EDITORIAL.

On 6th May, 1935, His Majesty, the King-Emperor George V, will have reigned for a quarter of a century and the occasion will be celebrated not merely with formal ceremony, but also with personal pleasure by many millions of his subjects, who altogether number about one quarter of the human race.

The sentiment of loyalty to the King-Emperor embraces several feelings. To Englishmen at home King George is in the first place the personification of a social and political system which has been slowly, instinctively achieved, and their loyalty to him is the measure of the value which they attach to that system. In the second place he is regarded by his people with personal respect and affection as "the first Englishman in the land"; he is admired for the possession in an outstanding degree of those qualities which Englishmen believe are characteristic of their race at its best. The Scots, the Welsh and the Scoto-Irish of Ulster have come to regard themselves in this common loyalty as Englishmen.

In the Dominions of the British Commonwealth the same dual sentiment prevails; but, because their personal relation is less immediate, the loyalty of his subjects is more a political principle, or perhaps the mystical perception of a vital political idea. That is the one clear fact defined in the Statute of Westminster, 1931. This sentiment has impregnated the French in Canada and is steadily percolating the Dutch in South Africa. It will probably capture the people of
the Irish Free State, as they realise that it is not the negation, but the guarantee of their freedom.

In the dependent territories, inhabited by backward peoples, over which also the King-Emperor reigns, the sentiment of loyalty is exchanged for a respect for the authority of which he is the symbol, for they are simply held in ward.

The position of India is peculiar. It has been an empire within an empire. It is now becoming a commonwealth of nations linked with another such commonwealth by this loyalty to the personal symbol of a social and political system which has been evolved by the English people. Indians can accept an Emperor as a personal symbol of union, for they have been ruled by great emperors—Asoka, Harsha, Akbar—in the past. The British people can more easily accept a king; the very word (kin-ing) is the symbol of the unity of kinsfolk. The title, King-Emperor, is thus the link in an evolving alliance. But there is something more, for we believe that many millions of Indians share the Englishman's personal regard for their common sovereign.

The present reign has covered the most critical period in the history of both peoples. Both have survived the greatest of all wars and are slowly digesting its consequences. Both have witnessed great political developments. Taken in conjunction with the Parliament Act of 1911, the Reform Act of 1928 has marked a great epoch in the progressive political achievement of the people of the United Kingdom. In a period of unprecedented instability their structure survives as strongly as ever without any essential alteration of its traditional principles.

During the same period India has experienced historical changes. His Majesty succeeded to the throne a little more than a year after the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which implemented the Morley-Minto constitutional proposals. This Act has proved to be the prelude to a rhythmical process of political evolution. Any review, however brief, of this fateful quarter of a century must record one deeply significant fact, namely, the steady, rapid growth of political consciousness in India, which is inextricably associated with one personality, Mahatma Gandhi, who has been so often and aptly called the Indian Mazzini.
Soon after their accession Their Majesties made a memorable progress through India and in December, 1911, held the great Coronation Darbar at Delhi, when the King-Emperor announced that that city was once more to become the capital of India, and that the administration of Bengal was to be re-arranged more in accordance with the wishes of the people of that province. Three years later came the World War. The great services of India in that War and the recognition of her political advance led to the momentous declaration by Montagu on 20th August, 1917, with which His Majesty strongly associated himself, of a programme by which India was progressively to achieve self-government through association of her representatives with the British Parliament. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 in pursuance of that programme recommended the introduction of the hybrid system, known as dyarchy, which has survived until now, but has always been regarded as a "half-way house" towards self-government.

For fifteen years dyarchy has been subjected to active criticism, which led to the appointment and Report of the Simon Commission and subsequently to the series of Round Table Conferences. These culminated two years ago in the assembling of the political leaders of Great Britain and India in the Joint Parliamentary Committee, whose Report is the basis of the India Bill, which is now being passed through the British Parliament. His Majesty's Jubilee will thus coincide with the most notable political event in the history of India, namely, the establishment of a federation which will embrace the whole country and the inauguration of the first stage in the achievement of complete self-government.
THE GROUNDS OF POLITICAL OBEDIENCE IN THE INDIAN STATE.

[PAPER READ ON 26TH NOVEMBER 1934.]

In all the talking and writing which goes on to-day in India about politics there is one universal assumption, an acceptance of democratic theory, and one universal preoccupation, the control of patronage and the safeguarding of vested interests. Political theory is too often an accessory after the fact, something which is lightly dragged in to justify what is too often proposed on quite other grounds. In ancient Greece politics began as a branch of general philosophy; Plato stumbled on his Republic in the course of his search for the true conception of justice. His Republic is the social embodiment of the idea of the good life. Later, since the good life involves living together in society, politics developed with Aristotle into speculation on the nature of society, its end and purposes. What we nowadays dignify with the term politics was labelled by Aristotle the art of distribution of offices.

Never was there a time in Indian history when serious political thinking was more urgently needed. A constitution is being discussed and elaborated and will shortly be launched, a government which is to claim the allegiance of 350 million people is about to be established, and no serious thought has been given to the principles to which that government is to appeal. Statesmen discuss quotas and percentages, patronage and safeguards, but have not considered for a moment the basic condition of the existence of all governments, the fundamental goodwill of the people. The basis of all stable states is an underlying belief in the principles on which they rest, an acceptance by the community at large of the legitimacy of the government's claim to obedience. But we have been concerned with the activities of the state—the distribution of offices as Aristotle would say—rather than with its principles; for four years we have been decorating the facade and embellishing the interior without giving any thought to the less visible but still necessary foundation. Such a state can never be stable, and I believe it is the most urgent task to-day before
publicists and political theorists to undertake the study of this problem. Why should I obey the new Indian state? That is the question. Unless the reason for which the state compels me to obey it in the long run corresponds with my own convictions, unless, in other words, I obey the state of my own will and not out of expediency or fear, the authority of the state can never be stable and will collapse whenever the compulsive force is weakened or the sense of expediency dulled.

This problem will not be solved merely by working out “good principles.” This is a mistake which I think is made by many universities to-day, which prescribe standard treatises of America and England, written for an utterly different political, economic, social and philosophic environment, and optimistically hope that the result will be the production of good Indian citizens. What lesson has Plato for the village community, or Aristotle for the problem of caste, or Laski for the communal problem? Politics studied in this way are no more than a hobby or a game. They lack all reality, because they lack contact with actual conditions of the country. All these authorities were written for our learning, but they do not exempt us from thinking out our own problems ourselves.

In any age the basic principles of a state are conditioned by the circumstances of the time. The principles which were effective in the Middle Ages would be fantastic and futile in Modern Europe, just as the democratic or nationalist ideas of the present would have been derided then. Twenty years ago it was widely believed that in representative democracy had been discovered the final and all-sufficing system of government, so that its progressive application to all sorts and conditions of people would automatically solve all the problems of government. The experience of post-war Europe has disillusioned us and we have learnt with Aristotle and Montesquieu that, whatever the abstractly best form of government may be, differing polities are necessary for differing peoples and civilisations. Democracy has broken down in Europe, because not enough people believed in it, with the result that when difficulties arose the people did not appoint fresh men to work the democratic machine, but constructed a new machine. To be stable, government must appeal to principles in which its subjects really believe.
The last twelve years have demonstrated in India that you cannot have diarchy without diarchists. The new democrato-communal-diarchic constitution will be no more successful, unless there are a sufficient number of democrat-communal-diarchists in the country. Is there a single such person existing to-day? The problem before us to-day is to find a set of beliefs shared by a sufficiently large number of people and to base government upon them. I am not here concerned with the details of the administrative machine, but with the fundamental principle of government. The problem is complicated by the fact that India is passing through a stage of transition not only politically but also culturally. The very beliefs upon which we seek to base political authority seem to be changing before our eyes. Something like mental anarchy has overtaken us.

On what principles then should governments be based? Governments may be based first on the motive of fear—fear of overmastering power, or fear of anarchy, if that power is withdrawn. Such was the thesis of Hobbes. Such governments can only be stable so long as the power is overmastering, or that "fear of something worse" persists. In other words, governments based upon the motive of fear rely upon a mental state which is in its essence temporary and fleeting. Secondly, they may be based upon inertia or indifference to political issues on the part of the masses, as was the case in Russia. But the case of Russia also shows the hollowness of such a principle. If the masses are really inert, the government will depend upon an active minority. If it rules them by force—as it did the middle class in Russia—it is really a government based upon fear, with all its instability. At any moment the masses may awake, as they did in Russia during the war and are beginning to do in India. You cannot to-day stimulate the peasant socially and industrially, turn him into a soldier and provide him with wireless, and expect him still to continue a political somnambulist.

Apart from these two bases there may be considered some positive principle which a man may accept with his mind and will, without which the State's argument for obedience by the individual can only be that of Belloo's nurse:

Always then keep hold of nurse
For fear of finding something worse.
This positive principle must vary with the circumstances of each nation and age.

Let us see what some of these principles have proved to be in practice. Most of the states of the ancient world had a religious basis. The state was the servant of the God and the King was the high priest. The country states of Egypt, Chaldea and Assyria, the tribal polity of the Hebrews, the city states of the Achaean and the Philistines were all on this basis. When states like Assyria and Persia blossomed into empires they were based frankly upon force and fear, and fell as soon as the central power decayed, as in the case of Alexander’s empire; or a stronger than they arose, as in the cases of Assyria, Babylon and Persia. The Greeks were the first to develop beyond this principle, to regard politics as apart from religion; the good life, (rather than the glory and service of the city’s patron god) was defined by philosophers as the end of the state. These states were founded on the democratic principle, and were made possible, first by the fact that the whole free population was educated and shared largely the same ideals, and second, by the institution of slavery, which gave the free citizen leisure to fill the public offices and to discuss affairs of state. The revolutions of Greek history, with their oligarchies and tyrants, were the result of economic crises rather than of any fundamental political instability. Dictatorships were temporary interruptions of an established order. The measure of the Greek belief in democracy is their use of the lot and the rotation of offices.

Rome, starting as a democracy, developed a new basis for her sovereignty—that of Law. Her systematising genius united with her conservative temper to bring about such a gradual and continuous modification of her divinely sanctioned customs as to cast over the highly developed law of the empire a halo of sanctity, which made it the cementing force of Roman society. The imperium of Rome combined a sense of awe—almost of the holy—with the sense of authority, and all the political disturbances of Rome were concerned, not with the modification or limitation of the imperium, but with its control by particular people. In Rome men talked about democracy but believed in law.

In the Middle Ages we find a situation wholly different. No imperium awed the feudal noble. The feudal king could exact obedience
only so far as his sword could reach. Even the strongest kings were often powerless, as the incident of Edward I and Hugh Bigod, Earl of Norfolk, shows. The earl refused to follow the king to France. "By God, Sir," said Edward, "you shall either go or hang." "Bigod, Sir," replied the earl, "will neither go nor hang"—and he didn't. The kings were the successors of the old Teutonic war leaders, and having lost the prestige of the old sacred families, who claimed descent from Odin, they tried to strengthen their authority by getting the support of the Church. The coronation service with its anointing with oil is a relic of this process. Belief in the Church was the real basis of authority in the Middle Ages. Its authority was universally accepted, its thunders universally feared and therefore effective, and so far as the State's authority stretched beyond pure force, it was because it had the sanction of the Church. The theoretical basis was the theory of empire and papacy, the practical the general conviction that there was no salvation outside the Church.

The Renaissance and the Reformation destroyed the position of the Church in northern Europe. But belief in religion remained, and so the doctrines of divine right became the working basis of political authority. National Churches, like those of England and Scandinavia, recognised the King as their earthly head and supported his claim to be God's divinely appointed representative upon earth. By 1600 this belief had ceased to be accepted generally in England, and the constitutional struggles of the 17th century form a study in what may happen to a state when it continues to claim obedience upon grounds which the people no longer accept. Custom carries on for a time, then force and repression, until some incident precipitates a crisis, which ends sooner or later in a new synthesis of popular belief and political authority.

All stable modern states rest their authority upon some claim which accords with deep rooted beliefs of the people. In France this belief is undoubtedly nationalism and the Rousseauite conception of democracy, which is more concerned with equality than with liberty, and which places more stress on popular sovereignty than on the manifestation of it. French institutions often seem designed as if for a breakdown, but the general belief in la patrie and democracy
has always proved strong enough to counteract the clumsiness of the political machine and to save the state almost in spite of itself. The rally to Poincaré in 1926 and Doumergue in 1934 illustrates this point.

In the United States men will still, as Dean Inge was fond of remarking, shout like the Ephesians of old for the space of about three hours, "Great is democracy." Though their voices are now perhaps a little hoarse, there is no doubt that the worship of the ballot-box has survived the eclipse of its rival, the dollar. Democracy is the political faith of America and this faith gives virility to American institutions in spite of all its defects.

In Germany the State has a different basis of belief, but one which has enabled it to survive in essential structure without any catastrophe the successive crises of the war, the peace, the collapse of the mark and the great depression. This is the German absolutist political philosophy, based on the teachings of Fichte and Hegel. What is only one school of opinion in England is the serious belief of most educated Germans. The State is a real mystic entity, a manifestation of Reality, which before all things must be obeyed. From the lecture room these ideas were disseminated through the schoolroom and the press until they became the basic belief of the mass of Germans. In Germany alone of modern states some of the awe surrounding the Roman imperium has been transferred to the State. This belief combined with Nietschianism to form the philosophic foundation of German militarism and is at the root of the docility and orderliness of the Germans, which has stood them in such good stead in the last 15 years. Revolutions have swept away only institutions based on no deep belief—the Hohenzollerns who trusted in the legend of success, which was shattered in 1918, and in the doctrine of divine right, which no one besides William II took seriously; and the Republic, which was never more than the product of defeat and despair. Through all these changes the State is to-day stronger than it ever was.

In Italy the same philosophy is preached by Croce and Gentile and officially adopted, but the State is less stable than in Germany in proportion as this philosophy is less deeply rooted in the Italian people. This belief also explains the secret of the frequent revolutions
in centralised France compared to the stability of equally authoritarian Germany; Germans believe in the divine right of authority, Frenchmen in the divine right of the people.

Lastly, it is in England, the most stable of them all, that the working beliefs of the people are most nearly expressed in their political institutions. Parliament and Law are the Englishman’s twin gods. An Act of Parliament is still something which the Englishman feels himself instinctively bound to accept; to pronounce a thing illegal is still the strongest deterrent you can place on the average Englishman. The General Strike was broken by Sir John Simon’s speech pointing out that it was illegal. In France such a speech at such a time might have caused a revolution, in England it provoked a surrender. What Englishman in his heart would not be an M. P. if he could?

If from the contemplation of stable states we turn to unstable polities and periods of political change, we find that this principle still works—always there is an absence of any political consensus, or else a clash of two or more beliefs. In 19th century Europe governments like that of Metternich relied upon divine right at a time when the belief was dying and the educated were divided in allegiance between democracy and nationalism. The secret of Bismarck’s internal success was that he perceived that nationalism was more deeply rooted than democracy, and in deft hands could be used to smother it. By making use at the same time of the fashionable Hegelianism, he transferred the Prussian monarchy from the antiquated divine right basis to its later nationalistic-militarist-authoritarian basis. Monarchies like Portugal, Spain, Austria and Russia, which could not or would not do this, fell one after another. Excellent eastern examples of a continuity of institutions accompanied by a radical change of basis are Japan and Siam. The measure of instability which does exist at the present day in the states we have just been discussing is due to the fact that there is a substantial body in each country which does not accept the political consensus of the majority; these are for the most part of course the advanced Socialists. Every state in every age to be stable must base its claim to political obedience upon the prevailing political beliefs of the people.
If with this principle in mind we now turn to India, one fact seems immediately apparent. It is that the present government is not based upon any fundamental popular beliefs. It is neither Hindu, Muslim, nor British, neither autocratic nor democratic. The only belief upon which it can seriously be said to rest at the present moment apart from expediency—is the traditional peasant belief that the *de facto* government must be obeyed just so long as it is strong enough to collect the taxes. This is what "the loyalty of the masses to the British raj" amounts to. But this negative loyalty is cold comfort to any government. It is only another way of saying with Sir John Harrington:

"Treason doth never prosper—what's the reason? For if it do—it is no longer treason."

Such a political foundation is one of sand. When the rains descend and the winds blow and beat upon that house, it will fall, and great will be the fall thereof. You cannot build up positive institutions upon a minus quantity.

A second fact seems equally obvious—that there is no consensus of political belief at the present time, but rather a confused jumble of conflicting beliefs and half-beliefs. There never was the uniformity of belief in India which 19th century historians assumed. But the problem has been immensely complicated by the incursion of western ideas and influence in the last hundred years. The significant movements in contemporary Europe were political and social; in India they have been and still are essentially cultural. The movements in Europe have all been within the framework of existing civilisation, inherited from Greece, Rome and the Jews. Institutions have been modified, but the fundamental outlook on life has remained unchanged. Europe continues to be eagerly activist or world-accepting, empirical, critical. But in India it is the old views of life, the fundamental attitude, which have been challenged and are changing. This cultural transition, this flux of ideas about life itself, increases the difficulties of the political theorist tenfold, for besides the clash of fundamental beliefs many people profess new opinions and at the same time act upon traditional ideas.
For example, democracy is the political creed of most educated people to-day, and that it has taken real root is evidenced by the ease with which every new enterprise of the educated world transmutes itself into a committee—one of the essentials of democracy, as Dr. Lindsay calls it. That democracy influences many is obvious, but that it dominates the majority in modern India I take leave to doubt. Mahatma Gandhi calls himself a democrat, and the professed creed of the Congress is democracy, but does not his democracy transposes itself, by the process of inspiration, into the doctrine of the divine right of Mahatmas? And who will say whether the latter has not really a stronger appeal than the former? What happens to democratic theory when joint electorates are proposed? How can the frequent walk-outs and walk-ins of political conferences be squared with democratic practice? Many people will say, when confronted with such cases, “Yes, I believe in democracy, but it must not touch my religion, my private life, or my culture.” Very well, in what sense do you believe in democracy? Democracy in itself is as vague a term as Socialism. What kind of democrat are you? It is questions like these which need the attention of thoughtful people to-day and so far have not received it. These are examples of professed theories which are not carried out in practice. But examples of the deeper clash of ideal and of principle are equally easy to find.

The Mahasabha for example, in so far as it represents orthodox Brahminism, is implicitly opposed in principle to the new outlook of the West. Congress conceals within its ranks two opposing tendencies—the world-renouncing Tolstoyan idealism of Mahatma Gandhi, and the robust industrialism of the Bombay and Ahmedabad magnates. The Arya Samaj is divided by the same clash of fundamental ideas, which we may call for convenience the world-renouncing and world-accepting attitudes.

Nor can we obtain much help from the study of India’s past. In ancient India, as originally in Greece, politics were a part of theology, and there never arose an Aristotle to effect the separation. Kautilya’s Arthasastra is the prototype of Machiavelli’s “Prince,” not of the “Republic” or the “Politics.” It is concerned with means, not ends; the fundamentals are all taken for granted. This was because
the realm of ends was considered the province of general philosophy and not that of politics. Politics was a subordinate science, and Kautilya was only concerned with the means by which a ruler could attain certain already accepted ends within certain recognised and fixed limits. The grounds of political obedience were theological not political. The ruling principle was the theological principle of "dharma." It was the religious duty of the subject to obey, the religious duty of the king to rule well and promote the welfare of his subjects. What if he did not? The theoretical position was something like that of James I in his "Divine Law of True Monarchy."

In practice the religious duty of obedience was tempered by the possibility of resistance. If imperial Russia was an autocracy tempered by assassination, the average ancient Indian state was a theocracy tempered by hartals and rebellions. The great empires tended to borrow Persian ideas of divine right and to treat the monarch as semi-divine—but the fundamental principle was precisely the same, as it was in all those states of the ancient middle-eastern world which were not founded on conquest, namely, obedience as a religious duty.

The Buddhist states were much less bound by custom and religious hierarchies. Beginning as a revolt against Brahminism, early Buddhism was naturally much freer, at any rate at first, from priestly influence. Then, again, early Buddhism was a system of agnosticism touched by emotion, and as such gave little scope for theocratic theories. Hence the rise of contract theories of the state, perhaps the real beginning of political thought as an independent science in India, is quite understandable.

With the passing of Buddhism the old theocratic system of the Brahmins regained its sway. The new "sudra" dynasties who replaced the old Kshattriyas were naturally even more under Brahmin influence than their predecessors. A new period opens with the Mussulman invasions of India. The invaders brought with them the doctrine of the Islamic state—another variation of the theocratic principle. The rule of the Delhi Sultans was a mixture of Islamic theory and Turkish practice. It has been usual to lump the two together in a common condemnation, but I think it is one of the most urgent tasks of historical scholarship—and one for which the Panjab
should form a particularly favourable milieu—to distinguish between the Islamic and the Turkish or racial influence in the Delhi Sultanate. Most of the actions of these kings, and those usually the most open to criticism, were no more Islamic than many of the actions of the Crusaders were Christian.

No doubt some of these ideas are still living beliefs in the minds of many people throughout India, but none of them provides a satisfactory basis for an all-India government, for the simple reason that none of them is held throughout the country or even by the vast majority of the population. The ideas of ancient Hindu policy were inextricably bound up with the Hindu social and religious system, and are not only irrelevant to all non-Hindus, but to most educated Hindus as well. They are, perhaps, the theoretical basis of the already mentioned peasant belief in the duty of obeying the de facto government. The contractual ideas of the Buddhists have a much more modern ring, because they are much more secular, but with the disappearance of Buddhism they lost their traditional basis and must now compete along with modern political theories for the ear of the educated. In other words they have no root in the popular mind and little serious appeal to the educated.

The Islamic theory is perhaps more faithfully treasured in India to-day than in any other part of the Islamic world, yet it is unsuitable as a basis of an all-India polity. Whatever its value may be to the Muslims, and whatever its virtues may be in the abstract, it can only be irrelevant to all non-Muslims. However well non-Muslims may be treated in the theocratic Islamic State, they can never be other than a subordinate community, and can never be expected to obey the government, except from motives of convenience and expediency. It is the weakness of theocratic systems that they are only effective within the limits of the religions to which they belong. Theocracies can never coalesce. If the cases of Kashmir and Hyderabad, with ruling minorities and subject majorities be quoted, I should reply that they have only lasted so long because of the common peasant tradition of obedience to the de facto power. Once let western ideas filter in, or the traditional communities become conscious of themselves, and the trouble begins. The wars of religion in Europe are a
witness of what happens when government is based on theocratic ideas in a country of more than one religion.

Let us now consider for a moment the only government of the last thousand years in India that has appealed to the allegiance of something like the country as a whole—the Moghul Empire. For nearly two centuries it maintained its sway and it continued to influence profoundly the minds of men long after its actual power had disappeared. Like the Goths in the late Roman Empire, men venerated its august name, even while they were destroying it. Perhaps here, if nowhere else, we may find some light for the problems of the present.

The first basis of the Moghul empire was the personal allegiance of the Moghul chiefs to Babur, an allegiance depending upon the personality of the leader. Babur was the Moghul Führer and his system of government might have appealed to Hitler, though one wonders what the cultured warrior and lover of nature would have made of the world's champion speech-maker. The relation of Babur to his immediate followers was like that of Nelson to his captains; they were a band of brothers. Humayun's fall was due to his lack of driving personality, and his return to Delhi was due to Bairam Khan's loyalty to his house, rather than to himself. Akbar revived this element of loyalty from his immediate followers, but he introduced many other elements to the Moghul political dichotomy. First he extended the principle of loyalty from the Moghul clan to all communities, until it included not only Moghul beys, but Persian nobles, Panjabi Mussulmans, Brahmans and Rajput rajas. Loyalty was no longer first to the clan and then to the person, but to the person only. It was the "Leader" principle in excelsis. To this principle of loyalty he added the principle of Honour, by the institution of the Mansabdar system. Service of the empire was the best road to fame and fortune for the ambitious young nobleman, and many a youth, who might have striven like any medieval noble for an obscure but disruptive independence, sought instead to win greater fame in the imperial service. Added to this was the policy of religious toleration, or one might almost say, of patronage of all religions (in the first half of his reign). The merchant was won by security, and the peasant yielded
his negative loyalty to the Moghul government as he did to all other *de facto* governments. By these means the basis of the Moghul empire was transformed from that of conquest into something like general consent. To sum up, it may be said that diverging principles, which might have disrupted the empire (Hindu and Muslim) were carefully respected, while the politically energetic elements in the country were nearly all secured by a system which appealed to their actual belief and practices.

The early Moghul state was neither a Hindu raj nor an outlying province of the Islamic state, but a government based on the political realities of the time. It was perhaps the first non-theocratic state, the first purely political government in India since the age of Harsha. Its distinguishing feature is that it appealed, and appealed for long successfully, not to the religion, nor to the fears of the people, but to their political instincts only. The distinction of Sher Shah was that he anticipated this conception, though he did not have time to work it out. It is true that Akbar tried to add a distinctively religious basis to the state by the institution of his new religion. But he himself (if that indeed was his intention) was never clear whether he was to be regarded as a god like a Roman Emperor, or as the prophet of a new religion, or only as the patron of a new cult, with the result that his religion died with him. Akbar’s theory of divine right dissolved into an exhibition of sublime egotism. The so-called infallibility decree was an attempt to provide a religious basis for his government for only one section of his subjects by acquiring the prestige of the Khalifa, and as such it was not an essential part of the Moghul system of government.

Apart from these two largely abortive experiments, the Moghul empire was essentially a political state appealing to political motives from the time of Akbar to the reign of Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb, as Sir Jadunath Sarkar has shown, conceived the state once more in theocratic terms. He regarded himself as the head of the Islamic church-state in India and no more, and the inevitable though gradual result was that the non-Muslims came to regard the state as something to be obeyed only as far as needs must. Aurangzeb relied upon the Muslims, and they alone were not strong enough to hold down the rest of India.
Now I believe that the Moghul empire is not just "an old unhappy far-off tale," which can be closed with a snap in 1707, or dismissed with the terms "medieval" or "barbaric." It is an integral part of the present, and many of the forces of the Moghul age are living forces still. We should not allow our eyes to be blinded by the sun in the West. What then can we learn from the Moghul political practice?

The first principle which to my mind stands out is that the government of India must be built upon a political foundation. No appeal to religion can be made by the state, because any such appeal must sound differently in different ears. To base the state upon any one religion and hope for the allegiance of all the communities is like trying to put two eggs into one egg-cup. The Indian state must be political, not theocratic. The next lesson is that the state cannot rely upon any religious belief beyond the precept "Fear God and honour the King," and that if it interferes with religious liberty it will at once encounter opposition. This postulates religious toleration. This is so generally accepted at least in theory, that no more need be said. But the state, because it cannot appeal to a religious principle, must take care to appeal to secular interests. Such matters as Indians overseas, trade and commerce, development of all sorts, and the various kinds of welfare work, are matters of this sort in which men think as individuals, not as members of a particular group. Again, Moghul experience suggests that certain sentiments are specially deep-rooted and can be exploited politically. One such sentiment is that of loyalty and a ready response to vigorous leadership. Another is that of ambition and the hope of fame. Ambition often leads a man into the public service, and loyalty keeps him there against the ties of blood, community and even of race. A third such is what Lord Hugh Cecil calls "natural conservatism," a tendency to routine and an ingrained reluctance to change. The new India is much more likely to be afflicted with inanition and stagnation than with revolution. These are psychological factors which no statesman can afford to neglect. It would be interesting to work out, on the basis of these and other psychological traits, the reaction of India to the behaviour of various Viceroyys, a Wellesley, a Bentinck, a Curzon and an Irwin.

Apart from these lessons from Moghul political experience, there is one lesson suggested by all Indian political experience, which may
be expressed in the admonition, "put not your trust in the villages."
The village to the modern politician is like the land of Egypt to the
ancient prophet—"they that go down therein shall not come up
alive." As in the past the villagers still obey the authority which
possesses most force and which demands fewest taxes. It was no
love of Congress principles that prompted the average villager to the
non-payment of taxes.

Besides these old factors which come from the past, we must
take into account the new factors which fill so much of our attention
at the present. These forces are political in the sense that they are
not tied down to any one religion, and to that extent they are hopeful
foundation-stones of the state; but they are also to some extent super-
ficial, because they are new, often half understood, and largely confined
to the educated classes. They are conscious principles as distinct
from the more deep-rooted subconscious political sentiments we have
just been considering. Officials have often made the mistake of
denying their existence, nationalists of assuming their omnipotence.
These ideas are nationalism, democracy and the sense of ordered
justice. The strength of the nationalist sentiment makes itself felt in
every Indian when he goes abroad; its limitation is felt when it comes
into conflict with communal interests. Democracy is undoubtedly a
force in modern India, but seems to me at present a sentiment rather
than an idea, because while everyone professes belief in the word,
very few have thought out what they mean by it, or are ready to
follow out the implications of any definition they do accept. Here
again the sentiment is present, but it is not all-powerful. The sense
of ordered justice is at the root of the demand for fair play in all
departments of public life. In the past the patron was expected to
reward his client; to-day he is expected to have some regard for justice
and merit. It may be said that in practice he still rewards his clients,
as in America under the "spoils system," but, at any rate, he is now
criticised for doing it openly. And crime is expected to be punished,
even if the offender is highly placed.

Taking into account all these considerations, we may venture to
make a few suggestions towards the securing of a stable foundation of
the new Indian State. Taking first the psychological aspect: the
marked responsiveness to vigorous leadership which exists suggests a strong executive, an authoritarian government, even if it has a democratic basis. The vogue of the Führer Principle in Germany is to a large extent artificial, an expedient accepted because the Germans see no other way out of their present difficulties; in Indian it has been the foundation of all successful governments. The great periods of Indian history are all associated with specific names—Asoka, Harsha, Akbar, Dalhousie. But the new nationalist sentiment demands that this leadership must be fundamentally Indian. This is the real case for Indianisation. It is not necessary that the leadership be entirely Indian in blood, but it must be so in sentiment. Foreigners have ruled India with general acceptance before, and may do so again. The Moghul service in its higher branches was even more foreign than are the services to-day, but its outlook and sentiment were Indian. In fact the period at which it was least acceptable to the mass of the people was probably the time at which it was most Indian—in the latter part of Aurangzeb's reign. This instinct of loyalty can also be given an obvious outlet in the public services, and this has to a large extent already been done. Another factor which promotes authoritarian government is inertia, the liking to have things done for one, in which India resembles Russia. This makes people more tolerant of authority than they otherwise would be, especially if on the whole that authority is working in accordance with their own wishes.

We now come to what is perhaps the core of the problem, the question of religion and its relation to democracy. If it is assumed that no one community is strong enough permanently to dominate the others, or to swallow them up, what is to be the attitude of the State towards them? If the State is to be strictly neutral and to impose upon itself a taboo in all matters of religion, where is the line, between religion and politics—a notoriously shadowy and difficult line to discover—to be drawn? If the line is drawn too sharply, it would render impossible such reforms as the abolition of sati and hook-swinging, or the suppression of thagi; if it is too wide, it might provoke a flood of religious passion, which would shake the State to its foundations. If the State is to be really democratic, how can it avoid dealing with matters touching religion?
The first step, I believe, is to recognise that in India religions are not only credal but cultural, that they are bound up with distinct cultures with long traditions, and that it is this cultural element which makes up half the value of these religions and gives to their followers half their tenacity. What Prof. Laski calls "the fundamental morality" of a people is in India bound up with religion and differs with each religion. In compact nationalistic states there is only one fundamental morality, and that often only loosely connected with religion, in India there are several. India from this point of view must be regarded as a communitas communitatum, a community of communities, each of which is more distinct and separate even than its medieval prototype. Just as one estate in medieval Europe could not legislate or vote taxes for any but itself, one community cannot expect to legislate for another in matters which concern itself only. For in India religion is not a matter merely of attending the mosque or going to the temple, but embraces the whole intimate ritual of home and social life, of eating and drinking, of dress and social intercourse and marriage. In other words, religion includes all that makes up the "fundamental morality" of the people, and if you touch one you touch the other also. The medieval analogy is more useful than that of the millats of old imperial Turkey, for while they also recognised the oneness of culture and religion, and safeguarded the fundamental morality of a community by conferring on it a limited autonomy, yet these millats were always subordinate to the dominant power, subject communities with no voice in the affairs of the country as a whole. The communities of India must be essentially independent and equal partners in the affairs of the country as a whole.

The second step in considering these problems is the frank recognition that Rousseauite ideas of democracy and the Austrian conception of sovereignty are both out of place in such conditions as those of India. The Rousseauite democracy, with its sovereign people, its general will, and its implication of the infallibility of the majority, is the subconscious assumption of much political writing and talking to-day, and it is at the root of many political misunderstandings. If political leaders had given more attention to political principles than to the mathematics of voting and the distribution of seats, many
difficulties would have been avoided. In a society divided up into communities, each with its separate fundamental morality, there can be no sovereignty of the people in Rousseau's sense. Again Austin's "determinate human superior" may be all very well in England, where people really believe that Parliament represents themselves and must therefore be obeyed. But can we really expect people to believe the same of the Assembly? The omnipotence of Parliament is the result of centuries of slow political growth; the Assembly in India would be wise not even to talk of such a thing. The unthinking application of Rousseauism and Austinianism to Indian conditions has produced the joint-electorate controversy, the Temple Entry Bills and the Sarda Act fiasco. People have been arguing at cross purposes and forgetting realities in their enthusiasm for academic principles. In Indian conditions the new Parliamentarism is but the old Absolutism writ large.

If then we accept the "real personality" of the great communities, and so cast aside all unitary and absolutist theories of sovereignty, what is the solution to the political problem? I suggest that it is to be looked for in a form of Pluralism adapted to Indian conditions. The conception of the real personality of various groups and the consequent curtailment of the old unrestricted sovereignty of the state was discovered by Gierke in his studies of mediæval institutions, popularised and developed by Maitland, and is now being applied in the West to a variety of bodies, economic, professional and religious. Syndicalism is one development of it, Guild Socialism another, the ideas of Dr. Figgis a third. Though not yet admitted in legal theory in England, its influence is shown in a measure like the Enabling Act of the Church of England setting up a Church Assembly, and in the powers accorded to professional bodies like the British Medical Association. May we not also see a foretaste of these ideas in the Gurdwara Act of 1924? The Government must control purely political questions only, appeal to political motives only; all that affects culture or religion must constitute the sphere of functional bodies and assemblies.

