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Through an oversight in the printing office the following corrections
made by Professor Barton in the proof of his article in this Journal,
vol. xxxiii, were not made in the final printing.
P. 295, l. 1, for \textit{names} read \textit{Names}.
\begin{verbatim}
  "  7, "  UDNUN$^k_i$ "  UDNUN$^k_i$
  "  2, "  \textit{front} "  \textit{part}
  "  3, "  BIR-IS-Si "  BIR-IS-SI
  "  4, "  \textit{kish} "  \textit{Kish}
  "  13, "  BASI "  BA-SI
  "  18, "  E-SAR-Ra "  E-SAR-RA
  "  39, "  mouthes "  months
\end{verbatim}
Add also the following:
P. 296, l. 2 and 4, for Mêki read Mêsilim.
\begin{verbatim}
  "  3, "  \textit{MÊ-KI} "  \textit{MÊ-SILIM}
\end{verbatim}
The Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali as illustrated by the Comment entitled The Jewel's Lustre or Maniprabhā.1 — Translated by James Haughton Woods, Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Book First: Concentration.

I praise Him unalloyed by hindrance or any such thing, Hari, the Primal Man,—the Enjoyer of the primary-substance, Sitā,—Him who is the Lord of Yoga and the Giver of Yoga. Bowing down devoutly to Patañjali the Author of the Sūtras, and to the Silent Sage Vyāsa, the Author of the Comment, I shall set forth an Exposition upon the Yoga called the Jewel's Lustre and, so far as my mind permits, worthy to be esteemed.

In this [sūtra], as every one knows, the Exalted Patañjali, to assist the activity of the learned, tells what is to be taught by the book.

1 The title of the book is an allusion to the passage in the Comment on Yoga-sūtra i. 36 (p. 822, Calc. ed.). Here the mind becomes stable in intent contemplation and unconcerned with its transitory and particular conditions. It is illumined by insight into its universal qualities. "It becomes like a ray of the sun or the moon or of a planet or a gem. Having attained to a feeling of its self, it becomes waveless like the Great Sea, calm, endless, with a sense of nothing but itself." The pervasive sense of personality is further described in this book at i. 36 (p. 193 of the Benares text) and again at iii. 32 (p. 635).

The date of the book is not far from 1592 A.D. For in the colophon of the Maniprabhā we read that the author Rāmānanda-sarasvatī was the disciple of Govinānanda-sarasvatī. Rāmānanda-sarasvatī dedicated another of his works the Bhaṣya-ratnaprabhā to the same master (Hall: Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Philosophical Systems, p. 89—90). Another disciple of Govinānanda named Nārayaṇa-sarasvatī wrote a book in the year 4693 of the Kali-yuga, corresponding to 1592 A.D. Accordingly the date of Rāmānanda, author of the Maniprabhā, would not be far from that same year.

1 JAOS 54.
1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made].

The word <Now> indicates a beginning; that is, the authoritative book on yoga is begun.—Although an authoritative book was made by Hiranyagarbha, still since that was deemed too extended, an authoritative work conforming to that [book] is begun. This he makes clear by the word <exposition>.—1. In this sūtra the word <yoga> stands for what is to be taught in the authoritative book.—2. It is evident that any one who wishes to understand is competent [to begin the book].—3. Whereas the outcome of yoga is to be Isolation.—4. The association together of these [three] as required. These may be regarded as the four introductory-reasons (anubandha).—

In this system yoga is said to be of two kinds, that conscious [of an object] and that not conscious [of an object]. This [yoga] moreover is a condition of the mind-stuff in so far as the fluctuations are properties of the mind-stuff. Accordingly the yoga which is the restriction of these [fluctuations] is also a condition of that [mind-stuff]. Of this mind-stuff there are five stages, the restless, the infatuated, the distracted, the single-in-intent, and the restricted. Restless [mind-stuff] is excessively changeable by the force of rajas [and is the mind-stuff] of dāityas. Infatuated [mind-stuff] contains sleep and similar states [and is the mind-stuff] of rakṣasas. Distracted [mind-stuff] is distinguished from restless and other [mind-stuff and is the mind-stuff] of gods and similar beings. Its distinguishing characteristic is that its excessively changeable mind-stuff is occasionally steady. Of these [three], in the case of the restless and infatuated [mind-stuff] there is not even a trace of yoga. Whereas in case of the distracted mind-stuff, the occasional yoga, which is consumed by the fire of increasing distraction and becomes unpoised and fruitless, cannot properly be called yoga. But in the mind-stuff focussed-in-intent, with a predominance of sattva and stable in respect of one object, the restriction of the fluctuations of rajas and tamas, which is distinguished by its sattva, becomes [yoga] conscious [of an object]. In as much as it is indirectly experienced by either verbal-communication or inference, it becomes, when its intended-object is known, directly-experienced; as a result of the direct-experience undifferentiated-consciousness and the other hindrances dwindle away; after this there is a burning of both merit and evil; as the result of this there is a change into the
yoga not conscious [of an object], which is the restriction even of its fluctuations of sattva in the restricted mind-stuff which is subliminal-impressions only and nothing more. Accordingly the Author of the Comment says «But that [yoga] which, when the mind is single-in-intent, illumines a distinct and real object, and causes the hindrances to dwindle, slackens the bonds of karma, and sets before it as a goal the restriction [of all fluctuations] is called that in which there is consciousness of an object (samprajñātā)».

The characteristic-mark common to the two kinds of yoga he now describes.

2. **Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff.**

In other words <yoga> is the restriction of the rajas and tamas fluctuations of the mind-stuff. There is therefore no defect in the extension-of-the-term to [yoga] conscious [of an object] also, which has its existence in its fluctuation of sattva. The objecters might ask ‘Why does a mind-stuff which is a unit have the distracted stage and various other stages?’ In reply we say it is because the mind-stuff is, in essence, of three aspects (guna). For the mind-stuff, because it is predisposed to thinking and pleasure and the like, and because it has activity and other properties, and because it undergoes apathy and poverty and other conditions, has the aspects of sattva and rajas and tamas. This being so, when rajas and tamas are both a little less than sattva, but reciprocally equal to each other, then because of the sattva [the mind-stuff] inclines to contemplation; and afterwards, when this [sattva] is shut off by tamas, under the influence of the rajas, it becomes lustful of lordly-power and devoted to objects of sense [and so becomes again] distracted. But when tamas predominates, the mind-stuff is infatuated, and then undergoes what is the opposite of happiness and of right-living and of thinking and of passionlessness and of power. And the opposite of thinking in this case is error and sleep. But when rajas predominates, the mind-stuff is restless. These [last] two, the restless and the infatuated, are common to all [states of the mind-stuff]. But it is the restless [mind-stuff which especially appertains to those who are not yogins. Now there are four [classes of] yogins, the Prathamakalpikas and the Madhubhumikas and the Prajñāyotis and the Atikrāntabhāvaniyas. But later the characteristic-mark of these will
be told. If however sattva predominates and [the mind-stuff] is free from tamas and contains some rajas, [the mind-stuff] is single-in-intent. And the mind-stuff of the two middle [classes of] yogins who attain to yoga conscious of an object becomes full of right-living and thinking and passionlessness and power. But now when the stain of rajas and tamas is washed away and the sattva is pure, the mind-stuff accomplishes the discriminative discernment and accomplishes the so-called Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things, the contemplation of the Self and nothing more. This is designated by contemplators the highest elevation. "The Energy of Thought is immutable and does not unite [with objects] and objects are only shown to it; it is undefiled and unending." Since this is determined and because (sat) the mind-stuff frees itself from attachment even to the discriminative discernment, which belongs with its sattva aspect, [the mind-stuff] restricts this [discriminative discernment] and finally becomes subliminal-impresious and nothing more. This is the mind-stuff of the fourth [class of] yogins. And this is the concentration not conscious [of an object]. Because [as yet] nothing very definite has been made known with regard to this [concentration], nothing more need now be said. The quotation beginning "The Energy of Thought" and ending with the word "unending" is from the Comment. In this quotation the words "does not unite with objects" refers to the Self when he has entered the thinking-substance or some other [form of the primary-substance] and does not go elsewhere, just as a serpent when he has entered his hole [remains there]. The words "objects are only shown to it" refer to that [Energy of Thought] which has its objects shown to it by the thinking-substance. The word "undefiled" means without pleasure or pain or infatuation.

If now the Self, whose nature is that the fluctuations of thinking-substance [are shown to him], restricts [these] fluctuations, how can he become self-stable (sthiti)? In reply to this he says

1 The comparison of the mind to a cave in which the Self is concealed is common. See for example the Comment on Yoga-sūtra iv. 22: "That cave in which the eternal Brahman lies concealed is not an under-world nor mountain-chasm nor dismal pit nor caverns of the sea, but in some fluctuation of the thinking-substance when not distinguished from himself." The similarity to Plato's figure of the Cave, Republic Book VII, is obvious.
3. Then the Knower [that is, the Self] abides in himself.

When all the fluctuations, peaceful and cruel and infatuated, of the mind-stuff are restricted, then the Knower, whose essence is consciousness, is established in his own natural form. Just so the crystal [gem] has [its own natural color] when the flower [next it] is removed. The point is that the Self's own nature is intelligence and nothing more and is not fluctuations.

The doubt is raised whether then in the emergent state, the Self lapses from his own nature. In reply he says

4. At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff].

The fluctuations, whether in the tranquil or other states, which are at other times than the restriction, [that is] during the emergence. It takes the same form as these. As a result of the Self's failure to discriminate [himself] from his thinking-substance which contains fluctuations, he makes the error of identifying himself with the fluctuations so that he thinks 'I am tranquil or I am pained or I am infatuated'. Hence he does not lapse from his own nature. For when one falls into the error of regarding the crystal [gem] as red, the crystal does not itself lapse from its own nature which is white. This is the point. Thus in restriction there is release; in emergence there is bondage. This is the import of the two sūtras.

He now tells the number of the fluctuations which are to be destroyed.

5. The fluctuations are of five kinds hindered or unhindered.

In the Rajavarttika it is said "The Author of the Sūtras desirous of explaining the restrictions of the fluctuations of mind-stuff—after explaining by a pair of sūtras that mind-stuff of which during restriction there is release and during emergence there is bondage, and after explaining the fluctuations by the words beginning [i. 5] with «The fluctuations»—explains restriction by the rest of the Book [First] beginning [i. 12] with "By means of practice and passionlessness." The termination tayā[—tayyāḥ] has the meaning of having parts. The word fluctuation refers to fluctuations in general. Because fluctuations in general are many, inasmuch as there are different
mind-stuffs belonging to Chāitra or Māitra on to others, the word <fluctuations> is used in the plural. In other words, fluctuation in general have five particular cases, sources-of-valid-ideas and the rest, which are described in the next sūtra. Those are of fine kinds (pañcatatayāḥ), the parts of which are five. He describes the distinction between them for the purpose of rejecting some and accepting others by saying <hindered or unhindered>. The causes of the hindrances, passion and aversion for example, are <hindered> and result in bondage. For every creature after having done a deed with passion, it may be, for intended-objects known by the source-of-a-valid-idea or by some other [fluctuation] is bound by pleasure or in some other way. The <unhindered> are destructive of the hindrances and result in release. These latter, occupied with the difference between sattva and the Self and arising under the influence of practice and passionlessness in the midst of the stream of hindered fluctuations, restrict the stream of hindered fluctuations by restriction of the hindered subliminal-impressions through the agency of self-effected unhindered subliminal impressions which have grown strong by repeated practice; and [in turn] they themselves are restricted by higher passionlessness. As a result of this the mind-stuff which is nothing but subliminal-impressions dissolves and release comes to pass. This is the point.

He specifies the fine fluctuations.

6. Sources-of-valid-ideas, misconceptions, predicate-relations, sleep, and memory.

Other than these there is no fluctuation. This is the result of the sūtra of announcement.

Of these [five] he analyzes the fluctuation of the source-of-valid-ideas.

7. The sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication.

The point is that there are three sources-of-valid-ideas. In this case the common characteristic-mark is the causation of valid-ideas. A valid-idea, moreover, is an illumination by the Self which pervades an unknown object and which is reflected
in a fluctuation. The instrument for this is a fluctuation. This being so, by means of a relation with a sense-organ, the mind-stuff, when there is a relation to any such thing as a water-jar, undergoes a fluctuation, which is chiefly concerned with the specification of a particular phenomenalized form in an intended-object which is essentially both general and particular,—this is source-of-valid-ideas from perception. That reflection of the conscious self upon the fluctuation which has the form of the conscious object acquires also, by means of the fluctuation, the form of the intended-object. Thus when an object not immediately presented is known in its general form by concentration, there exists the fluctuation of the particular, and that is knowable [by yogins] as having a perceptive validity. In inference and verbal testimony, requiring as they do, the the-major-premiss (vyāpti) and the grasping of a connected-meaning (saṅgati), there is, as regards the generic idea of fieriness, for example, only the presentation of the generic idea by the grasping of this [the major premiss and the connected-meaning]. Of these two, when one has grasped the major-premiss, inference is the fluctuation which specifies in general the characteristic-property (avachedaka) of the thing to he proved by the syllogistic-mark (liṅga) which functions (vṛtti) in the minor-term (paksā). Verbal-communication is a fluctuation of the [mind-stuff of the] hearer having for its province that intended-object, whether seen or inferred by a trustworthy person, which [fluctuation] is produced from the words used by that [trustworthy person]. It will be declared that the Veda is composed by the trustworthy Içvara.

Misconception is characterized.

8. Misconception is an erroneous notion which does not remain in the proper form of that [in respects of which the misconception is entertained].

This amounts to saying that it, has no basis (pratisthā) upon its own object which has the form of this or that. This is the opposite of a contradiction; [it is an assertion]. The predicate-relation is also the opposite of a contradiction and has no basis in the form of this or that. So the characterization in too wide. So remove this he uses the words <erroneous notion>. So that (tena) in respect of its own object [miscon-
ception] is possessed of a contradiction, admitted by all, which does away with [all] the business of life which it might itself produce. And you cannot say that a similar contradiction applies to the predicate-relation. For although certain pandits have an idea that there is contradiction in the predicate-relation, still the business-of-life goes on as before. Because doubt, moreover, is just about to be characterized, the characterization is not [after all] too wide. This is the point. It will be said that the five hindrances are cases (bheda) of this same misconception.

The predicate-relation is characterized.

9. The predicate-relation is [a notion] devoid of any corresponding perceptible object and follows upon knowledge conveyed by words.

That fluctuation which is called a predicate-relation does necessarily arise after one hears assertions, it might be for example, about a man’s horns. This predicate-relation having no real object is not the source-of-a-valid-idea. It is not a misconception because it necessarily arises even when [you are aware] that there is a contradiction and because it is the source of [ordinary] business-of-life. Thus for instance when it is said [by some philosophers] that “The true nature of the Self is intelligence (cāitanya)”, although it is certain that there is an identity, yet the predicate-relation is between the Self and intelligence as different. Non-existence apart from existence is nothing at all. Although you are certain of this, still the Self is defined as having non-existence of all attributes, and this is a predicate-relation between subject and predicate. Similarly when, for example, one speaks of Rahu’s head, predicate-relations must be instanced.

Sleep is characterized.

10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the cause (pratyaya, that is tāmas,) of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations].

It proceeds to (pratyayate), [that is] goes to an effect. In this sense it is a cause (pratyaya) [that is] a reason. It is
the reason why the waking and dreaming fluctuations cease. That fluctuation the support, [that is] object of which is [this] tamas is sleep. There is an express mention of the word <fluctuation,> although it is continued from [sūtra i. 5], in order to exclude the theory that sleep is cessation of thinking. So then a man [just after] awakening has the memory which leads him to say ‘I slept well’. This has for its object the tamas, which is auxiliary to the sattva of his thinking-substance, and leads us to postulate an experience of that [tamas]. The memory which leads [him] to say ‘I have slept poorly’ has tamas and rajas for its object, and leads us to postulate an experience of them. The memory which leads [him] to say ‘I have slept in deep stupor’ has tamas only for its object and leads us to postulate an experience of that [tamas only]. And it is this experience, which is a property of the thinking-substance, that is sleep. This [sleep] although it resembles the fluctuation which is single-in-intent, must yet be restricted by one who desires yoga, because it partakes of tamas. This is the point.

11. Memory is not-adding surreptitiously to the perceived object.

For the experience of a valid idea is the father of a memory; that which concerns this [experience] is [also] related to the memory; just as in ordinary life the wealth of the father belongs to the son. But the memory is concerned with the original experience. The taking of this property of another is surreptitious adding, [that is] stealing. And so with regard to the perceived object this same not-adding surreptitiously is not grasping after more. In other words, memory would be the grasping of what was perceived and nothing more. Thus an experience is an illumination on the part of the Self which rests upon a fluctuation and which illumines itself. Accordingly memory, as a result of a subliminal-impression produced by this experience, is also concerned with the experience. An objector [who denies that memory is caused by experience] asks, ‘Does not a man in dream remember the assumption of the form of an elephant such as he never experienced [in waking]?’ The reply is, no, because this [memory] partakes of misconception [instead of experience].
The method for restricting these fluctuations is described.

12. The restriction of them is by practice and passionlessness.

Every living-creature has by nature a fluctuation of mind-stuff which is a river moving on to the level of objects and which flows towards the sea of the round-of-existence. This being so, by passionlessness with regard to an object the flowing of this [river] is broken and by practice in the discrimination between sattva and the Self the opposite flowing of this river is brought to pass. For if [a man] were not to repeat [this discrimination between the sattva and the Self] then the mind-stuff, which is naturally deliquescent and distracted, when once the distraction is broken by passionlessness, would fall into sleep. Therefore both practice and passionlessness, because there is a distinction of use in the repression of the deliquescence and of the distraction, are required to act together for the restriction, which is the effect to be accomplished.

The nature of practice is described.

13. Practice is the [repeated] exertion that [the mind-stuff] shall have permanence in its [natural] state.

<Permanence> means a singleness-of-intent on the part of the mind-stuff which has no fluctuation of rajas or of tamas. <In its natural state> would mean in one of these two. <Practice> is the following up of the continued exertion which has as its object this, the abstentions and restraints and so on, which are means of effecting this result.

The objector says that practice, blunted by hostile subliminal-impressions from fluctuations of rajas and tamas extremely powerful from time without beginning, is not capable of permanence. In reply to this he says

14. But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention.

The word <But> is intended to remove a doubt. This practice cultivated for a long time with earnest attention, in the form of self-castigation and chastity and science and belief, and with earnest attention acquires confirmed subliminal-
impressions. And it is not overpowered by the subliminal-impressions of emergence. On the contrary it becomes capable of permanence. The Sacred Word [Pañcāna Up. i. 10] "But on the Northern [Path] by self-castigation and continence and belief and science having sought the Ātman" shows what earnest attention is.

The nature of passionlessness is described.

15. Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for objects either seen or revealed.

There are four forms of consciousness 1. the Yatamāna, 2. the Vyātireka, 3. the Ekeñdriya, 4. the Vācikāra. 1. The Yatamāna form of passionless consciousness is an effort to bring to completion the stains, resident in the mind-stuff full of passion and of other [hindrances], which are drawing the mental-processes to objects-of-sense. 2. Then the determination which separates a certain number of stains already come to completion from those which are coming to completion is the Vyātireka form of passionless consciousness. 3. Next the abiding in the central-organ of all those that are come to completion and are incapable of drawing the mental-processes is the Ekeñdriya form of passionless consciousness. 4. [For objects] «seen» means for women, or food and drink. Revelation is Veda; that which is revealed is heard, [that is] revealed after it has been uttered by the spiritual-guide. Things as so defined are revealed. The passionlessness which is the <conscioeousness of being master> (vācikāra) is the distinguishing perception (apecṣā-buddhi) on the part of <one who has rid himself of thirst>—as a result of immediately-presenting [to his mind] by practice such flaws as evanescence and anguish or the capacity-of-being-excelled and envy—of thirst for objects whether divine or not-divine, such for instance as heaven.

The lower passionlessness having been declared he now describes the higher passionlessness.

16. This [passionlessness] is the highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness for the aspects (guna) [and not merely for objects].

The earlier passionlessness is the cause of the later. Accordingly as a result of presenting-immediately [to his mind],
by practice, the kind of contemplation called the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things, there is that discernment of the Self which is understood from the verbal-communication of the spiritual guide. When once now there is the passionlessness called Mastery, as a result of seeing the flaws in objects after the mind-stuff not yet quite pure has followed up the aids to yoga which are to be described, the mind-stuff from which the stains of tamas and rajas have been completely dispelled and which is finally sattva and nothing more, becomes absolutely undisturbed-calm. This same undisturbed-calm, the condition of the quite purified mind-stuff, the final limit of the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things, has [gradually] become the result of this same [Rain-Cloud].—The higher passionlessness is the thirstlessness for aspects [and not merely for objects]. This is called by expects in Release the immediate-experience of the cause of release. At the rising of this [passionlessness] the yogin, all of whose hindrances have dwindled away and whose latent-deposit of karma with residuum has been washed away, is indifferent even to the discriminative discernment which he has accomplished and reflects thus, 'That which was to be accomplished has been accomplished; that which was sought has been found.' That mind-stuff which immediately succeeds this and which is reduced to subliminal-impressions not conscious of objects and to nothing more is the higher passionlessness. The lower passionlessness, on the other hand, is a condition of the mind-stuff which has ridden itself of tamas and which has a trace of the stain of rajas. In consequence of which there where [bodies] are resolved into primary-matter pars through an experience of power. In accordance with which it has been said, "As a result of passionlessness there is resolution into primary-matter".

Having thus discussed practice and passionlessness, the Author [of the Sūtras] in discussing what is to be效应ed by them points out first of all that [concentration] conscious of an object is of four kinds.

17. [Concentration becomes] conscious [of an object] by assuming forms either of deliberation or of reflection or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality.

Just as in ordinary life a novice bowman pierces first only a gross mark and afterwards a minute mark, so the yogin,
when a novice, by contemplation has direct-experience only of something coarse such as a çālagrāma stone. This immediate-experience of the coarse [object] the cause is deliberation (vītarka). Of this coarse [object] the cause is subtile, consisting of the subtile-elements and other [imperceptible things]; the immediate-experience of this subtile by contemplation is <reflection>. Sense-organs are coarse; and because they illumine they have the sattva form; the immediate-experience of these by contemplation is <joy>. The cause of these [sense-organs] is the thinking-substance; the sense-of-personality is because [the thinking-substance] has become one with the knower, [that is] the Self; the immediate-experience of this [sense-of-personality] by contemplation is said to be the <sense-of-personality>. And of these [four], the coarse is an object-to-be-known; the sense-organs are processes-of-knowing; the so-called sense-of-personality is the knower. The full completion of contemplation with regard to these [three], knower and process-of-knowing and object-to-be-known, is yoga <conscious [of an object]>. And this [kind of yoga] <by assuming> the four forms of deliberation or of reflection or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality is said to be [concentration] with deliberation or with reflection or with joy or with the feeling-of-personality. With regard to these [four kinds] the yoga with the coarse [object] has [at the same time] a coarse and a subtile and a joyous and a personal object, just as the perception of an earthen-jar has [at the same time] the clay [of which the jar is made] as its object; the yoga with the subtile [object] has three kinds of objects; the other two kinds have respectively two and one objects. This is the distinction mentioned by the Author of the Comment. In these cases, just as the perception of the clay does not have the earthen-jar as its object, so we must suppose that the [three kinds of] yoga, with reference to subtile and other objects, do not have the coarse object or the other objects [in their respective order]. In the Gloss of Bhoja, however, after describing the [concentration]-with-deliberation as referring to the sense-organs; and after describing the [concentration]-with-reflection as referring to the [five] fine substances (Tattvātra); [the author] describes the [concentration]-with-joy as referring to the personality-substance [and] the [concentration]-with-the-feeling-of-personality as referring to the Great Entity, [the thinking
substance]. In that [book] 1. the personality-substance is the
inner-organ which apprehends as its object the percept "I";
2. the feeling-of-personality is the inner-organ turned inwards
and merged in the Great Entity, which is being and nothing
more, and [so] flashes forth the sense of being and nothing
more. This would be the distinction between these [last] two
cases. The apprehender is the Self.

He now describes the [concentration] conscious [of an ob-
ject] and the method [of attaining it].

18. The other concentration [which is unconscious of an object]
consists of subliminal-impressions only, [after objects have merged]
and follows upon that practice which produces the cessation [of
fluctuations].

This [concentration] is that which <follows upon> [that is] has as its method the <practice> of that higher passionlessness
which <produces> [that is] is the cause of that <cessation>
[that is] the absence of fluctuations. By this word <produces>[
the method [of attainment] has been described. <The other>
is that [unconscions of an object] which <consists of subliminal-
impressions only>. For the higher passionlessness after having
overpowered even the subliminal-impressions of [concentration]
conscious [of an object] leaves only its own subliminal-impres-
sions as a remainder. This is concentration without seed.
Because there is nothing upon which it depends, since it has
no seed of karma.

Now this [concentration] is of two kinds: it is produced
either by the worldly method or by the [spiritual] method.
Of these two the first is to be rejected by those who aim at
liberation; and this [first] he describes.

19. [Concentration unconscious of an object] caused by existence-
in-the-world is that to which the discarnate and those [whose
bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain.

In any one of the evolved-effects from among the elements
and organs, which are not-self, there is an idea (bhāvana) of
the self. To this extent those who, after the dissolution of the
body, are resolved into elements and organs and are without
the six-sheathed body are <discarnate>. Those who are resol-
ved into unphenomenalized-matter or the Great [Thinking-
substance] or the personality-substance or the five fine-substances, in so far they have an idea of the self with regard to these as evolving-causes, are called <those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter>. Because the mind-stuff of these consists of subliminal-impressionless only and nothing more, their [concentration] is not conscious [of an object]. But this [concentration] is <caused by existence-in-the-world>. Because in it creatures are caused, [that is] born, it is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā), [that is] <existence-in-the-world>; and the production, [that is] the cause of it, is the idea of the not-self as being the self. Due to undifferentiated-consciousness, this yoga gives results that are perishable. As says the Vayu [Purana], "Ten Manu-periods the devotees of sense-organs remain here; a full hundred the worshippers of elements; those who identify themselves with illusions of personality remain without anxiety a thousand [Manu-periods]; those who identify themselves with thinking-substances without anxiety, for ten thousand; those who contemplate upon unphemonenalized [primary-matter] stay for a full hundred thousand; but after attaining the Self who is out of relation with qualities there is no limit of time". The mind-stuff of those who have no discriminative insight, although it be absorbed, rises up and falls into the round-of-rebirths, just as a sleeping mind-stuff would do.

Now he says what the second topic is.

20. [Concentration not conscious of an object,] which follows upon faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration and insight is the one to which the others [the yogins] attain.

The Self's range of action is the <faith> that is full of sattva; this produces <energy> [that is] effort; this by the successive steps of abstentious and observances and the rest [leads to] <mindfulness> [that is] contemplation; [and] this to <concentration>; and this to <insight> [that is] practice, conscious [of its object], in the discernment of the Self's range of action. As a result of this higher passionlessness <the others>, the yogins who are searching for release, gain [the yoga] not conscious [of an object].

The methods begin with faith and end with insight. When preceded by these this [concentration] is produced by the
[spiritual] method. These methods, moreover, in the case of living beings, under the compulsion of earlier subliminal-impressions, are gentle and moderate and vehement, of three kinds. And accordingly the yogins are three, the followers of the gentle, of the moderate, and of the vehement method. Among these three the follower of the gentle method is of three kinds, [that is] with gentle intensity, with moderate intensity, and with keen intensity. Likewise in the case of the other two [methods] there are three kinds [of intensities]. And thus there are nine [kinds of] yogins. These gain perfections slowly [or] more slowly, quickly [or] more quickly by reason of the gradation of method. Because perfection comes more quickly to some of these he says,

21. [Concentration] is near for the keenly intense.

For those yogins whose intensity, [that is] whose passionlessness is keen and whose methods are vehement, concentration not conscious [of an object] is near. And from this comes release.

22. There is a distinction even from this [near concentration] by reason of gentleness and moderation and vehement.

In the case also of keen intensity <by reason of gentleness and moderation and vehement> there is, as compared with the concentration that is near, for the yogin of gently keen intensity [and] as compared with [the concentration] that is nearer, for [the yogin] of moderately keen intensity, an acquisition of concentration that is nearest, belonging to [the yogin] whose intensity is vehemently keen. Thus there is a distinction.

23. Or [concentration is attained] by devotion to the Içvara.

<By devotion> either mental or verbal or corporeal, by a special kind of adoration <to the Içvara> the attainment of concentration is most near. The word <Or> indicates that [the yogin] who uses the method of devotion has a choice in so far as he may use the methods previously described. For the Içvara, turned towards [him] by the devotion, without regard to anything other than the devotion, favors him by saying 'Let this that he desires be his'. This is the point.
He discusses the nature of the Içvara.

24. Untouched by hindrances, karma, fruition, or latent-deposits [of karma], the Içvara is a special kind of Self.

Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) and the rest are the five <hindrances>. Right and wrong living are <karma>. The result of there two is <fruition>. The subliminal-impressions which correspond to the result are the <latent-impressions>. For (by derivation) they are latent (ācersite) in the central-organ. Just as in a man the subliminal-impressions [tending] to the eating of sticks in a birth as elephant intensify themselves (for otherwise life would be impossible). A Self in the round-of-rebirth is touched by hindrances and so on resident in his mind-stuff, inasmuch as he is an enjoyer so long as he does not discriminate himself from mind-stuff. Whereas the Self which is out of relation to these even in [all] the three times is the Içvara. The word <special> which expresses the absence of relation with the three times serves as the distinction between [the Self] and released souls. Because in time past they were in relation with the three bonds, when resolved into primary-matter they have a bond to primary-matter; when resolved into evolved-forms [of primary-matter] either into elements or organs, as discarnate beings they have a bond to evolved-forms; in other's, gods or men or so on, there is the bond to the South [the Way of the Fathers]. Because the fruition of karma depends upon the [particular kind of] mind-stuff. This is the difference. An objector asks 'If the highest power of the Self has the faculty of thinking and of action, how can you say that it is immutable'. The answer is that the Içvara has a mind-stuff perfect from time-without-beginning and of pure sattva in its essence and originating from the primary-cause and with unexcelled faculties of thinking and of action. For He, the Exalted, with the desire to rescue living-beings from the sea of the round-of rebirth assumes this mind-stuff, for without this it is not possible to exercise thinking or instruction in right-living or compassion upon adorers. And one should not ask how a desire could arise before He had assumed mind-stuff. For the stream of creations and dissolutions is, like [the succession of] seed and sprout, from time without beginning. When there is a dissolution of all effects, then the Exalted resolves 'In time to come, in order to show favor to
the world, this mind-stuff must be assumed'. Because (sat) the
mind-stuff tinged by this resolve becomes merged in the
primary-cause, at the beginning of a creation it becomes
intense. And in such wise the Içvara shows favor. Thus [our
contention] is without flaw. If an objector asks what the
authority is for the existence (sattva) of such a mind-stuff, the
reply is in such utterances of the Veda [Çvet. Up, vi. 8] as this
"And He the Içvara of all is self-inherent thinking and power
and action". Thus the order\(^1\) would be. The Veda was
composed by an Içvara distinguished for his unexcelled thinking
and power. Consequently it is authoritative; this is the brief
statement.

Thus because the Veda is authoritative, an all-Knower, the
Içvara is proved. He gives also an inferential-proof that He
is all-knowing.

25. In Him [the Içvara] the germ of the all-Knower it at its
utmost excellence.

Thinking such as ours must be inherently-connected with
that which is at its utmost excellence, because it admits of
degrees. Whatever admits of degrees, is always connected with
the utmost excellence, which is of the same kind with it, just
as the dimension of a water-pot is connected with the dimen-
sion of the all-pervasive [atmosphere]. This <knowledge> which
has been proved to be of the <utmost excellence> has a <germ>
[that is] an implication of the all-Knower; <In Him>, in whom
knowledge is of the utmost excellence, it is known as having
the quality of all-Knower. This all-Knower [thus] established
in generic form has various designations, established by reve-
lution (Çruti), such as Çiva or Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa or Maheçvara.
And thus it is said in the Vāyu-Purāṇa [xii. 32] "Omniscience,
Contentment, Limitless Knowledge, Freedom, Ever-unthwarted
Energy, Infinite Energy—these are called by the knowers of
the sacred-ordinance the six parts of the all-pervasive Maheç-
vara. Knowledge, Passionlessness, Preeminence, Self-control,

\(^1\) The order would be 1. A dissolution, 2. Merging of effects, 3. Re-
solve in the Içvara's mind-stuff, 4. Tinging of this mind-stuff, 5. Merging
in the primary-cause, 6. Intensification of the impression in the mind-
stuff at the beginning of the new creation.
Truth, Patience, Perseverance, Creative Energy, Right Knowledge of Self, and Competency to rule the creation abide eternally in Çankara". Similarly in the Mahâbhârata "By praising Viśnu, who is without beginning or end, the great Lord of all the world, the Ruler of the World, he would forever pass beyond all pain" and in similar passages.

He describes the difference between this Exalted One and Brahma with the rest [of the gods].

26. Teacher of the Primal [Sages] also, forasmuch as [with Him] there is no limitation of time.

<Of the Primal [Sages]> [that is] of those limited by time who arise at the beginning of the creation. The <Teacher> [that is] the Içvara. Why is this? <Forasmuch as [with Him] there is no limitation of time> [that is] because he has no boundary at the beginning. And in this sense the revelation (Çruti) [Çvet. Up. vi. 18] "To Him who first made Brahma and who sent forth the Vedas" and in similar passages.

Having thus discussed the Içvara, in order to tell what devotion to Him is, he tells his secret name.

27. The word-expressing Him is the Mystic-Syllable.

The sūtra is easy. An objector says 'The expressiveness of a words is its so-called denotative significance, the relation between the word and its object. Is this significance made by the conventional-usage, or is it revealed [by the conventional-usage]? It is not the first [alternative; that is, the faculty is made by the usage]. Because this would involve that the Içvara, who [would] be quite independent [of the past], would fit together the word and the intended-object, which would be different from the conventional-usage. Nor is it the second [alternative, that is, the significance is revealed by the usage]. Because [if the usage of the Içvara is there] it is superfluous for a father to make for his sons the conventional-usage of the word 'sun' or of other words. For there is no significance (çakti) which could be revealed [merely] by the conventional-usage of the father (tatra). And if there is nothing to be revealed [that is, a çakti], then a revealer [that is, a samiketa] would be of no use. Accordingly this conventional-usage
[mentioned in the sūtra] would be useless.' If this is objected, the reply would be this.

The significance remains all the time; and is only revealed by the conventional-usage. Just as the relation between father and son which remains all the time is revealed by the statement 'This is my son'. Likewise the Iṣvara makes us know by the conventional-usage the significance, of this or that word for this or that intended-object, which is always permanent, and which in any word, such as 'cow', is reduced at the time of a dissolution to [the condition of] the primary-cause and is intensified again together with its significance at the time of a creation. Whereas the subliminal-impressions of living-beings are broken. But the conventional-usage of a father, for instance, living today causes the significance to appear. Yet there are some who say that all words have significance for all intended-objects. So [the conclusion is that] the conventional-usage of the father or of others is also a revealer; but the words 'cow' or other words are restricted by the Iṣvara to a particular intended-object in order to give a fixity to the objects-intended by the Veda. So they say. Thus it is proved that even in all cases the Vedic relation between word and intended-object is permanent (nitya) in so far as it fixes what is expressed.

Having thus described the expressive-word he tells of the devotion.

28. Its repetition and reflection on its meaning [should be made].

The Comment of this is written «The repetition on the Mystic Syllable (pranava) and reflection upon the Iṣvara who is to be denoted by the Mystic Syllable. Then in the case of this yogin who thus repeats the Mystic Syllable and reflects on its meaning his mind attains to singleness-of-intent. And so it has been said [VP. vi. 7. 33f.]

"Through study let him practise yoga
Through yoga let him meditate on study.
By perfectness in study and in yoga
Supreme soul shines forth clearly."»

1 This is of course the point missed by the objector.
For this devotion to the Içvara the acquisition of concentration as the result is the nearest [method]; this has been previously [i. 22] stated. Now he tells of another result which corresponds with this.

29. From this [devotion] comes the knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, also the removal of obstacles.

A self is inverted (pratyāñc) in the sense that it represents (aṅcati), that is, understands in a reversed (pratipam), that is, opposite way [to the ordinary man whose mind-stuff flows out and is modified by objects]. This word describes the difference from the Içvara or else something other than the thinking-substance. This <thinking> is inverted; its <knowledge> [that is] its direct experience comes <from this> devotion. And besides there is <also the removal of obstacles>. The objector asks 'How can there be a direct experience of one's self coming from a devotion to the Içvara who is different from one's self. Because the practice and the thinking resulting from it have a perception (dargana) of some one object such as the fourth-primary-note. The reply is this. Just as the Içvara is unaffected [by objects] and consists of intellect (cit) and is absolutely unchanged and is without hindrance or any such thing, just so is the soul (jīva) on account of its similarity to the Içvara. The contemplation of the Içvara by virtue of His favor is the cause of the direct-experience of the soul as such. Thus there is no flaw in the argument.

He tells of the obstacles.

30. Sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, listlessness, worldliness, erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage, and instability in the stage [when attained]—these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles.

<These distractions of the mind-stuff> which distract the mind-stuff, [that is] cause it to lapse from yoga, are the nine obstacles [that is] obstructions of yoga. Of these [nine] <sickness> is a disorder of the wind or bile or phlegm or of the organs which secrete food. <Languor> is an incapacity for action on the part of the mind-stuff although it is attracted. <Doubt> is familiar enough. <Heedlessness> is a failure to follow up the aids to yoga. <Listlessness> is a lack of effort
due to heaviness of body. *Worldliness* is a greed for objects-of-sense. *Erroneous perception* is a misconception which sees only one alternative of a dilemma. *Failure to attain any stage* is a failure to gain any stage of concentration. The Honeyed (*madhumati*) and the other stages of concentration will be described. *Failure to attain any stage* so-called, is a lack of steadiness on the part of the mind-stuff in the stage which has been attained. For the mind-stuff when established in the earlier stage should produce the next stage. Lack of steadiness is accordingly a defect.

These distractions not only destroy yoga, but also give pain and so on.

31. Pain, despondency, unsteadiness of the body, inspiration, and expiration are accompaniments of the distractions.

*Pain* produced by disease is corporeal, produced by love and so on is mental; both of these two proceed from self; produced by tigers and so on it proceeds from living creatures; produced by the baleful influence of planets or something of the kind it proceeds from the gods. *Unsteadiness of the body* is the state of one unsteady in body, a trembling of the limbs. *Inspiration* is breathing involuntarily which makes the outer wind enter within; it is opposed to emission (*recaśa*) which is [voluntary], an aid to concentration. Similarly *expiration* is the out-going of the abdominal wind involuntarily; it is opposed to inhalation. These arise in the distracted mind-stuff together with the distractions.

He draws the discussion to a close by saying that these cease to be as a result of devotion to the Ṣvāra.

32. To check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity.

To destroy the distractions *practice* [that is] contemplation should be performed upon a single entity [that is] upon the Ṣvāra. On this point, with regard to the question of the Momentary (*kṣaṇikan*) theory which asks whether, if the mind-stuff is durable (*sthāyin*), its focussed state may be attained, the author of the Comment proves that by, for instance, recognizing 'This is I', this mind-stuff is found to be one and implicated in many objects and durable.
He tells of the methods for removing the taints of the mind-stuff that is tainted with envy and similar [vices] by bringing it into touch (āyoga) with yoga.

33. By the cultivation of friendliness towards happiness and compassion towards pain and joy towards merit and indifference towards demerit [the yogin should attain] the undisturbed-calm of the mind-stuff.

He should cultivate <friendliness> [that is, friendship] towards living beings who are in happiness; towards those who are in pain, <compassion> [that is] sympathy; towards those whose lives are meritorious, <joy> [that is] gladness; towards those who lives are evil, who are called demeritorious, <indifference>. By this cultivation an <undisturbed-calm> of the mind-stuff is gained. As a result of the cultivations, as described in order with reference to happiness and the rest, the external-aspect (dharma) [of the mind-stuff] which is full of sattva is produced. As a result of destroying jealousy, the desire to injure, envy, and hatred, the taints of the mind, with regards to these [classes of persons] are destroyed; and by virtue of the bright external-aspect the mind-stuff becomes undisturbedly calm. And when it has become undisturbedly calm, by methods to be described [it becomes] focussed and gains the stable state. This is the outcome of the argument.

Now after the cultivation of friendliness and the other [sentiments] he describes the methods for keeping the mind-stuff which is [in the state of] undisturbed-calm in the stable state.

34. Or [the yogin should attain the undisturbed-calm of the mind-stuff] by expulsion and retention of breath.

<Expulsion> is emission; there is <retention> of the emitted air outside. By using there to the best of one's power the mind-stuff gains stability upon one point-of-direction. If the breath is subdued, there is a subdual of the mind-stuff, because the two are not separate. After the restraint of the breath has caused all evil to cease, the mind-stuff becomes steady with regard to the cessation of evil. The word <or> expresses an option with regard to the other means which are to be described, but not with regard to the cultivation of friendli-
ness and the others. Because it must be supposed that the cultivation of these [latter] is connected [with them] inasmuch as they act as accessories to all the [other] aids.

Hedescribes the other aids.

35. Or by a process connected with an object the central-organ [comes into] the relation of stability.

By constraining the mind-stuff upon the tip of the nose he has a direct experience of super-normal odors; by constraint upon the tip of the tongue he has the consciousness of super-normal taste; upon the palate, the consciousness of color; upon the middle of the tongue, the consciousness of touch; upon the root of the tongue, the consciousness of sound. These consciousnesses, processes connected with objects such as odors, when quickly produced, having produced confidence, bring about a relation of stability between the central-organ and the Iṣvara or a similar object, which are very subtle things. When any point specially laid down by the authoritative-books is found to be in experience, then the yogin\(^1\) passes on towards constraint in faith with regard even to something very subtle.

36. Or a griefless, luminous [process brings the central-organ into a relation of stability].

After he has contemplated by emission (recura) [of breath] the eight-petalled lotus of the heart, as a result of constraint upon the vein, situated with mouth upward in the pericarp of this [lotus], and called Suṣumnā, consciousness of the central-organ follows. This central-organ assumes in many ways the forms of those rays which belong to the sun or moon or planets or gems. This [pure] light of the sattva is the central-organ. The cause of this [central-organ] is the personality-substance, waveless like the Great Sea and pervasive. As a result of constraint upon the light as such which belongs to this personality-substance, consciousness arises. This is that two-fold consciousness. The central-organ or the so-called personality-substance, when having a luminous object, is called <luminous>; it is <griefless> [that is] without pain; [this] process when it is produced is the cause of the central-organ’s stability.

\(^1\) Reading yogī.
37. Or the mind-stuff has as its object one [whose mind-stuff] is freed from passion.

The mind-stuff of the yogin which is fixedly attentive to that mind-stuff as its object which is <freed from passion>, one [that is] belonging to Vyāsa or to Čuka or to such as they.

38. Or the mind-stuff [is influenced] by thinking derived in dream or in sleep.

The word <thinking> refers to something to be thought. While worshipping in dream the very beautiful embodiment of the Exalted One he should attentively fix the mind-stuff on that alone. In deep sleep he should attend fixedly to the pleasure therein. In such wise, supported by the object thought in dream or in sleep, his mind-stuff gains stability.

39. Or [the mind-stuff gains the stable position] by contemplating upon that object which he desires.

What need of saying more? Let him contemplate upon whatever [divinity] he desires. [The mind-stuff] having gained stability there, gains stability in other cases also. The analysis [of the compound] is: <by contemplating> upon <that object which he desires> [that is] by not passing outside his desires.

The objector asks ‘If it be true that stability of the mind-stuff is produced, what is there to make this known?’

40. His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the Supreme Greatness.

<Mastery> [that is] freedom from obstruction <extends> to the <smallest atom> and belongs to <it (asya)> [that is] to the mind-stuff which enters into a subtle object. Likewise there is freedom from obstruction, which extends to the Supreme Greatness, [that is] to space, belonging to the mind-stuff which enters a coarse object. Having known by this supreme mastery that the mind-stuff has gained stability, he desists from following up the means of stability.

Thus the means for the stability of the mind-stuff having been described; and the mastery which makes this known having
been described; what now is the object of the mind-stuff which has gained stability; and of what does it consist? In reply to this he recites the answer.

41. The mind-stuff from which, as from a noble gem, the fluctuations have dwindled away reaches the balanced-state which rests in the knower or the processes-of-knowing or the object-for-knowledge, and which is colored by them.

Just as <a noble> [that is] high-class and quite pure crystal <gem> when colored by an hibiscus or some other flower, by the disappearance of its own color gains a red on some other kind of color, so as a result of practice and passionlessness the gem of the mind-stuff from which fluctuations of rajas and tamas have dwindled away, by giving up its own nature is affected—in so far as it is an object-to-be-known which is in essence a coarse or fine element, or in so far as it is the processes-of-knowing [that is] the organs-of-sense, or the knower [that is] the Self, the so-called feeling-of-personality previously [i. 17] described—and acquires that [yoga] in accordance with the kind of object into which it is changed (āpatti). By assuming forms either of deliberation or of reflection or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality previously [i. 17] described it is to be understood as being of four kinds, as having four objects. In this sūtra by following the order of the objects intended (after breaking [the order of] the reading [of the sūtra]) the mind-stuff, when affected by 1. the object-for-knowledge, 2. the processes-of-knowing, and 3. the knower, <rests in> these by giving up its own nature and assuming a complete change. This is the way of explaining [the sūtra] because mind-stuff is affected by the knower in the order of the coarse and [then of] the subtle. The word <rests in> should be taken as a separate word. Although it has no declination, we should understand it to be the genitive singular and then connect kṣinavṛttter with tatsthasya. Or else, tatsthain and tadañjanaṁ are two coordinate [members of the compound] and the ending —tā is added to denote an abstract noun.¹ That is to say,

¹ In the first case the translation would be <the mind-stuff from which fluctuations have dwindled away>. In the second case it would be 'because of the dwindling of the fluctuations the mind-stuff pains the balanced state'.
after the dwindling of the fluctuations as a result of this [state, the bhāva] there is the balanced state.

This same balanced state, the so-called consciens [yoga], however, is of four kinds, with deliberation, and super-deliberative (nirvitarka), with reflection, and super-reflective. Of these [four], he describes the [yoga] with deliberation.

42. Of these [balanced-states] that with deliberation is mixed with predicate-relations between words and things and ideas.

<Of these> [that is] from among these balanced-states, this is the balanced-state with deliberation. To explain. If we say ‘cow’, three things appear undistinguished [in consciousness]. This being so, when we think of ‘cow’ as a word, there is one predicate-relation. For this predicate-relation has as its object the word which has not been distinguished from the thing and from the idea which have been derived from [the word] ‘cow’. Similarly the thing ‘cow’ is another predicate-relation. In this case, the predicate-relation has as its object the thing which has not been distinguished from the word and from the idea which have been derived from [the thing] ‘cow’. Likewise there is another predicate-relation the idea ‘cow’; but this refers to the idea which has not been distinguished from the word and from the thing which have been derived from the [idea] ‘cow’. These same are predicate-relations because they refer to a false kind of failure to distinction. Thus such statements as ‘the water-jar is a piece of cloth’ are to be understood as predicate-relations. In this [system], just as, in so far as there is a failure to distinguish [things] from words and ideas, the direct-experience (produced by the concentration of the yogin’s mind-stuff concentrated upon some coarse object in predicate-relation, a cow, for instance) grasps even an imaginary thing, so this concentrated insight <mixed> with predicate-relations of words and things and ideas becomes like them, because it is of the same quality as the predicate-relations. In other words this mixed [balanced-state] is the balanced-state with deliberation.

He describes the super-deliberative [balanced-state].
43. When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced-state] which seems empty of itself, and which appears as the object only, is the super-deliberative [balanced-state].

The significant conventional-usage of words such as ‘cow’ is commonly understood with regard to things in predicate-relations only. By remembering this [conventional-usage] there is a memory which pertains to words. And only a predicate-relation inferred from some other thing arises. And so a balanced-state with deliberation arises the origin of which is a predicate-relation consisting in an action of hearing or of inferring with regard to a thing heard or inferred. <When the memory is quite purified> [that is] when the memory of the conventional-usage is given up because the mind-stuff which aims at the thing intended and nothing more is fixed upon the thing-intended only. After giving up the predicate-relation which is the effect of this, the concentrated insight, <seeming empty of itself> [that is] of its own condition of knower which consists in insight, because it appears at the object only, appears only as that object-for-knowledge which consists in a thing out of predicate-relations. In other words it is the super-deliberative balanced-state. In it there is a direct-experience with deliberation, which is a lower kind of perception because it has predicate-relations. But the super-deliberative is higher because its object is a true object. And this true object is to be understood as being a whole such as a cow or a water-jar. With regard to the doubt as to the Buddhist theory which states that in the case of this [real object] there is no whole over and above the group of atoms [of which it is composed], there is [a whole], inasmuch as if it is sure that one single water-jar is of a certain size (mahān), there is nothing to contradict the experience. And this [whole] in our system is a mutation of atoms which consist of subtle elements. And this [mutation, which is a whole] is identical, yet it has a difference in unity with its material cause [the atoms]. This is proved in the Comment.

44. By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the super-reflective [balanced-states] which have subtle objects have been explained [in respect of the giving up of predicate-relations]. That balanced-state with reference to those objects which have been particularized by a multitude of properties belonging
to their own peculiar causes or effects or place or time, and
which are in predicate-relations in so far as the objects have
not been distinguished from the ideas or the words which ex-
press them,—[objects] which are subtle, arranged as consisting
of elements and as being evolved-effects of the five fine
substances (tanmātra), that is, the atoms, which are adapted
to serve as material cause for coarse mutations such as water-
jars—this [balanced-state] is said to be <with reflection>. That
balanced-state with regard to the same atoms when they are
the things themselves and nothing more, empty of all attri-
butes is super-deliberative (nirvicāra). This now consisting of
the real thing and nothing more is the concentrated insight
and appears as if empty of itself. And in so far as the de-
liberative and the super-deliberative [balanced-states] are ex-
plained as referring to something coarse, the reflective and the
super-reflective are explained as having subtle objects.

The objector asks 'Does the balanced-state with regard to
the object-to-be-known end with the atoms?' The answer
is, No.

45. The subtle object also terminates in unresoluble [primary
matter].

<The subtle object> of this balanced-state terminates in the
unresoluble primary cause. To explain. The atom of earth is
produced from the fine substance smell, to which the other
fine substances are subordinate. But [the atom] of water, af-
after the fine substance smell has been excluded, is from
the fine substance of taste, to which the other fine substances
are subordinate. Whereas [the atom] of fire, after the pair
smell and taste have been excluded, [is produced] from the
fine substance of color, to which the other two are subordinate.
But [the atom] of water [is produced] from the previously
rejected fine substance of touch, and has subordinate to it the
fine substance of sound. Whereas the atom of air is produced
from the single fine substance of sound only. This is the pro-
cedure. Accordingly the five fine substances are the material
causes for the evolved-effects, the atoms, and are [with respect
to them] subtle. And as compared with them the personality-
substance is subtle. And as compared with it the Great
[thinking substance is subtle]. And as compared with the
Great, the primary-cause [is subtile]. For this does not become resolved, therefore it is called unresoluble [primary matter]. Higher than this there is nothing subtile as material cause, because the Self is not the material cause for the sattva. For the Self because it has experience and liberation as its purposes is nothing but efficient cause for the creation, which has the purposes of the Self as its efficient cause. Therefore it is proved that the balanced-state with regard to a subtile object-for-knowledge terminates in the primary-cause.

Thus the four balanced-states with regard to a coarse and a subtile object-for-knowledge have been described. He now brings to a conclusion the discussion of the fact that they are conscious.

46. These same are the seeded concentration.

And in so far as there is the distinction between predicate and non-predicate relation in the case of processes-of-knowing and of the knower, there are four balanced-states 1. with joy and 2. joy and nothing more, 3. with the feeling-of-personality and 4 the feeling of personality in conformity with the rule described. Thus <these same>, the eight balanced-states are <the seeded concentration> [that is, concentration] conscious [of an object]. So long as there is no discriminative discernment, because there is the seed of bondage, the state of having seed must be recognized.

Here he describes the supremacy of the super-reflective balanced-state in respect of its result.

47. When clearness of the super-reflective [balanced-state] arises, then the yogin gains the inner undisturbed-calm.

The sattva of the thinking-substance from which the taints of rajas and tamas have been removed has a flow of pure fluctuations stable in quality; its range is to the subtile objectfor-knowledge which ends in the primary-cause; and this is the <clearness> of the super-reflective balanced-state. In this. Taking in his grasp, in the order of reality, the whole assemblage of entities from the atom to the primary-cause he abides in his own self, <he gains the inner undisturbed-calm.>

He tells the technical name approved by yogins for this undisturbed-calm.
48. In this [clearness of the mind-stuff] the insight is truth-bearing.

In him (tasya) the super-reflective insight, which arises produced by concentration when this clearness has arisen, becomes the consciousness called <truth-bearing.> Because the etymology is that it bears truth [that is] unpredicated reality. He tells how the object of this is distinguished from false sources-of-knowledge.

49. This has a different object than the insight of oral-communication or of inference, inasmuch as it refers to the particular.

The significance of any word such as ‘cow’ is in the common characteristic of the genus ‘cow’, not in the particular individuals. For these are innumerable and it is impossible to know them. Similarly the concomitance also gives you only the common characteristic of fieriness. Hence a generic thing is the object of the insight in oral-communication and in inference. So in ordinary life after one has a knowledge of words and of a middle term (linga), one knows cow in general and fire in general and not any particular individuality. This is everyone’s own experience. Although sense-perception has some particular cow or piece of cloth as its object, still a subtile or hidden or remote particular is the peculiar object of concentrated insight. And if the concentrated insight has power-to-apprehend (prasanti) subtile and other things, enlightened by oral-communication or by inference, you should not ask whether it can have within its range particulars which are beyond the range of oral-communication and inference which are its own origin. For the thinking-substance has of itself the power of knowing all things. For the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is in essence light, although it has capacity to know all intended-objects, yet if obscured by tamas has little as its object as compared with ordinary-proof. But when its cover of tamas has gone away, by reason of the concentration, enlightening on all sides, it passes beyond ordinary proof, then because of the endlessness of light what can there be which is not within its range? Therefore concentrated insight because particular intended objects are within its range has one object and

1 Reading prakāśanantyāt.
ordinary proof has another object. This has been said [MBh xii. 530] 'As a man standing on a crag sees persons on the ground below, so a man of insight having risen to the pinnacle of insight, himself free from pain, sees all creatures in pain, [below].' The word 'creatures' means those who have no concentration, those who are slaves of ordinary proof.

The objector says 'If the concentrated insight is overpowered by very powerful subliminal-impressions from the experience of sounds and other [perceptible] objects, it does not gain stability'. In reply to this he says.

50. The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal-impressions.

<The subliminal-impression> produced by the super-reflective concentration is <hostile> that is <inhibitory> to emergent subliminal-impressions. The emergent subliminal-impression because it is not in contact with [one of] the entities is inhibited by the subliminal-impression of the [concentrated] insight which is in contact with an entity. When these [emergent subliminal-impressions] are inhibited, emergent presented ideas do not arise. Whereas the concentrated insight does arise. From this there is a subliminal-impression over and over again. So because the subliminal-impressions from concentration accumulate, when the hindrances are completely dwindled away, the mind-stuff becomes disgusted with experience and turns towards the Self; having accomplished the discriminative discernment, its task done, it becomes resolved [into its primary cause], because its predominance in finished. For the movement of the mind-stuff terminates at the time of the [discriminative] discernment.

The objector asks 'If the mind-stuff which is full of subliminal-impressions from consciously concentrated insight accomplishes in succession the insights of this [concentration], how can it accomplish seedless concentration?' In reply to this he says.

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1 The change of one vowel-quantity makes this word mean undisturbed-calm.
51. When this [subliminal-impression] also is restricted, since all
is restricted, [the yogin gains] seedless concentration.

After the discernment of the Self [and] in so far as there
is an accumulation of subliminal-impresions of the higher
passionlessness, <this> subliminal-impression from the con-
csciously concentrated insight, and the insight itself as implied
by the word <also> <is restricted.> Because all the stream
of insights and of subliminal-impresions from them is restricted.
For the mind-stuff has nothing to do inasmuch as its predo-
minance is ended, according to the rule "When there is no
cause there is no effect" and the seedless concentration comes
to pass. This has been said. "Preparing his consciousness
in a three-fold manner by the Sacred Tradition and by in-
ference and by eagerness for practice in contemplation he
gains the highest yoga". In other words, by the Veda, by
reasoning, by the higher passionlessness [that is] eagerness for
the so-called Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things [that is] practice
in the contemplation of the Self and nothing more, by directly
experiencing the Self, he gains the seedless yoga. In course
of time, when there is an accumulation of subliminal-impres-
sions of restriction, which are seedless, the mind-stuff resolves itself
into its primary matter since there is no reason for it [to
remain]. Because the reason for the stability of the mind-stuff
is its predominance characterized by something to be done.
For the mind-stuff which has the discriminative discernment
and which has finished its experience has nothing to be done
Therefore it is proved that the Self, when the mind-stuff is
dissolved, is grounded in nothing but itself, isolated, released.

Book Second: Means of attainment.

In the previous Book after stating what yoga is and after
having described its characteristic-mark and explained the
fluctuations and made known practice and passionlessness as
methods for restricting them; and after describing certain
methods for steadying the mind-stuff, the two kinds of yoga
with the subdivisions was made known. In this book assuming
that practice and passionlessness have been established as
means for purifying the mind-stuff, he first describes the yoga
of action which is the reason for the purity of this [mind-stuff].
1. The yoga of action is self-castigation and study and devotion to the Icvara.

In this Book the means of attainment of the yoga described in the previous book are described. This is the connection of these two Books. Continence, service of the spiritual guide, speaking truth, stock-stillness (kāṣṭha-māuna) and silence of countenance (ākāra-māuna), duties appropriate to one’s stage of life, endurance of extremes, measured food, and the like—this is <self-castigation> <Study> is the repetition of purifying formulas, such as the Mystic Syllable or [the verses to] the Exalted Rudra, or the Hymn to the Puruṣa [RV. x. 90] or the reading of books on release. The offering of actions, done without attachment to the result, to the Supreme Teacher, the Icvara is <devotion to the Icvara>. These are the yoga which consists in action because they are means of attaining yoga.

He describes the result of the yoga of action.

2. For the cultivation of concentration and the attenuation of the hindrances.

When the hindrances are dense, concentration is not perfected. Accordingly the yoga of action attenuates the hindrances and cultivates concentration. Attenuation is the occasional appearance of hindrances which [otherwise] appear at all times. Cultivation is the bringing about of concentration. <For> this is that whose result is this. By the yoga of action having obtained an opportunity in the intervals of the hindrances, concentration brings the discriminative discernment to pass and burns the hindrances together with the subconscious impressions. This is the point.

Now of what sort are the hindrances and how many are they? In reply to this he says.

3. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) and the feeling of personality and passion and hatred and the will-to-live are the five hindrances.

They hinder, [that is] in that they give an impulse to karma and its results they give pain to the Self. So they are called <hindrances> And they are five.
With regard to these [five], in so far as the four are the effects of undifferentiated-consciousness, he says that they have undifferentiated-consciousness as their essence.

4. Undifferentiated-consciousness is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained.

<Of the others> beginning with the feeling-of-personality <undifferentiated-consciousness is the field> [that is] the propagative soil. He describes the different subdivisions of these by saying <dormant.> Dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained—of these. Of these [four], the hindrances which belong to yogins who are discarnate or whose [bodies] are resolved into the primary-matter are dormant, because they remain unburned, in potential form, so long as there is no discriminative discernment. Accordingly at the end they appear again.—Attenuated hindrances belong to active yogins.—Intercepted belong to those who are attached to objects and become sustained. Just as Čaṭtra’s anger is intercepted towards the woman for whom he feels a passion, and his passion is sustained, so passion is intercepted for that person towards whom one’s anger is sustained. In time it becomes sustained and hinders man and beast. These hindrances have their root in undifferentiated-consciousness. When this ceases, as a result of the Self becoming perceptibly perceived, they cease, just as the hindrances of one who is liberated during life [cease]. When one can say that they have dwindled away, then this would be regarded as a fifth state of the hindrances.

Of these [five] he describes the nature of undifferentiated-consciousness.

5. The recognition of the permanent in the impermanent, of the pure in the impure, of pleasure in pain, of self in the nonself is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā).

That is, the thought of a thing with reference to what is not that thing. If one thinks that the gods are deathless as the result of the error of [finding] the permanent in the impermanent one performs sacrifice for the sake of a divinity and is bound. Similarly as a result of finding purity in impurity, in the body of a woman one is bound. This is said by the Exalted Divine Vyāsa ‘Because purification must be applied, the learned know
that the body is, because of its [first] abode, of its seed, of its sustenance, of its exudations, and of its decease, impure.' Its <abode> is the mother's belly full of excrement and urine. Its <seed> is semen and blood. Its <sustenance> is secretions and the like from mutations of food. Its <exudations> are the issue of filth from all the doors [of the body]. Its <decease> is death. If so, even the body of the Brahmin is endlessly impure. It needs [constant] purification, [that is] by bathing, anointing, and the like purity is attained. — Likewise there is the error of [finding] pleasure in enjoyment which has the pain of mutation [iii. 15]. — There is the recognition of the self in what is non-self, for instance, the thinking-substance. In other words, <undifferentiated-consciousness> is contrary to the consciousness of reality. Although there are undifferentiated-consciousnesses of the mother-of-pearl and of the silver and so on, still this undifferentiated-consciousness of just four kinds is the root of bondage. This is the point.

6. The feeling-of-personality is a fusion, as it appears to be, of the power of seeing and of the power of the sight.

The power of seeing is the Self. The sight\(^1\) in the sense that it is seen; the thinking-substance is the power of this. The word <power> has the meaning of predisposition. An identity [that is] oneness of essence has been accomplished by undifferentiated-consciousness between the enjoyer and the power of being enjoyed which are predisposed [to each other] but absolutely discriminate, the seer and the thing to be seen. By the words <as it appears to be> he indicates that an error with regard to identity has been made when one thinks 'I am.' In other words this is <the feeling-of-personality.> "This is the knot of the heart" as those\(^2\) who hold the theory of the Brahman say.

He explains that passion is the effect of the feeling-of-personality.

7. Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure.

When there is an experience of pleasure, that longing which there is in memory for another pleasure of the same kind or

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\(^1\) According to the Varttika *darçana* means organ-of-sight (*karana*).
\(^2\) Compare Muñḍ. Up. ii. 2. 8. and Kātha Up. vi. 15.
for the means of attaining it is <passion.> [This passion] dwells upon pleasure [that is] makes it its object; so it is said to <dwell upon pleasure.>

8. Hatred is that which dwells upon pain.

That anger which is in the memory of him who felt the pain towards pain and the means of pain is <hatred.>

9. Sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature the will-to-live (abhiniveśa) exists in this form even in the wise.

That fear of death in a creature just born, whether [he is to be] a wise man or a fool, is the will-to-live. Just as fear exists in the fool when he wishes ‘May I always be,’ so it exists [that is] is found <even in the wise.> It <sweeps on [by the force of] its own nature> in the sense that is flows [that is] flows onward by its own nature which is an attachment to a subconscious-impression produced by an experience of the pain of death more than once in previous births. By means of this fear the Comment shows incidentally that the soul is over and above the body. For even in a child just born the fear of death is found and this could not be explained unless there were a memory of previous death. These five, moreover, undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest are called (Gāuḍapāda’s Bhāṣya on Śāṅkhyā Kārikā xlviii) “Gloom, infatuation, great infatuation, darkness, blind darkness.” Of these [five], 1. gloom is undifferentiated-consciousness, the thought of self in what are non-selves, in the unphenomenalized [primary matter] or in the Great [thinking-substance] or in the personality-substance or in the five substances. 2. Infatuation is the identification with atomization or some other of the eight powers so that one thinks ‘I am atomic [or] I am of great size.’ 3. Great infatuation is passion for sounds or other of the ten [perceptible] objects in so far as there is this distinction between what is super-normal and what is not-super-normal. 4. Darkness is hatred towards the eighteen obstructions, in case there is failure to gain the ten objects which are the causes of these [powers], if for any cause there be obstruction to the [ten] powers. 5. Blind darkness is the fear of the destruction of these same eighteen things desired. And in this sense the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā [xlviii] “The distinctions of gloom are eightfold and also those of infatuation;
great infatuation is tenfold; darkness is eighteenfold and so is blind darkness."

And these hindrances are of two kinds. The subtile which consist of subliminal-impressions burned by the discernment of the Self; the coarse, attenuated by the yoga of action and by the purification which consists in the cultivation of friendliness and so on [i. 33]. Of these [two], he describes the method of rejecting the subtile [hindrances].

10. *These [hindrances when they are subtile] are to be rejected by inverse propagation.*

The mind-stuff having performed its task is dissolved into the feeling-of-personality, its own evolving-cause. <These> hindrances <are to be rejected> by <inverse propagation.> In other words as a result of the destruction of the whole there is a destruction of the external-aspects of this [whole].

He describes the means of rejecting the coarse [hindrances].

11. *The fluctuations of these should be rejected by means of contemplation.*

Those fluctuations of the hindrances, which are coarse, thinned by the yoga of action, being pleasure and pain and infatuation are to be rejected only by contemplation. Just as in ordinary life a spot of very coarse matter upon a piece of cloth is first cleansed by washing. Afterwards it is thinned by contact with alkali on something of the kind. But the latent-impression of the spot is destroyed only by the destruction of the piece of cloth. Similarly extremely dense hindrances become thinned by the yoga of action. But when thinned, they are attenuated by contemplation. Yet subtile [hindrances] are destroyed only by the destruction of the mind-stuff. This is the point.

After the hindrances have been discursed, the objector asks "How is it that they are hindrances?" In reply he says they are called hindrances because they are bonds, in so far as they are the root of karma and of its effects.
12. The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt either in a birth seen or in a birth unseen.

In this [sūtra], by the three words in order, the cause and the nature and the effect of karma are described. That in which all Selves in the round-of-rebirth are latent is a latent-deposit of karmas, a subliminal-impression consisting of right and wrong-action. Because the root of it is the hindrances, love and anger and the rest, it is said to <have its root in the hindrances.> And it is of two kinds <to be felt in a birth seen and to be felt in a birth not seen.> And the first [kind] is to be experienced in the very same body by which the karma was made (kṣita); this is the birth seen. Just as Nandīçvara, when only a lad, with a human body offered adoration to the Īcvara with keen intensity both by incantations and self-castigation and concentration, and instantly gained birth as a divinity and a long length-of-life and supernormal experiences. Likewise Vishvamitra gained the birth and the length-of-life. In like manner contempt shown to illustrious personages who have remained worthy of trust in the terrible calamities which they have undergone is instantly rewarded. Just as Nahuṣa because of contempt shown to the great sage [Agastya] instantly became a serpent. The second [kind], however, is the <latent-deposit of karma> which is the cause of heaven or hell or whatever it may be to be experienced in another birth.

This [latent-deposit of karma] does not occur when the hindrances have dwindled away. He describes this distinction.

13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it, birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience.

So long as <the root> which consists in the hindrances exists, there is <fruition> [that is] a result from the karma. For a man who has no hindrance does not enjoy. Since one who has no passion has no sensation of pleasure in any result arising in karma. For one who is not dejected does not lament. Therefore the seed of karma in hindrances burned by the fire of discriminative discernment, like rice which has no husk, does not generate a fruit. This fruition is of three kinds. <Birth> is being born as a divinity or as something or other; <length-of-life> is connected with the body and the breath for a long
time; <kind-of-experience> is the enjoyment of objects of sense by sense organs. Of these [three], kind-of-experience is primary; birth and length-of-life are supplementary to it. Because in this one body one feels different kinds-of-experience, many karmas bring the time of death to the full realization and originate a single birth. So the latent-deposit of karma is said to be one which has [its limit] in one existence. This is to be understood as having a multiplicity of results, in one case as birth, in another as length-of-life, in another as kind-of-experience; in another as two [of these], in another as three of these. This is said by the Exalted [Bhag. Git. iv. 17] 'Mysterious are the ways of karma.' The details way he looked up in the Comment.

In order now to indicate that birth and the others are to be rejected, he describes their result.

14. These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit or demerit.

<These> [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. Those that have a meritorious cause result in pleasure. Demerit is evil; those [fruitions] that have this as a cause result in pain. But [Vācaspati-]miśra says¹ that the kind-of-experience is the feeling of pleasure or pain; pleasure and pain are the results of that [kind of experience] because this [kind of experience] is a kind of action,² just as the village is [the result] of walking. So he says.

The objector says 'Suppose that these [karmas] which result in pain are to be rejected; but how is it that those which result in pleasure are to be rejected.' In reply to this he says.

15. By reason of the pains due to mutations, to anxiety, and to subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects, to the discriminating all is pain.

<Mutation> is a change of state. <Anxiety> is present. <Subliminal-impressions> are past. These same are pains; by

¹ See iii. 35, p. 245 ¹ and compare bhogah sukhamukha-saktākařah
ii. 13, p. 126 ¹ (Calc. ed.).
² That is, it is something to be accomplished not something ready-made.
reason of these. This is the analysis [of the compound]. To explain. The fire of passion increases as a result of the enjoyment of the pleasure in objects. In case it increases, when a man does not get what he desires, pain necessarily will come. There is aversion towards that which lessens [enjoyment]. As a result of this, because there is an increase of evil due to passion and aversion, there is pain. And if [enjoyment] does not lessen, there is disease and also evil. From this there is pain. Thus enjoyment has the painfulness of mutations. So at the time of the enjoyment of pleasure there is pain because of the fear of the loss of the objects. And as a result of the hatred for the destroyer there is anxiety. Thus enjoyment has the painfulness of anxiety. In this way when the enjoyment of pleasure is destroyed there is a subliminal-impression. In so far as there is this memory, when there is passion, because of the accumulation of merit and demerit, there is the experience of pleasure and of pain, there is a subliminal-impression again. Thus the uninterrupted-succession of pain is endless. If there were no subliminal-impression when enjoyment is destroyed, then there would be no uninterrupted-succession of pain. But because there is the subliminal-impression there is the painfulness of the subliminal-impression. These pains deject the discriminating yogin who is [sensitive] as the eye-ball; but not [ordinary people] busy in action, whose mind-stuffs are hard. Just as even a thread of wool of delicate structure dejects the eye-ball, but not any other part of the body. Accordingly to the discriminating every means of enjoyment without exception, like food mixed with poison, is surely pain by connection with <pains due to mutations, to anxiety, and to subliminal-impressions> <and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects.> In other words, there is opposition [that is] the reciprocal relation of causing and of being made to disappear, in the case of the fluctuations, pleasure and pain and infatuation, which belong to the aspects, sattva and rajas and tamas, which are mutated as mind-stuff. Because of this. For the mind-stuff is unstable. Whatever fluctuation of the aspects there is in this mind-stuff which appears when right-living becomes intensified, this same, because wrong-living is intensified, when once right-living has appeared, disappears again. The fluctuation of pleasure, which really by its very nature partakes of pain, manifests its natur-
ally painful nature, because it is a mutation of sattva mixed with rajas, the nature of which is pain. But in its own time [of being experience], the painfulness of this [fluctuation of pleasure] is not clear, because, at that time, the sattva [aspect] is predominant. [But when] the sattva [aspect] disappears by reason of the rajas, then it becomes clear. Thus it is that pleasure and pain are differently named. In this way the fact that pleasure infatuates is explained. Consequently it is proved that the whole world, in essence a mutation of aspects, is to be rejected as having in its essence an infatuation as to pain.

Just as in a book of medicine there are four divisions 1. Disease 2. Cause of the disease 3. Health 4. Cause of this [Health], so in this book too he shows that what is to be rejected is to be particularized and divided into four 1. What is to be Rejected 2. Cause of what is to be Rejected 3. Release 4. Cause of this [Release].

16. That which is to be rejected is pain yet to come.

Because past pain has passed away in experience and because present pain is dwindling in the very experience itself, it is <pain yet to come> that <is to be rejected.>

He describes the cause of the rejection.

17. The cause of that which is to be rejected is the correlation of the Seer and the object-for-sight.

The <Seer> consisting in intelligence is the Self who has a vision which is his own image lying on the thinking-substance. The <object-for-sight> is the sattva of the thinking-substance. The <correlation> is the relation of property and proprietor. For the sattva of the thinking-substance, mutated into the form of the various sounds and other [perceptible] substances, by the agency of the organs or in some other way, by changing into the image of the intelligence is seen as not different from the Self; giving its aid like a loadstone merely by being near and making the Self look towards the experience and the liberation which abide within him, it becomes the property of the Self the proprietor. This same is the correlation, formed by the the undifferentiated-consciousness which consists in the
the error which does not [see] the difference; and, constantly subject to the ends of the Self, is the cause of the pain which is to be rejected.

He amplifies [the description] of the object-for-sight.

18. The object-for-sight with its disposition to light and to activity and to inertia, consisting of elements and organs, exists for the purpose of the experience and of the liberation [of the Self].

The sattva has the disposition to light. The rajas has the disposition to activity. Inertia is an impediment to light and to activity; the tamas has this disposition. Thus while there is relation of castigated and castigator between the sattva and the rajas, infatuation is found in the Self because he looks upon them as belonging to him (mamatayā). These same three aspects, cooperating with their own effects of this kind or that, undiscriminated, objects-of-experience, to be put aside by the discriminating, causing each other to disappear, in the relation of whole and part to each other, having differences knowable by characteristic effects of pleasure and light and lightness and of pain and activity and incitement and of infatuation and obstruction and heaviness, with the difference between them hard to know inasmuch as they are not separated from each other, denoted by the word primary cause,—[these aspects] <consist of elements and organs.> The elements are the coarser fine substances; the organs are the ten organs of perception and of action, the thinking-substance and the personality-substance and the central-organ, which are the three inner organs. This is the object-for-sight, the mutation of which consists of, [that is] is not different from, [elements and organs]. It is <for the purpose of the experience and the liberation [of the Self]> [that is] its purpose is experience and release.

He shows what the mutation of these aspects is when one separates them.

19. The divisions of the aspects are the particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and resoluble [primary matter] and unresoluble [primary matter].

Sixteen evolved-forms are <particularized> in the sense that they are made particular [that is] singled out. Five coarse
elements, air and wind and fire and water and earth, ten organs of sense and of action, and the central-organ — these sixteen are evolved-forms only and not evolving-causes of other entities. The evolving-causes of these evolved-forms are evolved-forms of the thinking-substance, the six unparticularized, the five fine substances and the personality substance. According to the Sāṅkhya the five fine-substances are from the personality-substance. According to the Yoga the fine substances are offspring of the thinking-substance produced after the personality-substance. Of these the five fine-substances, sound and touch and color and taste and smell as they are called, are the evolving-causes of the coarse elements. The personality-substance, in both aspects of the sattva and the rajas, is the evolving-cause of the organ of sense and of action of the central-organ. The Great Entity is a fine-substance and it is <resoluble> in the sense that it is reduced to a resolution [into primary matter]. And the word mātra makes clear its characteristic-difference from the particularized and the unparticularized. For it is in essence unpredicated determinations and it is the first effect of the primary-cause which consists in the state of equipoise. The four divisions of the aspects are mutations. It is to be supposed that the aspects are supplementary to the intelligence.

Thus having discussed the object-for-sight he discusses the Seer.

20. The Seer, who is seeing and nothing more, although undefiled [by aspects], looks upon the presented-idea.

<The Seer> is the Self. <Who is seeing and nothing more> [that is] who is intelligence and nothing more, not having properties such as perception. Accordingly, although <undefiled> [that is] immutable, he beholds the presented-idea in conformity with a fluctuation of the thinking-substance. Thus he <looks upon the presented-idea.> In other words as a result of not discriminating the thinking-substance from himself, by becoming one with the fluctuations he looks upon the sounds and other [perceptible] things. This has been said [i. 4] 'At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff].'

Having thus described the object-for-sight and the Seer he tells which is subordinate and which is principal.
21. The being of the object-for-sight exists only for the sake of it [the Self].

The nature of the <object-for-sight> [that is] the object of experience is only for the sake of the Seer, not for its own sake, because it is unintelligent.

The objector says 'Then, when once the purpose of the Seer is completed, because it would have nothing to do, the primary-cause would not be an object-for-sight; it would be without functional activity; and so no world-of-change would now be appereceived.' In reply to this he says

22. Though it has ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose purpose is fulfilled, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others besides him.

The primary-cause is one; the Selves are endless [in number]. This is the settled rule, in accordance with the passage of the Sacred Word [Qvet. Up. iv. 5] 'The one she-goat.' In this case that Self with reference to whom the primary-cause has fulfilled its experience and liberation is <one whose purpose is fulfilled> because he is master, just as a master is said to have won a victory by a victory which has been won by a servant. Similarly, with reference to that Self who has accomplished his purpose and is free, this object-for-sight, although it has ceased to be [that is] reduced to non-sight, still it has not ceased to be, because it is common to other Selves. What he means to say is this. Because the purpose of the Self has stages yet to come, it is the cause of activity on the part of the primary-cause. In this case, although the primary-cause is not active with reference to [a Self] who has fulfilled its purpose, with reference to one whose purpose is not fulfilled, in the form of the Great [thinking substance] and the rest, activity does take place. And so if one [Self] has freedom, it does not follow that all have freedom.

Thus having explained the object-for-sight and the Seer he discusses the cause of what is to be rejected [that is] the correlation.
23. The cause of the recognition of the nature of the power of the property and of the proprietor is the correlation.

The <property> is the object-for-sight; its <power,> inasmuch as it is inert, is its capacity for being seen. But the <proprietor> is the Self; his power, inasmuch as he is intelligent, is his capacity as Seer, which merely consists in being himself. These two powers, whose nature is that they should be property and proprietor, have experience, that is to say, a recognition of the peculiar nature of the thinking-substance as the object-for-sight in the form of various sounds and other [perceptible] things. The recognition of the peculiar nature of the proprietor is liberation. The cause of this [recognition] is the <correlation> the so-called relation of property and proprietor. The same is called the relation of Seer and object-for-sight [and] the relation of experiencer and object-of-experience. When this is not, there is no recognition of the nature of the Seer and the object-for-sight; when it is, there is this [recognition]. This correlation is knowable only in [its] effect. This is pointed out.

Having thus described the nature and the effect of the correlation he tells of its cause.

24. The cause of it is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā).

In other words the cause of the correlation is a subconsci-impression from erroneous knowledge. When any one thinks 'I' the presented idea which does not distinguish between the Seer and the object-for-sight is an error. A mind-stuff permeated (vāsita) by subconscious-impressions of this [error] is resolved at a dissolution and passes over into the condition of the primary-cause; at the time of a creation, in the case of each Self, it comes forth as the sattva aspect only. By means of this correlation there is bondage for the undiscriminating and release for the discriminating. For [they are] together with that undifferentiated-consciousness, in the mind-stuff, which is diversified with subconscious-impressions from time without beginning. Upon the human victim¹ perforated like a fish-net and rejecting the pain received, which has been applied by his own karma, and receiving [the pain] rejected, who conforms

¹ This simile is derived from the Bhāṣya on ii. 13 and 15.
himself to the idea 'I' and to the idea 'mine'—upon him, born again and again, the triple anguishes, from both kind of causes both inner and outer, sweep down.

Having thus shown the consistency between, that which is to be rejected and its cause, he traces the derivation of the release, which is the rejection of that which is to be rejected.

25. Because this [undifferentiated-consciousness] does not exist, there is no correlation; this is the rejection, the Isolation of the Seer.

Because this [undifferentiated-consciousness] does not exist, after it has been destroyed by consciousness, the cause, the pain to be rejected, which is the correlation of the thinking-substance and the Self, does not exist [that is] is quite destroyed. This <Isolation> of the <Seer> [that is] of the permanently freed is itself the rejection.

After describing freedom he tells of its cause.

26. The method of the rejection is unwavering discriminating discernment.

The <discernment> is the sense of <discriminating> [that is] distinguishing between the Seer and the object—for—sight. Wavering is false sensation. In the first place we know that discriminating insight arises in a general way from verbal-communication. This does not put an end to undifferentiated-consciousness, which is from time without beginning, because there is no immediate experience. But when it is established by reasoning and is incessantly practised by a mind-stuff free from passion and directed towards the Self, then springing from the final perfection of contemplation and containing the reflection of the intelligence and consisting of immediate experience, it utterly destroys false sensation together with the subconscious-impressions. Being now <unwavering> by reason of the restriction which follows the higher passionlessness, it is [now] the method of release which is nothing but subliminal-impressions and which has performed its task, when once its end has begun, by virtue of the final cessation; and this is the rejection of future pain.
He tells of the greatness due to knowledge in the case of one freed while living, whose discriminating discernment is stable.

27. For him insight advancing in stages to the highest is sevenfold.

Those are advancing to the highest [that is] are in the final (carama) [stage], whose highest, [that is] whose end, is excellent as a result. That insight whose stage, [that is] whose state, has advanced to the highest is <advancing in stages to the highest.> Following after the wise man's steady and unwavering discernment of himself, in so far as other presented-ideas have disappeared, there are seven kinds, [that is] seven stages, that are final. 1. All that is to be known is known. Other than this there is nothing to be known. This is one [insight]. Because it destroys all desire to know, this insight has advanced to the highest. For this insight is impossible in one who does not know himself, because, as a result of this, although the insight, which terminates in the primary-cause, is established by the concentration which is based upon this, yet in so far as the desire to know the self persists (sattvend) the insight of this [persisting desire] is not final. Thus the last states are to be regarded as advancing in stages to the highest. 2. All the causes of bondage which were to be rejected have been rejected, there is nothing to be rejected by me. This is the second [insight]. 3. By the attainment of Isolation all that was to be attained has been attained; other than this there is nothing to be attained by me. This is the third [insight]. 4. By the accomplishment of discriminative discernment all that was to be done has been done; there is nothing to be done. This is the fourth [insight]. These four are the so-called final releases of action.—The so-called final releases of the mind-stuff are three. That is to say, 5. the sattva of my thinking-substance has performed its task. This is one [insight]. 6. The aspects (guna) also, in the form of the thinking-substance and the rest, like rocks fallen from the top of the mountain peak, without support, of their own accord, incline towards dissolution in their fall and come to final rest; lacking a motive they do not spring up again. This is the second

1 Reading iyam anātmajñasya.
[insight of the released mind-stuff]. 7. Similarly one who has passed beyond the aspects (guna) and who remains in himself and nothing more and whose sole essence is intelligence—this would be the third state of insight of the released mind-stuff. In other words the seven stages of insight advancing to the highest should be regarded as having as their results 1. the desire to know 2. the desire to reject 3. the desire to attain 4. the desire to act 5. the end of grief 6. the end of fear 7. the end of predicate-relations.

Now he tells of the means of attaining insight.

28. After the dwindling of impurity as a result of following up the aids to yoga, there is an illumination of thinking, up to the discriminative discernment.

As a result of following up the aids to yoga and also yoga [itself], when there is a dwindling of impurity consisting in the karma from hindrances, there is an illumination [that is] a purification of thinking, up to the unpredicated discriminative discernment. The point is that the means of attaining insight is by the purity due to following up of yoga together with its aids.

How many are the aids to yoga? In reply he says.

29. The eight aids are abstentions and observances and postures and regulations of breath and withdrawal of the senses and fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration.

Abstentions are mentioned first because they have results in connection with the others. Afterwards in respect of the abstentions come the observances. As being concerned with the purity which depends upon both these two kinds, the postures and the others, each the cause of the next, are afterwards mentioned.

He describes in particular these [aids] which are to be accepted by yogins.

30. Abstentions are abstinence from injury, from falsehood, from theft, from incontinence, and from acceptance of gifts.

Of these, 1. abstinence from injury is of course abstinence from oppression by mind or voice or body of any creature at
any time. This right-living is of the best white [karma]. The rest beginning with the observances are for the purpose of purifying this. And in this sense it has been said 'Surely this same brahmin in proportion as he desires to take upon himself many courses of action, in this proportion refraining from heedlessly giving injuries, fulfills [the abstention] of abstinence from injury in the full character of its spotlessness.' 2. Truth is the telling of the facts as they are, for the good of others. 3. Theft is taking the possessions of others by force or by stealth; when there is none of this, there is abstinence from theft, the absence of desire for the wealth of another. 4. Abstinence from incontinence is the constraint of the organ of generation. The renunciation of gazing at women and of talking with them or of touching them or of listening to them or of meditating upon them is an aid to this. 5. Abstinence from property is the non-acceptance of the means of enjoyment over and above the nourishment of the body. These five abstentions have a share in aiding, in so far as they reject injury and lying and stealing and contact with women and property which are foes to yoga.

31. The Great Course of conduct is [abstinence from injury] unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and [covering] all [these] classes.

A <species> such as the class of cows or of brahmins. A <place> such as some sacred-spot. A <time> such as the fourteenth day which has been determined upon. An <exigency> would be, for instance, some such time as a brāhmanic eating which has not been settled. In these cases the resolution never to kill a cow or a brahmin would be abstinence from injury as limited by species. The resolution not to kill any one at a sacred place or on the fourteenth day would be [abstinence from injury] limited by place and by time. The resolution not to kill excepting, at the unfixed-time (samaya) of eating, for the sake of gods and brahmins would be [abstinence from injury] limited by an unfixed-time. The resolution to kill no animal whatsoever at any time for any body's sake would be abstinence from killing undetermined by all four, species and the rest. Abstinence from injury has many varieties. In the same way one should consider truth and the rest as being unparticularized.
He describes the observances.

32. The observances are cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and study and devotion to the Īśvara.

<Cleanliness> accomplished by earth or water or the like and by sacrificial food purified by cow’s urine or fire or something of the kind is outer. Inner cleanliness is the absence in the mind-stuff of taints such as jealousy because of the cultivation of friendliness and the rest [i. 33]. <Contentment> is happiness caused by nothing more than the sustenance of the present life. <Self-castigation> is the bearing of extremes according to circumstances and mortifications and the like. <Study> is practice of the Mystic Syllable and of similar exercises. “Whatever I do, whether auspicious or inauspicious, whether consciously or unconsciously, all is committed to Thee. Moved by Thee I do [it all]. Whatever my movement be at any time in act or mind or speech let it be as an adoration of Keśava and also in birth after birth yet to come.” Thus devotion to the Īśvara is the offering up of all actions to the Supreme Teacher.

33. If there be inhibition by perverse considerations, there should be cultivation of the opposites.

When it happens that there is inhibition of these abstentions and observances by resolutions to kill [qualified] by perverse considerations such as ‘I will kill him who hurts [me]; I will also lie; I will take other’s property,’ a brahmin intent upon abstentions and the other [aids] should cultivate [in his mind] the opposites. ‘Baked upon the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths I take refuge in the duties of yoga, such as the abstentions, by giving protection to every living creature. If now, giving up abstinence from injury and the rest, I be-take myself to those [abstentions] already given up, then I shall [be doing something] like the doings of a dog. For just as a dog eats that which is vomited so I shall be taking again that which I have given up.’ Thus he should cultivate the opposites of the perverse considerations.

At this point describing in succession in the five words the ‘nature’, the ‘varieties’, the ‘causes’, the ‘different subdivisions’, and the ‘results’ of the perverse considerations, he makes clear what the cultivation of the opposites is.
34. Because perverse considerations, such as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending fruition in pain and in lack of thinking,—there should be a cultivation of their opposites.

Perverse considerations, such as injuries, are so called because they are considered. This describes their nature. Of these injuries there are three kinds. 1. done voluntarily. 2. caused to be done, because some one has said 'do it' and 3. approved, as when one says 'good, good'. Of these [three], each one is again three-fold, due to difference of cause 1. by greed, as for meat or for a skin. 2. by anger, as when one thinks he is hurt by a man. 3. by infatuation, as when one thinks 'I shall be doing a meritorious act.' Thus there are nine kinds of injuries. Once more greed and anger and infatuation are each of three kinds; and injury and the rest, as being caused by these, in so far as they are mild or moderate or vehement, are also mild or moderate or vehement and likewise are done or caused to be done or approved. Thus since each of the injuries and the rest are nine-fold, there are twenty-seven varieties. And, as being mild or moderate or vehement, each one [of there] is three-fold: mildly mild, moderately mild, keenly mild, mildly moderate, moderately moderate, keenly moderate, mildly keen, moderately keen, keenly keen. In this way greed is of nine kinds. Likewise anger and infatuation. Caused by these [nine kinds], injuries when done are of twenty-seven varieties. Similarly when caused to be done or approved; thus there are eighty-one varieties of injuries. In the same way, this is applicable to lying and to the rest. Perverse considerations are of such a nature. Pain, for example, that of hell, and lack of thinking, for example, the state of motionless things and the state consisting of error and doubt, give endless results. Accordingly it is clear that there must be cultivation of the opposites without any perverse considerations. What is pointed out is this: Perverse considerations are to be rejected as being this calculation of hatred. When they are rejected, the ten abstentions and observances are perfected without obstruction. When these are [in turn] perfected, there is Isolation by virtue of the mind-stuff's purity. The upshot of it all is that after this yoga is perfected.
Now he shows in order the subordinate results of the ten [abstentions and observances] which are the indications of their perfections.

35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity.

When abstinence from injury is perfected, even the snake and mongoose, enemies by nature, suspend their enmity in the presence of the best of silent sages who abstains from injury.

36. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and results depend upon him.

<As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood,> actions both of right-living and wrong-living and the results of these, for example, heaven, both abide [in him]. He is one who gives them merely by uttering a word. This is his state or condition. Just as a man becomes right-living in response to this saying ‘Be thou right-living,’ [and just as a man attains heaven] merely because he says ‘Attain thou heaven,’ so also he becomes wrong-living.

37. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all kinds of jewels approach him.

When he is established in abstinence from stealing, he obtains possession by a mere wish of all kinds of supernormal jewels.

38. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence he acquires vigor.

For abstinence from incontinence is a restriction of vigor; when this is perfected his power becomes unsurpassed. As a result of which, atomization and the other [powers] present themselves. His teaching bears fruit in his pupils instantly.¹

39. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from property, illumination upon the conditions of birth.

When one who is disposed to abstain from property, is steady in this [abstinence], he has a thorough illumination,

¹ Reading चिंगेशुपादेशः.
caused by his desire to know, of the conditions [that is] the different kinds of past, present, and future births. In what does this consist? In the desire to know the body which is opposed to property, in that one asks what its modes are, what its causes are, what its results are, what its end is. Then [there is illumination as to] the connection of effect and cause, the birth of the Self who is [really] unborn; the different kinds of men and gods and animals, that there are caused by karma from hindrances, that they have pain only as their fruit; that the end is the illumination as to the real nature of the Self. Thus having come to this conclusion from the verbal-communication of the master, he is freed from the body and experiences the highest degree of abstinence from property.

The perfections of the abstentions have been described; the perfections of the observances are now described.

40. As a result of cleanliness there is a disgust at one's own body and absence of intercourse with others.

One who is perfected in outer cleanliness does not see [any] purity in his own body and is disgusted at it. This body is essentially impure; no pride should be taken in it. One who sees its defects—so that he thinks 'I who am intent on purity have a body that does not become pure, how much more the body of another intoxicated [by the round of rebirths]'—has no intercourse with others' bodies.

Thus having described the perfection of outer cleanliness, the tells of the perfection of inner cleanliness.

41. Purity of sattva, gentleness, singleness-of-intent, subjugation of the senses, and predisposition for the seeing of the Self.

The words [ii. 40] <as a result of cleanliness> are to be continued. And the words 'there is' are to be supplied. Purity of the sattva of the thinking-substance is the fading out of such taints as jealousy, the taints of rajas and tamas. After this there is an effulgence of the sattva. Consequently there is steadiness. And from this comes subjugation of the outer senses. As a result of this, there follows fitness for the discernment of the Self.
42. As a result of contentment there is the acquisition of superlative pleasure.

When there is perfection in the dwindling away of desire, he who has ridden himself of appetite necessarily gains an experience of an incomparable pleasure due to the effulgence of his purified sattva. And in this sense in the Song of Yayati in the Mahabharata “The pleasures of appetite in ordinary life and the supreme supernormal pleasure are both not to be compared with a sixteenth part of the pleasure of dwindled desire.”

43. From self-castigation, as a result of the dwindling of impurity, there arises perfection in the organs of the body.

After the evil from hindrances has dwindled by reason of one’s own right-living or of mortifications and lunar fasts or something of the kind, there arises a perfection of the body, a perfection of the organs in grasping objects that are distant or subtile.

44. As a result of study there is communion with the chosen divinity.

As a result of repetition of the chosen incantation or of something of the kind, conversation and the like are perfected with one’s own chosen divinity.

45. As a result of devotion to the Icvara arises the perfection of concentration.

Only by devotion of all one’s inner being is there perfection of yoga. And one should not say that if this is so, the seven aids which begin with the abstentions are useless. Because it is conceded that there is a choice whether there be a perfection of yoga by the aids or by the devotion. This was said [i. 23] “Or by devotion to the Icvara.” Nor should one say that the aids are fruitless as regards devotion. Because it is possible that the abstentions and the rest would aid the devotion also. There is nothing contradictory in saying that these [aids] are useful in both ways, both for devotion and for yoga,

1 Reading siddhān.
2 In the Patañjala-Rahasyam this passage is attributed to the Vishnu Purana.
just as curds are an aid in both ways, both [to invigorate] the organs [of man] and also for sacrifice. And you should also not say ‘What is the use of devotion, if eight aids are necessary, for they themselves would give the perfection.’ Perfection of yoga is remote, if your means-of-approach lack faith; perfection of yoga is very near, if [your means-of-approach] shower down the nectar of devotion. Thus the choice [between devotion and the eight aids] can be properly explained because they are both methods-of-attaining the results, which are yoga at a distant time and yoga directly (acira). This devotion to the Içvara, moreover, has a different object from the yoga of the inner self. So it is proper to speak of it as an external aid. Thus there is no flaw [in the argument].

Having thus discussed abstentions and observances together with the perfections, he tells what the nature of posture is.

46. Posture should be steady and easy.

The meaning is that the posture which is motionless and which confers ease is an aid to yoga. A posture in the sense that one is posed. It is two-fold, external and bodily. Of these two, that is external such as is covered by a slab or a black antelope skin or by sacrificial grass; that is bodily such as the lotus or the mystic diagram. This is the distinction. Of these the lotus-posture is familiar enough.—One should put the left foot contracted between the left shin and thigh and the right between the left shin and thigh; this would be the mystic diagram.—Having made a hollow of the two soles of his feet near the scrotum, one should place the hollow of his hands above the hollow [of the soles of his feet]. This would he regarded as the decent-posture.

He tells of the method of steadying the postures.

47. By relaxation of effort or by a balanced-state with regard to Ananta.

Instinctive effort, because it moves, destroys the posture. By the cessation of it the posture is perfected; so that there is no shaking of the limbs. By a balanced-state of the mind-stuff <with regard to Ananta> [that is] upon the Chief of Serpents, who holds the globe of the world upon his thous-
and very steadfast hoods, there is no throbbing of pain in the posture in so far as there is no consciousness of the body.

He tells of a characteristic of perfection in this [posture].

48. **Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes.**

After the subjugation of the postures one is not beaten by cold or heat or by other [extremes].

He now tells of the restraint of breath to be effected by the postures.

49. **This done, restraint of the breath, the cutting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration [follows].**

When there is steadiness of posture, restraint of the breath is the inner and outer cutting off of the flow of the external and the abdominal winds.

Having described the general characteristic [of restraint of breath] he analyzes restraint of breath as the thing to be characterized.

