, there have been during the last 80 years various missions to the Jacobites and Nestorians. The American Presbyterian and Congregational Boards of Missions have long had missionaries among them; the Archbishop of Canterbury's educational 'Assyrian Mission' has worked among the East Syrians since 1886; and later the Russian Church sent a mission to them. Similarly missionaries from the West have laboured among the Malabarese in India. To all these missions we are largely indebted for a knowledge of the people, and for the publication of the Bible in classical and vernacular Syriac, of patristic texts, and of other liturgical and educational works.

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[1] *Liturgies*, p. 149 f.
[2] Heazell-Margoliouth, *Kurds and Christians*, p. 196.
[3] An account of these may be seen in Howard, p. 55 ff.
[4] Howard, p. 147.

[1] Howard, p. 123 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 153.
[3] *Ib.* p. 132.
[4] *Ib.* p. 160.

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iii. *THE MARONITES* (for their former doctrine see Literature given under art. MONOTHELETISM).—J. W. Etheridge, as above (ii.); F. J. Bliss, in *PEFSt*, 1890, p. 74 ff., 1892, pp. 71 ff., 129 ff., 207 ff., 308 ff.

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viii. For *SYRIAC TEXTS* of early works by Syrian Christians see W. Wright, *Short Hist. of Syriac Literature*, London, 1894.

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T

TABERNACLES.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

TABU.—The word 'tabu' is properly an adjective and appears to mean literally 'marked off' (perhaps from Polynesian *ta*, 'mark,' *pu*, 'exceedingly'). Applying equally to persons and things, it signifies that casual contact with them is forbidden as being fraught with mystic danger. Custom enjoins a negative or precautionary attitude towards them because of the supernatural influence with which they are temporarily or permanently charged. In short, they are 'not to be lightly approached,' and that always for some magico-religious reason. The term is native to the Pacific region, but has been adopted, with some modification of meaning, to designate a fundamental category of comparative religion. Thus, as in regard to the cognate term *mana* (*q.v.*), it is advisable to distinguish the local from the generalized sense.

1. Local meaning of tabu.—(*a*) *Cook's discovery of tabu*.—'Taboo,' used indifferently as adjective, noun, or verb, was introduced into English by Captain Cook. He first met with the word, in 1777, at Tonga.[1] Hence, by the way, the popularization of the Tongan form *tabu*, *tapu* being usual elsewhere in Polynesia, with *kapu* in the Hawaiian group; though in Melanesia *tabu* again occurs, as also *tambu*. When Cook later on discovered the Sandwich Islands, he found the institution of tabu prevailing there with even more rigour than at Tonga, whereas it seemed to him to have been less strictly observed in the Society Islands, except as regards the tabu resulting from contact with the dead.[1] He gives a clear and consistent account of the notion involved, stating that tabu 'has a very comprehensive meaning, but in general signifies that a thing is forbidden,' being 'applied to all cases where things are not to be touched.' He also emphasizes its 'mysterious significance' and duly notes the 'mixture of religion' in a certain ceremony concerning which 'we seldom got any other answer to our inquiries but *taboo*.'[2] Moreover, he makes it clear that religion herein made common cause with law and government. In reference to the same ceremony, he says: 'When we returned to the king, he desired me to order the boat's crew not to stir from the boat; for, as every thing would, very soon, be *taboo*, if any of our people, or if their own, should be

[1] See J. Cook and J. King, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-80*, London, 1784, i. 286, and *passim*.

[1] *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776-80*, ii. 249.

[2] *Ib.* i. 286, 350, ii. 40.

found walking about, they would be knocked down with clubs, nay, *mateed*, that is, killed.'[1]

Indeed, Captain King (who carries on the story after Cook's death) is perplexed to decide how far the 'implicit and scrupulous obedience' of the natives in regard to the prohibitions laid upon them—as when Karakakooa Bay was tabued, at the request of the navigators, while the remains of Captain Cook were being committed to the deep—was due to some 'religious principle' and how far to 'the civil authority of their chiefs.'[2] The whole account, however, makes it clear that king, chiefs, priests, and the gods themselves, formed one undivided theocracy, whereof tabu constituted the chief instrument, at once spiritual and temporal in its nature and effects. More especially, it ensured a complete control of the economic situation. Thus at Tonga the special officer who 'presided over the *taboo*' was a veritable food-controller:

> He and his deputies inspected all the produce of the island; taking care that every man should cultivate and plant his quota; and ordering what should be eat, and what not. By this wise regulation, they effectually guard against a famine; a sufficient quantity of ground is employed in raising provisions; and every article, thus raised, is secured from unnecessary waste.'[3]

For the rest, tabu was the corner-stone of the class-system, ensuring the subjection of women to men, of the lower orders to the chiefs, and of all to the king, whose very name was tabu on penalty of death.[4]

(*b*) *Primary connexion of Oceanic tabu with a theocratic system.*—Here, then, in this alliance of the religious with the civil forms of authority, we have the distinctive mark of tabu as understood in its local sense. R. Taylor's definition of it, as 'a religious observance established for political purposes,'[5] hits off what is at any rate its leading aspect in Oceania. In the Polynesian islands a class of chiefs with a social influence proportionate to their *mana*, or supernatural power, was everywhere recognized; and in the Eastern groups at any rate there were supreme potentates who might fairly be termed kings, though sometimes, as at Tonga in Mariner's day, the religious head of the community might be said to reign while the war-chief, his inferior in the hierarchy, actually governed.[6] On the other hand, no chieftainship proper is to be found in Melanesia. Here, however, the secret societies exercise a tumultuous, but none the less forcible, control over affairs by means of tabu; while, conversely, 'in cases where the English word taboo can be employed there is always in Melanesia human sanction and prohibition.'[7] Thus there is every reason to suppose that throughout the Pacific we have to do with customs belonging to a single type. This view is supported by the remarkable fact that, despite the diversity of tongues obtaining in this wide area, the word tabu in one of its dialectical forms, as well as the complementary term *mana*, is in general use. But, if the nature and name of the institution are uniform, so presumably will be its origin. On the strength of this argument, W. H. R. Rivers has recently tried to show that tabu in its Oceanic distribution stands everywhere alike for the prestige acquired and the authority exercised by an immigrant folk—his so-called '*kava* people'—in its dealings with an indigenous population of markedly inferior culture.[8] It is interesting to speculate how a system of tabus may have developed on the spot under stress of such culture-contact—how, for instance, barbarians, already worshipping gods and respecting private property, might come to impose their will on magic-haunted communistic savages, for whom threats rather than reasons must be provided as the grounds of obedience. On the other hand, if the immigrants came from Indonesia, as the theory assumes, it is also possible that they brought some form of the custom with them ready-made, since the Indonesian *pomali* is 'exactly equivalent to the "taboo" of the Pacific islanders.'

> Thus in Timor 'the custom of "tabu" called here "pomali," is very general, fruit trees, houses, crops, and property of all kinds being protected from depredation by this ceremony, the reverence for which is very great. A palm branch stuck across an open door, showing that the house is tabooed, is a more effectual guard against robbery than any amount of locks and bars.'[1]

This mode of indicating a tabu is similar to the Oceanic. Thus, when Cook wished to set up his observatory in the Sandwich Islands, the priests tabued the place for him by setting up wands;[2] and the *soloi*, or tabu-marks, of the Banks group in Melanesia usually consist of the leaves of some plant.[3] It may well be, then, that the property-mark, with its implication of a transferable curse, came into Oceania along with the notion of private ownership. It certainly was most effective in protecting property—far more so than the guns which the early mariners discharged at the thievish islanders with a like object in view.

(*c*) *Secondary developments of tabu in Oceania.*—It remains to note that, whereas the essence of tabu in its local signification consists, as has been shown, in a theocratic form of government, which in its turn may have developed by way of an apotheosis of landlordism, the ramifications of the notion are endless and cover the whole religion of Oceania, at any rate so far as it is taken in its negative aspect, namely as a system of scruples. The theocracy could consecrate a site, or devote a victim, or appropriate a house or canoe, or betroth a woman, or proclaim a rest-day for men or a close-time for game, all these being cases of the communication of tabu by a ritual act of imposition, such as could at will be neutralized by a ceremonial removal.[4] On the other hand, many tabus were inherent rather than acquired, such as those associated permanently with women, strangers, the sick, and the dead, or for the time being with the woman in child-birth or the warrior on a campaign. The world-wide distribution of similar beliefs concerning an infectious impurity makes it extremely improbable that they can be referred in the mass to an immigrant culture or treated as mere reasons of state, the by-products of the administrative scheme. At most we may say that, in so far as the direction of affairs was centralized and deliberate, they were incorporated in the political machine and to a like extent became subject to manipulation. Thus, at Hawaii in 1819, King Rihoriho at one stroke abrogated the laws of the tabu; though only, let us note, to make way for *la tabu*, the British Sunday.[5] So much, then, for the local or Oceanic sense of tabu with its special connotation of a theocratic system of controls, a more or less consciously organized body of sanctions backed by the joint authority of Church and State.

2. Scientific meaning of tabu.—(*a*) *Tabu as an aspect of rudimentary religion.*—For the purposes of the science of comparative religion it is convenient to drop the implication of a human sanction and to insist solely on the supernatural

[1] *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1776–80*, i. 338.
[2] *Ib.* iii. 163. [3] *Ib.* i. 411. [4] *Ib.* ii. 170.
[5] *Te Iku a Maui*, London, 1855, p. 55.
[6] Ct. W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, ed. J. Martin, London, 1817, ii. 87.
[7] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 215.
[8] Ct. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 239, 252, 384, 409, 485.

[1] A. R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*[3], London, 1869, i. 196, ii. 450.
[2] Cook-King, iii. 10, 36. [3] Rivers, i. 92.
[4] Ct. Taylor, pp. 78, 91.
[5] W. Ellis, *Narrative of a Tour through Hawaii*, London, 1826, pp. 15, 52, 95.

or mystic aspect of the penalties in store for the tabu-breaker. In this way it is possible to bring together under one head a large variety of avoidances characteristic of the less advanced peoples, of whom it may broadly be said that they have no king but custom. Just as their response to traditional rules is largely automatic, so, correspondingly, the rule itself has imputed to it a no less automatic power of self-maintenance and self-vindication. Indeed, so necessary is it for general purposes to lay stress on the immanence of the sanction normally attributed to a tabu that it is safer to deny the name altogether to prohibitions deriving their force mediately from a god or his earthly representative and to distinguish these as religious interdicts or bans. Tabu, in short, is to be understood as meaning 'unlucky to meddle with' rather than forbidden by edict human or divine. It belongs to what may be termed the perceptual (Lévy-Bruhl would say 'prelogical') stage of religion, when values are massively apprehended without analysis of their grounds. At this stage emotion of the collective or mobbish order is paramount as regards both the excitatory and the inhibitive processes that govern the social life. Now of all the emotions fear is inhibitor-in-chief, having in virtue of its haunting quality a special power of sustained control. A primary source of fear is the unfamiliar or strange as such; and this kind of fear in varying degree is always present as an element in that complex emotion of awe or reverence which is the root of religion. Tabu, then, stands for the whole mass of such fear-inspired inhibitions in so far as they proceed directly from the religious emotion, as it regulates the social tradition in the relative abeyance of reasoned direction. Here we have at any rate the psychological clue to a vast variety of customary abstinences—'negative rites,' as they may be called—of which the particular conditions are a matter for historical treatment in detail.

(*b*) *Tabu and the notion of contagion.*—It may next be noted that emotions are infectious. It is, indeed, the leading principle of mob-psychology that emotions are propagated more readily than ideas, their external manifestations lending themselves to unintelligent imitation. Moreover, fear is, perhaps, the most infectious of all. Hence the fear-inhibition embodied in tabu always implies an infectious unluckiness—a transferable curse on meddlers. As A. van Gennep in his analysis of the *fady* (=*tabu*) of Madagascar shows, the institution rests on two notions, one being that of *tohina*, 'contagion.'[1] 'Everything,' says Jevons, 'which comes in contact with a tabooed person or thing becomes itself as dangerous as the original object, becomes a fresh centre of infection, a fresh source of danger to the community.'[2]

Jevons goes on to discriminate between 'things taboo,' the primary sources of such contagion, and 'things tabooed,' in which the tabu-infection is not inherent but derivative.[3] 'A single thing taboo might infect the whole universe,' as he says with pardonable exaggeration;[4] but in practice the transmissible fear is strictly limited in its possible effects, being confined to certain channels prescribed by convention. Meanwhile it is not always easy to draw the line between the two classes. The clearest cases of 'things tabooed' are those in which, as in Oceania, a divine chief tabus something hitherto common, or *noa*—say, a hunting-ground—and then after a time restores it to ordinary use. But, when Jevons accepts at its face-value the Polynesian explanation that the tabu on the sick is due to the fact that they are possessed by an *atua*, or spirit, and therefore pronounces them 'tabooed but . . . not taboo,'[1] it is at least arguable that a 'pre-animistic' basis must be sought for the belief; for what more perceptibly contagious than certain (and those precisely the stranger and more alarming) forms of disease? It is surely no mere superstition to suppose that sickness—nay, as it were, death itself—is 'catching.' On the other hand, it is hardly profitable, in deference to the theory that the emotions of man afford the best criterion of his instincts, to regard 'things taboo' as so many danger-signals to which mankind has an innate predisposition to attend. Tabus need rather to be studied in relation to their proximate conditions, which are not biological but historical. In other words, tabus are primarily matters of custom, forming part of the social inheritance, not of the individual heredity.

(*c*) *Tabu and the notion of supernatural power.*—The other notion on which the tabu of Madagascar rests, according to van Gennep,[2] is that of *hasina* =*mana*, or supernatural power. The person or thing is not to be trifled with, because liable to react with a force of unknown range and degree. There is a spiritual electricity that must be insulated lest it blast the unwary. Now, if religion were all fear, such *mana* would rank as wholly bad, since fear is a shrinking from evil. But other primary constituents of the religious mood make rather for interest, receptivity, approach, communion. For reckless self-assurance, indeed—for what the Greeks knew as ὕβρις—there is always 'the devil to pay.' But fear tempered with wonder and submissiveness, and thus transmuted into reverence, is the forerunner of love. So *mana* has its good side as well, though from the standpoint of tabu this helpfulness remains, so to say, in reserve, being a consummation that lies beyond the purview of the fear-inhibition as such. Meanwhile to an advanced theology that has clarified its concepts by the method of antithesis the savage apprehension of *mana* by way of tabu seems blurred and equivocal, an experience of something monstrous, half-devil and half-god. And that there is some such ambiguity in the value perceived cannot be denied. The sacred and the abominable, the pure and the obscene, the hallowed and the accursed pivot within the same perturbed awareness of the object. Nevertheless, rudimentary religion has gone a long way towards defining in practice, if not in theory, the good and the bad manifestations of the hidden power. Thus the novice at initiation or the warrior on a campaign is tabu that he may seek and find grace in the self-concentration that ensues after spiritual crisis overcome. On the other hand, the criminal is tabu because his very soul is attainted; wherefore, as the words of his doom, 'Sacer esto,' imply, he cannot touch water and fire lest he sully their purity with his foulness.

(*d*) *Tabu as a source of personal religion.*—At this point it may be observed that the institution of tabu is not only the main organ of social discipline at the lower levels of culture, but likewise the seed-bed of personal religion. The latter function hinges on the fact that to be tabu with respect to society is at the same time to be tabu in relation to oneself. The external signs of this self-regarding attitude of precaution are often ludicrous enough, as when a man cannot feed himself, or must scratch his head with a stick, or needs to snuff up the holiness that exudes from his fingers. But an inward-seeking view reveals a profit even in such practices. The *mana* to be conserved is just that part of a man that he feels to be most

[1] *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, p. 17.
[2] F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 61 f.; see the whole of ch. vi. for examples.
[3] *Ib.* p. 69 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 69.

[1] *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, p. 70.
[2] *Loc. cit.*

worth the saving—the will for power. Such power may be coveted for temporal ends. Savage shepherds of the people are not more disinterested than the rest of their kind. But at least it is proximately envisaged as a spiritual power. At least it is the sort of power that comes with and after self-abnegation and the exercise of humility. There is good evidence, too, that a sense of unworthiness consequent on the violation of his self-regarding tabus—as one might say, his 'vows'—is enough to cause voluntary resignation of office on the part of the primitive wonder-worker. There can be no doubt, then, that the experience both of the access of inspiration and of its withdrawal is often perfectly genuine; and, again, that the due safeguarding of such a gift is a lesson first acquired in the school of tabu. Further, not to lay exclusive stress on the ecstatic experience peculiar to the religious genius, the whole development of personality, so far as this comes about by way of reverie and reflexion, arises largely out of the tabu condition. No other such opportunity is afforded in the gregarious life of the savage tribesman for that self-communing whereby man eventually becomes master instead of slave of the sense-world. Self-respect, again, is nourished on privacy; the king or priest must keep his distance from the *profanum vulgus*, lest he make himself cheap not only in their eyes but also in his own.[1] For the rest, tabu stands for the etiquette of savage life, and by encouraging mutual consideration enables manners to ripen into morals, the end of which is freedom.

(*e*) *Danger of the over-development of tabu.*—Hitherto the fruitfulness, the educative value, of tabu as a factor in religion of the perceptual or rudimentary type has been chiefly signalized. After all, the inhibition of impulse affords the measure of human advance. But such inhibition may be overdone, with paralysis of the will to live as a consequence. Tabu as such represents negation, and a religion made up mostly of negations is necessarily sterile. Denial, even self-denial, cannot but be soul-destroying, if taken as an end in itself. Hence a meticulous scrupulosity is a mark of degraded religion. Nothing, *e.g.*, is so characteristic of the dairy-cult of the Todas as the web of tabus in which every action of the priest-dairyman is emmeshed, and Rivers not without good reason comments: 'The Todas seem to show us how the over-development of the ritual aspect of religion may lead to atrophy of the ideas and beliefs through which the religion has been built up.'[2]

Even a positive rite such as prayer may degenerate into formalism. Much more is this likely to happen with the negative rite or tabu, wherein the nature of the spiritual activity subserved is less immediately manifest. In the last stage of such decay—and in this also the case of the Todas is instructive[3]—the scrupulosity itself tends to become a sham, an organized hypocrisy of evasions. The function of ritual in religion is to relieve attention in regard to things indifferent, and of negative ritual to do so in regard to things actually disturbing—all this in order to set attention free for active converse with the divine. It is true that there is in many forms of religious experience—and they are perhaps especially to the fore in rudimentary religion—a characteristic prelude of apparent inaction, a spell of listening, as it were; and, so far as the tabu condition corresponds to this halt on the threshold, it is apt to seem barren of results when it is not. To judge fairly in each case, we must watch the ritual drama as a whole to see whether the passivity induced is of the pregnant order. As an incident in a 'rite of passage' to a higher plane of experience, the chrysalis stage of the soul is symptomatic of development. If, on the other hand, the will to win through be somehow asphyxiated on the way, negation has triumphed; too much safeguarding has destroyed; the husk has stifled the germinal process.

(*f*) *Methods of studying tabus in detail.*—This cursory sketch of tabu aims at no more than a generalized version of the institution as it bears on the earlier growth of the spirit of religion. A fuller treatment might be based on the study of the particular systems of tabu native to the various ethnic areas—as has here been attempted only in regard to the Pacific region—when many differences of detail and shades of local colour would doubtless come to light. In defence of the present method, however, it can be urged that to deal with tabus on the ethnological principle would well-nigh involve a survey of religions on the same distributive plan, since every savage people has a religion and every savage religion has its tabus. Nay more, savage religion tends to be co-extensive with the social life itself; so that a regular panorama of cultures may seem to be the logical outcome of such a method. Another way of dividing up the subject (but one again that must inevitably lead too far afield) would be that of distinguishing certain main departments of activity typical of primitive society as a whole and showing how each is conditioned by its own set of special tabus. The food-interest, *e.g.*, is engirdled by one vast network of ritual controls, the sex-interest by another. Indeed, the critical stages of every vital process are hung about with such customary danger-signals. Sometimes these traditional fears can be shown to correspond to facts; more often they appear arbitrary, sheer aberrations of fancy, due to false analogy or what not, that have been incorporated in the tribal lore by a historical chance. Thus, however detailed our study of tabus, we are not likely to arrive at the explanation of minor features. For these reasons it has seemed preferable here simply to enlarge on the general principle that, at the primitive level, the object of religious belief or worship is always tabu, just as it is always *mana* as well; and that, moreover, tabu forms the hither aspect of the religious experience, inasmuch as fruition is reached through fear.

(*g*) *Tabu from the standpoint of civilization.*—Tabu being properly an institution of savagery, it would hardly be in point to consider at length its ulterior consequences for civilization—as apart from its survivals in folk-lore, which indeed are numerous. But a word about such after-effects may be added by way of conclusion. We must not look for them solely within the sphere of religion as it is now. With the gradual substitution of a rational for an emotional system of controls, there has come about a decentralization of authority whereby disciplines once merged in an all-pervasive religious sanction have been invested with quasi-independent functions. Politics to-day deals with the divine right of kings, law with the sacredness of property, morals with the virtues of temperance and chastity, and so forth. In all such cases the tendency is to refuse any validity to the old-world sentiment of tabu. Reason prefers to rest its case on grounds of so-called common sense. At most the immediacy and seeming unconditionality of the tabu-feeling might enlist the sympathies of certain schools of ethical thought. As for modern religion, while it hesitates to adopt a rationalist outlook, it is naturally anxious to purge its traditional rites of the mildew of ancient superstition. On all sides, however, so far as the influence of a philosophy of man makes

[1] Cf. *kapukapu*, 'to put on airs of distance or separation from others,' with *mamana*, 'to respect oneself,' in E. Tregear, *The Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, Wellington, N.Z., 1891, pp. 203, 473.

[2] *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 455.

[3] *Ib.*

itself felt, there is of late manifested a deeper interest in the emotional life, more especially as it relates to conduct. Alike in social psychology with its study of the crowd and in individual psychology with its doctrine of the subconscious the conviction is growing that society and mind alike are controlled from below, as it were, as well as from above—that reason is at best a constitutional ruler whose authority rests not on force but on consent. It may be, then, that, examined from this point of view, the primitive institution of tabu will be found to embody elemental principles of order that to-day are as active as ever beneath the surface of a changed custom. Experience, which is experiment, has doubtless taught us to reject many a freakish usage dear to the old order; but this experience, which in its most critical form is science, bids us seek beneath the accidents of history for those essential laws whereby our racial sense of direction is continuously maintained.

LITERATURE.—(i.) For tabu in Oceania see the works cited above, early authorities such as Cook and Mariner being especially enlightening, since the original social system has long been gone, at any rate in Polynesia; compare also Th. Waitz and G. Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859-72, vi.; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, iv.; G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, do. 1884; *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori, do. 1884; since the same cultural influences presumably extend to Indonesia and the Malay region (including Madagascar), see also W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, do. 1900. A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, brings the local into relation with a general interpretation.

(ii.) For a world-wide review of the facts about tabu see J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[3], 12 vols., London, 1911-15, esp. vol. iii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, and for his general theory vol. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 111 ff., also *Psyche's Task*[2], do. 1913. The subject being germane to any systematic account of primitive religion, it is hard to draw up a short list of authorities, but the following, in addition to those already quoted in the text, will be found useful: W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894; E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, do. 1902; E. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, esp. p. 427 f.; and, on special aspects of tabu, Crawley, *FL* vi. [1895] 130 ff.; E. Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, London, 1914; H. Webster, *Rest Days: a Study in Early Law and Morality*, New York, 1916. For a psychological study of tabu see R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914; E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, do. 1910.

R. R. MARETT.

TAHITIANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TALISMAN.—See CHARMS AND AMULETS.

TALMUD.—Two great works are known under the title 'Talmud'—a word (תַּלְמוּד) which denotes primarily 'teaching' and secondarily 'learning.' The two works are the Palestinian and Babylonian recensions, both of which are, in form, commentaries on the text of the Mishnāh (מִשְׁנָה). The Mishnāh ('repetition,' hence oral teaching by repeated recitation) was completed about A.D. 200. The Talmud consists of the Mishnāh with the Gemara (גְּמָרָא). It represents the scholastic activities of the Jewish Rabbis from the beginning of the 3rd to the close of the 5th century A.D.

The history of the compilation of the Talmud has been dealt with in many treatises and essays.[1] It is not the design of the present article to add to these or to reconsider the critical literary problems involved. Two practical questions will occupy us: (1) the attitude of the outside world to the Talmud,[2] and (2) the causes and nature of the permanent value of the Talmud within Judaism.

1. The Talmud in history.—The century which saw the completion of the Talmud also witnessed the beginning of interference with the normal circulation of the Rabbinical literature. In the year 553 the Emperor Justinian was called upon to arbitrate on a difference which arose between two sections of Jewry in the Byzantine realm. Whereas some were desirous of publicly reading the Scriptures both in Greek and in Hebrew, others wished to use the Hebrew only. Justinian[1] ordered the præfect Areobindus to promulgate the imperial decision in favour of the use of Greek (the Synagogue might use Aquila if it preferred it to the Septuagint), or of other vernacular tongues such as Latin in the Italian provinces. The emperor, moreover, forbade any attempt on the part of the heads of the schools or elders to prevent the use of the vernacular by devices or excommunication. Most significant of all was Justinian's interdiction of the practice of giving the Haggādic exposition (δευτέρωσις) after the reading of the Scripture. The opening words of the rescript explain Justinian's intention. The Jews, he suggested, should read their Scriptures with an eye to the hidden meaning and see in them a prophetic announcement of Christianity. Hence the emperor would naturally desire to curb the popularity of the Rabbinic exegesis, which of course would confirm the Jews in their refusal to admit Christological interpretations. Thus Justinian, who introduced drastic legislative enactments against the Jews, was also among the first to attempt interference with the free use and spread of their literature.[2]

We must here confine our attention to that phase of interference which concerns the Talmud. It was not till the 13th cent. that the attack assumed practical shape. Paris, in the year 1244, was the scene of the first public burning of copies of the Talmud. Before that date the Rabbinic doctrines had been assailed in the *de Insolentia Judæorum* of Agobard; but from the Paris incident onwards these assaults became far more frequent and dangerous. Nicholas Donin of La Rochelle had, while a Jew, been excommunicated by the Rabbi Yeḥiel of Paris because of his denial of the validity of the Rabbinic tradition. This occurred in 1225; he subsequently joined the Franciscans, and in 1239 he formally laid an accusation against the Talmud before Pope Gregory IX., who addressed bulls to many lands (including England) ordering the seizure of copies of the Talmud pending a public inquiry. In France the matter was seriously taken up. Charges of blasphemy, immorality, particularism, and absurdity were formulated; a public dispute between Donin and four Rabbis was ordered. The humours and futilities of such debates have been satirized in Heine's poem 'Disputation.' But the consequences were deplorable. The Talmud was condemned; many copies of it were burnt; and popular outbreaks against the Jews resulted.

Within a few years similar scenes were enacted in Barcelona. Here again the attack originated with a Jewish convert to Christianity, Pablo Christiani. He instigated a public debate between himself and Naḥmanides in 1263, as to the attributes and coming of the Messiah, and the Rabbi was sentenced to exile because his defence of Judaism was pronounced blasphemous. In 1264 Christiani induced Pope Clement IV. to appoint a Commission of censors, who expunged all those passages which appeared derogatory to Christianity. In particular, as time went on, Talmudic references to ancient paganism were misinterpreted as being attacks on the Church. This charge was brought forward by yet another erstwhile Jew, Geronimo de Sante Fé, who engineered a public dispute in Tortosa in 1410, and, like Christiani, submitted to the verdict of the crowd the most intricate problems of Biblical exegesis in relation to Messianic belief. The practical outcome again

[1] See 'Literature' below.
[2] Cf. art. ANTI-SEMITISM.

[1] *Novellæ Constitutiones*, 146.
[2] The view of Justinian's rescript given in the text is the one usually adopted. It is by no means the only possible explanation, for it is possible that what Justinian prohibited was the use of the traditional Aramaic translation (see art. TARGUMS).

was not a settlement as to the significance of Is 53, but the confiscation of copies of the Talmud.

Of much greater interest was the controversy which waged round the Talmud at the beginning of the 16th century. Owing to the part taken by Reuchlin (*q.v.*) in this incident, the Talmud became the battle-ground between the old and the new, between the obscurantists and the humanists. Again the protagonist in the attack on the Talmud was one who had left the Synagogue for the Church. It must not, however, be thought that the proverbial zeal of converts has invariably assumed this guise. In the recent assaults made on the Talmud by representatives of modern anti-Semitism (*q.v.*), powerful among the defenders of the fair fame of the Rabbinic system were such famous Judæo-Christian scholars as Daniel Chwolsohn and Paulus Cassel. The opponent of Reuchlin was of a different type. We know very little as to the antecedents of Johann Pfefferkorn, of whom Erasmus said that from a bad Jew he became an execrable Christian ('ex scelerato Judæo sceleratissimus Christianus'), for no reliance can be placed on the insinuations made by satirists that in his earlier days Pfefferkorn had added to the respectable calling of a butcher the disreputable career of a burglar. All that we know is that Pfefferkorn was animated by a strong animosity towards his former co-religionists, that his fanaticism far exceeded his learning, and that he found support for his campaign among the Dominicans of Cologne. Though the Jews had been excluded from that city in 1426 and only regained rights of free domicile there with the coming of the French in 1798, Cologne remained during the 15th and 16th centuries the headquarters of the campaign against Jewish books.

It would be unprofitable to repeat the details of the oft-told tale of Pfefferkorn's pamphlets and Reuchlin's rejoinders; of the seizure of Hebrew books in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1509, their restoration, and the long-drawn-out struggle that ensued in Rome. Nor is it of any importance to us now whether or not Pfefferkorn wrote the works that bear his name. The whole incident would have been forgotten but for certain facts. In the first place, this battle of the books gave rise to a famous satire, the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*, the first part of which appeared at Tübingen towards the end of 1514. The effect of this rather savage satire was instantaneous and permanent. As an exposure of obscurantism it remains one of the most masterly efforts ever put forward on behalf of humanism. The struggle between Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn became, in short, elevated to a higher plane. Reuchlin, once for all, struck the true note when he protested against the destruction of a literature because elements of it were distasteful to certain of its critics. 'If the Talmud contains errors,' he said, 'let us render them innocuous by studying to sift the chaff from the grain. Do not burn the Talmud, but read it.' It is to Reuchlin that we owe the foundation of Hebrew chairs in the universities; the first Hebrew text printed in Germany was the edition of seven Psalms used by Reuchlin in 1512. The study of Hebrew in Christian Europe commenced with him, was taken up by his immediate successors, and has never since been relinquished.[1] Reuchlin's devotion to Rabbinism began with his interest in the Ḳabbāla. But Hebrew was the passion of his life. And there is no doubt that to him we owe that interest in the Talmud which soon led to the publication of a complete printed edition of all its tomes. There were, as we shall see, printed editions of parts of the Talmud available in 1510, when he wrote that 'he would like to pay the price for a copy of the Talmud twice over but he had not yet been able to obtain one.'[1] He was referring to MS copies. Within about a decade of the year in which Reuchlin wrote this lament it was easy to procure the Bomberg edition printed in Venice. It was fortunate for scholarship that Daniel Bomberg began to print the Talmud in 1520, before the censorship intruded its hand. Yet the censorship has this value. In 1550 the Talmud was placed on the Index. But the Tridentine Synod in 1564 provided that the Talmud might be circulated, if the passages obnoxious to Christianity were deleted. This was done, and between 1579 and 1581 there was completed the censored Basel edition which formed the model for many subsequent editions. In this form, claims the Basel editor, the Talmud may be read by Christians not only without reproach but even with profit ('etiam cum fructu a nostris legi potest'). The Inquisitor Marco Marino went through the Venice edition of 1546–50, censored it, and affixed his name to the expurgated version page by page. The expurgated passages have often been edited and commented on separately. Attacks on the Talmud, nevertheless, continued. As late as 1757 copies of the Talmud were publicly burned in Poland as a result of the Kamenetz-Podolsk disputation. Literary onslaughts have naturally continued, and modern anti-Semitism has displayed much energy in seeking in the pages of the Talmud grounds for attacks on the Jews. Those pages contain enough and to spare of superstition, narrowness, folly, and intolerance. But the faults are superficial, the merits fundamental; and it is because of the latter that the Talmud retains its permanent worth.

[1] S. R. Hirsch, *A Book of Essays*, London, 1905, p. 14.

2. Permanent value.—In the first instance the Talmud represents more fully than any other Jewish work the lineal development of the religion of the OT. In several important particulars, the Talmud, indeed, represents an advance on the OT. The view (adopted by the school of R. H. Charles) is untenable that Rabbinism was a degeneration, while Apocalypse was an advance. On the contrary, all the nobler elements of the OT teaching were absorbed into and developed by Rabbinism, which was essentially a prophetic system. The moral life was at once the basis of religion and its ultimate outcome. The Talmud concerned itself with life. It therefore drew little or no distinction between the secular and the religious. This is not the place to discuss the Pharisaism which is assailed in the Gospels. For, however we explain the discrepancy, the Pharisaism of the Gospels is not identical with the Pharisaism of the Talmud.

Hence, though the Talmud, because it combines secular and religious into one whole, is often inclined to attach undue importance to ritual or customary trivialities, it cannot be said that it does so at the expense of the great principles. And, when all has been said, the fact remains that, difficult though it be to harmonize the daily round with the higher calls of spiritual moments, the Talmud did effect this harmonization with a considerable measure of success. The Talmud is interpenetrated with the presence of God in human life, and worship was not merely confined to the hours spent in congregational prayers. The home was sanctified as well as the synagogue. This fact constituted and constitutes the worth of the Talmud to the Judaism of all ages. The liberals who have rejected the authority of the Talmud have not rejected its spirit and its outlook.[2] They, like the conservatives, feel that the hallowing of life is the purpose of life. And, among the many attempts to effect this hallowing of life—in relation primarily to God, but also in intercourse

[1] *A Book of Essays*, p. 141. [2] Cf. art. LIBERAL JUDAISM.

with man—the Talmud must be conceded a high place.

In the main, then, the Talmud retains its worth because it has so thoroughly absorbed the prophetic conception of the close interconnexion of religion and life. But life is not altogether expressible in terms of conduct. There is the intellectual side. Now, for long intervals, the Talmud was the main means by which the Jew cultivated his mind. Some of the greatest Talmudists of the Middle Ages were indeed also devoted to science and philosophy, in the technical sense of those terms. But there were masses of Jews who knew no other intellectual interest than the Talmud and the allied literature. The nature of the Talmud saved them from stagnation. For the Talmud is a work of most manifold interest. It concerns itself with every phase of human activity. To read it intelligently—and it was assuredly so read—was a liberal education in the arts and sciences and philosophies. So wide is its range that a student of the Talmud is perforce acquainted with very many subjects which nowadays are regarded as distinct disciplines. The mind of the student was kept alert; his attitude never became scholastic; at every point he was in contact with actualities. It was an essential function of the Talmud to maintain this alertness, so that to con over its pages was not identical with losing oneself in an obsolete past. The Talmud breathes with vital freshness.

This enables us to understand why the Talmud has never been superseded by the codes founded upon it even by authorities so competent and able as Moses Maimonides and Joseph Qaro. The codes omit the very element which makes the Talmud so important, so unique. The codes reduce ritual and religious conduct to rule; the decisions are stated in precise paragraphs; they are anonymous. But the Talmud presents processes as well as results; there is little of rule in it, less of precision; and the dicta are largely associated with the names of their authors. We see the religious evolution in action. And, just as it is in action in the older book, it remained in action in the modern life. The claim often put forward by recent Talmudists that their beloved tomes represent a progressive Judaism is well founded. Codes have an air of finality, while the key-note of the Talmud is continuity.

For the Talmud, after all, comes into line with the newer theory of the evolution of religion. The effect of the Talmud, it has been said, was to obscure the difference between Scripture and Tradition. This may be true, but modern criticism tends (on quite other grounds) to obliterate the distinction. The Scripture is itself a traditional evolution—so the newer theories hold. The Talmud in essence anticipated this theory, not in the direction of belittling the divine character of the written text, but in the direction of magnifying the human part in the authorization of the message. Man has his part to play in bringing the Law into operation—in interpreting it, which is often another term for expanding it.

We can here merely mention the beauties of the Talmud, its felicities of thought, its flights of fancy, its parables, its poetry. The Jew did not merely feed his mind on the wit of the Talmud or his spirit on its idealism. His heart and imagination found their nourishment there also. From its pages the liturgy derived some of its choicest prayers. In germ, the Talmud already contains the mysticism which in later ages grew up so luxuriantly in Judaism. That this mysticism rarely became antinomian was due almost entirely to the Talmud, which more than permitted—for it encouraged—individualism as well as communism in the religious life. Our present point, however, is that volumes could be compiled (volumes have been compiled) out of the fine gems presented in a literary form which is unlike that of any other work—unlike in grotesqueness as well as in efficiency.

In the presence of these merits the attacks on the Talmud failed. Partly they were theological, partly moral, partly social. Ridicule was cast on its trivialities; fault was found with its religious conceptions; objection was taken to its attitude to Gentiles. These unfavourable criticisms were not all unfounded, for the Talmud contains much of inferior value, and bears the marks of the different ages and strata of thought in which it grew up. Nevertheless, some of the attacks on the Talmud were absolutely false; in others the assailants confused the attitude towards the Rome which destroyed the Temple with the attitude to the Rome which became the seat of the papacy. Often, too, overmuch importance was attached to the *obiter dicta* of isolated Rabbis. When, however, it was protested by Donin in 1239, and by Romano in 1553, that it was the Talmud that confirmed the Jews in their obstinate fidelity to the Synagogue, the charge was largely just. But that must be assigned to the Talmud as a merit, not as a fault. At all events it explains, perhaps in the most effective manner, how it came about that a work, so curiously alien from the modern canons of excellence in literature, has maintained its position not only with those Jews who more or less order their lives in accordance with it, but also with those who, rebels against its authority, retain an affectionate regard for its spirit. Written in style far removed from modernity, the Talmud is one of the most modern of books.

LITERATURE.—S. Schechter, in *HDB* v. 57–66, with full bibliography; W. Bacher, in *JE* xii. 1–27 (also with bibliography); H. Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, ii. chs. xiii.–end, and elsewhere in passages indicated in detail in the Index volume (1898) to the American ed. of the translation, p. 589 ff. The well-known unfavourable view of Schürer is contained in his section on 'Life under the Law,' in his *History*, Eng. tr., II. ii. § 23. An account of the Talmud is given in I. Abrahams, *Short History of Jewish Literature*, London, 1906, ch. iii. Special attention may be drawn to the brilliant essays of E. Deutsch (*Literary Remains*, London, 1874) and J. Darmesteter (*Reliques scientifiques*, Paris, 1890).

I. ABRAHAMS.

TAMIL-SPEAKING PEOPLES.—See DRAVIDIANS.

TAMMUZ.—Tammuz was the West Semitic form of the name of the great Asiatic nature-god, typifying the changing seasons in their relation to man's needs, desires, and passions, though the last-named were far from being so pronounced in connexion therewith as the other two aspects. For its meaning, and also other names of Tammuz, see §§ 7, 10, below.

1. The old view of the legend of Tammuz.—Prior to the successful reading of the Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions the legend of Tammuz was regarded as being exclusively West Semitic, owing, apparently, to the scene of the god's activities being located, in the then extant records, in Syria. There was considerable difficulty, however, in finding an acceptable root by which the name of the god might be explained.

2. Its most familiar versions.—According to the classic legend of Tammuz, his mother had unnatural intercourse with her own father, urged thereto by Aphrodite, whom she had offended. Pursued by her father, who sought to kill her for this crime, she prayed to the gods, who changed her into a tree, from whose trunk Adonis (the Græco-Syriac name of Tammuz) was in due time born. So charmed was Aphrodite with the beauty of the infant that, placing him in a chest, she

handed him to Persephone to take care of. The goddess of the under world, however, when she found what a treasure she had in her keeping, refused to part with him again. Zeus was therefore appealed to, and he decided that for four months in the year Adonis should be left to himself, four should be spent with Aphrodite, and the remaining four with Persephone. A variant account, however, agrees with the Babylonian legend in making him pass six months with Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone) and six with Ištar, or Aphrodite. The classic versions represent Adonis, or Tammuz, as being passionately fond of hunting, and undeterred therefrom by the fiercest quarry. His end was tragic, as he was slain through the tusk of a wild boar piercing his groin (see § 14).

3. The Syrian versions.—The centre of the Syrian worship of Tammuz was probably Gebal; in any case, Balthi ('the [divine] Lady,' as Aphrodite seems to have been called in the extreme west of Asia) was believed to have migrated thither from her realm of Cyprus for love of Tammuzo (Tammuz). But before Tammuzo she had loved Ares (Mars)[1] and thereby aroused the jealousy of her husband Hephæstus. In this version Tammuz is described as the son of Cuthar, king of the Phœnicians, to whom, when she fled from Cyprus, Balthi made all the villages around subject. It was not the irresponsible act of a wild boar, however, that caused the death of Tammuz, but the jealousy of either Aphrodite's husband Hephæstus or her lover Ares, who came and slew Tammuz on Lebanon whilst he was hunting wild boars.

The Syrian lexicographer Bar Bahlul also gives the legend as he had heard it: 'Tomuzo was, as they say, a hunter shepherd and chaser of wild beasts; who when Balathi loved him took her away from her husband. And when her husband went forth to seek her Tomuzo slew him,' but was himself slain later on by a wild boar which he encountered in the wilderness, and his father made a great weeping for him in the month named after him.

The Rabbinical references to Tammuz are more curious than instructive with regard to the history and development of the myths concerning him.

One (that of Rabbi Solomon Isaaki, or Rashi), commenting on Ezk 8^{14}, in order to connect the root of the name Tammuz with the Chaldæan *aza*, 'to make hot,' describes it as 'an image which the women made hot in the inside, and its eyes were of lead, and they melted by reason of the heat of the burning, and it seemed as if it wept; and they (the women) said, "He asketh for offerings."'

This and other varying traditions concerning Tammuz, however, seem to belong to the Christian era.

4. The worship of Tammuz in Syria.—In all probability the mourning for Hadadrimmon mentioned by Zechariah (12^{11}) is a reflexion of the lamentations for Tammuz, with whom this deity is said to have become identified; and in a passage in Amos (8^{10}) the Israelites lament as for 'an only son.' The most noteworthy Biblical passage, however, is seemingly that in Jeremiah (22^{18}), where it is said that they shall not lament for Jehoiakim, saying, 'Ah my brother! or, Ah sister! Ah lord! or, Ah his glory!' and where the word 'sister' suggests the sympathy of the mourners for his bereaved spouse or lover. When Belili, his sister, in the Babylonian legend, says, 'My brother, only (one), do not cause me pain'[2] (by leaving the world again to go to the regions below), we have perhaps a better parallel. Byblos, the Biblical Gebal, was the centre of the worship of Tammuz in Syria, where, in the month of June, the funeral-festival of the smitten sun-god was held, and lasted for seven days. 'Gardens of Adonis'—flower-vases planted with seeds which sprang up quickly, and as quickly, owing to lack of moisture, faded away—were prepared by the mourning women as emblems of the early death of the youthful Adonis. Throngs of wailing women filled the streets and the gates of the temple, tearing their hair, disfiguring their faces, and gashing their breasts. The Galli—emasculated priests of Ashtoreth, the spouse of Tammuz—took part in the mourning for 'the bridegroom of her youth.' These days of mourning were followed by days of rejoicing for his resurrection, during which a papyrus-head came over the waters of the Mediterranean from Alexandria—an emblem of the severed limbs of Osiris, which, gathered up by Isis, his inconsolable spouse, after he had been dismembered by Typhon, had of old arrived at Gebal. Thus did the legend of Tammuz assimilate itself with the Egyptian myth of the sun-god Osiris.

[1] Mars is probably to be identified with the Bab.-Nergal rather than with En-urta (Ninip). The former was the spouse of Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone). (See § 10 below.)
[2] See § 6 below.

5. Tammuz in Babylonia, his birth-place.—So far Babylonian sources have furnished but few of the details of the Syrian and the Greek versions of the myth of Tammuz. To all appearance the legend had not been carried from Syria to Babylonia, as might be expected, but the reverse. In its original form it must have been of considerable antiquity. According to the archaic list of royal names[1] discovered at Nippur (*Niffer*), and now preserved in the museum of the University of Pennsylvania, Dumu-zi, as the Babylonians called Tammuz, was a king of Erech and ruled for 100 years. His predecessor was the god Lugal-banda, who reigned for no less than 1200 years, whilst his successor was the half-divine and only half-historical king of Erech Supuri, Gilgameš, who ruled for 160 or possibly 180 years. According to this record, Tammuz was a fisherman (Sumerian *šu-ḫa*) of the city Ḫa-a, a site as yet unidentified, but which one would expect to find somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. Though king of Erech, Tammuz was more especially associated with Eri-du, the divine city of Ea, the god of the waters, at the head of the same waterway, and it was only natural that a maritime people, such as the southern Babylonians were, should make Tammuz a fisherman. In that part of the land he was evidently the god of the fruitfulness of the teeming waters, just as, inland, he was god of the fruitfulness of the fertile Babylonian plain.

6. Ištar's search for Tammuz in Hades.—Outlines of this legend are given in the articles BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS[2] and HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Babylonian).[3] From this text we see that Tammuz was, at the time of Ištar's descent, in the under world with Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone), whither he had descended in accordance with the decision of the king of the gods (Bel-Merodach = Zeus). This legend likewise shows that Tammuz had become the lover of Ištar, or, as the record puts it, 'the husband of her youth.' The sacrifices which she was willing to make on his account are noteworthy, for at each of the seven gateways of 'the land of No-Return' she parted—under protest—with an article of apparel or adornment, until she appeared in the presence of the queen of the region perfectly naked. As things went wrong on earth owing to the absence of the goddess of love, Šamaš, Sin, and Ea bestirred themselves and secured her release. Here the subject suddenly changes, and the name of Tammuz appears in the text for the first time:

'If she [Ereš-ki-gal] hath not given thee her dismissal, return to her.
Upon Tammuz, the husband of [her] you[th],
Pour out pure water, [sprinkle] sweet oil.

[1] See *ExpT* xxvii. [1915–16] 519ᵃ.
[2] *ERE* ii. 315ᵇ.
[3] *Ib.* vi. 645ᵃ.

Clothe him with a festive garment, let him strike up with the flute of lapis-stone—
Let the joy-maidens dance, [let] the honoured one . . .
[Then] Belili set [down] her instrument,
[And] "eye-stones" filled [her] la[p?]—[1]
[When] she heard her brother's voice, Belili smote her instrument . . .
Her "eye-stones"[2] filled [her] thoughts (?).
"My brother, only (one), do not cause [me] pain (?)."
On the day Tammuz plays on the lapis-flute, they will play along with him the tambour of chalcedony (?).
The men-mourners and the women-mourners will play along with him.
May the dead (?) arise and smell the incense.'

Belili, mentioned here as the sister of Tammuz, appears also in the great list of gods[3] in connexion with Alala, as forms of the deities of the heavens, Anu^{m} and Anatu^{m}. The flute of Tammuz, like the divine vine at Êridu, was of lapis-stone, emblematic of the blue sky, and it is not unlikely that the other objects mentioned—Belili's 'eye-stones' and the 'tambour'—were of precious and similarly symbolical materials.

7. Other Babylonian references to Tammuz.—The first place ought probably to be assigned to the lists of gods, which furnish us with some of his names, and the deities with whom he was identified. The transcription of the group standing, in Sumerian, for Tammuz is 'Dumu-zi,' though a longer form, 'Dumu-zida,' is often found. The commonly accepted rendering of this group into Semitic Babylonian is *mâru kênu*, 'the true (or faithful) son.' Of the lists in which the name is found the most important is probably the trilingual text (two dialects of Sumerian and Semitic Babylonian equivalents) published in *WAI* ii. pl. 59. In that inscription his character as a sun-god is indicated by the fact that his name comes towards the end of the section referring to the sun-god Šamaš, after Kêttu and Mêšaru, that deity's two attendants.[4] After this comes Ṭu-zi-zi (? from Ṭumu-zi), in standard Sumerian [Dumu]-zi, rendered by *šu-ma*—*i.e.* transferring Dumu-zi into the Semitic Babylonian column—and from the next line we see that he bore in Sumerian also the name of U-libir-si (dialectic) or Enligir-si, probably meaning 'the lord of the righteous covenant,' or the like. The next line, which begins a new section, has the name of Sir-du, dialectic Ṣir-ṭumu, the mother of Tammuz. Other deities in this section are 'the lady of the plain,' Ištar, and 'the lady of the gods.' A section giving further names of these goddesses follows, and then comes the final section of the tablet, beginning with Êreš-kigal and explaining her as Allatu^{m}, the Babylonian Persephone. Important as showing the feminine aspect of Tammuz, which is also visible in the Syro-Greek view of the deity, is the list[5] in which he is called Ama-ušumgal-ana, 'the peerless mother of heaven,' which may be one of the aspects of the planet Venus, described[6] as 'male at sunrise.' Another name, En-mersi, dialectic for Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagaš, identifies Tammuz with that deity and stamps him specifically as the great god of agriculture.[7]

8. The abodes of Tammuz in Babylonia.—The chronological list preserved at Philadelphia, U.S.A.,[8] makes Tammuz a king of Erech and seems to indicate that his native place was a city expressed by the characters Ḫa-a. In the incantation published in *WAI* iv. pl. 15, however, Êridu seems to have been his chief city, of which, therefore, Ḫa-a may have been a suburb or even another name:

'In Êridu a black vine grew—in a sacred spot it was made.
Its substance was white-flaked lapis-stone, planted in the Deep.
Êa's path in Êridu is filled with fruitfulness—
His seat is the [central] place of the earth.
His abode is the bed of Êngur [the Abyss].
In his holy house, which is like a forest, [his] shelter is set—no man can enter therein.
In the midst of it is Šamaš [and] Tammuz [Dumu-zi],
Between the mouths of the rivers [or canals] on both sides.'

Here follow the names of the waterways in question: Ka-ḫengala, Igi-ḫengala, and Ka-na-ab-ul, though the true total seems to have been four.[1]

Instead of 'the god Šamaš (and) Tammuz' we might read 'the sun-god Tammuz,' which would correctly describe his position in the Babylonian pantheon. The Sumerian original has expressed the name of Tammuz by the feminine Ama-ušumgal-ana.[2] The connexion of Tammuz with the vine of Êridu, the Paradise-city, stamps him here likewise as one of the gods of fertility, and it is owing to this that he is so closely connected with the god Êa, to whose nourishing streams the great fruitfulness of the land was due. It is noteworthy that Nin-Girsu, the god of Lagaš, who was identified with him, bore also the name of Uru, 'the husbandman.'[3]

9. Tammuz as the herdsman.—It has already been noted that Dumu-zi, or Tammuz, was called the fisherman (*šu-ḫa* = *bayaru*), but later he appeared as 'the herdsman.' This view of the deity is referred to in another incantation:

'The milk of a yellow goat which has been brought forth in the holy fold of Tammuz [Dumu-zida]—
The milk of a goat of the flock—may he give thee with his holy hand.
Pour it then into the skin of an undefiled she-goat.
Azag-suga, the uz-maḫ-Enlila ['glorious goat of the god Enlila'], has caused [it] to be eaten with his sacred hand.
Merodach, son of Êridu, has given the incantation—
May Nin-aḫa-kuddu, the lady of the limpid fountain, make him [the sick man] holy, make him pure.'

'The incantation of the milk of the yellow goat, and the flour of the undefiled she-goat's skin.'

The antiquity of the association of Tammuz with the flocks in Babylonia is shown by the noteworthy text in *The Amherst Tablets*, i. (London, 1908) no. 119, where 'fleece' is expressed by the phrase 'sheep of the sky.' This indicates that the flocks of Tammuz, the sun-god of spring, were the clouds illuminated by the setting sun, and comparable with the flocks of Helios in Greek mythology. In the same publication, nos. 110, 112, and 114 refer to the 'grain of the priest of Tammuz,' and no. 118 mentions his temple at Lagaš. The date of these inscriptions is about 2300 B.C.

10. The Babylonian hymns to Tammuz.—At least two series of these existed, and they may have formed the originals of some of those chanted by the Hebrew women[4] as well as by the Phœnicians and the other nationalities who accepted or adopted the cult. The following will show their nature:

'The ewe and her lamb he taketh;
The goat and her kid he taketh.
The ewe and her lamb he smiteth down;
The goat and her kid he smiteth down.

Arise then, go, hero, the road of "No-return."
Alas, hero! warrior, Un-amu;
Alas, hero! hero, my god Damu;
Alas, hero! son—my faithful lord;
Alas, hero! Gu-silim the bright-eyed;
Alas, hero! god Nagara, lord of the net;
Alas, hero! overseer, lord of prayer;
Alas, hero! thou who [art] my heavenly light;

[1] Probably poetically put for some such idea as 'Crystal tears filled her body'; see below.
[2] Probably 'crystal tears'—evidences of the grief she had felt when Tammuz descended into the under world.
[3] *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum*, London, 1908, pt. xxiv. pl. 1.
[4] See the art. RIGHTEOUSNESS (Babylonian), §§ 1 and 4.
[5] *WAI* ii. 54, 349.
[6] *Ib.* iii. pl. 53, l. 31; see *ExpT* xxx. [1918-19] 167^{a}.
[7] *WAI* ii. 54, ll. 34 and 36. For references to his temple at Lagaš see § 9 below.
[8] See § 5 above.

[1] See *ExpT* xxix. [1917-18] 182 f., 288.
[2] See § 7 above.
[3] Tammuz visited not only the under world, but also 'the heaven of Anu'; see *ERE* vi. 644^{a}.
[4] Cf. Ezk 8^{14}.

Alas, hero! Ama-ušumgal-ana;
Alas, hero! brother, mother, heavenly vine.
He goeth, he goeth, to the bosom of the earth—
He will cause abundance for the land of the dead.[1]
For his lamentation, for the day of his fall,[2]
In an unpropitious month of his year.[3]
To the road of man's last end,
At the call of the lord,
[Go], hero, to the distant land which is not seen.'

Or, according to the Sumerian original of the last four lines:

'In an unpropitious month of thy year,
To the road of the people's end [or rest],
At the call of the lord,
The worthy one, in his distant land, is not seen.'

'The unpropitious month' is probably Du'uzu, or Tammuz; 'the road of man's last end' is that leading to the under world; 'the lord,' who calls him, is possibly Merodach, but may be Nergal, king of that region, the Babylonian Mars.[4]

After a division-line the text continues:

'Alas, my abundance which has been withheld! Alas, my produce which has been detained!
My heart is oppressed, shepherd, dwelling in exile—
Where is his city? My heart is oppressed!
From the house of gloom he shall be brought forth—
Thou who art worthy, from the house of gloom thou shalt be brought forth!
Alas, hero! warrior, Un-azu,' etc., etc., as above.

Though these lamentations may have been recited by the women and others who joined in the ceremonies, it is probable that they were originally placed in the mouth of Ištar. The abundance and plenty referred to is probably the fruit of the earth; the oppression of heart was due to the lack of these things, and also to the god's exile in the regions below.

The bearing of these hymns upon the legend is clear. We learn that (1) some accident had happened to Tammuz, by which his sojourn in the under world was brought about; (2) this accident was that in some way he 'fell'—either through an attack by a wild animal (boar) or, like Eshmun, the Phœnician deity, by his own hand; (3) the result was that he passed part of his life in the under world, whereby the earth suffered and the under world profited; (4) the under world, to which Tammuz went, was man's last abode and the place of the people's rest. Notwithstanding that he was fulfilling his mission, the exile of Tammuz was still an unpropitious event for him, the realm of Êreš-ki-gal not being, even for the earth-dweller, that place of delight which the man looking forward to life with his god in the realms of bliss would like it to be. It may be supposed, however, that the worshipper of Tammuz, when he departed this life to dwell with his god, hoped to enjoy companionship with him not only in Hades, but also on earth when his time came to return thither.

11. The transfer of the legend to Syria.—As has already been stated,[5] the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia was of considerable antiquity—as early, in fact, as 4000 B.C. or even earlier, and it had had, therefore, ample time not only in which to spread abroad, but also to assume new forms and receive additions. Besides Byblos, the Babylonian Gublu (Gebal), Tammuz was also venerated in many intermediate states and cities—Cilicia, Cappadocia, Lycia, Lydia, Ephesus, and Pterium. Everywhere the cult was most enthusiastically adopted, falling in, as it did, so exactly with the Semitic view of the nature of things. Apart from the theories which were held as to the creation of the universe, the legendary teaching connected with Tammuz dealt only with the continuance of what had been brought into existence by the Creator. Regarded as a sun-legend, it was recognized that 'the kindly fruits of the earth' were due to his rays, and to the fact that, when these and their accompanying warmth were withdrawn or reduced, the growth of vegetation ceased.

12. The reflex-influence of the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia and Assyria.—That this enthusiastic worship of the Babylonian Dumuzida, under the name of Tammuz, had influence in Babylonia and Assyria, sympathetically related as they were with the Western Semites, is but natural; and its greater importance in the countries of its adoption than in the land of its origin is also easily comprehensible. This was due to the fact that the Babylonians had, from the date of the rise of Babylon, accepted Merodach, who was also a sun-god, as their supreme deity. Tammuz therefore continued to represent simply one of his forms, and thus remained ineligible as chief of their pantheon, whose construction, as a philosophical system, his position of supremacy would have destroyed.

13. The development of the legend farther west.—In all probability more than one version of the legend anciently existed in Babylonia and migrated, with the worship, westwards. Representing the summer sun, with all its warmth and its vivifying and productive power, Tammuz was regarded as the god who passed the six months between the beginning of autumn and the end of winter in the under world. As the planet Venus seems to follow the course of the sun, her disappearance with him was interpreted as due to her desire to rescue him from that prison-house, but, as her movements do not coincide with the seasons, she generally had to come forth without him. When the time for his release came, therefore, he had to return to earth unaccompanied by his spouse.

In the West the legend was modified, and Tammuz-Adonis there appears as the son of the Cypriote king Kinyras and as beloved of the goddess Aphrodite. He died, it was said, in the forest of Lebanon, killed by the wild boar typifying winter; and since the time of that catastrophe the river Adonis, now the Nahr Ibrahim, 'Abraham's stream,' flows yearly, when in flood, reddened by his blood. The name Adonis is the Greek form of the Phœnician Adōn, 'lord,' which this deity, in common with many others, bore. In the Sumerian hymns (mostly in the dialect) he is constantly called the 'lord,' *un* or *uwun*, and it is probably owing to this, at least in part, that Adōn (Adonis) became one of his names.

14. Tammuz in Cyprus.—According to Ovid,[1] the scene passes, in part, from Assyria (Syria) to Cyprus. Kinyras, king of that island, had, by an incestuous relation with his daughter[2] Myrrha, a beautiful son named Adonis. The child was brought up by the nymphs and had hardly reached manhood when he became the lover of Aphrodite. One day, notwithstanding the goddess's supplications, he went hunting in the forest of Lebanon and was wounded by a boar sent by Ares (Mars), who was jealous of the divine youth. Aphrodite, hearing of this tragedy, filled the forest with her lamentations and tried to revive him, but without success. From the blood of the dying Adonis the anemone had its birth, and the river Adonis was thenceforth reddened yearly by his blood.

15. The legend of Tammuz in Greece.—According to Panyasis (5th cent.), Adonis was the son of a princess of Assyria (Syria), Myrrha or Smyrna,

[1] Variant rendering: 'Šamaš will make him great in the land of the dead,' but that given above seems preferable.

[2] The full rendering in Semitic is 'Filled with lamentation on the day that he fell and (was) in distress,' but the Sumerian is insufficient for all this.

[3] In the calendar of lucky and unlucky days (*WAI* v. 48) the entries for the month Tammuz (col. iv.) include 'weeping' on the 2nd day, and 'lamentation' on the 10th, but it is doubtful whether these really refer to the legend.

[4] See § 3 above, and § 14 below.

[5] § 6 above.

[1] *Metam.* x.

[2] See §§ 2, 15.

whom Aphrodite had inflamed with a violent love for her father Theias. Myrrha profited by her father's drunkenness and the darkness, but, when afterwards Theias found out what had taken place, so violent was his anger that he attacked his daughter, sword in hand. Myrrha fled, praying the gods for protection, and the divinities who had been the cause of her ruin, recognizing that she was not really to blame, changed her into the tree which, since that time, has borne her name. Nine months later the tree opened and gave birth to the beautiful Adonis. Aphrodite took charge of him and, placing him in a casket, handed him to Persephone to take care of.

Other variants of the legend of Tammuz are recorded, but, as they are apparently later developments and seem not to bear upon the origin of the myth, it is needless to speak of them here. How far the above or any other variants may be founded upon further details from Babylonia is uncertain and will not be known until the Babylonian legend of Dumu-zida comes to light.

16. Why did the legend vary?—Not only was Tammuz faithful in fulfilling his fate and passing a part of his existence in the under world, but he was also faithful in bringing, as the god of agriculture, the fruits of the earth to perfection in their season. The climates of Babylonia and of Syria are so different that any legend common to both was bound, in its province, to differ; hence the variations in that of Tammuz noted here. According to G. Rawlinson,[1] increasingly heavy showers fall in Babylonia, in November and December, raising the river-levels. As spring advances, the showers become lighter and fewer until about May, when summer-weather arrives. From May to November rain is very rare indeed, and the sun's rays are only tempered at morning and evening by the grey mist. For five months, therefore, Babylonia is a land of drought. With this description the month-list of Lagaš, whose principal deity was Nin-Girsu—identified with Tammuz—seems to agree,[2] but it is the common calendar of later days[3] that is the most instructive. In this it would seem that it was the fourth month, Šu-(n)umuna, 'perfection of seed,' or the like (June–July), that ended the time of productiveness, and that this month was called Du'uzu, the West Semitic Tammuz, as the month of the god's greatest fruitfulness. The month next following, Bibi-gar, apparently means 'making heat' (=Heb. Ab), whilst the 6th month, August–September, is Kin-Innanna, 'the errand of Ištar,' generally regarded as that in which Ištar descended to Hades in search of her lover. Its Heb. name Elul (in Babylonian, Ululu) probably means 'grief' and seems to express the common Semitic sound of mourning and distress. In Marcheswan, the 8th month, the opening of the water-channels took place and was succeeded by the rain-clouds of November–December (the Heb. Chislev). The 11th month, January–February, was 'the month of seed' and probably marks the time when sowing became general. Finally came the 1st and 2nd Adars (Feb.–March), in Sumerian Se-gur-kud and Dir še-gur-kud, the two grain-plant cutting months, when the seedlings were cropped to encourage the increase of sprouts.

Roughly, the 12 months of the year fall into three groups of four each, Nisan to Tammuz marking the growth and perfection of the grain, Ab to Marcheswan practically barren owing to the great heat, and Chislev to Adar the season of irrigation by the rivers and the sprouting of the crops. It is probably to this that the three periods of the year of Tammuz—with Ištar, with Ereš-ki-gal or Persephone, and at his own disposal—are due, the division of his year into two periods of six months each being apparently Western.

17. Tammuz in the late Assyrian inscriptions.—In these documents there are certain names which testify to the popularity of the god—not, however, under the name of Dumu-zi or Tammuz, but under that of Adōn. The Assyrian form appears as Adunu, and the names containing it may be divided into the specifically Syrian and the Assyrian—the latter apparently imitations, or translations from Syrian into Assyrian. Among these are Adunu-apla-iddina, 'Adōn has given a son'; Adunu-nadin-apli, 'Adōn, giver of a son'; and Adunu-mâta-uṣur, 'Adōn, protect the land.' The purely Syrian names seem to be Adunaiz(i) or Aduna-iz(i), perhaps 'my lord hath sprinkled'; Aduni-ṭu and Aduni-ṭuri, 'my lord is my rock' (Heb. *ṣûr*); Aduni-iḫa, 'my lord liveth (?).' Aduni-ba'ali, 'Adōn is my lord,' is West Semitic and belongs to about 850 B.C. (he was king of Sianu), but all the rest fall between 680 and 660 B.C.

Whether, with Vellay, the gods of the countries into which the worship penetrated may be regarded as having become identified with Tammuz or not is doubtful. If correct, it was due to the fact that Tammuz, under the name of Adōn, 'lord,' was designated by a word which could be applied as a title to any god, whether the Merodach of the Babylonians, the Moloch of the Syrians, or the Hadad of the Amorites. It is this, in all probability, that caused Tammuz to become, in a measure, identified with the Adonai of the Hebrews—that more general divine name which, with them, replaced the all too sacred Jahweh (Jehovah) of their own monotheistic creed.

18. The Tammuz-cult and its contemporary creeds.—Naturally, the idea of a kind of martyr-god, dying, it may be, for the good of mankind, notwithstanding the difficulty of bringing Tammuz into this category, has to be taken into consideration. The most striking parallel, perhaps, is the Osiris of the Egyptians; and the Babylonian Merodach, who died in order that mankind might be produced from his divine blood, is equally noteworthy. As Merodach, the 'steer of day,' was a sun-god, it is not unlikely that he was regarded as dying daily and as being reborn that men might live. The sun as Tammuz, however, died yearly, not so much that men might live, but because he fell under the evil influences of the spouse of Nergal, the god of battle, disease, and untimely death. Vellay contends also that Jesus Christ, like Tammuz, was a sun-god and, also like him, descended into Hades; but there are so many fundamental differences in the career of the mythical sun-god of 4000 or 5000 years B.C. and the Christ of history that comparisons may well be set aside. The half-mythical Babylonian ruler, with his 100-year reign, comparing so unfavourably with his predecessor's 1200, may easily have had a misadventure in the hunting-field which gave birth to the nature-myth which the Babylonians, Syrians, and Greeks have handed down to us.

[1] *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, London, 1862–67, i. 38.

[2] See *PSBA* xxxv. [1913] 20 ff., 123 ff.

[3] T. G. Pinches, *An Outline of Assyrian Grammar*, London, 1910, p. 60.

LITERATURE.—Charles Vellay, *Le Culte et les fêtes d'Adonis-Thammouz* (*AMG*, 'Bibliothèque d'Études,' xii.), Paris, 1904; M. Jastrow, Jr., *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 2 vols., 1905–12 (details rather meagre); T. G. Pinches, *Hymns to Tammuz in the Manchester Museum*, Owens College, Manchester, 1904 (vol. xlviii. pt. iii. of the *Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Lit. and Philosophical Society*, session 1903–04), *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* London, 1906, pp. 48, 69 ff.; *PSBA* xxxi. [1909] 63 (prayer to Tammuz); W. Aldis Wright, in Smith's *DB* iii. [London, 1893]; A. H. Sayce, in *HDB* iv.; T. K. Cheyne, in *EBi* iv.

T. G. PINCHES.

TANJORE.—1. **History.**—Tanjore (Tamil Tanjāvūr, 'city of refuge') is the capital of the District of the same name in the eastern portion of the Madras Presidency; it is situated in 10° 47′ N. lat., 79° 8′ E. long.; in 1911 the population was 60,341. The District formed part of the ancient Chola country, and the kingdom reached the zenith of its power under Rājārājā I. (A.D. 985–1011). During the 13th cent. it passed under the rule of the Hoysala Ballālas of Dorasamudra and the Pāṇḍyas of Madura. An independent Nāyak dynasty was established in the 16th cent., which was displaced by a Marāṭhā kingdom about 1674. It was occupied by the British in 1773 and finally ceded to them in 1799; the royal family, who were pensioned, became extinct in 1885.

2. **The temple.**—Tanjore owes much of its importance to the great temple built by King Rājārājā I., who was a devoted Śaiva, but tolerant of other religions. It is known as Brihadīśwara, Brihatīśwara, said to mean 'temple of the great god,' or Rājārājiśwara, after its founder. Fergusson writes:

'In nine cases out of ten, Dravidian temples are a fortuitous aggregation of parts, arranged without plan, as accident dictated at the time of their erection. . . . The one great exception to this rule is to be found at Tanjore. The Great Pagoda there was commenced on a well-defined and stately plan, which was persevered in till its completion.'[1]

Entered by a fine gateway (*gopuram*), which is supposed to cast no shadow on the ground, the outer court, used as an arsenal by the French in 1772, is 500 ft. long and 250 broad, and is surrounded on all sides by a cloister. The main shrine stands to the west, and above it rises to a height of about 200 ft. a magnificent tower, decorated with pillars and statues. The summit is crowned by a single block of granite, weighing 80 tons, said to have been raised to its present position up an inclined plane commencing at a village four miles distant. An interesting feature of the tower is that the carvings are generally of a Vaiṣṇava type, while the ornamentation of other parts is Śaiva. Another curious fact is that one of the figures on the north side of the tower represents a European; the popular belief is that it is the figure of a Dane who assisted in the building or that it was erected to foretell the British occupation. It is probable that both the European figure and the Vaiṣṇava ornamentation were erected by one of the Nāyak princes, and that he was helped by some Danes who acquired Tranquebar in 1620. The base of the great temple and many of the other buildings are covered with inscriptions which have been translated;[2] nearly all of them belong to Rājārājā and his successors.

Another noteworthy building is the temple of Subrahmaṇya, god of war, younger son of Śiva,[3] with a colossal figure of Nandi, the bull of Śiva, 'a perfect gem of carved stone-work, the tooling of the stone in the most exquisitely delicate and elaborate patterns is as clear and sharp as the day it left the sculptor's hands.'[4]

'The temple, though beautiful, is not considered particularly sacred. The legendary cause of this is that the Saivite saint Appar was refused admission to it, and that therefore it was not celebrated in his hymns or those of the other three Saivite poet-saints. A peculiarity about it is that Śūdras are admitted to the apartment next the shrine, from which in most temples in this District they are excluded, and that Valaiyans [a hunting, fishing, iron-making, and cultivating caste],[5] who are usually not admitted at all, here come as far as the great bull.'[1]

3. **Tiruvādi.**—Tiruvādi (Tiruvaiyāru, 'the five holy rivers'), six miles N.W. of Tanjore, is a place of great sanctity, said to be holier than Benares by one-sixteenth, where pious Hindus desire to die and where their bones are cast into the river. It has a fine temple, called Pañchanadīśwara, 'Lord of the five rivers,' which contains inscriptions of Rājārājā and his successors.[2]

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been quoted in the article. For the early Tamil history see V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1904; G. Oppert, *The Original Inhabitants of Bhāratavarṣa or India*, London, 1893.

W. CROOKE.

TANNAIM.—See JUDAISM.

TANTRAS.—In the series of sacred books of the Hindus the *Tantras* occupy the fifth or sixth place. According to their character and contents they are fourth in the order of inspiration and authority, the degrees being *śruti*, *smṛti*, *Purānik*, and *Tāntrik*. They are also known as a fifth or the fifth Veda by those who regard them as authoritative and observe the ritual which they enjoin. In neither case is the series entirely chronological or consecutive. The *Tantras*, which succeed and are in part dependent on the *Purāṇas*, are also in parts unrelated to the latter and of greater antiquity. Their date, however, it is impossible to determine with any precision. The existing treatises are probably for the most part at least reproductions with additions and variations of older works which are no longer extant. In their present form they are usually ascribed to the 6th or 7th cent. of our era, but they may be considerably later. Tāntrik usages and popular formulas were current and practised in a much earlier age; they belong to a type of thought that is primitive and among primitive peoples varies little in the course of the centuries. Until recent years little was known of these works outside of India. A few have now been made accessible in translations, but the greater number are as yet unexplored.

The name *tantra* signifies a 'web' or 'warp,' then a continuous or uninterrupted series, and in religious usage an orderly rule or ritual. The word was then further applied to the doctrinal theory or system itself, and finally to the literary work or treatise in which it was set forth. In the last sense the word is not found in the *Amarakośa*, the great Sanskrit dictionary,[3] nor is it used by the Chinese pilgrims. The *Mahābhārata* also contains no reference to the *Tantras* or to any religious system founded upon them. All these facts are confirmatory of the comparatively late origin of the existing books. Śaṅkara enumerates the titles of 64 *Tantras*, comparatively few of which can be identified at the present day. The best-known of these treatises and the most worthy of study are perhaps the *Tantrakaumudī*, *Śaktisaṅgama*, *Rudrayāmala*, *Kālikā*, *Kulārṇava*, *Tantratattva*, and *Mahānirvāṇa*. Translations of the two last have been published by Arthur Avalon. Parts of the *Hitopadeśa* also are known as '*tantras*.'[4]

Traditionally the authorship of these works is attributed to Dattātreya, who was an incarnation of the Hindu trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva.

[1] *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1899, p. 342 f.
[2] E. Hultzsch, *South Indian Inscriptions*, Madras, 1890 ff., esp. vol. ii.
[3] B. Ziegenbalg, *Genealogy of the South-Indian Gods*, Madras, 1869, p. 63 ff.
[4] F. R. Hemingway, *Tanjore Gazetteer*, Madras, 1906, i. 271.
[5] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, vii. 272 ff.

[1] Hemingway, i. 271. For an account of the temple with illustrations see Fergusson, p. 342 ff.; *EBr*[11] xiv. 430; V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 36 f.
[2] Hemingway, i. 276 ff.; Fergusson, p. 346 f.; *EBr*[11] xiv. 431.
[3] Dated by Macdonell, but with much uncertainty, c. A.D. 500; see *Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1905, p. 433; cf. also T. Zachariæ, *Die indischen Wörterbücher*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 18 ff.
[4] For further titles see Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit Dict.*, s.v., and *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], p. 207.

They are therefore to be regarded as equally the revelation of the three supreme divinities. In form, however, they are dependent on Śiva alone, who in dialogue with his wife Durgā, or Kālī, reveals the mystical doctrines and observances which are to be received and practised by his worshippers. This authoritative or 'higher tradition' is further said to have been delivered from his central or fifth mouth. As such it is pre-eminently sacred and secret and may not be revealed to the uninitiated. 'The Vedas, the Śāstras, and the Purāṇas are like a common woman, but this mystical Śaiva science is like a high-born woman,'[1] and its communication is forbidden. The real authors of the several treatises are unknown. They bear the name also of *Āgamas*, and as such are sometimes distinguished from *Nigama*, the text of the *Vedas*, *Dharmaśāstras*, and other sacred books. The Indian commentator, Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, asserts that revelation (*śruti*) is two-fold, Vaidik and Tāntrik.[2] In the popular knowledge and belief they have practically superseded the *Vedas* over a large part of India, where religious practice and ritual are guided by the teaching of the *Dharmaśāstras*, *Purāṇas*, and *Tantras*. A native writer and exponent of these works in Bengal asserts that 'two-thirds of our religious rites are Tāntrik, and almost half our medicine.' They are the *Śāstras*, the scriptural authority and rule for the present age, the *kaliyuga*, and it is therefore incumbent on all orthodox Hindus to follow their directions.

In particular, the *Tantras* are the religious text-books of the Śāktas and of their various sects. There are different Tāntrik schools, with variant traditions, the distinctions between which are little understood outside of their immediate circle of adherents. The ritual of the *Tantras* of the Dakṣināchārins, however, is said to be pure and in harmony with the *Vedas*, while that of the Vāmachārins is intended only for Śūdras. Their influence unquestionably extends far beyond those who profess to accept their authority. Wilson quotes a passage from one of these treatises which claims that 'many a man who calls himself a Śaiva or a Vaishnava is secretly a Śākta, and a brother of the left-hand.'[3] Even the Jains of N. India are said to have adopted formulæ and ritual from the *Tantras*, and the Lāmaism or corrupt Buddhism of Nepāl and Tibet owes much to the same source.

The teaching of the *Tantras*, as of the *Purāṇas*, is essentially based on the *bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*), which is regarded as superior to the *karma-mārga* and *jñāna-mārga* of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*. Adoration of a personal deity is inculcated, especially of the wife of Śiva, who is worshipped as the source of all regenerative power. In all these writings the female principle is personified and made prominent, to the almost total exclusion of the male. Ultimately their doctrine is derived from the philosophy of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, with its theory of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, with especial emphasis on the mystical side of Yoga teaching and practice. Like the *Purāṇas* also every *Tantra* should theoretically discuss in order five subjects—the creation and destruction of the universe, the worship of the gods, the attainment of supernatural power, and union with the Supreme Being. In reality their contents are almost entirely magical and mystical, but they range over a wide variety of subjects, scientific, religious, medical, speculative, etc., and are interested in all that concerns human need and destiny. One at least of the more important *Tantras* expounds in metaphysical terms the nature of the Supreme Brahman, who is *nishkala* and *sakala*, *i.e.* with or without *prakṛti*, *nirguṇa*, and *saguṇa*; in the beginning only the *nishkala* Brahman existed, etc. Great use is made of mystical syllables, *om*, *ām*, *um*, *ūm*, etc., with which sometimes whole pages of writing are filled. By the repetition of these, magical and supernatural abilities may be gained. The use of *mantras* also is enjoined, and numerous examples are given; their essence consists in certain mystical and secret letters or syllables which they contain (*bīja*). The significance of the letters of the alphabet is taught, the employment of mystic diagrams (*yantra*), sacred circles (*śrīchakra*), spells, charms, and amulets (*kavacha*), symbolical movements and crossing of the fingers (*mudrā*), etc.

Together with all this, which appears to us so meaningless and puerile, there is undoubtedly much that is of historical interest in the *Tantras*, and that is of value for the interpretation and interrelation of Hindu doctrine. They are generous and broad in their sympathies, recognize no distinction of caste or sex, 'for men and women equally compose humankind,' and they forbid the practice of *satī*. According to the orthodox view, the rites and doctrine which they inculcate are to prevail until the close of the *kaliyuga*.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Works*, i., ii., *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1862, esp. i. 248-251, iii., *Essays on Subjects connected with Sanskrit Literature*, do. 1864, p. 95 ff.; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], do. 1891, *Indian Wisdom*[2], do. 1875, p. 501 ff.; M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der indischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1908, i. 162 f., 229 n. 3, 481 f.; N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*[2], London, 1900; Arthur Avalon, *Principles of Tantra* (*Tantratattva*), 2 parts, do. 1914 and 1916, *Tantra of the Great Liberation* (*Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*), do. 1913; Arthur and Ellen Avalon, *Hymns to the Goddess*, do. 1913; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*[3], Eng. tr., do. 1891; R. W. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*, do. 1915.

A. S. GEDEN.

TĀNTRISM (Buddhist). — A complete study of Buddhist Tāntrism would include the description and the history of its rites, its deities, and its doctrines, practically the *exposé* of the many problems which confront the historian of mediæval India. Buddhist tāntrism is practically Buddhist Hinduism, Hinduism or Śaivism in Buddhist garb. The present writer intends only to provide the reader with a definition of the chief topics.

Buddhists were not quite clear as to the specific meaning of the word *tantra*, 'book.' The Tibetan canon distinguishes the *Sūtra* (*Mdo*) and the *Tantra* (*Rgyud*), but a number of texts are classified in both sections: the limits between *Sūtra* (i.e. *Mahāyānasūtra*) and *Tantra* are not fixed. On the one hand, topics which are essentially Mahāyānist—*e.g.*, hymns to *bodhisattvas* (*stotra*), resolutions to become Buddha (*praṇidhāna*)—are met with in *Tantra*; on the other hand, *Mahāyanasūtras* include a number of fragments and often whole chapters which would constitute by themselves so many Tāntrik texts.

A good example is found in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, 'Lotus of the true Law,' which contains a whole chapter[1] of *dhāraṇīs*, on talismanic words, invocations in litany form to a female deity or to a female power; 'giantesses' are mentioned as protectors of the *Sūtra* and of its readers. There are good reasons for believing that this chapter is a late addition: such an addition testifies that the spirit of Mahāyāna had become largely tinted with the spirit of Tantrism, or rather that the Tāntrik syncretism made little distinction between Mahāyānism and Tantrism properly so called.

Tāntrik books, by assuming the title of *Sūtra*, secured authority. The *Kāraṇḍavyūha* is styled *Mahāyānasūtraratnarāja*, 'the very best of the Sūtras.' As a matter of fact, the introductory section is written according to the pattern of a *Mahāyānasūtra*; it does not pretend to relate, as

[1] Quoted from Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], p. 191.

[2] *Śrutiśca dvividhā vaidikā tāntrikīca*, note on Manu, ii. 1; H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures*, i. 248.

[3] H. H. Wilson, *Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus*, London, 1862.

[1] Ch. xxi.

Tantras do, the dialogue of a god with a goddess; it preserves the old phrase, 'Thus have I heard,' followed by the mention of the place, Śrāvasti, Jetavana, and the description of an audience of *bodhisattvas*. But, when we consider the chief topic of the book, viz. the glorification of Avalokiteśvara as the owner of the 'science in six syllables,' we cannot say that the author has written what we should like to style a *Sūtra*. In many cases the Tibetan scholars were not deceived by mere titles; *e.g.*, although the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*[1] is styled *Sūtra*, it is not in the *Mdo*, but in the *Rgyud*, that the Sanskrit and the Chinese recensions of this celebrated book are to be found. But the fact remains that *Mdo* and *Rgyud* overlap in a great number of cases.[2]

These confusions or 'overlappings' are accounted for by the fact that a number of speculations, beliefs, and practices which reach their full development in the Tāntrik or last period of Buddhism were not unknown during the former period —*e.g.*, the use of talismanic spells. Again, the Westerns establish a close connexion between the word 'Tantrism' and the worse forms of Hindu (or Buddhist) paganism—magic, theurgy, left-hand worship—and so far they are right, for the magical or left-hand practices are properly Tāntrik, and not to be found in Buddhism outside *Rgyud*; but these practices are not the whole of Tantrism. *Tantra*, with the Hindus as with the Buddhists, covers a large field. We find in the *Rgyud* the texts which are concerned with worship, whether it is 'Tāntrik' worship or Mahāyānist worship, including the building of domestic *stūpas*, the erection and the consecration of idols, the *stotras* or hymns, the daily offering. Worship, with the whole of the religious practices, is a Tāntrik topic. The *Bhadracharīpraṇidhāna*, 'Resolution of Pious Conduct,' is reckoned a *Tantra*, because the recitation of this *praṇidhāna* is one of the daily duties of a Buddhist devotee of the Great Vehicle: from the point of view of the Western definition of 'Tantra,' this text is absolutely non-Tāntrik: it is free from any tinge of idolatry, it breathes the most lofty spirit of the Great Vehicle.[3] Litanies, lists of 100 names, whether of Prajñāpāramitā, Avalokiteśvara, or Mañjuśrī, are also *Tantras*. Litanies may be used for Tāntrik or non-Tāntrik worship. We know that the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*, 'Collection of the Names of Mañjuśrī,' is susceptible of a twofold interpretation: the first is a gnostic or purely philosophical one, the second sees its way to give to the most decent phrases the worst Tāntrik meaning.[4]

Therefore, in order to draw a general outline of the history of Tāntrik ideas in Buddhist literature and life, we must disregard the traditional divisions as embodied in the Tibetan catalogues or the Western theories on the subject, and build a classification of our own.

I. *Early Buddhism.*—The Old Buddhism, as preserved in the Pāli canon and in the Sanskrit Hīnayāna literature, has a number of features which are not specifically Buddhist, which are alien to the noble eightfold path, which, to put it otherwise, are more or less Tāntrik or open the way to Tantrism properly so called. Let us mention a few topics. (1) There is a general belief in the mystic power of the 'statements of truth';[1] Śākyamuni praises the use of half-magical 'formulas of protection' which have a large place in the more recent Sinhalese Buddhism (*paritrā*, *paritta*, *pirit*).[2] (2) In the earliest documents respect is paid to a number of deities or non-human beings who are both powerful and unfriendly; there is an 'orthodox' way of dealing with them, but 'unorthodox' worship is the natural result of fear. Vajrapāṇi is regarded as the 'guardian angel' of Śākyamuni, as the protector of the *avoué* of the Church. He is the pattern of the 'Dharmapālas' of a later age. (3) The worship of relics, the building of *stūpas*, pilgrimages, and idolatry are old features of Buddhism. (4) Last, not least, the earliest machinery of meditation or trance is akin to the more intricate machinery which constitutes the basis of the *Yogatantras*. Buddhist 'meditation' is simply Hindu *yoga* more or less transformed. The 'insight into the truth' (*satyadarśana*), which is the only and the sufficient means to *nirvāṇa*, practically implies (*a*) the meditation on loathsomeness (*aśubhabhāvanā*), when the ascetic, often 'a dweller in the cemeteries,' 'purifies his bones' —*i.e.* fancies that his flesh is rotten and falls, and sees only the bones behind, until the whole world appears to him as full of skeletons—and thus succeeds in crushing desire; (*b*) the restraint of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), counting the expirations and inspirations, in order to render thought more tractable and to direct it towards the Buddhist truths; (*c*) the *vimokṣas*, *abhibhvāyatanas*, and *kasinas*, prolonged contemplation of disks of earth, etc., by which (*d*) a number of supernormal states are induced, the so-called *dhyānas* (*jhāna*), or 'trances' and *samāpattis*, or 'ecstasies.' According to the Pāli and Sanskrit theologians it is only when absorbed in those supernormal states that a man is susceptible of rightly understanding the four Buddhist Truths (*satyābhisamaya*) and thus progressing towards *nirvāṇa*. Now it is quite safe to state that meditations on corpses, restraint of breath, the diverse methods of inducing trance, and the trances themselves have been borrowed by Buddhism from Hindu *yoga*. Buddhism established, more or less artificially, a strong connexion between those archaic devices of *yoga* and its own spiritual aim, *nirvāṇa*. But Buddhists did not ignore, and their books do not conceal, the fact that the discipline of *yoga*, while it may be made 'supramundane' (*lokottara*), *i.e.* utilized for the conquest of *nirvāṇa*, also provides a man with many 'mundane' (*laukika*) advantages: he who lives in cemeteries acquires power over the *bhūtas* and the manifold spirits who haunt these places; he who 'restrains the breath' masters thought and the body; he who practises trance becomes the possessor of magical powers and secures rebirth amongst gods. In short, a man who practises *yoga* becomes a *yogin*, or a *siddha*, an owner of 'perfections' or 'powers' (*siddhi*). It is clear that the position of Buddhism is not a safe one. Let us state it in plain words. A monk must perform in a Buddhist spirit, *i.e.* for the sake of *nirvāṇa*, a number of rites and meditations which confer the most precious 'mundane' advantages; he must disregard these advantages—which, in India, are the surest mark of holiness—while he perfectly knows that he can enjoy them when he likes. We may be sure—even if there were no documents to this effect—that many of the monks of early

[1] Fully analyzed by E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, p. 523.

[2] See M. C. Ridding and L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan MSS of the Stein Collection in the India Office* (Manuscript).

[3] *Kanjur*, *Rgyud* (Beckh), xxiv. 331; also in *Vinaya* (Dulva); B. Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1142, ed. and tr. by Kaikioku Watanabe, *Die Bhadracarī: Eine Probe Buddhistisch-religiöser Lyrik*, Leipzig, 1912.

[4] *The [Mañjuśrī]nāmasaṃgīti* has been published by I. P. Minayeff together with the *Mahāvyutpatti* in *Buddhism, Researches and Materials*, Petrograd, 1887, i. sect. 2 (in Russian); we refer to the commentary called *Amṛtakaṇikā*.

[1] *Satyavachana*; see E. W. Burlingame, in *JRAS*, 1917, p. 429.

[2] See, *e.g.*, R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1860, pp. 26, 30, 240; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, pp. 302, 321. A large portion of the *Rgyud* is *paritrā*.

Christianity were not strong enough to resist so powerful a temptation; *e.g.*, they performed miracles for 'vain glory.' In such cases they acted as 'mundane' *yogis*; technically they followed the rules that later constitute the *Yogatantra*.

II. *MAHĀYĀNA.* — In Mahāyāna *bhakti*, or devotion, and *pūjā*, or worship in the Hindu guise, increase.

Mahāyāna is, like Hīnayāna, a thoroughly Buddhist discipline, viz. a way to *nirvāṇa*; the disciple of Mahāyāna is a candidate for Buddhahood (*bodhisattva*, future Buddha), because Buddhas alone reach *nirvāṇa*; he will become a Buddha by acquiring the wisdom and accumulating the merit of a Buddha. But an essential feature of the doctrine is that the candidate for Buddhahood cannot succeed without the help of the Buddhas and of the future Buddhas nearing Buddhahood; this help is secured through *bhakti*. The early Buddhist paid worship to Śākyamuni, to the relics, to the holy places, but there was little or no *bhakti* in his respectful behaviour. Now the objects of worship are so many living gods, so many *bhagavats*, quite different from Śākyamuni, very much like the Hindu *bhagavat*, and they are entitled to the *bhakti* of the faithful. As has been pointed out several times,[1] *bhakti* is seldom free from elements which easily take a Tāntrik shade. To mention only one point: a man will be saved by remembering at death the name of Avalokita or of Kṛṣṇa. The names of the Buddhas or the *bodhisattvas*, the mystic formulas in which they have themselves placed a wonderful force, acquire a rôle in the sanctification of the devotee. *Bhakti* has exalted the god to such a degree that *bhakti* is no longer necessary. Śāntideva, an orthodox divine of the Mahāyānist school, praises without reservation the use of *dharaṇīs* for the pardon of sins.[2] The schools of the Mahāyāna known as the Sukhāvatī sects place the highest spiritual advantages at the command of the man who knows how to worship Amitābha.[3]

Every form of *pūjā*, including the circumambulation of a *stūpa*,[4] offering flowers to a *stūpa*, giving food to the monks, etc., was considered very useful from the beginning. A treatise like the *Ādikarmapradīpa*[5] shows us that Mahāyāna has added much to the primitive liturgy; it gives a description of the many acts of worship which a Mahāyānist devotee, a 'beginner' (*ādikārmika*), was expected to perform — recitations of formulas, symbolic offerings, wonderful advantages to be obtained by acts which easily assume a mechanical character, so many features which give to Tantrism its specific aspects. A daily observance was the eightfold high *pūjā* (*aṣṭavidhā anuttarā pūjā*), a sort of worship 'in spirit and truth': confession of sins to the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*—to the Buddhas who have a special claim to the title of 'Buddha of confession'[6]—resolve to become a Buddha, 'application of merit' (*pariṇāmanā*), etc. That this eightfold *pūjā* often becomes a mere ritualistic performance—a special kind of *dhāraṇī*—is proved by the fact that it is a part of the *sādhanas* (see below). It is well known that Mahāyāna is prompt to admit any sort of spells that provide 'mundane' advantages[1]—of course it objects to 'black magic.' From our point of view, it is more important to observe that Mahāyāna worships a number of beings which are no longer Buddhist in character.[2] The demoniac origins of Vajrapāṇi are not forgotten; he nevertheless obtains a high rank in the pantheon; as he is the 'destroyer of the enemies of the Law,' he is probably one of the first gods who have been worshipped under a 'choleric' aspect.[3] Female figures —*e.g.*, the Tārās—are associated with the Buddhas, but there is not in this association any tinge of 'properly so called Tantrism.' The same can be said of Hārītī, the former goddess of smallpox, the account of whose avatars is one of the most curious and the best known pages in the religious and iconographic history of Buddhism. Her worship, both in the monastic and in the popular *milieux*, gives a correct idea of the Mahāyānist and of the half-Tāntrik methods of worship.[4]

III. *TANTRISM PROPER.*—Tantrism, properly so called, bears a twofold character; on the one hand, it is a systematization of the vulgar magical rites and it has existed under this form for many centuries in India and in Buddhism itself, together with its formulas and its pantheon; on the other hand, it is a 'theurgy,' a highly developed mysticism styled Vajrayāna; under this form Tantrism is an innovation in Buddhism.

Tantrism has its professionals, the sorcerers (*yogin*, *siddha*), and its laymen, the *clientèle* of the sorcerers, also all the Hindus who worship deities or idols of the Tāntrik type. The sorcerers, who are at the same time 'mystics' or adepts of the Vajrayāna, constitute a number of schools; there are many rival secret traditions characterized by different sets of formulas, of deities, and of theories.

We shall deal with only two points which deserve special notice: (1) the methods of *sādhana*, (2) the *vajrayoga*. To be complete, it would be necessary to study a number of *vidhis*, or rites, many of which are part of the Tāntrik daily cult and have been adopted by Mahāyānist Buddhism.[5]

1. **Sādhana.**—In order to perform a *sādhana*, *i.e.* the evocation of a god, the ascetic must be duly instructed by a *guru* and duly consecrated. The ascetics who have established the manifold secret sects of Tantrism had to propitiate the gods by long austerities and meditations before being favoured with the manifestation of the god; they at last received from him the secrets they are now able to teach to their pupils. The *guru* therefore assumes great importance: he is the paramount god of his pupil and the incarnation of the Buddha himself. When he has been taught all the details of the rites, the Tāntrika must undertake the *sādhana*, by which he renders visible any god he wishes and obtains control over him. The most important items in these magical performances are the knowledge of the *bīja*, the mystic syllable which is the 'germ' or the 'seed' of the god, and the knowledge of the *vidyā* or *mantra*, which gives to its owner control over him.

On a chosen day the ascetic, after performing the regular ablutions, wearing a neat dress or a new dress, goes to a solitary place, either auspicious—a wood or the bank of a river

[1] *E.g.*, by A. Barth, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1914, i. 190.

[2] *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, i.), ed. C. Bendall, Petrograd, 1897, p. 140.

[3] See *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, series iii. (Aryan), pt. 2, Oxford, 1883, and *SBE* xlix. [1894].

[4] See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 297; I-Tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, ch. xxx., 'On Turning to the Right in Worship': 'What is walking towards the right or towards the left, however, would seem a little difficult to determine' (p. 141). I-Tsing has many details on worship as practised in Mahāyānist convents.

[5] Ed. and tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Etudes et matériaux*, London, 1898, pp. 162-282.

[6] See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 289.

[1] See, *e.g.*, *Tūkstrustik* (*Bibl. Buddh.* xii.), ed. W. Radloff and A. von Staël-Holstein, Petrograd, 1910.

[2] We say 'in character,' for it is difficult to say whether Amitābha, *e.g.*, is not originally a sun-god; but Amitābha is 'Buddhistic'; he is the *sambhogakāya*, a modern name for the quasi-eternal Buddha of the Docetic school.

[3] The latest authority on the subject is A. Foucher, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, Paris, 1905–18, ii. 48–64.

[4] A. Foucher, *The Beginnings of Buddhist Art and other Essays*, tr. L. A. and F. W. Thomas, Paris, 1917; Noël Peri, 'Hārītī, la Mère-de-démons,' in *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême Orient*, xvii., fasc. 3 [1917]; cf. *JRAS*, 1906, p. 149.

[5] A glance at the catalogue of the *Rgyud* will show the variety of the *vidhis*.

—or loathsome—a cemetery—according to the purpose. He sits there at ease in a purified spot and fulfils in order the different acts of a Mahāyānist *pūjā*, offering of flowers and perfumes, either mental or real, to the host of Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, confession of sins, etc.[1] He continues in the same style by practising the virtues of friendship, pity, joy, indifference, by dwelling on the essential voidness of all things. Thus he is supposed to have acquired both merit (*punya*) and wisdom (*jñāna*): all this is only a preparation to the rite itself. The rite begins with the meditation on the *bīja* of the god who has been chosen for some technical reason (every god has his own department in mundane and supramundane affairs). If the god is Yamāntaka or Yamāri (the enemy or the destroyer of Yama, god of death), the syllable is *hūm*; it is to be written on the disk which in the magic circle (*maṇḍala*) is the symbol of the sun. The ascetic causes to arise from *hūm* the wrathful Yamāntaka, hair bristling, blue, with six faces, with six arms, with six feet, riding a bull, standing in the *ālīḍha* pose, adorned with a garland of skulls, exceedingly frightful. When the god has been summoned in that way, the ascetic undertakes the second part of the rite: he fancies that he is the god; the identity of the ascetic and the god is a metaphysical truism; the ascetic does not identify himself with the god, he only realizes the identity. As soon as the ascetic knows that he is the god, he possesses all the powers that belong to the god: any wish he utters in the proper form—for his voice must be the voice of the god—will surely be accomplished.[2]

As A. Foucher, from whom this definition of *sādhana* is borrowed, rightly observes, the description of the gods as given in Tāntrik treatises must be accurate: any mistake in the mental representation of those frightful persons would be fateful. The *Sādhana* treatises have been the pattern according to which Hindu and Tibetan artists worked, and they furnish the best means to the identification of the icons or idols.

Sādhanas serve all sorts of purposes—worship, white and black magic. In many cases they are complete with their first part, the summoning of the deity, to whom worship and prayers are respectfully offered. More often, when the deities are the 'girls' or 'princesses' (*kumārī*, which is not 'virgin'), or the 'ascetic goddesses' (*yoginī*), we have to deal with the worst features of paganism.[3]

2. Vajrayāna.—But Tantrism is much more than a pagan system of rites of worship and sorcery. It is a vehicle (*yāna*, *naya*), a way to final liberation or to the *summum bonum*. Tantrism is the Tantrayāna, or the Mantrayāna (=*naya*), 'Vehicle of the Magic Formulas,' more often and more technically, the Vajrayāna. *Vajra*, 'lightning,' is originally and remains the weapon of Indra, of Vajrapāṇi, of the ascetics or *yogins*, against human or demoniac enemies. But *vajra* has assumed new meanings: (1) it designates the mystic or divine energy which is identified with 'intelligence' (*vijñāna*): there are *vajrabodhisattvas*, '*bodhisattvas* of *vajra*,' *vajrayoginīs*, 'divine female sorcerers,' *vajravarāhī*, 'the divine sow'; all divine beings are so many *vajrasattvas*, 'beings of *vajra*'; the supreme being, the Ādibuddha,[4] is the *vajrasattva par excellence*. (2) On the other hand, *vajra* (with the variant *maṇi*) is a decent or mystic phrase for *liṅga*, the male organ, just as *padma*, lotus, is the literary rendering of *bhaga* or *yoni*.[5]

To this twofold meaning of *vajra* correspond two Tāntrik schools, right-hand and left-hand. Both owe much to the Mahāyānist doctrines, to Madhyamaka, and to Vijñānavāda;[6] they cling to the theory of universal voidness (*śūnyatā*), but they develop the concepts of *tathatā*, *tathāgatagarbha*, etc., and result in an undisguised monism. While Mahāyāna states that all beings are 'future Buddhas,' that all beings are 'embryos of *tathāgatas*,' the two Tāntrik schools maintain that all beings are *vajrasattvas*, are the unique Vajrasattva; they also maintain that the nature of *vajra* is immanent in all beings and can be actualized by appropriate meditations and rites.

Now the left-hand school conceives the nature of *vajra* according to the Śaivite pattern; the right-hand school is nearer the Vedāntist or Yoga tradition: on the one hand the traditions of the *Mahākālatantra*, etc., on the other hand the Church of the *Mahāvairochanābhisambodhi*, the Vajraśekhara, etc.—the modern Japanese sect of Shin-gon-shū.

In the Tantras of the Śaivite type we have to deal with a Buddhist adaptation of Śaivism and Śāktism. The three traditional bodies of a Buddha are preserved, but the true nature of *vajrasattva* is his fourth body, 'the body of bliss' (*ānanda*, *sukhamaya*, *mahāsukhakāya*), the body of *vajra*; it is with that body that the eternal *tathāgata* or *bhagavat* eternally embraces his *śakti*, Tārā or Bhagavatī. From this erotic conception of the nature of being or the divine being it follows that, in order to actualize his real divine nature, the ascetic must perform the rites of union with a woman (*yoginī*, *mudrā*) who is the personification of the *bhagavatī*,[1] who is Bhagavatī herself; as it is said, *buddhatvam yoṣidyonisamāśritam*, 'Buddhahood abides in the female organ.'[2] This truth was discovered by Śākyamuni, who, according to the *Chaṇḍamahāroṣaṇa*, conquered Buddhahood by practising the Tāntrik rites in the *harīm*. The most conspicuous topic of this literature is what is called the *strīpūjā*, worship of women:[3] disgusting practices, both obscene and criminal, including incest, are a part of this *pūjā*, which is looked upon as the true 'heroic behaviour' (*duḥkaracharyā*) of a *bodhisattva*, as the fulfilment of the perfect virtues. Buddhist mythology and mysticism are freely mixed with *śāktas*: the semen is the five Buddhas, etc. The leading idea that 'everything is pure to a pure man,' *omnia sancta sanctis*, is often expressed. 'Lust is to be crushed by lust. . . . Do strenuously that which is condemned by fools, united with your chosen deity, intent upon the purification of thought. Women stirred with the poisonous fire of love provide their lovers, ascetics of pure mind, with all the fruit of love. . . . Enjoy all the pleasures of love without fear. Do not fear; you do not sin.'[4]

We may add two remarks. (1) Some 'moral' rules are to be observed even in the ceremonies (*chakra*) which are provided for the thorough enjoyment of the *ma* (*māṃsa*, 'meat,' *madya*, 'alcohol,' *maithuna*, 'sexual union'). A modern Śaivite work, the *Mahānirvāṇatantra*,[5] explains that 'the ascetics should drink so long as their eyes do not roll and mind is not agitated. Beyond it, drinking is like that of a beast.' The rite of *pūrṇābhiṣeka* or *tattvachakra* must not be practised with any woman, but with one's own wife; so far, good, but there are two sorts of marriages, one for life, the other contracted for the purpose of the rite and lasting only till the completion of the rite. (2) Secret rites are the business of a few 'devotees.'

[1] See art. BODHISATTVA, vol. ii. p. 749b.

[2] Freely translated from A. Foucher, *Étude sur l'iconographie bouddhique de l'Inde d'après des textes inédits*, Paris, 1899–1905, pt. ii. p. 8f. See F. W. Thomas, 'Deux Collections sanscrites et tibétaines de *Sādhanas*,' *Muséon*, new ser., iv. [1903] 1.

[3] On the Tāntrik pantheon see A. Grünwedel, *Mythologie du Bouddhisme au Tibet et en Mongolie*, tr. J. Goldschmidt, Leipzig, 1900. The description of the local deities of Nepāl in S. Levi, *Le Népal*, Paris, 1905, i. 316–392, practically applies to all parts of Buddhist India.

[4] See *ERE* i. 93.

[5] On the spell *oṃ maṇi padme hūm* see *JRAS*, 1915, p. 397, and L. A. Waddell, art. JEWEL, vol. vii. p. 555. The old translation, 'Jewel in the lotus,' may be right after all.

[6] See art. PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist).

[1] We meet the formula, *Bhagavān bhagavatībhageṣu vijahāra*.

[2] On the *maithuna* rites see C. Bendall, 'Sabhāṣitasaṃgraha,' *Muséon*, new ser., iv.–v. [1903–04]; L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Une Pratique des Tantras,' *ICO*, Paris, 1899, i. 241, 'Note sur le Pañcakrama,' *ICO*, Geneva, 1896, i. 137.

[3] On *strīpūjā* in Hindu Tāntrism see H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Calcutta, 1846, p. 160f. (*Select Works*, London, 1861–77, i. 256ff.). Little has been added by modern scholars; see R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 146.

[4] H. P. Shastri, 'Discovery of a Work by Āryadeva,' *JASB*, vol. lxvii. pt. i. no. 2 [Calcutta, 1898], p. 175.

[5] Tr. Manmatha Nath Dutt, *Wealth of India*, Calcutta, 1899–1900, vii.–viii.

On the whole and for the largest number of its adherents, Tantrism is simply paganism.

According to the left-hand Tantrism which we have described, the rites of union (*maithuna*) are not efficacious by themselves: before practising them the candidate for *vajrasattva*-hood must be 'purified' in a threefold respect; he must possess the body, the voice, and the thought of a *tathāgata*. This threefold purification constitutes the Tantrism of the right hand.

These are 'aspersions' or 'consecrations' (*abhiṣeka*),[1] 'marking' (*nyāsa*) which consecrates the different limbs of the body, 'prayers' (*japa*) which purify the voice. The most intricate part of this discipline concerns thought. No Western scholar has yet endeavoured to understand the three mysteries of the body, the voice, and thought, the *vajradhātu* and the *garbhadhātu*, the five *tathāgatas* (the so-called *dhyānibuddhas*[2]) who are associated with five wisdoms, with the five *dhātus* (earth, etc.), etc.; the Buddha, Vajra, and Padma class of formulas, etc. We depend on the descriptions of the Shin-gon-shū sect, which are too meagre and obscure to be thoroughly intelligible.[3] The opinion of the present writer is that a number of schools are to be distinguished: there are branches which are connected with *rājayoga* (meditation and knowledge are the only means to the actualization of the nature of a *tathāgata*); some other branches praise ritualistic performances, especially 'intertwinings of the fingers' (*mudrā*);[4] some will admit the rite of union, but with a female described as a *jñāna-mudrā*, a mental female.[5]

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iii. *Editions, translations, or descriptions of Tāntrik texts.*—E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1845; W. Wassilieff, *Der Buddhismus*, Petrograd, 1860; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Études et matériaux*, Brussels and London, 1898; C. Bendall, 'Meghasûtra,' *JRAS*, 1880, p. 286, 'Subhāṣitasaṃgraha,' *Muséon*, new ser., iv.–v. [1903–04]; Poussin, *Études et textes tantriques*, i. *Pañcakrama*, Ghent, 1896.

iv. *The Tāntrik literature* is supposed to be included in a fourth basket, the *Dhāraṇīpiṭaka* or the *Vidyādharapiṭaka*, on which see Hiuen-Tsiang, S. Julien, *Voyages des pèlerins bouddhistes*, Paris, 1853–58, iii. 37 (S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1884, ii. 165); I-tsing, *Voyages des pèlerins bouddhistes: mémoire . . . sur les religieux éminents*, tr. E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, p. 101; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *JRAS*, 1895, p. 483.

v. *On the authors of the Tāntras.*—L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'hist. de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, pp. 355, 384.

vi. *On the subdivision of the Tāntras*, with the data of L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 152 and H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan-Eng. Dict.*, do. 1881, p. 112, cf. the *Padmatāntra*, *Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office*, pt. iv., *Sanskrit Literature*, by E. Windisch and J. Eggeling, London, 1894, p. 847; Sarat Chandra Das, *Tibet.-Eng. Dict.*, Calcutta, 1902, pp. 342, 396, 586, 697. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

TAOISM.—Taoism is one of the three 'Teachings' (*Sam Chiao*) of China, the others being Confucianism and Buddhism. Like Confucianism, and unlike Buddhism, it claims to be a native growth.

1. Lao-tse.—The primary source for our knowledge of Taoism is the *Tao-Teh King*. This small book of about 5000 characters, usually divided into two parts, 'Concerning Tao' and 'Concerning Teh,' comprising 81 chapters, is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), an older contemporary of Confucius. Lao-tse, surname Li, name Erh (= 'ear'), also known as Tan, a character which implies some aural peculiarity, is said to have been an official at the court of Chow and to have been visited on one occasion by Confucius, who after the interview compared him in his lofty incomprehensibility to a soaring dragon. Despairing of the world, Lao-tse retired from office and disappeared through the Western passes, the guardian of which induced him before leaving to compose the *Tao-Teh King* as a record of his teaching. This account of him was in later times supplemented by many marvels—*e.g.*, his prolonged gestation, which entitled him to be called 'old boy,' as his name Lao-tse might also be translated. Si-ma Ch'ien († 85 B.C.), who gives the more sober account of Lao-tse, gives also the names of his son and grandson and of the great-great-grandson of this grandson. He tells us further that about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. a book of Lao's was a favourite with the widowed empress of the second Han emperor. The emperor King (156–143 B.C.) is said to have made it a 'classic.' Still further back than Si-ma Ch'ien we have in Hwainan († 122 B.C.), Han Fei († 230 B.C.), and Chwang-tse (4th cent. B.C.) many quotations from Lao-tse (or Lao Tan) which are to be found in the *Tao-Teh King*. According to Legge, the first two of these authors quote the whole or parts of 71 out of the 81 chapters of that book. On a review of the evidence thus summarized, Legge concludes that he does not know of any other book of so ancient a date of which the authenticity of the origin and genuineness of the text are so well substantiated.

Criticism, however, has been busy both with Lao-tse and with his book. Founding upon the name Lao-tse, which may mean equally well 'old philosopher' or 'old philosophers,' an extreme criticism has resolved him into a number of ancient thinkers, some of whose sayings are preserved for us in the *Tao-Teh King*. For this view there is no ground except the ambiguity of the name. A less drastic criticism, of which H. A. Giles is representative, allows that at a remote period Lao-tse lived and thought and taught, and that some fragments of his teaching are preserved in the *Tao-Teh King*, in which we have those fragments pieced together by a not too skilful forger of the 2nd cent. B.C. with padding of his own. This conclusion is said to be practically certain. The criticism, however, by which it is attempted to establish this conclusion is somewhat crude. The external evidence summarized above at least does not support it; nor is it warranted by the occurrence in early Taoist writers of sayings ascribed to Lao-tse which do not appear in the *Tao-Teh King* and of sayings ascribed to Hwang-ti which do appear there, or by the evidence adduced from the *Tao-Teh King* itself (repetitions, quotations, late characters, rhyme), while the discrimination of what is admitted as genuinely from Lao-tse from what is rejected as compiler's padding is too subjective to be convincing. In favour of the earlier date of the *Tao-Teh King* it may be noted that, in its general type of teaching and in the avoidance of technical terms current in later Taoist authors it leaves on the reader the impression that it belongs to a less developed stage of Taoist thought than is found in them. The *Tao-Teh King*, however, still awaits a thorough application of sound critical principles. Indian influence on both the matter and the form of the *Tao-Teh King* has been asserted by some. The truth of this assertion cannot be considered apart from the general archæological question of the intercourse between India and China. There is a certain congruence between the mood of the *Tao-Teh King* and Buddhism, but not such as requires the dependence of one on the other as its explanation, and the present state of our knowledge hardly warrants the assumption of contact with Indian thought early enough to influence the *Tao-Teh King*, unless that book is dated later than all the other evidence seems to demand. According to D. T. Suzuki, the so-called Indian influence on the early Taoists is not probable. It is curious that in *Tao-Teh King*, ch. 39, § 3, there is an illustration taken from a chariot and its parts to which T. W. Rhys Davids[1] quotes a close parallel as having been used by Nāgasena, the founder of the Madhyamika school of Northern Buddhism, who taught about the beginning of our era. It is to be noted, however, that the same argument, only with a horse instead of a chariot as illustration, is found in Chwang-tse, bk. 25, p. 126.

It is not difficult to cull from the *Tao-Teh King* admirable ethical maxims.

[1] See INITIATION (Buddhist), vol. vii. p. 321, under 4 and 5.

[2] This phrase has never been met in any Sanskrit book.

[3] R. Fujishima, *Le Bouddhisme japonais*, Paris, 1889, pp. 81–99.

[4] See Si-do-in-dzou, 'Gestes de l'Officiant,' *AMG*, *Bibl. d'Études*, t. viii., Paris, 1899.

[5] *Mudrā* has a twofold meaning.

[1] *Buddhism*, London, 1878, p. 97.

'The highest goodness is like water. Water is good for advantaging all things and does not strive. It takes the place that all men hate' (ch. 8). 'He who raises himself on tip-toe cannot stand: he who straddles cannot walk' (14). 'He who overcomes men has force; he who overcomes himself is strong. He who knows he has enough is rich' (33). 'I have three precious things which I count and hold precious. The first is gentleness. The second is moderation. The third is not daring to take the first place under heaven' (67). To these might be added, but for the considerations mentioned below, the famous 'Recompense injury with kindness' (63).

The virtues commended lie in the line of self-suppression. For the inward state of which they are modifications the characteristic word is *hsü*, 'emptiness,' *i.e.* freedom from desires. Corresponding to this inner freedom from desires is the outward life of non-action (*wei wu wei*), *i.e.* absence of self-determined action for particular ends. Hence the world is an ethical danger (12), for it is by the world that we are drawn out into desire and action away from the stillness of our inner being, which it should be our object to keep (5), though this true type of life is unattractive except to the sage (35). He attains this life by a process of abscission of motives, by which he arrives at a childlike state of spontaneity and tenderness, in which there is also exemplified the paradoxical possession of security and strength (10, 20, 28, 55). This ethical ideal is supported by various arguments. Thus in ch. 13 the argument seems to be that to be in a position to enjoy what the world regards as honour is to be exposed to what the world regards as calamity. That which makes me a possible subject of either is just that I am an object to myself. The sage therefore treats his person as if it were alien from him. He never identifies his happiness with this or that, so never loses his happiness. Having no private ends, his private ends are realized (7). Again, it seems to be argued that as ideas suggest their contraries—*e.g.*, to know beauty is also to know ugliness—so the sage, seeing that everything is dogged by its opposite as by its shadow, refrains from all positive action (2). From the external world Lao-tse gathers illustrations, both negative and positive, of his teaching. The short-lived storm of wind and rain suggests the futility of violent action. Water in its fluidity and taking the lowest place exemplifies absence of self-determination and humility, while, as it also benefits all things and wears away that which is hard, it illustrates the paradoxical issue of *wu wei* ('Do nothing') in *wu pu wei* ('There is nothing that is not accomplished'). Specially is illustration to be found in vegetable life, which in obedience to an inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth, culminating and again subsiding (16). The Taoistic life is therefore a life of equable indifference, outwardly of non-action, devoid, *i.e.*, of action for chosen ends; moved in obedience to an inward spontaneity rather than motived by outward inducement; a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-determined. Hence the sage is 'simple' (19) with the simplicity of unwrought wood as contrasted with the definiteness of a carved beam; *i.e.*, he is free from self-determinateness. Again, he grasps 'the one' (22), withdrawing himself from the manifoldness of self-determination along particular lines and holding to 'the one,' *i.e.* the principle which Lao-tse knows as *Tao*.

The metaphysics of the *Tao-Teh King* centre in this conception of *Tao*. In many passages *Tao* has its common meaning of 'a way,' either the ethical way that men should follow or the method of action followed by Heaven (cf. 'course of Providence') or prescribed by Heaven for man's following. But elsewhere it is a metaphysical principle (chs. 1, 4, 14, 21, 25, 34, 37, 40, 42, 51, 62). The gist of what is stated in these chapters is as follows: The origin of heaven and earth is nameless (1), is indeed non-existence (40), something quite indefinite, which, when we attempt to define it, becomes nothing (14, 25); if we must make a name for it, we may call it *Tao*: it may seem to be prior to God (4); it becomes nameable in relation to the universe that springs from it (1), in an order which may be partly known (42); not only is it the origin of the universe as a whole, but it presides over all beginnings (21), reaching everywhere (25, § 3) and doing everything, while it seems to do nothing (37).

Summing up what we have here, we may say: (1) as transcendent existence *Tao* is something quite indefinite, which Lao-tse struggles to express by negatives; (2) from this indefinite ground the universe of things issues by a process which is emanation from *Tao* as mother and not creation by *Tao* as agent; (3) *Tao* is immanent in the world, working in an unobtrusive way, producing and bringing to perfection individual existences. On the whole, we perhaps come nearest to the meaning of *Tao* when we say that it is pure being (most abstract of categories) endowed with spontaneity, the ultimate essence and impulse of all definite things. Obviously this conception of *Tao* excludes all idea of its equation with God. In ch. 4 Lao-tse says of *Tao*, 'I do not know whose son it is: it appears to be before God (*Ti*).' There can be no doubt that with Lao-tse *Tao* is the ultimate ground of all definite existences, *Ti* among them, while, by saying that he did not know whose son *Tao* was, he lets us see that, having arrived at his conception of *Tao*, beyond which he could not go, for in the line of logical abstraction there is no going further than 'being' which is nothing, he yet dimly felt that it did not explain itself.

The only other term in the *Tao-Teh King* capable of a theistic interpretation is *T'ien*, Heaven. In some instances of its use a near approach is made to what we mean by Heaven when we use it as equivalent to Providence. In this, its highest, use it is not merely the physical sky, but a power supreme in the world of visible things obscurely connected with the sky, which is the supreme exemplar of *Tao*, but, even so, posterior and subordinate to it. *Tao* is to Lao-tse the ultimate and determining fact.

His metaphysic, as thus explained, explains his ethic. The ground of existence being a perfectly indefinite spontaneity, a dark abysmal one from which, for no reason assigned, the multiplicity of the world emanates, by the immanence of which the world is and is moved—all this agrees with the ethical doctrine of abstention from self-determination and of sinking back on the inner ground of our being that we may be as this spontaneity in us causes us to become. Here is the justification for regarding Lao-tse's doctrine as simply a variant of 'Follow nature'; only we must remember that *Tao* is both the substantial essence and the dynamic spontaneity of all things. This, of course, brings up the difficulty of accounting for the existence in *natura naturata*, the world of concrete things, of any contrariety to *natura naturans*, *Tao*, and raises the question, neither asked nor answered by Lao-tse, why a short-lived storm is not as much an expression of *Tao* as the enduring stillness of Heaven.

Before turning again to the practical side of Lao-tse's teaching, we may refer to what may, by courtesy, be called his theory of knowledge. It is by freedom from desire that we can attain to a knowledge of the mysteries of *Tao* (1). Inasmuch as *Tao* is the principle of all existence, knowing it, we are at the heart of all knowledge. There is no need for the sage to expatiate over the world. Without moving out of doors he already knows (47). Knowing one case, he knows all, for *Tao* is the one universal principle (44).

We can best return to Lao-tse's practical teaching by the word *Teh*, which next to *Tao* is his key-word. Like *Tao*, it received from Lao-tse a

new meaning, since it is the outcome of *Tao* (51). There is indeed a *Teh* which begins where *Tao* ends (38). This is the *Teh* which is the result of effort, self-conscious *teh*. *Teh* in the Taoist sense is usually distinguished by some epithet—'mysterious,' 'large,' 'lasting,' etc. As the outcome of *Tao*, it is activity devoid of self-determination, the expression of the spontaneity of the immanent *Tao*. The various virtues commended by Lao-tse are aspects of, or approximations to, this *teh*. It is in this Taoistic sense that we must take the famous maxim 'Recompense injury with *teh*,' where it is a mistake to translate *teh* by 'kindness.' The maxim is no more than a precept of indifferent self-possession: 'Be a Taoist, even though provoked' (cf. 5).

Lao-tse's practical teaching is completed by his speculations on physiology and politics. As to the former, it is asserted that the Taoist adept attains to 'lastingness' (7, 16, 44, 59). There is no place of death in him, and so he passes through dangers unscathed (50). Hints are also given of a death which is not destruction, implying a persistence in spite of death which is true long life (33). This thought, however, is not developed. With the other form of longevity appears to be associated a certain management of the breath (10, 52), and through this vein of thought there is a connexion with later Taoist developments.

In Lao-tse's politics, as in his ethics, there are attractive thoughts—*e.g.*, the protest against luxury in the court alongside misery among the people (53) and the detestation of war (31). The Taoist method of government is *laissez-faire*. The sagely king does nothing, and everything comes right of itself (32, 37, 57). Logically Lao-tse's thought implies that any sage would be the centre of a universal sway (49, 57, 77), but it is hinted that the influence of a sage becomes effective only when he has the advantage of high place (56). Here Lao-tse is in line with Confucius, who asserted that his principles would transform the world if only he could find a ruler wise enough to give him office. In describing the society which would come to being under Taoist influence, Lao-tse pictures small stay-at-home communities devoid of letters and of luxury, content with what is theirs and utterly incurious of what is not. As men within a Taoist society so societies in their relation to one another are to act Taoistically. The right way is one for men and for States (61).

There are unexplained remainders in the *Tao-Teh King*, but Lao-tse does give us a reasoned view of things. As we think back and back, we come to something which we cannot see or hear or touch, an obscure something from which all things come. It is in all things, which could not be apart from it. Yet it never parades itself. It simply is, a mysterious, ever-during, all-working existence. Let us conform ourselves to this: let us become one with it. For it is in us as in all else—our essence which would realize itself if it were not hindered by our self-will and self-seeking. If we put away these, then we know it and are and become what it tends to be. It is *Tao*, unqualified being, origin of things, and in them as essence and spontaneity.

2. Taoism before Lao-tse.—The question has been raised whether Taoism existed prior to Lao-tse. That there was such an early Taoism is argued on the grounds of quotations in the *Tao-Teh King* from earlier Taoists, the persistent reference of Taoism not only to Lao-tse but also to the at least semi-mythical Yellow Emperor (Hwang-ti, 2697 B.C.), so that 'the words of Hwang and Lao' came to be a term for Taoist teaching, and the allusions in the *Tao-Teh King* and other Taoist writings to an age when the world moved on Taoist principles. It has also been argued that, while the *I-King* is dualistic, it also contains allusions to a monistic and idealistic strain in pre-Confucian speculation, and that a doctrine of that from which the dual principles derived (*Tao*) was in various forms well known. Hence, it is claimed, the *I-King*, the doctrine of *Tao*, and some strongly held ethical principles intuitively known were the materials on which Confucius and Lao worked, Lao appropriating the monistic sayings of the *I-King* but placing his chief reliance on the doctrine of *Tao* as handed down from the Yellow Emperor.[1] In the same line E. H. Parker[2] says that there is little doubt that Lao-tse simply gave a name (*Tao*) to a floating group of ethical principles already for many centuries spread far and wide over China and already well known as the maxims of Hwang-ti, and that every single thought in the *Tao-Teh King* had been foreshadowed, usually word for word, in the *Book of History*, *Book of Rites*, *Record of Rites*, *Book of Changes*, *Book of Odes*, or other very ancient work. Among these other ancient works Parker puts the volume attributed to Kwan-tse, which he dates from the 7th cent. B.C. In spite of all that is here said, it may still be reasonably maintained that there is no conclusive evidence of an explicit Taoism previous to Lao-tse. Even Parker does not deny a certain originality to Lao-tse in developing a new quietistic conception of how human affairs once presumably were, and ideally should be, regulated. There may have been a floating group of ethical principles which Lao-tse took over, but it is the reasoned quietism of the *Tao-Teh King* based on *Tao* as metaphysical principle that alone has the right to be called Taoism, and of the earlier existence of this proof is yet lacking. In the *Tao-Teh King* itself there is no mention of Hwang-ti, and the allusions to the simpler social conditions of earlier times do not prove the existence then of a reasoned Taoism. Certainly this would be proved if we found Lao quoting 'from some sage anterior to himself who had already formulated the doctrine of inaction in the very terms we are accustomed to associate with the name and fame of Lao-tse himself.'[3] The reference is to *Tao-Teh*, ch. 57. But the introductory phrase may be translated 'Therefore the sage says,' meaning that such language is characteristic of the sage, whether actually or hypothetically existing, just as the next chapter contains a similar gnomic reference to the sage's action. Five other quotations (22, 41, 50, 69, 78) may be admitted, but they are not of a kind to prove the existence of Taoism anterior to Lao. Only if numerous other phrases introduced by the formula '*ku yüeh*' are treated as quotations, can justification be found for speaking as Legge does of 'the sentence-makers often drawn on by Lao-tsze'[4] or for saying that Lao-tse 'abounds in sentences out of some ancient lore of which we have no knowledge but for him.'[5] But these phrases may not be quotations so much as aphoristic expressions of Taoistic teaching, perhaps already current with Lao and his school. Parker's wide reference to ancient literature must be heavily discounted. It is difficult to justify his appeal to books so innocent of Taoism as the *Book of History* and *Book of Odes*. Moreover, it is one thing to find in ancient literature expressions congruent with Taoism and quite another thing to find expressions essentially Taoistic. It is true that *Tao-Teh* is a conjunction of characters

1 *Encyclopædia Sinica*, p. 433.
2 *Studies in Chinese Religion*, p. 53.
3 Giles, *China Review*, xiv. 270.
4 *The Texts of Taoism*, pt. i. [*SBE* xxxix.] p. 2.
5 S. Johnson, *Oriental Religions: China*, Boston, U.S.A., 1877, p. 81.

long consecrated by use in the *Book of Changes* and the *Book of Rites*.[1] In the *Book of History* or elsewhere we may meet with phrases such as 'The Son of Heaven acts as the people's Father and Mother, and as such is the King of the world,' or 'That the Prince of a State should hold dirt in his mouth is the Providence (*Tao*) of Heaven.' But such things do not prove the existence of Taoism as a scheme of thought prior to Lao-tse. Nor, when we read in the *Tao-Teh King*, 'Thus we cannot say that the ancients meant nothing by the expression "Bend and survive,"' is it quite legitimate to annotate, 'Note Lao's allusion to more ancient philosophy.' There is no evidence that the ancients grounded this maxim on a metaphysical *Tao*. The *I-King* does in parts[2] contain indications of what may be called Taoist philosophy; but this very fact leads Legge to put the origin of these parts posterior to Lao-tse in the 5th or 4th cent. B.C. Kwan-tse may be dated in the 7th cent. B.C., but the work ascribed to him is suspected of being a forgery of a later date. In the present state of our knowledge it is probably right to say that the existence of a Taoist philosophy prior to Lao-tse is not proven. The *Tao-Teh King* may still be taken as the earliest example of Taoist thought.

3. Taoism after Lao-tse.—The history of Taoism immediately subsequent to Lao-tse is obscure. Somewhat later its development can be traced in a succession of authors.

(*a*) *Lieh-tse*.—The earliest of these may be Lieh-tse (=Licius, 5th cent. B.C.), but the authenticity of the work ascribed to him is doubtful. According to him, the whole of things is in perpetual transformation. The ultimate basis of all is a vague something which differentiates itself into *ch'i*, *hsing*, and *chih*. The second and third terms may be translated 'form' and 'matter' respectively, though we must beware of assuming an exact equivalence to these terms as used elsewhere (*e.g.*, in Greek philosophy). *Ch'i* is more difficult to translate. Giles[3] gives as its meanings 'the vivifying principle or aura of Chinese cosmogony: breath, vital fluid: force: influence.' The state of things when these three were in an undifferentiated and therefore imperceptible condition is called 'chaos,' whether this is or is not to be identified with the ultimate origin and basis of things. Progress is made from chaos by an evolution vaguely indicated, in the final stages of which the pure and light portions form 'heaven,' the heavy and gross form 'earth,' and 'man' appears as the vehicle of their harmonious *ch'i*. The general ethical temper is quietist, based now on ignorance, now on fatalism. Another root for it is found in the subjectivity of knowledge, and the absence of any criterion of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, though this is hinted at rather than developed. Along with this may be noted a disclaiming of any discrimination in worth between waking and dreaming experiences. Views of death are given which are perhaps not quite consistent. On the one hand is put the question, which might suggest Buddhist influence, 'When the spiritual enters its gate and the material returns to its root, where do "I" survive?' On the other hand, it is asked whether death may not be another birth. Lieh-tse makes much use of anecdotes, a good many of which seem to have been treated by Taoist writers as the stock property of their school. The magical side of Taoism shows in Lieh-tse considerable development as compared with the *Tao-Teh King*. The secret of it is such a selfless identification with the life of nature as brings the Taoist into harmony with all its forces, animate and inanimate. The alleged immunity of a drunken man from injury by accident is used to illustrate the still higher immunity which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the 'heavenly' (*i.e.* 'natural' as opposed to 'self-determined') element of his constitution.

(*b*) *Chwang-tse*.—The most brilliant of the Taoist writers is Chwang-tse (*c.* 330 B.C.). In him as little as in the *Tao-Teh King* is there any systematic exposition of Taoism. In the development of his views he uses various literary devices—anecdote, allegory, and imaginary conversation. In some places he handles somewhat freely not only Confucius, but even more ancient worthies, such as Yao and Shun. How little historical accuracy or consistency is regarded is shown by the fact that Confucius is also introduced speaking in quite a Taoist vein. It is not easy to see the drift and relevance of all Chwang-tse's chapters, but the reader cannot fail to find a characteristic attitude towards reality. As in the *Tao-Teh King*, the metaphysical basis of everything is *Tao*, which as the explanation of all things is not itself a thing. It is more abstract even than non-existence, which is made definite by its opposition to existence, and so it may be called non-existing non-existence. To call it *Tao* is only a metaphor. From this absolute indifference all existences, including spirits and God, have come. No explanation is given of this coming into existence of definite things, though, to be consistent with the general scheme, the evolution must be unmotived and spontaneous. The process from unconscious indifference to the world of consciousness and of differentiated things is described in the allegory of 'Heedless' and 'Hasty' pitying insensible Chaos, and digging in him orifices of perception with the result that he died (bk. 7). *Tao* is in things, their reality and the regulator of their processes. In accordance with this view *Tao* and things are the hints of the illusory nature of all knowledge coming through the senses. The truth of things is perceived by the spirit, and Taoist adepts, when most in touch with reality, are in a trance, their bodies like rotten tree-stumps and their minds like slaked lime. One may notice also the incipient scepticism based on the relativity of knowledge and the phenomenon of dreaming. A paragraph more quoted perhaps than any other from Chwang-tse, though by no means the most central to his position, is that in which he hesitates to decide whether he is Chwang-tse dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is Chwang-tse. Since *Tao* alone really is, the truth of life is to be found in the above-mentioned trance when self-consciousness and self-determination are completely lost. But, as in the *Tao-Teh King*, so here, things are taken for granted, with *Tao* as their spontaneously operating essence; and in accordance with this assumption the ethical ideal is with Chwang as with Lao a life of spontaneity. There is inculcated an abscission of all definite volition and an indifferent yielding of oneself to the course of nature. Hence follows a characteristic attitude towards death, which is regarded as natural and therefore as little to be feared as birth. The Taoist is independent of all accidents, which are of no importance in comparison with the independent worth of self as an expression of *Tao*. It is only false opinion which differentiates between this and that outward state. If all self-determined effort is a departure from the truth of life, it follows that the devotee of virtue and the worker of iniquity fall under the same condemnation. Hence results a paradoxical levelling down of moral distinction. A similar strain of thought appears in Yang-tse, the heresiarch whom

[1] Parker, p. 70. [2] *E.g.*, Appendix, iii.
[3] *A Chinese-English Dict.*², London, 1912, s.v.

Mencius criticized, and is there regarded as congruent with the teaching of Lao Tan.[1]

(c) *Han Fei-tse and Hwainan-tse.*—Other writers reckoned as belonging to the Taoist school are Han Fei-tse († 230 B.C.) and Hwainan-tse († 122 B.C.). The writings of the former are preserved in 55 chapters, two of which (21 and 22) are entitled 'Explanations of Lao' and 'Illustrations of Lao.' Apparent quotations from the *Tao-Teh King* occur elsewhere in his writings. Han Fei-tse hardly discusses the metaphysical side of Taoism. His book is ethico-political, and is marked by shrewdness rather than by loftiness of tone. One sympathizes with the Chinese student who protests against his being classed as a Taoist and explains what he regards as the degenerate nature of his teaching as due to a perversion to a scheming selfishness of such sayings of Lao-tse as 'When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a previous expiration' (36) and 'The sage wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them' (66). Hwainan-tse is a more genuine Taoist than Han Fei, but his writings in their fanciful analogies and extravagant statements give evidence of a progressive deterioration of Taoism. Ethically he is superior to Han Fei. In at least one statement of his fundamental ethical position he shows a close verbal approximation to orthodox Confucianism: action in accordance with the nature (*hsing*) is called *Tao*, and this nature is to be distinguished from the passions (*yü*).

4. Later Taoist literature.—Later Taoist literature is voluminous and reflects that medley of subjects which make up Taoism, such as the search for immortality (which Chu Hi singles out as its main object), the conquest of the passions, alchemy, amulets, the observance of fasts and sacrifices, ritual and charms, and the multiplied objects of worship. Much of present-day popular hortatory literature may be reckoned as Taoist. Probably the most popular of all Taoist writings is *The Tractate of Actions and their Retributions*, which dates from the Sung dynasty. According to the original text, retribution takes effect in this world. The practiser of virtue indeed not only may receive earthly happiness but also may hope as the culmination of his reward to become immaterial and immortal, *hsien-jen* (=*ṛṣi* of Buddhism). As for the transgressor, he suffers in his person and fortune, and, if at his death guilt still remains unequated by punishment, judgment extends to his posterity. Of this retribution Heaven and spiritual beings are recognized as the agents. In the illustrative anecdotes added in many editions to the original text the stage of retribution includes the other world and successive rebirths in this world. The inculcated morality has many excellent details, but extends also to tabus—*e.g.*, striding over a well or leaping over food.

5. Present-day Taoism.—Chang Tao-ling (A.D. 34) has been regarded as the founder of present-day popular Taoism, which is not unfairly described as a mass of superstitious magic. The earlier literature, however, makes it evident that before his time Taoism had yielded to the love of the marvellous. Chang Tao-ling is said to have received from Lao-tse himself, who appeared to him from the realm of spirits, a sword and other apparatus in virtue of which he was able to exercise control over the spirit world. Descendants of Tao-ling, in each of whom it is said the soul of their ancestor is successively incarnate, and whose residence is at Lung-hu Shan in Kwangsi, have inherited his powers, and since A.D. 748 hold by imperial decree the hereditary dignity of 'Master of Heaven.' They are often spoken of in works on China as Taoist popes. After the introduction of Buddhism into China Taoism shows very evident traces of Buddhist influence, which was particularly potent in the 3rd and 6th centuries A.D. In its religious literature and practices it follows Buddhist models and borrows Buddhist phraseology. It has its temples, priesthood, and monasteries. Giles' statement, that the celibacy of Taoist priests has been strictly enforced since the 10th cent.,[1] is subject to qualification. Eitel says that Taoist monks or priests do not take the vow of celibacy. They may keep their families outside the cloister walls and spend the whole time between meals at home.[2] Doolittle distinguishes two classes of Taoist priests.[3] A Christian influence in the names and titles of objects of Taoist worship has also been traced by some (*e.g.*, Wieger). Many of the best known objects of popular worship are members of the Taoist pantheon; *e.g.*, Yü Hwang Shang-ti, who is the Supreme Taoist god, is also he to whom the great name Shang-ti 'sans phrase' would be most readily referred by the ordinary Chinese. Lao-tse is himself worshipped as one of the 'Three Pure Ones' whose images are prominent in every Taoist temple, the two others being Yü Hwang and Pan Ku. Taoism has produced a plentiful crop of legends and fairy-tales, the influence of which is seen in Chinese art.

The gulf between the Taoism of the *Tao-Teh King* and present-day Taoism is a wide one. It has to be remembered, however, that even in the *Tao-Teh King* there are passages which suggest a marvellous mastery of nature by the Taoist adept and provide a starting-point for that search after immortality which, according to Suzuki, first opened the door for the inrush of superstition. The suggestion has also been made that, as the opposition sharpened between Confucianism and other strains of thought, all of popular religion and superstition that found no encouragement in Confucianism took refuge in Taoism. Over and above any such accretions and any particular phrases in the *Tao-Teh King* which might provide a germ of magical developments, the general position of Taoism from the beginning exposed it to such deterioration. Starting from the assumption that man and nature are fundamentally one, its quietism obliterated the line between moral and physical, and promised its adept such a harmony with Nature as laid open to him her secrets and made him merely the vehicle of her great powers. The distinctness of the moral person was lost in the all-embracing sweep of *Tao*. Confucianism also speculated on the relation between man and nature, and thought of the sage as exercising a cosmic influence. But this influence is the issue of moral development, and the Confucian emphasis on self-determined morality prevented any sinking of man into nature.

The nobler elements of Taoism are, however, not extinct. The Taoist pope is not recognized as head by all the Taoist priesthood. There are celibate Taoists among whom the nobler Taoist strain is cherished, who disclaim any connexion with him. In some of the secret societies also elements of the higher Taoism survive. Even in Confucian circles classical Taoism has influence. The writer recalls one scholar who would not have described himself as other than Confucianist, who was well acquainted with the *Tao-Teh King*, and who used to repeat with genuine appreciation, 'The highest goodness is like water.'

6. State relations.—During its long history Taoism has experienced a considerable vicissitude of political favour and disfavour. In the pre-Ch'in

[1] J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, London, 1861, vol. ii. *Mencius* (Prolegomena, ch. iii.).

[1] *Confucianism and its Rivals*, p. 176.
[2] *Notes and Queries of China and Japan*, Oct. 1868.
[3] *Social Life of the Chinese*, 2 vols., London, 1866, ch. ix.

times the various schools of Chinese thought seem to have been allowed free play. With the Ch'in dynasty, the first emperor of which tried to suppress Confucianism, Taoism was in favour, and it continued to enjoy imperial patronage under the early Han dynasty. Thereafter its political relations were chequered; *e.g.*, in the 6th cent. it was suppressed in favour of Buddhism, while in the 8th cent. it was honoured by the emperor Hsüan Tsung. After other such vicissitudes it was by the late Manchu dynasty reckoned along with Buddhism and Christianity as a heterodox teaching in contrast to the sacred teaching of Confucius.[1] See also art. MYSTICISM (Chinese).

LITERATURE.—J. Legge, *The Texts of Tâoism*, pts. i. and ii. [*SBE* xxxix. and xl.], Oxford, 1891, *China Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1888; F. H. Balfour, *Taoist Texts*, London [1884], *The Divine Classic of Nan-hua*, Shanghai, 1881; S. Julien, *Le Livre de la voie et de la vertu . . . par le philosophe Lao-Tseu*, Paris, 1842; H. A. Giles, *Chuang-Tzŭ*, London, 1889, *China Review*, March-April, 1886, *Confucianism and its Rivals* (*HL*), London, 1914; E. H. Parker, *Dublin Review*, Oct. 1903, Jan. 1904, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, London, 1910; R. Dvořák, *Chinas Religionen*, Münster, 1895-1903, ii., 'Lao-tsi und seine Lehre'; R. K. Douglas, *Confucianism and Taoism*, London, 1906.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

TAPAS.—See ASCETICISM (Hindu).

TARGUMS.—Though the term 'Targum' was used by Jewish authorities to designate the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into any language, it was specifically restricted to the Aramaic renderings (cf. Ezr 4). Aramaic versions were used liturgically; the Hebrew text was read from a scroll, and this was followed by the Aramaic, recited without book by the official called *meturgeman*. This custom continued to the 10th cent., and was in parts maintained beyond that date. It is possible that the famous rescript of Justinian[2] was directed against the liturgical use of the Targum.

The most widely read of the Targums was that ascribed to Onqelos (*i.e.* Aquila), who lived in the 2nd century A.D. Aquila really rendered the Scriptures into Greek, but his name became associated also with the Aramaic version. Onqelos is a translation of the Pentateuch only, and it is known as the 'Babylonian Targum,' not so much because of its language, as because of its official adoption in the Babylonian Jewish academies. Thus, though edited in Babylonia, Onqelos is dialectically Palestinian. Onqelos probably includes elements of considerable antiquity, which were derived from oral tradition; some of it, on the other hand, is obviously of literary origin. Onqelos went through various re-editings, so that the extant text is not usually referred to an earlier period than the 4th or 5th century. The 'Palestinian Targum' (known also as the 'Targum of Jonathan'), though later than the earliest recension of Onqelos, contains elements older than the latter. The most remarkable theological characteristic of the Targums is the avoidance of anthropomorphisms. They are thus paraphrases rather than translations, though in very large part Onqelos is literal enough.

Similarly there were two Targums to the Prophets: the 'Babylonian' (ascribed to Jonathan, son of Uzziel), which originated (despite its Babylonian use) in Palestine; and the 'Palestinian,' which is fuller of homiletic elements. As selections were read from the Prophets (*haftārôth*) in the synagogues, these Targums also partook of an official character.

On the other hand, there were no such official Targums to those parts of the Bible from which no *haftārôth* were derived. Hence these Targumim to the Hagiographa form independent groups. On the whole they are freer, and in some cases (as in the Second Targum to Esther) are of greater interest for folk-lore than for exegesis. The Targum to the Song of Songs is throughout allegorical.

LITERATURE.—See full list of authorities in *HDB* iv. 683. Add W. Bacher, *Die älteste Terminologie der jüdischen Schriftauslegung*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 204 ff., and his art. in *JE*.

I. ABRAHAMS.

TARTARS.—See TURKO-TATARS.

TASMANIANS.—See AUSTRALASIA, POLYNESIA.

TATHĀGATA.—Whatever it may have meant originally, or from whatever source it may have been derived, Tathāgata is an epithet of Buddha used to express his very personality. It is, first of all, an appellation to specify his dignity as an enlightened being and a teacher of men and gods. He is the one who has realized the four truths according to reality (*yathābhūtam*) and, consequently, mastered the way to the realization of the truths. Sensation, perception, and thoughts are all under his own control. He is free from the bondage of the six senses and attachment to their objects, because they are not his masters, as they are with the common people, but he is master over them.[1] Thus he is beyond all the commotions and disturbances arising from contact with the objects of sense and thought. He was born a man, but has become a superhuman being in respect of and by virtue of these highest moral and intellectual attainments.[2] In order to express these superhuman excellences of Buddha's personality, the Buddhists from the earliest time used to call their master the Tathāgata with a special reverence. In this use, therefore, the appellation signifies nearly the same thing as Sugata ('the one who has gone blessed'). Here Tathāgata means the one who has gone (*gata*) from the realm of attachment to the other beyond according to reality (*tathā*, which means the same as *yathābhūtam*).

But the virtue of a Buddha does not consist in attaining this position for himself alone. He teaches the people the Way to the same attainment and guides them in its realization. He is the Master who, having himself reached the castle of fearlessness, invites and leads them to the same. The Tathāgata is not only sure that he is the perfectly enlightened one and has thoroughly overcome the miseries of existence, but also equally sure that he is the master of the Truth and the Law. With this confidence he turns the supreme wheel of the Law and roars a lion's roar in the assemblies of beings.[3] Thus the Tathāgata is the enlightened one who knows the Way and reveals that Way by treading which he himself has become the 'thus-gone.'[4] He practises as he preaches (*yathā-vādī tathā-kārī*) and *vice versa*.[5] Though this explanation of the term is, as etymology, certainly far-fetched, it is quite natural that the Buddhists saw in their Master a being without any falsehood and self-deceit. The association of the appellation with the very personality of an unerring Master of the way to final emancipation is undeniable. A stanza which is said to have been uttered by the disciples at the death of the Master is another testimony to this association. It reads:

[1] *Sacred Edict Maxim*, 7.

[2] See art. TALMUD.

[1] See *Majjhima*, nos. 102 and 123 (tr. K. E. Neumann, iii. 33, 261 f.), and *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 94, xxxv. 136 (*PTS* ed. iii. 139 f., iv. 127).

[2] See *Saṃyutta*, xxxv. 90, xliv. 2 (*PTS* ed. iv. 64, 380).

[3] See *Saṃyutta*, xii. 21 (*PTS* ed. ii. 27), and *Aṅguttara*, iv. 9 (*PTS* ed. ii. 9).

[4] See *Saṃyutta*, viii. 7 (*PTS* ed. i. 191), xxii. 58 (*PTS* ed. iii. 65); cf. *Aṅguttara*, vi. 64 (*PTS* ed. iii. 417); *Majjhima*, no. 35 (*PTS* ed. i. 372); *Saddharma-puṇḍarika* (*SBE* xxi. [1884] 129 f.).

[5] See *Itivuttaka*, 112 (*PTS* ed. p. 122); *Aṅguttara*, iv. 23 (*PTS* ed. ii. 23 f.). Cf. below, *Lotus*, ch. ii.; and *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, Paris, 1890, ii. 260, 266, 362, etc.).

'The Master, such a Master as he is (*yathā etādiso*), without any parallel in the world, the *Tathāgata* . . . is gone.'[1]

'Thus-gone' is the Master who has seen the way and revealed it to us, according to reality.

To the Buddhists their Master was the 'thus-gone' or 'thus-destined' (translation of Edmunds) to final emancipation, the 'perfected' (*der Vollendete*, Neumann) in wisdom and its realization, in short, the 'truth-winner' (Rhys Davids). The appellation was certainly a self-designation of Buddha, but it was more used by his disciples to express their confidence in the Master.

So far the empirical aspect of the concept. We must now take up the metaphysical side of the idea conveyed by or attached to the term. The Buddhists were, probably in Buddha's lifetime, nearly realizing for themselves the truth that the revealer of the Way must be at home in it, and that therefore he is the Way itself. They said:

'The laws (*dhammā*) are real and not otherwise as they are, and these are perfectly known by the Tathāgata.'[2] Here 'the laws' mean not only Buddha's teaching, but the things taught in his teaching and their essence. Hence the saying: 'He, the Blessed One, knows having known (the laws), sees having seen, born of Light, born of Wisdom, born of Truth (*dhamma-bhūto*), and born of Brhmā; He is the one who reveals and tells, the One who gives immortality, the Lord of Truth, the Tathāgata.'[3] Here we have translated the *dhamma* by 'truth,' *i.e.* the truth expressed in Buddha's laws.

The ideas here formulated cannot be called metaphysical speculations; still they show a tendency to base the faith in the Master on the transcendental entity of the Truth, not only revealed to us by him, but also represented personally by him. The foundation and elaboration of these ideas must proceed to a further development of Buddhological (so to speak, in analogy with 'Christological') speculations. The fact of the faith has been laid down by the personal influence of the Master; thought and clear conception must follow it. And it is quite natural that the Buddhological ideas were always closely associated with the appellation Tathāgata. These thoughts may be studied from three aspects or phases of their development. They are: (1) the relation of the Tathāgata to the Truth (*dhamma*) which he revealed, (2) the communion of the Tathāgata with the many other Tathāgatas, and (3) the eternity of the personality of the Tathāgata.

(1) The term *dhamma* (in both singular and plural) is a very flexible one. But the various aspects of the concept have a necessary connexion, when viewed as centring in the person of the Master. The *dhammā* (plural) are qualities of things, both physical and mental, which are transient, but subject to the laws. These laws make up existence,[4] and our attachment to and thirst for them are the causes of the miseries of life. Misery, its genesis, its extinction, and the way of release from it—these truths have been revealed by the Tathāgata according to reality (*yathābhūtam*). Thus our emancipation from the miseries is possible only by realizing to ourselves the laws according to reality. These are the laws or teachings (*dhammā*) of the Tathāgata. Therefore the laws have their root, light, and basis in the Blessed One.[5] Buddha is the king of the laws. On the other hand, however, Buddhahood is attainable only by the comprehension of the laws. Hence it is true also that Buddha is the protector of the laws, who, leaning upon the laws, reveres, honours, and adores them.[6] The Law and its revealer are mutual in their relations. He who sees the Law sees the Master, and *vice versa*.[1] The *dhamma* is not merely a phenomenon or an instruction; it is in reality the Truth, according to and by virtue of which the Master and his followers, and consequently the Buddhas of the past and future, have attained or shall attain Buddhahood.

(2) According to a commentator, as given by Burnouf, Tathāgata (*tathā-āgata*, 'thus-come') means the one who has come thus, in the same manner as his predecessors, the Buddhas of the past; it is, on the other side, *tathā* and *gata*, 'thus-gone,' and means the one who has proceeded or departed as they.[2] The oneness of enlightenment and Law among the Buddhas of the past and of the present is an idea as old as the history of Buddhism, and the development of its philosophy has always had a close relation with the idea. 'The Tathāgatā (plur.) lead men by the right law (*saddhamma*)'[3]—these are the words believed to have been spoken by Buddha himself to his temptresses. This and similar passages, speaking of the Tathāgatas and the Law, indicate the communion of the Tathāgatas, or the unity of Buddhahood in the same truth. Not only has the Law been proclaimed by the Law-born Buddhas,[4] but they all have one and the same road to tread. This one road (*ekayāna*)[5] consists in nothing but reverence towards and realization of the Law. Herein lies the very essence of the teaching of all the Tathāgatas, or, speaking metaphysically, their entity—*dhammatā*[6] or *dhammassa sudhammatā*.[7] In this concept of the essence of Buddha's teaching or Law, and consequently of his personality as the Law-born, the Buddhist philosophers have found a metaphysical basis for their faith in Buddha as the *dhamma*-born. They were to find, by the help of this idea, a metaphysical unity in the communion of all the Tathāgatas. It is quite natural that Nāgārjuna,[8] the Mahāyānist philosopher of the 2nd cent. A.D., founded his theory of Buddha's *dharmakāya*, or *dharma-ātmā*, upon this concept of *dhammatā* and the authority of the verses speaking of the *ekayāna*, above referred to.

(3) This point gives us a key to the consideration of Buddhological speculation on the eternity of the Tathāgata's life. Whether the Tathāgata exists after his bodily death or not is a question that had been asked from very early times in Buddhist history. Buddha is said to have neither affirmed nor denied it.[9] It is remarkable that every time this question is asked Buddha is named by the epithet Tathāgata. Whatever this connexion may have implied, we see that the question is affirmed on a metaphysical basis in the Mahāyāna texts, and that here again the appellation Tathāgata comes most conspicuously to the front. We have two most important texts, which devote each a whole chapter to the question of the duration of the Tathāgata's life (*Tathāgata-āyuṣ-pramāṇā*)—the *Lotus of the Law*[10] and the *Golden Light*.[11]

[1] *The Book of the Great Decease*, vi. 15 (*SBE* xi. [1900] 116 f., and ed. R. C. Childers, London, 1878, p. 62).

[2] *Digha*, no. 34; cf. below, ch. ii. of the *Lotus*.

[3] See *Majjhima*, no. 18 (*PTS* ed. i. 182); *Saṃyutta*, xxxv. 116 (*PTS* ed. iv. 94 f.); cf. below, ch. v. of the *Lotus*.

[4] See *Aṅguttara*, v. 57 (*PTS* ed. ii. 75), and *passim*.

[5] See *Saṃyutta*, xxiv. (*PTS* ed. iii. 202–217), etc.

[6] See *Aṅguttara*, iii. 14 (*PTS* ed. i. 109), v. 133 (*PTS* ed. iii. 150), etc.

[1] *Itivuttaka*, 92 (*PTS* ed. p. 91); *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 87 (*PTS* ed. iii. 120).

[2] *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1845, p. 76; cf. *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, ii. 266).

[3] *Saṃyutta*, iv. 3, 5 (*PTS* ed. i. 127).

[4] *Theragāthā*, verse 491 (*PTS* ed. p. 51); tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, London, 1913, p. 257.

[5] See *Saṃyutta*, xlvii. 18, 43 (*PTS* ed. v. 168, 186), etc.; *Aṅguttara*, vi. 26 (*PTS* ed. iii. 314); cf. the *Lotus*, esp. ch. ii. (*SBE* xxi. 49, 54, etc.).

[6] See *Saṃyutta*, vi. i. 2, lvi. 24 (*PTS* ed. i. 140, v. 434); *Aṅguttara*, iv. 21 (*PTS* ed. ii. 21); cf. *Prajñā-pāramitā* in 8000 verses (ed. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888, p. 396).

[7] *Digha*, no. 19.

[8] In his *Prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* (B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of Chinese Buddhist Literature*, Oxford, 1883, no. 1169).

[9] A whole chapter called the *Avyākṛta*, 'Undefined,' *Saṃyutta*, xliv., is devoted to the question; cf. *Saṃyutta*, xxii. 85 f., xxiv. 15–18, xxiii. 1–10; *Majjhima*, nos. 63, 72, etc.

[10] *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, *SBE* xxi. ch. xvi.

[11] *Suvarṇa-prabhā* (ed. Chandra Das, Calcutta, 1898), pp. 3–9.

The first of these texts expounds at length the transcendental side of the Buddhological speculation, and the chapter above referred to may be taken as the conclusion of the exposition. Though the whole text seems to be a composite one, made up of heterogeneous elements, a definite line of argument may be found from its opening up to ch. xv. Ch. ii., entitled 'Tactfulness,' gives a view of the Buddha's personality as a skilful and tactful teacher of the Law, who, being versed himself in the deepest truth, knows how to guide men to enlightenment and how to carry out the one vehicle.[1]

The Tathāgata is a perfect being who knows all and is perfected in all virtues.[2] 'The Tathāgata only can proclaim the Tathāgata's Law, those laws which the Tathāgata knows. And the Tathāgata knows all laws, *i.e.* what are (*ye te*) the laws,[3] how (*yādṛśās*) they are, of what characteristics (*yallakṣaṇās*) they are, of what essence (*yat-svabhāvās*) they are. In these laws (*i.e.* truths) the Tathāgata is versed face to face. . . . Believe me, I speak what is real, I speak what is truthful, I speak what is not otherwise (*bhūtavādī, tathāvādī, ananyathāvādī*). . . . Having seized the one vehicle (*ekayāna*) I proclaim to beings the Law, the Buddha-vehicle; there is no second vehicle, nor a third. This is the nature of the Law (*dharmatā*) universally in the worlds in ten directions. All the Tathāgatas of the past, of the future, as well as of the present, proclaim the same one vehicle.'

After elucidating this mastership of the one vehicle by two parables, the text proceeds, in ch. v., entitled 'On Plants,' to reveal the entity of the Tathāgata's personality and his omnipotent powers. The Tathāgata who knows all *dharmas* is identified here with the *dharmas* themselves, or rather all the *dharmas* are concentrated in, and derived from, the personality of the Tathāgata. He is the king of the Law, as is stated in the *Nikāya* texts. But the king is not a mere legislator: he is the very entity of the laws.

'Whatever law for any case is laid down by the Tathāgata it becomes really so. The Tathāgata aptly ordains and lays down all laws. By the Tathāgata-wisdom he lays down the laws in such a manner that they enter into the position of omniscience.'

The Tathāgata is such a being because his omniscience, the *Tathāgata-jñāna*, is the very essence of all the laws, the real metaphysical foundation of all their manifestations. The saying that one who sees the Tathāgata sees the Law finds here a metaphysical interpretation, illustrated by a parable of rain which nourishes all plants, each according to its capacity and nature.

The discourses and dialogues following this chapter try to disclose the mysteries of Buddhahood. It is explained as of remote origin and in communion with all the enlightened of the past and future. The person of the Buddha, who was born among the Śākyas, and who has attained Buddhahood at Gayā, is nothing but a personal revelation of the eternal *dharmatā*,[4] *i.e.* the Tathāgata.[5] This faith is illustrated and supported figuratively by the issuing of innumerable saints out of the earth. The idea is that these saints cannot be the Tathāgata's disciples, unless he is Buddha from an infinite past. The argument reaches its climax in ch. xv., entitled 'The Duration of the Tathāgata's Life,' which brings to light the true measure of the Tathāgata's life. A corporal manifestation of the Tathāgata is for the benefit of those who need to be educated in that way. In reality he was perfectly enlightened long ago (*chira-abhisambuddha*), and he is everlasting (*sadā sthita*). Therefore the Tathāgata declares, at the close of the chapter, that he knows eternity. Then he proclaims to all beings: 'I am the Tathāgata' (*lect. cur.* 'I am thus and thus,' *tathā tathā 'ham*).

In the *Golden Light* it is first asked why the life of Śākyamuni lasted only eighty years. Buddha answers by affirming the immeasurableness of his life. All the saints and celestial beings utter verses praising and adoring the Buddha of an immeasurable life. Here we shall give an abstract of the verses, which are indeed the statement of a metaphysics of the Tathāgata. They say:

Hearken, unimaginable is the entity of the Lord of the world, the Tathāgata, who proceeds according to reality (*yathā-ākrama*). All the Buddhas are equal in their virtue, having the same *dharmatā*. The Tathāgata is unoriginated, and our Master is not a conditioned being. The Perfectly Enlightened has the Law as his body (*dharma-kāya*),[6] the Tathāgata has the Law as his realm (*dharma-dhātu*). Neither does the Buddha vanish nor does the Law perish, yet he shows extinction, in order to bring the beings to perfection. Unimaginable is Buddha, the Blessed One; the body of the Tathāgata is eternal; for the sake of compassion towards all beings he manifests himself in various appearances.

Here, as in the *Lotus*, remains a problem to be elaborated—the question of the relations between the unchangeable entity of the Tathāgata and his manifestation. A Chinese version[7] of the text, produced by I-tsing, adds a chapter after these verses, and it treats of the three bodies (or personalities) of the Tathāgata. This may be the work of a commentator, but it indicates how the Buddhological speculations have been closely connected with the appellation Tathāgata.

[1] *SBE* xxi. 30–59.
[2] Cf. *Mahāvastu* (ed. Sénart, ii. 362).
[3] Here and in the following passage *dhammā* means the things, together with their qualities and laws.
[4] Cf. *tathatam* (*Lotus*, v. 20), and *dharma-tathatā* (*Lalita-vistara*, ed. S. Lefmann, Halle, 1902, p. 351, l. 8).
[5] Cf. *Lalita-vistara*, ch. v. (Lefmann, p. 351).
[6] Cf. *Lalita-vistara*, ed. Lefmann, p. 436 f.; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886, p. 396 f.
[7] Nanjio, no. 126.

In summing up these ideas we may see that with the Buddhists the Tathāgata has meant the personal aspect of the *dharma*. To found metaphysical ideas upon faith in the person of the Tathāgata has always been the task of Buddhist orthodoxy, even in its phases of development in the East. But, in addition to this, we should consider two currents of thought which flowed beside the central one. (*a*) One of them is the theory that denies personality in the Tathāgata or anything else. It may be designated the theory of 'no-sign' (*alakṣaṇa*) and is represented by *The Diamond-cutter*[1] and other texts of the so-called Prajñā class. There the person of Buddha remains as the preacher of the sermons, and the epithet Tathāgata remains also; but nothing is allowed to be defined, any definition or qualification being thought to be a limitation, which means the same thing as illusion. Thus the texts which assert the omniscience of the Tathāgata deny to him any ascribable quality (*lakṣaṇa*). 'Tathāgata means one who does not go to anywhere, and does not come from anywhere.'[2] Here we see that the very idea of Tathāgata is put away. Nevertheless, in the midst of thorough negations, the identity of the Tathāgata and the Law is asserted.[3] This is indeed a testimony to the tenacity of the idea.

(*b*) Another current, opposite to the above, may be called the theory of 'signs' (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*). In its theoretical aspect this doctrine cannot be distinguished from orthodoxy, being founded upon the idea that all the *dharmas* are realities, which are realized in the person of the Tathāgata. But in practical aspects it looks to a Tathāgata beside the historical Buddha. Amitābha, the lord of the Sukhāvatī, or Vaiśā-jya-guru, the lord of the Eastern paradise, or Maitreya, the future Buddha in the Tusitā heaven, is the object of their adoration and their hope of salvation. The cult of the Tathāgatas in various heavens is found also in the *Lotus*,[4] and it has proved to be useful for propagandism. Buddhism of this kind, whichever may be its Tathāgata and ideal heaven, is founded upon the belief that any Buddha or saint is the manifestation of the one Tathāgata. This philosophy of the *dharma-lakṣaṇa* is a natural outcome of the early Buddhist concept of *dhamma* and is in conformity with the faith that every *dharma* is the manifestation of Buddha's wisdom (providence, so to speak). Moreover, the religion of adoring this or that Buddha as the being of compassion or as our saviour is not only in accordance with the philosophy, but also has a very sympathetic aspect of faith and piety. But the defect of this system lies in its losing concentration of faith in the historical Tathāgata and therefore in its running sometimes to an extreme pantheism.

To sum up the results: Buddhist philosophy started with the ideal of release from the miseries of life in conformity with the real nature of things (*dhammā*). As the reality, so the existence (*yathā dhammā tathā sattā*). This *yathā tathā* has been revealed by the Tathāgata, whose personality consisted in *yathā-vādī tathākārī*. This Buddha's personality is inseparable from the metaphysical entity of *dhamma*, and *vice versa*. The idea of the Tathāgata has, in this way, become the pivot around which both philosophical speculations and religious faith have moved and developed.

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[1] *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. [1894] pp. xii–xix, 110–144.
[2] *Ib.* xlix. pt. ii. p. 142; cf. art. DOCETISM (Buddhist).
[3] *Sarva-dharmā Buddha-dharmā* (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii. p. 134).
[4] Ch. xx.

TATI BUSHMEN.—1. Race and distribution.—The Tati Bushmen, called by the Bechuana Masarwa, and by the Matebele Amasile, are a branch of the Bush people of S. Africa, with whom they have many characteristics, both morphological and linguistic, in common.

The Bushmen in general were formerly spread over a much larger area of the continent of Africa than they occupy at present. Traces of their occupation, such as paintings, weapons, and implements, have been found far beyond their present limits. Indeed there is good reason for believing that at one time they occupied practically the whole continent and were driven by other peoples into their present territory. They are considered therefore by most anthropologists to be the true aborigines of S. Africa. In their legends they speak of a time when they were the only inhabitants of S. Africa. Paintings in the W. Sudan, in the caves of Algeria, and in Central France are strangely reminiscent of the Bushman paintings of Rhodesia or Cape Colony. The Grimaldi race, who inhabited some of the European caves in Aurignacian times, may have been either the ancestors of the Bushmen or a portion of the people who crossed over into Europe probably as slaves of the Cro-Magnon race. The Bush people are now confined to the country west of the Drakensberg Mountains and south of the Zambesi River to the Atlantic Ocean, but are principally found in the northern parts of Cape Colony, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, S.W. Protectorate, and S. Rhodesia. There are few, if any, Bushmen between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean, and not many in the Transvaal. So far as is known, there are none north of the Zambesi. From the Bantu traditions they must be recently extinct in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The Bushmen are divided into many different tribes and clans, speaking languages differing widely from one another, but all of the same general type. According to Meinhof,[1] the Bushman tongues are purely isolating and have their closest relations among the isolating languages of the W. Sudan. While this is true to a certain degree so far as the language of the Tati Bushmen is concerned, it is too sweeping a generalization in the present state of our knowledge. The Tati Bushmen inhabit the country between the Zambesi and the Crocodile Rivers, from the Transvaal and S. Rhodesia on the east to Lake Ngami on the west. They are fairly tall, 5 ft. 3 in. being the average stature of the men, while they are much darker in colour as a whole than the southern Bushmen. The Cape Bushmen seldom exceed 5 ft. in height, the average stature being 4 ft. 9 in., and are dirty yellow in colour. Among the Tati Bushmen some individuals attain a height of 6 ft., but they are rare. The face of the typical Bushman is triangular in outline, flat in appearance, with weak chin, depressed nose, and prominent cheek-bones. The ears usually have no lobes, the hair is thinly scattered over the skull in small tufts, there is little or no beard, and the whole appearance of the face is wild and foxy. Most of these characteristics are shared by the Tati Bushmen. Their bodies are small but tightly built, and they are seldom fat. Steatopygy is common among them, as among the southern Bushmen. The whole Bush population of S. Africa probably does not exceed 10,000, of which the Tati people may number 1000. They are a fast vanishing race.

2. Culture and organization.—The Bushmen, as their name (originally given to them by the early Dutch settlers) implies, are a people of the open country, a race of hunting savages living largely in the Stone Age. Their love of freedom amounts to a passion, and they are passionate, irresponsible, courageous, and cruel. Consequently they have practically no tribal organization, and very little clan system, except in the sense that a particular portion of country was the possession of a certain clan, the families of which, under the leadership of a man of known prowess, would combine to defend it against intruders. But usually all that obtained was that the various families combined in the face of danger, under the strongest and most capable leader, and, once that passed, the combination came to an end. They do not cultivate the soil and have no domesticated animals except dogs. They therefore depend entirely upon the chase. Their dwellings are caves or holes in rocks, or shelters made of a few branches stuck in the ground, with skins or mats thrown over them, which they carry away with them when they migrate from the district. Their material civilization is thus very meagre, being restricted to what is absolutely necessary for the capture and cooking of game. A little coarse pottery is or was made, while ostrich egg shells are used to hold water. Beads of dried wild berries and necklaces made from disks cut from ostrich egg shells are worn by both men and women. Ear-rings made from pieces of bone or wood, or—since the white man came to the country—of metal, usually brass, are common. Leather arm- and leg-rings, together with fillets of skin round the head, into which are stuck ostrich and other feathers, are also worn. Clothing is scanty and generally consists of the skin of an animal thrown over the shoulders in cold weather. The women wear a small piece of skin with fringes in front, while the men are content with a narrow piece of skin passed between the legs and tied round the waist with sinew or cord. Children of both sexes go naked. In warm weather to prevent the sun from blistering the skin, and in winter to keep out the cold, they smear the body with fat, often rancid, so that they smell very offensively. Weapons of war and the chase are spears, bows and arrows, and throwing-sticks. The tips of the arrows are smeared with poison made from the Bushman's poison bush (*Acocanthera venenata*) and the two-rowed Amaryllis (*Amaryllis distichia*), mixed with snake poison, and in some cases with poisonous ants. The food of both sexes consists of the flesh of animals, locusts, larvæ of ants, called 'Bushman rice,' gum, and various tubers and seeds. For the collection of tubers an implement called the *!kibi* or *!kwe* is employed. It is a stout stick about 3 ft. long, upon which a round flat stone with a hole in the centre is fastened about 9 ins. from the end. This is the well-known digging stick, which is also used to excavate graves.

3. Mentality; artistic and moral life.—The Bush people as a whole are low in the scale of mental acquirements. They have an extensive knowledge of the outdoor world, especially of the habits of wild animals. They are wonderful as trackers and have a remarkable sense of direction. Their reflective faculties are not highly developed, although some of their paintings, and more especially their folk-tales and songs, are not wanting in this respect. The most interesting thing about the Bushmen is their artistic ability. They have left paintings upon the walls of caves and rocks and incised figures upon boulders all over the country. Most of these paintings or chippings indicate objects of the chase, the habits of animals,

[1] C. Meinhof, 'The Language of the Hottentots,' *Addresses and Papers read at the Joint Meeting of the British and South African Associations for the Advancement of Science*, South Africa, 1905, iii. 198.

or more rarely scenes of war and domestic life. The drawings of the wild animals are in many cases really well executed, though one can trace in places the gradual evolution of the art of painting. A fresco recently discovered in the Matopo Hills near Bulawayo is remarkable for its artistic merit. There is not much perspective in most of the paintings, while the execution as a whole reminds one of the paintings of the Old Stone Age. Certain paintings of figures are supposed to have a mythological signification, as they cannot be connected with animals or circumstances of the present day. Some caves were called after particular paintings—*e.g.*, the Cave of the Great Serpent, the Cave of the Lion—and hence were held in a certain degree of reverence by the people. To such caves they would periodically return as to a rallying-point to talk over their wild adventures. It has been suggested that the art of the Bushman is due to sympathetic magic, that this was the idea underlying it—in other words, that the Bushman painted the animals on the walls of his cave-dwelling to give him power over them in the field. While this is possible, and may be probable in some cases, there is not any good evidence of it. It has been maintained that paintings usually depict animals desirable for food, and that noxious animals are conspicuous by their absence. So far as Bushman paintings are concerned, this is not true. If animals such as lions, leopards, snakes, and rhinoceroses are to be considered noxious animals, they occur often enough on the paintings. But such animals are not undesirable as food to the Bushmen, as they eat practically everything, and certainly would not refuse to eat the flesh of a lion, unless it happened to be the totem of the hunter. On the whole the paintings reflect no more than the ordinary life of the people *plus* the caprice of the particular artist. At intervals of leisure—and the Bushmen, when food was plenty, had much of that—the scenes of the past would rise up in their minds, and they would attempt to visualize them by painting them on the rock, and by constant practice the faculty of drawing improved. The colours employed were yellow, brown, red, and sometimes white, and blue. Some of these paintings are ancient, and some are quite modern, as certain of the artists are or were recently alive. The faculty of drawing and painting was said to be hereditary in certain families. The theory has been advanced that the painters and sculptors belonged to different tribes, but there is no good reason for accepting this.

The Bushmen are passionately fond of dancing, more especially at full moon and at certain seasons of the year. Fires are lit outside their caves, and dancing is kept up all night, or until the performers are exhausted. Some of these dances, in which the performers paint their faces and bodies, are of a religious nature. Some of them are more or less coarse. Songs are sung by the leaders, and the other performers join in the chorus. The motions are not at all graceful. Some dances are called after animals—*e.g.*, the eland bull dance, the baboon dance, the bee dance, and the frog dance—and each has its own peculiar tune. The dancers give very good imitations of the animal in its different attitudes. The instruments used to accompany these dances are stringed instruments similar to an ordinary bow, with a tortoise-shell as a sound-box variously called *!kopo*, *!kangen*, and *‖gora*, 'reed,' 'flutes,' and 'drums.' The dancers have rattles round their ankles, made of the skin of the inside of the springbok's ear, with small pebbles inside to make as much sound as possible. Circumcision dances are performed after the boys have undergone the ceremony. These are of a distinctly religious character. Bushman music is, as might be expected, of a very primitive character—the melancholy and monotonous repetition of a few notes. It does not usually consist of more than six tones (which do not belong to our scale), but the strangeness and wildness of the melody give it a peculiar charm. There are other tunes which show some advance, especially one by the Natal Bushmen. Harmony does not exist.

The Bushmen have an extensive range of terms for family relationships, both male and female. Some of these are connected with tabus; *e.g.*, a mother-in-law must not see her son-in-law or mention his name; he, on his part, must not mention hers. The same rule applies to some other relations also. A woman must avoid mentioning the name of her husband or any of his near relatives. There are different terms for these relationships, but the system among the Bushmen is not nearly so perfect as that among the Australians.

Marriage is usually a very simple matter among the Bushmen, some of whom are monogamists and some polygamists, according to their individual worldly position. Two young people very often simply go off and live together, but usually the young man has to prove his prowess by going into the veld and slaying some wild animal—the strongest and fiercest he can find—and presenting the whole or a selected portion to the girl's father. Among some tribes this is considered indispensable before asking the hand of a girl in marriage. If the present is accepted, the marriage is complete. Sexual intercourse before marriage, while looked upon as a crime, is very often practised. Divorce too is simple. A man or woman leaves his or her partner and goes off with some one else. The custody of the children does not cause much trouble, as the young people are accustomed to fend for themselves at an early age. Parental control is thus exceedingly weak. Marriage usually takes place within the clan, but a man cannot marry a woman of the same family as his own—*i.e.* bearing his own surname. So far as we know, a man cannot take his own sister to wife, because of his totem, but he may take his sister-in-law. Although there is much freedom in the intercourse of the sexes, incest and adultery are regarded as crimes and are punished by death, usually by retaliation on the part of the injured person. Murder, theft, abduction, and especially witchcraft, are crimes against the Bushman moral code and are punished by fines, expulsion from the tribe, or even death in the case of persistent offenders. The old people, when too infirm to follow the family in its wanderings or unable to procure food for themselves, are left to die.

4. Totemism and religion.—As has been remarked, totemism exists among the Bushmen, especially among those tribes that have had long contact with the Bantu peoples, but they are too much the children of the wild to have developed it to any extent. Some call themselves the Zebra clan, or the Eland clan, or the Duiker clan, and, while they avoid killing and eating these animals or certain portions of them, they are not at all strict about the matter when pressed by hunger. In the case of the Duiker clan, the members may eat all of the animal except the heart. Those clans whose totem was the buffalo did not scruple to eat every portion of a domestic ox, although they might not eat every portion of a wild buffalo, even though they looked upon oxen as tame buffaloes.

They believe in a spirit which the northern tribes call Thora, and the southern !Kang or ‖Kaggen.

W. H. I. Bleek,[1] J. M. Orpen,[2] and others think that ! Kang is simply the mantis insect, for which they have a great reverence, but there does not seem to be great force in this contention. While it may be true of the Bushmen of Cape Colony, it is certainly not true of the Tati Bushmen. These tribes say that Thora is a spirit, that he sends the rain, the lightning (of which they are very much afraid), good weather, bad luck, and plenty. They are not very clear as to whether he is a person or not, but he is usually spoken of with dread, as a malevolent spirit, with whom it is advisable to keep on good terms. They also say that he made the animals, but they are not sure if he made the first men. The Tati Bushmen reverence the mantis to a certain extent, and do not like killing it if they can help it. All Bushmen have a great dread of death, and in common with many peoples believe that it is due to bewitchment by an enemy. Arbousset,[3] speaking of the Bushmen of Basutoland of his day, says that they looked upon death as a sleep. It is difficult to ascertain what they do really think on the subject, as they are so unwilling to speak of it at all. They also believe in some form of future life, but do not know what it is really like. They imagine that it does not differ much from the present life. This is shown by the burial customs of some tribes. They used to drag their dead into the surrounding bush to be devoured by wild animals, but generally they bury the bodies in a hole or cleft in a rock, which they carefully wall up, or they excavate a round hole about 3 or 4 ft. deep and place the dead man at the bottom in a sitting or lying position, with the legs doubled up to the chin, and in each case place beside him some food and his weapons of war. They generally indulge in a funeral feast afterwards, desert the locality, and never mention the dead man's name. Why they keep silence regarding the departed they cannot explain. Some tribes place the dead with his face to the rising sun; others observe no such custom.

The Tati Bushmen have no regular priests, but they have certain individuals, whom they call doctors, who possess a considerable knowledge of the properties and uses of wild plants, and thus exercise great influence over the people. This knowledge is sometimes confined to certain families, who jealously guard it. They have a considerable knowledge of vegetable poisons and have antidotes for them. Malicious poisoning does not often occur among them. Bushman doctors profess to cure malaria, typhoid, blackwater fever, dysentery, and other diseases, and, according to reliable information, are often successful. Most of the plants which they use are employed in religious ceremonies or in ordeals and trials for witchcraft. In fact, much, if not all, of the Bushman practice of medicine has a religious signification.

The Tati Bushmen, in common with most other Bushmen, practise circumcision. At present they perform the rite according to the Bechuana custom. Boys are operated upon at about the age of twelve years, development being rapid with them. A stone knife was formerly employed and still is by most tribes—a matter of necessity at first, but now a matter of custom, or of hygiene, as the knife is thrown away and a new one made for each ceremony. A number of boys of approximately the same age are operated upon at once. The method is as follows. The foreskin is pulled forward over the glans as far as it will stretch and then cut off with one slash of the knife. It quickly retracts and so prevents excessive bleeding, and usually heals rapidly. It is not known for certain whether the girls underwent the rite or not. The southern Bushmen cut off the last joint of the little finger of the right hand in the case of boys, and of the left hand in the case of girls. This was also a religious ceremony, but whether it took the place of circumcision or was additional thereto is still uncertain. Cutting off the joints of one or more fingers was also practised as a sign of mourning. The Tati Bushmen, whatever they may have done in the past, do not now practise finger-cutting.

5. Omens.—The great factor in the life of the Bushmen is their divining bones, commonly but erroneously called dice. The Bushmen would undertake no expedition without consulting them. They are four and sometimes five in number, and designated male and female. The female bone is usually longer than the male. They are made from the hoofs of animals, bone, horn, wood, or even the stones of wild fruits. Sometimes they are ornamented with designs on back or front. To consult them a man would clear a small space of ground, rub the bones with various kinds of medicine, blow upon them, and then cast them upon the ground. From their positions and conjunctions he divines what he wants to know, according to certain laws. If the result is unfavourable, it is useless for him to persevere in his object. Divination is also practised by means of the shoulder-blade of a springbok, and by certain other animals, such as the mantis, lion, jackal, and snake.

6. Spirits.—The Bushmen personify some animals and look upon them as men in another state of existence. They also believe that men, especially witch-doctors, can assume animal shapes at will and compel other people to do the same. This, they say, is to 'have power' over such victims. It has been held to indicate a belief in the transmigration of souls, but the point is very doubtful. They certainly believe in transformations of animals. The Tati Bushmen thoroughly believe in the existence of spirits, usually of a malevolent character, and, when closely questioned, admit that they can change their shapes at will, but they do not seem to believe that these spirits can be born again into other animal shapes. Lightning, wind, eddies of dust, storms, and other natural phenomena are looked upon as spirits. This is probably a relic of primitive man's belief that the animals and things about him were not different from himself—certainly to some extent the Bushman view. There are spirits of rivers, fountains, and thermal springs known to the Bushmen and much reverenced by them.

7. Mythology of the heavenly bodies.—The Bushmen have no regular system of mythology in the sense that the ancient Greeks or the modern Hindus have, but they have the elements of such. They are said to have worshipped the heavenly bodies and are therefore to be included among those people who attained to sidereal worship. Among the Tati Bushmen no special ceremonies are connected with these bodies, although it is evident from numerous tales in which the sun and moon appear that a considerable degree of reverence is paid to them. The new moon figures in many of their tales.

The moon is the shoe of the mantis. Her waxing and waning is explained as her dying and coming to life again. The Tati Bushmen have some of these tales in a more or less modified form; *e.g.*, one speaks of the moon coming down to wash her face in a pool of water. The Bushmen do not know why the sun is hot, and why there is no heat in the moon. Among the southern Bushmen the sun is spoken of as a little boy by the wayside; sometimes he is said to have been thrown into the sky by some children while he was sleeping. Again, the moon is spoken of as being cut by the sun and after death

[1] *A Brief Account of Bushman Folk Lore*, p. 6 ff.

[2] 'A Glimpse into the Mythology of the Malute Bushmen,' *Cape Monthly Magazine*, July, 1874, pp. 1-13.

[3] T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Relation d'un voyage d'exploration au nord-est de la Colonie du Cap de Bonne-Espérance*, p. 504.

carries away the people who are dead. Some of the Tati Bushmen say that the stars were once human beings and animals, and the Cape Bushmen speak of girls as having been turned into stars and flowers by the rain. Certain prominent stars have particular names among the Bushmen; *e.g.*, Jupiter is the Dawn's Heart; the Magellanic Clouds the Male and Female Steinbok, the Southern Cross the Giraffe Star (Tati Bushmen), Aldebaran the Male Hartebeest, Procyon the Male Eland, Orion's Belt the Female Tortoises. The origin of the stars is explained in the following manner. A girl of the early race, being angry with her mother because the latter asked her for a certain kind of food which she had put to roast in the fire, threw it together with the wood ashes that were upon it into the air. The food was changed into stars, and the ashes became the Milky Way. The rising of particular stars at certain seasons of the year was noted, as they were connected with the return of the seasons. Shooting stars were considered unlucky by the Tati Bushmen, and, if they appeared in great numbers, inspired terror.

8. Folk literature.—The Bushmen have a great body of folklore, mostly relating to animals and natural objects, customs, and so on, but next to none of a historical character, certainly none that throws much light on their origin and migrations. Not a tithe of those folk-tales have been garnered, and, as the race is a fast vanishing one, they will soon be completely lost. Bleek collected a large number of tales, and a selection from his great mass of materials was published in 1911 by his niece, Miss Lloyd. Smaller collections by Schultze, Theal, and Dornan have been issued. A study of these tales throws much light on the mental and moral outlook of the Bushmen.

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TATUING.—The word 'tatu' or 'tattoo,' meaning to mark or puncture the skin, is derived from the Tahitian word *tatau*, a reduplicated form of the root *ta*, 'to strike.' It was used by Captain Cook in the account of his visit to Tahiti:

'Both sexes paint their Bodys, *Tattow* as it is called in their Language. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins in such a manner as to be indelible.'[1]

Cook was thus the first to introduce the word to the civilized world of his day. Many writers since his time have included in the general term 'tatu' the practice of marking the skin with cicatrices; the two processes are, however, very different. Tatu proper is the insertion of pigment under the skin, whereby a practically permanent stain is produced, while cicatrization is the marking of the body, either by cutting or burning the skin in such a way as to cause scars forming small depressions or by cutting into the skin and keeping the wounds open, so that keloids, or raised scars, are formed, which stand out prominently from the surrounding tissue.

[1] *Journal during his First Voyage, 1768–71*, ed. W. J. Wharton, London, 1893, p. 93.

1. Antiquity and distribution.—Both these modes of personal decoration are of considerable antiquity and of wide distribution; they have been found among people of greatly varying culture, from the aborigines of Australia, who adorn their bodies with cicatrices, to the Polynesians and Japanese, who have developed tatu proper into a fine art. At a very early stage man no doubt felt a desire for personal decoration and learnt to use pigment for this purpose; and it is possible that tatu was resorted to as a means of giving a permanent character to the designs thus made to beautify the body at a stage prior to the use of clothes. Archæological evidence can, unfortunately, give us no direct proof of the existence of such a custom as tatu in pre-historic times, but it is well known that Aurignacian man was skilful in the use of colour. Déchelette suggests that the finely pointed implements found in Magdalenian deposits may have been used for tatuing. Referring to the practice among primitive peoples of cicatrization and tatu, he says:

'Les premiers habitants de l'Europe préhistorique s'ornaient le corps à l'aide des mêmes procédés, mais en général il nous est impossible de distinguer nettement pour cette période entre la teinture corporelle simple et le tatouage. C'est là un fait établi par des preuves indirectes mais décisives pour la fin des temps quaternaires, pour l'époque néolithique et le commencement tout au moins de l'âge du bronze.'[1]

In the pre-dynastic tombs of the old Egyptians excavated by Flinders Petrie, de Morgan, Amélineau, and others, some rude human figures have been found bearing marks that suggest the use of tatu—*e.g.*, the female figure discovered at Tukh.[2] In the second Theban empire the Egyptians tatued themselves on the breast or arms with the names or symbols of deities, but decorative tatu marks are rare on Egyptian remains of the classical period.[3] The prohibition in Lv 19[28], 'Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you,' indicates that the Jews had seen these practices carried on by the heathen nations among whom their lot was cast, and perhaps had themselves adopted them.

There are many classical allusions to tatu in Europe. Herodotus writes of the Thracian women being tatued as a sign of nobility.[4] Pliny[5] says that the men of the Dacians and Sarmatians marked their bodies ('corpora sua inscribunt'). That tatu was known to the Pictones and other tribes of Gaul is shown by the evidence from coins.[6] Chinese tradition says that the great Chinese hero Tschaipe found tatu among the Ainus of Japan, who indeed practise it to this day. In China it ceased at a very early time to be a desirable mode of decoration and survives only as a method of imposing a distinctive mark. A. T. Sinclair says that 'among the ancient natives in the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, tattooing was general if not almost universal.'[7] It was also practised by the early inhabitants of S. America, as notably among the coastal tribes of Ecuador and ancient Peru.[8] G. Elliot Smith finds it along the coast-lines of a great part of the world and includes it in the culture-complex of the 'heliolithic' track.[9] Darwin, in drawing attention to the universality of the custom among primitive peoples, said: 'Not one great country can be named, from the Polar regions in the north to New Zealand in the south, in which the aborigines do

[1] *Manuel d'Archéologie*, Paris, 1908–13, i. 203.
[2] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Naqada*, London, 1896, pl. 59. 6.
[3] J. Capart, *Les Débuts de l'art en Egypte*, Brussels, 1904, p. 32 f.
[4] v. 6. [5] *HN* xxii. 1.
[6] T. Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Cæsar*, Oxford, 1907, p. 418 ff.
[7] 'Tattooing of the American Indians,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xi. [1909] 399.
[8] T. A. Joyce, *S. American Archæology*, London, 1912, p. 61 f.
[9] *The Migrations of Early Culture*, London, 1915, p. 7.

not tattoo themselves.'[1] W. Joest goes so far as to say that no race or people exists that has not had the custom of either painting or tatuing the body.[2] On the other hand, some investigators have failed to find traces of cicatrization or tatu among certain primitive tribes, such as the Vedda of Ceylon,[3] the Mafulu of British New Guinea,[4] the Tati Bushmen,[5] and others; but this negative evidence does not rule out the possibility that such practices were once known to these people and have become lost arts. Cicatrization is mainly confined to dark-skinned races, while tatu proper prevails with those of lighter colour. Thus we find cicatrization in Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, Fiji, and other parts of Melanesia, in Torres Straits islands, among the Papuans of New Guinea, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakai), the Andaman Islands, and in negro Africa. It has been superseded in S. America by tatu proper, but has been observed among the Caribs of Guiana and in Brazil. The light-coloured races who have practised tatu proper include the Maoris of New Zealand and the inhabitants of the other islands of Polynesia. It is also found in Melanesia, Micronesia, the Malay Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, India, among the Tibeto-Burman peoples in general (but rare in Tibet), and in Japan. In Africa it is found in Algeria, in Egypt, among the For, the Tushilang, the Namaqua Hottentots, and other tribes, but it is by no means so widely distributed in this continent as cicatrization. On the other hand, tatu proper was very prevalent in the New World, especially among the Indian tribes of N. America, such as the Iroquois, the Pricked Pawnees, the Delawares, and others. It is used extensively at the present day by the Haida Indians of the N.W. American coast, and also by the Eskimo, and in S. America, notably among the Mundrucu and Guaycura tribes.

Tatuing is said to be one of the chief occupations of the Oriental gypsies. Sinclair found that most of the tatuing among the lower orders in Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and some parts of Persia was done by them. They also tatu themselves, and in this they differ from European gypsies, for these do not wear tatu marks. 'Hence their tattooing is an easy mode of identifying Oriental gipsies, who are often seen in all parts of Europe and America.'[6] At the present day tatuing persists in Europe among the lower classes. Lombroso made a comparative study of tatu among soldiers and criminals, and concluded that it was especially prevalent among the latter. He noted that the designs in criminal tatu are often extremely complex and of a cynical and obscene character.[7] There was a considerable revival of tatu among the soldiers and sailors serving with the British forces in the recent war. A revival, too, has been evident in Japan since 1881, when tatu ceased to be a penal offence and came once more into vogue, with the result that it is now an elaborate art.[8] Apart from these and similar isolated revivals, tatu is, on the whole, rapidly declining, especially in Polynesia, once the centre of a highly developed system of tatu. This change is due, no doubt, in a great measure to the action of the missionaries, who have discouraged the practice, because of the orgies that often accompanied the tatuing operations.

2. Methods and implements.—The methods and implements used to produce these marks on the body vary considerably in different parts of the world and often reflect the cultural conditions of the people among whom they have been found. It is impossible here to do more than indicate briefly some of the more striking variations of the processes which have been recorded and add a few examples by way of illustration.

1 *Descent of Man*, London, 1871, ii. 339.
2 *Tätowiren, Narbenzeichnen, und Körperbemalen*, Berlin, 1887, p. 45.
3 C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 207.
4 R. W. Williamson, *The Mafulu Mountain People of British New Guinea*, London, 1912, p. 36.
5 S. S. Dornan, 'The Tati Bushmen,' *JRAI* xlvii. [1917] 44.
6 *Amer. Anth.*, new ser., x. [1908] 361.
7 C. Lombroso, 'Criminal Anthropology,' in *20th Century Practice of Medicine*, London, 1897, xii. 382 ff.
8 B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[5], London, 1891, p. 399 ff.

(*a*) *Cicatrization.*—In Central Africa prominent keloids are formed by detaching a piece of skin, which is raised and held by a pellet of tow till the wound is healed. A. L. Cureau alludes to 'dandies of the Upper Ubangi and Equatorial Congo' who undergo this operation as a means of obtaining 'the prominent crest which gives them a fierce expression.'[1] Irritant substances are sometimes rubbed into the incisions to prevent the wounds from healing too rapidly. Among the Bageshu, a Bantu people on the south and south-east slopes of Mt. Elgon, the girls use a crescent-shaped flesh hook sharpened to a needle point at one end. Scars are formed on the forehead and stomach by pinching up the flesh between the thumb and finger and running the hook through it; fine dust from a wood fire is then rubbed into the wounds.[2] Natives from the interior of Mozambique wear marked *rugæ* on the forehead.

These are formed 'by making vertical incisions in the skin, rubbing in a medicine, and then binding tightly with a cloth, so that wrinkles are formed in the line of the incision.'[3]

Cicatrization begins with the Andamanese at the age of eight and continues at intervals until the sixteenth or eighteenth year is reached. It is usually done by women, who use a flake of quartz or glass held between the forefinger and thumb. The arms and back are marked first, while fasting, and afterwards the chest, abdomen, and legs, but never the face; the special tribal marks are, in some tribes, made by men with a pig arrow. Pork is not eaten while the wounds are healing; and the northern tribes have certain ceremonies connected with the operation.[4] The aborigines of Central Australia cut the skin with flakes of flint or glass and rub in ashes or the down of the eagle-hawk.[5] At Port Essington (N. Territory of Australia) scars are formed by burning the flesh with a red-hot stick.[6] In N.W. Queensland they are made by lighting charcoal on the flesh and allowing it to burn there. The implements used in Melanesia differ in different islands; *e.g.*, in the Solomons the circular or chevron-shaped cicatrices worn by both sexes on the face are made with the claw of the flying fox,[7] while in Florida Island the pattern is 'marked out in circles with a bamboo, and the skin is cut with the bone of a bat's wing.'[8] The keloids and scars called *kotto*, which are customary in New Britain, are made with obsidian flakes.[9]

(*b*) *Tatu proper.*—A method which seems to suggest a combination of cicatrization and tatu proper is that of cutting the flesh and rubbing pigment into the wounds. Livingstone says of the Makoa (Makua) of Central Africa, who have double lines of keloids on the face: 'After the incisions are made, charcoal is rubbed in and the flesh pressed out, so that all the cuts are raised above the level of the surface.'[10] The charcoal gives a bluish tinge to the skin, 'and the ornament shows brightly in persons of light complexion, who by the by are common.'[11] The Ainu women of Yezo (Japan) cut gashes on the face with a sharp knife and rub in soot from burnt birch-bark, which

1 *Savage Man in Central Africa*, tr. E. Andrews, London, 1915, p. 169.
2 J. Roscoe, 'Notes on the Bageshu,' *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 186.
3 G. A. Turner, 'Tribal Marks of S. African Natives,' *Transvaal Medical Journal*, Feb. 1911, p. 13.
4 E. H. Man, *Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, p. 112.
5 Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 41 f.
6 B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the N. Territory of Australia*, London, 1914, p. 9.
7 C. M. Woodford, *A Naturalist among the Head-Hunters*, London, 1890, p. 31.
8 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 237.
9 R. Parkinson, *Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee*, Stuttgart, 1907, p. 145.
10 D. Livingstone, *Last Journals in Central Africa*, London, 1874, i. 33.
11 *Ib.* i. 49 f.

produces a bluish-black effect.[1] This method has also been observed in some of the islands of Micronesia.

The implements used for pricking the skin range in complexity from such simple natural objects as thorns, fish spines, cactus spikes, shells, and bones, to the elaborate metal appliance of the Burmese and the steel and electric needles of Japan and Europe in use at the present day. The Roro-speaking tribes of British New Guinea obtain the desired effect by very simple means. The operator, who is generally an old woman, applies colouring matter—soot mixed with water—with a fragment of wood frayed out at one end to form a coarse brush. The colour is pricked in by means of a pricker having one or more thorns set at right angles to its long axis; these thorns are driven into the skin by tapping the pricker gently with a small wooden mallet. The women of these tribes are tatued from head to foot, but the operation takes place at intervals, and there is a regular order in which the different parts of the body must be tatued; thus the hands and arms are done in childhood, and later the tatu is gradually increased until at marriageable age it is applied to the buttocks, legs, and last of all to the face.[2] The Polynesian method of tatuing is generally to trace the design on the skin first with charcoal and then to follow the pattern with a small adze-shaped implement furnished with a serrated bone edge. The skin is perforated by hammering or tapping this implement with another made of wood and shaped like a paddle. But the ways and means employed vary a good deal in the South Sea Islands, and the operation is often accompanied by much ceremonial and feasting, and the keeping of certain tabus; *e.g.*, brides in the Fiji, while being tatued, are *tabu siga*, and are kept in seclusion, for they must not see the sun.[3] In New Zealand a very strict tabu has to be observed by the person undergoing the ordeal; he may not communicate with any one not in the same condition, nor may he touch his food. The Maori chief had to be fed through a special funnel during the process, which entailed a good deal of ceremonial of a somewhat religious character. The Maori tatu, or *moko*, was of two kinds, of which the older method was a cutting into the skin with a small chisel-like tool made of sea-bird's wing-bones, shark's teeth, stones, or hard wood, and of different sizes and shapes. The edge of the chisel was applied to the skin and tapped by a small mallet, which sometimes had a broad flattened surface at one end used to wipe away the blood. This chiselling process was superseded by prick tatu, which was done with small-toothed or serrated implements dipped in colouring matter obtained either from charcoal mixed with oil or dog's fat or burnt and powdered resin.[4] In Borneo the design is pressed on to the skin with a tatu block dipped in pigment made from a mixture of soot and sugar-cane juice. The needle points of the pricker, which are also charged with pigment, are then driven into the skin by taps from a striker. Among the Kayans the men carve the designs on the blocks, but the tatu is done by women. The artists are under the protection of a tutelary spirit to whom sacrifices must be made, and the operator has to avoid certain foods. The women are tatued in a hut built for the purpose; their male relatives are dressed in bark-cloth and must remain indoors until the operation is completed; in fact it cannot be commenced unless their men-folk are at home.

[1] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 24.
[2] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 265.
[3] T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*[3], London, 1870, p. 146.
[4] Major-Gen. Robley, *Moko: Maori Tattooing*, London, 1896, pp. 47, 62.

It is prohibited to tatu women at seed-time, or if a dead body lies unburied in the house, and bad dreams, such as 'a dream of floods, foretelling much blood-letting, will also interrupt the work.'[1] In Burma the outline of the desired pattern is roughly sketched on the skin with a camel's hair brush and is then pricked in by a series of punctures close together, which merge into a rough line. The pricker is of an unusual kind, being two feet long and weighted at the top with a brass or lead figure; the pigment is contained in a style four inches long, which fits into a hollow pipe and is thus joined to the weighted end.[2] In Japan steel needles of four different sizes are used; the effect of shading is procured by tying rows of needles together. Sepia, vermilion, and Prussian blue are used in the designs, which are very ornate.[3] In some parts of N. America the pigmented effect is obtained by running a needle-like implement through the skin threaded with some material coated in pigment.

This method was followed by the Salish tribes, who used a 'needle of fish-bone or a cactus spike, which passed a fine thread coated with charcoal under the skin,' or sometimes the charcoal was carried on an unthreaded needle, 'which was thrust under the skin in a horizontal direction.'[4]

The Eskimo use a needle and thread smeared with soot or gun-powder. Thus, speaking of the personal appearance of the Greenlanders, D. Crantz says:

'No one . . . is a finished beauty till the skin of her cheeks, chin, hands and feet, has been threaded by a string smeared with soot, which when drawn out leaves a black mark. The mother performs this painful operation on her daughter in childhood, fearful that she will else attract no husband. This custom obtains among the Indians of North America, and various Tartar tribes, where both sexes practise it; the one to heighten their charms, the other to inspire terror.'[5]

3. **Patterns.**—A detailed study of the patterns would doubtless yield results of considerable ethnological interest as pointing to the migrations and culture-contact of peoples. Flinders Petrie[6] has drawn attention to the resemblance between the Algerian patterns described by Lucien Jacquot[7] and those on the female figure found at Tukh and on the Libyans in the tomb of Seti I. (XIXth dynasty, 1300 B.C.). The dominating designs in Algeria are a cross and a figure resembling a fly, which are thought to be degenerate forms of the swastika—a device widely distributed in Africa and elsewhere, and of great antiquity, as is shown by its appearance on a leaden figure[8] in the second city of Troy (about 2500–2000 B.C.) and by its prevalence in ancient Crete. The designs in favour among the Haida tribes on the north-west coast of America are similar to those on their boats, house-fronts, pillars, and monuments, and include family crests and totemic symbols such as the thunder-bird, wolf, bear, codfish, and so on. There is a great variation in the patterns of the Polynesian tatu, for almost every island has some distinctive characteristic of its own. The Marquesans, *e.g.*, tatu in broad straight lines. Many of their signs suggest a hieroglyphic system which can be interpreted only by their priests; in Anaa, however, sea-urchins and quaint zoophytes are well represented on the leg and thigh. The Marquesan women have a design somewhat resembling a gridiron tatued on their lips.[9] In Tahiti the patterns are simpler, but of greater taste and elegance than those of the Marquesas Islands.

[1] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, i. 245–277.
[2] Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*[3], London, 1896, pp. 39, 41.
[3] Chamberlain[3], p. 401.
[4] C. Hill-Tout, *British N. America*, i., 'The Far West,' London, 1907, p. 74.
[5] *Hist. of Greenland*, Eng. tr., London, 1820, i. 129.
[6] *L'Anthropologie*, xi. [1900] 485.
[7] 'Les Tatouages des indigènes de l'Algérie,' *L'Anthropologie*, x. [1899] 434.
[8] H. Schliemann, *Ilios*, London, 1880, p. 337 f.
[9] F. W. Christian, *E. Pacific Lands*, London, 1910, pp. 197, 199.

The coco-nut tree is a favourite object, and figures of men, animals, and flowers also occur, as well as stars, circles, and lozenges.[1] The Maori tatu stands out in striking contrast to that of the rest of Polynesia, its chief feature being the blending of spirals and sweeping curves, which follow the conformation of the human form, the face being generally completely covered. This prevalence of curved lines suggests Melanesian influence; for Polynesian tatu is generally rectilinear in character. Melanesian tatu is often asymmetrical, perhaps because it is done at different times and by different artists. Here again the patterns are very diverse and suggest, as regards some islands, Polynesian influence. Each of the three principal centres of tatu proper in New Guinea has peculiarities of design and execution; thus, curved lines prevail in Humboldt Bay instead of the broader stripes of the south coast, and in the central district the designs used in tatu resemble those on the pipes and gourds, which show a preponderance of straight lines over curves and an absence of human or animal forms. The Motu (Port Moresby) and kindred tribes are said to have a geometrical art, and their tatu is angular in character, but there seems to be good evidence that many of their designs were naturalistic in origin and became conventionalized later.[2] In the Admiralty Islands the men wear cicatrices on chest and shoulders in the form of circular spots of the size of half-a-crown. Tatu proper is mainly confined to the women, who have rings round the eyes and all over the face, and diagonal lines on the upper part of the front of the body crossing one another so as to form lozenge-shaped spaces.[3]

Complicated serial designs are worn by the women in Borneo. The fingers and feet are done at the age of ten, the forearm at eleven, the thighs partly at twelve, being finished at puberty; it is thought immodest to be tatued after motherhood. The men have isolated designs, such as the dog design, in elongated or rosette form—a device prominent in Kayan art and one that can be traced in the shoulder tatu of many of the tribes including the Barawans (Sarawak). The most primitive tatu in Borneo is that of the Uma Long women of Batang Kayan; it is stippled in—on the forearm only—in irregular dots. Indigenous patterns are done by freehand, no blocks being used for them. The thigh tatu in Borneo produces the effect of tight-fitting breeches, and resembles that found among the Burmese and some of the Naga tribes. The latter have an elaborate face tatu called *ak*, formed of continuous lines across the forehead, round and underneath the eyes, over the cheeks, to the corners of the mouth and the chin. 'Rows of spots follow the outside lines, and two fine lines mark out the nose in a large diamond space.' With the Nagas both sexes tatu, but some tribes do not mark the face, and have the tatu placed on the breast, shoulders, back, wrists, and thighs.[4] The Burmese tatu generally from the waist to the knees, but among the Shans it extends from the neck to the feet. The designs include mystic squares, triangles, and a great variety of animals. The old or jungle style was to cover the skin with tracery producing an indefinite effect; the new style is distinct in outline.[5] Perhaps the most highly developed tatu is that of the Japanese, who cover the body with fantastic figures of dragons, birds, flowers, and landscapes, in a manner that recalls the patterns on their silks.

[1] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1831, i. 265 f.
[2] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 83.
[3] H. N. Moseley, 'On the Inhabitants of the Admiralty Islands,' *JAI* vi. [1876] 401.
[4] R. G. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called Naga Hills,' *JAI* xi. [1881] 208.
[5] Shway Yoe[2], p. 41 f.

4. Use and significance.—(*a*) *Magico-religious.*—The use and significance of these marks were manifold, and they have played an important part in the life of primitive man, since they had a magico-religious as well as a social aspect. Their widespread use, even at the present day, as a magical protection against sickness and other misfortunes shows a very general belief in their supernatural efficacy. The Yuin tribe of S.E. Australia wear vertical cicatrizations round the upper arm to make boomerangs glance off.[1] In Timorlaut scars are made with red-hot stones on the arms and shoulders in imitation of smallpox marks to ward off that disease.[2] The Andamanese believe that cicatrization is good for rheumatism, toothache, headache, paralysis, epilepsy, and phthisis; it is resorted to for these and other ailments when all else fails. The Todas use it to cure the pains caused by milking buffaloes. Tatu proper is a remedy for rheumatism much in favour with the men of the Halba caste, who work on the lands in the south of the Raipur District and the Kānker and Bastar States in India; its action is probably that of a counter-irritant.[3] The Gonds and Baigas have a number of designs for the protection of different parts of the body, including a figure of the monkey-god Hanuman to give strength, of Bhimsen's club to assist digestion, of the foot-god to cure pain, and so on.[4] The Burman has similar safeguards worn on all parts of the body; they are a protection against wounds and secure freedom from pain, and are sufficiently potent to procure even the favour of princes. The only tatu worn by the Burmese women is a love-charm in the form of a triangle between the eyes or on the lips or tongue; it is done with the 'drug of tenderness'—a mixture of vermilion with herbs and other ingredients such as the skin of trout-spotted lizards.[5] The Shans tatu boys as a test of courage, but special designs are added to prevent injuries or other mishaps. In Borneo the Kayan men wear a special tatu on the wrist called *lukut*, which keeps away illness. The *lukut* is a much-valued bead, which was formerly fastened on the wrist of the sick man to 'tie in' the soul; but, as the bead was liable to be lost, a tatued representation of it came to be worn instead. The Ainu women are tatued on the lips and arms to keep away the demons of disease, who are thus led to believe they are the wives of the gods, since these are all tatued in this manner. If an epidemic occurs in a village, the women must tatu each other; they also use tatuing as a remedy for failing eyesight.[6]

Many races believe that the efficacy of tatu marks extends beyond the present life to that of the next world, where they serve as marks of identification—*e.g.*, Nāgas of Manipur, Kayans of Borneo, N. American Indians, and many others—or as a guide, or as currency enabling the traveller to accomplish his journey.

The Dhanwār, who inhabit the wild hilly country adjoining Chotā Nāgpur, say that tatu marks 'remain on the soul after death, and that she shows them to God, probably for purposes of identification.'[7]

Women of the Brāhman caste believe that after death they will be able to sell the ornaments tatued on their bodies and to subsist on the proceeds. In Africa a similar belief is found among the Ekoi women, who think that in the next world they can exchange their scars for food, and that the ghost is able to remove them one by one for this

[1] Howitt, p. 746.
[2] H. O. Forbes, 'On the Ethnology of Timor-laut,' *JAI* xiii. [1883] 10.
[3] R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iii. 200.
[4] *Ib.* iii. 124–127.
[5] Shway Yoe[2], p. 45.
[6] Batchelor, p. 23 f.
[7] Russell, ii. 386.

purpose.[1] The Eskimo and the Fijians believe in Elysium only for the tatued; the Fijian women who have not these marks are said to be served up as food for the gods. Some investigators have insisted upon a considerable religious element in tatu, since the operation is often accompanied by sacrifice, prayer, and other religious ceremonies, and the designs frequently represent sacred animals, or other objects that may be regarded as symbols of gods. These serve to express a close union between the god and his disciple; hence the need for certain tabus to avoid the dread consequences of contact with persons in this dangerous state. The priest of the Ewe-speaking people of W. Africa has special tatu marks indicating the deity whom he serves and the rank that he holds in the priestly order; the shoulder marks in this case are so sacred that they must not be touched by the laity.[2] In San Domingo the priests did not wear a distinctive dress, but had a figure of a *zemi* (idol) tatued or painted on their bodies.[3] Tatuing was regarded by many people as a sacred profession, and the artists were under the special protection of deities of the craft. In Tahiti these were the children of Taaroa, the principal deity; their images were kept in the temples of those who practised the art professionally, prayers being addressed to them by the operator before he began his work. The Tahitians say that tatuing originated among the gods, and there are legends in Samoa and elsewhere telling of its sacred origin.

(*b*) *Informatory.*—To people who do not possess a system of writing the wearing of permanent and distinctive body-marks is not merely an æsthetic advantage, but in many cases a real necessity. Used extensively by uncultured peoples, these marks became a convenient means of conveying to their fellow-men all kinds of information concerning their activities and environment. They serve as a record of achievement and a means of identifying a man's tribe, clan, totem, social status, age-grade, and so on; and they have been regarded by some authors as a primitive form of writing.[4] Thus, in Africa cicatrization is a common form of tribal mark, the scars being worn on the face or on other parts of the body and arranged in a certain pattern. The Shilluk, Dinka, Dahoman, Mxosa, Mtyopi, and Hausa tribes are among those who follow this practice. Scars are used for the same purpose in the Andaman Islands, and in Melville and Bathurst Islands of N. Australia. Ellis, writing of the Maoris of New Zealand, says that their faces were much tatued:

'Each chief had thus imprinted on his face the marks and involutions peculiar to his family or tribe; while the figures tatued on the faces of the dependants or retainers, though fewer in number, were the same in form as those by which the chief was distinguished.'[5]

Even individual Maoris could be identified by special marks which were tatued on the face—usually near the ear—in addition to the general pattern. These came to be used as the signature of the wearer and have been accepted as such on documents relating to transactions carried on between the Maoris and white men.

The Salish and Dené tribes of N. America have markings—generally on the breast—symbolic of the totem or *manitu* of the individual wearing them. The Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands have their family totems or crests tatued on their bodies with great skill. The designs are often very elaborate and resemble those on the totem-posts that stand outside their houses. A. C. Haddon records an instance of the use of cicatrization to represent the totemic device in the Torres Straits, where he saw some women wearing it cut into their backs. He was told that the men wore it cut into the shoulder or calf of the leg.[1]

The Kavuya Indians of California formerly used the tatu designs worn by a landowner as a property mark by cutting or painting them upon trees and posts selected to indicate the boundaries. It was customary for the Maidu women to have a red spot tatued on the forehead by which, if taken prisoners in war, they could be identified by friends and so ransomed.[2]

A curious use of tatu occurs in the well-known story in Herodotus of the slave who was sent from Susa to Aristagoras of Miletus by Histiæus with instructions that he was to be shaved, and that Aristagoras should look at his head; this being done, it was found that a message had been tatued on the man's head, urging Aristagoras to revolt against the Persians.[3]

Cicatrization and tatu proper are included in the puberty rites and initiation ceremonies of many primitive peoples. In an account of one of these ceremonies in Australia Spencer and Gillen report:

'The final ceremony of initiation to manhood in the Urabunna tribe is called Wilyaru, and the same name is given to men who have passed through it. The most important part of the ceremony consists in making cuts on the back, one in the middle line of the neck and four or six others down each side of the backbone.'[4]

In the Marquesas Islands tatu proper was the principal initiatory rite.

In Samoa 'until a young man was tattooed, he was considered in his minority. He could not think of marriage, and he was constantly exposed to taunts and ridicule, as being poor and of low birth, and having no right to speak in the society of men. But as soon as he was tattooed he passed into his majority and considered himself entitled to the respect and privileges of mature years.'[5]

It sometimes marked the admission to secret societies, as in the Banks Islands (Melanesia), where at the performance of the *kole-kole* ceremonies the head of the *tamate* design adopted by members of the society is tatued on the wrist, a part of the body highly valued.[6] Mary H. Kingsley says of the initiation of boys in Africa:

'The boy, if he belongs to a tribe that goes in for tattooing, is tattooed, and handed over to instructors in the societies' secrets and formulæ.'[7]

In New Zealand tatuing began with both sexes at puberty, the women being tatued chiefly on the lips and chin.[8] Chin tatu on women signifies marriage, not only in New Zealand, but also among the Eskimo, the Chukchi, the Indians of the Pacific Coast, and in Syria, Egypt, and Tunis. Women are usually tatued at puberty. This is not, however, always the case, for in some of the islands of Fiji and among the Todas of the Nilghiris it is deferred until they have borne children, while with some races it is begun in infancy and completed at marriage. Only women are tatued among the Chukchi, most Californian tribes, the Ainus of Japan, and in many parts of India. In the Omaha tribe of N. America tatu marks on women signified great honour and a rank equal to that of a chief. Bachofen saw in the limitation of tatu to women among the Thracians an expression of their distinction and good social position.[9] This is contrary to the view taken by Plutarch, who said that the Thracians tatued their wives as a punishment to avenge the murder of Orpheus. In

[1] P. Amaury Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, London, 1912, p. 203.
[2] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, p. 146.
[3] T. A. Joyce, *Central American and West Indian Archæology*, London, 1916, p. 195.
[4] H. Wuttke, *Gesch. der Schrift und des Schrifttums*, i., 'Die Entstehung der Schrift,' Leipzig, 1872, p. 101.
[5] *Polynesian Researches*[2], iii. 354.

[1] *Evolution in Art*, London, 1895, p. 252.
[2] W. J. Hoffman, *The Beginnings of Writing*, London, 1895, pp. 37, 39.
[3] v. 35.
[4] *Across Australia*, London, 1912, i. 24.
[5] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 88.
[6] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 134.
[7] *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, p. 530.
[8] Robley, p. 33.
[9] *Das Mutterrecht*, Stuttgart, 1861, p. 336.

Melanesia, where tatu is mainly confined to women, their social position is very inferior, whereas in Polynesia it is comparatively good, and they are seldom tatued. But it is questionable whether there is any necessary correlation between the tatuing of women and their position in the social scale. The limitation of tatu to one sex or the other may be due to other causes; *e.g.*, it is possible that in the South Seas it may be connected with the migrations of different peoples.[1]

The social rank and profession of men are often indicated by their tatu marks, as in the case of the Maori chief who wore a complicated face tatu, and the Creek Town king who was marked in blue with figures of the sun, moon, and stars, animals, landscapes, and even battle-scenes. It has already been noted that priests sometimes had distinctive tatu marks. In some parts of India they serve as an indication of caste. All Gowari men—a herdsman caste of the Marātha country—are tatued with a vertical line on the forehead, the possession of this mark securing admission to the caste feasts.

Among some Indians of Brazil the executioner, or *matador*, was scarified above the elbows by the chief of the clan 'so as to leave a permanent mark there; and this was the star and garter of their ambition, . . . the highest badge of honour. There were some who cut gashes in their breast, arms and thighs, on these occasions, and rubbed a black powder in, which left an indelible stain.'[2]

The wearing of tatu marks proved a convenient method of recording, among other things, great achievements demanding personal valour and skill. The Koita tribes of British New Guinea have a special tatu for homicides.[3] Those of the Baronga (Bantu) who have slain an enemy used to be decorated with special marks from one eyebrow to the other:

'Dreadful medicines were inoculated in the incisions and there remained pimples "which gave them the appearance of a buffalo when it frowns."'[4]

On the Mendalam river in Borneo, the Kayans reserve thigh tatu for head-taking braves. With the Western Eskimo the men are tatued as a sign of distinction. Those who have captured whales have marks to show this, so that their tatu becomes a kind of whale tally.[5]

In many countries it is not only a record of great events, but also a memorial of the dead. In the Saibai and Dauan Islands (Torres Straits) the women wear a shoulder scar for a brother's death; it represents his nose, and the longer the nose, the longer the scar.[6]

In New Zealand 'the women were the chief mourners at funerals. . . . The custom was, in days gone by, that they should gash their faces, neck, arms, and bodies with sharp shells until they streamed with blood; the *naruhu* or moko-dye was sometimes applied to the wounds, and the stains commemorated the scenes at which the women assisted.'[7]

In Polynesia the tongue was tatued as a sign of mourning. Ellis saw this operation performed in a house where a number of chiefs had assembled for the purpose, and has described the tatuing of Queen Rihoriho's tongue after the death of her mother-in-law.

(c) *Decorative.*—Perhaps the most general use to which tatu has been put is that of personal adornment. Ellis, after noting that tatu was used in Polynesia as a badge of mourning and a kind of historical record, adds: 'But it was adopted by the greater number of people merely as a personal ornament; and tradition informs us that to this it owes its existence.'[8] Among the Kayans of Borneo, who have a very artistic style of tatu, the men affect it chiefly for ornament: so do the women in Greenland, New Zealand, and elsewhere. In fact both sexes in many parts of the world attach to it considerable æsthetic value. In regard to cicatrization among the Andamanese, Man says that it is primarily for ornament and secondarily to prove courage in enduring pain. It seems evident that in the Torres Straits islands it was adopted as a means of acquiring a certain accepted standard of beauty, for Haddon says that the women had a Λ-shaped scar to prevent the breasts from becoming too pendulous.[1] This fashion is also found on the neighbouring coasts of New Guinea and was observed by Seligman among the Otati, an Australian tribe on the east coast of Cape York.

In contrast with the opinions expressed in the writings of Waitz-Gerland[2] and others in reference to the religious significance of tatu, Joest and Westermarck see in it only an expression of man's vanity and love of adornment: 'At present tattooing is everywhere regarded exclusively, or almost exclusively, as a means of decoration, and Cook states expressly that, in the South Sea Islands, at the time of their discovery, it was in no way connected with religion.'[3] Westermarck admits, however, that it has been made to subserve many purposes, but adds: 'Nevertheless, it seems to be beyond doubt that men and women began to ornament, mutilate, paint, and tattoo themselves chiefly in order to make themselves attractive to the opposite sex,—that they might court successfully, or be courted.'[4] Wundt suggests that the marks at first gave magical protection against evil powers, but gradually became merely decorative, and were used to make the personality of the wearer more striking, as in the case of warriors, who wore them to increase their terrifying aspect.[5] On the other hand, E. Grosse thinks the priority should be given to the taste for embellishment, and that the marks only later came to have a tribal or social significance: 'Summarizing the results of our investigations of the significance of primitive scarification and tattooing, we find that the marks serve partly as tribal tokens and have perhaps as such sometimes a religious meaning, although this cannot be proved for a single instance. But in other and the largest number of cases the scars and tattoo marks are for ornament.'[6]

5. Origin and development.—Many theories have been put forward to account for the origin and development of the practice of thus marking the human body: as regards the origin, however, they must remain, for lack of evidence, little more than mere speculations. Instances have been known of involuntary tatu occurring among mechanics and other workmen, who have accidentally grazed or cut themselves while handling charcoal or other colouring matter. Primitive man may have arrived at the notion of tatu by accident, such as the pricking of a finger by a half-burnt splinter or thorn while kindling a fire. The unusual mark thus made might well excite his interest and so lead to an attempt at imitation and to elaboration and invention. Herbert Spencer thought that the practice arose from the custom of making blood-offerings to departed spirits, and that the marks thus made expressed subordination to or close union with them, and became in many instances tribal marks, 'as they would of course become if they were originally made when men bound themselves by blood to the dead founder of the tribe.'[7] In this connexion F. B. Jevons writes:

'The marks or scars left on legs or arms from which blood had been drawn were probably the origin of tattooing, as has occurred to various anthropologists. Like most other ideas, we may add, that of tattooing must have been forced on man; it was not his own invention, and, being a decorative idea, it must have followed the laws which regulate the development of all decorative art. . . . So the scars from ceremonial blood-letting may have suggested a figure; the resemblance was deliberately completed; and next time the scars were from the beginning designedly arranged to form a pattern.'[8]

[1] Rivers, ii. 436-438.
[2] R. Southey, *The Hist. of Brazil*[2], London, 1822, i. 232.
[3] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 130.
[4] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912-13, i. 454.
[5] J. Murdoch, 9 *REEW* [1887-88], p. 139.
[6] *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901-12, iv. 26.
[7] Robley, p. 45.
[8] *Polynesian Researches*[2], i. 262.

[1] *Rep. Camb. Anthrop. Exped. to Torres Straits*, iv. 16 f.
[2] *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859-72, iv. 33-38.
[3] E. Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*, London, 1894, p. 171 f.
[4] *Ib.* p. 172.
[5] *Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1900-09, v. 174.
[6] *Beginnings of Art*, Eng. tr., New York, 1897, p. 80.
[7] *The Principles of Sociology*, London, 1893-96, ii.[3] 71 f.
[8] *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 172.

M. Neuberger regards tatu as one of the popular customs that have sprung from primitive therapeutics: 'Smearing the skin with earth led to painting the body, and scarification of wounds and rubbing in the earth or rust (according to whether the pain was to be lessened or increased) developed into tattooing.'[1] Wundt, Joest, and others see a possible causal connexion between body-painting and tatuing and suggest that the latter was a crude attempt to fix the designs once painted on the body. Wundt regards both these practices as specific stages in primitive art; and in tatu he recognizes two types, the one being a crude system of simple marks often intensifying the natural lines of the body, and the other a stage in which the skin is treated as a material to work on—just as sand or rock is used for drawing upon—when the simpler marks are replaced by fantastic symbols. Capart points out the practical importance of replacing temporary marks by permanent ones, if they have a special meaning attached to them: 'Les dessins que le primitif se peint sur la peau n'ont aucun caractère de persistence et l'on peut à volonté les faire disparaître et les remplacer par d'autres. Il peut y avoir parfois intérêt à les rendre indélébiles, lorsqu'ils sont, par exemple, des marques de tribus ou des marques religieuses. De là naît la coutume de tatouage.'[2]

Concerning the origin of *moko*, or Maori tatu, native tradition says that the first settlers marked their faces for battle with charcoal, and later these warlike decorations were made permanent to save trouble. 'Hence arose the practice of carving the face and the body with dyed incisions.'[3]

How difficult and well-nigh impossible it is to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the early history of such a custom may be gathered from the admission of W. Ellis, who, after many years of personal contact with, and careful observation of, the natives of the Polynesian islands, said in reference to their tatu: 'Although practised by all classes I have not been able to trace its origin.'[4]

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the footnotes. In addition to the works there mentioned the following may be consulted: C. Hose and R. Shelford, 'Materials for a Study of Tatu in Borneo,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 60 ff.; A. W. Buckland, 'On Tattooing,' *ib.* xvii. [1887] 318 ff.; A. Lacassagne, *Les Tatouages*, Paris, 1882; C. Marquardt, *Die Tätowierung beider Geschlechter in Samoa*, Berlin, 1899; Otto Finsch, 'Ueber Bekleidung, Schmuck und Tätowirung der Papuas der Süd-Ost Küste von Neu-Guinea,' *Mittheilungen der Anthrop. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xv. 12 [1885]; M. Haberlandt, 'Ueber die Verbreitung und den Sinn der Tätowirung,' *ib.* xv. [1885] 53; G. von Düben, *Om Tatuering*, Ymer, 1886; A. Krämer, 'Die Ornamentik der Kleidmatten und der Tatauierung auf den Marshallinseln,' *AA*, new ser., ii. 1 [1904]. Valuable information has also been obtained from an unpublished essay by W. O. Hambly on 'Tatooing as a Means of Emotional Expression.'

CONSTANCE JENKINSON.

TAUROBOLIUM.—The *taurobolium*, a sacrifice performed in connexion with the cult of the Great Mother of the Gods, but not limited to it, was one of the most peculiar and most celebrated rites of the last two centuries of paganism. A striking description of it is put by the Christian poet Prudentius, of the 4th cent., into the mouth of one of his characters, Romanus the Martyr (*Peristephanon*, x. 1006 ff.). The high priest of the Great Mother, a golden crown on his head, his temples richly bound with fillets, his toga worn *cinctu Gabino*, descends into a deep foss which is completely covered by a platform of planks pierced by a great number of fine holes. On to this platform is led a huge bull, bedecked with garlands of flowers, his front gleaming with gold. His breast is pierced by the consecrated spear, and the torrent of hot, steaming blood floods the covering of the trench, and rains through the thousand chinks and perforations on the expectant priest below, who throws back his head the better to present cheeks, ears, lips, nostrils, and even tongue and palate, to the purifying baptism. When life has fled and left cold the body of the slain bullock, and the flamens have removed it, the priest emerges and, with hair, beard, and vestments dripping with blood, presents himself to the expectant throng of worshippers, who salute and do obeisance to him as to one who has been purified.

There were two principal motives which prompted the ceremony of the *taurobolium*. In the earlier period, the 2nd and 3rd cent. A.D., it was usually a sacrifice whose object was the welfare of the Empire, Emperor, or community. An entire college, community, or even province could give it, and a frequent date for it was March 24, the *Dies Sanguinis* of the annual festival of the Mother and Attis. The more frequent motive of the rite in the late 3rd and 4th cent. was the purification and regeneration of an individual. Its efficacy lasted for twenty years, or was even eternal, the baptized person being spoken of as 'renatus in æternum' (*CIL* vi. 510, 512). It was performed by laymen as well as priests, and by persons of all ranks and both sexes. A special altar was erected for the occasion, the time occupied by the ceremony varied from one to five days, and the expense was borne by the individual or association that inaugurated it. Besides the personal and the patriotic motive, it was performed as a fulfilment of vows, or at the command of the Mother herself. In Rome it usually took place near a shrine which existed where the present church of St. Peter stands. The *criobolium*—the sacrifice of a ram—was instituted later in honour of Attis on the analogy of the *taurobolium*, in order to give him due prominence in the rites of the cult. See art. CRIOBOLIUM.

As the *taurobolium* was celebrated in honour of both the Great Mother and Attis, it probably possessed a significance regarding that part of the legend which concerned them both (see MOTHER OF THE GODS). The priest descends into the dark pit and leaves the light of day; Attis dies; the vegetation of the earth withers; the priest is bathed in blood, and rises from the pit purified; Attis is restored; the vegetation returns.

The similarity between Christian doctrine and the phrase *renatus in æternum* ('born again for eternity') is startling, and has suggested belief in some connexion between the two religions in the way of borrowing, especially as paganism vied with Christianity in later days in promising such benefits as the latter conferred. The *taurobolium*, however, is better explained as the survival of a primitive Oriental practice based upon the belief, not uncommon among rude peoples, that the strength of brute creation can be acquired by consumption of its actual substance or by contact with its blood. The spiritual meaning of the practice first came with the advance of culture and the discarding of the primitive, literal belief (see Cumont, *op. cit.* below).

Though the *taurobolium* might with reason be supposed to have come, with the cult of the Great Mother, from Asia Minor, there is no positive evidence that it was originally connected with it either in the East or in Italy. Cumont thinks that it was a rite in honour of the eastern Artemis Tauropolos, deriving from her its name *tauropolion*, which was corrupted to *taurobolium*; and that the rite, having become wide-spread in Cappadocia and the neighbouring provinces in connexion with the worship of Artemis Tauropolos and other deities closely allied or identified with her—principally Anaïtis and Bellona—naturally found its way with them into Italy early in the 2nd cent. A.D., after the annexation of that part of Asia to the Roman Empire, and was soon afterwards adopted and popularized by the priesthood of the Great Mother. Its first known celebration took place at Pozzuoli in A.D. 134, in honour of Venus Cælestis, who, Cumont thinks, was Anaïtis under a Roman name. His conclusion that it was celebrated in connexion with the worship of Bellona rests on slender evidence. Others believe it to have been a part of the Great Mother's worship in Asia Minor (Hepding, *op. cit.* below). Whatever its origin, its popularity was attained through the cult of the Great Mother.

[1] *Hist. of Medicine*, tr. E. Playfair, London, 1910, i. 2.
[2] Capart, p. 30.
[3] Robley, p. 2.
[4] *Polynesian Researches*[3], i. 202.

It spread throughout the Empire, and maintained its importance up to the fall of paganism, the last celebration known occurring at Rome in 394.

LITERATURE.—E. Esperandieu, *Inscriptions de Lectoure*, 1892, p. 94 ff.; Zippel, *Festschrift zum Doctorjubiläum Ludw. Friedländer*, 1895, p. 489 f.; G. Showerman, 'The Great Mother of the Gods' in *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin*, no. xliii., Madison, 1901; F. Cumont, 'Le Taurobole et le Culte de Bellone,' in *RHLR*, vi. no. 2, 1901; H. Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, 1903, pp. 168 ff., 201.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

TEETH.—1. Ornament and trophy.—Among both pre-historic and savage races teeth of animals and human beings are used as an ornament, usually strung together as a necklace, headband, or girdle. Such ornaments are already found among burial remains of Solutrean, Magdalenian, and Azilian horizons, the corpses having been buried wearing them. In a ceremonial burial of thirty-three skulls in the grotto at Ofnet, on the upper Danube, the skulls were ornamented with stag's teeth and shells.[1] Among savages the custom of wearing teeth is well-nigh universal,[2] and, while it may simply serve an ornamental purpose, the intention often goes farther. The teeth are worn as a trophy. Thus, among the tribes of the N.W. Amazon, necklaces are made of the teeth of the tiger and other animals, bored and threaded, or of human teeth bound into a necklace with fibre string. These denote the skill of the wearer as a hunter, or his bravery in war, and the human teeth, which are those of an enemy, are 'a visible and abiding token of completed revenge,' and are buried with the owner. Sometimes the larger animal teeth are ornamented with lines or carved.[3] Analogous to the practice of wearing teeth as a trophy is the curse used by savages, 'Let their teeth be broken,' and the Psalmist's words, 'Break their teeth' (58[6]), 'Thou hast broken the teeth of the ungodly' (3[7]). The suggestion is that of enemies as ferocious beasts deprived of their power to tear and rend.[4] Men doubtless used their teeth in early times as a weapon, as savage men and maniacs still do. Divine images are known to have actual teeth set in their mouths, possibly as a trophy or offering.[5]

Possibly teeth worn by men also served the purpose of an amulet, as having a connexion with the qualities of the animal or person from whom they were taken,[6] or as protecting the wearer from similar animals in time to come.[7] On the other hand, a person's own tooth might serve as an amulet. Pliny says that the first tooth shed by a child was so used and protected him from pain.[8] Where teeth are knocked out at initiation, they are sometimes carefully preserved, or regarded as sacred, or used for magical purposes.[9]

Teeth taken from a corpse were used to cure toothache or for magic, and those of an old woman were used as a fertility charm in the yam garden by the New Caledonians.[10]

2. Mutilation of the teeth.—Filing the teeth to a point either singly or in pairs, and knocking out certain teeth as a ceremonial act, usually at initiation, and the purposes which these practices serve, have been already discussed.[1]

Staining the teeth is practised by several lower tribes—*e.g.* in S. America and Indonesia—as well as at higher levels—*e.g.* in China (applying lac to the teeth).[2]

3. Teeth as relics.—Teeth of Christian saints have often formed relics, and in early Buddhism the four canine teeth of Gautama were among his 'seven great relics.' One of these has been famous in Ceylonese Buddhism as the *Dalada*. Its miraculous preservation from every means taken to destroy it by a hostile Indian king, and its ultimate arrival in Ceylon in A.D. 312, are the subjects of a long narrative, and the Chinese traveller Fa-hian describes the procession of the relic as he saw it in 405. At a later time the Portuguese are believed to have destroyed it, though the Ceylonese allege that they only destroyed a counterfeit and that the real tooth is the one still preserved at Kandy in a shrine. It is probably not genuine.[3]

4. Teeth in myth and legend.—Greek myth told how Kadmos, having slain the dragon guardian of the spring Areia, at the suggestion of Athene scattered its teeth on the earth like grain. From the teeth sprang armed men called Spartoi ('scattered') from the manner of their birth. A similar myth was told of Jason.[4]

In the 16th cent. a report that a child had been born with a golden tooth in Silesia caused much anxiety in Germany, being regarded as a portent. The physician Horst in 1595 published the result of his astrological researches on the subject, and declared that the tooth symbolized a golden age, preceded by the expulsion of the Turks from Christendom.[5]

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the notes.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

TEETOTALISM.—See ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.

TEINDS.—See TITHES.

TELEOLOGY.—I. *INTRODUCTORY*.—1. The term.—The word 'teleology' (Mod. Lat. *teleologia*, Germ. *Teleologie*, Fr. *téléologie*) appears to have been devised by Christian Wolff in 1728. He felt the need of a term to designate the branch of natural philosophy which had to do with ends (Aristotle's τέλος or οὗ ἕνεκα) or final causes (the *causa finalis* of the schoolmen) as distinguished from efficient causes (ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, *causa efficiens*). For Wolff, accordingly, teleology signified the study of ends or final causes in nature, and more precisely the explanation or interpretation of natural phenomena in the light of the concept of end or final cause. In popularizing Leibniz's philosophy, he set explanation based on final cause side by side with explanation by efficient cause. Presumably Wolff derived teleology directly from τέλος, 'an end,' but, as J. Burnet has remarked,[6] the word is properly derived in the first instance from τέλειον, 'complete.' Thus, etymologically regarded, it does not bear the implication, which it has historically, of an external end; and the

[1] H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*[2], London, 1916, pp. 327, 378, 472, 477.

[2] O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 264 ff.; E. Grosse, *Les Débuts de l'art*, tr. E. Dirr, Paris, 1902, p. 67 ff.

[3] T. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons*, London, 1915, pp. 80, 82, 124.

[4] Cf. Pr 3[14], Job 4[10] 29[17], Jl 1[6].

[5] Stoll, p. 265.

[6] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Introductory and Primitive), vol. iii. p. 396[b].

[7] M. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, tr. S. Coleridge, London, 1822, i. 258.

[8] Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 7.

[9] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 593 f.; A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, pp. 542, 562 ff.

[10] Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 11; Stoll, p. 263; G. Turner, *Samoa, a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, p. 342.

[1] See art. AUSTERITIES, vol. ii. p. 233 f.

[2] Whiffen, p. 88; Stoll, p. 366; J. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, London, 1900, p. 174.

[3] J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, London, 1868, pp. 82, 158 f.

[4] For a connexion of these myths with the preservation of the teeth knocked out at initiation rites as a possible vehicle of reincarnation, being practically imperishable, and also because they look like 'seed-corn,' see Jane E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 272, 435.

[5] H. T. Buckle, *Hist. of Civilization in England*[4], London, 1864, i. 304; K. Sprengel, *Hist. de la médecine*, tr. A. J. L. Jourdain, Paris, 1815–20, iii. 247 f.

[6] *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., *Thales to Plato*, London, 1914, p. 346, note 1.

prevalent 'organic' use of it in modern thought is justified.

2. The concept.—As already indicated, the concept is much older than the term. It attaches itself primarily to that organic view of nature which was developed in the ancient Greek philosophy as against the mechanical view. According to the mechanical view, the whole is the product of the parts by their mutual interaction. According to the organic doctrine, the whole is ideally prior to the parts and constitutes the explanation of their mechanical actions and reactions. This last was a doctrine influential not only in the sphere of natural philosophy but in the spheres of political and social philosophy as well, and it led to the teleological interpretation of nature as a realm of ends or final causes. As the whole was an unchangeable form, it gave to all movement a purpose and goal; and in the light of its purpose and goal the movement itself was most deeply interpreted. This ancient opposition between the mechanical and teleological standpoints, as represented by Democritus and Aristotle respectively, set a problem which runs through the whole history of philosophy. The fundamental question at issue is, Are natural processes subordinate to conscious rational purpose, or is the world to be explained and interpreted by mechanical principles alone? That is the deeper philosophical issue in its most clear-cut form. There is a narrower issue which has assumed increasing definiteness in modern times. The fundamental question here belongs to scientific method rather than to metaphysics, and is most prominent at the present time in the dispute between mechanism and teleology in biological theory. Are the characteristic problems of biology (*q.v.*) capable of solution by means of mechanistic categories, or must teleological factors also be postulated?

II. *HISTORICAL.* — A. ANCIENT PERIOD. — 1. **Anaxagoras** (c. 500–428 B.C.) has been hailed as the father of teleology, but he is so only in a qualified sense.[1] His explanation of nature—to judge from the fragments of his Περὶ φύσεως preserved by Simplicius and from the references in Plato and Aristotle—appears to have been virtually a mechanical explanation on the basis of a qualitative atomism, nor is it even certain that his First Cause of motion was an immaterial or incorporeal essence. The movement and order of the universe he ascribes analogically to Νοῦς (mind, intelligence, reason), which by an initial impulse imparted a rotatory motion to the pre-existent chaos in which 'all things were together.' But, once the rotatory motion was set up, Νοῦς apparently had little else to do. It may be that a thoroughgoing teleological view of nature is logically involved in the Anaxagorean doctrine of Νοῦς, whether Νοῦς (which is represented as omniscient and omnipotent) be regarded as a spiritual or a corporeal essence, as mind or mind-stuff. On the other hand, it is altogether probable that Anaxagoras did not carry out the full implications of his doctrine. Socrates in the *Phædo*[2] complains that in actual explanations he called in only mechanical causes—'airs, æthers, waters, and such like absurdities'; and Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*[3] (in a passage reminiscent, as Burnet[4] allows, of the passage from the *Phædo*) charges him with making use of Νοῦς merely as a *deus ex machina*, to account for the formation of the cosmos or for phenomena that he could not explain on mechanical grounds. Similar objections, as J. Adam[5] reminds us, were afterwards urged against Descartes and Newton. But, however we may interpret the Anaxagorean concept, we cannot but recognize its significance in the history of thought.[1]

2. Diogenes of Apollonia.—The teaching of Anaxagoras was apparently influential upon his contemporary Diogenes, who attributes Νοῦς to his primary substance, air, inasmuch as all things are 'disposed in the best possible manner'—a phrase which sends one's mind on to Leibniz and his theological optimism. It is, however, impossible to say whether Diogenes followed up his affirmation of purpose or design in nature any farther than Anaxagoras appears to have done; and this difference between them remains, that, whereas with Anaxagoras the teleological inference is in the direction of theism, with Diogenes it is definitely pantheistic.[2]

3. Socrates.—The teleology of Socrates (*q.v.*) is to be found in the *Phædo* and the *Memorabilia*. (*a*) The Socrates of the *Phædo* expresses himself as mightily pleased with the book of Anaxagoras in which Νοῦς is affirmed to be the cause of all things, but as disappointed with the failure of Anaxagoras to transcend the mechanical view. He is dissatisfied with a philosophy that cannot show how everything finds itself as it is because it is best for it so to be. He has grasped the distinction between mechanical and final causes in nature, and discovers only in the latter a true ground of explanation. To rely upon mechanical causes alone would be as absurd as to say that the real reason or final cause of his sitting in prison was certain bodily dispositions, and not his mental resolve to abide by his sentence, as the best thing to do. Had this not seemed the best, then 'by the dog these muscles and bones would have been off to Megara or the Bœotian frontier long ago.'[3] (*b*) Consistently with this representation in the *Phædo* the Socrates of the *Memorabilia*[4] is found affirming an immanent Reason in the world, and consistently too with the general doctrine of the Platonic Socrates concerning the individual and the State (which Adam would sum up as 'noocracy,' or the supremacy of Νοῦς or Reason).[5] At the same time the Anaxagorean concept receives in the *Memorabilia* a development so one-sided that it becomes difficult, if on no other ground than this, to believe in the representations of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon respectively as both even essentially historical. W. Windelband[6] suspects the influence of Cynicism and Stoicism upon the representation in Xenophon. In any case it is an exclusively anthropocentric teleology that is here formulated. The whole world of nature is said to yield traces of design, as appears in particular from the wonderful adaptations of means to end in the structure of the human body, in man's psychical constitution, and in the phenomena of external nature; and, furthermore, all is designed towards the one end of the advantage and well-being of men. (*c*) The Socrates of the *Memorabilia* gave perhaps the first formal exposition of the 'argument from design.' Formally, and often naively, he argues from the evidences of design in nature to the existence of an intelligent and beneficent Deity (σοφοῦ τινὸς δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου).[7] This anthropocentric teleology, with the theistic inference associated with it, impressed itself strongly upon subsequent religious thought.

4. Plato.—(*a*) The teleology of Plato (*q.v.*) is so far indicated in what has been said regarding the Socrates of the *Phædo*, but it has a deeper philosophical setting than can actually be found in

[1] See art. ANAXAGORAS and also art. PHILOSOPHY (Greek), vol. ix. p. 860ᵇ.
[2] 97 B, 8.
[3] i. 4 (985a 18 ff.).
[4] *Early Greek Philosophy*², London, 1908, p. 310.
[5] *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, p. 263.

[1] See art. ANAXAGORAS, vol. i. p. 424.
[2] See art. PANTHEISM (Greek and Roman), vol. ix. p. 614ᵃ.
[3] *Phædo*, 99 A.
[4] i. iv., iv. iii.
[5] *Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 342.
[6] *Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*², Eng. tr., London, 1900, p. 124.
[7] *Mem.* i. iv.

Socrates. In keeping with his ethical and social philosophy, Plato seeks in his metaphysics to interpret the real in terms of the end or ideal of the Good. Ethics is for him the foundation of metaphysics, as it came to be for Lotze, and reality yields up its secrets according as its ethical meaning is apprehended. His conception, already adumbrated in the *Phædo*, of a 'Jacob's ladder of science' (as E. Caird calls it[1]), beginning with the lower principles of explanation and reaching to the highest principle of unity or the idea of the Good, by which all the others are explained, is developed more fully in the *Republic*.[2] The Good or Universal Reason (Νοῦς) is the final cause of every event and change, and to the idea of the Good all the other ideas are teleologically subordinate. The Good, as we may learn from a famous passage of the *Laws*,[3] is the perfection of the whole; and in the preservation and perfection of the whole every creature has its own proper end to fulfil. Thus it was that Plato sought by means of his theory of ideas to interpret the rational principle of Anaxagoras more adequately. He looks upon the world, says J. Hutchison Stirling, as 'a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart.'[4]

(*b*) In applying his metaphysical principles to the interpretation of nature, Plato is hardly liable like the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* to the charges of externality and anthropocentrism. For the *Timæus*, in which such a teleology may be found, is, in its details at least, 'mythical.' In consistency with his theory of ideas, Plato could not have claimed more for his accounts of the phenomenal world than that they were 'likely tales' (εἰκότες λόγοι). In any case he does not, even in the *Timæus*, lay much stress upon particular instances of adaptation in nature, nor does he encourage the notion of adaptations as designed exclusively for human needs. (*c*) In the *Timæus*, as indeed in the *Philebus* in non-mythical form, a theological interpretation is offered of the teleological constitution of the world. In offering it, Plato would apparently overcome the dualism between the ideal and the phenomenal which is inherent in his theory of knowledge and reality. God, the Demiurge, is represented as bringing order and harmony out of the moving chaos of not-being (μὴ ὄν), in accordance with the pattern of the Good, and in so far as natural necessity (ἡ ἀνάγκη) allows. Thus natural necessity comes in when divine activity according to ends fails as a principle of explanation, and something is yielded to Democritus. But, while the teleological explanation involves a recognition of divine activity, and is so far on the lines of the theistic argument, the Demiurge of the *Timæus*—the self-moved mover who fashions the world—is not identified with the Good, nor is he to be equated with the God of modern theism.

5. Aristotle.—(*a*) While it may be allowed to Plato that no ultimate explanation of anything is possible apart from the discovery of its final cause, we have to turn to Aristotle (*q.v.*) for a more adequate recognition of mechanical causes as principles of explanation, and this although Aristotle is the protagonist of the organic and teleological view of the universe. In the endeavour to overcome the Platonic dualism of ideas and things, Aristotle gives an even more thoroughgoing interpretation of the Anaxagorean Νοῦς than is to be found in Plato. With Plato he believes in the real existence of the form or idea, but he cannot think of it as separate from the world. It exists in the world and in things. Reality is a process of development, in which the change from more imperfect to less imperfect being is to be interpreted in the light of the τέλος, which in things that are not eternal is the moving form or final state of actuality (ἐνεργεία). The moved matter, which is the primal state of potentiality (δύναμις), exists for the sake of the form.[5] The individual is both form and matter, being form in relation to what is lower in the scale of things, and matter in relation to what is higher. The marble is form in relation to the materials composing its substance, and matter in relation to the statue which is made from it. The tree is form in relation to the elements of the soil that enter into the process of its growth, and matter in relation to the house built of it. The Good is the highest form of all, being pure form without matter, and is the ultimate end or final cause of all existence and all movement. It is not actually generated in the world-process, but is eternally implied in it, as the goal of the creation.

[1] *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (*Gifford Lectures*), Glasgow, 1904, i. 122.
[2] Bk. vi.
[3] x. 903.
[4] *Philosophy and Theology* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1890, p. 113.
[5] Cf. also R. Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 155.

(*b*) With this peculiar speculative idea of development which fills the central place in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle opposes Democritus (*q.v.*) and the atomists, who appeared to him as mere 'drunken stutterers' in comparison with Anaxagoras. Even in inorganic nature he finds purpose or final cause operative. Just as an army moving on the field, or a ship cleaving the sea under full sail, offers an instance of effort directed towards an end, so, wherever we observe in natural processes the regular achievement of results, we may similarly discern the presence of purpose. But it is principally the realm of organic nature that is viewed thus teleologically. How absurd, he urges, to ascribe the forms and activities of living beings to the operation merely of accident (τὸ αὐτόματον) or chance (ἡ τύχη)! Empedocles (*q.v.*) was emphatically wrong in his theory of the origin of species, in which he avers that nature produces in her prodigality every possible type of animal form, and that only those forms survive which are coherently and consistently constructed. If, as Empedocles believed, nature once produced 'man-faced cattle' (βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα), presumably she also produced at one time or other 'olive-faced grapes'! Nature is a cause which acts purposively, and if her end is sometimes unattained, it is due to the mechanical necessity to which matter (ὕλη)—Plato's 'not-being'—is subject.