There is one difficulty which will at once occur to the mind. How can such a system, it may be asked, be contemplated in India where centrifugal influences are notoriously so strong? The question is
very pertinent, for it is on the matter of the central executive that pluralists are most vague. Writers like Baker and Laski, Cole and Lindsay, while very clear as to the limitations of sovereign power, are none of them explicit as to the province of its assertion. Cole indeed, like the Syndicalists, would seem to reduce the central power to a board of conciliation. But by none of them is the relation of the state to the various groups clearly worked out. The answer is two-fold. That is why first it is necessary to qualify the word "pluralism" with the adjective "modified." For if there is no such thing as both absolute and universal sovereignty—and in India less so than in most places—there must certainly be absolute sovereignty within a limited sphere. The fact that no power is so universal as to make all men do everything (as Parliament claims to do) does not deny the possibility of a power which can make all men do some things. A power is needed which can enforce its will in certain spheres of life and conduct, and which can control the various groups when they try to stray beyond their proper provinces, which can say to them "Thus far and no farther." A ready response awaits such a power in this country. But that power must also respect the inherent liberties of the various groups. In doing so it is only recognising the realities of the situation. Such a recognition is no more than common prudence; many of the disasters which have befallen Indian governments have been precipitated by the neglect of this rule. Two principles thus emerge. The government must be supreme within a limited sphere of activity, and it must at the same time recognise the limits of its legitimate authority, outside of which the regulation of life will be carried on by the various groups—cultural, religious, professional, etc. The task before us is to discover and to delimit lucidly these various fields of activity. We have to separate the purely political from the cultural and to limit the authority of government to the former. With that limit, however, the authority of government must be unquestioned, and its leadership vigorous.

What kind of groups should be recognised in this way? Here again is a question requiring much thought. First undoubtedly would come the religious groups, but there might also be many others, such as professional groups like medical or legal associations, economic groups like trade unions or industrial guilds, occupational groups, of
which in some parts the village is an example surviving from the past, and social groups. This last raises the difficult question of the recognition of caste, which is really a question as to how far the traditional social grouping of caste remains effective and valid in the minds of the people to-day. This is a specially intricate question, because current social ideas are patently in a state of flux and transition to-day. The different kinds of groups to be recognised, that is, the different groups which have an effective hold on the mind of the people, as well as the exact liberties to be accorded to them and their relations to the State as a whole, are all problems which will have to be worked out in detail.

A further question may here be asked: In such a system will not social progress be rendered difficult or impossible? Would sati ever have been abolished, for example, under such a system? One answer, I think, is that reform will have to come from within, instead of from without; it may be slower, but it will be more certain, because voluntarily accepted by the community concerned itself. It is the old question, whether it was better to abolish slavery in the southern American states by force, or by the slower action of the South itself. You take your choice between a longer period of slavery, and the colour problem as it exists to-day in the Southern States. A second answer is that in present conditions the State could not carry a social reform in any other way. The present government is not so strong as Bentinck's; the Sarda Act has shown that the State which is omnipotent in theory is in social matters impotent in practice.

Another question may be raised as to what these proposals have to do with the new federal constitution. The answer, I think, is very little. The federalism of the new constitution is artificial in so far as it is territorial, and still more so in so far as it treats the Princes as a serious political factor. Their power rests upon little more than the negative loyalty to which I have already referred. To be real, federalism in India must be functional and not territorial.

T. G. P. Spear.
THE MISSION TO KANDAHAR, 1857-58.

The lurid light of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army in 1857 has thrown into shadow a series of important contemporary events beyond the border of India, which were related to that constant bogey of the British rulers of India in the nineteenth century, namely, the southeastern advance of Russia in Asia. A brief review of "the Russian menace to India" prior to 1857 is necessary to an understanding of the present subject.

The story begins in 1799, when Russia was at war with Persia over the disputed hinterland of Turkistan. The Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, observing the gradual Russian approach towards India, sent (Sir) John Malcolm to Teheran to arrange a commercial and political agreement between the Shah and the Government of India. But Russia was then in alliance with Great Britain in Europe against revolutionary France. Both feared the rapidly rising power of the young general Bonaparte, who had just returned from his audacious campaign in Egypt and Syria, to become First Consul and virtual dictator of France. Malcolm's treaty thus became valueless to the Shah.

During the next eight years the European kaleidoscope changed fantastically. General Bonaparte became the emperor Napoleon in 1804; in the following year he crushed Austria; in 1806 he overthrew Prussia; in 1807, after a bloody campaign against Russia, he met Alexander I at Tilsit and concluded that alliance of which we shall never know all the details. They included, however, a grandiose design of a Franco-Russian invasion of India, which profoundly disturbed the Governor-General, Lord Minto.¹ He accordingly despatched Metcalfe to conclude a defensive alliance with Maharaja Ranjit Singh; Elphinstone to Kabul to negotiate with the Sadozai Shah Shuja; and Malcolm to Teheran to arrange another treaty with the Shah of Persia; while Lord Minto also entered into a defensive agreement with the Amirs of Sindh (1809).

¹See "Lord Minto in India," pp. 100—131.
The ultimate outcome of all these negotiations proved equally melancholy. In 1810 the emperor Alexander I became estranged from Napoleon, whose power was now beginning to decline, and the French menace to India ceased to be, if it ever had been, real; but the rulers of India continued for almost a century to dread the advance of Russian power. After some delay Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe concluded the Treaty of Amritsar with Maharaja Ranjit Singh on 25th April, 1809.1 By this treaty, which was faithfully observed by Ranjit Singh during the remaining thirty years of his life, a strong buffer state was established between Afghanistan and British India.

Elphinstone, however, had scarcely arranged a similar agreement with Shah Shuja before the latter was expelled by his Barakzai rival, Dost Muhammad, and the treaty became null. Russian pressure upon Persia and Afghanistan steadily increased, but the Amir, Dost Muhammad, was consistently refused the British alliance which had been pressed upon his predecessor, and was finally compelled to negotiate with Russian emissaries, who had not ceased to court him. While Alexander Burnes was at Kabul in 1838, ostensibly upon a commercial mission, the Persians with Russian assistance laid siege to Herat, the great "inland port" of Turkistan, Persia and Afghanistan. That city was only saved by the romantic action of Eldred Pottinger, who reached it in disguise and inspired its defence.

It is impossible to understand why the British Government in India refused until 1855 to entertain the overtures of the singularly able and friendly disposed Amir Dost Muhammad, who adroitly maintained his authority in Afghanistan from 1809—with the interlude of the First Afghan War—until his death in 1863; while it persisted for a third of a century in supporting the impotent and unpopular Shah Shuja at an ultimate cost of thousands of lives, millions of pounds and disgraceful failure. In his difficulties in 1838 the Amir again pleaded with Burnes for British assistance, which was again refused. On the contrary, Lord Auckland negotiated the notorious Tripartite Treaty with the moribund Ranjit Singh and the futile Shah Shuja, which was signed at Lahore on 26th June, 1838. Shah Shuja was to be restored and maintained by force upon the throne from which he

had been expelled some thirty years before. Meanwhile, under strong diplomatic pressure from England, the Russian government withdrew its agents from Kabul, and the siege of Herat was raised by British military pressure on the Persian Gulf. The grounds of military intervention in Afghanistan were removed. Nevertheless the project of the Tripartite Treaty was executed and the lamentable First Afghan War inevitably ensued, at the conclusion of which Dost Muhammad returned to his troubled throne!

The negotiations with Persia and the Amirs of Sindh produced equally deplorable results. A fresh treaty was concluded at Teheran in 1809 with the Shah of Persia by Sir Harford Jones—who had been despatched thither from London without any reference to Minto—and Malcolm. This treaty, revised in 1814, guaranteed British support to Persia against the aggression of any European power. When Persia was again at war with Russia in 1826, the British government in India declined to implement the agreement and afterwards purchased from the Shah exemption from its obligation. Thereafter the Persian ruler might reasonably assume that he had acquired what is diplomatically termed “freedom of action.”

The solemn agreement of 1809 with the Amirs of Sindh led by gradual stages to its unscrupulous conquest and annexation in 1843—an evil procedure which has since been atoned by its beneficent administration, though the original motives of the annexation were purely selfish, namely, to control the commerce of the Indus and to “turn the flank” of Afghanistan by providing an easy approach to Kandahar.

After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 the kingdom of Lahore rapidly lapsed into political chaos, though not into military impotence, for it continued to possess the most formidable army that ever threatened the East India Company. The conduct of the First Afghan War, the annexation of Sindh, and the political corruption of the Khalsa Army by its own greedy arrogance and the unscrupulous intrigues of factious leaders made the Sikh Wars and the annexation of the Panjab in 1849 inevitable. The Company’s territory now extended to the natural boundary of India on the North-West and another phase of its relations with Afghanistan, Persia and Russia opened.
Dost Muhammad continued to maintain and even to extend his precarious authority. Afghanistan comprised four main provinces, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Bakh, but the Amir had hitherto been unable to assert effective control over any except the first of these. In 1850, however he seized Bakh, which he gave to his son M. Afzal Khan to administer, and four years later he added Kandahar to his dominion, placing it under the control of his son and heir, Ghulam Haidar Khan. But his position was more precarious than ever, for he was threatened by the Russians in the north and in the west by the Persians, with whom the dispossessed Sardars of Kandahar, his own half-brothers and nephews, were intriguing. In these circumstances he turned once more to the British and this time not in vain.

Dalhousie was now Governor-General and Sir John Lawrence, as Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, was in charge of the North-West Frontier and its external relations. Lawrence had already become convinced of the wisdom of that policy of "masterly inactivity" in respect of Afghanistan, the consistent maintenance of which would have spared the British government the grave loss of life, treasure and prestige, which was the only appreciable result of the Afghan Wars of the nineteenth century. This wise policy was strongly supported—perhaps even originated—by Herbert Edwards, who had had several years' experience of the Frontier and, since the assassination of Colonel Mackeson in 1853, had been Commissioner of Peshawar.

Edwards supported the Amir's overtures; Dalhousie welcomed them, and they resulted in the conclusion on 30th January, 1855, of a treaty signed at Peshawar by Sardar Ghulam Haidar Khan for the Amir and by Lawrence for the British government. "It guaranteed that we should respect the Amir's possessions in Afghanistan, and never interfere with them, while the Amir engaged similarly to respect British territory, and also to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies." This was the treaty which Dost Muhammad had sought for forty-six years in opposition to the wishes of the Government of India and of his own suspicious subjects.

Shortly after this event the British government became embroiled with Persia. Doubtless spurred on by the Russians, who were then engaged in war with the British and French in the Crimea, the Shah insulted and drove out the British Minister at Teheran and in the following year, 1856, still further improving the opportunity to fish in troubled waters, he sent his army to occupy Herat, in violation of a still subsisting clause of the treaty of 1814. These actions could not be tolerated. A British army was despatched in 1856 from India to the coast of Persia and inflicted a series of decisive defeats upon the Shah’s forces. By a treaty concluded on 13th March, 1857, he offered atonement and undertook to evacuate Herat and abstain from further interference in Afghanistan.

The Amir was anxious for something more concrete and helpful than the words of his treaty of 1855 and so arranged through Colonel H. B. Edwards to meet Sir John Lawrence at Peshawar. The meeting between Dost Muhammad and Lawrence took place at the mouth of the Khyber Pass on the first day of 1857. Five days later they signed a second treaty, by which the Amir engaged “on condition of receiving a monthly subsidy of one lakh of rupees, during the continuance of the hostilities with the Persians, to keep up a certain number of regular troops for the defence of Afghanistan, and agreeing that British officers should be deputed to any portion of his dominions to see that the subsidy was really applied to the purpose for which it was granted, and to assist the Afghans in every way in military matters when called on to do so.”

Lawrence arranged that three British officers should set out as soon as possible for Kandahar to satisfy themselves that the subsidy was being applied to the purpose for which it was granted and to give the Afghans whatever military assistance they required. The mission consisted of Major (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir) Harry Lumsden, who had raised and at that time commanded the famous Corps of Guides; his brother, Lieutenant (afterwards General Sir) Peter Lumsden; and Dr. H. W. Bellew, who was at that time attached to the

1 H. B. Lumsden: “The Mission to Kandahar” (Calcutta, 1860), pp. 2-3. The Ms. of this Report is to be found among the papers in the Panjab Government Record Office: Proceedings, 23rd October, 1858, Nos. 26—28 (Political).
Guides. They were accompanied by Nawab Faujdar Khan and Ghulam Sarwar Khan and an escort of Guides and Multanis.

The story of this important mission can be read not only in the official Report and its appendices, to which reference has already been made; but also in the "Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857," by H. W. Bellew, Medical Officer to the Mission, published by Smith, Elder & Co., London, in 1867; and in "Lumsden of the Guides," by General Sir Peter Lumsden and G. R. Elmslie, (Murray, London, 1899). The last named book is especially valuable, as it makes available not only Lumsden's diary of the mission and a number of his personal letters written from Afghanistan, but also a series of graphic letters written to Lumsden by H. B. Edwardes through the course of the mission, which informed him of other aspects of the matter in which he was engaged, and of the vicissitudes of the great Mutiny which ran its terrible course in his absence.

Finally Edwardes prepared the "Memorandum on the Report of the Kandahar Mission," which is here printed for the first time from the original manuscript, which is preserved in the Panjab Government Record Office and appears now by the courtesy of the Keeper of the Records, Mr. H. L. O. Garrett.

The Memorandum is of great historic interest as a presentation of the argument, convincingly maintained by Edwardes and Lumsden and strongly asserted by John Lawrence, for that policy of "masterly inactivity" in regard to Afghanistan, the later departure from which by Lord Lytton resulted once again in the depressing failure of British policy in that sphere. It cannot but be felt that, if Lytton had studied carefully and dispassionately the sequence of events and documents which is the subject of this note, instead of emulating his father's romances and entertaining that "fancy prospect ... painted on the blank wall of the future of bequeathing to India the supremacy of Central Asia," he would have avoided one of the most tragic and unjustifiable of historical repetitions—the Second Afghan War.

J. F. BRUCE.

---

1Proceedings, 23rd October, 1858, Nos. 26—28 (Political).
MEMORANDUM ON THE REPORT OF THE
CANDAHAR MISSION.

1. At the request of Sir John Lawrence, I proceed to make a few notes on this report.

2. It consists of a letter from Major H. B. Lumsden, the Chief of the Mission, dated 1st July 1858, to the address of the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, the object of which is to convey to Government in a condensed, systematic, and revised form, the general information about Afghanistan, which was collected by the Officers of the Mission during their sojourn in the Country; and which had been, from time to time roughly submitted in the Weekly Diaries. To this are annexed up Appendices treating in detail of (A) the Peywar route to Kabul; (B) the tribes along that route; (C) the tribes at the head of the Bolan Pass; (D) Affghani Field Sports; (E) the trade of Western Afghanistan; (F) Kaffiristan and its people; (G) some routes of approach from Persia to Candahar; and lastly a general and medical Report of the Mission drawn up by Dr. Bellew.

3. The objects passed in review by Major Lumsden are very various. He brings down the history of the Cabul Kingdom from the time of Elphinstone and Kaye to the present date; and taking us behind the scenes of the Ameer's Court, shows us to what a thread had at one time dwindled "the English Alliance" which kept the sword of the Affghani Nation suspended during the crisis of our helplessness in 1857; and how surely, but for the alliance, that sword would have fallen on British India. In the distance he sketches the Persian masses hovering like vultures along the Affghani frontier, in expectation of some prey, Soonnee or Christian, on so terrible a field—but falling a prey themselves to the hordes and deserts of Toorkistan. He shows how ill the late Treaty with Persia has been observed; and how the Shah is still Suzerain of Herat. He tells us of the power of the Priests in Affghanistan, and how the late Heir-apparent yielded to them at Candahar; and speculates on the struggle for the succession to the throne which must take place on the death of Dost Muhamud Khan. Admitting the faults of that Ruler, he justly says
that he has more clemency than all his predecessors and is the most remarkable man in Central Asia. He then brings before us the future combatants for the throne: the many sons of the Ameer, and the powerful chiefs. Next he arrays the military strength of Afghanistan; its regulars and irregulars; their arms, drill, pay, style of fighting, and efficiency; the oppression by which they are recruited; the dishonesty with which they are driven to plunder; and the brutal severity with which they are punished; the process by which they dispense with a commissariat; and how the Ameer breeds horses for his cavalry. A minute and valuable description is given of the lately rebuilt fort of Kelat-i-Guilzye. The inherent difficulties of Afghanistan, even under a native Government are pointed out; the deficit of its revenue and the surplus of its Chiefs. We are shown how Dost Muhamud has persistently dealt with these difficulties, and how under the process (under an Afghan who seems clement by comparison) the country is writhing in the grasp of the tax-gatherer and a standing Army. Justice is farmed out; and the morals of the nation are below description. An estimate is offered of the population of the present Kingdom of Cabul, which would make it to be only 2½* millions. The policy of the Ameer to all foreign states is explained; and from this Major Lumsden passes to the policy we ourselves ought to pursue towards Afghanistan. He grimly reminds us of our failures at Herat; exposes the fallacy of hoping for its independence; and counsels the abandonment of that political outpost; and the Military fortification of our Mountain frontier. Lastly, in a few modest words, Major Lumsden believes the Mission has been useful in its day; but advocates no more unless upon emergency; and brings to the favorable notice of Government every member of it except himself.

4. The question which gives interest to all these, and every other speculation on Afghanistan (the core as one may say of Central Asian politics), is what England ought to do about the North-West Frontier of her Indian Empire. To this Major Lumsden accordingly addresses himself as the practical conclusion of his report, in paras. 82

*I should think this was little more than half the actual population. The Ameer, in the conferences of 1857, stated his own revenue to be above 30 lakhs a year; and it is not credible that so poor a people could pay Rs. 1-4-0 a head. The revenue however is nearer 40 lakhs and I should doubt the population of the Kingdom being less than 5 millions.
to 93 inclusive; and I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing the result of my own observations during the five years I have been at Peshawar.

5. Major Lumsden first draws attention to the revived activity of Russia in the countries between us, and since his report was written we have heard of the arrival of a Russian Envoy (Monsieur Khanikoff ?) at Meshid; and the preparations to receive him at Herat with the honor due to the bearer of a subsidy. And the British Minister at Teheran has done his worst, at this critical juncture, to throw the Ruler of Herat into the arms of Russia, not only without the blame, but positively with the sympathy, of every Nation who may hear the story.

6. How then to keep Afghanistan "free of the Russian taint?"

7. Major Lumsden's conviction is "that this object will be best obtained by having as little to say to Afghans as possible, beyond maintaining friendly and intimate intercourse with the de facto Government; by never, on any account, interfering with the internal politics of the country; nor assisting any particular faction; but honestly leaving Afghans to manage their own affairs in the way that suits them best."

8. In every word of this I heartily concur. It is the basis on which we happily placed our relations with Cabul by the first Treaty of Peshawar in March 1855; and on which we have, up to this date, maintained them. The Heir-apparent of Cabul, (the late Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Khan,) was very anxious that the terms of our Treaty should be limited to the "heirs" of the Ameer; but we were careful to mark that our good will was not only for his "heirs," but "successors," provided they were friendly on their part. And throughout all the negotiations of the subsequent Treaty of January 1857, it was clearly manifested that we sided with no son of the Ameer, or faction of the Court or people; but were ready to accept the Cabul sovereign as a friend, whoever he might be; and help him with our good offices to maintain the liberty and independence of his country. We have maintained a native gentleman as Vakeel at Cabul; and we have sent a Mission of 3 British officers to Candahar, during a time of war
with Persia, to help the Afghans against their enemies; but on no occasion has there been any instance of interference, on the part of our Officers, in any of the business of the Country.

9. I quite join with Major Lumsden when (in para. 83), he advises no deputation of British Officers into Afghanistan “unless under the most pressing danger, and at the spontaneous and urgent demand of that Government itself.”

10. The conclusion to which he comes that Herat cannot be made independent; and that we have erred in not continuing the late Persian War till Herat was ceded to Cabul is one which I have, on many occasions, urged, on the ground that Cabul is to us what Persia is to Russia. It is useless to try and struggle against what is simply a law of nature. Our past failures need not be grudged or bewailed, if we will only profit by them; for nations, like individuals, must dearly purchase their experience; but what is so sad is to see that our country learns nothing from the past, and is still bent upon realizing the dream of Herat independence between Persia and Afghanistan. We have just escaped, with shame, from an intrigue which would have alienated Cabul from us by again bringing the Sudderzyes into Herat. If Herat was not to be made over to Cabul, I do not see that any better could be done with it, than leave it to its present Ruler, Sirdar Sooltan Ahmed Khan. He may be the creature of Persia; but he is at all events a Barakzye, the nephew and son-in-law of Dost Muhamud. That underneath all political struggles for selfish interests there is a sympathy and bond of union in these ties of kindred, is not to be denied. In spite of all past quarrels; in spite of having fled from the Ameer, and gone over to the Persian, and appropriated the much coveted Herat, yet in the moment of real danger, when Sooltan Ahmed Khan had countermanded the mines of a British Minister, the very first person to whom he sent off an express, and applied for counsel, was his supposed enemy the Ameer! And though Sooltan Ahmed Khan will take all he can from Persian and from Russian, and carefully keep their shadow over him to save himself from being absorbed by the Ameer; yet in his heart he will ever hate both Persian and Russian, and ever cherish the feelings of an Afghan and a Barakzye. Far different would it have been had Mr. Murray
succeeded in dethroning the present Ruler of Herat, and setting up a Suddozye. No Prince of that race could have remained many months independent of Persia, let his intentions at starting be what they may. He must necessarily fear the Ameer of Cabul; and, against the Ameer, the Shah would be his only refuge. What matter to him the squabbles of Englishmen and Russians? It was very good, he would say, of the English, to put him up; but the Shah alone could prevent his being put down. I must say, then, that I regard Mr. Murray's failure at Herat as a melancholy escape for our real interests; and now let us meddle there no more, but look around for other measures of precaution which may be prosecuted in Peace with honor, and in War with success. Major Lumsden turns for this purpose (para. 91) to our present mountain frontier on the north-west, from Peshawar to the sea; and discarding all idea of Herat being an outwork of India, he concludes that our true military position is "on our side of the passes, just where an army must debouche on the plain."

11. Amongst those passes, which are happily limited in number, he draws prominent attention to the Bolan, as the one on which all the routes from the side of Persia immediately bear.

12. But "in common prudence" he conceives that we are bound to strengthen them all, and leaving "the nature and extent of the preparations required to the General and Engineer Officers entrusted with the defence of the frontier," he justly desires, as the first and most important measure, to see Peshawar, Kohat, and Sindh brought by railroads and steamers into direct and rapid communication with the sea, which is our real base.

13. Possessed of those strategical points, and communications, a judiciously located European, and a well organized native, Army, Major Lumsden is confident that we should have at length grasped "the keys of India."

14. After the doubts and lessons of the last 5 years (which, with Afghan alliances, Russian encroachments and intrigues, a Persian War about Herat itself, and an Indian revolution, have been unusually fertile in experience) I have myself arrived very decidedly at the same conclusion. Whether led on solely by ambition and jealousy, as some think, or driven by that higher Power which works out its
decrees by human passions, it is clear that two great Christian forces are hurrying from the Caspian and the Indian Ocean towards some common centre, and rolling up the Hindoo and Mahomedan World between them. No one doubts that they will meet. All that seems doubtful is the point of meeting, and the result of the collision. The intervening space is growing narrow and the question becomes more intensely interesting every year. Each power has left to it, in this as other matters, a wide discretion; and each is bound, in reason and prudence, to survey the battle-field and choose its vantage ground. Looking at it from this purely selfish and strategical point of view, and putting out of the discussion, for the moment, all moral arguments, reflection and observation have satisfied me that it would not be wise for England to choose her battle-field above the passes. Afghanistan must be admitted to be a great physical difficulty. It is difficult to enter, difficult to conquer, difficult to hold, difficult to sustain an Army in, and most difficult of all to leave. The very Native Government of the Country lives from hand to mouth, and is savage with its own embarrassments. Finding such a country between ourselves and Russia, why should we divide the difficulty? Every mile that we advance beyond the present British border is a relief to the enemy; and is taking on our own shoulders a share of the burden which the invader ought to bear. After all, every contest is a question of resources. Experience has shown us that military operations in Afghanistan can, from the nature of the country, only be carried on at an enormous sacrifice of money. To take that expenditure on ourselves would surely be a blunder; and to throw it on the enemy the most obvious dictate of strategy. If defending a Fortress before which lay a vast morass, we certainly should not plunge into the morass ourselves, but allow the besiegers to exhaust half their strength, and lose half their material, in its toils; and then assail them as they emerged. The point would be of no moment if it involved a difference of only thousands of pounds in a great war; but it seems to me to be a question of millions; which neither England nor Russia can afford to throw away.

15. If England were once to adopt the moderate and purely defensive policy here advocated, there is little doubt that Russia
would push on her schemes in Central Asia with greatly increased vigour. But justifiable (sic) to absorb what still remains of Persian independence, Khiva, Bokhara, Kokan, Herat, and Afghanistan, I have come to think that there would be nothing in it which, as Englishmen, we should fear, or as philanthropists regret. For supposing her to be entirely successful, can anyone doubt that to substitute Russian rule for the anarchy and man-stealing of Khiva, the dark tyranny of Bokhara, the nomad barbarism of Kokan, the effeminacy and corruption of Persia, and the fanatical devilry of Afghanistan, would be anything but a great gain to mankind? And if we had ourselves, meanwhile, prepared our own frontier for defence, I do not see that we should go to war with Russia on any future occasion with any diminution of advantages. To make a diversion of any consequence in Asia, Russia must detach proportionally more of her strength than we to repel it; and the operations would be close to our base and far from hers.

16. One reason that we had for removing our struggles with Russia as far from India as possible, has, please God, been removed by the convulsions of 1857-58. Our internal power in India must now be placed on the basis of conquest; and if secure in our re-organisation, we need not fear the announcement of a European enemy in the defiles of Afghanistan.

17. But it is a very violent assumption to suppose that Russia could soon succeed in becoming our imperial neighbour; and I conceive that the policy now advocated would tend to retard such a result. Russia being herself a half-caste Tartar power has amalgamated readily with the cognate races of Asia, where they were either idolatrous, or Christian, or Armenian. In her early history, too, she forced both her yoke and her religion upon the Mahomedan tribes between the Black Sea and the Caspian. But the achievements of John the Terrible, have not been, nor are likely to be, rivalled in our day. The struggle in the Caucasus has undoubtedly been prolonged very greatly by the fanaticism of the followers of Schamil, who do not call themselves his soldiers, but his disciples. And whatever success may attend Russia in organising the nomad tribes of the Kipchak Desert and of Toorkistan, I do not think she would find the
Afghans at all an easier prey than the Circassians. The best way to prevent it is to show them that we ourselves want nothing in Afghanistan; by neither annexing, occupying, or interfering in that country; and so encouraging them to regard us as their friends, that in the hour of danger they may turn to us for pecuniary assistance. The surest way, on the other hand, to throw the Afghans into the arms of Russia would be to fix our battle-field above the Passes, and seek for strategical points in countries which do not belong to us.

18. Within the last few months I have learnt, with regret and astonishment, that the authorities in Sindh have advocated the friendly occupation of Quetta above the Bolan Pass, as a preliminary to subduing the Afghan Nation, and ultimately occupying Herat; so vast a pile of impracticable schemes seems more like some dream of conquest, than a sober system of imperial defence. The meaning of distance, the necessity of support, the physical difficulties of countries, the moral difficulties of races, past experience of them all, the future outlay involved, and the present financial position of India, seem alike defied or ignored in such astounding speculation. In the name of common sense, let us deal with the difficulties and responsibilities which we have already and economize the means which are still left at our disposal.

19. There is not in the East a more independent people than the Afghans; or one with a stranger country; and no foreign power can enter it, whether English or Russian without being an object of bitter hatred, and prolonged resistance.

20. From a policy which would throw these difficulties on us, instead of Russia, the minds of many will revert, with a sense of relief and safety, to the humbler, but far more practical, plans of Major Lumsden. The emergent probabilities of the case, and the eagerness evinced by Russia at this moment to avail herself of our difficulties in India, demand that we should not defer the question of the defence of the North-West Frontier, but take it into earnest deliberation; and having decided what is to be done, begin doing it at once; and carry it on parallel with the re-organization of the internal Government. Can we then do better than accept the position which Providence has given us? Let us neither take more Territory, nor give up what we
have. The mountain frontier which happened to us in 1849, has stood the strain of an imperial convulsion. It is still more capable, I believe, of repelling an invasion. While our Empire in India was expanding and advancing from the twenty-four Pergunnahs and the Sea to the Punjab and its mountain wall, instinct seemed to tell us not to stop and strive after a finality of frontier, by building forts midway in vast plains. But, as there must be limits to Empire as to other things, no one can I, think, take a broad view of the Map of Asia and not be satisfied that the Himalaya and the Soolimance range are Nature’s Frontier of Hindoostan. Quit it, and we shall find no other definite frontier in Central Asia. At last then we may betake ourselves to setting up, and fencing in, our boundaries; to the securing of a definite and completed Conquest by a system of Imperial Forts and military communications, worthy of the great interests to be guarded and the great dangers to be met.

21. The Grand Trunk lines of Railroad from the parts of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee, to Lahore and Peshawar, have been already decided, and partially executed; and will now no doubt be pushed on with double vigour to completion, as equally necessary for holding India, and developing its wealth. All that remains, therefore, is to crown these lines with a chain of forts from Peshawar to Kurrachee; and unite them to the railway by good roads, a bridge at Attock, and an effective flotilla of river steamers on the Indus.

22. Some able Engineer in whose judgment Government has confidence, and who had practical experience of siege operations, such a man as Lieut.-Col. Alexander Taylor, C.B., the projector of the attack on Delhi, should be deputed during this cold season, to inspect the frontier and submit a detailed plan for its military defence.

23. My own impression is that the strength of the defence may be concentrated upon the Peshawar and Shikarpoo borders; and that very subordinate measures will suffice along the majority of the line; for assuredly an Army adequate to the invasion of India must pour its masses through the Khyber or Bolan, or both, though its auxiliaries may scramble through the Peywar, Gwuleyree, and still more difficult passes in the Districts of Dehra Ghazee Khan and Sindh.
MEMO. ON THE REPORT OF THE CANDAHAR MISSION

24. I believe that the adoption of this policy, and the erection of such defensive works, would go far to assure the minds of our neighbours, not only in Afghanistan and Beloochistan, but also in Persia and Russia, that we had finally chosen our frontier, and meant to advance no farther. It would help Afghans and Beloochees to believe that our interests, as regards invasion from the West, are really one with their own. Whereas, nothing could throw such discredit on our professions of non-interference as an occupation (which we call friendly) of Quettah, which Beloochees must, in their hearts, regard as an intrusion, Afghans as a menace, and Persians and Russians as a blunder which would justify any encroachment of their own. No military occupation of a foreign soil, or nearer approach of outposts to an independent neighbour, can ever tend to real friendship. What were the feelings of Shah Soojah and the Suddozye party (to say nothing of the national party), during our stay in Afghanistan? And what are the feelings of the Romans towards the French? Surely nothing but resentment, smothered till it can be smothered no longer.

25. Before quitting this part of Major Lumsden’s report, which discusses the best policy to be pursued towards Afghanistan, I wish to urge upon Government, as the results of my own experience, the advisability of separating the Civil and Political duties of the Peshawar Commissionership. At present, the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division has the superintendence of the Judicial and Revenue Administration of the three Districts of Peshawar, Huzara and Kohat; and is also charged with the conduct of all political relations with Central Asia. The purely Civil Work of the Division is smaller, I believe, in the number of cases and letters, and in all details representable in a Statistical Return, than that of any other in the Punjab; but the embarrassments of the Pushtoo language, the barbarous nature of the people, the serious nature of their crimes, the feudal state of their society, the neighbourhood of the hills and the great importance of all questions in which the Mountain Tribes are concerned, the necessity of devoting time to free intercourse with the influential men both within and without the border, the periodical recurrence of feuds, and consequent Military operations, and the full reports which Government expect on all such frontier matters—are all disturbing
elements peculiar to the Division; and, when fairly considered, will be found to raise the actual labour of the purely civil administration quite up to, if not above, the average of the Divisions of the Punjab. Hence the Commissioner of Peshawar will always find as much, and more, than he can do, in performing the duties of his civil charge. In addition to these, however, he is called on to conduct all the relations of Government with the court of Cabul, and to keep Government informed of affairs generally in Central Asia. The time that work of any kind exacts is in proportion to the importance of the results involved in its right or wrong execution; and if the undisturbed attention of separate Officers is found indispensable (as I doubt not it is) to watch the affairs of each petty state in Rajpootana and Central India, much rather do the affairs of Afghanistan, of which the interest is necessarily both Imperial and European, demand the whole time and thought and powers of the Officer, who is charged with their conduct. I have myself found the Civil and Political duties of my office from the first very conflicting; and latterly (as we gave a definite shape to our Afghan policy, and formed an alliance with Cabul), perfectly incompatible with each other. Certainly I cannot feel that I have done justice to either, while striving industriously to do the best for both. And now that I am about to leave this post, and am no longer personally concerned, it seems due both to Government and my successor, that I should submit these conclusions for such consideration as Government may deem them to deserve.

26. There is no doubt some difficulty in separating the two Offices; but it is perfectly feasible, if desired. The Division I would recommend is as follows: The jurisdiction of the Commissioner and his subordinate Civil Officers to extend to all ordinary relations with the petty mountain tribes (almost all independent of both us and Cabul), whose country is conterminous with our own. (This would include the Ootmanzyes on the Indus, the Juddoons, the Khoodakheyl of Punjhar and Chinglec, the Boneyrees, the people of Ranizai, the Mohmunds, the Afreedees of the Khyber and Kohat Hills, the Oruckzyes, the Zymoosht, the Toorees and Bungusher of Koorrum, and the Vizeeerees). The Political Agent would deal with all beyond the above ring of border neighbours. The division is complete and practical, and precludes any collision of authority. The Political
Agent would indeed seldom have any business with any nearer neighbours than the Governor of Jellalabad, the Ameers of Cabul, Kokan, and Khiva, and the Walees of Herat, Yarkund, Kashgar, or Budukshan. It would only be occasionally that intercourse would arise between him and Swat, Bajour and Koonur.

27. His official designation might be either "Frontier Commissioner" or "Foreign Agent for the Chief Commissioner;" to whom he would be immediately subordinate.

28. The arrangement would not only be of great benefit to the Civil Administration of the Peshawar Division, but would admit of that attention being given to the procuring of intelligence from all parts of Central Asia, which has hitherto been impossible; and which the present aspect of affairs seems to render imperative. No fitter person for this important duty could perhaps be found than Major Lumsden himself, whose report is now under consideration. To every natural qualification of quick and vigilant intelligence, sound judgment, and manifold nerves, he adds long experience of the British frontier, and a personal knowledge of Affghanistan and its Rulers.