50. **External, internal, or suppressed in fluctuation; appearing in place, time, and number; spun-out and subtle.**

Restraint of the breath is of four kinds, external in fluctuation, internal in fluctuation, suppressed in fluctuation, and the fourth. Of these, the retention, outside only, of the abdominal wind which has gone out by reason of an emission, is <external> in fluctuation and it is an emission (recaka). By a filling in of outer wind, the holding within of [the air] which has gone within is <internal> in fluctuation and it is an inhalation (pūraka). The cutting off of the flow by an effort which is nothing other than a retention of the breath without an effort of emission or of inhalation is <suppressed> in fluctuation and it is suspension (kumbhaka). This is not an emission because it remains within. Nor is it an inhalation because it is subtle in that it contracts the breath in the body like a drop of water put on the surface of a boiling-hot stone. For an inhalation is [a breathing], that in coarse and restricted within, which fills the body, Therefore without any practice in emission or inhalation, by a single effort and no more, the
subtle breath called suspension, in so far as it is motionless like water in a jar, because it remains in the body is proven to be a suspension, a third [restraint of breath]. This mutation is three-fold, appearing as spun-out and subtle in place, time, and number. With regard to these, the <place> [that is] the object of the emission is measured by a span, a vitasti [from extended thumb to tip of little finger], or a hand or something similar; and is inferred, from the motion in a windless place of a blade of grass or of cotton, as being external. The place of inhalation, however, is internal and is inferred by means of touch, which resembles the touch of ants [moving on the body]; it extend from the sole of the foot to the head. <Time> is to be known by counting moments. <Number> is to be known by counting mātrā. A mātrā is that time which is distinguished by a snap of the fingers after having touched thrice with one’s hand one’s own knee. This [mātrā] occupies the same time as the inspiration and expiration of a man in ordinary health. In this case it is evident that [the restraint] is spun-out by a series of practices of twenty-six mātrās [in length]. The restriction of breath is <spun-out> when a large amount of place or time is covered. Just as a clever man sees it is spun-out, so because the breath is evidently subtle the spun-out [restraint] itself appears to be subtle.

He shows what the fourth restraint of breath is.

51. The fourth [restraint of breath] transcends the external and internal objects.

The outer place [that is] object has been described. And the inner object is, for instance, the heart or the navel. The transcending of these two is the complete apprehension of these with the subtle sight. The first stage of this <fourth,> is the [restraint] suppressed in fluctuation. And one should not question whether this might be included under suspension (kumbhaka). Because of [this] difference in quality: that the suspension is only when there is no ascertainment of outer and inner objects which have been subjugated by the practice of emission and of inhalation and it [the suspension] is suppressed in fluctuation by a single effort only; [whereas] the

1 Or it may be that one should touch each knee and snap one's fingers.
fourth is to be obtained after a deal of effort, and it is the suspended fluctuation that has as its antecedent the ascertain-
ment of those [outer and inner objects].

Now he tells of the result which is the cause of its being regarded an aid to yoga.

52. As a result of this the obscuration of light dwindles away.

As a result of practice in restraint of breath the covering, which consists in evil from hindrances, of the sattva, whose disposition is light, belonging to the thinking-substance, dwindles away.> This is said by the omniscient Manu [vi. 72] "One should burn up defects by restraint of breath."

53. The central-organ becomes fit for fixed-attentions also.

Furthermore as a result of restraint of breath, when the obscuration dwindles away, the central-organ becomes fit for fixed-attentions upon subtle points.

The mind-stuff which is purified with the abstentions and the rest which have been described withdraws its senses. After assuming this he gives the characteristic-mark of this [withdrawal].

54. The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff itself on the part of the organs, by disjoining themselves from their objects.

When the pure mind-stuff is disjoined from its own objects, the sounds and other [perceptible] things, when, in other words, it is close to reality by having not joined itself to objects as a result of passionlessness, the organs, the eye and the others, imitate the nature of the mind-stuff [that is] they get close to reality by disjoining themselves from their objects. This is withdrawal of the organs. According to the derivation of the word [the withdrawal of the organs] is that in which the organs are withdrawn (āhriyate) from the objects which are obstructive (prātilomyena). The words <as it were> are used to denote (dyotana) those organs whose power extends (gura) to objects are not close to reality, as is the mind-stuff. Just as when the king-bee mounts up the bees mount up after him and when he stands still they stand still after him, so the
organs in conformity with the mind-stuff are restricted merely by the restriction of the mind-stuff and not by any effort other than that. This is the import [of the sūtrā].

He tells of the result of the withdrawal of the senses which is the cause of yoga.

55. As a result of this [withdrawal] there is complete mastery of the senses.

[A man has] enjoyment at his will of objects which are not forbidden, without being dependent on them. Mastery of the senses is that knowledge of sounds and other [perceptible] things, in the absence of passion and aversion, which does not produce pleasure and pain. This [mastery] is not the highest because it is connected with the snake's poison (viṣa) of objects (viṣaya). But the opinion of Jāgīśārya is this: That mastery which is the absolute refusal (apratipatti), on the part of the women, who are the organs to deal with objects, that is to say, the objects of sense, although [these latter] are being carried near to themselves [the objects] by the objects—[a refusal] because they are true to their husbands, who are the realities,—just as the Lady Sītā did not accept Rāvana the basest of demons, although brought near to him—this is the higher mastery of the senses, the result of the withdrawal of the senses.

Book third: Supernormal Powers.

Having thus in the Second Book discussed the yoga of action as a means of attaining yoga by attenuation of the hindrances, and having told of the fruitions of the karma from the hindrances in detail, and having shown that pain is the reason for rejecting them, and having made that-which-is-to-be-rejected and its reasons harmonious with release and its reasons, he discussed the five outer aids of yoga, beginning with the abstentions, together with their subordinate results. Now while speaking of the three inner aids beginning with fixed-attention, [which together form] the so-called constraint, he will describe the supernormal powers to be attained by constraint as being causes, by means of belief, of putting that yoga into action which results in Isolation. So
beginning the book which comes next he characterizes fixed-attention.

1. Fixed-attention (dharanā) is the binding of the mind-stuff to a place.

That binding [that is] steadying of the mind-stuff to a place, such as the navel or the heart or the tip of the nose, is fixed-attention. This is said in the Vishnu Purāṇa [vi. 7, 45] “Having subdued his breath by restraint of breath and his organs by withdrawal of the senses he should make a localization of the mind-stuff upon some auspicious support. The form of the Exalted is incarnate and leaves one without desire of any [other] support. That should be understood to be fixed-attention when the mind is fixed upon this form. That incarnate form of Hari on which one should ponder—let that be heard by you, O Ruler of Men. A fixed-attention without location is impossible. His face is calm; his eye like the lovely lotus petal; his check is beautiful; the expanse of his broad forehead is resplendent [with the light of thought]; his pleasing ornament of ear-rings is placed even with the lobes of his ear; his neck is [marked with lines] like a shell of the sea; his great, broad chest is marked with the Ćrivatsa; his belly has a deep navel and broken folds; he has eight long arms or [as Vishnu] four arms; his thighs and legs are well-formed; his excellent lotus-feet are evenly placed. Upon him who has become Brahma with stainless yellow garment let [the yogin] ponder.”

He characterizes contemplation which is to be attained by fixed-attention.

2. Contemplation (āhyāna) is intentness upon the presented-idea within that [place].

While the fixed-attention requires an effort to avoid dissimilar fluctuations, which is the intentness upon the presented-ideas [that is] the fluctuations in the same [space], contemplation without requiring an effort has a single object. On this same point this was said by Keśidhvaja to Khāṇḍikajana [Vishnu Purāṇa vi. 7, 89] “A continuous series

1 Reading anādharā.
of focussed states upon the idea of his form regardless of anything else, that, O King, is contemplation. It is brought to pass by the six first aids."

He characterizes concentration.

3. *Concentration is the same [concentration] appearing as the object only, and, as it were, emptied of itself.*

Concentration is a contemplation which consists in a flow of extremely clear fluctuations of mind-stuff, and which appears to be the object only. He speaks of an object [to which the rule of Panini iv. 1. 15 applies which states that compounds ending] in mātra [take i after the suffix]. <Seeming to be emptied of itself> The word <seeming> denotes the existence of the contemplation. Just as a gem of pure crystal appears as a flower only, not in its own form,—so [this contemplation] is like that. Fixed-attention is interrupted by dissimilar fluctuations; contemplation is not interrupted; from among the throbings forth of object and act and agent of contemplation, concentration trobs forth as the object and nothing more. This same inasmuch as it spans a long time is the so-called conscious yoga. Yoga not conscious [of an object] has no throbbing in the object to be contemplated.

He states that the technical term, constraint, makes an easy term when used for fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, three at once.

4. *Constraint (sāmīyama) is the three, [previous aids] in one.*

The three having one object receive the technical name of constraint.

He tells what is the result of constraint.

5. *As a result of mastering this [constraint] there follows the shining forth of insight.*

As a result of mastering [that is] as a result of steadiness, a shining forth [that is] a spotlessness of the insight which has mastered the concentration arises. It has emptied itself of
error and doubt and it throbs forth with the reality of the object to be contemplated.

He gives the answer to the question 'But where is the result of the constraint which has been commanded?'

6. Its application in by stages.

The stages have been described as coarse or fine or the others, the deliberative and superdeliberative, the reflective and superreflexive and so on. Constraint has its application to these. After mastering by constraint the previous stage, [the yogin] should desire to master the next stage to that. For unless the coarse have been directly experienced, the subtile cannot he directly experienced. This is the point.

The objector asks 'In the First Book five aids from among all [the aids] to yoga were discussed; here three are discussed; what is the reason for this?' In reply to this he says—

7. The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five].

The five [aids] beginning with abstentions are indirect (bahir) aids to conscious concentration, because they remove (nivṛtti-dvārā) the taints, of mind-stuff and body and breathing and organs, which are obstacles [to yoga]. But the three [aids] beginning with fixed-attention, are called <direct aids> in so far as they have the same object as the principal end (āṅgin), because they are immediately useful [to that principal end]. Hence these [three] are direct aids in comparison with <the previous> five. And with this in mind (iti kṛtvā) he has defined them here in order to speak of [their] application to each stage in order.

8. Even these [three] are indirect aids to the seedless [concentration].

Even the three [aids] beginning with fixed-attention are <indirect aids> to [concentration] not conscious [of an object]. Because, inasmuch as the principal end is without an object [and] inasmuch as the three have an object, they have not the same object. Accordingly, when there is a restriction of the three, which are emergent, by the higher passionlessness, which
is the undisturbed - calm of insight, which [in turn] is the complete fruition of conscious concentration, because even the conscious concentration is restricted, [the concentration] becomes seedless. Because it gives its aid through a succession of efforts it is an indirect aid.

Desirous now of describing the supernormal powers which result from constraint, he points out that mutations are the things aimed at by constraint.

9. When there is a disappearence of the subliminal-impression of emergence and an appearance of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its period of restriction.

Emergence is conscious [concentration]. Restriction is the higher passionlessness by which this [conscious concentration] is restricted. This being so, when there is a disappearence of an emergent subliminal-impression and an appearance of a restricted impression, then the mind-stuff passes into the period [that is] the time of the unconscious [concentration], which has restricted subliminal-impressions. That inseparable connection of the disappearing and the appearing subliminal-impressions with the substance (dharmitvena) on the part of this mind-stuff, in its restricted period, because it is ever unstable by reason of the three aspects of the substance, and because it is thus disposed to mutation — this is the so-called restricted mutation. When the fluctuation of conscious concentration and its subliminal-impression have disappeared because of the fluctuation which consists in the higher passionlessness, because only the subliminal-impression of the higher passionlessness is clearly manifested, there [arises] the seedless <mutation of restriction.>

He tells of the steadiness of restriction when once the emergent subliminal-impressions have disappeared entirely.

10. There is a peaceful flowing [of mind-stuff] by reason of subliminal-impressions.

The mind-stuff which has cast off all the stain of emergent subliminal-impressions, because of the accumulation of restricted subliminal-impressions, comes to have a peaceful flowing of a
succession of restricted subliminal-impressions and of nothing more. The objector says 'Then at that time also [the mind-stuff] is unstable.' True. Still such a series of mutations is called steady [by us]. This is the point.

Having thus described the seedless state he tells of the mutation of conscious [concentration].

11. The mutation of concentration is the dwindling of dispersiveness and the uprisal of focussedness of mind-stuff.

The mind-stuff's <dispersiveness> [that is] its having the form of many objects is a quality which consists in its distraction. <Focussedness> is a quality which is to be described. Their dwindling and uprisal [is a] disappearance and appearance, but not an annihilation of something that exists and the creation of something non-existent. These two are the mutation of concentration. The point is that the singleness of intent [that is] the steadiness that there is, when distraction has passed away by reason of practice—this is concentration.

12. The mind-stuff's focussed mutation occurs when the quiescent and the uprisen [states] are similar ideas [in respect of one object].

Quiescent is past; uprisen is present—these two are similar ideas in respect of one subject. When the mind-stuff has two fluctuations both of which have a single object, there is the so-called focussed mutation. This focussedness when multiplied by twelve becomes fixed-attention; fixed-attention multiplied by twelve [becomes] contemplation; contemplation multiplied by twelve [becomes] concentration; concentration multiplied by twelve [becomes] the so-called conscious yoga. Such is the difference.

He extends by analogy the argument with regard to the focussed states of the restricted concentration, which are mutations of the central-organ, to other topics also.

13. Thus have been explained mutations of external-aspect, of time-variation, and of intensity with respect to elements and to organs.

With regard to elements, such as earth, which are substances, and with regard to organs, such as the eye. Mutations
are of three kinds, the mutation of external-aspect, the mutation of time-variation, and the mutation of intensity. <Have been explained> <thus> [that is] by the explanation of the mutation of the central-organ. To explain: Just as when a piece of clay has one external-aspect which is a [wet] ball and this disappears and another of its external-aspects which is a water-jar appears, so in the case of mind-stuff, when its emergent state passes away and its restricted state grows intense,—this is itself a mutation of external-aspect.—The time-variation (laksana) is so-called because it demarks (laksayati) [that is] separates itself from the external-aspect which consists of an effect. [The time-variation] is the three times, the future time-form, the present time-form, and the past time-form. Thus the three times are called three time-forms. In the case of these [three], the water-jar, which has these as its states (dharma), would have a future-state, its first time-form, a present-state, its second time-form, and a past-state, its third time-form. This is itself the mutation of time-variation. For the state which is future separates itself from the present and past states. The present and the other time-variations are also to be regarded in this same way.—Similarly the mutation of intensity must be regarded as belonging to the mutation of time-variation or to the external-aspect which is delimited by this [time-variation]. This mutation of intensity is as follows: That which will exist in a mundane-cycle yet-to-come is the most distant of those yet-to-come; that which will come into existence [at some future time] in this mundane-cycle is the more distant of those yet-to-come; that which will be to-morrow is yet-to-come; that which has occurred just now is the most present. So mutatis mutandis you must speak [in the other cases]. Likewise newness and oldness and so on are mutations of intensity. So the formula would be that all beings are incessantly in mutation except the power of intelligence (citiṣakti).

He points out what the substance is to which this three-fold mutation belongs.

14. A substance has in succession quiescent, uprisen, and indeterminable external-aspects.

Quiescent are past which have performed their functional-activity; uprisen are present which have entered upon their
functional-activity, for instance, fetching water; indeterminable are yet-to-come continuing in potential form, in substances, pieces of clay or what not. For these because of their subtlety cannot be attributed by an attribution which would distinguish them either from the substance or from other external-aspects. Consequently every effect, in so far as it is potential, is indeterminable and is to be counted as possible merely because of the existence of the cause. Thus every cause is essentially every effect. Because evidently plaintain sprouts spring up from seeds of cane that has been burned by the forest-fire. For it is impossible in this case that something non-existent should spring up, since everything springs up somewhere because of a multiplicity of factors which manifest it, such as place and time and predisposition. Such is the arrangement of cause and effect in the world. For those who are perfected in yoga, because place and so on is no obstacle, everything springs up from everything.—A substance which is in succession, [that is] which follows after these same quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable [mutations] ceaselessly rolling on like a water-wheel, <has> them <in succession.> Just as a substance is a whole-in-connection-with-its parts, for instance, a piece of clay with dust and [wet] ball and water-jar, or gold with neck-ornaments or something of the kind.

The objector asks ‘What reason is there for a single substance, if there are many mutations?’ In reply he says—

15. The order of the sequence is the reason for the order of the mutations.

In the case of clay a change in the order, which consists in an earlier and a later, of dust and round lump, of round lump and water-jar, of water-jar and pot-sherds is evidently a reason [that is] a means of making known a change, in the order of the mutations of one and the same clay, [that is] in the external-aspects [namely] the dust and the rest. Similarly it must be understood that the order of the time-forms yet-to-come, present, and past is the cause of the change of the mutation of the time-variation of the external-aspects. Likewise we may know of change in mutations of intensities, of newness or of oldness, by means of the sequence of imperceptible subtile mutations in the serial order of moments in a
water-jar or a grain of rice or of anything else. For one can see that grains of rice kept in a store-house, after a lapse of time, reach the intensity of dust merely by a touch of the hand. Because this intensity is not reached unless there be either a sequence of momentary mutations or unless there be fresh [grains]. Nor does it happen for no reason at all. Consequently a substance which is permanently in mutation has external-aspects which are different [from it]; the external-aspects have time-variations; these have intensities. This is established. Because the substance does not change, the theory of momentariness does not hold. So [our contention is] flawless. This being so, some mutations of the mind-stuff are perceptions, love and pleasure and what not. Others are accessible by verbal-communication or by inference, seven of them. This is said in the Comment «Restriction, right-living, subliminal-impressions, mutation, vitality, movement, and power are properties of mind-stuff excluded from sight.» In other words they are mediate experiences. Karma is preceded by merit and demerit. Because the mind-stuff has the three aspects (guna), its incessant mutation may be inferred. Vitality is the sustenance of breath and so on and is accessible [to our knowledge] by such indications as inspiration. Movement is an activity resident in the mind-stuff accessible [to our knowledge by inferences] from the movements of limbs. Power is the subtile form of effects [in the mind].

Thus external-aspects and the rest have been discussed as being objects of one who has excellence in constraint. From now up to the end of the book supernormal-powers are described in order that one may know the sense of mastery in respect of constraint upon this or that object.

16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there follows] the thinking of the past and of the future.

For the sattva of the thinking-substance of itself by its own nature enlightens everything. When by constraint the obstacle from the taints of rajas and of tamas has ceased, without any source-of-valid-ideas it knows all. This is the settled rule. In this same substance there are certain external-aspects, certain time-forms, the future for instance, and certain intensities. <As a result of constraint upon the three mutations>
which consist of external-aspects and time-variations and intensities the yogin gains an immediate-experience of past and future things.

17. Word and thing and idea are confused because they are erroneously identified with each other. By constraint upon the distinctions between them [there arises] the [intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all living creatures.

Over and above the syllable-sounds, but capable of being phenomenalized by syllable-sounds, permanent, undivided is the word-prototype (sphoṭa). It is of two kinds. If we say that 'c-o-w' is recognized as one word by the organ of hearing, we have then the prototype of the word. If we say that 'Fetch the cow' is recognized as one sentence, we have the prototype of the sentence. And there is no mental process which perceives unity in the several momentary syllable-sounds. To explain: The three syllable-sounds g-āu-hū are similar to the letter 'g', the letter 'āu', and the letter 'ḥ' which are found in the words g-āna, c-āu-ra, and pāya-hū [respectively]; these are the manifestors of three word-prototypes which are different in kind. [They are similar] because [they are produced by] the same place of articulation. This has been said [Cīkṣā, 13] "There are eight places of articulation [of syllable-sounds] chest, throat, head, root of the tongue, teeth, nose, lips, and palate." Thus for the consonants (sparṣa) the effort of the vocal organs [is said to be] in contact;¹ and for the sibilants and ḥ [is said to be] full. In such cases the effort is evidently similar. The syllable-sounds 'g' and the others are produced by the organ of speech which is active in the eight places of articulation, when there is a contact between the eight places of articulation and the emitted breath impelled by a special effort. [These] syllables, in so far as they are all sounds, are objects knowable by the perception of the organ of hearing; and so they make manifest the word-prototype of the word 'cow' and at the same time they make manifest some indistinct [impression] which bears resemblances to the several word-prototypes of words like gāna. And this is possible because the several resemblances [for example, the word-prototype of gāna and other words] which appertain to

¹ Reading sprṣṭaḥ and see Cīkṣā, 38.
any object [for example, $g$ and other syllable-sounds] are comprised within (*samāropāt*) that one thing [for example, the word-prototype of the word *cow*] which is [primarily] to be manifested by that object (that is, $g$ and other syllable-sounds) which go to make up the word *cow*. Again the three syllable-sounds beginning with $g$, uttered in succession, being gathered together as flashing in a single mental-process (*buddhi*) which rises in the organ of hearing that is accompanied by subliminal-impressions produced by the experience of those letters, manifests the word-prototype of the word *gāuh*. [This word-prototype,] is one individualized-form (*vyakti*), apart from any other word-prototype and although without parts, [is manifested] as having parts consisting in the similarity imposed upon it on account of its being identified with themselves [the syllable-sounds beginning with $g$]. [This word-prototype is manifested] as having an order and as being impermanent, although it is permanent and has no order. Just as a mirror that is soiled and irregular manifests a face that is unsoiled and regular as soiled and irregular, because similarity to the mirror is superimposed upon the face. Similarly the word-prototype when individualized by syllable-sounds conveys a meaning. Nor can an objector say, 'Let us suppose that syllable-sounds are indistinctly manifested, and let us suppose that they are distinctly manifested when brought together. What need is there for a word-prototype (*sphōta*)?'

The reply is this. Because distinctness and indistinctness, which are one phase (*dharma*) of perceptive knowledge, do not apply to the category (*sthātva*) of mediately perceived objects. If we say 'one word' or 'one sentence' we have knowledge of the word-prototype, with a perception given by the ear. Thus distinctness or indistinctness belongs to this [word-prototype] and to nothing else. Why say more? We have already proved that people understand conventional-usage as regards this word [the *sphōta*] with reference to an intended-object which is mixed as being in a predicate-relation (*vikalpita*) which does not distinguish [the object] from words and ideas. Accordingly the word *cow* and the thing *cow* and the idea *cow*, word and thing and idea, are erroneously identified with each other as being not different. So there is confusion well-known [to every one] from boys up to pandits. The distinction between these [word and thing and idea] is
well-known from authoritative books and from reasoning. The word may be manifested by syllable-sounds; the sentence may be manifested by words; and it conveys-sense (bodhaka) by the force (vyrtti) of its expressive-power (çakti) and of its other forces [laksana and vyasanã]. Such is the entity of words. A thing is that which is expressed by a word as being a substance, a quality, an activity, a common characteristic, or the like and it may also be indirectly devoted. Such is the entity of a thing. A presented-idea, resident in the thinking-substance, producible by a word, having a thing as its object—such is the entity of an idea. So we are to understand that there is a distinction in all cases, as in the case of the word 'cow.' When there is constraint upon this distinction, there arises an [intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all creatures, of beasts and birds and so forth. In other words, he who exercises constraint knows that these [birds, for instance] utter this meaning.

18. As the result of direct-experience of subliminal-impressions there is the [intuitive] knowledge of previous births.

Arising from hindrances in experience and causing hindrances of memory; arising from karma and causing pleasure and pain—such are these subliminal-impressions, states of the mind-stuff, accumulated in successive previous births. By constraint upon these, both as known by verbal-communication and as inferred [but now] immediately-experienced, the yogin gains an immediate-experience of the succession of previous births of himself and of others in so far as they are causes of this. With regard to this there is a story of the Exalted Jñãgìsavyaya. As a result, you know, of the immediate-experience of subliminal-impressions by this most excellent of yogins, who had mastered his primary-substance and who immediately experiences his successive births in ten great mundane-cycles, in the bodies of gods and animals men and so on, a supernormal discriminative discernment appeared. Him the Exalted Ávâtya asked 'Exalted One! in ten great mundane-cycles hast thou experienced more of pleasure or of pain?' Jñãgìsavyaya said 'Whatever has been experienced by me as I came into life over and over again, whether among gods or men, all of it was pain.' Ávâtya said 'Was even the mastery over the primary-substance by which supernormal enjoyment without
dwindling by a mere wish fell to your share—was this pain?" He spake 'It is true. As compared with the pleasure of the world, mastery of the primary-cause is incomparable; as compared with Isolation, it is the highest pain, in that the thread of longing, the maker of all pain, is not cut off. As a result of cutting this away there is the pleasure of Isolation undisturbedly-calm and incomparable.' Such is the little tale found in the Comment. The objecor asks 'Since it is necessarily true that he in whom there is constraint has immediate-experience, how is it that there is knowledge of previous births resulting from subliminal-impressions?' The reply is, True. As a result of constraint upon subliminal-impressions, together with their connections, it is consistent to have knowledge of a previous birth as being a connection. This is to be supposed.

He tells of another perfection.

19. [As a result of constraint] upon a presented-idea there arises [intuitive] knowledge of the mind-stuff of another.

By constraint upon the mind-stuff of another [the yogin] has immediate-experience of that [mind-stuff].

20. But [the intuitive knowledge of the presented-idea of another] does not have that [idea] together with that upon which it depends [as its object], because that [on which it depends] is not in the field [of consciousness].

Just as there is a knowledge of connections as a result of immediate-experience of subliminal-impressions, is there a knowledge of that on which [another's knowledge] depends as a result of immediate-experience of another's mind-stuff? He says, No. The mind-stuff of another and nothing more is immediately-experienced. The word ca has the sense of 'but.' <Together with that upon which it depends> [that is] together with its object; it is not however immediately-experienced. Because it is not known together with that upon which it depends. For constraint can be active only as regards that which is known by means of syllogistic marks and the like, and not with reference to that which is unknown. And so,—just as it is possible to know the connection of subliminal-impressions with a previous life on account of the very fact
(liṅga) of there being a subliminal-impression and because of the Sacred Word “That which has been practised in a previous birth, whether ferocious or not ferocious, whether cruel or mild, that is consistent even to-day. Therefore that is pleasing to him,”—so it is not possible to know what another’s mind-stuff is thinking of. [Why?] Because there is nothing to indicate it. But the mind-stuff itself of another man is easily known by such indications as joy or what not. If after having [intuitively] known another’s mind and after having immediately-perceived it by constraint he devotes his own mind-stuff to finding out what it is upon which that man’s [mind-stuff] now depends, then he can know that upon which [the mind-stuff of the other depends] with reference to that time [now past]. But such fluctuations as passion are immediately-perceived because the mind-stuffs are the same. Such is the distinction [between the emotions and objects].

He tells of another perfection.

21. As a result of constraint upon the external form of the body, when its power to be known is stopped, then as a consequence of the disjunction of light and of the eye there follows indiscernibility [of the yogin’s body].

As a result of constraint practised upon the form of the body—that form which is the cause of knowledge by the eye—when the power which is favorable to knowing that form on the part of another’s eye is stopped [that is] opposed, then when the form passes beyond the province of the knowledge obtained by the eye of another man, there follows the indiscernibility of the body of the yogin, [that is to say,] he is not the object of [the other’s] eye, whenever he wills. In this way, by constraint upon his own sound or touch or taste or smell, perfection in not being known by the organ-of-hearing or of the other [organs] follows.

He tells of another supernormal power.

22. Karma is advancing and unadvancing; as a result of constraint upon this [two-fold karma] or upon the signs of death there arises an [intuitive] knowledge of the final end.

Karma done in previous births which exists now is of two kinds, advancing and unadvancing. That which is functionally
engaged in giving results and which is having rapid fruition is advancing. It is like a wet piece of cloth which dries quickly when spread out in a heated place. That which gives forth its results at a later time and is now without functional activity and has a long fruition is unadvancing. It is like a wet piece of cloth rolled up into a ball in an unheated place. When there is constraint upon this, as a result of his immediate-experience, the termination [that is] the so-called <final end> of his term-of-life, which is the fruition of this [karma], is known. The final end in the case of Prajāpati is the Great Dissolution; in the case of men death is the final end. This immediate-experience is such as this 'In that place and at that time my separation from the body will take place.' When there is immediate-experience of this, the yogin, for the sake of experiencing the fruition of it, instantly assumes many bodies and dies when he wills. In case he is experiencing it in this [life] there is a delay of death [for a period] of one [body].—Incidentally he says <or upon the signs of death.> Of these [three], the signs of death pertaining to one's self [would occur when, for instance, a man] who has stopped the openings of his ears with his hands does not hear the sound of the vital-spirits [in his own body]. [The signs-of-death] pertaining to other creatures [would occur] when one sees the hirelings of Yama or something of the kind. Those pertaining to the gods [would occur] when one sees heaven unexpectedly or whatever else. These three kinds of indications of dying are called signs-of-death (ariṣṭa) because they terrify like an enemy (ari). <Or> by these the yogin also has a knowledge of death.

23. By constraint upon friendliness and other [sentiments] there arise powers of friendship.

Previously [i. 33] constraint upon friendliness and compassion and joy has been prescribed. By this the powers [that is] energies of these arise. By these [powers] the yogin becomes the benefactor and friend of any kind of living being and the deliverer from pain and is not a partisan. Indifference, however, which is nothing but a state of impartiality is not any power of his because constraint is [upon the other three].
24. [As a result of constraint] upon powers there arises power like that of an elephant.

If there be cultivation of powers such as those of the elephant or of Hanumana or of Garuḍa, as a result of constraint these powers appear in the yogin. The mind-stuff of itself has capacity and so on for everything.

25. As a result of casting the light of a process [of the central organ] there arises the [intuitive] knowledge of the subtile, the concealed, and the obscure.

The luminous process has been previously [i. 36] described. That light of the process which consists in an immediate-experience of illumination is a spot which is diffused forth everywhere, the untainted sattva of the thinking-substance. As a result of casting [that is] of throwing forth this [light] upon the subtile, such as an atom; or upon what might be concealed by something in a treasury, for example; or upon something obscure such as an elixir lying within [Mount] Meru, [intuitive] knowledge [that is] immediate experience arises. Just as one has knowledge of water-jars and such things by contact with the light of the sun.

Thus having described the [intuitive] knowledge by means of the light of the thinking-substance immediately-experienced by constraint, he tells of this [knowledge] by means of this [light] with regard to created things.

26. As a result of constraint upon the sun there arises the [intuitive] knowledge of the cosmic spaces.

As a result of constraint upon the disc of the sun shining brilliantly in the sky and wreathed with a thousand rays, the gate to which is through the Suṣumnah, the mind-stuff, not separate from the object-for-sight, immediately experiences the fourteen cosmic spaces.

27. [As a result of constraint] upon the moon there arises [intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the stores.

As a result of constraint upon the moon he immediately experiences the particular order of the asterisms. Because the sun does not cause the asterisms to appear, no knowledge of them arises from constraint upon it. This is the point.
28. [As a result of constraint] upon the Zenith (dhruva) there arises [intuitive] knowledge of their movements.

As a result of constraint upon the Zenith he knows the movements of these stars so that he may say 'That star goes with that planet by that path for so much time.'

Having thus described outer perfections he tells of perfections pertaining to one's self.

29. [As a result of constraint] upon the cakra of the navel there arises [intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the body.

As a result of constraint upon that cakra of the navel, which is in the midmost part of the body and has ten petals and lies above the ādhāra and the linga cakra, which have forty petals, he knows the constitution of the body. The disorders are three, wind, bile, and phlegm. The secretions are seven, skin, blood, flesh, sinew, bone, marrow, and semen. The arrangement of the body is such that the external in each case precedes.

30. [As a result of constraint] upon the hollow of the throat there follows cessation of hunger and thirst.

Below the thread of the tongue there is a region of the throat in the form of a hollow. By the collision of the breath and so on with this, hunger and thirst arise. As a result of constraint upon this, these two cease.

31. [As a result of constraint] upon the tortoise-tube there follows motionlessness [of the mind-stuff].

Below the hollow there is, within the chest, a tube, in shape a tortoise. As a result of constraint upon this the mind-stuff enters into it and gains motionlessness.

32. [As a result of constraint] upon the radiance in the head [there follows] the sight of the Siddhas.

As a result of constraint upon that aperture which is in the skull, the so-called opening of Brahma, and which—after there is a conjunction [of this light] with the Suṣumnā and after there is a conjunction with the jewel's lustre of the
mind-stuff resident in the heart—becomes resplendent as the radiance in the head,—[as a result of this] he beholds the Siddhas, although they are invisible.

33. Or as a result of Vividness (prātibha) the [yogin discerns] all.

For if constraint be made for the sake of the discriminative discernment, the Elevation (prasamākhyāna), the deliverer from the round-of-rebirths, there follows Vividness, an intuitive [knowledge] indicating the approach of the Elevation and arising from Vivid-light, which is reflective thinking and nothing more. <Or> by this the yogin knows <all.> Just as people see by the ray of dawn which indicates the rising of the sun. But in the Rājavārtika the Vivid-light is an [intuitive] knowledge arising instantly in accordance with the object produced by nothing but the central-organ without regard to any causes. As a result of constraint upon this, the Vividness, the deliverer, a prior state of discriminative discernment, dawns [in the mind-stuff]. By this the yogin knows all. So it is explained.

34. [As a result of constraint] upon the heart there arises a consciousness of the mind-stuff.

By constraint upon a station of the mind-stuff, the lotus of the heart with its face downwards, there is a consciousness of the mind-stuff together with its subconscious-impressions.

35. Experience is a presented-idea which is undistinguished on the part of the sattva and of the Self, each absolutely un-commingled [in the presented-idea]. Since the sattva exists as object for another, the [intuitive] knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon itself as object.

<That presented-idea which is undistinguished> on the part of the thinking-substance and the self, which are absolutely different in so far as they are object-of-experience and experiencer, is a mutation of the thinking-substance, a presented-idea of pleasure and of pain and of infatuation, undistinguished by the knowers of the reflection of the Self, [that is,] alike in quality to them, and attributive of pleasure and so on [to the Self] by means of the reflection—this is experience, resident in the thinking-substance because it is an object-for-sight. It exists for the sake of another, [that is,] it becomes subordinate
to the Self, the experiencer. The experience is for the sake of another; it consists in a presented-idea which is dependent upon the reflection of intelligence. Other than this is the essence of intelligence, which is the reflection; it exists for its own sake and is not subordinate to another. By constraint upon this the Self has an immediate-experience of the Self. And this object-for-sight resident in the thinking-substance is not able by the Self, who is self-lightening, to make the Self into an object. On the contrary, the knowledge of the Self is said to be empty of the forms of the not-self, because it knows the reflection of itself and nothing more. And in this sense there is the Sacred Word [Bṛhad Ar. Up. iv. 5. 15] "By whom, pray, should one discern the Discerner?"

Now when this constraint has immediately-experienced the Self he points out what are the previously existing perfections.

36. **As a result of this, vivid organs of hearing and of touch and of sight and of taste and of smell are generated.**

As a result of this constraint upon that which exists for its own sake, (the Vividness previously described,) the [intuitive] knowledge which is occupied with itself is generated by the central-organ and no other, aided by the Bright karma which arises from yoga. The organs for knowing supernormal sounds and touches and colors and tastes and smells, the organ of hearing and the skin and the eye and the tongue and the nose are generated in order, with the technical names of the organ of hearing and the organ of touch and the organ of sight and the organ of taste and the organ of smell. When the organ of hearing, which is the organ for knowing supernormal sounds, comes to the yogin, then the technical term <organ of hearing> is given to his organ of hearing (crotā). Similarly the <organ of smell> is the technical name for his nose. And so in this way the ellipsis must be supplied.

The objector asks 'Has then this yogin accomplished his task?' In reply to this he says—

37. **To concentration these [supernormal sensations] are obstacles; to emergence they are perfections (siddhi).**

<These> [that is] Vividness and the like in the case of one devoted <to concentration,> the fruit of which is final bliss,
are obstacles, [that is,] impediments. Accordingly he who desires liberation overlooks them. For his task is not accomplished, even if he have ten thousand perfections, unless he have a complete enlightenment of self. This has been said by Śrī Krishna, the Supreme Teacher. [Bhag. Gītā xv. 20] “Having understood this he would be wise and would have accomplished his task, O Bhārata.” But in the case of one devoted to emergence these [supernormal sensations] are perfections.

Having thus described the supernormal-powers of constraint as consisting in knowledge culminating in the vision of the self, he tells of them as consisting in action.

38. As a result of slackening the causes of bondage and as a result of the knowledge of the process, the mind-stuff penetrates into the body of another.

The mind-stuff which is disposed to pervade in all directions is fixed, [that is,] bound to its own body and to nothing else by contraction. The cause of this is right and wrong doing. By constraint upon these two a slackening arises. A process, [that is,] a collection of tubes (nāḍī) is that by means of which the mind-stuff proceeds. By constraint upon that also there is the knowledge so that one thinks ‘By that tube [the mind-stuff] passes through.’ Likewise there is a knowledge of the tubes which are the paths for the breaths and the organs. And so when the rope of bondage is destroyed, the mind-stuff which knows the path gains entrance to the body of another, whether it be dead or alive, just as one enters into one’s own clothing or another’s. The organs enter after the mind-stuff just as bees [enter after] the king-bee.

39. As a result of the subdual of the Udāna there is no adhesion to water, mud, thorns, or similar objects and [at death] there is the upward flight.

As every one knows there are two modes of action of the organs. One consists in the perception of external things and the like; the other is internal and consists of efforts [to preserve] the source of life and is common to all action. The effects of this [two-fold] mode of action are the five breaths (prāṇa). Of these [five] 1. Prāṇa extends from the tip of the
nose to the heart. 2. Samāna extends from the heart to the navel and [the derivation is] in the sense that it leads (nayati) the food equally [over the body]. 3. Apāna extends from the navel to the sole of the foot and [the derivation is] in the sense that it removes (apānayati) filth. 4. Udāna is a fluctuation from the tip of the nose to the head and is the cause of the upward flight. 5. Vyāna pervades all the body. Of these Prāna is the chief. As a result of the subdual of the Udāna, from among these, by constraint the yogin because of his lightness passes over ocean, mud, thorns, and other things without adhering to them. And at will he gains death.

40. As a result of the subdual of the Samāna there arises a radiance.

As a result of mastery of the Samāna which pervades the fire resident near the navel a radiance of flame arises, by which he appears radiant. Similarly by subduing the Prāna and the rest, it must be understood, that perfection in what can be done by this [fire is done] as [the yogin] wills.

41. As a result of constraint upon the relation between the organ-of-hearing and the air there arises the supernormal organ-of-hearing.

Although the organ-of-hearing is of the personality-substance, the relation between it and the air is that of container and contained. This is a partial statement [which applies to the other organs]. By constraint upon the relations between the eye and light, water and taste, nose and earth, supernormal organs with the technical names of the organ of hearing and the organ of touch and the organ of sight and the organ of taste and the organ of smell [iii. 36] arise, by which he instantly knows supernormal sounds and so forth.

42. Either as the result of constraint upon the relation between the body and the ether or as the result of the balanced-state of lightness as of a cotton fibre there follows the passing through air.

Having subdued the connection between these two, he becomes light in body by concentration upon the common characteristic of what is light or of what is cotton-fibre and
the like, first of all he walks upon water, then he walks upon spiders' threads, next upon sunbeams, thereafter he courses through air at will.

43. The fluctuation outwardly unadjusted is the Great Discarnate; as a result of this the dwindling of the obscuration of light. As a result of constraint upon the coarse (sthūla), the attribute (svāraṇa), the inherence (anvaya), and the purposiveness (arthavattva) there is a subdual of the elements.

When the sense of being "I" is in the body, by resolving 'my central-organ shall be outside,' the central-organ gains a fluctuation outside the body. This is the adjusted fixed-attention that is called discarnate. When as a result of this there is a renunciation of the sense of being "I" in the body, the external fluctuation is gained by this very fact. This same is the unadjusted fixed-attention called Great Discarnate. <As a result of this> the mind-stuff which is essentially light has its obscuration due to karma resulting from hindrances and so forth dwindled away. As a result of this it gains the state of being the knower of all. 1. The coarse visible form of the five elements, an orderly arrangement of parts, containing the common characteristics of earthiness and so on, joined with sounds and the other [perceptible] things, with the five qualities successively reduced by one. Such is the first form. 2. Next would be the second form, the essential attribute having successively the characteristic-mark of hardness, liquidity, heat, impulsiveness, all-pervasiveness. Impulsiveness is, for instance, the wind's power of carrying [blades of] grass and the like. 3. Then the third form, the subtile cause of these, the atoms; of these the subtile causes are the five fine substances. 4. Next the fourth form of these, the three aspects. For these are common [to all] and are the <inherence> in the sense that they inhere in the causes of themselves (sva). 5. Then the fifth form of these elements is the purposiveness, the capacity for experience and liberation, which is based in the aspects, as it comes to them (svesu) from the inherence of the aspects. Thus by constraint upon the five kinds of causes of the effects of the elements in succession beginning with the coarse, the elements conform to the wish of the yogin, just as cows follow after their calves.
44 [45]. As a result of this, atomization and the other perfections appear; there is perfection of body; and its external-aspects are unobstructed.

As the result of this subdual of the elements, atomization and the rest of the eight perfections appear in the yogin. 1. Atomization is the similarity to an atom. 2. Magnification is pervasiveness. 3. Levitation is lightness like that of a ball of cotton. 4. Ponderation is heaviness like that of Meru. 5. Extension is the touching of the moon with a finger. 6. Efficacy is the obtaining of desire. 7. Mastery is the power to compel elements. 8. Sovereignty is the power to create elements. Such are the eight sovereign powers. Of these, those ending with Extension are perfected by constraint upon the coarse; Efficacy by constraint upon the essential-attribute; the remainder by constraint upon the cause. Such is the analysis.—<Perfection of body> is to be described. And by constraint upon the elements there is no obstruction to this body by qualities of the elements such as hardness. So that he penetrates within the rock; cold and heat and so on do not impede [him].

45 [46]. Perfection of body is beauty, grace, power, and the hardness of the thunder-bolt.

Beauty is what is pleasant to the eye; grace is charm of all the body; power is energy; hardness of the thunder-bolt is the condition of him in the structure of whose limbs there is hardness as of the thunder-bolt, familiar enough in the case of Hanuman.

He tells of another subdual of the elements which is a means of subduing organs.

46 [47]. As a result of constraint upon the process-of-perception, the essential-attribute, the feeling-of-personality, the inherence, and the purposiveness there follows subdual of the organs.

Sound, for instance the fourth note; touch, for instance cold; color, for instance yellow; taste, for instance sweet; smell, for instance perfume. The five fluctuations, which are effects, the

¹ Četi Rāmānanda Yati has chosen to combine sūtras 43 and 44 into one. Consequently the numbering of the sūtras is changed by one from iii. 44 to the end of Book Third.
processes-of-perception belonging to the organs, from the organ of hearing onwards, have the sounds and the rest, which are in essence a general and a particular, as their field of operation. This is the first form. Illuminativeness is an essential-attribute, the second form. Personality-substance made of sattva and having the feeling-of-personality as its characteristic mark is the third cause of these [organs]. Inherence and purposiveness the fourth and fifth form have been explained [iii. 43]. By constraint upon these five kinds of organs he gains the subdual of the organs.

What is the result of this? In reply he says—

47 [48]. As a result of this [there ensues on the part of the body] speed as great as that of the central-organ, action of instruments of perception disjunct [from the body], and the subdual of the primary-cause.

<Speed as great as that of the central-organ> is the attainment of unsurpassed motion on the part of the body like that of the mind. <Action of instruments of perception disjunct [from the body]> is the modifiability¹ of organs which are quite distinct from the discarnate as regards knowledge of distant and external objects. The subdual of the primary-cause, [that is,] the inheritance, the fourth kind [of element or organ] is the mastery of the whole world. Such are the perfections which arise as a result of the subdual of the organs. Those perfections beginning with atomization and ending with the subdual of the primary-cause are called in this book Honey-faced, because they taste like bits of honey. In other words they are Honey-faced because they are like honey. Or else, the Honey-faced are those the cause of which, [that is,] that towards which something goes, is immediately-experienced by means of the subdual of the elements and organs. This is the honey, that norm-bearing insight produced by yoga, which has as its object the things extending from the coarse to the primary-cause.

Thus perfection of knowledge and of action which result from constraint, which are the objects aimed at extending

¹ Or one might translate 'disjunct action.'
to discriminative discernment as leading directly to belief, have been set in order. He now tells of the perfections subordinate to discriminative discernment.

48 [49]. He who has nothing more than the discernment into the difference between the sattva and the Self is the commander of all forms of being and the perceiver of the whole.

When there is a subdual of the inner organ from which the stains of rajas and of tamas have been washed away by constraint upon that which is an end to itself as previously [iii. 35] described, there arises a discernment of the distinction between the sattva of the thinking-substance and the self in the case of the yogin who is established in the lower dispassion, called the consciousness of mastery, and who has nothing but this [discernment], and who is devoted to the repetition of that [discernment]. He becomes perfected in being commander, [that is,] regulator of all forms of being, and in being the knower of all things past and present and future. This is the so-called [i. 36] "griefless" perfection.

He now tells of the most important perfection, that of the discriminative discernment.

49 [50]. As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these [perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the defects, Isolation.

When this griefless state is perfected as a result of passionlessness, the higher passionlessness arises even with regard to the discriminative discernment, which is the cause of this [griefless perfection]. Then when there is a dwindling, [that is,] a total disappearance of the seed, [that is,] the subliminal-impression of error due to the defects, [that is,] the hindrances, now that the mind-stuff has nothing but subliminal-impressions of the higher passionlessness, the Self is perfected in being grounded in himself, [that is,] in <Isolation.> This is the perfection <consisting of subliminal-impressions only> as it is called [i. 18].

When obstacles to this arise, he tells what are the means of removing them.
50 [51]. In case of solicitations from those in high places, these should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesirable consequences recur.

Now there are four kinds of yogins 1. Prathamakalpikas, 2. Madhubhūmikas, 3. Prajñājyotis and 4. Atikrāntabhāvaniyas. Of these [four], 1. the first has merely begun in constraint and knows nothing of such things as the mind-stuff of another. 2. The second after gaining by conscious yoga the Honeyed stage of mind-stuff, the so-called norm-bearing insight [i. 48], desires to conquer the elements and organs which are immediately-experienced. By means of the subdual of these he is desirous of gaining successively the three stages previously described as Honey-faced and griefless and consisting of subliminal-impressions only. 3. But the third [yogin], unshakable by Mahendra and the other gods, because he has subdued elements and organs, after gaining two stages, inasmuch as he has the desire to perfect the two stages which begin with the griefless [stage], strives for the constraint upon that which is an end to itself. 4. The fourth, however, a high-souled exalted being, dispassionate towards the three stages ending with discernment which he has gained, fearless of obstacles, released while yet living, abides in the fourth stage. Of him the insight in seven stages advancing to the highest has been explained. Of these four in the case of the first yogin there is not fitness for solicitation by the gods. So, by elimination, it is the second yogin, the Madhubhūmika who is solicited, [that is,] invited by <those in high places,> [that is,] those who are masters of this or that high place, for instance, Mahendra. "Sir! will you sit here? Will you rest in this heavenly high place? This maiden might prove attractive. This enjoyment is supernormal. This elixir wards off age and death. This chariot goes as you will." When he is thus invited, an attachment, [that is,] a lust arises in him so that he feels with pride. 'How great is the power of this yoga of mine!' This should not be done. Rather let him reflect upon the defects in it thus 'Baked on the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths and mounted 1 upon the wheel of successive births and deaths, I have hardly found the lamp of yoga which dispels the darkness of the hindrances. And of this [lamp]

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1 Compare Mudrārākṣasā v. 5; vii. 12.
the lust-born gusts of sensual things are enemies. How could it be that I who have seen its light could be led astray by sensual things, a mere mirage, and throw myself as fuel into that same blaze of the round-of-rebirths as it flares up again? Fare ye well! Sensual things [deceitful] as dreams and to be craved by wile folk.' His purpose thus determined let him cultivate concentration. If attached, he falls from his position. Thinking of himself in pride as having done all, he is not perfected in yoga. Accordingly because one whose yoga is broken is involved again in the round-of-rebirths, which is not desired, not being attached and not being proud are the means of throwing off the obstacles to Isolation.

The [intuitive] knowledge of discrimination, the deliverer, which results when the Self has been mirrored in the thinking-substance has been previously described. He tells of another method for this.

51 [52]. As a result of constraint upon moments and their sequence [there arises the intuitive knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

An indivisible fragment of time is the true moment. Other [divisions] such as hours and so on are fragments of time, consisting of collections of moments, are not true [moments]. For a collection of moments has no existence in reality. By constraint upon the moments, expressed thus 'Of these, this moment comes before that; this comes after that' and upon their sequence, [that is,] upon an antecedent and a consequent, he gains an immediate-experience, a discrimination, of extremely subtle things. And from that an [intuitive] knowledge, which is in essence an immediate-knowledge of things, beginning with the sky and ending with man, in one instant arises.

This [intuitive] knowledge arising from constraint upon moments and having everything for its object he will describe later. Now he tells of the particular object, a subtle thing, of this [constraint].

52 [53]. As a result of this there arises the deeper knowledge of two equivalent things which cannot be distinguished in species, in characteristic-mark, or in place.

A distinction is a determination. For in ordinary life there are three means of determining the differences between objects.
Of these, the idea of the difference between the cow and the gayal, which are similar as regards place and characteristic-mark, is [the difference] by species. The idea of the difference between two cows which are similar as regards place and species, is [the difference] by characteristic-mark. The determination of the difference between two myrobalans, which are similar in species and characteristic-mark, is the result of such a difference in place as being in front and behind. But when, in order to test the [intuitive] knowledge of the yogin, the myrobalan lying in the front place is put in the place of the myrobalan which was behind, and the myrobalan which was behind is removed, while the yogin is intent upon something else, then because it is impossible to determine change in species and so on in the case of the two myrobalans, which are similar in respect of the species of myrobalan and in the characteristic-marks such as changes of color and in place,—<as a result of this> the yogin gains the deeper knowledge of the change merely by the [intuitive] knowledge coming from constraint upon the moment. During those moments which are antecedent to that moment in which the myrobalan which was in front was put in the place of the myrobalan which was behind a series of previous mutations of being in front were produced in the myrobalan in front and not in the myrobalan behind. Because that [myrobalan behind] in those [earlier] moments was endowed with a series of mutations of being behind. And thus the yogin who knows the moments and their sequence, in knowing the uninterrupted-succession of this moment as compared with the moments of the series of the two, of the one in front and the one behind, each with its own mutation [in time], determines thus 'This one is now in front; previous to this it was behind, not in front.'

53 [54]. The [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination is the Deliverer, has all things as its object, has all times for its object, in an inclusive whole of time without sequence (akrama).

The knowing of the whole as a result of constraint upon this and that has been described. This [knowing of the whole] has for its objects merely the different varieties, just as when one says 'I had a dinner of all the different condiments produced in the kitchen,' the meaning conveyed is that he ate
all the varieties of condiments. Similarly again if one says ‘I had a dinner of all the food served with all the condiments on the dishes,’ the meaning conveyed is that he ate the whole as such and with its varieties. Likewise this discriminative knowledge proceeding from constraint upon the moments has all things as such as its object, has all times for its object, [that is,] has objects in all different varieties.—Because it penetrates into the reality of the Self, it rescues from the ocean of the round-of-rebirths. In this sense it has the technical name of <Deliverer>—<In an inclusive whole of time> [that is] simultaneously it has the whole collection as its basis, like a myrobalan on the palm of your hand.

Thus having cleared up the limits of excellence in discriminative discernment, the results of supernormal powers in this or that, that is, the constraints, he approaches the question whether the immediate-experience of the difference between the sattva and the Self, in case there be such excellence in discriminative discernment or not, is sufficient for release.

54 [55]. Isolation occurs when the purity of the sattva and of the Self is equal.

There is <purity> [that is] absence of all fluctuations, when the thinking-substance has cast off all the stains of rajas and by virtue of discriminative discernment is nothing but subliminal-impressions. Then in the case of the Self also, who is permanently pure, there is purity, <that is,> absence of experience in predicate-relations. So when the purity of these two is equal, there is Isolation. But supernormal powers in this or that have been discussed for the sake of awakening faith. Isolation, however, as a result of nothing but the subliminal-impressions of the Self uncharacterized by the thinking-substance, is perfected, when undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) has ceased, as consisting in the non-awakening of future pain.

Book Fourth: Concentration.

I bow down to Sitā and Rāma who have that incomparable perfection consisting in Isolation and nothing more which belongs to those who are perfected in all the means of attainment.
In the First and Second Books yoga and the means of attaining it have been set forth. In the Third Book the three direct aids technically called constraint, the different mutations aimed at by constraint, and the perfections have been described. Of these [latter] certain perfections such as those of the past or of the future are aids to the yoga of Isolation by means of faith; others such as the subdual of the organs are immediate aids. The perfection in the discriminative knowledge called the Deliverer is discussed as a result of yoga. Now Isolation itself as being of primary importance is to be set forth. For this purpose the mind-stuff that is conducive to Isolation, the world beyond, the self over and above momentary mental-processes, the experiencer of the pleasures and so on which are evolved forms of the mind-stuff, and the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things are to be described. And incidentally other things are to be described. Thus the Fourth Book is begun. In it he wishes to describe that mind-stuff which is capable of Isolation from among the mind-stuffs that have been first perfected, and he says that there are five kinds of perfections previously described, because of the different causes.

1. Perfections proceed from birth or drugs or spells or self-castigation or concentration.

Perfection by birth is such as belongs to yakṣas, and is, for instance, passing through the air. In [personages] such as Kapila, moreover, this is innate. [Perfection] in the use of particular drugs is to be found in such as Kapila. In the case of certain persons there is perfection in atomization by the repetition of spells. Perfection by self-castigation is to be found in such as Vishvamitra. These four perfections are really produced by yoga practised in former births and manifested in this birth which serves as efficient cause. Accordingly, in so far as there is disappointment in the practice of yoga, a beginning [should be made] here, even if so perfection is not perceived, because of results to come in another birth. Perfections proceeding from concentration have been explained in the previous book.

The objector says 'By the might of his self-castigation Nandiçyvara is reported to have entered by means of the side-long
glance of the husband of the Blessed Gāurī into the mutation of a divine body. With regard to this, in the first place this human body cannot be the material cause of any divine body. Because if this [human body] be regarded as subsisting, it is impossible that it should be mutated into another [body]; if transitory (naṣṭa), it cannot be the cause of anything. Nor can you say that the parts only [of the human body] should be the material cause [of the divine body], because it is impossible that a cause which is nothing but a human body should produce an effect which is totally different from it. To this objection he replies.

2. The mutation into another birth is the result of the filling in of the evolving-cause.

The evolving-causes beginning with the primary-cause and ending with [the element of] earth are real everywhere, because they fill in the parts of human or other bodies; by conforming to right-living, as the case may be, as efficient cause, they permeate the parts. Because of this it is right to speak of <the mutation into another birth.> Just as by the help of an evolving-cause a bit of flame pervades a vast area of grass and so on in a forest.

The objector asks ‘Does the filling in of the evolving-cause require such efficient-causes as right-living or not. If this is not the case, then one would have to admit that the filling in would be in all [causes]. And you cannot [hold] the first [alternative]. Because if something such as right-living were to set things in motion, you would then be going against your own doctrine which holds that the purpose of the Self sets things in motion.’ In reply to this he says—

3. The efficient cause gives no impulse to the evolving-causes, [but] the mutation follows when the barrier [to the evolving cause] is cut, as happens with the peasant.

For in the Sāṃkhya, which does not hold the doctrine of the Iṣvara, only the purpose of the Self, which lies in the future, sets the evolving-causes in motion. But we who hold the doctrine of the Iṣvara maintain that the Iṣvara sets [the evolving-causes] in motion in so far as this [purpose of the Iṣvara] gives the thing aimed at. Thus the purpose of the
Self is said to set things in motion in so far as it is the thing aimed at. But the efficient cause does not set [the evolving-causes] in motion, because it is an effect of them. On the contrary, as a result of this efficient cause there is resistance to the barrier, [that is,] the obstacle. Because of right-living the evolving-causes for the rejection of wrong-living quite of themselves set in motion towards a mutation into a god, or whatever it may be. When there is an obstacle to merit because of the excess of evil [karma], mutation into an animal or something else occurs. Just as Nahuṣa was mutated into a snake.—The words <as happens with the peasant> refer to the peasant, [that is,] the ploughman who merely makes a cutting of the barrier to the water on some higher level; then the water quite of itself sets in motion into another meadow-plot.

The objector asks "When the yogin at one time creates many bodies for the sake of enjoyment, then why are there mind-stuffs for these?" In reply he says.

4. The created mind-stuffs may result from the sense of personality and from this alone.

The mind-stuffs are created in the sense that they are created by the power of yoga. As a result of the filling in of evolving-causes which are subject to the yogin's will, just as a body is produced, [so mind-stuff] from the personality-substance as evolving-cause.

For because mind-stuffs refer constantly to different things, the yogin has not perfection in experience. Therefore he says

5. When there is a variety of evolving-causes the mind-stuff which impels the many is one.

From among the created mind-stuffs the yogin creates a mind-stuff which necessarily acts in the particular way which conforms to his own enjoyment; by the power of his yoga this mind-stuff becomes the guide of these [others] and in this way his enjoyment is arranged as planning for that [enjoyment].

Thus reasons have been given for the five kinds of perfected mind-stuffs as coming from birth or the other [sources]; from among these he selects the mind-stuff which is conducive to liberation.
6. Of these [five perfections] that which proceeds from contemplation leaves no latent-deposit.

Of these proceeding from birth and the other [four], that proceeding from concentration leaves no latent-deposit, [that is,] it has no subconscious-impressions from the hindrances and is fit for release.

He says that also the karma of the yogin, like the mind-stuff, has differences of quality.

7. The yogin’s karma is neither-white-nor-black; [the karma] of others is of three kinds.

White karma is to be attained by voice and by central-organ and its sole result is pleasure; it is found among those who are disposed to study and self-castigation. Black karma has its sole result in pain; it is found among the base. White-and-black-[karma] has a mixed result in pleasure and in pain and it is to be affected by outer means; it is found among the devotees of the soma sacrifice. In these [three] cases, because it is connected with the crushing of ants and similar [creatures]—in so far as rice or other grains are destroyed—and with aid to others, such as the giving of fees, there is this karma of three kinds in the case of others [that is] those who are not yogins. But the karma of yogins [that is] of ascetics, because they have cast off the karma which is to be effected by outer means, is not white-nor-black. Because the hindrances have dwindled it is not black; because the result of the right-living is committed to the Igvara without desiring any result it is not white karma. Consequently by means of the discriminative discernment into the purity of the mind-stuff the karma which is neither-white-nor-black has as its sole result release.

He tells incidentally of the manifestation of subconscious-impressions of karma.

8. As a result of this there follows the manifestation of those subconscious-impressions only which correspond to the fruition of their [karma].

As a result of this three-fold karma, just after the time of death, when there is a manifestation for giving the fruition which consists in birth, length of life, and kind of experience,
then there is a manifestation of the subconscious-impressions favorable to that [fruition] and not to opposed to it. If the mind-stuff reaches divinity there are subconscious-impressions of the human kind of enjoyment which become dormant, because in case they be manifested it is impossible that there should be the supernormal kind of enjoyment.

The objector asks ‘How is it that the subconscious-impressions, produced from the enjoyment of these things in heaven during his birth as a god, become manifest again in another birth as a god after thousands of births as men and as tigers have intervened? Why is it that just those subconscious-impressions which belong to the immediately preceding birth are not manifested, like the subconscious-impressions of the previous day?’ In reply to this he says—

9. There is uninterrupted-causal-relation [of subconscious-impressions] although remote in species or point of space or moment of time, by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions.

Although generally, in case of one who rises up after sleeping, the subconscious-impressions produced by the experience of the immediately preceding day are manifested because nothing intervenes, still in this never-beginning round-of-rebirths there are the subconscious-impressions, which have been heaped up in enjoyments, as a result of whatever karma there be in whatever birth. Although ten thousand lives and space and hundreds of mundane cycles may have intervened, these [impressions] manifested by that very karma or by that birth—when once a birth of that kind has been attained by a karma of the similar kind—are said to have an <uninterrupted-causal-relation.> In other words they become the cause of a kind of enjoyment through memory. The subconscious-impressions of the immediately preceding life, which was started by a different kind of karma, lie dormant because there is nothing that can manifest them. It is proper that [the subconscious-impressions], although there be interventions, should be manifested, because the karma and the birth exist which manifest them. Nor should you say ‘Let the subconscious-impressions of the immediately preceding life be manifested by both [karma and birth], because there is nothing that intervenes; for so
there would be memory. Yet [this karma] is quite different [from that which precedes it]. The reply is <by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal impressions.> The meaning is this. A subliminal-impression is that which remains as a potentiality, whether as act or knowledge or otherwise, and which contains passion and the other [qualities]; and this [impression] is the cause of memory of action which has the same object as itself.¹ A subliminal-impression of action comes into mutation as an action; a subliminal-impression of knowledge as memory; another subliminal-impression otherwise. In this manner, by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions, inasmuch as they are not distinct and have the same object, there is said to be a continuity between them, a relation of cause and effect, which cannot be between two disparates. For you cannot say that the fact that there is intervention can make the subliminal-impression produce a dissimilar effect. For if this were so, then immediately after the impression produced by the experience of a water-jar you could remember even that which is not experience.

To the Chārvāka who objects 'These are no subconscious-impressions from births gone by' he replies—

10. These [subconscious-impressions], furthermore, have no beginning [that we can set in time] since desire is eternal.

The meaning of the word <furthermore> is that these subconscious-impressions have not only an uninterrupted-causal-relation but also no beginning that we can set in time. Why is this? Because the craving 'may I always be,' which is the fear of death, is permanent, [that is to say,] one does not fail to find it in any living creature. The point of this is as follows. The fear of death inferred from the trembling, if from nothing else, forms the memory of the pain of the hateable object, because one never fails to find the two together. This [craving] forms the subconscious-impression; and this [impression forms] the experience of the pain which proceeds from death; this [experience] in that it cannot be made possible in this birth forms another birth. Thus it is established that

¹ That is to say, its object is not stolen away, as discussed in i. 11.
desire has no beginning. The objector asks ‘If body is not
the soul, who then is it that fears birth and death? [It can-
not be] the soul because it is without beginning or end and
as such is not susceptible to fear.’ We reply that [the fear
belongs] to the mind-stuff. It is the attainment (lābha) by
this same mind-stuff,—which is entangled in beginningless
desires, and which is all-pervading in that it is a product of
the personality-substance,—of a fluctuation disposed to ex-
pansion or contraction according to [the sizes of] the different
bodies; [this fluctuation] we call birth and the cessation of
[this] fluctuation we call death. While this is happening there
is pain. Thus all this round-of-rebirths belongs [to this mind-
stuff].

The objector asks ‘If the subconscious-impressions are from
time-without-beginning, how is it that they can be cut off?’
In reply to this he says—

11. Since [these subconscious-impressions] are associated with
cause and motive and mental substrate and stimulus, if these
cease to be, then those [subconscious-impressions] cease to be.

These are not, like the Self, without a beginning. But are
effects only in a stream without a beginning. Consequently
by cutting off their causes, it is possible to cut them off. To
explain. The never-ending wheel of the round-of-rebirths
ceaselessly rolls on. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā)
characterized by subliminal-impressions of delusion, each one
succeeding another, is the cause of the feeling-of-personality
expressed by ‘I am.’ And this feeling-of-personality is the
cause of this error ‘I am a man’ or ‘This dissatisfaction is
mine.’ This error is the cause of passion and hatred. Both
of these, again, are the causes of right-living and of wrong-
living by leading a man to punish another or by some such
act. Both these [kinds of living are causes] of enjoyment.

1 Reading with the India Office MS. 559 and the MS. in the Deccan
College Library (No. 619 of 1887—91) antasyābhayate vā iti.
2 The ā is to be read a according to the two MSS. just cited. This
adjective gives the motive for the creation. The next one ahankārikate
vēna vibhumās meets the objection that the mind-stuff of an elephant
must be many times greater in size than that of an ant.
3 Reading eva.
And this [enjoyment is the cause] of subconscious-impressions. And these again are the cause of delusion and the rest. In this case [then], the karmas from the hindrances are the causes of the subconscious-impressions; the body and the term of life and the kind of enjoyment are the result; the mind-stuff is the mental-substrate; sounds or other [perceptible] things are the physical-basis. Since [the impressions] are associated with these, if these are cut off by unwavering discriminate discernment produced by the yoga which is an aid to the yoga of action, then, because the causes have ceased to be, [these subconscious impressions] cease to be.

The objector asks 'If the subliminal-impressions are real, how can they cease to be?' In reply he says—

12. Past and future really exist [therefore subliminal-impressions do not cease to be]. For the different time-forms belong to the external-aspects.

There is no creation of what is not existent, nor destruction of what is existent. For according to the Word (Bhag. Gitā ii. 16) of the SupremeĪśvara "No being is found which comes from what does not exist; no not-being is found which comes from what exists." And in accordance with the saying that the past and the future, like the present, are knowable by perception which says [Bhag. Gitā vii. 26] "Know, O Arjuna, that I am all past and present and future things," nothing which does not exist can be knowable by perception. Therefore the totality of past and future external-aspects does exist in potential form in the substance. This (yat) yogins immediately experience by constraint upon the three mutations. And potters, for instance, after sketching in their minds make [the water-pot], when there is a substance, a whole-in-relation-to-all-its-parts, which is said to be permanent and unitary. The objector says 'Then the knowledge of the reality is useless, because one is bound by subconscious-impressions and so forth.' The reply is, No. For in the present time-form, because the future and the other time-forms belong to the external-aspects, the mind-stuff, diversified with subconscious-impressions of pain and what not and being dominant and disposed to numberless mutations, when changed into a state of being that is the object of experience, is said to be in bondage. When there
is knowledge of reality, the mind-stuff loses its dominance and enters into the past time-form, and although existent as primary-matter, yet because the purpose of the Self which was to be accomplished—and this is the seed for its rising again—has been accomplished, it does not return again.

It has been said that the past and the future as such do exist. If this is so, what are they as such? In reply to this he says—

13. These [time-forms] are phenomenalized [individuals] or subtle [generic forms] and their essence is the aspects (guna).

The <phenomenalized> belong to the present time-form; the <subtle> to the past and future time-forms. These time-forms begin with the Great Thinking-substance and end with such particularized things as water-jars; their essence is the aspects (guna) and they consist of sattva and rajas and tamas. All beings in so far as they are parts of the whole which is the aspects, whose essence is pleasure and pain and infatuation, because they are evolved from these, are as such precisely that. Just as water-jars, for example, are parts of the whole which is the clay and as such are that, because there is an identity in the form of identity in difference. In it the aspects (guna) are permanently in mutation. The Self is absolutely unchanged; all other beings are in mutation from moment to moment, fading out with the moments. This is said in the Comment. [by Varsaganya] "Constituents from their utmost height come not within the range of sight. But all within the range of sight a phantom seems and empty quite." In other words, it fades away like a mirage.

The objector says 'If the three aspects are in mutation, then the mutations one by one would have no unity. For it is plain that there is no one mutation of clay and of thread and of milk.' In reply to this he says—

14. The existence of a thing is due to its singleness of mutation.

Even of many things there is evidently a single mutation. For example elephants or horses or the like thrown into a brackish place have a salt mutation; wick, oil, and fire have a mutation as lamp. Yet such things as clay, because they
are not in the relation of subordinate to principal, have no singleness of mutation. The aspects (guna), however, because they have a unity of mutation, in the relation [to them] of subordinate to principal, which is a real thing (vastu) whether it be the Great [thinking-substance] or some thing else may rightly be said to have a reality, which is a unity. Of these [aspects], in case the sattva is principal, there is from the three aspects a single mutation, the Great [thinking-substance]; from this, which is single, when the rajas prevails, there comes the personality-substance; [from it], when tamas prevails, the five fine substances, one by one, arise as unities. From the personality-substance which consists of sattva there come the sense-organs; from that which consists of rajas there come the organs of action; from [the personality-substance] of both kinds there comes the central-organ. Thus when the fine substance sound is principal, there is the air, a single mutation of the five fine substances. Similarly when the fine substances touch or color or taste or smell are successively principal, wind or fire or water or earth are one by one produced. On the other hand, there are many mutations from a single one, because of the diversity in the potential forms of the subconscious-impressions of many mutations. Enough of such details.

The objector says 'There is nothing over and above the mind-stuff which is in essence momentary mental-processes. Whatever is to be validly known, that is not distinct from mental-processes; just as a mental-process is [not distinct from a mental-process]. These things which are to be validly known are water-jars and such things. Hence with reference to whom is the discussion of the unity or plurality? For the mind-stuff itself is without beginning; when diversified by subconscious-impressions which are the same as the immediate (samanantarā) cause it presents itself as substances and qualities.' To the Buddhist who talks thus he replies—

15. Because while the physical-object is the same there is a difference of mind-stuffs, the [two are upon] distinct levels of existence.

Of the two, [that is,] the mind-stuff and the physical-object the level is distinct, [that is,] the procedure is different. In
other words there is a difference between the mental-process and the physical-object. Why is this? Because while the physical-object is the same there is a difference of mind-stuffs. That mental-process with regard to the same woman is in the case of the husband a mental-process of pleasure; in the rival wives, a mental-process of pain; in the case of the lover, if he does not get her, infatuation, [that is,] despondency; in the case of him who has cast off love, a mental-process of indifference. Because the assertion 'What you have seen, that I have seen too' is contradicted by any one, one may say that there is one physical-object and several mental-processes. Thus there is a difference between them. Anything that is one is different from something that is many. Just as the mental-process blue is different from the mental-processes of yellows. And one physical-object is accordingly different from the several mental-processes, which have it as their field of operation. Nor is it proper to say that the object-of-a-valid-idea is identical with the valid-idea. Because if the unity were accepted, it would be opposed [to the usual ideas] of objects and of one who knows the object. And besides, if no intended-object existed, then [the different] mental-processes cannot possibly assume the forms of blue and yellow and so on. Nor can you say that a subconscious-impression of the nature of the object-of-the-valid-idea is the cause of the blueness or yellowness. Because that which is no more [a physical-object] cannot be the cause [of anything]. Nor can you [Patañjali] ask us [the Buddhists] 'How do you explain how there is a variety of mind-stuffs from one single intended-object.' For an intended-object is constituted of the three aspects (guna); and the sattva and rajas and tamas pertaining to the intended-object come up in spite of pressure (samudrekāt) on account of right-living or wrong-living or undifferentiated-consciousness. As a result of this [the sattva and so on] cause pleasure and pain and infatuation. And [fourthly] on account of the indifference the intended-object is the cause of the knowledge of the reality, because in this case the aspects are in equilibrium. Thus all is reasonable. Therefore we say that physical-objects do exist over and above mental-processes.

As regards that which somebody says 'We admit that there may be many intended-objects apart from mental-processes.
But that [object] being inert is to be known by a mental-process [and is therefore] vivid [by intelligence, that is,] it has no existence when not known'—he should be asked to tell us when [the object] is produced. If you [the Buddhist] say it is produced from mind-stuff, which is nothing but mental-processes, as knower, [two questions are to be asked]. Is the physical-object, the water-jar, the effect of the mind-stuff of the single Chāترا? Or is it the effect of many mind-stuffs belonging to Chāترا and to Māitra and to others? It is not the first. Accordingly he says—

16. And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff; [for then] it would be unproved, and then what would it be?

If the water-jar, which is a physical-object, were to be the effect of a single mind-stuff, then while that mind-stuff is absorbed in such things as cloth, would it be <unproved,> [that is,] would it be destroyed? [We say it would be destroyed.] Nor could you say that you accept this exclusion (िष्टापत्तिः). Because when that very same water-jar is seen again, there is a recognition that it is the same which is not falsified by anything; and because even when one mind-stuff is absorbed by one thing, then [this jar] is seen by another mind-stuff. Accordingly a thing is not dependent on one mind-stuff. Nor yet is it dependent on several mind-stuffs. Because 1. that which is presented-for-a-moment-without-substance (प्रतिभासिक) is invariably (नियमत) dependent on one mind-stuff, like a dream; and because 2. the unacceptable conclusion would follow that new and different water-jars would be produced when a jar which was being seen by one is afterwards seen in relation to several minds. [He gives the reason for this.] Because there is a difference in the totality of causes [in the two cases]. Furthermore at the time when the belly is seen the back does not exist. Thus it would follow that even the belly would not exist. Therefore the thing is not presented—for-a-moment—without-substance, but is over and above the mind-stuff and independent of it. This is established.

The objector says 'According to the system the supernormal-powers of the mind-stuff would know everything at all times, because it is in relation to everything.' In reply to this he says—
17. A thing is perceived or not perceived by virtue of its affecting [or not affecting] the mind-stuff.

Although the organs and the mind-stuff, because they are products of the personality-substance, are all-pervading, still their relation when asleep in the personality-substance is not a cause of making objects flash [on the mind]. But [they are the cause of making objects flash] when they are phenomenalized by karma and when they have a body underlying them. And thus led by the organs the mind-stuff is affected by that object with regard to which the mind-stuff receives the flashing [on itself] which consists in the reflection of intelligence (cit) lying upon [the mind-stuff] itself. The Self lights up (cetayati) this object by means of the fluctuation which has the same form as that [object], by means of a reflection of the Self in the thinking-substance; and not any other [object]. Thus a thing is perceived or not perceived. Consequently the mind-stuff, in accordance as it is affected by this object [or not], sometimes perceives it and sometimes not. Thus the point is that it is in mutation because the object is [now] perceived and now [not] perceived.

'If so, the self would be in mutation.' In reply to this he says—

18. Unintermittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] perceives the fluctuations of mind-stuff and thus the Self undergoes no mutations.

Now the Self has the mind-stuff with all its fluctuations, distracted and infatuated and what not, as its object. If this [object, the mind-stuff] were not to be known by the Self at the time when [the mind-stuff] itself exists (like the sounds and other [perceptible] things) which are objects of mind-stuff and [perceived] by the mind-stuff, then the Self would be in mutation like the mind-stuff. [Why so?] Because it would follow that this [Self] would be the perceiver only with reference to the mutations of the fluctuations when having this or that form. What then is the use of the two kinds of things in mutation? For the Self would not be other than the mind-stuff. But the mind-stuff's fluctuations, perceived at their own time of existence, as objects for experience, and as having the form of sounds and other [perceptible] things, make known the
the immutability of the master, [that is,] the experiencer of that object-for-experience. For only because the witness undergoes no mutation are they by that very fact uninterruptedly perceived and not otherwise.

The objector says 'Suppose that the mind-stuff is momentary and has lumination in itself and lightens itself and its own object. What is the use of the witness?' In reply to this he says—

19. It does not have light in itself since it is an object-for-sight.

If one says 'I am happy; I am angry; my mind is at peace' just as one says 'The water-jar is beautiful,' one cannot say that the mind-stuff has light in itself, [that is,] has lumination in itself; because it is an object-for-sight. The point is this. What is this having lumination in itself? Surely not having the object and the act of lumination undistinguished from each other. Because it is impossible that there should be unity of an act and of the object of an act. For the going is not gone to, but a village. Nor can you say that the mind-stuff is not the object of the lumination which is different from itself, as the Self is. Because if I say 'My mind is angry,' the mind-stuff is an object of experience. Hence because it is an object-for-sight it must have a Seer over and above itself. And the mind-stuff cannot be momentary because there is the recognition that 'I am the same.'

Moreover—

20. And there cannot be a cognition of both [thinking-substance and thing] at the same time.

The momentary theory maintains that in the same moment a cognition of both kinds, of the mind-stuff and of the intelligence (cāitanya), is impossible. To explain. When I say 'I saw the banyan tree,' there is a remembering of the mind-stuff and of the intended-object producible from the experience of these two. In this moment of the mind-stuff how is there an experience of these two? Nor may you say that the mind-stuff is itself the experience of both the kinds. 1. If the object were produced by the mind-stuff, then at the moment when the object [is produced and dies] the mind-stuff does not exist 2. And if it were not produced by this [mind-stuff],
it would be impossible that the intended-object should be perceived by this [mind-stuff], because there would be no production of it or of the identity of [object and mind-stuff], although the object might exist at the same time with it. 3. If you were to say that mind-stuff can be known out of relations, then you would have to admit that mind-stuff knows everything. For this is said by the Buddhists "The production of that which does not [correspond to] it and the identity of [object and mind-stuff] which does not hold is not known by this mind-stuff." It has been declared that the mind-stuff has neither an experience of itself, since it is an object-for-sight; nor has it the two kinds of experiences belonging to itself and to its object, since what is quite momentary has no functional-activity over and above that of production. For it has been said "Whatever is the being of a thing that is itself the action and the means-related-to-action." And there is no reason in saying that there is a distinction in effect resulting from a single thing when there is no distinction in functional-activity. Nor yet is it possible in sleep to make simultaneously the perception and the object to be perceived. Consequently in the witness alone there is the experience of the mind-stuff and of the intelligence. Thus the point is settled.

The objector says 'Granted that the mind-stuff is not an object-for-sight to itself; let it be seen by another mind-stuff. What use is there of a witness?' In reply to this he says—

21. If [one mind-stuff] were the object-of-sight for another, there would be an infinite regress from one thinking-substance to another thinking-substance as well as confusion of memory.

If a mind-stuff formed blue were the object-of-sight for another mind-stuff, then that mind-stuff formed as thinking-substance [would be the object] for another thinking-substance, and that too for another. Because an infinite regress would be formed. Nor could you say that objects-of-knowledge might consist of two or three, three or four, or five or six mind-stuffs and so be a complex of states. 1. Because if you are not sure that there is a mind-stuff which knows, you cannot be sure there is a mind-stuff which is the object known. 2. Because if there is doubt whether one sees the water-jar in the house or not; and if you are negatively sure that one
does not see it, then it follows that, in so far as you are not sure of seeing the object, the failure of the mind-stuff as perception is not the reason why you are not sure of the object. If there is an experience by numberless mind-stuffs one after another there would be also confusion of memory of the numberless mind-stuffs. Because as the result of this numberlessness of memories it would be impossible to know anything, and because there is no one to know, the distinction ‘This is the memory of the blue’ and ‘This is the memory of the yellow’ would not exist. So it is established that mind-stuffs are upon an equality and so it is not possible that one should be knower [and also known], like lamps [which cannot be both perceivers and perceived]. Consequently the mind-stuff must be cognized by the witness.

The objector asks ‘Because the witness who is absolutely unchanged has no relation with the mind-stuff which would be consequent upon an action, how can the mind-stuff be conscious as this or as that?’ In reply to this he says—

22. The intelligence (citi), which unites not with objects is conscious of its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes the form of that [thinking-substance] [by reflecting it].

There is an interconnection, [that is,] a union with the water-jars and other objects by the action of the thinking-substance, because it is in mutation. But the union of the intelligence (citi) with the thinking-substance is not so, because it is not in mutation. On the other hand, when the intelligence is reflected in the thinking-substance, just as the sun is reflected in water, and when the thinking-substance is changed into the form of the intelligence, [the intelligence] is conscious of the thinking-substance, in so far as it is its object-of-experience. As being in the relation of object-for-knowledge, by containing the image of the intelligence, the mind-stuff is affected by the intelligence and is cognized by the intelligence. As a result of the nearness of the intelligence which unites not with objects, this intelligence has a form, [that is,] an image. When there is a change into the nature of this [image of the intelligence], then [the intelligence] has a consciousness of the thinking-substance which is to be experienced by itself. Such is the connection [of the intelligence with the mind-stuff].
The objector raises the question: 'If the self is something over and above the mind-stuff, how then is it that some persons make the mistake of thinking that the mind-stuff is the self?' In reply he says that the source of these persons' mistake is the mind-stuff's capacity to know all objects.

23. Mind-stuff affected by the Seer and by the object-for-sight [leads to the perception] of all objects.

The Seer, [that is,] the Self is intelligent; the object-for-sight, [that is,] the sounds and other [perceptible] things, is unintelligent. That which [leads to the perception] of all objects is that of which the intended-object, [that is,] the province, is all objects, both the intelligent and the unintelligent. By the nearness of the one to the other [all this] is changed over, as it were, into the form of the intelligence and becomes affected by the Seer, [that is,] by the intelligence and the province of the Seer; [and] by means of the organs and so forth [all this] becomes affected by the object-for-sight and takes its form. And thus, although the mind-stuff is the object-for-sight and has the form of the sounds and [other] perceptible things which are to be experienced and is in essence a kind of experience characterized by mutations of pleasure and pain and so on, yet the mistake of the Buddhists, who think that [the mind-stuff] is not different from the reflection of the intelligence is reasonable. Because the mind-stuff,—which in reality is almost like a crystal gem, that is pure and that has the tendency to assume the forms of such objects as the hibiscus flower,—assumes the form of the object-for-sight, there is no object over and above mind-stuff. Such is the mistake of the Idealist theory. The distinction in this case is of this kind. Because the mind-stuff is the object-of-experience, it must be admitted that it is other than the experiencer; he is declared to be the permanently aroused power of intelligence (cit-ćakti). Two-fold is the power of intelligence, the permanently aroused and the manifestable. Of these two, the permanently aroused and absolutely unchanged power of intelligence has the power of intelligence as experience, as it is itself, manifestable by the mind-stuff's sattva and as being the reflection of intelligence after having become changed into likeness with pleasures and so on. And this experience is two-fold. The one, as ending in intelligence, [that is, leading
to release]; and the other, characterized as mutation. Of these two, the first is the manifestable power of intelligence, the second is the experience of the Self, the mutation into pleasure or something when the thinking-substance has acquired intelligence. Thus having discriminated between the thinking-substance and the Self, he is sure that the mind-stuff, which has dispelled the whole net of taints, and is concentrated like the flame of a motionless lamp, and is undisturbedly-calm in its flow, is the reality of the Self. This is the import [of the whole thing].

And as a result of this the enjoyer is other than the mind-stuff. Accordingly he says—

24. This mind-stuff [although] diversified\(^1\) by countless subconscious-impressions, exists for the sake of another, since its nature is to produce things by combining causes.

Although, in so far as its substance is in pleasure and the like, [the mind-stuff] is like the experiencer and diversified by numberless subconscious-impressions by the fruition of the karma from the hindrances, still in the sense that it perfects the two purposes, experience and release, for another, [that is,] for one whose real nature is being intelligence to which nothing is ascribed, it is said to exist for the sake of another. In other words, it is only an object-of-experience, not an experiencer. Why is this? Because it causes such effects as experience, by bringing together, [that is,] assembling such a combination as the body and the organs. That is for the sake of another which has its effect caused by assembling [its parts], a water-jar for instance. For a house, by combining parts and what not, does not make a dwelling for itself, but for the sake of another, Vishvamitra. Similarly it is reasonable to say that the aspects (guna) also make the thinking-substance and the rest for the sake of another. Consequently because they are subordinate to the Self they are called aspects. And so if we may say that the sattva and the others are for the sake of another, since they act by combining causes, as in the case of a house, then because this middle-term (hetu) becomes an attribute of the major-term it is proved that there

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\(^1\) The reading is evidently citram.
is one who is not combined from the aspects, who is undefiled [by aspects], who is motionless, who has his purpose in himself, and aims at intelligence and nothing else. Whoever is the experiencer of anything is not combined from that thing, for instance the master of the house. As a result of this concomitance, if the experiencer of the aspects were also for the sake of another, then because of the infinite regressus, there would be nothing higher than the Self in accordance with the Sacred Word [Kaṭh. Up. iii. 11]. Therefore it is proved that he whose two purposes of experience and of liberation are to be accomplished by the thinking-substance made of aspects, he who is to be favored by pleasure and repelled by pain, is the experiencer.

By the group of sūtras up to this point he has determined the perfection of birth and so on, and [determined] the mind-stuff which is fit for release from among [all] the mind-stuffs And after having first dilated (prapāṇa) upon karma and subconscious-impressions, by proving the existence of objects apart from mental-processes, he has determined in detail another world and the experiencer who is to [go] to the other world. Now in order to discuss Isolation he shows who it is that is competent for this [Isolation].

25. For him who sees the distinction, pondering upon his own states-of-being.

Some excellent (dāureya) person meditates upon, [that is,] has the curiosity to know, the truth as regards the self, on the strength of his former good deeds, and asks 'Where am I; to whom do I belong; or whence do I come?' The curiosity to know the reality on the part of this competent person, who is the one who sees the distinction, by means of the discrimination already referred to, (which would be the thought 'I am a Self; other than a thinking-substance; intelligence and nothing more')—ceases. Because a desire is removed when the object of desire is obtained. But that heterodox person, whose meditation upon the self as being identical with the non-self is firm, and who thinks in this manner 'There is no experiencer other than the body and the thinking-substance,—he is not competent. The point is that he who desires to know the reality is a competent person.
The objector asks ‘After there is a seeing of the distinction on the part of him who desires to know the reality, of what sort is the mind-stuff?’

26. Then the mind-stuff is borne down to discrimination, onward towards Isolation.

That mind-stuff which formerly at the time of the error of the self with regard to the thinking-substance and so on was borne down to objects, on towards the round-of-rebirths, is now that mind-stuff, belonging to the yogin whose error has ceased, which is borne down to discrimination. The discrimination is the difference between the Seer and the object-for-sight. It is borne onward towards, [that is,] it has a spot on which it rests; in other words the goal of discrimination. Accordingly that which [moves] <onward towards Isolation> is that of which the limit towards which [it moves] is Isolation. The final result of Isolation is that the mind-stuff becomes absorbed in the contemplation called the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things.

The objector asks ‘In such a mind-stuff whence come the emergent presented-ideas such as ‘I’ or ‘mine?’ In reply to this he says—

27. In the intervals of this mind-stuff there are other presented-ideas [coming] from subliminal-impressions.

In the case of him who is intent upon the Elevation (prashāṅkhyāna), which consists in discriminative discernment, day by day other presented-ideas, emergent in form, arise from the subliminal-impressions of emergence, which are manifested in the intervals of the Elevation.

The question is raised ‘Even if there is Elevation, subliminal-impressions of emergence arise for work. What means is there for rejecting these?’ In reply to this he says—

28. The rejection of these is described as being like the rejection of hindrances.

Undifferentiated-consciousness and passion and the rest of the hindrances, attenuated by the yoga of action, spreading out by taking opportunity after opportunity, when burned by the fire of Elevation (prasaṃkhya), do not again generate
a subliminal-impression in the mind-stuff. Thus subliminal-impressions of emergence produce other presented-ideas at the time when discrimination is not ripe; and when in the state of seeds burned by the burning which comes from the ripened Elevation they have not the property of generation. Thus it is to be understood that the rejection is described as being like that of the hindrances.

Thus having described the restriction of the emergence by Elevation, he tells of the means for restricting even the Elevation, which consists in emergence as compared with seedless yoga.

29. For one who takes no interest even in respect of Elevation there follows in every case, as a result of discriminative discernment, the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things.

The discernment into the difference between the sattva and the Self, which arises in one who beholds the twenty-five entities, has as its subordinate results the authority over everything, [and similar [results]. This is the Elevation (prasamkhyaña). <For one who takes no interest even> in this—the word interest (ku-sidasya), [that is,] passion being used in the sense that it sits (sidati) upon objects which are bad (kutsiteṣu)—for one who has none of this, the discriminative discernment only which consists of a series becomes, as being undivided in itself, the concentration called the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things. And this is said to be a Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things in the sense that it rains, [that is,] showers right-living, that is, of course, neither-white-nor-black, as the result of Isolation. When there is the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things as the result of passionlessness with regard to Elevation, the restriction of Elevation comes to pass as the result of the rise of the higher passionlessness.

He makes this order clear—

30. Then follows the cessation of the hindrances and the karmas.

<Then> [that is,] from the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things there follows the repression of the five hindrances together with the subconscious-impressions which have their root in these, and also of the karmas.
31. Then, because of the endlessness of perception from which all obscuring defilements and obscurations have passed away, what is yet to be known amounts to little.

Obscurations are so called because they obscure the mind-stuff. Defilements consist of karma from hindrances and are made of rajas and tamas. All these, both the obscurations and the defilements, [are what he means] by saying <all defilements and obscurations.> Because of the endlessness of perception resulting from these, by reason of the contemplation [called] Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things, which is the shining of pure thinking-substance, the <what is yet to be known,> [that is,] everything whether intelligent or unintelligent is very little. Just as in autumn when every defilement, whether it be cloud or any other thing, has passed away from the sky, and when on all sides there is a circle of the light of the fierce sun brilliantly shining, then such things as water-jars capable of receiving light amount to little. Likewise for the ever-undefiled sattva of the thinking-substance what, pray, is there that is not its field of operation! This same highest limit of the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things has been made known. Hence it is called [knowable] things (dharmāh); but not according to the etymological sense of those things that are supported (ahriyante). All knowable things it rains, [that is,] enlightens. So he calls it a Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things. For this same perfection of the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things is the undisturbed calm of perception, which makes the Self visible as being flawless [as plainly as] a myrobalan put on the palm of one's hand,—and which casts light as one would cast light upon fish in undefiled water, upon the defects such as impurity and destruction which are found in objects of sight that are evolved-forms of the material and impure primary-substance,—and which brings about the treasure called the seedless yoga for the [poor] ascetic mind-stuff. This is called the higher passionlessness.

The objector says 'This higher passionlessness wearing completely the hindrances away may be able to destroy utterly the deposits, auspicious or inauspicious, of karma, yet—because the aspects are of themselves disposed to mutation—the sequence of mutations, the body, the organs and so on (ūdi), with regard
to such a Self also, might continue to act. In reply to this he says—

32. When as a result of this the aspects (guna) fulfill their purpose, they attain to the limit of their sequence of mutations.

<When as a result of this> [that is] after the endless knowledge which is in essence the higher passionlessness, [that is] the fruit of the Rain-Cloud of [knowable] Things, and before the aspects have effected the purposes of the Self which consist in experience and in discriminative discernment. That sequence of mutations, beginning with the Great [thinking-substance] and ending with water-jars, by conforming to the regular order, is resolved at the time of the dissolution as a water-jar into earth, and in the inverse order the earth was resolved into water, the water into fire, and so onwards. This was the sequence which was completed by the aspects with reference to that Self. For because the Self has purposes, the purpose of the Self which has a future time-form is an impulsion to the aspects. When this [purpose] is fulfilled the aspects are not able to remain even for a moment. This is the point.

He tells the meaning of the word sequence.

33. A sequence is the correlate to a moment and is recognized as such at the final limit of the mutation.

Moments are portions of time (kāla). [Their] sequence is knowable by the thinking-substance which is concentrated upon them. In these words <a sequence is the correlate to a moment> the nature of the <sequence> is pointed out. It is said to be the correlate of the moment because two moments are indicated as its correlates. Thus the sequence of mutations from moment to moment is to be considered. He tells what the proof of this is. <And is recognized as such at the final limit of the mutation> Thus in the case of clay the perceived mutations, round-lump, water-jar, potsherds, dust, have a prior limit and a final limit. In this manner by mentioning the prior and the final termination the sequence is determined and becomes an object of knowledge. When we recognize that the water-jar comes after the round lump the sequence is
perceived there. By seeing the oldness in a well-kept garment, for instance, one perceives, moment by moment, beginning with the mutation of newness as the previous limit, the difference in the oldness [by the successive stages] of most subtile, rather subtile, subtile, rather coarse, and most coarse as they come to pass; and the sequence may be inferred as [soon as one sees] that the most subtile oldness comes after the newness and that the rather subtile oldness comes after that. The objector asks 'Is this sequence in impermanent things only, or is it also in permanent things also?' If this question is asked, we say that it is in permanent things also. There are two kinds of permanents. The Selves are absolutely unchanged permanents; the aspects are permanents in mutation. The substance in which the essential-attribute (svarūpa) is not lost while in mutation as external-aspect and as time-characteristic and as intensity is a permanent in mutation. With regard to these, in case of impermanent substances such as thinking-substances, although there is a previous limit of the sequence of such a mutation as passion, yet there is a final limit, the immediate experience of the Self. Thus in these the sequence has a termination. In the case of the aspects, which are permanent in mutation, the sequence of the mutation has no termination. Because although it ceases in respect of released Selves, it is not cut off in respect of bound Selves. The objector asks whether all Selves are released or not? If the first [alternative be true], the mutation in the primary-cause has a termination; if the second [alternative be true], there is no belief in your knowledge of the reality. On this point the Master of the Sāmkhya says [Bhāṣya on iv. 33] that there is a three-fold question 1. capable of an absolute answer, 2. capable of a partial answer, 2. incapable of answer. 1. Of these [three] the first is as follows. The question is 'Will this whole species die?' This may be answered absolutely, It will die. 2. But how do you answer the second question? This is capable of a partial answer. He who has discernment of the reality is released, and no other. And thus because living beings are endless and because it is revealed in the Purāṇas and elsewhere that creations and dissolutions are endless, there is no release for all. 3. But the third question is whether the sequence of mutations of the primary cause is completed or not. This question is incapable of answer, because it is
impossible to make a definite assertion. Or else this question is explainable by saying that the sequence of the round of rebirths has an end for fortunate beings, but not for the unfortunate.

Accordingly there is always a sequence, the aspects which are permanent and in mutation, because there is a difference in the mutation which occurs in sequence. In the Selves which are absolutely unchanged the sequence is not physically-real, but is predicated by attributing [to the Selves] the difference of mutation found in the thinking-substance and the rest. Thus all is cleared up.

He now shows what Isolation is, the result of the yoga which was to be taught by the authoritative book.

34. Isolation is the return of the aspects (guna), no longer provided with a purpose by the Self, to their original condition; or it is the Energy of Intellect (citi-çakti) grounded in itself.

Now that the aspects of the thinking-substance and of the rest of the [entities] have accomplished experience and liberation [for the Self], which was the task which they had to accomplish, they are generated inversely in the contrary direction and are resolved in the central-organ as subliminal-impressions of the higher passionlessness of the emergent concentration. And the central-organ is resolved into the feeling-of-personality; and this into the Great [thinking-substance]; and the Great Entity into the aspects. Such is a mundane dissolution. This Isolation of the primary-cause is transferred to a particular Self. Or else, the Energy of Intellect, which is the very Intellect itself, [that is,] an individual Self, abides in itself and in nothing else in a preeminent degree. So it is <grounded> in itself. That is, it is again out of relation finally with the purposelessness of the thinking-substance and the rest [of the entities]. This same is the Isolation of the light of the permanent Self permanently purified in its union with itself. Thus [all] is satisfactory. The word iti in the sūtra is intended to show the completion of the book.
1. Ceaselessly I bow to Rāghava, who is the source of all perfections, who is the Lord, who gives Isolation. All actions if dedicated to Him (yatra) produce yoga without [need of the] aids to yoga. His (yad) speech which is a fire for the performance of the Mystic Syllable, after having burned at once the forest of hindrances, produced the unflICKering lamp of knowledge which cleanses the darkness.

2. The Great Lord, the husband of Umā, whose dwelling is in Kāḍī, the slightest favor from whom produces all kinds of prosperity, such as release, I worship.

3. May my speech be a garland of pearls, placed forever at the feet of Rāma, and woven around the thread (sūtra) of the Lord of Serpents [Patañjali], and adorned by the [costly] jewel (mani) [in the middle of the string] which is the speech of Vyāsa.

4. What a difference (kva ... kva) between me given to mistakes and the master’s affection [for me]! The mind of the great is indeed naturally full of compassion for the helpless.

1 This word praṣāva might refer to the Veda or even to something heterodox.
The Expression of Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.—By Frank R. Blake, Ph. D., Johns Hopkins University.

Introduction.

Between the territory occupied by the demonstratives and that filled by the numerals lies a group of ideas that are usually classed together under the head of indefinite pronouns. For example in English, 'same' and 'many' are both classed as indefinites, tho 'same' is practically a demonstrative, and 'many' is closely related to the cardinal numerals.

The study of this linguistic territory is attended with considerable difficulty in most languages, since many ideas are expressed, not by any special word, but by a circumlocution or by some type of construction. This territory, therefore, can not well be studied on the basis of special words and forms, but must be approached from the point of view of the ideas themselves.

Indefinite pronominal ideas may be divided into three main classes, viz.:

1) indefinite demonstratives,
2) indefinite cardinal numerals,
3) indefinite ordinals.

The chief indefinite demonstrative ideas are the following, viz.:

a) the identifying, 'this equal to that', e. g., Eng. 'same',
b) the emphasizing, 'this indeed', e. g., Eng. 'self',
c) the comparing, 'like this', e. g., Eng. 'such',
d) the combining, {this not that', e. g., Eng. 'other',
    'this and that', e. g., Eng. 'both',
    'this or that', e. g., Eng. 'either',
    'neither this nor that', e.g., Eng. 'neither',
e) the distributive {these separately', e. g., Eng. 'each',
    'all of these separately', e. g., Eng. 'every'.}
The indefinite cardinal numerals may be divided into three sub-classes, according to what they refer to, viz.:

1) indefinite individualizing pronouns,
2) indefinite quantitative pronouns,
3) indefinite numerals referring to more than one.

The chief indefinite cardinal numeral ideas are the following, viz.:

A. Five classes that refer to individuals, quantities and numbers; the indefinite numerals proper:
   a) 'an individual, part or number, known but not mentioned', e. g., Eng. 'so and so, such and such'.
   b) 'an individual, part, or number unknown, but specially singled out', e. g., Eng. 'a certain one, a certain, certain'.
   c) 'an individual, part, or number unknown', e. g., Eng. 'someone, some'.
   d) 'an individual, part, or number that may be desired or chosen', e. g., Eng. 'anyone, any'.
   e) 'the negation of one, quantity, number', e. g., Eng. 'no one, nothing, none, no'.