(*c*) Much more clearly than in Plato we find in Aristotle, especially in the *de Partibus Animalium* and other biological works, the recognition of the double play of mechanism and teleology in nature, especially in organic nature, which does not operate with the refractory medium of matter. As a naturalist he is content to lay stress upon only two forms of causation—material or mechanical (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and formal or final (οὗ ἕνεκα), and the formal or final cause comes first, being the reason which determines the whole process. The mechanical causes are the servants and instruments of the final causes. Thus in Aristotle both mechanism and teleology are accepted as factors in the explanation of nature, though the Platonic principle preponderates. It is not quite true, however, to say that Aristotle has succeeded in reconciling Plato and Democritus, that by his cosmo-teleology he mediates between the onto-teleology of the theory of ideas and the mechanism associated with the atomistic hypothesis. Owing to his scientific limitations, notably in connexion with the mechanics of the heavens, Aristotle pushed explanation by final causes farther than his general principles warranted. Frequently resting upon final causes alone, he at once hindered the progress of his own scientific thought and lent his authority to the narrow and one-sided finalism of the scholastic interpretation.

(*d*) Aristotle's organic or teleological doctrine, based on the metaphysical concepts of matter and form, strikingly anticipates certain modern positions in biological and psychological science. Applied, *e.g.*, to the conception of the organism, it offers, as L. J. Henderson assures us,[1] a complete formulation of the biological principle of organization. Aristotle conceives of the living thing as an autonomous unit, having the teleological principle within, and with every part functionally related to every other and existing as the servant of the whole. That is the implication, we are told, of his comparison of the organism to a well-governed commonwealth, in which, once order is established, the individuals duly play their parts and a separate monarch is no more needed.

6. The Stoics.—(*a*) Among the so-called sects that came after Plato and Aristotle the Sceptics (*q.v.*) had no contribution to make in teleology. If causality was suspect with them, as with Hume in a later age, so also was finality. The contribution of the Epicureans (*q.v.*) was distinctly negative. Epicurus is to be classed with Leucippus and Democritus, of whom Aristotle said that they 'rejected design and referred all to necessity.'[2] But the Stoics (*q.v.*) recognize the principle of teleology. There was one philosopher indeed, an Aristotelian, who came near to Stoicism in his opposition to the mechanical explanations of the atomists; but, on the other hand, as Windelband puts it,[3] he 'threw away the keystone of the Aristotelian teleology.' This was Strato of Lampsacus, who denied the existence of pure form as of

[1] *The Order of Nature*, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1917, p. 21.
[2] *De Generatione Animalium*, v. 18.
[3] *Hist. of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 301.

pure matter, declaring form to be always immanent in matter, and so converting the Aristotelian system into a consistent naturalism. Stoicism may also be described as naturalism, but it was at the same time a pantheistic system. The old dualism of form and matter which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Anaxagoras, and had failed to throw off, gave place to an eclectic and somewhat facile monism, in which one eternal substance manifested itself as spirit (λόγοι σπερματικοί) and matter (πνεῦμα διάπνοον). It was essentially a teleological explanation of the world that was given by Stoicism, because, although every particular phenomenon was said to be determined by natural necessity, as Democritus had maintained, natural necessity was not based, as with the atomists, on quantitative differences and initial movements, but depended on the vital activity of the whole.

(*b*) In carrying out its teleology, Stoicism made much of the beauty, order, and harmony of the world and the adaptations of means to end, especially in organic nature, as manifestations of the rational unity and ideal meaning of things. The evils of the world, which offered even more difficulty on the monistic hypothesis than in the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, were optimistically explained as instruments or concomitants of the great cosmic movement, and it was said that they would be recognized as such, if the individual could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation often descended to externality and anthropocentrism, as in the teaching attributed to Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. Thus it was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the ass to carry man's burdens. Yet an immanent or intrinsic teleology such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruous with Stoic principles.

(*c*) If the *Memorabilia* is possibly influenced by Stoicism, Cicero's *de Natura Deorum* indubitably is. There the inference to God from the order and beauty of the universe is eloquently set forth in a well-known passage[1]—reminiscent perhaps of Plato's story of the Cave—attributed to Aristotle, where is depicted the impression that would be made on men whose dwellings had been underground, on their first beholding the glorious spectacle of earth and sea and sky. It has been suggested[2] that in the argument for the being of God contained in the *de Natura Deorum* it is Aristotle we have chiefly before us; *e.g.*, the comparison, in several passages, of the world to a furnished or inhabited house or an adorned and decorated temple of the gods (a comparison which is to be found also in writers like Philo the Jew and Minucius Felix the Christian apologist) is said to have come from Aristotle. This suggestion is odious to philosophers who are jealous for the purity of the Aristotelian doctrine of the end, especially as Cicero in the *de Natura Deorum* furnishes the prototype, in the ancient world, of Paley's *Natural Theology* and the Bridgewater Treatises.

7. Teleology of history.—While in the ancient Greek philosophy a teleology of nature was expounded, in the religious period of the ancient world and within the early Christian Church the idea of a teleology of history gained ground. The opposition in the Gnostic view of history to the OT religion as the revelation of an inferior Deity led to the view of history which has established itself as the truly Christian. It fastened upon the Pauline doctrine of the pædagogic function of the Law, which gave to the Law a distinctive place in a teleological series of divine processes; and the whole course of the ages was interpreted in the light of the great divine plan of redemption culminating in Jesus Christ. With Irenæus the teleology of nature is ancillary to the teleology of history as thus expounded from the Christian standpoint. At the hands of Augustine the whole conception receives an impressive treatment, and the human race is regarded as a teleological unity, as being destined to receive entrance into the catholic or universal Church (*civitas Dei*). This anthropocentric view of the world as the scene of the divine redemption in Jesus Christ still prevails in Christian theology, in which the teleological principle of history is sometimes described as Christological or Christocentric.

B. MEDIÆVAL PERIOD.—**Thomas Aquinas.**—All through the Middle Ages, in Christian and Muhammadan countries alike, the Aristotelian teleology dominated philosophical and scientific thought. Unfortunately it was the Aristotelian teleology in its defective form of explanation by final causes alone (*i.e.* apart from mechanical causes), and it laid an arrest upon the movement of natural philosophy. Yet Archimedes and others who came after Aristotle had shown that mechanics at any rate could altogether dispense with the hypothesis of final cause. Aquinas (*q.v.*) makes use of the so-called teleological proof, which was the favourite proof in the patristic and scholastic ages, and he quotes as exponents of it John of Damascus and Averroës on Aristotle's *Physics*. There is an intelligent 'somewhat,' says Aquinas, by which all natural objects are ordered in relation to an end, and this 'somewhat' we call God—which, indeed, is the gist of the teleological argument, whether in its popular or in its more philosophical form. Aquinas also catches up the patristic idea of the teleological unity of nature and history, and through his doctrine of the State gives it a more systematic expression. The State was not with him, as with Augustine, the devil's province (*civitas huius sæculi*), but was based on natural law or right (*lex naturalis*), which has its source in God; and the life of virtue, which Aristotle said was to be realized in the political society, was the preparation for the higher life of grace in the society or community of the Church. 'Gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit.'

C. MODERN PERIOD.—1. **Bruno.**—The transition from ancient and mediæval to modern thought is well illustrated, in this matter of teleology, as in others, in the views of Giordano Bruno (*q.v.*). His whole philosophy represents an attempt to combine in a unitary system the Platonic and Aristotelian idealism and the modern mechanical view of nature, of which Democritus was the precursor. Like the atomists, he affirmed that only, as it were, after repeated experiments on nature's part did combinations of elements arise which, as being adapted to ends, conserved their stability. At the same time he affirmed—and here the idealistic strain appears—that there is a world-soul, or inner principle of motion in nature, which is purposive in its working, and so orders all things as to secure the world's progress. Thus the mechanical and teleological views are united in this thinker.

2. **Bacon.**—Though Francis Bacon (*q.v.*) may also be said to belong to the age of transition, he was more definitely on the side of the modern scientific movement. It would appear that he looked upon the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as 'planks of lighter and less solid wood' than the physical philosophies of ancient Greece lost in the wreckage of the Roman Empire. For him philosophy was restricted to the investigation of nature, and there were certain 'idols of the tribe,' or common prejudices, to be dismissed from the mind if nature was to be explained aright. Among these was interpretation by final causes. Under the illusion that man is the measure of things (which Protagorean utterance, curiously enough, is actually become the watchword of a recent philosophical movement) we interpret things in reference to ourselves (*ex analogia hominis*) instead of universally (*ex analogia universi*). Yet Bacon does not reject the reality of final causes.

'For the cause rendered, that the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture.' Final causes in physics are, however, sterile like Vestal virgins, and, worse than that, they are 'impertinent,' being indeed 'but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing.' But final causes have their place in metaphysic and religion. The divine wisdom even appears more admirable when nature 'intendeth' one thing and providence 'draweth forth' another.[1]

[1] Bk. ii.

[2] See Hutchison Stirling, *Philosophy and Theology*, p. 170 ff.

[1] *De Augmentis*, iii. 5.

Thus Bacon throws off the two thousand years' yoke and touches hands with Democritus and Leucippus across the centuries. But, while vindicating physical causation as the one form of causation of which physical science need take cognizance, he conserves the metaphysical and religious interests which were bound up with the Platonic and Aristotelian teleology. It were incredible to him that this 'universal frame' should be 'without a Mind.'[1] He failed, however, to appreciate the scientific importance of the Aristotelian concept of organization in biology, as also—but this was the legacy of the schools—the philosophical depth of the essential Aristotelian doctrine of the end.

3. **Hobbes and Descartes.**—(*a*) Hobbes (*q.v.*), following Bacon and Galileo, tried to liberate philosophy from the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas and forms and to substantiate the mechanical view not only in the realm of nature but in the realms also of mind and society. He reduced all cause to motion, and philosophy to a doctrine of motion.

(*b*) Though Descartes (*q.v.*) also dispensed with final causes in nature, he did not fall like Hobbes into materialism. He explained natural phenomena by the mechanical principles of matter and motion, so founding the now orthodox systematic view of mechanics, but he dissociated himself from the ultimate positions of the ancient atomistic philosophy. Mechanical explanation was not ultimate explanation. But his rejection of final causes in nature was on theological rather than epistemological grounds. We may legitimately enough, he thought, attribute ends or purposes to God, but we cannot hope to discover these, as they are hidden 'in the inscrutable abyss of His wisdom.' Here, as in Bacon, there is a clear distinction between the scientific and the metaphysical and religious interest in final causes—a distinction which became clear only in the modern period of thought.

(*c*) For the issue between mechanism and teleology in scientific explanation Descartes possesses considerable significance, not merely because of his peculiar vitalistic theory that the *vis viva* might alter the direction of motion if unable according to the law of conservation to change its quantity, but chiefly because of his law of conservation itself. In the effort to reach the true principle of mechanical causation, he arrived at the belief that God conserved in things as a whole all the movement which He introduced into them at the creation; so that in virtue of this initial disposition the necessary world-process was at every stage teleological. His vitalism was a short-lived theory, but his principle of conservation marks a notable advance in the teleology of nature.

4. **Spinoza.**—(*a*) The most vigorous, as it was the most uncompromising, attack upon final causes in nature came from Spinoza (*q.v.*). In explaining a particular phenomenon we cannot, he said, go beyond the particular attribute of the one divine substance, be it the attribute of thought or of extension, under which the phenomenon appears to us. For, while the attributes are parallel to each other, there is no interaction between them. Thus material phenomena, including the movements of the human body, are only explainable in physical terms. Matter cannot be grounded in mind. There can be no ends or purposes in nature.

(*b*) Apart from the incompatibility of the doctrine with his fundamental philosophy, two main objections are urged by Spinoza against final causes. The first is Bacon's objection—that acceptance of final causes hinders the investigation of nature: recourse to the will of God in the explanation of natural phenomena, and in particular of untoward phenomena like tempests, earthquakes, and diseases, is a refuge of ignorance (*asylum ignorantiæ*). The secrets of nature are with those who abandon final causes and place their trust in mathematics, which, as dealing with the essences and properties of things, leads to rational knowledge. The other objection is that the method of explanation by final causes encourages false anthropomorphic conceptions of God. A God who works purposively, or towards ends, is subject to fate or necessity and lacks perfection of being. It implies defect in God that He should be in need of anything. Nor have we any right to infer distinctions in the divine nature analogous to the elements of the human mind. The intellect and will we may ascribe to God are no more analogous to our intellects and wills than the constellation of the Dog to the animal that barks.

(*c*) Undoubtedly Spinoza did good service in exposing the weakness and superficiality of the traditional teleology, but it should be observed that, while the denial of teleology is already involved in the doctrines of substance and parallelism with which he sets out, at the close of his thought a certain light breaks in upon his system. The *amor intellectualis Dei* with which he concludes is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself, and we may learn from it that with His universe God is well pleased. The ideas of satisfaction and value which are essential to a teleological interpretation of the universe appear to be here conserved.[1]

5. **Leibniz.**—(*a*) Despite the able efforts of the Cambridge Platonists (*q.v.*), such as Cudworth and More, to vindicate for final causes a place in physics, the mechanical view found increasing support, being applied also as against Platonists and vitalists to the phenomena of life, and it was left to Leibniz (*q.v.*) to attempt a reconciliation of the opposing principles. Leibniz's essential position still meets with great acceptance among scientists, philosophers, and theologians. In the phenomena of nature, he says, everything happens mechanically and at the same time metaphysically, and the source of the mechanical is the metaphysical. This position finds clear expression in two sayings that may be placed side by side—one from a recently discovered fragment, and the other quite familiar: 'Omnia in tota natura demonstrari possunt tum per causas finales, tum per causas efficientes.' 'Causae efficientes pendent a finalibus.'

(*b*) While Leibniz was as 'corpuscular' as Descartes or Spinoza in the explanation of particular phenomena, he could not, for two reasons, rest in the mechanical explanation. One reason appears in his metaphysical construction of the concept of substance. Rejecting the Cartesian and Spinozan opposition of extension and thought, and affirming substance to be force (*un être capable d'action*) and force substance, he passed from an abstract to a more concrete monism. Matter was no longer to be defined as extension but as a form of force, more specifically as power of resistance; and mind was no longer to be restricted to the sphere of consciousness, and was represented as comprising subconscious states (*petites perceptions*). With this view of substance, and with the aid of the Aristotelian principle of continuity and development, Leibniz at length reached the speculative position that the real world consists of an infinite host of independent monads or individuals, at countless different stages of development, whose activity is fundamentally spiritual or perceptual. Now it is the very nature of the monad to strive after the realization of all its latent possibilities. It has to rid itself of confused perceptions and attain true ideas, and so to enter into the mind of God the Supreme Monad—an end which may only be achieved on the plane of self-consciousness and spiritual freedom. So it is, according to Leibniz, that the forces active in mechanism may be interpreted from the standpoint of teleology. Everywhere in nature purposive activity may be discerned. Take but the inward view, or, rather, take but the universal view, and the world of physical causes and effects becomes a world of means and ends.

(*c*) The second reason that led Leibniz to uphold the teleological interpretation of the world starts from his postulate of 'pre-established harmony,' which is intimately connected with his monadology. Though independent or 'windowless,' each monad 'mirrors' the rest of the universe. Though subject to its own laws, each monad is in harmony with the universal development. Geulincx and Spinoza had already applied the principle of harmony or correspondence to the two Cartesian attributes, but Leibniz applies it to the totality of substance. He compares the correspondence which he has in view to different bands of musicians who may keep perfectly together without seeing or even hearing one another. He compares it also, using a frequent analogy of the time (and with the relation of body and mind chiefly in view), to two clocks so skilfully made as never to get out of time. The pre-established harmony is not imposed upon the world from without, but belongs to the inner life of the monads; none the less it needs to be explained. The only possible explanation is to be found in the will and purpose of God. It is God alone who brings to pass the union or interconnexion of substances whereby the world is orderly and rational. Thus the order of the world, interpreted as a pre-established harmony, necessitates the teleological inference to God.

(*d*) The principle involved in the teleological inference is named by Leibniz the principle of determinant or sufficient reason, viz. that nothing can exist or be true without a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise. Without such a

[1] *Essays*, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'

[1] A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (*Gifford Lectures*), Oxford, 1917, p. 353; cf. also below, § III. C, 7 (*b*), 8.

principle, implying the complete rationality of existence, philosophy would for Leibniz have ceased to be, as indeed for Descartes or Spinoza. But Leibniz gave the principle a characteristic application. He regarded it as the foundation of the contingent truths of natural science, just as the principle of identity and contradiction was the foundation of the necessary truths of mathematics and logic. So that the conservation of force or energy and the equivalence of cause and effect in the world must be teleologically explained as dependent upon the divine wisdom and order.

(*c*) In biology, as in physics, Leibniz advanced the teleological problem. He is said to have established the truth that biological organization is compatible with the mechanistic theory, but in comparing the organism to a kind of 'divine machine' or 'natural automaton' he still comes short of the Aristotelian teleology.

6. Rationalistic theism.—(*a*) In the 18th cent. Leibniz's theology was more influential than his monadology. There appears to be a certain looseness of connexion between the two, and it was accentuated by Wolff's effort to systematize and popularize the master's doctrines. In Wolff the harmony of the world is no longer an immanent order, but an order externally imposed by God; and the world's chief end is utility and advantage for man and beast—especially utility for man. This externalism impressed itself upon the 'popular philosophy' that arose in Germany about the middle of the 18th cent., and it promoted a remarkable and many-sided growth of natural theology or teleological physics and organics, the aim of which was to multiply the evidences of design in nature in the interests of the teleological inference to creative wisdom and benevolence. There were astro-theologies, litho-theologies, phyto-theologies, insecto-theologies, ichthyo-theologies, and numerous others. As among the Stoics, the ideas of advantage and utility were often beaten out into petty trivialities (*Nützlichkeitskrämerei*).

(*b*) In France Fénelon had already written eloquently on natural theology on similar lines, although later the materialism of d'Holbach and the scepticism of Bayle were to cut at the root of the popular teleology, and Voltaire was to pour contempt upon its anthropocentrism and shallow optimism.

(*c*) In England, too, natural theology was early developed on the lines of a superficial utilitarianism, beginning in the 17th cent. with the works of the naturalist Ray (on whom Milton drew in *Paradise Lost*), and of Boyle, Barrow, and Parker, continuing with Derham and many others through the 18th cent., and receiving classical exposition in Paley's *Natural Theology*.[1] So exhaustively had the teleology of nature been discussed that the Scottish divine Thomas Chalmers, in the first Bridgewater Treatise,[2] turned to mental as distinguished from physical teleology, discoursing on the adaptation of nature to mind and on adaptations within the mind; while McCosh[3] laid the emphasis upon moral teleology, inferring from the moral order a moral Governor.

(*d*) Notice should here be taken of a universal view of teleology held by the English deist Shaftesbury,[4] who rose above the particular views that so largely prevailed in the deistic as in the orthodox circles of his time. His was an æsthetic teleology, and in the beauty and perfection of the world he found a proof of the existence of God. Not only does the unity of the world point to a universal Spirit; but beauty lies not in matter but in form or formative power, which must work with design.

7. Hume.—(*a*) The speculative sincerity of David Hume (*q.v.*) was probably not so great as his speculative genius. In the *Treatise of Human Nature*[1] he reduced the world to a mere complex of sensations—not an ordered complex, which could be ascribed to a divine Author; and yet in his theological writings, notably in the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*,[2] we find him apparently assuming order and purposiveness in the universe. If the tendency of recent interpretations of the *Dialogues* is to be trusted, we may even regard Hume as sincerely adhering to what is there called a 'genuine theism,' and as accepting the essential core of the argument from design as its rational basis. We may hear Hume himself speaking through Cleanthes, the rationalistic theist, when it is maintained that at every turn we are obliged to have recourse to the hypothesis of design in the universe; or through Philo, who is sceptical and naturalistic in tendency, when he admits that all objections to the hypothesis of design appear mere 'cavils and sophisms' to those who realize the beauty and fitness of final causes.

(*b*) None the less the criticisms of the teleological inference which are put in the mouth of Philo are of great historical interest and importance. Cleanthes, who states the theistic argument from design (round which the discussion of natural religion mainly turns), compares the world of order to a great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which, even in their most minute parts, are all adjusted to each other with marvellous accuracy. This universal adaptation of means to ends so resembles the products of human contrivance that we are led by all the rules of analogy to infer that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties. Philo replies, in Hume's own sceptical vein, that the principle of analogy is not a sure basis of argument, especially as we depart the more from the similarity of the cases. Can we really speak, *e.g.*, of analogy between the fabric of a house and the generation of the universe? And why should thought, design, intelligence, be made the model of the whole? If it is valid to say that, because the world resembles a machine, it arose from design, is it not at least equally valid to say that, because the world resembles an animal, it arose from generation? And why go beyond nature in search of a transcendent cause? To take one step beyond the mundane system is to be forced to go on in an infinite progression. For the ideal world, into which the material world is traced, is itself to be traced into another ideal world, and so on. May it not be that there are forces in nature by means of which, even after a botching and bungling of many worlds throughout an eternity, this orderly and harmonious system was struck out? At most the argument from design can only prove the existence of a being in time and space, fashioning a given material, and all pretension to ascribe infinity to the Deity or even perfection in His finite capacity must be renounced. Can we even pretend to decide from the phenomena of nature as to whether the Deity is one or many? (A similar reference to the limitations of the argument is found in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*,[3] in which the criticism is in the form adopted and made famous by Kant.)

(*c*) By the objections thus urged by Philo a strong impression is made upon Cleanthes, who is also led to admit, in view of the problem of evil, that the Deity might be described in the terms of 'benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity'—an old position of the Greek theology with which we have been familiarized in recent thought. The carefully formulated conclusion of the *Dialogues*, that (as Philo says) 'the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence,' may not have represented in Hume's mind the whole of 'genuine theism,' but it dealt a destructive blow to the rationalistic theology of his time, with its deistic implications, its petty teleology, and its hedonistic view of life.

(*d*) On the scientific or philosophical side, however, Hume made a positive contribution to the problem of natural teleology. The idea goes back as far as Empedocles, and is expounded in Lucretius, that in nature the principle holds of the survival of the fit. In the *Dialogues*, as we have seen, Hume gives expression to this principle, and he does so in respect of both inorganic and organic nature. Described as the tendency towards equilibrium or equilibration, it is recognized in modern physics and biology as teleological in character; but, when Hume speaks of it further as perhaps originally contained in matter, he at least suggests the idea that there is a deeper and

[1] London, 1802.
[2] *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the adaptation of external Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man*, 2 vols., London, 1833.
[3] *The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral*, Edinburgh, 1850.
[4] See art. DEISM, § 3.

[1] 3 vols., London, 1739–40.
[2] London, 1779.
[3] London, 1748.

more original teleology in nature than ordinary mechanistic theory suspects. So that with Hume the teleological appearance of nature is perhaps more than a postulate of the reflective or subjective judgment, as it is with Kant.

8. Kant.—(*a*) In his early work on *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*[1] Kant acknowledged the great value of the arguments drawn from the beauties, harmonies, and perfections of the universe, and more particularly of the starry heavens, to establish the existence of a supremely wise and powerful Creator. At the same time he rises above the popular teleology. In a later pre-critical work on *The Only Possible Proof of the Being of God*[2] he declares himself impressed with the physico-theological argument, but, like Hume's Philo, he doubts the validity of the inference to a Creator who is perfectly wise and good. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*[3] a similar criticism appears, with a famous tribute to the physico-theological argument as 'the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.'[4] The argument at the best, however, cannot take us beyond the great power and wisdom of the Author of the universe; and it can prove, not a Creator, but no more than an Architect, who is necessarily limited by the character of His material. Contingency belongs not to the matter but to the form of the world. The attempt to show that matter is contingent and dependent upon a principle of intelligence is to fall back upon the cosmological proof, which in its turn rests upon the ontological, with the consequence that the claim of the physico-theological to be a pure induction from experience is invalidated. This argument in fact originates in the propensity of the human mind to view the order and purposiveness of nature as though they were the products of intelligence and design—a propensity for which on the principles of the critical philosophy there can be no real basis.

(*b*) We need not dwell on Kant's views in his pre-critical writings of the teleological principle. It is sufficient to note that they were on the lines afterwards developed in the *Critiques*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he justifies, as against Hume's scepticism, the mechanical or scientific view of nature as subject to causal determination. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*[5] he vindicates the teleological view of the spiritual life as a realm of moral freedom and independence. From the critical standpoint therefore the doctrine of nature and the doctrine of morality may each be true in its own sphere, and mechanism and teleology be so far reconciled. In the *Critique of Judgment*[6] he seeks to overcome the dualism—in his own phrase, to bridge the gulf—between nature and the moral order, which he had regarded to begin with as closed systems, independent and separate. He realized that the sensible world of things and persons is but one aspect of reality, and the supersensible world of moral values but another, and that the two must be interrelated. Accordingly he draws attention to certain things belonging to the sensible world of nature which we cannot describe adequately without that notion of purpose or end which has its proper sphere in the supersensible world of spirit. One of these is the phenomenon of beauty, the other that of organic being.

(*c*) The first section of the *Critique* treats of the æsthetic judgment. In the æsthetic experience the beauty of nature, as of art, is felt to be purposive, in the sense that, while it arises out of the sensible, it is in harmony with our 'undefined idea' of the supersensible. The second section has to do with the teleological judgment, in which nature is regarded as purposive in itself, and not merely, as in the æsthetic judgment, in relation to the subject of experience.

(*d*) The purposive character of living beings raises for Kant anew the whole problem of the world as a teleological or organic system, and he now gives the notion of judgment a wider meaning than before. In its use of the principles of the understanding for the subsumption of the particular under the general (in which the faculty of judgment consists) judgment had been shown in the first *Critique* to be determinant or, as we might say, mechanical; *i.e.*, its function is to determine or specify the phenomenal world of experience as a mechanical system under inviolable principles. But judgment is also of another kind, viz. reflective. In subsuming the particular under the universal, reflective judgment makes use of the idea of subordination to purpose or end as the guide to its operations. The determinant judgment is analytical, and simply brings particular facts under the universal principles of the understanding. The reflective judgment is synthetical, and, operating with the idea of nature as a teleological or organic unity, discovers its specific laws. As Windelband[1] remarks, in this application of the category of the practical reason to the object of the theoretical, we have evidently the highest synthesis of the critical philosophy.

(*e*) But still there is no real transcendence of the dualism between the realms of nature and ends, between the factual world of experience and the ideal world of purpose and meaning. For the principle on which reflective judgment proceeds—that the form of nature implies purpose, that the specific laws of nature are to be regarded as though determined by purposive intelligence—is not constitutive of objects. Transcendental though it be, as involving an *a priori* synthetic judgment, it remains a subjective or regulative principle, serving as a rule or guide for the organization of experience and the further extension of knowledge. Yet without the conception of end or a purpose of reason, as realized in the form of organized beings, we could not make such beings intelligible to ourselves. Even a simple blade of grass is inexplicable unless we look upon it as purposive.

(*f*) The conception of the organism as purposive leads, moreover, to the view of collective nature as an organic whole or teleological unity. But it should be reiterated that we cannot affirm the principle of end or final cause as belonging to the essential constitution of nature. Could we penetrate to the hidden ground of nature, we should possibly discover that the principles of mechanical and teleological causation are assimilated in one single principle. The very limitation of our knowledge suggests to us the idea of a higher intelligence, possessed of knowledge which is direct and not mediated by a subjective principle. For such an intuitive or perceptive understanding there would be no such separation as our discursive understanding makes between means and end. As it is, the mechanical and teleological principles are at once complementary and heterogeneous, though the teleological is the final or inclusive principle.[2]

9. Hegel.—(*a*) In the course of his examination of the critical philosophy Hegel (*q.v.*) dealt with Kant's view of the physico-theological proof. He agrees with Kant as to its inadequacy as a rational or logical argument. The conception of design, like that of cause in the cosmological proof, cannot express the true nature of the relation of the world to God. At the same time the argument represents a further stage, the first stage being represented by the cosmological argument, in the process whereby in the hidden or implicit logic of religion thought reaches the full apprehension of God as spirit or self-conscious intelligence. Kant might have allowed this, but for the rigidity of the distinction he drew between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, which made it impossible for thought to pass from the one to the other. But the distinction is only relative, and from the ultimate standpoint the two worlds are one. (*b*) As for the critique of the teleological judgment, here again Kant's doctrine is vitiated by the view of the phenomenal and the noumenal as abstract opposites. Yet Kant indicates, if indirectly, the right principle of cosmic interpretation. For it is impossible to distinguish the categories of mechanical and teleological causation as being constitutive and regulative, objective and subjective respectively. With his true apprehension of the idea of purpose as internal and immanent, Kant, but for his rationalistic prejudices, might have advanced to the recognition of the constitutive character of the organic or teleological principle. Internal

[1] Königsberg, 1755. [2] Königsberg, 1762. [3] Riga, 1781.
[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, 1800, p. 383.
[5] Riga, 1788. [6] Berlin and Libau, 1790.

[1] *A Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., New York and London, 1893, p. 561.
[2] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 330.

adaptation or design is no less constitutive than the principle of mechanical causation. To overcome, says Hegel, the opposition of phenomena and noumena, we must follow the development of the world from the realm of nature to the realm of mind and thence to the unity of nature and mind in the idea of God, in whom the world is seen to be a rational system.

10. Schelling: the philosophy of nature.—(*a*) If Kant promoted the movement of German idealism, he also promoted—perhaps indirectly rather than directly—the new German humanism. We shall take occasion later to speak of the teleological or organic view of history associated with the names of Schelling and Hegel, who carried forward the work of Bossuet and Montesquieu, of Herder (*q.v.*) and Lessing (*q.v.*). Meantime we refer to another aspect of the humanistic movement, viz. the teleological or organic view of nature which was upheld under the leadership of Schelling by the so-called philosophers of nature. For Schelling, as for Plato and others among the ancients, there was a world-soul which as an inner principle of life united all differences in nature in a single organic system. It was felt by the new humanists, as J. T. Merz[1] puts it, that in the Kantian and more particularly the Fichtean philosophy the details of the scenery of nature were forgotten in the interest of studying the attitude and the emotions of the beholder. (*b*) Under the shelter of the humanistic movement, it should be noticed, there was a recrudescence of vitalistic theories in biology (which term was first used in this period by Treviranus to cover the whole of the science of life). Though the biological implications of the *Critique of Judgment* are difficult to grasp, vitalism could readily appeal to Kant's philosophical authority against the mechanical theory of life. For, while Kant handed over the inorganic realm to the mechanical theory (in this only sanctioning a *fait accompli*), he had maintained along with the teleological unity of nature as a whole the Aristotelian concept of biological organization. So at least it was generally thought, despite the metaphysical distinction he drew between the determinant and the reflective or teleological judgment as constitutive and regulative respectively. It is a distinction indeed which science cannot but ignore. When science employs teleological concepts such as function or adaptation, it gives them the same validity as the concept of mechanical causation.[2]

11. Lotze.—(*a*) The humanistic movement soon lost its force. The vitalistic theories which had received their impulse from it, and which culminated in Johannes Müller, fell into comparative neglect, and the mechanical view of life was once more dominant. The most solid, according to H. Driesch,[3] of all the attacks upon the older vitalism was made by Lotze (*q.v.*), whom he describes as a static teleologist in physiology in that he believed in the irreducibility of the category of the organism, but a dynamic teleologist or vitalist in psychology in that he believed the soul to be productive of absolutely new mechanical movement. (*b*) But the significance of Lotze for teleology lies not so much in his work in the domain of biology as in his philosophical system. In him science and philosophy, which since Leibniz and Kant had been going separate ways, meet once more. For he combines the mechanical view of nature with a teleological metaphysics (which he holds Schelling also did). It is his aim to show, as he says in the Introduction to the *Microcosmus*, 'how absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.'[1] In his scientific materialism he was at one with the great body of the scientific thinkers of his age. In his speculative teleology he had affinities with Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Herbart. Following Leibniz, he was led to conceive of the world as a plurality of real spiritual elements, but in mutual interaction according to the principle of immanent as distinguished from transeunt causality. In his endeavour to account for the causal relation and the reciprocal interaction of the elements, he was led, by a similar process of thought to that which Spinoza went through, to the idea of a universal all-embracing principle, which for religion has the value of God. Under the influence of Herbart and the Kantian criticism, he utilizes the principle of human analogy in interpreting the inner reality of nature, which he regards as the instrument of a purpose, viz. the purpose of supreme good, though it is by a practical conviction rather than a logical or rational process that we pass from the world of things and forms to the world of values. So it is that Lotze reaches his teleological interpretation of nature.

12. Darwin.—(*a*) At first sight it would appear that the theory of biological evolution associated with the name of Charles Darwin so strikingly vindicates the mechanical view of nature as to banish the idea of teleology altogether, not only from scientific explanation but also from philosophical interpretation. Certainly, as Darwin himself realized, the doctrine of descent by natural selection gave a fatal blow to the old argument from design as expounded by Paley.

> 'We can no longer argue,' he says, 'that the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man.'[2]

Paley had not appreciated the metaphysical difficulties involved in the notions of an external designer or contriver and of special external adaptations, and he laboured under the further limitation that he believed with the orthodox science of his time in the fixity or immutability of species. If species were not fixed and permanent forms but the results of long evolutionary processes determined by necessity or chance, then Paley's argument was still further discredited. There appeared to be no more design in the principle of natural selection than 'in the course which the wind blows.'[3]

(*b*) But, while the Darwinian theory was subversive of the teleological argument in its popular form, which was deistic or rationalistically theistic, it was not really anti-teleological in the Aristotelian and post-Kantian sense. No doubt the principle of natural selection is in itself fortuitous or non-teleological, and that despite the teleological flavour of the terms 'selection,' 'fitness,' by which it is expressed; so that J. Ward, borrowing a 'plain' term from Herbert Spencer, would describe the principle in mechanistic language as one of 'equilibration.'[4] Moreover, in the hands of ultra-Darwinians natural selection of random variations has been employed as an exclusive explanation of the modification and transformation of species, and, so employed, may be properly described as anti-teleological. But Darwin himself did not urge natural selection as an exclusive principle. He recognized in evolution other factors besides, both non-teleological and teleological; *e.g.*, in the last edition of the *Origin of Species* he makes a

[1] *Hist. of European Thought in the 19th Century*, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1896–1914, iii. 352.
[2] Henderson, *The Order of Nature*, p. 67.
[3] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, London, 1914, pp. 127–132.

[1] *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr.[4], Edinburgh, 1894, vol. i. p. xvi.
[2] *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*[2], 3 vols., London, 1887, i. 309.
[3] *Ib.* i. 309.
[4] *The Realm of Ends* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1911, p. 101.

point of saying that natural selection is 'aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts.'[1] Ward contends that this, the Lamarckian factor, like the factors of sexual and human selection, is strictly teleological in the sense that it presupposes psychical activity, conscious or at least sentient, directed to the end of the satisfaction of needs or desires. Whether the Lamarckian is a real or supposititious factor in evolution is a point with which we are not here concerned. It might be added, however, that the anti-Darwinian theories of evolution are more favourable to the teleological idea than the Darwinian and ultra-Darwinian theories; also that Darwin's general theory of organic evolution, like the general cosmogonic theory of Kant and Laplace, is being increasingly recognized as not inconsistent with an ultimate teleology, profounder, subtler, and less rationalistic than Paley's.

'Unless the cosmos itself,' says Ward, 'is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indwelling, informing Life and Mind.'[2]

13. **Lachelier.**—In Merz's opinion Lachelier's short tract, *Du Fondement de l'induction*,[3] is 'a corner-stone in the edifice of modern thought.'[4] Lachelier faces the problem of the contingent (or the collocation of things in space) which, along with that of the discontinuous, is involved in the Lotzean formula, that 'the things which surround us are the material in which, the laws of nature the forms *through* which, the world of values, or the Ideals, are, or have to be, realized.'[5] Following Cournot, he took up into his philosophy the old distinction between nature passively conceived and nature hypostatized or taken actively (*natura naturata, natura naturans*). The possibility of inductive reasoning rests, he says, on the recognition of both these aspects of nature, which are complementary. From the one standpoint nature is a mechanical or serial unity in which the antecedent determines the consequent; from the other it is a teleological, systematic, or harmonious unity in which the whole determines the existence of the parts. Efficient causes and final causes are both needed in the inductive process. Nature is at once a science, for ever producing effects from causes, and an art, for ever setting about new inventions. As there is a principle of regularity in nature, so there is a principle also of harmony or order. The contrast of mechanism with teleology, as Bosanquet has put it, 'is rooted in the very nature of totality.'[6] We shall see that this philosophical position of Lachelier has been fruitful in the scientific investigation of the problem of universal teleology.

III. *SYSTEMATIC.*—A. TELEOLOGY IN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION.—1. **Description, explanation, interpretation.**—(*a*) In proceeding from the historical to the systematic discussion, it will make for convenience of treatment to distinguish three aspects of teleology. Historically they have been closely associated, and it is impossible to separate them in any rigid fashion. They may be named, however, the descriptive, the explanatory, and the interpretative. If one hesitates to set up the distinctions here implied, one hesitates more as to the terms by which to designate them. For description, explanation, and interpretation are ill-defined terms in current usage, although—perhaps because—they circulate so freely in discussions of the world and its meaning. By descriptive teleology we mean the teleology which answers at once to the definition of the concept of end or purpose and is immediately recognizable. It might be otherwise named as formal, empirical, or *de facto* teleology. By explanatory teleology we mean the teleology which is postulated in scientific theory in explanation of things, processes, and events. It might be otherwise named as methodical or logical teleology. By interpretative teleology we mean the teleology which offers in philosophy and religion a spiritual interpretation of the world as a whole. It might be otherwise named as speculative, ideal, or spiritual teleology.

(*b*) It might be objected in particular to this scheme that modern physical science leaves explanation to metaphysical philosophy and claims for its formulas no more than descriptive validity. It concerns itself only with the question, 'What is it?', and hands over to metaphysics and religious philosophy the questions, 'How came it to be?', and 'Why came it to be?' But it appears to us that physical science has been suffering in the last generation from an excess of reactionary modesty. Behind its so-called descriptive formulations, which are broad generalizations, lie worlds of patient observation and experiment and a host of flashing inspirations; and, if it does not tell us all about the 'How,' it tells us a great deal about it, and is richly entitled to the larger claim involved in the term 'explanation.'

'It is an interesting point,' remarks J. Arthur Thomson, 'that just about the time when physics began to proclaim emphatically that its office was to describe and not to explain, natural history in Darwin's hands passed emphatically from description to historical explanation.'[1]

For the rest, there is in any case august and already classical authority for a certain individualism in matters of terminology.[2]

2. **Descriptive teleology.**—(*a*) Teleology, in the sense of purposiveness or activity directed towards an end, is immediately recognizable in the ordinary work-a-day world. Conscious striving after ends, with adaptation of means to ends, is characteristic of human life. The concept of end or purpose is itself derived from observation of the human mind, and conative activity involving ends is central in human experience. But the idea of teleology is readily extended beyond the reference to consciousness. There is a teleology below consciousness, just as there is a teleology above consciousness.

'Neither Christianity nor the coral reef,' says Bosanquet, 'were ever any design of the men or the insects who constructed them; they lay altogether deeper in the roots of things.'[3]

(*b*) As in human history teleology or purposiveness appears to be present in the process, though the individual goes forth, like Abraham, not knowing whither he goes, so it is also in the spheres of subconscious and unconscious life. Many biological processes show the appearance at least of purposiveness, and Kant was right in saying that we could not attain to the knowledge of living things except under the form of the teleological judgment. The structure of the organism, the reciprocal relation of its parts as both means and ends for each other, and its growth, in which it is at once continually self-produced and self-producing, all appeared to him to demand a teleological explanation. It may be that, as Kant's critical philosophy forced him to admit, the teleological principle is subjective and only regulative of knowledge. All we have to say here is that the phenomena of organismal life have been explained both mechanistically and teleologically, but *prima facie* they are susceptible to description in teleological terms.

[1] P. 821, quoted by J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[3] (*Gifford Lectures*), 2 vols., London, 1906, i. 280.
[2] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 302.
[3] Paris, 1871.
[4] *Hist. of European Thought*, iii. 620.
[5] *Ib.* iii. 616.
[6] *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1912, p. 155.

[1] *The System of Animate Nature* (*Gifford Lectures*), 2 vols., London, 1920, i. 13.
[2] Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, Oxford, 1915, p. 6.
[3] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 155.

(c) When we pass from organic to inorganic nature, we meet no longer with the appearance of purposiveness, because in inorganic nature there are, to the eyes of sight at least, no individual beings. Yet, if we were to indulge the 'pathetic fallacy,' we should look even upon inorganic nature, the air, the sea, a rock, as responsive to our varying moods and thus as so far teleologically constituted.

(d) But, if purposiveness may not be discerned in the inorganic world, it is recognizable in products of art and man's device that are composed of inorganic elements. To our fancy a piece of machinery is often informed with life and purpose, like the machines in Samuel Butler's satire of *Erewhon*, but the purposiveness resides not in the parts but in the processes they subserve. A machine, as Driesch[1] says, is distinguished from other human 'artefacts' as being made for processes. It is, as it were, the depository of a purpose. That is why the comparison of the world to a machine in the old natural theology, as by Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues*, is apt enough, especially when the Deity is deistically conceived as purely transcendent. On the other hand, it is also the reason why the comparison is inept from the standpoint of materialism or naturalism, and why from such a standpoint mechanism as applied to the world is not a particularly happy term.

(e) Nor should it be forgotten that under descriptive teleology may be included the recognition of order, beauty, and adaptations in nature as a whole. These things are upon that empirical level of reality which has been attained by the unreflective processes of common sense, and are consequently appreciated by all; and they form the sufficient basis of the traditional argument from design. For order, beauty, adaptation, all speak the language of teleology.

3. The argument from design.—The argument classically expounded in the ancient world by the Stoic Lucilius Balbus in Cicero's *de Natura Deorum*, and in the modern world by Paley in his *Natural Theology*, is doubtless made more impressive, but is not essentially strengthened, by the multiplication of curious instances of extrinsic and intrinsic adaptation derived from the scientific order of nature. It is sufficiently based, as already said, on the fact of the empirical order. As an integral part, nay the very marrow and substance, of the old natural theology of Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, the argument is liable to criticism for its deistic flavour, its hedonism, its antiquated pre-evolutionary science, its old-fashioned teleology; and apart from its limiting historical associations it is liable, as Hume and Kant made it abundantly clear, to the charge of being essentially fallacious. In inferring divine purposeful agency from the teleological appearance of nature, it is guilty, as the logicians would say, of the fallacy of transcendent inference. Obviously it must be restated in a profounder way, if it is to retain validity. The essence of the argument, says R. Flint,[2] is that order implies intelligence. It is an argument not *from* but *to* design, and it is only to be regarded as part of a great cumulative argument. G. T. Ladd[3] admits that the argument is properly an argument from universal order, and he is careful to say that it implies the validity of the ontological argument. From the 'orderly totality' of the universe he would postulate a world-ground conceived of as absolute will and intelligence. But the 'plain man,' with his eye only upon the empirical order, uses the argument without hesitation or logical scruple. When his mind beholds the chain of causes 'confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.'[1] Nor need the man of science, with his deeper appreciation of nature's order, be hesitant to follow the 'plain man.'

'The Logos,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'is at the core of our system, implicit in the nebula, as now in the dewdrop. It slept for the most part through the evolution of plants and coral-like animals, whose dream-smiles are a joy for ever. It slept as the child sleeps before birth. It became more and more awake among higher animals,—feeling and knowing and willing. It became articulate in self-conscious Man,—and not least in his science.'[2]

'There is . . . something,' says D'Arcy W. Thompson, 'that is the order of the cosmos and the beauty of the world, that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man. . . . You may call it Entelechy, you may call it the Harmony of the World; you may call it the *Élan vital*, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or you may call it, as it is called in the Story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men—you may call it the Spirit of God.'[3]

B. TELEOLOGY IN SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION.—**1. Cosmology.**—(1) *Mechanical explanation.*—The teleological appearance of nature and the forms of life, considered above, has set a problem which science no more than philosophy can afford to ignore. In cosmology, however, narrowly interpreted as the science of inorganic nature, teleology is not required as a principle of explanation, whether the cosmos be considered in the spatial or in the temporal reference, *i.e.* from the standpoint of cosmography or from that of cosmogony. The inorganic world is not teleological, for physical science at least, in the sense of exhibiting immanent purposiveness. In its formulations of the things and processes of the inorganic world science employs only the mechanistic terms of kinematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry; and it has amply vindicated its right to employ mechanistic terms exclusively in this sphere. Whether it may also do so in the spheres of biology, psychology, and sociology is another question. But in cosmology it has no use for the category of end or purpose, or for that matter for the categories of cause and substance, but assumes the working only of the non-spontaneous, the automatic, the mechanistic. It may possibly be that such real categories as substance and cause (whether efficient or final) are, in Mach's phrase, tinctured with 'fetishism,' but the exact sciences as such are by no means committed to a materialistic or naturalistic standpoint. Materialism and naturalism are ultimate positions, and scientific explanation is not necessarily that ultimate explanation which we would include under the term 'interpretation.' In point of fact, exact science increasingly recognizes the abstract and artificial quality of its explanations, as it realizes increasingly the distinction between conceptual formulation and perceptual reality. Its formulas have been variously characterized as symbols or counterfoils of reality, as a kind of conceptual shorthand, as economics of thought, as convenient hypothetical summations, or, in J. Royce's favourite metaphor, as the ledger entries and balances of a particular method of book-keeping. It is open to science, as he truly remarks, to enter its accounts by other methods of book-keeping.[4] Gravitation, *e.g.*, may yet be explained as a mere appearance of some more genuine process of nature.

(2) *Collocations.*—In view of the foregoing, we may allow that mechanical explanation, if abstract and hypothetical, reigns supreme and alone in the physical domain. While therefore Chalmers strengthened the case for physico-theology by reviving the Cartesian distinction between the

[1] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, p. 4.
[2] *Theism*², p. 121 ff.; cf. also *Agnosticism* (*Croall Lecture*), Edinburgh, 1903, pp. 182-184.
[3] *The Philosophy of Religion*, 2 vols., London, 1906, ii. 59 ff.

[1] Bacon, *Essays*, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'
[2] *The System of Animate Nature*, ii. 637.
[3] *Life and Finite Individuality* (two symposia of the Aristotelian Society), London, 1913, p. 54.
[4] *The World and the Individual* (*Gifford Lectures*), 2nd ser., New York, 1901, p. 216.

laws and the dispositions or collocations of matter, he placed his argument in jeopardy when he said that 'the main evidence for a Divinity lies, not in the laws of matter, but in the collocations.'[1] 'But what would become of this main evidence for a Divinity,' remarks J. Ward,[2] 'if the laws of matter themselves explained its collocations?' Yet, although science has been gathering the collocations within the mechanism of nature, the problem of order still remains. As in the biological sphere, so in the cosmological there is an ultimate collocation or configuration to be acknowledged which natural laws cannot explain. Says L. J. Henderson:

'The forms and states and quantities of matter and energy in the nebula determine the resulting solar system.'[3]

So that we may affirm that the universe possesses an original teleological character.

(3) *Fitness of the environment.*—(*a*) But is it possible to discover an explanation of the order of nature beyond the laws of nature's uniformity? Henderson thinks positive thought has found a clue. He points out that, if the scientific or mechanistic origin of the natural order is to be explained, it must be through principles that account not merely for the general character of orderliness in the phenomena of nature and the products of evolution, but also for that radical or fundamental diversity which Herbert Spencer declared necessary to the evolutionary process. Such principles, clearly, are to be sought not so much in the laws of nature as in the properties of matter. Accordingly Henderson has investigated the properties of the elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and of their compounds water and carbon dioxide, which have been the chief factors in both geological and organic evolution. These properties are found to constitute a unique group of singular physical and chemical characteristics, so that they are *maxima* or the fittest possible for organic life; *e.g.*—to take the compounds, which are the primary constituents of the environment—the solvent action of water is greater than the solvent action of any other liquid, and the solubility of carbon dioxide in water is such that it must always be evenly distributed between the atmosphere and aqueous liquids. Or—to take the elements themselves—hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen possess the greatest number of compounds and enter into the greatest number of reactions, involving the greatest transformations of energy known to the chemist. Further (and here a teleological consideration appears), the aforesaid unique ensemble of properties is uniquely favourable to the existence of systems—of which the world of physics and chemistry consists—of numerous, diverse, stable systems. In fitness for systems no other elements and compounds even approach hydrogen, carbon and oxygen, water and carbon dioxide. In short, the arrangement of the properties of matter among the elements makes the diversity of the evolutionary process possible.

(*b*) It is Henderson's opinion, following up these results of physico-chemical research, that, as according to the law of probabilities the connexion between the properties and the process cannot be due to mere contingency, the properties can only be regarded as a preparation for the process, or, in other words, as resembling adaptation. There must be a functional relationship between them—something like that known to physiology—which must be described as teleological. How otherwise can we express the fact that the collocation of properties unaccountably precedes that to which they are unquestionably related? Just as biological organization is teleological and non-mechanical, so with the connexion between the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen and the process of evolution. This is the positive contribution Henderson has to offer towards the vast problem of the contingent set for natural science by Lotze and Lachelier, and it goes to strengthen the philosophical position that mechanism and teleology are both at the foundation of the natural order.[4]

2. Biology.—(1) *Evolution.*—(*a*) The term 'evolution' (*q.v.*) is itself teleological in its primary meaning, and denotes more than mechanistic process; but it is possible that the mechanistic (*i.e.* physico-chemical) explanation of biological descent may be found sufficient in natural science. Possibly the evolutionary process is mechanistically determined through and through by natural selection interpreted as non-teleological (whether working upon so-called fortuitous variations or upon variations themselves subject to the law of probability), or by natural selection supplemented by other non-teleological factors, perhaps by some non-teleological factor yet to be discovered. On the other hand, we have seen that Darwin did not regard natural selection as exclusive of teleological factors, and it may well be that the psychical principles of self-conservation and subjective selection, on which J. Ward would lay stress, are required to give natural selection a *point d'appui.*[1]

(*b*) It is a searching test of the sufficiency of mechanistic explanation that H. Bergson in the rôle of biologist proposes. If it could be proved, he says, that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution, then pure mechanism would be refutable and finality in a certain sense so far demonstrable. Accordingly he examines the evolutionary hypothesis in the two forms of it that have emerged from the welter of biological controversy since Darwin's time. He puts it to neo-Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism alike, What is the explanation of the structural analogy between the eye of a vertebrate and that of a mollusc like the common pecten?[2] It appears impossible on neo-Darwinian principles, which enter readily into a mechanistic philosophy of life, to account for the production of the same effect by two different accumulations of an enormous number of small causes, whether the possibility be urged, as by the stricter Darwinists, on the theory of insensible accidental variations or, as by de Vries, on the theory of sudden and simultaneous variations or, as by Eimer, on the theory that assigns a direct rather than an indirect influence to the environment, explaining the evolution of the various organs by a kind of mechanical composition of the external with the internal forces. To account for the convergence of effects we must appeal, continues Bergson, to some inner directing principle. Here Bergson's sympathy with the neo-vitalism of Driesch and Reinke appears, though he is more interested in their critical work than in their constructions. Turning to neo-Lamarckism, which explains variations not as accidental or determined but as springing from the effort of the living being to adapt itself to the environment, he declares it to be the only form of the later evolutionism capable of admitting, as it actually does with Cope, 'an internal and psychological principle of development.'[3] Weismann has shown, however, that the Lamarckian hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics is at most the exception and not the rule. How then may an organ such as the eye be developed? Is not the organic effort a deeper and more psychological thing than any neo-Lamarckian supposes? So Bergson returns to his speculative theory of life. He finds the fundamental cause of variations that accumulate and create new species, in the transmission of the *élan vital* from one generation of germs to the next through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, which is the false anthropomorphic view both of mechanism and of finalism. Life proceeds by dissociation and division. It starts with a direction or tendency no doubt, and is in this sense finalistic, but we cannot foretell how and where it will end.

(2) *Mechanism and vitalism.*—(*a*) Leaving genetic considerations, we find ourselves still pursued by the mechanistic hypothesis, which affirms 'living matter' to be completely describable as a physico-chemical system, and organization and regulation—those distinguishing marks of living bodies—to be conceivable in physico-chemical terms. But it is also maintained as against this that the way of physico-chemical analysis and synthesis yields but an abstract product falling short of what answers to that *vue d'ensemble* which Comte advocated in the study of the living.

(*b*) Mechanistic theory in biology may be said to follow two main types, so far as regards the relation to teleology. Sometimes it has no traffic with teleology at all, and is still afflicted with what von Baer called 'teleophobia,' in its jealousy for the mechanical explanation. Sometimes again—and this represents the predominant tendency—it finds room for the teleological view, re-affirming in fact the Aristotelian doctrine of the internal teleology of the living thing, which is its self-regulation.

(*c*) But, with the more synthetic method involved in this type of mechanistic theory, vitalism has appeared once again in the history of biological theory, if in subtler and more elusive forms. The difference between the prevalent mechanistic theory and the vitalistic hypothesis may be expressed in the distinction due to Driesch between statical

[1] *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God*, i. 20, note.
[2] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 47.
[3] *Fitness of the Environment*, p. 301.
[4] Cf. *Fitness of the Environment, Order of Nature, Philosophical Review*, vol. xxv. no. 3 [1916], *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. xiii. no. 12 [1916].

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 290.
[2] *L'Évolution créatrice*, Paris, 1907, Eng. tr., London, 1911, p. 66 ff.
[3] *Ib.* p. 81.

and dynamical teleology.[1] Whereas in statical teleology the processes of life are judged to be purposive in virtue of a given machine-like order or form underlying them, in dynamical teleology it is in virtue of their possession of a peculiar autonomy; and dynamical teleology leads, as Driesch thinks, to some form of vitalism. We suppose L. J. Henderson, who is a mechanist, might then be also named a statical teleologist; for, while on the whole persuaded that organization (the central issue between the mechanism and vitalism of to-day) is capable of explanation—though not as yet explained—in physico-chemical terms, he is also persuaded that the teleological concept of organization, if to be found also in sociology and in the meteorological cycle, is a necessary biological category, and that a mechanistic physiology is at fault in not recognizing this.[2] But, though he thus believes with Driesch in teleology as an 'irreducible peculiarity' of vital phenomena, he is not a dynamical teleologist in the neo-vitalist sense. He might allow that organisms, like machines, are inert embodiments of purposiveness; he would not allow that they are actuated by purposiveness.

(*d*) The anti-mechanists also fall into two main groups. In the first are the neo-vitalists, of whom Driesch is the most prominent representative. They contend that biological processes are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of the organism, but that some non-physical principle (like Driesch's entelechy or unifying causality) impresses itself upon those processes, to suspend, regulate, or control the physical and chemical reactions. With such a principle at work, the outcome of events, experimentally considered at least, is no longer determinate and unequivocal. Bergson's *élan vital* is such another non-perceptual determiner. Now, as Bergson realizes,[3] the contention of neo-vitalism is relevant and weighty on the critical side, but on its positive side is beset with difficulties. Even granted the existence of the mysterious non-mechanical semi-psychical entity postulated in the theory, it is impossible to say where and how it works in the biological processes. In recent constructions, no doubt, there is none of the crudity ridiculed by Molière in the older vitalism when he declared the cause of sleep to be the 'dormitive virtue' (which reminds one of the Johnsonian legend that the noise of wheels was once attributed by the learned doctor to the strepituosity of circumrotatory motion). All the same the conception of neo-vitalism remains mystical in quality, and biological science is reluctant to entertain it. An entity such as Driesch formulates, which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent *sui generis*, non-spatial, albeit acting into space, non-material, but logically belonging to nature, may have a strange fascination for the metaphysician, but will hardly retain a place for itself in the world of scientific explanation. We are assured, moreover, that the second law of thermo-dynamics, which entelechy is said to be capable of suspending, will hold even in the obscure cases in morphology on which Driesch founds his theory.[4] We are also assured that the non-physical something which is supposed to intervene in physical and chemical processes is invariably dependent upon the existence of physical and chemical conditions, yet it is not explained what part these conditions play in bringing about the actual results.[1] Vitalism sets itself a hard task indeed in seeking to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the mechanical and metaphysical explanations.[2]

(3) *Biologism.*—(*a*) Even as a scientific hypothesis neo-vitalism appears already on the way to occupy an intermediate position. The issue now seems to lie between some kind of mechanism and a form of teleological theory even more anti-mechanistic than neo-vitalism. For want of a better name, the theory may be called 'biologism.' It is the biological as distinguished from the mechanical theory of life. It is vitalistic in a sense, for it regards it as impossible to conceive distinctively biological phenomena in physical and chemical terms. For it the autonomy of life is more than a statical conception involving a teleological and non-mechanical relationship between mechanical things and processes. The autonomy of life is a dynamical conception, involving a dynamical teleology. But it is the living organism itself, and not some directive force within it, as in properly vitalistic theory, that is dominant in organic activity. The organism exists as such, and its structure and activities are the expression of its existence.

(*b*) Here, as is claimed by J. S. Haldane,[3] a protagonist of the biological theory of life, we have a good working hypothesis, necessary to biologists, and capable of overcoming the failures of the physico-chemical conception. Biology, he urges, is something very different from physico-chemistry applied to life. Its phenomena differ, not merely in complexity but also in kind, from physico-chemical phenomena. Although physico-chemistry has much to teach us concerning the origin and destiny of the material and energy in the body, it fails to throw light upon the apparently teleological ordering of that material and energy. The inadequacy of the physico-chemical explanation appears when we enter into the deeper problems of the organism's activity, not to say fundamental problems, such as reproduction and heredity. Animal heat, respiration, circulation—to take these examples from physiology—all contain teleological (*i.e.* physiological) elements that do not yield to physico-chemical analysis. Life is a unity of structure, environment, and activity, and is not resolvable into mechanism. Separate a living part from its environment, or suspend its activity, and you alter it completely. What therefore matter and energy are to physics, or the atom to chemistry, the living organism is to biology.

(*c*) Haldane is further of opinion that, inconsistent with each other as are the biological and ordinary physico-chemical theories of life (so that personally he would as soon go back to the mythology of his Saxon forefathers as to the mechanistic physiology), a common meeting-ground between biology and physico-chemistry will yet be discovered. That will mean, however, not a reduction of the organic to the inorganic, but the inclusion of the inorganic within the domain of biology.[4] In such an opinion the contrast between the principles of mechanism and biologism is sharply revealed, but with it we seem to be carried beyond the universe of discourse of natural science.

(*d*) It appears to us that in their bearing upon scientific explanation the differences between the mechanist or statical teleologist and the biologist or dynamical teleologist (if we may wrest Driesch's terms to our own use) is not so very radical after all. It is significant that Henderson accepts the mechanistic hypothesis as *upon the whole* most consistent with the evidence,[5] and that Haldane advocates the biological hypothesis on account of the unsatisfactoriness of the *ordinary* mechanistic (*i.e.* physico-chemical) explanation.[6] They both accept the principle of organic autonomy, and are good Aristotelians (as indeed Driesch is also), and possibly they would unite upon the formula: 'Not mechanism *or* vitalism, but mechanism *and* teleology.' This is a thesis admirably supported

[1] *The History and Theory of Vitalism*, p. 5; cf. also *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, ii. 135 f.

[2] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6 [1918], p. 575 f.

[3] *Creative Evolution*, p. 44, note.

[4] L. J. Henderson, in *Philosophical Review*, xxvii. no. 6, p. 574.

[1] J. S. Haldane, *The New Physiology*, London, 1919, p. 137.

[2] Cf. R. Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 181.

[3] *The New Physiology*, p. 48; cf. also *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, London, 1913, *Organism and Environment*, New Haven, London and Oxford, 1917, *Life and Finite Individuality* (Two Symposia), London, 1918.

[4] *The New Physiology*, p. 19; *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 100.

[5] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 576.

[6] *The New Physiology*, p. 49.

by R. F. Alfred Hoernlé,[1] who would make the particular point that in biology teleology not only is compatible with mechanism but is 'logically dominant' over it. Teleological terms are required, he says, not as substitutes for physico-chemical terms but to express the dominancy of the structures and processes of life, which—as he goes on to say—cannot be reduced to exclusively physico-chemical terms without disregard of the difference, on which Bergson insists so strikingly, between the living and the dead.

(*e*) In an intimate and eloquent discussion of mechanism and vitalism J. Arthur Thomson[2] makes it abundantly clear that biologism is at present no more than a descriptive or methodological theory. It distinguishes itself from mechanism in demanding ultra-mechanical categories, but what these categories should be is not as yet determinate. He himself describes the organism in Bergsonian language as 'a historic being which has traded with time, and has enregistered within itself past experiences and experiments, and which has ever its conative bow bent towards the future.'[3] Hesitating to interpolate with Driesch and the positive vitalists a new agency or directive activity, he is content to say that the organism reveals new aspects of reality, transcending theoretically mechanical formulation.

3. Psychology.—(1) *Body and mind.*—(*a*) If the teleological standpoint is required in the scientific explanation of the world of organic nature, it is also required in respect of the world of mind or consciousness. The world of mind is the native sphere of purposive activity, and only a very abstract view of it can dispense with teleological categories. According to W. R. Sorley's[4] analysis, the contrast between a purely mechanical and a purposive system lies in this, that, although purpose is consistent with the law of causation and the principle of the conservation of energy, yet as the result of a purpose or mental idea there is a liberation of energy passing from the potential to the kinetic form, and the same purpose may also control, non-mechanically, the direction of the movement. Therefore it is not to account completely for the activity of a purposive system to describe it in merely mechanistic terms. When this position is challenged (as it is in psychology as well as in biology), as not fitting into the mechanistic hypothesis, the discussion passes inevitably into the speculative sphere.

(*b*) In psychology the mechanistic position founds upon the Cartesian law of psycho-physical parallelism, which represents the relation between brain-processes and psychical changes as one not of interaction but of concomitance, and it usually takes the form of the parallelistic hypothesis known as conscious automatism or psychical epiphenomenalism (*Begleiterscheinung*), in which inner or conscious states are accounted for as collateral products of the physical phenomena. On such principles as are embodied in this form of psycho-physical parallelism, the appearance of purpose or ideal direction is an illusion, and the consciousness of purpose either belongs to a different order or level of reality or is simply a result or effect, however vague, shadowy, impalpable, of the neural organization. On the first alternative, every neurosis has its psychosis, but they cannot affect each other. On the second alternative, every neurosis has its psychosis, but the neurosis cannot react even a very little upon the psychosis. Either, then, the mechanical theory does not apply to consciousness or the principle of the conservation of energy breaks down. The mechanist must either give up his case or overthrow the foundations of his faith. If this line of argument laid down by J. Ward[5] be valid, then we are free to turn from the mechanistic hypothesis to one that allows full value to the teleological appearance of conscious life, say, the animistic theory which has so long persisted in human thought and for which W. McDougall[6] has made out so strong a case in recent times, or the double-aspect theory with which the name of C. Lloyd Morgan[7] may be associated, and which J. Arthur Thomson favours as in line with his biological contention, largely based on a study of behaviour, that the organism is a psycho-physical unity.[8]

(2) *Psychologism.*—(*a*) But the working scientist need not commit himself to any speculative position on the problem of the relation between what we call body and what we call mind. If he is of opinion that psychology is more than physiology, as biology is more than physico-chemistry, he can at least affirm a descriptive or methodological 'psychologism,' transcending merely biological concepts and claiming teleological categories of its own, exclusive and irreducible. A merely physiological psychology, avers J. S. Haldane, is as inadequate as a mechanical physiology. A conscious organism, which reacts not only in space but also in time, and in its temporal reactions joins itself at once to the actual past and the potential future, shows itself to be more than a mere organism, such as we commonly regard a plant as being. The relation to its environment, which is established through perception and volition, is no mere external relation, as in the case of a mere organism. There is a real connexion between the external world and the internal organic world. The environment is 'teleologically determined' by our organic needs, and but for this 'teleological determinism' the world of our conscious experience would lack unity and coherence. To disregard therefore the psychological aspect of living things, especially human beings, and to describe their behaviour in other than psychological terms is to deal unduly in abstractions.[1]

(*b*) If we may extend a remark of J. Arthur Thomson,[2] in which this idea of the autonomy both of biology and of psychology is summed up, there is not one science of nature but several. There is the physical order of nature—the inorganic world—where mechanism is dominant (always on the assumption, as W. R. Sorley[3] reminds us, that qualitative differences are really reducible to quantitative differences of molecular and infra-molecular structure). There is the vital order of nature—the world of organisms—where mechanism is in logical subordination to teleology; and there is the psychical order of nature—the world of mind—where purpose is dominant. In biology the primacy of the biological standpoint, and in psychology the primacy of the psychological standpoint, is to be maintained.

(3) *Discontinuity.*—It may be thought that discontinuity of the categories makes against a unified theory of nature, such as mechanism offers. But a unified theory of nature does not require, says Hoernlé, 'the reduction of all universals to one kind, or the restriction of all variables to one type of values,' but may be achieved by 'the correlation of different types or groups or levels of phenomena.'[4] It is such a correlation, or cumulative integration, that is here supported. Nor need exception to it be taken in the name of ultimate or metaphysical unity. The categories of mechanism, life, and mind, which are fundamental hypotheses of natural science, are, in the wider view of philosophy, only provisional. It is possible, as J. S. Haldane has hinted, that the principle of continuity may yet be amply vindicated even in the scientific order of nature, and that without surrender to the mechanistic hypothesis. From his own standpoint of philosophical idealism he can say that the categories are the forms which the riches of the spiritual world assume in their progress towards the truly real.[5]

4. Sociology.—(1) *Two functions of psychology.*—A. E. Taylor[6] speaks of two functions of psychology. The first, which is not its proper function but which it exercises 'pending the majority of cerebral physiology,' is to set forth mental processes as mechanical uniformities of sequence. The other function is to treat of purposive activities and adjustments, and thereby to afford a suitable terminology for the sociological sciences, and in particular ethics and history. Apart from

[1] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 629 ff.
[2] *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. i. lect. v.
[3] *Ib.* i. 160.
[4] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911–12, p. 216 ff.
[5] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. pt. iii.
[6] *Body and Mind*, London, 1911.
[7] *Scientia*, xviii. [1915] 1–15.
[8] *The System of Animate Nature*, lect. vii., esp. p. 247 ff.

[1] *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 111 ff.
[2] *Introd. to Science*, London, 1911, p. 163; cf. also *H.J.* ix. [1911], x. [1912].
[3] *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*), Cambridge, 1918, p. 407.
[4] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii. no. 6, p. 641.
[5] *The New Physiology*, p. 156.
[6] *Elements of Metaphysics*, London, 1903, p. 306.

the teleological symbols supplied by psychology, ethical appreciation and historical interpretation would be impossible. With this remark let us pass to the consideration of the teleological method in ethics and history.

(2) *Ethics.*—The teleological standpoint has its place in ethical theory, just as teleological symbolism necessarily enters into the appreciation of conduct. Among the possible divisions of ethical theories a fundamental one is into the teleological and the formal or jural. In the first case the moral standard is represented by the idea of good or value, in the second by that of duty or right. The teleological theory, which is found in Greek philosophy, takes the form either of hedonism or, as F. Paulsen,[1] borrowing an Aristotelian term, phrases it, of 'energism.' With Aristotle as with Plato the ethical end or ideal was the good personally realized in social relations as the actualization or full fruition of human powers and capacities. In modern ethical theory both the hedonistic and energistic forms of the teleological method have been revived. The formal or jural method is older than the other, as attaching itself to the legalistic stage of religion. Through Judaism it entered into theological ethics, and it received classical exposition at the hands of Kant, the fundamental idea of whose ethics is the original mental principle of the good will. As against a Kantian formalism and in favour of the teleological standpoint in ethical theory, it has often been urged that norms and motives of action are not abstract and transcendental principles but, as psychology and history teach us, generalized rules of the will which grow out of individual and social experience, and their value consists not in defining but in their power of promoting the ethical end.[2]

(3) *History.*—(*a*) The teleological principle has also been applied to the interpretation of the process of history. As we have already noticed, a teleological view of history took shape under the influence of Christianity, receiving various expression in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. But it was not until Lessing and Herder, or rather not until Hegel, that history was reflectively and intimately treated in the light of the Aristotelian principles of continuity and development.

(*b*) We may distinguish in this connexion three types of historical theory. J. S. Mill recognized the principle of continuity, but in his 'inverse deductive' method he applied to historical development the atomizing, mechanizing principles of Democritus and Descartes, treating history as a kind of social dynamics, human motives and actions as causes and effects, and the course of events as a rigorously determined sequence. Against this view it may be maintained that the hypothesis of mechanical causation is irrelevant in the sphere of history and of sociology in general, as in the sphere of psychology in its most characteristic aspect. Psychical events are not duly appreciated by means of subpersonal categories. A similar criticism is applicable to Herbert Spencer's theory of history. Although Spencer, here following Comte, applies the idea of organic or super-organic evolution to the interpretation of the historical process, he never really breaks with the conviction—'fixed probably in his mind,' says J. T. Merz, 'through his engineering education'[3]—that change and progress in society, as in nature and mind, are explicable on mechanical principles.

(*c*) The second type of historical theory is represented by Hegel himself, for whom the course of events is a continuity, not of mechanical causation but of evolutionary development. It is still a rigidly determined movement, but it is teleologically conceived, the end dominating the process. 'As the germ carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flavour and the form of the fruits, so the first vestiges of mind virtually contain the whole history.'[4] The history of society is for Hegel the necessary evolution of the immanent Idea, and the process is fixed in all its stages. Through human interests and actions the final purpose of history is carried out, but the purpose itself—such is the absolute cunning of reason—is beyond and external to human interests and actions.[5]

(*d*) It may be objected to this organic view that, in so generalizing the conception of historical development, it does not bring out its true nature as a process of interaction between conscious and self-conscious minds. Nor does it appear to offer a true rationale of human progress. A better explanation of the historical process, in our judgment, is implied in the words of G. Galloway, who, following Siebeck, says: 'Progress is the spiritual vocation of humanity: it is a task which it sets to itself, not an inherent necessity of its constitution. The . . . ideal is freely pursued, and what ought to be is never that which perforce must be.'[1] In other words, the organic view is to be replaced by the historical or spiritual view, in which the freedom of human personality is more clearly acknowledged.[2]

(*e*) The fuller justification of such a position must lie in the metaphysical sphere. It may be here observed that the third type of historical theory might be distinguished from the others as teleological indeterminism. In it development is acknowledged to be epigenetic or, in Wundt's phrase, creatively synthetic, whereas in the teleological and mechanical determinisms above named development is the necessary effect, as it were, of an attraction from before or an impulsion from behind, of a *vis a fronte* or a *vis a tergo*.

(*f*) It may be also observed that teleological indeterminism in the theory of historical science naturally leads in metaphysics to a form of spiritual pluralism (*q.v.*), that teleological determinism makes a ready alliance with pantheism, and that mechanical determinism is at home in a naturalistic or positivistic setting. Yet it is not without significance that in J. S. Mill a survival of the deistic tendency of thought is to be found. For it may be not unjustly said that deism, as a dogmatic or theological position, with its shallow rationalizing of religion and its mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world, largely promoted what J. Royce calls the 'mechanistic dogma' of our time. An 'absentee God' may be done without, so long as the mechanism of the universe keeps going. At any rate naturalism, deism, pantheism, and pluralism will meet us as we pass from the world of scientific explanation into that of philosophical and religious interpretation.

C. TELEOLOGY IN SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION.—1. **Universal teleology.**—As we view the world in its totality and seek to discover its meaning, we pass from empirical description and scientific or logical explanation to spiritual, *i.e.* philosophical and religious, interpretation. Here we are face to face with the metaphysical aspect of teleology, which is the aspect it has chiefly presented in history. The need of a philosophical interpretation of the world has always been more or less consciously realized, and in recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the deeper problems of nature, mind, and spirit. Philosophy and religion alike welcome the tendency among natural scientists to make incursions into what science has for long regarded as the 'foreign field' of metaphysics—a tendency begotten of the increasing recognition that no more than materialism does naturalism speak the last word on the perennial metaphysical problems. This has been largely due to 'the liberating influence of biology,'[3] and is marked among biologists. We have already noticed the idealistic position of J. S. Haldane, and Driesch has advanced beyond a conceptual phenomenalism, having even formulated a critical metaphysic which leans to theism.[4] The new and wider scientific outlook is well reflected in the significant postscript to T. C. Chamberlin's discussion of the geogonic, geological, and biological processes in his remarkable book, *The Origin of the Earth*:[5]

'It is our personal view that what we conveniently regard as merely material is at the same time spiritual, that what we try to reduce to the mechanistic is at the same time volitional; but whether this be so or not, the emergence of what we call the living from the inorganic and the emergence of what we call the psychic from the physiologic, were at once the transcendent and the transcendental features of the earth's evolution.'

[1] *Introd. to Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, p. 421.
[2] Cf. G. Galloway, *The Principles of Religious Development*, London, 1909, p. 235 ff.
[3] *Hist. of European Thought*, iv. 519, note.
[4] *Philosophie der Geschichte*, ed. 1848, p. 21, quoted by Galloway, p. 5.
[5] Cf. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 149.

[1] *Realm of Ends*, p. 43.
[2] Cf. W. James, *The Will to Believe*, New York and London, 1897, p. 245.
[3] Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 66.
[4] *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, pt. ii., esp. p. 232 ff.
[5] Chicago and London, 1916.

2. Teleology and naturalism.—(*a*) It is the essence of naturalism to construe the phenomena of life, mind, and society in terms of the mechanical and non-teleological conceptions which serve in physical science. But we are persuaded that thus to reduce the world to a mechanism is to fail to account for large tracts of experience. Mechanism is an undeniably excellent methodical principle, but is inadequate as an ontological dogma. Moreover, with the mechanistic dogma teleology cannot live, *i.e.* teleology as philosophical interpretation. It has ever been the contention of teleologists from Aristotle onwards that meaning and purpose underlie all material and mechanical processes, that mind or spirit is ideally prior to matter and more fundamental to reality. Naturalism, it may be said, ignores the distinction implied in Lotze's remark that 'the machinery which produces the image of a phenomenon is not identical with the meaning of this image.'[1]

(*b*) The counter-contention of spiritual philosophy is to be justified on epistemological grounds, as by J. Ward in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Ward insists boldly with Kant that the intellect makes or fashions, though it does not create, nature. He shows that the fundamental principles of knowledge, unity, causality, and regularity have entered anthropomorphically into our conception of nature, and that nature itself as one and uniform is teleological, being found conformable to human intelligence and amenable to human ends. The result is that unity of nature and man in one rational and coherent scheme of things, that confronting of human reason by universal reason, in which idealism or spiritualism has always consisted. It is the fault of naturalism, as Pringle-Pattison expresses it, that it prematurely closes the record, that it substantiates the antecedents in abstraction from their consequents.

'There is no system,' as he says, 'no whole of being, no real fact at all, till the external gathers itself up, as it were, into internality, and existence sums itself up in the conscious soul.'[2]

3. The essence of teleological interpretation.—Teleological interpretation is then confessedly anthropomorphic, or, as F. C. S. Schiller would say, humanistic. It rests upon the general epistemological principle of analogy, and is itself a particular instance of it. According to the teleologist, the worlds of nature and history are to be interpreted after the analogy of the purposeful life of which man is conscious in himself. Since Hume and Kant, at any rate, the analogical character of the teleological principle has been widely recognized. We saw it in Lotze, who believed none the less that the category of end or purpose afforded a definite clue to the nature of ultimate reality. We may see it in Bergson, who, however, regards the category of end or purpose as applicable only to the lower scientific order of reality. Yet, as H. Höffding[3] points out, Bergson himself actually employs the principle of analogy along with that of intuition. With him intuition is only the first step towards the interpretation of reality. As mechanism proceeds by analogy in taking the organism to be a machine, and finalism in making it respond to a preconceived plan, so is it not to go by analogy to understand life as an *élan*, a thrust, an effort? But in this instance, it must be allowed, the analogy is drawn not as in finalism from the intelligent self-conscious life, but from the spontaneous and semi-conscious psychical life. While there is force in this criticism of Bergson's position, it does not follow that Bergson's philosophy of life is thereby discredited. All metaphysic, as Leibniz said, is founded on analogy. Apart from the analogy of human experience, no kind of knowledge would be possible, and it is entirely reasonable to proceed by way of that analogy to the consideration of the truly and ultimately real. But it may be urged, as against Bergson, that the analogy of purposeful self-conscious activity—so central a feature in human experience—offers a better clue to the nature of the absolute experience than does any analogy based on experience which is subpersonal. In any case what is claimed here is that teleology is a valid principle of interpretation, and that divine purpose may be recognized as a true cosmic principle. We shall see that, if divine purpose is actually so recognized, the *analogia hominis* must not be pressed in detail. The category of purpose or end, viewed from the side of the Absolute, requires to be delicately handled.

4. Pragmatic teleology. — Pragmatism (*q.v.*) claims to be different from other philosophies in respect of the clearness of its consciousness that teleology is no more than a methodological postulate. It is astounded at the misunderstanding revealed in the recent criticism[1] that it assumes a teleological constitution of the universe guaranteeing in mediæval fashion satisfaction to human desires and needs—an assumption out of keeping, the critic adds, with the spiritual pluralism or radical empiricism which pragmatism generally professes. In reply F. C. S. Schiller[2] insists that, while the pragmatist makes use of the teleological principle, it is not for him an *a priori* truth that the universe is going to prove good and to be found favourable to his desires. His is a heuristic teleology. He assumes commensurability between the supreme reality and human faculty, and then acts upon the assumption in hope. In contrast to this methodological optimism, one recalls the attitude of Bertrand Russell,[3] who repudiates the 'will to believe' as an argument and can only face the universe with 'unyielding despair.' For, according to his naturalistic view, the universe is blind to good and evil and indifferent to human interests. Perhaps, as C. A. Richardson[4] suggests, it is the preoccupation of logical pluralism with the objective side of experience that leads it to look upon the notion of teleology with doubt and suspicion. But more likely the attitude arises out of a personal conviction or resolution of character.

5. Teleology in personal idealism.—(*a*) Where personal idealism means spiritual pluralism of a theistic type, the concept of purpose applied to the interpretation of the universe yields a conclusion that satisfies. Consider first how thoroughgoing an application of this concept is embodied in personal idealism. It conceives reality, as in the monadisms of Leibniz and Lotze, as consisting of a plurality of experiencing subjects or spiritual centres of experience. In this it builds upon the analogy in respect of purposiveness between human persons and the lower forms of organic life, and upon the conjecture that even inorganic matter is composed of purposive individuals. Like organic species arrested in their evolution, or apparently so, these exhibit the minimum of spontaneity and the maximum of habit, according to the idea expressed by J. Ward, 'Routine presupposes antecedent living purpose.'[5] The essential nature of the monads or spiritual individuals is affirmed to be their self-activity, involving self-determination (conscious, subconscious, or unconscious) in

[1] *Kleine Schriften*, iii. 229, quoted by Merz, iii. 549.
[2] *The Idea of God*, p. 215; cf. also p. 332.
[3] *Modern Philosophers*, Eng. tr., London, 1915, p. 290 ff. (see ref. at p. 292 to *Den menneskelige Tanke*, French ed., pp. 318-327).

[1] J. M. Warbeke, in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, xvi. [1919] 207, 'A Mediæval Aspect of Pragmatism.'
[2] *Ib.* xvi. 548, 'Methodological Teleology.'
[3] *Philosophical Essays*, London, 1910, p. 60 ff.
[4] *Spiritual Pluralism*, Cambridge, 1919, p. 17.
[5] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911-12, p. 260; cf. also C. A. Richardson, *Spiritual Pluralism*, p. 53.

reference to ends. Thus spirit and spontaneity, which naturalism banishes from the world, are restored on this panpsychist hypothesis throughout the whole vast range of experience. But that coherent experience may be made possible, a sympathetic *rapport* or responsive sympathy is, as with Lotze, postulated among the monads.

(*b*) With this the theory of personal idealism advances from its pluralistic base to its final theistic position, in which the world-ground is also teleologically conceived. Sympathetic *rapport* implies unity in the plurality, and unity implies a unifying principle, and the unifying principle is best stated not in the abstract terms characteristic of absolutist systems but in terms of that conative unity, that striving after the realization of ends, which is given at once in the most simple and the most complex individual experience; and in terms, moreover, of conscious and self-conscious activity, according to the teleological principle of the interpretation of the lower by the higher. Further, if we describe the world-ground as an ultimate self-conscious will, we are not to think of it, as in absolute idealism, as a purely immanent principle. Though God gives unity or system to the plurality of monads, He is not Himself the unity in which they subsist. There is a principle of distinction in a self-conscious mind, in virtue of which it belongs to itself and does not merely enter into other selves. So it is that G. Galloway,[1] *e.g.*, presses to a theistic conclusion.

(*c*) The map of reality consists, according to this theistic argument, of simple monads interacting within a common medium or environment, which is grounded in a transcendent self-conscious will. It is claimed that the theory offers a better key to the understanding of unity and individuality than absolute idealism or natural realism can supply. It is a brave attempt at any rate (and this is our particular point) to justify the teleological view of the universe on metaphysical grounds. Whether it yields too much to the voluntaristic psychology we do not pretend to judge; but we appreciate its consistency with the theism of the moral and religious consciousness, in which the teleological character of the world is felt.

'At the heart of religion and morality,' says Siebeck, 'is the feeling that the existence and development of the world is not an indifferent matter, but is designed to realise a highest Good.'[2]

When therefore ethical theism, with its religious conception of God as the absolutely good, is set beside the metaphysical theism of the pluralistic approach to reality, it seems possible to state a conclusion in terms such as these. (1) In the language of philosophy: though individual existences and personal spirits have a being for themselves and are variously endowed with spontaneity, the development of experience remains in the control of the world-ground. (2) In the language of theology: though the actions of the creature are not absolutely foreordained or predestinated but manifest spontaneity and freedom in various degrees, they fall within the providential government of God. (3) In the language both of philosophy and of theology, and in Galloway's concluding words, if the world have its ground in a self-conscious and ethical will, which comprehends and sustains all the individual centres of experience, faith in a providential order of things is sufficiently justified.[3]

6. Teleology of deism.—(*a*) While it may be said from the humanist side that the development of the universe is towards the goal of spiritual personality, it is difficult to conceive of the world-process *sub specie æternitatis*. The deistic conception of it, however, is an easy target for criticism. Its view of the world has been described as 'heteroteleic.' The world is regarded as a sphere of divine purpose, but divine purpose is as it were imposed upon it from without. There is an inherent dualism in this, as J. S. Mill realized.

(*b*) In the traditional form of the 'argument from design,' where the setting is deistic, the divine Artificer fashioned the world to its present form out of an already given matter; or else, as in the ecclesiastical doctrine, the matter was first created out of nothing by divine power, then shaped by divine wisdom and beneficence. But this initial dissociation of matter and form is inconceivable, and has been 'as much a bugbear as a chimæra.'[1] The idea of external adaptation should be replaced by that of internal or immanent purpose. God is not beyond or even alongside His world, says a truer theism; He is within it as immanent life, will, intelligence.

(*c*) In the sphere of history, as in the sphere of nature, the deistic teleology is also superficial and inadequate. Its language, if not inappropriate in the world of concrete relationships in which religion lives and moves, can hardly be literally applied in philosophy. It looks upon God as a moral governor who imposes His laws upon man after the fashion of an earthly potentate. But, says a truer theism again, the divine laws are not externally imposed, but are immanent in man's heart and conscience; and the divine providence is not exercised *ab extra*, but is an immanent righteousness working in and through free human agency.

(*d*) May we not say that the end or purpose of God in nature and history is His self-manifestation or self-communication to personal self-conscious individuals capable of a spiritual response to Him whereby His own life receives enrichment? But, even in so saying, we speak in the manner of men in terms of time rather than eternity.

7. The purgation of purpose.—(*a*) With the deepening of its philosophical interpretation, the teleology of theism loses undoubtedly much of its traditional and popular meaning, but a substantial meaning may remain. The finite element of contrivance, with external adaptation of means to end, may rightly fall away from the idea of purpose as applied to the nature of the infinite experience. No part of the world is then in danger of being handed over, as virtually in deistic theology, to mechanical necessity; and the inorganic becomes essentially related or adapted to the organic, and both inorganic and organic to the whole cosmic process. It is the strength of idealistic interpretation that it can thus dispense in the cosmic reference with the 'theistic Demiurge'[2] and associate itself with what has been called an 'autotelic' view of the world-process. When purpose is no longer thought of as superinduced in creation and providence upon particular events of the world, but is intimately applied to the world in its totality, we learn to appreciate Kant's ideal of nature as a complete teleological system, in which for the intuitive or perceptive understanding the distinction of means and end is transcended, and the whole appears as the unity of its members and the members as the differentiation of the whole.[3]

(*b*) If the notions of contrivance and external adaptation are to be dismissed as unduly anthropomorphic, is the notion of a preconceived plan to be retained, or is the so-called plan but the nature or process of the whole? It would be easier for the personal idealist or theistic pluralist to retain the notion than for the absolutist. It was the

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914, pp. 402–456.
[2] *Ueber Freiheit, Entwicklung, und Vorsehung*, 1911, p. 45 (quoted by Galloway, p. 439)
[3] Galloway, pp. 447–449.

[1] Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 70.
[2] Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 123.
[3] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 328.

conviction that God cannot be regarded, except by the logical imagination, as devising schemes and selecting methods that led Spinoza, from his standpoint of abstract monism or singularism, to repudiate the principle of human analogy altogether and to deny of God the faculties of intellect and will. These, as being exercised in the outcarrying of finite plans and purposes, could not be predicated of the eternal Being. There is danger as well as truth in such a position, but what we are here concerned to say is that Spinoza's views are not incompatible with the essential idea of teleology. He denounces externalism and anthropocentrism, but none the less he looks upon the world as a significant whole, necessitated indeed, but necessitated by the divine nature itself, which is the nature of the whole.

'It is the idea,' says Pringle-Pattison, 'of the divine necessity as a self-affirmed life, and not as a blind force acting within the universe like a fate which it undergoes, that constitutes the differentia between a theistic and a non-theistic doctrine.'[1]

(*c*) In support of Spinoza's objection to the notion of a pre-existent cosmic plan, it is pointed out that the conception of purpose therein involved is even inapplicable to human action of the highest kind, such as moral conduct or artistic production. We may therefore grant it to A. D. Lindsay,[2] a sympathetic interpreter of Bergson, that, if the world is a purposive system, it possesses a unity or individuality in time as well as in space. Apparently such a consideration lies behind Bergson's rejection of radical finalism—such as Leibniz's—as being only an inverted mechanism, as implying that things and beings realize a programme previously arranged ('*Tout est donné*'). To postulate the totality of the real as thus complete in the beginning is to make time (*q.v.*) of no account. If time *does* nothing, it *is* nothing. Yet, according to Bergson, time—not abstract spatialized time but concrete time or real duration (*la durée*)—is the very substance of our world, and there is no stuff more substantial or more resistant.

(*d*) The force of what Bergson here essentially contends for is acknowledged by idealistic thinkers. If the course of the world is preformed and predetermined—'the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago'[3]—there is indeed not much to choose between naturalism and idealism. In this connexion it is significant that naturalism and idealism, like fatalism and predestinarianism, often meet and, like righteousness and peace, kiss each other. It is also significant that the crusade of spiritual pluralism, in its various forms, against the absolutist systems is for the redemption of the spiritual values sold by them—'treacherously sold,' says F. C. S. Schiller[4]—into the bondage of naturalism. If then we abandon radical finalism with its illusion of preformation and predeterminism, shall we say that 'the history of the universe is the history of a great adventure'? So C. F. D'Arcy[5] puts it, in sympathy with the Bergsonian view.

(*e*) Where idealism differs from Bergsonism, if not from Bergson himself, is in holding that the adventure is not in the experience of the absolute but in the experience or from the standpoint of the finite subject. Moreover, for a theistic idealism there are bounds to the scope of the adventure. The theistic universe is fundamentally ethical. It is the very heart and core of theistic faith that an eternal purpose of good is working itself out in the world. In terms of modern Christian theology, the world is the scene of the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

(*f*) It is but to state the complementary side of this faith to affirm that the world must possess value and real existence for the divine experience, and that into the divine experience the time-process must enter somehow. The purpose which God possesses in Himself is independent of time, which is not as in Bergsonism an ultimate reality, yet it is somehow connected with the time-process in which it is being realized. How time is retained and yet transcended in God we do not know, nor can we. Yet we are not without a clue. In mystical contemplation and in artistic enjoyment the sense of time, as we are told, may almost vanish from the consciousness; and it is claimed that the life of the philosopher or artist bears in this respect some kind of analogy to the divine life. It is at least suggestive of the idea for which Pringle-Pattison contends, that purposive activity is the concrete reality and time only the abstract form.[1] If this be so, then Bosanquet's criticism of teleology, in the sense of 'aiming at the unfulfilled,' is so far met. Such a teleology, he says, gives undue importance to time and to the last term of a time-sequence.[2] But, says Pringle-Pattison:

'The last term is only important because in it is most fully revealed the nature of the principle which is present throughout. It is precisely this linkage of the first term with the last and, to that extent, the transcendence of the mere time-sequence in the conception of an eternal reality, that seems to me to be expressed by the profound Aristotelian idea of τέλος or End.'[3]

(*g*) The question may be raised here whether the purpose that may be attributed to the infinite ground of the universe is to be regarded as conscious or unconscious. On this question Bergson would appear to range himself in the succession of Schopenhauer (*q.v.*) and von Hartmann,[4] with this difference that for them the gates of the future are closed. Undoubtedly the *via media* of unconscious purpose avoids the difficulty of explaining how one self-consciousness may exist within another, the finite within the infinite, but it possesses inherent difficulties of its own. It has to account for inorganic arrangement and process, and for the transition from the unconscious to the conscious and self-conscious, nor can it explain the reason why the vital impetus should tend in one direction rather than another.

'If,' as W. R. Sorley says, summing up an illuminating discussion, 'purpose be admitted as necessary for the interpretation of organisms, and if organisms are held to have arisen out of inorganic material, then there is good reason to postulate that the process which led to organic and purposive life was itself animated by purpose,' not individual nor merely racial purpose, but universal purpose acting, moreover, not 'after the fashion of impulse' but 'in the manner of mind or consciousness.'[5]

This theistic postulate of universal conscious purpose is to be justified in face of the facts of dysteleology,[6] yet it appears a more reasonable postulate than that of unconscious purpose, and more hospitable too of human experience in the realms of fact and value.

8. Teleology and value.—The category of end or purpose, when purged of its finite incidents of preconceived plan and external adaptation of means to end, tends to pass into the category of worth or value (*q.v.*). In the teleological view of the universe the end, which is the nature of the whole, is an ethical end worthy of being purposed, *i.e.* worthy, so to speak, of enlisting the desire

[1] *Idea of God*, p. 340.
[2] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911-12, p. 241.
[3] W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1890, i. 453, quoted by Pringle-Pattison, p. 367.
[4] *Humanism*[2], London, 1912, p. xxv.
[5] *God and Freedom in Human Experience* (*Donnellan Lectures*), London, 1915, p. 217.

[1] Pringle-Pattison, p. 358.
[2] *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 135 ff.
[3] P. 332.
[4] See art. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.
[5] *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 426 f.
[6] Cf. Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*[5], 2 vols., Eng. tr., London, 1905, i. 86-88.

and effort of the Absolute. And may we not attribute desire and effort—conative activity—to God? May we not say that in the Infinite Experience conation and its correlative satisfaction are to be found, that, as Bosanquet[1] strikingly puts it, 'the contradiction of a conation co-existing with fruition must somehow be realized'? It seems to us that we must say this if the world is to be regarded as truly a 'vale of soul-making,' in which Providence rules and not fate, the concurrence of the living God and not the eternal decree, and in which spiritual values are created and realized. It is our belief that God is thus present and active in the process of the world, and that the true image of Him is not the pre-existent Creator of the deistic theology, nor the static timeless Absolute of acosmic pantheism, but the eternal Redeemer of the religious consciousness.

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TELEPATHY.—Telepathy, 'feeling from afar,' is a term coined by F. W. H. Myers, on the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, to express the apparently supernormal transmission of information from mind to mind in 'thought-transference' experiments and the like, just as 'telæsthesia' was suggested to cover the alleged facts of clairvoyance and clairaudience. It was defined as 'communication between one mind and another otherwise than through the known channels of the senses.' As thus defined, the notion was in the first place not free from vagueness. For, as a certain amount of hyperæsthesia of the known senses was admitted to occur under exceptional conditions, and this could be so extended as to amount to miracle, while it yet in a way explained away miracle, it was not clear how hyperæsthesia was related to 'telepathy.' Secondly, the definition was essentially negative, a declaration of ignorance, which suggested no agency or adequate cause for the phenomena it described. Now this was neither satisfactory nor a very strong or stable position logically. Even if the difficulty about the limits of hyperæsthesia is not raised, and if it is admitted that the possibilities of communication through the senses may be taken as fairly completely explored, we are impelled to develop such a definition in one of two directions. We may imagine some unknown sort of vibration, radiation, or 'brain-wave,' as a physical explanation of the phenomena alleged, undeterred by the facts that no positive support has yet been found for any such agency, and that, unlike physical forces, it would appear to be indifferent to distance; or else we may conceive telepathy as essentially psychic in its nature, and shall then tend to exalt it into a fundamental 'law' of spiritual being, as Myers himself subsequently inclined to do. But, so conceived, it is manifestly a challenge to further exploration of the spiritual world of which it claims to be a law; and yet it proves rather a double-edged weapon for believers in a spiritual world. It enables them indeed to hold that every mind, incarnate or discarnate, may in principle communicate directly with any other by telepathy; but it seems to formulate this possibility so broadly as to render it almost impossible for a discarnate mind to authenticate itself by communicating information. For any verifiable information must normally be, or have been, known to incarnate minds; and, if any living mind can 'tap' any other, and if knowledge can 'leak' subconsciously from any mind to any other, and still more if we entertain the somewhat fanciful but not unsupported hypothesis that all knowledge may be pooled in a vast 'cosmic reservoir' before it bubbles up in individual minds, the telepathic hypothesis can evidently be used to discredit nearly all the *prima facie* evidence in favour of 'spirit-communication.' Accordingly the opponents of this belief have made great play with it, even while holding also that the evidence for telepathy is itself insufficient to establish it as a *vera causa*.[1] This objection the believers endeavour to meet in various ways. They point out rightly that, if telepathy is a fundamental psychic law, it cannot be restricted in its operations to living minds. They argue, however, that unrestricted telepathy between incarnate minds, and such alone, is antecedently improbable, and quite unsubstantiated. Lastly, they try to develop methods of experimentation which avoid this objection, because the information communicated, though verifiable *ex post facto*, can be shown never to have been, as a whole, in the possession of any living mind. Hence the importance of 'cross-correspondences' between the information received through several channels and dovetailing into a coherent message; by this method some striking successes have been recorded, though different minds will long continue to vary widely in the estimation of their weight. Again, certain sorts of prediction may baffle explanation by telepathy. At present, however, no agreement, either about the nature of telepathy or about the degree to which it may be taken as a fact in nature, can be said to exist. More evidence is still required, and, until it is obtained, opinions will be determined not so much by the evidence itself as by the bias with which it is regarded.

The existing evidence is usually classified under the heads (*a*) *experimental* and (*b*) *spontaneous*. The former includes the evidence of hypnotization at a distance, recorded especially by Gibert and

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 33rd session, 1911-12, p. 251.

[1] Cf. art. PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

Pierre Janet, and experiments at close quarters, though without contact between the 'percipient' and the 'agent,' in guessing such things as cards and numbers, in reproducing diagrams and figures, etc. The transition to the 'spontaneous' evidence is mediated by a few rare cases in which the experimental projection of a phantasm is attested, on the strength of which it becomes possible to conceive the ordinary 'ghost' as an apparition telepathically projected by the dying or the dead. In all these cases the transfer of information has an emotional interest which is generally lacking in experiments of the first class, and this may conceivably account for their apparent capacity to override the obstacle of distance, which conspicuously differentiates them from the former. Still it should be remembered that to ascribe these phenomena to telepathy is a hypothesis which is possible only if telepathy is established independently by experimental evidence. Accordingly it is on this that the real stress falls. Now, as regards this evidence, it may be said in general that its character is very similar to that for other supernormal phenomena. Much of it is bad, some respectable, none beyond cavil. Its quality is not better than that of the best evidence for some of the most extreme phenomena, such as 'materializations.' It is liable, moreover, to the same or similar sources of error, fraud (in the shape of codes, collusion, and mendacity), mal-observation, lapses of attention, errors of memory, coincidence. The ultimate reason for these defects is that there plainly does not exist as yet any real experimental control of the phenomena and their conditions, so that the evidence cannot be accumulated at will, crucial experiments cannot be made, and the pragmatic test cannot be used to *apply* the doctrine of the direct intercommunication of minds and to distinguish the real from the alleged phenomena. As, however, this sort of situation occurs commonly enough in the beginnings of a science and sometimes lasts for centuries, it is no disproof of the reality of what is now provisionally called 'telepathy'; it may well be dispersed by pertinacious and concerted investigation, and in any case the matter should not be left in its present ambiguity.

LITERATURE.—This is largely the same as given in artt. PSYCHICAL RESEARCH and SPIRITISM. There may be mentioned in addition E. Boirac, *La Psychologie inconnue*[2], Paris, 1912, and *L'Avenir des sciences psychiques*, do. 1917, Eng. tr., *Our Hidden Forces* and *The Psychology of the Future*, New York and London, 1918; the art. by F. C. Hansen and A. Lehmann in *Philosophische Studien*, xi. [1895] pt. 4, 'Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern'; E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, London and New York, 1897; J. E. Coover, *Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior University*, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A., 1917; L. T. Troland, *A Technique for the Experimental Study of Telepathy and other Alleged Clairvoyant Processes*, 1917. All but the first of these attack the historical evidence, with some success, while the last two confess also (almost) complete failure in repeating the card- and number-guessing experiments of the Society for Psychical Research.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

TELUGU-SPEAKING PEOPLES. — See DRAVIDIANS.

TEMPERAMENT. — The doctrine of the temperaments is at once one of the earliest and one of the most persistent and popular efforts to classify the diversities of mental character in relation to bodily characteristics. It has always been recognized that there are broad differences of type in mind, and that some of these differences are inborn, and, practically at least, unmodified throughout life. It was natural that these should be looked for mainly in the feelings and emotions, which appear both more dependent upon the bodily constitution and less under individual control than either cognition or will. The temperament is accordingly a permanent disposition to certain forms or degrees of feeling, so far as such disposition is dependent on the inherited organic constitution. The number of temperaments has been variously given as two, three, four, six, eight, and even much larger numbers, but on the whole the classic 'four' has held the field down to our own day, as if it corresponded in some mysterious way to some ultimate differences in mind or body, or both.

This number was derived originally from the four elements of Empedocles, fire, earth, water, and air, and the four qualities, warm and cold, dry and moist; on these in turn was formed Hippocrates' theory of the four cardinal humours of the body—blood, corresponding to air, warm and moist; phlegm to water, cold and moist; yellow bile to fire, warm and dry; and black bile to earth, cold and dry. From these came through Galen the names of the main temperaments, *sanguine*, *phlegmatic*, *choleric*, and *melancholic*. Occasionally physiologists have suggested other terms for the phlegmatic and the melancholic, as 'lymphatic' and 'nervous,' lymph and nerve being at least known constituents of the body;[1] but the names as well as the number of the old four have kept their ground. For the Greeks the temperament meant a mixture or union of the four elements, qualities, or humours; where this contained a certain ideal proportion of each, there was bodily and mental health; where an excessive degree of one or more, or an excessive defect, there was distemper or disease. There should therefore have been only one ideal temperament, and a large variety of *in*temperaments,[2] but actually the four temperaments were regarded as falling within the limits of health and as implying only a slight predominance of one or other of the four qualities. With the progress of physiology, the physical basis of the temperaments underwent a series of changes in the conception of the theorists; first the mixture was sought in the blood itself, as conveying nutriment to all the tissues of the body—*e.g.*, the proportion of fibrin to fluid in the blood, the width of the vessels, the porousness of their walls and of those of the tissues; then stress was laid on the tissues of the body themselves, and especially the nervous tissue, its strength and its excitability (Haller); and finally on the more delicate qualities of the nerves as shown in intensity, and in rate, persistence, etc., of impression and of reaction. Here we are probably nearest to the truth, since it is with the nervous system that mental qualities and degrees are most directly correlated, but it must be admitted that we have no really scientific knowledge as yet of the precise relation of one to the other.

The problem may be approached from another side by considering the actual characterization or description of the four temperaments, the psychical qualities which each reveals; these are inferred of course from the behaviour, more especially the emotional expressions and the reactions of the will upon impressions; and here also there has been a constant tendency to simplify by seeking the main features of the temperaments in two pairs of mutually opposed characters, such as receptivity and spontaneity; change and persistence; feeling and action; pleasure and pain, etc. The most satisfactory of these psychological accounts is that of Wundt, based on the strength or weakness, and on the quick or slow rate of change in feeling and in mental life generally.[3] Strong and quick is the choleric temperament; strong and slow, the melancholic; weak and quick, the sanguine; weak and slow, the phlegmatic.

[1] Henle, *Anthropolog. Vorträge*, i. 108.
[2] Volkmann, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*[4], i. 207 f.
[3] Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*[5], iii. 637.

As E. B. Titchener has put it, 'the man who thinks quickly and feels strongly, is choleric, the man who thinks quickly and feels weakly, sanguine. The phlegmatic thinks slowly and feels weakly, the melancholic thinks slowly and feels deeply.'[1]

The classification does not adequately explain, however, the fact that the feelings of the sanguine are predominantly cheerful or pleasant, those of the melancholic predominantly painful or gloomy; and Höffding has suggested another pair of temperaments, or another division—'the bright and the dark temperament'—in order to explain 'the tendency to one or other of the two great opposites of the life of feeling, which gives colour and direction to the whole disposition.'

'This opposition is more fundamental than that upon which the other four temperaments are based, for it has its root in the fundamental conditions for the preservation of the individual organism.'[2]

More recently an interesting attempt to analyse the dominant characteristics by experimental methods has been given by Narziss Ach;[3] he finds that it is mainly on the strength or weakness of the 'determination,' along with the persistence or rapid falling away of the determining force, that the feelings, the associations, and generally the whole mental life depend; accordingly he makes these characters the basis of his five temperaments—for he adds a fifth, the *reflective* (*besonnene*) temperament.

Whatever the ultimate characters may be, mental or physical, they must be such as exercise a decisive influence on the whole life, inner and outer, of the individual. The facts that the pure temperament is rare; that it makes, as Volkmann says, 'an almost uncanny impression,' when it does appear; that most of us are of 'mixed' temperament (however illogical such mixture may be); that the old terms have lost all meaning, and that the scientific analysis is still to seek—these facts, which have led many psychologists to drop the doctrine of the temperaments altogether, do not dispose of the existence of broad and deep differences of mental type, mainly in the spheres of feeling and action, for which *some* names, and a scientific analysis, must be found.

The organism, through the afferent nerves, sends from its every part a stream of influence to the brain; to the functions of every tissue there correspond impressions and feelings which may or may not reach or effect separate consciousness, but which produce a mass-effect in the cœnæsthesia, or organic sensibility, and in the general feeling-tone which corresponds to it. This is the basis of the self-feeling: it is the inner or subjective aspect of the temperament. There is, as Henle says, a *tonus*, or degree of tension, in every nerve, even when the muscles which it contracts or the sense-organs from which it is impressed are 'at rest'; it differs in degree in different individuals; for each individual it varies from time to time, under varying conditions of health, fatigue, etc., but there is a relatively constant value for each below which it does not fall, so long as the nerves have life. Where the tension is high, response of feeling and action will be energetic and rapid; where it is weak, or low, response will be feeble and slow. The *tonus* is the physiological fact corresponding to the mass-feeling—vague and indefinite as it necessarily is—out of which the different moods of the individual, and his emotions, his passions, down to the simplest feelings of sensory pleasure and 'unpleasure,' emerge like waves on the sea. Like all feelings, the temperamental feeling is both an index of bodily condition and a cause of bodily expression and action; like all feelings, it influences alike the intensity, the quality, and the course of thought. Hence the detailed descriptions of character which we find in the older and even in some of the later writers on temperament are not without interest.

Johannes Müller,[1] who regards the *phlegmatic* as the highest type—the ideal temperament—finds that in such a man, with a well-developed intelligence, his phlegm enables him to accomplish results impossible to others, even with their livelier feelings and desires; easily retaining control of himself, he cannot be induced to acts 'of which he would repent on the morrow'; he can calculate in all security the chances of the success of what he undertakes; in danger, at the decisive moment, he is master of himself, wherever it is not a question of sudden decision and energy; 'he feels his ills little, and bears them patiently, nor is he much moved by those of others'; speed and quickness of choice often give others an advantage over him; but, 'when he has time before him, he arrives quietly at the goal, while others, heaping mistakes upon mistakes, are lost in endless side-issues.' On the other hand, Müller finds that the species of phlegm characterized by laziness, apathy, insensibility, irresolution, ennui, slowness of intellect, and the like, is not the true type, but a pathological form. The *choleric* has a remarkable power of action, both in energy and in persistence, under the influence of passion; his passions inflame at the least obstacle; his pride, his jealousy, his desire of vengeance, his thirst for domination, know no bounds, as long as his passion moves him. He reflects little, acts without hesitation, on the spur of the moment, because he is convinced that he is right, and above all because such is his will. He rarely turns aside from error, but follows the course of his passion to his own ruin and that of others. With the *sanguine*, pleasure is the dominant tendency, along with great excitability, and a short duration of any mood. Sympathetic and friendly to others, but without persistence or constancy; quick to anger, but equally quick to regret; prodigal of promises, but equally ready to forget them; credulous and confident, he loves to make plans, which he soon lays aside; indulgent to the faults of others, he claims the same indulgence for his own; easy to appease, frank, open, amiable, sociable, incapable of interested calculation. With the *melancholic*, sadness is the prevailing tendency; his excitability is equal to that of the sanguine, but disagreeable sensations are both more frequent and more durable than those of pleasure. The sufferings of others call out his sympathy to a high degree; for himself he is fearful, undecided, distrustful; a trifle wounds and offends him; the slightest obstacle discourages him, and renders him incapable of reasoning to overcome it; his thoughts are full of melancholy, and his sufferings appear to him beyond all consolation.

In their *Psychology in the Schoolroom*[2] T. F. G. Dexter and A. H. Garlick venture to describe, on behalf of teachers—for whom it is necessary to know their pupils' temperaments—not only the mental but also the external physical appearance of the types. The *sanguine*, lively, excitable, quickly but not deeply roused, with feeling generally uppermost in his character, has the circulatory and respiratory systems well developed, has red hair, blue eyes, skin fair, and face animated. The *choleric*, self-reliant and confident, with will uppermost, has the muscular system well developed, hair and eyes dark, complexion sometimes sallow, face impassive. The *phlegmatic* or lymphatic, mind heavy and torpid, sometimes nearly stupid, patient, self-reliant, and slow, has the abdomen large, face round and expressionless, lips thick, body generally disinclined to exertion. Finally the sentimental (i.e. *melancholic*), with great love of poetry, music, and nature, and marked indifference to the practical affairs of life, has the head large, eyes bright and expressive, figure slender and delicate, movements quick.

It may be doubted whether teachers would be well advised to guide their treatment by such physical characters as these, when noted in their pupils. Nor has the attempt been very successful to look in the different temperaments for predisposition to certain diseases of the body. It is, however, antecedently probable, and appears to be confirmed by experience, that different temperaments are liable to different forms of insanity; at least it is true that in insanity the differences of temperament are as clearly marked as in health.

As in drunkenness one man is 'talkative and boastful,' another 'maudlin,' another 'tetchy and violent,' another 'melancholy and silent'; so 'the lunatic of sanguine temperament . . . is puffed up and vain, his dreams are of marble halls and flattering voices; the choleric patient suspects everywhere the plots of his enemies, and hears voices insulting him or urging him to deeds of violence; and whilst his hallucinations are more often auditory than visual, the contrary is the case with the

[1] *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 233.
[2] *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., p. 350.
[3] *Ueber den Willensakt und das Temperament*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 312 ff.

[1] *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, French tr.[2], ii. 557.
[2] London, 1905, p. 343.

melancholic, and especially, as the name implies, with religious "visionaries."'[1]

It is especially in the melancholic, nervous, or, as it is called in extreme cases, the 'neurotic' temperament that the tendency to insanity is marked. T. S. Clouston gives a striking description of the modern phase of this temperament.

'The man of this temperament is in body small, shapely, tending towards a dark complexion, thin skin, with delicate features, a well-shaped head, a quick, bright, restless eye; in figure small and wiry, nervous, highly strung and sensitive, feeling pain keenly and tolerating it badly, subject to dyspepsia and insomnia. His muscles are incessantly active. He is quick in mind and body, imaginative, keen, sensitive, ever alert, fine in the grain, subtle, fond of intellectual work, not always resolute in decision because he sees there are two sides to every question, often artistic in feeling, ambitious, and with an ill-concealed contempt for fools. When run down, this man is "ill to do with." When he grows old he gets thin, dyspeptic, irritable, and often neuralgic. The diseases he is specially subject to are nervous and mental.'[2]

In religious psychology also the temperaments are of considerable importance, owing to the great suggestibility of some (the sanguine and melancholic) as compared with others, the greater excitability of the sanguine and choleric, the brooding tendency of the melancholic or nervous, the insusceptibility of the phlegmatic, and the excessive self-centring of the sanguine and choleric.[3]

The relative permanence of the temperament in the individual is not inconsistent with some gradual change over long periods of time, although there is no doubt that the temperament is that part of our mental and physical endowment which requires greatest effort or most violent and prolonged change of circumstances to modify. It has been thought that broadly the different stages of individual development and of racial evolution are marked by differences of temperament. Childhood is sanguine, youth sentimental or nervous, mature age choleric, and old age phlegmatic. The temperaments of primitive races are less obvious, but they seem to move from the phlegmatic and choleric (Negroes, Malayans) to the melancholic and sanguine (Mongolian, Caucasian); in Europe we have the sanguine Frenchman, the choleric Spaniard or Italian, the phlegmatic Teuton, and the nervous Briton. Women on the whole are sanguine or nervous, men choleric or phlegmatic.[4] These are of course mere rough general impressions. It has also been remarked that there has been a change of fashion in temperaments, or in what has been regarded as the ideal temperament: at one time the sanguine, it became the dark and melancholic (in the days of Byron), later the phlegmatic or indifferent, to-day perhaps the choleric—the man of energy.[5] Character in the highest sense of the word is something very different from temperament; the latter has to do with the form and manner, the quantity and degree of mental life, character with its quality, the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic values which that life recognizes and pursues; temperament gives the foundation on which character must build—it sets the problems which the training and the making of character have to solve; whatever we may think therefore of the popular classification of the four temperaments, the individual differences themselves on which it is based—differences of sensitiveness to impressions and to feelings, of strength and quickness of reaction, of energy and endurance—are of the utmost importance. It is to such differences and their measurement that the modern individual psychology is directing its attention; and from it we may hope in time to obtain a scientific account of temperament.

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J. LEWIS MCINTYRE.

TEMPERANCE.—There is much difference of opinion among writers on moral theology as to the true relationship between the three virtues of sobriety, moderation, and temperance. Each has had its claims to be the archetypal virtue, which includes the others, advocated by representative writers; but there seem to be very strong reasons why temperance should be regarded as the inclusive virtue, the chief being that it has held a place from early times among the 'cardinal' or principal virtues. From the first, Plato seems to accept this grouping of virtues as based upon a current classification, and it passes through Aristotle and Stoics into Christian thought. The definition of temperance given by Cicero may be accepted as typical:

'Temperantia est rationis in libidinem, atque in alios non rectos impetus animi, firma et moderata dominatio. Ejus partes sunt, continentia, clementia, modestia.'[1]

Plato shows a tendency to identify 'temperance' with 'continence'; in *Rep.* iv. 430 E he defines σωφροσύνη as follows:

κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια.

Aristotle, however, defines the word as μεσότης περὶ ἡδόνας and distinguishes it from ἐγκράτεια. The temperate man (σώφρων), he says, does not feel the pressure of inordinate desires; the continent (ἐγκρατής) feels it, but holds desire in restraint.[2] So Cicero: 'Continentia est, per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur.'[3] In the NT the word σωφροσύνη occurs only in 1 Ti 2^{15} (σώφρων in 1 Ti 3^{2}, Tit 1^{8} $2^{2, 5}$). ἐγκράτεια occurs in Ac 24^{25}, Gal 5^{23}, 2 P 1^{6}; ἐγκρατεύομαι in 1 Co 7^{9} 9^{25}; ἐγκρατής in Tit 1^{8}.

The general idea of temperance or moderation as an element in all virtue is peculiarly Greek, and it re-appears in Christianity.

'Temperance,' says Aquinas, 'is a cardinal virtue because that *moderation* which is common to all the virtues is peculiarly praiseworthy in the case of temperance.'[4]

This has been pointed out elsewhere.[5] It is perhaps most in accordance with modern ways of thinking to take as a basis the fact of personality and to consider the Christian as standing in a threefold relationship—to God, to his neighbour, and to himself. According to Augustine, there is a virtue corresponding to each of these relationships, as is implied in Tit 2^{12}, ἵνα . . . σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν.[6] Temperance is the form which

[1] E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, London, 1897, p. 188, quoting Paul Radestock, *Schlaf und Traum*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 209.

[2] *The Hygiene of Mind*, London, 1906, p. 66 f.

[3] See G. A. Coe, *The Spiritual Life: Studies in the Science of Religion*, New York, 1903; and E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*[2], London, 1901.

[4] See L. George, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, p. 136 ff., and Dexter and Garlick, *op. cit.*

[5] Volkmann[4], i. 211.

[1] *De Invent.* ii. 53. 164. [2] *Eth. Nic.* vii. 2. [3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli. art. 7, concl.; cf. Aug. *de Beata Vita*, 32: 'Modestia utique dicta est a modo, et a temperie temperantia. Ubi autem modus est atque temperies, nec plus est quidquam nec minus.'

[5] See art. MODERATION.

[6] Bern. *Serm. 2 in temp. Res.* 11, alludes to this passage: 'Haec enim tria sunt conversationis nostrae maxime necessaria: quoniam primum debemus nobis, secundum proximo, tertium Deo.'

true self-love, duty to self, necessarily takes. It is the spirit of discipline, or rather the spirit of love consecrating itself—body, soul, and spirit—to God.

The function of temperance 'consists in restraining and moderating the desires wherewith we yearn for those things which are apt to turn us away from God's laws.'[1]

Hence the virtue of temperance consists in the moderate and regulated use of those pleasures of sense, especially of touch and taste, which are most apt to draw the soul away from God, and to overthrow the supremacy of the rational faculty in man.[2] Temperance implies the control of appetite at those points where its demand is most importunate and difficult to resist. While 'moderation' (*modestia*) means self-control in matters of less difficulty, 'temperance' is concerned with the instincts and passions which in average human nature are the strongest and the least easy to restrain.

The following points seem to be worthy of special note.

1. The aim of the 'temperate' man is *positive*, not negative. He aims not merely at the subjugation of his lower nature, but at the cultivation of moral and spiritual power. Temperance is the virtue of the man of high ideals who strives to win a 'sovereign self-mastery.' It implies 'no monotonous restraint, but an ordered use of every gift.'[3] The temperate man faces life and uses its gifts and blessings in the temper of an athlete training for a contest (1 Co 9$^{25f.}$) or of a soldier engaged in a campaign (2 Ti 2$^{3f.}$). He exercises self-control 'not only in cutting off superfluities but in allowing himself necessaries'[4]—watchful against any form of self-indulgence that may bring him under the power of the world or of his lower nature (1 Co 6^{12}). He is not hindered or overpowered by circumstances, but controls them; he makes them subservient to his spiritual progress; he passes through them upwards and onwards to God.

So Augustine describes temperance as 'that action whereby the soul with the aid of God extricates itself from the love of lower (created) beauty, and wings its way to true stability and firm security in God.'[5]

2. Temperance holds a very prominent place in the earliest Christian teaching (cf. Ac 24^{25}). In the *Acts of Thecla* the substance of St. Paul's teaching is described as λόγος θεοῦ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀναστάσεως. In the early Christian usage of the word ἐγκράτεια was probably identified with sexual purity, and was gradually extended to include any form of world-renunciation and mortification of the body.[6] The words ἐγκράτεια, ἐγκρατεύεσθαι occur frequently in Hermas, but already the tendency is to connote by them the temper of self-control or temperance in general.[7] It includes control of appetite in the sphere of sex, food, and drink; but also the temper of moderation in expenditure, of sobriety in judgment and self-esteem, of self-restraint in matters of speech, etc. There follows a list of virtues in respect of which δεῖ μὴ ἐγκρατεύεσθαι. According to Hermas, ἐγκράτεια is in fact an archetypal and inclusive virtue. It is coupled with ἀπλότης in *Vis.* ii. 3.[8] It has a saving virtue. The 'first commandment' is ἵνα φυλάξῃς τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὸν φόβον καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν.[9] Self-restraint is a fundamental duty because it is directly involved in that conflict between flesh and spirit which is the condition of our mortality and the occasion of moral victory or defeat. So Augustine asks:

'Cui peccato cohibendo non habemus necessariam continentiam, ne committatur? . . . Universaliter ergo continentia nobis opus est ut declinemus a malo.'[1]

3. Temperance or self-control forms part of 'the fruit of the Spirit' (Gal 5^{22}). 'Walk in the spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh.' As a gift or endowment of the Spirit it was supremely manifested in our Lord.

'Where,' asks Bernard, 'is temperance to be found if not in the life of Christ? Those alone are temperate who strive to imitate *His* life, . . . whose life is the mirror of temperance.'[2]

It is of self-control that Augustine is speaking when he exclaims, 'Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.'[3] The presence of the Spirit in man gives him liberty—the true freedom which consists not in following the impulses of the lower nature, but in fulfilling the will of God. Accordingly in Eph 5^{18} St. Paul seems to imply that the one infallible safeguard of temperance is the realization of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the soul.

4. The sin of intemperance is wrongly limited to one particular form of excess.[4] It may include want of restraint in work, in recreation, in intellectual speculation, in the pursuit of wealth or power, in the use of the faculty of speech. On this last point much stress is laid by some Christian moralists.[5] The fact is that the habit of loose, unrestrained speech paves the way for grave lapses from truth, purity, or good faith. It 'defiles the man' (Mt 15^{11}). It hinders or weakens that power of controlling 'the whole body' (Ja 3^{2}) which is essential to Christian perfection. St. James implies that the 'sovereign sway of the Christian conscience' must be exercised even in what seems a small sphere, and thence gradually extended to the whole field of human nature till man becomes 'Deo solo dominante liberrimus.'[6]

LITERATURE.—Augustine, *de Mor. Eccl.*, *de Continentia*, etc.; Ambrose, *de Off. Min.* i. 43; Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli.-cxliv.; J. Taylor, *Holy Living and Holy Dying*, London, 1847, ch. 2, § 2, *Sermons*, do. 1848, no. xvi. ('The House of Feasting,' pt. 2); B. F. Westcott, *Lessons from Work*, do. 1901, p. 269 ff.; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, bk. i. ch. vii. § 4; Stopford Brooke, *The Kingship of Love*, London, 1903, serm. x.

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TEMPLES.—A temple, in the original sense of the Latin word *templum*, meant a rectangular place marked out by the augur for the purpose of his observations, which were taken within a rectangular tent. An extended sense gave it the meaning of a consecrated place or building, of rectangular shape, 'inaugurated' by an augur. In this sense it was applied to the house of a god, though, strictly speaking, this meaning belonged to the *ædes*. In its primitive sense *templum* corresponds to the Gr. τέμενος, a place marked off as sacred to a god, in which a ναός, or house of the god, might be erected. As we shall see, an enclosed consecrated space often precedes an actual temple in our sense of the word, viz. the house of a god, a structure containing his image, and sometimes an altar, though not infrequently the altar stands outside the god's house (as in Greece) but within the sacred place, in the open air, as it did before any house for the god was erected. As images became more decorative and costly, it was natural to provide a house for them, though this might be done for a quite primitive image or even a fetish.[7] Less often, however, the chamber or house of the god contained no image; it was merely a place where he might invisibly dwell or which he might visit

[1] Aug. *de Mor. Eccl.* 35.
[2] Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. qu. cxli. art. 2.
[3] Westcott, *Lessons from Work*, p. 271.
[4] Bern. *de Consid.* i. 8.
[5] *De Mus.* vi. 15. 50.
[6] Cf. A. Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, i. 111.
[7] See, *e.g.*, the list of things ἀφ' ὧν δεῖ τὸν δοῦλον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγκρατεύεσθαι in *Mand.* viii.
[8] Cf. iii. 8, 'From faith is produced self-control; from self-control simplicity,' etc.
[9] *Mand.* vi. 1.

[1] *De Contin.* i. 17.
[2] *In Cant.* 22. 11.
[3] *Conf.* x. 29.
[4] For temperance in drinking see artt. ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.
[5] See, *e.g.*, Aug. *de Contin.* ii. 3; Ambrose, *de Off.* i. 2 and 3; Butler, *Serm.* 4.
[6] Aug. *de Mor. Eccl.* xxi.
[7] Cf. the African fetish-hut.

from time to time.[1] Where a god has his image in such a place, those of other divinities may also stand there or in subsidiary chambers connected with it. In the popular sense of the word, 'temple,' while it is connected with worship, is not usually a place within which the people worship. The priests alone enter it; the laity may worship only within the precincts, if even there. Temples vary from the simplest and smallest buildings, as they mostly were at first, to the most elaborate and vast structures.

In studying the origin of temples, no single source for all can be found, as this differs in different regions. Nomads could have no temples, though they might have tribal sacred places, or sacred tents carried in their wanderings. With the advent of a more fixed mode of life and permanent dwellings, a similar dwelling for the deity became necessary, as is seen in 2 S 7[2]. A variety of primitive temples is known, and it could have been only in the course of a long period of time that the more elaborate buildings came into existence, while, generally speaking, the intermediate stages are not always discoverable.

1. Origin of temples.—(*a*) *Sacred places.*—Among savages, and probably also among most groups of primitive men,[2] most of the rites of worship are carried on in the open air, sometimes because no images of divinities exist, or, where they do, they are not always enclosed within walls, and sometimes because spirits are regarded as connected with natural objects. Sacrifices are simply laid on sacred stones, or cast into the waters, or into the fire, or hung upon trees.[3] Worship takes place in the open air among many of the lowest tribes (Veddas, Australians, Mūṇḍās and other Dravidian tribes, Melanesians, Sakai, and Jakun), as well as among tribes at a higher level (some American Indians, Lapps, Buriats, etc.). This is often the result of a nomadic life, yet even nomads carry sacred images with them[4] or have a tent for these or for other sacred things.[5] Such open places for worship tend to become sacred and to be preserved inviolate for cult purposes, and there images are set up.

Examples of this are found among the Sakai, Jakun, Mūṇḍas, Fjort, and Indians of California.[6]

This is obviously necessary where a sacred tree or stone stands in such a place. Sometimes sacred places are associated with the traditional appearances of spirits, gods, or ancestors, and must therefore be holy for all time. The mere fact that a religious gathering takes place in a certain spot once is enough to give it sanctity, and the gathering becomes recurrent there. Such sacred places will usually be marked by images or symbols, or by boundary-stones forming an enclosure.[7] Single graves, often with a structure over them, and places of sepulture also become recognized places of cult.

The same preference for open-air worship in a recognized sacred place is found among the Chinese—*e.g.*, in the cult of the Altar of Heaven, which dates back to early times when the *genius loci* was worshipped at an altar under a tree.[8] The practice is also found in the primitive cult of the Indo-European races, as a result of their conceptions of deity, not dissimilar from those of savages. The sacred stone, the sacred tree or grove, the sacred spring, were places of cult and usually possessed an altar. The limits of the τέμενος were marked by boundary-stones, and within these stood an altar and a stone or post in which the deity resided. In early Indian worship there were no temples nor indeed permanent sacred places for cult—probably a result of earlier nomadic conditions prevailing after the people had become settled—and to some extent this is the case even now when temples have existed for centuries. So in early Rome there were holy places but no temples; and in ancient Persian religion there were neither images nor temples.[1] The custom and method of building temples were borrowed by the Romans first from the Etruscans and then from the Greeks. Teutons and Celts also worshipped first in the open air, and in their case the earlier cult is especially associated with the sacred tree or grove, though a spirit or god might be worshipped also on a mountain top, in a cave, or at a spring.[2] For the Gauls the evidence of Lucan is interesting in the passage where he describes a sacred grove near Massilia. The grove was tabu to the people; even the priest feared to walk there at midday or midnight, lest he should meet its sacred guardian. The trees were stained with sacrificial blood, but there were also altars, and the images of the gods were misshapen trunks of trees. The marvels of the grove are of a mythical kind.[3]

While sacred groves were general over the Celtic area, temples had begun to be built in both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul. The Boii had a temple in which were stored the spoils of war, and the Isubri (Isombri) had a similar temple.[4] Plutarch speaks of the temple where the Arverni hung Cæsar's sword, and Diodorus of 'temples and sacred places.'[5] The temple of the Namnite (Samnite) women, unroofed and re-roofed in a day, must have been a simple building.[6] In Gallo-Roman times elaborate temples were built after Roman models, as well as smaller shrines at sacred springs.[7]

Similar sacred groves existed among the Teutons, as many passages of Tacitus show.[8] 'What we figure to ourselves as a built and walled house, resolves itself, the farther back we go, into a holy place untouched by human hand, embowered and shut in by self-grown trees.'[9]

The use of the sacred grove continued during many centuries. But in these groves simple temples also stood, and are referred to by Tacitus, while sagas and later ecclesiastical writings speak of them, and the latter show that, when they were destroyed, a Christian church was often built on the site.[10]

The Latin names used for these are *fanum*, *casula*, and *templum*. The first was probably a mere hut in which stood the sacred image; the others were more elaborate buildings, whether of wood or of stone.[11]

The grove is thus a primitive holy place, which may have as an accessary a small structure for the image which later becomes a more elaborate temple. This worship in groves, which might become the seat of a temple, is also found among lower races.

The village shrine among the Dravidian tribes of India is an example. Under a sacred tree or grove stands a heap of stones or a mound; this may be replaced by a mud platform or a mud hut with a thatched roof, or by a small building of masonry with a domed roof and platform. These form an abode for the deity and are thus a primitive kind of temple.[12]

The early Semitic sanctuary was a sacred place associated with a theophany or with the continued presence of a spirit or divinity. This might be at a tree, a stone, on a hill, or in a cave.

These holy places were sacred territory enclosed by boundary stones or walls, with altar and *ashêrâh*, or sacred pole. The 'high place,' or *bâmâh*, as its name denotes, was on a height, and in the enclosed space or court there were the altar, the *ashêrâh*, and the *maṣṣêbâh* ([q.v.] the abode of the divinity), while connected with these were 'houses,' probably of the priests, which sometimes contained images (2 K 17[29]), though these were also enclosed in tents (2 K 23[7], Ezk 16[16]).[13] These houses or tents represent a primitive temple within the *bâmâh*, and, though no clear traces of actual temples have been met with in excavations, these may have been the origin of actual Canaanite temples such as those at El Berith and Gaza (Jg 9[46]).

[1] Cf. the shrine or chapel of the god on the summit of the Babylonian *ziqqurat*, and the Jewish Temple.

[2] But see § 1 (*c*) below.

[3] For American Indian instances see J. R. Swanton, in *HAI* ii. 405.

[4] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 186.

[5] See § 1 (*c*) below, and cf. the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.'

[6] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 197; *ERE* iii. 144[a], viii. 362[b], ix. 2[a], 281[b].

[7] Hose-McDougall, ii. 7, 15; artt. LAPPS, § 7, LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES, § 3 (*a*), (*d*).

[8] See art. ALTAR (Chinese).

[1] Herod. i. 131; J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (*HL*), London, 1913, pp. 53, 225, 391.

[2] Cf. J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, iv. 1309.

[3] Lucan, *Pharsalia*, iii. 399 f.

[4] Livy, xxiii. 24; Polybius, ii. 32.

[5] Plut. *Cæsar*, 26; Diod. Sic. v. 27.

[6] Strabo, iv. iv. 6. [7] See art. CELTS, § XIV. 1.

[8] *Germ.* 9, 39 f., *Ann.* ii. 12, iv. 73.

[9] Grimm, i. 69; cf. art. OLD PRUSSIANS, § 4 (*c*).

[10] Tac. *Ann.* i. 51, *Germ.* 40; Grimm, i. 80 ff.; B. Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, London, 1851–52, i. 260; G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 403.

[11] Thorpe, i. 212; Grimm, i. 292.

[12] W. Crooke, *The N.W. Provinces of India*, London, 1897, pp. 236, 244 f., 249, *Natives of N. India*, do. 1907, p. 236; artt. DRAVIDIANS (N. India), § 27, BENGAL, § 9, ORAONS, § 7; cf. E. B. Tylor, ii. 223 f.

[13] A tent was used as a sanctuary in the temple of Beltis at Harran, and elsewhere (D. A. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 33), and by the Carthaginians as a portable shrine (Diod. Sic. xx. 65).

16[29]), probably consisting of an outer hall and an inner sanctuary for the image. The tents referred to resemble that provided for the Ark by David (2 S 6[17]), though it had previously been kept in some kind of building (1 S 3[3-15]; cf. 2 S 7[6f.]), just as there were family or tribal houses of a god (Jg 17[5] 18[18. 30f.]). Remains of simple Phœnician temples suggest Egyptian influence; they are little more than a *cella*, rectangular, but open in front.[1]

Examples of 'high places' among other races are found among the Aleuts and Bhils,[2] while they existed also in primitive Greek religion, and indeed wherever a cult was carried on on hilltops.

(*b*) *Shrines at graves.*—The grave as a sacred place may be another point of departure for the temple, when it is associated with a structure—though it be no more than an enclosing wooden fence with shrubs, as among the Tami of New Guinea[3]—where a cult is carried on. Sometimes an altar is placed over a grave, as with the Mayans and possibly the Nicaraguans,[4] and by the Chinese for the half-yearly sacrifice to the spirits of the dead.[5] Sometimes a series of memorial stones is erected, not always, however, over a grave, like the menhirs and dolmen-like structures of the Khāsis,[6] the stone circles with a rectangular niche in their circumference found in Algeria, the rectangular, elliptical, or circular groups of stones in Syria,[7] and the stone circles in Britain, varying in size and elaboration up to that at Stonehenge.[8]

These circles, long regarded without evidence as 'Druidical temples,' were probably connected with a cult of the dead in pre-Celtic times, and so were a kind of temple, like the Fijian *nanga* presently to be referred to. Some have regarded such a circle as that of Stonehenge as a temple dedicated to the sun or other heavenly bodies.[9]

Akin to these are the sacred stone enclosures, or *nanga*, of the Fiji islanders, now existing only as ruins.

These formerly presented the form of a rough parallelogram enclosed by flat upright stones, divided into three compartments by cross walls called respectively the little, great, and sacred *nanga*, the last enclosing the sacred *kava* bowl. Trees stood round the enclosure, and outside, beyond the sacred *nanga*, was the *vale tambu* ('sacred house'), a bell-roofed hut. Here the foreskins of youths circumcised on behalf of a sick parent were offered to ancestral gods with prayers for the patient's recovery. In the *nanga* 'the ancestral spirits are to be found by their worshippers, and thither offerings are taken on all occasions when their aid is to be invoked,' and here firstfruits are presented to them. They were also used in the elaborate initiation ceremonies, the object of which was the introduction of the candidates to the ancestral spirits.[10]

Where large chambered tombs exist, as they do in many parts of the world, they have been used for worship of the dead, either at the time of the burial or at stated intervals thereafter. To this extent, therefore, they form temples, and sometimes they contain a conventional image of the dead like the human figures roughly sculptured on the walls of rock-hewn tombs in France.[11] The structures built over graves may be no more than large huts, of logs and thatch, like those built over the graves of kings and chiefs among the Banyoro and Baganda, but these are regarded as temples, with priests and attendants, where the spirits of the dead are consulted.[12]

In Fiji certain temples of a primitive kind are associated with graves and with the cult of the *kalougalo*, or ancestor-gods.[13] Not unlike these are the huts of reed and grass built over the graves of chiefs in pre-historic Egypt, where offerings were made. They gave place to mud houses, and these again to structures of stone. Of the latter the *mastaba* had a chamber for the statue of the deceased and a tablet for offerings. Funerary chapels were part of the tomb-structure, but, where pyramids were built, this chapel or temple was erected outside the pyramid, and in it gifts and offerings were made. Sometimes they developed into large temples, which, like the smaller funerary chapels, had lands attached to them for their maintenance.[1]

(*c*) *Caves and temples.*—Caves occasionally served as scenes of a cult, and by their shape and enclosed space may have suggested the structural temple. The caverns of mid-Magdalenian times, which contained elaborate paintings of animals or even of human figures, have been regarded as the scene of religious or magical rites, but of this there is no direct evidence.[2] Where cave-dwellers used part of the cave as a shrine for an image or fetish, it might easily through conservatism still be regarded as the dwelling of a god, when men no longer used it for a dwelling. It might become a temple or be associated with a temple built above it. Caves used for burial purposes would doubtless also acquire a sacred character and be used for commemorative rites.

Thus some of the Canaanite 'high places' are associated with caves, which may have been abodes of the living or burial-places, and which, it has been conjectured, were used for oracular purposes or regarded as sanctuaries of a god.[3] Natural or artificial grottoes also constituted the earliest Phœnician temples.[4] An example of gods incarnate in animal shape inhabiting a cavern which served as a temple occurs in Fiji in the case of the gods Ndengei and Ratu-Mai-Mbulu, to whom prayers and offerings were made there.[5] Names of divinities worshipped in caves among the ancient Berbers are known, as well as the caves themselves with inscriptions to them. Sacrifices were probably offered in front of the entrance; within the cave niches contained sacred objects.[6] Rock temples are known in early Egypt and in N. Arabia, but they are most elaborate in India and Ceylon, where they are both hewn out of solid rock and sculptured in caverns. Some originated in Buddhist times, and many still exist as examples of striking architectural skill—*e.g.*, at Elephanta and Ellora.[7] Their prototypes are caves used as shrines and for the cult of Hindu gods in N. India.[8] Among the Caribs two caves were the places where sun and moon emerged and fertilized the earth. They were places of pilgrimage, were adorned with paintings, and contained images. Spirits were supposed to guard them.[9]

Another reason for caves becoming associated with worship is the belief that men first came out of them from their subterranean home. Examples of this are found in ancient Peru and other parts of America.[10]

Caves may also be the depositories of sacred or cult objects or of images of gods, and thus serve a purpose to which temples are also put.

The Arunta *ertnatulunga* is a rock crevice and sacred store-house containing *churinga* and their indwelling spirits. They are visited ceremonially and are highly sacred.[11] The Veddas keep their sacred arrows in caves to prevent them from being contaminated, especially by women.[12] The Hopi use clefts in the rock in which to place the *bakos*, or prayer-sticks, in honour of their deities, and the Coras and Huichols deposit ceremonial arrows and images in sacred caves.[13] The Ostyaks keep their images or stones representing the gods in sanctuaries in the hills guarded by a shaman.[14]

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[1] For the more elaborate Canaanite temples see art. ARCHITECTURE (Phœnician); and Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31.

[2] See artt. ALEUTS, § 5, BHILS, § 3.

[3] G. Bamler, in R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 518.

[4] *NR* ii. 799, iv. 61 f. [5] *ERE* i. 338[a].

[6] P. R. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, London, 1907, p. 144 f.; cf. art. MUNDAS, § 4.

[7] T. E. Peet, *Rough Stone Monuments and their Builders*, London, 1912, pp. 91, 116.

[8] *ERE* iii. 301[b], iv. 408. [9] Cf. artt. STONES.

[10] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 147 ff.; L. Fison, *JAI* xiv. [1885] 14 ff.

[11] E. A. Parkyn, *An Introd. to the Study of Prehistoric Art*, London, 1915, p. 158 f.

[12] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 109 f.; *ERE* ii. 357[b].

[13] *ERE* vi. 15[b].

[1] *A Guide to the Egyptian Collections in the British Museum*, London, 1909, p. 165 f.; *ERE* iv. 463.

[2] S. Reinach, 'L'Art et la magie,' *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. [1903] 257; H. F. Osborne, *The Men of the Old Stone Age*[2], London, 1916, p. 422.

[3] See the reff. in *ERE* iii. 178, vi. 631[b].

[4] W. R. Smith, p. 180.

[5] B. Thomson, p. 114; T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, London, 1858, i. 217 f.; cf. *ERE* vi. 14[b], 15[b].

[6] *ERE* ii. 507[b].

[7] J. Fergusson, *The Rock-cut Temples of India*, London, 1864; see also artt. AJANTA, CAVES, ELEPHANTA.

[8] *ERE* v. 10[a].

[9] J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 229.

[10] *Ib.* p. 312.

[11] Spencer-Gillen[3], p. 133, Spencer-Gillen[5], p. 267.

[12] C. G. Seligmann, 'The Vedda Cult of the Dead,' *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religion*, Oxford, 1908, i. 66.

[13] *ERE* vi. 786[b], 829[a]; C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, ii. 27, 160.

[14] J. Abercromby, *The Pre- and Proto-Historic Finns*, London, 1898, i. 162; *ERE* ix. 577[a].

(*d*) *The village-house, men's house, etc., as temple.*—In many regions where separate temples are unknown, the men's house, council-house, village-house, or the *kiva*, to some extent serves the purpose of a temple among its many other uses, and corresponds to the *prytaneum* of the Greeks and the *curia* of the Romans.

Religious dances or sacred dramatic plays are held in the 'village-house' among the Aleuts or in the 'assembly-house' of the Californian tribes, which may consist of a circular dome-shaped structure or a mere brushwood enclosure.[1] To the latter corresponds the bough *wurley* used in the fire-ceremony of the Warramunga tribe, in which certain men maintain for hours a continuous singing to the accompaniment of beating boomerangs.[2] Among many American Indian tribes, especially in the south-west, religious rites are associated with a 'sacred house,' as with the Hupa, which does not differ in construction from other houses in the village. Here sacred dances take place, and traditions are connected with it.[3] With the Pueblo tribes the *kiva* serves at once as sacred council-house, medicine-lodge, and temple of the members of a mystery society. In some districts *kivas* of ancient date are circular; more generally they are square and often below the surface of the ground. The pre-historic *kivas* of Colorado and Utah are of similar type. Women might not enter the *kiva* except to give food to husband or sons. *Kivas* are often very large, but the well openings are small, and entrance is gained by a ladder up to the roof, whence by another ladder descent is made to the interior from a hole in the roof. The walls are often decorated with symbolic paintings and are surrounded by a bench. At one end is an altar on which the symbolic objects of the society are placed, and before it is a dry sand 'painting,' representing gods and forces of nature.[4] Corresponding to these are the sacred lodges and club-houses of Melanesia and Papua, which are generally the nearest approach to temples in those regions. Examples are found in the 'sacred houses' of the Solomon Islands;[5] in the *toreu* of New Britain, etc.—a sacred enclosure with a large room where the dresses and masks were prepared and members of the society met, whence the spirit-personators of the ceremonies emerged, and which no woman or uninitiated male might approach;[6] in the *marawot* of the Bismarck Archipelago, a similar construction to the *toreu*, but with a special part containing images and visited by the *tena*, or magician, alone;[7] and in the house used in the *asa*-cult at Astrolabe Bay, where an ancestor-cult is practised.[8] The structure consisted mainly of wood and thatch. The 'men's house' in the same regions has often a sacred significance, and contains skulls and heads, effigies of the dead, and symbols associated with ancestor-worship, and sometimes masks, drums, and flutes connected with the mysteries and concealed from the uninitiated. These houses are often used for the worship of ancestors.[9]

(*e*) *The house-shrine as temple.*—Still another aspect of the primitive temple, sometimes suggesting a point of departure for more exclusive temple structures, is the hut or house a corner of which is set apart as a place or shrine for an image or sacred objects. This custom is well-nigh universal, and only a few examples need be noted.

Among the Banyankole in each hut is a special place for fetishes, consisting of a mound of earth a foot high, beaten hard, with grass laid upon it.[10] With Gold Coast tribes the *suhman* containing a spirit has an honoured place in a corner of the hut, where offerings are made to it, or, as with the Yoruba, the house-god Olarosa, represented in human form, is set up at the door, and huts have a recess in the wall for the fetish.[11] Here and there in Melanesia and Papua images of ancestors are kept in houses, or, as in certain islands off the western end of New Guinea, in a separate room of the house in which miniature wooden houses are placed for the souls to reside in. Offerings are made to them. In the chief's house are shrines for the souls of all who have died in the community. 'Such a house might almost be described as a temple of the dead.'[12] Among the Klemantans images are kept in the huts, or, as also with the Kayans, stand before them.[1] The Votiaks set their *vorsud*, or clan-god, on a shelf in the out-house.[2] In higher religions the household shrine is well known. Most Buddhist houses have their shelf with an image of Gautama. Shintôists treasure objects of private cult on a house-altar. In ancient Egypt each house had its domestic shrine, usually a recess or a cupboard with the figure of a household god.

In certain regions the temple seems to have arisen out of the private sanctuary of the king. In Mycenæ houses, especially the king's palace, had chapels as part of the structure, and the palace later became the temple. With the Phœnicians the temple was at first an annexe of the palace, like Solomon's temple at Jerusalem. Where a cult of the hearth-divinities, with libations thrown into the fire, existed—*e.g.*, in Roman houses—the house itself was a temple with the hearth as altar.

2. Actual temples in the lower culture.—We have seen that, while in many savage religions actual temples are unknown, many approaches to temples exist. Yet even savages are not devoid of temples of a primitive kind, for it was natural to suppose that, as the worshipper had a house, the god or spirit also should have one, either as the permanent shelter of his image or as the place whither he might resort and be approached by men in worship.

(*a*) The most primitive temples are probably those found in Africa, both Negro and Bantu. While frequently the 'place of praying' is a mere clearing under the tree in the village courtyard,[3] thus conforming to what was found in early Indo-European worship, sometimes an actual hut is provided for a god, not differing much from the ordinary hut.

On the Lower Niger the temples contain images standing on mud platforms, and the *ju-ju* house in the bush is secret to all but the priests, and contains images, while the walls are decorated with plates.[4] Similar temples exist among the Ewe, and that of the rain-god is painted with the colours of the rain-bow.[5] The celebrated serpent-temple at Whydah was merely a circular hut, thatched with grass—a privilege allowed only to shrines and temples—standing in an oblong enclosure. In it the sacred snakes were kept.[6] In Dahomey temples are circular huts, so low that a man must bend double to enter one. Images stand in them on a platform of clay, before which are earthen pots and vessels smeared with blood, eggs, and oil. Some temples are elaborately decorated, and they as well as sacred groves are distinguished by calico streamers fluttering from poles or trees.[7] Among the Yoruba—*e.g.*, at Benin—the *ju-ju* temple consisted of a space of ground 150 yards by 60, surrounded by a high wall, and covered with short grass. At one end a long shed extended across the breadth, and under it stood the altar, made of three steps the whole length of the shed. This was slightly raised in the centre, and on it stood ivory tusks on bronze heads. In the centre of the enclosure were a kind of candelabra with hooks, and a well for the reception of the bodies of victims.[8] Among the Baganda temples resembled the king's house. They were conical structures with an elaborate reed thatch coming nearly to the ground, and supported on posts, with hide curtains for the doorway. They had also a sort of pinnacle composed of layers of reeds bound together and fastened to the top of the roof. The floor was strewn with a carpet of scented grass, dried, and cut to uniform length. These temples took some time to build, and their structure was frequently renewed. Some had also a court surrounding them, and in the case of the more important gods only the priests and mediums could enter it. In others the temple attendants had their huts in the court. Temples without courtyards could be approached and even entered by the people. The temple of the god of war was surrounded on three sides by a thick forest sacred to him. Each temple had its priests and mediums who lived in huts near by, where their vestments, worn on entering the temple, were kept. Young girls tended the sacred fire always burning in the temples, save in those which might not be entered by a woman. The larger temples had estates attached to them for their upkeep. Temples of gods had no images, for images were unknown, but they had a dais on which the invisible deity was supposed to sit, or on which his relics were kept. Sacred drums were stored in certain temples. Fetishes had also temples with priests and mediums, and there were special temples for the king's jaw-bone and umbilical cord,

[1] *ERE* i. 305ᵃ, iii. 143ᵇ, 144ᵇ.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 382 f. [3] *ERE* vi. 880ᵇ.
[4] F. S. Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday*, New York and London, 1901, p. 233 f.; F. W. Hodge, in *HAI* i. 710; cf. *ERE* i. 336ᵃ, 822ᵃ.
[5] F. Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, tr. A. J. Butler, London, 1896-98, i. 325.
[6] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 60 f.
[7] *Ib.* p. 72 ff. [8] *ERE* ix. 348 f.
[9] R. Parkinson, *Inter. AE* xiii. [1900] 35, 42 f.; M. J. Erdweg, *Mittheilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxii. [1902] 292 f.; H. Zahn, in Neuhauss, iii. 301, 308; cf. *ERE* ix. 341, 349, 351, 354.
[10] J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 133.
[11] H. Ling Roth, *Great Benin*, Halifax, 1903, pp. 166, 171; cf. *ERE* ix. 278ᵇ, 280ᵃ.
[12] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, pp. 139, 173 ff.; J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, i. 315 f.

[1] Hose-McDougall, ii. 7, 19. [2] Abercromby, i. 164.
[3] C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of the A-Kamba and other East African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 86; cf. *ERE* ii. 358ᵃ.
[4] A. G. Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, London, 1906, p. 465.
[5] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1890, p. 49.
[6] *Ib.* p. 57. [7] *Ib.* p. 80.
[8] Ling Roth, p. 150.

and others for his ghost.[1] Similar temples for divinities and for the royal jaw-bone existed among the Busoga, Banyoro, etc., but with these and the Baganda the creator-god had no temple.[2]

(*b*) In Melanesia temples are not common, but in the Admiralty Islands wooden, thatched huts of a beehive shape, with carved door-posts representing male and female figures, serve as temples. The doorway is closed by a hurdle. Skulls of pigs and turtles are attached to the rafters, as well as balls of human hair. A mystery was always made about the principal temple, which contained images, and was sometimes open, sometimes closed.[3] In Fiji each village had one or more temples (*bure*), built on a mound faced with stone rubble-work. The roof was high-pitched, with a projecting ridge-pole, and the height of the structure was twice its breadth. Each *bure* had two doors and a fire-place, and contained images, jars, boxes, mats, etc. From the roof hung a long piece of bark cloth reaching to the floor at one of the corner-posts, and marking the holy place which none but the priest approached to be inspired by the god, who descended by this cloth. The dead were sometimes buried in the *bure*, but the building was only used for worship on special occasions and often became ruinous in the interval. It served also as a council-house and chiefs' club-house. *Bures* were also erected in memory of the dead, and had an altar for offerings.[4] In the district of Tumleo, New Guinea, *paraks*, or temples, built of wood and standing on piles, are found. They consist of two storeys and have high gables, and are approached by ladders with hand-rails carved in the form of crocodiles and ape-like figures. Nothing but drums and flutes is found in the *paraks*, and these, played by men, signify the presence of the spirits, for whose worship the temples exist. A certain degree of mystery attaches to the *paraks*; no woman or child may enter them or loiter in their vicinity.[5]

(*c*) In certain parts of Polynesia—Society and Sandwich Islands—the temples, or *marœ*, were enclosures open to the sky and they were of three classes: national, local, and domestic.

The national temples, called *tabu-tabu-a-tea*, perhaps because of their wide-spread sacredness, were depositories of the chief images and the places where great festivals were held. Each of them was composed of several *marœ*, some with inner courts for the images, altars, and sacred dormitories for the chief divinities, all enclosed by stone walls on two sides. In front was a fence, and at the back a pyramidal structure often of large size, with images and altars before it. At Atchura this structure was 270 ft. long, 94 broad, and 70 high. Steps led to the top, which had a surface area of 180 by 6 ft. Within the enclosure were the priests' houses, and trees grew both within and around it, forming a dark grove. Offerings were placed in the *marœ*. Men alone usually took part in the festivals, but on the completion of the year women and children also attended, but were not allowed to enter the sacred enclosure. Local *marœ* were those belonging to the different districts; the domestic *marœ* were for the family gods. In both of these, as well as in the royal *marœ*, the dead were deposited, and were there under the guardianship of the gods.[6] In other districts —*e.g.*, Samoa—temples resembled the beehive thatched huts, or, again, the village house where the chiefs met served as a temple. In some cases groves as well as temples were used as places of sacrifice.[7]

(*d*) Among the coast Veddas temple structures exist. One is 12 ft. by 10, roofed, and facing eastwards, with the roof carried forward beyond the front wall and door. Outside this structure are a long pole, a well, and a tree with a platform, and just outside the door stands an altar. The interior is decorated with cloths and branches on the occasion of a ceremonial dance, and ceremonial garments are kept within it. Some of the village Veddas have temples of bark or of mud resembling their own huts. In these the shaman dances, and symbols of the spirits are kept.[1]

(*e*) With the Todas, worshippers of the sacred buffalo, the dairy forms the temple or sacred place, with its ceremonial vessels and other things, which are preserved there; and precautions are taken to prevent their contamination by the touch or look of unauthorized persons. Relics of heroes are also stored in them. These temple-dairies have usually two rooms, and are of the same form as the native huts.[2]

(*f*) As an example of various stages in the evolution of temples from simple to highly elaborate, over a large area, we may cite those known in N. and S. America. Most of the lower tribes, and some of the more advanced (Hurons, Iroquois[3]), had no temples. But usually there were sacred spots or shrines where ceremonies were performed, sacrifices offered, and images set up.[4]

Among the Hopi such places were called *pakoki*, 'prayer-house,' and often had nothing to mark them but prayer-sticks —sticks with feathers attached. Others were denoted by circles of stones—*e.g.*, the sun shrine with an opening to the direction of sunrise at the summer solstice—by a single stone, or by some natural mark on a rock.[5] To these correspond the sites on which are erected bowers or lodges for the public performances of mystery societies in other tribes, often containing an altar with sacred objects.[6] More elaborate shrines also exist among the Hopis and will be described later. In S. America corresponding to such shrines is the secret spot where the *betuto*, or sacred trumpet, of the Orinoco tribes is kept, so that women and children may not see it. With other tribes the insignia of a *piai* are tabu and are kept in a special shed or hut, which is also used as a place where he may be consulted. It is called a 'spirit-house' and is tabu.[7] Here also may be mentioned the special 'medicine-lodge' of many tribes, erected for the performances of the shaman, corresponding to that found among the Ural-Altaic tribes of N. Asia.[8]

With other tribes—*e.g.*, the Omaha—the sacred structure consisted of three sacred tents, or *tipis*, which were carried from place to place, like the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.' They consisted of poles tied together at the top, arranged in a circle, and covered with bison skins. They sheltered the three sacred objects—the sacred pole, the sacred buffalo-cow skin, and the sacred bag.[9] The household tent as a shrine containing an altar is also sporadically found—*e.g.*, among the Siksika, with whom each tent has an altar, a mere hole in the ground, in which sweet gum is burned.[10]

With the Apaches, Sioux, and others, sacred caves took the place of temples, where religious rites (tabu to women) were performed, or which were used as resorts for prayer.[11] In Florida the Apallachians had a cave-temple on the sun-mountain, Olaimi, 200 ft. long, and containing an altar and images. Images also stood at the entrance, which faced eastwards, so that the earliest beams of the sun fell upon it.[12] More elaborate still was a cave-temple of the Wiyataos, which had been used to celebrate rites by the followers of a culture-hero Wixipecocha, but was later turned into a structure with galleries, halls, and apartments. Into it the priests descended to perform sacrifices and ceremonies hid from the vulgar eye.[13]

Among the Chibchas the temples, each of which was dedicated to a god, were mere huts with clay walls, containing small stools on which idols were set. The floor was covered with grass, and mats hung on the walls. Those of greater importance had the distinction of having their chief posts set on the body of a sacrificed slave. Small shrines also existed

[1] Roscoe, *The Baganda*, pp. 271 ff., 292 ff., 303, 308. Cf. artt. HEAD, § 5 (*f*), MOUTH, § 1.
[2] Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, pp. 90, 131, 227, 246.
[3] *JAI* vi. [1877] 414.
[4] C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during 1838-42*, London, 1852, ii. 53 f.; Williams, pp. 191, 223; R. Seeman, *Viti: an Account of a Government Mission to the Vitian or Fijian Islands*, Cambridge, 1862, p. 391.
[5] R. Parkinson, p. 33 f.; Erdweg, pp. 295 f., 377.
[6] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 339 ff., 405; cf. Ratzel, i. 325.
[7] G. Turner, *Samoa, a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, pp. 19, 152, 289.

[1] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 168, 235.
[2] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 56 ff., 422, 428.
[3] See *ERE* i. 335[b].
[4] See § 1 above.
[5] J. W. Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 558[b].
[6] G. A. Dorsey, in *HAI* i. 227 f.
[7] *SO RBEW* [1915], p. 137; T. Whiffen, *The North-West Amazons: Notes of some Months spent among Cannibal Tribes*, London, 1915, p. 212.
[8] See, *e.g.*, artt. NAVAHO, OJIBWA, SHAMANISM.
[9] Dellenbaugh, pp. 204, 208; J. O. Dorsey, *13 RBEW* [1896], p. 274.
[10] W. Hough, in *HAI* i. 46.
[11] J. G. Bourke, *FL* ii. [1891] 426; Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 559; Müller, p. 69; *ERE* vi. 829[a].
[12] Müller, p. 69.
[13] *NR* ii. 211; for other cave-temples see Müller, p. 184.

throughout this region, on hills or by lakes.[1] Among some Californian tribes structural temples, or *sanquechs*, in honour of the god Chinigchinich, consisted of an oval enclosure, four or five yards in circumference, with interior divisions formed by branches, stakes of wood, and mats, and containing a hurdle supporting an image.[2] The temples of the Natchez, one in each village, which stood on mounds, were huts about 30 ft. square and of a somewhat elaborate structure. They contained the sacred fire as well as a division in which sacred objects were kept. On a platform rested the remains of the 'sun-chiefs,' with sacred images, and in an innermost sanctuary was the holy image of the sun-god or hero. This temple was the object of great reverence.[3] Such sun-temples existed over a wide region in Florida, Arkansas, and Virginia, and were no more than large wigwams with thick mud walls and a dome-shaped roof with figures of eagles. Images stood in them, and women were excluded from them.[4] No more elaborate were the temples described by travellers among Virginian tribes, in the Mississippi region, among the Fox Indians, or in S. America with the Tupinambas.[5] Among the Huichols are temples (*tokpia*), 'god-houses,' and sacred caves, though the difference between the first two is not clear. The temples are larger than but otherwise resemble the houses, which are circular, stone-built, and roofed with thatch, and which possess a low entrance to the east. The roof is supported by upright beams. In the centre is a fireplace—a circular basin of clay. Niches in the interior walls contain ceremonial objects, and each of them is devoted to a god, and in charge of an officer of the temple. Flowers are offered with prayer in these niches. In front of the temple is a square open space for the 'god-houses,' in which the officers live who watch the temple. They are rectangular, of stone and mud, with a thatched gable-roof. The interior contains symbolic objects to please the gods. The people meet in the temples for shamanistic ceremonies. Chairs are placed for the deities invisibly present. Images are kept in sacred caves in the mountains, sometimes set in miniature temples there.[6] In the Pueblo region the more elaborate shrines were of the nature of temples. They consisted of sealed stone enclosures, sometimes with symbols painted on them, and they contained images and symbolic representations of supernatural beings. Among the Hopi the shrine of the earth-goddess is a sealed chamber in which is her image, seated. Every November at the 'new fire' ceremony a slab is removed, and offerings are placed in the shrine, while every four years the image is carried in procession. In all Pueblo shrines are placed permanent objects (images, stones, carved slabs, etc.) and temporary objects (prayer-meal, pollen, sticks, bowls of water, clay images).[7]

The council-house, men's house, the *kiva*, etc., as serving *inter alia* all the purposes of a temple, have been already referred to.[8] In the case of a *kiva*, or lodge of a mystery society, this is particularly marked. None but priests or the initiated may enter the sacred place; in it are made the sacred objects used in the ritual; and here prayers are said, smoke offerings presented, and other ceremonies—*e.g.*, purificatory rites—are carried on.

The rude stone structures just described form a primitive aspect of the more elaborate stone temples of barbaric peoples in N. and S. America. It was also natural that, where wooden temples existed, they should be replaced by temples of stone, as soon as more elaborate architectural methods were attained. Intermediate stages between these simple structures and the massive and elaborate temples—the ruins of which still command respect—are seldom met with, but Peter Martyr describes one in Hayti, and Schoolcraft another at Cayambe—a circle of sunburnt bricks 48 ft. in diameter and 13½ ft. high, with a small door, open to the sky.[9] Probably many of the Peruvian temples were of such a simple character, and even the great temple of the sun at Cuzco, comprising many buildings and apartments, though it was richly adorned with gold plates, cornices, and studs, and was provided with gardens and fields, had no great architectural character—mere squares and parallelograms of one storey, roofless or thatched.[10] Previous to the Inca rule, the temple was strictly a lofty altar with a chapel for the image. Under the Incas the chapel increased in size, encircling the altar, and was made elaborate by the addition of other buildings.[1] Certain remains of temples in Peru, however, show a greater architectural complexity than those described by early Spanish travellers.

The Mexican temples, *teocalli*, 'abode of the gods,' may be described as gigantic altars on which stood chapels for the images. There were many temples in each city, varying much in dignity.

The larger *teocalli* had a great outer court capable of holding a crowd of people. Within this space stood priests' houses, oratories, and chapels for lesser gods. There arose from it a pyramidal structure of earth faced with brick or stone, rising in stages, three to nine in number, each with a platform, to a height of 80 to 100 feet. Stairways, differently arranged, rose from the base to each platform, and thence to the top. Sometimes the stairway rose directly from base to summit up one of the faces of the pyramid; or it ascended at one of the angles to the first platform, at another angle to the second, and so to the top, in order that a religious procession in ascending might make a circuit of the structure. The platforms had palisades on which were stuck the heads of human victims. On the summit stood a tower or chapel, or sometimes two, containing the image of the god or gods to whom the temple was dedicated. In front of them stood the great stone of sacrifice and altars on which perpetual fire burned. The great procession of priests at the numerous religious services was visible to all who directed their eyes to the *teocalli*, as it made the ascent.[2]

The practice of placing temples on pyramidal structures is also found among the Mayans and throughout the whole area of Central America, but here the buildings were of a more ambitious kind, with elaborate architecture and sculpture.[3]

The mounds of the Mississippi region were thought to be of Mexican or Mayan origin, but it is now accepted that they were the work of Indian tribes—Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, Choctaws. Nor is it proved that every mound was crowned by a temple or altar. 'Whether these were sacred enclosures, sacrificial and temple mounds, are questions to be settled, if possible, by investigation and legitimate deductions.' Houses were built on some of the mounds, but occasionally travellers speak of a temple on a mound. In such a case the mound was of no great height, and the temple was a simple structure like that of the Natchez.[4]

3. Miniature temples.—Among many African tribes there is a custom of making a small hut for the spirits, about 2 ft. high. This stands in the village or outside, and offerings are made at it. It is supposed to contain 'an uncanny something,' and is a kind of temple of the dead, whose spirits are supposed to visit it.

In Uganda the hut is a veritable sanctuary, with a sort of altar for offerings.[5] In New Guinea some of the tribes set up little houses in the forest for the use of ancestral spirits, or place these within inner rooms of their own dwellings; others place the skull of the dead man in such a hut in the forest.[6] Similar miniature structures for ancestral ghosts are found in Indo-China and among the Gilyaks.[7]

4. Temples in the higher culture.—In higher civilizations the temple usually has a prominent place in religious life, and is architecturally of great importance. But here also it was evolved from simple structures, though these as well as the intermediate stages cannot always be traced in archæological sequence or from historical evidence. The series of articles on ARCHITECTURE deal with the structure of such temples in the greater religions, and it is unnecessary here to do more than offer a few general remarks.

(*a*) The great temples of ancient Egypt were preceded in pre-historic times by a simple structure of dried mud or a hut of wicker-work, not differing much from human dwellings and probably

[1] T. A. Joyce, *South American Archæology*, London, 1912, pp. 33, 37.
[2] *NR* i. 405.
[3] Dellenbaugh, p. 207; *ERE* ix. 190ᵇ.
[4] Ratzel, ii. 154.
[5] Müller, pp. 69, 280; John Smith, *Virginia*, in *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes* (Hakluyt Soc. Ex. Ser.), Glasgow, 1905–07, xviii. 450 f.
[6] Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, ii. 27 ff., 148 f., 160 ff.
[7] J. W. Fewkes, in *HAI* ii. 559.
[8] § 2 (*d*) above.
[9] Müller, p. 184; H. R. Schoolcraft, *Information respecting the History, Condition, etc., of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1853–57, v. 94.
[10] Garcilasso de la Vega, in Purchas, xvii. 340 f.; Schoolcraft, v. 89.

[1] A. Réville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru* (*HL*), London, 1884, p. 215.
[2] Joseph Acosta, in Purchas, xv. 319 ff.; Réville, p. 47; *NR* ii. 577, iii. 430; see art. ALTAR (American), § 2.
[3] See art. ARCHITECTURE (American), § 5; *NR* iv. *passim*.
[4] *18 RBEW* [1894], pp. 17 f., 604, 609, 652, 660, 671.
[5] Hobley, *Ethnology of the A-Kamba*, p. 85; A. Le Roy, *La Religion des primitifs*, Paris, 1909, p. 288; A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906, p. 47; artt. NYANJAS, § 2 (*c*), BANTU AND S. AFRICA, vol. ii. pp. 357ᵃ, 359ᵃ.
[6] Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, i. 315 f.; *ERE* ix. 350ᵃ.
[7] *ERE* vii. 231ᵃ, vi. 220ᵃ.

resembling African native temples. The hut was sometimes square, sometimes domed, and stood on a platform of earth to save it from inundation. Within it was the image of the god, and the only opening for light was the doorway or portico, with a mast at each side. In front was a court fenced with a palisade.

The hut gave place to a stone building, but, when additional rooms were built round the central 'house of the god,' and when the whole structure of the temple, with its spacious sphinx-guarded approach, pylons, courts for the worshippers, pillared halls for processions of priests, etc., was elaborated, the dark central chamber of the god, accessible to the higher priesthood only, remained as a constant factor, and contained the divine image or the sacred animal. The door was solemnly sealed with papyrus and clay at night, and as solemnly opened in the morning, before the day's ceremonial began. Thus what had once been the temple itself was now the inner sanctuary of a wide-spread temple, with all its multifarious buildings and chambers for purposes connected with the cult. The height of the Egyptian temple diminished from front to back.[1]

(*b*) The great temples of Babylon had probably originated in a structure of simple kind, oblong in shape, with a recess for an image. Excavations show that the great temples stood in a court with a vestibule, flanked by chambers.

The temple building consisted of a long outer hall, opening into a smaller one with the holy place, or *parakku*, where stood the image of the divinity and an altar. The holy place was open to the priests alone, or to a worshipper accompanied by a priest for special religious purposes. An altar stood in the court and perhaps in the outer hall also. The names of temples are many, and some of them show their great sanctity, others are suggestive of height—'the house of the shining mountain,' 'the lofty house.' This points to the high tower-like structure, the *ziqqurat*, which stood beyond the important temples, or towered within the sacred enclosure where stood many temples dedicated to various gods, as well as the houses of priests—a grouping of religious buildings found in the larger cities. The *ziqqurat* was a storeyed tower or pyramid, consisting of a series of diminishing and superimposed cubes. These varied in number, and symbolized the mythical mountain of the world. Where it consisted of seven storeys, these represented the planetary zones, or the seven zones of the earth. Each storey was approached by an inclined pathway or a flight of steps, either directly up the face or diagonally across it, until the top, which formed a broad platform, was reached. On the platform stood a chamber for the god, containing a couch and throne, and perhaps an image. As with the Mexican *teocalli*, processions winding up the tower could be plainly seen below, and, while the Egyptian temple in its grandest development was spread over a large area, the Babylonian, as far as the *ziqqurat* was concerned, aimed at reaching a lofty elevation, and represented in miniature the structure of the universe. It seems to have been regarded also as the grave of the god to whom it was dedicated, and persons of importance were sometimes buried round it.[2]

Both Egyptian and Babylonian temples were endowed with lands which yielded large revenues. Hence, outside their religious purpose, they had great influence on the economic life of the nation. In the Babylonian temple area also, as the priests were administrators of the law, there were courts of justice, chambers where national archives were stored, and even banks.

(*c*) The Greek temple was preceded by the *τέμενος*, the open sacred place with its ἄγαλμα of the deity, altar, and other *sacra*. In the Ægean religion the sacred cave served as a temple where the Mother-goddess was worshipped, as in the double cave (upper and lower) of Dicte in Crete, where a rich store of cult objects has been found in recent years.[3] Palaces had their domestic chapel or shrine, plain and of small size, with a ledge at one end for images and sacred objects. The ruler was a priest-king, and in one instance, that of the palace of Knossos, 'the Place of the Double Axe' (λάβρυς), the whole building has the character of a temple.[4] Free-standing shrines or temples also existed, like that discovered at Gournia, a small enclosure 12 ft. square, in the heart of the town, in which were found many images and cult objects.[1] With the perfecting of the divine image, a house to shelter it became necessary, and the earliest type was no more than a rectangular oblong *cella*, or σηκός. To this was soon added an additional chamber, with open front and a couple of columns supporting an architrave, the corners of which rested on flattened columns attached to the ends of the side walls. These columns were at first of wood; the earliest stone columns date from the 6th cent. B.C. Throughout the whole period of Greek religion the rectangular *cella* remained as the central part of all Greek temples, though it was sometimes prolonged back and front with additional chambers, or surrounded by single or double rows of columns, while these were sometimes also introduced within the *cella*. Vitruvius, indeed, classifies temples according to the arrangement of the columns in relation to the *cella*.[2] The temples of the gods faced eastwards, and opposite the entrance stood the image of the god. The *cella* also contained an altar or altars, votive offerings, and treasure, the last being also stored in the chamber behind the *cella*. The temples were never large; they were merely houses for the image, and hence were often kept closed. They were decorated with sculpture and painting both within and without. The temple stood within a *τέμενος*, where the great altar was placed, and where the worship was carried on.[3]

(*d*) The Roman *templum*, as already shown, was originally a rectangular space of ground marked off by the augur, in which a tent was pitched for augural purposes, like the 'medicine-hut' of the shaman. Strictly speaking, the house of a god was the *ædes*, but the word *templum* was now applied to such a structure, inaugurated by the augurs, and usually of larger and more complicated structure than the *ædes*. In the earliest times divine dwellings were unknown. The grove, the cave, the hearth, were the earlier sacred places, or the *sacellum*, a small place consecrated to a god, enclosed by a fence or wall, but roofless, with an altar and possibly an image. The Romans, in erecting houses for the gods, were influenced by the Etruscans and the Greeks. The Etruscan temples were of wood, oblong, with one or more chambers and an open portico. The Roman temple had also a central *cella*, but of much greater breadth than the Greek, this feature being probably a result of Etruscan influence. The structure of temples, whether simple or elaborate, was generally determined by Greek architecture, though there were differences in detail—*e.g.*, the absence of columns at the back. Circular temples were also built; these had become common in Greece from the 4th cent. B.C., though it is not impossible that the form may be copied from the early Italian house.

Before building a temple, a space of ground was *liberatus et effatus* by the augurs, and consecrated by the *pontifex*. When the building was erected, it was dedicated to a god. In some instances, however, a building might be consecrated to religious use without the preliminary augural ceremony. Such buildings were *sacra*, or *ædes sacra*, like the temple of Vesta.[4] Outside the temple stood the altar, and within burned the sacred fire. In the temples were stored votive offerings, gifts, treasure of all lands, as well as the images of the gods.

(*e*) During the Vedic period in India, as has been seen, there were no temples. No trace of temples in the pre-Buddhist period is known, but, if any existed, they must have been of wood, as they still are in Burma, the use of stone in

[1] G. Maspero, *L'Archéologie égyptienne*, Paris, 1887, pp. 65 f., 106 f., *The Dawn of Civilization*, tr. M. L. McClure, London, 1894, p. 119; W. Max Müller, *Egyptian Mythology* (=*The Mythology of All Races*, xii.), Boston, U.S.A., 1918, p. 187 f.

[2] Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, p. 427; Herod. i. 181 f.; M. Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York and London, 1911, lect. v.

[3] C. H. and H. B. Hawes, *Crete the Forerunner of Greece*, London and New York, 1909, p. 112.

[4] *ERE* i. 140ᵃ.

[1] Hawes, p. 101.

[2] Vitruvius, *de Architectura*, iii. 2.

[3] For plans and details, architectural and structural, see art. ARCHITECTURE (Greek), and cf. art. ALTAR (Greek).

[4] For architectural details see art. ARCHITECTURE (Roman), and cf. art. ROMAN RELIGION, § IV.

architecture not having been introduced until Aśoka's reign, as a result of contact with the West. Religious edifices are certainly known for the first time in Buddhism. The primitive sacred object in Buddhism was not an image, but a relic. This at first was not set in a temple, but enclosed in a *stūpa*, or *tope* (Siṇhalese *dāgaba*)—an elongated hemispherical structure standing on a base, the exterior often richly carved or ornamented, and crowned with a square capital and the *chhattra*, or umbrella. Many *stūpas* contained no relic, but were erected as commemorative objects. A path fenced by a railing surrounded the *stūpa*, for circumambulation. The *stūpa* was decorated with flags, streamers, and flowers; and it was the chief religious edifice of early Buddhism.[1] Another religious edifice was the *chaitya*, a name applied to any religious monument—*e.g.*, a *stūpa* with relics—but also restricted to a building corresponding to a temple or church, the '*chaitya* hall,' with pillared aisles and an apse containing a *stūpa* and an altar.

The earliest known structural building of this type—*e.g.*, at Ter, Haidarābād—consists of an apsidal chamber with high barrel-vaulted roof. In front is a square hall, or *mandapa*—perhaps a later addition, lower in height, with a flat roof supported by pillars. The façade above the roof of the hall has a niche containing now a Hindu image, which was probably at one time a window. Within the apse stood a *dāgaba*, now replaced by a Vaiṣṇava image. *Chaityas* of this type must have been common in India. Buddhism made use of rock excavations at an early time for *chaitya* halls, which sometimes had aisles.[2]

A third structure was the *vihāra*—a hall where the monks assembled, with cells at the sides for sleeping. The *vihāras* were later used as temples and became the centre of monastic buildings grouped around them. They usually stood beside *chaityas*, though they came to be furnished with chapels in which religious services could be performed as well as in the *chaitya*.

During ten centuries from Aśoka's time onwards cave *chaitya* halls and *vihāras* were excavated all over India.

In early examples at Bihār the *chaitya* halls are merely oblong chambers, sometimes with a cell or apse at the farther end for the *dāgaba* with its relic. Others are more elaborate. The façade of the cave represents the exterior of a wooden *chaitya* in all its details. The interior is apsidal. Pillars are cut in the sides, and in the apse is the *dāgaba*, which now has the image of Buddha in front of it. Some of these caves are highly elaborate in their carving both within and without, and are also pillared structures with aisles. The cave *vihāras* have a central pillared hall with cells at the sides for monks. Beyond the hall are one or more inner sanctuaries for images of Buddha. These are later additions. Here again the architecture and adornment varies from simple to highly elaborate. The earliest free-standing *vihāras* were probably simple halls with cells attached, and were sometimes of a storeyed pyramidal form, each successive storey decreasing in size, and giving a series of pillared halls one above the other, with cells for the monks on the terraces. This architectural structure supplied a form for all the later temples of southern Hindnism.[3] Attached to great monasteries, as at Peshawār, was a court, or *vihāra*, with cells for images, and beyond that, opening from it, a circular or square court surrounded by similar cells, and with a *stūpa* in the centre. These belong to the period of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

One of the earliest known temples, or *chaitpas*, is at Bodh Gayā, in front of the Bo-tree of Buddha's enlightenment. Frequently restored, it was probably erected in the 6th cent., and is 160 ft. high by 60 ft. wide. It is rectangular with an elongated pyramidal form of nine storeys, each with exterior niches for images, and the interior *cella* contained originally an image of Buddha. Such a nine-storeyed tower-temple is unique in India, but is found frequently north of the Himālaya.[4]

Hindu temples doubtless owe much in their inception to Buddhism, and are of great variety in structure, size, and ornamentation. But there are two principal groups, one in Southern India of the so-called Dravidian style, and one in Northern India, each of which shows great uniformity in general plan. In S. India the structure consists of the temple proper, or *vimana*, 'the vehicle of the gods'—a square building with a pyramidal roof which may have one or several storeys, like the storeyed *vihāra* of Buddhism. In this is the square cell containing the chief image of the god, and lit only from the doorway. Between the wall of the inner cell and the outer wall is the procession path, or *pradakṣina*. Pillared porches or halls called *mantapams* (Skr. *mandapa*) precede the entrance, and are usually larger than the *vimana*. *Vimana* and *mantapam* stand in a walled enclosure with gate-pyramids, or *gopurams*, corresponding to the Egyptian pylons and often very imposing. Within the enclosure stand a pillared hall, priests' dwellings, tanks, and other structures. These temples are devoted to the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva cults, and are not otherwise distinguishable apart from the sculptures and images. The earliest examples of the *vimana* show its derivation from the Buddhist apsidal *chaitya* hall. The apse for the relic-shrine has become a cell for an image and is entered by a door. In another early example the circular apse has given place to a cell with altar and image, surmounted by a tower, and the hall in front, distinct from the cell, is pillared. Cell and pillared nave or *mantapam* are reproduced in all Jain and Hindu temples of later date, together with the storeyed tower. The enormous size and elaborate architectural and sculptural design of these buildings make them still marvellous rivals of the cathedrals of Europe. Some, besides the original enclosure with its gate-pyramids, have a second or even third exterior enclosure, with *gopurams*, shrines, porches, cells, etc. The *vimana* in itself corresponds to the ordinary Hindu village temple, and in some examples has either been such a temple or is little more imposing than one of these. Sometimes two *vimanas* dedicated to different divinities stand within the central enclosure. In S. India the largest group or congeries of temple buildings is at Śrīraṅgam. There are seven enclosures, leading gradually to the central shrine, and the three surrounding the central enclosure are crowded with temples, porches, halls, etc., while in each wall there are two or three *gopurams* of great height. 'The idea is that each investing square of walls . . . shall conduct the worshipper by regular gradations to a central holy of holies.'[1] While the temples of this kind are of comparatively late date, others of earlier date, but presenting the same general features, have been carved out of the solid rock and excavated internally, so that they are monolithic temples. The chief examples are the raths (*ratha*=*vimana*) at Mamallapuram and the beautiful *kailāsa* at Ellora.[2]

The Northern temples (Fergusson's 'Indo-Aryan style')—*e.g.*, in Orissa—are characterized by a pyramidal curvilinear tower on a polygonal base in which is the central shrine, often quite small. The interior plan is square, and in the Orissan examples there are no pillars, or these are found only in modern additions. In front is a square porch with pyramidal roof, and sometimes in front of this again additional porches. The enclosing wall is always insignificant, if it is present at all, and has no *gopurams*. Other shrines are always subordinate to the towering temple proper with its porch. Even the more elaborate temples preserve these essential features—*e.g.*, the Kandarya Mahadeva, or temple of Śiva, at Khajurāho.

In all Hindu temples the inner cell or shrine with its image is the central feature round which all the other parts are grouped, and to which, however elaborate, they are all subordinate. The cell is cubical, of small dimensions, unornamented,

[1] See art. STŪPA. [2] See art. CHAITYA.
[3] J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, i. 171.
[4] *Ib.* i. 77 *f.*

[1] M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 448; Fergusson, i. 368.
[2] See art. ELLORA, vol. v. p. 270[a].

and unlit save by the doorway, and is too sacred to be entered by any but the priests. The exterior building surrounding the cell is of the most elaborate workmanship, often of a kind which offers little clue to the method of producing it. In some districts enormous numbers of temples exist, ancient and modern, and at Benares, the sacred city, there are 1500, though none are older than the 18th century.

(*f*) In Nepāl the *stūpas* do not contain relics. Some are of flattened hemispherical shape with a square capital, 'umbrella,' and lofty finial or spire, like those in Tibet and China, and stand on a plinth on which are built shrines of the five Dhyānibuddhas. Others are lower and flatter; and others again stand on a structure with successive roofs. Buddhism in Nepāl is mingled with Śaivism, and the characteristic temple is a square structure of several decreasing storeys divided by sloping roofs. Some are mounted on a pyramidal-stepped platform. These buildings are of wood and stone.[1]

(*g*) In Burma the *stūpa* (*tsedi*) is bell-shaped and stands on a series of platforms, and is crowned with a conical finial. The temples are of square form with projecting porches. In the thickness of the walls are narrow corridors with niches in which are images. A series of storeys arranged pyramidally and crowned with a slender steeple forms the roof. Ancient Buddhist temples in Siam have a rectangular outer enclosing wall, within which is the *bot*, also rectangular, with a porch. The interior is divided by pillars into a nave and single or double side aisles. Within are the high altar and image of Buddha. Behind the *bot* stands a *stūpa*, or *phra*. *Vihāras*, or *vihāns*, and *kamburiens* are buildings similar to the *bot*, but smaller, where the laity come to pray or hear sermons. The *bot* is accessible only to the priests. The *mondob* is a rectangular building enclosing a huge image of Buddha. One enclosure sometimes contains several of these structures, erected from time to time by devout Buddhists.[2]

(*h*) The earliest Chinese religion had no temples, and apparently the general use of these is due to Buddhism. With few exceptions the temples of the three religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, are mainly of one type, though they differ in size. The religion to which each is dedicated can be discovered only from their interior decorations and the images which they enshrine.

Buddhist temples are enclosed by a wall with an ornamental gateway. The temple has a series of porches or halls, opening from each other. Two of these form antechapels to the main structure with its altar and images of the three Buddhas, facing the entrance, and stalls for the monks. Before the images stands the table for offerings, with lamps and flower-vases. Beyond this another hall contains a *dāgaba*, and a final one enshrines the image of Kwan-yin. Within the enclosure are the various buildings for monks, pagodas, drum-tower, bell-tower, and other structures. The roof has the characteristic form of all Chinese buildings, concave, with projecting eaves, but more elaborately decorated than in secular buildings. Confucian temples are of the same general plan, the central 'Hall of Great Perfection' containing the tablets of Confucius, his disciples, and the twelve sages. Tables for offerings stand before these. Taoist temples contain the images of the Three Precious Ones, in imitation of the three images of Buddhist temples.

(*i*) In Japan, as in China, the earlier worship was in a consecrated enclosure open to the sky. Tradition assigns the first temples to a period near the beginning of the Christian era. Shintō temples are not large and conform in structure to the architecture of an age when tools were few and primitive. The quality of the wood used in the structure is of more importance than ornamentation and carving, whereas the carvings on Buddhist temples are highly elaborate, and have much gilding, lacquer-work, and painting. The oldest Shintō temples and many of the smaller ones are thatched. The type is similar to that of China, showing that Chinese influences prevailed.

The temple area, at least in the case of the greater temples, has several enclosures, with fences and gateways preceded by flights of steps. The grouping of the various structures differs according to the nature of the ground, usually on a slope, giving the chief eminence to the main shrine. Shintō temples, but rarely Buddhist, are preceded by the characteristic *torī-wi*, of two wooden uprights with cross-bars, the upper one projecting and curving upwards at the ends; they correspond to the gateways of *stūpas* and temples in India, like that of the *tope* at Sanchi, and to similar structures in religious architecture elsewhere.[1] The temple consists of two or three halls, one an oratory or prayer-hall for worshippers, an intervening hall, and the sanctuary open only to the priests. Shintō temples have no images, a mirror usually constituting the symbol of deity. Some temples are dedicated to more than one divinity. An altar stands in the shrine. The lay-worshipper, entering the prayer-hall, pulls a rope attached to a gong and so announces his presence to the deity before beginning his devotions. Within the temple enclosure, as in China, the grounds often being laid out artistically, stand a pagoda, drum-tower, belfry, stage for religious dances, library, votive-offering hall, store-houses, kitchen, priests' rooms, etc. This general description applies to both Shintō and Buddhist temples, though the latter are generally more gorgeous and imposing, and contain images, lights, votive offerings, lotus-flowers of silver-gilt, while the priestly ritual is elaborate. They are usually built of wood, with gilding and porcelain casing, and metal work; the roofs are of tiles.

(*j*) In Tibet the Buddhist monasteries are the chief architectural structures, occupying large areas and containing a square for assemblies, in which stands the temple.

This is a stone rectangular building, on the top of which is a pavilion with a roof of Chinese type. The interior is divided into a nave and side aisles by pillars, which are painted in yellow and red. The three great Buddhist images with their altar stand at one end. Other images stand along the side walls. There are no windows, and the interior, which is richly coloured or decorated with frescoes and hung with banners, is lit by lamps. Seats for the various officials and Lāmaist congregation are arranged according to a definite order. The temple is approached by a flight of steps and a gateway guarded by demoniac figures. In the vestibule are images of the kings of the four quarters, and also prayer-wheels. These, in larger temples, are placed in detached chapels, in which are images of lower divinities. Occasionally, as at Gyan-tse, a temple is built in stepped terraces, like a *vimāna*, crowned by a drum-like structure, on which are a square and a *chhattra* canopy. Shrines to the different Buddhas occupy the various storeys.[2] The great 'cathedral' at Lhasa faces eastward, and is three-storeyed, the roof being of gold. The approach is through a pillared hall, adorned with pictures. Beyond this is an antecourt, leading to a pillared hall, shaped like a basilica and divided into aisles by a series of colonnades. It is lit from above, as there are no side windows. On the side walls are chapels. Lattice-work separates the cross aisles from the longer aisles, and on the west the sacred place is approached by a staircase. This is in form of a square, with six side chapels, three on each side. An altar stands in the centre, and on the west is a recess with an image of Buddha. Here too are the seats of the Dalai and Tashi Lāmas, and of abbots and lesser officials, as well as images, relics, prayer-wheels, etc.[3]

(*k*) The Hebrews had different kinds of sanctuaries before the Temple was built at Jerusalem. The 'tent of meeting' referred to in E was pitched outside the camp in the wilderness. There Moses communed with God, who appeared in a pillar of cloud (Ex $33^{7f.}$, Nu $11^{24f.}$ 12^{5} 14^{10}). It is not described, and was obviously of a simple character. Its one guardian was Joshua, who 'departed not out of the tent' (Ex 33^{11}). The tent may have contained the sacred Ark, a kind of abode of deity, as Nu 7^{89} shows (cf. 2 S 15^{29}), though tent and Ark are never mentioned together. Such portable sanctuaries were used by the Semites, either in nomadic or in more settled times, in the latter case certainly in connexion with war, when the images were carried with the army. The Hebrew 'tent' was used for sacred divination like the Semitic portable sanctuary, and it may be compared with the sacred tents of the Omaha.[4] The Tabernacle, elaborately

[1] Fergusson, i. 277 *f.*; H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, 2 vols., London, 1880.

[2] L. Fournereau, *Le Siam ancien, archéologie, épigraphie, géographie* (*AMG* xvii., xxxi.), Paris, 1896–1908; Spiers, in Fergusson, ii. 404 ff.

[1] See art. Doon, § 2, vol. iv. p. 849[a].

[2] L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 287 ff.; Fergusson, i. 290 *f.*

[3] Waddell, p. 300; see also his *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, London, 1905, p. 361 ff.

[4] See § 2 (*f*) above.

described by P, and containing the Ark, was probably never more than an ideal priestly construction projected upon the past. The Ark was later kept in a 'house' or temple at Shiloh (1 S 1^{9} $3^{3, 15}$), which may have been destroyed by the Philistines, who carried off the Ark. On its recovery, it was kept from time to time in private houses, and possibly in a tent (2 S 7^{6}), as it was so kept later by David at Jerusalem (2 S 6^{17}; cf. 11^{11}). Tents were also used after the settlement in Canaan on the 'high places' (2 K 23^{7}, Ezk 16^{16}, 'sewn high places').

What the 'house' at Shiloh was like we have no means of knowing, but probably it was not elaborate. Micah's image and other religious objects were kept in an apartment of his house (Jg 17^{5} 18^{19}). When captured by the Danites, these were placed in a sanctuary at Laish. At Nob there was a sanctuary with its priesthood, containing an ephod and a table of holy bread (1 S 21).

Tent and high place were succeeded by the Temple built by Solomon. It stood within a great court as one of a series of buildings, including the palace, and was thus dominated by the latter, to some extent, though it was itself the chief building. It had its own 'court of the temple,' surrounded by a wall of stone and cedar.

The Temple was an oblong structure of stone, faced by a porch, in front of which stood two bronze pillars called Jachin and Boaz, like those in front of other Semitic temples. The structure, exclusive of the porch, which was of equal breadth with the Temple, was 60 cubits long, 20 broad, and 30 high. It was divided by a partition with doors into a Holy Place (*hēkāl*) and an Oracle, or Most Holy Place (*debîr*)—a square dark chamber 20 cubits in each direction, leaving a space of 10 cubits above it. The interior walls were lined with cedar, carved, and ornamented with gold, and the floor was of cypress. Between the walls of the structure and an outer wall, running round the sides and back to the height of 20 cubits, were three storeys of rooms for treasure and Temple ornaments. In the Temple wall, above these, there were latticed windows. The Oracle, or Most Holy Place, the *adytum*, was the dwelling of Jahweh, and contained the Ark with the cherubim. In the Holy Place stood the altar of shewbread, the altar of incense,[1] and ten candlesticks, five on each side. Outside the porch, which faced east, was the altar of burnt-offering, and near it a brazen sea supported by metal oxen, as well as ten smaller lavers on wheels. The people gathered for worship in the court, though it is called 'the priests' court.' The Holy Place was for the priests alone—a suggestive difference, appearing now for the first time.[2]

Thus the main features of the Temple were common with those of Syrian and Phœnician temples of the period—porch, outer chamber, and *adytum*—though some have suggested Egyptian influences in its construction.[3]

Ezekiel's ideal Temple has the same division of inner and outer sanctuaries and porch, but there are two courts, an inner one for the priests, an outer for the laity; and the sacred building was to be entirely dissociated from all secular buildings, and was also to be shut out from Jerusalem by the lands of the Zadokites.[4]

Zerubbabel's Temple of the restoration period had an outer court with walls and gates, and an inner court in which stood the altar of unhewn stones, and perhaps a laver. Into the inner court the laity appear to have had access for a time at least. The Temple itself had a Holy of Holies, but was unique among temples in possessing no representation or symbol of deity, the Ark having been lost. The presence of deity, however, was marked by the ritual of the Day of Atonement. The Holy of Holies was separated from the Holy Place by a curtain, and this chamber contained the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and the seven-branched candlestick. The Holy Place was entered by a curtain.

Herod's Temple, built about 20 B.C., was on a larger scale than any of its predecessors, but the general plan was the same.

[1] 1 K 7^{48}, perhaps a later addition to the text.
[2] 1 K 6 *f.*, 2 Ch 3 *f.*
[3] Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31, describes the temple at Hierapolis, with its court, altar, pillars, *pronaos*, and *cellæ*. It faced eastwards.
[4] Ezk $48^{8ff.}$.

A large outer court—'the court of the Gentiles'—was surrounded by porticoes or cloisters with marble pillars, built against the enclosing battlemented wall. Within the area, on a raised platform, was a second court surrounded by a terrace and an enclosing wall with nine gates, and with chambers and porticoes on its inner side. Within this none but Jews might enter. A wall across the breadth of this inner court divided it into two parts, the smaller of which was 'the court of the women.' The other part was open to male worshippers, and within its area stood the temple building, surrounded by a breastwork of stone enclosing the court of the priests. Within this court priests only could enter, except when a layman offered a sacrifice which required his presence. The Temple within this inner area was preceded by a lofty porch and gateway. This gave access to the *hēkāl*, or Holy Place, across the great door of which hung a curtain, and this again to the *debîr*, the Holy of Holies, across the entrance to which hung two curtains. Above these was an upper storey, and a side building of three storeys surrounded the Temple on three sides. In the *hēkāl*, which was open only to the priests, stood the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and seven-branched candlestick. The *debîr* was empty and quite dark, and was entered by the high-priest alone on the Day of Atonement. In front of the porch outside stood the altar of burnt-offering and the laver. The building was of white marble, and the eastern front and part of the walls were covered with gold.[1] The *debîr* was 20 cubits square; the *hēkāl* 40 cubits long, 20 broad, and 40 high. The porch was 100 cubits high, 100 broad, and 20 in depth, and extended on both sides beyond the Temple, with its side buildings, by some 15 cubits. Herod had raised many pagan temples throughout his dominions, and he erected this for the Jews in his capital partly as a matter of policy.

5. Conclusion.—A general survey of temples shows that the essential part is the *cella*, or chamber, for the image of the god, and that, whatever additions are made by way of increasing the splendour of the temple or as adjuncts to it, this remains constant, and is indeed its most important feature. It is the holy place, and is seldom if ever entered save by the priests. The temple at Eleusis forms an exception, for apparently there all was open to the worshippers. But generally worship takes place in the temple area or within the hall preceding the *cella*, which is very often dark and unlit by windows. The Jewish synagogue, the Muhammadan mosque, and the Christian church are not strictly temples, for they are not houses enclosing a divine image, but places of public prayer. Yet even in the mosque the recess, or *mihrāb*, indicating the direction of the *ka'bah*, towards which the worshipper prays, has a certain parallel to the *cella* with its image which the worshipper also faces. The great mosque at Mecca also contains the *ka'bah* with the sacred black stone, and the *ka'bah* is an old but reconstructed sanctuary within the mosque. In the Christian church the chancel and the sanctuary with the altar are not ordinarily open to the laity assembled in the nave, but yet they approach the altar at the Holy Communion.

Certain temples are national holy places, like the Pantheon at Rome, the *ka'bah* at Mecca, and similar great temples in important centres. Pilgrimages are often made to temples, and temples form asylums whither criminals flee for safety. Frequently there is much symbolism connected with the temple, and attention is paid to the direction in which it faces, most temples facing the east or the place of the rising sun. Very often in connexion with one great temple there will be a series of lesser shrines for other divinities, all forming a group of sacred buildings within the area. The area is usually enclosed by a wall with gates, which are often most elaborate, and avenues, while pillars and poles stand about it, and it is often decorated with flags and streamers. It is interesting also to notice how frequently with the change of a religion the old sacred places are retained, and successive buildings occupy the old site, or the same temple serves for new deities.

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[1] Jos. *BJ* v. v., *Ant.* xv. xi.; Mishnāh, tr. *Middoth*.

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TEN ARTICLES.—See CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 851.

TEN COMMANDMENTS.—See DECALOGUE.

TENDAI.—See PHILOSOPHY (Japanese).

TERAPHIM.—See IMAGES AND IDOLS (Hebrew).

TEUTONIC RELIGION.—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—**1. Position of the Teutonic peoples.**—We have no detailed information (and indeed little historic evidence of any kind) relating to the Teutonic peoples before the time of Julius Cæsar (58 B.C.). For the first one and a half centuries A.D., however, a comparatively large amount of evidence is obtainable. During this time the area occupied extended from the Rhine to the basin of the Vistula. From the Roman empire it was separated by the rivers Rhine and Danube and by a fortified line connecting these two rivers. On the east and south-east the boundaries of the Teutonic area cannot be determined with any precision—the plain of Hungary was occupied largely by Sarmatian peoples, but it seems probable that the Teutonic peoples extended into the basin of the river Dneister. In the north they undoubtedly occupied the kingdom of Denmark and considerable portions of the Scandinavian peninsula.

From the 3rd to the 6th cent. the Teutonic peoples extended their dominions considerably to the south-east, south, and west. The Goths conquered a large portion of S. Russia, and from about 260 to 270 the Romans had to give up to them their territory of Dacia (north of the Lower Danube); moreover, about the same time the Alamanni occupied the Black Forest region. During the 4th cent. bands of warriors, in ever-increasing numbers, began to enter the Roman service, and towards the close of the century a large section of the Goths was admitted *en bloc* within the Roman territories in the Balkan Peninsula. Between 406 and 486 all the western territories of the empire were conquered by the Teutonic peoples, of which the most important were: (1) Visigoths, who occupied S. France and Spain after 412; (2) Ostrogoths, who occupied Italy, 489-553; (3) Vandals, who crossed the Rhine in 406, and in 429 passed over into Africa, which they held for over 100 years; (4) Burgundians, who crossed the Rhine shortly after the Vandals and in 443 occupied S.E. France; (5) Alamanni, who went into Alsace and Switzerland about the same time; (6) Bavarians, who occupied the Alpine regions farther east probably about the same date; (7) Franks, who conquered and occupied successively one part after another of Gaul from 428 onwards, becoming supreme by their victory over the Visigoths in 507; (8) Langobardi, who, after occupying for some time the province of Austria and the Alpine regions to the south, passed into Italy about 568 and brought the greater part of the peninsula under their dominion; (9) English, who conquered and occupied most of the southern half of Britain from about the middle of the 5th cent. onwards.

Before the end of the 8th cent. a new series of movements began among the Northern peoples, an activity almost entirely maritime and lasting throughout the 9th and 10th centuries; this period was commonly known as the Viking Age. While it lasted, large numbers of piratical adventurers settled on the coasts of the Scottish islands, of Ireland, of the Netherlands, and of N. France. The last named, occupied by the vikings under the leadership of Hrólfr, son of Rögnvald, officer of Harold the Fair-haired, king of Norway, became after 911 the earldom of Normandy. From 866 onwards a large part of England too came under Scandinavian rule, though this domination was only temporary. In 870, however, those Norwegian chieftains who were unwilling to accept the sovereignty of Harold the Fair-haired began permanently to settle in Iceland, and more than 100 years later, in 985, Greenland was colonized from Iceland. Contemporaneous with these events were similar movements across the Baltic, which probably emanated mainly from Sweden. The establishment of the Russian kingdom (traditional date 859) was due to such bands of adventurers. In the East we hear of raids by parties of Scandinavians as far as the Caspian.

2. The conversion of the Teutonic peoples.—As conversion was in general due to direct contact with the Romans, we find those Teutonic peoples first converted who were settled within the territories of the empire. Before the middle of the 4th cent. the conversion of the Goths by Wulfilas to the Arian form of the Christian religion had begun and was practically complete within a generation. From them this religion must have spread very rapidly to the Gepidæ in E. Hungary and to other neighbouring peoples, since the Vandals appear to have been converted before the great movement to the West began. The Rugii in the province of Austria, the Langobardi, and some of the Burgundians also adopted the Arian form of Christianity, while the Franks before the close of the 5th cent. and the English in the 7th were converted to Catholicism. It was due largely to the efforts of Irish and English missionaries that between the 6th and 8th centuries the remaining peoples on the Continent (except the Danes), viz. Alamanni, Bavarians, Old Saxons, and Frisians, were converted. In the 8th cent. after great difficulty Charlemagne enforced the adoption of Christianity throughout the territory of the Old Saxons who had been conquered by him. Among the Danes and the Swedes missionary enterprises met with some temporary success, especially in the 9th cent. during the time of the missionary bishop Ansgar (826 to his death in 865). But Christianity was not permanently established in Denmark till after the defeat of Harold Gormsson by Otto II. in 973. In Norway Hákon I. (934-960) and his successors Harald II. and his brothers (960-975) were Christians, but the country was very little affected till the time of Olaf Tryggvason (995-1000), to whom conversion was really due. Many of the Scandinavians settled in the British Isles were converted before the close of the 9th cent., and these countries had become entirely Christian in the course of the 10th century. Some of the early settlers of Iceland had been converted to Christianity in the British Isles, but it was abandoned by their descendants and not established in the island till 1000. The traditional date of the establishment of Christianity in Sweden was 1008, but it was only towards the close of the 11th cent. that the heathen religion was entirely abolished. The adoption of Christianity by the Russians dates from 988.

3. Authorities.—(1) The little information which we possess relating to the religion of the Teutonic peoples during the period before their invasion of Roman territories in the 5th cent. is derived from the writings of Cæsar, Strabo, and Tacitus—especially from Tacitus' *Germania*, written in the 1st century. Some little evidence is also furnished by Roman inscriptions. Still less information is to be obtained from the period during which the Teutonic peoples living on the Continent were converted, though a few scattered notices are preserved in the writings of Ammianus Marcellinus (late 4th cent.), of Jordanes (*c.* 550), and especially of Procopius (about the same

date). In the 8th and 9th centuries a little evidence is to be derived from laws and capitularies in which heathen practices are prohibited, and survivals of heathen practices are occasionally noticed in writings of a much later date. The authorities until the 6th cent. are entirely Greek and Latin, in the 7th Latin alone, and with the exception of Jordanes, a monk of Gothic family, we have no records of Teutonic nationality.

As to actual beliefs we learn very little. The only myth which has come down to us is of Langobardic origin and connected obviously with an attempt to explain the name of that people. It occurs for the first time in the *Origo gentis Langobardarum*, an anonymous work dating, probably from the 7th century. There are also two German metrical charms from Merseburg which deal with mythological subjects (10th cent. MSS). Beyond this we have scarcely more than a few names, particularly those of the days of the week, which are translations from Latin and date probably from the 4th century.

(2) *English.*—In England most of the evidence available, which is but little, is contained in the writings of Bede († 735), who in the *Chronicle* attached to the *de Ratione Temporum* has left an account of the calendar used by the English in heathen times. A few references to their religion before conversion are preserved also in the *Ecclesiastical History*. No Anglo-Saxon poems have come down to us in a purely heathen form, but a certain amount of information relating to heathen practices and beliefs may be obtained from *Beowulf* and also from certain shorter poems, especially from charms. We may also learn something of the mythological conceptions of the English from glossaries, letters, and other writings.

(3) *Danes and Swedes.*—Certain foreign Latin works throw light on the religion of the Danes and Swedes. Particular mention may be made (for the Swedes) of the *Life of St. Ansgar* written by his disciple Rimbertus, and of the work of Adam of Bremen, who in the 4th book of his *History of the Church of Hamburg* gives an important description of the sanctuary at Upsala. Later Danish historians add considerably to our knowledge both of religion and of mythology for Danes and Swedes. In particular we have the *Danish History* of Saxo Grammaticus (*c.* 1200), much of the information in which is obtained from Icelandic sources. He himself acknowledges this in his reference to the men of Thule:

'Their stores, which are stocked with attestations of historical events, I have examined somewhat closely, and have woven together no small portion of the present work by following their narrative.'[1]

Some important evidence from earlier times is also to be obtained from inscriptions and sculptured monuments of the heathen period.

(4) *Norway and Iceland.*—(*a*) For the religion of Norway and Iceland far more abundant information is available from the Icelandic sagas, the evidence of which varies greatly in value. First in importance are the *Íslendinga Sögur* ('Stories of the People of Iceland'), anonymous works written chiefly in the 13th cent., though a few may be slightly older. These are based on oral sagas—stories preserved by oral tradition in a more or less fixed form of words—from the latter part of the 10th and early 11th centuries. Among these special mention may be made of *Eyrbyggja Saga*, which in its early chapters gives an account of the religious practices of a certain Thórólfr of Mostr, who emigrated to Iceland *c.* 884 to escape from Harold the Fair-haired. Much information relating to religion is also given in *Egils Saga*, *Njáls Saga*, *Víga-Glúms Saga*. These sagas tell us not only of the religion of Iceland itself, but also of the homeland Norway both before and after the settlement. For throughout the period covered by the *Íslendinga Sögur* (till *c.* 1030) it was customary for Icelanders to visit the home country, and consequently the scene of the sagas is often laid in Norway.

Next in order to these come the *Stories of the Kings of Norway*, contained in the important collection known as the *Heimskringla* by Snorri Sturlason († 1241). As an authority for the period of Harold the Fair-haired, he is not inferior to the writers of the *Íslendinga Sögur*, but his account of earlier periods, contained in the first saga, *Ynglinga Saga*, is legendary. The longer sagas of *Olaf Tryggvason* and of *St. Olaf*, in the *Flateyjarbók* and in the *Fornmanna Sögur*, offer a large amount of additional information, which in general is of a more legendary character than Snorri's sagas of the same kings, but all these sagas deal primarily with Norway. Much information too about religious practices and beliefs is contained in various stories of ancient time—the *Fornaldar Sögur*—which, like the *Íslendinga Sögur*, are for the most part anonymous, but of which the authority is much inferior to that of the latter. In part they are derived from earlier poems, some of which are inserted in the text. But there is no doubt that much fiction is embodied in these stories. The most important are *Hervarar Saga ok Heidhreks Konungs* and *Gautreks Saga*.

(*b*) For Norse mythology the chief sources of information are the poems commonly known as the Older Edda, the MSS of which date only from the 13th century. The poems themselves, on the other hand, are for the most part considerably older, most of those on mythological subjects dating probably from the 10th cent. and even in some cases from the 9th, and belonging consequently to the heathen period. The poems which give us most information are *Völuspá*, *Vafthrúthnismál*, and *Grímnismál*. The first deals with the cosmogony and fate of the gods. The second is in the form of a dialogue on mythological lore between Othin and the giant Vafthrúthnir. The third is a monologue by the disguised Othin, who gradually reveals himself by his mythological knowledge. Next in order of importance are *Lokasenna*, another dialogue poem in which Loki attacks various gods and goddesses with scandalous charges; *Skírnismál*, which tells of the wooing of Gerthr for the god Freyr; *Hymiskvitha* and *Thrymskvitha*, descriptions of the adventures of the god Thor; *Vegtamskvitha* ('Balder's Dreams'), a dialogue between Thor and a ferryman supposed to be Othin; *Alvismál*, a dialogue between Thor and a dwarf; *Hyndhuljóth*, a dialogue between the goddess Freyja and a giantess Hyndla. Much mythology is also contained in the philosophical poem *Hávamál*, and incidentally in some of the heroic poems in the same collection.

[1] Tr. O. Elton, p. 5.

In addition to the Edda poems there have been preserved the so-called 'skaldic' poems dating from the 9th and 10th centuries by known authors. The earliest of these (early 9th cent.) are fragments of poetry by Bragi Boddason, some of which are preserved, and which we know come from *Ragnarsdrápa*. To the late 9th cent. belong the *Ynglingatál* and *Haustlöng* by Thjóthólfr of Hvin, a genealogical poem describing the ancestors of the Norwegian royal family. To the same century belongs the poet, Thórbjörn Hornklofi. The *Eiríksmál*, an incomplete poem whose authorship is unknown, describes the death of Eric Blood-axe shortly after 954.

There are also extant two poems by Eyvindr Skáldaspillir, the *Hákonarmál* recounting the death of Hákon I. in 960, a copy of the *Eiríksmál*, and the *Hálevgjatál*, a genealogical poem dealing with the ancestors of the earls of Lathir, and modelled on *Ynglingatál*. References to mythology are also contained in many other poems.

It is to be noted that our knowledge of mythology comes almost entirely from Icelandic sources, for even the Norwegian poems—including the poems of the Edda, many of which were doubtless composed in Norway—are preserved only in Icelandic MSS. The chief reason for this phenomenon is doubtless to be found in the peculiar faculty for oral tradition developed in Iceland during the 11th cent. or slightly earlier, for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in Europe, except in Ireland. The unusual conditions under which Iceland was converted afford another reason, for there Christianity was not forced from above, as in countries with monarchical government. Indeed in Iceland there existed no strong central power which could effectively stamp out the observances and eradicate the remembrance of the old faith. The traditions of the heathen age survived the hostility of the Church in the 11th cent. and formed evidently a leading source of literary and antiquarian interest to subsequent generations.

A systematic account of Norse mythology is given in Snorri's Edda (commonly called the Prose Edda), the first part of which, *Gylfaginning* ('the Befooling of Gylfi'), is entirely devoted to the subject. Much mythology too is also introduced incidentally into the second part, *Skáldskaparmál* ('the Language of Poetry'). The chief authorities used by Snorri here are the poems of the Edda (*Völuspá*, *Vafthrúthnismál*, and *Grímnismál*). He makes use also of some lost poems and also no doubt of oral tradition.

Another account, which, however, has very little in common with the Edda, is given by the same author in the opening chapters of *Ynglinga Saga*. In it the gods are represented as having lived on earth as the rulers of the Swedes in ancient times—an account in which the euhemeristic element is prominent. A certain amount of mythological information also is afforded by the *Fornaldar Sögur*.

(*c*) The chief authority for the ethics of heathen times is the Edda poem called *Hávamál*, which, properly speaking, appears to be a composite work, made up of five different poems. In substance it may be compared with Hesiod's *Works and Days* or with the early Egyptian *Wisdom of Ptah-hetep*.[1] Such maxims occur in several other Edda poems, particularly in *Fáfnismál* and *Sigrdrífumál*. They are also common in the earliest Anglo-Saxon poems, though these do not often contain distinctively heathen precepts. The ethical standards of heathen times are no doubt faithfully portrayed in early Norse poetry and in sagas relating to the same period. With certain reservations the same may be said of *Beowulf* and other Anglo-Saxon poems.

4. Difficulties.—One of the greatest difficulties which the student of Teutonic mythology has to face is the question of how far the mythology and religious practices found in Iceland alone or in Iceland and Norway were shared also by the Danes and Swedes or by the Teutonic peoples in general. Indeed so little evidence is available, except for Iceland and Norway, that neither positive nor negative conclusions can be drawn with any confidence. Thus we have no information except from Norwegian-Icelandic sources of some of the more important deities, such as Freyja and Heimdallr; yet are we justified in assuming that these deities were unknown except in Norway and Iceland? One is forced to hesitate; for occasionally evidence is forthcoming for characters or conceptions which one might justifiably have assumed to be the creation of Norse literature. Othin's horse, Sleipnir—to quote one instance—is

[1] Tr. by E. A. W. Budge ('Egyptian Library').

represented as having eight legs in Norse mythology, and we find a clear representation of such a horse on an engraved monument at Tjängvide, Götland.[1] The riding *valkyrjur* too (one of the most picturesque conceptions of Norse mythology) might well have been regarded as the creation of Norwegian poetry, had we not met with the same conception on a Swedish inscription at Rök; indeed with great probability it may be traced also in an Anglo-Saxon charm.

Another difficulty which confronts the student is that at first sight there appears to be an irreconcilable discrepancy between the account of Norse mythology given by Snorri and the references to religious beliefs and observances recorded in the *Íslendinga Sögur*. The former represents Othin as the chief and most important god of the Norse pantheon; and the early poems of the Edda and of the skalds agree with this representation. The *Íslendinga Sögur*, on the other hand, scarcely records a single instance of worship of Othin. In them Thor is by far the most prominent deity, and after him Freyr. It is only in the *Fornaldar Sögur* and in the other sagas relating to the legendary period[2] that we find Othin prominent. The explanation of this fact is probably that the worship of Othin and that of Thor belong to different classes of the population; the former was the god of the royal families and of their military followers, while the latter was the god of the free population in general. Kingship never existed in Iceland, and very few settlers appear to have been of royal blood, and consequently the god of this class of society, though still celebrated in poetry, does not seem to have received any actual worship.

Lastly, one characteristic of Norse mythology may doubtless be accounted for by the fact that so much of our information is drawn from Iceland. In peculiar contrast to the mythologies of other peoples, the Norse deities are not associated with particular localities, and herein no student can fail to contrast Norse and Greek mythologies. Freyr indeed is traditionally associated with Upsala, and there are indications which connect Gifjón with Sjaelland; but these instances are rare. The homes of the gods mentioned in the Edda poems—Breithablik, the home of Balder, Himinbjörg, the home of Heimdallr, etc.—seem to be purely mythical. Some evidence is to be found in place-names, however, that various deities were connected with localities in Norway, Sweden, and Iceland as well as with districts in other Teutonic lands. The reason for this comparative absence of local association is obviously to be found in the fact that by their emigration the colonists were cut off from the ancient sanctuaries of their race.

II. *GODS, SPIRITS, AND MYTHICAL BEINGS.*—Since Norse literature offers an abundance of material for the study of its mythology and religion, it seems almost necessary to make it the basis of any description of Teutonic mythology and religion. In the following account under each heading an attempt will be made to show also how far the testimony available for the mythology of the other Teutonic peoples is corroborative or discordant. In the first place, it is convenient to distinguish between (1) beings essentially mythical and (2) beings or phenomena in themselves natural but treated mythologically.

i. BEINGS ESSENTIALLY MYTHICAL.—This class consists of the following: (1) *aesir* (sing. *ass*) and *vanir*, (2) *jötnar* (sing. *jötunn*), (3) *dvergar* (sing. *dvergr*), (4) *álfar* (sing. *álfr*), (5) *nornir* (sing. *norn*), (6) *valkyrjur* (sing. *valkyrja*), (7) *fylgjur* (sing. *fylgja*), (8) *landvaettir*, (9) such impersonal conceptions as Yggdrasil's ash.

[1] Cf. Du Chaillu, *The Viking Age*, i. 58.
[2] Cf. *Ynglinga Saga*.

1. **Aesir and vanir.**—(*a*) *Norse.*—It is a peculiar characteristic of Norse mythology that it possesses two classes of gods. To the *aesir* belong Othin, his sons Thor, Balder, Vali, Vitharr,[1] his brothers Vili and Ve,[2] and others. To the *vanir* belong Njörthr and his children Freyr and Freyja. Possibly also to the same class belongs Heimdallr, for, though this is not altogether proved by *Thrymskvitha*, 14, yet the fact that he is often associated with Freyja, apparently as her guardian, points in this direction.[3]

The story of the relationship of the two sets of gods is told most fully in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4. There had been a war between them, which was eventually settled by an exchange of hostages. Njörthr and his children were given as hostages to the *aesir*, and Hoenir accompanied by Mimir was sent as a pledge to the *vanir*. This story, in part at least, is known to early poetry. In *Völuspá*, 24, it is suggested that the *vanir* were successful, while in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 39, we are told that Njörthr had been given as a hostage to the *aesir*, and that he would return home to the *vanir* at the '*Ragnar Rök*.'

Apart from the *vanir* the divine mythology is confined to the *aesir*, in which term all the gods collectively are included. With them there are goddesses, known comprehensively as *ásynjur*, the chief of whom is Frigg, wife of Othin. Often Freyja of the *vanir* is included with this group.[4]

Besides the *aesir* and the *vanir*, we find two deities who belong to neither class and who indeed are never brought into connexion with the Norse pantheon, viz. Thorgerthr Hölgabruthr and her sister Irpa. Their worship was very prominent in Norway during the last years of the heathen age, especially under Earl Hákon of Lathir, who ruled Norway from 975 to 995 and who was specially devoted to their cult. Of myths connected with them we have no mention in Norse literature except what is apparently a confused reminiscence in *Skáldskaparmál*, 45. Their story is told only by Saxo,[5] who says that Thora (Thorgerthr) is the daughter of Cuse (*i.e.* Gusi), king of the Lapps, and wife of Helgi, the eponymous hero of Halogaland. It is generally believed that these deities hail from the north of Norway, and their character is Finnish (Lappish) rather than Norse.

Under the lordship of Othin the gods form an organized community, which is evidently modelled after the fashion of the ancient Scandinavian community. They have a council of twelve, whose duty it is to keep up the sacrifices, to deliberate on the government of the country, and to judge between man and man.[6] Councils of this type are found in many early Scandinavian countries, and there can be little doubt that in heathen times they had religious as well as judicial functions. In *Grímnismál* the gods are said to meet daily at Yggdrasil's ash. From the same poem we learn that each of the gods had a home of his own, the names of which are apparently mythical and generally adapted to the character of the god, Breithablik for Balder, Alfheimr granted as a tooth gift (*at tannfé*) to Freyr, etc. The most frequently mentioned is Othin's home of Valhöll ('the hall of the slain'), where he, together with the valkyries, entertains hosts of slain warriors, who pass their days in combat and their nights in feasting. In *Gylfaginning*, 23, some verses are quoted indicating that Njörthr loves living by the sea-shore, while his wife Skathi, daughter of Thjazi, a *jötunn*, prefers to dwell in her father's home, the mountains. Wherefore a compact is made by which they divide their time between the two places—Njörthr's home is called here

[1] Cf. *Gylfaginning*, 20, 51; *Grímnismál*, 17.
[2] Cf. *Gylfaginning*, 6.
[3] Heimdallr's father is not mentioned, but he is said to be the son of nine mothers, whose names are enumerated in the closing stanzas of *Hyndluljóth*.
[4] See art. GOD (Teutonic).
[5] Tr. O. Elton, p. 87 ff.
[6] Cf. *Gylf.* 20.

Nóatún. The association of Freyr with Upsala does not belong to this category.

Besides their individual homes, the gods collectively are said to inhabit Asgarthr. Their meeting-place is called Ytha-völlr.[1] In *Gautreks Saga*, 7, the hero Starkathr is represented as attending a conference of them held in a forest clearing. The significance of this (together with Yggdrasil's ash and the fact that *völlr* originally meant 'wood') is seen below, § IV.

A totally different account of the gods is given by Snorri, curiously enough, in the early chapters of *Ynglinga Saga*. Here they are represented as men who had once lived on the earth and come to Sweden from S.E. Europe. Othin is represented as dying and being succeeded in the leadership of the gods by Njörthr, whose reign was marked by prosperity and peace. The latter on his death was succeeded by his son Freyr, whose reign was of the same character. Freyr was succeeded by his sister Freyja, and she in turn by Freyr's sons, grandsons, etc., who are no longer represented as gods.[2] This story is no doubt of euhemeristic origin, but the association of Freyr with Upsala is ancient and traditional. In Saxo he is represented as instituting the Upsala sacrifices and is said to be the ancestor of certain Swedish warriors. *Ynglinga Saga* itself is largely based on an early poem *Ynglingatal*, which traces the ancestry of the ancient Norwegian royal family through the Swedes to Freyr, who is no doubt to be identified with Fricco of Adam of Bremen's account.[3]

There are many stories relating the appearances of the gods to men. These occur most frequently in the *Fornaldar Sögur*, and the deity most mentioned is Othin.[4]

(*b*) *Danish and Swedish.*—On examining non-Norse sources, we find a number of the Norse gods mentioned by Saxo, including Woden (Othin), Thor, Freyr, Frigg, and Oller (Ullr), as well as Balder and Hoder (Höthr), who, however, are by him represented as demi-god and human being respectively. It is not always clear how far Saxo draws from Icelandic sources, but there can be little doubt that these deities were known to him from Danish tradition. Freyr is constantly associated with Upsala and Sweden, and Saxo is also the only authority who gives the story of Oller (Ullr).[5] With Saxo the home of the gods is sometimes called Byzantium, which apparently is used to translate Asgarthr.

With regard to Swedish beliefs, we have important earlier evidence in Adam of Bremen's description of the sanctuary at Upsala. This contained the images of three gods, Thor, Woden (*i.e.* Othin), and a deity Fricco, who is in all probability to be identified with Freyr. No stories of the gods are, however, recorded from Sweden. In much earlier times we have a short account of the religion of the people of Thule (*i.e.* Scandinavia) written by Procopius.[6] The only deity specially mentioned by him is Ares, and it is not clear whether by this name we are to understand Othin or Tyr. An early trace of worship of Freyr may be preserved in the name Prove(n)—the god among the Wagri of N.E. Holstein.[7]

(*c*) *English.*—For the mythology of the heathen English we have little or no information except that to be obtained from names. The A.S. word *os*, corresponding to the O.N. *áss*, occurs as the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet (though here apparently its meaning is forgotten).[8] It also is to be found very frequently in personal names, as in Oswald, and the plural form occurs only in the genitive *esa* in an A.S. charm.[9] The form *van-* does not occur, except rarely in personal names—*e.g.*, Wanraed—unless this is possibly the origin of the prefix *wan-* in *wanseoc* ('epileptic'), in which case we might compare *elf-adl* in Saxon *Leechdoms*,[1] ii. 344. 20.

Othin's name also is preserved—A. S. Woden—as the ancestor of all the royal families except that of Essex, which traced its genealogy to a certain Seaxneat. His name is also preserved in 'Wednesday' (as a translation of 'Mercurius'). Thunor (O.N. Thorr) is known only from 'Thursday' (where his name is used to translate 'Juppiter') and from certain place-names, *e.g.*, Thunresleah and Thunresfeld.[2]

The name of Fri (*i.e.* Frigg) is preserved only in 'Friday' (as translation of 'Venus'), and Ti (Tiig) (O.N. Tyr) occurs in glossaries as translation of 'Mars,' and, like *os*, is the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet. His name is preserved also in 'Tuesday.' In Bede's account of the heathen English calendar two months (corresponding to March and April) are said to derive their names from goddesses called Rheda (Hrefʔ) and Eostre (Eastre). The existence of these deities has been doubted by some modern writers. We also find a reference, in a charm which appears to be a mixture of Christian and heathen beliefs, to Erce ('Mother of Earth'), with which we may compare Semnes Mate (Lettish).

Lastly, mention may be made of Ing, the name of one of the letters in the Runic alphabet. In the verses dealing with Ing he is said to have been seen first among the East Danes, but afterwards he went east over the sea, his car speeding after him.

(*d*) *German.*—With regard to German mythology, a fragment relating to gods is preserved in one of the Merseburg charms, in which we are told that Wodan and 'Phol' were riding to the forest when the pastern joint of the latter's horse was dislocated. Various deities tried by their incantations to put it right. The names mentioned are Frija and her sister Volla,[3] and Sinthgund and her sister Sunna. The only other myth recorded occurs in certain Langobardic writings and is rather striking.

'The two tribes of Vandals and Langobardi (then called Winniles) appealed to the gods for victory in their war with each other. The Vandals approached Woden, who replied: "Whatsoever I shall first look upon when the sun rises, to them will I give victory." The Winniles appealed to Frija, wife of Woden, who gave counsel that at sunrise the women of the Winniles should come with their husbands and let down their hair about their faces, like beards. And when Woden saw the Winniles women, he said: "Who are these Longbeards?" And Frija replied: "As thou hast given them a name give them also victory." And he gave them victory.'[4]

Apart from these references, the gods are known from the names of the week: Donar (O.N. Thorr; A.S. Thunor) throughout the German area; Fria (Frigg, Fri) at least in the greater part of German area; Wodan (Othin, Woden) only in the north-west and in Holland; Tiu (Ti, Tir) only in the south-west. Occasional references to the gods are also found in lives of missionary saints. Thus the worship of Wodan among the Alamanni is mentioned in Jona's *Life of Columbanus*, while in other cases German deities are no doubt intended by old names such as Juppiter. In a formula used after baptism and commonly supposed to have come from the region of the Old Saxons (though the language is rather peculiar) the convert is required to abjure Wodan and Thunor and Saxnot together with other monsters (*Unholden*) associated with them. This Saxnot is doubtless to be identified with the name that stands at the head of the genealogy of Essex. Lastly, in Alcuin's *Life of St. Willibrord* we hear of a god called Fosite. He was worshipped on a certain island, called after him and identified

[1] *Gylf.* 24.
[2] Cf. Saxo, tr. O. Elton, p. 228, 'sons of Frey.'
[3] Cf. *Hist. of the Church of Hamburg*, iv. 26.
[4] *Völsunga Saga*, ch. 11; *ib.* ch. 17; *Víga-Glúms Saga*, 26; cf. *Fornmanna Sögur*, xi. 134.
[5] See art. GOD (Teutonic). [6] *Gothic War*, ii. 15.
[7] Cf. Helmoldus, *Chron. Slavorum*, 153. 70. 84.
[8] Cf. *Runenlied*, str. 10, C. W. M. Grein, *Bibliothek der angelsächs. Poesie*, ed. R. P. Wülcker, Leipzig, 1881–98, i.
[9] *Ib.* p. 318.

[1] Ed. T. O. Cockayne, *Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Starcraft of Early England*, 3 vols., London, 1864–66.
[2] Cf. Thundersleigh in Essex and Thundersfield in Surrey.
[3] Cf. 'Fulla' of Norse mythology.
[4] *Origo gentis Langobardarum.*

by Adam of Bremen with Halogaland.[1] Grimm and others have identified this deity with Forsete, the son of Balder,[2] but discrepancies in the spelling of the two names offer difficulty.

In Gothic no names of deities have been preserved, unless we place in this category the name of the Runic letter Enguz (A.S. Ing). The word *ansis*, however (O.N. *aesir*), is mentioned by Jordanes in a curiously interesting connexion. He states that the Goths called their chiefs to whose good fortune they thought they owed their victory, 'non puros homines sed semideos id est anses.'[3] In earlier times Tacitus,[4] though unfortunately he seldom mentions Teutonic gods by their native names, twice mentions Mars and Mercurius among the deities of the Germans, and in the *Germania* specially mentions Mercurius as the deity most worshipped by them. There can be no doubt that the deities meant are the later Ziu and Wodan (N. Tir and Othin). In ch. 9 too he mentions Hercules and in *Annals*, ii. 12, a grove sacred to him. It is not so easy to ascertain the identity of this deity. Some modern writers believe Donar (O.N. Thorr; A.S. Thunor) to be intended; others think the reference is to a tribal deity.[5] In the same chapter Tacitus states that some of the Suevi worship with the symbol of a ship. Here again we are left in doubt as to the identity of the deity. Perhaps we may include the 'templum Tamfanæ' mentioned in *Annals*, i. 51, and 'lucum quem Baduhennae vocant' in iv. 73, if these be the names of deities. In *Germ.* 43 he speaks of a grove in which Castor and Pollux are worshipped under the name of deities. The fullest account, however, of a Teutonic deity is that of Nerthus,[6] who was worshipped by certain maritime peoples including the English, and whose sanctuary was situated on an island, the position of which is not clearly stated by Tacitus but is probably to be placed in the S.W. Baltic. It is to be observed that the name Nerthus is identical with the O.N. Njörthr, and, in spite of the difference in sex, we need scarcely doubt their original identity. Rites similar to those which Tacitus describes in connexion with Nerthus are associated with Freyr, son of Njörthr.

Apart from Tacitus, practically the only references to Teutonic deities occur in inscriptions upon altars raised by soldiers in the Roman service. Besides Mars, these inscriptions sometimes record a deity Nehalennia with the prow of a ship, and this may point to the identification with the Isis of Tacitus. In the introduction to *Germ.* 2 Tacitus states that in their ancient poems the Germans trace the origin of their race to a god called Tuisto ('son of earth'). His son was Mannus (? 'man'), and he again had three sons from whom three groups of peoples were named and descended—the Ingaevones (or Inguaeones), Ermi[n]ones, Istaevones. These group-names are mentioned also by Pliny the Elder, and a genealogy of the kind classifying Teutonic and other peoples is found in Merovingian times. We have no trace elsewhere of any god or hero called Istio, but there is some slight evidence for an Irmen. The name Ingaevones (or Inguaeones) is undoubtedly to be connected with A.S. Ing, who is associated in tradition with the Danes and with the titles Inguina Eodor and Frea Inguina, used in *Beowulf* of the king of the Danes. It is further to be noticed that in Norse the god Freyr and his descendants sometimes bear the title Yngvi, the full title of the god being Yngvi-Freyr or Ingunar-Freyr. His descendants—the ancient kings of Sweden—are known collectively as Ynglingar. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy between Norse and English tradition, the former connecting the name with Sweden, the latter with Denmark. Whatever may be the explanation of this, the association of the word with Freyr, the son of Njörthr, seems to point to some connexion with the worship of Nerthus—a conclusion which is confirmed by the fact that Tacitus, with whom Pliny is substantially in agreement, describes the Ingaevones as 'proximi oceano.'

2. Jötnar.—(*a*) *Norse.*—Giants or monsters play an important part in the stories of Norse mythology. When viewed collectively, they are called *jötnar* or *thursar*. Sometimes also we hear of the *hrímthursar* ('frost-giants') and *bergrisar* ('cliff-giants'). Most often, however, they appear singly, and the corresponding feminine form of the word *jötunn* is *gygr*. Unlike the *aesir*, they do not appear to form an organized community as a whole, though sometimes individual *jötnar* (like Thrymr, 'Lord of the Thursar') seem to have communities under their dominion. The home of the giants is known as Jötunheimar, lying, according to early story, far to the north-east, remote from Asgarthr, the home of the *aesir*. The general characteristics of the giants were huge form and superhuman strength.

The story of Skrymnir[1] tells dramatically how huge and strong a giant was conceived to be in Norse literature. For the god Thor took refuge one night in the thumb of one of his gloves, and, when he attempted to kill the giant with a blow of his hammer, Skrymnir only asked whether a leaf had fluttered down into his face.

Although the giants may have had monster shapes, it seems clear that sometimes the giantesses were deemed very beautiful, as in the case of Gerthr, to whose radiant beauty Freyr lost his heart.

It is necessary to distinguish between anthropomorphic and theriomorphic giants, though it is difficult to draw a definite line between them; *e.g.*, Loki has theriomorphic children. Many of the former class are mentioned in myth, the best known being Thrymr, Hymir, Hrungnir, Geirröthr, and Thjazi, all of whom fight with Thor, and are slain by him.

Sometimes the *jötnar* are on friendly terms with the *aesir*: Hyrrokin, a giantess, attended Balder's funeral, and it was through an appeal to her strength that the funeral ship was able to be launched. Further, we find a number of marriages between gods and giants; Njörthr married Skathi, the daughter of Thjazi.[2] Freyr married Gerthr, daughter of Gymir; and even Thor, despite his general hostility, had a son Magni by a giantess Jarn-Saxa. This giantess, with others, including the daughter of Geirröthr, appears as the mother of Heimdallr in *Hyndluljóth*, but this part of the poem (the short *Völuspá*) is commonly believed to be a late composition. The giants too are often represented as wanting to marry *dsynjur*; Thjazi carries off Ithunn, and Freyja was sued for by Thrymr. It may here be mentioned that anthropomorphic giants often had the power to assume the form of animals. In the incident referred to above Thjazi assumes the form of an eagle, and in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 37, the wind-demon Hraesvelgr is described as a *jötunn* in the shape of an eagle.

Although the giants are presumably gifted with tremendous physical strength, they are not always lacking in intelligence, for we have the incident of Othin's visit to the giant Vafthrúthnir in order to learn of his store of wisdom.

The chief theriomorphic *jötnar* are the Mithgarthsormr, or Jörmundgandr, and the Fenrisulfr, both of whom together with Hel are said to be the offspring of Loki and the giantess Angrbotha ('she who bodes distress'). Mithgarthsormr is represented in *Gylfaginning*, 34, as a kind of vast sea-serpent stretching round the earth. In *Hymiskvitha*, 23, Thor goes fishing and catches it on his hook. Fenrisulfr is a wolf which the gods succeed after great difficulty in fettering, though not until he has bitten off Tyr's hand, which has been placed in his mouth as a pledge of the good faith of the gods.[3] At the end of the world he will burst his bonds and attack the gods in conjunction with Mithgarthsormr, Loki, Surtr (a fire-demon), and other monsters. Although usually found in the company of the *aesir*, it would seem that Loki belonged to the *jötnar*. Here also we should perhaps mention Ægir, also called Hlér, a sea being, who is on friendly terms with the gods and visits them.[4] From *Fornaldar Sögur*, ii. 17, it seems clear that he was the son of Fornjotr, and in *Hymiskvitha*, 1, 2, he is described as a *berg-búi* ('cliff-dweller'), an epithet which is elsewhere synonymous with *jötunn*. His wife is called Ran,

[1] Cf. Adam of Bremen, *De Situ Daniae*.
[2] Cf. *Gylf.* 32.
[3] Ch. 13.
[4] *Ann.* xiii. 57; *Germ.* 9.
[5] For Irmen cf. below, IV. (*f*) (ii.).
[6] *Germ.* 40.

[1] Cf. *Gylf.* 45.
[2] According to *Hdleygjatál*, she was later also the wife of Othin.
[3] Cf. *Gylf.* 34.
[4] Cf. *Lokasenna* (prose introduction); *Bragarœthur*, 55.

and is said to have a net in which she catches all who perish in the sea. There is a suggestion too from the story in *Frithjófs Saga*, 6, that a man fearing death by drowning would do well to carry gold on his person in order to be received well in the halls of Ran.[1]

Apart from mythological works monsters are not infrequently mentioned both in the *Íslendinga Sögur* and in sagas of the kings, as well as in the *Fornaldar Sögur*, though they are more usually called *tröll* than *jötnar*.

As examples we may refer to the two demons (male and female) at Sand Haugar in the north of Iceland encountered by Grettir;[2] the female demon who ate eleven merchants in a rest house in the Norwegian mountains;[3] and the monster Brusi and his mother in the form of a black cat encountered by Ormr Stórolfsson in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*.

In those *Fornaldar Sögur* which deal with the north of Norway, viz. *Ketil Saga Haengs* and *Grims Saga Lothinkinna*, monsters are frequently mentioned. It may be noticed that Thorgerthr Hölgabrúthr once appears among them,[4] and Saxo's *Danish History* abounds with such stories. Tales like these recall Procopius's remark: 'The rest of the inhabitants of Thule . . . worship many gods and demons in heaven and in air and in sea and certain other daemonias which are said to be in the waters of springs and rivers.'

A spring was the home of Mímir. His story is given in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4, where the *aesir* send him with Hoenir as pledges to the *vanir*, who cut off his head and return it to the *aesir*. Othin then smears the head with worts to preserve it and keeps it for divining purposes. In *Völuspá*, 45, Othin is said to converse with Mímir's head. We are told further[5] that under one of the roots of Yggdrasil's ash is Mímisbrunnr ('Mímir's spring'), in which are hidden cunning and wisdom. Othin came to the brook asking a drink and was refused until he left his eye as a pledge. This he granted, and in *Völuspá*, 28, the sybil says: 'Mímir drinks mead every morning from the pledge of Othin.'

A reference to a Miming is made by Saxo[6] in his story of Balder and Höthr. Here Miming is called the 'silvarum satyrus,' and is said to have in his possession a sword and magic bracelets, the former of which alone of all swords will prevail against the charmed life of Balder. At the beginning of *Thithreks Saga* too Mímir is the name of the smith, teacher of both Sigfrit and Velint. It is to be noted also that Miming was the name of Weland's famous sword in the poem of *Waldhere*.

Perhaps originally Mímir was famed for his wisdom, but later tradition laid stress on his skill in smith's work. His name is preserved in modern Swedish folk-lore—Mímis-sjö and Mímis-å ('sea of Mímir' and 'river of Mímir'), both of which preserve his connexion with water. His name is also mentioned in the mediæval German poem *Biterölf* as 'Mime the old.'

(*b*) *Anglo-Saxon.*—The A.S. forms corresponding to the Norse *jötunn* and *thurs* are *eoten* and *thyrs*, and both terms are applied in *Beowulf* to the monster Grendel, who with his mother dwells under a pool in the fens and makes attacks on the hall of the Danish king whose knights he devours. As far as we can gather, these beings are anthropomorphic. The story of Beowulf's encounters is clearly to be connected with those of Grettir and of Ormr Stórolfsson and presumably has its origin in a folk-tale. In A.S. literature ancient weapons are sometimes described as being made by the giants.[7] In the *Gnomic Verses*, which form the introduction to the Abingdon text of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, the *thyrs* is said to have his home in the fens.

[1] For Ymir, the primeval giant out of whose flesh the world was made, see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Teutonic).
[2] *Grettis Saga*, ch. 65.
[3] *Saga of Olaf the Holy* (*Heimskringla*), 151.
[4] *Ketil Saga Haengs*, 5.
[5] *Gylf.* 15 (drawn from *Völuspá*, 29). [6] P. 85.
[7] '*Eald sweord eotenisc*' (*Beowulf*, l. 1558). The same expression is used for buildings of the past: 'Visible from afar are the (cities) skilfully built by the giants.'

(*c*) *German.*—There is no doubt that these monsters were known also in Germany, where we find for them the words *duris* (i.e. *thurs*) and *risi*. No stories dating from very early times happen to have been preserved, but mediæval German poetry and legend abound with references to such beings.[1]

3. **Dvergar.**—(*a*) *Norse.*—*Dvergar* is the name given collectively to the dwarfs in Old Norse literature, and to many of them are assigned individual names in *Völuspá*, 15 ff., where also their creation is mentioned. In *Gylfaginning*, 14, Snorri tells us that they first received life as maggots in the flesh of Ymir, but were endowed with intelligence by the gods, and given human shape. The *dvergar* were said to live either down in the earth or more frequently in stones (rocks), in front of which they were sometimes seen in the evening.

Svegdir one evening at sunset saw a dwarf sitting under a stone, and, when the dwarf called him to go into the stone, he assented, whereupon it shut behind him and naught has been heard of him since.[2]

It is perhaps to their connexion with rocks that the word for echo—*dvergmál* ('dwarf-speech')—owes its origin. In Norse literature they were renowned particularly for their skill in metal-work, and many were the wonderful things fashioned by their hands—so much so that a compound word has been formed to denote great skill, viz. *dverg-hagr*.[3]

On most occasions the dwarfs appear in human form, though small, but in *Reginsmál* Andvari lives in a water-fall in the shape of a pike and is caught in that form by Loki, who borrows Ran's net for the purpose. It is from him that Loki gets the gold required to ransom himself and his companions, Othin and Hoenir, from Hraethmarr, and this incident afterwards plays an important part in the *Völsunga Saga*. After this episode Andvari withdraws into the stone and curses all who shall possess the gold.

Possibly, too, 'Mimingus, sylvarum satyrus' mentioned by Saxo is associated with dwarfs, and possibly this Miming is identical with Völundr or Weland, the most famous of all smiths.

(*b*) The word corresponding to O.N. *dvergr* is to be found in all languages of the Teutonic peoples extant—O.H.G. *twerg*, A.S. *dweorh*. In A.S. literature we find a charm against a dwarf. Dwarfs also figure in German folk-lore. Thus in the *Seyfriedslied* the treasure which the hero won again after killing the dragon belonged in reality to some dwarfs, sons of Nybling.

4. **Álfar.**—For these see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 633.

5. **Nornir.**—For these see art. DOOM, DOOM MYTHS (Teutonic).

6. **Valkyrjur.**—(*a*) *Norse.*—Valkyries, or 'choosers of the slain,' were supernatural maidens sent by Othin to determine the course of battles and to choose warriors for Valhöll. They are also known as *valmeyjar*, *skjoldmeyjar*, and *óskmeyjar*, and in *Völuspá*, 31—if the phrase is not an interpolation—they are called *nönnur herjans*. By the Edda poems, *Grímnismál*, 36, and *Völuspá*, 31, we are given certain information about them, and of the former poem Snorri has made use in *Gylf.* 36. In *Grímnismál* our attention is drawn mainly to one aspect of the valkyries—their duties in Valhöll; for Othin is represented in the poem as crying to his maidens to bear him the ale as they do to the *einherjar*, when they are feasting in the evening in the hall. Here we have the names of thirteen valkyries given.

Snorri inserts this stanza from *Grímnismál* in his elaborate account of Valhöll in *Gylf.* 38, expanding it in prose and adding that Othin sends these maidens to battle. He specially mentions

[1] Cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 634.
[2] *Ynglinga Saga*, 15; also *Hervarar Saga*, 2.
[3] See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 632b.

Guthr, Rosta, and Skuld, the youngest norn, as undertaking this work. It is this function of the valkyries that the poet of *Völuspá* deals with in str. 31 of the poem. He gives us a picture of a band of valkyries, six in number and named, equipped and ready to ride into battle. From other references in Norse literature we learn that they were seen riding through the air and over the sea ('*lopt ok lög*'), white and shining with their helmets, shields, and spears—a splendid company of maiden warriors.[1]

With the valkyries may perhaps be compared the Slavic conception of the *víla*, who was thought to ride a seven-year-old stag and bridle him with snakes. The characteristic, attributed to her by the Slavs, of discharging fatal darts at men while in the air is especially interesting when compared with a similar reference in an A.S. charm.[2]

Other valkyries, who became the wives and lovers of heroes, and are represented as human in origin, although included by Othin among his battle-maidens, are mentioned below.[3] From a story in Saxo[4] we hear of maidens called 'nymphæ sylvestres,' who seem to be valkyries.

Hotherus (O.N. Höthr), the enemy of Balder, was hunting in a wood when he came to a lodge where he was greeted by certain wood-maidens. They told him that it was their lot to determine the fortunes of war and that often they secretly assisted their friends in battle, and gained for them the victory.

Since the valkyries were so closely bound up with the fate of warriors and the issue of battles, it is clear that they cannot be entirely dissociated from the norns. The close relationship between the two conceptions is clearly seen in the poem given in *Njáls Saga*, 156.

There in the accompanying prose account a certain Darruthr saw women riding twelve together to a bower, and, looking within, he saw that they had set up a loom of which 'men's heads served for weights, men's entrails for the weft and warp, a sword for the *skeith*, and an arrow for the *hrsell*.' They sang at their work and in their song seemed to describe themselves as valkyries, and finally they rode away, six to the south and six to the north.

Moreover, in *Gylf.* 36 Skuld, the 'youngest norn,' is included among the valkyries. In contrast with the norns, however, the valkyries are in Norse mythology associated chiefly with Othin, whose messengers they are, though in one passage quoted from Saxo they seem to assist Hother, who is an enemy of the gods.

(*b*) *Anglo-Saxon.*—In A.S. literature we find on several occasions the word *wælcyrge* (O.N. *valkyrjur*). In glossaries[5] it is glossed 'Erinys,' 'Bellona,' 'Tisiphone.' In Wulfstan's *Sermo ad Anglos* the *wælcyrge* are classed together with other undesirable people, and in a charm mention is made of certain women who ride over the land and array their forces. They hurl darts at human beings, who are thereupon seized with sudden pain. The word *wælcyrge* is not mentioned in the latter example, but there can be little doubt that the lines refer to them.

(*c*) *German.*—In German the word does not occur, though the idea does in the Merseburg charm, where they are called *idisi*. They are represented as fastening bonds, holding back the host, and tugging at the fetters.

7. Fylgjur.—For these see art. SOUL (Teutonic).

8. Landvaettir.—Just as the *fylgja* presided over the individual, so the *landvaettir* presided over the country as its tutelary spirits. A certain number of references are to be found to them in Norse literature, not the least interesting being the heathen law mentioned in the *Landnámabók*, iv. 7, which ordered that figure-heads of ships were to be removed on approaching the island, lest they should frighten the *landvaettir* with their 'yawning heads and gaping snouts.' In *Egils Saga*, 57, Egill turns a curse against the *landvaettir* of Norway in order to force them to drive away King Eric and Queen Gunnhildr, from whom he was fleeing. Sometimes *landvaettir* seemed to favour certain individuals, as was the case with Björn, the he-goat whom they accompanied to the assembly, while his brothers were accompanied by them when hunting and fishing.[1]

The *landvaettir* seem not always to be very clearly distinguished from the *fylgjur* of individuals; *e.g.*, in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Heimskringla*), 36, it seems to be suggested that the *landvaettir* of Iceland seen by the wizard are connected in some way with the great chiefs of the land. The word *vaettr* (pl. *vaettir*) is identical with A.S. *wiht*, 'creature,' etc., although the latter has not the specialized meaning of Old Norse. For the idea itself we may refer to the *genius loci* of the Romans.

9. Yggdrasil's ash. — Our information for Yggdrasil's ash is mainly derived from *Völuspá*, 19, 20, 27, and *Grímnismál*, 29–35. References also occur in *Fjölsvinnsmál*, 13–18. From *Völuspá* we learn that the ash Yggdrasil stands ever green over the well of Urthr ('Fate'), and from it falls dew into the vales beneath. Under this tree dwell the three norns. In *Grímnismál* not only do we learn that the *aesir* go daily to the judgment-seat under the ash, but we are given many details about its appearance.

It has three roots stretching in three directions. Hel dwells under one, the frost-giants under a second, and under the third the children of men. Its branches are the home of an eagle, a hawk, and a squirrel Ratatöskr, who bears messages to Nithhöggr dwelling below. Four harts gnaw the topmost branches, and many are the serpents which lie under its boughs.

In *Gylf.* 15 f. Snorri adds that in the spring of Fate dwell two swans, from whom are sprung all birds of that race, and also from the branches of the ash drops dew called 'honey-dew,' on which bees feed. The ash is sometimes called Yggdrasil, Askr Yggdrasils. Laérâthr, Mjotvithr, and Mímameithr seem to be names for the same tree. In both *Grímnismál* and *Fjölsvinnsmál* we have indications that the ash is being gradually destroyed; a hart bites it from above, it rots in its side, and Nithhöggr gnaws it from beneath. And, according to *Völuspá*, 47 f., when the last days come, it will shiver and groan. The golden foliaged Glasir which stands by 'Sigtyr's halls'[2] is perhaps to be identified with it. One other striking passage must be mentioned—*Hávamál*, 138, in which Othin is described as hanging on that tree of which no one knows from whose roots it proceeds.