29. Major Lumsden closes his report with acknowledgments of the services of Lieut. Peter Lumsden, Dr. Bellew, Nawaub Foujdar Khan, and Gholam Sirwur Khan. Seldom perhaps have all the members of a Mission been so well adapted to their duties, or better earned the approbation of their own Government by conciliating goodwill in a Foreign Country. This Report and its appendices is the best testimony to their labors; and I hope it will be published by Government as the only way of permanently securing, for the public use, the information it contains. Of all the information of Affghanistan gained by our Officers at such horrible cost between 1838 and 1842, how little is now available to the Government itself or its Officers! The reports, the routes, the Maps, the plans of Fortresses, in what Tomb are they buried, that no one ever can refer to them? They should every one be in the office of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. We need not be the least afraid of giving information to our enemies by publishing our stories; for I believe the Russian Government itself has published Maps and travels and reports, to which we can add little or nothing.
30. Lieut. Peter Lumsden’s (modestly named) “attempt,” a map of Kaffiristan “in Appendix F”; his rough plan of the Fort of Kilat-i-Ghilzye appended to the Report itself, and his finished map of the country, between our border and Ghuznee, which appertain to Appendix A (this map was not made over to me by the Chief Commissioner, and is either with him or Captain Walker of the Trigonometrical Survey); should all be lithographed and multiplied at once, in the Office of the Surveyor-General; and then distributed where they may be useful for the public service.

31. The professional portion of Dr. Belloc’s Medical Report will be found especially valuable, and I beg to draw particular attention to it. His kindness and science seem to have conciliated a large amount of goodwill both among the Court and people.

32. Major Lumsden expresses a hope that rewards may be conferred both on Nawaub Founjdar Khan and Gholam Sirwur Khan. For the former I have already submitted a proposition to the Chief Commissioner, in my No. 3 of August 11th, 1858. Ghulam Sirwar Khan has a cash pension from Government of 200 Rs. a month, for his Military Services at Mooltan, where he lost his right arm. He also had a garden called “Pooranah Bagh” at Shoojabad, in the Mooltan District, valued at 1,000 Rs. a year, conferred upon him at the same time, in perpetuity. The Khan desires that this garden in the Mooltan District may be exchanged for a Jageer of the same value and similar in perpetuity, in the District of Dehra Ishmael Khan where he resides. The request is a very modest one, and I beg to add to it that the title of “Khan Buhadoor” may be conferred upon the Khan (than whom no braver soldier ever struck a blow for us), with a Khillut of Rs. 1,000 and a sunnad from the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General, expressive of these marks of approval and confidence.

33. Lastly, Major Lumsden solicits a donation of 18 months batta for the Escort of Guides and Moollanies, Horse and Foot, who accompanied the Mission, and as it was always proposed that a present should be given them on the Return of the Mission, and their position during their 18 months residence in the Kabul territories proved more critical than was ever anticipated, I heartily support the recommendation.
34. For the British Officers of the Mission no doubt the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General will himself devise the most appropriate remarks.

Peshawar Division,
Commissioner's Office,
Abbottabad, Huzara:

11th September, 1858.

Herbert Edwardes,
Commissioner.
ROYAL TITLES IN THE PANJAB HILLS

Titles bearing the meaning of authority, in one form or another, must always have been in existence among communities of mankind from the most remote times in human history; we find many such titles in the hills. Most of them are known to be of ancient origin. Anterior to the advent of the Aryan tribes the hills are believed to have been inhabited by races of Kolarian and Dravidian stock, and traces of these are still found in the names and languages in use. That they had among them leaders bearing distinctive titles we may well assume, and it seems not improbable that one of the titles still current may date from those ancient times. We may conclude, for example, with a fair degree of certainty, that the titles borne by the Aryan rulers, on their arrival in India, were derived from one or other of the various dialects spoken among them, and may thus by a process of elimination, ascertain if any title, now in use, cannot be rightly included in those titles, as not being of Sanskritic origin. Of the many with which we are familiar there is only one that cannot be so regarded. This is the title of Thākur, meaning “Lord,” of which the ancient form was thakkura, and in this sense it is applied to Vishnu and Krishna in Hindu Mythology. Thakkura is a Sanskritised rather than a Sanskrit word and of uncertain origin. It was in use in early times as the title of a petty chief in the hills, and is still borne by some of the chiefs among the Simla Hill States. It is also found in Kulu, Mandi and Suket, and other parts of the hills, as the designation of local landholders not now exercising any authority, but many of whose ancestors were traditionally and even historically petty chiefs. It is also in use as the title of a ruler in several of the principalities of Kathiawar, and is borne by the Rajput nobility in Rajputana. In ancient times it was prevalent over a wide area. In the Rājatarangini, or History of Kashmir, we read of the Thakkuras of the Chandrābhāga Valley and of Lohara, the ancient name of Punch State. There were also Thakkura dynasties in Nepāl in the early centuries of the Christian era, and from the widespread distribution of the title, as a caste name in the hills, it seems reasonable to regard it as of very ancient origin.
The suggestion seems admissible that it may have been the primitive title, or one of the primitive titles, among the pre-Aryan races of ancient India. As a caste name in the hills it ranks socially below that of Rājpūt and Thakkurs, as they are still called, do not claim equal social status with that caste. They rank as a superior section of the Rāthi caste, immediately below the Rājpūts.

The Rāthīs and cognate tribes, such as Kanets, Girths and others, were undoubtedly settled in the hills long before the Brahmans and Rājpūts appeared on the scene. Even at the present time the census enumeration shows a great preponderance of the lower high castes over the higher, that came at a later time into the hills. In Chamba, for example, while the Rājpūts only number four or five thousand, the Thakkur and Rāthī castes form more than one half of the high caste inhabitants and are the backbone of the population. They are commonly regarded as almost indigenous to the hills or indigenous by the half-blood, and must have preceded the Rājpūts by a long period of time; as they themselves were preceded by the aborigines, now probably largely represented by the low caste tribes.

In popular tradition another class of ancient rulers—called Rānūs—is also included in the Apthākuri period, as the period of their rule is called. They were of Rājpūt origin and must have acquired power at a later time, possibly by dispossessing many of the Thakkura rulers. It is a significant fact that their descendants at the present time bear only a small proportion to those of the Thakkurs, even if we allow for a probability that many of the Rāthīs now return themselves as Thakkurs. With all these considerations before us, it seems not improbable that the title of Thakkura was in force among the ancient peoples and is the oldest royal title in the hills. There can be little doubt that it was originally borne only by the rulers, but in time it lost its distinctive and restricted character and was applied to his kinsmen, and finally degenerated into a caste name. As such, however, it is still used in its ancient form, while the later form of Thākur is purely a title.

The period when these ancient rulers held sway in the hills is called Apthākuri or Apthākurāi—that is, "independent lordship" and all tradition in the hills affirms that they ruled before the ancestors of the Rājpūt rulers appeared on the scene.
As already mentioned, tradition associates with the Thakkurs—another class of petty rulers called Rānās, as having held power in ancient times, and in some places down to a comparatively recent period. The name is found in Sanskrit literature and copper-plate deeds and inscriptions, in the form of rājānakā.

This name is also a Sanskritised rather than a true Sanskrit word and seems to be derived from the accusative singular—rājan—now rājā.*

The title rāna in ancient times was not confined to the hills, for the rulers of Chitor bore it, as their descendant, the Mahārānā of Udaipur, does at the present time, as well as the ruler of Dholpur. It is mentioned in the Rājatarangini in its ancient form. The Rānās were widely distributed in the hills, and some of their posterity still remain in the possession of a portion of the family patrimony. Most of them have been reduced to the position of common farmers, recognisable only by the title they still bear, which is freely accorded to them, and is now a caste name.

Several of the rulers among the Simla Hill States bear this title, while some who formerly bore it have recently received the title of Rājā from Government. The Rānās were considered to be of Aryan descent and are called Kshatriyas, that is, Rājpūts, in the record, as they still are. They must therefore have acquired dominion in the hills at a much later time than Thakkurs, and their family histories and traditions confirm this conclusion.

In Kashmir the title borne by the local barons, corresponding very much to the Thakkurs and Rānās in other parts, was Dāmara, and they belonged to a class of cultivators called Lavanā, similar to the Rāthis in social status. The Dāmaras are first referred to in the Rājatarangini about A. D. 700, as hereditary landholders, of whose growing influence the ruler of the time entertained well-grounded suspicions. Their power went on increasing for several centuries till they became a menace to the royal house, and Raja Harsha (A. D. 1081—1101) had many of them massacred. The title is of uncertain origin and was confined to Kashmir.

* The title rājā found on coins must stand for rājāna, the double consonant being commonly rendered by a single letter in early inscriptions. The Pali from rājāna corresponds to rājāya.
The independent rule of these ancient rulers came to an end at a much earlier period in some parts of the hills than in others. In Kāŋgrā for example this must have occurred at a remote time. But even after becoming subject to the Rājās they continued to enjoy great authority as "barons of the hills." The name by which they are then indicated in the inscriptions is Sāmanta. The domain of a Thakkur was called Thakuri and of a Rana—rankhu, and his son bore the title of rānaputra. Ferishta states that a Rājā of Kanauj overran the hills from Kumaun to Jammu and subdued 500 of these chiefs. This event is referred to the early centuries of the Christian era, but this number must have been only a moiety of the sum total, as there may have been 100 in the Chamba area alone.

In later times the title of Rānā bore an inferior meaning, as "almost a king," but at an earlier period it must have been on a level with that of Rājī, as an independent ruler, for it was borne by the rulers of Udaipur, originally Chitor, from an early period, as it still is.

Traditionally these petty chiefs have a very unfortunate reputation in the hills as quarrelsome and contentious among themselves, rendering them an easy prey to the founders of the Rājpūt States, by whom they were made tributary or expelled from their domains.

Of the royal titles of Aryan origin that of Rājā is the oldest and is found in Sanskrit Literature of the earliest Vedic times. The Latin rex corresponds to a shorter form, as rāj, which occurs in Sanskrit, but only in compound nouns, such as dēva-rāj (King of the gods), that is, Indra; and nāga-rāj (King of the Nīgas). Though in use on the plains from the earliest Aryan times, the title of Rājā does not seem to have been introduced into the hills till after the founding of the Rājpūt States, except in Kāŋgrā, originally called Trigarta, and Jammu, originally called Durgara, as it certainly also was in Kashmir from a very early period.

The title of Mahārājā is also very ancient as that of a paramount ruler, later also in the form of Mahārājādhirājā ("king of kings").

The title of an heir-apparent in ancient times and down to a later date was Yuva-rājā meaning "the young king." It is found in the great Epics but in a more or less restricted sense, as that of an heir-
apparent associated with the Rājā in the rule of the State. The full form of Yuvā is Yuvan—the n being silent—at once suggesting its connection with Latin juvenis (comparative: Jūnior), Urdu jawān. This very ancient title is found in Sanskrit Literature and on the copper-plate deeds, and is still in use in some South Indian States, especially Mysore and Travancore. In the Panjāb it was displaced in favour of Tikā in the sixteenth century. It is now being restored under the abbreviated form of Yuvrāj—a more appropriate form would be Yuvrāj, in keeping with ancient custom, if the ancient form of Yuvrāja is not preferred.

The title of Tikā is derived from Sanskrit tilaka, the mark on the forehead at the time of installation—hence the term rāj-tilak, for the ceremony. The title Tikā is applicable only to the son of a ruling chief, as heir-apparent to his father; other sons are called Dothain, Tirthai, etc.

The title of Kumāra, meaning infant or child, is also very ancient, though less so than Yuvrāja, and is found in Sanskrit literature. Like the Spanish enfante, it was applied to a king’s son, but with a general meaning. In order to make it definite the term Rājā-kumāra or Mahārājakumāra was used in the Gupta period (A. D. 300—600) to denote a prince, and also in the same restricted sense as Yuvrāja, that is “Crown Prince,” associated with the ruler in power. It is now in use as Rāj-kumār and Mahārāj-kumār.

It may be of interest to note that in the Gupta period references occur on title-deeds to a class of high officials or ministers called Kumārāmatya (kumāra-āmātya), attached to the person of the Crown Prince, in contradistinction to Rājāmatya or ministers attached to the Rājā.

The modern forms of Kumāra in use are Kunwar and Kaūr.

The oldest term of all applied to a Rājā’s son was simply rājaputra, with a general meaning as including all the sons of a ruling chief. Originally it must have been restricted to them, but must soon have lost this significance by being assumed more generally by kinsmen, till it finally became applicable to anyone claiming royal descent,
and thus became a caste name. That this was the real origin of the Rājpūt caste there can be little doubt.

For three centuries the honorific title of Miān—a word of Persian origin—has been prevalent in the Western hills, between the Satluj and the Chinab, for Rājpūts. It is believed to mean “Prince,” and is said to have been conferred by Jahāngīr on the twenty-two young princes in residence at his court as hostages for the fidelity of the ruling Chiefs within that area. Originally restricted to them, it in time acquired a wider signification like other titles in India, and is now applied to all the kinsmen of these royal families, and even in a wider meaning. Sometime ago the late Mahārājā of Kashmir issued an order abolishing its use within his territory, and restoring the ancient title of Thakkura—in the form of Thākur, but the cognomen of Miān remains in use to the east of the Rāvi.

In the inscriptions where the name of a ruling chief occurs, it is usually combined with the word Deva, and in the case of a Rānī with Devi, in the same manner as rex and regina are in use in our royal family. The present forms are dev and deī, in common use in the general community.

Though never used as a title, the ancient name of the Warrior Caste has close association with the titles of the ancient rulers. That name was Kshatriya. The name is derived from Sanskrit Kshatra, meaning “rule” and thus bears the meaning of “One who rules,” or a ruler. The modern pronunciation is Khatrī, and the members of the Khatri caste—mostly engaged in agriculture or trade and commerce—continue to pronounce the name as in former times, as they must always have done. They claim to be descended from the ancient caste, and possibly the change in name to Chhatri was meant to distinguish them from the upper section, maintaining the old traditions of the caste. To the Rājpūt, as to the Kshatriya, his typical weapon was the sword and his typical occupation was war. Any other kind of handicraft was the insignia of an inferior calling, involving social ostracism on any member of the community who handled it in any way. To the present time, among the Rājpūts of the hills, any member

---

1 Down to the present day the Gaddis of the Upper Ravi Valley pronounce the letter s as š and ś as šš gutteral initial and medial very much as ch in toch.
of the caste engaging in agriculture is called *hal-bāh* (ploughman), a stigma on himself and his family, and in former times it meant social ostracism almost amounting to exclusion from the caste. These restrictions have been much relaxed.

J. Hutchison.

J. Ph. Vogel.
MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH AND THE SECOND SIKH WAR

Sir Lepel Griffin makes the following statement in regard to the conduct of Maharaja Gulab Singh during the Second Sikh War: "Although the proof of Gulab Singh's complicity in the rebellion might fail to satisfy a court of law, yet there is sufficient evidence for history to decide against him."

In the first place, Griffin considers, there was the general belief at the time shared even by Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, that Gulab Singh was the instigator of the rebellion, and that against his will Chhattar Singh Attariwala would not have raised his hand. Then the evidence of Hira Nand, the agent sent by Chhattar Singh to the Maharaja, recorded by John Lawrence in October, 1849, though in many parts exaggerated and contradictory, bore the general stamp of truth. Hira Nand did not appear to have had any reason for accusing the Maharaja unjustly, and his evidence was confirmed in many important particulars by other witnesses whose depositions were subsequently taken. Finally, Sir Lepel observes no documentary evidence of any importance was discovered; but the most wily of men was not likely to commit himself by writing what might be verbally explained, or expressed by a sign or by the pressure of finger.

As against the opinion expressed above we have the evidence of Sir George Clerk who, writing in March, 1849, immediately after the rebellion, stated that he had tried very severely the loyalty of Gulab Singh on many occasions and found him true.

It is possible for us now to dispose of the question of the complicity of Maharaja Gulab Singh in the rebellion of 1848-49 by examining the Miscellaneous MSS. File No. 14 in the Panjab Government Record Office. The file which is entitled "Trial of Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir" contains the following documents: (a) minute by the President of the Board of Administration on the evidence given by

---

2 Ibid.
4 Quoted also in *Gulab Singh* by K. M. Panikkar, pp. 127-129. Martin Hopkinson Ltd., London. 1930.
Hira Nand and others, and on the correspondence found in the houses of Chhatar Singh and Hakim Rai, (b) minute by John Lawrence, (c) minute by C. G. Mansel, and (d) forty-one appendices containing the depositions of Hira Nand and others.

John Lawrence, in his minute, tried to implicate Maharaja Gulab Singh in the Second Sikh War by bringing two definite allegations against him, viz., (a) that he aided the Sikh rebels by his advice, and (b) that he wished for their success. On the other hand, Sir Henry Lawrence tried to defend the Maharaja by saying that all his hopes and desires during the crisis of 1848-49 were for the success of the British cause, which he identified with his own well-being and very existence.

The minutes of the President and the members of the Board of Administration together with the relevant papers on the subject were forwarded to the Governor-General on 1st November, 1850, for his consideration and final orders.

Lord Dalhousie after going into the papers carefully expressed his opinion that "it is impossible to pronounce with certainty what may have been in the Maharaja's mind during the progress of the late campaign, what his real wishes, his hopes or his fears. But it is only just to His Highness to admit that the documents contain no proof that the Maharaja's wishes were with our enemies, or that he was actively exciting them to the injury of the British power."

The Governor-General, therefore, proposed merely to record the documents and letters which had been transmitted to the Government together with the reasons which induced him to determine that no action should be founded upon them, and that the then existing relations of friendship between His Highness and the Government of India should not be interrupted by anything contained in those papers.

R. R. Sethi.

---

1 A few extracts from Sir Henry Lawrence's minute which runs to 90 pages are appended to this note.
2 John Lawrence himself recorded the evidence of Hira Nand and others. His minute is reproduced in full here.
3 C. G. Mansel has very little to contribute on the subject in his minute.
4 Vide minute by John Lawrence.
5 Vide extracts from the minute by Sir Henry Lawrence.
6 Letter No. 74, dated 13th November, 1850. From E. C. Bayley, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General-to-The Board of Administration for the Affairs of the Panjab.
7 Ibid.
MINUTE BY JOHN LAWRENCE.*

1. The evidence marginally-noted was recorded by me under the following circumstances.

2. In the month of May, 1849, Hira Nand, a Brahmin, arrived at Lahore under escort from Maharaja Goolab Singh. He was known to have been a vakeel from Sirdar Chuttur Singh to Maharaja Goolab Singh, and to have been several months in that capacity in Cashmere. As such, he was examined by the President of the Board, and, as he refused to make any explanations he was placed under restraint.

3. I had no intercourse with the man, and, to my knowledge, I had never seen him until after Chutter Singh’s arrest, when he sent me word that he wished to see me. I accordingly sent for him, when he said that he had heard of Chutter Singh’s and his son’s arrest; that hitherto he had kept silence, not wishing to hurt them but that now, if he was assured of a pardon for the past, he would tell all he knew.

4. I made him the desired assurance, on which he gave his evidence as recorded in the document marked I.

I was at this time in direct communication with the most Noble, the Governor-General, regarding the arrest of the Sikh Sirdars and other matters connected with their safe custody. I addressed His Lordship, and was authorized to pursue the investigation. I accordingly summoned the different parties, whose evidence Hera Nand asserted, would confirm the statement.

5. Maharaja Goolab Singh had been written to more than once both by Sir F. Currie and Sir H. Lawrence to give up Hera Nand, but their requisitions were not complied with until May, 1849.

* The minute is in John Lawrence’s own handwriting.
6. I fully admit that the evidence of Hera Nand is to be received with caution. He had, however, every inducement to tell the truth, but I cannot see that he had any to fabricate a story against the Maharaja.

No one at Lahore, that I am aware of, had sought, since the war, to fix any accusation on His Highness, and, if such was the case, I do not see why Hera Nand should conceive that a series of accusations against the Maharaja would gain him favor. Hera Nand, though intelligent, is nearly illiterate; he can only write a little in Goormukhee. His evidence in my judgment bears internal evidence of being true in its main points.

7. Hera Nand’s reasons for silence, in the first instance, and his subsequent admissions are consistent with probability.

He was Sirdar Chutter Singh’s trusted servant, and, as such, as long as his master had a chance of benefiting by his silence, he refused to reveal the secrets of his mission. When Chutter Singh was arrested, Hera Nand naturally felt that the time was come when he might benefit himself without injuring his employer.

8. The evidence of Hera Nand is corroborated, in many essential particulars, by the depositions which were subsequently recorded. The majority of the witnesses were between two and three hundred miles distant from him and he could not have seen any of them for months. Moreover the documents found in Chutter Singh’s house, selected translations of which accompany this memorandum, show that the individuals named by Hera Nand were employed and trusted by the Maharaja and Chutter Singh.

9. On the 30th October, 1849, I paid Sirdar Chutter Singh a visit, and, in presence of Major Edwardes and Dr. Login, questioned him and his son Raja Shere Singh, regarding Hera Nand’s deputation to Cashmere, and regarding the documents found in the Sardar’s house, subsequent to his arrest, by Lt. Hodson.

10. At this interview, the original of the documents marked I and A were shown to them. Chutter Singh cannot write, and read but indifferently. He remarked that he did not recollect having received the paper marked A and that it must have been received previous to
the war. The other paper in which the following expression occurs "the English shall go to their own possessions, and the Afghans to theirs," he denied all knowledge of.

11. Sher Singh, however, read the paper himself out loud, and at once admitted that it was written in Jawala Sahai's* handwriting, and must relate to matters which had occurred since the Sutlej campaign. On his father's asserting that the Maharaja had never written to him, the son replied that this was not correct, and instanced a letter signed "Ram Singh" and which had been received during the war, and was lost with other papers at the battle of Goorat. Chutter Singh did not deny the receipt of such a paper, but remarked "verbal messages were sent, not letters," and that he had no proof that a letter signed "Ram Singh" was from the Maharaja.

Sher Singh replied, that his father knew very well where it came from.

12. It is objected that Shere Singh is a notorious liar. I am not aware that he is particularly obnoxious to such a charge. I believe that there are few Sirdars of any race in India, whose unsupported testimony would be worthy of implicit credence. But the fact is undoubted that the papers were found among Chutter Singh's effects in his own house, and that the remark in one of them regarding the British and the Afghans could only apply to a period subsequent to the Sutlej campaign, and most probably to one of a late date.

13. Lieut.-Col. G. Lawrence attests that during his captivity Shere Singh repeatedly stated that he did not receive letters from the Maharaja; and the President understood him to have said the same thing at the interview, when he first arrived at Lahore, after the war, and gave up the letter from the Maharanee.

14. I was present at the interview, and I simply understood him to say that the letter he produced was the only one he had then left. I recalled perfectly a remark of his on that occasion, to the effect that he had received communication from all parties, and that, had he got to Lahore, not two men would have remained with the English, one of whom he named as Raja Tej Singh.

*Jawala Sahai was Maharaja Gulab Singh's confidential agent in all diplomatic business—"Gulab Singh" by K. M. Panikkar (1930), p. 163.
15. The question, however, does not seem to me to hinge simply on his veracity.

16. The result of the interview with Sirdar Chutter and Raja Shere Singh gave Major Edwardes, Dr. Login and myself the impression that Shere Singh was bitterly hostile to the Maharaja, whereas Chutter Singh was unwilling to say a word against His Highness.

17. If the hostility of Shere Singh is adduced as a sufficient reason why he should falsely accuse the Maharaja, that hostility can only have been excited in consequence of His Highness’ shortcomings during the war; for previously, as the cherished friend of his father, he could not have had any such feelings towards him. The ill-feeling equally existed when Shere Singh arrived at Lahore after the conclusion of the war.

18. If Shere Singh did, then, and before Lieut.-Colonel George Lawrence, assert that he had never received letters from the Maharaja, in the first place it is quite possible that his father had, unknown to him, for until a few days before the battle of Chillianwala, they had not met. Moreover, it is not impossible that, until Shere Singh’s arrest in October, he still hoped that the Maharaja might one day be of use to them. It is, however, a vain task to endeavour to account for the reasons which induced a native to make this or that statement. They would often find it difficult to account themselves for a given line of conduct, and reasons, which to them are conclusive, appear to us to be absurd.

19. Both Sirdar Chutter Singh and Raja Shere Singh, during their interview with me, denied having received any money from the Maharaja. On the same evening, however, Dr. Login, wrote me a note saying that Chutter Singh had sent for him and explained that his son Antar Singh had received 10,000 Hari Singhee rupees, thus corroborating Hera Nand’s evidence.

20. At the close of the conversation with Shere Singh he remarked “If the Maharaja was your friend, why did he not seize the Ladua Chief, and why did he allow him to remain two months in his Territory? He knew him to be criminal. The Maharaja allowed us to bring provisions from his territory, hundreds of our camels went daily to Meerpoor, where his troops were, and purchased food.”
21. It may be replied that no chief will surrender a fugitive, that the Maharaja’s army was in a false position, and might have been destroyed by the Sikh army. My answer is that Maharaja Golab Singh did surrender fugitives. Shortly after the battle of Goojrat, when the terrors of that action were in full strength, he seized both Ram Singh and the Wazeer Ichhar Singh of the Juswan Dhoon, and, as regards his army, if it was in danger, he was an able enough soldier to take up a safe position in such a strong country as that he holds, if he conceived that the troops were in danger. That a chief so astute, and so experienced in warlike affairs, should keep his army within a couple of marches of an enemy of ten times his force, would lead one to suppose that he had little to fear.

22. Dewan Jawala Sahai, the alleged writer of some of the letters, is, as is well known, the confidential Minister of the Maharaja, and his brother Hari Chand commanded His Highness’s Troops at Meerpore during the war.

23. The term “Mooluk” (country) in the letter marked A would be used by a great chief rather than by a petty Sirdar.

The autograph Siri-ramji is known to be that of the Maharaja, and there are counterparts in the Board’s office and among the records of the late Durbar.

24. It is known that Chutter Singh was a sworn friend of Maharaja Golab Singh. When his brother Jye Singh died, His Highness induced Maharaja Ranjeet Singh to confer on him half Jye Singh’s jager, to the prejudice of that chief’s son; when the latter died, he got the whole made over to Chutter Singh. Chutter Singh in return supported the Maharaja in the difficulty of 1844. In fact the two men were sworn friends. It is the general opinion, not only that Chutter Singh would not have undertaken any great design without consulting the Maharaja, but that the latter could have dissuaded him from any enterprise.

25. From the letter found among Gooroo Maharaja Singh’s effects, a translation of which was forwarded to Government with Major Burn’s letter No. 79, dated the 28th of February, it is clear that Dost Muhammad Khan of Cabul considered the Maharaja to have instigated Chutter Singh in the late war.
26. From the published papers relating to the war, many selections can be made showing that Maharaja Golab Singh was not a true ally to us during that period.

I have no prejudice against His Highness, and at the time he was most loudly accused of complicity with our enemies, I publicly stated that I was satisfied with the aid his people had given me during one of Ram Singh's inroads into the Trans-Sutlej Territory. But I never conversed with a native, high or low, either during or since the war, who professed to know anything of the matter, who did not assert that the Maharaja was secretly abetting the insurgents.

27. Such was not a mere opinion, but people acted on it. Ram Singh of Noopoor, on the occasion of both his inroads, marched through the Jummoo Territory, on the occasion of his defeats, he fled there. Ichhar, the Juswan Wazeer, did the same. Meean Bijah Singh of Seba, who is a connection of the Maharaja's took refuge in Jummoo.

I may add that the Juswan Raja, one of the principals in the Juswan disturbances, is also a connection of his. Lt. Hodson in the month of January, 1849, publicly reported that Umour Singh Munas and Ram Singh of Noopore had marched through the Jummoo Territory, not only without molestation, but without notice being sent that officer. He also reported that the families of Dewan Hakim Rai and his sons were there living in security. These statements I have reason to know were correct. In looking over Dewan Hakim Rai's papers and accounts in October last, I found proof that his family had sought refuge in the Jummoo Territory.

28. On the 6th October, the Resident of Lahore states that, besides the "universal belief" and "assertion" of the rebels, one whole Regiment of Maharaja Golab Singh's and two hundred and fifty men of another joined the insurgents.3

---


3 Vide Parliamentary Papers relating to the Panjab, 1847-49, p. 382. The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.
29. In that letter the Resident says that he had permitted the Maharaja at his own request to attack the enemy, but we never hear that he did so.

30. Government subsequently called on him, in a most solemn way, to play the part, not of a neutral, but of an ally, and to act against the insurgents on their anticipated defeat and retreat across the Jhelum; I am not aware that he did anything.

31. In opposition to Hera Nand's evidence, corroborated as it is by the documents and evidence now filed with this paper, and to the facts recorded in the Resident's letter of the 6th October, added to the strong probability arising from the Maharaja's friendship to Chatter Singh, and his fear of us, I know of no substantial acts of His Highness in our behalf, except that he sent a sum of money and four guns to Captain (now Major) J. Abbott. He doubtless deserves credit for so doing. But it must be recollected that he owed our Government several lakhs of rupees at the time, and could not, therefore, have well refused to send the money, without virtually declaring war. Major Abbott himself asserted that the Maharaja's troops "had mutinied by orders from Cashmere."

32. I think that the Maharaja's conduct in supplying Major Abbott with guns and treasure on the one hand, and abetting the Sikhs on the other, however, inconsistent in our eyes, is consonant to the wily and tortuous line of policy the Maharaja has pursued through life. Though a good and brave soldier, he has invariably pursued his objects by fraud rather than by force, and has seldom fought when he could avoid it. His principle has usually been to put others forward, and to keep behind the scenes till success was secured.

However valuable, on moral considerations, was the defence of Major Abbott in Huzara, his success or failure, could not have affected the results of the war, whereas, by giving him a little aid, the Maharaja, as it were, was securing for himself one instance, in case of need, which he could truly point out as the proof of his having acted the part of a real ally.

That he is fonder of intriguing than fighting was clearly shown in the Cashmere affair of 1846, when he allowed himself to be beaten
by Sheikh Imam-ud-Din, and when he doubted and hesitated, neither refusing nor accepting our aid, until our troops, almost against his will, occupied his territory, and he was literally dragged up to Cashmere by our Officers.¹

In conclusion, I hereby record that, in my judgment, though no overt act of hostility is proven against the Maharaja, yet, I have no doubt from the above facts and reasons, that he was in correspondence with the Chief Sikh Sirdars in the late war; that he aided them with his advice, and wished for their success, and that, while offering his services to the British Government, and protesting in his allegiance, he allowed the enemy to draw supplies from his territory.

LAHORE: Sd./ JOHN LAWRENCE.
4th May, 1850.

Extracts from the minute by Sir Henry Lawrence.

Para. 3.—As my judgment on those points, wherein I consider the Jummoo Government guilty, is much less severe than that of Mr. John Lawrence; and as without exculpating the Maharaja I find many palliating circumstances in his position and character, as well as in our own conduct of the war, I must, at some length, go over the ground already traversed by my colleague, premising, however, that I wholly protest against the third and fourth clauses of his opinion. I do not believe that the Maharaja aided the enemy by his advice, and I am, not only, not of opinion that he wished well to their cause, but I believe that he dreaded our possible discomfort, as a sure prelude to his own.

The evidence adduced may enable us to judge of the fact, whether he did give advice or not, but I question its being within the province of a judicial inquiry, to pronounce decidedly on his, or on any man's wishes, although acts, probabilities and interests may assist us in coming to a reasonable conclusion; if he did little service for us, during the war, he did literally nothing for the enemy. If his scanty and partial supports of us be declared hostility, his absolutely negative aid to the enemy, cannot in fairness, be pronounced friendship.

Para. 4.—I am further of opinion that any shortcomings in the services the Maharaja ought to have performed, any civilities shown to emissaries from the rebels, and any supplies sent through those emissaries, were solely and entirely caused by his fears for himself, arising from the scanty and imperfect success of our arms, during the early stages of the war; and from apprehension that as the villages around our Head Quarter Camp were, up to the battle of Gojrat, abandoned to the mercy of the Sikhs, so might a temporary retirement of our troops from Lahore open a road into Cashmere and Jummo to the Sikhs, the enemies of his family, and to the Afghans, panting to recover their own possessions.

Para. 5.—When we are told that a man, who has always acted with a view to his own interests, without respect to kindred, religion, or old friendship, who powerfully aided us at Peshawar, when the Sikh army jeered us to our faces, and sought only for occasion of hostility, who for his own purposes opposed his own nephew, when minister of Lahore, who separated himself from the Sikh cause, when it was strong, because he knew we were stronger, when we are told that such a man, on any pretext, whether of faith, friendship, or old connexion, has taken up that same Sikh cause when it was weak, forgetting old injuries, the blood of his son and of his nearest relatives, his own surrender, captivity, and heavy ransom, and equally unmindful, not only, of great and unexpected favours but (notwithstanding present appearances) of the undiminished power of the donors, when such strange conduct is asserted, we are bound closely to scrutinize the evidence, and to give the benefits of our doubts to the accused.

Para. 6.—But even assuming for a moment that the Maharaja is entirely devoid of gratitude, honesty, and all such human feelings, and further admitting that we cannot read the heart, or judge a native of India by European standards, we can at least judge of the present by the past, and if convinced by such a review that Gulab Singh had everything to hope from us, everything to fear from our enemy, we may fairly acquit him of the treachery laid to his charge, till we have conclusive proof of his guilt.
[Sir Henry Lawrence then proceeds in his minute to analyse the evidence taken by John Lawrence, as well as the letters found in Chattar Singh’s and Hakim Rai’s houses.]

Para. 37.—Mr. John Lawrence considers it clear that Dost Mohd. believed Gulab Singh to have stirred up the war. I will not say that the Amir did not, but I must say that, if he did he rested his belief on much slighter evidence than so sagacious a man might be supposed to demand, before entering on so hazardous a project. From his dilatory and cautious conduct at the beginning, as well as from the little respect he placed to Sikh or Hindu prejudices it rather seems probable that he emerged from the Khyber on a general venture, intending to be guided by circumstances as to which party he should join.

Para. 73.—I have now gone through a mass of conflicting evidence which bears a different aspect to me and to my colleague. Neither of us assume the inherent veracity of the witnesses before us. We can but sift and compare their testimony, and then judge how far it is borne out by facts and probabilities. This I have done attentively aided by considerable local experience, and the result is that I am compelled to differ from Mr. John Lawrence’s opinion, that the Maharaja “aided the chief Sikh Sardars with his advice, and wished for their success.”

Para. 80.—Sir Henry Lawrence concludes his minute by saying: “In fine though Maharaja Gulab Singh did not venture to cut himself off from all possibility of making terms with the rebels, had they succeeded, I am persuaded that all his hopes and desires were for the success of our cause, which he identified with his own well-being, and very existence. I do not positively assert that he is innocent of the offences laid to his charge, it is at all times difficult to prove a negative. But I have given many and cogent reasons why he should not have acted, as accused, and I believe that I have shown that the evidence and letters, now under review contain neither moral nor judicial proof of his guilt. Gulab Singh is now our friend; and, if ever he becomes our foe, it will be from fears for his own safety.”
THE RISE OF SANSAR CHAND.