B. Ten classes that refer only to quantities and numbers. These classes may be grouped in three divisions, viz.:

1) the comparative indefinites,
   a) 'a large quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'much, many',
   b) 'a larger quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'more'.
   c) 'the largest quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'most, the most'.
   d) 'a small quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'a little, few'.
   e) 'a smaller, quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'less, fewer'.
   f) 'the smallest quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'the least, fewest'.

2) the sufficive indefinites,
   a) 'a sufficient quantity or number', e. g., Eng. 'enough'.
   b) 'a quantity or number smaller than sufficient', Eng. 'too little, too few'.
   c) 'a quantity or number larger than sufficient', Eng. 'too much, too many'.

Frank R. Blake,
3) the comprehensive indefinite,
‘the quantity or number complete’, e. g., Eng. ‘everything, all’.
The chief indefinite ordinals are, viz.:
a) ‘the next, following’,
b) ‘the middle’,
c) ‘the last’,
d) ‘the next to last, last but one’.
These ideas have usually three uses. They may be employed absolutely to refer to a noun, like the indefinite pronouns in English, e. g., ‘each did as he was told’; ‘many are called, but few chosen’; &c.: they may be employed partitively, denoting a part of some definite whole, e. g., ‘some of the men’, ‘many of them’, &c.: or they may be used attributively to limit or define the meaning of a noun, like the English indefinite pronominal adjectives, e. g., ‘each man’, ‘many houses’, &c.
All of these ideas may be employed in all three ways except the simple indefinite demonstratives ‘same’, ‘self’, ‘such’, which lack the partitive use. The partitive and attributive uses sometimes fall together, e. g., with Hebrew יִּלָּל ‘all’; sometimes the absolute and partitive constructions are the same, e. g., with the Hebrew combining indefinite demonstratives ‘both’, ‘either’, ‘neither’. These may be said to be used attributively when they modify a single noun; when they stand in apposition to a plural pronoun, or a combination of two nouns, tho this is really an absolute construction, they have practically a partitive use.
In my article on the Comparative Syntax of the combinations formed by the Noun and its Modifiers in Semitic 1, I stated that “the material for the discussion of these important modifying ideas (the indefinite pronominal ideas used attributively) is exceedingly meager: in no Semitic grammar are they fully and satisfactorily treated”. The same thing is true with regard to the other uses of these ideas, and the present article is an attempt to supply this lack as far as Hebrew is concerned.
The article is entirely descriptive, no attempt being made to institute extended comparisons with the sister Semitic idioms or with other tongues. Comparative material will be found

1 Published in JAOS 22, parts 2 and 3, pp. 135—267; cited in the following pages as Comp. Syn. Noun and Mod. For some addenda and corrigenda to this article cf. p. 227, n. 1.
in Brockelmann’s Comparative Syntax\textsuperscript{1}, and also, for the attributive use of these ideas, in the article of mine just referred to.

The article is based primarily on the study of the Hebrew text, but Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Hebräische Grammatik*\textsuperscript{2}, Leipzig, 1909; and Gesenius-Buhl, *Handwörterb. über d. Alte Testament*\textsuperscript{15}, Leipzig, 1910; have been used as standard works of reference\textsuperscript{2}.

In the present article the expression of the indefinite pronominal ideas in Hebrew is discussed according to the classification just outlined, and in all three uses absolute, attributive, and partitive. Numerous examples are given under every heading, in many instances all or practically all of the cases of occurrence are cited. The signs “ in Hebrew and ... in English indicate an abbreviated word or passage. A long vowel due to pause is marked with Silluq, viz. —.

**Indefinite Demonstratives.**

**Same.**

The idea of ‘same’ employed absolutely in the sense of ‘the one already referred to’ is expressed by the simple demonstratives or by the pronouns of the third person, e. g.,

\begin{itemize}
  \item גּוּנֵר הַיּוֹם יִבְנֵי שְׁלֹשׁ נְפָשִׁים ‘here is the man of whom I spoke to thee; this [same] shall rule my people’ (I Sam. 9, 17; cf. Gen. 5, 29).
  \item נַעֲרֵי JHVH ... and he pours out of this [same] ‘(Ps. 75, 9).
\end{itemize}

There is yet one man ... the same is Micaiah son of Imla’ (Ii Ch. 18, 7; cf. Esth. 9, 1; Ezr. 10, 23; — Gen. 10, 12; 14, 8; 23, 2; 48, 7; Jos. 15, 8; II Sam. 5, 7; — Gen. 6, 4).

And the one of whom I shall say he shall go with thee, the same shall go with thee’ (Jud. 7, 4bis)\textsuperscript{3}.


\textsuperscript{2} These are cited as Gesenius-Kautzsch and Gesenius-Buhl: E. König, *Historisch-Comparative Syntax der Hebräischen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1897 (cited as König, *Syntax*) was also employed.

\textsuperscript{3} This use of the personal pronoun of the third person is similar to its use in the sense of ‘self’, cf. p. 127, and also to its use as copula.
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The pronoun of the third person has apparently also developed the meaning of ‘same’ as predicate to more than one thing or to several states or times of one thing, e. g.,

מאשוֹנַהּ ‘but thou art the same’ (Ps. 102, 28; cf. Is. 41, 4; 43, 10; 13; 46, 4; 48, 12; Jer. 5, 12 [?]).
מאשוֹנַהּ ‘small and great are the same there’ (Job 3, 19).

In its attributive use this idea is not clearly distinguished from the demonstratives, being often indicated by the demonstrative pronouns, e. g.,

מאשָהּ ‘in that same night’ (Gen. 26, 24).
מאשָהּ ‘on that same day’ (Gen. 15, 18).
מאשָהּ ‘in that same year’ (Jer. 28, 17).
מאשָהּ ‘these same words’ (Gen. 44, 6).
מאשָהּ ‘that same poor man’ (Ecc. 9, 15).
מאשָהּ ‘and it shall come to pass that the same goodness which JHVH does to us, we will do to you’ (Num. 10, 32).

Sometimes the pronoun of the third person (= remoter demonstrative) is placed without article after the noun in the sense of ‘same’, just as it is in the constructions of ‘self’ (cf. p. 127), e. g.,

מאשָהּ ‘and they made their father drink wine that same night’ (Gen. 19, 33; cf. 30, 16; 32, 23; I Sam. 19, 10).  

In I Ch. 1, 27; Prov. 28, 24 מאשָהּ may be regarded either as ‘same’ or as copula.

1 Of course it is possible to regard מאשָהּ בַּלָּלָל &c. as מאשָהּ בַּלָּל, or as
The personal pronoun of the third person seems to be placed before noun + demonstrative in the Aramaic fashion, the whole having the sense of ‘same’ in— ‘this same night is JHVH’s’ (Ex. 12, 42).

Attributive ‘same’ in the sense of ‘that already referred to’ may be expressed by placing before the modified noun a pronoun of the third person agreeing with the noun in gender and number. The noun may be either common or proper; ‘same’ + proper noun is regularly expressed in this way. The independent form of the pronoun is used when the noun is nominative, the suffix when it is in any other case (acc. or after preposition). When the suffix stands after a case-determinative (נָה or preposition), this determinative may be repeated, e.g., ‘that same wicked man shall die in his iniquity’ (Ezk. 3, 18).

‘and in the time of his oppression, this same king Ahaz trespassed yet more against JHVH’ (II Ch. 28, 22).

‘and these same magicians also did... thus’ (Ex. 7, 11).

‘and she saw that same boy’ (Ex. 2, 6; cf. 35, 5; Lev. 13, 57; Jer. 9, 14; Ezk. 3, 21).

‘when this same man came... ’ (Ezk. 10, 3; cf. 42, 14; Ezr. 3, 12).

‘woe to this same one... ’ (Ecc. 4, 10).

corrupted by haplography from אָזָה הִלָּלָה, but it is not necessary. Gen. 38, 21. 21 אָזָה הִלָּלָה: ‘where is the harlot that was openly by the road’, does not belong here, the אָזָה being rather relative than attributive in character.


2 These cases are ranged by Gesenius-Kautzsch (§ 131k—n) under the so-called Permutative, a kind of appositive, but the emphatic meaning is not referred to. In all the examples here given the noun which is emphasized occurs before in the context immediately preceding. The emphatic character of this construction was noted in my Comp. Syn. Noun and Mod. (p. 147) but the exact character of the emphasis I did not recognize at the time.

While still emphatic, the examples in which an element in some oblique case is resumed after an interval by a following suffix are of a different character, cf. Gen. 2, 17; 8, 3; I Sam. 9, 20; II Sam. 6, 23:—Gen. 13, 15; 21, 13; 47, 21; I Sam. 25, 29; II Ki. 9, 27; Is. 51, 22; (cf. p. 122, n): מַזָּה—מַזָּה I Sam. 9, 13. Here the first element is in the nature of an absolute case, the sense being ‘as regards—’. 
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 retorno to the land that I give to these same Israelites" (Jos. 1, 2; cf. Num. 32, 33; Jud. 21, 7; II Ch. 26, 14; Jer. 51, 56; I Ch. 4, 42; Dan. 11, 11).

"did not this same Hezekiah remove his high-places ..." (II Ch. 32, 12; cf. 33, 23).

when I went to make this same Israel rest" (Jer. 31, 2).

and the worthless fellows gave evidence against this same Naboth" (I Ki. 21, 13; cf. II Ki. 16, 15 Kt.).

who will not serve this same Nebuchadnezzar" (Jer. 27, 8).

the brass of all these same vessels was not weighed" (Jer. 52, 20 [contrast II Ki. 25, 16]; cf. Ezr. 2, 62. Neh. 7, 64; I Ch. 7, 9; 25, 1).1

'Same' when it means 'one and the same' is expressed both absolutely and attributively by the numeral רוא 'one' without article, e. g.,

any man ... who comes ... without being called, the law for him is the same ..." (Esth. 4, 11; cf. Job 23, 13; Gen. 41, 25).

all have the same fate' (Ecc. 9, 3; cf. 2; 2, 14; 3, 19; 20; 6, 6; Gen. 40, 5; 41, 26; Ex. 12, 49; 26, 2; 36, 9; 15; Lev. 7, 7; 24, 22; Num. 15, 16; 29; I Sam. 6, 4; I Ki. 6, 25; Ezk. 45, 11; Mal. 2, 10bis; Prov. 1, 14; Job 31, 15).

In one passage the plural of the numeral 'one' is employed attributively in this sense, viz.,

and the whole earth was of the same [one] speech and of the same words" (Gen. 11, 1).2

For the definite article used in a sense somewhat similar to this מָיְשָׂא cf. under 'some' p. 165.

Occasionally the word בָּעַי 'bone, essence' is employed in the construct before the modified noun in connection with a demonstrative modifying the noun to indicate this idea, e. g.,

1 For other less certain cases of this genitive construction cf. König, Syn., § 284a. The following noun may also stand after מָיְשָׂא (or in late Hebrew מָיְשָׂא); the construction does not seem to be emphatic: cf. for מָיְשָׂא Ezk. 37, 17.

2 Somewhat similar is the use of absolute מָיְשָׂא Ezk. 37, 17.
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‘on the same day’ (Gen. 7, 13; 17, 23; 26; cf. Ezek. 24, 2).

The particle בָּאָשֶׁר is occasionally employed before a noun in the nominative case in an emphatic sense that is at times equivalent to attributive ‘same’. Sometimes it occurs together with a demonstrative, e. g., בָּאָשֶׁר that [same] pillar of cloud did not depart from them’ (Neh. 9, 19; cf. Ezek. 35, 10; 43, 7).

בָּאָשֶׁר ‘all this same evil came upon us’ (Dan. 9, 13; cf. Jud. 20, 44; 46).

The opposite of ‘same’ viz., ‘different’ is expressed by the participle מַנְחַף of the verb מָנַח ‘change, become different’, e. g., מְאֹד וּמְאֹד ‘and the vessels were all different’ (Esth. 1, 7). מַנְחַף ‘and their law is different from [that of] all other people’ (Esth. 3, 8).

The idea ‘different among selves, various’ applied to one noun is expressed by the noun repeated with connective בֵּין, e. g., בֵּין דְּרֵישָהוּ ‘don’t have in your purse various [different kinds of] weights, a large one and a small one’ (Dt. 25, 13; cf. 14; Prov. 20, 10; 23).

בֵּין דְּרֵישָהוּ ‘consider the years of different generations’ (Dt. 32, 7).

בֵּין דְּרֵישָהוּ ‘with various hearts [double heart] they speak’ (Ps. 12, 3; cf. I Ch. 12, 33).

It is expressed by the simple plural of the word בֵּין ‘kind, sort’, in—

בֵּין דְּרֵישָהוּ ‘which they filled with perfumes and various sorts [of spices] prepared as salves . . .’ (II Ch. 16, 14).

For the repeated plural in this sense cf. p. 153, n. 1.

1 This בָּאָשֶׁר, however, is usually simply a strong demonstrative; so in Num. 5, 10; Ezek. 20, 16; Neh. 9, 34: וַיִּשָּׁר בָּאָשֶׁר occurs as nominative in Jer. 27, 8; 38, 16 Kt.; Zech. 12, 10; Ecc. 4, 3: (cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 117 m). Cases which are intermediate between this use of בָּאָשֶׁר and its ordinary use are, יִשָּׁר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁר וַיִּשָּׁר ‘for all the land that thou seest, I give it to thee’ (Gen. 13, 15; cf. 21, 13; 47, 21; I Sam. 25, 29; II Ki. 9, 27; Is. 51, 22) where the fact that the preceding object after בָּאָשֶׁר is resumed by a suffix makes the object very much like a nominative absolute. In Mishnic Hebrew בָּאָשֶׁר + suffix is used in the sense of ‘that’, ‘same’ (cf. my article Comp. Syn. Noun and Mod., p. 148). This is a combination of this use of בָּאָשֶׁר with nominative, with constructions for ‘same’ like וַיִּשָּׁר וַיִּשָּׁר (Jer. 27, 8), cf. p. 120 f.
Self.

This idea may modify either a personal pronoun or a noun. In connection with the oblique cases of pronouns it constitutes the so-called reflexive pronouns. In the first case it may be represented simply by the unemphatic pronoun (pronoun implied by verbal form, single pronoun in non-verbal sentence, or simple suffix), e. g.,

ירע "I myself will awake early" (Ps. 57, 9; 108, 2).\(^1\)  
יש "thou thyself art the man" (II Sam. 12, 7; cf. I Sam. 24, 18).

יבר ו "and Ehud made himself a sword" (Jud. 3, 16; cf. Num. 8, 17; Ru. 4, 6).

יוסף יבר יושב ו "and he took his two young men with him [self]" (Gen. 22, 3).

יוסי נב ו "and love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev. 19, 18; 34).

יהו הנני יבר יושב יושב ו "and he will show me himself and his habitation (II Sam. 15, 25; cf. Ex. 5, 19; Jer. 7, 19; Ezk. 34, 2; 8; 10).\(^2\)

The emphasis may be indicated by repetition of the pronoun; when the pronoun is subject, by pronoun + verbal form in verbal sentence,\(^3\) by repeated pronoun in non-verbal sentence. Sometimes the independent pronoun is used twice even in a verbal sentence, e. g.,

יהוה יושב יושב ו "and that they might see for themselves, that they themselves were beasts" (Ecc. 3, 18).

לי הנני יושב יושב ו "I myself put my maid-servant in your arms" (Gen. 16, 5; cf. ינ II Sam. 18, 2; Jer. 21, 5).

ירש יבר יושב יושב ו "slay me thyself" (I Sam. 20, 8).

ירש יבר יושב יושב ו "he hath made us and not we ourselves" (Ps. 100, 3).

"and he left his servant there, and he himself went into the desert" (I Ki. 19, 3—4; cf. Is. 38, 15; Prov. 11, 25; 21, 13; II Ch. 26, 20).  

\(^1\) The emphasis here may be due to the cohortative ending נ.  
\(^2\) The accusative of the reflexive pronoun is more commonly expressed by the reflexive forms of the verb, cf. p. 126.  
\(^3\) Not infrequently a pronoun subject before a verb, while still somewhat emphatic, has not the meaning of "self", cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 135a (at end). In late passages, particularly in Ecclesiastes, the pronoun subject is used after the verb without special emphasis, cf. op. cit. § 135a. Cf. unemphatic ושנ, p. 126, n.
for they themselves alone shall be saved’ (Ezk. 14, 18; cf. 16).

‘for we ourselves together will ‘build’ (Ezr. 4, 3; cf. Num. 32, 17).

‘I myself will tear . . .’ (Hos. 5, 14; cf. Jud. 5, 3; Is. 48, 15).

‘and she herself said . . .’ (Gen. 20, 5).

‘see now that I myself am he’ (Dt. 32, 39).

‘I indeed, I myself, am JHVH’ (Is. 43, 11; 26; 51, 12).

‘thou thyself art terrible’ (Ps. 76, 7).

‘they indeed are thy lot’ (Is. 57, 6).

One, usually the first, of the two pronouns may be a suffix after הָנָה or an infinitive; when the predicate is a finite verb it may stand with ה after the repeated pronoun, e. g.,

‘behold I myself will search out my sheep’ (Ezk. 34, 11; cf. 20).

‘and when I myself, Daniel, saw the vision’ (Dan. 8, 15).

‘behold I myself am against thee’ (Ezk. 5, 8).

‘behold I myself will bring upon you a sword’ (Ezk. 6, 3).

‘and behold I myself will harden Egypt’s heart’ (Ex. 14, 17; cf. Is. 52, 6).

When the pronoun is in any oblique case the emphasis may be represented by the emphatic suffixes, i. e., suffix in connection with independent pronoun1; the independent pronoun may precede or follow the suffix; it is often accompanied by הָרָא ‘also’, e. g.,

‘bless me also’ (Gen. 27, 34; cf. Zech. 7, 5).

‘I have made you, even you, know to day’ (Prob. 22, 19).

‘JHVH led me, even me, in the way . . .’ (Gen. 24, 27).

‘even me myself it will befall’ (Ecc. 2, 15).

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1 According to Gesenius-Kautzsch § 135f, the emphatic suffix occasionally loses its emphasis, e. g., I Sam. 20, 42; Ps. 38, 11. In the first of these cases the independent pronoun is the logical antecedent of ‘both’, cf. p. 146; in the second הָרָא is equivalent to ‘self’, emphasizing not the suffix but the noun, cf. p. 127.
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Judah, thee indeed shall thy brethren praise' (Gen. 49, 8).

would that I myself might die instead of you' (II Sam. 19, 1; cf. withProv. 23, 15: with indep.pron. before suffix Gen. 40, 16 withנ; Is. 45, 12; Job 21, 4

and your own bodies shall fall in this wilderness' (Num. 14, 32; cf. Neh. 5, 2 אוננות; Ps. 9, 7 המה: with pron. before Jos. 23, 9 הננה; Ezk. 33, 17 המה).

let the fault be upon me, my lord' (I Sam. 25, 24; cf. I Ki. 1, 26; II Sam. II Ch. 35, 21; I Sam. 19, 23; Dt. 5, 3; Hag. 1, 4; Jer. 25, 14: with pron. before I Sam. 12, 23 הננה; I Ki. 1, 20 and Mi. 5, 1 הננה; II Ch. 28, 10 הננה).

In poetry the pronoun emphasizing the suffix of a noun may be implied by a verbal form which, tho it does not agree with the noun, is its logical predicate (contrast Gesenius-Kautzsch § 144f): the noun + suffix may either precede or follow the verb, e. g.,

my own voice will call upon JHVH' (Ps. 3, 5; cf. 27, 7; 142, 2: ימ 66, 17: שים יזרעא על JHVH' Ex. 6, 3).

their own mouth speaks proudly' (Ps. 17, 10).

let thine own voice cry' (Is. 10, 30; cf. Ps. 17, 13: יז 17, 14: יז 60, 7; 108, 7).

thine own horses walked thru the sea' (Hab. 3, 15).

my own glory will sing and give praise' (Ps. 108, 2).

thine own hand did drive out the nations' (Ps. 44, 3).

A similar construction in a non-verbal sentence where the predicate agrees with the pronoun is—

for thy own name JHVH stands alone' (Ps. 83, 19).

The emphasis may also be expressed in any case byשמן, 'soul, life' + suffix, simple or with emphatic independent pro-
noun. When שָׁפַך is subject the verb usually agrees with it in the feminine singular, but may agree in person with the suffix according to the last construction, e. g.,

'let me myself die with the Philistines' (Jud. 16, 30).

'they themselves have gone into captivity' (Is. 46, 2).

'I myself lie among lions' (Ps. 57, 5).

'he who gets wisdom is a lover of himself' (Pr. 19, 8; cf. Num. 30, 6; 7; Ezek. 3, 21; 14, 14; Am. 2, 14; 15; Ps. 17, 13; 22, 30; Job 32, 2; Ecc. 6, 2).

'cease not yourselves' (Jer. 37, 9).

'he heart knows its own bitterness' (Prov. 14, 10).

'and the great man speaks his own evil desire' (Mi. 7, 3).

When the case of the pronoun is accusative or dative, the emphasis may be expressed by the reflexive idea in various verbal forms, chiefly the Niphal or Hithpael, e. g.,

'and I was afraid because I was naked, and I hid myself' (Gen. 3, 10; cf. Num. 12, 6 [הוֹדָע]; Jud. 16, 20 [גָּנָה]; II Sam. 22, 24 [לְךָ]; Job 9, 30 [רָאִין]).

'separate thyself from him' (Gen. 13, 9; cf. Ex. 34, 2 [בְּנֵבָא]; Num. 16, 13 [רַּבַּת]; II Ki. 22, 19 [נְנָע]).

'and David strengthened himself in JHVH his god' (I Sam. 30, 6; cf. Lev. 25, 49 [גָּנָה]; Job 27, 10 [רְבָא]).

'and she shall feign herself another' (I Ki. 14, 5; cf. Lev. 21, 9 [הָנָה]).

'and we will discover ourselves to them' (I Sam. 14, 8; cf. Gen. 44, 16 [מָצָא]; Jer. 50, 5 [הָנָה]).

'and rest yourselves under the tree' (Gen. 18, 4; cf. 49, 1 [בָּנָא]; Num. 31, 3 [נָאִין]; Dt. 14, 1 [רָאִין]; Is. 52, 3 [נָאִין]).

'that they had made themselves hateful to David' (I Ch. 19, 6; cf. Ex. 19, 22 [שָׁדַק]; Ps. 2, 2 [שָׁדַק]).

1 In a sense very similar to this שָׁפַך are employed 'ךָשָׁפַך 'flesh' (in Ecc. 4, 5; 5, 5) and 'ךָשָׁפַך 'heart' (in Ex. 9, 14), שָׁפַך + suffix is sometimes employed without special emphasis as the equivalent of a simple personal pronoun, e. g., as subject Gen. 27, 4; Num. 21, 5; Ezek. 4, 14; Ps. 105, 18; Job 16, 4: after prep. Ps. 11, 1; Job 16, 4.
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David asked for himself from me' (I Sam. 20, 6; cf. 28; Neh. 13, 6).

Jonathan took off from himself his mantel' (I Sam. 18, 4; cf. Gen. 3, 8; Ex. 32, 3; Jos. 9, 12).

and he prostrated himself on the ground' (Gen. 18, 2).

The expression 'by—self' is rendered by דבכ in separation' or by דבכ 'in body' + suffix, e. g.,

and if I have eaten my morsel by myself' (Job 31, 17; cf. Is. 44, 24; 49, 21).

why dost thou sit by thyself' (Ex. 18, 14).

and they put on food for him by himself, and for them by themselves' (Gen. 43, 32).

if he came by himself, he shall go by himself' (Ex. 21, 3).

The expression 'to—self' = secretly after a verb of saying or thinking is expressed by דבכ, דבכ or דבכ (לע) + דבכ 'heart' or דבכ 'interior' + suffix, e. g.,

and he said to himself' (Gen. 17, 17; cf. Ps. 4, 5; 10, 6).

and Sarah laughed to herself' (Gen. 18, 12; cf. Ps. 62, 5; 94, 19).

I said to myself' (Ecc. 1, 16).

and JHVH said to himself' (Gen. 8, 21; cf. 24, 45; I Sam. 27, 1; I Sam. 1, 13).1

When the idea of 'self' modifies a noun, it is expressed by the pronoun of the third person in apposition with the noun: the usual position of the appositive seems to be after the noun, tho it may also precede.2 When the noun is governed by a preposition the emphatic pronoun may stand in the absolute form or as suffix after the preposition repeated, e. g.,

therefore my Lord himself will give you a sign' (Is. 7, 14; cf. Lev. 17, 11; Num. 18, 23; Jos. 22, 23).

so that the Jews themselves prevailed over their enemies' (Esth. 9, 1; cf. Ps. 38, 11).

1 In these examples the idea of 'within', 'secretly' is giving way or has given way to the simple reflexive idea 'self', i. e., דבכ has practically become the equivalent of דבכ, cf. p. 125f., also p. 126, n.

2 Cf. the similar constructions of 'same', p. 119.
‘and the Highest himself will establish her’ (Ps. 87, 5).

‘and the profit of the earth is for all, the king himself is served by the field’ (Ecc. 5, 8).

‘and the light of my eyes themselves also is gone from me [not with me]’ (Ps. 38, 12; cf. Num. 4, 22).

‘JHVH of Hosts, himself ye shall sanctify’ (Is. 8, 13).

‘and to Seth himself also a son was born’ (Gen. 4, 26; cf. 10, 21; Ex. 35, 34).

‘the skin of the offering, shall be for the priest himself’ (Lev. 7, 8; cf. Ezk. 10, 13).

‘and any flesh in whose own skin is a swelling’ (Lev. 13, 18).

‘and they shall dwell in Judah itself and all its cities’ (Jer. 31, 24).

In a few cases when the noun is dependent on a preposition, ‘self’ is expressed by the noun בִּי, ‘bone’ in the construct before the noun, e. g.,

‘like the heaven itself in clearness’ (Ex. 24, 10).

‘in his strength itself, the very fulness of his strength’ (Job 21, 23).

‘on the stairs themselves’ (II Ki. 9, 13).

Such.

In rare cases this idea is left to be understood from the context, e. g.,

‘any of all food ... upon which [such] water gets, is unclean’ (Lev. 11, 34—cf. בֵּן שָׁם אֶצְרוּי v. 32).

‘and every draught that is drunk in every [such] vessel, is unclean’ (ibid.—cf. v. 32).

This idea is sometimes simply expressed by the pronoun of the third person or by the demonstrative, e. g.,

‘lo, such is the joy of his way’ (Job 8, 19).

‘anyone, who touches such a thing’ (Lev. 22, 6; cf. 7, 18; 27, 9).

1 Cf. מַעַשׂ ‘something’, ‘anything’ p. 175.
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such is the generation of those that seek him’ (Ps. 24, 6; cf. 48, 15; 49, 14; Job 18, 21).

but such are the dwellings of the wicked’ (Job 18, 21).

‘that this [such an] abominable thing was done among you’ (Dt. 13, 15; Jud. 19, 24; cf. II Sam. 13, 12; 19, 37).

‘for an abomination to JHVH thy God is everyone that does these [such] things’ (Dt. 25, 16; cf. Ezek. 17, 15).

would that they had such a heart (Dt. 5, 26).

Ordinarily, however, ‘such’, used both absolutely and attributively, is expressed by ב + suffix of third person or demonstrative. The meaning is often more strongly demonstrative than simple ‘such’, viz., ‘such as he, like him, such as this, like this’, &c. When this combination stands absolutely as subject, the verb agrees with the pronoun after ב: נְפָּלִים is treated as feminine plural. Examples of its absolute use are, e.g.,

‘or was such a thing heard?’ (Dt. 4, 32).

‘and such were not seen before’ (II Ch. 9, 11).

‘is such the fast that I have chosen’ (Is. 58, 5).

‘such a thing was not seen’ (Jud. 19, 30; cf. I Sam. 4, 7; Jer. 2, 10; II Ch. 30, 26).

‘and why hast thou thought such a thing against God’s people’ (II Sam. 14, 13; cf. Jud. 13, 23; 15, 7; Is. 66, 8; Ezr. 7, 27).

‘and such things have happened to me’ (Lev. 10, 19; cf. Job 12, 3 הָלַךְ דָּמָּה).

‘and he will not do such things’ (Ezek. 18, 14).

‘who has seen such things’ (Is. 66, 8; cf. Jer. 18, 13).

When used attributively this combination usually stands after its noun, either immediately or with the relative הבּ interposed; it may however precede its noun; the pronoun after ב agrees with the modified noun, e.g.,

1 The simple demonstrative נְפָּלִים is also sometimes treated as feminine, e.g., Ex. 21, 11; Is. 49, 15: here, however, with feminine antecedent.

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such locusts' (Ex. 10, 14; cf. Neh. 13, 26; II Ch. 35, 18).

whether for such a time' (Esth. 4, 14; cf. Ezr. 9, 13).

who is such a teacher as he' (Job 36, 22).

can we find such a man as this in whom is the divine spirit' (Gen. 41, 38).\(^1\)

on such a nation' (Jer. 5, 9; 29; 9, 8).\(^2\)

Attributive 'such' may also be expressed by placing ב before a noun modified by a demonstrative, e. g.,

'...to speak such things to them' (Jer. 38, 4; cf. I Sam. 2, 23; Dan. 10, 15; Neh. 6, 8).

'...for such a passover was not held from the days ...' (II Ki. 23, 22; cf. 7, 19).

The combination of 'such' with a descriptive adjective and modified noun\(^3\) may be formed in several ways. The construction may be noun + adjective + 'such', ב + noun + adjective + demonstrative, or ב + noun + demonstrative + ל + abstract denoting the quality expressed by the adjective, e. g.,

'...and there were added to them besides many things such as those' (Jer. 36, 32).

'...and they shall do no more such an evil thing' (Dt. 13, 12; 19, 20).

'...whether there has been such a great thing' (Dt. 4, 32).

'there had never come such an abundance of spices as ...' (I Ki. 10, 10).

When the noun is not expressed 'such' may be placed before the adjective; or, in the construction with ל + abstract, it may replace noun + demonstrative, e. g.,

'I have heard many such things' (Job 16, 2).

'...and many such things are with him' (Job 23, 14).

'I had not seen such ill-favored (heifers) in all the land of Egypt' (Gen. 41, 19).

\(^1\) Here ב may be also regarded as in apposition to מ, viz., 'such a one as this, a man in whom ...'

\(^2\) Such constructions as this belong grammatically under 'such' modified by a relative, cf. p. 131.

\(^3\) In most of the examples that occur the adjective is ב 'many' (cf. p. 187 ff.), but other adjectives would doubtless be treated in the same way.
Simple 'such' may have the additional idea of 'some', 'any': 'no such' is expressed by 'such' in connection with a negative; cf. in examples given above beginning on p. 129, II Ch 9, 11; Jud. 19, 30; Ezk. 18, 14; II Ki. 23, 22; Dt. 13, 12; I Ki. 10, 10.

When the idea of 'such' is modified by a following relative clause, several constructions are employed. 'Such' may not be expressed at all; it may be expressed as in a simple sentence (cf. above) with the relative clause added; it may be expressed by כ + suffix or by adverb in the dependent clause; כ may be placed before the relative הָא, e. g.,

כְּפַלְעֹלָא הָאֲשֶׁר אֲלֵנָא בּוֹבַיְא מְכַלְעָתְא רָאָיָא 'wonders such as have not been done in all the earth' (Ex. 34, 10; cf. II Ki. 21, 12; I Ch. 29, 25).

'‘such a time of trouble as never was since ...' (Dan. 12, 1).

לֹא הָאֲשֶׁר נֶבֶשֶׁת הַגְּזָה מְנֶבֶשֶׁת לֶאָלְאָיָא הָאֲשֶׁר תַּעֲבָר מְנֶבֶשֶׁת לֶאָלְאָיָא 'and there were no such spices as the Queen of Sheba gave to king Solomon' (II Ch. 9, 9; cf. I Ki. 10, 10).

כְּפַלְעֹלָא הָאֲשֶׁר אֲלֵנָא בּוֹבַיְא מְכַלְעָתְא רָאָיָא 'such very heavy hail as never was in Egypt' (Ex. 9, 18; 24).

כְּפַלְעֹלָא הָאֲשֶׁר אֲלֵנָא בּוֹבַיְא מְכַלְעָתְא רָאָיָא 'such a great cry ... as never was' (Ex. 11, 6bis).

'‘such a man as I' (Gen. 44, 15).

'‘to such a dead dog as I am' (II Sam. 9, 8).

יַזְּהֲבוֹתָא כְּפַלְעֹלָא כַּלְעָתְא שֶפֶדֶנֶא קַלָּזֵר 'will such a man as I flee' (Neh. 6, 11).

'‘I will give thee such riches ... as none of the kings that ...' (II Ch. 1, 12).

שיְפַשּׁיָא כְּפַלְעֹלָא כַּלְעָתְא 'savory things such as I love' (Gen. 27, 4).

The idea of 'such' modified by a clause of result is found in—

"וַיֵּלֶדֶנָא בּוֹבַיְא מְכַלְעָתְא רָאָיָא 'and he is (such) a worthless fellow that you cannot speak to him' (I Sam. 25, 17).

Sometimes the idea of 'such' is expressed by the adverbs כְּפַלְעֹלָא הָאֲשֶׁר אֲלֵנָא בּוֹבַיְא מְכַלְעָתְא רָאָיָא 'there came no such almug trees ... up to this day' (I Ki. 10, 12).
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... (II Sam. 13, 18).

‘behold such is our expectation’ (Is. 20, 6).

... no kings before you had’ (II Ch. 1, 12; II Sam. 13, 12).

‘wherefore has JHVH done such things to this land’ (Dt. 29, 23; cf. Jer. 22, 8; Ps. 144, 15).

Such an adverb is employed pleonastically with the regular expression for ‘such’ in—

‘there were never such locusts before’ (Ex. 10, 14).

**Other.**

The idea of ‘other’ is often left without definite expression in connection with a noun or pronoun that taken literally includes a preceding element with which it is contrasted, but is understood not to do so, e. g.,

... ‘and behold his hand had become like his [other] flesh’ (Ex. 4, 7).

... ‘I am JHVH who have separated you from the [other] peoples’ (Lev. 20, 24; cf. 26; Ezek. 16, 34; Hos. 3, 3; 9, 1; Ps. 73, 5).

... ‘and before all [other] herbs the flag withers’ (Job 8, 12; cf. Gen. 43, 34; Lev. 7, 24; Dt. 7, 7; Jud. 16, 17).

... ‘there was no city except (that of) the Hivites, all [the others] they took in war’ (Jos. 11, 19; cf. Job 24, 24; II Ch. 32, 22[?]).

... ‘and I shall be like any [other] man’ (Jud. 16, 7; cf. Num. 36, 3).

... ‘and I shall be like all [other] men’ (Jud. 16, 17).

... ‘both in Israel and among [other] men’ (Jer. 32, 20).

The ordinary way of expressing the idea is by means of רֶבֶן used as pronoun or adjective; when only two are in question ‘שֶׁשֶׁנִּים ‘second’ is usually employed instead of רֶבֶן (tho not necessarily; cf. II Ch. 3, 11; 12; I Ki. 3, 22 below). Without article these words mean ‘another, other’, with article ‘the other, the others’, e. g.,
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

(let another take his office' (Ps. 109, 8; cf. Job 8, 19).

‘and do not disclose a secret to another’ (Prov. 25, 9).

‘and my glory I will not give to another’ (Is. 42, 8; 48, 11; cf. Job 31, 10).

‘take it, for there is no other besides it here’ (I Sam. 21, 10; cf. II Sam. 13, 16).

‘and he set others in their stead’ (Job 34, 24; cf. Job 31, 10; Ps. 49, 11; Neh. 5, 5).

‘other money’ (Gen. 43, 22; cf. Lev. 14, 42).

‘another offspring’ (Gen. 4, 25; cf. 30, 24; Ex. 34, 14; Jud. 2, 10; I Sam. 10, 6; 9; Is. 65, 15).

‘another spirit’ (Num. 14, 24).

‘other clothes’ (Lev. 6, 4; cf. Ex. 23, 13; Dt. 7, 4).

‘other stones’ (Lev. 14, 42).

‘the other cherub [of two]’ (II Ch. 3, 11; 12).

‘the other woman [of two]’ (I Ki. 3, 22).

‘woe to this same one when he falls, and there is no other to raise him up’ (Ecc. 4, 10).

‘and of the other he shall make a burnt offering’ (Lev. 5, 10).

‘and besides, moreover [the other thing]’ (II Sam. 16, 19).

‘and another bullock thou shalt take as a sin-offering’ (Num. 8, 8; cf. II Ki. 9, 19).

‘another stretch repaired M.’ (Neh. 3, 11).

‘the other lamb’ (Ex. 29, 39; 41; cf. 19; Lev. 8, 22; I Ki. 6, 25; 26; II Ki. 25, 17; Jer. 52, 22; Zech. 11, 14).

‘on the other side’ (Ex. 38, 15; cf. 26, 4; 5; 36, 11; 12; 26, 20; 36, 25; Neh. 12, 38).

‘Other’ in the sense of ‘in addition to’ is usually represented by the adverb and quasi-verb רָאָשׁ ‘yet’ (cf. p. 195), rarely by רָאָשׁ ‘a second time’, e. g.,

‘have you another brother besides’ (Gen. 43, 6).

‘and he said, there is yet another man’ (I Ki. 22, 8; cf. 7).

1 רָאָשׁ as collective (?) subject of plural verb. 2 Cf. p. 120f.
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‘yet one other plague will I bring upon Pharaoh’ (Ex. 11, 1).

‘and David took other concubines and wives in Jerusalem’ (II Sam. 5, 13).

‘and there were born to David other sons and daughters’ (ibid.).

‘bring me another vessel; and he said there is no other’ (II Ki. 4, 6).

‘I am JHVH, and there is no other’ (Is. 45, 5; 22).

‘then the priest shall shut him up seven days more’ (Lev. 13, 5; cf. 33; 54).

‘and he waited yet seven other days’ (Gen. 8, 10; cf. 12).

‘and he served with him yet seven other years’ (Gen. 29, 30; cf. 27).

The ideas ‘some’, ‘any’, ‘no’, ‘much’, ‘many’, ‘little’, ‘few’ (cf. below pp. 165ff., 187ff., 198ff.) may be combined with ‘other, more, else’ expressed by this רוּע, e. g.,

‘and thou shalt take some more of them’ (Ezk. 5, 4).

‘have you anything else’ (Am. 6, 10).

‘there was no more spirit in her’ (I Ki. 10, 5; cf. Ex. 36, 6; Is. 23, 10; Zech. 14, 11).

‘no more of thy name shall be sown’ (Nab. 1, 14).

‘I am JHVH, and there is no one else’ (Jo. 2, 27).

‘for he will not put anything more on any one’ (Job 34, 23).

‘if there are many more [still many] among the years [before Jubilee]’ (Lev. 25, 51).

‘a little more and they would have stoned me’ (Ex. 17, 4; cf. Jer. 51, 33; Hos. 1, 4; Ps. 37, 10).

‘Other’ in connection with numerals is expressed by רוּע, רוּע, e. g.,

‘and behold two others stood up’ (Dan. 12, 5).

‘seven other heifers’ (Gen. 41, 3; cf. II Ch. 30, 23).
‘and thou shalt add for thyself three other cities’ (Dt. 19, 9; cf. Jon. 3, 4).

‘then the priest shall shut him up seven days more’ (Lev. 13, 5; cf. 33; 54).

‘Another man’ and ‘another woman’ may be expressed by הבש תות הנב יבצק תות ‘neighbor, friend’, אח ‘brother’, + suffix. Most commonly the noun is singular, and the suffix of the second person singular, but other suffixes occur, and is found at least once in the plural, e.g.,

‘thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor [— another man]’ (Ex. 20, 16; cf. 17; 22, 25; Lev. 19, 13; 16; 18; Dt. 19, 14; 23, 25; 26; 24, 10; I Sam. 15, 28; II Sam. 12, 11; Prov. 3, 28; 29; 25, 9).

‘and if at the door of my neighbor [— another man] I lie in wait’ (Job 31, 9).

‘and have committed adultery with the wives of their neighbors [— other men]’ (Jer. 29, 23).

‘thou shalt not hate thy brother [— another man] in thy heart’ (Lev. 19, 17).

‘and her royal rank let the king give to her neighbor [— another woman] who is better than she is’ (Esth. 1, 19; cf. for ‘another who is better’ also I Sam. 15, 28).

‘Other’ used of persons is also sometimes expressed by ר ‘stranger’, e.g.,

‘let another praise thee and not thy own mouth’ (Prov. 27, 2; cf. 14, 10; Job 19, 27).

‘there was no other person in the house with us . . . ’ (I Ki. 3, 18).

‘let them be for thyself alone, and not for others together with thee’ (Prov. 5, 17; cf. 10).

‘if thou hast struck hands with another’ (Prov. 6, 1).

‘when a man stands surety for another’ (Prov. 11, 15; 20, 16; 27, 13).

The idea of ‘other’ in a partitive sense is regularly expressed by the nouns ו and ע ‘rest, remainder’ in the construct before the modified noun, e.g.,

1 ‘stranger’ has also occasionally a meaning similar to ‘other’, tho probably the nominal meaning is never entirely lost, e.g., Prov. 27, 2; cf. 20, 16; 27, 13.
the rest of the spoil’ (Num. 31, 32; cf. Lev. 14, 17; II Sam. 10, 10; I Ch. 19, 11).

‘the rest of Gilead’ (Dt. 3, 13).

‘the rest of our enemies’ (Neh. 6, 1; cf. II Ch. 28, 26).

‘the rest of the acts of Jehoshaphat’ (II Ch. 20, 34; cf. 25, 26; 26, 22).

‘the rest of those doing the work’ (Neh. 2, 16).

‘the rest of the city’ (I Ch. 11, 8; 16, 41; II Ch. 9, 29; 24, 14; Is. 10, 19; Esth. 9, 12; Neh. 11, 1).

The participles רָם, רֵעָה, and רֵעָה (once) ‘what is left’ are at times employed in a sense quite similar to definite ‘other’ in its attributive and partitive uses; in the latter use they are followed by נ or ב, e.g.,

‘the remaining [other] company’ (Gen. 32, 9; cf. Ex. 28, 10; Lev. 10, 12; II Ki. 7, 13).

‘the rest of the fat’ (Lev. 14, 29; cf. 2, 10).

‘and the rest we have tabooed’ (I Sam. 15, 15).

‘and the rest of you’ (Lev. 26, 39).

‘and the rest of the flesh’ (Lev. 8, 32).

In expressions containing prepositions meaning ‘besides, except’, the idea of ‘other’ is in the preposition, and they are rendered ordinarily as constructions of ‘some’, ‘any’, ‘no’ (cf. p. 183f.). Occasionally, however, the idea of ‘other’ is definitely expressed before the preposition, e.g.,

‘for there is no other besides it here’ (I Sam. 21, 10).

‘thou shalt not have any other gods besides me’ (Ex. 20, 3; Dt. 5, 7).

‘there was no other in the house except us two in the house’ (I Ki. 3, 18).

‘and there is no other god beside me’ (Is. 45, 21).

The idea of ‘other’ as the second member of such correlative expressions as

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1 This is probably to be emended—

‘except us two, we were in the house’.
'one — another'
'the one — the other'
'some — others'
'some — the others'
is expressed in several ways. The various pairs of correlatives are the following:—for the singular

1) שָׁאָן — שָׁאָא
2) יָּא — יָא
3) יִנּוֹלָא — יִנּוֹלָא
4) יָּוהָו — יָּוהָא
5) יִנּוֹלוֹהָא — יִנּוֹלוֹלָא
6) יִנּוֹלָא — יִנּוֹלָא (also fem.)
7) אָאָא — אָאָא (also fem.)
8) אָאָא — אָאָא (also fem.)
9) אָא — אָא (also fem.)

for the plural
10) הַלָּא — הַלָּא

The correlatives may be coordinate, i.e., both subjects, objects, &c., or the second may be subordinate to the first, e.g., 'one said to the other', &c. The first five pairs are regularly employed only in this latter construction; the remaining five pairs may be employed in both. Only Nos. 6, 7, and 8 are used attributively. In No. 8 the article may be used with both or omitted with both, or omitted with the first only; in No. 6 and 7 it is usually employed with both, tho' it may be omitted with either separately. Usually in those groups that take the article, it is used with both or omitted with both, or omitted with the first רָמָא; other constructions are unusual. שָׁאָא and יִנּוֹלָא as first correlative may have the construction of singular nouns, or they may stand in apposition to a plural antecedent (cf. p. 149), e.g.,

שָׁאָא רָמָא יִנּוֹלָא 'but let no one strive with or reprove another' (Hos. 4, 4; cf. Lev. 20, 10; I Sam. 2, 25; I Ki. 20, 39; Is. 3, 5).

יִנּוֹלוֹלָא 'and one said to another' (Gen. 11, 3; Ex. 33, 11; Ru. 4, 7).

יִנּוֹלָא 'and let one woman (teach) the other lamentation' (Jer. 9, 19).

1 For another way of expressing some—others cf. Neh. 5, 2—4, p. 143 below.
2 Cf. English 'one—the other'. 
Frank R. Blake,

“and their faces were one towards the other” (Ex. 25, 20; 37, 9).

“and they separated one from the other” (Gen. 13, 11; cf. with ל 26, 31: with הא Ex. 10, 23; Mi. 7, 2).

“and one woman in addition to another thou shalt not take ... in her life time” (Lev. 18, 18).

“and thou shalt couple the curtains one to another” (Ex. 26, 6; cf. 3; 5; 17; Ezk. 1, 9; 23; 3, 13).

“the vultures shall be gathered together one with another” (Is. 34, 15; cf. 16).

“between one man and another” (Ex. 18, 16; with ויתו Dt. 1, 16).

“between one man and another” (Ezk. 18, 8).

there were two men in a certain city, one was rich and the other poor” (II Sam. 12, 1).

“and he shall bring ... two young pigeons, one for a sin-offering, and the other for a burnt offering” (Lev. 5, 7; 12, 8; cf. Num. 6, 11; Jud. 16, 29; Zech. 11, 7; Dan. 12, 5).

“and make one a sin-offering and the other a burnt offering” (Num. 8, 12).

“the name of one was Gershom and the name of the other was Eliezer” (Ex. 18, 3—4).

the name of one was Adah and the name of the other was Zillah” (Gen. 4, 19; cf. Ex. 1, 15; Ru. 1, 4; masc. Num. 11, 26; II Sam. 4, 2).

“the name of one was Hannah and the name of the other was Peninnah” (I Sam. 1, 2).

“and one shall be a sin offering and the other a burnt offering” (Lev. 14, 22).

“and one smote the other and slew him” (II Sam. 14, 6; cf. without art. Ecc. 7, 27; Ezk. 33, 30).

“and one was higher than the other” (Dan. 8, 3).
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

He did his work and the other held his spear' (Neh. 4, 11: suffix and demonstrative Ex. 25, 12; 37, 3).

'one lot for JHVH and the other lot for Azazel' (Lev. 16, 8; cf. I Sam. 14, 40).

'the cherub was five cubits and the other wing of the cherub was five cubits' (I Kr. 6, 24; cf. 26; 34; 7, 15; 16; 17; 18; Ex. 25, 12; 37, 3; 25, 32; 37, 18; 26, 10; 26–27; 36, 31–32; 29, 40–41; 28, 10; Num. 28, 7–8).

'shall thou offer in the morning and the other lamb in the evening' (Num. 28, 4; contrast Ex. 29, 40; Num. 28, 7–8).

'together with the other basket had good figs ... and the other basket had bad figs ...' (Jer. 24, 2; cf. Ezk. 10, 9).

'three bowls in one branch ... and three bowls on the other branch' (Ex. 37, 19).

'three bowls on one branch ... and three bowls on the other branch' (Ex. 25, 33; cf. 26, 19; 21; 25; 36, 24; 26).

'there is one without any other' (Ecc. 4, 8).

'woe to that same one when he falls and there is no other to raise him' (Ecc. 4, 10).

'and they came to one tent ... then they came to another tent ...' (II Ki. 7, 8).

'two to one door and two wings to the other' (Ezk. 41, 24).

'and one woman said ... and the other woman said ...' (I Ki. 3, 17–22; cf. II Ch. 3, 11; 12).

'one says this is my son ... and the other says it is not so ...' (I Ki. 3, 23; cf. masc. Job 21, 23–25; Ps. 75, 8 obj.).

'and one did not approach the other the whole night' (Ex. 14, 20; cf. Ecc. 6, 5; Is. 6, 3).

1 Here רָאָס and וּסָע are in apposition, viz., 'one, his hand' cf. רָאָס 'certain' modifying noun + suffix, p. 164f. Cf. my Comp. Syn. Noun and Mod., p. 240 end.
Frank R. Blake,

'Ve look at the death of one is just like that of another' (Ecc. 3, 19).

'some (trust) in chariots, and others (= some) in horses' (Ps. 20, 8; cf. Dan. 12, 2).

'...and they encamped the ones opposite the others for seven days' (I Ki. 20, 29; I Ch. 24, 5).

Sometimes the first of two demonstrative correlatives has a strongly demonstrative meaning, e. g.,

'...this one was still speaking when another came' (Job 1, 16; 17; 18).

Occasionally the first of one of these pairs of correlatives is omitted, the first element consisting simply of a noun, definite or indefinite; a similar construction is: indefinite noun—
indefinite noun + adj. רָאָשׁ, e. g.,

'...a satyr calls to another' (Is. 34, 14).

'The hangings of one side fifteen cubits, and of the other side ...' (Ex. 27, 14—15; cf. 38, 14—15; I Ki. 6, 27).

'...and the inheritance shall not pass from one tribe to another tribe' (Num. 36, 9).

Sometimes two of these correlatives coalesce into an expression like English 'one another', German 'einander', which is treated as a single pronoun. Such combinations are שָׁאָמָה (cf. p. 151) and רָאוּ (cf. p. 151) where the close connection between the two is indicated by the construct form of the first member, e. g.,

'...and ye shall be gathered to one another, oh children of Israel' (Is. 27, 12; 66, 17).

Sometimes the idea of these correlatives used attributively is expressed simply by repeating the noun, either with the same or with modified adjuncts, e. g.,

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1 Cf. Syriac connectivity (from מָכַשׁ) 'one another'.

2 If we accept the emendation רָאוּ for רָאוּ (cf. K. Marti, Das Buch Jesaja, Tübingen, 1900 [= Kurz. Handc. zum AT, 10] p. 411) this passage probably belongs here.

3 This repetition in the sense of one—other, which may be called extensive repetition, gives rise, as it does in many languages, to many important idiomatic expressions, usually of an adverbial character, sometimes with the meaning of some other indefinite pronoun, e. g.,

'...in heaps, by heaps' (Ex. 8, 10; cf. Jo. 4, 14).
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

From one end of the earth to the other’ (Dt. 13, 8; 28, 64; Jer. 25, 33; cf. Jer. 12, 12; Dt. 4, 32).

One two, another two [and so on] = two by two, by twos’ (Gen. 7, 9; 15; cf. 7, 2; 3; I Ch. 26, 17).

One six and the other six, in groups of six’ (II Sam. 21, 20).

Part for part, the same amount of each’ (Ex. 30, 34).

One face to another face, face to face’ (Gen. 32, 31; cf. I Ki. 6, 27; Is. 52, 8).

One eye for another eye, eye for eye’ (Ex. 21, 24—25).

One after another, one by one’ (Ecc. 7, 27; cf. Is. 27, 12; also 28, 19; 13).

One gate to another gate, from gate to gate’ (Ex. 32, 27).

One sort to another, all sorts’ (Ps. 144, 13).

One day to another, day after day’ (Num. 30, 15; cf. 1 Ch. 9, 25).

One day after another day [and so on] = every day’ (I Ch. 12, 22; cf. Dt. 15, 20).

This side and on that, on either side’ (II Ki. 2, 8).

This and that way, in every direction’ (Ex. 2, 12).

And up to this and then to this, in the meantime’ (I Ki. 18, 45).

On this side and on that, on both sides’ (Ex. 26, 13; 32, 15).

On this side and on that, on both sides’ (Ezk. 40, 10; 34, 37; 41, 15; 26).

One little and another little, little by little’ (Ex. 23, 30; Dt. 7, 22).

Just as repetition in the sense of ‘each, every’ (cf. p. 152) is sometimes replaced by a plural (cf. p. 154), so likewise the numeral expressions for ‘two by two, by twos’, &c., may be represented by the plural of the numeral, e. g.,

And all the people went out by hundreds and thousands’ (II Sam. 18, 4; cf. I Sam. 29, 2).

The temporal expressions like וְיָדוּ הָיוּ may be preceded by וּבָא, e. g.,

As on every day, as always, as usual’ (I Sam. 18, 10).

As at every time, as always, as usual’ (Num. 24, 1; Jud. 16, 20; 20, 30; 31; I Sam. 3, 10; 20, 25).

Of a different character from the above is the repetition that intensifies the meaning of the simple word (intensive repetition), e. g.,

Pure gold’ (II Ki. 25, 15bis; cf. Dt. 16, 20; three times Ezek. 21, 32).

By the road alone’ (Dt. 2, 27; cf. 16, 20).

Very deep’ (Ecc. 7, 24; cf. I Sam. 2, 3; Prov. 20, 14).

Holy, holy, holy’ (Is. 6, 3).

Very much, exceedingly’ (Gen. 7, 19; Num. 14, 7; Ezek. 37, 10; Ex. 1, 7).

The repetition of two words in exclamations in Jer. 4, 19; 6, 14; 8, 11;
Frank R. Blake,

from one boundary of Egypt to the other' (Gen. 47, 21; cf. Neh. 4, 10).

and leave a space between one flock and the other' (Gen. 32, 17).

one generation goes and another comes' (Ecc. 1, 4).

‘consider the years of one generation after another’ (Dt. 32, 7).

‘four tables on one side and four tables on the other’ (Ezek. 40, 41; cf. 39; 10; 12: Num. 23, 15).

da day’s journey on this side and a day’s journey on that [a day’s journey on every side]’ (Num. 11, 31).

d a golden bell and a pomegranate [then] another golden bell and a pomegranate [and so on] around the edges of the mantel’ (Ex. 28, 34).

a set of five curtains shall be coupled to one another and five other curtains to one another’ (Ex. 26, 3; cf. 25, 33).

Latin *alius*—*alius*, are expressed by two pairs of correlative, or by one pair of correlatives combined with the repetition just mentioned, a first correlative is sometimes omitted, e. g.,

‘and give one half to one and the other half to the other’ (I Ki. 3, 25).

‘and one said in one way and another in another’ (I Ki. 22, 20).

‘and Aaron and Hur

Lam. 1, 16; and of three in II Sam. 19, 1; Jer. 7, 4; 22, 29 is also intensive, tho somewhat different from the above.

Similar intensive ideas are expressed by the collocation of two or three words from the same stem, or with similar meanings, e. g., Is. 22, 5; Ezek. 6, 14; 32, 15; 33, 28; 35, 3; 7; Nah. 2, 11; Zeph. 1, 15; Job 30, 3; 38, 27 (cf. collocation of masc. and fem. to denote ‘every’, p. 154).

Some examples form a sort of transition between extensive repetition (one—other) and intensive repetition, e. g.,

‘and the vale of Siddim was [pits and pits] all full of bitumen pits’ (Gen. 14, 10; cf. II Ki. 3, 16).
supported his hands, one on one side and one on the other" (Ex. 17, 12; cf. Num. 22, 24).

"and they were in the midst of the Israelites, some being on one side and some on the other" (Jos. 8, 22).

"one on one bank of the river and the other on the other" (Dan. 12, 5).

"one wheel beside one cherub and another wheel beside another cherub" (Ezk. 10, 9).

'six of their names on one stone and the other six on the other stone' (Ex. 28, 10).

'the wing of one touched one wall and the wing of the other cherub, the other wall' (I Ki. 6, 27; cf. Ezk. 40, 12; II Ch. 3, 11; 12).

Combinations of three identical correlative expressions are—

"one carrying three kids and another carrying ... and another carrying ..." (I Sam. 10, 3).

"one shall say I am JHVH's, another shall call on the name of Jacob, and another shall write ..." (Is. 44, 5).

"and lo some will come from afar, and some from the north and the west, and some from the land of Sinim" (Is. 49, 12).

"[one] knob under two branches of it, and a [second] knob under two other branches of it and a [third] knob under two other branches of it" (Ex. 25, 35; cf. 37, 21; I Ki. 7, 25).

"there are some that say ... and others that say ... and others that say ..." (Neh. 5, 2—4).

Sometimes the correlatives ‘one—another’ are expressed by various verbal forms, chiefly Niphal and Hithpael, occasionally in connection with some other means of expressing the same

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1 This example seems to indicate that the two correlatives some—other may be expressed by repetition of ש + plural participle (cf. p. 165) as well as by הוא—he (cf. p. 137).
idea; the adverbs ינשוּד וּהְיוֹנָה ‘together’ often accompany these verbs, e. g.,
‘against me they speak one to the other’ (Ps. 119, 23;
cf. Ezek. 33, 30; Mal. 3, 13).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְּנַשְׁוֻד ‘let us take counsel together one with another’ (Ps. 71, 10; cf. 83, 6; Is. 45, 21; Is. 43, 26).
לָהוֹר ‘why do you look one upon the other’ (Gen. 42, 1).
לְשׁוֹנָה וּנַשְׁוֻד ‘against me all my enemies whisper together, one with the other’ (Ps. 41, 8).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘righteousness and peace have kissed one another’ (Ps. 85, 10).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘and the women as they made merry answered one another’ (I Sam. 18, 7).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘then those that revered JHVH spoke to one another’ (Mal. 3, 16).

Both.

The idea of ‘both’ in apposition to two nouns or pronouns may be expressed simply by joining the two nouns or pronouns modified by the idea, by † ‘and’, by †—† ‘both—and’, or similar copulative conjunctions, e. g.,
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘and to govern [both] the day and the night’ (Gen. 1, 18; cf. Prov. 22, 2; 29, 13).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘therefore shall a man leave [both] his father and his mother’ (Gen. 2, 24).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘at thy rebuke, oh God of Jacob, both chariot and horse are fallen asleep’ (Ps. 76, 7).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘to bring some of the Israelites, both some of royal and some of noble blood’ (Dan. 1, 3; cf. Dan. 8, 13).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘and twelve lions stood there on the six steps, on both sides [on one and on the other]’ (II Ch. 9, 19; cf. 18; [*—I Ki. 10, 19; 20]; Ex. 32, 15; Jos. 8, 33; Ezek. 45, 7; 47, 7; 12; 48, 21).1
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘our asses have both straw and fodder’ (Jud. 19, 19bis; cf. Gen. 24, 25).
לָשׁוֹנָה וְנַשְׁוֻד ‘and thou shalt slay both man and woman’ (I Sam. 15, 3 quater; cf. Ex. 9, 25; Jer. 6, 13; 9, 9).

1 For יפּוֹתֵב יָפָּה cf. p. 140, n. 3.
Occasionally the dual has the idea of 'both' instead of simply 'two', e.g., "בשִׁירֵי הָשָׁמָיִם 'better is one handful with quiet than both hands full with vexation' (Ecc. 4, 6).

לְהָעָלַיֻת הָעָלָיִם 'to be earnest in doing evil with both hands' (Mi. 7, 3).

This idea is regularly expressed by the numeral שִׂמְרַים 'two'. When not used attributively, it is always accompanied by the suffixes of the plural, the suffix agreeing in person with the nouns or pronoun referred to. When nouns are referred to, both numeral and suffix are masculine a) when both the nouns denote male persons; b) when they denote things, even when feminine; c) when one of the nouns is a male person: when the two nouns are female persons either both numeral and suffix, or the numeral only may be feminine. שִׂמְרַים + suffix may be employed absolutely, or it may stand in apposition to the nouns or pronoun referred to, which latter often follow שִׂמְרַים, e.g.,

two males—

אֲנָכָה שִׂמְרַים 'and the two of them (they both) made a treaty [Abraham and Abimelech]' (Gen. 21, 27; cf. I Sam. 23, 18; I Ki. 5, 26).

שִׂמְרַים אֲנָכָה 'and they both dreamed a dream' (Gen. 40, 5; cf. Gen. 21, 31; Lev. 20, 13; Jud. 19, 8; I Sam. 2, 34; 14, 11; 20, 11; II Sam. 14, 6; 17, 18; I Ki. 11, 29; II Ki. 2, 6; 7, 8; Esth. 2, 23).

שִׂמְרַים טוב בְּיִרְבֵּךְ 'let the cause of both come before God' (Ex. 22, 8; cf. Gen. 9, 23; Prov. 24, 22; 29, 13).

שִׂמְרַים טוב 'and Joseph took both of them' (Gen. 48, 13; cf. Ex. 22, 10; II Ki. 2, 11; 4, 33; Zech. 6, 13; Prov. 27, 3; Ecc. 4, 3).

two things—

שִׂמְרַים תְּהִקְנָה 'from one land shall both [masc. שִׂמְרַים 'roads'] come' (Ezk. 21, 24; cf. Ex. 26, 24; 36, 29; Dt. 23, 19; Ecc. 11, 6).

שִׂמְרַים תְּהִקְנָה 'JHVH made both [fem. שִׂמְרַים 'ear' שִׂמְרַים 'eye']' (Prov. 20, 12; cf. 10).

1 Ordinarily, however, the numeral שִׂמְרַים must be added to give this meaning (cf. p. 146); e.g., שִׂמְרַים 'both his hands' (Lev. 16, 21; cf. I Sam. 5, 4; 'feet' II Sam. 9, 13; 'ears' I Sam. 3, 11; II Ki. 21, 12; 'eyes' Jud. 16, 28). Contrast these cases with simple dual in Jud. 1, 7; 16, 21; II Sam. 4, 4; 9, 3; I Ki. 15, 23; II Ki. 25, 7; Jer. 19, 3; Ezek. 23, 25.
but a fool’s wrath is heavier than both
7, 13 [= 19 — 25 passim]; Is. 1, 31).

male and female—
מAtPath ית ‘they shall both [ישיא ‘man’, השיא ‘woman’]
surely be put to death’ (Lev. 20, 11; cf. Gen. 3, 7; Lev.
20, 18; Num. 12, 5; Dt. 22, 24).

two females—
 khoảng ‘and they both became his wives’
(I Sam. 25, 43; cf. Ezk. 23, 13).
小额 ‘and they both traveled until
they came to Bethlehem’ (Ru. 1, 19; cf. 4, 11).

1st and 2nd pers.—
לא אינני ‘there is no reprover between
us to lay his hand on us both’ (Job 9, 33; cf. Gen. 31, 37).
thing ‘why should I lose both of you in
one day’ (Gen. 27, 45).

antec. expressed—
מקודש לע תומךש רחיק הז行长 is both an abomination to JHVH’ (Prov. 17, 15).
יניעו ‘and the man and his wife were
both naked’ (Gen. 2, 25; cf. Num. 25, 8; Dt. 22, 22).
JHVH made both the
hearing ear and the seeing eye’ (Prov. 20, 12; cf. 10).
‘and both Mahlon and Kilion died’
(Ru. 1, 5).

‘and both he and Samuel went
out’ (I Sam. 9, 26).
‘as we have both sworn in
the name of JHVH’ (I Sam. 20, 42).1

When ‘both’ is used attributively modifying a single noun,
it is expressed either by placing שָׁנָה + suffix before the noun,
as in the appositional construction just described, or by using
the simple numeral שֶׁנָּה with the noun: the noun is definite,
e. g.,
‘and the heart of both the kings
was set upon evil’ (Dan. 11, 27).

1 For I Ki. 3, 18; cf. p. 136. n.
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'and both the men shall stand . . .' (Dt. 19, 17).

'it shall be forsaken by both her kings' (Is. 7, 16; cf. Ex. 32, 15).

'and both the daughters of Lot were with child by their father' (Gen. 19, 36).

'Both' in connection with a demonstrative pronoun occurs in—

'and both these things shall come upon thee . . . in one day' (Is. 47, 9).

'those two things are come upon thee' (Is. 51, 19).

For 'both' modified by partitive 'each' cf. p. 151f.

The idea of 'both' may be emphasized by using the adverbs 'together', e. g.,

'thou shalt not plow with both ox and ass together' (Dt. 22, 10; cf. 11).

'he and his princes together' (Am. 1, 15).

'the wolf and the lamb shall lie down both together' (Is. 65, 25).

'and they went both together' (Gen. 22, 6; 8; cf. Jud. 19, 6; Is. 1, 31).

'they have fallen both together' (Jer. 46, 12).

'or whether they shall both together be good' (Ecc. 11, 6).

Either, Neither.

Ordinarily neither of these expressions is employed absolutely, or in connection with a single noun; but only in an appositional relation similar to that of בִּשְׁנָה + suffix on p. 146.

'Either' is expressed simply by connecting the two words between which the choice lies by או 'or' or by using the correlative prepositions דּוּב—דּוּב 'from— to' with the two. 'Neither' is expressed by a negative in connection with an expression for 'either', or with the two words connected by ד 'and', e. g., how then could we have stolen (either) silver or gold from thy lord' (Gen. 44, 8).

'have you (either) a father or a brother' (Gen. 44, 19; cf. Ex. 5, 3; 21, 4; 18; 20; 26–37 passim).

1 The doubtful Hithpael of רָּשָׇׁא (Ezk. 21, 21) according to some has the meaning of 'take one or the other, either'.
‘take heed lest you say to Jacob anything either good or bad’ (Gen. 31, 24; 29; cf. 14, 23; Ex. 11, 7).

‘we can say to you neither bad nor good’ (Gen. 24, 50; cf. Num. 22, 18; 24, 13; I Sam. 22, 15).

‘he had neither son nor daughter’ (Jud. 11, 34).

‘for neither my sword nor my weapons have I taken with me’ (I Sam. 21, 9; cf. I Ki. 22, 31; Is. 17, 8).

Absolute ‘either’ is expressed by ‘both’ in—

‘but a fool’s wrath is heavier than both [either]’ (Prov. 27, 3; cf. Ecc. 4, 3; cf. p. 146).

Each, Every.

These two closely related ideas are usually distinguished in Hebrew, tho not infrequently a construction that ordinarily has the meaning of ‘each’ assumes that of ‘every’.

‘Each’ used absolutely is expressed by שָׁאָל (שָׁאָל) ‘man’, רָאָשׁ ‘one’, or a combination of the two דֹּאָשׁ אֶל ‘one man’, or by the corresponding feminines. These have the concord of a singular, e.g., נִשְׁמָת אֱלֹהִים ‘and each one loaded his ass’ (Gen. 44, 13; cf. Ps. 39, 7).

‘each one did what was right in his own eyes’ (Jud. 17, 6; cf. 21, 25; II Ki. 14, 6; Ezek. 22, 11 ter).

‘and each (every) woman shall ask from her neighbor jewels of silver ... ’ (Ex. 3, 22; cf. Am. 4, 3).

‘each was the head of his family’ (Num. 1, 4).

‘for thou rewardest every one according to his work’ (Ps. 62, 13; cf. II Sam. 6, 19; Jer. 17, 10; 23, 36; 32, 19; Ezek. 1, 23; Zech. 10, 1; I Ch. 16, 3).

‘every one to his tents, oh Israel’ (II Sam. 20, 1; cf. Dt. 16, 17; I Ki. 22, 36bis).

‘and he rewards every one according to his work’ (Prov. 24, 12).

‘each had two, each bound together’ (Ezek. 1, 11).\footnote{It is of course possible that בְּשָׁאָל (cf. p. 137) has fallen out after...}
‘each in appearance like the king’s sons’ (Jud. 8, 18).

‘and an ox for each one’ (Num. 7, 3; cf. I Ki. 4, 7; Ezk. 1, 6; 10, 14).

‘fifty shekels of silver to each one’ (II Ki. 15, 20; cf. Ezk. 9, 2).

The idea of ‘each’ used partitively is expressed by placing שָׁאָל (פְּלָשֵׁים) or יָשָׁה (יָשָׁה) ‘each’ in apposition to the plural pronoun (including pronouns expressed by verbal forms) or noun (including collectives even when they have the concord of a singular) when they have the concord of a singular) in which it is contained. The phrase containing שָׁאָל usually stands after, but may precede the pronoun or noun, e. g.,

‘and each of them opened his sack’ (Gen. 44, 11bis; cf. Ex. 7, 12; 12, 3; 16, 21; 30, 12; 33, 8; Num. 16, 18; Jud. 21, 24bis; I Sam. 4, 10; 25, 13; II Sam. 13, 29; I Ki. 8, 38; 22, 17; II Ki. 14, 12; Is. 31, 7; Jer. 26, 3; 36, 3; Jon. 1, 5; Mi. 4, 4).

‘let each of you put his sword at his side’ (Ex. 32, 27; cf. 16, 16; Lev. 25, 10bis; Num. 16, 17ter; Dt. 3, 20; 12, 8; Jos. 4, 5; Jud. 8, 24; 21, 21; I Sam. 8, 22; 14, 34; 25, 13; I Ki. 12, 24; II Ki. 18, 31ter; Jer. 25, 5; 35, 15; II Ch. 11, 4).

‘each of us dreamed according to the interpretation of his dream’ (Gen. 41, 11).

‘and every one of you runs to his own house’ (Hag. 1, 9; cf. I Ki. 10, 25; II Ch. 9, 24).

‘let each of you take according to what is in his tent’ (Ex. 16, 16; cf. Lev. 19, 3; Ezk. 20, 7: 3rd pers. Ex. 16, 18; Dt. 24, 16; Is. 9, 19; Ezk. 20, 8; 22, 6; Jo. 2, 7; Mi. 7, 2; II Ch. 25, 4).

‘and each of the Israelites camped in his own camp . . . ’ (Num. 1, 52bis; cf. 32, 18; Jud. 2, 6; 21, 24: יָשָׁה Jos. 6, 5; Jud. 7, 7; I Sam. 14, 34; יָשָׁה Ezk. 46, 18; יָשָׁה Gen. 47, 20; cf. also I Sam. 25, 10; Jer. 37, 10; Ezk. 8, 12).

the second שָׁאָל (cf. Bertholet, Das Buch Hesekiel, Freiburg i. B., 1897 [= Kurz. Handc. zum AT., 12] p. 6), but such a supposition is not necessary; the singular שָׁאָל stands in apposition to the plural מְשֹׁרָה as in constructions on p. 149.
remove each of the kings from his place' (I Ki. 20, 24).

'and he sent every one of the people to their inheritance' (Jos. 24, 28).

'and every one of the Israelites fled to his tent' (II Sam. 19, 9; cf. I Ki. 5, 5).

'and may each of you find rest in the house of her husband' (Ru. 1, 9; cf. 8).

'each one of them was in his family' (Num. 1, 44).

'they were as thou art, each like princes in appearance' (Jud. 8, 18).

'and I will bring each of them back to his inheritance and to his land' (Jer. 12, 15).

The genitive of 'each' may be expressed by a construct chain, but it is usually rendered by placing the governing noun with retrospective suffix after ישא. This position of ישא is due to analogy with the more numerous constructions where it naturally stands at the beginning of the appositive phrase (cf. above), e. g.,

'and from JHVH is the judgment of every one' (Prov. 29, 26; cf. Ps. 64, 7; Job 34, 11; with והנה cf. below Jud. 7, 22; I Sam. 14, 21).

'and to restore their money to the sack of each' (Gen. 42, 25; cf. 35; Jud. 21, 22).

'the name of each thou shalt write on his rod' (Num. 17, 17; cf. I Sam. 30, 22).

'and he interpreted our dreams for us, according to the dream of each he interpreted' (Gen. 41, 12; Ex. 12, 4; Num. 7, 5).

'and he put one piece of each opposite the other' (Gen. 15, 10).

'and every man's censer was in his hand' (Ezek. 8, 11; cf. 9, 1; 2; Zech. 8, 4).

'the hallowed things of every one are his; what each one gives to the priest is his' (Num. 5, 10).\footnote{For the רָּאָשׁ before רְשׁוּפּ cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 117 m, also p. 122, n. In the second part of the verse this same peculiar genitive construction is preserved, the instead of a noun + retrospective suffix, we have relative clause with retrospective subject.}
The word שָׁאָל in the correlative expressions meaning ‘the one—the other’, often has the added meaning of ‘each’, ‘every’ (cf. p. 137ff.), e. g., שָׁאָלָתָהוּ וַחֲזֵרָהּ ‘and they asked each after the health of the other’ (Ex. 18, 7; cf. Jer. 34, 15; Zech. 3, 10; 8, 16). שָׁאָלָתָהוּ וַחֲזֵרָהּ ‘and they kissed each other’ (I Sam. 20, 41). שָׁאָלָתָהוּ וַחֲזֵרָהּ ‘every one neighs after another’s wife’ (Jer. 5, 8; cf. Ezk. 22, 11).

שָׁאָלָתָהוּ וַחֲזֵרָהּ ‘and JHVH turned the sword of every man against his comrade’ (Jud. 7, 22; cf. I Sam. 14, 21).

The correlatives שָׁאָל and וַחֲזֵר, doubtless as a result of their occurrence in immediate juxtaposition, have formed the stereotyped expression וַחֲזֵר שָׁאָל ‘one another, each other’ (cf. above p. 140), e. g., שׁור וַחֲזֵר ‘at the hand of man, at the hand of each one’s brother I will require the life of man’ (Gen. 9, 5).

שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר ‘and the harm of one another devise not in your hearts’ (Zech. 7, 10; contr. 8, 17).

שָׁאָל ‘each’ may be combined with ‘self’ expressed by pronominal suffix or בַּר, e. g., בַּר ‘the men of the army plundered, each for himself’ (Num. 31, 53).

שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר ‘and let every man save himself from the burning wrath of JHVH’ (Jer. 51, 45; cf. Ezk. 32, 10).

The ideas of ‘both’ and ‘each’ may be combined by placing שָׁאָל ‘each’ in apposition to an expression containing the idea of ‘both’, e. g., שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר ‘and they both dreamt a dream, each in one night’ (Gen. 40, 5).

שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר ‘and thou and Aaron, each his censer’ (Num. 16, 17).

1 The use of the singular here in apposition to a plural is to be compared with the constructions on p. 157f.

2 Cf. K. Budde, Die biblische Urgeschichte, Giessen, 1883, p. 283ff. An example which stands midway between the ordinary use of שָׁאָל and this crystalized expression is, שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר ‘nor shall one oppress another’ (Jo. 2, 8).

Here שָׁאָל may be taken either as וַחֲזֵר שָׁאָל or שָׁאָל וַחֲזֵר.
'and Simeon and Levi took each one his sword' (Gen. 34, 25; cf. I Ki. 22, 10).

Each is employed not only in an absolute sense, but also occasionally as an attribute to either a definite or indefinite noun (cf. אָהֵב, אָהֵב, אָהֵב); e. g.,

'and Solomon's food for each [one] day was...’ (I Ki. 5, 2; Neh. 5, 18).

Every laver contained forty baths (I Ki. 7, 33; cf. Ex. 26, 2; bis; 16; 28, 17; 36, 9; bis; 15; bis; 21, 22; Lev. 24, 5; Num. 7, 8; bis; 15, 5; 11; bis; 28, 12; bis; 13; 28; bis; 29, 4; 14; bis; I Ki. 7, 27; 30, 32; 34, 42; 10, 16, 17; Jer. 52, 21; I Ch. 27, 1; II Ch. 4, 13; 9, 15; 16).

Each may also be used partitively, governing a prepositional phrase (cf. אָהֵב, אָהֵב, אָהֵב, אָהֵב), e. g.,

'and each of them had four faces and four wings' (Ezk. 1, 6).

'and each of [among] them was clothed in linen' (Ezk. 9, 2).

'and each of them shall take a sheep' (Ex. 12, 3; cf. Jud. 21, 21; Zech. 10, 1; I Ch. 16, 3). 3

'Each' used attributively may be expressed by repetition of the modified noun, often with one or more adjuncts. This construction has the idea of 'every' as frequently as that of 'each'. The two words may stand without connective, or be joined by אַ, 'and' or in time expressions in late passages by אָהֵב 'in'. These phrases may stand in the same grammatical relations as the single word, or they may stand in apposition to a plural antecedent, or as an absolute adverbial expression. When they stand as subject they seem to require a plural verb, e. g.,

'and it came to pass as she spoke to him each (every) day and he did not...’ (Gen. 39, 10; cf. Dt. 14, 22).

'and every nation was making its own gods' (II Ki. 17, 29).
and he delivered them to his servants, each flock by itself’ (Gen. 32, 17).

‘and they gathered it every morning’ (Ex. 16, 21).

‘this is a memorial of me for every [all] generation’ (Ex. 3, 15; cf. 17, 16).

‘and the land shall mourn every family apart’ (Zech. 12, 12). ¹

every Sabbath he shall set it in order before JHVH’ (Lev. 24, 8).

‘and it came to pass as they spoke to him each (every) day, and he did not . . . ’ (Esth. 3, 4; contrast Gen. 39, 10).

‘each province according to its writing’ (Esth. 8, 9; cf. 1, 22).

‘and with them the elders of every city’ (Ezr. 10, 14; cf. Esth. 1, 8; I Ch. 28, 14bis; 15bis).

‘and they cast lots . . . for each (every) gate’ (I Ch. 26, 13; cf. I Ch. 28, 16).

‘thou shalt eat it every year’ (Dtr. 15, 20; cf. I Sam. 1, 7; I Ch. 12, 22: after.Idem ‘as often as’ I Sam. 7, 16; Zech. 14, 16; II Ch. 24, 5).²

‘the allowance of every day [daily portion]’ (Ex. 5, 19; Jer. 52, 34; Neh. 11, 23; 12, 47: no suffix II Ch. 8, 13).

Occasionally the idea of ‘each’ in connection with a noun depending on another is expressed by the repetition of the governing noun, e. g.,

‘and take from them a rod for each family’ (Num. 17, 17).

‘and with him ten princes, one prince for each family’ (Jos. 22, 14; cf. Num. 1, 4; 13, 2; 34, 18; Is. 6, 2).

Sometimes both the governing and the dependent noun are repeated; in this case the dependent noun usually has the article, e. g.,

¹ The use of the plural perhaps gives the added force of ‘various’, viz., ‘each of the various families apart’.

² In Is. 66, 23 where יָעָבָד is said to mean ‘every’ (cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 159) the distributive meaning is probably due to the repetition. The second noun in this example has a suffix, viz., נָעַבְד לוֹ ‘as often as every newmoon’ (bis).
'and all their princes gave him a rod for each one' (Num. 17, 21).

A special form of repetition is that which consists of a masculine and feminine noun from the same stem usually connected by . This has ordinarily the added meaning of 'sort, kind', viz., 'all sorts of-', e. g., will take away ... every support [every sort of support]

'I procured for myself all sorts of singers'

Occasionally the plural of a noun is used in the sense of 'each', 'every', apparently as a substitute for repetition, e. g., and that thou shouldst visit him every morning and try him every moment' (Job 7, 18; cf. Ezek. 32, 10).

Attributive 'each' is also sometimes expressed simply by the article, usually in connection with a noun depending on a numeral or measure, or a noun subject with such a word in its predicate, e. g.,

For combination of 'each' and 'all' cf. p. 161.

Similar combinations of masculine and feminine forms, implying the not explicitly expressing the idea of 'every, all' are found in Is. 11, 12; 43, 6; 49, 22; 49, 23; 60, 4; Jer. 48, 19; Ezek. 21, 31; Zech. 9, 17; two suffixes Is. 38, 16; two verbs Nah. 3, 159.

'Every sort' is also expressed by ל, cf. p. 159.

These cases are cited by Gesenius-Kautzsch (§§ 123 c, 134 q) as instances of distributive 5. So also יִשְׁרָאֵל, יִשְׁרָאֵל I Sam. 29, 2; II Sam. 18, 4 (cf. p. 141, n.); cf. also S. Herner, Syntax der Zahlwörter im alten Testament, (dissertation) Lund 1893, p. 125. As already recognized by König, Syntax, p. 336f. there is no distributive 5.
'and he hid them fifty men in each cave' (I Ki. 18, 4).

'and I took from you twelve men, one from each tribe' (Dt. 1, 23).

'and he sent them ... ten thousand each month' (I Ki. 5, 28).

'and thou shalt set them in two rows, each row six' (Lev. 24, 6).

'the tenth of a bath out of every kor' (Ezk. 45, 14; cf. Jud. 17, 10; Ezek. 4, 10; 45, 24ter; 46, 5bis; 7ter; 11ter; Neh. 10, 33).

'a beka [= 1/2 shekel] to every head' (Ex. 38, 26; cf. 12, 3; 16, 16).

'every shekel is ten gerahs [= a shekel equals ten gerahs]' (Ex. 30, 13; Num. 3, 47).

'and he offered a bullock and a ram on every altar' (Num. 23, 14).

'and bring your sacrifices every morning' (Am. 4, 4).

Occasionally the article is omitted in these constructions the idea of 'each', 'every' being understood from the context, e. g.,

'a wench or two to a [every] man' (Jud. 5, 30).

'and I take you, one from a [every] city and two from a [every] clan' (Jer. 3, 14).

The idea of 'every' modifying a numeral, cardinal or ordinal, is expressed by the article as in the construction just discussed, e. g.,

'and we will take ten men of every hundred' (Jud. 20, 10; cf. Num. 31, 30; 47; Neh. 11, 1).

'a wagon for every two princes and an ox for each one' (Num. 7, 3).

'one head [life] of every five hundred' (Num. 31, 28; Ezek. 45, 15).

'and he placed a torch in the midst between every two tails' (Jud. 15, 4).

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1 The meaning 'every' here is possible, but by no means certain, the article may be nothing but the ordinary article, cf. K. Marti, _Dodeka-propheton_, Tübingen. 1904 [= Kurz. Handc. zum AT., 13], p. 181.
and that we would set aside every seventh year' (Neh. 10, 32; cf. Lev. 27, 32[?]).

The article, however, may be omitted with the higher numerals just as it is with המִיתָן 'each one', e. g., "once in [every] seven years there came ... ' (I Ki. 10, 22; II Ch. 9, 21).

םֵשַׁם 'at the end of [every] seven years thou shalt institute a release' (Dt. 15, 1; cf. 14, 28; 31, 10).

The same idea is expressed by םי 'between' in—

'and every ten days some of all [kinds of] wine' (Neh. 5, 18).

The article is not infrequently employed in connection with other constructions for 'each', 'every'. For its combination with repetition see next paragraph; instances of its use with other constructions are, e. g.,

'and JHVH reward every one [according to] his righteousness ... ' (I Sam. 26, 23; cf. I Ki. 8, 39; Prov. 24, 29; II Ch. 6, 30).

two homers for each' (Ex. 16, 22; cf. Num. 15, 12).

'one basin upon each base' (I Ki. 7, 38ter; cf. p. 152).

'for all day long I have been plagued and my chastisement was every morning' (Ps. 73, 14; cf. Zech. 4, 2[?]).

Sometimes 'each' is rendered by one of the constructions expressing the idea of 'each' (cf. p. 148 ff) in connection with repetition, e. g.,

'and they were numbered each according to his work' (Num. 4, 49; cf. Ex. 36, 4).

'every man was born in her' (Ps. 87, 5; cf. Esth. 1, 8).

'and with you there shall be a man of every tribe' (Num. 1, 4).

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1 For ב cf. p. 175f. With ב cf. use of Syriac בֵּין 'between' in distributive expressions (Nöldeke, Syr. Gramm. 2 p. 178, § 240).

2 In Zech. 4, 2 the meaning of the text as it stands is certainly 'seven pipes to every lamp', תַּחְנוֹן in this case is to be considered like זָהָב Ps. 73, 14. If, however, one נֶעֲבָד is omitted (cf. K. Marti, Dodeka-propheton p. 413) this example does not belong here.
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Seraphim ... with six wings to each' (Is. 6, 2).
‘one man from every tribe’ Jos. 4, 2; 4).
‘one man of every tribe of their fathers thou shalt send’ (Num. 13, 2).
‘twelve men, one for every tribe’ (Josh. 3, 12; cf. Ex. 36, 30; Num. 28, 21; 29; contr. 29, 4).
‘thou shalt take five shekels for each one [head]’ (Num. 3, 47; cf. I Ki. 18, 13; Ezek. 10, 21; Zech. 4, 21).
‘each spoon ten shekels in weight’ (Num. 7, 86).
‘two supports under each board’ (Ex. 26, 21; cf. 19; 25).
‘a thousand of every tribe ye shall send to war’ (Num. 31, 4).

The idea of ‘each’, ‘every’ is sometimes expressed, chiefly in poetry, by using a singular (as predicate, pronominal suffix, &c.) to refer to a plural noun, the singular referring to each individual included in the plural. The meaning is very similar to ‘any’ and sometimes the construction passes completely over to this character, e. g.,
‘every one of those that curse thee shall be cursed, and every one that blesses thee shall be blessed’ (Gen. 27, 29; cf. Num. 24, 9; Is. 3, 12; Prov. 3, 18).
‘every one that defiles it shall surely be put to death’ (Ex. 31, 14; cf. Lev. 19, 8; Prov. 18, 21; 27, 16; 28, 16 Kt.).
‘the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, how much the more when every one of them brings it in wickedness’ (Prov. 21, 27; cf. Is. 57, 2; Zech. 14, 12).
‘and the righteous are every one as bold as a lion’ (Prov. 28, 1; cf. 3, 35).
‘refusing to be comforted for her children, for every one is dead’ (Jer. 31, 15).

1 See p. 156, n. 2.
2 Apparently only the numeral is repeated when noun + numeral is taken distributively.
‘and upon their iniquity they set every one his heart’ (Hos. 4, 8; cf. Is. 2, 7bis; 8; 35, 7; 57, 2; Zech. 14, 12bis; Ps. 5, 10; 62, 5; Job 38, 32).

which they made every one for himself’ (Is. 2, 20; cf. 5, 26; 8, 20; 30, 22; Job 24, 5; cf. Is. 5, 23).

‘and the Ekronites cried out they have brought the ark to every one of us to kill us and our people’ (I Sam. 5, 10).

‘Every’ used absolutely, English ‘every one’ is usually expressed by the word for ‘all’ in the forms ל כל or כ כל; and ל כל ordinarily take the construction of a singular, but may take that of a plural, e.g., ב כל זר וי ‘his hand shall be against every one, and the hand of every one against him’ (Gen. 16, 12).

‘and every one will be ashamed of a worthless people’ (Is. 30, 5).

‘they shall every one [all] come to an end in the land of Egypt’ (Jer. 44, 12; Prov. 19, 6).

‘JHVH is good to every one [all]’ (Ps. 145, 9; cf. Ecc. 5, 8; 9, 3; 10, 3; Ezr. 8, 34).

‘every one is a lover of gifts and a chaser of rewards’ (Is. 1, 23; cf. Ex. 14, 7; Is. 9, 16; 15, 3; 16, 7; Jer. 6, 13; 8, 6; 10bis; 15, 10; 20, 7; Ps. 29, 9; 53, 4).

‘Every’ used attributively is expressed by ל in construct before the modified noun, which is singular and indefinite.

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1 The singular suffix of לאר, however, may refer to the collective idea implied in לאר, the meaning being then ‘and Ekron cried they have brought the ark to me to kill me and my people’.

2 Cf. use of ל and לכל for ‘all’ p. 203f.

3 Read for לאר ‘every one is the friend of’.

4 לאר may be explained as a collective ( = לאר) with the concord of a singular or as plural ואר + singular suffix (cf. p. 157). It is not impossible to suppose that we have here an appositional suffix (viz. לאר ‘every one’ + לאר ‘he’) such as has developed in Ethiopic and Amharic into a sort of definite article (cf. Dillmann-Bezold, Æthiop. Gramm., Leipzig, 1899, §§ 156, 172b; F. Praetorius, Die amharische Sprache, Halle, 1879, p. 199ff.) but this is unlikely.
The noun may take other modifiers like any indefinite noun preceded by a construct, e.g.,

יִשָּׁרָה ‘every house’ (Is. 24, 10).

םָרָה ‘every people’ (Esth. 3, 8).

יִשָּׁרָה ‘every woman’ (Num. 31, 17).

יִשָּׁרָה ‘every mad man’ (Jer. 29, 26; cf. Prov. 2, 9).

יִשָּׁרָה ‘every fortified city’ (II Ki. 3, 19).

יִשָּׁרָה ‘every human heart’ (Is. 13, 7).

לְכָל both absolute and attributive has sometimes the force of ‘every sort of’, e.g.,

שָׁם ‘two of every sort thou shalt bring into the ark’ (Gen. 6, 19; cf. 20). 1

שָׁם ‘bringing fish and all sorts of ware’ (Neh. 13, 16; cf. Lev. 19, 23; Neh. 5, 18; I Ch. 29, 2). 2

לְכָל before a singular demonstrative has sometimes the force of ‘every one of them, all of them’, e.g.,

שָׁם ‘every one of them could sling stones to a hair’s breadth without missing’ (Jud. 20, 16).

לְכָל ‘every one of them was a warrior’ (Jud. 20, 17).

‘Every one’ modified by the idea of a relative clause may be expressed by לְכָל or שָׁם followed by a relative clause, but usually it is rendered by לְכָל followed by the participle or adjective that constitutes the predicate of the dependent clause treated like the indefinite nouns in the last paragraph, e.g.,

שָׁם ‘every one that trusts in them’ (Ps. 115, 8; 135, 18).

שָׁם ‘thou might to every one that is to come’ (Ps. 71, 18; cf. II Ch. 30, 18—19).

שָׁם ‘from every one whose heart gives it freely’ (Ex. 25, 2).

שָׁם ‘every one that has a quarrel or a case’ (II Sam. 15, 4).


2 Gen. 24, 10 does not belong here (so Gesenius-Buhl, p. 342); שָׁם means ‘all the goods entrusted to him by his master’.

3 Perhaps to be classed with the constructions in which a singular refers to a plural antecedent, p. 157.
and it shall come to pass that every one that I meet will kill me’ (Gen. 4, 14; cf. without suffix Ps. 128, 1; Is. 55, 1).

‘and to every one that gives a free gift to JHVH’ (Ezr. 3, 5; cf. Ezk. 16, 25).

‘and unto me were gathered every one that trembled at the words of . . . ’ (Ezr. 9, 4).

‘therefore shall every one that is pious pray . . . ’ (Ps. 32, 6; cf. Job 40, 11; 12).

Sometimes the noun or participle modified by ָל in the sense of ‘every’ is accompanied by the article, as the result of some confusion between the ideas of ‘every’ and ‘all’, e. g.,

‘and every man that had a dispute . . . ’ (II Sam. 15, 2).1

‘every seat upon which he sat’ (Lev. 15, 4bis).2

‘every one that is left in the midst of the land’ (Is. 7, 22; cf. 43, 7; Jer. 5, 6; Zech. 5, 3; Dan. 12, 1).3

In connection with the words for ‘man’ ישו and כָּל, ‘thing’ כֶּל makes a more emphatic ‘every one’, ‘every thing’ כָּל may take the article (cf. above), e. g.,

‘cause every one to go out from me’ (Gen. 45, 1; cf. II Sam. 13, 9bis; 15, 4).

‘every one is only a breath’ (Ps. 39, 12; cf. 6; Job 21, 33).

‘only what shall be eaten by every one’ (Ex. 12, 16).

‘he seals up the hand of every one’ (Job 37, 7).

‘to confirm every thing’ (Ru. 4, 7).

‘every thing that will stand fire’ (Num. 31, 23; cf. II Sam. 15, 36).

1 The use of the article here is due to a confusion between ישו ‘every one’ and ישו ‘all the men’. That ‘every one’ is intended by the writer is indicated by כָּל and also by ישו in the similar passage v. 4.

2 These examples are due perhaps to a confusion between ‘every seat’ and ‘the whole seat’ both of which ideas were in the mind of the writer. In Ps. 119, 160 ָל belongs under ‘all’ being collective.

3 In these examples where the modified nouns are participles the article is similar to the article used as relative pronoun; cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 188 i, k.
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'until every thing was completed that…'
(Jos. 4, 10; cf. Dt. 13, 1; II Sam. 15, 35; Jer. 42, 4; 5; 44, 17).

'Every thing' modified by an adjective idea is expressed by תלל + masculine adjective, e.g.,
everything green' (Job 39, 8; cf. Neh. 9, 25).
everything bitter' (Prov. 27, 7).
everything hidden' (Ecc. 12, 14).
everything high' (Job 41, 26).
everything evil' (Dt. 17, 1; 23, 10).

The constructions for the expression of 'each' may be combined with ל 'all' to express the idea of 'each and every', e.g.,
'I will make thy name to be remembered in each and every generation' (Ps. 45, 18; cf. 145, 13;
Esth. 9, 28; וי Esth. 2, 11;/watch Esth. 9, 27; רי II Ch.
11, 12).

יתר and each and every one of the people cut down his bough' (Jud. 9, 49; cf. 7, 7; 8; I Sam.
30, 6; II Sam. 15, 30).
to each and every one he gave changes of raiment' (Gen. 45, 22; cf. Ezk. 7, 16).
and each and every one of us returned to the wall to his work' (Neh. 4, 9).
and I will set each and every one against his neighbor' (Zech 8, 10).
and each and every one of the princes gave him a rod' (Num. 17, 21).
For ל 'every' emphasized by repetition and ו 'all', cf. under 'all', p. 211.
For 'every' combined with 'some', 'any', 'no', cf. under 'all', p. 212.

Indefinite Cardinals.

So and So, Such and Such.¹

This idea used absolutely is expressed by ב + demonstrative or pronoun of the third person used twice, or by the combination יפלל אלמלס,² e.g.,

¹ In some of the examples here given 'so and so' might be regarded as either adverbial or pronominal.
² In Dan. 8, 13 יפלל used absolutely is either a contraction or a scribal corruption of this longer form.

11 JAOS 34
Frank R. Blake,

"such and such things said the girl"
(II Ki. 5, 4; cf. 9, 12; Jos. 7, 20; II Sam. 17, 15).

"such and such things has Micah done to me"
(Jud. 18, 4; cf. I Ki. 14, 5; II Sam. 11, 25).

"I would have given you besides such and such things"
(II Sam. 12, 8).

"sit here So and So" (Ru. 4, 1).

This idea used attributively is expressed by אָלבֵּינָן אָלְמָן standing as a genitive after its noun, in—
אָלְמָן מָשָׂא אָלְמָן to such and such a place
(II Sam. 21, 3; II Ki. 6, 8).

Occasionally this idea is expressed by the simple demonstrative, or by the adverb "thus", e. g.,
והָגְיָרָה מִכָּלְמָן take care not to go by such and such a place
(II Ki. 6, 9).

והָגְיָרָה נַכְּלָל so and so shall it be done to the one that kills him
(I Sam. 17, 27; cf. I Ki. 22, 20).

It is apparently expressed by אָלְמָן a certain one in—
אָלְמָן לַשָּׁבֶץ אָלְמָן and he would say thy servant is from such and such a tribe of Israel
(II Sam. 15, 2).

A certain, Certain.

This idea, which is usually employed attributively, is ordinarily expressed simply by the indefinite state of the noun, e. g.,
והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and a certain man drew his bow to its fullest extent"
(I Ki. 22, 34; cf. II Ki. 4, 42).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and he met a certain man"
(Gen. 37, 15; cf. 32, 25).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and there came a certain man of God from Judah"
(I Ki. 13, 1; cf. 20, 28).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and there came a certain old man from the field"
(Jud. 19, 16; cf. II Sam. 1, 2).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and there happened to be there a certain worthless man"
(II Sam. 20, 1).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and there was found in it a certain poor, wise man"
(Ecc. 9, 15).

והָגְיָרָה אָלְמָן "and the watchers saw a certain man coming from the city"
(Jud. 1, 24).

1 Two adjectives occur here without connecting as modifiers of the same noun. Usually the connective is employed, cf. my Comp. Syn. Noun and Mod., p. 167 f.
and there with us was a certain Hebrew boy’ (Gen. 41, 12).

'and he captured a certain boy of the people of Succoth' (Jud. 8, 14; cf. I Sam. 21, 8).

'he entrusted to me a certain matter' (I Sam. 21, 3).

'and shall beat him according to his offence with a certain number [of stripes]' (Dt. 25, 2).

'certain worthless men have gone out . . . ' (Dt. 13, 14).

'and I Daniel fainted and was ill certain days' (Dan. 8, 27; cf. Neh. 1, 4).

Sometimes in the case of a singular noun this idea is strengthened by the addition of the adjective דָּוִד 'one', e. g., 'and a certain man saw [it]' (II Sam. 18, 10; cf. I Ki. 20, 35).

'and a certain woman cast an upper mill-stone upon the head of . . .' (Jud. 9, 53).

'there were two men in a certain city' (II Sam. 12, 1).