A similar conception to that of a world-tree is certainly to be found among other Teutonic peoples—*e.g.*, among the Old Saxons, who worshipped the Irmensul. Several features in Adam of Bremen's description of the tree beside the temple of Upsala also recall Yggdrasil's ash.[3]

ii. NATURAL THINGS VIEWED MYTHOLOGICALLY.—**1. Day and night.**—From references in *Vafthrúthnismál*, 13, 25, Night, the daughter of Nörr, is depicted as driving across the sky her chariot and horse Hrímfaxi, from whose bit falls the spume which makes the dew in the valleys. Of Day we are only told that he is born of Dellingr. In *Gylf.* 10 Snorri gives further genealogical details.[4] In *Alvíssmál*, 30, is given a list of names by which Night is known among the *jötnar*, elves, and gods. In the document *Hversu Noregr Bygthist* we find a genealogy traced back to Swan the Red, son of Dagr, son of Dellingr, and of Sól, daughter of Mundilfari. For the personification of Night and Day, we may compare

[1] *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, 28, and *Hákonarmál*, *pass.*; cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 633ᵃ.
[2] Cf. below, § II. i. 6 (*b*).
[3] Cf. below, § II. ii. 9. For the valkyries as swan-maidens see art. SWAN-MAIDENS.
[4] P. 84.
[5] Cotton MS, Vitellius A 15.

[1] Cf. *Landnámabók*, iv. 12.
[2] Cf. *Skáldskaparmál*, 36.
[3] Cf. schol. 134 to Adam of Bremen.
[4] See art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

Greek mythology, especially the allusions to the chariots of the Sun and the Moon.[1]

2. Sun and moon.—For these see art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

3. Rainbow.—To the old Norse people the rainbow was the bridge built by the gods to span the space between earth and heaven. Bifröst or Ásbru was its name, and it was triple-hued. Though it is made with cunning and of great strength, Snorri tells[2] that the day will come when it shall be broken. This bridge is referred to as Bifröst in the Older Edda, though it is not explicitly identified with the rainbow. In *Gylf.* 27 Heimdallr is named as guarding it against the frost and cliff giants.[3]

4. Winds and seasons.—In *Vafthrúthnismál*, 27, 37, references are made to the winds and seasons. The winds, according to the poet, arise from beneath the wings of the giant Hraesvelgr, who sits at the end of heaven in the likeness of an eagle. In *Vafth.* 27 Vindsvalr is said to be the father of Winter and Svasudhr of Summer. In *Gylf.* 18 f. Snorri gives further details, explaining that the difference between Summer and Winter is to be accounted for by the difference of parentage, for each has inherited the disposition of his father.

5. Thor.—In the preceding paragraphs we have been dealing with mythological conceptions which are scarcely distinguished from the natural bodies or phenomena which have given rise to them. There can be no doubt, however, that other mythological conceptions originated from similar phenomena in early times, though their identity with these was subsequently forgotten. Thus the name of the god Thor is identical with the word for 'thunder' preserved in English and German. The identity was practically forgotten in Norse owing largely to the fact that the word had gone out of use, but it is clearly preserved in Adam of Bremen's account of the Upsala sanctuary, where he speaks of Thor, 'qui tonitrus et fulmina . . . gubernat.'[4] We may refer also to the 'malleos joviales' which were carried off by the Danish prince Magnus on one of his raids among the Swedish islands, and which, according to Saxo,[5] had been venerated as symbols of thunder.

In English and German the name of the god is not distinguished, and consequently with the small evidence at our disposal it is not always clear which of the two was meant. The thunder-god (especially personifications of thunder) is of course wide-spread among the people of Europe. It is sufficient here to refer to the Taranis of the Celts (whose name appears to be identical with that of the Scandinavian Thorr), Juppiter Tonans of the Romans, Zeus Keraunios of the Greeks.

6. Othin.—Many writers hold that Othin originated in a personification of the wind. This view is largely bound up with the association of the god with the raging host, the antiquity of which is not very clear. The name Woden itself, which seems originally to have meant 'inspired or frenzied,' hardly furnishes a parallel to the case of Thor.

7. Jötnar.—It has been supposed by many writers that not only gods but also *jötnar* largely owe their origin to personification of natural phenomena. The *hrímthursar* ('frost-giants') indeed, of whom we often hear collectively, can hardly be of other origin. The friendly *jötunn* Aegir is very closely associated with the sea, for which his name is often used in poetry. There is some reason also for suspecting that Thrymr, the *jötunn* who steals Thor's hammer, may originally have been a counterpart of Thor, a rival thunder-god. It has been proposed by some that the *eoten* Grendel in *Beowulf* arose from a personification of storm-floods, but this explanation is open to the objection that the story is clearly based on an early folk-tale, the original locality of which has not yet been determined. If the *jötnar* in general had been derived from the personification of natural phenomena, one would expect to find an obvious meaning for their names, as in the case of Thor and perhaps of Thrymr, but as a matter of fact the etymology of the majority of their names is quite obscure.

According to another view, which has obtained more currency in recent times, the *jötnar* largely represent the communities of a more primitive race or civilization. This view also can be justified in some cases by the records. The giant Hrungnir fights against Thor with a hone, which may perhaps represent a stone hammer, and the word *berg-búi* ('cliff-dweller') points in the same direction. In some stories, as in the case of Grendel, the *jötnar* have cannibal propensities, and for this practice there is thought to be evidence in the way human bones are found mixed with those of animals in some caves. We may note also that the name Heithr is sometimes applied to witches of 'Finnish' (Lappish) origin, while in *Hyndluljóth* Heithr is said to be the daughter of the *jötunn* Hrungnir.

Occasionally also the word *jötunn* is applied in some MSS to persons also described as *Finnar*, as in the case of Swasi, father-in-law of Harold the Fair-haired. In the genealogies given in a document *Hversu Noregr Bygthist* some connexion is hinted at between *Finn* and *jötunn*. With the evidence at our disposal we are not yet in a position to determine their origin. It has been suggested also that the *dvergar* may be derived from communities of more primitive inhabitants.

8. Nornir.—The *nornir* bear so close a resemblance to the *völur*[1] ('wise women'), not infrequently mentioned in the sagas, that there can be little doubt that they are at least partly derived from them. Sometimes indeed the words *norn* and *völva* are used interchangeably.

9. Valkyrjur.—It is not unlikely that the *valkyrjur* have a similar origin. Sometimes the name is applied to human beings endowed with supernatural powers, as, *e.g.*, to Svava, the heroine of *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, and to Sigrun in *Helgakvitha Hunding-bana II.*, and to Sigrdrifa, a valkyrie who was punished by Othin for not carrying out his commands. And, as most authorities identify her with Brynhildr, the term is applied to the latter also. This conception of human valkyries is not confined to the North. For, in Wulfstan's *Sermo ad Anglos*, *waelcyrgean* are mentioned beside *wiccean*, among a list of bad characters, from which the country is said to be suffering.[2] It is more difficult, however, to explain how the conception arose. We hear of fighting women more than once in Saxo, and the human *skjáldmeyjar* in the *Atlakvitha* point perhaps in the same direction.

10. Kings.—Among other human beings we may notice especially kings who were credited with supernatural powers both during their lives and after death. Two of the legendary kings of Sweden, Dómaldi and Olaf Trételgja, are said to have been put to death owing to bad harvests for which they were held responsible.[3] This belief lasted down to late times, since Gustavus Vasa is

[1] *E.g.*, Homeric *Hymns*, xxxi. 15 f., xxxii. 9 f., and, in particular, *Od.* xxiii. 244 ff. Cf. also 2 K 23[11].
[2] *Gylf.* 13.
[3] For reference to the rainbow in other mythologies we may compare *PC*[2] i. 298.
[4] iv. 26.
[5] *Gesta Danorum*, ed. A. Holder, Strassburg, 1886, p. 421.

[1] See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 632[a].
[2] Cf. II. i. 6 (*b*).
[3] *Ynglinga Saga*, 18.

said to have complained that the Swedes blamed him for bad weather. Nor was it peculiar to the North. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, xxviii. 5. 14, it was customary among the Burgundians to depose their kings in time of famine as well as after military disaster.

11. The dead.—Norse literature shows by constant reference that to the dead were attributed supernatural powers. Among those most commonly referred to is that of bringing prosperity and abundant harvest.

In *Ynglinga Saga*, 12, the god Freyr is said to die, but his death is not announced to his subjects the Swedes. His dead body was preserved that prosperity might abound in the land. A similar story is told about Halfdan the Black, for his body after death was cut in four pieces, which were buried in different parts of the kingdom, so that all sections of the land might have plenteous years.[1] A similar belief underlies the story of Olaf Geirstatha-alf,[2] and that of Guthmundr,[3] who after death was thought by his people to be a god, and was therefore worshipped. Yet another example is to be found in *Landnámabók*, i. 14, where Thórólfr Smjörr is mentioned as being worshipped after death. A curious instance of worship of the dead occurs in *Kristni Saga*, 2, where the missionary Thorvaldr is taken by a heathen Kodran to see a stone in which the ancestor (*dr-madhr* or *spá-madhr*) of the latter is said to have dwelt for a long time. Kodran averred that, when the missionary had sprinkled the stone with holy water, his ancestor had come out and complained that the water had scalded his little children.

12. Yggdrasil's ash.—This is a very complex conception, as may be seen from the variety of phenomena attached to it.[4] The descriptions indeed are hard to visualize and are apparently inconsistent. Sometimes the ash seems to spread out over the whole world; sometimes again it is represented as a definite locality to which the gods ride or walk to hold their court. If the tree called Laérâthr in *Grímnismál*, 25 f., is to be identified with the ash, as seems probable, it must be regarded as standing very near to Othin's hall. Now it was, and indeed still is, the custom for country houses in the North, especially in Sweden, to have standing by them a tree known as *vårdträd* ('protecting tree'), on which the welfare of the house is supposed to depend. Such trees were doubtless regarded as especially sacred in heathen times, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the original conception of Yggdrasil's ash may have been that of a *vårdträd* of the divine community. In *Völuspá* the reference to the ash seems to point to a tree on which the destiny of the gods depends rather than to an all-comprehending world-tree. That its origin is to be found in actual trees is rendered probable by the Irmensul, which likewise was all-comprehending ('universalis columna . . . quasi sustinens omnia'),[5] for this was a real tree, or rather a tree-trunk, in spite of the property assigned to it. Further, the adjuncts mentioned in *Grímnismál* and *Gylfaginning*—the harts, snakes, etc.—link it with grove sanctuaries. We may refer particularly to those of the Lithuanians and Prussians, especially to the sacred one at Romove. It was forbidden to injure any birds or animals in such groves. The description indeed of the sacred oak at Romove furnishes an interesting parallel to Yggdrasil's ash from real life. In the North itself we can find parallels for all the features involved; *e.g.*, snakes seem to have disappeared from the Northern sanctuaries before the date of our records, yet a very interesting analogy in some respects is furnished by the description of the sacred tree at Upsala in scholium 134 to Adam of Bremen's *History*.

iii. COSMOLOGY.—See art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Teutonic).

iv. ESCHATOLOGY.—See art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic). D. E. MARTIN CLARKE.

[1] *Ynglinga Saga*, 9. [2] *Flateyjarbók*, ii. ch. vi.
[3] Cf. the mythical *Hervarar Saga*, 1.
[4] Cf. accounts in *Grímnismál* and the Prose Edda.
[5] Rudolph of Fulda, *MGH Inscript.* ii. 676.

III. *WORSHIP.*—The Teutonic festivals are treated separately under the heading FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Teutonic). There are also separate articles on SACRIFICE (Teutonic) and HUMAN SACRIFICE (Teutonic). The various superstitions are covered under the headings DIVINATION (Teutonic), MAGIC (Teutonic), and ORDEAL (Teutonic). It remains in this section to speak of prophecy and the priesthood.

1. Prophecy.—According to Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 61, numbers of women among the Germani were considered to possess the gift of prophecy 'in consequence of which many were revered as goddesses,' though he denies elsewhere[1] that the veneration paid to them was so great as this. One of the chief of these prophetic women was known as Veleda, a prophetess of the Bructueri, who ruled over considerable territory. To increase the honour in which she was held, she lived at the top of a high tower, and questions and oracular responses were conveyed between her and the public by a near relative 'like a messenger who had converse with the gods.'[2] The name Veleda, strictly speaking, does not appear to be a proper name but a Gaulish word for 'prophetess.'[3] We may here mention the story of the older Drusus, who in his last campaign was met on the banks of the Elbe by a woman taller than human who prophesied to him the manner of his death even as it afterwards came about.[4] According to Strabo,[5] the Cymbri had prophetesses who practised divination with slaughtered prisoners.[6]

2. Priesthood.—(*a*) *Priest.*—(i.) In Norway, and especially in Iceland, the duties of the priest were performed by the political leader of the people. During the colonization of Iceland the more important of the chiefs who went out from Norway built their own temples, not infrequently of the wood of which their temples had been made in Norway.

Thus we read in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4, that Thórólfr of Mostr built a temple to Thor of such wood. To this temple all the men in his own district had to pay a tax called 'temple-toll'; but the chief himself paid for the upkeep of the building and performed all the necessary duties in connexion with the temple and the temple services, while at the same time exercising judicial authority over the people of the neighbourhood. Again in *Hrafnkel's Saga Freysgótha*, 2, we are told that Hrafnkel raised a great temple in Athalból, where he 'made offerings to Freyr of the half of all the best things that he had.' Hrafnkel settled the whole of the valley and gave land to people on condition that he should be regarded as their chief and exercise the authority of priest over them.[7]

The priest was called *góthi*, and his office *gothorth*. In each *gothorth* was a consecrated place set apart for the *thing* (gathering of the people). Small settlers who were not of sufficient substance and authority to build temples of their own joined one or other of the *gothorth* so as to have the benefit of the temple services and the temporal protection of the *góthi*. So inseparable was the political function from that of the priest in Iceland that the *gothorth* formed the starting-point for the foundation of the constitution of Iceland. The title of *góthi* continued in existence after the adoption of Christianity, although now it had lost all religious significance and meant no more than magistrate (*lögsögumathr*). It is interesting to observe that the *gothorth* was a hereditary office and could even be bought and sold like any other property.[8]

This combination of priestly with secular authority existed also no doubt in Norway, whence the original priests of Iceland came, though—and here is a difference from Iceland—the power of the

[1] *Germ.* 9. [2] *Hist.* iv. 65.
[3] Cf. Gael. *fáidh*. [4] Suetonius, *Claud.* 1.
[5] VII. iv. 3.
[6] See art. DIVINATION (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 827.
[7] Cf. also *Egils Saga*, 86, 89; *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 15.
[8] Cf. *Vatnsdæla Saga*, 41 f.; *Bandamanna Saga*, 2.

local chiefs in Norway was subordinate to that of kings. The word *góthi* is occasionally applied to local chiefs—*e.g.*, to Thorhaddr the Old, who was *hof-góthi* at Maeren in Trondhjem[1]—and on several occasions we hear of priests in Iceland who had formerly possessed temples in Norway. The *Saga of Hákon the Good* (*Heimskringla*), 16, gives an account of a great sacrificial feast at Hlathir of which Earl Sigurthr sustained the whole cost himself; and from the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Heimskringla*), 75, we learn that it had been the custom of Olaf's predecessors to offer sacrifice in Trondhjem. In poetry we sometimes meet with such expressions as *vörthr véstalls* ('guardian of the altar') applied to kings of the past. In all cases, here as in Iceland, it is clear that no exclusively priestly class existed, and that priestly duties were in all cases combined with temporal power.

For Denmark very little evidence is available. On three Runic inscriptions found in Fyn, and dating approximately from the 9th cent., the word *kuthi* (i.e. *góthi*) is found in combination with some proper name to form a compound word. Hróulfr and Ali are said to have been *nuRakuthi* (*Nora-góthi*) and *sauluakutha* (*Sölva-góthi*) respectively. It has been suggested that Nori and Sölvi are the names of men; but it seems at least equally probable that they are place-names.[2] If this is so, Hróulfr and Ali may have been local chieftains, like those on the west coast of Norway. It is significant that Saxo, who frequently refers to the laws and customs of heathen times, makes no references to a priestly class in Denmark.

For Sweden the evidence is more abundant. Adam of Bremen states in connexion with the great temple at Upsala:

'Assigned to all the gods they have priests to present the sacrifices of the people.'[3]

It does not necessarily follow perhaps from this statement that the duties of these persons were of an exclusively priestly nature. Elsewhere the evidence seems rather to point to a union in Sweden, like that in Norway and Iceland, of priestly duties with secular authority.

Thus we read in *Ynglinga Saga*, 47, that a famine which arose in the days of the legendary king Olaf Trételgja was attributed by the people to the king's remissness in offering sacrifices; and even towards the end of the 11th cent. we read in *Hervarar Saga, ad fin.*, of one Blótaveinn ('sacrificing-Sveinn') obtaining the throne in virtue of his promise to offer sacrifice on behalf of the people, which he actually carried out. Rimbertus[4] describes the formal deification of the Swedish king Ericus; and it will be remembered that the native dynasty, the Ynglingar, traced their descent from the god Freyr.

Thus, while the evidence is perhaps less direct and convincing for Sweden than for Norway, it seems on the whole to indicate a close union from the earliest times between secular and religious power.

(ii.) Except in Tacitus references to priests among the Teutonic peoples are of rare occurrence. In later times we read in the *History* of Ammianus Mercellinus[5] that the priests of the Burgundians were presided over by a chief priest who held his office for life. Jordanes[6] states that the priests of the Goths were of noble extraction.

(iii.) We learn from Bede[7] that the priests of the ancient English were forbidden to bear arms and to ride except on mares. Heathen priests are also referred to,[8] perhaps the most interesting instance being that of Coifi.

Eddius,[9] in his description of the shipwreck of Wilfrid off the Sussex coast, refers to the 'princeps sacerdotum idolatriae' standing before the country-people on a high mound and by his magic arts seeming to cast fetters on the hands of the people of God.

(iv.) Among the Teutonic peoples of the Continent in ancient times the priest seems to have combined to a great extent spiritual with temporal powers. According to Tacitus, his duties were threefold: (1) the consultation of omens on public occasions, together with divination, the casting of lots, and the observation of the sacred horses;[1] (2) duties in connexion with the tribal assembly such as the proclamation of silence at the opening of the meeting, and the administration of punishment at the assembly and in time of war;[2] (3) the guardianship of the sacred groves, symbols, and other holy objects,[3] which they also carried with the host to battle.[4] They no doubt had duties also in connexion with the public sacrifices. Indeed it may be said that their functions as a whole were essentially of a public character. There is little or no trace of any mystical relationship existing between the priest and the god, or of any peculiarly spiritual qualification in the priest such as we find noted, *e.g.*, in the case of prophetesses like Veleda, or in the account of the Druids given by Diodorus Siculus.[5]

(*b*) *Priestess.*—(i.) In Iceland the word *gythja* ('priestess') occasionally occurs,[6] and seems to be applied to women belonging to the ruling families of Iceland (*i.e.* those who held *gothorth*).

In *Kristni Saga*, 2, we are told of a woman Frithgerthr who was 'in the temple offering sacrifices' while Thorvaldr was preaching the Christian faith hard by. The term *gythja*, however, is not applied to her, and it is possible that she was only acting as deputy for her husband, who was absent at the *althingi* ('general assembly'). Mention is made in *Vápnfirthinga Saga*, 10, of a woman called Steinvör, who is described as a *hof-gythja* ('temple-priestess') and who owned a *hófuth-hof* ('public temple') and claimed temple-toll. When she wished to enforce the civil authority of the *gothorth*, she was obliged to apply to her kinsman Brodd-Helgi for help. But that she was conscious of her full religious responsibilities seems to be borne out by the amusing account given in *Kristni Saga*, 5, of a 'flyting' between Thangbrandr the priest and one Steinvör, the mother of the poet Ref, who is without doubt to be identified with the *hof-gythja* of *Vápnfirthinga Saga*. Here we are told that, after she had preached heathenism to Thangbrandr at some length, she made the startling announcement that 'Thor challenged Christ to fight in single combat; but he dared not fight against Thor!'

Beyond this, references to priestesses in the old Scandinavian countries seem to point to persons of a different character, though these references are not very satisfactory.

In *Sturlaugs Saga Starfsama*, 18, we are told of 60 *hof-gythjar* in a temple, which, however, was Finnish. Again in *Ynglinga Saga*, 4, we are told that the goddess Freyja was a *blót-gythja* ('sacrificial priestess'), and that after Freyr's death she kept up the temple and sacrifices at Upsala.

Here also we may mention the story of Gunnarr Helmingr, who is related in ch. 278 of the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*) to have personated the god Freyr after destroying his idol. Freyr's image was kept in a temple in Sweden, and his shrine is said to have been attended to by a young and beautiful woman who was known as his wife, and with whom he used to make an annual progress through the land, driven in a chariot. This person is not actually called a priestess (*gythja*), but at all events she apparently had charge of the sanctuary and interpreted the answers of the god. We may here compare the account of Freyja, who in *Ynglinga Saga*, 13, is said to have upheld the sacrifices at Upsala after the death of Freyr.

(ii.) We have no definite evidence for the existence of priestesses in the strict sense of the term among the other Teutonic peoples. Tacitus speaks of 'numbers of women of prophetic power,'[7] but these recall the *völur* rather than the priestesses of the North. The former existence of a priestess may, however, perhaps be inferred from the account of the sacred grove of the Nahanarvali, which is said[8] to have been under the charge of a priest 'muliebri ornatu.'

IV. *Temples and Sanctuaries.*—(*a*) *Iceland.*—(i.) In Iceland the temples formed centres of jurisdiction, one belonging to each of the 39

[1] Cf. *Landn.* iv. 6.
[2] Cf. L. F. A. Wimmer, *Die Runenschrift*, German tr. by F. Holthausen, Berlin, 1887, pp. 341 ff., 359 ff.
[3] iv. 27.
[4] *Vita Anscharii*, 26.
[5] xxviii. 5. 14.
[6] *De Rebus Geticis*, ch. 5.
[7] *HE* ii. 13.
[8] *Ib.* ii. 6, and elsewhere.
[9] Ch. 13.

[1] In the last duty he was accompanied by the king; cf. *Germ.* 10.
[2] *Ib.* 7. 11.
[3] *Ib.* 40, 43.
[4] *Ib.* 7.
[5] *Bibl. Hist.* v. 31.
[6] E.g., *Landn.* iii. 4, iv. 10.
[7] *Hist.* iv. 61, 65.
[8] *Germ.* 43.

gothorth. One of the fullest descriptions of such temples which we possess occurs in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4.

Here we are told that Thórólfr of Mostr set up a great temple to Thor by Thor's river. There was a door in the wall near one end. Inside stood the high-seat pillars containing the pegs which were called *reginnaglar* ('holy pegs'). On one of these pillars the image of Thor was carved.

'The interior of this temple was a very holy place. At the end of the temple farthest from the door there was an annexe like the choir of a church at the present time, and there in the midst of the floor stood a *stalli* which served as an altar, and thereon lay a jointless ring weighing twenty ounces on which all oaths are said to have been sworn. The priest wore this ring upon his arm at all assemblies. On the *stalli* stood also the sacrificial bowl wherein was a *hleitteinn* which served as a sprinkler, wherewith was sprinkled the blood from the bowl which was called *hlaut*. That was the blood which was shed by such creatures as were sacrificed to the gods. In the annexe round about the *stalli* were the gods ranged. To this temple all men had to pay tribute, and they were under an obligation to accompany the temple priests on all such journeys as *thingmen* now take with their chiefs, and the *góthi* kept up the temple at his own cost so that it should not fall out of repair, and in it he upheld the sacrificial feasts.'

Some additional details are furnished by the descriptions of the temple at Kjalarnes in *Kjalnesinga Saga*, 2, 4.

This temple was 60 ft. in breadth, and, like the one built by Ingimundr in Vatnsdaela,[1] 100 ft. in length. Thor was the god most honoured in this temple. The inner sanctuary was circular like the hull of a ship. Thor stood in the midst of it, and other gods on both sides. In front of them stood a *stalli* made with great skill and covered with iron. On it there was a fire which was never allowed to die down. They called it the 'consecrated fire.' On that *stalli* there lay also a great 'ring' of silver. The temple priest wore it on his arm at all assemblies. Men took their oaths on it in all law-suits. On that altar there lay also a great bowl of copper into which was poured the blood which came from the cattle which were sacrificed to Thor or from the men. This blood they called *hlaut*, and (the bowl they called) *hlaut-bolli*. Men and cattle were sprinkled with the *hlaut*, but the cattle which were sacrificed there were used for entertaining the company when sacrificial feasts were held. And the men who were sacrificed were sunk in the pool which was outside by the door, and which was called *blótkilda* ('sacrificial spring'). The temple was surrounded by a wooden fence too high to climb, and both the temple and the fence contained doors that locked. Finally we are told that the beams of the temple were very excellent.[2]

Thorhaddr the Old, like many another, took the temple-mould and the high-seat pillars from his Norwegian temple and used them for his temple in Iceland.[3] We are also told that Jörundr *góthi* raised a temple in Svertingsstathir.[4] Numerous other instances might be cited.

In *Kristni Saga*, 2, heathen sacrifices are mentioned as being offered in a temple at Hvamm. In *Hrafnkels Saga Freysgótha*, 3, we are told that Hrafnkel raised a great temple to Freyr in Athalból. This temple stood on a rock above a deep pool in the river and contained images of the gods which had some kind of robes or ornaments upon them. A temple dedicated to Freyr is also mentioned in *Víga Glúms Saga*, 5, as being 'on the south of the river at Hripkelsstathir.'[5] In ch. 24 of the same saga we read that there were three temples on Eyjafirthr. In ch. 25 we have an interesting confirmation of the accounts of the oath-ring mentioned above. In the temple in Diupadale on Eyjafirthr 'whoever took the temple-oath took in his hand the silver ring which was reddened in the blood of the cattle sacrificed and which weighed fully three ounces.' Possibly the ring of Tomar (Thunor) which was carried off from Dublin by King Charles Malachy II. in 994 was one of the sacred rings upon which oaths were sworn.[6] Here we may compare the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*,[7] where the oath-ring is represented as the most binding form of engagement known to the Danes.

(ii.) Not only the temple itself, but also the land round about, was regarded as sanctuary.

Thus in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4, we are told that Thórólfr of Mostr held as sacred a hill in the precincts of his temple on Thorsnes. Here the *thing* of the men of the Western Firths was held. No one was allowed to turn his eyes thither unwashed, and no blood was to be shed there. Thórólfr's sons preserved the sanctuary inviolate as long as they could; and, when it had been defiled with bloodshed by the Kjallekings,[8] the place was declared unhallowed and the *thing* removed to another part of the promontory, where the *dómhringr* is still pointed out to travellers—'That was one of the holiest of places.'

A curious tradition of sanctity is found in *Landnámabók*, ii. 16.

Authr the Deep-Minded was a Christian. 'She was accustomed to say her prayers at Cross-hills. She had crosses raised there, for she was baptized and a good Christian. Members of her family afterwards showed great reverence for that hill. A *hörgr* was made there when they began to offer sacrifices. They believed that they would pass into the hill when they died.'

(*b*) *Norway*.—(i.) From *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 3, we learn that, before Thórólfr of Mostr left Norway for Iceland, he had charge of Thor's temple on the island of Mostr, and was a great friend of Thor. The framework of this temple was transferred bodily to Iceland. Another island is mentioned in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*[1] as containing a large temple dedicated to Thor. Guthbrandr of the Dales also possessed a temple dedicated to Thor.[2] His predecessor was a great friend of Earl Hákon of Hlathir. They had a temple in common in Guthbrandsdale, which contained figures of Thor and of Hákon's patron goddesses, Thorgerthr and Irpa. Thorgerthr is described as being as tall as a full-grown man and having a hood on her head. Thor was seated in his car, and all were adorned with clothes or ornaments and had gold rings on their arms. This temple and Earl Hákon's temple at Hlathir are said to have been the two chief temples in Norway.[3] When Earl Hákon first took possession of Norway, 'he commanded throughout his whole kingdom that the temples should be maintained,'[4] and later, when the emissaries of the emperor Otto had overthrown the temples of S. Norway, Earl Hákon caused them to be rebuilt and the heathen sacrifices to be re-established.[5]

Some interesting details of one of his temples (in Arkadale) are given in *Faereyinga Saga*, 23.

It stood in the midst of a wood and was surrounded by a paling and adorned with gold and silver, while the roof was lighted with several glass windows. Inside near the door was a figure of Thorgerthr Hölgabrúthr, beautifully adorned. The same story occurs in the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 326, where we are told that Olaf stripped Thorgerthr of all her 'gold and silver and fine clothes' and dragged the idol at his horse's tail, finally beating it to pieces with a club and burning it along with the image of Freyr.

Olaf Tryggvason systematically destroyed Hákon's temples and despoiled the idols. He took from the door of the temple at Hlathir the large gold ring that Hákon had had made, and burnt the image of Thor which it contained.[6] In his missionary expedition to Inner Trondhjem he despoiled the temple at Maer, which contained many idols fixed on *stallar*, in the midst of whom sat Thor, 'an image of great size, all adorned with gold and silver.'[7] A curious and interesting account of a temple and image dedicated to Balder in the district of Sogn is mentioned in the *Saga of Frithjóf the Bold*.[8] It has been the custom to cast doubt on this evidence, but the details are not obviously fictitious, and it is difficult to imagine why they should have been invented. The account is at least as reliable as that of *Kjalnesinga Saga*,[9] which is usually accepted as probable.

(ii.) The word *hof* ('temple') frequently occurs in association with the word *hörgr*.[10] What exactly the *hörgr* was we do not know. From *Hyndluljóth*, 10, the *hörgr* seems to have been made of stones:

'He made me a *hörgr* built of stones. Now, this heap of stones is turned to glass.'

But in *Grímnismál*, 16, Njörthr is said to rule over *hótimbruthum hörgi* ('high-timbered *hörgrs*').

[1] Cf. *Vatnsdaela Saga*, 15.

[2] Here we may compare the story given in *Landn.* v. 12 of Ketilbjörn, who was so rich that he ordered his sons to make a cross-beam of silver in the temple which they were building on Mossfell. His sons, however, did not carry out his orders.

[3] Cf. *Landn.* iv. 6. [4] *Ib.* v. 3. [5] Cf. also 9, 19.

[6] Cf. *Annals of the Four Masters*, *sub an.* 994.

Sub an. 876. [8] Cf. *ib.* 9, 10.

[1] *Flateyjarbók*, 243.

[2] Cf. *Saga of Olaf the Holy* (*Heimskringla*), 118.

[3] Cf. *Njála Saga*, 87, 88.

[4] Cf. *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 61.

[5] *Ib.* 87; cf. also 313–315.

[6] *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Flateyjarbók*), 248.

[7] *Ib.* 268. [8] Ch. 1 and *passim*. [9] Ch. 2, 4.

[10] Cf., e.g., *Helgakvitha Hjörvarthssonar*, 4.

The phrase '*hörgr* and *hof* high-timbered' occurs also in *Völuspá*, 7. It has been suggested that the word 'high-timbered' is merely conventional and that the *hörgr* was a stone structure as opposed to the wooden temples so common in Norway and Iceland. In *Örvar Odds Saga*, 29, we are told that Oddr 'burnt a *hof* and broke a *hörgr*'; but in the preceding verse both *hof* and *hörgr* are spoken of as being 'burnt.' *Hof* and *hörgr* are spoken of as burnt in ch. 165 of the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* (*Fornmanna Sögur*). But in ch. 141 of the same saga we are told that the king commanded '*hof* and *hörgr* to be broken and burnt.' The *hörgr* is frequently mentioned in connexion with women.

Thus in *Gylf.* 14 the goddesses are said to inhabit 'a *hörgr* which was a very fair house. It was called Vingólf.' In *Hervarar Saga*, 1, Starkathr is said to have carried off Alfhildr as she was in the act of reddening the *hörgr* by night after the great *disarblót*. After the death of Authr the Christian, her relatives made a *hörgr* on the hill where she had set up her crosses.

The word is still traditionally connected with high places in popular speech. Thus, when the land lies deep in snow, the Icelanders say that 'only the highest *hörgar* jut out.' And in the Norwegian patois a dome-shaped mountain is called a *horg*. Perhaps the word is a survival of an older form of religion when places of worship were more primitive than the carefully constructed *hof*. It is obviously connected ultimately with the O.H.G. *haruc*.

(iii.) It will be seen that there are certain obvious discrepancies in regard to the use of the term *hörgr*. It appears in some cases to have been a cairn, but in others a building capable of habitation. Sometimes it is made of stone, in other cases perhaps of wood. The difficulty is increased by the fact that the word is obviously identical with the early German word *haruc*, which is used to gloss the words *nemus*, *lucus*, while the corresponding A.S. *hearg* is also perhaps used for 'grove.' Such sacred woods or groves were probably common in early times, since many place-names are compounded with the word *lundr* ('sacred grove'). Moreover, the usual name for the place of assembly in the North is *thingvöllr*, which must originally have meant 'wood of the assembly,' *völlr* being cognate with O.S. *weald* and O.H.G. *wald* ('forest').

The legendary sanctuary at Glasisvellir[1] was probably connected with a holy grove, and is no doubt identical with Glasir, the name of the tree by Valhöll, Othin's dwelling-place, mentioned in *Skáldskaparmál*, 34. It is in a forest clearing that the gods meet to decide the fate of Starkathr.[2] According to a mythological poem,[3] the gods meet every day to dispense justice under Yggdrasil's ash. Perhaps we may also instance Tomar's wood,[4] which was situated near Dublin. It has been suggested that this means 'grove of Thor.'

It is noteworthy that the two great assembly places, Frosta and Gaula, are both on peninsulas. Sacred islands may also have been known, as can perhaps be inferred from the recurrence of such names as Njardhrey, Vé-ey, Thorsey, and possibly Halogaland.

(*c*) *Sweden.*—(i.) The great temple of the Swedes was at Upsala.

'The Swedes have a most magnificent temple which is called Ubsola [Upsala] not far distant from the city of Sictona [Sigtuna]. In this temple, which is fitted [?] entirely with gold, they worship the statues of three gods. Thor, the most powerful of them, has his seat in the midst of the couch [?], while Wodan and Fricco occupy places on either side of him. . . . Wodan they represent as armed, just as our people represent Mars, while Thor with his sceptre seems to copy Jupiter.'[5]

'That temple is surrounded by a golden chain which hangs over the roof [?] of the building, and the gleam of which is visible to visitors at a distance; for the shrine itself stands on level ground with hills round it like a theatre.'[6]

(ii.) In the (contemporary) scholium 134 we have an interesting account of a holy grove which stood beside the temple, and which contained an evergreen tree of great sanctity.

'Near that temple there is a very large tree stretching out its branches afar and always green both in winter and summer. No one knows what kind of tree it is. There also is a spring in which it is the practice of the heathen to do sacrifice by sinking a living man in it. If he does not reappear, the prayers of the people will be fulfilled.'

The description of Yggdrasil's ash, which is said to overshadow Asgarthr,[1] is no doubt derived from the Upsala evergreen, as the description of the home of the gods is surely derived from some Northern sanctuary, in all probability the identical sanctuary at Upsala.[2]

There are many other references to this sanctuary in both Norse and Danish authorities, and it was in fact the most famous one in the North. In *Ynglinga Saga*, 12, and in Saxo, iii. 90, its establishment is attributed to the god Freyr, who in the former is represented as having lived and died at Upsala. This is no doubt also the scene of the story of Gunnar Helmingr, although in this story the place is not actually mentioned.

In *Jómsvíkinga Saga*, 12, we are told of a temple in Götland which contained 100 gods and also temple treasure and temple servants to offer the sacrifices, but, apart from the great temple at Upsala, we know little of the heathen temples of Sweden.

(*d*) *Denmark.*—No records of Danish temples appear to have been preserved. The chief sanctuary of the Danes was at Leire. This was no doubt a sanctuary of great antiquity. It is the home of the famous kings of the 6th cent., Hróarr and Hrólfr Kraki (the Hrothgar and Hrothwulf of *Beowulf*). In *Ynglinga Saga*, 5, it is said to have been the home of the goddess Gifjón and her husband Skjöldr, the eponymous ancestor of the Skjöldungar (A.S. Scyldingas), the Danish royal family. Like Upsala, the locality is remarkable for its barrows, some of which date from the earliest times.

The existence of ancient sanctuaries in the old Danish kingdom is also implied by some of the place-names; *e.g.*, Lundr, the name of the old ecclesiastical capital in Skáney, meant originally a 'sacred grove.' Cf. also Véborg (mod. Viborg; 'sanctuary town') and Helganes ('holy promontory') in Jutland; Othinsé or Othinsvé ('Othin's Sanctuary') on the island of Fyen, and Hlésey, besides many other Danish (and Norwegian and Swedish) place-names.

(*e*) *England.*—In England the worship of idols and the existence of heathen temples were well known to Bede. In A.D. 601 Pope Gregory sent a letter to the abbot Mellitus urging that, while he is to destroy the idols in England, he is to leave the heathen temples standing that they may be consecrated for purposes of Christian worship. He says expressly, 'It is their custom to slay many oxen in sacrifice to devils.'[3] The East Anglian king Redwald, who had been converted to Christianity on a visit to Kent, is said to have had in the same temple an altar for Christian worship and an *arula* at which to offer victims to devils;[4] and his son Earconberct is said to have been the first of the English kings who commanded the idols throughout his country to be destroyed.[5] When the Northumbrian Council decided to adopt Christianity, the high priest of the heathen, Coefi, rode to the sanctuary of Gudmanum on the Derwent, cast a spear into it, and commanded his companions to destroy and set fire to it with all its precincts.[6] References of a historical character to sanctuaries in this country are rare, however. But such place-names as Thunresleah, which must originally have

[1] Cf. the *Tháttr af Nornagesti*, 1; *Hervarar Saga*, 1.
[2] Cf. *Gautreks Saga*, 7. [3] *Grímnismál*, 30.
[4] Mentioned in the *War of the Gaethil with the Gaill*, 113.
[5] Adam of Bremen, iv. 26. [6] *Ib.* scholium 135.

[1] *Gylf.* 15. [2] Cf. also *Skáldskaparmál*, 34.
[3] *HE* i. 30. [4] *Ib.* ii. 15.
[5] *Ib.* iii. 8. [6] *Ib.* ii. 13.

meant 'grove of thunder,' perhaps indicate the existence of groves sacred to the thunder-god among the ancient English, and there are other reminiscences of heathen worship no doubt preserved in such place-names as Thunresfeld and Wednesbury.

In *Beowulf*, 175, we hear of offerings made *aet haergtrafum*, which perhaps means 'shrines' covered with canopies. The word *haerg*, identical with Norse *hörgr*, is of frequent occurrence standing alone, and is used to translate various Latin terms such as *fanum*[1] and *idolum*. There are other passages in which the word seems to mean a 'grove,' as in German, and it is not uncommon in place-names—*e.g.*, Harrow. A number of other words which appear in Christian usage were presumably applied at first to heathen sanctuaries—e.g., *weofod* ('altar').[2]

(*f*) *The Continent.*—(i.) References to temples on the Continent are rare. In the 6th cent. a Frankish temple was destroyed by Radegund, wife of Chlotar. Gregory of Tours describes a temple at Cologne which contained figures of the gods and in which sacrificial feasts were held. The Frisians seem to have had temples, but the notices are not always clear.

(ii.) The word *fanum*, by which these sanctuaries are usually denoted, is also used of the Irmensul, which, according to Thietmar of Merseburg,[3] was an immense wooden shaft or pillar worshipped by the Old Saxons in a place called Eresburg. According to the *Vita S. Alex.* 3, this pillar was 'set up aloft in the open.' In their own language they call it 'Irmensul, quod latine dicitur universalis columna, quasi sustinens omnia.' It was cut down in the year 772 by Charlemagne, who spent three days destroying the sanctuary and carried off much gold and silver.

Among the heathen practices of the Old Saxons condemned in the *Indiculus Superstitionum* and elsewhere we hear of sanctuaries connected with woods, of springs connected with sacrifices, and of various places which are venerated as holy.

The chief sanctuary of the Frisians was that of 'Fosite's Land.' According to Alcuin's *Vita S. Willibrordi*, 10, it took its name from the god Fosite.

'For *fana* of this god were "constructed" (*constructa*) on it.' This place was held so sacred by the country folk that no one dared to touch the cattle or anything else that fed there. He also mentions a sacred spring on the island.[4]

Adam of Bremen[5] identifies this land with the island of Heilgiland (Halogaland). In the *Vita S. Bonifatii*, 23, we read of a sacred oak of gigantic size, the *robor Jovis*, which was cut down by the saint amid the clamorous protests of the heathen.

There is no doubt that sacred trees and groves were of frequent occurrence among all the Teutonic peoples of the Continent. In the *Translatio S. Alexandri*, 3, we are told that the Saxons worshipped trees and streams. Claudian speaks of 'groves grim with ancient religious rites and oaks resembling barbaric divinity.'[6]

The O.H.G. word *haruc*, like the O.N. *hörgr* and A.S. *hearg*, presents some difficulty, being used sometimes to gloss *nemus*, *lucus*, sometimes *fanum*, *delubrum*. It has been suggested by Mogk that the lack of clear distinction between the terms for the natural and the artificially constructed sanctuary is due to the utilization of old sanctuaries as sites for later temples.

(iii.) References to Teutonic temples in earlier times, in the works of Tacitus, are rare and doubtful. In *Ann.* i. 51 it is stated that Germanicus razed to the ground the temple which they called the temple of Tamfana and which was most frequented by those tribes. Again, in *Germ.* 40 mention is made of the *templum* of Nerthus, but it is not unlikely that the word is used loosely for 'sanctuary'—'the holy grove on an island in the ocean,' the home of the goddess Nerthus, who visits the nations in a consecrated car covered with a garment.

'One priest alone is permitted to touch it. He is able to perceive when the goddess is present in her sanctuary and accompanies her with the utmost reverence as she is drawn along by cows. It is a season of rejoicing, and festivity reigns wherever she deigns to go and be received. They do not undertake hostilities or take up arms; every weapon is put away; peace and quiet are then only known and welcomed, until the goddess, weary of human intercourse, is at length restored by the same priest to her temple. Afterwards the car, the garments, and, if you are willing to believe it, the deity herself, are cleansed in a secret lake. This rite is performed by slaves who are instantly swallowed up by its waters.'

The indications given by Tacitus are too vague to enable the site of this sanctuary to be fixed with any certainty, but it is not impossible that it was the Danish sanctuary of Leire. In that case Nerthus may have lived on as Gifjón. Her name, however, is identical with that of the Norse god Njörthr.

According to *Germ.* 9, 'the Germani deem it to be inconsistent with the majesty of the gods to confine them within walls or to represent them after any similitude of a human face; they dedicate groves and woods and call by the names of gods that invisible thing which they see only with the eye of faith.'[1]

Sacred groves are mentioned by Tacitus in several other places. Arminius's forces assemble in a wood sacred to Hercules.[2] Civilis brings his army together in a sacred wood.[3] According to *Germ.* 43, the Nahanarvali had a grove of ancient sanctity. It was in these groves that they kept the sacred symbols.[4] Here also were reared the sacred white horses which were never allowed to do work for mankind, but were employed to draw the sacred cars, when their neighing was carefully observed by the priest and king of the state.

According to *ib.* 39, the Semnones had a wood of immemorial antiquity and holiness. Here on certain occasions there met embassies from all the kindred peoples (the various branches of the Suevi) to celebrate their barbaric rites by the slaying of a man. The grove was held in reverence, and no one was allowed to enter unless he was bound with chains to signify his own humility and the power of the grove.

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For material on burial customs and archæology in general see *EBr*[11], *s.vv.* 'Germany' and 'Scandinavian Civilisation,' with the bibliographies appended.

Convenient edd. of most Norse works, both prose and poetry, are published by Sigurthur Kristjánsson, Reykjavík. An English ed. of all the early poetry with trr. is contained also in the *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, by G. Vigfússon and F. York Powell, 2 vols., Oxford, 1883 (scarce). There are also several German and Scandinavian critical edd. of the Edda poems and of many

[1] *E.g.*, in the passages quoted above from Bede, *HE* ii. 13.
[2] Cf. also Aūsl, an old pagan word for sacrifice, etc.
[3] *Chron.* ii. 1.
[4] Cf. also *Vita S. Liudgerii*, i. 19.
[5] iv. 3.
[6] *Cons. Stil.* i. 288.

[1] Cf. also *ib.* 7, and *Ann.* i. 61.
[2] *Ann.* ii. 12.
[3] *Hist.* iv. 14.
[4] See art. IMAGES AND IDOLS (Teutonic and Slavic).

of the sagas. The following list of the English translations may be found useful: *The Elder or Poetic Edda*, pt. i., 'The Mythological Poems,' tr. Olive Bray, printed for the Viking Club, London, 1908; *The Prose Edda*, tr. A. G. Brodeur, New York, 1916; *Laxdæla Saga*, tr. M. C. Press[2] ('The Temple Classics'), London, 1906; *Eyrbyggja Saga*, tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' ii.), do. 1892; *Gísla Saga Súrssónar*, tr. G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1866; *Kormaks Saga*, tr. W. G. Collingwood and Jón Stefánsson, Ulverston, 1902; *Víga-Glúms Saga*, tr. E. Head, London, 1866; the *Heimskringla*, containing *Ynglinga Saga*, *The Saga of Hákon the Good*, *The Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*, *St. Olaf's Saga*, etc., tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' iii.–vi.), London, 1893–1905; *The Saga of Olaf Tryggvason*, tr. J. Sephton ('The Northern Library,' i.), do. 1895 (different from the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvason* contained in the *Heimskringla*); *Íslands Landnámabók* ('The Book of the Settlement of Iceland'), tr. T. Ellwood, Kendal, 1898; *Story of Egil Skallagrímsson*, tr. W. C. Green, London, 1893; *Grettis Saga* ('The Story of Grettir the Strong'), tr. E. Magnússon and W. Morris, new ed., do. 1900; also tr. A. Hight in the 'Everyman's Library,' do. 1914; *Brennu Njáls Saga* ('The Story of Burnt Njál'), tr. G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1861 (also in 'Everyman's Library'); *Hrafnkels Saga Freysgóða*, tr. J. Coles in *Summer Travelling in Iceland*, London, 1882 (contains also *Bandamanna Saga* and the *Thórthar Hraethu Saga*); *Howard the Halt* (containing also *The Banded Men*, and *Hen Thorir*), tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon ('The Saga Library,' i.), do. 1891; *Völsunga Saga*, tr. W. Morris and E. Magnússon, London and Felling-on-Tyne, 1870; *Three Northern Love Stories* (containing the *Saga of Prithjóf the Bold*, *Víglund the Fair*, *Gunnlaugs Saga Ormstungu*, *Hethinn and Högni*, etc.), tr. E. Magnússon and W. Morris, London, 1875. A list of English trr. of other sagas will be found in Craigie, *Icelandic Sagas*, ch. 7, p. 110; *Beowulf*, ed. W. J. Sedgefield[2], Manchester, 1913; also by A. J. Wyatt and R. W. Chambers, Cambridge, 1914, etc.; *Beowulf* has been translated by J. R. Clarke Hall, C. B. Tinker, F. J. Child, etc.; Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. C. Plummer, 2 vols., Oxford, 1896, tr. A. M. Sellar, London, 1907, tr. V. D. Scudder ('Everyman's Library'), do. 1910.

The most important German texts, chiefly charms, will be found in W. Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*[3], Halle, 1888; and in M. Heyne, *Kleinere Altniederdeutsche Denkmäler*[2], Paderborn, 1877; Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, bks. i.–ix., tr. O. Elton, London, 1894; Jordanes, *The Origin and Deeds of the Goths*, tr. C. Mierow[2], Princeton, U.S.A., 1915; Strabo, *Geography*, tr. H. C. Hamilton and W. Falconer, 3 vols., London, 1854–57; Tacitus, *Annals* and *Histories*, esp. the *Germany*, tr. by many and various scholars (*e.g.*, A. J. Church and W. J. Brodribb), London, 1877; Cæsar, *Commentaries on the Gallic War*, tr. T. Rice Holmes, do. 1908.

N. KERSHAW.

THAGS.—A secret organization of robber-stranglers called Thags existed for centuries in India, but it was put down by Lord William Bentinck's Government in the second quarter of the 19th century. Their history is full of incident and varied interest; here the religious and ethical aspects of the subject must be dominant.

1. Introduction.—The word *thag*, usually written *thug*, comes from a Sanskrit root *sthaga* meaning 'conceal,' which in the modern vernaculars becomes *thag* and means 'deceive.' The earliest reference to Thags comes from the middle of the 12th cent., and the first historical information about them from the end of the 13th cent.; but clear and full knowledge did not become available until the time when the organization was put down, about 1830. At that time there were thousands of Thags, well organized and extremely successful. They were all men of intelligence and capacity, most of them Hindus of good caste or respectable Muhammadans. Religion controlled their operations down to the last detail. How far back the fully organized confederacy reaches we cannot tell; but scattered fragments of information make it probable that in all essentials the conspiracy had been the same for several centuries.

2. Description.—Thags were ostensibly most respectable men, engaged in business, farming, or something else equally harmless. Their method was to start out in bands of from ten to two hundred in the month of October. They usually posed as merchants, but on occasion adopted other disguises, especially the dress and marks of ascetics. They possessed a secret vocabulary and a number of secret signs, which could be used without danger in the presence of outsiders. They travelled along or near the great roads used by merchants and money-porters, discovered which individuals or companies carried valuable goods or large amounts of gold and silver, and then with much skill and cunning contrived to win their confidence. They would then travel with them, it might be for days or even weeks, until time, place, and all else were favourable to their purpose, when, at a signal, they suddenly set upon the unsuspecting party, strangled them all in a few minutes, buried their bodies, distributed the booty, and decamped. They used a cloth in strangling their victims. Similar methods were practised on the rivers. One of the most extraordinary features of their history is the almost unbroken immunity which they enjoyed: it was only very rarely that a Thag was caught and punished for his crimes.

Thags believed their profession to be a religious duty, and all that they did was done under the sanction of religion. They were fully convinced that the goddess Kālī, the wife of Śiva, called also Durgā and Bhawānī, had commanded them to strangle and to rob, and had laid down all the rules which they followed in the course of their operations. Many Brāhmans were Thags; and, when there was a Brāhman member in a gang, he conducted the ceremonies. The neophyte, whether the son of a Thag or a new accession, was initiated in an impressive religious ceremony, and took a dread oath of absolute fidelity to the brotherhood. Before starting on the season's operations each gang met in a suitable place, and took part in a solemn act of worship. As soon as possible after every successful operation another religious ceremony was carried out. Once in seven days at least the goddess was worshipped, and on the greater occasions animals were sacrificed in her honour. They would not start on a journey, admit a new member, or decide upon an act of murder, unless the goddess granted them favourable omens. In every ceremony she was worshipped, and to her their prayers were offered. No image was used; but the pickaxe for digging the graves of their victims, solemnly consecrated, stood for the goddess, and was believed to be filled with her power and inspired by her to guide them. In every ceremony the offerings of *gur* (*i.e.* coarse sugar) and water were made to the pickaxe; over it every oath was taken; and at all times it was regarded with extreme reverence, confidence, and fear. On every occasion when *gur* and water were offered to the pickaxe, every fully qualified Thag also ate of the *gur* and drank of the water. At the close of each period of operations a percentage of the gains was solemnly presented to the goddess in one of her temples.

Among the rules which guided the Thags perhaps the most noticeable was the law that they must never strangle a woman.

3. Sources of the system.—The religious and political conditions of mediæval India provided the soil and the seed from which this extraordinary organization grew. The following facts require to be realized.

(*a*) In all parts of India to-day there exist criminal tribes,[1] *i.e.* tribes whose regular caste-occupation is some form of crime. In each case there is a belief that some divinity has imposed on the tribe the particular type of crime which it practises and has also laid down the rules under which it is followed. It is therefore the duty of every member of the tribe to make the practice of the crime his regular occupation, and to obey all the religious rules which are laid down for his guidance in it. So long as he does so, he regards himself as a religious man. A percentage of the gains is regularly dedicated to the god or goddess who gave the tribe its criminal profession. A few of these tribes profess Muhammadanism, and dedicate their gains to some *pir* (Muhammadan saint); but they are probably old criminal tribes which have undergone a shallow conversion to Muhammadanism. Criminal tribes are primitive people of very low social standing.

(*b*) All the chief forms of Hindu theology declare that the Supreme is exalted far above the petty distinctions of human

[1] J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915, p. 424.

morality. The idea is to make Him truly absolute, to sever Him in the most decisive way, not only from the earthly and the sensual, but from all human conditions as well. Thus, from the very fact that in Himself He is completely separated from both good and evil, it becomes possible to acknowledge that He is indifferent to them and is equally the cause of both. Hence to suggest that God should bid men do what we call wrong seems to the Hindu to be not only quite natural but also inevitable.

(c) The Śākta sect of Hinduism, which worships the wife of Śiva, called Durgā, Kālī, Bhawānī, or simply 'the goddess' (Devī), and possesses a philosophical theology, falls into two sub-sects—the Right-hand and the Left-hand. The Left-hand sect has a cult which contains several extraordinary features. Only one need be mentioned here, viz. that for many centuries not only animal but also human sacrifice was offered. In 1835 the British Government prohibited human sacrifice, but until then it was common in the chief shrines of the goddess in North and Central India. According to the ritual law, only males can be sacrificed to her.

(d) In the worship of the goddess in the homes of the people, pots, pieces of metal, and diagrams are more often used than images; and both images and symbols, when duly consecrated, are believed to be filled with the presence and power of the goddess.

(e) In modern India there are many groups of ignorant Muhammadans who take part in Hindu worship. They not only join in the great festivals, but also visit Hindu temples and make offerings to the gods, in order to secure immunity from disease and to obtain other boons. Muhammadans of a low type thus readily adopt elements of the Hindu cult.

These facts enable one to realize that, in mediæval India, there might readily appear a community organized on the basis of the worship of the goddess and the practice of murder and robbery. At first it would differ but little, if at all, from an ordinary criminal tribe; and the first Thags would be ignorant Hindus who had been worshippers of the goddess before they formed the society to strangle and rob unwary travellers. To pass from participation in human sacrifice before the altar of the goddess to the search for victims for her on the high roads would be no violent change. Nor would even the thoughtful Hindu be shocked by the doctrine that the goddess had ordered the programme of murder. Hindu theology provides a substantial basis for the idea. Further, the fundamental document on which the worship of the Devī rests[1] is full of blood and horror. The story in that document of her struggle with a demon named Raktabīja and her final triumph over him was made by Thags the starting-point of the tale in which she commands the original Thags to strangle men.[2] The ritual law that only males should be sacrificed to her is clearly the source of the rule that Thags must not kill women. It would also seem quite natural to devotees of the goddess to use the pickaxe as a symbol instead of an image, and they would instinctively believe that the power and the will of the goddess were present in it.

Nor need we wonder that Muhammadans, in order to become Thags, were willing to participate in Hindu worship, since so many are to-day accustomed to supplement Muslim rites with the cult of Hindu divinities.

(f) India has usually been ruled, not by one Imperial Government, but by a multitude of petty states, each of which sought only to secure peace and order within its own narrow territory, and cared little or nothing for what happened outside. Nor has the individual Indian ever felt it to be his duty to go out of his way to secure the well-being of the Indian people as a whole. If, therefore, some of the subjects of one of these small states pursued a certain type of crime outside the limits of the state and brought back large gains, whereof they gave considerable percentages to the Government, on the one hand, and to the temples, on the other, both Government and people were usually only too willing to acquiesce in the arrangement, and to do all that was possible to protect the men who brought them so much prosperity.

These and similar facts account for the almost universal immunity which the Thags enjoyed. They were found all over India, were closely bound to one another by oath and interest, and were usually only too well able to take prompt vengeance on any who molested the brotherhood.

[1] *I.e.* the Chaṇḍī episode in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*.
[2] Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, p. 127.

Thus only an Imperial Government using wide powers could successfully grapple with them.

4. The rise and fall of Thagī.—It seems clear that the Thag conspiracy was originally a Hindu organization, as we have already suggested, and that it came into being before the Muhammadan conquest of North India (1193–1293). In his *Śrīkaṇṭhacharita* the Hindu poet Maṅkha or Maṅkaka (fl. *c.* A.D. 1150) compares the thievish spring to a Thag.[1] Clearly by his time the community was already well known.

If the community was very successful, it would soon attract indigent Hindus of high caste, and there would be plenty of poor Brāhmans who would be eager to enter. It seems probable that, after the Muhammadan conquest, during one of the many periods when anarchy was wide-spread, the stranglers found unusual opportunities for their depredations, and waxed so rapidly rich that many Muhammadans became Thags and readily acquiesced in the established cult of the goddess. The great success and the wonderful immunity from punishment which the movement enjoyed would be to them clear proof of its divine origin. There is conclusive evidence that Muhammadan Thags looked back with great veneration to Nizām al-Dīn Awliyā, a famous Muslim saint, who lived at Delhi in the first quarter of the 14th cent., and that they regarded him as one of the founders of the system.[2] This fits in perfectly with our theory that, at some time after the conquest, numerous Muhammadans joined the community. It is probable that the event occurred about A.D. 1300. The story that Muhammadan Thags were all descended from seven famous tribes[3] may also have a historical root.

The confederacy lived and flourished for many centuries, and was still extremely prosperous at the moment when it had the ill fortune to attract the attention of the British Government in India. In 1829 special officers were appointed to investigate the system, and a serious campaign was started for the destruction of the whole organization. Within seven years the work was done. The success of this great effort is mainly due to the devotion and genius of Captain, later Major-General, Sir W. H. Sleeman.

5. Religious and ethical character of the Thags.—Those Europeans who had extended intercourse with Thags, during the period when the British Government were endeavouring to put the system down, gave very vivid descriptions of the kind of men they were.

(a) Every Thag was fully convinced that the goddess had created the system, and that she invariably saved Thags from punishment or disaster, so long as they obeyed the rules she had laid down for their operations. They were also immovably convinced that the consecrated pickaxe was so filled with the presence of the goddess as to be able to guide the Thags in their wanderings and to bring dire disaster on every one who disobeyed.[4]

(b) No Thag ever showed the slightest compunctions of conscience for his crimes. Sleeman writes:

'A Thug considers the persons murdered precisely in the light of victims offered up to the Goddess; and he remembers them, as a Priest of Jupiter remembered the oxen, and a Priest of Saturn the children sacrificed upon their altars. He meditates his murders without any misgivings, he perpetrates them without any emotions of pity, and he remembers them without any feelings of remorse. They trouble not his dreams, nor does their recollection ever cause him inquietude in darkness, in solitude, or in the hour of death.'[5]

Never did the strength of religious faith or the extraordinary domination which religion exercises over man's moral nature find clearer illustration.

LITERATURE.—W. H. Sleeman, *Ramaseeana, or a Vocabulary of the Language used by the Thugs, with an Appendix*

[1] Garbe, *Beiträge*, p. 187.
[2] W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, rev. and annot. ed. by V. A. Smith, London, 1915, p. 491.
[3] Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, p. 11.
[4] *Ib.* p. 9.
[5] *Ib.* p. 7 f.

descriptive of the Fraternity, etc., Calcutta, 1836; *Report on the Depredations committed by the Thug Gangs*, do. 1840; Meadows Taylor, *Confessions of a Thug* (a novel), London, 1839, new ed., do. 1916; J. Hutton, *Popular Account of the Thugs and Dacoits*, do. 1857; *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Thugs'; R. Garbe, *Beiträge zu ind. Kulturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1903.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

THALES.—See IONIC PHILOSOPHY.

THĀNESAR.—Thāneśar (Skr. *sthāṇvīśvara*, *sthāṇu*, a local name of Śiva, *īśvara*, 'lord'; also *sthāṇeśvara*, *sthāṇa*, 'shrine,' and *īśvara*) is a sacred town in the Karnāl District of the Panjāb, lat. 29° 59′ N.; long. 76° 50′ E., on the banks of the river Sarasvatī (*q.v.*). The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsiang, describes it under the name of Sa-t'a-ni-shi-fa-lo, as the centre of the Hindu Holy Land (Dharmakshetra, Kurukshetra) and gives the local legends.[1] It has been identified with the Ostobalasara or Batangkaisara of Ptolemy.[2] In A.D. 1014 it was sacked by Maḥmūd of Ghaznī.[3] The most famous shrine was that dedicated to Chakrasvāmi, Viṣṇu, 'lord of the discus.' The statue is said to have been taken to Ghaznī to be broken up and trodden under foot. It was finally desecrated by Aurangzīb. Enormous crowds of pilgrims visit the place to bathe at eclipses of the sun.

LITERATURE.—A. Cunningham, *Archæological Survey of India Report*, ii. [Simla, 1871] 212 ff.; *IGI* xxiii. 305.

W. CROOKE.

THANK-OFFERING.—See SACRIFICE.

THEATRE.—See DRAMA.

THEFT.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

THEISM.—**1. Definition.**—The word 'theism' (Fr. *théisme*, Germ. *Theismus*) is a purely modern formation, implying a non-existent Greek θεισμός and an equally non-existent verb θείζω (on the analogy of μηδίζω, φιλιππίζω, and the like). As there is a certain vagueness about the meaning of the word in current English, it is necessary to begin this article with a convention as to the sense in which 'theism' will be employed in what follows. The word will be used throughout as a name for a philosophical theory as distinct from a practical religious faith. Perhaps the faith and the theory are never absolutely disjoined, but they are at least logically distinguishable. It may be doubted whether any man wholly untouched by the spirit of adoration and wholly devoid of love to God has ever been a genuine theist in philosophy, and again whether one can be in earnest with a philosophical belief in God without being led on to regulate his life by that belief. But it is at least possible to practise love of God and trust in God without making any conscious attempt to find a speculative explanation of the world. There are many who, in George Tyrrell's phrase, share the faith of Simon Peter without concerning themselves about his theology. The present article will be exclusively concerned with the philosophical conception of God as the ultimate ground of things. Current usage seems to require a further distinction. It seems necessary to discriminate theism not only from atheism (*q.v.*), the denial that God exists, and scepticism or agnosticism (*q.v.*), the refusal to answer any question about the ultimate ground of things, but also from deism (*q.v.*), which, in its way, also treats God as an ultimate ground. We shall probably not depart far from the implications of current language if we agree to define theism as the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (*a*) intrinsically complete or perfect and (*b*), as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship. Belief in a ground of things which is not intrinsically complete and perfect, and consequently no adequate object of adoration, but at best of respect and admiration, would at the present day probably be described by every one as deism rather than as theism. Thus the suggested definition in fact coincides with the famous formula of St. Anselm, that God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest*, 'the being than which none greater can be thought.'[1]

It is evident that theism, thus understood, is incompatible with polytheism (*q.v.*) and also with any doctrine, theological or metaphysical, which asserts a plurality of independent and equally ultimate 'reals,' whether in the form of a dualism between God, the good principle, and an immaterial evil principle (Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism [*qq.v.*]), or between God and matter, or in that of an ultimate plurality of unoriginated 'souls' or 'persons,' or in any other shape. All such doctrines involve the denial that there is any object which answers to the definition *id quo maius cogitari non potest*. For this reason the various modern theories of a finite or limited deity are inconsistent with strict theism. For a deity limited by restrictions arising outside his own nature is manifestly not the source of all reality other than himself, and thus not God in the sense in which we are using that word. And, if the 'limitations' are asserted to be self-limitations, due to the nature of God Himself (as in the philosophy of Hastings Rashdall), we have to face a dilemma. Either the presence of these limitations in the deity is a defect, and the deity is therefore not God in our sense at all, or their presence is not a defect, and there is then no sense in calling them restrictions or limitations, as it is their absence which would, in this case, be the defect.

It is mainly on the ground of alleged difficulties in the notion of the divine Omnipotence that these theories are recommended. But the difficulties seem due to misunderstanding. Omnipotence means only power to do whatever is consistent with God's own perfection. It is no real limitation of the divine power to hold, as most theologians and philosophers have done, that God cannot do what is in itself absurd—*e.g.*, cannot make a false proposition true, or make virtue vice, or annihilate Himself. The old Stoic boast that the sage is in one respect more powerful than God, because he can put an end to his existence if he grows tired of it, is a mere false paradox.

It is, perhaps, more important to be clear on the point that theism, as defined, is equally inconsistent with the type of philosophic monism called by James Ward 'singularism'—the theory that there is only one existent, the Absolute, and that this single existent is the true subject of all significant propositions. If we mean by God a being from whom all else that exists derives its being and who can be worshipped, then the belief in God necessarily implies belief in the real existence of beings who can worship God. To say that God is the source of existence implies that God is not all that exists. From a theistic point of view it is, no doubt, proper to call God, the being from whom all others are derived, the Absolute or unconditioned being, but only on the condition that the Absolute is not equated with all that really exists. The underived source of existence may, in virtue of its unique intrinsic completeness or perfection, be called the *ens realissimum*, but the very use of such a phrase implies that there are other *entia realia*.

It will probably be readily admitted that the ἓν καὶ πᾶν doctrine of Spinoza cannot be reasonably called theism, nor have the most distinguished representatives of singularism in

[1] S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, London, 1884, i. 183 ff.
[2] J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 128.
[3] H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, ii. 452 ff.

[1] *Proslogion*, ch. 2.

our own times shown any desire to claim the name of theists. It should be recognized that the popular language about a purely 'immanent God,' as opposed to the 'transcendent God' of orthodox Christian theology, is equally incompatible with genuine theism, inasmuch as it conflicts with the recognition of a real distinction between the supreme source of existence and the dependent existents. It is just this distinction which is vital in a theistic philosophy, and, for this reason, it may be taken as a fair test of the theism of a philosophy whether its way of conceiving the relation of its God to the world is compatible with a real recognition of the divine transcendence.

2. Philosophy and theism.—If we look at the history of European philosophy, it may be said that in the main the general trend of philosophic thought, even independently of the influence of positive religions, has been theistic, at least from the time of Plato to our own day. Even the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, when all the qualifications with which it is enunciated by its author are taken fully into account, has a recognizable theistic tendency and might be said, apart from its blunders about dynamics, to be little more than a very crude reproduction of the 'negative theology' which is really one-half of the orthodox Christian doctrine of God. As will be shown directly, this tendency to theism is a direct consequence of the permanent influence of Plato on all subsequent developments in philosophy. Apart from materialism (*q.v.*), which has never produced a philosopher of the first rank, the main antitheistic influence in modern European philosophy has been that of Spinoza (*q.v.*), which has steadily affected metaphysical thought, perhaps even more outside than within the professionally philosophical schools, from the time of Jacobi and Lessing down to the end of the 19th century. This is partly accounted for by the powerful attraction exercised by the naturalistic strain in Spinoza's doctrine on the devotees of physical science, partly by the tendency of many of the most prominent 19th cent. representatives of the Hegelian line of thought to interpret Hegel (*q.v.*) in a Spinozistic sense.

Whether the Spinozistic interpretation of Hegel is the true one might admit of question, and it has been rejected by such eminent Hegelian students as Hutchison Stirling and J. M. E. McTaggart, in the one case for a definitely theistic interpretation, in the other for a version which has more affinity with the monadism of Leibniz (*q.v.*) than with Spinoza's singularism. But in the main Hegel has become known, at least in the English-speaking world, through the work of philosophers with strong Spinozistic prepossessions, with the consequence that the influence of Hegelian ways of thinking has been definitely hostile to theism. Even among professedly Christian theologians allegiance to Hegel in philosophy has usually led to an extreme 'immanence' doctrine of God which at least compromised the theistic position.

More ephemeral has been the influence excited in the last half of the 19th cent. by the pessimistic atheism of Schopenhauer (*q.v.*), and in the last twenty or twenty-five years by the brilliant, if incoherent, anti-Christian polemics of Nietzsche (*q.v.*). Both the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the antitheism of Nietzsche are, however, too little reasoned and too obviously matters of personal temperament to be regarded as of permanent philosophical importance. The influence of Hegel, also, and still more that of Spinoza, would seem to be for the present a spent force. In the present state of philosophy the most formidable rival to theism as an explanation of the world appears to be the thoroughgoing rationalist pluralism of the 'new realism,' represented at its best by the writings of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Of this doctrine, as well as of the supposed objection to theism arising from the evolutionist's alleged vision of Nature as 'red in tooth and claw,' something is said below (§ 17).

3. Plato.—The importance of Plato as the creator of philosophical theology makes it necessary to begin any serious account of theism as a philosophical theory with a clear statement of the Platonic position, so far as that position was expressed by Plato in his writings. To call Plato the creator of philosophic theology does not, of course, mean that the belief in God is an invention of Plato. As has often been remarked, the general trend of the best Greek thought on the problems of human conduct and destiny—as represented, *e.g.*, by such poets as Aeschylus and Euripides—is in the direction of a vague monotheism. And it cannot be seriously doubted that an earnest practical faith in God was characteristic of Pythagoras and of Socrates. Even the most unreasonable scepticism about the historical good faith of Plato's accounts of his master cannot obscure the fact that Socrates gave up the whole of his mature life to the execution of a mission to which he believed himself to have been called by God and died as a martyr to his calling. But this, so far as we know, was a matter of personal religious conviction rather than of speculative theory. Even Plato himself does not attempt a formal philosophical statement and justification of the belief in God until we come to the *magnum opus* of his old age, the *Laws*. In his best known earlier writings—*e.g.*, the *Republic*—great stress is laid upon the importance for the formation of moral character of an ethically adequate conception of the divine nature. God must be thought of as perfectly good, and current religion must be purged of everything which suggests that there is anything unethical in His character or that His dealings with men have any other purpose than their true good. It is just because God is perfectly good that (*Republic*, *Theaetetus*) the end of life may be said to be to 'become like God.' God fashioned the world and made it the best possible world because it would be unworthy of His goodness to make it otherwise (*Timaeus*). True piety is to be a 'fellow-worker' with God (*Euthyphro*). We are God's sheep and He is our shepherd (*Politicus*). The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and when they depart from us it is to be with Him (*Phaedo*). But this is, of course, the language of religion, not of science, and we are made to understand the difference by the simple fact that nearly all that is said of God, outside the *Laws*, beyond the one emphatic statement about His perfect goodness, is conveyed in 'myths,' *i.e.* in imaginative stories, as to which we are cautioned that we cannot undertake to pronounce on their strict truth. Nor is any attempt made to *prove* either the existence or the perfect goodness of God. In particular the story of creation in the *Timaeus* is, as we are explicitly warned, not to be taken as scientific truth, but as a tale which is the most probable that can be told about matters which lie outside the region within which scientific knowledge is possible. If we did not possess the *Laws*, it would be legitimate, as in fact it is not, to doubt whether Plato did not agree with Kant that reasoned scientific knowledge of God is impossible, though on grounds which are not identical with Kant's. In the tenth book of the *Laws*, however,[1] we have a formal proof of God's existence, wholly devoid of any features of mythical colouring, which is expressly declared to be conclusive. The argument, the main principle of which had been already anticipated in the *Phaedrus*,[2] is as follows. The most universal characteristic of things is motion and change. Now, motions are of two kinds, (*a*) impressed, and (*b*) original or spontaneous. Or, to use Plato's own phraseology, there are motions which are able only to move something else (impressed or communicated movements), and there are motions which 'move themselves as well as other things.' And native or spontaneous movement is logically prior to impressed or communicated movement. We cannot

[1] 887 A–899 E. [2] *Phaedrus*, 245 C–E.

regard all movements as impressed or communicated without falling into an impossible logical *regressus in indefinitum*. Further, 'motion which moves itself' is precisely what we mean when we talk of ψυχή, 'soul.' 'Soul' is simply a shorter name for the κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν δυναμένη. It is just when we see a thing manifestly capable of internally initiated movement or change that we feel bound to say that the thing in question is 'animated' or has a 'soul.' It follows, then, that souls and their various 'motions' (judgment, volition, hope, desire, and the like) are prior to bodies and their motions or changes. All bodily processes are derivative from and dependent on 'motions' of the soul, and it is just for this reason that Plato explicitly denies the doctrine, often imputed to him by the uncritical, that 'matter' can be the principle of evil. Further, good souls, in the degree of their goodness, are sources of orderly and beneficent motions; evil souls, of disorderly and evil motions. Now, the great recurrent motions which science discovers in the universe (the periodic motions of the heavenly bodies) are all regular and orderly and belong to the class of the 'good' motions. Hence they must be due to good souls. (It had been carefully laid down in an earlier passage that all apparent irregularities and anomalies in these motions are only apparent and disappear as our science becomes more adequate.) If, then, we define God as a perfectly good soul, we may say that, since the great motions of the universe are all perfectly orderly, they must be caused by God. God, however, cannot be the only soul, or 'movement that moves itself.' For, though the *magnalia naturae* exhibit perfect regularity, there are also irregular and destructive motions, such as those, *e.g.*, of disease or those due to a wicked will; and these are just as actual as facts as anything else. Thus the facts of the universe bear witness to the existence of souls which are not wholly good. There must be at least one 'bad' soul, which is not God, and there may, of course, be as many more as are required to account for the observed facts. The transcendence of God is thus safeguarded.

Plato's language about the 'bad' souls has been misunderstood both in ancient and in modern times. Plutarch[1] thought that he had discovered in Plato's words the doctrine of an ultimate dualism between a good and an evil world-soul. This view did not find favour with the Platonists of antiquity, but has been revived in modern times by Zeller, from the weight of whose name it has obtained a wholly undeserved consideration. Plato says nothing about an evil principle, in the *Laws* or anywhere else. What he does say[2] is merely that all motions cannot be due to a single soul; there must be at least two, the 'beneficent' and 'that which has power to effect the contrary results.' The whole context suggests that the bad souls of which he is thinking are chiefly those of passionate and ignorant men, which, of course, are numerous. It should further be noted that, in the passage of the *Laws* containing the theistic argument, Plato speaks throughout in the plural of 'gods,' giving the soul which moves the sun as an example of his meaning. This is, however, a mere consequence of the fact that the legislation of the *Laws* is designed for an ordinary Greek community. It is assumed that the State religion of the colony will recognize 'gods many,' and Plato's object is to substitute the heavenly bodies, or rather the souls which move them, as types of regularity and beneficence, for the morally frail and passionate anthropomorphic deities of actual Greek cults. Of Plato's personal conviction of the unity of God there can be no real doubt. The unity of God, 'the best soul,' follows in fact, as we may see from the *Timaeus*, from the unity of the universe. The universe is one and is a rational system; therefore it is the product of one intelligence.[3] That a Greek writing for Greeks should allow himself to speak of θεοί explains itself; what is really significant is that Plato speaks so frequently, and just when he wishes to be most impressive, of θεός.[4]

From the goodness of God, since God is a soul (ψυχή), it follows that everything in the world is governed by a wise and beneficent Providence, and that God's dealings with man are perfectly and inexorably just. Thus the tenth book of the *Laws* definitely creates 'natural theology' as a branch of philosophy for the first time and indicates once for all its main doctrines—the existence and goodness of God, the reality of God's providential government of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and the correspondence between man's destiny and his works. These doctrines together make up what was known as 'natural' or 'philosophical' theology, as distinct from both 'poetic' theology—the stories told of the gods by the poets—and 'civil' theology, which consists in knowledge of the cultus prescribed by the State.[1]

The question whether Plato's theology amounts to a complete theism is not without its difficulties. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, as Burnet has said,[2] Plato regarded his doctrine of God as the central thing in his whole system. It is precisely the activity of God, the perfectly good soul, that connects the world of 'becoming,' *i.e.* 'Nature,' the world of all that we call empirical existence, with the system of εἴδη. The reason why there is a world of 'things' at all is just that God, the perfectly good soul, exists and is eternally active. The perfectly good soul, of course, has a perfect knowledge of 'the Good,' and its activity consists in reproduction or 'imitation' of the Good. Thus all existents other than God owe the very fact of their existence to God, as they owe it also to Him that they are what they are. Still it does not appear that the Platonic God is *all* that later theists have meant by the Supreme. He is an existent, though a perfect one, and beyond all existents there is the system of 'form' or 'numbers.' This is the pattern (παράδειγμα) after which God makes heaven and earth and all that is in them, and is thus something metaphysically prior to God Himself. If we understand by theism the doctrine that God is the sole unconditioned source not only of existents but also of real possibilities, we shall have to say that it is only in Neo-Platonism that Greek philosophy succeeds in being fully theistic. A word or two may be said about the argument by which Plato establishes the existence of God. It contains in itself the germs of more than one of the 'proofs of the being of God' which have become traditional. Its presuppositions are two: (1) the universal validity of the principle of causality, and (2) the regularity of the cosmical motions—the 'reign of law' in the physical world. From the principle of causality, taken together with the assumption that there cannot be an infinite regress in the causal series, comes the conclusion that there must be an original cause (or causes) of all movements, which is 'self-moving'—*i.e.* a 'soul' or 'souls'—and from the regularity of the cosmic motions and the systematic interconnexion between them it follows that the ultimate 'mover' is the perfectly good soul. Thus Plato's reasoning combines in one argument the principle of the cosmological argument from the 'contingency of the world' to the existence of a First Cause and that of the argument from design, which is not degraded by Plato, as it has often been by modern apologists, into an argument from the alleged adaptation of the world to our individual convenience. As understood by Plato, the

[1] *De animae procreat. in Timaeo*, 1014 E.
[2] *Laws*, 896 E.
[3] *Timaeus*, 30 D-31 B.
[4] In *Ep.* 13 he writes to Dionysius II. that he will distinguish letters of real importance from those which he is obliged to write as a matter of formal politeness by mentioning θεός and not θεοί in the opening sentences.

[1] The distinction in this form became fixed in consequence of the fact that it was adopted by the Roman encyclopaedist M. Terentius Varro and taken over from him by St. Augustine in the *de Civitate Dei*. The theology of the philosophers was called 'natural,' not, of course, with any thought of a contrast with 'revealed' truth, but because it was held to be scientific and true, unlike mythology, which the poets were believed to have invented, and the cultus of the State, which, as Hobbes puts it, 'is not philosophy but law.'
[2] *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., *Thales to Plato*, London, 1914, p. 335.

argument from design is simply the argument from the intelligibility of the world of actual facts and events to intelligence in the cause which produces and sustains it.[1] Plato's argument is thus an *argumentum a posteriori*, in the correct scholastic, not in the inaccurate Kantian, sense of the phrase *a posteriori*; *i.e.*, it is an argument from the character of a known effect to the character of its cause. That there is a world of mutable things, and that, as scientific insight advances, the processes in this world of mutability are more and more found to exhibit conformity to intelligible laws, are assumed as empirically known truths, and without these empirical premisses the demonstration would not work. There is no hint in Plato of the line of thought which at a later date crystallized into the one genuinely *a priori* argument for the existence of God, the ontological proof, which, if valid, establishes its conclusion without any empirical premiss whatsoever.

4. Aristotle.—Aristotle's doctrine of God, though better known to the modern world than Plato's, is simply the Platonic doctrine rather more precisely expressed and shorn of its ethical and practical applications. With Aristotle, as with Plato, the doctrine of God is absolutely central, and the argument is once more based upon the assumption of the causal principle. Like Plato, Aristotle contends that communicated or impressed motion presupposes original or spontaneous motion, and like Plato he regards ψυχή as the one source of spontaneous movement. But here he is led to make a further refinement. The 'motions of the soul' arise from ὄρεξις, 'appetition,' and appetition is always appetition of something apprehended as good (ὀρεγόμεθα διότι δοκεῖ). This apprehension of an object as good is an exercise of νοῦς, an act of immediate intelligent apprehension. The apprehension is not itself a movement, though it gives rise to motions both of the soul and of the body. We must not then be content to trace back all motions to their origin in the 'movement which can move itself,' but behind even this we must look for an 'unmoved mover,' an unchanging initiator of all change. Otherwise we shall simply fall into an indefinite regress, and an indefinite regress in the order of efficient causes is unthinkable (the principle of the argument from the 'contingency of the world'). The unity of the supreme First Mover once more follows from the unity of the physical world. The whole physical world is a scene of 'becoming,' in which the potentialities latent in things are developed into actuality by the agency of efficient causes which are already themselves developed actualities. Behind every process of development lies the agency of such already developed actualities, and thus, just because there really is something and not nothing, there must be some actual agents which have never developed at all, but have been eternally and immutably active. From Aristotle's point of view, all processes of development depend upon the eternally regular and uninterrupted movements of the heavenly bodies. Hence there must be as many 'unmoved movers' as there are independent astronomical movements. Further, astronomical movements form a hierarchy. Each of the 50 odd concentric 'spheres' which Aristotle postulates to account for the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies has its own proper revolution and its own 'unmoved mover.' But there is one sphere which, without being enclosed by any other, encloses all the rest, and, according to the Aristotelian astronomy (which disagrees on this point wholly from Plato), communicates its movement to all the spheres it contains. This is the sphere of the fixed stars, which rotates uniformly on its axis in the period of 24 hours. The 'unmoved mover' of this sphere is consequently God. As that which He moves is one, and its movement is eternal, continuous, and regular, God is also one, eternal, immutable, the First Mover upon whom all motion in the universe depends.[1] So far Aristotle's doctrine is, in substance, that of Plato in the *Laws*, except that Aristotle has dogmatically committed himself to a particular astronomical theory, that of Eudoxus, which, for sound scientific reasons, did not commend itself to Plato. In his conception of the nature of the First Mover Aristotle departs more widely both from Plato and from true theism. God, as Aristotle describes Him, is not a ψυχή, but a νοῦς. And he infers from his doctrine that the First Mover must be unmoved the conclusion that the divine mind, unlike our minds, because it is unmoving, must eternally think one and the self-same object. Further, this object must be adequate to occupy the divine mind through eternity. It follows that the object of God's unbroken Sabbath of contemplation is God Himself. 'He thinks Himself and His thinking is a thinking of thinking (νόησις νοήσεως).'[2] In fact, though without the presence of God there could be no motion in the universe, God is supposed to be wholly unaware of the existence of the universe which He moves. He moves it by being an object of appetition to it, and thus it is aware of Him, but He is no more aware of it than the various objects of our human appetitions need be aware of us and our desire for them. The world's desire after God is precisely and exactly the 'desire of the moth for the star.' This conception, due apparently to Aristotle's own temperamental indifference to the practical life, of course strikes out of philosophical theology the doctrine of Providence and of the righteousness of God's dealings with man. In fact, since Aristotle held that 'goodness of character' is a different thing from 'goodness of intellect,' he is quite consistent when at the end of his *Ethics* he expressly denies that goodness of character or moral goodness is predicable of God.[3] God, in fact, becomes in Aristotle what Aristotle himself would have liked to be, if the conditions of human life would allow it—a mere 'magnified and non-natural' scientific thinker. In respect of this evacuation of all ethical content from the idea of God, Aristotle may fairly be said to be the founder of philosophical deism, as Plato was the founder of philosophical theism. It is clear that to Aristotle and his disciple Eudemus, who identifies the speculative life with the contemplation and worship of God,[4] the First Mover was an object of genuine worship and reverence, though the worship of such a being could have no real connexion with active good works; but a non-ethical deity, who knows nothing of humanity's needs and aspirations, can never become the centre of an enduring religion. Hence it is not surprising that, while Platonism continued throughout later antiquity to be the creed of educated religious men, Aristotelianism was reduced to simple naturalism within half a century of Aristotle's death by the third head of the school, Strato of Lampsacus.[5]

5. Epicureans.—The deism of the Epicureans is of no significance for natural theology. For all practical purposes the school were, what their opponents called them, pure atheists, since it was

[1] The notion of an unconscious intelligence or reason as the ground of things is excluded by Plato's doctrine that νοῦς can only exist in a ψυχή (*Sophistes*, 249 A, *Philebus*, 30 C, *Timaeus*, 30 B).

[1] See for all this in particular *Metaphysics*, 1072a 19–1073b 17, *Physics*, 258b 10 ff.

[2] *Metaphysics*, 1074b 33.

[3] *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1178b 7–23.

[4] τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (*Ethica Eudemea*, 1249b 20).

[5] Cicero, *Academ.* ii. 38, *de Natura Deorum*, i. 35; Plutarch, *adv. Colotem*, p. 1115.

one of their principal tenets that the gods not merely take no interest in the doings of men but play no part in cosmology; the world has been formed and continues to exist *opera sine divom*. The only use made by Epicurus of gods is a trivial one; their existence accounts for the phantasms of superhuman beings which are seen in dreams.

6. Stoics.—In Stoicism, on the other hand, natural theology of a kind plays a prominent part, though the original Stoic doctrine can hardly be called theistic. The theology of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is a materialistic doctrine of immanence. The substance of all that exists is a single body; in fact, the universe is a 'fire.' The cosmic fire is intelligent, and it is this fire that is God. This doctrine, borrowed by the founders of Stoicism from Heraclitus, but put forward with a conscious opposition, which Heraclitus would not have understood, to the immaterialism of Plato and Aristotle, is the nearest counterpart that ancient thought has to show to the Spinozist conception of the one substance with its plurality of disparate but 'parallel' attributes. But with the Stoics it is not, as with Spinoza, thought, but extension, that is the 'Aaron's rod that swallows all the rest' of the attributes.

As to the details of the doctrine. God and the world, though really one, are logically distinguished. At one time in the history of the universe the 'fire,' or God, exists alone in its purity and contains within itself all the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι, or constitutive ratios, of everything. There follows a process of evolution, identified by the Stoics with the 'downward path,' or ὁδὸς κάτω, of Heraclitus, in which the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι of all things are unfolded and a world of diversified existents produced. There is a second and antithetical process, regarded as identical with the Heraclitan ὁδὸς ἄνω, or 'upward path,' and ending in an ἐκπύρωσις, or general conflagration; the plurality of diverse existents is once more converted into the original fire, and God is left once more as the only existent. The whole double process of evolution followed by involution constitutes a 'great year,' and the life of the universe is made up of an endless succession of such 'great years,' each repeating the events of the preceding without variation (a fancy which we know from a fragment of Eudemus preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle[1] to go back to the early Pythagoreans, and which has been revived in our own time by Nietzsche as the doctrine of 'eternal recurrence'). The details of the process of evolution belong to the Stoic physics and do not concern us here. In accord with this doctrine, God is sometimes declared to be the same as the κόσμος, or universe, sometimes distinguished from it. 'They use the word κόσμος in three senses, to mean (1) God Himself . . . who is, of course, imperishable and unoriginate, the artificer of the world-order, who resumes into Himself and again begets out of Himself the whole of being in accord with certain cycles of time; (2) the world-order formed by the heavenly bodies, (3) the composite of these two.'[2] Hence the full definition of God was that God is πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα κατ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεται, 'a fire of craft [or 'art'] proceeding in order to the generation of a world, containing in itself all the constitutive ratios in accord wherewith all things come to be in the order of destiny.'[3] Strictly speaking, this doctrine, which equates God with the κόσμος, is not theism at all, since it denies that there are any real existents other than God. But religiously the founders of Stoicism, as we see from the well-known *Hymn* of Cleanthes, were fervent worshippers of God. It was characteristic of the school from the first that they insisted strongly on the moral side of theism. Like the Platonists, they were vigorous asserters of Providence and used the doctrine to justify even such things as astrology, prophetic dreams, oracles, and divination. Providence was, however, regarded as identical with absolute predestination, and scientifically explained by the rigid mechanical concatenation of all events in a single causal system. Hence, as may be seen from the controversial essay of Plutarch on *The Contradictions in Stoicism* (περὶ στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων), the devices by which the Stoic philosophers tried to conciliate their optimistic belief in the providential order with their materialistic monism were often really fatal to the ascription of moral goodness to God.

In the writings of the Stoics of the Roman period, from whom the ideas of the school have become familiar to the modern world, the materialistic and fatalistic side of the doctrine is less prominent. They often seem to be teaching a simple spiritual theism. It must be remembered that all these writers are later than, and were greatly influenced by, Posidonius of Apamea (first half of 1st cent. B.C.), who gravely modified the original doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus by contaminating it with Platonism, as his contemporary, Antiochus of Ascalon, tried unsuccessfully to introduce Stoicism into the Academy. It is precisely those among the later Stoics, such as Seneca, who can be shown to depend most completely on Posidonius in whom the monism and materialism of Stoicism is least apparent. To understand the real tendencies of the system, it is important to study it as it was before Posidonius had Platonized it. For this purpose the anti-Stoic essays of Plutarch and the account of Stoic doctrine given in the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius are particularly valuable. Indispensable for special students is H. von Arnim's collection of the complete fragments of the Stoics of the pre-Roman period, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1904–05.

The one really original contribution made by Stoicism to natural theology is the appeal to 'innate ideas' and the *consensus gentium* as an argument for the existence of God. The doctrine of innate ideas (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, *notitiae communes*) is a consequence of the Aristotelian criticism of Plato. According to the theory of method expounded more specially in the *Phaedo* and the central books of the *Republic*, the work of science begins with the provisional assumption of a theory (ὑπόθεσις) to account for a group of observed facts. If the observed facts (τὰ φαινόμενα) agree with the results of deduction from the ὑπόθεσις, the 'appearances' are said to be 'saved' by the theory, and it is so far vindicated. It may still, however, be called in question, and in that case will have to be defended by being deduced from some more ultimate premisses which the impugner himself admits. It thus becomes a task for dialectic (or, as we should say, metaphysics), the highest science of all, to make a critical examination of the provisional assumptions (the unproved postulates) of all the other sciences and to discover the real unquestionable presuppositions of all knowledge. Aristotle insisted, as against this view, that the special postulates of each science must be self-evident when once they have been formulated. For the Stoics this doctrine, that every science depends upon self-evident universal premisses, created a difficulty, as in their theory of knowledge they were, unlike Aristotle, extreme sensationalists, regarding particular sense-perceptions as the foundation of all knowledge. They were accordingly obliged to provide some criticism or test by which those universal propositions which are valid generalizations from sensation may be discriminated from those which are not. An obvious test suggested itself. Generalizations which are made only by certain special groups of men or by particular individuals may fairly be supposed to be due to temperamental, educational, national, or racial bias; those which appear to be made without exception by all men, no matter how widely they differ in temperament, education, national traditions, social institutions, may be presumed to be formed spontaneously, and therefore naturally, *i.e.* as a consequence of the intrinsic character of mind. It is thus reasonable to regard these generalizations as true and thus to take the *consensus gentium* as the best guarantee for the truth of a belief. The Stoic κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, 'common' notions, are thus innate in the very sense in which Descartes afterwards used the word. It is not meant that we come into the world with them already in our possession, but that the formation of them is due to the normal development of intelligence independently of any kind of bias. As the most obvious examples of such common notions the Stoics instanced the beliefs, which they held to be common to all mankind, 'that there are gods and that they care for us.'[1] All this passed, mainly through Cicero, into the natural theology of the 17th century. This explains why modern natural theologians have often been anxious to prove the universal diffusion

[1] Diels, p. 732, 26 = Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[3], Berlin, 1912, ii. 355, 8.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, vii. 70, 137.

[3] Aetius, *Placita*, i. 7, 33 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin, 1879, p. 305). The same definition was given of φύσις, 'nature.' Cf. Cicero, *de Deor. Nat.* ii. 57: 'Zeno igitur ita naturam definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum, ad gignendum progredientem via.'

[1] Diog. Laert. vii. 36, 52.

of the belief in God and why their critics have often laid great stress on travellers' reports which have been supposed to indicate the existence of 'atheistic' savages. The Stoics themselves, in appealing to universal agreement, did not, of course, mean to deny the sporadic appearance of individual atheists. This could be accounted for as the consequence of individual prejudices due to improper education and 'unnatural' institutions. What was supposed to be demonstrated was merely that belief in God and Providence is too widely diffused to be regarded as anything but a spontaneous and 'natural' conviction. The position taken up by some modern apologists who deny that there has ever been a single convinced and sincere atheist is an exaggeration of the Stoic doctrine.[1] It may be added that the degradation of the argument from design or 'intentional causality' into the crude form which it assumes in so much of our popular apologetics is mainly due to the extravagant exaltation of man by the Stoic philosophy. With Plato and Aristotle teleology means simply that the world of historical existents and processes is so ordered that it realizes an end which has absolute intrinsic worth.[2] It is to the Stoics that we owe the coarsening of the thought into the assertion that man and man's convenience and comfort are the intrinsic and absolute good which is the end realized by the cosmic processes. Thus they maintained that plants and animals exist only to furnish man with food and raiment convenient for him, or even with agreeable luxuries.

Porphyry[3] quotes from Chrysippus the statement that 'the gods made us for ourselves and one another, but animals for us, the horse to help us in war and the dog in hunting, leopards, bears, and lions, to practise ourselves in valour upon. The pig was made for nothing but to be sacrificed, and God mixed soul with its flesh like a seasoning to make it readily digestible for us. Shell fish of all kinds and birds he contrived that we might have no lack of soups and *entrées*.'[4] According to Plutarch,[5] Chrysippus carried things so far that he asserted in his work περὶ φύσεως that God made bugs to prevent us from sleeping too long and mice to teach us to take proper care of our cupboards.

7. Neo-Platonism.—In any account of the popular theism of antiquity prominence would have to be given to the utterances of the later Platonizing Roman Stoics, such as Seneca, and to the earnest defence of the ethical side of theism by writers like Plutarch and his contemporary Maximus of Tyre. Plutarch's philosophical essays which deal with the theistic problem are specially interesting, as his determination to treat Providence and the moral government of the world by God as serious matters leads him into sharp and acute criticism not only of the perfunctory deism of Epicurus but also of the Stoic pantheistic necessitarianism (especially in the essay περὶ στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων, which aims at showing that the materialism, pantheism, and determinism of Zeno and Chrysippus are inconsistent with their moral optimism and professed belief in an ethical Providence). Interesting, however, as this theological literature is to the historian of Platonism, it cannot be said to add anything of value to philosophical theism. The Neo-Platonist school, founded in Rome by Plotinus (*c.* A.D. 205–270), worked out for the first time a thoroughgoing metaphysical theism which provided the philosophical basis for the Christian theism of the whole Middle Ages. For the purposes of the present article it will be most convenient to reproduce the main features of this doctrine as it is presented by the great systematizer of the school, Proclus (A.D. 410–485), in his στοιχείωσις θεολογική, *Rudiments of Platonic Theology*.[1] In what follows nothing will be quoted from Proclus which does not form part of the teaching of the whole Neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onwards.

In Plato's own theology, or at least in the statement of it which he gives in his writings, as we have seen, God is not quite all that the Christian theist has usually meant by God. God is the supremely good 'soul' and the source, it appears, of all existents other than Himself. But we are not positively told what is the relation of God to the supreme principles of the Platonic system, the forms (εἴδη, ἰδέαι) or numbers, and in the mythical picture-language of the *Timaeus* these forms (or numbers) are certainly represented as superior to God; they are the pre-existing model or pattern which God contemplates in fashioning the world of finite existents, or, as Plato calls it, the world of 'becoming.' There is no warrant anywhere in Plato for the psychologizing interpretation, often put on his language since the time of Philo of Alexandria, which makes the forms into thoughts of the divine mind. This means in modern language that, though God is regarded as the source of actuality, He is not unambiguously held to be also the source of all real possibility. In Neo-Platonism the further step is taken. God is thought of as the absolute *prius* of everything, and the world of existents as dependent on Him not only for its actuality but also for all its possibilities. God is no longer regarded as a soul or even as a mind, but is simply identified at once with the Good which is described in *Republic*, bk. vi., as the source of 'being and knowledge,' though itself 'on the other side of' both being and knowledge, and with the One which, according to Aristotle, Plato regarded as the οὐσία, or formal element, in the forms themselves and as the same thing as the Good.[2] The One thus becomes in Neo-Platonism a transcendent God of whom nothing can in strictness be predicated. It must not even be said to be good, since it is identical with goodness, not a subject to which goodness can be ascribed as an attribute. Nor must it be said to be or exist; it is not a being or existent, but the transcendent source of all being, and is therefore regularly said to be ὑπερούσιον, 'super-essential,' or 'super-substantial.'[3] God, thus conceived as the transcendent and ineffable source both of actuality and of real possibility (of existences and of 'essences'), is connected with the actual world by the Neo-Platonic theory of causality. The theory is commonly known as that of 'emanation,' but the metaphor of emanation is with Plotinus and Proclus only a metaphor, and the

[1] For a classic statement of the general Stoic view of the place of God in the scheme of things see, besides the famous *Hymn* of Cleanthes preserved in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i. 1, 12, p. 25, 3 (critical text in von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, i. 121 f., also J. Adam, *Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle*, London and New York, 1902, p. 54 f., and A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Cambridge, 1891), the eloquent conclusion of [Aristotle] *de Mundo*, 397, b 9 ff. The latter gives the Posidonian version and betrays Academic influence by ending with a direct quotation from the 'admirable Plato' of *Laws*, 715 E–716 A. Cicero's expositions of Stoic theology, based mainly on Posidonius, are too well known to require special mention.

[2] It is significant, as Burnet has remarked, that the very word 'teleology,' as its form shows, is derived not directly from τέλος but from the adjective τέλειος, 'whole,' 'complete.'

[3] *De Abstinentia*, iii. 20.

[4] Cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 37: 'Scite enim Chrysippus, ut clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata: ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit, animantium causa; animantes autem, hominum. . . . Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum.'

[5] *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, 1044 C.

[1] There is no good critical edition of this important work. The least defective is that in F. Creuzer's *Initia philosophiae ac theologiae*, 3 vols., Frankfort, 1820–22.

[2] *Metaphys.* A 987*b* 20: ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν. A 988*a* 14: ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν, τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν.

[3] Here we have the origin of the mystical 'negative way' in theology, and of the familiar scholastic doctrine that nothing whatever can be predicated univocally of God and of any creature, as well as of the proposition *Deus est suum esse*; *i.e.* in God the distinction between existence and *essentia*, valid for every other existent, ceases to have any meaning. It is from this last thought that the famous ontological argument for the being of God was destined to take its origin.

theory requires to be explained a little more fully, as it was not only influential throughout the Middle Ages but is tacitly presupposed in the famous attempt of Descartes to establish the existence of God in the *Third Meditation*. Causality, as understood by the Neo-Platonists, does not necessarily imply antecedence in time and is always a relation between substantival terms, not between events. The relation is dyadic and subsists between a producer (τὸ παράγον) and something which the activity of the producer calls into being (τὸ παραγόμενον). The cause of anything is the ground not merely of the existence of that thing but of its being what it is and having the character it has (the cause of its *essentia* as well as of its actuality). Causality is a relation of 'participation' (μέθεξις) or 'likeness'; *i.e.*, the effect (τὸ παραγόμενον), since it derives the fact that it is and its whole quality from its cause (τὸ παράγον), is like its cause, exhibits the same character but in a less perfect form.[1]

The Neo-Platonist theology is strictly creationist, not in the popular sense of regarding the world as having been made at a definite date in the past (all the Neo-Platonists held strongly that Plato, like Aristotle, meant to teach the 'eternity of the world'), but in the philosophical sense of maintaining the causal dependence of everything in the world upon God and upon God alone. What 'really is' and what 'becomes' form a hierarchy of manifestations of the excellences contained 'eminently' in the One, each member of the hierarchy, according as it is at a farther remove from God, exhibiting these excellences in a less perfect way. Proclus adds the further point that the causal activity of the higher principles extends farther down in the scale of being than that of those below them.[2] The One, or God, as we have seen, is 'above being' and is absolutely simple, not because it is void of character, but just because all perfections are completely and perfectly united and interpenetrant in it.[3] The reason why the One creates at all is that the One *is* goodness, and goodness is, of its very nature, active. It must 'overflow.'[4] That which is immediately produced by the 'overflowing' is νοῦς, 'intelligence' or 'understanding.' Or rather, since the fundamental inferiority of produced to producer shows itself at this stage in the form of a dualism, it is νοῦς together with the objects it contemplates, τὰ νοητά, the connected system of scientific concepts. The two are inseparable, for the νοητά 'have no subsistence outside the understanding'; they are not a realm of 'things-in-themselves,' for which Neo-Platonism has no room. As mind or understanding is an imperfect image or mirroring of the divine One, so soul is a further image or mirroring of mind. And mind and soul together make up for the Neo-Platonist the whole system of ὄντα, real things. Bodies, the natural world as disclosed through the senses, are images of soul and are properly not ὄντα but γιγνόμενα; they 'are' not, they 'become'—*i.e.*, they are 'appearances,' though we must remember that they really do appear and are the appearances or shows of souls, which are real ὄντα. Below these real shadows of real things, just as God was placed above the real things themselves, stands that 'shadow of a shade,' πρώτη ὕλη, bare 'stuff,' which neither is nor appears, and, as a mere potentiality of something better than itself, may properly be called μὴ ὄν.[5]

Besides being causally dependent on God, the series of ὄντα and γιγνόμενα is further connected with the One by ἐπιστροφή, 'inversion' or 'reflexion.' The effect not merely proceeds from its cause, but is inverted or reflected back into its cause. This is, in fact, a consequence of the identification of the First Cause with the universal Good. For the good of anything is that to union with which the thing in question aspires, and the universal Good is therefore, according to the old definition of Eudoxus, that οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, 'that which all things go for.' As all things have their source in God, so all things find their end or completion in Him. In souls and minds this process of inversion takes place, as Proclus puts it, γνωστικῶς, as a γνῶσις, or knowing. It is in turning back on their source in contemplation that they come by self-knowledge, and are thus inverted into themselves as well as into it. The soul gets to know itself in learning to know νοῦς, and νοῦς learns its own true nature in contemplation of the One; in both cases self-knowledge is got by reaching out of one's self towards the higher.[1] Thus the transcendence of God, though it is so complete that we may not even predicate 'being' of Him, in no way interferes with the truth that the whole world 'lives and has its being' in God and has no origin or support but God.[2] The monotheism of this philosophy of religion is, of course, no more affected by the belief of the Neo-Platonists in an elaborate hierarchy of superhuman beings whom they call θεοί than the monotheism of Christians by the belief in the various orders of the angelic hierarchy, or that of Milton by his application of the appellation 'gods' to the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost*.

It should be particularly observed that the Neo-Platonic school, by definitely making the One its God and teaching that the One is 'beyond being,' is committed to theism as against pantheism. The world is in the One, but, precisely because the effect is only an imperfect mirroring of its cause, it would not be true to say in the same sense that the One is in the world. The relation between God and the world is that of one-sided dependence. God, or the One, produces νοῦς, ψυχή, and bodies; they do not produce the One. In fact, in the mythology elaborated by Proclus the ἐγκόσμιοι θεοί occupy the lowest rank among the orders of beings to whom he gives the name 'god,' thus corresponding to some of the middle ranks of the mediaeval hierarchy of angels.[3]

8. Anselm.—As is well known, when the Christian Church began to feel the need of a philosophical foundation for its theology, it sought that foundation primarily in Neo-Platonism. The Neo-Platonic influence was exerted in three main ways—through the Cappadocian Fathers, who, without incurring the condemnation which was passed on the speculations of Origen, incorporated much of Origen's Platonism in their system, through the prominent part played in the development of Christian theology by St. Augustine and Boethius, and through the authority enjoyed by the writings of the supposed Dionysius the Areopagite, a superficially Christianized version of the theological and angelological speculations of Proclus. The Neo-Platonic conception of God thus became part and parcel of orthodox Christian thought. It is this conception that St. Anselm assumes in his famous attempt to prove the existence of God by an argument which, in one form or another, has been a centre of philosophical controversy from the date of its first becoming generally known to our own day—the so-called 'ontological proof' of the existence of God. St. Anselm's own formulation of his argument will be found in chs. 2–3 of the little tract, written before he had been called from his monastery at Bec, to which he gave originally the name *Fides quaerens intellectum* and afterwards that of *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia*. The object of the reasoning is to show that the existence of God is in fact an immediately evident truth. Uncertainty about God's existence is possible only so long as we are unaware of the true meaning of the word *Deus*. The argument, as given by Anselm, runs thus. By 'God' we

[1] The technical phrase of Proclus is that the characters which exist καθ' ὕπαρξιν—*i.e.* so as to be properly predicable of it—in the effect exist κατ' αἰτίαν in its cause. The scholastic way of putting the matter is to say that what exists *formaliter*—as constituting the *forma* or *essentia*—in the effect exists *eminenter* or *eminentiore modo*, 'in a more excellent manner,' in its cause. It is in virtue of this doctrine that the philosophical theology of Neo-Platonism and orthodox Christianity acquires a positive side. Though we may not predicate of God any 'perfection' (*i.e.* positive attribute) of a creature, yet, since all creatures are produced solely by God, we may say that their perfections are in God 'in a more excellent manner.' Hence, though we are forbidden to predicate anything univocally of God and a creature, we are permitted to reason *per analogiam* from beauty, wisdom, power, goodness in the creatures to the presence of superexcellent beauty, power, wisdom, goodness in the Creator.

[2] This is intended to justify in particular the view that 'bare matter,' though it cannot be regarded as produced by mind or soul, is still created by the One, and so to get rid of the dualism of God and matter.

[3] So the schoolmen maintain, on the same ground, that each attribute of God, power, wisdom, and the rest, *is* God.

[4] As the Christian mystics say, 'love *cannot* be idle.'

[5] The Neo-Platonist 'matter' is thus identical with that of Aristotle, but it is important that it is regarded as the remotest production of the One, not, as with Aristotle, as a principle independent of and coaeval with God.

[1] Bodies are incapable of 'inversion into self,' and they are not inverted into their immediate cause, soul, γνωστικῶς.

[2] When Kingsley in *Hypatia* makes his Neo-Platonic philosopher misquote St. Paul as saying that it is God who 'lives and has His being' in us, he is going wrong from mere ignorance of the doctrine he is criticising.

[3] For the sources of the preceding paragraphs see Proclus, *Institutio theologica*, props. 1–6 (unity and plurality), 7–14 (causation, the good), 15–20 ('inversion'), 21, 23, 24, 31–47.

mean 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' It seems that a doubt may be felt about the existence of anything answering to this definition, since Scripture tells us that the fool has said in his heart (*i.e.* has thought) that there is no God. Anselm, in reply to such a 'fool,' argues as follows. Even the fool who doubts or denies the existence of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' must understand what this phrase means before he can doubt or deny that there is such a thing.[1] Thus it is certain that God, as defined, is *in intellectu*—a phrase which means simply that the words 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' have a definite meaning. But, if God were only *in intellectu* (*i.e.*, if there were no object answering to the definition), we could think of something greater than God, for we could at least conceive that such a being was not merely thinkable but real.[2] Thus the argument is that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' exists only *in intellectu*, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' is not 'something than which nothing greater can be conceived,' and this is a formal contradiction *in terminis*. It follows therefore[3] that God cannot be conceived as non-existent and therefore that God cannot be conceived not to exist. How then can it be true that the fool 'has said in his heart' that God does not exist? Only in the sense that the fool attaches no sense or a mistaken sense to the word 'God.'[4] These few lines contain the whole of the famous 'proof'; the rest of the pamphlet is really taken up with the identification of 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' with the universal Good.

Before going any farther, it may be well to make one or two reflexions on the general character of the argument as given by its originator. This is the more necessary as Anselm's reasoning is not quite identical with that of Descartes, who gives his own ontological proof in his *Fifth Meditation*, and it is principally from Kant's criticism of Descartes' argument that the ontological proof is known to modern students of philosophy. It will be noted that Anselm expressly presupposes the Neo-Platonic conception of God; it is the One of Plotinus and Proclus of which he undertakes to prove the reality. We should also observe that Anselm for the first time attempts a proof which is *a priori* in the proper sense of the phrase. The existence of the world is not one of the premisses of his reasoning, whereas with the Neo-Platonists the reality of the many is the starting-point of all argument. Again, it is no valid retort to Anselm to urge that his proof depends upon a definition and on nothing else, but nothing can be proved simply from a definition, since all definitions are merely conventions about the meaning of a sign. Anselm is not, of course, concerned to deny the truth of this account of definitions or to maintain that men are not free to attach any meaning they please to the sign *Deus*. The real question is whether among all our concepts there is just one, the concept of 'an x such that nothing greater than x can be conceived,' which implies *as part of its meaning* the actual existence of the corresponding object. It seems to the writer of this article that Anselm is at least right in maintaining that, if we can frame the concept 'thing than which no greater can be conceived,' we are bound to think of the object thus conceived as actual. To admit that what we are necessitated to think may be false is fatal to all philosophy and all science, and no exception can be taken to Anselm's argument on the ground that it excludes such an ultimate agnosticism. The really difficult question is rather whether there is any such concept as 'thing than which no greater can be conceived.'[5] The problem is not whether, granting that Anselm's definition of God has a meaning, the actual existence of God is included in that meaning, but whether the words given as the definition have a meaning at all or are not rather an 'unmeaning noise,' like the words, *e.g.*, 'line so crooked that none crookeder can be conceived' or 'rational fraction so small that none smaller can be conceived.' This is the difficulty which we shall find arising in connexion with every version of the ontological argument which has been given by metaphysicians. Whatever we may think on this point, it is plain that a proof of the Anselmian type is not what is ordinarily meant in logic by proof or demonstration. Its real object is not to deduce the existence of God from any more ultimate or certain premisses, but to find a definition of God such that, when the definition is substituted for the *definiendum*, the proposition 'There is one and only one God' is seen to be self-evident. The real function of the argument is, like that of an Aristotelian 'induction,' not to demonstrate something, but to 'point something out.'

Anselm's argument was at once subjected to severe criticism by his contemporary Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, in his 'Apology for the Fool' (*Liber pro Insipiente*), a tract which more than sustains comparison for real acumen with the better-known criticisms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Gaunilo remarks that it is one of the premisses of the Anselmian argument that *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest* exists at least in the *intellectus* even of the atheistic fool. It is assumed that God exists *in intellectu*, and the only point discussed is whether He exists also *in re*. But what is meant by this statement? It may mean only that the fool understands the meaning of the statement 'God exists.' But we understand the meaning of many propositions which we know to be false. Hence the existence of God is not proved by simply urging that we know what the theist means when he says that God exists. To make the argument valid, it ought to be shown that the fool cannot understand what the theist means without also seeing that his assertion is true, and Gaunilo denies that Anselm has established this point. Arguing, not as an empiricist, but from Neo-Platonic premisses common to himself with Anselm, he urges that in point of fact we have no positive adequate concept of God;[1] and it adds nothing to our information to be told that God is greater than all the things of which we have positive concepts.[2]

So far Gaunilo (who has been oddly mistaken by some modern critics for an empiricist) is simply playing off the negative or agnostic side of the theology common to himself with Anselm against the positive, and it is significant of his real purpose, which is that of a mystic rather than of an empiricist, that he quietly replaces Anselm's definition of God as 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' by the very different phrase 'that which is greater than all which can be conceived.' He then continues as follows. Even if I admit, what is itself questionable, that I understand the meaning of the phrase 'something which is greater than all which can be conceived,' Anselm's argument cannot force me to admit that there really is such a thing. All that the argument proves is that it would be inconsistent to admit that there is such a thing and at the same time to deny its reality, since, if it is not real, it is not greater than things which are conceived and are real. But the 'fool' is not really convicted of this inconsistency, since all that he admits is, at the outside, that he understands the sense of the words 'something greater than all that can be conceived.' To make Anselm's argument cogent, some proof ought to be supplied that this something actually exists. If this proof is once forthcoming, Anselm's further demonstration that the something in question is all that God is

[1] 'Certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico . . . intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu ejus est, etiamsi non intelligat illud esse' (*Proslogion*, ch. 2).

[2] 'Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil maius cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id, quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod maius est' (*ib.* ch. 2).

[3] 'Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest ut nec cogitari possit non esse: et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster' (ch. 3).

[4] 'Nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est; licet haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla, aut cum aliqua extranea significatione' (ch. 4).

[5] Hobbes and others raised this question very pertinently when they replied to Descartes' argument from our possession of an 'idea of God' that we possess no 'idea' of God.

[1] 'Neque enim rem ipsam quae Deus est, novi' (*Pro Insipiente*, § 3).

[2] 'Nec prorsus aliter adhuc et in intellectu meo constat illud haberi, cum audio intelligoque dicentem esse aliquid maius omnibus quae valeant cogitari' (*ib.* § 4).

held to be will be valid. It is to illustrate this second point that Gaunilo introduces the reference to the famous lost island by which he is principally remembered. If this lost island were described to me as wealthier and better than any inhabited land, I should readily understand the meaning of the words, and the lost island would be 'in my understanding' in the same sense in which God may be said to be in the understanding of the fool. But it would be idle to say that the island must also really exist somewhere in the ocean because it would otherwise not be, as by definition it is, richer than all habitable lands. Finally he contends that it is not, as Anselm had assumed, a *proprium* of God that He can only be thought of as existing. It is true, no doubt, that we who know that God exists cannot think the proposition 'There is no God' true, but neither can we think any other proposition to be false which we know to be true; *e.g.*, I cannot think it true that I do not exist at this moment, because I know it to be true that I do exist. There may be a sense in which it is possible to think of my own non-existence, but, if there is, it is equally possible, in the same sense, to think of the non-existence of God, even though we know that God does exist.[1] This last point, of course, anticipates Hume's criticism that whatever we can think of as existing we can equally think of as not existing, and if sustained is fatal to every argument of the ontological type.

Anselm's reply to his critic is contained in the short *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem respondentem pro Insipiente*. He points out, naturally enough, that Gaunilo's substitution of the phrase 'that which is greater than everything which can be conceived' for 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' alters the character of the argument, and that Gaunilo's reasoning about the lost island is not a real parallel to his own proof, which, as he insists, is applicable only in the case of the concept 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' What he does not prove, but merely asserts, is that this phrase really has a definite meaning and is not a nonsensical or insignificant sound. On this point he is content to say that even the 'fool' must conceive the meaning of the words before he can deny that they stand for a reality.

It is very difficult to follow Anselm here. If his reasoning is sound, it will prove not only the real existence of God but also the existence (in the logician's sense) of nothing, round squares, equilateral right-angled triangles, fabulous monsters, the greatest of all integers, since it is beyond a doubt that the propositions 'There is no such thing as a round square,' 'There are no fabulous monsters,' 'There is no integer which is the greatest of all integers,' etc., are true; and it may then be argued that, since they are true, round squares, etc., must exist in the *intellectus* of the person who asserts the propositions. What Anselm is assuming is, as he himself says, that a proposition cannot be understood unless its 'parts' are severally understood. From this he infers that, if 'there is no such thing as x' is a significant proposition, x must be a significant term. The assumption is plainly not justified, since my ground for asserting the proposition may be precisely that x has no intelligible meaning. The state of the case, then, seems to be that Anselm's argument certainly proves that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' (or 'that which cannot be conceived as not existing') exists *in intellectu*, it also exists *in re*. But the question whether it exists *in intellectu* remains undecided.

9. Thomas Aquinas.—The history of the subsequent fortunes of Anselm's theistic argument is a highly interesting one. In the 13th cent., the golden age of scholastic philosophy, it was widely known and discussed by all the leading thinkers. In the main the mediaeval philosophers seem to have been disposed to accept it until it was rejected as a sophism by St. Thomas, whose great authority has ever since discredited it. The principal 13th cent. texts relative to the subject have been edited with an acute commentary by the Benedictine Augustin Daniels.[1] It is a singular fact that, though all the teachers of the second half of the 13th cent. seem to have felt themselves obliged to make their attitude to Anselm's argument clear, no theologian of the 12th cent. appears to have taken any account of it. The most probable explanation of this silence seems to be that of Daniels, that the circulation of the *Proslogion* was slow and the work unknown to theologians in general until well on into the 13th century. It is certainly not true, as is sometimes said, that acceptance of the argument was confined to the Oxford Franciscans. Of the fifteen scholastics whose writings are examined by Daniels, three (one of whom is Albert the Great) express no opinion on the validity of the proof, ten (including Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Scotus) accept it, only two (Richard of Middleton and St. Thomas) reject it. These facts seem of themselves to show that the discredit into which the ontological argument fell —it will be remembered that, when Descartes revived it in the 17th cent., critics were quick to remind him that he was laying himself open to at least the suspicion of heterodoxy—was due almost entirely to the general recognition of the weight of St. Thomas's criticisms. They are, in fact, so formidable that they still repay the closest attention and are, in the present writer's opinion, altogether on a much higher philosophical level than the better-known polemic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The general position of Thomas is precisely what we should expect from a philosopher whose thought has been moulded partly by Neo-Platonism and partly by Aristotelianism. He holds that the existence of God can be, and has been, sufficiently proved *a posteriori*, by reasoning from the works of God to their Author, and consequently he accepts as valid both the argument from the necessity of an unmoved First Mover (the Aristotelian argument) and the argument from design, in the wide sense of an argument from final or intentional causality (the Platonic argument from order and intelligibility in the world to an intelligent Creator). But he rejects altogether and on principle the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God *a priori* (from a mere consideration of the content of the concept of God).

The most important of the relevant passages in the works of Thomas are *Summa contra Gentiles*, i. 10, 11, and *Summa Theologica*, i. qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. His own view on this question is that the proposition is self-evident if the *essentia* of God is once adequately known, but, since we in this life do not behold the *essentia* of God, His existence is not self-evident to our understanding. It is not immediately evident to us that there is anything 'than which a greater cannot be conceived,' or that 'God cannot be thought not to exist'; on this point St. Thomas is in complete agreement with Gaunilo. Anselm's argument, in fact, is a sophism arising from failure to distinguish between that which is *notum per se simpliciter* and that which is *quoad nos notum*, evident to us. 'For *simpliciter* it is self-evident that God exists, since what God is is his *esse*' ('cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est sit suum esse'; *i.e.*, God's *essentia* or 'what' and His existence are identical). 'But because we cannot conceive what God is, it remains unknown relatively to us.'[2] Anselm's reasoning is fallacious because (*a*) not all even of those who admit the existence of God are aware that God is 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'; and (*b*), even if every one were aware of this, it would not follow that God exists otherwise than *in intellectu*; *i.e.*, all that would be proved is that we can think of such an object without absurdity. So Thomas asserts against Anselm that there is no logical absurdity in supposing the non-existence of God.[3] The same considerations are urged in much the same language in the article of the *Summa Theologica* already referred to. Thomas's own view is[4] that the existence of God can be demonstrated *a posteriori*, by reasoning

[1] 'Cogitare autem me non esse, quamdiu esse certissime scio, nescio utrum possim; sed si possum, cur non et quidquid aliud eadem certitudine scio? Si autem non possum, non erit jam istud proprium Deo' (*ib.* § 7).

[1] *Quellenbeitr. und Untersuch. zur Gesch. der Gottesbeweise im 13 Jahrh. mit bes. Berücks. des Arguments im Proslogion des heil. Anselm*, Münster, 1909.

[2] *Contra Gent.* i. 11.

[3] *Ib.*

[4] i. qu. ii. art. 2.

from effect to cause. He relies on five such *a posteriori* arguments,[1] which are (1) the argument from the fact of motion to the First Mover; (2) the parallel argument from causal agency to a First efficient Cause; (3) the argument from possibility and necessity, known more commonly as the argument from the contingency of the world;[2] (4) the argument from the scale of 'degrees of reality,' by which we infer from the existence of greater and lesser goods the existence of a perfect good which is the cause of all lesser degrees of goodness (in virtue of the specifically Neo-Platonic theory of causality already explained); (5) the argument *ex gubernatione rerum*, *i.e.* from final or intentional causality. (Even the processes of inanimate nature are ordered or adapted to the realization of an end or good; this adaptation presupposes an intelligent intention, and, since inanimate things have no intelligence of their own, a supermundane intelligence.) St. Thomas's arguments are thus all of one type. They are all appeals to the principle of causality taken in combination with the denial of the possibility of an infinite regress. Both the appeal to the principle of causality and the refusal to admit the infinite regress are direct inheritances from the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. The former is invalidated if the soundness of the Kantian criticism of speculative theology be admitted; the latter requires reconsideration in the light of what may be called the 'logical realism' of Bertrand Russell and the 'new' realists. Scotus, in the *Scriptum Oxoniense*,[3] restates the Anselmian argument with a modification which seems obviously meant to meet the fundamental point in Gaunilo's criticism and anticipates a line of thought afterwards developed by Leibniz. God is defined as 'quo cogitato sine contradictione malus cogitari non potest sine contradictione,' 'that which can be thought without a contradiction but than which nothing greater can be thought without a contradiction.' The important modification is the addition to the definition of the first *sine contradictione*. As Scotus says, 'in cuius cogitatione includitur contradictio illud dicitur non cogitabile.' It thus becomes a preliminary to the ontological proof to show that God can be 'thought without contradiction'; *i.e.*, that we really have a concept of God, or that the word 'God,' or the phrase employed as by definition equivalent to the word, is not an unmeaning noise. When this condition is fulfilled, Scotus holds, the Anselmian inference from the *esse in intellectu* of the *summum cogitabile sine contradictione* to its *esse in re* is valid.

10. Descartes.—Descartes' theism, like that of his mediaeval predecessors, is predominantly of the Neo-Platonic type, and is intimately connected with the assumption, which underlies the reasoning of the *Meditations*, that the principle of causality, in the very form which had been given to it by Proclus, is evident by the natural light of the understanding. The extent to which the thought of Descartes is in fundamentals Platonic is probably not adequately realized by most of his readers. Even the most original feature of his philosophy, the thoroughgoing reduction of natural science to mechanics, is really a reversion from mediaeval Aristotelianism to the standpoint of the early Academy, and the metaphysics of the *Meditations* is thoroughly Neo-Platonic. We quite misconceive Descartes' meaning if we regard the presence of God in his system as an excrescence due to the necessity of artificially bringing together again the artificially sundered worlds of body and mind. Even from the point of view of a merely mechanical interpretation of the world, Descartes is, of course, much more true to the analogies on which mechanical interpretations are founded in assuming the direction of the mechanism by God than those modern half-philosophers who attribute to the cosmic machine an inherent power of directing and repairing itself. He has not forgotten, as the modern materialist tends to do, that behind the most complicated and perfect machinery there is always intelligence which is not that of the machine to start it, to direct its workings, and to repair it. But, beyond this, Descartes has reasons for asserting the existence of God which are wholly independent of his reversion to the mathematical and mechanical standpoint in physics and would have been equally strong if he had adopted any other type of physical doctrine. The theism of Descartes is, in fact, dictated by two considerations—his unqualified acceptance of the principle of causality and his adherence to the conception of the 'Perfect Being' as the only adequate object of the understanding, and therefore the 'natural good' of rational beings (the 'ben dell' intelletto,' to use Dante's phrase). He is a theist, not because he holds the mechanical view of nature, but for the same more ultimate reason which leads him to hold that view, that he is, like the whole Platonic succession, a rationalist and consequently regards the knowledge of the 'Supreme Being' as the culmination of science.[1] The actual proofs of theism offered by Descartes are two. In the third *Meditation* we have the *a posteriori* proof in the special form of an argument from our possession of an idea of God to the existence of God as the cause of the idea. This is, of course, strictly on Neo-Platonic lines. In the fifth *Meditation* the *a posteriori* proof is confirmed by an *a priori* proof which turns out to be, in principle, a restatement of the Anselmian argument with a modification which is by no means an obvious improvement.

The well-known argument of the third *Meditation* runs thus. I have an 'idea' of the 'Perfect' or 'Infinite' Being. My possession of this idea, like any other fact, demands a causal explanation. The explanation cannot be that I am myself the Perfect and Infinite Being and that the idea is derived from my immediate awareness of myself, because I am aware of myself as, in many ways, defective and limited. It is not derived from acquaintance with other persons or things, which are all no less limited and finite than myself; and it has not been obtained by an imaginative combination of the various perfections I have observed separately in different finite things, for internal simplicity is itself one of the perfections which I think of as constituting the 'Infinite Being.' Nor again is 'infinite' a merely negative expression. (If it were, it might, of course, be objected that, when I say 'infinite,' there is no definite concept corresponding to the word.) For in the order of logic the infinite is prior to the finite. If I had not already an intelligible concept of infinity, I could not even be aware of my own finiteness. There is thus only one possible cause of my possession of the idea of the Infinite Being. It must be the effect of a really existing Infinite Being, who possesses *eminenter* or *formaliter* all the perfection which my idea of the Infinite Being contains objectively, *i.e.* by way of representation. God therefore exists, and my idea of God may be said to be the mark which the Creator has stamped on His creature. It may be added that, to argue the point even more generally, I who have this idea could not exist if the object of the idea did not also exist. For, since time is no more than a sequence of moments, each independent of all the rest, conservation, continuance in existence, is logically equivalent to fresh creation at every moment, and it is certain that I have no power to create myself. (This is proved by urging that it is easier to bestow new excellences on what already exists than to create. If then I cannot bestow infinite wisdom or power on myself, as I know I cannot, *a fortiori* I am not my own creator.) If it is urged that my parents are my creators, and their parents in turn their creators, we fall into the infinite regress. Thus the mere fact of the existence of any finite thing is proof of the existence of the Infinite Being; *i.e.*, if anything whose existence requires an external cause exists (and the Cartesian *cogito* assures me of the existence of at least one such thing), there exists also a Supreme Being whose existence requires no external cause (another form of the argument called by St. Thomas the argument from possibility and necessity).

The argument from my possession of an idea of God is Descartes' own substantial contribution to the philosophy of theism. It must be carefully distinguished from the old Stoic appeal to the *consensus gentium*. Descartes' critics were not really hitting a blot in his reasoning when they said that savages and atheists do not possess this idea. Against such objections Descartes' own explanation, that he only meant that, given the knowledge of myself from which he starts, reflective analysis is sufficient to lead to the concept of an Infinite Being, is a sufficient rejoinder. He seems to be equally right in his contention that the concept of an Infinitely Perfect Being is logically implied in my recognition of my own finitude, just as T. H. Green maintains that the recognition of a morally 'better' implies the conception of a 'best.' The real point of weakness in the argument, so far as the present writer can see, lies elsewhere. Descartes is clearly right in maintaining that the concept of a Being who combines all perfections or excellences in the absolute internal simplicity of his own nature is not formed by a process of synthesis; it is clearly obtained by

[1] r. qu. ii. art. 3.

[2] The argument is that whatever is merely possible or contingent exists at some times but not at others. Hence, if all things are merely possible or contingent, there must have been a time when nothing existed at all. But (in virtue of the principle of causality), if there had ever been a moment when there was nothing at all, nothing could ever have come to be. Hence the fact that there is something now proves that there must be 'something in things' which is *necessary*, *i.e.* incapable of not existing. And the argument from the impossibility of an indefinite regress is then invoked to show that there must be *one* ultimate necessary being.

[3] See the relevant passages in Daniels, pp. 105–107.

[1] 'Perfecta scientia,' as St. Hilary puts it, 'Deum scire.'

the process of 'passing to the limit,' of which mathematical reasoning furnishes so many examples. But we are not really authorized to infer from our ability to conceive the limit of a series or of a sum of terms that a given series has a limit or a given sum a limiting value. Whether a series or a sum has a limiting value or not has to be discovered by examination in each special case; it is notorious that mathematicians down to a very recent date have been repeatedly led into fallacies by the assumption that limits exist where, in point of fact, they do not. Thus, when we have conceded to Descartes that there is an idea of the Infinitely Perfect Being and that this idea is presupposed in our own judgment that we and other things are finite, it does not follow of itself that the series of existents, arranged in ascending order of perfection (assuming such an arrangement to be possible), must have an actual upper limit. This is the very point which ought to be proved, and has not been proved. Descartes himself was presumably led to ignore the difficulty by the laxness with which he employs the word idea to cover alike memory-images, concepts, and judgments. When once he has allowed himself to call a judgment an idea, it is easy for him to think that he has bridged over the chasm between the concept of God and the judgment that God exists. The whole argument, it will be observed, is based on the combination of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of causality with the doctrine of representative perception. According to the latter doctrine, the direct and immediate object of apprehension, both in sense-perception and in thought, is never an extra-mental reality, but always itself mental or 'in the mind.' When this theory is combined with the view that everything that becomes has a cause and that all causality is imperfect mirroring, we get at once the proposition of Descartes that the cause of any idea must contain eminently or formally at least as much perfection as the idea contains objectively. 'Eminently' here answers to the *κατ' αἰτίαν* of Proclus, 'formally' to his *καθ' ὑπαρξιν*, 'objectively' to his *κατὰ μέθεξιν*.

The *a priori* or ontological argument of the fifth *Meditation* runs as follows. By 'God' I mean a being who has all perfections. But existence is a perfection. Therefore the being who has all perfections has existence; *i.e.* God exists. Or, in other words, just as I see when I analyse the idea of a [rectilinear] triangle that it includes the property of having the sum of the internal angles equal to π, so, when I analyse the idea of God, I find that it includes existence. God therefore exists and exists necessarily. (Thus Descartes seems to assume that there is just one existential proposition, and only one which is, in Kant's sense of the term, analytical, viz. the proposition 'God exists.') The objection that St. Thomas (now the recognized chief authority in all questions of theology) had rejected the Anselmian argument leads Descartes, in his *Reply* to the *First Objections*, to insist vehemently that his own proof is not that of Anselm, but differs on a vital point. The force of his own reasoning depends entirely on the fact that existence is already contained in the concept of God. Anselm[1] had said nothing about this, and that was why St. Thomas was reasonably dissatisfied with his argument; *i.e.*, the all-important point is that, according to Descartes, the proposition 'God exists' is analytic; Anselm had left it an open question whether it might not be synthetic. Historically this modification of the ontological proof is important, since Kant (who appears not to have known the writings of St. Anselm) makes it the main object of his attack on the proof to show that the proposition 'God exists' is synthetic. It is precisely because the proposition is synthetic, though the conditions which make the affirmation of an *a priori* synthetic proposition legitimate are, in this case, not fulfilled, that we can, according to Kant, have no speculative certainty of the existence of God. If Descartes should be right in regarding 'God exists' as an analytic proposition, Kant's antitheological polemic would become a mere *ignoratio elenchi*.

The further peculiarity of the Cartesian argument on which Kant fastens, that it improperly treats existence as a predicate or attribute, is not really of much importance. Whether all propositions can without violence to their meaning be represented as asserting (or denying) a predicate of a subject is an important question for formal logic, but seems to have no relevance to theology. If there is no predicate in the proposition 'God exists,' it must be held, on the same ground, that there is no predicate in such a proposition as 'Joseph dreams' or 'Esau hunts' or 'The rich man died.' *Per contra*, if dreaming, hunting, and dying are predicates in these propositions (as Kant, who professed to regard logic as a science created perfect by Aristotle, ought to hold, and presumably did hold), existence is a predicate in every proposition of the form 'x exists.' The only question it is relevant to raise about the Cartesian argument is the question whether in the special case of the *ens summe perfectum* existence (whether existence be regarded as a predicate or not) can be asserted to be part of the meaning of a concept.

Whether there is really so much difference as Descartes maintains between his own argument and Anselm's may be doubted. Certainly the definition from which Anselm starts (God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest*) does not specify existence as part of the meaning of the concept. But, since Anselm tries to show that admission of the definition is logically tantamount to admitting that 'God cannot be thought not to be,' the difference between him and Descartes seems to be that Anselm tries to prove the point which Descartes is content to assume without more ado. It is hard to believe, as Descartes does, that St. Thomas, who denied that God is *notum per se quoad nos*, and gave a very sensible reason for his denial, would have regarded the Cartesian version of the proof as anything more than a glaring *petitio principii*.

11. Spinoza.—With Spinoza's attempt to give a pantheistic turn to the Neo-Platonic and Cartesian lines of thought it is not necessary to concern ourselves further than to remark that the whole of the First Part of the *Ethics* is logically no better than one long *petitio*. The first, third, and sixth of the definitions already contain the two assumptions, that God = *substantia* = *causa sui* and that *causa sui* (which is defined as 'that whereof the nature cannot be conceived but as existing') exists. Where the whole doctrine has thus been taken for granted by arbitrary definition, it is really superfluous to add anything in the way of 'proof,' even if the 'proofs' themselves were more free than they are from formal logical fallacy. What Spinoza wholly evades considering is the question, which is really fundamental, whether the definition of *causa sui* is more than a 'meaningless noise.'

One particularly glaring example of Spinoza's singular carelessness about his initial definitions may be noted. He has taken from Neo-Platonism the first and most fundamental notion of his system, that of *causa sui* (*τὸ αἰθυπόστατον* of Proclus). Now, by calling a thing *αἰθυπόστατον*, the Neo-Platonists meant exactly what they said, that it 'causes' or 'produces' itself (*προάγει ἑαυτό*). Hence they confined the name *αἰθυπόστατα* to minds and souls and expressly maintained that the One, or God, having no cause, being unproduced, is not *αἰθυπόστατον*;[1] *i.e.*, they understood *causa sui* in a positive sense. Theologians had done the same thing; as Arnauld said in his comments on Descartes' *Meditations*,[2] no theologian would admit that God is *a se positive tanquam a causa*, but at most that God may be said to be *a se* in a purely negative sense —*i.e.*, in the sense that He is not an effect of anything else. Spinozism succeeds in appearing to satisfy our demand for an object of religious adoration only by a constant equivocation. It defines *causa sui* (= *τὸ αἰθυπόστατον*) in the positive Neo-Platonic sense as *id cuius essentia involvit existentiam* (*τὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ παραστικόν*) and then asserts of it all that Neo-Platonism had asserted of the uncaused One. To put the point rather differently, it defines God as 'that whereof the *essentia* implies existence' and transfers to God, so defined, what theologians have asserted of a God in whom the distinction between *existentia* and *essentia* is unmeaning. Spinoza commits the paralogism in set terms in the first sentence of the *Ethics*: 'Per causam sui intelligo id cuius essentia *involvit* existentiam, sive id cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens.'

12. Locke.—Locke's proof of theism,[3] which he regards as having an evidence 'equal to mathematical certainty,' though in some ways perfunctory, is in its general character of the Neo-Platonic type. He does not refer to the *a priori* or ontological argument, and refuses to pronounce any opinion on Descartes' own special argument from our possession of an idea of God except to remark that 'It is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation.' (As the context shows, Locke thinks that it would be a true and relevant criticism of Descartes to say that some men have no idea, and others false ideas, of God.) It is not quite clear whether Locke regards the certainty of theism as equal to the certainty with which we know actually perceived facts or the fact of our own existence. He says that we have more certainty of it 'than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us,' and again that 'we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else without us.' This certainty looks as if Locke held (as Descartes did not) that the existence of God is less certain than our own, and

[1] The name of Anselm occurs neither in the *Objections* nor in Descartes' *Reply*. Apparently both he and his critic knew the Anselmian argument only at second hand, through Thomas. Descartes' point, to be strictly accurate, is that his own argument turns wholly on the contention that concepts in general contain only the 'possible existence' of a corresponding object, but the concept of God 'contains the necessary existence' of God.

[1] Proclus, *Instit. theol.*, prop. 40: *ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ αἰθυπόστατον εἶναι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον.*

[2] *Objectiones Quartæ*, § 'de Deo.'

[3] *Essay*, bk. iv. ch. 10, 'Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.'

possibly less certain than that of the objects of actual and present sense-perception. But it is also possible that he only means that our certainty in the last two cases is immediate, but in the first depends on an ability, not found in all men, to follow the steps of a deduction. He may not intend to suggest that, to the man who can perform the deduction, its conclusion is inferior in certainty to any immediate cognition, 'intuitive' or 'sensitive.'

Locke's own proof is the usual *a posteriori* one based on the principle of causality and the empirical proposition (guaranteed by the *cogito*) that something (viz. myself) exists. It is also assumed, as usual, that a cause must contain more reality or perfection than any of its effects, as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The argument then becomes this: I exist; therefore I must have a cause; this cause cannot be 'bare nothing'; therefore it is a positive something. Since 'bare nothing' cannot be the cause of anything, therefore the cause of my own existence and that of all other existents must be eternal. (The impossibility of the endless regress and the 'contingency of the world' are not mentioned, but are of course tacitly presupposed.) An effect must derive all its properties from its cause. Therefore the 'eternal cause' must be the most powerful of things. (It is assumed that the cause has not only as much 'reality' as the effects, but more, and further that there can be only one 'eternal cause'—a point which Locke is hardly entitled by his own metaphysics to assume.) There is intelligence in myself, the effect, and therefore there is intelligence (of a higher degree) in the cause. The 'eternal cause' is thus 'most knowing' as well as 'most powerful.' From this Locke thinks it follows that this cause is what we mean by God; whether we use the name or not is a mere matter of vocabulary. 'There is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not.' The rest of the chapter is given to an argument in proof of the immateriality of the eternal cause. The goodness of this cause Locke presumably held, as any Platonist might, to be inseparable from its wisdom. He does not seem to reflect that he has given no reason for supposing either the power or the intelligence of the 'eternal cause' to be perfect. His argument is thus only the familiar one from causality very badly stated and with most of its real premisses left unexpressed.

13. Leibniz.—Leibniz's treatment of the subject is far more adequate. In his system, at least as represented in his best known works, the proposition 'God exists' holds a unique position. It is a 'truth of fact,' and therefore, like all 'truths of fact,' synthetic. But it is the only truth of fact which is capable of demonstration. In general, only 'truths of reason,' analytic propositions, admit of formal demonstration, because the demonstration of a proposition is nothing but its analysis into simpler propositions which are seen on inspection to be identities. This is why the 'principle of contradiction' (A is not non-A) is regarded by Leibniz as the supreme principle of all truths of reason. Truths of fact (which all assert actual existence) do not fall under the principle of contradiction, but under that of sufficient reason, and thus, with the one exception of the proposition that God exists, they are not analysable into identities and cannot be formally demonstrated. The anomalous character of the proposition 'God exists' vanishes, however, when we discover from the papers published by Couturat[1] that Leibniz's real view was that all truths are analytic, the only difference between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact' being that the former can be resolved into identities by a finite number of steps of analysis, the latter require (like the extraction of the square root of an integer which is not a perfect square) an infinite number of intermediate steps.[2] It follows that God, being omniscient, knows all truths of fact *a priori* (*i.e.* sees them to be identities), just as Leibniz says more than once that God sees 'from eternity' in the 'notion' of Peter that Peter will repent of his denial, and in the 'notion' of Judas that Judas will die impenitent, and that the distinction between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact means nothing to him. *Quoad nos* truths of fact are, in general, contingent merely because we cannot perform an infinite analysis. The peculiarity of the one truth of fact which is necessary *quoad nos*, 'God exists,' is merely that this proposition does not require for its proof *a priori* an infinite series of resolutions. In being capable of resolution into identities by a finite number of steps it resembles the truths of reason.

Consequently Leibniz is bound to hold that the Anselmian argument *a priori* from the meaning of the concept of God to the real existence of God is in principle valid. Since he also held that all propositions without exception are predicative, he naturally adopts the form of the argument used by Descartes, viz. that the predicate of the proposition 'God exists' is already implicitly contained in the subject. Descartes' proof is valid, but incomplete. To make it complete it is only necessary to show that the concept of God is a genuine concept, *i.e.* that it contains no contradiction, *i.e.* does not attempt to unite incompatible constituents.[1] Leibniz thinks that this can be shown by the consideration that the 'most perfect' or 'most real' being means the being of whom no simple positive predicate can be denied. (Any being of whom a positive simple predicate could be denied would be without the excellence or perfection for which that predicate stands.) Now, all complex predicates can be resolved into simple ones, and Leibniz holds that all *positive* simple predicates are compossible in a single subject just because they are all positive. If any two predicates are incompossible, one of them must deny what the other affirms. But no simple predicate denies anything. Consequently all simple predicates can 'inhere' in a single subject. This proves that 'the most real' being is possible. And Descartes has proved in the fifth *Meditation* that, 'if the most real being is possible, it is also actual.' Hence the 'ontological' proof, when completed by the preliminary proof that the most real being is possible, is a valid demonstration.[2] There is an obvious weakness in the argument. Leibniz assumes that, if we have one proposition, 'A is B,' where B is a 'simple' predicate, and a second, 'A is C,' and the two are incompatible, the proposition 'A is C' must be capable of resolution into simpler propositions, of which one is 'A is not B.' It ought to follow that, since the propositions 'A is red' and 'A is green' are incompatible, if 'red' is a simple quality, 'green' is a complex. But, in point of fact, green is as much a simple positive 'perfection' as red. This seems sufficient reason for regarding Leibniz's proof that the *ens realissimum* is possible as a failure. A more promising line of thought is suggested by the short memoir of 1701, *De la Demonstration Cartésienne de l'existence de Dieu du R. P. Lami*, where Leibniz is content to argue that the *ens a se* must exist because, if there were no *ens a se*, there would be no real possibilities—a position since made familiar by Lotze's adoption of it. It is worth noting that in the chapter of the *Nouveaux Essais* where Leibniz is commenting on the corresponding chapter of Locke's *Essay* he feels himself, as standing outside the Roman Church, free to say expressly that St. Thomas was wrong in rejecting Anselm's proof and to commend Descartes for rehabilitating it.

Leibniz naturally agrees with Locke that there are several ways of proving the existence of God and that none of the proofs should be neglected. He himself expressly recognizes three proofs besides the ontological.[3] These are (*a*) the cosmological argument from the actual existence of the world to the existence of God as its cause (the standing Platonic-Aristotelian proof); (*b*) the argument from 'eternal truths'—truths which involve no reference to time or particular temporal existents in time, and would still be true if the world of temporal existents had never existed—to the 'eternal' intellect of God as their source; (*c*) the argument from 'pre-established harmony.' This is a special version of the teleological argument from the order and purpose revealed in the world to an ordering and designing intellect as its source. Any remarks which the present writer desires to make upon these *a posteriori* theistic arguments will more naturally find their place in a later paragraph. But it should be mentioned that the use of the argument from design introduces a curious contradiction into Leibniz's peculiar metaphysic. From his view that all propositions are predications and that all true propositions can be analysed into identities it follows at once that, as he constantly asserts, every real existent (every monad) is the ground of all its attributes. Since existence itself, on this view, is a predicate or attribute, the world of existing monads ought to be its own ground, and there should be no need of any external cause to account for the order found in it. Accordingly we find

[1] *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz*, Paris, 1903, p. 518 ff.

[2] *Ib.* p. 518: 'Semper igitur praedicatum seu consequens inest subiecto seu antecedenti et in hoc ipso consistit natura veritatis in universum'; p. 519: the law of sufficient reason itself is a consequence of this, for 'alioqui veritas daretur, quae non posset probari a priori, seu quae non resolveretur in identicas, quod est contra naturam veritatis quae (semper) vel expresse vel implicite identica est'; p. 376: 'omnes propositiones existentiales sunt verae quidem, sed non necessariae, nam non possunt demonstrari nisi infinitis adhibitis.'

[1] Cf. what has been said above about the attitude of Scotus, by whom Leibniz may very possibly have been influenced.

[2] *Nouveaux Essais*, iv. 10, § 7: *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis.*

[3] See the discussion of them in B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, ch. ix.

Leibniz himself at times explaining why the actual world, rather than any other equally possible world, exists, by ascribing to the various possible worlds an 'appetence of existence' (*existuritio*) proportionate to their degree of internal harmony, and saying that the most orderly of them is actual just because its *existuritio* is a maximum,[1] but elsewhere, especially in more popular writings, treating existence as something which is conferred on the most orderly and harmonious of the possible worlds by God in virtue of His 'choice of the best.' Unless one is prepared, as the present writer after long study is not, to accuse Leibniz of insincerity, it seems impossible not to recognize here a fundamental inconsistency between his personal religious convictions and the logical requirements of his metaphysical system. If all true propositions are identities, philosophy must be atheistic.[2]

14. **Hume.**—The most important philosophical treatment of the theistic problem between Leibniz and Kant is unmistakably that of Hume in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (written apparently before 1751, though not published until 1779, three years after the author's death). In judging this work it must be borne in mind that it makes no pretence to expound the theology of the author. It is strictly what it purports to be, a conversation between a supporter of philosophic 'natural theology,' Cleanthes, a violent fideist, Demea, intended as a representative of orthodoxy, and a sceptic, Philo. The responsibility for the positions maintained by the three speakers rests entirely with themselves. Hume abstains from indicating his own sympathies except in the final sentence, where he suggests that the 'opinions' (he is careful not to say 'the arguments') of the 'natural theologian' Cleanthes probably come nearer to the truth than those of Philo, and those of Philo than those of Demea.[3] Hume's real position in natural theology, as in philosophy in general, seems to have been that of a consistent Academic. Genuine scepticism is a rare thing and liable to be misunderstood. So Hume's general philosophy has commonly been mistaken, as by T. H. Green, Huxley, and others, for a shallow sensationalistic phenomenalism. In reality he is neither a sensationalist nor a phenomenalist. He holds that there are insuperable difficulties in the Cartesian rationalism, and that, on the other hand, sensationalism leads to the conclusion that science is an impossibility. Being unable to accept either Cartesianism or sensationalism, and knowing of no third choice in philosophy, he adopts the sceptical attitude of ἐποχή, 'suspense of judgment.' There can be no question of seriously regarding principles presupposed in all science as false; at the same time Hume confesses himself unable to justify these principles. His real attitude towards theism seems to have been the same. It is probably true, and, as the letter to Elliot shows, Hume is very unwilling to believe that his leaning towards it rests on nothing more solid than emotional bias, but the alleged proofs of theism are open to criticisms which Hume does not know how to refute, and there are 'appearances' which it is hard to reconcile with the theistic 'hypothesis.' We have not, as it is to be wished we had, convincing proof of its truth, though Hume lets us see that personally he inclines to accept it. His attitude is neither that of a zealous 'infidel' nor that of a 'phenomenalist' and anti-theist. Neither the Hume of contemporary High Churchmen like Johnson and Wesley nor the Hume of Huxley's biography is the Hume of historical fact.[1]

In form the *Dialogues*, like some of Plato's greatest works, are reported conversation. An unnamed narrator informs his friend Hermippus of the discussions between Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea. The narrator, it should be observed, is a theist.

'What truth so obvious, so certain, as the *BEING* of a God? . . . What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But in treating of this obvious and important truth; what obscure questions occur, concerning the *NATURE* of that divine being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence?'

There is no sign of irony in this utterance, and its seriousness is all the more probable that Hume proceeds to dwell on the intellectual difference between the characters of the dialogue, assigning an 'accurate philosophical turn' to Cleanthes the theist, 'careless scepticism' to Philo, and 'rigid inflexible orthodoxy' to Demea.[2] His obvious intention is to predispose the reader to find in Cleanthes the hero of the work. It is with the same object that, until the discussion is near its end, Demea, the zealot for unreasoning faith, is made to regard Philo as an ally against Cleanthes.[3] The intimate correspondence between what Cleanthes says about the impossibility of seriously acquiescing in complete philosophical scepticism and Hume's own utterances to the same effect in the *Treatise of Human Nature* further helps to indicate that we are not to take Philo's estimate of the theistic arguments as meant to be that of his creator. His function is not to refute Cleanthes, but to call attention to the difficulties and weak points in his exposition.[4] The precise position at the opening of the discussion is this. Cleanthes affirms the existence of a 'cause' of the universe and, reasoning by analogy from the products of art to those of nature, holds that this cause is a mind resembling our own. He denies the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians that God is absolutely simple and therefore unknowable in His *essentia* to us, on the ground that this amounts to atheism. Philo and Demea are agreed in opposing him, though for different reasons—Demea because he accepts the negative theology, Philo on the ground that, as we have no experience of 'world-making,' we are not entitled to say that the order in the world presupposes a world-building intelligence. Cleanthes has rested his case on the old Platonic argument from 'orderly motion,' but has admitted that the argument is one from analogy. Philo replies that there is no sufficient basis for an analogical argument. He further appeals to the difficulties of the 'infinite regress.' If matter and mind must be effects of a cause, why must not that cause have a more ultimate cause, and so on *ad indefinitum*? Cleanthes declines to consider the problem: 'You ask me what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my enquiry. Let those go farther, who are wiser or more enterprising.' Philo not unnaturally replies: 'I pretend to be neither; and for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer.'[5] Philo, it must be remembered, calls himself a theist, though he professes to regard the nature of God as totally unknown. The point at issue between him and Cleanthes is that Cleanthes maintains that the 'First Cause' is not only a mind but also 'a mind like the human,' and that the teleological argument is an 'experimental proof' of this. These two points are what Philo disputes and Demea regards as 'anthropomorphist' heresy. Philo, in fact, wishes, like Kant, to maintain that speculative theism is dependent upon the validity of the '*a priori* proof.' If we rely solely on the argument from

[1] Cf. Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz*, Paris, 1901, pp. 224–226, with the passages cited there.

[2] For a useful conspectus of all the more important utterances of Leibniz on the existence of God known before the publication of Couturat's volume of *Opuscules* see Russell, *Crit. Expos. of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 284–291, and, for a 'smashing,' but by no means final, attack on all the four arguments, ch. ix. of the same work.

[3] That this remark is made in good faith seems clear from Hume's letter to Gilbert Elliot of March 10th, 1751, where he speaks of Cleanthes as the 'hero' of the dialogue and asks his friend for any suggestions which will 'strengthen that side of the dialogue,' protesting against the ascription to himself of 'any propensity to the other side,' by which he plainly means the side of Philo. No one could suspect him of 'propensity' to the side of the 'mystic' Demea.

[1] That Hume was personally an orthodox Christian is, to be sure, unlikely, but there is no reason to suppose that he was much further removed from orthodoxy than more than one of the prominent 18th cent. latitudinarian bishops or Scottish 'moderates,' and in his philosophy he never commits himself to any view not compatible with the completest orthodoxy, as orthodoxy was understood in his day. Huxley's anti-clericalism is quite incompatible with Humianism.

[2] There is a certain want of definiteness about the position ascribed to Demea. He is spoken of as a 'mystic' and a depreciator of the powers of reason; on the other hand, he is the champion of the 'simple and sublime argument *a priori*'—an odd attitude for an irrationalist. Hume does not seem to have distinguished between negative theology, the creation of philosophic rationalists, and the scepticism of despair which arises from sheer distrust of reason. Philo's 'scepticism' is quite another thing, a mere declaration that, 'as at present advised,' he has not sufficient material for a definitive conclusion.

[3] Demea is, in fact, so little of a real theologian that he is unaware that it is actually unorthodox to maintain that the existence of God is known only 'by revelation.' Perhaps, like Hume himself, according to Johnson, 'he had never read the New Testament with attention,' and he almost certainly did not know that his position had been formally condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council.

[4] Huxley's exploitation of Philo for an antitheistic purpose rests on the false assumption that it is he who is the real 'hero of the dialogue.'

[5] Hume, *Philosophical Works*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1874–75, ii. 410.

effect to cause, the known effect is not perfect and we are not entitled to infer that its author is free either from intellectual or from moral deficiencies, or even that 'several deities' may not combine to construct a world as many men co-operate to build a house or a ship. 'A man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and hypothesis.'[1] The God of Cleanthes is, in fact, a 'finite deity,' and a finite deity is as bad as none at all. And, if reasoning by analogy be in place at all, analogy suggests that we should look on the material world as an animal of which God is, as with the Stoics, the soul, and thus we shall be led to affirm the eternity of the world (contrary to the position of Cleanthes, who has tacitly assumed that the thing to be accounted for is its origin). Or, again, if the world is more like an animal or vegetable than a watch or loom, why should we not infer that worlds are propagated rather than made? A comet may be the 'egg' of a solar system. Demea, of course, comments on the absence of any data for such 'wild' theories. But this is exactly the point on which Philo wishes to insist; 'we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.' He insists, none the less, that such analogies as we have suggest that intelligence itself is caused by physical generation. Generation, itself an unintelligent process, is explained to be a 'principle of order in nature,' and 'we see every day the latter [intelligence] arise from the former [generation], never the former from the latter.' (It is, of course, obvious that Cleanthes is here making two very questionable assumptions—that the 'rational soul' is generated like the body, and that, because an oak or a spider is not rational, the growth of the one and the instinctive behaviour of the other are not guided by intelligence at all. 'Experience' does nothing to assure us of these negations.) Philo finally reaches the climax of his polemic against the *a posteriori* argument when he urges that the 'unguided' motions of material particles may give rise to 'an uniformity of appearance,' and thus 'account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance' in nature. (As before, he makes the wholly illegitimate assumption that we know from experience that this has really happened. 'This we know to be the case with the universe at present. . . . May we not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter?' Of course, experience does not warrant the statement that there is or ever has been 'unguided matter.') He had himself repudiated the notion that chance has any place in a scientific theory, but he ends by suggesting that the only reason why there is order in the world is that 'it happens' so.[2] Cleanthes reasonably retorts that the degree of harmonious adaptation in the known part of the universe to the needs of an intelligent civilization goes far beyond what Philo undertakes to account for—such order as is necessary 'for the subsistence of the species.' But Philo has made the main point for which he was concerned, that the *a posteriori* argument, taken by itself, is not adequate to establish the existence of the all-perfect or 'most real' being. Accordingly the dialogue now proceeds to consider the *a priori* argument by which the existence of the *ens realissimum* is to be established from an analysis of its own nature. The exposition of this argument is given to Demea, the spokesman of traditional theology, and the objections against it are put into the mouth of Cleanthes, the upholder of the argument from design, as well as into that of Philo. We now find Cleanthes and Philo allied against Demea, as we have hitherto had Demea and Philo combining against Cleanthes. The particular argument regarded as conclusive by Demea is one which ought more properly to be called *a posteriori*. It is, in fact, as he words it, a combination of two of the forms of the *a posteriori* argument admitted by St. Thomas—the argument from the fact of motion to a First Mover and the argument from the possible to the necessary. Since the indefinite regress is illegitimate, in arguing from effects to causes, we must come to a First Cause, and, when we ask why the 'succession of causes' should be what it is and not a different series, we are forced to answer that the First Cause is a 'necessarily-existent Being, who carries the *REASON* of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction.'[2] (This last clause thus gets in the point of the ontological proof under cover of the argument from causality; this may be the justification for calling Demea's reasoning *a priori*. Or Hume may possibly mean that his argument is based simply on the general principle of causality and not on the special character of the effect under consideration, the actual universe.) Cleanthes urges against the proof the five following considerations. (1) No fact can be demonstrated *a priori*. 'Whatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.' This agrees with Thomas's verdict on Anselm except for the fact that Hume disregards the fine distinction between what is evident *in se* and what is evident *quoad nos*. (2) We cannot know that 'the Deity' is a 'necessarily-existent Being' 'while our faculties remain the same as at present,' and therefore 'the words *necessary existence* have no meaning' to us. Here there seems to be a direct contradiction between Cleanthes and St. Thomas. But on looking more closely we see that Cleanthes is merely repeating his former objection in fresh words. By a 'necessary existence' he means one that cannot be thought of as not existing, and St. Thomas also admits that 'our faculties' do not allow us to perceive that God's existence 'flows from His essence.' St. Thomas's argument only went to show that there is a being who exists always. This contention Cleanthes does not refute, but merely denies without giving a reason; 'nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being.' (3) If there must be a 'necessary being,' or a being which cannot be thought not to exist, why may not 'the material universe' itself be this necessary being? 'For aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five.'[1] (4) How can there be a first cause of an 'eternal succession of objects'? (5) In such a 'succession of objects' each may be said to be caused by something that preceded it, but there is no sense in asking for a cause of the whole chain. Demea adds that possibly the 'whole economy of the universe' is 'conducted by a necessity,' undiscoverable to us, which he compares with the arithmetical rule that the sum of the digits of any multiple of 9 is divisible by 9.[2] These reflexions really suggest more than they actually contain. Consideration (4), if thought out, raises the question whether the 'infinite regress' is really an impossibility, and consideration (5) is at least a hint of the more modern doctrine of ultimate pluralism that the universe may consist of a multitude of independent but interrelated constituents. Demea's remark deserves less consideration. It amounts manifestly to the suggestion that the 'material universe' itself may be the 'necessary' being whose existence follows from its 'essence,' and is inconsistent with the objection already urged against the ontological proof, that there is no existent which may not be conceived not to exist.

The discussion now turns to the moral character of the First Cause. Philo and Demea agree in arbitrarily assuming the pessimistic view of the general misery of creation and in particular of man. The case is argued by Philo with an abundance of rhetoric and manifest want of logic which of themselves suggest that Hume is treating him with some irony. That Cleanthes declares that he feels little of this misery himself and hopes that pessimists are not very common is a further indication that it is he who is the spokesman of Hume's own conviction, so far as any of the characters can be said to be so. Demea, of course, means only to infer from the pessimistic estimate of life that the true good of man is not to be found on this side of the grave, and is driven out of the company by disgust when Philo goes on to argue at great length, and with still more obvious begging of the question than before, that all the indications show that the cause or causes of the cosmic order are either incompetent, evil, or indifferent to morality. (It is almost incredible, again, that Hume was not aware that the whole of Philo's eloquence depends on the tacit assumption that nothing is good but pleasure. He merely revives the old Epicurean argument against Providence in its crudest form, and it is no surprise to an intelligent reader when he informs Cleanthes, after Demea's departure, that his real object has been merely to protest against the abuse of the topic of benevolent design by popular preachers. It is not quite so easy to believe him sincere in his assertion that, in spite of all that he has hitherto said, he thinks the evidence of rational design in nature overpowering and regards doubt about the existence of a 'Supreme Intelligence' as 'pertinacious obstinacy.') Philo's final conclusion is that the controversy between theists and atheists is at bottom verbal. The order and design in the world prove that its cause (he quietly abandons his own former objection to the demand for such a cause) bears an analogy, though, no doubt, a remote one, to the human mind. If theists would remember the remoteness and atheists the reality of the analogy, there would be nothing left to dispute. But he objects *in toto* to all 'religion' which goes beyond the intellectual admission of this one proposition (and thus is plainly meant to be insincere in his assertion that his 'philosophical scepticism' is 'the most essential step,' in an educated man, 'towards being a sound, believing Christian'). Deism—bare intellectual affirmation of the existence of an intelligent First Cause which exercises no influence whatever on the practical conduct of life—is manifestly what Philo really means to recommend. (His attack on 'religion' is little more than a denunciation of the 'horrors of the Inquisition' and contains a logical contradiction to which his creator must have been alive. He maintains, on the one hand, that 'religious motives' are so weak, by comparison with others, that 'religion' is impotent to influence conduct for the better, and, on the other, that it is so strong that all the worst evil in life is due to 'priests' who play on the fanaticism of the vulgar for their own interested purposes. It is hard not to believe that Hume is treating his puppet with intentional malice, just as he is treating Demea with malice when he represents him as welcoming Philo's description of the hopeless wretchedness of existence without any suspicion of its drift, though, as an educated man, he must have known what conclusions Lucretius had drawn from the same premisses.) Cleanthes, it is to be noted, listens to this assault on religion almost in silence and leaves Philo with the last word. It is to be supposed that he does not assent, though he may not see his way to 'dissolve the ἀπορία.'

15. Kant.—Much more closely knit is the assault on the whole of natural theology in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It should be remembered that Kant had not always been a disbeliever in the

[1] *Philosophical Works*, p. 414. [2] *Ib.* p. 428. [3] *Ib.* p. 432.

[1] *Philosophical Works*, p. 432. [2] *Ib.* p. 434.

possibility of demonstrating theism. In his thesis for his degree,[1] which aims at showing the irreducibility of the principle of sufficient reason to the logical principle of contradiction, he offers a proof, based on the former principle, that 'there is a being whose existence is antecedent to the possibility of itself and of all things, which being must therefore be said to exist with an absolute necessity.'[2] This is, in principle, the contention most fully developed later by Lotze.

As Kant states it, the argument runs thus. 'Possibility' means the absence of contradiction (*non repugnantia*) between the constituents of a 'complex notion.' The 'constituents' are thus presupposed as the 'matter' of the 'complex notion.' Thus a 'possibility' with no presuppositions, a 'possibility' when nothing whatever has been given as actual, is meaningless. It follows 'that nothing can be conceived as possible unless that which is real in every possible notion exists, and, indeed, exists with absolute necessity (since, if you leave this [reality] out of account, nothing whatever would be possible, *i.e.*, everything would be impossible). Further, he urges, this 'necessary reality' must be a single being. The argument for this is that, if we suppose 'the reals, which are, so to say, the matter of all possible concepts, to be found distributed among many existents' (*i.e.*, if we suppose a plurality of ultimate 'reals'), each 'real' will have limitations, *i.e.* 'privations,' negative characters. But negative characters have not, like positive 'realities,' an 'absolute necessity.' The supposed 'reals' will therefore all contain an element of contingency. The being which exists with absolute necessity must therefore be without any limitations and therefore infinite. (Like Leibniz's God, it must be the subject of every proposition affirming a positive 'perfection.') If there were more than one such infinite being, the very plurality would re-introduce contingency. 'Thus God, and one only God, is given as the absolutely necessary principle of all possibility.' Kant thus, by deducing the existence of God from the principle of sufficient reason, is already anticipating the doctrine of the *Critique* that all existential propositions are synthetic without exception. Descartes' ontological argument is pronounced to be invalid, precisely because it attempts to deduce the 'existence' of God from His 'essence' (thus treating an existential proposition as analytic), whereas, in the proof given by Kant, the 'possibility' of God is itself made to depend on His 'existence.'

Kant returns to the subject in his short essay on *The only Possible Proof of the Being of God*.[3] The proof offered is substantially that of his thesis of 1755, divested of scholastic terminology. Existence is not a predicate or determination of a subject, but the absolute positing of the subject itself; *e.g.*, when I am fully acquainted with the whole story of Julius Caesar and know every predicate of the hero of the story, it is still an intelligible question whether this Julius Caesar is a 'real' man or only the hero of a fiction, and by calling him a 'real' man I do not add an $(n+1)^{th}$ predicate to the n predicates which I have already asserted about him in telling the story. The difference between a 'real' and a merely possible thing lies not in what is posited in each case, but in the way in which it is posited. If I think of a thing first as possible and then as real, the same complex of predicates and relations is posited in both cases; but in the first case this complex is posited hypothetically (a complex of propositions are true about the thing if it exists), in the second case absolutely—*i.e.* categorically. I cannot think of anything as possible unless its predicates are all compatible with one another; *e.g.*, I cannot think of a triangle with four sides as possible, but I can think of a triangle with a right angle as possible. 'Both the triangle and the right angle are the data or material element in this possibility; the agreement of the first with the second in respect to the law of contradiction is the formal element of the possibility.' Since the material element (the data) as well as the formal is required to constitute a possibility, 'the internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence' (*irgend ein Dasein*), and 'it is wholly impossible that absolutely nothing should exist.' (In more modern language this means that the difference between the logically possible and impossible depends on the compossibility of some predicates and the incompossibility of others; thus, that there may be so much as the difference between what is logically impossible and what is possible, there must be predicates, and predicates are predicates of something. Hence there must be something, to be the subject of predicates if the very word 'possible' is to have a meaning.) Thus we get back to the starting-point of the proof of 1755. Possibility logically presupposes actual existence as its foundation. Therefore there is something actual, the elimination of which would destroy all 'internal possibility'; *i.e.* there is 'an unconditionally necessary being.' Kant then proceeds, as in 1755, to prove that the necessary being is one, simple, immutable, and eternal, and, as that which contains the data of all possibilities, is, in fact, the *ens realissimum*. From these attributes it is inferred that 'the necessary being is a spirit (*Geist*),' and this completes the proof that God exists.

It still remains for Kant to show that his form of the argument 'from the possible to the necessary' is the only valid theistic proof. The Cartesian proof of the fifth *Meditation* is set aside on the ground that it treats existence as a predicate. The familiar argument from the contingency of the world (the world is an effect, therefore it has a cause which is itself uncaused and therefore 'necessary') is unsatisfactory. Kant allows in this essay, as he does not in the *Critique*, that the inference to an uncaused First Cause may be valid. It is not so clear that 'this independent thing is unconditionally necessary,' *i.e.* that it cannot even be thought not to exist, since the demonstration of this turns on the principle of sufficient reason, which is not admitted by all philosophers. But, even if the point be conceded for the sake of argument, it is not proved that the absolutely necessary being is what we mean by God, *i.e.* is utterly perfect and utterly One. To establish this point (that 'the necessary being = the perfect being') we require to prove that, 'if X is perfect, X necessarily exists,' and this is just the ontological argument, with its treatment of existence as one predicate among others, over again (a point on which Kant expatiates more fully in the *Critique*). The teleological or, as Kant calls it, the physico-theological proof here, as in the *Critique*, comes off better. Like Hume's Philo (in one of his moods), Kant is convinced that there is such evident system, adaptation, and benevolence in nature that its author must be thought of as One, wise, and good. But, though the argument deserves to be enforced in the interests of practical piety, it is not enough to prove perfect wisdom or benevolence in the Creator, and thus not enough to prove that He is all we mean by God. The same criticism will meet us again in the *Critique*.

The argument for the dependence of the world on a 'necessarily existing being' recurs again, in a slightly different form, in a third 'precritical' work—Kant's inaugural lecture as professor on 'The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World.'[1] As in the two works already considered, Kant assumes the Leibnizian conception of the universe as a complex of simple substances or monads. His object is to show that such a complex must depend for its existence and character upon a supreme and 'necessary' extramundane 'substance,' which is God. The theistic argument is more specially contained in §§ 17–22, and runs as follows. The principles of interrelation between a plurality of substances cannot have their complete ground in the existence of these substances. Each substance is indebted for its mere subsistence only to its cause (if it has a cause). But the relation of effect to cause is not *commercium* (reciprocal interaction), but *dependentia* (one-sided dependence), and what we have to account for is the *commercium* of the substances which make up the universe. Not all these substances can be 'necessary,' because, if they were, they would be absolutely without dependence on each other; there would be no *commercium* between them, and they would not form a world at all. The world, or 'totality

[1] *Principiorum Primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio*, Königsberg, 1755 (*Werke*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1838–39, i. 367–400).
[2] *Ib.* § ii. prop. 7.
[3] *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*, Königsberg, 1763 (*Werke*, ii. 109–205).

[1] *De mundi sensibilis atque intellegibilis forma et principiis*, Riga, 1770 (*Werke*, ii. 395–425).

of substances,' is, therefore, a 'totality of contingents'; and 'the world, in virtue of its essence, consists of mere contingents. Moreover, no necessary substance is connected with the world (*mundus*) at all, unless as cause with effect, and therefore not as a part with a whole, since the parts of one and the same whole are connected by reciprocal dependence, a relation which does not affect a necessary being. The cause of the world, then, is an extra-mundane being and not a "soul of the world."' And the necessary being which is the extra-mundane cause of the world is one and not many. For the effects of different 'necessary beings' would stand in no relations of reciprocal dependence, since their assumed causes are not reciprocally inter-related. Hence the unity of the substances composing the world in a single system is a consequence of the dependence of them all on one being, and it follows that this one being is not a mere 'architect of the universe' (*i.e.* δημιουργός), but its Creator. Incidentally also the argument removes the ambiguity which had haunted Leibniz's account of the 'pre-established harmony' to God. It definitely makes the harmony itself dependent on God.[1]

Thus down to 1770 Kant shows no doubt of the possibility of demonstrating theism. The argument on which he relies in all the essays examined is one and the same—the Neo-Platonic argument *a posteriori*—and rests on the assumption that the world as given is an object for which we are bound by the principle of causality to seek an explanation.[2] The proof, as with the Neo-Platonists, aims at establishing the existence of the One—the single, internally simple and perfect, extra-mundane source of all the existents which together make up the κόσμος. The peculiarity of Kant's special version of it is that, to escape the criticisms which had been directed against Descartes, he sets himself to deduce the existence of a 'being which cannot be thought not to exist,' not from the logical concept of *ens realissimum*, but from the consideration that, in the universe itself, some combinations of predicates of the same thing and some combinations of relations between the same things are possible, and others not. The existence of an actual extra-mundane being once established as a pre-condition of the difference in intra-mundane things between what is possible and what is impossible, the internal unity, simplicity, and perfection of the necessary being are then deduced as consequences of its necessary existence. If this line of argument is not fallacious—*i.e.* if it really proves that something 'exists of necessity'—it clearly has the double merit of being free from the objection to the ontological proof, and of being equally untouched by the considerations urged by Philo and Demea in Hume against the *a posteriori* proof. If the principle on which Kant relies—that the possible presupposes the actual—is sound, his argument seems to be a complete speculative demonstration of the 'being of God' reduced to its most succinct expression. Why, then, did Kant, in his later 'critical' years, pronounce the question whether God exists to be transcendent—*i.e.* outside the legitimate limits of speculative investigation—and all 'proofs of the existence of God,' including that for which he had himself formerly claimed 'geometrical certainty,' mere fallacies?

In dealing with Kant's drastic assault on speculative natural theology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we may perhaps distinguish two questions which Kant himself naturally treated as one. It is one question whether Kant has proved that the demonstration of theism is impossible on the assumption that the special doctrine of his *Critique* as to the limits of human knowledge is true, but quite another question whether that doctrine *is* true, and consequently whether Kant has proved the fallaciousness of natural theology unconditionally. The first of these two questions no doubt permits of only one answer. Kant is clearly right when he asserts that all existential propositions are synthetic, at any rate (to repeat the distinction of St. Thomas to which Kant himself pays no regard) *quoad nos*. And it follows at once from this single consideration that, if, as the *Critique* maintains, the synthesis in a synthetical proposition must always in the end be effected by an application of formal 'categories of the understanding' to a material supplied in sensation or sensuous imagination, no synthetical proposition (and, by consequence, no existential proposition) can be affirmed of a subject which is purely 'intelligible,' a νοητόν. And Kant expressly makes this a main point in his criticism of the ontological proof. Unfortunately, however, this doctrine, if carried out to its full logical consequences, would lead to a result which Kant would have been the first to reject. For it follows that there can be no such sciences as pure arithmetic and pure geometry. The subjects about which synthetical propositions are asserted in these sciences are one and all *Objekte des reinen Denkens* no less than the *ens necessarium* or the *ens realissimum* of speculative theology. No element whatever supplied by sense enters into the mathematician's concept of a circle, a parabola, an integer, or a real number. Kant overlooks this all-important point because he assumes throughout his whole reasoning that, before I can demonstrate a proposition in geometry, I must draw the figure, and similarly that, before I can say what the sum of two integers is, I must count the units of which he supposes the integers to consist. The erroneous character of this view has been sufficiently demonstrated by the subsequent history of mathematical science, but ought to have been clear to Kant himself. Even if all geometry, as he tacitly assumes, were metrical geometry, he ought to have seen that Descartes' invention of co-ordinates had already made the drawing of figures in principle superfluous in geometrical science. His conception of arithmetic is even more superficial—in fact, on a level with Aristotle's. As Couturat has correctly observed, Kant's examples are all drawn from the demonstration of singular propositions (such as $7+5=12$). If he had asked himself how any general truth in the theory of numbers is proved (how, *e.g.*, we prove Fermat's theorem), he would have seen at once the inadequacy of his own theories. Indeed, mere consideration of a singular proposition which does not relate to integers (*e.g.*, the proposition $2{\cdot}5+3{\cdot}\dot{6}=6{\cdot}1\dot{6}$) might have taught him that arithmetic is not the same thing as counting, and even suggested to him that an integer is not a 'collection of units.'

With the discrediting of Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the section of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' containing the famous antinomies, which may now be fairly regarded as a *fait accompli*, our task becomes the comparatively simple one of considering whether natural theology does or does not involve (as Kant alleges that it does) an illegitimate use of the principles of pure logic. From Kant's point of view, to be sure, it does. But this is just because Kant assumes that the only legitimate use of logical principles is their employment to order a material given by sense. If the doctrine of his 'Aesthetic' is rejected, and with it that part of the 'Dialectic' in which he absurdly tries to show that the mathematical doctrine of infinite series leads to antinomies,[1] it is no longer obvious that what Kant calls a transcendent employment of the principles of logic—*i.e.* their employment independently of application to 'the manifold' of sense—need be illegitimate. In fact, it is not clear that the whole of the general theory of arithmetic is not just such an employment of logical principles as 'constitutive of a *Denkobjekte*.' (It is certainly so if, as is probably the case, the series of natural integers can be defined wholly in terms of the primitive indefinables of logic.) One Kantian paralogism, in particular, may be noticed here, as it plays a prominent part in the assault on the theistic arguments. Kant complains that all the arguments for the 'necessary being' based on the causal principle depend on employing this principle, which is a mere rule for ordering the appearances of the sensible world, and has no meaning apart from these appearances, as a means of transcending the world of sense.[2] It might be a sufficient retort that the one form of causality with which we are intimately acquainted is our own volitional activity. In this activity, which is at once efficient and intentional causality, what are connected as cause and effect are not an earlier and a later event in the 'world of sensible appearances,' but the self, which does not belong to that 'world' at all, and an event

[1] 'Commercium itaque omnium substantiarum universi est externe stabilitum per causam omnium communem' (*ib.* p. 22).

[2] Philo, in Hume, it will be remembered, had at least suggested that this need not be the case; the material world may be its own explanation.

[1] On the absurdity of all this see, in particular, the crushing exposure of Couturat, *De l'Infini mathématique*, Paris, 1896, bk. iv. ch. 4.

[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², Riga, 1787, p. 637.

which does belong to it. Kant could not deny the causal relation between the rational self and events in the *Sinnenwelt* without ruining the foundations of his own ethics, but the admission of such causality ought to debar him from attacking natural theology on the ground that it 'uses the principle of causality as a means to transcend the world of the senses.' He only escapes open self-contradiction by his monstrous theory, which is not likely to find a defender at the present day, that the self with which we are acquainted is not the real self at all, but a phenomenal self apprehended by an inner sense. From the point of view of logic, the criticism is equivalent to a refusal to admit the validity of any logical inference from the terms of a series to a limit which is not itself a term of the series. It is not in itself any more absurd to hold that examination of the things and events of the *Sinnenwelt* in the light of the causal principle reveals their dependence on something which does not belong to that world than it is to hold that a series of which every term is a rational fraction can be shown to have a limit which is not a rational fraction. (This is, *e.g.*, the case when we represent a surd 'square root' as a recurrent continued fraction. Each of the 'convergents' is a rational fraction, but the limit of the series is not.) The general argument is thus invalid. No *a priori* reason can be given why the causal principle should not enable us to transcend the world of sense, and the only real question which remains is whether the particular arguments of theists will stand scrutiny on their merits. There is no general logical presumption against them of the kind Kant imagines.

We are thus brought to the consideration of the force of Kant's attack on natural theology taken by itself and apart from its connexion with a general theory of the nature of scientific knowledge which is certainly erroneous. We may therefore confine ourselves to the sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which profess to make a complete enumeration of the possible proofs of the existence of God and to convict each of the 'proofs' of fallacy, together with the 'Critique of all Speculative Theology,' in which Kant sums up his results.[1] The general line of argument is as follows. The scientific interpretation of facts consists in regarding any given actual condition of things as conditioned and asking for the antecedent facts which condition it. When they have been found, science once more requires an interpretation of them on the same lines, and so on *in indefinitum*. Every set of facts has thus to be regarded by the scientific intellect as conditioned by an antecedent state of things which has, in its turn, to be discovered. The scientific 'explanation' of the world is thus a task which, from its nature, can never be completed. Behind every set of conditions, however remote, at which we may arrive there is always a body of still more remote conditions to be discovered. (The conditions, in every case, like the facts they condition, are facts and processes of the *Sinnenwelt*.) The unending regress from conditioned to conditions, however, naturally suggests the thought that the process of explanation would be completed if we could find something ultimate, itself unconditioned but the condition of everything else. Thus we arrive at the notion of a being which 'exists necessarily' and contains in itself the explanation of everything else, the one and only being which is not contingent (*i.e.* a consequence of something other than itself). Next, it occurs to us that, if there is such a 'necessarily existing' being, it must, as the condition of everything else, contain in itself all that is truly real or positive; what is real in all limited and finite things must come to them from it. Thus we identify the *ens necessarium* with the *ens realissimum* ('*dasjenige was alle Realität enthält*'). Finally, since we ourselves, who are among the things dependent on this being, are intelligent moral persons, we 'personify' this being, and thus we arrive at the conception of God as the Supreme Being and source of the world. But the whole process has no scientific worth. The inference to the existence of a 'necessary being' is invalid because it employs the causal principle, which is really only a rule for the interconnexion of sensible events, as a means of connecting the sensible with the intelligible (a general criticism which has already been considered in the last paragraph); we have no positive conception whatever of the character of this necessary being (supposing it to exist), and the attempt to find one by identifying it with the 'most real being' will not stand examination, since it is logically possible that there might be a plurality of 'necessary' beings, each imperfect and finite (one may illustrate by the theory that 'ultimate reality' is a 'society' of unoriginate 'persons' without any Creator); and the attempt to prove the existence of a single 'most real being' directly is a pure sophism. The conclusion then is that, though speculation may suggest to us the possibility that God (conceived after the fashion of the Neo-Platonic 'One') is the source of the world, it can do no more. It cannot even prove that the possibility is more than 'logical'; *i.e.*, speculation may convince us that there is no internal contradiction in the notion of such a being; it cannot show that God is a 'real' possibility—*i.e.*, that there is no incompatibility between the existence of God and the actual facts of the world of experience, if we knew them all instead of being aware of a mere fragment of them. The whole value of speculative theism is to suggest this mere possibility, to warn us that we are not speculatively justified in regarding the sensible world as underived, but must keep an open mind. If, however, apart from all speculative philosophy, there are *practical* grounds for believing in God—*i.e.*, if the reality of absolute moral obligation can only be made intelligible by appeal to our dependence on God—then, for practical purposes, the open possibility is converted into a moral certainty. Kant means, as he explains,[1] that, in shaping the conduct of our lives, *il faut parier*. We must act either on the assumption that moral obligation is absolute or on the assumption that it is not; there is no third course. But all moral obligation, as is shown at length in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*,[2] is absolute, and there is no fact more certain than this. Without God as ruler of the world, however, the system of absolute obligations would be a logically flawless construction ('*in der Idee der Vernunft ganz richtig*'), but would have no 'reality of application to ourselves, *i.e.* would be without motives.'[3] A virtuous man is thus necessitated to a firm rational belief in theism, but that which makes the necessity is not the demonstrative force of the theistic arguments (which in fact is zero), but the virtuous man's immediate conviction of the absoluteness of moral obligations. This is what Kant meant when he described himself as abolishing knowledge to make room for faith.[4] If our unfavourable judgment on the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is justified, we plainly cannot concede to Kant that all speculative theism must be baseless. The theistic arguments must be scrutinized on their merits, not condemned *en bloc* like the generals at Arginusae. With his usual love for formal schematism Kant urges that there can be three and only three ways of trying to prove the existence of the Supreme. We may attempt to

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², pp. 611-670.

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², p. 615. [2] Riga, 1788.
[3] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², p. 617.
[4] He must not be understood in a pragmatist sense. He did not mean that the existence of God is a speculation which a man may accept or decline 'at his own risk,' may adopt 'because up to the present it works,' or because inferences can be drawn from it which gratify the believer. The faith of which he speaks has its foundation in the conviction that the law of duty is absolute, and this proposition is admitted by the good man not as an 'hypothesis accepted at his own risk to see whether it works,' or because he chooses to accept it, but because, being a good man, he sees it to be true and certain.

prove the existence of the 'most real being' entirely *a priori* (*i.e.* without the use of any 'truth of fact' as a premiss) by arguing that existence is included in its very nature—the ontological proof; we may, departing from the strictly *a priori* method, employ the single truth of fact, 'something exists,' as one of our premisses, and then argue to the conclusion that a 'necessary being' exists—the cosmological proof; we may include among our premisses specific assertions about the character of the 'something that exists'; *i.e.*, we may argue from the marks of intelligent and benevolent design in the actual world to intelligence and benevolence in its source—the physico-theological proof. Each of these proofs is now to be shown unsatisfactory. The first is a pure verbal sophism and the second no better, and, as proofs of the existence of God, both the second and third have to be eked out by a silent combination with the first.

The refutation of the 'ontological' proof is one of the best-known passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant speaks of the argument as the 'ontological (or Cartesian) proof.' He examines it only in the form in which it has been revived by Descartes, and was apparently not acquainted with its earlier history. His objection, put briefly, is simply this, that the proposition 'God exists' can only be got out of the concept of 'God' if existence has already been included in that concept. If I define God as a 'really existing *X*,' of course I can make the true proposition, 'If there is such a being as the God thus defined, then that being exists.' But I am not entitled to assert that there is such a being, and consequently not entitled to assert the consequent of the foregoing hypothetical proposition ('God exists') categorically. In fact existence is not a real predicate. The concept 'a hundred dollars' has precisely the same content whether the hundred dollars actually exist in my pocket or not. 'Our concept of an object may contain what and as much as you please, still we must go outside it to impart existence to the object.'[1] Hence the ontological proof is not really a proof of anything. 'The Idea of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most useful Idea, but just because it is merely an Idea it is wholly incapable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone.'[2] Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and exalted concept of the Supreme Being. The present writer does not feel that Hegel's witticisms on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension.' The logical investigations which have issued in the creation of the modern 'exact' or 'symbolic' logic of Frege, Peano, and Russell have made this point even clearer than it could have been to the first readers of the *Critique*. If it is immediately evident that there is a member of the unit-class of which 'supreme being' is the class-name, there is neither room nor need for proof. If this is not immediately evident, proof is wanted. In general it cannot be inferred from the definition of a class that the class has members. If the class 'supreme being' or 'most real being' is an exception, we require proof that it is an exception to the rule, and neither Hegel nor any one else has ever offered anything in the way of proof. Thus, as against Descartes, Kant's argument is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive. Nor does he see that the original Anselmian proof fares any better. It is not directly touched by Kant's denial that existence is a predicate, since Anselm does not rest his case on the assertion that existence is a predicate. But Kant's counter-argument can equally be stated without raising this question. Whether existence is a predicate or not, it is equally true that we are not entitled to infer from the hypothetical proposition, 'If there is a God, that God is an existent,' the categorical proposition, 'God is an existent'; and this is what Anselm tries to do. He is really committed, as every defender of the ontological line of argument must be, to the attempt to prove that it is irrational to suppose that there might have existed nothing at all. In point of fact most of those who have tried to turn the edge of Kant's criticism have not attempted so desperate a task. They have consciously or unconsciously assumed as a premiss the proposition that something exists, and have been content to argue that, since something exists, God exists also. In doing this they tacitly admit the truth of the contention of Kant and St. Thomas that no purely *a priori* proof of theism is possible.

Kant's attack on the cosmological proof is more elaborate and, in the present writer's opinion, less successful. The rejection of the ontological proof does not depend in the least on the acceptance of the peculiar theory of knowledge expounded in the *Critique*. The proof had been rightly treated as a sophism in all the precritical essays in which Kant deals with the foundations of natural theology. The case of the cosmological argument is different; Kant's own precritical proof, based on the need for an actual ground of real possibility, was itself a form of the cosmological proof, and is thus among the inferences now rejected as illegitimate. We may therefore expect to find that the rejection of this type of argument does depend on the special critical theory of the limits of human knowledge, and is thus only valid on the hypothesis that the doctrines of the *Critique* are accepted. The typical form of the proof as stated in the *Critique* for examination is this: (*a*) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being exists; but at least one thing (viz. myself) exists; *ergo* an absolutely necessary being exists; (*b*) a necessary being must be completely determined by its concept; the only concept which thus completely determines an object is the concept of the *ens realissimum*; *ergo* the concept of the *ens realissimum* is the only one by means of which a necessary being can be thought; *i.e.*, a Supreme Being necessarily exists. The argument thus consists of two stages: first, the proof that, because at least one thing exists, a necessary being exists, and, second, the proof that a necessary being can only be the Supreme Being.

Kant denounces this cosmological argument with special vehemence, as was only natural in one who had until his late middle age built on it with perfect confidence and then come to distrust it. His tone in criticizing it is not unlike that of a rather unscrupulous attorney determined to secure a verdict against the accused party by fair means or foul. He begins by a charge of general fraudulence. The cosmological proof professes to appeal to experience, but it is really only the old discredited ontological argument dishonestly disguised. For it only uses the appeal to experience to establish the result: 'There is a being which exists necessarily.' When we ask what this being is, we are referred back to the *ens realissimum* as the only thing which meets the requirements of the case. Therefore 'it is only the ontological proof from mere concepts which contains the force of the demonstration and the alleged experience is wholly superfluous.'[1]

The complaint is surely unfair. The objection to the ontological argument did not lie in the concept of the *ens realissimum*, but merely in the absence of an existential premiss. If, then, the new argument supplies the missing existential premiss, it is no objection to it to say that the necessary being of which it speaks turns out to be the *ens realissimum*. The only legitimate objection would be that the argument does not actually supply such an existential premiss as is really needed. This is what Kant next proceeds to urge.[2] He complains that it ought to be shown that the necessary being is the *ens realissimum*. To prove this, we require to establish two propositions, of which one is the simple converse of the other: (*a*) every necessary being is an *ens realissimum*, (*b*) every *ens realissimum* is a necessary being. But this second proposition is 'determined merely by *a priori* concepts,' and therefore 'the mere concept of the most real being' must be the ground for ascribing to it necessary existence. Thus we commit the fallacy of the ontological proof, the establishment of a proposition by mere analysis of concepts. This criticism seems wholly *verfehlt*. The real objection to the ontological proof was that it aimed at proving an existential proposition by mere analysis of concepts. There can be no logical objection to the attempt to prove by such analysis the hypothetical proposition, 'If anything is an (or the) *ens realissimum*, it is *ens necessarium*,' or the simple converse, 'If anything is *ens necessarium*, it is also *ens realissimum*.' Both these propositions are implications, not assertions of existence; the existential import is brought into the cosmological argument entirely by the preceding proof, or attempted proof, that, if anything exists (as we know to be the case), a necessary being exists. Kant is entitled to contend that this has not been proved; he is entitled to contend that the equivalence of *ens necessarium* and *ens realissimum* has not been made out. He is not entitled to treat the fact that the equivalence is an equivalence of concepts as proof of this second charge. Up to this point he is merely following the recommendation to give a dog a bad name and trust to its hanging him. We now come to the really relevant part of his onslaught. This consists of the following allegations: (1) the inference from the contingent to its cause has a meaning only in the sensible world, but the principle of causality is used in this proof to transcend the sensible world; (2) the argument from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes in the sensible world to a first cause is illegitimate; (3) the very notion of necessity presupposes conditions upon which the necessity in question depends, and it is therefore impermissible to cut short the regress from proximate to more ultimate conditions by the really empty concept of an unconditioned necessity; (4) the proof confuses the mere logical possibility of a concept (absence of internal contradiction) with its transcendental possibility, which 'requires a principle establishing the possibility of performing such a synthesis,' but this latter can only be established 'in the field of possible experiences.' All these objections are valid only on the hypothesis that the Kantian theories about the limits of scientific knowledge are true, and it has already been contended that this hypothesis (involving, as it does, the acceptance of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the consequent recognition of the antinomies of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' as inevitable) is certainly false. In particular, it may be replied to (1) that all use of the principle of causality involves transcending the sensible world; consistent phenomenalism, as the work of such writers as Mach, Pearson, Avenarius, abundantly shows, is bound to eliminate

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², p. 629. [2] *Ib.*

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*², p. 635. [2] *Ib.* p. 636.

the category of causality from science; to (2) that the 'cosmological argument' is not an argument from the impossibility of an infinite series of events at all. In fact it has been often maintained by thinkers who, like Aristotle, deny that the series of events has a first term, or, like St. Thomas, hold that it can only be known by revelation whether the series has a first term or not. The real bearing of the argument cannot be seen at all, so long as we think of causality, as Kant does throughout the *Critique*, as a mere rule of uniform connexion between earlier and later events. Its real foundation is in the conception of efficient causality (activity or agency). The point of the argument is that, if there is not a First Mover or First Agent (or 'movers' or 'agents' in the plural, as the case may be), the whole history of the world is a mere accident. Things are what they are because there 'happen to be' such and such agents, and the reason why there are just these agents and no others is that there 'happen to be' (or 'to have been') certain others by which the set first mentioned have been produced, and so on *in indefinitum*. This means that there might just as well have been no world at all, or one quite different from that which there is. An ultimate pluralistic realism, no doubt, might maintain this thesis, and we shall have to face it in the sequel. But it is an *ignoratio elenchi* to defend it by assuming phenomenalism *plus* an erroneous theory of the mathematical meaning of infinite series. The phenomenalism is further in flat contradiction with the presuppositions of Kantian ethics, for which it is indispensable that every human self shall be a 'first cause' of its own morally and legally imputable acts. If 'first cause' really means nothing intelligible, Kant's practical philosophy is no better than an idle sporting with insignificant words. One must add that the full force of the cosmological argument is only seen when it is combined with the argument from intentional causality. If the historical world-process has a meaning of any kind, whether its meaning lies in the direction of events towards an end or result or in their internal, quasi-aesthetic harmony, the explanation of it cannot, in the end, be merely that the constituents of the universe happen to be what they are. An ultimate pluralism must, to be consistent, deny that there is any meaning at all in the world-process. But, again, the Kantian phenomenalism affords no valid reason for entertaining this view. As to the last point, it does depend on the special principles of the critical philosophy, and, in particular, on the theory that an appeal to the senses lies at the root of all valid synthetic propositions. As has already been remarked, this theory is sufficiently disposed of by the simple consideration that every proposition in the theory of numbers is synthetic in Kant's sense of the word. In the present writer's opinion, then, Kant's attack on the cosmological argument (which he himself clearly regards as the central feature of his general assault on speculative theism) is a complete failure. He proves neither that the argument from the fact of existence to the existence of a 'necessary being' is fallacious nor that there is any sophism in the reasoning by which he himself had formerly established the equivalence of the 'necessary being' with the perfect or 'most real' being. This does not, of itself, prove that the cosmological argument is valid, but it does prove, if the remarks just made are in principle sound, that Kant's objections to the argument are unfounded. Even the complaint that we have no positive conception of either 'necessary' or 'most real' being only amounts to the true assertion that we do not know what it would be like to be God—a proposition which no reasonable theist, least of all an orthodox Christian theologian, need be concerned to deny. For the matter of that, I do not know what it would be like to be my cat, but that is surely an insufficient reason for denying the existence of my cat's mind.

Kant's treatment of the argument from intentional causality—the physico-theological proof, as he calls it—may be summarized more briefly. This argument, which he reduces to the argument from design, he regards with great respect as the most ancient, most obvious, and soundest of all. He assumes it as an undoubted fact that nature, so far as we know it, exhibits all the marks of intelligent purpose, and admits that it is correct to argue from such marks to a designing intelligence. It does not occur to him to explain away the appearances of order and purpose as merely apparent or as the results of anything in the nature of a struggle for existence. He is content to call attention to the limitations imposed on the argument by the imperfection of our knowledge of nature. It is only a part of nature with which we are acquainted, and any inference from the orderliness and purposiveness of that part to thoroughgoing order and purpose in nature everywhere has at best a degree of probability which falls short of certainty. We cannot therefore be sure even of the unity of the designing intelligence, since we do not know that, if all the empirical facts were before us, they would show absolute singleness of design. Even if we knew all the empirical facts, and knew that they all showed perfect unity of purpose, we could only infer that the intelligence which designed the natural order was very wise, very good, very powerful. We could not argue from any knowledge of empirical facts to infinite wisdom, etc. In particular, we only detect intelligence in the arrangement of the 'stuff' of the world, and thus, even if we knew all the facts, we could not use them as a proof of the existence of the Supreme Being, but at most as a proof of the existence of a demiurge or 'architect of the universe.' Thus, if a theologian appears to demonstrate the existence of God by the appeal to design in nature, it is only because he is illegitimately supplementing his reasoning by a concealed appeal to the ontological argument. In these criticisms, in which Kant is manifestly justified, he is, of course, urging considerations with which Hume had already made Philo confront Cleanthes. It is abundantly manifest that no empirical reasoning can establish the existence of a Supreme Being. Kant's final result, stated with his usual love for pedantic formal distinctions, is given in the section of the *Critique* which bears the special title 'Critique of all Theology based on Speculative Principles of Reason.' Theology, we are told, may be based on revelation or on mere reason. Rational theology, again, may think of its object (God) either as *ens realissimum* without further specification or with a further determination as the Supreme Intelligence. The first is transcendental theology, and its supporters may be called deists; the second is natural theology and is the doctrine of the theist. Natural theology, once more, may conceive God as the source of the order that actually exists (the natural order) or as the source of an order that ought to exist (moral order). It is only consideration of the latter that really gives us a right to postulate the existence of a Supreme Being; speculative theology, which attempts to establish the existence of God as required to explain the order of nature, is, as we have seen, condemned to failure, because it seeks to prove the reality of a being which cannot be an object of possible experience. Its value is simply that it shows us that there is no logical impossibility inherent in the notion of a Supreme Being. Thus it forbids us to assert that we know that there is no God, or that, if there is, He is not an intelligent being or is imperfect and limited like ourselves (it saves us from dogmatic atheism, deism, and anthropomorphism), and thus leaves us free to maintain the existence of a supreme spiritual principle, if the moral order proves to be unintelligible apart from the postulate that such a principle exists. For the present it may suffice to make two observations on this. The denial that God is an object of possible experience depends, of course, on taking a specific view of what is meant by experience. If it is indispensable to an experience that it should have an object into which sense-data enter as constituents (and this is what Kant always assumes), manifestly God cannot be experienced. But it may be observed that it is no ground of objection to speculative theology in particular to say that it claims to give us knowledge about a being which is not an object of 'possible experience' in this sense. The same thing is equally true of arithmetic or any other part of pure mathematics. The integers, *e.g.*, are not objects of experience in this sense; still less would it be possible to maintain that, when one utters the well-known proposition, 'Every integer can be represented as the sum of four squares, of which—except in the case of the integer 0—one at least is not 0,' one is not transcending possible experience. It would be quite impossible to verify the proposition by examining its validity for each successive integer (since there is an infinite number of them). Wherever I make a statement about a class with an infinity of members, I am dealing with an object which is not, in Kant's sense of the words, an 'object of a possible experience.' His doctrine reposes on the theory of his 'Aesthetic' that, in the case of arithmetical propositions, I can justify such an assertion by counting. But, though I could, *e.g.*, prove the proposition quoted to hold good for a few cases by actual counting, I manifestly cannot verify it or any other general proposition of the science by this method of appealing to intuition. Again, we may fairly ask why experience should be assumed to be concerned only with objects which fall under the 'forms of intuition.' Why are the saint's moments of vision to be from the outset excluded from experience? If they are included, the statement that God is not an object of possible experience at once becomes questionable. It is a standing defect of the *Critique* that the concept of experience itself has never been subjected by Kant to careful and searching criticism. The second observation which naturally suggests itself is that the sharp opposition between speculation and practice might prove on a closer examination to be misleading. All that Kant can claim to have shown, even if every one of his charges against natural theology could be sustained, is that the facts of physical nature do not warrant the theistic hypothesis. But it is surely as much part of the task of a speculative philosophy to explain the facts of the moral as it is to explain the facts of the physical order. The absoluteness of moral obligations is a fact of the moral order, and, if this fact is only intelligible from the theistic standpoint, then it may fairly be said that speculative philosophy is committed to theism. This was, indeed, Kant's own conviction, and his hard and fast severance between speculation and practice does less than justice to the view he intends to maintain. It gives rise to the misleading suggestion that he regards theism as a doctrine which is doubtfully true but had better be taught to the proletariat with a view to keeping them out of mischief and making them conveniently submissive to their 'betters.' This was not in the least what Kant meant, but his unfortunate verbal distinction between theory and practice is what gave colour to the jest of Heine that after abolishing God in the first *Critique* Kant revived Him in the second in the interest of his old butler's morals, as well as to the strange view of Bernard Bosanquet[1] that Kant's theism is an 'unessential survival.'

It would be wholly unjust to Kant to confine our attention to the destructive side of his treatment of philosophic theism; even more important is his positive teaching, which will be found most fully expressed in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*.[2] If Kant's object was to destroy the

[1] *Essays and Addresses*, London, 1889, p. 129.
[2] Riga, 1788 (*Werke*, v. 116-153).

old speculative natural theology, it is even more his purpose to replace it by a positive moral theology, and it is probably true to say that it is primarily due to his influence that in our own time it is mainly upon the moral argument that popular theistic philosophy continues to base itself. As the Kantian moral theology has often been very imperfectly understood by its critics, it is necessary to state Kant's real position rather carefully, in order to put in the clearest light the differences between Kant and those who hold that the existence of God remains after all a 'pious opinion,' suggested but not established by the facts of the moral life, or those who hold that it is a doctrine recommended mainly by its comforting character. To appreciate the strength of Kant's position, it is necessary to understand that theism is not in any sense an arbitrary hypothesis tacked on to a system of ethics, or, as Bosanquet calls it, a 'survival' of belated superstition, but a logically necessary part of 'practical' philosophy. The argument starts from premisses which are taken as once for all established in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* and the *Analytic of Practical Reason*.[1] These premisses are as follows. The object which all moral action has in view is the realization of the highest or complete good. The complete good means a state of things in which the reasonable will finds full and complete satisfaction. Such a state of things implies two constituents: virtue (a right state of the will itself), and happiness (by which Kant means, as he says, a condition of things in complete accord with the rational will, *i.e.* the successful domination of rational will in the universe). If only the first constituent were real, *i.e.*, if the will of every rational being were morally wholly good, this would not of itself be enough to satisfy the demands of the rational will itself. We should not think a universe satisfactory or rational if it consisted of beings of perfect morality whose volitions were always defeated and disappointed by the course of things. The only condition of things which would satisfy our rational demand for the triumph of the virtuous will would be one in which every rational being should be happy (*i.e.* should find his volition effective), in proportion to the moral goodness of his will. The highest good—the object of the moral will—is thus a union of virtue with happiness, but a union in which the inner virtue of the agent is the condition and cause of his happiness.[2] So the highest good means a condition of existence in which a rational being is (*a*) deserving of happiness, deserving that his 'will be done, as in heaven so in earth,'[3] and (*b*) has the happiness which he deserves as a consequence of his deserving it. (More briefly, the highest good is that the actual order of things should be a moral order.) But—and here comes in the antinomy which Kant thinks indispensable in a *Critique*—the principle, as distinguished from the object, of the virtuous will is always to act from reverence for the unconditional obligatoriness of the moral law, without any consideration of the results of our conduct. We must, as moral beings, will the highest good, yet we must also, as moral beings, will to do right for its own sake, without even asking the question whether our right actions will result in bringing about this good or not. We cannot escape from this antinomy, as Kant holds we can from those of speculative reason, by dismissing it as illusory. For we are under absolute obligation to be virtuous, and we cannot be really virtuous without desiring the highest good, nor yet can we be really virtuous if we allow this desire to affect our will to do right because it is right, regardless of consequences. Thus, if morality is to be more than an empty dream, the union of virtue and happiness must be realized, though we must not set ourselves to realize it by treating virtuous action as a means to it. The realization of the union must be brought about for us, not by us. Now, experience shows abundantly that in the empirically known system of nature there is no dependence of happiness on virtue. The most virtuous man is not regularly the man whose will is actually done 'in earth,' nor the man whose will is done the man whose volitions are morally purest. The union must therefore be effected for us by a supreme power, not our own, in the 'intelligible world' which disposes the course of events so that, if we could see the whole infinite series at once, we should see that every man is happy in proportion to the degree in which he deserves to be happy. Further, since morality demands not merely that the virtuous shall be happy but that the happiness shall be a consequence of their virtue, we could not regard the union of virtue and happiness as effected by a mere blind 'natural tendency' in things. The virtuous man's virtue must be the motive of the disposing power to make him happy—*i.e.*, this disposing power must be thought of as an intelligent and absolutely holy *will*. Thus it becomes a postulate of morality that there is an absolutely wise and holy Supreme Being. We have already seen that the speculative use of reason in finding an explanation for natural events themselves suggested the hypothesis that there is a Supreme Being, though all our attempts to demonstrate the truth of this hypothesis proved to rest on fallacy. The consideration of the presuppositions of morality now shows us that, unless there is to be a hopeless conflict between our conception of the highest good and the first principle of duty, such a Supreme Being must really exist and, what is more, must be spiritual. Practical reason then does not introduce us to any new idea; if it did, there might be an insoluble conflict between its suggestions and the results of speculative criticism. It only gives us the right to affirm as a reality what speculative reason itself unavoidably suggests as a possibility, the complete dependence of the world on a Supreme Being, and enables us to determine the character of that Being so far as to say that it combines perfect wisdom, holiness, and power. Beyond this moral theology cannot go. It tells us what God must be if the world is to have moral order, and it tells us nothing more. Kant pushes this consideration so far that he is not content to say with the Neo-Platonists and scholastics that we do not know God *secundum essentiam suam*. Recurring to his view that an object of possible experience must have sensuous constituents (must be given in intuition), he in effect denies that we have any experience of God at all. 'Mystics' profess to experience the divine, but for that very reason Kant sets them down summarily as 'fanatics' who must not be allowed a hearing.

[1] That the *Critique of Practical Reason* should be divided, like the *Critique of Pure Reason*, into an 'Analytic' and a 'Dialectic'—of course there can be no 'Aesthetic' in this case—and that the 'Dialectic' must have its antinomy is a pure piece of pedantic formalism which Kant would have done well to dispense with.

[2] The words of this statement are not precisely those of Kant, but have been chosen to express as briefly and untechnically as possible the substance of his thought. It should be carefully observed that the central thought is not egoistic. Kant's point is that the 'ideal spectator,' apart from any consideration of his own happiness, would judge unfavourably of a world in which the will of the truly virtuous man was constantly thwarted by the 'force of circumstances.' My own happiness, as he is careful to state, only comes into the consideration in so far as I am one among the many rational and responsible beings in the universe. Nor is happiness understood in a merely hedonistic way. It is the condition in which things happen 'according to our will'—*i.e.* in which the rational will is really effectual.

[3] In fact, though Kant would have been horrified by so 'fanatical' a phrase, he is at bottom quite agreed with 'Dionysius' that 'deification' (θέωσις) is the ultimate goal of the moral life.

The value of Kant's moral argument for theism seems quite independent of our judgment of the critical philosophy as a whole. The phenomenalism which is the weakest point of the system only affects Kant's unfavourable estimate of specific religious experience. It might, indeed, be said with an appearance of plausibility that God as the source of the subordination of nature to the moral order is only brought in to solve a difficulty which Kant has created for himself by the abstract formalism of his ethics. No Kantian doctrine has come in for more unsparing reprobation than the famous theory that the moral worth of an act depends upon its being done from mere reverence for universal law as such, and is destroyed if any desire for a specific result influences the agent's motives. But, apart from this untenable theory, it may be said, there is really no antithesis between the supreme object of virtuous willing and its true principle; the realization of the good is at once object and principle. And thus the problem which, according to Kant, is solved for us by the existence of God is not a real problem at all. Yet such criticism surely misses the mark. The problem Kant has in mind still remains when the pure formalism of his own conception of the good will has been dismissed. One and the same conviction of the absoluteness of moral values, the right of δικαιοσύνη to control the world, compels us to pronounce the world evil and our own moral striving a vain show if the highest good is not realized or realizable, and also forbids us to aim directly at the realization of this highest good by doing moral evil that good may come out of it or leaving the right undone because the consequences of doing right are judged by us to be, in a certain case, bad. It is certain that good often comes out of moral evil, and that moral integrity itself often demands action which leads to bad results which would not have followed if the agent had been less virtuous.[1] Thus, quite independently of any special Kantian theses in ethics, we are confronted by the dilemma: either the order of things, rightly understood (the intelligible world), is a moral order and realizes the highest good or the highest good is not realized and all moral effort is senseless and foredoomed to failure, in which case the conviction of the absolute value of the good, on which morality is based, is a mere illusion. If this be so, the argument from the reality of absolute moral values to the all-wise, all-holy, and all-powerful Supreme Being, in the present writer's judgment, holds, exactly on the lines on which Kant has conducted it. It is precisely the same argument, divested of its incidental trappings of Kantian 'critical' phraseology, which Solovyof compresses into a sentence when he writes:

'The unconditional principle of morality, logically involved in religious experience, contains the complete good (or the right relation of all to everything) not merely as a demand or an idea, but as an actual power that can fulfil this demand and create the perfect moral order or Kingdom of God in which the absolute significance of every being is realized.'[2]

16. Lotze.—This article cannot undertake to follow the history of the treatment of theism in philosophy beyond Kant with any detail. To do so would require a substantial volume, and it does not seem to the present writer that anything which is new in principle has been added to the arguments for or against theism since Kant's development of the moral proof in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. An exception, however, may be made for Lotze, more particularly on the ground that he has done so much, in the face of Kant's critical repudiation of his own earlier position, to vindicate the speculative argument upon which Kant himself relied until advanced middle age.[1]

It may seem strange to describe Lotze as reasserting the particular version of the cosmological argument which finds in God the necessary actual ground of possibilities, in view of the fact that Lotze himself, in the chapter on the 'Proofs of the Existence of God' in the *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*, professes to have disposed of the cosmological proof in one or two paragraphs of not very profound criticism. Yet an analysis of his own argument will show that, though it is not quite identical with any former statement of the cosmological proof, it really follows the general lines of Kant's pre-critical argument for the 'being which exists with an absolute necessity.' The starting-point of Lotze's train of thought was historically determined for him by the necessity of taking up a definite attitude towards the philosophy of Herbart, and to a lesser degree of Hegel; this special concern with the problems raised in the metaphysics of Herbart further accounts for the very marked influence of Leibniz.[2]

Lotze starts with the fact of incessant change or becoming as the most obvious characteristic of the empirical world. The great problem of the metaphysician is to give an intelligible account of the pre-conditions of this universal fact of change.[3] We can neither dismiss change or becoming as a mere illusion (since, even if you deny all change in the objective world, the illusion itself has to be regarded as a process of change in the inner states of the existents which we call minds or souls) nor resolve the history of the universe into a process of absolute becoming, a wholly lawless succession of disconnected states. This would be fatal to the possibility of all knowledge whatever. Change or becoming, then, is real, and it is always grounded change. This is shown by our success in formulating laws of natural processes. If we find that A is regularly, though not always, followed by B, we must suppose that there is a reason in the state of things in which A was present why A should be replaced by B rather than by P or Q, and, if on special occasions A (which is commonly followed by B) is followed by P, there must again be a reason why it is, on these occasions, followed not by the usual B but by the unusual P. At the stage of reflexion reached in natural science we attempt to do justice to this demand for an intelligible interpretation of change by the view that the world is made up of a plurality of different 'things' (A, B, C . . .), each exhibiting a succession of 'states' (a_1, a_2, a_3 . . . b_1, b_2, b_3 . . . c_1, c_2, c_3 . . .). We then say that the changes of state of the various things are interconnected by laws according to which a definite change of 'state' in one thing (*e.g.*, the occurrence of a state a in A) gives rise to the corresponding change in another (the occurrence of a state b in B). This interpretation of the facts, Lotze urges, cannot be final. If the universe were really a collection of independent existents, or 'things,' how could the occurrence of a change of state in one of these existents be conditioned by changes of state in the rest? The very fact that, *e.g.*, A only exhibits the change from state a_1 to state a_2 on the condition that certain definite changes occur in a number of other 'things'—in a word, the 'interconnexion of things in obedience to determinate laws'—shows that the universe is not an ultimate plurality. We are bound to think of it as *one* being of which what we commonly call the various 'things' are partial expressions or activities. We must amend the statement that the changes of state in a plurality of things are related according to definite formulae into the statement that the one and only real 'thing' has a determinate nature or character of its own which it maintains unimpaired. It is this self-maintenance of the 'living whole'—M, as Lotze symbolically calls it—that requires that the change of which we speak as occurring in the thing A should be compensated in a definite way by connected changes, which we are accustomed to refer to the other things B, C. . . . Strictly speaking, then, every change in any element of M is correlated with changes in all the rest. But some of these changes may be minimal and so escape our notice. Hence we are able for our human purposes to formulate laws which connect a definite change in one element with definite changes in a finite number of others, B, C, D, and treat all the rest of the elements as a remainder R, which is irrelevant. The world, then, is not a plurality but a unity-in-plurality. How the unity is effected is more than we can ever expect to know. We may say, 'The unity is the plurality,' but we must remember that the 'is' here is a copula of which the concrete modality

[1] See the entertaining illustrations of this point in V. Solovyof, *The Justification of the Good*, Eng. tr., London, 1918, pt. iii. ch. 6.

[2] *Ib.* p. 180. The whole of Solovyof's book is worth reading as a corrective to Kant's thesis that philosophical theology is exhausted by the one proposition that God exists.

[1] Lotze's treatment of the subject is to be found partly in his *Metaphysik*, latest ed. Leipzig, 1912, Eng. tr.[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1887; see particularly bk. i. chs. 6–7, with which may be compared the more condensed *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, Leipzig, 1883, Eng. tr., *Outlines of Metaphysics*, Boston, U.S.A., 1886, particularly the chapter 'Of Causes and Effects' (Eng. tr., pp. 57–73), partly in the *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*[3], Leipzig, 1894. A longer and more popularly written exposition is given in *Mikrokosmus*[5], 3 vols., do. 1896–1909, Eng. tr.[4], Edinburgh, 1894, bk. ix., 'The Unity of Things.' Only the general outline of Lotze's doctrine can be dealt with here.

[2] It must be remembered that Lotze was necessarily unacquainted with Leibniz's most important papers, which were mostly unpublished until after Lotze had arrived at his own fundamental doctrines; hence his version of the earlier philosopher's thought is not to be implicitly trusted.

[3] This was precisely the problem which had specially occupied Herbart and the Herbartians.

is not fully known to us. But it is important to be quite clear on one point of the first importance. The one 'living whole' M is not properly described as 'subject to universal laws.' If we think of the world as composed of things subject to general laws, it is quite impossible to give any ultimately intelligible account of the relation between the things and the laws. The absolute *prius* is not a complex of laws, but the concrete M and its individual acts of self-expression and self-maintenance. Since we are part of the contents of M, we can compare facts with facts, recognize likeness and differences, and so come to formulate general propositions. We can even carry this so far as, when we have formed the notions of 'class' and 'member of a class,' to think of M, the real world itself, as one member of a class of worlds, and to speculate on the possibility that there might be others—'possible' worlds, as Leibniz said. Then we may be led, as Leibniz was, into the insoluble problem why just this world M, and not a different one N, is real. But this whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as anterior to the individual facts we call the actualized cases of these laws, rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements would be different, and, if we were among these elements, our views as to what alternatives are possible would be different also. It is a radical error in philosophy to confound logical with metaphysical priority.[1]

How M can be the ἓν καὶ πολλά required by the theory we cannot say in detail. But we can see, at any rate, that M cannot be material. The only thing with which we are acquainted which, even imperfectly, discharges for a part of reality the functions which M must discharge for the totality is the soul which at once has or owns a multiplicity of states or activities and would have no life without them, and is yet aware of its own unity and its distinction from each and all of these states and activities. We are thus driven to think of M in terms of spirit. It must be akin to the soul, but must, at the same time, have all the differences from our souls which result from the consideration that it has nothing outside it, is wholly unique, and can meet with no resistance. We are thus led to think of M as an infinite spiritual and, Lotze adds, personal being, all-wise (because its knowledge has not to develop under difficulties and from point to point, like our own), almighty (because it is the absolute *prius*, anterior to all 'law' as well as to all fact), and, above all, all-good (Lotze weakens his case on this point by a half-hearted tendency to take a hedonist view of good, and so to reduce perfect goodness to mere 'benevolence'; a Platonist would have no difficulty, since the all-wise must have complete knowledge of the good, and to know the good is to act it out). M is also 'out of space' and 'eternal,' since geometrical and temporal relations are, and are what they are, as a consequence of M's existing and being what it is. Thus the conception of M with which we began as 'the one real being' passes into the conception of the almighty and eternal God, and the close of our historical retrospect brings us back very close to the position of Neo-Platonism again. It calls for remark that, though Lotze's initial account of M, taken by itself, would suggest a pantheistic or immanence theory, the doctrine, as fully worked out, is definitely theistic. Lotze is careful to guard himself, even when he says that M *is* the world, by adding that 'is' here has a unique sense which it has in no other judgment, and is consequently not the 'is' which occurs in an ordinary identity. Later on we find that each soul, being aware of its own unity, is a real individual distinct from God and from every other soul, though it is from the creating and sustaining activity of God that the soul derives this character. And mere inanimate things are held to be a superfluous hypothesis. There are, according to Lotze, only the one living God and His acts. Some of these acts are souls with a real spiritual individuality of their own. In this way, while avoiding the customary theistic language about the transcendence of God, Lotze secures the same result by maintaining not that God is immanent in the world, but that the world is 'immanent in God.' The limitation of real individuality to souls naturally reminds us of the Neo-Platonic view that souls hold the lowest place in the system of ὄντα, bodies being not ὄντα but γιγνόμενα, 'what becomes,' or εἰκόνες τῶν ὄντων, 'images of ὄντα.' The resemblance with Neo-Platonism is even more marked when Lotze uses his view of M as the metaphysical *prius* of universal laws or eternal truths as a ground for urging that life, truth, and goodness are not, as the Aristotelian phrase has it, 'naturally prior' to God; God is Himself the concrete Life, Truth, and Good.

17. Logical pluralism.—The foregoing statement of the theistic argument as presented by Lotze provides an opportunity for considering the type of ultimate pluralism of which we have spoken as the most serious philosophical alternative to theism. This type of view is best represented in contemporary English philosophy by the writings of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, though, as neither of these authors has ever directly attempted the construction of a metaphysical system, we must be content to indicate the general view to which their studies in logic, ethics, and the philosophy of the exact sciences seem to point. A pluralism of the type in question would take issue with Lotze over the validity of the ground on which he maintains the existence of such a being as M. It would insist on precisely that form of 'dualism' which Lotze assumes to be unthinkable—the 'dualism' of actual existence and hypothetical universal laws. It would be maintained that what we actually find the 'world' to consist of is a plurality of existing things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. These relations, it would be further said, cannot all be reduced, as Lotze assumes, to reciprocal causal inter-connexions. Causal connexion is only one of the many types of relation; there are others, such, *e.g.*, as the mere 'togetherness' or 'compresence' which language represents by the word 'and,' the 'disjunction' symbolized by 'or else,' and so forth, in which causality is not a component at all. Relations are all 'universals,' and no relation is an 'existent,' while 'existents' are all individual. We have to accept it as an ultimate fact which permits of no explanation that specific individual existents stand in certain definite relations to other specific individual existents. To ask why this is so is to ask a question quite as illegitimate as that which Lotze ascribes to the purely mechanical philosophers whom he ridicules for asking 'how being is made.' More particularly, the special problem which leads Lotze to frame the concept of M—the problem how a change of 'state' is brought about, how one thing can exhibit a succession of different states or first have a relation to a second thing and then lose it—would be declared illegitimate. According to the view which has been most elaborately developed by Bertrand Russell,[1] the proposition that at a certain moment A changes its state from a_1 to a_2, or changes its relation to B from R_1 to R_2, if expressed accurately, only means that the whole duration of A's existence can be resolved into two mutually exclusive classes of moments. In any moment of the one class A has the state a_1, or stands to B in the relation R_1; at any moment of the other class A has the state a_2, or stands to B in the relation R_2. And, further, every moment of the one class a_1 comes before any moment of the other class a_2. There is no moment in the whole conjoint class a_1+a_2 at which A has both states or both relations, and no moment at which it has neither. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no such process as that which Lotze calls change, and we live, in fact, 'in a changeless world.' Fully thought out, this view leads to the position, adopted of recent years by Russell, that all existents really exist only at a mathematical instant. What we commonly call one and the same thing or one and the same mind is an infinite succession of different things or minds which we mistakenly regard as one, because the thing or mind which exists at a moment m_2 separated by a minute interval from a preceding moment m_1 is very much like its predecessor. Thus Lotze's argument is invalidated by denying the reality of the facts it is employed to make intelligible. As there are no changes, in the sense in which Lotze understands the word, there is no ground to assert the existence of M to account for them. All arguments for the reality of a 'being which necessarily exists' are thus invalidated; and it is, further, at least highly doubtful whether we can even form the thought of

[1] It will be clear from these last sentences why the present writer regards Lotze's argument for the unity-in-multitude of M as in principle identical with Kant's pre-critical argument for a 'necessary existent' as the foundation of real possibility.

[1] In *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903. The later work of Russell and Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Cambridge, 1910 and subsequent years, does not assume this metaphysic.

a 'being which cannot be conceived not to exist.' Causality, as commonly understood by metaphysicians, likewise disappears. The causal principle reduces to the modest proposition that an observed frequent sequence of an event of the class β on an event of the class α affords ground for the judgment that in cases not previously observed an event of class β is likely to have been preceded by an event of class α. How likely this conclusion is is then a mere problem in the mathematical theory of probability. Whether all events have causes or not remains an open question, and must always remain so. It is clear that such a theory leaves no room for theism in philosophy. If it is really the last word of metaphysics, belief in God loses all rational foundation, though it is, to be sure, still possible that the belief may 'happen' to be true. It must further be admitted that the theory has its strong points. It is by no means obvious that a philosopher is entitled to assume as axiomatic such a conviction about the thoroughgoing interconnexion of all events as Lotze makes the basis of his argument. In what sense or to what degree the 'world' is a unity is a question to which philosophy must find the answer. The interconnexion might conceivably be very much looser than Lotze is willing to admit. And it seems clear that the mathematical analysis by which the particular puzzle about change is eliminated is, *as far as it goes*, entirely justified.[1] Nor yet can it be denied that the very modest statement to which the principle of causality is reduced is all that is required at any rate for the purposes of natural science.

It still, however, remains a question whether we could possibly be content with a logical pluralism of the kind just described as the final answer to our intellectual demand for a rational explanation of the world. For the purposes of the present article it must be enough to call attention to a few of the considerations which suggest that such a theory can only be provisional. One may fairly doubt whether it can really be called an explanation or interpretation at all. The system of interrelated existents with which it presents us as the solution of a perennial intellectual problem seems to be simply the problem itself stated in an unusually abstract way. And it ought to be clear that, when it has been granted to the full that the special problem about the meaning of change has been eliminated, there is a more fundamental problem which the theory has simply left out of account. However true it may be that 'we live in a changeless world'—*i.e.*, that there never is a 'moment' in which anything is 'passing from one state to another'[2]—Lotze's main contention, that the analysis of the universe into relations and existents, which are the terms of the relations, rests on the uncriticized assumption that the successive steps of the logical construction by which we try to make things intelligible correspond exactly to the steps of the real process by which 'being,' so to say, constructs itself, has been left unanswered. Logical pluralism, no less than the 'panologism' of Hegel, simply assumes that the logically prior and the metaphysically prior are identical. The only difference is that the logic of Hegel is so much inferior as logic. To put the point in the simplest possible way, we cannot avoid raising the question why, out of the infinity of relations open to the study of the logician, some and only some are actualized—have existents as their terms. Logical pluralism has no answer to this inevitable question except that 'it happens to be so.' And this is really no answer at all. It amounts to saying not merely that the world might have been wholly different from what it is, but that there might equally well be no actual existents whatsoever. The theory fails to satisfy us for the same sort of reason as that which prevents the ontological proof from producing conviction. Just as that argument assumes that 'there must be something,' so the theory we are now considering assumes that 'there might just as well be nothing.' Now, we cannot prove that there must be something, nor can we prove that there might have been nothing; we have to start from the fact that there is something and that this something has a definite character. Hence, to the present writer, Lotze seems right in contending that it is the character of this something that accounts for the range of logical possibilities itself being what it is, and Kant in arguing that there is an actual ground presupposed by the very distinction between the possible and the impossible. In fact the logical pluralists themselves seem to admit as much when they rightly insist that the so-called laws of thought are laws not of thinking but of things. It is therefore by a rightful exigence of the intellect itself that we are driven to conceive of the structure of the world as explicable only by the metaphysically 'first' character of the 'necessary being'; and, when once we have taken this step, it is not hard to show that the 'necessary being' must have the character of the *ens realissimum*. It must be its own justification, its own *raison d'être*. If so much be granted, it follows at once that, though we can form no adequate positive concept of such a Supreme Being, the least inadequate way in which to think of it is in terms of the highest values known to us—*i.e.* by analogy with the human spirit at its best. How inadequate such an analogy is has always been patent. Even of the human spirit at its best we can only form very inadequate notions from what we see of its actual achievements, and our notion of the Supreme Reality which is the source of our estimates of worth, as of all other possibilities, must needs be doubly imperfect when it has to be framed in so unsatisfactory a way. But we can at least say that such a being must be all that we mean when we think of perfection in ourselves, and infinitely more. If we are not satisfied with theories which, under a disguise, offer us the unexplained detail of the world as its own explanation, it is only in the thought of the detail as throughout conditioned by the living Good that the intellect itself can finally acquiesce. Of course we cannot expect to know in particular how each constituent of this detail is consequent on the character of the Good—why, *e.g.*, it is 'best' for us in particular to be living on the particular planet on which we do live, rather than any other; why there should be just the number of members of our planetary system there are; why the range of colours we can perceive should be neither more nor less extended than it is; and the like. But the conviction that all this detail is as it is 'because it is best' gives an adequate reason why it is what it is, even though we may be quite unable to see why it is best.[1] And it is only the thought of the dependence of the world on the absolute Good which, by removing the artificial severance between the realm of fact and the realm of values, can achieve

[1] The question is *how* far does it go? Is an 'instant' more than a mathematical 'limit'? The 'Theory of Relativity' becomes important at this point (consult A. N. Whitehead, *Enquiry into the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919).

[2] Yet it is surely true, as maintained, *e.g.*, by Whitehead, that 'passage' is just the fundamental fact about Nature, however we choose to analyse it. 'Nature' is, as Plato called it, a γιγνόμενον.

[1] It would be a superficial objection to say that 'because it is worst' would be also an answer to our question. Good (no one has done more to insist on the point than Moore) means something definite and positive. So 'best' has a meaning, but 'worst' has none, any more than 'so crooked that nothing can be crookeder' has.

the solution of the supreme intellectual problem, the reconciliation of science with life.

These considerations suggest certain further reflexions on the limitations of logical pluralism. The whole theory has manifestly been thought out in the exclusive interest of pure mathematics and the application of mathematics in the natural sciences, and for that purpose it works admirably. But there is more in heaven and earth than these sciences take into account. Even within their limits it remains to be seen whether the theory as it stands will really do all that a philosophy of the sciences should. The fundamental difficulty is that it is a consequence of the theory that, as has already been said, the establishment of scientific laws by induction comes to be simply a problem in the theory of probabilities. But the theory of probabilities, taken by itself, seems to give us no ground whatever for attributing to the conclusion of an inductive generalization any finite probability, however small.[1] Science would thus seem to be impossible in principle unless some as yet undiscovered premiss for induction, which is not included in the theory of probabilities, can be unearthed; and it remains to be seen whether such a premiss, if discovered, is consistent with the rest of the theory. Again, the replacing of the individual existents of popular common sense and ordinary science by infinite series of momentary individuals seems an absolutely necessary consequence of the initial assumption of the theory, and, so far as the things of the external world as conceived by common sense, or the constituents of the physical order as conceived by the physicist, are concerned, there might be no difficulty about it.[2] But it is quite another question whether the substitution does not destroy the whole significance of the moral realm, the system of intelligent spirits. It is not merely that it creates a difficulty in psychology, though surely it does create such a difficulty. The immediate witness of consciousness to our identity as subjects of experience is a real fact which no logical theory about the constitution of the world has a right to ignore. It may be that 'the mind thinks not always,' that there are intervals in which each of us is wholly unconscious, though such evidence as we have does not seem favourable to the supposition; but, at least when we are conscious, every conscious act fills an actual interval and yet has its absolutely unitary character. A 'duration,' though a brief one, is necessary to think the simplest proposition, and much more to draw the easiest inference. Yet the thinking of the proposition or the making of the inference is a unitary act only intelligible as the act of a unitary intelligence. It is nonsensical to say that, when I think 'God is,' this thought, as a mental event, is really made up of an infinity of momentary 'mental states' of similar but numerically different minds, or that the 'I' which resolves on a given act and the 'I' which carries out the resolve are each an infinity of different 'I's' with a further infinity of still different 'I's' between them. Only the elementary blunder in analysis of resolving activity into mere succession can account for the promulgation of such a view. It is a still more serious matter that the doctrine is wholly incompatible with the fundamental prerequisites of ethics. This point is capable of being developed in great detail and from more than one side, but in principle it should be enough to say that the denial of permanent personality is fatal to the conception of personality as having moral worth. If we analyse any act upon which a moral judgment would normally be passed into an infinity of momentary phases, no moral predicate can be ascribed to any one of these stages. The moral judgment for approval or condemnation has no meaning if it be applied to any such single stage; to be significant, it must be passed on the whole act, considered as one, and as an expression in act of the inner will of a subject who is one and the same from its first inception in thought to its completion. Similarly the notion of duty loses all its meaning with the relegation of permanent selfhood to the realm of illusion. That an act is my duty in the present situation means that it is something not yet done, but which ought to be done and to be done by me. But if 'I' only exist at a mathematical *punctum temporis*, the proposition that I ought now to do a certain act has no longer an intelligible significance. A merely momentary 'I' can do nothing and can be nothing except just what it is; 'ought' is a category which has no application to it. It is no mere accident that Russell should have dropped significant hints in his latest writings of conversion to the view that moral judgments are only 'subjective,' mere expressions of fundamentally irrational moods. The real outcome of a logical pluralism, put forward as the ultimate truth about what is, is not even that standing dualism of what is and what ought to be of which Lotze complains; it is rather the pronouncement that categories of value (there can be no reason to confine the conclusion to specifically ethical values) are one and all devoid of any real application. For those who cannot accept this result, Kant's moral argument for theism seems to the present writer unanswerable. For it is only if the Good is also the supreme principle of all existence that it becomes possible to understand how what is and what ought to be can form one 'world,' and from the recognition of the Good as the Supreme Being theism follows directly. This seems to be illustrated by the present state of philosophical opinion in our own country. Throughout the thirty years or so, from the seventies of the last century onward, in which Hegelianism, interpreted with a marked Spinozistic bias, was the dominant philosophy in academic circles, there was a natural tendency to make it almost the test of a man's philosophical capacity that his attitude towards the problems raised by the religious life should be an emotional pantheism; atheism was in discredit as indicative (as indeed it is) of lack of interest in or understanding of the whole realm of personal values; theism as a supposed mark of want of logical thoroughness. In the present generation the issues seem to be clearing. Philosophers are certainly tending, though not without exception, to range themselves into two camps. Those to whom the business of philosophy seems to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in providing a logical basis and a methodology for exact science appear to be identifying themselves with the doctrine of logical pluralism and taking up a definitely atheistic attitude which involves the denial of the objectivity of judgments of value; those, on the other hand, who are convinced that the business of philosophy is to make life, as well as science, intelligible, and consequently find themselves obliged to maintain the validity of these categories of worth apart from which life would have no significance, are, in the main, declared theists.

18. Objections to theism.—It may be desirable to add some brief observations on certain types of objections which are often quite sincerely raised against a theistic interpretation of the world. In principle none of these difficulties are novel; most of them find their expression in Hume and may be traced back far behind Hume to the literature of

[1] See the acute discussion by C. D. Broad, in *Mind*, new ser., cviii. 389-404, and the criticisms of P. E. B. Jourdain, *Mind*, new ser., cx. 162-180. Jourdain's criticisms do not seem to the present writer to affect the soundness of Broad's contentions.

[2] But the philosophical interpreters of the 'Theory of Relativity' would have something to say on this point.

the ancient world. Popularly these objections are often called 'scientific,' though their only connexion with modern natural science is that its discoveries enable some of them to be stated in a more impressive way. For the most part they are all summed up in the antitheological assertion of Lucretius that the existing world is too bad to have been created or to be administered by a divine intelligence, 'tanta stat praedita culpa.' Thus it is urged that the suffering of the animal creation is too great, the cost of the 'struggle for existence' too painful, for us to ascribe a world like that we know to a benevolent Creator. Or, again, it is said that an almighty Creator might have made the human race, in particular, such that it would not be exposed as it is to suffering, to constant struggle with its environment, to the consequences of its own mistakes and wrongdoing. It is then inferred that, if there is a superhuman intelligence behind nature, that intelligence is either deficient in wisdom or wanting in goodness. Now, obviously, criticisms of this kind rest upon premisses which may be fairly called in question. One might reasonably doubt whether the pessimistic interpretation of the facts which sees misery predominant everywhere in animal and human life has any real warrant. To an unbiased observer an animal does not seem normally to give signs that it finds its existence miserable, and it is notable that suicide is not common among men, and, unless the stories of the scorpions which kill themselves when surrounded by fire are true, apparently as good as non-existent among the lower animals. The misuse of the metaphorical phrase which describes the process by which species are selected for survival as a 'struggle' is too glaring to need more than a word of comment. If competition plays a prominent part in the economy of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as it does in the economy of commerce, it no more follows that the life of every animal, or most animals (and? vegetables), is one of wretchedness than it follows that all or most business men are hopelessly miserable.[1] Still, of course, it may be said that there is, at any rate, some suffering in the world and that perfect goodness would have permitted none at all. Such an argument, however, tacitly assumes that perfect goodness can have only one end, a hedonistic one, and thus permits of the answer that whatever the end which perfect goodness conjoined with omnipotence would propose to itself—and we clearly are not in a position to say what that end would be—it is at least unreasonable to suppose that it can be the mere promotion of agreeable feeling, an end which even we ourselves regard as a low one. If we could know the purpose of creation, it might well be that we should see that it is entirely good and at the same time could not be attained without the presence of an element of hedonic evil in things. Similarly, with respect to the objection based on the view that it would be 'better' that human beings should have been placed in a world where there were no unfriendly or intractable environment to master, and should have been *ab initio* infallible and impeccable, it is obvious that it loses its force if we decline to assume (1) the hedonistic identification of good with pleasure, and (2) the proposition that the good of the human race must be the sole or at least the principal design of God. If God's aim in dealing with us is to educate us into noble character—a much worthier aim than that of making us comfortable—it may well be that such an end could not be obtained except by the discipline of struggle with our surroundings, with our own mistakes and our own misdeeds.

[1] And is it possible, in the present state of knowledge, to regard 'competition' as playing anything like the part Darwin assigned to it in determining the fate of 'varieties'?

Nor have we the right to assume that the human race must necessarily be the sole or even the chief object of the divine care; we do know, unless ethics is a delusion, that a human soul is a thing of absolute worth; that it is of higher worth than everything else which God has created is more than we can know. Indeed there is a rival objection which proceeds on the opposite assumption. We are asked to think of the enormous spaces revealed to us by astronomy and the number and bulk of the heavenly bodies, and then to reflect on the absurdity of supposing that the fate of the inhabitants of one petty planet can count for anything in the scheme of the universe. Yet it is clear that here, too, the antitheist is reasoning (if it can be called reasoning) upon a false assumption. He is assuming that we know that the absolute worth of a member of the universe is estimated by its bulk and duration. Man must be of little value in the scheme of things because his body is tiny and its lifetime short. Plainly we have no right to make serious objections to the theist's belief in God's care for man on such flimsy grounds. If we do not know that man is the thing of highest worth in the creation, neither do we know that he is not. The one thing which a theist can affirm is that the absolute worth of moral personality must be respected in a system which is the work of God. 'Justorum animae in manu Dei sunt'; that is all we can say, but surely it suffices. If the Good is the principle of actuality, that means that we can say that a thing has come to be because it was better that it should be than that it should not; it is where and when it is because this is better than that it should be otherwhere and otherwhen; that befalls it which does befall it because it is best that it should befall—*i.e.*, God is alike Creator, Providence, and Judge of His creatures. Of course, if we had no grounds at all for our theistic conviction, difficulties like those mentioned might forbid us to entertain it as a mere 'extra' belief. But, if it is true, as has been urged in this article, that speculation and practice alike point to the eternal nature of God as the object in which both find their completion, we have a double exigence of the practical and the speculative reason on the side of theism, and in the presence of such an exigence we are justified in applying Newman's remark that 'a thousand difficulties do not amount to one doubt.' One might add that there is a third exigence—the specifically religious. It would be perhaps a more serious objection to theism than any we have yet considered to urge that our whole procedure in looking for a First Cause is vitiated by one obvious fallacy. The world, it might be said, even if it has attained its present structure as the result of processes which are in the last resort reducible to mere redistributions of unintelligent primary constituents, directed by no mind and having no end, still must, of course, have a perfectly determinate structure, and, as we ourselves happen to be included in that structure, of course we inevitably discover adaptations in our environment to our special needs, and are led to fancy that such adaptations are evidence of the direction of the world by an intelligence which aims at supplying our needs. But the real fact is simply that it is not the world that has been adapted to us, but we who have learned and are learning to adapt ourselves to the world. If we did not so adapt ourselves, we should not be here, and, if a time ever comes when our capacity for such 'adjustment' of our 'inner relations' to the 'outer relations' is exhausted, we shall cease to be here. If the actual course of events had been different, all the reactions which we now call good, because they further adaptation, might have hindered it, and those which now hinder it might

have furthered it. If in such a state of things there had been reflecting beings at all, they, judging from their standpoint, would have called good all that we think evil, and evil all that we think good. They would have inferred benevolent divine activity from the existence of conditions which we should regard as indicating the control of nature by malignant 'diabolical' intelligences; and their inferences would have just as much foundation as ours. These considerations, it might be said, are a *reductio ad absurdum* not merely of all attempts to reason from 'Nature up to Nature's God,' but of the moral argument itself, since they show after all that standards of valuation are and must be in the end purely subjective. Since the human race exists, and so long as it continues to maintain itself, there must, of course, be no irresoluble discord between human estimates of value and the actual conditions of existence. But, as the illustration shows, we have no right whatever to argue from this simple and obvious fact to the dependence of existence on an absolute 'Good.' In fact, any of the races which have 'gone under' in the struggle for existence would be equally justified in asserting that existence depends on the absolute 'Evil.' Here, as it seems to the present writer, we are confronted by the real ultimate difficulty for theism. If there is, after all, no realm of absolute values, a line of thought which is throughout determined by the conviction that the realm of facts and the realm of values cannot be separated must manifestly be futile. It is just the recurrent fear that the 'realm of values' may turn out to be a fiction of our imagination that is, in speculation, the last enemy to be overcome. How is it to be met? The answer, it may be suggested, is the old one, given in the memorable utterance of Pascal: 'Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne me possédais. Ne t'inquiète donc pas.'[1] The sentences may be applied to ultimate doubt about the reality of every kind of human value. Is a man tempted to doubt whether there really is any absolute and certain truth, whether all our 'truths' may not be mere 'human' or even 'personal' points of view, βροτῶν δόξαι αἷς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής? Let him bethink himself that it is only because he is not unacquainted with truths that he can frame the notion of the absolutely true, and only because he has framed the notion that he can raise his doubt. So it is only because we are all along secretly aware that there are things which we ought unconditionally to do that the question whether any given accepted obligation is really unconditional can so much as be put. If we knew no beauty, we could not even ask ourselves whether our judgments about beauty rest on illusion. In like manner it is only because the absolutely Good and utterly Adorable has not left Himself without a witness in our hearts that we feel the need of an object to worship and are driven on from the worship of trees, or streams, or animals, or mighty men, or anthropomorphic deities, towards an object in which our adoration can at last find rest because that on which it is directed is adequate to sustain it. Prayer and adoration need no more justification than the questioning attitude towards things which leads to science, or the impulse to make things of beauty which leads to art, or the desire to do right which leads to morality. It is not for nothing that man, as the Greeks said, is the only animal who has a god. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we may fairly say that the Stoic appeal to the *consensus gentium*, though no formal demonstration, still contains a thought which goes to the very root of things. There are, of course, individual men who do not feel the impulse to seek for Him whom they may worship with a *rationabile obsequium*, as there are men with no sense of humour, or men to whom music means nothing, or men who cannot be made to see that the difference between right and wrong is anything more than the difference between what society will allow them to do and what it will not let them do without making them uncomfortable. The existence of such individuals is about as important in any one of these cases as in any other. Nor does the number of such men without a religion seem to be on the increase. In our own day the only effect of persuading men that the Most High is a dream appears to be that they transfer their worship to the demonstrably not most high; we get such quaint aberrations as the Comtist worship of 'humanity,' or the elevation of Marxian Socialism into a faith. The one real question is not what certain individuals are unable to feel the necessity of searching for, but what those who do seek find, *sed quid invenientibus?* The lives of the 'saints' are the real answer of theism to the last insistent perplexities of the doubter who lurks in each of us. Others, without the theist's faith, have often led noble lives; they have fought a good fight with the untowardness of a world which they have believed in their hearts to be stupid or malignant; yet the most clear-sighted among them, like Huxley, have confessed that mortal heroism is a losing game, a battle with the cosmic forces. Such heroes, after all, do but apply to the universe the saying of the Emperor Marcus about base men: 'The finest revenge is not to become like them'; they have revenged themselves on the world. What they lack—and one does not see how the lack is to be made good—is the secret of spiritual joy which belongs to those who are assured that it is the Good which is supreme in heaven and in earth. It would be tempting to develop this argument farther, from a slightly different point of view—that of love. To love, no less than to worship, it may be said, is an ultimate human need. At least, if a man does not feel the imperativeness of the need, we should probably say there was something 'inhuman' about him. And love too, like worship, seeks its adequate object — that which, without any yielding to illusion, a man can love with all his heart and mind and strength. Love, with no limitations, if it is clear-sighted, for us at least must be an *amor ascendens*, and, as it has its source in good (for real love is always for what is good, not for what is evil, in its object), so, unless it can at last rest in the supreme Good, which is good altogether, it must remain unsatisfied. But we cannot here pursue the point farther. Only one thing more will be said in conclusion, and that for the believer in 'science' who scruples at admitting the reality of the Good. Why do we believe in science at all? Why do we, as we must if we have this belief, refuse to entertain the possibility that the 'progress of science' is only bringing us nearer to a point at which the whole construction would be found to culminate in manifest and hopeless contradictions? As a mere logical possibility there seems to be nothing absurd about the suggestion. If we dismiss it, as we do, it is because we believe that knowledge is good, and because in our hearts, whatever we may say with our lips, we believe that the Good is real. Therefore, little as we know of the facts of the world, we work on in confidence that, however drastically the discovery of new facts may compel us to modify our statements of truth and to supersede as provisional results we once thought established for ever, no new fact of the infinity which might be discovered in an endless 'progress' will ever show that 'science' has been a secular nightmare of the race.

[1] *Pensées*, vii. 555 (ed. Brunschvicg, Paris, 1905).

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A. E. TAYLOR.

THEOCRACY.—The term 'theocracy' was coined by Josephus,[1] upon the analogy of 'aristocracy' and 'democracy,' to denote a certain kind of national polity. Any tribe or state that claims to be governed by a god or gods may be called a 'theocracy.' History has many different types; *e.g.*, the theocratic idea underlies Brāhmanism, Islām, the papacy, and the theory of 'kingship by divine right.' Yet there is probably no historical instance of a 'pure' theocracy. Just as the British constitution to-day, while predominantly democratic, has monarchic elements, so of old time the Hebrew commonwealth, for example, while predominantly theocratic, had democratic elements. Different polities are distinguishable historically, not because a single principle exhausts them, but because some one principle is dominant within them. The idea of government by God was the dominant one in Israelite polity. In this way it was unique, as Josephus claimed, among the polities of his time. It is the leading instance of theocracy for all times. It is the only one discussed here.

Theocracy came to Israel by survival. The earliest form of human society, so far as anthropology has yet discovered, was the clan or kindred-group. This appears to have been world-wide. In religion it was 'henotheistic,' a particular god belonging to a particular clan. He was part of it, as much a part as any human member. His relation to it was too many-sided to be summed up in any one word. In some ways a tribe's god was like a father, in some like a captain, in some like a king, and so on. But, as monarchy developed among the Semitic races, the relation of the god to the tribe came to be chiefly like that of a king. So, among them as well as elsewhere, there arose the early 'henotheistic' type of theocracy. Its best-known examples are Biblical: Chemosh ruled Moab, Milcom ruled Ammon, Jahweh ruled Israel, and so on. Sooner or later, however, this kind of theocracy perished in every settled land except one. The gods of such tribes as Edom and Moab passed away, with the tribal independence, before the attack of Assyria, or Babylon, or Persia. In other lands polytheism supervened on henotheism. There the gods slowly became rather an appendage of the state than its rulers. But in Israel the idea of the sole rule of a single God survived all the vicissitudes of history. It survived by development. Its history is the history of the way in which Hebrew thought about Jahweh's rule evolved to meet the varying challenge of national need. To set this out fully would be to write the whole story of Israel. Here a narrower question is in place: the idea of government by Jahweh being constant in Israel, how did the idea of its *method* evolve?

The study of the method of any kind of polity turns largely on the nature of its organs, for almost all civilized governments rule through organs. This is peculiarly so with theocracies, since it is only in legend that gods speak directly to their peoples. Josephus himself, in the very passage where he coins the word 'theocracy,' speaks, not of Jahweh, but of Moses, as 'our law-giver.' In Israel, as elsewhere, the organs of theocratic government were long associated with sacred shrines. Horeb, Shiloh, and Bethel are instances.[1] The shrine, so to speak, gave the organ authenticity. When doubt or dispute arose about Jahweh's Law, appeal would be made to the guardians of some great shrine.[2] These came to form a priestly class. At the great shrines, too, there soon began to be books of Jahweh's *tōrōth*;[3] here as well there were the few men who could write and read books. Traditionally, at least, the original Law had been given, and its first edicts written, at the shrine of Horeb or Sinai.[4] In later times, no doubt, when a Hebrew visited a shrine to learn Jahweh's will, its authorized exponent, the priest, would not only read the appropriate law, but explain it. Sometimes, again, he would need to extend an old principle to meet a new 'case.' So, little by little, the 'Law of Jahweh' would insensibly grow. For early Israel three things were indissoluble—Jahweh's shrine, Jahweh's book, Jahweh's priest. The three together formed the normal organ of theocracy.