(See Journal, Vol. III, Part I, April, 1934, p. 31.)

When Raja Ghammand Chand was leading his army to the subjugation of the hill states in January, 1765, his son Tegh Chand's wife bore a son to her husband at Bijapur, on the Beas, at that time capital of the Katoch Raj. It was then a fortified town, but town and fort have now dwindled into insignificance. The turrets looking down on the river, the old gateway and massive brick walls, which survived the terrible earthquake of 1905, indicate the site of the old royal palace. It has been marked by a marble tablet \(^1\) in a wall inside the ruins of the palace, with the following inscription:

Birthplace of
Raja Sansar Chand
January, 1765, A. D.

According to local tradition, Raja Sansar Chand was born and brought up here to the age of five years.

Soon after his birth the foundation of the fort of Tihra was laid and the palace and gardens at Alampur were repaired. The capital was then shifted from Bijapur to Alampur in the year 1769, A. D.

Sansar Chand's education was interrupted at a very early age, when he witnessed the downfall of his grandfather at the hand of Sardar Jassa Singh Ramgarhia and his death in the year 1773. Tegh Chand, his father, also died within few months, and in 1774 Sansar Chand was left a helpless boy of ten years.

Henceforward his career may be divided into four different periods.

The first of these began in 1774 with his attack on the stronghold of Kangra, in which he invited a foreigner to help him. But his ally, after reducing the fort, seized it for himself and ruled supreme in the hills. Sansar Chand governed his state as a dependant of this chief for some years and then entered into conflict with him. In the second

---

\(^1\) The stone slab marking the birthplace of Raja Sansar Chand was put in the walls in 1905 by order of the Deputy Commissioner of Kangra.
period, having recovered his ancestral stronghold, Kot Kangra, in the year 1786, he asserted his independence, laid claim to the headship of the hill states of Jullundur circle and aspired to establish a kingdom from the Jumna to the Ravi which his ancestors had once governed. He maintained his power in the hills for twenty years (1786—1806).

In the third phase of his career reaction set in. The hill chiefs would no longer submit to his aggrandisement; they formed a coalition against him and invited a more formidable power from outside. Sansar Chand was defeated and Kot Kangra was besieged for three years. Sansar Chand secured the help of Ranjit Singh and expelled the Gurkhas from the Kangra Valley. In his last days he meekly submitted to Khalsa domination and passed his days as a tributary to the Government at Lahore.

We know nothing of the first period of Sansar Chand’s life. The Panjab was in those days in the throes of anarchy. There were many rulers in different parts of the country and the Sikh Misals were gaining power every day. Sardar Jai Singh, head of the Kanhiya Misal, having contracted a friendship with Sardar Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, drove out Sardar Jassa Singh Ramgarhia to the wastes of Hansi and Hissar and occupied a paramount position in the Panjab as the ruler of the Bari Doab.1 The Ramgarhia Sardar had for some time been in possession of the Kangra Valley,2 which again fell into the hands of its native rulers. Sansar Chand succeeded his father in the year 1774 when the Ramgarhia had been expelled from the country. He started as an independent ruler3 and soon after his accession he heard of the death of Nawab Saif Ali Khan in 1774 A. D. and laid siege to the fortress of Kangra, but, unable to reduce it himself, he invited the assistance of Sardar Jai Singh Kanhiya, who dispatched a considerable force under his son Gurbaksh Singh.4 It is said that Gurbaksh Singh bribed Jiwan Khan, the son and successor of Nawab Saif Ali Khan, and procured the surrender of the fortress partly by force and partly by diplomacy. He retained possession of

---

1 The Transformation of Sikhism (G. C. Narang, p. 173).
3 History of the Sikhs, Cunningham (ed. Garrett), p. 115.
4 J. D. Cunningham, p. 115, as above.
the fort for his master, and Sansar Chand, seeing no hope of resistance, submitted to the will of his ally.  

The fort of Kangra was in those days the key to the whole valley of Kangra; whoever held the fort ruled the hills. It was not for nothing that Ghammand Chand had coveted it. The strength and reputation of the stronghold can easily be estimated, if we look to the career of its last Moghul commandant, Nawab Saif Ali Khan. He maintained his position for thirty years in complete isolation from Delhi and Lahore without any resource beyond the range of his guns, though he was surrounded by enemies on all sides. Thus by the possession of Kot Kangra Sardar Jai Singh became lord of all the hill states between the Satlaj and the Ravi, and ruled them for ten years.  

In 1780 a quarrel arose between Sardar Jai Singh Kanhiya and Maha Singh Sukarchakia. Sansar Chand fought on the side of Maha Singh and laid siege to the fort of Kangra. Jai Singh seems to have been helped by the Rani of Bilaspur. When in March, 1783, Forster passed through this part of the country, he found the two armies lying about sixteen miles apart. The Rani of Bilaspur was able to inflict considerable losses on Raja Sansar Chand, whose territories were pillaged. Her army was however at this time confined to her own borders, eight miles from the frontier of Kangra. Forster thus describes her forces:—

"About 300 horse and 8,000 footmen armed with matchlocks, swords, spears and clubs were huddled together on two sides of a hill in a deep state of confusion and filth. Having resided for the space of four months in the small sheds made of boughs of trees, the effects

---

1 There are different accounts of this event. See below.
2 With the present Raja of Guler I saw a painting of the Darbar of S. Jai Singh Kanhiya, in which different hill chiefs are placed in accordance with their seniority. The following is the order in the painting:—
1. Khalsa Jai Singh Kanhiya (on the Gaddi.)
2. Raja Raj Singh of Chamba.
3. Raja Parkash Chand of Guler.
4. Raja Jagrup Chand of Jaswari.
5. Raja Narain Singh of Sibs.
6. Khooshala the Kotwal.
7. Nathn the Wazir.
These names are given on the portrait in Dev Nagri character.
11 Ibid; Vol. I.
resulting from the situation could neither have been pleasant nor salutary. In all were four ordinary tents. The Rani with her son, a youth of about ten years of age, and a favourite Sanyasi, had retired during the war to an adjacent fort, where she directed the general operations of the war....I waited on the commander-in-chief, then sitting under a banian tree, and attended by his principal officers, the greater part of them clad in native buff. Some new levies were passing in review before him. All the power of a Prussian drill sergeant could (not) have impressed on them a competent knowledge of military discipline. On approaching the chief, I made an offering of a Rupee, laid on the corner of my vest.¹

When Forster was in the Bilaspur camp, negotiations for peace were about to begin. Two messengers were being sent to the Kangra camp to convey proposals of peace.² Forster's journey to the Kangra camp was attended with many adventures, but he reached it at last in safety. "A small body, chiefly of horse, was stationed at this camp, the greater part of the forces under the command of the Rajah being employed in the siege of Kot Kangra."³

If Forster is to be believed, this alliance between Sansar Chand and the Sikhs had already cost the former a good deal. "The ordinary revenue, which is estimated at seven lacks of rupees, has been much diminished by the chief's alliance with the Sikhs, who spread destruction wherever they go."⁴ He describes the territory of Kangra as "limited on the North and North-West by Haripur, on the East by Chamba, on the South by Bilaspur, and on the West by the Panjab."⁵

In the year 1780 a quarrel arose between Sardar Jai Singh Kanhiya and Sardar Maha Singh Sukerchakia. A battle was fought near Batala in the year 1784. Jai Singh was severely defeated in two decisive actions and fled with his assistants, Jemal Singh and Tara Singh, to Pathankot. The victorious army then took possession of the vanquished chief's territory. Sardar Jassa Singh Ramgarhia

recovered all his possessions in the plains, but the hill country still remained under the Kanhiya chief. ¹

Meanwhile Sansar Chand Katoch continued the war in other quarters. His object was the acquisition of the fort of Kangra, but knowing his strength unequal to the work in hand, he thought it expedient to leave it for some better occasion. Leaving some contingents at Kangra to watch the movements of the enemy within the fort, he first fell on Hajipur and took the whole country between that town and the hills, including Mukerian. Next he laid siege to the fort of Atalgarh. It was gallantly defended by a slave girl of the Kanhiya Sardar, named Dasser. The siege continued for four months; all attacks of the enemy were successfully repulsed and Sansar Chand was obliged to abandon it. The war continued between Sansar Chand and Jai Singh for more than three years in different quarters. ²

In 1785 a scheme to suspend hostilities was arranged by Mai Sada Kaur, widow of Gurbaksh, son of S. Jai Singh. ³ She proposed to her father-in-law an alliance between the Kanhiya Misal and the Sukerchakia Misal by giving her daughter Mahtab Kaur in marriage to Ranjit Singh, son of Maha Singh. The proposal was no sooner made than carried out. She proceeded in person to Jawalaji and invited there Raj Kaur, wife of Maha Singh, and Sansar Chand. Mehtab Kaur was then betrothed to Ranjit Singh and perpetual friendship was cemented between the two misals. At the same time Sansar Chand pressed his claim to the possession of Kot Kangra. The matter was referred to a court of arbitration, which decided that the fort of Kangra should be given to him, while he on his part promised to restore the possessions of the Kanhiya Sardar, which he had conquered in the recent war. It was further agreed that the Katoch Raja should take the side of the Kanhiya Misal in the event of a war with the Ramgarhia Misal. ⁴ Thus after a lapse of two centuries the stronghold of Kangra once more came into the hands of its legitimate prince, the Katoch Raja.

¹ S. M. Latif, H. S., p. 105-06 and Transformation of Sikhism G. C. Narang, p. 175.
⁴ S. M. Latif's History of the Sikhs, p. 107. Latif is wrong in describing the event as the marriage between Mahtab Kaur and Ranjit Singh (394). Ranjit Singh was only betrothed; the marriage took place in 1795.
The current accounts of the acquisition of Kot Kangra by Sansar Chand do not agree. There is confusion as to the date as well as the methods by which he acquired it.

Drs. Hutchison and Vogel, relying on Mr. Barnes, are of opinion that the siege took place in 1781-2 and think that Latif, who gives the date as 1774 must be incorrect. They state:—

"Sansar Chand’s chief ambition was the capture of Kangra fort, the ancient home of his ancestors, and soon after coming into power an attempt was made but without success. He then called in to his aid Jai Singh Kanhiya, and, in 1781-2, the combined forces again laid siege to the stronghold." The old Nawab was then dying and on his demise the fort was surrendered in 1783, but by a stratagem fell into the hands of the Sikhs. The story of its capture as found in one of the records is as follows:—

"The siege had lasted a year when the Nawab died and his remains had to be conveyed to the burial ground outside the fort. The Hazaris, or Mughal gunners from Delhi, were in secret league with Sansar Chand and had arranged to give up the fort to him for a suitable reward, when a favourable opportunity presented itself. As the Nawab’s corpse was being conveyed from the fort to the Imambara for burial by his sons, the Hazaris sent word to Sansar Chand to seize the opportunity for an attack. Jai Singh also, however, had information and, as his force was nearest the gate, some of his men secured an entrance first; Sansar Chand, though much chagrined, had to acquiesce and bide his time." 1

Dr. Hutchison and Dr. Ph. Vogel seem to have been led astray by Barnes’ report and Forster’s account. I think Barnes is referring in that place to the second siege of Kangra in 1781, because in the report he admits Jai Singh Kanhiya as a paramount ruler in the hills and cites a document under the Kanhiya’s seal dated 1776 A.D., fixing the Chamba tribute at Rs. 400. Forster, who passed through the Kangra hills in March, 1783, and referred to a siege of the fortress as a recent event, is correct, but he too is probably referring to the second siege by Sansar Chand, when he, as an ally of the Sukerchakia and Ahluwalia Misals, made war upon the Kanhiyas.

1 History of the Panjab Hill States, Vol. I, p. 177 and note I.
THE RISE OF SANSAR CHAND

Vigne's account is misleading. He regards Kangra only as a jagir which was granted by the Moghul Emperor as a favour to some of his courtiers. He also tells us that Kangra was besieged by Sansar Chand and that Jai Singh Kanhiya, the father-in-law of Ranjit Singh, being a friend of the Vazir, came to his rescue, and that after he was recalled by Ranjit Singh and killed in a fray near Amritsar, the fortress fell into the hands of Sansar Chand.¹

Cunningham says: "In 1783 Kangra was besieged by Jai Singh Ghani, a Sikh leader. The old governor, Seif Ullah, died during the siege and after holding out for five months the fort was surrendered by his son, Zafiskar Khan. Sansar Chand, the titular Raja of Kangra, is said to have instigated this siege and to have been disappointed when the Sikh chief kept Kangra for himself. Four years later he obtained the aid of other Sikh leaders, and in 1787 Jai Singh was reluctantly obliged to surrender the fort into the hands of Sansar Chand.²"

Diwan Sarb Diyal's account is still different:—

"Raja Sansar Chand was born in Sambat 1822. He succeeded his father at the age of ten, and first of all in Sambat 1837 (1780 A.D.) when he was about fifteen, he assaulted the fortress of Kangra, which was at that time in the possession of S. Jai Singh of Batala. The old chief not being able to stand against him, took his way home. The stronghold of Kangra after a lapse of centuries again came into the hands of Sansar Chand, its legitimate owner." (Para. 36).

This view has also been supported by local tradition, and a painting which I saw at Alampur shows Sansar Chand leading his forces to the siege of Kangra, and on its back bears the following inscription in Tamkari:—

"On the 23rd of Katak Sambat 1837 (November 1781 A.D.) Sansar Chand conquered the country and town of Kangra."

J. D. Cunningham, S. M. Latif, and the Kangra Gazetteer agree and give the date of the siege as 1774. Barnes cites a document (dated 1776) by Jai Singh Kanhiya, which proves that the hills were already under Jai Singh.

To sum up, we come to the following conclusion:—

The document cited by Mr. Barnes fixing the Chamba revenue in 1776 A.D. proves that the hills had already come under the domination of S. Jai Singh Kanhiya, who occupied the Kangra Valley about the year 1775. As Sansar Chand was at this time only a boy of ten years, he could not be expected to have laid siege to the fortress and to have asked the assistance of the Kanhiya Sardar in its reduction. About the year 1780, when Sansar Chand had reached the age of sixteen, hostilities broke out between the Kanhiyas and Sukerchakias in the plains and Sansar Chand sided with the latter. It was about this time that he conquered the town of Kangra and began the siege of the fortress which continued for about three or four years (1781—1784). It is of this siege that Vigne and others wrote. It is to this assault that the painting already described refers. It is on this account that Diwan Sarb Diyal wrote of the first achievement of Sansar Chand at about the age of fifteen, in which he took the fort of Kangra from the old Sardar Jai Singh Kanhiya. The confusion has been caused by mixing two events and the whole situation becomes clear when we remember that the fort of Kangra was besieged twice, in 1774 and 1781—1784.

The assertion that Sansar Chand laid siege to the fortress in 1781, on the death of Nawab Saif Ali Khan, and then invoked the aid of Sardar Jai Singh does not tally with the facts, because from 1780 until the treaty of Jawala Mukhi in 1785 Jai Singh was occupied in a struggle against the Sukerchakias. Moreover, the picture referred to shows that Sansar Chand was not entitled to the position of a Raja when Jai Singh was paramount in the hills. This shows that Jai Singh had occupied the hills before 1776 A.D.; that Nawab Saif Ali Khan died in 1774; and that Kangra was occupied by the Kanhiya Sardar about 1775, and was delivered to Sansar Chand in 1785.

Mansa Ram Sud,
Edited by Sri Ram Sharma.
ANDREW DALGLEISH.

CENTRAL ASIAN TRADER AND TRAVELLER.

Just beyond the northern end of the grim Karakoram Pass over the Mustagh Range there stands besides the track amid an utter abomination of desolation a small rough stone pyramid, having on its truncated summit a marble tablet, bearing this inscription:

In Memory of Andrew Dalgleish
Central Asian Trader and Traveller
Who was treacherously murdered at this spot
By an Afghan on the
8th of April 1888

This humble monument, placed there by a French fellow trader and traveller, commemorates one of the most extraordinary personages in all the annals of British trade in the East, and the last of that great multitude, who, unsung and uncelebrated in history, have died in the remoter parts of the earth to further the interests of British business, themselves earning but a humble living.

Andrew Dalgleish, born at Edinburgh in 1853, was one of those able, silent, steadfast and kindly Scots who have made their nation trusted and respected throughout the world by those who do business with them. For some fourteen years, in ten of which he fared alone amongst Asiatics, Andrew Dalgleish ploughed his lone furrow through the snowy passes and upland plains of the most formidable mountains in the world, to gain the markets of Central Asia and especially Chinese Turkistan for the goods of his country and a scant living for himself. He could have gained a far better and easier living, but he chose rather this labour of love, that bound him to eastern cities and the wild lands where he left his bones, as perhaps he wished.

How Andrew Dalgleish, once of the British Mercantile Marine, came to spend and end his days in the heart of a continent many thousands of miles from the nearest seaport, was told after his death by Mr. Thomas Russell,* a founder and first travelling agent of the

* Letter, 7 May, 1889.
Central Asian Trading Company of Lahore, a firm started in the early seventies of the last century by some business men and investors of Lahore. The object was to introduce British goods, mainly piece-goods and hardware, to the markets of Central Asia, and to import from there and Kashmir silks, furs, shawls and other suitable articles. Srinagar was the half-way house, where the loads were changed from camels to ponies, the latter being the only animals capable of enduring a range of altitude often varying from 5,000 to 18,000 feet.

In the year 1874 Mr. Russell was at home in Edinburgh, where he found Dalgleish, a distant relative, recovering from the effects of an accident sustained when he was second mate of a British cargo steamer on the Far Eastern run. It was a broken shoulder, caused by the fall of a boat from the davits between Hong Kong and Yokohama, and though he was in hospital at the latter place for 12 months, the condition of the shoulder on arrival necessitated its opening and the extraction of some fragments of broken bone. His mother begged Mr. Russell to take him as a companion in the Yarkand journey, which was done. Accordingly in June 1874, the Yarkand venture with Russell in charge (they were going via Tibet) left Jullundur, arriving at Yarkand four months later.

In a letter written to the "Civil and Military Gazette" of Lahore after Dalgleish's death Mr. Russell spoke most appreciatively of the manner in which his new assistant speedily acquired Persian, Urdu and Turki, as well as the many dialects of the Kirghis, Argoons, Bhots, Wakhhanese and Yarkandis, and of his adaptability to all kinds of men and conditions of travel, by which he gained the respect and confidence of all and was able to make such a success of his dealings despite a Scottish capacity for driving a hard bargain. This indeed was admired by the Chinese and Yarkandis, no mean professors of the art themselves. He quickly acquired a knowledge of simple medicine and of rough surgery, which was also most valuable, for in those parts every European was expected to be a sort of doctor and to have plenty of medicine available. In this Dalgleish was especially good, as was vouched for by all who spoke of him and by himself in a letter to the Church Missionary Society, urging the appointment of a medical missionary at Yarkand. He mentioned that, though he
gave up half his time to treating such cases as he could, there were many that required the skilled hand of a proper medical man and eye-doctor.

As to the physical difficulties of his enterprise and how he overcame them, we may quote Russell, Captain Younghusband and lastly Dalgleish himself. The physical difficulties of transporting goods over the Himalayan Ranges to Turkistan and the Eastern Khanates are very great and only to be overcome by a man like Dalgleish, who in the end paid with his life for bringing to a successful issue the trade in British goods far beyond Indian frontiers.

Just behind Leh is the Khardung Pass, the ascent of which to 17,000 feet is very abrupt, causing mountain sickness; after that comes the Saser Pass, also about 17,000 feet, and then what must be the most dreary and desolate upland plains in the world, the Dipsang. They lie at an altitude of 17,000 feet and consist of barren gravel plains and mounds as bare as a sidewalk, over which even in summer, blow blinding snow storms. After crossing these plains you enter a shallow valley strewn with the skeletons of ponies, a veritable Valley of the Shadow of Death, and thence pass to the Karakoram, 18,850 feet high. "Descending the northern slope we came to the memorial to poor Dalgleish, erected by M. Dauvergne and Lieutenant Bower last year. No drearier spot can be imagined than this where fell the only Englishman who tried to make a home and livelihood in Central Asia and, after gaining success and the good-will of all he met, was murdered in a fit of passion or fanaticism by one who, like himself, was a stranger in the country."

Dalgleish, who did this journey twice a year for some ten years, says very little about his difficulties, and that only casually, in the extracts from his letters to Russell and Mr. Ney Elias, Joint Commissioner at Leh, occasionally published in the Indian press, which took much interest in the daring and unique project, which by 1880 had become the sole property of Dalgleish, the others having dropped out or sold out. Russell, who had a general business at Lahore and Kashmir, still continued to act as a kind of agent, and it was to him that most of the extracts were due. They are all so descriptive of the

* Younghusband:—Heart of a Continent, pp. 224-25.
country and the people dealt with and withal so characteristic of this remarkable man, that I am confident they will be as interesting to readers as to myself.

"November 17th, 1881.—My letters of the 30th September will reach you in due course, as I hear that the bearer got safe over the Karakoram Pass. In those I told you of my friendly reception by the Chinese Amban and how I am progressing with my venture. The respect paid me by the Amban and the Chinese generally exceeds even the most sanguine expectations I entertained when I bade you farewell in Lahore in December last. But though the Chinese are friendly enough, the native Begs have to be conciliated and, as you can do nothing with these people unless you feed them, I am compelled to spend a round number of rupees each month on them, though I would much rather duck them in the river or tar and feather them. On my arrival the Amban gave orders that I was to be entertained to the best the country could afford and the whole of the notables of Yarkand were invited to meet the Englishman (I am obliged to drop the Scotchman here).

"I have now been eight months at Yarkand and well treated all the time. Yesterday, being the birthday of the chief Amban, Shanko Jew, he issued orders that the Englishman was to be suitably entertained. This invitation I managed to get extended to all the Indian traders and in consequence there were assembled some forty traders, two Chinese officials and several Begs and Tungchues. My own house was most gorgeously decorated at the expense of the Amban and after dinner everything was cleared away and in came musicians and dancing girls, the former shedding their wild music on the night air. The nectar was passed round freely and the usually silent Asiatic soon forgot his sorrows and woes in song and dance. One of the three dancing girls was distinctly pretty and her deportment, enhanced by flowing silk robes and a deep fur-trimmed turban, would have passed muster even in Merry England.

"19th November.—The Amban and his suite having returned from Kashgar, I waited on him to pay my respects. He greeted me most cordially and during the interview asked me how my venture was progressing. I told him well enough, but, not being completely sold
out, I did not intend to return to India this winter. He replied that he would never consent to my undertaking the journey in the winter, and I must still remain as his guest.

"January 22nd, 1882.—Winter in Yarkand is indeed dreary. With the fall of the leaves, every living thing seeks shelter from the biting blast. During the very severe weather there is a Chinese order that, should any beggar or traveller seek admittance after sundown, he must be admitted for the night. Any refusal entails the wearing of the wooden collar and, should the person refused admittance die, those responsible are executed. There are some drawbacks to this laudable order, for an old Yarkandi of my acquaintance, who gave a drunken Chinaman shelter, found that 400 silver tangas (£20) had departed with the guest.

"February 22nd, 1882.—I am afraid that I may shortly be ousted by Russian influence, though the Amban assures me of his support and the Lo Shay at Kashgar has sent me a fine Badakshani horse. Still, a man who is not even recognised by his own Government has small chance against Russians backed by all the power and influence of theirs, and these Chinese have a great idea of Russian might. As far back as 1837, the Governor of Yarkand told me, the Russian armies were within a few marches of Lahore. I have managed to get a Kashmiri released from slavery and shall take him back with me. He cost me little, save a silver watch to the Chinese Dalal who arranged the business.

"For several days past the Yarkandis have been celebrating their New Year on the plain outside the city. There were a great variety of races present, consisting of Bhots, Badakshanis, Baltis, Chinamen, Kashmiris, Kanjutis and Hindustanis, the latter very independent and virile men, very different from the specimens one sees in the Panjab. In the end fighting took the place of dancing, for all got drunk and several got killed. Trade is at a standstill, though I am not affected, being quite sold out.

"14th March 1882.—For the past three days I have been engaged in copying Captain Trotter's map of Chinese Turkistan, the Amban having provided me with silk paper. Communication between Leh and Yarkand has ceased for the past three months, the season being very
inciement, and Dad Mahomed Khan* had to turn back from the Karakoram and with him came back my letters for India. There is now a new Governor, who favours the Russians and having excused them all customs, the market is crowded with their goods, which sell at ruinous prices. I have managed to obtain some fine Ovis Poli head, one being 65 inches, and some snow leopards and Turkistan wolves, which I am taking to India with me.

“19th June, 1882.—I have paid my farewell visit to the Amban, who was good enough to forego all duty on my ten paods of silks, as he has always done on what I brought in. Yesterday I left Yarkand, escorted by all the Indian traders, some Chinese officials and Begs and Tungehues, there being in all 80 persons, who saw me as far as the Yarkand River and, when they bade me farewell, bestowed on me a number of presents, one being a sword, another a fancy pipe, etc. On the journey to Shahidullah Fort, which is the Chinese outpost, I was treated with the utmost courtesy by all and when I reached there on the 8th of July I found the Kirghiz tent presented to me by Hatim Beg nicely pitched by an old Kirghiz lady, who has taken quite a fancy to me.”

In October, 1882, Dalgleish arrived at Lahore after visiting Simla to press the importance of a British Agent at Yarkand, but uselessly, though he received support from all the Press, which adduced his having led caravans backwards and forwards successfully for so many years as a strong argument for his own appointment.

In March, 1883, he makes the first mention of any difficulty in getting over the Passes, though this only casually and lightly. “I had some difficulty in getting over the Karakoram. My Yarkandi servant broke down at the Sasser Pass and I had to put him on my own pony and walk alongside to hold him on for some 14 marches. Just under the Karakoram the two head pony drivers broke down through hard breathing caused by the rarefied air, 18 inches of snow on the ground and a breeze like to cut the sheepskin coat from one’s back. Though I am against strong drink, I gave each man a couple of stiff pegs and found the effect so wonderful that I took one myself. It was only this stimulant that got us over the Karakoram on that dreary January day. It is a grim pass.”

*Later his murderer.
He seems to have been quite indifferent as to the season, crossing the passes at any time of the year. His next trip was in November, 1883, with a mixed cargo, amongst which was a marble chair for the Amban, piecegoods, hardware and other goods, including a complete set of tennis gear and some footballs. His last letters are as cheery and descriptive as the others:

"September 29th, 1884.—Once more am I settled down in comfort within the walls of Yarkand, enjoying the best of health and treatment from both Chinese and Mahomedans. The journey from Leh was rather trying owing to the deep soft snow still lingering, but though I avoided the Kardung, Karawal and Sasser Passes by following the route by the Shyok, the grim Karakoram and the Suget and Killian Passes were still clad in white and gave us much trouble. However once across the Killian, the steep snow-clad mountains of Tibet are out of sight and after passing the Killian ravine the change is complete, gladdening the heart that leaves those howling wastes and enters the fertile lands of Yarkand.

"I was received with the same warm courtesy as of old, some of the officials meeting me five miles out and the Amban, who directed that I was to be the guest of the Government, gave a ceremonial dinner on a very grand scale with such a number of courses that I feared it would never end. I have seen the Imam, the Hakim Beg and all the Chinese officials, or they have been to see me, and I have been fortunate in disposing of most of my caravan. In short, the sun shines bright on the solitary Briton in Chinese Turkistan. But I fear that our trade will not long survive the Treaty of Kuldja and unless something is done by our government, neither I nor the many Indian traders who wander friendless and alone will survive against the Russian efforts, for we have no treaty with Chinese Turkistan and the power of our Joint Commissioner ends at the Karakoram. I should greatly like to see a medical missionary at Yarkand, for though I usually devote half the day to treatment, my resources in skill and medicine are both limited.

"November 19th, 1884.—I intend wintering at Yarkand and starting back in the spring, if nothing happens, for the Russians are ever pressing forward and increasing their influence. I have just
attended the weekly market at Yengi Shahr, riding slowly through the place and enjoying the scene. One is first struck by the boldly coloured robes of the women, contrasting with the ever moving sea of white turbans of the men. The gait and deportment of all is quite European, whilst the long loose robes of the women and their conical flowered caps, which cover a mass of escaping black hair, contrasting with their rosy complexions, are quite pleasing. The salutation of the men and the low courtesy of the women to passing friends remind one strongly of home customs.

"Here are to be seen the weekly labours of the poor nicely displayed for sale. The women with thread spun from the spindle and embroidered needlework of all kinds, the tailor, the bootmaker, the weaver and the hatter, with all their varied wares set out to advantage, the country people, aside by themselves, busy selling the fruits of their labour and making new purchases with the proceeds, the wandering jeweller selling old and new ornaments, the travelling baker edging his way through the crowd with his yard-long loaves, the dealers in silks and gold thread, and that very life of the markets, the Dalal (tout) plying his persuasive trade. It is a charming scene, as pleasing as picturesque, for, as the solitary Englishman passes along, no rudeness, nor incivility, no scowls, nor angry taunts greet him. On the contrary their usually passive faces are wreathed in smiles as the whisper of 'the Feringi Sahib' passes along."

Dalglish's apprehensions of Russian intrigue were well enough founded, for in March, 1885, he was ordered to quit Yarkand at once and return to India. On this occasion Dad Mahomed, who ran a carrying business between Yarkand and Leh, proved very useful, for he lent his ponies to Dalglish free of charge save for their food. Fortunately on arrival at Leh, Dalglish found there Mr. Carey of the Civil Service, an old friend and a great traveller, who induced him to accompany him on an extensive journey right into Tibet and thence around Chinese Turkistan. This lasted until May, 1887, by which time matters at Yarkand were again favourable enough to justify another trading expedition.

In November, 1887, he left Lahore for Leh with a caravan and left Leh at the end of February with thirteen ponies, accompanied
by some Yarkandi Hajis returning from Mecca, a few Addijanis and a Mahomedan fakir from Rawalpindi. A few marches this side of the Karakoram he was overtaken by Dad Mahomed travelling empty to Yarkand, and received him most cordially, a greeting returned in the same manner. He distributed some of his loads on Dad Mahomed’s ponies, making him his personal guest for the remainder of the journey.

They proceeded in the utmost apparent amity until the evening of the day the Karakoram was crossed. That evening Dad Mahomed came to the tent of Dalgleish after the tents had been pitched as usual, but declined the proffered cup of tea, which was the first indication of anything wrong. He then went to his own tent, where ten minutes later Dalgleish, who had put on a thick coat, followed him. What now happened no one knew, for the men were alone; but according to the servants, almost immediately two pistol shots rang out and they heard Dalgleish expostulating with Dad Mahomed as they ran up. After a short silence Dad Mahomed rushed from the tent with a drawn sword in his hand and furiously attacked the unarmed servants, who fled for their lives. Luckily for them he stumbled over a tent rope, giving the men an opportunity of taking shelter with the Hajis, whose entreaties saved their lives. Dad Mahomed then went to Dalgleish’s tent and ordered tea, first directing that the murdered man’s dog, which was lying on his bed, should be taken to his dead master’s head and strangled, which was done.

During the night his own men and the fakir, who had taken Dalgleish’s gun and sword, kept watch over the servants, warning them that, if they moved from the numdah on which they were seated, they would be cut down. Indeed it would seem that, bearing in mind the long and intimate friendship of the two men until this time and that this was the only time that Dad Mahomed had ever called his old friend a “kaffir,” the fakir may have raised a fit of fanaticism inducing the murder. However, the next day Dad Mahomed took possession of all the dead man’s goods and left the camp with the servants, leaving the body lying where it fell.

Two marches further on he cut off the pigtail of the Bhots and cropped the beards of the Mahomedans, after which he dismissed them with a defiant message to the Wazir of Leh, to the effect that
any pursuit would be useless, for in a few days he would be "Lord of
the Jungle" (far in the wilds). The next day he also left the camp,
leaving there all the goods and ponies of the murdered man, save a
few cups and saucers, and made his own way to Afghanistan, where
he joined the army of Ishak Khan, a rebel against the Amir
Abdurrahman Khan of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the servants hastened back to the camp, where they
found the body untouched and, on examining it found the right
shoulder broken by a bullet, another shot having been turned by a coat
button, the left hand nearly cut off and a great gash on the back of the
neck apparently inflicted after the victim had fallen on his face. They
placed the remains in a sack and left for Leh, which they reached on the
27th of April, 1888, and there made the body over to the Wazir, who
on a further examination found a sum of Rs. 5,200 in the money-belt.
The body was buried by the Reverend Redslote, a Moravian
missionary, who was himself buried there two years later.

A party of soldiers was sent out in search of the murderer, against
whom the whole country was raised by a reward of Rs. 500 dead or
alive. But he was gone too far by the time the soldiers had crossed
the Karakoram, though they recovered and brought back the abandoned
goods. A week after their departure, M. Dauvergne, a French gentle-
man who had made Kashmir his travelling headquarters for some 22
years and was a great friend of the dead man, arrived at the camping
ground of Yakasham and found the bloodstains where the body had
lain, with a scarf frozen to them which he recognised as one he had
seen with Dalgleish. Having quickly decided to raise a memorial,
he placed his stick upright and built a small cairn around it, tying the
bloodstained scarf to the top of the stick.

In June, 1888, he was at Lahore to send home his collections and
travel diaries, and whilst there had this tablet cut and inscribed, the
cost being defrayed by small subscriptions amongst the personal
friends of the dead man. He afterwards placed over the grave at Leh
another tablet, paid for by himself, Major Cumberland and Lieut.
Bower. In June, 1889, he left for the Karakoram from Leh in company
with Major Cumberland and Lieut. Bower, the former being his
travelling companion in a prolonged tour round all the Pamirs and the
latter intent only on the pursuit of Dad Mahomed. After much travel on wrong scents, Lieut. Bower realised the impossibility of a European finding an Afghan in these countries, and applied to the Wazir of Leh for native assistance, which was supplied in the person of one Shams-ud-Din, an Afghan following the same occupation as Dad Mahomed had done.

At Kashgar this man found Lieut. Bower, who supplied him with passports and letters to the Amir of Afghanistan, the Amir of Bokhara and other Khanates where Dad Mahomed might be found, a pony, and Rs. 250 in cash. The story of the pursuit is a veritable epic, ranging through Afghanistan, Bokhara, Balkh and part of Khorassan, up to Samarkand, where Shams-ud-Din found his man, who had fled there with the remains of the Army of Amir Ishak Khan, when the latter was defeated by Abdurrahman. Having gained his confidence by pretending that he was the bearer of a letter and parcel of coin from the brother of Dad Mahomed at Yarkand, Shams-ud-Din induced his quarry to remain in a shop in the bazar whilst he returned to his lodgings to fetch the parcel. But instead he went to the Russian Court and the native Governor of Samarkand, from whom he obtained permission for the arrest and a Russian official and two Mahomedan sepoys, with which to effect it.