'and a certain one of the young men told Abigail' (I Sam. 25, 14; cf. II Ki. 4, 1).

'A certain one' in a partitive sense is expressed by דָּוִד, absolute or construct, or with article (cf. below), by דָּוִד or by דָּוִד, governing the noun of which they form a part after מִן (cf. also preceding example). The plural 'certain ones' may be expressed by מִן דָּוִד 'men' followed by מִן, e. g.,

'and a certain one of his servants said . . . ' (II Ki. 6, 12: abs. cf. 17, 28; I Sam. 16, 18; 26, 22; Ezek. 19, 3).

'and from a certain one of them came forth . . .' (Dan. 8, 9).

'and a certain one of the prophets . . . ' (I Ki. 20, 35; cf. Ezek. 33, 2).

'and a certain one of Saul's servants was there on that day' (I Sam. 21, 8; cf. Num. 25, 6).

'he and certain men of Judah' (Neh. 1, 2; cf. Jer. 26, 17; Ezek. 14, 1; 20, 1).

1 This construction is the germ of a formal indefinite article. In only a few cases, however, in Hebrew, has דָּוִד 'a certain' been weakened to simple 'a', cf. Ex. 16, 33; Jos. 4, 5; II Ki. 6, 2. Most of the cases which are usually cited as examples of דָּוִד = 'a' are rather = 'a certain', so Jud. 13, 2; I Sam. 1, 1; I Ki. 18, 11; II Ki. 4, 1; Dan. 8, 13.
'and there came certain men from Shechem . . . ' (Jer. 41, 5; cf. Num. 16, 2; Jos. 2, 2).

Not infrequently the definite article used indefinitely has the meaning of 'a certain, certain', e. g., 'and a certain fugitive came . . . ' (Gen. 14, 13; cf. Ezk. 33, 21; Num. 11, 27 נַעַר; II Sam. 15, 13 יְרֵעֲשָׁה; 17, 17 נַעַר).

'and he came upon a certain place, and spent the night there' (Gen. 28, 11; cf. Ex. 2, 15 תִּבְאֹר).

'and he brought among his fellows a certain Midianitish woman' (Num. 25, 6).

'and the angel of the Lord appeared to him . . . in the midst of a certain bush' (Ex. 3, 2).

'and a certain lion came and took a sheep from the flock' (I Sam. 17, 34).

'and on a certain day [— one day] he went out to his father, to the reapers (II Ki. 4, 18; cf. 8, 11; I Sam. 1, 4; 14, 1; Job 1, 6; 13).

'and there were certain men lying in wait in the chamber with her' (Jud. 16, 9).

A certain one' used absolutely may be expressed by the preceded by this indefinite definite article1; 'certain' plural, by . e. g.,

'and a certain one [of them] opened his sack' (Gen. 42, 27; cf. II Ki. 6, 3; 5).

'and there were certain men that were unclean . . . ' (Num. 9, 6).

'a certain one' may take a correlative 'other' like 'one', (cf. p. 137 f.), e. g.,

'and a certain one of the prophets said to another' (I Ki. 20, 35).

When 'certain' modifies a singular with possessive suffix it may be expressed by after the noun either with or without the indefinite definite article, e. g.,

1 Probably the use of without article was also possible. and were also probably employed in this sense, tho they are ordinarily used with the added sense of 'man', (cf. Gen. 37, 15; I Ki. 22, 34; II Sam. 18, 10).
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These ideas are usually expressed by the same constructions, and are best treated together. However, the two ideas 'any' and 'no' ('no' being the negative of 'any', not of 'some') have in common a number of constructions which are not found in the case of 'some'.

When these ideas stand as the subject of a sentence containing a verbal predicate, they may be represented simply by the unexpressed, indefinite subject of the verb. When the verb stands in a dependent sentence, or in other words when the subject has the meaning 'some that', 'some one that', &c., it is regularly represented by the participle, usually without relative pronoun. In a dependent sentence, the predicate of such an indefinite subject may also be an adjective. The participles and adjectives are treated in this case just like nouns. When the predicate is singular its subject represents 'some one', 'any one', or 'no one', when it is plural, 'some', 'any', 'none', e. g., נַח דִּבְרָיָן אַבְרָהָּם וְאַבְרָהָּם יִשְׂרָאֵל 'and after these things some one said to Joseph' (Gen. 48, 1; cf. 2; I Sam. 24, 11).

לָהֵם מָשְׁרַשׁ 'some one calls to me from Seir' (Is. 21, 11).

אֲפִירָם יִקְשְׂפִּיתֵם וְנֶמְצָא 'there are some that say, our bones are dried up' (Ezk. 37, 11).

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1 Cf. יִנְחַּת Neh. 4, 11 under 'one—other' p. 139.

2 These words when used in this article without limitation are meant to include all uses of the indefinite ideas they represent, absolute, attributive, partitive, e. g., 'some' sg. and pl. adj.; 'some one', 'something', 'some' pl. absolute; 'some of' partitive: and so with 'any' and 'no'.

2 The indefinite personal pronoun French on, German man, English you, they, is expressed by the same constructions that denote 'some', 'any', 'no' as subject, viz., by:

a) unexpressed indefinite subject, e. g.,

כְּלָלוֹת הַדְּאֵרָה עַל אָמָּה 'therefore they [one] called its name Babel' (Gen. 11, 9; cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, Hebr. Gr., § 144 d).


c) שָׁיָם, cf. p. 172, n. 2.
and there are some that say...’ (Neh. 5, 2; 3; 4). I saw in Judah some that trod wine presses on the Sabbath’ (Neh. 13, 15; sg. I Ki. 1, 48).

‘...and I sought... and for some to comfort [me] and found none’ (Ps. 69, 21).

‘...and he was as [some] one that joked in the eyes of his sons-in-law’ (Gen. 19, 14; cf. Ps. 119, 162; Prov. 6, 11; Cant. 1, 7; 8, 10).

‘for the king speaks this as one guilty’ (II Sam. 14, 13; cf. Ps. 35, 14 בָּאָשָׁב; 78, 65 קָשׁ; cf. also Num. 12, 12 אָשָׁב; Ps. 89, 11 בָּאָשָׁב).

‘...and if any one say I have sinned...’ (Job 33, 27).

‘...is there still any one left of the house of Saul’ (II Sam. 9, 1).

‘...and no one says, where is God my maker’ (Job 35, 10; cf. 12; Is. 44, 19; Ps. 22, 30).

‘...and none shall appear before me empty-handed’ (Ex. 23, 15).

‘...let none hold him’ (Prov. 28, 17).

‘...houses in which none dwell’ (Job 15, 28).

‘...and Jericho was besieged... no one came out and no one went in’ (Jos. 6, 1; cf. Lev. 26, 6; II Ki. 9, 10; Is. 1, 31; 5, 29; 14, 31; 22, 22bis; 34, 10; 59, 4bis; 66, 4; Jer. 4, 4; 13, 19; Ezek. 34, 6bis; Ps. 50, 22; Job 11, 19; II Ch. 20, 24).

‘...and of all her lovers she has none to comfort her’ (Lam. 1, 2; cf. 1, 17; Dt. 28, 31).

‘...but no one goes to war’ (Ezek. 7, 14; cf. Dt. 32, 39).

‘...and ye shall flee when no one pursues you’ (Lev. 26, 17; cf. Gen. 40, 8).

‘...thou hast said, no one sees me’ (Is. 47, 10).1

‘...that he might not allow any one to come out or go in to Asa’ (II Ch. 16, 1; cf. Jer. 51, 62).

‘...and the cities of Judah I will make a wilderness so that no one dwells [there]’ (Jer. 9, 10; cf. 11).

‘...Zion’s paths mourn because none come to her feasts’ (Lam. 1, 4).

1 The logical subject of קָשׁ is only apparently definite, but cf. p.173, n.
'he shall have no one to sit on the throne of David' (Jer. 36, 30).

'and let there be no dweller in their tents' (Ps. 69, 26; cf. 109, 12).

The same ideas are sometimes expressed by making a participle or verbal adjective derived from the same stem as the verb, the subject instead of leaving the subject entirely indefinite. The participle or adjective may stand in singular or plural, and with or without the article, e.g.,

'that some one will hear it and say . . .’ (II Sam. 17, 9).

'and some of them escaped' (Jos. 10, 20).

'and if any one dies near him suddenly' (Num. 6, 9).

'if any one falls from it' (Dt. 22, 8; cf. Is. 28, 24; Ezk. 33, 4).

'in their presses no one will tread wine' (Is. 16, 10).

'no one of them shall flee away, and no one of them shall escape' (Am. 9, 1).

'for I have no pleasure in any one's death' (Ezk. 18, 32; cf. Num. 12, 12; Ps. 89, 11).

A participle with or without article may stand as predicate in the protasis of a conditional sentence without conditional particle, in the sense of 'any one that', e.g.,

'if any one sheds man's blood by man shall his blood be shed' (Gen. 9, 6; cf. Ges.-Kautzsch, § 116w).

'if any one speaks to you bring him to me' (II Sam. 14, 10).

Not infrequently the ideas 'some', 'any', 'no', particularly the last, are left without definite expression, e.g.,

'thou shalt surely give him something' (Dt. 15, 10).

'and I sought for [some] to console me, and there was none' (Ps. 69, 21).

'have you any more' (Am. 6, 10).

1 The same construction may have the force of the indefinite personal pronoun, cf. p. 165, n. 3, e.g.,

'one [a man] shall be put to death on the word of two or three witnesses' (Dt. 17, 6; cf. Is. 28, 4; Jer. 9, 23). Cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 144e.
I will be —ed if I take anything’ (II-Ki. 5, 16; cf. Ex. 22, 2; Num. 15, 24; 30; Dt. 15, 2).

I will raise up some one from the north’ (Is. 41, 25).

‘and thou shalt say there is no one’ (Jud. 4, 20).

‘thou hast no one commissioned by the king’ (II Sam. 15, 3; cf. II Ch. 20, 6; Esth. 5, 12 with נ ב, cf. p. 183f.; II Sam. 7, 22 and Dan. 1, 19 with ב, cf. p. 185).

‘and I sought among them for a man, and found none’ (Ezk. 22, 30).

‘and there was no day like that day before it or after it’ (Jos. 10, 14).

‘let it look for the light when there is no light’ (Job 3, 9; cf. Jer. 35, 14; Ezek. 7, 25).

‘and for some to comfort me, and I found none’ (Ps. 69, 21; cf. Is. 34, 12).

‘and to the Kohathites he gave none [wagons and oxen]’ (Num. 7, 9).

‘if he has nothing’ (Ex. 22, 2; cf. Prov. 22, 27).

‘and thou givest him nothing’ (Dt. 15, 9; cf. Ex. 5, 8; Dt. 4, 2).

‘there is nothing to be added to it and nothing to be taken from it’ (Ecc. 3, 14).

‘they lacked nothing’ (Neh. 9, 21; cf. Ecc. 6, 2).

‘and hid nothing from him’ (I Sam. 3, 18).

‘we will restore them and ask nothing in return’ (Neh. 5, 12).

‘is it nothing to you’ (Lam. 1, 12).

‘some of the people went out to glean, but they did not find any of it [manna]’ (Ex. 16, 27; cf. 26).

‘Some one,’1 ‘any one,’ ‘no one’ may be expressed by one of the words for ‘man’ שַׁיָּא, יָּאָרָה, שָׁמַע, or by שֵׁם ‘person’.2 Occasionally the combination שֵׁם + genitive of ‘man’ is employed in the same meaning, e. g.,

‘if any one could count the dust of the earth’ (Gen. 13, 16; cf. Lev. 15, 18; 24; Dt. 23, 11; Jud. 4, 20; II Sam. 19, 8; II Ki. 4, 29; Ps. 49, 17).

1 No examples of ‘some’ seem to occur.
2 שֵׁם ‘flesh’ has occasionally a meaning very much like ‘anyone’, cf. רְשׁוּפֶּל used of Israel in Jer. 12, 12; Jo. 3, 1.
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'and says, is there anyone here' (Jud. 4, 20).
\textit{if a false witness rise up against any one}' (Dt. 19, 16; cf. II Ki. 4, 29).

'and any man that has a seminal emission' (Lev. 15, 16; cf. 24, 17).

'when any one sins' (Lev. 5, 1; cf. 2, 1).

'if any one of you bring an offering to JHVH' (Lev. 1, 2).

'if any one touches the dead body of any one he shall be unclean . . . ' (Num. 19, 11).\footnote{For \textit{אֶל֖} cf. p. 180f. In Lev. 24, 17 \textit{אָמָּה} means rather 'the life of any man' cf. the \textit{מְשִּׁים} and \textit{פָּשָׁה} in v. 18.}

'if the snakes had bitten any one' (Num. 21, 9).\footnote{For use of \textit{אֶל} cf. p. 222.}

'and no one shall deliver her from my hand' (Hos. 2, 12; cf. Gen. 24, 16; Ex. 16, 29; Jud. 11, 39; 21, 8; II Ki. 10, 19; 25; Ps. 49, 8).

'and he oppresses no one' (Ezk. 18, 7).

'not one [star] is lacking' (Is. 40, 26).

'for there is no one that does not sin' (I Ki. 8, 46).

'let no one's heart fail him' (I Sam. 17, 32).

'he regards no one' (Is. 33, 8).

'and when any one has no Goel' (Lev. 25, 26).

'every one that smites any one' (Num. 35, 30; cf. Prov. 28, 17).

'for God respects no one' (II Sam. 14, 14).

The meaning of \textit{אֲלֵהֶם} in these constructions may be emphasized, viz., 'any at all, any whatsoever, &c.;' by repeating the \textit{אֹיָב}. e. g.,

'when any one [man] whatsoever has an issue from his flesh' (Lev. 15, 2; 17, 10; 13; 22, 4; 24, 15; Num. 5, 12; 9, 10).

'no one of you whatsoever shall approach to any near of kin . . . ' (Lev. 18, 6). The word \textit{אָשֶׁר} with the meaning of 'any' may be followed by a correlative meaning 'other', just as when it means 'one' (cf. p. 137f.), e. g.,
Frank R. Blake,

‘and if any one [man] hate another’ (Dt. 19, 11).

‘that in which any one trespasses against another’ (I Ki. 8, 31).

‘let no one plot the evil of another’ (Zech. 8, 17).

The idea of ‘some one’ &c., used absolutely is also sometimes expressed by רוח ‘one’, e. g.,

מִי שׁוֹדֵרָה נָפְשֹׁמַע ‘who can make a clean thing from an unclean, no one’ (Job 14, 4).

‘Some’ plural absolute referring to persons may be expressed by מִשְׁתַּלָשׁ ‘men’, e. g.,

וַיִּזְדַּמְנוּ ‘and some [men] left some of it till morning’ (Ex. 16, 20; cf. II Ch. 30, 11).

The idea of ‘something’, ‘anything’, ‘nothing’, may be rendered by בְּרֵךְ ‘word, thing’ or בְּרֵךְ (once by מִשְׁתַּלָשׁ ‘word, thing), e. g.,

וַיָּצָא וְלֹא הָיָה בְּרֵךְ ‘and he said, I have something [to say] to you’ (I Ki. 2, 14; cf. Job 4, 12).

וַיְמַעֲרֵר רוּחַ ‘come up to us [if you dare], and we will show you something’ (I Sam. 14, 12; cf. 3, 11; I Ki. 14, 5; Jer. 38, 14).

וַיְהִי מִקְרָא ‘and I will take something from him’ (II Ki. 5, 20).

וַיִּשָּׁמַע ‘is there anything of which one can say . . . ’ (Ecc. 1, 10; cf. Job 15, 11).

וַיִּהְדַּו ‘is anything too wonderful for JHVH’ (Gen. 18, 14).

ולא יֵלְדָה ‘don’t be hasty in uttering anything before God’ (Ecc. 5, 1; cf. I Sam. 3, 17; 22, 15; Ezek. 14, 9; Prov. 25, 2bis).

מִבְּלַע ‘the end of anything is better than its beginning’ (Ecc. 7, 8; cf. 8, 1).

וַיְנַעֲצֶנָה אֱלֹהִים ‘and it seemed difficult to Amnon to do anything to her’ (II Sam. 13, 2; cf. Num. 22, 38).

לֹא ‘nothing was left’ (II Ki. 20, 17; cf. 15; 13; Ex. 5, 11; Esth. 6, 3; II Ch. 9, 2).

וַיִּשָּׁמַע ‘hide nothing from me’ (Jer. 38, 14; cf. Gen. 19, 8; Dt. 2, 7; 22, 26; I Ki. 5, 7; Jer. 42, 4; Neh. 5, 8).
‘and do nothing to him’ (Gen. 22, 12; cf. 30, 31; 40, 15; I Sam. 12, 4; 5; 20, 26; 39; 25, 15; 29, 3; Jer. 39, 12; Jon. 3, 7; Ecc. 7, 14; 9, 5).

‘and nothing was missing to them’ (I Sam. 25, 7; cf. Jud. 14, 6; I Ki. 18, 43; Jer. 39, 10; Ecc. 5, 13).

‘silver was accounted as nothing . . .’ (II Ch. 9, 20; I Ki. 10, 21).

‘if thou decreest anything it shall be established for thee’ (Job 22, 28).

‘Some’, ‘any’, ‘no’, used attributively may be expressed simply by the indefinite noun, singular or plural, e. g.,

‘and we will say, some wild beast has devoured him’ (Gen. 37, 20).

‘and some harm will come upon us’ (II Ki. 7, 9).

‘for he thought, something has happened’ (= it is some happening) (I Sam. 20, 26).

‘let us send some men before us’ (Dt. 1, 22; cf. Gen. 12, 20; Jos. 7, 2; I Ki. 11, 18; 24).

‘let the girl stay with us ten days or so (= some days or ten)’ (Gen. 24, 55; cf. 4, 3; I Ki. 17, 7; Is. 65, 20).

‘and at the end of some years, they shall be joined together’ (Dan. 11, 6; cf. 8; 13).

‘and some Hebrews crossed the Jordan’ (I Sam. 13, 7; cf. 23, 19).

‘and if I have done any wrong’ (II Sam. 14, 32).

‘and if thou knowest any men of force among them’ (Gen. 47, 6; cf. Ob. 5; Job 33, 32).

‘there was no silver’ (I Ki. 10, 21; cf. 18, 26; Ps. 36, 2; 119, 165; Job 20, 21).

‘let no fugitive come out of the city’ (II Ki. 9, 15; cf. Gen. 13, 8).

‘and no harm follow’ (Ex. 21, 22; cf. Jer. 42, 17; 44, 14; Mi. 3, 11).

‘behold to me thou hast given no offspring’ (Gen. 15, 3; cf. Dt. 2, 34).

1 The words for ‘man’ singular and plural, which are used absolutely for ‘some one’, ‘any one’, &c., belonged originally here meaning ‘some man’, ‘some men’, &c.
there are no grapes on the vine, and no figs on the fig tree' (Jer. 8, 13; cf. Ex. 14, 11; 34, 17).

'and they had no sons' (Num. 3, 4; cf. 26, 33; I Sam. 1, 2).

'and she has no breasts' (Cant. 8, 8).

'they will leave no gleaning-grapes' (Jer. 49, 9; cf. Lev. 26, 1).

When a noun of this type is a cognate accusative the construction sometimes expresses the idea of 'something', 'anything', 'nothing', e. g.,

'and if ye sell anything [any selling]' (Lev. 25, 14).

'he roasts something [a roast]' (Is. 44, 16).

'and Joseph dreamt something [a dream]' (Gen. 37, 5).

'he that knows anything [has any sense] spares his words' (Prov. 17, 27).

Attributive 'some', &c., may also be expressed by the definite article used indefinitely, e. g.,

'lest some evil befall me, and I die' (Gen. 19, 19).

'and some lion will smite you' (I Ki. 20, 36).

'and she called someone' (Jud. 16, 19).

'and anyone that sits on anything that ...' (Lev. 15, 6; cf. 23).

'and if any man said to him ...' (I Sam. 2, 16; cf. שמה Lev. 5, 4).

1 Besides the various meanings discussed in the text, viz., 'a certain' (p. 164), 'some', 'any', 'no' (p. 172) 'some other', 'some single one' (p. 173), at least one other variety of this indefinite definite article may be distinguished in the examples given by Gesenius (cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 126 r), viz., in some cases it is almost equivalent to a possessive, e. g., נַעַלְשֶׁנִי חָלְשֶׁנִי הָבְעֵד 'behold it is wrapped up in the cloth [that pertains to it, its cloth]' (I Sam. 21, 10; cf. Gen. 15, 1; 50, 26; II Sam. 23, 21).

In other cases the article may be explained as definite from the context, e. g.,

'and she called someone' (I Sam. 17, 19) = 'the woman [of the house]' (cf. שָׁאְמָה רָעָב v. 18).

2 Siman is employed in the sense of indefinite pronominal subject in, 'לֹא כְּלַוָּא לָעָּא מְדֹרָה שָׁאְמָא 'in Israel they [one] formerly said' (I Sam. 9, 9).
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"and all that any one has, he will give for his life" (Job 2, 4; cf. Prov. 15, 23; 20, 3; 17).

"for no man [one] shall see me and live" (Ex. 33, 20; cf. Jer. 4, 25 4).

Occasionally this indefinite definite article has a somewhat more definite meaning 'some single one', 'same' about equivalent to רַחֵם 'same' cf. p. 121, e. g.,

'and a man and his father shall have intercourse with some one maid' (Am. 2, 7).

It may also have the meaning of 'some other, different from this', e. g.,

'גֶּלֶּב אֲלֵי הַנַּחַת אִשָּׁה וְהָיָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה 'the man appeared to me who came to me the other day' (Jud. 13, 10).

This indefinite definite article is also employed in connection with other constructions for 'some', 'any', 'no' (cf. שֵׁן, הָעָלָה above, and p. 167), e. g.,

'be not as [some] one dead' (Num. 12, 12; cf. Ps. 89, 11).

'קָמָה וְאָנַּחַת וּלְשׁוֹנָה 'that some one will hear it and say...

(II Sam. 17, 9; Dt. 22, 8).

Attributive 'some' modifying a plural noun is occasionally expressed by the plural of the numeral 'one', (cf. Spanish unos 'some'), in the examples that occur, with the added sense of 'few', e. g.,

'ולָלְךָ עַל צָלְמַי אֲנָחָה 'and thou shalt dwell with him some [a few] days' (Gen. 27, 44).

'וַיֶּלַע בְּלַעְתָּו וְיִרְאֶהוּ 'and they seemed in his eyes as a few days' (Gen. 29, 20; cf. Dan. 11, 20).

'Some', 'any', 'none', used in a partitive sense 'some of, &c.' is expressed by the preposition מִן 'from, of' before a definite noun, singular or plural, or pronoun of which the 'some, &c.' forms a part. When such an expression is predicate to a singular, the מִן has the force of 'some one of', &c. e. g.,

'זָא מִן הַזְּרוֹעַ לְעַמָּהוֹ 'and the priest shall put some of the blood upon the horns of...

(Lev. 4, 7).

'זָא מִן 'and let him take some of the blood of the bullock' (Lev. 4, 5; cf. II Ki. 10, 10; Ps. 72, 15; 137, 3).

1 Here the logical subject of יְהֹוָה, which is regularly indefinite, takes this article, viz., יְהֹוָה יָהוָה.
and thou shalt put some of thine honor upon him' (Num. 27, 20; cf. Lev. 2, 16bis; 11, 25; 37; 38; Dt. 2, 5).

some of the people went out to gather' (Ex. 16, 27).

let me leave with you some of the people that are with me' (Gen. 33, 15; cf. II Ch. 16, 10).

and there were some of the priestly-class that ...' (Ezr. 10, 18; cf. Jer. 52, 15; II Ch. 21, 4).

and some of those of understanding shall fall' (Dan. 11, 35).

and some of my young men I stationed at the gates' (Neh. 13, 19; cf. Ru. 2, 16; Dan. 8, 10).

and some left some of it till morning' (Ex. 16, 20; cf. 16).

and he fought against Israel and took some of it captive' (Num. 21, 1).

and some of them had wives ...' (Ezr. 10, 44).

this one is one of the Hebrew children' (Ex. 2, 6; cf. Ru. 2, 20).

and if any of the flesh of the consecrations, or of the bread remain till morning' (Ex. 29, 34; cf. Lev. 11, 25; 37; 38).

and see lest there be any of the servants of JHVH here with you' (II Ki. 10, 23).

and none of the meat ... shall remain over ...' (Dt. 16, 4; cf. II Ki. 10, 10).

and I found none of the Levites there' (Ezr. 8, 15).

let us not give them any of the spoil' (I Sam. 30, 22; cf. Ex. 12, 46; Dt. 2, 5).

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1 Here מַעְלָה, with מַעְלָה = partitive 'some', is certainly the possessor, and should be preceded by ו viz., מַעְלָה. The omission is perhaps due to the fact that מַעְלָה has here a certain possessive as well as a partitive force (cf. the acquisition of a partitive force by the possessive ו, p. 177), contrast Neh. 5, 5 where מַעְלָה has only partitive force.

2 With this use of the plural in a singular sense, 'one of', and the similar use of ז + pl. below, compare the plurals said to be used in a similar sense, Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 124o. These plurals, however, are generic, standing for a class, not for a number of individuals, e. g., מִשְׁפָּר (Dt. 17, 5) means not 'to thy gates', or 'to one of thy gates', but 'to the gate (a regular part of every city)'.

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I shall leave none of them there any more' (Ezk. 39, 28; cf. 7, 11).

'ye shall leave none of it until morning' (Lev. 22, 30; cf. Dt. 26, 14ter).

In a few cases this ה may stand before a word denoting one single thing. So before the nomen unitatis 'hair' in the sense of 'any one of, a single one of'; also before partitive ר (cf. p. 177), where it is pleonastic, e. g.,

'if a single hair of his head falls to the ground' (I Sam. 14, 45; cf. II Sam. 14, 11; I Ki. 1, 52).

This ה + suffix of third person singular masculine is sometimes used as a neuter pronoun in the sense of 'something', 'anything' or 'any such thing' (cf. p. 128), e. g.,

'and let him raise in his hand some [something] of the meal of the sacrifice' (Lev. 6, 8).

'he had nothing [no one] either son or daughter' (Jud. 11, 34; cf. Jos. 1, 7).

'and the person that eats any such thing shall bear his iniquity' (Lev. 7, 18; cf. 27, 9).

The partitives expressed by ה may be used in connection with the indefinite participial construction (p. 167). In this construction ל may take the place of ה (cf. p. 177), e. g.,

'and some of them escaped' (Jos. 10, 20).

The preposition ב has developed a partitive meaning which is occasionally very similar to that of ה, tho it is usually more demonstrative than indefinite, e. g.,

'and let them be of those that eat at thy table' (I Ki. 2, 7).

'they are of those that rebel against the light' (Job 24, 13).

'and thou art one of those that trouble me' (Jud. 11, 35; cf. Prov. 22, 26).

'and it shall happen that when some of them fall at the beginning' (II Sam. 17, 9; cf. II Ki. 17, 25).

'and they found nothing of her except ...' (II Ki. 9, 35).

1 In all these cases and in Ex. 25, 15, מ is said to stand for הנוק. Gesenius-Kautzsch states p. 461, n. that they may be otherwise explained, but does not give any explanation. In Ex. 25, 15 the suffix refers loosely to the masc. noun מ 'ark'.

In all these cases and in Ex. 25, 15, מ is said to stand for הנוק. Gesenius-Kautzsch states p. 461, n. that they may be otherwise explained, but does not give any explanation. In Ex. 25, 15 the suffix refers loosely to the masc. noun מ 'ark'.
... was prepared for me, and every ten days some of all [kinds of wine]' (Neh. 5, 18).

The idea of 'some one', &c., used partitively, may also be expressed by דּוֹתֵן 'one', שאו 'man', שָׁם 'men', governing the plural or collective in which it is included. דּוֹתֵן may take its noun in the genitive, or after מ or ב (here דּוֹתֵן may be construct); שאו, שָׁם only after מ or ב.' This construction is really a strengthening of the preceding. The meaning when דּוֹתֵן is used is often equivalent to the singular of the dependent noun with the added attributive idea 'some, any, no', e.g.,

'and let us throw him into some pit [some one of the pits]' (Gen. 37, 20; cf. II Sam. 6, 20; 17, 9bis; 12).

'and every one of the people might easily have lain with thy wife' (Gen. 26, 10).

'that he might flee to [some] one of these cities and live' (Dt. 4, 42; cf. Lev. 25, 48; I Sam. 9, 3; II Ki. 17, 27).

'and whenever any Levite comes from any one of thy gates' (Dt. 18, 6; cf. 13, 13).

'and if they do any of the things prohibited by JHVH' (Lev. 4, 13; cf. 22; 27; 5, 17; 22; 26; Jud. 17, 11; II Sam. 9, 11).

'no one of these shall fail' (Is. 34, 16; cf. Num. 16, 15; Dt. 28, 55; Ps. 34, 21; 106, 11).

'when there was none of them' (Ps. 139, 16; cf. Ex. 14, 28).

'to do to thee any of these' (Ezek. 16, 5; cf. Lev. 5, 13).

'lo, the man has become as [any] one of us' (Gen. 3, 22; cf. I Sam. 17, 36; Ob. 11).

'some of the Asherites' (II Ch. 30, 11).

'arm some of yourselves for the war' (Num. 31, 3).

'and there was no one of the house-servants there' (Gen. 39, 11).
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וושב אשתך נצפתו 'and they took the women captive, they killed none at all' (I Sam. 30, 2).

ואל נוגר פסח ואש 'and none of them was left . . .' (Num. 26, 65; 31, 49; cf. I Sam. 30, 17; I Ki. 18, 40; II Ki. 10, 14).

'if any of these men see . . .' (Dt. 1, 35).

'and among these there was no one of those numbered by Moses' (Num. 26, 64).

'for there was no one among us that knew how to cut wood like the Sidonians' (I Ki. 5, 20; cf. I Sam. 14, 36; Is. 5, 27; Hos. 7, 7).

A partitive force is also sometimes given by placing שָׁא in apposition to a plural definite noun or pronoun in a negative sentence (in an affirmative the meaning of שָׁא is 'each', 'every'), e. g.,

'no one moved his tongue against any of the Israelites' (Jos. 10, 21; שָׁא יְשֵׁן אֵשׁ Lev. 18, 6).

'and let none of you go out from the door of his house' (Ex. 12, 22).

In a few passages יה is used partitively takes an additional נ before it, the whole phrase being treated like a single noun made partitive by נ (cf. p. 175), e. g.,

'It is not the ḫašṭef which does any of these things' (Lev. 4, 2; cf. 5, 13; Ezek. 18, 10).

'if there is among you any of thy brethren that is poor . . .' (Dt. 15, 7).

Occasionally the preposition ל is employed instead of ש or נ in constructions of partitive 'some', 'any', 'no', the possessive idea having given way to the partitive, e. g.,

'none of them shall flee away, and none of them shall escape' (Am. 9, 1).

'some, any one of them' (cf. Ezek. 1, 6 'each of them').

Similar partitive ideas may be expressed by using the exceptive construction with שָׁא יְשֵׁן &c., after a definite noun or pronoun, e. g.,

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1 The שָׁא is not to be regarded as the שָׁא after רַמַּא transposed from its proper position; so Brockelmann, Comp. Syntax, p. 84. Cf. Arabic מַזָּא. op. cit., p. 397.

2 Examples like נָשַׁי אֵשׁ יַהֲפָכֵל 'and they took for themselves each a sheep' or 'each one of them took a sheep' (Ex. 12, 3; cf. Jud. 21, 21) show how ל acquired this force, cf. p. 152.
‘if any of the men . . . except Caleb see . . .’ (Num. 32, 11—12).

When one of these indefinite ideas ‘some’, ‘any’, ‘no’, is combined with an adjective it may be expressed by the indefinite adjective alone, either masculine or feminine. When the indefinite idea is ‘some one’ &c., the adjective is logically its predicate (cf. p. 165f.), e. g.,

Jo, I will do something new’ (Is. 43, 19; cf. Jer. 31, 22).

‘they were considered as something strange’ (Hos. 8, 12; cf. Ecc. 2, 24).

‘who will show me anything good’ (Ps. 4, 6).

‘no one was exempt’ (I Ki. 15, 22).

‘there is no one so holy as JHVH’ (I Sam. 2, 2).

‘for there is nothing true in his mouth’ (Ps. 5, 10; cf. 19, 7; Prov. 8, 8).

‘and distribute to those that have nothing prepared’ (Neh. 8, 10).

Or, the adjective or participle may be used as a modifier of the nouns expressing the indefinite idea, necessarily so when the indefinite ideas are attributive (cf. p. 171f.), e. g.,

‘because there was found in him something good towards JHVH’ (I Ki. 14, 13).

‘for even in Judah there were some good things’ (II Ch. 12, 12; cf. 19, 3).

‘lest there should be anything worthless in thy heart’ (Dt. 15, 9).

‘or is there anything in secret with thee’ (Job 15, 11).

‘and no one lays it to heart’ (Is. 57, 1; Jer. 12, 11; cf. Jud. 19, 15).

‘there is no one that has power over the spirit’ (Ecc. 8, 8).

‘incline not my heart to anything evil’ (Ps. 141, 4; cf. I Sam. 20, 2; 22, 15; II Ki. 4, 41).

‘no straw is given to thy servants’ (Ex. 5, 16).

1 In this case רָבָר and its modifier, here a noun used as adjective are separated by another element.

2 Here a prepositional phrase is used practically as an adjective.
‘and if there are no white hairs in it’ (Lev. 13, 21).

The words רָעֶה and מָאוֹם may be used in the genitive after a noun, the sense being practically the attributive one of ‘some’, ‘any’, ‘no’, e. g.,

רָעֶה הַגָּדוֹל הַגָּדוֹל רָעֶה ‘because he has found in her some deformity [= a deformity in something]’ (Dt. 24, 1; cf. 23, 15).

מָאוֹם מַעֲנוֹמָה מַעֲנוֹמָה מַעֲנוֹמָה ‘when thou lendest another any loan [= a loan of anything]’ (Dt. 24, 10).

They may also be used partitively, e. g.,

מָאוֹם הֵמָא הַגָּדוֹל הַגָּדוֹל ‘but to this man do nothing of such a shameful thing’ (Jud. 19, 24; cf. Ps. 101, 3).

מָאוֹם מַעֲנוֹמָה מַעֲנוֹמָה מַעֲנוֹמָה ‘if you hide from me anything of all that . . . ’ (I Sam. 3, 17; cf. Jos. 11, 15; 21, 43; Esth. 6, 10).

לֹא הַגָּדוֹל הַגָּדוֹל הַגָּדוֹל ‘and nothing of all that belonged to the Israelites died’ (Ex. 9, 4).

לֹא ‘and let none of the tabooed stuff stick to thy hand’ (Dt. 13, 18; cf. I Sam. 25, 21).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה ‘and nothing of [the product of] his toil can he take’ (Ecc. 5, 14).

Not infrequently several of these indefinite expressions are found in the same sentence, e. g.,

לֹא מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה ‘and some of them left some of it till morning’ (Ex. 16, 20).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה ‘any woman with whom any man lies’ (Lev. 15, 18).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה מָאוֹמָה ‘have I said anything to any of the tribes of Israel’ (II Sam. 7, 7; cf. I Ch. 17, 6).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה ‘no one shall approach any of his near relations . . . ’ (Lev. 18, 6).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה ‘and when any one has no Goel’ (Lev. 25, 26).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה ‘that no one unclean in anything might enter’ (II Ch. 23, 19).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה ‘and they had nothing to do with any-one’ (Jud. 18, 7bis).

לֹא מָאוֹמָה ‘and thou hast not taken anything from any one’ (I Sam. 12, 4).

1 This is somewhat different from the use of these words in the genitive in the regular sense of ‘something’, &c., cf. Ecc. 7, 8; 8, 1.
and no one said anything to him’ (Job 2, 13).
The interrogative pronouns are occasionally used as indefinites in the sense of ‘any’, ‘no’, used absolutely, e. g.,
he אָן מִי דָּעַת ‘hast thou any here besides’ (Gen. 19, 12).
והָּאֵין הָּאָם ‘and if I see anything I will tell you’
(1 Sam. 19, 3).
והָּאָם יִדְּבָּה ‘and she knows nothing’ (Prov. 9, 13; contr. Neh.
2, 12).

Sometimes they are strongly indefinite meaning ‘any one whatsoever’, ‘anything whatsoever’; e. g.,
שְׁפִיט אֹהֶל מַיִם נַעֲרָה גֹּפֵר בֵּית שְׁפִיט אֹהֶל מַיִם
‘let any one at all [= everyone whatsoever] guard the young man Absalom’ (2 Sam. 18, 12).
והָּאֵין יִדְּבָּה ‘let come upon me what will [= anything whatsoever]’ (Job 13, 13).
והָּאֵין יִדְּבָּה אַבּוֹטוֹלְ אַבּוֹטוֹלְ ‘and he said whatever may be [= let happen anything at all] let me run . . . ’ (2 Sam. 18, 22).

Sometimes the interrogative is employed as an enclitic particle to emphasize the indefinite meaning of one of the expressions for ‘some’, ‘any’, ‘no’, e. g.,
והָּאֵין יִדְּבָּה ‘if he shows me anything at all, I will tell you’ (Num. 23, 3; cf. I Sam. 19, 3 above).

The idea of choice in ‘any’ and the idea of negation in ‘no’ may be emphasized by the use of לָּא employed in the same way as when it means ‘every’, ‘all’ (cf. pp. 158 ff., 203 ff.), usually in connection with one of the constructions already discussed, but occasionally alone. When used alone לָּא may refer either to individuals or to quantity, meaning, for example ‘any one’ or ‘anything’; it may stand with or without article. A verb whose subject is modified by לָּא in this sense usually agrees with the noun, but may agree with לָּא. When לָּא has the constructions of ‘all’ the sense is partitive. This use of לָּא is comparatively rare in affirmative sentences, e. g.,
והָּאֵין יִדְּבָּה ‘and everyone that touches anything that was under him’ (Lev. 15, 10; cf. Jer. 42, 21).
והָּאֵין יִדְּבָּה ‘when any man whatsoever offered a sacrifice, the servant of the priest came . . . ’ (1 Sam. 2, 13; cf. Gen. 4, 15).

1 These cases seem to stand midway between the interrogative and indefinite use of these pronouns, e. g., ל in II Sam. 18, 12 means something between ‘whoever it may be’ and ‘any one at all’.
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any prayer ... whatsoever that any one shall make ... hear thou' (I Ki. 8, 38—39; II Ch. 6, 29—30; cf. Dt. 14, 20).

is anything at all too hard for me' (Jer. 32, 27).

if I take anything at all of yours' (Gen. 14, 23; cf. II Sam. 14, 19).

and does not turn aside for any [beast]' (Prov. 30, 30).

it is good for nothing' (Jer. 13, 7; 10; cf. Ps. 49, 18).

because there is nothing left him in the siege' (Dt. 28, 55; cf. 8, 9; Prov. 13, 7: cf. Dt. 4, 17).

thou shalt not covet another's wife ... nor anything that is his' (Ex. 20, 17; Dt. 5, 18; cf. Gen. 11, 6).

those that seek JHVH shall not want anything good whatsoever' (Ps. 34, 11; cf. Ecc. 1, 9; Ex. 12, 20).

nothing is too hard for thee' (Jer. 32, 17; cf. II Sam. 15, 11).

a place in which there is no want of anything at all ...' (Jud. 18, 10).

that no one unclean in anything might enter' (II Ch. 23, 19).

anyone that touches anything unclean' (Lev. 5, 2).

none of the diseases that ... will I put upon thee' (Ex. 15, 26).

if I taste bread or anything [else]' (II Sam. 3, 35).

the warden of the prison did not look into anything that was in his charge' (Gen. 39, 23).¹

no man dwells in them' (Jer. 51, 43; cf. Lev. 16, 17; 7, 27; 23, 23).

'no work at all shall be done' (Ex. 12, 16; cf. Ezek. 31, 8;—obj. Ex. 20, 10; Lev. 7, 27; Num. 35, 22; Dt. 14, 3; 21; 16, 21).

¹ For ḥa cf. p. 222.
Frank R. Blake,

the blood of no flesh shall ye eat' (Lev. 17, 14).

'thou shalt not eat from any tree at all in the garden' (Gen. 3, 1; cf. Lev. 15, 22; 18, 6; Dan. 11, 37).

'and none of the wicked shall understand'
(Dan. 12, 10; cf. Ps. 76, 6).

'and with none of the diseases of Egypt will he afflict you' (Dt. 7, 15; cf. Ex. 11, 7).

'and choose none of his ways' (Prov. 3, 31; cf. Ezk. 12, 28; 33, 16).

'none of those that go in to her shall return'
(Prov. 2, 19; cf. Ps. 25, 3).

'and none of those that trust in him shall be desolate' (Ps. 34, 23).

'and he let none of his words fall to the ground' (I Sam. 3, 19; cf. Gen. 14, 23).

'for in vain [for nothing] is a net spread in the sight of any bird' (Prov. 1, 17).

A similar emphasis is sometimes expressed by using הַלָּא 'one' in conjunction with some other construction denoting 'any', 'no'. Probably הַלָּא used alone (cf. p. 170) has sometimes a similar emphasis.

'and if any one at all sin ...' (Lev. 4, 27).

Another way of expressing such emphasis is by the use of the correlative adjectives זָדוֹם — קְטָן 'small'—'great', רָע — קָשׁ 'good'—'evil', either absolutely or attributively in connection with some construction denoting 'any', 'no', e. g.,

'fight not with any at all ...' (I Ki. 22, 31; cf. II Ch. 18, 30; Num. 22, 18).

'they killed none at all' (I Sam. 30, 2).

'for thy servant knew nothing whatever of all this' (I Sam. 22, 15; 25, 36).

'my father will do nothing whatever ...' (I Sam. 20, 2).

1 For the various combinations of these correlatives cf. p. 220, n.
and there was nothing whatever lacking to them' (I Sam. 30, 19).

we cannot say to you anything at all' (Gen. 24, 50; cf. 31, 24; 29; Num. 24, 13; II Sam. 13, 22; cf. either p. 147f.).

Two correlative verbs are sometimes employed instead of two adjectives, e. g.,

'yea, do good or do evil [something, anything at all]' (Is. 41, 23).

Still another way of emphasizing these ideas is by using the infinitive absolute as a verbal modifier, e. g.,

'can I say anything at all' (Num. 22, 38).

'and if she has any husband at all' (Num. 30, 7).

'a man will redeem anything at all of his tithes' (Lev. 27, 31).

An exception to an idea modified by 'any', 'no' is introduced by the particle מִשָּׁה 'except, besides'. The noun expressing 'one', 'thing' is often omitted (cf. p. 167f.), e. g.,

'no one ... but Elisha ... can tell the king' (II KI. 6, 12).

'there is nothing in the Ark except the two tables of stone' (I Ki. 8, 9; cf. 22, 16; II Ch. 18, 15; Ps 117:3 I Ch. 15, 2).

'this is nothing but sadness of heart' (Neh. 2, 3; cf. Gen. 28, 17).

'this is nothing else than the sword of Gideon' (Jud. 7, 14; cf. Gen. 47, 18).

'she asked for nothing but what Hegai ordered' (Esth. 2, 15).

'and he has kept back from me nothing except thee' (Gen. 39, 9; cf. 6; Esth. 5, 12).

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1 This pair of correlatives is employed in a different sense in sentence denoting discernment, discrimination; here the adjectives have their proper meaning (cf. Gen. 2, 9; 17; Dt. 1, 9; II Sam. 14, 17; 19, 36; I Ki. 3, 9: also with different correlatives Jon. 4, 11).

2 From this use of וְ with a negative is developed its use in an affirmative sentence in the sense of 'only', cf. e. g., Gen. 26, 29.
'and the poor man had nothing but one little lamb' (II Sam. 12, 3; cf. Num. 11, 6 נַעַלְתָּבָהּ דְּלוֹא אִישׁ אֱלֹהֵי אֵשׁ. I Ki. 15, 5 כַּפַּר; II Ki. 4, 2).

'if any of these men except Caleb... see the land...' (Dt. 1, 35–36).

'and none of them was left except Caleb...' (Num. 26, 65; cf. I Sam. 30, 17).

'if any of the men... see the land... except Caleb...' (Num. 32, 11–12).

'if any of you enter the land... except Caleb...' (Num. 14, 30).

'and they gave no part in the land to the Levites except cities to dwell in' (Jos. 14, 4; cf. II Ch. 21, 17; Neh. 2, 12).

'let us not give them any of the spoil except to each his wife...' (I Sam. 30, 22).

'fight not with any at all except the king of Israel alone' (I Ki. 22, 31).

'there is nothing good for me to do except to escape to the land of the Philistines' (I Sam. 27, 1; cf. Ecc. 8, 15 כְּהוֹ לָכֶם.

'and besides her is only child, he had not any one, son or daughter' (Jud. 11, 34).

'and besides me there is no savior' (Is. 43, 11; cf. 44, 6; 8; 45, 6).

'and if some other man beside thy husband has had intercourse with thee' (Num. 5, 20; cf. Jos. 22, 19).

'and there is no savior besides me' (Hos. 13, 4; cf. I Sam. 2, 2 לֵבָנָה + noun Jos. 11, 19).

'and I know there is no other besides thee to redeem' (Ru. 4, 4).

'and there is no other god besides thee' (II Sam. 7, 22; I Ch. 17, 20).

'besides me there is no other god' (Is. 45, 5; cf. 22; Hos. 13, 4).

'other lords besides thee have ruled us' (Is. 26, 13).

1 In Ex. 22, 19 'לַבָּנָה is a conjunction.
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if thou takest other wives in addition to my daughters' (Gen. 31, 50).

An element modified by 'some', 'any', 'no' may be compared with another element, either in the comparison of equality or in that of superiority. The indefinite element is sometimes completely omitted, e.g.,

there is no one like me' (Ex. 9, 14; cf. Is. 46, 9).

for there is no one like thee' (II Sam. 7, 22; cf. Jer. 10, 6; 7; I Ch. 17, 20).

there is none so holy as JHVH, and there is no rock like our God' (I Sam. 2, 2; cf. Gen. 41, 39).

'and none of them all were found like Daniel' (Dan. 1, 19).

for there are no gods like thee' (I Ki. 8, 23; cf. II Ch. 6, 14).

none of the gods are like thee' (Ps. 86, 8bis).

'so that there was none like thee before'
(I Ki. 3, 12bis).

'so that no one was like thee' (I Ki. 3, 13; cf. Job 35, 8).

'and there was no day like that day before it or after it' (Jos. 10, 14).

you shall not make any other like it' (Ex. 30, 32; cf. 33; 38; I Sam. 10, 24; 21, 10 fem.; II Ki. 18, 5; 23, 25; Jer. 30, 7; Ezk. 5, 9; Jo. 2, 2; Job 1, 8; 2, 3).

'there is no one in this house greater than I' (Gen. 39, 9).

'there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in what he has done' (Ecc. 3, 22; cf. 2, 24; cf. with De 8, 15 and I Sam. 27, 1).

The idea of 'nothing' as an entity = 'nothingness' 'thing of nought' is expressed by a combination of negative and a word for 'anything', viz., כלם, כל yap 'not substance', and by a number of nouns or negatives used as nouns,

1 כ in these constructions followed by a pronoun is very similar to constructions of 'such' (cf. p. 129f.).

2 If this passage belongs here must have fallen out (cf. Die Fünf Megillot; Der Prediger erklärt von D. G. Wildeboer, Freiburg i. Br. [= Kurz. Handc. zum AT., 17] p. 130f.).
viz., וָאָל אֵלֹהִים 'falseness', וְאָל אֵלֹהִים 'non-entity', נֶפֶשׁ (נֶפֶשׁ) 'ceasing, end', יָקָב 'not', בֹּקֶץ 'breath', מַר 'wind', מַשְׁחָה 'vanity, falseness', בֶּלַח 'waste, emptiness', e. g.,

אַלְכַּלִּים 'oh ye that rejoice in nothingness [= a thing of no account]' (Am. 6, 13).

חַסְלֵי הַר הַבַּשׁ 'he hangs the earth upon nothing' (Job 26, 7).

אֹתֵי תָּמִיד 'thou sellest thy people for nought' (Ps. 44, 13).

וֹאֵל מִכָּל דְּבָר יְהוָה 'and Bethel shall become nothingness' (Am. 5, 5).

כָּל כְּלֵי חֲדָשִׁים 'my age is a nothing before thee' (Ps. 39, 6; cf. Is. 41, 11).

וַיֹּאָכְלָה לֹא שָׁרֵי 'and all her princes shall be nothing' (Is. 34, 12).

וַיָּרַא הַלַּכְוָה 'and they look to what is nothing' (Ezk. 13, 3).

בָּטִּיל לְעַד וְעָשָׂה 'all is nothingness and striving after wind' (Ecc. 1, 14; cf. 1, 2).

בְּנַכְּבִּישָׁי 'and the prophets shall become nothingness' (Jer. 5, 13).

יְנֻנָּה חַסְלֵי מָאָר הַשָּׁמָי 'turn aside my eyes from seeing things of nought' (Ps. 119, 37).

וַיְבִשְׁפֹּל לִי בָּלָה בּוֹקֶץ 'they go to nothing and perish' (Job 6, 18; cf. 26, 7; Is. 29, 21).

וַיֹּאָכְלָה לֹא שָׁרֵי נֶפֶשׁ מִשְׁכָּבָה 'behold they are all vanity, their works are nothing, their molten images are wind and emptiness' (Is. 41, 29; cf. 40, 17; 23; 41, 12; 24; 49, 4).

The idea 'for nothing, gratis' in which 'nothing' is an entity like the expressions in the last paragraph, is expressed by בָּחַל, e. g.,

בָּחַל 'shouldst thou serve me for nothing' (Gen. 29, 15; cf. Ex. 21, 2; Is. 52, 5; Job 22, 6).

בָּחַל 'does Job reverence God for nothing' (Job 1, 9).

בָּחַל 'ye have sold yourselves for nought' (Is. 52, 3).

1 'For nothing' — 'not for anything is rendered according to the rules that apply in general to 'some', 'any', 'no'; cf. תַּמָּא I Ki. 10, 21; II Ch. 9, 20: יִתֵּן Jer. 18, 7; 10.
Much, Many.

These ideas used absolutely are expressed by the pronominal adjective בְּרָע, and by the infinitive absolute יִהְיֶה בִּמְשָׁלְתָּה used as an invariable pronominal adjective. The singular of בְּרָע, and יִהְיֶה בִּמְשָׁלְתָּה are used for both ‘much’ and ‘many’; ‘many’ is also expressed by the plural of בְּרָע, e. g.,

אֵלֶּה אֶשְׁפְּתִי מִגְּדוֹל הֹרְנֵי (Job 31, 25).

שַׁבְלָה בְּרָע הָאָן בְּרָע ‘but the people are many, much’ (Ezr. 10, 13; cf. Num. 13, 18; I Sam. 14, 6; Is. 31, 1).

אַתֶּם בְּרָע יִהְיֶה בִּמְשָׁלְתָּה ‘and thou shalt know that thy offspring shall be many’ (Job 5, 25).

אָנוּסִים אֲמַרְתִּרְבֹּת יֵשָׁבָה ‘whether he eats little or much’ (Ecc. 5, 11; cf. Hag. 1, 6; 9).

יִוְרָע יֵאַלְתַּר ‘and let him remember the days of darkness, for they shall be many’ (Ecc. 11, 8).

יוֹרָע יֵאַלְתַּר יִוְרָע ‘many will see and fear’ (Ps. 40, 4; cf. Job 11, 19; Neh. 6, 18).

יִוְרָע יֵאַלְתַּר יֵאַל ‘for his mercies are many’ (II Sam. 24, 14; cf. Ezk. 33, 24).

יֵאַל בְּרָע יֵאַל ‘do thou hast instructed many’ (Job 4, 3).

יֵאַל בְּרָע יֵאַל ‘for I have heard the slander of many’ (Ps. 31, 14).

כְּמַה אֶלְּבֶה בְּרָע אֶלְּבֶה ‘I was a wonder to many’ (Ps. 71, 7).

כָּרָע נְתַתֶּה לְאֶלְּבֶה ‘thou seest may things but dost not heed’ (Is. 42, 20).

כָּרָע נְתַתֶּה לְאֶלְּבֶה ‘many are the afflictions of the righteous’ (Ps. 34, 20).

כָּרָע נְתַתֶּה לְאֶלְּבֶה ‘behold the people of the land are now many’ (Ex. 5, 5).

The adjective בְּרָע may be used in the construct before a following genitive in the sense of having much of what the genitive denotes, e. g.,

כִּיָּרָע רָע לְאֶלְּבֶה ‘full of kindness [h. much kindness]’ (Jo. 2, 13; cf. Ex. 34, 6; Ezk. 17, 7; Ps. 147, 5; Prov. 14, 29; 29, 22).

1 ‘רַבְּרָה ‘great, mighty’, seems to be used in a sense very similar to ‘much’ in Job 31, 25; Is. 16, 14. Certain of the higher round numbers, especially כָּרָע are employed at times in a somewhat indefinite sense very much like ‘great number’, ‘very many’. They may stand either absolutely or attributively, e. g., Ps. 50, 10; 90, 4; 91, 7; Job 9, 3.
'and he that hides his eyes shall have many curses' (Prov. 28, 27; cf. 16; 20; II Sam. 23, 20).

'and she that has many children is become feeble' (I Sam. 2, 5).

'the city that had many people' (Lam. 1, 1).

'oh thou that hast many treasures [Babylon], thy end is come' (Jer. 51, 13).

'they shall mock thee... that art in much confusion' (Ezk. 22, 5; cf. גר Jer. 32, 19).

These ideas used attributively are expressed by the same words employed as adjectives. The singular of גר is used with singulars and collectives, the plural with plurals, and הנבוב (once הנבוב) with any noun, e.g.,

'much gold' (I Ki. 10, 2; cf. Dt. 28, 38 עזר; II Ch. 32, 29 דרכו).

'much plunder' (II Ch. 14, 13; cf. I Ch. 18, 8 ההוב).

'many people' (II Sam. 13, 34; cf. Jos. 11, 4; Ezk. 17, 9; II Ch. 30, 13; cf. Jos. 22, 8 ממון).

'a people great and many' (Dt. 2, 21).

'much good' (Ecc. 9, 18).

'much wisdom and understanding' (I Ki. 5, 9).

'many years' (Ecc. 11, 8; cf. Ecc. 6, 11 דבר; 12, 12 סɣפדים).

'many nations' (Dt. 7, 1; 15, 6; 28, 12; cf. Gen. 21, 34 ימי; Jos. 22, 8 גכמה; II Sam. 22, 17 מע).

'many peoples' (Is. 2, 3; 17, 12; Ezk. 3, 6; 32, 9; 10; 38, 9; 15; Mi. 4, 3; 13; 5, 7; Zech. 8, 22).

'many cities' (Zech. 8, 20; cf. Ps. 106, 43 מגדים: Neh. 9, 30; Ecc. 11, 8 with המבנה).

'eating much honey is not good' (Prov. 25, 27).

The plural of גר sometimes precedes its noun, e.g.,

'many sons' (I Ch. 28, 5; cf. Jer. 16, 16 סדר; Ps. 32, 10 סובב macOS; Prov. 7, 26 בלחם).

'many daughters' (Prov. 31, 29; cf. Nell. 9, 28 עזר).

1 The adjective גר 'good' may be employed just as in English, in a sense somewhat like 'much', viz., 'good with respect to size, quantity', cf. Gen. 15, 15; 25, 8; 30, 20; Prov. 31, 18; Ecc. 4, 9.
The ideas 'much', 'many' used attributively may also be expressed by the nouns בָּל (once) 'abundance' in the construct before a singular, or a plural or collective noun respectively, e. g.,

'much food' (Prov. 13, 23; cf. Gen. 27, 28; Ps. 37, 11; 72, 7; Job 36, 18; Ecc. 1, 18bis).

'many slain' (Nah. 3, 3).

'many years' (Job 32, 7; cf. Prov. 14, 4; 20, 15).

'thy many kindnesses' (Ps. 106, 7).

'half of the greatness of thy wisdom' (II Ch. 9, 6).

Similar ideas are expressed by the prepositional phrase בָּל in abundance' placed after the noun. The construction is late, occurring chiefly in Chronicles (elsewhere I Ki. 1, 19; 25; Zech. 14, 14; Job 26, 3; Neh. 9, 25), e. g.,

'much iron' (I Ch. 22, 3bis; cf. 8; II Ch. 9, 1; 17, 5; 18, 1; 24, 11: נְזָכָה II Ch. 11, 23).

'many sheep' (I Ch. 12, 40; cf. II Ch. 14, 14; 16, 8; 18, 2; 29, 35; 32, 5; 29).

'many sacrifices' (I Ch. 29, 21; cf. 22, 4; 29, 2; II Ch. 2, 8; 30, 24: before noun I Ch. 22, 15).

Occasionally יְנֵגָה is employed instead of בָּל in this construction, e. g.,

'abundance of all kinds of wine' (Neh. 5, 18).

'many horsemen' (II Ch. 16, 8).

In a few passages these phrases with ב are employed absolutely, e. g.,

'for it [iron] was much, in abundance' (I Ch. 22, 14; cf. II Ch. 20, 25; 31, 10).

Attributive 'much', 'many' is sometimes expressed by בָּל 'heavy', e. g.,

'many people, a large army' (Num. 20, 20; cf. Ex. 12, 38; I Ki. 10, 2; II Ch. 9, 1).

The expression יְנֵגָה 'as much as a sufficiency of' (cf. p. 194), is sometimes used in a sense closely approximating 'much', 'many', e. g.,

'and there will be enough [much] contempt and wrath' (Esth. 1, 18).

For יַפְשֶׁר 'multitude' before a genitive in the sense of 'very much, many' cf. p. 192f.
Attributive 'many' is expressed by a species of repetition, singular + plural of same noun in—

I procured for myself ... many concubines' (Ecc. 2, 8).

The plural of 'day' is sometimes employed in the sense of 'a considerable time, many days'; e. g.,

'and she and he and her family had food for many days' (I Ki. 17, 15; cf. Ps. 34, 13; Dan. 10, 14; 11, 33).

The ideas 'much', 'many', used partitively are expressed by ב or הַמֵּדֶם + dependent noun after the prepositions מ or ל, e. g.,

'and many of the people of the land became Jews' (Esth. 8, 17; cf. Ezr. 3, 12; Dan. 12, 2).

'and many of the people also have fallen' (II Sam. 1, 4).

'lest many of them [ם יב people] fall' (Ex. 19, 21).

'much, many of Ephraim' (II Ch. 30, 18).

'much, many of the congregation' (II Ch. 30, 17).

The same idea may be expressed by using independently the definite noun or pronoun of which logically a part is taken, and following it by an expression for 'much, many', e. g.,

'and he made very many of all these vessels' (cf. II Ch. 4, 18).

ב may be used attributively as the modifier of a definite noun in the sense of 'great in quantity, number'. In this case it has of course the definite article like any descriptive adjective, e. g.,

'great [amount of] pride of Jerusalem' (Jer. 13, 9).

'and the many waters will cover thee' (Ezk. 26, 19).

'upon this great [numerous] people' (I Ki. 5, 21; cf. II Ch. 20, 12; 15).

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1 From this use is developed the meaning 'year', cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 292.
2 II Sam. 24, 16 also belongs here if we take ב together with מַהְקָם יְהִי מַעְלָה יַקְרָב = 'the destroyer of many of the people', ב, however, may also be taken separately = 'it is enough', cf. p. 201.
3 In ב וְהָעַל (Dan. 12, 3) the article of course belongs to the whole expression 'turners of many to righteousness'.
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'and it came to pass after those many days [after a long time]' (Ex. 2, 23).

'in all the great [numerous] multitude' (Is. 16, 14).

'thy great [much] kindness' (Neh. 9, 35).

'thy many mercies' (Dan. 9, 18; Neh. 9, 19; 27; 31; cf. II Ki. 9, 22; Jer. 11, 15).

'Vey נמשיג the mighty and many waters of the
river' (Is. 8, 7).

Used absolutely with the article the singular ב is employed
in a similar sense. The plural with article has sometimes
the force of a superlative, sometimes apparently the same force as
the form without article', e. g.,

'from [the] tribe that is numerous thou shalt
take many [cities]' (Num. 35, 8; cf. 26, 54; 33, 54).

'for you are the most [more] numerous' (I Ki.
18, 25).

'and among [the] many nations [that exist] there was no king like him' (Neh. 13, 26).

'and he will make them rule over many' (Dan.
11, 39; cf. Is. 53, 12).2

'and they that understand among the
people shall instruct many' (Dan. 11, 33: cf. 9, 27; Is. 53, 11;
Esth. 4, 3).2

The ideas ‘much’, ‘many’ may also be expressed by various
conjugations of the verbs בָּר, בָּר, and יִעַנֵּשׁ (apparently only
once and then in a construction meaning ‘more’ cf. p. 196), e. g.,

’ Consider my enemies, for they are many’ (Ps.
25, 19; cf. I Sam. 14, 30; I Ch. 23, 17).

'and the years of thy life shall be many'
(Prov. 4, 10).

'increase and be many' (Gen. 1, 22).

'now-a-days there are many servants that . . .
(I Sam. 25, 10; cf. Is. 66, 16; Jer. 5, 6; 14, 7).

'and when men began to become many'
(Gen. 6, 1).

1 This article is perhaps the indefinite definite article, the sense being
‘those that are many under the conditions that prevail’ (cf. p. 172, n. 1).
2 It is possible, of course, that in these examples ב and י are to read
for ב and י.
’make your army great [much] and come out’ (Jud. 9, 29).

‘and who slew many of us [made many our slain]’ (Jud. 16, 24; cf. Hos. 8, 11).

‘and thou takest much soap’ (Jer. 2, 22; cf. Gen. 3, 16; Num. 26, 54; 33, 54; 35, 8; II Ch. 33, 23).

‘he makes many stumble’ (Jer. 46, 16).

‘and he that gathered much had nothing over’ (Ex. 16, 18; cf. 17; Ecc. 6, 11; Neh. 9, 37).

The ideas ’much’, ’many’ may be emphasized by the addition of the adverb רבא ’very’, e. g.,

‘for his camp is very great’ (Jo. 2, 11).

‘and the fish shall be very numerous’ (Ezk. 47, 9).

‘and the land remaining is very much’ (Jos. 13, 1).

‘for his mercies are very many’ (I Ch. 21, 13).

‘very much gold’ (I Ki. 10, 2).

‘very much cattle’ (Jos. 22, 8; cf. 11, 4; Ezr. 10, 1; II Ch. 32, 29).

‘very much copper’ (I Ch. 18, 8).

‘very many garments’ (Jos. 22, 8; cf. Gen. 41, 49; Jer. 40, 12; II Ch. 14, 13).

‘a very great force’ (II Ch. 24, 24; cf. 9, 9; 30, 13).

‘very many horsemen’ (II Ch. 16, 8).

‘and he made very many of all these vessels’ (II Ch. 4, 18).

‘with a very great force’ (I Ki. 10, 2; II Ch. 9, 1; cf. Ex. 12, 38).

‘and that ye may become very many’ (Dt. 6, 3).

‘and [the water נָחוּ נָנוּ] became very much’ (Gen. 7, 18; cf. 47, 27; Ps. 107, 38).

’multitude’ + genitive may be regarded as the emphatic form of רב + genitive (cf. p. 189); the genitive may also be modified by רב, e. g.,
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‘and he desired a great many [very many] wives’ (II Ch. 11, 23; cf. Is. 29, 5bis; Jer. 10, 13; 49, 32; 51, 16). 1

‘and thou shalt become a father of very many nations’ (Gen. 17, 4; cf. 5).

‘woe to the multitude of many nations’ (Is. 17, 12; cf. Dan. 11, 10). 2

For the expression of ‘many such’ cf. p. 130.

When these ideas ‘much’, ‘many’ modify the first term of a comparison of equality they need not be definitely expressed, the meaning being borne by the comparative construction. The second term in this case consists of כ + noun or רותא + sentence. These ideas in such a comparison, however, may be more definitely rendered by the addition of the phrase בכל in quantity, in number’. Sometimes ‘much’, ‘many’ is definitely expressed by וב, &c., in the first term. Sometimes בכל is added pleonastically to this construction, e. g.,

‘it shall be for all the sons of Aaron, for one as much as the other’ (Lev. 7, 10).

‘and we will cut trees from Lebanon as many as thou wantest [according to all thy desire]’ (II Ch. 2, 15).

‘and take for yourself as much as you want’ (I Sam. 2, 16).

‘fill the men’s sacks with as much food as they can carry’ (Gen. 44, 1).

‘and people as many as the sand on the seashore’ (I Sam. 13, 5; cf. Jud. 6, 5; 7, 12bis; II Sam. 17, 11).

‘and you are this day as many as the stars in heaven’ (Dt. 1, 10; cf. 10, 22; 28, 62; I Ki. 10, 27; II Ch. 1, 15; 9, 27).

‘a people as numerous as the sand on the seashore’ (Jos. 11, 4; cf. I Ki. 4, 20).

‘and JHVH will add to the people as many again as they are . . .’ (II Sam. 24, 3).

1 In I Ki. 18, 41, המ may mean either ‘murmuring’ or ‘abundance’ for there is the sound of the murmuring of [of very much] rain’; so also perhaps Jer. 10, 13; 51, 16.

2 In Ps. 37, 16 המ means ‘the abundant wealth of many wicked men’. 12
‘if there is as much as a step between me and death’ (I Sam. 20, 3).

‘and the sun stood still ... and did not hasten to go down for as much as a whole day’
(Jos. 10, 13; cf. Num. 11, 31; II Sam. 19, 37; Ru. 1, 4; 2, 17;—Is. 26, 20; Ezr. 9, 8; II Ch. 12, 7; Ps. 105, 12; I Ch. 16, 19).1

‘As much, many as’ may also be expressed by בָּשָׁם ‘sufficiency’ + genitive, alone or preceded by ב: בָּשָׁם may be employed as in the last construction, e. g.,

and if his hand can not reach to as much as a sheep [if he cannot afford]’ (Lev. 5, 7; cf. 12, 8; Jer. 51, 58bis; Hab. 2, 13bis).

‘and he can afford as much as its redemption [requires]’ (Lev. 25, 26; cf. Dt. 25, 2).

‘we redeemed our brethren ... as many as we could’ (Neh. 5, 8).

‘and they came as many as locusts in number’
(Jud. 6, 5).

The idea of ‘as much, many as’ may be expressed also by בָּשָׁם ‘number’, e. g.,

‘for thy gods were as many as [the number of] thy cities’ (Jer. 11, 13; 2, 28).

‘ye have erected altars as many as the streets of Jerusalem’ (Jer. 11, 13; cf. Job 1, 5).

‘and they took as many wives as they themselves were’ (Jud. 21, 23; cf. Jos. 4, 5).

The idea ‘so much, such a great quantity, number’ used without expressed second term of the comparison, may be rendered by בָּשָׁם or בָּשָׁם, e. g.,

‘and they were three days taking the spoil, for it was so much’ (II Ch. 20, 25).

‘for what purpose do you make so many [are your many] sacrifices to me’ (Is. 1, 11).

‘because thy transgressions are so many [on account of thy many]’ (Jer. 30, 14; 15; cf. Hos. 9, 7; Lam. 1, 5).

1 From this use of ב is developed the meaning ‘about’ both quantitative and temporal, cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 326: in many of the examples here given ב may be translated by ‘about’. The same ב is found in בָּשָׁם ‘how much’, בָּשָׁם ‘almost’.
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The idea ‘as many as you are’ may be expressed by the adverb, המיה (cf. p. 133 f.).

The idea ‘more’ in the first term of a comparison of superiority is regularly expressed by the words that denote ‘much’, ‘many’ followed by the comparative preposition מ, tho they may be omitted, e. g.,

‘behold the Israelites are more numerous and mightier than we are’ (Ex. 1, 9; cf.Dt. 20, 1; Am. 6, 2).

‘JHVH is able to give thee more than this’ (II Ch. 25, 9; cf. Ecc. 2, 7).

‘for there are more with us than with him’ (II Ch. 32, 7).

‘for those that are with us are more numerous than those that are with them’ (II Ki. 6, 16;2 Is. 54, 1; I Ch. 24, 4).

‘if thou sayest ... these nations are more numerous than I’ (Dt. 7, 17).

1 Here the plural קהל may mean ‘as many as they are, and a hundred times as many as they are’. i. e. ‘not only once but a hundred times as many’. Others think it means ‘a hundred times and again a hundred times as many’, cf. K. Budde, Die Bücher Samuel, Tübingen u. Leipzig, 1902 [= Kurz, Hande, zum AT., 8], p. 329.

‘and those he killed in his death were more than those he killed in his life-time’ (Jud. 16, 30; cf. Jos. 10, 11).

‘the rich man shall not give more... than half a shekel’ (Ex. 30, 15).

‘they are more in number than the sand’ (Ps. 139, 18; cf. I Ki. 5, 10).

‘my enemies are more numerous than the hairs of my head’ (Ps. 69, 5; cf. Jer. 46, 23).

‘they are more numerous than the hairs of my head’ (Ps. 40, 13).

‘not because you were more numerous than any other people has JHVH loved you...’ (Dt. 7, 7).

‘and thou hast made thy abominations more than they [did]’ (Ezk. 16, 51; cf. Ex. 36, 5).

‘this has more rest than the other’ (Ecc. 6, 5; cf. Prov. 26, 12; 29, 20).

‘and he will stand more years than the king of the north’ (Dan. 11, 8; cf. Ezk. 16, 52; 23, 11bis; Ps. 4, 8; Esth. 2, 17).

‘and Manasseh seduced to do more evil than did the nations...’ (II Ki. 21, 9).

‘my righteousness is more than God’s’ (Job 35, 2).

The idea ‘times as much, many’ may be expressed by this same construction, e.g.,

‘and Benjamin’s portion was five times as much [more] as the portions of all [the others]’ (Gen. 43, 34).

The ideas ‘more than’ ‘as much, many as’ may be rendered by a numeral expression followed by ‘over’, e.g.,

‘and I will give thee one shoulder [of land] more than thy brothers’ (Gen. 48, 22).

‘and it was double as much as they gathered every day’ (Ex. 16, 5).

‘and I will punish you seven times as much as your sins [deserve]’ (Lev. 26, 24; cf. 28).

The verb פָסָה to add, do more, make more usually in the Hiphil, may express the idea of ‘more’. Sometimes it is combined with other constructions denoting ‘more’, e.g.,
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These words JHVH spoke ... and no more' (Dt. 5, 19).

'JHVH do so to me and more also if ...' (Ru. 1, 17; cf. I Sam. 14, 44; 20, 13; II Sam. 3, 9; 3, 35; I Ki. 2, 23; 19, 2: with א I Sam. 3, 17; 25, 22; I Ki. 20, 10; II Ki. 6, 31: with א II Sam. 19, 14—cf. also Ps. 120, 3; Ezk. 5, 16).

'JHVH will increase you [= make you more] (Ps. 115, 14).

'thou hast added to the report that I heard' (II Ch. 9, 6).

'and he that increases knowledge, increases pain' (Ecc. 1, 18; cf. Neh. 13, 18).

'and what more can David say to you' (II Sam. 7, 20; cf. Prov. 11, 24).

'then thou shalt get three more [other] cities besides these three' (Dt. 19, 9).

'and Ahab did more ... than all the kings of Israel ...' (I Ki. 16, 32).

'and I will chastise you seven times as much as your sins deserve' (Lev. 26, 18).

Most.

This idea may be rendered by making definite the expressions for 'much', 'many', e. g., 

'for you are the most numerous' (I Ki. 18, 25).1

'most men will proclaim, each his own goodness' (Prov. 20, 6).2

This idea in the sense of partitive 'majority, greater number of' may also be expressed by ויהי followed by the definite genitive of the modified noun or pronoun, e. g.,

1 Possibly also ויהי Esth. 4, 3; cf., however, ו with article in an indefinite sense, p. 191. In Ex. 16, 17; 18, the article of הנָּשָׁנָּה makes the participle definite, not the idea of 'much', in v. 18, however, ויהי אל הנָּשָׁנָּה 'and he that gathered much had nothing over' comes very close to being a superlative and was perhaps felt as such (cf. Num. 11, 32), tho it is more likely that it has the same force as הנָּשָׁנָּה in v. 17, which is certainly not superlative.

2 Here ויהי is poetical for ויהי ו with article.
Frank R. Blake,

'for most of the people had not cleansing themselves’ (II Ch. 30, 18).

'and until now most of them had watched…’ (I Ch. 12, 29).

A little, Few.

The idea of 'a little' both absolutely and attributively is expressed by מָן:1 when used attributively it usually stands in the construct before its noun, but may stand after it in the genitive, e. g.,

אֲרוֹמָה מַעְשֵׁה (Ecc. 5, 11; cf. Gen. 30, 15; 30; Dt. 28, 38; Jos. 22, 17; Hag. 1, 6; 9; 2, 6; Ps. 8, 6; 37, 16; Prov. 15, 16; 16, 8).

לְבֵל מָעְשֵׁה ‘the heart of the wicked is like a little [thing]’ (Prov. 10, 20).

'is it a little thing that…' (Num. 16, 13).

מָן מַעְשֵׁה ‘a little water’ (Gen. 18, 4; 24, 17; 43, 2; 11bis; 44, 25; I Sam. 14, 29; I Ki. 17, 12; Prov. 6, 10; 24, 33; Is. 26, 20;8 Ezr. 9, 8).

מָן מַעְשֵׁה ‘a little help’ (Dan. 11, 34; cf. Ecc. 10, 1; Ezk. 11, 16).

'Little' is also expressed by Außerdem בַּע ‘here a little, there a little’ (Is. 28, 10; 13).

The idea of 'few' used absolutely may be expressed by מָן; its plural מַעְשֵׁה מַעְשֵׁה, or by מַעְשָׁה as 'number': used attributively, it is expressed by מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה or מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה (only once) used in the genitive, or as adjective after its noun; by מַעְשָׁה in the construct before following genitive (only once); by מַעְשָׁה as adjective after a plural noun (cf. p. 173); by the dual or the numeral two in the sense of 'a couple', 'one or two', e. g.,

מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה ‘and the people in it were few' (Neh. 7, 4; cf. Ecc. 9, 14).

מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה ‘few and evil were the years of my life’ (Gen. 47, 9; cf. Job 10, 20).

מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה ‘for they are few’ (Jos. 7, 3).

מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה ‘his days shall be few’ (Ps. 109, 8; cf. Ecc. 5, 1).

מַעְשָׁה מַעְשָׁה ‘and let him not die and his men not be few’ (Dt. 33, 6; cf. Is. 10, 19).

1 מָן ‘whisper’ is used in a sense somewhat like ‘a little’ in Job 4, 12; 26, 14.

2 מַעְשָׁה in these two passages means ‘as much as a little bit of a moment’, ‘for a very little while’ (cf. pp. 193f., 194, n.).
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whether they [עמה the people] are few or many' (Num. 13, 18; cf. I Sam. 14, 6).
and few men were with me' (Neh. 2, 12).
a few men' (Dt. 26, 5; 28, 62).
a few days' (Num. 9, 20).
a few men' (Gen. 34, 30; Dt. 4, 27; Jer. 44, 28; Ps. 105, 12; I Ch. 16, 19; cf. Job 16, 22).
a few men' (Is. 24, 6).
a few men' (II Ch. 24, 24).
a few days [a year]' (Num. 9, 22).
'and see I am gathering a stick or two . . .' (I Ki. 17, 12).

The idea of 'few in number' may also be expressed by רעים. Just as רב may take the genitive in the sense of 'having much, many', this word may take a dependent noun with ב in the sense of 'having few, few in', e. g.,
and the numerous [people] will serve the one few in number' (Gen. 25, 23; cf. Mi. 5, 1; Ps. 68, 28).
and the one few in number [shall be] a mighty nation' (Is. 60, 22).
I have but few days' (Job 32, 6; cf. 30, 1).\(^1\)

Like רב (cf. p. 191) ממון may take the article in the sense of 'small in number', and in the sense of a superlative, e. g.,
and to the [tribe] small in number thou shalt give a little portion' (Num. 26, 54; 33, 54; cf. 35, 8).
for you are the smallest in number of all the peoples' (Dt. 7, 7).

The idea of 'few' used partitively is expressed by one of the words for 'few' governing the modified noun with the preposition ב or ב, e. g.,
and I will leave a few of them' (Ezk. 12, 16).
for we are left a few of many' (Jer. 42, 2).
and thou wilt take from there a few of the number' (Ezk. 5, 3).

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\(^1\) From such cases as these, רעים develops the meaning 'young', cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 683.
"and if there remain but few of the years to the year of jubilee" (Lev. 25, 52).

The ideas 'a little', 'few' may also be expressed by verbal forms derived from the stem מָעַם, e. g., כַּהֲנָה 'and I will make them many and they will not be few' (Jer. 30, 19; cf. Neh. 9, 32; Piel Ecc. 12, 3).

'and they [בָּאָה הָעָם the wild beasts] will make you few in number' (Lev. 26, 22; cf. II Ki. 4, 3; Num. 26, 54; 33, 54; 35, 8).

'and gathered, both those that gathered much and those that gathered little' (Ex. 16, 17; cf. 18).

The ideas 'a little', 'few' are apparently emphasized by מְחַמָּה used adverbially, just as 'much', 'many' are emphasized by מְרַמָּה ‘very’, e. g., 'yet a very little [time] and ...' (Is. 10, 25; 29, 17).

'and the rest shall be very few' (Is. 16, 14).

When the noun depending on מָעַם is also modified by a demonstrative, it may apparently stand either with or without article, e. g., 'a little of this honey' (I Sam. 14, 29).

'those few sheep' (I Sam. 17, 28).

Less.

The idea 'less' in the first term of a comparison of inferiority may be expressed by one of the words denoting 'a little', 'few' followed by the comparative preposition ב. The word denoting 'a little', 'few', however, may be omitted, e. g., 'and the poor shall not give less than half a shekel' (Ex. 30, 15).

'that God exacts of thee [less] than thine iniquity [deserves]' (Job 11, 6).

'nothing' (Is. 40, 17).

'and now those that have fewer days that I, mock me' (Job 30, 1).

Least.

This idea may be expressed by making the expressions for 'a little', 'few' definite, e. g.,
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for you are the least of all peoples', (Dt. 7, 7).

and the one that gathered least
gathered ten homers’ (Num. 11, 32).

and my gens is the
least numerous of all the gentes of the tribes of Benjamin’
(I Sam. 9, 21; cf. Jud. 6, 15).

for the least little while thy holy people
possessed it’ (Is. 63, 18).

Enough.

This idea used absolutely may be rendered by בָּר ‘much’ or בָּר ‘sufficiency’. When that for which anything is a sufficiency is expressed, the construction is either בָּר with ל + ‘that for which’, or בָּר with possessive suffix or following genitive, e.g.,

בָּר ‘it is enough’ (Gen. 45, 28; II Sam. 24, 16; I Ki. 19, 4; I Ch. 21, 15; cf. Ex. 9, 28).

לְבָּר ‘it is enough for thee’ (Dt. 3, 26; cf. Ezek. 44, 6; 45, 9; Dt. 33, 7).

לְבָּר ‘I have enough, my brother’ (Gen. 33, 9).

לְבָּר ‘you have dwelt long enough on this hill
[enough is your dwelling on this hill]’ (Dt. 1, 6; cf. 2, 3).

לְבָּר ‘until there is not enough [room to hold it]’ (Mal.
3, 10).

לְבָּר ‘eat enough for thyself’ (Prov. 25, 16).

לְבָּר ‘would they not steal enough for themselves’
(Ob. 5; cf. Ex. 36, 7; Jer. 49, 9).

לְבָּר ‘Lebanon is not enough for
a burning, nor its animals for a sacrifice’ (Is. 40, 16; cf. Dt.
15, 8; Nah. 2, 13; Jer. 51, 58bis; Hab. 2, 13bis).

לְבָּר ‘and if his hand can not find
enough to restore it to him’ (Lev. 25, 28).

The noun בָּר ‘substance’ may be used absolutely with the meaning ‘it is enough’, like בָּר; occasionally לְבָּר seems to have
a meaning very similar to ‘enough’, e. g.,

1 In Ex. 16, 17; 18 שָׂמַח has probably a positive meaning ‘the one
that gathered little’, tho in v. 18 it approaches closer to the superlative
meaning cf. יִרְמַת p. 197, n. 1.
2 Cf. p. 190, n. 2.
3 In Jud. 21, 14, לְבָּר is regarded by some (cf. Gesenius-Buhl13, Leipzig,
1899, p. 375) as having the meaning of ‘enough’, this meaning in this
‘four things do not say enough’ (Prov. 30, 15; cf. 16).

take, I pray, my present... for I have all [I need, enough]’ (Gen. 33, 11).

As an attribute this idea may be expressed by י or השגה + the genitive of the noun of which there is a sufficiency. Sometimes one of the expressions for ‘enough’ used absolutely has practically the force of an attribute, e.g.,

שגו כ בולע י ת ‘enough goat’s milk’ (Prov. 27, 27).

ף ‘enough of the service’ (Ex. 36, 5).

שגו ת ‘bread enough’ (Ezk. 16, 49).

שגו בר ‘we have both straw and fodder enough [both straw and fodder are enough with us]’ (Gen. 24, 25).

The idea of enough may also be expressed by the verbs שגו, ישו ‘to be sufficient’, אנק ‘to reach’, עב ‘to have enough, be sated’, the last usually with reference to food, e.g.,

‘אנק ב שים כ שארו לילעון לילעון טו if the dust of Samaria were enough for handfuls for all the people...’ (I Ki. 20, 10).

‘לighthouse י and all this is not enough for me...’
(Esth. 5, 13).

‘and yet [even thus] they were not enough for them’ (Jud. 21, 14; cf. Num. 11, 12bis; Hos. 12, 92).

‘the mountain is not enough for us’ (Jos. 17, 16; cf. Zech. 10, 10).

‘he that works his land will have enough bread, but he that follows vain things will have his fill of poverty’ (Prov. 28, 19; cf. 30, 16).

‘and she ate and had enough...’ (Ru. 2, 14; cf. Ezk. 16, 28bis; Hos. 4, 10; Prov. 30, 15; II Ch. 31, 10).

‘they never have enough’ (Is. 56, 11).

‘that they may eat enough’ (Is. 23, 18; cf. Hag. 1, 6).

‘what she left after she had enough’
(Ru. 2, 18).

passage, however, is expressed by the verb שגו (cf. p. 202), י having its usual meaning ‘thus, even so’. So regarded in Gesenius-Buhl15.

1 י + genitive is said to occasionally have the meaning of ‘every’, cf. p. 153, n. 2.

2 To be read אופס י and שארו קינוא לא אל ינייניעלב ‘all his goods are not enough for the sins he has committed’ cf. K. Marti, Dodekapropheton, p. 96.
Too much, too little.

These ideas are ordinarily rendered by one of the expressions for 'much', 'a little', usually by בַּר and פָּטִים, either used absolutely or followed by the comparative preposition נַפְס: in the latter case נַפְס may be omitted, e. g.,

בר נפש יוע ‘the people are still too many' (Jud. 7, 4).
וכל בר ‘you take' too much upon you' (Num. 16, 3).
וכל בר מָשֹּאָר יָחָשֹּׁב ‘it is too much [long] for you to go up to Jerusalem' (I Ki. 12, 28; 19, 7).
יכָּל ‘for the portion of the Judahites was too much for them' (Jos. 19, 9).
וכָּל בר ‘the people with thee are too many for me to give the Midianites into their hand' (Jud. 7, 2).
וכֶּל ‘and if the way is too much [long] for thee' (Dt. 14, 24).
וכָּל ‘and if it is too little' (II Sam. 12, 8; cf. Num. 16, 13[?]).
וכָּל ‘but the priests were too few' (II Ch. 29, 34).
וכֶּל ‘is it too little for you ...’ (Num. 16, 9; Is. 7, 13; Ezek. 34, 18; cf. Job 15, 11; Ezek. 16, 20[?]).
וכָּל ‘and if the family is too few [in number] for a lamb' (Ex. 12, 4).
וכָּל ‘and the boundaries of the Danites were too little for them' (Jos. 19, 47).
‘Too much' may also be expressed by ‘more than enough' (cf. p. 202), e. g.,
וכָּל בָּרוּ תְּמָנִים נְפָס ‘the people furnish more than enough service for the work' (Ex. 36, 5).

All.

This idea used absolutely in the sense of 'everything', 'all of it', 'all of them' referring either to all things in creation, or to all things in a certain class or set, is expressed by בָּרוּ or בָּל apparently without difference of meaning. When בָּלוּ stands as subject of a verbal sentence, the verb may be plural when the subject represents a plural idea,1 e. g.,

1 Cf. בל, בָּלוּ ‘every one' p. 158.
thou hast put everything under his feet' (Ps. 8, 7; cf. Jer. 44, 18; Zeph. 1, 2; Prov. 16, 4; 28, 5; Job 13, 1; 42, 2).

I have given you all [of them]' (Gen. 9, 3).

I am JHVH, the maker of all' (Is. 44, 24; cf. Prov. 26, 10).

in want of all things' (Dt. 28, 48; 57; cf. 47; Ezk. 44, 30bis; Ps. 119, 128).

and he gave him a tenth of all (Gen. 14, 20).

everything is vanity' (Ecc. 1, 2; cf. I Ki. 6, 18; 7, 33; II Ki. 24, 16; 25, 17; Jer. 52, 22; Ps. 119, 91; Ecc. 2, 16; 3, 20; 6, 6; 9, 2; Ezr. 2, 42; 8, 35; I Ch. 29, 16; II Ch. 28, 6; 29, 28; 35, 7).

all came to pass' (Jos. 21, 43; cf. II Sam. 17, 3; Ecc. 3, 20 bis).

they all came to pass for you' (Jos. 23, 14).

‘and the priest shall sacrifice all of it…’

(Lev. 1, 9; cf. 13; 8, 27; Dt. 2, 36; Jos. 11, 19; II Sam. 19, 31; I Ki. 14, 26; Ecc. 3, 11; 7, 15; 10, 19; 11, 5; II Ch. 12, 9).

David recovered everything, all of them' (I Sam. 30, 19; cf. Ex. 29, 24; II Sam. 24, 23; Dan. 11, 2: Is. 65, 8; Ezk. 7, 14; Ezr. 1, 11; I Ch. 21, 23; 28, 19; 29, 19; II Ch. 36, 17; 18).

for he is the former of all things' (Jer. 10, 16; 51, 19; cf. Is. 29, 11; II Ch. 31, 5).

‘and JHVH blessed A. in everything’

(Gen. 24, 1; cf. II Sam. 23, 5; Ps. 103, 19; I Ch. 29, 12).

everything has a time‘ (Ecc. 3, 1; 19; cf. I Ch. 29, 12: Job 24, 24).

The pronoun used absolutely may be modified by a relative clause, usually introduced by a relative pronoun. In this case never takes the article, tho it may be preceded by the nota accusativi e. g.,

thou shalt die and all that is thine’

(Gen. 20, 7; cf. 6, 17; 13, 1; 31, 21; 43; 39, 3; 45, 11; Lev. 15, 20bis; Num. 19, 14; II Sam. 16, 4; I Ki. 20, 4; Ezk. 47, 9).

‘and he left everything that he had in Joseph’s hand’ (Gen. 39, 6; cf. 3; 8; 21, 12[?]; Jud. 13, 14; I Sam. 9, 19; Neh. 5, 19; 9, 6bis).
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(hebrew)

'ye have observed everything that Moses commanded you' (Jos. 22, 2; cf. Gen. 12, 20; 24, 36; 25, 5; Ex. 20, 11; Num. 16, 30; Dt. 29, 8; I Sam. 3, 12; II Sam. 14, 20; I Ki. 2, 3bis; II Ki. 20, 15; Jer. 38, 9; Esth. 6, 13).

'and put thy mind upon all that I shall show thee' (Ezk. 40, 4; cf. Ex. 36, 1; Jos. 22, 2).

'God is with thee in all that thou doest' (Gen. 21, 22; cf. 39, 5; Ex. 23, 13; I Ki. 2, 26; 11, 37; Ecc. 9, 3).

'and thou didst evil more than all that were before thee' (I Ki. 14, 9; cf. 22, 16, 30; II Ki. 21, 11; Ecc. 2, 7.—Gen. 6, 2; Jud. 13, 13; Ezk. 43, 11).

'and he placed him over his house and over all that he had' (Gen. 39, 5; cf. Num. 1, 50).

'and Noah did according to all that God commanded him' (Gen. 6, 22; cf. 7, 6; Ex. 29, 35; 31, 11; 39, 32; 42; 40, 16; Num. 2, 34; 8, 20; 9, 5; 30, 1; Dt. 1, 3; 41; II Ki. 11, 9; II Ch. 23, 8.—Dt. 12, 8; I Ki. 21, 26; 22, 54; II Ki. 14, 3; 18, 3; 23, 32; 37; 24, 9; 19; Ezk. 24, 24; II Ch. 26, 4; 27, 2; 29, 2.—Jos. 1, 17; 11, 23; I Ki. 8, 56; II Ki. 10, 30; Jer. 42, 20).

'and all [that] he had he put in his hands' (Gen. 39, 4; cf. Ex. 9, 4).

This idea in an attributive sense may be expressed by in the construct before, or by + retrospective suffix after, the modified definite noun. When the noun is singular the expression denotes quantity, when the noun is plural or collective it refers to number. The article is often omitted in poetry, e. g.,

'all the land, the whole land' (Jos. 11, 23; Gen. 13, 9).

'all the day, the whole day' (Is. 65, 2; 28, 24).

'the whole ram' (Ex. 29, 18; Lev. 8, 21).

'all the nations' (Is. 2, 2; cf. Jer. 42, 17).

'all the days' (Job 1, 5).

'all the women' (Ex. 15, 20).

'the whole people, all the people' (Gen. 19, 4; cf. 3, 14; Ps. 116, 11).

'all Israel, all the Israelites' (I Ch. 11, 1; cf. Gen. 45, 9).
all the tables’ (Is. 28, 8; cf. Jer. 25, 23; Ps. 89, 48; 64, 9; Cant. 4, 14bis).

the whole head’ (Is. 1, 5bis; cf. 9, 11; II Ki. 23, 3bis; Ezk. 7, 17; 29, 7; 36, 5).²

the whole world’ (Job 34, 13).

all the people’ (Is. 9, 8; cf. Mal. 3, 9).

all Israel’ (II Sam. 2, 9; cf. Jer. 48, 31).

all Egypt’ (Ezk. 29, 2; cf. 36, 5; Jer. 13, 19).

all peoples’ (Mi. 1, 2; Ps. 67, 4; 6; II Ch. 18, 27; cf. Is. 43, 14; 44, 9; Ezk. 32, 12; 30).

all thy people’ (Is. 60, 21).

all the best Assyrians’ (Ezk. 23, 7).

The idea of ‘all’ may be emphasized by using both constructions with ל together, e. g.,

the whole house of Israel’ (Ezk. 11, 15; 20, 40; 36, 10).

the whole of Edom’ (Ezk. 35, 15).

all the kings of the Gentiles’ (Is. 14, 18).

the whole congregation’ (Num. 16, 3).

all thy enemies’ (Jer. 30, 16).

‘All’ in the sense of ‘everything’ may also be expressed by כל (cf. p. 160f.), and כל (all the things’ e. g., sempre; literally: ‘all things are continually laboring’ (Ecc. 1, 8).

and he told everything that he had done’ (Gen. 24, 66; cf. Lev. 8, 36; Dt. 1, 18).

When the idea of ‘all’ modifies a demonstrative pronoun, the demonstrative is treated just like a modified noun. When the demonstrative is singular the feminine זה is usually employed. These expressions ordinarily take זה in the accusative, e. g.,

nom. all this’ (Jud. 6, 13; Mi. 1, 5; Ps. 44, 18).

acc. ‘all this’ (Gen. 41, 39; without זה Dt. 32, 28).

‘in all this’ (I Sam. 22, 15; II Sam. 14, 19; Is. 5, 25; 9, 11; 16; 20; 10, 4; Hos. 7, 10; Ps. 78, 32; Job 1, 22; 2, 10; Neh. 10, 1; cf. II Ch. 21, 18).

nom. ‘all this’ (Esth. 5, 13).²

² The article is said to be often omitted with parts of the body after לב cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 127c. This is probably simply the frequent poetical omission of the article, so that these cases do not differ in kind from those in the preceding example.
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

The noun modified by ל כל may take other nominal modifiers (possessive suffix, descriptive adjective, demonstrative, genitive, relative clause); ל כל + suffix stands after all other modifiers (cf. p. 206), e. g.,

ל כל 'all my goodness' (Ex. 33, 19; cf. Dt. 5, 13).

ל כל 'all my bones' (Ps. 22, 18; cf. Num. 31, 10; Jer. 35, 8; Ezek. 43, 11).

ל כל 'all her people' (Lam. 1, 11; cf. Gen. 41, 40).

ל כל 'all the cities that they found' (Jud. 20, 48).

ל כל 'all the cities' (Num. 21, 25).

ל כל 'all the kings of the earth' (Ps. 102, 16).

ל כל 'all the Israelites' (Lev. 21, 24).

ל כל 'all the men of his house' (Gen. 17, 27).

ל כל 'all the men that turned their faces ...' (Jer. 42, 17; cf. 16, 15; Gen. 6, 17; Num. 35, 7; Dt. 4, 3).

When the idea of 'all' modifies a personal pronoun the pronoun is expressed by affixing a possessive suffix to ל כל. If the pronoun is singular, the expressions indicate quantity or extent; if plural or collective, number. These expressions may stand in apposition to a preceding noun or pronoun, e. g.,

ל כל 'I will assemble all of thee, oh Jacob' (Mi. 2, 12).

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1 In Ps. 89, 51 כ and ב ב appear to be used together, viz., כ ב ב, but the passage is corrupt, cf. B. Duhm, Die Psalmen, Freiburg i. B. 1899 (= Kurz. Handc. zum AT., 14) p. 224.
let none of thee rejoice, oh Philistia' (Is. 14, 29; cf. 31).

all of thee is fair, my sweetheart' (Can. 4, 7).

for thou, all of thee, hast gone up to the house-tops' (Is. 22, 1).

and the first came out red, all of him was [he was all] like a hairy mantle' (Gen. 25, 25; cf. Lev 13, 13; Nah. 2, 1; Job 21, 23; Cant. 5, 16).

and Mt. Sinai, all of it, smoked' (Ex. 19, 18; cf. Prov. 24, 31; Jer. 2, 21; 48, 38).

yet all go out keeping time ['locusts'] (Prov. 30, 27).

... the whole plain of Jordan, that all of it was well watered' (Gen. 13, 10; cf. Ex. 25, 36; 37, 22; Is. 48, 6; Jer. 6, 6; 50, 13; Am. 8, 8; 9, 5; Nah. 3, 1; Ps. 139, 4; Job 38, 18).

behold a candle-stick, all of it gold' (Zech. 4, 2).

we are all of us the sons of one man (Gen. 42, 11; cf. Ex. 12, 33; Dt. 5, 3; II Sam. 19, 7; Is. 64, 7; 8).

all of us are lost' (Num. 17, 27; cf. II Sam. 13, 25; Is. 53, 6; 59, 11; 64, 5bis).

to which of us' (II Ki. 9, 5).

have not all of us one father' (Mal. 2, 10; cf. Prov. 1, 14; gen. Is. 53, 6).

and you ... are all of you alive this day' (Dt. 4, 4; cf. 29, 9; Jud. 20, 7; Is. 50, 11; Ps. 82, 6; Job 13, 4; 16, 2).

and all of you came to me' (Dt. 1, 22; cf. Jos. 8, 4; I Sam. 22, 8; Is. 48, 14; 65, 12; Jer. 2, 29; Ps. 62, 4; Job 27, 12).

because ye are all become dross' (Ezk. 22, 19).

will the son of Jesse give to all of you fields and vineyards' (I Sam. 22, 7bis).

1 The whole sentence הָלָּךְ בַּהֲדָה is nomen rectum to construct תְרָנָא, cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 130d.
Indefinite Pronomina Ideas in Hebrew.

In a number of cases the article is omitted in constructions of ל, viz.:

a) with ל used absolutely; always before רָאָשִׁים; לֹא may be used in the accusative, e. g.,

ל "all" (cf. p. 203f).

לְדָרְשָׁא acc. "all" (Gen. 9, 3).

לְדָרְשָׁא acc. "all that" (cf. p. 204f).