The history of pre-monarchic Israel, however, has traces of two other theocratic organs—the so-called 'judge' and the 'prophet.' Of these a distinctive phrase is used: 'the spirit of the Lord came upon' so-and-so.[5] The phrase has variants,[6] but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy.[7] There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot.[8] If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. There was perhaps a similar connexion at first between the shrine and 'prophesying.'[9] Before the days of Samuel the

[1] *C. Apion.* ii. 16.

[1] The 'Ark of God' was originally a kind of movable shrine.
[2] Cf. Ex 21[6] and parallels; 1 S 2[28] 7[1ff.].
[3] Cf. Jos 24[26], Dt 31[9. 26ff.], 1 S 10[25].
[4] Ex 34[4. 12].
[5] *E.g.*, Jg 11[29], Nu 24[2], 1 S 10[10].
[6] Cf. esp. Jg 6[34].
[7] It is possible that historical study will at length speak of three organs here instead of two, distinguishing the 'judge' from the warrior-'saviour.' For it has been implied above that to judge, in the ordinary sense of the word (cf. 1 S 8[1-5]), was a function of the priest in Israel; and this was not confined to priests (*e.g.*, Jg 4[4ff.], 1 S 4[18] 7[6]). Such 'judges' were thought of as organs of the 'spirit of Jahweh' (cf. Nu 11[17ff.]). One who had 'saved Israel' (cf. Jg 3[31] 6[14] etc.) was also such an organ. Not infrequently a 'saviour' became a judge as well, and later Hebrew writers, used to the constant union of the captain and the judge in the king, treated it as constant in the leaders of early times too (*e.g.*, Jg 2[16] D 3[9ff.] D). Yet there seem to have been judges who were neither priests nor 'saviours' (Jg 10[3] 12[8-15]; cf. 1 S 7[16ff.] 8[1]). To 'save Israel,' to judge, to serve at a shrine, were distinct theocratic functions, though two of them might unite in a single man.
[8] Jg 4[5] 8[27], 1 S 2[28] 7[15ff.].
[9] Cf. 1 S 3[20f.] 9[19].

Hebrew 'prophet' was probably hardly more than the wandering saint of other Eastern faiths[1]—a man who lived a separate and so a 'holy' life. In all lands these have frequented shrines, for, even where they have no 'official' connexion with the ritual, temples offer the best opportunities for the alms by which they live. The first band of 'prophets' named in the Hebrew records appears as 'coming down from the high place.'[2] Primitive thought does not readily isolate the different organs of a god's activity.

Scholars differ about the degree in which the religion of pre-monarchic Israel surpassed other tribal faiths, but all allow that within the period of the monarchy Hebraism became unique. In that period all the theocratic organs named above persisted, but in persisting changed. Every other Hebrew shrine was eclipsed by the Temple in Jerusalem, and at length disappeared. So, too, the Temple became at last the depository of the one recognized book of Jahweh's Law.[3] In Jerusalem, again, the priesthood of Israel ultimately concentrated. At crises in the history of the Southern Kingdom the high-priest sometimes played a decisive part,[4] and there is evidence that the Temple had a succession of priest-preachers who surpassed all contemporary priesthoods in the loftiness of their teaching and the purity of their lives.[5] Their permanent memorial is the book of Deuteronomy. It was only at the close of the monarchy that they became utterly corrupt—a fate that also befell the 'sons of the prophets'—and even then Jahweh's great witness, Jeremiah, was born a priest. Of the three other theocratic functions found in the times before the kings, two—leadership in war and judgment in peace—which had previously often united in a single person[6] now permanently blent in the king. While, of course, there were inferior captains and subordinate judges, he was both supreme captain and supreme judge. And he was effectively both. A king, unlike the earlier 'saviour,' held permanent office, and, unlike the earlier judge, had power to enforce his decisions. And he was king by the will of God. He was Jahweh's 'son,' as having His mind and acting under His guidance.[7] He was 'the Lord's anointed.' At times even a wicked king fell back upon Jahweh's help at the pinch of his people's need.[8] It is true that one king after another 'did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord,' and so repudiated the righteous God of Israel, but the ideal of a king who, like David, did the will of Jahweh remained a part of the hope of Israel. Ideally the Hebrew monarchy was theocratic.

The chief glory of monarchic Israel, however, was its prophets. They were different indeed from all other 'prophets'! With them the connexion of theocracy with shrines, maintained by the kings,[9] began to loosen. At times, again, the prophet must perforce denounce the priest. Yet the prophets, more than any else, were the true organs of theocracy. 'Thus saith the Lord' was their watchword. They spoke under the impulse of the Spirit. In a sense they kept God alive. It is true that, from the time of Elijah, Israel began to refuse their guidance, that at last the Northern Kingdom rejected it altogether, and that even in Judah they became the leaders only of a 'remnant.' But it was just this 'remnant' that meant so much for the future of the world. Israel is unique among theocracies because of its prophets.

The Exile was a signal proof of their greatness, for no other ancient people survived exile. 'To be carried captive' destroyed, as it was meant to destroy, nations and their gods together. Even in exile, however, Israel believed in the rule of its God. Of this creed the unknown prophet now called 'Deutero-Isaiah' was preacher *par excellence*. The Hebrew of the Return re-crossed the desert under the definite conviction that his God was leading him, as He had led Abraham.[1] In consequence a decisive change in the Hebrew idea of theocracy became complete. From Isaiah onwards the primitive notion that there were as many gods as there were nations had been gradually making way for the belief that there was but one God, and He the master of all nations. Only so could Jahweh save Jerusalem from Sennacherib, or redeem Judah from Babylon. Monotheism now entirely supplanted henotheism. While Israel was still Jahweh's 'peculiar treasure,' His theocracy was no longer limited to Canaan, but swayed the world.

Yet the immediate sequel was disappointing. 'Judaism'—to use the name appropriate after the Return—set out to be a pure theocracy. It rebuilt the old shrine; it gathered the ancient books; at length it made the ancient priesthood paramount. Yet it gradually became a splendid failure. The line of prophets dwindled away. The Jews looked in vain for kings like David. At last no priest dared, in the Lord's name, to add to His Law. And it seemed clear, besides, that the Lord did not rule the world. Theocracies tend to become hierarchies, and hierarchies tend to stagnate. Israel was now a hierarchy, and it looked as though Jahweh would sink to the level of the gods who had done great things in the past, but who did nothing in the present. The Jewish theocracy threatened to 'fossilize.'

Yet it escaped this fate. As the Psalms of the period show, there were always Jews who practised the creed that their God was still alive, and they knew that His time would come. The book of Daniel bears the same witness in a different way. It is the first apocalypse, and all apocalypses are theocratic. So, again, in its own way, is the book of Esther. The distinctive note of this epoch is not really its consummated ritual or its completed law, but its unextinguished hope. Israel believed that the future, as the past, was its God's and its own. There would be a perfect theocracy yet! The Kingdom of God would come!

There were two leading opinions about the way of its coming, readily separable in thought, though not always separated in fact. The one opinion found its aptest expression in the apocalypses. Broadly speaking, these expected a kingdom based on force, in which the Jew would rule all other nations—a kingdom won and maintained by a superhuman organ of God. This opinion laid hold of the external form of the old theocracy, kingship. It had an element of truth in it, for the NT has an apocalypse. In the interval before the perfect kingdom comes Christ does 'over-rule' all things and men, and this is a theocratic idea. Yet the other opinion is final for Christianity. Its earlier exponents were some of the later Psalmists; it lived in the quiet circles that 'waited for the consolation of Israel'; its perfect preacher was Jesus. He accepted the phrase 'the Kingdom of God,' and so looked for a theocracy, but He gave the phrase His own exposition and laid down the true method of the Kingdom's coming. It has been seen above that from the first a man who was the organ of

[1] *E.g.*, 1 S 10.
[2] 1 S 10[5].
[3] 2 K 22[8] ('the' book).
[4] 2 K 11, 22.
[5] Cf. G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1908, ii. 111 f.
[6] See footnote 7 on p. 287.
[7] Cf. 2 S 7[14]. The idea of a Divine monarch with an earthly vicegerent was quite common in the Semitic world (W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, lect. ii.).
[8] *E.g.*, 1 K 20[13].
[9] 2 S 6, 1 K 12[26f.].

[1] Cf. Ezr 8[22].

Jahweh was thought of as 'filled with' His Spirit. This was why and how he knew God's will. More than once it had been discerned, even by OT thinkers, that a perfect theocracy, therefore, could come only if all its citizens, and not a few only, had the Spirit of Jahweh.[1] This idea is really central in Jesus' teaching, though He was able to teach it only as men were able to bear it. With the Acts of the Apostles it became explicitly the master principle of Christianity. At the same time there began the evolution of the Christian doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost. There can be a perfect theocracy only when every man acts always under the guidance of the Spirit of God. Here is the culmination of Biblical theocratic doctrine. Yet here also is its euthanasia. For this kind of 'theocracy' does not satisfy the definition given above. It is not a 'theory of national polity.' The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is naturally individual, and as naturally universal, but it is not naturally national.[2] Again, the term 'polity' implies government and its coercions, and one of the marks of the Spirit's sway just is that it is incoercive. Yet the husk of Israel's theocratic idea held a kernel of 'eternal' value. The last human society will be a Kingdom of God.

LITERATURE.—For Josephus's use of the term 'theocracy' see *HDB*, *s.v.*, vol. v. [1904] p. 337 (V. H. Stanton); for the facts about the general Semitic notion of theocracy see W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, London, 1894, lect. ii., and *The Prophets of Israel*, do. 1897, lect. ii.; for the development of the idea in Israel and in the apocalyptic literature see the standard authorities on the religion of Israel, the theology of the OT, and the extra-canonical Jewish books; the corresponding authorities on the NT discuss the relation of the idea of the Kingdom of God to the earlier theocratic doctrine. Separate treatment of the subject is unusual.

C. RYDER SMITH.

THEODICY.—1. The term.—Theodicy (Germ. *Theodizee*, adapted from Fr. *théodicée*, which is compounded of Gr. θεός, 'God' + δίκη, 'justice') means literally the (or a) justification or vindication of God. Leibniz appears to have been the first to use the word in its distinctive sense. In a letter written in 1697 he spoke of employing it as the title of an intended work,[3] and in 1710 the work duly appeared. The complete title was, 'Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal.' Since Leibniz's time the word 'theodicy' has been in common use.

2. The concept.—In modern usage the scope of the term is vague and ill-defined. Sometimes it is employed, as by P. Janet and G. Séailles,[4] as equivalent to natural theology or philosophy of religion. For those writers theodicy comprises the general problem of religion, though it is also understood by them in a more particular sense, as comprising only the central problems of the nature of God and the relation of God to the world. In either of these senses it may escape the charge of being a theory put forward 'to save the situation.'[5] But in the usual sense it does not so readily escape such a charge. For as a rule the use of the term is more in keeping with its literal meaning, and theodicy is understood as the (or a) vindication of the divine providence or government in view of the existence of evil. The 'theodicean' assumes the validity of the theistic conception of God as powerful, wise, and good, and on this basis seeks to defend the divine administration: he would

'assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.'[1]

3. Origin of the concept.—The need of such a defence and vindication is not felt in primitive religion under polydæmonism, with its animistic or spiritistic view of nature, because under polydæmonism the world is subject to a multitude of spirits both good and evil, who limit each other and are themselves limited by the natural order. Nor is the need felt even at the polytheistic stage of religious belief, with its multitude or hierarchy of gods as distinguished from spirits or godlings, because at this stage thought, if no longer naive and instinctive, is still uncritical, and the gods are conceived as being subject to fate or necessity or as governing a world already given and never properly under their control. At the monotheistic stage of religion, however, where thought is become critical and reflective, the problem of theodicy arises and calls for a solution. Sometimes, as in Persian religion, a dualism in the divine nature is postulated, and the world represented as the scene of a grand conflict between the principles of good and evil, in which good is destined to final triumph; and obviously a dualistic philosophy of religion, if it could be otherwise satisfying, would ease the problem. Under a monistic philosophy of religion, again, the tendency is actually to get rid of the problem, by minimizing evil or even by reducing evil to illusion. This tendency is observable in the cosmic and acosmic pantheisms of Stoicism and Brāhmanism respectively. Only in a philosophy of religion in which God is recognized as wholly good, and evil as truly evil, is the problem of theodicy felt in all its insistence. *Si deus bonus, unde malum?* Christianity, theistically interpreted, supplies such a philosophy, and in the course of Christian history the problem of theodicy received distinctive treatment in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall. Whatever may be said as to the form of that doctrine, it stands for a principle which should be acknowledged in theistic interpretations of the world, namely the principle of human freedom and responsibility. It is not without significance that the classical theodicy or theistic apologia of Leibniz bears in its title not only 'the goodness of God' and 'the origin of evil,' but also 'the freedom of man.'

4. Leibniz's Théodicée.[2]—(*a*) In the problems of theodicy Leibniz had been interested since his boyhood, and he claims to have given more attention to them than most.[3] There are many references to them, certainly, in his correspondence during the last decades of the 17th cent. with Pellisson, Bossuet, and others; and the *Essais* itself also bears ample witness to his long-continued interest in them. It should be remarked, however, that the *Essais* is not, properly speaking, a systematic presentation of the questions involved in theodicy. It is, in Leibniz's own word, a 'tissu'[4] of what he had said and written in the course of the theological and philosophical discussions, centred in Pierre Bayle's works and especially his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, which he carried on with Sophia Charlotte, queen of Prussia. From a letter of Leibniz's written to Sir Thomas Burnett in 1710 it appears that the *Essais* was compiled at the request of his friends and as a memorial to the deceased queen.[5] The book was extraordinarily popular, and apparently the author finds satisfaction in recording that it was welcomed

[1] *E.g.*, Nu 11[29], Jer 31[34], Jl 2[28].
[2] Except in the sense that every true nation, being an organic part of mankind and set to minister to the whole, is meant to be 'filled with the Spirit' for this office.
[3] Cf. J. T. Merz, *Leibniz*, Edinburgh, 1884, p. 101.
[4] *A Hist. of the Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1902, vol. ii. pt. iv.
[5] Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 380 A; and A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 400.

[1] Milton, *Paradise Lost*, bk. i. l. 25 f.
[2] See also art. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.
[3] *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875–90, vi. 43.
[4] *Ib.* vi. 11.
[5] *Ib.* p. 10. Sophia Charlotte died in 1705; a common but erroneous impression is that the *Théodicée* was compiled during her lifetime.

by Catholics as well as Lutherans and Evangelicals.[1] No doubt the *Essais* served its purpose well in an age of theological rationalism, and helped to stem the tide of scepticism which was now beginning to threaten the foundations of religion itself.[2] But Leibniz's theistic apologia does not commend itself so readily in our time.

(*b*) It will be sufficient for the purposes of this article to indicate a few salient points in Leibniz's theodicy, for the sake of illustrating the difference between the older and the newer theism in apologetic method and outlook.

(1) *God.*—Unlike most recent exponents of a theistic philosophy of religion, Leibniz was of the belief that the being or existence of God could be demonstrated by purely logical or rational processes. Though he recognized, he did not make much use of, the ontological proof, and the proof, so peculiarly his own, from the 'pre-established harmony' is bound up very closely with his monadology; but the cosmological or aetiological proof and the proof from the eternal truths are both characteristic of his theology or religious philosophy and independent of his ontological scheme. In accordance with the principle of the cosmological or aetiological proof, Leibniz starts from the world of finite existents as contingent and infers an Existent which is not contingent but metaphysically necessary. There must be a sufficient reason or cause, he says, for the existence of the whole collection of contingent things which composes the world, and it is to be found in the Substance which carries with it the reason or cause of its own existence, and which is consequently necessary and eternal; and that Substance can only be God.[3] It may be objected to this argument that it is logically fallacious, as containing more in the conclusion than is contained in the premiss: as the premiss is contingent, so must also be the conclusion.[4] As for the proof from the eternal truths—*i.e.* truths which involve no reference to time or to the world of existents in time—it is largely dependent upon Leibniz's notion of possibility. For Leibniz, as not for Spinoza, the possible was wider than the actual, essence than existence; and he argues that, if the eternal or metaphysically necessary truths are real, and founded on something existent, that existent something must be the metaphysically necessary Being of God, in whom essence involves existence, and to be possible is to be actual. Without God not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible.[5] Against this proof, as handled by Leibniz, it may be urged that it is inconsistent in one who regards the possible as wider than the actual, the essential than the existent, to regard truth as dependent upon existence; and that in any case we cannot on the premisses reach a necessary Being separate from the existent and actual world. In all such arguments indeed, as B. Russell points out, there is difficulty in avoiding Spinozism.[6]

(2) *The world.*—In presenting what may be named his teleological optimism Leibniz still moves on the high plane of metaphysical notions and *a priori* verbal proof, nor condescends to the lower empirical world, to which Bayle would bring him down. Founding upon the principle of sufficient reason and the idea of divine perfection, he holds that this is the best of all possible worlds; for, were a better world than this world possible, God would have chosen it. God is absolutely powerful, wise, and good; and His goodness moved Him to create and produce all possible good, His wisdom led Him by a moral necessity to the choice of the best, His power enabled Him to execute His great design.[7] It is curious to reflect that the Leibnizian optimism may be associated with the most diverse ethical valuations of life, optimistic, pessimistic, melioristic; which gives point to Schopenhauer's objection that, even if this is the best possible world, it does not prove that it is a world good enough to have been actualized.[8] An objection, this, on philosophical grounds, thus meeting Leibniz on his own plane, but it is on empirical grounds that the Leibnizian optimism has been most frequently challenged, from Voltaire's *Candide* down to the present. Nor could Leibniz himself ignore the empirical aspect of the problem of theodicy.

(3) *Evil.*—Accordingly—apart from his metaphysical theory of evil as necessary limitation appertaining to finite existence and the source of both moral and physical evil—we find him emphasizing the instrumental theory, according to which evil, especially physical evil, is to be interpreted as an instrument or means of good. In advocating this theory he sought to counter Bayle's contention that the strength of Manichaeism was due to its conformity with an empirical rather than *a priori* conception of the world. Even from the empirical standpoint, Leibniz would reply, physical evil may be reasonably accounted for by the theory of instrumental value; and, as for moral evil, it could not be prevented by God without the subversion of the freedom of self-determination which belongs to spiritual beings and makes morality possible. By other empirical arguments also Leibniz supports his doctrine of optimism, but enough has been said to show that, while his theodicy is forced to recognize the standpoint of experience, it rests primarily—like his theistic proofs—on metaphysical considerations.

(*c*) The difference between Leibniz's theodicy and the modern attitude in theodicy may now be briefly stated. Leibniz approached the problem of evil with a God whose existence had already been proved, as also His character of absolute perfection in power, wisdom, and goodness; and it was therefore an altogether reasonable presupposition on Leibniz's part that this world as being the creation of such a God was the best possible. No matter what exception might be taken to the case as presented, the case itself was excellent. But nowadays, with the spirit of pessimism abroad in society, and the spirit too—not unakin—of anti-religious agnosticism, the problem of evil has become more acute, and one has learned to sympathize with W. James and others in their impatience with Leibniz's optimism and the complacency of his attitude towards, *e.g.*, a dogma like eternal punishment. The 'charmingly written *Théodicée*' is even described by W. James as a piece of 'superficiality incarnate'; as a 'cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm.'[1] Such strictures are too severe, but let them be a reminder of the difference in spirit between the old and the new approach to the problem of evil. It would be quite untrue to say of modern exponents of theism that they compose theodicies 'with their heads buried in monstrous wigs.'[2] The modern theist is conscious of the failure of rationalistic or purely speculative theology to establish its claims, and of the necessity of fundamentally empirical methods in theology if scientific results are to be gained, and he therefore examines the world of experience in face of evil as an empirical problem, with the view of testing the reasonableness of the theistic faith in God as just, holy, and loving. And he is led to recognize that the observed facts of nature and history do not afford an unexceptionable argument for the goodness of God, and that after all the most solid ground of belief in the divine goodness lies in the needs and claims of the religious consciousness.[3] No doubt there would be a *circulus in arguendo* involved here if such considerations were put forward as a solution of the problem of evil.[4] On the one hand, it is by the faith of religion that God is affirmed to be perfectly good, despite the evil to be found in the world of His creation and governance. On the other hand, religious faith is based on the power of religion as a solvent, or at least a partial solvent, of the problem of evil: in religion men seek refuge from the various evils that assail, from without and from within—which shows that a non-rationalistic theism could not offer a real solution of the problem of evil. Nor does it profess to do so.

5. Theodicy and philosophical reflexion.—It is not necessary that this article should enter into a comprehensive discussion of the problem of theodicy from the side of philosophical explanation. This will be found in the art. GOOD AND EVIL, where it is affirmed with most students of the subject that 'every proposed solution either

[1] *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, p. 12, note.

[2] Cf. R. Flint, *Agnosticism* (*Croall Lecture*), Edinburgh, 1903, p. 115.

[3] *Théodicée*, 7 (Gerhardt, vi. 106 f.).

[4] Cf. B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 175.

[5] *Théodicée*, 184 (Gerhardt, vi. 226 f.); cf. also *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ix. 45 (Gerhardt, vi. 614).

[6] *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 181, 186.

[7] *Théodicée*, 8 (Gerhardt, vi. 107), 116 (Gerhardt, vi. 167), 228 (Gerhardt, vi. 253 f.).

[8] Cf. H. Höffding, *A Hist. of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1900, i. 364.

[1] *Pragmatism*, New York and London, pp. 23, 27.

[2] *The Will to Believe*, New York and London, p. 43.

[3] Cf., *e.g.*, G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 440.

[4] Cf. G. T. Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 147.

leaves the old question'—*si deus bonus, unde malum?*—'unanswered or raises new ones.' None the less we should like to express our sympathy with a type of solution—partial as it must be—which is on the lines of Leibniz's theology, but which goes beyond Leibniz in its recognition of human freedom as real, in the sense of implying self-limitation on God's part. Self-limitation does not mean finitude, nor freedom unqualified indeterminism. Such a solution is not only consistent with the moral and religious consciousness, but alleviates also the burden of the mystery of evil; and it lends itself to attractive exposition in the speculative sphere, as in the humanistic or personalistic idealisms which arouse so much interest at present. Yet it still leaves God, as indeed must every theodicy, ultimately responsible for both physical and moral evil. At the same time the recognition of the instrumental worth of evil somewhat relieves the weight of the divine responsibility. Take it first in connexion with the problem of physical evil. Pain and suffering are no doubt largely retributive and to be accounted for as the wages of individual and racial sin. But retribution is not an end in itself, and the positive rather than the negative purpose of physical evil is being more and more emphasized. Through pain, hardship, and loss moral energy may be stimulated and character moulded and shaped to finer issues. In this aspect of it suffering may be twice blessed, blessing those who suffer and those brought into contact with them. Take it also in connexion with the problem of moral evil. Here again the instrumental theory applies, and evil may be regarded as for education and discipline. In fact many theists regard moral evil or sin as having been always under the divine control, and interpret it as necessary like physical evil to human development. It is the discord without which there could be no harmony, the shade without which there could be no light. Through sin man learns his weakness, and his need of strength from on high. Through sin, and its direful effects in society, he learns the meaning of brotherly service and the measure of the sacrificial love of God.[1] Christianity looks for the time when man's moral education shall be brought to completion, and his suffering and sin have served their purpose. Yet, when all is said, the problem of evil remains.

6. Theodicy and the religious consciousness.—The discussion of the problem of evil on empirical grounds, and in particular of the instrumental theory of value, leads us to a consideration of the religious solution. There is a philosophical theodicy, and there is a religious theodicy. In the first, evil is explained—or an attempt is made to explain it—in the light of the divine goodness; in the second, evil is not explained, nor is there any attempt to explain it—it is simply to be overcome. As Eucken has remarked, 'religion does not so much explain as presuppose evil';[2] and, as P. T. Forsyth so well insists, a religious theodicy is not 'an answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle.'[3] In a religious theodicy it is not man who justifies God's ways, but God who justifies His own ways, and that not by accounting for the world's evil, but by saving men from it. While this is said, religion can no more than philosophy escape the problem of evil. For the individual believer in God and His goodness the problem receives a practical solution through the victory of his faith: he estimates life no more by hedonistic standards, but discovers the Supreme Good in moral and spiritual union with God. From the universal point of view the religious solution of the problem may be stated broadly in terms of the teleological idea. The end or purpose revealed in the universe is the creation of free ethical personalities capable of personal intercourse with God and of reflecting as in a flawless mirror the divine image and likeness.[1] To that purpose the presence of evil is subservient, and there are traces of it even in animate nature, which we have too often regarded as merely a field of struggle and carnage.

'There is a legitimate scientific sense,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'in which it may be said that Man is part of the system of Nature and the crown of its evolution; and it is assuredly of some significance that he can find in Animate Nature far-reaching correspondences to his ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.'[2]

We might therefore be content to state our theodicy in the following terms, which give due regard to the fact—made clear in modern science—that our world is still in the making, and which also illustrate the newer empirical as distinguished from the older rationalistic way of approach to the problem of evil, as well as the pragmatic tendency in modern theology and religious philosophy:

'While this world is far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless in view of its general constitution it may be regarded as the best possible *kind* of world in which to have man begin his development, and . . . the evils which exist in the world furnish no good reason for abandoning belief in a God who is both good enough and great enough to meet every real religious need.'[3]

LITERATURE.—References to the problems of theodicy may be found in works on the history and philosophy of religion, dogmatic theology, and general philosophy. See in particular the literature mentioned in the artt. GOOD AND EVIL, PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM. Useful discussions will also be found in the following works, selected chiefly from recent philosophical and theological literature: O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*[2], Eng. tr., 4 vols., London, 1886–88, esp. iv. 1–45; G. T. Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1906; G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914; J. Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., do. 1877, 1885; H. Siebeck, *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, Freiburg i. B., 1893; J. Kremer, *Das Problem der Theodizee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1909; O. Lempp, *Das Problem der Theodizee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1910; J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*[2], 2 vols., Oxford, 1889; J. R. Illingworth, in *Lux Mundi*[15], London, 1904; C. F. D'Arcy, *God and Freedom in Human Experience*, do. 1915; B. H. Streeter and others, in *God and the Struggle for Existence*, do. 1919; J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, 2 vols., do. 1920; D. S. Cairns, *The Reasonableness of the Christian Faith*, do. 1918; A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God (Gifford Lectures)*, Oxford, 1917; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1918; C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, London, 1918; J. Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1899; H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, London, 1917; W. S. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, do. 1919; D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, do. 1919; P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God*, do. 1916; R. Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, Eng. tr., do. 1911.

WILLIAM FULTON.

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA.—See ADOPTIANISM, ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY.

THEOGNIS.—Theognis is the name attached to a collection of some 1389 erotic, convivial, reflective, and hortatory elegiac verses whose chief interest for this article is that they are the fullest extant repertory of Greek ethical commonplace in the half-century preceding Plato and the tragedians. The collection begins with invocations to Apollo, Artemis, and the Muses, and a dedication to a young friend Cyrnus, to whom many of the quatrains and couplets are addressed, and whose name may be meant by the seal that perhaps marks their genuineness.[4] But many verses lack this certification. Some are addressed to other

[1] Cf. W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 209.
[2] *The Truth of Religion*, p. 500.
[3] P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God*, p. 229.

[1] It is here that, in a more extended treatment, the 'theodicean' aspect of the doctrine of immortality might be considered.
[2] *The System of Animate Nature*, lect. xx. f.
[3] D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, London, 1919, p. 217.
[4] Line 19.

friends, including a Simonides who may be the poet.[1] After the first 100 lines there is little sequence or coherence of ideas. There are many repetitions, and some of the verses occur in the fragments of Solon, Phocylides, Tyrtæus, and Mimnermus. These considerations, and the fact that quotations in Plato[2] and in a passage attributed by Stobæus[3] to Xenophon are susceptible of various interpretations, raise many problems about the composition of the poem, if it is in any sense a unity, and have given rise to an extensive German literature of hypothesis most conveniently surveyed in E. Harrison's *Studies in Theognis*.[4] Harrison argues plausibly, if not always quite convincingly, that the poems as they stand form a connected sequence. His book concludes with an excellent chapter on the life and times of Theognis. He was a noble of Nisæan Megara, who apparently at one time was also a citizen of Hyblæan Megara in Sicily. He spoke of the terror of the Medes,[5] and is therefore conjectured to have lived to see the invasion of Xerxes. He lived in a time of social and political revolution at Megara, vaguely known to us from three references in Aristotle's *Politics*[6] and from one passage in Plutarch.[7] His temper was embittered by the temporary triumph of the popular party,[8] the loss of his property,[9] and the exile,[10] which was perhaps the cause of the travels in Eubœa, Sparta, and Sicily to which he refers.[11] To these experiences we may trace his pessimism,[12] his cynicism,[13] his harping on the hardships of poverty that constrains a man to deeds to which his will does not consent,[14] his complaint that money makes the man and that mercenary marriages corrupt the breed of men,[15] his emphasis on the virtue of faith[16] or loyalty to caste, club, and mates[17] in times of trial, and his frequent use of 'good' and other ethical terms in the political or social sense.[18]

Too much has been made of this last idea by Theognis's translator J. H. Frere,[19] by Nietzsche, whose own philosophy is largely based upon it, and by Grote, who, however, admits that the ethical meanings are not absolutely unknown.[20] Theognis is merely the chief example, the conveniently quotable *locus classicus*, so to speak, for a natural human tendency. We still speak of the better classes as they did in Aristotle's time,[21] and Homer characterizes menial tasks as the services that the worse sort perform for the good.[22] We cannot infer that the ethical idea was lacking.[23] We can only say that before Plato it was easier to confound pure or absolute ethics with prudential, conventional, tribal, caste, or political morality than it has been since. Much the same may be said of the naive inconsistency between Theognis's general commendations of truth, justice, good faith, and kindliness, and his passionate prayers for vengeance,[24] his (perhaps ironical) counsel to set your heel on the empty-headed demos,[1] to be all things to all men,[2] to adapt yourself to your environment with the protective resemblance of the polyp which takes the hue of the rock to which it is clinging,[3] and to flatter and cajole your enemy well till you have him in your power and then take your revenge.[4] The last precept appears almost as nakedly in one of the noblest Greek poets, Pindar.[5] Plato first laid it down that the good man will not wrong even his enemy, and Plato did not apply the principle to international politics in the Tolstoyan way. Lastly, the erotic verses of Theognis—most of them, to be sure, in a separable and perhaps spurious part of the collection,[6] dealing with themes repugnant to modern feeling—seem to us incompatible with the conception of him as a moralist and still more with the use of his elegies as a school-book. They were indeed, on the hypotheses of R. Reitzenstein,[7] mainly banquet songs. But, however that may be, Theognis's own use of the verb 'admonish'[8] classes them in some sort with the literature of prudential precepts and moral admonition known by the name of ὑποθῆκαι.[9] And no less a moralist in his own esteem than Isocrates recommends the study and excerpting of them as entirely edifying. At any rate, whether in excerpts for school use or otherwise, they were, like Solon and Hesiod, learned by heart by educated Greeks of the 5th cent., and so provide many texts for amplification in Pindar and the Greek drama, and for discussion in Greek philosophy.[10] An exhaustive dissertation on this subject would be of interest, but would require the nicest discrimination. Harrison[11] collects the parallels in Pindar and Bacchylides, some of them perhaps overstrained. It is not easy to determine how many of the resemblances in tragedy are conscious reminiscences. The chorus in Sophocles, *Œd. Col.* 1226 ff., is clearly an expansion of the melancholy lines 425 ff.:

'Not to be born into life were the best for us, creepers on earth's face,
Never to look on the sun's burning and pitiless rays;
Happiest lot of the living is theirs who come quickest to Hell Gate
Laid out quiet and stark, wrapped in a mantle of earth.'[12]

Jebb on *Antigone*, 622, quotes Theognis, 403, as one of the anticipations of the untraced 'quem Juppiter vult perdere dementat prius.' *Antigone*, 297, echoes Theognis, 221, in the sentiment that the man who thinks that he alone is wise is himself void of wisdom. Soph. frag. 356 repeats the commonplace that health is best and justice fairest of things;[13] frag. 525 the humorous fancy that even Zeus cannot please all, whether he rains or holds up.[14] But these are only conspicuous examples of an indeterminate list. When Euripides praises the man who is as true to absent as to present friends,[15] we cannot be certain whether he is or is not paraphrasing Theog. 93–95, and the same holds of the coincidence between *Phœnissæ*, 438–440, and Theog. 717 f. in the sentiment that

[1] 469, 667.
[2] *Flor.* lxxxviii. 14.
[3] 764.
[4] Cambridge, 1902.
[5] *Quæst. Græc.* 18.
[6] 1302 B, 1304 B, 1300 A.
[7] 346, 1200, 667 ff.
[8] 53 ff., 1013–1016.
[9] 783.
[10] 219, 332.
[11] 129 f., 161–164, 209, 275, 299, 360, 375, 615, 621, 653, 857–861, 1135 ff.
[12] 165–169, 425–429.
[13] 391, 155, 175, 267, 384, 620, 649, 667 ff., and *passim*.
[14] 190; cf. H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics*, 2 vols., London, 1892–93, § 233.
[15] πιστός, 77, with Plato, *Laws*, 630; cf. 80, 88, 121, 209, 283, 416, 529, 861, 1137, and *passim*.
[16] ἑταῖρος, 79, 91, 95, 97, 98, 113, 115, 411, 416, 643, 851, 1169 (the abstract κακεταιρίης).
[17] 28, 32, 43, 57. For ἀρετή (often in the Elizabethan sense of 'virtue') cf. 129, 147–150 (ethical?), 402, 654, 699. In 865 and 1003 it is courage in battle. For σώφρων, 'sober,' politically, intellectually, or morally, cf. 379, 431, 437, 454, 483, 497, 665, 701, 754, 1138, and Shorey in *AJPh* xiii. [1892] 361.
[18] Reprinted in the vol. containing Hesiod, Callimachus, and Theognis, in Bohn's Classical Library, London, 1856.
[19] *A Hist. of Greece*, new ed., London, 1888, ch. 9, *in fin.*
[20] *Pol.* 1282.
[21] *Od.* xv. 324.
[22] Cf. 11, 147–149, 315 ff., 465.
[23] 337–340, 344, 348, 362, 872.

[1] 847.
[2] 63, 213.
[3] 215–219, a passage much bespoken and imitated. Cf. A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, London, 1917, frag. 307. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, ii. 224, takes it of the traveller who is to do at Rome as the Romans do. Ion, frag. 36, Plutarch, and Pseudo-Phocylides, 47, reprobate the sentiment.
[4] 363; see J. Girard, *Le Sentiment religieux en Grèce d'Homère à Eschyle*[3], Paris, 1887, p. 157; Schmidt, ii. 312.
[5] *Pyth.* ii. 84.
[6] 1230–1389.
[7] *Epigram und Skolion*, Giessen, 1893.
[8] ὑποθήσομαι, 27, 1007, 1049.
[9] See Isoc. *ad Nic.* 43 f.
[10] Antisthenes is said to have written a commentary in five books (Diog. Laert. vi. 16).
[11] P. 314.
[12] Cf. R. C. Jebb, on Bacchyl. v. 160, in *Bacchylides, the Poems and Fragments*, Cambridge, 1905; and P. Decharme, *Euripide: l'esprit de son théâtre*, Paris, 1893, p. 119 ff.
[13] Theog. 255.
[14] *Ib.* 24 and 801.
[15] *Supp.* 867, *Hippol.* 1001.

wealth is all-powerful. Plato's saying[1] that a spirit of reverence (αἰδώς) is a better inheritance than great riches is, the present writer thinks, a distinct reference to Theog. 409. Isocrates, i. 19, equals Theog. 72, and i. 29, Theog. 105.

Among the chief commonplaces of Greek ethics expressed by Theognis[2] are man's dependence on the gods,[3] and his ignorance of what the future has in store,[4] his duties to the suppliant and the guest,[5] and to parents,[6] the doctrine of the mean,[7] of nothing too much,[8] of κόρος and ὕβρις,[9] the late punishment of the wicked,[10] the dangers of slander[11] and of light oaths,[12] the admonition that all true gains are costly,[13] that ill-gotten gains do not abide,[14] that the lust for wealth is insatiate,[15] and that the boastful word (ἔπος μέγα)[16] or the forsworn forecast[17] provokes the gods and invites nemesis, the complaint that shame and reverence are exiled from a degenerate world,[18] and that men value nothing but wealth.[19] Other commonplaces, whether of ethics or of criticism of life, are the immortality of song,[20] the praise of patience,[21] the Anacreontic, Epicurean, or Horatian 'Carpe diem,' evil communications,[22] 'in vino veritas,'[23] there is no perfect man,[24] the ingratitude of children,[25] the foible of censoriousness and self-praise,[26] and the generalized metaphor of the 'counterfeit' man.[27] His convivial and social precepts, his slight anticipations of later motives of satire,[28] and his somewhat cynical, political,[29] or worldly wisdom[30] do not further concern us here. Lines 823 and 1181 are in apparent contradiction on the justification of tyrannicide. Theognis apparently does not mention the confounding of the innocent with the guilty, or the jealousy of the gods except as involved in the nemesis that attaches to the too confident oath.[31]

As an aristocrat he, like Pindar, emphasized nature against teaching.[32] No teacher can put sense into a man,[33] or make a bad man good. Plato[34] finds a contradiction between this and the admonition to associate only with the good because from them you will learn good only. But it is Theognis's belief that it is easier to corrupt the good than to reform the bad. In lines 155–159 there is a suggestion of the noblest thought of mature Greek ethics, the idea that the mutability of fortune and our common frailty impose the duty of leniency and compassion upon all men.[35]

Especially interesting are Theognis's direct appeals and protests to Zeus. He complains that the prosperity of the wicked casts doubt upon the moral government of the world.[36] This, however, is rather a development of the motive of Menelaus's speech in the *Iliad*[37] than the startlingly new thought which Croiset finds in it.[38] Theognis's protest against the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children, which results from the late punishment of the wicked,[1] invites illustration both from the OT and from later ethical literature.[2]

LITERATURE.—The fullest recension of the text is in the latest ed. of T. Bergk's *Poetæ Elegiaci*, Leipzig, 1915. The edd. of Immanuel Bekker (Leipzig, 1815) and F. G. Welcker (Frankfort, 1826) and the critical literature of the subject are discussed in Harrison's book referred to above. Cf. also T. Hudson Williams, *The Elegies of Theognis*, London, 1910.

PAUL SHOREY.

THEOKRASIA.—See GREEK RELIGION, vol. vi. p. 421 f.

THEOLOGY.—1. Definition.—Theology may be briefly defined as the science which deals, according to scientific method, with the facts and phenomena of religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis or philosophy of religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief.

According to its etymological meaning, the word 'theology' denotes 'discourse or doctrine concerning God.' In this sense it was used among the Greeks to describe the work of poets like Homer and Hesiod when they wrote of the gods and their doings, and that of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle when they speculated regarding the supreme reality or ultimate ground of all things. In early Christian literature the distinctive appellation of 'theologian' is applied to the author of the Apocalypse, probably because he maintained the divinity of the λόγος, asserting the identity of the λόγος that became flesh in Christ with God (Θεός). In this sense the term is applied to orthodox Greek Fathers like Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen, who distinguished themselves in defending the personality and divinity of the λόγος. But doctrine concerning God—His being and attributes—is only one branch or department of theology, as that is now commonly understood. Man's knowledge of God is part of the content of that matter of human experience which is termed 'religion,' and which includes other content also, referring to the world of nature and of man, to sin and death, to salvation and immortal life. And, as science in general deals with some definite department of human experience, it is more in accordance with the proper conception of science to regard theology as that branch of science which deals with the department of human experience known as religion, from which experience man's knowledge of God and divine things is obtained. Theology is the science which, by right use of reason, in accordance with proper scientific method, correlates, systematizes, and organizes the matter of human religious experience in such a way as to reach a unified body of coherent doctrine, fitted to satisfy the mind's demand for truth and to furnish guidance for the practical life.

As the science of religion it deals not merely with the subjective contents of the religious consciousness, or the opinions, emotions, and actions of men in the religious sphere, but also with the objective grounds of religion and the ultimate truth or reality which underlies and explains the religious experience of mankind. It is not merely the science of religions dealing with the various historical religions which have developed among men (though that is a part of it), but the science of religion regarded as an important department of human experience, which claims to be no mere subjective delusion, but to have a real and rational foundation in objective reality or fact.

2. Theology and religion.—As theology is the science of religion, religion precedes and is wider

[1] *Laws*, 729 B.
[2] See Schmidt, i. 10; A. and M. Croiset, *Hist. de la litt. grecque*, Paris, 1887–99, ii. 148 f.
[3] 134, 165, 171, 687. [4] 585, 1075–1078. [5] 143 f.
[6] 131, 821; cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 185 f.
[7] 220, 331, 335, 559 f. [8] 219, 335, 401.
[9] 151, 153, 603–606, 693. [10] 203. [11] 324.
[12] 399; cf. 1195.
[13] 463 f., 1027 f.; cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 286 ff.
[14] 198–202; cf. 329. [15] 227, 596, 1158. [16] 159.
[17] 559, 'il ne faut jurer de rien'; cf. Archil. frag. 76; Soph. *Antig.* 388 f.; Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 83.
[18] 291; cf. 86, 635, 647.
[19] 523 f., 621, 1116 ff., 699 ff. [20] 237 ff.
[21] 320, 355, 445, 555, 591, 637, 1029.
[22] 31, 305; cf. Schmidt, i. 272. [23] 99.
[24] 799, 902. [25] 275–278. [26] 611.
[27] 117, 119, 965; cf. Plato, *Laws*, 916 D.
[28] 295, 453, 595, 1215.
[29] 43, 233, 283 ff., 331, 367 ff., 341, 603, 671 (the ship of state), 793, 805, 833, 845, 947.
[30] 303 f., 423, 575, 903 ff., 963. [31] 660.
[32] Schmidt, i. 160; Shorey, *TAPA*, 1910, p. 188.
[33] 430 (ἐνθέμεν), 435 (ἔνθετον); cf. Arist. *Eth.* x. 9. 3; Plato, *Rep.* 518 C (ἐντιθέναι).
[34] *Meno*, 95 C ff.
[35] Cf. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 565–569; Isoc. i. 29.
[36] 373 ff., 743 ff. [37] xiii. 631.
[38] Cf. also Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 270 ff.; and Archil. frag. 84 (6).

[1] 731 ff.; cf. 203–208.
[2] Cf. Jer 31[29f.]; Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, § 140; Schmidt, i. 71 ff.

than theology and furnishes it with the matter with which it deals. In all departments of human life and activity experience, in which feeling, intuition, and volition are the predominant factors and reason or intellection is as yet implicit, precedes theory or science, which seeks to exhibit and make explicit the reason, thought, or principles of truth and reality underlying and accounting for the experience. Thus the use of numbers in the relations and activities of the practical life precedes the science of mathematics; the practical use of speech precedes the science of language; the use of reasoning in practice precedes the science of logic; and the sailing of the seas in ships precedes the science of navigation. So too the experience and use of religion as a practical factor in life's activities precedes the science of religion, or theology. And, as men may attain considerable efficiency and success in various departments of life without having rationalized or reduced their experience to system and exhibited its underlying principles, so men may live a truly religious life and have a rich and full religious experience without having attained to any very clear or coherent system of theology. But, while a man may be religious without being a theologian, religious experience is necessary to enable a man to be a competent theologian; and the fuller and richer his religious experience has been, the more likely is he to prove a trustworthy and satisfactory theologian.

Schleiermacher was so impressed with the importance of the part played by feeling or emotion in religion that he gave it not merely the predominant but the exclusive place. Over against the long prevailing definition of religion as consisting in 'knowing and doing homage to God,' he defined religious piety as in its essence consisting neither in knowledge nor in action but in a determination of the feeling. The root of all religion he held to be man's feeling of absolute dependence on some power or powers other than himself. But this dictum, while it emphasizes the important truth as to the large part played by feeling in religion, if strictly taken, is one-sided and exaggerated, in that it ignores the part played by the cognitive faculty in forming some conception, more or less definite, of the power or powers on which we depend, and the part played by the will in choosing and adopting means for getting into harmony with that Supreme Power or Being, which are elements characteristic of all religion.

In theology, as distinct from religion, the cognitive faculty, or reason, is predominant. It succeeds religion, and seeks by a right use of reason on the matter of experience furnished by religion to evolve out of it a system of connected and coherent truth to which the term 'science' can be properly applied.

3. Theology and science.—The aim of science in any of its departments is to apply reason, with its powers of analysis and generalization and its laws of inference, induction, and deduction, to the data of experience in that department in such a way as to discover the laws or principles underlying and relating the given facts and phenomena and to unify the entire content of experience in that department into a coherent systematic whole or body of truth such as may be described as knowledge of reality. Inasmuch as theology seeks to do this as regards the data of human experience in the realm or department of religion, it is rightly described as a branch of science. The instrument which the scientist makes use of in ascertaining, analysing, and systematizing the facts or data of experience in the department selected for scientific investigation is the reason with its powers and laws of perception, conception, evidence, inference, etc. And reason is the instrument made use of by the scientific theologian in investigating the facts and phenomena of religious experience and building up a science of theology not less than is the case in other departments of science. Lack of clearness as to the place and function of reason in theology is apt to lead to confusion and disagreement as to what theology is and what are its aim and scope. Thus in some quarters it is maintained that theology differs from other sciences inasmuch as the matter with which religion is concerned is given to us by revelation and not by reason as in the other sciences. But this contrast between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge is unsound. Reason is not the source from which, in any case, we get the matter which we build up into science, but merely the instrument by means of which we grasp, analyse, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize that matter which is given to us by revelation from without in experience. This is as true of other sciences as it is of theology. As a matter of fact, the material which we build up by use of reason into the natural sciences, as they are called, such as mechanics, chemistry, biology, etc., is given to us by revelation from without in experience not less than the matter which we seek to build up by use of reason into a systematic scientific theology. The latter is just as much matter of experience, which the reason must seek to apprehend and co-ordinate into a coherent whole of knowledge of the truth, as is the former. The knowledge got by using reason to grasp, co-ordinate, and systematize the given matter of experience is of the same kind in both cases. In both cases it rests ultimately on a foundation of faith—faith in the reliability of our faculties of knowledge (perception, cognition, inference, etc.) and on the ultimate reasonableness or cognizability of all that is given to us in experience. We go on using our powers of perception, cognition, inference, etc., in reference to what is given to us from without in experience, never doubting that the knowledge thus reached is real knowledge or knowledge of truth and reality, even though we may know and realize that our knowledge in any department of experience is incomplete and leaves room for progress. Thus the physicist may realize that he does not know the ultimate nature of matter, the mathematician may be puzzled to explain what space and time are, and the biologist may feel that he does not know what, at bottom, life and consciousness are.

But the fact that there remain unsolved questions of an ultimate kind, in regard to the data of experience in various departments, does not nullify or render valueless the results of scientific investigation and systematization in those departments. It merely shows that our knowledge of what is revealed to us in experience is as yet incomplete, and that an adequate synthesis of knowledge or metaphysic of being has not yet been reached by us, not that such a metaphysic is unattainable. So too with the data of religious experience. It is the function of theology as a branch of science to collect, examine, analyse, compare, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize all that is revealed to us in this department of experience, so as to reach a whole of scientific knowledge in this sphere, as in other departments of experience and knowledge. We must use our reason as far as it will go in synthesizing or giving us rational knowledge of what is given in experience. And, if there are problems of an ultimate kind in this science, as in other sciences, which still remain obscure or inadequately solved, this does not invalidate the knowledge reached by the application of sound scientific method to the data of experience, nor deprive it of the right to be regarded as

science or knowledge of truth. It merely shows that our science in this sphere is incomplete and spurs us on to reach out towards a more comprehensive synthesis of all our knowledge in an adequate metaphysic or philosophy of being.

4. Theology and philosophy.—It is here that the science of religion passes over into the philosophy of religion, that highest form of knowledge which is the consummation aimed at by theology. Science in all its departments is limited and incomplete as knowledge of reality. It leaves unsolved ultimate questions as to the nature and relations of matter and mind or spirit, space and time, life and consciousness. It is the function of philosophy, as the ultimate form of knowledge, to grapple with these ultimate problems and seek a satisfactory solution of them. And it is along the lines of moral and religious experience, and the data furnished thereby, that light on such ultimate problems may most hopefully be looked for.

Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, began a movement in philosophy which has had far-reaching influence on modern theology as well as on philosophy. His contention is that in unifying the given matter of perceptive experience into an ordered and coherent world-knowledge the mind or reason of the percipient subject makes use of forms of perception and cognition which are subjective (*i.e.* belonging to the nature or constitution of the knowing mind), not objective (*i.e.* belonging to the object or reality as it is in itself apart from its being known or cognized). Kant thus concluded that the world of which we have definite knowledge, through grasping and unifying the given matter of experience by means of the subjective forms of perception and cognition, is but a phenomenal world or a world as it appears to a conscious subject endowed with powers of perception or cognition like man, not a noumenal world or thing-in-itself existing exactly thus apart from being perceived or known. Thus exact scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is limited to knowledge of the phenomenal world and cannot reach to ultimate reality. The use of those very forms of perception and cognition which give definiteness to our knowledge makes it knowledge of the phenomenal as contrasted with the ultimately real or thing-in-itself. All scientific or theoretic knowledge is thus knowledge of the phenomenal only. If there be a noumenal world of reality, and if it be in any way accessible to us, this must be in some other way than that of rational knowledge. Kant maintains that access to a noumenal world of reality is gained by us, not through the pure reason but through the practical reason or moral consciousness, by means of which we may and do reach a kind of faith-knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality, which, though not rational theoretic knowledge, such as we have in science, is yet of value for the moral and religious life. This demarcation of the limits of valid, rational, scientific or theoretic knowledge, and differentiation from it of the kind of knowledge got through moral and religious experience or through supernatural historic revelation is characteristic of many theological writers since Kant. The argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is supposed to be conclusive against the possibility of our ever reaching any rational metaphysic or valid theoretic knowledge of ultimate reality. Huxley and Spencer pressed Kant's conclusion into the service of their doctrine that God or ultimate reality is and must remain unknown and unknowable by man, and that therefore a science of theology is impossible. Hamilton and Mansel endeavoured to reconcile the agnostic conclusions of Kant in regard to a rational metaphysic with the acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine as grounded on revelation, not on reason. The Ritschlian school accept Kant's conclusions as to the impossibility of a rational, theoretically valid, knowledge of God or ultimate reality, and so rule out all natural or rational theology as incompetent; but, while eliminating all metaphysic from Christian theology as untenable, they seek to retain in large measure the traditional Christian theology as grounded on a divine historic revelation culminating in Christ, of which Scripture is the record. As with Kant, they seek to find a grounding for this in the immediate deliverances of the moral and religious consciousness, which furnishes them with a basis for 'value-judgments' where valid theoretic knowledge fails. This sharp differentiation between the kind of knowledge got by making use of reason, our cognitive faculty, in grasping, analysing, and systematizing the data of perceptive experience in the sphere, say, of physics or chemistry and the kind of knowledge got by using reason in the same way—call it practical reason or what you will—in grasping, co-ordinating, and systematizing the data of moral and religious experience is arbitrary and unconvincing. The world of reality revealed to us in experience—whether the ordinary perceptive experience which grounds our common knowledge or the moral and religious experience which grounds our religious knowledge—is one whole, and our knowledge of it, however acquired, should be capable of being synthesized as one coherent whole. The attempt of the Kantians and Ritschlians to rule out all metaphysic and natural theology as going beyond the proper limits of the reason, and yet to build up a theology of value-judgments founded on the needs of the moral consciousness or practical reason or on the data of a historic divine revelation, is not satisfying to the inquiring mind that seeks for unity and coherence and consistency in its knowledge. Theology, as the philosophy of religion, is to be looked upon, not as the rival or opponent of rational science, but rather as its copestone and completion.

True theology can never come into conflict with true science. For it includes all the data and verified results of true science among its material or postulates. It seeks to co-ordinate or synthesize all our knowledge into a comprehensive and coherent whole of truth or knowledge of reality, based upon the data of human experience regarded as a whole, tested, analysed, co-ordinated, and systematized by sound scientific methods.

5. Reason and intuition.—Akin to the distinction which Kantians draw between the theoretic reason, which gives us definite knowledge of a phenomenal world, and the practical reason, which gives us vague knowledge of noumenal reality, is the distinction which more recent philosophers such as Henri Bergson draw between reason, or intellect, and instinct, or intuition, as sources of knowledge. Intuition, it is alleged, brings us more immediately into touch with the living flowing stream of reality, of which as individual persons we form a part, and enables us to adapt ourselves thereto more surely and satisfactorily than reason or intellect, whose forms of thought and processes of inference are adapted to matter that is fixed or static rather than to the ever-changing creative flux of actual reality or real time. But this contrast or antithesis between intuition and intellect, like that between faith and reason, is unsound. The intuitions of a rational being are just an implicit form of reason. And it is better in every way for a rational being such as man that what is implicit in consciousness should be made explicit and fitted into the comprehensive synthesis of rational cognition, which alone deserves the name of knowledge. The only supreme

authority and court of appeal for rational conscious beings is reason based on an ultimate ineradicable faith in the reasonableness of our experience, which is the underlying assumption of all science, including theology. To subject reason to intuition or instinct as instrument of knowledge is to incur moral and intellectual bankruptcy which is unworthy of a rational being such as man. It is to take a step downwards towards the brutal condition, not upwards towards the goal of true personality.

For conscious rational beings the only reality which has or can have any meaning is reality which is or may be apprehended by rational consciousness. In the case of reality of which we are, or suppose ourselves to be, dimly aware in subconscious apprehension or intuition, it is assumed that to a more perfect or adequate consciousness this would evidence itself as real. Reality for us means reality apprehended or apprehensible by a conscious being. To affirm an unknown reality may mean simply that we are dimly aware of the existence of some power or force which we have not yet been able to adjust to our incomplete synthesis or scheme of knowledge. But to affirm a reality which is, and which must ever remain, inaccessible to every conscious apprehension is to affirm a contradiction in terms or to use words without meaning.

Practical reason, faith, intuition or instinct, to which some would point as the proper guides in theology rather than what they call the pure or theoretic reason, are all forms of conscious apprehension which enable us to build up the data of experience into some more or less coherent whole of knowledge. The data to be unified and synthesized in a science of systematic theology are not indeed given to us by reason from within, but by revelation from without. Reason, however, is our only proper instrument for the apprehending, co-ordinating, and systematizing of these data.

6. Theology and the Bible.—Some theologians conceive of the task of theology as that of setting forth in coherent systematic form the content of that revelation concerning God, the world, and man of which the Bible is the inspired record. But, while this points to a very important department of theology, it is too narrow a view to take of the scope and function of theology as a whole. There are other materials or data for theological construction besides those furnished by the Bible, which cannot be overlooked or ignored by the scientific theologian who takes a wide and comprehensive view of his subject. The revelation of ultimate reality given in the natural world around us with its varied facts and phenomena, which it is the function of natural science to investigate, furnishes material which the theologian must interpret and construe. So too the course of general human history, which it is the function of historical science to present and elucidate in the light of general principles or laws, affords data of experience which are of value for theological construction. And the moral consciousness of mankind generally, the investigation of which is the special task of the science of ethics, furnishes important material to the scientific theologian to help in the upbuilding of a system of theology. But the revelation given in the history and religious experience of Israel as a nation and of the outstanding personalities among that people, culminating in the fact of Christ and the foundation of the Christian Church, is of such supreme importance and unique significance in the religious sphere that it is customary and convenient to distinguish between the general revelation to mankind as a whole in nature and history and conscience, which is treated of under the heading of natural theology, and the special historic revelation culminating in Christ, which is treated of under the heading of specifically Christian theology, and which may be regarded not as something entirely different from natural theology, but rather as its crown and completion.

7. Classification of theological sciences or disciplines; theological encyclopædia.—Having such a vast and varied material to deal with, theological science has many branches or disciplines with aims and methods differing according to the material dealt with and the purpose kept in view. To elucidate and classify these various disciplines is the function of what is known as theological encyclopædia, which itself constitutes a branch of theological study.

Religion as an object of investigation has two aspects: (*a*) a historical aspect, under which it is to be regarded as a historical phenomenon appearing under various forms among various peoples with characteristics which furnish ample material for historical inquiry and investigation; and (*b*) a normative aspect, under which it appears as a present inner power of life making claim to truth and to the right to regulate individual and social life. This twofold aspect of religion furnishes us with guidance for classifying the branches of theology, which is the science of religion, into two main divisions: (*a*) the *historical or phenomenological* branches, including all those sciences which deal with religion on its phenomenological side as an actual appearance in history; and (*b*) the *normative or constructive* branches, including those sciences which deal with religion as a present-day reality and power, claiming to be truth by which the practical life of man should be moulded and regulated. The distinction already referred to between natural theology and specifically Christian theology furnishes ground for suitable further subdivision of the material falling to be dealt with under these two main divisions, thus affording a basis for a convenient classification of theological disciplines or branches of study.

(*a*) The investigation of religion in its phenomenological aspect may be conveniently subdivided into (i.) a general branch dealing with the phenomenology of the ethnic religions other than Christian that have appeared in history, which will include (1) history of religions, with a descriptive account of the distinctive features and characteristics of religious beliefs as they have appeared in history, (2) comparative study of religion, and (3) psychology of religion in so far as historical investigation can throw light on that; and (ii.) a special branch dealing with the phenomenology of the Christian religion. This will embrace, under the general heading of Biblical science, (4) linguistics, or a study of the Bible languages and the principles of interpretation and exegesis; (5) Biblical introduction, or investigation into text, date, authorship, and historical setting of the various books of the Bible; (6) Biblical history and antiquities, and (7) Biblical theology, which aims at setting forth by means of impartial exegesis the ideas as to God, man, and the world and their relations set forth in the different Biblical writings; and, under the general heading of ecclesiastical history, (8) Church history, or the history of the spread of the Church, (9) history of doctrine, and (10) symbolic, or the history of the different creeds and confessions in which Christian doctrine has been embodied.

(*b*) The investigation of religion in its normative and constructive aspect may be subdivided into (iii.) a general branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the truths of natural religion, including (11) the apologetic of religion generally, (12) natural theology, (13) philosophic ethic; (iv.) a special branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the

truth of Christianity as the highest and final form of religion; this embraces (14) the apologetic of the Christian religion; systematic theology, which includes (15) Christian dogmatic, and (16) Christian ethic; and practical theology, which includes (17) homiletic, (18) liturgic, (19) catechetic, or paideutic, (20) pastoral theology, (21) ecclesiastical polity, and (22) evangelistic theology, or the theory of missions; (v.) the final synthesis of the truths reached in the various theological disciplines, historic and theoretic or normative, which is the aim of (23) the philosophy of religion, in which theology reaches its consummation.

8. Method in theology.—The method to be made use of in dealing with the data of theological science in its various branches will vary with the matter dealt with and the purpose or end in view.

In the historical or phenomenological branches of theology the end in view is simply the ascertainment and accurate presentation of historic fact, and the methods to be made use of are those which are appropriate to historical inquiry in general.

(1) Thus in setting forth the *history of religions* the investigator must make himself acquainted as widely as possible, by observation and inquiry, with the features and characteristics of extant religions as they now appear and are practised among men. He must further acquaint himself with the historic origin and development of these religions by the study of such books, monuments, and other records of the past as are available. Careful observation and industrious inquiry and research are thus the methods most needful for success in this department of theological science.

(2) In the *comparative study of religion* the investigator must use the material furnished by the history of religions, and seek by analysis, comparison, and spiritual insight to show the relations of the various religions to one another and their grading as manifestations of the common spirit of religion. This calls for more of speculative thought and philosophic reflexion, as regards method, than the previous discipline.

(3) In *psychology of religion* the investigator must discuss the origin and form of religion generally from the psychological point of view, and seek to show what part the various mental faculties and capacities—intelligence, feeling, desire, will, imagination, etc.—have in religious experience, and how they enter into and manifest themselves in religions. The methods appropriate to scientific psychology—observation, reflexion, induction, and deduction—have proper application in this discipline.

(4) *Biblical linguistics*, which is the study of the languages in which the Bible was originally written, is just a branch of philology, and the methods of philological study and inquiry have here their proper application. Hermeneutics and exegetics, which deal with the interpretation of the text of Scripture, may be brought in under linguistics.

(5) In *Biblical introduction* the methods of the lower or textual criticism and of the higher or historical criticism have a proper place. Textual criticism investigates the various manuscripts of the Bible that have come down to us and the various readings in the texts of these manuscripts, and seeks by rational principles to get as nearly as possible at the true original text. Historical criticism investigates the evidences of compositeness in different books of the Bible and seeks with the help of tradition and of a knowledge of contemporary history to gain reliable knowledge as to the composition, date, authorship, and historical setting or circumstances of the various books of the Bible, and to estimate their place and function as elements in a progressive revelation.

(6) *Biblical history* deals with the history of the Jewish people and the rise of the Christian Church as recorded in the Bible, while Biblical antiquities has to do with the archæology, chronology, and geography of the Bible.

(7) *Biblical theology* (including Biblical psychology) aims at unfolding and presenting in a clear and orderly form the doctrinal conceptions or ideas presented by the various writers of the OT and NT. It is the crown and completion of Biblical science, and, for those who accept the Bible as the inspired record of a divine revelation, it is of supreme importance for furnishing material towards the upbuilding of a comprehensive, normative, systematic theology. But of itself it is a purely historic discipline, aiming at the accurate presentation of historic fact and recorded thought in an impartial objective way, without meantime taking into account the bearing of that on permanent normative religious truth. The methods to be used in Biblical theology are those of sound philology and impartial scientific exegesis or interpretation, so as to make sure that the ideas or doctrines set forth are those of the various Bible writers themselves, unmodified by any subjective theological bias of the interpreter. The work of adjusting the scheme of thought faithfully gathered from the Scriptures by sound impartial exegesis to a comprehensive scheme of normative systematic theology is the important task of the Christian systematic theologian.

(8) *Church history*, or the history of the spread of Christianity, aims at recounting accurately the gradual enlargement of the area known as Christendom, the conflict of Christianity with anti-Christian forces, and the growth of the Church's constitution and cultus, showing how the polity and worship of the Christian Church developed as time went on, and how divisions over questions of constitution and government and cultus arose among Christians.

(9) The *history of doctrine* describes the dogma, or body of doctrine, accepted by the Christian Church, and traces its development along the centuries.

(10) *Symbolic* gives a more detailed attention to the various 'symbols'—creeds or confessions—that have been formulated from time to time in the Church's history than can be given in a general history of doctrine. These are obviously purely historical disciplines, aiming at the ascertainment and accurate presentation of historic facts, for the achievement of which the proper methods to be used are the methods of impartial historical research and inquiry.

(11) The *apologetic of religion* in general has as its function to inquire into the nature and essence of religion generally and to establish the truth of the religious view of the world over against all irreligious, antitheistic, or agnostic views. It aims at discussing and exhibiting (α) the nature and essence of religion in general; (β) the nature and validity of religious belief and the relation of the knowledge got thereby to the knowledge of natural objects gained through perception and rational cognition; (γ) the truth and reality of what is postulated and affirmed in religious belief, as against atheism, materialism, agnosticism, and other forms of unbelief; (δ) the rational proofs for the existence of God or the ways in which the human mind by valid process rises to the apprehension of supreme personal Spirit as the ultimate reality, from reflective contemplation of the changing natural world and its phenomena, of the course of human history, and of the facts of the moral consciousness; (ε) the evidence contained in the general revelation given to all men for the immortality of the soul and a future state.

(12) Closely associated with the general apologetic of religion is that systematic presentation of the truths underlying natural religion to which the name of *natural theology* is usually given. Its aim is to set forth in a methodical orderly way all that may be known concerning God and the world and man, and their mutual relations, from that general revelation which is given in nature, mind, and history. It is the dogmatic of natural religion, as philosophic theism is its apologetic.

(13) Akin to natural theology is *philosophic ethic*, whose aim is to ground a science of practical conduct on the immediate deliverances of the moral consciousness and the knowledge of God and duty derivable therefrom. The ethic of Kant, associated with what he described as a 'religion within the limits of pure reason,' may be taken as illustrative of the aims and methods of philosophic ethic, defective though it may be as a presentation of the results of such ethic, even as his 'religion within the limits of pure reason' is defective as a presentation of the truths of natural theology. In this region of natural theology and philosophic ethic the aim is to reach not merely historic but permanent normative truth, in which the mind of the rational thinker can find rest and by which practical conduct can be regulated. The methods by which alone, if at all, such results can be reached are those of speculative thought and philosophic reflexion on the data of moral and religious experience—not merely of our own personal experience, but of the experience of mankind generally as far as that can be ascertained, analysed, and used as the basis of rational inference, induction, and deduction. A great accession to the material or data of experience, on which a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophical theology and ethic may be grounded, is given us when we take into account the special revelation, culminating in the fact of Christ, of which the Bible is the record. Apart from this, indeed, the data on which natural theology and philosophic ethic seek to build are so incomplete that the probable conclusions reached are lacking in fullness of content and convincing power. The new data of experience furnished by this special revelation not only add cogency to the probable conclusions reached by philosophic theism and ethic, but also bring a greater fullness of content to constructive normative theology, by which it is enriched and made more satisfying to the mind and heart of man.

(14) *Christian apologetic* has as its function to indicate the nature and essence of the Christian religion, grounded on the historic revelation of which the Bible is the record, and to set forth in order the evidences of its truth. It deals with such questions as these: (α) the idea of revelation, its spheres and modes, and the manner of its apprehension; (β) the idea of inspiration and its results; (γ) the trustworthiness of the Bible as a reliable record of fact and experience; (δ) the evidences of a progressive revelation of divine things given in the Bible and the significance of the fact of Christ as consummating and completing that revelation; (ε) the evidences of the truth of the gospel proclaimed by Christ and its fitness to meet human need and to bring salvation and satisfaction to mankind. Christian apologetic clears and prepares the way for

(15) *Christian dogmatic*, which aims at setting forth in accurate and systematic manner, and in such a way as to show its consistency with all our other knowledge of truth, the intellectual content of the Christian life as that becomes our inward possession on the ground of divine revelation through the receptivity of faith. It presupposes and includes the conclusions reached by philosophic reflexion in the sphere of theism and natural theology, and gives added cogency and convincing power to them and greater richness and fullness of content to our knowledge of God the supreme reality, as not only intelligent personal Spirit but holy loving Father. It is usually subdivided into (α) theology proper, or the doctrine of God involving an exposition and justification of the Christian conception of God as triune, which was the prominent feature of Greek Christian theology in the 4th cent. when various forms of unitarianism (Monarchianism, Sabellianism, Arianism) were combated by Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers; (β) Christology, or the doctrine of the Person of Christ, to which the attention of the Church was particularly directed after the Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) by the theories propounded by Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches, which were condemned at the Councils of Constantinople (A.D. 381), Ephesus (A.D. 431), and Chalcedon (A.D. 451); (γ) pneumatology, or the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, to which attention was first prominently given by the Church when the views of Macedonius were condemned by the Council of Constantinople; (δ) anthropology, or the Christian doctrine of man; (ε) hamartiology, or the doctrine of sin, which first came to the front in the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius in the 5th cent.; (ζ) soteriology, or the Christian doctrine of salvation, which, through Augustine and Pelagius, became an important feature in Western theology, receiving fresh development at the hands of Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, who devoted attention to the redemptive work of Christ and its application to sinful men, and engaging prominently the thoughts of theologians in the Reformation period when the doctrines of justification by faith and reconciliation with God came into prominence; (η) ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church and the sacraments, which first received prominence in the early Church at the hands of Cyprian of Carthage (A.D. 250), was further developed by Augustine (in his *City of God*) and Thomas Aquinas (in his *Summa Theologiæ*), and received much attention from Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians at the Reformation and from Ritschl and Anglican High Churchmen in modern times; and (θ) eschatology, or the doctrine of the last things, which has occupied a foremost place in recent theological discussion.

(16) *Christian ethic* has as its aim to set forth the content of the Christian life as it works itself out in disposition and action on the ground of the self-activity that is rooted in Christian faith. It looks upon the Christian life from the view-point of man and his duty, while dogmatic looks upon it rather from the view-point of God and His will. Both deal with the same subject-matter, viz. God and man and their relations to one another, but under different aspects or from different view-points, so that, while they belong together to systematic theology, they are most conveniently treated as separate or distinct branches of that science. Christian ethic presupposes the conclusions of philosophic ethic, just as Christian dogmatic presupposes those of natural theology. But it adds new fullness and richness of content and new power to philosophic ethic through the new data of moral and religious experience, centred in the fact of Christ, which it contributes. The first attempts to formulate Christian ethic in separation from Christian dogmatic were made by Lambert Daneau, a French Protestant, in 1557, and G. Calixtus, a Lutheran, in his *Epitome Theologiæ moralis* in 1634. Since the time of Schleiermacher this separate treatment of Christian ethic as a branch of theology has been generally followed in Germany, Britain, and America; and numerous works on Christian ethic have appeared in which

the relevant material is dealt with under different divisions. A convenient division followed in the main by Martensen and other writers is (i.) general introduction, dealing with (α) the definition and scope of Christian ethic, its relation to other disciplines, and its place in a classification of ethical systems; (β) fundamental conceptions of the science—end, norm, and motive; (γ) postulates of the science, theological, anthropological, cosmical, and eschatological; (δ) the source of our knowledge of the Christian moral ideal, the content of that ideal, and the means of its realization; (ii.) individual ethic, dealing with the origin and progress of the Christian life in the individual soul and its manifestation in the virtues and graces of the Christian character; (iii.) social ethic, dealing with the realization of the Christian ideal in the various spheres of society—the family, the Church, the State or nation.

Practical Christian theology in its various departments treats of the Christian religion from the point of view of its power to expand and to build up Christian life in the Church. It includes those disciplines that are concerned with the application of Christian theology in the practical sphere. It is art rather than science.

(17) *Homiletic* deals with the art of sermon-making.

(18) *Liturgic* deals with worship and its forms.

(19) *Catechetic*, or paideutic, deals with the religious instruction of the young.

(20) *Pastoral theology* deals with the duties of the pastoral office.

(21) *Ecclesiastical polity* deals with Church government, law, and procedure.

(22) *Evangelistic theology*, or theory of missions, deals with the best methods of propagating the Christian religion at home and among heathen peoples abroad.

The methods appropriate for use in the upbuilding of a scientific normative Christian systematic theology, into which the content of Biblical theology as a historical discipline is taken up and adjusted, are in part the methods commonly made use of by science in general—analysis, classification, inference, induction, deduction, etc.—but partly also the less easily applied methods of philosophic reflexion and speculative thought, by means of which the philosopher must seek to bring unity and consistency into his entire knowledge of the real. The God revealed in the Bible and through Christ and Christian experience — the triune God of Christian revelation—must be related and harmonized through rational thought with the God of the theistic proofs and natural theology, if our theology is to be at once Christian and philosophic.

(23) *Philosophy of religion*, which is the highest stage or form of theology, has for its data the results reached as truth by the use of scientific method in the previously mentioned theological disciplines; and its aim is to combine these elements of truth in a comprehensive synthesis of knowledge, such as will exhibit the relations of the various aspects or parts of truth and their harmonious cohesion in an organic whole of truth or reality. Its special function is to harmonize the results reached by reflective thought along the line of philosophic theism and natural theology with the results reached through believing appropriation of the Christian revelation.

If reason is indeed the means whereby we apprehend and know truth and reality, then we should not rest satisfied until what we accept as true or real is shown to commend itself to our reason as reasonable, and so 'worthy of all acceptation.' We must therefore strive to make our theology rational or reasonable, if it is to be the expression of truth. If, again, the Christian revelation concerning God and the world and man and their relations be true, as Christians believe it is, then the Christian philosopher must strive to make his philosophy and metaphysic religious and so adequate to embrace and express the truth of religious, and specifically of Christian, experience. Only when theology becomes rational and philosophy becomes religious can there be hope of such a union between the two as will yield a satisfactory philosophy of religion which will also be the most adequate and satisfactory metaphysic of being. To reach such a philosophy of religion is the worthy aspiration of the Christian speculative theologian who, while not ignoring the importance of faith alike in science, theology, and philosophy, strives to secure that the faith on which he rests shall be a reasonable faith.

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D. S. ADAM.

THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.—**1. Definition and scope.**—Every great religion has two parts, an inner and an outer, a spirit and a body, 'the knowledge of God,' which 'is Eternal Life,' and its dogmas, rites, and ceremonies. The inner part, 'the wisdom of God in a mystery,' spoken of by St. Paul as known to 'the perfect,' is that which has, since the 3rd cent., been known in the West as 'theosophy'; in the East it has been known for ages under its Sanskrit equivalent, *Brahma-vidyā*, 'God-wisdom,' 'God-knowledge,' or 'God-science.' Such theosophy, or mysticism, the direct knowledge of God by man, belongs equally to all great religions, as their sustaining life, and may be possessed by any individual, even outside any religious organization. The Brahmavadins, 'knowers of God,' in Hinduism; the Gnostics, the 'knowers,' who, Origen declared, were necessary to the very existence of the Christian Church; the *shaikh* in Islāmic Ṣūfism—these are typical theosophists from the standpoint of the modern Theosophical Society. No man is truly a theosophist who has not direct knowledge of God, but he may win this through any religion or by his own unaided efforts.

Theosophy, in the modern as in the ancient world, proclaims the possibility of such knowledge, as the inevitable result of the immanence of God. Man is essentially a spiritual being, his self, or spirit, being an emanation from the Universal Self, or Universal Spirit, God, as a ray is an emanation from the sun. Hence, to know himself, his deepest self, is to know God; he can sink in consciousness into the depths of his own being, beyond the body, the passions, the emotions, the mind, the reason; these are all his, but they are not he; he can pass beyond them all, and realize himself as separate from them, the pure 'I,' pure being. This is the universal experience of those who, successfully, seek the Kingdom of Heaven within, and it is followed by the recognition that this Universal Being into which the self opens transcends all the beings in which it is manifested, and is alike in all. Out of this experience, repeated for every one who becomes a knower of God, or theosophist, are built the two fundamental truths of theosophy: the immanence and transcendence of God, and the solidarity, or brotherhood, of all living beings. The realization of the first truth, man's identity of nature with God, as a fact in consciousness, and the subsequent realization of the second, his identity of nature with all around him, by a blending of his self with their self, a conscious dwelling in their forms as in his own—these sum up theosophy in its fullest and deepest sense. The man who has thus reached self-realization in God and in all beings is a theosophist; those who deliberately aim at such self-realization are also generally called theosophists.

The word 'theosophy' has further, historically, a second meaning: it denotes a body of truths, or facts, concerning God, man, and the universe; and these may conveniently be classified under three heads: religion, philosophy, and science.

On these truths is based its system of ethics, rational, inspiring, and compelling. In considering this body of truths we are not studying a system invented and published in modern days; we have to do with what has aptly been termed the Wisdom-Tradition, handed down in all civilized countries, ancient and modern, by a long succession of prophets, teachers, and writers. It may be traced in the *Upaniṣads*, *Purāṇas*, and epics of the Hindus, and in the six systems (*darśanas*) of Hindu philosophy; it underlies many of the Chinese systems, especially Taoism, and is seen in such books as *The Classic of Purity* and in the writings of Lao-tse; it is found in Egypt, as in *The Book of the Dead* and the papyri from which its religion has been re-constructed; it appears in the fragmentary records of Assyria and Chaldæa; in the *Gāthas* and other scriptures of the Pārsīs; in the Hebrew Scriptures as expounded by the Ḳabbālā and the Talmud; in the Christian, as treated by the early Fathers of the Church, and by such Gnostic writers as Valentinus, Basilides, and a host of others; in Pythagoras and Plato, with the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic schools, with Plotinus, Iamblichus, and the theurgists; it is taken up from these by the doctors of Islām and the Ṣūfī mystics; appears in the Rosicrucian students of alchemy and astrology, in Rosenkreutz, Paracelsus, Bruno, Eckhartshausen, Boehme, Eckhart, Vaughan, Bacon, More, Fludd—all these and scores of others have assimilated and handed on the Wisdom-Tradition; it has lent its symbols to masonry, and hidden some of its mysteries in masonic ceremonies; it peeps out of Scandinavian and Celtic folk-lore, out of the Hawaiian legends and Maori traditions, the unburied temples of the Mayas and Quiches, the magic of the Zuñis and other N. American Indian tribes. Its revival and its systematization into a coherent and inter-related body of doctrines, separated from non-essential and irrelevant teachings—this is modern, and is the work of the Theosophical Society, a modern association. But the doctrines themselves are scattered everywhere, through all times, in all places.

The test to be applied to a religious doctrine which claims to be theosophical is catholicity. 'Semper, ubique, et ab omnibus'—such is the test. For all religions come from a single source, the Divine Wisdom, and have as founders divinely inspired men—men who have climbed up the ladder of evolution till they have reached perfection in humanity, and have entered on the superhuman evolution. Such men we call 'masters,' and we regard them as the guides and directors of the evolution of humanity; the similarities in doctrines and ethics, pointed out by comparative mythology and comparative religion, we regard as due to the fact that all the founders of religions are members of the one lodge of masters, possess the same knowledge, and are guided by the same principles.

The universal—*i.e.* theosophical—doctrines of religion are: the unity of God; the manifestation of God as a Trinity for the building of a universe; the existence of graded orders of intelligences, a vast hierarchy of beings, forming the inhabitants, visible and invisible, of a universe, or a solar system. The doctrine of reincarnation, taught in every religion, though in some temporarily overlaid, belongs to the domain of philosophy rather than to that of religion; the immortality, or rather the eternity, of the spirit belongs also to philosophy more than to religion, when dealt with intellectually; the law of action and reaction—*karma*—falls under science, as do the constitution of a solar system and of man.

2. Religious teachings.—(*a*) *The unity of God*, the universal one Existence which is the source of all existences actual and potential, the super-life and super-consciousness in which all lives and consciousnesses inhere, eternal beneath the transitory, changeless beneath the fleeting, unsupported but the support of all, all-embracing, all-containing, the One without a second—this is the central teaching of theosophy as of all religions, the first universal truth of religion.

(*b*) *The Trinity of the manifested God* is the second great and universal truth of religion, and therefore of theosophy. Theosophy speaks of the manifested God as the Logos, borrowing the term from Plato, Philo, and the Fourth Gospel.

'Coming forth from the depths of the One Existence, from the One beyond all thought and all speech, a Logos, by imposing on Himself a limit, circumscribing voluntarily the range of His own Being, becomes the Manifested God, and tracing the limiting sphere of His activity, thus outlines the area of His universe. Within that area the universe is born, is evolved, and dies; it lives, it moves, it has its being in Him; its matter is His breath; its forces and energies are currents of His life; He is immanent in every atom; all-pervading; all-sustaining; all-evolving; He is its source and its end, its cause and its object, its centre and circumference; it is built on Him as its sure foundation, it breathes in Him as its encircling space; He is in everything, and everything in Him. Thus have the Sages of the Ancient Wisdom taught us of the beginning of the manifested worlds. From the same source we learn of the Self-unfolding of the Logos into a threefold form; the First Logos, the Root of all Being, the *Will* which outbreathes and inbreathes the worlds; from Him the Second Logos, manifesting the two aspects of life and form, the primal duality, making the two poles of nature between which the web of the universe is to be woven—life-form, spirit-matter, positive-negative, active-receptive, Father-Mother of the Worlds—the *Wisdom*, or Pure Reason, "mightily and sweetly ordering all things," sustaining the universe; the Third Logos, the Universal Active or Creative *Mind*, that in which all archetypically exists, the source of beings, the fount of fashioning energies, the treasure-house in which are stored up all the archetypal forms which are to be brought forth and elaborated in matter during the evolution of the universe, the fruits of past universes, brought over as seeds for the present.'[1]

(*c*) *The hierarchy of beings* is the third truth universally accepted: the 'seven spirits before the throne of God'; the primary emanations of the Supreme Trinity; the ranks of secondary Logoi, who rule congeries of solar systems, down to the Logos of a single solar system. In such a system the vast hosts of spiritual intelligences (the *devas*, archangels, and angels of religions), the grades of spirits encased in human bodies, the sub-human intelligences and those not yet even awakened to intelligence—all these, with the solar Logos at their head, form the ladder of lives, and evolve within the system. The sub-human intelligences include all nature-spirits, the gnomes, fairies, etc., who play so great a part in folk-lore, the living though limited intelligences who make all nature a living responsive organism instead of a soulless mechanism, whom little children sometimes see, and who are visible to the ordinary seer.

(*d*) The fourth truth in theosophy is that of *universal brotherhood*, the inevitable deduction from the preceding; since there is but one life in all forms, all forms must be inter-related, linked together, and, however unequal they may be in development, they none the less make one huge family, are 'of one blood.' The universal brotherhood of theosophy differs from the political conception of 'equality,' the foundation of modern democracy, in that it postulates identity of origin and of potentiality, but recognizes varying degrees of development, the latter yielding the hierarchy of beings, or ladder of lives. In this freemasonry resembles it, with its broad division of mankind into the enlightened and the profane, and the subdivisions of the enlightened into degrees and graded officers, uniting the essential equality with a hierarchical order and due subordination. In this both theosophy and freemasonry are in harmony with nature, increasing power going hand-in-hand with increasing knowledge and increasing

[1] A. Besant, *The Ancient Wisdom*.

responsibility. Wisdom, supported by strength and made manifiest in beauty, rules in a true brotherhood, as in nature.

It is interesting to note that these four primary religious truths of theosophy, of universal religion, are but the intellectual formulation—for the instruction of the people—of the two primary spiritual truths directly contacted by the knower of God, the gnostic, the theosophist. The first three are religious dogmas, expressing intellectually the first spiritual truth; the fourth is the expression in the outer life of the second spiritual truth. The spiritual truths can be *known* only by individual self-realization; they may be intellectually taught and believed as the fundamental dogmas of universal religion, theosophy. A dogma is the intellectual presentment of a truth known by the spirit, and believed on external authority.

3. Philosophical teachings. — Philosophically, theosophy is idealistic; consciousness is primary, the one indubitable fact, which can neither be strengthened nor weakened by argument. 'I am' is the testimony of consciousness to itself, and naught can disprove its witness, since every disproof, every argument, must be addressed to that same consciousness, and imply its existence. To the All-Self, matter is but the limitations imposed by Himself on His thoughts; to us, evolving in a universe which is the manifestation of our Logos, matter is His thought, limitations imposed on us by His thought and activity—limitations which we cannot transcend until we can realize ourselves in Him. Human thought, though feeble and undeveloped, is of the same nature as divine thought, and increases its power over matter with its increasing growth; thought is the one creative and moulding power, and, as evolving man realizes this, and so clarifies his lower nature that this aspect of the self can work through it, he becomes the master of that lower nature and of his surroundings, the creator and controller of his destiny. By thought, mastering the science of physical nature, he bends it to his will and utilizes it; by thought, mastering the science of the emotions, he builds virtues and destroys vices; by thought, mastering the science of mind, he subdues its turbulent energies into orderly obedience; by thought, directing will and controlling activity, he brings all things, within and without, into subjection to the self, 'the inner ruler, immortal.' Only by such fit rule and due subjection can man attain perfect health of body, emotions, and mind, and reach the highest good. Hence many of the practical theosophical teachings deal with this power and control of thought.

The eternity of spirit—more loosely spoken of as the immortality of the soul—is an integral part of theosophical philosophy. It is an inevitable deduction from the identity of nature of the human and the universal Self; 'unborn, undying, perpetual,' it is eternal as God Himself. The continuity of consciousness is equally inevitable, since the self is conscious and continuous, and in the self must consequently abide all its experiences, of which a successive survey is memory. The extent to which these memories are carried on by the material sheaths, or bodies, of the self—*i.e.* the survival of the individual and the person—will be better considered under the constitution of man.

The method of the unfolding of this continuous and conscious self in the human kingdom is by reincarnation. Reincarnation is, in fact, the only doctrine of immortality that philosophy can look at, as Hume said.[1] It means that the self, having unfolded to the human stage, appropriates matter from the three worlds (see below) and builds it into bodies, suitable for life in those worlds, beginning in the stage of barbarism, as a savage of a low type. During earth-life he gathers experiences, pleasant and painful; after death he meets the results of these experiences—the lower in the intermediate world, where he suffers in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and the higher in the heavenly world, where he enjoys in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and converts all these experiences into mental and moral capacities. When all are thus converted, he returns to earth-life, bringing with him these capacities wrought out of experiences, into new bodies built to express and utilize them. In these he goes through a similar cycle, gathering, suffering, transmuting, and so on and on; each birth brings the fruitage of the preceding lives to start the new pilgrimage, and this is the inborn character and temperament mental, moral, physical. Step by step he climbs the ladder, working under inflexible and inviolable laws, until he reaches the stature of the perfect man; he passes through all the classes of the school of life until he has mastered all that this world has to teach, and is *asekha*—he who has no more to learn. He is then a man, beyond birth and death, 'fitted for immortality,' ready for work in the larger life.

[1] In his Essay 'Of the Immortality of the Soul.'

4. Scientific teachings.—Theosophy differs from modern science in the fact that it includes under 'science' investigations into superphysical worlds. Its methods are the same: investigation by observation of objective phenomena, reasoning on observations, framing of hypotheses, discovery of invariable sequences (*i.e.* of natural laws), repeated experiments to verify deductions, and formulation of results. It uses the senses for observation, but the senses intensified—supersenses, in fact—responding to vibrations of matter finer than that which affects the physical senses.

As with modern science, so with theosophical—'occult science,' it is usually called—there is a body of accepted facts, laid down by recognized experts and largely reverified by later experiments, and a fringe of modern discoveries, constantly added to, revised, and modified. The accepted facts have been established by generations of occult experts, and their existence is often referred to in the scriptures of various religions; the more accessible of these are being constantly reverified by occult students to-day, but the larger cosmological facts are beyond our reach. Any discoveries made by students are subject to revision and modification, as observations are repeated and the instruments of observation are improved.

(a) *The constitution of the universe.*—The broad outline of this comes from the seers of the past, and is largely confirmed in the scriptures. It appears reasonable to us, and is congruous with the observations which we are able to make. The laws of analogy and recapitulation confirm it, for we see its outlines repeated in miniature within our own range of observation, and we see sequences rapidly repeated in miniature which the seers have described as occurring in a universe—as the zoonian evolution of the kingdoms of nature is mimicked in the growth of the embryo in the womb. A universe consists of seven kinds of matter, or planes, of which the densest is called physical or solid; the next finer, astral, or watery; the next, mental or fiery; the next, spiritual or airy; the next, superspiritual or ethereal; and the two finest, divine. What are called solar systems are all on the physical plane of the universe, and a solar system repeats within itself the seven kinds or states of matter, these subdivisions of the vast cosmic plane forming its planes, or worlds.

Within a solar system these subdivisions can be mostly studied by less developed seers, and we are in a field of research open to the occult student of our own day. We find in relation to our own earth: 'physical matter,' all formed by aggregations of similar physical atoms, similar except that some are positive, some negative; these aggregations are grouped into solids, liquids, gases, and three kinds of ethers; 'astral matter,' formed by aggregations of astral atoms, differing from physical atoms in shape, and grouped into states corresponding to the physical; 'mental matter,' formed by aggregations of mental atoms, again distinguishable by their form, and again grouped as before; the 'spiritual' and 'superspiritual worlds' are formed on the same plan, each having its own type of atom and its own corresponding states of aggregation. Of the 'divine worlds' we cannot directly speak.

(b) *The constitution of man* is analogous to that of the solar system, and hence the possibility of knowledge concerning it. As said, he is a fragment of the Universal Self, and he is clothed in the matter of his system. In the divine world dwells his

true self, the monad, and his consciousness appropriates matter from each of the five worlds below in order that he may know and conquer them; as the continuing 'I,' he uses matter from the superspiritual, spiritual, and the finer regions of the mental world; this is the 'spiritual body' of which St. Paul speaks; it grows and evolves through the whole cycle of reincarnation, and beyond, but is not changed or lost in birth or death; probably St. Paul refers to this when he speaks of our 'house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,' which he says 'we have.' It is this spirit in the spiritual body which is the reincarnating Ego, or individual, though the term is often used to indicate only the consciousness working in the finer mental matter, in what is termed 'the causal body,' a subdivision of the spiritual taken separately. When the reincarnating Ego takes a new birth, he appropriates some of the coarser matter of the mental world for his 'mental body,' some of the matter of the astral world for his 'astral body,' some of the matter of the physical world for his 'physical body'; his consciousness, in thinking, uses mental matter; in desiring or sensating, uses astral matter; in acting in the physical world, uses physical matter; these are 'the three worlds' in which his evolution goes on, and in which he is affected by birth and death, and is a personality, or person, *i.e.* the individual, as limited in expression by grosser matter; the mental body is closely related to the brain, though not dependent on it, save for activity in the physical world; the astral body is mainly correlated with the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic ganglia and nerves, and the glands; the three bodies interpenetrate each other, mutually acting and reacting throughout waking life. In sleep consciousness withdraws from the physical body, clothed still in its astral and mental garments, living then in the astral world, and sometimes, on its return, impressing on the physical brain some of its experiences in vivid and coherent 'dreams'; it keeps in magnetic touch with its physical body. In death this magnetic touch is broken off, and the consciousness dwells for a while in the astral world, called often 'the intermediate world,' in relation to those who have passed away from earth. After a while the astral body dies, and the man passes in the mental body into the mental world, or heaven, where he abides for a period extending to many centuries, the length depending chiefly on the richness of his intellectual, emotional, and artistic past life on earth. When he has assimilated all the experiences of this nature accumulated on earth, the mental body disintegrates, the consciousness withdraws to the spiritual body with all it has gathered to enrich the Ego. Then the Ego builds a set of new bodies for a new pilgrimage in the three worlds, and returns to them by birth. Thus the evolution of man is carried on in three worlds, brooded over by the spirit—himself—the spirit garnering the results and unfolding thereby; he is an inhabitant of the three during waking life; of two during sleep and for a period after death; of one during his heavenly life. The lowest, the physical body, is at present the most perfectly organized, and therefore the most capable of receiving impressions from without and transmitting them to the consciousness. The astral body is rapidly becoming organized, and its proper senses are developing, so that it is receiving and transmitting many impressions from the astral world, though generally with a lack of sharpness and accuracy; these include the phenomena of second-sight, premonitions, warnings, visions, perception of phantasms of the living and the dead, etc.—the phenomena to which modern psychology is paying so much attention. An increasing number of people are 'sensitive,' or 'psychic,' and are using the supersenses, *i.e.* the senses of the astral body, more or less consciously. The mental body is becoming well organized in educated people, but more in relation to its organ, the brain, than as an independent vehicle of consciousness, active in its own world. Consciousness, in the mental body, is in-turned rather than outward-turned. The occultist, having by the practice of special methods—meditation, concentration, etc.—artificially forced the evolution of the astral and mental bodies beyond the normal, is, as regards these, many centuries ahead of his time; he uses the supersenses for life in the astral and mental worlds in his waking consciousness, and thus carries on his investigations in them as the physical scientist does in the physical world. The dying of the three bodies, and the building of new ones for each successive life-period, is the cause of the loss of memory of past lives; that memory is in the reincarnating Ego, and is shared by the consciousness when animating the lower bodies only if, in those bodies, the man has realized himself as one with the higher.

(*c*) *The law of action and reaction* is universal, and exists in the worlds of emotion, thought, and spirit as much as in the physical world. Hence a man can build his character as scientifically as he can build up his body, and disregard of the mental and moral laws is as destructive of mental and moral health as disregard of physical laws is destructive of physical health. The study and utilizing of the laws, summed up as *karma*, forms an important part of theosophical work.

(*d*) *Evolution.*—The monad gradually unfolds his powers by coming into touch with matter and appropriating portions of it; he thus passes through the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, until in a highly developed animal the intelligence reaches the human stage; thenceforward reincarnation under *karma* is his means of unfolding. Humanity, on our globe, takes on a fresh type—more delicately organized as to the nervous system—that of a root-race, when a considerable number of reincarnating Egos are ready to develop a higher quality of consciousness. The third, or Lemurian, race, was the first to assume the really human type in the middle period of its evolution—the previous types being embryonic; the surviving remnants of the Lemurian are the negroes and the many negroid peoples scattered over the world. The fourth, or Atlantean, race with its seven sub-races—of which the Toltec, Akkadian, Turanian, and Mongolian peoples are typical—is still the most numerous. The fifth, or Aryan, race has already five sub-races—the Aryans of India, the Mediterranean Aryans (Arabs, the later higher-class Egyptians, etc.), the Iranians, Celts, and Teutons—and has yet to develop two more. These varying types afford to the reincarnating Egos the necessary varieties for their evolution, each Ego taking birth in the races and sub-races as often as is necessary for the unfolding of the qualities characteristic of each.

(*e*) *Human perfection.*—By repeated reincarnations under inviolable law, each man reaping exactly as he has sown, man reaches his temporary goal—human perfection. At the present stage of evolution it is possible for him to reach this goal in advance of the evolutionary term, which will last yet for many millions of years. By strenuous exertions and noble and unselfish living, he may attract the attention of the spiritual guardians of mankind, who will teach him how to quicken his evolution, so that he may enter on 'the path of holiness,' pass through its five initiations—or stages of widening consciousness—and become a 'master,' the last of the five initiations opening the gateway of superhuman evolution. He may then pass into other worlds, or enter the ranks of the guardians of this world, as he wills. From the hierarchy of these guardians have come the founders of world-religions, the lesser prophets and teachers being their disciples.

5. The ethics of theosophy.—These are not definitely formulated into any code, but consist of the highest and purest teachings of the world's noblest saints, prophets, and founders of religions. All that is sweetest and most lofty in the world's Bibles, all that is most inspiring and ennobling in the writings of its philosophers and moralists, forms the ethics of theosophy. As man lives by the highest ethic he can grasp, he becomes capable of appreciating ethic yet sublimer; the theosophist strives to live by the spirit of Christ rather than by any legal code, and, cultivating love, he hopes to be enlightened by the lords of love. Broadly speaking, that which works with the Divine Will in evolution is right; that which works against it is wrong; and the best examples of that Will are found in such divine men as the Buddha and the Christ. These the theosophist looks up to as examples, and strives to reproduce their likeness in himself.

6. The Theosophical Society.—This association was founded on 17th Nov. 1875, in New York City, U.S.A., by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and Henry Steele Olcott. The former was a Russian noblewoman, of extraordinary psychic endowments, and these had been trained and cultivated to the highest point by her 'master,' an Eastern occultist; she gave up social rank, wealth, and family to seek him in Tibet, and spent some years with him near Shigatze, after which, returning to the world, she gave the rest of her life to carrying out his directions. In America she met, at the famous Eddy farmhouse, a man who had won high distinction during the Civil War, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott, and he became her pupil. She endeavoured first to collaborate with the American spiritualists, but, failing in this, she, with Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society; she became its corresponding secretary, an office which she held for many years, and he its president; its organization is due to him and he remained president until his death in 1907, when the present writer was elected as his successor.

The unit of organization is a lodge, of not less than seven members; when a number of lodges, not less than seven, exist in any territory, they may group themselves into a section, or national society, which is self-governing, within the wide limits of the general constitution. The central ruling body consists of president, vice-president, treasurer, recording secretary, a general council consisting of the general secretaries, each elected by his own national society, with not less than five additional councillors, chosen by the general secretaries. It meets once a year and deals only with matters affecting the whole Society; but it may not meddle with the business of the sections, unless there be a transgression of the general constitution. The annual report of 1917 showed 19 national societies, 1074 lodges, with 28,673 active members. Round each lodge are gathered a considerable number of sympathizers and helpers, but these are not entered on the rolls. The headquarters of the Society were first in New York; in 1879 the

founders left America for India, and fixed the headquarters in Bombay; in December 1882 they moved to Adyar, a suburb of Madras, and there the headquarters have since remained. The Theosophical Society owns there an estate of 266 acres, with several fine buildings, and a library which is known all over the world of scholarship as possessing the finest existing collection of *Upaniṣads*, as well as some unique Sanskrit MSS.

While the Society exists for the purpose of spreading the ideas formulated above, it does not impose belief in them on its members, who, providing they accept the principle of universal brotherhood, are absolutely free to think as they will. Admission to membership is obtained on recommendation of two Fellows of the Society, and the acceptance of the following objects:

'To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour.

To encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science.

To investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.'

The following, written many years ago by the present president, states the general position of the Theosophical Society:

'The Theosophical Society is composed of students, belonging to any religion in the world or to none, who are united by their approval of the above objects, by their wish to remove religious antagonisms, and to draw together men of good will, whatsoever their religious opinions, and by their desire to study religious truths and to share the results of their studies with others. Their bond of union is not the profession of a common belief, but a common search and aspiration for Truth. They hold that Truth should be sought by study, by reflexion, by purity of life, by devotion to high ideals, and they regard Truth as a prize to be striven for, not as a dogma to be imposed by authority. They consider that belief should be the result of individual study or intuition and not its antecedent, and should rest on knowledge, not on assertion. They extend tolerance to all, even to the intolerant, not as a privilege they bestow, but as a duty they perform, and they seek to remove ignorance, not to punish it. They see every religion as an expression of the DIVINE WISDOM, and prefer its study to its condemnation, and its practice to proselytism. Peace is their watchword as Truth is their aim.

Theosophy is the body of truths which forms the basis of all religions, and which cannot be claimed as the exclusive possession of any. It offers a philosophy which renders life intelligible, and which demonstrates the justice and the love which guide evolution. It puts death in its rightful place as a recurring incident in an endless life, opening the gateway of a fuller and more radiant existence. It restores to the world the Science of the Spirit, teaching man to know the Spirit as himself, and the mind and body as his servants. It illuminates the Scriptures and doctrines of religions by unveiling their hidden meanings, and thus justifying them at the bar of intelligence, as they are ever justified in the eyes of intuition.

Members of the Theosophical Society study these truths, and Theosophists endeavour to live them. Every one willing to study, to be tolerant, to aim high, and to work perseveringly, is welcomed as a member, and it rests with the member to become a true Theosophist.'[1]

There have been some offshoots from the Theosophical Society which have become independent of the central organization, but which spread the same truths. There are two international societies, with headquarters in America, and some scattered independent bodies in Germany and Austria.

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A. BESANT.

THEOSOPHY.—Theosophy has characteristics which relate it closely to religion, and somewhat more remotely to philosophy. It also attempts to determine man's place in the universe and to solve the riddles of life and of death. Like religion, it aims at guaranteeing to its followers a more favourable destiny by showing them the way of healing and salvation. Like philosophy, it proposes to have recourse only to the resources which nature, on the one hand, and the human intellect on the other, place at its disposal, and it is by knowledge that it saves men. But the knowledge which it obtains is not grounded on the observation of facts which are within the reach of ordinary intelligences; it is intuitive, dependent on the exceptional clear-sightedness of men on a superior level, and communicated by them to their disciples. There is then a theosophical knowledge, just as there is a religious and a philosophical knowledge. Besides, it may well be that the content is throughout materially the same. Such a concept, *e.g.*, as that of the immortality of the soul may be found in all three. By what distinctive marks then can we recognize that a doctrine is theosophical? Now we know that there is a criterion which makes it possible for us, without risk of error, to distinguish between what is philosophical and what is religious. If a doctrine has been established by means of observation, induction and deduction, it is philosophical; it is religious if there has been concerned in its origination an intuition operating under the influence of feeling and imagination; it is only at subsequent stages that the ordinary processes of the human intellect intervene. Theosophy also begins with affirmations having an intuitive basis, and its constructions may have great emotional and imaginative significance. Having once secured this foundation, it may proceed, like theology, to construct, in accordance with the demands of reason, a system of satisfying coherence. The difference between theosophy and religion lies neither in their ideas nor in their method. It is in the attitude which the religious man, on the one hand, and the theosophist, on the other, assume towards the objects presented. The one hopes to work, by fear, reverence, and adoration, upon the will of powerful beings for his own advantage; the other depends upon himself, upon the immediate efficacy of his own knowledge and action; religion is humble, whereas theosophy is proud.[1]

This self-reliance the theosophist has in common

[1] *Theosophy*, p. 91.

[1] It is to be noticed, however, that, though the suggestion of pride is justifiable in connexion with the esoteric tendencies, the prevailing intellectualism, and calm acceptance of grades of religious capacity noticeable in modern theosophical teaching, yet there is also an element of humility frequently to be found in the modern theosophical attitude. There is a constant reference to teachers or adepts, and it is urged that their teaching should be accepted with implicit faith. The general efficacy of knowledge in obtaining the desired results may indeed be exaggerated and become an incentive to pride, but the individual thinker is not encouraged to depend merely on his own knowledge or even on the knowledge of his contemporaries. He, and they also, must look backwards with reverence to the past and accept the teachings which have been handed down from remote ages and are rediscoverable for men of the present age when the more modern excrescences upon religious systems have been removed.

with the magician. Both—the one more consciously than the other—admit the existence in the universe of hidden forces, for the control of which knowledge of them is sufficient. Both also show individualistic tendencies. They detach themselves from the religious community and break through the tradition officially recognized around them. But we may notice at least this difference between the magician and the theosophist: the one aims at using his power in an external way—he desires to control nature for the advantage or the disadvantage of his fellows; the other is a contemplative, who acts but little except on himself and for his own sake.[1] The theosophical spirit has left a very deep mark upon Indian thought. It is possible to trace its influence from its origin to our own day. India would be for the investigator a remarkable field for study if the chronological sequence of ideas and systems were not enveloped in a darkness which up to the present time has not been penetrated. It is impossible for us to date the most important of the texts from which we derive our information. Many of them are much later than the period when the theories which they set forth were formulated. Under such circumstances it becomes exceedingly difficult to settle the debit and credit side of the account of each school. Perhaps, however, one result may be considered to be now established: there has been in India a continuity of theosophical tendency. The systems interlace with and influence one another. The intuition on which their authors pride themselves consists in perceiving afresh the 'truths' which a kind of heredity has tended to fix in the Indian mentality. The task of the great philosophical schools has to a large extent been that of systematizing the ideas already worked out in the *Upaniṣads*. Buddhism would be unintelligible if the way had not been prepared for it, if not in these very schools, at least in antecedent groups bearing a very strong resemblance to them. And the reformers who have appeared in India in such large numbers since the Middle Ages have drunk at the same source. If, then, we cannot yet dream of giving a strictly historical presentation of theosophical speculations, it is at least not impossible to discern the order in which the principal systems have appeared. We shall follow (1) the development of this thought in circles which are, if not, strictly speaking, Brāhmanic, at least closely related to Brāhmanism (the *Upaniṣads* and the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, and the Yoga); (2) the transformation of theosophy into religion (into Jainism and Buddhism); (3) its incursions into popular religions of long standing, with which it has associated itself, not without a certain sacrifice of its own character and significance; and finally (4) we shall see how modern theosophy in India is dominated by ancient philosophical tradition.

[1] This statement should, however, be slightly modified when applied to modern theosophy in India. On the one hand, this shows an affinity to magic, in that it is greatly interested in the details of existence upon planes other than the physical, and so takes up a slightly materialistic attitude to those existences which are ostensibly non-material. The inhabitants of the astral and mental planes might for practical purposes be described as materializations of spiritual entities. Again, a distinct claim is put forward by theosophy to the discovery and use of hitherto unknown laws of nature, and the power which is thus put into the hands of the expert occultist who is also a theosophist is not altogether different from the power claimed by the magician. But, on the other hand, it must be frankly acknowledged that the modern theosophist in India does not, like some magicians, separate himself from the community to such an extent as to desire to use his powers for merely selfish purposes. Further, the ends at which he aims are ultimately of a spiritual rather than of a materialistic character, and in this he shows his superiority over the Christian Scientist in respect of the excessive attention paid by the latter to the claims of bodily health. It is thus undoubtedly true that the modern theosophist is a contemplative, to the extent that he places the spiritual far above the material, but he is perhaps less inclined than his forefathers in India to be interested merely in his own concerns, and he is more inclined to use for social purposes the powers which contemplation and thought-concentration have secured for him.]

1. The Brāhmanic theosophy.—(1) *The beginnings.*—The two tendencies which characterize Hindu thought throughout its course appear early in Brāhmanic circles. The one is the spirit of tradition: the rites and formulas do not show the expected results unless they are repeated just in the way in which the 'fathers' instituted them at the beginning. Not only will every innovation and every addition be avoided, but an even more necessary requirement is that the sacred acts shall be performed only by those who are in possession of liturgical knowledge, viz. by the Brāhmans. The *dharma*, *i.e.* the rule, which derives its authority simply from its antiquity, thus gradually extends its domination over men's minds. It becomes systematized in one of the six *darśaṇas*, the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā*. Anxious care in observing traditional forms has created the power of the priesthood. The fathers of families have been deprived of their religious importance to the advantage of the Brāhmans. The gulf between sacred and profane makes itself more and more evident.

Contrariwise, it is the spirit of novelty which manifests itself in the other tendency. During all the Vedic period the treasury of hymns and rites is taking form and being constantly enriched. If the gods have at first made use of these, it is not the gods who have revealed the knowledge of them. The *ṛṣis* have 'seen' and have communicated their visions to men.[1] The gods would have preferred to have the exclusive proprietorship.

Signs of this double tendency are to be found even in the same texts. We may be sure that, in circles as yet differing slightly from one another, tradition and originality existed side by side without offence. Why should they have entered into conflict? Did not both of them find their point of departure in the same hymns? Most of the Vedic deities can scarcely be distinguished from the forces and elements in which they reveal their power. They have almost no characterization, and they represent vaguely the divine which permeates the objects and phenomena of nature. Out of this naturalism, frequently rude in character, there easily emerge the pantheistic conceptions which were so soon to dominate Indian theosophy. Besides, do not ritualists and innovators alike make knowledge the essential condition of religious efficacy? Are not both of them Brāhmans, *i.e.* the heirs of the magicians who were charged at the beginning with the protection of the sacred rite from the pernicious influence of evil spirits? Finally—and most important of all—do not both believe that there is in every being and in every sacred act a mysterious energy which establishes harmony and co-ordination between man and the universe? And are they not now on the earth, like the 'fathers' of ancient times and the gods in the heavens, the depositaries and the agents of this mysterious force, creator of order and of life? When there is the thought of turning the secret power of the sacrifice to the benefit of the individual, with a view to assuring him of happiness beyond the grave and guaranteeing him against a second death which would be final, there are here the essential elements of theosophic doctrine—desire for deliverance from suffering and death, hope to succeed by personal effort, confidence in the saving efficacy of knowledge.

(2) *The ancient Upaniṣads.*—Theosophical thought, which is to be found in germ in the hymns and in the *Brāhmaṇas*, obtains form and consistency in the *Upaniṣads* (*q.v.*). Certainly the authors of those old treatises were far from

[1] See art. INSPIRATION (Hindu).

having broken their connexion with the traditional cult. But they love to give the sacred actions a symbolic interpretation which will relieve them of their mechanical and formal character. A still more significant thing is that they manifest a well-marked esoteric tendency: usually a long time is spent in appealing to the master before he consents to reveal the supreme truth, and the disciple is under obligation not to transmit it himself except to a particularly dear and well-qualified person. The method of discovery is always intuition; thought proceeds by abrupt illuminations. Moving impetuously and boldly, it puts assertions side by side with one another without concerning itself about their contradictoriness. It does not demonstrate; it is content to illustrate by beautiful metaphors and arresting similes.

In an as yet vague form the idea of the essential unity of the universe was implicitly contained in the Brāhmanic theory of sacrifice. There is now posited the existence of a Being in which all that is finds its reality. This Being is called *Brahman*, the name of the energy which manifests itself in the sacred action. It is also designated the *ātman*, *i.e.* the self or the soul of all that lives.

'Let one worship *Brahman*, knowing that he is the reality. Let one worship the *ātman*. The *ātman* has for body the life; for form, the light; for essence space. It can take all forms according to its inclination. . . . It permeates all the world. . . . It is the essence of life; it is the essence of myself.'[1]

Thus the theme is stated which the *Upaniṣads* go on to develop and repeat without intermission.

This Being is one and absolute. He has no determinations. One can say nothing of him except that he is. No definition is possible. We may at least try to name him, so convinced are we still that we know the Being of which we know the name. He is 'that,' *tat*. He is 'No, no,' for we deny every quality, which would serve only to limit him. He is the reality—the reality of realities, *satya satyasya*. Beyond the reach of all comparisons, he is bliss, a negative bliss, and, in consequence, absolute. He is without a second. He is my *ātman*, the reality of *me*. There is an identity between the *ātman* which I am and *Brahman*. 'I am *Brahman*.' 'Thou, thou art that.' The universal soul and the individual soul are one.

The world also is real. It derives its reality from *Brahman*, the only reality. A parallel between the psychical and the cosmical is founded upon the unity between the individual soul and the world soul. The cosmos and the ψυχή are the two aspects of the same reality, and the parallel elements which constitute them sustain themselves upon each other.

Finally, *Brahman* is the reality not only of the individual and of phenomenal existence, but also of transcendental existence. For there are two forms of *Brahman*, the one corporeal, the other incorporeal; the one mortal, the other immortal; the one mobile, the other immobile; the one manifested (*sat*), the other transcendent (*tyat*).[2]

In its individualized form the soul could not have the bliss which is the exclusive prerogative of the Absolute Being. The limited Ego is in contact with the non-Ego, and is unhappy while experiencing the alternations of pleasure and of pain, the impermanence and the vanity of finite things. In truth, 'he who is another than himself is suffering.' This misery is born of individuality and lasts equally long. The active self, the *jīva*, is involved, through its activity, in a series of existences of which each one is determined as to its quality by the quality of the existence which has preceded it. 'According as a man acts, according as he conducts himself, so is he reborn.'[3] 'Through good work a man is reborn in a good state, through evil work in an evil state,'[4] and so on, indefinitely. If the life is evil, it is because the man in his ignorance believes himself a person and says, 'I am such and such a one, this thing belongs to me.' This error and the activities which result from it entangle him in the meshes of a life which ever begins anew. Thus the wise man yearns after repose in the Absolute, in the bosom of a Being in whom alone are permanence and truth. How shall a man succeed in quenching individuality, which is the cause of all suffering? It is not by means of action, since action on the contrary is a source of individual life. Even asceticism has only the value of a propædeutic: it tends towards salvation, but it does not save. One way only is open to the soul desirous of deliverance, and that is knowledge. Knowledge is necessary, not now of rites and their meaning, but of *Brahman* himself. And since knowledge of *Brahman* means realization of the identity of the self and the Being who alone exists, one must be able to say to this Being: 'Thou, thou art the *ātman* of all that exists. That which thou art, I am that. . . . Thou art the Reality.' This saving knowledge can be reached only through inner vision. The individual suppressing his senses destroys all contact with the outer world and finds *Brahman* in himself. 'The eye would not flash forth to meet him, nor word, nor sense, nor works, nor ascetic practices. But if the mind is calm, if the heart is pure, then one contemplates the indivisible *Brahman*. One cannot know him except in the heart.'[1] If the Absolute cannot be grasped, one may at least approach him by intense meditation directed towards the symbols of him, and very especially by meditation upon the mystic syllable *Om*, for 'in truth this syllable is *Brahman*; in truth it is the supreme existence; it is the best fulcrum of existence; it is the ultimate ground.'[2] United with *Brahman*, the individual self has no more a distinct consciousness. 'It is when there are two existences that one hears, sees, and knows the other, but when for any one everything has become his own proper self, how could there be anything which he could see, hear, and understand?'[3] Moreover, absorbed in the Being who is altogether happiness, he shares in this infinite bliss.

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, x. vi. 3. 1 ff.
[2] *Bṛh. Ar. Up.* II. iii. 1. [3] *Ib.* IV. iv. 1.
[4] *Ib.* III. ii. 13.

(3) *The Vedānta.*—Of the six philosophical schools which claim connexion with Brāhmanism—more exactly, of the six schools which Brāhmanism has claimed as its own and which it has annexed—three only have given assistance to the elaboration of theosophical doctrine. They are the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the Vedānta (*qq.v.*). The last school is the only one of the three which devotes itself to an explicit continuation of the ancient *Upaniṣads*. We shall therefore begin with it, although, very probably, it did not attain its full development until after the two others.

The name Vedānta does not designate a single homogeneous school. There is a strictly monistic Vedānta: reality pertains to *Brahman* alone; all outside of him is nothing but appearance (*advaita*); this is the thesis of Śaṅkara,[4] at the beginning of the 9th century. Other Vedāntins profess a modified monism—the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja (*q.v.*; 11th century). Others finally abandon monism altogether, not in the sense that they put mind and matter over against each other, but because they allow an essential difference between the individual self and the universal self; these last attach themselves to Mādhva (*q.v.*; 12th century). But, however great their differences, the three teachers all invoke the authority of Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, and all three have written on this older teaching a commentary which is the fundamental text of their respective schools.

Rāmānuja has more right than Śaṅkara to claim to continue the teaching of the *Sūtras*. But Śaṅkara more than the two others, more even than Bādarāyaṇa, is in the line of succession to the *Upaniṣads*. While Rāmānuja and Mādhva are explicitly theistic and teach that God, the author of all grace, saves those who give to Him the worship of love and faith, Śaṅkara attributes to God (Īśvara) an apparent existence only, and an accessory rôle in the genesis of salvation. Consequently the history of theosophical doctrines in India is directly concerned with Him alone.

The first *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa thus states the object of the Vedānta: 'Now comes the study of *Brahman*.' To know *Brahman*, it is not enough to open the eyes and the ears and search for Being in the world which surrounds us. Between the Ego and the non-Ego there is an irreducible opposition: the senses and the understanding which perceive and appreciate the non-Ego either transfer to the object the qualities of the subject or transfer to the subject that which they believe they know of the object. In either case external cognition is vitiated by error; the true name of this pretended knowledge is 'nescience' (*avidyā*). Outside of us the senses and the understanding give us only the cognition of the phenomena of 'becoming.' Now Being, in reality, does not 'become'; it is. If it were 'becoming,' it would not 'be'; for it is impossible to see how that which is not could come to be. All becoming is only an appearance, an illusion.

This Being, the only reality, retains in the Vedānta the name of *Brahman*. This is the absolute *Brahman*, without determination, or, as the Vedāntins say, without quality; beyond time and space and causation, for time, space, and causation belong to the world of appearance, of *avidyā*. 'Being is one; all plurality results from false knowledge.' As it is impossible for me to doubt the reality of myself—I could not express this

[1] *Muṇḍ. Up.* III. i. 8 f. [2] *Kaṭha Up.* I. ii. 15–17.
[3] *Bṛh. Ar. Up.* IV. v. 15. [4] See art. ŚAṄKARĀCHĀRYA.

doubt except in affirming my existence—'I am *Brahman*,' provided that 'I' am denuded of every quality and of all contingency, of everything which constitutes my individuality. In this way I am *Brahman* entire, for *Brahman*, being absolute, could not have parts.

Nescience is not only a relation between the subject knowing and the object known; it is also the relation which emerges between the absolute *Brahman* and the world of names and forms. To this cosmic power, more particularly, the name *māyā* is given. *Māyā* (*q.v.*) signifies the alteration which takes place in *Brahman* and in the self as both pass from the category of the Absolute into those of time, space, and cause—an illusory alteration, which affects the ultimate Being and the self only in appearance. *Māyā* modifies on the one hand *Brahman* and thus creates the world; but it modifies also in the same way the Ego and creates the individual Egos. By the existence of *māyā* the unqualified *Brahman* becomes the qualified *Brahman*, the effect-*Brahman*, the lower *Brahman*. Śaṅkara gives to this *Brahman* also the name of God, *Īśvara*; but this God, His attributes, and the world which the lower *Brahman* creates, preserves, and destroys, do not exist save in virtue of nescience; all is phenomenal, illusory. From the point of view of true knowledge, there is neither cause nor effect; neither Īśvara nor world; neither agent nor act; but only Being unchangeable, indeterminate. Under the influence of *māyā*, the *ātman* becomes a *jīva*. The *jīva* becomes individualized through everything which serves it as a substratum, or *upādhi*—the body, the senses, the power of action, and the faculties of knowledge. But the attributes of the *jīva* have no more reality than those of Īśvara. Truly speaking, the self is not a product; it is incorporeal, spiritual, immutable, infinite, one.

For practical purposes and provisionally, both the world and the individual exist. To both of them even Śaṅkara pays considerable attention. Both are subjects and objects of action. Their destiny is determined by *karma*. 'An act cannot be annulled; this is the universal law; or, at least it cannot be annulled except through working out the result.' Action produces life, and life produces action. The self which acts will be reborn for action, and, again, for rebirth. The chain of causes and effects has not had a beginning. How could it have an end? Fortunately, cause and effect, act and result, are the work of nescience. And what nescience has produced, knowledge will destroy. 'As long as nescience has not been abolished, the individuality of the self is not abolished, and the individual soul continues to be the sphere of good and evil.' The individual can, by a knowledge of *Brahman*, escape from *karma* and the misery of a limited life. If he has discovered how he may attain this by a severe spiritual discipline, he can, through concentrating his thought upon himself and by a kind of spontaneous effort, reach the 'perfect vision,' i.e., he can perceive the *ātman* in himself and thus have an intuition of his identity with the supreme *Brahman*. This vision destroys in him the remnants of personality and dissipates the mirage of the empirical world. He is saved. He is *Brahman*, and in consequence he is, in an absolute sense, being, thought, and bliss.

(4) *The Sāṅkhya.* — The Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*) is of ancient origin, for its influence upon primitive Buddhism cannot well be disputed. The main pronouncements of the school are, however, of later date, and several centuries subsequent to the birth of Buddha. Fortunately there are other works—*e.g.*, the *Mahābhārata* and some ancient Buddhistic writings—which mark out the path of development from the *Upaniṣads* to the classical form of the Sāṅkhya. As we now have it, the Sāṅkhya, realistic and atheistical, is Brāhmanical. It has no difficulty in including the Veda among the standards of knowledge. It may be that, originating outside of Brāhmanism, it was at a later date recognized by the latter, and has paid for this advantage by an adhesion, more or less nominal, to the authority of revelation. Nevertheless, as we find in works undoubtedly orthodox the antecedents of several essential doctrines of this system, it is more probable that it has originated from the same circles as those in which the ancient *Upaniṣads* were elaborated. Its genesis can be best explained if it is regarded as a product of reaction against the radical idealism which is implicit in the *Upaniṣads* and develops in the Vedānta.

The Sāṅkhya posits the absolute reality of the empirical world. If it is said that the world of things is the theatre of a perpetual becoming and that it is impossible to predicate being of that which is impermanent, its answer is that a thing is not real only at the moment when it manifests itself; it has also a subtle state, in which it exists potentially in its cause. For the effect is already to be found in its entirety in the cause: 'The effect and its cause are one.' To affirm the reality of things when they are in the subtle state is to assert that they are already substantial. The ordinary man is unable to see them in their causes because his senses are too gross. If, by ecstasy or as a reward of exceptional merit, he intensifies his power of vision, he will perceive the subtle as easily as the gross.

Whether subtle or gross, the world is essentially composite and changing. Now every complex thing implies a simple Being for the sake of whom it is formed; everything that changes changes only for the sake of an immutable Being. Thus, over against a substance composite and changing, the Sāṅkhya philosophy posits a simple and stable substance; with the *prakṛti*, which is the sphere of becoming, it contrasts the *puruṣa*, which is Being. Everything that acts or is acted upon, everything that changes and lives, the object known, the act and the organs of knowledge, all depend upon *prakṛti*. This includes ψυχή as well as φύσις, since, in the living being, the ψυχή must nourish itself like the φύσις, in order to sustain life and growth.

The change which emerges in the physical and psychical universe is a regular evolution, taking the form of a determination, a growing complexity, an increasing materiality. In its creative aspect evolution brings the gross out of the subtle. At the dissolution of the world the gross resolves itself into the subtle. The Sāṅkhya, which has minutely described the successive phases of the evolutionary processes, posits 24 principles (*tattvas*) which are arranged in order, from the *prakṛti*, the common foundation of all phenomenal existence, to the gross elements and their combinations. It is because the *prakṛti* is not simple that it has been able thus to produce all the things of the physical and mental world. It is threefold. It is composed of three factors, themselves substantial, which are called *guṇas*. These are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, goodness, passion, and darkness. It is by their presence in infinitely varying quantities that things affect men differently.

The 18 *tattvas* which in the evolution emerge between *prakṛti* at the one end and the gross elements at the other unite to form the 'characteristic body,' the *liṅga śarīra*. The *liṅga śarīra* is subtle and is to the gross body as the cause is to the effect; it explains the differences, both physical and psychical, which distinguish individuals from one another. Whilst the gross body is destroyed by death, the *liṅga śarīra* passes from birth to birth and constitutes the identity of the individual in the series of its existences. In every life it becomes richer or poorer according to all that a man thinks, does, or resolves. It is like capital which bears as interest the quality of succeeding existence. The characteristics of the *puruṣa*, or the soul, are directly the converse of those of *prakṛti*. The *puruṣa* is simple, immutable, inactive, unproductive, without *guṇas*. It is also multiple. Because all the souls have not the same kind of knowledge, and because some are free and others are still bound, it follows of necessity that there is an infinity of souls. But the *puruṣa* is in itself independent of all individualization to such an extent that we can always speak of it in the singular. The *puruṣa* is light and understanding; it is light without even having anything to illumine; it thinks without even having any object of knowledge.

Being and becoming, both infinite, are not placed simply over against each other. There is a relation established between them which explains creation, knowledge, and salvation. The neighbourhood of the *puruṣa* in fact causes in the *prakṛti* an excitation which leads in it to the formation of a subtle body in connexion with each *puruṣa*. But the subtle body is only the substratum of the conscious life. That emerges in virtue of the immediate presence of the soul. It is the form in which is expressed the relation between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Now this relation involves suffering for the soul. It is real, but it is not inherent in the soul. Because it is real, deliverance is necessary; because it is not inherent, deliverance is possible.

Both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* have to submit to certain consequences of the relation in which they are bound. When illuminated by the *puruṣa*, the modifications which take place in the ψυχή of the individual become conscious. These again are reflected upon the soul, which thus becomes subject to all the interplay of the affections. It is in this roundabout way that the soul arrives at a knowledge of itself. For, though it is the subject of all knowledge, the *puruṣa* cannot know itself directly. This knowledge becomes possible through a reflexion coming from the mirror provided by the internal organ. The *puruṣa*, full of light but inactive, and the *prakṛti*, active but unconscious, stand to each other in the relation of the paralytic to the blind. Their association is discovered to be beneficial for both. In the service of the *puruṣa*, the *prakṛti* is creative, and this creation has no other end than to make knowledge possible for the soul—which knowledge necessarily eventuates in salvation.

A slow and elaborate process is necessary to break the bond and suppress suffering. This is the main intention—not to destroy actual suffering, which on other grounds would be impossible, but to make it abortive in its germ or in the persistent dispositions stored in subtle form in the internal organ. A slow internal struggle brings a man from the natural state—*i.e.* the morbid state—to absolute healing. Works and asceticism may prepare the ground, but it is knowledge which is truly efficacious. By means of study, self-contemplation, and meditation, we may arrive at an assertion of the truth: 'I am not; nothing is mine; this is not me.' One thus gets a direct perception of the distinction between the Ego and the *prakṛti*. To establish this distinction is to destroy the bond and to see the *puruṣa* in its absolute purity. Henceforth the soul has no other substratum than itself; there is no further association with the subtle body, no reflexion cast by it; the soul is healed.

The *prakṛti* also derives advantage from a deliverance which, in effect, suppresses suffering for it, inasmuch as suffering is not felt except for so long as the *prakṛti* is illumined by the soul. As it would not be creative except in relation to the soul and its salvation, it ceases to be active and returns to the original equilibrium of the *guṇas*. Moreover, this healing has no value except for the liberated soul. 'Since, notwithstanding the infinity of time, there are still souls not liberated, there will be such to all eternity.'[1]

(5) *The Yoga.*—It might be asked if in the history of Indian theosophy the place of the Yoga (*q.v.*) is truly next to the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, if its affinities are not in an altogether different direction and with the group of systems which, though they adopted many theosophical ideas, are obviously theistic and devotional in tendency. Does it not make a place for God, for that Īśvara who is a 'soul apart,' a unique Being, eternal, all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing, exposed to no suffering, to no desire or change? Does not this God show an infinitely benevolent activity on behalf of men desirous of salvation? Does He not vouchsafe spiritual vision to His elect? Does not the *yogī*, to obtain salvation, surrender himself to God with that feeling of complete abandonment which is called *praṇidhāna*? Finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place? What have the recognized means for purifying the body and delivering the soul from the organ of thought to do with the pursuit of *jñāna*, the knowledge which brings salvation?

It is easy to answer these objections. First of all we may remark that the rôle attributed to Īśvara in the scheme of salvation is really secondary. After the preliminary process is gone through, there is no further intervention of divine assistance to second the efforts of the *yogī*, and everything happens as if he had only his own powers to rely upon. Further, the supreme end is not, by any means, as in theistic religions, eternal life in God or near God; what is desired is the absolute isolation of the individual soul. It follows that, probably, when the Yoga came to be systematized, Īśvara was merely a survival of a period when practices of asceticism and sorcery were associated with Śiva, a god whose vigorous personality might seem incompatible with an exclusively human conception of salvation. In fine, Īśvara was no more an inconvenient intrusion in the Brāhmanical Yoga than in the monistic Vedānta; it is even possible that his presence was indirectly the sign of the penetration of the Yoga by the theosophical spirit.

The Yoga, desirous of specially emphasizing the practical conditions of meditation and saving ecstasy, would naturally disregard study and reflexion, since neither of them was of service in securing the marvellous powers for which the *yogī* was ambitious. But, as in Brāhmanizing itself it had adopted very nearly in its entirety the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya, there was really no need to indicate the acquisition of knowledge as among the demands imposed by the need for salvation. This acquisition could have been considered as implicitly prescribed from beginning to end. In any case it is interesting to point out that in an *Upaniṣad* greatly influenced by Yoga ideas, the *Maitri Upaniṣad*, the examination of reflexion had a place among the members of Yoga. Perhaps we have in this a proof drawn from a period before the Yoga became entirely allied to the Sāṅkhya.

In other characteristics the Yoga shows itself faithful to the theosophical spirit. It rests upon very ancient beliefs closely related to magic. The remarkable manifestations of patience, will-power, and intelligence reveal the presence of supernatural faculties and imply in their possessors a new acquisition of energy. Besides, the accomplishment of salvation depends entirely upon personal effort. There is no possible doubt that the Yoga belongs legitimately to the same spiritual family as the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.

[1] *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, i. 158.

Properly speaking, the Yoga is the act by which the senses and the understanding are held in restraint; turned resolutely in one single direction, the mind acquires greater force and certain new faculties. The processes regarded as efficacious had already been employed for a long time when Patañjali formulated his theory of them. If, as is probable, the author of the *Yoga Sūtras* is the same as the illustrious grammarian of the same name, then this spiritual discipline was systematized in the 2nd cent. B.C. But, in the influence which from the beginning it exerted upon Buddhism, we have proof that it goes much farther back. The proper object of the Yoga, as supplied with doctrines by the Sāṅkhya, is, as the first of the *Sūtras* says, 'the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle,' *i.e.* of the understanding. Freed from all *chitta*, the *puruṣa* regains its own nature. We are not concerned, as in the Vedānta, with recognizing by an effort of thought the identity of the Ego and the universal self; nor with distinguishing, as in the Sāṅkhya, the self from that which is not the self; the aim is to bring about the integration of the soul, in which consists her salvation.

The *yogī* pupil has difficult conditions to fulfil. A long and painful process of preparation is imposed upon him, so that he may triumph over all the obstacles inherent in the feebleness of man. It is in the first phase of this process that devotion and the practice of mortification have their parts to play. Whenever this propædeutic has fulfilled its functions, the adept may proceed to exercises which lead to the suppression of the intellectual functions and the detachment of the soul. According to the authoritative scheme, the programme of this gymnastic is divided into eight members. Five of these rubrics aim at the bringing of the body under control. They comprise interdictions and injunctions, prescriptions relative to the positions to be taken in meditation, and others which have for their aim the control of breathing, and, finally, the procedure which has to be followed in restraining the senses and destroying communications between the mind and the external world. There is special insistence upon the regulation of the breath, on the ground that individual life and thought are bound up with respiration, and that to control the one is to dominate the other. When, finally, the body has been purified, it becomes possible to exercise control on thought; three kinds of exercises lead it progressively towards unification, the destruction of individuality, and isolation.

Another method, more violent and more complicated, is founded upon a most bizarre kind of physiology. Through modifying and even stopping the circulation of the vital spirits in the channels of the body, the *yogī* succeeds in suppressing the natural functions of the understanding and in exalting the power of action and of vision. Strange phenomena accompany the last phases of this spiritual process: colours appear which are invisible to the ordinary man; sounds are heard; the *yogī* sinks into a 'mystic slumber.' Sometimes also the strain of so much effort ends in madness. The texts expatiate at great length on the manifold advantages which Yoga brings to its disciples. First of all there are benefits of an entirely mundane character: health, youth, and beauty. Especially there is obtained a 'sovereign power' which enables those who possess it to realize immediately all that they desire, to make themselves at will exceedingly small or big, light or heavy; to control the elements; to guide the will or sentiments of another; to change the nature of substances, to distribute their personality amongst several different bodies, etc. But for the *yogī* the spiritual results have more value. In seven stages the soul obtains liberation, first of all from the external world, then from the hindrances which come to it through its association with the organs of the intelligence and the will. Liberated from the world of results, the soul rejoices in pure tranquillity; dissociated from the internal organs, it tastes the ineffable delights of ecstasy, and reaches without any distraction the state of integration (*kaivalya*) in which is its salvation.

Before leaving Brāhmanic theosophy, we may point out that in more than one characteristic it is very closely connected with Western occultism (*q.v.*). Our theosophists have, like the Vedāntists, a marked tendency towards monism; their anthropology has borrowed much from the Sāṅkhya philosophy; they authorize exercises which are not without analogy to those prescribed by the Yoga.

2. Theosophy as the germ of new religions.—In

Brāhmanism the theosophical doctrines are placed alongside of the old tradition, and religious society remains confined to the old framework. When theosophy is transformed into a religion, the conditions are altogether altered. Henceforth a man becomes a member of a community, not because of his birth, but because of his adherence to a certain belief; the idea and the group are co-extensive. Moreover, theosophy ceases to be a mere intellectual doctrine; it takes entire possession of the individual, and aims at maintaining among its adherents the unity of discipline and of life.

Two religions have sprung from the movement of thought which we find permeating the old *Upaniṣads*, viz. Jainism and Buddhism. Seeing that they are born in the same spiritual environment, it is not strange that they should have many characteristics in common. Their doctrines, their legends, their rules of life, have an unmistakable air of family relationship. The worship itself, in its outer forms, is so similar in various particulars that from the outside one might easily confuse the two systems; witness only the tale of Aśvaghosa in which one finds King Kaniṣka worshipping a Jain *stūpa* under the impression that it is Buddhistic. Jainism and Buddhism are both products of the process of crystallization which was a feature of the period of the ancient *Upaniṣads*. Besides Brāhmans practising strict observance of rites and a solitary asceticism, India has been familiar with what one might call wandering cenobitism. The teachers, accompanied by their disciples, go from place to place, not settling down anywhere except during the months of the rainy season. These *parivrājakas*, in the course of instructing their pupils, discuss the most diverse subjects. The groups are not closed. Round about a knot of faithful disciples there gathers a numerous body of adherents and friends. If Jainism and Buddhism have been able to transform themselves into Churches, the reason is that they have understood better than some other *saṅghas* how to attach the laity by solid bonds and to organize the community by fixed rules. There is now no doubt that Jainism is prior to Buddhism. Buddhists themselves do not hesitate to admit the fact. But Jain writings are certainly posterior—and very much so—to those of Buddhism. It may well be that, if there has been borrowing, the Jains have been the debtors. If we begin with them, it is not in order to lay stress on the relative dates, but rather because, on the whole, the Jainist Church has remained more faithful to the theosophical tradition of the *Upaniṣads*.

(1) *Jainism.*—Jainism (*q.v.*) has all the characteristics of a theosophical religion. It puts at the centre of its teaching the doctrine of *karma* (*q.v.*), and shows itself chiefly interested in human destiny. It aims at delivering men from the misery of the *saṁsāra*. It demands that the individual should be the instrument of his own regeneration. It searches for the saving truth beyond phenomena and sensible perception, and, as a consequence, asserts the authority of persons endowed with exceptional faculties of vision and knowledge. It places itself outside the Brāhmanic tradition. Nothing more is heard of Īśvara. Jainism is a 'human' doctrine. Śaṅkara sees in this a reason for its condemnation. Because it opposes to Vedic tradition a new rule, this theologian accuses it of not being 'revealed.' And yet Jainism also makes it a duty for its disciples to have faith in the words of an omniscient master, who made known the way of emancipation, who has triumphed over the world of death, and who, because of this, has received the surname of Jina ('the Victorious').

Perhaps because the Jains appeal to omniscient teachers, they have promulgated a theory of knowledge which forbids any absolute affirmation or denial. Every proposition has a relative value only (*anekāntavāda*); a thing is not thus; in a way it is this; I can say that a thing is not, that it is, and that it is not, that it 'cannot be spoken of,' etc., only if it is understood that these predicates are true merely relatively and under certain reservations (*syādvāda*). As far as one can conjecture from the examples which illustrate the various dialectic 'refractions' (*bhanga*), the aim of the *syādvāda* is to show that nothing can be known except in relation to the totality of the universe, where birth, duration, and death rule together, and that, relatively to this indeterminate universe, things are themselves indeterminate. 'Everything is indeterminate by the very fact of its existence.'[1] The aim of this doctrine was to destroy at one and the same time the monistic dogmatism of the Vedānta and the negations of the sceptical schools.

Everything in the universe comes under one or other of the five categories of substances (*dravya*): soul (better, life), space, merit, non-merit, and material molecules. Souls (*jīva*) and molecules (*pudgala*) are infinitely numerous; space, merit, and non-merit are single. Merit (*dharma*) has the effect of furthering the progress of the soul; non-merit (*adharma*) leaves it stationary. The progress of the soul is the consequence of its *karma*.

In fact, the soul is by its nature limited and active. As limited, it has the dimensions of the body, which serves as its substratum; it is lessened and increased along with the body. As active, it receives in virtue of its *karma* an influx of material molecules, which, according to their quality, are black, blue, grey, yellow, rose-colour, and white, and which affect the *jīva* by giving it various colours. This influx of karmic matter is the bond which links the soul to the *saṁsāra*. The individual who aspires to salvation has the task of purifying his soul. By asceticism he eliminates the *pudgala* which stain it. By draining off the acquired *karma*, asceticism is the essential factor in *nirjarā*, or the burning up of the effects of *karma*. Thus one of the characteristics of Jainism is the extreme importance which it assigns to *tapas*. It is not sufficient to annul the past; it is also necessary to prevent the formation of new *karma*. And this desirable result is produced by discipline, by *saṁvara*. In its two principal forms it prevents the entrance of the karmic *pudgala* into the *jīva*; the two forms are control (*gupti*) and good behaviour (*samiti*). By *gupti* the soul represses the activity of the body, of speech, and of the mind; by *samiti* it so behaves as not to injure or offend any one. Reflexion and meditation are also efficacious means of discipline and of defence against the pernicious influx. Right vision (*i.e.* right faith), right knowledge, and right conduct complete the way of deliverance. And, just as an elixir does not heal any one except him who knows it, has faith in it, and applies it properly, so the Three Jewels cannot produce deliverance unless they are united.

Henceforth, liberated from the *saṁsāra*, the zealous Jain is a *siddha*, a perfected being. He is disburdened of all karmic matter. He is without colour. His soul, lightened of every hindrance—like a flame which rises by its own strength—begins its course upwards towards the higher regions of the universe. There he enjoys a happy and eternal existence. *Mokṣa* has the effect of rendering the *jīvas* detached and free.

(2) *Buddhism.*—Buddhism also is a theosophy which has expanded into a religion. If the 'high priest' of Ceylon can give his approval to the catechism drawn up by Colonel Olcott, and, still more, if the communities of Ceylon, Burma, Japan, and Mongolia give their adhesion to the fourteen articles in which the same writer gathers together the fundamental beliefs of Buddhism, the reason lies in the unmistakable affinity between the tendencies of present-day Buddhism and those of Western theosophical societies. But we have no need of external proof to enable us to assert the fundamentally theosophical character of the teaching of Gautama Buddha.

'As the ocean has only one savour, the savour of water, so the doctrines which I teach and the rule which I establish have only one savour, that of salvation.'[2] Buddha wishes to save men, not from sin, but from suffering and death.

He summons all men to salvation. 'The gate of immortality is open for all beings. Let him who has ears come, hear the Word and believe.'[3]

He rejects the authority and traditional knowledge of the Brāhmans. 'In a line of blind men who attach themselves to one another, the first does not see, the man in the middle does not see, the last does not see. Such are the discourses of the Brāhmans. Their faith is without foundations.'[4]

He makes salvation a personal matter for each individual. 'Be your own lamps; be your own refuge. Do not search outside yourselves for a lamp or a refuge.'[5] 'You must yourselves make the necessary effort. A Buddha is only a counsellor.'[6]

Finally, the framework of the building erected by Buddha

[1] *Sarvadarśana Sutras*, p. 29. [2] *Chullavagga*, ix. i. 4.
[3] *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 170. [4] *Ib.* ii. 169 ff.
[5] *Digha Nikāya*, ii. 101 (= *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, ch. ii.).
[6] *Dhammapada*, v. 276.

is constructed almost entirely from materials borrowed from the Brāhmanical schools, nurtured in the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*.

The method of salvation which Buddha preaches to men includes rules of life and truths of an intellectual character. But since it is well understood that his teaching has but one savour, there is no hint that men should practise virtue because it is virtue, or search for knowledge because of the practical or intellectual satisfaction which knowledge brings. Morality and learning, in intention at least, are looked at only from the narrow point of view of salvation. Thence come the limits within which they move. In fact, Buddha did not wish to teach either morality or science, but only a therapeutic of the will and a therapeutic of the intelligence. When once a man is healed from moral evil and from error, he may work onwards towards salvation.

(*a*) *Therapeutic of the conduct.*—Only a soul purified by moral discipline can receive with profit the teaching of the Law. The most formidable enemy of salvation is the desire for sensual enjoyment. Sensuality figures in all the lists of depravities, infections, obstacles, and hindrances. It is against sensuality that men have chiefly to struggle. Hence the imperious necessity of exercising constant control over the senses. Of all the virtues vigilance is most characteristic of Buddhistic moral teaching.

(*b*) *Therapeutic of the intellect.*—Knowledge is not less necessary than good conduct. Like good conduct, it has chiefly a negative value. In theosophies closely connected with Brāhmanism knowledge is a working out of deliverance in a positive manner, because upon the topics of God, the world, the soul, and human destiny there is a body of knowledge directly efficacious for salvation. But the point of view of Buddha and his earlier disciples is quite different. That which they want is to deliver the mind from unfavourable thoughts which may hinder the individual or at least lead him in a false way. It can be understood how different are the conditions under which the spiritual struggle presents itself according as one admits or denies the existence of eternal and immutable beings, whether immanent or transcendent or both. Buddha's aim was to show that in the succession of phenomena no cause was revealed which was not itself phenomenal, and to deduce from this proposition the consequences affecting the moral life of the individual. The earliest Buddhism neither knew nor wished to recognize anything other than phenomena. Phenomena, both physical and psychical, constitute *dharma*. In us and outside of us we reach nothing but *dharma*, not because of our mental incapacity, but because neither in us nor outside of us is there anything but *dharma*. The constituents of *dharma* are not hung, as it were, upon a substance of which they are the momentary phases; they are themselves the whole reality. Primitive Buddhism is thus at the opposite pole from the Vedānta, which abstracts from phenomena and regards Absolute Being as the only reality.

Whether subjective or objective, phenomena are incessantly changing, and things are involved in a perpetual flux. Phenomena are just those states of individuals and objects of which the essential characteristic is complexity. Now only the simple and homogeneous can be permanent. The human individual is an assemblage of five kinds of aggregates, and this composite is modified from moment to moment. What is called the individual (*pudgala*) is a series, more or less lengthy, of the phases of composites continually altering. The movement of aggregates, or of combinations of aggregates, does not take place by chance, or without any system. One cause determines the condition of every new combination, and this cause is the quality of the antecedent combination. With conscious individuals, who alone are interested in the theory of salvation, the causal combination is an agent, and his action produces results of two kinds; it manifests itself externally as the immediate cause of phenomena, and internally as a modification of the doer himself of the action. *Karma* may be defined as the reaction of the act upon the subject. This reaction takes place generally at 'the dissolution of the body after death,' in such a way that the binding force of one individual life reappears in another individual life. As Buddhism has discarded every hypothesis not connected with visible forms of existence, it does not posit a subtle body as the vehicle of *karma*, or an Īśvara as the controller of resultants. Even at a distance *karma* is a force which works mechanically. Moreover, it fulfils in Buddhism the function of explaining the congenital differences which are found among men, and of awakening in the hearts of the faithful adherents the feeling of their moral responsibility.

Karma is far from being a doctrine specifically Buddhistic. The same cannot be said of the two sets of rules the discovery of which transformed the potential into the actual *buddha*: the Four Noble Truths and the Twelve Causes. These Buddhism has always claimed as its own. The Truths are suffering, its cause, its suppression, and the way which leads to suppression. 'What is impermanent, that is suffering.'[1] 'The craving for existence and for the cessation of existence are the causes of suffering.'[1] 'The suppression of suffering consists in the destruction of the craving by the complete suppression of desire.'[2] We arrive at suppression by following the Noble Eightfold Path—right knowledge, right willing, right speech, etc. The ultimate significance of the Twelve Causes is to explain suffering without having recourse to any principle except those recognized by Buddhism, viz. the aggregates, *karma*, and the Noble Truths. Through one causal link after another, the life of suffering is connected with its deepest source, viz. ignorance. In this way there is excluded the notion of a soul which would be essentially and incurably suffering. There is eliminated also the interference of a God who imposes the suffering upon His creatures; if the misery came from outside, it would not be in the power of man to put an end to it. It does not belong to the Ego as a permanent substance, and, since the older theosophy had shown that man cannot find God except in and through the Ego, Buddhism, in denying the *ātman*, is compelled also to deny *Brahman*, the original and immanent cause of the universe.

[1] *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, iv. 26.

If Buddhism is a theosophy, it is much more a religion. Religion aims at satisfying much more varied needs than does an essentially intellectual doctrine. Religion is a manner of living, and not only a manner of thinking. The necessities of life and of controversy soon compelled Buddhism to extend considerably the range of its practical and dogmatic teaching.

In ethics Buddhism was far from confining itself to the limits imposed by the demands of salvation. In seeking to give the greatest possible effectiveness to its moral pronouncements, Buddhism does not take the trouble to co-ordinate systematically the lessons which circumstances suggest. When it addresses itself to the laity—as frequently happens—it disregards the special conditions of the strictly religious life, and its precepts obtain a universal significance. The exclusive interests of personal salvation are then so far from its thought that the virtues which it enjoins have a social and human value—compassion, charity, humility. Similarly there is an expansion of doctrine. Questions kept in reserve at the beginning soon had to be investigated, and the reason for this was that facility might be obtained for discussing them with rival schools. Ontological and epistemological topics soon became the order of the day. It was inevitable that, even within the limits of Buddhism, some divergent solutions would be proposed. Hence the appearance of sects in which tendencies showed themselves which had hitherto remained latent: the realistic schools of the Sarvāstivādins, the idealistic schools of the Yogāchāras, the nihilist schools of the Mādhyamikas.

The later disciples of Buddha deliberately abandon the prudent agnosticism of their Master. Their speculations are concerned with the transcendental world (*lokottara*). Even the fundamental unity of the universe is affirmed (doctrine of the *tathatā*). It is noteworthy also that Buddha himself, who from the earliest times had been regarded as the perfect example of humanity, comes to represent, in the theory of the Threefold Body, at one and the same time, phenomenal existence, non-sensible existence, and absolute existence—the body of creation, the body of bliss, and the body of the Law.

But, even when considerably amplified, conduct and knowledge are not given more than a negative importance as regards salvation. Upon the soil cleared by them the problem is now to construct the properly religious life. On what plan will this building be erected? It will be no matter of astonishment that, being at once theosophical and religious, Buddhism has conceived a double ideal of life and has proposed two different methods. To become *arhats* and accomplish their own salvation was the aim of the *sthaviras* of the ancient Church; they are the adherents of the Lesser Vehicle. Those of the Greater Vehicle

[1] *Mahāvagga*, i. vi. 20. [2] *Ib.* i. vi. 21.

aspire to become *bodhisattvas* and believe in religious solidarity.[1] It was enough for the first to transform a sinner into a saint; the others have more ambition; they desire that the sinner, following in the footsteps of Buddha, should become a saviour. It can easily be understood that the way of the *arhat* and the career of the *bodhisattva* separated themselves perceptibly from one another.

(α) *The way to arhatship.*—Conversion makes of the Buddhist a new man. He 'enters into the current.' By an energetic and long-continued struggle he destroys in himself the adverse principles. Two roads to the goal now open up before him. The one is through a series of spiritual exercises. Meditation and intense concentration secure in him serviceable tranquillity (*śamatha*). No more of attachment, no more of desires; the very residues of desire are destroyed. The results of the liberation of the heart are clear vision (*vipaśyanā*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). The other way is that of enfranchisement (*vimokṣa*). The path to the awakening is by ecstatic contemplation (*dhyāna*). From ecstasy to ecstasy the monk rises in eight stages (the *samāpatti*) to a state of being which is neither thought nor the absence of thought. It is the suppression of voluptuous ideas, of discursive ideas, of joy, of breathing—the abolition of the world of forms by that of space, and of the world of space by that of knowledge; of the world of knowledge by that of the non-existence of things, and of the last by that in which there are neither ideas nor the absence of ideas. Arrived at this already very elevated stage, the *arya* enters into possession of superior powers (the six *abhijñā*). But it is necessary to go even higher. A ninth and last *samāpatti* leads to the 'dissolution of all conscious perception,' to 'the awakening,' to *sambodhi*. When one has taken the way of wisdom or of enfranchisement, one becomes an *arhat* (*q.v.*), a saint. The *arhat* has done 'that which he had to do.' When his *karma* is drained off, he will be extinguished without his last thought or his last aggregate giving rise to a further thought or a further combination.

(β) *The way to Buddhaship.*—As the ideal is higher, the method is more complicated. The career of the *bodhisattva* (*q.v.*) demands a long preparation and solemn pledges. There must emerge in the man the 'thought of illumination' (*bodhichitta*), that he should take the vow to do everything to arrive at the goal (*praṇidhāna*); that by an act of will he should 'assign' to the advantage of another his actions and the fruit of his actions (*pariṇāmanā*). Then commences the struggle properly so called. In order to obtain illumination, the *bodhisattva* must provide himself with a double equipment, merit and knowledge. The programme which has to be followed includes acts of worship, rules of conduct, and the practice of meditation. The object is to acquire successively the ten perfections (*pāramitā*), each corresponding to a spiritual world (a *bhūmi*). At the end of this long ascent the *bodhisattva* obtains finally the illumination which makes him a *buddha*, *i.e.* a liberator of creatures, an ultra-phenomenal being still sojourning for a time in the phenomenal world.

For *arhat* and *bodhisattva* the eventuality is the same—*nirvāṇa* (*q.v.*), extinction. What does it matter that neither Buddha nor his authorized disciples have said what *nirvāṇa* is? If one knows that it is the abolition of suffering and death, of relative and individual existence, that is enough to make it an infinitely desirable state. If Buddha has gained control over natures of the most diverse qualities, it is just because he has left them the liberty of imagining a *nirvāṇa* conformable to their needs and their aspirations.

Let us take a look backwards. We may agree that Buddhism has certainly characteristic marks of a theosophical system. It regards ignorance as the source of all the evil of living, and knowledge as the panacea of suffering. It seeks to deliver its adherents from the fear of death. It endeavours to upset the Brāhmanical methods of salvation. It denies that texts or doctrines have any direct value for salvation, and it affirms the value of 'vision,' of intuition arrived at by internal concentration and ecstatic meditation. It demands that every man should be the architect of his own salvation, and, even though it multiplies the 'saviours,' it no less emphasizes for the individual the necessity of personal effort. It teaches that knowledge is power, and that spiritual excellence manifests itself outwardly in extraordinary faculties. It breaks through the traditional framework and urges the individual to work without procrastination towards his regeneration and so to arrange matters that this labour shall fill his whole life.

[1] See artt. HĪNAYĀNA, MAHĀYĀNA.

3. Introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions.—Brāhmanism in its different aspects was only one of the forms of the religious life; in every period there was also the popular current, powerful, infinitely varied, and mobile. Just as in the sacerdotal tradition minutely elaborated rites occupy the principal place, gods and demons are central in the popular religion, and the worship which is given to them, mixed throughout as it is with superstitions and gross practices, answers more fully to the idea which is generally held of devotion and of piety. These two religious contents have not existed side by side without exerting an influence upon each other. We have here to do only with the influence exerted by the theosophy of Brāhmanism. This influence is only a particular illustration of the growing preponderance which the sacerdotal caste obtained in all the moral life of India, and of which the Buddhistic writings themselves give unmistakable evidence. Nothing is more natural than this primacy. The Brāhmanical families had at their disposal two powerful forces, tradition and cohesion. In a society which was crumbling to its foundations they formed a solid group, cemented by community of interest and of ambitions and reinforced by the habits of knowledge and of virtue. Popular forms of worship, legal and social rules, and secular poetry no doubt flourished to a large extent outside of Brāhmanical circles; but the influence of the latter has none the less succeeded in filtering through at every point. Just as Sanskrit, the scholastic idiom of the Brāhmans, invaded the epic and the drama, the popular style, and the literature of business, so the Brāhmans made themselves the theologians of the sectarian religions. They applied to them the methods of their systematizing temperament. They also introduced into them their conceptions of being, of the world, and of destiny, hesitating less to popularize these conceptions since Buddhism had already deprived them of their esoteric character.

We have in the *Mahābhārata* (*q.v.*) excellent evidence of the appropriation by Brāhmanism of materials which were without doubt independent. This document is all the more significant because it shows clear traces of successive accretions, and because its slow elaboration was carried through during the many centuries when the Brāhmans were gradually establishing their spiritual domination. We may regard the poem as completed, in the form in which we know it, at the time when neo-Brāhmanism was triumphant, *i.e.* in the 4th or 5th cent. A.D. And this voluminous encyclopædia of the traditional knowledge of the Hindus is something more than a witness; it was also one of the agents, perhaps the most effective of all, in the expansion of Brāhmanism in India. Before, during, and after the composition of the great epic, a mass of writings emerge to illuminate or supplement its evidence—sectarian *Upaniṣads*, *Dharmaśāstras* (as the first of which we may regard that which bears the name of Manu), *Purāṇas*, books written in prose or in verse by the numerous reformers of Hinduism or under their influence. Unfortunately the investigation of this rich literature has not yet been completed.

By gaining entrance into works definitely popular, the ideas whose development we have hitherto followed in the texts of a school or in the monastic literature began to exert a powerful influence upon the general thought of India; and nothing proves more effectively the plasticity of religious thought than the faithfulness with which conceptions originally monistic and antitheistic persist, almost

unchanged, in sects permeated with the most ardent devotion.

As in the ancient theosophy, the soul is haunted by the thought of death: 'Every being is in fear of death.'[1] 'Some men in their fear of death have died of fear.'[2] 'The world is under the attack of Mṛtyu. How dost thou not think of it?' 'Do to-day that which you will have to do to-morrow: do this morning what you will have to do to-night. Death does not trouble itself with what one has done or with what one has not done. It seizes a man as a wolf carries off a lamb.'[3] There is not a moment to lose: 'the days pass away; life wears to an end. Rouse yourself and run.'[4]

The new religious conceptions bring home to men the necessity and the way of salvation: 'Let a man search for a remedy through the suppression of suffering and let him apply it without murmuring. Then he will be free from misery.'[5] It is the individual life which is full of suffering and death; it is necessary to get deliverance from it: 'Death has two syllables, for it is *mama*, everything that I consider as my own. *Brahman* has three syllables, *na mama*, for in it nothing is mine.'[6] There is always the same hate of the body and its fugitive pleasures: 'Let one becoming an ascetic, abandon this stinking body, full of filth and urine, subject to old age and disappointment, the abode of maladies, burnt by passions and perishable.'[7] 'All the joys which arise from contact with the world are a source of suffering; they begin: they end; the wise man does not find in them any pleasure.'[8]

How is man to be saved? The means of salvation have become more numerous and more varied. There is nothing more interesting than to mark the persistence of the ancient ideas and the traditional formulas. The new has not destroyed the old. Salvation is the result of an effort entirely personal. 'Strengthening your soul by your soul, vanquish the enemy who reclothes the forms of desire, and who is difficult to strike.'[9] 'The yogī is he who finds within himself his happiness, within himself his pleasure, within himself his light.'[10] 'Let a man establish the self by the self and suffer not the self to be overwhelmed, for no man has any other friend than himself, or any other enemy than himself.'[11] Salvation is still the result of knowledge, a knowledge which is acquired by concentration of thought and meditation: 'Knowledge is the best vessel (for traversing the sea of the *saṁsāra*).'[12] To know *Brahman* is to obtain peace 'which has as its final result *nirvāṇa*';[13] it is oneself to become *Brahman*.

As may be seen from the last passages, it is the solution of the Vedānta which obtains most favour of all those proposed by the Brāhmanical schools. Recourse is had readily to the Sāṅkhya when one wishes to analyze the universe and the soul, or to the Yoga for teaching as to the practice of concentration and ecstasy; but the theory of *mokṣa* remains essentially monistic and pantheistic. As far as the evidence gathered from the great epic is concerned, the doctrine which is adhered to is not the radical monism of Śaṅkara (which was indeed later than the centuries during which the *Mahābhārata* was finally redacted), but the monism of the *Upaniṣads* and of Bādarāyaṇa: the world of names and forms is real, but it is *Brahman* who is the reality of its reality. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* does not leave any doubt on this point:

'Others offering me the sacrifice of knowledge, give to me worship as to a being at once universal and individual, who, under various forms, extends himself in every direction.'[14] 'The knowledge of goodness is that through which is seen in all beings the one imperishable Being, a whole in every particular being.'[15] 'One portion of me has entered into the world of living beings, as the soul of the individual, the imperishable portion.'[16] 'The knowledge by which thou wilt perceive all beings without exception in thyself and then in me, will for ever give thee a refuge from error.'[17] 'In the Brāhman, in the ox and the elephant, in the dog and also in the eater of the flesh of the dog, the wise man sees only one and the same being.'[18] 'He who sees me in everything and everything in me, is never far from me, and I am never far from him.'[19]

God is immanent in all beings, but He is not confused with them; He is the principle of life which animates them, the principle of all spirituality.

Finally, He is not only immanent; He is also transcendent. Things are in Him, but He is not in them. The world of phenomena does not exhaust His nature. He has an inferior nature which reveals itself in names and forms, and a superior nature which is also a living soul. He is distinguished from the immortal and imperishable *Brahman* of which He is the foundation, just as He is the foundation of eternal law and perfect blessedness. Thus, without going beyond the limits of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, we can see theism substituting itself for the original pantheism, and a personal God taking the place of *Brahman*. The evolution completes itself in the modified monism of Rāmānuja, and the spiritualistic dualism of Mādhva. The worship of the *guru*, which is so persistent a characteristic of the modern sects, has its source in the same conceptions. God, who is the essential excellence in all beings and in all the categories of being, specially manifests His adorable nature in the persons who behold and who reveal the truth.

When, in a passage from the *Bhagavad-Gītā* which has just been quoted, the god alludes to the 'others,' who offer the sacrifice of knowledge, he puts them over against those who render the worship of love. At once pantheistic and theistic, the poem places on the same level the two methods of salvation—knowledge and *bhakti*. The explanation is that in Hindu thought nothing which has once been acquired is ever altogether eliminated. Tradition and novelty, animism and ritualism, naturalism and theosophy, scholasticism and mysticism—in short, the most contrary ideas—live together in the same minds and in the same writings. In theory the *advaita* may be professed, but in fact the *dvaita*, and even a plurality of co-eternal principles, is affirmed. It is, as it were, tacitly understood that an affirmation has value in itself, and that it is not annulled by adjacent affirmation. In his everyday life Śaṅkara was a Vaiṣṇava—we could hardly imagine this in reading his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*. These men duplicate themselves with wonderful ease. So it is vain to attempt to apply to the *Bhagavad-Gītā* the critical processes devised for Western works. In separating the disparate elements and the successive layers, we should succeed only in ruining the unmistakable artistic beauty of the poem. Works much later than the *Bhagavad-Gītā* exhibit a character equally composite. Theosophic conceptions and formulas are mingled with effusions of an ardent and humble piety. One marks this characteristic in many writings attributed to the founders and poets of the reforming sects, Kabīr, Tulsī Dās, Chaitanya, etc. The most recent representatives of an enlightened Vedānta, Ramakṛṣṇa and Vivēkānanda, also unite the *bhakti-mārga* with a phraseology which has become traditional since the period of the older *Upaniṣads*. There has been formed in India as it were a stock of words, ideas, and illustrations which belongs to every one and from which every one has the right to draw and is in the habit of drawing. One example will be sufficient to show how heavy a weight this theosophy of the past lays upon a thought which in other respects shows itself to be original and independent.

Nānak (*q.v.*), the founder of Sikhism, and his successors connect themselves with the religion of *bhakti*. They teach that a man is saved by the fervent worship of God, or by the worship of the *gurus*, the interpreters of God, and of the Book, the perpetual incarnation of the *gurus*. But the God of the Sikhs is like the *Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads*, and frequently borrows His name from the latter. In His own proper nature He is *nirguṇa*, without attributes; when He creates the world by means of *māyā*, He is also immanent in the phenomenal world and becomes *sarvaguṇa*, endowed with all qualities. In order to be saved, one must discover God in the heart; through self-concentration the mind eliminates all duality. To know God is to make oneself identical with God. God unites with Himself the man who knows Him, and this man is not reborn. As regards this life, salvation wins for him who is assured of it unbounded happiness, and death has no more terrors for him.

1 *Mahābhārata*, iii. 2. 40.
2 *Ib.* iii. 101. 15.
3 *Ib.* xii. 283. 9 ff.
4 *Ib.* xii. 329. 8.
5 *Ib.* iii. 219. 28.
6 *Ib.* xiv. 51. 29.
7 *Laws of Manu*, vi. 76 f.
8 *Bhagavad-Gītā*, v. 22.
9 *Ib.* iii. 43.
10 *Ib.* v. 24.
11 *Ib.* vi. 5.
12 *Mahābh.* xii. 291. 44.
13 *Bhag.-Gītā*, ii. 70 ff.
14 *Ib.* ix. 15.
15 *Ib.* xviii. 20.
16 *Ib.* xv. 7.
17 *Ib.* iv. 35.
18 *Ib.* v. 18.
19 *Ib.* vi. 30.

The great Vaiṣṇavite and Saivite sects are, quite as much as Sikhism, impregnated with theosophy. Their appearance is in itself evidence of an individualism in revolt against the excessive pressure of a religious tradition. Those who assert the authority of the Vedas are ridiculed. The framework in which the divine is placed is broken; no great importance is any longer attached to the name which the gods bear—Śiva or Viṣṇu, the label is different, but it is always the same god. The human framework is also broken; the religious value of caste is denied, and all men are called to salvation. The distinction between the sacred and the profane is abolished. Generally the first concern of the reformers is to put Sanskrit on one side in favour of an exclusive use of the popular language.

'The whole world for me,' says Nānak, 'is a sacred enclosure. Whoever loves the truth is pure.' 'All food and drink which come from God are pure.'[1]

The mechanical and the excessively ritualistic elements in the old religion are removed. Religion tends to become more human, more closely connected with ordinary life; the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has already expressed something approaching a sentiment of human solidarity, then an idea new in India. Moreover, religious tolerance becomes almost universal. Royal inscriptions prove that Brāhmanism, Jainism, Buddhism, Saivism, and Vaiṣṇavism have their representatives in the same families, and the sovereigns extend their favours to all the communities. Is it not clear that religion has become an affair of the individual, and that the son is not in this respect bound to follow the example of his father?

Unfortunately the sects which were originally the boldest very soon fall into the old errors, or, rather, a new tradition, also altogether tyrannical, is established in place of the ancient tradition; or, still more frequently, the older safeguards are restored and most weighty concessions are made to the prevailing ideas. The popular language takes on, in its turn, a sacred character. Caste and restrictions about food recover all their influence. One returns to the old formalism and to the grosser superstitions; and the work of reform, to which men constantly address themselves, has always to be done over again.

Their admission into the popular religions was not a clear gain for theosophical ideas. They remain in the outer courts, in an altogether subordinate position. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* everything that is merely a heritage from the past, a survival, is theosophical. The elements which are truly living and fruitful are of an entirely different origin. The religious emotion and the fervour of feeling which spring up in hearts full of adoration do not come from the *Upaniṣads* or their derivatives. Far from celebrating the triumph of theosophic ideas in India, the sectarian writings rather indicate their failure, since they make salvation depend on the love and grace of a personal and transcendent God.

4. [Theosophy and ancient Indian philosophy.—In dealing with the introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions we have been tracing what might be described as a waning of the influence of theosophy. In the *Gītā* and in the sectarian writings theosophical elements are largely overlaid by materials gathered from other sources. But the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of theosophical teaching. This is to a great extent connected with an incursion of influences from the West and especially with the teachings of Madame Blavatsky and Mrs. Besant. The authority of Madame Blavatsky has been largely discredited, but Mrs. Besant is still a living force and her followers are numerous. Indeed India can claim a larger number of theosophists than any other country in the world. The latest available report (1917) shows 385 Indian lodges, with a total of 7344 members, among whom are some outstanding personalities. Their literary activity is great, at least in quantity, and the flow of publications from the headquarters at Adyar, near Madras, is unceasing and influential. The implicit influence of theosophical ideas is even more important than that which is explicitly allowed, and theosophical literature is frequently to be found in the hands of thinking men who would disclaim any connexion with a theosophical society. The popularity of theosophy is not, however, always due to purely theosophical causes.

Theosophy in India glories in having no creed, and thus claims to appeal to men of all creeds and to interpret for them the hidden values of their respective religions. But, though it is without a creed, theosophy has a threefold aim which is stated by Mrs. Besant, as follows:

(1) 'To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity . . .; (2) to encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; (3) to investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.'[1]

The popularity of theosophy at the present time in India is largely due to a judicious combination of those three aims. Unless we give a very wide interpretation to the term, the two first are not particularly theosophical, but they are universally acceptable, and they thus strengthen the appeal of the third—the only properly theosophical enterprise. The first aim affords an opportunity for an easy transition from religious to political activity and a reinforcement of the former through the popularity of the latter. The second sets itself in seemingly attractive opposition to the harsh judgments of certain apologists for particular religions, and appeals to that specious liberality of mind which finds expression in the oft-repeated assertion that one religion is as good as another. It calls forth the retrospective tendency which seems to be inherent in all theosophy and thus enables theosophy to serve itself as the heir of the ages. Emphasis is laid upon the idea of a hidden tradition which is traced through the magic of mediæval Europe, through the lore of the Knights Templar and the mystics, through Freemasonry and the speculations of alchemists and astrologers, until the ultimate source is postulated in the Great White Brotherhood, a vague and indefinite society which Madame Blavatsky alleges to have existed from time immemorial in the mountains of Tibet and to have delegated one of their number to act as her Master during a period of many years. This mystic brotherhood is believed still to have operative power and to have charge not only of the education and development of the human race, but also of cosmic evolution. Their doctrines embody the truths which are said to be at the basis of all religions, but, on investigating the matter more closely, we find that they are in a very special manner the fundamental principles of Indian thought. Theosophy thus gives a universal importance to Indian philosophical speculation and in so doing inevitably enhances its popularity in India. It levies contributions from all the more important Indian systems, taking from the *Upaniṣads* the doctrine of a fundamental unknowable and characterless Unity, and the identity of the human and the divine; from the Sāṅkhya the idea that spiritual advancement consists in a gradual detachment from the processes of the phenomenal world; from Buddhism the idea of *karma* and transmigration; and from Yoga the conception of various occult methods by which freedom of thought and

[1] Cf. M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, i. 243; cf. i. 43.

[1] *Theosophy* ('People's Books'), London, n.d. [1912], p. 89.

spirit may be won. Further, by an application of its ideas of graded being and of development extended over many generations, it is able to allow a moderate amount of justification even to the grosser forms of the popular religions, and thus carry farther the process of infusing theosophical ideas into the cults of the people which, as pointed out, had but moderate success in earlier centuries.

As in Indian philosophy generally, so in theosophy the ultimate Being is an unknown and unknowable ground of all things, acquiring character as a Logos with the triple functions of will, wisdom, and activity. This differentiates itself into the human monads, having a similar triplicity. The human monad descends through various grades of being until it reaches the causal body, which has also a slightly lower mental aspect, uniting it with the grades of being of which even an ordinary man may be aware, and forming the basis of personality as we know it. The mental body has as its appropriate sphere the heavenly world, but the soul as it proceeds downwards enters also the astral world or the world of emotion and desire, and finally reaches the physical world. Over and over again there is incarnation reaching downwards ultimately to the physical world, and in each incarnation new experiences are obtained, leading, if rightly used, to the development of the soul. The supreme aim of the soul is to rise upwards to its original source, and the degree of ascent will be proportionate to the use it has made of the experiences of each incarnation. The working of the law of *karma* is inexorable. A man will receive the fruit of the deeds done in the body, and according to his good or his evil will be the duration of the period spent on each plane before another incarnation takes place. The aim of the whole process is to get rid of the separating sheaths of personality and reach absorption in the Absolute.

Theosophy is thus definitely committed to the doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration, with, on the one hand, its plausible explanation of the inequalities of human life, its stern insistence on moral consequences, its distant prospect of negative salvation, and, on the other hand, its ethical weakness arising out of its tendency to fatalism and encouragement of procrastination, and its lonely outlook as it traces the succeeding phases of individual development and promises reunion with those we love only in a 'togetherness' of absorption in which the definite character which was the object of our love altogether disappears.

The doctrines of theosophy claim a scientific basis in experience, but this experience is found to be very different from the experience of the ordinary man. It is dependent on the development of our latent powers, by the use of which we may acquire that knowledge which is already possessed by the masters of the human race, the adepts or initiates, and which may give to us a wonderful penetration into the hitherto undiscovered laws of nature. It is at this point that theosophy differentiates itself most completely from philosophy. Once make the initial assumption that the operation of these powers is possible and that the latent faculties can be exercised, and all is easy. We may attain a wonderful amount of detailed knowledge about the lower at least of the super-physical planes. We may discover, *e.g.*, that even during physical life the astral body projects a few inches beyond our physical body, and that it is shaped like an egg; also that various astral bodies are formed by the vibrations of thought and desire, the vibrations of unselfish affection producing bodies of pale rose colour, intellectual effort resulting in yellow bodies, devotional feeling in blue, etc. We may discover also facts on a higher ethical level—*e.g.*, that our prayers produce beings functioning as guardian angels and that our thoughts eventuate in actual astral existences, fulfilling the purposes into which our vague wishes would have been transformed, had opportunity waited upon our desires. In short, with an almost total disregard of the law of parsimony and of the rule against the multiplication of entities, we may explain many of the mysteries of our present life and many of the hitherto unexplained problems of nature by simply transferring the difficulty to a higher plane and 'discovering' beings personally responsible for what previously appeared to be a mysterious occurrence. It is at least doubtful whether modern theosophy in India distinguishes sufficiently between subjective imagination and the controlling power of objective facts, and this considerably lessens the force of the rebuke which it administers to our materialism, diminishes the value of its insistence upon the power of thought and prayer, and weakens its encouragement to explore farther than has yet been done the phenomena of spiritualism and telepathy as well as the more weighty experiences of the mystics of all ages.]

Conclusion.—The history of theosophical ideas, far more than that of religious ideas, allows us to establish the spiritual unity and continuity of India. Moreover, we have here an excellent field of observation for any one who wishes to know the meaning of theosophy, its principles, its aspirations, its method, and its influence upon life. With the idea that Indian theosophy is typical of this form of thought, we shall rapidly pass in review its principal characteristics.

(*a*) The most obvious quality is its concentration on the self, which not only occupies the first place in its scheme of thought, but also concerns itself with the Ego as if it were the only existence—as if everything else existed only for it and in reference to it. This theosophical individualism is both proud and exclusive. The vulgar intelligences, concerned with superstitions and traditional practices, are despised, and with jealous care the precious truth is guarded for a small number of the elect. 'There is nothing in common between popular religion and knowledge.'[1] As if to show clearly the existence of a double current in religious thought, a verse in the *Mahābhārata*[2] says that the gods, women, and the worlds have only one divinity, one *guru* only, but that the Brāhmans have two, Agni and Brahman, the god of sacrifice and the Being without a second.

(*b*) It is always flattering to belong to a privileged group; esotericism was an attractive element in theosophy. And there were others. Those who were terrified by threatening death and mysterious destiny, those who were shocked by the spectacle of physical and social injustice, found in the doctrine of *karma*, *saṁsāra*, and *mokṣa* just the solution fitted to give them moral serenity and courage to live. All the theosophical systems teach some way of salvation; they deliver their followers from the painful prospect of a second death, from an interminable series of lives poisoned by the expectation of death.

(*c*) Another advantage: truth is not arrived at slowly and patiently by study and reflexion; it is grasped by sudden internal vision. Once the premisses have been given by intuition, a rigorous dialectic can construct a system whose scientific appearance has an element of attractiveness for persistently intellectualistic minds eager to 'know.'

(*d*) The intuitive method is not only rapid and apparently trustworthy; it is also very fruitful.

[1] Śaṅkara, *passim*; cf., e.g., *Comm. on the Vedānta-Sūtras*, p. 820.
[2] *Mahābh.*, i. 95. 7.

It reveals that which neither analysis nor induction could discover—the supersensible world. Theosophy thus gives satisfaction to the mystical needs in human nature. Then, when one knows that the sensible world is only an insignificant part of being, and that, side by side with the very limited realm of knowledge, there is an infinite transcendental world, one resigns oneself easily to the most glaring logical impossibilities.

(*e*) Finally, the laws of material nature are not valid except for material bodies. Theosophy has been also a discipline of sublimation and dematerialization. Marvellous perceptions and an indefinite enhancement of intellectual and active powers are also privileges which India has always held in the highest esteem.

If now we ask what theosophy in fact did for individual and social life in India, we shall see that it has had some results which are excellent and others which are harmful. On more than one occasion it has vindicated the rights of the individual and struggled against authorities altogether dependent upon tradition. Theoretically at least, it has placed itself outside of social distinctions. It has made salvation a personal affair of the individual. It has opened the eyes of men to the foolishness of their futile occupations and the vanity of sensual pleasures and temporal possessions. It has taught them to seek for happiness in the contemplative life and in peace of heart. But it has also taught contempt of the ordinary life and of finite existence. It has ignored the possibility of progress in human affairs. It has been a school of pessimism. Its followers have searched for the absolute and the whole, when life can give only the relative and the partial. They have thought it possible to arrive by a leap at truth, when in fact nothing has really been secured by this intuitive method and everything has to be begun over again. It has lowered the dignity of virtue by making it a means and not an end. In condemning action and individualizing salvation, it has shown itself dangerously anti-social. Frequently, it is true, these bitter fruits have not been produced, for it has, on occasion, neglected its fundamental principles. Buddhism, *e.g.*, has preached the highest virtues without making them the instruments of salvation. This is intelligible, for in Buddhism, side by side with theosophy, there is a large dose of humanity.

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PAUL OLTRAMARE.

[Additions in brackets by W. S. URQUHART.]

THERAPEUTÆ.—The Therapeutæ[1] were a radical offshoot of the movement in pre-Christian Judaism which threw up an order like the Essenes (*q.v.*); but, unlike the Essenes, they were purely an Egyptian phenomenon, a religious confraternity, or θίασος, residing in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, and particularly on the low hills to the south of Lake Mareotis, leading the life of studious recluses and organized on semi-monastic lines. Outside Egypt, indeed outside this district, they are never heard of. They were a local development.

1. Source of information.—The only authority for the subject is a short treatise *de Vita Contemplativa* (περὶ βίου θεωρητικοῦ ἢ ἱκετῶν [ἀρετῶν], or, better, Φίλωνος ἱκέται ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν τόδ'), included in the works of Philo. It is first quoted by Eusebius.[2] The rise of the monastic movement in the Church drew his attention, and evidently the attention of others, to a tractate which offered striking precedents and parallels for the cœnobitic discipline of Christians, and the general opinion came to be that the Therapeutæ were really Christian monks. This anachronism can be traced from Eusebius and Epiphanius onwards; it flourished right down to the beginning of the 18th cent., when the French scholar, B. de Montfaucon, published his *Livre de Philon de la vie contemplative, etc., traduit sur l'original grec, avec observations, où l'on fait voir que les Thérapeutes dont il parle étoient Chrestiens* (Paris, 1709). So completely had the Therapeutæ been identified with the origin of Christian monachism that even by the 6th cent. *vita therapeutica* had become the Latin equivalent of ἀσκητικὸς βίος.

This unhistorical interpretation did one service; it preserved the Philonic treatise. But it was responsible for vehement discussion between Protestants and Roman Catholics—discussion which was so prejudiced that it threw next to no light upon the Therapeutæ (except, of course, to disprove the Eusebian ecclesiastical contention); it was also responsible for an avenging scepticism in the 19th century. To suppose,[3] on the evidence of Eusebius and Jerome,[4] that Philo re-visited Rome c. A.D. 44, was impressed or converted by St. Peter, and returned to join this ascetic community of St. Mark's Christian converts near Alexandria, was to expose the *de Vita Contemplativa* to unjust suspicion in a more critical age. The naive theory provoked an equally naive scepticism. It is not creditable, but it is hardly surprising, to find that in the 19th cent. the Therapeutæ were almost blotted out of existence. Some Jewish scholars, especially Graetz,[5] seemed as anxious to disavow any connexion with the poor Therapeutæ as Roman Catholics were to dub them monks; they attempted to rid Judaism of these recluses by relegating them to the 3rd cent. A.D. as Christian monks, the treatise being assigned to some Encratitic, semi-heretical source. Other writers[6] also dated the *de Vita Contemplativa* in that period, although they more prudently regarded it as a Jewish sketch of some ideal, ascetic community. It was reserved for P. E. Lucius[7] to twist the stray threads of this scepticism into a stout denial that the Therapeutæ had ever existed except in the imagination of a Christian c. A.D. 300, who ingeniously used Philo's name and authority to create a monastic community in the first half of the 1st cent. A.D. This aberration of criticism carried away many writers great and small. French and English scholarship, however, came to the rescue, in L. Massebieau's study,[8] Renan's decisive judgment,[9] and F. C. Conybeare's work.[10] P. Wendland reinforced the defence,[11] and the historical authenticity of the

[1] See *ERE* viii. 782[b].

[2] *HE* ii. 17, ii. 18. 7.

[3] As the *de Vit. Con.* was indubitably Philo's, the only logical way of explaining this panegyric on Christian monks was to make Philo himself a Christian when he wrote it.

[4] *de Vir. Ill.* 8.

[5] *GVI*[2] iii. [1863] 463 f.

[6] *E.g.*, M. Nicolas, *RThPh*, 3rd ser., vi. [1868] 25-52, and A. Kuenen, *The Religion of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1874-75, iii. 217-223.

[7] *Die Therapeuten und ihre Stellung in der Geschichte der Askese: eine kritische Untersuchung der Schrift: De vita contemplativa*, Strassburg, 1879.

[8] 'Le Traité de la vie contemplative et la question des Thérapeutes,' *RHR* xvi. [1887] 170-198.

[9] *Journal des Savants*, 1892, pp. 83-96, as already, *ib.* 1874, p. 798 f.

[10] *Philo about the Contemplative Life, or the Fourth Book of the Treatise concerning Virtues: critically edited, with a Defence of its Genuineness*, Oxford, 1895.

[11] *Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift von beschaulichen Leben: ein Beitrag zur Gesch. des hellenistischen Judenthums*, Leipzig, 1896.

treatise was finally vindicated. Whether it was composed by Philo or by some contemporary Jew is another and a subordinate question. The important point is that the treatise is a pre-Christian or non-Christian description of actual recluses in the Judaism of Egypt about the end of the 1st cent. B.C. or the opening of the 1st cent. A.D. Conybeare's edition is the standard authority on the Greek text. His translation[1] is followed in this article. Both he and Massebieau have made out a good case for the hypothesis that the *de Vita Contemplativa* originally was a sequel to the lost Philonic account of the Essenes in the ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Ἰουδαίων, from which Eusebius drew his information. But their interpretation of details in the account of the Therapeutæ is sometimes open to serious criticism.

2. Characteristics.—According to Philo, the Therapeutæ are part of a movement which is known outside Egypt[2]—the more or less organized semi-philosophical, semi-religious retreat from cities and a corrupting civilization to the simple life of retirement. Though the movement is not confined to the environs of Alexandria, it is there that the Therapeutæ are most numerous.[3]

They are Jewish recluses who reside in simple huts, at a short and suitable distance from one another (*i.e.*, they resembled the cœnobites of Pachomius in a later day, instead of being hermits and anchorites). Each hut has a sacred chamber (μονήρειον or μοναστήριον σεμνεῖον), reserved for their sacred books (the Law, the Prophets, the Psalms, and other writings, οἷς ἐπιστήμη καὶ εὐσέβεια συναύξονται καὶ τελειοῦνται, 'by means of which religion and sound knowledge grow together into a perfect whole'). After praying at dawn, they devote the day to meditation upon the Scriptures; these include writings or commentaries (συγγράμματα) 'drawn up by the ancient founders of their sect,' by which Philo probably means the literature current under the names of men like Enoch and Abraham, whom he regarded as the primeval ascetics and recluses, the ideal progenitors of the Therapeutic movement. The method of study is allegorical interpretation (τὴν πάτριον φιλοσοφίαν ἀλληγορούντες), and one outcome of it is the composition of sacred hymns. Prayers at sunset close the day. Such is the life in each hut.[4] On the seventh day the various members meet for common worship; they arrange themselves according to age, sitting on the ground with 'the right hand between the chest and the chin, but the left tucked down along the flank.' The senior recluse then delivers an address, to which all listen in silence, merely nodding assent. A partition, ten or twelve feet high, separates the men from the women, so that the latter can hear the speaker without being seen by the male recluses.

The seventh day[5] is their day for relaxation. On the other days no one eats before sunset, and some go fasting almost entirely for three or even six days, in their contemplative raptures. But all use oil (as a physical refreshment, unlike the Essenes[6]), and on the seventh day all 'propitiate the mistresses hunger and thirst, which nature has set over mortal creatures'; the diet is simply water and cheap bread, flavoured with salt, and occasionally supplemented by hyssop. None[7] of your drunken Greek symposia! Philo anticipates Lucian in his scorn of these rowdy gatherings.

Once every seven weeks[8] they assemble for their supreme festival, 'which the number fifty has had assigned to it,'[9] robed in white and with looks of serious joy. At a given sign from one of their leaders they arrange themselves in ranks, raising eyes and hands to heaven ('their hands, because they are pure from unjust gains, being stained by no pretence of money-making') and praying for a blessing on the festival. Then the senior members recline, in order of seniority, upon their cheap, rough couches; on the left side of the room the women also recline. The younger novices wait upon the older members, for the Therapeutæ (like the Essenes)[1] decline to be served by slaves; 'they deem any possession of servants whatever to be contrary to nature,' which makes all alike free at birth. It is not a banquet of luxuries; no wine, only cold water, heated for those who are delicate; no meat—for the Therapeutæ are vegetarians, living on nothing but bread and salt, with hyssop for the more delicate palates, the hyssop being added 'out of reverence for the holy table of offering in the sacred vestibule of the temple,'[2] to signify that the Therapeutæ are too humble to emulate the unleavened bread reserved for the priests. But, before this Spartan meal is eaten, a quiet address or allegorical exposition of Scripture is delivered by the president. The rest listen in breathless silence; but, if the speaker does not make his meaning clear, they are allowed to indicate their perplexity by a slight movement of the head and a right-hand finger. When he is considered to have spoken long enough, all clap their hands three times. A hymn then follows, sometimes composed in honour of God by the singer (cf. 1 Co 14[26]), 'either a new one which he has made himself, or some old one of the poets that were long ago.' Each member has to sing a hymn in rotation, while the rest join in the chorus. Only after this religious service of an address and praise—nothing is said of prayer[3]—does the banquet proceed.

The final act of the festival[4] is the famous παννυχίς, or all-night celebration of a sacred singing dance,[5] by men and women in two choruses, each headed by a chosen leader. Each of the choirs, the male and the female, begins by singing and dancing apart, partly in unison, partly in antiphonal measures of various metres, 'as if it were a Bacchic festival in which they had drunk deep of the divine love.' Then both unite to imitate the choral (Ex 15[1. 20-22]) songs of Moses and Miriam[6] at the Red Sea, sung as thanks εἰς τὸν σωτῆρα θεόν (cf. Rev 15[3]). It is a thrilling performance, this choric dance and exulting symphony; 'but the end and aim' of it all 'is holiness' (the exodus symbolizing, of course, the mystical release of the soul from material bondage). Instead of being drowsy after this all-night ecstasy, the Therapeutæ are more wide-awake in the morning than they were at the beginning of their vigil; they turn to the East, 'and, so soon as they espy the sun rising, they stretch out aloft their hands to heaven and fall to praying[7] 'for a fair day, and for truth and for clear judgment to see with.' Then they separate to resume the ordinary day's contemplation in their separate cells.

Such, says Philo, is the method of life practised by these true 'citizens of heaven and of the universe.' The term 'citizens' is deliberately chosen. They abjure cities, he means, but none the less, indeed all the more on that account, these recluses belong to a higher polity.

3. Religious significance.—A complete renunciation of the world, resembling that demanded by Jesus in Lk 18[29], lay at the foundation of the Therapeutic society. What they abjured was money rather than matter. In the austerity of their zeal they voluntarily handed over their property to others,[8] since absorption in money-making and the cares of life not only took up too much time and thought but also fostered injustice. Having divested themselves of their possessions, 'they flee without turning back, having abandoned brethren, children, wives, parents, all the throng of their kindred, all their friendships with companions, yea, their countries in which they were born and bred.'[9] Philo describes this with a wistful enthusiasm, as he had described the renunciation of Enoch[10] and of Abraham.[11] But he is careful to explain why they prefer solitude to cities. It is only because intercourse with the unsympathetic world would injure them, 'not from any harsh and deliberate hatred of mankind'—a disclaimer[12]

[1] In *JQR* vii. [1895] 755–769.

[2] Philo is trying not only, as he does elsewhere, to show that the recluse tendency is Greek as well as Jewish, but to link the Therapeutæ to the wide-spread phenomenon of *cultores dei* (*deorum*), as their name of 'devotees' (θεραπευταί) permitted. In this way he seeks to interpret them to his readers, just as he had already (*de Vit. Con.* 1–2) contrasted them with the inferior 'philosophers' of Greece on the one hand, and with the silly Egyptian worshippers of animals on the other. His attempt to explain θεραπευταί as possibly meaning 'healers' of the soul is equally unhistorical. So far as it is not the official title of the community, it means what it meant in the case of the Essenes, whom Philo himself had called θεραπευταὶ θεοῦ. The variant title ἱκέται meant 'supplicants.'

[3] *De Vit. Con.* 3.

[4] So constant is their sense of God's presence that even in their dreams they have visions of nothing but the divine ἀρετῶν καὶ δυνάμεων, while many men talk in their sleep of what they have been studying.

[5] *De Vit. Con.* 4.

[6] Cf. *ERE* v. 398ᵃ.

[7] *De Vit. Con.* 5–7.

[8] *Ib.* 8.

[9] This seems to have been a festival, partly modelled on the five weeks or pentecostal type (for here as elsewhere the Therapeutæ show distinct affinities with Palestine) but celebrated seven times a year, at the expiry of every 49 (7 × 7) days. On the resemblances between this periodical festival and the Feast of Weeks in the book of Jubilees see A. Epstein in *REJ* xxii. [1891] 14 f., 20 f., as well as on the similar institution among the Abyssinian Jews (Falasha).

[1] *ERE* v. 396ᵇ.

[2] *De Vit. Con.* 9.

[3] Is this omission accidental? Or was prayer regarded as a part of private devotion (cf. *ERE* x. 191ᵇ)?

[4] *De Vit. Con.* 10.

[5] A trait of popular religious worship in Egypt (cf. *ERE* v. 238ᵃ; and, generally, x. 359ᵃ).

[6] Miriam, in some quarters of early mystical literature, is the counterpart of Isis, and she plays an important rôle in Gnostic speculations, as Reitzenstein points out (*Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 136 n.). Her popularity among the Therapeutæ is probably another Egyptian touch.

[7] Lightfoot (*Saint Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon*[7], London, 1884, pp. 85, 372) took this to mean sun-worship; but the Therapeutæ did not practise sun-worship any more than the Essenes did (see *ERE* v. 398ᵃ, note 4).

[8] Unlike the Essenes, and the primitive Christians (Ac 2[45]), with whom Eusebius (*HE* ii. 17) would fain connect them on this account, the Therapeutæ did not pool their funds for the benefit of the community.

[9] *De Vit. Con.* 2.

[10] *De Præm. et Poen.* 3.

[11] *De Abrah.* 3.

[12] He had made the same disclaimer of misanthropy in speaking of Abraham (*de Abrah.* 4).

of the *odium humani generis* for which Jews were blamed by the outside world. Philo always protested against the people who withdrew into seclusion, simply because they lacked public spirit. He also anticipated the criticism which might be passed on the Therapeutæ, that they acted from a morbid misanthropy. Hence his defence and admiration of them. The Therapeutæ, in fact, realize for Philo what he had always dreamt of, a small (only a small) number or θίασοι of spiritual athletes, acting from the highest of motives, carrying out a counsel of perfection, and capable of making the supreme renunciation in order to attain the highest vision of God and truth.[1] To them he applies his favourite Platonic metaphor of the wealth with eyes (*i.e.* the mystic rapture of the soul enriched with the vision of truth); no wonder, when they possess this inward treasure, that they abandon their blind wealth (τὸν τυφλὸν πλοῦτον)[2] to blind worldlings! For their renunciation does not empty life. It is not a mere negation; it is the soul surrendering to a higher passion for God (ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἁρπασθέντες οὐρανίου), which enriches life past dreams of avarice. The Therapeutæ are recluses and students, but their spirit is an ecstatic yearning for the positive vision of Truth. 'It is as easy to close the eyes of the mind, as those of the body,' Bishop Butler wrote;[3] it is still more easy, Philo felt, to let the eyes of the mind be closed by luxury and money-making, and he applauds the Therapeutæ for sacrificing their great possessions and position in order to keep the higher vision unimpaired.

Another feature of the Therapeutæ which goes to Philo's heart is that their allegorical interpretation of the OT does not render them indifferent to the actual rites and institutions of Judaism. He disliked the ultra-spiritualists[4] who evaporated the historical element in religion, and dropped all adherence to the forms of their faith. But he delighted in people like the Therapeutæ who, *e.g.*, attached, as he did, in his own enthusiasm, a high mystical sense to the number 'seven,' and yet not only kept the seventh day strictly but also celebrated a special festival after every 49 days, out of their reverence for that perfect number and its multiple (7 × 7). This appeared to him to be a healthy form of mysticism. The Therapeutæ appealed to Philo more than the Essenes did, because they were on old Jewish lines, adherents of the Mosaic law, respectful to the Temple at Jerusalem, and capable of attaining the heights of contemplative ecstasy without abandoning the lowly duties prescribed by the Torah.

A third feature which evidently pleased the gentle Philo was their freedom from angry controversy and flashy rhetoric. With his eye not only upon the quarrels of Greek sages at their symposia but also upon the rabbinic disputants at Jerusalem, he tells of the unostentatious style practised by the Therapeutic speakers, of the rapt attention shown by the audience, and of the respectful demeanour of the gathering—exalting the very virtues which Paul recommended to the showy, noisy Christians at Corinth (cf. 1 Co 14[26ff.]). Philo loves them for their quiet demeanour. The Therapeutæ never wasted their time over rabbinic exegesis of the letter of Scripture. They gazed placidly through that, as through a glass, into the mystical significance which held them spellbound. Their wisdom was pure and peaceable; it combined plain living and high thinking, and the sages never lost their tempers.

All this, added to their philosophic aspirations and their distaste for luxury, moved Philo to write his panegyric. He professes that it is nothing but the bare truth. Certainly it is not a Defoe-like work of fiction. At the same time, his enthusiasm probably leads him to idealize the Therapeutæ; a disproportionate amount of space is surrendered to a scornful criticism of the Greek symposia, in which Plato as well as Xenophon is censured; and he forgets to explain how the Therapeutæ lived, if they did no work and held no property. Did they depend, like Buddhists, on charity? It is one of the questions which Philo forgets to answer. The main outline of the sketch, however, has all the marks of accuracy. Though he was not a member of the community, it was so near to Alexandria that he could easily have heard of its life and even visited it. His admiration may have heightened the colours, but it did not invent the content, of his delineation. The tone of his account resembles that in which Izaak Walton, in his biography of George Herbert, speaks of the little settlement of recluses at Little Gidden, under the spiritual guidance of Nicholas Ferrar.

The Therapeutæ were organized on lines resembling the later *lauras* of monasticism in Egypt, *i.e.* in a group or encampment of separate residences, with a common hall for special gatherings; they lived in huts, set close enough for fellowship and for mutual protection against an attack of robbers (which was a common experience of such communities). Plainly, they acted in self-defence when occasion required. The differences between them and the Essenes are patent. The Therapeutæ confined themselves to a life of contemplation; they were a small community of men and women who had been well-born and wealthy,[1] and who lived in a Chartreuse-like retreat; they were not religious communists, and they had no interest in prophecy (their dreams being not of the future but of the celestial order); they fasted, as the Essenes did not, and their relation to women was quite different. Both the Therapeutæ and the Essenes were 'holiness' movements, but the former displayed some unique features, especially the combination of individual contemplation with a periodical outburst of emotional fervour in the common song and dance.

Nothing is known of their history. They are one of the local, transient phenomena of the age that baffle modern curiosity. A single ray of light falls on this tiny community, at the bridge between B.C. and A.D., but we do not know who founded them or what became of them. Philo's description was never followed up by any subsequent writer. Gibbon[2] thought it 'probable that they changed their name, preserved their manners, adopted some new articles of faith, and gradually became the fathers of the Egyptian Ascetics.' This is guess-work, however. A community which was recruited like the Therapeutæ could not survive like the Essenes; so much is clear; and Therapeutism probably was an ephemeral product, an anticipation rather than an ancestor of the later Christian monasticism in Egypt. Abraham E. Harkawy, the Petrograd scholar, in his edition of Kirkisāni, the 10th cent. Karaite savant,[3] points out that Kirkisāni includes among the Jewish sects one called the Margārites, to whom the 'Alexandrine' belonged; this sect practised allegorical interpretation, as a rule abjured laughing, and were called Margārites, or 'cave-folk.' Harkawy identifies the 'Alexandrine' with Philo, and the Margārites with the Therapeutæ, as a branch of the Essenes—a view shared by Bacher,[4] but doubted by Poznański.[5] It seems an interesting, if vague, recollection of the Therapeutæ, lingering in the Judaism which had surrendered its interest in these recluses to the Christian Church.

4. Compositions.—The Therapeutæ were not only ascetics but also students; yet no trace of their literature has survived. (*a*) The λόγος, or hymn, coloured by Jewish Hellenism, which is discussed by A. Dieterich,[6] has been sometimes assigned to them. But it shows euhemeristic syncretism; there is nothing specifically Therapeutic about its language or ideas, and, although it does refer to the rescue of Israel from the Red Sea, this is too general to serve as an identification-mark for the choric song of the Therapeutæ (see above). The Therapeutæ are less analogous to the circle of this hymn than an anticipation of the Encratites (*q.v.*) in their aversion to marriage and their avoidance of wine and animal food.

1 Cf., e.g., *de Mut. Nom.* 4.
2 *De Vit. Con.* 2.
3 *Sermons* (ed. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896), x. § 13.
4 Cf. *ERE* i. 310b.

1 ἀνθρώποις εὐγενέσι καὶ ἀστείοις (*de Vit. Con.* 9).
2 *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xv. note 163.
3 *Memoirs of the Oriental Section of the Archæological Society at St. Petersburg*, viii. [1894] 247–319.
4 *JQR* vii. 703.
5 *REJ* l. [1905] 19–23.
6 *Abraxas*, Leipzig, 1891, pp. 138 *f.*, 145 *f.*

(*b*) Nor is the book of Wisdom distinctively Therapeutic, as some[1] thought.

The emphasis on ὅσιος and on ὁσιότης, rather than on the more outward εὐσέβεια, certainly suggests that Wisdom emanated from some inner circle or set of Jewish pietists, but there are no indications that point decisively to the Therapeutæ, not even the casual use of θεραπεύειν in 10[8.16], 31[37], is not in praise of celibacy, and, even if it were, the tendency to exalt celibacy in the later Judaism was not confined to the ascetic cohabitation of the sexes among the Therapeutæ.[2] 4[7-9] simply echoes the common reflexion that life is measured by its content of wisdom, not by length of years; it has nothing particularly to do with the Therapeutic regulation[3] that seniority was reckoned by the years spent within the society. The allusion in 7[26]-8[2] to the wise man being wedded to Wisdom (τὸν σοφίᾳ συνοικοῦντα . . . ταύτην ἐφίλησα καὶ . . . ἐζήτησα νυμφην ἀγαγέσθαι ἐμαυτῷ) resembles the description of the nun-like recluses in the *de Vita Contemplativa*, 8 (for the most part 'aged virgins, that have preserved intact their chastity . . . because of their zeal and longing for Wisdom; with whom they were anxious to live,' in order to bring forth not mortal children but 'the immortal progeny which the God-enamoured soul is alone able to bring forth of itself').[4] But this metaphorical description applies in the one case to men, in the other to women, and it is too general and common (cf., *e.g.*, Sir 15[2], Pr 2[17]) to be confined to the Therapeutæ; in *de Vita Contemplativa*, 8, Philo is speaking as he speaks elsewhere.[5] Finally, the Therapeutic custom of offering prayer at sunrise (see above) was not peculiar to them among the Jews, so that Wis 16[28] ('one should be before the sun in giving thanks to thee, and one should plead with thee at the dawning of light') need not be a glimpse of these recluses—the less so, that nothing is said about their eastward position by the writer of Wisdom, who is simply moralizing about the story of the manna.

5. Origin.—In view of the various Oriental and Hellenistic influences which were playing upon the later Judaism towards the close of the 1st cent. B.C., a phenomenon like the existence of the Therapeutæ, with their celibacy, their aversion to social life, their absorption in a divine θεραπεία, and their mystical speculations, all carried out 'in accordance with the most holy counsels of the prophet Moses,'[6] is not altogether surprising.

'The societies of the Essenes and the Therapeutæ . . . belong, just as the mediæval and modern Hassidic asceticisms belong, to Judaism quite as much as do any of its more normal institutions.'[7]

It is still less surprising to find such a gild or monastic settlement in Egypt. The soil of Egyptian popular religion was full of 'monastic germs'; there were men and women recluses in the Serapeum at Memphis, whose θεράπευσις embraced both study and mystical dreams; the very name of θεραπευταί was connected with the worship of Isis,[8] which also had its mystic raptures, combined with an emphasis on asceticism and celibacy; the climate itself, and the gaunt deserts, stretching away from the cities and townships, invited those who had recluse tendencies. It was in Egypt that the monastic movement of the Church first developed its varied and most distinctive forms three centuries later, and the development was no more surprising upon the basis of primitive Christianity than that of the Therapeutæ or of the Essenes upon the basis of orthodox Mosaism. One of the most suggestive parallels to the Therapeutic discipline is to be found in the contemporary account of the Egyptian philosopher-priests which is given by Chaeremon, the Egyptian ἱερογραμματεύς. It is quoted by Porphyry,[9] and some sentences deserve to be quoted here for the light they throw upon 'monastic' lines of development in pre-Christian Egypt.

'They chose sanctuaries (ἱερά) as the place in which to study philosophy, since to dwell with the statues of the gods was in harmony with their utter longing for vision (τῆς θεωρίας). Besides, this gave them security, owing to the reverence felt for the gods, since all men honoured these philosophers as if they were sacred creatures. They also lived in solitude, only mixing with other people at the sacred assemblies and festivals. . . . Having renounced every other employment and all human toils (πόνους ἀνθρωπίνους), they gave up the whole of their existence to the contemplation and vision of things divine . . . for to be in constant association with divine knowledge and inspiration delivers men from all lust (πλεονεξίας), subdues the passions, and rouses life to intelligence (σύνεσιν). They were also studious to be frugal in food and clothing. . . . Their hands were always inside their garments. . . . When they were not engaged in purification, they ate bread cut up along with hyssop, as they declared hyssop was extremely potent in purifying bread. . . . They trained themselves to endure hunger and thirst and scanty food through all their life. . . . The day they spent in the worship of the gods (εἰς θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν), singing hymns to them three or four times, at dawn and at eventide.'

The origin of the Therapeutæ lay in Jewish Hellenism, as that was specially affected by its Egyptian environment. Nothing more is required to explain the ascetic and mystical habits of these recluses beside Lake Mareotis. But it would be uncritical to dismiss this problem without some reference to the question which has repeatedly been asked: Do not several traits of the Therapeutic discipline recall Buddhistic monasticism—*e.g.*, the combination of a cœnobitic life with study and devout contemplation, and the vegetarianism? The latter is one of the marks which sharply distinguish the Therapeutæ from the Essenes, who were not vegetarians. But there is at least one feature of the Essenes themselves which is analogous to Indian practices,[1] and it is open to conjecture whether some Buddhistic influence had not penetrated Egyptian Hellenism by the 1st cent. B.C., as it is sometimes held to have penetrated the later Gnosticism.[2]

Robertson Smith,[3] after observing that 'in Egypt, the doctrine that the highest degree of holiness can only be attained by abstinence from all animal food, was the result of the political fusion of a number of local cults in one national religion, with a national priesthood that represented imperial ideas,' added that 'later developments of Semitic asceticism almost certainly stood under foreign influences, among which Buddhism seems to have had a larger and earlier share than it has been usual to admit.'

The Therapeutic avoidance of animal food need not, of course, be Buddhistic; the practice of the Orphic societies in Egypt or of the Neo-Pythagoreanism which affected the Essenes in other ways[4] may account for it as well as for the stress on hymns,[5] the παννυχίς, and some other features. Indeed, so far as our scanty data go, with regard to the Therapeutæ or the Essenes, the evidence does not appear to warrant any hypothesis of direct Buddhistic influence, although the Orientalism which had filtered into Jewish Hellenism, even in Egypt, by the 1st cent. B.C. may have contained some elements of Buddhistic religious tendency. The trade connexions between Alexandria and India, and the intercourse of both countries ever since the 3rd cent. B.C., make it quite possible to suppose that Indian merchants reached Egypt by the 1st cent. B.C. Rohde points this out in another connexion, detailing the Indian and Buddhistic elements in Greek fiction.[6] But the interaction

[1] *E.g.*, Ewald, *The Hist. of Israel*[3], Eng. tr., London, 1880, v. 377, and A. Gfrörer, *Krit. Gesch. des Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart, 1831, ii. 280 f.

[2] *ERE* i. 179; K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911, p. 188 f.

[3] *De Vit. Con.* 8: 'For they do not regard as elders those who can count their years and are merely aged, but, on the contrary, account these to be still mere infants, in case they have been late in embracing the vocation.'

[4] This is the Philo who had written so extraordinarily about Tamar (*Quod Deus immut.* 29).

[5] *E.g.*, in *Cherubim*, 13 f. [6] *De Vit. Con.* 8.

[7] I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Cambridge, 1917, p. 121.

[8] See the Cynicus inscription, *e.g.*, quoted by A. Morditmann, in *RA* xxxvii. [1879] 258 f.

[9] *De Abstin.* iv. 6-8.

[1] Cf. *ERE* v. 398[b], note 5. [2] Cf. ib. ii. 432, vi. 234.

[3] *Rel. of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 302 f.

[4] *ERE* v. 401[a].

[5] This again distinguishes them from the Essenes. C. A. Bugge, in his recent study of the Essenes (*ZNTW* xiv. [1913] 167 f.), argues that the Palestinian Essenes must have cultivated song and music like the Egyptian Therapeutæ; but there is no 'must' about the matter. Had hymns been a prominent feature of the Essenic cultus, they would have been mentioned by Philo or Josephus.

[6] *Der griech. Roman und seine Vorläufer*[2], Leipzig, 1900, p. 581 f.

was not marked.[1] A trait like the presence of the 'nuns' is almost sufficient by itself to justify disagreement with the verdict of Mansel:

'The Therapeutæ . . . appear to have sprung from an union of the Alexandrian Judaism with the precepts and modes of life of the Buddhist devotees, . . . in their ascetic life, in their mortification of the body and their devotion to pure contemplation, we may trace at least a sufficient affinity to the Indian mystics to indicate a common origin.'[2]

On the other hand, even after allowing for the Neo-Pythagorean and Orphic environment, as well as for the fact that certain phenomena of this recluse life spring up independently on any soil at the touch of organized monasticism,[3] we may leave open the possibility that the Therapeutæ and perhaps the Essenes more or less unconsciously developed features which owed their original suggestion to Buddhistic sources. One of the main reasons for hesitating to admit even this possibility is the fact that Buddhistic influence on Gnosticism, two centuries later, appears to be almost unrecognizable, although Gnosticism might be expected to show distinct affinities with this line of Indian religious practice and speculation.

LITERATURE.—Besides what has been noted in the course of the article, the following may be chronicled as among the few significant contributions which the interminable discussions of the subject have thrown up: the notes of H. de Valois (Valesius), the great 17th cent. editor of Eusebius; Thomas Browne, *Dissertatio de Therapeutis Philonis adversus Hen. Valesium*, London, 1695 (Therapeutæ = converts of St. Mark, who afterwards became the monks described by Palladius); two critical letters by J. Bouhier (*Lettres pour et contre, sur la fameuse question, si les solitaires appelés thérapeutes dont a parlé Philon le Juif, étoient chrétiens*, Paris, 1712), which Conybeare calls 'the best commentary on the *de Vita Contemplativa* ever written'; A. F. Gfrörer, *Krit. Gesch. des Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart, 1831, vol. i. pt. 2, pp. 280-299; and A. Neander, *General Hist. of the Christian Religion and Church*, Eng. tr., London, 1850-58, i. 81-85.

None of the older dictionary or encyclopædia articles deserves mention. The main help has been given by critics of Philo—*e.g.*, H. P. Delaunay, *RA* xxii. [1870-71] 268 *f.*, xxvi. [1873] 12 ff., and in *Moines et sibylles dans l'antiquité judéo-grecque*², Paris, 1874, pp. 10-57; B. Tideman, *ThT* v. [1871] 177-188; A. Edersheim, *DCB* iv. 368-371; L. Cohn, *JQR* v. [1893] 38-42; J. Drummond, *ib.* viii. [1896] 155-172 (reviewing Conybeare's ed.); and E. Schürer, *GJV*⁴, iii. 687-691 (still reluctant to give up his scepticism); or by writers like E. Renan, *Hist. du peuple d'Israël*, Paris, 1887-95, v. 366-380; O. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchthum*, Frankfort, 1897, i. 128 *f.*; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*⁴, Leipzig, 1876-1903, III. ii. 377 *f.*; M. Friedländer, *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judenthums im Zeitalter Jesu*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 197 *f.*, 265 *f.*; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im NT Zeitalter*², do. 1906, p. 536 *f.*; E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1908, pp. 321-324; W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity*, London, 1909, p. 63 *f.*; O. Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, Eng. tr., 1906-11, iii. 1-8, 18 *f.*; and H. Leclercq, *DACL* ii. 3063-3075.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THERIANTHROPISM.—See LYCANTHROPY.

THEUDAS.—See MESSIAHS (PSEUDO).

THEURGY.—Theurgy (θεουργία)—the direct working of God—is closely connected with certain systems of mysticism and theosophy. The word itself is not often used by those who claim that supernatural effects are produced through them by divine action; they more often ascribe the miraculous effects to good 'spirits,' whom God uses for His purposes, and they call this system of divine working 'magic,' frequently 'white magic,' as distinguished from 'black magic,' which is supposed to be the work of diabolical spirits. Vaughan has given a good definition of it. He says:

'I would use the term theurgic to characterise the mysticism which claims supernatural powers generally,—works marvels, not like the black art, by help from beneath, but as white magic, by the virtue of talisman or cross, demi-god, angel, or saint. Thus theurgic mysticism is not content, like the theopathetic, with either feeling or proselytising; nor, like the theosophic, with knowing; but it must open for itself a converse with the world of spirits, and win as its prerogative the power of miracle. This broad use of the word makes prominent the fact that a common principle of devotional enchantment lies at the root of all the pretences, both of heathen and of Christian miracle-mongers. The celestial hierarchy of Dionysius and the benign demons of Proclus, the powers invoked by Pagan or by Christian theurgy, by Platonist, by Cabbalist, or by saint, alike reward the successful aspirant with supernatural endowments; and so far Apollonius of Tyana and Peter of Alcantara, Asclepigenia and St. Theresa, must occupy as religious magicians the same province. The error is in either case the same—a divine efficacy is attributed to rites and formulas, sprinklings or fumigations, relics or incantations, of mortal manufacture.'[1]

Some form of belief in theurgy is at least as old as history and literature. Homer's heroes are constantly raised beyond themselves and perform deeds which seem to be done through them by the Olympian divinities who come to their aid. Oriental as well as Grecian mythology everywhere assumes theurgic powers. The eclectic Gnostics, who drew upon many popular religions and sacred books as the sources of their divine *gnosis*, also believed and taught that great divine powers became available to those who were initiated and who thus received something of the fullness—the Pleroma—of the Godhead.

The Neo-Platonists, especially in their later periods, gave new impetus to theurgy and were unwittingly the transmitters of it into Christian circles. Plotinus, the founder of the movement, was a metaphysician of high rank and a noble mystic whose influence on Christian mysticism can hardly be overestimated, but he was not interested in occult knowledge or in theurgic phenomena. His Syrian successors, however, Porphyry and Iamblichus, were concerned with the problem of discovering and applying divine powers or energies in the sphere of human action. Iamblichus, who strongly reveals Gnostic influences, turns the ideas and hypostases of Plotinus into divinities, *i.e.* personified beings, and he holds that these 'intelligences' work wonders in the macrocosm outside and in the microcosm within man. These divine powers come into the soul of the mystic on high occasions, possess it, and enable it to do works beyond human capacity. There are, according to Iamblichus, hierarchal orders of these divine powers in varying ranks, and it belongs to mystical wisdom to know how to invoke the higher and more benign powers and to gain their theurgic assistance. This theurgic system is set forth in Iamblichus' treatise *de Mysteriis*. Proclus, the last important name among the Neo-Platonists, was a much greater philosopher than Iamblichus, but he also expounded a system of theurgy and encouraged belief in hierarchal powers, arranged in triadic orders, who work divinely and mysteriously through those who are raised into union with these higher powers.

Through the Gnostics, through the Neo-Platonists, especially through the Christian Neo-Platonist who wrote under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite, and above all through contact with the pagan world and its wide-spread belief in magic, the Christian Church unconsciously absorbed a multiform faith in theurgy. Angels of many orders, saints who have been glorified, the Virgin Mary and her divine Son, can and do work wonders, it is believed, for faithful worshippers. Water and bread and wine and other elements of nature are by miraculous divine grace transformed into spiritual substances, become, in fact, the real divine presence, and supply to the recipient supernatural powers, which *work* mightily within the soul. Many Roman Catholic saints and many 14th and 15th cent. mystics believed themselves possessed of special theurgic powers. Stigmata of nail-prints were believed to be divinely produced in the hands and feet of Francis of Assisi and of Catharine of Siena. Others had the power to 'levitate' them-

[1] See G. Faber's cautious survey and verdict in his *Buddhistische und Neutestamentliche Erzählungen*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 10-29.

[2] *Gnostic Heresies*, London, 1875, p. 31 *f.*

[3] *ERE* x. 729 *f.*

[1] *Hours with the Mystics*, i. 36.

selves and to soar above the earth in moments of possession. Others had the miraculous gift of shedding tears in extraordinary measure or of emitting fragrant odours from their body in periods of ecstasy, while still others underwent profound physical transformations or radiated light like a self-luminous body. The entire field of theurgic phenomena is thus intimately bound up with the psychology of hysteria and auto-suggestion. Automatism of many types is now scientifically recognized. It seems to the 'subject,' when parts of his own body perform functions without his conscious volition, as though some foreign person had entered and possessed him and were using his hands or his feet or his lips. Where the results are beneficent and constructive, it seems natural to believe that divine power has come to his assistance and is working a miraculous work through him, so that theurgy appears, to persons of this type, to rest upon facts of experience.

An immense revival of theurgy came in with the rise of humanism and during the period when science was emerging from the stage of superstition and pseudo-science. This revival was due, in large measure, to the influence of Neo-Platonism and of the Jewish Ḳabbālā, both of which the early humanists studied with zeal and enthusiasm. Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) gave great prominence to the symbolical, mystical, theurgical Ḳabbālā, and he also glorified the writings of the Neo-Platonists. W. R. Inge quotes the following passage from Pico's *Apology* which illustrates the mental attitude of the first humanists:

'One of the chief charges against me is that I am a magician. Have I not myself distinguished two kinds of magic? One, which the Greeks call γοητεία, depends entirely on alliance with evil spirits, and deserves to be regarded with horror, and to be punished; the other is magic in the proper sense of the word. The former subjects man to the evil spirits, the latter makes them serve him. The former is neither an art nor a science; the latter embraces the deepest mysteries, and the knowledge of the whole of Nature with her powers. While it connects and combines the forces scattered by God through the whole world, it does not so much work miracles as come to the help of working nature. Its researches into the sympathies of things enable it to bring to light hidden marvels from the secret treasure-houses of the world, just as if it created them itself. As the countryman trains the vine upon the elm, so the magician marries the earthly objects to heavenly bodies. His art is beneficial and Godlike, for it brings men to wonder at the works of God, than which nothing conduces more to true religion.'[1]

Reuchlin (1455–1522) carried the study of the Ḳabbālā and of Neo-Platonism still farther and laid the basis for the theurgy and magic which swarm in the writings of Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, Valentine Weigel, and, in a distinctly less degree, Jacob Boehme. All these theosophically-minded thinkers believed that it was possible to come into possession of direct divine wisdom or light and thereby to discover the secret of the universe and to use the secret in marvellous theurgic ways. Reuchlin expressed this view, in 1517, in a passage which is translated in the appendix to the *Three Books of Occult Philosophy by Henry Cornelius Agrippa.*[2] He says:

'God, out of love to his people, has revealed the hidden mysteries to some of them, and these can find in the dead letters the living spirit. For Scripture consists of single letters, visible signs, which stand in a certain connection with the angels as celestial and spiritual emanations from God. By the pronunciation of the one, the others also are affected; but with a true Caballist, who penetrates the whole connection of the earthly with the heavenly, these signs, rightly placed in connection with each other, are a way of putting him into immediate union with the spirits, who through that are bound to satisfy his wishes.'

A still better account of the theurgic operations which are believed to work through those who catch the divine secret and find the light is given in the words of 'J. F.,' who translated Agrippa's *Occult Philosophy* into English in 1651. The passage is in the 'Preface to the Judicious Reader,' and is as follows:

[1] *Christian Mysticism*, p. 269, footnote 2.
[2] Ed. W. F. Whitehead, Chicago and London, 1898, p. 251.

'This is true and sublime Occult Philosophy. To understand the mysterious influences of the intellectual world upon the celestial, and of both upon the terrestrial; and to know how to dispose and fit ourselves so as to be capable of receiving the superior operations of these worlds, whereby we may be enabled to operate wonderful things by a natural power—to discover the secret counsels of men, to increase riches, to overcome enemies, to procure the favour of men, to expel diseases, to preserve health, to prolong life, to renew youth, to foretell future events, to see and know things done many miles off, and such like as these. These things may seem incredible, yet read but the ensuing treatise and thou shalt see the possibility confirmed both by reason and example.'

Once more in modern times there has appeared a recrudescence of theurgy in spiritualistic and theosophical circles. The element of fact in it now, as of old in the days of humanism and of Neo-Platonism, is due to the automatisms, *i.e.* to subliminal action, emerging without the subject of the action being conscious that it is initiated by him. It seems to be done through him and not by him and thus is attributed to God, or to spirits who 'possess' him.

LITERATURE.—Jules Simon, *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1844–45; E. Vacherot, *Hist. critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, 3 vols., do. 1846–51; *Theurgia: or, The Egyptian Mysteries, by Iamblicos*, tr. Alexander Wilder, London, 1912; J. Reuchlin, *De Verbo Mirifico*, Basel, 1494, *De Arte Cabbalistica*, Hagenau, 1517; Agrippa of Nettesheim, *De Incertitudine et Vanitate omnium Scientiarum et Artium*, tr. J. F., London, 1651; Franz Hartmann, *Life and Teachings of Paracelsus*, do. 1896; R. A. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, 2 vols., do. 1860; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, do. 1899; R. M. Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, do. 1914, esp. chapters on Weigel and Boehme.

R. M. JONES.

THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES.—See CONFESSIONS.

THOMISM.—**1. Name.**—Broadly speaking, Thomism is the name given to the system of philosophy and theology founded by St. Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.*). Strictly speaking, it is the name given to a group of opinions taught by St. Thomas and held by what is known as the Thomistic school, which is mainly but not exclusively composed of Dominicans.

2. Historical survey.—The foundation of Thomism is incontestably due to the personal influence of St. Thomas Aquinas. It should not, however, be forgotten that Albert the Great did much to prepare the way for the birth of the new system, so that the names of both master and pupil will ever remain inseparable in the great work. Although there were many points of contact between the minds of Albert and Thomas, the genius of the one was entirely different from that of the other. The mind of Thomas was more critical than Albert's. The latter does not possess his subject quite perfectly; there is a lack of precision in details and a certain want of synthesis necessary to unify his knowledge. On the contrary, Thomas possesses his matter perfectly; above all, he has a power for order; his precision is nicer and his analysis finer; his vision is more penetrating and more embracing; and his power of analysis is on equal footing with his power of synthesis. Albert revealed to his age an intellectual world unknown to it; Thomas with the débris of the intellectual world of the ancients created a new one. Both aimed at incorporating Aristotle into Christian philosophy and theology. Albert's endeavour has the merit of initiative, but it remained incomplete and only provisional; Thomas with a magician's hand forwarded the work and produced a masterpiece which he embellished with a finish undreamed of by Albert.

Before the time of St. Thomas several attempts had been made to synthesize the sum of human knowledge, but nothing of any great value had been the result. The work of reformation undertaken by St. Thomas was so vast and complicated that it is not surprising that he was at first a little hesitating and diffident; but, as he advanced in

years and learning, his vision became clearer, and at the age of thirty he took up a position that, with regard to most things, was definite and final. Being perfectly familiar with all the problems discussed by philosophy and theology, and having carefully weighed the value of the respective solutions and examined the systematic points of view already attempted, he saw that a perfect system necessarily demanded the unification of the whole of knowledge. This perfect ordering of the whole of knowledge which he bequeathed to the world was due to his sublime metaphysical sense. It is because St. Thomas surpassed the host of thinkers of his time as metaphysician that he produced a unique work.

In philosophy he is the first to proclaim the autonomy of reason; and he has produced his philosophic works without once having recourse to an authority other than experience and reason to establish his conclusions and defend them. Starting from the 'sensible' world as from a secure basis, St. Thomas passes to the region of the absolute, to the highest and purest intellectualism. In theology he proclaims the autonomy of revelation. At the outset he maintains the impossibility of a real conflict between the natural and supernatural orders which have the same source of truth, viz. God. Thus he synthesizes natural and supernatural, nature and grace, faith and reason. To assimilate his thought it is necessary to understand, above all, the functioning of his general synthesis, and especially of his metaphysics, which rules the whole economy of his work. Eclecticism has no meaning with regard to Thomistic doctrines; their value and strength reside essentially in the marvel of their unity and solidarity.

3. Progress of Thomism. — The Dominican order gradually took up the teaching of St. Thomas, but not without opposition; some of its members were still imbued with the doctrines of Augustinism, and these could not be converted to a new system in a day.

Robert Kilwarby, archbishop of Canterbury and a Dominican, condemned St. Thomas's theory of the unity of substantial form, on 18th March 1277. A few years later, however, the English Dominicans were among the most resolute defenders of this doctrine. In Germany Ulrich Engelbert de Strasbourg († 1277) inclined towards Augustinism and the Neo-Platonism of the Arabs. Eckhart († 1327) was much inclined towards Neo-Platonism. Thierry († towards 1315) was an Augustinist strongly influenced by Avicenna: the latter never hesitated to combat the doctrine of St. Thomas.

In France the great adversary of the new system was Durand de Saint-Pourçain. In Italy Umbertus Guidi was punished by the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Arezzo in 1315 for attacking St. Thomas; and the General Chapter of Puy (1344) cautioned Thomas of Naples for opposition to St. Thomas. Many chapters of the Dominican order encouraged and promoted Thomistic doctrines. Worthy of mention are the General Chapters of Paris (1286), of Saragossa (1309), of Metz (1313), of Castres (1329), of Brive (1346). So great indeed was the attachment of the Dominicans to the *Summa Theologica* that the celebrated Spaniard Arnauld de Villeneuve († 1311) wrote a work against the Dominicans in 1304 (*Gladius jugulans Thomistas*), in which he accuses the Dominicans of preferring the study of the *Summa* to that of the Bible. Two centuries later Erasmus formulated the same reproach.[1]

4. Introduction of St. Thomas's writings as text-books in schools.—At the end of the 13th cent. the Bible was the principal text, and the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard was the theological text *par excellence*. The Dominicans introduced the reading of the *Sentences* 'in via Thomae,' *i.e.* according to the thought of St. Thomas. Other schools following this example taught the *Sentences* 'in via Alberti,' 'in via Durandi,' 'in via Scoti,' etc. Not until the end of the 15th cent. did the Dominicans substitute entirely the *Summa* for the *Sentences*.

5. Thomistic polemics.—The fights sustained by the Dominican order during the end of the Middle Ages in defence of their school were (1) to make a good stand against Augustinism, and (2) to defend certain doctrines special to Thomism.

(*a*) *General.*—In favour of Augustinism a great reaction was made by the Friars Minor in a work composed by William de la Mare. The Oxford Dominicans replied in a work known as the *Corruptorium*. A further work, *Correctorium Corruptorii*, was published by two Oxford Dominicans, William de Makelsfeld and Richard Knapwell. At the end of the 13th cent. another general defence of Thomism was written by Robert de Bologne, *Apologeticum pro St. Thoma*. Last of all a great work (unfinished) was written by a celebrated Thomist, Hervé Noël de Nedellec, master at the university of Paris and master-general of the Dominicans, *Defensa doctrinæ Sti. Thomæ Hervæus Natalis*.

Other important works written towards the end of the Middle Ages are *Defensiones theologiæ divi Thomæ Aquinatis*[1] by John Capreolus († 1444), who was called the 'princeps Thomistarum,' and *Clypeus Thomistarum contra modernos et Scotistas*[2] by Pierre Niger († 1481). Diego de Deza († 1523), the illustrious protector of Christopher Columbus, wrote two polemical works in favour of Thomism, of which the more important is: *Novarum defensionum doctrinæ Angelici Doctoris beati Thomæ de Aquinas super quatuor libros Sententiarum quæstiones profundissimæ et utilissimæ* (Seville, 1517).

(*b*) *Special.*—(1) St. Thomas formulated the theory of the unity of the human person by making the intellectual soul the only *form* of the human composite. Against the Averroism (taught at Paris) which held the unicity of intellect for the human species, and against Augustinism, which held the plurality of forms, several treatises were written by Thomists—*e.g.*, by Pierre de Tarantaise, Gilles de Lessines, William de Makelsfeld, Thomas de Sutton, Jean de Faënza, etc.

The General Council of Vienne defined the Thomistic doctrine on this matter, which was further confirmed by the 5th Council of Lateran (1515), and by Pope Pius IX. in a letter to the archbishop of Cologne (15th June 1857).

(2) The question of the nature of religious poverty and its practice by Christ and the apostles was hotly discussed between the Dominicans and the Friars Minor. The discussion became so disastrous that Pope John XXII. condemned as erroneous and heretical the doctrine that Christ and the apostles did not possess anything, or did not perform acts of proprietorship, viz. buying and selling; etc. (12th Nov. 1323, *Cum inter nonnullos*).

(3) There was another theological combat between the Dominicans and the Minors with regard to the blood of Christ shed during the Passion. The Minors said that it ceased to be united to the divinity of Christ, the Dominicans that the union did not cease. Eventually Pope Pius II. forbade both parties to discuss the question further.[3]

(4) The Dominicans strenuously fought against the nominalism[4] of the 14th cent. of which Durand de Saint-Pourçain and William Ockham were the leaders.

[1] *Opera Omnia*, Leyden, 1703–06, iii. 515.

[1] New ed., 7 vols., ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, Tours, 1900–08.
[2] Venice, 1481.
[3] All the literature of this quarrel is to be found in a MS in the Bibliothèque of Paris (*Cat.* 12390, fol. 1–78; also cf. Benedict XIV., *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et beatorum Canonizatione*, bk. ii. ch. 30).
[4] See art. REALISM AND NOMINALISM.

(5) The Averroism against which Albert the Great and St. Thomas fought was renewed again at the beginning of the 16th cent. in Italy. Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan, published a commentary on the *de Anima* of Aristotle (Florence, 1509). A few years later the Council of Lateran (19th Dec. 1513) condemned the teaching of Averroism on the point, and further exacted that professors of philosophy should solve contrary arguments, which Cajetan held only theologians could do.

(6) In the 14th cent. disputes concerning the Immaculate Conception arose. St. Thomas undoubtedly leaves the question unsolved, but he was at great pains to show that the Blessed Virgin was not excluded from the redemption. St. Thomas says that the precise moment of sanctification is unknown; he therefore never propounded the question whether Mary was sanctified at the very instant of conception. He believed it better to be silent on this point, although, had he followed his personal inclination, he had without doubt concluded in the affirmative, as his first declaration witnesses in *IV. Sent.* I. dist. xliv. qu. 1, art. 3, ad 3. But his superior theological sense did not let him, in presence of the silence of tradition and the negative position of many theologians, and in particular the reserved attitude of the Church. The endeavour to drag St. Thomas to the negative or positive side is to force his meaning, since he voluntarily abstained from either.

6. Renascence of Thomism.—In the 14th and 15th centuries there was an intellectual decadence in philosophy and theology. Thomism could not altogether abstract itself from the influence of the time. However, even in the 15th cent. there was notable vitality among Thomists like John Capreolus, St. Antoninus of Florence, and Jean de Torquemada. At the end of the 15th cent. the intellectual life of Thomism received new vigour, which manifested itself in the 16th cent. and continued for two centuries afterwards. In 1551 the General Chapter of Salamanca ordered the text of St. Thomas's writings to be used as text-books in all its schools. Hence at this time the great commentaries began to be written. Cajetan wrote from 1507 to 1522; Conrad Köllin on the *Prima secundæ* (Cologne, 1512); François de Vittoria (whose commentaries remained in MSS) and Barthélemy de Medina from 1577 to 1578; Banez from 1584 to 1594; Sylvester Ferrariensis on the *Summa contra Gentiles* (Venice, 1534). The humanist movement of the 16th cent. had a great influence on certain Thomists. François de Vittoria took the lead; of his disciples the most famous was Melchior Cano († 1560), whose work, *de Locis theologicis*, is a tribute to the humanist movement by its purity and beauty of style. Two new doctrines issued from the humanist state of thought: Ambrose Catharin († 1553) put forward new theories on predestination and grace; and Barthélemy de Medina formulated probabilism. Thomists combated the former doctrine; whilst in answer to the desire of Pope Alexander VII. they combated strongly probabilist doctrines.

7. Thomism and the Council of Trent.—Thomists held an important part in this council. The Thomistic school had grave interests at stake on account of the dogmatic question regarding the doctrine of justification. Of the five members of the commission instituted by Paul III. to study this question three were Dominicans, of whom Barthélemy Spina, master of the Sacred Palace, was the most active. The decree on justification was not drawn up without the help of St. Thomas. The text of the decree as regards the mode of preparation for justification[1] is taken in its every detail from the *Summa*, III. qu. lxxxv. art. 5. The decree numbers six acts preparatory to justification. They are the same in nature, number, and order as in the *Summa* (*loc. cit.*). Also, in the following chapter of the decree the causes of justification are exactly those given by St. Thomas in the *Summa*, I. ii. qu. cxii. art. 4, and II. ii. qu. xxiv. art. 3.

The official catechism (published by the council), in which the doctrine of the Catholic Church is contained and which was compiled for the use of the clergy, was drawn up by three Thomists—Leonard de Marinis (archbishop of Lanciano), Gilles Foscarari (bishop of Modena), and François Foreiro (theologian to the king of Portugal).

As soon as the Council of Trent was finished, Pope Pius V. on 11th April 1567 proclaimed St. Thomas a doctor of the Church.

8. Thomism and Molinism.—See art. MOLINISM; also see below § 12.

9. Thomism and Jansenism.—In his posthumous work *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640) Jansenius strove to prove that the new theology, especially that of Molina and Suarez, was against the doctrine of St. Augustine and contrary to the doctrine authorized by the Catholic Church.[1] The *Augustinus* aroused much opposition among the Jesuits. After an examination of the book, the Dominicans found that it militated not only against Molinism, but also against Thomism. Two Dominicans wrote against Jansenius—Alexander Sébille (*de Augustini et SS. Patrum de libero arbitrio interpres thomisticus adversus Cornelii Jansenii doctrinam*, Mayence, 1652), and Bernard Guyard (*Discrimina inter doctrinam Thomisticam et Jansenianam*, Paris, 1655).

10. Thomism and probabilism.—The theory of probabilism (*q.v.*) was unfolded by Barthélemy de Medina, a Dominican, in his *Expositio in Primam Secundæ D. Thomæ* (Salamanca, 1577). The Jesuits generally adopted this new theory. But, since the ease with which any opinion could be made probable, provided the contradictory was probable, led to grave abuses, Alexander VII. asked the Dominicans to combat strongly the probabilist doctrines. This they did, and from that time no Dominican theologian has written in favour of probabilism.

11. Neo-Thomism and the revival of Scholasticism.—At the beginning of the 19th cent. Scholasticism (*q.v.*) began to revive, and there followed a revival of Thomism. The encyclical *Æterni Patris* of Pope Leo XIII. (4th Aug. 1879) set up St. Thomas Aquinas as the great model and master of Catholic philosophy and theology. From that time all schools have studied the works of the master and have endeavoured to make his thought their own. The endeavour to keep in touch with the progress of modern science, and to show that the fundamentals of Thomism are in perfect accord with the latest discoveries of science, was set on foot, not, as is sometimes supposed, by the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain University, but by the Thomist Sanseverino, one of the most learned and vigorous promoters of the movement. This is evidenced by his work, *Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata*. This great movement has been fostered and developed by the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, founded by Cardinal Mercier at Louvain. Certain *Revues* are now published in which the teachings of Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism are consistently set forth. The *Revue Thomiste* and the *Revue néo-scolastique de Philosophie* are worthy of mention.

12. Essence of Thomism.—Thomism is above all a system of philosophy and theology. Now a

[1] Sess. vi. ch. vi.

[1] See art. JANSENISM.

system necessarily implies harmony and solidarity among the doctrines of which the system is built up. In proportion as a system lacks unity, so much is it less of a system. Many philosophers and theologians have endeavoured to give systems of knowledge to the world, but on examination it is found that they lack the first essential of a system, viz. solidarity of thought in every department. If certain principles are laid down in metaphysics, no doctrine in any department of applied metaphysics (as, *e.g.*, in psychology, cosmology, natural theology, ethics, etc.) should be at variance with those principles. Moreover, if a system claims to be a system of the *whole* of knowledge, both of that attained by human reason and of that attained by revelation, then no doctrine formulated by natural reason should be at variance with the doctrines formulated by faith; and conversely. It is evident that, if there be a system of this nature, it is eminently constructive or synthetic. Every stone in the structure must be in its proper place, and, if the building is to stand firm, there must be some grand unifying principle or foundation upon which it is built up. Now, just as in any architectural building there cannot be several foundations, but only one ultimate foundation, so in Thomism there is one fundamental principle unifying the system and imparting harmony and solidarity to every department which it embraces.

13. The fundamental principle of Thomism.—An examination of the various departments of Thomist metaphysics, of applied metaphysics, and of the whole realm of Thomist theology will show that the fundamental doctrines of each department are applications to various matters of a great principle inculcated by Aristotle in his metaphysics. It is the principle of the real distinction between *act* and *potentiality*. One has not far to seek in order to understand what is meant by 'act' and by 'potentiality.' 'Act' means perfection; 'potentiality' means absence of perfection. A thing in the state of potentiality is in an imperfect state, and is therefore capable of receiving what it lacks, viz. some perfection or an act (as it is termed in scholastic language), whereby it ceases to be in a state of potentiality and is brought to a state of having some perfection. There are, as is evident, many kinds of states of potentiality and many kinds of corresponding states of act, but it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of them, since the doctrine underlying them all is one and the same. Furthermore, it is clear that the state of potentiality must be really distinct from the state of act; for, if this be not true, then 'to run' and 'to be able to run,' 'to know' and 'to be able to know,' 'to be hot' and 'to be able to be hot,' are one and the same, which is absurd. Hence there must be a real (extra-mental) distinction between the two states. This principle, then, may be formulated thus: *Between the state of potentiality and the state of act there is a real distinction.* Further, the first unfolding of this principle necessarily implies that that which is in a state of potentiality cannot cease to be in that state unless it be 'moved' from that state by something which is in the state of act; *e.g.*, cold water has the potentiality to become hot, but it is impossible for cold water to become hot unless it be 'moved' from that state by something that actually possesses heat. It will be seen that this conclusion is an immediate inference of the real distinction between potentiality and act. Hence the principle in a more explicit way may be formulated thus: *Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.*

This is the fundamental principle of the entire Thomist system; established at the outset in metaphysics, it is applied without exception to the fundamental doctrines in every department of Thomist philosophy and theology. Whoever draws a single conclusion which is in any way at variance with this principle, although he may hold all other doctrines of the Thomist system, ceases *ipso facto* to be a Thomist.

14. The application of the principle.—(*a*) *In metaphysics.*—The Thomist doctrine of real distinction between essence and existence in created things, wherein essence is conceived as a potentiality and existence as an act, is an application of the principle; likewise the real distinction between substance and its accidents, wherein substance is conceived as in potentiality to the accidents which are its acts or perfections; likewise the doctrine concerning the nature of dimensive quantity, the essence of which is not that it actually extends the parts of a corporeal substance in place, *i.e.* in triple dimension, but that it distributes the parts of that substance within the substance itself (which internal parts are only potentially distributed in triple dimension by dimensive quantity), and that it has the capability or potentiality of *actually* extending those parts in place according to triple dimension. Upon this doctrine of the nature of dimensive quantity is founded the doctrine of the real presence of the whole body of Christ in a small consecrated Host; also the doctrine of the virgin birth of Christ, of His passing into a room, the doors being shut, etc. Likewise the important doctrine of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, is an application of the aforesaid fundamental principle. An analysis of 'that which begins to be (effect) must have a reason (cause) for its inception' shows the underlying great principle.

(*b*) *In psychology.*—The doctrine of the unity of the human composite, viz. that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, and that it is the only form, is an application of the same principle. The 'prime matter,' a pure potentiality, which is informed by the intellectual soul (or act) receives from this act all that makes it body, and human body, and living. Through the same principle it follows that the faculties of intellect and will are really distinct from the substance of the soul, because they are the acts or perfections of the soul, which in regard to them is a potentiality. As a consequence it also follows not only that every faculty is really distinct from its object as potentiality to act, but also that, in regard to it *as object*, every faculty is passive, not active. Hence the important doctrine that the human intellect is a passive, not active, power or faculty, in that it receives, and does not make, its object of thought *as object*.

Further (and this is most important from the point of view of Thomism *versus* Molinism), the human will, which is the faculty of choice, must ultimately be moved to the very act of choosing by something which is in act; and the reason is that, before the act of choosing (given everything necessary for this action save this action itself), the will is in a state of potentiality and must therefore be 'moved' by something outside it to the state of perfection which is 'choosing.' Only God, the *actus purus*, can move the will to the very act of choosing; if aught else did this, the will *ipso facto* would cease to be free. This is the Thomistic doctrine of physical premotion, which is a rigorous application of the aforesaid fundamental principle.

(*c*) *In cosmology.*—In this department of applied metaphysics the fundamental question concerns the precise nature of body, as body. Applying the aforesaid principle, Thomism concludes that

body, as body, is a composite of two principles, one of which is substantial form and the other prime matter. Prime matter is a pure potentiality of which the substantial form is the act; and between the two, as a consequence, there is a real distinction.

(*d*) *In natural theology.*—The classic proof for the existence of God, viz. from the existence of motion in the world, is nothing more than a rigorous application of the same principle. Motion is here taken in its widest sense, embracing not only local motion but every kind of 'passing from potentiality to act.'[1]

(*e*) *In ethics.*—All the doctrines concerning habits and their formation, of the passions, of virtues and vices, of laws, etc., have their mainstay in the same fundamental principle.

(*f*) *In theology.*—For the existence of God see above (*d*). It is only necessary to run through the *Summa* to see that the same principle is fundamental in the doctrines concerning revelation and concerning inspiration (in which is implied the doctrine of cause and effect, and in particular of instrumental causality). By an understanding of the same great principle it is concluded that God alone is pure act with no admixture of potentiality whatsoever, whilst everything created contains both potentiality and act. It is further concluded not only that God's essence is identically the same as His existence, but that His intellect and His will, His attributes of unity, goodness, truth, His knowledge and love are likewise identically the same as His essence. The same grand principle underlies the whole of the doctrine concerning the mystery of the trinity of persons in God. A further application is to be found in the treatise on the angels, whose existence is really distinct from their essence, whose minds and wills are really distinct from their substance, etc. Thus through the whole of the *Summa* one finds the same principle applied. It will be necessary to take only two more cases in order to show the solidarity of Thomistic doctrines. According to St. Thomas, the sacraments are the instrumental causes of grace; they are not mere channels through which grace is infused into the soul; they are real, physical, instrumental causes which produce or infuse grace into the soul. The soul in regard to the sacramental grace that informs it is a potentiality (*potentia obedientialis*), and grace is the act.

The final instance we shall take to illustrate the application of the fundamental principle of Thomism concerns the doctrine of actual grace. Just as in the natural order it was concluded that the human will is physically premoved by God to the act of choice,[2] so in the supernatural order an actual grace is nothing more than a physical premotion in that order. Hence the Thomists speak of 'gratia efficax ab intrinseco,' a grace intrinsically or of its very nature efficacious, and not of grace, intrinsically indifferent, to be made efficacious by consent of the will to accept, or to remain inefficacious by refusal of the will to accept. Thus Thomism, by a relentless logic, applies the great principle to the doctrine of actual grace. To the mind of St. Thomas, in spite of the apparent difficulties, this doctrine is the only logical conclusion. For Thomism the theory of Molina or Suarez bristles with more difficulties in that the theory subverts the doctrines of God as the Prime Mover of all things, of causality, and of the great metaphysical principle: *Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something which is in act.* In short, for the sake of a difficulty in applied metaphysics (*i.e.* the freedom of the will under God's physical premotion), Molina and Suarez gainsay a principle already established in metaphysics, just as he who, on account of some difficulty in mixed mathematics, gainsays a principle of pure mathematics.

Any conclusion other than the one drawn above wrecks a system of the whole of knowledge in the mind of the Thomist. It is owing to the perfect consistency of application of the grand fundamental principle aforesaid to every department of knowledge that Thomas bequeathed to the world a sublime system remarkable for its perfect unity, harmony, and solidarity of thought.

[1] Cf. *Summa*, I. qu. ii. art. 3, *Prima via*.

[2] See above (*b*).

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THRACE (Θρῆκη, Θρᾴκη). — Thrace was the name given in classical times to the mountainous region lying north of Greece proper. The inhabitants (Θρῆκες, Θρῆκες, Θρᾷκες) were a barbarous people, having no close affinities to the Greeks in language, culture, or originally in religion. In the last field, however, their influence on their more civilized neighbours was considerable, beginning early and continuing fairly late. In particular, they appear to have been partly responsible for the remarkable change in the spirit of Greek religion which took place about the beginning of the classical epoch or shortly before it. This change must not be thought of as something revolutionary, akin, *e.g.*, to the conversion of most of N. Europe from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism at the Reformation; for the large majority, probably if not certainly, religious beliefs and practices changed little if at all; it was rather the introduction of a new element, which rendered possible the holding by many Greeks of ideas either unknown to their fathers or existing among them in a very undeveloped form, and largely forgotten when first we hear anything definite about the Greek race.

1. **Origin and history of the Thracians.**—The Thracian invasion of the country which they occupied in historical times is part of a wider movement from the north into the hilly region of the Balkans and the countries west and east of that district (Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one side, the Caucasus and Armenia on the other). The invaders were of Indo-European stock, probably originally from the Carpathians. Driven perhaps by the pressure of Slovak tribes from the region of the Vistula, or possibly from sheer restlessness or desire for fresh

territory, they occupied the country in successive waves. The Phrygians (q.v.) and tribes most closely related to them, together with the Armenians, occupied the Asiatic district for the most part; the Thracians seized chiefly upon the European sector. That Thracian and Phrygian were related stocks was already recognized in antiquity,[1] and modern philology, together with arguments drawn from their religious and social organization, inclines us to believe that this is substantially correct. Throughout Greek history the Thracians, or the majority of them, remained politically independent, protected both by their great courage and by the difficult nature of their country; Rome, after much trouble, succeeded in subduing them, the ferocious Dacians finally yielding to Trajan. They remained, however, an intractable people, little influenced by the civilization of their rulers. Finally, about A.D. 400, their ancient priestly tribe, the Bessoi, were converted to Christianity. Some 200 years later a Slovak invasion swept over the country, and from that time begins the history of what ultimately became the Balkan peoples.

2. **Ethnology.**—The Thracian races fall, broadly speaking, into two groups—a northern and a southern. The latter, inhabiting the region of the Haimos and Strymon, included, besides the Bessoi already mentioned, the Bisaltai, Thynoi, Bithynoi, Sakai, Dioi, Odrysai, and other tribes; the former or Getic group consisted of a smaller number of peoples, individually more important than the tribes just mentioned. Besides the powerful Getai themselves, we must count among them the still more formidable Dacians (Δάκοι, Δᾶκαι, Δῖοι), who are often confused with them, and the Agathyrsoi, whose name seems to indicate that they were held in no great esteem by their Scythian neighbours (the first two syllables are probably to be connected with Zend *agha*, 'bad'), and who appear from Herodotos[2] to have practised the very primitive custom of group-marriage. On the whole, the northern group shows certain cultural affinities with the Germanic tribes, the southern with the Orientals, especially, as already mentioned, with the Phrygians.

3. **Language.**—As the Thracians seem to have had no knowledge of writing, the few inscriptions we have from Thrace are late and never in the native tongue. There remain, however, a number of glosses, some 36 of which we may take as genuine Thracian words; about 25 names of plants given as Thracian by Dioscorides; and a considerable number of proper names, both of persons (including deities) and of places. From these it appears that their tongue was Indo-Germanic, of the E. European group, having as its nearest ancient congeners Phrygian and Armenian. Traces appear of two distinct linguistic stocks, the result presumably of the blending of two races; and this we may consider along with the fact reported by Herodotos[3] that the cult practised by their chieftains differed from that of the common people.