Returning to the bazar he left the others a short distance away, going up to the unsuspecting Dad Mahomed alone and, as the latter held out his hand for the expected parcel, Shams-ud-Din seized both hands and shouted for the others who put Dad Mahomed in irons and took him to the Court. A plea of mistaken identity having failed, Dad Mahomed was put in jail to await extradition proceedings. As these were conducted from London and St. Petersburg, they were very long drawn out and in the end unnecessary, for Dad Mahomed hanged himself with his own turban two months after his arrest. Shams-ud-Din received a reward of Rs. 3,500 in all and the command of the bodyguard of the Wazir of Leh.

The death of Andrew Dalgleish was also the end of the project to which he had devoted his life. The memorial still stands at the foot of the Karakoram and keeps his memory green, as M. Dauvergne prophesied, for the Yarkandis and Ladakhis accord it the same tribute
of respect as they do that of the Spirit of the Pass. Maybe the spirit of Andrew Dalgleish returns from Valhalla to hover over the scenes he knew so well and to dwell unseen amongst the descendants of the men he knew and loved, and who loved and respected him.

Note—Dalgleish’s letters, from which passages have been quoted in this article, were published in “The Civil and Military Gazette.” Lahore, on 2nd February, 1882; 19th November, 1882; 11th March, 1883; 10th November, 1884. An account of the murder of Dalgleish and of the pursuit, capture and death of the murderer, Dad Mohammad Khan, was published in the same newspaper on 2nd and 26th July, 1890. The provision of a memorial to Dalgleish is described in the issue of 6th September, 1889.

C. GREY.
BACK NUMBERS

A limited number of back numbers of the Journal of the Society are available. Price to members, Rs. 3 each. To others, Rs. 5.

PANJAB HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

✓ Abulfazl. Sh. Abdal Qadir.
✓ Historical Notes on the Lahore Fort. J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ Vedic Social Life according to the Similes in the Agni Hymns of the Rig Veda. H. D. Griswold.
✓ The Shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj at Pakpattan. Miles Irving.
✓ A new Pathan Sultan of Delhi. R. Whitehead.
✓ The Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique in the Panjab, 1641. E. D. MacLagan.

✓ The Earliest English Visitors to the Punjab, 1585—1628, E. D. MacLagan.
✓ Coronations of Muhammadan Sovereigns. Khan Bahadur Pirzada Muhammad Husain.
✓ The Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique in the Panjab, 1641. E. D. MacLagan.

Historical Rhymes and Proverbs of the Punjab, J. Ph. Vogel.

Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1—95 (1913).
✓ The place of Coins in Indian History. R. B. Whitehead.
✓ Dara Shikoh as an author. Pt. Skeo Narain.
✓ A Statue of King Kanishka. J. Ph. Vogel.

✓ Baba Ratan, the Saint of Bhatinda. J. Horovitz.
✓ The Indian Origin of the Gypsies in Europe. A. C. Woolner.
✓ Jahanara. G. Yazdani.
Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 1—70 (1914).
India and Historical Research. Ramsay Muir.
The Road between Delhi and Multan. A. M. Slew.
The History of the Western Hills. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
The Ranas and Thakurs of the Western Hills. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.

The Punjab Hill States. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ The Site of the Battle of Delhi, 1803. Sir Edward MacLagan.

Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 1—75 (1916).
✓ Four Letters by Austin of Bordeaux.
History in its relation to Sociology. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Shah Din.
✓ History of Kashtwar State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ The "Kohinoor" of 1851. Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.
Pahul (Sikh Baptism). Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.

Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 77—149 (1916).
✓ History of Basohli State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ Malana and the Akbar-Jamlu Legend. G. M. Young.
History of Bhadrawah State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
The Post Office in the Mutiny.

Mughal Farmanis, Parwanahs and Sanads issued in favour of the Jesuit Missionaries. (With twelve plates.) The Rev. Father Felix, O. C.

Jesuit Missions in Lahore. The Mughal Seals. The Rev. Father Felix, O. C.

✓ Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 1—67 (1917).
Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 69—167 (1917).
Some Notes on Ancient Kulu Politics. G. C. L. Howell.
An Unpublished Diary of Sikh Times. Shaikh Abdul Qadir.
Influence of the Indian King upon the Growth of Caste. The Hon'ble Mr. H. J. Maynard.
✓ History of Nurpur State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ Note on the Routes from the Panjab to Turkestan and China recorded by William Finch (1611). Sir Aurel Stein.
General Ventura. Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.

✓ History of Mandi State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ The Family of Lady Juliana Dias da Costa. The Rev. H. Hosten, S. J.
✓ The Annual Relation of Father Fernao Guerreiro, S. J., for 1607-1608. The Rev. H. Hosten, S. J.
Land Revenue Administration under Maharajah Ranjit Singh. Sita Ram Kohli.

✓ History of Suket State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ The Struggles of the Hindu Sahi Rulers of Kabul and Panjab against the Central Asian Turks (870—1027)—Gulsham-Rai.
✓ History of Kulu State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
A Journey to Toling and Tsaparang in Western Tibet. G. M. Young.

Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 1—102 (1920).
The Ballad of Ram Singh's two Rebellions.
✓ History of Kangra State. J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.
✓ Addenda to History of Nurpur State.
✓ Daniel Moginie, a forgotten Swiss adventurer in Hindustan (1738—1749). Translated from the German by the Revs. J. W. Dühr, S. J., and H. Hosten, S. J.
The Cradle of Graeco-Buddhist Art. A. Foucher.
Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 103—206 (1921).

- History of Spiti. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Some aspects of Slavery. *Dr. Lakshman Sarup.*
The Historical aspect of some Himalayan Customs.
Military Secretariat Records.


Note on the passage of the Hydaspes by Alexander. *J. Hutchison.*
Note on the History of the Burning Glass. *Dr. Lakhshman Sarup.*
Ahmad Shah Abdali and a Hindu Swami. *Parmanand Arora.*
Hasham Shah. *Bawa Budh Singh.*


History of the Punch State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*
History of Rajauri State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*
A Note on Five Rare Old Paintings of the Moghul School. *Kanwar Sain.*


  \( \checkmark \) Akbar's Popularity. Parmanand Arora.
  \( \checkmark \) Surgeon Gabriel Boughton. Abdul Wali.

  Jasswan State, Guler State, Siba State, Datarpur State, Kutlehr
  State, Bangahal State. J. Hutchison.
The Unpublished Letters of Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala.
  Jagat Singh.

  Padmavati—A Romance of the Sixteenth Century.
Review—"Warren Hastings and Philip Francis."—By Sophia
  Weitzman. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

  The Trial of Bahadur Shah II. H. L. O. Garrett.
  The Revolt in Kashmir, 1846. R. R. Sethi.
The Multan Outbreak and the Trial of Diwan Mul Raj. Sita Ram
  Kohli.
  The Sangala of Alexander's Historians. J. Hutchison.
  Cornwallis in Bengal. J. F. Bruce.

Quinquennial Circuits or Transfers of Asoka's Officials. A. C.
  Woolner.
The Multan Outbreak and the Trial of Diwan Mul Raj. Sita Ram
  Kohli.
  Captain Manuel Deremaio. H. Bullock.

The Sikh Darbar and the First Afghan War. K. C. Khanna.
The Voice of History from Living Lips. Ram Chand Manchanda.
BACK NUMBERS

✓ The Mughal Province of Multan and its Subsequent History.  Gulshan Rai.

Vol II, Pt. II, pp. 97—180 (December, 1933).

✓ A Brief History of the University of the Panjab.  J. F. Bruce.
✓ Events Leading to the Ambela Expedition.  R. R. Sethi.
✓ The Multan Outbreak of April, 1848.  K. C. Khanna.
✓ The Ballads of George Carnac Barnes.  R. R. Sethi.
The present issue of the Journal is in a special sense historical. It includes a report of the Silver Jubilee Meeting of the Historical Society, which was held in Hailey Hall, Panjab University, on 16th December, 1935, in the presence of His Excellency, the Governor of the Panjab, who is its Patron.

The Society has led a double life during the past four years. Founded in 1910, the Panjab Historical Society, after a period of about twelve years of notable activity, fell into gradual decadence, until it was reluctantly decided at the end of 1931 to dissolve it. Meanwhile, a University Chair of History had been established at the end of 1930. A conference between the President of the Society, the Honourable Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp, I.C.S., and the University Professor of History led to the proposal to establish a University Historical Society, which should absorb and continue the work of the older Society.

The Panjab Historical Society was liquidated and the University Historical Society was formed at the same meeting, over which Mr. Justice Skemp presided, in January, 1932. The members and funds of the older Society were transferred to the new Society, so that the transformation was largely nominal. Moreover, several of the foundation members of the old Society passed into the new Society.
They included Sir Edward Maclagan, Sir J. P. Thompson, Dr. A. C. Woolner and Raja Hari Kishen Kaul, who had been respectively President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Society at its foundation in 1910; as well as Rai Bahadur Pandit Sheo Narain and Dr. J. P. Vogel.

It may be asked why in these circumstances even a nominal change was made; for it might appear that the moribund Society could be revivified without interrupting its tradition. The answer is that the change was more than merely nominal. The Society became closely associated with the University Department of History, which assumed responsibility for its reorganisation and maintenance; the University provided it with quarters and a secretariat; and particularly the University, through the agency of the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Woolner, from that time has contributed an annual donation to its revenue, which has been essential to the continuation of its functions. The most permanently valuable of those functions is the publication of its Journal, a fairly expensive undertaking, which would be impossible without such financial help. But a scrutiny of its membership will show that the Society has continued as a provincial and not merely a University body. In the four years since its renaissance membership has grown from about 12 to 100, of whom only about one half are otherwise associated with the University.

It must be confessed, however, that the maintenance of its proper function as a learned society has depended upon the continuous efforts of a very small band, whose depletion, even by an individual, is a serious loss, not easily replaced. To obtain contributions not entirely unworthy of the tradition of the old Society is a constant and anxious task, which grows no lighter each year, though we continue to hope that sufficient recruits to historical research will be found to encourage us to contemplate with optimism the future celebration of the Golden Jubilee of the Society.

It has suffered a deplorable loss by the death of Dr. A. C. Woolner, whose last public appearances were made (though we did not remotely contemplate the fact) at the functions which were held to celebrate its Silver Jubilee. He was not only the prime mover in its foundation and for many years its most active member, but also, since its transformation, its most beneficent sponsor.
The Society is about to lose also the active support of another valuable member, Lieut.-Colonel Garrett, Principal and Professor of History of Government College, Lahore, who has been on its strength during 23 of its 25 years' existence. But in this case we hope to receive many further contributions to its Journal, the fruit of his retired leisure.

We believe that the state of a Historical Society is one of the clearest criteria of the cultural condition of a people. The judicious examination of its past creates a consciousness of its character and assists more than any other process to impart the momentum of tradition to the solution of its present problems and the definition of its future path. The study of a people's history is, in short, the most powerful shaping force in the education of its youth. India needs to place in the hands of its youth histories of their country which shall inculcate an accurate and temperate record of its past in order to enable them to adjust themselves intelligently to the rapidly growing responsibility of their present and future political and social tasks. Upon the strength of that consciousness the future of this Society depends. We cannot but feel that the educated and patriotic citizens of the Panjab will increasingly respond to our purpose and assist our humble attempt to contribute to it.

As this number is at the point of publication we have learned of another historic event which has arrested the attention of the world, namely, the death of the King-Emperor, George V. We are conscious of the loss of a great personal influence for good in the British Commonwealth of Nations, in which his reign has witnessed the gradual accession of the Indian people to a new status. It is almost impossible to imagine a person whose passing will be more universally or sincerely mourned, for the British people believe that he has personified whatever national virtues they possess. His interest in his Indian subjects was earnest and profound and has been appreciated by them in a manner which must deeply impress his successor. Our natural dejection is somewhat relieved by our realisation that his son, the King-Emperor Edward VIII, is entirely worthy of his great heritage and as competent to bear its high responsibility.

ADDRESS BY MR. J. F. BRUCE, M. A., PRESIDENT:

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

This, the second meeting of the Society in its present session, is unusual in three respects: (i) your presence, Sir, as Patron; (ii) the distinction rather than the largeness of this audience—for I can record several recent meetings from which the dilatory were excluded because of lack of sitting and standing space in this hall; (iii) the formal commemoration this evening of the Society's survival for a quarter of a century.

There are patent advantages in such a commemorative occasion as this. It evokes the periodic incarnation of our Patron; it heartens us with the reflection that we are beginning to acquire the respectability of age, that our Society may become historic, as well as historical; it draws to the attention of a notable audience the existence and purposes of the Society and no doubt impels all the public spirited and thoughtful among them forthwith to enrol themselves!

The Society has already experienced one avatar, but its soul goes marching on. It originated in a private meeting of three men in 1910. One of those three, Sir J. P. Thompson, died very recently, to our deep regret, having fulfilled a career of high public service and keen devotion to culture and sound learning in India. The second, Dr. J. P. Vogel, has since been retranslated into the Dutch and now adorns the Chair of Sanskrit in the great University of Leyden. But the third, who was its prime mover, Dr. A. C. Woolner, is present this evening. You see him now wistfully comparing this youth with the infant he swaddled, pondering gravely upon its future.

The first formal meeting of the Society was held in the Old Senate Hall yonder on 27th December, 1910, in the presence of His Honour Sir Louis Dane, Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab. The three apostles quickly gathered about them an admirable coterie of scholars, including Sir Edward Macalagan, who was the first President, Sir Abdul Qadir, Sir John Maynard, Sir Aurel Stein, Raja Hari Kishen
Kaul, Rai Bahadur Pandit Sheo Narain, Dr. H. D. Griswold, Dr. J. Hutchison, Mr. R. B. Whitehead, Mr. T. Graham Bailey and others, nearly all of whom, like our Vice-Chancellor, vigorously survive—such is the healthful influence of a zealous study of history! I need not remind many members of this audience of the contribution which these men have made and are making to the culture of India.

The transactions of the Panjab Historical Society, to which His Excellency himself has contributed, were published in its Journal, the numbers of which have gained currency and respect widely beyond India. The Honorary Secretary continues to receive, often from remote distances, requests for complete sets or individual numbers of the old Journal, and I am always conscious of the fine standard of scholarship which it has set before us who try to maintain its tradition.

But the pristine zeal of the old Society could not be constantly maintained. The World War relaxed interest in its modest pursuit of one of the high ends of peace, and its later life was the thin existence of an ever paler ghost of its former self. It became, as it were, a yogi which periodically retired within itself for long periods of transcendent meditation, while its body slowly withered. Indeed, in 1925 it seems to have entered upon a samadhi which lasted for four years. Despite the efforts of its last President, the Honourable Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp, it was feared by the end of 1931 that it would finally perish of inanition.

In January, 1932, at a meeting which contained three members—a sombre reminiscence of the three apostles of 1910—Mr. Skemp sadly announced its dissolution, but also more hopefully the simultaneous transmigration of its spirit and its material elements—particularly its funds—to the new born Panjab University Historical Society. At that moment the old Society had about twelve active members. The new Society now has 100 members. In the twenty-one years from 1911 to 1931 the old Society published twenty-one numbers of its Journal. In the four years since January, 1932, the reorganised Society has published seven numbers, while the eighth is now in press. The membership has steadily increased and we hope that, with the encouragement of Your Excellency and of
interested members of this audience, the Society will enter the second quarter of a century of its life well over one hundred strong. We hope upon our present financial basis quickly to increase our numbers to at least 150 subscribing members—a strength which will enable us to undertake certain projects, of which I shall speak presently.

We can review the progress of the reorganised Society with moderate satisfaction. Whatever success we have had is due in no small degree to the Vice-Chancellor, who has not forgotten his nursering, but has contributed to its support from University funds at his disposal as liberally as the lean years would allow. But we must confess to one notable aspect of inferiority to the old Society, namely, the less active and prolific quality of our membership. This is not to cavil at attendance at our meetings. At the first meeting of the present session, held on 27th October, this hall somehow contained 250 persons, while nearly 100 more failed to gain admission. The majority of that audience consisted of non-members; but we gladly receive the stranger within our gate. Our principal defect lies in the quantity and particularly in the quality of our transactions, which depend upon the genuine scholarly activity of members. In the last resort a long roll of members, a sound financial condition and the periodic attendance of large and interested audiences weigh light against a record of really scholarly offerings to the current volume of history. We welcome the new member; but we fervently embrace the active and competent scholar. For that reason we are very grateful to Mr. Ogilvie, who has somehow snatched time from assisting in the preparation of the annual provincial budget to address us this evening.

A glance at our roll of members will show that we derive much of our support from members of the High Court and of the various Government services and that Europeans are conspicuous among them. This is a clear indication of their real interest in an attempt to develop Indian historical culture. It is a matter for regret, it is true, that on account of the ever-increasing concentration of their energy upon the heavy task of a complex administration, which is their primary duty, these gentlemen can nowadays seldom find leisure for the active cultivation of those interests which are the legacy of
their education. The segregation of many of the best minds in India within the administrative services is possibly one of the chief causes of the comparative deficiency of the modern development of its culture.

An even more regrettable fact, which may be accounted for in the same way, is the fewness of the educated Indians not so employed, who take a genuine, active interest in the purposes of societies such as this. We hope that this occasion will stimulate their interest.

I spoke earlier of our projects. The first of these is to acquire a local habitation—a room which can be used as a library, at present housed in almirahs on a verandah outside my office. I know that Dr. Woolner will help us in this respect when he can. I envisage an historical library which will become an asset to the culture of this province.

In the next place I hope that it may become possible to publish a series of monographs, which commercial presses cannot undertake. This is a regular function of Historical Societies elsewhere, and will depend upon the provision of funds. An annual subvention from Government would seem appropriate.

I hope also that a strong Panjab Historical Society may take a lead in establishing an Indian Historical Association, which this great and ancient country should maintain.

The Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President, Mr. Garrett, will address you on other aspects of the Society and I hope that after Mr. Ogilvie's address His Excellency will also honour us with a speech on this occasion which his presence has made notable.

We greatly regret the very recent death of an eminent member of this Society, His Highness the Raja of Chamba, one of whose last acts must have been to send a liberal donation to our Jubilee Fund.

One last word. My duties as President during the past four years have been greatly lightened by the zeal of the Honorary Secretary, Mr. R. R. Sethi, and during the past two years by the efficiency of the Honorary Treasurer, Mr. Ishwar Das, Registrar of the University.
ADDRESS BY DR. A. C. WOOLNER, C. I. E., M. A.,
D. LITT., VICE-CHANCELLOR.*

A Jubilee of this Society, even a Silver Jubilee, makes me feel historical, not to say prehistoric. The President has sketched the history of the Society as known to him from the published documents, that is from back numbers of the Journal. That account could be expanded somewhat by reference to the manuscript records of meetings which were not published.

To recover the whole inner history would be more difficult. I doubt if all the early correspondence has been preserved with meticulous care. With so many crowding interests the first members of the Society may find it far from easy to disentangle their memories of the Panjab Historical Society from those of other activities.

Perhaps I may say something of the circumstances under which the Society was founded in 1910, and then allude to the struggles to keep the institution alive after 1923 up to its second incarnation as a University Society.

In the summer of 1910, the late Sir John Perronet Thompson, then a judicial officer in Delhi, went to Simla for his summer recess. One morning he called on Dr. J. Ph. Vogel, who was officiating Director-General of Archaeology, at his office in Benmore. Mr. Thompson, as he was then, commonly known as "J. P.," had been working on the history of the old streets in Delhi and was seeking further information.

Dr. Vogel was delighted to make the acquaintance of such an earnest and methodical student of local history and was struck by the fact that during a number of years in the Panjab he had never happened to meet Thompson or to hear anything of the work he was doing. There ought, he thought, to be some organisation to link up such workers, of whom he hoped to discover more, with each other, with the official archaeologists and with history teachers in the Universities. After talking this over, the three of us, Thompson, Vogel and myself, met one night at Corstorphan's Hotel and drafted the first Rules of the Panjab Historical Society. It was agreed to ask Sir Edward Maclagan to be the first president.

* This was Dr. Woolner's last public utterance.—Editor.
This was probably in September. After my return to Lahore, but before the Panjab Government had moved down, a meeting was held in Benmore at which it was formally resolved to form the Society. The rules were adopted and officers were elected as follows:

President .......... The Hon’ble Mr. E. D. Maclagan.
Vice-President .... Mr. J. P. Thompson.
Secretary .......... Mr. A. C. Woolner.

The proceedings of this meeting have not been recorded in the Journal.

During the autumn members were enrolled and His Honour Sir Louis Dane consented to become the first Patron of the Society.

The first meeting of the newly formed Society was the Annual Meeting of 1910. This was held in the Old Senate Hall on the 27th December. In the absence of the President Mr. J. P. Thompson read the President’s address. You may find that address in the first six pages of the first number of the Journal and it is still very well worth reading.

Sir Edward Maclagan remained President till he became Lieutenant-Governor of the Province, but he could only preside at meetings in Simla, which in early years formed an important part of the Society’s activities. The management of the Society’s affairs was in the hands of Thompson and myself, subject to the decisions of the Council, which usually met only once a year. The Rules were changed so as to put all the power in the hands of the Council, which nominated new members.

In the course of time the Society was to experience ebb tides.

The first blow was the foundation of the Historical Society of the United Provinces.

The War on the whole did not affect us much at the time. Much more serious were the Reforms which turned men’s thoughts to the present and future of India, so that less interest was felt in the past. A still greater catastrophe in its immediate results was the failure of the Alliance Bank of Simla, which swept away a substantial reserve and checked the publication of the Journal. No Journal meant fewer members and a further reduction of income. We gave up the old format, insisted on by Vogel, and adopted a cheaper one.
From this time our difficulties were very real—lack of members, lack of funds, lack of papers worth printing and, worst of all, a lack of enthusiasm.

Even Rai Bahadur Sheo Narain, a most constant contributor, speaker and supporter, despaired of its future. Still some of us felt the need of such a society would be realised later on and obstinately refused to let it die. It is a source of satisfaction to us that the Society has survived, if in a rather different form, that it is fulfilling a useful function, and that in its more definite association with the University we can see a better hope of its survival in the future. I am very glad that the University Professor of History has taken the Society under the wing of his Department. At the same time, I hope it will continue to be something more than a University Society and that it will serve, as was originally intended, as an association of all those who are really interested in history, especially local history, throughout the University area.
ADDRESS BY LT.-COL. H. L. O. GARRETT, M.A., I.E.S.,
VICE-PRESIDENT.

I suppose my main claim to speak on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of our Society lies in Anno Domini, as I have been a member of the two Societies for 23 years and have, at different times, been Treasurer, Secretary, President and Vice-President.

As a member of the old Society, one cannot but feel some regret at its disappearance. There were giants among our contributors of those earlier days, and one thinks to-night of historical scholars whose papers appeared in the pages of the old journal—Sir Edward Maclagan, Sir Aurel Stein, Dr. Vogel, Dr. Hutcheson, our present Vice-Chancellor and, last but not least, His Excellency, our Chairman of to-night, all of whom are still happily with us, while others like that very loyal member, Sir John Thompson, have passed on. The standard of those early days was high and the Journal exceptionally well produced—too expensively produced, indeed, for the dwindling membership.

With the incorporation of the old Society with the new University Society another era has commenced, an era which seems to promise to be a successful one in every way. I think I may claim a certain amount of responsibility for this. The reorganization and rearrangement of the papers in the Record Office in the Civil Secretariat, which I have carried on as Keeper of the Records during the last 13 years, has enabled a younger generation of scholars to make fuller use of the records of the province and to conduct researches into our local history which were not before possible. There is much material available in the Record Office for future research, and I have every hope that the Society will be able so to utilize it as to make its Journal a real contribution to our knowledge of local history.

Professor Bruce has suggested, as one of the possible reasons for the tempered success which attends the efforts of societies such as this, the fact that officers of Government are so preoccupied with the tasks of administration that they become segregated from the general community in its other aspects. I think that he may have introduced that sentence after he had learned from my Secretary that I intended not to make a speech this evening, but merely to express an appreciation of the other speeches and specially of the very interesting discourse by Mr. Ogilvie on early kingship in Britain, which has obviously involved much research. Mr. Ogilvie’s discourse has inspired me to add some remarks of my own, suggesting parallels to his subject which exist in India. Although I cannot rival Dr. Woolner’s claim to almost prehistoric distinction, I recall that the last occasion on which I attended a meeting of this Society, many years ago, I came as a victim, to give a prepared address. This evening I have come unprepared, because of lack of time.

I would suggest to teachers and students of Indian history that they might draw many interesting analogies between the characteristics of early kingship in Britain and elsewhere and conditions of kingship which still survive in the Panjub. Mr. Ogilvie for example referred to the early king’s claim to certain attributes of divinity. Various theories have been advanced, as by Frazer, to explain the origin and motive of such a claim. A primitive king needed to be a man of great vigour and often supplemented his natural vigour, which would inevitably decline with years, by a claim to divine sanctions. I have encountered parallels in the Panjub hill states, which suggest that originally the enfeebled king was finally sacrificed as a god and replaced by a more vigorous member of the royal stock. I once witnessed an interesting survival of this superstition in a Himalayan state, which occupies a beautiful valley at a height of 9,000 to 10,000 feet, with a background of mountains 21,000 feet high. The raja was approaching his capital in a palanquin. At a certain point he descended, exchanged his royal robes for the simple garments of

* Extempore.
another man and mingled with the crowd, proceeding to his place afoot. Meanwhile the other, clad in the royal robes, entered the palanquin and was ceremoniously escorted to the capital. This man was a puppet king, who was symbolically sacrificed on behalf of the raja, dedicated to the gods. It was in fact a sign of the sanctity of the king as the head of the religion of his people.

In Kulu I witnessed a similar illustration of the belief in the divine sanction of the king. His subjects considered themselves unjustly oppressed and that the raja was therefore inspired by evil attendants, who frustrated his will. They refused service to these evil ones, betook themselves to the forest, cut down trees and buried a large piece of salt, grieving at the influence of the raja's evil ministers, imploring the gods for their removal and so securing a change of ministry and policy by an appeal to the ruler's tutelar gods, whose agent he was.

I have found many similar instances, which I have no time this evening to relate, showing the survival in present day Indian hill states of several of the characteristics of primitive English kingship, which Mr. Ogilvie has so learnedly explained. Such lectures are very valuable.

I have great pleasure in learning that the Historical Society is again flourishing and I presume that it will continue to flourish. I wish to add to the names of the members who have been mentioned by previous speakers those of Professor Bruce, Dr. Woolner and Mr. Garrett, who as Keeper of the Panjab Government Records has furnished students with a great deal of valuable historical material. I hope that historical students will be inspired by these efforts to pursue research and contribute to the aims of this useful Society, to which I wish every success.
SOME ASPECTS OF EARLY ENGLISH KINGSHIP

[Address delivered on 16th December 1935.]

The 25th anniversary of the Panjab Historical Society has fallen in the jubilee year. For this reason alone the subject of this paper seems appropriate. The province is also about to receive a new constitution based largely upon the product of English political experience, and there is no doubt that the key to the comprehension of English constitutional development lies in the understanding of mediæval kingship. It may therefore be of interest to consider briefly some aspects of the great institution from which the whole of our constitutional and administrative machinery is derived. The science of politics according to Lord Acton is the one science that is deposited by the stream of history like grains of gold (or possibly of iron pyrites) in the sand of a river, and knowledge of the past is a power which may be used in the making of the future. "Politics," said Sir John Seeley, "are vulgar when they are not liberalised by history, and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics." The results of such failures are in fact frequently still more deplorable. There is no great harm in vulgarity and normally none in literature, but the lie in the soul is to be avoided. Ignorance of origins may often be of minor importance, but the postulation of false origins commonly serves to lend strength to bad arguments and consecration to follies and abuses. In the 19th century it was an article of faith that we owe what we call our liberties to the true democratic spirit of the Anglo-Saxon race, which, after being purged of all corruption by the fire of the Norman Conquest, was in due course permitted by the English Justinian to blossom forth into its typical manifestation, parliamentary institutions. Historically there is nothing to be said for such a belief. We owe the fact that we have for long been governed not by one but by many, not to the alleged freedom-loving instincts of the Saxon peasantry, but to the struggles of our Kings with their turbulent aristocracy. Much too much stress has been laid on the Germanic origin of our constitution, and especially of Parliament. The institution, like the word, owes nothing to the Anglo-Saxon past. The ancestors of Parliament are the Curia and the Household of the Norman Kings, and our administrative institutions owe their
existence to the fact that the increased effectiveness of the monarchy, which resulted from the Conquest, necessitated the diffusion of royal power over Departments of State. The Norman monarchy on the other hand owed much to its predecessor. So much by way of introductory justification. There is little or nothing that is original in what is to follow. Much of what I am going to say has somewhere or other appeared in print, and my debt to the late Professor Tout, Mr. A. J. Carlyle, Mr. Hockart, Mr. McIlwaine, Mr. Russell, Mr. Conway Davies and Mr. M. Bloch will be sufficiently obvious.

I propose in this paper to examine briefly the nature and theory of mediaeval English kingship, and to try to show what were its advantages and what its limitations in its long conflict with its only rival, the Norman aristocracy.

In the remote hill states of the Himalayas the local gods, though endowed with power to control the manifestations of nature, are entitled to be worshipped only so long as they continue satisfactorily to safeguard the interests of their devotees. If disease is prevalent, or harvests continue to be bad, the worshippers, or at least the elders among them, are justified in taking such action against the god as may bring him to a proper sense of his responsibilities, and in the event of failure even to renounce their allegiance and choose another deity. The position of the Himalayan deity of to-day affords a close parallel to that of the mediaeval European monarch. Sacred or semi-sacred though he was, his power, as will be shown in detail later, was never absolute. The idea of the sovereign whose will is law was entirely alien to mediaeval ways of thinking, and reappeared only at the Renaissance with the renewed study of Roman jurisprudence. The sanctity of the king was always great, but in the beginnings of history it seems that his political power was weak, and anthropological research has shown that the primitive king was often a medicine man. A certain family was believed to possess supernatural powers, perhaps to be able to control the elements, and at any rate to judge of auspicious moments and guarantee good luck. A member of it was chosen as king, who was not so much the leader and judge among his people in peace and war as a puppet or mascot responsible for success in tribal undertakings. The attainment of temporal supremacy by a being possessed of spiritual power was a natural development
and a mascot king of intelligence and energy, who used his opportunities to the best advantage, would inevitably tend to outstrip all competitors for the day-to-day exercise of authority.

The working out of these ideas is clearly to be seen in the history of Teutonic kingship. The primitive tribes of interior Germany, whence in due course emerged the barbarian invaders of England, chose, according to Tacitus, their kings for their birth, their generals for their courage. But the magic power of royalty must frequently have been combined with the quality of leadership, and then the mascot king might become an effective ruler and governor. Caesar says that ordinarily the chiefs of the German clans were the guides and leaders of society, but that in the event of war, the need for a central authority was felt and the chieftains would then temporarily unite under the orders of a single leader. If they had a sacred king, who was also a man of his hands, it seems certain that they would have chosen him. A successful war would naturally tend to consolidate the position of the god or priest king, and the enlarging of the state by conquest would mean that there would always be work to be done by a central authority. Conquest also tended gradually to lower the status of the mass of the conquerors, as in time they merged insensibly with the conquered among whom they dwelt. This process can be observed in the history of the Saxon and Danish invasions of England. Voltaire was almost certainly wrong, at least as far as Teutonic monarchy was concerned, when he asserted that war made kings and that the first king was merely a successful soldier. He would have been nearer the truth if he had said that war gave kings political power.

The German king did not lose his sacred character by becoming a temporal ruler. The divinity that doth hedge a King always remained and seems to have been recognised in all the States of medieval Europe which were evolved out of the welter of barbarian invasion in which the Roman Empire passed away. Some traces of Roman and even of Greek and Eastern ideas on the divinity of kingship probably survived the cataclysm and were added by the barbarians to their own Teutonic notions. The State religion of the Empire, with which many of the barbarian tribes must have been perfectly familiar, was worship of the Emperor. The new
kings of the west started life then in an atmosphere of semi-religious veneration, due in the main to ancestral German ideas of the sanctity of the blood royal, but also in part to exhalations from the debris of classical civilisation. The coming of Christianity was the third factor in the development of the sacrosanct character of kingship. At first sight it might seem unlikely that the Church, comparatively fresh from its victory over paganism and emperor-worship, would recognise any pretension to divinity on the part of the barbarian princes. But it was clear that the idea could be made to subserve the mission of the Church for the betterment and uplifting of mankind. Society was cruel, barbarous and undisciplined, and the bonds which held it together were few and slender. If anarchy supervened, the condition of the mass of men was one of hopeless misery. The Church alone stood for civilization. Whatever we may think of the tendency of the early Church occasionally to put theology before conduct, it can hardly be gainsaid that in the affairs of this world it never trusted to visionary ideals, but always endeavoured to support any practical and concrete power which could be used to further the peace and happiness of man. In the early middle age the need for strong kingship was obvious so long as the king could be brought even dimly to realize his responsibilities and the Church did not think of lessening his power by depriving him of his sacred character, though its manifestations might seem markedly usurpatory and even to savour of heathendom. The ceremony of anointing a king at his coronation seems to date in Europe from the time of the Carolingians and to have been borrowed by them from the ancient civilisations of the East. The Saxon kings of England adopted it soon after. The practice must be considered as marking the ceremonial acceptance of the divinity of kingship by the Christian Church. The ceremony was however double edged, and when the necessity for an irresistibly strong secular ruler became less pressing, it could be said and was said that it takes a priest to make a king.