לְדָרְשָׁא acc. "all that" (cf. p. 205f).

b) in poetry with a noun modified by attributive ל (cf. p. 205f).

c) with collectives modified by ל, probably because the idea of the individuals (every) in the collective is more prominent than the collective idea, e. g.,

לְדָרְשָׁא ‘all flesh, living things’ (Gen. 6, 12 &c.; with לָא Is. 66, 16; with article, only Gen. 7, 15; Is. 40, 6).

לְדָרְשָׁא ‘all trees’ (Neh. 10, 36; 38; cf. II Ki. 3, 19; 25; Ezek. 20, 28).

לְדָרְשָׁא ‘all birds’ (Ps. 50, 11; with לָא Gen. 1, 21).

לְדָרְשָׁא ‘all living things’ (Gen. 3, 20; Job 12, 10; 28, 21; 30, 23; Ps. 145, 16; with לָא Gen. 8, 21; with art., Gen. 6, 19).

14 JAOS 34.
d) with noun modified by לְ in Gen. 9, 12; 15; 16.

Contrast הנֵחַ in Gen. 9, 12; 15; 16.

For other correlative expressions of a somewhat similar character, cf. p. 221, n. at end. None of these, however, express the idea of 'all' so explicitly as the above.

For the various combinations of these correlatives cf. p. 220, n.
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew. 211

'that his city is all captured' (Jer. 51, 31; cf. Gen. 19, 4).

Rarely בָּל 'much' has a meaning similar to 'all', e. g.,
ולעְמוֹת הָעָם 'and it shook all my bones' (Job 4, 14; cf. 33, 19).

The ideas of 'all', 'every' may be emphasized by the repetition of הָכֹל. The two may stand as the modifiers of a single noun (cf. p. 206), or one may stand in the construct before the noun, the other either absolutely or attributively in a genitive depending on the noun, e. g.,
ָכֹל בָּל 'all birds of all kinds [wings]' (Gen. 7, 14; Ezek. 17, 23; cf. Neh. 10, 36).
ָכֹל חֹשֵׁב הָכֹל 'therefore all [thy] commandments concerning all things I will consider right' (Ps. 119, 128; cf. Ezek. 44, 30).

ָכֹל הָכֹל 'every oblation of everything' (Ezek. 44, 30).

The expressions יָנָק וּשָׁאָל; לָעָל בֶּן; בְּעָלָהּ; בָּל; בְּנָתָהּ; בָּל; וּשָׁאָל may be employed for emphasis together with הָכֹל, e. g.,
ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'and all the people rose up as one man' (Jud. 20, 8; cf. Neh. 8, 1).

ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'and all the people rose up both small and great' (II Ki. 25, 26; cf. 23, 2; Esth. 1, 5; II Ch. 15, 13; 34, 30; 36, 18).

ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'to destroy all the Jews, young and old' (Esth. 3, 13; cf. Jos. 6, 21).

'ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'and all his ways, first and last...' (II Ch. 28, 26).

'ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'all the kings of the north, near and far...' (Jer. 25, 26; cf. Esth. 9, 20; Dan. 9, 7).

ָכֹל בָּל וּשָׁאָל 'all the people together' (Gen. 19, 4).

Expressions containing הָכֹל 'all', 'every' may also be emphasized by והָכֹל, e. g.,
ָכֹל וּהָכֹל 'all have gone aside together' (Ps. 14, 3).
ָכֹל וּהָכֹל 'all flesh will perish together' (Job 34, 15).
ָכֹל וּהָכֹל 'all his men together on that day' (I Sam. 31, 6; cf. Jer. 31, 24).

ָכֹל וּהָכֹל 'every one has gone aside together' (Ps. 53, 4).

ָכֹל וּהָכֹל 'all of them together shall perish' (Is. 31, 3; cf. Neh. 4, 2).
Frank R. Blake,

ל 'all', 'every' may be combined with the various constructions denoting partitive 'some', 'any', 'no',! 'each', e. g., נַעֲמָה וְאָסָף הָנִירָרָא שֶׁלַּנִּי 'if I take anything of all thou hast' (Gen. 14, 23; cf. Num. 6, 4).

'אָתָנוּ שֶׁלַּנִּי מֵכַל הָכְלָיָל 'and none of them were found like Daniel ...' (Dan. 1, 19).

יָרֵאָתָנוּ בְּכָל שָׁלֹשׁ יָהֳרָא בְּכָל יָהֳרָא 'and every ten days some of all sorts of wine in abundance' (Neh. 5, 18).

רַבִּים וְרָחֲאָתָנוּ מֵכַל שֶׁלַּנִּי 'and there is not lacking to him anything of all he wants' (Ecc. 6, 2).

כְלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי בְּלֵיל בְּלֵיל 'and he gave to each of them all changes of raiment' (Gen. 45, 22: cf. p. 161 and p. 156).

יָקַּע לַחַל בְּכָל בְּכָל הָכְלָיָל 'and the Lord gave into his hand Jehoiakim ... and some of the vessels of the temple' (Dan. 1, 2; cf. 5[?]; Neh. 7, 70 [contrast Ezr. 2, 68]).

The partitive meaning of the הָכְלָיָל in these constructions is sometimes lost, e. g.,

הָכְלָיָל וְיָפַּהוּ נֶשֶׁת וְלָכְלָיָל 'and they took wives, all that they wanted' (Gen. 6, 2[?]).

כְלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי מֲנַעֲמָה וְאָסָף הָנִיר וְאוּלַיָה 'all in the nostrils of which was the breath of life, all that was on the dry land, died' (Gen. 7, 22; cf. 8, 17).

כְלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי מַעֲשָׂה 'every stranger' (Gen. 17, 12; cf. Cant. 3, 6).

The idea 'all' may be combined with the idea of partitive 'other, rest', e. g.,

כְלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי וְאָסָף הָנִיר 'and all the rest of the people' (Jud. 7, 6).

כְלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי כְּלַל הָכְלָיָל 'for cream ... shall all those left in the land eat' (Is. 7, 22).

כְּלַל שֶׁלַּנִּי 'and the rest of the acts of Solomon, first and last [all the rest of] (II Ch. 9, 29; cf. 20, 34; 25, 26; 26, 22).

The idea 'in all' in summing up after an enumeration is expressed either by לְכִי alone or by לְכִי + suffix as subject with a numeral as predicate, e. g.,

1 In connection with 'any', 'no' this לְכִי is similar to emphatic לְכִי cf. p. 180f.

נְגָפָה may belong here, but the meaning 'all' may also be due to the fact that it is an abbreviation of נְגָפָה רֹעָה, cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 714.
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

‘in all thirty seven’ (II Sam. 23, 39; cf. Jos. 21, 26; 37; 38[?]; cf. 1 Esdr. 2, 42). 1

‘five in all’ (I Ch. 2, 6).

‘five chiefs in all’ (I Ch. 7, 3).

When a noun or pronoun modified by ל is employed as the logical subject, the predicate regularly agrees with the modified word (for pronouns cf. p. 207 ff.), tho occasionally it agrees with the grammatical subject ל, e. g.,

‘and all the days of Adam were . . . ’ (Gen. 5, 5).

‘and all the women went out after her’ (Ex. 15, 20).

‘let all that has breath praise JAH’ (Ps. 150, 6).

‘and all the days of Noah were . . . ’ (Gen. 9, 29). 2

‘all that eat it shall be destroyed’ (Lev. 17, 14; cf. Nah. 3, 7).

‘all our pleasant things are laid waste’ (Is. 64, 10).

‘all a man’s ways are clean in his own eyes’ (Prov. 16, 2).

Indefinite Ordinals.

Next. 4

This idea is usually expressed, absolutely and attributively, by the definite ordinal יָשָׁנָה ‘second’, or by אחר ‘other’, both regularly with the article, e. g.,

‘and Yahath was the first born and Zizah was the next [the second]’ (I Ch. 23, 11).

1 In the passages in Joshua ל is to be read כְּלֵי תָּרוֹם ‘in all—cities’.

2 This use of the singular with reference to a plural, however, is probably best explained like the constructions on p. 157.

3 Examples in which a singular verb precedes, as here, are not conclusive, as the rules of concord are often suspended when the verb comes first, cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, § 145 o—r.

4 ‘Next’ in the sense of ‘next, nearest to’ without regard to any special order is expressed by בָּא (cf. Gesenius-Buhl, p. 721) and קְנָי (cf. Neh. 3, 2; 4; 5 ff.).
and he went out the next day' (Ex. 2, 13; cf. Jos. 6, 14; Ezek. 43, 22; Neh. 8, 13; Gen. 47, 18).

'and the next day I said to her' (II Ki. 6, 29).

'that Sarah would bear a child at this festival next year' (Gen. 17, 21).

'in the next generation let their name be blotted out' (Ps. 109, 13).

The same idea is expressed by לָאֹ֫דְרִיָּהּ, which usually means 'last', in—

'that ye may tell it to the following generation' (Ps. 48, 14).

With reference to 'day' this idea may be expressed by בּוּרְהַ֫הְמֵא, 'morrow, the day after', used either absolutely or as a genitive modifying מִ֫הְמֵא, e. g.,

'when the dawn broke the next day' (Jon. 4, 7; cf. I Sam. 30, 17; Gen. 19, 34).

'and all the next day' (Num. 11, 32).

'Next' in the sense of 'second in rank' may be expressed by the noun לָאֹ֫דְרִיָּהּ, e. g.,

'and the name of his first born was Joel and the name of his second born was Abijah' (I Sam. 8, 2; cf. 17, 13; II Sam. 3, 3; I Ch. 16, 5; Neh. 11, 17; I Ch. 5, 12; pl. I Ch. 15, 18).

'and Conaniah was ruler over them and his brother Shimei was next in rank' (II Ch. 31, 12).

'the one next to the king, second in rank [a title]' (II Ch. 28, 7; with ב Esth. 10, 3; absolute I Sam. 23, 17).

Middle.

This idea is expressed by the adjective לָאֹ֫דְרִיָּהּ used either absolutely or attributively, e. g.,

'and the middle one six cubits in width' (I Ki. 6, 6; cf. Ezek. 41, 7; 42, 5; 6).

'and they went up by winding-stairs to the middle [chamber], and from the middle to the third row' (I Ki. 6, 8).

'the beginning of the middle watch' (Jud. 7, 19; cf. I Ki. 6, 8; Ex. 26, 28; 36, 33).
Sometimes the idea in its attributive use is expressed by the genitive of אֶלֶּה 'midst' depending on the modified noun, e. g., אֶלֶּה הָעֲשָׁרָה יָמָּוִים 'the two middle pillars' (Jud. 16, 29; cf. Jer. 39, 3).

_Last._

This idea is expressed, absolutely and attributively, by the adjective יְמֵּרָה, e. g., יֵי יְמֵּרָה 'I am the first and the last' (Is. 44, 6; cf. 48, 12).

אֶלֶּה יָמָּוִים 'from the first day to the last' (Neh. 8, 18).

אֶלֶּה הָרְבָּעִים 'and these are the last acts of David' (II Sam. 23, 1; cf. I Ch. 23, 27).

אֶלֶּה הֶרֶחְבָּלוֹת הָרָאשָׁמִים 'and the acts of David first and last' (I Ch. 29, 29; II Ch. 9, 29; 12, 15; 16, 11; 20, 34; 25, 26; 26, 22; 28, 26; 35, 27).

General Discussion.

The indefinite pronominal ideas, as we have seen, are expressed partly by special words, partly by the use of certain grammatical categories and principles, partly by the mere construction.

The following is a list of all special words so employed, viz.:  

םִּגְא—(man) some one, any one, no one, cf. p. 168f.

םִּגְא—(falseness) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.

םִּגְא—(brother) other as correlative to one, cf. p. 137ff.


םִּגְא—(sister) fem. of other as correlative to one (see מִגְא), cf. p. 137ff.


* The expression 'next to last, last but one' does not occur in Biblical Hebrew.
—(nonentity, not) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.
—some one, any one, no one, cf. p. 169; each, every, cf. p. 156.
—(man his brother) one another, cf. p. 151.
—(these) used twice for correlative some—some, cf. p. 137 ff.
—(word, thing) anything, cf. p. 170 f.
—(man) some one, any one, no one, cf. p. 168 f.
—cf. שָׁא.
—(end) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185 f.
—by-form of מֵשָּׁה.
—(woman) fem. of one as correlative to other, cf. p. 137 ff.
—(nota accusativi) same, cf. p. 122.
—(in, among) some of, &c., cf. p. 175 f.
—(in body) with suffix by—self, cf. p. 127.
—(not anything) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185 f.
—(not) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185 f.
—cf. נָבֶא.
—(bone) self, cf. p. 128.
—(word) something, anything, nothing, cf. pp. 170 f., 179.
—(breath) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185 f.
—(riches, goods) enough, cf. p. 201 f.
—(murmuring, multitude), very much, many, cf. p. 192 f.
—(this) used twice as correlative one—other, cf. p. 137 ff.
—cf. נָבֶא.
—(stranger) other, cf. p. 135.
Indefinite Pronominal Ideas in Hebrew.

בָּשׁ—(good) good in respect to size, quantity, much, cf. p. 188, n.; עַ—בָּשׁ anything at all, cf. p. 182f.

הַמָּן—(act. part. of הָמָן) other, cf. p. 136.

רַמְא—(rest, remainder) other part of, others of, cf. p. 135f.

כָּפָר—(as, like) as much, many as, cf. p. 193f.: used with pronominal suffix, e.g., הֲֽוֹמַר, הֲֽוֹמָּן, or with following demonstrative in the sense of such; כָּפָר may be separated from the demonstrative or joined to it as one word, viz., הִפָּר, הִפָּרָה, הַפָּרָה, cf. p. 129f.

—כָּפָר—followed by demonstratives 'so and so', cf. p. 161f.

דָּבָר—(heavy) much, many, cf. p. 189.

דּוֹבָר—(great, mighty) much[?], cf. p. 187, n.

דָּבָר—(thus) such, cf. p. 131f.


שִׁמְעָל—(every man) every one, cf. p. 160.


שִׁמְעָל—every one, cf. p. 158.

שִׁמְעָל—(thus) such, cf. p. 131f.

שִׁמְעָל—(not a thing, non-thing) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.

שִׁמְעָל—(non-substance) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.


שִׁמְעָל—one of, cf. p. 177.


שִׁמְעָל—next day, cf. p. 214.


שִׁמְעָל—(number) few, cf. p. 198f.; as much, many as, cf. p. 194.


שִׁמְעָל—(something small, unimportant) few, cf. p. 198f.

שִׁמְעָל—cf. הַמָּן


שִׁמְעָל—(stranger) other, cf. p. 135, n.


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(remarks) so and so, cf. p. 161f.
(small) few, cf. p. 199.
(end) all, cf. pp. 210, 212.
(near) בַּר emphatic, cf. p. 211.
(first) cf. יַעֲרָא.
(wind) nothing as entity, cf. p. 186.
(far) cf. בַּר.
(evil) cf. בַּר.
(friend) with suffix: in sense of another man, cf. p. 135; as correlative other to one, cf. p. 137ff.
(fem. friend) with suffix: another woman, cf. p. 135; as fem. correlative other to one, cf. p. 137ff.
(rest, remainder) other part of, others of, cf. p. 135f.
(vanity, falseness) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.
(a little, n.
different, cf. p. 122.
(secondly) other, cf. p. 133f.
(waste, emptiness) nothing as entity, cf. p. 185f.

The grammatical categories or principles employed in expressing indefinite pronominal ideas are the following.
2) The singular referring to a plural sometimes has the force of one or each of the plural, cf. pp. 137f., 149f., 157f., 159, 213.
3) The dual occasionally has the sense of both, cf. p. 145.
4) The plural is occasionally used for every, various, apparently as a substitute for repetition, cf. pp. 154, 122; for many, cf. p. 190.
5) The article in its definite use may express the idea of each, every, cf. p. 154f.; in its indefinite use it may express the ideas certain, cf. p. 164; and some, any, no, cf. p. 172f.
6) The personal pronouns are employed in the sense of self in both verbal and non verbal sentences, cf. p. 123ff.; the pronoun of the third person denotes attributive self, cf. p. 127f.; and absolute such, cf. p. 128; the third person singular denotes absolute and attributive same, cf. pp. 118—121; in connection with נ ‘as’ they denote such, cf. נ above.
7) The demonstratives may be employed in the sense of same and such, cf. pp. 118, 119, 128f.; as correlates one—other, some—some, cf. נ and נפ above; so and so, cf. p. 162; in connection with נ ‘as’ they denote such, cf. נ above.
9) Repetition is employed to denote the correlative ideas one—other, cf. p. 140ff., each, every, cf. p. 152ff., different, various, cf. p. 122. Special forms of this repetition are masc. and fem. of the same stem = all kinds of, cf. p. 154; sing. and pl. = many, cf. p. 190.
10) The various constructions for the expression of the indefinite subject, are also employed to express the ideas some, any, no in the subject, cf. p. 165, n. 3.

In a number of cases there is no formal expression of the indefinite pronominal idea, it being simply indicated by the construction. The chief cases are, viz.,
a) self in subject of sentence, cf. p. 123.
b) such modified by a dependent clause, &c., cf. pp. 131, 128.
c) other in contrasts, cf. p. 132.

in connection with prepositions meaning 'except, besides', cf. p. 136.
d) both in apposition to two nouns or pronouns, cf. p. 144.
e) either, neither, cf. p. 147f.
f) every with numerals, cf. pp. 155, 156.
g) some, any, no used absolutely. cf. p. 165f.

used attributively in connection with prepositions meaning 'except, besides', cf. p. 183.
in comparisons of equality, cf. p. 185.

j) too little, cf. p. 203.

Several of these indefinite pronominal ideas may be emphasized or strengthened in various ways, viz.,
both

 ربַּה, הַנְּפַר 'together', יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר 'as one', cf. p. 147.

some, any, no by


all by repetition of לָל, cf. p. 206, 211; by יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, יָהַנְּפַר שֶׁשַּׁנְּפַר, cf. p. 211.

by יָהַנְּפַר 'together', cf. p. 211.

1 These correlatives occur in a variety of combinations. With regard to לְגַוּר the connectives may be,
—רָנַב (Gen. 19, 11; I Sam. 5, 9; 30, 2; 19; II Ki. 23, 2; 25, 26; Esth. 1, 5; 20; II Ch. 15, 13; 34, 30: in II Ki. 23, 2; II Ch. 15, 13 Ȝ precedes 邯 without special force; in Esth. 1, 5; 20 with dative force).
—רָנַב (Dt. 1, 17; I Ch. 26, 13; II Ch. 31, 15).
—רָנַב (I Sam. 25, 36; I Ki. 22, 31; Jer. 16, 6: Job 3, 19; II Ch. 18, 30; 36, 18).
—רָנַב (Num. 22, 18; I Sam. 22, 15; 20, 2).
—רָנַב (Ps. 104, 25; 115, 13).

Sometimes these pronominal expressions, tho they have, of
course, a certain indefiniteness of meaning, are grammatically
definite, and are treated as such. These definite indefinites
are, viz., many of the indefinite demonstratives, the superlative
indefinite cardinals most, least, the comprehensive indefinite
cardinal all, the indefinite ordinals. Same and self are often
expressed by definite pronouns, personal and demonstrative,
cf. pp. 118f., 123ff. רַֽחַם other may take the article in the sense
of the other, וְָ֣י ‘friend’ and רָֽגוּ ‘brother’ are made grammatically
definite by the suffix in the sense of ‘another man’; the correlatives
ינָֽלֵו and הָֽיָּֽשָּׁ֑ו may take the article, cf. p. 137;
ינָֽלֵו, הָֽיָּֽשָּׁ֑ו, רַֽחַם, רַֽהֲֽזָּֽו in the sense of other regularly take the article. Both expressed
by רַֽחַם is definite both when used absolutely and when used
attributively, cf. p. 145ff. ﬁ וְָ֣א each, every is occasionally treated
as definite, cf. p. 156; similarly, ﬁ לְָ֣ו every, cf. pp. 158, 160; every
is sometimes expressed by the article itself, cf. p. 154f. Most,
least are definite by virtue of being superlatives, cf. pp. 197f., 200f.
לְָ֣ו all may take the article, cf. pp. 203f., 205, or suffix, cf. p.
207ff., and may also be treated as definite when it stands without

The two adjectives may be used—
in indefinite singular (Gen. 19, 11; I Sam. 5, 9; &c; fem. Num. 22, 18).
in indefinite plural (Jer. 16, 6; fem. Ps. 104, 25).
in definite singular (all exs. under —ר; I Sam. 30, 19; II Ch. 18, 30).
in definite plural (Ps. 115, 13; II Ch. 36, 18).

They are used attributively—
with noun repeated with each (I Sam. 20, 2).
with one noun (I Sam. 22, 15; 25, 36; Ps. 104, 25; II Ch. 36, 18).

לְָ֣ו may stand first (Jer. 16, 6; Esth. 1, 5; 20; II Ch. 31, 15; 34, 30; 36, 18).

With regard to ﬁ לְָ֣ו, the connectives are
—לְָ֣ו (Gen. 19, 4; Jos. 6, 21; Esth. 3, 13).
—(Is. 20, 4; Jer. 51, 22; Lam. 2, 21).

The plural is used only in Is. 20, 4; the feminine and definite forms
apparently not at all; ﬁ לְָ֣ו precedes in Jer. 51, 22.

With regard to ﬁ לְָ֣ו, the following combinations occur, viz.,
—לְָ֣ו (Gen. 24, 50).
—I (Num. 24, 13).
—I (Gen. 31, 24; 29).
—I (II Sam. 13, 22).

—and ﬁ לְָ֣ו, take article and are connected by ﬁ. For
similar correlative expressions with meanings somewhat like the above
the article, cf. p. 209f. The indefinite ordinals are grammatically

The pronominally used words in the list above (p. 215 ff.)
which are found with the article when used pronominally
are, viz.,

םינ — indef. definite article, cf. p. 172f.
מִּי — the other, cf. p. 132f.; the next, cf. p. 213f.
םיִּמְלָה — the last, cf. p. 215.
שֶׁ — each, cf. p. 156; indef. definite article, cf. p. 172f.
לֶא — the rest, cf. p. 136.
לֶא — the one small in quantity or number, cf. p. 199.
לֶא — the next in rank, cf. p. 214.
לֶא — the other, rest, cf. p. 136.
לֶא — the other, rest, cf. p. 136.
לֶא — the one small in’, cf. p. 199.
בְּ — the one great in quantity or number, cf. p. 191.
בְּ — the other, cf. p. 132f.; the next, cf. p. 213f.
בְּ — the middle, cf. p. 214.


The *nota accusativi* מִי may of course be employed with
those pronouns standing with article, cf. above; with those
expressed by the demonstratives מִי, מִי; and with those de-
efined by a suffix, viz., מִי, מִי, מִי, מִי, מִי, מִי. It is also
found with several which are without any formal mark of
determination, viz.,

טֶא Num. 21, 9.
לֶא Gen. 9, 3.
לֶא Gen. 39, 23.

With regard to the concord of the indefinite pronouns,
some are practically adjectives and are varied for gender, viz.,

מִי other, next.
םיִּמְלָה next.
לֶא much, many.
לֶא other.
לֶא much.
לֶא in all meanings.


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The correlative adjectives לְזַדְכָּה and כְּכָה, &c., cf. p. 220, n.

All of these except כְּכָה have also plural forms, masculine and feminine (כְּכָה only masc.); moreover, כְּכָה occurs in the masculine plural, viz., כָּה כָּה.

Some are pronouns or nouns which have a special feminine form, viz.,

לְזַד — לְזַד
כְּכָה — כְּכָה
שְּכָה — שְּכָה
לְזַד — לְזַד
שְּכָה — שְּכָה

as correlatives, cf. p. 137 ff.

In the expressions for such the demonstrative or personal pronoun after כְּכָה usually agrees with the gender and number of the noun referred to. The suffixes after all agree in gender and number with the noun to which they refer. For the concord of כְּכָה and its suffix with its antecedent, cf. p. 145. A verb whose subject is absolute such, agrees in gender and number with the demonstrative or personal pronoun after כְּכָה, כְּכָה being treated as feminine, cf. p. 129. A verb whose subject is שְּכָה one, each, or absolute לְזַד all, every may stand either in the singular or plural masculine, cf. pp. 148, 149, 158, 203 ff. For the concord of a verb whose subject contains attributive לְזַד cf. pp. 180, 213. The correlative one in the expressions meaning one — other, שְּכָה + suffix both, and שְּכָה, שְּכָה each may stand in apposition to a plural noun or pronoun, or an equivalent copulative expression. The constructions in which a singular refers to each individual of a plural (cf. p. 157) are of a similar character.

The feminine form is used for the neuter in שְּכָה 'such things’ (treated as feminine), שְּכָה, שְּכָה כְּכָה 'all this’, ‘in all this’, cf. pp. 129, 206.

It has been stated that the indefinite pronouns lie midway between the demonstratives and the numerals. The close relation between the demonstratives proper, and the indefinite demonstratives is shown by the use of the former in the sense of same, cf. pp. 118, 119, such, cf. p. 128 ff., and the correlatives one — other, some — some, cf. p. 137 ff.

The fact that the plural of כְּכָה may stand before its noun
is probably due to the analogy of the closely allied cardinal numerals, cf. p. 188.

'Some', 'any', 'no' and 'a certain' modifying a singular noun are not sharply distinguished from simple indetermination (i.e. the indefinite article), cf. pp. 162, 163 and n., 171. 'Some', 'any', 'no' as subject are not sharply distinguished from the indefinite personal pronoun (they, man, on), cf. p. 165, n. 3.

Among themselves the various categories of indefinites are not separated by any hard and fast boundary line. *Same* and *self* may both be expressed by personal pronouns, cf. pp. 118 ff., 123 ff.; by מָאָס, cf. pp. 121 f., 128; *so and so, such and such* may be expressed by simple *such*, cf. p. 162; and by הָאָמִּי *a certain*, cf. p. 162; the correlative *one* and *each* are both expressed by אַהֲמָר, or by סֵּנַה, which often wavers between the two meanings, cf. pp. 137 ff., 148 ff., 151; the ideas *each* and *every* are often not kept distinct, cf. pp. 148—158; the negative of *each*, *every* falls together with *no*, *none*, cf. p. 177; *other* and *more* in the sense of *in addition to* are both expressed by מַעָמָר, cf. pp. 133 f., 195; repetition of words employed originally to denote the correlations *one—other*, cf. p. 140 ff., passes over on the one hand to the meaning of *each*, cf. p. 152 ff., and on the other to that of *different*, cf. p. 122; מָעָמָר means both *all* and *every*, and the constructions of the two are at times confused, cf. pp. 159, 160, 206, n., 209; *certain* and *some*, *any*, *no* are often expressed in the same way, cf. pp. 162 ff., 168—173, 176 f.; מַעָמָר means not only *much*, but also, a large quantity being considered as sufficient, *enough*, cf. pp. 187 f., 201; and מַעָמָר *abundance* in a few cases means practically *all*, cf. pp. 189, 211.

Each of the different constructions for rendering the same idea usually express only a certain phase of the idea, or the idea under certain conditions. For example the demonstratives and personal pronouns mean 'same' in the sense of 'the one just mentioned' while הָאָמִּי means 'one and the same, identical'; מָעָמָר means 'other, in addition to', אַהֲמָר means 'other, different', מָעָמָר means 'other, second'; מָעָמָר and הָאָמִּי denote 'each' absolute and partitive, repetition denotes attributive 'each', &c., &c.

Not infrequently, however, the different constructions for the same idea interchange just as do the constructions for different ideas. For example מָעָמָר may mean 'one and the same' (Job 3, 19); אַהֲמָר may be used for מָעָמָר (cf. p. 132); a re-
peated noun followed by a singular referring to it may be used very much as וייא ‘each’ (II Ki. 17, 29); &c.

Sometimes two of these constructions are used together, viz.,
such—ץ and יתלוכ, p. 132.
other—רעת and nast, p. 134.
one—other—reciprocal verb and correlative, p. 143f.
each, every—article + other constructions, p. 156f.
—repetition + other constructions, p. 156f.
—לי + other constructions, p. 161.
some, any, no—indef. definite article and other constructions,
p. 173.
—indef. participle and partitive לי, p. 175.
—שין, פות + partitive לי, ב, p. 176f.
much, many—加快建设 and לוב, p. 192f.
—לוב and ליג, p. 193.
—ר and ליג, p. 194.
more—加快建设 and other constructions, p. 196f.
all—לי before and after noun, p. 206.
—ט and ממקות, ב, p. 211.
—לי + correlative adjectives, p. 211.

Occasionally we can trace by means of intermediate stages the shift from one construction or category to another, viz.,
from ‘same’ to copula, p. 118, n. 117.
from עצ note acc. to עצ ‘that, same’, p. 122, n.
from עצ + noun (acc.) = ‘same’ to עצ + def. noun (any case)
= ‘same’ in later Hebrew, p. 122, n.
from לול ‘in heart, mind’ to לול ‘self’, p. 127 and n.
from extens. repetition to intens. repetition, p. 142, n. at end.
from ויהי—שין ‘one—other’ to ויהי ‘one another’, p. 151.
from ‘a certain’ to indef. article, p. 163, n.
from possess. לי to partitive לי, p. 177, n. 2.
from interrogatives to indefinites, p. 180 and n.
Cf. also the half pronominal nouns in the list p. 215ff. viz.,
שניא, תלה, לבר, יבר, בבר, לבר, רבר, רבר, לבר.

Moreover, when the pronominal idea is expressed by a word that is ordinarily a noun, the nominal idea is always latent in the word used pronominally, and ready to emerge whenever the mind of the user becomes conscious of it. This is especially true of the words ושיא (and other words for ‘man’ used pronominally), והشعور, והشعور, והשוער, והשוער, and the numerous nouns denoting nothing as an entity. Cf., for example—

15 JAO 34.
Many of these indefinite pronominal categories are closely related to adverbs of quantity, the same word being often employed for both. The expressions for *such* are closely related to the adverbs פֶּפָּלֶפֶל, פֶּפֶלֶל, פֶּפֶלֶל 'thus, so', which are sometimes practically equivalent to *such*; הָעֵבֶּרֶבֶּר בְּפֶפֶלֶל is employed adverbially in Neh. 6, 4. *Other* in the sense of 'in addition to' is expressed by the adverb רֵעַ 'still, yet', הָעֵבֶּרֶבֶּר something, &c. seems to be employed as an adverb in I Sam. 21, 3. The feminine of בּ(כּוּד), (Ps. 62, 3; 78, 15; 89, 8: בּ(כּוּד) Ps. 65, 10; 120, 6; 123, 4), and also הָעֵבֶּרֶבֶּר (II Ki. 10, 18), are employed adverbially in the sense of 'much'. ישָרְבּוֹ and מָשָרְבּוֹ are both indefinite pronouns and adverbs; for examples of adverbial use cf. מְשָרְבּוֹ II Ki. 10, 18; Zech. 1, 15; Job 24, 24; Ru. 2, 7: יֵשְׁרָאָר Job 36, 2: מְשָרְבּוֹ, p. 200. Adverbial 'too-much' is expressed by הָעֵבֶּרֶבֶּר in Ecc. 7, 16; 17. כּוּד seems to be used adverbially in II Sam. 1, 9; Hos. 14, 3; Ps. 39, 6; Job 27, 3.

In comparisons containing 'much', 'more', (cf. p. 193—197) some of the same constructions that are employed to denote a pronominal idea may be employed adverbially, e. g., הָעֵבֶּרֶבֶּר 'in the way of thy testimonies I have rejoiced as much as in all riches' (Ps. 119, 14).

לָחָם 'and he sinned more, again' (Ex. 9, 34; cf. Lev. 26, 18; II Ch. 28, 22).

לָחָם 'and they hated him still more' (Gen. 37, 5; cf. Ps. 78, 17).

לָהָם 'and they dig for it more than for hidden treasures' (Job 3, 21; cf. 23, 12; 35, 11 bis; 42, 12; Ezek. 16, 47; Ps. 19, 11; Cant. 1, 4; Ecc. 2, 9; 4, 2).

לָהָם 'and I will be viler than this' (II Sam. 6, 22).

לָהָם 'and he found them ten times as [wise as] all the enchanters' (Dan. 1, 20).
Conclusion.

The article just concluded is an exemplification of the employment of a principle of syntactical study all too seldom applied. Such study is ordinarily carried on from the point of view of words and grammatical forms, the so-called formal method, and not by the so-called logical method, from the standpoint of the idea or grammatical category. The formal method is

1 In connection with this article it may not be amiss to give a list of some addenda and corrigenda to my former article on Comparative Syntax (cf. p. 117, n. 1), viz.:

p. 141, note, add Roumanian to Indo-Eur. languages with post-positive article.

p. 146, l. 8, for ʿawā-u read ʿarrā-u.

p. 159, l. 27, for ʿawāš read ʿawāš.

p. 159, ll. 36, 37; p. 160, l. 23 for sandāj read sandāj.

p. 161, l. 8, for ʿawāš read ʿawāš.

p. 162, l. 22f. change to—In Modern Egyptian Arabic an adjective agreeing with a strong feminine plural or with a broken plural denoting persons is put in the masculine plural in īn.

p. 167, l. 23, for ʿawāš read ʿawāš.

p. 167, l. 30, insert sometimes before only.

p. 168, l. 4, for ʿawāš read ʿawāš.

p. 181, l. 28 for masārā read masārā.

p. 184, ll. 10, 11, for matātī read matātī.

p. 192, l. 30, for mayādīl read mayādīl.

p. 192, l. 37, ʿawāš really occurs only as absolute pronoun, but it is quite probable that it was also employed attributively (cf. p. 198, above).

p. 194, l. 36, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 194, l. 3, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 4, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 9 for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 9, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 10, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 10, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 195, l. 18, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 200, l. 5 ʿaharun is not a good example, because it has only the meaning 'as much as a sheep', (so Lev. 5, 7; 12, 8); the meaning 'enough for a sheep', however, is a perfectly possible one (cf. p. 201, above).

p. 209, ll. 26, 27, cancel "in the case of those numerals that are without suffix 4th".

p. 259, note, for ʿaharun read ʿāharu.

p. 267, l. 11 for jacket read jacket.

The present article, besides the discussion of the attributive use of these pronominal ideas in general, cf. the notes on pp. 119, 120, 121, 122, 139, 145, 157, 160, 162, 163, 172, 206, 208, 220ff.

2 For a discussion of these two methods of syntactical inquiry, cf. G. von der Gabelentz, Die Sprachwissenschaft... 2., verm. und
in its way, of course, just as important and valuable as the logical, but as ideas are after all the ultimate things in language, it is evident that any study of a language from the logical point of view will get closer to the heart and genius of that language than one conducted along formal lines.

It is to be hoped that this method of syntactical inquiry will be followed more frequently in the future. Such investigations in the Semitic field can not fail to add largely to our knowledge of Semitic languages in general and of the Bible in particular, and to reduce greatly the amount of time required to gain a knowledge of any of these tongues.


To p. 219, (3) add—Dual = few, cf. p. 198 ff.


To p. 126 end add—For the chief combinations of these pronominal ideas with each other and with other ideas, cf. pp. 130, 131, 134 ff., 136; 147, 151, 159 ff., 160 f., 161; 164 f.; 177 f., 178 f., 179 f., 183 ff., 185; 193 ff.; 200; 195—198, 200 f.; 203; 204 f.; 206 f., 207 ff., 212.
Athravaprajyaścittāni. — Vorwort und Einleitung von Professor Julius von Negelein, University of Königsberg.

Vorwort.


A: Ms. des Ind. Office, Cat. Eggeling 526 A.
B: Haug'sches Ms. (München) Nr. 62.
C: Anhang zu dem vorigen, von anderer Hand geschrieben.
D: Berliner Ms.

Am verhältnismäßig wertvollsten war Ms. A. Es scheint D näher zu stehen als BC. Im übrigen kann man von Handschriftengruppen nicht reden. Die Mss. stehen sich sehr nahe, sind recht jung und haben die meisten Fehler und Auslassungen völlig gemeinschaftlich. Die sprachliche Korruption hatte bei

1 Text, notes, and indices were published in the preceding volume, 33, 121 and 217.
16 JAOS 34.
ihnen in den Prosawie in den Verspartien einen so hohen Grad erreicht, daß ich zeitweilig an der Lösung meiner Aufgabe völlig verzweifelte und die Hoffnung, einen irgendwie lesbaren Text zu rekonstruieren, bald als unerfüllbar auf gab. Nur darauf mußte es ankommen, die einigermaßen verständlichen Partien so zu geben, wie die letzten Abschreibergenerationen sie aufgefaßt haben konnten, und inhaltlich zu retten, was zu retten war. Gern will ich zugeben, daß Texte, wie der vorliegende, an der äußersten Grenze der Edierbarkeit stehen. Dafür verlangte ich auch meinerseits das Zugeständnis, daß mit dem überliefernten Material nichts Besseres geleistet werden konnte. Nicht dies konnte mein Bestreben sein, ein durch tausendjährigen Abschreiberverständnis getrübtes Textbild archaisierend aufzuputzen, sondern das älteste Erzeugnis eines wichtigen Gebietes der altindischen Religionsliteratur in der überliefernten Form zugänglich zu machen und seine sachliche Bewertung und Verarbeitung anzubahnen.


Meinen Weg vorwärts zu gehen, wäre mir kaum möglich gewesen, kaum hätte ich es vermocht, das sachlich Zusammengehörige überall aneinanderzureihen, wenn mir nicht Bloomfields ausgezeichnete Concordance zur Hilfe gekommen wäre. Bisweilen benutzte ich sie, um von der im Texte zitierten Mantra-Partie aus die sachlich zugehörigen Prosastellen der gedruckten Parallelten zu ermitteln, zuweilen zur Feststellung des Mantras selbst, wenn dessen fürchterliche Korruption seine Identifizierung auf anderem Wege unmöglich machte, — aber immer, ohne daß sie jemals durch eigene Schuld versagt hätte. Wir können in ihr ein Musterwerk philologischer Präzisionsarbeit sehen.

Ein zweiter Umstand war es, der mir in außerordentlichem Maße zu Hilfe kam. Unser Text streift in vielen Partien die verwinkeltesten Fragen des Rituals, dessen Beherrschung die Sonderarbeit eines halben Lebens voraussetzt. Mit den einschlägigen Texten keineswegs unbekannt, wäre mir die Lösung vieler sich hier bietender Probleme, die Kenntnis einer großen Zahl von Einzeltatsachen, gleichwohl verschlossen geblieben, wenn sich Herr Prof. W. Caland nicht gütigst bereit erklärt hätte, die zweite, teilweise auch die dritte Korrektur des Satzes zu lesen. Er hat mich dabei vor einer Reihe von Mißgriffen bewahrt — standen ihm doch genaue Kopien des Textes zur Verfügung — und durch seine freundlichen Rat-
schläge den Wert der Arbeit erheblich gefördert. Ihm für seine im Interesse der Wissenschaft geleistete tätige Anteilnahme zu danken, ist mir Pflicht und Freude. Endlich hat Herr Prof. E. Sieg bei dieser ebensowenig wie bei früheren Arbeiten die Mühe gescheut, am Lesen der Korrekturen sich zu beteiligen und dabei viele Einzelheiten zu bessern.


Ich werde den beschrittenen Weg weiter verfolgen. Die gegenwärtig vorliegende Arbeit ist die Erfüllung meines im Traumschlüssel S. 121 Anm. 1 gegebenen Versprechens. Sie soll mit der Ankündigung einer Bearbeitung der ältesten astrologischen Literatur Indiens, auf die ich seit Jahren als auf eine sehr wichtige Gruppe religiöser Dokumente mein
Augenmerk gerichtet habe, schließen. Auch auf diesem Gebiet liegt, wie wir sehen werden, das Interessanteste und Beste in den Atharvaparisista wie in einem großen Thesaurus verborgen.

Je mehr der Kreis der tätigen Mitarbeiter auf unserem Forschungsgebiete zusammenschmilzt, um so mehr ist es unsere Pflicht, sich des Ideenschatzes bewußt zu bleiben, dessen strenge Wahrung und Ausgestaltung der Pflege des Sanskritstudiums allein sein Recht zu geben vermag, und die Einwirkung eines in flacher Routine sich selbstgenügsam ergebenden Virtuosen- tumms auszuschalten, das unter dem Alleinanspruch auf äußere Exaktheit nur fehlgreifende innere Hohlheit verbirgt.

Einleitung.


Über den Umfang der Sühne-bedürftigen Verfehlungen der Opferpraxis unterrichten uns Āsv. Prāy. 1b; s. Ath. Prāy. Anm. 2; dort wird von der Möglichkeit, einen Opferbestandteil durch einen anderen zu ersetzen, also von der so wichtigen Substitutionshandlung, gesprochen, und dabei als zur heiligen Handlung gehörig, also dem menschlichen Irrtum unterworfen, genannt: das Opfermaterial, die Gegend und Zeit seiner Vollziehung, der Opferlohn, die Priester und die Göttin. Tatsächlich können wir aus unseren Texten den Umstand belegen, daß an jede einzelne dieser Eventualitäten gedacht ist.


„aus seinem eigenen Mutterschoß“ von neuem sich herausentwickeln lassen (Ath. Prāy. Anm. 79), während sie das Āhavaniya-Feuer als „das zu Entflammende“ bei seinem vorzeitigen Erlöschen nicht durch Quirilen, sondern durch Übertragung aus dem Gārhapatya abermals ins Leben rufen. Der Sühneprozeß ahmt also den vorgeschriebenen Opferverlauf ängstlich nach. Allerdings soll man nach Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 7. 2 in dem letzteren Falle das Agnīdhra-Feuer zur Neuerzeugung benutzen; wenn dieses erlöschen sollte, es aus dem Gārhapatya nehmen; das letztere aber nötigenfalls durch Quirilen wiederbeleben. — Um derartige Umständlichkeiten zu verstehen, muß man sich erinnern, daß das Opfer als ein von der Gottheit geöffnetes Naturphänomen angesehen, also jeder Veränderlichkeit entrückt gedacht wurde; daß mithin die Aufgabe der Priester im Falle eines Mißlingens bei demselben darin bestehen mußte, das alte Gleis wieder zu gewinnen. Darin liegt eines der wesentlichsten psychologischen Motive aller Sühneshandlungen innerhalb, ja selbst außerhalb des Opferkreises.


Die Frage der Schuld des Opferveranstalters, wie sie dem modernen Dogma der Willensfreiheit entwächst, wird nirgends erörtert. Nur der Enderfolg, die nackte Tatsache des Vorhandenseins des rituellen Mißgriffs, entscheidet; die ihn verursachende Gesinnung des Opferveranstalters wird zwar bis-


1 Eine Ausnahme machte ihrer Natur nach die kultische bahisphavamāṇa-Zeremonie, bei welcher sämtliche Beteiligten, in geduckter Haltung sich
(Sat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 1. 2 folg.). — Von der Opfersubstanz wird in der gleichen Quelle gesagt, daß sie, falls sie verunreinigt sei, nach einigen Autoritäten gegen reine ausgetauscht werden müsse, nach anderen nicht. Es kommt in diesem Falle auf die Beurteilung der strittigen Vorfrage an, ob die Götter, denen sie vorgeschrieben wird, vor unsauberer Speise Ekel empfinden, — was manche Autoritäten verneinen (Sat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 2. 2). Das psychologische Moment der religiösen Überängstlichkeit wird endlich bei der Lösung der Frage der Opfernotwendigkeit in Stellen wie Sat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 3. 4—5, 4. 2 in die Wagschale geworfen; nur so kann ich die dortige Wendung: „yady u asya hrdayam vy eva likhita“ verstehen. — Endlich haben Schulen und Textgruppen über diese Frage verschiedene gedacht (s. Ath. Präy. Anm. 856 und ibid. 4. 1). Durchaus ist aber festzuhalten, daß die Anzahl dieser nach irgendeiner Richtung hin strittigen Punkte bezüglich ihrer Zahl wie ihrer Bedeutung hinter der festgefügten Gruppe der seit uralters durchaus unbestrittenen Fälle völlig zurücktritt. Der große Bau der Sühnehandlungen konnte wohl gewisse Auskleidungen oder Verzierungen erfahren, sein Plan und Fundament aber standen unerschütterlich fest.


1 Auch in dieser Hinsicht glichen die Götter zweifellos den sie formenden Brahmans. Sāṅkh. Śr. S. 3. 20. 5 sagt: „[Nur] was ein Brahmane aus Ekel nicht genießen kann, ist mit dem Kennzeichen der Unreinheit behaftet.“ Das heißt umgekehrt: „Unreine Speise darf ein Brahmane nicht genießen.“ Andererseits wurde wiederum gelehrt: „dem Magen eines Brahmans schadet nichts.“ Die gelehrte Kontroverse stritt also um Priester und Götter in gleicher Weise.
wachsen sein, wie z. B. die, daß man die herabgefallene Kohle des Opferbrandes wieder aufschütten (ibid. 2. 6; cf. Anm. 667); das vorzeitig erloschene heilige Feuer erneuern (6. 1); an Stelle der verlorengegangenen Frühmilch die Abendmilch (oder umgekehrt) in zwei Teilen opfern (Anm. 607); das eingebüllte sämnäya durch neues Melken abermals gewinnen (Anm. 665); von dem angebrannten Opferkuchen das genießbare Stück darbringen (4. 1) oder diesen gegen einen gutgerätenen aus-tauschen (Anm. 653); an Stelle der besudelten Opferausrußung (Streu usw.) eine reine beschaffen (Anm. 646); das leck gewordene Opfergefäss durch ein festeres ersetzen (5. 5) soll. Diese Regeln sind mit einer bis ins kleinste gehenden Gewissenhaftigkeit ausgestaltet. Nach dem Komm. zu Äp. Šr. S. 14. 26. 2 möge man, wenn ein Opfergefäss platzte, die vorgeschriebenen Sühnezeremonien vollziehen und das Gefäß mit Bindemitteln (samdhäniya-dravyaith) haltbar werden lassen; falls es aber dennoch leckt (dhäraṇā-samārthatve), es wieder dicht machen; sollte aber das pūtabhrt- oder ādhanā-rei-Geß zerspringen, zuvor mit der sarvaprāyaścitta-Zeremonie opfern. — Zu dem „Körper des Opfers“ gehört auch die Spender des Priesterrohnes. Wer deshalb das Opferhonorar auszuteilen unterläßt, soll „reiches Land“ (urvarā samrddha) als süßenden und ausgleichenden Gegenentgelt geben (Maitr. S. 1. 4. 13). — Schon im älteren Ritual nehmen die Sühnezeremonien bisweilen einen theatralischen Anstrich an. Wenn über dem noch nicht (aus dem Gārhapatyā-Feu) herausgenommenen Āhavaniya-Feuer die Sonne untergeht, so soll man in westlicher Richtung mit einem Faden aus darbha-Gras ein Goldplättchen befestigen; tritt das Analogie beim Sonnenaufgang ein, in östlicher Richtung auf gleiche Art eine silberne Scheibe aufhängen (Ath. Pr. 1. 2); — Sat. Brähm. 12. 4. 4. 6—7 läßt keinen Zweifel darüber, daß in dem Goldstück die Sonne, in dem Silberstück der Mond dargestellt ist, welche, wenn sie in Wirklichkeit schon untergegangen sind, über dem Opfer wenigstens in effigie dastehen sollen, um noch solange zu scheinen, als sie der Priester für die korrekte Vollziehung seiner Handlung braucht. — Bisweilen treten Renovatio oder Iteratio des Opfers neben die Sühnezeremonie, welche letztere dann in einer Handlung der Abstinenz bestehen kann. Wenn z. B. der Haus herr die morgendliche Vollziehung des Agnihotra-Opfers nicht rechtzeitig vorgenommen hat, so möge er den Tag über samt


* rāvan nā *paityy amedhyā'-ktād
* gandho lepas ca tat-kṛtaḥ |
* tāvan mṛd vārī vā ”deyāṃ
* sarvaśu dravya-śuddhiṣu |


Wir sehen, daß bei den heiligen Handlungen der Begriff der *physischen Reinheit* eine sehr große Rolle spielt. Von hier aus hätte der Weg zur Forderung einer *ethischen* Reinheit gefunden werden können; aber er ist niemals zielbewußt betreten worden. Vielmehr blieb der Brahmanismus stets in der Beobachtung ältester Religionsvorschriften, wie sie auf Grund unklarer, uransprüchlicher Ideen in der Menschheit aufzutreten pflegen, stecken. Zwar stellte er (vermutlich seit ältester Zeit) an den opfernden Brahmanen weitgehende Anforderungen in bezug auf sittliche Haltung und Familienzugehörigkeit, auch auf körperliche Reinheit; ferner dürfte er bei dem Opferveranstalter, der die Priester dingte und lohnte, eine gewisse Rechtlichkeit vorausgesetzt haben; zum mindesten dürfte der Opferherr keiner Todsünde schuldig gewesen sein. Denn mit dem auf ihr stehenden *sozialen Boykott* (pari + varj) war naturngemäß auch die Opferunfähigkeit ver-
bunden. Im übrigen aber wünschten die Priester als einzige Tugend bei ihrem Brotpfand nur eine: Freigiebigkeit in der Ausleihung der Opferlöhe. — War die Forderung der sittlichen Lauterheit sehr wenig rigoros gestellt, so war es die der physischen um so mehr. Hier läßt sich ein interessanter Gegensatz zwischen vedischer und avestischer Auffassung feststellen. Die Parsenreligion verehrte die Naturelemente als heilig und suchte sie vor Verunreinigung zu beschützen; die vedischen Opfervorschriften konstruierten einen räumlich genau festgelegten Bezirk der Heiligkeit und Reinheit, dem gegenüber die ganze Außenwelt als befeuchtet galt. Der ganze Operraum war ein geweihter Kreis für sich, jeder Einbruch in ihn eine Sünde, wenn er von Menschen; eine Sühne bedürftige, ominöse Handlung, wenn er von Tieren oder Gegenständen (Wagen) verübt wurde. Drang Schmutz oder Unreinheit irgendwelcher Art, wozu namentlich auch alle Ausscheidungen des menschlichen und tierischen Körpers gerechnet wurden, in das Opfermaterial ein, d. h.: wurde damit die Opfersubstanz oder das Opferwerkzeug (im weitesten Sinne des Wortes) befeuchtet, so mußte die anfängliche Reinheit des geweihten Bezirkes durch Zeremonien wieder hergestellt werden. Die Tatsache des Geweihseins als solche, welche die Frucht einer bestimmten rituellen Handlung (dikṣā) war, gab den Ausschlag über die Heiligkeit oder Unheiligkeit des Eindringlings. Nur so verstanden wir es, daß selbst die Naturelemente als Unheilsstifter angesehen werden konnten. Die Luft war es, wenn sie Fliegen oder anderes kleines Ungeziefer auf die Opferspeise trug; — das Wasser, indem es in Form trübe Schmutzes oder körperlicher Ausscheidungen den heiligen Kreis befeuchtete; doch selbst die Träne, ja sogar der Regentropfen verursachte die gleiche Wirkung; — das Feuer, das heiligste Element der Parsen-


Was die Entweihung des Opferbezirks durch Tiere anlangt, so war sie in mehr oder minder hohem Grade durch alle nicht opferfähigen Lebewesen zu befürchten. Da aber als opferfähig (nach strengster Auffassung) nur fünf Haustiere in Betracht kamen, war damit eine starke Quelle abergläubischer Furcht angeschlagen. Als besonders gefährlich galten nach Šat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 1. 4 (cf. Ath. Prāy. Anm. 63) das wilde Schwein, das wilde Schaf, der (herrenlose) Hund samt seinen nächsten Verwandten (Hyāne, Schakal, Fuchs: śvāpāda), ferner namentlich auch die dem Erdboden und deshalb dem Reiche

Als unrein, verunreinigend und unfähig der heiligen Handlung irgendwie beizuwohnen, galten endlich Tiere und Menschen unter gewissen Zuständen ihrer physiologischen Beschaffenheit, namentlich schwangere Wesen 1 (s. Traumschlüssel, S. 172 folg.) und solche, die Zwillinge geboren hatten, ferner die Gattin des Opferveranstalters, wenn sie sich in der Menstruation oder innerhalb eines gewissen Zeitabschnittes nach ihrer Entbindung befand. 2

Wir sehen, daß einerseits die Opfer-Veranstalter und -Teilnehmer, andererseits die leblose Glieder des großen Opferleibes eine große Anzahl von Bedingungen erfüllen mußten, wenn sie als würdig gelten sollten, zur Gottheit in Beziehungen zu bleiben. Entsprachen sie den traditionellen Anforderungen nicht, so wurden sie sofort ausgeschaltet. Nur ein unbeabsichtigter Mißgriff oder unabwendbare äußere Einflüsse konnten


2 Vgl. z. B. Ath. Prūy. Anm. 684; s. auch Taitt. Brāhma. 3. 7. 1. 9 (= Kāth. 35. 18): „Die Hälfte des Opfers geht nämlich demjenigen verloren, dessen Gattin am Tage des Gelübdes [infolge ihrer Unreinheit] unantastbar ist. Er möge sie entfernen und [dann erst] opfern. [Dann aber] mit dem ganzen Opfer opfert, soll er nach demselben sie herbeirufen und sagen: „Der bin ich; die bist du; der Himmel ich; die Erde du; Sāman ich; Re du; komm, wir wollen uns vereinigen... um kräftige Söhne zu erzeugen." In der Mitte [der Zeremonie] ruft er sie; das ist dafür die Sühne."
ihnen die Möglichkeit einer vorübergehenden Verwendung beim Opfer geben.


physischen Vernichtung des Unheilstifters zog, in jüngerer aber an deren Stelle die Aussetzung, das Wegschenken an die Priester, trat. Wenn gar ein Gegenstand, etwa durch Verunreinigung, nur halbwegs opferuntauglich gemacht worden war, so wählte man den jesuitischen Ausweg, ihn unter Umständen, z. B. wenn er aus schmutzig gewordener Milch bestand, auf heiße Asche zu gießen; da diese vermöge ihrer Wärme das Feuer repräsentieren konnte, galt die ihr gespendete Milch als geopfert; da sie keine Flammen zeigte, als ungeopfert (Ath. Präg. 1. 3; Erklärung nach Sat. Brähm. 12. 4. 2. 2). Immerhin können wir die Tötung der menschlichen und tierischen Zwillinge als unheildrohender Erscheinungen teils nachweisen (cf. Traumschlüssel S. 258 Anm. 1), teils wahr-scheinlich machen. Als uralte Opfergabe an die Priester finden wir (falls der Text richtig ist, z. B. in Ath. Präg. 5. 5) das Zwillinge gebärende Mutterwesen von Mensch und Tier, namentlich aber von der beim Agnihotra notwendigen Opferkuh. Diese war integrierender Bestandteil eines grundlegend wichtigen, unaufhörlich erneut vollzogenen Ritus. Ihre Opferunreinheit hatte deshalb ein weit höheres Gewicht als der gelegentliche Einbruch von störenden Elementen, wie z. B. hindurchlaufenden Hunden, Wildschweinen, Mäusen usw. (die man wohl einfach weggagte) in den Opferbezirk. Darum verstehen wir es, wenn alle Eventualitäten des Verhaltens der Agnihotra-Kuh aufs sorgsamtigste erwogen wurden, und die das Unheil, welches sie heraufbeschwor in den durchreißenden Sprüche ihrem Wortlaute nach der Gelegenheit ihrer Rezitation genau angepaßt waren, — was im allgemeinen im Verhältnis zwischen Mantra und Opferhandlung keineswegs immer der Fall ist. Wie man bei den heidnisch-germanischen Völkern das Pferd aufs genaueste beobachtete, ja die rege Dämonologie jener Stämme in jeder Bewegung dieses, in den sakralen Dienst gestellten Tieres eine möglicherweise wichtige religiöse Tat-sache sah, so erging sich der In der Betrachtung bedeutsam erscheinender Momente im körperlichen und psychi schen Gebahren der Kuh, deren Milch die Opferspeise zu der wichtigsten kultischen Zeremonie lieferte; eben darum ent ledigte er sich dieses Wesens, wenn die von ihm zu dem Opferzwecke hergegebene Milch beispielsweise blutig war (Sat. Brähm. 12. 4. 2. 1); darum schenkte er es an einen Brahmanen, dem er voraussichtlich nicht wieder begegnen würde (yam
anabhigamisyan manyeta), weg, wenn es sich (angeblich aus Furcht) während des Agnihotras niedergesetzt hatte (ibid. 12. 4. 1. 9).


Der Zauberspruch im Verein mit der von ihm begleiteten zеремониellen Handlung ergibt den Körper der Sühnezерemonie. Daß er bereits früh kanonisch festgelegte Formen annahm, erwähnten wir. Wo dies nicht der Fall war, nämlich bei den „unbekannten Omina“, behalf man sich mit dunkeln Zaubernamen (s. unten S. 262); anderenfalls aber gestaltete man allmählich die Zeremonien zu selbständigen, komplizierten Opfern aus, deren beispielsweise ein späterer, zu dem Atharva-
veda gehöriger Text nicht weniger als 30 aufzählt. Manche von ihnen lassen eine gewisse Naivität und Sinnfälligkeit nicht vermissen, so z. B. die pathikṛtī („pfad-ebnende Sühne“). Ihren Namen zu erklären, dient Sat. Brāhma. 12. 4. 4. 1: agnir vai pathikṛtī patāṁ apinētā sa evai 'naṁ yajñapatham apinayati; „Agni ist der Pfadfinder; er führt auf die rechten Wege; er führt ihn (den Opferherrn) auch auf den [rechten] Opferpfad.“ Dementsprechend wird die Pathikṛtī angewendet, wo etwas „aus dem rechten Gleis gekommen“ ist; zunächst also, wenn etwa ein Wagen aus der rechten Bahn lief und dann zwischen zwei Opferfeuer eindrang (Āp. Śr. S. 14. 31. 2); ferner, im übertragenen Sinn, wo Zeit und Ort der heiligen Handlung den Vorschriften nicht entsprechen (Ath. Prāy. Anm. 825; 845); also bei Opferentgleisungen; daher auch, wenn ein angelegtes Feuer ausgeht (Ath. Prāy. 5. 3; cf. Anm. 826). „Vom Wege her (patho 'niti-kā; in spielernder Etymologie zu pathikṛtī) soll er die darbhan'Gräser nehmen; ein Wagen ist dafür der Opferlohn; immer dient bei der pathikṛtī ein Wagen zum Opferlohn.“ Eine kindliche Ideenassoziation reiht hier Wagen und Pfad; Pfad und Feuer; Feuer und Agni; Agni und den Opferpfad (= den richtigen Weg zu opfern) aneinander und läßt selbst die Anforderungen der nur selten mit geringen Honoraren sich scheidenden Priester in mäßigen Grenzen bleiben. Andere Beispiele der Ath. Prāy. lehren, daß man bei dem (rituell unerlaubten, zeitlichen und räumlichen) Zusammenfall verschiedener Sühnezeremonien die Vaivici („die Differenzierende“) zuerst vollziehen soll (Ath. Prāy. 5. 5); daß die Vārūṇī dem Wassergott zu Ehren darzubringen sei, weil dieser die verdorbenen Teile des Opfers aufnimmt (ibid. Anm. 729). Je nach der gerade gegebenen Gelegenheit wendet man sich an gewisse, für sie ausersehene Götter. Dem Mitra und Sūrya wird ein Brei dargebracht, wenn die Sonne über dem noch nicht begonnenen Agnihotra-Opfer aufgeht (ibid. 4. 4); dem Mitra resp. Varūṇa bei anderen Versäumnissen des richtigen Zeitpunktes dieses Ritus ein Fladen geopfert; dem Agni, der dann übrigens mit dem jedesmal betroffenen Attribut zu verehren ist, eine ähnliche Speise geweiht (ibid. Anm. 276). Wenn die Agnihotra-Milch beim Kochen überläuft, soll man die Viṣṇu-Varūṇa-Verse sprechen; dann was beim Opfer verleibt ist, gehört dem Viṣṇu; was in Unordnung geraten, dem Varūṇa (ibid. 1. 5). Überhaupt kehren manche Verse bei sachlich
zwar sehr verschieden, aber zueinander in gewisser Analogie stehenden Gelegenheiten wieder. So dient der mit „33 Fäden“ (Taitt. Samh. 1. 5. 10. 4) beginnende Vers dazu, durch einen Zauber den zerrissenen Gürtel des Opferherrn und seiner Gattin wiederum zu schließen; sodann aber auch, das durch Mißgriffe im Ritus zerrissene Opfer-„Gewebe“ zusammenzu ziehen (ibid. Anm. 877). Er soll nach Śāṅkha. Śr. S. 13. 12. 13 sogar angewendet werden, wenn das mahāvira-Gefäß platzt. — Bei allem, was gespalten, aufgeplattet, verderbt ist (es handelt sich hier wohl in erster Linie um Opfergefäße: Ath. Prāy. 6. 5), soll man die Formel anwenden: „Zurück komme zu mir die Indra-Kraft“.


Das Opfer war, der orthodoxen Lehre nach, unveränderlich; tatsächlich aber ließen sich gewisse Umgestaltungen, die allmählich Vereinfachungen bewirkten, nicht vermeiden. Die große Sorgfalt, mit der die Substitute der Opferelemente aufgezählt und besprochen werden, ist ein klarer Beweis für die soziale Wichtigkeit der Sühnopfer und die so oft beobachtbare, zu dem theoretischen Rigorismus der Priester in fast ergötzelchem Widerspruch stehende Anpassungsfähigkeit ihrer Vollzieher.


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1 Dagegen sagt Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 7. 5: yasya kritam [somam] apaḥreṣyur udārāṁ ca phālguṇāni ca 'bhiṣunuyāt.

So wenig als die Opfersubstanz war das sie zum Himmel tragende, auf rituellem Wege durch Reibung zweier Hölzer aneinander zu entzündende Feuer überall zur Stelle; deshalb muß bisweilen ein profaner Agni den aus seinem Versteck nicht hervortretenden himmlischen Opfervermittler ersetzen. Es war gleichgültig, woher man ihn nahm (Ath. Prāy. 5. 2).

In dessen Ermangelung sollte man in die rechte Hand eines Brahmanen; wenn auch diese Eventualität nicht gegeben war, in das rechte Ohr einer Ziege opfern. (Manche Texte, wie z. B. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 3. 1 ff., nennen die Ziege zuerst; so auch Āp. Śr. S. 9. 3. 7 ff.) Als letzte Stellvertreter sind endlich noch Grasbüschel, Wasser, Gold angegeben. Offenbar kamen diese Bestimmungen namentlich dem auf der Reise, resp. auf der Flucht vor dem Feinde oder gar im Sterben befindlichen Brahmanen entgegen, der das umgänglich notwendige Opfer in irgend einer, den Umständen angepaßten Form darzubringen gedachte. Die Verwendung der Substitute des heiligen Feuers hatte deren Ausschaltung für den profanen Gebrauch zur Folge. Dies galt für die älteste Zeit zweifellos bei allen Stellvertretern, also auch dem Brahmanen. Unsere Texte freilich nehmen den letzteren aus, wenn sie, wie Ath. Prāy. 5. 2 oder Kāty. Śr. S. 25. 4. 9—10, seine Verachtung verbieten. Daß die hier in Frage kommende Wendung na paricaksīta tatsächlich so gedeutet werden muß, lehrt nicht nur die Überlieferung, sondern auch indirekt Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 3. 3 mit seinem Verbot, den Brahmanen, der als Stellvertreter des Opferfeuers gegolten hat, von seiner Wohnung fern zu halten: vasatyai nā 'parun-
dhyāt; Komm.: tad-dhaste hutavān puruṣaḥ svagṛhe nivāsā-
ṛtham āgataṁ brāhmaṇaṁ na parihaṛet | tad-parihāre svakīyaṁ
agnim bhāgaraḥitaṁ kuryāt |. Aber eben die Tatsache, daß
das dem Brahmanen gegenüber doppelt selbstverständliche
Verbot der Verachtung seiner Person und der Mißachtung
des geheiligten Gastrechts hier besonders betont wird, läßt
den Schluß zu, daß in ältester Zeit der Verkehr mit ihm und
seine Aufnahme als Gastfreund unter den obwaltenden Vor-
bedingungen verboten war. Als Stellvertreter des Sühneopfer-
feuers war er eben verfehmt. Dies ist nach den Apastamba-Be-
stimmungen, die der Komm. zu Taitt. Brāhmaṇ. 3. 7. 3. 6１zitiert, den
Vorschriften des Ālekhana zufolge lebenslang, nach Āsmaratha
nur ein Jahr hindurch der Fall. Da die Ath. Prāy. nur die
letztgenannte Autorität zitieren, dürften sie auf dem weniger
vigorousen Standpunkt stehen, entsprechend dem Grundsatz:
„das Jahr ist der Sühnezeitpunkt für alles“ (Ṭāṇḍya 9. 8. 13);
dürften also das über sämtliche Substitute des Opferfeuers
verhängte Tabu nach Ablauf eines Jahres als aufgehoben be-
trachten. Dann könnte man dem Brahmanen wieder begegnen
resp. ihn besuchen; von der Ziege die Milch genießen; auf den
benutzten Gras- (darbha- oder kuśa- [s. Ath. Prāy. Anm. 804])
Büschnel wieder sitzen; die Füße mit dem betreffenden Wasser
waschen; das sakrosankte Goldplättchen wieder tragen. —
Man fragt sich nun, warum gerade diese Dinge das Opfer-
feuer vertreten können. Darüber unterrichtet uns beispiels-
weise der Komm. zu Taitt. Brāhmaṇ. a. a. O.: die Ziege (kann
es sein), denn sie gehört zu Agni (ist feuerhaltig: āgneya).
Agni und die (weibliche) Ziege kamen nämlich bei der Schöpf-
fung zu gleicher Zeit aus Prajāpatis Munde. Deshalb sind
sie miteinander verwandt; — der Brahmane, denn er ist Agni
vaiśvānarah (diese Idee, nach der gerade der Priester das
lebendige Feuer sei, resp. dies in seinem Leibe tragen und
durch den Mund ausströmen lassen könne, ist die Grundlage

１ Lies jedoch daselbst (Ausg. der Bibl. Ind. B. 3 S. 448 Z. 10): ty āhā
ūśmarathyo.

２ Hier ist die Lesart der Ath. Prāy. zweifellos besser als die von
Taitt. Brāhmaṇ. 3. 7. 3. 5, welches an entsprechender Stelle liest: āpas tu
na paricakṣita, also: er soll die Wasser nicht verachten. Die Begründung
des Komm. 1. c. lehrt, daß es sich nicht um einen jüngeren Textfehler
handeln kann. Zur Verachtung der Wasser lag selbstverständlich ebenso-
wenig Grund vor, als zu der des Brahmanen.
Idee des Austausches gegen *Gleiches,* allmählich gegen *Geringwertiges,* ist die Grundlage der im christlichen Dogma seinen Höhepunkt findenden Sühnopfertheorie — darauf sei nur an- deutend hingewiesen.


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1 Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 3. 20. 9—10 ... yat sāmānyatamaṃ manyeta tat prati- nidadhyāt; eṣa pratinibhām dharmah | allerdings kann es sich hier nur um "begrifflich" oder etymologisch (-aja von aj, daher *agni-*) Nächstliegendes handeln, denn ein Brahmane sieht dem Opferfeuer, ein Schaf dem Ziegenbock kaum sehr ähnlich.
gebracht, des ersteren Stelle vertretenden gegenüber, als gepfert gelten soll, lehrt z. B. Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 3. 20. 11.


— Die Substitution von Menschen erwies sich als notwendig, wenn beispielsweise ein Priester erkrankte,1 wenn die Gattin zeitweilig unrein war, wenn der Hausherr dahinsiechte oder starb. Im letzteren Falle mußte er durch seinen Sohn, Bruder oder sonstigen Verwandten ersetzt werden (Ath. Prāy. 3. 9; 6. 7; cf. Sat. Brāhm. 12. 5. 2. 15: athai 'tām āhutiṃ juhoti putro vā bhrātā vā yo vā 'nyo brāhmaṇaḥ syāt). Die Stellvertretung von Gegenden wurde vorgenommen, wenn Fälle eben dieser Art sich ereigneten. Sobald es dem rituell lebenden Inder nicht möglich war, die heimische Opferstätte zu erreichen, trat an deren Platz irgendein beliebiger Ort (yatrai 'vā 'śmā āśasanam jōśitaṃ syāt: Sat. Brāhm. 12. 5. 2. 1); ebenso bei Krieg und Revolution (vgl. Komm. zu Ap. Śr. S. 14. 32. 5). War unter solchen Umständen selbst eine Verlegung der Opferstätte ausgeschlossen und eine korrekte Opfervollziehung unmöglich geworden, so griff zugleich ein abgekürztes Verfahren platz: ohne neues Opfermaterial herbeizuschaffen, warf man, wo immer man sich befand, das gerade Vorhandene, mochte es aus Tieren oder flüssigen Substanzen bestehen, in die große hölzerne Soma-Kufe und brachte dar, was man gerade besaß. Nach einzigen Autoritäten soll man in jedem Falle wenigstens den Soma heimlich ausreißen [falls dies zuvor nicht geschehen ist]; denn er ist die Hauptsache beim Opfer.

1 Asv. Prāy. 17b: catvāra ṛtvijah | yat-samkhyayā ṛtvig-abhāvas tat-samkhyayā vyāhṛti-homaḥ | ājyabhāgā-'nantaram kāryaḥ.

Diese Tatsache wird nur durch den Charakter der Opferpriester verständlich. Schwerlich sind Volk und Priesterchaft in irgend einem Lande so völlig an Leib und Seele miteinander eins gewesen als in Indien; kaum irgendwo anders verstanden es die Priester in ähnlichen Maße, die Volksseele zu erfassen, ihren Bestrebungen und Instinkten Ausdruck zu geben.

Dies gilt in ganz besonderem Grade von dem Brahman-Priester. Obgleich er bei der Vollziehung des Opfers keineswegs unbeteiligt war (s. Ait. Brāhm. 5. 34. 5 und W. Calands Bemerkungen in dem Aufsatz „Über das Vaitānasūtra und die Stellung des Brahman“, WZKM. 14. S. 122) und fast jede Handlung des ganzen Opfers mit anumantrāna zu begleiten hatte, war seine Hauptfunktion bei letzterem eine überwachende. Er griff in dasselbe ein, wenn irgendeine Unregelmäßigkeit sich ereignet hatte, mußte also die Atharvapṛyāṣcitānī, die „Sühnezерemonien der Atharvanpriester“ (wobei wir weit davon entfernt sind, seinen Katechismus mit dem korrupten Fragment, welches wir geben, irgendwie zu identifizieren) auffs genaueste gekannt und verstanden haben. Infolgedessen war er der selbstverständliche und berufene Omina-Interpret, der gelehrte Kenner der drei Veden, also der gesamten Opferwissenschaft überhaupt, wie namentlich im speziellen des Ineinandergreifens der Rollen der einzelnen Priester und der korrekten Abwicklung des komplizierten Vollzuges der einzelnen Zeremonien. Er mußte wissen, was zum Erfolge des Opfers wesentlich, was unwichtig war und auf dessen Endziel sein Augenmerk richten (s. Kātyā. Śr. S. 25. 14. 36: yad eva trayyai vidyāyai śukram tena brahmavām; ibid. 38: vedatrayavihitā - karmasamyogo brahmaṇa eva). Sein spezieller Kanon, der Atharvaveda, gilt


War der Zusammenschluß von einzelnen, in religiöser Hinsicht besonders fein veranlagten Individuen einmal erreicht, und eine Steigerung, Komplizierung und Differenzierung des sozialen Instinks, der später als „Gewissen“ eine metaphysische Ausdeutung bekam, dadurch gewährleistet, so mußte notwendig auch der Begriff der Sühne eine völlige Veränderung erfahren. Die Frage, ob das Opfer des einzelnen — es war und blieb sehr lange das Hauptbindemittel zwischen Gott und Menschen — der verehrten Gottheit genehm war, konnte nicht mehr von der Korrektheit der Veranstaltung desselben abhängig gemacht werden; die sittliche Qualitäts des Opferers entschied dabei. Demgemäß wurde das bei der heiligen Handlung sich zeigende Omen zum Zeugnis der Gottheit dafür, daß sie einen Ständer in der Nähe wisse und diesen warnen, resp. strafen wolle; mit anderen Worten: das Wahrzeichen gab dem religiösen bemuhtigten Gewissen den sichtbaren Ausdruck. Wenn deshalb z. B. in dem Mythus von dem Ikṣvākū-Könige Try-

noch bestehen (vgl. Anm. 126; 642); bisweilen werden jene beiden Momente nebeneinander genannt, so z. B. Agnipur. 174. 8: „in welchem Manne, der Sünde getan, Reue aufkeimt, dessen einzige und höchste Sühne ist die Versenkung in das Wesen des Hari (Viṣṇu)“. Dieses intuitive Sich-Vereinigen mit der Gott-heit überhebt den Gläubigen selbst der Notwendigkeit des Gebets, das im übrigen zweifellos um so mehr hervortreten muß, je weiter durch die Ausgestaltung der Gotttheit zur Persönlich- keit der nackte Ritualismus zurücktritt. Von derartigen Gebeten sei zum Schlusse eine Probe gegeben, die leicht dadurch mißdeutet werden könnte, daß man sie der Sprache des modernchristlichen Gebetes näherte. Bei aufmerksam Beobachtung empfindet man gar bald, daß der Sprecher dieses Gebets ein echter Inder und Viṣṇu-Anbeter ist, und daß er mit einer in der Form und im Gehalt sich gleich deutlich hervorwagenden Ängstlichkeit alles ergreift und aufzählt, was von Eventualitäten an Sündenhandlungen kanonisiert war und seinem Gedächtnis in folgedessen irgendwie erreichbar erscheint. — Agnipur. 172 Vers 6ff. lauten (wobei wir darauf aufmerksam machen, daß die Übersetzung angesichts der großen Unsicherheit und Korruptheit des Textes in vielen Einzelheiten anfechtbar ist):


12. Wenn ich am Vormittag, am Nachmittag, wenn um Mittag oder in der Nacht mit dem Körper, dem Geiste, dem Worte (d. h. mit Worten, Werken oder Gedanken) Böses getan habe, [selbst] ohne mein Wissen,


16. Mag sie klein oder groß sein, mag sie zu einer schlechteren Existenz oder in die Hölle führen — so möge dies alles zur Ruhe kommen (d. h.: Sühne finden) infolge der Nennung des Vasudeva.

1 Versuch der Nachahmung eines Wortspiels.
TEXTKRITISCHES.

heit der zugrunde liegenden Rezensionen, sondern auch auf Abschreiber-Flüchtigkeiten zurück. Als weitere Beispiele offenbarer Kompilation und Interpolation erwähne ich 2. 6 Anfang: atha yasya yūpo virohed asamāpte karmanī ... gegen 5. 6 Anfang: atha yasyā 'hargane 'visamāpte yūpo virohet ...; ferner 2. 6: yat prayaĵesv ahuteṣu prāg aṅgarāḥ skandet gegen 4. 1: prāk prayaĵebhīyo 'ṅgāram barhiṣy adhiśkandet; — 2. 9 Anfang: yasyo 'pākṛtāḥ paśuḥ prapatet ... gegen 5. 5: upākṛtās cet paśuḥ prapatet ... Der mit prātaḥsavanāc cet kalaśo vidir-yeta beginnende Passus von 6. 4 wiederholt sich in der überlieferten Fassung von 6. 6; beiden steht Taitt. Samh. 7. 5. 5. 2 nahe. Hier ist die Anm. 1055 gegebene Stelle der Brahms. Präy. zur Textrekonstruktion von großem Wert; 6. 4 ist wohl nur ein korruptes Fragment davon.

4. 2 ... ced ahuti-velāyām patny anālambhukā syāt tām aparudhya yajeta | steht Ṛp. Śr. S. 9. 2. 1 gegenüber: yasya vratye 'han patny anālambhukā syāt tām aparudhya yajeta; — den Ath. Prāy. 4. 3: ... ced abhivarṣen mitro janān yātayati 'ti samidham ādhāya 'nyā(ṃ) dugdhhvā punar juhuyāt | entspricht fast wörtlich Ṛp. Śr. S. 9. 2. 6: yasyā 'gnihotram avavarsen mitro janān kalpayati prajānān ... juhote 'ti tat kṛtvā 'nyāṃ dugdhhvā punar juhuyāt.


Die Mantra-Fassungen lassen gesicherte Schlüsse auf das Alter des Textes ebensowenig zu. Sie entstammen bisweilen der Paippalāda-Rezension des Atharvaveda und waren in diesem Falle nicht immer zu verifizieren. Ein Stamm von ihnen hebt sich als alt und allen Schulen gemeinschaftlich hervor, so z.B. der die renitente Opferküh zum Genuß von Heu einladende Spruch: sūyavasād bhagavatī hi bhūyāḥ; ferner die Mantras, welche ihr die Furcht vor Unheil austreiben

Parallelen.

[Wir haben, da die Abschnitte der Atharvaprāyaścittāni bisweilen eine recht erhebliche Länge besitzen, welche das Auffinden des jedesmal erwähnten Passus in der Druckausgabe verzögern würde, durch die (stets an den Anfang der Zeilen gebrachten) Ziffern nicht nur auf den betreffenden Abschnitt, sondern auch auf die nächststehenden Indexnummern hingewiesen; es bezieht sich z. B. der Hinweis „4.1. Text zu Anm. 608—609“ auf die S. 33 Z. 2—4 befindlichen Worte: „prātārdho ham ced apahareyuh sāyamdo ham dvaidham kṛtvā“]

Beispiele für wörtlichen Parallelismus.
3. 1—3. Den langen und schwierigen Passus haben wir geben müssen, wie die Mss. ihn boten. Die Lesarten anderer
Beispiele für die Möglichkeit sachlicher Erklärungen durch Parallelstellen.

2.4 Anm. 182 zu Aśv. Prāy. 3 b; vgl. Śat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 1. 12.
2.5 Anm. 203: vgl. Śāṅkh. Śr. Ś. 13. 3. 5.
2.6 Anm. 240: Kāṭh. 34. 2; Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 7. 1.
2.6 Anm. 262: vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 2. 6; Kāṭh. 35. 18.
2.7. — In sämtlichen aufgezählten Fällen der Vermischung zweier oder mehrerer Opferfeuer miteinander ist stets die Frage nach deren Reinheit resp. Unreinheit das Unterscheidungsprinzip, wie dies z. B. der Komm. zu Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 3. 7 deutlich ausspricht; vgl. dazu Śat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 4. 2 und ibid. 5: yasyā 'gnayo 'medhyaīr agnibhiḥ samsṛjyeran . . . agnaye śucaye 'stäkapālaṁ puroḍāṣaṁ nirvapet (dieser aśṭākapālaḥ puroḍāsaḥ wird als Sūneopfer überall in den Ath. Prāy. wie in den Paralleltexsten festgehalten).
2.7 Anm. 290: vgl. Śat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 4. 4: yasya vaidyuto dahet . . . agnaye 'psumate 'stäkapālaṁ puroḍāṣaṁ nirvapet.
2.9 Anm. 350: vgl. Śat. Brāhm. 12. 4. 2. 5.
2.9 Text zu Anm. 358: die Stelle klärt sich vielleicht wörtlich und sachlich, wenn man Śat. Brāhm. 12. 5. 2. 3: te ye tataḥ sāmātpād agnayo jāyerams (tair enam daheynus tathā "ha: tair eva dagdho bhavati na u pratyaksam iva) als ursprünglichen Text annimmt. Allerdings kann ich den Text von Anm. 359 gleichwohl nicht rekonstruieren.
3.4 Text zu Anm. 466: völlig zerstört, inhaltlich zweifellos identisch mit Āp. Śr. Ś. 14. 32. 7: yady rktō yajñāṃ bhreṣṭa āgacchēd . . . also: wenn infolge [der unzeitigen oder verworrenen Rezitation] der Rgvedaverse eine Verfehlung ins Opfer kommt.

1 Hierbei ist festzustellen, daß, wo immer von zwei Opferfeuern die Rede ist, stets nur gārhapatya und āhavaniya gemeint sind: Āp. Śr. Ś. 14. 31. 2.
3. 5 Text zu Anm. 478—486; für mich völlig unverständlich; ich vermunte aber in cittavāpyatōyr ein Korruption von vyāpatād īty [aśmarathyah].


3. 8: Der ganze Abschnitt Śat. Brāhm. 12. 5. 1 handelt von dem Fall, daß der Agnihotrin auf der Reise stirbt. Die ibid. 16 erwogene Möglichkeit: „atha hai 'ke antareṇa 'gnmś citim citvā tam agnibhiḥ samuposanti“ scheint in dem Passus unseres Textes: madhye 'gnmām edhāṁs citvā ... wiederzukehren.

3. 8 Text zu Anm. 534: vṛthāgni scheint vollständig grāmāgni in Śat. Brāhm. 12. 5. 1. 14 zu entsprechen: tam hai 'ke grāmāgninā dahanti.


4. 1 Text zu Anm. 597—600: vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 1. 4ff.: osa-dhīr vā etasya pāśun payaḥ praviśati | yasya haviṣe vatsā apākṛtā dhayanti | 4 | tān yaḥ duḥyat | yātayāṁ maṇaḥ vajyeta | yān na duḥyat | yajā-parur antariyāt | vāyavyān yavāgʊn nirvapet | ... | 5 | atho 'ttaṣmāi haviṣe vatsān apakuryāt | sai 'va tataḥ prāyaścitiḥ | ähnlich Kāṭh. 35. 17.


5. 3 Anm. 821: cf. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 1. 1; Kāṭh. 35. 17.

5. 3 Anm. 824: cf. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 1. 2: sa yaḥ udvāyati vichittir evā 'syā sā | tām prāncam uddhṛtya manaso 'pati-stheta |

5. 3 Text zu Anm. 829folg.: vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 1. 3f.; Kāṭh. 35. 17.

5. 3 Text zu Anm. 846—9: vgl. Gop. Brāhm. 2. 1. 9: yasya havir
niruptam purastac candramā abhyudiyat ūṃs tredhā taṃultural vibhajed ye madhyamās tān agnaye dātre 'ṣṭākapālān nirvaped ye stāviṣṭhās tān indrāya pradātre dadhātī carum ye kṣodīṣṭhās tān viṣṇave śīpivīṣṭāya |

5.5 Anm. 889: vgl. Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 13. 3. 2.

5.6 Text zu Anm. 900: nabhihita offenbar identisch mit na hi te in Āp. Śr. S. 14. 29. 3.

6.1 Anm. 927: vgl. Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 3. 19. 10ff.


6.2 Text zu Anm. 956: vā des Textes ist aus "mā korrumpiert, wie Āp. Śr. S. 14. 33. 9 sehr wahrscheinlich macht ("wenn ein ungebranntes ukhā-Gefäß platzt ... ")


6.4 Text zu Anm. 999: lies wohl abhidagdhe; vgl. Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 13. 6. 7; Āp. Śr. S. 14. 25. 3.


6.4 Anm. 1008: s. Kāṭh. 35. 16.

6.4 Text zu Anm. 1010–12: vgl. Tāṃḍya 9. 5. 1; Āp. Śr. S. 14. 24. 9; Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 7. 5.


6.4 Text zu Anm. 1015—16: cf. Śāṅkh. Śr. S. 13. 6. 2: somā-hārāya somavikrayine vā kimcid dadyat |

6.4 Anm. 1019 (vgl. Anm. 984) zu Brahm. Prāy. 93a: s. Āp. Śr. S. 14. 24. 7; vgl. auch Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 7. 4: yasya soma upadasyet suvarṇam hiranyam dvedhā vichidyā riṣe 'nyad ādhnuyāt | juhuyād anyat |


yajamāno vyrdhyeta | adaksinah sa yajnah samsthāpyah |
die Textfassung der Ath. Präy. ist wohl durch Verände-
runung, Auslassung und Korruption entstanden.

6.5 Anm. 1046: vgl. Tāṇḍya 9. 9. 5: yasya nārāśamsa upa-
vāyatī . . . 6: yam adhvaryur antato grahām grhṇyāt tasyā
"ptum (so zu lesen!) avanayet | Was unter einem nārā-
samsa-Becher zu verstehen ist, lehrt Komm. zu Āp. Śr. S.
14. 28. 1: bhāksitā-"pyāidiś camaso nārāśamsa ity uktam |.

6.6 Text zu Anm. 1051 ff. — Daß der Text falsch sein muß, es sich
vielmehr, wie in Brah. Präy. 103b (Anm. 1055), um das
Übrigbleiben des Somas handelt, lehrt indirekt die Tatsache,
daß eine Wiederholung des bereits Ath. Präy. 6.4 vorkommen-
den Passus: prātaḥsavanāc cet kalaśo vidiryeta . . . nicht zu
erwarten ist, direkt der Text zu Anm. 1054—5, welcher von
den Parallelen in den eben erwähnten Zusammenhang ge-
bracht wird. Das Übrigbleiben der Opferspeise gilt über-
haupt als ein Unglück: vi vā etasya yajña rūhyate yasya
havir atiricyate Taitt. Saṁh. 3. 4. 1. 1. Der Text zu Anm.
1055 (hinter stuyuh) eröffnet offenbar eine Lücke; das
folgende (in den Ath. Präy. verloren gegangene) Stück ist
7. 5. 5. 2; Taitt. Brāhm. 1. 4. 5. 1—4): yadi prātaḥsava-
nat somo 'tiricyetā 'sti somo ayaṁ suta iti marutvaṭisu
gāyatrena stuyuh ībid. 6: yadi mādhyanidnāt savanād ati-
ricyeta vanmahām asi sūrye 'ty ādityavatiṣu gaurivitena
stuyuh | 9: yadi ādityasavanād atiricyeta viṣṇoḥ śipiviṣa-
vaṭiṣu gaurivitena stuyuh | 11: yadi rātrey atiricyeta viṣṇoḥ
śipiviṣṭavatiṣu bhṛata stuyur eṣa tu vā atircyata ity āhur
yo rātrey atiricyāta iti; s. im übrigen auch Śāṅkh. Śr. S.
13. 7. 1—13, 9. 4. Āp. Śr. S. 14. 18. 2—15.

6.6 Text zu Anm. 1056—7. Statt parighṛṇyāt liest Taitt.
Saṁh. 7. 5. 5. 1 in dem parallelen Passus charakteristisch:
vrūkte; statt des korrupten nā 'tirātryā: mahati rātreyai;
ebenso Kāṭha. 34. 4; Tāṇḍya 9. 4. 1: mahati rātreḥ; Āp.

6.6 Text zu Anm. 1062: hinter mādhyanidnānde lies nach Śāṅkh.
Śr. S. 13. 5. 6 als Ergänzung eines dort offenbar ausge-
fallenen Passus: jagatyai chandasa iti tṛtyasavane.

6.6 Text zu Anm. 1074—5 soll wohl statt: śrotṛam cā śvinau
pātām mit Āp. Śr. S. 14. 21. 4 heißen: śrotṛam ta āśvinah
pātu.
Beispiele für inhaltlich zugehörige, ergänzende Stellen.
Zu 4. 1 Anm. 614 füge hinzu: Śāṅkhā. Śr. S. 3. 20. 5: yad brāhmaṇo jugupsur na bhaksyayat etad duṣṭasya lakṣaṇaṁ Ĳ.
Zu 4. 1 Anm. 637 vgl. Agnipur. 170. 12: śaraṇāgatam pariṣṭhaya vedaṁ viplāvya ca dvijaḥ | samvatsaram yatā-"hāras tat pāpam apasedhāt Ĳ
Zu 4. 2 Anm. 691 vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 2. 4—5; Kāṭh. 35. 19: yadi pūrvasyām āhutyām hūtāyām uttarāhutiḥ skandet... yatra vettha vanaspate devānāṁ guhyā nāmāṇi... gāmaya.
Zu 4. 3 Text zu Anm. 703 folg. vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 2. 1: yad anāyatane nīnayet | anāyatanaḥ syāt | prājāpatya rce valmika-vapāyām avanayet |... tat krtvā | anyām dugdhvā punar hotavyam |... cf. Kāṭh. 35. 18 f.: yad anāyatane nīnayet |... madhyamena parṇaṁ dyāvā-prthivyaya rce 'ntaḥparidhai nīnayet | vgl. auch Taitt. Brāhm. a. a. O.: yad viśyaṇena juhuyāt | aprajarā apasur yajamānaḥ syāt Ĳ.
4. 3 zu den Worten (mantraskannam)²⁷⁴) ced abhivāset: vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 2. 3 folg. (Kāṭh. 35. 19): yad avārvṣena juhuyāt | aparūpam asya "tman jayeta | kilāso vā "syādarsaso vā | yat pratyeṣat | yajñaḥ vichandyāt | sa juhuyāt | mitro janān kalpayati prajānan |... jhote 'ti mitrenai 'vai 'nat kalpayati | tat krtvā | anyām dugdhvā punar hotavyam Ĳ
4. 3 Text zu Anm. 739ff.: vgl. Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 2. 2 [Kāṭh. 35. 19]: yat kīvavapannena juhuyāt | aprajarā apasur yajamānāḥ syāt Ĳ.
5. 2 Anm. 818 zu Brahm. Prāy. 70a: kṛṣṇaḥ śakunir vgl. Āp. Śr. S. 14. 31. 1: yadi sadohavirdhanāni kṛṣṇasakunir upary-upary atipatet pakṣābhīyām adhunvāna ivā 'bhiniśided vā viṣṇur vicakrama ity āhūtim juhuyāt | yady uccaiḥ paten na tad ādriyeta Ĳ.
5. 5 Anm. 1046: vgl. Kāṭh. 35. 16: yasya dronakalasa upadasyati... 5. 6 Anm. 1049: cf. Agn. Prāy. 9b: āhutidvaya-samsarge Āpasambokta-prāyaścittam | pūrva-huter upary uttarāhutim juhuyāt tadā yatra vettha vanaspate... gāmaya (RV. 5. 5. 10) 'tī vānaspatyaya rce samidham adhāya (ha) šeṣena tūṣṇim uttarāhutim hūtvā tato vṛṣṇya te (l: vṛṣnas te vṛṣṇyam?) punar havir-uptattim krtvā punar homaḥ kāryāḥ.
Beispiele für sachliche Abweichungen sonst paralleler Stellen.


4. 1 Text zu Anm. 606ff.: s. indessen Taitt. Brāhm. 3. 7. 1. 6 ff.: yasya sāyām dugdham havir ārttim ārchati | indrāya vṛhin nirūpyo 'pavaset ... | yat prātaḥ syāt tac chṛtāṃ kuryāt || 6 || athe 'tara aindraḥ puroḍāśāḥ syāt |; ferner Kāṭh. 35. 18, wo statt chṛtāṃ, wahrscheinlich nur verdruckt, chatam steht.


6. 3 Anm. 987: Kāṭh. 35. 16 erwähnt die Möglichkeit: yasya camasa upadasayati...


Höchst auffällig ist es, daß manche, im Sühneritual sehr häufig angewandten und diesem zugehörigen Sprüche, wie etwa trayastrimśat tantavo ye vitatnire (s. Bloomfields Conc.) in unserem Texte fehlen.
The Consonants Z and Z in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic.
—By William H. Worrell, Professor in the Kennedy School of Missions, Hartford, Conn.

Willmore, The Spoken Arabic of Egypt (London, 2nd ed. 1905), throughout his grammar and explicitly on pp. xxvii and 19, recognizes the existence in modern Egyptian Arabic of the so-called emphatic consonant ẓ. This is sometimes found to correspond to classical ḫ or ḫ (without distinction); sometimes it arises out of classical ẓ under the influence of other sounds associated with it in the same phonetic complex; see especially pp. 11 ff. Willmore is quite aware that Spitta, Grammatik des Arabischen Vulgärdialektes von Aegypten (Leipzig, 1880), p. 9 and throughout, quite as definitely denies the existence of ẓ, either primary or secondary. Omitting the many guides and small grammars, which follow Spitta and yet have no claim to being the result of immediate personal observation of phonetic phenomena (e.g. Probst, Dīrī, Thilenius), it is interesting to note that Vollers, a careful student of long residence, in his Lehrbuch der Aegypto-arabischen Umgangssprache (Cairo, 1896), takes the position of Spitta (§ 1); while in his article in Z. D. M. G., XLI, 1887, pp. 365 ff. he does not (pp. 367, 368) go into the question which concerns us, being chiefly interested in the process by which the inter-dental became post-dental. On p. 372 he comments on the change of ṭ to t, and of ṣ to s. The testimony of the Egyptian Spiro, An Arabic English Vocabulary (London, 1895), followed up with many propagandist publications, loses when one reflects that he has ever been the enthusiastic disciple of Spitta in every respect.

Such different results from Willmore and Spitta, leaving the others out of account, as the followers of the latter, within so short a space of time, involving if accepted a reversal of the
natural course of phonetic development—require if possible an explanation.

Classical Arabic, as now pronounced in Cairo, exhibits three classes of consonants: (I) Light consonants, comprising those not hereafter mentioned. These have no effect upon the vowels with which they are associated. The \( a \)-vowel retains its natural Arabic quality of \( a \) (English pat). (II) Medium consonants, comprising \( b b r \) (sometimes light) \( y q \). These are accompanied by \( a \)-vowels of the quality of \( a \) (Engl. father), and by a sort of furtive \( a \) when followed by \( i \)-vowels. (III) Heavy consonants, comprising \( s d t z \). These are accompanied by \( a \)-vowels of the quality of \( d \) (English father in the dialectic form burlesqued as \( f a u t h e r \)), and by a sort of furtive \( d \) when followed by \( i \)-vowels. They do not appear to me to have any actual effect upon \( i \)-vowels or \( u \)-vowels themselves. The general rules here given are subject to wide fluctuations due, no doubt, to principles of syllable and sentence stress not yet clearly recognized. The consonants are not always grouped just as I have them. I have purposely not entered into the tangled questions of the \( t a f h i n \) and \( i m âl e \) of the Arabic grammarians.

In modern colloquial Arabic of Cairo the (III) consonants \( s d t \), though frequently exchanged with the (I) consonants \( s d t \), are recognized when they occur by two qualities: 1) The consonants themselves have a peculiar articulation (tip of the tongue between English \( s \) and western American \( r \), as in whistling against the front teeth) and resonance. 2) The accompanying vowels are affected as in classical Arabic. The (III) consonant \( z \) on the other hand is easily confused with the (I) consonant \( z \). The syllable \( za \) differs from \( za \) apparently only in a heavier quality of vowel. Spitta seems to have been correct in refusing to recognize the existence of the \( z \) with \( a \); but he has overlooked the fact of a difference of vowel coloring. Willmore seems to have taken the latter for a difference in the consonant. It would be more correct to say that \( za \) and \( za \) syllables differ.

The discovery of Vollers (loc. cit.) that the \( th \)-sounds became stops, or \( t \)-sounds (i. e. by organic shifting), in genuine colloquial words, but \( s \)-sounds (i. e. by acoustic error) in loanwords from the classical, furnishes the further result that really no genuine \( z \) was handed down in direct transmission to colloquial. Both \( z \) and \( z \) became \( d \) in the latter. The
and ُ of classical words were both heard and reproduced as ُsounds; heavy or light according to circumstances.

It is noticeable that Willmore's vocabularies show ُ: 1) without regard to whether the classical form has ُ or ُ; 2) generally in connection with ُ-vowels (but ُ also occurs with ُ-vowels); or 3) in connection with (III) consonants regardless of vowels; or 4) with (II) consonants (but ُ has ُ in classical); or 5) in connection with ُ-vowels (e.g. ُ古典 ُ, only example given!) especially when the singular of the noun has an ُ-vowel; and 6) that the sound is of rare occurrence in the language. With few exceptions, which may be slips on the part of Willmore, the words fall under (2).

Turning now to general phonetics: It is a well attested fact that the influence of a vanished consonant upon its surviving vowel with which it was associated in the same syllable dynamic or not may occur through the gradual weakening of this one of the two organically connected elements. Grandgent, German and English Sounds (Boston, 1892), p. 9, mentions the coronal character of the vowel ُ in northern English after which an ُ has been dropped. The tip of the tongue remains still turned back in the old ُ direction. Here succeeding generations have heard and copied a slight difference in resonance in the vowel while the consonant became ever weaker, and was less and less noticed and copied. A somewhat different case, resulting from the acoustic error of an alien race, is the Turkish use of the letters ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ ُ to indicate the presence of a "hard" vowel (ُ ُ ُ ُ) as opposed to the "light" vowels (ُ ُ), even in genuinely Turkish words. They never learned the pronunciation of the consonants themselves. See Müller-Giese, Türkische Grammatik (Berlin, 1889), p. 6.

Modern Egyptian Arabic shows a marked tendency to pronounce a syllable throughout with the same sort of resonance, (thick or thin, heavy or light), and even to carry the influence beyond into a following syllable, provided that no light consonants intervene whose obscuration would lead to unintelligibility. Sometimes even this provision is disregarded. It is more correct to regard this not as the influence of the consonant, but as the general coloring of the syllable as a whole, which is the real unit of memory. The following examples from Willmore, pp. 11ff., show that it is as often the vowel
as the consonant which seems to determine the resonance of the syllable.