4. **Material culture.**—It has been pointed out[4] that Homer does not consider the Thracian culture as an inferior one. In the *Iliad* the Thracians are for the most part the allies of the Trojans; Priam's treasury includes a cup of their giving;[5] the son of Antenor was brought up in Thrace and married there;[6] Rhesos comes to Priam's aid with a strong Thracian contingent.[7] On the other hand, some of them at least trade with the Greeks.[8] No hint is given that they are in any sense savages; in particular, the followers of Rhesos encamp in a soldierly manner.[9] But there is no need to suppose, as Helbig does, that the Thracians of that day, under Phœnician or other foreign influence, were enjoying a short period of 'hothouse' culture which brought them for a time to higher levels than they ever afterwards attained. The true explanation seems to be that Homer knows nothing of the later division between Greek and barbarian, and that the Greeks of his day were not a highly civilized people themselves. A race which lived under the rule of feudal barons, practised the blood-feud, allowed wer-gelt, occasionally mutilated or otherwise ill-treated a dead foe, was not quite free from the custom of human sacrifice, and buried its dead much in the fashion of the historical Thracians,[10] besides keeping up the old custom of bride-price and having only very rudimentary manufactures and handicrafts, was not much superior to the Thracians of historical times. The difference was that the Greeks developed with marvellous rapidity in the next 300 years or so, while the Thracians remained backward.[11]

Passing to classical authors of the later periods, we find our chief account of Thrace in Herodotos.[12] His whole attitude towards the Thracians, while not unfriendly,[1] is clearly that of civilized man describing interesting barbarians; and this is certainly justified. They are, he tells us, a numerous race, of little political importance owing to their lack of unity; their culture is on the whole uniform. They despise agriculture, counting it more honourable to be idle and to live by plunder. They have, however, some arts, as they can weave very good cloth of hemp fibre.[2] To this we may add, what sundry later authors tell us, that they showed skill in making various tools and weapons of iron.[3] They were accustomed to dye their hair and tatu their skin. They were, in some cases at least, polygynous; that they lived under father-right, not mother-right, is clear from the facts that they paid bride-price and that marital jealousy was strongly developed, though the chastity of an unmarried girl was quite disregarded—*i.e.*, their women were apparently thought of chiefly as valuable property, belonging to their fathers so long as they were unmarried—hence the light view taken of their immoralities, for any children that they might bear out of wedlock would also belong to their own family—but afterwards belonging to their husbands, who had paid for the exclusive use of them. When we add that as a race they were cattle-breeders and especially famous for their horses from very early times,[4] it is clear that we shall not be far wrong in comparing them to some one of the principal Basuto peoples, such as the Amazulu, before the latter attained unity of government under T'Chaka. Physically, however, they were at the other end of the colour-scale, being fair-skinned and yellow-haired.

Finally, four points should be noted as giving the clue to many features in their religion. According to the practically unanimous voice of antiquity, (1) the Thracians were desperately brave, having little fear of death; (2) they were excitable, and, in particular, had a bad name for unrestrained indulgence in sexual passion; (3) they were heavy drinkers; and (4) they were intensely fond of music, performing well on both flute and lyre. In addition, their country was a mountainous one, in which caves were no rarity.

5. **Religion.**—We may take as our starting-point the famous passage of Herodotos, v. 7: 'They worship only the following gods, Ares, Dionysos, and Artemis; but their kings . . . reverence Hermes above all other gods, swear by him alone, and say that they are descended from Hermes.' We must in the first place remember that the names in the above passage are not to be taken too literally. Whereas a modern writer, if he said that a particular race worshipped Buddha, would mean exactly what he said, and the Hebrew prophet[5] who speaks of the name of his God as being 'great among the Gentiles' means his words to be startlingly paradoxical, a Greek always assumes that the gods of all nations are much the same as his own and never scruples to talk of the Egyptian cult of Hermes or the Roman worship of Hera, meaning thereby Thoth and Juno. We shall see that, taken as it stands, Herodotos' statement is true of one deity only.

(*a*) *Ares.*—That Ares is a Thracian deity is a fairly wide-spread opinion. As far back as Homer[6] we find Thrace mentioned as the home of the war-god, and later writers echo Homer.[7] Ares has, moreover, certain non-Greek features; his cult is wholly without any of those higher forms which distinguish, *e.g.*, Apollo or Athene and remains throughout that of a war-god pure and simple. Homer's whole attitude towards him is one of dislike; he supports the Trojans throughout; and in his ritual we find one feature paralleled in Thrace[8] hard to parallel in purely Greek cult—the dog-sacrifice to him under the name of Enyalios at Sparta.[9]

At the same time it must be confessed that none

[1] οἱ Φρύγες Θρᾳκῶν ἄποικοί εἰσι (Strabo, x. 471).
[2] iv. 104. [3] v. 7.
[4] W. Helbig, *Das Homer. Epos*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 9.
[5] xxiv. 234; we are not told who made the cup.
[6] xi. 222 ff. [7] x. 434. [8] ix. 71 f.
[9] x. 471. [10] See below § 5 (*h*).
[11] The present writer holds the view of Andrew Lang, van Leeuwen, and other scholars that the Homeric poems are substantially the work of one man, and he would put their date about the 10th cent. B.C. For the Homeric customs above mentioned see *Il.* ix. 632, xxii. 371, xxiii. 175 (the poet clearly disapproves strongly of the sacrifice), and xxiii. passim, *Od.* xv. 224, 272 ff., xx. 355, and many other passages. Elaborate manufactures or works of art are regularly the work of gods (as *Il.* xviii. 468 ff.) or imported (as *Od.* iv. 615). Simple weaving and the like are done at home, as *Od.* ii. 94. Cf. the account of Thracian arts above.
[12] Chiefly v. 2-8. References to other passages of Herod are cited in the notes. For fuller authorities see Tomaschek, *Die alten Thraker*, i. 111 ff.

[1] Between Greeks as a whole and Thracians as a whole no bitterness seems to have existed. The references to Thracians as bloodthirsty savages are mostly in comparatively late authors—*e.g.*, Hor. *Od.* i. xxvii. 2. The writer is of opinion that the detestable conduct of certain Thracian mercenaries in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. vii. 29) may have had something to do with this, while later their savage battles against the Romans prejudiced the latter against them.
[2] Herod. iv. 74, vii. 75.
[3] References in Tomaschek, i. 119.
[4] Cf. Hom. *Il.* x. 436. [5] Mal 1[11].
[6] *Il.* xiii. 301 and elsewhere.
[7] *E.g.*, Verg. *Æn.* iii. 35.
[8] *Vita Euripidis*, i. (vi.) ταύτην δὲ (τὴν κύνα) Θρᾷκες, ὡς ἔθος θύσαντες ἔφαγον.
[9] Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 290d; Paus. III. xiv. 9; Arnob. *adv. Nat.* iv. 25. Such a sacrifice, however, is not wholly unknown elsewhere in Greece.

of the above features are conclusive against his Greek origin. Among a people brave enough, but not fond of war for its own sake, the war-god might well remain 'functional'—too important to be altogether neglected, too unpopular to develop. Among the traditional friends of Troy are also Apollo, Artemis, and at times Zeus himself; not much can be made from a single feature of an obscure ritual;[1] and the references to Thrace need mean no more than that the Thracians, being warlike, had a popular cult of a war-god. And we must remember that the cult of Ares is very old in Athens and Boiotia, and that his name is not only plausibly derived from an Aryan root, which in itself proves nothing, but has a characteristically Greek formation.[2]

We conclude therefore, on the whole, that the Thracians did not originate the Greek cult of Ares, but had from very early times a war-god of their own, about whose ritual we must be content to remain ignorant. It is worth mentioning that Herodotos seems to speak of him as an oracular god in one rather obscure passage.[3]

(*b*) *Dionysos.*—The case of Dionysos is very different, and there is little serious doubt that here Herodotos and the numerous later authors who speak of this god as Thracian are literally correct.[4] The chief arguments in favour of this statement are as follows:

(i.) *Philological.*—The first two syllables of the name are apparently to be connected with the Thracian tribe-name Diol. Further, a Phrygian inscription gives us the formula *με διως κε ζεμελω*, which almost certainly means 'By heaven and earth.' We thus have a god with a name of which the first part has close Thraco-Phrygian affinities, while the rest is certainly not Greek, whose mother is apparently the earth-goddess of the Thraco-Phrygian stock.[5]

(ii.) *Traditional.*—Strabo definitely calls the cult of Dionysos Thraco-Phrygian.[6] When first we hear of the god at all, it is in connexion with the Edonian king Lykurgos;[7] and his cult is called Thracian far more persistently than that of Ares by authors of all ages. Moreover, all tradition is agreed that he is not genuine Greek. It is true that the usual birth-legend (not the 'Orphic' story; see below) makes him a Theban; but even there he is disowned by his kin and has to win his way into prominence against the vehement opposition of Pentheus;[8] while many similar tales indicate that his cult had to force an entrance into Greece. It is true that many, if not all, of these are misinterpreted ritual tales; but that they were persistently misinterpreted in the same way, as stories of persecution, strongly suggests that a folk-memory of real opposition lies behind the interpretation if not the stories themselves.

(iii.) *Facts of cult.*—On the one hand, very early Greek agricultural festivals either are not Dionysiac, like the Attic Thesmophoria, or present Dionysos as an obvious intruder, like the Anthesteria. On the other hand, the Thraco-Phrygian region is the home of all manner of orgiastic nature-cults,[9] and one detail of the worship of Dionysos which we have good reason to suppose primitive, viz. the oracle, is Thracian and hardly Greek at all.[10] He seems always to have been a wine-god as well as a god of nature in general, and a wine-god we find him in Thrace, which was a wine-growing country very early.[1] Further, he is connected in cult with Sabazios, who is probably Phrygian.

From Thrace, then, his cult spread through Greece some time, probably not very long, before the dawn of Greek history. In Homer he is apparently a foreign god, little known and not much regarded; of the five mentions of him two[2] are certainly interpolations, one[3] is unimportant, the others come in the story of Lykurgos. When we come to the Homeric hymns, however, he is a well-known and important deity, and all later literature is full of references to him. It would appear then that somewhere after the downfall of the Homeric (Achaian) culture, and during the period of reconstruction, of which very little is known, his worship crossed the border and was carried, it is no longer possible to say exactly how, or by whom,[4] to all parts of Greece, meeting with considerable opposition, but finally establishing itself as part of the state religion and becoming largely civilized in the process, though recrudescences of its original barbarism, such as the well-known one in Italy,[5] were always possible.

No detailed description of the cult of Dionysos in Thrace has come down to us from antiquity; but it is not difficult to frame one from various scattered notices,[6] from the wilder and more savage features of his Grecian cult, from the traces of the ancient worship still to be found in N. Greece, and from what we know of similar rites elsewhere.

We learn, firstly, that the most prominent feature of the ritual was a wild orgiastic ceremony held normally, if not always, at night. In this the worshippers worked themselves up into a state of frenzy by dancing and shouting (hence the numerous names of the god, such as Euhios, Iakchos, and perhaps Bakchos,[7] which are derivable from ejaculations or from words meaning 'shout' or 'cry'), to the accompaniment of savage music. They were dressed in the skins of wild animals—we hear especially of fawn- and fox-pelts (*νεβρίδες, βασσάραι*)—and carried the thyrsos, a spear-like implement covered with the sacred ivy, or the narthex (fennel-wand). It is obvious that for an excitable people, not highly civilized, and susceptible to strong sexual emotion, and therefore to nervous emotion of all kinds, including religious enthusiasm,[8] the violent exercise under the stimulating surroundings of their mountainous country in the clear night air would of itself produce an abnormal condition; and this seems to have been further encouraged by the free use of wine and perhaps other artificial stimulants. The result was, at least in many cases, and particularly among their women, a condition of frenzy, involving anæsthesia, abnormal strength and endurance, and other such symptoms, followed by fainting and exhaustion. The natural explanation, to any one at that stage of culture, was that the worshippers were possessed by their god (*ἐνθεοι, κάτοχοι*); and therefore we find them called by his name (*βάκχοι, βάκχαι*). That Dionysos himself was present was

[1] The odd ritual of Ares *Γυναικοθοίνας* (Paus. VIII. xlviii. 4, 5) may point to Amazonianism, which is not Greek. But this is exceedingly doubtful.

[2] The forms *Ἄρης* (Hom. Ionic) and *ἀρεύω* (Alkaios) indicate a stem in *-ηυ-*; cf. *πρεσβήϊον* and *πρέσβυς*. The root is akin to Skr. *rāv*, 'roar.' See C. A. M. Fennell in *CR* xiii. (1899) 306.

[3] vii. 76, *ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι ἀνδράσι Ἄρεός ἐστι χρηστήριον*. The context is corrupt, and it is uncertain who are referred to, quite possibly not Thracians at all.

[4] The counter-theory, that he is a Cretan deity, is supported by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena*², ch. viii.). The arguments for it reduce to (*a*) the fact that a cult of a god of this type did exist in Crete from very early times and remained so powerful that Zeus himself was absorbed by it; (*b*) certain very primitive features of Cretan Dionysiac ritual. But, in view of the overwhelming arguments in favour of Thrace, these phenomena are of little weight. The former is common to many localities; the latter is naturally explained by supposing that the worship of Dionysos, once it was imported, found favour in Crete because it was so like the native worship, and so was but little modified.

[5] *CGS* v. 94. The attempts to make Semele a thunder-cloud or the like are too absurd to deserve more than passing mention. The syllables *-νυσα-* are unintelligible, but possibly connected with the holy mountain Nysa, which is variously located but apparently Thracian in Homer.

[6] x. 471; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 2. [7] Hom. *Il.* vi. 130 ff.

[8] The best known form of the legend is that given in Euripides, *Bacchæ*. Even in this the final birth of Dionysos, from the thigh of Zeus, does not take place in Thebes.

[9] Cf. art. PHRYGIANS.

[10] See Eur. *Hec.* 1267; Arist. *ap.* Macrob. *Sat.* I, xviii. 1.

[1] Hom. *Il.* ix. 72; Arist. *loc. cit.*

[2] *Il.* xiv. 325, and *Od.* xi. 325. [3] *Od.* xxiv. 74.

[4] It was an age of wandering prophets (see Rohde, *Psyche*⁴, ii. 63 ff.). The favourable reception of the women may have had a good deal to do with it also.

[5] Liv. xxxix. 8 ff.

[6] To save a multitude of quotations, we refer the reader for detailed authorities to the authors cited in the Literature at the end of this article.

[7] The root is perhaps *Fαχ-* (Curtius), in both names, Iakchos being *ϝιϝαχχος*. Euhios is derived from the well-known cry *εὐοί*.

[8] The present writer holds religious and sexual emotion to be essentially the same; see, *e.g.*, W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, and New York, 1902, *passim*. The frequency of 'conversions' and the like during adolescence and the regular employment by mystics of all nationalities of erotic metaphors are among the facts supporting this view.

a commonplace, familiar to us from many literary and artistic representations of the rites, from Euripides to Titian and Keats;[1] the skins in which the worshippers dressed were those of animal *avatars* of the god; and the culmination of the rite was the tearing in pieces and devouring of one of these animals.

It is far from impossible that in some cases the victim was a man or a child. That the Getai practised a form of human sacrifice we know;[2] Themistokles sacrificed three captives to Dionysos ὠμηστής;[3] the legends of Pentheus, etc., point the same way; and in the modified Dionysiac ritual of Tenedos[4] the cow whose calf is to be the victim is tended like a woman, and the calf when born has buskins put on it before being killed.

We have so far a quite normal ritual of a vegetation deity, of the kind familiar from the *Golden Bough*.[5] The god visits his worshippers in early spring (the time of most of the festivals),[6] is welcomed by them, and is joined to them by a sort of primitive sacrament. Of the death or expulsion of the worn-out god, later in the year, we do not hear so much, but there are traces of it. In the legend of Lykurgos already referred to the king pursues the god into the sea—the throwing of the vegetation-spirit into water is a very common rite; there was a strong tradition that he had died, and was buried at Delphi;[7] and there is also a legend of his descent into Hades to fetch up Semele.[8] We are therefore, in view of these facts and on the analogy of all similar ritual elsewhere, justified in supposing that his death was part of the ceremonial of his cult; and this belief is strengthened by the curious relic of Dionysiac worship found in Thrace by R. M. Dawkins,[9] in which the death of one of the characters in the mummers' play is a prominent feature. Closely allied with this went the ceremony representing his birth and cradling in the λίκνον, or winnowing-fan. The last detail, however, marking him definitely as a corn-god, is Greek rather than Thracian.[10]

In the ritual of Dionysos the forms of the god change bewilderingly. We have reason to suppose him to have been conceived as bull, goat, kid, sheep, serpent, stag, and even pig,[11] for all these animals, besides the fox and perhaps others, were sacred to him, and, as he is at times said to have taken the forms of some of them, notably bull and serpent, we may conjecture that he was more or less identified with the others as well. But in iconography he is always human, and he had human *avatars*, as might be expected from the human sacrifices.

(*c*) *Divine kings; Lykurgos, Pentheus, Rhesos, Orpheus.*—Several of the legends seem to indicate that in Thrace, as elsewhere, there existed kings of the type familiar from the investigations of J. G. Frazer—*i.e.* incarnations of the local god, who ended by being sacrificed, possibly devoured. As the Greeks probably never had had this sort of king—certainly had forgotten it—they naturally misunderstood the legends. Thus none of the above mythological figures exactly correspond to the Frazerian type. Lykurgos persecutes Dionysos; but the form which his persecution takes is a pursuit (probably originally ritual) of the god and his attendants and the flogging of them with the βουκλής, by which is possibly meant, not an ox-goad, but a whip of bull's hide, a fertilizing *februum* like the hide thongs of the Roman Luperci. He is not torn in pieces by the god's followers, but in one way or another (the legend varies in detail) is punished, by blindness or otherwise, and imprisoned in a cave.[1] Pentheus opposes the Bakchai and is torn in pieces by them. Orpheus is a royal priest of Dionysos and is torn in pieces by the Mainades—an act for which late mythologizers assign sundry fanciful reasons.[2] Rhesos is a vague figure, but it has been urged that his name may be connected with *rex* (Gothic *raiks*) and the royal Thracian name Rhescuporis. After his death he appears—the exact sense and reading are matters of dispute—to be represented by the author of the play bearing his name as becoming an oracular deity or semi-deity (ἀνθρωποδαίμων) of somewhat Dionysiac type.[3] Add to all this the facts that the Getic priest-king was called 'god'[4] and that we get as a royal name of frequent occurrence the word Kotys, which is a by-form of Kotyto, and it becomes at least plausible that the cult of Dionysos and other gods of the same kind in Thrace had at its head in early times[5] a priest-king who was the incarnation of the deity and ended by being violently put to death to make way for a fresh incarnation.

(*d*) *Orphism.*—Of the persons mentioned in the last section one is of such importance as to deserve separate treatment, viz. Orpheus. Concerning this priest-king the tradition of antiquity is fairly constant. He is a more or less historical figure;[6] he existed some time before the Trojan War;[7] he was a Thracian,[8] son of King Oiagros and a Muse, usually Kalliope, sometimes Polymnia. He was a priest of Dionysos, founder of Dionysiac mysteries, public and private, and originator of the Orphic βίος, *i.e.* way of life.[9] He was also a seer, a magician, a 'theologian' in the Greek sense of the word,[10] a marvellous musician. His home, when exactly localized, is generally said by our earlier authorities to have been Mt. Pangaion, the site of an ancient and famous Dionysiac shrine, while later writers locate him on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebros. After various adventures, the most notable of which was the descent into Hades, familiar in later literature from Vergil's handling of it in the *Georgics*, he was

[1] *Bacchæ*; *Endymion*; the 'Bacchus and Ariadne' in the National Gallery.

[2] See below, § (*g*).

[3] Plut. *Them.* 13.

[4] See Ælian, *Nat. Anim.* xii. 34. The Thracian ritual seems to have been toned down almost into a normal sacrifice.

[5] See for full references the index vol. to *GB*³, *s.v.* 'Dionysus.'

[6] For a few examples see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Greek), *ad fin.*

[7] See Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 365*a*.

[8] *GB*³, pt. vii., *The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 15.

[9] Described in his art. 'Archæology in Greece (1906–1907),' in *JHS* xxvii. [1906] 284 ff.

[10] Hence Dionysos' title Λικνίτης (Plut. *loc. cit.*); cf. Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* i. 166.

[11] A selection of the relevant passages will be found in *CGS* v. 303 f.

[1] See Soph. *Ant.* 955 ff., and Jebb, *ad loc.*

[2] For examples see Serv. on Verg. *Georg.* iv. 519.

[3] See Rohde, i. 161, who rather too confidently assumes Rhesos to have been a faded god. W. Leaf (*JHS* xxxv. [1915] 1 ff.) goes too far in the opposite direction. On the whole the present writer is of opinion that Rhesos may really have been a half-forgotten king of some Thracian tribe, who after his death was supposed to give oracles. The ancient evidence is to be found in *Il.* x.; [Eur.] *Rhes.* 955 ff.; Polyæn. vi. 53.

[4] Strabo, vii. 298.

[5] Presumably not in historical times, as one can hardly suppose that none of our authors would have mentioned it in that case.

[6] For an isolated expression of doubt see Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 38 (108), 'Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse,' which from the context is almost certainly a denial of Orpheus' existence. But Aristotle may merely have meant to deny his authorship of the 'Orphic' poems.

[7] Contemporary with the Argonauts, according to most versions of their story—*e.g.*, Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 176, and Apollonios Rhodios.

[8] 'Thracius Orpheus' (Ver. *Ec.* iv. 55) is his stock epithet.

[9] βίος is perhaps the nearest Greek equivalent of 'sect' or 'persuasion' and greatly resembles the NT use of ὁδός (Ac 9²). It signifies a form of life depending on certain religious or philosophical principles and is applied especially to the Orphic and Pythagorean bodies.

[10] *I.e.*, not a writer on the theoretical basis of religion in general, or of any particular religion, but one who describes the nature, relationships, etc., of deities. In this sense Hesiod, *e.g.*, is a 'theologian' (θεολόγος).

torn in pieces by a band of women, possessed by real or pretended Dionysiac frenzy.[1]

From what is said above it is clear that all this may have some historic foundation—*i.e.*, that the legends regarding him go back to some real happenings in connexion with the ritual of Dionysos. The death of an Orpheus, and consequently his descent into Hades, and presumably also his resurrection in a new incarnation, may have taken place, not once but many times.[2] But tradition crystallized all these forgotten personalities into one picturesque figure, the founder and Messiah of a religion of mystical other-worldliness.

The chief tenets, so far as we can reconstruct them, are as follows.[3] At the end of a long succession of deities[4] comes Dionysos-Zagreus, the son of Zeus and Persephone.[5] This god, while an infant, was beguiled by the Titans, who gave him a mirror and other toys and then tore him in pieces and devoured him, all but his heart, which was saved by Athene. The god was re-created by his father, who swallowed the heart and re-bore the child; the Titans were destroyed by the thunderbolt, and from their ashes sprang man. Man is therefore a creature of mixed origin, containing a divine principle (Dionysos) and an evil one (the Titans). The main object of his existence is to get rid of the latter element—a task which cannot be completed in one lifetime. To further it, however, it is necessary to live in strict ritual purity, avoiding the use of meat, wearing white garments, shunning the polluting presence of corpses and of women in child-birth,[6] and practising chastity,[7] all these being observances well known in ancient ritual and not peculiar to Orphism. In addition, it seems that the higher class of Orphics practised a more or less definite ethical code.[8] Side by side with all this went, as might be expected, a lower, popular form, in which a sort of begging friars drove a thriving trade in indulgences, so to call them, 'persuading not only individuals but cities,' says Plato,[9] 'that their sins can be purged with sacrifices and pleasant merry-makings'; *i.e.*, performing quasi-magical rites, effective *ex opere operato*, quite independently of the moral condition of the person concerned, at prices proportioned to the wealth or superstition of their clients.

To return to the higher forms of Orphism. After a life spent in moral and ceremonial purity the soul of the Orphic believer was rewarded in Hades, apparently for 1000 years,[10] or ten times the supposed maximum length of a human life, while those who had sinned, but not beyond remedy, were punished for the same period. After this came reincarnation, not necessarily in human form. Next came another period in Hades, and so on, the process being known apparently as the κύκλος, or cycle of reincarnations.[1] Release from this could be obtained by a series of good lives on both sides of the grave—for apparently each world was the heaven or purgatory of the other. After a triple good life on either side—three on earth and three in Hades—the soul had purged itself from the stain of 'original sin' and was free to enter a permanent paradise, with no more prospect of reincarnation, and in the enjoyment of divine or heroic[2] rank.

This theology, and much besides, was embodied in a large literature, attributed either to Orpheus himself or to his pupil Mousaios,[3] the oldest parts of which probably date from the 6th cent. B.C., while the latest representatives, the *Hymns* and Orphic *Argonautica*, are about 1000 years later.[4] Of this the greater part has perished, and especially the earliest and most valuable part; and we have of undoubted and fairly early Orphic origin only one set of documents, the so-called Petelia Tablets, gold plates found in Orphic graves in S. Italy. It appears from these that a pious Orphic was in the habit of burying with his dead friend directions for his conduct in Hades, to aid him to secure final bliss, since no doubt it was charitable to suppose that the life just completed was the last of the series of good lives required to qualify for escape from the circle.[5]

The tablets present the following picture of Hades. The soul, apparently after long and thirsty wanderings, travels along a road flanked on either side by springs. Avoiding the left-hand spring,[6] it addresses the guardians of the right-hand one, declares itself to be of divine race, and begs for a draught of 'the cold water which floweth forth from the lake of Memory.' The request is granted, and the soul is hailed as having 'endured that which aforetime it had never endured.' It addresses Persephone and the other deities of the under world and is admitted into their society.

The poem to which all these tablets go back is of unknown authorship and date, but it is evident that it or something like it stands behind the passages of Pindar and Plato already cited and also behind much that is to be found in other authors, mostly late. The connecting link is to be found in Pythagoreanism, which, it would seem, found Orphism already established in S. Italy, and incorporated much of its teaching. This results in a confusion between the two systems so complete that it is practically hopeless, with our imperfect documents, to say definitely with regard to any eschatological passage that it is purely Orphic or purely Pythagorean. Through the Pythagorean exiles who reached Greece proper after the dispersion of their communities in Magna Græcia the higher forms of the doctrine became known to Plato, in whom consequently we find side by side strong Orphic-Pythagorean influence and hearty contempt for Orphic charlatanism. Not dissimilar is the attitude of Aristophanes, who, on the one

[1] For full authorities, and variants of the myth, see Gruppe. We give a few of the leading references: priest and founder of mysteries: Eur. *Hipp.* 952 ff.; Aristoph. *Ran.* 1032; Herod. ii. 81; Plut. *Quæst. Con.* ii. 635*e*; seer: Plat. *Prot.* 316*b*; magician: Eur. *Alc.* 956 (973), *Cycl.* 639; musician: Pind. *loc. cit.*, and Verg. *loc. cit.*

[2] Cf. Proclus, *in Plat. Remp.* 398: 'Ορφεὺς ἅτε τῶν Διονύσου τελετῶν ἡγεμὼν γενόμενος τὰ ὅμοια παθεῖν λέγεται τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.

[3] The details varied (see Rohde, ii. 115 ff.; Gruppe, col. 1121 ff.). The Orphic writings being largely lost, much has to be patched together from various sources, many of them obscure.

[4] The theogony does not differ from the Hesiodic in essentials; the chief departures are the insertion of the World-egg laid by Night and of two vague deities, Phanes and Erikapaios.

[5] *I.e.* sky-god and earth-mother. Persephone = Zemelo = the Semele of the Theban myth. The source of the name Zagreus is doubtful.

[6] See esp. Eur. Κρῆτες, frag. 475*a* Dindorf, and *Hipp.* 952.

[7] See *Hipp.* 1002. Hippolytos is apparently represented as the ideal Orphist.

[8] For reference to this see *Hipp.* 992 ff., and Pind. *Ol.* ii. 76.

[9] Condensed from Plat. *Rep.* ii. 364 E.

[10] This is the figure given by Plat. *Rep.* x. 615 A, B; cf. Verg. *Æn.* vi. 748; of these the former is probably Orphic-Pythagorean, the latter contains the Orphic-sounding phrase *rotam voluere*. For other Platonic myths containing similar eschatology see J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, London, 1905; cf. A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*[2], p. 84 ff. In Pind. frag. 98 (110) the soul spends only eight years in Hades (*i.e.* an *oktaeteris*; cf. art. CALENDAR [Greek], § 3) before its final earthly life, after which it attains heroic rank.

[1] The word is found in the Petelia Tablets and elsewhere in Orphic literature. This account of Orphic eschatology is put together largely from Pind. *Ol.* ii. and frag. 98–110. In the latter we take the disputable words κοινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος as meaning 'atonement for her (Persephone's) ancient grief' (at the murder of Zagreus).

[2] The tablets have ἄλλοισι μεθ' ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξεις and also ὀλβιὲ καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο. The confusion is natural enough in a religion which has much to say of the beatified dead (ἥρωες) and also claims divine ancestry for all men. Ordinarily, a Greek sharply differentiated between a god, who did not die at all, and a hero, who had been an ordinary man but continued to live in some way after bodily death.

[3] Plat. *Rep.* ii. 363 C, 364 E, and commentators.

[4] Onomakritos edits and interpolates Musaios in the time of Hipparchos, son of Peisistratos, Herod. vii. 6; Orphic writings falsely called pre-Homeric, Herod. ii. 81.

[5] Text and tr. by G. Murray in J. E. Harrison, *Proleg.*[3], appendix.

[6] Probably Lethe, of which a soul drinks before reincarnation. The finally purified soul has no need to forget.

hand, parodies private mysteries of the Orphic type in the *Clouds* and, on the other, draws in the *Frogs* on the same type of ideas for his half-serious picture of the other world.

Another problem which we cannot solve with any great exactness is the amount of non-Thracian thought which goes to the making of Orphism as we know it. The very name of the founder is in doubt, for, while to some it appears a Thracian name,[1] others point to the occurrence of Greek cognates[2] as indicating it to be Greek. As to the doctrines, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Thracians produced so elaborate and quasi-philosophical a system of reincarnation; this is rather the result of Greek reflexion on Thracian Dionysiac material. Thrace, on the other hand, is the likeliest claimant for the grotesque myth on which the whole system rests; but here again we do not know how much was contributed by obscure superstitions from backward corners of the Greek world. The asceticism we may not unfairly call Thracian, though the details of it are not definitely non-Hellenic.

Exactly what form the Orphic religion took, in its externals, and how long it remained a potent force, cannot be very precisely determined, still less what proportion of the Greek peoples was seriously affected by it. With regard to the first point, however, it would appear that Orphism had but little organization. There was, and could be, no Orphic state anywhere, and, though there was no doubt a considerable number of Orphic congregations (θίασοι), there was no central authority to connect them, nor have we any right to suppose that they were identical with each other in doctrine and practice. It was as if there existed a form of Freemasonry in which each lodge was a law unto itself, and there was no very definite common ritual and no recognized means of communication between the various lodges. Also, though many of the greatest individual minds, notably Pythagoras and Plato, and probably Socrates also, were at one time or another affected by the cult, we have no evidence that it was a particularly numerous body. Pythagoreanism, which seems to have been much more organized and had decided political leanings, was still the faith of a minority, as is seen by its helplessness when popular feeling in Italy turned against it; Orphism, being non-political and probably still more the religion of the few, was not persecuted. As to the length of its existence, we have seen that Orphic documents were still being written in the 4th cent. A.D., but, like other productions of that epoch, they show unmistakable traces of syncretism, and of Orphism we have little or nothing outside of literature. Therefore, on the whole, we are disposed to attach less importance than Dieterich does to the undeniable coincidences between Orphic imagery, *e.g.*, and that of certain Gnostic and Christian writings; we would look for the source of that imagery, and the many common points of ritual and belief in Christian and non-Christian cults, to the numerous Hellenized Oriental faiths rather than to Orphism proper, holding that the language which once was chiefly, if not peculiarly, Orphic had become common property,[3] while Orphism itself had become very unimportant. This, however, cannot be considered as settled beyond reasonable doubt.

[1] See Tomaschek, ii. 52.

[2] Orphe, given as a Laconian name in Serv. on Verg. *Buc.* viii. 29; the Boeotian name Ὀρφώνδας; ὀρφός, the name of a fish in Ælian, *Nat. Anim.* xii. 1; and the root of the adj. ὀρφναῖος.

[3] Thus the 'cold water' of the formula above quoted is found again on Osirian tombs (G. Kaibel, *IG Siciliæ et Italiæ*, Berlin, 1890, nos. 1488, 1705, etc.), and on at least one which is traditionally Greek in its wording, *ib.* no. 1342; finally appearing as the Christian *refrigerium*; cf. the 'water of life' of the NT.

We may now consider briefly the moral value of the Dionysiac and Orphic cults. That they were immoral in the obvious sense is not likely. It is true that Livy,[1] *e.g.*, makes out Dionysiac orgies to have been horrible riots of lust and violence; but he is speaking of a late form of the worship, far from its native place, and has all the Roman prejudice against any secret conventicle—the same prejudice which later gave rise to the same tales about the early meetings of the Christians. But in a broader sense we may say that all such cults were immoral, for they were untrue to Hellenism, replacing its clear envisagement of the facts of life with a misty other-worldliness, sure to lead to intellectual decay, however brilliant the first flowerings of its mysticism might be in such a mind as that of Plato. Not till the nonage of the ancient world did such doctrines really become prevalent; and the overthrow of the Pythagorean communities, primarily political, may be thought of as also an unconscious revolt against a force traitorous to Greek civilization.[2]

(*e*) *Artemis.*—Here we need have no doubt that Herodotos is not to be taken too literally. All we have any reason to believe—since of a Thracian origin of the cult of Artemis properly so called we have not the faintest trace—is that some great nature-goddess was worshipped in that country. We can give at least two names of such deities. Kotyto, or Kotys, though generally spoken of as Phrygian, was also Edonian.[3] Another deity, who was to some extent naturalized in Greece in fairly early times,[4] was Bendis, whose cult is mentioned together with that of Kotyto by Strabo.[5] Of the details of her worship we know but little; the torch-race mentioned by Plato[6] fits well enough with any deity equated with the torch-bearing Artemis, but is by no means peculiar to her; and of the native worship of her we hear chiefly that it was noisy.[7] Probably enough there were a score of such female personifications of the fertility of nature, worshipped with orgiastic rites not unlike those of Dionysos himself, possibly in connexion with him.[8]

(*f*) *Hermes.*—With regard to Herodotos' statement that the Thracian kings especially venerate Hermes, we are not aware that any very convincing explanation has been offered, but, in view of the facts mentioned in the next paragraph, we suggest that he means Hermes Chthonios and identifies with him some one of the deities after the pattern of Zalmoxis.

(*g*) *Zalmoxis.*[9]—Our chief authority for this deity is again Herodotos, who informs us[10] that the

[1] xxxix. 10, and elsewhere in his description of the Bacchanalian affair.

[2] The above account of the origin and progress of Orphism, while in our opinion the correct one, has been controverted by R. Eisler (*Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, Munich, 1910, ch. v.). He endeavours to prove that its origin is due to Asiatic, particularly Persian, influences, and this theory is accepted by some later writers (*e.g.*, Mrs. A. Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life*, London, 1915, p. 274). We hold that, with all deference to Eisler's great learning and industry, his arguments are wholly insufficient for the Orphism of the times of Pythagoras or of Plato, whatever light they may throw on the mongrel system which at the beginning of the Christian era went by that name.

[3] Æsch. Ἠδωνοί, frag. 55 Dindorf: σεμνὰ Κότυς ἐν Ἠδωνοῖς; cf. the common royal name Kotys.

[4] 419 B.C., see Plat. *Rep.* i. 327 A ff.; cf. schol. *ad loc.* and commentators.

[5] *Loc. cit.* [6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] βαρβαρικὸς κλύδων, Procl. in *Tim.* 26e.

[8] Or in conjunction with some of the other Dionysiac deities, such as Sabazios (Thraco-Phrygian).

[9] Also called Gebeleïzis (Herod. *loc. cit.*). The name is generally written Ζάλμοξις, but with one exception the MSS of Herodotos give Ζάλμοξις. As σ and ζ are often confused in Thracian, both forms may be correct.

[10] iv. xciv f. Part of this passage, xciv. 4, runs: οὗτοι οἱ αὐτοὶ Θρῆικες καὶ πρὸς βροντήν τε καὶ ἀστραπὴν τοξεύοντες ἄνω πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπειλέουσι τῷ θεῷ, οὐδένα ἄλλον θεὸν νομίζοντες εἶναι εἰ μὴ τὸν σφέτερον. This has been oddly misunderstood,

Getai worshipped him, and so exclusively that they regarded no one else as a true god, even the heavens themselves. What his nature was we can gather in part from the rationalistic story told of him, that he was a slave of Pythagoras, who, returning home, taught a variant of his master's philosophy, insisting especially on the immortality awaiting the faithful. To prove this, he disappeared for a time, hiding in an underground room; after three years he returned, and so made every one believe that he had been in Hades and was come again. It is noteworthy that the same story is told of Pythagoras himself,[1] and it smacks strongly of the tales, Greek and other, of superhuman persons who live in caves or under mountains and thence return occasionally or in some way intervene in human affairs.[2] With this story we must join the decided suspicion of Herodotos himself[3] that Zalmoxis is a local divinity, not a mortal at all, and the statement of Strabo[4] that he was worshipped in an ἀντρώδες χωρίον in Mt. Kogaionon. He is clearly, like Dionysos himself, a god belonging to the under world, but not excluded from the surface of the earth, on which, we may perhaps suppose from the myth, he was thought to appear every year, as Dionysos frequently did every second.[5] As an infernal deity, he received a curious sacrifice, if sacrifice is the proper term to apply to what seems to have been rather a sort of fantastic messenger service. Once every four years the Getai chose a man by lot, whom they tossed in the air and caught on spear-points. If he died, he was deemed to have become immortal;[6] if not, the god had rejected him, and he was disgraced. Before being tossed, he was charged with the messages of the people to the deity—a curious form of the idea, found among many races, that the dying can take to the dead the mandates of the living.[7]

(*h*) *Other religious practices.*—Besides the cult of definite gods, we have a few facts relative to the general religious attitude of the Thracians. In particular, we have Herodotos'[8] description of a funeral ceremony, which sounds oddly like Homer's account of the funeral of Patroklos. The corpse, if of an important man, lies in state three days, during which mourning and sacrificial feasts go on; finally there comes the actual funeral, when the body is buried or burned, a mound raised, and games of various kinds, the principal one being a single combat, are celebrated. This was the usual rite, and it indicates at any rate high honour paid to the dead.[9] The duel especially may reasonably be thought to be a form of blood-sacrifice. This, in some of the wilder tribes, was no mere form; beyond Krestone, we are told, lived a race which practised *sati*; the favourite wife, chosen, it would seem, after careful examination of the claims of the whole *harîm* by the surviving relatives, was sacrificed by her next-of-kin at the tomb and then buried with her husband.[1] The Trausoi again made a death a subject of rejoicing, and mourned at a birth.[2] We see, then, that the whole of Thracian religion was permeated by the idea of the vast importance of the future life.

(*i*) *Summary: general characteristics of Thracian religion.*—We find in Thrace a religion of a barbarous kind, but by no means incapable of development into something higher and more spiritual. The chief marks of barbarism, besides the revolting character of some of the rites, were (*a*) the largely magical character of much of the ceremonial, unconnected with anything either ethical or spiritual, and tending rather to excite than to elevate; and (*b*) the materialistic conception of the future life. Gods such as Zalmoxis live underground, occasionally intervening for the bodily good of their worshippers[3] and rewarding the faithful departed with drunken feasts; or so one gathers from the rationalizing story of Zalmoxis already quoted, in which he is represented as feasting the Thracians, and the taunt of Plato that the inferior sort of Orphics considered eternal drunkenness the highest possible felicity.[4] This is not to say that Thracian religion was always of a sensual character. It is noteworthy that the northern races, or some of them, had a reputation not only for courage but also for virtue and even for superhuman powers.

Thus the Getai are the 'bravest and most righteous' of the Thracians; the holy Hyperboreans live somewhere near the Thracian region; in and near the neighbouring Scythian country are the sacred and ascetic Argippaioi, the just Issedones, and the Neuroi, who are all magicians, besides the Sauromatai, who are of Amazonian stock; while the glorified shade of Achilles haunts various localities of the Black Sea region.[5]

A great part at least of this persistent attribution of saintly or magical distinction to the northern districts may well have for its justification the natural complement of the strong sexuality of those races—asceticism, which, as we have already seen, was a strong feature of Orphism. Another reason no doubt is simply the fact that many of these peoples were distant and unknown.[6] Yet another is, quite likely, the existence, not of whole nations, but of castes, which were priestly. We have already seen that the Bessoi certainly, and other tribes probably, had divine kings, and this often enough, as in Egypt, means the domination of a sacerdotal clan or caste.

To sum up, therefore, Thrace had, so far as we can learn from the observations of its nearest civilized neighbours in classical times, a religion predominantly chthonian, other-worldly, orgiastic, gloomy, often cruel and barbaric, but not unspiritual—a sharp contrast with the brightness of the characteristic Greek cult of the Olympian deities.

LITERATURE.—(i.) *Ethnology, etc., of Thrace*: J. A. Tomaschek, *Die alten Thraker*, pt. i., 'Übersicht der Stämme,' *SBAW* cxxviii. [1893] pt. ii., 'Die Sprachreste,' *SBAW* cxxx. [1893].

as if τῷ θεῷ meant 'their god,' which would involve a contradiction in terms: 'They threaten the god they believe in because they don't believe in him.' The correct translation is of course 'Heaven' or 'Zeus'; cf. lxxix. 1 f.: ἐνεθύμησε Διονύσῳ Βακχείῳ τελεσθῆναι . . . ὁ θεὸς (Zeus, not Dionysos) ἐνέσκηψε βέλος, and many other passages in which ὁ θεὸς means 'sky' or 'heavenly bodies.'

[1] Hermippos, *ap.* Diog. Laert. viii. 41. This story is perhaps imitated from the one in Herodotos, which probably is an invention of the Greeks of the Pontos.

[2] Examples in Rohde, i 111 ff.

[3] iv. 96. [4] vii. 298.

[5] His festivals were regularly trieteric, *i.e.* in alternate years, by the Greek (inclusive) method of counting. Did this originate in a custom of shifting the cultivation every other year, vouched for by Horace, *Od.* iii. 24, 'nec cultura placet longior annua,' as occurring among the Getai? Among a people backward in agriculture the practice may well have varied, the period of cultivation lasting for one, two, or three years in different districts according to the richness of the soil. The author owes this suggestion to Farnell.

[6] iv. 93: Γέτας τοὺς ἀθανατίζοντας (this becomes their stock epithet); v. 3.

[7] The idea is particularly common in modern Greek ballads.

[8] v. 8.

[9] The exact interpretation given to these facts depends upon the view taken of the origin of ἀγῶνες in general. The present writer holds that they do not originate in funeral ceremonies, or connote divine or quasi-divine honours, though they are often associated with both. The duel, however, is, like the Etruscan gladiatorial shows, definitely a sacrificial rite in this case.

[1] v. 5.

[2] v. 4; cf. Eur. Κρεσφόντης, frag. 452 Dind.

[3] Plato (*Charm.* 156 D) mentions 'physicians of Zalmoxis' and appears playfully to interpret ἀναθανατίζειν as referring to their skill. They were probably a sort of shamans or medicine-men, who may, like their Siberian confrères, have combined medicine and prophecy.

[4] *Rep.* ii. 363 D.

[5] See Herod. iv. 13, 32–36, 23, 26, 105, 110 f., 55; cf. Lykophron, *Alex.* 186 ff.

[6] Cf. the piety of the Homeric Ethiopians (*Il.* i. 423).

The former deals chiefly with history and ethnology, the latter with linguistics.

(ii.) *Thracian cults*: L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896–1909, v. (Ares, Dionysos): J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*², Cambridge, 1908 (Dionysos; also Orphism); see also the articles 'Bendis,' 'Dionysos,' 'Kotys,' in Roscher.

(iii.) *Orphism and related cults*: see esp. E. Rohde, *Psyche*⁴, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1907; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*², Leipzig, 1913; O. Gruppe, art. 'Orpheus' in Roscher; E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig and Prague, 1885 (texts).

Further references to ancient and modern authorities will be found in the above works.

H. J. ROSE.

THRESHOLD.—See DOOR.

THUGS.—See THAGS.

THUNDER.—See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, STORM, STORM-GODS.

TIBET.—The Tibetans are entitled to be regarded as one of the most 'religious' peoples in the world, if by 'religion' is understood not only 'the belief in spiritual beings,'[1] but also the *binding* influence of that belief, as formulated by their Church, for the better regulation of their worldly actions in everyday life, and for procuring for them by pious observance of the inculcated maxims the satisfying hope of a higher position in the life after death. Not only is the proportion of the population in Tibet which devotes its life to religion greater than that in any other country, being at least about one to eight of the population[2] — monks, nuns, non-celibate priests, and neophytes—but the life of the laity is also dominated and pervaded by their religion to an exceptional extent.

1. Climatic environments.—The peculiarities in the climate and physical character of Tibet, and its topographical position, between the two great civilizations on either side, the Indian and the Chinese, from both of which it has derived the elements of its composite form of Buddhism, explain to a considerable extent the peculiarities of its religion. The vast awe-inspiring solitudes with the rigorous nature of the climate have impressed themselves visibly on the religion of the country. And Nature has contributed, by the massive physical barriers she has erected against access to that land, to maintain to the present day the isolation of that country from the rest of the world, and thus to preserve the more ancient and archaic forms of religion and superstitions.

Perched on the summit of the great plateau of Central Asia, and stretching across over twenty-two degrees of longitude, in the palæarctic region, from the Himālayas to the Kuen-lun mountains and Western China, it includes the loftiest tableland on the surface of the earth. Although generally called a plateau, it is in fact covered with innumerable hills and mountains, cut up by ravines, the stretches of level land being relatively few and far apart. The general elevation of the permanently inhabited tract seldom falls below 11,000 feet above sea-level, while a very great extent of the country exceeds 16,000 feet, which is about the limit there of perpetual snow. Its highest border lies along the Himālayas, rising in mountains, the highest on the globe, from which its surface slopes gradually eastwards into China—a feature explained by the fact that in not very remote geological times the land of Tibet formed part of the bottom of the China Sea of the Pacific; and the writer has picked up fossil shells on the Tibetan side of the Himālayas which were of the same species as those he obtained from similar strata-

[1] E. B. Tylor, *PC*³ i. 424.

[2] The census of the population hitherto taken was that by the Chinese in 1737, which gave the proportion of the Lāmas as one to three of the total population. At the present day about one to eight appears to be near the mark, in accordance with the present writer's own observations and those of W. W. Rockhill.

formations on the outskirts of Peking. This also explains why the Mongolic racial elements and the Chinese forms of civilization predominate in Tibet, and why China has maintained for so long its suzerainty there.

Geographically, it is usual to divide Tibet latitudinally into North (Chang) and South (Kham), the North-land comprising all the Northern and Central and much of Western Tibet, and the South comprising South and South-Eastern Tibet. This division is also generally followed by the Tibetans themselves, though they erect Central and South-Western Tibet (U-Tsang), with their twin centres of Lāmaism, at Lhāsa and Tāshilhunpo, into a separate, and for them the chief, division of their country, which they call Bod (pronounced Pöt). The former division they call sTod-Bod (pronounced Tö-Pöt), or 'Upper Bod,' which is the origin of our modern name 'Tibet,' derived from the phonetic spelling of mediæval European travellers to whom only this northern division was accessible, and latterly applied by Europeans to the whole of Bod, though wrongly so. This is also the source of the Chinese name for the country of T'u-Fan, or 'the land of the *T'u* barbarians of the West.'

The northern division, or Chang, through its extreme altitude, has a terrible climate and is uninhabited for the greater part of the year, being mostly used as summer-grazing grounds by nomad shepherds and traversed by miners and occasional caravans of merchants at that season. It consists of a series of parallel mountain-ranges running east and west, with muddy valleys intervening. In these depressions lie a great number of lake-basins, many of which have no outlet, so that their water is salt, and some of their shores are white with borax crystals. It is an altogether treeless region, interspersed with grassy tracts used for summer pasturage. On the other hand, Central and more especially South-Eastern Tibet, which are of considerably lower elevation, are traversed by the Brahmaputra, and upper reaches of the Irrawady, Mekong, Salween, and Yangtse rivers and their tributaries are for a considerable part wooded, enjoy a less rigorous climate, and are the seat of most of the settled population. But the total population of the whole country is probably not more than 3,500,000[1]—*i.e.* a little less than the entire population of Scotland. Snow falls more or less, even at Lhāsa, in every month of the year.

2. Popular religion.—Living in such a rigorous climate and isolated amidst such severe surroundings, the Tibetan builds his daily fears and hopes on his religion, and, despite its inveterate devil-worship, it is not without its elevating and inspiring influence. The current of Buddhism which runs through its tangled paganism has brought to the Tibetan most of the little civilization which he possesses, and has raised him correspondingly in the scale of humanity, lifting him above a life of semi-barbarism by setting before him higher hopes and aims, by giving milder meanings to his demonist mythology, by discountenancing sacrifice of animal lives, and by inculcating universal charity and tenderness to all living things. Their Buddhism, unlike that of the Burmese, is not, however, an educational factor in secular teaching or in the mysteries of their religion; for the Lāmas, while living on the laity by their ministrations as priests, restrict their learning to themselves, like the Brāhmans and most priestly orders of old, and they contemptuously call the laity 'the dark (ignorant) people' (*mi-nag-pa*) and 'the worldly ones' (*hjig-rten-pa*), though they condescendingly

[1] This is the estimate of W. W. Rockhill (*Land of the Lāmas*, p. 296), and it generally agrees with that of the present writer.

also call them 'the givers of alms' (*sbyinbdag*), at the same time making it understood that it is the donors who benefit most by the exercise of this charity. And certainly the last epithet is well deserved, for the Tibetans, the most priest-ridden people in the world, are among the most lavish in their religious gifts.

Notwithstanding the large amount of non-Buddhist elements in Lāmaism, derived from the pre-Buddhist shamanism of the Bon-cult,[1] it is surprising to find how deeply the everyday life and notions of the laity are leavened by the Buddhist spirit. The doctrine of metempsychosis and its *karma* and the potency of acquired merit by good deeds enters into the ordinary habits and speech of the people to a remarkable extent. Their proverbs, folk-lore, songs, and lay dramas are full of it; and they explain human as well as animal friendships on this principle. Even practices which are clearly dishonest and sinful are at times justified on the same principle, or rather by its abuse. Thus the more sordid Tibetan reconciles cheating to his conscience by naively convincing himself that the person whom he now attempts to defraud had previously swindled him 'in a former existence,' and that justice demands retribution. Congenital defects, even such as blindness, dumbness, and lameness, and also accidents are viewed as retributions due to the individual having in a previous life abused or sinned with the particular limb or organ now affected. Indeed this is the orthodox dogma of Buddha's own teaching and forms the basis of the *Jātakas*, or tales of the previous births of Buddha, which are diffused by itinerant or friar Lāmas, and greatly impress the people; a few of the better-known *Jātakas* in manuscript copy or in block-printed booklets form, with the manuals of ritual and divination, the chief books of those Tibetan laity who are able to read; and they also form the subject of the chief dramas enacted by the laity.

This wide-spread belief in metempsychosis also influences the people in the treatment of their cattle and other dumb animals. They treat these exceptionally humanely, and life is seldom wantonly taken. The taking of animal life unnecessarily, even for food, is largely prohibited, and, although in such a cold climate animal food is an essential staple of diet, the professional butchers are stigmatized as sinners and are the most despised of all classes in the country. Yet human prisoners are at times cruelly tortured and mutilated, possibly in some measure after the example set by the Chinese, and possibly in some measure as a deterrent from crime among a rather lawless people. But nearly every crime, even the most heinous, the murdering of a Lāma, may be condoned by a fixed scale of fines; and, when the fine is not forthcoming, the punishment is inflicted, and the prisoner, if not actually killed, is set free, mutilated or maimed (as there are no prisons), to serve as a public warning to other evil-doers. Many of the maimed and blind beggars who swarm around Lhāsa are criminals punished in this way.

The tolerant spirit of Buddhism has, however, stamped more or less distinctly the national character, the mildness of which contrasts strongly with the rough and semi-barbarous exterior of the people. Testimony to this trait is afforded by the experiences of all intimate observers of the people in their own country, as recorded by the present writer and others. Huc, writing of the lay regent of Lhāsa, describes him as a man whose 'large features, mild and remarkably pallid, breathed a truly royal majesty,' while 'his dark eyes, shaded by long lashes, were intelligent and gentle.'[2]

[1] See below, § 3.
[2] *Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China*[2], Eng. tr., ii. 168.

Similarly Rockhill and others have described many of the headmen and leading Lāmas with whom they came into intimate contact.[1] The spirit of consideration for others expresses itself in many grateful acts of genuine politeness and kindness. Tibetans usually present a stirrup-cup of wine to the departing visitor or traveller, bidding him God-speed and adding, 'May we be able to present you with another as welcome on your return.' The seller of an article other than eatables usually gives his blessing to the buyer in terms such as these: 'May good come upon you,' 'May you live long,' 'May no sickness happen,' 'May you grow rich,' to which the buyer replies with 'Thanks'—'*Thug-rje-chhe*,' literally 'Great mercy,' which recalls the French *merci* tendered on similar occasions.

The personal names of both boys and girls are largely borrowed from mystical Buddhism—*e.g.*, Dor-je-tshe-ring, 'the thunder-bolt of long life,' Dolma (spelt *sgRol-ma*, the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit name Tārā, the Indian goddess of mercy); and the influence of this religious habit is also seen in the names of various places.

The common oaths or plights of asseveration are mainly Buddhist in character. The oath most commonly used by merchants and the laity as an asseveration in ordinary conversation is, 'By the Powerful Saint' (Sākyamuni, *i.e.* Buddha), or 'By the three Holiest Ones'—the Buddhist Trinity.

The non-Buddhist features and practices of the Tibetan religion, however, are also conspicuous, and reflect their pre-Buddhist cult, the shamanistic Bon. The physical environment of their life, in their rigorous climate where they see Nature in her roughest mood, in pitiless fury of storms and cold, terrorizing the brave as well as the timid, has impelled them to worship the more obvious forces of Nature as malignant demons which seem to wreck their fields and flocks, and vex them with disease and disaster. Their inveterate craving for material protection against those malignant gods and demons, as they thought them to be, has caused them to pin their faith on the efficacy of charms and amulets, which cherished objects are seen everywhere dangling from the dress of every man, woman, and child, not even excepting the Lāmas themselves. These charms, as we have seen,[2] are mostly sentences of Sanskrit texts borrowed from mystical Indian Buddhism, and they are supplemented by bodily and other relics of holy Lāmas, such as bits of their dress, crumbs dropped by them, nail-parings, etc.; and by these charms the Tibetans believe that they muzzle or bind or banish the devils.

A more cheerful and graceful side to their worship is seen in their popular practice of planting the tall inscribed 'prayer-flags,' which picturesquely flutter in the breeze around every village, and in the strings of inscribed flaglets which flaunt from house-tops, bridges, sacred trees, and passes, and from other places believed to be specially infested by malignant spirits or sprites.

As the people live in an atmosphere of the marvellous, no story is too absurd for them to credit, if only it is told by Lāmas. They are ever on the outlook for omens, and the everyday affairs of life are governed by a superstitious regard for lucky and unlucky days and the influences of unpropitious planetary portents. Although special divinations are sought from professed astrologer Lāmas in the more serious events in life—in birth, marriage, sickness, and death, and often in sowing, reaping, building, etc.—each layman determines for himself the auguries for the more trivial matters

[1] See, *e.g.*, the description by the present writer of the regent of Tibet (*Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 401 f.).
[2] See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Tibetan).

of his ordinary business, for travelling, buying and selling, mending, etc.[1] And yet we are apt to forget that Confucius and Cicero—to mention only these instances—believed in astrological auguries.

Pilgrimages to sacred shrines are very popular,[2] and little is thought of the hardships and expenses of long journeys for this purpose. Every opportunity is seized to visit celebrated shrines and to circumambulate the numerous holy buildings and sacred spots.

Prayers ever hang upon the lips of the people in the intervals of their work and even during their work. But the prayers are addressed chiefly to devils, threatening them with punishment through the saints and deified Buddhas, or imploring them for freedom or release from their inflictions;[3] or they are plain, naive requests for aid in obtaining the good things of this life. At all spare times, day and night, the people ply their prayer-wheels (*q.v.*), and tell their beads and mutter especially the mystic Sanskrit six-syllabled spell, *Oṁ ma-ṇi pad-me Hūṁ!*, '*Oṁ!* the jewel in the lotus *Hūṁ*,'[4] the sentence which, they are led to believe, gains them their goal, the glorious heaven of eternal bliss, the paradise of the fabulous Buddha of Boundless Light (Amitābha) or 'the Boundless Life' (Amitāyus [*q.v.*]). Yet with all their strivings the Tibetans seem never to obtain real peace of mind in religious matters.

3. Bon or pre-Buddhist religion.—The aboriginal pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet is called by the people *Bon* (pronounced *Pön*); and those who profess it are called *Bon-pa*, *i.e.* 'the Bons.' The meaning of the word is unknown. It is essentially a shamanist, devil-charming, necromantic cult with devil-dancing, allied to the Taoism of China, and, like the latter, has become largely intermixed with Buddhist externals. But it still retains its essentially demonist character. It was actively suppressed and its establishments were destroyed by the Tibetan rulers on their conversion to Buddhism from the 7th cent. A.D. onwards, at the instigation of the Lāmas, as it indulged freely in animal and human sacrifices; and it is still strictly forbidden by the Lāmaist hierarchy which holds the temporal rule in Central and Western Tibet. But it is still largely and openly professed over the greater part of Eastern and South-Eastern Tibet, the most populous part of the country, which for many centuries has been under Chinese rule and outside the domination of the Grand Lāmas. Indeed it was an appeal by the people of these provinces to China to protect them and their Bon religion that induced the Chinese to administer these provinces on behalf of the Bons. This unsuspected fact of the wide prevalence of the Bon religion there was brought to light by W. W. Rockhill in his extensive travels in these provinces,[5] where he found it to be much more popular and prevalent than Lāmaism. It was especially popular among the settled agricultural people, whilst the nomads, whose business led them into the territory of the Grand Lāmas, were more attached to Lāmaism. So numerous were its adherents that Rockhill estimated that about two-thirds of the population of Tibet were Bons. In Central and Western Tibet, where the repressive policy of the Lāmas prevents the profession of the Bon cult, it is rare to meet with any Bon priest. The present writer has met only a few itinerant priests who were clandestinely performing their demonist rites for villages in remote places; they were wholly illiterate and uncouth-looking men, exceptionally dirty, with long shaggy hair, and bedecked with little tufts of wool and tiny flags; and they indulged in devil-dancing antics and incoherent chants.

In Eastern Tibet, however, where they are free to practise their cult, the Bon priests live in large flourishing monasteries, which they call *gom-pas*, like the Lāmaist establishments; and they have many images of gods and saints and demons generally resembling in appearance those of Lāmaism, but bearing different names. Their chief god they call gShen-rabs Mi-bo, who is reputed to be a deified priest analogous to the Lāmaist Padma Sambhava. They have bulky printed and MS books of ritual, which Rockhill found to consist of a Sanskritic jargon for the most part interspersed with other meaningless words. The present writer observed that the words in some of their MSS, which are written in the Tibetan script, were the Lāmaist Sanskritic words spelt backwards: the lotus-jewel formula of the Lāmas[1] was spelt 'Muh-em-pad-ni-mo,' thus, while attesting their borrowing from Lāmaism, emphasizing their anti-Lāmaist character. The *swastika* also, which they use extensively, is invariably figured with its ends or 'feet' turned in the reverse direction to that of the *swastika* proper (the feet of the latter turn to the right in the direction of the sun's course), and thus indicate the Bon cult to be of a lunar character, which is evident not only from the bloody sacrifices, but also from the predominance of the dragon-worship therein.

A significant glimpse into the original character of the Bon cult is obtained from the Chinese annals of the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. (*i.e.* before the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet), where the rites of the Tibetans are described:

> 'The officers (Tibetan) are assembled once every year for the lesser oath of fealty. They sacrifice sheep, dogs, and monkeys, first breaking their legs, and then killing them afterwards, exposing the intestines and cutting them into pieces. The sorcerers having been summoned, they call on the gods of heaven and earth, of the mountains and rivers, of the sun, moon, stars and planets, saying: "Should your hearts become changed, and your thoughts disloyal, the gods will see clearly and make you like these sheep and dogs." Every three years there is a grand ceremony, during which all are assembled *in the middle of the night* on a raised altar, on which are spread savoury meats. *The victims sacrificed are men*, horses, oxen, and asses, and prayers are offered up in this form: "Do you all with one heart and united strength cherish our native country. The god of heaven and the spirit of the earth will both know your thoughts, and if you break this oath, they will cause your bodies to be cut into pieces like unto these victims."'[2]

Even in the Buddhist period, in the 8th cent. A.D., similar bloody rites were celebrated by the professing Buddhist king of Tibet in concluding a treaty with the Chinese.[3]

The attire of the Bon priest in his special celebrations[4] is a coat of mail armour, from the shoulders of which project small flags, and a high-crowned hat bordered by effigies of human skulls and ornamented by flags and tufts of wool; a sword and shield are in the hands to fight the demons. (The black-hatted devil-dancers are of the Bon sect.) On ordinary occasions they wear a red robe, and occasionally have human skulls embroidered on their dress. Their hair is worn shaggy, and not tonsured like the Lāmas. They offer on their altars wool and yak hair, and images of men and animals made of dough, presumably, as shown by the present writer, instead of the sacrificed animal of the primitive cult.

Whilst the present-day Bon religion has acquired many of the externals of Lāmaism, many of the elements of the old Bon religion have been incorporated into the latter, just as so many of the pagan rites of Roman and Celtic heathendom have

[1] See art. DIVINATION (Buddhist).
[2] See art. PILGRIMAGE (Buddhist), § (*d*).
[3] See art. PRAYER (Tibetan).
[4] See art. JEWEL (Buddhist).
[5] *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet*, pp. 68, 86 f.

[1] See art. JEWEL (Buddhist), § 7.
[2] S. W. Bushell, 'Early History of Tibet from Chinese Sources,' in *JRAS*, 1880, p. 441.
[3] Cf. L. A. Waddell, 'Ancient Historical Edicts at Lhāsa,' in *JRAS*, 1909, p. 941.
[4] See the figure in L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 50.

been incorporated into the later Christianity. The reformed Lāmaist Church of the Yellow-hat sect employ many rites which are transparently Bon, such as the necromantic expelling of the death-demon and the demons of sickness, and much of their divination-ritual. The unreformed Red-hat sects practise the old Bon rites to a much greater extent, including the erection of masts attached to dogs' and sheep's skulls, to 'bar the door' to the earth- and sky-demons.[1]

4. Lāmaism and its sects and rites.—The various aspects of Lāmaism and its sects and rites have already been described in previous articles.[2]

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TIME.—1. Introductory.—Temporal characteristics are among the most fundamental in the objects of our experience, and therefore cannot be defined. We must start by admitting that we can in certain cases judge that one experienced event is later than another, in the same immediate way as we can judge that one seen object is to the right of another. A good example of the immediate judgment in question is when we hear a tune and judge that of two notes, both of which come in our specious present, one precedes the other. Another direct judgment about earlier and later is made in genuine memory. On these relations of before and after which we immediately recognize in certain objects of our experience all further knowledge of time is built.

It must be noticed that the relation, as given in experience, connects what we may call protensive events, *i.e.* events that have some duration, and not momentary events or moments. We are not directly aware of events without duration, still less of moments of empty time, and therefore are not directly aware of the relations between such objects. Momentary events, moments of time, and the relations which order them in a series are all known only after a long process of reflexion, abstraction, and intellectual construction. This does not necessarily imply that they do not exist in nature, still less that they are subjective and arbitrary; all that is meant at present is that they are not the objects of direct awareness. Again we must notice that the relations of before, after, and simultaneous with, as given in experience, are not mutually exclusive. Protensive events may very well overlap, and therefore we must recognize that the most general relation between them is that of partial precedence or consequence. Of course, when we become familiar with the conception of momentary events and see how convenient it is, we tend to define partial precedence in terms of them and their relation of total precedence. But the opposite direction must be followed if we want to start with the experienced facts and trace the logical development from them of the scientific notion of time. We must take the experienced relation of partial precedence as fundamental and define momentary events, moments, and the relation of total precedence in terms of partial precedence and events of finite duration.

That such a course is possible is shown by the fact that it has recently been followed to a satisfactory conclusion by Norbert Wiener in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, and by A. N. Whitehead in his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. We may compare the duration of experienced events with the extension of visible and tangible objects, and the relation of partial precedence with the partial overlapping of two extended objects in the field of vision. The problem of defining momentary events, moments, and the serial relation of before and after in terms of protensive events and partial precedence is closely comparable to that of defining material points, geometrical points, and the relations of before and after on a straight line in terms of extended objects and their partial overlapping. The problem for time is, however, easier than that for space, because in the former we have only to deal with a relation that generates a one-dimensional series, whilst with the latter the experienced facts force us to define a three-dimensional manifold.

2. Time and space.—The analogy between time and space has long been recognized; and it will be useful to consider at this point just how far it goes and where it is supposed to break down. Let us consider the likenesses and the alleged differences.

(*a*) *Likenesses.*—(1) Most objects of immediate experience possess a kind of magnitude called extensity, and such objects stand in certain immediately recognizable relations to other objects of the same sense experienced along with themselves. Also the parts of any one such object have relations of this kind to each other. Similarly the objects of our experience have another kind of magnitude called protensity or duration. Such objects have to others of the same kind the relation of partial (or, in special cases, total) precedence, and this relation can be recognized immediately. Likewise the parts of a single specious present can be seen to have this relation to each other.

(2) The relations in each case have magnitude. Just as one object in the field of view can be more to the right of another than a third, so one event in the field of memory or in the specious present can precede another event by a longer interval than some third one.

(3) In each region there is the same close and peculiar connexion between the kind of magnitude possessed by the terms and the kind possessed by the relations. It is possible to say that the interval between two events A and B is as long as the duration of some event C, just as it is possible to say that the distance between two sticks laid in the same straight line is the same as the length of some third stick.

(4) It is commonly believed that, when the analysis is made into moments and momentary events, all the events in the history of the world fall into their places in a single series of moments. So too it is supposed that, when the analysis is made into material and geometrical points, all the points in the world take their places in a single three-dimensional series of geometrical points.[1]

(*b*) *Alleged differences.*—(1) It is commonly held that all events have temporal relations to each other, but that psychical events have no spatial relations. This is denied by a small number of philosophers, notably by Samuel Alexander.

[1] *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 484 f.

[2] See artt. ABBOT (Tibetan); ATIŚA; BHUTĀN, BUDDHISM IN; CELIBACY (Tibetan); CHARMS AND AMULETS (Tibetan); CHORTEN; DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Tibetan); DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Tibetan); DIVINATION (Buddhist); FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Tibetan); IMAGES AND IDOLS (Tibetan); INCARNATION (Tibetan); INITIATION (Tibetan); JEWEL (Buddhist); LĀMAISM; LOTUS (Indian); PADMASAMBHAVA; PRAYER (Tibetan).

[1] We shall consider later what the Theory of Relativity has to say as to the impossibility of separating time and space and as to the notion of one single time-series.

Without questioning the possibility of correlating psychical events with positions in space, we must hold that this alleged difference is a genuine one. If in introspection we do contemplate our states of mind in the same sense as in perception we contemplate other objects, it seems clear that our states of mind show no trace of being extended or standing in spatial relations, but do have duration and stand in temporal ones. Alexander would, however, deny that we can contemplate our states of mind. If this be so, it would of course be quite possible that we should fail to become aware of the spatial characteristics of our mental states, even though they possess them; but of course we have no right to pass from this merely negative position to the conclusion that they actually do possess them. Alexander's positive reasons are bound up with a large and complex metaphysical theory into which we cannot here enter. In any case the present difference is merely an external one, and would not affect the essential similarity of space and time.

(2) A much more important point is that time is said essentially to involve the distinction between past, present, and future as well as that between before and after. Now nothing in space obviously corresponds to these distinctions in time.

(3) Closely connected with this alleged difference are a number of rather vague statements often made—*e.g.*, that parts of space co-exist, but that only the present moment exists.

These two supposed differences between space and time may be treated together. They rest largely on confusions into which it is very natural to fall. The distinction between past, present, and future is not one which, like that between before and after, lies wholly in the experienced objects, but is one that rests on the relations between experienced objects and the states of mind in which they are experienced. To begin with, the distinction between present and not-present at any rate may be usefully compared with that between here and elsewhere in space. Here means near my body; elsewhere means distant from my body. If we want an analogy to the distinction between past and future, we can find one in the distinction between things before and things behind our body. It is true, however, that this analogy is incomplete, and that for an important reason, though one extraneous to the nature of time. The reason is that our practical and cognitive relations towards the future are different from those towards the past. We know a part of the past at any rate directly by memory, but we know the future only indirectly by probable inference. There is no analogy to this in space; our knowledge of what is behind our body is of the same kind and of the same degree of certainty as our knowledge of what is in front of it. But we may imagine that a distinction like that between past and future would have arisen for space also, if we had been able to see straight in front of us but had never been able to turn our heads or our bodies round.

The distinction is sometimes drawn that the past is fixed and unalterable, while the future depends, in part at any rate, on our volitions. In what sense is this true?

Without involving ourselves in controversies about free will and determination, we may at least assume that the laws of logic apply to propositions about the future. Hence any proposition asserting the occurrence of any future event must be true or false, and cannot be both. In that sense the future is as determinate as the past. But two points have to be noticed. (i.) However much I may know about the laws of nature, I cannot make probable inferences from the future to the past, because I am not directly acquainted with the future, but I can make probable inferences from the past to the future; *i.e.*, although every possible proposition about the future is even now determinately true or false, I may be able to judge now, from my knowledge of the past and present and of the laws of nature, that some propositions about future events are much more likely to be true than others. (It must of course be remembered in this connexion that a proposition that is actually false may be much more likely to be true on my present information than one that is actually true.) (ii.) I know with regard to certain classes of events that such events never occur unless preceded by a desire for their occurrence, and that such desires are generally followed by the occurrence of the corresponding events. But the existence of a desire for x does not increase the probability that x *has* happened. If it did we might be said to affect the past in exactly the same sense in which we are said to affect the future. Thus the assertion that we can affect the future but not the past seems to come down to this: (*a*) that propositions about the future can be inferred to be highly probable from a knowledge of the past and present, but not conversely, because of our lack of direct acquaintance with the future; and (*b*) that the general laws connecting a desire for x with the occurrence of x always contain x as a consequent and never as an antecedent.

3. Relation of time to logic.—This brings us to the very important question of the relation of time to logic. If we say of any event e that it is present, this proposition will generally be false, and will be true only at one moment. It seems, then, as if the truth of the proposition altered with time. Any other proposition asserting the occurrence of an event—*e.g.*, Queen Anne is dead—seems to be equally at the mercy of time. Then again there seem to be other propositions that are totally independent of time—*e.g.*, $2 \times 2 = 4$. These are sometimes called eternal truths; they always state relations between universals, and all our *a priori* knowledge is of such propositions. Lastly, there are propositions which essentially involve time, but claim to apply to any time; *e.g.*, whenever it rains and I am out without my umbrella, I get wet. Thus, on the face of it, there seem to be three kinds of propositions as regards relation to time: (1) eternal truths, which are independent of time because they deal with the timeless relations of timeless objects; (2) hypotheticals asserting temporal relations between classes of events—these contain an essential reference to time, but not to any particular time; (3) propositions which assert the occurrence of particular events, and which *seem* to be true at certain times and false at all others, though this is not really so.

There are two points to notice about the last class of propositions. (*a*) All propositions about events essentially contain a reference to time, and all propositions about particular events essentially contain a reference to the particular time at which the event happens. This reference is not always made explicit; but, until this has been done, we cannot say that the verbal form stands for any definite proposition. (*b*) We have to distinguish between the time at which a judgment is made and the time involved in the proposition that is judged. When the latter is not made explicit in the verbal expression of the judgment, it is a convention of language to assume that the time in the proposition is intended to be that at which the judgment is asserted. Thus, if I say 'It is raining,' this verbal expression, since it clearly intends to refer to a particular event, is incomplete and stands for no definite proposition; for it says nothing about the time at which it rains. It therefore seems to be sometimes true and sometimes false. But, as actually asserted, the words would be taken to express my judgment of the proposition, 'It is raining at the time at which I say "It is raining."' And this proposition is timelessly true or false, subject to a further correction which we shall add in a moment. In fact, whenever we are told that a proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false, we know that we are dealing with an incomplete statement about an event, and that the real state of affairs is that a propositional function of the form 'e happens at t' gives true propositions for some values of t and false propositions for other values. But the propositions themselves are timelessly true or false.

It is important to notice that in practice there is always the possibility of any verbal statement about events, no matter how carefully put, being sometimes true and sometimes false. We are not directly aware of moments of time, and so can date events only by other events. And the persons who read or hear our verbal expressions may know only by some description the event which we use for purposes of dating. Now we can never be certain theoretically that only one unique event answers to any description however complicated, and often there is real ambiguity in practice. Take, *e.g.*, the amended expression offered above: 'It is raining at the time at which I say "It is raining."' To any reader of this article the

expression remains ambiguous, because he knows the event that is used for dating only by the very ambiguous description, 'The writer's statement of the words "It is raining"'—a description which applies to dozens of different events. In practice the difficulty is solved in conversation by the fact that all the manifold circumstances under which the particular conversation takes place go into the description and make it practically unambiguous. In writing, the difficulty is solved practically by using as the origin of dates some event, such as the birth of Christ, whose full description is so complicated that it is almost certain that only one event answers to it. But the theoretical difficulty remains, and so we are tempted to say that any proposition about events is sometimes true and sometimes false. But the proper thing to say is that any verbal expression referring to events, no matter how carefully put, always runs a theoretical risk of ambiguity—*i.e.*, it might with equal propriety make one reader think of one proposition which is true, and another of another proposition which is false.

We can now apply these general results to the special case of events being sometimes future, and then present, and finally past. The statement 'e is present' is essentially incomplete and ambiguous, for, as we loosely say, it is sometimes true and sometimes false. The first thing, then, is to fill in the special time involved in the proposition. We then get 'e is present at t,' where t is some definite moment fixed by some system of dating from a well-known and presumably unique event. What does this statement mean? Assuming that there are such things as moments, it means that e is at the moment t in an analogous way to that in which an object is at a position in space. The statement 'e is present at t' may be compared with the statement 'Mr. Asquith is present at the meeting,' which means that his body is in the place where the meeting is held. In all complete statements of the form 'e is at t' we must understand the word 'is' as standing for a timeless copula, and distinguish it from the 'is' of the present tense, which is contrasted with 'was' and 'will be.' Let us denote the 'is' of the present tense by 'is now.' Then the statement 'e is now present' is an incomplete statement which is interpreted in use to mean 'e is at (or occupies) the same moment as my assertion that it is now present'; 'e is now past'='e was present'='e is at a moment earlier than my assertion that e is now past.' Similarly, 'e will be present'='e is now future'='e is at a moment subsequent to my statement that e is now future.' The laws of logic are of course concerned with the timeless copula, and they presuppose that statements containing tenses are reduced in the way suggested above.

4. Past, present, and future.—We see, then, that the real source of the distinction between past, present, and future, and of the difference here between time and space, is that our judgments as well as the events judged about are in time, whilst our judgments about things in space are not in any obvious sense in space. These three distinctions correspond to the three possible temporal relations between our judgments and the events which our judgments are about. These distinctions are important, and they have been enshrined in language because they are correlated with important epistemological and psychological differences. Some states of mind are essentially contemporary with their objects—*e.g.*, the immediate awareness of visual sense-data when I open my eyes.[1] Other states are essentially later than their objects—*e.g.*, memories. If we exclude the possibility of prophecy, we may state the important epistemological proposition that all states of mind which give us an immediate knowledge of existents are either contemporary with, or later than, their objects.

It is important to notice that these statements are not merely analytic. There is a psychical difference between memories and awarenesses of contemporary sense-data which is open to introspection (though, of course, there may be marginal cases where the difference falls below the threshold of distinguishability), so that the statement that the former succeed and the latter are contemporary with their objects is a synthetic proposition.

We must, moreover, take into account the facts described in psychology as the specious present. In the first place, we must say that, if an object be known directly by a state of mind which succeeds it by more than a certain short time t, which seems to be fairly constant for a given individual, the state counts introspectively as a memory, and the object is judged to be past. If the period between the object and the direct awareness of it be not greater than t, the awareness does not count for introspection as a memory, and the object is judged to be present. To say, then, that an object has been present and is now past means that (a) it is (timelessly) the object of an immediate awareness which succeeds it by less than t, and (b) that my statement 'It is now past' succeeds it by more than t. We have still, however, to consider what is meant by the presentness of a state of mind. This seems to mean that, if a state of mind be the object of an act of introspection which succeeds it by less than a certain short period, the state presents a certain peculiar characteristic which it does not present to any later act of introspection.

We can now deal with such statements as that only the present exists, or that the present is a mere transition from one infinite non-existent to another. These phrases are mere rhetoric rooted in confusions. It is perfectly true, of course, that the whole history of the world is not a complex of co-existing parts (in the sense of parts existing at the same time), as a table is. But this does not mean that it is not a whole, or that one part of it exists any less than any other part. To say that x no longer exists, or does not yet exist, simply means that it occupies a moment before or after my statement about it. At another moment I may make another statement of the same verbal form about x, and, since this no longer stands for the same proposition, it may no longer be true (*i.e.* no longer stand for a true proposition). But this involves no change in x itself. That x exists at a certain moment simply means that x occupies that moment, and this is timelessly true. Similarly, the fact that this moment has a certain temporal relation to any definite assertion that I may make about x is timelessly a fact. That it has different and incompatible temporal relations to various assertions of the same verbal form made by me is also timelessly true, and is not merely compatible with but also a necessary consequence of x's existence at its own moment. An event must continue to *be*, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be present merely means that they precede any assertion that I or my contemporaries can make about them; that both were once present merely means that both are contemporary with some assertions made about them.

[1] It is better for the present not to call these states of mind either perceptions or sensations, because the object of a perception is generally supposed to be a physical object or its state, and this may exist millions of years before the perception—*e.g.*, the perception of a distant star. Similarly, to call these states of mind sensations would lead to misunderstandings, owing to the ambiguities of that word and the widely held belief that sensations do not have objects.

The fallacy which we have to avoid is that of confusing two different senses of co-existence. In one sense the parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those events that occupy the same moment of time co-exist. It is clear that the whole course of history does not co-exist in the second sense, and it is thought that this prevents it from co-existing in the first. Yet this is necessarily false, since it is admitted that events do have and continue to have temporal relations, and therefore they must form a related whole all of whose parts have being. The confusion is increased by the belief that past, present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time in the same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into the temporal relations of states of mind and their objects.[1]

When it is once recognized that the whole course of events is in a certain sense a *totum simul*, it becomes easy to see the answer to the famous theological problem: How can God's foreknowledge of men's actions be compatible with the freedom of men's wills? The answer is as follows. Whether men's wills be free or not, every man's future actions are as completely determinate as his past ones; this is a mere consequence of the laws of logic. If indeterminism be true, then no amount of knowledge about events previous to a moment t, and about the general laws of nature or the particular habits of a man, will enable us or even God to infer with certainty what the man's volition at t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate. These two statements are clearly quite compatible. Finally, in spite of the fact that God cannot *infer* the man's volition at t, He may at any and every moment be directly aware of it in precisely the same way as we are aware directly (and not merely inferentially) of certain events through memories which are themselves later events. The facts that at a certain moment t_1 God can have a state of mind whose immediate object is the volition of a man at some later moment t_2, and that no amount of knowledge of events before t_2 would enable Him to *infer* the volition at t_2, are perfectly compatible; and they cease to be even paradoxical when we compare the case of memory and note that there is no essential difference between past, present, and future.[2]

5. Reality of time.—A great many philosophers have been concerned to deny the reality of time. Their arguments fall into two groups: (1) those that depend on the supposed infinity and continuity of time, and are therefore equally applicable to space; and (2) those that depend on the supposed peculiarities of time—*e.g.*, on the distinction of past, present, and future. Before considering the arguments in detail, it will be useful to make some quite general reflexions.

(i.) It is a matter of direct inspection that the immediate objects of some of our states of mind have temporal characteristics. It is as certain that one note in a heard melody is after another in the same specious present and that each has some duration as that some objects in my field of view are red or square and to the right or left of each other. It is then quite certain that *some* objects in the world have temporal characteristics, viz. the immediate objects of some states of mind. Now it is also certain that these objects exist at least as long as I am aware of them, for, in such cases, I am obviously not aware of *nothing*. Hence there cannot be anything self-contradictory in the temporal characteristics found in these objects, for otherwise we should have to admit the existence of objects with incompatible characteristics. Hence there is no obvious reason why temporal characteristics should not also apply to what is not the immediate object of any state of mind. It follows, then, that criticism cannot reasonably be directed against temporal characteristics as such, but only against the descriptions that we give of the temporal characteristics of experienced objects, and the conclusions that we draw from them or the constructions that we base on them. And arguments that refer to the infinity and continuity of time are really directed against a construction based on what we conceive to be the essential characteristics of the time element which is undoubtedly present in the objects that we experience; for we are not directly aware of infinite duration or of the continuity—in the mathematical sense—of time. If we suppose that such criticisms are successful, the conclusion ought not to be either that reality has no temporal characteristics (for it is quite certain that at least some parts of it have), or that time, as an inference or construction extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects to others, is unreal (for this goes much too far). The only justifiable conclusion would be that one particular way of describing and extending the temporal characteristics of experienced objects is unsatisfactory, and that it behoves us to look for a better one. This point has not commonly been grasped by philosophers who claimed to disprove the reality of time.

(ii.) It is thus obviously of importance to be clear as to what is the particular view of time that is attacked by special arguments. The important distinction for us to make is this: it is possible to hold (*a*) that there is a series of moments of time, and that events occupy some of them but are distinct from them, and have temporal relations to each other in virtue of those which subsist between the moments that they occupy; or (*b*) that there are no such things as moments distinct from events, but that events really do have direct temporal relations to each other; or (*c*) that there are no moments, and that even events only *appear* to have temporal relations to each other. It is clearly possible to deny (*a*) without denying (*b*). To do this can hardly be called denying the reality of time; it should rather be called denying the absolute theory of time in favour of the relative theory. It is only philosophers who deny both (*a*) and (*b*) and support (*c*) who can strictly be said to deny the reality of time. It is quite possible, however, that some arguments might be equally fatal to (*a*) and to (*b*).

It will be well at this point to say what we can about the controversy between absolutists and relativists. The absolute theory strictly means that temporal relations between events are regarded as compounded out of two relations—(1) that of an event to the moment of time which it occupies, and (2) the relation of before and after between moments of time. The relative theory holds that there are no moments, but that temporal relations hold directly between events. Its most important philosophical upholder is Leibniz, though he goes a good way farther in the direction of (*c*); it is also held, with a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion, by many modern physicists of a philosophical bent. We may say that the relative theory stands at one remove, and the absolute theory at two removes, from what we find in the objects of immediate experience. Here we find, as we have seen, events of finite duration and relations of partial precedence. The relative theory replaces these objects by series of momentary events of no duration, and the relations by those of total precedence and simultaneity. The absolute theory takes the farther step of introducing a new set of entities, viz. moments which have no duration and stand in relations of total precedence but never of simultaneity, and a new relation, viz. that between a momentary event and the moment which it occupies.

Neither theory has been very accurately stated by most of its supporters; *e.g.*, Newton, the chief upholder of the absolute theory, was mainly concerned with the measurement of time and the desire for a constant rate-measurer. But the two theories, when thought out, may be reduced to what has been stated above. We may say at once that we know of no way of deciding conclusively between the two. But, although moments and momentary states *may* exist, we now know that all their

[1] The point can perhaps be made clearer by reflecting that a tune has a pattern in time in exactly the same sense as a wall-paper has a pattern in space.

[2] We can, of course, remember much that we could not infer.

work can be done by certain logical functions of nothing but events of finite duration and their relations of partial precedence. Hence both theories may be said to sin by assuming entities which are not necessary to science and cannot be either directly or indirectly verified (viz. momentary events in the relative theory, and moments in the absolute theory), and the absolute theory is the worse sinner of the two. As certain logical functions of what actually exists (viz. certain classes of classes of events), moments do exist; but whether there also exists anything having the same logical relations but of the type of individuals and not of that of classes of classes it seems totally impossible to determine. It is, however, often convenient to continue to speak in terms of moments, and this is harmless for the reasons given above.

We can now deal with the special arguments against time.

(1) Those based on its supposed infinity commonly confuse infinity with endlessness. They generally proceed on the assumption that what is meant by the infinity of time is that it has neither a first nor a last moment. But this would be perfectly compatible with the whole course of time lasting for no more than a second. The fractions between 0 and 1, arranged in order of magnitude, have neither a first nor a last term, and yet the interval between any two of them is less than unity. But all attempts to prove that time or the series of events must have an end fail. So do attempts to prove that they cannot have ends. The most celebrated argument on both sides of this question is contained in Kant's first antinomy. His argument against the endlessness of time, interpreted as charitably as possible, comes to the statement that, because there are definite points in the time-series—in particular, the point which we have reached when we read Kant's argument—therefore the series must have a definite beginning point. Otherwise, Kant says, the series of events could never have reached the definite point which it admittedly has reached. The argument is, of course, a complete *non-sequitur*, for it practically amounts to saying that a series cannot have *any* definite term unless it has *end* points. And this is sufficiently refuted by considering that the number +2 is perfectly definite, although the series of numbers with signs has neither a first nor a last term.

Arguments to prove that time or the series of events in time cannot have a beginning are perhaps more plausible. It is difficult for us psychologically to imagine a first event or a first moment, because all the events that we can remember have been preceded by others. Also there are special difficulties connected with causation in the notion of a first event, which do not apply to a first moment or to a last event. A first event is one which no event precedes, though there may of course be moments that precede a first event. Now, the only plausible general proposition about causation seems to be that, if the whole universe were completely quiescent for a finite time, it could not begin to change.[1] This means that, if the universe be in the same state at any two moments t_1 and t_2 and at all moments between them, it will be in the same state at all moments later than t_1. Now, to say that a change happens at t_1 means that, if the state of the universe at t_1 be s_1, and if it also be s_1 at any later moment t_2, then there is a moment between t_1 and t_2 at which its state is different from s_1. It follows from this definition that to say that a first event happens at t involves that the universe has been in the same state for a finite time before t. And this is contrary to our proposition about causation. If, then, we accept this proposition as an *a priori* truth, there cannot be a first event, though there might be a first event in certain isolated parts of the universe (*e.g.*, the creation of the world) provided that there had never been a first event in other parts (*e.g.*, in the mind of God). But, of course, there remains the doubt whether our axiom about causation be not a mere prejudice masquerading as an *a priori* law.

[1] The universe here must be taken to include God, if there be one.

It must be carefully noted that, if there be a first event, there need not be a first moment of time, and that, if there be a first moment of time, there need not be a first event. Again, if there be a first moment of time and no first event, either there might be no moment, except the first, that was not occupied by an event, or there might be a duration unoccupied by events. These consequences follow from the continuity of time, and have often been overlooked by philosophers ignorant of the mathematical theory of continuity.

Leibniz based his main argument against the absolute theory of time on the fact that, if it were true, there might be a period, finite or infinite, before any event happened. This period must be definite; and yet, the moments of time having no intrinsic difference, there is no reason why it should be ended or limited by one moment rather than another. If, on the other hand, we avoid this by assuming that there is an event at every moment of time, there is no reason for assuming *both* events and moments, for the series of events will suffice.

This argument is a sound one against assuming that there *are* moments, though it certainly cannot disprove that there may be moments. If there were moments, they would doubtless have intrinsic differences, though we could not discover them; we must further recognize some ultimate facts, and one of these might be that the course of events is preceded by such and such a duration of empty time.

We may sum up our conclusions as follows. Arguments to disprove the reality of time from its infinity and continuity either confine themselves to criticizing infinity and continuity as such or introduce considerations about causality. Arguments of the first kind would be equally fatal to *any* infinite or continuous series, and therefore prove too much, for they would destroy the series of real numbers. And we now know that all such arguments do rest on confusions and on an insufficient analysis of the notions of infinity and continuity. There is therefore no reason why the series of moments at any rate should not be either (*a*) endless or (*b*) of infinite length. The second set of arguments can apply only to events and not to the supposed series of moments, because causation is concerned with events and not with empty time. We saw that, if a certain plausible axiom about change be true, there cannot be a first event. This would not, however, prove that the whole series of events has lasted for an infinite time, though the present writer knows of no objection to such a possibility. There is no more objection to the series of events being endless than to any other series being endless—*i.e.*, there is none at all. The result is that all danger of a valid antinomy against time vanishes. (i.) Whether the axiom about change be true or not, it is equally possible that the series of moments shall be (*a*) endless or terminated, and (*b*) of finite or of infinite length. (ii.) If the axiom about change be true, the series of events cannot have a beginning, but may (*a*) have an end or not, and (*b*) be of finite or of infinite length.

(2) Arguments against the reality of time which turn on the distinction of past, present, and future may be dealt with shortly. One argument asserts that the past and the future do not exist, and that the present is a mere point without duration. It is then supposed that what occupies no finite duration cannot be real, and this disposes of the present. An argument of this kind is used

by Leibniz against absolute time, though it would presumably apply to events just as well. It is met, of course, by the consideration that past, present, and future are all always equally real, and that these characteristics do not belong to events as such, but in virtue of the temporal relations between them and certain psychical events.

A somewhat different argument against the reality of time has been produced by J. M. E. McTaggart.[1] His argument is that every event is past, present, and future; and that the attempt to avoid the incompatibility of these predicates by saying that the event has been future, is present, and will be past involves a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. The answer is that, whenever we consider any definite statement about the pastness, presentness, or futurity of an event, we can see that there is no contradiction. Take a definite statement by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is now past and has been present and future. Suppose we interpret this to mean that Queen Anne's death is not the direct object of any awareness (even a memory) which is contemporary with McTaggart's statement, but that it is contemporary with some states of mind (*e.g.*, Lord Bolingbroke's) which precede McTaggart's statement; and that it is later than some thoughts about it (*e.g.*, William III.'s), which also precede the statement. Then those three propositions seem to be timelessly true, perfectly compatible, and to contain all that is meant in the assertion by McTaggart that Queen Anne's death is past and has been present and future.

We may conclude, then, that no satisfactory proof has been offered even that absolute time is unreal, still less that the series of events and their direct temporal relations are unreal.

6. Measurement of duration.—It seems to have been the question of a rate-measurer that led Newton to the theory of absolute time. Newton considers a number of periodic events which are roughly isochronous, and compares their rough isochronism with 'absolute time, which flows uniformly.' It is an unfortunate way of introducing absolute time. In the first place, it is of no practical use to any one. Whether absolute time flows uniformly or not, we can only observe events and must use them, or processes based on them, as our rate-measurers. Again, the statement that absolute time flows uniformly is thoroughly obscure. Time cannot be said to flow, for this seems to imply that time changes; and this would make time consist of a series of events in time. Nor is it at all clear what Newton meant by uniformity in this connexion. Presumably the meaning must be that the moments of time form a series like the real numbers. What we really want to know is whether we can find any periodic process such that the time that elapses between corresponding stages in each repetition is the same. But no essential reference to absolute time is involved here. We must beware of confusing the two statements: (1) there are definite intervals of a certain determinate duration, and this duration is independent of our methods of measurement; and (2) there are absolute moments of time, and the interval between any two of these has a definite magnitude. The latter implies the former, but not conversely. The real problem is: Granted that there is a definite interval between pairs of events, how are we to measure it?

There is a special difficulty in measuring intervals of time between events which is not nearly so much felt in measuring the distance between things. This difficulty is in the temporal analogue to superposition. We may carry a rod about with us in space, and we may have fairly good reasons to believe that it has not altered in length. The corresponding procedure in time-measurement is to find some process which can be started and stopped at any moment and can be assumed to have the same period whenever it is repeated. Such processes may be called isochronous. But, even when an isochronous process has been secured, it cannot be used to measure time in the same direct way in which a rod can be used to measure length. A rod will not as a rule fit an exact number of times into what we want to measure; it is therefore divided into a number of equal parts. Similarly we want an isochronous process that can be divided into equal subdivisions which can be easily recognized; *i.e.*, we want a process which itself consists of a number of similar processes which all occupy equal times. Now, it is not nearly so easy to be sure that a process takes the same time whenever it is repeated as to be sure that a rod keeps the same length wherever we use it; and it is much less easy to divide a process into parts that occupy equal times than to divide a rod into parts that have equal lengths. The recognizable divisions in a process of change are largely fixed for us, while divisions on a rod can be fixed by us with marks without affecting the rod as a whole.

Nevertheless the assumptions that have to be made, and the peculiar mixture of observation and convention that is involved, are the same in principle for the measurement of time and of space. The fact is that we can make immediate comparisons both of length and of time with a certain amount of accuracy. We believe that these judgments are the more accurate the nearer the objects to be compared are in time and space, and the more similar the circumstances under which each is inspected. Trusting to these immediate judgments, we see reason to believe that both the lengths of rods and the time taken by processes may vary when the rods are moved or the processes repeated. But we believe that the variation always depends on the fact that change of position in space or time involves change in the relations of the rod or the process to pieces of matter, and that mere changes of position in absolute time and space—if such could be—make no difference. We have learned by experience what are the most important factors that determine change of length or of period, and we can allow for them. It is found that the periods of recurrent processes are, on the whole, more largely affected by changes in the surroundings than are the lengths of such bodies as steel rods.

Our method of determining an ideal rate-measurer is somewhat as follows. We begin with some process which is sensibly isochronous—*e.g.*, the swing of a pendulum, or the time taken for a complete rotation of the earth on its axis. We can judge of this isochronism with a certain amount of accuracy by direct comparison in memory, just as we can compare lengths by looking at them. We can go farther than this. Just as we are greatly helped in our comparison of lengths by putting the objects to be compared side by side, so we can use expedients to help our judgments of the isochronism of processes. If we start two pendulums together and their periods be not exactly the same, the divergence will become more and more marked the longer they swing. If no divergence be noted after many swings, we may conclude that each swing of one takes the same time as the corresponding swing of the other. This does not prove that the successive swings of either are isochronous; for the period of each may be varying according to the same law. But, if we also find that the period of one of these processes synchronizes with the corresponding period of some other

[1] 'The Unreality of Time,' *Mind*, new ser., xvii. [1908] 457–474.

sensibly isochronous process which is physically very different, it becomes very improbable that there should be any law by which the successive periods of two such very different processes alter in precisely the same way. We are therefore justified in concluding *tentatively* that the successive periods of these sensibly isochronous processes are actually isochronous.

The next step is to state all the laws of nature which involve time on the assumption that equal intervals of time are measured by complete periods of such processes. We find, *e.g.*, that, if it be supposed that the successive rotations of the earth on its axis are isochronous, the laws of motion can be very simply stated and are very nearly verified by all the mechanical phenomena that we can observe. So far we are entirely in the region of what can be experienced or rendered very probable from what we experience. But now a conventional element enters. We shall probably find that, when time is measured by an actual physical process and when our laws have been stated in terms of time so measured, a closer investigation shows that there are slight divergences from the laws which cannot be accounted for by mere experimental errors. The last stage in the determination of the equality of times now begins. We argue that the suggested laws are so simple and so nearly true that the most reasonable plan is not to keep the same time-measures and complicate the laws, but to suppose that the laws are rigidly true but the time-measurer not perfectly accurate; *i.e.*, that successive periods of this physical process are not perfectly isochronous. We therefore erect the laws into principles, define equality of times by them, and apply the necessary corrections to our old time-measurer. There is nothing particularly arbitrary about this. We believed, to begin with, as the result of direct judgments assisted by the use of such expedients as have been described above, that a certain periodic process is isochronous. We admitted, however, that deviations from isochronism so small as to escape the notice of any direct method are possible. We then stated our laws in terms of time as measured by this process, and found them to be simple and very nearly true; but, if they are to retain their simple form and become quite true, a small correction must be made in the assumed isochronism of the process. This contradicts nothing that we have deduced from our experience; for we admitted all along the possibility of errors too small for direct detection. The procedure has the least trace of arbitrariness if, as is often the case, we can see the physical cause of the lack of complete isochronism in our time-measurer and can fully explain this lack in accordance with the laws which we have erected into principles. This has happened, *e.g.*, with the earth as a time-measurer, where we can explain its small defect from isochronism, when once we have to assume it, by the frictional effect of the tides acting according to the laws of mechanics. Even when no physical cause can be detected for the presumed lack of isochronism, it is always possible to suggest a hypothetical one. But, in so far as this has to be done, our procedure does become more arbitrary; and a point may be reached where a full explanation of all the phenomena demands a real change in the form of the laws with or without a change in the time-measurer. This has happened in recent years to the laws of motion, mainly through investigations on the movements of small electrically charged particles with a velocity comparable to that of light.

7. Theory of Relativity.—The next point to be considered is the criterion of beforeness, afterness, and simultaneity among events which are not the objects of any one experience. We have seen that in favourable cases we can immediately judge that one event that we experience is after another that we experience. Other people can make similar judgments about events in their experience. But we cannot directly judge of the temporal relations of events which we do not directly experience. Matters are on exactly the same footing with spatial relations. I may be immediately aware that one object in my field of view is to the right of another in the same field, and another man may be able to make similar judgments about his visual sense-data. But it remains to be seen what is meant by saying that an object which A experiences is at the right of one which B experiences; or again what is meant by the statement that of two objects which no one experiences—*e.g.*, two atoms—one is to the right of the other. What is wanted is to be able to date events in a time-series which is neutral as between A's experience and B's, and shall contain events that do not fall into the direct experience of any one. In this problem we must carefully distinguish between two questions which are liable to be confused: (1) How do we come to understand the nature of the relations in the neutral time-series?, (2) How do we know with regard to any two definite events, e_1 and e_2, whether e_1 is before or after or simultaneous with e_2?

The answer to the first question is that the relations in the neutral series are regarded as having the same logical properties as those which we directly experience, or at any rate as being capable of definition in terms of the logical properties of these relations. Possibly a temporal relation as experienced by A has a sensuous particularity different from that possessed by one experienced by B; just as it is impossible to say whether the quality of what A sees and that of what B sees are precisely the same when they say that they perceive the same colour, and no available test can detect any discordance between their experiences. But, of course, the sensuous particularity is what is shed when we consider a neutral time-series, and only the logical properties of the relations (*e.g.*, transitivity, asymmetry, etc.) are important.

The distinction between the space and time of each man's experience and a neutral space and time runs parallel with the distinction between the immediate objects of each man's experience and neutral (or, as we call them, physical) objects. However we suppose physical objects to be constituted, and whatever we suppose to be the relation between our minds and them, it must be assumed that physical objects are in the neutral space, and that their changes take place in the neutral time and make themselves known to us by correlated changes in the immediate objects of our experience.

It is not necessary here to consider how a number of people, $M_1 \ldots M_n$, come to agree that certain events, $e_1 \ldots e_n$, in their respective sense-data are all correlated with the same physical event. But it is necessary to notice that they will find, first of all in the case of sound, that, if their physical laws are to give at all a simple and complete account of what they may expect to hear under given circumstances, they must assume that the sounds heard by various people, and all correlated by them with a single physical event, are not in general contemporary with each other. The greatest accuracy and simplicity is introduced into the laws of sound by supposing that the hearing of the sounds by the various people takes place at times dependent on the positions of their bodies in physical space and on the spatio-temporal position of the single physical event correlated with all these sounds. This example brings out three very important points. (1) The determination of the temporal

relations between events in the minds or in the immediate objects of the minds of different people can be accomplished only when these events have been correlated in some definite way with supposed neutral physical events; (2) the temporal relations then assigned are such as to make the laws telling us what sensations to expect in given circumstances as simple and accurate as possible; (3) it follows from these considerations that the determination of a neutral time-series and of the positions of physical objects in a neutral space must proceed *pari passu*.

Suppose, *e.g.*, that we say that the velocity of sound is v centimetres per second: (1) we want to connect all the known facts about the sounds which people hear under circumstances that can be directly experienced; (2) we want to do this compatibly with the assumptions which have already been made as to what heard sounds are to be classed together as connected with one physical event; and (3) we want our laws which sum up the known facts and anticipate experience to be as simple as is compatible with accuracy. We find that these ends can best be accomplished by supposing that A's hearing of s_a and B's hearing of s^b (s_a and s_b being both correlated with the single physical event S) take place at times $t + \frac{x_a}{v}$ and $t + \frac{x_b}{v}$ respectively, where t is the date of S in the neutral time-series, and x_a and x^b are the respective distances between the place where S happens in physical space and A's and B's bodies as physical objects. We must remember that the correlation of several sounds heard by different people with a single physical event and the assignment of positions in neutral space to physical events are themselves carried out on the same general principles as the dating of events in neutral time and as the measurement of duration already described; *i.e.*, we start with instinctive judgments of rough accuracy, and then proceed to a more accurate determination of our terms, guided by the general motive of maximizing the accuracy and simplicity of scientific laws.

As we have seen, sound is the first and most obvious case where it is necessary to assume different dates for different members of a group of sense-data which are all correlated with a single physical event. The more accurate researches of science necessitate a similar process for dealing with the sense-data of sight, and so the notion of a velocity of light is introduced. These velocities, once determined, furnish a criterion of before and after among physical events, and, through them, for events in different minds.

Let us denote any moment at A by the symbol ${}^a t_r$, and an event which happens at the point A at the moment ${}^a t_r$ by ${}^a e_r$. Let us use the same notation for events and moments at B. Then we can say: An event ${}^a e_r$ precedes an event ${}^b e_s$ if a disturbance leaving A at ${}^a t_r$ reaches B not later than ${}^b t_s$. Now it is found that we have no reason to believe that any disturbance travels faster than light. It can be shown that, if the above be our sole criterion for before and after between events at different places, there will be pairs of such events of which we have no reason to say that one is either before, after, or contemporary with the other.

To see this, consider the following case. Let ${}^a e_1$ happen at A at ${}^a t_1$. A signal which leaves A at ${}^a t_1$ cannot reach B *before* a certain moment ${}^b t_2$. Again, a signal that reaches A at ${}^a t_1$ cannot have left B *after* a certain moment ${}^b t_0$. On our criterion, therefore, ${}^a t_1$ is before any moment that is after ${}^b t_2$ and is after any moment that is before ${}^b t_0$. But how are events at B which happen between ${}^b t_0$ and ${}^b t_2$ related in time to the event ${}^a e_1$? Take an event ${}^b e_x$ such that ${}^b t_x$ is between ${}^b t_0$ and ${}^b t_2$. You cannot say that it is before ${}^a t_1$; for a disturbance leaving B at ${}^b t_x$ would reach A later than ${}^a t_1$. But you also cannot say that ${}^a t_1$ is before it; for a disturbance leaving A at ${}^a t_1$ would reach B later than ${}^b t_x$ (viz. at ${}^b t_2$). Hence on our criterion we can neither say that ${}^b e_x$ is before ${}^a e_1$ nor that ${}^a e_1$ is before ${}^b e_x$. Moreover, there is an infinite number of events at B of the form ${}^b e_x$ where x is between 0 and 2. Thus we cannot cut the knot by saying that, since they are neither before nor after ${}^a e_1$, they are contemporary with it. For they are not contemporary with each other. Thus one and only one of the class of events ${}^b e_x$ can be taken to be contemporary with ${}^a e_1$, and the rest, so far as our criterion goes, must be held to be neither before, after, nor simultaneous with ${}^a e_1$. We are thus compelled to recognize that we may have no means of deciding whether a pair of events at different places in physical space are contemporary or not in physical time.

We can, if we like, accept this result, and build up our physics on the assumption that physical time really is non-connexive; *i.e.*, that, though all events have temporal relations to some events, none have temporal relations to all events. This has recently been done very fully and ably by A. A. Robb.[1] Or we may take the more usual course of assuming that physical time really is connexive, but that in certain cases all criteria fail to determine the actual temporal relations which subsist between events in different places. We then must simply make a convention (to return to our example) that one particular event of the class of events at B, whose temporal relations to ${}^a e_1$ are left doubtful by our criteria, is contemporary with ${}^a e_1$, and that whatever precedes this one precedes ${}^a e_1$ and whatever follows it follows ${}^a e_1$. It is customary to assume that the event at B which comes midway between ${}^b e_0$ and ${}^b e_2$ is contemporary with ${}^a e_1$; but it must be noticed that this is a mere convention, though doubtless the most reasonable one to make. (On our notation this event would naturally be ${}^b e_1$.)

We must notice further that, for this convention to be determinate at all, we must assume that we know that the time-measurer at B goes at the same rate as that at A, and that both go uniformly. Now, if the time-measurers cannot be moved about, their synchronism can be determined only by sending signals from one to the other—*e.g.*, light-signals. And, even if they can be moved about, our only test for the continuance of their synchronism, when they have been moved apart and are no longer in view together, is by light-signals. On the other hand, the question whether our tests for synchronism by light-signals are genuine tests (*i.e.* involve synchronism in physical time) depends on whether the velocity of light relative to the system containing the time-measurers is constant in time and the same in all directions. And this last point cannot be determined *until* the time-measurers in two places have been synchronized; for it is obvious that to measure a velocity we need to know the time in two places. We see, then, that the possibility of synchronizing time-measurers and the uniformity of the velocity of light stand and fall together, and that neither can be proved independently of the other. If we allow that the velocity of light relative to the system is constant and uniform in all directions, our tests for synchronism and uniformity in our time-measurers are valid; if we allow that the criteria ensure physical synchronism, the physical velocity of light (as distinct from its *numerical* measure on our convention) will be constant and uniform. But neither question is or ever will be capable of independent settlement; and therefore we simply have to make a convention that the meaning to be attached to synchronism in different places is agreement with the tests based on light-signals, and another convention that distances shall be so measured that the measure of the velocity of light relative to the system is independent of time and of direction.

Suppose now that the people on a system S determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates in this way, and that the people on another system S^1, moving with uniform translational velocity relative to S, determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates similarly. Let them arrange, as they can do, that the time-measurers at the origin of each go at the same rate; and further let them arrange their units so that the velocity of light as measured by each from experiments with sources and mirrors fixed in their own system shall have the same numerical measure. Then (a) it can be proved that each will find the same numerical measure for the velocity of light, even though the sources and mirrors be in uniform motion relative

[1] *A Theory of Time and Space.*

to the two systems. (*b*) It is possible to find equations connecting the spatio-temporal co-ordinates which the people on S give to any momentary event which they observe with those which the people on S^1 give to the same event. These are the celebrated transformations of the Theory of Relativity. They are, as we should expect, perfectly reciprocal, since the relative motion of S and S^1 is a perfectly mutual phenomenon. But (*c*) they lead to certain rather startling results. (1) Lengths along and at right angles to the direction of relative motion which are judged to be equal by the people on one system will be judged to be unequal by those on the other. The ratio depends on the relative velocity and on the value of the velocity of light which is common to the two systems.[1] (2) Events in different places which are judged to be contemporary by the people on one system will be judged to occur at different times by those on the other system, and the difference of time will depend on the distance apart parallel to the direction of relative motion.

Although the observers on the two systems thus differ, they cannot criticize each other. Each has pursued precisely the same plan in setting out his co-ordinates and synchronizing his time-measurers. And it would be quite futile for one to claim that his results are the right ones because his system is at rest and the other is in motion. For the relative motion is completely reciprocal, and neither absolute motion nor any consequence of it can be observed. Lastly, it is equally futile for one to say that he is at rest 'relative to the ether,' while the other is in motion; for we know that no experiment whatever has been able to demonstrate motion 'relative to the ether,' and this motion may fairly be dismissed as a fiction. The upshot of the matter is that there is nothing to choose between their respective judgments, and that all the laws of nature can be stated as truly and will have precisely the same form, no matter which of an infinite number of systems in uniform translational motion be taken as the basis for spatio-temporal co-ordinates. This result, with the mathematical consequences that flow from it, is known as the Theory of Relativity. Its philosophical importance is that it enables us to see the tacit assumptions that are made when we talk of events at different places being contemporary; and the fact that measurement of distance is entangled with time, since the distance between two objects at any time involves a decision as to what is meant by the same time in two different places. Though it no more completely refutes the possibility of absolute space and time than does any other argument (for after all it only deals with our numerical measures and leaves it open whether one system of time-measurers is physically uniform and synchronous and one system of space-measures directly represents distances in physical space), yet it helps to render the notions of absolute space and time still more spectral and remote from all possible experience than before. For it enables us to see that there are a certain indeterminateness and conventionality even in the measurement of the distance between physical objects and of the lapse between events; and that therefore what we can know is even at a farther remove than we had thought from the points of absolute space and the moments of absolute time.

The Theory of Relativity sketched above was first fully stated by Einstein in his classical paper, 'Über das Relativitätsprinzip und die aus demselben gezogenen Folgerungen,' which appeared in the *Jahrbuch der Radioaktivität und Elektronik* for 1907. This may be called the restricted Theory of Relativity. It may be briefly characterized as consisting of an experimental fact and a philosophical principle suggested by a great number of facts. The philosophical principle is that, since we can never observe absolute time, space, or motion, even if there be such things, the laws of physical phenomena as learned from experiment and observation must retain the same *form* for acts of observers in uniform motion relative to each other. This persistence of form (or *covariance*, as it is technically called) in the differential equations that express the laws of nature does not in general imply that the actual *magnitudes* measured by two observers in uniform relative motion will be the same.

E.g., an observer moving with his instruments relative to an electrically charged body will detect magnetic as well as electrical forces, whilst one who is at rest with his instruments relative to this body will observe only electrical forces. But the differential equations connecting the effects noted by one observer with each other and with his x, y, z, and t co-ordinates will be precisely the same as those connecting the effects noted by the other observer with each other and with his x, y, z, and t co-ordinates.

This principle by itself, however, would be of little use, since it does not enable us to say what connexion exists between the co-ordinates of the two observers. But, if there be some physical magnitude, which is not merely covariant but also *invariant* as between different observers in uniform relative motion, the transformations connecting the two sets of co-ordinates can be found. Now the velocity of light *in vacuo* is found to fulfil this condition; its actual numerical value is found to be the same by all observers. The mathematical consequences of this fact lead to Einstein's set of equations connecting the x, y, z, t co-ordinates of one observer with those of another who is moving relative to the first. The precise significance of Einstein's principle of the 'Constancy of Light Velocity' has been indicated above, and shown to be connected with the way in which we are forced to lay out a system of co-ordinates and to define simultaneity between events in different places.

Einstein's restricted theory has gained many triumphs. It explains at once what is known as Fresnel's dragging-coefficient for light passing through matter that moves relative to the observer. It also accounts for the change of mass with velocity which is observed when small particles move with speed comparable to that of light. The principle necessitates slight changes in the previously accepted form of some of the laws of nature. Maxwell's equations and the equation of continuity in hydrodynamics do indeed at once and without modification fulfil the condition of covariance. But the laws of mechanics, as they stand, are not in accord with the principle and need modifications which only become practically important in dealing with the motion of matter with velocities comparable to that of light.

Considerable philosophic importance, in connexion with the nature of time, attaches to the work of Minkowski.

On the ordinary Newtonian mechanics the form of the laws of nature is unchanged if the three spatial axes be twisted in space about their origin as a rigid body. Now Minkowski showed that the Lorentz-Einstein transformation is equivalent to a twist of the same nature performed on a set of *four* mutually rectangular axes in a four-dimensional space. Three of these axes are the ordinary spatial ones, the fourth is the time axis multipled by c, the velocity of light, and ι, the root of -1. So far the theory must be regarded as a merely elegant mathematical device, since the fourth axis is imaginary in the mathematical sense, and the angle of solution is also imaginary. But, if we do not assume that the geometry of the four-dimensional 'space-time' is Euclidean, a much more important meaning can be attached to Minkowski's interpretation of the relativity transformations. If we suppose the geometry of 'space-time' to be hyperbolic (*i.e.* the geometry of Lobatchewski), the relativity transformation corresponds to twisting a set of four real axes as a rigid body through a real angle about the origin. The axes are now x, y, z, and ct, and c simply depends on the different units that we use in measuring time and space; so that really we are dealing with a four-dimensional

[1] This is the famous Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction.

manifold in which space and time are homogeneous with each other, but whose geometry is not Euclidean but Lobatchewskian.

The work of philosophical mathematicians since Minkowski's death has consisted largely in developing the notion that the ultimate data in the world are events in space-time, *i.e.* events extended both in space and in time. The content of a specious present forms an example of such data. Space and time as used in the sciences only emerge at the end as elaborate mathematical constructions built on the immediately perceptible relations between extended events.

The best exposition of this point of view is contained in A. N. Whitehead's *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, which begins with a severe criticism of the concepts of classical physics and proceeds to elaborate the notions of space, time, and matter from the crude data of sense and their immediately given spatio-temporal relations. It seems hardly possible to doubt that this is the right path for further research, but it demands a combination of philosophical and mathematical abilities of so high an order that few can tread it successfully. Alexander in his *Gifford Lectures* at Glasgow has developed the notion of space-time with great fullness from the purely philosophic side, but, at the time of writing, his lectures have not appeared in print, and it is impossible to give a fair account of his views from the short synopses which are alone available.

It remains to say a few words about the generalized Theory of Relativity. So far we have only considered observers in *uniform* relative motion and have laid down a principle of relativity for them. Einstein has occupied himself in the last few years in removing this restriction and thus bringing gravitation, which fell outside the older theory, into the scope of the Theory of Relativity.

A particle is said to be under the action of no force if it move uniformly in a straight line. But the question whether it moves in a straight line and whether it moves uniformly is clearly relative to our spatial axes and to our measure of time. If, *e.g.*, a particle moves uniformly in a straight line relative to the rectangular axes x and y, it will not do so relative to axes which rotate about the origin in the xy plane. Accordingly, relative to one set of axes it will be said to be under the action of no force, whilst relative to the second set it will be said to be under the forces needed to produce the observed accelerations. Now the 'forces' introduced by these mere changes of our axes of reference are in one respect very much like the force of gravitation. They, like it, affect all forms of matter indifferently and depend only on the mass, not on the special nature of the matter. On the other hand, a genuine gravitational field cannot be altogether transformed away by a suitable change of axes, as a purely geometrical field can be. For any one particle this can be done by choosing axes fixed in the particle, but relative to these axes the other particles in the field will still be accelerated. Now it seems clear that a mere change of axes could not make any difference to the form of the laws of nature, and thus, if gravitation were capable of being transformed away merely by a suitable change of axes, the principle of relativity would assert that the presence of a gravitational field makes no difference to the form of the laws of nature. For the reason mentioned above the principle of relativity cannot be taken in this unrestricted sense. It may, however, be taken to assert that the form of the law of nature is unaltered in a gravitational field up to a certain (as yet undetermined) order of differential coefficients.

It is now necessary to see the bearing of these results on the constitution of the 'space-time' of nature.

It has been proved by Riemann that the metrical geometry of any space is completely determined when the 'linear element,' *i.e.* the interval between any pair of infinitely near points, is expressed as a known function of the differentials of the coordinates. Thus a three-dimensional Euclidean space is completely defined by the equation

$$ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2$$

for the linear element. Now the metrical properties of four-dimensional space-time will be completely determined when ds^2 (the interval of any pair of adjacent points in it) is expressed as a known function of dx^2, dy^2, dz^2, dt^2, $dxdy$, $dxdz$, $dxdt$, . . . etc. In space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of dx^2, dy^2 . . . must be known in order to determine ds^2. In general these coefficients will be functions of x, y, z, t; they are denoted by the letters g_{xx}, g_{yy}, g_{xy}, etc. Any transformation of axes corresponds to a change in these g's and therefore to a change in the form of the linear element. It follows that, as regards forces introduced simply by changes of axis, it is a matter of perfect indifference whether we say (*a*) that the geometry of space-time is such and such and that such and such forces are acting, or (*b*) that the geometry of space-time is such as to produce the appearance of these forces. The g's can be regarded either (*a*) as completely determining the forces on a given assumption about the geometry of space-time; or (*b*) as determining the metrical properties of space-time itself. The extended Theory of Relativity prefers to take the second view of them and to drop all reference to forces; on the first view the g's are of the nature of potentials. Now, in theory, any function whatever might be chosen for the g's. But, in fact, all parts of nature are subject to gravitation. This means that the choice of g's is not absolutely unrestricted, but that in every permissible system of axes for describing nature the g's will be subject to a set of differential equations connecting them with each other and with the x, y, z, and t of that system. These equations then express the law of gravitation and at the same time express it as a fundamental property of space-time.

It is extremely difficult to render Einstein's theory intelligible without mathematics, and the mathematics needed is somewhat formidable. It is hoped, however, that the above slight sketch may illustrate that extreme entanglement of time with space and with matter which undoubtedly occurs in our crude sense-data and is now seen to persist even in the most refined speculations of mathematical physics. It may perhaps be added that Einstein's generalized theory, as distinct from the special philosophic interpretations which may be put on it, is not a mere idle speculation, but has already explained the anomalies in the perihelion of Mercury, and has correctly foretold the amount of deviation in a ray of light due to its passing near a heavy body like the sun.

8. Historically important speculations about time.—Our knowledge of time as of space owes more to the labours of mathematicians and physicists than to those of professed philosophers. The sharp distinction between time and what changes, and between space and what moves in it and is extended, is largely due to the development, first of mechanics, and latterly of electrodynamics.

To the Greeks we owe much less with regard to time than with regard to most matters of philosophic or scientific speculation. This may perhaps be ascribed to the late development of dynamics; the Greek approach to the problems of time was mainly by way of astronomy. Of course, Zeno's celebrated arguments have an important bearing on change and continuity, and, whatever may have been the real intention of their author, they remained the best discussion on these subjects so closely related to time until the final treatment of infinity and continuity by Dedekind and Cantor in the latter part of the 19th century. Time plays an important part in the *Timæus* of Plato; and, although his treatment cannot be called satisfactory, it has the merit of distinguishing time from what is in time.

Plato says that God wished the created world to resemble the intelligible one as far as possible. Now, it was not possible for it to be eternal, and the nearest analogue to eternity which He could provide was to make 'a moving image of eternity.' This is time, and it is closely connected with the motions of the heavens; eternity 'rests in unity,' but the image 'has a motion according to number.' Before the heavens were created, there were no days, years, etc.; but, when God created the heavens, He created these divisions of time also. Time was thus created *with* the heavens, and, if one were to be dissolved, so would the other be. But Plato does not appear to identify time with the motion of the heavens, though it is difficult to see what he supposes it to be in itself. According to Plato, past and future are created species of time which we wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; strictly 'was' and 'will be' are to be asserted only of generation in time, for they are motions. The analogy of the moving image to the eternal

is that the created heavens have been, are, and will be in all time. This view has something in common with that of Spinoza, who makes things as they really are for *ratio* timeless, but holds that this timelessness cannot be grasped by *imagination*, which represents it confusedly as duration through endless time.

Aristotle defines time as 'the number of motions relative to before and after.' Number here appears to mean what is numbered. The now is borne along with the movable as a point may be regarded as moving and making up a line. So in a sense there is only one now, though in another sense there are many nows. This is obviously a very unsatisfactory metaphor, and there seems no reason to think that Aristotle was really clear as to the distinction between time and motion.

The Schoolmen in the main adopted Aristotle's views, though with certain modifications. St. Thomas Aquinas, in the tract *de Instantibus*, discusses time and change with some fullness. He draws a distinction between the time in which angels perform their acts and that in which men and matter operate. The time of angels is discrete, that of men continuous; the difference arises from the fact that continuity is essentially connected with matter, while angels are separated substances. An instant for an angel is the time occupied by a single act; it may thus correspond to a long period in our time. This may be compared with Royce's views about the varying lengths of the specious present in various beings.

In modern philosophy the men who have most concerned themselves with time are Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz argued strongly for the relative view of time in his letters to Clarke, who represented Newton and the absolute theory. His arguments turn mainly on the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz carefully distinguished duration from the relation of before and after, and he compared duration to the extension of matter. Leibniz's view is that time is a system of possible positions of possible events related by before, after, and simultaneous with. He holds that all possible worlds must be in time, though, of course, the particular temporal relations of the actual world are contingent. To make Leibniz's theory coherent, it would be necessary to be much clearer than he is as to the relation between the time-series of each monad and the time-series of the universe. He attempted to explain the relation between successive states of the same monad by saying that the earlier ones have the quality of being desires for the later ones. As an attempt to replace relations by qualities this clearly fails, since 'desire for' anything is clearly a disguised relation. And as an attempt to *define* before and after it also fails; for it is clearly a synthetic proposition that desire for X precedes X. Then again it seems essential to Leibniz's doctrine of the reflexion by one monad of the states of another that we should have some account of the temporal relations between corresponding states in different monads. The state of a monad at a given moment in its own time-series is presumably the reflexion of the *contemporary* states of other monads; but we are not told what is meant by a time-series common to the monads, nor is it clear that this would be consistent with Leibniz's dislike of relations.

The absolute theory of time has never had much philosophic support; there can be little doubt that Leibniz had the better of Clarke. Perhaps the best arguments for absolute time and space are to be found in Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. They do not seem to the present writer to be conclusive, and their author has latterly taken a much more relativistic view.

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume insisted that the notion of time comes from the succession of our ideas. But they never made it clear how their temporal relations are connected with the time that is used in physics. Berkeley and Hume in particular fail to give any reasonable account of the distinction that we certainly make between the temporal order of our ideas and the temporal order of the objects which we claim to know by them. It is a great merit of Kant to have seized on the importance of this point in his 'analogies of experience,' though the distinction will certainly not bear the superstructure which he built on it. He attempted to prove that the distinction involves the permanence of substance (which he seems to identify with the chemical law of the conservation of mass) and the law of causation among experienced objects. But his arguments are entirely inconclusive even to prove that, in order to make the distinction, we must *believe* in these principles; much less to prove, what the transcendental method always tends to confuse with this, that the principles are true.

Time plays perhaps more, and more important, parts in Kant's philosophy than in any other.

(1) In the *Æsthetic* he tries to prove that it is a form of intuition, the form appropriate to the internal sense. This seems to mean that, just as we can only perceive physical objects as being in space, though there is no reason to think that things-in-themselves are spatial, so we can only perceive ourselves and our mental states in introspection as being in time, though there is no reason to think that we really are in time. This certainly seems to raise the special difficulty that, unless we know ourselves as we are and not merely as we appear, we cannot know what our forms of intuition are, but only what they appear to be, whilst Kant's argument certainly assumes that we know what they are. (2) In the *Dialectic*, as we have seen, Kant has an antinomy about time. This apparently would, if valid, overthrow not merely absolute time but also the temporal character of events and the temporal relations between them. We have already seen how grave are the difficulties in the way of any such conclusion, and how entirely powerless Kant's arguments are to prove it. (3) In the *Analytic* time plays an important part in the difficult doctrine of the schematism of the categories. The position seems to be that the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding cannot be applied immediately to the manifold given in sense, even after that has been synthesized by imagination. They have to be mediated through time; thus the category of ground and consequent, which is purely logical, can be applied to the world of sensible experience only after it has been schematized into the temporal form of cause and effect. The whole argument here is confused and weak to a remarkable degree; the principle appears to be that the manifold of sense is provided with temporal characteristics by intuition; that these remain and are elaborated by the syntheses of imagination; and that then the categories can be applied if they be first schematized so that they and the synthesized manifold share the temporal characteristic in common. (4) Kant's critical solution of his own antinomy is that the infinity involved in time is not an actual infinite, as it would have to be if time applied to things-in-themselves, but is only the power that we have of always synthesizing farther than we have yet gone in constructing a temporal series. To this Lotze makes the very pertinent criticism that it surely depends on the nature of things-in-themselves whether we shall be indefinitely supplied with material to synthesize.

The modern development of our knowledge about time is due mainly to two sets of people: (1) philosophical mathematicians, like Dedekind and Cantor, who have given a satisfactory analysis of infinity and continuity, and thus finally refuted all antinomies based on these; (2) mathematical physicists who have been led by their studies in the optics of moving systems to elaborate the Theory of Relativity. The pioneer in this work is Lorentz; the theory itself was first formulated by Einstein; and the mathematical and philosophical consequences have been drawn and elaborated by Einstein, Minkowski, Robb, Whitehead, and others.

It is also necessary to mention among recent philosophers Bergson, in whose works time, nominally at any rate, plays an important part. Bergson holds that the attempt to treat time as similar to space is a perverse one philosophically; it may work very well in dealing with dead matter, but it

shows its falsity in biology, psychology, and philosophy. He also falls foul of the mathematical theory of the *continuum* as applied to time; he admits that it is internally consistent, but denies that it describes what anybody really means by change and motion. Bergson's arguments seem to rest partly on a comparison between change as a sense-datum (*e.g.*, the peculiar characteristic of what we see when we look at the second hand of a watch as distinct from the hour hand) and physical change, and partly on the erroneous view that a whole of related states cannot be a change unless each of its terms be a change. Again, in some of his remarks about memory he seems to suppose that, because a memory-act is a later awareness of an earlier event, the earlier event and the later awareness must somehow be contemporary. Finally, he seems to think that the ordinary view of time is refuted by the facts, of which he is strongly convinced, that no two total states of mind at different times can be exactly alike, that there are not, strictly speaking, distinct elements which can recur as parts of different mental states, and that no amount of knowledge about earlier states will enable us to foretell later ones completely. But Bergson's most characteristic doctrines belong to the subject of change rather than to that of time.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *Historical.*—Plato, *Timæus*; Aristotle, *Physics*; St. Thomas Aquinas, *de Instantibus.* (*b*) *Absolute and relative theories.*—Leibniz, *Letters to Dr. Samuel Clarke*, London, 1917; Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903, i. (*c*) *Reality of time.*—Leibniz; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*; F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed. revised, London, 1902; J. Ellis McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time,' *Mind*, new ser., xvii. [1908] no. 68, p. 437 ff.; H. Bergson, *Time and Free-will*, Eng. tr., London, 1910, and *Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., do. 1911. (*d*) *Measurement of time and Theory of Relativity.*—H. Poincaré, *Science et méthode*, Paris, 1908, and *La Valeur de la science*, do. 1908; H. A. Lorentz, *The Theory of Electrons*, London, 1909; H. Minkowski, *Raum und Zeit*, Leipzig, 1909; L. Silberstein, *The Theory of Relativity*, London, 1914; C. D. Broad, *Perception, Physics, and Reality*, Cambridge, 1914; A. A. Robb, *A Theory of Time and Space*, London, 1911; A. S. Eddington, *Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation*, do. 1918. (*e*) *Physical time as a construction.*—B. Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, London, 1914; A. N. Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919.

C. D. BROAD.

TINNEH.—See DÉNÉS.

TIPITAKA.—See LITERATURE (Buddhist), vol. viii. p. 85[b].

TIRUPATI.—Tirupati, vulg. Tripetty (Tel. Tirupati, *tiru*, Skr. *śrī*, 'venerable,' *pati*, 'lord'), a town in Chittoor District, Madras (lat. 13° 38′ N., long. 79° 24′ E.), is a famous place of pilgrimage, situated on the Tirumalai or sacred hill, usually known to Europeans as Upper Tirupati, in contrast to the lower town at its base. The whole area is considered sacred, and up to 1870 had never been visited by Europeans. Mark Wilks states that he was on duty for eighteen months in the neighbourhood, and, though he frequently climbed the adjoining hills, he could never catch even a distant view of the pagoda.[1] The belief that much crime was committed without detection in the holy town led to the issue of an order by Government that it should be thrown open to the District officials. This at first produced considerable local opposition; but European visits now cause little sensation. The sanctity of this hill-range rests on the legend that it forms part of the sacred mountain Meru. The range has seven principal peaks, each of which is sacred and has a name and legend of its own. One of the peaks, known as Śeshāchalam, 'serpent hill,' takes its name from the belief that it was torn from Meru by Ādi Śesha, the primordial snake, who contended in a trial of strength with the wind-god, Vāyu. Vāyu raised so great a tempest that the peak was blown away and fell to earth in its present position. Near this peak the great temple stands. Little can be seen of it, and no European has been allowed to enter it. It is a building of little architectural beauty or importance, but the cultus of the deity is interesting as an example of the amalgamation of local non-Aryan beliefs with orthodox worship. Within a small chamber lighted by lamps is the idol, a stone image of Viṣṇu, seven feet in height. It represents the god as Chaturbhuja, 'four-armed,' one of the right hands holding the discus (*chakra*), one of the left the conch-shell (*sankha*), the second right hand pointing to the earth to draw attention to the miraculous origin of the holy hill, while the remaining left hand grasps a lotus. The deity possesses 1008 titles, the most common of which are Śrīnivāsa, 'dwelling with Śrī or Lakṣmī,' goddess of prosperity, and Venkaṭachalapati, the title of the sacred hill, which has been adopted into Sanskrit from the Tamil *ven*, 'white,' *kadam*, 'hill slope,' thus showing that the deity was adopted into Brāhmanism from a Dravidian cult. By visitors from the Deccan and N. India he is generally known as Bālāji, which, according to Monier-Williams,[1] is the name of a human incarnation of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa of whom little is known, save that he was remarkable for many extraordinary qualities, and that he lived in the neighbourhood of the sacred hill. Hence visitors to the shrine generally invoke him by the title of Govinda, 'cow-keeper,' one of the names of Kṛṣṇa. It is remarkable, however, that, according to common belief, the image worshipped was originally one of Śiva. The transformation of the Śaiva cult to that of Viṣṇu is traditionally ascribed to the reformer Rāmānujāchārya (born *c.* A.D. 1017). It is said that he procured a conch-shell and discus of gold, which he placed before the image and closed the temple doors. When the shrine was opened next day, it was found that these emblems of Viṣṇu were grasped in the hands of the image, and therefore it was really Viṣṇu. The tangled hair (*jaṭa*), the cobras carved upon the body, and various other peculiarities indicate that it was intended to represent Śiva, and the priests, who are Dīkshita Brāhmans, admit that they belong to the Śaiva sect. The god is provided with a consort, Padmāvatī, said to be the incarnation of a mortal woman, and the offerings are believed to have been originally collected to provide for the marriage of the pair. In an ante-room there is a brass vessel with a bag hanging in it, into which money and jewels are placed. On the other side are two gongs, one of which, when struck, utters the name Govinda, the other Nārāyaṇa—both titles of the god. Many pious persons observe the custom of collecting in their homes monthly contributions which are placed in a money-box and finally offered at the shrine.[2] The anthropomorphism of the cult is shown in the belief that the deity annually announces to certain persons that he needs shoes, which they make and present.[3] Various rites indicate the non-Aryan character of the worship. Thus a feast called *Gangājātra*, 'Ganges festival,' is held in the early spring, when a figure is made of clay or straw, before which animals are sacrificed—a custom quite opposed to true Vaiṣṇava beliefs. Even Brāhmans, who will not attend personally, send victims. When the sacrifices are over, the image is burned, and much rude merriment follows. Some votaries carry on their heads a structure made of bamboo, resembling a car, adorned with coloured paper, and supported by iron nails that

[1] *Hist. Sketches of the South of India*[2], Madras, 1869, i. 246 n.

[1] *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 267 f.

[2] E. Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 352.

[3] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, iv. 310 f.

often pierce the flesh of the bearer, who submits cheerfully to the torture. At the *Gangammā* festival held at the temple 'language truly filthy and obscene' is used to the goddess herself.[1] The explanation of this custom is obscure.

'Abusive language is believed in certain circumstances to bring good luck to the person against whom it is directed.'[2]

On this theory the obscenity may possibly be regarded as a form of mimetic magic intended to repel the powers of evil from the deity, and thus advance her powers of promoting fertility.[3]

Again, on the road leading up to the temple 'small stones heaped up in the form of a hearth, and knots tied in the leaves of the young date palms may be seen. These are the work of virgins who accompany the parties of pilgrims. The knots are tied in order to ensure the tying of the *tāli* string on their necks [at marriage], and the heaping up of stones is done with a view to ensuring the birth of children to them. If the girls revisit the hill after marriage and the birth of children, they untie the knot on a leaf, and disarrange one of the hearths. Men cause their names to be cut on rocks by the wayside, or on the stones with which the path leading to the temple is paved, in the belief that good luck will result if their name is trodden on.'[4]

The hope of recovery from sickness and the desire for male offspring are the chief causes of vows being made to the god. The vow need not be performed immediately on receipt of the blessing. Death merely transfers the obligation to the heir, and it is said that the god is never defrauded. A common offering by women is the hair of their heads, which is shorn off by barbers, more than half the women who visit the temple returning with their heads clean shaven. J. A. Dubois[5] describes a custom of binding the idol in chains of silver, apparently with the object of preventing him from leaving the temple. The same writer[6] speaks of the custom of women who desire children passing a night in the temple. He also alleges that at the festival, when the image is taken in procession, the Brāhmans select the most beautiful women as wives of the god; they are branded with a hot iron, and, after serving for some years, are dismissed with a certificate of good conduct which ensures that, as they wander through the country, their wants will be abundantly supplied.[7] By other accounts, when such a woman becomes too old to please the deity, the priests make a mark on her breast, the emblem of the god, and give her a patent certifying that she acted for a certain number of years as one of his wives, that he is now tired of her and recommends her to the charity of the public. H. A. Stuart, however, denies that any dancing-girls attend the god; but he admits that the state of morality among priests and pilgrims has deteriorated, even celibate Bairāgis and priests taking their paramours with them up the sacred hill. In the Deccan it is very common for a woman to make a vow that, if she is relieved from sickness or other trouble, she will shave her head to the god at Tirupati. After being shaved, she walks thrice round the temple, worships the image, pays a fee to have lighted camphor waved round the idol, receives a pinch of the sugar offered to the god, distributes food to the poor and to the monkeys which swarm round the temple, offers charity, and returns home.[8] The tonsure of children is also performed at the temple.[9]

LITERATURE.—This art. is mainly based on an excellent account of the place by A. F. Cox, *Manual of the N. Arcot District*, Madras, 1881, p. 146 ff., supplemented by later information supplied by its writer. In addition to the authorities quoted, see J. B. Tavernier, *Travels in India*, tr. from ed. of 1676 and ed. V. Ball, London, 1889, ii. 243. For various references to the worship of the god among the people of S. India see also E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, i. 195, 335, 389, ii. 43 f., 112 ff., iii. 42, 461, iv. 310, 326 f.

W. CROOKE.

TITANS.—The Titans, like the Giants (*q.v.*), are potencies belonging to an early pre-Olympian stage of Greek mythology. The two tend to be confused by late authors, but in origin they are distinct. The Titans are distinguished from Giants by the following well-marked characteristics: (1) they are gods (*θεοί*), and as such immortal, whereas the Giants are mortal; Τιτῆνες θεοί, 'Titans, gods,' is a fixed formulary in Hesiod's *Theogony*; (2) they are sky-potencies (Οὐρανίωνες)[1] as contrasted with the Giants, who are earth-born (γγγενεῖς); Titans and Giants alike are to Hesiod the offspring of Earth and Heaven, but the Titans tend skywards, the Giants with their snake-tails earthwards. To Shakespeare Titan is the sun.

'And Titan, tired in the mid-day heat,
With burning eye did hotly overlook them.'[2]

To Pausanias[3] Titan, according to the local legend of Titane, is 'brother to the sun,' and Pausanias himself held that Titan 'was great at marking seasons of the year.' Empedocles holds a less specialized and perhaps juster view; he places side by side

'Gaia and billowy ocean and air with its moisture,
And *Æther, the Titan*, embracing the All in a circle.'[4]

The Titan Phaethon is the sun and sun's charioteer; the Titaness Phoebe is the moon; the Titans Atlas and Prometheus are the sky-pillars supporting Ouranos. The Titans are an integral part of that primeval cosmogony of earth and sky, ousted in Greece by the anthropomorphic Olympians, but remembered as part of their Indo-European heritage by the Northern Muses who came to Helicon and taught their lore to Hesiod.

The etymology of Gigas, 'giant,' is uncertain; that of Titan is happily secure, and it throws a flood of light on the function of these sky-potencies of older date and explains in a flash the two Titan myths—(*a*) the Titanomachia, (*b*) the rending of Zagreus, which, but for this etymology, must have remained obscure. Three glosses of Hesychius make it certain that *Titan* means simply 'king.' They are as follows: τιτῆναι· βασιλίδες (the word glossed is from a lost play of Æschylus); τιήνη (for τιτήνη)· ἡ βασίλισσα, and τίταξ· ἔντιμος. ἢ δυνάστης. ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς. Titan is king, 'honoured one,' but —and here is the interesting point, or rather series of vitally interconnected points—he is the king of the old order, the king-god or divine king, and as such he is a sky-potency, for one main function of the old king-god was to order the goings of the heavenly bodies and generally to control the weather. Here we have that odd blending of physical phenomena with human and social potencies which lies at the back of most gods and certainly of Zeus himself.

The Titanomachia is at once clear. For on the physical point of view it is, as described in Hesiod,[5] just a half-humanized thunder-storm, Zeus, the new sky- and thunder-god, fighting the old sky-potencies; from the theological point of view it is the new anthropomorphism against the old religion of the king-god or medicine-man who controls the weather. The Olympian religion naturally regarded these old Titan kings as criminals, rebels against high heaven, condemned to Tartarus for their sin of ὕβρις; they are the counterpart of the arch-Titan Prometheus.

[1] *Madras Government Museum Bulletin*, Madras, 1901, iii. 267 f.
[2] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, ii. 492.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 100.
[4] Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes*, p. 351.
[5] *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], tr. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906, p. 591.
[6] P. 593 f.
[7] P. 601 f.; cf. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, ii. 117; N. Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, Eng. tr., London, 1907-08, iii. 143 f.
[8] *BG* xxii. [1884] 64.
[9] J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 97 f.

[1] *Il.* v. 898. [2] *Venus and Adonis*, 177. [3] II. xi. 5.
[4] H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1903, p. 38.
[5] *Theog.* 665 ff.

The second Titan myth, the rending of Zagreus, is less transparent, but in the light of the Titan kings even more illuminating, for we catch the king in his earliest stage of all, when he was tribal elder or medicine-man, not yet fully developed into kingship. The Titans, according to a version of the story as early as Onomakritos,[1] lure away the infant Zagreus, dismember, and (in some versions) cook and eat him. The story is an initiation myth based on the familiar initiation ritual of the mock death and resurrection of the initiate. The initiators are the elders or dynasts of the tribe, the embryo-kings.[2] The Titans as old-world kings are well in place; as a form of giant they are absurd. The name Zagreus takes us to Crete, and in Crete we find the Titans in a connexion that again points to initiation mysteries. The Cretans, according to Diodorus,[3] said that in the time of the Kouretes those who were called Titans ruled over the region of Cnossos, where were shown the foundations of the house of Rhea and a sacred cypress-grove of hoary antiquity. These Titans again must have been the old king-medicine-men, contemporary with the Kouretes and, like them, initiators into the 'men's house' of the Mother Rhea.[4] On a red-figured *hydria* in the British Museum[5] Zagreus is depicted as actually devoured by the Titans, and these Titans wear the characteristic dress of Thracian chieftains. We may safely infer that the Titan myth of the rending of Zagreus was known from Thrace to Crete, and we may suggest that it arose in that early stratum of 'satem'-speaking population known to the later Greeks as 'Pelasgian'—a stratum specially addicted to the mystery-cults of the son of Semele.

LITERATURE.—M. Mayer, *Die Giganten and Titanen*, Berlin, 1887. For the Titans as Ouraniones, J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 453–460. The right etymology of Titan from the root *ti*, 'honour,' was first seen by L. Preller, *Gr. Mythologie*[4], Leipzig, 1894, p. 44. Its meaning as 'king' was made clear by F. Solmsen, in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xxx. [1912] 35. The full significance of the 'king' meaning in relation to the mystery-rite of the *omophagia*, as practised in Crete and by Thracian chieftains, was established by A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, Cambridge, 1914, i. 655 ff., in relation to his republication of the British Museum vase in pl. xxxvi. The previous literature of the subject will be found in Cook's notes. On p. 655, note 2, he rightly points out that the present writer's former derivation (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908, p. 493, and *Themis*, p. 15) of the word 'Titan' from Τίτᾶνος, 'white-clay man,' is erroneous. As initiators the Titans probably were daubed with white clay, but the name is not derived from the disguise.

J. E. HARRISON.

TITHES.—1. Origin and purpose.—Tithes are connected, on the one hand, religiously, with offerings of firstfruits (*q.v.*); on the other hand, politically, with tribute and taxation. While taxation often took the form of a tenth, the amount might vary, less or more, though the name 'tenth' (*decima*, δεκάτη) was retained. Voluntary offerings to a deity soon became customary, and even necessary, especially where kings began to impose taxation and tribute, and where a god was now thought to be a divine monarch. To keep up his sanctuary was as much an obligation as to keep up the royal person and court. An early example shows this. The people of Tyre paid tithes to Melcarth as king of the city, and the Carthaginians similarly sent their tithes to Tyre.[6] W. R. Smith[7] shows that in this case the tithe was as much political as religious. The voluntary offering necessarily became tribute also, as the ritual of a sanctuary became more elaborate, the sanctuary itself more splendid, and the attendant priests more numerous. Why a tithe or tenth should have been fixed on so generally is not clear, but probably it is connected with primitive views about numbers, or with methods of counting—*e.g.*, by fingers and toes.[1]

In Babylon, whether the tithe was native or borrowed, its use is found in the time of Nebuchadrezzar II. Earlier evidence is so far lacking, and there is no trace of it in the Assyrian period. It was a due paid to the temple of a god from the land, and was paid by all, including the king, who assigned to temples founded by him an annual amount from cultivated lands and from the treasury. Numerous tablets concern tithes, and show that the people were taxed for support of the temple. Tithe was of the nature of a fixed charge on the land and even became negotiable. Such tablets may be regarded as of the nature of a receipt for payment of tithe, which was generally paid in kind—corn, oil, sesame, dates, flour, oxen, sheep, and asses—though this might be commuted for a money payment. One man sometimes paid it collectively for a group of men, and possibly this signifies a systematic collection of tithe in one district by an authorized person.[2] At the same time Babylonian kings had a tithe of all imports, as had also Persian satraps.[3] In S. Arabia tithes were used for the erection of sacred monuments.[4] Cyrus, on the advice of Crœsus, caused his soldiers to devote a tenth of their booty to Zeus.[5] The tithe as a tax on land was well known in Greece and Rome, and the payment of a tithe to temples on special occasions was not uncommon. Pausanias gives many instances of this—*e.g.*, a tenth of war-booty being set aside to make an image or a vessel for a temple.

In Egypt there was apparently greater freedom. Temples were usually provided with lands for their upkeep, but the gods expected to receive a share of the produce of fields, vineyards, orchards, and fish-ponds. The kings in time of war dedicated a tenth of their booty to the temples, as well as of tribute levied on vassal states and of prisoners who were made slaves of the conqueror.[6]

Zoroastrian literature refers to the fourth rank of men—traders, artizans, market dealers, etc.—who should pay a tithe to the high priests and to the king.[7] Chinese sacred literature mentions a tenth of the produce of 'the fields' being annually levied; whether as a religious tribute or not is not clear.[8]

The *Confucian Analects*[9] tell how 'the Duke Gae enquired of Yew Jô, saying, "The year is one of scarcity, and the returns for expenditure are not sufficient. What is to be done?"' He desired to take two tenths, instead of the usual statutory single tithe, from the allotments cultivated in common, against which Yew Jô protested.[10]

2. Tithe in the Old Testament.—Among the Hebrews the relation of tithes to firstfruits[11] is complicated, and opinions differ as to whether they were distinct or not. Firstfruits would naturally vary in quantity. Tithe expresses more or less a fixed proportion. Perhaps the tithe represents firstfruits made systematic, or different names may have been favoured at different times and in different localities. The tithe is called 'an heave offering' in Nu 18^{24}, but the two are apparently separate in Dt $12^{6ff.}$. In the later legislation firstfruits and tithes appear to be distinguished.

The tithe, which is not mentioned in the Book of the Covenant, appears first in the Northern

1 Paus. viii. xxxvii. 3.
2 See art. Kouretes and Korybantes.
3 v. 66.
4 See artt. Mountain-Mother and Kouretes and Korybantes.
5 E. 246.
6 Diod. Sic. xx. 14.
7 *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 246.

1 See art. Numbers (Introductory).
2 C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, pp. xi, 205 f.; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, U.S.A., 1898, p. 668; G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, tr. M. L. McClure, London, 1894, p. 678.
3 Aristotle, *Œcon.* 1345*b*, 1352*b*.
4 W. R. Smith, p. 247.
5 Herod. i. 89.
6 Maspero, p. 126.
7 *Riwâyats* (*SBE* xxxvii. [1892] 425; cf p. 443).
8 *Shi King*, vi. 7 (*SBE* iii.[2] [1899] 370 f.).
9 Bk. xii. ch. ix. §§ 1–4.
10 J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, i. 119.
11 See art. Firstfruits (Hebrew).

Kingdom in the time of Jeroboam II. as the material given for a feast at the sanctuary (Am 5^{11}; cf. 4^{4}), though the feast was one for the rich at the expense of the poor. Here it appears as a fixed tribute. In Gn 28^{22} (E) Jacob promises a tenth of all to God—perhaps a reflexion of later custom, though not necessarily so—and Melchizedec receives a tenth of all (14^{20}). In 1 S $8^{15, 17}$ tithe is paid to the king, and perhaps he devoted this to the upkeep of some sanctuaries. The tithe in the Deuteronomic Code is not a forced tribute. The tithe of corn, wine, and oil, with the heave offering, free-will offering, and firstlings of herd and flock, are to be brought to the sanctuary and eaten there as a feast with servants and Levite (Dt $12^{6f., 17f.}$). Here the connexion with firstlings suggests that the tithe was the firstfruits of produce, or perhaps included these. This was a private feast at the sanctuary, and may have been a reform due to the fact that the ruling classes, as in Am 5^{11}, secured the best for themselves. It was not a direct due for the priesthood or for public religious services. If, however, the distance to the central sanctuary was too great for the offering to be taken there, it might be commuted for money, and this would furnish the material for the feast at the sanctuary as before (Dt $14^{22ff.}$). Every third year the tithe was to be laid aside to furnish a feast or feasts at home for the Levite, stranger, fatherless, and widow (14^{28} $26^{12f.}$).

Does the tithe here referred to form the equivalent of the firstfruits, the ritual of which, as perhaps forming part of the tithe, is detailed in Dt $26^{1f.}$? Probably they are ultimately the same, including an offering of part as firstfruits, and a feast for Levite and stranger, just as in 18^{4} firstfruits are to be given to the priests. If so, the words in 26^{11}, 'Thou shalt rejoice in all the good which the Lord thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger,' would refer to the feast and be equivalent to the feast on tithe of $14^{22f.}$, while the earlier part of ch. 26 would refer to the offering of part as a firstfruits offering.[1]

Is the third year's tithe additional to the tithe given each year, or is it a special form of treating tithe in the third year? Here again opinions differ, but most regard it as a diverting of the usual tithe for the benefit of the local priesthood, who would be deprived of the tithes through the new custom of feasting at the central sanctuary. Others regard it as a second tithe, and this is supported by the LXX, which reads for 'the year of tithing' 'the second tithe,' τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιδέκατον. But two tithes in every third year would mean a large amount, and it is unlikely that such demands would be made, or, if made, carried out.

In the Priestly Code tithe assumes the form of a fixed due. A tithe of the produce of the land, of fruit, and of the herd and flocks (*i.e.* of their yearly increase) is 'holy unto the Lord.' If commuted for money, one-fifth part of the value is to be added (Lv $27^{30f.}$). This is probably the tithe of produce referred to in Nu $18^{26f.}$, which was to be given to the Levites, they in turn giving a tenth of it to the storehouse for the support of the priests (cf. Neh $10^{37f.}$), who received now also firstfruits of corn, oil, and wine (Nu 18^{12}). The tithe of cattle and sheep in Lv 27^{32}, which is to be 'holy unto the Lord,' may represent the firstlings used at the Deuteronomic tithe-feast, but claimed later by the priests (Nu $18^{15f.}$) as apart from the Levites, but it is not referred to in Neh 10^{37}, where the tithe is described (cf. 12^{44} $13^{5, 12}$), and may be a later addition. It is, however, mentioned as paid to the priests in To 1^{6}, by Philo,[1] and in the *Book of Jubilees* (32^{12}). Rabbinic authorities regard it as furnishing, along with a second tithe of produce (Lv 27^{30})—additional, therefore, to the tithe of produce in Nu 18^{21}—a feast for the tither and guests at Jerusalem, as ordained in Dt $14^{22f.}$ The purpose of the Priestly Code was probably to abrogate the law of the tithe in Deuteronomy, but later harmonizers did not take this view and spoke of two tithes, and even three, the third-year tithe of Deuteronomy being regarded as an additional one.[2] The law of P is reflected in Hezekiah's legislation, which ordered that firstfruits and tithes of produce, sheep, and oxen should be brought for the priests and Levites (2 Ch 31^{4}); hence, if the tithe of animals is in addition to the original law of Lv $27^{30f.}$, it may have come into force after Nehemiah's time.

In Neh $10^{34f.}$ firstfruits and firstlings and firstfruits of dough were for the priests, and tithes of produce for the Levites—the latter collected by the Levites under the supervision of a priest, and a tithe of the tithe being given to the priests (cf. 12^{44}). The tithe, however, was not always paid to the Levites, as Nehemiah discovered, and they had to cultivate their own land. At Nehemiah's remonstrance it was paid ($13^{10f.}$). At a later time the priests themselves collected the tithe,[3] and the subsequent history of the Levites in connexion with it is obscure, while they no longer shared in the tithe, either from the time of Ezra[4] or from that of John Hyrcanus.

The Pharisees, as well as the regulations of the Talmud, considered minutely the things to be tithed (Lk 11^{42}), the former even paying tithes of garden herbs—mint, anise, cumin.

Under the Rabbinic system of three tithes referred to above, the first was collected yearly; the second was due in the first, second, fourth, and fifth years; the third in the third and sixth years. Two were thus taken every year, except in the seventh year, when the land lay fallow. The poor's tithe suggested tithing of earnings, all of which was given to them. Extravagant claims were made for the virtue of tithe; *e.g.*, through it Israelites escape the twelve months' punishment in hell which is the lot of the wicked.[5]

In Ezekiel's proposed legislation, which marks the transition to P, the first of all the firstfruits of everything is reserved for the support of the priests. There is besides a tax paid to the prince for the support of ritual and feasts out of wheat, oil, and flocks ($44^{30f.}$ $45^{13f.}$; cf. 20^{40}). No mention is made of tithes, nor are the payments to be made to the priests as in P.

3. Early and mediæval Church usage.—In the Christian Church the need of supporting the clergy, who were early withdrawn from secular business, was recognized, but the system of tithe was not generally resorted to for several centuries. Once it did become general, tithe was regarded, on the analogy of its use in the Jewish Church, as *de jure divino*, and supported by such passages as Mt 10^{10}, Lk 10^{7}, 1 Co $9^{7ff.}$—an argument which Selden was the first to show groundless, in his work on the subject. Until the 4th cent. little is heard of it, and some writers regard the matter from a totally different point of view from that which was later adopted. Irenæus, referring to tithes in the Jewish system, says characteristically that Christians, as 'those who have received liberty, set aside all their possessions for the Lord's purposes, bestowing joyfully and freely not the less valuable portions of their property.'[6] Origen

[1] Cf. S. R. Driver, *Deuteronomy* (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1895, *in loc.* The passage in Dt 18^{4} assigning firstfruits of corn, wine, and oil, and of wool to the Levites is out of harmony with the other Deuteronomic legislation, if firstfruits and tithe were one and the same.

[1] Philo, *de Præmiis Sacerd.* § 2, *de Carit.*, § 10.
[2] Jos. *Ant.* IV. iv. 3 f., viii. 22; *cf.* IX. xiii. 3; To 17.
[3] Jos. *Ant.* XX. viii. 8, IX. 2, *Vita*, 12, 15.
[4] So the Talmud, *Yebhâmôth*, 86; Hullin, 131; *Kethûbhôth*, 26.
[5] *JE* xii. 1515.
[6] *Adv. Hær.* IV. xviii. 2.

regards tithes as something to be far exceeded in Christian giving,[1] and Epiphanius says that tithe is no more binding than circumcision.[2] Augustine regards the tithe as something due by Christians to God, though he and others are prompted also by the finer ideal of freedom in all Christian giving. It was inevitable, however, that, as the Church spread far and wide, circumstances should make it necessary to fall back upon rule, based upon legal provision, and the old standard of a tenth was set up, and the Christian priest was compared in this matter to the Jewish priest and Levite. Ambrose and many other Fathers accordingly maintain that tithes should be given, but their views were not generally accepted in the Eastern Church. Even in the West there is evidence that 'this species of ecclesiastical property was acquired not only by degrees, but with considerable opposition.'[3] The moral duty of paying tithe was now generally taught, but, even after it was made a matter of law, tithe was paid reluctantly and irregularly. In A.D. 585 the Council of Mâcon ordained its payment, while priests were to use it in helping the poor and in redeeming captives. He who refused to pay it was to be excommunicated. Other councils enjoined it, but it was not until the time of Charlemagne that it became matter of law. In one of his capitularies he ordained it to be paid to churches and clergy. Preachers had already exhorted strenuously towards its payment as tending to Christian perfection, and doubtless it was now more generally rendered. At the same time it has to be remembered that, apart from ecclesiastical law, under Roman law colonists had to pay a tenth to the State as rent from the *ager publicus*. This had already in large measure fallen into the hands of the Church. While the ecclesiastical tithe was usually paid to the bishop, who apportioned it, Charlemagne's capitulary regulates its division into three parts—for the bishop and clergy, for the poor, and for the support of church fabrics. In later times tithe was often appropriated to particular churches and to monastic foundations. Once the payment of tithe became a matter of legal due, excommunication or temporal penalties were decreed against those who refused to pay it. Meanwhile abuses had risen in connexion with the appropriation of tithe. Sometimes, instead of appropriating it to a church, monastery, or diocesan treasury, a proprietor would appropriate it to his own uses or even sell it. It had also become common for ecclesiastics to grant tithes to laymen as an award for service or in recognition of their protection. These were now regarded as evils, and it was set forth as a legal maxim that all tithes are of ecclesiastical origin. Where they had been appropriated by laymen, they were withheld from the Church only by robbery or by feudal grant (*decimæ infeudatæ*). No layman could possess tithes without risking his salvation. Hence the Third Lateran Council of 1179 forbade detention of tithes by laymen as well as transference of them to other laymen. The Council also declared that any one who violated this decree endangered his soul, and would be deprived of Christian sepulture. As a result of this, many tithes were restored to ecclesiastical use. Towards the 13th cent. tithe was also extended from the fruits of the earth, or predial tithes, to all kinds of profit and wages. It was divided by the canonists into (1) predial—derived from the fruits of the ground; (2) mixed—of things nourished of the soil, or those due partly to its productiveness, partly to human skill and labour; (3) personal—from the profits of trade and merchandise. But generally the second division is included in the first. Ecclesiastical law in the Middle Ages laid down precise rules regarding what was tithable and what was not, those who were exempt, the sale or transference of tithe to laymen (a custom which gradually came into use), the superiority of tithe to State taxes, and the like.

[1] *In Num.* hom. xii.
[2] *Hær.* 50.
[3] H. Hallam, *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*[11], London, 1855, ii. 145.

4. English law and practice.—In England legislation on the subject seems to date from the latter part of the 8th century. Pope Adrian in A.D. 785 enjoined payment of tithe on the Anglo-Saxon Church. This was confirmed in later ecclesiastical councils and synods, sometimes by royal orders. The idea that the civil grant of tithe dates from an alleged charter of Ethelwulf (A.D. 855) is now abandoned; and in any case it appears to grant a tenth of the land, not of produce.[1] In King Edgar's reign failure to pay tithe was made legally punishable (A.D. 950). Towards this time the growth of parish churches was attended by their endowment with part of the tithe paid by the landowner, who was usually the founder of the church, to the diocesan or monastic treasury. In course of time, and with the extension of the parochial system, it became a matter of legal presumption that the local tithe was the property of the rector. In many places rectories with their tithes were the property of monastic establishments, a vicar being appointed to perform the duties of the charge. The Reformation brought about great changes, and, where the rectorial tithes belonged to monasteries, at their dissolution the tithes became the property of the crown. They were now frequently granted to lay impropriators, thus being completely dissociated from their original purpose. The rectorial tithe was the 'greater' tithe, and such tithe or part of tithe as was paid to vicars was the 'smaller.' The greater tithes were generally predial; the smaller were mixed and personal. These distinctions were practically wiped out by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836, although long before that date commutation of tithe paid in kind for a money payment had been general. By the Act of 1836, tithe, with a few exceptions, was now commuted for a fixed rent-charge, based on a seven years' average of the price of corn—wheat, barley, and oats—the amount being that which formed the legal tithe at the date of the Act. With the difference in values since 1836, the result has not been for the benefit of the recipient of tithe. Further legislation has modified details in procedure. The Tithe Act of 1918 amends the Acts, 1836 to 1891, and orders that the sum payable under these Acts in respect of tithe rent-charge on or before 1st Jan. 1926 shall be the sum payable, as ascertained by the septennial average prices under the Corn Returns Act, 1882, in January 1918. Tithe rent-charge is thus fixed up to 1st Jan. 1926, at £109, 3s. 11d. But the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries shall, after 25th Dec. 1925 and in succeeding years, compute in the same manner as for this septennial average the average price of corn for the preceding *fifteen* years. The sum payable as tithe rent-charge after 1st Jan. 1926 shall be ascertained on this fifteen years' computation.

5. Teinds in Scots law.—In Scotland tithes are known as teinds, and are almost entirely predial, including *decimæ mixtæ*, and only in exceptional cases personal. They were divided into parsonage and vicarage teinds, the former being leviable from grain (wheat, oats, and barley), the latter from natural grass or bog-hay, certain vegetables, butter, cheese, calves, lambs, herring, etc. Where an incumbent was appointed by the patron, he

[1] Hallam, ii. 263.

received the whole teind. In other or 'patrimonial' parishes the teind belonged to the bishop, or to a religious house, and the vicar who served the parish received stipend out of the teinds, sometimes a small part of the vicarage teinds. When teinds first began as such in Scotland is not known with certainty, but they are frequently mentioned in charters of the 12th cent., as well as in writs of that period to enforce their payment. Canons of provincial councils in the pre-Reformation period regulate this payment and appropriation. Many abuses arose regarding teinds, and the decrees of the Lateran Council were often ignored. Certain ecclesiastical lands (*i.e.* lands which were the property of monastic orders) were granted freedom from payment of tithe by papal privileges. When such lands were feued to laymen, this exemption also passed to them. In view of the coming Reformation, ecclesiastics frequently made grants to landowners, called titulars, conferring heritable rights to teinds by feu or by long lease. At the Reformation church lands passed into the hands of laymen by grant from the crown or otherwise, but payment of teind still continued, though the stipends of ministers were entirely at the will of proprietors and were of the scantiest amount. In 1537 the General Assembly petitioned the Privy Council to make permanent provision for the maintenance of ministers. The Council thereupon decreed that one-third of all ecclesiastical revenues should be divided between ministers and the crown. On the rent-rolls being made up, this sum was found to amount to over £6000. But, as a result of imperfect returns, remission, and refusal of payments, much less than half of this sum was available. In 1567 Parliament, under the scheme known as the 'assumption of thirds,' ordered that 'the haill thrids of the haill benefices of this realme' be paid now and for all time coming to ministers until 'the Kirk come to the full possession of their patrimonie, quhilk is the teindes.' This third was never paid in full, but the system remained in force until 1633. While Parliament thus recognized the right of the Kirk to teinds—a proprietary right fully enjoyed by the pre-Reformation clergy—that right was nullified, and teinds had been 'evicted from their former owners, diverted from their former use, and acquired and dealt with by the crown and nobles as their own property.'[1] An Act of 1617 appointed a commission authorized to augment stipends out of teinds, and a number of stipends were so treated. In 1627, as a result of Charles I.'s intention to receive surrenders of alienated church lands and teinds, and of the opposition which this roused, a commission was appointed to deal with the subject and to make provision for churches. Submissions were made to the king by those who had benefited by grants of teinds or were interested in them, and as a result he issued his 'decreets-arbitral,' which were confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1633, and commissioners were appointed to deal with the whole matter. Teinds were to be valued at 'the fifth part of the constant rent which each land payeth in stock and teind where the same are valued jointly,' or, if valued apart, the commissioners were to declare their value. Titulars of teinds were to sell them to heritors at nine years' purchase, but only so far as not already devoted locally to the minister of the parish. The valuation thus made fixed the amount of teind for all time coming, and the minister's stipend was to be paid out of the commuted teinds as a permanent endowment, with a further possible augmentation. Stipend thus forms a paramount claim upon teind. These decrees were confirmed by Act of the Scots Parliament in 1633, and still continue to regulate the right to teinds and the payment of stipends of ministers of the Established Church. The whole matter of teinds was vested in commissioners, but was transferred under the Union of 1707 and subsequent Acts to the Lords of Council and Session, acting as a Court of Commission of Teinds. This Court of Teinds deals with all matters regarding teinds, and in particular hears all claims for augmentation of stipend out of the unexhausted or free teinds, where such exist in the possession of the proprietors after payment of stipend. Such claims can be preferred only twenty years after a previous claim has been upheld.[1]

[1] J. M. Duncan, *The Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland*², p. 230.

In valuing teinds under the Act of 1633, the valuation was made either in grain or in money. Where stipend is payable according to value of grain, it is valued according to fiars prices of the county, as determined by a local court who strike the value for the crop and year.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Duncan, *The Parochial Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland*², ed. C. N. Johnston, Edinburgh, 1903; *Green's Encyclopædia of the Law of Scotland*, new ed., ed. J. Chisholm, do. 1909–14; C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, do. 1904; H. Lansdell, *The Sacred Tenth*, 2 vols., London, 1906; A. S. Peake, art. 'Tithe' in *HDB*; G. F. Moore, art. 'Tithes' in *EBi*; R. J. Phillimore, *Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of England*², ed. W. G. F. Phillimore and C. F. Jemmett, 2 vols., London, 1895; J. Selden, *The History of Tithes*, do. 1618; W. R. Smith *The Religion of the Semites*², do. 1894, pp. 244 ff., 458 ff.; John Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus, et earum rationibus*, Cambridge, 1685.

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TITHES (Greek).—It is difficult to separate tithes (δεκάτη) and firstfruits (ἀπαρχή), since the tithe is only a special form of firstfruit. Many nations and tribes, if not nearly all, have had the custom of setting apart a portion of their goods for the gods; and when, as was sometimes the case, the king or chief was a sort of god, he took his share by compulsion. It seems to have been a wide-spread belief that some sacrifice was due to the local spirits whenever men broke new ground, built a settlement, or bridged a river; and it was certainly common in very early times to leave a portion of the new land to the possession of the old divinity. Perhaps for the same reason portions of the fruits of the earth were left, or otherwise given to the gods. It is not likely that this portion was always the same fraction of the whole; but the tenth was found to be a convenient fraction early and in many nations, among them the Jews. No doubt the decimal numeration had something to do with this choice.[2] In Greece a few traces are known of the early custom just mentioned—*e.g.*, the sacred groves of Artemis, with game that no men might kill except in a sacred hunt.[3]

The Pelasgians are said by Stephanus to have offered the tithe, which in later days they dedicated at Delphi;[4] and Herodotus[5] tells how the Hyperboreans used to send their annual tithe to Delos. The tithe is not mentioned in Homer; and the earliest records come with the inscriptions, although legendary tithing is spoken of earlier. When Agamemnon conquered Mycenæ, he is said to have dedicated a tenth to the gods.[6] An epic poem, the *Europia*, two lines of which are quoted by Clement of Alexandria,[7] mentions the dedication of tithes at Delphi. The Liparians, on conquering the Etruscans, dedicated a tithe of the spoils at Delphi.[8] After the Persian invasion the Greeks took an oath to tithe all those cities which

[1] *Green's Encyclopædia of the Law of Scotland*, ed. J. Chisholm, xii. 103 f.; Duncan, p. 312 f.

[2] δεκατεύω = 'I count.'

[3] Philostr. *Imag.* i. 28, *Heroicus*, 286=665; Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 9; *IG Sept.*, Berlin, 1892–1908, iii. 1. 654 (2nd cent. after Christ); cf. the ἱερὸν κυνηγέσιον mentioned in Demosth. *c. Aristogeitona*, A, Introd.

[4] Stephanus, *s.v.* Ἀβαρίγενες; Dionysius, i. 18. 49.

[5] iii. 33.

[6] Diod. xi. 65.

[7] *Strom.* i. 349 (Sylburg).

[8] Diod. v. 9.

had sided with the enemy.[1] Tithes of that great struggle are also mentioned as being upon the Athenian Acropolis.[2] A helmet exists that was part of a war-tithe, dedicated by Hiero probably from the spoils of Cumæ.[3] Tithes of spoils are recorded also from the battle of the Eurymedon.[4] Tithe is a certain restoration in the inscription that records how the Cnidians built their θησαυρός at Delphi.[5] Statues on the Sacred Way at Branchidæ bear the inscription of tithe.[6] Two colossal figures were purchased with the tithe of Plataea;[7] the Clitorians also dedicated another as a 'tithe from many cities.'[8] A bronze Apollo in the Pythium at Athens belongs to the 4th cent.;[9] and an archaic bronze figure of the 'Apollo' type bears the word 'tithe.'[10] Even the private person speaks with pride of the tithes that he offered to Athene, to the amount of more than half a talent.[11] Most of the dedications of arms and spoils are without the distinctive word; but the war-tithe is recorded from the following places: Apollonia,[12] Athens,[13] Bœotia,[14] Branchidæ,[15] Crete,[16] Mantinea,[17] Megara,[18] Sparta,[19] Thessaly;[20] at Delphi by Athenians,[21] Caphyes,[22] Cnidians,[23] Liparians,[24] Spartans,[25] and Tarentines;[26] at Olympia by Clitorians,[27] Eleans,[28] Messenians,[29] Spartans,[30] Thurians.[31]

Other tithes are mentioned in Anaphe,[32] Arcadia,[33] Argolis,[34] Athens,[35] Bœotia,[36] Calabria,[37] Calymna,[38] Crete,[39] Cyrene,[40] Delos,[41] Delphi, Didymi[42] and Epidaurus[43] in Argolis, Halicarnassus,[44] Ithaca,[45] Megara,[46] Naxos,[47] Pæstum,[48] Paros,[49] Rhodes,[50] Samos,[51] Thera,[52] Siphnos.[53] They are dedicated by men or women, or by groups of persons, to Apollo, Artemis, Athene, Demeter, Heracles, Zeus. The articles tithed are all kinds of produce, corn and the fruits of the earth, hunting, fish, gotten minerals, or the profits of trade and industry. Thus we find the Siphnians tithing the output of their mines,[54] the Corcyreans their fish,[55] the Samian merchants their profits.[56] Before the Persian invasion the farmer offers a tithe of his farm;[57] other early dedications of tithes are made by fullers[58] and shipwrights.[59]

1 Herod. vii. 132: δεκατεῦσαι. 2 Dem. *Timocr.* 741.
3 *CIG*, 16; *IGA*, 510. 4 Diod. xi. 62.
5 Paus. x. 11. 5; *BCH* xxii. 592.
6 C. T. Newton, *Hist. of Discoveries at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Branchidæ*, London, 1862–63, inscr. vol., no. 66.
7 Herod. ix. 81; Paus. v. 23. 1, x. 13. 5.
8 Paus. v. 23. 6. 9 *CIA* ii. 1154, 1204.
10 *American Journal of Archæology*, new ser., ii. [1898] 50.
11 Lys. *Polystr.* 686. 12 Paus. v. 22. 3.
13 *CIA* i. 334; Paus. i. 28. 2.
14 *IGA*, 191; *Amer. Journ. Arch.*, new ser., ii. 250.
15 Newton, p. 777.
16 *Monumenti Antichi*, iii. [1891] 402 ff.
17 *IGA*, 100; H. Collitz, *Sammlung der griech. Dialektinschriften*, Göttingen, 1884–1905, i. 1198.
18 *IG Sept.* i. 37. 19 Paus. iii. 18. 7. 20 *IG Sept.* (*Thera*).
21 Paus. ix. 13. 9. 22 *BCH* xviii. 177. 23 *Ib.* xxii. 592.
24 *Diod.* v. 9. 25 Xen. *Anab.* v. 3. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 9.
26 Paus. x. 13. 10. 27 *Ib.* v. 23. 7. 28 *Ib.* vi. 24. 4.
29 *Die Inschriften von Olympia*, Berlin, 1896, p. 259.
30 Paus. v. 10. 4. 31 *IGA*, 548.
32 *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, Berlin, 1895–1908, iii. 257 f.
33 Collitz, i. 1198.
34 *Ib.* iii. 3407; *CIG*, 1172; *IG Peloponnesi et Insularum Vicinarum*, Berlin, 1902, i. 580, 977.
35 *CIA* i. 210. 36 *IG Sept.* i. 1739[16], *IGA*, 191, etc.
37 *IG Siciliæ et Italiæ*, Berlin, 1890, p. 643.
38 L. Ross, *Inscr. Græcæ ined.*, Naples, 1834–35, iii. 298.
39 *CIG*, 2556.
40 Collitz, iii. 4839, 4840; *CIG*, 5133; *Mittheilungen des deutschen archäol. Instituts*, xxiii. [1898] 22.
41 *BCH* xxvii. 65, xxx. 214.
42 Collitz, iii. 3407. 43 *Ib.* iii. 3335. 44 *CIG*, 2660.
45 *IG Sept.* iii. 1. 654. 46 Paus. i. 42. 5. 47 *IGA*, 408.
48 *Ib.* 542.
49 *Mittheil. des deutsch. arch. Inst.* xvii. [1902] 196.
50 *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, i. 817a 3.
51 *Herod.* iv. 152. 52 *Ib.* iii. 57.
53 *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, iii. 431.
54 Herod. iii. 57; Paus. x. 11. 2.
55 Paus. x. 9. 3, v. 29. 9. 56 Herod. iv. 152.
57 *CIA* iv. Suppl. i. 373[121], p. 182.
58 *Ib.* iv. 373 *l.*, p. 42. 59 *Ib.* iv. 1. 373[324], p. 198.

We also read of a butcher,[1] a courtesan,[2] and others who speak generally of a tithe of their work.[3] Sometimes friends or relatives offer the tithe for another.[4] Some of the female statues of the Acropolis were tithes.[5] See also art. FIRST-FRUITS (Greek).

LITERATURE.—Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Dekate'; Pauly-Wissowa, *s.vv.* ἀπαρχαί, δεκάτη; H. Lansdell, *The Sacred Tenth*, 2 vols., London, 1906; W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, Cambridge, 1902, ch. ii. and index; J. Selden, *The Hist. of Tithes*, London, 1618; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], do. 1894, pp. 244 ff., 458 ff.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

TLINGIT.—The Tlingit, who occupied the coast of Alaska from Portland Canal to Copper River, were organized into two main phratries and one subsidiary phratral group, and the phratries were subdivided into clans. The character of their country and their manners and customs were almost the same as those of the Haida (*q.v.*), though the northern towns had not adopted the elaborately carved poles so characteristic of the latter, and their potlatches were conducted in a somewhat different manner.

1. Cosmological beliefs.—The outlines of Tlingit belief were like those of the Haida and indeed of the other tribes of the North Pacific coast, but in details there were considerable divergences. Like the Haida, they believed that the earth was flat and the sky a solid vault hung above it like an inverted cup and tenanted by various supernatural beings. The stars were supposed to be towns and their light the reflexion of the sea. The sun and moon were also occupied by special beings, and more regard was paid to the sun than by the Haida. Shooting stars were supposed to be live coals thrown down by departed spirits, and the northern lights were those spirits at play. Under the earth was an old woman called Old-woman-under-the-earth, who supported a great post, on which the solid land rested. According to one story, she was the sister of four brothers, who were favourite heroes of Tlingit mythology, and who in early days travelled all over the world killing harmful animals, putting things in order, and establishing customs for future generations. One of these brothers, Kashkatlk, was a powerful shaman who succeeded where his brothers had failed, and was frequently called upon to restore them to life, while another, Hlkayak, was always getting them into trouble by his impetuous and trifling character. He was suspected of an amour with his own sister, and, when his brothers discovered that their suspicions were well founded, they drove him away, and he became the wielder of the thunder. His sister, overcome with shame, went down into the earth at a place where the extinct crater of Mt. Edgecombe now is, near Sitka, and became Old-woman-under-the-earth. The remaining brothers and their mother were turned into rocks while trying to cross the Stikine River, and they may be seen there at the present day. According to the version of this story told at Wrangell, the sister was also turned into rock at that place and Old-woman-under-the-earth was an entirely different person. Old-woman-under-the-earth liked to receive food and prayers from human beings, and she was especially fond of girls because they made the fires on earth which warmed her. When she did not get enough attention from mankind, she became angry and moved her pole, causing an earthquake. Others said that the earthquake was caused by her anger at some persons who were teasing her, and Veni-

1 *IGA* 543. 2 Herod. ii. 135; cf. *BCH* xv. 113.
3 *KAT* 172, *BCH* vi. 192[53].
4 *CIA* i. 349; Collitz, iii. 3448; *IG Insularum Maris Ægii*, ii. 258.
5 *v.g.*, the pillar base 150 in Acrop. Museum; cf. *CIA* iv. 1. 373[202] 218.

aminoff[1] was told that it was because Raven was angry with mankind and was trying to drive her away in order that the earth might fall into the sea. Though Hlkayak was said to cause thunder, it was more often ascribed, as in the case of the Haida, to a huge bird; the flapping of its wings produced the thunder and the opening of its eyes the lightning; it lived principally on whales, which it carried up into the mountains, and their bones were often found there. Still another story relates that several brothers became wizards in order to rescue their sister from a giant slug which had dragged her up on the side of a steep cliff, and, having learned to fly, afterwards became thunder beings. When a peal of thunder was heard, people shook themselves and jumped into the air, crying, 'Take all my sickness from me.'

2. Supernatural beings.—Except in the general way common to all American tribes, we do not hear much of sky-beings. The 'above-people' of the Haida were said to have been first heard of through the Tlingit, however, and the conception of Tāxēt's house also originated with them, although they did not recognize any special being of that name.

The four brothers have been referred to as the originators of culture and customs, but they by no means supplant Raven, whose personality, functions, and attributes were the same here as on the Queen Charlotte Islands.[2] It is ethnographically important to note that he began his career on the Nass River, and, according to some accounts, returned to its head as his final home.

In connexion with Raven we have the nearest approach to a supreme deity that the Tlingit seem to have possessed, for the heaven-god of the Haida appears to be entirely wanting among them. This personage was called Raven-at-the-head-of-Nass (Nasshakiyehl), and it was from him that Raven obtained the sun, moon, stars, and eulachon to distribute all over the world. Some of the more thoughtful Indians at the present day elevate this being to a position far above that which he occupied aboriginally, but there is no doubt that he always had a real existence. He was called in some stories 'the king of birds,' and Raven was therefore subordinate to him. Up to the present time, however, no account of him has been obtained in the northern Tlingit towns—a fact which may indicate that Tsimshian and Haida influence has been instrumental in creating him.

Although held in considerable regard, killer-whales did not receive a tithe as much attention as among the Haida, nor do they appear to have been associated with points and reefs. Land-otters, however, and the land-otter men (*kushtaka*)—the Tlingit equivalent of the *gagihit*—played a great part in Tlingit mythology and in the rites of shamans, and were viewed with even greater terror. We also find a counterpart of the Haida Property-woman called Tlenahidak, and a counterpart of Master-carpenter. The increased importance of hunting is shown by the conception of Mountain-dweller, who lived far back among the mountains and had a house always abundantly stocked with game. Mountains generally were called upon for a fair wind. Other patron-deities were undoubtedly believed in, but the tendency in this direction does not appear to have been as strong as among the Haida. Another belief peculiar to the Tlingit was in a race of seal-men. When one of these was seen, they poured a bucket of fresh water into the ocean. The grizzly bears and mountain-sheep, which are wanting in the Queen Charlotte Islands, were naturally held in greater regard than there, and, when bears were killed, their skins were hung up and adorned with eagle-down and red paint, being addressed meanwhile with soothing words. If this were not done, it was feared that the bear's relatives would be angry and would kill the hunter. Favourite among Tlingit myths was that of a hunter named Kats, who was captured by a female grizzly bear that killed her bear-husband in order to marry him. His children by her were a famous race of bears known as 'Kats's children.' They destroyed many people and committed great depredations, but were at last killed, and in later times figures of them served as heraldic crests in many of the most prominent families. There were also special tabus regarding mountain-sheep and the handling of their skins.

People obtained good luck by grasping at the sun's disk and pretending to put it upon anything that they desired to be lucky. Like the Haida, the Tlingit gave food to any thing or any being that they wished to help them, and called to it, mentioning their wants. Everything was believed to have a spirit connected with it—there was one in every trail that a person followed and in everything that he did.

3. The dead.—The regions of the dead are said to have been three—one below and two above the plane of earth. The first was the country of the killer-whales, and was for those who had been drowned, and the third, or highest, was for those who had died by violence, corresponding to the Tāxēt's house of the Haida. The approach to this place was through a hole reached by a single log, and this was guarded by a person who admitted only such as had perished in the prescribed manner. The trail thither was infested by grizzly bears and other animals. All other persons passed after death to the lower sky-country Sagi-kawu-ani ('souls' home'), which corresponded closely to the Giettlgai of the Haida. The person who was to go thither found himself on a trail, and, following it, came to a fork. One of the two paths had been much trodden upon, while the other was very faint. The former came out on the bank of a river, beyond which were the houses of the departed, but, however loudly the new-comer shouted to the other souls to carry him across, they paid no attention until by chance he yawned, when they exclaimed that a soul had arrived, ferried him over, and gave him food. This river was said to be formed by the tears which women shed over the departed, and therefore it was not good to weep much until one's friend had crossed the river. A story recorded by Krause[1] adds the important fact that only the souls of those who had friends among the spirits got to the other side, the remainder being forced to wander about miserably, and also that the river itself was as green and bitter as gall. The souls were dependent for their food on what their friends put into the fire for them, and all had to do their own work except those for whom slaves had been killed. Cremation, which was well-nigh universal among the Tlingit, was accounted for by the belief that only those whose bodies were burned could go near the fire in the spirit-world, the others being forced to shiver near the doors of the houses. According to Veniaminoff,[2] the path of those whose friends wept much was muddy and watery, but for those whose friends wept less it was smooth and even. A world for wicked persons was sometimes spoken of, called Yehlkiwakawo ('Raven's home'), and would seem to be in the place where Raven lived, but it is possible that the belief was due to missionary influence.

4. Rebirth.—As among the Haida, belief in rebirth was general—so much so that it is said

[1] *Ap.* A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, p. 268 *f.*
[2] See *ERE* vi. 473.

[1] P. 280.
[2] *Ap.* Krause, p. 282.

that a poor person would wish to die in hope of being reborn in a higher position in life. If a pregnant woman dreamed of some dead relative, it was believed that her child would contain his soul, and in consequence the child was given the relative's name. A belief in four rebirths followed by annihilation has also been recorded, but this was perhaps a distorted rendering of the Haida idea of reincarnation.[1]

5. Shamanism.—Shamanism reached its highest development among the Tlingit, and nowhere on the coast were shamans of such exalted social rank, so well thought of, or so powerful. When performing, the Tlingit shaman was dressed much like his Haida counterpart, but he also assumed a wooden mask, and, besides being possessed by one principal spirit, he was, if not possessed, at least accompanied, by several subordinate ones. The latter were represented on the masks by small figures round the eyes, jaws, ears, etc., of the principal figure, and were supposed to strengthen the corresponding features of the shaman. Still other spirits had charge of his rattle. With each of the masks went a certain number of songs. One of the most popular spirits was the wood-worm, which enabled the shaman's mind to pierce through anything just as the wood-worm cuts through wood. In addition to his other neck ornaments, the shaman sometimes had a bird's head tied in front. He had an assistant, who took charge of his paraphernalia, beat time for him, and told the other people what to do. This assistant was generally the man who was to succeed to his office. According to Veniaminoff,[2] the successor was a son or sister's son, but for a son to succeed to his father's position seems to have been the exception. The right to certain spirits might be inherited, and in saying that this seldom happened Krause has gone decidedly too far.[3]

Not infrequently the spirit came to a novitiate shaman on the death of his predecessor, but often he was compelled to stay as long as two weeks in the mountains and woods before it showed itself. When it finally made its appearance, it usually sent him the land-otter, the tongue of which he wrenched out, catching the blood on a little bundle of sticks. Krause[4] says that the shaman killed this land-otter by exclaiming 'Oh!' four times very loudly, each time in a different tone of voice. He also notes that none of the sticks in his bundle were retained except those on which the blood had fallen. As the shaman drew out the tongue, he exclaimed, 'May I be skilful in my new calling,' 'May I be able to charm and dance well,' etc. The tongue was afterwards concealed in the bundle, which was then kept in an out-of-the-way place, for, if an uninitiated person were to come upon it, he would lose his reason. The skin he removed carefully and preserved as a visible mark of his calling, but he buried the flesh in the earth. The part played by land-otters in shamanism and in mythology generally inspired the Tlingit with such respect and dread that, before the coming of the Russians, they would not shoot one of them.

If a person could not otherwise succeed in becoming a shaman, he might go at night to the grave of some dead shaman and take from the body a tooth or the end of one of the little fingers, and place it in his mouth. A shaman who did not observe certain regulations carefully might be killed by his own spirits, and, on the other hand, he could throw them into one who did not believe in him and destroy him.

The great exhibitions or performances of the shamans were undertaken only during the new or full moon. Shamans then called upon their spirits to bring good fortune and health to their town and people. From the morning of the day before that appointed until the following morning none of the relatives of the shaman who were to assist him might eat or drink. They cleansed themselves internally by drinking water and introducing a feather into the throat to bring on vomiting. At sunset all entered the appointed house, which had been thoroughly cleansed and provided with new floor-planks. Then the shaman came out from behind a screen and began to run round the fire, his friends singing all the time, until the spirit came to him.

Veniaminoff[1] divides the spirits that spoke through shamans into spirits from above, land-spirits, and water-spirits. The first were the souls from the above-country already referred to. The land-spirits appeared in the form of land-animals, but were said to be the spirits of those who had died a natural death and who had their dwellings in the distant north. The water-spirits appeared in the forms of sea-animals, and were in fact the spirits of those animals. According to Krause,[2] every Tlingit, whether shaman or not, had his own protecting spirit, but this belief does not seem to have assumed the importance which it bears among the inland Indians.

6. Witchcraft.—As shamanism had reached its highest development with the Tlingit, so also had witchcraft, which might almost be described as a diseased shamanism. A wizard accomplished his object by obtaining some portion of the person or clothing of the victim and laying it by an unburned body, among the ashes of a burned body, or on the body of a dog. When a person was suspected of being a wizard, his hands were bound behind his back and he was imprisoned in an empty hut without food and with nothing to drink but sea-water. There he was kept until he confessed, lost his reason, or died, unless his friends were powerful enough to liberate him. The person who confessed to having bewitched any one was forced to wade out into the sea with the medicine or compound which had caused the illness and to scatter it upon the water, accompanying his actions with certain formulæ. Instead of being imprisoned, a suspected wizard was sometimes bound hand and foot and exposed on the beach for the rising tide to cover him. Sometimes he was dealt with in a still more summary manner. Among other accomplishments, wizards and witches were universally believed to possess the power of flight.

7. Charms, etc.—The principal families and many in humbler circumstances kept charms to bring wealth and good fortune. They believed in all sorts of signs, which they extracted from, or rather read into, natural phenomena, and they thought that natural phenomena would be affected by the breaking of this or that tabu. After a person had died, his body was carried through a temporary hole in the side of the house, and a dog, dead or alive, was thrown out after it, either that the spirits might follow it out of the house or that the dead man might be protected in his journey to the spirit world.

LITERATURE.—The monumental work of A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, Jena, 1885, is the authority on the subject. Most of the important mythological material contained in I. Veniaminoff and other early writers has been gathered into it. See also J. R. Swanton, 'Social Condition, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationship of the Tlingit Indians,' in *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 391 ff., and 'Tlingit Myths and Texts,' *Bull. 39 BE* [1909]; F. Boas, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 801 ff. JOHN R. SWANTON.

TOAD.—See ANIMALS.

[1] See art. HAIDA, § 17.
[2] P. 286.
[3] *Ap.* Krause, p. 284.
[4] P. 285.

[1] *Ap.* Krause, p. 291.
[2] P. 292.

TODAS.—The Todas are a small community, about 700 in number, living on the undulating plateau, about 7000 ft. above sea-level, of the Nilgiri hills in Southern India. They are a purely pastoral people who eschew all other occupations. They are provided with the products of agriculture by the Badagas, a Canarese tribe who also live on the plateau, while the Kotas, allied to the jungle peoples of Southern India, furnish their metal-work and pottery. Except for these commercial relations, the Todas form a wholly separate community and have few other relations with the Badagas or Kotas. With the Kurumbas, a jungle tribe living on the slopes of the Nilgiris, the Todas have even less frequent relations, and these arise chiefly out of the Toda belief that the Kurumbas are sorcerers.

1. Social organization.—The people are divided into two sections called the Tartharol and the Teivaliol, each of which is strictly endogamous, though irregular unions are allowed between men and women of the two. Each section is divided into a number of exogamous clans. Each clan owns a number of villages, or *mad* (commonly called *mand*), and takes its name from the *etudmad*, or chief of these villages. The villages are small settlements, sometimes consisting of only one or two houses with a dairy and buffalo-pen. They are scattered over the hills, but most of the villages of a clan are near one another. Each clan is divided into two divisions called *kudr*, 'horn,' which should properly be, and usually are, only two in number. These divisions are of importance only in ceremonial. Another division of the clan is the *polm*, by which the sharing of communal expenses, such as those incurred in the repair or rebuilding of the chief dairies of the clan, is regulated. The Todas recognize the existence of the family, or *kudupel*, as a social unit, and this often corresponds with the *polm*. One clan, the Melgarsol, has an exceptional position in that, though belonging to the Tartharol, it shares many duties and privileges with the Teivaliol.

Descent is always patrilineal. A man belongs to the clan of his father. The effect of fatherhood is not determined by marriage, however, but by a ceremony of giving a bow and arrow which takes place at the seventh month of pregnancy. This ceremony is not performed at every pregnancy, but a person is regarded as the child of the man who was the last to perform this ceremony with his or her mother.

The Todas practise polyandry, nearly always of the fraternal type.[1] Formerly this practice was possible in a pure form owing to the existence of female infanticide. Though girls are probably sometimes killed at birth, the practice is now less frequent. There is still a considerable excess of men, but polyandry is often combined with polygyny, producing a state which may be regarded as a variety of group marriage.[2] In addition to orthodox marriage there is a regular system of unions in which a woman has connubial relations with one or more men called *mokhthodvaiol*. This kind of union may take place between a Tarthar man and a Teivali woman or *vice versa*, thus differing from marriage proper, which is confined to members of one section. The orthodox marriage is between cross-cousins, and this institution is reflected in the nomenclature of relationship which in several respects resembles that of the Tamils. The cross-cousin is classified with the spouse, the mother's brother with the father-in-law, and the father's sister with the mother-in-law. Betrothal in infancy is customary, and this practice is probably responsible for a custom of transferring wives from one man to another which has now become very frequent. The custom seems to have been originally one by means of which a widower could obtain a wife in a community where, through the practice of infant betrothal, every woman is already bespoken, but it has now become a process set in action whenever one man desires the wife of another.

The people are governed by a council of five called the *naim*, one of the members of which should properly be a Badaga. This council is chiefly engaged in settling disputes arising out of the transference of wives. It is also the business of the *naim* to arrange when ceremonies shall be performed, especially those of the more important dairies. There is a headman called *monegar*, but he is chiefly concerned with the payment of the assessment to the Government, and the institution is almost certainly recent. On the other hand, the headship of the clan is certainly an old institution. Its functions are not especially important, and this also holds good of the headship of the *kudr* and *polm*.

2. Religion.—The Todas believe in certain superior beings who may be regarded as gods, and speak of them as 1600 or 1800 in number, but these are the customary Toda expressions for an indefinitely large number. The two most important are Ön and Teikirzi. Ön is a male deity who presides over Amnodr, the world of the dead. He is believed to have created the Todas and their buffaloes and to have been himself a dairyman. More important in the minds of the people is Teikirzi, a female deity, who is believed to have lived on the Nilgiris and ruled the people. Most of the Toda social and ceremonial laws are ascribed to her ordinance. These two deities are not especially connected with hills, but nearly all the others seem to be hill-deities, each being associated with a special hill-top. Two are river-gods, associated with the two chief rivers of the district.

The ritual of the Toda religion is concerned almost exclusively with the buffaloes and the treatment of their milk. The dairies are the temples; the dairymen are the priests; and various incidents in the lives of the buffaloes, such as their movements from one grazing ground to another, the first milking, and the giving of salt, have become the occasion of ceremonial which has a religious character. This ritual stands in a definite relation to the gods, for these beings are mentioned in the formulas of the dairy ritual, the general character of which indicates that they must be regarded as prayers. The names used for the deities in these prayers differ from those used in ordinary speech, and form part of a series of expressions called *kwarzam*, in which special names of deities, buffaloes, dairy utensils, and other objects are uttered, preceded by the word *idith*, said to mean 'for the sake of.' The dairies and the buffalo-herds form a somewhat complicated organization, especially among the Tartharol. Every village has a number of buffaloes devoid of any element of sanctity, and their milk is churned in a dairy, also devoid of sanctity, with no special ritual. Most of the buffaloes, however, belong to herds with special names with varying degrees of sanctity, and in correspondence with these there are great differences in the elaborateness of the ritual with which the milk is treated and in the ceremonial regulations of the lives of the dairy-priests. This complicated system is confined to the buffaloes of the Tartharol, the Teivaliol having only one variety of sacred buffalo, but the most sacred kinds of dairy of the Tartharol must be tended either by Teivali men or by men of the Melgars clan, which occupies an intermediate position between the two main sections.

[1] *ERE* viii. 427. [2] *Ib.*

The lowest grade of Tarthar dairy is called *tareali*. Its ritual is comparatively simple and is confined to the evening milking and churning. When the dairyman enters the dairy, he bows down and touches the threshold with his forehead, touches certain dairy vessels ceremonially, lights the lamp, and utters a prayer before beginning to churn. After churning he holds the churning-stick to his forehead, uttering the sacred syllable 'Om.' He also repeats the prayer of the dairy after milking.

The dairy next in order of sanctity differs in the possession of a bell (*mani*). The dairyman is not allowed to put his food on the ground; both curd and milk are put on the bell with the utterance of the sacred syllable; and the chief milk-vessel is beaten three times with the bark of the sacred *tudr* tree (*Melioma pungens* and *Wightii*), the same syllable being uttered. The dairymen of this grade are allowed to sleep in the ordinary hut only on certain days of the week. Ordinary people are not allowed to drink the milk of buffaloes tended at this dairy.

Certain villages have dairies with special features of ritual, but the next kind of dairy in order of sanctity which occurs in every Tarthar clan, except the Melgarsol, is the *wursuli*, the dairyman of which must be taken either from the Teivaliol or from the Melgars clan. The restrictions on his conduct are more numerous and the ritual of milking and churning is more complex, special features being that he wears his cloak in a particular way, and that the proceedings of both morning and evening have an equally ceremonial character. In many dairies of this rank there are two rooms, the inner of which contains the more sacred dairy vessels. The dairyman, or *wursol*, is allowed to sleep in the village and have intercourse with women only on two nights of the week.

All these dairies are situated at the villages where the people live, though they may be at some distance from the dwelling-houses. The highest kind of dairy, called the *ti*, on the other hand, is situated far from the villages. Each herd has several dairies, all of which are remote from the dwelling-places of the people. The dairyman, called *palol*, must be of the Teivaliol, and his attendant, the *kaltmokh*, must come either from the Teivaliol or from the Melgars clan. The *palol* is not allowed to visit a village or have intercourse with any persons other than dairymen of his own rank, his *kaltmokh*, and men of the Melgars clan who are privileged to visit the *ti* dairy and drink buttermilk. Intercourse with women is entirely forbidden except on one occasion after the *palol* has held office for eighteen years. The ritual of the *ti* is far more complex than that of any village dairy. In this dairy the vessels are more numerous and have special names different from those of the less sacred forms of dairy. The more sacred vessels, viz. those which come directly into contact with the milk of the buffaloes, are always kept in an inner room, together with the bell or bells, and are not allowed to come into contact with the vessels which, being used to contain the products of the churning, are regarded as less sacred. The details of milking and churning are more elaborate and more strictly regulated than in the village dairies, and the prayers are longer and more frequently repeated.

The proceedings when the buffaloes move from one grazing ground to another have a definitely ceremonial character. This is especially elaborate in the case of the *ti* dairies. The more sacred vessels are carried by the *palol*, while the others are taken by the *kaltmokh*, assisted by a man of Melgars, who leads the way. There are elaborate ceremonies of purification of the dairy which is about to be occupied, and a special prayer for the welfare of the buffaloes is offered before going to rest. On the following day there is a ceremony in which the *kaltmokh* takes a leading part. His head and body are rubbed with a mixture of milk and clarified butter, and he is given a ball of a special kind of food larger than he can possibly eat, the remainder of which he has to leave on the spot where the ceremony has taken place. An invocation is uttered that evils of many kinds may afflict the boy, and this is followed by another invocation that these evils may be averted. At some dairies milk and butter are rubbed on certain stones.

Before entering upon office every dairyman undergoes certain ceremonies which may be regarded as a kind of ordination. These increase in complexity with the increasing sanctity of the dairy, but the chief feature common to all is a process of purification by drinking and washing with the water of a stream which is used only for ceremonial purposes. The ceremony is named either after this process or after the act of lighting a lamp, this being the first duty of the newly ordained dairyman. An important part of the ceremony is the use of certain leaves to rub the body and as drinking vessels. The ordinary dairyman uses the leaves of a bramble for this purpose, while the *wursol* and *palol* use the leaves and bark of the sacred *tudr* tree. Another feature is the use of the special kind of cloth which is worn by the *palol*. A fragment only is used by the lower grades, while the *wursol* and *palol* assume a complete garment of this material. The village dairyman of the lower grades touches the various vessels of the dairy, beginning with the less sacred, as the final stage of his ordination, while the *wursol* and the dairymen of certain other villages touch a buried vessel, called *mu*, specially disinterred for the occasion. The ordination of the *palol* is preceded by a qualifying ceremony in which after certain purifying rites the candidate in a state of nudity receives food from an old woman. Though the woman must be past the age of child-bearing, the original object of the rite is probably to test whether the candidates are likely to submit successfully to the abstinence which is incumbent upon the holder of the office of *palol*. In the ordination ceremony proper of the *ti* dairy the rites of purification last for a whole week, and in the later stages of the ceremonial the candidate drinks water from the sacred *tudr* leaves three, seven, and nine times seven times. The *palol* touches a bar of the opening into the pen in which the sacred buffaloes are enclosed at night as the final act with which he enters into office.

An important ceremony of another kind is named after the buttermilk, called *pep*, which is put into the milking-vessel before milking is commenced. A vessel called *mu* is kept buried in the buffalo-pen of the chief village of each clan, and, if this has been tampered with, or if a dairy has been defiled or the bell of the dairy has been taken to a funeral, a new vessel has to be procured and consecrated, the ceremony, however, being called the consecration of the buttermilk. The chief feature of the ceremony is the sanctification of the new vessel with the earth of a buffalo-pen taken from the footprints of one of the buffaloes.

Another ceremony is performed about the fifteenth day after the birth of a calf to one of the sacred buffaloes, and still another when salt is given to the buffaloes. There seems to be little doubt that the great ritual development of the business of the dairy is connected with a belief in the sanctity of the milk of the sacred buffaloes. At the present time the buffaloes themselves are not regarded with any special veneration, and it would seem as if this had been transferred to certain cattle-bells called *mani*, so old that their tongues have been lost, and to the vessels which come directly into contact with the milk of the buffaloes, while another specially sacred object is the vessel, called *mu*, which is buried in the buffalo-pen of the chief village of each clan (see above).

3. Sacrifice and offerings.—An important ceremony is one in which a male buffalo-calf is killed and its flesh eaten, this being the only occasion on which a Toda should eat the flesh of a buffalo. At the *ti* dairy the ceremony, which may be regarded as sacrificial, takes place three times a year; at the other dairies it should probably be annual, but now takes place more frequently. After a prayer in which the calf is asked to appear to certain deities, and after it has been stroked with leaves of *tudr*, the animal is killed by being struck with a log of the *tudr* tree, the bark and leaves of which are prominent in the dairy ritual. The right fore-limb is of especial importance, being placed near the middle of the fire at which the flesh is roasted and eaten together with the pelvis, feet, and head by the dairyman.

There is an annual ceremony in which a fire is lighted by the *palol* at the foot of certain hills, the summits of which are believed to be occupied by gods. Clauses are added to the ordinary prayer asking that fruit may ripen and honey abound.

The ceremonies which have been described are performed regularly, and their occasions arise chiefly out of the necessary events of the pastoral life, the last described standing alone in its reference to vegetation and means of subsistence other than those provided by the buffaloes. The cere-

monies now to be described are more occasional and depend on the commission of some act which has offended the gods and thus brought illness or some other misfortune upon the offender. In these cases the central feature of the ceremony is an offering to the gods of either a buffalo or a buffalo-calf, a piece of the cloth worn by the more sacred dairymen, or a ring.

The simplest kind of offering, often made when some mistake has occurred inadvertently in a ceremony, is to undertake not to kill or part with a buffalo, but allow it to die a natural death. In this case there is little ceremony, the donor simply stating that he is giving the buffalo to the gods while he salutes an elder. A more ceremonial offering of a buffalo-calf is made if a misfortune is ascribed to some serious offence against the dairy, such as stealing milk or its products, quarrelling in the dairy, or going to it in an impure state. In this case the calf is given by the offender to the people of the other *kudr* of his clan. All members of the *kudr* of the offender have to leave the village for a month, at the end of which, after purification with fasting, the calf is driven across certain ceremonial stones to be received by members of the other *kudr*. For minor offences a piece of cloth or a ring is offered with similar rites, the offering passing in every case from the *kudr* of the offender to the people of the other *kudr* of the clan. In all cases prayers are offered, which include in some cases supplications for the health of the people and their buffaloes.

4. Divination.—The offerings just described are made as the result of the finding of diviners called *teuol*, or god-men. The decisions are given when the *teuol* are in a state of frenzy and in a language which is said to be Malayalam. It is believed that they are the utterances of some of the gods. The diviners are often consulted at funerals, usually to discover the cause of death or illness either of men or of buffaloes, or the cause of any harm which has happened to a dairy or its contents. In the case of illness they usually find either that the patient has committed some offence against the dairy or that he is the victim of the sorcery of the Kurumbas.

5. Birth and childhood ceremonies.—Two ceremonies are performed during pregnancy; in the first the wrists of the woman are burnt while she is undergoing seclusion, while the second ceremony is that already mentioned in which the presentation of a bow and arrow determines the fatherhood of the child. Various ceremonies occur at the end of a period of seclusion which follows childbirth. Until a child is three months old no one but the mother is allowed to see its face, and at that age a ceremony is performed in which the face is uncovered and the child is allowed to look at the sun. Ceremonies are also performed when the name is given, when the ears are pierced, and when a lock of hair is cut, the last ceremony only taking place on the day after the second funeral (see below) of a Tarthar man.

6. Death.—The funeral ceremonies are very elaborate and take place on two different occasions often separated by many months. At the first ceremony the body is cremated on a pyre, the orthodox position being face downwards. Several rites are performed before cremation, among them being one in which a cloth is given by a near relative of the deceased to men who have married into the family, the cloth being then placed on the corpse by the wives of these men. In the case of a man the cremation is preceded by a ceremony in which earth is thrown three times into a buffalo-pen by the Teivali dairyman at a Tarthar funeral and by the relatives if the dead man is one of the Teivaliol. In most Tarthar clans the body is placed before cremation in a special three-roomed dairy. Buffaloes are killed, varying in number in different clans. In each case the right hand of the dead man is made to clasp one of the horns, and lamentations are uttered in which each person addresses the dead buffalo by the same term of relationship as he would use to the deceased. Immediately before the body is burned, it is swung three times over the fire upon a representation of a bier. When the body is consumed, a piece of the skull is recovered from the ashes and kept, wrapped with some of the hair in a cloak, for the second funeral ceremony. In the interval these relics are kept in a special village, where they are saluted by any Todas who visit the place. Formerly the body was smoke-dried, after it had been eviscerated, if the cremation ceremony was delayed.

At the second funeral ceremony the earth-throwing rite is repeated. At a Tarthar funeral a ceremony is performed in which the relics are sprinkled with the blood of a buffalo mixed with the bark of the *tudr* tree. This is done by a Teivali man, wearing the cloak in which the remains have been wrapped, after which he touches the remains with a bow and arrow. Buffaloes are killed, as at the first ceremony, and the men dance with a tall pole obtained from Malabar. During the following night the final ceremony takes place, in which the relics together with a number of other objects are burned within a stone-circle. The ashes are interred at an opening in the circle, and the grave is covered with a stone. A bell is then rung and a new pot broken on the stone, after which all go away without turning back to look at the resting-place of the ashes.

The dead are believed to go to a place called Amnodr in the west and below the earth. The god On presides over this world of the dead, where the people live much the same kind of life as on earth. The dead travel to Amnodr by a definite route, which differs in some respects for Tartharol and Teivaliol. In each case the dead perform acts on the way by which they lose their love of the earth and regain the vigour of health. They have also to cross a bridge of thread, running the risk of falling into a river full of leeches. Those Todas who have offended against the dairy or have been selfish and jealous are thus delayed in their journey to Amnodr. One of the Tarthar clans, that of Taradr, has an Amnodr, distinct from the rest, at Perithi in the Wainad, where there are still some Toda settlements.

7. Sacred days and numbers.—Many Toda ceremonies must be performed on definite days of the week, and this is probably connected with an institution in which each clan has one or more days on which a large number of activities are forbidden. Thus, on the *madnol*, or village day, neither dairymen nor women are allowed to leave the village, and nothing may be sold or taken away. There are various restrictions on conduct, and funeral and other ceremonies may not be held. Among the Tartharol there are similar restrictions on days sacred to each kind of dairy, so that in a village which has dairies of several different kinds few days of the week are left for the performance of the ordinary activities of life.

Sacred numbers are very prominent in the ritual, three and seven being the most important. Many ritual acts are performed three times, a threefold rite being usually associated in the dairy ceremonial with the utterance of the sacred syllable 'Oñ.' This number is also prominent in the funeral rites, especially in connexion with the ceremonial throwing of earth and the swinging of the body over the pyre before it is burned. The sevenfold performance of ceremonial acts only occurs in the

dairy ritual and is especially prominent in the ordination ceremonies. Several of the most ancient lamps of the dairy are said to have had seven cavities or seven wicks.

8. Sorcery.—Two kinds of sorcery are practised, in one of which an incantation is uttered over some hair, preferably that of the person it is designed to injure. This is then hidden in the thatch of the proposed victim's hut. In the other form the sorcerer uses a bone or lime, which is then buried near the village of the proposed victim. In each case the incantation resembles the ordinary form of prayer, but with less explicit reference to the gods. It consists mainly of an enumeration of the misfortunes which it is hoped may fall upon the victim. The trouble is removed or averted by a corresponding formula as the result of negotiations with the sorcerer to whom the misfortune has been ascribed by one of the diviners.

There are many points of similarity between the ceremonial of the Todas and that of the Hindus, the sanctity of the milk-providing animal being an important feature common to both. There is reason to believe that the two main sections of the Todas differ in origin, and it is probable that the Teivaliol represent the earlier settlers and that they mixed with an indigenous people who practised interment of the dead preceded by some kind of mummification. The Tartharol seem to be later comers, who either brought the practice of cremation or accentuated its importance. The complexity of the dairy ritual is probably due to their influence, and they seem to have adopted the practice, so frequent in India, of employing the earlier settlers as their priests.

A point of especial interest is the relation of the Todas to the stone-circles and other megalithic structures on the Nilgiri hills. The people at present take little interest in these monuments, and this is intelligible if they were erected by the older stratum of the population represented by the Teivaliol, whose beliefs have been put into the background by the greater influence of the purely pastoral Tartharol. Stones of various kinds enter into the ritual of the dairy. The burial of the ashes at the entrance to a stone-circle at the end of the second funeral and the ritual throwing of earth into the buffalo-pen at both funeral rites suggest that the body was once interred in a buffalo-pen, and this is perhaps confirmed by the burial of the dairy-vessel called *mu* in a pen and by the sanctification of this vessel with earth taken from this spot. These features of ritual point to the circular pens as part of the culture of the older people, and in this connexion it is noteworthy that the most ancient dairies are circular and afford characteristic examples of the round house with conical roof. It may also be noted that these dairies are surrounded by stone walls, in one case by two such walls.

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TOHUNGANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TOKEN.—In its broadest sense a token is any portable object serving as a sign or proof of authenticity or credit, by which the issuer guarantees that the claim indicated by the token will be satisfied on its presentation in the proper quarter. In numismatics it signifies a coin-like piece of metal or other material representing money of much more than its intrinsic value, for which money the issuer undertakes to redeem the token when presented; it is also loosely applied to tickets admitting to certain privileges, such as the holy communion, or serving instead of letters of recommendation or other forms of credential.

1. Antiquity. — Many vague statements have been made as to the use of tokens or *tesseræ* (*symbola, symthemata*) for identifying persons who had been initiated into mysteries, but nothing of the kind has been identified. *Tesseræ* were largely used in Roman times for giving admission to shows or entitling to share in the distribution of grain (*tesseræ frumentariæ*), and some of these bear Christian symbols (one is extant in ivory bearing an anchor, two fishes and AΩ). No Christian *tesseræ hospitalitatis* (memorials of hospitality for which a return might be claimed when they were presented) have been identified as extant. *Tesseræ* were also used as credentials, serving instead of *litteræ commendatitiæ* or *commendatoriæ*.[1] Such *tesseræ* would have been used when persons were sent to confessors in prison to minister to them. *Tesseræ* may also have been used to identify the faithful when they desired admission to religious gatherings. Such use is *a priori* possible and probable, but it is important to remember that nothing of the kind, so far as is known, has survived from antiquity bearing a specially Christian character. Even among pagan *tesseræ*, those relating to religious bodies are rare. A certain number are extant bearing the names of the *magistri* and other dignitaries of the *sodalitates* who made distributions at festivals, such as the *magistri Minervales*; there are also *tesseræ* inscribed 'Sacr(a) Lani(vina) iuven(alia),' which were used at the festival of the college of Iuvenes at Lanuvium.

As regards Byzantine times, a certain number of *tesseræ* of churches, convents, confraternities, and other pious institutions have been described; they may have served, as in the West, for the distribution of alms and also for the control of various payments due to the personnel of churches and religious bodies. Such are, *e.g.*, an anonymous bronze *tessera* with the busts of the Virgin and St. Demetrius, and another with God the Father (inscr. ἅγιος ἅγιος ἅγιος) and a bunch of grapes on the reverse, which, it has been suggested, may have been used for the remuneration of cantors. The pieces used for charitable distributions are inscribed (in Greek) with such texts as 'He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord,' 'Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.'

2. Méreaux of the Roman Catholic Church.—The token, or *jeton de présence*, issued to the clergy in collegiate churches as a record of their presence at mass, at the canonical hours, and at other offices, in order that they might claim the statutory payment for their services, was most commonly known as a *méreau*. The Latin word *merellus* (*merallus, maralus*, etc.) is of uncertain derivation. Other names met with are: *plomb* (*plonc, plommet, plumbus*, etc.), even when made of other metal than lead (*plommez de cuyvre* at Aire in 1527), *enseigne, signum, marque, manuel, palot* (*pallotus*), *moneta capituli, simbolum*, etc. Many of these terms, signifying merely distribution-token, on the presentation of which a share in funds or privileges could be claimed, were not confined to the tokens of religious bodies, but extended to all kinds of corporations. It is uncertain when *méreaux capitulaires* were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a *distributio nummorum matutinalium* does not necessarily refer to such *méreaux* as distinct from ordinary coins, and the *méreaux* which are mentioned in charters of 1167 and 1173 are passes, or *tesseræ* of identification,

[1] Cf. the phrase of Tertullian, *de Præscript.* xx.: 'dum est illis [*i.e.* ecclesiis] communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis.'

without any special connexion with religion. The earliest undoubted documentary reference to their use in churches seems to date from 1375, when Charles V. granted to the canons of the collegiate church of Langeac (Haute Loire) the right of having struck at the Royal Mint of St. Pourçain *merelli* for distribution to clerks and canons present at offices; they were to be of copper, lead, or tin, and to be carefully distinguished by their types, which are specified, from coin of the realm. None of these seems to have been identified. Next in date comes a reference in 1401. In a clause of his will Charles VI. ruled that the distributor of the Sainte Chapelle 'ne baille les méreaux jusqu'à la fin des heures de Notre Dame.' In a letter of 18th July 1401 he announces his intention of carrying out during his lifetime the new system outlined in his will; no one of the clergy who misbehaved or absented himself was to receive *méreaux*. A 15th cent. statute ordered that on every Saturday all the canons, chaplains, and clerks of the Sainte Chapelle should attend in the pay-room and bring their *méreaux* to show what each had earned. But there are extant church-*méreaux* which by their style must be earlier than the documents referred to, and the substitution of these for the custom of paying in actual money at the time, or for pricking in, or for tallies, may date from early in the 13th century. In 1557 the canons of Mâcon claimed that they had had for 'more than three or four centuries' the right of distribution of leaden *jetons* for the payment of choristers and other priests serving in the church; what foundation their claim possessed is not known. Nearly all the examples known come from France or the Low Countries, where *méreaux* were also used by abbeys, convents, hospitals, infirmaries, parish churches, and confraternities. The popular English term 'abbey token' for what are really reckoning-counters must not be taken to prove the existence of the custom in England; there is no evidence for such use in this country.[1]

Such tokens were cashed from time to time by the receivers of the various funds on which they were issued; sometimes they could be exchanged by the cellarer for victuals; and they often had a modified circulation. As long as this did not extend outside, so as to encroach on the currency of the realm, no objection was raised to any body issuing such *méreaux*. But, when it was the custom, as it was at Saint-Amé (Douai) or at Arras (where *méreaux* were used inscribed 'merellus mandati pauperum'), for the clergy to give away such tokens, entitling to portions of victuals, as alms to the poor, it is easy to see how the circulation might extend outside. In 1577 the Cour des Monnaies had to forbid the use of *méreaux* issued by the chapter of Autun except for distributions to the clergy; they had got into circulation in the town. In the case of certain pieces, especially of places in the Low Countries, it is matter of dispute whether they are really church-*méreaux* or base coins, of which the circulation was enforced by local authorities; such are the lead *deniers* of the Abbesses of Maubeuge, which circulated throughout Hainault until they were forbidden in 1541, the copper *deniers* of Notre Dame de Termonde, the 'yellow-money' of the chapter of Notre Dame de Cambrai. The rare *méreaux* of Carthusian foundations, such as the Certosa at Pavia or St. Mary Magdalen at Louvain, were used not for the remuneration of the clergy, but for alms-giving. A similar subsidiary use of *méreaux* is illustrated by the custom at Lembeke (near Eecloo, E. Flanders), where *méreaux* were used for the distribution of alms under the foundation of G. Kermans (1717); tokens of the value of two *patards* were given to each of the poor who attended at catechism in preparation for communion, and of one *patard* to children who were zealous in preparation for their first communion.

[1] See, however, § 6 below.

The metal of which church-*méreaux* are made is usually lead, copper, or brass; the ruder specimens in the baser metal may be cast in moulds, but a large proportion are struck from engraved dies. The slate moulds used for casting the *méreaux* of the parish church of St. Julien at Ath, mentioned in letters-patent of 1478, are still in existence. Non-metallic substances such as leather or paper could also be used, but specimens in such material, if they survive, are very rare; a find made in demolishing a wall of the cathedral of Limoges seems to indicate that *méreaux* of leather were used there.

A few typical inscriptions and types found on *méreaux* may be mentioned. The St. Omer pieces are inscribed 'Mo(neta) Ecc(lesiae) Santi Audomari,' with the arms of the chapter, and 'Presentibus dabitur'; those of St. Martin des Champs read 'Distributio pro beneficiatis.' The series of the Ste. Chapelle dating from after 1448 reads 'Capella Reg(u)alis Palacii Parisiensis.' An ordinance of that year shows that those used for prebendaries and cantor bore a long cross with the crown of thorns on it, those for chaplains and clerks had a royal crown; other kinds then in use were ordered to be withdrawn: such were pieces marked with a cross, lance-head, and nail, representing relics in the chapel. Some series bear the names of the various offices for which they were used, as *matines, prime, tierce, missa, sexte, nonne, vespres, comp(lies)*. Dates do not appear before the 16th century. The value in money which the pieces represent is frequently expressed as 'VI . D . T' ('six deniers tournois'). A series mentioned in the archives of St. Pierre d'Aire (Artois), and described by Rouyer,[1] may be given as typical.

There were (*a*) *plombs des matines* or *deniers Marchant*, worth one *denier Parisis*, distributed daily after matins, and paid from the fund known as *du Marchant*; these occur from 1484 to 1637; (*b*) *plombs de la Croix* or *de la procession du vendredi* and the *plombs Lambert* or *du trésorier*; these represent particular foundations, and were of different values, given to canons, cantor, or other clergy; they are not mentioned after the 17th cent.; (*c*) *plombs obituaires*, i.e. *monetæ anniversariorum*, given to those who assisted at anniversary obituary services; (*d*) *plombs des heures canoniales*, instituted 20th June 1571, distributed to each canon present at the canonical hours; (*e*) *plombs des revêtus*, distributed in the 17th and 18th centuries at the masses said at the high altar to the canons who assisted the celebrant as deacons or sub-deacons; (*f*) *plombs des jours capitulaires*, for ordinary meetings of chapter, from 1571 onwards; (*g*) *plombs des chapitres spirituels*, from 1758, for chapters dealing specially with matters of cult; (*h*) *plombs des vicaires*, poor priests or clerks employed by canons to take their more arduous duties, as early as 1465; (*i*) *plombs de la confrérie de Notre Dame Panetière*, or *plombs du Salve*, from about 1520 down to 1790, for offices of the confraternity.

Some specimens of the *moneta anniversariorum* have survived; one belonging to St. Pierre d'Aire has on the obverse a death's head, on the reverse a bone and a key in saltire between three stars. Another inscribed 'Moneta anniversariorum' has a crowned *A* between two lilies; on the other side 'Requiescant in pace,' the mark of value 'XII.,' and three lilies. Yet another is inscribed 'Obit solenel' and dated 1585; and there is a pair of *méreaux* inscribed 'Orate Deum pro vivis' and 'Orate Deum pro defuntis' respectively.

A subsidiary use of tokens, more or less corresponding to the use as communion passes,[2] has at times prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church. There is a tradition that Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's time made use of such tokens in order to distinguish those who conformed from those who did not. Communion certificates in the shape of tokens or tickets were given to those going to communion at St. Andrew's, Glasgow, from 1840

[1] *Rev. num. fr.* xiv. [1849] 363 ff.

[2] Described in § 3 below.

to 1850. At certain churches in Rome communicants at Easter receive them after they have been present.

3. Tokens of the Reformed Church. — The earliest mention of *méreaux* (*marreaux, marrons, marcqs*) in the Reformed Church abroad is in the registers of the Geneva Council; on 30th Jan. 1560 Calvin advised their introduction, but there is no evidence that they were actually used at Geneva before 1605. On the other hand, the French Protestants immediately adopted Calvin's suggestion, and there are tokens of the Walloon Church at Amsterdam as early as 1586. These tokens (which in the first Helvetic Confession are called *tesseræ*) were used for quite a different purpose from that of the *méreaux* of the Roman Catholic Church; they were certificates, issued to all persons considered after examination to be satisfactory in regard to religious knowledge and moral character, admitting them to partake of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In 1584, *e.g.*, Mme. Duplessis-Mornay and all her household were refused tokens for communion at Montauban because she dressed her hair in the court fashion instead of wearing the Huguenot hood. Extant specimens of these French Reformed Church tokens seem to be not earlier than the 17th cent.; they bear appropriate types, such as a chalice, or a shepherd feeding his flock, and the initials of the names of the churches, and sometimes dates; such inscriptions as 'Ne crains rien, petit troupeau' also occur. Copper *méreaux* with an angel-shepherd, and the inscription 'In unum conducam reliquum Israel, Mich. 2,' or 'Christ est le pain de vie,' of good 17th cent. workmanship, were probably made for Protestants in Paris. Another similar piece reads 'Christ habite en nos cœurs par foy,' and bears a flaming heart transfixed by two arrows.

The first French church to employ this kind of *méreaux* was at Nîmes (before 1562). Except at Sedan and Troyes (where it was introduced in 1564), none of the Reformed churches of the East is known to have used it. It was especially popular in Poitou, no fewer than 45 churches in that district being represented. Such pieces are commonest from 1740 to 1840, and are often very rude, being the handiwork of the elders themselves. The material is usually lead, tin, or a mixture, and they are most commonly cast (five moulds are extant), though some are struck. The French Reformed church at Erlangen in Bavaria began to use *méreaux* in 1689, and the same mould has remained in use down to present times.

In England the books of St. Saviour's Church, Southwark, show that communion tokens were used as early as 1559. It was the custom at Southwark to collect Church dues by 'selling the communion'; thus, in 1596, 2000 tokens were sold at 2½d. each; and a similar practice prevailed at St. Peter Mancroft, Norwich. At Durham and elsewhere in the 17th cent. it was the custom to take Easter reckonings of such people as partook of the holy communion, and account with them and deliver and receive tokens. The names of communicants were written down, and they received tokens which at the time of the administration of the sacrament were demanded again, so that it might be known who had paid their Easter offerings and who had failed to do so. The use of tokens in Presbyterian churches in England was derived from Scotland towards the end of the 17th cent., but the earliest actually bearing a date is of 1724 (Etal). Tokens are known of the Established Church of Scotland, the Independent Presbyterian party, the Reformed Presbyterian Church, or Cameronians, the English Presbyterian Church, the Associate Secession Congregation, the Relief Church, the General Associate Congregation, the United Associate Congregation, the United Presbyterian Church, and the Free Church of Scotland. Printed cards have now, as in Scotland, generally ousted metallic tokens.

But it was in Scotland that the sacramental token was most generally used. By the law of the Church of Scotland, no one was permitted to come to the Lord's Supper unless he or she had been provided with a communion token, which was issued after examination had shown the would-be communicant to be of good character and properly instructed. The tokens were sometimes kept as certificates of character, serving the same purpose as ancient *tesseræ*. The Scottish tokens were at first probably written or stamped cards; such 'tickets' were in use as early as 2nd May 1560 at St. Andrews, and continued often to be used after metal tokens were introduced; the word 'ticket' is frequently used indifferently of either. Written tickets were used as late as 1656. The date of the introduction of metal tokens has not been determined. The use of them has continued in both the Presbyterian Churches and in the Scottish Episcopal Church down to the present day, although in the larger towns they have been almost entirely superseded by printed cards. Recently established denominations, such as the United Free Church and the Free Presbyterian Church, appear to use only the latter. The metallic tokens are most often made of lead, tin, or a mixture, but brass, iron, copper, and even leather (the last only at the Secession congregation at Ceres, 1743) have been employed; the Crown Court Chapel, London, and the Presbyterian Church at Charleston used silver tokens, and for the first Reformed Presbyterian Church of New York they were made of ivory. They are generally cast in stone moulds, but are sometimes struck from dies. The oldest extant dated piece is of 1648, but a dated one of 1588 is recorded (Glasgow). At first they were distinguished merely by the initials of the parish (and this occurs as late as 1866); later came the initials of the minister, with 'M.' prefixed. Incuse numerals sometimes indicate the table to which a communicant was admitted when the number was very large. Religious symbols (heart, burning bush, vine, lily, chalice and bread) appear towards the end of the 17th century. The Covenanters' conventicle tokens bear simple texts, such as 'Holiness to the Lord,' without indication of parish or date; and texts are common from the beginning of the 19th century. The cross, which is common on Episcopalian tokens, also occurs on some of Presbyterian origin. In some large towns we find the burgh arms and the initials of the deans of gild. Views of churches first appear in the 18th century.

From Scotland the Presbyterians naturally carried the usage, not only to England, but to other countries such as Ireland, where the oldest dated token known to have been struck is that of the Old Presbyterian Congregation of Larne, of the year 1700. Stamps and moulds for many of these Irish tokens are illustrated by G. R. and D. Buick.[1]

4. Monnaies des innocens et des fous. — A curious phase of Church life is illustrated by satirical 'coins' issued by the bishops and other dignitaries (including archbishops, cardinals, and even popes) who were elected by the clergy at the ecclesiastical saturnalia known as the *fêtes des innocens* or *fêtes des fous*. Such festivals flourished, according to documentary evidence, from the 13th to the 17th cent., especially at Amiens, but also at other places such as Chartres, Reims, Laon,

[1] See reference under Literature.

Senlis, St. Quentin, Roye, Péronne—chiefly therefore in the north of France, but also as far south as Besançon. These dignitaries issued tokens struck in lead, bearing such inscriptions as 'John. Fournier eps. S. Aug. 1560,' 'Moneta nova Adriani Stultorum Pap(e),' 'Moneta epi(scopi) innocen(tium),' as well as texts such as 'Homo non in solo pane vivi(t),' 'Iudica Domine nocentes me,' 'Stultorum infinitus est numerus.' The types are sometimes saints, as on Jean Fournier's piece just mentioned, which was struck by the Augustinians at Amiens and bears St. Augustine. Rebuses are also in common use. Most of these pieces come from Amiens, and bear dates from 1499 to 1583. The custom of issuing tokens on these occasions also prevailed at Thérouanne, Lille, and perhaps Aire, but in those places no attempt was made at humour, and the types are religious or allegorical.

5. The boy-bishops.—The boy-bishops who were elected at certain churches in England on St. Nicholas' Day and held office for a week are also supposed to have issued leaden coins. The extant specimens, which seem all to come from Bury St. Edmunds, all bear a head of St. Nicholas or a mitre and are modelled more or less on the groats and pence of the 15th century. They are usually inscribed with an invocation to St. Nicholas on the obverse; on the other side we find inscriptions such as 'Ave rex gentis,' 'Ave rex gentis Anglor. Mile,' 'Ecce nova facies quia, Ecce reges Angel-or(um).' The words 'Ave rex gentis Anglorum miles Regis angelorum' are the beginning of an anthem for the Feast of St. Edmund. The constant association of these pieces with St. Nicholas suggests that they were issued by the boy-bishops. On the other hand, it has been argued that they were used for the same purpose as the *méreaux* or *jetons de présence* described in § 2. It would, it is true, be strange if such a method of distribution were confined in this country to a single chapel (that of the Hospital of St. Nicholas) in St. Edmundsbury; but this argument cuts both ways. Another Bury piece inscribed 'Siglum Gilde Sci. Nicho(lai)' round the bust of the saint on the obverse, and on the reverse 'Congregacio Duooe' round the letters 'S T N,' appears to be connected with the Gild of the Translation of St. Nicholas; but from the published description it may perhaps be a seal and not a token.

6. Church tokens of the Near East.—The right of coinage by sacerdotal authorities has always existed in the Levant and is revived in periods of stress. During the Russo-Turkish War the churches and convents and the Jewish communities of Constantinople issued much token-money for small change. After the Peace of San Stefano the Turkish authorities called in from the provinces all the metallic token-money issued in the first half of the 19th cent., but the custom still persists. Silver, copper, and lead were issued for the metallic tokens, but many of these issues took the form of small cardboard tickets of different colours. Typical examples are the silver 'obol of St. Irene' (from Smyrna), the copper of St. George's (from Smyrna), dated 1775, and the cardboard pieces of the churches of Maronia (20, 10, and 5 paras, 1894), of St. George at Apolloniada (Apollonia ad Rhyndacum, 10 and 5 paras), of St. Michael at Goulion near Apollonia (10 and 5 paras, 'legal tender inside the church'), of St. John the Divine at Yeronda (Didyma, 5 paras); while the Sefarite synagogue, the synagogue of Akrida, and other Jewish communities are represented by both copper and cardboard.

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(2) *Roman Catholic Church.*—The literature is very scattered. Besides the index to the *Revue numism. franc.* s.v. 'Méreaux,' see esp. J. Rouyer, 'Notes pour servir à l'étude des méreaux,' *Rev. num. fr.* xiv. [1849] 356-377, 446-464; 'Méreaux de la Sainte Chapelle,' ib., new ser., vii. [1862] 481-497; J. de Fontenay, *Manuel de l'amateur de jetons*, Paris, 1854; A. Forgeais, *Collection de plombs historiés trouvés dans la Seine*, do. 1862-65, 3rd ser., 'Variétés numismatiques'; A. Chassaing, 'Méreaux de la collégiale de Langeac,' *Rev. num. fr.* iii. iii. [1885] 179-182.

(3) *Reformed Churches.*—J. de Pétigny, 'Méreaux des églises calvinistes,' *Rev. num. fr.* xix. [1854] 67-80; E. Delorme, 'Le Méreau dans les églises réformées de France,' *Bull. Soc. Hist. Prot.* xxxviii. [1888] 204-213, 316-325, 371-381, 483-492; H. Gelin, *Le Méreau dans les églises réf. de France*, Saint-Maxent, 1891; J. Rouyer, 'Méreaux de cuivre frappés à Paris . . . pour l'usage des protestants,' *Rev. num. fr.* iii. xi. [1893] 385-405; T. Burns, *Old Scottish Communion Plate*, Edinburgh, 1892; E. F. Herdman, *Sacramental Tokens of the Presbyterian Churches in England*, Morpeth, 1901; G. R. and D. Buick, 'On a Small Collection of Presbyterian Communion Tokens,' in *Ulster Journal of Archæology*, ix. [1903] 17-30; A. J. S. Brook, 'Communion Tokens of the Established Church of Scotland,' *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scot.* xli. [1906-07] 453-604.

(4) *Monnaies des innocens.*—J. R. [igollot], *Monnaies inconnues des Evêques des Innocens, des Fous, etc.*, Paris, 1837; A. Danicourt, 'Enseignes et médailles . . . trouvées en Picardie,' *Rev. num. fr.* iii. v. [1887] 49-67; A. Demailly, 'Inventaire d'une sér. inéd. de monn. des Evêques des Innocents, etc.,' *Mém. Soc. Ant. de Picardie*, xxxvi. [1908] 1-170.

(5) *Boy-bishops.*—D. H. Haigh, 'Leaden Tokens,' *Numism. Chronicle*, vi. [1843] 83-90; C. Roach Smith, 'Pilgrims' Signs and Leaden Tokens,' *Journ. Brit. Archæol. Assoc.* i. [1846] 200-212.

(6) *Near East.*—A. Sorlin-Dorigny, 'Droit de monnayage des communités non-musulmanes,' *Rev. num. fr.* iii. i. [1883] 216-223.

G. F. HILL.

TOLERATION.—1. The policy.—The word 'toleration' in its legal, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal application has a peculiarly limited signification. It connotes a refraining from prohibition and persecution. Nevertheless it suggests a latent disapproval, and it usually refers to a condition in which the freedom which it permits is both limited and conditional. Toleration is not equivalent to religious liberty, and it falls far short of religious equality. It assumes the existence of an authority which might have been coercive, but which for reasons of its own is not pushed to extremes. It implies a voluntary inaction, a politic leniency. The motives that induce a policy of toleration are various, such as mere weakness and inability to enforce prohibitory measures, lazy indifference, the desire to secure conciliation by concessions, the wisdom to perceive that 'force is no remedy,' the intellectual breadth and humility that shrink from a claim to infallibility, the charity that endures the objectionable, respect for the right of private judgment.

However lamentable the fact may be, it should not surprise us that greater intolerance has been found in Christian nations than among any other peoples. Polytheism allows of an indefinitely enlarging pantheon. Its theology admits the existence of separate national gods among the various nations. But monotheism not only denies the existence of any such divinities; it regards the homage offered to them as a derogation from the worship due to the true God. Christianity, therefore, as well as the Judaism on which it is based, is necessarily intellectually intolerant. The same idea applies to Muhammadanism, which is always an intolerant religion as regards doctrine, even when it is not actively persecuting alien faiths. Then both Christianity and Muhammadanism claim to be universal religions; they are essentially aggressive; and the positive missionary work which this fact implies easily passes over into overt acts for the repression of idolatry and polytheism, contrary as they are to the genuine Christian temper. Add to this the fact that moral earnestness, at its best mounting to enthusiasm, in extreme cases degenerating into fanaticism, urges the devotees of a missionary religion towards a militancy which the hereditary adherents of non-aggressive religions have less inducement to adopt. When paganism is not tolerant, this is generally due to resentment against those who have attacked it, unless political motives are the real grounds of action. The persecution of Elijah and the adherents of Jahweh by Jezebel was occasioned by the prophet's vehement opposition to the introduction of the rites of the Phœnician Baal into Israel. The persecution of the Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes was due to their refusal to admit Hellenizing practices into their national life.

2. Indian toleration.—It has been asserted that Hinduism is the most tolerant of religions. This may be true as regards others than Hindus, because, being entirely racial and hereditary, it cannot proselytize. Judaism is also racial and hereditary, but not exclusively so, because it can admit proselytes. Hinduism has no opening for such. Accordingly, it must tolerate alien faiths, unless, like Tibetan Buddhism, it forbids immigration. Aśoka, the Constantine of Buddhism in India (3rd cent. B.C.), had monuments of his legislation cut in stone expressing his liberal treatment of religion as follows:

'The king, beloved of the god, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion, whereof this is the root—to reverence one's own faith and never revile that of others.'

The Muhammadan invasion put an end to tolerance in India by introducing cruel persecution of Hinduism with a wholesale destruction of the temples; but this was intermittent, the incursions of Turks, etc., taking the form of raids, from the 11th till the 17th cent., when the Mughal empire was established in Delhi. Akbar, the most famous of the Mughal emperors, aimed at combining all the inhabitants of his religion in his own eclectic theism. He held disputations in his palace every Friday when Brāhmans, Buddhists, and Parsis expounded their views as freely as Muhammadans.

3. Greek toleration.—The toleration of the Greeks for great varieties of religious beliefs may be attributed to their intellectual breadth, but also to the syncretism which admitted a plurality of divinities into its pantheon. Accordingly, as Adam remarks,

'There was comparatively little persecution for religious beliefs in Greek antiquity. Religious institutions and ceremonies were carefully guarded; but in respect of dogma the limits of toleration were very wide. We may infer from a remark of the Platonic Socrates that the Athenians in general cared little what a man believed, so long as he did not attempt to proselytise.'[1]

The Orphic believers, who, as the same authority states, were 'analogous to modern dissenters,' were tolerated since they showed no sign of abstaining from the religious services which the city ordained. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, were attacked because they used their religious organization for political ends.[2] The death of Socrates appears to have been due mainly to animosity against the philosopher on account of his friendship with proscribed leaders of the aristocratic party. He was seventy years old at the time, and his daring teaching had long been tolerated without any interference on the part of the authorities.

4. Roman toleration.—It was a principle of Roman state policy to allow conquered nations to continue the practice of their indigenous religious rites ('Cujus regio ejus religio'). The old Latin cults were not propagandist, and they admitted of alien rites for alien peoples. Nevertheless difficulties arose, imposing limits on this easy tolerance in several ways: (1) by provincials coming to Italy and even to Rome with a claim to bring their own religions with them; (2) by missionaries of these alien faiths propagating them and by Roman citizens adopting them; (3) by the enforcement of the new state worship of the emperor throughout the empire; (4) by the dread of dangerous magic and the suspicion of immoral and cruel proceedings among the adherents of the foreign cults; (5) by a notion that public calamities might have been caused by neglect of the worship of the old divinities ('atheism'). But there were differences. The Twelve Tables had forbidden the introduction of new gods into Rome. Nevertheless for commercial reasons the Jews had a dispensation granted them to practise their religion in various parts of the empire, including the imperial city. But they were supposed to be confined to their own quarters in each locality—the ghetto. They spread their ideas, however, especially among women of the upper classes—in particular in Rome and Damascus, where it became the fashion to 'Sabbatize.' At first the Christians obtained tolerance on account of their Jewish origin, and it was not till their separation from the Jews became marked that they were interfered with by the authorities; nor was that the case at once even then. The Acts of the Apostles shows us Christians protected by Roman magistrates and police when attacked by Jewish mobs. By the time of Nero, however, in Rome the distinction between the two communities had become evident, and then the Christians were no longer sheltered by the licence for Jews. Christianity was not a *religio licita*. It is true that many unlicensed cults were winked at, in particular the religions of Syria and Egypt—the worship of Mithra, the Dea Mater, Serapis, etc. This was due to their great popularity. Christianity was not popular; it was too stern on the vices of paganism. W. M. Ramsay has shown reason for thinking that the tolerance of the Flavian emperors did not secure the protection of the Christians from local outbreaks. Nevertheless, on the whole, previous to the great Decian persecution the authorities were not disposed to initiate active measures against them. When Pliny wrote to Trajan expressing his perplexity at the Christianity of Bithynia and the consequent desertion of the pagan altars, the emperor replied ordering him (1) not to seek out the Christians, (2) to discourage informers, but (3) to punish convicted persons who had been brought before him for judgment. This rescript has been described by some as a persecuting order and by others as a decree for the easing of the case of the persecuted Christians. In fact it was both. Evidently Trajan was opposed to active persecution and favoured a policy of leniency; but his clear pronouncement requiring the punishment of definitely convicted Christians left no alternative but sentence of death for such people. This was the first formal order to that effect. Previously Christianity was implicitly illegal; henceforth it was to be explicitly illegal. In this respect the rescript was a limitation on the Roman policy of toleration. The persecution which had been carried on with exceptional ferocity at Lyons and Vienne under the gentle Marcus Aurelius was stayed by his worthless son Commodus owing to the intercession of his concubine Marcia, who appears to have been a Christian catechumen. This act of toleration cannot be raised to the level of state policy. It was purely personal in its origin, and it emanated from an unprincipled character.

When the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians, the persecution which he had instigated was brought to an end by his son Gallienus, who issued a rescript in A.D. 260. It has not been preserved. But Eusebius[1] quotes a letter from this emperor to the bishops of Egypt written in the following year, in which he gives directions in accordance with his rescript. He there states that he has issued an order throughout all the world encouraging all to come out of their religious retreats and ordering that no one may molest them. Eusebius adds that there is another ordinance addressed to other bishops in

[1] J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (*Gifford Lectures*), Edinburgh, 1908, p. 7; cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1908.

[2] See Adam, p. 355.

[1] *HE* vii. 13.

which the emperor grants them permission to recover their cemeteries in which they worshipped (τόποι θρησκευσιμοί). Gallienus's rescript has been claimed as the first Roman edict of toleration; but Uhlhorn and Harnack have shown that our knowledge of it does not indicate that Christianity was now made a *religio licita*. Two things only are ordered: the Christians are not to be molested; their property is to be restored. Since the churches had registered themselves as burial clubs and mutual benefit societies (*collegia fratrum, collegia tenuiorum*), it was in their social relations and with regard to their possession of property that Gallienus was now protecting their rights. Nevertheless, although Christianity was still illegal, in point of fact, since it was not to be molested, this was a policy of toleration. It cannot be justified on grounds of consistency; but practical politics are often guilty of inconsistency and prove themselves all the more humane for their freedom from legal pedantry. In the line that Gallienus was taking we see the exact opposite to his father's calculating measures of repression, devised with the deliberate, but now hopeless, design of stamping out Christianity. Gallienus's mild policy by no means gave to the Christians the legal rights which could assure them against future persecution. They enjoyed in consequence a whole generation of immunity from attack; but all along this was in a condition of unstable equilibrium, since nothing had been done to settle it on a sound legal basis. We might compare the situation to that of the Stuart 'Indulgences.' Christianity was not yet a *religio licita*.

Legalized toleration did not appear till after the last and greatest persecution. It was then seen in two stages. The first of these was spasmodic, insincere, and illogical, but still definite and effective. Galerius, the fierce instigator of the persecution which bears the name of the senior emperor Diocletian, who had been his reluctant associate in it, seized with death-bed terrors, issued the most extraordinary decree ever conceived by a Roman emperor (April, 311). Galerius first takes credit to himself for endeavouring to bring the Christians back to the ancient laws and discipline of the Romans, and, after a jibe at their divisions, for which he suggests he has supplied a wholesome corrective, he gives orders that his subjects may again be Christians ('ut denuo sint Christiani') and hold their assemblies, 'provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline.' Galerius concludes with the remarkable sentence, 'and for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god.'

Toleration was not yet the settled policy of the empire. Where it was practised, it was too much subject to the caprice of the individual ruler. Maxentius at Rome was openly anti-Christian and Maximin Daza elaborated subtle devices for the destruction of Christianity; even later, during part of his period of government, Licinius favoured the pagans to the detriment of the Christians. The final stage was reached in the Edict of Milan. That magnificent Magna Charta of religious liberty issued from a meeting of Constantine with Licinius at Milan towards the end of the year 312, after the defeat of Maxentius. Maximin's evasion of the order of toleration granted by Galerius was the occasion which gave rise to it, but the new edict was much more statesmanlike than its curious predecessor, resting on a broader basis, breathing a nobler spirit, and establishing a surer policy. It was issued throughout the whole empire in the year 313. The Edict of Milan is the work of the great emperor Constantine, who induced his colleague Licinius to join him in it. There can be no doubt that Constantine was thoroughly convinced by the enlightened principles that it contains. His colleague's assent must be ascribed to political necessity, and subsequent events showed that Licinius was by no means loyal to it except under compulsion. Unfortunately the original rescript has been lost, but Licinius's edition of it, sent out a few months later, has been preserved, both the original Latin by Lactantius,[1] and a Greek translation, slightly differing verbally, by Eusebius.[2] The toleration granted is absolute and unconditional. It is expressly applied to the Christians, for whose benefit it clearly shows that it was primarily intended. But it also includes devotees of all other religions. This went far beyond the spirit of the ancient world, and indeed only occasionally and in the teaching of exceptional and rare minds has such toleration reappeared until quite modern times, when it has been seen in Cavour's dictum of 'a free Church in a free State.'

Constantine did not live up to his own principle. No sooner did he adopt Christianity than he began to patronize it, and his patronage soon took the form of interference and control. The Christian emperors were rarely more tolerant than the Church of their day; and, as this Church was stern in the denunciation of heresy and schism, too often the imperial government stepped in to give effect to the ecclesiastical sentence. Sometimes it went farther, the emperor taking sides and enforcing his own will, if for orthodoxy against the heretics, if in favour of heresy, as in the support of Arianism by Constantius and later by Valens, against the Catholics. Later emperors interfered in the Christological controversies with the Nestorians and the Monophysites. The iconoclastic emperors were regarded as persecutors of the Church when they took strong measures to put down image-worship. Therefore, while Christianity is not only tolerated but legalized as the religion of the State, the policy of toleration so brilliantly anticipated by Constantine is now buried out of sight, like an untimely birth. The tables are turned, and paganism, ceasing to persecute, comes to be itself persecuted. First magical rites are prohibited as dangerous to the State and the citizens; then the worship of the old gods is prohibited and their altars and temples are demolished. Theodosius II. is the most conspicuous figure in this anti-pagan crusade. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the Christian emperors never went the lengths in murderous violence to which the persecuting pagan emperors had gone. There was nothing approaching the devastating Decian and Valerian persecutions. On the rare occasions when the death penalty was inflicted this was nearly always for magic and sorcery, not as the suppression of a false doctrine but for the extirpation of a dangerous practice. The persecution of paganism naturally led its champions to preach toleration. Libanius argued for the principle of absolute toleration. The pagan reaction under Julian was based on a profession of tolerance, but the emperor was not entirely true to his profession.[3]

5. Early Christian toleration.—The early Christian Fathers advocated toleration, not merely in self-defence, but on principle. Tertullian was most emphatic in asserting this principle:

'Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putaverit colere, nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debeat, non vi: cum et hostiae ab animo libenti expostulentur.'[4]

Lactantius maintained the inherent wickedness of persecution.[5] The bigotry which appeared among the Fathers of the 4th cent. was not allowed to prevail without protest. Athanasius advocated a conciliatory attitude for winning heretics back to the faith. While Augustine denounced heretics and schismatics—especially Pelagians and Donatists—Hilary of Poitiers was a thoroughgoing advocate of toleration. Ambrose condemned the persecution of the Priscillianists, and Martin of Tours denounced it as an atrocious crime because it went so far as killing. The Fathers were slow to sanction the death penalty for heretics; Augustine, while advocating milder measures of persecution, was opposed to this extremity.