I have said enough to explain in a general way the theory of monarchy as sacred and to indicate the strength that such a theory necessarily lent to the kings of old. The Anglo-Saxon monarchs enjoyed the full benefits conferred. The power was in the blood, and to be an Anglo-Saxon king the right ancestry was essential,
but birth was not the sole qualification. The hereditary idea though strong was diffused and had not crystallized into the doctrine of primogeniture. Not everyone in whose veins flowed the royal blood would make a successful leader and therefore, strictly within the magic circle, there was some liberty of choice. Normally however son succeeded father, and election, or rather selection, by the wise men of the kingdom was almost entirely a matter of form. After election came coronation and unction, by which the Church recognized the King as God's representative in earthly governance. The conception of the king as the vicar of God, which is christianised Roman, existed early but did not develop its full strength until comparatively late in the history of Anglo-Saxon kingship and rose to its highest peak in the York Anonymous, the date of which work is 1100. The ordinary Anglo-Saxon way of regarding the ruler was as an oak tree king, a good patriarch who sat under a tree, was courteous and kindly, dispensed hospitality and did justice to those who came to seek for it. The business of the Government was normally largely domestic and the King was the father of his people. This idea was very strong throughout the Anglo-Saxon period. It survived the Conquest and is very marked in the Poliorcaticus of John of Salisbury. It was not confined to England, and Louis IX of France appears always to have sat under a tree to conduct business. But though the Anglo-Saxons regarded their ruler as a revered parent rather than as an autocrat, neither election nor consecration served to impose any practical limitations to his power. It is obvious that when the power of the King was considered to be the power of God, earthly restrictions on it were impossible to devise. It has been argued that the assembly of wise men, which nominally selected the king could also depose him, but the fact remains that they never did. The constitution of the Witan was undefined. The King could summon it when he wished. It had not even the right to be consulted. In practice the King often found it desirable to consult the great men of the country, clerical and lay, on all sorts of business, but he was in no way bound to accept their advice, or even to ask for it. Only in one matter had he to walk warily. The law was above him, and by the law was meant not legislative enactments, but roughly the established customs and usages of his people. There
was no distinction in the early middle ages between natural law, recognised as derived from the ordinances of God, and positive law. Positive laws were regarded as parts of the natural law, recognised as being such after generations of test and experience, and the King was both their guardian and their agent. If his actions were not in accord with these laws, he was not king in so far as those actions were concerned. The King can do no wrong. This idea survived throughout the middle ages, and comprehension of it is vitally necessary for the understanding of mediæval kingship. It became much more prominent after the Norman Conquest, when government began to press more heavily on the people and particularly on the aristocracy, and the good tempered oak tree king gave place to the efficient but heavy-handed administrator. Actually in Anglo-Saxon times there was, as I have said, no clearly recorded case of deposition of a king, or even of any organised attempt to coerce one. Still, if any alteration was to be made in the customary law of the land, the king invariably found it advisable to take counsel with the great men of the realm and to preface any innovation with the announcement that he had secured their assent. The Church had no power to bind him. At his coronation he swore to protect the Church and to rule in accordance with law, but his oath had nothing contractual about it. He was moreover definitely the head of the Church and apparently there was never any thought of excommunicating him, whatever his conduct might be. When Ethelred besieged Rochester and laid waste the patrimony of St. Andrew, Dunstan, the Archbishop of Canterbury, emerged from his retirement armed not with the spiritual weapons of the Church, but with a hundred pounds of silver to buy him off. The King was everywhere supreme. He was responsible to God for his people's welfare, but his responsibility was moral and unenforcible.

But undiffused royal power could hardly make itself effective throughout a heterogeneous, loosely knit kingdom, and there was no adequate higher administrative machinery in the Anglo-Saxon state. Aristotle says that it is essential that a state should be easily overseen. This applied most emphatically to the feudal kingdom. If it was not, the local nobles, to whom the king had delegated some or all of his powers and whom he had strengthened by large grants of
crown land, tended to become independent rulers. In the end he might find that he ruled in actual fact over nothing and no one. This never actually happened in Anglo-Saxon England as it did in France, but at the best of times the king’s control over a large part of the country was very nominal. In short, the continued concentration of authority in the person of the ruler made the imponderable power of the Anglo-Saxon monarch largely ineffectual, unless he happened to be a man of exceptional ability and energy. But even the most vigorous man has only 24 hours in his day, and time and space; therefore, as well as moral obligation set limits to the power of the Old English king.

William the Conqueror had one overwhelming advantage over his predecessors. All England was undeniably his by right of conquest. The conflicting elements of the population, West Saxons, Mercians, Northumbrians, Danes, were reduced to a uniform level of complete, if sullen, submission. It is however difficult even for the invincibly stronger to rule, if there is never any acquiescence in the hearts of the conquered. Not even a Norman duke would care to live without ever taking his hand from his sword. William moreover suffered from two great disadvantages. In the first place his Norman companions held the orthodox feudal view of kingship. According to their ideas he was the head, it is true, of the feudal hierarchy, but he had definite obligations, and if he did not fulfil them, they could withdraw their allegiance and even devise measures of coercion. William and his successors naturally preferred the Anglo-Saxon view and did their utmost to secure its dominance. In the second place he was without one qualification for the rule of England which all his predecessors had had. He lacked even a drop of the blood of the House of Wessex, and this deficiency affected not only him but his successors down to the time of Henry III. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the vital character of the deficiency, or of the efforts made to set it right, but there is no doubt that it exercised a profound influence on the policy of Norman and Angevin monarchy and hence indirectly upon constitutional development.

When the fighting was over, William set himself to secure a measure of acceptance from the English. Possibly he would have
found the task even more difficult than he did, had not the vanquished Harold been himself a usurper. He went through the form of election by the Witan, was crowned and consecrated by the Saxon Archbishop and promised that the country should continue to be ruled by the laws of Edward the Confessor, that is, by the old customs of England. This promise was constantly repeated by his successors, especially by those whose position or title was weak, notably Henry I and Stephen. Henry I married a daughter of the ancient Royal house and also probably began the practice of touching for the King’s Evil. This is a very interesting example of the continuous effort to make the new dynasty appear the legitimate heir of the old, as the power was alleged to descend from Edward the Confessor, who had acquired it by his personal sanctity. The practice was originally invented by the Capetian house of France, who, like the Norman Kings of England, were troubled by the prestige of their predecessors, the mighty Carolingians, and was first exercised by Robert II, who was renowned for holiness. Down to the time of Henry I of England the descendants of Robert II of France were the only healers. The other anointed kings did not attempt the miracle, which meant that the fact of unction would not suffice as an explanation. For the gift of healing, election and consecration were not enough. Descent from the first holder of the power was the quality required. Henry I did not admit that he was imitating the Capetians, or that the power had been acquired by himself, but claimed to have inherited it from the last of the old kings of England, the saintly Edward, which of course went to prove that he was the legitimate heir of the ancient dynasty. The practice continued right down to the reign of Anne, and it will be remembered that Dr. Johnson, who did not die till 1784, was touched for the evil as a small boy. Throughout these centuries, whenever the king was becoming unpopular for one reason or another, it has been found that he was more assiduous in touching for the evil. A striking instance is the case of Edward II, who went further than any of his predecessors or successors, and endeavoured to add to the power of healing scrofula a miraculous cure for rheumatism. Charles I during the years immediately preceding the Civil War was an indefatigable toucher. The Church naturally regarded the practice with a good deal of suspicion and dislike, but
one of the most surprising things about it is that for several hundred years everyone, even those most opposed to royal pretensions, believed in its efficacy. Gregory VII alone expressly denied to temporal sovereigns, even to the most pious, the gift of miracle, but as a rule ecclesiastical circles both in England and France maintained complete silence about the thaumaturgic rite. There were in fact only two exceptions, Guibert de Nogent in France and Peter de Blois in England, and both, though they were reluctant to ascribe the miracles to the hereditary sanctity of their ruler, were compelled to admit that they did actually occur. The power of healing was concentrated in a single person, and the sacred character of royalty did not extend in France and England after the beginning of these miraculous cures to a whole family, but was limited to the head of the oldest branch, who became the only rightful heir to the Crown. Its influence upon the adoption of primogeniture in France and England is obvious.

In other ways also the Norman and Angevin Kings were at pains to conceal the defect of blood. John, whose difficulties are notorious, went so far as publicly and expressly to state that he was not the heir of William the Bastard of Normandy, but of Edward the Confessor, King of England, and chose as his patron saint the canonized Anglo-Saxon Bishop Wulfstan, by whose side he lies buried in Worcester Cathedral. His son, Henry III, gave up the use of French or Norman names for his children and Edward I bore the old English name of the Confessor. There is little doubt that English national feeling had for long to be placated. What the Norman Conquest had done was to sweep away the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy, which was numerically very small, and substitute for it a Norman noble class. A century or so of strong and on the whole good government produced, as it always will, a middle class and when that class emerged, it was definitely English. If it were friendly, it could be used as an invaluable counterpoise to the pretensions to independence of the great Norman territorial aristocracy and to defeat their theory of the nature of royal power. The leaders of the Church, who in respect of the temporalities of their sees were as much subject to royal pressure as the lay nobility, as a rule, took the side of the territorial magnates against the king, and the struggles to obtain some weapon which
would counter regal sanctity, particularly as displayed in the miraculous power of healing, are of peculiar interest. The development of political sainthood as an anti-royal expedient was a remarkable feature of Angevin England. It did not occur in France, as the French royal house included a saint, Louis IX, and to set up saint against saint was perhaps considered impossible or at least unsuitable. But the kings of England could point to a Confessor only and saints ranked higher than Confessors, even though the Confessors were kings. The first and greatest of the political saints was Thomas Becket. In addition Hugh of Lincoln, Edmund Rich and Thomas Cantilupe were actually canonized, and Stephen Langton, John’s great opponent and the organiser of the baronial opposition which led to the signing of the Magna Charta, narrowly missed the honour. The pope, however, for reasons of his own, was more often on the side of the king than not, and official canonization was difficult to procure. Popular or rather aristocratic recognition of sainthood could be accorded however even to the most unlikely candidates. Simon de Montfort and Thomas of Lancaster were actually excommunicated at the time of their deaths, but miracles were wrought in profusion at their tombs. Thomas of Lancaster was as dull, stupid, selfish and unscrupulous a noble as can well be imagined, but crowds flocked to look at an image in St. Paul’s, which was said to resemble him and a poem was composed in which stress was laid on the similarity in name and end to Becket.

"Gaude Thoma, ducum decus, lucerna Lancastriae
Qui per necem imitaris Thomam Cantuariae."

There is no doubt that the canonisation of hostile leaders was highly embarrassing to English royalty, and was moreover difficult to punish. Russell has pointed out that “the sanctification of opposition to the King in such an ecclesiastical age as the 13th century was an important factor in raising anti-royal movements to a position of respectability and power in England, which they never achieved in France.” The policy was undoubtedly effective in securing to the oligarchs a certain measure of popular support which otherwise they would have found it hard to secure. In particular it gave an opportunity to the Franciscan friars who were always hostile to royal pretensions and who enjoyed high prestige among the masses in the 13th century.
It should be observed that all the political saints were supporters of the aristocracy, and that all of them were magnates, ecclesiastical or lay. The common folk, unless advantage were taken of their superstitious credulity, were normally for the king and against the nobles. The one great popular rising of medi\aeval England, the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, had for its watchword "The King and the Commons," and was directed not against the boy King, Richard II, but against the magnates who ruled in his name. It produced one leader who was probably a real saint, John Ball, St. Mary's Priest of York. He however was not canonized. He was drawn and quartered.

On the whole it can be said that when the king was successful, particularly in his foreign policy, his view of the position of royalty prevailed. When he was not, as in the cases of John, Henry III, and Edward II, the small clique of oligarchs, who had set themselves to become a ruling class which could direct and control the king, for the time being had their way. I have indicated that their theory of kingship differed from the old Anglo-Saxon view. It conceded the divinity of kingly power, but emphatically denied that royal responsibilities were unenforecible and laid particular stress on the duty of the magnates to see that the king ruled according to law, that is, according to custom, and that he should not be allowed to make innovations in the established order of things without their consent. The Anglo-Saxons had thought that he ought not to do these things, but had left it at that. The Norman nobility were determined to prevent him from doing them. Their ideas are well summed up in the Song of Lewes, which was written to celebrate Simon de Montfort's victory. Its author was probably a Franciscan friar. In the song the king is urged to rule by law and to consult not men of his own choice, but the barons of England, who know what is good for the country, and is bidden to beware of pride and to remember that he who for a short time is given earthly pre-eminence is soon enclosed in marble and buried in the ground. The government of the country is a matter which concerns the safety or the destruction of all. Therefore, the question in whose hands should the guardianship of the realm lie is important, and if the king fails, the magnates must take the charge upon themselves. The song
closes on a distinctly minatory note:

"Incolas in ordine suo rex tenebit
Et hoc moderamine regnando gaudebit
Si vero studuerit suos degradare
Ordinem perverterit, frustra quaeret, quaere
Sibi non obtemperant ita perturbati
Immo Si sic facerent, essent insensati"

"The king shall maintain his people in their condition and shall rejoice in reigning on this principle. If indeed he shall have endeavoured to degrade his people, if he shall have overturned their rank, he will seek to rule in vain, because, if they are so outraged, they will not obey him. Indeed, if they were to do so, they would be mad."

An interesting passage in the De Legibus of the famous lawyer Bracton, which was almost certainly interpolated about this time by one of Simon de Montfort's supporters, runs as follows:

"The King has a superior, namely, God, likewise the law, through which he was made King, likewise his court, to wit, his earls and barons, for earls (comites) are so called as being the King’s associates, and he who has an associate has a master, and therefore, if the King be without a bridle, that is, without law, they ought to put the bridle upon him."

The difficulties of the baronial position are summed up in the following declaration of policy, which dates from the troublous times of Edward II. "Homage and oath of allegiance is more by reason of the Crown than by reason of the King’s person, and is more bound to the Crown than the person, and this appears in that before the estate of the Crown hath descended, no allegiance is due to the person. Wherefore, if by chance the King be not guided by reason, his lieges are bound by oath made to the Crown to guide the King and the estate of the Crown back again to reason, and otherwise the oath would not be kept. The question now arises, how one ought to guide the King, whether by suit of law or by constraint: by suit of law one cannot have redress, because he will have no judges but the King’s, in which case, if the King’s will be not according to reason, he will have nothing but error maintained; wherefore it behoveth in order to save the oath, that, when the King
will not redress the matter or remove that which is evil and damaging for the people at large and for the Crown, it is to be adjudged that the matter shall be removed by harsh measures, for he is bound by oath to govern his people and his lieges, and his lieges are bound to govern in his aid and in his default." From this it will be clear that in spite of the wholly revolutionary treatment of the royal capacity as something apart from the king's person, there was no authority which could decide what belonged to the Crown and what to the King. The only solution lay in coercion.

There is not time to discuss the baronial theory of opposition in greater detail. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the royal theory of government was so potent, that even when the magnates won, they did not know what to do with their victory. No one thought of altering the form of government and trying to do without the king, and till the 17th century he remained as necessary for the conduct of the administration in every sphere as he had in Anglo-Saxon times. It is worth remarking that England was, throughout the middle ages, incomparably the best administered country in Europe.

In conclusion, I cannot do better than quote Bacon's admirable statement of the dual character of mediæval kingship—its divine origins and earthly limitations:

"All precepts concerning Kings are in effect comprehended in these two remembrances: Memento quod es homo; and, memento quod es Deus; the one bridleth their power, the other their will."

C. M. G. Ogilvie.
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SINDH, 1842-43.

III

(Annexation.)

In a previous article I examined the policy of the British Government towards Sindh during the eventful years of the First Afghan War. Before Lord Auckland left India, he had succeeded in forcing Sindh to accept a subsidiary force and had made it a base for the operations of the army of the Indus.

Lord Ellenborough succeeded him, and the situation which he had created, in March, 1842. Sir Charles Napier had arrived in India three months earlier. The intricate situation which these two men found on their arrival was this:—The British army in Afghanistan had met disaster after disaster, the news of which was received in the Panjab and Sindh with undisguised satisfaction. Auckland’s invasion of Afghanistan had turned out to be what has so aptly been described as an Asiatic copy of Napoleon’s invasion of Spain. The reputation of British arms was at the lowest. In addition to all this an insurrection had broken out among the Afghan tribes of Kakars and Kujjaks and the Murri Bilochis in 1840. The Sarwans had set up Mehrab Khan’s son and assembled a large force. Thus the position of the British Agents at Quetta and Kalat had become critical and the safety of the Bolan Pass was in danger. Major Clibborn, who had gone to relieve the Kahun outpost, had also met with reverses in the Marri Hills. It was also reported that Diwan Sawan Mall, the Lahore Government’s governor of the Multan province, had rendered help to Dodeh Khan and had encouraged him to seize the Bolan Pass, though Outram did not believe it then. Later on Outram changed his opinion and reported that Sawan Mall was intriguing with the Marris. The Diwan was also supposed to be carrying on correspondence with the ruler of Hyderabad (Sindh) with the purpose of strengthening friendship.

1. Journal Vol. III, Part II.
3. Ibid.

115
circumstances, was Ellenborough, in the words of Major William Napier, to sit silent and "foment the hopes of neighbouring powers, eager for war, by a show of humility which could only appear to them weakness."\(^1\) He therefore at once decided on a bold policy and carried it through.

Soon after his arrival he wrote three letters to the Amirs, which clearly state that "on the day on which you shall be faithless to the British Government, sovereignty shall have passed from you." The threat contained in these letters was not idle. It was, as Lord Ellenborough's secretary wrote to Major Outram, "a declaration of the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, cost what it may, the first chief who shall prove faithless, by the confiscation of his dominions."\(^2\) This threat, however brutal in its frankness, was at least denuded of all garb of friendship, which usually covered Lord Auckland's communications. Now at least the Amirs might know where they stood. Ellenborough knew that in going forward he would be forging another link in the chain of injustice started by Lord Auckland, but as Sir W. Butler puts it, "In India to go forward has often been to go wrong, but to go back in that country has always been to admit the wrong, and once to do that is to admit the truth of an argument which, if prolonged to its fullest consequences, must lead us to the sea-coast."\(^3\) General Sir Charles Napier was in perfect agreement with Ellenborough, and in fact had forwarded a plan to Calcutta giving his opinion as to how best the prestige of British arms could be retrieved in Afghanistan and the countries of the Indus. But the new Governor-General, though ardently wishing to extend the frontiers of British India to the line of the Indus, was "far from aiming to take advantage of past misdeeds" and "gave warning for the future only."\(^4\)

His object was two-fold. Firstly, he wished to obtain the power of acting on both sides of the Indus, consequently the continued occupation of Karachi, in order to communicate with Bombay, and the occupation of Bukkur and Sukkur to insure a passage over the Indus, which was necessary for maintaining communication with

2. Ibid.
British stations on the Sutlej and the army at Kandhar by the Bolan Pass. Secondly, he aimed at controlling commerce by the Indus.\(^1\)

It was therefore proposed to exchange all the arrears of tribute due from the Amirs under the Treaty of 1839, for permanent possession of Karachi, Bukkar and Sukkar and for the cession of a strip of land on both sides of the river. The new arrangements were to be based on a principle of cession of territory in commutation of the tribute because, thought Lord Ellenborough, "the obligation on the part of a Native State to pay tribute to our Government is one which places us in a false position. No character can be more offensive than that of an exacting creditor, with which this obligation invests us....It makes us appear to be the cause of all the exactions which the Native State inflicts upon its subject."\(^2\)

Meanwhile Major Outram had collected various proofs of the hostile designs of the Amirs. These were:

(i) Intercepted letters from the ruler of Hyderabad to Diwan Mul Raj.\(^3\) This was considered a violation of the eighth article of the Treaty of 1839, which forbade the Amirs to negotiate with foreign States without the sanction of the British Government.

(ii) A secret plot of the Brahooes and Bilochees, encouraged by the Amirs, to rise against the British on a favourable opportunity. The rising was to be a religious one, "the sword was to be drawn for Islam."

(iii) Intercourse with the Sikhs.

(iv) Intercourse with the Shah of Persia.

(v) The dominating influence in the Courts of Hyderabad and Khyrpur of a man called Fattah Mohd Ghori, the minister of Rustum, well-known for his talents and his hatred of the English. Only Sobdar and Alimorad of Khairpur were faithful to their engagements.

On these and other grounds Outram proposed the infliction of a new treaty on the Amirs, involving the cession of Bukkur, Sukkur and Karachi and free communication between Karachi and the Indus at Tatta. But Ellenborough rejected the proposal and intimated his wish to take from the delinquent Amirs the districts of Subzulkote

---

1. Parliamentary Papers relative to Sindh No. 334 (p. p.)
and Bhoongbhora and restore them to the Nawab of Bahawalpur, from whom they had been conquered by the Amirs about thirty years back.

"... It is my intention," wrote the Governor-General, "to seize the first opportunity of bestowing substantial benefits upon the Khan of Bahawalpur as a reward for the constant support which the British Government has received from him and his ancestors." ¹

Another object of transferring these districts to Bahawalpur was the desirability of not appearing selfish aggressors, and because the fact of Bahawalpur being a Muslim State would render it impossible for anyone to create religious excitement against the British.² This restoration was contemplated in pursuance of a policy of "reward and punishment," a policy well recognised and established in continental politics by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and not on any "principle of abstract justice."³ By this time Major Outram had proved himself offensive to the Governor-General and was dismissed. Sir Charles Napier was ordered to Sindh and invested with the sole charge of affairs there.

Napier set out from Bombay for Sindh on 3rd September, 1842, and reached there after eight days during which cholera broke out on the ship and many soldiers died. He reached Hyderabad on September 25, and had an interview with the Amirs, at which he warned them against any attempt to violate the terms of the treaties and especially against taking measures to isolate the British station of Karachi by driving their subjects from the bazar.⁴ Early in October, Napier arrived in Sukkur and found the following instructions waiting for him.

"Should any Amir or Chief, with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power it is the present intention of the Governor-General to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct, but the Governor-

⁴ P. p. 373.
General will not proceed in this course without the most convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused." Also "... if the Amirs or any one of them should act hostilely or evince hostile designs against our army, it is my fixed resolution never to forgive the breach of faith and to exact a penalty which shall be a warning to every Chief in India." ¹

But the evidence of guilt was naturally to be collected by the man on the spot, and thus the whole moral responsibility was shifted on to the shoulders of Napier. Here for once the path was not clear to the General. The war in Afghanistan had been ended. Kabul had been retaken and burnt. Many old scores had been paid off. The prestige of British arms was re-established. Still more, the English army had safely passed the Bolan Pass. Was it necessary under the circumstances to follow a strong policy towards Sindh? Lord Ellenborough instructed him to draft a new treaty and force it on the Amirs.² The new treaty, which was ready by November, took away the right of coinage from the Amirs and was especially hard on the Khyrpur Chiefs.³ Rustum of Khyrpur's letter to the Maharaja and the part which his minister, Fatteh Mohammad Ghori, took in the escape of the rebel Syed Mohd. Sharif affixed on that Amir the character of an enemy.⁴ Major Outram was again sent to Sindh as Commissioner on the request of Napier for the purpose of enforcing the treaty.⁵ Outram pointed out that the present treaty was more stringent than that of Auckland.⁶ But Napier was determined to enforce it, and tried to convince the Amirs that they would become richer by accepting it. But if they refused, he would allow them to "try the force of arms, at their own peril, if they are so pleased," ⁷ Major Outram felt that this treaty would drive them to desperation and war and, not wishing that consequence, he urged his government to make it less stringent. He supported his argument with Benjamin

¹. P. p. 361. Ellenborough to Napier.
². P. p. 375.
³. P. p. 392. (Draft of the new treaty.)
⁴. Napier, op. cit. 133. Also p.p. 379. Inclosure 6. This man Fatteh Mohd. Ghori seems to have been an implacable enemy of the English. At this time, he allowed the rebel Syed to escape. Later on he played an important part in the attack on Outram.
⁵. P. p. 416.
Franklin's authority to the effect that "no objects of trade warranted the spilling of blood, that commerce is to be extended by the cheapness and goodness of commodities, that the profit of no trade could equal the expense of compelling it by fleets and armies." But his argument fell on deaf ears, as it was bound to, for the main object was not the extension of trade, but the strengthening of the position on the Indus. Moreover, Napier wanted war because, as Sir W. Butler puts it, "no lover ever longed for mistress more than did this man long for fighting." His defender James Napier, gives another explanation of his firmness. He was firm according to him, not because he wished to precipitate war but because, "he held it shameful and wicked to tempt the Amirs by any appearance of infirmity of purpose, to display their arrogance, when the Governor-General had assured him the sword of vengeance would be inexorably bared for the first fault." He too had prepared a list of the offences of the Amirs which included secret alliances and confederacies against the British Government and the troops from Kabul and many other infringements of the treaties. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough he wrote, "We are here by right of treaties," and "there does not appear any public protest registered against the treaties by the Amirs; they are therefore to be considered as free expressions of the will of the contracting parties." In another part of the same letter he admits that "there is such hostility to us on the part of the Amirs, such a hatred of the treaties—such a resolution to break them in every way ..." If the treaties were free expressions of the will of the Amirs, one wonders why they should have been so determined to break them in every way. Evidently they had never willingly signed a treaty, and Napier's attempt to justify his conduct under the shelter of treaties is a failure. But he is on surer ground when he takes his stand on interests of humanity! Speaking of the oppression practised by the Amirs on their subjects, he writes, "The question arises whether we

3. Napier, op. cit. 117.
4. It appears to me that much of the evidence on which the allegations of secret confederacies based was of doubtful authenticity. In this connection see letter of Mr. Clerk, Agent at Ludhiana regarding letters of Amirs to the Sikh Chiefs. P. 388.
6. Ibid.
shall abandon the interests of humanity and those of the British Government, which in this case are one, and at once evacuate Sindh, or take advantage of existing treaties and maintain our camps permanently.” If the camps are maintained, they will “quickly grow into towns and the people within them will carry on a transit trade along the Indus to the exclusion of the subjects of the Amirs without. Among the latter misery and poverty will sojourn.” Can such a state of things long continue? “I conceive such a state of political relations cannot last; the more powerful Government will at no distant period swallow up the weaker. Would it not be better to come to the results at once? I think it would be better if it could be done with honesty.” Such was Napier’s impatience of delay! With a sweep of the sword he wishes to come to the results at once. Major Outram had pointed out to him that the tribes on the river above that part possessed by the Amirs of Sindh, did levy tolls and therefore to allow those tribes to levy tolls and forbid the Amirs to do so would be unjust. Napier had a very simple answer to this argument, namely, to compel these tribes also to give up the tolls. In his own words, “to excuse the Amirs on the ground that others are not equally coerced is answered by coercing the others.”

As already pointed out, the draft of the treaty now prepared was approved by Ellenborough, though it was more stringent than the treaty of Lord Auckland and the one proposed by Outram. While the latter was negotiating for the acceptance of this treaty at Hyderabad, the Amirs began collecting troops and gathering their Bilochi feudatories. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that their measures were entirely defensive and were inspired by Napier’s measures. Their peaceful and defensive attitude was considered by Napier mere camouflage and he thought that they only waited for the hot season, which they expected would paralyse the British soldiers by its deadly heat. Napier therefore decided to strike before they could, and in the beginning of 1843 marched towards Imangurh, a desert fortress, which was deserted on his approach and which he blew up. It may be noted here that he did this without any declaration of war. He now turned South and halted at Sakrunda for a few

1. Ibid, being observations of Napier on the occupation of Sindh.
days on hearing from Outram that the Amirs had accepted the treaty. Here Napier intercepted some letters from Amir Mohammad of Hyderabad calling upon Bilochi chiefs of the Murree tribe to march to Miani immediately.\(^1\) This finally decided him on the side of war if at all he had harboured any irresolution, which is doubtful.

Outram was attacked in the Residency by Biloochees on the 17th February, having previously been warned by the Amirs to leave. He escaped and joined Napier at Hala, thirty miles north of Hyderabad. Napier now marched towards Miani, where his twenty-two hundred soldiers fought against thirty thousand men of the enemy and won a fierce battle. Next day the British flag was flying over the tower of Hyderabad. Shere Mohammad, the real fighting man, was defeated at Dubba in the middle of March,\(^2\) Mirpur occupied the same month, and Amarkote seized on the 4th of April, thus completing the conquest of Sindh. Shere Mohd., who had escaped at Dubba and had gathered some ten thousand men about him, was again defeated by Roberts and Jacobs some fifty miles north of Hyderabad and became a fugitive. Sindh was annexed in August and the Amirs exiled. Napier, who was appointed Governor of Sindh, now set about introducing reforms and a stable Government in the unhappy valley.

The annexation of Sindh aroused hot passions and controversies at the time. Ellenborough and Napier were both condemned as well as praised. But in a retrospect of a century one is in a position to judge better. It is quite clear that the Amirs of Sindh were a barbarous, avaricious and cruel set of people. It is also clear that from the standpoint of international ethics the British Government of India had no more right then to appoint themselves protectors of the "interests of humanity" in Sindh than has Italy to-day in Abyssinia. Major James Napier, the defender of his brother Sir C. Napier, makes much in his two volumes "The Conquest of Sindh" of the fact that the subjects of the Amirs were greatly oppressed and that it was natural to respond to the cry of oppressed humanity. But we know that that was neither the real nor the only cause. The

\(^1\) Conquest, Napier, op. cit., p. 276, 277.
\(^2\) The medals for "Scinde" bear two names, "Meane" and "Hyderabad," the latter being the official name for the Battle of Dubba.
fact was that, owing to the disasters of the Afghanistan Campaign, Lord Ellenborough considered it necessary to extend the frontiers of British India to the Indus, and Napier supported him out of the soldier's innate love for glory. In fact he was very impatient, as is clear from his letter to Lord Ellenborough already quoted. On the point of honesty he satisfied his own conscience and that of Lord Ellenborough by diligently preparing a list of the infringements of the treaty. Here he was justified to a great extent, for there is no doubt that the Amirs had not been faithful to their engagements. But he never gave a thought to the justice or injustice of those treaties, on the strength of which he tried to defend his own conduct. His conduct, though just in itself, was based on injustice. It seems that he himself considered those treaties unjust. In a private letter, dated 16th January, 1843, he writes, "I found the Amirs and our Government in the position in which a treaty made by Lord Auckland placed them. I had no concern with its justice, its propriety or anything but to see it maintained." Again, in the same letter, "I cannot enter upon our right to be here at all; that is Lord Auckland's affair."¹ Napier wanted war and prepared the case; Ellenborough wanted Sindh and believed the case; the conquest followed.

Why did Ellenborough want Sindh? Because of a political necessity. Herein lies his only defence and justification, as James Napier admits it when he writes, "Take away this ground (of necessity) and it was a continuation of Lord Auckland's aggressive policy."² The Amirs wished for peace till the very last moment. At least that was the impression which the people had. Prince Soltykoff writes in 'Voyage Dans l'Inde' that while at Hyderabad in February 1843, he was told that the "Amirs were still in hopes of a settlement and that the desire of the Amirs was all for peace."³ They had accepted the new treaty even after Napier had destroyed Imamgurah without any provocation or declaration of war and without any offence having been committed by the owner of the castle, Mir Mohd. Khan of Khyrpur. Napier also plundered the castle,

¹ Extract of private letter from C. Napier (Appendix to Conquest, Napier, p. 175.)
² Napier, op. cit. vol. I, p. 121.
³ Translation of Voyage Dans l'Inde under the caption, "Ninety Years Ago," in the C. & M. Gazette, Lahore, by H. L. O. Garrett.
"although no resistance was attempted, and although he had assured the Amirs that he would neither plunder nor slay them if they did not make any resistance.\(^1\) This uncalled for spoliation of Imamgurh, which Napier termed 'the Gilbrathor of Sindh,' although it did not offer any resistance, was bound to give "consistency to the prevailing rumours of intended aggression on our part which then agitated the Amirs," and thus drive them to measures of self-defence which, as Outram puts it, were afterwards assumed as ground for aggression.\(^2\) Sir C. Napier himself wrote that he was going to take Imamgurh "although war has not been declared, nor is it necessary to declare it."\(^3\) Not only had he a contempt for the formalities of war but also for arguments which he thought utterly useless. He pointed out to the Amirs, "I cannot go into argument. I am not Governor-General, I am only one of his commanders."\(^4\) It is not surprising under the circumstances that the Amirs lost control over their Biloichi tribesmen, who were seething with anger against the Feringhee, and, collecting them at Miani, gave battle to the English General.

Many contemporary Englishmen of eminence considered the policy towards Sindh and its annexation a mistake. Henry Lawrence hated the whole affair and wrote to Lord Hardinge, "I don't think that Government can do better than restore it to the Amirs."\(^5\) Mr. Gladstone afterwards revealed that Sir Robert Peel's cabinet, of which he and the Duke of Wellington were both members, disapproved, he believed, unanimously, of the conquest.\(^6\) In England Elphinstone's contemptuous comment was: "Coming after Afghanistan, it put one in mind of a bully who has been kicked in the streets and went home to beat his wife in revenge."\(^7\)

While judging the contemporary condemnations of Napier and Ellenborough, one must remember another factor which contributed

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 535.
\(^3\) Letter to Governor-General, Decr. 27, 1842. Napier op. cit. 229.
\(^4\) Outram, Commentary, op. cit. p. 184.
\(^5\) Henry Lawrence to Lord Hardinge 24th April, 1847. In Morrison's "Lawrence of Lucknow," p. 178.
to the feeling against these two men. Napier's brilliant generalship against heavy odds at Miani stood out in great contrast against the cowardice shown by British Generals in Kabul a year before, just as Ellenborough's policy beyond the Indus provided a contrast with the blundering policy of Auckland. But still the case against Sir Charles Napier is so well established that even the most zealous of his defenders, General James Napier, gives up the moral or legal justification and takes his stand on what he calls "utility, irrespective of abstract justice." Two motives impelled Napier to war, firstly the love of glory and secondly the desire to bestow the blessings of the British Raj on the people of Sindh even against their will. That, I think, is the only possible explanation of his conduct. Behind all his talk of the breaches of treaty by the Amirs, and their hostile designs, one can perceive a substratum of that missionary spirit which implies an implicit faith in one's right and capacity to do good. One cannot deny Napier's capacity to do good, which he clearly proved in his administration of Sindh, but whether he had any right to do so is a problem which it is difficult to solve. Perhaps there are occasions when "utility, irrespective of abstract justice" may also be justified.

PRAN NATH KHERA.
ITALY AND ABYSSINIA.

[Address delivered on 28th October, 1935.]

The modest purpose of this address is to explain as simply and impartially as possible the circumstances and background of the present Italo-Abyssinian conflict to those members of the audience who have not had the opportunity of informing themselves clearly and authentically upon the problem.

I—ABYSSINIA: The Country.

Abyssinia (the name is derived from the Arabic word habesh, meaning mixed; for that reason the dominant tribe, the Amhari, prefer to use the classical name, Ethiopia) is a roughly triangular territory of 350,000 square miles in Africa with a medial line running W. S. W. of the Gulf of Aden and separated from the coast by a littoral which varies in width from about 50 miles to about 180 miles. It is politically interesting as one of the three areas of Africa (which consist, in addition, of Egypt and the deplorable little republic of Liberia), still free from the direct political control of one of the European nations.