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
\text{iştânät} & \text{for} & *\text{iştânat}, \text{iştânat} & (iş) \\
\text{tişt} & \text{for} & \text{tişt} & (ti) \\
\text{sût} & \text{for} & \text{sût} & (şû) \\
\text{bûrûd} & \text{for} & \text{bûrûd} & (rû) \\
\text{bûlus} & \text{for} & \text{bûlus} & (lu) \text{ but bûlis with i.} \\
\text{bûsta} & \text{for} & \text{bûsta} & (bû) \\
\text{usmân} & \text{for} & \text{usmân} & (u) \\
\end{array}
\]

The following are examples of psychical prolepsis:

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
\text{ismârr} & \text{for} & \text{ismârr} & (mârr) \text{ but mismîrr with i.} \\
\text{turâb} & \text{for} & \text{turâb} & (râb) \text{ but turâb with ā.} \\
\text{intâzar} & \text{for} & \text{intâzar} & (zar) \\
\text{ihštâr} & \text{for} & \text{ihštâr} & (âr). \\
\end{array}
\]

Syllables of this sort are said to be velarized; the back part of the tongue is slightly raised toward the position for u.
The Malediction in Cuneiform Inscriptions. — By Samuel A. B. Mercer, Professor in Western Theological Seminary, Chicago.

A malediction is the praying down of evil upon a person, and implies the desire or threat of evil declared either upon oath or in the most solemn manner. An oath is a solemn declaration made with a reverent appeal to the deity for the truth of what is affirmed; or, when used in law, it is an appeal, in verification of a statement made, to a superior sanction in such a form as exposes the person making the appeal to an indictment for perjury if the statement be false. A promissory oath is a solemn declaration of an intention to abide by a definite promise. There have been found many promissory, as well as direct oaths, in Cuneiform literature. To every oath there is joined either an expressed or an implied threat or malediction. If one swears that a thing is true when it is not he is liable to an indictment for perjury; and if one solemnly makes a promise and breaks it he must suffer the consequences. An oath, then, always carries with it a promise whether expressed or understood; and, in Cuneiform literature, the promise of punishment nearly always took the form of an implied or expressed malediction. The malediction is therefore closely connected with the oath.

Sometimes in earlier, and often in later, Cuneiform inscriptions the promissory oath was replaced by a malediction. When a contract was made or a treaty concluded, a conditional malediction could be pronounced on the offender instead of the oath. Hence, whenever we meet a malediction we are almost always sure that a contract expressed or implied is involved. The case of the special kind of malediction which is called a ban is not an exception to this rule, for it seems certain that a ban is the result of some form of disobedience which involved an implied promissory oath. The oath is, in fact, a malediction
in embryo on offenders, and the malediction belongs to the oath just as punishment does to the breaking of the law. The malediction may in itself be looked upon as the sealing of a sworn contract or agreement.\(^1\) Therefore I shall treat the malediction as a sequel to the oath.\(^2\) Indeed, it may almost be termed a development of the oath, for, while, as we shall see later, the oath and malediction existed side by side in Cuneiform literature, yet, as time went on, the malediction became far more prominent than the oath, even in those contracts where an oath would be expected.

Nothing proves the close relation between the malediction and the oath more thoroughly than the use of the two words mamitu and niš.

The word mamitu comes from yama' which means primarily that which is pronounced, e.g. oath, malediction, ban. It has been shown in The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature that mamitu means "oath". Now, since an oath, in its essence, is a call upon the deity to punish the perjurer, it is, therefore, a conditional malediction, for if the oath is broken the deity will punish. Further, as we have already remarked, this conditional malediction often takes the place of the oath. It should be also noticed that nam-erim, the Sumerian equivalent of mamitu, originally meant "hostile destiny" (nam = šimtu = destiny; erim = hostile). Moreover, the idograms dug and da which are often found in connection with sag-ba in oath formulae are equivalent to arâru, tamû, and mean, "condemn", "curse", "utter words of a curse".\(^3\)

In an oath, mamitu acted as a taboo, making the covenant a sacred one, just as holiness did in Hebrew ritual. It thus became a concrete curse to those who swore wrongfully or broke their oath, because an oath was taken "under pain of the malediction (mamît)"\(^4\) of the divine beings invoked. Poet-

\(^1\) Compare Neh. 5, 12-13.
\(^2\) See Mercer, The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature; also The Oath in Sumerian Inscriptions (JAOS XXXIII, Pt. 1) and The Oath in Babylonian Inscriptions of the time of the Hammurabi dynasty (AJSL XXIX, 2).
\(^3\) Compare the Hebrew ךָּנָּךָּ which means both oath and curse. Compare also, as analogy, the Arabic יֵּשָּׁרָּמַקָּ mishap, which is a derivation of ַּשָּׁמַק which, in turn, is connected with mamitu.
\(^4\) I R. 13 Col. V 12-16 (Tiglath-Pileser I).
ically, we also find the word mamitu translated “malediction” or “curse” in the sense of an active pestilence or evil, e.g. ilu Nāru ... mamit ina mah-ri-šu ri-gim-ša kīma a-li-e, “the god Nāru ... the curse is before him, his (the curse’s) cry is like that of a demon (alū).” Used in this poetical way the malediction was perhaps personified, for we read in a Semitic Šamaš-hymn: ilu Šamaš aš-šum m-a-mit ša ul-tu ûme ma-a-du-ti arki-ia rak-su-ma là paṭāru ši-i-ta hu-l-ku u là tāb šēri iš-šak-na, “O Šamaš when the curse for many days is bound behind me and there is no deliverer, expulsion of the evil and of the sickness of the flesh is brought about (by thee)”. In another place we read that the “curse (it is) which falls upon a man like a demon”. Mamitu was also the “state of uncleanness and sin, from which the sick man was to be freed”, for a malediction always afflicted its victim with uncleanness and sin.

Besides meaning oath niš also means malediction, e.g. ni-š šamaš u-ša-az-ki-ru-šu, “they let him pronounce the curse of Šamaš”. It should be noticed, however, in addition to what I have said on the word niš in my Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature that the word was used as a particle. In later inscriptions the preposition ina often took its place. The particle niš, therefore, may be rendered “by”—but only in connection with a word to swear in oath or to curse in malediction. The Sumerian Zi = niš = “in the name of” (as a particle) in connection with words which express the pronouncement of an oath or malediction. Niš, like mamitu, was perhaps personified and meant the evil spirit (ni-š Sumerian Zi,  symbol, evil spirit) or demon who bans one, e.g. li-in-ni-is-si ma-mit li-ša-rid ni-šu, may the Ban be sent away, may the curse be driven out”. It also, like mamitu, came to mean the sinful state resulting from the demon’s attack.

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1 IV R. 14, No. 2, obv. 1. 23-25 (Interlinear Bilingual Fragments).
2 The text is in Bezold’s Catalogue p. 1436; and also in Gray, The Šamaš Religious Texts, pl. IV. Compare Del. HWB p. 565.
3 IV R. 7, Col. I, l. 1 (Tablet, partly bilingual).
4 Morgenstern, Doctrine of Sin, p. 42.
5 Muss-Arnolt, Dict. p. 278.
6 Del. HWB p. 303a, 470b, 482d.
That the malediction and the oath are closely related a comparison of the two formulæ found in contracts of the time of Sumu-la-ēl will show. They are Kohler und Ungnad, Hammurabi's Gesetz Nos. 26 and 36. In KU 26 the formula reads: 

\[
\text{niš īlu Šamaš īlu Marduk ū Sumu-la-īlu ša āvat duppim anim unakaru.}
\]

In KU 36 it reads: 

\[
\text{limun īlu Šamaš īlu Marduk ū Sumu-la-lūm ša āvat duppim anim unakaru.}
\]

In both cases the preferable rendering is: "curse of Šamaš etc. upon him who changes the contents of this tablet". A possible rendering is: "by Šamaš etc. (they swore) that they would (not) change the contents of this tablet". In any case limun is synonymous with niš, and the relationship between malediction and oath is established.

It is evident from the above that the malediction and the oath served the same purpose and were, therefore, interchangeable. Both attempted to secure the preservation of an agreement or contract under penalty of punishment and curse.

I. Maledictions found in Cuneiform Inscriptions.

There are in Cuneiform inscriptions three classes of literature: poetical, historical, and legal and commercial. For convenience sake, we shall refer to the last class as "contracts", to which also belong the codified laws of Hammurabi. While the many references to maledictions in poetical literature are valuable for a general discussion of the nature and ritual of the malediction, it is not possible on account of the very nature of poetical usage to treat them as examples of actually pronounced maledictions. Such references, then, will not be tabulated in the present study, but will be used in the general discussions. The same is true of the maledictions which occur in letters. It is different with the other two classes of literature. All the expressed maledictions found in them will be tabulated and studied with a view to throwing light upon the custom of pronouncing maledictions in the different periods of the life of those peoples represented by Cuneiform inscriptions.

1. Sumerian Period.

1. Contracts. The paucity of Sumerian contract literature is probably the reason that no expressed oath formula has been found before the dynasty of Ur 2295 B.C. During that
dynasty the oath formula was common. The malediction, however, is found, as we shall learn from an historical inscription of the time of Eannatum king of Lagash c. 2900 B. C., previous to the dynasty of Ur. There is evidence that the malediction was used also in contracts during the same period, e. g. in the reign of patesi Entemena of Lagaš c. 2850 B. C., for in a contract published by S. Langdon in ZA xxv, 1-2, Sprechsaaal, "Some Sumerian Contracts", pp. 205 ff., No. 4 (RTC 16), the expression ud an-dù dug-gàl-an ud-da dug-dug-na nig-erim ba ga-gà giš kaka dug-dug-na-šu gaz may be rendered: "when in future days complaint is made, provided that by the complaint evil is done, may such a one be slain by the sword for his words". At any rate, a very old tablet now in the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania, published by G. A. Barton in The Museum Journal, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 4 ff., contains a contract in which the phrase SA-NE GIN, "their curse he established" certainly teaches us that in the earliest Sumerian periods (the contract is not dated, but because of its archaic script Barton places it among the very oldest of extant Sumerian inscriptions) the idea of malediction was known, and as we saw from the preceding example, was probably expressed formally. As far as our records go, therefore, the malediction is found at an earlier period than the oath. Further, evidence is not lacking to show that both were intimately connected in early as well as in late Cuneiform inscriptions. As was shown above, both the malediction and the oath served the same purpose. And this is seen in very early contracts, e. g. in a contract published by S. Langdon in ZA xxv, 1-2, Sprechsaaal, pp. 205 ff., No. 1 B 6, which is dated in the reign of Gimil-Sin, king of Ur, 2209-2203 B. C., the expression mu lugal-bi in-pàd galu galu nu gi-gi-da, "by the king the oath was taken—man shall not bring suit against man", there is a prohibition which amounts to an implied conditional malediction.

As it is not the object of this paper to collect implied maledictions, this example will suffice. The fact that there are very few extant examples of maledictions in Sumerian contracts is due to the paucity of materials recovered.

2. Historical Inscriptions. Whenever an inscription was set up it was usual to invoke the curse of different gods on anyone who in anyway would sin against its purpose and intention.
These inscriptions related to treaties, building contracts, and agreements about other public works. Besides enumerating the deeds and qualities of the king who caused their publication, these contracts contain maledictions invoking a curse on anyone who may in future mutilate or destroy them. In almost the whole range of Cuneiform literature such maledictions are plentiful. It is also interesting to note in this connection that from the earliest time till the New Babylonian dynasty, when the malediction seems to disappear, blessings often occur in the same inscription side by side with the malediction, and, in later times, even took its place.

In the treaty of E-an-na-tum, king of Lagaš (c. 2900 B.C., Thureau-Dangin, SAK pp. 10 ff.), which he made with the people of Giššu we find, together with the oath, a conditional malediction pronounced against any inhabitant of Giššu who may in the future alter the words of the treaty. In the oath, the king invokes the šus-gal (“net”) of Enlil (Bel), of the goddess Ninḥarsag, of Enki ( Ea), of Enzu ( Sin), of Babbar (Šamaš), and of Ninki, and the šus-gal of the same deities will slay the person who in any way impairs the treaty. The malediction was conditional, but very definite. Over and over it is said: ud-da inim-ba šu-ni-bal-e sa šus-gal (dingir) en-lil-lá nam-e-na-ta-tar giš-HU ki an-ta he-šus, “whoever in the future changes this word, may the great šus-gal of (such and such a deity), by which they have sworn, slay Giš-HU”.

Here six deities are invoked to curse; but, if we admit that in the oath by Enlil his son Ningirsu is included, then the number of the deities invoked in the oath would be seven, the holy number of swearing, and consequently the number in the malediction-formula would also be seven.

The next malediction in chronological order is found in the reign of Šar-Gani-Šarri c. 2650 B.C. It is inscribed on a door socket (SAK 162—163), and reads: ša duppam sù-a u-sa-za-ku-ni itu Bēl ù itu Šamaš ù itu Innina isdê-su li-zu-ḫu ù zēra-su li-il-gu-tu, “whoever changes this inscription, may Bēl, Šamaš, and Innina (Ištar) remove his foundation and exterminate his seed”. A second door socket (SAK 164-165) has the malediction: ša duppam sù-a u-sa-za-ku-ni itu bēl ù itu Šamaš isdê-su li-zu-ḫa ù zēra-su li-il-gu-dua, “whoever changes this inscription, may Bēl and Šamaš remove his foundation and exterminate his seed”.

Two maledictions represent the reign of Naram-Sin, the successor of Šar-Gani-Šarri. The first is found on a small stela (SAK pp. 166-167, Stela A) and reads: ša duppam šu-a u-sa-zu-ka-ni išu Innina (broken here) li-zu-ku .Parcelasi su li-il-gu-tu, “whoever changes this inscription may Innina (Ištar) remove — — — and exterminate his seed. The second is on a statue of the king found at Susa (SAK 166f.), the malediction reads: ša duppam šu-a u-sa-zu-ku-ni (broken here) išu a-ga-de ki išdē-su li-zu-ha .Parcelasi su li-il-gu-da, “whoever changes this inscription may — — of Akkad remove his foundation and exterminate his seed”.

From the reign of Gudea patesi of Lagaš c. 2450 B.C. there are many inscriptions. Among them none is better known than Statue B (SAK pp. 66ff.). In cols. 8 and 9 is found a conditional malediction invoked to operate against all or anyone who may in the future disturb in any way the statue which the king has set up. The formula is a very long one. The first deities invoked are Anu, Enlil, Ningirsu, Enzi, Ningirsu, Ninâ, Nin-dar-a, Ga-tum-dug, Bau Innina, Babbar, Pa-sag, Gal-alim, DUN-sag-ga-na, Ninmarki, Dumuziabzu, Ningišzida. The malediction is to be manifold, but does not contain the stereotyped formula išdē-su li-zu-ha .Parcelasi su li-il-gu-da. A similar though shorter formula is found inscribed on Statue C (SAK pp. 74ff.) of the same ruler. Only the goddess Innina (Ištar) is invoked. The malediction formula of this inscription contains for the first time the technical word for curse, namely, nam-tar in the phrase nam-ḫe-ma-tar-e. In the inscription on Statue E (SAK pp. 78ff.) col. 9, there is a phrase which implies a threat and seems to take the place of the malediction. It is alan galu e-ḫe-digir ba-ḫa mu-ḫu-a-kam ki-gub-ba-bi galu nu-zig-zig ša-ḫu-ni-bi galu la-ba-ni-lal-e, “the statue of the builder of the temple of Bau, its foundation may no one remove, may no one restrict its offering”. There is a similar inscription on Statue K (SAK pp. 86ff.) where deities are invoked. They are: Ningirsu, Bau, Galalim, DUN-sag-ga-na.

An inscription (SAK pp. 170ff.), belonging to the reign of Lasirab, king of Gutiu, who reigned near about the period of the dynasty of Akkad, contains the usual malediction. The deities invoked are: the gods of Gutiu, Innina, and Sin.

The stela of Seripul (SAK pp. 172-173) teaches us that
Anu-bânini, king of Lulubu, previous to the dynasty of Ur, erected a monument to himself and to his goddess Innina in the mountain, and thereon he inscribed a conditional male- diction on all who might in the future change the text. He invokes Anu and Antu, Bêl and Bêlit, Immer and Innina, Sin and Šamaš (and others whose names are broken off). The text contains the interesting formula: *ir-ra-dam li-mu-dam li-ru-ru-uš*, "with an evil curse may they curse him".

The stela of Sheichan (SAK pp. 172-173) belongs to about the same period as the above. Though poorly preserved it contains a malediction in which the deities Šamaš and Immer are invoked.

There are several inscriptions belonging to rulers of Susa (SAK pp. 176ff.), contemporaneous with the dynasty of Ur, which contain maledictions. BA-ŠA-šušinak patesi of Susa erected an alabaster statue and inscribed upon it a malediction on all who might in future change the text. The gods invoked are Šušinak, Šamaš, Nariti, Nergal, and one whose name is broken off. Another inscription from the same reign invokes, in the malediction, Šušinak, Innina, Narîte, and Nergal; and still another invokes Šušinak and Šamaš, Bêl and Enki, Innina and Sin, Ninârsag and Nati, all the gods. At about the same time we find an inscribed basin from the reign of a certain Idadu-Šušinak which he made for the temple of his god Šušinak. The deities invoked in the malediction are Šušinak, Šamaš, Ištar, and Sin. They are asked to curse the offender "with an evil curse" (*ar-ra-la li-mu-dam li-ru-ru-šu*).

In contracts of the Sumerian period there is sufficient evidence to show that maledictions were pronounced, but, as far as we can judge, no stereotyped formula was used and no specific gods were invoked, neither was the name of the king invoked, contrary to the practice in the oath formula. It will be remembered also that no specific god was invoked in the oaths of contracts of this period.

The earliest historical inscription which contains a male- diction belongs to the dynasty of Ur. From that time on maledictions are quite frequently found, and a formula which may be considered more or less stereotyped occurs often. It is *išdê-su li-zu-hu ù zêra-šu li-il-gu-tu*, "may (the gods, who are mentioned) remove his foundation and exterminate his seed":
The deities invoked in maledictions in historical inscriptions of the Sumerian period, in order of occurrence are:

Enlil (Bêl), Ninêarsag, Enki (Ea), Enzu (Sin), Babbar (Šamaš), Ninki (Istar?), Ningirsu (?)

Bêl, Šamaš, Innina (Istar).

Bêl, Šamaš.

Innina (Istar).


Innina.

Ningirsu, Bau, Galalim, DUN-šag-ga-ra.

Innina, Sin.

Anu and Antu, Bêl and Bêlit, Immer and Innina, Sin and Šamaš.

Šamaš, Immer.

Šušinak (lord of Elam), Šamaš, Narudi, Nergal.

Šušinak, Innina, Narudi, Nergal.

Šušinak, Šamaš, Bêl, Enki, Innina, Sin, Ninêarsag, Nati.

Šušinak, Šamaš, Istar, Sin.

It will be noticed that the deities most frequently invoked in these maledictions are Šamaš, Istar, and Bêl, and Šušinak in Elam. The above maledictions represent inscriptions from Akkad, Lagaš, Gutiu, Luluba, Susa, and one unknown place.

2. Period of the First Babylonian Dynasty.

1. Contracts. It is not till we reach the First Babylonian dynasty that we find the malediction sometimes definitely taking the place of the oath. Of course this might have been a common practice long before this dynasty, but as far as our sources go the first examples are found in contracts of the reign of Sumu-la-ēl c. 2218 B. C. KU 26 contains absolute proof (see above p. 285f.) that in KU 36 we have a malediction as substitute for an oath. There limun takes the place of niš. From the same reign, namely, Sumu-la-ēl (for Sumu-ēl as merely a variant of Sumu-la-ēl, see Daiches, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, pp. 16-17), we have another example. This contract, KU 453, records the presentation of a temple by
Nur-ilišu who promises not to make trouble about the priestly office of the temple. Whoever does so is to be cursed. The formula is: li-mu-un ily Šamaš ulti Su-ku-šum ša i-ra-ga-mu, “an enemy of Šamaš and Sumu-šu is he who complains”. There were seven witnesses to the contract. KU 371 is a sale contract and belongs to the reign of Ilumma-Ilia, a prince contemporaneous with Sumu-la-šu. Instead of the usual oath, the malediction formula occurs. It reads: li-mu-un ily Šamaš ulti An-na-ni-la ša ana a-vat-i-šu i-tu-ru, “an enemy of Šamaš and Ilumma-Ilia (see Daiches, op. cit., pp. 33ff., for a discussion of this name) is he who contests the agreement”. The only other malediction formula found in contracts of the Hammurabi dynasty appears in KU 478, a contract about the presentation of a piece of land. It belongs to the reign of Ammi-šaduga c. 1984 B.C. Here again the malediction takes the place of the oath. The phrase is: ḫa-at-tu ša Ku-uk-ka-nap na-še-ir i-na mu-ul-bi-ša li-īš-ša-ki-in, “may the fear of Kukka-našir (the Elamite king) be upon him” (compare the “fear of Isaac”, Gen. 31:42).

2. Historical Inscriptions. The only inscription of the First Babylonian dynasty, which may be said to belong to this class, and which contains a malediction, is the famous stela of the Hammurabi Code. In the Epilogue (Harper, The Code of Hammurabi, pp. 99ff.) Hammurabi says: “if that man do not pay attention to my words which I have written upon my monument; if he forget my curse (ir-ri-ti-ia) and do not fear the curse of the god (ir-ri-it ili) — — — as for that man — — — whoever he may be, may the great god — — — curse (li-ru-ur) his fate”. He then goes on to enumerate the various gods upon whom he calls to pronounce a malediction upon such as may in any way interfere with the stela. He carefully describes the attributes and activities of each deity invoked. The deities are: Bêl, Bêlit, Ea, Šamaš (the blighting curse of Šamaš is referred to), Sin, Adad, Zamalmal, Ištar, Nergal, Nintu, Ninkarrâk, and, finally, the great gods of heaven and earth, and the Anunnaki. They are asked to curse with blighting curses. At the end Bêl is again invoked.

The deities invoked in contracts of the First Babylonian dynasty in order of occurrence are:

Šamaš, Marduk, and the king (named).
Šamaš and the king (named). This occurs twice.
Kukka-našir (the Elamite king).
There is evident a stereotyped malediction formula in these contracts. It is: *limun — — — šá, “curse of — — — upon him who”*. Notice that Šamaš is the favourite god, and that the king is also often invoked (compare the usage in oath formulae of the same period, AJSL XXIX, 2).

For the deities invoked in the Hammurabi inscription, the only text of that kind with a malediction, in this period, see above.

3. From the Second to the Ninth Babylonian Dynasty.

1. Contracts. The Second Babylonian or Kassite dynasty is represented by a property contract from the time of Adad-šumiddin c. 1240 B.C. (KB III 1 pp. 162-163). The deities invoked are: Anu, Bêl, Ea, Sin, Šamaš, Rammân, Marduk, Nindimsu, Bakad, Pappu, Uraš, Bélit-ekalli, Šukamuna, Šumalia, Nannar, and as many gods as are mentioned on the stela. The next contract containing a malediction and which belongs to this period represents the reign of Marduk-nadin-âhi c. 1140 B.C. (KB IV, pp. 70ff.). Whoever in any one of many detailed ways disputes the conclusions of the contract will be subject to the curse of the gods. The formula is: *ilâni ma-la i-na mul-hi na-ri-i an-ni-i ma-la šu-un-šu-nu za-ak-ru ar-rat la nap-šu-ri li-ru-ru-šu, “the gods as many as are named on the stela shall curse him with an indissoluble malediction”*. The phrase *ar-rat la nap-šu-ri li-ru-ru-šu* occurs often as a particularly powerful malediction formula. The invoked deities are named in detail. They are: Anu, Bêl, Ea, Marduk, Nabû, Rammân, Sin, Šamaš, Ištar, Gula (wife of Ninib), Ninib, Nergal, Zamalmal, Papsukal, Eš-ḫanna, the great god (*ilû rabû*), the great lord (*belu rabû*), and the gods as many as are mentioned on the stela. The characteristic of each deity is mentioned, and each is invoked to curse the offender in some specific way. Then the same formula as above is repeated. A similar (though not quite as elaborate) malediction is found in another contract of the same reign (KB IV, pp. 76ff.). The formula is a particularly powerful one. It is: *ar-rat la nap-šu-ri maru-us-ta li-ru-ru-šu, “may they curse him with an indissoluble evil curse”*. The deities invoked are: Anu, Bêl, Ea, Ninmarki, Sin, Šamaš, Ištar, Marduk, Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Nabû, and all the gods as many as are named on the stela. Again each
deity is asked to curse the offender in some specific way. A third malediction is found in another contract of this reign (KB IV, pp. 78ff). The formula is the same as the last named. The deities are: Anu, Bêl, Ea, Ninmarki, Marduk, Šamaš, Sin, Ištar, Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Nabû, and the great gods as many as are named on the stela. The next belongs to the reign of Marduk-apli-iddi-na I c. 1120 B. C. (Scheil, Dél. en Perse, VI, pp. 31ff). This is a kudurru containing a semi-historical inscription, though clearly a contract, in which many deities are invoked to curse. They are Anu, Bêl, Ea, Ninḫarsag, Sin, Ningal, Šamaš, Aia, Bunêne, MAH, Šeru, Kitta, Mešaru, Marduk, Zarpunitum, Nabû, Tašmetum, Ninib, Nin Karrak, Zamalmal, Bau, Damu, Geštinam, Ištar, Nanâ, Anunnitum, Adad, Šala, Mišarru, Nērrugal, Lāz, Išum, Šubula, Lugal Garrison, Sitlamtaḫ, Lugalgisatugabliḫ, Ma‘metum, Lil, Ninbat, Tispak, Kadi, Nusku, Sādarnunna, Ip, Ninegal, Šukamuna, Šumalia, all those who are named on the inscription. The same indissoluble malediction is pronounced, e. g. ar-ra-at la nap-su-ri-im. The old stereotyped phrase is used here although partly broken off, namely, išdē-su li-iz-su-ḫu ėru-su li-il-gu-dum. A fragmentary kudurru from the same time (Scheil, op. cit., pp. 39ff) contains the remnant of an indissoluble malediction. The deities are: Šamaš, Nannar, Adad, Marduk, Gula, Nusku, Ninegal, Šukamuna, Šumalia.

The Sixth Babylonian dynasty is represented by a contract from the reign of Ninib-Kudurušur c. 1020 B. C. (KB IV, pp. 82ff) which contains a malediction. Though not well preserved in the part where the malediction comes, there is sufficient to show that the conditional malediction was pronounced upon anyone who would in anyway violate the contract. It seemed to be a regular practice in such land contracts as this to record the malediction as soon as the agreement was sealed. This is directly expressed in the present contract as we learn from the phrase: ekli ik-nun-kam-ma ar-ra-ta i-ru-ur-ma, “he sealed the field and pronounced the malediction”. The deities invoked are: Anu, Ea, Zarpunitum, Nabû, Šamaš, Nergal, Zamalmal, Ninib, Gula, and others whose names have been broken off. The same stereotyped malediction formula occurs: ar-rat la nap-su-ri ma-ru-us-ša ti-ru-su. Of uncertain date is an inscription in New Babylonian script but which probably belongs to this general period. It contains a pre-
sensation contract and the malediction is pronounced in the name of Marduk and Nabû (KB IV, pp. 98-99).

The Ninth Babylonian dynasty c. 753 B. C. (KB IV, pp. 158ff.) is represented by a contract which contains two maledictions. It is a sale contract. Whoever in future contests the agreement, may Anu, Bêl, Ea, curse him with a wicked indissoluble malediction. The usual formula appears, namely, arrat la nap-sur maruštum li-ru-ru-šu. The contract is sealed and dated in the reign of Sargon of Assyria. In the second malediction, or the second record of the same malediction, the same gods are invoked, namely, Anu, Bêl, and Ea, and the same formula is used.

Many contracts of this period contain no directly expressed malediction but are sealed and signed—an indication that either an oath or a malediction was understood. It is worthy of note how completely the malediction has usurped the place of the oath in these contracts.

2. Historical Inscriptions. The first historical inscription of this period which contains a malediction belongs to the reign of Nebuchadrezzar I c. 1140 B.C. (KB III1 pp. 168ff.). Whoever in any way defaces the inscription of the king is to be cursed by all the gods named therein. The deities are then named and their attributes noted. They are: Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Šumalia, Nergal, Nanû, the gods of Namar, Sin, the lady of Akkad, the gods of Bit-Ḫabban. The next belongs to the reign of Nabû-abal-iddin c. 888 B.C. (TSBA VIII, pp. 164ff.). The deities invoked are: Šamaš, Malik, and Bunênê. The stereotyped formulae of earlier maledictions do not appear in these two inscriptions. The reign of Marduk-apli-iddi-na II c. 721 B.C. furnishes us with the next malediction. At the end of a long inscription (KB III1 pp. 184ff.) it is declared that whoever in future, whether prince or subject, in any way defaces the inscription would be cursed with an indissoluble curse (arrat la nap-šu-ru) by Anu, Ea, Bêl, Marduk, Erua, and the great gods. Another malediction is found on an inscription of the reign of Šamaš-sum-ukin c. 668 B.C. (KB III1 pp. 194ff.). Only one god is invoked, namely, Nabû.

The deities invoked in the contracts of the Second to the Ninth Babylonian dynasty are:

Anu, Bêl, Ea, Sin, Šamaš, Rammân, Marduk, Nindîmsu, Bakad, Papu, Uraš, Belit-ekalli, Šukamuna, Šumalia, Nannar.
The Malediction in Cuneiform Inscriptions.


Anu, Bêl, Ea, Ninmarki, Sin, Šamaš, Ištar, Marduk, Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Nabû.

Anu, Bêl, Ea, Ninmarki, Marduk, Šamaš, Sin, Ištar, Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Nabû.


Šamaš, Nannar, Adad, Marduk, Gula, Nusku, Ninegal, Šukamuna, Šumalia.

Anu, Ea, Zarpanitum, Nabû, Šamaš, Nergal, Zamalmal, Ninib, Gula (rest broken off).

Marduk, Nabû.

Anu, Bêl, Ea.

The deities invoked in the historical inscriptions of the Second to the Ninth dynasty are:

Ninib, Gula, Rammân, Šumalia, Nergal, Nanâ, the gods of Namer, Sin, the lady of Akkad, the gods of Bit-Ḫabban.

Šamaš, Malik (MUH?), Bunêné.

Anu, Ea, Bêl, Marduk, Erûa.

Nabû.

The favourite deities invoked in maledicitions in contracts during this period are: Anu, Ea, Marduk, Bêl, Šamaš, Nabû. No deity is found to occur more than once in maledicitions in the historical inscriptions of this period. However, the number of such texts is too small to warrant any conclusions.

4. Assyrian Period.

1. Contracts.

(1) Royal Contracts. In the reign of Adad-nirari IV c. 810 B. C. a royal contract (Kohler und Ungnad, Assyrische Rechtsurkunden, No. 1) contains an oath and the following expression: rubû arkû pi-i dan-ni-te šu-a-tu la ú-šam-sak, “a later prince shall not change the contents of this contract”. Although no direct malediction is here expressed, the phrase may be considered an equivalent. The oath is taken in reference, as it
seems, to the preservation of the contents of the contract, and contains within itself the idea of a malediction, which is evident in the above quoted phrase. The same is true of KUA 4 of the same reign; KUA 8 (reign of Tiglathpileser III); and KUA 9 (c. 730 B.C.), all of which contain an oath and the same stereotyped expression as was found in KUA 1. KUA 10 (reign of Sargon c. 722) contains no malediction, but the following phrase occurs: aš-šu sat-tak-ki ili A-šur la ba-da-a-li ulti kiri šarri maḫ-ri-e la ša-un-ni-i kunuk šarri ab-run-ma ad-din-šu-nu-li, “in order that the tribute to Ašur may not come into disuse, and the notice of the former king may experience no change, I imprinted my royal seal and gave it to them”. Here the sealing seems to take the place of the malediction.

KUA 15 (reign of Ašurbanipal c. 668) is an interesting contract. Whoever sins against the contract will incur the displeasure not only of the gods but also of the king. The stereotyped formula reads: ū-lu-u šarru ū-lu-u rubû ša pi-i dan-ni-li šu-a-tu ū-ša-an-nu-ū ni-iš ili Ašur ili Adad ili Be-ir ili En-līl Aš-šur ki ū ili Istar Aš-šur ki-i-tun, “whoever changes the contents of this contract, whether king or prince, may Ašur etc. curse him”. The word niš here can be translated by nothing else but “curse”. The content requires it. The same formula is found in KUA 16 (reign of Ašurbanipal) and the deities Ašur, Adad, Ber, Enlil of Assyria, and Istar of Assyria are invoked. KUA 18, of the same reign, is fragmentary in the place where we should expect the malediction, and was probably the same as KUA 16. KUA 19, the date of which is uncertain, probably contained a similar malediction to the above. There is sufficient evidence to show that the king was invoked in the malediction.

KUA 20 (reign of Ašur-etel-ilāni c. 626) is very fragmentary where the malediction ought to come. A portion, however, is preserved, showing that deities were invoked. The introductory ni-iš is also preserved. The usual cause of the malediction is stated. KUA 21 of the same reign is another fragment. KUA 23 (undated) contains a command instead of a malediction. It is: “O future prince, change not the contents of this contract”.

(2) Dedication of a Temple. KUA 44 (time of Ašurbanipal). A temple is dedicated to Ninib. Whoever deprives Ninib of the property will be cursed by Ninib, a goddess (broken off),
Adad, Nabû, Ištar, Ašur, Gula. The old ar-rat la napšuri is invoked.

(3) Inheritance. KUA 46 (uncertain date) is an inheritance contract. Whoever disturbs it will be cursed by Bēl and Nabû. KUA 47 (undated) is a similar contract. A piece of land in Nineveh near the temple of Šamaš is presented by a man to his daughter. Whoever in future disputes the contract will be cursed by Ašur, Sin, Šamaš, Bēl, Nabû.

(4) Exchange. KUA 632 (c. 600 B.C.) is a slave exchange. Whoever contests the transaction must pay a certain amount of money. This punishment takes the place of the malediction. The judges in the decision are the deities Ašur, Šamaš, Bēl, and Nabû.

2. Historical Inscriptions.

The first Assyrian historical inscription which contains a malediction belongs to the reign of Pudi-îlu c. 1350 B.C. (Budge and King, The Annals of the Kings of Assyria, p. 3). The king declares that whoever shall blot out his name or alter his inscription may Šamaš overthrow his kingdom and send famine upon the land. The next is an inscription of the reign of Adad-Nirari I c. 1325 (B. & K., pp. 9-12) recording the king’s conquests and his restoration of the temple of Anu. He declares that whosoever shall blot out his name and inscribe his own in its place or shall in any other of many enumerated ways deface or injure the inscription will be cursed. The deities invoked are: Ašur, Anu, Bēl, Ea, Ištar, all the great gods, the Igigi (the spirits) of heaven, and the Anunnaki (spirits) of earth. The evil curse (ir-ri-ta ma-ru-us-ta) is invoked. In the Annals of Tukulti-Ninib I c. 1275 B.C. (L. W. King, Records of the Reign of Tukulti-Ninib I, pp. 92-95) a malediction similar to the above is recorded. The one god invoked is Ašur. Upon a clay tablet of the time of Šennacherib is a copy of a seal inscription of the reign of Tukulti-Ninib I (B. & K., pp. 14ff). The inscription contains a malediction in which the gods Ašur and Adad are invoked. The same malediction is repeated. Building inscriptions of the time of Ašurreš-îši c. 1140 B.C. (B. & K., pp. 17ff.) contain two maledictions in one of which Ištar is invoked and in the other the gods.

Tiglath-pileser I c. 1100 B.C. in his great Cylinder inscription (B. & K., pp. 27ff.) appeals to the gods Anu and Adad to curse with an evil malediction (ar-ra-ta ma-ru-us-ta li-ru-ru-us) all
who may in any way violate his inscriptions. Ašur-bêl-kala c. 1080 B. C. has left an inscription on the back of a female statue (B. & K., pp. 152ff.) in which a malediction is pronounced invoking the gods of Martu and a god whose name has not been completely preserved. What is left is Za.

The annals of Tukulti-Ninib II c. 889 B. C. (Scheil, Annales de Tukulti Ninip II, rev. ll. 63-64) contains a malediction in which the name of Ašur, and Adad are invoked. Ašur-našir-pal c. 884 (B. & K., pp. 155ff.) invokes a malediction in the name of Ašur, Adad, and Ura; another in the name of Ištar (B. & K. 172); a third in the name of Ašur and Ninib (B. & K. 188); and a fourth in the name of Ašur, Anu, Bêl, and Ea (B. & K. 252ff.). Sargon c. 722 (KB II, pp. 50-51) invokes Ašur, Šamaš, Ramman, and the gods; Sennacherib (KB II 112-113) invokes Ašur; and Ašurbanipal (KB II 237ff.) invokes Ašur, Sin, Šamaš, Ramman, Bêl, Nabû, Ištar of Nineveh, Ištar of Arbela, Ninib, Nergal, and Nuska in one inscription, and Marduk alone in another. In the latter Marduk is invoked because the malediction occurs in an inscription which has to do with the installation of a Babylonian king. To an inscription of the reign of Agum I or Agum-Kakrimi c. 1734 B. C. (KB IIIi, pp. 152-153), one of the Kassite kings, there is appended a note of Ašurbanipal invoking a malediction upon anyone who might remove his name (the name of Ašurbanipal) from the stela. The deities Ašur and Bêlit are invoked. The very last king of Assyria, namely, Sin-šar-šisûn c. 616-606 invoked the gods to curse (li-ru-ru-us) the future violator.

The deities invoked in contracts of the Assyrian period are:

The king and Ašur, Adad, Ber, Assyrian Enlil, Assyrian Ištar.
Ašur, Adad, Ber, Assyrian Enlil, Assyrian Ištar.
The king.
The great gods.
Ninib, a goddess (name lost), Adad, Nabû, Ištar, Ašur, Gula.
Bêl, Nabû.
Ašur, Sin, Šamaš, Bêl, Nabû.
Ašur, Šamaš, Bêl, Nabû.

It is worthy of note that in the earliest Assyrian contracts no maledictions were invoked; that the king was invoked
sometimes as well as the deities; and that few stereotyped phrases occur. Many of the tablets that have been recovered are in a poor state of preservation. Ašur is, as would be expected, the favourite deity in these maledictions.

The deities invoked in historical inscriptions of this period are:

Šamaš.
Ašur, Anu, Bēl, Ea, Ištar, the Igigi, the Anunnaki.
Ašur.
Ašur, Adad.
Ištar.
Anu, Adad.
A god Za-, and the gods of Martu.
Ašur, Adad.
Ašur, Adad, Ura.
Ištar.
Ašur, Ninib.
Ašur, Anu, Bēl, Ea.
Ašur, Šamaš, Rammān, and the gods.
Ašur, Sin, Šamaš, Rammān, Bēl, Nabū, Ištar of Nineveh,
Ištar of Arbela, Ninib, Nergal, Nusku.
Marduk.
Ašur, Bēlit.
The gods.
Ašur is also the favourite deity in these maledictions.

5. New Babylonian Period.

1. Contracts. Nbk. 125 (Kohler und Peiser, Aus dem Bab. Rechtsleben) is a slave contract in which Nabū and Marduk are invoked in the malediction. It was drawn up in the 21st year of Nabuchadrezzar. Nbk. 283 is an inheritance contract from the 35th year of the same reign. In the malediction Marduk and Nabū are invoked. Nabū-na'id (KB IV 214-215) is represented by a contract which contains a malediction. Anu, Bēl, and Ea are invoked to bring upon the offender the ar-rat la nap-šu-ru ma-ar-uš-tum. Then Nabū, IB, and Bēlit-ekalli are also invoked. The contract is sealed. Here we have the perfect malediction formula of earlier days, the great gods Anu, Bēl, and Ea being invoked. This is characteristic of this antiquarian king who made an attempt to restore the customs
of past ages. In another contract (KB IV 234-235) the curse of the great gods (ir-rît ûlânî rabûti) is written; and in still another (KB IV 246-247) Marduk and Zarpanitum are invoked.

2. Historical Inscriptions. In an inscription of the time of Nabopolassar (Langdon, Die Neubabylonischen Königsinschriften, pp. 66ff.) there is an expression of a malediction. It is: šî-te'-e-ma li-na-ru ga-ri-ka, “may they overthrow thy enemies”. The deities invoked are Nabû and Marduk.

Nabonaid in an inscription (Langdon, op. cit., pp. 218ff.) invokes a malediction upon his enemies. This curse is embedded in a detailed blessing which the king invokes upon himself. In the malediction no specific god is named.

The deities invoked in contracts of the New Babylonian period are:

Marduk, Nabû.
Nabû, Marduk.
Anu, Bêl, Ea, Nabû, IB, Bêlit-ekalli.
Great gods.
Marduk, Zarpanitum.

Only one malediction has been found in historical inscriptions of this period which contains the names of invoked deities. The deities are: Nabû and Marduk. In these historical inscriptions numerous blessings are found where maledictions would be expected. The favourite gods, as one would expect, are Nabû and Marduk.

6. Persian Period.

In the seventh year of the reign of Cyrus (KB IV 278-279) there was drawn up an interesting will. In the contract it is stated that whosoever contests the will Anu, Bêl, and Ea will curse him with an indissoluble malediction, and Nabû will deprive him of future days. The formula is: ar-ra-as-su mar-ru-us-tu li-i-ru-ur. It is sealed before witnesses.

The historical inscriptions of this period contain no maledictions but many blessings. It seems that the benediction has gradually taken the place of the curse. This fact would prove very suggestive in a study of the development of the social moral consciousness in Babylonian and Assyrian culture.
II. General Nature of the Malediction in Cuneiform Inscriptions.

The malediction as found in Cuneiform inscriptions seems to have been employed as a means of praying down evil upon a person. There were two main classes, direct and conditional. A direct malediction was pronounced after the forbidden deed had been done, e.g. Istar it-ta-di a-ru-ru-ta, "Istar pronounced a malediction" (Gilg. Epos VI, 175). A conditional malediction is one which is invoked and will take effect if the forbidden deed be done, e.g. "in future time if this tablet be destroyed then may the great gods wrathfully curse (ag-giš li-ru-ru-šu) him (the destroyer)" (Kudurru of Nebuchadrezzar I).

Some maledictions were considered more powerful than others. There were some which belonged to a class known as the "indissoluble malediction". This designation occurs again and again under such forms as: ar-rat la pa-ša-ri, ar-rat la nap-šu-ri. A malediction of similar significance occurs under the following forms: ir-ri-ta ma-ru-us-ta; iz-ra rab-a. The oft recurring words enim enim nam-šub nun-ki-ga ú-me-ni-sig, "the words of the malediction of Eridu utter" refer to a standard formula of magic curse. We do not know what the words of this formula were.

The most frequent source or cause of maledictions is found in the endeavour of kings to have their name and fame well preserved throughout the ages, and whoever failed to do whatever was calculated to bring that about was made the object of a malediction. Not only the king's own name, but also that of his father and grandfather must be preserved (V R 10, 116-120, Ašurbanipal, Rassam-Cylinder). Moreover, the king's record must be placed in a conspicuous location, and published, so that all may be able to read of his renown. The kings thus provided for the punishment of sins of omission as well as of those of commission. Whoever seized the property of another, and tried to claim ownership; or whoever disturbed the grave of a king; or removed a boundary-stone (I R 70 Col. II 8-9; cf. Deut. 27 17) was cursed. A malediction may come upon a man not only because of his own sins, but also because of those of his parents. In short, the smallest offence

1 See Zimmern, Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Babylonischen Religion, Šurpu, V-VI, 1. 43 etc., where ar-rat means the sin which is the result
could cause a malediction, *e.g.* offence against the protective god of the family; against honor, the city etc.

Of course, anyone could be the object of a malediction, and even deities were sometimes cursed, but naturally this was poetically conceived, *e.g.* *ilu Bēl i-zi-ir-an-ni-ma,* “Bēl has cursed Me (Ea)” (IV R 43 Col. I 36, Deluge). Inanimate objects were also cursed, as we learn from KB VI, *Weltsch.*, Tafel III, l. 19, where the day is cursed (compare Radan, *Ninib the Determiner of Fates*, p. 23, where stones are cursed).

As in the case of the oath so here the greater the gods invoked, or the more solemn the occasion, the greater the banning power of the malediction.

When a curse was pronounced it often comprised in its malediction the whole activity of a man’s life. His every work and interest were placed under a ban. Not only the man himself but also his seed was doomed to destruction (Compare the Hebrew curse in Deut. 27, 17, Ps. 109, etc.). As each deity seems to have had a special work to do when pronouncing a malediction—even the minor deities—the contents of a curse were very various and extensive. Like the ban, a malediction always brought misfortune upon its object; yet it acted as the strongest possible protection—as a taboo. This is seen very clearly in those cases where it took the place of an oath serving as a protection against violation.

### III. General Ritual of the Malediction in Cuneiform Inscriptions.

Any one presumably could invoke a malediction, but the king appears, as far as our literature goes, to have been the most frequent invoker. Further, any divine being whether god or demon could be invoked, and the “seven” which were so active in Babylonian and Assyrian times may have been an expression indicative of all the gods or demons. All the great gods whose names are mentioned in heaven and earth (*ilâni rabûti ma-la i-na šamâ u ersîti šum-šu-nu zak-ru*) may be invoked. The greater the god the oftener he was likely to have been invoked. Once or twice the king was invoked. This was due to the tendency to deify him. In poetry such beings as

of a malediction. Compare the Hebrew doctrine implied in Jer. 31, 29 and Ezekiel 18, 2.
Tiāmat (KB VI, Weltsh. III 73) and Gilgameš (Gilm. Epos VI 84) could pronounce a malediction. When inscribing a tablet, the names of the deities invoked were placed on record with the inscription. These, then, acted as the special gods who would curse the transgressors. Such deities, even when their names were unknown, acted as protective gods.

A malediction could presumably be pronounced anywhere, although, of course, it is reasonable to suppose that special occasions might call for special ritual in this respect. On one occasion it is said that Ištar went upon the wall of Ereh and pronounced a malediction (Gilm. Epos VI 174-175). This is, of course, poetical; but it is an indication of use.

It is difficult to say whether one time was considered more favourable than another for the pronunciation of a malediction. Such expressions as umē ar-ur-ti, "the day of malediction"; u-um su-gi-i ar-ru-ti, "the day of want and malediction" occur often, but no definite conclusions can be drawn from them. However, it seems that certain times were unfavourable for such purposes, e.g. the 7th 14th 19th 21st and 28th of different months (IV R 32-33, Hemerology).

As far as we know, few physical acts were performed at the pronunciation of a malediction. But since maledictions seem to be so bound up with oaths, often being substitutes for them, and oaths were taken by raising the hand, it seems likely that the same gesture 1 was also used at the pronunciation of a malediction. However, the attitude assumed at the pronunciation of a malediction was probably like that of the seven devils on the bas-relief (Frank, Babyl. Beschworungsreliefs, Tafel IV G, LSS, III 3. But it is also possible that the seven devils have in one hand a stone to throw). It seems certain, however, that the spoken word was the commonest form. Poetically speaking, the god pronouncing the malediction may change his outward visible form as Ninib did (Hrozný, Mythen von dem Gotte Ninag, MVAG 1905, 5. pp. 24f.). But it is not at all sure that this metamorphosis was made as a ritual preparation for the pronouncing of the malediction.

A ban is similar to, and interchangeable with, a malediction. Mamitu is often translated ban and so is niš. This is further

1 Compare ܐܒܫܪ, to make a sign with the hand, with which mamitu is related, and whose derivative ܝܒܫܫmeans misfortune or malediction.
proved by the use of the word *aråru* which means (1) to ban, and (2) to curse. But every ban is not necessarily a malediction, because the ban is usually the work of the witch, charmer, or demon who secures control over divine influences by properly uttering the ban and by magic symbolism; while the malediction is the work of a divine person. The evil-spirits, demons, charmers, and witches ban one chiefly through the instrumentality of the “evil glance”, the “evil tongue”, the “evil mouth”, or more often the “evil word”, together with certain magical acts such as the use of a picture made of different kinds of material. The gods *curse* when called upon to do so, but also ban the evil-spirits who have enchanted mankind, e.g. *kiš-pi ik-šip-an-ni ki-šip-šu*, “by the charm by which he has charmed me, charm thou (Nusku) him” (Tallqvist, *Maqlu* I Obv. 126). Gilgameš is called the *bēl ma-mi-ti-ku-nu*, “lord of the ban”, *i.e.* the master of the enchantment which enchants a person, and he can dispel it by pronouncing a ban upon the evil-spirit who holds the person in its power. A ban produces a malediction, and a malediction produces a ban (cf. the phrase *ar-rat u-sur-ta*, “the curse of a ban”)—especially if the ban has been the result of one’s own sinfulness. To be under the influence of a ban was considered a bad thing, for we find it often coupled with other afflictions. Hence, one sought always to be rid of the ban; and since most bans acted at the same time as maledictions and were often identical with them, we can assume that the same ritual was used in removing a malediction as in the case of the removal of a ban. In fact, in the loosing of a ban the malediction which it produced was removed, and *vice versa*. Hence, I shall proceed to describe the main features of the ritual used in the removal of a ban as being the same as those used in the removal of a malediction.

The ceremony in the loosing of a malediction was sometimes very simple, but often very elaborate. In some cases, merely the pronunciation of a set formula was sufficient to drive away the evil-spirits. Such a formula was: “in the name of heaven be exorcised, in the name of earth be exorcised”, etc. In other cases, besides the formula, certain specific acts were necessary. For example; Marduk’s attention is attracted by a man suffering under a malediction. He goes to his father Ea and says: *a-bi ar-rat limut-tim Kīma gal-ti-e ana amēli*
it-tas-kan, “my father an evil malediction like a demon has befallen a man”. After relating the whole story of the man’s affliction he succeeds in being sent by Ea to loose the sufferer. He goes and takes the enchanted man and explains his enchantment. Then he pronounces the destruction of the ban. The man is free from his malediction, and in turn the sorcerer is banned.

There are some other methods even simpler: a man may be loosed after having prayed in a prescribed way, e.g. by lifting up the hands in prayer and invoking the great gods. King gives a good example of this in his translation of No. 12 l. 78b-79 of his Bab. Magic and Sorcery: lip-šu-ru ni-šu ma-mit ni-ši kāti zikir ilāni rabūti, “from the ban, the malediction, may the lifting up of my hand, the invocation of the great gods, give release”.

From the cylinder seals we can easily tell the attitude a man must assume when led before the deity. He stands with both hands raised—sometimes with only one, the other being taken by the priest who leads him. Then come the invocation, confession, and prayers, recited partly by the priest and partly by the man. Offerings are then made, magical rites, such as the presentation of small images, the knotting and unknotting of colored threads, throwing into a fire certain substances, dropping certain substances into oil, and pouring libation. Very often the exact position of the priest was required. He must stand facing the east, west, or the evening star, according to the time of day. A specific place was often prescribed, e.g., on the river bank in the house of ablation. The priest who stood in the service of the gods wielded the same power against the evil-spirits as the evil-spirits wielded against the sick. He wore vestments special to the occasion, changing them at certain points in the service. He recited the Šiptu, ki-ma šame-e li-lil ki-ma irši-tim li-bi-ib ki-ma ki-rib šame-e lim-mir, “like heaven may he be bright, like earth may he be clean, like the middle of heaven may he be pure”, or exorcising formula, in technical language, which was the weightiest weapon he could wield against the evil-spirit. This he did usually in a whisper in the presence of an image of wax, or with mutterings or singing. Accompanying the ceremony was the burning of torches. Liquids and incense played a prominent part, especially water. Washing especially with pure and clean
water—sometimes with oil of different kinds—played a prominent rôle in the ritual. Unwashed hands always denoted ritual uncleanness. A man usually washed his hands over a bowl with images of the witches in it. The water could also be drunk as a remedy, but in every case it must be absolutely pure and clean.

Then, there often took place the symbolical burning of the evil-spirit or witch which was supposed to hold the man under ban or malediction. The picture of the witch (which may or may not be known) played the chief part. Here the common magical element of fire came in. Sometimes the images were made of burnable material, such as, wood, pitch, clay, wax, etc. Then came the symbolical casting of certain things in fire, such as, tamarisk-wood, mustakal-plant, cane, etc.

It was customary sometimes for the priest to repeat the ceremonies, which the witch had performed and thus, by the law of opposites, succeeded in driving the evil-spirit away (cf. Maqalu II 148-168). Perhaps the most usual proceeding in loosing a malediction was the following: the priest goes into the presence of the sick man before the great gods, the lords of loosing, asks a series of questions about what the sick man might have done to deserve the malediction, reciting a long list of sins which might have caused it in order to locate as definitely as possible the sufferer's sin. Then, with the sick man, he recited a litany, touching the sick man and calling upon the different gods. Finally, the loosing benediction is pronounced, "go and never return". The ban passes on to the evil-spirit leaving the sick man whole.

And now let us indicate as briefly as possible the two chief modes of loosing the malediction, i.e., the simple and the elaborate. Of course the degree of simplicity and elaborateness varied. It may be said that the simple mode is that used in the case of an ordinary person. It consisted merely in the recitation of an incantation. Examples can be found in Zimmern, Šurpu, V-VI. On the other hand, very elaborate ceremonies prevailed, for example, in the loosing of a king from his malediction. Let us briefly indicate one example: The king comes and has something placed on his head. A formula is recited and atonement is made. The exorciser puts on a dark garment and causes seven altars to be set up. Upon these altars he places dates, bread, honey, oil, etc. Then seven
incense vessels and seven vessels of wine are prepared, a lamb is killed and an offering is made. After many other points of ritual, the exorciser stands behind the preparations which he has made, being careful to stand with his face towards them, and recites the incantation. A preparation of honey and butter is cast to the four winds, gifts are brought out to the gates, the offering is completed, and prayers are directed to the "seven gods" for the king's forgiveness. Up to this point only the priest has been active. Now the king takes part for the first time. He takes up his position on an elevated place and prays that his sins be forgiven. He then pours intoxicating liquid into a special vessel and prays for continuance of life; and into another he makes libation and prays for purity. He then washes in pure water and puts on a clean robe. The exorciser again takes up his part, by going to the palace gate and making an offering of a sheep, and sprinkling the doorposts with its blood. Then follows a special piece of ritual. The exorciser goes to a field and causes a bath-house for the gods to be built, near which are set up the standards of the king. Three offerings are made. Then censers are prepared and supplied with cypress for twenty-three gods and different incantations are said, each three times. Then follow different atonement ceremonies before different gods, and several minor points of ritual, and the exorciser waits for the setting of the sun. The king again takes part. After sun-set he washes himself in water, puts on a clean ritual garment and sits in the bath-house. The priest then kindles all the censers which he has placed before the king; prepares the wood and offers the sacrificial lamb. Then he brings the three kinds of meat with cypress, milk, wine, and different gifts. Finally, he makes another atonement for the king who repeats the prescribed incantation, and the evil-spirits depart (compare Zimmern, Ritualtafeln).

The official looser of a malediction was the priest—usually the Ašipu priest (see Zimmern, op. cit., Ašipu)—acting through the power and under the direction of the gods. Special gods were usually invoked. The most usual were the so-called light-gods, the patrons of the exorciser and magician. These were Ea, Šamaš, Gibil, Nusku, Ištar, etc. Nusku under the name Gibil (written Bil-Gi or Giš-Bar) i. e. the fire-god, was often invoked especially in hymns. The greater the god the
more certain was the removal of the curse, and hence Ea, the inventor of all "the useful arts, and especially of magic, the master of wisdom" (or his envoys) was oftenest invoked. Marduk was so popular as the lord of magic and exorcism, that incantation itself became especially identified with his name, e. g., ši-p-tum ši-pat ili Marduk a-si-pu ša-lam ili Marduk, "incantation is the incantation of Marduk, exorcism is the image of Marduk" (Zimmern, op. cit., No. 54). Yet, by the power of any god, through the priest, one could be loosed from his malediction, because the usual formula, niš išāni rabūti lā tamāta, "in the name of the great gods be thou exorcised", is merely a stereotyped expression for all the gods, great and small, known and unknown. Thus, the priest, through the gods, with the accessories of natural assistance such as "the storm of the south, north, east, and west, the four winds"; or of suitable seasons, such as the "feast of departed souls, gift-day, unlucky-day", etc., could always loose the malediction.

After the evil-spirits were driven forth, means were devised to keep them away. Herbs were prepared as an antidote against them, either before or after they had really gone. Probably also the sign of the cross was used 1. However, talismans were frequently used. They had usually an inscription, e. g., parak Ašur u Mela’m eti bīti an-ni-i, "may the shrine of the gods Ašur and Melam be over this house" (King, New Fragment of the Dibbarra-legend-ZA XI, 1896, p. 52). Defence against evil-spirits was made by recourse to objects supposed to contain some holy power, e. g., a ring, amulet, image, plant, "white-wool" spun into threads, "black-wool", etc. Holy objects were often stationed at the outer-gate of the house of the cursed man to prevent evil-spirits from ever entering again. Sometimes an image of the sick man (or parts of the sick man’s body) was made and various ceremonies performed with it. Blood was used in a similar way as by the Hebrews, as a defence against evil-spirits (see Zimmern, op. cit., No. 26, l. 19-21). It was thought that the malediction could be diverted by different spirits if invoked. Such were considered protective deities and were very numerous.

1 Compare Hommel, Grundriß, p. 100, Anm. 1. For the cross as a sign-mark and a symbol of the enemy-god in inscriptions, see Hilprecht, BE, II pl. 59, No. 129, and in other places. See also Jeremias, A TAO, 1. Aufl., p. 356.
In the above study an attempt has been made to record every instance of an actually pronounced malediction found in Cuneiform inscriptions. Our study of the ritual of the malediction, however, has taken into consideration not only the actually pronounced maledictions but likewise the many references to maledictions found in magical and poetical literature. These references, while not indicating actually pronounced maledictions, nevertheless throw much light upon the conceptions associated with the idea of malediction and with the manner in which a malediction could be properly pronounced or averted.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that the malediction in Babylonian and Assyrian times was a highly developed legal and religious ceremony, universally practiced and respected. It not only figured in ceremonies of great occasions, but also penetrated into the everyday life of the people. It seemed to have served almost the same purpose as Common Law does among modern people, for it acted as a restraint, corrective, and stimulant to better deeds. It illustrates the force which religion, even when it is merely magical, can exercise upon the human mind.

Near the end of the twentieth book of the Atharva-Veda stands the group of so-called Kuntāpa hymns, the first of which is the 127th of the book. This 127th hymn falls into four distinct documents, the third of the four comprising verses 7—10, and dealing with the golden age of King Parikṣīt, who is an aspect of Agni.¹ The text of the four stanzas, as given by Hillebrandt, Vedachrestomathie, p. 39, is as follows:

7. rájino viśvajānānasya
   vaisvānarāsya suṣṭutīṁ
   yó devó mártyaṁ áti
8. parikṣīṁ naḥ ksēmam acaḥ
   kūlayaṁ kṛṇvān kaúravyaḥ
   á śrṇotā parikṣītaḥ
9. katarāt ta á harāni
   jāyā pātiṁ vi prcchati
   pátir vadati jāyāṁ
10. abhi 'va svāḥ prā jihite
    jānaḥ sá bhadrāṁ edhate
    dadhimanthām parisrūtaṁ
    rāṣṭre rájñāḥ parikṣītaḥ
    yavaḥ pakvāḥ paró bilaṁ
    rāṣṭre rájñāḥ parikṣītaḥ

Essential Apparatus Criticus (see Roth and Whitney, Atharva Veda Sanhitā, Berlin, 1856; Shankar Pāṇḍurang Paṇḍit, Atharvavedasamhitā, Bombay, 4 vols., 1895—8).

7d: sunotā, Mss. and Bom., from Prāk. root su, — Skt. śy; śyotā is restored by RW.
8ab: akarottāma Mss., akarot tāma Bom., akar uttamā RW.

¹ The Brāhmaṇas interpret Parikṣīt as either Agni or the year, since of either it may be said that it "lives round the people, and the people live round" it. Cf. Ait. Br. vi, 32, 10ff.; and M. Haug's trans., II, p. 432; Gop. Br. ii, 6, 12; Kauś. Br. xxx, 5; Śāṅkh. Śr. S. xii, 17. But the epithet vaisvānara, here applied to Parikṣīt, is a constant Rigvedic epithet of Agni, and in Śat. Br. i, 4, 1, 15—16, Agni vaisvānara is spoken of in much the same vein as here in the AV.
9b: dādhi mānthāṁ Mss. and Bom., dādhi manthāṁ RW.; for Hillebrandt's dadhimanthāṁ, see footnote 2.
9b: pari śrūtam most Mss., Bom.; pariśrūtam RW.; pari śrūtāṁ a few Mss.; cf. footnote of following page.
10a: abhīvāsvaḥ most Mss. and Bom., ośva Ms. C.; RW. emends as above.
10b: pathō or pātha Mss., pathō Bom., parō RW.
10c: ēdhati Mss. and Bom.; edhate RW., from Vait. S. 34, 9c.
Bloomfield's translation of these stanzas (in his Hymns of the Atharva Veda, vol. xiii of the Sacred Books of the East, pp. 197—8; cf. also his commentary on pp. 688—692) runs as follows:

"7. Listen ye to the high praise of the king who rules over all the peoples, the god who is above mortals, of Vaiśvānara Pariksit!"

"8. Parikṣit has secured for us a secure dwelling, when he, the most excellent one, went to his seat. [Thus] the husband in Kuru-land, when he founds his household, converses with his wife."

"9. What may I bring to thee, curds, stirred drink, or liquor?" [Thus] the wife asks her husband in the kingdom of king Parikṣit.

"10. Like light the ripe barley runs over beyond the mouth [of the vessels]. The people thrive merrily in the kingdom of king Parikṣit."

The first two pādaś of stanza 10 are of doubtful interpretation, though the text is reasonably certain; Hillebrandt's text is that of Roth-Whitney, which is followed both by Bloomfield and by Griffiths (The Hymns of the Atharva Veda, 2 vols., Benares, 1895—6), in their translations. Bloomfield himself says of his own translation (op. cit., p. 691), "The comparison of the overflow of the grain with the bursting forth of the light is bold, nay bizarre". Then suggesting that the correct

1 Rather came, i. e., to his place in the house as the sacrificial fire.
2 The katarāt of pāda a shows that b expresses only two separate beverages, and dadhimanthāṁ must therefore with Hillebrandt be read as one word. Dadhimanthā is interpreted in the commentary of Gārgya Narāyaṇa to Aśv. Grh. S. ii, 5, 2, by the words dadhimirās tu dadhimantāḥ prakīrtitāḥ, and should be translated meal stirred with sour milk.
3 Both pāda-text and native commentary are wanting in the Bombay edition.
reading may be not svāh, but svāh, written for svāh ‘to-morrow’, with the common confusion of the different sibilants, he offers an alternative translation, “On the morrow the ripe barley bursts forth from the opening of the ground”, that is, “grain planted to-day ripens on the morrow”.

Now iva, the second word of the line, is a postpositive particle of comparison, and must govern the abhi which precedes it, as well as the svāh which follows. Either of Bloomfield’s translations makes a perfectly clear interpretation, indicative of abundance of food in the happy days of King Parikṣit, quite in keeping with the rest of the hymn; but his first version neglects the abhi, and his alternative disregards the iva. Griffiths (op. cit. II, 434) takes proper account of both in his translation, “Up as it were to heavenly light springs the ripe corn above the cleft”, but his English is unintelligible; possibly by the cleft we are to understand the rift through which the plant makes its way out of the ground? But either by this interpretation or by Bloomfield’s alternative translation, to represent the ripe grain as springing forth from the ground is decidedly incongruous.

The following version may therefore be presented for 10a and b: “As if toward the sunlight, springs forth the barley [when] ripe beyond the opening [of the jar]”. In paraphrase, ‘just as the growing barley plants spring up towards the sunlight, so the ripe barley corns spring forth over the mouth of the jar in which they are stored’. This interpretation takes full account of the Sanskrit text, and gives a distinct meaning, fully harmonizing with the context: In King Parikṣit’s reign, the barley produces abundantly, luxuriance of the stalks not taking up all the strength of the plants, but being fully matched by the yield of grain, which overflows all receptacles; and India’s great plague famine is a thing unheard of.

1 Cf. Bloomfield and Spieker, JAOS. 13, cxvii ff.; the converse miswriting appears in the pariṣrataṃ of the Mss. in 9b, which is kept in the Roth-Whitney and Bombay texts, though corrected by Hillebrandt and recognized as a miswriting by Whitney in his Index Verborum to the Atharva-Veda, JAOS. 12, 176, and by Monier-Williams in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary, ed. 2, p. 602, col. 3.
A Coptic Ostracon. — By Professor William H. Worrell, Hartford, Conn.

The curious ostracon here presented was bought in 1909 by Professor Walter Dennison from the well known dealer in Gizeh, the Shêch Ali al-Arabi (who as usual gave no information of its origin), and was kindly placed at my disposal.

Text

† ωইνε ικα ΜΗΤΕ ΠΗΜΟΥΝΕ
’ΗΒΗΝΕ ζηΤΝ ΑΜΜΑΚ[ο]ΥΡΙ ΠΜΑ
ΠΗΜΑΟΥΛ ΕΡΕ ΧΟΥΟΤ ΝΕΡΤΟΡ
ζιωωμ ΕΝΑ ΠΗΜΑΝΒΙΧ ΝΕ
+ ΑΘ/ ι\. ΊΝΑ/ +

Translation

[Ansate cross] Demand ten sacks
of dates from Ammakouri the
camel-driver. He has twenty artabs,
being those of the place of Bij.
+ Ath[or] 14th, [of the current] ind[iction the
year] +

The language is Sahidic with certain northern tendencies,
e. g.: ΒΗΝΕ for ΒΕΝΝΕ, ΑΘΩΡ for ΣΑΤΩΡ. The sixth letter of the first line is plainly Η but must have been intended for C.
The eleventh and twelfth of the second line though crowded are ΜΜ. The fifteenth of the second line may have been an Α similar to the Α just preceding and to the Α of the ΙΑ in the last line. Yet the space and the visible remains suggest far more strongly ΗΥ. Either would be a possible reading. We have here either a Copt or an Arab with the Arabic
familiar name الـُكَارِي Al-Mukāri, “the Camel-driver”. The
Coptic writer either consciously or unconsciously translates this by ΠΗΜΆΣΑΜΟΥΛ, and renders it phonetically by ΑΜΜΑ-
ΚΟΥΡΙ. It was probably the only name by which he was to be designated. Such metatheses are common in vulgar Egyptian Arabic today. For the kunya العُكاري see Al 'Asyʿūṣī, Lubbu l-Lubāb, edition Veth, page 150. But the assimilation of the 1 of the article is Coptic and rare at that, for the Arabic article with following m is regularly given in Coptic as َلَم.

The name Pemanbijj, or the place of Bij, is difficult. The tempting identification with the name of the now ruined city of Mambij (Mabog, Bambyke) in extreme northern Syria, north-east of Aleppo, must be rejected. Ripe dates are not produced on the coast today further north than about Jaffa; and palms cease to grow north of Haifa. In Mesopotamia the northern limit of the date-palm is fixed by Baedeker, Palästina und Syrien, 1910, p. 395, between Sāmarrā and Bagdad. Egypt, the land of dates, would not have imported such from southern Mesopotamia by way of Mambij. On the other hand, I find no record of any Egyptian locality of that name; and بِيْك is found in Peyron's Lexicon Linguae Copticae, 28, following Kircher's very doubtful authority, to be the Arabic فَمَس "tessera", "pupilla", "joint", "gem". As it is written in larger letters than the rest of the line it must be a proper name.¹

The year of the current indiction is not given. Perhaps the purposes of the memorandum made this unnecessary, and the writer added إِنْا from habit. Possibly the numeral | 10 is intended by the + at the end.

¹ I am indebted to Professor Torrey for the suggested identification of the word with البَيْك mentioned by al Belâdhuri 238 f. [ed. Cairo 1319, p. 247 f.; cf. Maqrizi ed. Cairo 1324, vol. i, p. 313 f.]. The name was, and perhaps still is applied [Baedeker, Egypt and the Sudan, 1908, p. xxxvii, Beja], to a nomadic people east of the Nile, between Qena and Quṣėr on the north and the Abyssinian mountains on the south. The famous revolt of this people in 854 A.D. is recorded by Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, p. 41. The country about Aswān at least is famous for its dates. In Coptic this people is called سَامِحِيْكَوُةْ.
Religious Conceptions Underlying Sumerian Proper Names. — By George A. Barton, Bryn Mawr College.

In cataloguing the Proper Names in the Haverford Library Collection I was impressed with the amount of Sumerian theology which they expressed. Almost all the religious ideas which underly Semitic proper names can be paralleled in Sumerian.

The following study is based on the names in the Haverford Collection. These tablets, though but four hundred in number, contain so many pay rolls that they are particularly rich in proper names. Nearly 3300 individuals are mentioned in them, while in all the documents from which Huber collected the names for his Personennamen ... der Zeit der Könige von Ur und Nisin there are only about 5100 names. The documents here drawn upon do not, therefore, afford a meager basis for induction. Of course a great many of the names found in the Haverford tablets occur in other documents also, and are found in Huber's list. Before considering the religious ideas of particular names it should be noted that some of the most peculiar and striking of these ideas have not yet been found in names of earlier periods. One searches the name-lists from the reigns of Urkagina and Lugalanda in vain for some of them; though, of course, this is not true of those which express the simpler and more common ideas.

The first fact that impresses one in the study of these names is the popularity of certain deities. For example, the name of the goddess Bau enters as a component part into the names of at least 147 individuals mentioned in these texts; that of Utu, the sun-god, into the names of 64 persons; that of Kal, into 58; that of Galgir into 50; and that of Ningirsu, into 54. This does not show any tendency to monotheism among the Sumerians any more than the popularity of Marduk
and Nabu, as shown in the Proper Names of the Neo-Babylonian empire, implies a tendency to monotheism then.

Among the Sumerians the most common way of showing devotion by means of a proper name was to call the boy or girl a "servant" of some deity. Thus 85 different men mentioned in this collection bore the name Ur^4 Bau. Ur not only means "servant", but the "consecrated servant" or qadeš; hence the name expressed deep devotion. We find not only Ur^4 Bau, but Ur^4 Ningirsu, Ur^4 Enlil, Ur^4 Ninâ, Ur^4 Dumuzi, etc. All the gods were remembered in this way. Another form of name almost as popular was to call a boy the gûl or gâlu,^2 i.e., the "man" of such and such a god. Thus we have Gâl^4 Bau as the name of 28 individuals in these texts, Gâl^4 Ningirsu, as the name of 31, Gâl^4 Naru, as the name of 22, and the other deities are similarly honored. Girls were in like manner said to be the servants of different deities by calling them the gîm or gîme^3 of some deity. Thus we have Gîm^4 Kal, Gîm^4 Ninâ, etc. Thirty-two different deities are in these texts honored in this way.

Sometimes, apparently, it was the intention of the parent to place the child under the protection of any or every deity. In that case the infant was called Ur^5 dingirra, Gâl^5 dingirra, or Gîm^5 dingirra, "servant of god", "man of god", or "maidservant of god". It is, of course, possible that in these cases some particular deity was intended, and that the names are hypocoristica.

Naturally there are also many names which ascribe attributes of various kinds to the gods. The following are a few examples: Nin-an^4 Ba-u,^4 "Lady of heaven is Bau", sometimes turned about as Ba-u-nin-a-an, "Bau is lady of heaven". ^4 Utu-mê-ne, "Utu is he", is the statement of another name. Others are: ^4 Utu-en-dug, "Utu is good lord"; ^4 Ba-u-azag-ga,

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^1 This is the Sumerian equivalent of Semitic names beginning with Arad, such as Arad^4 Bēl, Arad^4 Nusku, etc.
^2 These are equivalent to Semitic names beginning with amîlu, such as Amîl^4 Marduک.
^3 These are equivalent to Semitic names beginning with Amîtu, such as Amât^4 Belît.
^4 References are not given for each of these names. They can be found by consulting the name list in Part III of the Haverford Library Collection of Cuneiform Tablets.
"Bau is brilliant"; Ba-una-e, "Bau is greatly exalted"; Ba-ubar-giš, "Bau is a great lady"; Sag-Ba-ugul, "Bau is chief", sometimes shortened to Sag-Ba-u. Then we have Utu-padda, "Utu is bright"; Nannar-maš-ib, "Nannar is a mighty prince"; Utu-gir-gal, "Utu is great strength"; Utu-gal-ka, "Utu is for protection"; Utu-ušum-gal, "Utu is the great one"; Utu-bar-ra, "Utu is lord"; and Utu-si-di, "Utu is upright" (HLC, II, 68, 33, i, 12). Sometimes a name asserts something of a god: thus Ba-uda-me-a means "To Bau there is no father"; or, since a may mean "son" also, it may mean "Bau has no son".

Another series of names explains the attitude of the gods toward worshippers. Thus Utu-ūr-ra means "Utu is a protector"; Ba-ug-mu, "Bau is my faithful one" or "my guide"; Sag-Ba-u-kin, "The head of Bau turns", apparently toward the worshipper; Utu-sag-ga, "Utu is favorable"; Nin-gir-sunu-sag, "Ningirsu is gracious". Then we have Ba-u-ni-tum, "Bau protects"; Ba-u-he-gal, "Bau is a rich blessing"; Utukalam-e, "Utu is for all"; Utu-zi-mu, "Utu is my life"; Bau-zi-mu, "Bau is my life"; Kal-zi-mu, "Kal is my life"; Utuki-ram-me, "Utu is the one who loves us"; Kal-e-za, "Kal makes him live"; Šu-ba-ni, "Šu created him"; Úr-zib-apin, "The foundation-god places the foundation"; Ba-u-egir, "Bau is behind"; En-zu-egir-su, "Enzu is behind the hand"; Nannar-maš-egir, "Nannar is behind the prince"; Kal-ama-mu, "Kal is my mother" or "my love"; Nin-mar-ti-igi-di, "Ninmar lifts up the eyes"; Nin-mar-ti-mah-kal-la, "Ninmar exalts the humble man"; Ba-u-lugal-gi-gi, "Bau is faithful queen", or "queen of the faithful"; Ba-u-tur-gid, "Bau makes the short tall"; Ka-Ba-u-dū, "The word of Bau exalts".

Several names are formed on the analogy of the Biblical Micah (מיכא, "who is like Yahu?") and Michael (מיכאל, "who is like God?"). Thus we have A-ba-Nin-gir-su-šim, "Who is like Ningirsu?" and A-ba-Dun-gi-šim, "Who is like the god Dungi?" The question is sometimes shortened by leaving the šim — "like" to be understood, as in A-ba-En-ki, "Who is like Enki?" and A-ba-Nin-gir-su.

Sometimes the name is a prayer, as Utu-ha-rug, "May Utu increase!"; Ininni-ha-zal, "May Ininni be great!" Gu (or)

1 Erroneously read in my name-list Utu-sik-ki.
Ka-4Ba-u-ma, “Speak, O Bau, the name”; 4Ininni-zi-zi, “O Ininni, give life!” 1 Sometimes the name alludes to the attitude of a god to the general welfare, as 4Utu-uru-na, “Utu exalts the city” 2; 4Kal-uru-na, “Kal exalts the city”. The name 4Ba-u-uru is probably of the same meaning, only the na has been omitted. In the same class belongs the name 4Sig-kam-pa-te-si, “The wool-god the Patesi cultivates”.

Sometimes a name expresses the intercession of one god with another. Thus 4Nin-gir-su-zid-da-šagiše 4Nina-ta means “Ningirsu brings the blessing from Nina”.

Sometimes it expresses the aid which one god gives another; this is the case in the name 4Ur-4Kal-ma-du-4Na-ru-a, in which the du might also be read gin or gub, and which means “Servant of Kal, who brings (or establishes) Narua”.

Another series of names indicates a tendency to fuse deities together. Thus we have 4Ur-4Utu-nigin-4Nin-gir-su, “Servant of Utu (who is) the totality of Ningirsu”; 4Ur-4Ba-u-4Šur-mê, “Servant of Bau (who is) the god Shur”; 4Ur-4Iš-4Ba-u, “Servant of Ish (who is) Bau”; 4Gâl-4Ur-4Āšaru, Man of Ur (who is) Asharu”. It must be said, however, that this tendency has not gone far.

The deification of Dungi and Bur-Sin left its traces in the proper names of the period. Thus we have 4Ur-4Bur-4En-su, “Servant of Bur-Sin” and 4Dun-gi-iš-4Umun-gal, “The divine Dungi is the mountain of the great divine lord” 3.

The names compounded with Dungi are especially laudatory. For example, one man bore the name 4Nin-gir-su-a-taḫ-4Dun-gi, “Ningirsu is the helper of the god Dungi”; another, the name 4Dun-gi-uru-mu, “The god Dungi is my city” 4 — a sentiment not unlike that of Ps. 90:1: “Lord, thou hast been our dwelling place”.

Another bore the name 4Dun-gi-nitah-gin, “The god Dungi increases men”, or “weighs men”. Still another was called 4Tab-4Dun-gi-4Nannar, “The god Dungi is equal to Nannar”.

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1 Which might also be translated “Ininni is life”.
2 Na is here taken in the sense of elû (cf. Barton, Origin of Babylonian Writing, no. 71 10). It might be taken as the suffix (no. 71 12); the name would then become “Utu is his city”. In that case these names would be of the type of 4Dun-gi-uru-mu, mentioned below.
3 Perhaps the mu here means “be high” (Barton, op. cit. no, 62 19), in which case this name would belong to the class of 4Utu-uru-na.
One pay roll (HLC, 10; cf. II, 53) contains no less than ten men, into whose names Dungi as a god entered as an element. Four of these were sons of a certain Ba-ba-a. They were Gâl-a-Dun-gi, "Man of Dungi"; a Dun-gi-hé-gâl, "The god Dungi is a great blessing"; a Dun-gi-ra-kalam-ma, "the people are for the god Dungi"; and a Dun-gi-kalam-ma-hi-lî-bi, "The god Dungi — the people are his delight". Three others, the name of whose father is lost, were a Dun-gi-a-du-kalam-ma, "The god Dungi is the prince of the people"; a Dun-gi-à-nital, "The god Dungi is the reward of men"; a Dun-gi-ki-har-sag, "The god Dungi is like a mountain", or "inhabits a mountain". A certain A-tu mentioned in the same tablet named his son Ka-
a Dun-gi-ib-ta-â, "The word of the god Dungi goes forth from him"; while another named Lugal-gal-ušum named his two sons, Ama-a Dun-gi-e-a Ur-ru, "The mother of the god Dungi is the goddess Urru"; and a Dun-gi-u-nam-ti, "The god Dungi is the food of life". Could laudation of a living monarch go further? It is a rare collection of synchopantic praise to be collected in one pay roll! One wonders whether this group of men were especially favored by the king.

There is one name which is peculiar. It is šag-gar-zu-erim, "In the midst of thy food is a slave". It is probably addressed to a god, and indicates that the bearer is among the devotees of the deity from whose bounty he lives. Either the parent who gave this name had a sense of humor or he was a literalist as utterly lacking humor as some of the Puritans who gave their children names consisting of long sentences.

One name is puzzling. I have read it Bib-ur-sal, "The priest is a man-woman". Ur may have the meaning "dog" = "Sodomite" as in Deut. 23, 19, in which case the name would mean "The priest is a female dog", or "is a bitch"! The term ur-sal is probably of similar significance to the sal-zikru of the code of Hammurapi, which occurs in §§ 178, 180, etc., and designates a class of women devoted to a god.

Twelve years ago the writer claimed on the ground of the character of the deities and the mythology that the substratum of the civilization of southern Babylonia was Semitic.¹ Later Eduard Meyer² adduced more convincing proof of this

¹ Semitic Origins, 1902, 195 ff.
² Sumerier und Semiten in Babylonien, 1906.
from the evidence of the art, showing that the gods of the Sumerians in southern Babylonia were fashioned after the models of Semitic culture and that therefore the Semites must have been first in the country. The evidence of these proper names adds another bit of proof which tends to establish the same position. It is hardly possible that so many names should correspond to Semitic models — models which are found all over the Semitic area — had not the Semites been in Babylonia first. If the gods worshipped there by the Sumerians were Semitic, and the Semites formed the bulk of the population, this phenomenon is explicable, but on any other hypothesis it is very difficult to explain.
Striking Phenomena of Sumerian. — By J. Dyneley Prince, Ph. D., Professor in Columbia University, New York City.

Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, in his recent work *Sumerische Sprachlehre für Nichtassyriologen*, Leipzig, 1914, § 5; § 14, mentions several peculiarities of Sumerian regarding which he invites comment and comparison with similar phenomena in other languages. In the following paper, the two most important features to which he alludes will be briefly discussed; viz., A. the multiplicity of meanings associated with single sound-values; and B. the abbreviation of verbal roots.

A. Multiplicity of Meanings.

One of the most striking characteristics of the Sumerian syllabary is the existence of a great number of words, apparently identical in sound, yet differing widely in signification; a problem which Delitzsch makes little attempt to explain in the work just mentioned, or in his *Sumerische Grammatik* (Leipzig, 1914), or *Sumerisches Glossar* (Leipzig, 1914). It is evident, however, that many of these varying meanings must have been distinguished from one another in speech, as their sense-divergence precludes the possibility that they could have been pronounced alike. For example, Delitzsch calls attention to the fact that the syllables *aš* ‘one’ and *aš* ‘six’ could not possibly have had the same vocalic value, and hints that there must have existed in the spoken idiom “vocalic nuances” which the cuneiform writing was not fitted to express.¹ Such a supposition is perfectly reasonable, so far as it goes, but, as will appear from the following pages, there are other elements to be taken into consideration as well.

In MSL,² I have alluded to the necessity of supposing that

¹ *Sumerische Grammatik*, p. 14, d.
² *Materials for a Sumerian Lexicon*, p. XIX; XXI.
tones must have existed in primitive Sumerian, as in the system prevailing in spoken Chinese; but, while this theory still seems necessary as an aid in accounting for the kaleidoscopic nature of the Sumerian syllabary, it is not in itself sufficient to explain all the variations; first, because the different meanings attached to a syllable frequently exceed the possible, or at any rate probable, number of tones, and secondly, because syllables are often abbreviations of longer originals, a fact which would tend to change the vowel shading or quantity, rather than the tone. This becomes apparent from an examination of almost any sound-value showing a number of meanings.

For instance, Delitzsch mentions the syllable aš — ‘one’ and also — ‘six’, but this value aš seems to have served for seven distinct ideas, divisible into three sign-groups.¹

I. aš — the horizontal wedge.

1. aš = ędu ‘one’; ỉšēn ‘one’; gitmālu ‘perfect’, which latter is evidently a secondary meaning from the idea ‘one’, ‘unique’; hence also = magāru ‘agree’ and mitxaru ‘be alike’ (see just below sub No. 5 in this list). There can be no doubt that maš = asāridu ‘first’ also belongs to this association, which maš must have been pronounced waš = aš.

2. aš ‘stretch out; direct’: šu aš-ni, or me-ri aš-ni = tirig gātišu (or šeptih) ‘the stretching out of his hand’ (or ‘foot’) Probably this idea of direction also appears in gar-aš ‘decision’; literally ‘making one’, or ‘making a direction’ (order).

3. aš ‘man’, which may be rhotacism for ur ‘man’ (cf. uš and eš (GI) = ‘man’), or else, in this case, the horizontal may have been pronounced dīl[i], also = ‘man’, or it may have been read ru as a metathesis for ur ‘man’. Note in this connection that aš and ru both = gitmālu ‘perfect’.

4. aš occurs in the combination aš-buluj ‘hasten very much’; as Delitzsch suggests, for a = ID ‘power’ + KU = š(u) postposition = ‘with power’; hence ‘exceedingly’.

II. aš = Aš.

5. aš = çibitu ‘desire’ (n.); = xašāšu ‘need, want’ (vb.). This sense seems to be a development from aš — horizontal wedge — magāru ‘agree’ (above in No. 1).

¹ Materials, p. IX, on sign-groups.
6. aš = *iritu* ‘curse’ (n.); = ezeru ‘curse’ (vb.), apparently an extension of the sense ‘desire’ (No. 5), i.e. ‘desire’ + ‘evil’ understood.

III. aš = Six-Sign.

7. aš = ‘six’, given by Delitzsch as necessarily pronounced with a vowel different to that in aš ‘one’ (No. 1). aš = ‘six’, however, is plainly for i(a) ‘five’ + aš ‘one’; cf. i-min ‘seven’ = ‘five and two’; us ‘eight’ = i(a) + eš ‘five and three’, with a change of the written vowel;1 i-lim ‘nine’ = ‘five and four’. The initial palatalized i was undoubtedly a weak consonant, as is seen also in Semitic Babylonian verbs, as in iskun = *iškun*, which may really have been pronounced *yiskun*.

It is difficult to analyze satisfactorily even such a brief table of meanings as the above, according to vocalic pronunciation and tone, because there are so many elements of possible difference which do not depend either upon the vowels or the tone. Of the seven sense-values just given, the equivalents aš ‘man’ and aš ‘six’ leave us in doubt as to whether aš ‘man’ was really pronounced aš. Here it must be remembered that aš, eš and uš all appear in the sense ‘man’, and also that there are in Sumerian many other such values, similar to each other in sound, yet identical in meaning. Such are laš-luš ‘wash’; ġad-ūd ‘be bright’; nu-nu ‘lie down’, etc. where exactly the same meaning appears with apparently quite a different vowel (Delitzsch, *Sprachlehre*, § 6). One is tempted to wonder, on examining such equivalents as these, whether some of the vowels in spoken Sumerian were not often obscure and indeterminate,2 as, for example, in modern Algonquin Indian idioms. In such a word as Passamaquoddy *'mūs* ‘dog’, there is really only one clear vowel; the ū, and this word has been variously represented by English speaking recorders as *almoos*; *elemoos*; *ulumoos*. A similar difficulty may well have been present in Sumerian speech, which may give an additional key to the variant writings of syllables which may have the same or allied meanings. On the other hand, all vowels were certainly not indistinct, as we have *zu* ‘know’, which is probably etymologically connected with *su-a = nabū* ‘make known,

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2 Almost like the Scheund; cf. *da-dū-dū*, all = ‘seize’ (*galātu*).
announce, name'. Furthermore, in connection with aš 'man', we are in doubt, as indicated above, as to whether it may not have been pronounced not aš, but dīl(i), or ru. As to aš 'six' = jaš, this syllable may really have been uttered jaš, even when written aš, the j being a very 'weak palatal',¹ as noted above sub No. 7. The same principle seems to apply to aš 'one', as the form maš = waš occurs in the sense 'first'. The common ordinal 'first' was ušu which must have been pronounced differently to ušu 'thirty', plainly from uš 'three', a harmonic obscuration ² of eš 'three' + u 'ten'. This maš 'first' must have been uttered waš, and here again it may be conjectured that aš 'one', even when written aš, may have been spoken waš, although with a very weak initial w-. In later speech, (w)aš 'one' and j(aš) 'six' may also have developed a short and a long pronunciation respectively. An almost parallel phenomenon appears in Magyar numerals, where tízenegy ('ten and one' = egy) 'eleven' must be carefully distinguished in pronunciation from tízenégy ('ten and four' = négy) 'fourteen'. It should also be noted that there are three meanings connected with aš 'one', i. e., 'one; perfect; agree', which, although allied in sense, may also have varied tonally; cf. in Chinese the three Mandarin tones mo; viz., mo¹ 'feel, touch'; mo² 'grind, rub'; mo³ 'rub out, obliterate', where there are certainly three tones used to distinguish variations of one and the same fundamental idea, while a fourth mo⁴ = 'afterwards, at last'.

Of the four remaining aš-values; viz., aš 'direct, stretch'; aš in the combination a = ID + s(u); aš 'desire' and aš 'curse', these may have been distinguished tonally. Yet even here, it is not necessary to suppose four tones, as there are, for example, in English, a number of similar sounding words differing in meaning yet perfectly comprehensible by context without any tone differentiation or vowel shading; cf. "the mine is mine"; "I know that that 'that' is demonstrative"; "for four"; "so, sew, sow"; "fine" = "delicate"; = "magnificent"; "pay a fine", etc. Examples of such accidental sound resemblance may be drawn from any language.

¹ Palatalized j appears very weakly in Russian before i-vowels as in oni 'they', which is not pronounced fully oni. This does not appear at all in Servian oni, where there is no palatalization at all.
It will be sufficient to choose only one other example, in order to demonstrate the difficulties of the Sumerian word-list. Thus *du* (DU) = ‘walk, go,’ but as *di* also = ‘go’ this would seem to show that the vowel in this case was probably  weiber; *du* = ‘hold, carry’; expressed by *šu-du* ‘carry in the hand’, no doubt an extension of the ‘go’-meaning of *du* (DU), as many Sumerian verbs may be used both transitively and intransitively; as *te* ‘approach’ and ‘bring near’; *ē* ‘go out’ and ‘bring out’; *tu* ‘enter’ and ‘bring in’, etc. Closely connected with the ‘carry’-idea is *du* = ‘lift up’, as in *našû šu ēni* ‘lift up the eyes’; *kullû ša ṭēši* ‘raise the head’.

Also from the go-motion-idea must come the equation *du* (UL) = ‘throw down; shove, push’, a sense found likewise with *ru* (UL) which is probably etymologically connected with this *du*. Delitzsch also gives *šu* ‘overpower’ as being a possible connection here, but *šu* meant originally ‘cover’ and corresponds with this sense of *du* only secondarily, and not etymologically. Here, however, really must belong *tu* = *tug* ssplit, loosen’, whence *nam-du* ‘freedom’ = ‘looseness’, and possibly also *du* ‘make bricks’, from the idea ‘throw down, spread’.

Hence also *du* = *ēpû* ‘bake’ and *pixû* ‘mend with bitumen’.

A number of the *du*-values are shortened forms of longer roots, as, just above *du* = *tug*, and *du* = *dul* (TUL) ‘chamber’, whence *du* = *nigîçû* ‘ravine, hole’; *du* = *dug* (KA) peak’; *du* = *dug* (KAK; RU) ‘make, construct’, explained by the value *du-u*, but this KAK = *du* was also pronounced *ru* (*d* = *r*). Delitzsch thinks that such writings as *du-* indicated a shading rather than a lengthening of the vowel, but this seems improbable, as, in the case just cited of *du* and *di*, both = ‘go’, the *di* plainly indicated an Um-laut of the possibly earlier *u*, and yet this value *du* is explained both by the prolonged *du-u* and by *du* (DU = KA-KA = *dabābu* ‘meditate’). The likelihood is that doubled vowels indicated long vowels just as in German *Boot, Loos*, etc. Many illustrations of this principle may be drawn from the Assyrian as *rābu-u* plainly = *rābû* (cf. all the Assyrian verbs “Final He”).

It is difficult to explain why *du* (UL) should be equated with *asâmû* ‘be comely, seemly’, unless it be an erroneous asso-

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1 That is, by *du* with no evidence of vocalic prolongation.

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cation with $du = dug$ (XI) ‘good, be good’. The UL sign does not lend itself to this signification. Similarly $du = ki$ ‘land’ was possibly due to an association with $du = paxaru$ ‘gather, assemble’; $napxaru$ ‘totality’.

Such lists as the above are sufficient to convince the student that we have two difficulties to meet in considering the Sumerian syllabary: 1. the association of many meanings with the same sound-value; and 2. the less frequent, but nonetheless evident, association of variant sound-values with identical meanings, as indicated above ($la\tilde{a}-lu\tilde{a}$, etc.). The following six principles must be understood in order to untangle the Sumerian syllabary. 1. Roots are often shortened from longer roots, as above $du$, worn down from $dul$, $dug$, $tug$. 2. There was occasionally a distinction by means of tones as in Chinese, as indicated in the above commentary on the $a\tilde{s}$-words and possibly also in the $du$-list, between $d\tilde{u}$ ‘go, move’; $du$ ‘push’; $du$ ‘bake bricks’ and $du$ ‘raise’. 3. There must also have been vowel shading, as $du$, $di = du$ ‘go’ and its probable derivatives: $du$ ‘push; spread bricks’ and ‘raise’ (‘move’). This may well have been a simultaneous phenomenon with tone variation. 4. Often there may have been no distinction in sound at all, as in the similar sounding words in English cited above. 5. Paronomasia based on erroneous association of signs played a great part, as pointed out in MSL at length; cf. in the $du$-list: $\hat{d}u$ (UL) = $as\tilde{a}mu$ ‘be seemly’, transferred to the sign UL (val. $du$) from the sign XI (val. $du$ ‘be good’). 6. Distinctions must have been made, as in Chinese, by means of combinations which fixed the meaning of the ambiguous syllable.

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1 That is, there may have been and probably were $d\tilde{u}$-tones and $du$-tones.

2 Materials, p. IX. Paronomastic association of Sumerian words with similar sounding Semitic words, as $e-me = amat\tilde{u}$ ‘word’, was probably largely mnemonic.

3 In Chinese, such defining words are common, where the first word serves to limit the special meaning of the second; thus, ‘milk-skin’ = ‘cream’; ‘fire-leg’ = ‘ham’. Better, chih tao ‘know the way’, but now used for ‘know’, in general. There are great numbers of such two-word phrases and also a system of numeratives (Giles, Encyclopaedia Brit. VI, p. 217), such as also exist in English, as ‘piece, pair, brace’. In Old English numeratives of this sort were much more common; as ‘a sounder of boar’; ‘a pride of lions’. We still distinguish between ‘a herd of cattle’, ‘a flock of sheep’, ‘a flight of geese’, etc.
as dam = 'conjux' but dam-dam 'young married person'; nita-dam = the same; di 'judgment' and di-kud = the same; literally: 'cut (kud) a decree' (di). Di alone was an indeterminate root as to meaning. Thus, it might mean 'go' = du; 'speak' = du = dug (KA), but di-kud or di-kuru could only mean 'judge, decree'. Thus, also šu-du 'carry in the hands' (šu) = 'carry by excellence. Šu-du was only thus combined to show that this was the du = 'carry' and not 'go'; dab-du 'go at someone's side', etc. Examples of this system may be multiplied by a study of Delitzsch's Glossar or my MSL. According to Giles (Encycl. Brit., VI, p. 217), there are thirty-three instances of the Chinese syllable shih with different meanings, which are distinguished, not only by tones, but by indicative combinations, the same in principle as the above.

Sumerian suffered much from being used as a sacred idiom by an utterly alien people. The difficulties of its syllabary were greatly increased by misunderstandings of signs and false groupings owing to paronomastic associations of sound values. Upon this fact too little stress has been laid by recent Sumerologists. This punning association must have become more and more frequent as Sumerian ceased to be a spoken language and the bewildering result gave rise to the not unnatural Haléyvan theory, that this was not a language at all, but a mere jumble of priestly inversions and rearrangements, similar, although this was not quoted, to the plays made by the ancient Irish monks on the Erse of their day. So apparent did this seem at first that Delitzsch himself believed for a time in the "cryptogram" theory, which has long since been disproved by indisputable grammatical evidences.

B. Abbreviated Roots.

The occurrence in Sumerian of a great number of roots which have lost their original consonant, which consonant reappears before a vowel ending is certainly strange, but not without linguistic parallel. Thus, we find in Sumerian du 'speak', but dug-ga-mu 'when I speak' = dug-a-mu. In his Sumerische Sprachlehre, p. 9, Delitzsch gives a quantity of such examples, such as pa(b) 'brother'; ša(y) 'heart'; u(d) 'day', etc. If we were to find the French phrases: les frères

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1 This = dug (KA) + vowel of prolongation + mu = 1 p. ending.
sont là and les frères sont ici written: lè frèr soñ la and lè frèr soñ-t-isi, precisely the same phenomenon would be evident. Furthermore, in Celtic, particularly in Welsh and Irish, such consonantal changes as Welsh pen ‘head’, butfy mhen ‘my head’; Irish bo ‘cow’, but ar m-bo (pron. mo) ‘our cow’ come from an original nasal in the possessive which affected the succeeding consonant, but which totally disappeared graphically from the possessive particle. In Eastern Algonquinn also, the final -l of the third personal accusative (obviative), which appears in Passamaquoddy skitap-y-il ‘man’ has been quite lost in the kindred Canadian Abenaki alnôba-a ‘man’, a process of decay which may be observed taking place in the Penobscot of Maine, where this -l survives only as the faintest lingual touch, often inaudible even to a trained ear. The probability is that in Sumerian, even at first, the final consonants were pronounced very lightly, unless followed by a vowel. This phonetic peculiarity gave rise to the current eclipsis in the later language. It is, however, striking that the older form with the consonant was often written apparently contemporaneously with the shorter and later form, as nitaj, nita and nid ‘male, man; suğuš and suğ foundation, etc.