6. Mediæval toleration.—During the early part of the Middle Ages persecution was comparatively rare, even in the case of sorcery, which, it was thought, could be counteracted by the more potent

[1] *De Morte Pers.* 48. [2] *HE* x. 5.
[3] Cf. art. PERSECUTION (Early Church).
[4] *Ad Scapulam*, 2. [5] See *Div. Inst.* v. 20.

influence of the rites of the Church. But with the rise of the Inquisition in the 13th cent. a greater rigour of ecclesiastical discipline crushed out the spirit of tolerance.

7. Toleration in the Renaissance and the Reformation.—The irreligious and pagan habits that accompanied the Renaissance issued in an easy indifference which favoured an unprincipled tolerance. But the intellectuality and breadth of view that it engendered went farther and gave rise to a reasoned doctrine of toleration. Sir Thomas More, while sanctioning persecution, admitted the abstract excellence of the opposite course. Montaigne's scepticism and liberal idea of life made for tolerance. On higher grounds Erasmus laboured incessantly for the same end, combining inimitable wit with immense learning, exposing the folly as much as the wickedness of ignorant, narrow-minded persecution. The duty of absolute toleration was insisted on by Castellio, a Frenchman, who had been a friend of Calvin when the Reformer was a professor at Basel. Denouncing the execution of Servetus, he argued that, if the end of Christianity be the diffusion of a spirit of beneficence, persecution must be its extreme antithesis, and that, if persecution can be the essential element of a religion, that religion must be a curse to mankind.

Most of the Reformers were not advocates of universal toleration; but Zwingli regarded error as not inherently blameworthy and held that it should be tolerated. He went farther and showed a comprehensive appreciation of human excellency apart from religious differences.

Lælius Socinus was a pronounced advocate of religious liberty, and a clear assertion of the principle is put forth in the Socinian Catechism of Rakow. The German Anabaptists and the Dutch Arminians also advocated this principle.

8. The German settlement.—The Peace of Augsburg (1555) was arranged between the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans; it excluded the Reformed Church, both Zwinglian and Calvinistic, as well as all the minor sects. Further, this arrangement left it to the princes of the several states to decide which of the two permissible types of religion should be adopted and imposed on their subjects. Disagreements between the two parties concerned and the exclusion of the Reformed Churches led to the Thirty Years' War. This was concluded with the Peace of Westphalia (24th Oct. 1648), to which there were three parties—the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Reformers. It made provision for none of the minor sects. The princes were allowed to pass from one of the three religions to the other and to require their selected religion to be imposed on their subjects to the exclusion of all other religions, or to admit other religions, as they saw fit. This right was called the *jus reformandi*. It implied a limited and optional toleration.

Subsequently two influences arose to widen the conception of religious liberty: (1) pietism, which, as both non-dogmatic and charitable, tended towards universal toleration; and (2) the effect of the school of natural law. Pufendorf maintained that no one could be compelled to embrace a given religion and held it to be a fatal necessity that dissensions should exist within the Church. Christian Thomasius, the typical illuminist, bases the principle of religious liberty on his fundamental conception of law. He distinguishes morality from law, on the ground that law is coercive while morality cannot be coerced. Much more is this the case with religion. The difference between the spheres of the prince and the clergy is that it is the duty of the prince to coerce and the duty of the clergy to teach. The clergy should fight heresy with instruction, not by appealing to the secular arm. While urging these principles in all his works, Thomasius devotes three treatises especially to the exposition of them, viz. the two 'Programmata,' *Programma de tolerantia dissidentium in controversiis religionis* (1693) and *Programma varia testimonia Martini Lutheri de tolerantia dissidentium in religione complectens* (1697), and the more popular work in the vernacular entitled *Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten* (1696). In these works he maintains that all dissidents are to be tolerated so long as they do not disturb the public peace. Frederick William I. of Prussia used the *jus reformandi* in favour of allowing Roman Catholics to live in his Protestant state, and his son Frederick the Great adopted a policy of toleration for all religions with the cynical idea that, since they arose only from the ignorance of the people, they were equivalent in the region of dogma and to be distinguished only by their greater or less ethical import. Thus, since morality is independent of articles of faith, absolute religious liberty should be conceded. In a rescript of 15th June 1740 he says: 'All religions are equal and good so long as those who profess them are upright people.' There was a temporary reaction under Frederick William II., after which the right of religious liberty spread first through Prussia and then through the other German states, although the territorial state recognition of the three favoured religions remained—a policy of general toleration, but not of religious equality.

9. England and America.—In the 16th cent., under the Tudors, the extreme Puritan party, which had shared with other Protestants in the persecutions of Roman Catholic times, did not obtain religious liberty. But the principle of toleration was maintained by the Baptists and the Congregationalists, although there were some limits to the applications of it. The early Congregationalists would exclude from its privileges both Unitarians and Roman Catholics, the latter as themselves a persecuting party and a danger to Protestant liberty. But John Robinson, a large-minded man of liberal views, drew up a covenant for the Pilgrim Fathers who sailed in the 'Mayflower' and founded New England. The first instrument of this covenant conferred equal civil and religious rights on every member of any commonwealth. A little later the colony of Maryland, founded by a charter from Charles I., granted toleration to Roman Catholics as well as to Protestants. Its first law runs as follows: 'No person professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be in any way molested or discountenanced for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof.'

The Pilgrim Fathers, who had claimed liberty at home, have been blamed for the inconsistency of intolerance in their own colony when they were settled in America. The defence is that the exclusive theocracy that they established implied that they regarded themselves as a Church rather than as a State, and as such would refuse membership to unfit persons in accordance with a fundamental Congregational principle. But they have often been unfairly accused of narrowness through a confusion of two different positions—that of the early settlers in New England who had come from John Robinson's church in Holland and were the real Congregationalist immigrants, and that of the Puritans who settled later in Massachusetts. The latter were Presbyterians who had never adopted the principles of religious freedom. It was not until the separation from England that complete equality in religion was established in the United States.

10. The English problem.—In the 17th cent. neither the bulk of the Presbyterians nor the Episcopal party as a whole had any idea of toleration. Under the early Stuarts Laud and the High Church, having the upper hand, persecuted the Presbyterians. Under the Long Parliament the Presbyterians tried to force the Covenant on the whole nation. Cromwell took a wider view and ordered his 'triers' not to molest Protestant godly men who preached the gospel, whatever their ecclesiastical principles might be, and he gave the Jews a legal footing in England.

At this time the Baptists, the Congregationalists (then known as Independents), and the Quakers maintained the principle of religious liberty—the last-named body basing it on their doctrine of the inner light, which excluded all ecclesiastical and official interference with the individual soul. The protest of the five Independents at the Westminster Assembly (1643), which was mainly Presbyterian

in composition, maintained the right of religious liberty.

Later, on the Presbyterian side, Richard Baxter laboured for large measures of comprehension, and John Goodwin, generally regarded as a Congregationalist, but described by Rufini as 'a Puritan *sui generis*—a rationalist Puritan,' maintained that every religion, sect, or schism should be tolerated so long as there was no attempt to interfere with the security of the State. Milton, claimed by both Presbyterians and Congregationalists, but not wholly committed to either party, in triumphantly vindicating the freedom of the press, pleaded eloquently for religious toleration. In the *Areopagitica* he showed that persecution was both unnecessary for the preservation of truth and a hindrance to the discovery of truth. He would tolerate all Protestants, including Socinians, Arminians, and Anabaptists, but not Roman Catholics. On the Anglican Church side the more liberal-minded writers were in favour of toleration and comprehension. Chillingworth affirms that Protestants are inexcusable if they do violence to the consciences of others. He holds it to be a great sin to force on other people our own interpretations of Scripture, arguing that this was the cause of all the schisms and discords of Christianity. John Hales took a similar line in his tractate *Schism and Schismaticks* (1636). Jeremy Taylor, in his famous *Liberty of Prophesying* (1646), was contending for freedom of speech against the tyranny of the Covenant under the Long Parliament.

The reaction at the Restoration and the passing of the Act of Uniformity (1662), followed by the Conventicle, Five Mile, and Test Acts, narrowed the State Church position and imposed great disabilities on Nonconformists; these were to some extent relieved a little later by James II.'s Indulgences, but at the expense of the rights of Parliament. Legal toleration did not appear till the Revolution. In the Declaration of Breda Charles II. promised to respect tender consciences; but, when well established on the throne, he had not the moral courage to stand to his word.

William III. obtained his invitation to England mainly as the champion of religious liberty. His aim was to bring about an agreement between the Church of England and Protestant Dissenters. While in his own country, he had been profoundly affected by the ideas of the Dutch Arminians. In England his most trusted adviser, Bishop Burnet, had adumbrated the policy which the king afterwards adopted in a *Modest and Free Conference between a Conformist and a Nonconformist* (1663). William first aimed at comprehension in 'A Bill for Uniting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects.' The failure of this measure to pass in the House of Commons necessitated another line of action.

II. The Act of Toleration.—The Act of Toleration, which was passed in the year 1689, gave relief to Nonconformists from their chief disabilities; but it did not grant complete religious liberty; much less did it establish religious equality in the eyes of the law. It exempted Nonconformists from the pains and penalties of the Act of Uniformity, the Conventicle Act, and the Five Mile Act; at the same time it required people who desired to avail themselves of its privileges to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and make a statutory declaration against Romish superstitions, and it ordered Nonconformist ministers to subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England with the exception of three—those referring to the traditions of the Church, to the homilies, and to the consecration of bishops and priests, a fourth exception, that of the article on infant baptism, being allowed for Baptist ministers. Further, it enacted that every Nonconformist place of worship should be certified by a bishop, an archdeacon, or a justice of the peace. Quakers were allowed to make a solemn declaration instead of taking the oaths and were required to declare their belief in the Trinity and in the inspiration of the Bible. Neither Roman Catholics nor Unitarians were included in the concessions allowed by this Act, and even orthodox Nonconformity was still illegal, the persecuting laws remaining on the statute-books, and only the exaction of their penalties being forbidden. While this measure was logically inconsistent, it was practically serviceable as far as it went. It secured a considerable amount of toleration.

The same year (1689) saw Locke's first *Letter Concerning Toleration* published anonymously in Holland in Latin. It was translated into English immediately. A second and longer letter, and a third longer still, followed in reply to answering letters. Yet a fourth letter completes the series in Locke's work; this is not finished. The collection has become a literary classic on the subject of toleration. Locke bases his argument on the ground that the rightful sphere of the State is wholly confined to externals and does not extend to religion, which is internal. He holds that not only the doctrines and 'articles of faith,' but also 'the outward form and rites of worship,' are out of the province of the civil magistrate. Such a position goes beyond toleration. Logically it involves disestablishment, because, if the State is not competent to deal with religious matters at all, it follows that it should not patronize or support a favoured religion any more than persecute a religion of which it disapproves. With regard to persecution, Locke holds that it is anti-Christian, since love of our fellow-men is of the essence of Christianity, and it cannot be maintained that persecutors are actuated by love to their victims in the cruelties which they perpetrate. But, while on these principles Locke would tolerate Jews as well as all Protestant sects, his toleration does not extend to Roman Catholics or atheists. With regard to the former, though he does not name them in his argument on the subject, he says:

'That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince.'[1]

He would also exclude persons who hold views subversive of society and atheists, who, he considers, are to be included in that category.[2] Thus he regards both these parties as obnoxious to the State and to be excluded from toleration on political grounds, not for their religious views. Locke carries his idea of toleration beyond the political sphere to the ecclesiastical, arguing for liberty of thought within the Churches themselves. He writes:

'What think you of St. Athanasius's Creed? Is the sense of that so obvious and exposed to every one who seeks it; which so many learned men have explained so different ways, and which yet a great many profess they cannot understand? Or is it necessary to your or my salvation, that you or I should believe and pronounce all those damned who do not believe that creed, *i.e.* every proposition in it? which I fear would extend to not a few of the church of England; unless we can think that people believe, *i.e.* assent to the truth of propositions they do not at all understand. If ever you were acquainted with a country parish, you must needs have a strange opinion of them, if you think all the ploughmen and milkmaids at church understood all the propositions in Athanasius's Creed; it is more, truly, than I should be apt to think of any one of them; and yet I cannot hence believe myself authorized to judge or pronounce them all damned: it is too bold an intrenching on the prerogative of the Almighty; to their own Master they stand or fall.'[3]

Under Queen Anne the toleration that had been obtained by the accession of William and Mary was threatened by the Schism Act, which made it illegal under heavy penalties for any one to keep a

[1] *Works*, new ed., London, 1823, vi. 46. [2] *Ib.* p. 47.
[3] *Ib.* p. 410 f.

private school or teach in a seminary unless he signed a declaration of conformity to the liturgy of the Church of England and obtained a bishop's licence to teach on production of a certificate that he had taken the communion according to the rites of the Church of England during the preceding year. The queen's death stayed the execution of this drastic measure, and it was repealed in the reign of her successor, George I. From this time onwards toleration with regard to religious views and practices was firmly established; but its limitations were still numerous. It was the minimum of concession to those who had previously been the victims of persecution. Active persecution was no longer allowed. But the negative policy of exclusion and prohibition left galling grievances long unrelieved. Toleration is far from religious equality. The very practice of it involves an exalted position of power enjoyed by the people who tolerate as opposed to an inferior position in which the tolerated are living. It is not inconsistent with the monopoly of privileges by the one class and the refusal of them to the other. If those privileges are rights of citizenship, toleration is even possible side by side with serious injustice. The tolerated may be denied political power, the parliamentary and municipal franchise, the opportunity of election as members of Parliament or of corporations, access to public schools, colleges and universities, whether as pupils or as teachers, and a host of other national rights and privileges. So it was that under the Georges, and even throughout much of the 19th cent., Nonconformists, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, Jews, and others suffered from various forms of exclusion. The abolition of the Corporation and Test Acts, Catholic Emancipation, the admission of Jews to Parliament, the permission to dispense with the member's oath extracted in order to meet the case of Mr. Bradlaugh, the throwing open of the universities to Nonconformists, the enlarged foundation of grammar schools, and the extension of popular education generally, irrespective of ecclesiastical distinctions, were all steps beyond mere toleration towards the goal of religious equality—a goal which in several directions its advocates have not yet completely attained.

12. Toleration in France.—The fight for religious liberty which was waged principally in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and England during the 16th and 17th centuries passed on to France in the 18th century. The Edict of Nantes (1598) had conceded toleration for Protestants; the revocation of that Edict (1685) restored and aggravated persecuting intolerance. Bayle established the intellectual basis of toleration in his *Dictionnaire* and in a work entitled *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ: Contrain-les d'entrer*—a refutation of the misuse of a text popular with persecutors from the time of Augustine. He holds it to be immoral to compel men to profess religion in which they do not believe, and also irrational, because it discourages the discovery of truth. No one, he maintains, has a right to claim such complete possession of truth as not to need to compare his ideas with those of other men. Montesquieu, in *De l'Esprit des lois* (1748), argues for religious liberty and exposes the futility of coercion. Rousseau, in his *Contrat social*,[1] affirms the complete liberty of individual beliefs; nevertheless, holding that intolerance is inherent in Christian dogma, he would abolish this and establish a civil profession of faith in truths indispensable to a well-organized social life, including that of the existence of God. But it was Voltaire who by his scathing sarcasm did more than any other man in France during the 18th cent. to put an end to persecution and secure tolerance for the Protestants. The ideas of these champions of religious liberty powerfully moulded the course of the French Revolution in regard to religion and the universal toleration that has since prevailed in France.

[1] Bk. iv. ch. 8.

13. The present situation.—A policy of toleration now obtains throughout Western Europe, North America, the British, French, and Italian colonies, and India, where it is a safeguard of peace and good order under British rule. It is established in Japan and practically observed throughout the provinces of China. It is also practised generally throughout S. America. Eastern Europe and Western Asia are still excluded from its privileges. The exclusiveness of Tibet is national rather than religious in character. Thus it is apparent that the policy of toleration has been adopted throughout the greater part of the civilized world.

Apart from the liberalizing of legislation, great progress has been made by means of Modernism in Roman Catholic countries and by the general spread of Christian charity, culture, knowledge of history, scientific methods of criticism, and the study of comparative religion, by the softening of manners, by scepticism, and by religious indifference, all tending to cool the ardour of the persecuting spirit and so to establish toleration. The champions of liberty now resent the use of the term as representing a gracious concession on the part of the privileged and claim to go far beyond it in their demand for the abolition of all theological and ecclesiastical privileges and the establishment of absolute religious equality.

Cf. also artt. PERSECUTION.

LITERATURE.—The literature of toleration is immense. A few of the more important works are Tertullian, *ad Scapulam*; Lactantius, *Divinæ Institutiones*; Vincentius, *Epistolæ*, 93, 17; Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, 13th cent.; Faustus Socinus, *Opera*, 2 vols., Irenopolis, 1656; Milton, *Areopagitica*, London, 1644; John Goodwin, *Plea for Liberty of Conscience*, 1644; Locke, *Epistola de Tolerantia*, Gouda, 1689, Eng. tr., London, 1689; P. Bayle, *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ: Contrain-les d'entrer*, 2 vols., Cantorbery, 1686, *Supplement du Commentaire*, etc., Hamburg, 1688; S. Pufendorf, *De habitu religionis Christianae ad vitam civilem*, Bremen, 1687, Eng. tr., London, 1698; C. Thomasius, *Disputatio an haeresis sit crimen*, 1697; Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, Paris, 1762; F. M. de Voltaire, *Traité sur la tolérance*, do. 1763, etc.; J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, London, 1859; Jules Simon, *La Liberté de conscience*[3], Paris, 1872; J. C. Bluntschli, *Gesch. des Rechtes der religiösen Bekenntnissfreiheit*, Elberfeld, 1867; P. Schaff, *The Progress of Religious Freedom as shewn in the Hist. of Toleration Acts*, New York, 1889; H. Fürstenau, *Das Grundrecht der Religionsfreiheit nach seiner geschichtl. Entwicklung und heutigen Geltung in Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1891; M. Creighton, *Persecution and Tolerance*, London, 1895; Wallace St. John, *The Contest for Liberty of Conscience in England*, Chicago, 1900; L. Dubois, *Bayle et la tolérance*, Paris, 1902; L. Robert, *Voltaire et l'intolérance religieuse*, do. 1904; Luigi Luzzatti, *La Libertà di Conscienza e di Scienza*, 1909, French tr., Paris, 1911; G. Bonet-Maury, *Hist. de la liberté de conscience en France (1598–1905)*[2], do. 1909; W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, auth. ed., London, 1910; A. A. Seaton, *The Theory of Toleration under the later Stuarts*, Cambridge, 1911; H. F. Russell Smith, *The Theory of Religious Liberty in the Reigns of Charles II. and James II.*, do. 1911; Lord Acton, *Hist. of Freedom and other Essays*, London, 1907; Francesco Rafini, *Religious Liberty*, Eng. tr., do. 1912; J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of Freedom of Thought* (Home University Library), do. 1913.

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TOLERATION (Muhammadan). — Muslim toleration may be considered under two distinct aspects, with respect to (i.) the faithful themselves, and (ii.) non-Muslims.

(i.) Within the circle of the Muslim Church the basis for toleration is found in the saying traditionally attributed to Muḥammad: '*Ikhtilāfu ummatī raḥmat*[un],' 'Difference of opinion in my community is a (manifestation of divine) mercy.' In accordance with this principle, it has been possible for the four schools (*madhhab*) of theologians and legists into which the Sunnīs are divided, viz. Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī, to exist side by side, and for each of them to permit difference of opinion even in its own midst. There has been

abundance of controversy between these schools, but instances of open violence have been rare.[1] A similar basis for toleration was found in the traditional saying of the Prophet: 'My community will become divided into 73 sects,' and rendered possible the ample sectarian development in the Muhammadan world. Instances have occurred from time to time of the persecution of one sect by another,[2] but a more characteristic feature of the Muslim Church has been the freedom allowed to the exposition of religious doctrine, and the common sentiment of princes and people has generally condemned intolerance on the part of professed theologians.[3]

(ii.) The recognition of rival religious systems, as possessing a divine revelation, gave to Islām from the outset a theological basis for the toleration of non-Muslims. Judaism and Christianity are represented in the Qur'ān as forms of the primitive faith given to man and taught by a series of prophets from Adam onwards:

'Men were of one religion only; then they disagreed with one another.'[4] 'Mankind was but one people; then God raised up prophets to announce glad tidings and to warn, and He sent down with them the Book with the truth, that it might decide the disputes of men.'[5]

But Jewish and Christian teachers had corrupted the purity of this primitive faith, which Muḥammad as 'the seal of the prophets'[6] came to proclaim anew.

This recognition of a common God is put forward in the Qur'ān as the basis for friendly relations with the followers of rival creeds, in the following verses:

'Say to those who have been given the Book and to the ignorant, Do ye accept Islam? Then, if they accept Islam, are they guided aright; but if they turn away, then thy duty is only preaching.'[7] 'Those who have inherited the Book after them [*i.e.* the Jews and the Christians] are in perplexity of doubt concerning it. For this cause summon thou [them to the faith], and walk uprightly therein as thou hast been bidden, and follow not their desires; and say, In whatsoever Books God hath sent down do I believe; I am commanded to decide justly between you; God is your Lord and our Lord; we have our works and you have your works; between us and you let there be no strife; God will make us all one, and to Him shall we return.'[8] 'Dispute ye not, save in kindliest sort, with the people of the Book; save with such of them as have dealt wrongly [with you], and say ye, "We believe in what has been sent down to us and hath been sent down to you. Our God and your God is one, and to Him are we self-surrendered."'[9]

Muslim theologians have found a sanction for the toleration of religions other than Judaism and Christianity in passages such as the following:

'To every people have We appointed observances which they observe; therefore let them not dispute the matter with thee, but summon them to thy Lord: Verily thou art guided aright: But if they debate with thee, then say: God best knoweth what ye do.'[10] 'If any one of those who join gods with God ask an asylum of thee, grant him an asylum in order that he may hear the word of God; then let him reach his place of safety.'[11] 'They who had joined other gods with God say, "Had He pleased, neither we nor our forefathers had worshipped aught but Him, nor had we, apart from Him, declared anything unlawful." Thus acted they who were before them. Yet is the duty of the apostles other than plain-spoken preaching?'[12]

The clearest injunction of toleration is in the verse, 'Let there be no compulsion in religion,'[13] and forcible conversion is condemned in the words:

'But if thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the world would have believed together. Wilt thou then compel men to become believers? No soul can believe but by the permission of God.'[14]

In harmony with the injunctions of the Qur'ān is Muḥammad's letter to the bishops, priests, and monks of Najrān promising them the protection of God and His apostle for their churches, their religious services and monastic institutions, and freedom from disturbance or any interference with their rights, so long as they remained faithful to their obligations.[1] He permitted the Jews in Medīna to practise their own faith, until their implacable hostility led to their expulsion from the city, and he gave instructions to Mu'ādh b. Jabal, whom he sent on a mission to Yaman in 10 A.H., that he was not to compel any Jew to abandon his religion.[2]

The teaching of the Qur'ān and the practice of the Prophet thus served as a clear basis for toleration of the Christian and Jewish faiths. As mention is made of the Sabians in the Qur'ān,[3] they also were considered to have received some divine revelation and therefore to be entitled to toleration; it is possible that the Harranians (*q.v.*) and Mandæans (*q.v.*) claimed to be Sabians in order to enjoy the same toleration.[4] Their practice of heathen rites naturally gave offence to orthodox Muslim feeling, and the khalīfah al-Qāhir (932-934) is said to have consulted the jurist Abū Sa'īd al-Istakhrī as to whether the Sabians should continue to be tolerated or not, and was told that, as they were neither Jews nor Christians, but worshipped the planets, they ought to be exterminated; however, the khalīfah allowed the Sabians to buy themselves off and disregarded the decision of this pious theologian.[5] About forty years later his successor, Ṭā'i'l-amrillāh, promulgated a fresh edict of toleration in favour of the Sabians, guaranteeing to them protection for themselves, their wives, and property, and free access to their temples and places of prayer, and the undisturbed performance of the rites of their religion.[6] Their last temple was not destroyed until 1230, and then by the heathen Mongols.[7]

Political expediency, and the desire of the jurists of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra to make the religious law tally with the accepted practice, prompted the extension of a similar toleration to such faiths as were not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but were found to have adherents in the rapidly growing Muhammadan empire; *e.g.*, when Arab rule was extended into Persia, it was averred that Muḥammad had given directions that the Zoroastrians were to be treated exactly like the Ahl al-kitāb ('people of the Book').[8]

The Zoroastrians appear to have been but little disturbed in the exercise of their cult up to the period of the fall of the 'Abbāsid dynasty.[9] There is even an account of a Muhammadan general (in the reign of Mu'taṣim, 833-842) who ordered an *ímám* and a *mu'adhdhin* to be flogged because they had destroyed a fire-temple in Sughd and built a mosque in its place.[10] In the 10th cent., three centuries after the conquest of Persia, fire-temples were to be found in almost every province.[11]

Even the Manichæans (*q.v.*), though not entitled to toleration according to Muhammadan law, survived as a separate sect until the end of the 10th cent.; in the reign of Ma'mūn, Yazdānbakht, the leader of the sect, held a public disputation with the Muslim theologians in Baghdād.[12]

The severe condemnation of idolatry in the Qur'ān[13] seems to have made any toleration of idol-worshippers impossible for a Muslim ruler, but already in the reign of Hārūn Muslim law had granted the privilege of paying *jizyah* to idolaters—worshippers of idols, fire, and stones—and thus gave them a place among the tolerated cults.[14] The khalīfah 'Uthmān, in dealing with the heathen Berbers, followed the precedent of 'Umar in regard to the Zoroastrians, and allowed them to pay *jizyah*.[15] In India the Brāhmans appear to have paid *jizyah* from the earliest days of Arab domination,[16] and to have been allowed to retain their faith undisturbed, but the building of new temples was held to be illegal.[17] Though during the later Muhammadan conquests there was a considerable destruction of Hindu temples, the settled Muhammadan governments appear often to have respected the state endowments granted by the former Hindu rulers to religious foundations, as was done in the case of the temple of Brahmanābād in the province of Sind, where Muhammadan rule was first established in India. At a much later date, in the 16th cent., the Muhammadan government of Bengal is said to have raised the large sum of £100,000 a year by licensing the worship of Jagannāth in Orissa,[18] and even Ḥaidar 'Alī and Tīpū Sulṭān, usually so notorious for their

[1] See *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 178 f.
[2] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
[3] C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Le Droit musulman,' *RHR* xxxvii. 174-184; I. Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 94 ff., *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 51-53, 182-185.
[4] x. 20. [5] ii. 209. [6] xxxiii. 40. [7] iii. 19.
[8] xlii. 13-14. [9] xxix. 45. [10] xxii. 66-67. [11] ix. 6.
[12] xvi. 37. [13] ii. 257.
[14] x. 99, 100; *cf.* xvi. 84, xxiv. 53, xlii. 47, and lxiv. 12.

[1] Caetani, *Annali dell' Islām*, ii. 351.
[2] Balādhuri, *Futūḥ al Buldān*, p. 71.
[3] ii. 59, v. 73.
[4] Al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871-72, i. 320.
[5] Al-Nawawī, *Biographical Dictionary*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1842-47, p. 725.
[6] Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, ii. 537 f.
[7] *Ib.* i. 232. [8] Balādhuri, pp. 71 (*fin.*), 79, 80.
[9] D. Menant, 'Les Zoroastriens de Perse,' *RMM* iii. [1907] 212.
[10] Chwolsohn, i. 287.
[11] Mas'ūdī, *Les Prairies d'Or*, Paris, 1861-77, iv. 86; see art. GABARS.
[12] Al-Nadīm, p. 338.
[13] iv. 115-120, xxi. 98-100, lxvi. 9, etc.
[14] Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, p. 73.
[15] Balādhuri, p. 80, lines 16-17.
[16] Elliot, *The Hist. of India*, i. 176, 476.
[17] *Ib.* iii. 380.
[18] W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal*, xviii. [London, 1877] p. 190.

intolerance towards their Hindu subjects, made grants of money to the monastery of Śringēri, one of the most famous shrines in S. India.[1] The same tradition survives in present Muhammadan states in India, such as Ḥaidarābād and Bahāwalpūr, which still assign revenues for the support of Hindu temples.[2]

Even in such a barbarous country as Baluchistān the Hindus enjoyed religious toleration in consideration of their payment of *jizyah*. 'They were free from persecution and molestation; in any dispute with the tribesmen they could appeal to their protector or the headman for a fair hearing and a fair settlement; the honour of their women was respected; their religion was tolerated; no one tampered with their customs.'[3]

The non-Muslim living under a Muhammadan government was styled a *dhimmī* (lit. 'one with whom a compact has been made'), and the conditions under which he lived were supposed to be regulated by the agreements made with the Muslim conquerors as they extended their dominion over various cities and districts. As an example of such an agreement, the conditions may be quoted that are said to have been drawn up when Jerusalem came under Muslim rule in A.D. 638:

'In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate! This is the security which 'Umar, the servant of God, the commander of the faithful, grants to the people of Aelia. He grants to all, whether sick or sound, security for their lives, their possessions, their churches and their crosses, and for all that concerns their religion. Their churches shall not be changed into dwelling-places, nor destroyed, neither shall they nor their appurtenances be in any way diminished, nor the crosses of the inhabitants nor aught of their possessions, nor shall any constraint be put upon them in the matter of their faith, nor shall any one of them be harmed.'[4]

The theory was that the *dhimmī*, in return for tribute paid and in consideration of good behaviour, received protection from the Muslim government and immunity for life, property, and religion. Tradition attributed to the Prophet a warning against the disregard of this compact: 'Whoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made [*i.e.* a *dhimmī*] and lays on him a burden beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser.'[5] 'Whoever torments the *dhimmīs*, torments me.'[6] A similar consideration for them was shown by the khalīfah 'Umar, who in his testament enjoined on his successor: 'I commend to your care the *dhimmīs* of the Apostle of God; see that the agreement with them is kept, and that they be defended against their enemies, and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength.'[7] Similarly, 'Alī, when he appointed Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr governor of Egypt in 36 A.H., bade him do justice to the *dhimmīs*.[8] In a like spirit, the Turkish code ordains that the *dhimmīs* are not to be disturbed in the exercise of their religion.[9]

The actual practice appears to have varied according to local conditions and the character of the local government; and by the 2nd cent. of the Hijra, when some codification was made of the law relating to the *dhimmīs*, more harsh and intolerant regulations had come into force than those of earlier times. But in the first century of Arab rule the various Christian churches enjoyed a toleration and a freedom of religious life such as had been unknown for generations under the Byzantine government. We have the contemporary testimony of the Nestorian patriarch, Ishō'yabh III. (A.D. 650–660), who, writing to the primate of Persia, says:

[1] *Annual Report of the Mysore Archæological Department for the Year 1916*, Bangalore, 1917, pp. 73-75.
[2] M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, v. 246; *Punjab States Gazetteers*, vol. xxxviA. [Lahore, 1908] p. 183.
[3] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. iv. [Calcutta, 1913], *Baluchistan*, pt. i. p. 175.
[4] Ṭabarī, i. 2405.
[5] Balādhurī, p. 162; Yaḥyā b. Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Leyden, 1896, p. 54, *ad fin.*
[6] Al-Makīn, *Historia Saracenica*, Leyden, 1625, p. 11.
[7] Abū Yūsuf, p. 71.
[8] Ṭabarī, i. 3247, line 1; cf. his instructions to Ma'qil b. Qays, i. 3430, line 14.
[9] M. d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman*, Paris, 1820, iii. 44.

'The Arabs, to whom God at this time had given the empire of the world, behold, they are among you, as ye know well; and yet they attack not the Christian faith, but, on the contrary, they favour our religion, do honour to our priests and the saints of the Lord, and confer benefits on churches and monasteries.'[1]

Indeed, the Church to which this ecclesiastic belonged exhibited a remarkable expansion under Muhammadan rule; missionaries were sent from Persia to China and India, both of which were raised to the dignity of metropolitan sees in the 8th cent.; about the same period the Nestorians gained a footing in Egypt, and later spread the Christian faith right across Asia, and by the 11th cent. had gained many converts from among the Tatars.[2] But by the 2nd cent. of the Muhammadan era the condition of the Christians had become less tolerable. The victorious armies that established Arab rule over Syria and Persia appear to have been little swayed by religious considerations, and under the rule of the Umayyads the Christian and other non-Muslim religious communities seem to have been little regarded except as sources of revenue; but under the 'Abbāsids a change in the attitude of the government made itself felt. The orthodox reaction which supported this dynasty and the union of the spiritual and temporal power which characterized it tended to make the administration of the existing laws more oppressive. In the course of the long struggle with the Byzantine empire the khalīfahs had had occasion to distrust the loyalty of their Christian subjects, and the treachery of the emperor Nikephoros was not improbably one of the reasons for the harsher treatment initiated by Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–809), who ordered the Christians to wear a distinctive dress and give up to Muslims the government posts which they held. But the prescriptions of the jurists and theologians[3] were often more intolerant than the actual practice of the government, and it would be rash to assume that the treatment meted out to the non-Muslim population corresponded exactly with the principles which they laid down. Hārūn's great jurist, Abū Yūsuf,[4] leaves no alternative to the Arabs of the Riddah (*i.e.* the Defection, after the death of the Prophet) or to the idolatrous Arabs, except death or the acceptance of Islām, but Cætani[5] has proved that the early conquerors had no power to enforce such a principle, and historical facts do not show that any such alternative was actually imposed on the heathen Arabs.

But protests against cruelty towards the *dhimmīs* are not wanting in the works of Muslim legists themselves; *e.g.*, Abū Yūsuf[6] claims for the *dhimmīs* gentle treatment; they are not to be beaten when called upon to pay *jizyah*, or to be made to stand in the sun, or to be tormented in any way; and he makes an earnest appeal to his patron, Hārūn, on their behalf:

'It is incumbent on the commander of the faithful (may God grant thee his aid!) that thou deal gently with those that have a covenant with thy Prophet and thy cousin, Muḥammad (the peace and blessing of God be upon him!), and that thou take care that they be not wronged or ill-treated and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength, and that no part of their belongings be taken from them beyond what they are in duty bound to pay, for it is related of the Apostle of God (the peace and blessing of God be upon him!) that he said, Whosoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made [*i.e.* a *dhimmī*] or imposes a burden on him beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser on the day of judgment.'[7]

Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī († 1512) maintains that the majority of Muslim jurists hold that the *dhimmī* must be treated with kindness and consideration and not with contempt, when he comes to pay the

[1] J. S. Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Rome, 1719-28, vol. iii., pt. i., p. 131.
[2] J. Labourt, *De Timotheo I. Nestorianorum Patriarcha*, Paris, 1904, p. 37 ff.
[3] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
[4] P. 73, *ad fin.*
[5] ii. 829, v. 337 f. [6] P. 70. [7] P. 71.

jizyah.[1] Commenting on this passage nearly two centuries later, al-Birmāwī († 1694) enters a protest against such fanatical glosses on *Qur'ān*, ix. 29, as are referred to in art. PERSECUTION, and holds that the phrase 'being humbled' implies only conformity to the regulations of Islām in regard to the *dhimmīs*, and that these words give no justification for the rough treatment sometimes inflicted on a *dhimmī* when he paid *jizyah*—*e.g.*, that he should be made to stand with bent head and back before the collector of the tax, who should slap his face and pull his beard—for (as he rightly says) there is no evidence that the Prophet or any one of the khalīfahs acted in such a manner.[2]

A powerful influence in the direction of toleration in a period when feeling was acerbated against the Christians, and when the disorder in Muhammadan administration made their position more precarious and exposed them to the tyranny of local officials, was the extension of the religious orders, especially that of the Qādiriyyah, and the popularizing of that mystical presentation of religious thought in which devout Muslims found consolation after the devastations of the Mongol conquests. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī († 1166), the founder of the order referred to, emphasized the virtues of charity and meekness, and his attitude and that of his followers towards the Christians was kindly and sympathetic.[3] The tendency of Persian mysticism was opposed to any emphasizing of religious differences, and the teaching of the poets who wrote under the influence of this mystical movement often made for tolerance; a well-known example is the story of Abraham in Sa'dī's *Būstān*,[4] in which the patriarch is rebuked by God for refusing his charity to an aged fire-worshipper on the ground of his infidelity. But in the present article attention may rather be drawn to instances of toleration in contrast to the fanatical usage of legislation; *e.g.*, though the so-styled Pact of 'Umar[5] forbade the building of new churches, there was considerable variation of opinion among the Muslim legists themselves on this question, from the more liberal Ḥanafī doctrine, which declared that, though it was unlawful to build churches and synagogues in Muslim territory, those already existing could be repaired if they had been destroyed or had fallen into decay, while in villages where the tokens of Islām were not apparent new churches and synagogues might be built, to the intolerant Ḥanbalī ruling that they might neither be erected nor be restored when damaged or ruined. Some legists held that the privileges varied according to treaty rights: in towns taken by force no new houses of prayer might be erected by *dhimmīs*, but, if a special treaty had been made, the building of new churches and synagogues was allowed. But, like so many of the lucubrations of Muslim legists, these prescriptions bore but little relation to actual facts. Schoolmen might agree that the *dhimmīs* could build no houses of prayer in a city of Muslim foundation, but the civil authority permitted the Copts to erect churches in the new capital of Cairo. The fact that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz (717–720) ordered the destruction of all recently constructed churches, and that more than a century later the fanatical al-Mutawakkil (847–861) had to repeat the same order, shows how little the prohibition of the building of new churches was put into force; and both Christian and Muhammadan historians record numerous instances of the erection of new churches, some of them buildings of great magnificence.[1] Al-Muqtadir (908–932) even gave orders himself for the rebuilding of some churches at Ramlah in Palestine, which had been destroyed by Muhammadans during a riot.[2]

Muslim law made death the punishment for apostasy (*q.v.*), and the convert to Islām was not allowed to return to his former faith, but instances are not unknown of a more tolerant view vindicating freedom of conscience in such cases.

Even the mad Ḥākim (996–1020), whose persecutions caused many Jews and Christians to abandon their faith, ordered the churches that had been destroyed to be rebuilt, and the property settled on the churches that had been taken from the Christians to be restored to them, and allowed the unwilling converts to return to their old faith.[3] It is stated by more than one Muhammadan writer that Moses Maimonides under the fanatical rule of the Almohads in Spain feigned conversion to Islām, but fled to Egypt and there openly declared himself to be a Jew; that towards the end of his life a Muslim jurisconsult from Spain denounced him for his apostasy and demanded that the extreme penalty of the law should be inflicted on him for this offence; but the case was quashed by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. 'Alī (one of the most famous of Muslim judges and prime minister of Saladin), who authoritatively declared that a man who had been converted to Islām by force could not rightly be considered to be a Muslim.[4] Jewish writers, jealous for the honour of their great co-religionist, have disputed the accuracy of this story, though the first who narrates it, Ibn al-Qifṭī, was himself a contemporary of Maimonides;[5] but in reference to Muhammadan toleration it is of interest to note that the decision of al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil is reported without contradiction or condemnation. In the same spirit, when Ghāzān, ilkhān of Persia (1295–1304), discovered that the Buddhist monks who had become Muhammadans at the beginning of his reign (when their temples had been destroyed) only made a pretence of being converted, he granted permission to all those who so wished to return to Tibet, where among their Buddhist fellow-countrymen they would be free once more to follow their own faith. J. B. Tavernier[6] tells a similar story of some Jews of Ispahan who were so grievously persecuted by the governor 'that either by force or cunning he caused them to turn Mahometans; but the king (Shāh 'Abbās II. [1642–1667]), understanding that only power and fear had constrained them to turn, suffer'd them to resume their own religion and to live in quiet.' The Yazīdis who were forced to accept Islām under the oppressive rule of Badr Khān Beg in 1844, were permitted by an imperial firman to return to their own creed three years later.[7]

The practice of Muhammadan governments seems, generally, to have been to leave to each separate protected community the management of its internal affairs, and to permit the religious leaders to administer the laws as to marriage, inheritance, etc., in accordance with the ordinances of the particular faith as accepted by the persons concerned, in some instances in criminal cases also,[8] though, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, there was no obligation resting on the Muhammadan government to recognize the decisions of such a judge or on the *dhimmīs* to conform to them.[9] But, if an appeal was made to the Muslim judge, he would decide the case on the basis of the Qur'ān and Muslim law, and some jurists held that the State could even insist on the application of Muslim law in cases of inheritance in which the public treasury would thereby derive more benefit than if the special law of the *dhimmīs* concerned

[1] *Fatḥ al-Qarīb*, ed. L. W. C. van den Berg, Leyden, 1894, p. 625 f.

[2] *Ḥāshiya 'alā sharḥ Ibn Qāsim al-Ghazzī*, Cairo, 1879, p. 326.

[3] T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*², p. 329.

[4] ii. 37–54, ed. C. H. Graf, Vienna, 1858, p. 142 f.

[5] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan), vol. ix. p. 767.

[1] For examples see Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*², pp. 66–68.

[2] Eutychius, *Annales*, ed. L. Cheikho, Paris, 1906–09, ii. 82.

[3] Ibn Khallikān, *Biographical Dictionary*, tr. MacGuckin de Slane, Paris, 1843–71, iii. 451.

[4] Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ta'rīkh al-Ḥukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert, Leipzig, 1903, p. 318, line 5, p. 319, lines 16–19; Abu'l Faraj, *Ta'rīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, Beirut, 1890, p. 417 f.; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'ah, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, ed. A. Müller, Königsberg, 1884, ii. 117.

[5] See A. Berliner, 'Zur Ehrenrettung des Maimonides,' in *Moses ben Maimon: sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss. Zur Erinnerung an den siebenhundertsten Todestag des Maimonides*, Leipzig, 1914, ii. 103 ff.

[6] *Six Voyages through Tartary into Persia and the East Indies*, Eng. tr., London, 1677, p. 160.

[7] G. P. Badger, *The Nestorians and their Rituals*, London, 1852, i. 133 f.

[8] Arnold², p. 146.

[9] Mawardī, *Constitutiones Politicæ*, ed. M. Enger, Bonn, 1853, p. 108 f.

were applied.[1] It is recorded of Khayr b. Nu'aym, a judge in Egypt about the middle of the 8th cent., that, after hearing the cases of the Muslims inside the mosque, he would sit on the steps outside the gate in the afternoon and hear the cases of the Christians and Jews, testing the value of the evidence of the witnesses by inquiring into their credibility among their co-religionists.[2]

An important testimony to the toleration of Muslim rule is the fact that persecuted Christian and other sects took refuge in Muhammadan lands, to enjoy there the undisturbed exercise of their several cults. When the Byzantine emperor, Leo, in 714, instituted a persecution against the Montanists and the Jews, forcibly compelling them to submit to baptism, while some burnt themselves alive rather than suffer the loss of religious freedom, others fled for safety into the neighbouring Arab territory.[3] The persecuted Spanish Jews at the end of the 15th cent. took refuge in Turkey in enormous numbers.[4] The Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical house of Hapsburg;[5] and the Protestants of Silesia in the 17th cent. looked with longing eyes towards Turkey and would gladly have purchased religious freedom at the price of submission to Muslim rule.[6] The Cossacks, who belonged to the sect of the Old Believers and were persecuted by the Russian State Church in 1736, found in the dominions of the sultan the toleration which their Christian brethren denied them.[7]

Of toleration in the Muhammadan world generally it may be said that it was more operative in the earlier centuries of the Hijra than in the days of the decline of the khalifate or the unhappy period of the Mongol conquests or in modern times when the pressure of Christian Powers exasperated Muslim feeling. The civil government has as a rule been more tolerant than the clergy, and the regulations of jurists have seldom been put into force with all their rigour; though practice has varied with time and place, the persecutions[8] that have occurred have been excited by some special and local circumstances rather than inspired by a settled principle of intolerance. The judgment of A. de Gobineau is on the whole justified by the facts of history:

'Si l'on sépare la doctrine religieuse de la nécessité politique qui souvent a parlé et agi en son nom, il n'est pas de religion plus tolérante, on pourrait presque dire plus indifférente sur la foi des hommes, que l'Islam. Cette disposition organique est si forte qu'en dehors des cas où la raison d'Etat mise en jeu a porté les gouvernements musulmans à se faire arme de tout pour tendre à l'unité de foi, la tolérance la plus complète a été la règle fournie par le dogme. . . . Qu'on ne s'arrête pas aux violences, aux cruautés commises dans une occasion ou dans une autre. Si on y regarde de près, on ne tardera pas à y découvrir des causes toutes politiques ou toutes de passion humaine et de tempérament chez le souverain ou dans les populations. Le fait religieux n'y est invoqué que comme prétexte et, en réalité, il reste en dehors.'[9]

To this sober conclusion of the historian may be added the eloquent outburst of one of the Spanish Muhammadans who was driven out of his native country on the occasion of the last expulsion of the Moriscoes in 1610:

'Did our victorious ancestors ever once attempt to extirpate Christianity out of Spain, when it was in their power? Did they not suffer your forefathers to enjoy the free use of their rites at the same time that they wore their chains? Is not the absolute injunction of our Prophet, that whatsoever nation is conquered by Musalman steel, should, upon the payment of a moderate annual tribute, be permitted to persevere in their own pristine persuasion, how absurd soever, or to embrace whatever belief they themselves best approved of? If there may have been some examples of forced conversions, they are so rare as scarce to deserve mentioning, and only attempted by men who had not the fear of God, and the Prophet, before their eyes, and who, in so doing, have acted directly and diametrically contrary to the holy precepts and ordinances of Islam which cannot, without sacrilege, be violated by any who would be held worthy of the honourable epithet of Musalman. . . . You can never produce, among us, any bloodthirsty, formal tribunal, on account of different persuasions in points of faith, that anywise approaches your execrable Inquisition. Our arms, it is true, are ever open to receive all who are disposed to embrace our religion; but we are not allowed by our sacred Alcoran to tyrannize over consciences. Our proselytes have all imaginable encouragement, and have no sooner professed God's Unity and His Apostle's mission but they become one of us, without reserve; taking to wife our daughters, and being employed in posts of trust, honour and profit; we contenting ourselves with only obliging them to wear our habit, and to seem true believers in outward appearance, without ever offering to examine their consciences, provided they do not openly revile or profane our religion: if they do that, we indeed punish them as they deserve; since their conversion was voluntarily, and was not by compulsion.'[1]

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TOLSTÓY.— 1. Early life and manhood.—Lev Nikoláevich Tolstóy (1828–1910), novelist, social reformer, and religious mystic, was born on 28th Aug. (O.S.), 1828, at Yásnaya Polyána ('Bright Glade'), the home of the family, in the government of Tula, about 130 miles south of Moscow. Lev was the youngest of four sons. His mother having died when he was three, and his father five or six years later, the boy went in 1840 to the university town of Kazán in eastern Russia, where he lived under the charge of an aunt, whom he held in grateful remembrance. After two years' study he left the university without a degree. The blame is usually laid upon the professors, but some portion of it must be attributed to Tolstóy's own dissipated and irregular life. Returning to his estate, he interested himself in the life of his peasants, with the disappointing results recorded some years later in his *A Morning of a Landed Proprietor* (1856). He admits that he did not really know their life, and that he was aiming at their betterment only from the outside. It was, however, the beginning of that interest in 'the people' which led him at last to throw in his lot with the peasants and the poor. In 1851, to escape from the idle dissipation of his class, he fled to the Caucasus, where he wrote his earliest works—*Childhood*, *A Morning of a Landed Proprietor*, and *The Incursion*—and planned *The Cossacks*, sold ten years later to pay a gambling debt.

Childhood (1852), *Boyhood* (1854), and *Youth*

[1] *REJ* xxix. [1894] 209–211.
[2] Al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-Quḍāh*, ed. R. Guest, London, 1912, p. 351.
[3] Michael the Elder, ii. 489–490; Theophanes, *Chronographia* (*PG* cviii. 810, 812).
[4] La Jonquière, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, new ed., ii. 501.
[5] *Ib.* i. 266; J. Scheffler, *Türcken-Schrift*, 1664, § 45 f.; T. Gasztowtt, *La Pologne et l'Islam*, Paris, 1907, p. 51.
[6] Scheffler, § 48. [7] La Jonquière, ii. 482.
[8] See art. PERSECUTION (Muhammadan).
[9] *Les Religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie centrale*, Paris, 1865, p. 24 f.

[1] J. Morgan, *Mahometism Explained*, London, 1723–25, ii. 297 f., 345.

(1856) form an autobiographical fragment, thinly disguised under fictitious names. Here, as elsewhere, Tolstóy doubles himself, to bring out the dual nature, the natural and the spiritual man of which he was always conscious in himself. Irténev represents the lower nature, his friend Nekhlyúdov the higher. The latter reappears in the *Landed Proprietor* and in *Resurrection*, just as in *War and Peace* Pierre Bezúkhi, and in *Anna Karénin* Konstantín Levín, are Tolstóy himself in that struggle between flesh and spirit which ended only with life. There is truth in Leo Wiener's statement that even the Christ of his religious writings is still the image of the author, and that 'it is Christ-Tolstóy that becomes the final and lasting stage of his spiritual evolution.'[1] This autobiographical fragment reveals Tolstóy as an awkward child, morbidly sensitive to his appearance; a boy, confessing frankly every shade of evil in his heart, such as the rise of sexual feeling; and a youth 'in search of an ideal,' whose one faith was in the possibility of virtuous perfectibility. Beyond this, his creed, though retaining the forms of the Orthodox Church, had become dust, ready to crumble at a touch. Yet we see the beginnings of many things which appear and reappear in his writings to the end—a shame of being rich while others want, a deep hatred of injustice, and the clear poetic vision of Nature and her loveliness.

The Cossacks (1863) represents Tolstóy's revulsion from the artificial and vicious life of cities and his class. The natives had their vices, but they sinned naturally and frankly, and thus escaped the deeper corruption of hidden immorality. In contrast with their bold outdoor life, Tolstóy saw himself (the Olénin of the story) as a degenerate weakling.

Joining the army in 1851, Tolstóy commanded a battery at Sevastopol; and in his three sketches —*Sevastopol in December, 1854, Sevastopol in May, 1855, Sevastopol in August, 1855*—we find the seeds of thought that were to fructify in his *War and Peace*, and many an indignant denunciation of the violence by which nations are governed. The conviction of the sheer wickedness and brutality of war sank deep into his soul and grew with the years. The sketches probably saved his life; by the emperor's orders the young man was removed to a place of safety. On the fall of Sevastopol in 1855 he was sent with dispatches to St. Petersburg, and his career as a soldier came to an end.

Of this period, and up to his marriage in 1862, Tolstóy could never afterwards think without shame. Between 1857 and 1861 he travelled in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, England, and Belgium, to study their educational methods, wrote many books on education, and started schools for peasant children on his estate. Yet alongside this generous interest in 'the people' the tides of the passions of the natural man never ceased to flow. His own words in his *My Confession*[2] frankly reveal this moral duality:

'I cannot recall those years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to duels to kill; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour of the peasants; I punished them, fornicated, and cheated. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder—there was not a crime which I did not commit, and for all that I was praised, and my contemporaries have regarded me as a comparatively moral man. Thus I lived for ten years.'

On 23rd Sept. 1862 Tolstóy married Sófiya, second daughter of a Dr. Behrs of Moscow, who bore him thirteen children, several of whom died in infancy. Fifteen years of unbroken domestic happiness followed. Tolstóy was busy with his schools, his works on education, the management of his estate, and, above all, the writing of his greatest novels, *War and Peace* (1864–69) and *Anna Karénin* (1873–77), in which appear all the problems round which his mind never ceased to work—war, the peasants, the land and the serfs, education, the universal duty of manual labour, and, at the root of all, religion and the ethical duties flowing therefrom. Then suddenly, to the dismay of the literary world, Tolstóy cast aside the art in which he was acknowledged the greatest living master, and devoted the remainder of his life to moral and religious tales for peasants and children, and an examination of the Gospels, the Creed, and the foundations of violence on which he believed the entire system of civil government rested. His literary ambitions had been treason to the deepest convictions of his soul. The literary caste set up to teach what they did not know, and for the sake of his family he had shared their delusions:

'The new conditions of my happy family life completely drew me away from all search for the general meaning of life. All my life during that time was centred in my family, my wife, my children, and, therefore, in cares for the increase of the means of existence. The striving after perfection, which before had given way to the striving after perfection in general, after progress, now gave way simply to the striving after making it as comfortable as possible for me and my family. Thus another fifteen years passed.'[1]

The struggle to break away from this treason to the higher life led to great family unhappiness, and ultimately to his mysterious and tragic end.

2. Ethical and religious ideas.—Tolstóy's principal works after his 'conversion' are *My Confession* (1879–82), *Critique of Dogmatic Theology* (1880–82), *The Four Gospels Harmonized and Translated* (3 vols., 1880–82), *My Religion* (1884), *What shall we do then?* (1884–86), *Moral and Religious Tales*, *The Kingdom of God is within you* (1893), *What is Art?* (1897), and *Resurrection* (1899), his last great novel, in which he sums up his indictment of Church and State and the entire structure of society. It is from this vast mass of literature that we must now attempt to deduce the religious and ethical convictions into which, with endless vacillations, Tolstóy finally settled.

(1) Tolstóy's fundamental conviction is that the one purpose of life is to know God by bringing all relations of humanity into harmony with His will. In reply to the decree of the Holy Synod which excommunicated him in 1901 he states his creed:

'I believe in God, whom I understand as Spirit, as Love, as the beginning of everything. I believe that He is in me and I in Him. I believe that God's will is most clearly and comprehensibly expressed in the teaching of the man Christ, whom to understand as God and pray to I consider the greatest blasphemy. I believe that the greatest true good of man is the fulfilment of God's will, but His will is this, that men should love one another and in consequence of this should treat others as they wish that others should treat them, as, indeed, it says in the Gospel that in this is all the law and the prophets. I believe that the meaning of the life of every man is, therefore, only in the augmentation of love in himself; that this augmentation of love leads the individual man in this life to a greater and ever greater good, and gives after death a greater good, the greater the love is in man, and at the same time more than anything else contributes to the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world, that is, of an order of life with which the now existing discord, deception, and violence will give way to free agreement, truth, and brotherly love of men among themselves. I believe that there is but one means for success in love, and that is prayer, not public prayer in temples, which is directly forbidden by Christ (Matt. vi. 5–13), but such as Christ has given us an example of,—solitary prayer, which consists in the establishment and strengthening in our consciousness of the meaning of our life and our independence of everything except God's will.'[2]

(2) Tolstóy warns us that, when he calls God 'Father' and speaks of His 'will,' he is not to be understood as meaning that God is a personal being. He admits that, when he prays, he is inconsistent with his doctrine of the impersonality of God: it is a necessity forced on him by the fact that he himself is a person. The doctrine of the Trinity is blasphemy. Metaphysical speculations conceal God; nothing reveals Him but love in its

[1] *Lev N. Tolstóy: an Analysis of his Life and Works* (*Complete Works of Count Tolstóy*, tr. and ed. L. Wiener, xxiv. 293).
[2] Ch. ii. (*Works*, xiii. 8 f.).

[1] *My Confession*, ch. iii. (*Works*, xiii. 16).
[2] *Answer to the Decree of the Synod* (*Works*, xxiii. 235 f.).

application to human life. The fundamental idea of *The Kingdom of God is within you* is that God is, in every man, the revelation of life and the power by which man lives and acts upon the world. Whatever approves itself to the God within has divine sanction and right. Since God thus acts naturally through man, miracles are impossible.

(3) Tolstóy's conception of Christ passed through many fluctuations. In the Crimea he dreamed of a new Christianity 'purged of dogma and mysticism,' giving happiness here on earth. At his brother Nikoláy's funeral he projected 'a Life of Christ as a Materialist.' After reading a German work on the Gospels he inclined to agree with the author that Christ never existed. In the end, while admitting His existence, he denied indignantly His divinity. 'To recognise Christ as God is to renounce God.'[1] On the theory of His divinity the Temptation becomes absurd—'God is tempted by God Himself.' The miraculous Birth is an invention to cover His mother's shame. The Resurrection is 'a trite, contemptible invention,' contrary to reason and needing the invention of other miracles to support it. He is 'the living Christ' only in the sense in which all men live on in the spirits of those who come after them. Jesus is grouped with other great religious teachers of the world, such as Confucius, Buddha, Lao-tse. These views are asserted with a peculiar earnestness: 'I am standing with one foot in the grave, and I have no need to feign.' The truth is that Tolstóy had almost a personal interest in thus emphasizing the human side of Christ: he found in it those elements of wavering of which he was conscious in himself. The Temptation, the shrinking of His soul at the visit of the Greeks, the agony in the Garden, the cry 'My God, my God' on the Cross, seemed to bring Him nearer to his own weaknesses and vacillations. There was even a moment, he held, when Christ resolved to use violence against violence and advised His followers to sell their garments and buy swords; and it was only in the Garden that He was able to overcome the terrible temptation by prayer.

(4) Tolstóy's attitude to Scripture settled down into acceptance of nothing that did not commend itself to the God within himself. The OT is non-essential to Christianity. The Church doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture—myths, miracles, contradictions, immoral stories, and all—only commits the soul to untruth. Yet he admired the OT stories and the Gospel parables as the highest form of art, taught them to the peasant children in his schools, and advocated that cheap unabridged copies be given them, not one word omitted:

'The book of the childhood of the race will always be the best book of the childhood of each man. . . . There is no book like the Bible to open up a new world to the pupil and to make him without knowledge love knowledge.'[2]

After giving elaborate interpretations of the Four Gospels, he warns his readers against all interpretations: let each man read for himself in the spirit of a little child. To get nearer the original meaning he learned Greek; and he used his new-found instrument in the most uncritical and arbitrary way. The Four Gospels were the heart of the Bible; the Sermon on the Mount was the heart of the Gospels; and a few sayings of Christ formed the heart of the Sermon. Whatever in Scripture did not harmonize with these few sayings and Tolstóy's vast 'private interpretation' of them was set aside without scruple as no part of the true original teaching; and, as one has said, if he cleared away superstitions of the Church, he created others of his own.

[1] *Three Letters on Reason, Faith, and Prayer* (*Works*, xxiii. 472).

[2] *The School at Yásnaya Polyána* (*Works*, iv. 308, 310).

(5) In substance, Tolstóy reduces Christianity to five commandments of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount:

(*a*) *Thou shalt not be angry* (Mt 5^{21-26}).—He takes this prohibition absolutely, omitting 'without a cause.' It forbids, not killing merely, but the anger from which violence flows. In his own experience he found that contempt was the root of anger; and, since contempt was possible only to inferiors, he strove to divest himself of the worldly possessions, standing, and privileges which gave him a false sense of superiority over those who were sons of the one Father. If it be said that Christ in this passage speaks of the penalty of judgment and fire for this sin, Tolstóy replies that He never prescribed this penalty, the mention of which only indicates the severity of His condemnation of it. In his discussion of Mt 23 he does not seem to recognize that Christ's indignation against the Pharisees must be a breach of His own law against anger, if understood in the absolute sense.

(*b*) *Thou shalt not commit adultery* (Mt 5^{27-32}).—Tolstóy interprets the words in v.[32], 'saving for the cause of fornication,' as meaning that the husband by divorcing his wife 'causes her also (as well as himself) to commit adultery.' His views pass through several stages and are influenced by his own early lapses. For the first fifteen years of his married life his ideal for woman was the duty of motherhood. He disapproved of celibacy and held that monogamy is 'the natural law of humanity.' The close of *What shall we do then?* is an impassioned appeal to women to fulfil 'the highest act of life,' the duty of maternity. *Domestic Happiness* (1859), however, warns against basing the happiness of marriage on the romantic fever of the senses called love, from which motherhood is the true escape. This view persists through *War and Peace* and *Anna Karénin*. In the latter a young and beautiful woman, married to a man much older than herself, turns to feed her starved heart to an illicit passion; and the suicide in which she ends is, in the author's intention, far less the punishment of her infidelity to her husband than of her unfaithfulness to her lover and their child—the burning out through jealousy of her lover's affection, and her unworthiness of her own maternity. The *Kreutzer Sonata* (1889) marks the extreme development of his views—a sordid story of the murder of a guilty wife and the acquittal of the husband on the ground that he had merely defended his honour. The title implies that in Tolstóy's view Beethoven's music irritates and hypnotizes soul and sense into crime. His final position is given in his *Epilogue to the Kreutzer Sonata* (1890), written to defend himself against many attacks. In substance, he demands an absolute chastity, whether in the married or in the unmarried life. The teaching of the gospel is 'in the first place that a married man must not be divorced from his wife, in order to take another, and that he must live with the one with whom he has come together (Matt. v. 31–32; xix. 8); in the second place, that for man in general, both married and unmarried man, it is sinful to look upon woman as an object of enjoyment (Matt. v. 28–29), and, in the third place, that for an unmarried man it is better not to marry at all, that is to be absolutely chaste (Matt. xix. 10–12).'[1] He admits, however, that this absolute chastity is not a precept, but an ideal, to which the race is meant to approximate. To the objection that this ideal would annihilate the race he replies coolly, Why not? Both Church and science foretell an end of the world; why should it not come through the increase of virtue?

(*c*) *Thou shalt not swear* (Mt 5^{33-37}).—This means much more than mere simplicity and truth of speech: 'Yea, yea; nay, nay.' Christ forbids us to bind ourselves by an oath to any human power or authority. To do so is to abjure the freedom of conscience, which is the divine within us, and to make ourselves the slaves of a human will which may be the enemy of the will of God. It is the deliberate renunciation of Christianity. In short, this command of Christ strikes at the root of all military power, since all armies rest on an oath of allegiance to some human authority; and this plain command the Church explains away, knowing that, if it were obeyed, the entire structure of society, and its own institution as part of it, would fall to the ground.

(*d*) *Resist not evil* (Mt 5^{38-42} $7^{2\,5}$ etc.).—This doctrine of non-resistance dominates all the rest of Tolstóy's teaching. It was the first command of Christ which he understood, and it opened the meaning of all the others. Physical force, being an outrage on the freedom of conscience, which is the Kingdom of God within the soul, must never be applied to make any man do what he does not wish to do. Compulsory military service, the whole system of civil and criminal law and government, parliaments, courts, judges, police, jails, taxation, even the payment of debts—all stand condemned as unchristian. Property must be abolished, since it rests on force; it is not merely theft, but murder, because human life is the price paid for it. He prophesied the bankruptcy of the present system of violence; and, were he alive, it is conceivable that he would point to the Great War and the horrors of Bolshevism as the fulfilment of his prophecy. Non-resistance is the only way to destroy violence. 'As fire does not put out fire, so evil does not put out evil.' Given a non-resisting community, 'no enemies—neither Germans, nor Turks, nor savages—would kill or torture such people.' His fanatical and uncompromising Russian mind admitted no limits to this doctrine. If he saw a madman attack a child or a horde of savages fall on his own wife and children, this command of Christ forbade him

[1] *Works*, xviii. 430.

absolutely to protect them by force. The worst that can happen by not resisting is death, whereas to resist is to 'act contrary to the law of Christ, which is worse than death.' We need not hesitate to say that this carries the doctrine to the point of insanity. The natural instinct of a normal conscience is to protect the weak and the defenceless from a drunkard or a madman.

(*e*) *Wage no war* (Mt 5[43-45, 48], Lk 6[32ff.]).—The five commandments of Christ form five widening circles: (1) the individual heart—harbour no anger; (2) man and woman, the family—avoid carnal lust; (3) private worldly relations with others—bind the conscience by no oath or promise; (4) relations to the State—resist no evil by force; (5) the human race—regard no nation as your enemy: 'If they make war on you, submit, do good, and wage no war.' It is absurd to say that Christ, who forbade anger to the individual, now allows anger, and murder which is the fruit of anger, to communities and nations.

From the Sevastopol sketches, on through *War and Peace*, *The Kingdom of God is within you*, and innumerable pamphlets, etc., Tolstóy never ceased to strip war of its 'glory' and to hold up its naked falsity, cruelty, and bestiality. Under all its fine names its true purpose is murder. Three causes are named: '(1) the unequal distribution of property, that is, the robbing of one class of people by another, (2) the existence of a military class, that is, of people educated and destined for murder, and (3) the false, for the most part consciously deceptive, religious teaching, in which the young generations are forcibly educated.'[1] Patriotism is the chief war-criminal—a sentiment fostered by pageants which hypnotize the people into 'loyalty,' by alliances with or against other nations, based on an unreal love and a created hate. There is no such thing as a good patriotism, the aim of all patriotism being that of 'Deutschland über Alles,' to exalt our own nation over others, by violence if need be. It is this sentiment that puts into the hands of rulers a diabolic weapon, making possible military conscription and all the cruelties, atrocities, and bestialization of invasions and battlefields. The one remedy is the substitution for love of country of love for man as man, and the refusal of individuals to submit to military service, be the consequences what they may. Tolstóy had a profound distrust of peace congresses and courts of arbitration, because 'the decision of the court of arbitration against the military violence of the states will be executed by means of military violence.'[2]

(6) Following out his doctrine of human freedom, Tolstóy attacked all current forms of education as the forcible ruin of life and ethics. The schools on his estate were based on absolute freedom. The children came when they pleased, sat where they liked, were at liberty to speak, had no home lessons to torture them. Yet the order and attention were perfect. The teaching included walks in the fields, explanations of natural sights and sounds, history, folk-tales, stories and parables from the Bible, by far the finest instrument of education. Tolstóy wrote a series of tales, which had a great success in Russian schools; but he held that it is the peasant children who can teach us to write, not we them: they are nearer the original harmony of beauty, truth, and goodness than men, whose education has been a system of destroying that harmony. His views are summed up thus:

'I am convinced that the school ought not to interfere in that part of the education which belongs to the family; that the school has no right and ought not to reward and punish; that the best police and administration of a school consist in giving full liberty to the pupils to study and settle their disputes as they know best.'[3]

He opposed 'popular education' because it was not popular, but compulsory, based on violence, and hated by both parents and children, who forgot its artificial results as quickly as they could.

'Schools which are established from above and by force are not a shepherd for the flock, but a flock for the shepherd.'[4]

From infant school to university the system was arbitrary, mechanical, and out of relation to life and its needs. To compel all child-natures to pass through a standardized system, without freedom of choice, is torture. In fine, education has become an elaborate system of demoralizing child-nature, which is good, in the interests of the world and its evils. At an early age it severs the natural bond of parent and child, and of the great mother, Nature herself, and it does so in a way which fosters lying, hypocrisy, and vice, and destroys individuality.

(7) In *What is Art?* Tolstóy sweeps aside with contempt all theories of mere æsthetics and 'art for art's sake,' and reduces the criteria of art to the following: (1) art must spring from a genuine feeling in the artist; (2) this feeling must have the power of infecting others with the same emotion; (3) it must have the power of uniting men by this infection of a common hope, joy, love, or whatever it be: if it separates men, it is not art. The more widely it unifies men, the more worthy is it of the name. 'Upper class art,' dependent on an artificial training, springs from no living infectious emotion in the artist, who has to write, paint, etc., to please his rich patrons, who lead idle, artificial, and parasitic lives. Such art grows ever narrower in its appeal, and its patrons ever prouder of its exclusiveness, whereas 'great works of art are only great because they are accessible and comprehensible to every one,' like the story of Joseph and the parables of Christ. Whole generations of artists, singers, poets, players, artisans, workmen, are practically serfs for the production of false exclusive art—an art which is simply the expression of the pride, sensuality, and weariness of life of the men and women who pay them.

All good art, being universal, depends on universal emotions which unify men by infection. What these are is revealed by 'the religious perception' that all human good is contained in 'the fraternal life of all men, our love-union among ourselves.'

Hence 'the Christian art of our time can be and is of two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception of man's position in the world in relation to God and to his neighbour—religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the simplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible to all men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—universal art. Only these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our time.'[1]

The name of art is denied to emotions which divide men, as patriotism, or religious sectarianism, or the honour given for wealth, education, rank, or profession. The theory has met with much ridicule; but, making allowance for some exaggeration in Tolstóy's dislike of the conventional forms in which every art seeks expression, we may agree with Kropotkin that *What is Art?* is a much-needed protest against the over-artificiality into which modern art has drifted.

(8) Tolstóy's doctrine of the future life may be described as a kind of pantheistic immortality. His novels overflow with studies of death and the process of dying. The higher ranks meet death with reluctance and complaining, the poor with cheerfulness and faith. Of Natálya, the old stewardess in the home of his childhood, he says: 'She executed the best and highest act of this life,—she died without regrets or fear.'[2] During the period of his 'conversion' thoughts of suicide became so strong that he had to hide a rope that hung in his dressing-room and could not trust himself to go out hunting with a gun. There was no meaning in life, no end to which it moved. He was saved from suicide by the discovery that the end was God, God in whom he lived, and moved, and was. The fear of death is a 'superstition' due to the fact that men live in a mere fragment of their own nature and of the world, and this the lower fragment of their carnal and personal being, instead of their rational consciousness in its relation to the sum of things, which is God. Life is given to be a ministry of life to the world, and

[1] *Who is to Blame?*, Letter on the Transvaal War (*Works* xxiii. 458).
[2] *Concerning the Congress of Peace* (*Works*, xxiii. 440).
[3] *The School at Yásnaya Polyána* (*Works*, iv. 237).
[4] *On Popular Education* (*Works*, iv. 15).

[1] *What is Art?*, ch. xvi., tr. Aylmer Maude, London, 1905 (of this tr. Tolstóy in a Preface says: 'I request all who are interested in my views on art only to judge of them by the work in its present shape.' The tr. is from the original MS, and is free from the mutilations of the Russian censor).
[2] *Childhood*, ch. xxviii. (*Works*, i. 136).

it lasts just so long as this ministry is being fulfilled. To cast it away in suicide when it becomes unpleasant to us is sinful, partly because just then is probably the time when this ministration truly begins. Moreover, it is in this life of universal ministry that man finds the only true immortality. Personal immortality is impossible, because true life is the deliberate sacrifice of all personal ends. Resurrection and reincarnation would be nothing better than a return to the carnal and personal relations which are spiritual death. Life is an ever onward movement of reason and love, and the only real death is to arrest the movement at any given point. Live onward beyond the old self, and life becomes a living part of the growing good of the world. This is the life eternal and the only true immortality for man.

3. The last phase.—The life of the great Russian ended in a mysterious tragedy of conscience. For many years his life consisted of a struggle to bring his practice into harmony with his principles by escaping from his class, his wealth, his family. In *My Religion*, written in his fifty-sixth year, he lays down five conditions of human happiness: (1) a life that does not break the link with Nature—the open sky, sunlight, fresh air, soil, plants, animals; (2) work, physical labour, giving appetite and sleep; (3) family life; (4) a free and living intercourse with all the various classes of mankind; (5) health, and a natural and painless death. These conditions are open most widely to the peasant, and grow narrower the higher you rise in the privileged classes, the Tsar, *e.g.*, holding intercourse with none but a few of his jailers. Hence Tolstóy's later years were one long effort to transform himself into a peasant; and the asceticism which formed part of his strangely complex nature finally struck out the third condition, the family life. He transferred to his wife the responsibility of managing his estates, and, although he continued to live in the family mansion, it was, as far as possible, as a poor man working with his hands. It was a compromise which gave no peace of conscience. More than once he left his home intending never to return, but family affection always drew him back. The family friction which resulted is portrayed in the form of fiction in *Walk in the Light, while ye have Light* (1888). One's sympathies are not entirely on the husband's side; the countess had much cause for complaining that the burden of the children, the estates, and the publication of his books was transferred to her shoulders. In spite of a true affection between them, they drifted apart.

Tolstóy's actual departure from his home came about through the question of the copyright of his works. From 1882–83 the countess, to counterbalance her husband's neglect of the estates, became the publisher of his writings; and in 1894 she deposited in a public museum for safety large quantities of his manuscripts, producing evidence afterwards that they were given her by Tolstóy. This was done, evidently, to protect herself from a deliberate attempt by one of his disciples, V. G. Tchertkóf, to deprive her of them and of all control of their publication. In 1891 Tolstóy, having convinced himself that to make money by his moral and religious writings was sinful, made public announcement that any one was free to publish his works written from 1881 to the time of his death. About the same time he gave Tchertkóf the right of first publication, in Russian and in English, of his future writings. Although this was almost equivalent to copyright, Tchertkóf was not satisfied with it, and set about a long series of intrigues to induce Tolstóy to make a will in his own favour, and without the knowledge of the countess, on the ground that only through him would his works be published in accordance with his publicly expressed wishes. An unhappy aspect of the affair is that his youngest daughter, Alexandra, was in the intrigue against her mother. After many tentative wills had been drawn up and signed, a final one was made on 22nd July 1910, bequeathing all his productions and the manuscripts themselves into the full possession of his daughter Alexandra. An 'explanatory note' stated his wish that 'all papers extant at the time of his death shall be handed to V. G. Tchertkóf, that he may examine such documents and publish what he may consider suitable.' This will was signed on the stump of a tree near Tchertkóf's house, after a long series of unscrupulous intrigues, and when the old man of eighty-two was fast breaking up in both body and mind. At 5 o'clock on the morning of 28th Oct. 1910 he left his home for ever, accompanied by his daughter Alexandra and his disciple Dr. Makovitsky. His son Ilyá, in his *Reminiscences*[1] of his father, traces his flight to the intolerable moral torture of the dilemma of confessing all to his wife or of repudiating the will. He started with no object but to hide himself somewhere, anywhere. He went first to see his sister Mary, a nun of the Shamárdino convent, and expressed to her his intention of taking a peasant's cottage and living near her; but his daughter, fearing that her mother should discover his whereabouts, carried him off secretly, with the intention of securing a passport and leaving Russia. The old man, however, was nearing his end. At Astápovo he had to be removed to the house of the stationmaster, where he lingered on till the morning of Sunday, 7th Nov. 1910 (20th, N.S.). Tchertkóf, professing to guard him from intrusion, refused to allow the countess—who had learned where he was only through a message from a newspaper office—to see her dying husband until he was in the article of death and past the power of recognizing her.

Thus passed away in darkness the greatest of modern Russians. Nevertheless, he had attained moral and spiritual unity as nearly as was possible to a nature so vast and turbulent. The common idea that his life is broken into two distinct parts is a mistake. His 'conversion' is simply the emerging into clear consciousness of those ideals of truth and right towards which we see him striving even in the midst of his most dissolute life. His fixed idea was God, and, in spite of all appearances, the effort to make God all and in all gave to his life a great and solemn unity. He was like a wild tumultuous river with the fall of the mountains behind it, thwarted by rocks, gorges, precipices, but never ceasing to turn and twist and foam around and over every obstacle in its thirst for the sea.

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TOLTECS.—1. Origins.—The beginnings of the Toltec peoples are enveloped in the fogs of mythology. Their origin is rather mysteriously attributed to the acts of a certain hero-god, Quetzalcoatl ('a twin'), compounded of two words *quetzalli*, a plume of green feathers, and *coatl*, a serpent, in other words, a plumed-serpent (-god). Some wild speculations and pious conjectures have identified him with St. Thomas, and others with the Messiah. Another mysterious hero-god (personage) who has been closely linked with Quetzalcoatl was Votan, the reputed founder of the civilization of the Mayas, for a time a contemporary and rival people with the Toltecs.

In the pre-Toltec period of history in Mexico and Central America the Nahua and the Maya were the two leading civilizations. Quetzalcoatl, the plumed-serpent divinity, was the creator of man,[2] the founder of the new order of things among the Nahua peoples. Like the Maya peoples of Yucatan and Central America, the Nahuas did not confine

[1] *Reminiscences of Tolstoy*, Eng. tr., London, 1914.
[2] Bancroft, *NR* iii. 272, 275.

their colonies or activities to any one area of territory, though their main settlement was on the plateau of Mexico. In the 6th and 7th centuries the Toltec Chichimec tribes, representing the Nahua power, migrated from Central America and settled down on the Mexican plateau, in proximity to the wonderful lakes of that region.[1] Of the Nahua tribes who made their homes in this region the Toltecs were one of the prominent sections, the beginnings of whose separate and independent existence cannot be sharply depicted.

2. History.—At the opening of historic times the Toltecs were in possession of Anáhuac (a section of the plateau of Mexico) and outlying territory. While the civilization was old, the name Toltec was new, possibly derived from Tollan or Tulan, the original capital of the empire. The boundary lines of the Toltec sovereignty cannot be fixed, though it probably did not exceed that of the Aztec domain of later times. It is thought to have extended so far west as to have covered Michoacan, which was never conquered by the Aztecs, and stretched eastward to the Gulf of Mexico, including also the Totonac territory of Vera Cruz. The many tribes and peoples of which the Toltec empire was composed cannot be identified by name with any of the later nations found in Anáhuac. Outside the so-called Toltec empire, the peoples, particularly in the north, were regarded as barbarians and were popularly known as Chichimecs.

From the 7th to the 12th cent. the Toltec empire was in the main ruled by a confederacy which resembled the alliance of a later time between Mexico, Tezcuco, and Tlacopan with capitals at Culhuacan, Otompan, and Tollan respectively. Each capital in its turn became the dominant force in the confederacy. Tollan on the river Quetzalatl is reputed to have reached the highest point in culture, splendour, and fame. It is now represented by the little village of Tula, about 30 miles north-west of the city of Mexico. Culhuacan was the only one of the three capitals of the confederacy to survive by name the bloody revolution by which the empire was finally overthrown, and to maintain anything of her earlier greatness. The confusion and often contradiction between the numerous reports and records and manuscripts of the native and Spanish writers lays a heavy burden upon a historian; but Bancroft and Nadaillac are apparently faithful to the best evidence available in those writers. Let us make a survey of the history and constitution of the Toltec empire, so called, during its five centuries of domination in the central plateau of Mexico, based on the representations of Bancroft and Nadaillac.[2]

The pre-eminent personage in the beginnings of this new agglomeration of tribes and peoples was Hueman the prophet. It was through his line that a powerful priesthood ruled the destinies of the Toltec empire from its inception to its downfall. The government was in reality a theocratic republic, in which each leader directed his own tribe both in war and in peace, but all were more or less subservient to their spiritual leader in all matters of national import. Seven years after the arrival of these peoples in Tollan the heads of families and chiefs met in assembly and decided to change their form of government, and establish a monarchy, in order to consolidate their strength against any possible future challenge to their rights as a people. On the advice of Hueman, the chiefs sent an embassy to the reigning king of the Chichimecs to ask for a son or other relative to be crowned king over the Toltecs, accompanied by a specific requirement of agreement on the part of the Chichimec king that the Toltecs should ever be a free and independent people, owing no allegiance whatever to the Chichimecs, although the two powers would enter into an alliance for mutual defence and aid. The Chichimec king was only too ready to seize such an opportunity, and sent back with the embassy his second son with the required guarantees, to be crowned first king of the Toltecs at Tollan under the royal name of Chalchiuh Tlatonac, 'shining precious stone.' This young king, by his splendid bearing, fine character, intelligence, and amiability, immediately won the admiration and affection of the people. His coronation and accession to the throne took place about the first quarter of the 8th cent., between 710 and 720.[1] Immediately after his accession the young king and his counsellors laid down a law that the time limit of a king should be 52 years, at the end of which he should abdicate in favour of his oldest son, to whom he might, however, act as adviser. If the king should die before the time limit had been reached, the unexpired term should be filled by magistrates elected by the people. The next task of the king was to find a wife to provide an heir to the throne, so that the dynasty might be perpetuated. The amiable young king left this choice entirely to his subjects—at least so the records say—to their joyful satisfaction. Their choice fell upon the daughter of Acapichtzin, who himself had been a candidate for the throne when it was proposed to found a kingdom. Two Nahua documents give a rival story of the beginnings of the monarchy, but the main features are not so widely different.[2]

Chalchiuh Tlatonac, the first Toltec king, died at the end of 52 years and was buried in the chief temple, about A.D. 771. His son and successor was Ixtilcuechahuac. He had a peaceful and prosperous reign. The signal event of his rule, and near its conclusion, was a meeting of all the wise men under the direction of the old prophet Hueman. This assembly collected all the Toltec ancient and modern documents, and after a prolonged conference and careful investigation, compiled the *Teoamoxtli*, 'book of God.' On its pages they inscribed the Nahua annals from the creation down; also their religious rites, their governmental system, laws, and social customs; their methods of agriculture; their arts and sciences, and especially astrology; their methods of computing time and interpreting their writings. To these wealthy pages was added a chapter on the forecast of the future events of the kingdom, including the disaster through which it was crushed and destroyed.

The third king, Huetzin, succeeded to the throne about 823. The fourth king, Totepeuh, sometimes given as the second king of Culhuacan, came to his father's throne at the end of 52 years; and handed it down at the same time limit to his son Nacaxoc, the fifth king at Tollan, who was succeeded by Nauhyotl, or Mitl. This sixth reign stretched over 59 years. During all these six reigns there was great advance made in building new cities, beautifying old cities, erecting new temples, one of especial magnificence at Quauhnahuac and another at Tollan rivalling even the Temple of the Sun at Teotihuacan, a city which surpassed Tollan in extent and beauty. These more than 300 years saw the Toltec empire well and prosperously established over a large territory and many peoples.

Looking back at some of the details of those reigns, we gather a few significant facts. The annals of Culhuacan mention Totepeuh (the fourth Toltec king) as the second king of that city. He waged several successful wars, notably in the province of Huitznahuac, where he found, conquered, and married a princess Chimalman, who bore him an heir named Ceacatl Quetzalcoatl. This notable scion of the royal family succeeded in establishing certain laws of succession which prevailed down to the end of the empire; but the most far-reaching act was the conclusion of an alliance between the crowns of Culhuacan, Otompan, and Tollan. Each king was to be independent in his own domain; but in affairs of general interest the three rulers were to constitute a council, in which the king of Culhuacan was to rank first, with a title almost equivalent to emperor. Otompan took the second rank and Tollan the third. The date of the formation of this confederacy or empire was about A.D. 856.

After Quetzalcoatl had ruled in Culhuacan about ten years, he met obstinate opposition to his authority from his enemies. He was a radical reformer whose ideas ran counter to those of the reigning pontiffs. He modified much of the religious ritual and abolished human sacrifices. These sacrifices had had a first place from pre-Toltec times at Teotihuacan, and more or less general acceptance in Culhuacan and Tollan. He absolutely prohibited them in the temples of Tollan, and so stirred up the enmity of the powerful priesthood of Otompan and Culhuacan. The nobility of Tollan also, who resented the curbing of their religious liberties, became jealous of their brothers of equal rank among other peoples of the empire. Nevertheless, Tollan became the metropolis of the confederacy. In the magnificence of her palaces and temples, in the skill and fame of her artists, if not in her population, Tollan surpassed all her rivals on the plateau. This was too much for the other centres, and active aggressive opposition, political,

[1] *NR* v. ch. iii.
[2] *Pre-historic America*, Eng. tr., new ed., London, 1895.

[1] *NR* v. 244 ff.
[2] *Ib.* v. 248-250.

magical, and religious, raised its weapons of warning. Quetzalcoatl's aversion to the shedding of blood is said to have caused the abandonment of his throne, against the ardent wishes of his more warlike friends, and his crossing over to the eastern part of the plateau of Huitzilapan in 895. His successor in Tollan, Nacaxoc, known under several other names, was the fifth king of the Toltecs.

The reign of Nauhyotl, or Mitl, the sixth king of Tollan, was marked with great prosperity and peace. His entire energy and strength were devoted to the promotion of the glory of his city, where he re-affirmed and carried out the reforms of his predecessor. Cholula, a rival sacred city, really stirred him to vigorous action, in building greater temples and more attractive shrines to prevent pilgrimages from Tollan to the rival city. He also built superb temples in other provinces to the south outside the boundaries of Anáhuac.

Nauhyotl, or Mitl, at his death, was succeeded by his queen, Xiuhtlaltzin, who reigned four years. She showed wonderful wisdom and skill in her direction of public affairs, and her death was greatly lamented by her subjects. Her son and successor was Matloccoatl, whose reign covered 949 to 973; he was succeeded by Tilcoatzin, who ruled from 973 to 994, and who was followed by Tecpancaltzin. The records of this period are almost a blank, except that in Culhuacan Quetzallacxoyatl was succeeded in 953 by Chalchiuh Tlatonac (II.) and the latter in 985 by Totepeuh, the second king of that name.

We now approach the period when the Toltec empire was descending the slopes of ruin. The annals of this period are scarlet with the sanguinary struggles between the powerful tribes and bands from the north and north-west and the civil and religious authorities of the empire. The extensive records of the period of the downfall of the Toltec empire are confusion worse confounded. They abound with tales of marvel and mystery, as if intending to throw dust into the eyes of the reader.

Spanish writers still speak of Tollan as the empire, but Nahua documents find in that city the 'occurrences which caused the destruction of the Toltec power.' Whether this is the truth or not, it seems that a battle was fought between the king of Culhuacan and the king of Tollan, and, while this contest was going on outside the city, a party of invaders was admitted into Tollan. Civil strife followed in the streets between three rival sects, until the city itself was nearly in ruins. The three allied powers fought each other, and later there came a period of famine and pestilence in the land. These events occurred between 1040 and 1047.

Defence was so weakened, the reins of government so loosened, that dependencies took advantage of their opportunity to renounce Toltec authority and declare their independence.

The other Toltec cities of power, Culhuacan, Otompan, and Texcoco, seem to have gone down before Tollan. Invaders from the north and north-west, from the powerful Chichimec tribes and Nahua peoples, fell upon the weakened Toltecs without mercy and took possession of all their cities and territory. The cities of the confederacy were plundered and burned except Culhuacan, whose king seems to have made a 'delivering' alliance, about A.D. 1060.

The Toltec power was overthrown. The last years of its struggle for existence are inextricably mixed. Plots, intrigues, battles, invasions, assassinations, blot the escutcheon of the once noble kings of the Toltec empire. Many of the nobility of the Toltecs are said to have migrated before the storm burst. They went to foreign provinces with their families, their treasures, and their other movable wealth. But the Toltec peoples of the humbler classes remained in Anáhuac. Some of them are said to have maintained a national existence for a time in Culhuacan, and possibly in Cholula. But they finally became the subjects of the invaders, whose language and customs were probably identical with their own. Even the sanguinary records do not warrant us in believing that the Toltecs as reported were reduced to merely a few thousands in number. The Toltec collapse was the fall of an empire, not the annihilation of a nation. The succeeding period was a struggle to secure the authority which fell from the hands of the Toltec rulers.

3. Physical features and culture.—The Toltecs, we are told,[1] were tall, well built, with clear yellow complexions; their eyes were black, their teeth white, their hair black and glossy, their lips thick, their noses aquiline, and their foreheads receding. They had thin beards, and little hair on their bodies. Their mouths made an agreeable impression, but their facial expression was severe. They were brave, cruel, and vengeful, and their religious rites were sanguinary.

They were intelligent, eager to learn, and are said to have been the first [in Mexico] to construct roads and aqueducts; they used the ordinary metals except iron, cut precious stones, built houses of stone laid up in lime mortars; knew how to spin, weave, and dye cloth; and built mounds similar to those found so plentifully in the Mississippi valley.[2] Their cities were marvels of construction, beauty, and durability. Their temples were ornate with sculptured bas-reliefs and hieroglyphics, cut in porphyry, basalt, and obsidian.

Their commerce was important and pioneering. Their products were exhibited yearly at fairs, spread before the public in the cities of Tollan and Cholula. Though they seemed not to have used iron, they did work in gold, silver, copper, tin, and lead. They were skilled in making fine jewellery, in which precious stones, such as emeralds, turquoises, and amethysts, were mounted. Cholula was famous for its pottery in the form of vases, utensils for the house, idols for the temples, and ornaments for the people.

The weapons used by the Toltecs were slings, bows and arrows, spears, and darts pointed with silex, obsidian, porphyry, copper, or bone. The warriors wore padded cotton armour, practically impenetrable to arrows or javelins, and so heavy that a warrior once fallen could not always get up again. Their round shields of light flexible bamboo were decorated with feathers and covered with cloth or the skins of animals which they had killed in hunting. The shields of the chiefs were decorated with plaques of gold as a mark of their rank.

4. **Human sacrifice.** — Prisoners of war were often sacrificed to their gods. Funeral ceremonies were also accompanied by the burning of women upon the funeral pile of their husbands; this the women joyfully accepted because it opened to them the door into the first celestial sphere, where they could follow their husbands and thus avoid Mictlan, a gloomy and solitary abode.

5. **Religion.**—The religious system of the Toltecs is a chaos of ceremonies and ritual, so entangled with the pre-Toltec era and modified in the subsequent Chichimec-Aztec period that little definite and specific can be affirmed beyond those items already mentioned above in § 2. Even the many extracts from native and Spanish writers given by Bancroft and Nadaillac convey merely a hazy idea of the so-called religious systems of the Nahua nations of which the Toltecs were a part. Their multitudinous polytheism only adds to the confusion and attests that religion, mysticism, and mythology were such a conglomerate of everyday life that even the alleged documents of native writers could not disentangle them.

6. **Calendar and hieroglyphic language.**—The so-called Mexican calendar, found on a block of porphyry uncovered in the old city of Mexico in 1790, probably supplies us with the Aztec astronomical cycle. The Mexicans kept a solar year, and a lunar year only for religious holidays; the latter was divided into periods of thirteen days, corresponding to the phases of the moon.[3] The Toltecs (and Mayas) had a month of twenty days, apparently based on the normal number of a man's fingers and toes.[4] The key to the ancient hieroglyphic language of the peoples of Mexico and Central America, as found on their great monuments at Palenque and Copan and other remarkable ruins, is practically lost.[5] A few signs are known, but, until a sure key is established, we shall have to rely mainly on the native sources, as reported to and by Spanish writers, for any information regarding the hieroglyphic era of the pre-Aztec, and even of the Aztec, peoples.

Even the most comprehensive works on the Toltecs are inadequate and insufficient in method to clear up the problems that native and Spanish authors pour out on the table of the modern student of ancient Mexico.

1 Nadaillac, p. 275 f. 2 *NR* i. 24. 3 Nadaillac, p. 306.
4 See art. CALENDAR (Mexican and Mayan).
5 *NR* ii. 119.

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I. M. PRICE.

TOMB.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.

TONGANS.—1. Introduction.—Tonga—or at least the Tonga of this article—is the name of a group of islands in the Western Pacific, lying to the north of New Zealand, the east of New Caledonia, and the south of Fiji and Samoa. It is sometimes known as the Friendly Isles, the name given it by Captain Cook. The Tongans who inhabit this group are a tiny nation of the Polynesian race. Although few in number—about 20,000 only—their nationality is clearly marked, and they can easily be distinguished from their neighbours the Fijians and Samoans. Typical Tongans are tall, large-limbed, of a light coffee colour, with upright forehead and straight hair; but a little acquaintance with them shows that there has been an admixture with a race that was short and had receding foreheads. This agrees with their traditions, which state that, when the Tongans came to the group, some five or six centuries ago, it was already occupied by an aboriginal race. Traces of these have been found in one of the volcanic islands, but the vestiges have not been scientifically examined. Still it is clear that the Tongans, and Polynesians generally, have emigrated from a distance; and the most probable theory is that of Fornander, that they came from the head of the Persian Gulf.

Old navigators used to speak of the Tongans as 'the most splendid savages in existence,' and they were certainly the terror of the neighbouring groups, all of which are said to have been once conquered by them. They acknowledge themselves to be mentally inferior to the European; but it cannot be said that they come very far behind; and occasionally students at Tubou College have achieved results that could be equalled only by the best pupils in English schools. A fair measure of the size of their brains may surely be found in their language, which contains, it is estimated, at least 10,000 words in use. The verbs have about 20 voices, and the pronouns are developed to such an amazing extent that there are more than 100 ways of saying 'our,' against two in English, 'our' and 'our own.' As the adjectives, too, have many degrees of comparison, and there are more than two articles, shades of meaning can be produced to an almost infinite extent. That the Bible translates well into a language like this is not surprising; but geometrical treatises, and such works as Milton's *Paradise Lost*, can also be well rendered.

Physically, then, and mentally, the Tongans stand high; and it comes as a surprise that their spiritual development, as represented by their old religion, was low. Their pantheon was a medley, and their theology unredeemed by any gleams of philosophy as in the religion of India.

2. The gods of Tonga may be divided into three classes.

(1) In common with other parts of Polynesia, their great gods comprise the two groups of the Tangaloa and the Maui (pronounced Mow-y: Mow as in *now*). The *Tangaloa* were the earlier group, and consisted of Tangaloa 'Eiki ('Lord Tangaloa,' or 'Tangaloa the Elder'), Tangaloa Tufunga ('Tangaloa the Smith, Carpenter, or Artificer,' who made axes and built canoes), and Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo ('Tangaloa the Sender-forth-of-sound'). The *Maui* group consisted of five persons: Maui Motu'a ('Old Maui,' or 'Maui the Father'), Maui Loa ('Maui the Tall'), Maui Buku ('Maui the Short'), and Maui 'Atalanga ('Maui the Vigorous Planter'). This last had a son called Maui Kijikiji (pronounced Kitsikitsi: 'Maui the Violent, the Mischievous'), who was, of course, the grandson of Maui Motu'a.

There were, however, older gods than any of these. One was called Tama-bo'uli-ala-mafoa ('Son-of-the-Darkness-that-can-have-a-dawn'). Some accounts represent him as the original deity. Another of the primitive gods was 'Eitu-matubu'a ('Eitu-of-the-olden-time'). He is spoken of as the father of the Tongan people. Another of these gods was Hikule'o, the Tongan Satan. *Hikule'o* means 'the echo,' and there is no doubt that this was the original signification of the name; but as it *might* mean 'Watching Tail,' the legend grew up that the tail of this deity was so long that when he, the god, went about, the tail kept watch at home. But even now the Tongans, when they hear an echo, say it is Hikule'o walking in the woods; and the other explanation was evidently an afterthought.

These with others were the original gods of Tonga. By and by a division of departments took place. To the Tangaloa was assigned the Sky (or Heaven); to the Maui group the Under World; and to Hikule'o the World and Bulotu (Hades). But in order to keep Hikule'o in his place, as he was a god that delighted in mischief, a cord was attached to him, one end of which was held by Tangaloa in the sky, and the other by a Maui in the under world, to prevent his leaving Bulotu to damage the world. This division was effected by an older god than any, namely, Taufulifonua ('Frequent-Upsetter-of-the-land'), who also assigned the sea to Hemoana, and the woods and dry land generally to Lube (the Dove). Hemoana's name is sometimes pronounced Heimoana, and the present writer *believes* that Tongavalevale spoke of him as Hea-Moana, though he is unable to speak positively on that point. *Hea-Moana* would signify 'Hea-of-the-deep-sea'; *Hemoana* would be simply 'the Deep Sea' = Oceanus. His shrine was the banded sea-snake. These were the Olympian gods of Tonga; but, with the exception of Hikule'o, they were rarely worshipped, and few if any temples were erected in their honour. The exception is due to the fact that Hikule'o was a mischievous god, and must therefore be propitiated.

(2) The second class of gods were an inferior race, who had their shrines in animals, birds, fishes, trees, whales' teeth, clubs, and even stones. Yet these were the gods worshipped by the people, and their temples were to be found in every village. Here are a few of them: Tu'i 'Ahau ('King of the town of 'Ahau'), whose shrine was a volcanic stone of peculiar shape; Tu'i Lalotonga ('King of Rarotonga,' or perhaps of the world below Tonga), whose shrine was the dragon-fly; Taliai Tubou (the god of the reigning dynasty while yet heathen),

whose shrine was a shark [Mariner renders *Taliai Tubou* by 'Wait there, Tubou,' which is certainly incorrect; Taliai Tubou was probably the name of a king]; Bulotu Katoa (the Pleroma of the Spirit World, who presided over hurricanes, and agriculture), whose shrine, we think, was a tree at Kolonga [Mariner mentions several the present writer has never heard of: Tubou Toutai ('Tubou the Mariner'; Tubou is the familiar designation of the king, and one of his family is usually called Tubou Toutai); Hala'evalu ('Eight Ways'; also the name of a chief); 'Alo'alo ('the Fanner'), the god of wind and weather, rain, harvest, and vegetation; Tu'i Bulotu ('King of the Spirit World')]. Other gods resided in the turtle, the cuttle-fish, the kingfisher, etc. Fonokitangata's shrine was a war-club. These were, so to speak, the private gods of the people, and the shrine of each was tabu to its worshippers. Thus the people of Te'ekiu were forbidden to eat the octopus, that being the shrine of their god. In the neighbouring villages, however, it would be freely eaten. In Nomuka one particular family were thus debarred from eating turtle, while the rest of the town were free to partake of that delicacy.

(3) In addition to these there were a number of supernatural beings whose position in the Tongan pantheon is not clear. They were looked upon as gods, and the term expressive of highest deity was applied to them; but they were never worshipped, nor were temples built to them. On the contrary, they were looked upon with contempt, and their follies freely portrayed and laughed at. It is curious to see these ascriptions of high divinity and expressions of contempt standing side by side. Is it that these were the gods of the inferior race which the Tongans found in the group when they landed?

Take an instance or two. Jiji and Faiga'a were two goddesses in this class, who had set their affections on a Tongan of great masculine beauty called Bajikole. He, tired of their attentions, plaited two large baskets of cocoa-nut leaves, put one goddess in each, and, shouldering them like a Chinaman, conveyed them into the bush, and hung them on the branch of a tree, and left them there for two years, until the baskets rotted, and they fell to the ground. They made another attempt on his affections, and he finally got rid of them by inveigling them into his fish traps, and leaving them at the bottom of the sea, where they lay until Tangaloa took pity on them, and sent a god to release them. Take another instance. In this case also it was two goddesses, who set out to meet a mortal lover. While waiting for him, they took off their heads to dress their hair. Suddenly his footsteps were heard, and they put their heads on again; but in the hurry one of them put hers on hind before; and when she attempted to move, her face went one way and her legs another. It is extremely puzzling to meet with tales like these, referring to those to whom the titles of highest deity are given: and yet, after all, they do but recall the vagaries of the Olympian deities as described by Homer, when

'Unextinguished laughter shook the skies.'

On the subject of ancestor-worship, Mariner speaks positively (vol. ii. p. 97): 'That there are other Hotooas or gods, viz. the souls of all deceased nobles and matabooles.' The present writer was disposed to agree with him at first, especially as it was a custom of the people to go to the cemeteries to pray, even after a sacrifice had been presented at the temple. But further inquiry has convinced him that they did so because they fancied themselves nearer the spirit-world in such places. Intelligent chiefs like Valu, who were acquainted with heathenism, are equally positive in the other direction, and deny that they looked upon the spirits of deceased chiefs as gods. We think the truth lies between the two statements, and that Mariner himself gives us a key to the solution of the question. In vol. i. p. 376, he speaks of Feenow as being frequently inspired by the spirit of Mumui (a late king of Tonga). Now we can readily understand that in such circumstances Feenow would pray to Mumui, and others would join him; so that in time Mumui would be looked upon as a god. This would account for such gods as Tu'i Lalotonga, Tu'i 'Ahau, Taliai Tubou, and others. All the inquiries of the present writer negative the assertion that the spirits of chiefs as a general thing became gods. We may then look upon the gods of the first class as primitive, brought by the Tongans from their original home, and the third class as the gods of the aboriginals whom they conquered. The second class contained also some primitive gods, but was recruited largely from the spirits of ancestors—*i.e.* the spirits of certain deceased chiefs by whom kings and notable personages fancied themselves to have been possessed.

The other point the present writer made special inquiries about was whether the Tongans worshipped the clubs, whales' teeth, animals, trees, stones, etc., before which they placed their offerings, or the god who was supposed to be temporarily residing in them. The answer was decisive. The clubs, trees, etc., were simply the *vaka*, the god itself was spiritual. *Vaka* signifies a 'mode of conveyance,' usually a canoe, but also a carriage, or anything by which one is conveyed from place to place.

Probably we may see here a development of their spiritual ideas. The oldest class—Tangaloa, Maui, Hemoana—were undoubtedly corporeal. Their bodies performed all the functions of human bodies, and they were inflamed with human passions. But the Tongans had long ceased to pray to them, and scarcely any vestiges of their worship remained when the missionaries came. The third class of gods, too, were corporeal, but there are no signs of worship being paid them at any time. These two classes existed side by side; but long before the introduction of Christianity both had been discarded as objects of worship, which was paid only to the second class. In other words, the Tongans had worked out a theology, which had, at any rate, this noble feature in it, that God was a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit.

The general Tongan term for supernatural beings is *fa'ahikehe*. This is often shortened into *fa'ahi*, and when the adjective *lahi* ('great') is added—*fa'ahi lahi*—the idea conveyed is that of full deity. *Fa'ahi* signifies properly 'a party,' 'a side' (as in cricket); or it may be short for *fa'ahinga* = 'kind,' 'class,' 'race,' 'species,' 'genus.' *Kehe* = 'other' (ἕτερος, not ἄλλος), so *fa'ahikehe* is 'different folk,' 'other kind of people.' The usual word for 'God' is *'Otua*. Mariner spells it *Hotooa*, but there is no *h* in it. The inverted comma represents a guttural, a half *k*, which is one of the difficulties of the language. It is not readily recognized by the European ear, and is mostly neglected by foreigners, while being as intractable as the Ayin in Hebrew. The present writer has failed to find any derivation for *'Otua*, or meaning other than 'God,' and believes it to be a primitive Polynesian word. In some parts of the Pacific it appears as *Atua*.

The other great word is *'Eiki* = 'Lord,' which is used as in English for both earthly and heavenly lords. Hence it is not so high a term as *'Otua*. Indeed it seems sometimes to mean only 'supernatural.' Thus a corpse is called *ha me'a faka'eiki*, which apparently signifies 'a thing belonging to the spirit world.' Probably Mariner was thinking of this when he said (vol. ii. p. 130): 'The human soul after its separation from the body is termed *hotooa*, *i.e.* a god or spirit.' He is certainly wrong in that statement. It is clear that *'eiki* was not the original form of the word, which the laws of the language point out to have been *ikeiki*.

We must not pass over the fact that the members of one of the dynasties of kings were regarded as gods. This was the earliest line of kings, and their title was *Tu'i Tonga* ('King of Tonga'). They were certainly looked upon as in some sense divine beings; and instances are on record of prayers being offered to them. Words applied only to the gods were used in addressing them; such as *'Ei*, already referred to, *ha'ele*, and *'afio*, used of the movements of deity. The face of the Tu'i Tonga was termed the 'sky,' and to him, as the representative of the gods, were presented the 'first-fruits.' This ceremony, called the *'inaji*, or 'portion,' is described by Mariner (vol. ii. p. 196). When a Tu'i Tonga died, he was said to be 'missing' (*hala*), and he was buried in a *ziggurat*, or pyramid

of steps. This was called a *langi*, or 'heaven'; and many of them remain in tolerable preservation, and excite the wonder of the visitor by the huge size of many of the stones, some of which measure over 20 ft. in length.

Many, probably most, of the names of the Tu'i Tonga have been preserved, and their history curiously reminds us of the story of the Carlovingians and Merovingians in France. One of the Tu'i Tonga, called Takalaua, was murdered, and his son and successor Kau'ulufonuafekai, from weariness or fear, devolved the duties of government on his younger brother, reserving to himself the honours and emoluments of the office. His brother assumed the title of Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua ('King of the Takalauans'), and soon got all the power into his hands, the Tu'i Tonga becoming a *roi fainéant*. After a few generations, however, the Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua became effete, and the government was handed over to another branch, called the Tu'i Kanokubolu ('King of Kanokubolu,' the town in which he lived). This is the title of the present dynasty. Representatives of the other two lines, however, still exist, but the titles are not used. The representative, however, of the Tu'i Tonga holds even now a quasi-sacred position, and is still addressed as the gods used to be; and words sacred to deity are used for all his movements.

Mariner mentions another semi-divine person called the Veachi (vol. ii. p. 80). This part of his narrative is very perplexing, as neither Veeson nor Thomas nor any of the modern chiefs knows anything about him.

The word used all over Polynesia for 'religion,' 'worship,' 'prayer,' etc., is *lotu*. Fortunately this has a meaning in Tongan, and signifies 'a seeking for something that is hard to find.' Thus when famine prevails, the people *lotu kai*, *i.e.* go all over the land looking for food. It is also used for the restlessness of a caged animal seeking an outlet, and for the cry of an animal for its mate or companions. This is not the only word common to Polynesia which finds its meaning in Tongan. *Tabu* (or *taboo*), now of world-wide use, signifies in Tongan that something which might be opened is closed. These and other considerations lead one to think that the Tongan language comes nearer than most of the dialects to the original Polynesian tongue.

3. **The religious rites** of the Tongans were few. There was nothing in their religion corresponding to our idea of worship. If they wanted something—rain, fair winds, good crops, successful fishery—or if they wished to prevent some calamity—such as sickness, death, hurricanes, war—they would seek the favour of a god, would offer sacrifice and pray. But to come into his temple, to worship, to sing his praises, to dwell upon his attributes—this was a foreign idea altogether. Hence there was very little in the Tongan religion to cultivate the conscience, or to control the passions, or to elevate the thoughts. Mariner thinks otherwise, and we would gladly believe his favourable report of the Tongan character. But all our information—and much of it goes back to Mariner's time—contradicts his statements. He even contradicts himself. The Feenow he speaks so highly of was a monster of iniquity; and there is no doubt that for centuries theft, murder, lust, treachery, and almost everything in the catalogue of evil, have been rife in Tonga. No man's life or property, and no woman's honour, was safe for a day.

They never went to their gods empty-handed; a piece of kava root for making the native drink was a *sine qua non*. Baskets of food, too, were usually brought in addition, and presented to the god or his priest. One of the party would then state the object of their visit, and implore the deity to grant their request, or use his influence with the gods of Bulotu in their favour. Sometimes the priest would remain silent; at other times he would object that their gifts were too small. If he spoke at all, he spoke as the god, being supposed to be 'possessed' by the god at the moment. John Thomas says (Farmer's *Tonga*, 128): 'Often there was another person present, the friend of the god, who acted as mediator, and addressed the priest on behalf of the offerers.' Hingano, a chief lady of great age, described to the present writer how she and others would take baskets of food to the door of Taliai Tubou's temple in Nuku'alofa, and, bowing down, would implore the god's favour. Shortly a white (*sic*) foot would be protruded from beneath a curtain, which they would kiss and then retire.

If their object was to deprecate a calamity, as in a case of sickness, the rite assumed a darker hue. Fingers were cut off, wrapped in banana leaves, and presented; or children were strangled, and their bodies brought as a sacrifice. When prayers were offered to Fonokitangata, the sacrifice was always an adult. Generally a man obnoxious to the community was hunted down and killed, and his body brought in a basket and laid before the priest; but Mariner speaks of a chief of rank being killed in one instance. The offerers, clothed in old and dirty mats, and wearing necklaces of chestnut leaves, would squat on the ground at a distance, and weep and beat their breasts, while the priest, holding in his hand a war club, the shrine of the god, would listen to their prayers with his eyes fixed upon the club or upon the ground. Sometimes he would reply in his ordinary voice, but more often in unnatural tones, as if some one were speaking in him; and frequently he would begin to shake as if in a fit, and to roll about and foam at the mouth. Any words he might utter whilst in this condition were eagerly caught up as the direct utterances of the god. After a while the shaking would cease, and the priest, striking the ground with the club, would announce that the god had departed. Mariner (vol. i. p. 160) has a good description of this kind of possession; and he evidently thought that the phenomena were not altogether voluntary, but that a real possession of some kind took place—a belief which was shared by some of the earlier missionaries.

4. The Tongans believed in **the immortality of the soul.** Mariner, Veeson, and Thomas are agreed on this point.

Veeson says (Farmer's *Tonga*, p. 131): 'One day they were conversing about a person that was lately dead, and said, "He goes to the island through the sky." "How can he be," said I, "in that place, when he is dead, and his body here? Did you not bury him some moons ago?" But all they answered was, "But he is still alive." And one took hold of my hand, and, squeezing it, said, "This will die, but the life that is within you will never die"—with his other hand pointing to my heart.'

Mariner and Veeson, too, agree in stating that this immortality is enjoyed only by the upper classes: the souls of the Tu'as, or common people, die with their bodies. This, no doubt, was the belief of the upper classes, who looked down upon the Tu'as as little better than animals; but it is no evidence of the belief of the Tu'as themselves. Thomas says more truly: 'Of the faith of the common people there was no certainty.'

The 'island' referred to was called Bulotu, and 'through the sky' meant 'over the horizon.' Bulotu is, the present writer thinks, a primitive Polynesian word, and is the name for Paradise in all the dialects. It was situated west or north-west of Tonga, and could be reached by sea. At least the ballads speak of canoes touching there; but how the disembodied spirits got there is not stated. Mariner tells us (vol. ii. p. 101) that Bulotu was believed by the Tongans to be a large island, stocked with all kinds of useful and

ornamental plants in a state of high perfection, and that when these were plucked others would immediately occupy their place. The whole atmosphere was filled with a most delightful fragrance; there were also beautiful birds of all kinds, and abundance of hogs—all of which were immortal unless killed to provide food for the gods. At the moment a bird or a hog was killed, another living bird or hog came into existence. Further on he gives another account of Bulotu brought by a canoe which touched there:

'The crew landed, and proceeded to pluck some breadfruit; but to their unspeakable astonishment, they could no more lay hold of it than if it was a shadow. They walked through the trunks of trees, and passed through the substance of the houses without feeling any resistance. They at length saw some of the gods, who passed through the substance of their bodies as if there was nothing there.' The gods were supposed to have no canoes, not requiring them; 'for if they wished to be anywhere, there they are the moment the wish is felt.'

Now, is this again a development? For the ballads, which date from a time long antecedent to the visit of Mariner, give a very different description. According to them, everything in Bulotu was material. Its entrance was guarded by a woman with eight tongues. There was a large canoe for the gods to voyage in, which was called Langotangata ('the human-rollered'), because it was dragged down to the sea on living rollers, each being a human being. The same trees grew as on earth: cocoa-nuts, breadfruit, yams, etc.; and provision was made for the favourite pastimes of chiefs. There were eminences for netting wood-pigeons, reefs for shark-catching, *'ulua* to be fished, and gigantic clams to be dived for. Ovens of food were cooked as on earth, and kava was prepared and drunk. The houses had solid posts, and the roofs were constructed in the usual way. One of the halls in Bulotu was panelled with the pupils of men's eyes 'which sparkled and flashed.' The women had a hall lined with mirrors—a veritable crystal palace. There was a *Vaiola*, or Fountain of Life, whose waters were so potent that a child plunged into it grew up to manhood in a few days. There was also a *Vai-lolofafanga*, or Fountain of Perfumery, and other delights of women (see 'Voyage of Faimalie,' *Tubou College Magazine*, vol. iii. p. 39).

5. Cosmogony.—The earliest chapters of the Tongan genesis ran somewhat as follows:

Some seaweed and slime clung together, and were carried away by the sea, and washed up on the island of Totai in Bulotu. By and by there grew up between them a large metallic stone called Tou'iafutuna ('Pregnant-how-long-ago!'). Suddenly it began to shake, and sent out a sound like thunder; and, splitting, there sprang out a male and a female twin. The male was called Biki ('Sticky') and the female Kele ('Slimy'). Again the huge stone rolled about as if there was an earthquake, and other twins sprang out: the male called Atungaki (?), and the female Maimoa'alongona ('Vagaries-of-sound'). Again the stone groaned, and twins sprang out, called 'Land-turtle' and 'Sea-turtle.' Again the stone sounded and earthquaked, and twins sprang forth, Hemoana (the Sea-snake), and Lube (the Dove).

They grew up and married, *i.e.* the first pair and the second and the third. The eldest child of Biki and Kele was a son, Taufulifonua ('Frequent-overturner-of-the-land'[1]). The next was a girl called Havea-lolofonua (Havea-of-the-underworld'). The second pair had a girl called Vele Lahi, and the third pair a girl called Vele Ji'i. (*Vele* signifies 'longing' or 'desire'; *Vele Lahi*='Desire the Elder,' *Vele Ji'i*='Desire the Younger'). Sticky and Slimy crested a new land called Tonga Mama'o ('Distant Tonga'), and put on it Taufulifonua and Havea-lolofonua.

[The next incident is unprintable, but is a realistic setting of the words, 'And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.' They were ignorant even of the sexual function, which they discovered only by accident. The result was a boy called Hikule'o ('the Echo,' the Tongan Satan: see above).]

Then Havea said to Vele Lahi and Vele Ji'i, 'Come and marry your brothers as I have done, for there is no man for you.' They did so, and Vele Lahi gave birth to the Tangaloas, and Vele Ji'i to the Maui family. Then Taufulifonua divided the heaven and earth as stated above.

In process of time the Tangaloas ordered Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo to go down and see in what condition the world was. So he entered into the Kiu ('Sea-lark'), and went down, and flew in all directions, but could not see any land, only shallows. Then went he up to heaven and reported to the Tangaloas that there was no land, only something that looked like shallows. Said the heavenly chief, 'Wait seven nights, and then go again and see': so Tangaloa 'Atulongolongo remained seven days in the sky, and then went down to look at the shallows. The bottom was evidently coming up, and he reported to heaven, 'It looks like a reef.' He said also, 'I can find nothing to stand on and rest.' So they said, 'Go to Tangaloa the Smith, and let him throw down the dust of the pumice he sharpens his axes with.' So Tangaloa Tufunga did so, and threw down the dust of his grindstone, and produced the island of 'Eua. On this being reported, Tangaloa was sent down to stand there and watch. By and by a bit of the shallows would become dry, and ultimately a large land grew up, which consisted, however, only of sand. Tangaloa reported, 'My land is large, but nothing will grow on it.' Then said Lord Tangaloa, 'Take this seed, and set it in the land you have discovered.' It was a *fue* (convolvulus). So he set it, and it overspread the land. Then said he, 'There is vegetation enough, but no people: and Lord Tangaloa and the other heavenly chiefs replied, 'Go and split the root of the *fue*.' He did so, and it rotted and produced a grub. So he reported to the sky, 'A great thing is lying in the *fue* I split.' They ordered him to cut it in two, and to call the head Kohai ('Who is it?') and the tail Koau ('It is I'). He did so, and both parts became men: as did also a little piece that had adhered to his beak. This was called Momo ('Little Bit'): and he with the other two were the first men.

Now at that time Maui the Elder ordered his family to go on board a canoe, and fish up lands. There were four Maui in the canoe: Maui Loa, Maui Buku, and Maui 'Atalanga with his son Maui Kijikiji; and they took their mother Vele with them. She was the maker of mats and fine robes. They called at Manuka, a part of Samoa that was already above the waters. And Maui Kijikiji, leaping ashore, went to get a fish-hook. Meeting the chief's wife, he ravished her; and she, taking kindly to him, revealed her husband's secret, that the magic fish-hook, which would bring up lands, was not a bright and glittering one, but an old and rusty hook, stuck in the reeding. So they got the hook, and, having tried it successfully near Samoa, sailed on boldly, and pulled up Tonga and many other groups of islands. When they came to 'Eua, and saw the three men, they asked whether they had any women; and on their replying 'No,' they went and fetched three, so that they might have one each.

At that time the sky was very low, and an ironwood tree that stood in Tonga reached quite up to heaven. So 'Eitu-Matubu'a was wont to climb down, and visit the earth; and, cohabiting with a woman in one of the islands, had a child by her called 'Aho'eitu. When he grew to man's estate, he asked who and where his father was; and was directed by his mother to climb up the ironwood tree, and seek him in the sky. He finds him, is recognized, and sent to play with his brothers, who become jealous, and finally kill and eat him. 'Eitu, finding this out, makes them vomit into a large tub, and covers the *disjecta membra* with the leaves of the tree of life (*Nonu*). By and by the fragments cohere, and ultimately 'Aho'eitu is found sitting up alive. His brothers are punished by being turned out of heaven, and have to serve 'Aho'eitu on earth, who becomes the first Tu'i Tonga, superseding the children of the 'grub.' The Maui afterwards pushed the sky higher up, as it is at present.

Now the Maui dwelt in the under world, but one of them, Maui 'Atalanga, said to his brethren, 'Have you any objection to my living on the earth, if I visit you from time to time?' And they said, 'No.' So 'Atalanga went up to the earth, taking his young son Kijikiji with him. He lived in Vava'u, and married a mortal wife. Now Maui 'Atalanga did not plant in Vava'u; for he was a mighty planter, and there was not land enough; so he had his plantation in the under world. He kept this, however, a secret from his son Kijikiji, for he was such a mischief. But Maui Kijikiji tracked his father by his footsteps, and, seeing him lift a bush and descend into the earth, waited a while and followed him. Many tricks did he play, until one day his father sent him to Maui the Elder to get a fire-stick. Kijikiji kept quenching the fire and going back for more. At last old Maui told him to take the whole log. This was of enormous size, but the young Maui took it up with ease. Old Maui, who had not recognized his grandson, perceiving that he was a superhuman being, challenged him to wrestle—with the result that the elder Maui was thrown and left for dead. 'Atalanga, hearing of it, strikes his son with his spade and kills him. On going, however, to see how his father was faring, he finds the old man alive, and rather pleased than not with his defeat by his grandson, and angry with his son for having killed him. They apply, however, the leaves of the tree of life, and Maui Kijikiji revives. His next exploit is to carry some fire from the under world to earth, in spite of the efforts of his father to prevent him. They then devote themselves to fighting with and destroying the monstrous animals that infested the world—a huge rat, a gigantic bird called the Moa, a lizard, and some carnivorous trees, etc. Maui 'Atalanga is at last devoured by a huge dog that lived in a magic cave which opened and closed automatically; and his son, after killing the dog, died of grief for his father, etc.

LITERATURE.—The principal authorities on the state of Tonga in early times are these: William Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*[2], London, 1818; G. Veeson, *Authentic Narrative of Four Years' Residence in Tongatabu*, do. 1810; S. S. Farmer, *Tonga and the Friendly Islands*, do. 1855. (Mariner's is a most valuable work. He gives evidence

[1] *Tuu* is sometimes intensive. This would then mean 'complete-overturner.'

of being possessed of no common ability, and of an excellent memory; and, if the present writer has ventured to differ from him, it is for the following reasons: (1) the shortness of Mariner's stay—only 4 years; (2) his obvious want of acquaintance with the niceties of the language; (3) the considerable time that elapsed between his leaving Tonga and the writing down of his reminiscences; (4) the fact that the present writer's acquaintance with Tonga extends over a period of 40 years; (5) that most of his information was taken down from the lips of the 'Last of the Bards,' a once heathen chief called Tongavalevale, who was the repository of their folk-lore and ballads; (6) that he has had access to the unpublished journals of the Rev. John Thomas, Wesleyan minister, who went to Tonga in 1826, and was the first missionary to make a lengthened stay.]

J. EGAN MOULTON.

TONGKING.—Ethnographically Tongking is divided into two parts: South Tongking, the special domain of the Annamese race, and North Tongking, bounded on the north by the Annamo-Chinese frontier, on the east by the sea, on the west by the range where the waters separate into the Red and Black Rivers (Song-Koi and Song-Bo), and on the south by a line bisecting the provinces of Kwang-Yen, Bac-Giang, Thai-Nguyen, Tuyen-Kwang, and Yen-Bay. This Upper Tongking has an area of 54,700 square kilometres, and a population of 374,528, belonging to 26 different ethnic groups. There are no Annamese or Chinese except officials and merchants; the country is peopled chiefly by Tai, Man, or Yao, Pa-Teng, Meo, Lolo, Muong, and a very small number of representatives of far more ancient ethnic groups, such as the La-tchi (La-ti) and the Keu-Lao.

I. *TAI.*—The Tai element, most important in point of numbers (239,179 individuals—about 60 per cent of the total population), is divided into numerous sub-groups, the most important being the Thô (146,000), who are found round Cao-Bang, the Nung (66,000), and the Black Tai (14,500). The Tai have a strong admixture of Chinese and Annamese and are thus closely related to the Siamese and Laotians.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Tai are strong and of a lively disposition, careless, fond of pleasure and play, and extraordinarily indolent. This race seems to be on the decrease; there are few births, and infant mortality is very high. They are not absolutely averse to mixed marriages: their daughters may marry Chinese or Annamese if they choose, and their sons take wives from any variety of the race whatever, even from the Man; these mixed marriages produce a stronger and more provident race than the pure Tai.

The Tai live in the plains and low valleys by preference. Their houses are, as a rule, built on piles, the ground-floor being reserved for live-stock and poultry, the upper storey for the inhabitants. The Nang and several other tribes dress like the Chinese; the rest of the Tai follow the Annamese fashion, but wear much brighter colours—indigo blue is almost universal—and far more ornamentation. Rice is the staple food. The Tai also use beans, sweet potatoes, and gourds; pork is their most usual meat, chickens and ducks being reserved for feast-days; they also eat fish. Tea is their chief beverage, though they sometimes drink too much wine or spirit made from fermented grain. The use of tea and betel is practically universal among them; opium is confined to the rich.

The Tai are essentially farmers. They cultivate rice, maize, buck-wheat, beans, peas, sweet potatoes, and sesamum. Industry and commerce are practically non-existent owing to the indolence of the race. They can, however, distil alcohol, weave cloths, make rich embroidery, and do fine basket-work. The Thô even spin a little silk.

2. Religion.—On their original animism the Tai have superimposed a confused mixture of Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas, derived from the Chinese and Annamese. A few priests or lettered men have a vague knowledge of the cosmic system of the *di-kinh*.

They believe that the primordial principle of nature gave birth to the male and female principles, from which issued everything and everybody. The male principle is the sun, the sky, the intellectual soul of men; the female is the dark earth, the moon, the vital and sensual soul of beings. Man has three subtle souls, or *hôn*, which emanate from the male principle, and seven or nine (according as the sex is male or female) vegetative souls, or *vía*. At death these *vía* return to the earth whence they came, while the *hôn* go to the infernal regions. Here we see the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of the transmigration of souls and their purification by punishment. After undergoing the punishments which they have merited, they may approach the throne of the emperor of Jade, the supreme Taoist idol.

The great majority of the people, a most superstitious race, confine themselves to the worship of the evil spirits which infest the air and lie in wait for man even in the most insignificant actions of his life. These are combated by means of forethought and offerings, and especially by the help of more powerful good spirits which are rendered propitious by devoted worship. Among the good spirits the genius of the hearth and the tutelary deity of the village are held in highest honour; of the evil spirits, which have different names in the various Tai groups, the most dreaded are the spirits of people who have died a violent death and the chicken-spirits that insinuate themselves into people, especially women, and give them the evil eye. Of course the Tai believe in white and black magic, spells, lots, and philtres.

Their priests are chiefly sorcerers, who earn their living by offering sacrifices to the spirits, exorcizing the sick, and warding off all the evils invoked against man. They also choose the material with which to build villages or houses, the propitious day for beginning any work, etc. Among the Tai they are nearly all connected with an official cult, but there are independent sorcerers and sorceresses.

The only temples that the Tai possess are small rustic pagodas, nearly all dedicated to the tutelary genius of the locality.

Their religious festivals are borrowed from the Annamese; but among certain tribes, particularly the White and Black Tai, there are some festivals which seem peculiar to the race. (1) *Kin lao mao* ('drink,' 'alcohol,' 'drunk') takes place in September. All the inhabitants of the village meet in one of their houses for a banquet, which is followed after sunset by music and singing. The feast lasts three days, during which no one may enter or leave the village. (2) *King pang* ('to eat bread') takes place in January. It is characterized by round dances to the accompaniment of chants. Among the White Tai it is the women who dance, among the Black Tai the men. (3) *Kin tien* ('to eat coined money') takes place in December in honour of the dead. It lasts three days, with banquets, dancing, and singing. Both men and women take part.

Ancestor-worship exists among the Tai, but only a more or less slavish imitation of Annamese ritualism. It is practised chiefly among the Thô, who preserve the names of their ancestors to the fourth generation, make offerings at prescribed times, and train their children to honour the dead as the protectors of the hearth. Only those who have died a natural death have a place on the family altar; those who have died a violent death, out of doors, have only a small outside altar, usually built in the garden.[1]

3. Myths and legends.—Among all the Tai is found the tradition of a universal deluge, from which the god of the earth saved only a brother and a sister—a poor but pious couple—who shut themselves at his command inside a hollow pumpkin, with some rice for provision. After the subsidence of the waters the present-day races were born from the union of this couple.

4. Medicine.—The Tai regard nearly every illness as the work of evil spirits, and the best medicine is the sorcerer; the more enlightened members of the race sometimes admit that there are natural ailments, which they treat with simples and mineral products borrowed from the Chinese pharmacopœia.

[1] It should be noticed that the Tai know nothing of the property called *hương hoả* in Annam—an inalienable part of the patrimony reserved to meet the expense of the cult of the dead and the upkeep of the tombs. As a rule after a few months, at most after four years, the Tai have nothing more to do with the tombs.

5. **Marriage.** — Although the manners of the Tai are not so free and easy as those of the Laotians, youths and maidens meet freely to sing and play—which often leads to sexual relations; all that Tai morality requires is that there be no tangible proofs of these relations, and hence recourse is had to abortive measures or the suppression of children.

The father is the unquestioned head of the family, yet it is only among the highly Annamitized Tai that he chooses a mate for his child; among the Tai of the right bank of the Red River the young people make their own choice. The proposal is made by a go-between; the young man pays a dowry, and the engagement is settled after a sorcerer has compared the genealogical forecasts of the couple, in order to see whether any supernatural influence opposes their union. The engagement is generally long—from three months to three years—and is rather expensive for the *fiancé*, who is expected to give a great number of presents. The engaged couple are bound to observe the strictest reserve; they are not allowed to take any notice of each other until the wedding-day, while they have complete liberty in their relations with the other young people of both sexes. The marriage-ceremony itself is borrowed from the Annamese.

The outstanding characteristic of marriage among the Tai—with the exception of the Thô in the west, the Nung, and the Thô-Ti—is the quaint custom of separating husband and wife after the celebration of their union: among some tribes the wife spends a fortnight with her parents and a fortnight with her husband; among others she cannot go to her husband except when invited. This state of affairs comes to an end with the appearance of pregnancy, or, in cases of sterility, at the end of the fourth year of married life, when the wife takes her place at the family hearth. As the separated husband and wife retain complete liberty of behaviour outside with people of their own age, Tai morality suffers some strange drawbacks from this custom. The Tai youths marry usually between twenty-three and twenty-five, the girls between sixteen and eighteen.

The Thô of the west and several other tribes practise marriage by adoption and marriage by contract also. A poor young man can enter a rich family without paying the usual dowry, on condition that he takes his father-in-law's name, and lives with and works for his father-in-law. Should he wish later to live apart with his wife, he is liable to pay an indemnity to his father-in-law. A young man can also marry without paying a dowry and without changing his name, by undertaking a contract to serve his wife in her father's house for a stated number of years—from four to seven. If he dies before the contract has expired, his widow is responsible for his debt. These two forms of marriage, which are not held in high esteem, entail no long engagements and no costly wedding-feasts.

Polygamy is allowed by the Tai, but seldom practised; the number of wives is usually limited to two, only the first having honour and authority at the hearth, the other being practically her servant. Among the White Tai, however, the daughter of a chief has the rights of first wife, no matter when she is married. The Tai woman, though she enjoys a life of perfect freedom in her youth, becomes after marriage a sort of beast-of-burden; all the hard work in the fields and in the house falls on her. She has no real individuality till she becomes a mother. Divorce is rare; by right only the husband can seek it; in actual life it is the wife who applies for it. Repudiation is still more rare and is nearly always due to sterility.

6. **Birth.**—The house of the mother is forbidden to strangers during and for a certain time after confinement. If they did enter, they might themselves be contaminated and bring harm to the child. The confinement is made known to those outside by a branch of shaddock and a piece of coal among the Thô of the west, by a piece of wood, a knife, and a green branch among the Thô of the east, fastened to the ladder of the house. The first visitors to enter the house of the mother have to pass over a burning brand or a pail of water, into which red-hot iron is plunged. The Tai woman is delivered nearly always in a standing position, holding on to ropes with her hands. The eastern Thô alone light a brazier on the camp-bed whither she is afterwards carried. The placenta is secretly buried by the midwife. The birth is announced with libations to the ancestors by the head of the family. A propitious day is chosen for putting the child in the sack that does duty as swaddling. The choice of a name is surrounded with the same superstitious fears as are found among the Annamese, and the same unpleasant designations are chosen.

7. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—The Tai originally practised cremation and still do so for certain chiefs. As a rule they have now adopted burial. Funeral honours are paid only to men over 18 years of age and to married women. The rites are imitations of those of the Annamese. The medicine-man determines the position of the coffin and the situation of the grave. The deceased is dressed in his best clothes and a pair of new sandals, and is put into a coffin containing about 10 kilogrammes of ashes. On the bier are placed some duck-feathers to help him to ford the rivers of the other world, and a pencil and paper for him to make his wishes known. On the day of burial—usually the third after death—the corpse is placed on a paper catafalque and taken to the cemetery with great ceremony. The one idea at this juncture is to prevent the dead from returning to torment the survivors at home and at the same time to protect him from evil spirits. It is for this purpose that the medicine-man is employed; he brandishes his sword at intervals round the coffin and the mourners, who strew the road with gold and silver paper in order to tempt the evil spirits to stop and gather it up. The coffin is then put into the grave under the protection of the medicine-man's sword; food is placed on the tomb, near which the catafalque is burned—a house for the dead in the other world. Among the Chong-Kia Tai, when the coffin has to cross a river, the children stretch a piece of cloth from side to side for the souls of the dead, to keep them from wandering. Commemorative rites are not observed regularly by the Tai, except where they are very much under Annamese influence.

8. **Tabu.**—There seems to be only one kind of tabu among the Tai, viz. the entering or leaving a village during a local festival. Strangers are warned to turn back by notices placed outside the village.

II. *MAN.*—This Chinese name, which means 'barbarous,' 'rude,' is applied in Tongking to the ethnic group of the 'children of Pan-Hù or Phien-Hù,' who claim to be descended from the union of the dog Pan-Hù with the daughter of the emperor of China, whose inveterate enemy had been vanquished by Pan-Hù. The Man, or Yao, probably inhabit the high parts forming the basin of the Li-Kiang in the north, and are about 50,651 in number in N. Tongking and much more numerous in the west than in the east. Their various groups have been classified in six great families issuing, they say, from the six sons of Pan-Hù: the Man Côc, or 'horned Man'; the Man Tiên, or *sapèque*

Man; the Man Lan-Tien, or 'indigo-tinted Man'; the Man Quân Trăng, or 'blue-trousered Man'; the Man Quân Côc, or 'short-trousered Man'; and the Man Cao-Lan, or 'great rainbow Man.' The Man Côc, most numerous and most important, live in the highest parts of the country; lower down are the Man Tiên; the Lan-Tien hardly ever are found at a greater altitude than 300 metres; the others follow by various stages to the borders of the deltic plains; as a rule, they all find life in the valleys uncongenial.

1. **Physical characteristics.**—The Man are not so tall as the Tai, but are more robust, more intelligent, and much more active. As they have no rice, their staple food is maize, vegetables, and yams. They eat meat sparingly, chiefly pork, rarely buffalo or ox, never the dog—for this is the totem of their race. They do not chew betel, but both men and women smoke tobacco and the rich consume opium.

Their houses are built sometimes on the ground, sometimes on piles, and sometimes half-and-half. A random group of these houses forms a village, and the village is scarcely ever surrounded by a wall. The Man borrow their style of dress from either the Chinese or the Annamese according to their locality. The women's garments are embroidered on the skirts, facings, neck, and sleeves with bright red and blue designs so intricate and elaborate that it takes three years to embroider one costume. Their hair-dressing is also elaborate, and is nearly always finished off with a large turban having coloured edging and embroidery.

The Man are essentially agriculturists; but they are also good blacksmiths, and can make the trinkets that their women use, and also paper from bamboo-fibre. They are good fishers and hunters.

2. **Religion.**—Their beliefs are like those of the Tai, but even more confused—a few vague notions from the three great religions of China; but the mass of the people are animists, though not quite so superstitious as the Tai. Ancestor-worship is held in great honour among them. They have the same flood legend as the Tai. The Man have only a few pagodas dedicated to the tutelary deity of the village. They are nearly always built against a fruit-tree. They have medicine-men who present offerings, exorcize spirits, and work cures. The reputation of these sorcerers varies with the Man Côc according to whether they have or have not received complete initiation to the third degree. Among the other tribes initiation generally comprises only one degree. The Man worship consists in sacrifices, songs, and dances. They observe the Chinese feasts with varying regularity. They have also two curious local feasts celebrated with great pomp, especially by the Man Côc. The one takes place every three years in certain tribes, every five years in others, and commemorates the rescue of the Man race when—so long ago as to be in the region of hypothesis—it was shipwrecked in sight of the Chinese coast on its way from an island in the east. The second feast, called 'the great fast,' comprises five days of extraordinary pomp, and occurs only once in ninety years. We have no data of any value on its origin or symbolic meaning.

3. **Medicine.**—Their medicine comes from the Chinese, but the Man would not believe in the efficacy of any medicine that was not accompanied by incantations and exorcisms.

4. **Metamorphism.**—The Man believe that their neighbours, the Mao, have a third cutting of teeth in their old age, and after death escape from their graves and reappear as tigers.

5. **Marriage.**—The Man do not attach much importance to virginity. When a child is born before marriage, it is suppressed without a thought of the law which demands a fine for such an offence. Violence is also punished by a fine. The young people themselves, and not their parents, arrange their marriages. The young man makes his choice, then tells his parents, who send a go-between to make proposals to the parents of the girl. After examining the genealogical forecasts, the go-between may, at a second visit, discuss the amount of the dowry and the presents to be offered by the suitor. The engagement is concluded when the young man himself brings all or some of the presents. All intercourse between the engaged couple is stopped until the wedding-day, which is signalized by the customary banquets; the couple drink a cup of rice-wine together and prostrate themselves before the ancestral altar. They live together after the marriage-ceremony. The daughter-in-law must scrupulously avoid touching her husband's parents, though she serves her father-in-law at table.

The Man are also familiar with marriage by adoption and contract. Among the Man Cao-Lan the newly-married couple do not live together until two or three months after the marriage-ceremony. Among the Man Quân Trăng the marriage is preceded by a term of three years spent by the young man in his future father-in-law's house, the girl being usually about thirteen or fourteen at this time. The youth may marry her at the beginning of the three years on condition that he indemnifies his father-in-law for the three years' service which he owes. If pregnancy occurs during this term, the parties are bound to each other; if the youth changes his mind before the end of the term, he can leave without paying or receiving anything; if he is dismissed, he can claim an indemnity for the service rendered. After marriage the couple serve seven years in the paternal home of the husband.

Polygamy is practised among the Man; the number of wives is usually restricted to two, the first alone having authority in the house. The Man Quân Trăng allow polygamy only in exceptional cases. The material status of woman is high among the Man, the men doing all the heavy work; her legal status is different: she is the property of her husband, who can give her away and repudiate her. She, on the other hand, is not allowed to leave him. In cases of adultery the husband has the right to send his wife back to her parents and reclaim the dowry that he paid for her; if he keeps her, he can claim damages.

6. **Birth.**—From the third month of pregnancy sexual relations cease, and the woman abstains from fat, green vegetables, and garlic. She is not allowed to sew or embroider except outside her house. The Man Lan-Tien believe that, if a pregnant woman were the first to cross a new bridge, it would fall; that the touch of such a woman spoils rice and alcohol; the Man Quân Trăng, on the other hand, keep her away from these things for her own sake, in case they should cause miscarriage. The birth is announced to outsiders by a bunch of grass hung on the door among the Man Côc, by threads stretched across the door among the Quân Trăng; no announcement is made among the Lan-Tien. The Man woman is delivered sitting on a little stool. No fire is put under the bed after delivery. The placenta is taken far away and hidden in a hole in a tree or rock; it is buried under the mother's bed among the Man Lan-Tien; if eaten by an animal, it would bring misfortune on the child. Children born out of wedlock among the Quân Trăng belong to the mother; but the father, if known, is liable to pay a fine and give two months' service free in the house of the mother's parents to repay them for the loss of work caused by the birth. They practise adoption freely and thus receive into their families many Annamese children as their own.

7. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—The Man Côc used to burn their dead, and this custom survives west of the basin of the Red River. The Lan-Tien nearest the delta buried only those over fifty; the Quân Trăng buried all the heads of families. The burial rites are copied from the

Annamese. The Man Côc do not make 'the white silk soul' or catafalque; a sorcerer of the second degree exorcizes the tree from which the coffin is to be made so that the tree-spirit may not come to torment the dead.

III. *PA-TENG.* — The Pa-Teng, about 200 in number, live near the Man on the heights separating the Red River and the Clear River (Song-Ka). They are often classed with the Man, but are really separate linguistically. Their beliefs and customs are practically those of the Man.

IV. *MEO.* — The Meo, or 'cats,' numbering 21,471, are found in Cao-Bang, Bao-Lac, Lao-Kay, and Coc-Len as well as in the provinces of Thai-Nguyen and Yen-Bay. They claim to have come originally from the Chinese provinces of Yun-Nan, Kwei-Chu, and Tse-Chuen. Their last invasion into Tongking, in 1860, was very violent.

1. **Physical characteristics.**—The Meo are little and squat, very vigorous on their short legs, brave, hardy, and independent; they can be very abstemious, but are inclined to eat and drink heavily. Maize is their staple food; they eat very little meat, and drink a great deal of alcohol, but tobacco is not used and betel is unknown among them. Their rustic huts, of *pisé* or mud, are dirty to repulsiveness.

2. **Religion.** — Their traditional beliefs are borrowed from China and are very unprecise and wavering. They dread evil spirits—among others, the souls of beheaded people and of the unburied dead. A vague form of ancestor-worship is practised; it amounts to a few prayers and offerings of food, which are quickly consumed by the survivors. They are familiar with the flood-legend of the couple saved in the hollow pumpkin. Their priests are sorcerers.

3. **Marriage.**—Paternal authority is not strong. The young people make their own choice of mates, and marriage is accomplished through a go-between. In some districts the suitor has both to pay a dowry and to serve his future parents-in-law for two years before marriage. The Meo marry freely with other ethnic groups. Marriages are always accompanied by dances, songs, and games; if the bridegroom cannot afford the expense, he may leave it for his father-in-law to bear, on condition that he and his wife give so many years' work in payment. Marriage by capture is also found: the youth may carry off the girl who has been denied him, and he atones for his offence by paying a heavy dowry. Polygamy is allowed, but is not practised except when the first wife has no children. In adultery the husband has the right to kill the culprits, but as a rule he is content with repudiating his wife and taking back the dowry.

4. **Birth.**—There is nothing to mark the house on the occasion of a birth; the mother is delivered sitting and remains indoors for 33 days. The placenta is buried in front of the house, if the child is a boy; under the fire-place, if it is a girl.

5. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—The Meo bury their dead. The watch by the corpse consists of three days' feasting and dancing; the children of the deceased invite him to join in the banquets, and even slip a piece of food between his teeth. By the side of the corpse, which is dressed in new clothes and fixed in an upright position to a wall of the hut, a dead dog, killed for the purpose, is placed. The two are bound together by a strip of paper going from the dog's mouth to the dead man's wrist. The dog's duty is to guide his master in the other world. The coffin and the body are taken to the grave separately; the body is carried on a litter and is followed by the sorcerer, the family, and some friends, while guns are fired to frighten the evil spirits. When the grave is filled in, the litter is broken over it, some food (which must be renewed for several days) is placed on the tomb, and the funeral-procession returns to a banquet at the deceased's house.

V. *LOLO.*—The Lolo, a people almost certainly originating in the Brahmaputra valley, are about 2300 in number in Tongking and live chiefly in the region of Bao-Lac.

1. **Physical characteristics.**—Of medium height, muscular and well built, with fine regular features and a copper complexion, they recall to the Western mind the Bohemians of Europe. They are luxurious and indolent, marrying only among themselves; but their race is degenerating through the use of opium. Their chief foods are rice, maize, vegetables, and gourds, meat being reserved for festivals. They make alcohol from fermented maize. They use no betel and very little tobacco, but indulge in opium to excess.

Their houses are built on piles in the rich villages; in poor villages they are wretched huts placed on the ground. In dress the Lolo resemble the Chinese or the Thô according to locality, but their garments (those of the women in particular) are shorter and much more elaborately embroidered. The Lolo are great agriculturists and hunt and fish a little.

2. **Religion.**— Their beliefs and psychical life vary according as their villages are next a Tai, Man, or Meo clan. Their chief cult appears to be that of evil spirits, and they countenance ancestor-worship, theoretically. They also have the story of the flood and the survival of their ancestors in a pumpkin.

3. **Marriage.** — Marriage, which takes place during the night, comprises no religious ceremonies, but simply banquets and dances. After marriage the wife lives only two or three nights with her husband, and then returns to her parents until pregnancy privileges her to take her place in her husband's home. Marriage by capture is practised, the captor paying a double dowry. Adultery is punished by the death of both offenders. Polygamy exists only in theory.

4. **Birth.**—The rites connected with birth have no peculiarities among the Lolo. Adoption is of frequent occurrence, either by free consent or as the result of a bargain, and is the occasion of great festivities.

5. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—Burial takes place, without ceremony and in presence of relatives only, three days after death. For nine days in the case of a man, eight for a woman, and six for a child, the family keep a fire burning on the tomb, and after that take no more trouble. Certain tribes exhume the dead, after one or three years, with great pomp, and put the head or all the bones into a little wooden box, which is then placed on a neighbouring rock, where the survivors can see it while at work. Their ancestor-worship is very crude. The place of the tablet is often taken by a representation of the dead made from an orchis stem and little bits of paper, placed against a partition or between the wall and the roof of the hut.

6. **Tabu.**—Women after puberty are forbidden to eat pork, chicken, duck, or dog, and must not even cook their food in dishes which have been used for preparing these foods; hence the necessity of two fire-places and two utensils in a Lolo house.

VI. *MUONG OR MON.* — The Muong or Mon are an ethnic group centring in the province of Hoa-Binh. They are of uncertain origin, but appear to be closely connected with the Annamese, whom they resemble strongly in physical type, dress, and customs. Their religion is a development of the popular animism of the Annamese.

It should be noted that in one thing they are very different from the Annamese: among the Muong the relations between the sexes before marriage are very free. Whenever a girl becomes pregnant, her family and that of her seducer are made to pay a fine to the village. As among the Annamese, the blood-test is applied when the father of a child denies his paternity. Marriage is celebrated according to the Annamese rites. Accouchement takes place on a camp-bed under which the usual fire is kept burning, and the house is marked to outsiders, after the delivery, in the

same way as among the Annamese. The placenta is buried underneath the house itself. The dead are buried in accordance with the Annamese rites. The corpse is placed in a coffin made from a hollow tree-trunk and set up in front of one of the doors of the hut. Outside, and facing it, there stands on a bamboo tripod a basket containing a little dog killed for the purpose, some rice, alcohol, and incense-sticks. A special cord binds the tripod to the coffin. After the coffin has been let down and the grave filled in, a wide-mouthed jar is emptied near the stone which marks the position of the dead man's head; and, if rain-water comes and fills this jar again, it shows that the grave has been well chosen and it brings a thousand blessings to the survivors. The bodies of the *quan-lang* (village chiefs) are kept, it appears, for three years before burial in front of the ancestral altar; a long bamboo tube leading from the hermetically-sealed coffin right up beyond the roof of the hut preserves the hut from mephitic vapours.

VII. *KEU-LAO.*—The Keu-Lao, of whose origin and customs we know next to nothing, form an ethnic group of seven families in the neighbourhood of Dong-Vâu.

VIII. *LA-TCHI.*—The La-tchi or La-ti are about twenty in number and live in the village of Chi Ka, near the upper valley of the Song-Chay. Though resembling the Annamese of the delta in physical type, they claim to be aboriginals. They are very little known and seem to live like the Meo. Their characteristic trait is their abstention from pork, the diet *par excellence* of the Far East, because, they say, their orphaned ancestors were fed by a sow.

LITERATURE.—E. Lunet de Lajonquière, *Ethnographie du Tonkin septentrional* . . ., Paris, 1906; A. Bonifacy, 'Contes populaires des Mans du Tonkin,' in *Bull. de l'Ecole fr. d'Ext.-Or.* ii. [1902] 268-279, 'Etude sur les langues parlées par les populations de la Haute-Rivière Claire,' *ib.* v. [1905] 306-327; A. Chéon, 'Notes sur les Muong de la province de Sontay,' *ib.* v. 328-367; E. Diguet, *Etude de la langue Taï*, Hanoï, 1895, *Les Montagnards du Tonkin*, Paris, 1908.

ANTOINE CABATON.

TONGUE.—1. Physiology.—The essential organ of taste is 'the mucous membrane which covers the tongue, especially its back part, and the hinder part of the palate.'[1] Here are found certain cells, arranged in groups which are known as 'taste-buds' and are connected with two cranial nerves. Sensations of taste are intermingled with accompanying sensations of touch, and often of smell.[2]

'There appear to be distinct terminal organs for bitter tastes, for sweet tastes, for acid tastes, for salt tastes, and possibly for other tastes, all differing from the terminal organs for tactile sensations, and from the structures, whatever they may be, which are concerned in general sensibility.'[3]

Modern knowledge of the physiology of taste began (1665) with Malpighi (1628-94), who employed the newly invented microscope.[4] The sense of taste was grouped by Aristotle under that of touch, both operating only through immediate contact.[5] Pliny notes that the human palate also possesses the sense of taste, and he gives many details about the variety in the tongues of animals.[6] An Anglo-Saxon leech-book, in prescribing 'for men in whom the string under the tongue is badly swollen,' says that 'through the string first every disorder cometh on the man.'[7] But the chief significance of the tongue for primitive thought is obviously in regard to the faculty of speech, to which it contributes, together with the throat and lips, in the modulation of the voice. That vibration of the vocal cords which is called 'voice' is modified by the varying shape of the resonant chamber formed by the mouth. The tongue, however, is not indispensable to speech; Huxley refers to a case in which conversation remained quite intelligible though the tongue had been completely amputated.

2. Localization of psychical function.—This characteristic of primitive thought concerning the physical organs[1] is frequently illustrated by primitive practices in regard to the tongue. Since the nervous system and the minuter structures of the tissues were unknown to the ancients, the tongue was thought to possess an *inherent* faculty of speech, as something residing in it, so that the faculty or its special qualities could be transferred by acquisition or assimilation of the tongues of specially gifted animals or men.

Thus, among the Tlingits of Alaska, the chief of the spirits sends the candidate for shamanism 'a river-otter, in the tongue of which animal is supposed to be hid the whole power and secret of shamánism. . . . If, however, the spirits will not visit the would-be shamán, or give him any opportunity to get the otter-tongue as described above, the neophyte visits the tomb of a dead shamán, and keeps an awful vigil over night, holding in his living mouth a finger of the dead man or one of his teeth; this constrains the spirits very powerfully to send the necessary otter.'[2] 'In Bohemia the tongue of a male snake, if cut from the living animal on St. George's Eve and placed under a person's tongue, will confer the gift of eloquence.'[3] 'A North American Indian thought that brandy must be a decoction of hearts and tongues, "because," said he, "after drinking it I fear nothing, and I talk wonderfully."'[4] In S.E. Australia 'one of the Wakelbura was observed to take the tongue out of a certain grey-and-white lizard called Bungah, and give it to his little son, a child of about thirteen months old, and gave as a reason for doing so that after eating the tongue his child would soon be able to talk.'[5] 'When a child is late in learning to speak, the Turks of Central Asia will give it the tongues of certain birds to eat.'[6] The converse is illustrated by the belief that the saliva of a queen touching the tongue of a bird gave it human speech.[7] Among the Nubians, 'before the tongue of any animal is eaten, the tip is cut off; on human analogy they believe that "here is the seat of curses and ill-wishes."'[8] It is a common custom of hunters to cut out the tongues of animals that they have killed. Perhaps 'the removal of the tongues is sometimes a precaution to prevent the ghosts of the creatures from telling their sad fate to their sympathising comrades, the living animals of the same sort, who would naturally be frightened, and so keep out of the hunter's way.'[9] The cannibal practice of eating the tongue of a slain enemy is partly based on the idea that the localized qualities are in this way acquired.[10]

3. Ordeals.—The idea of the localization of psychical function and its ethical qualities underlies different forms of the tongue-ordeal.

Lady Anne Blunt records an interesting case of this in connexion with a dispute as to the parentage of a child: 'The matter, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by a live coal being placed upon her tongue.'[11] Here the original thought seems to have been that the truth would be elicited when the inherent falsehood of the tongue was, if necessary, burnt out. Similarly, in case of theft among certain W. African tribes, use is made of a needle which the operator 'thrusts through the tongue of each member of the household in succession, to discover the thief, it being believed that it will fail to pierce the tongue of the person who committed the theft.'[12]

Reference to the tongue-ordeal among E. African natives was recently made in the British House of Commons: 'A native chief was investigating a case of cattle theft in the presence of

[1] T. H. Huxley, *Lessons in Elementary Physiology*, new ed., London, 1900, p. 354.
[2] G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*[2], London, 1904, p. 195.
[3] M. Foster, *A Text-book of Physiology*[6], pt. iv., London, 1900, p. 1519.
[4] M. Foster, *Lectures on the Hist. of Physiology*, Cambridge, 1901, pp. 94, 100.
[5] *De Anima*, bk. ii. ch. 10.
[6] *HN* xi. 37.
[7] J. F. Payne, *English Medicine in Anglo-Saxon Times*, Oxford, 1904, p. 153.

[1] See art. BODY, vol. ii. p. 755 ff.
[2] *NR* iii. 147, quoted by H. Spencer, *Descriptive Sociology*, London, 1873-1910, i. 266 n.
[3] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 270.
[4] *Ib.* p. 147.
[5] Howitt, p. 402.
[6] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 147.
[7] *LP* i. 97.
[8] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 111. The thrusting out of the tongue in derision or contempt (Is 57[4]; Livy, vii. 10; Cicero, *de Oratore*, ii. 66 [266]) may be in origin a concentrated curse.
[9] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 269 f., where numerous examples and parallels will be found.
[10] J. Robinsohn, *Die Psychologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 64, 67.
[11] *A Pilgrimage to Nejd*[2], London, 1881, i. 10.
[12] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 201.

the District Commissioner, Mr. Dundas. The chief called on the accused, one of his people, to go through the native form of ordeal by fire, by licking a hot knife. Mr. Dundas did not prohibit this procedure, but took care that the knife was not sufficiently heated to burn the tongue of the accused.'[1] An ordeal of a different kind is undergone by the medicine-man in certain tribes of Central Australia. The tongue is mysteriously mutilated, and 'remains throughout life perforated in the centre with a hole large enough to admit the little finger.'[2] But this may rather be an example of the frequent practice of mutilating an organ before its special use in order that it may be used with impunity (cf. circumcision, etc., at puberty).

4. Religious usages.—The tongue is not often named as a separate offering in the rites of sacrifice.

The Homeric Greeks concluded a feast by casting the tongues of the victims upon the fire, over which they poured the drink-offering.[3] 'According to some accounts, the tongues of the victims were assigned by the Greeks to Hermes, as the god of speech, or to his human representatives, the heralds.'[4] The Yakut made a special sacrifice, for a sick man's recovery, of tongue, heart, and liver, consuming the rest of the meat themselves.[5] In the horse-sacrifice of the shamanists of N. Asia the tongue of the sacrificed animal is torn out (in order to make its spirit dumb under the shaman's control?).[6]

Honey was placed on the tongue of one who was being initiated into Mithraism, as was the custom with newly-born infants;[7] we may compare with this the ceremonial tasting of milk and honey by those being baptized into the Christian faith.[8] In this connexion may be noticed the miracle of healing ascribed to Martin of Tours, wrought by anointing the tongue of a dumb girl with oil after exorcism.[9] The wide-spread rule of silence (*q.v.*) during particular religious ceremonies falls beyond the scope of this article, but the idea of the localization of function probably underlies the Indian usage recorded by Devendranath Tagore:

'On another elephant sat the Rajaguru (religious preceptor of the Raja) dressed in the ascetic's brick-coloured robe, and silent. He had his tongue encased in wood, lest he should speak.'[10]

5. Penalties.—In the light of these illustrations of the fundamental idea of localized function (or 'diffused consciousness'), we may better understand certain barbarous mutilations widely practised by way of penalty or revenge. These have often survived into times relatively more civilized than those of their origin, when the idea that first prompted them has been lost, viz. the idea of penalizing the guilty organ in which the original evil resides.

The Laws of Hammurabi enacted that in certain cases an adopted son denying his new parents was to have his tongue cut out.[11] According to 2 Mac., when the seven brethren were being tortured, the king 'commanded to cut out the tongue of him that had been their spokesman' (7[4]). Judas Maccabæus, 'cutting out the tongue of the impious Nicanor, said that he would give it by pieces to the birds' (15[33]). Maximus and two other opponents of Monotheletism were dragged from Rome to Constantinople, where their tongues and right hands were cut off, before they were driven into exile.[12] Blasphemy for the fifth time was punished by excision of the tongue, according to a law (1347) of Philip of Valois (1293–1350).[13] Evagrius writes of the heretic Nestorius: 'I learn from one who wrote an account of his demise, that when his tongue had been eaten through with worms, he departed to the greater and everlasting judgment which awaited him.'[14] The instinct which doubtless created this legend worked also in Fulvia's savage action, when she thrust her needle through the tongue of her dead enemy, Cicero.[1] 'The Clarendon Papers, quoted by Southey, state that at Henley-on-Thames, as late as 1646, it was ordered that a woman's tongue should be nailed to a tree, for complaining of the tax levied by Parliament.'[2]

6. 'Figurative' usages.—The selected evidence already given will prepare us to recognize a deeper meaning in many phrases of ancient literature which the modern mind is apt to dismiss as simply figurative and poetical. The Biblical usages will sufficiently illustrate this. The quality of 'a backbiting tongue' is as inherent as that of 'an angry countenance' (Pr 25[23]); a lying tongue hates those that it wounds (26[28]); the tongue devises wickedness, like a sharp razor (Ps 52[2]); Job asks more literally than most readers suppose, 'Is there injustice on my tongue?' (6[30]). The Servant of Jahweh declares that his Master has given to him the disciple's tongue, that he may know how to help the weary by his words (Is 50[4]). In the Messianic future the tongue of the stammerers will be prompt to speak plainly (32[4]), the tongue of the enemies of Israel will consume away in their mouth (Zec 14[12]). The tongue is not named in the well-known narrative of Isaiah's call (Is 6), but the cleansing of his lips by the live coal illustrates the principle of the localization of psychical function. So in the NT, when the tongue is said to defile the whole body, and to be a restless evil, full of deadly poison (Ja 3[5, 8]), there is a hidden intensity of meaning derived from primitive thought. The importance of this is seen in regard to such a phenomenon as the 'gift of tongues,'[3] which implies that the local and quasi-independent organ has been taken possession of by the Spirit of God. This is more difficult for the modern mind to conceive sympathetically than it was for the ancient, largely because we have lost touch with the idea of the localization of psychical function and ethical attributes, and have replaced it by that of the cerebral centralization of consciousness.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 269 f. (where a number of primitive practices in regard to the tongue are collected in a long footnote); J. B. Mayor, *The Epistle of James*[3], do. 1910, pp. 219–221, discusses the ethical aspects of the use and abuse of the tongue. See also H. Wheeler Robinson, art. 'Tongue' in *DAC*.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

TONGUES.—See CHARISMATA.

TONSURE.—Tonsure is the shaving or cutting of the hair after a particular fashion as a sign of reception into the clerical order and to the privileges pertaining thereto. As a rite it is preparatory to the reception of holy orders, and is administered by the bishop or by a mitred abbot or by certain privileged priests in whom its administration has been vested by the pope. At first it was part of the ceremony of ordination, but was separated from it towards the end of the 7th century. The origin of the tonsure is obscure, but from passages in the Fathers it is clear that long hair in men was considered effeminate or worse, and this was particularly true in the case of monks. Epiphanius censures some Mesopotamian monks for their long hair against the rule of the Church, and Jerome is particularly indignant at the custom.[4] A monk's hair had thus to be cut short, though not shaven, as this was the custom with the priests of Isis.[5] The earliest tonsure was probably no more than a close cutting of the hair of the entire head, though this may have become a shaving of the whole head after the manner of

[1] As reported in the *Manchester Guardian* of 6th May 1914.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[3], pp. 523–525, with accompanying photograph. A Hebrew name for an enchanter is 'a master of the tongue' (Ec 10[11]).
[3] *Od.* iii. 333–341.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 270, where references will be found.
[5] F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 146.
[6] W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*[2], Leipzig, 1893, ii. 26.
[7] F. Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*[2], Brussels, 1913, p. 162.
[8] *ERE* ii. 386[b].
[9] Sulpicius Severus, *Dial.* iii. 2; cf. Mk 7[33-35].
[10] *The Autobiography of Maharashi Devendranath Tagore*, Eng. tr., London, 1914, p. 131.
[11] C. H. W. Johns, *The Oldest Code of Laws in the World*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 42, § 192; cf. S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*, London, 1903, p. 134.
[12] W. F. Adeney, *The Greek and Eastern Churches*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 130.
[13] Fernand Nicolaÿ, *Hist. des croyances, superstitions, mœurs, usages et coutumes (selon le plan du Décalogue)*, Paris, 1902, i. 380 (numerous other examples given).
[14] *HE* i. 7.

[1] C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, new ed., London, 1904, iii. 206.
[2] Edward Eggleston, *The Beginners of a Nation*, London, 1897, p. 67.
[3] See art. CHARISMATA, vol. iii. p. 370.
[4] Epiph. *Hær.* lxxx.; Jerome, *Ep.* xxii. 'ad Eustoch.,' § 28.
[5] Herod. ii. 36; Martial, xii. 29.

the Nazirites and those under a vow (Nu 6^{18}, Ac 21^{24}).[1] It may also have been adopted by monks as a symbol of a penitential life, since penitents had their hair shorn. This is the Eastern form of tonsure, or that of St. Paul. Bede tells how Theodore of Tarsus, before being consecrated by Pope Vitalian in A.D. 668, waited four months for his hair to grow, that it might be shorn into the shape of a crown (the second or Western form of tonsure, or St. Peter's), 'for he had the tonsure of St. Paul the apostle, after the manner of the Eastern people.'[2] The Petrine tonsure consists in leaving only a circlet of hair round a shaven crown, this symbolizing the crown of thorns or the crown of Christ's royal priesthood. It had displaced the Pauline form in the West, and is first mentioned by Gregory of Tours (6th cent.), and was worn by Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590-604), who sent Augustine to England.[3] It is ordered in the 41st canon of the Council of Toledo (A.D. 633)—that 'all clerics must shave the whole front part of the head, and leave behind only a circular crown' of hair on the lower part. While tonsure arose as a monastic custom, it was soon adopted by all clergy, probably before the end of the 6th cent., and the Quinisext Council of 692 appoints it for such lesser orders as readers and singers.

A third form, that of St. John—or of St. James, as its upholders claimed—seems to have been peculiar to the Celtic Church, and occasioned great controversy with the missionaries from Rome, who were astonished to find it in use in Britain, and vigorously combated its use. Nevertheless it continued to be used long after the Synod of Whitby (A.D. 664), which decided against it. What precisely its nature was is uncertain. The Irish Druids are known to have used a tonsure, perhaps denoting servitude to the gods, as it was customary for a warrior to vow his hair to a divinity if victory were granted him.[4] The Druidic tonsure seems to have consisted in cutting all the hair on the anterior part of the head from ear to ear, except a small patch at the forehead.[5] This was looked upon as the tonsure of Simon Magus, regarded as the archdruid or Magus. It has been thought that the Celtic Christian tonsure resembled this and was retained through national feelings. But there was apparently some difference, possibly slight, and it is hardly likely that, while other Druidic observances were banned, this would be retained. Two views are held regarding the Celtic Christian tonsure. (1) It left the hair long at the back, the upper part of the front being shaved so as to leave a band of hair round the forehead from ear to ear.[6] This view was first mooted by Thomas Innes, who says:

'The tonsure of the Scots was not fully round and did not reach the hindermost part of the head, and therefore resembled a crescent or semi-circle.'[7]

(2) All the front of the head was shaved, to a line from ear to ear, behind which the hair was grown.[1] Each of these forms has strong supporters, but the former is probably confirmed by Ceolfrid's account of his discussion with Adamnan, who wore the Celtic tonsure, and to whom he said:

'You who think you are advancing to the crown of life which has no end, why do you wear on your head the representation of a crown which has an end, as Simon Magus did? His tonsure resembled a crown in front but on closer inspection was seen to be imperfect.'[2]

The adherents of the Petrine tonsure generally ascribed the origin of the Celtic to Simon Magus, by way of contempt, or, for the same reason, to the swine-herd of King Loigaire MacNeill.[3] At an earlier time St. Patrick, who was tonsured after the then prevailing Roman manner, viz. the whole head shorn, tried to induce its adoption, but apparently in vain.[4] According to Bede, the community at Iona and the others subject to it accepted the Petrine tonsure about A.D. 716, but other Britons did not conform then.[5] The Celtic tonsure, carried by emigrant Britons to Armorica, was known there in the 9th century.

The Latin form of tonsure with regulars leaves often no more than a circlet of hair; with seculars it is smaller. According to the Synod of Placentia (A.D. 1388), it was to be of the breadth of three fingers. Once the tonsure has been received, it must always be retained.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited, see E. Martène, *de Antiquis Ecclesiae Ritibus*, Venice, 1783; artt. 'Tonsur' in *PRE*[3], and in H. J. Wetzer and B. Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*[2], Freiburg i. Br., 1882-1901.

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TONSURE (Buddhist).—There is no mention of tonsure, and no regulation as to the method to be adopted in wearing or not wearing the hair, in the 227 original rules of the Buddhist order of mendicants. But in the *Khandhakas*, or collection of subsidiary and supplemental rules, completed at the end of the first century after the Buddha's death, we find the following paragraphs:

1. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to wear long hair. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a minor breach of the regulations [*i.e.* of a *dukkaṭa*]. I allow you, O Bhikkhus, hair that is two months old, or two inches long.'
2. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to smooth the hair with a comb, or with a snake's hood [*i.e.* with an ivory instrument so shaped], or with the hand held in that shape, or with pomade, or with hair-oil.' . . .
3. 'I allow you, O Bhikkhus, the use of razors, of a hone to sharpen the razors on, of powder prepared with Sipāṭika-gum to prevent them rusting, of a sheath to hold them in, and of all the apparatus of a barber.' . . .
4. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have the hair of your heads or on your face cut by barbers, nor to let it grow long.' . . .
5. 'You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have your hair cut off with a knife.'[6]

We should not draw, from the fact of these paragraphs being found among the subsidiary rules, any conclusion that they belong to a later time than the original rules. The subsidiary rules refer quite often to what were evidently older customs in the order, and only legalize and give authority to practices already followed, though not mentioned in the older rules. But we should notice in the first place that there is no mention of scissors. The reason of this is curious; scissors had not then been invented. This is confirmed by an exception to rule 5 above. If a *bhikkhu* had a sore on the head, and the hair round it could not be removed by a razor, then a knife might be used.[7] In this case no doubt, if scissors had been

[1] And also as a mark of servitude to God, since Roman and Greek slaves had their heads shaven.
[2] Bede, *HE* iv. 1.
[3] Greg. *Vitæ Patrum*, xvii.; Joannes Diac. *S. Gregorii Magni Vita*, in *PL* lxxv. 230.
[4] Adamnan, *Life of St. Columba*, ed. W. Reeves ('Historians of Scotland'), Edinburgh, 1874, p. 237; J. H. Todd, *St. Patrick: his Life and Mission*, Dublin, 1864, p. 455; P. W. Joyce, *A Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 234; J. Rhys, *The Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom* (*HL*), London, 1888, p. 213, *Celtic Britain*[4], do. 1908, p. 73 f.
[5] L. Gougaud, *Les Chrétientés celtiques*, Paris, 1911, p. 198, quoting *MS Cotton, Otho E*, xii. fol. 112[b].
[6] J. Dowden, 'An Examination of Original Documents on the Question of the Form of the Celtic Tonsure,' *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, xxx. [1895-96] 325 ff.; John Smith, 'de Tonsura Clericorum,' Appendix to Bede, *HE* (*PL* xcv. 327 *f.*).
[7] *Civil and Eccles. Hist. of Scotland, A.D. 80-818* (Spalding Club Publications, xx.), Aberdeen, 1853.

[1] Reeves, *Introd.* p. cxiv; Todd, p. 487; Bede, v. 21.
[2] The tonsure here referred to was a mere segment with a half circlet of hair in front and the hair worn full behind.
[3] Bede, v. 21; Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 74; Gougaud, p. 197.
[4] A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, Oxford, 1869-78, ii. 292, 328.
[5] Bede, v. 22.
[6] *Vinaya*, ii. 107, 134, tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 69 *f.*, 138 *f.*
[7] The word *satthaka* (*Vin.* ii. 115) has been rendered 'scissors' by Sten Konow, *JPTS*, 1909, p. 55. But this cannot be right. See Buddhaghoṣa as quoted in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 90.

then known in the Ganges valley, their use would have been allowed, at least as an alternative.[1]

The members of the order, we see, were to be shaven, not only on the face, but all over the head; and the shaving had to be performed, not by a barber, but by fellow-members. Why was this the rule? Undoubtedly because this was the custom previously followed by the *religieux* belonging to the other orders that we know to have been older than the Buddha's time. It was only natural that men who had devoted themselves to the higher life, and whose main duty was the learning by heart and the repetition of texts dealing with the higher life as they conceived it, should have thought it becoming to themselves to avoid, not only the use of fashionable clothing, but also the elaborate hair-dressing then habitually used by men of the world. The medallions carved in bas-relief on the stone railings round the Bharhut tope may serve as illustrations of these turban-like arrangements, in which strips of brocaded cloth are intertwined with the hair (left long), the faces being clean shaven.[2] Though the sculptures are later in date, earlier texts confirm the general style by descriptions ambiguous without the help of such illustrations.

There is one passage in a very early text, about the same age as the five paragraphs, which confirms the suggestion that those paragraphs probably give us the earliest customs as to shaving followed in the order. That is *Dīgha*, i. 90, in the *Ambaṭṭha Suttanta*, where a Brāhman, reviling the adherents of the new movement, and in fact referring to the Buddha himself, calls them 'shavelings, sham friars, the off-scouring of our kinsman's heels.'[3] It is clear that, in the view of the compilers of this passage, the members of the order had their heads shaven. Another such passage is preserved in the popular anthology called *Dhammapada*, 264, which says: 'Not by his shaven crown is one a *samaṇa*' (a member of any order of *religieux*, a 'religious'), if he be irreligious. It should be noticed that the technical word used is not *bhikkhu* (a member of the Buddhist order), but *samaṇa*, which included non-Buddhist orders also.

In the much later legend of the Great Renunciation—it is at least about seven centuries later than the event which it purports to relate—we are told that the first act of the future Buddha after he had 'gone forth' was:

'Taking his sword in his right hand, and holding the plaited tresses of his hair, and its twisted decoration with his left, he cut them off. So his hair became two inches long, and lay close to his scalp curling from the right, and so it remained his life-long; and his beard the same.'[4]

Now the oldest representations of the Buddha that we possess—the so-called Græco-Buddhist bas-reliefs and statues—are an endeavour to reproduce the coiffure thus described. This story, therefore, as to the imperfect form of the tonsure habitually followed by the Buddha himself, must have been credited, incredible as it seems to us, at the date of those sculptures, not only in the Ganges valley, but also beyond the present frontiers of India, in the extreme north-west. In the second place, the inventors of the story ascribe to the Buddha the belief that every *religieux*—not only Buddhists, for there were none then—should have the hair cut quite short. In other words, they claim a pre-Buddhist origin for the custom followed in the Buddhist order. Perhaps the whole episode is merely invented as a popular explanation of the odd rule as to two inches in the first of the five paragraphs quoted above.

[1] *Vinaya*, ii. 134, tr. *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 139.
[2] See figs. 21 and 22 in Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, pp. 94-97.
[3] The whole episode is translated in Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 112 ff.
[4] *Jātaka-nidāna*, p. 64 (vol. i. of the *Jātaka*, ed. Fausbøll).

At the present time the *bhikkhus* in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon hold theoretically to the two-inch rule, but in practice never appear in public without the head and face clean shaven. The numerous sects of Buddhists in Tibet and Mongolia, China, and Japan have long ago forgotten, if they ever knew, the ancient rule. But we have no exact particulars as to when and where they have enacted and carried out any newer rules of their own.

LITERATURE.—*Vinaya Piṭaka*, ed. H. Oldenberg, 5 vols., London, 1879-83; T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1880-85 (*SBE* xiii., xvii., xx.); Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* ('Story of the Nations' ser.), London, 1903, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1899-1910 (*SBB* ii., iii.); *The Jātaka, with its Commentary*, ed. V. Fausbøll, tr. Rhys Davids, London, 1877-97, i.

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TONSURE (Chinese).—**1. Confucian.**—Confucianism, being a system of ethics, has no priests or monks. The tonsure is therefore unknown in it.

2. Buddhist.—(*a*) *Monks.*—The Buddhist tonsure was brought into China by monks from India. The whole head is shaved once a month or oftener. With boys brought up in monasteries, being either dedicated by their parents to a religious life or bought by the monks for that purpose, the tonsure takes place early, but with others the age is often eighteen or twenty. At the reception of a novice the liturgy directs that the introducer of the candidate shall ask the chapter assembled that the tonsure may be granted. This acceded to, the vows are taken.[1] A rite which is apparently a constant sequel of the tonsure consists of the branding of the head with from three to eighteen small circular spots.[2] A mutilation of one or more fingers is also sometimes undergone. An explanation of the Buddhist tonsure given by some of the Chinese is that it indicates the 'desire to put away . . . everything of the world, so that the monk does not claim as his own even his hair.'[3]

(*b*) *Nuns.*—Aspirants are received at the age of ten into the nunnery, and their novitiate continues till they are sixteen. During these years only the front part of the head is shaved, but all the hair is shaved when they become nuns. A woman desiring to become a nun must obtain the consent of parents, husband, or guardians.

'One of these must act as sponsor to her at the time of initiation and must hand the razor to be employed in shaving her head to the Prioress who is to perform the ceremony.'[4]

3. Taoist.—(*a*) *Monks.*—Taoist monks shave all about the crown, but the rest of the hair is allowed to grow long and is gathered together into a topknot fastened by a wooden article like the back of a tortoise.[5] In some cases all the hair is allowed to grow.[6]

(*b*) *Nuns.*—Taoist nuns do not shave their heads, but have their hair done up on the top of their heads.[7]

4. Dislike of the tonsure.—Though Buddhism has benefited largely in the past from the favour of emperors, the tonsure has often been very obnoxious to the governing classes in China, who doubtless took it as the outward sign of the celibate priesthood, which severs its connexion with the family, entirely against Chinese ideas of the paramount importance of domestic life. Memorialists inveigh strongly against it. The following are instances:

In A.D. 624, in a memorial to the emperor requesting the suppression of Buddhism, it was stated that it caused people to

[1] L. Wieger, *Buddhisme chinois*, Ho Kien Fu, 1910, i. 151.
[2] S. Couling, *Encyclopædia Sinica*, Shanghai, 1917, s.v. 'Tonsure'; *The Chinese Recorder*, Shanghai, ix. [1878] 181 ff.
[3] J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, London, 1866, ii. 241.
[4] *Woman's Work in China*, vii. [1883] 27 ff.
[5] W. Milne, in *The Chinese Repository*, xiii. [1844] 25.
[6] Doolittle, ii. 243.
[7] J. H. Gray, *China*, London, 1878, i. 104.

'shave their heads and abandon their ruler and their parents.'[1] The memorialist says again: 'Before the Western Tsin Dynasty [A.D. 256–317] reigned, the ruling dynasties enacted stringent laws by which the people of the Middle Kingdom were prevented from shaving the head at pleasure.'[2]

In A.D. 995 an edict threatened severe punishment to those who were 'shaved surreptitiously' without first obtaining permission of their district prefect to become monks or nuns.[3]

In A.D. 1408 it was decreed that, 'if any person surreptitiously took the tonsure to become a monk,' he should be punished with a term of hard labour, and after that become a husbandman.[4]

The determination of the Chinese Government to keep the tonsure as well as the age of receiving it under their control is seen in other enactments. Taoists are also mentioned in some of these cases.[5] Eight blows was the punishment under the Manchu dynasty to Buddhist or Taoist who in the one case took the tonsure and in the other did up his hair on his own account.[6] At the same time monks were not allowed to go about without the tonsure, and pupils adopted by the Buddhist clergy had to be tonsured. Those in monasteries without the tonsure had to return to secular life, being neither monks nor laymen.[7] This was the case also in A.D. 1458 for those who had been tonsured after twenty, but the culprits were to be banished for life;[8] and in A.D. 1537 it was decreed that not only those who privately shaved their heads, but also their parents, neighbours, and helpers,[9] were to be punished.

5. Ridicule of the tonsure.—The tonsure of the Buddhist lends itself to the derision of the Chinese, who are very susceptible to anything that opens a way to mockery or banter. One term applied to the Buddhist monk is 'bald-headed ass,' another is 'bald-headed thief.'[10] As a further example of the way in which the shorn and shaven priest is despised may be instanced the curious custom of shaving the head of a young boy in order that the evil spirits may think that he is of no consequence—in fact worthless to the parents—and thus pass him by uninjured. The boy is then called 'Buddhist priest.' The present writer saw an instance of this in the case of a neighbour's son in Canton.[11]

6. The Manchu tonsure.—A species of tonsure was practised by every male except monks in China under the Manchu rule of the country. The hair is now allowed to grow, instead of the greater part of it being shaved off.

7. Tonsure of children.—Young children's heads are also shaved to a large extent. The first shaving of an infant's head, when a month old, often has a religious character, being done before an idol or the ancestral tablets.[12]

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the footnotes.

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TONSURE (Hindu).—*Chūḍā*, 'tonsure,' is the name of an ancient rite in India, also called *chūḍākaraṇam* or *chūḍākarma*, *chaulam*, which is performed on boys, sometimes on girls also, and derives its name from the tuft of hair left on the top of the boy's head (*chūḍā*). According to the ancient rule, this rite is to be performed when the boy is three years old, or, in the lower castes, in his fifth or seventh year. The boy is dressed in new clothes, and placed on his mother's lap. A barber cuts his hair with a razor, while sacred verses from the Veda are recited. The hair is thrown on a heap of cow-dung, and afterwards dug into the ground (see Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, Strassburg, 1897). It is interesting to note that this rite, as pointed out in Gerini's monograph on the tonsure rite in Siam, has spread into Siam, together with other Brāhmanical institutions. In India it has been invested with some legal importance, the Sanskrit lawbooks stating that a boy on whom the ceremony of tonsure has been performed in the family of his birth is no longer capable of being affiliated to another person (see Jolly, *Tagore Law Lectures*, Calcutta, 1885). The tonsure rite is carefully kept by many castes of the present day, though the time of its performance varies. Thus the Kanoj Brāhmans of Poona perform the rite when a boy is from six months to two years old; the Lingayats, after a year; the Vanis, at any time from six months to five years. Sometimes the child is taken to the village temple for the ceremony, or after its performance (see the *Bombay Gazetteer*, *passim*; Rai Bahadur L. B. Nath, *Hinduism*, Meerut, 1899). The tonsure rite is supposed to belong to the common heirloom of Indo-European nations, because similar rites and superstitions occur in the Avesta of the Zoroastrians, and, particularly, among some Slavic nations, such as the Servians and Bohemians.

LITERATURE.—J. Kirste, 'Indogermanische Gebräuche beim Haarschneiden,' *Analecta Graeciensia*, Graz, 1893; Potanski, *Die Ceremonie der Haarschur bei den Slaven und Germanen*, Cracow, 1896.

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TOPHET.—Although the OT references to Tophet, the scene of the Moloch sacrifices in the Valley of Hinnom, leave no doubt as to its great importance in the popular religion of Judah in the period before the reformation under Josiah, the place itself is mentioned only in the following places: 2 K 23[10], Is 30[33], Jer 7[31f.] 19[6. 11. 12-13]. The similar word in Job 17[6] is clearly not to be understood in this connexion. The original pronunciation of the word, which is transliterated in the LXX Τάφεθ or Θαφέθ, is unknown, the Masoretic pronunciation in this case, as in others, being due to the substitution of the vowels of בֹּשֶׁת, 'shame.' Moreover, the etymology of the word is quite uncertain, and it cannot be determined whether the final *t* is radical or is merely the feminine ending. In Is 30[33] indeed the form is תָּפְתָּה, which, if the text could be trusted, would be evidence of the former alternative, unless the word should be understood as having a double feminine ending such as שִׁנְאָה (Ps 3[3]). But against this supposition is the fact that the word is construed as masculine in its immediate context. In any case, since, with the exception of Is 30[33], it always has the definite article or is capable of being so pointed, it is evident that it is not strictly a proper name. We may reasonably infer that there were several *tophets*, although we know only of the one which was situated in the Valley of Hinnom.

Robertson Smith,[1] arguing from the fact that 'at the time when the word תפת first appears in Hebrew, the chief foreign influence in Judæan religion was that of Damascus (2 K 16),' sought to connect the word with the Aramaic *tfaya*, which means a 'stand or tripod set upon a fire . . . of which we might, according to known analogies, have a variant *tfāth*. The corresponding Hebrew word is אִשְׁפָּת (for *shfāth*), which means an ashpit or dunghill, but primarily must have denoted the fireplace.' But this explanation of the word by an Aramaic etymology takes for granted that the cult practised at the *tophet*, or at any rate the precise ritual of the cult, was a comparatively new-fangled thing in the 7th cent. B.C., and there are grave difficulties in such an assumption. Even if Ahaz did bring from Damascus a new contrivance for burning the children's bodies, why should it have kept in Hebrew its Aramaic name, when the Hebrew language itself possessed the same word with the ordinary dialectic difference? When the same king introduced in Jerusalem the innova-

[1] J. J. M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, Amsterdam, 1903, p. 37.
[2] *Ib.* p. 39. [3] *Ib.* p. 73 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 83.
[5] *Ib.* pp. 97, 114. [6] *Ib.* p. 100; also see p. 80.
[7] *Ib.* p. 114. [8] *Ib.* p. 85. [9] *Ib.* p. 88.
[10] E. J. Dukes, *Every-day Life in China*, London, 1885, p. 183, and see also Chinese-English dictionaries.
[11] Also see Gray, i. 112, note 1.
[12] Doolittle, i. 122 f.

[1] *The Religion of the Semites*², p. 377.

tion of a great stone altar, it was called by the Hebrew word for 'altar,' not the Aramaic. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that such a practice as the sacrifice of the first-born should have been suddenly introduced into Jerusalem as late as the 8th cent. B.C. When it is considered how hard debased superstitions have died in our own country—if indeed they are dead—we can understand the survival or even the recrudescence in Palestine of aboriginal superstitions, but not the adoption of so terrible a rite as human sacrifice by a people who had reached an altogether higher level of religion. The OT is unintelligible unless it is recognized that the population of Palestine in the days of the kings of Judah and Israel was not so homogeneous as later writers imagined it to have been, and that the true-born Israelites were in a minority. In a fusion of races there is, no doubt, a tendency for the higher to be drawn down to the level of the lower. When a man of fairly good intelligence, but not possessed of any strong religious convictions, marries a thoroughly superstitious woman, it is the wife's superstition rather than the husband's intellect that will be the dominant factor in the household. And that the sacrifice of the first-born was a deeply-rooted Canaanite cult is proved not only by the excavations at Gezer,[1] but also by more than one passage in the OT. It is most significant that the E document of the Pentateuch represents God as commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Gn 22^{2}), and that the same document in its legislation (Ex $22^{29f.}$) puts the first-born of men and cattle on exactly the same level, not requiring the redemption of the former as is ordered in Ex 34^{20} (J). And that a law allowing, if not requiring, the sacrifice of the first-born was at one time issued in Jahweh's name is evident not only from Ezk $20^{25f.}$, but also from Jeremiah's protest (7^{21}; cf. 19^{5}) that Jahweh had never commanded or contemplated any such cult. Although Ahaz is the first king of Judah of whom it is definitely stated that he sacrificed his first-born, it would be unsafe to conclude that he was the first who actually did so; for what had been done by earlier kings unheeded may well have called forth a vehement protest in the days of Isaiah. Certainly, if the stories of David recorded in the books of Samuel are based on a sound tradition, and are not merely what later prophets of the non-reforming party thought David must have done, there would be no difficulty in supposing that even David had presided over the Moloch cult at the *tophet* in the Valley of Hinnom. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, as the story of the Rechabites proves, certain strata of the population remained till a late period aloof from and uncontaminated by the Canaanite elements, and it is doubtless these non-Canaanite elements that we ought to credit with the attempts made from time to time to abolish the worst of the pre-Israelite superstitions which threatened to swamp the religion of Jahweh. There is no reason to question the statements in the book of Kings that reforms were attempted in the days of Asa and of Jehoshaphat.

While it is not improbable that the method of burning the bodies at the *tophet* in the Valley of Hinnom was the same as that adopted elsewhere,[1] it is by no means clear that either the cult itself or its ritual came from Damascus. It must not be overlooked that the *tophet*, or at any rate the place of the *tophet*, is called in Jer 19^{5} 32^{35} 'the high places of the Baal.' The point of Jer 7^{32} is that in the massacres which may be expected corpses not slain in sacrifice will be buried at the *tophet*—proof of the impotence of the *tophet* sacrifices to avert the divine wrath.

Robertson Smith, in discussing the meaning of Is 30^{33}, writes as follows:

'It appears that Tophet means a pyre, such as is prepared for a king. But the Hebrews themselves did not burn their dead, unless in very exceptional cases, and burial was equally the rule among their Phœnician neighbours, as is plain from researches in their cemeteries, and apparently among all the Semites. Thus, when the prophet describes the deep and wide pyre "prepared for the king," he does not draw his figure from ordinary life, nor is it conceivable that he is thinking of the human sacrifices in the valley of Hinnom, a reference which would bring an utterly discordant strain into the imagery. What he does refer to is a rite well known to Semitic religion, which was practised at Tarsus down to the time of Dio Chrysostom, and the memory of which survives in the Greek legend of Heracles-Melcarth, in the story of Sardanapalus, and in the myth of Queen Dido.'[2]

But surely at a time when sacrifices were being offered to Moloch, *i.e.* the king, at the *tophet*, a statement that a *tophet* has been prepared for a king must have suggested the ritual of the Valley of Hinnom; the prophet declares with grim Hebrew irony that a *tophet* has indeed been prepared for a king, only in this case the king will be the victim and not the recipient of the sacrifice.

How long *tophets* remained in Palestine it is impossible to say. It is asserted (2 K 23^{10}) that the one in the Valley of Hinnom was defiled by Josiah; but this statement occurs in a passage which appears to be secondary, and, even if Josiah tried to put a stop to the cult, there may have been a recrudescence of it after his death; and beyond the limits of his diminutive kingdom it probably continued considerably later. It is difficult to see why Jeremiah should have published his denunciation of the *tophet* in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, if it had been abolished once for all in the eighteenth year of Josiah. And if, as seems probable, Deuteronomy is to be dated in the 6th cent. B.C., it is evident that as late as that time it was still necessary, at least in some parts of Palestine, to protest against the sacrifice of children (Dt 18^{10}). Moreover, the prophecy in Is 30, though based on a genuine utterance of Isaiah, bears many evidences of having been modified at a later date, and, if Asshur here, as in $11^{11.16}$ and $19^{23f.}$ (cf. Ezr 6^{22}), means the Seleucid empire, the king referred to in the present form of the passage may be Antiochus Epiphanes. It is certainly not impossible that in some outlying districts of Palestine, such as Ammon, Moab, or Edom, the cult associated with the *tophets* held its own down to the 2nd cent. B.C.

LITERATURE.—S. D. F. Salmond, art. 'Tophet, Topheth,' in *HDB*; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894.

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TÔRĀH.—See LAW.

TORCH (Greek and Roman).—In common with other races, the Greeks and Romans held many festivals at night, when torchlight was a practical

[1] That the skeletons found at Gezer belonged to children who had been sacrificed appears more natural than the explanation adopted by J. G. Frazer (*GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 108 f.), nor is the greater age of some of the children whose skeletons were found in Tell Ta'annek conclusive proof to the contrary. It is evident that the redemption of the first-born must have been a not uncommon custom before it was required by law (Ex 34). Parents would endeavour to save their children by substituting some other victim, and, if all went well afterwards, would assume that the god had been satisfied. In time of great distress, however, it would be imagined that the god had not been contented with the substitute and demanded his real due. See art. REDEMPTION.

[1] 'The human holocaust is not burned on an altar, but on a pyre or fire-pit constructed for the occasion. This appears both in the myths of Dido and Heracles and in actual usage. At Tarsus a very fair pyre is erected yearly for the burning of Heracles; in the Carthaginian sacrifice of boys the victims fall into a pit of flame, and in the Harranian ox-sacrifice the victim is fastened to a grating placed over a vault filled with burning fuel: finally, Isaiah's Tophet is a broad and deep excavation filled with wood exactly like the fiery trench in which, according to Arabic tradition, the victims of 'Amr b. Hind and the martyrs of Nejrân found their end' (Robertson Smith[2], p. 376 f.).

[2] P. 372 f.

necessity, and need have no particular religious significance. But the torch was also important in various ceremonies where its presence was not merely utilitarian; and in many cases where it may have been originally used for merely practical purposes it acquired a sacred or symbolic meaning. In agricultural festivals, *e.g.*, the use of fire is a well-known rite, although its precise significance may be doubted. Mannhardt and Frazer have collected a large number of customs which illustrate fire-ritual as a means of promoting the growth of crops and animals.[1] The underlying idea may sometimes be a belief that earthly fire represents the sun; and torches, carried over the fields, may be the means, by sympathetic magic, of 'making sunshine.' It is more probable, however, that the fertility which the use of fire is believed to cause is to be explained by its purifying power.

In Greek myth and ritual the torch is specially connected with Demeter. According to the Homeric hymn, the goddess, after the rape of Persephone, rushed wildly in search of her daughter with lighted torches in her hands. The hymn deals with the Eleusinian mysteries, and it is probable that the actual rites observed by the initiated were attributed to the example of the goddess. The Eleusinia[2] included a 'torch-day' (*lampadum dies*), when the μύσται roamed along the shore with torches. They supposed themselves to be imitating the wanderings of Demeter; but the original meaning of the rite was doubtless to purify the land and ward off pestilence from the crops. In the same way the early Eleusinians seem to have purified their children by making them pass over the fire, as the myth of Demophon, in the same hymn, appears to indicate.[3] The most solemn ceremonies at Eleusis took place at night, when the hall of the mysteries (μυστικὸς δόμος) was lit by torches. One of the chief officials was called the 'torch-bearer' (δᾳδοῦχος), and a priest bearing the same title took part in another festival (the Lenæa), and assisted at a rite of purification or atonement of sin.[4] Juvenal[5] speaks of the torch as the special emblem of the Eleusinian priest.

The torch is an attribute of various Greek deities besides Demeter. Persephone has the same emblem as her mother. In literature and art we find the torch regularly associated with Hecate, perhaps as a moon-goddess.[6] Artemis is also commonly represented with a torch in literature[7] and in art from the 4th cent. B.C. Here the torch may be the symbol of a moon-goddess; but Farnell,[8] who holds that Artemis was originally an earth-goddess, thinks that it belongs to her as a deity of vegetation. The torches which in art are a frequent attribute of the Mænads are perhaps best explained by reference to their nocturnal festivals. Finally, Ares sometimes carries a torch, an appropriate emblem for the god of war.[9]

In Greek custom the most conspicuous example of the use of torches is in the torch-race (λαμπαδηφορία, λαμπαδηδρομία, or, most often, simply λαμπάς). This competition is best known as Athenian; but it is also recorded for other Greek states, and Alexander included it in most of the festivals which he established in various cities. In Athens the torch-race was a feature of various festivals, in honour of Prometheus, Athene (in the Panathenæa), Hephæstus, Pan, Bendis, Hermes, and Theseus. It was even held in the festival of the dead (ἐπιτάφια). The date of its institution is unknown, but it was first held in honour of Prometheus, the fire-bringer, at whose altar the competitors lit their torches. As regards the festival of Pan, we know that the race was instituted after the battle of Marathon. At the Bendidea it was run on horseback, and was a novelty in the time of Socrates; elsewhere the race was on foot. The competitors were apparently chosen from the several Attic tribes. The torch was passed from one member of a team to another, at fixed intervals along the course, and the victory rested with the team whose lighted torch first reached the goal—an altar on which fire was kindled with the torch. This procedure gave rise to the famous simile of Lucretius ('et, quasi cursores, vitaï lampada tradunt'), the idea of which is found in Plato.[1] An equally famous line in Æschylus[2] also refers to the race, although the exact point is doubtful.

Æschylus might possibly have meant that all the runners in the winning team have an equal share in the victory, the last no less than the first; but more probably he refers to the fact that the winning torch was handed in by the last to receive it. This man would be first in relation to the rival teams, but last in relation to his own.

The Greeks themselves explained the torch-race as a commemoration of the gift of fire by Prometheus;[3] but the original motive must have been something more than a mere commemoration. The essential feature seems to lie in the transference of fire from one altar to another at the greatest possible speed. It is probable, therefore, that the underlying idea is the need of carrying fire from a pure source to take the place of a polluted fire. At Athens all fires were extinguished before the race began (at least in the Promethea), and were rekindled from the new fire. A belief in the pollution of fire is shown in the Argive custom of extinguishing fire after a death, and rekindling it from another source ὡς μεμιασμένον.[4] Similarly the fires at Platæa were defiled by the presence of barbarians, and new fire was brought from the sacred hearth of Delphi. The attraction of such a rite to the cults of Prometheus and Hephæstus needs no explanation. Athene, too, might well have adopted a torch-race, as being the patron of handicrafts and metal-working, for which fire was a necessity; but more probably she claimed the torch-race as the supreme head of the city. The race seems less appropriate to the other gods, with the possible exception of Pan. The theory that he was a sun-god cannot be accepted; but fire certainly played a part in his ritual, and an ever-burning lamp was maintained in his cave under the Acropolis. Most probably, however, the Athenians instituted the race in his honour to commemorate his appearance to the runner Phidippides after the battle of Marathon. Once established, the race became popular, and was attached to other festivals without any special religious fitness.

The Romans had no torch-race, and the torch was less prominent in their ritual than in Greek religion. But the same ideas can be traced in Italy as appear in Greek fire-rites, although it is not always possible to distinguish the indigenous from the borrowed element; *e.g.*, the festival of Diana at Aricia (Nemi) no doubt belongs to a primitive Italian stratum, but it is impossible to say how far Greek influence may have modified its

[1] W. Mannhardt, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme*, Berlin, 1875, p. 497 f.; J. G. Frazer, *GB*², London, 1900, iii. 313, and *GB*³, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, do. 1913, vol. i. ch. v.

[2] See art. MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), § 1 (a).

[3] See E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Freiburg i. Br., 1894, p. 29; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 365 f.; T. W. Allen and E. E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns*, do. 1904, p. 9 f.

[4] Suidas, p. 1404: Διὸς κῴδιον; L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896-1909, iii. 161 f.

[5] xv. 140.

[6] Roscher, p. 1888 f.; but see also *CGS* ii. 509 f.

[7] First in Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 206.

[8] *CGS* iii. 459.

[9] Cf. Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 27.

[1] Lucr. ii. 78; Plato, *Laws*, vi. 776.

[2] *Agam.* 314: νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.

[3] Hyginus, *Astron.* ii. 15; *Anth. Pal.* vi. 100.

[4] Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 24.

details. In this festival women whose prayers before child-birth the goddess favourably heard bore lighted torches to her shrine. It is difficult to say whether this custom is a survival of a purificatory rite (Diana representing a forest deity or the goddess of agriculture) or whether the torch is only a symbol of the moon-goddess, who was the natural patron of women in child-birth.

In Greek and Roman private life the torch was an important feature in marriage, as the bridal procession took place at night or towards evening. As early as Homer[1] there is mention of this torch-light procession. It was the duty of the bride's mother to light the nuptial torch.[2] In Italy the bride was also escorted to her new home by torch-light, under the protection of Juno Domiduca or Iterduca. Hence the god of love, both in Greece and in Rome, is often represented with a torch—an idea no doubt assisted by the common conception of love as a 'fire.'

The torch had also funereal associations to the Romans, being used to light the pile on which the corpse was burned. Those who applied the torch averted their faces.[3] The 'two torches' (of marriage and death) are mentioned by Propertius[4] and Ovid.[5]

LITERATURE.—The λαμπαδηφορία has been frequently discussed—*e.g.*, by A. Mommsen, *Heortologie*, Leipzig, 1864, p. 282; P. Foucart, in *Revue de Phil.* xxiii. [1899] 112; N. Wecklein, in *Hermes*, vii. [1872] 437; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Lampadédromia'; J. R. S. Sterret, in *AJPh* xxii. [1901] 393.

E. E. SIKES.

TORRES STRAITS.—See NEW GUINEA.

TORT.—See DELICT.

TORTOISE.—See ANIMALS.

TORTURE.—*Quæstio*, said Baldus de Periglis, an interpreter of that word of dire significance in Roman law, 'is a certain kind of inquisition made for the purpose of tearing out the truth ('eruendae veritatis') by torments and bodily pain.' Few institutions have more signally failed even to afford rational excuse for their evil existence as a method of extracting evidence. Starting from a deep instinct of violence, it consistently made manifest its inherent viciousness, which no fundamentally good intention could redeem and no humane afterthought of qualification and exception could withhold from pernicious and cruel consequences. Unlike the ordeal (*q.v.*), which was in some measure an appeal to a fairly equal chance, torture was without even the negative virtue of offering a percentage of probabilities of right and truth in its results. It is difficult to think of any principle which could make it really assist in evoking truth from reluctant witnesses or reliable confession from accused persons. The one point of affinity to ordeal was the resort to torture when there was a deficiency of direct legal evidence. Its basis in injustice is shown not only in its penalizing the innocent and unconvicted, but in the fact that its applicability was long confined in both Greece and Rome to slaves—significant of its palpable unfitness for freemen. It never was universal, though in ancient use among Assyrians, Egyptians, Medes, and Japanese; it does not appear in the early laws of Chinese, Hindus, or Jews. There is no mention of it in the OT record. The metaphoric heaping of coals of fire on the head probably refers to torture, as appears from a Muhammadan penalty of a live coal laid on a lascivious palm. From a remote age torture prevailed in Greece for slaves, and, although freemen were generally exempt, the exemption was overborne in cases of conspiracy and murder. Slaves in Athens were subject to torture in causes civil as well as criminal. At times the actions were determined by balancing the testimonies of the slaves of the opposing litigants put under the pressure of the wheel, the ladder, the rack, or the burning tile. Grecian practice has not transmitted any code; that was reserved for Roman law, which unfortunately hardened into permanence the crude tradition of force which it shared with Greece.

In this exposition we are not dealing with torture as a method of punishment, to which some speculations give an earlier place than belongs to the torture of witnesses or accused persons. It is as a process for obtaining testimony or confession, chiefly in causes criminal, that torture has historically played its most unreasoned and baneful part. In the Roman Republic it had wide currency in spite of sharply defined restrictions which instructively exhibit the efforts, too tardily made and not thoroughgoing enough, to modify and restrain an institution for which abolition was the only remedy. And yet credit must be given to the insight and humanity of some of the distinctions made. The exemption of freemen gave way under imperial impulses when lese-majesty was imputed. The general safeguard that there must be vehement presumptions of guilt before resort to the torture was clear enough in theory, but was widely ignored in practice. Most curious fact of all perhaps is the frankness of the authorities grouped in the *Digest* on the primary desirability of doing without torture, on the frailty and peril of the method as an engine for ascertaining facts, on the delusive character of confessions induced by modes which were tests not of truthfulness but of physical endurance, and on the danger to third parties from the allegations wrung from men willing to say anything to save themselves. Evidence of slaves under torture was declared inadmissible against their masters, but there were exceptions of some intricacy. The apostle Paul (Ac $22^{24ff.}$) pleaded with success his right as a Roman freeman as a protection from examination under the scourge. Mainly used only in causes criminal, the institution made good its footing in some civil causes also. Exemptions of minors, patricians, priests, and pregnant women were inapplicable when charges of treason were made. The direction of Antoninus Pius that torture was not to be used to secure betrayal of alleged accomplices was as wise as it was humane, but the very object of getting at other culprits came ultimately to be a main occasion of its employment. The provisions of the *Digest*[1] and the *Code*[2] systematize several contradictory doctrines 'de quaestionibus' illustrative of a considerable development. The emperors were not long in discovering what Dante was to illustrate by extreme examples, that treason was the worst of crimes. This was the creed too of Anglo-Saxon as well as of later feudal criminal law, and it encouraged violent processes of detection. In Rome the kind of torture with widest currency was that of the *equuleus*, or rack, which passed on as perhaps the worst legacy of Roman law to mediæval Europe.

The abolition of the barbarian ordeal by the Lateran Council of 1215 left a vacuum which was partly filled by a still worse expedient—the Roman method of 'tearing out the truth.' Under the Salic law ordeal and torture had co-existed, but the latter for slaves only, the provisions obviously echoing Roman practice. The Ripuarian code apparently countenanced ordeal alone. The renaissance of Roman law explains the return of torture after some measure of abeyance. In

[1] *Il.* xviii. 492.
[2] Eur. *Iph. in Aul.* 732, *Phœn.* 344, *Med.* 1027.
[3] Virg. *Æn.* vi. 224. [4] iv. (v.) 11, 46. [5] *Her.* xxi. 172.

[1] xlviii. 18. [2] ix. 41.

France and Italy it seems to have re-established itself during the 13th century. Continental charters cited by Du Cange[1] gave exemption from torture. Its French name, *gehenne*, was fit enough. There were many modes—the *brodequin*, the *estrapade*, the *chevalet*—all used in the *question préparatoire*, preliminarily in the trial, and in the definitive *question préalable* after conviction to disclose accomplices. In England, though without place in the common law, it was practised as an abuse notably in the anarchy under King Stephen and in King John's processes of extracting treasure from the Jews. The *peine forte et dure*, however, or torture by pressure of weights to compel a prisoner to put himself 'upon the country' or verdict of a jury, appears about 1300. Under Edward II. in 1311 papal inquisitors in the trial of the Templars applied torture admittedly never legally countenanced in England before. Though long without regular sanction in the courts for crime, the practice of torture crept in with what may be called council government under the Tudors. As always, secret courts favoured secret methods, and torture loved the darkness. With Shakespeare and other Elizabethan dramatists 'rack' and 'strappado' were household words. Coke might excommunicate the institution from the common law, but Coke and Bacon alike countenanced it in practice when the scent of treason was strong.

In Scotland the law and practice appear to have nearly paralleled the state of things in England. Isolated examples of torture, such as that given by way of punishment to the murderer of James I., may have been preceded, as one annalist asserts, by judicial torture at his trial. So late as 1542 the point of law was established that a confession procured by torture was null. George Buchanan, in spite of the risks that he himself had run from the Inquisition, recognizes without censure the obtaining of proofs by torture. The deplorable inhumanities resulting from the witchcraft craze, nurtured in Scotland by the sapience of the demonologist James VI., and absolutely paralleled by the like frenzy in England and France, were a distressing combination of the mischiefs of torture with a recrudescence of the ordeal. The victims were often old, miserable, and insane; the pitiful and pitiless mania, however, was not merely a British but equally a European crime; its creed on the Continent was of one context with that in Britain; everywhere the witch-finders used the same methods of pain. It was the last stage of a sort of common law of torture, although the variety of local usage shows a wide range of divergence in detail. In the Covenant time a last outburst of persecuting zeal revived the decadent engine of violence. A dubious tradition traces the thumbikins in Scotland to a Russian origin.[2] Museums of torture such as those of Nuremberg, The Hague, and the Tower of London—competitions in horror as they are—unite in a kind of commonplace of malignancy. Authorities on torture in like manner dwell with the same tedious insistence on the *indicia*, or preliminary evidences needed to justify torture, and on the conditions of its infliction. The *Summa Angelica*, a great cyclopedia of instruction to confessors, enjoins the interrogation to judges in confession whether they had put people to torture without sufficient *indicia*, which was very rightly classified as a deadly sin. Now and again a tractate of law and practice of torture, such as that of Paulus Grillandus, breaks away from its companions in the great folio vol. xi. of Zilettus (1584) by its superior realism. Grillandus distinguishes with grim precision the five degrees of torture: now a mere threat, now a suspension on the rack for the space only of an Ave Maria or a Paternoster, now a graver suspension for the space of a Miserere, now for a period which might reach into hours, and, last degree of all, where the victim's limbs, weighted down, were jerked and twisted till the agony was greater than the amputation of the hand. It is marvellous how men endured such torments, but that they did so is attested by occasional observations by the judges or assessors of court who wrote the treatises. Grillandus, *e.g.*, drawing upon his experience at Pisa and at Rome, registers the wonderful case of a most cunning thief whose absolute impassiveness was ascribed to certain words that he whispered when the torture was applied until a slip of paper was found bearing as a charm the Scriptural text (well known for its use in amulets) 'Jesus autem transiens.' Finally, however, with the charm removed altogether, this stout malefactor defied the torture again by his whispered invocation so that it was necessary to abandon the torture. And still greater cases, the commentator concludes, were seen at Milan and Rome when certain words touching the milk of the Virgin enabled the victim to go through the torment as if he slept. This particular variety of charm was reported to be no less effective as a counter-charm, but Grillandus shows no faith in its potency as an aid to the prosecutor.

An unfortunate feature of torture was its adoption by the inquisitorial courts of the Church for the investigation of charges of blasphemy, heresy, and the like. Was persecution not, like the Inquisition itself, a confusion of a secular with a sacred function, in which the analogy of treason to an earthly potentate carried priests of religion to extremes not compatible with the conception of a majesty which, though wounded, was divine? Whatever of error lurked in the concept itself, the tribunal which was its executive of vindication added to the wrong in principle by a series of false directions of the practice in prosecution. It surely was a blunder worse than a crime to adopt methods which doubly branded with public odium courts which were designed by processes of barbarism to repress the freedom of the human mind. The fact that already by the middle of the 13th cent. papal dispensations to churchmen were needed for irregularities in the use of torture casts a lurid light on the procedure. No safeguard of institutions is so sound as publicity—the liberty of moderate criticism, the freedom of defence, and the avoidance of the abuses which wait upon invisible dungeons and courts. Secrecy inevitably means tyranny and obscurantism. The refusal of counsel for the accused was a fundamental and far-reaching error in a 'court of inquisition into heretical depravity,' which by its very object tended to unite the zeal and interest of both prosecutor and judge against the heretic. The double sanction of royal and ecclesiastical authority sometimes enabled the machinery against heresy to be used for political rather than spiritual ends. The most notorious persecution of the 16th cent. was in the Netherlands, and torture was the keynote of its procedure. The Renaissance had not wholly escaped the persecutions which rose to their evil eminence during the transition period in which the swaying boundary-line came to a stand between Lutheran reform and Roman orthodoxy. In 1532 the Constitutions of Charles V. codified for Germany a system which incorporated torture among the fundamentals of procedure. His establishment of the Inquisition in 1550 inaugurated a period of atrocities perhaps worse than any other in human history. Philip II. of Spain found in the Duke of Alva a spirit of

[1] *Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis*, new ed., Niort, 1883-87, vi., *s.v.* 'Quæstio.'

[2] Maclaurin, *Arguments and Decisions*, preface, p. xxxvii.

merciless executive in the Netherlands, scarcely less jealous of public liberty than of private creeds, and Alva's *horrenda gloria* of death penalties earned for him not only his downfall but also the execration ever since attached to his name. Out of that fierce time aptly came its strange definitive and callous expression in a contemporary book, the *Praxis Rerum Criminalium* of Josse de Damhoudère, a councillor under both Charles and Philip in the Netherlands, published in French and Latin in 1554 and repeatedly afterwards, remarkable among other things for its matter-of-course attitude to torture, which makes only too intelligible the excesses of practice under the most illustrious and excellent Alva, whose honour and sagacity a preface in some editions incidentally extols. Woodcuts queerly illustrate the varieties of crime, while seven whole chapters on torture make transparent the vices of a system the radical barbarity of which, despite its antiquity of sanction expounded by generations of civilian glossators and jurists, all its touches of humanity—and there were some—were hopeless to redeem. Damhoudère harrows the modern soul perhaps most by his passionless exposition as of a principle doubtless imperfect, yet itself of the nature of things. Leading modes indicated are by the rope (*i.e.* the rack), by water forced through the mouth, by oil internally administered, by burning pitch or lime, by hunger, cold, or the thumbscrew, by mice or parasites that gnawed the flesh, or by fire intensified by basting the body with oil—these were only a few of at least fourteen species of torments. What wonder that Damhoudère after this enumeration should consider that torture often could most happily (*felicissime*) be applied by scourging alone? Two pictures complete the impression, one showing a victim girt and twisted with ropes and swung stretched out with weights at his feet, the other an idyllic group of the doctors, knights, priests, old men, children, and prospective mothers, who were benignly excusable from torture.

It was a law from which no conceivable evolution could eliminate the initial anomalies (1) of punishing an accused by torture before he was found guilty or a witness before he was proved a perjurer; or (2) of torturing an accused after conviction when torture was no part of the sentence, and when the judge's function was ended and the process was no part of the trial. These were dilemmas from which no escape was ever devised, and they gave effectual leverage to criticism when—late in the day, it must be owned—the opposition developed energy enough to make abolition of torture a direct object of humane propaganda. Illustrious opinions against torture were many; those in its favour were perhaps less illustrious. Augustine, Ulpian, Quintilian, and Montaigne could be cited on one side, and Demosthenes, Aristotle, Bodin, and Pothier on the other. But the lawyers were indifferent, and their neutrality and acquiescence gave the practice a long lease of life. Roman tradition persisted little shaken in Europe till Beccaria and Voltaire threw a new intensity into attack on abuses, and the objection to torture passed from being a mere dissent into a positive and earnest movement to repeal what was at once a futility and a cruel injustice. From the middle of the 18th cent. until the beginning of the 19th the Continental countries by degrees followed the example of repeal set by Great Britain. Torture had died out in England by the middle of the 17th cent.; it was abolished for Scotland by statute in 1708. Its extinction on the Continent has been assigned in Prussia to 1740, in Portugal to 1776, in Sweden to 1786, in France to 1789, in Russia to 1801. But in the last-named country it is said that so late as 1906-07 political prisoners underwent grievous treatment in a 'museum of torture' comprising brutalities in which 'scorching of the feet at the fire' was among the least revolting. In the Far East the persistence of the evil has been still greater. In China the usage has long held, and presumably still holds, place as a fundamental law. But in Japan it was abolished in 1876. Suspicion, however, obtains that in Oriental lands, despite reforms and prohibitions, illegitimate torture is still secretly carried on. One main fact in Europe is perhaps that, while the lawyers 2000 years ago already saw the fallacy and futility of torture, seventeen centuries had passed before its abolition was taken firmly in hand. The many generations of clerical jurists and judges did no better than the laymen, accepting the institution and 'passing by on the other side,' if indeed the ecclesiastical tribunals were not the worst offenders. The divorce of the judges from all legislative function has much to answer for in checking the critical initiative of amendment sometimes induced by judicial experience. Abolition at last came neither from the logic of the law nor from the impulse of the Church, but from the impassioned zeal of humanitarian philosophy.

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TOTEMISM.—1. Introductory.—The word 'totem' is derived from *ototeman*, which in the Ojibwa and cognate Algonquian dialects means 'his brother-sister kin.' Its grammatical stem *ote*, meaning the consanguine kinship between uterine brothers and sisters, the group of persons recognized as by birth or adoption collectively related together as uterine brothers and sisters who cannot intermarry, is never used alone.[1] The word was introduced into the English language by J. Long[2] in the form of *totam*. This he wrongly defined as the favourite spirit which each of the savages (Chippewa or Ojibwa) believes watches over him, adding:

1 J. N. B. Hewitt, in *HAI* ii. 787.
2 *Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, London, 1791.

'This *totam* they conceive assumes the shape of some beast or other, and therefore they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal whose form they think this *totam* bears.'[1]

The first to give an account, accurate as far as it goes, of totemism on the American continent was Peter Jones, himself an Ojibwa chief, but an ordained Wesleyan Methodist minister and missionary to his tribe. He wrote the *History of the Ojebway Indians*, published without a date in London after his death, which took place in 1856. He says:

'Their belief concerning their divisions into tribes is that many years ago the Great Spirit gave his red children their *toodaims*, or tribes, in order that they might never forget that they were all related to each other, and that in time of distress or war they were bound to help each other. When an Indian in travelling meets with a strange band of Indians, all he has to do is to seek for those bearing the same emblem as his tribe; and having made it known that he belongs to their toodaim, he is sure to be treated as a relative. Formerly it was considered unlawful for parties of the same tribe to intermarry, but of late years this custom is not observed. . . . Each tribe is distinguished by certain animals or things, as for instance the Ojebway nations have the following toodaims: the Eagle, Reindeer, Otter, Bear, Buffalo, Beaver, Catfish, Pike, Birch-bark, White Oak-tree, Bear's Liver, etc. etc. The Mohawk nation have only three divisions or tribes—the Turtle, the Bear, and the Wolf.'[2]

What Jones calls a tribe is now usually called a clan or gens, meaning a group, not necessarily localized, of persons regarded as united by a bond of kinship real or fictitious, extended beyond the family properly so called to a brotherhood bearing the same name and including strangers who have been formally adopted into it. This brotherhood or clan may, and frequently does, extend also beyond the boundaries of the local body called by Jones a nation, but now usually known as a tribe.

In the meantime Sir George Grey, then governor of S. Australia, in the account of his travels in W. Australia, drew attention to the similarity between the Australian *kobong* and the American totem, describing the *kobong* at some length and giving genealogical lists to illustrate the mode of descent.[3] A series of articles in the *Fortnightly Review*[4] on 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' by J. F. McLennan was suggested, at all events in part, by Grey's observations. It was this series of articles, with McLennan's important but erroneous speculations, which finally brought the subject of totemism before the scientific public in Britain. Among others whose attention they attracted were Lord Avebury (then Sir John Lubbock) and W. Robertson Smith. It was especially the use made of totemism by the latter in the speculations embodied in his important work, *The Religion of the Semites*, that started the controversies incessantly waged on the subject from that day to this.

2. Definition; plan of the article.—Totemism as exemplified in N. America and Australia, where it has been found in the fullest development, is a form of society distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) it is composed of clans or bands of men each united among themselves by kinship real or fictitious, a kinship frequently extending beyond the limits of the local tribe; (2) the clan is distinguished by the name of some species of animal or plant, or more rarely of some other natural phenomenon, such as the sun, rain, etc.; (3) the species or object which gives its name to the clan is conceived as related to the clan, and to every member of it, in some mystic way, often genetically; and in this case every individual specimen of the object, where it is an animal or plant, is regarded as belonging to the clan; (4) such species or object is usually the subject of a religious or quasi-religious emotion, and every individual specimen is the subject of tabus or prohibitions: subject to certain limitations, ceremonial or in self-defence, it may not be injured or killed, or (where eatable) eaten; (5) moreover, as in all societies organized on the basis of kinship, the members of the clan are entitled to mutual defence, protection, and resentment of injuries. They may not marry or have sexual intercourse within the clan.

These characteristics are general, but they vary to some extent not merely from area to area, but from tribe to tribe. After detailing a few typical examples, it will be necessary to mention others where totemism seems to be decadent, and then to consider whether it has ever prevailed among peoples where it is not now to be found, and lastly to inquire into its origin. Various influences tending to modify, submerge, or destroy it will be indicated from time to time in the course of the article.

3. Typical examples.—(*a*) *America.*—Somewhat fuller accounts than that of Peter Jones are now available concerning the totemism of the Ojibwas. They were divided into about 40 exogamous totemic clans, of which those of the Crane, Catfish, Loon, Bear, Marten, and Wolf were the principal, and the first five appear to have been the original. The other clans are said to have been formed by the segmentation of these. Nearly all the clans are named from animals of either land or water. Members of a totem-clan were held to be closely related to all other persons of the same totem, even though belonging to different tribes.[1] We have no information whether the Ojibwa clans regarded themselves as having descended from the totems whose names they bore; but the clans of some other Algonquian tribes claim such descent. Thus, among the Delawares or Lenape the Tortoise, Turkey, and Wolf clans (the three chief clans of the tribe),[2] among the Sauks the Fox, Eagle, Bear, Beaver, Fish, Antelope, and Raccoon clans,[3] among the Menomini the Bear, Golden Eagle, Wolf, and other clans,[4] and among the Ottawas the Carp clan,[5] are specified as tracing their lineage to the animals after which they are named; and in the last-mentioned tribe the Bear clan ascribed its origin to a bear's paw without explaining the precise nature of the relationship. However this may be, the Ojibwa Bear clan was held to resemble the bear, its totem, in disposition. The members were surly and pugnacious, the acknowledged war-chiefs and fighting men of the community; the war-pipe and war-club were committed to their custody. The Crane clan took its name (Bus-in-as-see, 'Echo-maker') from the loud, clear, ringing cry of the crane; members of the clan were thought to possess naturally a loud ringing voice, and they were the acknowledged orators of the tribe.[6] We are not informed whether in their personal appearance, dress, or ornaments the Ojibwa totem-clans were ordinarily in the habit of imitating the totem-animals, as some other tribes do. The Abenaki, also an Algonquian tribe, painted their totems on their arms, breasts, and legs.[7] An Ojibwa sometimes had the figure tatued on him, or carried some

[1] P. 87. [2] P. 138.
[3] *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in N.W. and W. Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 225 ff., 391.
[4] New ser., v. [1869] 407 ff., 562 ff., vi. [1870] 194 ff.

[1] J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 46 ff., citing various authorities.
[2] *Ib.* p. 40, quoting J. Heckewelder, *Trans. Hist. and Lit. Com. Amer. Phil. Soc.* i. [1819] 246 f.
[3] Mary A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, p. 8.
[4] W. J. Hoffman, *14 RBEW* [1896], pt. i. pp. 39–41, 43.
[5] Frazer, iii. 55–67, citing *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, new ed., Paris, 1781, pp. 168–172.
[6] *Ib.* p. 55, citing W. W. Warren, *Coll. Minnesota Hist. Soc.* v. [1885] 43 ff.
[7] Hoffman, p. 65 n., quoting J. A. Maurault, *Hist. des Abenakis*, Quebec, 1866, p. 23.

other token by which his totem might be known.[1] Unfortunately our reports are chiefly confined to the social aspects of the Ojibwa organization, so that we have little or no information as to the religious outlook. Religion is inextricably mingled with other aspects of savage life; hence we may be sure that it reacted upon social and political life. Among their neighbours, the Sauks or Musquakies, dances in honour of the totems were held. At these dances—a religious exercise—those who took part were covered with masks and dresses to resemble the totemic animals, so dreadful that the women were seriously frightened, and the old masks were therefore destroyed and milder ones substituted.[2] Special ceremonies were performed by the Bear clan of the Ottawas to soothe a bear when they killed it, including an offering to the dead animal of its own flesh. When a member of that clan or of the Carp clan died, he was buried, whereas by command of the totem a member of the Great Hare clan was cremated—at least, whenever he died at a distance from home.[3] Among the Menomini a member of the Bear clan who, when hunting, met a bear would apologize and ask forgiveness before killing it; and no member of the clan could eat of the meat (though members of other clans might do so) except the hunter himself, who was permitted to eat of the paws and head, the bones of the head being carefully preserved in a place of honour in the wigwam as a relic of the totem-animal to which due reverence must be paid.[4] The Ojibwa reckoned descent and kinship through the father only; but there is some evidence that they formerly reckoned through the mother only—a change possibly accelerated by white, and particularly missionary, influence. Such a change is known to have occurred elsewhere.[5]

The Iroquois, a confederacy of six tribes in what is now the state of New York, on the other hand, were matrilineal. They were organized in totemic clans, of which all of them possessed three—the Bear, Wolf, and Turtle—some of them eight. There is some reason to think that the larger numbers were derived by segmentation from the three original clans, though it is possible that, in some of the cases at all events, the number of the three clans may have been augmented by the adoption of captives from other tribes, who formed separate clans. The clans were exogamic, but in the eight-clan tribes they were formed into two phratries. The members of the clans were not allowed to marry indiscriminately into any other clan; they could marry only into a clan of the opposite phratry, the phratry thus becoming the exogamic unit in place of the clan. On the social side of Iroquoian totemism we have fairly full information. The members of a clan were united for mutual defence and the resentment of injuries; and the phratries, where the tribe was organized in phratries, had certain important functions at the death of a chief and the election of his successor.[6] On the religious aspect, however, our information is sadly deficient. There is one account by a chance traveller, in which the Iroquois were stated to believe in their descent from the turtle (or tortoise), the bear, and the wolf—their three chief totems;[7] and among their myths one has been preserved by a scientific inquirer relating how the turtle became a man and the progenitor of the Turtle clan.[1] But neither L. H. Morgan nor Horatio Hale, to whom we are indebted for nearly all that we know of the organization of the Iroquois, has told us anything concerning the intimate relations between the totem and its clan, or the aspect in which the totem was regarded by the clan, or the members by one another.

The Iroquois, however, had one custom common to a number of N. American tribes. Each clan had a stock of personal names appropriated to it only, which other clans of the same tribe were not permitted to use, so that, if a person's name was known, it was possible to say to what clan he belonged. To such a length was this custom carried by some tribes that, when the clan organization began to decay, a child could be assigned to another clan than that into which by hereditary descent he was born, by the simple process of giving him one of the personal names belonging to the latter clan—at all events if the clan recognized the child and thereby confirmed the choice.[2] The clans of some of the N. American tribes performed ceremonies for the control of their totems for the common good of the tribe. This was the practice, *e.g.*, among the Omaha.[3] But its utmost development is found in the southwest of the United States among the various tribes of Pueblo Indians.[4]

(*b*) *Australia.*—In Australia totemism has been crossed, and among some tribes superseded, for exogamic purposes by a system of marriage-classes.[5] The consequent variation in the social arrangements of the different tribes has introduced a confusing factor into the totemic organization. Among those tribes whose organization has been least affected is the Dieri, inhabiting part of the Lake Eyre basin in S. Australia. They possess a number of clans of which the names of 27 are known. Their totems belong chiefly to the animal world; but the list includes some vegetable totems and such objects as rain and red ochre. It seems to be common to all the tribes in the Lake Eyre basin, though it is not ascertained whether all the totems are recognized by every tribe. Each tribe, like some of the Iroquois tribes, is divided into two moieties, or phratries, some of the clans belonging to one phratry and the rest to the other. These phratries are called by the Dieri Kararu and Matteri respectively; and, as among the Iroquois, not only the clan but also the phratry is exogamous. A Kararu man must marry a Matteri woman, and conversely a Matteri woman a Kararu man; but within the limits of the opposite phratry the mate may belong to any clan. Both the clan and the phratry descend in the female line, the children in all cases taking those of the mother.[6] The Dieri clans do not claim their totemic animals or plants as ancestors. More than one legend accounts for them.

According to one story, the totems (*muridus*, properly *madas*) came out in an unfinished condition from the earth in the midst of Lake Perigundi and lay on the sandhills around the lake until the warmth of the sun strengthened and raised them up as human beings, whereupon they separated in all directions. Hence the *madas* (totemic clans) are now scattered all over the country. According to another story, a malignant *mura-mura*, or supernatural being, was killed by the people for his misdeeds, but came to life again. He followed footprints, and, finding the people busy fishing, opened his mouth and swallowed water, fish, and men. Some escaped, running off in all directions, and to every one as they ran he gave a *mada*. In proof of the story, rocks are pointed out which are said to be the body of the *mura-mura* in question, and his teeth.[7]

If we may trust one account, the Dieri do not regard the animal or plant which is their totem as sacred, but will kill or eat it.[8] It is not, however, certain that we can rely on this statement. Its author, for a long time a mounted constable in the district, and hence brought much into contact with

[1] Frazer, p. 59, quoting Edwin James, *Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner*, London, 1830.
[2] M. A. Owen, p. 51 f. [3] Frazer, iii. 67, 66. [4] Hoffman, p. 65.
[5] E. S. Hartland, *Mem. Amer. Anth. Assoc.*, iv. [1917] 48; cf. Frazer, iii. 58; cf. also the derivation of 'totem' at the beginning of this article.
[6] L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London, 1877, pp. 70-98, *League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-ne, or Iroquois*, new ed., New York, 1904, i. 74-120; H. Hale, *The Iroquois Book of Rites*, Philadelphia, 1883, pp. 48-75. These are all summarized by Frazer, iii. 7 ff.
[7] Frazer, iii. 18, citing T. Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York*, London, 1823.

[1] *2 RBEW* [1883], pt. ii. p. 77.
[2] Morgan, *Ancient Soc.*, p. 78; Hartland, pp. 35, 40. See, on the organization of Iroquoian clans, *Amer. Anthrop.* xix. [1917] 392 ff.; also Frazer, iii. 13, 42.
[3] *3 RBEW* [1884], pp. 238, 240 f., 248; cf. p. 227.
[4] See below, § 4. [5] See below, § 4 (*b*).
[6] Howitt, p. 90 ff. [7] *Ib.* pp. 476, 779-781.
[8] *JAI* xxiv. [1895] 168.

the natives, was, we know, mistaken in other matters with respect to them. In general throughout Australia the clansmen regard their own totem with reverence.

Thus, in the Wakelbura tribe we are expressly told that the totem-animal is spoken of as 'father.' 'For example, a man of the *Binnung-urra* (Frilled-lizard totem) holds that reptile as sacred, and he not only would not kill it, but would protect it by preventing another person doing so in his presence. Similarly a man of the Screech-owl totem would call it "father," and likewise hold it sacred and protect it. . . . A man who was lax as to his totem was not thought well of, and was never allowed to take any important part in the ceremonies.'[1] In the tongue of the Wotjobaluk *yauerin*, 'flesh,' is used for totem, indicating the close relationship of the totem and the totem-clan.[2] Grey, writing of the tribes of W. Australia, reports that 'each family [clan] adopts some animal or vegetable as their crest or sign, or *kobong*, as they call it,' and that 'a certain mysterious connection exists between a family and its *kobong*, so that a member of the family will never kill an animal of the species to which his *kobong* belongs, should he find it asleep; indeed he always kills it reluctantly, and never without affording it a chance to escape. This arises from the family belief that some one individual of the species is their nearest friend, to kill whom would be a great crime. Similarly a native who has a vegetable for his *kobong* may not gather it under certain circumstances and at a particular period of the year.'[3] So far is this belief in a connexion between the totem-clan and its *kobong* carried that in the Wakelbura tribe, 'when a man could not get satisfaction for an injurious action by another, he has been known to kill that beast, bird, or reptile which that man called "father," and thus obtain revenge, and perhaps cause the other to do the same, if he knew of it.'[4] Such is the influence of belief that the killing of a man's totem has been known to hasten his death.

An interesting development of totemism in Australia is the assignment of a number of sub-totems to each totem. Thus in the Wotjobaluk tribe the Deaf Adder totem has for sub-totems the Native Cat, Black Swan, Tiger-Snake, Sulphur-crested Cockatoo, Crow, and Dingo; and the other totems have similar lists.[5] Where, according to the peculiar exogamic regulations, the phratries developed into marriage-classes, the sub-totems were attached to the latter. Ultimately the result was to divide the universe between the various classes and sub-classes—a result expressed in diagrammatic form in accordance with the points of the compass by the Wotjobaluk, who buried their dead orientated to agree with the diagram thus obtained.[6] What the reason was for assigning these sub-totems to the different totems and classes has not been ascertained; to us it seems arbitrary. At any rate the Australian native extended the regard for his totem to the sub-totems comprehended in the totem-clan or class to which he belonged.

A man of the Buandik tribe, we are told, 'does not kill or use for food any of the animals of the same sub-division with himself, excepting when hunger compels; and then they express sorrow for having to eat their *warigong* (friends) or *tumang* (their flesh). When using the last word they touch their breasts to indicate the close relationship, meaning almost a part of themselves.'[7]

Another custom developed extensively in Australia, but (as already intimated) not unknown among the Sioux in N. America, and elsewhere, is that of the performance of ceremonies by a totem-clan for the purpose of exercising control over the totem—*e.g.*, for multiplying its numbers, especially where it was edible, or for ensuring its capture, or, where it was injurious, for driving it away. The *intichiuma* ceremonies of the Arunta have by the investigations of Spencer and Gillen become the best known; they are perhaps the most elaborate, but by no means the only, ceremonies of the kind. The Dieri and other tribes perform such ceremonies, though it is not clear in all cases that the performers are confined to members of the totem-clan. From the analogy of cases both in Australia and in the islands of Torres Straits we may probably assume that they are. Whether these ceremonies should be called religious or magical is a question of terminology, though it seems certain that the performers are under the influence of emotional excitement such as we usually connect with religious rites.

Little is known about the relations of the clansmen in Australia among themselves. From vague references by Howitt and others it would seem that they enjoyed mutual defence and responsibility. But offences were brought before a tribal council, by whose decision blood-revenge was pursued in a quasi-legal manner and, if resisted, ultimately involved the whole tribe in the blood-feud.

(*c*) *Africa.*—Another area in which totemism has been found is that large portion of Africa which is occupied by the Negro and Bantu races. Of the totemism of some of these peoples, particularly of the Negroes, our information is fragmentary. Concerning the Tshi-speaking Negroes of the Gold Coast we have on the whole most information. They are divided into totemic clans, or 'families,' of which the principal are twelve in number, viz. Leopard, Buffalo, Dog, Parrot, Plantain, Corn-stalk, Servant, Red-Earth, Palm-oil-Grove, Abadzi, and Dumina or Dwimina. The meaning of the names of the last two clans is uncertain. The last is probably a local variant of the name of the Nsonna, or Bush-Cat, clan; and, according to some accounts, Abadzi, which may mean 'cannibal,' is another name of the Ntwa, or Dog, clan. About certain of the clans little or nothing beyond the name is known, and questions of identity arise on some of them. These difficulties are incidental to traditional lore where we are dependent upon natives who are not familiar with all the clans about which inquiries are made. To the Leopard clan the leopard is sacred, though members of it are reported now to abstain from the flesh of all the *felidæ*. No member may kill a leopard; if he were to do so by accident, he would exclaim, 'I have killed my brother,' and would put palm-oil on the wounds. If he sees a dead leopard, he must scatter shreds of white cloth upon it and anoint the muzzle with palm-oil, as a sign of respect and sorrow. If a dead leopard is brought into the town, the members of the clan smear themselves with chalk (a sign of mourning) and bury the body. If on a journey a member of the clan were to meet a leopard, he would turn back. The Buffalo, Bush-Cat, Dog, and Parrot clans abstain from eating the totem-animal. The Bush-Cat clan, it is said, abstain from killing not only a bush-cat, but also a crow, under penalty of sores on their bodies. Formerly, if they found a crow or a bush-cat dead, they would bury it, and with the crow a piece of white cloth, with the bush-cat a piece of speckled cloth. The traditional accounts which have reached us of the origin of these clans do not generally claim genetic descent from the totem.

One account states that 'people originally came from the earth, sky, sea, mountains, and the animals, etc., that came with them are their totems'; *e.g.*, the Parrot clan came with the parrots on their loads; the Dog clan came from a river with a broom and with a dog carrying fire.

Other clans, fewer in numbers and conjectured to be of more recent origin, claim that they are descended from an actual animal which possessed the power of assuming human shape at will. In the case of two such clans tales belonging to the Swan Maiden type are told to account for them. The totem-animal is revered. It is addressed as 'grandfather,' a title of respect used in addressing the kings of Ashanti. It is supposed to help the clansmen in various ways; and restraint is said to be placed upon it in order to compel it to grant the wishes of the tribe. There are no marks or dresses distinguishing the clans; but, when a member of

[1] Howitt, p. 147 f.
[2] *Journals*, ii. 228.
[3] *Ib.* p. 121.
[4] *Ib.* p. 241.
[5] Howitt, p. 148.
[6] *Ib.* p. 453 f.
[7] L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 168 f., quoting a correspondent; cf. E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, do. 1886–87, iii. 460.

the Leopard clan dies, the mourners (clansmen) make spots on their bodies with red, white, and black clay to represent a leopard, and scratch the figure of a leopard on the wall of the house and on the coffin. The Nsonna clan in the like case put white clay or white cloth round their necks, because the crow which the clan respects has a white band round its neck. The clan is always matrilineal and exogamous; and it has a common burial-place. There is said to be a belief that at death a clansman becomes or transmigrates into an individual of the totemic species, and, further, every clansman's life is bound up with one such individual, so that, if it dies, he will also die.[1]

The Bantu have for the most part advanced from maternal to paternal descent, though among some tribes we find an intermediate stage. This has not been without its effect upon their totemism, which in several ways varies from the pattern of true matrilineal totemism. The Bechuana, who occupy the centre of S. Africa, are divided into a number of independent 'tribes' generally called by totemic names and having totemic practices and beliefs. In many cases, however, these 'tribes' are not true totemic clans. Since the wife always goes to reside with her husband, the result of the change to paternal descent is to collect the members of the clan together, instead of distributing them as in a matrilineal people, and hence the clan tends to become identified with the geographical and political tribe. Every Bechuana tribe is ruled by a chief, whose totem is recognized as that of the tribe. The political conditions were such that before the European occupation of the country members of a tribe who were discontented with their chief used to desert him and go to a neighbouring rival, with whom they were sure of a welcome. Thus a powerful chief was liable to be reduced to weakness, and perhaps conquered by a neighbour, if his rule was unpopular. It followed that a tribe frequently comprehended members of many totemic clans. But they all accepted the chief's totem, and in time became indistinguishable from the true clansmen, though we do not read of any formal adoption into the clan or of any blood-covenant. The chief is always addressed by the name of the totem, as 'O Crocodile!' 'O Lion!' The Bechuana word for 'totem' is *siboko*, which has led Van Gennep to propose the name 'sibokism' to distinguish the S. African variety of totemism. The chief's totem is held sacred, and the animal, plant, or other object is regarded with fear and reverence.

Thus the Banoku, 'they of the porcupine,' are reported to 'sing,' *i.e.* 'feast, worship or revere' that animal. 'When they see any one maltreat that animal, they afflict themselves, grieve, collect with religious care the quills, if it has been killed, spit upon them and rub their eyebrows with them, saying: "They have slain our brother, our master, one of ours, him whom we sing." They fear that they will die if they eat the flesh of one.' Yet they doctor a new-born child with it, mixed with the juice of certain plants.[2] The Bakuena, 'they of the crocodile,' call the animal their father; 'they celebrate it in their festivals, they swear by it, and make an incision in the ears of their cattle, by which they distinguish them from others.' They call it 'one of them, their master, their father.' Similar practices are recorded of other clans. 'No one dares eat the flesh or clothe himself with the skin of the animal the name of which he bears. If this animal is hurtful, as the lion, for instance, it may not be killed without great apologies being made to it and its pardon being asked. Purification is necessary after the commission of such a sacrilege.' The Bataung, 'they of the lion,' 'carefully abstain from touching his flesh as other people do; for how could one think of eating his ancestor?' Nor does even the chief dare to wear, like other chiefs, a lion's skin by way of royal mantle.[3]

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 206; J. M. Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws*, do. 1897, p. 4; *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 178 ff.

[2] T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, tr. J. C. Brown, Cape Town, 1846, p. 176.

[3] *Ib.* p. 213 f.; E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, London, 1861, p. 211.

But totemism is decadent among the Bechuana, and has been so for a period which probably dates from before the coming of the European,[1] due partly to the change to paternal lineage, partly to the political conditions, and partly to the keeping of herds of cattle, a custom that seems to have been adopted from the Hottentots.

America, Australia, and Africa are the three chief areas in which totemism has been found widely spread and fully developed. It will be perceived that each of them has its own type, though variations in detail are found in individual tribes and peoples. The remaining areas are India and Melanesia.

(*d*) *India.*—In India totemism is found only among the non-Aryan tribes, and chiefly among the Dravidians. Of these we may take the Orāons on the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur in Bengal as representing the type. Though they have to a great extent emerged from the hunting and pastoral stages of culture, totemism 'still forms the fundamental feature of their social organization in so far as kinship, marriage, and relations of the sexes are concerned.' They are divided into a number of exogamous clans distinguished by names supplied by 'the fauna and flora of their past and present habitats'; and to these, 'with the acquisition of a knowledge of agriculture and the use of metals, a few new totem names have been since added.' The animal and vegetable names amount in number to 62. There are also (probably of more recent origin) two mineral totems, those of Iron and Salt; two which may be called place-totems, viz. Bāudh, an embanked reservoir of water, and Jūbbi, a marsh or surface-spring; and two which belong to a class known elsewhere, called 'split-totems' as involving tabus of a portion only of an animal or vegetable, and frequently known by the name of that portion. Among the Orāons these split-totems are Anvir (rice-soup) and Kispōttā (pig's entrails). Sexual union within the totem-clan is reckoned incestuous, though at the present day, if a marriage takes place in which the rule is infringed wittingly or unwittingly, the offending pair, after paying a fine and giving a feast to the clansmen by analogy with the usual caste practice in India, are formally re-admitted to the tribe and their union is thus legalized. The remaining ordinary totemic tabus are observed. 'An Orāon must abstain from eating or otherwise using, domesticating, killing, destroying, maiming, hurting or injuring' his totem. A wife, in addition to the tabus of her own clan, is required to observe those of her husband's while she actually resides in his village. Men of the clan whose totem is any kind of tree may not go under the shade of the tree or use its produce in any shape. But some modifications have been introduced where the totem is an indispensable article of diet or household use.

Thus members of the Paddy clan abstain only from eating the thin scum on the surface of rice-soup when left standing in a cool place; members of the Salt clan abstain only from taking raw salt, the tabu not extending to food or drink in which salt is an ingredient or flavour; members of the Iron clan abstain only from touching iron with their lips or tongue; members of the Pig clan are forbidden only to eat the head of the pig; members of the Bārā clan, of which the *Ficus Indica* is the totem, may eat the fruit whole, but not by dividing it in two.

On the other hand, the tabus of some clans have been extended to objects having a real or fancied resemblance to the totem or bearing the same or a similar name.

Thus members of the Tiger clan not only have to observe various tabus in reference to the tiger and to the wolf, but also must abstain from eating the squirrel's flesh, since the squirrel is striped like the tiger, and they may not marry in the month of Māgh (December–January) because the name Māgh rhymes with *bāgh*, the Hindi word for 'tiger.'

[1] W. C. Willoughby, *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 298.

In this case the foreign word *bāgh* points to a late and highly artificial origin for such a tabu, which is obviously due to the timidity of superstition. Other additional tabus have been suggested to be due to the fusion of clans, just as some 'split-totems' may have arisen from the opposite process of the division of clans.

'The general attitude of an Orāon to his clan-totem is that of a man to his equal—to his friend and ally,' though some periodical practices seem to indicate a more religious regard—at any rate for its effigy. But totemism is now in decay, as it is over the rest of India. An unintentional breach of a tabu is no longer believed to entail any serious consequences, though looked upon with social disapproval. There is no difference between the clans in personal dress or adornment, nor is a man supposed to partake of the qualities of the totem. There are very few traditions of the origin of totem-names. Such as there are do not reveal any belief in the descent of the clan from the totem, but rather in some other relation between the totem and the human ancestor of the clan. The Orāons are patrilineal.[1]

(*e*) *Melanesia.*—In Melanesia (including New Guinea and the islands of Torres Straits) there is a tendency to associate with the principal totem of a clan a number of subordinate totems which have been called 'secondary,' 'subsidiary,' or 'linked' totems. The western islands of Torres Straits have for many years been the scene of successful missionary enterprise. Under this influence the totemism which formerly existed among the people has almost disappeared. But twenty years ago the members of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition, who spent some time on the islands, were able to recover very definite evidence of its existence. The population was divided into a number of exogamous totemic clans. As a rule each clan had subsidiary totems in addition to its chief totem. 'In some cases two or more clans might have the same chief totem, while differing in their subsidiary totems'—which looks like the fission of an original clan. Members of a clan were distinguished by wearing an emblem of the totem, or more rarely bearing it in cicatrices or keloids on the flesh. Personal belongings also, it is said, were adorned with a representation of the owner's totem. Descent was reckoned in the male line; but adoption seems to have been practised. In conformity with patrilineal reckoning there was a tendency to a geographical distribution of the clans. This, however, was apt to result in quarrelling; and the missionaries had accordingly succeeded in inducing the people, at all events of one of the islands, to abandon the localization of the clans.

'The solidarity of the totem-clan was a marked feature in the social life of the people, and it took precedence of all other considerations; not only so, but there was an intimate relationship between all members of the same totem [-clan] irrespective of the island or locality to which they might belong and even warfare did not affect the friendship of totem-brethren. Any man who visited another island would be looked after and entertained as a matter of course by the residents who belonged to the same totem as himself.'[2]

The clans were grouped in two classes or phratries. On the island of Mabuiag these two phratries were respectively known as 'the children or people of the Great Totem' and 'the children or people of the Little Totem.' The former comprised the Crocodile, Cassowary, Snake, and Dog clans (all land animals); the latter the Dugong, Shovel-nosed Skate, Shark, Ray, and Green Turtle clans (all water animals). On this island there is no sufficient evidence that the phratries regulated marriage during recent times; but there is reason to think that they were exogamous on some other of the islands. Members of a clan might not kill or eat the totem; but this did not apply to the Dugong and Turtle clans, for both dugong and turtle were important articles of food on the islands, which are somewhat barren. Members of the clan, however, were not allowed to eat of the first dugong or turtle caught, but might partake of those subsequently caught. They performed ceremonies to entice the animals to the island and ensure a good season. They could, on the other hand, by magical rites with the contrary intention, prevent them from coming. A mystical relation was held to subsist between the totem and the clan. He was said to be 'all same as relation, he belong same family.' The Cassowary, Crocodile, Snake, Shark, and Hammer-headed Shark clans were reputed to be truculent and to like fighting. The peaceable clans were the Shovel-nosed Skate, Ray, and Sucker-fish; while the Dog clan was sometimes peaceable and at other times quarrelsome—all like the totem-animal. Certain of the clans, possibly all, had formulæ which they repeated in going into a fight, and which were either magical or in the nature of invocations to the totem. The prayer is in some stages of civilization near akin to the spell.[1]

4. Decadence of totemism.—The foregoing examples will sufficiently indicate the chief characteristics of totemism in the five great areas in which it has been found. It is apparent that in each area totemism was by no means a new phenomenon. It arises in a low condition of savagery and is connected in its typical forms with matrilineal descent. But, even before contact with Europeans, it had begun to assume forms very divergent from what we understand by normal totemism, leading in some cases to degeneration and disintegration.

(*a*) *America.*—Among the divergences found in N. America those of the coast-dwellers of the north-west are the most remarkable. The Tlingit, inhabiting S. Alaska, are divided into two exogamous phratries or classes, called after the raven and the wolf respectively;[2] and these two phratries are again divided into a number of totemic clans. The members of a clan are believed to be related to one another more closely than to those of other clans even of the same phratry. They reckon descent through the mother and as a consequence are not gathered at one place, but distributed as social groups and not geographical. Yet each clan usually derived its origin (and most of them, at the present day, their names) from some village or camp which it once occupied. They seem, however, to have had alternative names (if F. Boas's account is correct) derived from the animal, or one of the animals, which they claimed as a badge. In point of fact the emblems or representations on the north-western coast, generally called totems, are rather badges or crests. The clans of each phratry, indeed, all use the totem of the phratry; they also use a number of other badges, some of which are the special property of the clan, or of some sub-clan, and are guarded with much jealousy. They carve and paint the badge on the so-called totem-poles erected in front of the dwelling-house, or on a grave. These poles are, however, less frequently erected by the Tlingit than by some of their neighbours. The badge is also exhibited on many other articles of property, worn as a mask or hat used as a disguise at dances, potlatches, and funeral ceremonies, and painted

[1] S. Chandra Roy, *The Orāons of Chōta Nāgpur*, Rānchi, 1915, p. 324 ff.; cf. Frazer, ii. 284 ff., and the authorities there referred to.

[2] A. C. Haddon and W. H. R. Rivers in *Reports of the Cambridge Anthrop. Exped. to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–08, v. 161.

[1] Haddon and Rivers, *ib.* v. 153–186.

[2] J. R. Swanton, *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 467, suggests that these two phratries may have had a racial origin.

on the faces of the clansmen. It is not now held that the clan or phratry is descended from the totem or animal represented, though it may be suspected that in former times this was believed. At present stories are told by the clan or sub-clan claiming a badge of its acquisition by an ancestor through an adventure with the animal in question, such animal being often conceived as of superhuman power.