It is constituted of two high tablelands, lying respectively in the north and the south-west of the territory, and of the arid plain of Abyssinian Somaliland, lying in the south-east. The two tablelands are divided by a great gorge—at places impassable—which runs in a line between the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and the great Lake Rudolf in the British Kenya Colony. Through this rift the river Awash runs north-east, losing itself finally in the depressed desert of Aussa, on the border of French Somaliland.

It is now completely surrounded by British, Italian and French territory, two-thirds of its frontier marching with British and most of the remaining third with Italian possessions. The country lies entirely within the Tropics, between latitudes 2° and 15° north; but the two tablelands lie at heights of 5,000—8,000 feet, studded with mountains rising as high as 15,000 feet and intersected by abrupt, wooded gorges, which are often impassable. The climate of these plateaux is consequently temperate. Addis Ababa ("the new
flower''), which stands at a height of 8,000 feet on the edge of the mediastial depression, has a mean average annual temperature of 60°—70° by day and cold, often frosty, nights. The whole of the north and west of the country is drained by a river system forming the headwaters of the Nile—which, incidentally, constitutes almost the sole British interest in the country. The south-east of Abyssinia, an almost arid plain, punctuated by certain oases, which presumably form the crux of the present conflict, is drained, if at all, by a few uncertain streams which flow south-east through Italian Somaliland, to the sea. The rainfall on the tablelands is heavy, but short, occurring chiefly between June and September, when it retards and generally interrupts communication. At Addis Ababa it averages annually about 47 inches. Abyssinia, in short, contains almost every range of climate; but particularly it embraces perhaps 100,000 square miles of territory potentially suitable, like Kenya Colony, to European colonisation.

II.—The People.

The population of Abyssinia is guessed at 7—10 millions. Of these the dominant race, the Amhari, a people of Semitic origin, constitute perhaps one-quarter and provide the official language, Amharic. They inhabit chiefly the districts of Shoa, Amhara and Tigre. The most numerous race is that of the Gallas, a Hamitic people, numbering about 40 per cent. of the total, who invaded the country in the sixteenth century A. D. and have only recently been subdued by the Amhari. In the east and south-east live chiefly the Somalis and Danakil, a barbarous Hamitic race. The inhabitants of the south-west are mostly savage negroids. The Amhari are mostly Christians, of varying degrees of approximation, belonging to the Coptic Church; the Gallas, Somalis and Danakil are Muslim; the negroids are pagan.

The Abyssinians are a heterogeneous people living at the most various standards of culture, from that of the enlightened and highly intelligent Emperor Hailie Selassie to a condition of savage barbarism prevailing amongst the negroid pagans and many of the Somalis. When James Bruce, after his exploration of the headwaters of the Nile in 1770, referred to the common practice in
Abyssinia of eating the still warm raw flesh of animals, he was generally disbelieved; but the practice is authentically reported of the tribes at the present day.

In general the Abyssinian tribesmen are described as virile, warlike, proud of their independence and deeply hostile to any attempt to destroy it, especially when made by foreigners.

III.—Economic Conditions.

The country is very largely self-supporting at a very low standard of life. Its staple industry is a primitive agriculture, in which the hired labourer earns about three annas a day; his food costs another anna. Foreign trade returns afford little indication of economic conditions. In 1929-30, the last year for which such statistics are available, the recorded imports and exports each were valued at a little less than Rs. 13 lakhs (£1 million sterling).

Abyssinia supplies annually about 450 lbs. of platinum—approximately 3 per cent. of world production. The chief exports are hides, beeswax and coffee. The chief import is cotton cloth and yarn, almost monopolised by the Japanese. The country is said to contain uncertain quantities of copper, tin and petroleum.

There is a restricted silver currency, linked to sterling, and one bank, founded in 1931. The first formal tax was levied in the present year in order to buy munitions of war. Slavery is an ancient institution, still strongly surviving. The principal forms and institutions of a civilised state were hastily promulgated about 1923, when the Government of Abyssinia applied abruptly for admission to the League of Nations in order to safeguard its territorial integrity and sovereignty chiefly from the threat of Fascist imperialism.

IV.—Recent History and Foreign Relations of Abyssinia.

We may select as our starting-point the significant year 1870, when a company, formed in the then scarcely consolidated national state of Italy, purchased Assab, a port near the southern entrance to the Red Sea, from a local sultan.

That picturesque adventurer Kassa (born in 1818), who adopted the name of Theodore and the resounding title of Negus Negústi (King of Kings) had not unreasonably earned the enmity of the British and died by his own hand on the day that Magdala was
stormed by Napier in 1868. He had displaced the hereditary Negus, Helie Melikoth, who had died in 1855, bequeathing his rights to his 11-year-old son, Menelik. But in 1868 Kassai, Ras (Chief) of Tigre, who had acquired a portion of the abandoned arms and equipment of Napier’s expeditionary force, adopted the name of John and the title and prestige of Negus, thus effectively postponing the realisation of Menelik’s ambitions.

John proved a doughty king, who reigned until 1889, when he died of wounds in an encounter with the rebellious dervishes of the Sudan. During these years Menelik was subordinate King of Shoa.

Between 1870 and 1889 the Italians spread along the coast of what is now Eritrea. The Company was bought out by the Italian government in 1882—the year in which, defrauded as she not unreasonably considered herself by the French of Tunis, Italy gained inclusion in the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria, which thus became the Triple Alliance.

King John viewed Italian expansion in Eritrea with hostile suspicion, but the Italian government shrewdly courted Menelik, who eventually began his remarkable reign in 1889. In that year also the Italians purchased that sphere of influence from the Sultan of Zanzibar, now Italian Somaliland, of which the undemarcated boundary with Abyssinia has been made the immediate ostensible excuse for the present conflict.

Having supported Menelik in his successful efforts to gain the throne of Abyssinia, the Italians in 1889 negotiated with him the Treaty of Ucciali, by the terms of which they claimed a virtual protectorate over Abyssinia, for, according to the Italian text, Menelik promised to “avail himself of the Italian government for any negotiations which he may enter into with other Powers or governments.” But it seems that according to the Amharic text this clause was optional, and not obligatory for the Abyssinian king. In any case Italian penetration made Menelik hostile and in 1893 he denounced the Treaty of Ucciali to the Powers. Still the Italians advanced in a series of small aggressive expeditions, until they completely aroused the Abyssinian hornets’ nest and in March, 1896, their army of 14,500 found itself confronted in a difficult terrain by a force six times its number under Menelik at Adowa. In the battle
which ensued had tactics and defective staff work by the Italians led to their overwhelming defeat.

Menelik was generous in his hour of triumph—far too generous, say his successors. A treaty of peace was signed at Addis Ababa, which Menelik had made his capital, in which Italy agreed to the annulment of the Treaty of Ucciali and also formally acknowledged the complete independence of Abyssinia.

During the remaining twelve years of his effective reign the Emperor brought most of the tribes into some degree of quasi-feudal subordination, though he was forced to leave many of the powerful *ruses* with almost unfettered local authority. He also negotiated a series of treaties with Great Britain, France and Italy, fixing his frontiers. All of these frontiers were amicably adjusted, except those with Italian Somaliland.

In 1908 he became completely incapacitated by disease, of which he died in 1913, aged about 69. A man of strong character and great enlightenment, Menelik II was incomparably the greatest African ruler and statesman of modern times.

His reign was the hey-day of "the scramble of Africa," in which various European Powers, including even little Belgium, competed bitterly for control of areas of exploitation in "the Dark Continent;" and Abyssinia, the last remaining autonomous territory, naturally did not escape the attention of diplomatic map-readers. Italy had been rather crowded out of this "thieves' kitchen." She was aggrieved by Jules Ferry's more than dubious diplomacy, which had added Tunis to the French empire in Africa in 1881 and had driven her into Bismarck's camp in 1882. In 1891 and 1894 she negotiated with Great Britain three agreements, which defined their respective "spheres of influence" in Somaliland. Even in 1894, despite Menelik's denunciation of the Treaty of Ucciali in the previous year, Great Britain formally acknowledged that Abyssinia lay within the Italian sphere.

In 1894 also a French company obtained a 99-year concession to build a railway to Harrar in Abyssinia, which in 1904 was extended by Menelik to Addis Ababa. But by the end of the nineteenth century "the Imperial Company of Ethiopian Railways" was in financial straits and, in order to prevent the influx of British capital, the
French government gave it an annual subsidy of 500,000 francs (£20,000) for fifty years. This naturally perturbed Menelik, for it obviously converted a commercial agreement into a nationalistic enterprise without his concurrence. By 1917 a metre gauge railway had been completed between Jibuti and Addis Ababa, a distance of about 480 miles. It has since been described by victims as the most uncomfortable and expensive railway in the world.

The next thread in the diplomatic web which was encompassing Abyssinia was a boundary treaty with Great Britain in 1902, which reserved to Britain the rights, (i) to control the headwaters of the Nile, (ii) to build a railway through Abyssinia from the Sudan to Uganda and (iii) to lease a trading post in Abyssinia.

The indefinite relations of the "spheres of influence" of Great Britain, Italy and France in respect of the Abyssinian hinterland dictated in 1906 a tripartite treaty between these powers, to which Menelik ultimately gave unwilling assent. This treaty is essentially connected with the grounds of the present conflict. It guaranteed the future maintenance of the then existing treaties in regard to frontiers and all other subjects. It specifically confirmed the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894, though in 1893 Menelik had denounced the Treaty of Ucciali; and it made no specific reference to the Treaty of Addis Ababa of 1896.

Article III of this Treaty of 1906 bound the three Powers to "a neutral attitude, abstaining from all intervention in the internal affairs of the country. In no case shall one of the three Governments interfere in any manner whatsoever, except in agreement with the other two."

According to Article IV they "shall make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia," while concerting to safeguard the special interests of each Power in the country, including "the hinterland of Italian possessions and the territorial connection between them to the west of Addis Ababa."

It is well to remember the diplomatic background at the time when this Treaty was signed. Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, but her genuine adherence was already doubted by her allies and their rivals. Great Britain and France had reached a "friendly understanding" in 1904; while
France was in firm alliance with Russia and Great Britain was already negotiating that settlement with Russia which in August, 1907, created the Triple Entente. The subversion of Italy's allegiance to the Triple Alliance became a prime object of the Entente. It was finally achieved at a terrible price by means of the lamentable secret Treaty of London, 26th April, 1915. In short, Italy was being courted in 1906 and her aspirations in regard to Abyssinia would be regarded with special indulgence by the other two signatory Powers.

Meanwhile, in 1897, that is, within a year of the Battle of Adowa, the Italian government negotiated another agreement with Menelik in regard to the Somaliland frontier, which was re-stated and published in 1908, when also the frontier with Eritrea was demarcated. Unfortunately in these conventions the Abyssinia-Somaliland boundary was not defined so plainly as not to be beyond dispute by the Italians. The actual bone of contention is the Ogaden tribal territory and particularly a group of wells and grazing lands within it, such as Walwal Wardair, Afdub and Gerlogubi.

The text of the 1908 Convention would seem plain enough to the plain man. It states: "From the Webi Shebeli the frontier proceeds in a north-easterly direction, following the line accepted by the Italian Government in 1897; all the territory belonging to the tribes towards the coast shall remain dependent on Italy; all the territory of Ogaden and all that of the tribes towards the Ogaden shall remain dependent on Abyssinia."

The boundary line was also defined in a telegram approved by the Italian Government in 1897 as running at a distance of 180 miles parallel to the coast of the Indian Ocean and joining the Juba to the north of Bardera.

These definitions appear unequivocally to indicate that the area now in dispute was accepted as Abyssinian, though, as we shall notice later, the matter is complicated by (i) the seasonal wanderings of tribesmen in search of pasture across this arbitrary line; (ii) the apparent complete neglect of the area by the central government of Abyssinia; and (iii) the uninterrupted occupation of the area by Italian military posts during the past five years.
V.—Abyssinia since 1913.

The death of Menelik II one year before the outbreak of the World War marks an epoch in the history of Abyssinia. He was succeeded by his grandson, Lij Jasu, who shortly afterwards was converted to Islam. Civil war ensued and Jasu was deposed in 1916 in favour of Menelik's daughter Zauditu (Judith), who reigned till 1930, with Ras Tafari, the nearest male descendant of the royal line, as Regent and heir. In October 1928, Ras Tafari was crowned Negus and in 1930, on the death of Zauditu, he was crowned Emperor (Negus Negusti—"king of kings"), assuming the title of Haile Selassie I. He is an enlightened ruler and has done whatever he can to improve the civilisation of Abyssinia. He has tried to consolidate the country, but the tribes are jealous of their independence, and absence of communication protects them. He has tried to improve education, to abolish evil customs and institutions, such as slavery, and to establish and accustom his subjects to modern methods of government and administration; but he has been obstructed by the stubborn conservatism of the priests and retarded by the primitive economy of the country and the indolence of the people, who at best are content with a little "window dressing."

He has decreed compulsory education, but his ordinance remains largely "the expression of a pious aspiration." He has created three model provinces to be administered under his eye by officials of his own choice; but it is stated that his officials often enslave their servants. He established a parliamentary constitution in 1932; but since its first session, the representatives have been changed every three months in order to accustom them to this novelty.

In the first session of parliament a Company Law, a Currency Law, a Bankruptcy Law and a Law of Property and Corporations were enacted; while a Commission was appointed to revise the Civil and Penal Codes upon the Belgian model. Despite his parliamentary experiments, the enlightened ruler continues to govern alone, assisted by foreign experts.

He has begun to establish a modern army and is said to have a bodyguard of 30,000 men with modern rifles and equipment, besides a regular army of 100,000 maintained by provincial governors, and the auxiliary assistance of tribal levies, variously estimated in numbers
and possibly approximating in total to 500,000. But the country is said to boast not more than 100,000 modern rifles. A few aeroplanes, a few machine guns and five "tanks"—ironically enough, presented to him by the Duke of Abruzzi in 1927 and not used since that occasion—would seem to complete his defensive apparatus.

There is ample evidence to support the reiterated Italian indictment that slavery commonly persists in Abyssinia. It is a deeply rooted institution, though the evidence of competent observers is that it is not generally inhumane in practice. Laws for its abolition were enacted by the Emperor in 1924 and 1931, but they appear to have been evaded in proportion to the distance from his presence. His officials, as already noticed, are prominent among the offenders. In 1932 a Slavery Bureau was established under the direction of an Englishman and by 1934 sixty-two bureaux were established in the provinces, with magistrates empowered to liberate slaves and punish offenders. But it seems that cattle and slaves are still the chief spoil of raiders among the remoter tribes.

In fine, Abyssinia must be considered by its minimum standards of civilisation a very backward country.

VI.—Foreign Relations, 1913-1934.

It will already have been seen that in the projects of imperial diplomacy Abyssinia had been more than tacitly acknowledged by Great Britain and France as a potential field of Italian exploitation. France had been beforehand in Tunis. In 1911-12 Italy had waged a very expensive aggressive war against an embarrassed Turkey in order to wrest from her nominal sovereignty the sand and oases of Libya. But she was by no means satiated by the possession of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya, of which the colonial value cannot be rated high in comparison with Morocco and the Sudan.

Italy consequently drove a hard bargain during the negotiation of the secret Treaty of London, 1915, which finally detached her from the Central Powers and actively transferred her to the Entente. Article XIII of that Treaty stated:

"In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable
compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of
the questions relating to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea
Somaliland and Libya..."

Nevertheless Italy was grievously disappointed at Versailles, even
though she gained certain unjustifiable accessions to her territory
in Europe, for, while Great Britain and France divided valuable
German territories in Africa in the form of mandates under the
League of Nations, Italy saw promised lands in Asia Minor vanish
into the grip of a resurgent Turkey, while no compensating area of
exploitation in Africa fell to her share. Her post-war negotiations
with Great Britain and France yielded only minor rectifications of
her existing African frontiers. So the aspirations of Fascist Italy
again centred upon Abyssinia and grew with the expanding self-
confidence of that regime.

In 1923, within one year of the Fascist "'march to Rome," the
Government of Abyssinia abruptly sought admission to the League
of Nations—a measure of its fear of Italian aggressive designs. The
Committee of the Assembly, which examined the application decided
that Abyssinia was a sovereign and fully self-governed state, but
asserted that "they could not state that her international engagements
have always been strictly fulfilled in the past."

The Committee were in fact divided in opinion. The representa-
tives of Great Britain, Switzerland and Australia held that she was
not yet sufficiently developed to fulfil her obligations under the
Covenant. But the representatives of France and Italy strongly
supported her application, urging that her membership would assist
her to abolish slavery within her territory; Italy particularly urging
that no special stipulation would be necessary against the nefarious
importation of arms. Such is the irony of history that Abyssinia
was admitted to the membership of the League largely by the
insistence of Italy, and Italy is now urging the very grounds of refusal
by Great Britain, Switzerland and Australia, as the basic justification
for her present aggression.

Two years later, in 1925, the Italian Government was negotiating
with Great Britain alone—and not with France, third signatory to the
Tripartite Treaty of 1906—offering a quid pro quo for certain freedom
of exploitation in Abyssinia, which would in effect convert that
country into an Italian protectorate on the analogy of Morocco. Provided that complete control of the headwaters of the Nile was guaranteed, the British Government agreed to "recognise an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the railway [from Eritrea to Somaliland]. They would further promise to support with the Abyssinian Government all Italian requests for economic concessions in the above zone."

When these negotiations became known to the other two interested governments, they evoked from Abyssinia a shrill protest to the League of Nations and some distrust in the mind of the French Government, which Sir Austen Chamberlain did not find it easy to allay. His explanation to the House of Commons stated that "the Anglo-Italian notes do not 'reserve' any part of Abyssinia to Italian economic influence" and that "the agreement imposes no obligation on any one except the British Government, who, in return for the Italian undertakings in regard to Lake Tana, engaged not to compete or to support competition with Italian enterprises in the region specified."

The official Italian explanation must have been even less comforting to Abyssinia. To the plain reader it carries no assurance against ulterior designs. The essential sentences state:

"As regards the recognition by the British Government of an exclusive sphere of Italian economic influence in certain parts of Abyssinia, it is clear that this constitutes an agreement which is binding solely on the Italian and British Governments; it cannot detract from the right of the Abyssinian Government to take such decisions as it may think fit, or limit the possible action of third parties.

"It is a guarantee of an economic nature obtained for Italian enterprises as against British enterprises in order to avoid competition which might imperil the success of these enterprises and hinder that development of local resources which it may well be in the interests of Abyssinia to assist and promote."

Two passing comments may be made: (i) Similar agreements and guarantees had given Italy, Eritrea and Somaliland. (ii) It is impossible to imagine such a negotiation in respect of any other State member of the League of Nations, say, Jugoslavia."
Reassured by the League of Nations publication of this correspondence, which he regarded as a safeguard of the integrity and sovereignty of his country, Ras Tafari signed a Twenty-year Pact of friendship and arbitration with Italy on 2nd August, 1928, that is, two months before his coronation as Negus (King). This Pact was officially reaffirmed by both Governments at Rome on 29th September, 1934. The vital article in respect of the present conflicts is Article V, which states:

"Both Governments undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation and arbitration disputes which may arise between them and which it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic methods, without having recourse to armed force."

At the same time a convention was signed to enable the construction of a motor road from Addis Ababa to Assab in Eritrea and the lease to Abyssinia of land for a free wharf at that port. But this convention has never been implemented.

In 1930 it was agreed by the interested Powers that the Brussels Act of 1890, for the preservation of African populations against nefarious traffic in arms, should no longer be applied to Abyssinia in view of her membership of the League of Nations. So in August of that year Great Britain, France, Italy and Abyssinia signed a new treaty, which enabled the Abyssinian Government to buy arms abroad upon a sealed order of the Emperor. Article IX stated that "if the attitude or disturbed condition of Ethiopia constitutes a threat to peace or public order, the authorities of the adjacent territories shall refuse to authorise the transit until this threat has ceased to exist." But in such case the delivery of arms would be permitted to the "legitimate authorities in Ethiopia" for "the maintenance of public order."

French interests in Abyssinia are apparently limited to the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway; British interests are limited to the preservation of the headwaters of the Nile after the satisfaction of local Abyssinian needs; Italian interests consist of unstated aspirations. Japan also has an interest. She supplies the great majority of Abyssinian imports.

Japan and Abyssinia signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1930, ratified in 1932. The Japanese are naturally concerned for their
Abyssinian market and in the present conflict are strongly pro-
Abyssinian in sentiment. An "Ethiopian Problems Society" has
recently been formed in Japan, strongly supported by the Black
Dragon Society (a national propagandist body), and by the Japan
Production Party, which on 24th July last denounced Italy's method
and demanded the withdrawal of Italian troops. In the same month
the Japanese Government officially denied a report from Rome that
Japan had assured Italy that she would not interfere with Italian
activities in Abyssinia. This unleashed against Japan the Italian
press, which is apparently sometimes allowed unrestrained freedom
of expression.

VII—The Present Conflict.

The ostensible reason for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia is
connected with the nomadic habits of Somalis, which have no regard
for arbitrary frontiers.

In 1934 a Joint Anglo-Abyssinian Delimitation Commission was
appointed to fix the frontier with British Somaliland and to examine
on the spot the seasonal wanderings of local tribes which might cross
the frontier from pasture to pasture. When this Commission reached
Wal Wal on 23rd November, 1934, they found it occupied by an
Italian military post, of which the Commanding Officer received them
with extreme hostility and discourtesy. The British Commissioner,
Colonel Clifford withdrew, later reporting the episode indignantly
to his Government. The Abyssinian Commissioner remained with his
escort on this threatened Abyssinian territory, as he had every reason
to regard it.

The clash between the Italian and Abyssinian detachments
occurred on 5th December without an impartial eye-witness. There
is no detached evidence that the Abyssinian force took the
offensive, which they deny and the Italians assert. The Abyssinian
Government proposed arbitration in accordance with the Treaty of
1928, but the Italian Government refused this and demanded an
apology, punishment of the offenders, a salute to the Italian flag at
Wal Wal and £20,000 in compensation. On 14th December the
Abyssinian Government placed the situation before the League and
on 3rd January, 1935, formally sought the intervention of the League
in terms of Article XI of the Covenant.*

On 19th January the two Governments were induced from Geneva to negotiate in the spirit of their Treaty of 1928; but on 29th January another clash occurred at Afdub and on 11th February the Italian Government announced the mobilisation of two divisions (30,000 men). But on 4th March the two Governments agreed to concert in establishing a neutral zone in the area of contention. The Italian Government obstructed this procedure and on 17th March Abyssinia again appealed to the League in terms of Articles X and XV of the Covenant.†

The appointment of a Commission of Conciliation was resolutely obstructed by the Italian Government and it was plain from the outset that its efforts would be nullified, as proved the event.

Both Governments were now preparing for war—Italy to exact retribution for an insult to her dignity, Abyssinia to defend her very existence as a State. On 13th May the Emperor appealed a third time to the League to protect the sovereignty and integrity of his country against Italian aggression.

The Council of the League met on 25th May and ordered that a Commission of Conciliation in terms of the Treaty of 1928 should meet and that, if this Commission should not have reached a settlement by 25th July, the Council should then reassemble in order to devise some other peaceful solution. On the eve of the meeting of the League Council on 25th May S. Mussolini had made an arrogant and uncompromising speech; but he recognised that the League was competent to review the issue and he accepted its proposal. Abyssinia requested impartial arbitration and asked for the despatch of neutral observers to the disputed area.

On 24-25th June Mr. Eden, on behalf of the British Government, suggested to S. Mussolini at Rome a compromise, Great Britain ceding

* Article XI, 2: "It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

† Article X. "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League....."

Article XV is a long article which defines the measures by which the Council or the Assembly shall examine and settle a dispute which is likely otherwise to involve a member in international war.
to Abyssinia the port of Zeila with a corridor, and Abyssinia making territorial concessions to Italy in return. This proposal was rejected by the Italian Government and it must be remarked that it was scarcely relevant to the ostensible cause of the dispute.

An appeal by Abyssinia to the United States Government on 4th July to place the obligations of the (Kellogg-Briand) Pact of Paris before the Italian Government was met by an evasion and a pious hope for the maintenance of peace.

During these weeks the Conciliation Commission proceeded towards an inevitable deadlock, which the Italian delegates were obviously instructed to ensure. On 3rd August the Council of the League met again to consider the problem. Its objects, of course, were to reach a mutually acceptable settlement by arbitration and to arrest resort to force. After making various conditions, the Italian Government sent Baron Aloisi as its representative on the Council. But the Council could only recommend, (i) a resumption of the negotiations of the Commission of Conciliation, with a provision that the sovereignty of the disputed area of Ogaden should not be a subject of discussion; and (ii) a discussion by the three Powers signatory to the Treaty of 1906. Both these measures were undertaken; both failed.

Italy had never stated her case; she had merely seized certain territory, had delivered ex-parte judgment on a hostile encounter, and had demanded the humiliation of Abyssinia, without giving form to any possible ulterior designs, and by this attitude she had alienated the sympathies of almost the whole civilised world. But on 31st July an article in the "Popolo d'Italia," which was universally accepted as S. Mussolini's composition, expounded his real aims:

"Slavery exists in Abyssinia....but it is not for that reason that Italy is preparing herself for action....Nor is the question of race an essential argument....Not even civilisation is the object that Italy has in view.

"The essential arguments, absolutely unanswerable, are two: the vital needs of the Italian people and their security in East Africa....

"The solution of the problem can only be totalitarian. Any action of expansion or any protectorate must be accompanied by
military measures. Italy is the only judge of her security in East Africa. Put in military terms, the Italo-Abyssinian problem is simplicity and logic itself. The problem admits of only one solution, with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva.”

In short, the Wal Wal incident was a mere excuse, which S. Mussolini now cast aside. The Treaty of 1928 has been scrapped. Italy must have room for the expansion of her population and her political system. Abyssinia affords such room and the Dictator intends to absorb it by force.

In August both the Commission of Conciliation and the Three-Power conversations collapsed.

We have now entered into the stage of the past two months, which is fresh in everyone’s memory and can be very briefly summarised.

The Council and Assembly of the League met in September and, acting with unwonted energy, unanimously declared Italy the aggressor nation in terms of Article XVI of the Covenant* and are now proceeding by a series of committees to apply the sanctions authorised by that Article.

**VIII—Observations upon the issue.**

At this point my simple function of expositor is concluded. But my audience may wish me to comment personally upon the problem. In that case I shall confine myself to reminding you of factors which may be overlooked in the heat of political partisanship.

(i). The sympathy of practically the whole world outside Italy is with Abyssinia; but we should not on that account wish to support Abyssinia in its present condition, which is in most respects deplorable and utterly unsuitable to a member of the League of Nations. Nor should we assume that Italy has no case to support. Her argument is the same as that which led the early Aryan people into India and the European peoples to America.

---

* Article XVI i.: “Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenant under Articles XII, XIII and XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State whether members of the League or not.
(ii). The League of Nations cannot adopt a really satisfactory policy in problems like the present so long as the relations of nations are determined by the territorial distribution of 1919. We must contemplate, for example, an even stronger national demand from Germany in the near future.

(iii). Although the circumstances in each case are somewhat different, can Italy acquiesce in the arrest of her expansion in Abyssinia, when she has seen Japan proceeding with her designs in Manchuria? We must answer as naturalists, not as moralists.

(iv). The Italians have not yet conquered Abyssinia. If they persist in the project, we may need to draw no moral. The economic condition of Italy has been steadily becoming more critical.*

(v). The sanctions under Article XVI of the Covenant, if applied with a reasonable degree of completeness, will have a far more powerful effect than is at present contemplated by many people.

Sources of Information.

A complete collection of the treaties relating to Abyssinia up to 1908, so far as they had then been published, is available in Hertslet's "Map of Africa by Treaty," which forms a pendant to his monumental work, "The Map of Europe by Treaty."

Later documents will be found in the official publications of the League of Nations, such as the Treaty Series and the official Journal.

The annual "Survey of International Affairs" has recorded the foreign relations of Abyssinia since the end of the Great War.

An admirable analysis of the Abyssinian question has been made in Information Department Paper No. 16, "Italy and Abyssinia" (second edition, August, 1935), published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The subject has also been well treated in a pamphlet, "The Abyssinian Dispute" (fourth edition, August, 1935), published by the League of Nations Union of Great Britain.

Authoritative articles on the subject have been published during the present year by "The Times" and "The Daily Telegraph" (London) and "The Manchester Guardian."

The unofficial views of the Italian Government upon the dispute have been published in a succession of "inspired" articles in the "Popolo d'Italia" (Rome) and the "Corriere della Sera" (Milan).

Various recently published books recording the writers' personal experience of Abyssinia, such as L. M. Nesbitt's "Desert and Forest" (Cape, 1934), and L. Farago's "Abyssinia on the Eve" (Putnam, 1935), contain much useful information.

J. F. BRUCE.
THE CIS-SUTLEJ STATES AND THE FIRST SIKH WAR

The Cis-Sutlej States came under the protection of the British Government in 1809, when a proclamation was issued by the latter assuring the Chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind that they would "in future be secured from the authority and influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh."¹ The territories of the Chiefs thus taken under protection were "exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government."² The Chiefs remained "in the full exercise of the same rights and authority in their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were received under the British protection."³

The British Government as a return for these privileges sought that—

(a) "Should a British force on purposes of general welfare be required to march through the country of the said Chiefs, it is necessary and incumbent that every Chief shall within his own possessions assist and furnish to the full of his power such force with supplies of grain and other necessaries, which may be demanded;"⁴

(b) "Should an enemy approach from any quarter for the purpose of conquering the country, friendship and mutual interest require that the Chiefs join the British army with all their forces, and exerting themselves in expelling the enemy act under discipline and proper obedience;"⁵

(c) "All Europe articles brought by merchants from the eastern districts for the use of the army shall be allowed to pass by the Thanadars and Sayerdars of the several Chiefs, without molestation and the demand of duty;"⁶ and

². Ibid. Art. 2.
³. Ibid. Art. 3.
⁴. Ibid. Art. 4.
⁵. Ibid. Art. 5.
⁶. Ibid. Art. 6.
(d) "All horses purchased for the use of the Cavalry regiments, whether in the district of Sirhind or elsewhere, the bringers of which being provided with sealed rahdaries from the Resident at Delhi or Officer Commanding at Sirhind, shall be allowed to pass through the country of the Chiefs without molestation or the demand of duty."¹

But no sooner were the Chiefs relieved of their fears of Ranjit Singh than the more turbulent among them began to prey upon one another, or upon their weaker neighbours; and another proclamation was issued by the British Government protecting the states from one another.²

But for the disputes regarding boundaries of their estates, succession and escheats, the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs enjoyed a period of peace and security for thirty-six years from 1809 to 1845. They were protected from foreign aggression and were exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government. "They were required to aid the British with all their force in the event of war; but no special contingent had been fixed and through all these years no occasion had arisen to test their fidelity and gratitude."³ But when an occasion did arise during the First Sikh War to test their fidelity and gratitude, they were found wanting.

The following account of the conduct of the Protected Cis-Sutlej Chiefs and their subjects during the First Sikh War is extracted from the MS. report on the subject by Lieut.-Col. H. M. Lawrence, C.B., Agent to the Governor-General, N. W. Frontier.⁴

"There can, I fear, be but little doubt that the feelings of the great mass of the Cis-Sutlej population without any reference to the disposition to their rulers, were decidedly hostile to the British Government.

"A large proportion of that population is of the Jat caste which has been a fertile source of soldiers and votaries of the Sikh cause.

² P. G. R. Vol. II op. cit. Letter No. 126. Proclamation for the information and assurance of the Protected Chiefs of the plains between the Sutlej and Jumna, dated 22nd August, 1811.
³ *The Rajas of the Punjab.* Lepel H. Griffin, p. 188. Trubner & Co., London, 1873.
The majority of the remainder are Dogurs, Rangurs and Gujars, all predatory tribes, delighting in and accustomed in all ages to plunder both friends and enemies, both rulers and invaders, as the armies of one or other have periodically desolated the banks of the Sutlej. . . . It was estimated that from ten to fifteen thousand of the inhabitants of the Cis-Sutlej States, chiefly of Jat extraction, were serving in the Lahore ranks at the commencement of the War. It was then but natural that the zamindars of every village should hope success to the cause on which depended the fortunes of their friends and relatives. Moreover, they had everything to expect and nothing to fear from the Lahore Government of whose munificence they had heard much, of whose tyranny under British protection they knew nothing. On the other hand they were ignorant of the advantages of British Government; for as the Paramount Power we have protected them only from foreign aggression and not from domestic tyranny.

"It is possible that the Chiefs alone were ignorant of the coming storm, that they alone had never condescended to enquire into what must have been the prevailing topic of conversation among their subjects. Yet from not one Chief did we receive any information of the intentions of the enemy or of the hostile feelings of the Cis-Sutlej population. This charge then applies equally to every Chieftain, and if my views be correct, every Chieftain is obnoxious to the accusation of having been (prior to the outbreak of hostilities) at least lukewarm and indifferent."

"The Protected Chiefs are bound to assist the British Government in time of war to the best of their ability, to furnish information, forward supplies, and join their contingents to the British force. The obligation to furnish information is not specially mentioned in the Treaty, but is implied. Indeed it would be a strange fidelity that refused to give warning of coming danger.

---

3. "Major Mackeson in paragraph 11 of his report mentions his own experience of the general feeling, and shows clearly that in consequence of the number of Cis-Sutlej soldiers in the Lahore service, every village must have been cognizant of the intentions of the Khalsa force."—P. G. R. Press List Vol. IX. Serial No. 808. Ms. Letter No. 87, dated 27th July, 1846. From Major F. Mackeson, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej territories to Major H. M. Lawrence, Agent, Governor-General, N. W. F.
"The geographical position of the Protected States, between own territory and the scene of action, rendered the question of supplies a most important one. As a general rule, however, with a few exceptions, small supplies were sent in till the contest had been virtually decided by the victories of Aliwal and Sobraon. Then, where before had been indifference, if not open hostility, all was zeal and devotion; and an examination of dates will show that the Sikh Chieftains were obedient only when they considered us, in a position to enforce obedience.

"Of the contingents (which the Protected Chiefs were bound to furnish) it will be sufficient to remark how that some fought against us, and many never appeared at all. Even those that did join our army were but little to be depended upon, and such was their want of discipline and equipment that had they been faithful, they had still been useless.

"The least that the British Government had a right to expect from the Protected Chieftains was that they should protect the roads in our rear, and restrain their subjects from robbery and pillage. But in most cases the Chiefs seemed, on the outbreak of hostilities, to have suspended all civil control in their own states, except when it could be employed with effect to keep back the supplies required by the British army.

"It must be borne in mind that these acts of the Chieftains were in the face of continued orders sent from the various officers of the Agency, who spared no pains to impress on the minds of all the necessity of obedience and the consequences of neglect.