It is tempting to try to see in Sumerian ma-e (wa-e = wâ?) T a resemblance to the Chinese wù of the first person; in Sumerian za-e = zā (?) the counterpart of the Turkish sen ‘thou’; to compare Sumerian dingir (dimer) ‘god’ with Turkish tangri ‘god’, but, owing to the many confusing forces which contributed to its formation, Sumerian stands alone as a prehistoric philological remnant. Its etymologies should be studied only in the light which can be got from the Sumerian inscriptions themselves. On the other hand, it is permissible to seek analogies for striking Sumerian phonetic and grammatical peculiarities in known languages, without attempting to establish a linguistic affinity between Sumerian and any of these idioms on the basis of what are probably only accidental resemblances, such as occur between many unconnected linguistic groups.

1 Delitzsch, Sumerische Sprachlehre, § 14.
Indo-Iranian Word-Studies (ii). — By EDWIN W. FAY, Professor in the University of Texas.

1) Old Persian māniyam ‘estate’.

1. The origin of Old Persian māniyam is still as dubious as when it was treated by Gray in AJPh. 21. 17, where the derivation from the sept of μάνοι ‘maneo’ was relinquished for the comparison with Av. nmāna, but Gothic damāna: δάμω, Lat. domus. Gray renders by ‘real estate’ (L. c. p. 16) and Bartholomae by ‘liegende habe’, and this seems to be the most probable rendering. It coincides the more nearly with derivation from the root men. Analysis of the Latin compounds (for they are not derivatives) in -mōnium | -mōnia will serve to prove that māniyam meant ‘abode, estate’, precisely the definition that I gave to -mōnium in AJPh. 31, 410. The words fall into the following larger groups:

2. A. Business words (-mōnium = estate, property): patri- monium (not till Cicero, but surely early) ‘father’s-estate, -property’; merci-monium (Plautus) ‘trade, wares’, but in Most. 904, 912 specifically of a house-trade; original sense was ‘trade-property, stock in trade’. A vadi-monium (Plautus) was a ‘stake’ or ‘forfeit’ (vadi-: Goth. wadi ‘forfeit’) consisting of ‘realty’; or vadi-monium was the ‘surety’s property’. By irradiation from vadi-monium came testi-monium, of that which the witnesses ‘put up’; unless -monium originally referred to the sum put up by the litigants in support of the truth of their cause—which would include the truth not only of the litigant’s own statement, but the truth of his witness as well. In ali-monium (Plautus), while we may perhaps feel -monium as ‘maintenance’, the definition as ‘food-property’ (what one was to spend for food) balances merci-monium as ‘stock-in-

1 It may be noted here that the root men also has derivatives meaning ‘dwelling, abode’, viz. νοσος; and Lith. namin nāmas (falsa ap. Walde, s. v. domus).

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trade'. So *parsi-monia* was the 'saved-stock' or, reinforcing the original sense, 'what remained as savings'. From the neut. pl. *parsimonia* would come the fem. sg. = 'saving, frugality'.

3. B. Abstracts (*-mōnium* = 'estate, condition'): The transition to this group may have been formed by *matri-monium* 'mother's-estate', cf. *in matrimonium dare*, in contrast with *matrimonio uxorem exigere* (though the sense of 'dame's abode' might inhere in both these Plautine turns). A further transition to the abstract suffix *-monia* (*-monium*) might have been supplied by some jocular formation like *falsimonia* (cf. Plautus, *Bacch. 541, reperiuntur falsi falsimoniis* with *Rud. 13, falsas lites falsis testimoniis*). But the abstract sense of 'estate, condition' suits all the adjective derivatives, e.g. Plautine *aegrimonia* 'sick-estate'; *tristimonia* (Novius) 'sad (or angry) estate' (cf. Plautine *aerimonia* 'bitterness, anger'), with the late counterterm *gaudimonium* (Petronius). *Laberius* (ap. *Non. 214, 17*) employed *miseri-monium* for *miseria* and *Gellius* (16. 7. 2) seems to censure him for inventing *mendici-monium* 'beggary' and *moechi-monium* 'adultery'. By considering the three examples together we may realize the important rôle of a single author in spreading the vogue of a suffix. Of course *moechi-monium* may have been suggested by *matrimonium*, or by *castimonium* or *sanctimonia*. Extensions like *queri-monia* (Cicero) would belong in a group with *tristimonia* and *gaudimonium*; like *caerimonia* 'sanctity' (then 'awe, rite'), with the *castimonia* group. An apparent estray like (deorum) *sessimonium* (Vitr. *vius*) 'assembly' might be explained, if genuinely old, as 'sitzen-bleiben' or, after *curia* 'aedificium; senatus', as a 'session (-abode').

4. The above classification of the Latin words involved proves, it is submitted, the verbal entity of *-mōnium* (*-mōnia*) with the definition 'estate', 1st concrete, = 'abode, property'; 2d abstract, = 'condition, state': Thus *-mōnium* seems to me nearly as well attested by *OPers. māniyam* 'property' as the original verbal entity of *Eng. dōm* (in *OEng. cyme-dōm* 'kingdom', abstr. *ealdordōm* 'authority', see Wright’s *OEng. Gram. § 597*) is proved by *dōm* 'judgement', *OHG. tuon* 'state, condition'.

2) Gen. plur., type of asmā'kam.

5. The material (with a slight addition) and the theory of these forms are found combined in Jackson’s Avesta Grammar, § 440, n. 3.

Observe that āhmā'kam, yavā'kam, yuśmā'kam <Gathic. xēmākom> employed as ‘genitives’ of the personal pronouns..., are really stereotyped cases of the possessive adjectives, as similarly in Sanskrit asmā'kam, yuś'kū, yuśmā'kam.

Besides these “stereotyped” forms we have in both languages possessives regularly inflected from the ka-stem, cf. OBulg. svoya-kū ‘affinis’ (Brugmann, Gr. 2. 1. 498). Further explanation of the forms may be found in Brugmann, Gr. 2. 2, § 398sq.

6. The reason for stereotyping the neuter (accusative) singular in -kam has never been given, and there is no reason that can be given. On the other hand, the forms inflected on a stem asmā'ka- grew up secondarily to asmā'kam, as in Latin the obvius paradigm arose from ob viam. I shall undertake now to show that the -kam of asmā'kam is identical with the -cum of Lat. mecum, the hitherto unexplained ā before kam being an instrumental case vowel. This involves the demonstration how in Indo-Iranian “mecum” has sunk to “meum”.

7. Delbrück, ai. Synt. p. 204, remarks:

höchstens finde ich zu bemerken, daß die Gen. überwiegend in possessivem sinne erscheinen, also bei nomina, oder as bhū...yuśmā'kam stets und asmā'kam meistens (es kommt außerdem vor bei ċru hören <²º> und parikhya vernachlässigen <¹º>.

8. A reference to Grassmann’s index will show that the number of nouns used with asmā'kam is great, and their distribution such as not to favor the notion that the neuter form was in a position to overpower (and “stereotype”) the rest. In the somewhat chaotic character of Avestan syntax, āhmā'kom may have the look of enjoying a wider casual range than asmā'kam, though really it does not.

9. The examples of predicative asmā'kam in RV.—yuś'kū (incorrectly accented by Brugmann, l. s. c.) and yuśmā'kam (10º, according to the Bombay index) are not predicative—here rendered into Latin by ‘nobiscum’, as well as by the appropriate forms of ‘noster’, are as follows:

1. 7. 10 (Arnold’s A period), repeated in 1. 13. 10 (B): asmā'kam astu ke'valah= nobiscum (noster) sit solus.
1. 27. 2 (A), midhāṅ a. babhāyat = largus nobiscum (noster) fuat.
4. 22. 10 (A), a. sū M. bodhi godāḥ = nobiscum (noster) bene O M.,
fu bovidans.
7. 51. 2 (A), a. santu bhāvanasya gopāḥ | pibantu sōmam ávase no adyā
= nobiscum (nostri) suntu mundi custodes | bibunto vinum iuvare nos
nodie.
8. 54. 8 (A), tvām a. Č = tu <sis> nobiscum (noster), O Č.
8. 92. 31 (A), tvām a., táva smasi = tu nobiscum (noster), tui sumus.

This is all. Every example is early Vedic. In every instance,
if we do not turn our adjectives by substantives, ‘nobiscum’
is perhaps even a better rendering than ‘noster’.

10. If the above renderings do not show the reader how
original ‘nobiscum’ (a moribund predicate; cf. Lat. frugi, in
a general way) shifted to ‘noster’, the following Latin examples,
wherein ‘mecum’ approximates ‘meus’, may be noted:

Ovid. Am. 3. 1. 41, sum levis et mecum (meus) levis est .. Cupido;
Lucan, 8, 143, numeri quod adhuc mecumst (meumst); Propertius,
2, 18, 51, nobiscum (vestra) est Iope, nobiscum candida Tyro; Plautus,
Cas. 451, erit hodie tecum (tuum) quod amas, cf. Ovid. Met. 3, 466;
quod cupio mecum (meum) est; Cicero, Phil. 12. 23, nobiscum (noster)
nec animo certe est nec corpore; Fin. 5, 86, <discipulus> erit mecum
(meus), si tecum (tuus) erit, cf. Lig. 33, nos omnes adversarios putari
nisi qui nobiscum essent; te omnes, qui contra te non essent, tu os.
Examples of things: Plautus, Aul. 449, hoc .. quoquo ibo, mecum (meum)
erit; Pacuvius, Trag. 424, topfer tecum (tua) sit potestas; Terence,
Ad. 347, si infinitas ibit, testis mecum (meus) est, anulus; Phorm. 983,
uma iniurias tecum (tua); Vergil, Aen. 4, 115, mecum (meus) erit iste
labor; Epist. Sapph. 103, nil de te mecumst (meumst); cf. Livy,
postquam .. victoria cum Poenis (Poenorum) erat.

The possessive force of the -kom groups led to their
adjectivization (stem ko-), and put them in competition with the
genitive. Hence by syncretism of *mā-ka-s ‘meus’ (cf. svaka-s
meus, tuus, suus’) and māma ‘mei’ there arose the possessives
māma-ka-s (20 in RV.) and māma-kā-s (30), cf. tvāvā-kā-s
‘tuus’. In Greek γυναξ-ας, originally = ‘muliebris, femininus’
(I suggest), we have the adjectivization of loc. *γυνατ + *kom
§§ 15-16) 1. Also in loc. pl. γυνατ-ι the posterius is from
ks[w]-i (loc.: ξ-ν, acc.), attached to a locative prius (as in
πους, Skr. hāste-ṣu; see TAPA 44, § 2). We have perfect
analogies in other tongues, as e.g. in Osmanli, for the origin
of the case suffixes in postponed prepositions.

1 If, as I maintain, *kom is from *[s]k[w]-o-m and ξ-ν from *sku-m
(the root sekw, sekw = sequi) then *[s]k[w]o (§ 16, fn.) is like παρός
as co- (from *[s]k[w]o) is like πάρο.
11. Thus Vedic usage and general semantic propriety admit of our explaining the asmā'kam type as parallel, when we look to the point of origin, with the mecum type. Further objective considerations that support the equation of -kam with -cum (IE kom) lie in the existence of asmāka (19), yusmā'ka (20), wherein -ka is to be matched with Latin co-; and the -ā before -ka(m), as has been noted above, is best explained as an instrumental case ending.—IE ko- may perhaps be found in Vkām (i.e. ko+am) ‘amare’.

12. We must also seek to account for -ku in yuvāku ‘vestrum duorum’. Its vocalism proves to be in entire accord with the derivation of kom as I have elsewhere sketched it (AJPh, 33, 197; Bull. Univ. Texas, no. 263, § 66). I have there conjectured an IE preposition sku, whence (in the form ksu) ĺō-v: Lith. sū; and a fuller form skw-om / skw-o (like pro: per). In OLat. quom (Welsh pwy) we have [s]kwom, with s- lost precisely in (IE) combinations like nobis(s)k[w]om. Alternating with kwom we have k[w]om (see Brugmann, Gr. 2. 2. § 665, 1). Evidence for [s]ku- I now see in yuvā-ku’1; and, as I am showing more fully elsewhere, in Lat. qu-aes-o, i.e. ‘co-aerusco’ (see also Bull. Univ. Texas, l. s. c.).

3) Postponed ka’m.

13. As we look further about us we find ka’m quasi ‘gratia’ following upon datives of purpose (RV). This ka’m has been connected with OBulg. kū (Brugmann, Gr. 2. 2. § 668) and Irish co ‘to’. If we bear in mind the cognition of ka’m with secundum (see above, § 121), this kam ‘gratia’; e.g. in amr’tāya ka’m ‘immortalitatis gratia’ and ka’smāi ka’m ‘quaia gratia’, may be compared with Lat. secundum nostram causam = ‘nostra gratia’. In the example amr’tāya ka’m, [s]kam looks as though it may have been an infinitive, = ‘for immortality to follow’. In Brugmann’s first Slavic example, pristapiže kū n-jemu ‘sie

1 The connection of skw with the root of [z]pom is undoubted. Instead of positing a root sekw, dissyllabic sekū (in secū-tus), perhaps we should rather deal in [z]pom with IE sekw-. Because of [z]pom with -π- appearing to match -ψv in Skr. a’ce- we have accustomed ourselves to think that, given IE -kw-, we must expect -π- in Greek from -kw-, and likewise some doubled consonant from -kw-.

In view, however, of Lat. vacca (Skr. vaca’), with its clearly hypochoristic -cc- (cf. Engl. “Bossy”), it may be that [z]pom also has hypochoristic -π-. Note proper names like "[z]pom."
traten zu ihm hin' kū n- is not unlike 'sequi' in 'pergunt sequi eum'. The abstract datives with ka'm are also semantically suggestive of Lat. cum commodo (tu), cf. σὺν τῷ σῷ ἀγαθῷ.

4) The infixes ka- and ku-

14. The study, after asmā-kam, of the Sanskrit (i.e. IE) suffix ka- | ku-, yields a suprisingly simple interpretation of this group of words, viz. as containing in their suffix a posterius meaning 'with'. The examples are easily controlled in Edgerton's Hopkins dissertation on the ka-suffix. I will begin with his 3ka as used in Bāhuvrīhis (Edg. §§ 12, 53-55). All Sanskritists know that the "bare-foot" type of compound is frequently extended at the end by -ka. In RV. we have try'-amba-ka-m (acc.) 'tres-matres-habentem', but originally 'ter-matre-cum', let us say; also tri'-kadru-ka- designating a three-jar festival (orig. 'ter-cado-cum', let us say). A.V. adds sv-asta-kā- 'bona-domo-cum', sarva-keṣa-ka- 'omni-capillo-cum' and, doubling the 'with', saha'-kantha-ka- 'co-gula-cum'. Edgerton accidentally renders by 'with the throat', just as Whitney (Gr. 1222. c) renders rū'pa-ka- by 'with form'. These unpurposed renderings reveal the close connection between the sense of 'cum' and of 'habens' (cf. ἔγγρον 'cum'). The appositeness of -cum may be tested also in words like RV. hādika- 'refreshing', i.e. 'with refreshment', citti-kā- 'cooling': cītam 'frost' (Edgerton's 4 ka, § 56, containing 5 words only; there remain a'nta-ka- 'Death' [AV.], i.e. 'fine-cum', yācana-ka- 'mendicant', i.e. 'prece-cum'; vimanyu-ka- 'allaying wrath', containing* manyu-ka- 'ira-cum').

For Latin examples wherein turns with cum approximate "possessive" derivatives cf. from Plautus (Am. 330 and) Poen. 852, cum onere (sc. homini)=onustus; Mil, 1021, cum hac forma=tam formosus; Cu, 286, cum tanta gloria=tam gloriosus.

15. Possibly the priora of these -ka words also sometimes exhibit instrumental form (§ 11). Thus we find (Edg. § 29, c) pracala-ka- 'chameleon', prius *pracalā 'creeping' (noun): praca-la- 'serpens' (adj.); patā-ka- 'banner', prius patā- 'cloth' (cf. patī 'stripe'), i.e. 'with a rag' (designating the pole + the "rag"). In pr'dā-ku- (Edg. § 29. a; note ku- not ka-) 'serpent' (also 'panther', lexical) the prius was [s]pr'dā- quasi 'macula', cognate with (σπόραθος | σπόραθαρν 'pill, pellet' (σπόραθ- 'scattered?'). Thus pr'dā-ku- = macula-cum, i.e. 'maculosus'.
Çyâmâ-ka- ‘millet’ = (grano) atro-cum, of the black variety. Cf. Lat. pâni-cum ‘with a tuft’ (panus). Of priora in i to i-stems (Edg. §§ 31-32) I note: āṛçi-ku ‘conspicans’ āṛçî-ka- ‘conspicuous’, with prius from āṛçi- quasi ‘species’; pûṭî-ka- ‘Soma-substitute, near-Soma, orig. ‘purificatione-cum’ (not with Edgerton, § 46, ‘putidus’), identical with Av. pûṭî-ka- ‘cleansing’ (Edg. § 109); sûcî-ka- ‘stinging’ (i.e. ‘acu-cum’); kalmalî-ki-n- (−kin a “possessive” derivative of -ka) ‘splendidus’ (i.e. ‘splendore-cum’). Before accented -ka -i may be a reduction form of the locative in -āi (see § 16), or of an instrumental in -yâ (yâ- stem).

16. That the long vowel before -ka in these and like words is actually an instrumental ending there is no way of proving, but the hypothesis suggests the first rational accounting for the long vowel. If but few priora with the long vowel are retained, the conditions under which -ka sometimes bore the accent go far to account for the reduction of the previous syllable. Given an oxtone *hotȳka- ‘priest’s assistant’ (sacerdote-cum), it may represent an IE prototype of *hotr-a-ka- with hotr-a- an original instrumental; or the pruis might also have been a locative, [s]k-om being derived from the root of Skr. sa’cate ‘sequitur’. Edgerton (§ 46) actually recognizes in tiraçci-kâ ‘planities’ tiraçci-, loc. sg. of tiryânc. The same may be true of vrȳći-kâ ‘scorpion’ (i.e. ‘aculeo-cum, cf. cum gladiis stare: in armis s.). Umbr. veris-co ‘portas-apud’ exhibits IE kom (or skom sk[w]om) as a localis.—In Lat. mendicus ‘beggar’ we may realize the sense of ‘in hole(s)’, i.e. ‘in rags’, and in mendî- a reduced form (in composition) of the prehistoric locative *mendâi i. For ‘in’: ‘with’ cf. “She walks in beauty”. It is particularly to be borne in mind that sa’cā ‘cum’ takes the locative in RV, not the instrumental. Cf. ped-i-sequa?

17. The further analysis of a few Sanskrit and Avestan
examples (and groups), taken according to Edgerton's classification, may serve to show how aptly the hypothesis of derivation from -ko(m) 'with' explains a wide range of formations. Thus from 1ka = 'characterized by, like', etc. (Edg. § 9): chattā-ka- (ā-) 'mushroom' (not 'like' an umbrella, but 'with' one); Av. daityka- 'bestia' ('dentibus-cum'); Skr. nāḍikā- 'throat', not 'like' a tube (nāḍī), but 'with' one; a'ntaka- 'death', i.e. fine-cum; cf., with a different turn of the sense, anita-ka- 'border' 1. Av. maśya-ka- 'mortalis' (homo) perhaps contains a prius meaning 'mors', cf. Skr. mṛtyu- 'mors'. In the numeral group represented by dvaka'- trika'- 'by twos, -threes' the sense of 'zwei-mit' has yielded 'zwei zusammen'. Note ā in ekākin (Edg. § 47), and cf. Lat. unicus, e'kaka- / ekaka-. In the preposition group, the adverb anti-ka'm (R.V.) 'prope' exhibits IE kom as a localis (cf. on Umbr. veris-co, § 16); cf. Lat. anti-quo (kwo-) 'in verno', but adjectivized as 'vor-stehend', i.e. 'prior' and 'priscus'. Does pri-seus contain the prius prī (see Brugmann, Gr. 2. 2. § 691; Lindsays Paulus-Festus 252. 25 2), and the posteriorus sk(w)0-?

18. 2ka 'connected with' (Edg. § 11): hotra-ka- (ib. § 51) 'sacerdos', i.e. sacrificio-cum; cf. hōtyka- (ib. § 66) 'assistant hotr', i.e. sacerdote-cum. — By my analysis words like svasti-

1 Along with this group I may explain Lat. o(p)pa-cus 'umbrosus', whose prius was the noun *ob-p-a- 'schirm', cpd. fem. root-noun: Skr. pātī 'protegit', with ob- as in ob-volēt, ob-tegit. It will have been used something like Germ. oβdach; *opā-co = 'tecto-cum'. Cf. umbra-culum 'shelter', diminutive of a lost *umbrā-ko-m 'shade-with'. Other 'primary' derivatives susceptible to our explanation are Skr. dhā-ka- 'receptacle'; yā-nē 'chest', orig. sense 'with (= ḍvā) a holding', (pīva)-spā-ka-'having a swelling', i.e. 'swelling' (with fat). The morphologically riddle-some muṣ-ka's 'testiculus' muṣkā'u 'vulva' originally signified 'with moss' (mus: Germ. moos) cf. μσταξ 'mustache'. — Jean Paul called the beard the 'moos der männlichkeit', cf. the derivative rámelle which approximated its primitive rāmās (tempestas = tempus).

2 I may be permitted to note pri-stinus (? for *pri-stinus, after divinus) 'vorstehend'; cf. on āγχ-στίνος 'prope-stans' προ-μνη-στίνος 'praem-man-stans' AJPh. 33. 392.

3 From words like this we realize how the diminutive and contemptuous force of -ka arose. Cf. Lat. secundus and Eng. "seconds" (PAOS 31, 4031). If I may say so without offense, Edgerton attributes far too much imprecatory force to -ka in the Vedas. In R.V. 1. 33. 4 ayañasānakāh = 'non-sacrificantes veteres' ('old-timers' as constantly in Varro, L. L., albeit here old-timers of a different race), and not "old rascals who give
ka-‘amulet’ (i.e. fortuna-cum) and madhū-ka-‘bee’ (i.e. melle-cum) become perfectly transparent. In a’r̂tu-ka-‘quarrelsome’ a prius *artu-‘ira’ is to be recognized (a’r̂tis ‘inimicitia’); cf. mā’nsya-ka-‘humanus’ (orig. ‘hominum-cum’ = mit-mensch). In old Latin we have (ager) hosti-cus ‘with (belonging to) the enemy’.

19. 3ka ‘consisting of, containing’ (Edg. § 53; the bāhuvihi usage, § 54, has been considered above § 14): āṇḍi-ka- ‘lotus’ (i.e. ovo-cum); muṣṭi-ka- ‘Mr. Boxer’: muṣṭi-‘pugnus’; hī-ka-‘pudicus’; hṛī- ‘pudor’. Cf. ḍṣ ν- ‘crab’, i.e. ‘with bone’ (ōṣīṇ); Skr. caḷyka- ‘porcupine’, i.e. ‘with spine’ (caḷya’). Lat. pudī-cus will have a prius *pu-dī- (pu- cognate with pavor ‘fear, shrinking’), +-dī: Skr. dhī- ‘prudentia’, though pu-dere may be analyzed as from a compound root pu-dhē-.

20. 4ka, “has active verbal force” (Edg. § 56), but see on hlādika- above (§ 14). Earlier examples, not here classified

no offering”. Nor is there a common and usual sana-‘senex’ on which sana-ka-’vetulus’ would be likely to be formed, while sana-ka-’vetustathecum’ (or something like that) may have a prius cognate with sa’nā ‘olim’ cf. sanā-ju‘- ‘senectute debilis’. In RV. 10, 133. 1 jyāka’s is rendered by “damned bowstrings”, but in view of jā, ‘bow’ jyā-ka- may have started life as jā-ṣ-ṣ ‘. As for jyā- ‘bowstring’, its formation may be illustrated by the proportion, Gāthic Av. pada-m ‘foot’ (measure): Ṛ pīṇ ‘fetter’:: jā-ṣ ‘bow’ jyā ‘bowstring’. This type may be true even if, as I suspect, pīṇ is no mere a-derivative of ped(o)-. This change of meaning seems far too great to be ascribed to an a-suffix. I suspect rather that pīṇa (plural) started as a dative ‘ad pedem’ (sc. “vincula”), like Lat. frugi; cf. Lat. impedīre ‘to fetter’. In AV. 6, 18, 3 I can conceive that the charmer might not have been by manaska m patayinaka ‘accursed restless mind’ but rather ‘animulam volatiam’, petting the thing he sought to drive away. We may think of cajoling formulae like “Grandfather Smallpox” (see Encyc. Brit. 22, 357). Surely the little bird that carries off the poison in RV. 1. 191. 11, is addressed affectionately, as the scaphe is called lepuscula in the incarnation cited by Heim, Incantamenta Magica, no. 72 (Suppl. Annal. Phil. 19, p. 483).

1 Isidore (10. 230) rightly connected pavit ‘strikes’ and pavet ‘is smitten’ (with fear); cf. admiratōna pavens (‘seized with astonishment’) with our fear-smitten, wonder-struck etc.; and note ḍvāvīs, strikingly defined by Stephanus, without change of the metaphor, as ‘perculus, percussus, stupidus’. The Celtic cognates (see Walde, s.v. pavoa) do not make in the least against this, and one can but wonder why Walde seemed to think so. There is perfect morphological correspondence between pu-dere, from a root pu- (weak stage) ‘to strike’ etc., and O’Bulg. styādēi se ‘pdere’ from the root stu-, found in the sept of Lat. tunda and of stu-pet.
because the prius is not extant, are yāyājū-ka- ‘sacrificans’ dandaćū-ka- ‘mordacious’. I see no sound reason, however, in view of an action noun like Lat. im-pet-u- ‘onset’ to refuse to admit *yāyājū- ‘sacrificium’ *dandaćū- ‘morsus’, cf. Lat. volatīcus ‘flying’: volatū-s ‘flight’.

5) The Vedic hapax iṣu-dhyā (RV. 1. 122. 1).

21. Ludwig and Griffith take as instrumental ‘mit dem Verlangen’; ‘with prayer’). The nominative may have ended in *dhis *dhi or *dhyā. I take the word as a tautological compound of *iṣu- ‘petens’ (or ‘petitio’) + -dhi- (dhyā-) ‘precatio’. The cognate Avestan verb iṣūidyāmahi = ‘supplicamus’, with the generalized sense of ‘veneramur’. The Avestan noun is iṣud- ‘demand; petitum’.

6) Vedic madrīk madrī-ak ‘me adversus’.

22. Grassmann (Wbch. 159) has collected the curious group of words in -dṛi-āνc-, to-wit: asmadrīac- <tvadṛi-āc> madrīac- vīcvaḍrīac-. This formation seems not yet to have been explained, though the essential combination was made by Joh. Schmidt (ap. Brugmann, Gr. 2. 1. § 86, anm.) when he explained the -ā of sa-ḍṛā ‘quoquooversus’ (i.e. semper idem) by analogy of pratyaṇ; cf. vicvāṭaḥ p. ‘nach allen seiten hinge-wandt’ with v. su’pratikah sadṛṇ (RV. 1. 94. 7) = ‘good countenance alike on every side’.—I take madrīk as for *madṛk, identifying -dṛk with -ḍṛa[x] in ṭrā-ḍṛa, original sense ‘suspicions’, cf. suar-ṛk ‘looking at (or like) the sun’. Note that the modern Hindu pronunciation of ṛ is ri. In the prius of madrīk we may have ma = μ or ma(ḥ), the apparent stem of the 1st person pronoun in Sanskrit. Note the difference of meaning between tvadṛik ‘facing thee’ and post Vedic tvāḍṛk ‘like thee’. Upon these forms in -dṛk / -ṛk the adverbial group in -āνc ‘versus’ played, resulting in -dṛyāk as an adverbial neuter. For the intrusion of y, cf. sam(y)-aḥc- and fem. uḍc (*uḍk/y-aṇc-), with y, it would appear, from pratyaṇc (which perhaps had a prehistoric byform *pratāṇc-). In RV. we find madṛyaḍrīk, corrected (without comment) in PW. 2 to madṛyadṛk. Can this be a combination of -dṛya[k]-dṛīk?

23. In the consideration of the problem offered by madrīk we may ask whether there was original gradation in the flexion of the posterius, i.e. nom. *-drak (k for t by dissimulation from
the previous d, cf. Class. Quart, 8, 53, on rtvi'k), gen. *-dṛcas. For *-dṛk note fut. dra'ksyati, aor. a'dṛk 'vidit', nom. ag. draśy-. Original *madṛk were more liable to analogy from praty'ak than *madṛ'k, perhaps.—But the final form of madrī'ak 'ad me versus' may have been suggested by sadhri'ak (AJPh. 35, 253) 'ad unum locum versus'. [Cf. *dṛk for *dṛt.]

7) The pair duryona'- durona'-.

24. In the eyes of most linguistic scholars, I suppose, the chief value of etymology lies in its contributions either to phonetics or to morphology. I find it chiefly valuable for verbal interpretation. But the values are indivisible, after all, as may be seen from the study of the pair durona'- and duryona'. The genesis of the former I cannot explain morphologically¹, whereas durona'- lends itself to easy analysis as a compound, viz. from dur- 'door' (? or dus- 'ill', see below) + yona- 'domus, locus', originally quasi 'iunctum': yu- (which brings us to the "wattled" house again). Cf. Av. yaona- 1) 'statt, stätte'; 2) 'heimstätte, heimat'; Skr. yo'nis 1) 'schoss— vulva' (i. e. locus 'iunctionis', cf. Lat. loci muliebres, ap. Varro, L. L. 5. 15); 2) 'heimat, haus, lager, nest, stall'—noting our American slang word joint 'a low resort'. The period at which a term like 'door-house' (duryona') came into being was the time when such a house was supplanting an older type. For hut-urns with indicated porticoes (for a door-house would have been a house with a portico) see the Italian finds discussed and pictured by Montelius in Mannus, 2, 24.

25. A merely casual glance at the RV. usage of durona'- (common) and duryona'-(39) would make one suppose that the rarer form was the secondary; and it would lie near to guess that duryona' is durona', blended with the not infrequent synonym durya-. But a study of the usage will perhaps reveal that durona' was derived from, though it almost entirely supplanted, duryona'. I am not going, lest I provoke the smile interaurgural, to suggest that, in the hapax durona-yu'- 'domi-peta', the succession *yona-yu'- was dissimil-

¹ The explanation retained by Brugmann, Gr. 2, 2, 171 was very properly rejected by Uhlenbeck. Which, e. v. In da'mu-nas- 'hausgenosse' -nas- is a grade form of the root of vaṣṭi; 'dwell' (pace Brugmann, ibid.). 'On the contrary, in words like vicinus -no-, felt as a suffix, has replaced -nas-, a posterius of composition (see Fay, AJPh, 33, 369).
ated to -jyonayu-. Instead, let us look first at the usage of durona'. We find durona'm 4 times, always at the end of a pada; loc. durone', 19 times at end of a pada; 3 times before consonants, not at the end (3. 18, 5; 4. 28. 3; 6. 12. 11), and a 4th time (3. 1. 18, below), before a vowel. At the end of a pada before vowels we find durona' | imôm (5. 4. 5); durone' | a (10. 120. 7); durone' | (a)gnir (7. 7. 4), but in the interior of a pada, durone' anôto (3. 1. 18) — with violation of samdhi, i.e. -e a-, in both cases. The remaining examples are of the combination durone', followed by the preposition a' (once in the samhita text a'ñ, with anunásika, see Wackernagel, Gram. 1, § 259, b, 2), i.e. durone' a' 'domum apud', 3 (4) times at the end of a pada (7. 16. 8 [a'ñ]; 8. 19, 27; 8. 87. 2 = 10. 40. 13), and 1 time (4. 24. 8), not at the end. The conclusion I draw is that the original combination in this locative phrase was *duryonâvâ with dissimilative loss of the first y. The syllable succession duronâv | a, (\_\_\_\_\_) was rhythmically apt for iambic clausulae (jagati, anuṣṭubh), and carried along with it dur[y]one' in trochaic clausulae (triṣṭubh).

26. Of duryone' (3 times only) the usage is as follows: ni' duryone' ku'ya\vácam mrdhî' cret (1. 174. 4, Arnold's A period); ni' duryone' àvrañm mrdhra\vácas (5. 29, 10, repeated in the singular \vácam in 5, 32, 2, both of later date). The 2d pair of examples looks to be a mere broidery pieced out from the first: cf. [ku'ya-]vácam mrdhi' with mrdhra\vácam, the whole general sense of the padas being the same, an imprecation against the evil speakers. Thus ku'ya-vácam, (nom. pr.) is haplogic for ku'ya\vava-1 'bad-harvest' + vác- 'speaking', naming a conjurer that spoke words bringing a bad harvest. It is not without significance that duryona' is genuinely preserved only in an ancient verse reciting the downthrow of this evil spirit of the harvest. Elsewhere, it has yielded before the dissimilated locative turn dur[y]ona'vâ 'domum-apud', whence durone' 'domi'. If, as I have suggested, a very special antiquity adheres in 1. 174, 4, then dur-iona'- into which the imprecation—for ni' cret 'deicit' involves the imprecation 'deiciat'—would thrust ku'ya\vác may originally have signified

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1 The old connection of ya'va- 'getreide' with yu- 'binden' seems completely vindicated by ku'ya\vava- = 'mis-ernte'. In Homer, àsati is 'fodder', i.e. the 'bundles' of grain, cf. ya'veya-s 'gerstenvorrath, fruchtvorrath'.

an ill sort of house (dus- ‘male’ -so Sāyana), a hole, or pit. But later, this force of dur- seems to have vanished.

8) The abstract suffix -tā- -tā(tī)-.

27. In the first volume of Kuhn’s Zeitschrift p. 162 Aufrecht noted that the Hindu scholiasts explained words in -tāti- as compounds, deriving -tāt(i)- from the root tan (‘to stretch’). On finding this explanation my immediate reaction was the prompt protest of hostile surprise; and certainly the applications cited by Aufrecht seemed unattractive. But the suggestion kept active in my mind till I began to realize that it might have a value not brought out by the Hindu scholiasts. On the merely formal side a noun or verb-root tā: the root tan- has plenty of analogies, in and out of Sanskrit, cf. Macdonnell’s Vedic Grammar §§ 368-369, noting ātā- ‘frame’. Macdonnell p. 249 notes khā : khan, gā : gām, jā : jan sā : san, omitting drā : dram, tā : tan—and bhā ‘appearing’. *bhan (ṛaivā). In -tāti- we seem further to have a -ti derivative from -tā- ‘stretching; strecke’.

28. Now I need no reminding that -tā- and -tāti- must have been started on their widely productive career as abstract suffixes before the upbreak of the IE period; but in Indo-Iranian, where the range of meaning is wide, the examples are few. By good fortune one of the Avestan examples shows tmesis of -tātī-, and Jackson (Av. Gram. § 842) cites the example in proof of “the independent origin” of the suffix. The example is yavaēcā tātē = something like ‘diuturnique extensioni’ (for eternity, forever); but more often we have yavaētātēcā = ‘diuturnitatique’. How Bartholomae avoids the explanation by tmesis may be gathered from his lexicon. But the particular example in which the tmesis appears is the example above all others which best justifies the definition of -tātī- by ‘extensio, strecke’. The only common Indo-Iranian examples seem to lie in upara-tāt- ‘supremacy’ and in Av. haurva-tāt- : Skr. sarva’-tat- ‘completeness’, in both of which the local sense of ‘extension’ may still be realized. Temporal extension is indicated by Skr. -tana- : Lat. -tino-, in the type of compounds represented by adya-tana- ‘hodiernus’ diu-tinus ‘longe extensus’, with posterius also from ten- ‘to stretch’.

29. The typical IE usage of -tā- ‘strecke’ may be traced in the pair ἔνος ‘life’, but ἔνο-τι (secondary ἔνοτος) ‘lebens-strecke’
Lat. vi(vi)tā (in vita = per totam vitam), Lith. gyvatā (connoting the life everlasting). Like examples are found in Lat. aevi(-)tas vetustas tempestas aetas (with -tāti-); and senec-tā iuven-tā (with tā-). Both space and time extension are denoted by Lat. longinquitas, cf. Skr. dirghatā:- OBul. dlūgotā ‘longitude’.

30. The chief objection raised by Aufrecht to the explanation offered by the Hindu scholiasts lay against the appeal, in their definition of some of the -tāti- compounds, to a secondary sense of tan, viz. ‘bereiten’. But, though foreign to τηνός and Lat. tendo, this is the sense we have, approximately, in Lat. teneo, which further yielded ‘possideo’ (cf. also Vedic tāṁs- and its cognates ap. Grassmann). This sense we may restore to Skr. a-go-tā ‘lack of cows’, negative to a not recorded *go-tā quasi ‘bovi-tentēntā’: πολυ-βωστής ‘multibovitenens’, cf. vasu-tā and vasu-tāti- ‘divitiae’ (orig. ‘goods-holding’); a sense repeated in ḍaṁ-tāti- ‘fortuna’, but adj. ‘beneficent’ (from a bāhuvarhi = fortunam-habens). Nor is satya-tāti- ‘veritas’ (orig. sense ‘truth-holding’) essentially different. An apparent abstract like de’va-tā ‘god-head’ may have started with the sense of ‘divo-tenens’ (divum = sky), nom. without s as in Latin compounds like ad-vena; cf. also the Vedic proper name uca’nā (masc.) and the adverbially used nom. sa’cā (RV.) as explained in TAPA, 44, 119, § 23.

31. As an independent monosyllabic word IE tā ‘tenens; strecke, extensio’ cannot be attested. As a monosyllable it was exposed to loss, the more exposed to loss as an independent word the more freely it was employed in composition. But the compound ā-tā ‘frame’ we seem to have, see Macdonnell, l. c. p. 25311, 2556; and the monosyllable tan- ‘extension, duration, continuity’ (advb. ta’nā / tanā ‘continuo’); also ta’n / ta’nā-m / ta’nā- / ta’nas- ‘posterity, child’ (cf. Lat. tenus ‘length’). The dissyllable -tāti- ‘strecke’ seems to have been maintained only as a hapax in the Avesta. But, with due consideration of analogous formations, IE tā- tāti- ‘strecke, extensio’ seem entirely warranted; and surely the knower of English with its abstract suffixes -hood (OEng. hād ‘grade, rank’) and -ship (OEng. sceippan ‘createe’) — cf. also OEng.

1. The traditional syncretic explanation of Lat. i-tiner ought to be given up in favor of the definition ‘geh-strecke’. In fact, the itinerā were the distances, and not the roads, traversed.
treow-ræden ‘fidelity’ (ræden ‘state, condition’), OEng. sorg-stæfas ‘sorrow’ (-stæfas plur. of stæf ‘stick’) — cannot refuse on methodic grounds to consider the evidence offered for the contention that IE. -tā- -tāti- originally signified ‘stretch, strecke’.

32. Brugmann has included in his group of words in -tā (Gr. 2. 1. § 309) much that belongs elsewhere; e. g. the military terms like āṣpi-ṣṭai (from *āṣpi-[ɔ]-ṣṭai ‘in scutis stantes’), xorɔ[ɔ]-ṣṭai etc. (see Fay, AJPh. 34. 41). Possibly a rival confix -sthā-ti- ‘state, condition’ lies perdu behind Lat. über[s]-tas etc. But sth could only be proved by Sanskrit, in which no trace has been left. In Lith. gyvastis = gyvata I would see IE -sthis ‘state’, but know full well how to discredit the evidence of the -s-.


33. In Vedic prose the paradigm dātā’smi ‘daturus sum’, dātā’si ‘daturus es’ dātā’ (lit. dator) ‘daturus’ (sc. est) is well known. As I have elsewhere noted, OLat. auctor sum es est, barring the time note and the regular ellipsis of ‘est’, are precisely like the Sanskrit future. A complete correspondent including the time note and the ellipses of est, may however have been preserved in Paulus-Festus (p. 166, 29, Lindsay):

nancitor in XII (inc. 1) nactus erit, praedentem. item in foedere Latino “pecuniam quis nancitor, habeto” et; “si quid pignoris nanciscitur sibi habeto”.

In the antique language of a treaty, if anywhere, we might expect the preservation of an archaic, rather than an analogous, Latin formation of independent origin. A nancitor like this, made on the present stem of OLat. nancio, lies behind the “future” imperative of the deponent and passive (see Bull. Univ. Texas, no. 263, §§ 88, 92).
The Assyrian Chronicle. — By A. T. Olmstead, Professor in the University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

Of the sources for Assyrian History, none is more valuable than the so called Assyrian Chronicle¹. For the reign of Shalmaneser IV, Ashur dan, Ashur nirari, and Shalmaneser V, it is practically our only authority. For that of Adad nirari, we must largely rely on it as the brief display inscriptions barely mention the most important facts. For the others, it fills up that unknown period which is found at the end of each reign. Even where we have contemporaneous documents, its data cannot be neglected, for it sometimes supplements and sometimes corrects. As to the chronology, its mention of the eclipse of 763 fixes the whole system of dating, and, with the

¹ First published II R. 52; the best edition in the cuneiform is still that by Delitzsch, Assyr. Lesestücke², 92ff. The material collected up to his time is given by G. Smith, Eponym Canon, 42ff., but only in English translation. Schrader, Keilinschr. Bild. I, 208ff., gives a trans- literation and translation which are still useful. The fragments 82-5-22, 526, and Rm. 2, 97, are given by Bezold in Proc. Soc. Bild. Arch. VII, 286ff. and plates. They are reproduced in transliteration and translation by Winckler, Keilinschr. Bild. III, 2, 142ff., but the dating is largely wrong. This was corrected by Olmstead for the reign of Sargon, Sargon, 15ff., and a reconstruction attempted. This discussion, like others of a similar nature in the book, seems never to have been utilized by later writers, perhaps because the results were not incorporated in a regular edition. It is for this reason that in the present paper the reconstructed document is presented. It makes no claims to being a complete edition, its purpose is merely the making clear of the changes which ensued as a result of the study, but, until an up to date edition of the cuneiform text is available, it is hoped that in this way too it will be found worth while. — Mention should also be made of the important translations by Sayce, Records of Past ², II, 120ff. and by Barta, in Harper, Assyr. Bab. Literature, 209ff. Since the original paper was prepared, a new transliteration and translation has been given us by Rogers, Cuneiform Parallels, 226ff., and this has been of much value in checking up results already secured.
aid of the eponym lists¹, the lists of the officials who gave their name in rotation to the year, it is our one sure clue for the chronology of the period.

Thus it will be seen that the value of this compilation, which, in its present form, gives the history from the accession of Shalmaneser III to the reign of Sennacherib, has long been recognized. At the same time, there has grown up the feeling that its value has been entirely utilized, that no further study of its dry lists is necessary. No doubt it is to this feeling that we owe the fact that no complete edition of its cuneiform text is available. The present article will attempt to show that a more intensive study will result in the acquisition of facts of real importance, and that a reconstruction of the text is often possible with consequent additions to our store of knowledge. Accordingly, such a restored text will be presented at the end of the article.

The so-called Chronicle is really a chronological table in three columns. In the first is given the name of the eponym for the year. In large part this has been lost, but can be easily restored from the data of the eponym list, here utilized in the reconstructed text for the period covered by the cuneiform. To the student of nomenclature, this long list is of great value, but to the would-be editor of the text, it is of equal difficulty, for the exact transliteration of these names is still often a matter of uncertainty. Occasionally the name itself has an interest, as when the eponym for 855, Abu ina ekalli libur, "May the father grow old in the palace", shows us a courtier inflicting so long a name on his innocent child in order to gain favor with the monarch.

But the names in the first column have little value without the second where we have given their office. First comes the king, then the turtanu or prime minister, then the other palace officials. Last of all come the governors of the provinces, the latter indicated by ša, "of", followed by the name of the province. This second column is an unworked mine, and a main purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a large part of it and to indicate what may be gained from its data.

First of all, we learn much about the careers of these

¹ II R. 68f., III R. 1; Delitzsch, op. cit., 87; Schrader, op. cit., 204 ff.; Rogers, op. cit., 219 ff., are the most important publications.
governors, for their promotions can be clearly traced. In the study of the official inscriptions, we have only the traditional presentation of the king, and references to subordinates are rare indeed. For the last portion of the Assyrian history, the letters enable us to secure a knowledge of the personalities behind the mask of the conventional official narrative. But for the period covered by the Chronicle, letters are rare or non-existent. Fortunately, a close scrutiny of the data here given affords us a little more of that sense of personality without which history loses much of its human interest. And in so doing we sometimes stumble on a bit of real history of great importance.

For example, take the reign of Shalmaneser III. At the beginning, we have the king, *turtanu, rab bi lub*, and *nagir ekalli* in regular order. Then we should expect the other officials and the governors, as we find them in other sections. Instead, we find a new *turtanu*, Dan Ashur, and three years later a new *nagir ekalli*, or major domo, Bel bana who still holds office 824. On the other hand, Ashur bana usur, the *rab bi lub* of 856, still holds this office as late as 826 and 817. Evidently we have here the trace of a palace revolution, in which at least the *turtanu* and *rab bi lub* were changed. Nor are we without other proof of a revolution at this time. Dan Ashur became *turtanu* in 855, for he holds that office in 854. Now for this very year 855, the Monolith, a strictly contemporaneous inscription, dating from the following year, 854, gives not a single event. Clearly, then, conditions at home were too engrossing to permit a foreign campaign. The fact that the Obelisk \(^1\) does give an expedition against Kashiari for 855 is no proof against this, rather it furnishes proof of such a revolution. The Obelisk dates from 829, a whole generation later, and is the latest, and, as I hope to prove in another article\(^2\), the worst authority for the reign. This alone would prejudice us in favor of the earlier document and one strictly contemporaneous. But it can be shown that the Obelisk, which dates from the very year of the revolt of Ashur dan apal, is almost a formal apology for the prime minister Dan Ashur. For example, all its dates save one are by the year of the

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\(^1\) Obl. 52 ff.

\(^2\) *Assyrian Historiography*, soon to be issued as a *University of Missouri Bulletin*. 
king. This one is dated by the eponymy of Dan Ashur, and, to our amazement is placed in 856:\(^1\) Clearly Dan Ashur is trying to conceal the fact of 855, and to do so the more securely, he has padded out the following year with events which the Monolith did not know. Still further proof as to the relation of this document to Dan Ashur is to be found in the frequent references to his leading the army. This is generally explained as due to the approaching age of the old king. But can we assume that a man who was important enough to become turtanu five years after the accession of his monarch could have been much younger? The important fact is not the leading of an expedition by another than the king, that is not unusual. What is strange is the attribution of all this to the general in an official inscription. Clearly the turtanu who was powerful enough to falsify the earlier history of the reign in his favor and to usurp the glory of a series of campaigns in an official inscription that was supposed to be for the glorification of the monarch alone, must have been the real ruler of the kingdom. And this fits well with subsequent events. The Obelisk inscription ends with a fine list of conquests for the year 829. But it ends abruptly, without the usual list of building activities and without any glorification of the king. And in the Chronicle this same year is marked, not by an expedition against any of the lands mentioned in the Obelisk, but with the single ominous word "Revolt". And the Chronicle gives us also the natural reply of Dan Ashur to this revolt. Ashur dan apal had no doubt revolted because his father was a figure head under the control of his too powerful prime minister. As proof that the king still ruled, the next year, 828, Shalmaneser once more appears as eponym. Soon after, Shalmaneser died. The revolt continued under his son and successor Shamshi Adad, but the cause of it seems to have at last disappeared. When the turtanu of the new ruler appears in the lists, it is no longer Dan Ashur. It would appear that with the death of his nominal master his power came to an end, and we may without much difficulty conjecture that he met a violent death.

The place of Dan Ashur was taken by Iahalu, who had already been governor of Kakzi in 834, while in 825 he had

\(^1\) Obl. 45 ff.
been apparently the *abaraku*. His tenure of office did not survive his master's rule, and we have no reason to see in him so dominant a personality as Dan Ashur. Aside from the *turtanu*, there seems to have been little change in the personal caused by the accession of Shámshi Adad. Bel bana held the office of *nagir ekalli* in 824 as in 851, and it is strange that an official who so obviously owed his position to the revolution of 855 and who held so intimate a place as major domo of the palace should have been allowed to remain under Shamshi Adad. Ashur bana usur was *rab bi lub* from 856 to 817. Ninib ila, governor of Salmat in 838, had been advanced to that of Ahi Suhina in 802. In all probability, this had taken place before 813, for in that year Salmat is under another governor. Nish pati Bel, governor of Kalhu in 832, had been promoted to that of Nasibina by 816. Nergal ila, who was destined to become *turtanu* under Adad nirari, seems to have held his place as governor of Arba in both 831 and 818, but had been promoted by 812, when he too was supplanted by another man. The only other official who seems to have survived the death of Shamshi Adad is Bel dan who is *nagir ekalli* in both 821 and 808. Worthy of note is the Bel tarsi Nabu who erects the famous Nabu statue in whose inscription Sammuramat is mentioned.

With the accession of Shalmaneser IV, Shamshi ilu becomes *turtanu*. As he never before is mentioned in the lists, his sudden elevation to supreme power is surprising. No less surprising is the fact that he held this supreme power under the two succeeding rulers as well. All this goes to prove the accession of another dominant personality of the type of Dan Ashur. For this reign and its successor this is not so surprising, for there is reason to believe that these rulers were minors for a considerable part if not all of the reign; but it is more difficult to see why he should have continued to reign under Ashur nirari. At any rate, it is clear enough that he was the power behind the throne during the long period from 781 to 745. How far he was responsible for the growing weakness of Assyria and for the ultimate fall of the dynasty is an interesting question which we do not have the data to answer. But we may note that, at the end of this period, he

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1 I R. 35, 2.
must have been a very old man. Is it possible that it was his death which gave the opportunity for the successful revolt of Tiglath Pileser?

As might be expected, continuity of office is characteristic of these reigns. Nergal eresh is found in charge of Rasappa both in 804 and 775; Ashur bel usur was at Kirruti in 797 and at Kalhu in 772; Mushallim Ninib held Tille in 793 and 766; it would seem that Ninib mukin ahi was at Nineveh in 790 and in 761; Pan Ashur lamur, shaknu in 776, has become governor of Arbela in 759, unless the apparent lowering in rank means that this is another individual.

With the successful revolt of Tiglath Pileser, Nabu daninani becomes the turtanu, but we may assume that he had little of the power of his predecessor. Few of the officials seem to have weathered the storm. Adad bel ukin held in 738 the same position of shaknu he had in 748, but Bel dan, the rab bi lub of 750 has been degraded to the governorship of Kalhu in 744 and 734. Under Shalmaneser V, the old order continued for three years, and it is only in the fourth that the king is eponym. The turtanu was Ninib ila, who had been governor of Nasibina in 736. We know nothing of the other officials of the reign, for before the limmu of the turtanu was completed, Sargon was on the throne.

Sargon did not become eponym before his third full year. But his turtanu seems to have held this office the year before, for a tablet\(^1\) gives as turtanu Ashur iš... who can only be the Ashur iška dan of 720. The revolt of Sargon brought an entirely new set of officials into office, if we may judge from the total absence of old names. For succeeding reigns, the letters and business documents give us the positions of practically all the eponyms, but, as this is not found in the Chronicle, it will not be discussed here.

But it is not only in the study of the officials that this second column is of great importance. Equally valuable is the insight it gives us into the provincial government. It will be noted that there was a regular cursus: first the king, then the turtanu, then the palace officials, and finally the governors of the various provinces; and it is on this general continuity of order that many of the restorations in the appended

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\(^1\) K. 998, quoted Johns, Deeds, II, 69.
text are based. It is also of special importance in showing the relative rank of the provinces themselves, for, with rare exceptions, all the changes in office of the various governors are promotions to some place higher in the list. For example, Ashur bel usur, at Kirruri in 797, is in 772 at Kalhu, and this immediately precedes Kirruri in 798.

When we come to study this relative order, a startling fact appears. The headship is not taken by Nineveh or Kalhu, the two provinces in Assyria proper. Thus Nish pati Bel, in 832 governor of Kalhu, has by 816 been promoted to Naṣibina. It may seem strange that a move from Kalhu, already at times the real capital of Assyria, to the foreign city of Nisibis, should be considered a promotion; but in this very passage it is placed before Kalhu, and the same is true of 853, 852, seemingly in 816, 815, certainly in 801, 798, in 774, 772, in 736, 734, in 715, 713; that is, so long as a regular cursus was in use. Why Nisibis, of all places, should so head the list, is a question we cannot answer. Equally strange is the position of Raṣappa, the city in the far off North Syrian desert. The first time it occurs, 840, there is nothing remarkable about its position. But the second, in 804, it heads the list while Nisibis, at the head in 853, has now but fourth place. Raṣappa again heads the list in 775 while Nisibis has been partly restored and given second place, and the same is true in 747-746, and 737-736. Why two such foreign cities should rank before Nineveh and Kalhu, the former of which actually appears near the bottom of the list, raises questions which we cannot here discuss.

These lists give us a very good idea of the extent of the empire. For the reign of Shalmaneser III, we have given Kalhu, Nineveh, and Kakzi in Assyria proper, Ahi Suhina from the country just south of the last and on the south east boundary toward Babylonia, and Arbaḫa, Mazamua, Salmat, and Kirruri on the mountain frontier on the east and north east. Of these, Kirruri and Mazamua certainly date from this reign as they were but recently hostile. Naṣibina was not far away on the north west. Thus we have for this period a compact group, centering about Nineveh, and with the frontier not far distant. The only exception to this is Raṣappa, which first appears in 840. It is of course quite possible that other provinces were listed in the break which extends from 850 to
842 and so would allow possibly nine new ones. But we have no provinces to fill the gap. Nor was the cursus so well fixed as yet. We have an official breaking the list of governors in 835, and we even have Ahi Suhina in 839 when it had appeared but two years before. And when we find Nasibna and Kalhu, which had appeared in 853-852, repeated in 833-832, the poverty of choice is apparent.

We thus see that the territory actually incorporated into the Assyrian empire at this time was not of very great extent. The great period of reorganization seems to have been the reign of Adad nārari, whose own inscriptions tell us so little, but whose importance is proved by the long list of expeditions in our document. The first province seems to have been Amedi in 800, though the fact that it was conquered by Ashur nāsir apal, that there is no mention of it in the records of Shalmaneser, and that it was included, even though in the second class, in the list of cities which revolted under Ashur dan apal, might point to its earlier incorporation into the empire. Then comes the group 795-791, which includes Tushhan, Guzana, Tille, Mehinish, and Isana. Of these, Tille had been hostile as late as 817 and Guzana as late as 809, so that these at least can be definitely dated to this period. Tushhan alone might with some probability be dated earlier, as it already seems to have been under the control of Ashur nāsir apal, but its absence from the Ashur dan apal list seems equally strong against its actual incorporation. All thus far listed belong to the north-west boundary, and Isana is of special importance as being the first province west of the Euphrates. Its addition is no doubt due to the Syrian campaigns of Adad nārari. A business document shows us that Shibaniba was added in 787, Rimusi occurs the next year in our document, and Kurban in 784, and the first and third occur also in the list of revolted cities. Since we have new provinces listed for 787, 786, 784, we should naturally assume that the blank should be filled by still another new one and that the same would be true of 788. Certain it is that all the provinces listed for previous reigns are accounted for in this. The blank of 788 is probably to be filled with Arbailu, as this follows in the same manner as here Kakzi in 759, and is also found in the Ashur dan apal list, while 785 is to be filled with the Parnunna of the same list and which occurs
in our document in 756. It is true that in this latter place, it follows Kurban instead of preceding it as in 785, and is two years before Rimusi instead of following it as in the former case; but these new provinces seem not yet to have been given a definite order, and the fact that, in the later list, 759-754 are all taken by provinces formed not later than the reign of Adad nirari seems to place them all together. The occurrence of so many of these province names, Nineveh, Shibaniba, Parnunna, Kurban, Arbailu, Amedi, in the revolt list, is striking, but after all they are but six out of twenty seven, so that this list has no necessary connection with the eponyms.

During the period of decline of the dynasty, no new names seem to have been added. The first trace of another is in 732, under Tiglath Pileser IV, when Sime, already in the revolt list as Shimu, was incorporated, while Lulume is the only one proved by our document for the reign of Sargon. Under his successors, there were many additional provinces, but these must be reserved for a later paper.

As a result of this part of our study, two facts of great importance stand out sharply. One is the small amount of territory actually incorporated in the Assyrian territory at a date even so late as the time of Shalmaneser III. The distinction is thus more sharply than ever made between the actual Assyrian country and the buffer states which in but small part and at a much later time were incorporated as parts of Assyria proper.

The other fact is that the greatest period of provincial organization was not, as has been generally assumed by historians, the reign of Tiglath Pileser IV, to whom but one new province can be definitely assigned, but that of Adad nirari, under whom many, perhaps as many as eleven, were incorporated. Whether as many as eleven can be attributed to him or not, these eleven were made in his period and under the dynasty of which he was the last great representative. That this must shift the emphasis in Assyrian history is obvious, for credit should be as much given to the administrator as to the warrior. But Adad nirari was a warrior

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1 Shamshi Adad Ann. I, 46; the reading Udnunna is also possible. It occurs as eponym as late as 697.
as well, and so we must look with all the more eagerness to the day when the annals which Adad nirari must have composed to celebrate his many campaigns may be found.

The third column offers less of novelty, but still well merits a closer examination. For the earlier part of the reign of Shalmaneser III, we unfortunately have no data, but with 842 we begin to have traces. In this year we have a sign which is probably an error for \( k\alpha \), and so we must restore \( \text{Di}
\text{mas} \text{\text{k}} \text{a} \), Damascus, to fit the official inscriptions. For the next two, we must restore Que and Qummuhi, as this best fits the data of the official inscriptions which give Hamanu and Que respectively. For 839, we have Danabi, the well known Tunip in North Syria, while the official inscription gives Damascus and Phoenicia. The year 838, which has Tabal in both the Obelisk and our document, shows that Winckler\(^1\) is wrong and Barta\(^2\) right in their dating of the fragment; indeed, the two agree literally down to 834 where, after the proper expedition against Que, the Chronicle adds another line “to Que, the great god went forth from Der”. It is natural to take this as a separate year, but unfortunately, if we do this, it throws all the dates, before or after, one year out of the way. So the only thing we can do is to assume, reluctant as we may be to do so, that here there are two lines for one year, supply something like \( \text{ra} \text{bute} \), “nobles”, before the “to Que”, and translate “nobles were sent to Que”. If we do this, we find 833 attributed to Urarti as the Obelisk\(^3\), 832 to Unqi, the ‘Amq which was in the Patina of the Obelisk\(^4\), 831 to Ulluba, which was in the Kirhi of the Obelisk\(^5\), and 830 to Manna, another exact agreement with the same inscription\(^6\). The next six years are marked “revolt” because of that of Ashur dan apal.

The Annals of Shamshi Adad place in his first expedition a campaign against Nairi\(^7\). We know from the same source\(^8\) that Amedi was one of the revolted cities and so we may connect the last year of the revolt according to our document, 824, with the first campaign of the Annals. For the next

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\(^1\) L. c. \(^2\) L. c. \(^3\) Obl. 141 ff. \(^4\) Ibid. 146 ff. 
\(^5\) Ibid. 156 ff. \(^6\) Ibid. 159 ff. 
\(^7\) Shamshu Adad Ann. II, 1 ff. 
\(^8\) Ibid. I, 49.
year we have *ri-is*. Our natural restoration is Sikris, as we have later references to it as an important place on the frontier. This fits well with the second expedition of the Annals which is against Nairi. For the next year, 822, we have only *-a*. This we would naturally restore Manna, as the third expedition was against that place. But the wide space vacant before that sign hardly allows more than one sign to have stood in the mutilated portion, so we should rather restore Mada, the Medes. The *...* shumme I cannot identify. It may have been in Babylonia, as the fourth expedition was against that country. For the next three lines, we have only *-e*. This may be restored Qarne to correspond with the Annals, or Tille to correspond with the following year in our document. The Mada of 810 is the Mada of the Kalhu inscription of Adad nirari and proves the identity of Mat-a with the Medes. The Manna of 808-7 dates the Munna of the Kalhu inscription to these years, and the Syrian cities of the next four years show that the Hatte and Amurri of the same inscription date here. The *eli tamtim* of 803 shows that here is placed the detailed Syrian campaign of the Kalhu inscription, *adi eli tamtim rabiti ša šulmu šamši*. It seems a general rule that the shorter display inscriptions deal most fully with the data of the year in which they are erected, so we may date the Kalhu inscription to this time. The fact that tribute of the Kaldi kings is later mentioned does not argue to the contrary, for our document gives no expedition against Babylon during the entire reign, and the position of Sammuramat hints at peaceful relations with Babylonia.

After the loss of the Kalhu inscription, we are entirely dependent on the chronicle for the history of the next half century, and so little new can be hoped for. The frequent

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1 Cf. Olmstead, *Sargón*, 121; years 823-819 are omitted by Winckler, Barta, and Rogers.
2 Shamshi Adad Ann. II, 16 ff.
3 Ibid. 34 ff.
4 Ibid. III, 70 ff.
5 Ibid. IV, 9.
6 Kalhu 7.
7 Ibid. 8.
8 Ibid. 11.
9 Ibid. 13.
10 Ibid. 22.
expeditions against Urartu have often been noted and connected with the sudden rise into prominence of that country. Yet even as late as 773, an expedition could be made against so distant a place as Damascus. Then came the pest, no doubt the cause of the "in the land" of the next year. The revolts, beginning in the oldest capital, Ashur, at the time of the famous eclipse of 763, and then extending to the provinces, can only point to a disputed succession. It is interesting to note that the final fighting took place in Guzana, which reminds us of how the decisive battle after the death of Sennacherib took place in the not far distant Hani rabbat. This final defeat of the rebels resulted in the "peace in the land" and also in the "in the land" of utter exhaustion of the next two years.

Then come, in 755-4, expeditions against North Syria, Hatarika and Arpad. As we later find Tiglath Pileser forced to fight Sardurish of Haldia (Urartu) in the latter city, it is not too far a conjecture that the presence of an Assyrian army in this region was a last attempt to save North Syria and the Isana province from that ruler or from his predecessor Argishtish. It is clear that the power of Haldia was on the constant increase, even if expeditions against it are no longer chronicled in our document.

It would seem as if ill success here led to the downfall of Ashur dan. His successor Ashur nirari is not his son and he ascended the throne the very year of the Arpad expedition. After Arpad, our chronicle adds the enigmatic expression "from (?) the city of Ashur the return". Are we to connect this with the fact that Ashur was concerned with the earlier rebellion and to assume that it shows Ashur nirari a usurper? If so, how are we to square this with the fact that Shamshi ilu was still turtanu under Ashur nirari? The puzzle must be left unsolved with our present knowledge.

The constant "in the land" of this reign points to utter exhaustion. The fact that there are expeditions against Namri does not contradict this, for they are nothing more than attempts to beat back the tribes on the mountain boundary to the east. The revolt which finally put an end to the dynasty began in Kalhu, formerly its most staunch defender.

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1 Esarhaddon, Broken Prism I, 18.
2 Tiglath Pileser IV, Ann. 91.
The data in our chronicle bearing on the reign of Tiglath Pileser have been discussed in detail by Rost in his edition of the inscriptions of that monarch. Without it, the sadly mutilated Annals could hardly have been arranged in chronological order. A serious difficulty is found under 743, where our document gives "in Arpad". Rost seeks to obviate this by reading ana, "against", but an error from a common to a less common reading is hardly likely. And this emendation does not remove the real difficulty, which is topographical. The data in the Annals make it clear that Tiglath Pileser had not crossed the Euphrates before his great battle with Sardurish. The error of the compiler may have been due to the ina habal Arpadda of Annals 91, though this obviously refers to 741. The data for the next year must be found in the Annals in the badly mutilated lines 74-82, where the place-names are still clearly east of the Euphrates. The "after three years captured" of 741 seems at first sight strange in view of the fact that the next year still gives an expedition against Arpad, but this is really the expedition against Unqi and the south of the Annals. For 739, "against Ulluba", the only reference in the Annals is the casual remark that the king settled captives in that land. The display inscriptions, however, tell of the conquest of Ulluba and Kirhu and the foundation of the city Ashur iqishka with which Rost rightly compares the "fortress founded" of our text. The only references to Nal, given under 736, in the slab inscriptions, are clearly to be connected with the Ulluba campaign of 739 of which this is obviously the continuation. There is no part of the Annals to correspond to this, as all the data in 177 ff. refer to the Urartu campaign of 735. It would appear that we must take the Pilishta of 734 as Palestine and not as the land of the Philistines, for strategical considerations are opposed to an expedition against them before the ones against

1 Rost, Die Keilschripttexte Tiglat-Pileser; cf. Anspacher, Tiglath Pileser.
3 Ann. 92 ff.
4 Ibid. 133.
5 Slab I, 28; II, 41; Clay I, 43.
6 L. c
7 Slab I, 28; II, 41.
Damascus the two following years, and moreover we cannot discover in the Annals anything but a Damascus expedition after that against Urartu. Sapia, the land attacked in 731, is not in the Annals, so we may with much probability date that document to the preceding year, 732. On the other hand, the Clay Inscription¹ deals most fully with the events of the year, and accordingly its composition may be dated immediately after. The “in the land” of 730 naturally is to be attributed to the settlement of Babylon and as naturally leads the next year to the “seizing the hands of Bel”. When the Babylonian Chronicle² and the king lists³ date the accession of Tiglath Pileser to the Babylonian throne to 728, they are merely postdating. Whether the beginning of the second statement under 728 is to be restored as “Tyre . . .” may be left an open question.

It has already been pointed out that the city attacked in 727 must be assigned to the reign of Tiglath Pileser, as it is placed before the accession of Shalmaneser in our document, and we know that he reached the throne late in the year. The mutilated place name here must be restored as “Damascus”⁴. The “in the land” of the next year seems to point to some sort of internal troubles. The curious triangular agreement on the basis of which Samaria is to be restored in the blanks for the next three years has long ago been pointed out⁵.

For the reign of Sargon, we have the data given in the fragment Rm. 2, 97, this part of which has already been discussed by the present writer in his Sargon⁶. For the actual process of reconstruction and especially for the dating of the lines by the traces of the cities governed by the eponyms, reference must be made to this work. Here, only the data of interest for the document as a whole will be considered. Agreements with the official annals, at least with the later form of it which has alone come down to us with a fair de-

¹ II R. 67.
⁴ The Di, omitted by later editors, was evidently clear in the time of G. Smith, Trans. Soc. Bibl. Arch. II, 321ff.
⁶ Sargon, 15, n. 45.
gree of completeness, are not so frequent as in other reigns. For example, the Manna reference under 718 is given under 716 in the Annals, but this account on the face of it covers more than one year. The "governors appointed" of 717 may refer either to the settlement of Carchemish or of Manna. The next year has a reference to Musasir and then to Haldia, but as the latter has no determinative, it is left open to doubt whether it is the god of that name, or a unique occurrence of the native name of the land which the Assyrians called Urartu. Another expedition against Musasir is listed under 713. "The nobles in the land of Ellipa" seems a reference to the events of Annals 83ff. Although the Annals has an expedition for each year, our document under 712 has "in the land", and this alone would make us doubt the accuracy of our official annals. With 711, "against Markasa", we have for the first time an exact chronological agreement with our Annals, and the two following, "to Bit Zirnaid, the king was distant in Kesh", and "Sargon seized the hands of Bel", fit in with the respective events of the same years in that document. The first part of 708, "Qummuh captured", agrees with the Annals, and dates this part of that document to this year, but the second, "a governor established", has no parallel. It may refer to Babylonia. "The king returned from Babylonia", seems to be a reference to his return to meet the Cimmerian invasion. "He of Dur Iakin went out", and "Dur Iakin was destroyed" for 706 and 705 must refer to Merodach Baladan, but they can hardly be connected with the account in Sargon's Annals. Rather do they form the prologue and the result of the first expedition of Sennacherib, while "the nobles into Karalla" must refer to the events of his second expedition, for the conquered tribes are annexed to the province of Arrapha.

1 Sargon, Ann. 52ff.
2 Ibid. 50.
3 Ibid. 52ff.
4 Ibid. 208ff.
5 Ibid. 228ff.
6 Ibid. 388ff.
7 Cf. Olmstead, Sargon, 157. — Thureau-Dangin, Huitième Campagne de Sargon, xiv, places the whole set of events referred to in the Urartu letters in the time of Rusash.
8 Bellino 5ff.
9 Ibid. 20ff.
There is still another fragment, seemingly fitting the one just described but unfortunately the actual text seems never to have been published. Under 701, our authorities tell us, it had "from the land of Halzi"; under 700, there is a reference to "Ashur nadin shum, the crown prince", who was later killed in Babylonia, and we have also a notice of the building of the walls of the palace Qabal ali, a part of Nineveh, of Kalhu, and of the city of Dargitu; and Bel shanaia, governor of Kurban, is also mentioned.

In addition to these purely historical facts, there is a certain number of references to religious events which show the religious leanings of the compiler. These are "the great god went to Der", in 815 and 785; the return from that city in 834; the "foundations of the temple of Nabu were laid" in 788, and seemingly in 722; the resulting "Nabu entered a new house" 787 and 721; and the same statements in regard to the house of Nergal in 719 and 714. With Winckler, we must restore under 704 "the gods of Shumer and Akkad] to their houses returned". Perhaps here too belongs the "former" of 702.

These are all the known fragments of the chronological table we call the Assyrian Chronicle. But, before closing this article, we must glance for a moment at another document of this character, the fragment K. 4446. This is somewhat more literary in type and is at times so close to the Babylonian Chronicle that one may be used to restore the other. Like the Assyrian Chronicle, it has been long known and often published or referred to, but, as certain corrections and improvements have never been incorporated, it too will be given at the close of the article. As for its translation, this should run about as follows:

708 In the eponymy of Shamash upahhir, governor of Kirruri . . . .
the nobles to the city of Qummuhi [went . . .
707 In the eponymy of Sha Ashur dubbu, governor of Tushha[n, the king from Babylon] returned. The

2 Keilinschr. Bibl., III, 2, 147.
3 Cf. Olmstead, Sargor, 15.
4 K. 4446; II, R. 69, 6; Schrader, op. cit., I, 214f.; Rogers, Parallels, 238.
great gods who were captur[ed to their houses returned.] On Tashritu 22, the gods of Dur Sharruken [to new houses entered?]

706 In the eponymy of Mutakkil Ashur, governor of Guzana, the king...
On Aru 6, the city of Dur Sharruken had its foundations laid.

705 In the eponymy of Upahhir Bel, governor of Amedi,.....
Against Eshpae the Kulummite.....
A hostile king the camp of the king of Assyria [took.]
On Abu 12, Sennacherib [ascended the throne.]

704 In the eponymy of Nabu din epush, governor of Niveveh,.....
The cities of Larak and Sarabanu [were taken.]
The palace of the city of Kakzi, which was being built, had its foundation laid.

Great.....

The Assyrian Chronicle.

860 Taβ Bel ša Sulman ašarid mar Asur našir apal išna kussi ittušib

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859 Šarru balti(?) niše
858 Sulman ašarid šar Ašur
857 Ašur bel ukin (amelu) turtanu
856 Ašur bana usur (amelu) rab bi lub
855 Abu ina ekallı lilbur (amelu) nagir ekallı
854 Dan Ašur (amelu) turtanu
853 Šamaš abua (amelu) šaknu ša (alu) Našibna ¹
852 Šamaš bel usur ša (alu) Kalha
851 Bel bana (amelu) nagir ekallı
850 Ḥadi lipušu ša (alu).....?
849 Šergal alik pani ša...
848 Bir Ramana ša.....

(End of 82-5-22, 526)

¹ The fact that we here, and here only, have šaknu prefixed to the ša and the name of the province seems to point to this being the first reference to a governor of a province, in other words, that 860 probably marks the real beginning of the document. — The form Našibna here and in 833 is curious, not so much in view of the form later used, Našibina, as of the present day form Nišibin.
847 Nibin mukin niše [ša…] ana Iaeti
846 Nibin nadin šum [ša…] ana Hätte
845 Ašur bana 1 [ša…] ana Nairi
844 Taša Nibin [ša…] ana Namri
843 Taklak ana šarrī 2 [ša…] ana Ḥamanu

(Beginning of Rm. 2, 97)

842 Adad rimani [ša…] ana Dimašja
841 Bel abua [ša Aḫi šuḫina an[a Kule]
840 Šulmu bel lumur [ša] Rašappa ana(matu)K[umu]hi
839 Nibin kibsi usur [ša Aḫi] (naru) Su- ana (matu) Danabi
 hina

838 Nibin ila [ša] Salmat 3 ana (matu) Tabali
837 Kurdi Ašur 4 [ša Ki]rruri ana (matu) Melidi
836 Sep šarrī [ša Njinua ana (matu) Namri
835 Nergal mudammik abarakku 5 ana (matu) Kue
834 Iaḫalu [ša Kakzi ana (matu) Kue
[robute] ana (matu) ilu rabu ištu (alu)
Kue Diri ittaška

833 Ulula [ša Naši]bna ana (matu) Urarṭi
832 Niš pati Bel [ša Kal]hi ana (matu) Unki
831 Nergal ila [ša Arba]la ana (matu) Ulluba
830 Huba [ša Mazamu]a ana (matu) Manna
829 Ilu mukin aḥi [ša…] siḫu

(V. l. — —)

828 Sūlman asarid šar [Ašur] siḫu
827 Dan Ašur [(amelu) turtanu] 6 siḫu
826 Ašur bana usur [(amelu) rab bi lub] siḫu

1 Is Ashur bana the same as the Ashur bana usur of 856? S. 726 = J. 926
is dated in the limmu of Ashur ban . . . . Johns, Deeds, I, 561, dates 846
and reads Ashur bani ai usur, but this begs the question of identity.

2 S. 736 places before Ashur ban . . . another eponym Taklak . . . . In
spite of its position, this must refer to 843 as the next earlier Taklak . . . .
is in 886.

3 Cf. for reading the river Salmat of the letter Rm. 2, 3; Olmstead,
Sargon, 154, n. 29.
4 We can hardly identify him with the eponym of the same name in
873 or in 767.

5 Johns, Deeds, II, 94, is evidently making a slip when he makes Dan
Ashur a tušulu in 854.

6 For the titles in 827—824 cf. under 854, 856, 834, and 851 respectively.
825 Iahalu
824 Bel bana

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823 Šamši Adad
822 Iahalu
821 Bel dan
820 Ninib upaḫḫir
819 Šamaš ila
818 Nergal ila

(End of Rm. 2, 27; beginning of K. 51)

817 Ašur bana uṣur
816 Niṣ pati Bel
815 Bel balaṭ
814 Mušikniš
813 Ninib ašarid
812 Šamaš kumua
811 Bel kata šabat

(Beginning of 81-2, 4, 187)

910 Adad nirari
809 Nergal ila
808 Bel dan
807 Šil Bel
806 Ašur taklak

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1 The Bel dan of 750, 744, and 734 is a younger and less important person.

2 By their order, the eponyms for 820-819 must have been palace officials. All are represented but the abarakku and šaknu, so these must be the ones required. As the abarakku precedes the šaknu in 806-805, this order should be followed here. Comparison of the two groups may assist us in restoring the mutilated name in 805. The official here was šaknu, the same office we have secured for 819, and as the eponym for this year was Shamash ila, we restore this for 805 as the traces very well fit this name. It need hardly be pointed out that Shamash ila is not the same person as Shamshi ila.

3 Sayce, ad loc., restores [turta]nu, but this fits neither the traces nor the order. The sign gu seems an obvious error in copying. The easiest restoration would be Kjalu on the basis of 832, though we must admit the possibility of Amedi which likewise follows Našibina in 800.

4 Barta, ad loc., reads turtanu, which agrees with neither traces nor order.
805 Šamaš ila
804 Nergal ereš
803 Ašur balti niše
802 Ninib ila

801 Šep Ištar
800 Marduk šimani
799 Mutakkil Marduk
798 Bel tarşi Nabu
797 Ašur bel ušur
796 Marduk šaduni
795 Kin abua
794 Mannu ki (matu)

Ašur
793 Muşallim Ninib
792 Bel ikišani
791 Šep Šamaš
790 Ninib mukin ahi
789 Adad mušammir
788 Šil Ištar

[(amelu) ša]knu
[ša R]ašappa
[ša (a)]lu Arbaḫa
ša (alu) Aḫi (naru)
ša (alu) Našibina
ša (alu) Amedi
(amelu) rab šaḳe
ša (alu) Kallī
ša (matu) Kirruri
ša (alu) Salmat
ša (matu) Tušhan
ša (alu) Guzana
ša (alu) Tille
ša (alu) Meḥiniš
ša (alu) Isana
ša (alu) Ninua
ša (alu) Kakzi
ša (alu) A[rba]ulya

ana (alu) Ḥazazi
ana (alu) Basli
ana eli tamtim mutanu
ana (alu) Hubuška
ana Mada
ana Mada
ana (matu) Lusia
ana (matu) Namri
ana (alu) Manṣuate
ana (alu) Deri
ana Mada
ana Mada
ana(Matu)Hubuška
ana (matu) Itu’a
ana Mada
ana Mada
(uššu ša bet Nabu
ša Nin)ua karru

1 For restoration of name of eponym, cf. p. 362 n. 2.
2 K. 3042 = J. 1077 from the time of Sargon, refers to the limmu of Mannu ki Ašur, in the time of Adad nirari, VIII, 10; K. 2655, Smith, Canon, 81, and K. 310 = J. 651 are dated in his year.
3 The insertion of Guzana in the list, between Tushhan and Tille, seems to have been based on topographical considerations, if Tille is really the Til at the junction of the eastern and western Tigris.
4 The section 789-785 is based on K. 51, supplemented in 788 by 81-2-4, 187, the portion in parenthesis. So far as preserved, the two agree exactly as regards the events, but differ in the dating. The error in 81-2-4, 187 can easily be explained. The initial error took place when the scribe started to put down the line for 785, which began with the name of Marduk shar ušur, but when he began to write the second section, his eye wandered to the very similar Nabu shar ušur of the next line and so he completed the line with the second and third parts of 784. Nabu shar ušur was then given 787, displacing Balatu, and the loss of 785 forced the scribe to antedate by a year all the events to 789. The eponym list Rm. 580, quoted by Bezold, ad loc., follows 81-2-4, 187, in giving Nabu shar ušur for 787, an interesting proof of interdependence.
5 The reading is by no means certain as only two horizontal hastae remain. These might be remains of the sign Ap, and Arbaḫa was at first considered. But in 759 Arbaḫu comes after Ninua and Kakzi as here and so this is made almost certain.
787 Balatu  
786 Adad uballit  
785 Marduk šar ušur  
784 Nabu šar ušur  
783 Ninib našir  
782 Nabu li  
781 Sulman ašarid  
780 Šamši ilu  
779 Marduk rimani  
778 Bel lišir  
777 Nabu išid ukin  
776 Pan Ašur lamur  
775 Nergal ereš  
774 Ištar duri  
773 Mannu ki Adad  
772 Ašur bel ušur  
771 Ašur dan  
770 Šamši ilu  
769 Bel ila  
768 Aplia  
767 Kurdi Ašur  
766 Mušallim Ninib  
765 Ninib mukin niše  
764 Șidki ilu  
763 Bur Sagale

ša (alu) [Šibaniba]  
ša (alu) Rijm tiesi  
ša [Parnunna]  
ša [Kurb]an  
š[a] Maz]amua  
š[a Našibjina  
[šar A]sur  
[(amel)u turt]janu  
[(amel)u) rab bji lub  
[(amel)u] nagire]kalli  
[(amelu)] abarakku  
[(amelu] šak]nu  
[ša R]asappa  
[ša Našij]bina  
[ša Sa]limat  
[ša Kal]hi  
š[ar [Ašur] (ki)  
[(amelu turt]]janu  
ša (alu) Arbaqa  
ša (alu) [Maz]amua  
ša (alu) Aḫi] [naru]  
ša (alu) [šušteda]  
ša (alu) [Tille]  
[ša] (matu) Kirruri  
[ša] (matu) Tušač  
[ša] (alu) Guzana  
ana Mada Nabu ana  
bet ešši etarab  
ana (matu) Kiš[i] (ki)  
ana Ḫubuškia ḫulu  
ana (alu) Deri ittalak  
ana(matu) Ḫubuškia  
ana (matu) Itu  
ana (matu) Itu  
ana (matu) Urarti  
ana (matu) Urarti  
ana (matu) Urarti  
ana (matu) Urarti  
ana (matu) Urarti  
ana (matu) Erini  
ana (matu) Urarti  
(matu) Namri  
ana (alu) Dimashka  
ana (alu) Ḫatarika  
ana (alu) Gananati  
ana (alu) Marrat  
ana (matu) Itu  
in a mati  
ana(matu) Gananati  
in a mati  
an Mada  
an(a)matu) Ḫatarika  
mutanu  
in a mati  
in mu ina Anu) Ašur  
in a Simanu šamšu  
atala ištakan

1 The reading Balatu is proved by K. 2829 = J. 653, dated in the limmu of Balatu of (alu) Šibaniba, a welcome restoration of our text.  
2 Identification with the Ištar duri of 714 is not probable.  
3 Bezold, Catalogue, ad K. 290 et al., ascribes a number of documents dated in the limmu of Ašur bel ušur, to 773 (sic), but Johns, Deeds, I, 561, rightly dates them to 695.
Tab Bel 762 [ša] (alu) Amedi siḫu ina (alu) Aršur
Nabu mukin abī 761 [ša] (alu) Ninua siḫuina(alu)Arbaštā
Lašipu 760 [ša] (alu) Kakzi siḫuina(alu)Arbaštā
Pan Ašur lamur 759 [ša] (alu) Arbailu siḫuina(alu)Guzana mutanu
Bel taklak 758 [ša (alu) Isana ana (alu) Guzana šulmu ina mati
Ninib iddinna 757 [ša (alu) Kurbān ina mati
Bel šadua 756 [ša] Parnunna ina mati
Ikišu 755 [ša] Meḫiniš ana (matu) Ḫata-
Ninib -šezišani 754 [ša] Rūmūs ana (matu) Arpadda ištī (alu) Aršur tairītu

Ašur nirari 753 [šar] Ašur ina mati
Šamši ilu 752 [(amelō) tur]tanu ina mati
Marduk šallimani 751 [(amelō) nagir] ina mati ekallī
Bel dan 2 750 [(amelō) ra]b bi lub ina mati
Šamaš ken dugul 749 [(amelō)] abarakku ana (matu) Namri
Adad bel ukin 3 748 [(amelō)] šaknu ana (matu) Namri
Sin šallimani 4 747 [ša] Rašappa ina mati
Nergal naṣir 746 [ša (alu) Naṣibina siḫu ina (alu) Kalḫi

(End of 81-2-4, 187)

Nabu bel uṣur 745 [ša] (alu) Arbaštā ina Aru XIII Tukulti apal ēšarra ina kussi itušīb ina Tašritu ana bištīt nari ittalak

(V. 1. — — —)

Bel dan 744 [ša] (alu) Kalḫi ana (matu) Namri

(V. 1. — — —)

Tukulti apal ēšarra [ša]r Ašur 743 ina (alu) Arpadda diktam ša (matu) Urartī dikat

1 Here and in the next line K. 3403 (alu) for (matu).
2 Bel dan appears in K. 6069, according to Johns, Deeds, I, 562.
3 There is a variant reading, Ašur bel ukin, but the Adad bel ukin of 758 proves this correct.
4 Sin šallimani occurs in K. 326 = J. 412, and as Sin mushal[limani in K. 976 = J. 67.
742 Nabu daninani\(^1\) (amelu) turtanu ana (alu) Arpadda
741 Bel Ḫarran bel ULATION (amelu) nagir ekalli ana (alu) III šanati kašid
740 Nabu eširani (amelu) rab bi lub ana (alu) Arpadda
739 Sin taklak (amelu) abarakku ana (matu),Ulluba
738 Adad bel ukin (alu) šaknu (alu) Birtu šabtat
737 Bel emurani ša (alu) Rašappa (alu) Kullani kašid
736 Ninib ila ša (alu) Našibina ana Mada
735 Ašur šallimani ša (matu) Arbaša ana šepa (šadu) Nal
734 Bel dan\(^2\) ša (alu) Kalha ana (matu) Urašti
733 Ašur daninani\(^3\) ša (alu) Mazamaša ana (matu) Pilipša
dašša (alu) Sišme ana (matu) Dimaška
732 Nabu bel ULLET ša (alu) Ahi (naru) ana (alu) Sapi
731 Nergal uballit ša (alu) Aššušina

Sultina
730 Bel ludari\(^4\) ša (alu) Tile ina mati
729 Napfar iluš ša (matu) Kirruri šarru kara Bel išṣabat
728 Dur Ašur ša (alu) Tušhan šarru kara Bel išṣabat (alu) Sjurri?

727 Bel Ḫarran bel ULLET ša [G]uzana ana (alu)\(^6\) Dišmarša
726 Marduk bel ULLET ša Amešdi ina kussi ittušib
725 Mašde ša Ninua išna mati
724 Ašur šimani ša [K]akzi ana (matu)\(^6\) [Sammerina
723 Sulman ašarid\(^7\) šar Ašur (ki) an[a] Samarina

a[n]a Samarina

(Beginning of Rm. 2, 97)

\(^1\) K. 422 = J. 75 is dated in the limmu of Nabu] daninani tur[tanu] tarši Tukulti apal ešarra.
\(^2\) K. 378 = J. 90, limmu Bel dan ina šane purišu; cf. Rm. 2, 19 = J. 415 where to this is added “governor of Kalhu”.
\(^3\) Ašur daninani has the unusual honor of being mentioned in the royal inscriptions, Slab. II, 27; Clay I, 42, as the governor who led an expedition against the Medes, evidently in his character of governor of Mazamaša.
\(^4\) Bel ludari is eponym in K. 369 = J. 295; K. 384 = J. 1; Rm. 2, 194 = J. 658.
\(^5\) Naphar ila governor of Kirruri is eponym in Rm. 187 = J. 195.
\(^7\) K. 407 = J. 395 is dated in the limmu of Shalmaneser King of Assyria.
722 Ninib ila

[(amelu) turtanju] [uššu ša bet Nabu kar'ru]

721 Nabu tariṣ

[(amelu) nagir ekalli (?)] Nabu ana bet ešši ejtarab

720 Ašur iška dan

[(amelu) turtanu] ana Ta'bala

(V. l. — — —)

719 Šarruken ³

[šar Ašur] uššu ša bet Ner]gal karru

718 Zer ibni

[(amelu) rab bi lub] ana (alu) Manna

717 Šab šar Ašur

[(amelu) abarakk] piḫati šaknu a (?) di (alu) Mušašir

716 Šab šil ešarra

[ša Ašur] Haladia

715 Taklak ana Bel

[ša Našibina] rabute ina (matu) Ellipā

714 Ištar duri

[ša Arbaḥa] Nergal ana be[t ešši

713 Ašur bani

[ša Kalḫu] etarab

712 Šarru emurani

[ša Lulume] ana] (alu) Mušašir

711 Ninib akin pani

[ša Sišem] ina mati

710 Šamaš bel ušur

[ša Ar Suḫina] ana (alu) Markasa

709 Mannu ki Ašur li'

[ša Tille] ana (alu) Bet Zer-

708 Šamaš upaḫḫir

[ša Kirruširi] na'id

707 Śa Ašur dubbu

[ša Tuššan] šarru ina Keš bedi

706 Mutakkil Ašur

[ša Guza]na Šarruken kata Bel

705 Upaḫḫir Bel

[ša Amējdi] iššabat

(V. l. — — —)

704 Nabu din ipuš

[ša Ninua] (alu) Kumuḫa kašid

[(alu) Dur Iakin nasa]

alu) peḫu šakin

šarru ištu Babi iššuḫra

ša (alu) Dur Iakin

ila]ana betatišunu

etarbu

¹ Nabu is restored on the basis of 787; for the dating of the events on the reverse of Rm. 2, 97, cf. Olmstead, Sargon, 15, n. 45.
² Turtanu is restored on the basis of K. 998, quoted Johns, Deeds, II, 69.
³ K. 3781 = J. 767 is dated in the limmu of Sargon.
⁴ For the officials, cf. K. 4446 and Olmstead, l. c.
703 Kanuna  [ša Kakzi  rabut]e ina (matu)
           Karalli
702 Nabu li'  [ša Arbailu  ....]mahra

K. 4446

708 limme [Šamaš upahhîr (amelu) şakin (matu) KIRRURI
          rabute ana (alu) Kûmuḫḫi ....
707 limme Ša Ašur dubbu (amelu) şakin (alu) Tušḫa[n
          issuḫra ilani rabuti šallut[e 1
          (araḫ) Taḫritu umu XXII (kan) ilani ša (alu) Dur
          Šarrûken
706 limme Mutakkil Ašur (amelu) şakin (alu) Guzana šarru
          MU MA
          (araḫ) Aru umu VI (kan) (alu) Dur Šarrûken karu
705 limme Upahhîr Bel (amelu) şakin (alu) Amedî
          ina muḫḫi Ešpâî 2 (amelu) Kulûmma
          šarru 2 nakru madaktam ša šar (matu) Ašur ....
          (araḫ) Abu umu XII Sin aḫe erba jina kussi
          ittušib
704 limme Nabu īn ipuš (amelu) şakin (alu) Ninua
          (alu) Larak (alu) Sarabanu
          eḫallu ša (alu) Kakzi epeš ka[ru
          rab be ka .......

1 Cf. Olmstead, *Šargön*, 146.
2 So on the original according to Delitzsch, *Beitr. z. Assyr.*, I, 615 n.;
cf. Olmstead, *Šargön*, 157, n. 44.
The Sothic Cycle used by the Egyptians. — By Francis A. Cunningham, Merchantville, N. J.

In this paper I present a new solution of a most interesting and important problem regarding the use of the Sothic Cycle by the ancient Egyptians in dating some of their monuments. This solution enables us to arrange the chronology of Egyptian history in a much more satisfactory manner than has heretofore been done and to harmonize the lists of Manetho and the monuments.

It is universally conceded that the Cycle used was a cycle determined by the Heliacal Rising of the Dog Star Sirius, known to the Greeks as Sothis, on the First of the month Thoth of the civil calendar of the Egyptians. If this calendar had remained always the same there would be little difficulty in arriving at fixed dates in the History of Egypt, but this was not the case. The same difficulty presents itself in Babylonian History where a 360-day year was in vogue. Using as the Egyptians did first a year of 360 days, but later a year of 365 days by the addition of the Epagomenae, a little month of five days, they failed to take into account the fraction of a day needed to make up the true year, 365 days decimal .24239, about eleven minutes longer than the civil year. This difference of almost one-quarter of a day gave rise to the Sothic Cycle.

In 1460 Sirius years, 1461 Civil years elapsed. The Sirius year was a little longer than the Civil year and practically equal to the Julian year, owing to the precessional movement. The Rising of Sirius, heliacally, annually, dropped back on the Civil year one day in four years. This was called a Tetramene and no date can be given more exactly than within four years. The statements on the monuments give the day in the Civil year on which the Rising took place. From this we can find the number of days from the beginning of the Civil year and multiplying by four we get the number of years
that have elapsed since the beginning of the Sothic Cycle. This would be simple enough if the Civil Calendar had always remained the same, but that it was changed in order to make it agree with the seasons cannot be doubted, as Lockyer clearly shows.

I shall add an additional proof. The latest date arrived at, by Dr. Breasted, for the 7th year of Senusert (Usertsen) III, 1872-76 B.C., is based upon the use of a Cycle calculated backwards from 1321 B.C. Julian. This Cycle would begin 2781 B.C. That it was not in vogue among the Egyptians prior to 1321 we have certain knowledge, as will be shown. In determining the first use of the Sothic Cycle, lacking monumental evidence, we should consider what prominent event would lend itself pre-eminently as a starting point. In the first place we have the annual rise of the River Nile, which took place each year at the same time at the Summer Solstice, and the observation of the Dog Star Sirius, the Greek Sothis, known as the Heliacal Rising of Sothis, occurring exactly at the same time each year Julian.

These would present suitable starting points for calculating the lapse of time. How much more suitable would be the combination of the three. Now we find that the Heliacal Rising of Sothis, the Summer Solstice, and the annual rise of the river Nile coincided in the year 3000 B.C. Julian in the latitude of Memphis on July 18 Julian, according to Oppolzer. I am firmly convinced that the founders of the Monarchy came from Babylonia, and brought with them the astronomical knowledge acquired from the Chaldeans, and that the priests became observers of the heavenly bodies in the Temples of Egypt as they had been in Chaldea, and proofs are not wanting to substantiate this position.

Assume, therefore, in the absence of direct evidence that the year 3004, to be within the limit of accuracy, was the year in which the Heliacal Rising of Sothis took place on the First Thoth of the Civil year and hence the beginning of a Sothic Cycle. According to my chronology this was about the 30th year of Menes, whose true name was Ea: Thoth. We must now consider how this assumption agrees with the known facts derived from the monuments.

First, we have a notice of the Heliacal Rising of Sothis in a papyrus found at Kahun from which we learn that the Rising
took place in the seventh year, eighth month, sixteenth day of the fourth winter month that is sixteenth of Pharmuthi. Calculating in the usual way we have 7 (mos.) times 30 equals 210 days plus 16 equals 226 days. 226 (days) times 4 equals 904 years from the beginning of the Cycle. 3004 minus 904 gives us 2100 B.C. as the date sought for. This is the fourth year of a tetramene 2103-2100 B.C. Julian. My date for the seventh year Usertsen III is 2105, obtained by dead reckoning, a result which is marvellously close. The next notice occurs in the Papyrus Ebers where it is stated that in the ninth year of a certain king, supposed by many to be Ser-Kepher-ra, Amenhotep I., by Lieblein to be Beon a Hyksos King, whilst I maintain that the proper rendering of the name, which is difficult to decipher, should be Uat-Kepher-ra—Kames, the Heliacal Rising of Sirius took place on the Ninth Day of the Eleventh month or the 9th of Epiphi. From this we have 3004—1236—1768 as the date. For many reasons this result cannot be correct and we are compelled to suspect that some change in the Calendar had taken place. The question is, when and by whom was a change made?

In a notice attached to the Shepherd King Asseth we have the statement by Anianus that “this one added the five Epagomenae to the year”. Now we know that they were in use long before his time, at least as far back as the beginning of the Twelfth dynasty. It indicates, however, that Asseth did something to the calendar by adding days to the year. Moreover, we have another indication preserved by Nigidius Figulus regarding the kings after the Hyksos, namely that “each Egyptian King on his accession to the throne bound himself by oath before the priest of Isis in the temple of Ptah in Memphis not to intercalate either days or months, but to retain the year of 365 days as established by the Antiqui”. My date for Asseth is 1744 B.C. Using the Cycle of 3004, the Heliacal Rising of Sothis took place in that year, 3004-1744 = 1260 years for the elapsed period which, divided by 4 gives us 315 days, or in other words, it occurred on the 15th of the 11th month, or 15th of Epiphi. If, therefore, Asseth undertook to correct the civil calendar he would probably start a new cycle. How? By making the Heliacal Rising of Sothis begin again as of 1st of Epiphi, which would practically be adding 15 days to the Civil year at that time.
Taking again the notice of the 9th of Epiphi, we will have 9 times $4 = 36$ years to 1st of Epiphi. Deducting 36 from 1744 when the change would be made, we will have 1708 B.C. as the date of the notice, according to my chronology, taking place in the 9th year of Uat-Kepher-ra—Kames.

The next notice confirms this conjecture. An inscription of Thothmes III states that the Heliacal Rising of Sothis occurred on the 28th of Epiphi. 28 times $4 = 162$, the number of years since 1st of Epiphi, which gives the date 1632 B.C. The tetramene 1635-2 includes the date 1634 B.C., which is my date for the 3d year of Thothmes III when a 30-year Sed Festival took place, and which was probably the cause of the inscription being made.

The change made by Asseth would create a Cycle calculated backwards beginning in 2944 and ending in 1484 B.C., which date happens to be the 3d year of Rathotis and also the occurrence of a 30-year Sed Festival. This new Cycle was the Cycle used by Meneptah Hotephima son of Rameses II, as we shall see. The very name of the King Ra Thoth seems to be connected with a new Cycle beginning with the 1st of the month Thoth.