As Frazer points out, many of 'these tales have the true totemic ring about them; they point clearly to the former identification of the clanspeople with their totems, which is only another way of saying that the present people are supposed to be descended from the totemic animals.'[1]

To this it may be added that, according to Boas's report, 'the animal and a member of its clan are considered relations. Thus the wolf gens will pray to the wolves, "We are your relations; pray don't hurt us!" But notwithstanding this fact they will hunt wolves without hesitation.'[2]

The truth is that the more or less permanent settlement of all the tribes along the coast—at least from the Tlingit to the Kwakiutl—in villages, and their increasing civilization, have led to the division of the population into ranks or castes and to a continually higher value being set on the crests or badges as marks of rank and wealth, and as symbols, if not guarantees, of descent from a distinguished ancestor. This has resulted in an accumulation of crests, some clans or sub-clans obtaining a larger number than others; and some of the crests were used by more than one clan.

'The great majority of Tlingit personal names referred to some animal, especially that animal whose emblem was particularly valued by the clan to which the bearer belonged.'[3]

Of these names many seem to have been peculiar to one or other of the clans. The solidarity ordinarily subsisting between members of a clan is found, among the Tlingit, rather between the members of a phratry.

'According to the unwritten Tlingit law it was incumbent upon everyone belonging to a phratry to house and feed any other member of that phratry who should visit him, no matter from how great a distance he might come'; and it was a mark of good manners, therefore of high caste, not to abuse such hospitality.[4]

Any serious collision at a potlatch arising out of the rivalry of opposing parties of dancers was averted or stayed by the host's people, who rushed between them bearing the emblem of their phratry or making the call of the animal whose name was that of the phratry. When a man died, the funeral ceremonies were conducted by the opposite phratry, who were afterwards entertained at a mourning feast by the relatives of the deceased. On the whole it may be conjectured that the two phratries represent original totem-clans, out of which the existing clans or groups, whether social or local, have developed. There was also reckoned among the Tlingit population a small group at Sanya, called the Nexádi ('People of Nex,' a creek in the neighbourhood), who stood outside both phratries and might marry into both. They bore the Eagle crest or badge and had personal names having reference to the eagle. They were doubtless a small intrusive population, which Swanton, the latest investigator of the Tlingit, suggests as perhaps of Athapascan derivation.[5]

Coming down from north to south along the coast and islands of Alaska and British Columbia, we find a similar organization, differing however in detail, among the various peoples, with an increasing emphasis laid on rank and the possession of crests, until we reach the Kwakiutl. The Kwakiutl proper (or Southern Kwakiutl, as they are often called to distinguish them from the Heiltsuk, their northern congeners) are organized in 'tribes,' which in turn are subdivided into exogamic groups distinguished not, as a rule, by totemic names but by the collective form of the name claimed as that of an ancestor, by geographical names, or by 'names of honour.' The evidence seems to show that they are neither definitely patrilineal nor matrilineal in descent, but in a state of transition, since a child may belong to any 'clan' or exogamic group to which one of its ancestors belonged at the arbitrary discretion of its parents. Each exogamic group, like the ordinary clan of several of the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, had a number of personal names appropriated to it; and to assign a child to such a group it was enough to give it one of these names. In this way it appears to have become *ipso facto* a member of the group; it might even belong to more than one at the same time. What was more important in Kwakiutl society was the possession of crests and the privileges that they carried. These were obtained in three several ways: (1) they might be inherited by direct patrilineal descent from an ancestor who acquired them through an adventure in the course of which he obtained the protection and guidance of a *manitu*, or spiritual helper, for himself and his descendants; direct inheritance of this kind, however, was comparatively rare; (2) more usually they were obtained by marriage; the payment of a bride-price secured not only the bride, but also the right of membership in her 'clan' or exogamous group, the crest and privileges of the bride's father, and a good deal of other property; (3) the third method was to obtain them by killing the owner, as in the case of the position and privileges of the King of the Wood of Nemi. The privileges include not only the use of the crest but also the right to the membership of certain societies and the ownership and exclusive right to practise certain dances connected with the ceremonials of the societies. They are, however, not acquired for the benefit of the son-in-law in the case of marriage, but for his successor, whoever he may be. Seeing, moreover, that the number of noblemen is fixed, and there is only one person at a time who personates the ancestor and has his rank and privileges, the person entitled must wait for a vacancy before he can be admitted to them. He may wait in vain; for before a vacancy occurs the owner may change his mind, or even after the person entitled has obtained the privileges he may devest them and confer them upon some other successor.

This is manifestly not totemism, for the societies operate only during the winter, when they dominate the social organization to the exclusion of the kinship and local groups. It may have been influenced by true totemic conceptions, from which it may even have sprung. But its cause must be sought in the increasing power of wealth, the consequent development of rank, and the desire for display.[1]

The transformation that thus seems to have overtaken totemism among the Kwakiutl is in process also among the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico and Arizona. Here the cause is different. In these tribes, originally organized in totemic clans and phratries with matrilineal descent, the struggle for existence in an arid country has evolved a sense of dependence upon the supernatural powers and a religious ritual and elaborate ceremonies, partly religious and partly magical, for the production of rain and maize. At first these ceremonies appear to have been performed by the appropriate clans, as we have found in other areas. In some cases they are so still, as among the Zuñi, but aided and superintended by the priests of the various deities. In other cases,

[1] iii. 273 f.
[2] *Report of 59th Meeting of British Assoc.* 1889, p. 819.
[3] Swanton, *26 RBEW*, p. 421. [4] *Ib.* p. 427.
[5] *26 RBEW*, pp. 296–449; Boas, *Rep. Brit. Assoc.* 1889, p. 819 ff.

[1] Boas, *Rep. U.S. National Museum*, 1895, Washington, 1897, pp. 334, 338, 340, 342, 358.

as among the Hopi, the Snake clan has been superseded for this purpose by an 'order' or society, the members of which were probably at the beginning recruited exclusively from the clan. The rule is now somewhat less strict, embracing others besides members of the clan, though the members of the society are limited.[1] In fact the latest inquiries appear to show that the societies or fraternities have broken away and become quite independent of the clan organization.[2]

(*b*) *Australia.*—Turning to Australia, we find that among the Central tribes the totemic clans have been carried far towards their complete conversion into societies performing magico-religious rites, the object of which is the multiplication of the totemic animal or plant. The Warramunga hold that the totem-clans originated each from a single ancestor, half-beast, or half-plant, from whose body emanated a number of spirit-children; and the descendants of the clan are all animated by these spirit-children. The ceremonies are here performed by the clan in a definite order, representing in dramatic fashion the traditional history of the clan. The Warramunga and the tribes to the north of them are definitely patrilineal with exogamic clans; but the members of the clan in every generation are believed to be continual reincarnations of deceased ancestors. The Arunta, on the other hand, have ceased to regulate their marriages by totemic exogamy and now regulate them solely by class-divisions consisting of the pristine moieties of the tribe, which have been doubly subdivided, so that they are now eight in number. There are various places in the territory of the tribe which are totemic centres believed to be haunted by the spirit-children of the original ancestors. One of these spirit-children is held to have entered the body of every pregnant woman, according to the totemic centre near or at which she first felt herself pregnant. In this way the 'clan' of the child is ascertained, and in no case does it depend upon that of the father or mother. The resulting group passing under a totemic name is clearly no true clan.

'There is no such thing as the members of one totem [-group] being bound together in such a way that they must combine to fight on behalf of a member of the totem [-group] to which they belong.'

Inasmuch as every death is supposed to be due to witchcraft, revenge has to be taken by somebody. Normally this duty would fall on the clansmen of the deceased. But among the Arunta it would seem to be the members of the local group who undertake it.

'In fact,' say Spencer and Gillen, summing up the subject, 'it is perfectly easy to spend a considerable time amongst the Arunta tribe without even being aware that each individual has a totemic name'; but the fact of his belonging to one or other of the divisions governing marriage is soon apparent.

These groups thus passing under totemic names perform under the direction of their respective headmen from time to time, as the headman concerned decides, the ceremonies known as *intichiuma*. These ceremonies are not, like those of the Warramunga, the property of the entire group, but each of them belongs to a specific individual, who alone has the right of performing it or of requesting others to do so. One consequence of this is that they are not performed in a definite series: they are fragments and may be given in any arbitrary order. They have ceased to be a representation of the traditional history of the group; they have become mere magical rites. Further, in the tribes both south and north of the Central group, consisting of the Arunta and their immediate neighbours, a man is forbidden to kill, injure, or eat his totem. In some of the tribes, though patrilineal, the prohibition also applies more or less absolutely to the totem of the clansman's mother—probably a relic of an older matrilineal condition. Among the Arunta, however, there is no such prohibition. Indeed the members of a totem-group are expected to eat of the totem during the ceremonies; and they have liberty to do so at other times, though only sparingly. The conclusion from these and other facts is irresistible that the Central tribes of Australia are finding their way out of normal totemism, and that of these tribes the Arunta and their immediate neighbours to the north (the Kaitish, Unmatjera, and others) are the farthest advanced on the road. Their totemic organization is not merely decadent; it is obsolescent. Such remains of it as persist are preserved only as societies held together for the performance of certain magical or religious rites and as the carriers of certain religious traditions, but no longer as organic social groups.[1]

But decadent totemism often takes another course in its transformation. In most totemic communities it is customary to assemble the growing youths for the purpose of what are generally called the puberty ceremonies. By means of these ceremonies the youths of the tribe are taken from their mothers' care and out of the society of women and children, are submitted to tests of courage and endurance, educated in sexual matters and in the customs and traditions of the tribe, and fitted henceforth to take their part in the life of the tribe as adult and fully admitted members. Such initiation rites are prominent all over Australia. Among the Central tribes they have been developed beyond all others. They have been made very severe, not to say cruel; they have been elaborated into four distinct stages and protracted through years, though not of course continuous during that period. Their performance is everywhere one of the important occasions on which the tribe comes together. The members are summoned by special messengers with traditional formalities. But the actual performance of the greater part of them is secret, in the sense that no one is allowed to witness or take part in it who has not previously been in a similar manner initiated.

(*c*) *Africa.*—There is evidence of the existence of totemism in W. Africa from Senegambia southward in almost all the populations. In many places, however, where it is decadent or obsolete it is replaced by secret societies which dominate or supplement the nominal government. Thus at Old Calabar there is a very powerful society known as Egbo, divided into numerous grades. The king is the head. It has in a rough and ready way the whole administration of the law in its hands.[2] Farther south, in the cataract region of the Lower Congo, is a secret society known as Nkimba. According to the latest researches, it is entered about the age of puberty. The candidates are chosen by the *nganga*, or medicine-man. The ceremonies take place in the forest, where the camp is jealously guarded from all intrusion. There the candidates remain for a period variously stated as from one or two months to five or six years. They are painted white, and a narcotic is administered. They are subjected to a number of tests, such as the imposition of a new name and an oath of secrecy, and to flagellation. They are circumcised, if not already in that condition. They are taught a new language, and it is believed

[1] The various minutely detailed accounts of the Pueblo Indians and their ceremonies have been admirably summarized by Frazer, iii. 195 ff.

[2] A. L. Kroeber, 'Zuñi Kin and Clan,' *Anthrop. Papers of the Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, xviii. [New York, 1917] 145 n., 150 ff.; J. W. Fewkes, *19 RBEW* [1900], pt. ii. p. 965.

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 34, 112-127, 167-211, 467-473; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 143-225.

[2] H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908, p. 115 ff.; *Journ. African Soc.*, iv. [1905] 306. Cf. art. SECRET SOCIETIES (African).

by the women and other non-initiated that they are put to death and brought to life again. They are instructed in the religious beliefs and moral rules to which they must in future conform. Various prohibitions are enforced during and after their retirement. If approved for the purpose, they may become fetish-priests or medicine-men; otherwise they become simply adult men, ready to take part in public life. This is obviously little more than the puberty rites of ordinary totemic peoples; but there is reason to think that the Nkimba tends to become more magical in its purview. Those who have passed through it have acquired a character in some degree sacred and mysterious; a special tie is established between them; they regard one another as brethren and render mutual aid. Another society called Ndembo, often confounded with the Nkimba, exists on the Congo. A Ndembo is not held periodically, but one is established whenever the elders of the village direct. It appears to have a specially sexual aim; men and women are admitted, and sexual licence is said to be encouraged in the camp; and to such a length is the comedy of death and resurrection carried that, on returning after the conclusion of the ceremonies, those who have been subjected to them pretend to have lost all remembrance of their previous life, act in the most foolish manner, and are only gradually recalled to ordinary sense and behaviour. The object of the Ndembo appears moreover to be more specialized, more decidedly magical, than that of the Nkimba.[1] It seems probable that all these secret societies have been developed from, or at least deeply influenced by, the initiatory rites of totemic tribes.

The Herero of S.W. Africa, who have been massacred and almost entirely destroyed by the Germans, offer a peculiarly difficult problem, not yet entirely solved. They were divided into clans called *eanda* (plur. *omaanda*) reckoning descent exclusively through the mother. A tradition of their origin is related, deriving it from a pair who emerged from the trunk of an *omborombonga* tree in the far North, whose children were all daughters fructified by contact in some way or other with various objects of the external world. These objects became the totems of their descendants. Among them may be enumerated the sun, rain, the tree, the marmot, the koodoo, the chameleon, besides others the significance of whose names is disputed. The members of an *eanda* called themselves brothers-in-law (not brothers) of the totem. The blood-feud attached to the *eanda*, which moreover, formerly at least, was exogamic. Side by side with the *eanda* stands another organization, apparently of more recent origin, the *oruzo* (plur. *otuzo*). The *oruzo* descends exclusively in the paternal line. It is also totemic; and among the totems appear the chameleon, the sun, the koodoo, rag, necklace of beads. The members of an *oruzo* are distinguished by the mode of dressing their hair, by their food-tabus, and by special sacrificial regulations. The colour and shape of the horns of the cattle which an *oruzo* possesses also differ from those of every other *oruzo*. The institution of the *oruzo* is attributed to the medicine-men; and there can be little doubt that it is specially a religious organization for the maintenance of the sacred fire of the family and the worship of ancestors. All cattle belong to the *oruzo*, for the Herero are a pastoral people, and their wealth consisted of cattle until the Germans deprived them of their stock. The cattle never descended to or through females, at all events if there was a male descendant to inherit them. The food tabus of the Herero are probably not all totemic. The Herero have no totemic badges or signs.[1] The totemism prevalent among them is thus widely divergent from the common type. Its twofold organization is manifestly the result of a conflict between matrilineal and patrilineal institutions. How that conflict originated is obscure; but it is obviously not unconnected with the growth of ancestor-worship and the introduction of herds of cattle among a hunting and perhaps rudely agricultural people, and the consequent changes of mode of life and social arrangements. The country which they now inhabit is steppe, almost desert, and quite unsuitable for agriculture. After the rains there is for a time abundant pasture, which at other seasons must be sought in the deep and sheltered dales with which the land is intersected. The change to a pastoral life may be surmised to have occurred when or shortly before they penetrated to their present possessions, not probably more than five or six centuries ago. The consequent development of their institutions is even yet incomplete.

At the other extremity of the area occupied by the Bantu are found the Baganda, the most highly civilized of the race. They were governed by kings probably descended from a Hamitic stock which conquered the country several centuries ago.

'The Baganda are divided into a large number of totemic clans, the members of which observe the two fundamental canons of normal totemism, since they abstain both from injuring their totem and from marrying a woman of the same clan.' Each clan has a principal and a secondary totem, and takes its name from the former. 'Both totems are sacred to members of the clan, who may neither kill nor destroy them. Other people, however, may kill or destroy them for a reasonable purpose, without hurting the feelings of members of the clan.'[2]

The Baganda trace their lineage in the male line; but a woman's children were taught in infancy to respect her totems and to avoid them. When they grew up, they adopted their father's totems and ceased to regard those of their mother. Yet they were forbidden to marry into their mother's clan. For these and other reasons it seems clear that descent had originally been reckoned in the maternal line, and that, as in the case of the Herero, though on different lines, the transition had been recently and incompletely effected.[3] Like the clans of certain N. American tribes, each clan had special names appropriated to its children; hence the clan to which a man belonged was recognized by his name.[4] The king had a large harem. His children, however, took the totem of their mother; and it was naturally deemed an honour for a clan to give a king to the realm by means of the union of one of its female members with the king. From this honour certain clans were excluded for reasons which are now unknown. To obviate this some of the excluded clans joined more favoured clans, so that their daughters might marry the king and have children who might be in the succession to the throne. Another reason for the union of clans was to better the position of a despised clan. Clans so associated obtained the right to use the totem of the more honourable clan; yet they were so little regarded as relations by the members of the latter that intermarriage between members of the two clans was not forbidden. The Lung-fish clan (the largest of all) also was in an exceptional position in that its members were not subject to the rule of exogamy.[5] The totems are usually some species of animal. A few species of trees and other vegetables are found as totems, besides beads and other articles of human manu-

[1] E. de Jonghe, *Les Sociétés secrètes au Bas-Congo*, Brussels, 1907, p. 15 ff.

[1] F. Meyer, *Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero*, Berlin, 1905, p. 25 ff.; E. Dannert, *Zum Rechte der Herero*, do. 1906, p. 11 ff.; Frazer, ii. 356; [S. African] *Folklore Journal*, i. [Capetown, 1879] 37 ff., ii. [1880] 61; *Report on the Natives of S.W. Africa and their Treatment by Germany*, London, 1918, p. 37.

[2] Frazer, ii. 472 f.

[3] Hartland, *Mem. Amer. Anthrop. Assoc.*, iv. 18.

[4] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 135.

[5] *Ib.* pp. 187, 137, 148, 134.

facture; and 'split-totems' and other anomalous totems (as a tailless or a spotted cow, and rain-water from roofs) are not unknown.[1] Notwithstanding the existence of a system of law and administration of justice, the sense of clan-solidarity remained strong. The blood-covenant was practised and was considered more binding than common oaths.[2] Murder was rare; but cases of murder and manslaughter, when they occurred, were taken up by the clan. The clan of a murdered man might accept and share a fine, instead of insisting on the punishment of death; and, on the other hand, the clan of the wrong-doer contributed to the payment. 'When a member of a clan wished to buy a wife, it was the duty of all the other members to help him to do so'; when a person got into debt, or was fined, the clan combined to assist him to pay the debt or fine.[3] Thus the totemism of the Baganda, while preserving many, if not most, of the essential features normally present, departs widely from more typical totemism. The religious aspect, though not quite absent, has fallen into the background before polytheism and the cult of the dead. The kingship and the organization of the kingdom have been imposed by a non-Bantu conquering people, which brought a military class, imperfectly assimilated by the bulk of the people when the English occupation took place. This people probably introduced domestic animals, some of which have become totems; and its influence is perhaps also to be traced in the 'split-totems.' Secondary totems are met with elsewhere, as we have seen.

Totemism is decadent also among the tribes of the Congo. It there manifests itself chiefly in tabus, though totemic tabus are only a few of the tabus observed. Among the Bangala of the Upper Congo the totem-animal may not be killed or eaten. A woman after marriage observes her husband's totem as well as her own. A child born to them takes the totems of both parents, until a council of both families determines which totem it is to take permanently—usually the father's. The Bangala are patrilineal.[4]

(*d*) *India.*—In continental India the decadence of totemism has been caused chiefly by the spread of Hinduism, and with it the extension of the caste system. The origin of caste has not yet been entirely cleared up. Within the Hindu system it is largely, if not mainly, occupational. As applied to the Dravidian and other races of the peninsula, it is transforming, or has transformed, independent tribes into castes; and by means of legends, some of them doubtless consciously forged to manufacture claims, these tribes have succeeded in gaining reluctant and often strongly contested admission as castes into the Hindu social hierarchy. The Reddi or Kāpu, the largest caste in the Madras Presidency, are probably descended from a Dravidian tribe which in the early centuries of our era was powerful in India. They are now a great caste of cultivators, farmers, and squireens in the Telugu country and rank next to the Brāhmans in Hindu society there. They are divided into a number of sections, for whose names fanciful etymologies have been found, and for some of them legends have been invented. One of these sections, the Panta Kāpus, are again severed into two endogamous divisions. But they are said also to have true totemic septs, of which the following are examples:

(1) Magili (*Pandanus fascicularis*): the women of this sept do not, like those of other castes, adorn themselves with the flower-bracts; and a man of the sept 'has been known to refuse to purchase some bamboo mats, because they were tied with the fibre of this tree'; (2) Ippi (*Bassia longifolia*): this tree and its products must not be touched by members of the sept; (3) Mancham (cot): members of this sept avoid sleeping on cots; (4) Arigala (*Paspalum scrobiculatum*): members of this sept do not use this grain as food; (5) Chintaginjalu (tamarind seeds): these seeds may not be used or touched by members of the sept; (6) Puccha (water-melon): the fruit may not be eaten by members of the sept.

Moreover, the names of various exogamous Kāpu septs are suggestive of totemism, such as the Cow, Grain, Buffalo, Sheep, Fowl, Goat, Elephant, as well as various plant-names, though others, such as Cart, Army, Hut, Harrow, Woman's Skirt, Plough, are more doubtful.[1]

This is not an uncommon type of caste. It suggests that the caste in question is a transformed tribe, and that the divisions of the caste originate from totemic clans, many of which retain their totemic names and some of their tabus, though other subdivisions have forgotten them or originated in a different manner. The Khangārs are a low caste of village watchmen and field-labourers in the Central Provinces, almost certainly of non-Aryan origin. They are divided into numerous exogamous septs, all of which are said to be totemic. 'The members of the sept usually show veneration to the object from which the sept takes its name.' Thus the Barha sept is named from *barāh*, 'pig,' this sept worshipping the pig; the Chirai from *chiriya*, 'bird,' this sept revering sparrows; the Ghurgotia from *ghora*, 'horse,' towards which the members practise certain observances; the Kasgotia from *kāusa*, 'bell-metal,' which is tabued by the sept; the San from *san*, 'hemp,' pieces of which are placed by members of the sept near their family god. The Hanumān sept is so called from the monkey-god, and the Viṣṇu sept from Viṣṇu, the god worshipped by it.[2]

In the United Provinces there are also many tribes and castes, probably of Dravidian origin, among whom totemism is traceable. Such are the Agariya of Mirzāpur, who have seven septs, all exogamous and apparently of totemic origin: the Markām named from the tortoise, which the members will not kill or eat; the Goirār from a certain tree which they will not cut; the Paraswān from a tree (*Butea frondosa*) which they will not cut and whose leaves they will not use for platters; the Sanwān from hemp (*san*), which they will not sow or use; the Baragwār from a tree (*Ficus Indica*) which they will not cut or climb and from the leaves of which they will not eat; the Banjhakwār, said to be named from *beng*, 'frog,' which the members of the sept will not kill or eat; and the Gidhlē, the members of which will not kill or even throw a stone at a vulture (*gidh*). The Agariya are patrilineal; and they have been deeply influenced in other ways by Hinduism. Indeed they call themselves Hindus in religion, though they worship none of the regular Hindu deities. There are, however, traces of a previous matrilineal condition. They practise tatuing, and many of the marks inscribed on their bodies are probably totemic in origin, 'but the real meaning has now been forgotten, and they are at present little more than charms to resist disease and other misfortunes, and for the purpose of mere ornament.'[3] The social and political conditions of India are such that almost the only possible relics of totemism consist in the names of the septs and the prohibitions of marriage within the clan and of eating, killing, or using the totem. Hindu influence leads to the ascription of descent to human beings rather than to animals or plants, concerning which tales are told to account for the totemic name and observances. The organization of the tribe or caste by means of a council and the police regulations render unnecessary the union of members for mutual protection. Hence, and owing to the universal tendency of caste to subdivision, the sense of solidarity is greatly weakened and is daily decreasing in force.[4]

[1] Roscoe, p. 133 ff.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 20, 206, 268, 12.
[3] *Ib.* p. 268.
[4] *JRAI* xl. [1910] 365.

[1] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, iii. 222 ff.
[2] R. V. Russell, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, iii. 439.
[3] W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, i. 1 ff.
[4] See H. H. Risley, *The People of India*[2], ed. W. Crooke, London, 1915, pp. 95-109, for a general consideration of the evidence; and, for the evidence itself, also his *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1891-92, *passim*; Crooke,

(*e*) *Melanesia.*—There are signs that totemism was developing in the islands of Torres Straits into an anthropomorphic cult. Traditions are found of culture-heroes associated with various clans. Of these Sigai and Maiau on the island of Yam appeared first in the likeness of a hammer-headed shark and a crocodile respectively. For each of them a shrine was erected, the essential feature of which was a turtle-shell model representing either a hammer-headed shark or a crocodile; under each of these was a stone in which the spirit, the so-called *augud* ('totem'), resided.

Uninitiated persons were not allowed to visit these shrines, 'nor did they know what they contained: they were aware of Sigai and Maiau, but they did not know that the former was a hammer-headed shark and the latter a crocodile; this mystery was too sacred to be imparted to uninitiates. When the heroes were addressed it was always by their human names, and not by their animal or totem names.'[1]

Each was associated in his animal form with one of the two phratries or groups of totem-clans. Warriors before going to battle prayed to them. Totem-dances were celebrated and songs were sung, which were believed to have an effect upon the weather, by the shark-men and crocodile-men, dancing separately and wearing feathers coloured white or black according to the party to which they belonged. On Mabuiag and Muralug the hero was Kwoiam, a warrior-hero, who himself was called an *augud*. In the Muralug group of islands he was regarded as the 'big *augud*' and 'the *augud* of every one in the island.'

He is said to have made and worn 'two crescentic objects of turtle-shell, which blazed with light when he wore them at night-time, and he nourished them with the savour of cooked fish. These objects were termed *augud*; . . . and they became the insignia of the two phratries into which the old totem-clans of Mabuiag were grouped.'[2]

'When attacking an enemy the warriors formed into two columns, each of which was led by a head-man who wore the Kwoiam emblems.'[3]

Like Sigai and Maiau, he possessed a sacred shrine. It was situated on the island of Pulu; there his crescentic emblems were kept, and thence they were taken with certain ceremonies to be borne before the appropriate phratry in war.[4]

A similar evolution has been observed in Fiji.

'The people of the interior of the island [of Viti Levu] form a number of independent communities which may probably be regarded as tribes, and each of these has a number of divisions and subdivisions, which in the relatively high development of Fijian society have departed widely from the character of the septs into which a totemic community is usually divided. The animals from which descent is traced, and whose flesh is prohibited as food, are usually associated with the larger groups which seem to correspond to tribes, though the divisions of the tribe often have sacred animals or plants peculiar to themselves in addition to those which are *tabu* to them as members of the tribe.'[5]

Rivers goes on to give examples.

The tabued animal of the people of Cawanisa is an aquatic creature called the *dravidravi*, from which they believe themselves descended; and none of the divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves. The sacred animal of the Nadrau or Navuta people is the *qiliyago*; some of its divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves, the Wallevu division eating neither the dog nor a fish called *dabea*, the Kalvuci respecting the snake. Other animals were held sacred in other parts of the island, the people believing in descent sometimes from the tabu animal of the tribe, sometimes from that of the smaller group. Marriage is regulated by kinship alone, and there is no evidence at present of totemic exogamy. It is manifest that this kind of totemism is widely divergent from what is usually reckoned normal totemism. Nor is this to be wondered at, seeing how far Fijian civilization has progressed. Yet it presents 'the three characteristic features of the institution: belief in descent from the totem, prohibition of the totem as an article of food, and the connection of the totem with a definite unit of the social organization.' Rivers discovered evidence among these hill-tribes 'that the sacred animals had become gods, which had, however, retained their animal form definitely.' Certain rules of conduct given to the Nadrau people by the bird *qiliyago* showed an early stage in the evolution of a god from the totem-animal. In the Rewa district in the low country things had gone a step farther. 'Here each village had a deity called *tevoro*, with a name which usually showed no sign of an animal origin, but in many cases these deities had the power of turning into animals, and in such case the people of the village in question were not allowed to eat the animal.' Thus the people of Lasakau, a division of Bau, had a *tevoro* who turned into a bird called *sese*. 'The bird could not be eaten, and here, as in the hills, it was clear that the restriction extended to the whole people and was not limited to either of the two divisions of which the Lasakau people are composed.'[1]

These are not the only cases which he mentions; but they are probably enough to render the evolution plain.

It is almost unnecessary to remark that totemism may decay, especially where it comes under European influence, by simple neglect.

Thus the Winnebago, a Siouan tribe of N. America, tracing their descent from animals who were transformed into human beings and became ancestors of the various clans, treat the totem-animal in no way differently from other animals, hunting it and eating it if edible. Descent is patrilineal, and a child used always to take a name of his father's clan; but this is falling into desuetude. The reckoning of descent has become irregular; and the sacred bundle of the clan occasionally now passes out of clan-possession.[2]

Again, the Diegueno of California were all formerly totemic. Descent is paternal. Clan exogamy is still observed by many of the clans, but not by all. Some, like the Blue Wild-Cat clan, regard the totem-animal as brother. But many of the clan-names have ceased to be totemic, and the clans have become, or are becoming, mere local groups. The clan-name is frequently taken as a personal or family surname under modern conditions.[3]

Such cases may be found elsewhere than in America.

5. Traces of totemism among non-totemic peoples.—Over a large area of the globe, embracing Europe, the greater part of Asia, S. America, and Polynesia, the north of Africa, and the extreme north of N. America, inhabited by the Eskimo, totemism is now unknown. But among many of the peoples of these regions certain beliefs and practices have been reported which seem to bear traces of a former prevalence.

(*a*) *Polynesia.*—Rivers' discoveries, just referred to, in Melanesia find their analogies in Tonga and Tikopia.

In the former he learned that 'each family had its *otua* [a Polynesian word, usually written *atua*, meaning "god" or "ancestor"], some of which were animals and some stones, while a man might also be an *otua*. Examples of animal *otua* were the octopus, the flying fox, and the pigeon. . . . An animal was never eaten by those whose *otua* it was, and I was told,' he says, 'that there was definite belief in descent from the animal.' Similarly on the island of Tikopia he found a number of animals called *atua*. 'Some of these animal *atua* belong to the whole community and may be eaten by no one on the island; others belong to one or other of the four sections into which the people are divided.' Thus the octopus is the *atua* of the Kavika; but it is forbidden as food not only to them but also to the whole people. The Taumako may not eat the sea-eel or a bird called *rupe*—prohibitions limited to this division of the people. The Fangalele may not catch an *ene* fish. The Tafua may not eat the fresh-water eel, the flying fox, or the turtle, the two latter 'being also prohibited as food to the whole community, though regarded as especially sacred to the Tafua.' There was also evidence that the Kavika were believed to be descended from the octopus, the Taumako from the eel, the Tafua from the flying fox; and it was believed that one man of this division became after death a fresh-water eel, while two men of the Fangalele became, the one an *ene* fish, the other a *moko* bird. There are also plant and vegetable *atua*, to which corresponding restrictions attached.[4]

Thus there is reason to think that totemism had at one time existed and had left traces attributable to no other cause. Elsewhere in Polynesia there are relics more or less distinct of the same conditions.

(*b*) *Egypt.* — We are naturally reminded of Egypt. The origin and early development of Egyptian religion are obscure. What we find is that in the earliest period known to us by the

Tribes and Castes of N.W. Provinces and Oudh, passim; and the other works referred to in Crooke's notes to Risley's observations. Cf. also Crooke's observations in *PR*[2] ii. 148–159.

[1] A. C. Haddon, in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 185.

[2] *Ib.* p. 184.

[3] *Ib.*

[4] *Reports Camb. Anthrop. Exped.* v. 373 ff., 367 ff., 80; Frazer, ii. 18–24.

[5] W. H. R. Rivers, *Man*, viii. [1908] 134.

[1] *Man*, viii. 134 f.; *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 158.

[2] *Amer. Anthrop.*, new ser., xii. [1910] 212, 214.

[3] *Univ. of California Publications*, xiv. [1918] 167 ff.

[4] *JRAI* xxxix. 156 ff.

monuments each nome or district had its own peculiar object of adoration in some animal, which was regarded with indifference or, in consequence of local quarrels, with hostility in the adjacent nomes. Moreover (in spite of changes during the country's long history, in spite of the evolution into higher polytheism and of the syncretism which gradually won its way, at all events among the educated classes), the same attitude towards these animals prevailed to the end. One nome venerated the ibis, one the crocodile, one the cat, one the gnat, one the ram, one the *oxyrhynchus* fish, and so on. Some of these are domesticated animals; in the earliest period, however, domesticated animals do not appear. The monarchy seems to have been introduced by a people which invaded Egypt and conquered the aborigines. The invaders carried the standard of a falcon, from the name of which (*heru*) that of Horus, later regarded as the last of the gods who reigned over Egypt, is derived. When the objects of adoration took human form, becoming anthropomorphic gods, these were identified with various animals, and are represented on the monuments with the heads of the appropriate animals. The animals remained sacred, as their numerous mummies attest; and various legends were told to account for their relation to the respective gods. At Bubastis, where the cat was venerated, the goddess Bast had her seat; Ombos, where the crocodile was honoured, was the sacred town of the crocodile-headed god, Sebak; the ram-headed god, Khnûm or Ammon-Rā, was worshipped at Thebes, and there precisely was the place where the sheep was revered. As a result of the unification of the country under the kings, syncretism in theology spread, and the various gods tended to be identified with one another and with the animals honoured in the different towns. At length the myth and worship of the culture-hero, Osiris, prevailed throughout the land; and his myth included a story of how the various gods fled, 'disguised in brutish forms,' from the rage of his enemy Typhon. In short, all sorts of devices are adopted to account for the local gods and animals venerated in the different cities and districts and to unify the religion. These devices were probably known to, or at least accepted by, the educated classes only. All the other classes remained attached to their local deities.[1] The evidence points to the prevalence at one time in the valley of the Nile of a form of totemism, which possibly included various trees and other vegetables (for these, though less prominent than animals, are not unknown in Egyptian religion), and which by a series of steps was slowly merged and elevated into a polytheistic worship tending ever in the minds of the educated more and more to monotheism.[2]

Of the original social organization, however, we know little beyond the fact that it was matrilineal. The woman was mistress of the house; the husband on marriage was received as a guest or went to reside with her. Those men who could afford it kept harems, the members of which were under the governance of the chief wife. It is a probable conjecture from the available information that society was constituted of clans, in later ages directly or indirectly giving birth to trading and other gilds. The custom of the husband going to reside with his wife secured the local concentration of the clan and facilitated the conversion of the clan-settlement into the nome and the dominance of a single animal-totem in each nome.

[1] A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, ii. ch. xv.; E. Naville, *RHR* lii. [1905] 357 ff.; *RHR* li. [1905] 238; A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, chs. vii.–viii.

[2] A. H. Sayce, *The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 116.

All this was doubtless the result of the agricultural occupations of the people. What were the relations of the members of the clan to one another or to the totem we are not informed.

(*c*) *Greece.*—Scientific controversy has raged over the question whether remains of totemism are discoverable in ancient Greece. Salomon Reinach, Toutain, and Van Gennep have been the protagonists. Andrew Lang pointed out the various remains of animal-worship among the Greek peoples — in Thessaly the Myrmidons claiming descent from the ant and revering ants; in the Troad and the islands the mice sacred to Apollo Smintheus and a tribe referred to by an oracle as mice; the adoration of the wolf at Delphi and Athens and of the sheep on Samos; the descent of Tennes, the hero of Tenedos, from a swan; the invocation of Hecate as a dog and the sacrifice to her of a dog;[1] the Artemis of Arcadia, identified with Callisto, a nymph who is fabled to have been metamorphosed into a she-bear, from which the Arcadians claimed descent; the similar tale of the Brauronian Artemis in Attica, served by girls called bears, dancing with the gait of bears and probably in archaic times wearing bear-skins; and a hundred other such myths, rituals, and metamorphoses.[2] Nor has he been alone in discerning that such cases pointed to a primitive totemism, outgrown and misconstrued before the dawn of authentic history. The social organization of Athens has also been examined. The γένος and φρατρία have been pronounced parallel in all essentials with the organization of the Australian totemic clan and phratry.[3] There are good reasons for suspecting that originally matrilineal descent was the rule, of which vestiges subsisted down to historical times.[4] Though this view has been challenged,[5] and it is undoubted that agnatic descent prevailed in historical times, the suspicion is not without solid foundation. Probably the pre-historic population of the period called the Mycenæan age was matrilineal and was conquered by a patrilineal military people from the north, who formed the dominant classes in the Homeric age, and under whom Greek society was transformed and reorganized. On the whole we are justified in accepting with L. R. Farnell the theory that various remarkable cults—the Arcadian worship of Zeus Lycæus and of Artemis Calliste, the Attic worship of Zeus Polieus, and perhaps some others—can be explained only by a survival of what is in effect totemism.[6] But, if so, then other cults and myths of which the connecting links have been lost may with the more likelihood be assigned to the same origin.

(*d*) *Ireland.*—Over the rest of Europe the traces of totemism are still more uncertain. They will be found, as in Greece, if at all, on the side of belief and practice which may be called quasi-religious rather than in social observances such as marriage restrictions; for under the dominance of Christianity and the social ideas, Hebrew and Roman, carried with it society has been shaped for two millenniums. In Connemara and the islands off the west coast of Ireland persons bearing the name of Conneely, who are descended from the clan Conneely, an old family of Iar-Connaught, claim 'that they have seal's blood in them, and that is why they are such good swimmers.'

A story is told of some members of the clan who at a distant period were changed into seals. Since then, it is said, no Conneely can kill a seal without afterwards having bad luck.

[1] *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, i. 277. [2] *Ib.* ii. 211.

[3] A. W. Howitt and L. Fison, *JAI* xiv. [1885] 142 ff.

[4] Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909, i. 265, ii. 18.

[5] L. R. Farnell, *ARW* vii. [1904] 70; H. J. Rose, *FL* xxii. [1911] 277 ff.

[6] *CGS*, Oxford, 1896–1901, i. 41, 58, 91, ii. 434, 441 (cf. iv. 116, v. 106; and J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, *passim*, esp. ch. v.).

Seals are said to be regarded with profound veneration. They are called Conneelys, and are said to be the souls of departed friends. We are told that 'in some places the story has its believers who would no more kill a seal, or eat of a slaughtered one, than they would of a human Conneely.'[1]

Both in Ireland and in the Scottish isles are stories and customs which point to an extinct totemism as the best explanation; and the same explanation has been offered, with more or less probability, of various beliefs and practices in Wales and England as well as in other European countries.[2]

(*e*) *W. China.*—In W. China among the Lolos, an aboriginal mountain people of Szechwan, there is something more than traces of totemism.

Their 'surnames always signify the name of a tree or animal or both tree and animal,' and 'these are considered as the ancestors of the family bearing the name. This name is often archaic. Thus the surname Bu-luh-beh is explained as follows:—Bu-luh is said to be an ancient name for the citron, which is now known as *sa-lu*. The common way of asking a person what his surname is, is to inquire "What is it you don't touch?" and a person of the surname just mentioned would reply "We do not touch the *sa-lu* or citron." People cannot eat or touch in any way the plant or animal, or both, which enters into their surname. The plant or animal is not, however, worshipped in any way.

People of the same surname may marry if there is no obvious relationship. There are, however, groups of two or three surnames amongst whom intermarriage is forbidden; and no explanation of this is given. There are also groups of two or three surnames who are called comrades, and intermarriage amongst them is favoured.'[3]

The Chinese themselves are on a higher plane of civilization, and totemism is unknown. But from sundry prohibitions its existence has been suspected. Among some other peoples of S.W. Asia and various islands of the Indian Archipelago totemism has been either found or suspected. In Madagascar and in the Polynesian islands a number of superstitions have been ascribed with more or less probability to an original totemism no longer forming part of the social organization.

(*f*) *American.*—In Central and S. America also customs and beliefs have been interpreted as traces of totemism. Thus in Peru, where the various clans were localized, each clan worshipped its ancestor, and the tendency seems to have been for such objects of worship to assume the form of an animal, vegetable, or some other natural phenomenon. Each clan, moreover, had a distinctive dress. But our information is too imperfect to permit of a definite opinion on the subject.[4] The Bororo of Brazil claim to be araras (a bird with a red plumage) and believe a neighbouring tribe, the Trumai, to be water-animals, while a certain cannibal tribe is descended from the jaguar.[5] In N. America it was usual for a young man at adolescence, or a man who wished to acquire special powers, to go out into the woods and fast for days in order to acquire a guardian spirit, which usually took the form of an animal. It was revealed to him in a vision in which his austerities culminated; and when it took the form of some animal, a portion or symbol of that animal became his fetish or medicine. Thereafter he obeyed the restrictions and prohibitions believed to have been communicated to him by the vision. There was a tendency among some tribes, particularly in the north-west, for the guardian spirit (*súlia* or *manitu*) to be inherited by his descendants. And some writers have seen in this the origin of totemism.[6] A variety of the practice in Central and S. America is known under the name of nagualism (Quiche *naual*, 'the knowing one' or 'sorcerer'), in which some natural object, commonly an animal, is believed to have a parallel relation with a human being, so that for weal or woe their fates are mutually dependent. The *nagual* is sometimes chosen by divination for an infant at birth, but more often obtained, like a *manitu*, by fasting and prayer.[1] It seems that the *nagual* is a purely personal acquisition and is not inherited like the *súlia*. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the belief of the Bororo nor the *manitu* or *nagual* of other tribes has the marks of true totemism. It has no relation to a clan, nor is it in any way related to the social organization: where the *manitu* descends, it is only to the children or remoter issue of the original possessor, and in such case the descent has only taken place under the influence of patrilineal kinship.

(*g*) *Australia.*—In Australia among the Kurnai and some other tribes of the south-east the two sexes have animals respectively regarded as their protectors, with whom the life of individual members of the sex is supposed to be bound up. Fights between the sexes on behalf of their sex-totems often occurred, as a means, or a preliminary, to marriages.[2] Here again, and for the same reason as in nagualism and the other American beliefs just referred to, the sex-totems are, whatever their origin, entirely unconnected with true totemism.

6. Origin.—The origin of totemism has been the subject of much discussion and speculation among anthropologists. It is only necessary here to refer to a few of the hypotheses offered. That which is identified with the name of Hill-Tout has already been incidentally dealt with. Though accepted by some American anthropologists, it has not generally found favour on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the totem-animal or vegetable, and so for ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use,[3] has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Spencer and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of Rivers of the Melanesians, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and childbirth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans derived respectively from ancestors who originated from the animals or fruits.[4] Such a theory, however, encounters the same difficulties as the theory which ascribes the origin of totemism to the *manitu* become hereditary.

Earlier than either of these theories Frazer had suggested 'that the key to totemism might be found in the theory of the

[1] *FLJ* ii. [1884] 259; *FLR* iv. [1881] 104; C. R. Browne, *Proc. Roy. Irish Academy*, 3rd ser., v. [1899] 262; *JAI* ii. [1873] 448 f.; G. L. Gomme, *Archæol. Rev.* iii. [1889] 219.

[2] G. L. Gomme, *loc. cit.*; N. W. Thomas, *FL* xi. [1900] 227 ff.; *RHR* xxxviii. [1898] 295; S. Reinach, *Cults, Myths and Religions*, Eng. tr. i. 1.

[3] *JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 105.

[4] E. J. Payne, *Hist. of the New World called America*, Oxford, 1892-99, i. 400, 403 n., 462, 463; *Man*, xiii. [1913] 116.

[5] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 352.

[6] C. Hill-Tout, *Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada*, 2nd ser., ix. [1903] 61; and *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 326 ff.

[1] O. Stoll, *Die Ethnologie der Indianerstämme von Guatemala* (Suppl. to *AE* i.), Leyden, 1889, p. 57; D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*[3], Philadelphia, 1896, p. 122, and *Nagualism*, do. 1894, p. 59; D. D. Granada, *Reseña Histórico-descriptiva de antiguas y modernas Supersticiones del Rio de la Plata*, Monte Video, 1896, p. 591.

[2] Howitt, p. 148.

[3] *Fortnightly Rev.*, new ser., lxv. [1899] 647 ff., 835 ff.

[4] Frazer, iv. 57 ff.

external soul, that is, in the belief that living people may deposit their souls for safe keeping outside of themselves in some secure place, where the precious deposit will be less exposed to the risks and vicissitudes of life than while it remained in the body of its owner.'[1] This hypothesis, though founded on a widely spread practice and belief, has not, he frankly admits, been confirmed by further research, inasmuch as 'the evidence which connects this theory of external human souls in animal bodies with totemism appears to be insufficient to justify us in regarding it as the source of the whole institution.'[2]

Andrew Lang, towards the close of his life, was led to emphasize the social aspect of totemism. He advocated a theory similar to that first propounded by Herbert Spencer, and adopted by the German scholar, J. Pikler,[3] that the origin is to be sought in names. According to this theory, bands of men, having been given names from outside, either by way of distinction or as nicknames, accepted these names and came to fancy that they themselves were in a mystical connexion with them, or rather with the things signified by the names, and then the course of social organization, from one cause or another, led first to the preference for wives of another band having a different name, and subsequently to a positive prohibition to marry a woman of the same band and necessarily having the same name—in other words, to clan-exogamy.[4] The influence of names, and the inveterate tendency to regard a name as a real objective existence belonging to and having a mystical connexion with the person or thing signified by it, are practically universal in the lower culture. But why these names were appropriated and accepted by the various bands is left unexplained. Lang apparently agrees with Frazer that the institution of exogamy is distinct from totemism, and that totemism as a matter of fact preceded exogamy.[5] It certainly is a usual, but not quite invariable, accompaniment of it. Lang indeed offers explanations of the origin of exogamy, but it cannot be said that his speculations are more satisfactory than those of previous inquirers.

A. C. Haddon some time ago hazarded a suggestion of the 'possible origin of one aspect of totemism.' It is that there were numerous small human groups in favourable areas, each occupying a restricted range in which a certain animal or plant or group of animals or plants might be specially abundant, and that they consequently utilized these as a food-supply and for other purposes, the superfluity of which could be bartered for the superfluities of other groups.

Thus 'the group that lived mainly on crabs and occasionally traded in crabs might well be spoken of as "the crab-men" by all the groups with whom they came in direct or indirect contact. The same would hold good for the group that dealt in clams or in turtle, and reciprocally there might be sago-men, bamboo-men, and so forth. It is obvious that the men who persistently collected or hunted a particular group of animals would understand the habits of those animals better than other people, and a personal regard for these animals would naturally arise. Thus from the very beginning there would be a distinct relationship between a group of individuals and a group of animals or plants, a relationship that primitively was based, not on even the most elementary of psychic concepts, but on the most deeply seated and urgent of human claims, hunger.'

Here Haddon agrees with Lang that the name of the group was probably imposed from without and adopted by the group thus named. Once accepted, the name and the regard for the animal, or whatever was the object signified by the name, would result in a mystical connexion being held to exist between the object and the human group, which might issue in the object being tabued instead of used as originally, and, on the other hand, in magic being worked to secure a continuous supply of the object. As part of the tabu, or incident to it, exogamy, originating in a preference for women of contiguous groups, might be developed.[1]

E. Durkheim, envisaging chiefly the Australian evidence, considers totemism as a religious institution. According to him, it is the religion of a sort of anonymous and impersonal force manifested in various animals, men, and emblems, none of which possesses it entire, but all of which participate in it. It is the god adored in all totemic cults; but it is an impersonal god without name or history, immanent in the world, diffused in an innumerable multitude of things. It is, in short, *mana* (*q.v.*) or *orenda*. It is not, however, represented under its abstract form, but is conceived as a species of animal or vegetable—in a word, under a sensible form—each group of men taking for ensign the animal or vegetable diffused most plentifully in the neighbourhood of the place where the group was accustomed to assemble. The totem is really only the material form under which this immaterial substance, this energy diffused through all sorts of heterogeneous beings (which is the sole object of the cult), is represented to the imagination. It is the symbol not only of the impersonal totemic principle or god, but also of the definite society, the clan, of which it is the totem. It is the standard, the emblem, by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible sign of its personality, the mark borne by every one that makes part of the clan, whether men, beasts, or anything else. All are sacred in varying degrees; but most sacred of all—more even than the totem-animal or other object itself—is the artificial standard or emblem of the clan. Since all who communicate in the same totemic principle are sacred, the totem is the source of the moral life of the clan, and all are morally bound to one another, with definite duties towards one another of help, vendetta, and so forth. The totem is thus not only a material but a moral force, which may easily transform itself into a divinity properly so called. Totemism therefore is bound up with the organization of society. It is practically assumed as the earliest form of religion and of society everywhere.[2] In the striking work of which the main thesis is here imperfectly summarized Durkheim elaborates this thesis with infinite pains and abundance of illustrations. But everything rests on the assumption of primitive universality, which no attempt is made to prove. Large spaces of the world, however, remain in which totemism has never yet been found. More or less probable traces of it may, indeed, be discerned in these areas; or they may hereafter be discovered. Meanwhile Durkheim's theory remains a brilliant conjecture, and nothing more.

In its insistence on an attitude towards nature and on a psychology different from that of civilized mankind it avoids the rock on which most of the hypotheses heretofore considered have split. This was also emphatically laid down, as the condition of success in solving the question of the origin of totemism, by E. Reuterskiöld, a Swedish scholar, in an article which appeared almost contemporaneously with Durkheim's work. This article is an extension of part of a previous essay by the same author published in 1908. He urges that totemism is connected with an impersonal conception of life. A group of men are allied with a group of animals. There is nothing personal, nothing individual, in their union. It is an association peculiar to the primitive mode of thought, which does not compare one thing with another: if it finds likeness between them, it identifies them. For primitive man the individual is nothing; the group or the species is

[1] Frazer, p. 52. [2] *Ib.* p. 55.
[3] *Der Ursprung des Totemismus*, Berlin, 1900.
[4] Lang, *The Secret of the Totem*, chs. vi. and vii.
[5] iv. 9.

[1] A. C. Haddon, Presidential Address to Anthropology Section, *Report of 72nd Meeting of Brit. Assoc.*, 1902, p. 745 ff.
[2] *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, pp. 269, 294, 334, etc.

everything. Man did not picture himself as lord of creation. He did not sever himself in thought from other living creatures; he was only a part of a great community. He felt himself closely united with a kind of animal living in his neighbourhood and coming in touch with him. It was no accident that he associated himself with one or other species. Totemism has its various sides—religious, magical, and social. These were in the origin undistinguished from one another. The distinction between them came later, with the development of individualism and analysis.[1]

In this way Reuterskiöld would explain the origin of totemism. Without saying that he has completely solved the question, the opinion may be expressed that he has realized the conditions of primitive life and thought sufficiently to define at all events some of the conditions to be fulfilled and so lead to a solution. In endeavouring to explain the attitude towards nature of the tribes of Central Brazil Von den Steinen not only says that they draw no strict line of demarcation between man and brute; he uses the emphatic expression that, to understand it, 'we must think the boundary completely away.' There is thus no impediment to their assimilating themselves to one or another animal. Indeed, the Bororo declare, as we have seen, that they are red araras, not that they will become araras after death, nor that they were araras in a previous existence, but that they are araras here and now. From this attitude of mind we can see how it follows that in their stories human modes of life and thought are attributed to the lower animals, and indeed, as frequently in savage tales, it is often impossible to say whether the actors are human or brute; it follows also that marriages between the former and the latter are in the tales contemplated without aversion or are even regarded as natural, and that interchanges of shape are quite ordinary incidents. It is no question of naming. Totemism is founded on something deeper than that. It assumes a community of nature between men and other creatures; and the existence of the individual is ignored, except as a small and subordinate part of a group, thought of as a whole. It was part of the organization of society which is bound up with the general concept of the world indicated above—a concept by no means confined to totemic peoples, but not always issuing in the same type of organization. How or why particular totems were chosen is a difficult question, but, however interesting, relatively unimportant.

In strict acceptation of the term totemism is not a religion. The respect of the clan for its totem arises out of the attitude of mind just explained. The relation of the clan to its totem assumes a mystical aspect and generates an intense feeling of kinship. This frequently is expressed in the belief that they are descended from the totem-species. As civilization evolves, this belief becomes modified into the shape of a story of the adventure of a human ancestor with the totem-species. Although regarded with reverence and looked to for help, the totem is never, where totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god or a person with powers which we call supernatural. In fact, in that stage of culture totemism usually co-exists with the cult of the dead and often with the worship of other spirits and gods accurately so called.

Its connexion with the social organization, on the other hand, is very intimate. Probably beginning in a more or less inchoate recognition of kinship, it develops the clan-feeling and the clan-organization and by means of clan-exogamy binds the whole tribe together. Whether exogamy actually precedes totemism in point of time or not, there can be no doubt that the interaction of the two strengthens and develops it, until exogamy is seen as an essential element of totemism in its full force. When, in the course of evolving civilization, totemism begins to decay, exogamy may and often does continue to exist independently. And the cases are numerous where the clan-system and exogamy have arisen and existed for long periods without any other element of totemism, so far as we know. So various are the forms of totemism that it has been maintained with plausibility that they are due to a fortuitous concurrence of causes which has united elements originally diverse but tending to converge into a system on the whole marvellously similar wherever it obtains, just as the disintegration, and in many cases the dissolution, of the system have historically been due to a concurrence or a sequence of causes of the opposite kind.

[1] *ARW* xv. [1912] 12 ff. The author's previous work, to which reference is made, is entitled *Till frågan om uppkomsten af sakramentala måltider med särskild hänsyn till Totemismen*, Upsala, 1908.

LITERATURE.—The most comprehensive account of totemism is J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols., London, 1910. It is indispensable to every student of the subject, and it includes a reprint of his early work, *Totemism*, Edinburgh, 1887, and of his subsequent artt. in *The Fortnightly Review*, new ser., lxv. [1899] 647 ff., 835 ff., and lxxviii. [1905] 162 ff., 452 ff. Other important works are Andrew Lang, *Social Origins*, London, 1903, *The Secret of the Totem*, do. 1905, and his earlier work, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, 2 vols., do. 1887; W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], Edinburgh, 1894; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896; four artt. by L. Marillier, on 'La Place du totémisme dans l'évolution religieuse,' in *RHR* xxxvi. [1897] and xxxvii. [1898]; Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, vols. i. and ii., Paris, 1905–08, Eng. tr., London, 1912, *Orpheus*, Paris, 1909; J. Toutain, 'L'Hist. des religions et le totémisme,' in *RHR* lvii. [1908], and A. van Gennep's reply in *RHR* lviii. [1908]; A. A. Goldenweiser, 'Totemism, an Analytical Study,' in *JAFL* xxiii. [1911], with replies by R. H. Lowie in *American Anthropologist*, new ser., xiii. [1911], by A. Lang, *ib.* xiv. [1912], by W. D. Wallis, *ib.* xv. [1913], and the consequent discussions, including an art. by A. A. Goldenweiser, in *ib.* xx. [1918]. Articles bearing on totemism will be found in various volumes of *ASoc*, 1897–1907. Works in German are numerous, but of less importance. The remaining literature in English will be found in the usual anthropological periodicals and other works published in England and America, many of which have been referred to in the text. Other important works have been indicated in the course of the article.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

TRACTARIANISM.—See OXFORD MOVEMENT.

TRADE.—See COMMERCE.

TRADE UNIONS.—A trade union has been defined as 'a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment.'[1] This definition would not be regarded as an adequate account of the objects of a trade union by many labour leaders of the present time, but it may stand with the proviso that there are large questions of politics and industrial reconstruction which under modern conditions have a direct or indirect bearing upon the 'improvement of conditions.' The underlying basis of the movement is the power of combination, and the progressive realization of this power by the masses of the workers in various countries has gone far to revolutionize the face of civilization. Labour is no longer a suppliant pleading for justice, but a strong man armed, presenting demands which he has the power to enforce. How will that power be used? The time seems appropriate for a consideration of the ethical aspects of the trade union movement.

1. Historical.—Trade unionism, like parliamentary government, is the child of the passionate instinct of the British people for civic freedom. It has been transplanted to the colonies, adopted by the working people of every nation in Europe, carried

[1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 1.

across the Atlantic to America. It pervades the whole world of intelligent white labour, but England was its cradle.

Attempts have been made to trace its descent from the craft gilds (*q.v.*) of the Middle Ages, but those institutions are to be regarded as associations of masters rather than of men, and there is little or no evidence of the existence of permanent associations of wage-earners before the 18th century. It was then that the differentiation between employer and employed became more and more marked until a great gulf was finally set between them by the transformation of industry effected by the introduction of machinery and the institution of the modern factory system of production on a large scale. The trade union movement was a direct response to the change of conditions.

In the early part of the 18th cent. continuous associations of wage-earners generally took the form of friendly societies, with sick and funeral funds attached; but, as the century wore on, and the effects of the industrial revolution, in divorcing the worker from the instruments of production and degrading his position, became more apparent, they inevitably assumed a different character. The meetings of the clubs afforded opportunities for talk about questions of wages and conditions of labour, and we find Adam Smith writing:

'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and discussion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.'[1]

This was what the early trade unions appeared to be to the governing classes of those days—'a conspiracy against the public'—and they were only taking the same view as had been taken by the governing classes long before. Combinations of workmen were held to constitute a danger to the State, and from early times a series of statutes had been directed against them. The earliest of these appears to have been the statute 33 Edw. I. c. 1 (1305).

It stamped as conspirators 'all who do confeder or bind themselves by oath, covenant or other alliance, as relates or extends to combinations or conspiracies of workmen or other persons to obtain an advance of, or fix the rate of, wages, or to lessen or alter the hours or duration of the time of working, or to decrease the quantity of work, or to regulate or control the mode of carrying on any manufacture, trade, or business, or the management thereof.'

From this it may be seen that labour questions, including the limitation of output, were much the same in the first part of the 14th cent. as they are to-day. The statute goes on to declare 'combinations or conspiracies of masters, manufacturers, or other persons' to be equally illegal; they too were regarded as constituting a danger to the State; and the principle that all combinations, whether of masters or of men, should be suppressed in the interest of the public may be said to underlie most of our earlier industrial legislation. But, as time went on, the tendency was for the laws against labour to be rigidly enforced, while those in its favour were very laxly administered or allowed to fall into oblivion.

The Act of Edward I. was followed by a series of others of the same nature. In the 18th cent. they became more and more frequent with the rise of the new associations. At least fifteen were enacted in the reign of George III. before the year 1800. That year marks an epoch. The whole of the existing Combination Acts were consolidated in a new law which made all associations of workmen (and of employers) illegal, and membership of such an association a criminal offence (39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 106).

The position of the workers now was that, while no attempt was made to extend already existing State regulations as to wages, hours, and conditions of employment so as to apply them to the altered circumstances of the times—and many of them had become practically inoperative—they were debarred by statute from what seemed the only chance of escape, association for mutual protection. But, in spite of this, associations were formed, some of which, as the direct result of this repressive legislation, took the form of secret societies with strange oaths and revolutionary rites, and the next twenty-five years were full of trouble and discontent. Eventually by the Acts 5 Geo. IV. c. 95 (1824) and 6 Geo. IV. c. 129 (1825) the Combination Laws were repealed and association for the purpose of regulating wages or hours of labour was expressly legalized.

The position of the trade unions was now secure. Some forty-five were discovered in 1824 to have managed to maintain a precarious existence in spite of the Combination Laws, but, when the laws were repealed, trade unions sprang into life all over the country. The next few years were a period of great industrial activity, and the work of organization was taken in hand in earnest. It was also a time of great political activity, and soon after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832 we find that the unions had already accumulated members and funds sufficient to make them a distinct power in politics. They threw themselves heartily into the movement initiated by Robert Owen—the membership of his 'Grand National Consolidated Trades Union' in 1834 has been estimated at half a million—but on the whole stood aloof from the Chartist movement which played such an important part in the history of the working classes between 1837 and 1848. Between 1850 and 1860 trade unionism made rapid strides on the old lines, and then there was a marked increase of political interest with the Reform Bill of 1867 as its centre.

The Trade Union Act of 1871 marked another stage. Though the repeal of the Combination Laws had left the workers free to combine, all combinations 'in restraint of trade' were still illegal. The funds of any such society therefore did not enjoy the protection of the law, but were at the mercy of any official who had access to them. As a matter of fact the trust had been very seldom abused, but the position was unsatisfactory, and the Act remedied it, and also strengthened the position of the unions in other respects. In 1875 a further Act recognized employers and workmen (they were no longer called master and servant) as equal parties to a civil contract, and 'peaceful picketing' during a strike was expressly permitted. Thus 'collective bargaining, with all its necessary accompaniments, was after fifty years of legislative struggle finally recognized by the law of the land.'[1]

Ten years later the movement entered upon a new phase. The leading spirits were no longer content to proceed steadily upon the old lines, and John Burns and Tom Mann became the apostles of a more militant and aggressive creed. A 'new unionism' came into existence which was inspired by the doctrines of socialism (*q.v.*). Its spirit was manifested in the labour unrest of 1889–90. This has been in its turn outpaced by the still newer unionism of the 20th cent., which is syndicalist instead of socialist and regards the general strike as its weapon. But, at all events up to the outbreak of the war in 1914, the great bulk of trade unionists seem to have been content, as Joseph Clayton has said,

'to proceed steadily on the old lines—distrusting revolutionary sentiments, favouring the return to Parliament of their officers, of whose abilities and honesty they are well aware, believing that by collective bargaining they can achieve a more comfortable life for themselves and their families and that

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, bk. I. ch. 10.

[1] Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 275.

legislation of a social character is also needed to improve their position.'[1]

Beyond the outbreak of the war we do not propose to go.

The total number of trade unions in existence at the end of 1913 is given in the *Labour Year Book* as 1135 with a membership of just under four millions—more than double what they had been ten years before.

2. Moral and economic justification of trade unionism.—No one would be likely to deny that trade unions are a necessary feature of modern industrial life, and most people would admit that they are on the whole a salutary feature. Our forefathers may have been sincere in their belief that the State could not afford to allow such associations to exist, that they constituted a real danger to the public; but in those days there was little knowledge of the conditions under which the 'lower classes' lived and little sympathy with the workers themselves. Moreover, the existing order was taken for granted. It was recognized that there were evils which called for alleviation, but the ideas of the most sympathetic did not get farther than palliation; prevention was beyond their scope. Such attempts as were made in early times to regulate industry by legal enactments were crude; and, when the great crisis of the 18th cent. arrived and there was the most urgent need of strong and intelligent control, there was no one who saw the meaning and implications of the change. The industrial revolution went its way unfettered; the old industrial order was swept away and chaos supervened; whole classes of workers became involved in a condition of unparalleled servitude, poverty, and degradation. But the governing classes failed to realize that, if there was a possible element of danger in the existence of combinations of workers, the existence of such a state of things was a far greater danger and in addition an intolerable disgrace to any civilized country. From the fetters riveted upon us in those evil days we as a nation have been for a century endeavouring with infinite struggles and effort to set ourselves free. The conscience of the public was at last aroused, but long before it was aroused the workers had learnt to help themselves; the State at last awoke to some sort of a sense of its responsibilities, but the driving power which lay behind the various enactments was the power of the associations of workers. This is the first and broadest ground of justification of unionism. It has laid the foundations of a new industrial order, and those foundations were laid in the power of two far-reaching ideas—the realization of the power of combination and the conception of the organization of labour.

Another debt which the country owes to trade unionism is the emancipation of large sections of its population from the cold and selfish individualism of past days. It is a debt which is not generally realized and seldom acknowledged; but no one who knows anything of the actual working of trade unions, or is brought much into contact with their members, can fail to see how strong the bonds of fellowship are, how clearly the members realize their dependence upon one another, how ready they are to bear one another's burdens if occasion arises. Trade unionism is full of paradoxes, and none of them is more striking than that action which appears to be hard and selfish is found sometimes upon investigation to be based upon the most unselfish motives, or that practices which intelligent workers themselves admit to be unjustifiable in theory are invested with a strong moral sanction as the only means for the protection of the weak.

[1] *Trade Unions*, London, 1913, p. 27.

On these two broad general grounds—that it has pointed the way to the establishment of a new industrial order, and that it has recalled us to a sense of a forgotten side of our social order—it may be said that the trade union movement has abundantly justified itself. We shall now proceed to consider some of the special manifestations of its activity which have been at different times the subject of criticism.

(*a*) *Strikes.*—The strike (*q.v.*) has always been the trade unionist's most effective weapon. He can do much to protect himself by the method of mutual insurance or collective bargaining, but the strike gives him the power of bringing pressure to bear if he desires to enforce an agreement or to secure an improvement in wages or conditions of labour. The question whether it is a fair weapon is therefore fundamental. At present the right to strike has been practically acknowledged by the law, but the concession has only been gradual. At first all strikes were regarded as conspiracies and illegal; then there came a stage at which the right to strike was tacitly acknowledged, but the courts condemned them on the ground of assumed 'malicious intent'; next attempts were made to discriminate between different kinds of motive; and now the tendency seems to be to uphold the right to strike as such.

The relation between employer and employed has been regarded in law since 1875 as a civil contract between two theoretically free and equal individuals. It is in some cases a contract of very short duration, but it does not differ in nature from longer contracts. A weekly-wage-earner is in this respect in the same position as a highly placed salaried official. He therefore has the right to terminate his contract when he pleases, so long as he does not contravene its terms. But the essence of a strike is that it is the simultaneous termination of many contracts, and it derives its power from the fact that it is inconvenient or even harmful to the employer, and generally meant to be so. Now no one would deny that any worker where wages are inadequate or conditions intolerable has the right to say to an employer, 'I will not work for you for such wages or under such conditions.' Nor will it be denied that many of the workers have a right to say this simultaneously as a joint protest. Finally, it is hard to see how they would be wrong in endeavouring to persuade others to do the same. If these three points are conceded, the right to strike is established in principle.

The strike then, regarded as a protest, is a lawful weapon, but the days are long past when strikes were simply protests. To-day in the majority of cases they are used as weapons of offence. Even as such they are doubtless often justifiable, but weapons of offence are used to threaten or to inflict injury: that is what they are for; and, if it is conceded that the use of such weapons is allowable in industrial warfare, there would seem to be need of some controlling power to see that they are used fairly. A strike may be simply an instrument of tyranny and oppression.

Moreover, the whole question has assumed a new aspect in recent years as the result of closer association between different classes of workers and the enormous increase of power which the strike has derived from their simultaneous action. A strike on a large scale is no longer a mere matter between employers and employed: the whole nation may be affected. An unpleasant feature of some recent strikes has been the frank admission by their promoters that it was their deliberate intention to cause such general inconvenience and even injury as would force a settlement in their favour, simply to put an end to them. Such

action is narrow and selfish and is condemned by public opinion. In no civilized country can any one body of men be allowed to hold the nation to ransom at their pleasure. The State is greater than any of its component parts, and is morally bound to take measures to protect the nation as a whole from exploitation by any section of it.

The question of picketing is closely connected with that of strikes. A strike really is a device to starve an employer out; its efficacy depends upon the completeness with which his supplies of labour can be cut off. It is therefore of the first importance to the strikers to see that no one else takes their place, and that none of the workers continue their work. Hence an elaborate system of sentries and pickets. There is nothing to be urged against 'peaceful persuasion,' but it is obvious that, at a time when strong emotions are aroused, such a practice needs careful watching if the persuasion is not to be allowed to degenerate into intimidation or even violence.

The Act of 1875 rendered liable to a fine or imprisonment 'every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority *watches or besets* the house or other place where such other person resides or works'; but declared that attending at or near the house or place 'in order merely to obtain or communicate information' shall not be deemed watching or besetting.

(*b*) *The limitation of output.*—There are some things about trade unionism which will never be understood unless they are regarded as projected against a background of injustice and petty tyranny. The deliberate limitation of output is one of them. It has been, and is still, the practice of some unions not to allow their members to do more than a given amount of work in a given time. A bricklayer, *e.g.*, may not lay more than a given number of bricks in a day. This practice is unjustifiable from the economic point of view, because the object of industry is production and the worker who systematically produces less or worse work than he might is not true to his trade. It is also morally unjustifiable because every one is bound in honour to accomplish to the best of his ability the task which he has taken in hand. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this. On what grounds then is it defended? On the ground that it is the only protection that can be devised for the weak against the lowering of the rate of wages by an unscrupulous employer. It was found that an employer who had already agreed to a certain piece-rate, on finding that the best of his men were earning wages which seemed to him in his short-sightedness preposterous, went back upon his word and proceeded to cut the rate, with the result that the slow or weak among the workers were no longer able to earn the weekly wage which he himself had considered as fair when he fixed the original piece-rate. Labour, in order to remove any such excuse for a lowering of wages, resolved that no member of the trade, whatever his strength or speed, should be allowed to outpace the rest. The best workers were called upon to make a sacrifice, but it was made readily and it rested upon altruistic motives. It is an anomaly, and it is injurious to industry. As the progressive organization of industry proceeds, the need of it will probably disappear. Meanwhile it remains, not without a touch of pathos, as an indication of the dislocation which has invested in the eyes of the workers a practice which they would not really defend with the sanction of self-sacrifice.

(*c*) '*Ca' canny.*'—The policy of limitation of output is sometimes adopted upon less defensible grounds. We do not refer to those cases in which a man does less than he might, or as little as he can contrive, out of personal resentment towards an employer or as a protest against a system which he believes to be unjust. Such cases are not uncommon, but it is doubtful whether any union would deliberately support them with its formal sanction. But many unionists believe that there is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that there will not be enough to go round if the standard of production per man is too high. This 'lump-of-labour' doctrine of the worker is the complement of the old 'wages-fund' theory of the capitalists of the 19th cent., who believed that there was only a certain sum available for wages, and that, if one set of workmen got more, it meant that of necessity another set would get less. Both were equally fallacious. There is neither a fixed amount of work nor a fixed sum available for wages; both are elastic. The way to increased wages lies through increased production, for it is out of the value of the product that wages, like salaries and the cost of raw materials, are paid. To limit production is to lessen the fund out of which wages are paid. There is also a belief that, if the best workmen are allowed to force the pace, the result will be a subtle reduction of the standard of earnings of the average worker—a 'bell-wether' is regarded as an abomination—and the best protection against this danger (which is a real one) is held to be a sort of standardization of output comparable to the standardization of hours and wages in which the workers have found protection and safety. But it seems indisputable that, if the best workers in a trade are circumscribed and shackled, the whole trade must be the worse for it, workers included.

(*d*) It is difficult to estimate the truth of the charges of tyranny, intimidation, and violence which have often been brought against the trade unions. There have doubtless been many cases of such things in the industrial history of the last 150 years. Violence has been used against employers; intimidation and violence have been used against other workers who failed to come into line. What we want to know, and what is very difficult to find out, is to what extent, if at all, the unions have condoned such action. We should be safe, however, in asserting that violence forms no part of the trade union programme, and we may go further and say that with the growth of trade unionism there has been a distinct improvement in the conduct of strikes. Violence and bloodshed are certainly less common now than they were.

(*e*) It has been said that the organization of labour on modern lines is an idea which we owe to the trade unions. Has this organization in some cases been carried too far? Employers often complain that they find themselves fettered and obstructed by trade union regulations which seem to them to be merely meticulous and vexatious. There is probably some truth in this. Trade unionism, on its defensive side, has surrounded itself with an elaborate system of bulwarks against every conceivable possibility of an attack. These regulations are not arbitrary; the initiated know that they are applications in detail of some principle which the workers regard as important. They are born of mistrust, and they will not disappear until employers and employed learn to understand one another better and feel that they are co-partners in the same enterprise. But it should be realized that industry cannot work in chains.

Trade unions are 'an inevitable product of modern economic life.' They are now almost universally recognized, and the recognition is based upon the fact that the conditions of labour are now group conditions and that the worker who forms a simple unit of a large group is powerless

to bargain successfully with an employer. The employer occupies a superior strategic position, and the worker's only hope is in association. It is undeniable that, where large associations of industrial units are formed, there is a danger of tyrannous action, and the larger the association, the greater the danger; but it is equally undeniable that the circumstances of the time seem to call for such associations, and the danger should be confronted. The advantages to be gained are great, and the danger can be met with the assistance of the legislature and the law-courts.

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TRADITION.—The word 'tradition' means, etymologically, 'handing over.' The conception of tradition, therefore, implies (*a*) a 'deposit' which is handed over, and (*b*) 'depositaries,' *i.e.* persons who are in possession of the deposit, and are commissioned to preserve it and transmit it to successors. Most religious systems claim to bear within themselves a deposit, consisting of ceremonial, myth, dogma, or ethic, or of some of these elements, revealed by some ultimate divine or quasi-divine authority, and meant to be handed down to posterity by a succession of duly qualified trustees. This article discusses the part which the principle of tradition has played in the history of Christianity.

1. Christ and Jewish tradition.—There is not much uncertainty regarding the attitude of the Founder of Christianity towards the Jewish tradition which He found already in existence. He was Himself a member of the Jewish Church, and disclaimed any idea of being a rebel against it: 'Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil' (Mt 5^{17}). It would be generally agreed that His object was, not to abolish the traditional Mosaic deposit or to annihilate the depositary society—the 'congregation of the Lord,' the 'Israel of God'—but rather to develop and expand the then existing Jewish Ecclesia into the 'Kingdom of God' and to reform and purify the deposit by blending it with the gospel, or 'good news,' of a glorious age to come. In regard to the reform of the deposit, He insisted primarily upon its re-moralization. The classical passage for this is, of course, the famous saying about Corban (Mt 15^{1-20}, Mk 7^{9-23}), with the affirmation, which follows, that it is not the things which go into a man, but those which come out of the man, that defile the man. This may appear, at first sight, to challenge in principle the whole conception of the ceremonial deposit and brusquely to deny any spiritual value to outward observances. It certainly claims an infinitely higher place for ethical values as compared with ceremonial precepts; it might be taken, further, to imply that the sole seat of religious authority for a pious Jew lay in the written Word, the *Tôrāh*, and that the oral tradition of the Rabbis was comparatively worthless. An even stronger implication as to the transitory nature of the Rabbinical tradition is contained in the saying about the 'new wine' and the 'old wine-skins' (Mk $2^{21f.}$, Mt $9^{16f.}$), though it is to be noted that Luke (5^{39}) appends a saying which may seem to point in the other direction—'The old (wine) is better.'

It may perhaps be said also that, to a certain extent, Christ demanded the re-intellectualization of the deposit. The authority of tradition is subordinated, not merely to that of the moral law embodied in the written Word, but to that of common sense. This is illustrated by His various sayings on the subject of the Sabbath. The impression which we gain from a review of the teaching of Christ, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, is that His attitude towards the Rabbinical tradition was simultaneously both reverential and critical, both conservative and progressive. There are two other pieces of evidence which should be considered in this connexion. Opinions differ as to the amount of historical value which should be assigned to the Fourth Gospel; but it is to be presumed that the exceedingly hostile attitude assumed by the Johannine Christ towards 'the Jews' is at least based upon genuine reminiscences of one side of the teaching of Jesus; and the declaration that the worship of the future was to be conducted neither on Mount Gerizim nor at Jerusalem, but throughout the whole earth, 'in spirit and in truth,' represents an attitude as anti-Rabbinical as it is possible to conceive. On the other hand, sayings recorded by 'Matthew,' the specifically Jewish evangelist, seem to represent Jesus as a whole-hearted supporter of tradition, though a severe critic of the moral shortcomings of its depositaries. 'Not one iota or one vowel-point shall pass away from the law until all be fulfilled' (Mt 5^{18}) is a passage in which the characteristic Jewish doctrine of the eternity of the *Tôrāh* seems to be proclaimed; He adds that, unless the zeal of His converts for the literal observance of the Law exceeds even that of the scribes and Pharisees, they cannot hope to enter into the Messianic Kingdom (5^{20}). The official, as distinct from the personal, authority of the Rabbis appears to be affirmed in the saying, 'The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe: but do not ye after their works,' etc. ($23^{2f.}$). Another saying in the same chapter contains the warning that Christ's insistence upon the supreme importance of moral conduct is not meant to imply any contempt for ceremonial minutiæ, in their proper place: 'Ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, judgement, and mercy, and faith: but these ye ought to have done, and not to have left the other undone' (v.^{23}). On the other hand, it is fair to remember that the denunciations of the hypocrisy and quibbling casuistry of the Rabbis recorded by St. Matthew equal in intensity and bitterness the Johannine Christ's most vehement invectives against 'the Jews.' It seems probable that the Rabbinizing utterances in the First Gospel represent ironical sayings of Christ, which the first evangelist has misunderstood and taken literally, in accordance with his Judaistic presuppositions.

We may sum up this section of our inquiry by observing (*a*) that, in the view of the Founder of Christianity, the Jewish Church was in any case destined to be expanded and transformed into the 'Kingdom of God,' and that His attitude towards Jewish tradition must, therefore, have been of an interim and provisional nature, which will not necessarily give us the clue to His attitude towards the whole principle of tradition, as such, in religion; (*b*) that, for the time being, He had no desire to deny the value or divine origin of the main body of the Jewish deposit; it seems that His invectives against the *de facto* depositaries had reference rather to their personal shortcomings than to the official authority which they claimed; (*c*) that He insisted upon the subordination of the existing oral tradition to the authority of Scripture, the moral law, and common sense; and (*d*) that He was a deadly foe to that tendency towards the hypertrophy of ceremonialism, and the evanescence of moral and intellectual content, which is familiar to the historical student as the weakness to which traditional religions are peculiarly liable.

2. Christ and Christian tradition. — We now approach a question on which opinions are, and have been for many centuries, acutely divided. It seems clear that Christ did not, on any showing, contemplate the eternal permanence of the Jewish tradition; but did He Himself mean to found a new one? Did He design to promulgate a new

deposit, a body of dogmatic and ethical truth revealed by Himself for the first time? Did He mean to found a society as the guardian of this deposit and its authorized expounder? Did He institute a class of depositaries within the society, empowered to decide as to its true contents in cases of dispute? Or did He mean to make a complete breach, in theory and principle, with the great religions of the ancient world as they had historically grown up, and to propagate, not so much an organized religion as a philosophical point of view or a mode of emotional feeling? In other words—Is Christianity to be regarded as the perfect traditional religion, the crown and flower of that whole process of traditional evolution which may be traced down the centuries, possessing a deposit of immutable truth and authentic, life-giving sacraments, and preserved by a majestic, supernatural society, a Kingdom which is in this world, yet not of it? Or was Christianity, as designed by its Founder, meant to involve a complete break with the past, and an entirely fresh start upon non-dogmatic, non-sacramental, non-ecclesiastical lines?

3. The 'Catholic' view of tradition.—It is a well-known fact that at the present day three-quarters of Christendom would return an unhesitating affirmative to the question, Did Christ intend to be the Founder of a traditional religion? We may refer to this great majority of Christians as the 'Catholic' part of Christendom—not with the object of begging any controversial questions, but merely in order to have a convenient label for denoting that system of faith and practice which is, in its general outlines, common to the 'pre-Reformation' Churches—*i.e.* to the Roman, Eastern Orthodox, Coptic, Abyssinian, Armenian, Syrian Jacobite, Chaldæan, and Malabarese communions—and which was inherited by them from the ancient undivided Church of the Græco-Roman Empire, of which they are fragments. The 'Catholic' view of tradition maintains that the deposit of faith (*depositum fidei*) was partly taken over by Christ from the existing Jewish Church and partly revealed by Him to His apostles and other hearers during His earthly life and especially during the 'great forty days,' which, according to St. Luke (Ac 1^{3}), intervened between His resurrection and ascension, and during which He spoke of 'the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.' He thus committed to them—either by stamping with His own approval certain already existing Jewish beliefs or by Himself revealing fresh truth for the first time—in germ and essence the great doctrines of the orthodox faith and the system of sacraments which He instituted for the salvation of mankind. He told His adherents that they were to consider themselves as being the true Israel, *His* Ecclesia, which, in some sense, He would build upon Peter as a foundation (Mt 16^{18}). With this divinely-founded society He promises to be present all the days, even unto the consummation of the age (28^{20}), and to it He promises to send the Paraclete, who would guide its members into all truth (Jn 16^{13}). These promises are interpreted by 'Catholics' as guaranteeing the 'infallibility' of the Church in the interpretation and definition of the authentic contents of the deposit. It is, further, believed that within the Church the special task of preserving (and, when need should arise, of defining) the deposit was committed by Christ to the twelve apostles and to their successors, the bishops.

According to this view, therefore, all that Christ instituted was (1) a deposit (no doubt embodied at first in a way of life, rather than in an exactly formulated creed, and expressed, so far as it was verbally expressed at all, in pictorial rather than logical or metaphysical terms), and (2) a depositary class, consisting of the twelve men whom He had designated, in apocalyptic language, as the satraps of the future Kingdom. It would be hardly correct to speak of Him as having instituted the depositary body, the Church, inasmuch as this was conceived of as being, not a new society, but the only orthodox remnant of the old Jewish Church. But in these rudimentary beginnings the possibility of a magnificent development was given. The living force of the Christian tradition spontaneously generated the same complex mechanism for its own preservation and perpetuation as may be seen, endeavouring to struggle into existence, in the fields of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. The first element in this apparatus to appear was the canon of Scripture. At first the only Scriptures which the Christian Church possessed were those of the Jewish Church, or, rather, of the Jewish Church as it existed outside Palestine. The Bible recognized in most parts of the earliest Christian Church was the Septuagint Old Testament, containing the books now called Apocrypha; so that, from the first, the oral tradition, vested in living depositaries (the apostles and their successors), was, to a certain extent, controlled by the existence of written documents, believed to embody some at least of the main constituents of the deposit. The Marcionite controversy of the 2nd cent. compelled the Church to form a collection of apostolic writings for the purpose of demonstrating the identity of the deposit, as she maintained it, with that committed by Christ to the original depositaries, and refuting the Gnostic claim to possess a secret tradition other than, and opposed to, the ecclesiastical tradition. This apostolic collection became canonized as 'the New Testament' of equal authority and inspiration with the original Scriptures, the 'Old Testament' of the Jewish Church.[1] In the 2nd cent., too, we observe the first beginnings of the baptismal creeds, brief formulæ whose threefold structure was derived from the threefold invocation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the solemn words of baptism, and intended to summarize the essentials of the orthodox faith in a form which could be committed to memory by persons of the weakest intellectual capacity.[2] The canon of Scripture and the baptismal creeds were thus the two great contributions of the 2nd cent. to the organization whereby the Catholic deposit was perpetuated and safeguarded against any essential change of content. The last great development of apparatus for safeguarding the authenticity of the deposit is to be found in the institution of ecumenical councils—the characteristic invention of the 4th century.[3] In the 2nd and 3rd centuries it had been possible for Hippolytus, Irenæus, and Tertullian to appeal to the unbroken succession of the bishops and to point to their unanimous consent as a proof of the authenticity of the ecclesiastical tradition, as against the alleged secret traditions of the various Gnostic sects. But towards the end of the period of persecution it came to be realized that the bishops themselves, the chief depositaries of the faith, might disagree as to its content; and these disagreements could only be resolved, in Christianity as in Buddhism, by the expedient of summoning a council representing, in theory or in fact, the complete body of chief depositaries, *i.e.* the total episcopate of the world. The object of a council was not so much to discover fresh truth as to determine what, as a matter of fact, was the doctrine which had been believed in the Church from the beginning. Hence, though each bishop

[1] See art. BIBLE IN THE CHURCH, I. 2 f.
[2] See art. CONFESSIONS, 8.
[3] See art. COUNCILS (Christian: Early, to A.D. 870).

had, in theory, the right to put before the council that version of the faith which he had received from his predecessors and which had been handed down to his local church from its first founder, the greatest weight was naturally attached to the testimony of the great 'apostolic sees.' Complete unanimity in the acceptance of one particular version of the faith would, of course, have stamped it in the minds of Catholic Christians as unquestionably authentic and apostolic; but, if complete unanimity had been possible of attainment, it would probably have been unnecessary to summon councils. The principle was, therefore, arrived at that an overwhelming majority of the depositaries, especially if it included the occupants of one or more of the great apostolic sees, had the same authority as the whole body. This principle is expressed by St. Vincent of Lerins when he says, or implies, that the consensus of 'paene omnes' is as good as that of 'omnes [sacerdotes].'[1] Hence it follows that a small minority of the depositaries, contumaciously refusing to submit to the authority of the majority, necessarily becomes schismatic. Another famous expression of the right of a majority among the depositaries to decide what is the true version of the deposit is to be found in St. Augustine's celebrated aphorism: 'Securus iudicat orbis terrarum, bonos non esse, qui se diuidunt ab orbe terrarum in quacumque parte terrarum.'[2]

It is true that most of the so-called ecumenical councils were not actually representative of the total episcopate of the world. They became ecumenical in virtue of their acceptance, immediate or gradual, by the majority of bishops. We are here concerned solely with theory, and need not go into the question as to how far theological controversies during the first thousand years of Christianity were merely the reflexion of political, national, or racial antagonisms. It is sufficient to note that each of the great decisive doctrinal formulations of the conciliar period was followed by a split between the majority, which accepted, and the minority, which rejected, it. Thus, after Nicæa and Constantinople, a separate, 'non-juring,' Arian Church came into existence among the Goths and other northern barbarians; after Ephesus a 'non-juring' Nestorian Church[3] was constituted in Syria and Persia; after Chalcedon the Monophysite Church,[4] which still includes most of the Christians of Egypt and Armenia, split off from the rest of Christendom. But, whilst shedding, so to speak, these dissentient bodies round its periphery, the 'great Church,' the Church of the majority of the depositaries, the Church of the Græco-Roman Empire, the 'Melkite' or 'Imperial' Church, as it was derisively called by the Eastern schismatics, held together round the imperial throne and the great apostolic see of Rome, maintaining its majestic unity unbroken, with the brief exceptions of the Zenonian and Photian schisms, for a thousand years. In the 'Great' or 'Melkite' Church, as it stood on the eve of the Great Schism of 1054, the fourfold structure of traditionalism, towards which the Buddhist and Zoroastrian faiths had been dimly groping their way, had come into full, explicit, and conscious existence, in the most imposing and magnificent form which has ever existed upon earth. The Church, the hierarchy, the canon of Scripture, and the ecumenical councils are all there, each fulfilling its harmonious part in the task of preserving, elucidating, and defining the apostolic deposit.

4. The Reformation and tradition. — The Reformation (*q.v.*) was, in essence and in its earlier stages, a revolt not so much against the authority of the deposit or of its Founder as against that of the existing depositary class in Western Europe—a revolt occasioned by the corruption and exactions of the pope and the hierarchy. In the first fervour of indignation against the vices of the clergy it seemed necessary to deny the whole principle of a body of men divinely commissioned to safeguard the Christian revelation. The mental outlook and *Weltanschauung* of the earlier Reformers was just as scholastic as that of the mediæval theologians, and demanded, just as imperiously, a clear-cut body of dogmatic theology as an essential element in religion. Hence, only those elements in the deposit were discarded the rejection of which followed immediately from the rejection of the hierarchy; and a new basis of authority had to be found for the Christian tradition. This basis was found in 'the Bible, and the Bible only.' We have seen that, for Catholic Christians, the structure of the orthodox faith was raised upon two pillars—the oral tradition of the Church and the Scriptures. The logical effect of the Reformation was to knock away the first of these pillars, leaving the second standing; and so adamantine was (and is) the cohesion and solidarity of orthodox Christianity that for three hundred years it was able to remain practically intact throughout Protestant Europe, balanced upon the solitary surviving pillar. The last hundred years have witnessed the gradual erosion of this pillar, through the continual dropping of the rains of Biblical criticism, and the consequent collapse in those regions of the superincumbent structure. This result, however, could not then have been foreseen. The great orthodox Protestant theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries only designed to modify the Catholic theory of authority in the following sense:

'We quite agree with the Catholic in holding that there *is* a changeless deposit of eternal truth, and that this was imparted by Christ our Lord to the apostles as depositaries, during His earthly life and the "great forty days"; but we deny that the functions of the apostles as depositaries were meant to be transmitted, or were transmitted, by them to any successors. Their functions as guardians of the truth were purely temporary, and ended at their deaths. They were, however, divinely inspired to write the New Testament, in which, together with the Old Testament, the deposit is fully and sufficiently contained. Thenceforward, the sole authority for the content of revealed truth was and is to be found in the written Word of God; and councils and synods have no authority other than that which may attach to the piety and learning of their members.'

It would, perhaps, be unfair to assert that this doctrine of the Bible, isolated and abstracted from the life of the teaching Church, as the sole fount of religious truth, necessarily presupposes the mechanical theories of 'verbal inspiration' which prevailed during the era of Protestant scholasticism, though it certainly did much to encourage them. Two difficulties, however, at once made themselves felt: (1) 'If the authority of the Church is practically *nil*, how do we know what "the Bible" is, *i.e.* what books ought to be included in the canon and what not? Because, hitherto, it has only been on the authority of the Church that we have believed in the canonicity and inspiration of these particular books.' (2) 'As some parts of the Bible are admittedly written in an obscure style, how are the unlearned to decide what the true meaning is?' The former difficulty, which the Catholic theologians of the counter-Reformation were not slow in pressing upon their opponents, at once raised the question of the canonicity of the Apocrypha, books which were uncongenial to the Reformers because of the passage (2 Mac 12^{43-45}) commending prayers for the dead. A similar difficulty was created for many Protestant Christians by the *prima facie* incompatibility of the Epistle of St. James with Lutheran solifidianism—a fact which caused Luther to describe it as an 'epistle of straw.' The second was emphasized by the fissiparous tendencies which immediately began to manifest themselves in reformed Christendom, converting it into a chaos of sects, which ranged from the high scholastic orthodoxies of Luther and Calvin down to the Arianism of Socinus and the crazy extravagances of the Münster Anabaptists. The patent contradiction between the Protestant theory of the simplicity and obviousness of the meaning of Scripture and the infinite diversity of opinions held by those who professed to accept it as the sole authority for the outlines of the Christian deposit was satirized in the celebrated couplet of Werenfels of Basel:

'Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.'

[1] *Commonitorium*, iii. 6.
[2] *C. Epist. Parmen.* III. iv. 24.
[3] See art. NESTORIANISM.
[4] See art. MONOPHYSITISM.

To the former of these objections the Reformers replied by taking the short Palestinian canon of the OT, as now held by the Jewish Church, on the ground that (as Jerome had urged) the Jews must surely themselves know what their own Scriptures were (thus abandoning the primitive Christian tradition which had taken over the longer, Septuagintal canon from the Hellenistic Jew) and by affirming that, so far as the NT Scriptures were concerned, their authority was manifest on the face of them, in virtue of the sublimity and elevation of their style and doctrines. This reply obviously settled nothing as to the disputed case of the Epistle of St. James, inasmuch as the question at issue between Luther and his opponents on the subject of this book was precisely this—Were its doctrines to be called 'sublime' or pernicious? To the second question, also, no very satisfactory reply was ever given. In logic the orthodox Protestant divines were compelled to maintain, and did in fact maintain, that the whole system of Nicene and Chalcedonian doctrine could be deduced with unerring certainty from the text of the NT, given a prayerful and reverent spirit on the part of its readers. But the 'subordinationistic' passages in St. Paul's Epistles (cf. 1 Co 11^{3} 15^{28} etc.) and those in which the Logos and the Spirit are apparently identified (cf. Ro $8^{9f.}$, 2 Co 3^{17}), together with the patent fact that Socinus and his followers regarded themselves as 'prayerful' and 'reverent,' must have made the orthodox Protestants doubt in their inmost hearts whether the matter really was as simple as this; and hence they sometimes show signs of being, unwillingly, driven back upon the conception of a teaching Church as the authorized interpreter of Holy Writ.[1] The Thirty-Nine Articles characteristically take up a position which may be interpreted as consistent either with the Catholic view of tradition and Scripture as joint authorities for the truth of the deposit or with the Protestant conception of the book of the Scriptures as the sole authority, independent of any living exponent.

So we are told that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation,'[2] that the three creeds are apparently only to be believed 'because they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture,'[3] that 'General Councils may err, and sometime have erred,' and that 'things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.'[4] On the other hand, 'the Church . . . hath authority in controversies of faith' and is 'a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ.'[5]

So far as a coherent conception of the relations of tradition to Scripture can be wrought out from these statements, it has been attained by Hooker, whose *Ecclesiastical Polity* appears to be based on the now antiquated assumption that the Chalcedonian theology can be deduced from the text of the NT as directly and irresistibly as the movements of the heavenly bodies can be deduced from a set of astronomical tables. A characteristic and explicit expression of the thoroughgoing Catholic view within the Anglican Communion is to be found in Thorndike's declaration that an indispensable mark of the true Church is 'the preaching of that word and that ministering of the sacraments which the *tradition* of the whole Church confineth the sense of the Scriptures to intend.'[6]

It is well known that the new Protestantism of the Continent would go much farther than the old in its attack upon the Catholic tradition, and that it would in fact dispute not merely the authority of the depositaries, but that of the deposit and the Founder Himself. Its contentions may be summed up under two headings, (1) philosophical and (2) historical. (1) *Philosophical.*—Starting from Kant's denial of the validity of the categories of the theoretical understanding within the noumenal sphere, Ritschl (*q.v.*) and his followers would deny the possibility of a deposit of intellectual truth altogether. Owing to the creaturely limitations of man's understanding, intercourse with God is a matter of emotional feeling and right conduct, not of strictly intellectual apprehension. (2) *Historical.*—It is admitted that the essence of the Catholic deposit and of the traditional conception of Christianity can be traced back from the ecumenical councils, through the sub-apostolic writers, into the NT itself; and the modern liberal Protestant finds no difficulty in allowing their natural sense to such passages as 2 Th 2^{15}: 'Stand fast, and hold the *traditions* (τὰς παραδόσεις) which ye were taught, whether by word, or by letter of ours'; 3^{6}: 'Withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the *tradition* which they received of us'; and notably to the Pauline, or deutero-Pauline, injunction, τὴν παραθήκην φύλαξον (1 Ti 6^{20}), in which 'the deposit' is expressly mentioned.

It would now be conceded that St. Paul regarded Christianity as a dogmatic, sacramental deposit, of which the 'apostles' were, in a general sense, the depositaries. But it is contended that in this respect there is an absolute gulf between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul; that Jesus regarded Himself merely as a teacher of ethics, or as the prophet of a new eschatological enthusiasm; that the movement which He initiated was of a purely emotional kind, though fraught with an *Interimsethik* valid only for the very brief period of time which, in His view, remained before the collapse of the existing world-order and the inauguration of the New Kingdom; and that, as Jesus believed in the imminence of this catastrophe, He could have had no idea of promulgating a deposit or constituting a depositary class. On this view it is Paul himself who was the real founder of Catholic Christianity. It was he who transformed the vague and formless apocalyptic enthusiasm of the first Christian generation into a mystery-cult, with wonder-working sacraments; it was he who taught Christendom to identify the Prophet of Nazareth with the Logos of Platonic and Stoic metaphysic, thereby laying the foundations upon which later ages were to build the elaborate structure of Trinitarian and Christological dogma; it was he or his immediate successors who taught primitive Christians to regard themselves as members of a mystic international brotherhood, the new Ecclesia or Congregation of God, thereby institutionalizing Christianity as a Church and a hierarchy. It is obvious that this view, if it can be historically sustained, destroys the whole traditional conception of Christianity by severing the connexion between the deposit, as it stands, and its alleged founder. The history of Christianity then becomes exactly analogous to the history of Mazdaism and of Buddhism. It is the history of the gradual overlaying of the teachings of the founder by dogmatic, sacramental, mystical, and hierarchical integuments derived from other religions: 'Catholicism' is to authentic Christianity what Lāmaism is to primitive Buddhism. The classical expression of this view is still, perhaps, Harnack's great *History of Dogma*, in which the majestic pageant of Church history is exhibited as a gradual working out of that 'acute secularization' of Christianity initiated by the well-meaning, though mistaken, desire of St. Paul to commend the new religious movement to persons who had grown up in the atmosphere of the Hellenic and Anatolian mystery-religions. It follows from this view that the whole of the 'Catholic' deposit, including the great central doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, must be discarded, and not merely those comparatively peripheral portions of it which were dropped by the great 16th cent. Reformers; so dogma as an essential element in Christianity will disappear entirely, and institutionalism will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the practical efficiency of religion. Despite the many conscious or unconscious attempts that have been made to becloud the issue, this question, Is the Catholic deposit *in toto* substantially what was promulgated by Christ, or is it a vast mass of Græco-Roman accretion which has nothing whatever to do with His authentic teaching?, is the primary and crucial question that lies before the religious thought of Europe at present, and will probably have to be answered decisively, in one sense or the other, before one hundred years are over.

5. **Recent developments.**—Within the sphere of traditional Christianity three additional developments deserve brief mention. These are all, it may be observed, confined to the Western or Latin Church, as in the East the era of petrifaction, which set in with the death of St. John of Damascus and precludes the possibility of development, still holds sway. (1) The first of these is analogous to what may be noticed in the case of Lāmaism, viz. the tendency to concentrate the functions of the depositary class in the hands of a single chief depositary or supreme pontiff. So, within the Roman Church, the pope was declared by the Vatican Council of 1870 to be endowed, when performing his office of supreme pastor and teacher of Christians, with the same infallibility (*q.v.*) as that which Catholic traditionalism attributes to the Church; and this belief is concisely

[1] Cf. the affirmation of the *Confession of Würtemberg*: 'Credimus et confitemur quod . . . haec ecclesia habeat jus judicandi de omnibus doctrinis,' quoted by E. C. S. Gibson, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, London, 1896, p. 513.
[2] Art. 6. [3] Art. 8. [4] Art. 21. [5] Art. 20.
[6] *Theological Works*, 10 vols., Oxford, 1844–56, iv. 895.

summed up in the 'I am tradition' of Pius IX.—a remark in which an unfriendly critic might discern a recrudescence of the old priest-king idea. (2) The second development is the tendency, analogous to what we see in Judaism, with its attempts to form 'a hedge around the Law,' to protect the real deposit by surrounding it with a kind of secondary deposit as with an armour. In Judaism this protective armour or integument was supplied by the *dicta* of the Rabbis. In Latin Catholicism the opinions of theologians have, in practice, come to assume the same position. Outside the central nucleus of the deposit, consisting of doctrines which are strictly *de fide*, there is a fringe, or penumbra, of 'pious opinions' which are *proxima fidei*, based, not upon the decrees of ecumenical councils, but upon the *consensus theologorum*. To deny these opinions is not indeed heretical, but may be censured as 'temerarious' or 'offensive to pious ears.' In practice the distinction between the dogmas of the primary deposit and the pious opinions of the secondary does not appear to be very clear; and even local traditions regarding the authenticity and sanctity of particular holy places and objects, which in principle are merely a matter of ordinary human evidence, are sometimes treated with as much respect—and criticism of them is as much resented—as though they belonged to the inner nucleus of the deposit of faith. (3) The third development represents a reaction against the former two, and is popularly called 'Modernism.' In its extreme French and Italian forms, Modernism (*q.v.*) is logically identical with the extreme Ritschlian Protestantism sketched above. It denies that Christ meant to promulgate a deposit, or would have had any authority to do so if He had so meant; and regards Him rather as a religious genius, not exempt from the errors and limitations of His age and country, who merely gave the first impulse to a wave of emotional feeling, which has reverberated down the centuries and is still affecting myriads of human souls. This view is, of course, entirely destructive of Catholic traditionalism as described above. In England, Germany, and America, however, the Modernist movement has taken a more moderate form; and, within the Anglican Church, the corresponding movement has raised a very interesting problem—that of the relation between the spiritual contents of the deposit, which the Anglican Modernist would not deny that Christ promulgated, and the conceptual forms borrowed by the early Fathers and councils from Greek metaphysic to contain it. Whilst the Anglo-Catholic would maintain that the Church was divinely inspired to choose the right conceptual forms, and that these, having received ecumenical sanction, cannot be discarded by the individual believer, the Anglo-Modernist regards the forms as having no more than a purely human authority, and as capable from time to time of variation or even of supersession.[1] The question of the depositary class does not seem to have been directly raised in these discussions, but it is probable that the Anglo-Modernist would regard the whole Church or Christian people, and not any specialized class within it, as being the depositary.

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[1] Cf. W. Sanday and N. P. Williams, *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*, for an exhaustive comparison and contrast of these two points of view.

TRAGEDY.—See DRAMA.

TRAINING (Religious).—Religion is an attitude towards God. It expresses itself in acts of appreciation of values by individuals and groups. These actions are rooted in the basal instincts. They may be few and irregular; they may be gross expressions of wild passion; or they may be refined and well-disciplined reactions of the whole personality in the presence of eternal values. The differences are determined chiefly by training the inner life to react consistently to higher ideals and motives, and by training conduct to habitual and adequate expression of appreciation.

There is a broad sense in which religious training is a feature of all forms of religion, from primitive animism with favourite incantations up to the cultured forms of ritual, all transmitted to successive generations by imitation and other educative processes. But this article deals only with the specific types of religious training now practised or proposed in the English-speaking world.

By religious training is meant a systematic effort to preserve, improve, propagate, and transmit religious life, by methods commonly used in education, such as imitation, instruction, discipline, and inspirational and ideal-forming agencies, in correlation with other means of promoting religion. It goes even farther in some minds; and not without justification the claim is made that educational training, no matter how secular or technical, is not complete or adequately motivated unless in its aim and spirit it leads up into that social purpose which is the chief part of religion (Herbart, Coe).

1. Background.—The types of religious training which now prevail have arisen by connected development (1) out of a long and diversified history of maladjustment between childhood and the Christian Church, (2) out of numerous artificial theologies and individualistic theories of religion, and (3) out of an utter lack, until recently, of any psychology of religion or of childhood.

(1) The historical background of religious training may be found (*a*) in the stereotyped forms of worship and religious expression handed down to successive generations through church and family life; (*b*) in the catechism and confirmation class, where formal drill and authoritative doctrine and precept have long produced educational results of some importance in religious life. (*c*) A nearer background exists in the modern Sunday schools, first with their memorized Bible lessons, and since 1870 with their uniform lessons taught by rather feeble hortatory methods.

(2) The theoretical background is found in an individualistic theology. The corner-stones of this theology were the natural sinfulness of every man, the impending judgment of punishment therefor, and the miraculous atonement of Jesus Christ, which made possible the repentance and pardon of the individual sinner. The supernatural factor was magnified; the human ways and means were subordinated, and the ethical discrepancies passed unnoticed. The process was conceived as judicial on the basis of a retributive penology now discarded in the best judicial practice. The instruction given was not regarded primarily as educative, but rather as dogmatic, evangelistic, and hortatory. No important significance was attached to the teachings of Jesus about the growth of the spiritual

life or the conditions of the ground into which the seed shall fall.

The social gospel lately found to be so conspicuous in the teaching and life of Jesus was unknown. For lack of it the process of salvation was essentially self-regarding, which is doubtless the main reason why Christianity has been so long and slow in making its way in the world. When the era of modern missions dawned, three significant things happened. (*a*) The individual gospel was proclaimed from social and really Christian motives, and the result was good so far as it went, but incommensurate with the effort expended. (*b*) Actual conditions in mission fields and the emergence of social ideals at home forced an expansion of missionary aims so as to include social service—a gospel which was not always well correlated with the other. (*c*) As soon as this social gospel had time to reveal its character and possibilities, results became overwhelming; and the missionary prayer is no longer for the opening of doors, as it was a half-century ago, but for teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, and skilled workmen, by hundreds, to carry a full-orbed Christian civilization into all the lands whose Macedonian calls are coming unsolicited.

(3) Until the last quarter of the 19th cent. psychology was a thing remote from religion. It had not then as now stressed the unity of the self, as against a number of more or less independent 'faculties' bearing little relation to religion. Nor had child psychology made known the extent to which the mind is at first rudimentary, and subject to the continuous and slow changes which the long human infancy makes possible.

Psychology and social and educational science have found no place in the theory of religion until the last generation, and even yet there are those in every religious body who shudder at the thought of applying scientific methods to the propagation of religion. But it is out of these diverse conditions ancient and modern that a theory and practice of religious education is now rapidly taking shape.

2. Theory and aim.—There is a type of religious education which perpetuates the theoretical background of intellectualism and individualism. Its propositions are arranged in logical order, and not in the order in which they arise in human experience. They are held to be authoritative, and are taught in dogmatic form. Under this theory the service which education renders to religion is to make these formulæ known, and here the service ends.

Under the other type the service rendered by education to religion is much broader. The knowledge to be imparted is not dogmatic but inspirational; not an end, but a means to spiritual values; not generalized and abstract, but presented concretely and made illuminating to the pupil's present life. This type of religious training includes habits of worship, attitudes towards the natural world, ideals of life, deeds of service, the relations sustained to the smaller and larger groups of one's fellow-men, and, in fact, every form of useful expression which can be given to inner spiritual life.

(1) The theory on which any adequate plan for religious training is based includes the following fundamental ideas as to the development of religion. (*a*) The presence of the religious life is felt not only in worship and in the conventional forms of religious expression, but especially in character and in social purpose, which subordinates all interests to the supreme values of life. (*b*) The religious life is a continuous growth, not a thing produced artificially, or judicially instituted at the moment of a passing experience. (*c*) This growth involves not a special organ or faculty, but the whole personality. It involves even the group of persons, and it tends to realize in them their oneness with the larger whole of society and of the world in God. (*d*) Finally, the growth of the religious life is normal, vigorous, and healthy, in proportion as its true nature is understood, as favourable conditions for its growth are provided, and as consistent work and painstaking devotion are given to its cultivation.[1]

(2) The following educational facts and principles are also involved in the theory of religious training. (*a*) The subject of an educative process is a person with all his inherited equipment of race instincts and family traits, as well as his undeveloped mental, moral, and religious powers. It is the business of education, not to eradicate or supplant any of these, but to develop and cultivate them, and subordinate them to the highest ends. (*b*) Education is more than instruction. It not only builds up many and rich concepts, which shall serve as a basis for judgment and action by a member of society; but it also takes measures to establish desirable habits, and to create ideals of commanding dignity and emotional power. (*c*) Education uses concrete materials for this purpose. It selects for its use those human experiences best fitted in character and grade to accomplish the particular purpose in view. The treasures of the race have become very rich in such material, so that the selection and preparation of it is a task demanding the skill of educational experts.

(3) The thing that is aimed at in religious education is (*a*) to put one as early and as completely as possible in possession of that rich treasure of experience which has come down from the past, and has been gathered from the ends of the earth, especially those parts of it which are richest in their meanings for a man's life in the world with other people and as a worker with God. (*b*) A further aim is to turn the full force of that experience, in the form of socialized ideals and purposes, as a motive power upon conduct and upon the ordering of the programme of life. This is an individual aim, but it is far more. It enlists churches, homes, and communities in this motivation of conduct for the well-being of society at large. (*c*) It is believed that the instruction to be gathered from the parable of the soils (Mk 4^{3-20}) is a lesson of education, in which the minds mellowed by long processes of nurture are those which respond quickly and whole-heartedly to the evangel. Such nurture would seem therefore to be the most direct and effective way of co-operating with the Spirit of God for the evangelization of the world.

3. Content.—Since religion and its promotion are understood to be, to some extent at least, an enterprise in education, it is necessary to choose for such instruction that material which will be most fruitful religiously. Rather vague ideas prevail on this subject, due to lack of critical analysis of the values to be sought, and to incomplete knowledge of how to produce and conserve those values.

The educational reformers of a century ago established the principle of gradation of material—*i.e.*, that the ability of children to understand and master material changes as they grow older. The material must therefore be chosen with reference to this changing ability; *e.g.*, the incident of a boy robbing a bird's nest can be understood and remembered by a five-year-old child, but the moral interpretation of the same incident is better suited for a mind several years older.

The fallacy of catechetical instruction is partly a pedagogical one. It consists in presenting adult abstractions to children—in offering strong meat instead of milk to babes. A similar

[1] George A. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, New York, 1917.

fallacy has vitiated much of the Bible teaching in Sunday schools where 'uniform' lessons have been chosen for young and old alike. If the children had a story which they could understand and remember on one Sunday, they must feed on Prophets and Epistles for several weeks before they might expect another children's lesson. Of course adaptations by editors and teachers could do something to overcome the discrepancy in grading, but it is only making the best of a bad case. It is wholly unnecessary for religious instruction to be subjected to these hindrances, now that the principles of grading are understood and have been applied to the materials used in religious training.

There is also a religious fallacy in catechetical instruction, appealing as it does exclusively to the intellect with logical propositions dogmatically conceived and expressed. The emotional and social aspects of the child's religious life are the first to be required for the development of ideals and the motivation of conduct. The intellectual formulations satisfy better the mature religious needs of adults, and the different needs of children should be provided for.

In selecting and grading the materials for religious education there are a number of considerations to be provided for.

(1) The language of religion must be acquired. As in any field of human experience, the language and the thought develop together. Some terms are advanced and technical, but many are elementary. The history and practice of religion, the reading of the Bible, and the social environment offered by a religious community can make familiar to children, nurtured in such an atmosphere, all the elementary concepts of religion, and the words and phrases which express those concepts. They can make known a few of the landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

A properly graded curriculum therefore provides for young children a selection of simple Bible incidents on subjects within their experience, or a like class of subjects taken from biography, literature, and life. For this purpose one may choose stories about children, animals, natural objects, and the things familiar to childhood, especially those which contain some of the language and forms of religion, but none of the generalizations and abstract principles in which religious teaching is so often couched.

(2) The child inherits certain capacities for a moral and religious life. But each individual must shape his concepts of that life from the examples of other experiences seen and heard by him. His education consists in becoming acquainted with these selected experiences of others, in reading meaning into them, and in shaping his own habits, judgments, and ideals, with reference to the experiences so set before him. This formation of concepts represents a later stage of religious development than the language stage mentioned above, but the later mingles with the earlier stage, and they move forward together. A class of more meaningful experiences is chosen for this purpose, such as the parables of Jesus, tales of moral heroism, events in which service and sacrifice are exemplified, the revealings of motives and of character and of loyalty to persons and to ideals, and the superiority of moral and spiritual values over those values which are chiefly carnal and commercial.

It is therefore the business of religious education to bring into the life of youth an abundance of human incidents rich in moral and religious meaning; to present these experiences with sufficient detail and pedagogical skill to assure them an atmosphere, an emotional vitality, and some permanence; and to give definite guidance to each youth in the construction of his own habits, judgments, and ideals, out of the concrete materials furnished to him. The selection of material for this purpose out of the Bible or from other sources is the most responsible and difficult task of religious education. It is also the point at which failure has been most complete in nearly every curriculum thus far proposed for religious training.

(3) While it belongs to the province of science and general education to develop in youth a conception of the causal connectedness of the world and of its unity, consistency, and organization under natural law, it is a well-known fact that this is not generally done. Such reflexions arise more frequently in connexion with religion than elsewhere, and it is proper that religious education should provide in place of discarded cosmologies a better instruction, which can serve the common people as a credible philosophy of nature. Nothing can do more to disintegrate religious faith and moral integrity than lack of a believable philosophy of the world. Such a philosophy is entirely within the mental compass of enlightened youths; and they have a right to it as a support for their faith and as a part of their education. Indeed they will have it. The only uncertainty is as to how good or how poor a philosophy they shall work out for themselves if wise help is withheld from them.

For the few but important lessons on this subject the creation stories and a few other portions of Scripture will serve as occasion for wise and modern instruction. A few of the great chapters in the history of science are required. These need to be correlated, not only with the names of discoveries and inventors, but with the forward movements in the world's life, and the human values which they have enhanced.

(4) A task of religious education still more important is the interpretation to young minds of the world of human life. We live and act in a world of purpose and meaning, as well as in a world of natural law and causal connexion. It is out of this purposive life that real values arise; and it is with those values that religion is concerned. There is no gain for religion in knowledge of the Scripture, or of the facts of nature, and no benefit in formal covenants and ordinances, unless in the human heart there is an ideal which throws over all these things an emotional glow that enriches them with meaning and value. It is doubtless the same thing that is spoken of as the Spirit of God in the human heart taking the things of Christ and showing them to us.

Religious teachers generally try to do this. Most expository Bible teaching is so intended. So also is the preaching. But the efforts are desultory, and the results are not cumulative. A need is felt for a programme or a definite policy, based on a sound philosophy and on educational principles, to give continuity and cumulative effect to the propagation of religion. It can hardly be claimed that such a programme has yet been proposed, although efforts have been made in that direction, and in some cases with gratifying results.

The choice and arrangement of material awaits a fuller agreement upon Christian ideals and the fundamental philosophy of religion. In this task the interpretation of the world of human life is the chief factor. What is called the social gospel has already gone far to supplement and modify the individualism of the former day. But 'a theology for the social gospel,' as Walter Rauschenbusch calls his book,[1] has not yet formulated itself in popular thinking. In the light of such a theology and philosophy, there is required a re-defining of the virtues and of the unifying principle by which those virtues are correlated in the good man. The new sense of the structural character of society, the place and function of the individual within the structure, and the interactions between the structure and its members must have much weight in determining what the content of a religious education curriculum ought to be, and what educational aims and values ought to be conspicuous in that material.

(5) The great issues over which men and nations have struggled in the world's forward movement need to be made known to young people, and

[1] New York, 1918.

their meanings interpreted. Such issues were drawn in OT times by the prophets against royal and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Jesus defined an issue between the Pharisees and the new religion of the inner life. Every forward step, every reform, every moral and spiritual achievement from that day to this, can be of great service to those whose motives and ideals are forming. They are needed as a background for the tasks and problems of to-day, as a guide in defining present and future issues, and as an inspiration to loyalty in trying situations. Here will appear biographies of men and women who have caught visions of an improved world and have helped to realize those visions. Here also belong the rise and fall of institutions in response to the changing needs of the world. Out of such rich and varied sources are being selected the graded and sifted materials for a curriculum of religious training.

4. Method and organization.—While the history of pedagogy has been progressive, and general education has profited by every improvement, religious training has been slow to take up improved methods. Memoriter catechetical teaching is still common. Hortatory and semi-expository teaching of the Bible is quite general in church schools, the aim being evangelistic and not primarily educative.

There is a marked tendency to reconstruct, not only the curriculum in ways already indicated, but also the method and organization. In method these changes consist in a larger use of direct narrative in connexion with concrete story material used in the lower grades; the immediate oral reproduction by pupils of the narrative so presented;[1] the increased use of pictorial and graphic representation, and the tendency to substitute for the leaflet, pamphlet, or bare Bible specially prepared text-books of a more permanent and attractive character.

But the most important tendency is towards things to be done, as an expression in real life of the moral and religious impulses, as they awaken in childhood and youth. Daily conduct, positions taken on moral questions before associates, missionary work, community betterment, neighbourly and charitable work, and worthy social activities in general, offer a welcome field for religious training in this growing aspect. Out of such activities arise deeper and truer thinking and finer emotional responses than any didactic method can produce.

Modern forms of church organization provide for a department of religious training in the local church. This department is free to adopt methods in harmony with improved educational and religious ideas, and to introduce a curriculum something like that outlined above. Only in those local churches where the broad full meaning of religious education has been discussed and appreciated has the reconstruction taken place. But the number of these churches is increasing; they are profiting by experience; and their results are watched and reported.

In several American communions, notably the Protestant Episcopal, the Congregational, and the Presbyterian, important steps have been taken to reconstruct the denominational machinery on educational lines. Numerous officials are employed to propagate the principles and ideals of religious training in the local churches, and to aid in the installation of better systems. These methods are especially successful in missionary fields, (1) because there the need is more obvious, and (2) because these fields are not bound by tradition to antiquated methods as many of the churches are.

While the prospect for the future of religious education is best in the direction of denominational organization, there is also a distinct movement on foot for community organization disregarding ecclesiastical divisions, or at least bringing them into co-operation.[1] This plan calls for a local board and a superintendent, who shall inaugurate a school system parallel to the other system or systems in the same community. Less time would be required for the religious than for the general and vocational schools; yet the effectiveness of it cannot be estimated by the time spent. In addition to the direct values of such training the material of general education is re-interpreted and given new meaning and dignity from the spiritual aspect. Teachers who have training in the principles of education, as well as personal fitness and inspiring leadership, soon make apparent the large possibilities of religious training, both in its own field and in its effects on the whole structure of society.

In Britain and in some other European countries the schools supported at public expense are expected to furnish some instruction of a religious nature. Recognition is made of denominational preferences, and teachers are assigned to groups with this in mind. In France religious instruction is entirely excluded from all public and private schools of general education, and the members of religious orders are disqualified as teachers. This of course does not prevent the teaching of religion in the churches. In the United States of America religion is excluded by the laws of the States from the public schools; but entire freedom is given for this instruction under church or community supervision. In some States the pupils are released for one session each week from required attendance at a public school on condition of spending that time under approved religious instruction, proportionate credit being given if such work is satisfactorily done.

In general it may be said that the ideals and content of religious education have been reconstructed in accordance with modern ideas. The realization of the better ideals has been achieved in a limited degree, and every year marks distinct gains. But the progress is retarded (1) by conservative traditions among earnest religious people, who have not seen the spiritual values in a religious life conceived developmentally and socially; (2) by inadequate conceptions of and facilities for training in religious activity and self-expression, and (3) by lack of united and trained leadership in the re-organization of religious education in local communities. It seems to be the task of Christian colleges to raise up a generation of men and women who have the religious and educational ideals and the ability and enthusiasm to organize them into the life of our time.

A good central organization for the study of religious education, for the comparison of results, and for the promotion of this large interest in the life and thought of the world exists in the Religious Education Association (Henry F. Cope, Secretary, 1440 East 57th Street, Chicago, Ill.). It was founded in 1903 by representatives of all religious faiths. It has held important annual conventions, mostly in American cities. These conventions have done much to shape thought, guide effort, and stimulate experiment. The volumes of the bi-monthly magazine of the Association entitled *Religious Education* furnish much material in the history and discussion of this subject.

Other related articles in this Encyclopædia may be referred to as follows: EDUCATION (Moral), CHRISTIANITY, CHURCH, CONFIRMATION, CATECHISMS, BIBLE, SUNDAY SCHOOL.

LITERATURE.—H. F. Cope, *Religious Education in the Church*, New York, 1917; B. S. Winchester, *Religious Education and Democracy*, do. 1917; W. W. Smith, *Religious Education*, Milwaukee, 1909; W. S. Athearn, *The Church School*, Boston, 1914; G. A. Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals*, New York and London, 1904, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago and London, 1917; E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, London and Boston, 1910.

WILLIAM JAMES MUTCH.

TRANCE.—See HYSTERIA, DHYANA, YOGA.

TRANSCENDENCE.—See IMMANENCE.

[1] W. J. Mutch, *Graded Bible Stories*, Ripon, Wis., 1914.

[1] W. S. Athearn, *Religious Education and American Democracy*, Boston and Chicago, 1917.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. — The term 'transcendental' plays an important part in Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason*—'transcendental æsthetic,' 'transcendental analytic,' etc.—and through the influence of the critical philosophy the term has become familiar in modern thinking and even in popular literature. Kant did not originate the term; but he gave it new vigour and a new orientation.

1. Pre-Kantian transcendentalism.—(1) *Use of the term in scholastic logic.*—Before Kant's time 'transcendental' and 'transcendent' were familiar terms in the scholastic logic and were practically equivalent in meaning, although he sharply distinguished between them. To the scholastic logicians these terms were used of those most general notions that could not be subsumed under the ten Aristotelian categories. They rose beyond or transcended them. Spinoza uses 'transcendental' in this sense of the most general notions and gives his view of how psychologically they originate.[1] Strictly speaking, these *transcendentalia* or *transcendentia* belonged to a realm above ordinary categorical logical thinking and as such were beyond the province of logic proper. Various enumerations of these transcendental notions are given. Albertus Magnus gives *ens, unum, bonum*, and *verum*; and very generally these, along with *res* and *aliquid*, make up the list of the six *transcendentalia*. Their interrelations are stated and various subtleties regarding them introduced by different schoolmen. *Ens* was as a rule regarded as super-transcendental, the rest being passions or modifications of being (*passiones entis*). This category in scholastic philosophy was pretty much what the 'Absolute' is in modern philosophy.[2]

(2) *Use of the term in theology.*—To the schoolmen, however, logic was only the handmaiden of theology, and so we find these terms more or less always moving into the area of theological speculation. These transcendental notions had their reality in the mind of God, who is transcendent *par excellence*. The passage in Augustine[3] where he posits the transcendental ideas in the divine mind became classical and is quoted by all the great mediævalists. It is historically the fusion of Greek thought with Christian experience. Plato speaks of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) as transcending being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας),[4] and Plotinus uses the phrase often.[5] Transcendent is simply the Latin equivalent of ἐπέκεινα, 'beyond.' At times this tendency became extreme, as in the case of Erigena and the mystics who speak of God as above all predicates—ὑπεραληθής, ὑπέρσοφος, ὑπεραιώνιος, 'above truth,' 'above wisdom,' 'above eternity.'

Transcendentalism in theology, then, means the position that God's knowledge and character are perfect, absolute as distinct from man's knowledge, which is imperfect, and from man's virtue, which is immature; as such it is part of the very essence of theology and the unmovable conviction of religion. But it may become falsified through over-emphasis and dangerous through over-refinement of subtlety. Ordinary living religious experience speaks of the divine in plain speech, ascribing to God organs, actions, passions, movement, change, purposes, and this is done without any feeling of incongruity—even when the divine spirituality is clearly recognized. Transcendentalism becomes over-subtle when it objects to this, and it is usually when religious experience is at a low ebb and beset by foes that this form of transcendentalism gains a hearing. Even in the OT, as Schultz points out,[1] we have the beginning of reflective transcendentalism. It is more evident in the Septuagint translation and in the post-Biblical Jewish literature, and it operates dominantly in Philo until God becomes the Great Unknowable. In the history of Christian theology we find the superimposition of this metaphysical and mystical transcendentalism on the direct religious thought of the NT. Edwin Hatch, in his famous Hibbert Lectures,[2] maintains that the great creeds of Christendom buried religion under this metaphysic; and in his zeal he has overstated the case; for transcendentalism in the sense of God's absoluteness is an integral part of religion and of theology, but, when it makes this a mode of throwing discredit on man's knowledge and of undermining man's notions of right and wrong, when it empties God of feeling, purpose, and initiation, then it becomes false and dangerous.

It is better to deal here with the special forms of transcendentalism in this sense, before discussing the Kantian and post-Kantian usage of the term, as these forms of thinking have their roots in a soil different from that which is specifically and dominantly under the influence of Kant.

2. Extra-Kantian transcendentalism. — Transcendentalism in the theological and philosophical sphere means, in a general way, the recognition of God as exalted in thought and character above man and sensible objects. It is thus contrasted with phenomenalism, naturalism, and materialism, and, one may say, also agnosticism, for, although the agnostic may grant the existence of such a Being, the concession is of no value either for knowledge or for morality. In this sense every religious view of the world is transcendental. When, however, we ask what the relation between man's knowledge and virtue and God's is, the real problem of transcendentalism emerges, and, according to the answer given, thinkers fall into different classes, which for purposes of clearness may be distinguished as follows.

(1) *Extreme transcendentalism.*—Those who hold that God is utterly incomprehensible to us, and that knowledge and virtue in Him are quite different, not only in quantity but also in quality, from what we mean by these terms, are extreme transcendentalists in the sphere of ontology. Modern examples are Hamilton and Mansel, who, borrowing a Kantian distinction, maintained that our predicated knowledge of God is regulative not speculative truth, that it was given, not to satisfy the reason, but to guide the practice of man, not to tell us what God is in His absolute nature, but what He wills us to think of Him in our present conditioned state. This phase of transcendentalism arose as a protest against what Hamilton calls 'the scheme of pantheistic omniscience so prevalent among the sequacious thinkers of the day.'[3] Speculative theologians have always had leanings towards this mode of reasoning regarding the divine, and its influence can be traced in theology from the days of Origen. While the ordinary religious consciousness speaks of God as wise and good, and cannot help so doing, yet these terms in reality do not apply to Him, and are to be understood anthropopathically. He has deigned

[1] *Ethics*, pt. ii. prop. xl. schol. 1.

[2] For the scholastic logical usage consult C. von Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande*, Leipzig, 1855–70, iii. 245 ff.; J. Veitch, *Institutes of Logic*, Edinburgh, 1889, p. 175; Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, Edinburgh, 1860, iii. 198; also Reid, *Works*[2] (ed. Hamilton), do. 1849, p. 687 f.; R. Eucken, *Gesch. der philosoph. Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879.

[3] *De Diversis Quæstionibus*, i. 46.

[4] *Rep.* 509 B.

[5] *E.g.*, *Enneades*, v. i. 6, where God is described as ἐπέκεινα ἁπάντων, 'beyond all things.'

[1] *OT Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1892, ii. 114.

[2] *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Church*, ed. A. M. Fairbairn, London, 1890, ch. ix.

[3] *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, etc., London, 1852, pp. 1–37, quoted by H. L. Mansel, *The Limits of Religious Thought*[4], p. 191.

to accommodate this revelation to our limited intelligence, but it is, after all, only an accommodation (συγκατάβασις), and the true method of theology is to strip away all these predicates and to proceed *via negationis*. The danger here is obvious, viz. forgetting of the truth that man is made in the image of God, and forgetting that thinkers are apt to cut apart God and man, and thereby religion and reason alike become unreal and untrustworthy. Under this impulse religious men fall back on an authority which has no basis in our rational or moral nature, or on some occult faculty apart from reason; and others, strictly adhering to the working of the understanding, leave the transcendental sphere of Being alone. Outside the small circle illuminated by the understanding there may be Something, but to us it is unknown and unknowable. Agnosticism as regards ultimate reality is the result of this attitude.

(2) *Religious transcendentalism.*—Others, again, maintain also God's transcendental character, but they hold that man's knowledge is accurate as far as it goes, that in quality, though not in quantity, it is the same as God's, and that morality in man can not be different in essence from what it is in the divine, that the pathway of true knowledge and moral progress leads to God. God's revelation is certainly an accommodation, but this accommodation itself is an education of man by God, progressing from less to more and conserving in its more perfect stages continuity with the earlier, and besides the process is self-correcting. J. B. Mozley[1] gives a very fair view of this position as regards the OT. God dealt with men as they were, but in such a way as to lead them onwards and upwards. Man makes God in his own image, but it is because God first made man in His image. Augustine, who often speaks of God as incomprehensible—as indeed every religious mind must do, so that Hamilton has no difficulty in compiling a catena of such passages from various writers—yet maintains that our intellectual and moral strivings are but a returning to the Source whence intelligence and goodness spring. The human mind and heart participate in transcendent knowledge and goodness, and the aim of theology is to ascend by this road to God; only to man the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary to initiate and guide this quest. The method here is not so much that of negation as of eminence (*via eminentiæ*), and it differs from pure philosophical or epistemological transcendentalism both in its insistence on the need of grace and in its proper valuation of other aspects of experience besides the pure intellect. It is this that 'Rabbi' Duncan has in view when he defines transcendentalism as 'the denial of that which renders man's knowledge an inferior kind of knowledge';[2] and it is in this sense that F. D. Maurice is a transcendentalist when in somewhat exaggerated fashion he fathers on Mansel's theory such frightful consequences.

(3) *Epistemological transcendentalism.*—Distinct from this again is what one may call pure epistemological transcendentalism, according to which the highest knowledge in man becomes identical with, and indistinguishable from, the divine knowledge. Thus Boethius:

'Sense judges figure clothed in material substance. Imagination figures alone without matter. Thought transcends this again, and by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which is contained in the individual. The eye of intelligence is yet more exalted, for overpassing the sphere of the universal it will behold absolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's vision.'[3]

[1] *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, London, 1877.
[2] *Colloquia Peripatetica*[3], ed. W. Knight, Edinburgh, 1871, p. 111.
[3] *Consolation of Philosophy*, tr. H. R. James, London, 1897, p. 189.

From the plane of intelligence, according to Boethius, all the contradictions of the ordinary experience are reconcilable. Thus to God they harmonize, and to us as far as we look at them from this point of view. No one can fail to notice the similarity between this and the method of modern absolutist transcendentalism, with its solving of contradictions and its transcendental intuition. This school speaks in such a way as to lead the ordinary reader to suppose that the individual can attain by knowledge to the divine point of view—a claim which it is extremely difficult to distinguish from omniscience.

(4) *Moralistic and mystical transcendentalism.*—The term, however, may be applied, and often is applied, to those who are keenly conscious of the limitations of the human mind, and impatient and sceptical regarding its slow ratiocinative processes, but who hold that man's moral nature or his feelings or intuitions can give immediate access to the divine. Typical thinkers of this school are Pascal, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl. They lay stress on the supremacy of the heart—'The heart makes the theologian'—or on the value of feelings or intuitions; and a strong current to-day draws many along the pathway of the subconscious towards God. Thus we have schools of moralistic and mystical transcendentality. They disparage reason and logic, and find refuge in the alogical departments of the soul. The so-called New England transcendentalism[1] combines both mysticism and moralism with a large element of vague eclecticism, but it may, for purposes of classification, be included here.

3. Kantian transcendentalism.—To appreciate modern transcendentalism both in its philosophical and in its more popular application, we must briefly review Kant's view of knowledge.

(1) *The factors in knowledge.*—To Kant knowledge—mathematics and the physical sciences—involved two factors, one due to the activity of the mind, the other due to sense-data. He did not doubt the fact of knowledge itself, nor did he concern himself with its psychological origin. He found in knowledge a synthesis of these two elements. Nothing could form the subject-matter of knowledge but what came from sense-data, but then sense-experience itself was a chaos without the principles supplied by the understanding and the activity of the mind; even perception itself required space and time—mental forms. To him God, the world, and the soul could not become the objects of scientific knowledge and therefore they were transcendent; *i.e.*, they were outside the limits of possible knowledge. There can be no doubt that Kant had a horror of those who spoke familiarly of God, as if He were an object of sense-perception, and that his real anxiety to mark clearly the boundaries of possible knowledge was largely due to fear of intrusion from this quarter. He thus distinguishes clearly between 'immanent principles which apply solely within the limits of possible experience' and transcendent principles 'which are intended to reach beyond these limits.'[2]

Kant did not deny the reality of God, or of the soul, or the ultimate essence of matter, but he did strongly insist that the pure reason got into hopeless difficulties when it tried to apply the principles valid in the sphere of phenomena to these extra-phenomenal entities. To him we owe the very prevalent modern view that science has its own domain—it includes all knowledge, though not all reality—and religion and morality have their domain; that the marches between them should be clearly defined; and that there should be no raids, excursions, or alarums from one side or the other.

(2) *Transcendental principles.* — Having thus excluded transcendent realities from the domain of the understanding, because we can have no scientific knowledge of them, he shows that in knowledge itself there were principles like causality—the categories, in short—which were not due to sense-data. Those principles are transcendental (as distinct from transcendent), which means both that they are not due to sense and that they can be shown to constitute knowledge. Without sense-data they are empty, but sense without them is blind.

Transcendental to Kant then means constitutive

[1] See § 4 (1) below.
[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1853, iii. 245.

of valid knowledge, and a transcendental inquiry, such as his own critical method, 'concerns itself, not so much with objects, but with the way in which we know objects in so far as this may be possible *a priori*.'[1] What reality in itself may be is not the aim of the critical philosophy to determine, but to find out that element in knowledge which makes it valid and to guard knowledge against the admission of anything which cannot be scientifically known. Kant is not concerned with ontology but with epistemology, and the two to him are not identical. Kant thus sharply distinguishes between transcendent and transcendental. He uses the former term in a disparaging sense, while the latter means constitutive of knowledge—what makes knowledge possible.

'The term *transcendental*,' says R. Adamson, 'probably has, for English ears, an unpleasant ring, and will suggest metaphysical efforts to transcend experience. It must be understood, however, that *transcendental* method is simply the patient and rigorous analysis of experience itself. For any question or theorem which might pass beyond possible experience, Kant reserved the term *transcendent*; and the distinction, if not the mode of expressing it, is accepted by all his successors. Neither in Kant nor in Fichte is there anything in the slightest degree resembling what is commonly called metaphysics.'[2]

David Masson[3] traces through all history two tendencies in regard to the origin of knowledge—one fathering all knowledge on sense-experience (this may be called empiricism), the other maintaining that 'there are elements in knowledge, the origin or reason of which transcends or lies beyond the horizon of historical conditions.' Historically it is the conflict of these two that we find in the controversy between Locke and Leibniz or between Mill and Hamilton. The transcendental position is summed up in the famous phrase: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu—nisi ipse intellectus.' There is no doubt that Kant is a transcendentalist in this sense, yet for him transcendental meant something different. He is not interested in innate ideas or intuitions. He is dealing with knowledge as it exists, not as it grows, and he finds in it what sense alone does not explain, but rather what explains sense, unifying forms or principles, supplied by the mind itself, which give receptivity to sense-data and combine them together into adequate knowledge. Ultimately the formal unity of the mind itself is involved in knowledge. Thus he might agree even with the physiological psychologist in his analysis of knowledge and yet maintain the necessity of the unity of the mind.

(3) *Pure and practical reason.*—Although Kant maintained that God, the world, and the soul as noumenal realities could not be objects of knowledge or constitutive of knowledge—that they were not transcendental in his strict sense of the term—yet he allowed that they were present in knowledge regulatively. The mind was constrained to aim at unity, and this striving was due to the regulative influence of these ideas of the reason. It is this part of his system that he himself calls transcendental or critical idealism. As ideas in the mind they were transcendental, though only regulatively so; yet in themselves as realities they are transcendent as far as knowledge goes—they are beyond the bounds of knowledge. Sometimes indeed he speaks of the reality of the material world as the 'transcendental object,' where we might expect him, if he were strict in his own use of terms, to use transcendent. And he speaks of it in such a way as to suggest a *substratum* which is the outward cause of our perceptions, but for the understanding it is simply x, an unknown quantity. His transcendental object is the limit which our understanding can reach in dealing with phenomena from the side of the receptivity of mind, just as 'the transcendental unity of apperception' is the limit on the side of the mind's synthesizing activity. Neither of these is noumena for the understanding, for it knows nothing of noumena.[1] If one were to regard this only as Kantianism, the first review of the *Kritik*—that of Christian Garve of Breslau, in the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* of 19th Jan. 1782—might have force:

'This work . . . is a system of the higher or transcendental idealism—an idealism which embraces both mind and matter, transforms the world and ourselves into ideas, and represents the objective world as derived from appearances which the understanding combines in the interdependent whole of experience. . . . The cause of these ideas is to us unknown and unknowable.'[2]

But what pure reason cannot attain to, practical reason can. Morality needs transcendent realities as postulates, and, because the sphere of morality is to Kant more real than, or as real as, the sphere of knowledge, this postulation is necessary and valid. The transcendent of knowledge becomes the transcendental of morality. God, the world, the soul, freedom, and immortality become real here. We cannot prove their existence, it is true, by cognitive methods, but they are imperatively demanded by the facts of the moral life, of which facts he had no doubt.

4. Post-Kantian transcendentalism. — Kant's system was profound in its effects, different thinkers adopting those parts of it which served their turn, so that the complexion of their transcendentalism is determined by their point of contact with his view. His influence touched the English-speaking world at first largely through the works of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.

(1) *The teaching of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.*—Coleridge's philosophical function 'may be defined by saying that through him was transmitted an opportune suffusion of Kant and Schelling into England as of light softened through a stained-glass medium, and that into this suffusion he also resumed whatever of Anglo-Platonism had been floating long neglected in the works of old English Divines.'[3] Thus the distinction between the 'reason' and the 'understanding' became familiar, and 'transcendental philosophy' acclimatized in English speech. The reason could overcome the impotence of the understanding and get hold of unseen realities.

'As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy, which is therefore properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and re-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as *transcendent*.'[4]

It is clear that Coleridge has no interest in accurately reproducing Kant. To him transcendentalism is just emphasis on the spiritual side of man's nature, and this is the meaning also to Carlyle:

'The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Teufelsdröckh is, that with all this Descendentalism, he combines a Transcendentalism, no less superlative; whereby if on the one hand he degrade man below most animals, except those jacketed Gouda Cows, he, on the other, exalts him beyond the visible Heavens, almost to an equality with the Gods.'[5]

Under the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, and the general romantic movement of the time,

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, iii. 49.

[2] *Fichte* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh, 1881 p. 112, note.

[3] *Recent British Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1865.

[1] See J. P. Mahaffy and J. H. Bernard's ed. of Kant's *Kritik*, London, 1889, ch. xiv., and also his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, ed. J. P. Mahaffy, London, 1872, Appendix B.

[2] Quoted by W. Wallace, *Kant* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh, 1882, p. 60.

[3] Masson, *Recent British Philosophy*, p. 54.

[4] S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, London, 1817, vol. i. ch. 10 (Everyman's Library ed., do. 1906, p. 129).

[5] *Sartor Resartus*, bk. i. ch. 10.

transcendentalism came to mean the recognition of supersensible realities, and the spiritual nature of man—that man was more than 'an omnivorous biped that wears breeches.' A passage from Coleridge shows the influence of this attitude in the sphere of interpretation:

'The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old religion,
The power, the beauty, and the majesty
That had their haunt in dale, or piny mountain,
Or forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring,
Or chasms, and watery depths; all these have vanished;
They live no longer in the faith of reason.
But still the heart doth need a language.'[1]

The faith in 'the light that never was on sea or land,' 'the vision and the faculty divine,' the fight against a crude interpretation of man's spirit as ultimately matter, and the protest against literalism in all its forms, characterize transcendentalism at this stage; and this is still the sense of the word in extra-philosophical literature. In New England Emerson and others, rebelling against an orthodoxy that tended to make men wholly sinful and corrupt and the will of man necessarily in bondage, and impatient of dogmas derived from a revelation confined to one book, initiated a movement that got the name 'transcendentalism' more in derision than in honour, but the term was accepted, and the claim made that all the best in the world's thought was here included. Carlyle, who, in spite of his sympathy with Emerson, saw in this movement an extravagant disregard of facts and an enthusiastic eclecticism, warned Emerson against the dangers ahead:

'You seem to me in danger of dividing yourselves from the Fact of the Universe, in which alone ugly as it is can I find any anchorage.'[2]

James Martineau—himself a transcendentalist in the Carlylean sense, whose intellectual history is a pilgrimage from the bondage of empiricism—does not take Emerson seriously. No doubt New England transcendentalism became extravagant, welcoming the ravings of the Swedenborgian and of the unregulated mystic as possible revelations, yet it never became a system, and its airy optimism is explicable and defensible as a protest and a reaction; yet to its influence is largely due the fact that to many, if not to most, in our day transcendentalism means hopeless and unwarranted idealism — unworkable dreaming. It was not patient enough to be lasting, and, with all its boasted catholicity and insight, it was blind to the facts that gave the old orthodoxy its seriousness and its power of rejuvenescence. On the other hand, it was a refreshing and liberalizing movement.

(2) *Science and transcendentalism.*—Kant's influence was felt in a very different quarter—among those whose interests were devoted to science. Thus Lange, the historian of materialism, interpreting Kant, as he thought, confines man's knowledge of reality to the results of science, but contends for a world above this created by our moral and spiritual needs—an unsubstantial world of ideals, a transcendentalism which is like a painted cloud; and this attitude has more or less existed since, differing according to the amount of reality the individual thinker gives to this beautiful but airy realm. It is found in the historian Buckle, and has been well described as a 'consolatory private transcendentalism.'[3] Herbert Spencer's magnanimous handing over of the Unknowable to religion is an example of this 'private transcendentalism.' It is due to a one-sided exploitation of Kant without regard to Kant's moral certainty. To Kant the moral nature of man planted man in an intelligible real world, although knowledge left him only in the phenomenal, with just a glimmer of the noumenal breaking through, but this transcendentalism which, as in Lange's case, pretends to be its lawful heir finds the phenomenal the real, and the transcendental the vague and the shadowy.

Others more alive to the reality of religion have sought to place this transcendentalism side by side with scientific results, while conscious all the time of the hostility between the two. Thus W. H. Mallock[1] attempts to hold by the results of science and yet to allow the demands of religion validity; and this attitude was prevalent in the past century.

In psychology the theory of psycho-physical parallelism exhibits the same tendency—a species of eirenicon between phenomenalism and transcendentalism. The results of science are accepted; its principles are unquestioned; and then these same facts are explained as if nothing but psychical data were involved. It is a truce born of perplexity—a compact that real issues will not be raised on either side. It is not difficult to see how closely related to Kant these tendencies are, for it may not unfairly be said that he himself adopted without questioning the results of science and also the deliverances of a spiritual philosophy due to religion and held them both without consistently uniting them.

Paulsen, one of Kant's most faithful modern disciples, contends that science will never give up its claim to explain everything mechanically; yet metaphysics must give to this realm of science an idealistic interpretation. One may be the most rigid materialist at one moment, and yet be wholly transcendentalist as a philosopher at another. The scientist will never admit any supernatural agent, and the only way of peace is to admit his claim; yet somehow to transform all into spiritual reality is the task of the philosopher. It is because of this felt dualism that transcendentalism in its pure form as absolutism claims for itself to be the true heir and rightful corrector and interpreter of Kant.

(3) *Absolute transcendentalism.* — 'Transcendentalism' in modern philosophy is used of that world-view known at times as absolutism, objective idealism, neo-Hegelianism, or rationalism. The term 'transcendentalism' traces this system historically to Kant's theory of knowledge. As we saw above,[2] 'transcendental' to Kant meant at least two things. (*a*) Those principles in knowledge which in the nature of the case did not originate in sense-experience are transcendental. In this sense of the term Kantianism allied itself with that tendency in British thought which recognized *a priori* or original data both in knowledge and in morality—what may be generically named intuitionalism. Leibniz's famous revision of the empirical formula may be taken as the watchword of this school: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu *nisi ipse intellectus*.' The controversy between Hume and Reid, between Mill and Hamilton, is one between psychological empiricism and psychological transcendentalism, just as the controversy between hedonism and intuitionism is a phase of the same in the sphere of ethics. This was the outstanding question in British philosophy for many a day. Masson in his *Recent British Philosophy* gives a readable account of the state of matters in his time, and 'transcendentalism' is used by him of those systems which recognize in the mind more than sense-data. Spencer considers it one of the merits of evolution that it supplied a means of reconciliation between these opposing views. According to him, what was native to the individual was the residuary deposit of racial experience. Thus evolution reconciled empiricism and transcen-

[1] *The Piccolomini*, act ii. sc. iv. l. 123 ff.
[2] *Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson*, London, 1883, ii. 11.
[3] Masson, p. 249.

[1] *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, London, 1902.
[2] See § 3.

dentalism. (*b*) But 'transcendental' meant to Kant constitutive of knowledge—those principles which, though not due to experience, yet made experience itself coherent, above all, the unity of the self. All the content of knowledge came from experience, but the active self made knowledge. Besides, reason had as regulative principles the ideas of the self, the world, and God, and in its practical working reason got into touch with these realities. It was this side of Kant's teaching that issued in transcendentalism, as it came to be understood in English-speaking countries in the first half of the 19th century. Hamilton welcomed the Kantian system chiefly because he found it in harmony with the limits of our knowledge as propounded by himself, but others welcomed it because in their view it taught that man by his reason was more than a mere creature of the senses. Thus Carlyle, in his paper on Novalis,[1] points out that German transcendentalism denies the absolute existence of matter, that it makes space and time forms of the understanding; therefore to God 'Time and Space are not laws of His being but only of ours,' and so He is omnipresent and eternal; and 'the black Spectre, Atheism . . . melts into nothingness.' Again the transcendentalists recognize a higher faculty than understanding, viz. reason. Thus the invisible world is brought near us, and we feel in every thought that in God 'we live, and move, and have our being.' It was in this way that transcendentalism also at first became known in America.[2]

The transcendental unity of the self which Kant understood of the individual knower, and which by theoretical reason gave him no substantial subject or soul, was raised by Kant's successors in Germany to the level of a universal principle and an active subject, and thus knowledge was made adequate to grasp all reality. Reality now became subject and object, and epistemology became ontology. The transcendent of Kant vanished completely; it became immanent in knowledge. Fichte laid stress on the creative activity of the self in such a way that the object, the world, was called into being by the subject. Schelling, whose views changed considerably from one stage in his history to another, regarded the Absolute as the background of subject and object alike, but itself a *neutrum* of indifference, and he made intellectual intuition the eye by which intelligence grasped this whole. Hegel tried to do equal justice to both subject and object: 'the real is the rational,' and 'the rational is the real,' and Absolute Spirit is the whole, which becomes conscious of itself through a dialectical process. For some time this mode of thinking, through its novelty and obscurity, was unintelligible and obnoxious to English thinkers,[3] but, when it did take a hold in Britain, it was with such force that it conquered the philosophical chairs in our universities with few exceptions, and exercised an orthodox tyranny against which it was difficult to contend. To Hamilton,[4] who viewed with extreme repugnance the philosophy of the Absolute, must be attributed the revival of philosophical speculation in Britain, and his pupils were able to understand the German philosophy which then was an enigma and a puzzle to others who in Britain interested themselves in speculation.

[1] *Miscellaneous Essays* (People's Edition), London, 1872, ii. 183 ff. The essay was originally published in the *Foreign Review* [no. 7] in 1829.

[2] See J. Veitch, *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*, Edinburgh, 1869, p. 421 ff.

[3] See J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1865, Preface.

[4] See his 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned' (*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, pp. 1 ff., 605) where he ascribes the theory of Schelling and Hegel to Cardinal de Cusa—a sufficient indication of the value he placed on it.

(4) *Modern developments.*—Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysic*[1] was perhaps the first systematic exposition of transcendentalism in our tongue, although others had by that time acquainted themselves at first hand with its varied expositions in Germany—some repelled by it (*e.g.*, John Cairns),[2] others enthusiastic in their advocacy (*e.g.*, Hutchison Stirling, whose *Secret of Hegel* was an elaborate attempt to make Hegel intelligible to English-speaking students). It was, however, through the teaching and writings of Thomas Hill Green (*q.v.*) that transcendentalism became a philosophical force in Britain. Evolutionism, while it attempted to reconcile the older empiricism and transcendentalism, did so from below, by trying to relate man's knowledge and man's morality with animal life and animal activity in general, but the new transcendentalism, while acknowledging that in one sense man is a part of nature, yet explained knowledge and morality from above. Knowledge, according to this view, is explicable as the reproduction in man of the eternal self-consciousness of God, and morality is the realization of the immanent Eternal. The following passage from William James describes the spread of this movement in Britain:

'For many years adherents of this way of thought have deeply interested the British public by their writings. Almost more important than their writings is the fact that they have occupied philosophical chairs in almost every university in the kingdom. . . . It follows from their position of academic authority, were it from nothing else, that idealism exercises an influence not easily measured upon the youth of the nation—upon those, that is, who from the educational opportunities they enjoy may naturally be expected to become the leaders of the nation's thought and practice. . . . Carlyle introduced it, bringing it as far as Chelsea. Then Jowett and Thomas Hill Green, and William Wallace and Lewis Nettleship, and Arnold Toynbee and David Ritchie—to mention only those teachers whose voices are now silent—guided the waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Isis. John and Edward Caird brought them up to the Clyde, Hutchison Stirling up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey and up the Severn and Dee and Don. They pollute the bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Cam and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain. The disaster is universal.'[3]

'Transcendentalism' came to be used of this new movement, although the term was not a favourite one with the idealists themselves. It was used by Henry Sidgwick[4] especially of the teaching of Green; by A. J. Balfour,[5] who contributes a chapter of criticism, and who even then could say:

'In English-speaking countries it is within the narrow circle of professed philosophers, perhaps the dominant mood of thought; while without that circle it is not so much objected to as totally ignored.'[6]

William James used it of all objective idealists, however these may differ among themselves, while Caldwell uses it of Bosanquet's teaching in his *Gifford Lectures*, which he describes as 'the last striking output of British transcendentalism or absolutism.'[7]

(5) *Neo-Hegelianism and Christianity.*—What gave this philosophy its vogue, to begin with at any rate, in Britain was undoubtedly the fact that to many minds it appeared as a *defensor fidei*. It seemed to supply an answer to materialism and empiricism on the one hand, and a vague scepticism and agnosticism on the other. It could be preached, and was preached often, by men who adopted the familiar phrases of sacrosanct religious thinking which were associated in the public mind with Christian values, and thus it came to be regarded

[1] Edinburgh, 1854.

[2] See A. R. MacEwen, *Life and Letters of John Cairns*, London, 1895, pp. 160–163.

[3] *A Pluralistic Universe* (*H L*), London, 1909, p. 53 f.

[4] *Outlines of the Hist. of Ethics*[2], London, 1888.

[5] *The Foundations of Belief*[2], London, 1895.

[6] *Ib.* p. 137.

[7] *Pragmatism and Idealism*, p. 14.

as a type of Christian philosophy. Hutchison Stirling found in Hegelianism a new version of Calvinism. Green used it to demolish the traditional English sensationalism and hedonism, and amidst the scepticism which prevailed regarding the historical elements of Christianity used it to rear a Christianity of ideas and ideals, from which dualism we are still suffering—witness the controversies concerning the historic Jesus and the eternal Christ. John Caird, afraid of the inroads of Spencerian and Manselian scepticism and Huxley's agnosticism, found in Hegel's teaching an ark of refuge and a citadel of defence. It was thus a movement of deliverance, of reform, and of religion. Not a few of its most zealous advocates were men destined for theology who found here a more congenial home. But, as time went on and this system began to be developed, the difficulties, tendencies, and obscurities inherent in it, as well as the dangers, revealed themselves. Just as in Germany Hegel's system allied itself at first with orthodox theology and then, in the hands of Strauss and Feuerbach, swung back to practical atheism and materialism, so also in our own country time has made it plain that this system is no guarantee of Christian faith or morals. Green[1] speaks with philosophic sorrow of those who find in poetry and religion the satisfaction for their ideals and aspirations, though they harbour scientific views which contradict these. He is sorry because such people do not proceed to frame or adopt a coherent philosophical system; forgetting that what gave transcendentalism its interest and vitality among the educated was not its speculative scheme—that was always a puzzle more or less—but the idea that this philosophy conserved spiritual values, and that what is fast loosening its hold on this class to-day is the feeling, rightly or wrongly entertained, that these interests are being betrayed or disregarded in the interests of the coherence of the system itself. To begin with, it is widely felt that transcendentalism speaks too confidently of its own power to present a perfectly explicable view of the world—to exhibit all reality in thought categories. Its manner is apt to strike the observer as being haughty and supercilious, and its language would lead one to think that a claim to something like omniscience is arrogated—a claim so contrary to our broken experience as human beings, and so opposed to that humility which serious thinkers have always regarded as the fitting attitude for all searchers of truth.

(6) *Faith and knowledge.*—No one has done more among our professional philosophers to abate this soaring gnosticism than Campbell Fraser, with his insistence on the function of faith as lying at the very basis of knowledge itself, as accompanying and regulating its advance all along its operations. Reality is richer than thought, nor is it possible to factorize reality into thought terms. The limits of human knowledge are obvious even in the most daring schemes of rationalism, and philosophy has again to face the problem of the relation between faith and reason.

Again, it is felt that transcendentalism does not do justice to the reality of the external world. To it the external world is only an object for a subject, and the tendency of all idealistic schemes is to lapse into solipsism. This solipsism may be of the human individual or of the One Supreme Subject, but in essence it is the same. Sidgwick suggested the term 'mentalism'[2] as a more adequate description of this tendency. Whatever term we use, the tendency itself is undeniable, and the reaction is seen in the movement known as neo-realism,[1] but the tendency is acutely felt by reasonable idealists, as, *e.g.*, by A. S. Pringle-Pattison;[2] yet one wonders if his own view of creation is not just a residuum of this old leaven of mentalism which he cannot purge out of his system. He has no difficulty in regard to the creation of souls, which, if it means anything, means something new, but he cannot admit the creation of matter. Yet, if God existed in His fullness before any person now living existed—if such an assumption is tolerable—why should creation as applied to matter be considered incredible? It is futile to try to explain matter as thought-elements, either in the mind of man or in the mind of God. When a philosopher arrives at such a view, it is surely the sane course for him to examine his reasoning again.

(7) *The problem of personality.*—The personality of man in this system, as we see from its modern developments, becomes insecure, or, if that danger is avoided, it is at the price of God's personality that man's is safeguarded. Thus there are those who, like Bosanquet, lay stress on the Supreme Personality or Individuality, and tend to make men but aspects of this Being's life. Others lay stress on man and make God the totality of men—a college or community of spirits, eternal *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*. To conceive of God as a perfect personality, above and apart from men and the world, and yet originating and sustaining both, seems an absurdity to this scheme of thinking.

'History is the biography of the Absolute; science the natural history of the Absolute; philosophy the self-consciousness of the Absolute, recalling and arranging its past being in unconsciousness, and discovering thereby the laws of its own thought.'[3]

The outcome is seen in a book like Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, in which the Absolute is everything—God, men, nature, spirits good and evil—and yet somehow it is all that in the bliss of an absolutely consistent whole. Personal idealism, pragmatism, and, above all, theism, will never take such a theory seriously.

5. The task of philosophy.—The modern world is alive to the fact that the intellect alone is not man, and that reality is not to be construed solely by its means. Emphasis is now laid on the will and the emotions as well, with the result that the moral life—the sphere of ideals—is given its own place. When this is recognized, then it becomes clear that reality is not a perfection which the mind has to mirror, but an ideal which has to be achieved. Nothing is more deadening and more untrue than to think of reality from man's point of view as a perfect 'is'; for the moral life at any rate reality is in ideals—'the best is yet to be.' Thus only can man's freedom be saved from the cloudland of illusion, and thus only can evil and sin—the root of all our intellectual as well as of all our moral problems—be faced as our moral nature imperatively calls on us to face them. Our duty in regard to these, unless our whole nature be itself a delusion, is not so much to explain them as to abolish them. To tell us that 'this very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order'[4] is to treat man's moral nature with insincerity. Transcendentalism has no eschatology, because to it the Absolute—*i.e.* all that is—is already perfect and cannot be more so, and yet a philosophy or a religion without an eschatology offers nothing to man's needs, imposes a veto on man's passion for reformation, and does away with

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, p. 2.
[2] The term 'mentalism' or 'immaterialism' is also used by James S. Ferrier.

[1] See art. REALISM.
[2] *The Idea of God* (*Gifford Lectures*), Oxford, 1917, ch. x.
[3] Cairns, in *Life*, by MacEwen, p. 163.
[4] J. Royce, *The World and the Individual* (*Gifford Lectures*), New York and London, 1900–01, ii. 385.

his felt need of redemption. These are some of the difficulties that most modern thinking men feel in regard to modern transcendentalism, and the recognition of them has led to a very general revolt against it in recent years from within the philosophic world itself. Pragmatism, neo-realism, neo-Kantianism, personal idealism, are but some of the phases of this revolt. It cannot be said that these views, any or all of them, are free from difficulties; and at the present moment it is impossible to say what the future may have in store for philosophy. The best we can wish for it is that it free itself from the tyranny of phrases and become intelligible and interesting; that it may have the humility to attempt to solve real problems that perplex men; that it be freed from its disdain regarding men's abiding convictions; that it abstain from any language which would throw doubt on the great ideals and values of life; and that it realize the necessity of satisfying the heart as well as the head. God, nature, man—these are the realities. Transcendentalism tends to forget the second, and to make the first and third coequal; pragmatism forgets the first, and naturalism the first and third. The task of philosophy is concerning these three, and transcendentalism is valuable when the claims of naturalism become exorbitant; but it must not, without becoming false, succumb either to humanism on the one hand or to pantheism on the other.

LITERATURE.—The *OED* gives an idea of the variety of meaning attached to the word 'transcendental,' and R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosoph. Begriffe*[3], 3 vols., Berlin, 1910, gives the philosophical usage. For the pre-Kantian logical usage and the mediæval theological usage the Histories of Philosophy and of Theology must be consulted. For New England transcendentalism see art. EMERSON. Joseph Cook, *Transcendentalism*, Boston, U.S.A., 1877, is a vigorous popular criticism of Emersonianism in the interests of orthodoxy. The literature under artt. COLERIDGE and CARLYLE is instructive for the early influence of German transcendentalism in a popular form in Britain.

A short account of the history of British transcendentalism, or absolutism, is given by Robert Mackintosh, *Hegel and Hegelianism*, Edinburgh, 1903, chs. vi. and vii. O. Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtl. Grundlage*, Berlin, 1878, and *Development of Theology*, Eng. tr., London, 1890, gives the history of post-Kantian idealism from a theological point of view. J. H. Stirling, T. H. Green, John Caird, Edward Caird, J. Watson, H. Jones, W. Wallace, J. Royce, J. Machride Sterrett, G. S. Morris give a version of Hegelian transcendentalism of a religious character. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1902, is mainly negative. For the revolt against transcendentalism in Germany see H. Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, Berlin, 1911. French philosophy since Cousin and Renouvier, down to Bergson, has been more or less generally anti-rationalistic and personalistic. James Seth, *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, London, 1912, is instructive for English thinking; an older book by D. Masson (quoted above) deals with Mill and Hamilton—the conflict between transcendentalism and intuitionism. The works of A. Campbell Fraser, Henry Sidgwick, and A. J. Balfour lay stress on primitive convictions and are in spirit against Hegelian gnosticism. See the literature under artt. NEO-KANTIANISM, REALISM, and PRAGMATISM. William Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*, London, 1913, gives ample information as to anti-rationalistic literature in Britain, Germany, France, and America.

D. MACKENZIE.

TRANSFORMATION.—See METAMORPHOSIS.

TRANSMIGRATION.

TRANSMIGRATION (Introductory and Primitive).—Reincarnation is the passage of the soul from one body to another, usually of the same species, among higher races often with ethical implications, the lot of the soul on earth being determined by its behaviour in a former life. Transmigration, metempsychosis, and other terms are often used in an almost identical sense, but also in a vaguer way, implying at times that the soul itself assumes an animal form, sometimes permanently, sometimes only as a prelude to another reincarnation or to final destruction or absorption. Somewhat different is the creed which may be termed 'alternation of existences'; it involves the belief that man is double, a counterpart in another world corresponding to the earthly body or embodied soul in this world and taking the place of the latter when its turn comes to quit this world. Separate existence, reincarnation, annihilation, and transmigration are the possibilities that present themselves to the primitive mind when it inquires into the fate of the soul. We cannot say why one belief rather than another has been adopted in any specific instance; but it is clear that the resemblance of children to parents (or other relatives) has played some part, especially in W. Africa. The complex of beliefs is therefore to some extent a semi-scientific creed, taking the place of a biological account of heredity, and based on reasoning that we can follow. It seems equally certain that the widespread belief in transformation (or change of bodily form) during life must have had its effect on eschatological doctrine; and here the creed goes back to what must be some of the most archaic elements of human speculation. Those two factors are, however, at times to some extent combined, when a rise or fall in the scale of existence is put down to the merit or demerit of previous births. Both in reincarnation and in transmigration doctrines the life or lives that succeed the human life on earth are sometimes regarded as limited in duration, sometimes as indefinitely prolonged; where some accident interferes with the due course of reincarnation, the lot of the soul may be a kind of third state, neither reincarnation nor annihilation (or absorption), but separate existence (as an evil spirit).

Many widely distributed customs appear to be connected with the belief in reincarnation. Thus, in Africa and America children are buried by the wayside, near the mother, under the eaves, or in other situations that would in the eyes of the natives facilitate reincarnation; in parts of Central Australia and in Africa people are buried in the place of their birth.[1] But it must be recalled that, generally speaking, the common feeling that it is well to be buried with one's own people implies no more than the view that this is necessary to ensure the solidarity of the family in the future life. The custom of killing the first-born[2] has been explained for some areas by the belief that this child is, in special measure, an embodiment of the father or grandfather; and the abdication of a king, as in Tahiti, in favour of an infant son has been put down to the same cause. The belief in transmigration again in certain areas has led to the sacrosanctity of certain species, and the totemism (*q.v.*) of some regions, such as S. Africa and Oceania, has been referred to this origin.

[1] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory and Primitive), § VII. 3 (*e*).
[2] See art. FIRST-BORN (Introductory and Primitive), § 3.

A well-developed scheme of reincarnation or transmigration, if we except the anomalous case of the Central Australian tribes, as to whose real belief there is some doubt, is generally found only among peoples who either have attained a certain stage of culture, as in India, or have almost certainly been in contact with or influenced by a higher culture, as among W. African tribes. The W. African tribes among which a reincarnation creed has been recorded in more or less detail are the Mandingo, Ewe, Edo, and Ibo. The belief is also known among the Yoruba, who lie geographically between the Ewe and the Edo; but details of their ideas on the subject are lacking.

1. West Africa.—(*a*) *Mandingo.*—As regards the Mandingo, we have only a summarized account of their beliefs,[1] which differs widely from another account from a portion of the area;[2] a summarized account is always liable to mislead, and, in view of the large divergences recorded in other areas in the transmigration and reincarnation beliefs, it is prudent to await further details from the French territories before classifying the belief as aberrant.

According to Delafosse, every living being and every natural phenomenon depends for its nature on a *niama*, 'dynamic spirit'; the word *nia* is applied to a genius, *niama* to a spirit, which may be that of a genius, a human being, a sacred object, an animal, a rock, etc. The *niama* of a dead man can reside where it likes—in the corpse, in the hut, in a sacred object, or in the body of a living being whose *niama* it absorbs. Certain magicians attribute their powers to the possession of the *niama* of a genius or of a dead man. The *niama* of a man for whom the due rites have not been performed may reincarnate itself in a solitary animal, or in a human being, who goes mad. It is therefore clear that, though the *niama* may be reincarnated, it is by no means invariably the case, and, where reincarnation takes place, it differs in kind from the reincarnation in which the more easterly tribes believe (see below). Side by side with the *niama* we have the *dia*, or breath of life, which passes at death into another being; it is not the object of any cult; it is found only in living beings and passes only into another being of the same species, save on the rare occasions when it animates the body of a totem. This belief is, in form, on all fours with those of other Negro tribes; but it is hardly possible to speak of reincarnation, which implies some degree of identity, some measure of personality.

According to Monteil, the Khassonke believe that *dya* is soul, force, or shadow, while *ni* means breath; if this is correct, the meanings are just the reverse of what they are in the foregoing account of Mandingo beliefs, and it seems clear either that we are in the presence of a far-going disintegration of creed or that, as has probably happened farther east, the belief has come from without and has been worked up by each tribe in its own fashion. In any case it seems improper to give a generalized account of the beliefs of a mass of tribes if such varied views have to be regarded as identical.

(*b*) *Ewe.*—According to the Ewe belief, every man has two souls—a *luwo agbedo*, or life-soul, and a *luwo kuto*, or death-soul; the former is visible when a man casts a short shadow, the latter when he casts a long shadow. The death-soul accompanies a man into the grave and then goes to the land of the dead; the life-soul leaves the body at death and goes sighing mournfully and seeking for a resting-place; each man has also a breath-soul. That the shadow-soul is more than a shadow is clear from the fact that sleep is attributed to the absence of the shadow-soul, waking to its return, and dreams to its activity outside the body.

The land of the dead appears to be the same as Amedzowe, the place of man's origin—a land not on earth, but in heaven, where everything corresponds more or less closely to the things of this life. In Amedzowe are yams, corn, cotton, bush, and all that surrounds a man in this life, not, however, in bodily form, but spiritually, so to speak; and the human inhabitants of Amedzowe live and thrive on these things in their spiritual form. Life in Amedzowe, however, is more than a duplication of this world; for, when a child dies soon after birth, a priest may declare that it was a great king in Amedzowe and has died in order to return to the scene of its former glories. Conversely, the things of this world may influence the course of events in Amedzowe; if a man remains too long away from the other world, he will fall ill, for the dwellers there prepare to break down his hut; and, to save him, his associates in this world must each bring a blade of grass and lay it on the roof of his house, as a symbol of the re-roofing of his spiritual house. In Amedzowe a man has a spiritual aunt (*tasi*) and other relatives; from her he must obtain permission to leave the world of spirits and come to the world of men.[1] Some of those who come to this world are so dearly loved by their spiritual relatives that they have to give a promise, called *gbetsi*, to return after a short time; these are the children who die young; this promise has been personified and is regarded as in some measure an evil genius, for it incites men who break it to evil deeds and especially to suicide or to acts that will bring about a violent death. Generally speaking, the lot of a man in this life and his abilities are determined by the fate announced to him by his *tasi*; but here, as elsewhere, there is a fundamental contradiction in the creed of the Ewe, for, as will be seen below, the *aklama*, or genius, is also held responsible for a man's lot in this life.

Side by side with this curiously untheological creed we find the belief that Mawu, the supreme god, is a dweller in Amedzowe and is the king who sits in judgment on the departing soul before it takes up its abode in this world. Not only so, but we find also the view that the lot of man, or at least his term of life, is determined, if not by Mawu, at any rate by Mawu's intercession with Death, whom he begs to spare one of his earthly children. If, as appears to be the case, the Ewe beliefs are the result of syncretism, there can be no doubt as to which are the older elements in their creed; for the god of death, Ogiuwu, is found also among the Edo, from whom they were separated by the Yoruba influx, and whose views as to reincarnation at the present day come much closer to those of the Ibo, their neighbours on the east.

There is, however, another side to the Ewe beliefs; this is the *aklama*, *kla*, or, in the language of the neighbouring Twi, *okra*; it is often identified with the *luwo*, but an older and more correct conception seems to be that it is a genius or tutelary spirit. Another authority says that *kra* is the collective name for *ñunu*, all the spiritual beings that surround a man, whether they be evil or good, human or demonic. Westermann connects the word *aklama* with Efik *akaña*, a promise to return to the other world. If this derivation is correct, the conception of *aklama* as a tutelary spirit has arisen in the same way as that of its counterpart, *gbetsi*, by the personification of a promise, but Efik is a member of a different group of languages and topographically remote; the derivation must therefore be received with caution; it is none the less possible that both words are derived from the same root or form, especially if it should be the case that the reincarnation idea has been introduced from without or fostered in its growth by foreign influence.

Every man has a *kla*, or, perhaps, properly speaking, one or more, for the *aklama* figurines worshipped by a man are often in duplicate, male and female, in any case with only a single arm, as an indication of the identity of *aklama* and human being. Children sometimes carry an *aklama*

[1] Delafosse, *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, iii. 165.
[2] C. Monteil, *Les Khassonké*, p. 142.

[1] It is perhaps not without significance that the *tasi* is the father's sister; for the Ewe are matrilineal, or at most in a transition stage; and we can hardly suppose that the father's sister has normally such influence in the family; the belief in question therefore either must be young or, more probably, has come to them from without.

figurine on their backs, and, in the case of twins, each carries the figurine of the other; it is not without importance that these twin figurines are found in areas, such as Sierra Leone, where the reincarnation belief is not found, at any rate at the present day. One name for these figurines is *ame we luwo*, 'the soul of a man'—a phrase which makes clear the present deeply-rooted confusion between *luwo* and *aklama*. The *aklama* lives in Mawuwe, probably the same as Amedzowe, till Mawu gives it permission to enter a man, which it does before birth; the child to which it is assigned is known in advance, however; for the priest can interrogate the *aklama* as to the future lot of the unborn child. In some places the *kla* receives offerings annually, probably on the birthday of the child, for the *kla* is named from the day of the birth and is also known as the younger brother of Mawu. The *aklama* seeks only the welfare of his ward, so long as the latter fulfils his obligations; otherwise he may punish him with disease, madness, or other ills, or, more properly, may allow him to fall a victim to them. The obligations just mentioned include abstention from certain foods, generally, or for a period, or on certain days. In some unexplained way the *aklama* is associated with a man by virtue of his being made by Mawu out of certain earth; for, when a thief has a thievish son, it is said that Mawu formed both of the same earth, and hence their *aklama* are alike. A man comes to the world with his character formed once for all, and it seems in reality to be that of his *aklama*; a man's nature (*dzogbe*) is said to leave him at death, and, though it is believed to be conditioned by his *aklama*, it seems difficult to distinguish them.

So far as we have gone, there has been some confusion between *aklama*, *dzogbe*, and *luwo*; after death this confusion is increased. The images of the *aklama* are broken in pieces or thrown away, for their owner needs them no longer. The *aklama* seems now, like the *luwo*, to be termed *ñoli* ('ghost' or 'spirit') and is questioned a few days after death to find out who was responsible for his death. The final destination of the *ñoli* is Tsie or Agume, the place under the earth, the road to which passes through a river; Kutiame is the ferryman, and his fee is twelve cowries. Another account says that the dead man meets Liagbe at the entrance of a town, and she questions him as to his deeds in this life; she has a great wound, which he must lick; and, though this is a detail on which we have no other information, it seems highly probable that Liagbe should be identified with the spiritual aunt (*tasi*).

Native beliefs are rarely so clear and unambiguous as a written account commonly assumes them to be; but it is impossible to study the foregoing summary without feeling that syncretism must be reckoned with as a possible explanation. A knowledge of the beliefs of the peoples to the east of the Ewe can only strengthen the probability of this explanation; for here too we find diverse ideas combined, and some of them agree so closely with the Ewe creed that any possibility of separate origin must be rejected; at the same time, the general balance of the elements of the creed is so different, and the terminology so different (except where the creeds agree, as noted above), that we can hardly accept the theory of a common origin of the whole complex as the explanation of the points of agreement, which are not relatively numerous.

(*c*) *Edo.*—The Ewe language is closely akin to the Edo and forms a member of the group of languages named from the best known member, which is spoken in Benin city and the neighbourhood. It is somewhat surprising that as regards the subject of this article the terminology differs *in toto* from that of the Ewe, as is made clear by the following table:

	Ewe	Edo	Ibo
Genius . .	*aklama*, *kla*	*ehi*, *ekosi*, *ima*	*či*, *eri*; cf. *ikeňga*.[1]
Shadow (soul)	*luwo*	*agogo*	*onyinyo*, *ndò*.
Breath . .	*gbogbo*	*eti*	*ńdò*, *ume*, *uzu*.
Spirit . .		*orio* (?)	*mwo*.
Ghost . .	*ñoli*		cf. *akalagoli*.[2]
Ward . .			*(ńw)ago*.
Other world .	Amedzowe	Elimi	Owamwo, Okwa.
Promise .	*gbetsi*		*akaňa*; cf. *ikeňga*.

Broadly speaking, *ehi* corresponds to our idea of soul, for the *agogo* is said to disappear on the day that a man's body is put into the grave; in the Kukuruku country there are traces of belief in a breath-soul (*eti*), which does not, however, correspond to the *dyu*, for *eti* is said to be the breath of *ehi*, which dies in Elimi before it comes to this world. Osa (god) is said to take a man's *eti* to Elimi, where it turns into a man with a body (*i.e. ehi*). Two *ehi* are usually distinguished, *ehinehi* (*ehinowa*) and *ehinoha*, sometimes identified with *ekosi*, sometimes with *ehogai*, the *ehi* of a childless person. Some say that *ehinowa* is in Elimi, while *ehinoha* is on the back of a man's neck; others say that *ehinoha* is a man's shadow in Elimi, or that *ehinowa* is on the top of a man's head; the latter statement was qualified by the addition that there was another *ehi* in Elimi. Some say that *ehinowa* comes to earth when a man dies, thus reproducing the idea of alternation already found among the Ewe, others that *ehinoha* lives in Elimi and comes to earth as *ehinehi* when a man dies. It is also said that *ehinowa* goes at death to Elimi and returns for sacrifices and offerings; in Elimi this *ehi* may lay claim to a woman for whom his earthly counterpart paid bride-price without being able to secure her as a wife. Some say that *ehinowa* is sent by Osa to animate a child already conceived, others that it brings a child to a man, others again that it 'does things for a man,' *i.e.* is his genius. *Ehinoha's* functions are equally a matter of opinion; it is on the back of a man's neck, or is the servant of *ehinowa* and takes sacrifice to him in Elimi, or lives in Elimi and comes to earth when its ward dies, or is a man's shadow in Elimi, where *ehinowa* is also, or corresponds to *ere*—a man's enemies (perhaps, rather, evil spirits), to whom he sacrifices on the road.

We reach a somewhat different cycle of ideas when we find *ehinoha* regarded as a 'bush soul,' injury to which means sickness for the human being. It is also said to be the 'king of the bush' and to be richer than *ehinowa*; when it receives a sacrifice, it is satisfied and turns its back. The prevailing view is undoubtedly that *ehi* brings a child from Elimi but is not identical with it; some say that the dead go to Elimi and are reborn seven times in the same or another family, alternately as male and female. Though there is some confusion between the *ehi*, they seem to be clearly distinguished from the man himself; they are real genii, but so far bound up with their human counterpart that his health is sometimes regarded as dependent on the state of the bush *ehi*. On the whole, the *ehinoha* is a bad genius that leads a man astray, spoils things, and, so far as the identity of man and *ehi* is accepted, refuses to remain in this world. The word *ehi* is found in Kukuruku in the form *ezi*, with which may be compared the Ibo *eri*,[3] *ezi*.

(*d*) *Ibo.*—Among the Ibo, who number several millions, there is much diversity of view; but only a small percentage of the tribes have been adequately investigated; the following summary relates to the Awka and Asaba districts. West of the Niger the belief is that an entity known as *či*, sometimes identified with *eri*, sends the new human being into the world; the reincarnated person and the reincarnation are known respectively as *ago* and *ńwago*. The *či* is normally a dead person, but in some areas may be the father or mother of the child. East of the Niger the *či* is in the main, like *ikeňga*, a personal protective deity, with only slight traces of a connexion with the reincarnation belief; there is no explicit statement that the *či* sends a child into the world. The *ikeňga* may perhaps be equated with the Ewe *gbetsi*, especially if, as seems probable, it is etymologically connected with Efik *akaňa*, the promise to return to the other world. The Ibo are quite clear in their belief that a person is reincarnated, normally in his (or her) own family, at any rate if he has been buried with his fathers; children of tender years will assure the inquirer with the utmost solemnity

[1] A personal protective spirit. [2] Evil spirit.
[3] r represents a breathed r.

that they are their deceased grandfathers or grandmothers; and the identity of the ancestor is determined by divination. A child that speaks before it opens its eyes is said to be relating what it saw in Owamwo and is at once exposed in the *ajoifia*; it is also asserted that a man who has been unlucky in one existence may decide, on opening his eyes for the first time in a new life, that it is the same world in which he was unhappy before, and resolve to give up the struggle, whereupon the new-born child dies on the spot.

The relation between *či* and *ago*, west of the Niger, may be compared with that of godchild and godparent; the relation sets up a bar to marriage, and a man may not even marry into the *umunna* (sept) of his *či*; two people who have the same *či* may not marry, nor yet may their children, though apparently a man may marry the fellow *ńwago* of his sister. There is a saying that the child who is one's *ago* (*ńwago*) should have been the child of a man's own loins; both must be of the same quarter; if the *či* has no heir of his own, the *ago* inherits the property. Curiously enough, the *onye bi owe*, the reincarnated person, who is sent into the world by the (living) *či*, and who ought by analogy to stand to the child in a closer relation than the *či*, is in point of fact regarded as a comparative stranger; he may come from another *ebo* (quarter) or from a different tribe altogether, and his ritual prohibitions do not concern the child, who has to observe those of his *či*.

There are traces of the view that *či* and *ńwago* form two links in a continuous chain, at any rate where the *či* is not a living person, the *ńwago* of one generation being the *či* of the next; and this affords a satisfactory explanation of the views as to prohibitions. At the same time, it must be remembered that the *či* is properly a personal protective deity, in fact a personal *alose*, and that the facts are, in other directions, best accounted for on this hypothesis; it must not, however, be forgotten that east of the Niger an *alose* may be the *či*, or, according to another account, may itself be reincarnated. East of the Niger also we sometimes find the view that the *ago* goes to the next world with a dead man, while the *oglisi* pegs that represent it are thrown away; so that here the *ago* is regarded as the *či*; it is, at any rate for a time, to some extent represented by the *ndičie*, or ancestral figurines. Curiously enough, the *umunna* (sept) claims to have a collective *ago*, just as it has a collective *ndičie*, though in the nature of things an *ago* which sends to this world a corporation, not individual human beings, is unthinkable.

West of the Niger there is a good deal of confusion between *či* and *eri*, which is properly a genius, and may perhaps originally have been a breath-soul (cf. Kukuruku *eti*, 'breath').[1] If this is the case, *eri* is now none the less distinct from the man, for ceremonies are performed to bring it to the house, and in many cases it is identified with *či*. Perhaps two streams of belief flowing together, one placing *či* in Owamwo, the other locating *eri* in this world, have coalesced, so that ideas associated with *či* came to be attached to *eri*, and *vice versa*.

[1] The following forms may be compared:

Edo	Sobo	Kukuruku	Ibo
ehi, eti	*eri*	*ezi*	*eri.*

Cf. also the undoubtedly related words for 'ear':

eho	*ero*	*ezo*	*nti* (= *eti*).

It has been pointed out that the words *akaňa* and *ikeňga* are in all probability connected etymologically; it is by no means unlikely that *kla* and *aklama* are from the same root; for *la* and *na* may well be alternative forms of a suffix, and the transition from *kala* to *kla* is a well-established phonetic change in W. Africa. There is some reason for supposing that the original idea is that of a promise, though in Ewe the term *gbetsi* is now used in that sense, while *aklama* has become a genius; but further research is needed in other areas before any definite pronouncement can be made. It is tempting to connect the root *ka* with the Egyptian *ka*, which was a double of the man and believed to be after death, with the mummy, a denizen of the tomb;[1] but, though there are clear traces of mummification in W. Africa, probably due to Egyptian influence, and though nothing is more probable than that Egyptian ideas in traversing the continent would have undergone fundamental changes, there is no positive evidence to connect any of the beliefs mentioned above with any article of the Egyptian creed.[2] The possibility of Egyptian influence must, however, be kept in mind, for Egyptologists appear to accept the evidence produced by L. Frobenius[3] as to Egyptian influence in the present Yoruba area in the 6th cent. B.C. That the terms of the Yoruba language show no connexion with those cited above is of no importance, for there can be little doubt that the Yoruba tribe has come down from the north and may not have been in occupation of the area in question, if indeed it existed, at the period in question.

2. South Africa.—In many parts of S. Africa, and sporadically in other parts of Africa, there is a belief that the dead are transformed into certain species of animals, or at any rate that they assume this form to appear to the survivors; it has been maintained, not quite convincingly, that some Bantu tribes[4] suppose themselves to be transformed at death into their totems. This belief is, however, definitely reported from the west coast, among the Siena and the Twi, as well as in the north-east of the Congo Free State. Among the Zulu the transformation is supposed to be into a species of serpent.

3. Madagascar.—In Madagascar the belief in transformation is also found, though here doubtless of Indonesian origin; and we see a different lot in the future state assigned to various social grades; this is of course a common feature of eschatological doctrine not connected with the theory of moral retribution.

4. Central Australia.—According to Spencer and Gillen, the tribes of Central Australia believe that children are reincarnations of their ancestors (totem) and are continually reborn;[5] but the testimony of Strehlow, a witness well acquainted with the language of the Arunta tribe, directly contradicts this;[6] for he maintains that the native belief is that the soul of every man goes at death to the Isle of the Dead, there to be annihilated by a flash of lightning; in certain cases it is believed that a totem-ancestor is himself reborn, but after this reincarnation he does not return.

[1] See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

[2] In modern Egyptian folklore the *guarina*, equated by Seligman with the *ka*, is held to be the spiritual counterpart of a man, which has nothing to do with his immortal soul; it plays the part of a good or bad angel. It is of course possible that this resemblance to present-day W. African beliefs is due to convergence; we can hardly assume that both are simple replicas of ancient Egyptian beliefs, nor yet that the course of development has been identical; but there is at least a *prima facie* case for inquiry.

[3] *Und Afrika Sprach*, Berlin, 1912.

[4] See art. BANTU AND S. AFRICA, § 3 f.

[5] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 123, 127; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 145, 174.

[6] *Globus*, xci. [1907] 285, xcii. [1907] 123; see also literature below.

Strehlow's account of Aranda (Arunta) belief is as follows:

The totem-ancestors dropped some of their *churinga*, which were transformed into trees, rocks, etc., from which proceed *ratapa*; these are completely formed boys and girls of reddish colour and have both body and soul; they are invisible to ordinary mortals. When a woman passes a spot (*kuanakala*) where the transformed body of an ancestor is, and where consequently the *ratapa* associated with that ancestor dwell, one of the latter, when it recognizes a suitable (*i.e.* of the correct clan) woman, enters her body and causes various symptoms. The child belongs to the totem of the ancestor associated with the spot.

There is a second method by which an ancestor impregnates a woman, but this does not seem to imply any kind of reincarnation, though the ancestor is called in both cases the *iningukua* of the child. The ancestor is said to come out of the earth and throw a small bull-roarer (*namatuna*) at a suitable woman, in whose body it takes human form.

Both kinds of impregnation are said to be equally frequent, and the difference is recognized in the face of the child, which is narrow in the first, broad in the second kind.

An *iningukua* can also, very rarely, enter a woman's body in person; and a child thus originated has light hair; in such a case the soul goes at death like other souls to the Isle of the Dead, and is annihilated by a flash of lightning. There is therefore no question of repeated reincarnations, and only in the third case can we really speak of an Aranda belief in the doctrine, so far as can be seen from Strehlow's narrative.

This account agrees with much of what is reported by Spencer and Gillen;[1] though these authors speak of reincarnation of ancestors, they really mean an incarnation of spirit-children left behind by the totem-ancestors. And even among the Aranda we hear of the totem-ancestors[2] living in water-holes.

Perhaps it is most probable that large local variations of belief account best for the differences between Strehlow and the English authors. In this connexion the account of R. H. Mathews[3] is of interest, though it must be remembered that he is probably relying on information derived from others. Some of the Chingali believe in repeated reincarnations of ancestors, and a change of sex occurs each time;[4] others say that women are not reincarnated and consequently deny at any rate the change of sex; the northern Chingali deny the reincarnation creed altogether and come very near the doctrine set forth by Strehlow for the Aranda.

5. Other areas.—The totemism of Indonesia[5] and Oceania[6] has been traced both by Wilken and by Rivers to the belief that the sacrosanct animal species is the residence of ancestral souls. Transmigration theories are also found sporadically in New Guinea (*q.v.*) and N. and S. America. The Bororo Indians of Brazil believe that they become *arara* birds after death and in dreams; other tribes say they pass into other birds. The *arara* is kept as a pet and mourned at death, though the wild bird may be killed for its feathers; yet the Bororo say, 'We are *arara*.' According to von den Steinen, the earliest form of the belief was that the native said, 'I have a bird,' not 'I am a bird,' which flies at night and which remains as the natural form of the person when a magician or other evil-disposed being hinders his return to human form (*i.e.* causes his death). But it is only in parts of Australia and W. Africa that these forms of eschatological creed are an element of real importance.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, xii., *Bibliography and General Index*, *s.v.*; *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 385; N. W. Thomas, *Anthropological Report on the Edo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, 2 pts., London, 1910, *Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, 6 pts., do. 1912–14; K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 353, 512; B. Hagen, *Unter den Papuas*, Wiesbaden, 1899, p. 225; A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904; *Baessler-Archiv*, ii. [1911] 73; M. Delafosse, *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, Paris, 1912; C. Monteil, *Les Khassonké*, do. 1915; C. Strehlow, 'Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien,' in *Veröff. städt. Völker-Museum Frankfurt a. M.*, 1908 ff., i. ii. [1908] 51 ff., etc. N. W. THOMAS.

TRANSMIGRATION (Buddhist).—Theoretically Buddhism teaches neither the existence of the soul nor its transmigration, but insists on the revolution, or 'stream' (*saṁsāra*), of existences. In its practical influence on the popular mind, however, this doctrine amounted to much the same as any other doctrine of transmigration. It amalgamated everywhere with the animistic conception of the soul, whether human or other; it inspired the people with the feeling of a certain continuity of life-relationships through various existences; it impressed the popular mind with a degree of fatalism—the belief that every event in one's life was the result of past deeds. The doctrine, when formulated, contained more or less sensuous descriptions of the better lives in the heavens, besides horrifying details of purgatorial existences; and these aspects of the teaching resulted in the growth of a respectable volume of visionary literature during the course of the history of the religion in various countries.[1] Thus, in spite of the higher doctrine of the ideal Buddhist perfection in *nirvāṇa*, and in spite of the psychological and metaphysical formulations of the teaching of *karma* and *chitta*, the Buddhist conception of transmigration may be treated in the same category as other doctrines of the same kind.

According to the regular teaching, the *saṁsāra* consists in an indefinite revolution of renewed existences produced and prolonged according to the qualities of the *karma* (*q.v.*), which is the matrix as well as the *vis a tergo* of the enduring existences. It is said repeatedly:

'No beginning is known of the eternal revolution (*saṁsāra*) of the beings, streaming and flowing to and fro [in the ocean of births and deaths], being covered by ignorance (*avijjā*) and fettered in thirst (*taṇhā*).'[2]

In this vast ocean of renewed births there are innumerable streams of existences, conditioned by their respective deeds and retributions, flowing uninterruptedly not only in the continuity of the individual being but also in the solidarity of a group of existences. Now the groups of existences are classified into five *gatis* ('courses,' 'modes of life')—the heavenly life, the human life, the animal life, the ghostly life, and the purgatorial (or hellish) life; or into six, by adding the *asura* (or furious spirits).[3] Another classification is that of the *bhava* ('being') or *loka* ('realm,' the cosmic installation of beings) into three—the formless heavens, the heavens with forms, and the material worlds with desires and greed.[4] In this connexion it is to be noted that the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration emphasized the affinity and solidarity of the *karma* and all its consequences within a group of existences, whether a specific world in the cosmic system, the local division of the abode, or the class division in social life; in short, any and every link, material, physical, moral, emotional, intellectual, or social, is the cause and a manifestation of the solidarity of existence due to the common *karma*. The principle of the solid-

[1] Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 156 *f.*, 161.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 445.
[3] *Proc. Roy. Geog. Soc. Queensland*, xxii. [1907] 75 *f.*
[4] Cf. Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 148.
[5] See art. INDONESIANS.
[6] See artt. AUSTRALASIA, MELANESIANS.

[1] In *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 254–262, Mahā-Moggallāna, the great disciple of Buddha, well versed in supernormal attainments, narrates to his fellow-monk Lakkhana his visions of beings tortured and purified in the purgatories and the causes of their sufferings. Thence we have a long series of similar narratives, for which see, *e.g.*, the opening of the *Mahāvastu* (ed. E. Sénart, Paris, 1882–97, i.), or B. Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, nos. 561, 677, 679, 706, etc.
[2] *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 178 *f.*, etc.
[3] See art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist), esp. §§ 5–8
[4] The five or six circles are graphically represented in the *bhavachakra* (the cycle of existence), for which see art. AJANTA, on the *Nidāna* (vol. i. p. 258[b]).

arity is the *karma*, and its manifestation is the *bhava* or *dhātu*, the latter of which means the characteristics (common to the beings within a group), the specific circle of existence, community, common destiny.

How the different *dhātus* are produced; what are the reciprocal actions and reactions of the psychical factors and environmental factors in the process of the development of *karma*; what are the conditions of the individual *karma* being attracted to and incorporated into the common *dhātu*—these and associated questions gave rise to varied speculations in the Buddhist schools, the whole forming a web of subtle argument and grotesque fancy, in which are mingled Buddhist cosmology, psychology, ethics, and sociology. This is a subject which awaits further investigation.[1]

The practical effects of the Buddhist doctrine of *saṁsāra* were a deepening and broadening of the feeling of the continuity of life. Though often vulgarized through its amalgamation with animistic beliefs, the effect of the doctrine was to extend affection and attachment in human relationships to the former and coming lives, even to animal and plant life, which was held to be continuous and closely associated with human life, and to elaborate those sentiments through the belief in deeper causes, remoter connexions, and wider aspects of being than those of the present life.

This point can be illustrated from the folk-lore and literature of every Buddhist people, and one of the flowers of romantic literature—the Japanese literature of the 11th cent.—is dominated by this sentiment of continuity. There the delicate yet strong tie of human affection was associated with the idea of its continuity through lives beyond death, as well as with the idea of nature as inspired by physical surroundings and their changes. Unfortunately both W. G. Aston and Karl Florenz, in their histories of Japanese literature, hardly touch this point.

Another point in the effect of the teaching of *saṁsāra* is the belief in the occasional appearance of persons who can remember their former lives. In fact, it seems that Buddha himself regarded this faculty as one of his supernormal attainments (*iddhi*) and one of the criteria of saintliness. Everywhere in Buddhist literature we find mention of the three special faculties (*tevijjā*)—the divine vision, the divine hearing, and the clear recalling of one's former lives (*pubbenivāsa*). This belief gave rise to a rich literature of *Jātaka* (*q.v.*) and the allied literature of *Nidāna* and *Avadāna*, which aimed at supplying that belief with concrete illustrations and impressing believers with the close association of the lives of Buddha and Buddhist saints with those of all other beings, besides inculcating morals by the stories. Thus it was no wonder that some persons claimed to have the same faculty, whether by chance or as a result of training. The folk-lore and legends of Buddhist countries are full of instances, and a noteworthy point in them is that many of those endowed persons are children, whose remembrance of their own former lives is mostly said to lose its vividness as they grow older.[2]

LITERATURE.—See artt. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist), JĀTAKA, KARMA, and the literature cited there.

M. ANESAKI.

TRANSMIGRATION (Celtic).—I. There are two passages which clearly assert the belief in metempsychosis among the ancient Celts. Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14) tells us that the principal point in the teaching of the druids is that the soul does not perish, but, after death, passes from one body into another. Diodorus completes the evidence of Cæsar and states it precisely:

'Among the Galatæ [Gauls or Germans] the doctrine of Pythagoras prevails, namely, that the souls of men are immortal and after a fixed number of years begin to live again, the soul entering into a second body' (v. 28).

But is Diodorus giving the teaching of Pythagoras or that of the Celts? If the former, it would be wise to attach only a relative importance to the precision of his words; if the latter, it must be admitted that, according to the belief of the Celts, the passage of the soul into another body does not follow immediately upon death, and that, while the soul awaits its reincarnation, it continues to live, though under conditions which are not those of the life on earth. This interpretation would make it possible to reconcile the passages in Cæsar and Diodorus with the evidence of ancient writers who have transmitted Celtic conceptions regarding the future life in which the idea of metempsychosis does not occur.

Diodorus goes on to say:

'Therefore, during the funerals of the dead, they throw into the funeral pyre letters written to the dead relatives in the expectation that the dead will read them.'

It seems, therefore, that the man whose body was burned acted as a messenger between the living and the ancestors whom he was about to meet again in the other world. It is the idea of the immortality of the soul and of another world that is emphasized by the Latin writers.

Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells that there was an ancient custom among the Gauls of lending each other sums which were repayable in the lower world, so firmly were they persuaded of the immortality of the soul. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life among the *manes*, adds that they burn and bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postponed the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time when debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world; there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kindred in the expectation that they would rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-seated beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (*inferos, manes*); but Lucan is not content with that superficial assimilation:

'You assure us, Druids, that it is not the silent dwellings of Erebus nor the pale kingdoms of Dis who inhabits the depths, at which the souls arrive; the same breath directs their members in another world ['orbe alio'], and, if your songs declare what can be known, death is in the heart of a long life' (*Pharsalia*, i. 449–456).

There has been an endeavour to fix the meaning of 'orbe alio.' In the Latin of the time of Lucan it can mean only 'another region of the earth' and not 'another celestial globe' (see S. Reinach, *RCel* xxii. [1901] 454).

The commentaries on the few and vague Greek and Latin texts which bear upon the ancient Celtic belief in metempsychosis do not lead to any further precision. In particular, we cannot determine whether the teaching of the Celts was borrowed from the Pythagorean school. Such was, however, a tradition of antiquity. The passage from Diodorus quoted above lacks clearness, but as early as the beginning of the 1st cent. B.C. Alexander Polyhistor (frag. 138 [*FHG* iii. 239]) wrote that Pythagoras had the Gauls (Γαλάται) as disciples. Timagenes (*ap.* Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 9) seems to connect the organization of the druidic corporations with Pythagoras with regard to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Valerius Maximus (II. vi.) declares that he would consider the belief in the immortality of the soul a foolish thing if it were not for the fact that the belief of the Gauls on that matter agreed with that of Pythagoras. But the Celtic doctrine, though showing analogies with the Pythagorean doctrine, was not identical with it: it did not distinguish between the fate of the wicked and

[1] Cf. *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, ii. 140–177, and artt. ABHIDHARMA KOŚA VYĀKHYĀ, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

[2] See Lafcadio Hearn, *Gleanings in Buddha-Fields*, Boston and New York, 1897, ch. x.; H. Fielding, *The Soul of a People*, London, 1898, pp. 324–343.

that of the just; the other life is neither a punishment nor a recompense, and, in fact, the idea of justice is entirely absent from the Celtic conception.

2. We have another source of information in the legends preserved by Irish epics, which tell of historical personages and seem for the most part to be anterior to Christianity.

In the middle of the 6th cent. of our era St. Finnen met at Mag Bile (Moville, Co. Down) a warrior named Túan Mac Cairill, who lived all alone in his den; at first he would not allow the saint and his disciples to enter his dwelling, but he ended by making them welcome and showing them hospitality. They refused to accept anything from him, however, until he had told them of his adventures, which were by no means ordinary. Túan Mac Cairill had come from Spain to Ireland 312 years after the Flood along with the first inhabitants, Partholon, the son of Sera, and 24 couples. When the number of immigrants had increased to 5000, an epidemic destroyed them one after another, until only one survived to tell the tale, that one being Túan Mac Cairill. For 22 years he was the only inhabitant in Ireland; then Nemed, son of Agnoman, who also came from Spain, landed on the island, after a storm, with four men and four women. On his arrival Túan went into hiding; he fasted for three days, and, having lain down to sleep one night, he awoke in the morning in the form of a stag. He led the herds of deer in Ireland until the extinction of the race of Nemed. Then he became a boar, and remained in that shape as long as the men of Semion, son of Starist, from whom the Firbolg are descended, were in possession of Ireland. He next became a vulture during the reign of Beothach, son of Iarbonel, an ancestor of the Tuatha Dé Danann; and, once more, a fish, when the sons of Milé conquered Ireland. One day he was caught by a fisherman, brought to the wife of king Cairell, cooked, and eaten by her. At the end of the usual period he was born again as an infant and was called Mac Cairill, *i.e.* son of Cairell. Up to his second birth as a man Túan had lived 320 years: 100 as a man, 80 as a stag, 20 as a boar, 100 as a vulture, and 20 as a fish.

Certain details of this metempsychosis should be noticed: in all his successive shapes Túan preserved the consciousness and recollection of his previous existences, and his human intelligence persisted during his lives in the bodies of animals; his metamorphosis took place only when he had reached the extreme limits of old age and decrepitude; it occurred only in the neighbourhood of the house in which he lived during his first life as a man; and, finally, his change of body took place only after a fast of three days.

There is another Irish legend dealing with metempsychosis, though in a less varied and definite manner than that of Túan—the history of Mongán, son of Fiachna.

One day Mongán had a discussion with his *fili*, Forgoll, as to where king Fothad Airgdech, who was slain by the Fian Caoilte, had fallen. It was agreed that if, in the space of three days, Mongán failed to prove that Fothad had fallen at the river Larne in Ulster, and not at Duffry in Leinster, as Forgoll maintained, his goods and his person should become the property of the *fili*. Mongán's wife broke into lamentations which increased as the time went on, but Mongán waited calmly in the firm belief that a witness would come from a distant country to attest the truth of his statement; for Mongán heard the steps of the mysterious traveller from afar. On the third day, at nightfall, a warrior appeared, who, when brought into the presence of Forgoll, pointed out the exact spot where Fothad had been buried, and even gave the inscription on his tomb. While narrating the death of Fothad, the warrior called Mongán as witness to the truth of his story, and named him by the name of Fionn. The warrior was Caoilte, and Mongán was thus a reincarnation of Fionn, living about three centuries after him. The legend gives us no information about the incarnations of Fionn between the end of his first life and his reincarnation in Mongán, but probably they were similar to those of Túan Mac Cairill.

Other Irish legends allude to cases of metamorphosis, but they do not seem to take place at the end of a life. There are also epic stories presenting beings which have had a second birth, but those beings belong to the world of fairies and have no bearing upon the study of human metempsychosis.

3. The Welsh romances also contain numerous examples of metamorphosis. Perhaps there are traces of metempsychosis in the romance of Taliesin, in which he tells in verse of all the places where he has been since the beginning of the world, and in the poem entitled *Kat Goddeu* ('Battle of Goddeu'), in which the poet enumerates all the shapes which he has taken: sword, star, book, eagle, ship, serpent, etc. But the story of Taliesin is preserved only in MSS of the 17th cent., and the ancient poems attributed to the celebrated bard of the 6th cent. cannot be earlier than the 12th. It is difficult to disentangle the real archaic elements contained in them.

To sum up: it is practically only in the texts of the writers of antiquity that definite evidence is found of a Celtic belief in metempsychosis: among the Irish, metempsychosis is an exceptional phenomenon, a kind of privilege enjoyed by heroes; what we find among the Welsh is a literary tradition rather than the traces of an ancient belief. Whatever may be the ingenuity of modern scholars, it cannot on this subject make up for the lack of documentary evidence.

LITERATURE.—H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Le Cycle mythologique irlandais et la mythologie celtique* (*Cours de littérature celtique*, ii.), Paris, 1884; *The Voyage of Bran, son of Febal*, ed. K. Meyer, 'With an Essay upon the Irish Vision of the happy Otherworld and the Celtic Doctrine of Rebirth,' by A. Nutt, London, 1895–97.

G. DOTTIN.

TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian).—There are three different ideas which refer to changes of personality: (1) the union with a god, (2) the transmigration of the soul into an animal for a life-time, (3) the voluntary metamorphosis of the person temporarily into another form for his own benefit.

(1) The *divine union* is often stated in the *Book of the Dead*, as 'I am Ra' or 'I am Thoth'; this was the person entering into such union with the god that he had all the compelling power and safety of the god. Even in the earliest inscriptions, on the cylinders before the 1st dynasty, the dead is *sen*, or brother, to a god; or *sensen*, allied, associated, in touch, or united, with a god.

(2) The question of *transmigration* has been disputed. The Greek authors refer to it as an undoubted belief; but there seems to be no Egyptian text which refers to the idea. Two scenes have been supposed to indicate it; these are judgment scenes (Seti I. sarcophagus and tomb of Rameses III.)[1] showing a pig being driven from the judgment. Yet, as referring to justified men, it cannot be the soul driven away as a pig. In most judgment scenes there is present the devouring monster, a blend of hippopotamus and crocodile, waiting to devour the guilty; but no such monster appears where the pig is, and so it seems likely that the pig is the flesh-eating animal, driven away so as to be quite apart from the justified king. The Greek testimony is so strong that it seems unlikely to have all been derived from the metamorphoses. As all the authors are post-Persian, it is possible that the idea really did blend with Egyptian belief during the Persian occupation, when other Indian ideas came into Egypt, such as asceticism. Transmigration is plainly stated in the *Korē Kosmou*, of the Persian period, probably about 500 B.C.[2] After this it is natural that the Greek writers, Herodotus, Plato, Theophrastus, Plutarch, and others, should ascribe the belief to the Egyptians of their times, unconscious that it was a new importation.[3]

(3) The belief in *metamorphosis* (*q.v.*) was general, as a magic process. The earliest Egyptian tale turns on a wax model being transformed into a living crocodile. The *Book of the Dead* has a series of magic chapters (76–89) to give power to the dead person to be transformed into 'whatever form he pleases,' into a golden hawk, a divine hawk, a god, a lily, the god Ptah, a phœnix, a heron, a swallow,

[1] I. Rosellini, *Monumenti del Culto*, lxvi., Pisa, 1834; J. G. Wilkinson, *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, new ed., London, 1878, iii. 467.

[2] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity*, London and New York, 1909, pp. 43, 47.

[3] See passages quoted in Wilkinson, iii. 462–464.

an earth-worm, or a crocodile; and lastly the power of being united to its own body. The following examples are parts of chs. 86, 89, and all of 88:

'I am the Swallow; I am the Swallow. I am the Scorpion-bird (or white bird), the daughter of Rā. . . . And that which I went in order to ascertain, I am come to tell. Come, let me enter and report my mission. And I, entering, and ascertaining who cometh forth through that gate of the Inviolate one, I purify myself at that great stream, where my ills are made to cease, and that which is wrong in me is pardoned, and the spots which were on my body upon earth are effaced. . . . Here am I, and I come that I may overthrow mine adversaries upon earth, though my dead body be buried' (86). 'For I am the Crocodile god in all his terrors. I am the Crocodile god in the form of man. I am he who carrieth off with violence. I am the almighty Fish in Kamurit. I am the Lord to whom one bendeth down in Sechem' (88). 'Oh, thou who bringest; oh, thou runner who dwellest in thy Keep, thou great god; grant that my soul may come to me from whatsoever place wherein it abideth. . . . Let my soul (*ba*) be caught and the spirit (*khu*) which is with it, wheresoever it abideth. Track out among the things in heaven and upon earth that soul of mine, wherever it abideth . . . ' (89).

LITERATURE.—J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1912, p. 277, and works quoted above.

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

TRANSMIGRATION (Greek and Roman).—I. *GREEK.*—The notion of transmigration (παλιγγενεσία),[1] *i.e.* the passage after death of the human or animal soul from the mortal body to a new incarnation in another body of the same or another species, necessarily rests upon a belief that the soul itself is immortal, or at any rate more lasting than the body. Pherecydes,[2] who was born about 600 B.C. and is reputed to have been the teacher of Pythagoras[3]—which does not necessarily mean more than that he was earlier in time—is said to have been the first to introduce the doctrine. On the other hand, Herodotus[4] declared that it was the invention of the Egyptians and was derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of Pherecydes and Pythagoras, who were already dead. It is, however, impossible to accept Herodotus' account, because (1) the best authorities are inclined to doubt whether the Egyptians ever held the doctrine in question,[5] and (2) the Greek evidence indicates that the belief, if not indigenous, goes back to a remote past. Moreover, the notion that Pythagoras was influenced by Indian modes of thought with which he became acquainted in Ionia or elsewhere[6] is altogether unconvincing. The truth seems to be that a belief in the transmigration of human souls into other bodies after death was a relic inherited from the primitive or savage ancestors of the European peoples. It is expressly attributed to the Gauls,[7] and less explicitly to the Thracians and Scythians.[8] In fact it must have developed independently in many parts of the world,[9] without direct transmission from place to place, especially in connexion with the idea that the limited supply of souls necessitates the reappearance of the same soul in various earthly bodies. Thus in popular tales the change of a man into a beast involves the assumption that, though the body is different, the soul remains the same; *e.g.*, in the metamorphosis of Odysseus' companions into swine their intelligence remained unaffected.[10] Not that this popular tradition ever became widely effective: except for one not very clear example,[1] stone inscriptions show no trace of a belief in transmigration, while Euripides refers to a second incarnation as an actual impossibility, whose realization might have been welcome as a divine instrument of discrimination between the good and the bad.[2] But, although there is nothing to show that the belief struck deep, or was cherished outside certain particular circles, it was brought into prominence by the religious upheaval which undoubtedly took place in the 6th cent. and became associated with the worship of Dionysus and the Orphic cults. Thus the notion that the soul is imprisoned in the body as in a dungeon is attributed by Plato and his commentators to the Orphic mystics.[3] Two famous passages in Pindar presuppose the doctrine of transmigration. In one of these Persephone sends the souls back to earth in the ninth year when they have been purified from their ancient sorrow;[4] and in the other those who have thrice made their abode on either side of death are destined at last to reach the islands of the blest.[5] It seems more likely that Pindar derived this doctrine from the Orphic mysteries than indirectly through the Pythagoreans.[6] The prevalence of this mystical belief and its religious potency are illustrated with remarkable clearness in certain inscriptions on golden tablets found in S. Italy, near Rome, and in Crete, which are chiefly attributed to the 4th or 5th centuries B.C. and published as an Appendix to J. E. Harrison's *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 660 ff. One of these contains some words which form part of the appeal of the purified soul: 'I have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel; I have passed with eager feet to the Circle desired.' This refers to the mystical Wheel of Fortune which in its revolutions symbolizes the cycle of successive lives necessary to be traversed by the harassed soul before its final release. This specific cycle of progress, as well as the more general conception of a κύκλος in human affairs, is traditionally attributed to the Orphic-Pythagorean sphere of thought.[7] In the Orphic hymns[8] this has so far developed as to include a statement that an exact reproduction of the movements characteristic of the present world-era may be expected when the revolving wheel comes round to the same point again; but it is not easy to reconcile this with the opportunity which, as we have seen, is given to particular souls to obtain their release.[9] Aristotle's reference to the Orphic poems as an authority for the opinion that the soul enters the body from outside in the process of respiration accords well enough with the doctrine now under discussion.[10] Further, the Orphic prohibition of a diet of animal flesh, evidenced by Euripides and Aristophanes,[11] points in the same direction.

In popular estimation[12] transmigration is particularly associated with the name of **Pythagoras.** Much of what has been established as belonging to the Orphics, the imprisonment of the soul in the body as a retribution for past ill-deeds, the undeviating recurrence of the cycle of existence,[13] the prospect offered of ultimate escape after purification,[14] and the abstinence from a flesh diet—limited, however, by the reservation that it did not apply to the flesh of such animals as are

1 Serv. on *Æn.* iii. 68.
2 Suid. s.v.
3 Diog. Laert. i. 118, viii. 40.
4 ii. 123.
5 How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, London, 1912, *ad loc.*; cf. art. TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian).
6 T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, i. 127.
7 Caes. *de Bell Gall.* vi. 14; Diod. v. 28.
8 Pomp. Mela, ii. 18.
9 *PC* ii. 2 ff.
10 Hom. *Od.* x. 240 and the schol.

1 *Epigr.* ed. G. Kaibel, Berlin, 1878, p. 304.
2 *Herc. Fur.* 653 ff.
3 *Phæd.* 62 B, *Cratyl.* 400 C.
4 Frag. 96 Schr.
5 *Od.* ii. 68.
6 E. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1881, i. 71; but see schol. on v. 104.
7 See a note by the present writer on Soph. frag. 871.
8 Frag. 225.
9 Frag. 226.
10 *De Anim.* i. v. 410b 28.
11 *Hipp.* 951; *Ran.* 1032.
12 Cf. Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, iv. i. 131, *Twelfth Night*, iv. ii. 54.
13 Diog. Laert. viii. 14; Zeller, i. 474, note 2.
14 E. Rohde, *Psyche*[5], Tübingen, 1910, p. 165, note 2.

offered in sacrifice to the Olympian gods[1]—is established for the Pythagoreans by not less convincing testimony. It would seem, therefore, that, when founding his brotherhood, Pythagoras appropriated much that was characteristic of contemporary religious asceticism. Nevertheless the reincarnation of souls in various bodily shapes is so closely associated with the person of Pythagoras that he must be held to have inculcated it with peculiar vigour. There is a good deal of legendary matter relating to him, most of which can be traced to the authority of Heraclides Ponticus.[2]

To this source we owe the famous story that it was permitted to Pythagoras to retain the memory of his previous incarnations, and that he established his credibility on the occasion of a visit to the Heræum at Argos by identifying as his own, before seeing the inscription, the shield of Euphorbus, son of Panthus, which he was bearing when slain by Menelaus before the walls of Troy.[3] Heraclides was also responsible for the statement that Pythagoras claimed to have lived as Æthalides, the son of Hermes and herald of the Argonauts, before he became Euphorbus, that as Æthalides he obtained from his father Hermes the offer of any gift he might choose save immortality, and that thus he received the privilege of remembering his previous fortune while on the earth and in Hades. After Euphorbus died, he became Hermotimus and subsequently Pyrrhus, the Delian fisherman, before his final re-birth as Pythagoras.[4] Further, Pythagoras declared that after the lapse of every 207 years his soul returned to the light of the sun.[5] Accordingly, if the birth of Pythagoras is placed in 572, the date of Euphorbus will be 1193 and of Æthalides 1400.

There is, however, much better evidence than these fables that Pythagoras seriously taught the doctrine in the almost contemporary verses of Xenophanes:[6] they say that once, as he was passing by, he pitied a dog that was being beaten and exclaimed: 'Beat him no more; for his soul is my friend's, as I recognized when I heard his voice.' It was therefore his belief that the same soul could dwell in a beast as in a man, and that there is a universal kinship between all living things.[7] He did not hesitate to ascribe reasonable souls to animals, holding that the activity of their reason was impeded by the unsuitability for its exercise of their physical organs.[8] Aristotle describes the possibility of any soul taken at random passing into any body as a Pythagorean fable.[9] The punishment of souls for their misdeeds by successive incarnations in corporeal dungeons was a theme developed by the Pythagoreans in a manner hardly to be separated from the Orphic,[10] and the results of their joint influence are to be found in the Platonic myths.

Empedocles in his poem entitled 'Purifications' (καθαρμοί) took over the doctrine of transmigration from the Orphic-Pythagorean school without making any attempt to combine it with his philosophical system. Indeed it is difficult to see how it was possible for him to advocate the immortality of the soul consistently with his doctrine that the vitality of the soul is the result of an aggregation of corporeal substances. Thought and consciousness are concentrated in the blood which envelops the heart.[11] Aristotle's assertion that, according to Empedocles, the soul is compacted from all the elements[12] is generally discredited as a misconception; and his further remark in the same passage that each of the elements is soul is equally misleading. But, even if the materialism of Empedocles is somewhat less explicit than is sometimes represented, logical justification is still to seek for his pronouncement concerning the punishment of guilty souls in a purgatory lasting for 30,000 years[1] and his personal experience of the wretchedness of the wandering spirit which is harassed by its weary passage through air and sea and earth: 'Ere now have I been a youth and a maiden, a bush and a dumb fish in the sea.'[2] A discrimination of the degrees of transgression is involved in the assignment of the less base souls to the higher forms of animal or plant life: these inhabit the bodies of lions among beasts or appear as bay trees in the world of vegetation.[3] The best of them become prophets, bards, physicians, and chieftains, and at last return as divine beings to the company of the gods.[4] As a consequence of this doctrine Empedocles, like the Pythagoreans, prohibited the eating of flesh and the slaughter of animals, which he stigmatized as the shedding of kindred blood, the murder of a son by his father or of a father by his son.[5]

In several of his dialogues, particularly in the *Phædo*, *Phædrus*, *Republic*, and *Timæus*, **Plato** associates the doctrines of the immortality and pre-existence of the soul with its transmigration. The variations to be found in his descriptions are not of serious moment and do not admit of being discussed in detail.

According to the *Phædo*,[6] those who in this life have failed to emancipate themselves from the burden of the corporeal element cannot rise to the purer element above, but, being dragged down into the visible world, haunt burial grounds as ghostly apparitions until they are again imprisoned in another body. Of these the sensual become asses or similar animals, the violent and unjust wolves or kites, but those who, though lacking the philosophic impulse to virtue, have lived an ordinary respectable life may become bees or ants, or even men who in their next incarnation prove themselves just and moderate. Only those who have devoted themselves in this life to philosophy are entirely exempt from any further incarnation and pass to the pure ethereal homes destined for them in the upper world.[7] In the *Phædrus*[8] the souls of the dead are punished or otherwise treated according to the measure of their human actions for 1000 years, until the period of reincarnation arrives, when they are allowed a limited area of choice, so that it often happens that the soul of a man comes into life as a beast, and that of a beast which had formerly been human again enters into the body of a man. A much more elaborate account is given in the myth of Er the son of Armenius, how a great variety of choice comprising the lives of every animal and of men in every condition is offered to the allottees whose time for reincarnation has arrived. The order of choice is determined by ballot, but even the soul which drew the last lot had plenty of opportunities for selection left. The narrator of the myth was a witness of the choices made by some of the famous heroes of antiquity; how Orpheus chose to be a swan, Thamyras a nightingale, Ajax a lion, Agamemnon an eagle, and Thersites a monkey, while Odysseus, who drew the last lot, wearied of his former ambition, was delighted to find still available for him the life of an ordinary man free from all anxiety.[9] In the *Timæus*[10] the creator fashions as many souls as there are stars, and distributes one to each star, in order that later, after a period of contemplation, they may be embodied in human form. If during the time of probation the soul lived well, he would return to his ethereal habitation; but, if he failed, he would suffer a new incarnation as a woman; and, if his wickedness continued, he would sink down among the beasts until his corporeal taints had been thoroughly purged away. In the same dialogue Plato explains the evolution of birds and other animals as arising from the deterioration of human souls. Birds, with their feathers taking the place of hair, are developed from men who are harmless but light-minded. The four-footed beasts of the earth were originally men who had never given themselves up to the study of philosophy, since they no longer heeded the revolutions in the head, but followed the impulses of those parts of the soul which are situated in the breast.[11]

Critics have not been entirely agreed as to how far Plato was a serious believer in transmigration,[12] some holding that the entire description was purely a play of fancy, and others that, though he may have credited the successive incarnations

[1] Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 85; Aristoxenus, *ap.* Diog. Laert. viii. 20, makes the prohibition apply only to the ram and the plough-ox.
[2] Pauly-Wissowa, viii. 476.
[3] Hor. *Od.* i. xxviii. 10; Ov. *Met.* xv. 160 ff.; schol. Hom. *Il.* xvii. 28.
[4] Diog. Laert. viii. 4, 5; schol. Ap. Rhod. i. 645; schol. Soph. *El.* 62.
[5] Diog. Laert. 14.
[6] B 7 Diels.
[7] Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 19.
[8] Aët. *Plac.* v. xx. 4 (H. Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin, 1879, p. 432, 15).
[9] *De Anim.* i. 3. 407*b* 22.
[10] For an attempt to distinguish Pythagoreanism from Orphism see F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, London, 1912, p. 198 ff.
[11] B 105 Diels.
[12] *De Anim.* i. 2. 404*b* 11.

[1] B 115, 6 Diels.
[2] B 117 Diels.
[3] B 127 Diels.
[4] B 146, 147 Diels.
[5] B 136, 137 Diels.
[6] 81 E.
[7] *Ib.* 114 C.
[8] 249 B.
[9] *Republic*, 617 D–620 D.
[10] 41 D.
[11] *Ib.* 91 E.
[12] See the authorities quoted by J. Adam in his note on *Rep.* 618 A.

of human souls, he cannot have extended his belief to their passage into animal shapes. It should of course be noticed that all these descriptions, if not actually parts of a myth, have a mythical colouring, and must be read subject to the warning given by the Platonic Socrates in the *Phædo*:[1]

'No sensible man will affirm that these matters took place exactly in the way that I have described. But to hold that either this or something like it is the truth in regard to our souls and their habitations, appears to me, *now that the soul has been shown to be immortal*, to be no unreasonable or unworthy venture.'

So long as this limitation is borne in mind, there is no valid reason for mistrusting Plato's sincerity.

Transmigration does not cohere with the Stoic doctrine of the soul's nature; but there are some grounds for thinking that **Posidonius** held the pre-existence and immortality of the soul in the limited sense in which it was possible for a Stoic to affirm them consistently with a belief in the ἐκπύρωσις.[2] It was, moreover, natural that a Stoic should speak of a periodic reincarnation[3] as a consequence of the dogma that every conflagration introduces a new era in which the experience of the past will be exactly repeated. But that either Posidonius or any of the Stoics believed in a series of successive incarnations within the limits of the current world-period is, notwithstanding the isolated statements of certain of the doxographical sources,[4] open to very grave doubt.[5]

According to **Plotinus**, the future destiny of the soul depends on the use it has made of its several functions and capacities during each particular incarnation. Hence we should constantly strive upward, not yielding to the images of sense or carnal cravings.

Thus he who has exercised his human capacities again becomes a man, but those who have lived by sensation alone become animals. If, without yielding to active passion, they have remained immersed in sluggish perversity, they may even become plants.[6] There is always retribution for an ill-spent life: the bad master becomes a slave, the abuser of wealth a poor man; the man who has murdered his mother becomes a woman and is murdered by a son.[7] On the other hand, those souls which are pure and have lost their attraction to the corporeal will cease to be dependent upon body. So detached, they will pass to the region of being and the divinity, which cannot be apprehended by a human vision as if it were akin to the corporeal.[8]

II. *ROMAN.*—There is no evidence among the Romans of an indigenous belief in transmigration, but several of their poets acknowledged the influence of Greek speculation, and of Plato and Pythagoras in particular. Horace mentions[9] the 'Pythagorean dreams' of Ennius, who thought that his soul had once inhabited the body of Homer and earlier that of a peacock.[10] Vergil, in a famous passage,[11] takes more serious notice of Pythagoreanism, when he describes the purification of souls in the under world, and their return to human bodies after the completion of the cycle of 1000 years. Ovid[12] introduces Pythagoras himself making an eloquent appeal against the slaughter of animal life, based upon the identity of the soul-substance which permeates our bodies and theirs.

LITERATURE.—The best sources of information are the works of E. Rohde, T. Gomperz, and E. Zeller mentioned above. For Pythagoras see art. PYTHAGORAS; also A. E. Chaignet, *Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1873; and for Plato J. A. Stewart, *Myths of Plato*, Oxford, 1905; and E. S. Thompson's ed. of Plato, *Meno*, London, 1901, pp. 286-297.

A. C. PEARSON.

TRANSMIGRATION (Indian).—The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is in India the presumption which underlies not only Buddhism and Jainism, but also the philosophical systems of the Brāhmans and the whole of Hinduism. In the ancient Vedic period it had as yet no existence. At that time the Indian peoples were still filled with a keen delight in life, and the righteous man looked forward to eternal continuance of existence after death. They believed that good men ascended to heaven to the companionship of the gods, and there led a painless existence, free from all earthly imperfections—a happy life, which was usually depicted as an enjoyment of sensual pleasures, but was yet occasionally conceived in a higher spiritual sense. The necessary consequence of this belief was the view (very rarely expressed in the Veda) that the souls of the wicked sank down into the abyss of hell. This naive representation of the soul's fate after death experienced a real change when, suddenly and without any transitional stages that we can perceive, the Indian people was seized by the oppressive belief in transmigration, which holds it captive to the present day. The conviction that every individual enters again after death upon a new existence, in which he gathers the fruit of merit earlier acquired, and has to endure the consequences of sins previously committed, meets us for the first time in a work belonging to the second period of Indian literature, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 'the Brāhmaṇa of the hundred ways.' Since then this thought has been regarded in India as a doctrine that needs no proof, which only the adherents of a crude materialism could doubt. It is a significant fact—to which H. Oldenberg first drew attention—that belief in transmigration at its very first appearance in the literature assumed the form of the harassing thought of a continual recurrence of death. How this belief, which lies at the root of Indian pessimism, could take the place apparently immediately of the innocent joy in life which greets us in the ancient times in the hymns of the Rigveda is an interesting question, but one that can be answered with only a certain measure of probability. Certainly the Indian doctrine of transmigration is not to be derived from one definite source alone; there are undoubtedly several streams of thought, which hardly admit of being definitely traced, but which were distinct in their origin. In order to ascertain the main source, we must have recourse to general folk-lore.

Among peoples in a low stage of civilization in very many parts of the earth there is found the belief that the souls of men after death pass into the trunks of trees or the bodies of animals, but especially into the bodies of birds, reptiles, and insects. Hence a choice is open to us between the following alternatives. We must suppose either that the Aryans of India, when they came into closer contact with the rude aboriginal inhabitants of the Indian peninsula, received from them the idea of the continued existence of men in animals and trees, and appropriated it to themselves; or that this conception had maintained its hold upon the lower strata of the Aryan people themselves from savage times, and then in an age adapted to constructive speculation thoughtful men had set themselves to develop from it the theory of transmigration. The second of these two possibilities is the more probable. Whatever view, however, may be accepted as correct, under any circumstances the primitive belief—whether it be that of the Indian aboriginal tribes or that of the lower strata of the Aryan people—gave merely the first impulse to the formation of the doctrine of transmigration; for no primitive people possesses more than the conception of the immediate prolongation of human existence in animals and trees. Among

[1] 114 D.
[2] A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, Berlin, 1892, pp. 250-255.
[3] M. Ant. xi. 1.
[4] Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 175, 571. 19, 587. 19, 614. 13.
[5] Rohde, ii. 325 n.
[6] *Enn.* iii. 4. 2.
[7] *Ib.* iii. 2. 13.
[8] *Ib.* iv. 3. 24.
[9] *Epist.* ii. i. 51.
[10] Pers. vi. 10.
[11] *Æn.* vi. 748.
[12] *Met.* xv. 98-142, 153-258.

the Aryans of India the theory, as it meets us for the first time in the literature, appears already fully formed in the shape of belief in a permanently continued but ever-changing existence. And the different forms under which the individual lives are in their rank, and the measure of happiness or misery which they experience is regarded as dependent on moral conduct. At the basis of the Indian conception of transmigration lies the immovable conviction that there is no unmerited happiness and no unmerited misery, that each man shapes his own fortune down to the smallest details. This conviction has given to the Indian people a power to endure suffering which has often enough excited the wonder of foreign observers.

Since the Indian recognized that no explanation of the apportionment of happiness and misery, of joy and sorrow, by the moral state of the individual was to be found in the present life, he concluded that man's fate is determined by his good and evil deeds in a former existence. A moral qualification, therefore, according to this view, attaches to the soul; and this corresponds exactly to the sum of its good and evil deeds, and demands reward or punishment in the next existence, if not in the present.

Granted, then, that we endure in the present life the consequences of our own behaviour in the past, the conditions must have been precisely the same in the previous existence; the joy and sorrow that we experienced therein were again the consequences of our own actions in a preceding life, and so on without end. For that part of the individual, therefore, which was involved in the cycle of existences no beginning could be assigned. It was thus that quite early in India the theory of the endless pre-existence of the soul was developed; and the doctrine of the soul's eternal duration in the future was inferred according to the law that that which is without beginning is also endless, and in accordance with the ancient popular view of the permanence of personal existence in heaven. The belief in the eternity of soul was followed by belief in the eternal existence of the universe.

Life for the ease-loving Indian was overshadowed by the belief in transmigration. The thought of wandering perpetually through the bodies of men, animals, and plants, of being compelled in each existence to experience more pain than joy, and perpetually to renew the pangs of death, occasionally also to sojourn for a time in hell—this thought must have been dreadful for the Indian. Nor would he be sufficiently compensated by the prospect of being able to gain heaven by his merit, and to raise himself to divine honours. For with the very ascent to divine honours no more than a transitory success has been gained. Even the gods, according to the transmigration theory, are involved in the cycle of existence, the *saṁsāra*, and must again descend to lower forms of life when their time comes round, that is, when the power of former merit is exhausted through the enjoyment of divine position and honours. The popular gods, therefore, have ceased to be eternal and omnipotent beings, as they were in Vedic times.

According to this view, therefore, the wheel of existence rolls on without rest or intermission, and hurries living creatures perpetually to renewed suffering and renewed death. Naturally, then, the question must have been raised whether there is no deliverance, no release, from this constantly renewed existence upon earth.

The hypothesis that once in the course of time the previous deeds of a living being may meet with their complete reward or punishment, and that, therefore, the basis for a re-birth may and will disappear, was not made in India. According to the Indian view, when a living being dies there always remains a remnant of merit and guilt still unrewarded and unpunished, from which is derived the germ of a new existence. Even sacrifice and deeds of piety or asceticism cannot deliver from the necessity of renewed birth and death. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* it is said that the powers of death which pursue men from one existence to another may be appeased by sacrificial offerings, and that by such offerings release may be obtained from the return of death. This thought, however, is soon abandoned, and is supplanted by the conviction that no sacrifices can do more than secure temporary happiness in higher forms of existence.

Since, then, in India it had become the supreme aim of spiritual endeavour to find this release, the issue could not fail to be the conviction that success had been attained; not by the way which had been previously followed and which no longer afforded inward satisfaction, but by the way of *knowledge*, which, in fact, might be trodden only by a few. In the knowledge of the essential nature of things, which is veiled from ordinary sight, was found the means of deliverance from the pressure of worldly existence. This saving 'knowledge' removes 'ignorance,' *i.e.* the empirical view of the universe which is natural to man, but is mistaken and perverted. With ignorance disappears also desire, which fetters man to existence, and is the cause of all action; as, on the other hand, successful resistance to the desires of the senses promotes the entrance of knowledge. Saving knowledge has the power—to use the technical Indian expression—of 'consuming the seed of works,' and so making impossible for all future time a continuance of migration.

The entire course of thought as hitherto developed is already contained in substance in the ancient *Upaniṣads* (*q.v.*). For them saving knowledge consists in the recognition of the sole existence of the Brahman, the soul of the universe, of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, and especially of the identity of the individual soul, the *ātman*, with the Brahman. In what way the saving knowledge is conceived in Buddhism, in the religion of the Jains, and in the philosophical systems of the Brāhmans (Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya), must be ascertained from the respective articles. Cf. also art. MOKṢA.

LITERATURE.—Leopold von Schroeder, *Indiens Literatur und Cultur*, Leipzig, 1887; A. Barth, *Religions of India*[3], London, 1891; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906; A. E. Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*[2], London, 1891; H. Haigh, *Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, London, 1903.

R. GARBE.

TRANSMIGRATION (Jewish).—Metempsychosis, or the migration of the soul (Heb. *gilgūl*, 'rotation' or 'cycle'), is a doctrine which forms part of a system of esoteric mysticism tolerated rather than approved or furthered by Judaism. Its beginnings are difficult to trace. Whether they were Egyptian or Indian—probably through Gnostic or Manichæan intermediaries—this doctrine, no doubt, had to accommodate itself to other Jewish conceptions before it could be assimilated and adopted, and it had to undergo such a profound modification as to give to Jewish metempsychosis a character of its own.

The belief in the migration of the soul presupposes the existence of the soul; and a whole esoteric system about the creation of the soul, and the conception of sin and redemption, are the fundamental principles upon which such a doctrine must rest. The relation between spirit and matter, soul and body, must be determined, as must the question of pre-existence as well as that of the finality of soul and body. An attempt will here be made to do justice to these problems, however succinctly. The questions of punishment and reward, of God's

justice and mercy, are also involved. It must be borne in mind that any theory, if it was to be accepted by Jews, had to be subjected to a process of close adaptation to the fundamental principles of Judaism, and must not run counter to the Law. Now, if migration of the soul is to be accepted as a part of philosophic speculation concerning sin and redemption, it has to formulate its theory in accordance with Judaism.

1. Creation of souls.—God is the creator of everything; therefore souls are His creation. But does God continue His act of creation? Does He continually create souls as soon as any human being is on the point of being born? The answer of the believer in metempsychosis is that He does not. His creation came to an end with the close of the sixth day. At the beginning the souls were created. The power of God is thus limited to what He had done on that occasion. Before creating Adam, God had finished the creation of all the souls of man, but, His work of creation being overtaken by the end of the sixth day, He did not continue it, and produced only those evil spirits which hover between the pure divine soul and the earthly matter (the *mazziqîm*; see art. MAGIC [Jewish]).

A distinct line of demarcation is not drawn, however, and, as will be seen, a soul can assume the form of a demoniacal spirit. The souls created, then, are of a limited number, as the creation was only a limited act, and had to come to an end at a definite period of time. These souls are God's creation, not any emanation from God. This very essential point should be remembered, for it separates Jewish metempsychosis widely from Buddhist. The souls at the end of the migration are not absorbed into a kind of divine pantheistic fluid; they are conceived as having an individual existence; they live separately and fully conscious of their individuality; they dwell in the heavenly halls or in Paradise in rapt contemplation of the divine glory; thither they are allowed to return at the end of their peregrination through the lower world. The souls of the born and the unborn, of those who have already been in the sublunar world and of those who have not yet been in that world, are dwelling together in the heavenly halls, or in the treasury of God (Dt 32[34]). No clear distinction is made between these two categories of souls. It is all so vague in this world of theosophic speculations, and contradictions are not seldom found; schools of thought have sometimes blended their teaching without any successful attempt at harmonizing contradictory views. All that comes is readily accepted, so long as it is not diametrically opposed and so long as it comes as an ancient mystical tradition. Thus the pre-existence of all human souls affects the Messianic eschatology. The soul of the pre-existing Messiah is fully conscious of its own individual pre-eminence in this world. Though a spirit, the Messiah dwells among the other souls, and He is fully aware of the tribulations of the people of Israel; He weeps over their sufferings and anxiously asks the angel who is in His company when the time will arrive for His revelation (M. Gaster, *Chron. of Jerahmeel*, London, 1899, xx. 9). Moses in his ascent to heaven sees the souls of the great and pious, of those who have lived upon earth, and of those who are to come to life hereafter—among others David and Aqiba (*ib.*). This view is found also in the book of Enoch and in other Apocalypses, though the theory of migration is not there clearly connected with it.

The one definite outcome is that no new souls are created for each child that is born, the number of souls being limited. Everything created has a specific purport. Even the angels have not been created without purpose. They are God's messengers; they carry out His wishes and commands in the heavens above and on the earth beneath; above all, they are created for the purpose of singing to their Master and of praising Him in angelic choirs. Such, then, is the purpose of the entire creation. The angelic action is typical of the human man, the highest and most perfect creature after the angels. He must by his action approach the divine, and his whole life must be a long-sustained hymn of praise to God. But man, made of the dust of the earth, cannot rise to such perfection unless the divine soul lifts him up and unless the divine Law guides him steadily upwards towards heaven. His life is a constant struggle between the grossly material inclinations inherent in his earthly nature and the high spiritual promptings of his divine soul. According to the way in which he inclines, his soul will become more or less contaminated by the contact with matter; it will lose more and more of its spiritual lustre and purity. For man has absolute free will; he is master over his own actions. This is an axiom; otherwise the whole principle of reward and punishment has to be abandoned. And yet, with that naive inconsistency so characteristic of this mystic philosophy, predestination is not excluded. Nothing happens which has not been pre-ordained, yet no attempt is made to bridge this gulf.

2. Incarnation of souls.—The souls have been created for a specific use; they must enter human bodies; but the choice is not left to them, either of the bodies to be selected or of the time of entry and the time and manner of exit. As soon as a woman conceives (see art. BIRTH [Jewish]), an angel appears before God with the sperm, and God decrees the future life of the yet unborn babe. Its whole life is thereby determined—whether it will be rich or poor, high-stationed or lowly, wise or foolish, long-lived or short-lived, good or bad, pious or wicked; even its future helpmeet is proclaimed in heaven to the joy and satisfaction of the heavenly hosts. In order to obviate too glaring a contradiction in a later version of this legend of the 'Creation of the Child' (see Gaster, *Jerahmeel*, ix. 19 f.), the moral qualifications of the future man and woman have been omitted. The soul, which is very reluctant to give up its heavenly abode and enter the human body, especially if the shell is that of a wicked one, is forcibly seized by the angel and carried through the bliss of heaven and the agony of hell, to see the reward for good actions and the punishment for evil deeds. Although the soul forgets it all with entry into this world, yet a dim recollection remains, a subconscious image, which is the guiding principle in elementary recognition of good and evil. Every man has within himself a standard of right and wrong given to his soul in its premundane existence. Another version (*Zôhâr*, ii. 96*b* ff.) describes the incarnation of the soul in the following manner:

> God created all the souls from the beginning, in the very form in which they would afterwards appear in this world. He beheld them and saw that some of them would be wicked. At the time when the soul is to descend, the Lord calls it and says, 'Go to such and such a place.' The soul replies, 'Let me remain here and not be defiled in that other world.' The Lord answers, 'From the beginning thou hast been created for the purpose of getting into this world.' Then the soul submits, and descends against its will. The Law which helps the soul says to it, 'See how the Lord had mercy on you. He has given you His precious pearl (the Law) to help you in this world, so that ye may return pure.' But, if laden with sin, the soul must obtain purification so as not to be delivered to Gehinnom; for two rows of angels and demons are waiting for the soul; the good to lead to Eden and the evil spirits to Gehinnom; and to be saved from punishment the soul migrates from body to body.

3. Life of the soul on earth; migration; defeat of evil spirits.—Now the soul begins its course upon earth. It must endeavour to obtain the

absolute mastery over the body and not to become its slave. In the first entry the soul is absolutely pure and without blemish. It is not met by the obstacle of 'original sin.' The principle upheld throughout is that 'each man dieth by his own sin' (Ezk 18[20]). But the weakness inherent in matter soon makes itself felt, and, moreover, there are the temptations placed in its way through the envy and spite of the evil spirits (*mazzīqīm*), who, though they partake of some spiritual character, are imperfect compared with the pure soul, and are anxious to drag it down to their own level.

A still greater cause lies at the root of this attempt of the evil spirits to lead the pure soul away—a desire to frustrate by the means of sin and transgression the divine plan of creation. God has created the world and man in it for His glory. Through trial and trouble man must win the crown of eternal bliss. The finite number of souls forms part of this divine plan. A term is thereby set for man's spiritualization, for an infinite number of souls might make that end impossible of being reached. But, as there is a limited number, it is obvious that the desired consummation would set in as soon as the last soul had passed through the human body, or, rather, had entered the last human body. For then all the souls created would have fulfilled their mission upon earth, and all the human beings through whom they had passed would have reached the highest degree of moral development of which they were capable, so that the progress of mankind and of the world would have attained its ultimate goal, or, to put it in the words of the mystics, the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth would then be established, the time reached for the advent of the Messiah. Already in the Talmud the saying is found, 'The son of David will not come before all the souls in bodies will come to an end.' The power of the evil spirits would then be entirely broken, and only good would reign in the world. The spirits, therefore, try to entice the soul and defile it by all manner of temptation and sin. The result is that the contaminated soul must be kept out of the heavenly bliss, and the divine plan is effectively checked. Like a 'shell' (*qᵉlīfāh*), the evil spirits surround the soul, making the material covering still more impenetrable to light and truth, as they are clinging close to the body like an additional covering. In the later development of this system the evil spirit 'cleaves' to the body of the person whose soul is to be obstructed, and the spirit is then called *dibbūq*. It has entered into a more intimate connexion with the body, and is no longer an outer covering, or *qᵉlīfāh*, originating from the 'other camp,' the *siṭrā aḥarāh*.

But the demons strive in vain to impede the steady development and unfolding of God's plan. They may delay its speedy consummation; they cannot indefinitely frustrate it. The soul which has been contaminated can be purified again; the sin committed can be atoned for, and even here the means is given to the soul to achieve its own purification. The soul retains its own consciousness and is sensible to its own failings; it realizes the bitterness of punishment and the tragedy of not being allowed to ascend on high and stand again before God in its pristine purity. For it flits about the world as a disembodied spirit, hovering between heaven and earth, and waiting for the chance of atonement or punishment. This comes to it by being re-embodied, and thus the soul migrates from one being to another. It is not made clear, however, whether the soul in this new incarnation remembers its former existence or whether it realizes it when it is leaving this second body, and continues its migration until all the blemish has been eliminated. This transmigration is thus the means of defeating the work of the evil spirits, of hastening the emptying of the divine treasury of unborn souls, and of bringing about the close of the cycle and the advent of the Messiah.

4. The justice of God.—(*a*) *Theories of rewards and punishments.*—The migration of souls is made to serve another and still higher and more direct purpose, the justice of God. The grave problem which has haunted every form of faith has been: how to reconcile the happiness of the sinner and the trials and sufferings of the pious and good with the justice of God. Every religion has endeavoured to form a theodicy. Most of them have relegated the solution of this problem to the life after death, finding the answer in rewards and punishments to be meted out in another world filled with bliss and unutterable torments. Such teaching presupposed the eternity of the soul, and in some form or another a combination of soul and body if the latter is to suffer the torment of hell, unless it was supposed that the souls would continue an individual conscious existence capable of enduring torments as well as rejoicing in heavenly bliss. This is, however, not the place to follow further this extremely complicated problem. It was, after all, a subtle way out of the difficulty, and it was not quite free from a possible reproach of selfishness. The goodness of the soul or the purity of life obtained for that individual soul alone happiness and bliss. No one else was directly benefited by it, except perhaps that such a good and pious man served as an example to others. But the world in general apparently had nothing from him, and his virtuous life led nowhere except to his own exaltation. Not so with the belief in the migration of the soul. Here, upon earth, in the sight of all, the sinner—whosoever he might be—had to expiate his sins. Here he had to suffer for the wrong committed, and here obtain, as it were, the pass for the heavenly regions. By this slow purification and reunion with the other purified souls, moreover, a cycle was completed, at the end of which the Messianic period would begin. By his actions the whole world would benefit, and the general progress and welfare of mankind would be hastened and consummated.

Thus the soul of Adam, because he had sinned, had to begin a period of migration through other bodies and thus pass through David, who, by the sin which he had committed with the wife of Uriah, impeded the complete purification of Adam's soul. But, by its final entry into the last descendant, the Messiah would also bring about the desired result meant by the divine plan when Adam, the first man, was created.

The soul of Abel passed into Moses, or, according to another theory, the soul of Adam passed into Moses, who sinned at the rock, and then into David, who sinned with Uriah's wife, and, finally, into the Messiah, thus linking the first with the last.

There are, as it were, successive incarnations of the same pre-existing soul, and for their sakes the world has been created. There cannot be any doubt that these views are extremely old. Simon Magus raises the claim of former existences, his soul passing through many bodies before it reaches that known as Simon. The Samaritan doctrine of the *ṭaheb* teaches the same doctrine of a pre-existing soul which was given to Adam, but which, through successive 'incarnations' in Seth, Noah, and Abraham, reached Moses, for whom it was originally formed and for whose sake the world had been created. The element which is absent here is that of migration for the purpose of purification. The latter gives to 'migration of souls' a peculiar character. Not only is the world perfected thereby (*tiqqūn*), but the sinner expiates his sin in this world in the new existence in which his soul reappears. It may enter the body of a pious man, and by his good deeds he will cleanse the dross still adhering to the soul and facilitate its ascent

on high. If the pious suffer, it is only and solely for sins committed in a previous existence, and thus suffering is not a punishment for sins now committed, but a 'purgatory' for evil deeds of a former life. The explanation of the prosperous sinner is not quite so clear. Here use had been made of the other doctrine of punishment and reward after death. The sinner benefits from the good deeds that he had performed in a previous existence. He prospers now, so that *all* his reward is eaten up by him in this world, and nothing but punishment and tortures is reserved for him in the life after death. This presupposes that the soul of the wicked is beyond 'redemption' in this world, and is sent to Gehinnom for punishment. This seems to be the view taken by 'the Saba' in the *Zôhăr* in the passage quoted above (§ 2). The cycle of the soul is thus broken. It is not made quite clear how it is to be completed; but it seems that, according to some, a soul which has just sunk to this lowest level of contamination, instead of being sent to Gehinnom, becomes an evil spirit in this world, which is anxious to enter living bodies for torment or for that punishment which starts from the lowest rung of the ladder and is to lead up to the highest without recourse to punishments in 'hell.' Such a soul becomes a *dibbŭq*. To exorcize it, to free it from this temporary existence as quickly as possible, and thus hasten the new cycle of evolution, is a meritorious deed, a real *tiqqūn*, an 'improvement' and perfection.

No attempt is made to reconcile these two separate systems of punishment and reward; they are often mentioned side by side in the *Zôhăr* and other kabbalistic treatises. In the Targum to Ec 8[3] the suffering of the pious and the happiness of the wicked have already been explained in a somewhat similar manner, inasmuch as the pious suffer for small sins in order to enter afterwards directly into heaven, and the sinner enjoys the fruit of some good deeds here, so that hereafter he is to go straight to torment and punishment.

(*b*) *Kabbalistic theory.*—The kabbalist, however, adds and superimposes the new theory of suffering and happiness, not for sins and good deeds performed in the person's lifetime, but for sins done during previous existences. The punishment was expected to fit the crime. Thus, if a man had sinned by his eyes, he would be reborn blind or suffering with his eyes, and, similarly, every other part of the body would then be affected by the sin committed through that part in the previous existence. Moral sins would have to be expiated in a similar manner; for, according to some of the oldest and most accredited teachers, transmigration is not limited to that from one human body to another human body. The soul of the wicked passes also into animal bodies corresponding with the character of the sin. In later schools the transmigration has been extended also to plants, stones, and metals. As an example of the former it may be stated that the soul of an adulterer passes into the body of a female stork, for it is believed that the storks punish adultery with death.[1] Thus an explanation was found for the prohibition of mixing various kinds of seeds and the cross-breeding of animals, for they disturbed the normal laws of nature and caused great suffering to the souls of such mixed products. Similarly, the peculiar command of marrying the deceased brother's wife (*yibbūm*) has its reason and justification in this doctrine of migration. The soul of the childless man cannot return to its source, for the soul has remained barren and is cut short in its earthly career before it has been able to pass through all the stages of purification. Hence the reason why the child born was to be called 'in the name' of the deceased, though it does not follow that it must bear the same name. In fact, the child of Ruth, which was a 'restorer of souls' to Naomi, did not bear the name of Ruth's dead husband. The new-born babe would receive the soul of the dead and continue his earthly life.