"Such facts cannot fail, I think, to convince the Government that all the Protected States have more or less failed in fulfilling these obligations to our Government and that we have little reason to be satisfied even with the best disposed. Under these circumstances, I agree with Major Mackeson that we may improve the present opportunity to place our relations with the various Chieftains on a more satisfactory footing, and that in doing so we shall not be acting contrary to the provisions of the proclamation and engagements with the several Chiefs. I venture therefore to suggest a few alterations which may be satisfactorily put in force at once.
"In the first place I would suggest that, with the following exceptions, all transit and custom duties should be abolished between the Jumna and the Sutlej. The conduct of the Chieftains has been such that they cannot claim compensation, and the nature of the order will show that the Government does not seek any pecuniary advantage, but makes the punishment of their misconduct a means of benefit to the mercantile classes. On the advantage of such a change and on the stimulus it would give to commerce, I need not dilate; by the present system trade has been virtually destroyed, nor can there be much hope of its revival except by such measure.

"In the second place as the contingents of all the Chiefs were found more or less disaffected or useless, it would be unwise to expect assistance from them in any future war. I propose, therefore, that with the aforementioned exceptions, the contingents be commuted to a money payment.

"The states of Patiala, Jheend, Fureedkote, Mullair Kotla, Rai Kote, Chickrowlee (Kulsea), Booreah (Dyalghur) are the only states that on the most liberal interpretation, behaved well. I recommend that negotiations be entered into with them for the removal of all custom duties on the terms of giving the states a full equivalent in lands for loss incurred thereby. I further recommend that the contingents of Kulsea, Rai Kote, and Booreah (amounting in all to Foot 45, Horse 23) be excused during peace and that Pattiala, Jheend, Fureedkote, and Mullair Kotla continue on the old footing."

The Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, after studying carefully Lawrence’s report and other relevant papers, recorded a minute, of which the following extract shows his views on the sentiments of the Chiefs and the people of the Cis-Sutlej States during the War and the policy necessary to adopt towards them in future. 1

1. “It is impossible to read the reports drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, C.B., 2 and Major Mackeson, C.B., 3 and to examine

---

1 P. G. R. Press List Vol. IX. Serial No. 243. MS. Letter No. 465, dated 17th November, 1846. From P. Currie, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Foreign Department to Lieut.-Col. H. M. Lawrence, Agent, Governor-General, N. W. F.


3 Ibid. Serial No. 806. From Major F. Mackeson, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej Territories to Major H. M. Lawrence, Agent, Governor-General, N. W. F.
the documents by which their proposals are supported, without coming to the conclusion that it is the duty of the Government of India to correct the inefficiency and danger inherent in the present system of our relations with the Sikh Protected States, provided the remedies to be applied can be reconciled with justice and good faith.

2. "This system has lasted for nearly forty years, during which period, judging from the experience of the last campaign, no progress has been made in gaining the attachment of the Sikh population under British protection. The people seldom have any opportunity of feeling the benefits of British rule, being in all their internal affairs governed by their own native Chiefs. Although of warlike and predatory habits, they were never taken into our service, whilst their own national and religious feelings disposed them to consider the Sikh army, into whose ranks they were admitted by thousands, as composed of friends and relations. The Panchayat system—good pay and loose discipline—was infinitely more agreeable to their habits than the stricter system of our regular system.

3. "Our protection was felt by the Chiefs during Ranjit Singh's career of conquest, but as regards the people of these States, our intercourse was not of a nature, by the benefits we could confer, to secure their attachment.

4. "Every village had some relations in the Sikh ranks, and if questioned by our officers to what regiment he belonged, the soldier usually replied in a tone of defiance that he was a soldier of the Khalsa army on furlough at his native home. On the breaking out of the war, these men came over to their villages as emissaries, and whenever the hostile feeling against the British Government could be prudently exerted, no occasion was omitted for so doing by intercepting stragglers and plundering baggage. Even in the case of the troops of the Maharaja of Pattiala, the most faithful of our adherents, when the affair of Buddewal was going against us and the baggage was sent off from the main body, the whole of the Pattiala cavalry, about 200 in number, went over bodily to the enemy, and the villagers in the rear cut up our sick and plundered the camp-followers. This force employed at Loodiana conveyed daily information to the
enemy. I notice these facts because this contingent was esteemed to be the most trustworthy, in consequence of the fidelity of their Chief to the British cause.

5. "It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the fact that the hearts of the Sikh population in our Protected States were with the men of their own tribe and sect, and decidedly averse to the British Government.

6. "The disaffection to the British power, which for years had protected them may be said to have been almost universal from the Jamna to the Sutlej, with the exception of a few villages which for years had been administered by British officers.

7. "The great majority of the petty Chiefs, some of whom held offices at Lahore, and to many of whom the Lahore service held out the prospect of making their fortunes, were as adverse as their own ryots to the British Government, in fact, neither these petty Chiefs nor their ryots derive any direct and manifest advantages from British protection. The door for employment with us is closed against them, with the Lahore Government it was open.

8. "Throughout the Lahore districts and the Aloowala estates, now about to be brought under the direct superintendence of British officers, the case will be different. Liberal assessments and strict justice over the Sikh States ceded to us, will, I should hope, in a short time create a feeling very favourable to British rule, as contrasted with that of the native Chiefs. The estates now belonging to the East India Company will comprise about one-half of the territory between the Jamna and the Sutlej.

9. "But these papers demonstrate that the hostility was not confined to the less wealthy Chiefs.

10. "The Raja of Ladwa, with an estate of £10,000 a year, almost openly avowed his treason, and, after a time, went over to the enemy with all his troops and artillery.

11. "The Raja of Nabha, with an estate of £40,000 a year, did not hesitate openly to defy the British Authorities by a total disregard of the orders he received.

12. "At the time when this hostile feeling was so unequivocally expressed, the British army had been successful in capturing 100
pieces of the enemy's artillery, and in compelling the Sikh army to cross the Sutlej.

13. "There can be no doubt, if we had suffered reverses, that, as in the case of the Pattiala troops at Buddeewal, the contingents would have joined the enemy, and we should have had a general rising of the population in our rear as far east as Kurnal, cutting off our supplies and our small detachments, and making war upon us to the knife.

14. "When the war suddenly broke out I felt, notwithstanding this hostile feeling on the part of the population, that it was quite impossible to apply a military remedy by detachments in sufficient strength to keep up our communication with the rear. This could only be partially and occasionally done by the regiments marching up to the south, no detached forces could be afforded of sufficient strength. It was absolutely necessary to concentrate every man where the battle was to be fought, against a well-appointed and well-drilled army, inferior to none in Asia for its courage and its national pride, and superior to every other native army except our own, from its European system of discipline.

15. "Minor points were risked by bringing away 5,000 men and 12 field guns from Loodiana; the same measure was adopted at Ferozepur on the 21st December, and my deliberate conviction is, that if the British army had concentrated its forces on Ambala, allowing the Sikh army to advance through the protected States to meet us, then the whole population would have risen in arms against us.

16. "I state this conviction in reference to the policy of the questions now before me in these reports.

17. "There can be no doubt that the security of this part of the country demands a modification of the existing system, as far as can be effected, consistently with good faith and an adherence to treaty.

18. "These papers incontrovertibly show the existence of a disaffected feeling on the part of the Chiefs and the people, either by overt acts, or by neglecting to obey orders, which they were lawfully bound to fulfil.

19. "The refusal to obey the orders given to afford supplies, and to join the British army with their contingents, is clearly established
by proof. The evidence is ample to justify the general measures proposed of no longer permitting these States to raise contingents of their own, but to pay to the British Government a ratable annual sum in lieu of personal service. These contingents were not forthcoming when wanted: the disobedience was wilful and almost universal, and by the 4th and 5th Articles of the Declaration of Protection, these obligations are laid down in the most precise terms—viz., that the contingents are bound to join the British forces in a war, and their Chiefs to provide supplies. This betrayal of their duty did not arise from any want of power to fulfil the requisitions made on them. Supplies came in most abundantly as soon as the struggle was decided, and not before.

20. "The delay was persisted in for the purpose of impeding the operations of the British army at a most important crisis, by crippling our means of movement; and after the experience of the past, it can never be tolerated that the territories under British protection, who pay no taxes and contribute nothing to the State, shall furnish from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers to the ranks of a neighbouring power, and shall, in time of war, evade, with impunity, to fulfil the very moderate demands which the paramount power has thought it right to exact.

21. "These States have, in reality (with very few exceptions), forfeited their privileges by their repeated acts of disaffection and disobedience during the war; they have shown that their contingents are not to be depended upon; they cannot be distinguished from the enemy; they are neither an efficient nor a faithful force; and are worse than useless, for they are positively dangerous.

22. "To abolish the existing practice of each petty Chief furnishing his contingent for the service of the paramount power, and substituting in lieu of it local corps, commanded by our European officers, recruited from the Sikh population, and paid by the Sikh Chiefs indirectly, will, to a certain extent, remedy the mischief of the present system.

23. "I therefore, without hesitation, sanction the proposition that the moderate rate proposed shall be taken in commutation of personal service, making the exceptions recommended by the
Political Agent, and including the Chief of Mamdot in the number of the excepted Chiefs.

24. "I also sanction, on the same ground—viz., that these States have forfeited their privileges by their disobedience—the abolition of all transit and custom duties, which, levied through so many independent small States, is a system most ruinous to the trade of the country, and ought to be, as it has been in our Provinces, abolished. I approve of the exceptions to be made in favour of the Chiefs who conducted themselves with loyalty to the British Government, and I trust the equivalents for their loss by the abolition will be given so as to afford satisfaction.

25. "I also entirely approve of the proposal to take this opportunity of settling the rules of succession to property, by a recorded declaration of what the rule is to be for the future in the families of the landholders.......

27. "With regard to paras. 16 and 17, proposing to resume all the Sikh Protected States, and then granting new Sanads from the Government, I consider the same ends will be obtained by carrying out the proposals of the Political Agent, as detailed in the preceding paras. 16 and 17 which I have sanctioned. A general measure of resumption would create alarm, and must be preceded by a public declaration of the disloyalty of the largest portion of the Sikh Protected States, explaining the grounds of forfeiture, which general measure, not being absolutely necessary, had better be avoided. The object in view seems to be as well obtained without it.

28. "I therefore prefer to apply the remedies proposed, as being justified by the misconduct of the Chiefs during the late war, without proclaiming that misconduct to all India.

29. "The preceding observations apply to the general measure proposed."¹

Edited by—
R. R. SETHI.

¹ P. G. R. Press List Vol. IX. Serial No. 243. Ms. Letter No. 465, dated 17th November, 1846. From F. Currie, Esqr., Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Foreign Department to Lieut.-Col. H. M. Lawrence, Agent, Governor-General, N. W. F.
Quoted also in The Rajas of the Punjab, op. cit. pp. 191—197.
TARIKH-I-PANJAB

Abbreviations:

P. U. L. ... Panjab University Library.
P. P. L. ... Panjab Public Library.
I. O. ... India Office Library.
B. M. ... British Museum.

The Panjab University Library contains a beautifully written manuscript of Tārikh-i-Panjāb (History of the Panjāb) by Ghulām Muhayy'ul-Din, surnamed Bāti Shāh, of Ludhiana. The author is silent about himself in this book and nothing can be traced about him from the sources extant. It appears that the author was well known in his time, for J. D. Cunningham, in his book, refers to him as follows: "Capt. Murray, the political agent at Ambāla, and Capt. Wade, the political agent at Ludhiana, each wrote a narrative of the life of Ranjit Singh. The two narratives in question were, indeed, mainly prepared from accounts drawn up by intelligent Indians, at the requisition of the English functionaries, and of these the chronicles of Bāti Shāh, a Muhammedan, and Sohan Lal, a Hindu, are the best known, and may be had for purchase."

It is mentioned in the P. U. L. MS. (though not in any other MS.) that the book was written by the order of George Russell Clerk, the then Agent to the Governor-General (P. U. L. MS., f. 2).

The statement is borne out by J. D. Cunningham, who mentions that the accounts were drawn up 'at the requisition of the English functionaries' (p. 131, f. n.).

Unlike the chronicles of the Mughal period, this history is written in a direct and lucid style. The author rightly takes credit, at the opening of the book, for being the first to write a history of the Panjāb, which he narrates from the earliest times down to A. D. 1840.

There are three other complete MSS. known besides the P. U. L. MS. One is in the Panjab Public Library, Lahore; another in the

---

1. No. A Apc III, 8; ff. 618; written in Nasta'ī̄lq; size 14 in. by 7 in.; 27 lines, 4 in. long.
3. George Russell Clerk was appointed Agent at Ludhiana in 1835 Vikram (≈A.D. 1838), (Umdat-ul-Tuwārīkh, 1836, Vol. IV, Book 3, p. 50) and later on succeeded Lieut.-Col. Wade to the charge of British relations with the Panjāb (Cunningham, p. 227).
British Museum; a third in the India Office Library. Two fragments of this voluminous work are also extant. One belongs to Mr. H. M. Shairání, Oriental College, Lahore, the other is in the Panjáb University Library. The former comprises the first section of the book; the latter contains only the last section but one.

**Date of composition.**

Dr. Rieu in his *Catalogue of Persian MSS.*, iii, 953 a, mentions that the chronicle was completed in A. H. 1264 (≈A.D. 1847). Ethé supports (or copies) him in I.O. Library Catalogue (i, 197). Both of them have arrived at this date by misinterpreting the chronogram given at the beginning of the book, which runs as follows—

\[ \text{تاریخ تالیف آن شمس} \quad \text{بدین و حکم مشنطبل نمود} \]
\[ \text{مرتب شد حرواب نام تاریخ ذکر} \]
\[ \text{بفضل داور بیرسپ و دادار} \]
\[ \text{جز سالم تاریخش خود گفت} \]
\[ \text{که تاریخش پس از نامش بروز آر} \]
\[ \text{ول غیر از مائت ایه دانش آگیش} \]
\[ \text{زا اعداد نخستین جز و مشمار} \]

(P. P. L. MS. f. 2).\(^1\)

This gives the date of completion as A.H. 1258 (≈A.D. 1842). Rieu and Ethé have probably read the last couplet as follows:

\[ \text{ول غیر از باط ایه دانش آگیش} \]
\[ \text{زا اعداد نخستین جز و مشمار} \]

and have come to the conclusion that the book was completed in A.H. 1264 (≈A.D. 1847). But there is no such word as باط,\(^2\) and the couplet yields no sense.

Internal evidence shows that the book was actually being written in A.D. 1840.

The following occurs on f. 6b of the P. U. L. MS:

"إن قل ه در سال گذشته 938، عابدوی بر فرض رقصت اپالاين"

Tr. "Last year in A.D. 1839 the fort [of Bhakhar] came into the possession of the officers of the Company."

---

1. These verses do not occur in the P. U. L. MS.
2. Dr. Rieu has apparently conjectured that باط is the plural of پات, which is grammatically wrong.
Further on the author mentions the Hijra and Vikrami years as follows:

'Ta' kahun khan saal jijri ke beyk pir az dar mulk wintajah wabst reeide'.

(P. U. L. MS. f. 55b).

Tr. "Now the Hijra year has reached 1257."

Again:

'Akhar sast mdkorik ishar wabst md rukud wabst murqom misad'.

(Ibid.).

Tr. "Now the said year [Vikrami] is written as 1898."

Both these years correspond to A. D. 1841, which shows that the author continued to write the book in A. D. 1841.

To sum up, the chronicle was begun somewhere in 1840 and was completed in 1842.

Contents.

The P. U. L. MS. consists of a Muqaddima (Introduction), five Daftars (Books), and a Khutima (Epilogue).

Introduction.

(ff. 1—42).

The historical geography of the Panjab is given in full detail in the Introduction. The author begins with the sources of the rivers of the Panjab, and describes their courses. After giving the length and breadth of the five Doabs of the Panjab, he mentions all the important towns and cities of every Doab, and some light is thrown on their historical importance.

Book I.

(ff. 48—61b.)

An account of Hindū Rājas from the beginning of the reign of Raja Shūbūman (supposed to be the first ruler of the world, according

---

1. I. O. MS., B. M. MS., and P. P. L. MS. read it as Sadūman, which is probably the more correct form.
to Hindūs), to the reign of the last Hindū king Pithaurā, is given in this book. The author has taken pains to collect material for this period of history from the available sources. The following authorities are quoted:

The Bhāgavatgītā,
Mahābhārata, and
Padmā-purāṇa.

Book II.

(ff. 651—152).

This chapter covers the whole of Muhammadan rule in India. The author begins with Mahmūd Ghaznavī and gives a short history of the Ghoris, Khaljis, Lodis and Chaghatais. He concludes with the expulsion of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī by the Sikhs, and his death in A.H. 1183.

The author says he has consulted the following works:

(i) Habīb‘us-Siyar,
(ii) Ma‘āsir‘ul-Malūk,
(iii) Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī,
(iv) Tārīkh-i-Alfī,
(v) Tārīkh-i-Banāktī,
(vi) Tabaqāt-i-Nāsirī,
(vii) Tārīkh-i-Guzīda.

Book III.

(ff. 153—209).

This section deals with the lives of Gurūs of the Sikhs, from Nānak to Gobind, and their descendants the Bedis and the Sodhīs. It begins with Gurū Nānak and concludes with Bedī Sāhib Singh. The following authorities are quoted for this book:

1. 4 folios are left blank in the P. U. L. MS.
(i) Jawāhar Singh Sodī,
(ii) Shankar Jotshī,
(iii) Sohan Lāl,
(iv) Muftī Khair Dīn,
(v) Miān Ahmad Shāh of Batāla.

**Book IV.**

(ff. 211⁵—302).

An account of the Sikh Sardārs and Rājūs, who rose during the decline of the empire of Delhi, is given in this book.

It opens with the account of the Misal of Bhangīs and ends with an account of the Phūlkiāns.

**Book V.**

(ff. 302⁵—611).

A detailed history of Ranjit Singh, from his rise to his death in A. D. 1839, is given in this book.

**Epilogue.**

(ff. 612—618).

A short history of the East India Company and of British conquests in India (down to A. D. 1815), is given in these folios.

Dr. Rice has confused this Epilogue with another section, in which an account of the Rājūs of the mountainous districts, such as Kangrāh, Jammū, etc., is given. But this last-named section is not contained in any other MS. except the B. M. MS.

MUHAMMAD BAQIR MALIK.

---

¹. 2 folios are left blank in the P. U. L. MS.
². 5 folios are left blank in the P. U. L. MS.
THE FIRST CENSUS OF THE PANJAB, 1855.\textsuperscript{1}

In October 1854, the Chief Commissioner of the Panjаб considered that the time for a census of the Province had come. Though other methods had been employed in India, the best one, that of the actual enumeration of the people, as they were all over the country at a given time, was adopted. Considerable experience had been gained from the North Western Provinces Census of 1853. The census of the Panjаб was taken on the night between the 31st of December, 1854, and the first of January 1855. Every Government official was employed for making or checking the returns, and at Lahore and Amritsar especially the Deputy Commissioners found no time to rest during the night. Nearly all the Government employees, Mohalladars, Lambardars, Patwaris and other trusted men gladly volunteered to do the work.

Some doubts had been expressed as to the expediency of the measure and its success, but the Chief Commissioner placed his "confidence in the good sense and the feeling which the Panjаб people had uniformly displayed," and the reliance was amply justified. The utter absence of alarm among the inhabitants on this first census in the whole history of the Province was truly remarkable. People were even enthusiastic about it and often waited with lanterns before their gates, so that the officers on duty should meet with no inconvenience. The co-operation of the people was indeed so thorough that the census was considered to be one of the best so far taken in India. Even the frontier tribes, whose pursuits ranged from brigandage and nomadism in deserts or wide pastoral areas to the settled pursuit of agriculture and industry, were enumerated. The returns were tested and averages per square mile, per house, per enclosure, per village, the proportion of males to females, and agriculturists to non-agriculturists were struck.

The population of the Panjаб was sparse in comparison with that of the whole of India. The average population per square mile of North Western Province stood at 420; of Bengal at 311; of

\textsuperscript{1} Panjab Government Records. Press List Vol. 16. Serial No. 1328. Letter No. 41, dated 14th January, 1856. From Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Panjаб, to Secretary to the Government of India.
Madras Presidency at 170; of Bombay Presidency at 156. It was as thickly populated as contemporary France, Prussia, Austria and Italy. On the whole the Panjab was one-fourth less populous in proportion to its area than the United Kingdom, and only half as populous as the most densely inhabited parts of the world, such as Holland, Belgium, northern Italy, China, and the Gangetic Provinces of India. The averages in the various parts of this province ranged from the most thickly populated districts of Jullundur, with 513 persons per square mile, Sialkot 475, Gurdaspur 470, Amritsar 436, Ambala 420 and Ludhiana 385, to the veritable deserts of Multan, Leja, Jhang and Kohat, with 73, 50, 44 and 35 persons per square mile, respectively.

The average population per village or ‘mouza’ stood at 440, which was slightly in excess of the corresponding average for the North Western Province, viz., 369. There were at that time 2,124 small towns, whose populations numbered between 1,000 and 5,000; seventy-six towns having a population of between 5,000 and 10,000; and 32 cities having between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. These last included the towns of Ludhiana, with 47,191 souls; Jullundur with 28,422; Batala with 26,208 (Batala was in fact much more important than Gurdaspur, and it was after much hesitation that the name of the latter place was given to the district); Multan with 24,973 (it was supposed at that time that the rivers being navigable up to that part, Multan would become a great entrepôt and the first city of Northern India); Sialkot had 19,249; Gujranwala 17,650; Wazirabad 16,846; Pind Dadan Khan 13,558 (centre of the salt traffic); Bhera 13,913; Mianee 6,005; Ferozepore 12,032; Jhelum 6,060; Rawalpindi 15,813; Dera Ismail Khan 15,899; Dera Ghazi Khan 21,097.

There were three cities of first class importance in the Panjab, each having more than 50,000 inhabitants. Amritsar, the commercial capital of the Province, though it had lost much of its religious and political importance since the annexation of the Province to the British territory, was the largest city having 122,184 inhabitants. Lahore, the metropolis, came next, with 94,143 inhabitants. As it possessed none of the commercial advantages of Amritsar, the author of the Census Report, Mr. D. Mcleod, thought
that it was most likely to fall off under British rule; but the event has proved quite otherwise. Peshawar was the third city of the Province. It contained 53,294 souls and had great political and commercial importance, for it was the emporium of the vast and flourishing trade carried on at that time between India and central Asia.

The followers of the Hindu and Mohammadan religions were enumerated, but no sub-castes were defined, and by an unfortunate oversight the Sikhs were not enumerated as a separate community. The Hindus numbered 5,352,874 and the Mohammadans 7,364,974. The Mohammadans were thus as 1:37 to 1 of Hindus. The distribution of Mohammadans and Hindus was much the same as to-day, that is: in the cast, from the Jumna to the Chenab, the Hindus were predominant; but the area west of the Chenab was almost entirely Mohammadan. Agriculturists formed 56 per cent. of the total population.

There were 54 males to 46 females; but this was affected by the fact that a large number of Hindustani soldiers and camp followers were stationed in the Panjab, temporarily placing men in a considerable and misleading majority. Moreover, the country was still suffering from the effects of female infanticide.

The average number of persons per house was 4·53, whereas in the North Western Province it was 4·83. The Census, taken with considerable accuracy and precision, is valuable as partly illustrating the distribution of population, and, to some extent, the economic life at that time.

**CENSUS OF THE PANJAB, 1855**

*British Possessions.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Area sq. miles</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Land Revenue</th>
<th>Population per sq. mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cis-Sutlej States</td>
<td>8,090-11</td>
<td>4,902</td>
<td>22,821,111</td>
<td>32,61,122</td>
<td>282-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Sutlej States</td>
<td>6,791-88</td>
<td>4,171</td>
<td>22,73,037</td>
<td>33,91,298</td>
<td>334-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>11,027-88</td>
<td>8,188</td>
<td>34,58,694</td>
<td>43,17,118</td>
<td>297-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhelum</td>
<td>16,761-22</td>
<td>4,647</td>
<td>17,62,488</td>
<td>23,77,301</td>
<td>105-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>15,494-00</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>9,71,175</td>
<td>10,74,950</td>
<td>68-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>15,271-70</td>
<td>2,531</td>
<td>11,22,621</td>
<td>16,96,662</td>
<td>73-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>75,88-50</td>
<td>1,891</td>
<td>8,47,695</td>
<td>9,51,664</td>
<td>111-70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Area sq. miles</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Land Revenue</th>
<th>Population per sq. mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cis-Sutloj States</td>
<td>7,368.95</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,94,800</td>
<td>31,23,000</td>
<td>257.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisla Hill States</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,32,643</td>
<td>5,72,100</td>
<td>80.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Sutloj States</td>
<td>5,318.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,98,163</td>
<td>8,18,284</td>
<td>54.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahawalpore</td>
<td>25,200.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,25,000</td>
<td>15,43,150</td>
<td>36.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharaja Gulab</td>
<td>60,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,00,000</td>
<td>80,00,000</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singh's territory.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (States)</td>
<td>1,02,884.95</td>
<td></td>
<td>67,50,600</td>
<td>1,40,56,534</td>
<td>65.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding Panjab</td>
<td>81,625.24</td>
<td>28,879</td>
<td>1,27,17,821</td>
<td>1,70,10,210</td>
<td>155.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>18,46,10.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,94,98,427</td>
<td>3,30,99,699</td>
<td>165.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OBITUARY

At a meeting of the Society held on Monday, 28th October, 1935, at 6-15 p.m. in the Hailey Hall (Panjab University) the following resolution, moved by Raja Hari Kishen Kaul, C.I.E., and seconded by Mr. Justice Currie, I.C.S., was unanimously passed, all standing:

"That the members of this Society have learned with great regret of the recent death of one of its most distinguished members, Sir John Perronet Thompson; and that the Secretary be instructed to convey to Lady Thompson their deep sympathy and sense of the loss of an eminent administrator and scholar, whose service to the government and culture of India will preserve his memory."

At a meeting of the Society held on Monday, 20th January, 1936, at 6-15 p.m. in the Hailey Hall (Panjab University) the following resolution moved by Mr. J. F. Bruce and seconded by Mr. H. L. O. Garrett, was unanimously passed, all standing:

"That the members of the Society wish to record their grief at the loss which this Society has suffered by the death of Dr. A. C. Woolner, Vice-Chancellor of this University, who, as a founder, office-bearer and constant supporter of the Society and also as an original scholar, has laid the Society, the University and the province under a lasting debt of gratitude."

DR. A. C. WOOLNER

Dr. Alfred Cooper Woolner, C.I.E., M.A., D. Litt., F.A.S.B., Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Panjab, Dean of University Instruction and a founder of the Panjab Historical Society, died at Lahore on the morning of 7th January, 1936, after a protracted illness.

Dr. Woolner was born on 13th May, 1878, at Etruria Hall, near Hanley, Staffordshire—a large house belonging to the Duchy of Lancaster but now surrounded by potteries and blast furnaces, named Etruria Hall by Josiah Wedgewood, the famous potter, who had lived there.
He was the son of Captain Henry Woolner (of the Shropshire Volunteer Artillery), an artist who was headmaster of the School of Art at Hanley and then Examiner and Inspector of Schools under the old Science and Art Department at South Kensington. Captain Woolner was a brother of the well-known sculptor, Thomas Woolner, R.A., who was one of the seven pre-Raphaelite brethren.

Dr. Woolner received his early education in Suffolk, the original home of the Woolners (older spelling: Woolnough, from still earlier Wolfnoth) and of his mother’s people, Coopers. His mother was responsible for his education until the age of twelve, when he was sent to the Queen Elizabeth School, Ipswich, where he remained for seven years until 1897. At school he read mainly the Classics, starting on his own initiative Persian and Sanskrit with books found in second-hand shops.

In 1897 he obtained an open Classical Exhibition at Trinity College, Oxford, and the Ford Studentship and in 1901 he was awarded the Boden Sanskrit scholarship. He remained at Oxford for nearly six years. He passed the Honours School of Oriental Literature (Sanskrit and Pali), and in March, 1903, while reading Chinese (with a view to another scholarship), he was appointed Principal of the Oriental College, Lahore, and Registrar of the University of the Panjab.

On 22nd December, 1908, Dr. Woolner married the youngest daughter of the late Rev. Samuel King Bland and Mrs. Elizabeth Hazeldine Bland in Lahore. Mrs. Woolner is a great-niece of John Lawrence on her mother’s side. Mrs. Bland was a Lawrence before her marriage.

Dr. Woolner was Registrar of the Panjab University from 1903 to 1920, combining with this the office of University Librarian, which he held until 1928. In January, 1921, he was nominated Dean of University Instruction for the purpose of co-ordinating the various academic activities. In the following year he was granted the status of University Professor of Sanskrit. In October, 1928, he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University in succession to the Hon’ble Mr. F. W. Kennaway, I.C.S., who had taken over charge of this office temporarily for two months from the Hon’ble Sir Geoffrey

In 1926 Dr. Woolner was awarded the Companionship of the Order of the Indian Empire and on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the Panjab University on 4th December, 1933, the degree of Doctor of Literature was conferred upon him, *honoris causa*. His Excellency the Chancellor remarked, when admitting him to this Degree, "Seldom has a University bestowed an honour so richly deserved; and of the many qualifications which merit the distinction—profound scholarship, original research, administrative service and long devotion to the University—I think he would himself like the first place to be assigned to the interest he has always taken in the welfare of the students."

Dr. Woolner was a member of the University Enquiry Committee which submitted its report in the spring of 1933, and since that time had been busily engaged in devising measures for the improvement of the University. During this period the Panjab University Union was founded under his auspices and its new building, which is nearing completion, was largely due to his efforts. He was the Founder President of the Panjab Literary League.

Dr. Woolner took a considerable interest in University affairs outside the Panjab. He represented his University in the Inter-University Board, India, for a number of years, and was its Chairman in 1929-30. In June, 1934, he was nominated *Officier de l'Academie* by the Minister of National Education, France. He was also a Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Dr. Woolner was a Sanskrit scholar of no ordinary calibre; his work in this field was known and appreciated both in India and Europe. He was the author of the following publications: *Introduction to Prakrit; Asoka's Text and Glossary; English translation of Plays attributed to Bhasa*. He also contributed a number of articles on these subjects to well known Journals.

Outside his special branch of learning he took great interest in the promotion of historical research and together with Dr. J. Ph. Vogel and the late Sir John P. Thompson was one of the founders of the Panjab Historical Society in 1910. He was also the first Secretary
of the Society and contributed a number of valuable articles to its Transactions.

In his younger days Dr. Woolner was a keen volunteer and for many years commanded a company of the Panjab Rifles. When in 1919 a University Company of the Indian Defence Force was formed for the training of students, Dr. Woolner was appointed its Officer Commanding.

The *communique* of the Panjab Government, appreciating Dr. Woolner’s academic and extra-mural activities, published in the *Panjab Gazette* of the 10th January, 1936, concluded most appropriately with the following remarks:—"Secure as is the position of Alfred Cooper Woolner as a scholar, it is for his kindliness, his humour and his humanity that his many friends and pupils, inside and outside the University, mourn him to-day and will long remember him with respect and affection."

R. R. S.
# Contributions Towards the Silver Jubilee Celebration Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Title</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>His Highness the Maharaja of Chamba State</td>
<td>Rs. 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon’ble Dr. Sir Gokal Chand Narang, Kt., Ph.D., Minister for Local Self-Government, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon’ble Lt.-Col. Wilberforce-Bell, C.I.E., Agent to the Governor-General, Punjab States, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. F. Bruce, Esq., M.A., University Professor of History, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon’ble Sir Douglas Young, Kt., Bar-at-Law, Chief Justice, High Court, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon’ble Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp, I.C.S., High Court, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. L. Currie, High Court, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwan Bahadur Lala Madho Ram, Chief Secretary, Chamba State</td>
<td>Rs. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. H. Barry, Esq., M.A., Principal, Aitchison College, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Ross Wilson, M.A., Professor, F. C. College, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. L. Sale, Esq., I.C.S., District and Sessions Judge, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. R. Sethi, Esq., M.A., University Lecturer in History, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. B. A. Kuraishi, M. A., Ph.D., Professor, Islamia College, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. G. Khaliq, Esq., M.A., Lecturer, Emerson College, Multan</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. B. Sardar Jwala Sahai, M.A., Katra Jaimal Singh, Amritsar</td>
<td>Rs. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. D. Anderson, Esq., I.C.S., Legal Remembrancer, High Court, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. S. Lala Sohan Lal, B.A., B.T., P.E.S., Lecturer, Central Training College, Lahore</td>
<td>Rs. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name and Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lala Ram Chand Manchanda, B.A., LL.B., Advocate, High Court, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dr. J. B. Weir, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, F. C. College, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Miss W. N. Cocks, B.A., Principal, Queen Mary College, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Miss S. Ittyerah, M.A., L.T., Lecturer, Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>U. N. Ball, Esq., M.A., Professor, Dyal Singh College, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Pran Nath Khera, Esq., M.A., Alexandra Research Scholar, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

Succession Lists
(1910—1935).

Patrons:
Panjab Historical Society:—
1911. The Hon’ble Mr. J. McC. Douie, C.S.I., I.C.S.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

Presidents:
Panjab Historical Society:—
1928. H. L. O. Garrett, Esqr., M.A., I.E.S.
1929. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp, M.A., I.C.S.

169
PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

1932. J. F. Bruce, Esqr., M.A.

Vice-Presidents:—(Two Vice-Presidents elected every year.)

Panjab Historical Society:—

1915. The Hon’ble Sir Alfred Kensington, Kt.
1915-18. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shah Din, K.B.
1924-26. Dr. J. Hutchison.
1926. R. B. Pandit Sheo Narain.
1928. Dr. A. C. Woolner, M.A., C.I.E., F.A.S.B.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

1932. No provision for the office of Vice-President in the constitution.

1933. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp, M.A., I.C.S.
1934. Dr. S. K. Data, B.A., M.B., Ch. B.

Secretaries:

Panjab Historical Society:—

1912. A. M. Stow, Esqr.

(Acting).

1924. H. L. O. Garrett, Esqr., M.A., I.E.S.
1926. Rev. Ross Wilson, M.A.
1928. Amolak Ram Khanna, Esqr., M.A.
PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

1932. R. R. Sethi, Esqr., M.A.

Treasurers:

Panjab Historical Society:—

1910. R. B. Pandit Hari Kishen Kaul, M.A.
1914. H. L. O. Garrett, Esqr., M.A., I.E.S.
1920. Miss V. M. Forster.
1922. E. Tydeman, Esqr.
1923. Dr. Lakshman Sarup, M.A., D. Phil.
1926. Dr. J. B. Weir, M.A., Ph.D., D.D.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society)

1934. Ishwar Das, Esqr., M.A., LL.B.
"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book clean and moving.