5. Number of migrations.—There is a difference of opinion as to how many times a soul would migrate before it had run its entire course. The majority of kabbalists incline to the opinion that no soul migrates through more than three bodies. The real course is that in which the soul has performed the whole of the 613 commandments of the Law, by which alone perfection is attained. For the shortcomings in one existence the soul is punished in the next, and then also performs some good deeds. Others think that the soul passes through a greater number of changes. It is held that the fate of the soul of the sinner is decided after three migrations, at the end of which a thoroughly wicked soul becomes an evil spirit—a demon—while that of the pious may be reincarnated times without number. In this case the ascent of the soul from the lower to the higher degree of purity and perfection is asserted.

6. Various other theories; purposes of metempsychosis.—It is held that builders of the Tower of Babel were divided into three categories, which were punished in accordance with the degree of wickedness of which they were guilty. The first lost the unity of language, and were dispersed upon the face of the earth. The second—a more daring category—were changed into all kinds of animals, and their souls were sent into animal bodies. The third—the thoroughly wicked section—were changed into demons. The change of the body of Nebuchadrezzar into a wild animal, as told by Daniel (Dn 4[33]), lent further countenance to the possibility of a human soul dwelling in an animal body. The rules for slaughtering special animals and for the blessing by which the cutting is accompanied rest upon the same principle of thereby possibly saving a penitent soul from dwelling too long in the body of an animal. It is liberated by a religious act which assists it in its further migration. All this forms part of the *tiqqūn*, the improvement and perfection of the world, the preparation for the Messianic rule. The covenant before Mt. Sinai was made by God with *all* the souls which He had created: 'Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but with him that standeth here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is *not here with us* this day' (Dt 29[14f.]), for He did not speak only to those who were there, but also to those who were not there on that day, in their material form, *i.e.* in human bodies.

By this migration of good souls to good men and contaminated souls to sinners and evil-doers a certain affinity of souls was established, which led to the identification of such souls in the various stages. As mentioned before, the soul of Abel or of Adam was that of Moses, and the souls of the ten brothers of Joseph became the souls of the ten martyrs whom the legend described as contemporaries. In fact, this tendency of recognizing the older souls in more recent bodies developed in the later schools of kabbalistic speculations established by Luria, Vital Calabrese, and others into a regular system. Lists have been drawn up and books have been compiled (*Sēpher hag-Gilgūlīm*, Frankfort, 1684), in which the reincarnations of the good and evil men of the past have been duly recorded. Such spiritual genealogies—if we may use such a term—have found their way even into bibliographical and historical compilations. In

[1] The Heb. name for stork is *ḥăsīdāh*, which, by a popular etymology, may be explained to mean 'the chaste' or 'the pious.'

addition to the complete reincarnation, there came the newer doctrine of impregnation (*ibbūr*). The soul of a good man is sometimes not strong enough to fight successfully the temptations of the world, and another soul is temporarily grafted upon that which he already possesses, so that it is made almost unassailable. The older teaching runs that the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. In the same manner a soul is grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vindication of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.

7. Date and origin.—This doctrine of migration is nowhere to be found systematically developed. Wherever it occurs, it is tacitly assumed as well known, and no explanation is given in detail. It has, therefore, been pieced together and reconstructed by the present writer mostly from the Zoharistic literature, viz. the *Zōhār*, the *Zōhār Ḥādāsh*, and the *Tiqqūnīm*, which represents a more or less homogeneous view on migration, whenever it is referred to. While these are by far the most complete writings, they are by no means the oldest. This brings us to the question of the date and probable origin of this doctrine among the Jews.

All the beginnings of esoteric teachings are lost in the mist of antiquity, and, when such doctrines finally see the light of day, they have, as a rule, a long history behind them. It is, therefore, a fallacy to date the origin of metempsychosis among the Jews from the time when it becomes known publicly in the 9th or 10th century. The masters of the occult science never doubted its Jewish character or its old origin. Was it not part of that heavenly mystery handed down from Adam on through all the great men of the past? With great ingenuity they endeavoured to find proofs for it in the Scriptures by means of an exegesis which was fantastic in the extreme. A few examples will suffice. They are taken at random from the *Zōhār*, and they are found in large numbers in Manasseh ben Israel, *Nishmat Ḥayīm*, bk. iv. chs. 8–10.

'Till thou return unto the ground' (Gn 3^{19}) is interpreted to mean that the body alone returns to the ground; the spirit, however, is reborn.

'Naked shall I return thither' (Job 1^{21}) is interpreted literally as meaning 'to the womb,' *i.e.* being reborn.

'The word which he commanded to a thousand generations' (Ps 105^{8}) is interpreted to mean that it refers to the same soul passing through innumerable generations, for God's command had been given once to all the souls, and these souls are reincarnated over and over again.

'One generation goeth, and another generation cometh' (Ec 1^{4}). The fact that the passing away of the generation is mentioned first is a proof that this must have existed before; otherwise it ought to read 'one generation cometh and another generation goeth.'

'Which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive' (Ec 4^{2}) is interpreted to mean that the living are still uncertain as to the future fate of the migration of their souls.

A proof of 'impregnation,' or the addition of a soul, is also deduced from the following verses: 'Ye shall therefore separate between the clean beast and the unclean,' etc. (Lv 20^{25}), meaning that a clean soul shall be added, not an unclean. 'Shall flocks and herds be slain for them, to suffice them?' etc. (Nu 11^{22}), is taken to mean the addition of souls. 'O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh,' etc. (Nu 16^{22}), means also those that are added to strengthen them 'should one man sin' whose soul proved too weak, as it had no support. 'Doeth good to his own soul' (Pr 11^{17}) means that a man attaches another soul to himself.

The letters of the name of Ad(a)m have been taken as the initials for *A*dam, *D*avid, *M*oses, and *M*essias; hence it was proved that the soul of Adam passed through all these. The letters of the name M(o)sh(e)h (Moses) are the initials of *M*oses, *S*eth, and *H*abel (Abel); hence the soul of Abel passed through Seth to Moses. The numerical value of the letters of the names of the ten tribes corresponds to the numerical value of the names of the reputed ten sages who suffered martyrdom. These examples could easily be multiplied from later kabbalistic literature, but they all follow the same line of argument. There cannot, however, be the slightest doubt that the doctrine of metempsychosis was borrowed from other religious systems, and is not Jewish at all. It will remain an open question whether the denial of the resurrection of the dead attributed by Josephus (*Ant.* XVIII. i. 4 [16]) to the Sadducees implies denial also of reward and punishment, or whether it extended only to the life beyond the grave, and that they believed in the reward and punishment in this world. His allegation that they believed that the soul died with the body is too strange to be accurate. The vindication of God's justice would most easily be found if it means that the soul migrates from one body to another, as they did not deny the divine origin of the soul. Whatever the remoter origin of it may be, it cannot be gainsaid that the atmosphere of Palestine was saturated with mystical and esoteric teachings of every kind, one among them being that of metempsychosis. The Gnostics and Manichæans held fast to it; Neo-Platonism did not deny its possibility, and thus almost insensibly it crept into Judaism. The Palestinian Targumim show traces of it, inasmuch as in some places they speak of a second death (so Dt 33^{6}), which can only mean at least a life twice repeated upon earth; this is possible only if the soul migrates from one body to another (so also Baḥya, *ad loc.*; cf. also Targum to Is 22^{14}). Saadya Gaon (†942) in the 10th cent. inveighs against such tenets, held, as he says, by a certain Karaite sect, although it was probably rather a mystical heterodox section of Rabbanite Jews who believed also in the migration of souls. A few centuries later Abraham Bedaresi (1280), a rationalist philosopher, in his letter to R. Solomon ben Adreth, no. 8, protested against this doctrine; but they were the only opponents, for the wave of mysticism was rising steadily with the narrowing of the political outlook and the change of social conditions. With the appearance of the *Zōhār* the older kabbalistic literature was pushed into the background, and many an ancient mystical treatise was forgotten, unless it became embedded in the *Zōhār*—*e.g.*, the treatise by 'the Saba,' 'the venerable' (*i.e.* Rab. Hamnuna), in the form of a commentary on the Biblical section '*Mishpāṭīm*,' Ex 22, which is found now in the *Zōhār* Ex 94^{a}–114^{a}. In older writings, *Qānā* and *Bāhir*, and in those of Naḥmanides (1263), R. Solomon ben Adreth (*c.* 1300), and Isaac of Akko (*c.* 1330), faint traces of this doctrine can be detected. They show that in these mystic schools echoes of the older theory of metempsychosis had been heard and recorded. Whenever referred to, it is always an ancient tradition. Since the 13th cent. the *Zōhār* has swayed the mind of the larger section of a Jewry despondent and broken by ruthless persecution.

The dark Middle Ages began for the Jews when they came to an end for the other nations in Europe. The writings of Rekanati (14th cent.)

and Baḥya (14th cent.) prepared the way for the development.

Palestine—in a lesser degree the adjoining Babylon—seems to have been throughout the centre of mystical speculations. Thither Naḥmanides had gone, and a great school flourished in Akko for some centuries from the 12th onwards. The flow of the Spanish emigrants at the end of the 16th cent. was also towards Palestine. In Safed there arose the school of Luria (1534–72; commonly known by the initials of his name Ari=*R*abbi *I*saac *A*shkenazi), Vital Calabrese, Cordovero, Poppers, and others. Among other doctrines, they developed, in the writings *Kavvānôth*, *'Eṣ Ḥayim*, etc., much further the tenets of metempsychosis as a punishment for the wicked and an exalted reincarnation for the pious. The *tiqqūn*, or improvement of the world by delivering souls from the chain of migration, became one of the prominent features of this school, which led to that of the Hasidim. Remarkable legends of such deliverance are henceforth told. Every pious and great kabbalist performed them, none, however, so effectively as the master Luria himself. The history of the deliverance of such a soul in Safed is one of the most vivid autobiographies of a 'wandering soul' (first published in the *'Emeq ham-Melekh* of Naphtali Herz, Amsterdam, 1648). The belief that certain persons are the *gilgūl* of other persons who had lived before them is still strongly held by those to whom the *Zôhār* is an inspired book and the teaching of divine revelation. This belief strengthens in them the concept of God's righteousness, and the conviction that, if the time were hastened for all the created souls to pass through the human body, the advent of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God upon earth would be hastened.

LITERATURE.—The books mentioned in the course of this attempt at a synthetical exposition of the doctrine of metempsychosis—the first of its kind—form the only literature that can profitably be mentioned. Manasseh ben Israel, *Nishmat Ḥayim*, bk. iv., treats it apologetically. A. Franck, *La Kabbale*², Paris, 1892; A. Jellinek, *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Kabbala*, Leipzig, 1851–52; D. H. Joël, *Sohar*, Leipzig, 1849, have incidentally, of course, referred briefly also to this apparently unimportant section of kabbalistic Zoharistic speculation. See also literature to art. KABBALÂ.

M. GASTER.

TRANSMIGRATION (Teutonic).—It is clear that the doctrine of metempsychosis was held by the early Teutonic peoples, though the amount of evidence is limited and for the most part dates from a time when heathen beliefs, if not forgotten, were at least misunderstood. Such evidence as exists is chiefly derived from Scandinavian records. The only reference in early poetry is to be found in *Sigurðarkviþa hinn skamma*, 45, where Hogni refuses to hold Brynhild back from self-destruction:

'Let no man stay her from the long journey, and may she never be born again (*aptrborin*).'

More striking evidence for the belief is furnished by the prose passages contained in *Helgakviþa Hjorvarðssonar* and *Helgakviþa Hundingsbana*, ii. At the end of the former it is said that Helgi and Sváva, the hero and heroine, were born again (*endrborin*); in the latter we are told that the heroine Sigrún was Sváva reincarnate, and later that both she and her husband Helgi Hundingsbani were born again as Kára and Helgi Haddingjaskati. A reference is given to *Káraljóð*, a poem now unfortunately lost, which dealt with the adventures of these persons. Moreover, in the *Gautreks Saga*, c. vii., Starkaðr is reviled as an *endrborinn jotunn*, a 'giant' reincarnate; his grandfather Starkaðr is said to have been a *jotunn* (c. iii.).

With the introduction of Christianity metempsychosis came at last to be regarded as 'an old wives' tale.' For a time it still survived among the half-heathen population: to his horror St. Olaf found himself regarded as the reincarnation of a legendary king, one Olafr Geirstaðarálfr (*Flateyjarbók*, ii. 135).

It is not to be overlooked that in all these cases the men—though not the women—bear the same names in each incarnation. As among certain primitive peoples of the present day, the name is regarded as something more than a mere label; it is intimately connected with the soul of its possessor, so that a child inheriting the name of a dead person necessarily inherits the soul as well. An interesting reference to this belief may be cited from *Flateyjarbók*, i. 255: Thorsteinn Uxafót, a follower of Olafr Tryggvason, is visited in a dream by the ghost of a man called Brynjarr; it bestows a treasure on him and asks in return that one of Thorsteinn's children should be baptized under the name Brynjarr, since it desires a Christian reincarnation for its heathen soul.

In the *Islendinga Sogur* there are no actual references to metempsychosis, though the practice of naming children after lately deceased kinsmen (*Njals Saga*, ch. 89, *Eyrbyggja Saga*, ch. 12, *Laxdæla Saga*, chs. 36, 56) points to the existence of some such belief. But the passage in *Sturlunga Saga*, ix. 42—*þótte þeim nu Kolbeinn aptr kominn ok endrborinn*—is no true instance of this kind, since Thorgils Boðvarsson, referred to here, was born in 1226, nineteen years before the death of Kolbeinn Arnorsson, of whom he seemed to be the reincarnation. To the present day, however, it is believed in Norway and Iceland that, if a ghost appears to a pregnant woman in her sleep, it is seeking a namesake (*gaar efter Navnet*); and accordingly the child is baptized with the name of the dead person (cf. K. Maurer, *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, v. 99). Sophus Bugge, moreover, states that he had heard *reise upp atte* ('raise up again') used in the west part of Telemarken with reference to the naming of a child after a dead person (*Home of the Eddic Poems*, London, 1899, p. 333).

Among the other Teutonic peoples the evidence for anything in the nature of metempsychosis is very meagre. An Anglo-Saxon charm (T. O. Cockayne, *Leechdoms, Wortcunning, and Starcraft of Early England*, London, 1864–66, iii. 66 ff.; C. W. M. Grein, *Bibliothek der angelsächs. Poesie*, Göttingen, 1857–65, i. 326 ff.) advises a woman who cannot bring forth a child to step thrice over the grave of a dead man, using an incantation for the safe delivery of her offspring. It is a question much in need of investigation whether the same idea can be traced in certain usages said to be practised in connexion with burial-places of the heathen age in various parts of Northern Europe.

It may be mentioned in conclusion that Appian (*Hist. Rom.* iv., 'de Rebus Gallicis,' 3) describes the Germans who followed Ariovistus as 'scorning death because of their hope of rebirth' (θανάτου καταφρονηταὶ δι' ἐλπίδα ἀναβιώσεως). In view of what is said of the Gauls by Diodorus, v. 28, and Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 454 ff. (with the scholia), it is not unlikely that the reference here is to a belief in metempsychosis, though one cannot deny the possibility that Appian's statement may be due to a misunderstanding of the Valhalla doctrine.

LITERATURE.—G. Storm, *Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi*, ix., new ser., v. [1892] 199–222; K. Maurer, *Zeitschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde*, v. [1895] 98 ff.; P. Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 35–37; O. L. Jiriczek, 'Seelenglauben und Namengebung,' in *Mitt. der Schles. Gesellsch. für Volkskunde*, i. 3 [Breslau, 1895] 30–35.

BRUCE DICKINS.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION.—See EUCHARIST.

TRAPPISTS.—Trappists is the popular name for the Reformed Cistercians, or Cistercians of the Strict Observance, now the chief division of the order.

The art. MONASTICISM[1] outlines the successive reforms named after Benedict, Cluny, Cîteaux. By 1600 the Cistercians themselves had yielded to the spirit of luxury, despite the restoration in Spain promoted by Martino de Vargas. Though Richelieu and Mazarin furthered many attempts to recall them to the letter of their vows, and though their centralized constitution might have facilitated this, a general reform was refused. Here and there a few abbeys did return to the ideals of St. Stephen Harding, the Jansenist reform of St. Cyr and of Port Royal being well known. Armand-Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé (1626–1700), abbot *in commendam* of La Trappe from the age of ten, abandoned court life in 1662 and entered one of the reformed abbeys as a novice. Two years later, having again professed, he came to take charge of his own inaccessible Norman abbey. Finding that the few monks had not shared his experience and would not share his ideals, he pensioned them off and colonized the place from other reformed abbeys. The community improved on the original austerities, taking only one vegetarian meal daily, abstaining from literature and from speech except for urgent purposes. The ideals were published by de Rancé in his *Traité de la sainteté et des devoirs de la vie monastique* (1683), and in his posthumous *Réglemens généraux de l'abbaye de la Trappe* (1701); but only a single community of nuns and two Italian monasteries adopted them. For a century they were unimportant, though other Reformed Cistercians undertook missions to Africa which had some temporary success.

The French Revolution broke up the home; the abbey was suppressed, and the premises were converted into a foundry for cannon. This was the real birth of the order. In 1791 Dom Augustine de Lestrange, master of the novices, took a score of monks to Val Sainte, Switzerland, imposing a rule stricter than ever; postulants flocked in; colonies were sent to many lands; a congregation was formed, and Dom Augustine was appointed father abbot. When the Trappists were hunted to Poland, Germany, and Italy, their zeal only increased. A nunnery was formed at Stapehill near Wimborne; a party of monks that wandered through Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois returned to France on the fall of Napoleon, occupying La Trappe and Belle Fontaine; presently five priories were established in France, and a great college at Soligni. Before his death in 1827 Dom Augustine saw abbeys grow up in Belgium and Italy, besides two more in France. One was founded at Coalville in Leicestershire and named after the great Bernard. The cowl of his friend Alberic was taken in 1848 by an expedition from La Meilleraye in Brittany, which settled in Kentucky at an abbey named Gethsemane. Mount Melleray in Ireland sent another colony to Dubuque in Iowa, and both establishments thrive, though all the fathers are aliens. A second Irish abbey arose at Roscrea in Co. Tipperary.

Outward disasters again intensified the spiritual life. La Trappe was destroyed by fire in Aug. 1871; 1450 fathers and brothers were again expelled from France in 1880; but the austere ideals were embraced by nearly all Cistercians outside Austria-Hungary. After two constitutional changes they were formally recognized in 1892 as the Order of Reformed Cistercians, with an abbot-general at Rome; and this success was crowned six years later by the purchase of the original premises of Cîteaux. In 1903 they were expelled from France in common with most other congregations; two communities went to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, one to Oregon, one to Brazil; two tiny groups have taken refuge near Kingsbridge and Salisbury. Belle Fontaine has endeavoured to uphold the agricultural ideals of St. Benedict, especially by its Canadian offshoots at La Trappe, where the Ottawa joins the St. Lawrence, at Lake St. John, and in Manitoba. No establishment in England offers even to its co-religionists any educational, medical, or philanthropic service. Settlements in Japan, China, Syria, Asia Minor, Algeria, Belgian Congo, and Natal have undertaken mission work, but no impartial observer has anything to say as to results. The finest Protestant tribute is that an abbey is 'an asylum for the poor and helpless, the shipwrecked, the conscience-stricken, and the broken-hearted.'[1]

Attached to each of the 71 monasteries and annexes is a body of brothers who do the rougher field work; in all there are about 2000 of these, and 1600 professed fathers. Twenty-one priories contain 2000 nuns and lay sisters. Three Italian monasteries still follow the rule of de Rancé as once used at La Trappe, but do not belong to the Reformed Cistercians; they have only 50 members.

LITERATURE.—A. Félibien, *Description de l'Abbaye de la Trappe*, Paris, 1671; P. de Maupeou, *Vie du Père A. J. Le Bouthillier de Rancé*², 2 vols., do. 1709; J. Marsollier, *Vie de dom Armand Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé, abbé de la Trappe*, 2 vols., do. 1703; P. Hélyot and M. Bullot, *Hist. des ordres monastiques religieux et militaires*, do. 1860 (orig. ed. 1714–19), vol. vi. ch. i.; *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux*, ed. M. L. Badiche, 4 vols., do. 1858–59 (forming ser. i. vols. xx.–xxiii. of J. P. Migne, *Encyclopédie théologique*, do. 1844–66); F. Pfannenschmidt, *Illustrierte Gesch. der Trappisten*, Paderborn, 1873; *Use of the Cistercian Nuns of the Strict Observance of Our Lady of La Trappe*, London [1886]; J. L. Allen, in *Century Magazine*, new ser., xiv. [1888] 483–496; M. Hartry, *Triumphalia Chronologica Monasterii S. Crucis in Hibernia*, ed. D. Murphy, Dublin, 1891; Hyacinthe de Charencey, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de la Trappe*, Paris, 1891; *Us de l'ordre des cisterciens réformés précédé de la règle de S. Benoît et des constitutions*, Westmalle, 1895; C. F. R. de Montalembert, *The Monks of the West*, Eng. tr., 6 vols., London, 1896; *Abrégé de l'histoire de l'ordre de Cîteaux par un moine de Thymadeuc*, St. Brieuc, 1897; *Odyssée monastique Dom A. Lestrange et les Trappistes pendant la Révolution*, Imprimerie de la Grande Trappe, 1898; *Les Trappistes au Japon* [Hongkong, 1899]; *L'abbaye de Notre-Dame du Lac et l'ordre de Cîteaux au Canada et dans les Etats-Unis*, Montreal, 1907; Max Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der kathol. Kirche*², 3 vols., Paderborn, 1907–08; Wetzer-Welte², *s.v.*; *PRE*², *s.v.*

W. T. WHITLEY.

[1] Vol. viii. p. 792 f.

[1] J. L. Allen, *Century Magazine*, new ser., xiv. 484.

TRAVANCORE.—Travancore (Malayālam Tiruvitānkūr, 'place where the goddess of prosperity resides'), a native state in the extreme south-west of the Indian peninsula, takes its name from Tiruvankod, 30 miles south of the capital, Trivandrum.

'It has been truly remarked that "it will be difficult to name another land which, within so narrow limits, combines so many, so varied, and such precious natural blessings."'[2]

1. History.—Travancore is said to have formed part of the ancient kingdom of Kerala. During the 11th cent. A.D. it was conquered by the Cholās; in the 13th cent. it was invaded by the Pāndyās of Madura. The present kingdom was founded in the first half of the 18th cent. by Mārtāṇḍa Varma, and in 1795 it became a protected state under the British Government. Since then it has enjoyed prosperity under a well-regulated government, and it has been conspicuous for the maintenance of order, religious toleration, and encouragement of education.

2. Area and population.—The area of the state is 7593 sq. miles, and the total population at the census of 1911 was 3,428,975, of whom 93·8% are rural and 6·2% urban. The density of the population is high: 452 per sq. mile for the whole area, and 686 if mountains, lakes, and forests are ex-

[2] *IGI* xxiv. 2 f.

cluded. The people are of the usual S. Indian Dravidian type, and they preserve many characteristic usages, in particular the matriarchal forms of the household and system of marriage.

'Among the Marumakkatāyom [Malayālam *maru*, 'next,' 'other,' *makkal*, 'children,' *tāyam*, 'portion'] Hindus the family is matriarchal, *i.e.*, traces its descent from a common ancestress. The Tarwād [Malayālam *taravāṭu*, *tara*, 'village,' *pāṭu*, 'place'], as the family is called, consists of brothers and sisters and the descendants of the latter along the female line. The eldest male member, called the Kāranavan ['originator'], manages the Tarwād. In such a system the wives and children of the male members have no place. It may happen, however, that a Kāranavan may be allowed to bring in his wife and children to live in the Tarwād, but this is not necessary, nor have they any legal status in the family. The male members who are married usually visit their wives in the houses of the latter. When, however, under modern conditions, they feel able and inclined to support themselves, living apart from the Tarwād, they settle with their wives in houses of their own. In this way the putting up of separate homesteads receives a stimulus. But the Tarwād, as such, is split up only when a partition takes place with the consent of all the members. Among Makkatāyom Hindus the joint family does not generally continue single after the lifetime of the parent, especially the male parent. At the death of the father the sons divide and go and live in separate houses with their wives and children, the mother residing with one of the sons in the original household. The unmarried sons, if any, usually live with the mother. In regard to the Nampūtiri Brāhmaṇs, however, the eldest son alone marries, the other sons living with him in the family.'[1]

The chief castes are the Nāyar ([*q.v.*] honorific plural of Nāyan; Skr. *nāyaka*, 'leader') numbering 592,655, best known on account of their peculiar marriage customs.[2] The Izhuvans or Illavans, who take their name from Izham, the Malayālam name for Ceylon, are immigrants from that island, cultivate coco-nut and palmyra palms, make the drink known as toddy (Skr. *tāla*, 'the palmyra tree'), and distil country spirits; they number 546,265. The Pulayans (*pula*, 'pollution'), numbering 185,314, are agricultural labourers. The Channān or Shānān (Tamil *shāru*, 'toddy') cultivate the palmyra palm and make coarse sugar. Brāhmans number 55,643; among them the most remarkable are the Nambūri, Nambūtiri, or Nambūdri (Malayālam *nambu*, 'the Veda'; *othu*, 'to teach'; *tiri*, Skr. *śri*, 'holy'), who aim at following the original Vedic rites and practise elaborate rules of purification, while they allow the younger sons of the family to enter into polyandrous relations with Nāyar women.

3. **Religion.**—Classified by religion, the population consists of: Hindus, 2,282,617, 66·57%; Christians, 903,868, 26·36%; Muhammadans, 226,617, 6·61%; animists, 15,617, ·46%; Jews, Buddhists, and Jains, 100.

(*a*) *Hindus.*—Of the triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, the cult of Viṣṇu is most popular; in the form of Ananta Padmanābha ('the endless, from whose navel springs the lotus') he is the patron deity of the state, with a famous temple at the capital Trivandrum, which is visited by crowds of pilgrims. Among the minor deities the following are the chief: Vighneśvara ('obstacle Lord'), the Gaṇeśa or Gaṇapati of other parts of India; Subhramaṇya, Skanda, Kārttikeya, or Velāyudha, like Gaṇeśa a son of Śiva, the guardian who protects the helpless and punishes the wicked—a cult special to the Tamil and Malayālam peoples; Śāsta ('ruler'), Aiyappan or Aiyanār ('honourable father'), the most popular minor deity, chief of the ghosts (*bhūta*), who rides over the land mounted on a horse or elephant, sword in hand, to disperse all obnoxious spirits. Besides these the lower classes worship a host of godlings or minor spirits, male and female, the females attendants of the goddess Bhadrakālī, the males classed as followers of Śiva.

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 41.

[2] H. H. Risley, *The People of India*², London, 1915, p. 206 ff.; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, London, 1912-13, ii. 22 ff.; V. Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, ii. 352 ff.; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, v. 307 ff.; E. Westermarck, *The Hist. of Human Marriage*, London, 1891, pp. 116 f., 452 f.

(*b*) *Christians.*—These show a notable increase, from 498,542 in 1881 to 903,868 in 1911. The Hindu compiler of the *Travancore Census Report* for 1911 writes:

'It may be remarked here that the degeneration of the socio-economic institution of caste that showed itself in the sequestration and neglect of the labouring classes, the indifference of lay and ecclesiastical Hindu bodies in the matter of the preservation of their faith as a living force in the intellectual and moral life of the people, the atmosphere of unsuspecting toleration one breathes on all sides, the great sympathy and help accorded by the rulers of the State, the status which the religion itself enjoys, and last but not least, the self-sacrificing zeal and devotion of the missionaries as a class and of the pioneers in particular—all these gave vigour to the work and assured the results. While natural increase has been unsteady and irregular, propagandist activity has been such as to make it difficult to reduce to definite proportions the augmentation which it succeeds in bringing about—so rapid and great it has been.'[1]

The following are the details of the Christian population: Syro-Roman, 293,407; Syrian Jacobite, 202,059; Roman Catholic, 173,724; Congregationalist, 81,573; Reformed Syrian, 74,866; Anglican, 56,251; Salvationist, 16,794. The Church Missionary Society commenced work in 1816, the London Missionary Society in 1806, the Salvation Army in 1891.

(*c*) *Muslims.*—Muhammadan missionaries are said to have visited Malabar as early as A.D. 710, and the story of the conversion of the last of the Perumāls suggests that traders from Arabia arrived as early as the 8th cent. A.D.[2] In more recent times, under the rule of Haidar 'Alī and Tipū Sultān of Mysore (A.D. 1761–99), compulsory proselytism added large numbers to the faith. The present Muhammadans are either indigenous, immigrants from the Coromandel Coast, or recent settlers from Arabia, Sindh, Gujarāt, Kachh, or Bombay, who came for purposes of trade. The first differ little from the Hindu population except in matters of belief. Those who were converted by the Musalmān kings of Mysore are known as Moplah (Malayālam Māppila, probably 'great child,' an honorary title conferred on converts), or Jonaka, Shonaga, a corruption of Yavana, 'Greek.' The Moplahs are notorious fanatics, and in several cases bodies of them have fiercely resisted British troops. The Mettan are descendants of old Musalmān merchants and of their converts. The Tulukkan (Skr. Turashka, 'Turk') belong to the immigrant class.

(*d*) *Animists.*—Animism prevails widely among the hill tribes. Spirits (*chāvu*, *chāvar*, 'death,' 'the dead') are invoked by those afflicted with disease or suffering from starvation, a long string of the names of ancestors being recited. These spirits are of two kinds: (1) those who have met with a violent death from wild animals; (2) those who have died before the age of seven. They are propitiated by animal sacrifice and oblations of spirituous liquor on a platform erected for the purpose. The forest spirits must be propitiated before a tree is cut, and special patches of the forest are left uncut because they are supposed to be inhabited by some spirit. The hill people also worship godlings who possess neither priests nor temples, the oldest member of the family offering sacrifices and oblations to trees in which they are believed to dwell. Totemism has not been recognized among the hill tribes, but they respect the cow and will not kill the elephant, the vehicle and manifestation of Śāsta. In November–December, the harvest season, they worship their weapons and tools, bows, arrows, sickles, and knives.

LITERATURE.—N. Subrahmanya Aiyar, *Census of India, 1901*, vol. xxvi., *Travancore*, Trivandrum, 1903, *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii., do. 1912; V. Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, 3 vols., do. 1906; G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants*

[1] *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 195.

[2] *Ib.* p. 104 ff.

of Bhāratavarṣa or India, London, 1893; S. Mateer, *Native Life in Travancore*, do. 1883, *The Land of Charity*, do. 1871.

W. CROOKE.

TREASON.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

TREATIES.—1. Their place in international law and ethics.—The history of treaties, as formal agreements between nations, ratified by the respective governments, throws some light on the development of international ethics; and the formulæ and ceremonies connected with the sanctions employed at various times, to give validity to the pacts, are of interest to the historian of religion. Throughout the whole of antiquity the gods presided over all treaty-making, and the oath was a predominant factor; the transition from ancient to modern times is marked by a steady decline of this religious element. For the present purpose the juristic aspect of treaties may be ignored. But it is necessary to define their general position in regard to law. They belong to the sphere of what is known as 'international law'; but the rules known as international law 'lie on the extreme frontier of law,'[1] and it is only more convenient, not necessarily more correct, to treat them as a branch of law rather than of morals. The difficulty of regarding them as properly a branch of law lies in the fact that there is no fixed authority (unless it be a universal League of Nations) that can lay down and enforce these rules as between nations, and the rules are liable to be broken with impunity by any nation that has the power and the will to defy them. No pact between two nations can bind a third which was not a consenting party. But treaties, which are one of the most important means by which 'international law' is laid down, are valuable as a record of the development of morality, for the very reason that they 'express national opinion in a peculiarly deliberate and solemn manner.'[2] The history of treaties accordingly illustrates the growing sense of nations—which, by a legal fiction or a bold metaphor, are moral persons[3]—for morality in international relations. It also illustrates the constant struggle to discover some means of enforcing the observance of pacts.

'Upon a scrupulous fidelity in the observation of Treaties, not merely in their letter but in their spirit, obviously depends, under God, the peace of the world. *Pacta sunt servanda* is the pervading maxim of International, as it was of Roman Law.'[4]

In the earliest times of which we have record this fidelity was reinforced by religious ceremonies, calling of the gods to witness, with oaths and imprecations.[5] In modern times these religious appeals, as also the giving of pledges, hostages, and the like, have generally fallen into desuetude except in the case of treaties with savages, and the observance of treaties has been left to the conscience of the parties; but, as this could no more be relied upon than when it required to be fortified by oaths, one of the chief objects of treaties in modern times has been the establishment of a balance of power in one form or other, so as to make the violation of them a risky undertaking. Finally, the impossibility of obtaining permanent equilibrium between groups of nations has raised the question of a universal League of Nations, which, in the form which it has assumed in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, may be regarded as the highest development that the treaty has so far reached, since, by creating a determinate authority capable of enforcing the rules, it seeks to merge international law and (so far as law can make men moral) international morality in one. Previously to this treaty, little had been done in this direction beyond the general recognition that promises and signatures are futile, and that the only security lies in 'the establishment of a just and stable order.'[1] But how to ensure that the wrongdoer who, feeling himself strong enough, wantonly violates his word and destroys the peace of the world or breaks the laws of war shall be punished has seemed an insoluble problem, since his very act implies an assurance of impunity. W. G. F. Phillimore suggested[2] that each state that is a party to a treaty should contract with each and every other state that is a party, that, in the event of war between it and any other state that is a party to the treaty, it will observe towards the state with which it is at war all the agreed rules of the laws of war; and, if the rules are violated, then any other state party to the treaty may consider it an offence against itself that the law has been violated, such violation being considered an indirect injury, by reason of the lowering of the standard of conduct. The weak point of this arrangement is that interference on the side of law and order is merely permissive; it requires to be made imperative, and its scope extended so as to cover the maintenance of the peace of nations, and not merely the observance of the laws of war.

It is generally agreed that 'international morality—if not international law—calls upon every State to use every means at its disposal, without giving offence—for example, friendly suggestion, moral suasion—to prevent the outbreak of war, or, when it has begun, to help the contending parties to compose their differences. A war between two nations directly or indirectly concerns all nations, members as they are of the international community. There is not and there cannot be any principle of law, of ethics or of religion, prohibiting peaceful States from doing their utmost to bring about a cessation of carnage and devastation.'[3]

The League of Nations converts this negative into a positive injunction to interpose, and removes the offence from the most forcible methods of doing so. For art. 16 of the Covenant of the League declares that any resort to war in breach of its covenants by a member of the League is an act of war against all other members, which is to be met by a complete severance of relations of every kind, personal, financial, and commercial, with the offender, supported by the necessary military force. The provisions of this article may even be extended to cover the case of a state which is not a member of the League and refuses, in the case of a dispute, to adopt the obligations of membership. It is obvious that even this machinery will not suffice to suppress the ambitions of a state that feels itself strong enough to defy the greater part of the world; but it is equally obvious that such a state will be less ready to take the plunge than it would be if no such machinery existed.

Although the experience of the Great War of 1914–18 dashed the high hopes which were entertained as a result of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, it is unreasonable to regard those proceedings as a mere 'misprint in the world's history.' They were attended by the representatives of nations so numerous and so important that it was possible to say that in the result of their deliberations 'we have what may be regarded as the common judgment of mankind expressed in the most solemn manner in which an international engagement between nations is capable of expression' on such vital questions as the desirability of substituting arbitration for war.[4] For the first time, too, an international court was established

[1] W. E. Hall, *Treatise of International Law*[4], Oxford, 1895, p. 17.
[2] *Ib.* p. 9.
[3] De Garden, *Hist. générale des traités de paix*, vol. i. p. ii.
[4] R. J. Phillimore, *Commentaries upon International Law*, ii. 56.
[5] See artt. OATH.

[1] W. G. F. Phillimore, *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace*, p. 146.
[2] *Ib.* p. 167.
[3] Coleman Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 75.
[4] Choate, *The Two Hague Conferences*, p. 34.

to give effect to the principle agreed upon by the conference. Now it is true that this solemn judgment was abrogated by the wanton action of a single one among the signatories, and the whole fabric of international relations tottered. But the foundation remains, to which The Hague Conferences contributed certain elements of solidity, if only by producing unanimity among a greater number of nations than had ever before been parties to a treaty. Such unanimity was secured again among an even greater number, and, when a fresh start was made in 1919, the problem of securing adequate sanction for the engagements between the nations by means of a League of Nations was attacked with the more insight and chance of success, because it was known wherein the old conferences had failed.

Among the chief reasons for the failure of treaties to preserve the peace are the misconception of their object as the termination of war merely, and not also the establishment of permanent peace, and the lack of elasticity in their terms. If they are drawn merely to settle the questions outstanding at the time, without care being taken not to sow the seeds of fresh conflict by imposing harsh conditions, restraining progress and liberty and ignoring the claims of the peoples concerned, they do little more than temporarily suppress forces which break out with the greater violence at the first opportunity. For the same reason, they should not be so rigidly drawn as to prevent reconsideration in the light of new conditions, and should include the necessary machinery for such reconsideration.[1]

2. Historical development: antiquity.—(*a*) The earliest treaties of which we have any detailed record relate to the two cities of Lagash and Umma, on either side of the Shatt-el-Hai in Babylonia.[2]

Entemena, patesi of Lagash (about 2850 B.C.), records an arbitration of earlier date in the time of Mesilim, king of Akkad. The actual patesis of Lagash and Umma are not named; the dispute is settled by the gods; the god Enlil presides over the conference and invites the parties to make the treaty; the boundary is fixed at his command by Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and by the city-god of Umma; even Mesilim acts only at the command of his goddess Kadi. This is obviously an extreme instance of the religious sanction; the parties are supposed to live and move and have their being entirely in their local gods.

A second treaty between the same two cities was made about 2900 B.C. by Eannatum, patesi and king of Lagash, and Enakalli, patesi of Umma. A great boundary-ditch was dug, and the plain of Gu-edin, which was in dispute, was restored to Ningirsu, god of Lagash. Shrines to Enlil, Ningirsu, and other gods were erected along the new frontier beside the pillars of delimitation, and it was doubtless at the altars of these shrines that the parties took oaths in ratifying the treaty: 'On the men of Umma have I, Eannatum, cast the great net of Enlil. I have sworn the oath, and the men of Umma have sworn the oath to Eannatum.' He invokes the vengeance of Enlil on the men of Umma if they 'alter this word.' He also invokes other gods, to whom he has made suitable offerings, to enforce the treaty.

In the third treaty, the terms of which were imposed on Umma by Entemena of Lagash (about 2850 B.C.), we have a similar imprecation: 'If the men of Umma ever violate the boundary-ditch of Ningirsu or that of Nina, in order to lay violent hands on the territory of Lagash . . . then may Enlil destroy them, and may Ningirsu cast over them his net, and set his hand and foot upon them.' The imprecations recall those which are invoked on the violators of Babylonian boundary-stones; naturally the same means were employed to secure the validity of legal engagements of all kinds.

(*b*) The famous treaty between Rameses II. and Khetasar (Hattusil), prince of the Hittites (*c.* 1300 B.C.), is recorded in three copies, of which two are hieroglyphic, at Karnak and in the Ramesseum, while the third is the Hittite-Babylonian version, or rather fragments of two copies thereof, from Boghaz Keui.[3] Two Hittite envoys brought the text of the treaty written on silver tablets, the design of which is described:

On one side 'a figure in the likeness of Setekh, embracing the likeness of the great chief of the Kheta, surrounded by the words: "The seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens; the seal of the treaty which Khetasar . . . made." That which is within the frame of the design is the seal of Setekh, the ruler of the heavens. That which is on its other side is a figure in the likeness of the goddess of Kheta, embracing the figure of the princess of Kheta, surrounded by the following words: "The seal of the Sun-god of the city of Arinna, the lord of the land; the seal of Petkhep, the princess of the land of Kheta, the daughter of the land of Kezweden, the priestess (?) of Ernen, the mistress of the land, the votaress of the goddess." That which is within the frame of the design is the seal of the Sun-god of Arinna, the lord of every land.'

Thus the treaty is reinforced by being placed under the seals of the gods themselves. In addition we find the following invocations, corresponding to similar paragraphs usually attached to other documents which were intended to be permanently valid:

'As for the words of this contract . . . a thousand gods, male gods and female gods, of those of the land of Kheta, together with a thousand gods, male gods and female gods of those of the land of Egypt, they are with me as witnesses to these words: "the Sun-god, lord of the heavens," and various other gods, including those "of the mountains and the rivers of the lands of Kheta and of Egypt, of the heavens, the earth, the great sea, the winds, and the clouds."' These are invoked to desolate the house, the land, and the subjects of the violator of the treaty, and, as for him who keeps it, to preserve his health, and his life, together with his issue, his land, and his subjects.

(*c*) The covenants recorded in the OT are for the most part between single persons; but certain forms and ceremonies were doubtless common to such covenants and international treaties. Such were the setting up of a pillar and a heap of stones as witness, the invocation of the God of Abraham and the God of Nahor, Jacob's oath 'by the fear of his father Isaac,' and the sacrifice and eating of bread in the mountain, in the covenant between Jacob and Laban (Gn 31^{44-54}). The treaty between Isaac and Abimelech (Gn $26^{28ff.}$) is similarly accompanied by feasting and oath-taking. In Joshua's peace with the people of Gibeon the princes of the congregation swore by the Lord God of Israel (Jos $9^{15, 19}$). The ceremony of cutting an animal in twain and passing between the halves was used by the Hebrews in covenants between God and man (Gn $15^{7ff.}$, Jer $34^{18ff.}$),[1] as by other nations in connexion with purification and oath-taking; but the derivation of the phrase כרת ברית from this division of a victim is doubtful, to 'cut a covenant' being rather parallel to ὅρκια τάμνειν and *fœdus ferire* or *percutere* or *icere*;[2] whether these phrases refer to the cutting down of the victim, however, seems uncertain.

(*d*) The writers of antiquity give details of a number of more or less picturesque ceremonies accompanying oath-taking in treaties between less civilized nations. Of these the most important is the blood-covenant.[3]

The Scythians mixed wine with their own blood in a bowl, dipped their weapons into it, took oaths and uttered imprecations, and finally pledged each other in the mixture.[4] The Arabians made the incision with a sharp stone, smeared the blood on seven stones, and invoked Orotalt (Dionysos) and Allat (Urania).[5] The *locus classicus* is Tac. *Ann.* xii. 47 (the Armenians suck each other's blood): 'id foedus arcanum habetur, quasi mutuo cruore sacratum.' It was also in later days a Saracen custom, and it was a reproach to Isaac Angelus that he conformed to it in making peace with that nation.[6] Other ceremonies are collected by Dumont.[7] In China the

[1] Graham Bower, in *Grotius Soc. Papers*, iii.

[2] L. W. King, *Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, pp. 101 ff., 126 ff., 164 ff.

[3] R. von Scala, *Die Staatsverträge*, i. no. 13; *Mitt. der deutsch. Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin*, no. 35, p. 13 ff.; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, iii. [1906] 373–391; S. Langdon and A. H. Gardiner, *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, vi. [1920] 179–205. The passage quoted is from the Egyptian version, in which the Egyptian scribe has turned the Hittite sun-goddess into a male deity.

[1] E. J. Pilcher, in *PSBA* xl. [1918] 8–14.

[2] E. McClure, *ib.* p. 41.

[3] See art. Brotherhood (Artificial).

[4] Herod. iv. 70.

[5] Herod. iii. 8; cf. i. 74: Medes and Lydians.

[6] Nicetas Choniata, *de Isaacio Angelo*, ii. 5 (536); *PG* cxxxix. 775.

[7] *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. i. p. xxxiv ff.

blood-covenant was also in use, and treaties were confirmed by oaths and imprecations and accompanied by the sacrifice of an ox. In a treaty of 544 B.C. the formula is: 'May the gods of the hills and the rivers, the spirits of former emperors and dukes, and the ancestors of our seven tribes and twelve States watch over its fulfilment. If any one prove unfaithful may the all-seeing gods smite him, so that his people shall forsake him, his life be lost, and his posterity cut off.'[1]

(*e*) Coming to the Western nations, we find that the international relations depicted in the Homeric poems, though primitive, include the making of truces, with oaths, for the burning of the dead;[2] oaths, invocation of the gods, imprecation on the treaty-breaker, with sacrifice and feasting, also accompany a treaty between Greeks and Trojans.[3] In the historical period in Greece we find certain primitive survivals, as when Aristeides administered the oath to the Greeks and took it himself on behalf of the Athenians, throwing pieces of hot iron (*μύδροι*) into the sea. But as a rule the oaths are the ordinary ones (*νόμιμοι ὅρκοι*) in the name of the chief gods (*ὅρκιοι*); or, as in the alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantineia, and Elis (420 B.C.), the instruction is that each party should swear its most binding national oath over perfect victims (*τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων*). The tendency is to increase the number of gods invoked, in the futile hope of increasing the force of the oath.

In a treaty between Carthage and Philip V.[4] in 216 B.C. the following deities are invoked: Zeus, Hera, Apollo, the Genius (*δαίμων*) of the Carthaginians, Heracles and Iolaos, Ares, Triton, Poseidon, the gods of the army (*θεοὶ οἱ συστρατευόμενοι*), the Sun, Moon, and Earth, the rivers, harbours, and waters, all the gods who rule Carthage, all the gods who rule Macedon and the rest of Greece, all the gods who preside over the campaign (*οἱ κατὰ στρατείαν*). The Magnesians in allying themselves with Smyrna (mid. 3rd cent. B.C.)[5] swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Ares, Athene Areia, Artemis Tauropolos, the Sipylene Mother, Apollo *ὁ ἐν Πάνδοις*, all the other gods and goddesses, and the Good Fortune of King Seleucus. The Smyrnæans substitute Aphrodite Stratonikis for Apollo and omit the Good Fortune of the king.

The inscriptions frequently omit the instructions as to the gods in whose names the oaths are to be taken, prescribing merely the nature of the undertaking, as:

'I will fight for the Bottiæans who enter into the pact, and will keep the alliance with them faithfully and without guile, showing all zeal according to the pact; and I will bear no ill-will because of what has happened in the past.'[6]

Formulæ of imprecation frequently accompany the oath; in the simplest form (as in the alliance between Athens and Corcyra in 375 B.C.)[7] it is: 'If I keep the oath, may much good befall me, but if not, the contrary'; but destruction is sometimes invoked on the perjurer and all his house.[8] The inscriptions give some information as to the machinery for administering the oath.[9] The more distinguished the oath-taker, the more solemn was the oath. Frequently the oath was taken *en masse*; thus in the peace with Selymbria (408 B.C.)[10] the Athenian generals, trierarchs, hoplites, and 'any one else who was there' took the oath for Athens, while the whole people of the Selymbrians swore on the other side. Provision was sometimes made to keep the consciences of the parties alive by a periodical renewal of the oath—*e.g.*, at each Olympiad (Eretria and Histiæa)[11] or every year (Athens and Dionysius I.).[12]

The gradual moralization of international relations in the Greek world is well illustrated by the treaties of *asylia*, which have for their object to do away with the rough-and-ready methods of reprisals between individuals or states.[1] The most famous instance is the treaty between Œantheia and Chaleion (5th cent.), restricting seizures to the open sea, imposing fines for breach of the regulations, and prescribing the proper tribunals for trying cases.[2] The Greek attitude to the ethics of treaties does not differ from that of other nations; practice also, as usual, fails to conform to precept, and there is the customary laying of the blame for breach of oath on the other party.

Archidamos before Platæa calls the gods and heroes of the Platæans to witness that it was they and not the Lacedæmonians who first broke their oath.[3] The Athenians took the trouble to record a breach of faith by the Lacedæmonians on the stone on the Acropolis which bore the text of the broken treaty.[4] Again, the Athenians and Ceians inscribed on a stone the names of certain people of Iulis who had broken faith and been condemned to death; these people, however, returning to Ceos, tore up the stone; and, finally, the Athenians again provided for the restoration of the stone with the names of the offenders (363 B.C.).[5]

(*f*) Roman usage shows, as might be expected from the Roman legal genius, a more highly organized conception of international relations. The whole procedure of making treaties was laid down, and carried out by a definite body of officials, the college of *fetiales*, whose function was[6] to be the guardians of good faith in international relations.[7] This religious body represented the Roman people in all public international acts, such as making war and peace. Their origin was early, and was attributed to one or other of the kings; in fact neighbouring communities, such as the Latins and Samnites, had analogous magistrates, so that the institution must have been Italic in origin. The derivation of their name is uncertain. There were twenty in the college, one from each *curia* of the two primitive tribes, Ramnes and Titienses, men of good family, in early days at least of course non-plebeians. Their head was known as the *magister fetialium*. A fetial mission for contracting a peace consisted of at least two, the *pater patratus* and the *verbenarius*. The procedure was as follows, supposing that the peace was to be made outside Rome.

The *verbenarius* inquired whether he and the *pater patratus* were to make peace; if so, he asked leave to take the *verbenæ* (*herba pura*, or *sagmina*), *i.e.* a piece of turf from the soil of the Capitol, which rendered the persons of the mission inviolable (we may compare the legal fiction by which the site of an embassy is now considered to be the territory of the nation it represents). The fetials also carried with them sacred vessels, the sceptre of Jupiter Feretrius, and a flint knife (representing Jupiter Lapis, a primitive touch) from his temple. The *pater patratus* wore priest's clothing, not of linen, and a woollen fillet on his head. The *verbenarius* selected him from his colleagues by touching his head with the *sagmina*. They proceeded to the place selected, and, in presence of the generals and armies, and the fetials of the enemy, the terms of peace were read, and the *pater patratus* swore to them on the sceptre of Jupiter Feretrius, calling to witness Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, and all present. He then slew a pig[8] with the flint knife, invoking death on the Roman people if they should break the peace. Then he threw away the stone (a detail recalling the throwing away of the axe in the Attic Buphonia) saying: 'If I wittingly violate my oath, may all others prosper, while Jupiter casts me out, even as I cast away this stone.'

The scene of the swine-sacrifice by fetials is represented on Roman coins of the time of Augustus commemorating the ancient treaty between Rome and the Gabines, and an analogous sacrifice by warriors, evidently engaged in making a treaty of some kind, is a common type on other Roman coins, as well as on those of the Italic revolt

1 C. Phillipson, *Internat. Law and Custom of Anc. Greece and Rome*, i. 387 f., who adds that 'amongst the uncivilized races of to-day the formal oath, imprecation, and sacrifice—sometimes of human victims—are the invariable accompaniments of the conclusion of treaties.'

2 *E.g.*, *Il.* vii. 375 f., 408 f.

3 *Ib.* iii. 103 f., 268–301, iv. 156 f.

4 Polyb. vii. 9.

5 Michel, *Recueil d'inscr. grec.* 19.

6 *IG* i. 52; *c.* 422 B.C.

7 Hicks and Hill, *Greek Hist. Inscr.* no. 106.

8 Michel, *loc. cit.*

9 See Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Fœdus.'

10 See Hicks-Hill, no. 77.

11 Michel, 7.

12 Hicks-Hill, no. 112, if the restoration is correct.

1 See Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Fœdus,' p. 1204.

2 Von Scala, i. no. 58.

3 Thuc. ii. 74.

4 *Ib.* v. 56. 3.

5 Hicks-Hill, no. 118.

6 Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 15 (86).

7 See A. Weiss in Daremberg-Saglio, and E. Samter in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.*; Phillipson, *Int. Law and Custom of Anc. Gr. and Rome*, ii. ch. xxvi.

8 Cf. Virg. *Æn.* viii. 641.

against Rome in 91–88 B.C.[1] When Livy[2] describes a similar ceremonial among the Carthaginians, substituting a lamb for a pig, he is perhaps only attributing Roman customs to them; Polybius[3] is careful to distinguish, saying that the Carthaginians swear by their own gods, while the Romans perform the ceremony evidently regarded as peculiar to themselves. After the ceremony the fetials signed the text and brought it to Rome, and the whole college pledged itself to secure that it should be duly observed. It is hardly too much to say that the account given of the functions of the fetials reveals as highly organized a system, and as dignified a conception of the legal essence of the treaty, as has ever been realized. But it is a mistake to suppose that this organization is the expression of a high ethical standard.[4]

3. **Middle Ages and modern times.**—(*a*) The *Pax Romana* makes records of treaties during the empire scanty.[5] The swearing of oaths lingers on into the modern period.

In the treaty between Justinian and Chosroes (A.D. 561) the 12th article contains the invocation of God and the prayer that God may be compassionate to him who keeps the peace and may fight on his side, but that he may be the adversary of the deceitful man who seeks to overthrow the pact. The oath taken in the treaty of Andelot between Guntram, king of Burgundy, and Childebert, king of Austrasia (A.D. 587), is 'by the name of Almighty God and the indivisible Trinity, and all things divine, and the awful Day of Judgment.' In 842 Louis II. of Germany and Charles II. of France swear 'per Domini Dei amorem et Christiani Populi et nostram communem conservationem.' A treaty made in the 12th cent. by the city of Spalato[6] contains an imprecation: 'in the name of the Triune God, of the 118 Fathers, the 12 Apostles and all the Saints.' The oath is sometimes taken over relics, but most commonly over the Holy Gospels; *e.g.*, in the peace between Pope Alexander III. and the Emperor Frederick I. (1177) the representatives swear: 'Iuramus in manibus vestris super haec sancta Dei Evangelia quod pacem . . . bona fide servabimus, et absque fraude. Sic Deus nos adiuvet, et haec Sancta Dei Evangelia.'

The formula 'jurer en son âme,' 'jurare in animam suam,' appears frequently in treaties between England and France or the Low Countries.

Excommunication was the logical sequel to violation of a treaty-oath (as specified, *e.g.*, in the truce for the renewal of the Treuga Domini at the Council of Narbonne, 1054). Gradually the oath fades away into the promise.

In the treaty of commerce between Henry VII. and Philip, Duke of Burgundy (1495), the commissioners, in a declaration 'to all faithful Christians . . . Eternal Greeting in the Lord,' *bona fide* promise and oblige themselves, on the pledge and obligation of all their goods present and to come, to procure the observance of the treaty; these obligations are to be delivered to the deputies of each side in the church of the Virgin Mary at Calais. The king's undertaking to ratify the agreements made by his commissioners is given '*bona fide* and on the word of a King,' and the duke promises '*bona fide* and on the word of a Prince.' In the treaty of 1604 between Philip III. of Spain and James I. of England the gradual obsolescence of the oath is markedly visible in the clause: 'They shall make a like promise on the word of a King and Prince, and even swear on the Holy Gospels, if they are thereto required by the other party.'

The most modern example of an oath is said to be that taken in the cathedral of Soleure in the alliance between France and Switzerland in 1777. Thus finally disappeared that element which was, 'in a certain sense, the underlying basis of the whole body of the ancient laws of nations.'[7]

It was not uncommon for a party to a treaty to obtain absolution from his oath.

Thus Maximilian I., a few months before the League of Cambrai (1508), had made a treaty with Venice; one of the articles of the League summoned him by a papal brief to the aid of the Church and gave him reasons for breaking his oath. The pope dispensed François I. from his oath taken in the Treaty of Madrid (1526) and Henri II. from his oath at Vaucelles (1550).

A second clause was sometimes inserted, intended to prevent any party from seeking, or accepting the offer of, dispensation from his oath (*e.g.*, in the cession of the Spanish crown to Charles III. in 1703).[1] But, since release from this second obligation could obviously be obtained in the same way as from the first, it was as futile as an attempt to prevent the repeal of a law by inserting a clause imposing a death-penalty on any one who should propose such repeal. Modern treaty-custom recognizes the vanity of all such artificial supports to good faith.

The most sweeping and perhaps most futile example of absolution from a treaty-oath is provided by the bull of Pope Innocent X. describing numerous articles in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as 'null, vain, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, condemned, reprobated, frivolous, void of force and effect,' and dispensing anybody who pleased from his oath taken thereto.[2] The explanation of this outburst lies in the fact that this treaty was 'the first fundamental pact of Europe which struck at the root of the foreign temporal authority of the Pope.'[3]

The king in recent treaties merely engages and pronounces upon his royal word that he will sincerely and faithfully perform and observe the terms of the contract.[4] Finally, the parties to the Treaty of Versailles (1919) merely 'agree' to the covenant of the League of Nations and the closing formula is simply: 'In Faith Whereof the abovenamed Plentipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.'

(*b*) Religious formulæ are also used to a considerable degree as introductory clauses from mediæval times onwards, but in this feature treaties merely fall into line with all important documents. The commonest introductory formulæ are 'In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity' (*e.g.*, in the treaty between Charles the Simple and Henry I. of Germany, 926, or in the Treaty of Vienna, 9 June 1815) and 'In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.' A more florid style is naturally observable in the treaty between Frederick II. and Abu-Zakaria-Yahia, king of the Saracens of Tunisia, in 1231.

'In nomine Dei misericordis, miseratoris. Incipimus cum laude Dei maximi et, invocatione illius prelaudata, petimus prosperitatem. Laus Deo, scienti abscondita, futura, extantia, qui est eternus, post finem omnis viventis.'

The importance of the religious sanction made it long a moot point whether nations of different religions could make valid treaties with each other (a point, however, which Grotius decided in the modern sense), or, again, whether it was obligatory on all Christian nations to be leagued together against the infidel. In modern times it is recognized that treaties are governed by natural law alone, and the religious element, either in the content or in the phraseology of treaties, has naturally become much less discernible—to such a degree that the profession of Christian principles in the Holy Alliance (26th Sept. 1815) between Austria, Prussia, and Russia makes a deep and justifiable impression of insincerity.

In this remarkable alliance (the real object of which was anti-revolutionary) the contracting parties 'solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish in the face of the whole world their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which . . . must have an immediate influence on the Councils of Princes and guide all their steps as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections.'

It is significant that the pope was not invited to join this alliance, and that Britain was prevented

[1] H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, London, 1910, ii. 56, 98, 332, etc.
[2] xxi. 45.
[3] iii. 25.
[4] J. S. Reid, in *JRS* vi. [1916] 172.
[5] For treaties before Charlemagne see Barbeyrac's *Supplément* to Dumont's *Corps universel diplomatique*, from Charlemagne onwards Dumont's work itself, and for the modern period the various collections, especially Martens'.
[6] Dumont, i. 88.
[7] Phillipson, *Int. Law and Custom of Anc. Gr. and Rome*, i. 289.

[1] J. J. Schmauss, *Corpus Juris Gentium*, Leipzig, 1730, ii. 1165.
[2] Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 208.
[3] R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 58.
[4] Oakes and Mowat, *Great European Treaties*, p. 4.

from doing so 'by the forms of the British constitution.'[1]

(c) Apart from professions of this sort, the actual protection of the religious freedom of peoples involved in a settlement by treaty has often formed the subject of special articles.[2]

An early and remarkable instance is in the treaty between Justinian and Chosroes, in A.D. 561, in which a special article provided that Christians in Persia should enjoy freedom of worship, and on their own part should not attempt to make proselytes among the Magi. In modern times the Treaty of Westphalia marked an advance in religious toleration. The Treaty of Paris in 1763, recognizing the conquest of Canada, made special provision for liberty to the new Roman Catholic subjects of the king of Britain to follow their own religious worship. The Treaty of Oliva in 1660 (between Poland and Sweden) protected the co-religionists of either power in the territory of the other. In 1867, when Russia ceded Alaska to the United States, it was provided that the civilized inhabitants should not be interfered with in their religion. And in 1913, by the Treaty of Constantinople, Muslims resident in Bulgarian territory were guaranteed the enjoyment of religious liberty, and the name of the sultan as khalif was to continue to be pronounced in their public prayers. 'It is incumbent on the acquiring sovereign to allow to the inhabitants of the annexed territory the free exercise of their religion when it is not incompatible with good order and the fundamental dictates of morality. The obligation is not, of course, a legal one, but its sanction is rooted more deeply than that of positive enactments.'[3]

Hence the necessity of actual stipulations, such as those enumerated, is not usually felt.

(d) Of more importance, as indicating moral progress, than professions relating to religious principles, or even than provisions for religious freedom, is the degree of solicitude shown by the contracting parties for the general interests of the people. W. G. F. Phillimore[4] remarks that, except in the matter of religious toleration, the Treaty of Westphalia paid scant regard to the interests of the people. From 1648 to the recognition of American independence in 1783 the chief consideration in treaties is paid, as in older days, to the rights and interests of sovereigns and reigning families. In the next period, down to 1859, there is increased recognition of the rights of states. Still, by the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, *e.g.*, states and populations were trafficked in, with absolute disregard of the peoples concerned, who might as well have been slaves or cattle.

Since 1850 'little regard is paid to the supposed rights and interests of individual sovereigns or reigning families, and a new principle has arisen, viz. the rights of nationalities.'[5]

4. **Conclusion.**—Certain moral considerations which arise in connexion with treaty-making and treaty-breaking may be stated, though no solution is necessarily offered of the questions involved.

(a) The construing of treaties is a matter of equity. They are covenants *bonæ fidei*, and are not therefore to be technically construed.

'Discrimen actuum bonae fidei et stricti juris, quatenus ex jure est Romano, ad jus gentium non pertinet.'[6] The principle of the *Digest*, 'voluntatem potius quam verba spectari placuit,' applies with especial force.[7] 'There is no place for the refinements of the courts in the rough jurisprudence of nations.'[8]

In antiquity a famous instance of the breach of this principle was the murder of Hippias by Paches.[9] The classical example in modern writers, however, is the action of the French who, having destroyed the fortifications of Dunkirk in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht, proceeded to construct a still stronger place at Mardick, a few miles away. The principle by which a provision may be 'extended' so as to include a case to which the same reason applies as applied to the case originally envisaged, or may be 'restricted,' so that an ally excludes the application of a provision to a case obviously improper (as when, having promised to aid an ally in all its wars, it is asked to join in an unjust war)—this principle of extensive or restrictive interpretation assists contracting parties in adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of the treaty.[1]

(b) Since governments are representatives of justice, morality, and religion, it is assumed[2] that a treaty containing an engagement to do or allow that which is contrary to morality or justice is invalid. 'Pacta, quae turpem causam continent, non sunt observanda.'[3] Since a large number of treaties are forcibly imposed on a conquered by a conquering state, it is obvious that this principle provides innumerable opportunities for dispute and repudiation, under the next heading.

(c) How far is a treaty invalidated by the employment of force on the part of one of the parties? To this it is generally agreed to answer that there is no force in the plea that one of the parties consented through fear, or in face of superior force, such as would invalidate a private contract, since such treaties are only a way of terminating war, which is entirely determined by force. 'No inequality of advantage, no lesion, can invalidate a Treaty.'[4] But it is equally clearly held that treachery or duress exerted against the representative of a state amply justifies the repudiation of a treaty. The classical instance is Napoleon's extortion of terms from Ferdinand VII. at Bayonne.

(d) Fraud is also clearly held to invalidate a treaty, for then there is no real freedom of consent on the part of the deceived party.[5] The distinction is sometimes a little delicate between positive fraud and *suppressio veri*.

In the negotiations for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) Webster suppressed a map which was favourable to the British cause. The map could have been found, as Greville admitted, if the British authorities had caused proper search to be made, and Lord Ashburton agrees that he had no legal cause for complaint.[6] Yet it is to such cases as this that the remark of Hall[7] may be applied: 'It is recognized that there is an international morality distinct from law, violation of which gives no formal ground of complaint, however odious the action of the ill-doer may be.'

(e) The question of how far a party can liberate itself from obligations has been brought into special prominence by Germany's repudiation of its pledge to Belgium in 1914. To the doctrine that 'necessity, when real and *bona fide*, overrides the obligation of the promise' R. J. Phillimore[8] replies:

'It is manifest that the State, like the Individual, which takes advantage of every change of affairs to disengage itself from the obligations of a solemn covenant, weakens the foundations of that good faith on which the peace of the world depends.'

So too Hall:[9]

'Modern writers, it would seem, are more struck by the impossibility of looking at international contracts as perpetually binding, than by the necessity of insisting upon that good faith between States without which the world has only before it the alternatives of armed suspense or open war, and they too often lay down canons of such perilous looseness, that if their doctrine is to be accepted, an unscrupulous State need never be in want of a plausible excuse for repudiating an inconvenient obligation.'

Pedants such as those on whom Frederick the Great relied to justify his acts are to be found in all ages and countries. The Conference of London (1871) made the declaration:

'It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.'

This declaration, which was signed by all the

1 Oakes-Mowat, p. 34.
2 W. G. F. Phillimore, *Three Centuries*, pp. 55 f., 145; Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 309.
3 Phillipson, *loc. cit.* 4 *Three Centuries*, p. 14.
5 *Ib.* Doubts are already being expressed as to the permanent value of this principle; cf. Sir A. W. Ward, *Securities of Peace*, p. 9.
6 Grotius, *de Jure Belli ac Pacis*, ii. 16. 11; see R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 79.
7 L. 16. 219. 8 Hall[4], p. 356.
9 Thuc. iii. 34.

1 R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 96 f.
2 *Ib.* ii. 64 and 111. 3 *Dig.* II. xiv. 27. 4.
4 R. J. Phillimore, *Comm.* ii. 63; cf. Phillipson, *Termination of War*, p. 162.
5 Hall[4], p. 342.
6 Crandall, *Treaties, their Making and Enforcement*, p. 14.
7 P. 15. 8 *Comm.* ii. 100. 9 P. 366.

leading Powers of Europe, was provoked by Russia's attempt to evade its obligations under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, on the ground that lapse of time had changed the conditions. Although no specific declaration to the same effect appears to be included in the covenant of the League of Nations or in the treaty with Germany, the case seems to be covered by article 16, which provides for the prevention or punishment of breaches of covenant in general.

(*f*) How far does honour demand the intervention of one of the guarantors, in the case of a collective guarantee, when agreement is not reached between all parties?[1] Bluntschli holds that each guarantor is bound to act separately in such a case. Lord Derby (in connexion with the Luxemburg Convention of 1867) held that honour (but not legal obligation) compelled each guarantor, in concert with the others, to maintain the engagements; but that, if concerted action was not obtainable, then a guarantor would have the right, but not necessarily the legal obligation, to act. It is obvious that this difficulty could be avoided by care in drafting, and that, unless Bluntschli's view be accepted, the collective guarantee is not likely to be very valuable until we have reached a higher code of international honour than prevails at the present time. The covenant of the League of Nations meets the case by making joint intervention obligatory on all its members.

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TREES AND PLANTS.—1. Introductory.—All plants are sacred. This principle of the followers of Zoroaster lies at the root of all plant-lore, all tree-cults. All plants possess the gifts of immortality and health.[3] The subject enters into every form of religion, and its ramifications are traceable in different aspects and degrees from the tree of life to the May-pole. It rests on the earliest conceptions of the unity of life in nature, in the sense of communion and fellowship with the divine centre and source of life. The oak of Mamre, the ash Yggdrasil, the *ashērāh*, the oak of Dodona, the *Ficus ruminalis*, the Bodhi-trees, the pine-cones, and the seven-branched candlestick, even the modern Christmas-tree with its lights and its fruit and its fillets, are instances of the vast area in folk-lore, tradition, and social custom which has been influenced by early reverence for the sacred tree.

The sacred tree is thus deeply rooted in the primitive religious ideas of the human race. The spring, the rock, the tree are all visible manifestations of the divine spirit. They are found associated in the most ancient sanctuaries as different symbols of life; and this life, in earth or water or tree, is one with human life. The same divine spirit lives and works in all and manifests itself in each and all. The secret of religion is the recognition of this life as divine; its duty is the obligation of fellowship and worship which comes of this recognition.

In the earliest stage the sacred tree is more than a symbol. It is instinct with divine life, aglow with divine light. It is at once the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This animistic stage is traceable in folk-lore and myth, in traditional survivals in later ritual, and in savage cults in more recent and even modern times. In the history of religious development it lies behind the historic era. The burning bush, living and aglow with the divine voice, gives a conception of this earliest stage.

In the second stage the sacred tree is planted in holy ground. It is representative of the deity. It is the dwelling-place of the deity. The priest-king is its champion, and is himself the embodiment or incarnation of the god.[1] It is as priest-king at Mamre that Abraham arms his trained servants and leads them against the kings of the earth. It is an archaic survival in an archaic fragment (Gn 14[13b]). The champion of the tree-god must be loyal to the cult. A new sanctuary must be consecrated by the planting of the sacred tree, though not always of the same tree. The oak-Zeus of Dodona adopted under certain conditions the white poplar and the plane. Abraham, the champion of the oak or terebinth of Mamre, planted a grove, *i.e.* a tamarisk, at Beersheba. Agamemnon, as guardian of a sacred tree, and himself enjoying the divine title ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν and worshipped as a chthonian Zeus in Laconia, planted a plane-tree at Delphi and another at Caphyæ in Arcadia.[2] These plantings are examples of the second, or representative, stage of tree-worship.

The third is the symbolic stage. The 'grove,' or *ashērāh*, the common adjunct of the Canaanite shrine, is the most familiar example of this stage. It was a wooden pillar, representative like the living tree of the deity, 'the token of the deity's presence or a magnet for attracting it.'[3] There are traces of it in the sanctuaries at Samaria (2 K 13[6]), at Bethel (23[15]), and even in the Temple at Jerusalem (23[6]).

The differentiation of the one deity into the 'gods many and lords many' of local and national cults led to the iconic representation of the tree-god. The stump takes human shape. The Hermæ, wooden or stone pillars swelling towards the top, were crowned with the head of Hermes. The rude figure of Priapus as protector of gardens was of a similar character. The *caduceus* of Hermes, a wand with a triple shoot, may refer also to his origin as a tree-god.[4] Silvanus is represented in a similar form, with his sacred pine and also with the *caduceus* as a symbol. And in this connexion the statement of Pausanias

[1] Hall, p. 360. [2] *RGG* ii. 506.

[1] A. B. Cook, *CIR* xvii. [1903] 277. [2] *Ib.*

[3] L. R. Farnell, *ERE* vi. 397b.

[4] O. Seyffert, *A Dict. of Classical Antiquities*, ed. H. Nettleship and J. E. Sandys, London, 1904, pp. 285 f., 515; Mrs. Philpot, *The Sacred Tree*, do. 1897, p. 76.

and Pliny is significant, that in ancient times the images of the gods were made of wood.[1] And with the differentiation of the deity into the gods of the nations there came the differentiation of the tree into the trees sacred to the several gods. The oak was specially sacred to Zeus. The *Ficus ruminalis* of the Palatine was originally the sacred tree of Rome, though Juppiter was associated with the oak on the Capitoline Hill.[2] The cult, in early times as wide as the world, was narrowed when no sanctuary could be dedicated to Apollo which was unfavourable to the growth of his sacred laurel.[3]

Primitive worship was essentially an act of fellowship and communion with the deity. The vestment of the worshipper was the sheep-skin or the goat-skin specially sacred to the deity worshipped, as the white robe of righteousness is the symbolic vestment of the Christian worshipper. This is generally traceable in theriomorphic cults, as in the Lupercalia. But it is traceable also in tree-worship. The victor in the Olympic games was treated as the human representative of the tree-god. He was decked with olive and crowned with a helmet filleted and crested with the twig of the sacred tree.[4] The English Jack-in-the-Green of the old May-day sports and the Kentish Holly-boy and Ivy-girl of the Shrove-tide revels[5] are reminiscences of this worship.

Sacrament and worship are closely linked together. In the archaic tradition of Abraham (Gn 14^{18}) Melchizedek, king of Salem, brought forth bread and wine; and he was 'priest of the most high God' (El Elyon). Sacramental communion with the deity is the essence of the mysteries, and the mysteries belong to the primitive stages of religion: 'I fasted; I drank the kykeon; I took from the basket.' This was the touching of the *sacra*, the sacramental core of the mysteries of Eleusis. They were rites sacred to Demeter the Earth-Mother.[6] She is the Mountain-Mother (*q.v.*), the mother of the gods, represented with her pillar-shrine, the pillar of her sacred tree. She may be compared not only with Isis, but with Hathor and her sacred sycamore. Hathor nourished the wandering souls in the cemeteries of Egypt with food and drink. The Cretan Demeter in her mysteries nourished her mystics in life. The mysteries of Dionysus belong to the same cycle of ideas. Dionysus combined in himself the rites of the beer-god Sabazios of Thrace and of the mystery-god Zagreus of Crete.[7] The *haoma* of the Persians, the *soma* of the Hindus, the *ambrosia* of the Olympian gods, were all means of sacramental communion, a partaking of the tree of life.[8]

The sacred tree, instinct with the divine life, is vocal with the word and the will of the deity. A prominent feature of the Zeus-cult of Dodona was its oracle. 'And the giving of oracles was a chthonian prerogative.'[9] David is to consult the oracle of the mulberry-trees before he attacks the Philistines (2 S 5^{24}). God called unto Moses from the midst of the bush in Horeb (Ex 3^{1-4}). The sacred tree is alight with the wisdom of God. To partake of the acorns of Zeus was to acquire wisdom and knowledge.[10] The burning bush points to the symbolic meaning of the seven-branched candlestick in the Temple. It is a budding and blossoming almond (Ex 37^{17-24}). The imagery of the rod out of the stem of Jesse, and the Branch growing out of his roots, the setting of the sevenfold gift of wisdom, is another illustration of the same truth (Is 11^{1-3}; cf. LXX). And this again illuminates the meaning of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gn 2^{17}). It is the oracle of the God of righteousness, as the seven lamps are 'the eyes of the Lord . . . beholding the evil and the good' (Ps 15^{3}; cf. Zec 4^{10}, 2 Ch 16^{9}). The tree of knowledge is the oracle of religious and moral wisdom.

2. The animistic stage in tree-worship.—The tracing of this stage in its original simplicity is almost as elusive as animism itself. In prehistoric times it was already being absorbed in higher religious conceptions and revelations, in the higher physical and religious and ethical development of the human race. Jahweh 'finally triumphed over the *b'ālīm*, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them.'[1] This is the principle in all religious development. The burning bush was not merely the oracle of Horeb; it was the dwelling-place of Jahweh (Dt 33^{16}). The fable of the trees and the bramble king was spoken 'by the plain [oak or terebinth] of the pillar that was in Shechem' (Jg 9^{6-21}). It is a survival of ancient religious conceptions, an apologue or parable familiar in early tree-worship. The story of the thistle and the cedar is another (2 K 14^{9}).[2]

'Tree-worship pure and simple, where the tree is in all respects treated as a god, is attested for Arabia . . . in the case of the sacred date-palm at Nejrān. It was adored at an annual feast, when it was all hung with fine clothes and women's ornaments.'[3]

The sacred *erica* in the temple of Isis at Byblos was said to have grown round the body of Osiris. It was a stump wrapped in a linen cloth and anointed with myrrh. It represented the dead god. It is suggested that this explains the mystery of the draping of the *ashērāh* (2 K 23^{7}).[4] There are similar survivals in Greek ritual. Incense was burned and the tree was decked with fillets and honoured with burnt offerings. Mrs. Philpot gives[5] an illustration of a fruit-tree dressed as Dionysus—another example of draping as part of this early ritual. Cook in his exhaustive monograph on the cult of the oak-Zeus[6] has traced it through all the earliest sanctuaries of the Mediterranean area, especially in Dodona and Crete, and has given his conclusion as follows:

'Zeus was at each of these cult-centres conceived as a triple divinity (sky-god + water-god + earth-god) dwelling in a sacred oak and served by a priestly-king, who was regarded as an incarnation of Zeus himself and whose duty it was to maintain the sun's heat by magical means.'[7]

The Minotaur, the Ægean horns of consecration, and the axe[8] are also features in this ancient ritual.

This survey of the primitive cult is a key to the early worship of the sacred tree, not only in Celtic folk-lore and Gaulish sculpture, but in the survivals of pagan worship. E. Clodd gives a study of the 'primitive pagans' of S. Nigeria which sums up the animistic conception of tree-worship.

'A recent traveller among the "primitive pagans" of Southern Nigeria reports this speech from a native: "Yes, we say, this is our life—the big tree. When any of us dies his spirit does not go to another country, but into the big tree; and this is why we will not have it cut. When a man is sick, or a woman wants a child, we sacrifice to the big tree, and unless Oso'wo wants the sick man, our request is granted. Oso'wo lives in the sky, and is the Big God. When any of us dies away from this place, his spirit returns to the big tree."'[9]

Among the Hamitic tribes the crude animism has developed into a sort of polytheism with one highest god, Wāq.[10] He is the big god of the big tree of Nigeria.

[1] Philpot, p. 32.
[2] *Ib.* p. 28.
[3] *Ib.* p. 36.
[4] *CIR* xvii. 274 f.
[5] See art. SHROVE-TIDE.
[6] J. E. Harrison, *The Religion of Ancient Greece*, London, 1905, p. 48.
[7] *Ib.* p. 53.
[8] Philpot, pp. 122-127.
[9] *CIR* xvii. 179.
[10] Philpot, p. 36.

[1] *ERE* ii. 291b.
[2] W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, Edinburgh, 1889, p. 126.
[3] *Ib.* p. 169.
[4] *Ib.* p. 175 n.
[5] P. 31.
[6] *CIR* xvii. 174 ff., 268 ff., 403 ff.; xviii. [1904] 75 ff., 325 ff., 360 ff.
[7] *Ib.* xvii. 403.
[8] *Ib.* xviii. 85.
[9] *Animism*, London, 1905, p. 74.
[10] *ERE* i. 56b.

The tree-cult of the aboriginal Africans is today largely associated with ancestor-worship. Trees planted round the graves of their ancestors acquire a sacred character. The great tree on the verandah of a dead man's home becomes the shrine of his spirit. And it is held that the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship. One tree is hailed with the words: 'Holy art thou, our ancestor.'[1] The facts must be accepted, but the inference may be questioned. The polytheism and the ancestor-worship are both to be traced to the more primitive forms of animism represented in Ægean evidence as the cult of the Great Spirit or the oak-Zeus. They are both due to the principle of differentiation in the development of religious conceptions.

'Anthropomorphism is in some cases preceded by theriomorphism, but theriomorphism is never generated out of anthropomorphism.'[2]

All life in primitive ages is one, and in its movement inspires fear, not only the fear of God, but the 'fear' of Isaac (Gn 31^{42}). It is Jacob who 'sware by the fear of his father Isaac' (31^{53}). And Jacob by his wrestling attained the title of Israel (32^{28}). Abraham was the priest-king of Mamre, Melchizedek the priest-king of Salem. At Olympia and probably at Dodona the challenge of the priestly king gave rise to a regular athletic contest.[3] Minos as priest-king of Cnossus had a reign of limited duration. He was king for a period of nine years, when he withdrew to the Idæan cave to hold converse with Zeus.[4] Theseus, by his victory over Minos under the guise of Taurus, succeeded to the sun-king's rights as champion of the oak-Zeus.[5] Is it not evident that, behind and prior to the hero-worship of Theseus and the veneration for Israel, there is the ritual and there are the *sacra* of the deity, whether Zeus or El Elyon or Jahweh, the Great Spirit of primitive animism?

3. The sacred plantation.—The planting of the sacred tree or grove is a farther step in the development of tree-worship. The primitive priest-king does it as champion of the tree-spirit, under the conscious guidance of God. Eden is the most familiar example of a sacred plantation (Gn $2^{8f.}$). The practice of primitive religion colours the language and imagery of poet and prophet (cf. Nu $24^{5f.}$, Ps 104^{16}, Is 61^{3}). The riddle and parable of Ezekiel has new meaning when read in the light of early ritual:

'A great eagle . . . came unto Lebanon, and took the highest branch of the cedar: He cropped off the top of his young twigs, and carried it into a land of traffick; he set it in a city of merchants. He took also of the seed of the land . . .; he placed it by great waters, and set it as a willow tree. And it grew, and became a spreading vine of low stature' (Ezk 17^{3-6}; cf. vv.$^{22-24}$).

In Ægean art the living tree is represented sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of three, or in groves. It is at times close to an altar, or even growing from it; in one case the goddess sits under it. The palm-tree, the fig, and the cypress are most frequent; but the pine, the plane, and the vine also appear.[6] It may even spring from the *bucrania*, or 'horns of consecration,' which themselves represent the sacred bull, the theriomorphic representation of the oak-Zeus.

At Athens the original cult was that of the oak:

'Nondum laurus erat; longoque decentia crine
Tempora cingebat de qualibet arbore Phoebus.'[7]

There are in the Caryatides, or nut-maidens, traces of a nut-grove, the nuts themselves being known as the acorns of Zeus. Later, after this first stage of substitution, 'Zeus took over the olive.'[8] These ἀθῆναι, or nurses of Zeus, gave their name to the city, and later to the goddess whose cult overshadowed that of Zeus on the Acropolis.[1] In the Academy at Athens there were twelve sacred olives in the precinct of Athene.[2] Demeter had her sacred oaks, and the boy who pronounced the Eleusinian formula at Athenian weddings, ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον, was wreathed with oak and thorn.[3] There was a grove planted for Demeter at Dotium by the Pelasgians before they migrated from Thessaly to Cnidus. And Ovid, telling the story of the judgment on Erysichthon, speaks of the tree of Demeter as an oak, adorned with fillets and tablets by the people.[4]

These plantings are wide-spread, and traceable to the earliest sites. Hercules planted two oaks at Heraclea Pontica in Bithynia.[5] Æneas planted a huge oak-tree, lopped and decked as a trophy, on the tomb of Mezentius the Etruscan. The crown of golden oak-leaves from Vulci implies that the Etruscan kings were representatives or champions of the oak-Zeus. The tree planted by Æneas was itself identified with the king: 'manibusque meis Mezentius hic est.'[6] The identification of tree, god, and king is general. Romulus and Remus were worshipped in the Comitium under a sapling planted from the *Ficus ruminalis* on the Palatine. The Bodhi-tree of Anurādhapura, long the capital of Ceylon, is over 2000 years old. It was planted by Tissa—a branch of the original Bodhi-tree, at Gayā in India.[7] The sanctuary of 'Uzzā at Nahla near Mecca consisted of three trees[8]—another link with the wide-spread cult of a triple tree-god, as sky-god, water-god, and earth-god in one.

The chain of evidence is unbroken from East to West: the triple-headed gods of Gaul, sitting cross-legged on their throne as in India, point to closer contact with the neolithic age than even Greece and Syria. The sacred flint of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline Hill at Rome, the 'antiquum Jovis signum,' the home of Jupiter Lapis, has been regarded as an unhafted neolithic celt, preserved among the aborigines of Latium from an immemorial past.[9]

The sacred tree, the sacred plantation, was the seat of authority, the seat of judgment. The Romans met for council 'in aesculeto.' The senate of the Galatian Celts met at a place called Δρυνέμετος, doubtless sacred to their national cult: κελτοὶ σέβουσι μὲν Δία, ἄγαλμα δὲ Διὸς κελτικὸν ὑψηλὴ δρῦς.[10] Deborah the prophetess 'dwelt under the palm tree of Deborah, . . . and the children of Israel came up to her for judgment' (Jg 4^{5}; cf. 1 S 22^{6}, Jg 6^{11}). In 458 B.C. the Roman envoys were sent to complain that the Æqui had broken a treaty concluded in 459. They were bidden to make their complaint to a huge oak on Mount Algidas under the shadow of whose branches the Æquian commander had his quarters.[11] The *prætorium* under the sacred oak is certainly a primitive trait.[12]

A sacred rowan-tree in Ireland derived its origin from the rowan of Dubhros, the Black Forest, in Co. Sligo.

The tree had grown from a quicken-berry dropped by the Tuatha Dé Danann, who had brought it from the Land of Promise. It was guarded by a giant named Searbhan, who could only be slain by three blows from his own club, and had a single broad fiery eye in the middle of his black forehead. He was overcome by Diarmait, the culture-hero of Irish folk-lore.[13] He

[1] *ERE* i. 164b.
[2] Cf. Ovid, *Met.* i. 446.
[3] Cook, *CIR* xvii. 411.
[4] *ERE* i. 142-144; cf. Cook, *CIR* xvii. 407.
[5] Ov. *Met.* i. 450 f.; cf. Cook, *CIR* xviii. 84: Drymas, Ægeus, Codrus.
[6] Cook, *CIR* xviii. 86.
[7] *Ib.* i. 573a.
[8] *Od.* xix. 179; Strabo, 476.

[1] Cook, *CIR* xviii. 86.
[2] *ERE* i. 59a.
[3] *CIR* xviii. 84.
[4] *Ib.* p. 76; Ov. *Met.* viii. 738 ff.
[5] *Ib.* p. 79.
[6] Verg. *Æn.* xi. 5-16; *CIR* xviii. 362.
[7] *ERE* i. 599b.
[8] *Ib.* i. 660b.
[9] *CIR* xviii. 365.
[10] Max. Tyr., *Dissert.* viii. 8; cf. *CIR* xviii. 79, 369.
[11] Livy, iii. 25.
[12] *CIR* xviii. 365.
[13] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*², p. 355 ff.

dwelt in a hut among the branches and was so great a magician that he could not be killed by fire, water, or weapons of war.

Here again there is the sacred tree, the fierce-eyed guardian, triply inviolate, the challenge, and the contest so frequently met with in the legends of the sacred grove. And in Danu (the Welsh Don), the goddess-mother of the Tuatha Dé Danann, is there not a link with the Demeter of Greek myth, and in the name itself an echo of the Δάν (acc. Δᾶν) of the oak-Zeus, and of Jana, Diana, Artemis on the slope of the Aventine? She is the earth-goddess, the Dea Dia of the Romans, the Dan of the Dorian Greeks: οἱ γὰρ Δωριεῖς τὴν γῆν δᾶν λέγουσι καὶ δῖαν.[1]

4. The sacred stump.—The Lion Gate at Mycenæ is one of the earliest aniconic representations of the worship of the sacred tree. The pillar of which the lions are the supporters tapers downwards like the ancient Herm.[2] The subject has been very fully treated in art. POLES AND POSTS; but some further links may be noted.

The pillar-shrine of Cnossus with its sacred doves is recognized by Cook as a 'conventionalised but still aniconic form of a triple tree-Zeus.'[3] The Lydian cult of Zeus δασκαῖος was connected with the oak. A coin of Halicarnassus represents him 'as a bearded god crowned with rays and standing between two oak-trees, on each of which is a bird.'[4] In the same city there was a cult of Aphrodite δασκαία. This cult gave its name to the city of Aphrodisias.

The coins of this city 'show the leafless trunk of a tree with three branches. Sometimes the three branches rise separately from an enclosure of trellis-work. Sometimes they spring from a single trunk, on either side of which is a naked man wearing a Phrygian cap: the one on the left wields a double-axe; the one on the right kneels or runs away, turning his back upon the tree [a feature still preserved in folk-lore]. Sometimes . . . the tree is flanked by two lighted altars.'[5]

The priest of the Cappadocian cult of Bellona at Rome is represented with a branch in one hand and the two-headed axe in the other—a further link with the oak-cult of Crete.[6]

Amid the early rites of Etruria and the *sacra* of Rome there are further associations with this cult. Hermes is represented in a fragment of Aristophanes as τριπέφαλος; so also is Janus on a coin of Hadrian.[7] Janus is also represented with a spear; and his title Quirinus is understood in reference to the oak-god. The Sabine *curis*, the oaken spear, the Quirites, the men of the oaken spear, are thus related to Janus Quirinus or Jupiter Quirinus.[8] The spear is a variation of the sacred stump. The tree-god is often represented by a post, sceptre, or spear.

The *trixylon* associated with Juno Sororia and Janus Curiatius is a symbol of this triple Janus. It consisted of two vertical beams and a cross-bar, the rude form of a cross. The 'yoke' under which the conquered were forced to march was of three staves or spears, and is also traced to the cult of Janus Quirinus. The door-posts (*janua*) were sacred to him, as the threshold was to the Earth-Mother.[9]

The sprinkling of the blood on the door-posts in Hebrew ritual (Ex 12[7], Ezk 45[19]) and the shaking of the threshold in the vision of Isaiah (Is 6[4] RV) are examples of the same cycle of ideas—the sacredness of the posts and the threshold as tokens of the Deity.

The *caduceus* is another variation of the sacred rod. It consisted of a triple shoot, the central shoot forming the handle, the two side shoots being folded back into a double knot. The elder lends itself to this by its opposite shoots, and the tree is tabu in the folk-lore of the West. It is not lucky to burn it. Judas hanged himself from an elder-bush. The *lituus* of the augur is another variation of the sacred rod. So also the mysterious twisted rods used in what is probably a funeral procession in the decoration of Etruscan tombs at Norchia and Tarquinii.[1] In the fresco at Tarquinii, while most of the figures have the twisted rod, 'the symbol of the Etruscan Hades,' one of the leading figures has the *lituus*, and prominent among these is the hammer borne aloft, 'a frequent emblem of supernatural power.'[2] The figure of the god with the hammer is frequently met with on Celtic monuments.[3] The Y cross with its mystic Pythagorean meaning has also some ancient link with these Etruscan rods.[4] A hazel-twig of this shape is in use as the divining-rod for tracing water.

The Etruscan *lucumones*, or kings, were representatives of Jupiter. Their crown was of golden oak-leaves, with acorns, gems, and fillets. They acted as vice-gerents of the oak-god. Their golden *bulla* was the symbol of the sun-god—another link with the oak-Zeus. They used a sceptre with an eagle, and were preceded by the lictor bearing the axe with the bundle of rods. Cook suggests that these may be a conventional substitute for the trees of the tree-god.[5] These were all part of the royal insignia of the ancient king. Is it not possible to trace the origin of the English regalia to the same source?

In the Inventory of 1649 are enumerated the 'large staff with a dove on the top, formerly thought to be all gold, but upon trial . . . found to be the lower part wood within and silver-gilt without'; the 'small staff with a fleure de luce on the top . . . found to be iron within and silver-gilt without'; 'one staff of black and white ivory with a dove on the top'; and the two sceptres, one with the cross, and one with the dove.[6]

These are all symbols of authority, such as are found in the *sacra* of the ancient races of Europe. The sceptre with the cross, the wooden rod with the dove, the rod with the 'fleure de luce' may be compared with the tau-cross, the blossoming stump, and the dove-pillars of the Etruscan and Ægean cults. The rods laid up before the Lord in the tent, 'one for each father's house' (Nu 17[2] RV), 'twelve rods,' and the budding of Aaron's rod (v.[8]) point to similar associations on Semitic soil. And the cross with its *spolia opima* was the most honoured sign of Jupiter Feretrius at Rome. The *feretrum*, from which he took his name, was the lopped trunk of the ancient oak, venerated by the shepherds of old, forming a wooden cross to which votive armour was attached.[7] The cross in the folk-lore of Rome was a sign of the primitive oak-cult—a token of the presence of the oak-king, a shrine for the offering of the trophy of right to the oak-god.[8] Was Pilate altogether unconscious of this when he said: 'What I have written I have written' (Jn 19[22])? And was St. Paul too in his 'foolishness of preaching,' and in his witness to the power of the Cross and of Christ crucified, unconscious of the other tradition of the power of the cross, when he wrote:

'Unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God' (1 Co 1[23f.])?

5. Trees many and gods many.—The sacred tree signified universally in primitive ages the presence of the deity. The one tree with its nursery-grove was the shrine of the one God. But east and west, in hill or in valley, in north aspect or in south, the tree varied.[9] And, as the tree varied in species, the god varied in name. Then the tree and the god of the clan grew to be the tree and the god of

1 *Etymologicon Magnum*, ed. F. Sylburg, Leipzig, 1816, p. 60. 8; *CIR* xvii. 177.
2 Seyffert, pp. 50, 285.
3 *CIR* xvii. 407.
4 *Ib.* 416.
5 *Ib.*
6 Seyffert, p. 96.
7 *CIR* xviii. 367, n. 19.
8 *Ib.* pp. 369, 373.
9 *Ib.* p. 369.

1 G. Dennis, *The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*, London, 1848, i. 253.
2 *Ib.* pp. 310–312.
3 G. Grupp, *Kultur der alten Kelten und Germanen*, Munich, 1905, p. 154 f.
4 Dennis, i. 253.
5 *CIR* xviii. 361 f.
6 W. H. Stacpoole, *The Coronation Regalia*, London, 1911, p. 33.
7 *CIR* xviii. 364 f.
8 Verg. *Æn.* x. 423, xi. 15 f.
9 Verg. *Georg.* ii. 109–113.

the district, and in turn the tree and god of the nation. The parable of the bramble king (Jg $9^{8ff.}$) is true to fact. The olive, the fig, the vine had established their fame and their rule; they would not submit to another; the bramble had ambition to rival even the cedar of Lebanon.

Trees many led on to gods many.[1] The oak-Zeus at Athens took over the olive. Apollo remained true to his sacred laurel. This development is most marked in Greek art and Roman verse:

> 'Populus Alcidae gratissima, vitis Iacchо,
> Formosae myrtus Veneri, sua laurea Phoebo.'[2]

The Semitic nations stand apart from this tendency to assign a particular tree to a particular god,[3] whether from reaction to monotheism or from adherence to the primitive conception of the oneness of the divine spirit. They had sacred trees in great number, but they were all sacred to one god localized in village, clan, or nation. In India each Buddha had his own tree, and Gautama himself, after having passed through 43 incarnations as a tree-spirit, eventually found wisdom under the sacred tree of Brahmā, the *pipal*-tree, or *Ficus religiosa*.[4]

This triumph of the gods over the nations and the consequent interlacing of the tree-cults, sometimes by expansion, sometimes by absorption, resulted in certain cases in the distinction between tree-gods and tree-demons. As the *jinn* or *genii* of the Arabs were gods out of touch with men, outlaws, dehumanized, 'abominations of Moab and Ammon,' so the wood-demons of the German forest or the Polynesian islanders were the foes and the dread of their conquerors—or their neighbours. And in the controversy between the supporters of ancestor-worship and the supporters of animism based on the presence in nature of the divine spirit this wide-spread belief in wood-demons and unlucky trees is in favour of the latter. In an age when 'every valley had its king,'[5] and every hill its shrine and its sacred tree, as in these islands in Celtic times, and when feuds were frequent between clan and clan, the jealousy of the clan would separate between god and god, and between tree and tree, and people the forest-clad hills with every form of terror and danger. The only bond of safety was in the nation's god and in the king as the champion of his rights. All around was danger and death: 'for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God' (Ex 20^{5}; cf. 2 Co 11^{2}). This is the language of religion, not the language of ancestor-worship; and it may be traced in tree-worship and demon-lore from earliest times.

A blasted or stricken oak might be the messenger of misfortune:

> 'De coelo tactas memini praedicere quercus.'[6]

The Abors in Assam regarded the rubber-tree as the abode of two malignant spirits; another haunted the plantain and stinging-nettle.[7] The satyrs and devils of the OT, the *jinn* of the Arabian stories, the centaurs and cyclops, fauns and dryads of Greek and Latin mythology, the wood-maidens, wild-men, and elves, the wild-women of the Tyrol, and the green-ladies of Neufchâtel, in their different degrees of mischief or maliciousness, were haunting terrors of the old world.[8] The Neraides of Macedonian folk-lore are tree-spirits. It is not well to lie down in the shade of a tree, for it is there that the tree-demons appear. At this day the country-folk avoid especially the plane, the poplar, and the fig-tree, for these are favourite haunts of fairies.[9]

[1] Verg. *Geory.* ii. 116 f. [2] Verg. *Ecl.* vii. 61 f.
[3] Philpot, p. 39. [4] *Ib.* p. 14.
[5] C. I. Elton, *Origins of English History*², London, 1890, p. 238.
[6] Verg. *Ecl.* i. 17. [7] *ERE* i. 33ᵃ.
[8] Philpot, p. 52 ff.
[9] G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 244.

In Ireland ghosts and apparitions haunt isolated thorn-bushes.[1] To call up the Tolcarne troll near Newlyn, an incantation was necessary, and three dried leaves must be held in the hand, 'one of the ash, one of the oak, and one of the thorn.'[2]

> 'Sing Oak, and Ash, and Thorn, good Sirs,
> (All of a Midsummer morn)!
> England shall bide till Judgment Tide,
> By Oak, and Ash, and Thorn!'[3]

The creation myth of the Tanganarin natives in Australia holds that Punjil fashioned man out of the bark of a tree. Another tree was tabu, and haunted by a bat; the tabu was broken; the tree was violated; the bat flew away, and death came into the world.[4] Daphne is the name both of the laurel and of the spirit within it. The *numen* of a palm-tree is not called Tamar, but Ba'al Tamar. The former conception is Indo-European, the latter Semitic.

> 'The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature. . . . The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the object and its *ba'al*.'[5]

Among the nymphs were Philyra, the linden, Rhœa, the pomegranate, Helike, the willow, and Daphne, the laurel. Mrs. Philpot notes:

> 'In later times an attempt was made in some cases [*e.g.*, Daphne in Laurum, Lotis in Lotum, Dryope in Arborem][6] to explain the connection by metamorphosis . . . but it is extremely probable that this was an inversion of the primitive nexus.'[7]

The classic passages for the oak of Dodona are Hom. *Od.* xiv. 327 f., xix. 296 f. In Hom. *Il.* xvi. 233 f. the oracle is mentioned; Vergil refers to it in *Georg.* ii. 15 f. The oak was also sacred to Ceres;[8] before harvest worship must be rendered to her, and the worshipper must be crowned with a wreath of oak.[9] The willow is associated with Hera at Samos, and with Artemis at Sparta. Artemis was the goddess of the nut-tree and the cedar in Arcadia, of the laurel and the myrtle in Laconia.[10] The laurel is sacred to Apollo; the priest-king Anius is guardian of the tree and the shrine.[11] The olive is specially connected with the cult of Athene at Athens. The pine is associated with Pan and Silvanus, the cedar with the Accadian deity Ea, the sycamore with the Egyptian goddess Nuit (Hathor). The cypress was sacred among the Persians, and in the West, together with the poplar, it belongs to the chthonian deities. The vine and the ivy were closely connected with the rites of Dionysus.[12] The ash and the elm appear in Scandinavian mythology as the first man (Ask) and the first woman (Embla), and the ash Yggdrasil is connected with the court of the gods.[13]

Celtic folk-lore has many points of contact with the ancient oak-cult of the Mediterranean area, with variations due to local developments under northern conditions. The δρύτομοι of Dodona, the αἰγειροτόμοι, or poplar-fellers, at Athens, the κισσοτόμοι at Phlius,[14] have their representative in the tree-felling god Esus on the Paris monument.[15] The ancient axe-ritual of Dodona, Crete, and Etruria appears in the sculptures of Sucellos and other deities in Celtic lands.[16] On the Trier monument the deity is felling an oak-tree on which are three cranes. The Tarvos trigaranus, the bull, before the oak-tree, with two cranes on the back and one between the horns, is another variation of the Paris altar.[17]

[1] W. Y. Evans Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*, Oxford, 1911, p. 70.
[2] *Ib.* p. 176.
[3] Rudyard Kipling, *Puck of Pook's Hill*, London, 1906, p. 32.
[4] *ERE* i. 34, 36ᵃ, ii. 36ᵇ, 45ᵇ. [5] *Ib.* p. 285.
[6] Ovid, *Met.* i. 452, ix. 345, 350–393.
[7] P. 59 f. [8] Ovid, *Met.* viii. 741–743.
[9] Verg. *Georg.* i. 347–350. [10] Philpot, p. 29.
[11] Verg. *Æn.* iii. 79–82. [12] Philpot, *passim*.
[13] *Chambers's Encycl.* new ed., Edinburgh, 1888, *s.v.* 'Ash.'
[14] Paus. ii. xiii. 3. [15] Grupp, p. 153.
[16] *Ib.* pp. 154–156. [17] *Ib.* p. 165.

The cult of Cernunnus supplies another link. He is represented in the Cluny Museum with stag's horns, the ring on each horn referring to the sun.[1] In the silver bowl from Gundestrap in Denmark he is cross-legged, Buddha-like, with stag's horns, and on his right a stag and a bull.[2] In a wax tablet at Pesth he is called Jupiter Cernenus; on a Rheims monument he is with a stag and an ox, and at Saintes with several *bucrania*. The presence of the sun-wheel in Paris, and the bull-masks at Saintes, point to his original identity with the Zeus of Crete. In one case he is represented with a chain.[3] His name is almost certainly connected with the horns. In folk-lore he probably survives in Windsor Forest as Herne the Hunter, who walks

> 'round about an oak, with great ragg'd horns;
> And there he blasts the trees, and takes the cattle,
> And makes milch-kine yield blood, and shakes a chain
> In a most hideous and dreadful manner.'[4]

It is not unlikely that the Horn-dancers of Abbots Bromley in Staffordshire commemorate some early pagan rite connected with the oak-cult of Zeus Cernunnus. Bagot's Park is a celebrated oak-forest. The village-games in old times took place round the Beggar's Oak. Though now held early in September, in Robert Plot's time (1641-96) they took place about Christmas. The dancers wore stag-horns (reindeer, kept in the church). It is noteworthy that the Pesth tablet of Jupiter Cernenus has also an echo in a modern dance—a horned figure among the mummers of Mohacs on the Danube.

The oak also entered into the ritual of invoking Zeus as a rain-god. On the Lycæan mountain of Arcadia was a shrine sacred to Zeus, in which was a spring to which the priest went in time of drought. He touched the water with a sprig of oak, when a vapour would rise and spread in fruitful showers over the land. In Brittany the fountain of Barantin in the Forest of Brécilien served the same purpose. Water was thrown on a slab near the spring, and rain would then fall in abundance, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The well was near the fabled shrine of Merlin, one of the Celtic types of the sun-hero, and it was overshadowed by a mighty tree. Rhys suggests that the spring, the tomb, the slab, and the tree 'all belonged to the Celtic Zeus.' There is a similar story connected with the Snowdonian tarn Dulyn, the Black Lake, where the slab was called the Red Altar.[5] There is also in the moorlands of Staffordshire, near Ipstones, a strong spring overshadowed with oak and mountain-ash long known as the Thundering Well. The name alone remains, but it may be grouped among the sites sacred to the Celtic Zeus as rain-god. Within the last few years a Celtic chambered tomb has been discovered within a short distance of the well.

The ash is also among the sacred trees of Ireland. In the parish of Borrisokane, Co. Tipperary, there was in 1833 a huge ash called the Big 'Bell' tree.[6] The name is derived from the word 'Billa,' which occurs in Magbile, 'the plain of the old tree,' the present Moville.[7] This name has been connected by Windisch with *bile* or 'Beli,' king of Hades, the consort of Danu. This Beli represents Cronos in his darker character as Death, and suggests that the Big 'Bell' trees of Irish folk-lore were ash-trees sacred to the Celtic Cronos.[8] The ash was also sacred to the Celtic Silvanus: 'Silvane sacra semicluse fraxino.' He presided over woodlands, clearings, and gardens.[9]

[1] Grupp, p. 164. [2] *Ib.* p. 288. [3] *Ib.* p. 164.
[4] Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, iv. iv. 29.
[5] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*², p. 183 ff.
[6] W. G. Wood-Martin, *Traces of the Elder Faiths of Ireland*, London, 1902, vol. ii. pp. 155-160.
[7] *The Martyrology of Gorman*, ed. Whitley Stokes (Henry Bradshaw Soc. Publications, ix.), London, 1895, p. 319.
[8] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 678. [9] *Ib.* p. 65.

The white-thorn has also its sacred associations. It is unlucky to cut it down. A 'lone thorn' is regarded with special veneration. Christianity took over its sanctity. The Crown of Thorns was said to have been made of white-thorn. An old thorn near Tinahely, Co. Wicklow, is still called 'Skeagh Padrig,' or 'Patrick's book.' In Britain 'the holy thorn' of Glastonbury has similar venerable associations. The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The yew among the Druids was a symbol of immortality.[1] Celtic folk-lore has many other traditions of tree-worship. The first man sprang from an alder, the first woman from a mountain-ash. The berries of the rowan are a charm against all disease. There are also trees which were inauguration trees. One, an old sycamore in Coollemoneen in the parish of Killadown, is called 'the honey-tree.' A tree in the parish of Kilmactaign is called 'the fern-tree,' *i.e.* the alder.

6. Tree-offerings and tree-rites.—The cult of the sacred tree had its offerings and its rites. There are even survivals of the offering of the highest sacrifices. The natives of the Vindhyan uplands of India until lately offered human sacrifices to trees.[2] In the animistic worship of the Ainus the worship is vocal.[3] At the close of the bear-festival the head of the bear is set up on a pole, called 'the pole for sending away,' and the skulls of the other animals which are hung up with it are called 'divine preservers' and are at times worshipped.[4] This is a link with the *bucrania* which form so integral a part in the sacrificial tokens of Aryan worship. Plutarch states that Theseus on his return from Crete put in at Delos, and instituted a dance in imitation of the mazes of the labyrinth.

> 'He danced it round the altar Keraton which was built entirely of the left-side horns of beasts.'[5]

This was known as the 'crane dance,' and is certainly in some way associated with the cult of the Celtic tree-god Sucellos or Esus with his three cranes, and with the Tarvos trigaranus of the Paris monument.[6] A note in Langhorne's Plutarch states that the crane commonly flies in the figure of a circle, which together with the *swastika*, or conventional labyrinth sign, is symbolic of the sun-cult. The dance round the May-pole and the Jack-in-the-Green festivities within our own memory in May Fair, London, are survivals of the same rites.

The griffins in Assyria and in Asia, in their attitude of devotion,[7] have their counterpart in the vision of the Temple in Ezekiel:

> 'And it was made with cherubims and palm trees, so that a palm tree was between a cherub and a cherub' (41[18]).

In a Mexican MS the tree breaks into two branches in the shape of a tau-cross, each branch with three blossoms; the tree is surmounted by a parrot, and is supported by two men, standing, each with his right hand raised in the attitude of devotion.[8]

Trees were hung with votive offerings. In India the sacred banyan-tree is represented with six elephants in the act of worship.[9] In Egypt it is the sycamore with jars and fruit, and the worshipper before it has the right hand raised.[10] Elsewhere it is a tree sacred to Artemis, hung with the weapons of the chase.[11] Wreaths were worn and garlands were carried in various Greek rites; and this use of wreaths points to some analogy with tree-worship in the two pillars before the Temple at Jerusalem.[12] Robertson Smith gives a coin from Paphos with similar detached pillars before a temple, each surmounted above the cornice by a dove as in the rude pillar-shrine of Crete. Whether

[1] Grupp, p. 145. [2] *ERE* i. 35ᵇ. [3] *Ib.* p. 243ᵇ.
[4] *Ib.* p. 250ᵇ.
[5] Plut. *Lives*, tr. J. and W. Langhorne, new ed., London, 1823, i. 55.
[6] Grupp, p. 165. [7] Philpot, p. 6. [8] *Ib.* p. 17, fig. 9.
[9] *Ib.* p. 42. [10] *Ib.* p. 44. [11] *Ib.* p. 45.
[12] W. R. Smith, p. 469.

they were candlesticks or not, they were wreathed in pomegranates.[1] On the eastern gateway of the Buddhist tope at Sānchi the sacred tree is represented with worshippers. It divides into two main branches, like that in Mexico, and there are two smaller trees, one on either side. The central tree is being wreathed in garlands.[2] The Bodhi-tree of Kanakamuni breaks into three branches and is also hung with festoons.[3] This custom still survives in the West. Rhys has collected recent evidence from Glamorganshire of holy wells overshadowed by thorn or other trees, on which rags were fastened.[4] And the present writer some thirty years ago saw a bush hung with red rags in one of the islands of Aran off Galway. It is one of the last relics of the cult of the sacred tree, like the practice of 'touching wood' to avert a change of 'luck,' still in use in this country.

The tree is also a trophy of victory. As late as the 4th cent. of the Christian era a pear-tree at Auxerre was hung with trophies of the chase and venerated as a god.[5] The 'Stock-im-Eisen' in the centre of Vienna is the stump of a sacred larch, now studded and bound in iron, the last remains of trophies with which it was originally hung. The Irmensul had a similar origin.[6] Romulus celebrated his victory over the Cæninenses by his institution of the *spolia opima* in honour of Jupiter Feretrius:

'He cut down a great oak that grew in the camp, and hewed it into the figure of a trophy: to this he fastened Acron's whole suit of armour, disposed in its proper form. Then he put on his own robes, and wearing a crown of laurel on his head, his hair gracefully flowing, he took the trophy erect upon his right shoulder, and so marched on, singing the song of victory before his troops. . . . This procession was the origin and mould of future triumphs.'[7]

The 6th cent. Gallican poet Venantius Fortunatus, author of the *Vexilla regis*, who lived when the honour of the sacred tree was still more familiar to the Gauls than the shame of the Cross, lifts up the old faith in his great hymn of the Passion:

'Pange lingua gloriosi proelium certaminis
Et super crucis tropaeo dic triumphum nobilem,
Qualiter redemptor orbis immolatus vicerit.

. . . . . .

Crux fidelis inter omnes arbor una nobilis
Nulla tamen silva profert fronde, flore, germine:
Dulce lignum dulci clavo dulce pondus sustinens.'[8]

7. The tree of life.—The sacred tree was the source and the sustenance of life. Worship, sacrament, and mystic charm are closely linked together. The *soma*-plant, the Iranian *haoma*, is the sacred food of the gods in Asia, and corresponds to the *ambrosia* of the Greek world.[9] The Vedic *amṛta* or *soma* had in it the principle of life and was withheld from ordinary men: it was, however, to be taken by the initiated.[10]

In Sparta, in early times, the dead were laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive. In the forest land of northern Europe hollowed oaks were used in the burial of the dead.[11] The practice among the Oddfellows of each member dropping a sprig of sweet herbs on the coffin in the grave is a survival of the same early rites. In Abyssinia the branches and twigs of the ghost-tree are used by the pagan Kunamas as a protection against sorcery and as charms and amulets at childbirth and death.[12] In Babylonia the idea is more strictly defined. The god Nin-gish-zida is 'master of the tree of life.'[13] In time of drought the priest of the Lycæan Zeus let down an oak-branch to the surface of the water.[1] Codrus, when he devoted his life to his country, dressed as a woodman. Cook notes:

'If the last of the Athenian kings on so solemn an occasion appeared as an oak-cutter armed with an axe, we may be sure that this was no mere disguise but the ancient ritual costume of an oak-king.'[2]

The cult of the sacred tree embraces the highest rites in life and in death. The rite of tree-marriage in India in its surviving forms is mainly conventional.[3] The idea of reincarnation may in some cases explain it, but the rites seem to point to other and more primitive ideas. The Agariā, a Dravidian tribe of Chotā Nāgpur, have a special regard for the *sāl*-tree, which is used at their marriages.[4] The *bali*, or totem, system prohibited marriage between those who have the same totem. Among the Marathas the *devaks*, or marriage-guardians, though they no longer form a bar to the union of two worshippers of one *devak*, still have some share in the marriage-rite.

'The *devak* is usually some common tree such as the bel, fig, banyan, or the sami. In its commonest form it is the leaves of five trees, of which one, as the original *devak* of the section, is held specially sacred. It is worshipped chiefly at the time of marriage.'[5]

It has already been suggested that in primitive ages every valley, as Elton says, had its own king. Each king would be the champion and priest of the sacred tree, and this tree as indwelt by the divine spirit would be sacramentally united in all rites of initiation or other social *sacra* with the tribe or clan. The five leaves represent a pentapolis, or group of five states, one or other, as in ancient Rome,[6] choosing the common priest-king of the five, preference therefore being given to the leaf which represented his sacred tree. Similar customs banning all marriage within a totem-clan have been observed among the Bantu tribes of S. Africa. The mushroom totem of the Awemba is an example of a vegetable totem.[7]

Again, it would appear that the root-idea in the animistic cult of the sacred tree is religion rather than totemism or ancestor-worship; these are perhaps only relics of the primitive age—results of anthropomorphic development and differentiation, degenerate conceptions of the earlier animistic principle of the unity of the divine spirit of life.

The mistletoe-bough in the Christmas feast and 'kissing under the mistletoe' are relics not only of the oak-cult of the Druids, but of its connexion with primitive marriage-rites. This cult rests on the authority of Pliny,[8] and the special virtues ascribed to mistletoe are also referred to by him. Cook has some valuable notes on the mistletoe, which give support to Frazer's conjecture 'that the sun's fire was regarded as an emanation of the mistletoe.'[9] Cook bases his argument on the cult of Ἴξιος Ἀπόλλων at Ixiæ in Rhodes, a town named after the mistletoe. The cult is not definitely referred to in connexion with the oak, but 'it is probable, because the Rhodians regarded the oak as the sun-god's tree.' In the story of the punishment of Ixion there is, he suggests, another link between the mistletoe and the sun-cult. Ixion was the father of Peirithoüs, whose constant associate was Dryas.

'The relationship thus established between Ἰξίων the mistletoe and Δρύας the oak is scarcely fortuitous.'

A scholium on Euripides, *Phœn.* 1185, reads:

'Zeus in his anger bound Ixion to a winged wheel and sent it spinning through the air. . . . Others say that Zeus hurled him into Tartarus. Others again, that the wheel was made of fire.'

This flaming spin-wheel has been commonly understood as the sun-god. Cook concludes:

[1] Cf. 2 Ch 4[12b].
[2] Philpot, p. 15, fig. 8.
[3] *Ib.* p. 41, fig. 19.
[4] Rhys, *Celtic Folk-Lore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 354 ff.
[5] Philpot, p. 20.
[6] Baedeker, *Oesterreich*[22], Leipzig, 1890, p. 17; *ERE* ii. 45[a].
[7] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 98.
[8] H. A. Daniel, *Thesaurus Hymnologicus*, Halle, 1841–55, i. 163.
[9] *ERE* ii. 13[b].
[10] Philpot, p. 125 *f.*
[11] *ERE* ii. 18[a].
[12] *Ib.* i. 56.
[13] *Ib.* ii. 295[b].

[1] *CIR* xviii. 88; Paus. VIII. xxxviii. 3.
[2] *CIR* xviii. 84.
[3] *ERE* viii. 431.
[4] *Ib.* i. 180; cf. i. 233.
[5] *Ib.* ii. 338[b].
[6] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 182.
[7] *ERE* ii. 352 *f.*
[8] *HN* xvi. 44; *ERE* iii. 295[b].
[9] *GB*[2] iii. 455; *CIR* xvii. 420.

'It has not, however, been hitherto observed though indeed the fact is obvious, that 'Ιξίων is derived from ἰξός and that the mistletoe was on Greek soil thus intimately associated with the sun-god.'[1]

An old Staffordshire custom of keeping the mistletoe-bough throughout the year and then burning it in the fire under the Christmas pudding probably rests on some tradition of the perpetuation of the sacred fire. The mistletoe represented during the winter the 'sap of the oak,'[2] and this formal burning of it, like the feeding of the sacred fire of Vesta from the oak-grove of the Palatine slopes, expresses the principle of life. It has not been customary to use mistletoe in the decoration of churches at Christmas; but W. Stukeley[3] reports a curious custom from York:

'On the Eve of Christmas Day they carry mistletoe to the high Altar of the Cathedral and proclaim a public and universal liberty, pardon, and freedom to all sorts of inferior and even wicked people at the gates of the city, towards the four quarters of Heaven.'[4]

There was in Plutarch's time a shrine of Fortuna Viscata on the Capitol at Rome. This may be the Fortuna Primigenia near the temple of Jupiter, where stood the oak of Jupiter Feretrius.

The *rota Fortunæ* survived till lately at Douai, when about midsummer 'a large wheel called the *roue de fortune* was carried in procession before a wicker-work giant known as *le grand Gayant*, and other figures called *les enfants de Gayant*. These wicker giants were certainly the Druid divinities, whose colossal images of wicker-work are described by Cæsar':[5] 'Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent; quorum contexta viminibus membra vivis hominibus complent: quibus succensis, circumventi flamma exanimantur homines.'[6]

The mistletoe-bough and the various customs connected with it are all survivals of the solar cult, and, with the wreaths, axes, spears, cranes, and doves, point to the true meaning of the worship of the sacred tree. The mistletoe-bough is made the type of the Golden Bough:

'Quale solet silvis brumali frigore viscum
Fronde virere novâ, quod non sua seminat arbos,
Et croceo fetu teretes circumdare truncos:
Talis erat species auri frondentis opaca
Ilice.'[7]

The yew was also regarded as a symbol of immortality.[8] The name *eburos*, mid-Irish *ibhar* (*Taxus*),[9] enters into place-names and clan-names—*e.g.*, Eburacum (York), Eburodunum (Yverdon), Eburones. The last-named is an instance of a tribe or clan taking its name from a tree-deity.

There was a yew in Belach Mughna in the west of Leinster—'a great sacred tree, and its top was as broad as the whole plain. Thrice a year did it bear fruit: it remained hidden from the time of the Deluge until the night on which Conn of the Hundred Battles was born, and then it was made manifest. Thirty cubits was the girth of that tree, and its height was three hundred cubits. However, Ninine the poet felled that tree.'[10]

Cell-eo in the *Martyrology of Gorman* is the 'church of yews.' And there is an ancient hallowed site in Staffordshire, with only the memory left of its All Saints' dedication, the New Year festival of the Celts, which is now marked by the Hanchurch Yews. The churchyard yew is an ancient symbol of the tree of life.

In the story of Eden the command went forth: 'Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die' (Gn $2^{16f.}$).

No ban is put on the tree of life till the command is broken. Was the tree hidden like the yew of Mughna? Could it be found only by those initiated and instructed, as in the quest of the Golden Bough? It stood in the midst of the garden:

[1] *CIR* xvii. 420. [2] *ERE* iii. 295b.
[3] *Medallic History of Carausius*, London, 1757–59, ii. 163 f.
[4] J. Brand, *Observations on Popular Antiquities*, ed. H. Ellis and J. O. Halliwell, new ed., London, 1848, i. 525.
[5] *CIR* xvii. 421. [6] *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 16.
[7] Verg. *Æn.* vi. 205–209. [8] Grupp, p. 145.
[9] H. Pedersen, *Vergleich. Grammatik der kelt. Sprachen*, Göttingen, 1909–11, i. 365.
[10] Whitley Stokes, *The Martyrology of Œngus the Culdee* (H. Bradshaw Soc. Publications, xxix.), London, 1905, p. 259.

'Latet arbore opaca
Aureus et foliis et lento vimine ramus,
Junoni infernæ dictus sacer: hunc tegit omnis
Lucus, et obscuris claudunt convallibus umbræ.'[1]

Was it so shut in and shadowed that it could not be found? Is there anything parallel in the imagery to that of the Cretan labyrinth?

It has been suggested that in an earlier version of the Eden story there was but one tree, the tree of life, and it is to be noted that in Gn 3^3 the tree with its forbidden fruit is described as being 'in the midst of the garden,' as is the tree of life in 2^9. And in most of the myths of paradise there is the conception of the one tree.

The Norse Yggdrasil in its complexity is the central tree of the universe: 'The chief and most holy seat of the gods is by the ash Yggdrasil. There the gods meet in council every day. It is the greatest and best of all trees, its branches spread over all the world and reach above heaven.'[2]

The garden reached by the Chinese king in quest of the glories of paradise had 'a wondrous tree in its midst, and a fountain of immortality, from which four rivers, flowing to the four corners of the earth, took their rise.'[3] The central tree with its fruit in the old willow pattern dish is a familiar illustration:

'The Chinese temple, there it stands
And there's the tree of many lands'—

in other words, the universe-tree of China.

Hercules, in the garden of the Hesperides, 'conquered the protecting dragon and secured the golden sun-fruits from the central tree.'[4] The garden of Indra contained five wonderful trees, the chief of which was the *paridjata*, 'the flower of which preserved its freshness throughout the year, contained in itself every scent and flavour, and gave happiness to whoever demanded it. It was, moreover, a test of virtue, losing its splendour in the hands of the sinful, and preserving it for him who followed duty.'[5]

It was but a step in the development of myth to differentiate between the tree of life and the tree of knowledge; and it was a step in the revelation of truth. The tree of life has the promise of immortality and bliss.

The sacred books of the Parsis state that 'the original human pair, Maschia and Maschiana, sprang from a tree in Heden, a delightful spot where grew homa or haoma, the marvellous tree of life whose fruit imparted vigour and immortality. The woman at the instance of Ahriman, the spirit of evil, in the guise of a serpent, gave her husband fruit to eat and so led to their ruin.'[6]

The story of Eden ends in ruin, but it is ruin which has the promise of regeneration (Gn 3^{15}). There is the way of the tree of life, and Christian mysticism found it in the way of the holy Cross. The drama of religion closes with the vision of the holy city, New Jerusalem, and the throne of God and of the Lamb:

'In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations' (Rev 22^2).

Ethics and religion have each their part in keeping 'the way of the tree of life' (Gn 3^{24}); they are the supporters of the wheeling sword, the whirling flaming circle of the solar disk, the most sacred symbol of the Sun of Righteousness.

8. The tree of knowledge.—The oracle is an integral part of tree-worship.

Joshua at Shechem 'took a great stone, and set it up there under an oak, that was by the sanctuary of the Lord. And Joshua said unto all the people, Behold, this stone shall be a witness unto us; for it hath heard all the words of the Lord which he spake unto us' (Jos $24^{26f.}$).

It was a witness to the oracle at Shechem. The 'plain of Meonenim' is the 'terebinth of the diviners (Jg 9^{37}). In Africa the trees planted round the ancestral graves were tended by women whose oracles were listened to in times of crisis.[7] Tree-divination was practised by the Ainus.[8] The oracular virtue of the oak of Dodona was assigned to the depths of its root.[9] The oracle was

[1] Verg. *Æn.* vi. 136–139.
[2] *The Prose Eddas*, tr. G. W. Dasent, Stockholm, 1842, *ap.* Philpot, pp. 113–115.
[3] *Ib.* p. 134.
[4] Hesiod, *Theog.* 215 ff.; Philpot, p. 136.
[5] Philpot, p. 129. [6] *Ib.* p. 130.
[7] *ERE* i. 104a. [8] *Ib.* i. 248b.
[9] Philpot, p. 94.

chthonian. The witch of Endor raised spirits from the earth (1 S 28[13]).

'Altior ac penitus terrae defigitur arbos;
Aesculus in primis: quae quantum vertice ad auras
Aethereas, tantum radice in tartara tendit.'[1]

At Delphi the sacred laurel of Apollo grew in the cleft of the rock.[2] The chthonian rock-altars on the Areopagus at Athens are carpeted in springtime with asphodel. Did this suggest the phrase, κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα, in Hom. *Od.* xi. 539, xxiv. 13? Both passages are assigned to the very latest or Athenian stratum of the Odyssey.

The rustling in the mulberry-trees (2 S 5[24]) has its counterpart in the story of Æacus. He consulted an oak, a sapling from Dodona:

'Tu mihi da cives: et inania moenia reple.
Intremuit, ramisque sonum sine flamine motis
Alta dedit quercus.'[3]

The sacred cedar of the Chaldæans was not only the tree of life but 'the revealer of the oracles of earth and heaven.' The name of Ea, the god of wisdom, was supposed to be written on its core.[4]

The hazel appears in Irish romance as the tree of knowledge. The mystical fountain known as Connla's Well was overshadowed by nine mystical hazel-trees. The nuts were of the richest crimson colour and teemed with the knowledge of all that was choicest in literature and art. The nuts fell into the spring, where they were eaten by the salmon which frequented the spring. Therefore the salmon was the wisest of all things. In the story of Kulhwch, in the *Mabinogion*, the salmon of Llyn Llyw is stated to have been the first animal created, and its memory to surpass that of the eagle, the owl, the stag, and the blackbird. The source of its wisdom was the many-melodied hazel of knowledge.[5] The culture-god of the Celtic world has been identified with Mercury, and with the Gaulish deity Ogmios, the god of eloquence and wisdom. His name in Welsh survived in the word *ofydd*, one skilled or versed in anything. In Ireland he appears as Ogma, one of the ancient Goidelic group of the Tuatha Dé Danann. He was in a special sense the diviner or discloser among the gods.[6] The divining-rod is the surviving relic of the tree-oracle, and the hazel is the favourite tree from which it is cut. In France it was the custom to cut it on Wednesday, Mercury's day. This also points to the association of the hazel with the Gaulish Mercury. He was known also as the god 'qui vias et semitas commentus est,' and the custom of beating the bounds with a hazel-switch is another link with ancient rites.

Irish literature represents crimson nuts as forming the food of the gods.[7] The crimson berries of the mountain-ash explain its sanctity. It has been suggested that it is the original counsel-tree of the Northern races.[8] In Ireland the mountain-ash and the birch are still held sacred, and in Staffordshire in the 17th cent. Plot states that it was held dangerous to do wanton damage to the tree.[9] It is still, under the name 'wicky,' a favourite tree in the country districts. Evelyn[10] states that it was held in such veneration in Wales that it was found in every churchyard. It is still found in old burial-grounds in Yorkshire. In Derbyshire a little cross made of the witch-wiggin is held as a protection against witchcraft. The rites observed in cutting it belong to the earliest ages of tree-worship. It was to be cut on St. Helen's Day. It must be cut stealthily from a tree never seen before, and carried home by any way save that by which the wood-cutter had gone

[1] Verg. *Georg.* ii. 290-292. [2] Philpot, p. 98.
[3] Ovid, *Met.* vii. 628-630. [4] Philpot, p. 131.
[5] Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*², pp. 554-556.
[6] *Ib.* p. 5 ff. [7] *Ib.* p. 356.
[8] J. Holden MacMichael, *Antiquary*, xlii. [1906] 369.
[9] *Ib.* p. 370. [10] *Ib.* p. 371.

on his secret and sacred quest.[1] As the care-tree it has been taken over by the Church in the rhyme:

'Care Sunday, care away,
Palm Sunday, and Easter Day.'

Care Sunday is Passion Sunday, the Sunday before Palm Sunday.[2]

The holly is the Irish *cuilenn*, the Welsh *celynen*, the O.E. *holegn*; it is not a variant of 'holy.' The persistence of its red berries in winter and its Christmas associations give it a high place among the trees of the north. It enters into place-names in Ireland, as in Druimm Cuilinn, now Drumcullen, barony of English, King's County. More noticeable is its occurrence as a personal name, Macc Cuilinn, bishop of Lusk.[3] The effigy of the Holly-boy in the Kentish Shrove-tide revels may be regarded as a substitute for the oak with its ancient religious association. At the close of the revels it was burned.[4] The Christmas burning of the Yule-log is another link in the same chain, as the burning of the mistletoe-bough is the evidence of the continuity of the sacred fire.

The Christmas blossoming of the Glastonbury thorn and the Christmas-tree (of late introduction in England), with its lights and flowers and fruits, have been associated with the 'strange blossoming power of nature connected with St. Andrew's Day' (30th Nov.). These were transferred in the Middle Ages to the Christmas festival.[5]

'Christmas-Eve was given to the memory of Adam and Eve, and this led to the Paradise-plays which formed a prelude to the Nativity-plays. The Cross of Christ was held in ancient legend to have been made of "a tree which had sprung from a slip of the Tree of Knowledge." In the Paradise-play this tree was brought in laden with apples and decked with ribbons.'[6]

The lights form an integral part of the earlier ideas of this tree-ritual.

In old Icelandic legend there is the story of a mountain-ash at Mödhrufell which on Christmas Eve was covered with lights that the strongest gale could not extinguish. These lights were its blossoms. In French legend, Perceval comes across a tree illuminated with a thousand candles; and in another story Durmals le Galois twice saw a magnificent tree covered with lights from top to bottom.[7]

In Icelandic folk-lore lights are seen in the rowan-tree, and in Celtic folk-lore the scarlet berries of the rowan-tree are the source of wisdom. Is there not here a link between the light of wisdom and the bright fruit belonging to the tree of knowledge? The flamens wore the scarlet tuft in their caps.[8]

'Simonides tells us that it was not a white sail which Ægeus gave, but a scarlet one, dyed with the juice of the flower of a very flourishing holm-oak, and that this was to be the signal that all was well.'[9]

The story of Ægeus and Theseus has its parallel in the sign of the 'scarlet thread' at Jericho (Jos 2[18]).

The rod of Aaron was the rod of the priesthood, and the priest's lips were to keep knowledge (Mal 2[7]).

At the return from Captivity 'the Tirshatha said unto them, that they should not eat of the most holy things, till there stood up a priest with Urim and with Thummim' (Ezr 2[63]). The breastplate of judgment contained these sacred lots (Ex 28[30]). The sacred oracles are in the charge of the priest: 'for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts' (Mal 2[7]).

The rod was the token of this authority; and the rod of Aaron was a rod of almond. The Hebrew word for 'almond' is *shāḳēdh*, connected with the root 'to watch.' It is the tree of watchfulness, the tree of light. Jeremiah of the priests of Anathoth, in the opening of his prophecies, sees the vision of an almond-rod. It is the token of the watchfulness of God:

[1] Macmichael, *Antiquary*, xlii. 422.
[2] *Ib.* p. 426.
[3] *Martyrology of Œngus*, pp. 382, 431; cf. 202 *f.*
[4] Brand, i. 68. [5] Philpot, p. 167.
[6] *Ib.* p. 169. [7] *Ib.* p. 171 *f.*
[8] Plut. ed. Langhorne, i. 189 n.
[9] *Ib.* p. 51; cf. *EBi*, col. 4316.

'Then said the Lord unto me, Thou hast well seen: for I will hasten my word to perform it' (Jer 1^{12}).

And in the open vision of death it would seem that the blossoming of the almond-tree symbolizes the light of the presence of God (Ec 12^{5}), the light of wisdom and knowledge: 'Because the preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge' (12^{9}).

The early cult of the sacred tree among the Jews left its mark in the Temple of Jerusalem. Robertson Smith notes that, as the two pillars Jachin and Boaz, so also the golden candlestick had associations with this ancient cult.[1] The pillars were wreathed with pomegranates; the candlestick was a budding and blossoming almond. If the former witness to the tree of life, the latter witnesses to the tree of knowledge.

Light was the first of the gifts of life; and it is in the light alone that religion can fulfil the duties of life. A Babylonian seal figured by Mrs. Philpot shows the sacred tree with seven branches, three on the right and four on the left, with a fruiting branch drooping on either side. On the right is a figure sitting with outstretched hand, the head crowned with the horns of a bull; on the left is another figure sitting, without the bull-mask, but with a snake behind it.[2] It recalls in some points the story of Eden; but it is also a link in the development of the seven-branched candlestick of the Temple.

The sacred twig, the sacred fire, the priest-king who is guardian and champion of both, and who is also the representative of the majesty of the sun, each and all witness 'at sundry times and in divers manners' to the religious fellowship and communion which man enjoys with the divine spirit. Silent adoration is called for in the presence of the tree of life. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is vocal in the light of divine wisdom:

'And I turned to see the voice that spake with me. And being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks; And in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man . . . and his voice as the sound of many waters' (Rev 1^{12-15}).

This voice is the voice of divine wisdom, vocal at Dodona and Cnossus and Delphi, vocal in the burning bush, and vocal to-day in 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and ghostly strength, the spirit of knowledge and true godliness . . . and the spirit of God's holy fear.'[3] And this fruit of the Holy Spirit is the fruit of the sacred tree:

'And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him' (Is $11^{1,2}$).

It is true to-day, as in the earliest ages of animistic religion, that 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Ps 111^{10}).

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the footnotes.

THOMAS BARNS.

TREE OF KNOWLEDGE, TREE OF LIFE.—See TREES AND PLANTS.

TRIADS.—See TRIMŪRTI, TRINITY.

TRIMŪRTI.—Though the *Rigveda* does not contain the conception of a supreme spirit manifested in three forms (*trimūrti*), which is the Hindu doctrine of the Trinity, it contains elements which have contributed to form that belief. In the first place, Agni as the god of fire has three forms: he is the sun in the sky, lightning in the aerial waters, and fire on earth. On this idea is based much of the mysticism of the Vedic period, and it is reflected in the ritual by the threefold character of the sacrificial fire. Secondly, in prayers such as 'May Sūrya protect us from the sky, Vāta from the air, Agni from the earthly regions,'[1] appears a tendency to reduce all the gods to manifestations of three chief deities, each representative of one of the three divisions, sky, air, and earth. Yāska[2] tells us that his predecessors in Vedic interpretation held that all the gods could be reduced to three, Agni, Vāyu or Indra, and Sūrya, though he himself does not adopt this view. A further step towards the amalgamation of the gods is seen in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*,[3] which holds that Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya are all sons of Prajāpati, the creator god.

The further development of the doctrine occurs only in the later *Upaniṣads* as the outcome of the adoption of the principle of the absolute (*brahman* or *ātman*). In the *Taittirīya Araṇyaka*[4] or *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* the highest self (*paramātman*) is identified with Brahman (by which Brahmā is probably meant), Śiva, Hari, and Indra; the identification with Hari is probably a later interpolation, as it spoils the metre, but it is doubtless an old change in the text. In the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad*[5] Brahmā, Rudra, and Viṣṇu appear as forms (*tanavaḥ*) of the absolute, which itself is incorporeal, and again[6] are declared to correspond respectively with the *rajas*, *tamas*, and *sattva* aspects of the absolute. The same triad is found in other texts such as the *Prāṇāgnihotra*, *Brahma*, *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya* and *Rāmottaratāpanīya Upaniṣads*.

The comparative lateness and esoteric character of the doctrine are shown by the almost total absence of the conception from the epics, where it appears definitely only in the statement of the *Mahābhārata*:[7]

'In the form of Brahmā he creates; his human form [*i.e.* Viṣṇu] preserves; in his form as Rudra will he destroy; these are the three states of Prajāpati.'

This is the classical form of the doctrine which is repeated in the *Harivaṃśa*, in Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava*, and not rarely in the later literature. The personality of the trinity is varied slightly according to sectarian preferences; thus in the Śaiva view[8] the absolute, which is Śiva, is manifested as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Bhava, the last a personal form of Śiva; the Nimbārkas and other sects[9] identify Kṛṣṇa with the absolute, distinguishing him from Viṣṇu as one of the trinity. There is some uncertainty whether the formation of the definite idea of a trinity was preceded by the conception of Viṣṇu and Śiva as merged in a unity, attested by the term Harihara, which appears first in the *Harivaṃśa*; this view, however, is rendered probable by the fact that the epic appears to have identified Viṣṇu and Śiva as equals before it combined Brahmā with them as their peer. A characteristically late idea recognizes a trinity of the Śaktis, or personifications of the power of the three gods: Vāch or Sarasvatī as that of Brahmā; Śrī, Lakṣmī, or Rādhā as that of Viṣṇu; and Umā, Durgā, or Kālī as that of Śiva. For this there is no Vedic parallel, though in the *āprī* hymns of the *Rigveda* a triad of sacrificial goddesses is found in Sarasvatī, Iḍā, and Bhāratī.

Serving as it does to reconcile rival monotheisms with one another and with the philosophic doctrine of the absolute, the theory of the Trimūrti presents no such close similarity to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as to render derivation from Christian influences either necessary or probable, though chronologically the existence of such influence is

[1] P. 467 f. [2] P. 130.
[3] *Book of Common Prayer*, Order of Confirmation; cf. Is 11^{2} LXX.

[1] x. civiii. 1. [2] *Nirukta*, vii. 5. [3] iv. xii. 2.
[4] x. xiii. 12; cf. P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 252, n. 2.
[5] iv. 5, 6. [6] v. 2.
[7] III. cclxxii. 46—an interpolation, according to E. W. Hopkins, *Great Epic of India*, New York, 1902, p. 184.
[8] *Liṅga Purāṇa*, i. xviii. 12.
[9] R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 79.

quite possible. It is, however, conceivable that the idea developed under the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which possesses the notable triads of Buddha, Dhyāni-buddha, and Dhyāni-bodhisattva on the one hand, and of the Dharma-, Nirmāṇa-, and Sambhoga-kāyas of a Buddha on the other. The Buddhist art of Gandhāra, followed by that of Tibet, China, and Japan, is prone to depict groups of three deities, Buddhas, or *bodhisattvas*, and it is to this influence that we may assign the existence of such sculptures as that from the cave of Elephanta, Bombay, which presents the three gods in one statue, and affords the inspiration for the *ekā mūrtis trayo devāḥ* of the *Matsya Purāṇa*,[1] a passage often wrongly interpreted to mean 'One God and three persons.'

LITERATURE.—J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, iv.[2], London, 1873; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (=*GIAP* iii. 1), Strassburg, 1897; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, do. 1896; A. B. Keith, *Indian Mythology* (=*Mythology of All Races*, vi.), Boston, 1917; A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, Eng. tr., London, 1901; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *JRAS*, 1906, pp. 943-977; N. Söderblom, in *Transactions of the Third Internat. Cong. for the History of Religions*, ii. (Oxford, 1908) 391-410.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

TRINITARIANISM. — See TRINITY, RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

TRINITY.—1. The term and concept. — (*a*) The term 'Trinity' (from Lat. *trinitas*) appears to have been first used by Tertullian,[2] while the corresponding Greek term 'Triad' (τριάς) appears to have been first used by Theophilus the Christian apologist,[3] an older contemporary of Tertullian. In Tertullian, as in the subsequent usage, the term designates the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Spirit.

(*b*) Although the notion of a divine Triad or Trinity is characteristic of the Christian religion, it is by no means peculiar to it. In Indian religion, *e.g.*, we meet with the trinitarian group of Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu; and in Egyptian religion with the trinitarian group of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, constituting a divine family, like the Father, Mother, and Son in mediæval Christian pictures. Nor is it only in historical religions that we find God viewed as a Trinity. One recalls in particular the Neo-Platonic view of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality, which was suggested by Plato in the *Timæus*; *e.g.*, in the philosophy of Plotinus the primary or original Realities (ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις)[4] are triadically represented as the Good or (in numerical symbol) the One, the Intelligence or the One-Many, and the World-Soul or the One and Many. The religious Trinity associated, if somewhat loosely, with Comte's philosophy might also be cited here: the cultus of humanity as the Great Being, of space as the Great Medium, and of the earth as the Great Fetish.

(*c*) What lends a special character to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is its close association with the distinctive Christian view of divine incarnation. In other religions and religious philosophies we meet with the idea of divine incarnation, but it may be claimed that nowhere is the union of God and man so concrete and definite, and so universal in its import, as in the Christian religion. As Augustine said,[5] if in the books of the Platonists it was to be found that 'in the beginning was the Word,'[1] it was not found there that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.'[2] It is the very central truth of Christianity that God was historically manifest in Christ, and that He is still revealed in the world as the indwelling Spirit of the Church or community of Christ's founding. This Christian faith in the incarnation of the divine Word (λόγος, *sermo*, *ratio*) in the man Christ Jesus, with whom the believer is united through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the distinctive basis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

2. The development of the doctrine.—The limits of this article preclude any attempt to trace in detail the development of the Trinitarian idea from its beginnings in the Bible to its final formulation in the orthodox creeds. In various articles of this Encyclopædia this ground is traversed, such as the comprehensive art. GOD; the artt. on particular developments of ancient Christian thought like the Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Cappadocian Theologies; the artt. on individual Christian theologians like Athanasius and Augustine; the artt. on heretical phases of Christological and Trinitarian belief like Adoptianism, Arianism, Monophysitism, Nestorianism. It will be convenient, however, to take here a general conspectus of the development in question.

(*a*) The *Old Testament* could hardly be expected to furnish the doctrine of the Trinity, if belief in the Trinity is grounded (as stated above) upon belief in the incarnation of God in Christ and upon the experience of spiritual redemption and renewal through Christ. It is exegesis of a mischievous, if pious, sort that would discover the doctrine in the plural form, 'Elohim,' of the Deity's name, in the recorded appearance of three angels to Abraham, or even in the *ter sanctus* of the prophecies of Isaiah. It may be allowed, however, that the OT ideas of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God are adumbrations of the doctrine, as recognizing the truth of a various self-revealing activity in the one God.

(*b*) In the *New Testament* we do not find the doctrine of the Trinity in anything like its developed form, not even in the Pauline and Johannine theology, although ample witness is borne to the religious experience from which the doctrine springs. None the less Christ is acknowledged as the eternal Son of God and the supreme revelation of the Father, and the quickening Spirit of life is acknowledged to be derived 'from on high.'[3] And so, when the early Christians would describe their conception of God, all the three elements—God, Christ, and the Spirit—enter into the description, and the one God is found to be revealed in a threefold way. This is seen in the baptismal formula,[4] 'In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' which at least reflects the usage of the apostolic Church, and in which the members of the Trinity are already all three associated together. It is also to be seen in the familiar words of St. Paul,[5] 'The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost.' This last has been called, and justly so, the great Trinitarian text of the NT, as being one of the few NT passages, and the earliest of them, in which the three elements of the Trinity are set alongside of each other in a single sentence. If the passage contains no formulated expression of the Trinity, it is yet of great significance as showing that, less than thirty years after the death of Christ, His name and the name of the Holy Spirit could be employed in conjunction with the name of God Himself. Truly, if the doctrine of the Trinity appeared

[1] J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, Oxford, 1920, p. 149.

[2] 'Custodiatur οἰκονομίας sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit' (*adv. Praxean*, 2).

[3] τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ (ii. 15). But perhaps the earliest appearance of the term is in Clem. *Excerpt. ex Theod.* § 80; cf. A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 7 vols., London, 1894-99, ii. 209 n.

[4] *Enn.* v. 1, cited by C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1918, p. 43.

[5] *Conf.* vii. 9; cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, London, 1911, p. 236.

[1] Jn 1[1].
[2] Jn 1[14].
[3] Lk 24[49].
[4] Mt 28[19].
[5] 2 Co 13[14].

somewhat late in theology, it must have lived very early in devotion.

(c) The story of the Trinity in *ecclesiastical history* is the story of the transition from the Trinity of experience, in which God is self-revealed as the Father or Creator and Legislator, the Son or Redeemer, and the Spirit or Sanctifier, to the Trinity of dogma, in which the threefold self-disclosure of God is but the reflexion, as it were, of a threefold distinction within the divine Nature itself. With the transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma the theological statement tends to lose touch with the gracious figure of the historical Christ. In the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed, in which the Eastern development of the doctrine of the Trinity culminated, the dogma still retains its connexion with its positive ground and basis in the incarnate life of Christ; but in the Athanasian Creed, which represents the form which the dogma finally assumed in the West, it appears to have lost the connexion altogether, and to move entirely in the transcendent realm.

Five stages in the dogmatic development may be distinguished.[1] (1) The formal identification of the pre-existent Christ (of the Pauline and Johannine theology) with the Logos of Greek philosophy. In the NT the identification is in the practical rather than speculative interest, but in Justin Martyr and the apologists it may be regarded as the first step in the logical process whereby the historical figure of Jesus Christ was caught up into the purely speculative sphere. (2) The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son (hitherto regarded primarily as the cosmological principle of revelation and not therefore co-eternal with God). This doctrine, due to Origen, which may be expressed in other words as the eternal Fatherhood of God, entered into the Athanasian theology. Formulated in the interests of the divinity of Christ, it conserved also—as against Sabellian views—the distinction between the Father and the Son. On the other hand, the subordinationism it implied and acknowledged, while countering dyotheistic and tritheistic tendencies, lent support to the Arian conception of the Son as a creature, especially after the Origenist theory of eternal creation (which enabled Origen himself to regard the Son as still primarily a cosmological principle) had been abandoned. (3) The doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. This was affirmed against Arianism at Nicæa, where the concept—if not as yet the actual term—*homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος) as applied to the eternal Son was amply vindicated. As Athanasius taught, in jealous regard for the divineness of the Christian incarnation and redemption, there was an absolute likeness between the Father and the Son, and also a co-inherence or mutual immanence (περιχώρησις, *circumincessio*) of their Persons.[2] (4) The doctrine of eternal distinctions within the divine Nature, according to the formula of 'three Hypostases in one Ousia or Substance' (τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μία οὐσία). To the Cappadocian theologians (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) we owe the final settlement, for which this formula stands, of the dogmatic terminology. In distinguishing between *hypostasis* and *ousia*, the former denoting a real principle of distinction within the divine Nature and the latter the divine Substance or Nature (φύσις) itself,[3] they sought to lift the orthodox doctrine out of the Sabellian modalism which recognized no distinction in reality between the Father and the Son, so impairing the significance of the historical Christ, and at the same time to vindicate it against the opposite error of heathen polytheism (tritheism), of which it was so often accused. Moreover, the Cappadocians gave to the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the definite place and character which He now possesses in the Eastern orthodoxy, as being also a Hypostasis in the Godhead, consubstantial with the Father, and proceeding from the Father through the Son. (5) The doctrine of the double procession from the Father and the Son (the *filioque* clause, added to the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed on canonically indefensible grounds[1]) —a doctrine which represents the difference between Western orthodoxy and Eastern (with its view of procession as from the Father alone, the unitary source of deity[2]); which was conceived, in the interests of the divine unity, as counteractive of the subordinationism contained in the Eastern formulas; and which under Augustine's influence found its way into the Athanasian Creed. Curiously enough, the Athanasian Creed (so called) thus differs theologically from the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed in its original Eastern form on a point on which Athanasius's own sympathies would have lain with the Eastern symbol. The Greek (Athanasian) theology found the divine unity in the Father, the one fountain-head of deity, so leaving room for the conception of the Son and the Spirit as subordinate to the Father. The Roman (Augustinian) theology found the divine unity in the divine Nature or Substance, with the result that, as the distinctions between the three Hypostases or Persons became weakened under the doctrine of the co-inherence, so attractive to the non-metaphysical Westerns,[3] there remained no proper foothold—so to speak—for the doctrine of subordination.

3. The statement of the doctrine.—(*a*) The ecclesiastical doctrine whose stages of development have been indicated may be briefly stated as follows, and the form of statement would commend itself as a whole alike to the Western or Roman Catholic and the Protestant Church. For, although the doctrine of the Trinity was the subject of much discussion, dogmatic and speculative, in the Middle Ages and at the Protestant Reformation, and has been since, it has been formulated all along on the lines of the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants—generally speaking—yield formal adherence to these symbols, and the old orthodoxy remains still the new.

(*b*) There are then (as the statement may run) three Persons (Hypostases) or real distinctions in the unity of the divine Nature or Substance, which is Love. The Persons are co-equal, inasmuch as in each of them the divine Nature is one and undivided, and by each the collective divine attributes are shared. As a 'person' in Trinitarian usage is more than a mere aspect of being, being a real ground of experience and function, each divine Person, while less than a separate individuality, possesses His own hypostatic character or characteristic property (ἰδιότης). The hypostatic characters of the Persons may be viewed from an internal and an external standpoint, *i.e.* with reference to the inner constitution of the Godhead or to the Godhead as related to the cosmos or world of manifestation. Viewed *ab intra*, the hypostatic character of the Father is ingeneration (ἀγεννησία), of the Son filiation, of the Spirit procession; wherefore, 'the Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is

[1] Cf. W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 142.
[2] Cf. Jn 17[21].
[3] See, further, art. TRITHEISM, 3.

[1] Cf. T. B. Strong, *A Manual of Theology*[2], London, 1903, p. 168 ff.
[2] μία πηγὴ θεότητος.
[3] Strong, p. 170.

eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.'[1] Viewed *ab extra* (for Love functions externally as well as internally, is centrifugal as well as centripetal[2]), the hypostatic character of the Father is made manifest in creation, whereby a world is provided for beings who should be capable of experiencing fellowship with the divine Love; the hypostatic character of the Son in redemption, whereby the alienating power of sin is overcome; and the hypostatic character of the Spirit in sanctification, whereby human nature is quickened and renewed and shaped to the divine likeness. Yet, while this is said, as there is no separation in the unity of the Godhead, so the one God is manifested in the threefold work of creation, redemption, and sanctification; moreover, each of the Persons as sharing the divine attributes is active in the threefold work, if with varying stress of function. Verily the doctrine of the Trinity *exit in mysterium*.

(*c*) It should, perhaps, be emphasized that the Trinitarian statement is never tritheistic, in the sense of affirming three separate self-conscious and self-determining individualities in the Godhead. When it is affirmed that there are three Persons in one God, the word 'person' is used archaically, and not in the modern sense of a centre or core of personality. It was a word employed by Tertullian[3] as on the whole the best word by which to convey the idea of an inner principle of distinction or individuation (ὑπόστασις); and it was a good enough word when it bore a vaguer and more flexible meaning than it bears nowadays in Western Europe. To say that there are three separate personalities in the Godhead would be polytheism. To say that there are three eternal principles of distinction or modes of subsistence in the Godhead is not polytheism—although in the speculative construction of the Trinity it might lead, and has sometimes led, to a theoretical pluralism or polytheism.

4. The speculative construction of the doctrine.—(*a*) Although the Christian Church soon came to look upon the Trinity as an incomprehensible mystery of revelation, which reason might not probe, her theologians have not refrained whether in ancient or in modern times from speculation upon the doctrine. In mediæval times, indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity was 'the high school of logic and dialectic.'[4] Then, as before and since, recourse was often made to the principle of analogy, in order to throw light upon the mysterious notion of tri-personality in the Godhead. It is a principle that has received classical treatment at the hands of Augustine, who employed in particular the analogies of the human self-consciousness and the relationship of love. It is not pretended, however, that by such analogies the doctrine of the Trinity may be rationalized. And, clearly, such analogies fail on one side or the other to satisfy the conception of 'three Persons in one Nature.' On the one hand, the psychological analogy of the self-consciousness does justice to the unity of the Nature, but not to the distinction of the Persons. This is as true, it has been remarked,[5] of Dorner's construction founding upon Hegel's 'being in itself, being for itself, being in and for itself,' as of Augustine's 'memory, understanding, and will'[6] (in each of which he found the whole rational nature expressed), or, as we might add, of his 'mind, self-knowledge, and self-love.'[1] On the other hand, the social analogy of love does justice, more or less, to the distinction of the Persons, but not to the unity of the Nature. In this case the three elements of the analogy are the loving subject, the loved object, and the mutual love which unites them. The subject and the object possess, to be sure, more than sufficient independence for the purpose in view, but it is difficult to see how the love which unites may be accepted as a distinct person, even in the vaguest sense of that term. The application of the psychological analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the *theoretical* interest attaching to the traditional dogma for which the Logos-conception stands, namely, the explanation of the relations between God and the world. On the assumption that the human individual is a microcosm, bearing traces of the divine Personality upon him, it would seek to make more intelligible the unity in diversity, or more precisely the unity in triplicity, affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Again, the construction of the Trinity which is founded upon the social analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the *practical* interest attaching to the traditional dogma, namely, the vindication of the truly divine character of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. On the assumption that the love-created social unit is the real microcosm, it would make more intelligible the triplicity in unity which is also affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Perhaps the social analogy has been the more influential of the two. It certainly offers a picture of the inner constitution of the Godhead that corresponds to the Christian Gospel: 'The love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in the Eternal Son; the Father and the Son are for ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of the Divine Love.'[2]

(*b*) In modern constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity there is a tendency to make much of the microcosm of human personality as carrying traces of macrocosmic Reality. God is to be interpreted, it is said, according to the teleological principle of the highest, and human personality is the highest thing we know. The result is that, as C. C. J. Webb[3] has indicated, we hear a good deal nowadays, even in non-Unitarian Christianity, of 'the Personality *of* God,' whereas the historical doctrine is that of 'Personality *in* God.' This raises the question whether the future of Christianity lies in its associating itself with the modern philosophical movement of personalism or in the renewal of its old alliance with Platonism. Into such a question we may not enter, but we would cite a recent instance of a discussion of the Trinity in which human personality figures as the key to the mystery of the Godhead. It is S. A. McDowall's[4] contention that there is more than analogy between human and divine personality, there is also identity in their nature. The Trinity within us is more than suggestive of the truth that in God personality is also triune. If we might borrow the language of Julian of Norwich,[5] the 'made Trinity' actually points to 'the unmade blessed Trinity.' If the Godhead be a Personality, it must indeed be a unity, but the unity—like the unity of human personality—is composed of three persons, which, although not self-existent but completely interpenetrating, are differentiated from each other by the stress of their individual functioning.[6] Personality, whether in God or in

[1] *Westminster Confession*, ii. 3.
[2] Cf. S. A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*, Cambridge, 1918, p. 53 f.
[3] *Adv. Praxean*, 11 f.
[4] Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vi. 183.
[5] T. Haering, *The Christian Faith*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1913, ii. 918.
[6] *Memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*; cf. *de Trin.* ix.-xv.

[1] *Mens, notitia, amor*; cf. *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 26.
[2] Strong, p. 166.
[3] See *God and Personality*, lect. iii.
[4] Pp. 62 f., 95.
[5] Cf. W. R. Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, London, 1907, p. 28.
[6] McDowall, p. 108.

man, could not really exist if it did not thus involve an internal manifold.[1] For the elaboration of these positions reference must be made to the book itself. The discussion is cited here only as illustrating a recent tendency in the application, in Trinitarian speculations, of the principle of analogy.

5. Economic and essential trinity.—(*a*) The transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma is describable in other terms as the transition from the economic or dispensational Trinity (τρόποι ἀποκαλύψεως) to the essential, immanent, or ontological Trinity (τρόποι ὑπάρξεως). At first the Christian faith was not Trinitarian in the strictly ontological reference. It was not so in the apostolic and sub-apostolic ages, as reflected in the NT and other early Christian writings. Nor was it so even in the age of the Christian apologists. And even Tertullian, who founded the nomenclature of the orthodox doctrine, knew as little of an ontological Trinity as did the apologists; his is still the economic or relative conception of the Johannine and Pauline theology. So Harnack holds,[2] and he says further[3] that the whole history of Christological and Trinitarian dogma from Athanasius to Augustine is the history of the displacement of the Logos-conception by that of the Son, of the substitution of the immanent and absolute Trinity for the economic and relative. In any case the orthodox doctrine in its developed form is a Trinity of essence rather than of manifestation, as having to do in the first instance with the subjective rather than the objective Being of God. And, just because these two meanings of the Trinity—the theoretical and the practical, as they might also be described—are being sharply distinguished in modern Christian thought, it might be well if the term 'Trinity' were employed to designate the Trinity of revelation (or the doctrine of the threefold self-manifestation of God), and the term 'Triunity' (cf. Germ. *Dreieinigkeit*) adopted as the designation of the essential Trinity (or the doctrine of the tri-personal nature of God).[4]

(*b*) It should be observed that there is no real cleavage or antithesis between the doctrines of the economic and the essential Trinity, and naturally so. The Triunity represents the effort to think out the Trinity, and so to afford it a reasonable basis. The first Christians had with St. Paul a saving experience of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the love of God, and of the communion of the Holy Ghost;[5] and the theologians of the ancient Church sought to set forth the Christian experience in logical terms of reason. In the effort they were led, inevitably, to effect an alliance between the gospel of their salvation and the speculative philosophy, and more especially the Platonism, in which they had been trained, while, in making room for the Christian gospel within the world—not altogether hospitable—of the Greek philosophy, they found themselves translating their empirical knowledge of God—the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ—into a doctrine of diversity or multiplicity, as distinguished from merely abstract unity, within the divine Nature itself. In other words, in thinking out the Trinity they arrived at the Triunity. None the less the greatest and most influential of the Christian Fathers, Origen, Athanasius, Basil and the Gregories, Augustine, all acknowledged that, for all the light thrown upon it in the Biblical revelation, the divine Nature remained for them a mystery transcending reason.[6]

[1] McDowall, p. 218.
[2] *Hist. of Dogma*, ii. 209, 260.
[3] *Ib.* iii. 8.
[4] Cf. W. N. Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1898, p. 161.
[5] Cf. 2 Co 13[14].
[6] Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, London, 1907, ch. vi.

(*c*) It is claimed, however, especially by Catholic thinkers, that, logical mystery as the Trinity undoubtedly is, it not only conserves the spiritual values of the Gospel, but may be said to enshrine or encasket them. The Athanasian Creed, *e.g.*, is declared to be in effect a sublime and magnificent hymn of the Christian faith, having a power all its own to stir and uplift the souls of believers with the greatness and mystery of the divine redemption in Jesus Christ. That being so, it may be allowed that there is justice in the contention that acceptance of the Triunity does not commit one to the adoption of obsolete modes of thought, but only to acceptance of the authoritative Christian tradition which the terms of the Greek philosophy served to symbolize, and with whose continued vitality they have become invested.[1]

(*d*) But in consequence of a wide-spread failure, especially within the Protestant Church, to appreciate the symbolism in which the traditional Christian convictions are embodied, and to recognize in the doctrine of the Three in One any more than a sacred mysterious formula, modern Christian theology is thrown back more and more upon the historical revelation in Jesus Christ and the inward experience of Christian believers as the practical ground and basis of Trinitarian doctrine, being less concerned with what God is in Himself than with what He has shown Himself to be—less concerned with the Trinity of essence than with the Trinity of manifestation. It is part of the modern empirical movement in theology, chiefly associated with the names of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. When thus employed practically, as interpretative of Christian experience, rather than theoretically, as a doctrine of reality beyond and even apart from experience, the Trinity may be regarded as summarizing the different ways in which the knowledge of God may be held. (1) He may be thought of as the self-disclosed God and, as such, known to men as the ultimate and absolute Being, whose ways are past finding out. (2) He may be thought of as the self-disclosing God and, as such, known to men in nature and history and, above all, in the character and purposes of Jesus Christ. (3) He may be thought of as the self-imparting or self-communicating God and, as such, known to men as indwelling power. God revealed, God revealing, God abiding—in these three ways God makes Himself known, and they correspond to the elements of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian formula. If then, theoretically, the Trinity is 'the affirmation of a full rich life in God as distinct from all abstract and barren conceptions of his Being,' it is, practically, 'the affirmation that the true nature of God must be learned from his historic revelation in Christ, and from the experience which Christ creates.'[2]

(*e*) Doubtless such a statement is liable to the charge of Sabellianism (modalistic Monarchianism), but it may readily be defended against such a charge. In Sabellianism the divine nature is an abstract undifferentiated unity known only in three successive modes or manifestations, none of which is complete or permanent; they are but names,[3] and may not be translated into fundamental factors in the divine experience. Here the elements of the Trinity are acknowledged to be rooted eternally in unseen reality, so that God is always the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, although known through the threefold self-manifestation or not known at all.

(*f*) In the system of Christian theology the

[1] Cf. Illingworth, p. 238.
[2] Adams Brown, p. 162.
[3] Epiphanius, *Hær.* lxii.: ὡς εἶναι ἐν μίᾳ ὑποστάσει τρεῖς ὀνομασίας; cf. J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, 3 vols., Paris, 1909–12, i. 349, 483 f.

doctrine of the Trinity does not usually fit well into the general doctrine of God, and often bears the character of a doctrine apart. There is much to be said for Schleiermacher's view—in his case reflecting, it may be, a Sabellian attitude—that the Trinity falls to be discussed at the end of the dogmatic system. One could not properly speak, he urged, of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit until one had expounded the Christian faith regarding the Son and the Spirit. None the less, it is quite possible vitally to relate the Trinity, conceived scripturally as a Trinity of manifestation, to the general Christian conception of God.[1] (1) There is no difficulty with the doctrine of the Father, who in the new formula as in the old is God in all His fullness of being and life; from which fullness the Son and the Spirit subtract nothing. (2) The doctrine of the Son is not without difficulty in this connexion. The old formula rested on the assumption that the divinity of Christ (the Christian conviction of which was the experiential ground of the doctrine of the Son) was to be discovered in the metaphysical constitution of His person, and accordingly by the way of analysis, whereas the new formula founds upon the principle that the secrets of personality do not yield themselves to 'searching' but to observation, and that accordingly the divinity of Christ is to be traced and recognized, if anywhere, in the unfoldings of His character and life. Moreover, the old formula also implied that there existed a fundamental difference of nature between God and man, so that the incarnation of the divine Word was nothing if not a stupendous miracle. The new formula, under the ruling modern conception of divine immanence, would imply that the divine-human Christ may be reached along the lines of God's normal working in His world. God is to be conceived as always present and active in the world, manifesting Himself continuously in nature and history, yet manifesting Himself supremely and fully only in the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ we have at once true man arising out of humanity and true God coming forth from the Godhead. In other words, Jesus Christ is the perfect expression of the divine Nature in terms of human character and life. With such a new criterion of divinity, and such a new conception of the relationship between the divine and the human, an assured place may be found—it is claimed—for the doctrine of the Son in the modern doctrine of God. (3) The doctrine of the Spirit may also be seen to be fulfilled in the new doctrine of God towards which modern Christian thought appears to be advancing. For the Spirit is but the immanent God Himself, working more freely in the souls of men as righteousness and power because of the new channels of influence He has opened up for Himself through Jesus Christ. In short, God Himself (ὅλος θεός) is the Father revealed; God Himself is in Christ revealing; God Himself is the Holy Spirit abiding. The form of the ancient dogmatic conception may be changed, but the substance of it remains. Still as of old we know God in His threefold relationship to men, and in each relationship we have very God Himself. Wherefore we may still unite in ascribing glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.

LITERATURE.—See the histories of Christian doctrine by A. Harnack, F. Loofs, R. Seeberg, J. Tixeront, G. P. Fisher, J. F. Bethune-Baker; also works on dogmatic theology, such as the classical expositions of John of Damascus, Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvin; and, among modern expositions, those of F. Schleiermacher, A. E. Biedermann, M. Kähler, F. H. R. Frank, H. Martensen, I. A. Dorner, R. Rothe, F. A. B. Nitzsch, J. Kaftan, T Häring, T. B. Strong, C. Hodge, W. Adams Brown, W. N. Clarke. Among special discussions see Augustine, *De Trinitate*; D. Waterland, *The Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity* (*Works*, Oxford, 1856, vol. iii.); F. C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtl. Entw.*, 3 vols., Tübingen, 1841–43; G. Krüger, *Das Dogma von der Dreieinigkeit und Gottmenschheit*, do. 1905; F. Schleiermacher, *Über den Gegensatz zwischen der sabellianischen und der athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität* (*Werke*, Berlin, 1835–64, i. 2); J. R. Illingworth, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, London, 1907; W. Adams Brown, *The Trinity and Modern Thought*, New York, 1907. See also relevant matter in recent works like H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, Cambridge, 1882; R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, London, 1901; R. L. Ottley, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, 2 vols., London, 1896; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, Edinburgh, 1912. In *HDB*, *DCG*, and *DAC* there are elaborate articles, with bibliographical notes, on the Scriptural and early Church doctrine of the Trinity. See also the literature under art. GOD.

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[1] Cf. W. N. Clarke, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, Edinburgh, 1909.

TRITHEISM.—**1. Definition.**—Tritheism (Gr. τρεῖς, 'three,' and θεός, 'God') is the belief in three Gods. As such, it is a form of polytheism, defined as the belief in many Gods or in more Gods than one.

2. Christianity and tritheism.—So far as the present writer is aware, no historical religion may properly be called tritheistic. Where divine triads or trinities are found, they are not distinguished from other divinities as true or real gods from idols. (1) On the other hand, the charge of being tritheistic has often been preferred against the Christian religion, as presented in the doctrine of the Trinity. (2) The Christian Church has, however, expressly dissociated itself from Trinitarian views tending to tritheism. (3) Moreover, liability to the charge of tritheism is regarded as sufficiently damaging also to speculative constructions of the Trinity. In what follows the writer would expound these three statements one by one.

3. The charge of tritheism.—(*a*) The accusation of being tritheistic, which has often been made against Christianity, is in a sense justified. For undoubtedly the doctrine of the Trinity has been, and is still, conceived among simple uneducated Christians in a naively tritheistic way. Sometimes also a naive tritheism is found even in theological statement, as when in so-called transactional theories the Atonement is represented as the result of a bargain between the first and second Persons of the Trinity.

(*b*) But the Christian religion, like other historical religions, must be judged by the affirmations of its best and most representative minds, and not by the crudities of the uninstructed or the aridities of theological pedantry. It is affirmed by the representative minds of Christianity that the accusation of tritheism is unjustified, being largely founded upon misunderstanding of the theological terms in which the Trinity is formulated. They would insist that there is a world of difference between the formula, 'There are three Gods,' or even the formula, 'There are three distinct or separate individuals in the class known as God,' and the formula in which the orthodox doctrine may be summarized, 'There are three Persons in one God.' In fact the Trinity is declared to be at bottom an assertion of the divine unity. If in the light of the Christian revelation we are led to affirm three eternal distinctions in the Godhead, we must still hold fast to the old faith of Israel's prophets and say, 'These three are one.' Admittedly, however, there are ambiguities and associations to mislead in the Trinitarian terminology. In particular, the ambiguity of the word 'person' is allowed to be a source of much misunderstanding. To set forth the true theological meaning of this word should be enough, it would be added, to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity against a charge so obnoxious as that of tritheism. We are

reminded in this connexion of how the early Christian thinkers abhorred the suggestion even that in affirming the Trinity they were reinstating heathen polytheism.

It should be remembered[1] that there was no word 'person' in the vocabulary of the Greek-speaking theologians, who shaped the doctrine of the Trinity to the authoritative form it assumed in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. 'Person' (Lat. *persona*, 'an actor's mask'), as it appears in the Athanasian Creed, was intended to represent the Greek ὑπόστασις. Now 'hypostasis' ('sediment' or 'dregs,' lit. 'standing under or below') was used about the beginning of the Christian era to signify a real concrete existence or actuality in contradistinction to a mere appearance having nothing solid or permanent underlying it, such as a comet in comparison with a rainbow. Through Origen's influence it came to be employed in the theological terminology as the designation of a member of the Trinity, as in the Cappadocian formula, 'Three Hypostases in one Nature or Substance' (φύσις, οὐσία).[2] 'Hypostasis' then stood for a real independence—a real principle of individuation or distinction—τρίθεία the Being of God, and ceased to be regarded, as in the Stoic use, as theologically equivalent to οὐσία or φύσις. It may be that the term 'hypostasis' as applied to the members of the divine Trinity suggested an independence or individuality of too complete a sort, as though the Father, Son, and Spirit were as separate in the class God as Peter, James, and John in the class named man;[3] but this suggestion was corrected, at least for speculative minds, by the Logos-Christology deriving from St. John and St. Paul, in which the idea of immanent distinctions in the unity of the Godhead received recognition. On the other hand, the tritheistic suggestion was in a sense accentuated for the Latin-speaking theologians by the selection, due probably to Tertullian,[4] of the word 'person' as the translation of ὑπόστασις. Though *persona*, as its original meaning might show, implied only a temporary and superficial kind of individuality (an implication more definitely conveyed by πρόσωπον, lit. 'face,' by which *persona* was often rendered in the later Greek theology), it implied also the dignity and worth of a rational nature. A 'person' in the early centuries of the Latin Church was an individual viewed in a legal aspect (the word often meant a litigant or a party to a contract as well as a player) as the subject of rights and duties, if not as yet in the philosophical sense of a self-conscious and self-determining Ego—a sense which has attached itself to the word in modern times. Yet even the ancient legal and relative associations of 'person' would impart ambiguity to its theological use, especially in popular thought, and the ambiguity would tend to increase in European usage as the word approximated more and more to the modern philosophical sense of personality. So it is not surprising that there has been a strong tendency to tritheism in Western theology, especially among the people; and that non-Christian thinkers, notably Jewish and Muhammadan, have so often viewed the doctrine of tri-personality in God as virtual or veiled tritheism.

4. Tritheism as a heresy of dogma.—(*a*) Although aberrations from the orthodox doctrine were in the East towards a modalistic Monarchianism (Sabellianism) rather than tritheism, it was in the East—among the Greek-speaking theologians—that a form of tritheism actually arose to meet with the condemnation of orthodoxy. The movement in question illustrates the reaction of Christological discussion and controversy upon the doctrine of the Trinity. Christology lay in the heart of the Trinitarian dogma, and the development of Christology naturally led to a revision of the dogmatic terms.

(*b*) As a definite phase in the history of Christian thought tritheism appeared c. A.D. 550 in Monophysite circles, being associated chiefly with the names of John Askusnages and John Philopon. The latter, an Alexandrian philosopher and a distinguished Aristotelian, of whose work entitled Διαιτητής important fragments have been preserved in the writings of John of Damascus,[5] appears to have been the most influential of the school. As a Monophysite John Philopon was opposed to the Chalcedonian description of the Person of Christ as consisting of 'one person in two natures' (ἓν πρόσωπον or μία ὑπόστασις ἐν δύο φύσεσιν), and contended that Christ's was a single nature compounded of the divine and the human. That is to say, in Christology φύσις or οὐσία and ὑπόστασις were to be viewed as synonymous terms.

(*c*) When this Christological position is applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, the question is at once raised as to whether the orthodox formula of three Hypostases in one Substance can be maintained. If one οὐσία, is there not but one ὑπόστασις; if three ὑποστάσεις, are there not three οὐσίαι? The affirmative to the first question leads to a form of Unitarianism, the affirmative to the second to a form of tritheism.

(*d*) John Philopon started from the consideration of the three ὑποστάσεις and reached, accordingly, a tritheistic conclusion as to the divine οὐσία or φύσις: ἔστω τρεῖς φύσεις λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος.[1] So he and his followers were named by their opponents 'tritheists' (τριθεῖται), although we are told[2] that they would not actually have confessed themselves as believers in three Gods. If theirs was a theoretical, it was not also a practical, tritheism, like the Trinitarian notions of the transactional theorists mentioned above (which amply justified the protest of the earlier Unitarians). It appears, however, that John Philopon admitted the notion of a common Nature (οὐσία κοινή), if holding it in what might have been named later a nominalist sense; but Damian[3] (578–605), the Monophysite patriarch of Constantinople, held so pronouncedly realistic a view of the one Substance, at the same time apparently regarding the three Persons as true reals or separate individualities, that, like Peter the Lombard in a later day, he was accused of teaching a Quaternity rather than a Trinity, and his followers were labelled 'tetradites' (τετραδῖται). The tritheists were definitely opposed in the name of the orthodox dogma by John of Damascus, who in seeking to emphasize as against them the unity of the Godhead gave—as Augustine did—a modalistic flavour to his theological exposition.[4]

5. Tritheism as an error of speculation.—It has been remarked[5] that in the tritheistic movement (so called) and the counter-movements it evoked we may find the roots of the mediæval controversy between nominalism and realism. The remark is illustrated by the case of Roscellin, the best-known representative of the older nominalism. According to Roscellin, universals were not reals, but merely subjective conceptions (*flatus vocis*).[6] And, if this principle holds of the Nature or Substance of God, then the Persons of the Trinitarian formula must be regarded as distinct self-consciousnesses, and the unity of the Godhead as but a nominal and generic unity. Thus on philosophical principles Roscellin reached a theoretical tritheism, which, however, at Anselm's instance, was condemned at Soissons in 1092.[7] And over and over again, from the beginnings of Christian theology down to the present, speculative constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity have had to encounter—sometimes in the irony of things—the damning charge of being tritheistic. In the ancient Church, as Callistus accused Hippolytus of dyotheism, so Dionysius—maintaining the Roman tradition of unspeculative adherence to the

[1] See the recent discussion of Trinitarian terminology in C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality* (*Gifford Lectures*), London, 1918, esp. lect. ii.

[2] Cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* xxxix. 11 *f.*

[3] Greg. Nyss. ii. 188, and other writers quoted by R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1895, § 21, d.

[4] *Adv. Praxean*, 11 *f.*

[5] *De Hær.* 83.

[1] Leontius, *de Sectis*, actio v. c. 6, quoted by J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, 3 vols., Paris, 1909–12, iii. 196; cf. also Photius, *Bibliotb.* codd. 21, 24, 75; John of Ephesus, *Hist. Eccl.* v. 1–12.

[2] Timothy, *de Receptione Hæreticorum* (*PG* lxxxvi. 1, col. 61).

[3] *Ib.* col. 60.

[4] In *de Fide orthodoxa*. For summary discussions of Tritheism as a heresy of dogma reference may be made to the artt. 'Johannes Askusnages,' 'Johannes Philoponus,' in *PRE*[3] ix. and the art. 'Tritheistischer Streit' in *PRE*[3] xx.

[5] A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 7 vols., London, 1894–99, iv. 126 n.

[6] Cf. Anselm, *de Fid. trin.* 2 *f.*, *Ep.* ii. 35, 41.

[7] Roscellin and the nominalists were dubbed by Anselm *dialectice hæretici* (*de Fid. trin.* 2); cf. F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*[3], Halle, 1893, § 60, 4.

unity of the Godhead—preferred the accusation of tritheism against Origen's teaching.[1] Yet Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son entered into the orthodox formulas, and a follower of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, mightily championed the unity of the Godhead against the polytheists (tritheists).[2] Again, in the mediæval Church even Abelard was suspected of tritheism, and yet it was Abelard's aim and endeavour to mediate between the extremes of a tritheism like Roscellin's and pure modalism, and his sympathies lay with modalism rather than tritheism.[3] Once again, if it is not invidious to select so modern an instance, W. Adams Brown comments as follows on W. N. Clarke's constructive presentation of the essential Trinity:

'It is hard to see how these "centres of conscious life and activity" can be distinguished from separate personalities.'[4]

And yet W. N. Clarke[5] so emphasizes the Trinity of manifestation, as distinguished from the Trinity of essence, as to be far away indeed from tritheism. It all illustrates the fact that, while the doctrine of the Trinity, as set forth in the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds, will have no traffic with tritheism, it is difficult in the theological exposition of the dogma to steer a safe course between tritheism and a Sabellian modalism (in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are merely three modes or aspects of the one God)—which serves to give point to Augustine's famous remark that the alternative to the affirmation of the three Persons is silence: 'dictum est tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.'[6]

LITERATURE.—See art. TRINITY.

W. FULTON.

TRUST.—In the wide sense of confidence in a supernatural Power on which man feels himself dependent, trust enters as an element into practically all religions from the lowest up to the highest. Savages rely on their fetish to bring them success in the chase, and other peoples on their national god to give them victory in war. But such trust possesses no ethical quality and need not further detain us. Only when the superior and supernatural Power is conceived in more or less ethical fashion can a trust emerge that has ethical and religious value. Religious trust, in the only sense worth considering, is confidence in and reliance upon the eternal Power on which we hang, as one that is working towards a worthy end and guiding the course of events in wisdom and goodness. It is the trust that comes to expression in Ps 36[5ff.]:

'Thy lovingkindness, O Lord, is in the heavens; thy faithfulness reacheth unto the skies. Thy righteousness is like the mountains of God. . . . And the children of men take refuge under the shadow of thy wings.'

Were the facts of life uniformly of a kind to render the moral purpose and control of God obvious and unmistakable, the exercise of trust would make no particular demand on our energies. Since, however, they are far from being so, the world not seldom seeming to ride roughshod over man and his values, trust always carries with it the idea of a triumph over difficulties. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is presented in the light of an act of heroism: 'He endured, as seeing him who is invisible' (11[27]).

Trust of this kind is not of course to be looked for in the religion of primitive races or in religions that are merely national. Nor does it emerge with any distinctness in the pantheistic religions of India. The Indian conception of the world-order as governed by the principles of *karma* and *saṁsāra* (transmigration) is not at bottom ethical, and the corresponding piety consists not in submission to that order as something good, but in the desire to escape from it, and in the exercises through which the goal of absorption in Brahman is attained. Bhāgavatism, it is true, acknowledges a single God who is personal and gracious; and in its conception of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, as the way of deliverance from the wheel of birth and rebirth, resignation appears, if not as a constituent, at least as a fruit.[1] But *bhakti* is far less ethical trust than a mystical 'abiding' in the 'Adorable,' and the piety of Bhāgavatism as mirrored in the *Bhāgavad-Gita*, intense though it is, is for the most part of the usual Indian type.

In the religion of the Greek dramatists, of Plato, and of the later Stoics, trust holds an assured though not a prominent place. Sophocles expresses the conviction that, however things may seem to us in our short-sightedness, if we could only see the purposes of the gods in their totality, we should know them to be good, and that 'nothing to which the gods lead man is base.' Of the just man Plato declares:

'Even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and in death: for the gods have a care for any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue.'[2]

Even more striking are the words of Epictetus: 'Do with me what thou wilt: my will is thy will: I appeal not against thy judgments.'[3] In the *Epinomis*, a dialogue wrongly ascribed to Plato, it is said: 'Pray to the gods with trust.'[4] And of Socrates Xenophon says that he must have believed in the gods, since he trusted them: πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν.[5]

But, though in the higher Greek religion trust had a firm basis provided for it and secured a certain amount of recognition, its full significance was far from being realized. Nowhere do we find it put forward as a central element in piety or a spring of strength and goodness. It was in the Hebrew prophets and their spiritual successors that it first really came into its own. Everywhere in the Bible we are met by utterances of fervent and steadfast trust in God. And its religious importance is clearly recognized. Isaiah sees in it the only source of safety: 'If ye will not trust, ye shall not be established' (7[9]). Jeremiah speaks to the same effect: 'Cursed is the man who trusts in man and makes flesh his arm, and whose heart turns aside from Jahweh. . . . Blessed is the man who trusts in Jahweh and whose confidence Jahweh is' (17[5, 7]). To trust in Jahweh and do good is presented in Ps 37 as the sum of religion. In the NT the idea of trust, deepened by a new feeling for God's care for the individual, occupies a position of still greater prominence. Outside the Synoptic Gospels, however, it is to a large extent merged in the idea of faith (*q.v.*). It is faith in the sense of belief that is established as the condition of salvation. This change of emphasis—as we shall see, it amounts to nothing more—is intelligible when we remember that the gospel was preached as, in the first place at least, a message to be received. None the less it created for the Church a serious problem and one that had to wait long for a satisfactory solution. The problem has to do with the mutual relations of faith and trust. By St. Paul,[6] and also in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith

[1] Cf. Harnack, iii. 90, 93. [2] *Ib.* iii. 101 f.
[3] *Ib.* vi. 182.
[4] *Christian Theology in Outline*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 152.
[5] In his *Outline of Christian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1898, and more especially in his *Christian Doctrine of God*, do. 1909.
[6] *De Trin.* v. 9.

[1] See art. BHAKTI-MĪRGA.
[2] *Rep.* x. 613 (tr. B. Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*[3], Oxford, 1892, iii. 329).
[3] Quoted from A. Schenkl, *Epicteti Dissertationes*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 158, by L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905, p. 205.
[4] πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχου, quoted by W. H. P. Hatch, *The Pauline Idea of Faith* (*Harvard Theological Studies*, iii.), Cambridge, Mass., 1917, p. 69.
[5] *Memorabilia*, i. i. 5.
[6] *E.g.*, Ro 4.

is conceived in a way that makes the two practically identical. But what if its object is thought of as a doctrine which must first be assented to before trust can enter? In that case faith, while including trust, will contain in addition a purely intellectual element, either intellectual submission, if the doctrine is authoritatively given, or intellectual insight, if it is the product of a rational process. Adopting the first alternative, the older Protestant theologians in their analysis of faith established *notitia* and *assensus* as the necessary preliminaries to *fiducia*. The vice of this solution is that it destroys the independence of faith—in other words, of religion—by binding it to an act external to it and without moral quality. The faith described by Paul as trust in God is presented as at bottom subjection to the Church or the Bible as the guarantor of religious truth. And its independence is equally subverted if, adopting the second alternative, we regard it as receiving its object from philosophical reflexion. The true solution of the problem lies in the recognition that in faith itself there is a cognitive element, and that its object is given not in the form of a doctrine, but in the form of an ideal value. Face to face with the great values that are supremely embodied in the life and cross of Jesus and that are summed up in the conception of a kingdom of the good, we affirm them on the ground of their worth as the manifestation of the eternal Power that works at the heart of things, the eternal Reality on which the universe no less than our human life is founded. Faith is nothing else than just this feeling for the ideal and, above all, the moral values and this affirmation of their cosmic significance. So interpreted, it is one and the same thing with trust in God, for what is trust in God but trust in the good as the central might on which we and the whole universe hang? If there is a difference, it is that in the idea of faith the emphasis falls on the cognitive aspect, and in the idea of trust on the volitional.

LITERATURE.—See the works referred to in the footnotes and those given in art. FAITH (Christian). W. MORGAN.

TRUSTS.—See ECONOMICS.

TRUTH.—See ERROR AND TRUTH.

TSHI-SPEAKING TRIBES.—See NEGROES AND W. AFRICA.

TSIMSHIAN.—The Tsimshian belong to the northern group of coast Indians, but differ markedly from the Haida and Tlingit (*qq.v.*) in language. Their social organization is also somewhat divergent, since instead of two phratries they have four—Eagle, Wolf, Kanhada, and Gyispawaduweda—each embracing many small local groups or clans. There are three chief Tsimshian divisions: the Tsimshian proper, living on the lower Skeena River and the coast to the south, the Niska of Nass River, and the Kitksan of the upper Skeena. The last does not border on the coast and is intermediate between the coast tribes proper and the true interior tribes of Athapascan lineage. Most of the information that we possess regarding Tsimshian religion is from the Niska, but there seems to have been little difference between their beliefs and those of the other divisions.

1. Cosmological beliefs.—The earth was believed to be flat and circular. It was supported by a man named Amala ('smoke hole'), who lay on his back and held upon his chest a spoon made of the horn of the mountain-goat. This was filled with grease, and in it stood a pole, on which the earth rested. When he became tired, he lifted the pole, and the earth shook. The pole, with the earth on it, was turning round in the bowl of the spoon, the grease in which served to make it revolve easily. Sun, moon, and stars belonged to the sky and did not turn with the earth. This reference to the turning of the earth seems to point to White influence, but the association of grease with the being under the earth is paralleled by something related of the Haida Atlas, Sacred-one-standing-and-moving, and is probably genuinely aboriginal.

2. Supernatural beings.—The supernatural beings, so far as we are acquainted with them, were much the same as those among the Haida (*q.v.*). They had a supreme heaven-god called Laha ('on the air'), a perfect counterpart of the Haida Power-of-the-shining-heavens. From the information regarding him gathered by Boas, however, it seems that he approached much nearer to the monotheistic idea of a supreme being.

'Heaven is the great deity who has a number of mediators called Neqno'q. . . . Heaven rules the destinies of mankind; Heaven taught man to distinguish between good and bad, and gave the religious laws and institutions. Heaven is gratified by the mere existence of man. He is worshipped by offerings and prayer, the smoke rising from fires being especially agreeable to him. Murderers, adulterers, and those who behave foolishly, talking to no purpose, and making noise at night, are especially hateful to him. He loves those who take pity upon the poor, who do not try to become rich by selling at high prices what others want. His messengers, particularly sun and moon, must be treated with respect. Men make themselves agreeable to the deity by cleanliness. Therefore, they must bathe and wash their whole bodies before praying. For the same reason they take a vomitive when they wish to please the deity well. They fast and abstain from touching their wives if they desire their prayers to be successful. They offer everything that is considered valuable—eagle-down, red paint, red cedar bark, good elk-skin lines, etc. The offering is burnt.'[1]

The ethics of this, especially in the matter of acquiring wealth, seems so different from the aboriginal code found elsewhere that it is probable that the native informant's statements were tinged with missionary teaching, and that Heaven, or Laha, was elevated to a position above that which he occupied in earlier days. There can be no doubt, however, as to the existence of a sky-god 'first among equals.'

The Tsimshian prayed less often to their heaven-god than to the minor deities, or 'mediators,' whom they generally asked for food and fair weather. Sometimes they prayed to the supernatural beings collectively. The most important 'mediators' are stated to have been the sun and moon, spirits appearing in the shape of lightning strokes, and animals. The Raven, also called Skämsem, was believed in and had the same functions and general character as among the Tlingit and Haida. They also believed in the sea grizzly bear, or Hagulâk, which may have been originally a Haida conception, since his home was called Helahaidek ('near the Haida country'). In his house he had four kettles called Lukewarm, Warm, Hot, and Boiling. The killer-whales seem to have been his servants, since they were known as 'Hagulâk's men.' There was also a one-legged man similar to the Master-hopper of the Haida.[2]

Besides praying to the deities, a person could force them to grant his desires by rigid fasting. He had to abstain from food and from seeing his wife for seven days, lying in bed motionless all that time. Then he might rise, wash himself, comb the right side of his head, and paint the right side of his face, after which he might look at his wife. A less rigid form of fasting extended over four days only. To make the ceremony very successful, the man's wife must join him, but, if the wife should be untrue to her husband, the effect of the fasting would be destroyed. Whatever twins wished was believed to be fulfilled, and they were appealed to especially to control the

[1] Boas, in *Rep. of Brit. Association for Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 845 f.

[2] See art. HAIDA, § 19.

weather and bring eulachon and salmon. Numbers of tabus governed hunting and fishing, particularly the fishing of eulachon, which run into the Nass River in great numbers and are, or were, a principal source of wealth to the people. The first of these fish to be caught were roasted on a peculiarly-shaped frame made of elder-berry wood and with special ceremonies, the man who handled it praying meanwhile for an abundance of fish.

3. The dead.—The principal world of the dead was reached by following a trail and crossing a river. According to one story, a man who fainted and passed to the spirit-world was saved by a perforated stone hung round his neck as an amulet, which thwarted the endeavours of four shamans to remove his heart. Whether those who had died by violence or drowning went to regions distinct from the others is not recorded. At least at the mortuary feasts food was put into the fire for the dead.

4. Shamanism.—Nothing is known of Tsimshian shamans which would in any way distinguish them from those of the Tlingit and Haida, except that their bodies, like those of the common people, were cremated.

5. Witchcraft.—The wizard cast his spell by putting some article taken from the victim into a box containing portions of a human body. Strings were fastened inside this box, and, if the wizard wished his victim to die slowly, he fastened the object some distance above the body, but, if he desired him to perish at once, he cut the string, thereby precipitating the object upon the body. Afterwards he had to go round the house in which the person whom he had killed by witchcraft was lying, and later he had to walk round his grave and rub himself, pretending to cry all the time. Unless he observed these rules, he would himself perish. If it was believed that a person had been killed by witchcraft, the Tsimshian would take out his heart and lay a red-hot stone against it, wishing at the same time that the wizard might die. If the heart burst, it was expected that their wish would be fulfilled; if not, it was a sign that their suspicions were unfounded.

LITERATURE.—Nearly all the available Tsimshian material is contained in F. Boas, report v. 'On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1889, p. 801 ff., report vi. *ib.* 1890, p. 562 ff., report x. *ib.* 1895, p. 523 ff., in *Bull. 27 BE* [1902], and in *31 RBEW* [1909–1910].

JOHN R. SWANTON.

TUKĀRĀM.—In Tukārām there culminates an important section of the *bhakti* school[1] and his verses have all the authority of a 'Veda' for most of the twenty million Marāṭhī-speaking people of one of India's noblest races, among whom are to be found some of the greatest Indian reformers of the day. Both for his poetic genius and for his unique place in the people's heart he is happily described as 'the Robert Burns of India' who marks 'the era of the efflorescence of Mahārāshtra's people.'[2]

1. Sources.—(*a*) *Biographical.*—Two serious difficulties confront the modern biographer of Tukārām. (1) All the Marāṭhī *Lives* of Tukārām are drawn almost exclusively from a single authority, the poet-saint Mahipati (1715–90), whose accounts in the *Bhakti Vijaya* (chs. xlviii.–li.) and the *Bhakti Lilāmṛita* (chs. xxv.–xl.) were written in 1762 and 1774 respectively, more than a century after Tukārām's end in 1650, 'long enough for legends to grow.' (2) We have 'no authentic and properly sifted account of his life,' but only 'a mass of legends and traditions that have gathered round Tukārām'[3] and show a distinct 'tendency towards deification.'[4] Yet we have 'at least some facts of historical accuracy to start with,'[5] and Mahipati's 'detailed legends . . . seem to be in every way as deserving of being critically worked out as those of the early Christian martyrs to which they often bear a strong resemblance.'[6]

A few sources earlier than Mahipati have been indicated recently by V. L. Bhawe. Besides (1) Tukārām's autobiographical poems (see below) and (2) the *abhangs* of Rāmēshwar Bhaṭṭ, the leading disciple of Tukārām,[1] there are (3) a brief life of Tukārām by his grandson, Gōpāl Buwa, (4) the autobiography of Bahinābāi, another disciple of Tukārām who dictated her own life-story, giving the names of some of Tukārām's contemporaries who figure prominently both in Mahipati and in Tukārām's own poems,[2] and (5) a source a century earlier than Mahipati, a work written by one named Krishnadās Bairāgi on Keśav Chaitanya Sampradāya, which gives the important 'guru-succession' of Tukārām and helps us to settle important dates in his life, this work being quoted by name and its facts given by one Niranjan.[3] Some would add a sixth source earlier than Mahipati, in Narahari Māḷu, author of *Bhaktikathāmṛita*, but he must be pronounced utterly untrustworthy, though he is followed by a few Marāṭhā authors.[4]

The investigation concerning biographical material has gone far enough to conclude with safety that, despite much unsifted tradition, 'miracle and wonder-working,' Mahipati's account has a solid substratum of historical accuracy. Moreover, he uses his sources with discrimination, rejecting what he discovers to be unreliable.[5]

(*b*) *Autobiographical.*—The true text of Tukārām's writings has not yet been critically ascertained, and between the several collections there is a wide difference as to the number of poems included, ranging from 4621 in the edition generally accepted[6] to 8841 in one[7] described by R. G. Bhandarkar as 'uncritically made.'[8] Even the former is based on MSS admitted to have been 'corrected,' 'further corrected,' and 'arranged.' The problem remained in abeyance for fifty years until Bhawe in 1919–20 edited and published the first two instalments, numbering about 1300 poems, of what he claims is 'Tukārām's Original Gāthā,' written by one of Tukārām's fourteen disciples, one Santāji the Oilman whose MS[9] bears a date in one place three years earlier than Tukārām's death. All that can be said at present is that scholars are patiently investigating the problem of a critical text of Tukārām's writings. His verses were probably all extempore and were taken down by at least one or two of his immediate disciples. It is almost certain that every collection contains poems which are not really his, and we are also quite unable to fix their chronological order—a serious disadvantage. They are practically our only source of information regarding his teaching.

2. Life.—Penetrating 'a wilderness of surmise and guess,' we are safe in deciding that Tukārām was born the same year as John Milton, in 1608, though later research may push the date farther back. From at least seven generations Tukārām inherited a devotion to the god Viṭhobā of Pandharpūr.[10] It is first as a Śūdra grain-seller in his own native Dēhū, eighteen miles north-west of Poona, that Tukārām comes before us. His father Bōlhōbā, having married off his three sons with lavish outlay, sought to hand over his business to the eldest, whose predilection, however, for an unworldly life led to this responsibility falling on Tukārām at the early age of thirteen. The first four or five years appear to have been prosperous, but they were followed by a succession of disasters in business and home, so that young Tukārām's capital disappeared. Many stories are told illustrating his honesty, simple-mindedness, and spiritual devotion, Viṭhobā being represented as his unfailing helper on all occasions. All these stories probably have a solid basis of fact.

A great famine in 1629, during which his elder wife[11] died crying for bread, was the last in a succession of sorrows which led him to give up all business and worldly attachment. Sitting on the river bank with his younger brother Kānhōbā, he threw into the stream his half of the business papers and handed over the remainder to Kānhōbā, while he dedicated himself wholly to Viṭhobā.

The spirit of poetry came to him in a dream, commanding him to complete the unfinished task

[1] See artt. BHAKTI-MARGA, MYSTICISM (Hindu).
[2] D. Mackichan, *The Indian Interpreter*, vii. [1912] 165, 173.
[3] W. B. Patwardhan, *The Indian Interpreter*, vii. 19.
[4] *Poems of Tukārām, Indū Prakāsh*, ed. Bombay, 1869, p. 2.
[5] Patwardhan, *The Indian Interpreter*, viii. [1913] 11.
[6] J. J. Sedgwick, *JRASBo*, no. lxv. vol. xxiii. [1910] p. 127 f.

[1] See *Bhaktililāmṛit*, ch. 40. 209.
[2] V. L. Bhawe, *Mahārāshtra Sāraswat*, Poona, 1919, pp. 193, 242 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 190, note 1. [4] *Ib.* p. 391. [5] *Ib.* p. 374.
[6] *Indū Prakāsh*, Bombay, 1869, now out of print.
[7] By Tukārām Tātyā, Bombay, 1889.
[8] *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, in the *Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*, Strassburg, 1915, p. 94.
[9] Bhawe, *Tukārām's Original Gāthā*, vols. i.–ii., Thana, Bombay, 1919–20.
[10] See art. PANDHARPŪR.
[11] His wife Rakhmābāi being 'constitutionally asthmatic,' he had married another, Jijābāi or Āvali, daughter of a well-to-do Poona merchant.

of his great predecessor Nāmdēv, *bhakta* and poet. In another dream he received his all-important *gurū-mantra* — *Rām-Krishna-Hari*, the secret mystic formula which finally initiated him as a Hindu teacher. This was at the hands of one Bābājī Chaitanya of the line of Rāghav Chaitanya and Keśav Chaitanya—a possible indication that Tukārām had some connexion with the Chaitanya sect of the Vaiṣṇavites. A series of events setting forth his dealings with Brāhmans constitutes the most important part of his life-narrative.

One such story provides an interesting Hindu parallel to the Quaker doctrine of the sacramental significance of every meal. A Chinchwād Brāhman, Chiptāmani Dev, had invited Tukārām to dine with him, and, the Śūdra's plate having been laid the usual distance from the Brāhman's, Tukārām made the strange request that two more be laid, one for his own god and another for Gaṇpati, worshipped by his host, his explanation in an autobiographical poem being: 'If you enjoy a meal in faith, God sits down to dine with you.' Another event, one of the most critical in his life, demonstrates Tukārām's reverence for Brāhmans, even at the height of his renown. Rāmēshwar Bhaṭṭ, a Brāhman scholar jealous of the Śūdra's fame, had not only moved the public authorities against him but had personally enjoined silence upon him. 'But what of the poems already written?', asked their docile author. 'Throw them into the river,' was the cruel reply, and into the river the whole bundle went, covered with a stone. It was Tukārām's darkest hour, but, to the astonishment of all, several days later the sheets were seen floating on the river and were taken out unharmed. Rāmēshwar's deep repentance followed, the poet replying in gentle verse: 'If your mind is pure your enemies will be your friends.' And it was true enough in this case, for Rāmēshwar became his lifelong disciple.

Of the many incidents illustrating Tukārām's religious views one is of a Vedāntist Brāhman who persisted in reading to this Vaiṣṇavite *bhakta* a pantheistic treatise to which Tukārām agreed to listen only on condition that he might be covered with a blanket. When the blanket was lifted after an hour's reading, Tukārām was found seated with his fingers in his ears, his defence being that he could not listen to the Advaita doctrine that God and His worshippers were the same.

The miraculous is found interwoven throughout Tukārām's life-story. His birth is viewed as an incarnation. He performs many miracles to help the poor. Viṭhobā miraculously intervenes at every point to vindicate and deliver his faithful devotee. In this legendary material is to be included, unquestionably, the account of Tukārām's 'ascension' on which Mahīpati has expended all his powers, giving rise to the popular Hindu belief[1] that Tukārām was carried away to Vaikuṇṭha (the Hindu heaven) in the car of Viṣṇu. The probability is, as suggested by P. R. Bhandarkar, that 'he met his death by drowning,' in the holy river of his own village, in 1650, whether by what is called *jalasamādhī*, or prearranged drowning, as in the case of some other Indian *sādhus*, or whether 'the constant expectation of God's coming to fetch him away produced an illusion, and in obeying a fancied call from the opposite bank he ran into the river and was drowned, it is very difficult to say.'[2] The various traditions concerning Tukārām's influence after death must also be regarded as legendary.

3. Autobiography.—Though there is as yet no critical edition of Tukārām's *abhaṅgs*[3] in existence, his autobiographical poems are generally accepted, and his self-revelations give the impression of being sincere and genuine. Of his kindness and unselfish service for others, on which Mahīpati dwells so often, he himself tells us nothing, his autobiographical verses being wholly concerned with the personal and spiritual side of things. 'It is his own religious life that occupies his soul.'[4] The *abhaṅgs* classified as 'autobiography' in the English translations of the poems by J. N. Fraser and K. B. Marāṭhē[5] number over 500, and there are many hundreds more given up to confession, invocation, and aspiration. He tells us but little of his life in the world, though he often dwells on his guilt and misery. The poems of self-accusation, about 300, reveal a sense of sin whose depth is rare in Hindu literature, though his relation to God is personal and pantheistic by turns.

'Fallen of fallen, thrice fallen am I' (343). 'I am a great fallen sinner. . . . My heart is witness to me that I am not redeemed' (126). This conviction of sin is often closely associated with extreme mental depression: 'False is "mine," false is "thine." False is Tukā, false is his faith. He speaks falsehood to the false' (2345). Sorrow, resulting from the death of parents, favourite wife, and eldest son, and from business failures, clearly led him to his self-dedication: 'It is well, O God, that I became a bankrupt, and was crushed by the famine; this is how I repented and turned to thee' (113). And his dedication was complete: 'Rank, race, colour, creed and caste—all are gone' (2790).

Patwardhan has made a 'tentative' effort to depict Tukārām's long inward struggle.[1] That this earnest pilgrim reached some worthy goal would appear from the poems, about 80 in number, under the heading 'Triumphant Happiness' in Fraser and Marāṭhē.

'I have found a sea of love, an inexhaustible flood. I have opened a treasure of spiritual knowledge; it diffuses the lustre of a million suns arisen in thy worshippers' souls' (573).

This, however, is by no means his habitual mood, which is rather one of despising his self-complacency. He has a passionate desire to help and serve those around, and, though he is far too often censorious, sometimes to the point of coarseness, yet he has something to say of constructive worth to his age and people. And it is chiefly as a preacher that he views himself. Though he lays no emphasis on Vedic lore, he has nevertheless a message invested with authority.

'These are not my words: I am a hired servant of Viṭhobā' (1420). Earnest and sincere preachers are badly needed, for there are impostors who eat and drink and who do even worse: 'Their desires are set on shawls and pots and money.' 'Matted hair and ashes are a scandal when the mind has no patience and forbearance' (1199). 'Such people sink themselves and destroy the ship of salvation,' but a true preacher 'rescues others by the sweet perfume of his words.'

4. Experience of bhakti.—To fathom Tukārām's deepest secret we need to explore his experience of *bhakti*, the 'clinging affection of the heart' for a personal God, though the god in Tukārām's case was a village-idol, surrounded by Puranic gross mythology and superstitious animism. The idol he worshipped was even one 'standing for both' Kṛṣṇa and Śiva,[2] but whether Tukārām recognized this plurality of gods at Paṇḍharpūr we cannot say. In this unpromising soil Tukārām's *bhakti* grows, with pantheism and idolatry as twin-stems on the same tree. And, though his *bhakti* is too often a mere emotion, fugitive and fleeting, with more of longing than of satisfaction, it is yet free from those sensual extravagances that have degraded some forms of Indian *bhakti*. In Tukārām we probably see Indian *bhakti* at its best.

If it be asked in what Tukārām's *bhakti* experience consisted, the answer might be given in the words of the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtra*: 'surrendering all actions to God and feeling the greatest misery in forgetting God.'

'Tukā has his home in the Inconceivable' (1578). 'Wheresoever I go, thou art my companion: thou takest me by the hand and guidest me. As I walk along, I lean on thee' (2149).[3] 'No particular time is necessary,' says Tukārām, 'for the contemplation of God, it should be done always.'[4] And again: 'God is ours, certainly ours, and is the soul of all souls. God is near, certainly near, outside and inside.'[5]

His deep sense of sin offered a serious obstacle to the quest of his soul.

[1] See L. R. Pāṅgārkar, *Śrī Tukārām Caritra*, Poona, 1920, pp. 495–512.

[2] *Two Masters: Jesus and Tukārām*, Bombay, 1903, p. 11.

[3] An *abhaṅg* is an Indian metre, somewhat irregular, words rhyming at certain intervals.

[4] J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, London, 1920, p. 300.

[5] *The Poems of Tukārām*, 3 vols., Madras, 1909–15; the references by simple figures below are to this useful work.

[1] See *Ferguson College Magazine*, vol. i. no. 3 (1910), pp. 4–16.

[2] See J. N. Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, p. 301.

[3] See also a poetic rendering in N. Macnicol, *Psalms of Marāṭhā Saints*, Calcutta, 1919, p. 71.

[4] Narayan G. Chandāvarkar, *Speeches and Writings*, Bombay, 1911, p. 527.

[5] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 95.

'The Endless is beyond, and between him and me there are the lofty mountains of desire and anger. I am not able to ascend them, nor do I find any pass.'[1] 'I know my faults, but I cannot control my mind . . . I am a slave of the senses' (1369).

Did 'any pass' over the 'mountains' ever appear on his horizon? He would appear to have had glimpses of one.

'I know not how to cleanse me of sin, so I have seized thy feet. . . . If thou dost take a thing in hand, what is impossible?' (2035). 'Thou hast saved many a humble, many a guilty, many a sinful man. Tukā dwells at thy feet; preserve him, O God' (248). 'What prayer can I put up? . . . Up till now, I felt sure that some of my service had been accepted. Now nothing but the struggle is left me: I see no sign of assurance in him who stands hand on hip'=Viṭhobā (3010). 'Though I made myself ceremonially pure, some impurity would still cling to me' (2968).

Inward purity thus becomes the prime necessity. 'What I delight in is purity of heart' (2632). 'What you need is a clean heart and a spirit at peace' (2309). 'Blessed are the pious, for their heart is pure. . . . Their hearts are filled with devoted love' (894).

The urgent question therefore comes to be: How shall this purity be realized? Ceremonies are unavailing, as are also pilgrimages.[2] Tukārām has full confidence that God can fulfil His child's desire, and to the crucial question how the divine blessing is obtained the answer comes repeatedly: 'It is *bhāva*' (812).

'My single-minded *bhāva* has put an end to pilgrimage to and fro' (2773). 'God comes quickly and stands where he finds *bhāva*' (3671). ''Tis *bhāva* that moves us and is fitly called the means of salvation' (2597). 'Without *bhakti* and *bhāva* everything else is useless trouble.'[3] 'Lay reasoning or learning aside in a bundle, for here *bhāva* is the one great criterion.'[4]

What is *bhāva*? His modern interpreters are not always clear. Bhandarkar says that it is 'faith, love, or the pure heart,'[5] and also that it has different meanings in different contexts.[6] Sometimes *bhāva* is that heart-religion which is guarantee of the vision of God without conscious effort, a parallel being found in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* reference to 'those who by the heart know the Supreme Spirit who dwells within.'[7]

Bhakti, therefore, as experienced by Tukārām, seems to have concerned itself chiefly with realizing a change of heart. 'The great precept of religion is to hear God in the heart' (812). And, with a change of heart, he longs for some assurance of the change:

'Whether I am indeed God's child, truly accepted by him, how am I to know? How shall I know of a surety that my heart is purer, my mind less tainted with anger? For if love be not in my heart how has my heart been changed?' 'Fortunate, indeed, are those persons in whose heart dwells forgiveness.'[8]

Three lines of solution appeared to Tukārām: concentrated personal meditation on God and His saints, persistent self-examination that shall root out self-esteem, and such utter self-abandonment to God that no voice shall be desired but His.[9] Deep humility, simple faith in the divine protection, and complete abandonment of self to God comprise another triple secret of *bhakti*.[10] Tukārām had travelled a long rough road in quest of peace. *Yoga* he had found unavailing, as well as *mantras*, austerities, and the five fires. On the summit of *bhakti* he found three graces whose fragrance reaches us in his pages: pity, pardon, peace.

'He who gives to God simple-hearted devotion . . . within his soul there dwell pity, pardon, peace.'[11] 'There is no Saviour of the needy save God alone: in Him are pity, pardon, peace.'[12] 'Where pity, pardon, peace abide there God dwells. Thither He runs and makes His home . . ., and where these graces have free play He tarries.'[13]

[1] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 96.
[2] *Ib.* p. 95. [3] *Ib.* p. 95.
[4] Bhandarkar's tr., *Marāṭhī Writings*, Bombay, 1919, p. 223.
[5] *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 109.
[6] *Marāṭhī Writings*, p. 187.
[7] *Ib.* p. 187 *f.*
[8] Bhandarkar's tr., *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 97.
[9] Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism*, pp. 40, 54, *Marāṭhī Writings*, pp. 315–321.
[10] *Ib.* p. 431 *f.* [11] *Ib.* p. 436.
[12] *Ib.* p. 581. [13] *Ib.* p. 535 *f.*

5. Teaching.—Tukārām is never systematic in his psychology, his theology, or his theodicy. He oscillates between a Dvaitist and an Advaitist view of God and the world, leaning now to a pantheistic scheme of things, now to a distinctly Providential, and he does not harmonize them. He says little or nothing of cosmogony, and, according to him, God realizes Himself in the devotion of His worshippers. Likewise, faith is essential to their realization of Him: 'It is our faith that makes thee a god' (1785), he says boldly to his Viṭhobā. On the other hand, God makes Himself accessible to man's feeble apprehension by means of visibility, the idol thus becoming a proof of divine condescension: 'He has embodied himself in forms to suit our pleasure' (1753). Man is a child of God. Indeed, the figure of childhood is pressed sometimes so far as to sacrifice reverence and dignity, the same applying to Tukārām's view of God as Mother, though in the latter he finds a solution of many perplexities. All this deals with man's 'natural' state, but separation has entered, sin being viewed variously. It is sometimes a mere breaking of caste rules, sometimes a breach of morality, and again, and very often, it is *mīpaṇa*, a word often on his lips and perhaps best rendered by 'self-centredness,' though this is inadequate. We have seen how deep was his sense of sin and what means of salvation were disclosed to him. Brāhmanical or mystic intuition and verbal theology were deprecated as much as austerities. Men should waste no time in argument, but throw themselves at God's feet. Specific hindrances to salvation are found in the above *mīpaṇa*, in indulgence of desire, fear of ridicule, learning, and disputation. What the religious life meant to him we have already seen. Mere renunciation leads to nothing, and indeed everything is worthless save a personal experience of religion. Tukārām's 'good man' must possess humility, peaceableness, kindness, truthfulness, contentment, and simplicity.

He is mostly despondent of his fellow-men: 'I am sick of mankind' (994), and for relief he turns to 'the saints,' about whom he has hundreds of verses, setting forth their calling, character, and service to mankind. At the other end of the scale of creation animals call forth his real sympathy. Whether he held to *ahiṁsā* is not quite clear. Reincarnation he accepts (972), but he is not sure whether to prefer mortal rebirth, for the power of God's name could break his *karma*. Conscious communion on earth was far preferable to being merged in the unconsciousness of Brahman.

Patwardhan has shown that Tukārām's 'doctrine of *bhakti*' comprised a conception of the Divine Motherhood which gave Tukārām a God of love and tenderness, a sense of human insufficiency which led to conflict between faith and 'the flesh,' devotion thus being frustrated by human frailties, and a defective view of life 'that was at best one-sided. His end was individual, the peace and solace and beatific rest of his own restless soul. . . . Tukārām was a pessimist in regard to this world. . . . The *bhakti* of the future ought to be broader based, fuller veined, and larger souled.'[1] A defect sometimes pointed out is that the claim of human need 'is a rare mood and very seldom expressed in his poems'[2] and that 'there are but few traces of the passion of winning others.'[3] It is a 'defect,' however, very largely repaired by his self-forgetting service as set forth in the pages of Mahipatī.

6. Relation to Hinduism.—Tukārām acquiesced in the greater part of the conventional Hinduism of his day while himself living on a loftier plane. Often therefore he speaks with two voices. Temple ceremonies he does not condemn, but his heart aspires to something higher. About Viṭhobā, however, there is no kind of ambiguity, for, as an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa or Viṣṇu, Viṭhobā was the bigger half of Tukārām's spiritual life,

[1] *Indian Interpreter*, vii. 19–30.
[2] N. Macnicol, *Psalms of Marāṭhā Saints*, p. 31 *f.*
[3] Farquhar, *Religious Literature of India*, p. 300.

though again faith was always the channel. Inwardly he experienced the living God, though outwardly it was an idol he worshipped.

'There is scarcely a theological or philosophical system to be found in his writings, but so far as philosophical thinking may be traced, he tends to be a monist.'[1] 'Tukārām was thus a devotee only of Viṭhobā of Pāṇḍharpūr and a monotheist in this sense. Though he worshipped the idol at the place, still he had always before his mind's eye the great Lord of the universe.'[2]

In some verses indeed he holds that the stone idol was a mere stone, neither embodying nor symbolizing the divine. The inconsistency of such a position he appears to have realized, but he does not solve it. Hence the millions in the Deccan who follow him in idolatrous practices and the thousands who share his theistic aspirations have both much to support them. Hence too a theistic society like the Prarthanā Samāj[3] so recently as 20th June 1920 failed to pass a resolution that 'any member who performs a domestic or any other ceremony with idolatrous rites or worships any idols while performing such rites will *ipso facto* cease to be a member of the Bombay Prarthanā Samāj.'[4]

A similar ambiguity exists in his references to caste and holy places. Caste was accepted by Tukārām as an institution of the Hindu world, and he did not carry to its logical conclusion his conviction that God does not consider a man's caste, all His worshippers being equally dear to Him (2077). In personal inward religion Tukārām was democratic enough, but he was too much of the 'mild Hindu' to fight the battle of religious rights and privileges.

Tukārām was in no sense a 'reformer,' as the word is commonly understood: he was a sage with lofty principles in a degenerate time, a sage who for lack of courage, conviction, or inspiration allowed his protests to lapse after he had uttered them.

7. Influence.—Tukārām has quite a unique place in the inner life of his own people. Besides the Vārkarīs, a pilgrim sect devoted to him, every member of which visits Paṇḍharpūr not only at the two annual festivals but on other *ēkādashīs*, or 'monthly-elevenths,' named *vārīs*, and whose preachings of equality and disregard of caste have been 'a valuable counterpoise to Brāhman domineering,'[5] there are some fifteen million Deccan peasants of all castes and creeds who sing his verses in the fields by day and in companies around some flickering lamp at night. His poems form a substantial part of the hymn-book of the Prarthanā Samāj (*q.v.*) of Western India, now in its ninth edition and containing 500 of his *abhangs*. His terms 'Viṭhobā, Pāṇḍurang' etc., being unacceptable to *ēkēshwarīs* (monotheists), the simple term 'God' has been substituted.[6] That Tukārām has exercised a great nationalizing and democratizing influence among the people of the only Indian nation that has ever ruled over any considerable portion of India can hardly be doubted. His moralizing force cannot be said to have been so great, in view of idolatrous conditions in the Deccan to-day. But the Viṭhobā of Tukārām still inspires a phenomenal type of devotion in his devotees. From as far distant as Madras, women have been known to make at Viṭhobā's shrine the hair-offering called *vēnidān* (*vēnī*='braid,' *dān*='gift') by having their heads shaved as do Brāhman women at Gaya, and all Paṇḍharpūr pilgrims have such an affection for their god that no *darshan* is complete without the pilgrim's head touching Viṭhobā's feet. No fewer than 140,000 people take this *darshan* at a single festival, at the rate of 12,000 daily. Some of them accomplish the journey by prostrating their form at every step in honour of Viṭhobā, some thus rolling along for more than 40 miles;[1] one case is known of a man rolling like a log from Nāgpur, hundreds of miles away, at the rate of two miles a day, the journey taking two years.[2] Tukārām's moving verse has done not a little to inspire this tragic devotion in men and women alike.

All attempts to classify Tukārām have failed. He was neither an orthodox Hindu nor a Hindu Protestant. He lived according to the rules of a gigantic religious system with much of which he disagreed while enjoying an inward experience transcending the system, for spiritual intercourse with God and His 'saints' was the sum and substance of Tukārām's religion. He belongs therefore to none of the stereotyped forms, and, to be understood and appreciated at his proper worth, he must be approached without any kind of dogmatic prejudice, whether Hindu or Christian. Those who have no definite creed and who follow no organized system find in him a kindred spirit. He cannot be classed as a mystic, for he had no extraordinary visions, and he followed Hindu rules of living. We may regard him as a devoted theist living his own inward life amid idolatrous surroundings.

'You can find much in Tukārām's poetry that runs parallel with the teachings of Christ save its principles and spirit. These latter, eclectics easily read into his words, and when they cannot do so they put them there. Tukārām was one of the greatest saints of India, and as such he has influenced and is still influencing the devotional trend of his own people. In the case of us Christians he is one of the most powerful of sidelights. Only a few weeks ago he threw me into the very arms of my Lord.'[3]

At the close of an examination into 'The Alleged Indebtedness of Indian Theism to Christianity' the conclusion is reached:

'Certainly either Tukārām was actually in contact with Christian teaching, which is by no means improbable, or he was a remarkable instance of a *mens naturaliter Christiana*.'[4]

Of these two alternatives we incline to the second, as there has been no evidence adduced as yet pointing to Tukārām ever having been 'in contact with Christian teaching,' and, while he has much kinship with the NT writers, none of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Church, with the possible exception of faith, can be traced in his pages.[5] The kinship is indeed so close that a knowledge of his poems, at least in their English translation, should be regarded as an indispensable preparation for missionary work among his people. That nearly three centuries ago Tukārām should have proclaimed so clearly the inefficacy of all merely external rites and should have insisted so constantly on inward experience as the one essential of true religion offers to the Christian evangelist a most useful point of contact with the people of India.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. For a fuller treatment of the subject see J. N. Fraser and J. F. Edwards, *Life and Teaching of Tukārām*, Madras, in the press.

J. F. EDWARDS.

TULASĪ-DĀSA.—1. Life.—Little is certainly known about the life of Tulasī-Dāsa (commonly pronounced 'Tulsī Dās'), the greatest poet of mediæval Northern India, beyond two or three dates and a few accidental particulars mentioned in his writings.

A life of the poet is said to have been written by his friend and companion, Vēṇī-mādhava Dāsa. It is referred to by Śiva

1 Farquhar, p. 300.
2 Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism*, p. 95.
3 See art. PRARTHANĀ SAMĀJ.
4 *Subōdh Patrikā*, 27th June 1920, with *Dhyānodaya* comments, 1st July 1920.
5 *BG* xx. [1884] 471–473.
6 Bhandarkar, *Marāṭhī Writings*, pp. 506–513.

1 *BG* xx. [1884] 470.
2 J. Murray Mitchell, *IA* xi. [1882] 155.
3 N. V. Tilak, in an unpublished paper.
4 N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, London, 1915, p. 279.
5 See J. Murray Mitchell, *JRASBo* iii. [1849] for the opposite view.

Sinha, who wrote in the latter half of the 19th cent., but no copy of it is now known to exist. We have two personal documents relating to the poet—a deed of arbitration, and an entire book of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*, both in his own handwriting.

There are numerous traditions concerning him, some of which may be accepted with considerable confidence. He is said to have been born at Rājāpur, in the present United Provinces of Bāndā, about A.D. 1532, and to have been a Sarwariā Brāhmaṇa of the Parāśara *gōtra*.[1] His father's name was Ātmārāma, and his mother's Hulasī, his own name being Rāma Bōlā. In one of his verses[2] he tells us that he was abandoned by his parents immediately after his birth, and with great probability it is assumed from this that he was one of those unfortunate children known as *abhuktamūla*, born under the beginning of the currency of the asterism Mūla. Such a child is said to be destined to destroy its father, and the only remedy is to abandon it on its birth, or, at best, so to arrange that its parents shall not look upon its face during the first eight years of its existence. He was picked up by a wandering Sādhu, who, in token of the sacred leaf used in the ceremony of purification of the infant, renamed him Tulasī-Dāsa ('Servant of the *tulasī*-plant'), and by this name he was henceforth known. With this Sādhu, who was probably also his *guru*, or spiritual preceptor, Narahari-Dāsa, he wandered all over Northern India. From his *guru* he learnt the story of Rāma,[3] but owing to his ignorance (? of Sanskrit)[4] he could not at first grasp its importance. At length, after frequent hearings, he learnt it so far as his intelligence would allow, and then determined to write it in the vernacular for his own benefit and for that of others similarly situated. When he grew up, he lived as a householder, and married a girl named Ratnāvalī, the daughter of one Dīnabandhu Pāṭhaka, by whom he had a son named Tāraka, who died at an early age. He was devoted to his wife and could not bear to be separated from her. She was a firm Vaiṣṇava, and on one occasion, when she had gone on a visit to her people, she reproached him for following her and for not showing equal affection to Rāma. Struck with remorse, Tulasī at once left her and took to an ascetic life. He is said to have seen her only once again in after years, and then not to have recognized her. With his head-quarters at first in Ayōdhyā and subsequently in Benares, he made long journeys over Northern India preaching the gospel of Rāma. At first he met with considerable opposition, but his holy life and his attractive personality conquered all obstacles, and, even in Benares, the head-quarters of Śiva-worship, he won universal respect. His fame as a poet spread far and wide and gained him many friends and followers, the most famous of whom were Rājā Māna-siṁha (Mān Singh) of Ambēr († 1614) and the celebrated 'Abdu 'r-Raḥīm Ḫānḫāna (1556–1627). A wealthy landowner of Benares named Ṭōḍar Mall (who is to be distinguished from Akbar's finance minister of the same name) was one of his closest friends, and a touching poem which Tulasī-Dāsa wrote on his death has survived among his most cherished verses. After Ṭōḍar Mall's death his heirs quarrelled as to the disposal of the property, and referred the matter to Tulasī-Dāsa as arbitrator. The deed of arbitration in his handwriting is still in existence and is dated Sambat 1669 (= A.D. 1612).

[1] No fewer than four places claim the honour of being his birthplace. The claim of Rājāpur is that best established. His caste has been a subject of dispute. According to some authorities, he was a Kānyakubja Brāhmaṇa.

[2] *Vinaya-pattrikā*, 227, 2.

[3] *Rām.* i. 30.

[4] He was never a good Sanskrit scholar, and some of his few verses in that language contain grammatical blunders.

Bubonic plague appeared in India in 1616, and lasted for eight years. The poet seems to have been attacked by it, for one of his minor works, the *Hanumān Bāhuka*, describes his sufferings from some such disease. After temporary relief he had a relapse and died in Benares in A.D. 1623.[1]

2. Works.—More than twenty formal works, besides numerous short poems, have been attributed to Tulasī-Dāsa, but some of these are certainly apocryphal, and others are of doubtful authenticity. The most generally accepted list mentions twelve, viz. six minor and six major. The minor works are the following: (1) *Rāma-lalā-Nahachhū*, (2) *Vairāgya-saṁdīpinī*, (3) *Barawai Rāmāyaṇa*, (4) *Jānakī-maṅgala*, (5) *Pārvatī-maṅgala*, (6) *Rāmājñā*. The six major works are (7) *Kṛṣṇagītāvalī*, (8) *Vinaya-pattrikā*, (9) *Gītāvalī*, (10) *Kavittāvalī*, (11) *Dōhāvalī*, and (12) *Rāmacharita-mānasa*.

Tulasī-Dāsa was a Smārta Vaiṣṇava; *i.e.*, while a worshipper of Rāmachandra, he also adhered to the tradition (*smṛti*) of ordinary Hinduism and followed the general religious customs of his caste. This involved, among other things, the worship of the god Śiva and the practice of eating his meals apart. In both respects he differed from the more thorough Vairāgī Vaiṣṇavas, who had abandoned tradition, and who worshipped only Viṣṇu in one or other of his incarnations and ate in company. During his stay in Ayōdhyā he associated with these Vairāgī Vaiṣṇavas and there composed the first three cantos of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*. Subsequently, being unable to agree with them on points of discipline, he migrated to Benares and there completed the poem.

His devotion to Rāmachandra as an incarnation of the Supreme is illustrated by the above list of works. With two exceptions (nos. 5 and 7) they all deal directly or indirectly with that deity. No. 7 is a collection of hymns in praise of Kṛṣṇa, another incarnation of Viṣṇu. No. 5 is a short poem describing Śiva's marriage with Pārvatī, a subject also treated at some length as an episode in the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*. As already stated, Tulasī-Dāsa paid special reverence to Śiva as a great and kindly god, although by no means on a level with Rāmachandra. It was Śiva who, out of love for the world, communicated Rāma's history to Pārvatī and thereby made it known to mortals.

A brief notice of each of the works named above will suffice.

(1) *Rāma-lalā-Nahachhū*.—The genuineness of this is disputed. It is a short poem describing the 'nail-paring' ceremony at the investiture of Rāmachandra with the sacred caste-thread. This ceremony is a village rite still kept up on such occasions and at weddings in Oudh and Bihār, and the whole poem is in rural style and in rural metre.

(2) *Vairāgya-saṁdīpinī* ('Kindling of Quietism') describes the true nature of holiness. It advocates *vairāgya* (absence of passion), and the description of the perfect peace resulting from absolute self-surrender to the Deity is not without poetic beauty.[2]

(3) The *Barawai Rāmāyaṇa* is a summary of the history of Rāmachandra in the Barawai metre. It is very short and, as we have it, probably incomplete. It is rejected by some authorities.

(4) *Jānakī-maṅgala* and (5) *Pārvatī-maṅgala*.—These are two short works celebrating the marriages of Sītā to Rāmachandra and of Pārvatī to Śiva respectively. The authenticity of both is doubtful. In no. 4 the order of events differs from that given by the poet in his more important works. The

[1] See G. A. Grierson, *Proceedings ASBe*, 1898, p. 147 ff.

[2] The whole has been translated by G. A. Grierson in *IA* xxii. [1893] 198 ff.

Pārvati-maṅgala is dated Sambat 1643 (= A.D. 1586).

(6) *Rāmājñā.*—This is a collection of verses to be used as omens previous to undertaking a journey or other important task. The contents are in the main a history of Rāmachandra in seven chapters, each of seven septads of verses, or 343 in all. The omen is found by selecting a verse by lot—a kind of *sortes Virgilianæ*. It is dated Sambat 1655 (= A.D. 1598).

(7) The *Kṛṣṇagītāvalī*, the first of the major works, has been already referred to. As its subject demanded, Tulasī-Dāsa wrote it, not in his customary Awadhī, but in the Braj Bhākhā dialect. It is one of the least read of the poet's works, but well repays perusal, as it contains many beautiful passages. He has entirely avoided debasing religion by that association with eroticism which spoils so much of the literature devoted to Kṛṣṇa.

(8) The *Vinaya-pattrikā* ('Petition') is one of the most important works of the poet, in which his most intimate feelings towards the Deity and that Deity's relations to the human soul are displayed with a freedom from reticence and poetic fervour that have rarely been equalled.

An interesting legend accounts for its origin. Tulasī, harassed and terrified by persecution, writes this petition to Rāmachandra—the loving, almighty, God—appealing for His protection. The whole forms a series of prayers, addressed, one by one, to the various minor gods as door-keepers and courtiers of the Supreme, and then, in an outburst of passionate entreaty and self-humiliation, to the Deity Himself. The final verse tells how, as in the case of an earthly monarch, the petition was granted under Rāma's own signature.

The *Vinaya-pattrikā* is one of the most admired works of the poet, but the difficulties of its language have discouraged many readers. The intense fervour of the writer often carries him into an extremity of passion, bursting forth in an elliptical style very different from the limpid beauty of his narrative poems. Again, the very form of the poem militates against its easy comprehension. It is a petition to a sovereign, expressed in a courtly vocabulary full of high-flown words and phrases. These belong to the nature of the case and are here most appropriate, but they do not tend to make the poem comprehensible to any one who is not a Sanskrit scholar. In spite of these surface defects, this admirable work deserves the closest study from any one who would become acquainted with the religious history of India. We have here a man whose influence for good over generations of Indians cannot be exaggerated, laying bare the inmost recesses of his heart, and openly proclaiming that at which other writers with the same experiences have only dared to hint. It is a book of confessions, but the confessions of a pure and faithful soul.

(9) In the *Gītāvalī* Tulasī-Dāsa appears in a new character, that of a *māgadha*, or panegyrist. It is a book of songs intended to increase in his readers their love for a tender, loving God. Again, as elsewhere, the love which he teaches is that of a child to his father. For the songs he has used the Braj Bhākhā dialect as the traditional vehicle of expression, and the dominant tone is not, as in the *Vinaya-pattrikā*, passion, but sweetness and charm. In this way he gives the whole history of Rāmachandra in a delightful style, quite different from that of his formal epic. There is no verse in the book which is not a complete little picture, and most attractive of all are those in the first book, in which he tells of the baby life of his hero and his brothers. It is a true gospel of the infant Rāma.

(10) Different again is the *Kavittāvalī*. Here the poet, in the character of a *vandin*, or bard, tells of the glory of Rāma, so as to encourage the faithful with a picture of the Deity's power. The language is Awadhī mixed with Braj Bhākhā. No work of Tulasī-Dāsa shows his extraordinary mastery of vocabulary so well as this. His subject is heroic, and, without having needless recourse to Sanskrit, he writes in a heroic style. In the battle scenes the words themselves by their very sound echo the clash of arms and the cries of the combatants, and, in the description of the burning of Lankā, the crackling of the flames. The narrative closes with the sixth book. The seventh, which is nearly half of the whole, consists of a number of short poems in the *kavitta* metre written at different times and here collected by their author. They have no direct connexion with the preceding books, and, being full of personal allusions, form a valuable source of information as to the poet's times and experiences. It is here that we learn about his birth and parentage and about the persecutions to which he was subjected, and from one verse we gather that the date of the compilation was somewhere between A.D. 1612 and 1614. A supplement, in the same metre, is the *Hanumān Bāhuka*, already referred to, in which he tells how he was attacked by plague.

(11) *Dōhāvalī.*—The title means a collection of verses in the *dōhā* metre, and it is by no means certain what is meant by it. There is a work of this name (see below), but some authorities maintain that the list alludes to a poem called the *Rām Satsaī* ('Seven hundred verses [also in this metre] in Praise of Rāma'). Many good scholars consider that this was written, not by the poet, but by another author of the same name. It is a rather tasteless production, but, if genuine, is not without importance, as the fifth chapter gives in great detail what purports to be the poet's doctrine regarding works as opposed to faith.[1] The difficulty in the way of accepting the work now called the *Dōhāvalī* as that referred to in the list is that it is largely composed of verses already occurring in the *Rāmacharita-mānasa*, the *Rāmājñā*, and the *Rām Satsaī* itself. Out of a total of 572 verses no fewer than 258 have been so identified, and there are quite possibly more. If genuine, there must have been a nucleus of original verses to which subsequent admirers have added others, so as to compile a kind of anthology of the poet's best *dōhās*. This is the present writer's opinion, and, if it is correct, the final recension must have been sufficiently long after the composition of the *Rām Satsaī* for the latter to have become recognized as the work of our poet.

(12) The *Rāmacharita-mānasa* ('Lake of the Gestes of Rāma') is commonly called the *Tulasī-kṛta Rāmāyaṇa*. This epic, the poet's greatest achievement, and also, in point of time, probably his first, was begun in A.D. 1574, when its author was about 43 years of age, and upon it his fame chiefly rests. It has been described as the Bible of ninety millions of people, and is certainly more familiar to every Hindu of Northern India than our Bible is to the average English peasant. There is not a Hindu of Hindōstān proper, whether prince or cottar, who does not know its most famous verses and whose common talk is not coloured by it. Its similes have entered even into the language of Indian Muslims, some of whose most ordinary idioms, though they know it not, made their first appearance in this work.[2]

The life of Rāmachandra, considered as an incarnation of the Supreme, is here dealt with in a formal epic. The subject is the same as that of the celebrated Sanskrit *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki, but the epic of Tulasī-Dāsa is in no way a transla-

[1] Tr. G. A. Grierson in *IA* xxii. [1893] 229 ff.

[2] See G. A. Grierson, 'Tulasī Dāsa, Poet and Religious Reformer,' *JRAS*, 1903, p. 447. Much of what follows is condensed from this paper.

tion of that work. We have an independent story, built on the same foundation, but differing from it in the treatment of episodes and in important details.[1] The author himself states that he has taken his account from many different sources, and it has been shown that the principal of these, besides Vālmīki's work, were the *Adhyātmā Rāmāyaṇa* (a section of the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*), the *Bhuśuṇḍī Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Vasiṣṭha Saṁhitā*, and the *Prasanna-rāghava* attributed to Jayadēva.[2]

As illustrating the estimation in which this poem is held in India, the following very popular legend may be quoted. Rāmachandra denoted his approval of Vālmīki's epic by appending his signature to a copy of it. Thereupon the monkey-god Hanumān, with his nails, wrote another *Rāmāyaṇa* upon a rock, and took it to Rāma. The latter approved of it also, but said that, as he had already signed Vālmīki's copy, he could not sign another; he had better show it to that poet. He did so, and, as Vālmīki saw that it would eclipse his own work, by a stratagem he induced Hanumān to fling it into the sea. Hanumān, in complying, prophesied that in a future age he would himself inspire a Brāhmaṇa named Tulasī, who would recite his (Hanumān's) poem in the tongue of the common people and destroy the fame of Vālmīki's epic.

There can be no doubt that its reputation is well deserved. The *Rāmacharita-mānasa* is one of the great epics. It has its prolixities and its episodes that jar upon European tastes, but, even so, no one can read it without being impressed by its high poetic merit. The various characters are vividly and consistently described, and live and move with all the dignity of a heroic age. The style is most admirably varied. There is the infinite pathos of the passage describing Rāma's farewell to his mother; the rugged, harsh language telling of the horrors of the battlefield; when occasion requires it, a sententious, aphoristic method of dealing with narrative, teeming with similes drawn, not from the traditions of the schools, but from nature herself; and, suffusing all, a life-giving atmosphere of the purest poetry. To us its weakest side is that which, to a Hindu, is its strongest—the character of its hero. To the poet, Rāmachandra is necessarily, as God manifest on earth, a perfect character. Even when the old story shows him performing unknightly deeds, Tulasī must call them virtues and plead that the end justifies the means. Or, again, the foulest treachery, such as that of Vibhīṣaṇa towards his brothers, is extolled because the traitor is accepted and rewarded by the hero.[3] But this is one of the obligations of the story and of the author's view of the divinity of Rāma. The human characters are to our ideas far more sympathetic. There are the impetuous and loving Lakṣmaṇa; Sītā, the ideal of an Indian wife and mother; Bharata, constant and tender, the model of the true *bhakta*; and Rāvaṇa—the Satan of the epic—destined to failure, and fighting with all his demon force against his fate.

One of the most striking features of the poem is the writer's capacity for seeing things. More than any other literature, Indian poetry has its stock similes—the lotus, the water-lily, the bee, the moon, and so on. Even the best Sanskrit poems often give the impression of being largely the work of the closet, not of the open air. Tulasī-Dāsa employed the same old similes—he would not have been Indian if he had avoided them—but thousands of others are his own. Little expressions—the turn of a sentence or an apt epithet—show how he had seen and studied the world for himself.

It would be a great mistake to look upon him merely as an ascetic. He was a man that had lived. He had been a householder—a word of much meaning to an Indian—and had known the pleasures of a wedded life, the joy of clasping an infant son to his bosom, and the sorrow of losing that son ere he had attained his prime. He appealed not to scholars, but to his countrymen as a whole, the people whom he knew. He had mixed with them, begged from them, prayed with them, shared their pleasures and their yearnings, and, on the other hand, had contracted intimate friendships with the greatest men of the emperor's court. All this we find reflected in the pages of his writings.[1]

His works have suffered the fate which has befallen those of other famous Indian authors. Imitators have written poems which they have passed off as his, and numerous *kṣēpakas*, or apocryphal additions, have been inserted in his epic. He has suffered too from the attentions of commentators without end, most of whom have wasted energy in discovering hidden meanings in the simplest passages, while they discreetly avoid the real difficulties. Finally, his epic has actually been translated into Sanskrit, and there are critics who have maintained that the translation is the original, and that the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* is nothing but a barefaced theft of another's poetry.[2]

3. Religious ideas.—The religious ideas of the poet are of great importance in the history of India. Seventh in descent of teacher and pupil from the great Rāmānanda (*q.v.*), he was a thorough Vaiṣṇava and follower of the *Bhakti-Mārga* (*q.v.*). He taught that there is but one Supreme Being, and that man is by nature sinful and unworthy of salvation. Nevertheless the Supreme, in His infinite mercy, became incarnate in the person of Rāmachandra to relieve the world from sin. Rāma has returned to heaven, where, besides being the ineffable Supreme, he is still Rāma, and where, in consequence, we have now a God who is not only infinitely merciful, but who knows by actual experience how great are man's infirmities and temptations, and who, though Himself incapable of sin, is ever ready to extend His help to the sinful being who calls upon Him. On all this follows, as a corollary, the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man, and the duty which man owes to his neighbour. His definition of sin is that which is contrary to the will of Rāma, and it is only by acknowledging this, and by abandoning himself to utter loving faith in Rāma's power to save him from its thraldom, that a man can escape from the weary round of perpetual transmigration. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God and of the necessity of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, had long been known. In Northern India Rāmānanda had been its great exponent, and Tulasī-Dāsa put forward no novelty. His claim for consideration is that his teaching was successful. His own pure life and the magic of his poetry have done for the *Bhakti-Mārga* what the eloquence of hundreds of other teachers failed to do. The fact that he was a Smārta Vaiṣṇava must not be forgotten. He belonged to no sect, and founded no sect, but was just an ordinary Hindu, accepting all the Hindu mythological machinery. While worshipping Rāma as the Supreme, he paid adoration to Śiva and the other gods. His attitude to them was much the same as that of the official teaching of one branch of the Christian Church: to Rāma alone he offered λατρεία, to the others δουλεία, to Śiva ὑπερδουλεία.

A few words must be devoted to the poet's use of the word *māyā*. Occasionally he refers to it in terms that can only be interpreted as meaning the influence which hides Brāhma from the soul—the *māyā* of the Śiva-worshipping Vēdāntins, to whose doctrines he was strongly opposed. But all his

[1] *E.g.*, the account of the great battle outside Laṅkā is quite different.

[2] See L. P. Tessitori, *Il 'Rāmacaritamānasa' e il Rāmāyaṇa*, reprinted from *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, xxiv. [1911] (reviewed by G. A. Grierson, in *JRAS*, 1912, p. 794 ff.), and Sītā Rām, in *JRAS*, 1914, p. 419 ff.

[3] The authors of the *Hindī Navaratna* (pp. 88, 289) point out that, with one exception, none of the numerous Hindī poets who told the tale of Rāma ever thought of condemning Vibhīṣaṇa's conduct. The exception is Kēśava-dāsa, a court poet who lived amid knightly surroundings. He also has the courage to condemn Rāma's treatment of Sītā.

[1] Cf. *JRAS*, 1903, p. 452.

[2] See G. A. Grierson, in *JRAS*, 1913, p. 133 ff.

uses of the word in this sense are merely cases of similes and the like, and in no way form part of his real teaching. We may attribute this use of the word to his own association with the worship of Śiva. Elsewhere he employs the word in two different senses: in one it means merely 'magic,' and is the evil force used by demons in their combat with Rāma's army; in the other it represents a combination of the Gnostic demiurge and the Christian 'Tempter';[1] it is a personality, a female, subordinate to the Supreme, and, to a certain extent, His agent. In the latter capacity she sets the whole world dancing, yet she herself is set a-dancing, like an actress on the stage, by a movement of the Lord's eyebrows. She sullies every one, even the gods, with her temptations; and the Deity sometimes sends her forth specially to tempt some pious person who begins to show overweening pride.[2] As the world, the flesh, and the Devil in one, she leads mankind to sin, but, if a man has true *bhakti*, he is surely armoured against her, and she cannot approach him.[3]

Above all, Tulasī-Dāsa taught that the Supreme is a personality. While not denying the existence of the *Nirguṇaṁ Brāhma* of the *Upaniṣads*—a being totally devoid of all qualities, of whom the only thing that can be said is 'he is not this or that'—he maintained that the idea of such a being was beyond the comprehension of the human mind, and that the only God whom it was possible to adore was the personal (*saguṇa*) manifestation of the impersonal (*nirguṇa*).[4]

The practical result of the general adoption of Tulasī's religious attitude has been of the greatest importance to Northern India. In the poet's own time the masses of Hindōstān had two alternative religions open to them. One was the crude polytheism of the worship of village godlings, the other was the Kṛṣṇa-cult. The first still exists, but controlled and thrust into the background by Tulasī's faith. What the Kṛṣṇa-cult becomes among the uncultivated masses the religious fate of Bengal has shown. It inevitably tends to become a sex-worship, and its text-books teem with the most passionate, most licentious descriptions of the love adventures of Kṛṣṇa among the herdmaidens. All else is lost, and there gradually develop the unnameable horrors of a Śākta-cult. Upper India has been saved from this by Tulasī-Dāsa.

LITERATURE.—G. A. Grierson, 'Notes on Tul'si Das,' *IA* xxii. [1893] 89, 122, 197, 225, 253 (this is the only complete account in English of the poet's life and works; a few errors in it have been corrected in the preceding pages), 'Tulasī Dāsa, Poet and Religious Reformer,' *JRAS*, 1903, p. 447 ff.; Gaṇēśa-vihārī Miśra, Śyāma-vihārī Miśra, and Śukadēva-vihārī Miśra, *Hindī-Navaratna*, Allahabad, 1910 (an account in Hindī of the nine great writers in that language); cf. the same authors' *Miśrabandhu-vinōda*, Khaṇḍwā, 1913, p. 304 ff. (a general history of Hindī literature in the same language).

Numerous edd. of all the poet's works have been published in India, but few of them possess critical value. Two excellent edd. of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* have been published, viz. that issued in 1889 by the Khaḍga-vilāsa Press in Bānkipur and that issued in 1903 by the Kāśī Nāgarī-pracharinī Sabhā of Benares. Both are critically edited and have elaborate introductions dealing with the poet's life and writings. For those not familiar with the language the writer can recommend a good ed., with a line-for-line Hindī commentary and much general information concerning the poet, by Rāmēśvara Bhaṭṭa, Nirṇaya-sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904. The same editor has issued from the Indian Press, Allahabad, 1913, a similar ed. of the *Vinaya-pattrikā*, which can be recommended to students. It is believed that it is intended to issue all the poet's works in this series.

A good, if somewhat literal, Eng. tr. of the *Rāmacharita-mānasa* has been made by F. S. Growse (1st ed., Allahabad, 1880-81). It has been several times reprinted in India.

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[1] For a full account see *Rām.* vii. dō. 70 ff., Benares edition.
[2] *E.g.*, the divine saint Nārada (*Rām.* i. dō. 128 ff., Ben. ed.).
[3] *Rām.* vii. ch. 116, Ben. ed.
[4] See *Rām.* vii. dō. 13 and following *chhand*.

TUNGUS.—1. Area, distribution, number, and history.—The name Tungus is usually derived from the word Tung-hung ('Eastern barbarians'), by which these people were known to the ancient Chinese. They call themselves Avankil (sing. Avanki) or Donki. The Tungusic tribes are the most widely distributed of all the native tribes of Siberia; they live in small groups all over Siberia as far west as the river Taz, as far east as the island of Sakhalin, as far north as the Arctic shore, and as far south as the middle of Manchuria. In spite of this distribution, the language and social anthropology of these tribes are the least known of all the Siberian peoples, the Samoyed, Turkic and Mongolic tribes, and Koryak and Chukchi, even the Gilyak and the Ainu, having had more space given to them in anthropological literature than the Tungus. As a reason for this may be cited the fact that the Tungus usually live in the interior of the continent, in places difficult of access and, with the exception of the Lamut, far away from the coast. The total number of Tungus belonging to the various tribes was 76,504 in 1897, while in 1911 there were only 75,204.

The Tungusic tribes are usually divided into Northern Tungusic and Southern Tungusic. Of these the Northern Tungusic group comprises: (1) Samogir, (2) Nigidal, (3) Olchi, (4) Oroki, (5) Manegu, (6) Tungus proper (including Lamut and Orochon). The Southern Tungusic group comprises: (1) Manchu, (2) Daur, (3) Solon, (4) Gold, (5) Orochi.

The Northern Tungus are at the stage of reindeer culture like the Magdalenian man in Europe, though at the same time they know the use of iron, which they brought from their more southern home. They belong to the Neo-Siberian group. The Southern Tungus are horse nomads, cattle-breeders, and fishermen, and in some places also agriculturists, and in the towns artisans. The Siberian Tungus emigrated from Manchuria partly in the seventh and partly in the thirteenth century after the Mongolic conquest, but their armies had probably invaded Siberia frequently even in the pre-Christian era. The first Tungus subdued by the Russian authorities in Mangazei in 1603 were the Tungus of the lower Tunguska. In 1615 a large Tungus force was defeated by the Russians on the Yenisei, and about 1623 all the Tungus of Central Siberia were forced to pay taxes. The Tungus of the Amur country, together with their territory, were made subject to Russia about fifty years ago.

Although the Northern Tungus live now under a very primitive culture, their pedigree goes as far back as that of the Turkic people, and they therefore present a case of degeneration under the influence of environment. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in their folk-tales, which in comparison with the really primitive tales of the Samoyed are rather sophisticated. The old Chinese chroniclers used to comment on their two powerful neighbours as barbarians of inferior culture, *i.e.* their north-western neighbours in the pre-Christian era, the Turks of the present day, and their north-eastern, the Tungus. But, as both of them appear under a variety of tribal and dynastic names, it is difficult sometimes to know which of these peoples are of Tungus and which of Turkic race. They are more easily classified by their customs and characteristics, while the Mongols, whose name, used in a broad sense, is applied to both these races, seem to have no characteristic cultural features and are probably a mixture of the two races influenced by their steppe environment more than the Turks and Tungus, and brought to prominence through Jenghiz Khan's (himself a Mongol) conquest.