The notice of Meneptah II in his 2nd year states that the Heliacal Rising took place on the 29th of Thoth. 29 times 4 equals 116 years. 1484 minus 116 gives us 1368 B.C. as the date. I have strong reasons for suspecting that this date should be 1364 B.C., as a 30-year Sed Festival occurred in that year. This is extremely close and seems to prove that Meneptah made use of a Cycle beginning 1484 B.C. in the reign of Rathotis. Taking up the next notice we find that another change must have been made in the civil calendar, and it is this change that was not taken into account in arriving at the date for Usertesen III 1881 B.C. This notice is found in the tomb of Rameses VI, where it is stated that the Heliacal Rising took place on 1st of Paophi, year of reign not given. Comparing this with the notice in Meneptah's 2nd year we find the dates only two days apart, 29th Thoth to 1st Paophi. As each day counts four years in the Cycle, we have 8 years as the interval between them. Needless to remark, this is clearly impossible. The interval between the two dates cannot be less than 150 years.

What results from this? It shows absolutely that a change
in the calendar has taken place, and that the notice of Me-
neptah cannot refer to the same Cycle as that of Rameses VI. The latter, doubtless, referred to the Cycle of Censorinus, better known as the Era of Menophres beginning 1321 B.C. Julian. The Era of Menophres, contrary to the attempts of many to identify it with the name of a king, for example, with Men-pehti-ra Rameses I., is not named from a king, but from a place. In other words, Menophres is the Greek rendering of the name of the city of Memphis, Menofer with the usual "s" added, and indicates that the Era of Menophres was established at Memphis when the Civil Calendar was a second time corrected by making the Heliacal Rising in that year, 1321 B.C., count as of 1st Thoth in the Civil Year, whilst in the old Cycle it would fall on the 11th of Paophi in the close of the reign of Menepthah II, or beginning of the reign of Seti Menepthah II. The names of these sovereigns betray a more intimate connection with Memphis, where Ptah was worshipped, than with Thebes, where Amen ruled supreme.

The notice of the Heliacal Rising on the 1st of Paophi fixes the date 1197 B.C., as the 12th year of Rameses VI.

The close of the Cycle falls in 139 A.C. During this time there are evidences of various changes in the Calendar, but as they do not appear to have been generally accepted, we may dismiss them for the present. My conclusions are that the Cycle used by the Egyptians was a Sothic Cycle beginning in 3004 B.C. Julian; that a change was made in the Civil Calendar under Asseth, by adding 15 days to the year in 1744; and that a second change was made in 1321, when 11th of Paophi began again as of 1st of Thoth.
The Kashmirian Atharva Veda, Book Six.—Edited, with critical notes, by Franklin Edgerton, Ph. D., Assistant-Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

Prefatory.—Professor Leroy Carr Barret, of Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, has for some years been occupied in editing the text of the Atharva Veda in the Paippalāda recension. He has already published Books 1, 2 and 3; see this Journal, 26. 197ff., 30. 187ff., and 32. 343ff. At his kind suggestion I have undertaken to help a little in his slow and laborious task by editing Book Six. Needless to say, I should not have taken such a step without a suggestion from him. And I am indebted to him not only for the initial impulse, but also for many helpful hints—both as to general method, and in regard to troublesome details. Editing the Paippalāda is a task of very peculiar difficulty (for reasons which Barret has fully set forth), and success can be hoped for only within certain limits—alas, much narrower limits than we should all desire. But such success as I may have attained is certainly greater than it would have been without Barret’s generous assistance.

I have adhered strictly to the general principles of procedure laid down by Barret. To be convinced of their soundness one need only try for himself a very little of the work of editing this exasperating manuscript. As Barret has made clear, this can only be regarded as a preliminary publication; we are still far from being ready for anything like a final edition. It has been one of my first aims to present a strictly accurate transliteration of the text. This is printed throughout in heavy black-faced or Clarendon type, as in Barret’s edition of Books 2 and 3.

In one slight point of typography I have deviated from Barret’s custom. He keeps each line of the manuscript distinct in his
transliteration by always beginning a new line of the transliteration at a point where a new line begins in the ms. I hav hoped to accomplish the same end, and to indicate at the same time (for handy reference to the ms.) the exact line on the page which begins at the spot, by putting in the line-number in parenthesis. When a new folio or page begins, I hav introduced in like manner the number of the folio and the letter of the page (a for obverse, b for reverse), with the numeral 1—indicating the first line of the page. These indications of page and line of the ms., being not part of the transliteration, ar not in Clarendon type. I trust their meaning will be clear to the reader. Thus, hymn 1 begins in folio 90a, line 10; accordingly the first word of its transliteration is preceded by (90a, 10). Where line 11 begins, in the middle of the word jyeṣṭham, (11) is inserted, and so on down to càrcate in vs 6, after which comes (90b, 1), indicating that the reverse side of folio 90 begins here.

In some hymns, where it seemed simpler to indicate the verse division in the transliteration itself, I hav done so by introducing at the end of a verse its numeral, in parenthesis, and preceded by the abbreviation ‘vs’ = verse. This is done, for instance, in hymn 3. The use of ‘vs’ will distinguish these numbers from the numbers of the lines of the ms., and the use of ordinary type instead of Clarendon will make it clear that they, too, ar introductions of my own, and do not represent anything found in the ms. The ms., as a rule, does not represent verse-divisions in any way (see below), and when it does use a mark of punctuation I hav always preserved the same in my transliteration. Let it be borne in mind that the Clarendon type represents the literal transliteration of the ms. throughout.

I believe that all my other signs and abbreviations will be self-explanatory, especially to one who is already familiar with Barret's text. Ç means Çāunakiya, the vulgate text of the Atharva Veda: P or Ppp means Paippalāda: ms. means manuscript: z means a period, and a vertical bar a colon. Following Barret's custom, I hav represented the jihvāmāliya and upadhāmiya in my transliteration by s; they ar only used occasionally in the ms. In editing the text I hav substituted ḫ for them, for the sake of uniformity.
Introduction.

The manuscript.—This sixth book of the Kashmirian ms. begins on folio 90a, line 9, and ends on folio 97b, line 17. It therefore consists of about 15 1/2 pages, or a little less than 8 folios of the manuscript. Nearly every one of these pages contains exactly 19 lines; a few hav 20. The ms. is in this part complete and undamaged.

Divisions in the manuscript. — Book Six is composed of 4 anuvākas; anu 3 contains 7 hymns, the others contain 5 each, making 22 hymns in all. The division of the hymns is always clearly and correctly markt in the ms., and in all but three cases the number of the hymn in its anuvāka is given—always correctly. The ms. does not attempt to number the hymns consecutively through the book.

The stanzas, on the other hand, are not divided with any regularity in the ms., and are never numberd. Often a mark of punctuation, a colon or less often a period (represented in the transliteration by | and z respectively), is put at the end of a verse—as also frequently at the end of a half-verse; but these marks are more often omitted, and sometimes they are wrongly inserted in the middle of a half-verse. In my transliteration I hav strictly followed the ms. in this matter, as in others; but in editing the text I hav introduced punctuation when it seems to be required, without comment.

Peculiarities of the text as written.—The lack of verse-division in the ms. makes it not infrequently hard to ascertain with certainty the end of one verse and the beginning of the next. Sometimes failure to observe sandhi, or the use of the virāma, indicates a verse-end; cf. Barret, JAOS 30. 188f., 32. 344. These guides must however be used with great caution. The matter is further complicated by several peculiarities in the method of writing the text. Thus:

1. When a stanza has occurred previously in the text of the Pāippalāda itself, only the first words are written, followed by 'ity ekā'. This practice was first noted by Barret in Book 3 (JAOS 32. 344). Neither Barret nor I feel certain at present as to just what 'ity ekā' stands for; Barret suggests possibly ity ekarcam ('thus to the extent of one verse') or the like. At any rate, it means that the verse is to be supplied in full from a previous occurrence in this same text. It occurs three
times in Book 6, viz.: 7. 5 (where by mistake ity aki is written in the ms.), 11. 1 and 22. 20.

2. When several consecutive stanzas contain repetitions of the same pada or padas, the text is frequently abbreviated in some way. The simplest case is that in which a refrain is carried from one stanza to another. The refrain may be omitted altogether in the stanzas following the first, without any indication that it is to be supplied except the sense, which seems to require it: so in 5. 2-12 incl., 18. 2-5, 19. 2-8 (supply the 5th pada), and probably 14. 2-5. Or, the first word or words of the refrain may be written—with or without a mark of punctuation: so in 6. 6, 17. 3-9 incl., and 19. 5-8 incl. (where the beginning of the 3d pada is written). In either case the ms. always writes the refrain out in full with the first and the last verses where it occurs.

3. Sometimes when the beginning and the end of juxtaposed verses are identical, only some words in the middle being different, the text abbreviates by leaving out most of the identical portions in all verses after the first, or in all except the first and last; only the new parts of the other stanzas, with perhaps the adjoining words of the context, are given. This seems to explain the readings found in 12. 9-11 and 15. 6.

4. Still more confusing is a way the ms. has of occasionally jumbling together several verses which are identical throughout most of their extent, but have different beginnings; in such a case it is liable to write the initial words of all the verses, one after another, and even united by sandhi as if they formed a consecutive passage,—following this up with the common conclusion.¹ That is, if one verse reads a, b, c, d, the next p, b, c, d, the next r, b, c, d, and the next t, b, c, d, the text may read thus: a, p, r, t, b, c, d. Examples are found in 11. 6-8 and 12. 1-4.

_Hymns and stanzas._—Some of these devices of abbreviation occasionally cause uncertainty about the verse-division, tho they are in the main easily detected. The state of the ms. is, however, such that even when deliberate abbreviation has not taken place, it is not always possible to divide the verses with certainty. The following figures are therefore not to be taken as absolutely accurate. They show, however, that the normal

¹ Just as at Q 8. 8. 2, see Lanman, Album Kern, 301 f.
number of stanzas in the hymns of this book is 9, and that when a hymn deviates from the norm it almost always exceeds it. Only two hymns appear to contain less than 9 stanzas. Of these one, No. 18, is uncertain, and should perhaps be read with 9 stanzas; the other, No. 21, may perhaps owe its location in this book to the fact that it is closely connected with the preceding hymn, for both deal with the same subject, and they are found juxtaposed also in C 19.

There are in Book 6—

2 hymns of 6 stanzas,
9 hymns of 9 stanzas,
3 hymns of 10 stanzas,
3 hymns of 11 stanzas,
1 hymn of 12 stanzas,
3 hymns of 13 stanzas,
1 hymn of 25 (?) stanzas,—

making in all 232 stanzas in the 22 hymns of the book.

New and Old Material.—More than half of this material is found in Vedic texts already published. 9 of the 22 hymns are found practically entire in other places: 2 others are made up of verses found in various previously known sources: 3 others contain important sections found in such sources. Only 8 may be regarded as practically new, and some of them contain, of course, occasional verses or padas found elsewhere. The Vedic Concordance now makes it easy to discover the location of these materials. When an entire hymn, or a considerable section thereof, is found elsewhere, I have called attention to the fact under the heading of the hymn: where it is a question of a single verse I have referred to the parallel passage in my editorial notes, under the verse in question. Transpositions in the order of stanzas I have not, as a rule, thought it worth while to mention; nor have I undertaken to catalog the numerous variant readings found in the parallel passages. All such matters can be easily traced with the aid of the Concordance.

As to the relation of this book to C, it cannot be said to correspond very definitely with any of C's books, though it contains more material from C 5 than from any other. Hymns 1 and 2 of C 5 are our 2 and 1 respectively, and our book reproduces more or less closely four other hymns of C 5. Besides this, it contains 1 hymn from C 2, 1 from C 4, and 2 from C 19. It contains no material from C 6. Our first hymn occurs twice
in Q, once in Book 5, and once in Book 20—in the latter place in a form much closer to the RV version of the hymn. It is noteworthy that Ppp's version of this hymn is much closer to the version found in Q 20 and in RV than to that found in Q 5.—Besides the hymn just mentiond, two other complete hymns of our book and a considerable part of a third occur in RV: one of these also occurs in full in KS. Part of another of our hymns occurs in KS, and nowhere else: still another occurs only in TB. This exhausts the list of hymns or considerable passages which ar found in other parts of the Vedic literature.

*Accents.*—Accents are never written in this book.

*Colophons.*—Of the extraneous material of the sort which Barret found in Book 3 (JAOS 32. 344f.) practically none occurs in Book 6. Only two hymns have colophons or quasi-titles stating the purpose of the preceding matter, viz. No. 13 ‘iti rākṣoghnasūktam’ and No. 22 ‘iti ārddhavrahmaṇam’. See the passages, below. A bit of brāhmaṇa-like matter seems to have crept into the text at the end of hymn 22.

ATHARVA VEDA PĀIPPALĀDA ČĀKHĀ, BOOK SIX.

(For typographical devices, signs, and abbreviations used, see p. 374f.)

(90a 9) z atha śaṣṭhaṃ kāṅḍā likhyata z z om namamo jvālā (10) bhagavatyāi z om namo tilotamāyāhī z z om Read: z atha śaṣṭhaḥ kāṇḍo likhyate z z om namo jvālāyāi bhagavatyāi z z om namas tilotamāyai z z om

With the last phrase compare the invocation of Book 2 (JAOS 30. 190f.), which Barret would now emend to om namas tilotamāyai.

1.

Mystic-Filosophical.

RV 10. 120; Q 20. 107. 4-12; Q 5. 2.

(90a 10) ud id āsa bhavaneṣu jye-(11)-ṣṭham yato jajña ugras tvecāṁnaḥ sadyo jajñāno anṛṣita ṣatruṁ anu yaṁ (12) viçve sadanty ūmāḥ vāydhānaḥ čavasaḥ bhūryojāc čatruṁ dāśāya bhīyasāṁ da-(13)-dāti āvyaya ca avyanaḥ ca sastri saṁ te navantaḥ pīpṛttāmadeṣu tve kratu-(14)-m api vrñjanti viçve dvir yad ete trir bhavanty ūmā svādos
svādiya svādunā (15) srjā sam adhas su madhu madhunābhi yodhī | iti cid vi tvā dhanā jayantāṁ (16) raṇāṁ raṇam anu madanti viprāḥ ojīyo dhṛṣṇo cicram ā tanuṣva ma tvā da- (17)-bhāṁ durayava yātudhānāḥ tvayā vayaṁ čāsadmehe raṇeṣu prapačyanto (18) yudhenyāṁ bhūri | codayāmī thā- yudhā vaçobhis saṁ te čicāmi vrhaṃṇāḥ (19) vayaṁśi | snu- şeyyaṁ puruvarpasam rtvam inatamas āptīma āptyaṅāṁ | ā čarčate (90 b 1) čavasa saptadānun pra sākṣate pratimāṇāni bhūri | nyādityadiše varam param ca (2) yasminn āvathāvasa duroṇe | ā mātara sthāpayase jighanta va ta iṃoṣi (3) karvarā purūni | imā vrhaṃ vrhaddivo vivaktīndrāya čiṣam agryas svarṣāḥ (4) maho gotrasya kṣayati svarājo durāc ca viçvā avṛṇod apa svāh eva māṁ (5) vrhaddivo tharvānocat svāṁ tanum indram eva svasāro mātarihvarī aripra hiṃva-(6) -nti ca yavasā vardhayanti ca | z 1 z

It is noteworthy that our text agrees much more closely with RV and Q 20, 107 than with Q 5, 2. It may be red as follows.

tad id āsa bhavanaṣu yeṣṭhaṁ yato jajña ugras tveṣanṛmnāḥ | sadyo jajño ni riṃati čatruṁ anu yañe viçye madanty umāḥ z 1 z

This vs occurs also in SV, VS, AA, ApC, MÇ and N (see Conc.). tad ... āsa for ud ... āsa: u and ta ar so much alike in Qār. that this change to the reading of all other texts seems cald for, in view of the fact that ud with the root as seems not to occur, altho ud with bhū is common enuf and would make good sense in this place. All other texts read bhuvaneṣu. śa is written above the line for ca in tveṣanṛmnāḥ.

vārddhānaç čavasa bhūryojāç čatruṁ dāsya bhīyasām dadhāti | avyanac ca vyanac ca saśni saṁ te navantaḥ pipṛṭa madeṣu z 2 z

The vs also occurs SV 2, 834 and AA 1, 3, 4. In pada d P’s reading seems superior to that of the other texts (navanta prabhṛta). I construe saṁ with pipṛṭa, which is for pipṛṭa (pipṛṭa) — a form which might perhaps better be inserted in our text: navantaḥ is a participle.

tve kratum api vṛṇjanti viçe dvir yad ete trir bhavanty umāḥ | svādos svādiyas svādunā srjā sam adas su madhu madhunābhi yodhāḥ z 3 z

The vs also occurs in SV, TS, AA and MÇ (see Conc.). iti cid vi tvā dhanā jayantāṁ raṇāṁ-raṇam anu madanti vi- prāḥ | ojīyo dhṛṣṇo sthiram ā tanuṣva ma tvā dabhan dureva yātudhānāḥ z 4 z
vi, construed with jayantām.—For the accus. raṇaṁ-raṇam cf. Wh. Gr. 277: or possibly it may be dependent on anu. In any case it seems unnecessary to insert the loc. as found in the parallel texts.

tvayā vayaṁ cācādharmahe raneṣu pra paçyanto yudhenyāni bhūri | codayāmi ta āyudhā vacobhis saṁ tu cīcāmi brahmaṇā vayaṁśi z 5 z

stuseyyāṁ puruvarpasam ṛḥvam inathamam āptyam āptyānāṁ| ā darṣate ṭavasā saptadānūn pra sākṣate pratimānāni bhūri z 6 z

The vs also occurs N 11. 21 (readings agreeing with RV). ā darṣate with RV, Č 10. 107. 9 and N; Č 5. 2. 6 has ā darṣati. To keep the ms reading of P seems impossible, altho some thot of the root cū may hav been in the mind of the copyist who was originally responsible for the corruption.

ni tad dadhiṣe ‘varaṁ paraṁ ca yasminn āvithāvasā durone | ā mātaras sthāpayase jighatnva ata inośi karvarā purūni z 7 z

I hav not ventured to change the ms reading in pada c (except to put jighatnva for ntva, which is hardly an emendation), altho it is bad as to form an inferior to the parallel texts as to meaning. As the text stands mātaras and jighatnvas must be construed as accusatives.

imā brahma bhraddivo vivaktindrāya cūṣam agryas svarṣāḥ | maho gotrasya kṣayati svarājo durāc ca viçvā avrnod apa svāḥ z 8 z

Perhaps read durāc with the other texts (Č 5. 2. 8 turač), rather than assume a stem durā-

evā māṁ bhraddivo ‘tharvāvocat svāṁ tanvam indram eva | svasāro mātaribhvarir aripā hinvanti ca yavasā vardhayanti ca z 9 z

Other versions hav mahān for māṁ: but the real meaning of the verse is unknown, and for aught we know svāṁ tanvam, as well as P’s māṁ, may be correlativ with indram (”me, himself and Indra”). It is very likely that we should read čavasā with the other texts in pada d.

2.
Mystic-Filosophical.
Č 5. 1.

(90b 6) vṛdhan mantra yoni no vibhāvā amṛ-(7)-tāsu sva- janmā vardhamānāḥ adubdhāsu bhrājasā iha trato dādhāra
trī-(8)-ṇi vi ni yo dharmāni | prathama svasāa ta'ī vapuniṣi
gnute puṇosi | (9) yaś ca yoniṁ prathamā viveṣa | yo vācam
anucitāṁ jīgāya yas te ṭokas ta-(10)-nvā rireca kṣuviranyo
cucayo na svā | atra dadhrṣe mṛṭāṁi nāṁsiṁ (11) vastrāṇi
ṣerayanta | pred ete prataram pūrvyaṁ gus svadhā svadhā
tiṣṭhanto duryāṁ | kari cu-(12)-ṣasya mātarā riḥāne jāmīva-
dhvaryuḥ pratimāṇamīta | tad ā se ta mahā (13) prathūrya-
sāṁ nāma kaviṣ kāvyenā kṛṇo yat samyaṇco bhyaṇco
yakṣādāmāīvoda (14) cakṛā vavardhā | sapta maryādās ka-
vayās tataktus tāsām anekāṁ abhyānhuro (15) gāt | utāmṛ-
tāsa vrte kṛṇvaṁ asurās pūtas svadhayaṁ samadgū | utā-
(16)-yu jyeṣṭho ratnā dadhāty īṛjāvāyum ca te kavir dāt
| putro vā yat pitarā kṣantu-(17)-m īnte jyeṣṭham maryādam
ahayaṁ svasti | darçaṇnu tāṁ varuṇe ca īṣṭāv āvaravra-
(18)-jata | kṛṇavo vapunṣi | ardham ardhena čavasā pṛṇacy
ardhena čūṣmam vadhhayase (19) mura | avivṛdhāma čāgnyo
sādhāyaṁ varuṇam putram aditer īśiram | kaviṣa-(20)-sthāny
asmāi vacāṁ vōcāma rodasī satyavācau z z

The appearance of this hymn in Q (5. 1) helps us little,
since the text there is very uncertain (see Wh. AV. 1. 220 ff.),
and very different from our text. I am unable to offer a
complete reconstruction of this discouraging hymn.

Vs 1: ends with dādhāra triṇī. Pada b seems practically
right: amṛtāsus svajanmā vardhamānaḥ. The second hemistic
begins adabhāsur. For the rest I am in despair; on the whole
our text looks like a corruption of Q rather than vice versa.
Cf. the Q readings, and note in WH.'s translation.

Vs 2: vi ni yo ... jīgāya. I cannot construct pada a. The
rest may plausibly be red: tato (i for to is an easy mistake
in Qār) vapūṇiṣi kṛṇute purūṇi | yaś ca yoniṁ prathamā a viveṣa
yo vācam anucitaṁ jīgāya z

Vs 3: yas te ... ṣerayanta. I can do nothing with this
verse.

Vs 4: pred ete ... pratimāṇamīta. No suggestions occur
to me.

Vs 5: tad ā se ... vavardhā. Read kṛṇomi in pada b. For
the rest I hav nothing to offer.

Vs 6: sapta ... samadgū (? The second hemistic of Q is
missing here: our c-d is Q 7 a-b). Vs 9 of Q consists of
6 padas, which makes it appear that Ppp may represent
the original form of the hymn. Nevertheless, RV (10. 5. 6) contains
this whole stanza in its Ć form. Padas a and b occur also in N. 6. 27). Padas a-b seem to need no change. Padas c-d are certainly corrupt (cf. Ć's reading, itself probably corrupt), but I cannot improve upon them.

Vs 7: utāyu jyeṣṭho .... svasti. Possibly the following may be approximately right:

utāyur jyeṣṭho ratnā (ratnā ā) dadhāti ūṛjāṁ vāyuṁ (? or vāyur, i.e. vā-ayus ?) ca te kavir āt | putro vā yat pitaram kṣantum īde (nt is an easy corruption for ċ) jyeṣṭhaṁ maryādam ahvayāṁ svasti z

Vs 8: darcaṁu .... mura. Read darcaṁ nu in pada a: possibly ā varvrajataḥ (or ā vāvrē: gen.) in pada b: prnasy (pr “fill”) in pada c, and ‘müra in pada d.

Vs 9: avivṛdhāma .... vācāu. Pada a: probably cāgmyāṁ is to be red, and sādāyahāṁ is an easy corruption for sakāhāyāṁ. Pada b needs no change. In pada c read probably kavičastānī asmāi vapūnṣy avocāma, with Ć, or the like: vacāṁ looks like a lectio facilior. Were it not for this, it might seem simpler to emend the adjectiv to kavičastām, preserving the superior meter of the verse as it stands.

3.
To the waters; for prosperity and good luck.

(90b 20) ko vāṣ paçcā-(91a 1)-t prāvicchāyat kaṣ puraṣ purākhanat pathā yad ejatu parimānā varuṇapra-(2)-sūtā apaḥ prajāpatir asṛjata sa puraṣ (vs 1)

purā so no annavāsrjat tena (3) sṛṣṭā kṣarāmasi | (vs 2)
punānāsāu bahudhā kṣiyantīsāṅc ca lokāṁ pradi-(4)-caç ca sarvā | purām tasmāduritād avidyā muñcantu mṛtyor nirṛter udasthāḥ (vs 3)

(5) āpo asmān mātaras sūdayantu ghṛtena no ghṛtapuvaṣ punantu | viçvam hi ri-(6)-praṁ pravahantu devīr ud id ābhyac çucir ā pūtay emi | (vs 4)

āpo devīr mātaras sū- (7)-dayiṣṇavo ghṛtaçcuto madhunā sampapaçcchre tā āsmābhyaṁ sūdayo viçvam ā-(8)-yu kṣapa usrā varivasyanu çubhrāḥ | (vs 5)

udakamśyodakatvam ā revatvam ā re-(9)-vatīnāṁ çundhotvāṁ āpaç çundhatv asmān (vs 6)

yūyam āpo vīraçriyor yūyāṁ (10) sūdayathā çucirīm yaṣ kumākamid diço ma hiryaṁte pradiças prthak (vs 7)
(11) yūyām mittrasya varuṇasya yonir yayaṁ somasye dhena vām adhiṣṭhāḥ yakṣmāṁ (12) devīr devā kṣiyatīryam rūrī yūyām jinvata vrahma kṣatrāpah (vs 8)

cacva-(13)-dābhīc cācādatān ċamanām navāmūṃ | ṣpo vi-
vāsya sūdānī-(14)-r yā devā manave dadhuh | (vs 9)
yad dhāvan vipunatedad āpo yas tiṣṭhati cṛddhā (15) yat
tad (ud?) bhavanti nāṣām avadyam avadaṃtya ripūṃ sanād
eva madhunā sampapṛ- (16)-cchre | (vs 10)
hiranyavārṇaç cucayaç pavaka pra cakkramarhītvāvadyam āpā (17) čataṃ ca vaḥ prasravaṇeṣu devīś sahasram ca
pavītāraḥ punantī (vs 11)

tā-(18)-sva ruci vrahmahānaṃ sudayantya aṅgoṣṭhiya stotriyā jīvadhanyā | yā (19) vičvasya sucaκriyo vāyaṭhargavāvāva
payasās tā ajāya (the first a of ajāya is corrected to dra) (vs 12)
vičvā-(91b 1)-d riprāa muṇcantu sindhavo no yāṇy enāsi
cakrāma tanūbhīḥ indraprasṛṣṭā vara-(2)-nasya prasūtiṣi śiṅ-
catāpo madhvā samudre (vs 13) z 3 z

Vs 1: pada a, pravicchāyat “prest forth, brot out”. pada b?
ejanti? pada c, āpah?

Vs 2: pada a, perhaps purā sa no avāṣṛjat. (The waters
speak.) pada b, srṣṭāḥ.

Vs 3: pada a, punānāso. pada b, imāṅ... sarvaḥ. pada c,
probably read puraṁ tāṃ tasmād durīthā avidyā(ḥ). pada d,
upasthit.

Vs 4 (is Č 6. 51. 2): pada d, pūta emi.

Vs 5: pada b, saṁpaprcre. pada c, āyuḥ. Cf. RV 6. 52. 15 c-d.

Vs 6: probably read: udakasyodakatvam ā revattvam ā re-
vatīmāḥ | cuṇḍhyutvam āpaç•.

Vs 7: pada a, viraçriyo. pada b, sudayathā. padas c-d? hi-
ryaṁte could easily stand for hriyante or hīyante.

Vs 8: pada a, mitrasya. pada b, yuyām somasya. pada c:
yakṣmān seems probable, the verb seems to be a form of kṣi
“destroy”, and rūrī probably conceals a form of rūrā “hot”.
pada d, kṣtram āpah.

Vs 9: pada a, cācādatān. pada b? Something like čamanam
ā navāmūṃ? pada d, yad for yā? daduh?

Vs 10: pada a, dhāvati vipunatedam. pada b, yat for yas;
cṛddhā yad ud bhе? (“that they may become pure”?). pada c
is dubious (na-āsām is all right: for ripū might be red ripram,
and the final vowel of avadaṃtya may belong to the next word).
pada d, “paprcre.
Vs 11: pada a, pávakāh. pada b, pra cakramur hitvāvadyam āpah. pada d, punanti.

Vs 12: pada a, rucir? brahś. pada b, the crucial word is aṅgoṣṭhiyā(h), which might also be red ṝṣṭriyā(h): if the text is correct it is a new word: cf. aṅgośin, epithet of Soma? Read jivadhanyāḥ. pada c, su-cakrayo vyaṃṭ(a). pada d, (ū)ṝjāyāiva: for the last word in the pada I hav no suggestion. It is probably a dativ of some noun. The text is confused here; it means to read tādrajāya. Compare the root dhraj “glide”?

Vs 13: pada b, enāṇi cakrimā. pada c, varunaprasūtāḥ. pada d, siṃcāntv āpo.

4.

To heal wounds; with the läkṣā-plant.

Vśs 1-9 = Ç 5. 5.

(91b 2) rātrī mātā nabhaś pī-(3)-tāryamā te pitmahaḥ cilādi nāma vāśi sā devānām asi svasā | (vs 1)

(4) yas tvā pivati jīvati trāyase puruṣaṃ tvam | dharatī ca (5) caçvatām asi caçvatām tyanvaṇcanāṁ | (vs 2)

yas ançdeta yak uṣṭā yād adur harasa kṛ-(6)-taṃ tasya tvam asi bhīṣajāṁ niśkṛtr naṁ vāśī z | (vs 3)

bhadra prakṣena tiṣṭhāṣya a-(7)-çvatithe khadire dhave | bhadrā nyagrodhe parṇe mā nehy arundhatī z | (vs 4)

vrksam vṛksam a roha-(8)-si vrṣaṇaṇyantiva kanyalā | jayanti pratyaṭiṣṭhati sarājyaŚ nāma vā-(9)-śi | (vs 5)

hīranyavatne yuvate čuṣme lomasamakṣaṇe | apām asi svasā laṅkṣe (10) vāto yat sā babhuvyathe | (vs 6)

hīranyabhū subhage sūryavatne vapuṣtame | rutan ga-(11)-cchami niṣkṛdhi semaḥ niṣkṛdhi pātuṣaṃ z | (vs 7)

gṛtāci nāma kānino ta babhrū pitā (12) bhava | açvo yamasye črāvas tāṣya hāstraśy uksata | (vs 8)

acvasyāstraṃ samapatiḥ sā (13) parṇam abhi čuṣyata | sadā patatinrasī sā nehy arundhati | (vs 9)

gṛtācakre vāmarate (14) vidyutparne arundhati yātur aṅgamāṭhāṣi tvam aṅganiṣkariṣy asi | (vs 10)

yat te ja-(15)-gradhāṃ piçāças tā tāḥāpy āyatāṁ punaḥ | lākṣāya tvā vīcvaḥeṣaṣajīr deve-(16)-bhis trāyatāṁ saha | (vs 11) z 4 z

Vs 1 needs no change (Ç has silaci for cilādi).

Vs 2: pada a: read pibati. pada c: read dhartri. pada d: with
much hesitation I propose çaçvatāṁ tv anvāṇcanī (cf. anvāṇc, and Pāṇ. 3. 4. 64).

Vs 3: pada a: read daṇḍena and iśvā. pada b: read yad ārur. Above sā (in harasā, pada b) is written mā. pada c: read bheṣajī or bheṣajāṁ. pada d, vā asi.

Vs 4: pada a: read plakṣena, or perhaps plakṣe nistīṣṭhasy. pada d: read sā na ehy, and probably arundhati.

Vs 5: pada b: read vṛṣanyantiva. pada d: read vā asi.


Vs 8: pada b: uncertain. I can suggest nothing more attractive than the reading of Q, “jababhru pitā tava, tho this is not very satisfactory itself. (Whitney reads tava in Ppp. for bhava: the mistake is an easy one on account of the similarity of the letters, but the ms clearly has bhava.) padas c-d: again I can suggest nothing better than the unsatisfactory readings of Q: açvo yamasya yaḥ cṛyāvas tasya hāṃsāny ukṣitā.

Vs 9: pada a: read probably açvasyānas. pada b: guṣ-as trans. is impossible; possibly read with Q sisyade? Cf. 6. 4b. pada c: read patatriny asī. pada d: read na ehy.


5.

For protection from dangers.

Cf. Q 2. 15, MG 1. 2. 13.

(91b 16) yathā dyauṣ ca prthivī ca na bibhito na (17) riṣyataḥ evā me praṇa mā bibher evā me pāna mā riṣayā | (vs 1) yathā vāyu-(18)-c cāntarikṣaṁ ca | (vs 2) yathā sūryaç candramāç ca | (vs 3) yathāhaç ca rātrī ca | (vs 4) yathā dhenuç ca | (vs 5) yathā mitraç ca varuṇaç ca | (vs 6) yathā vrahma ca kṣatrāṁ ca z | (vs 7) yathendraç candri (92a 1)-çcendriyaṁ ca | (vs 8) yathā víraç ca víryaṁ ca | (vs 9) yathā praṇaç cāpānaç ca | (vs 10) yathā mṛc-(2)-tyuç cāmṛtaṁ ca | (vs 11) yathā satyaṁ cāṁṛtaṁ ca | (vs 12) yathā bhūtam
ca bhavyam ca | na bibhito na riśya-(3)-taḥ | evā me prāṇa mā bibher evā me pāna mā riśa (vs 13) z 5 z (4) z anu i z

Notes. Only pada a is given in vss 2-12 incl.: padas b, c and d ar to be supplied from vss 1 and 13. (In pada d read ’pāṇa mā riśya in each case, where vs 1 has riśayā and vs 13 riśa.)
Vs 7: read, as usual, brahma.
Vs 8: a case of dittografy. Read yathendrāc cendriyaṁ ca.

6.

A woman's charm to get or retain a lover; with an herb.

(92a 2) madhumatam me nikramaṇaṁ madhumatam me paṁyaṇaṁ | vācā madhu-(5)-madudyāma akṣo me madhusam-
dṛci (vs 1)
māṁ anuprasarayaṁ sa sa patto ni me divaṁ (6) atho te
punar āyato kṣo kāmena cuṣyatāṁ (vs 2)
vaḥ madhuga te mātokṣā bhrājar-(7)-śabhaḥ pitā dhenvādhi prajāto si rājā saṁmadhumattamaḥ z (vs 3)
viṣāṇaṁ vṛṣṇyā-(8)-vantaṁ sā parṇam abhi cuṣyatam in-drāṇy agrābharam madhuri bhagāya kam (vs 4)
pitubho-(9)-jano madhugas sāuṣkāmyo hrdayayā kām sa mā madhunā vakaktu yathāham (10) kāmaya tathā | (vs 5)
sindhuṣ prajāno madhugo cuvīva niyate janāṁ anu sa māṁ (vs 6)

(11) madhumatī sinivāli madhunā mā samakṣatu z sā mā madhunānaktu (12) yathāham kāmaya tathā | (vs 7)
yathā madhu madhukṛtām saṁ bharanti madhāv adhi | (13)
evān yunajmi te mano ddhy asyaṁ māmakī tanum | (vs 8)
ye tu manaḥ parāgatāṁ yad va-(14)-m iha vēha vā | tat tayā vartayāmasi | api badhnāmi te manaḥ (vs 9) z i z

Vs 1: pada c, read madhumadudyāmā (cpd., udyāma in the sense of the later udyāma). Pada d, read ’kṣyāu (’kṣi?).
Vs 2: pada b, patito. pada d, ’kṣyāu (’kṣi).
Vs 3: pada a, madughā. (mātokṣā, i.e. mātā ukṣā.) pada c, dhenvādhi for dhenvām adhi, Macdonell Ved. Gr. 70, 3, b and 75, 1. ’si. pada d, sa (or san?) for sam?- or su?-
Vs 4: pada a, vṛṣṇām. pada b occurs above in hymn 4, vs 9b, and appears to hav been inappropriately adopted from that hymn into this one. In that place the ms has cuṣyata as cuṣ trans. is impossible, we must probably read siṣyade (with Q 5. 5. 9 b) in both places. pada c, agra abhavaṁ.
Vs 5: pada a, madughas. pada b, sāukāmyo? pada c, vyanaktu.

Vs 6: pada a, sindhuprajñ, madugho. pada b, 'çviva. padas c-d, read sa mā, and supply the rest of padas c-d from vs 5.

Vs 7: pada c, madhunā vyanaktu.

Vs 8: padas a-b = Ç 9. 1. 16 a-b. pada c, evā. pada d, 'dhy, tanû (loc. sg.: so also māmakī, loc. sg. fem.)

Vs 9: pada a, yat te or yat tu. pada b, perhaps yad u iha vēha (vā iha) vā?

7.

Against poison; with an amulet of earth from an anthill.

(See our note to vs 6 below.)

(92a 15) kaçyapasya suparṇaç ca yan maric'yām abhiśtha-tām suparnaḥ z paryavāpaçcat sa-(16)-mudre bhūmim āvṛt-tām suparnaṃ abhiśaṅcatām z (vs 1)

parYaṇapaçca antar maha-(17)-ty arṇave | tām sūkaratvān māya tiras samudrād udābhora | (vs 2)

yām samudrād u-(18)-dudbharo bhūmyām sūkaramāyā | sāisā viṣasya duṣany asmāi bhavanta bheṣa-(19)-jī | (vs 3)

acyutā hiranyena yā satye adhiśṭhati | tasyās te viçvadhā- (92b 1)-yaso viṣadūṣaṇam udbhare (vs 4)

asyās kulāyam ityakā | (vs 5)

yasyā bhūmyā upacikā-(2)-d grham kṛṇvatātmme | tasyās te viçvadhāyaso viṣadūṣaṇam udbhare | (vs 6)

yas tvā (3) bhūmiṁ na vindad yas tvā bhūmim udābharat |

tayos sahasradhāmaṅ aham nāmāni (4) jagrabbhaḥ | (vs 7)

yāni u indro akṛṇd bhāume nāmāni vrtrahā | tāni te (5)

babhros samvidmas sahaiva viṣadūṣaṇi | (vs 8)

yāni te marutaç cakrur yāni sa-(6)-ptārṣayo viduḥ viçvā-dityā yām vidus sā bhūmir viṣadūṣaṇī (vs 9) z 2 z

Vs 1: pada a, kaçyapaç ca. pada c, omit the punctuation z, and read 'paceyat. pada e, abhi-śiccatām. The division of vss in the text is very dubious: perhaps what we hav printed as pada e of vs 1 is really the beginning of vs 2.

Vs 2 (see the preceding note): pada a, parYaṇapaç Yad. It is possible that the subject has been accidentally omitted. pada b, māyaṁ. pada c, udābharat.

Vs 3: pada a, udābharad or udā-. pada b, 'māyaṁ. pada d, bhavatu.
Vs 4 needs no change.
Vs 5: the ms means to read yasyāś kulāyam ity ekā. See our introduction, p. 376f. The verse is quoted from Book iii, hymn 15, stanza 4 (Barret, JAOS 32. 361), and reads in full: yasyāś kulāyam salile antar mahaty arṇave | tasyās te viṣya-
dhāyaso viṣadūṣānam ud bhare z

Vs 6: pada a, upacikā occurs in the same connection in Ppp 1. 8. 3 (Barret, JAOS 26. 207), and it is unnecessary to emend to upajīkā (with Ç 2. 3. 4, 6. 100. 2): read upacikā(ḥ). See Bloomfield, SBE XLII, p. 511; AJP 7. 482 ff., and references there quoted. The form upacikā occurs in Pāli. Our form is a nom. pl. and is understood as subject of krūvata in pada b. pada b, ud grhaṁ+.  

Vs 7: pada a, na avindad. pada c, sahasradhāmāṇy. pada d, jagrabha.

Vs 8: pada a, yānī. pada d, perhaps viṣadūṣānti?
Vs 9: the sense is anacoluthic, but no emendation is necessary. With yānī of course supply nāṁāni.

8.
Against demons and sorcerers; with an herb.
(92b 7) sahasva yātudhānāṁ sahasva yātudhānyāḥ sahasva sarvā rakṣāṁsi saha-(9)-mānasī oṣadhe | (vs 1)
sahāmāṁ sahasvatī sarṁhatyāham uttarā | utāham a-(9)-smi sāsahi | sahasva sadhāṁvā | (vs 2)
yā sahasāna carati sāsahā-(10)-nāiva vrṣabhaḥ sadānvāghni raksoghni sā tvam ugrāsy oṣadhe | (vs 3)
khelehalam (11) manastani naç cebhaṣ purām uṭaṣ pathā na tvāmamavya tad iho akṣe vu cṛṇa-(12)-vac chiraḥ (vs 4?)
amuvāne bahuputre ananītraçvye mahodari | pathas sat sattare (sature?) tvāṁ ça-(13)-rkaravapatsitāra | (vs 5?)
ye rāyāç carati pākasyecchāṁ tvā çuciṁ tān agne kr-(14)-ṣṇavartmane tiksāpçṛṇo dhṛçain ihi | (vs 6)
ado yad dāru plavate sindhor madhye apū-(15)-ruṣam ucaṛabhasya durhaṇo tena yāhi parastaram | (vs 7)
asyājaniṣtam i-(16)-ṣṭargā ariṣṭaś krīmayaṣ puruṣāya ta-
syāi balā sa patnī namah krṇo-(17)-mi | (vs 8)
kuṣṭhi sarvaputre bhava pattriyaḍ u trāttas sadānvē ta-
syādhi putrān bhrātrī-(18)-ç ca yatra tvā vi nayāmasi (vs 9)
z 3 z
This hymn contains some old material, more or less altered, and some new—which is very difficult of interpretation.

Vs 1 has a close parallel in VS 12. 99. It needs no change except yätudhānyah in pada b.

Vs 2; cf. in a general way ApMB 1. 15. 2, 1. 16. 3. Pada b, read sahanýtāham uttārā. pada c, sāsahih. pada d, sādanvāḥ. Vs 3: padas a-b, yā sahamānā carati sāsahāna iva (read as if sāsahāneva) vṛṣabhah.

Vss 4 and 5 I cannot solve.

Vs 6: padas a-b, read perhaps ya irāyaḥ carati pākasyecchan tvā cucim. padas c-d ar from RV 10. 155. 2 (slightly altered). Read krṣṇavartane, drṣṭan.

Vs 7 is RV 10. 155. 3 entire. In pada c read tad ārabhasva durhano.

Vss 8 and 9: I can suggest no improvement, except the obvious tasmāi for tasyāī in 8c. In 9b the word trāttas might equally well be red tratus; this would be an easy corruption from bhrātus, which may be the true reading.

9.

Against enemies (of a king); with the sacrifice of a bull.

Cf. TB 2. 4. 7. 1ff.

(92b 18) vṛṣāyam úcür vṛṣabhāya grhyā-(19)-te vṛṣāyam ugro nrcakśase divyo nir yo acikradam nahām näma rṣabhasya (93a 1) yat kakut | (vs 1)

viṣuvān vṛṣṇyo bhava tvām yo nṛpatir māma | atho indreva dewebhyo vi (2) vibhravītu janebhayaḥ (vs 2)

manuśebyo dhivravītu sajūr indreṇa medinā | agni-(3)-c ca tubhyaṁ sahamtyo rāṣṭram vāičvānaro dadhat | (vs 3)

yasmāyaṁ bhāgam rṣabhāṁ indrā-(4)-ya pariṇiṭaye | sa haṁtu čatrub āyato atho haṁtu pariṇaṭah (vs 4)

sa haṁtā ca-(5)-trūn bhavatu ahaṁtā bhavatu dodhatāṁ viṣāsahāḥ praṇīr ayad agra madhubhīrdatā-(6)-v asat | (vs 5)

āyuṁmaṁ varcasvantam athō adhipatiṁ vičām | asyaḥ prthivyāḥ cetta-(cetu-?) (7)-nem imaṁ indra vṛṣabhāṁ krṣṇu | (vs 6)

asya čṛṅgasuṣaṇi-padaḥ (!) kalyāṇo barhir āṣa-(8)-dat | kārnivaṇaprajānena rṣabhena yajāmehe | (vs 7)

rṣabhena yajamānā (9) krāureṇāiva sarpiṣā | mṛḍhač ca sarvā indreṇa prṭanac ca sāmahe | (vs 8)
yaṁ tubhyaṁ (10) bhāgam ṛṣabhaṁ devas kāivalyaṁ da- 
duḥ | tena vṛtrāṇi johanač catrūṇc ca jahi āha-(11)-ve | (vs 9) 
jahi satrūn pran prati ramādhayasva kṛdhyaṁ samhūto si 
vīrāvən | indrā-(12)-ya bhāgam pari tvā nayāmo ruṇno loko 
apṛtanyo stu | (vs 10) 
ghrtvṛddha ghrtāhu-(13)-ta sahasračṛṅga suṣṭutaḥ | ghrtā- 
havana dihi (vs 11) 
yo ghrtenābhīghārita-(14)-m ugro jāitrāya tiṣṭhasi sa nas 
saṁkusu pārayā | pṛtanāsāhyeṣu ca (15) (vs 12) z 4 z 
Vs 1: pada c, acikradan. pada d, for nahaṁ (which is cer- 
tainly corrupt) TB has bṛhan, which is probably to be red. 
Vs 2: pada c, indra iva. pada d, omit vi (dittography) and 
read vibravitu. 
Vs 3: pada a, 'dhibritu. pada c, tubhyaṁ sahantyo. 
Vs 4: pada a, yasyāyaṁ bhāga ṛṣabha (indr-). 
Vs 5: pada b, hantā. pada c, viśāsahā is either a corrup- 	ion of, or a parallel formation to, viśāsahih. pada d, read 
agra udhibindatām asat (cf. TB 2. 4. 7. 3). 
Vs 6: pada c, the absurd cettanem (cetunes?) seems to me 
to conceal some form of cettṛ, a word which occurs repeatedly 
in the sīfer of rājanyāni sūktāni. Perhaps the gen. pl. cettṛnām, 
depending on ṛṣabham of pada d? Cf. pada d of the pre- 
ceding vs. Or (more natural in sense) cettāram? 
Vs 7: pada a, çṛṅgasusāṅgadaḥ seems to me to hav been 
the reading (giving good battle with the horns). It is obviously 
an epithet of the bull. Of course ūpa of the ms is an absurd 
and impossible corruption: the scribe doughtless ment to write 
ūgha, which would not be very dissimilar from ūpa. I take it 
then that (su)-saṅgha, the evidently intended reading of the 
ms, is a corruption for (su)-ṣaṅga (saṁ-ga), "war", "conflict" 
(RV 4. 20. 1 etc.). pada c, read perhaps *prajātena (but 
TB has pragānena, which Barret would prefer to read in this 
passage). 
Vs 8: pada b, akrāurenāiva or -neva. pada d, sahāmahe. 
Vs 9: pada c, vṛtrāṇi. For johanač some form of the root 
han must be read: possibly (a)jughanač? (But this tense-form 
seems to be otherwise not known in the Veda!) 
Vs 10: pada a, catrūṇ, omit pran (dittography). pada b, the 
dh of kṛdhyaṁ is probably a badly made ś and I do not hesitate 
to read kṛṣyāt; I take the word to be a gnndv. formation of 
kṛṣ, in a hitherto undiscoverd use as a noun, "field". kṛdhya
at would, so far as I can see, be a senseless reading.—pada d, for ruino (!) possibly read 'rugno? 
Vs 11: this vers is taken from the sfere of Agni. pada b, read suṣṭuta. pada c, didihi.
Vs 12: pada a, read *ghārita (nom. sg.). pada c, saṅkāsu.

10.

For progeny and prosperity; with the offering of a cow.

(93 a 15) kavis subhāgarṣabhasya patnīṣ prajākāmā vaći-(16)-nī vācitā gāuḥ tāṁ sahasram ekamukhā dadāti garbhaṁ dadhānā mithu-(17)-nā caranti z (vs 1)
garbhaṁ dadhānāpāiduhānāgnihotram vācićvadevi duhānā | 
(18) dāurgamāhinsir varuṇasya patnīṁ karkyā yaṁiṁ sa-
manaso bhi gavaḥ | (vs 2)

(19) prajām icchanto dhīṣaṇaḥ carantīmān etv aditi vićvārū-
pābhikrandanti (93 b 1) bhuvanāyā žūnām | prajāpatineśitām 
ṛtvīyāvatī nahiṇām prajāyā ṛṣabhā ṛçraya-(2)-nte | (vs 3)
vrṣanyānty vrṣaṇas saptanāmāṁ hiṁkrēṇvanto abhinudenti 
vacitāṁ (3) sā pratyusanis suṣadā suvarnāc çukramas vasānā 
varuṇaḥ ca ninnudāḥ (vs 4)

vācićva-(4)-devī sudhayām ārabhante | prajām dātā puṣyatu 
gopatiśṭhe | svayaṁ sthāvarya vr-(5)-vrṣabhāyā tiṣṭhiti prāti-
ṣomaṁ prati sūryam āgniṁ | (vs 5)

ahimsanty vāci-(6)-temāṁ upehi paçūn dātā puṣyatu go-
patiśṭhe | vaçīdā bhavatu vācitāyā-(7)-m agner bhāgam usri-
yāṁ yo dadāti | (vs 6)

priyam dhāma hrdayam sāumyaṁ madhu vāji-(8)-nīṁ tvā 
vājino vājayantu z (vs 7)

yo vācitāyam gavya aṁtad agnir yad asyāṁ nṛ-(9)-mṇām 
mahinā babhūva z namas te stu pratīghṛtam grñomi syonā 
me stu tanve (10) suçēvāu (vs 8)

yema gaṁ vācitā tām pratīmā paṁsāṁ vrātena sā puṣṭy-
ānā gauḥ (11) ūrjam dadhānā gṛhtarūm id duhānām sahasra-
poṣā ime stu dātre (vs 9) z z (12) z anu 2 z

Vs 1: pada a, kavis subhāgarṣabhasya (as two words, subhāga 
rś*: but it might also be taken as a karmadhāraya epd.) patnī.
Vs 2: pada a, dadhānā apa id duhānā (agni*). pada b, vāi-
çvadeviṁ (as name of ceremony), orVir, duhānāḥ. pada c, 
apatnī. pada d, kārīr (?) yaṁi (?) subj.) sumanaro 'bhi gavaḥ.
Vs 3: pada a, dhīṣaṇaç. pada b, aditir vićvarē. pada c, urūṇi
for ūnāṁ? pada d, rtviyāvatim. pada e, na-hināṁ? (Or should we read "vatim a-hināṁ?"). rṣabhāḥ.
Vs 4: pada a, vrṣanyantim. pada b, hiṅkr-. padas c-d I cannot solve: the readings are not all clear. susādā seems certain, and for the next word svārṇa is to be red. It seems that the word pratyusaniś contains sanis “bestowing”; perhaps pratyu- may be for prabhū-. Read varunasya nir-.?
Vs 5: pada a, not certain: perhaps sudhā yām ār-? pada b needs no change (cf. next vs). gopatiśthe = gośthe. pada c, sthāvari vrṣabhāya tiṣṭhati.
Vs 6: pada c, perhaps vačditā bh-?
Vs 7 needs no change: it should perhaps be regarded as part of vs 6.
Vs 8: pada a, yo vačitāyāṁ gavy antar agnir. pada b, nṛṁṇāṁ. pada c, pratigṛhanā śrṣāmi. pada d, 'stu, sucevā.
Vs 9: pada a, perhaps ya [or yām?] imāṁ gāṁ vačitāṁ tāṁ pr-. pada b, perhaps sā puṣṭānāṁ gāuḥ (a kind of kāmadhenul). pada c, duhānā. pada d, sahasrapoṣāya me 'stu dātre(?).

11.
For protection.
(Made up of parts of Q 5. 6. 5. 9, and RV 9. 73.)

(93 b 12) vrahmā jajñānam ity ekā anāptā ya va prathamā yāni (13) karmāṇi cakkrire | vīrā no atra mā dabham tad vetat puro dadhe | pratrātmānā-(14)-t pari ye sambabhūvuh člokavantas somanasya varṇtavaḥ | apānakāsāso badi-(15)-ram astantasya panthā na taranti duṣkṛtaḥ sahasradhāram abhi te samasmaram dīvo (16) nāke madhujihvā açasyataḥ | tasya saraço na nimiṣantī bhūṁyāḥ pade-(17)-pade | pāčinas saṁtu setave | pary uṣa pra dhanva vāṁjasātaye pari vrtrāṇī (18) sakṣāṇih divas tudarṇavān nīyase | sahasraṇa nāṁśi trayoḍa (19) māsāḥ indrasya grho śindrasya ċarmāsti indrasya vārmaśi | indrasya vārū- (94 a 1) -tham asi | vīte-nāvāitenāmāitenaratstṛidad asāu svāhā | tigmāyudhau ti-(2)-gmaheśi sucevāgniśomāv iha su mṛdaṁnam nh samuktam asmād grbhi- (3)-thā- | (!) -d avadyāy juseṭhām yajtām amṛtam asmāśu dhattāṁ svāhā z cakṣuṣo (4) hete manaso hete vrahmāṇo hete menyā menir asi | anena yas te santu yo (5) smān abhyabhāyantu svāhā z yo smān cakṣuṣā maṇasā yaç ca vācākātyā (6) dityā vrahmāṇāghāyur abhidāsā tvam agne tvāṁ menyāmenim kṛṇu svāhā z (7) ud āyur ut
kṛta bad valam aṁ nanīṣo yad indrāṁ nṛṁṇam asmāsu dhēhi svāhā | (8) āyuṣkṛtāyuṣmati svadhāvanto gopā me stho gopāyatan vā | ātmasadhū me sta-(9)-n ve suṣcēnāu | mā mā hīṁsiṣṭāṁ svāhā z z

Read as follows:

brahma jajñānam ity ekā z 1 z

This is the pratika of Č 5. 6. 1 = 4. 1. 1, which occurs in Ppp. Book v (see Whitney’s note on Č 4. 1. 1), and is therefore quoted by pratika; see our introduction p. 376f. anāptā ye vāḥ prathamā yāni karmāṇi cakrire | virāṇ no atra mā dabhan tad va etat puro dadhe z 2 z

pratnān mānat pari ye sāṁbhāhūvāḥ clokavantas śāumanāsya mantavāḥ | apānakṣāso badhiram ṭ astantasya ṭ panthāṁ na taranti ṃuṣkrtaḥ z 3 z

This is RV 9. 73. 6. The text even as found in RV is very obscure, and our text apparently was somewhat different from RV’s in spots: to restore it with any confidence is evidently hopeless. Pada a, at least the last part of it, seems reasonably sure. It would perhaps be better to take over pada b bodily from RV (clokayantrāso rahbasasya mantavāḥ). The end of c and beginning of d are hopelessly corrupt in our ms: RV has ·badhirā ahāsata for c, and begins d with ṛtasya.

sahasradhāram abhi te samsvaran divo nāke madhujihvā asaṣcataḥ | tasya spaṇo na nimīṣanti bhūrnayaḥ pade-pade pā-činas santu setave z 4 z

This vs is RV 9. 73. 4, from which all of our emendations are taken. RV also reads santi setavaḥ in pada d, and perhaps this should be red here.

parī ya Ṛṣa pra dhanva vājasātaye pari vrtrāṇi sakṣanāḥ | dviṣas ṭ tudārnavāni nyase ṭ sahasraṇo nāmāṣi trayodaṇo māṣaḥ | indrasya grho śindrasya ċarmāṃśindrasya vāṃśindrasya varūtham asi z 5 z

Most of this vs is found Č 5. 6. 4 (thru indrasya grhah): part of it also (ending na nyase) in RV 9. 110. 1. The last part of our vs seems like a sort of index to the vss Č 5. 6. 11-14 (see below, Hymn 12). The last part of the vs, at least, is prose. In pada a it would seem natural, but not necessary, to read parī ṛṣu with RV and Č. Pada c I give up, except that it seems certain that dviṣas should stand for divas: Whitney remarks that
ʼQʼs reading here (dvīṣas tad adhy arnave neyase) looks like a corruption of RV dvīṣas taradhyā rṇāyā na iyase, but our incoherent jumble looks more like ʻQ than like RV. Perhaps tudarnavan should be read tu rṇavān.—Our sahasraço looks like a lectio facilior for ʻQ sanisraso, but the whole thing is too dubious to justify the emendation, in my opinion.

vy etenārātsir asāu svāhā | tigmāyudhāu tigmaheti sucevā agnīsomāv iha su mṛdatām naḥ z 6 z
avāttenārātsir asāu svāhā** z 7 z
apāttenārātsir asāu svāhā** z 8 z

That this is what our text is meant to read may be seen at once by comparing the jumble of the ms with ʻQ 5. 6. 5-7, the vss which are equivalent to ours. Our ms has simply put together the two opening words of each stanza (vy etena, avāitena, apāitena—for which last is red the corrupt amāitena) at the beginning, and followed it up with the rest of the text, which is common to all three vss. The same method was followed below in hymn 12, vss 1-4, q. v. mumuktam asmān grbhīthād avadyāj juṣethām yajnam amṛtam asmāsu dhattaṁ svāhā z 9 z

This is equivalent to ʻQ 5. 6. 8.

cakṣuṣaḥ hete manaso hete brahmaṇo hete (tapasaḥ ca hete?) menā menir asi amenayas te santu ye ʻśmān abhyaghāyanti svāhā z 10 z

This is ʻQ 5. 6. 9. There is no sign in the ms of the omission of the words tapasaḥ ca hete, and as the passage is non-metrical there is no way of proving that they were originally there: nevertheless I believe I am right in inserting them from ʻQ. Our text follows ʻQ very closely at this point, and moreover there is a sort of cadence in the passage which requires the insertion: this is evidenced by the evidently false placing of the comma after asi in the ms. Haplography would easily account for the omission. yoh ʻśmān cakṣuṣā maṇasaḥ yaḥ ca vācakūtyā cittyā brahmaṇāghāyur abhidāsāt tvam agne taṁ menyāmenin kṛṇu svāhā z 11 z

This (also prose) equals ʻQ 5. 6. 10, which reads in the last clause tān agne menyāmenin.

ud āyur ut kṛtam ud balam un maṇiṣa(m?) ud indriyāṁ nṛmṇa asmāsu dhehi svāhā z 12 z
This, with the exception of the last clause, is found in § 5. 9. 8, without the aid of which I should certainly not have emended so boldly (nor—it is safe to say—with such success: I think in spite of the extreme corruption of the ms that the text as restored is essentially sound).

mostly corresponds to the last part of § 5. 9. 8. § has ayskrmed—which Wh. suggests might better be read *krt*—ayspatni (for which our *aysmati* looks like a lectio facilior). In the second half, § reads atmasadæu.

Our text gives really no help to the understanding of these very cryptic materials.

12.

For protection.

Cf. § 5. 6. 11-14; § 5. 9. 7; KS 37. 15, 16.

(94 a 9) indrasya grho sindrasya ca-(10)-rmäsi indrasya varmäsi indrasya marhatam asi | ta tvä pra viçämi sarväm sa-(11)-rvätma sarvagus sarvapauruṣaḥ sam ye stu tena aṣṭro nāmāham ayām assi mātmānam pari dadhe dyāvā-

prthivibhyāṁ gopīyāya prahūyase | aṣṭro nāmā (13) prājapatyo devapurāyam antaḥ prahāgam devapurāt saha grāmas svastaye z (14) sarñvatsarasya sapyatas sarvāis sahodarī saha z om sarväis sahodarī saha praha-(15)-naṅgâm devā- 

devapurāyevāmi me vanam yo mä kaçaçābhidāsati | sa prajāpa-(16)-tim iva gacchati | asmāsu pratismaçaṣ pahi riṣaṣ pahi dvīṣaṣ pā-(17)-hi devyābhicāṣyāt sa miya tanvaṁ pāhi | yo sman prācyā diço ghāyur abhi (18) dāsā | etat sa ditsād aĉmavarma no stu asmām dakṣiṇāya diçaḥ (19) asmān pra-

ticyā diçaḥ z 2 z

indrasya grho ’si taṁ tvā pra viçāmi sarvaṁ sarvaṁ sarvagus sarvapuruṣaḥ | yan (?) me ’sti tena z 1 z

indrasya caṛmāsi taṁ tvā*** z 2 z

indrasya varmāsi taṁ tvā*** z 3 z

indrasya varūtham asi taṁ tvā*** z 4 z

That this is what the text means to read may be inferred from § 5. 6. 11-14: see also above, hymn 11, vss 6-8. I am not very confident that §’s reading yan me ’sti should be substituted for sam ye stu: and if we adopt it, very
probably the final of the preceding word should be changed according to the rules of sandhi, since there is hardly enuf of a break in sense to justify the punctuation which I hav introduced.

astrto nāmāham ayam asmi sa ātmānaṁ pari dadhe dyāvā- pytivibhyāṁ gopithāya prahūyase z 5 z

This is Q 5. 9. 7 in part: cf. also KS 37. 15, 16.
astrto nāmā prajāpatyo devapuruśāṁ antāḥ † prahāgānā
devapuruśa saha † grāmas svastaye z 6 z

This seems to hav no parallel, and I cannot make the last part of it clear: the three words prahāgānā... saha certainly need emendation, but I hav no suggestion.
saṁvatsarasya sapratthas sarvāśīsahodari saha om sarvāśī

saḥodari saha prahanagānā devapuruśevāsmi (?) me vanam yo mā kaścābhīdāsati z 7 z

Most of this vs is wholly unclear to me, and the readings ar 'of course very open to suspicion. For sapyatas, sapratthas seems likely: I think the last part of the vs is approximately correct.

asmāsu pratispaçah pāhi riṣaḥ pāhi dviṣaḥ pāhy advēyā

abhiçastyā sa ma iha tanvaṁ pāhi z 8 z

For most of this vs cf. KS 37. 15, 16. I think pratispaçah is right: cf. TS 5. 7. 3. 1.

yo 'smān prācyā diço 'ghāyur abhīdāsāt | etat sa rcohād

acmavarma no 'stu | asmān daksināyā diçah | asmān praticyā
diçah z 9-11 z

Cf. the following hymn. For abhīdāsā(t) might also be red abhīdāsati.—I am almost certain that these verses ar ment to be red here insted of one, the last two padas being nothing but short-hand methods of indicating a repetition of the vs with the variations indicated. If so, we should supply yo before, and aghāyur abhi*** after, each of the last two padas, thus making vss 10 and 11. Cf. the similar treatment of vss 1-4 above, hymn 11, vss 6-8, and hymn 15, vs 6.

13.

For protection (especially against demons).

Cf. Q 5. 10. 1.

(94a 19) asmān udīcyā diçah (94b 1) asmān dhruvāyā
diçah yo smān ārdhvāyā diço ghāyur abhīdāsāt z (2) tat
sa ritsād açmāvarma ṇo stu | (vs 1) prācyāi diçe svāhā |
(vs 2) daksīṇāyāi diçe (3) svāhā | (vs 3) pratīcāi diçe svāhā |
(vs 4) udīcyāi diçe svāhā | (vs 5) dhruvāyāi di-(4)-çe svāhā |
(vs 6) urdhvāyāi diçe svāhā | (vs 7) dive svāhā | (vs 8) antarikṣāya svā-(5)-hā | (vs 9) deve (l) svāhā (vs 10) z 3 z iti rākṣoghnasūktam z z

For vs 1 cf. Q 5. 10. 1. In it read asmān, 'smān, 'ghāyur, rccḥād for ritsad, açmāv, and 'stu.

The remaining formulae mostly need no emendation: in vs 4 read pratīcyāi. In vs 10 deve must certainly be a corruption of prthivyāi, which I should not hesitate to put in the text: it probably arose in the first place thru the accidental omission of the syllable pr, after which a later copyist changed the monstrous-looking thivyāi to a more reasonable-looking form. The label of the hymn should be red iti rākṣoghnasūktam.

14.
Against all manner of demons.

(94b 6) mahākaṇṭhām karīṣājam abaddhyādam anāhutām |
oṣṭhas kokhamukha-(7)-ç ca yas tāy ito nācayāmāsi (vs 1) |
rāmadanta ṣōdanām prahāram ahināsī-(8)-kaṁ upavṛttṛmaṁ |
balāhakam khenam gardabhanādinaṁ | grddhram hastiyāya- |
nam (9) tyā | pramṛṣyādina satyāmaṁ | (vs 2?)

bhīmahastāṁ sarīṛpaṁ | bhrastākṣaṁ mṛdva-(10)-ñgulim |
nakhogram daṅcāvīryaṁ tāṁ pary andami bhi pāpadaṁ |
(vs 3?)

jigīṣmaṅo rūpakaṁ | atho çalalyam çevalatām | taṇḍam |
agre tuṇḍika dalyaṁ ça uta (12) vatsapaṁ | (vs 4?)
dāsagranthyaṁ sanisraṣam udrayedām cārusyantām |
idiya-(13)-jñāna keçavaṁ rakṣa烃 caraty āhutaṁ (vs 5?)
barhiṁ predam icchati | asyānū napāsyo-(14)-ç cace jñān-
urāyāṃçukihyanas tāy ito nācayāmāsi (vs 6?)

yas kumā-(15)-rāṁ jarasyāmi tṛṇāṁ (?) dāsāsür arāyaḥ ke |
cyākila na yohvanā-(16)-nahaṁtvakticatam ito nācayāmāsi |
(vs 7)

hīrājñō nāma gehyo rāya (17) nāma sūnuha | tam ito nā- |
cayāmāsi z (vs 8)
nitulambhāksam ākhi-(18)-daṁ vanakroçam ca roruhaṁ |
āmādam prayatīśitaṁ paryamāṇāṁ paridra-(19)-vam vrक-
sya nṛcagaṁ grānaṁ tāy ito nācayāmāsi (vs 9) z 4 z
This hymn consists largely of a list of demons, whom its purpose is to exorcize. Its flavor strongly suggests Q 8. 6, which is directed against demons which attack women in pregnancy and travail: but whether this is the exact application of our verses or not is not clear. I seem to detect in vss 7 and 8 rather a reference to demons which attack children. But the text as a whole is very corrupt, and I can get no clearer idea of what it is all about than what I have just said. Q 8. 6 also consists largely of a mere list of demons, a sort of demoniacal Almanach de Gotha; many of the names it contains are, as Whitney's note says, "unknown elsewhere and untranslatable". This is a fortiori true of our hymn, which contains only one or two of the names found Q 8. 6. Even the division of verses is highly problematic in some cases; possibly tān ito nācayāmasi should be supplied at the end of each stanza, see Introduction p. 377.

Vs 1 is fairly clear. Read kariṣājam in pada a. In pada c I cannot better oṣṭhas: the following word is of course koka. In pada d read tān ito.

Vs 2: pada a, perhaps rāsabhadantaṁ sodaraṁ ("big-bellied")? pada b, ahināsikāṁ is certainly sound. padas c-d seem all right (reading upavrtraṁ), tho khenāṁ is otherwise unknown. In padas e-f (if they really belong to vs 2!) the only certain word is grdhraṁ.

Vs 3: padas a-b ar all right if we read bhraṣṭākṣaṁ. The margin has marimṛçam, evidently as a substitute for sarisṛpam. For padas c-d I suggest hesitatingly nakhogāraṁ daṇcāvīryāṁ tāṁ paryāyāmy abhipādāṁ.

Vs 4: pada a, jīgīṣamāno. pada b, cālalyāṁ may conceal a form related to cālali. Perhaps we may read cēvalam for cēvalatāṁ; cf. Q 1. 11. 4, where cēvala is an epithet of the afterbirth (jarāyu). Or the syllable tāṁ may belong to the next pada. pada c should probably end with tundikaṁ (Q 8. 6. 5), and pada d may be red dalyāṁ ca uta vatsapam. The name vatsapa occurs Q 8. 6. 1, but dalyāṁ is an unknown word, and of course open to suspicion.

Vs 5: I can suggest no improvement. I suspect that pada b ends with ca plus a participle form from arusyati. The name keçava occurs Q 8. 6. 23. My verse-division may be incorrect; it looks very likely that 5d goes closely with 6a.
Vs 6: except that the tāy of the last pada should be (probably) tān (possibly tā) I can make no suggestion.

Vs 7 is also too much for me, tho’ it of course contains some words that are obviously correct or nearly so.

Vs 8: pada b, read ‘rāyo nāma sūnūhā.

Vs 9: most of the names here look sound, and I at least can venture no improvement on those which do not. In the last pada of course read tān ito. In pada c possibly ghrāṇān?

15.

To Indra, for prosperity.

(95 a 1) yaça ca bhūmad yā ca sphāti yayorja yo rasasya te | havāmi cakra tām han taya prattām (2) ḍacipate kṣetrād āharāmi sphāṁti sarvāṁ ḍacipate | tayeaham vṛtraхаn (3) patum ā harāmi | grhan upa yas te sitā bhagā kṣetre | ārādhir yaça ḍaciyate | (4) atho yā niśthā te kṣetre itv āhrāṣi vrahmanā | yat khale nasay āde yad gośṭhe yac ca (5) cēvadhāu | athotkussyyāṁse tasya te rasam ā dadhe | ārjā yā te nṛpa tasyorjā yāva-(6)-hasasya te ārjām te pacyamāṇasyorjām piṣṭāt tādadhe | te nṛpa tasyorjāvātā asya (7) te | ārjām te pihyamāṇasyorjām pakvā te ārjā yā te prañugdhasyojā yā madhita-(8)-syā te | ārjā te duhyamāṇasyorjām dugdhān tādade | ā tetade gavāṁ ārjām ü-(9)-rjām avityā dadhe | ajādyā ārjam ādāyāta ekacapā dadhe ārjā yā te (10) puruṣūrjā citte ca vedye | ārjā te sarveśām aham grhaṇāṁ vrahmanā dade (11) z 5 z

Read as follows:

yaça ca bhūmā yā ca sphātir yā ca corjā yo rasaça ca te | harāmi cakra tām aham tvaya prattān ḍacipate z 1 z

kṣetrāt kṣetrād āharāmi sphāṁti sarvāṁ ḍacipate | tayeahām vṛtraḥān pitum āharāmi grhaṇ upa z 2 z

yās te citā bhagā kṣetre ārādhir yaça ḍacipate | atho yā niśthā te kṣetre ita (ito) āhrāṣi vrahmanā z 3 z

In pada d the only question is one of sandhi—whether the original text red ito or ita. In pada a there is a real problem, and I am by no means certain of my attempted solution: I hav assumed cītā(ḥ) as a ppp. from the root cī-; undoubtedly a bold assumption, but I can see no more likely guess.

yat khale rasam ādade yad gośṭhe yac ca cēvadhāu | ṭathot-
kussyyāṁse ṭ tasya te rasam ādade z 4 z
Pada c is hopeless. I am fairly confident of my restoration of pada a: the signs for na and ra are easily confused in Çāradā, and yat may be taken as a conjunction, tho' it would be better to have it agree with the noun as a relativ pronoun.

úrjā yā te nrpa tasyorjā yāvahatasya te | úrjaṁ te pacyamānasoryjām piśṭām ta ā dade z 5 z

Pada a: yā-avahatasya? pada d: piśṭāt might stand were it not for the parallels pakvām and dugdham of pada d in vss 6 and 7, which make the accus. almost certain here.

(úrjā yā) te nrpa tasyorjā † vātā asya † te | úrjaṁ te piṣya-

mānasoryjām pakvām ta (ā dade) z 6 z

The first two and last two words of this verse are evidently meant to be supplied from the preceding and following verses. The method used by our ms to indicate such omissions of repeated passages is often very imperfect. Compare 12. 9, and Introduction p. 377.—Note the curious chiasmus in the second hemistics of this and the preceding verses: pacyamānasya... piśṭām, piṣyamānasya... pakvām.

úrjā yā te pradugdhasoryjā yā maditasya te | úrjaṁ te du-

hyamānasoryjām dugdham ta ā dade z 7 z

ā te dade gavām úrjam úrjam avinām ā dade | ajānām úrjam

ādāyāta āikačaphām ā dade z 8 z

The constant interchange between the stems úrj and úrjā is striking. Instead of the genitives avinām and ajānām perhaps derivativ adjectives (avityām?) analogous to āikačaphām (from ekačapha) may hav stood here originally. Pada d begins, of course, with ata(s), and is hypermetric if my reconstruction is correct (perhaps read with secondary crasis atāika*).

úrjā yā te puruṣānām úrjā † cittecavdey † úrjam te sarve-

śām aham grhaṇām brahmaṇādade z 9 z

The restoration of puruṣānām is made nearly certain by the preceding stanza and the metrical requirements. I cannot solve pada b.

16.

To the soma-drink, for blessings.

RV 1. 187; KS 40. 8.

(95 a 11) pitum na stoṣaṁ maho dharmāṇaṁ tavisi | yasya trito voujasā vṛ-(12)-trim viparyamardayat | svādo pito madho pito vayaṁ tvā vivṛīmaha | asmā-kā-(13)-m avitā bhava | utta naṣ pittav (pitu?) ā gahi čivač čivābhīr ūtibhih
mayobhūr a-(14)-dvīṣeṇyas sakhā suceva edhi naḥ tava tye pito rasā rajāḥsy anu viṣhītāḥ di-(15)-vi vātā iva āṛitāḥ tava tye pito dadataḥ tava svātiṣṭha te pito | pra svādāno rasā-(16)-nāṁ tuvyagrīvā iverate | yat te pito mahānāṁ devānāṁ mano hitaṁ | akārī cā-(17)-ru ketuna tavāhīm avasāvadhit yad adaś pito ajagan vivasva parvatānām (18) atrā cin no madhupito raṁ bhakṣāya gamyāṁ | yat te soma gaāciro yavāciro bhajā-(19)-mahe | vātāpe pīva id bhava | yad apāṁ oṣadhīnāṁ balīṁ samāriśā-(95b 1)-mahe | vātāpe pīva id bhava | karamba oṣadhe bhava pīvo vṛkka udārathīḥ (2) vātāpe pīva id bhava | tan tvā vayaṁ pitovacobhir gāvo na havya suṣū-(3)-dima | asmābhyaṁ tvā sadamādam de-vēbhyaṁ tvā sadamādam z 6 z

pituṁ....."mardayat z 1 z

Read nu for na (pada a) and taviṣṭām (pada b). Pada d seems better than the reading of the parallel texts, viparvam ardayat. This vs also occurs VS 34. 7 and N 9. 25.

svādo.....bhava z 2 z

Pada b: vivṛṣmahe is very likely corrupt (the other texts have vavṛmahe), but cf. BR s. v. varj with vi, 3).

uta naś pitav ā gahi čivaḥ.....edhi naḥ z 3 z
tava tye.....iva āṛitāḥ z 4 z
tava tye.....iverate z 5 z

Pada b: read svādiṣṭha. Pada d: read tuvigrīvā.
yat te pito.....vasāvadhit z 6 z

The only different reading in RV and KS is tve for yat te in pada a.
yad adaś.....gamyāṁ z 7 z

Pada d: read 'raṁ (perhaps also gamyāḥ, as the parallel texts do?)
yat te soma.....id bhava z 8 z

Pada a: read gavāciro.
yad apāṁ.....id bhava z 9 z

(Pada b seems superior to the reading of the parallel texts.)
kārambha oṣadhe.....id bhava z 10 z
tvā tvā vayaṁ.....sadhamādam z 11 z

Padas c-d: read sadhamādam both times.
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17.
To Agni and the Maruts.
Vss 1-9 = RV 1.19.

(95 b 4) prati tyaṁ cārum adhvaram goṇiṭhāya prahūyase | marudbhir agna ā gahi | (vs 1)
(5) na hi devo na martyo mahas tava kratum purāḥ ma- | rudbhir agna ā gahi | (vs 2)
yameha (6) rajaso vidur viçve devāso adruhaḥ marudbhi | (vs 3)
ye čubhrā ghoravarpa-(7)-sas suṣṭatraso riṣādasaḥ ma- | rudbhi | (vs 4)
ya ugrā arkam ānṛtar anādr-(8)-ṣṭāsa ojasā | marudbhi | (vs 5)
ye nākasyādhi rocane divi devās sa-(9)-hāsate | marudbhi | (vs 6)
ayaṁ kṣayanti parvatāṁ tirs samudram ojasā | (10) ma- | rudbhi | (vs 7)
ā ye tanvanti raçmibhis tirs samudram arṇavam | ma- | rudbhi | (vs 8)
abhi tvā (11) pūrvapītaya srjāmi somyaṁ madhu | ma- | rudbhi | (vs 9)
ā yantu maruto ga-(12)-nāi stutā dadhatu no rayim | ā | tvā kāṇvā hūṣata grṇanti tvra te dhi-(13)-yaḥ marudbhir | agna ā gahi (vs 10) z 7 z anu 3 z

The text of this hymn is practically as it is written, except that the third pada (refrain) of vss 3-9 is abbreviated in the ms. Vs 1 is also found SV 1.16, Kāuç 127.7, and N 10.36.—Vs 2: pada b, read paraḥ for purāḥ.—Vs 3: for yameha read perhaps (with RV 1.19.3) ye maho.—Vs 4 pada b: perhaps riṣādasaḥ should be red (with RV vs 5), but riṣ- and riç- are almost interchangeable.—Vs 5 pada a: read ānṛcur. Pada b: read anādhrṣṭāsa.—Vs 7 pada a: read probably ya Ģihayanti parvatān, with RV vs 7.—Vs 8 also occurs MS 4.11.2.—Vs 9 pada a: read pūrvapītayas? but better, *pitaye with RV vs 9, and all other texts (see Conc.). This vs entire occurs N 10.37, and pada a repeatedly elsewhere, see Conc.—Vs 10 (cf. RV 1.14.2): pada a, read gaṇāis: pada c, read perhaps abuṣata? pada d: read probably grṇanti.
18.

To various gods, for blessings.

Cf. Ç 7. 33. 1, and the following hymn.

(95 b 13) sam mā siñcantu (14) marutas sam pūṣā sam vṛhaspatīḥ sam māyam agnis siñcatu prajayā ca (15) dhanena ca | dīrgham āyuṣ kṛṇotu me | (vs 1)

sam mā siñcantu ādityās sam mā si-(16)-ñcantu agnayaḥ indras sam asmān siñcatu (vs 2)

siñcantu anuṣā sam arkā rṣa-(17)-yaḥ ca ye | pūṣā sam siñcatu gandharvāpsarasas sam mā siñcatu devatāḥ (vs 3)

(18) bhagas sam siñcatu prthivī sam mā siñcatu yā diva | antarikṣaṁ sam (19) siñcatu pradīças sam mā siñcatu yā diçaḥ (vs 4)

ācā sam mā siñcatu kṛ-(20)-ṣayaḥ sam mā siñcatu oṣadhīḥ sam mās sam mā siñcatu nabhyas sam mā si-(96 a 1)-ñcatu sindhavāḥ samudrās sam | (vs 5)

sam mās siñcatu āpas sam mā siñcatu vṛ-(2)-ṣṭayaḥ satyam sam asmāna siñcatu prajayā ca dhanena ca | dīrgham āyuṣ kṛ-(3)-ṇotu me (vs 6) z r z

The division of verses which I hav introduced in this rig-marole is highly problematic: the ms indicates, as usual, no division, and the sense gives little help. I think it most probable that there were more than six verses in the hymn as originally recited; perhaps the normal nine. Padas d and e of vs 1 and 6 ar to be supplied at the end of each vs.

Vs 1 = Ç 7. 33. 1 (all that Ç 7. 33 consists of).

Vs 3: pada a is corrupt. The only fairly certain thing about it is that Uṣās appeared in it. It might be written siñcantv asmān uṣasas.

Vs 4: pada b, divaḥ (!).

Vs 5: pada a, aças. pada c, probably read sam mā siñcatu nadyas.

Vs 6: pada a, mā for mās. pada c, asmān for asmāna.

To various gods, for blessings.

Cf. the preceding hymn.

(96 a 3) sam bhargo varcasā māgne sam viṣṇuṣ puṣṭyāśrjat (4) kṣetram sam asmān siñcatu prajayā ca dhanena ca | āyuṣmantaṁ kṛṇotu māṁ (vs 1)
(5) saṁ virāḍ varcasā māgne saṁ deśṭī puṣṭyāśrjat iḍā saṁ asmān si-(6)-ṅcatu prajayā ca dhanena ca | (vs 2)

saṁ dhātā varcasā māgne saṁ siktī puṣṭyāśrjat (7) saṁ devo smān aryamā prajayā ca dhanena ca | (vs 3)

saṁ arṇo varcasā māgne saṁ vā-(8)-yuḥ puṣṭyāśrjat vātas saṁ asmān sīncatu prajayā ca dhanena ca | (vs 4)

(9) saṁ sabhā varcasā māgne saṁ sarā puṣṭyāśrjat | sūryā saṁ | (vs 5)

saṁ (10) savitā varcasā māgne saṁ sūryaṣ puṣṭyāśrjat |
candra saṁ | (vs 6)

saṁ paçaavo varca-(11)-sāgne saṁ yajñaṣ puṣṭyāśrjat |
dakṣiṇā saṁ | (vs 7)

sā mā sīncatu dravāṇam (12) saṁ sā sīncatv indriyam |
tējas saṁ | (vs 8)

saṁ mā sīncatu varcāṃsi saṁ mā si-(13)-ṅcantu bhūtayaḥ sarasvati saṁ asmān sīncatu prajayā ca dhanena ca | (14)
āyuṣmantam krṇotu mā (vs 9) z 2 z

All the vs. ar to be red with 5 padas, supplying the necessary parts of padas c, d, and e, where the text is abbreviated, from vs 1 or 9.

Vs 5: pada c, read probably sūryas.

Vs 6: pada c, candras.

Vs 8: pada a, saṁ for sā. pada b, mā for sā.

20.

Against nocturnal and hidden dangers.

Q 19. 47.

(96 a 14) a ṛatri pārthivaṁ rajaś pitaraś prā-(15)-yu dhāmabhiḥ divas sudhāṃsi vṛhatīva tiṣṭhāsa ā tvecaṁ vartate tamah (vs 1)

na ya-(16)-syāḥ pāram dadṛce na yoyavad yasya sasyām
nimīṣate rejati | arisṭāca-(17)-syā ca ud urvati sasya ca
ṛatri pāram acīmaḥ | bhadre pāram acīmaḥ (vs 2)

(18) ete rātre nṛcakṣaso drṣṭāro navatīr navaḥ acītis saṁtv
aṣṭā uto te (19) sapta saptatiḥ (vs 3)

ṣaṣṭyuc ca saḍ u ca revaty ancācat yaṁca naçānñhi
catvāraḥ ca-(96 b 1)-tvārīṇcāc ca trayas triṇcāc ca vādini z
(vs 4)

dvā ca viṁcātiḥ ca te rātri ekāda-(2)-cāvamā tebhir no
dya pāyubhir nṛ pāhi duhitaṁr divaḥ (vs 5)
rakṣā mākir no a-(3)-ghaçaṇ̄sa iḍata mā no duccaṇ̄sa iḍata | mā no dyā gavāṁ steno māvāṁṇāṁ vrkāśataḥ | (vs 6)
(4) sācvānāṁ bhadre taskaro mā nṛṇāṁ yatudhānyāḥ | paramebhiṣ pathibilī steno dā-(5)-vatu taskarāḥ | (vs 7)
pareṇa datvatī rajjus pareṇāyur aṅkṣatu andho rātrī tiṣṭadhu-| (6)-mam aĉīrśānim ahiṁ kṛṇu | (vs 8)
hano vrkasya jambhāyā dvāināṁ nrpate ja-(7)-hi | tāirātrī viĉāmasi sapuṣṭyāmasi jāgrvi | (vs 9)
gobhyo naĉ çarma ya-(8)-cchād aĉvēbhyāsa puruṛebhyāh | (vs 10) Z 3 Z

Vs 1 (also found in RVKh 10. 127. 1, VS 34. 32, N 9. 29): pada b, read with C pitur aprāyī dh-. pada c, divas sadaṁsi brhati vi (?) with C. pada d, tveṣaṁ.
Vs 2: pada a, yoyuvad. pada b: hopeless. C’s reading is viĉam asya nad nivicete yath ejati. It does not seem likely to me that Ppp had this reading, but I cannot reconstruct a substitute. pada c, as bad as pada b (q. v.). C has ariṣṭasas ta urvi tamasvati.
Vs 3 also occurs RVKh 10. 127. 2, ČČ 9. 28. 10. pada a, perhaps read ye te for ete, with the other texts. pada b, draṣṭāro, nava. pada c, saṁty (?) aṣṭā.
Vs 4: pada a, ṣaṭṭi. pada b, paṇcācaṭ paṇca, and for na-çaunihī possibly sumnayī with C? pada d, I suspect vādinī, but C’s vajini is not too alluring.
Vs 5: pada b, rātrī (rātrī), "āvamāḥ. pada d, ni for nr?
Vs 6: pada d, māvāṁṇā vṛka iḍata (with C)?
Vs 7: pada a, mācvānā. pada d, dhāvatu.
Vs 8: pada b, pareṇāghāyur arṣatu. pada c, either trṣṭa- ḍhumām with C, or perhaps tksṇadh? pada d, aĉīrśānap.
Vs 9: pada a, hanū. pada b is very corrupt (C reads stenaṁ drupade jahi, which is as likely to hav been Ppp’s reading as anything that occurs to me). pada c, tvaï rātrī. pada d, probably svapīṣāmasi jāgrhi.
Vs 10: needs no change (C reads yacchācvebhayāh).

21.
To night, for protection from nocturnal dangers.
Č 19. 48.

(96b 8) atho yāṇi tamassahe yāṇi (9) cāntaṣ pareṇihī tāṇi ye pari dadhmahi | (vs 1)
With the offering of a “vīṣṭārin” rice-mess; for blessings.

Vss 1-8 = 4. 34.

(96b 17) vrahmāsi cilro vṛhad asya prṣṭham vāmadevyam udaram odanasya | chandān-(18)-si pakṣāu mukham asya satyam viṣṭā yajñas tapaso dhi jātā | (vs 1)

anastā-(19)-c cuṭṭhāś pavanena pūtač cucayac cucin api yanti lokān | vīṣṭārīṇa-(20)-m odanām ye pacanti nāhiṣāṁ siṣṭām pra dahāj jātavedāḥ nāhiṣāṁ (97a 1) siṣṭāṁ pra dahati jātavedāḥ (vs 2)

svarga loka bahu strīṇim eşām naināṁ yasaḥ pari (2) muṇḍātī retā z yāste yama upa yāti devān sam gandharvāir asaditi syāumyāiḥ (vs 3)

(3) viṣṭārīṇam odanāṁ ye pacanti nāinanivanti sajate kutač cana | rathī ya bhūtvā (4) rathayaṁ iyate pakṣī ya bhūtvā divam çamayati | (vs 4)

eṣa yajñō vitato bhāṣṭho (5) viṣṭārapakvo divam ā samāda
catuṣkumbhyāṁ caturdhā dadāti kṣireṇa prajā (6) udakena dadhnā | (vs 5)

etās tvā kulyā upa yanti viçvahā sarge loke svadhaya pi-(7)-nvamānā | gṛhabradā madhukulyā svarodakā kṣireṇa pūrṇā udakena da-(8)-dhnā | (vs 6)

etās tvā nulyā upa yanti viçvatas sarge loka svadhaya mādayanti | (9) puṇḍarīkaṁ kumidam sa tanoti viçam ca-lūkahṃ capakho mulāli | sarge lo-(10)-ke svadhaya pin-
vamānā upa ma tiṣhanti puṣkariṇīs samakta | (vs 7)

yam odanam paca-(11)-si miçraddhadhāno viṣṭāriṇam lok-
kajitiyaṁ svargyaṁ sa merī mā kṣeṣṭa sadam i-(12)-ṣya-
māṇo viçvarupā kāmadughā dhenuh astu me | (vs 8)

vṛṣabham santam saha sāunṛta-(13)-yā sarge loke amṛtam
duhāne | yeme putraś pitaraç ca sati te tvā viṣṭāri-(14)-d
upa sarve sadeyuḥ | (vs 9)

ya imāni yajñaṁ abhi viṣṭhatāni yasye yeme lokās sva-(15)
svadhaya samaktaḥ yeme pāutṛ uta ye pitāmahās tebhyo
viṣṭāraṁ amṛta (16) ni dhukṣva z, | (vs 10)

yat prthiviyāṁ yady antarikṣam yadi divam devatāyā
ejagatha ye-(17)-me prapāturāḥ | prapitāmahāḥ ca tebhyo
viṣṭārinān anu prajñeṣu tatra | (vs 11)

sarge loke (18) apsaraṣa enam jāyā bhūtvopacere viṣ-
tāriṇam odanam ye pacanty asmin lo-(19)-ke dakṣināyās
pariṣkṛtaṁ | (vs 12)

innudaināṁ svany apa tanād adhi bibhrañ çam asye
(97 b 1) krṇvo viçṛhībhrañ (2) çatāmasu | (vs 13)
apāṇcaṁ pratimā kurcy adharācīyaṁ striyaṁ naya | ati-
(2)-mām daça parvataṁ atimā nāvyā daça | | (vs 14)
adhāracīm apācīm ato kulaçalāṁ bhi-(3)-śam bibhrañ çam
asyāi krṇvas tenāinā pratimāmasi | (vs 15)

ājaniruja bilaṁ bilād a-(4)-ṛṇyāmākurv araṇyād araṇaṁ
janaṁ | mṛgān anu prapātaya vātasyāinā çikham (5) kuru |
| (vs 16)

vātāgre yassa hṛdayaṁ manor eśv anu dadhmasi | bibhrañ
cam asyāi krṇvo (6) viddhaṁ samāmakaṁdaṣe | (vs 17)
čarvaṁ anu pariplava tāṁ antar ā dyāvāprthivī u-(7)-
bhe | yathā na vadhri dāntarād viça tūlam ivopari | (vs 18)
acām asyāi vāto vātv a-(8)-cāṁ tad ati śuryaḥ ato yad
annam açñāti tatas sī viṣuvattarāṁ | (vs 19)
sinhas te stu (9) cakṣuṣa ity ekā | (vs 20)
eṣa vām agnim antarā | sa vičvaṁcāu vy asyatu yathā
vām sā (10) manty uttarastyoç canāyuṣī | (vs 21)

upātaya cīmidāv ati | imāu vy asya dampati-(-11)-ś pakvaṁ
māmsam ivācinaṁ meham asmin patāu raṁstamossyo çay-
ane sve | jaha-(-12)-ti vasanoç cam ahi jīrnām iva tvacaṁ
(vs 22-23)

yathā mṛtāc ca jīvāṇc cāsin lo-(13)-ke vyokasaḥ evesau
dampati stām asmin loke vyokasaū z (vs 24)

piṭāś pi-(-14)-tarāu tuśṭārmātārmātāmahās tena vṛahaṇās
tenā cchandasas svargo lokās sva-(15)-rgasya lokar gamayate
ya ivaṁ veda (vs 25)

z anu 4 z ziti çrāddhavra-(16)-hmāṇam z z oṁ asmin
loke vyokasaū z z ity atharvāṇi (17) pāippalādaçākhāyāṁ
śaṣṭhaç kāṇḍāç z

Vs 1: pada a, brahmāśya čiro brhad-. pada d, viṣṭāri or
viṣṭāri-yajū-. jataḥ.

Vs 2: pada a, pūtāc. padas d and e, nāiteśāṁ čiṇām. (Is
pada e an accidental repetition of pada d,—a case of ditto-
graphy?)

Vs 3: pada a, loke, strāṇam. pada b, yamaḥ, retaḥ. pada c,
āste for yāste? pada d, madate for asaditi? sāumyāḥ.

Vs 4: pada b, perhaps nāinān avartis? pada c, ha for ya?
perhaps rathayāṇā for yān? pada d, probably read pakṣi ha
bhūtvāpi divaṁ sameti.

Vs 5: pada a, vahiśtho (but the reading of the Q mss, as
well as Ppp, is bah-). pada b, sasāda. pada c, catuṣkumbhyāṁ
(acc. sg.)? pada d, I believe that prajā must represent a fourth
instr. form: possibly prkṣā?

Vs 6: pada b, pinvāmanāḥ. pada c, madhukulyā svarodakāḥ.

Vs 7: pada a, kulyā for nulyā. pada b, loke, mādayantiḥ.
pada c, kumudaṁ. pada d, bisam čāläuftaḥ caphako mulālī.
pada e, svadhaya. pada f, samaktāḥ.

Vs 8: pada a, probably mičraṁ dadhāno. pada b, perhaps
lokajitam? pada c, me for mem, madam for sadam. pada d,
vičvarūpā.

Vs 9: pada a, sahaṁ sūnṛtāya. pada b, perhaps duhānām.
pada c, ya ime. santi. pada d, viṣṭārinn.

Vs 10: pada a, ya imān yajūn abhi viṣṭhito 'si. pada b,
omit sva. pada c, ya ime. pada d, viṣṭārinn amṛtaṁ ni dh*,
Vs 11: pada a, probably read yadi prthivā. pada b, probably devatāyām (possibly devatayā). pada c, ya ime. pada d, anu-pra-jūṣeṣva?

Vs 12 seems correct as it stands.

Vs 13: I cannot solve the first part. The last part is perhaps to be red bibhraṃ cām asyāī kṛṣṇa vigrhitau catamasi. The letter h of vigrha is doubtful: Barret thinks the sign bhra of the ms is fairly clear, but bhra and tra ar nearly interchangeable, and the vowel r is written ra countless times.

Vs 14: padas a-b, apācāṇa pratimāṃ kṛdhy adharaṇāṃ āriyāṃ naya. pada c, atimān.

Vs 15: pada b, I read bīṣaṇa for bhiṣaṇa: both this and kulaçaḷaṇa seem to be designations of plants. pada c, kṛṣṇas. Verses 16-19 ar in bad shape and I can offer little.


Vs 17: pada a, yasya? pada b, manor might be sanor also. pada d, *ktaṇḍase might equally well be *kuṇḍase.

Vs 18: pada c, no adhrī?

Vs 19: pada d, perhaps tad asti visavat?*

Vs 20 is quoted (by pratika, cf. our introduction p. 376 f.) from 2. 58. 3, where it is given in full, tho in a corrupt form: see Barret, JAOS 30. 233. (The word astu is there omitted—evidently by error. Our caksuṣa stands for caksuṣa.)

Vs 21 (cf. 2. 58. 6 and 3): pada a, esa vāṁ agnir antaraḥ. pada b, viśvaṁcāu. pada c, probably yathā vāṁ naço asati (cf. Barret, l. c.). pada d is unintelligible to me: it may belong to the following verse.

Vs 22-23: I can do little more than the division of words implies. The second pada seems all right (reading dāṃpati).

The last two padas ar all right except for the words va-sanoḍ cam, which I can do nothing with.

Vs 24: pada a, jīvaḥ. pada c, evemāu. Otherwise the verse needs no change.

Vs 25: this appears to be a prose passage of brāhmaṇa-like character, and it may well be doubted whether it originally belonged to the hymn. I cannot construe the first part of it. Read brahmaṇa, chandaśā, lokam (for lokar), and evaṁ (for ivan). Compare the Vedic Concordance under tena brahmaṇa and tena chandaśā.—The colophon should probably be red iti ṭrāddhabrāhmaṇam, and should be taken as referring specifically to this last stanza (or, possibly, *brahma, referring
to the whole hymn?) Note that after it the last pada of vs 24 is repeated. This is in itself an indication that the hymn really ends with vs 24. In a number of other cases our ms. repeats at the end of a hymn the last pada of the last stanza\(^1\), introducing it by the syllable om.

\(^1\) Such repetitions occur, according to a list which Barret sends me, at the end of 1. 92, 1. 112, 2. 8, 2. 28, 2. 73, 2. 91, 3. 10, 3. 30, 4. 7, 4. 27 and (?) after vs 6 of 4. 17.
Armageddon.—By Paul Haupt, Professor in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.¹

Theodore Roosevelt concluded his speech before the Chicago Convention on August 5, 1912 with the words: We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord. Armageddon denotes the place of a final battle, just as Waterloo is used for an overwhelming defeat, or as F. A. Beyerlein called his sensational novel, in which he endeavored to point out some alleged defects in the German army, Jena oder Sedan? (Berlin, 1903) the meaning of this title being, Will the conditions prevailing in the German army lead to Jena or to Sedan, to a great disaster, as in 1806, or to a notable victory, as in 1870?

Similarly the author of the Maccabean homily in the Book of Joel, which was written toward the end of Simon’s reign (about 136 B.C.) when Antiochus VII Sidetes sent his general Cendebeæus against Judah, says, If the enemies of the Chosen People should attempt a new invasion, JHVH will bring them down into a Valley of Jehoshaphat where they will be annihilated, as the Moabites, Ammonites and Meunites² were exterminated in the Valley of Berachah when they marched against Jerusalem in the days of Jehoshaphat (about 850 B.C.).³

The name Valley of Jehoshaphat is now given to the Valley of Kidron which separates Mount Zion from Mount Olivet. This designation (which cannot be traced beyond the fourth century A.D.) may be based on the fact that in the account of the Maccabean victory, given in 1 Macc. 16, 9, Simon’s son, John Hyrcanus, is said to have pursued Cendebeæus as far as Kedron. This place, however, is not the Kidron Valley on the east side of Jerusalem, but the fortress of Kedron, i.e. the present Kefta, SE of Jamnia, NE of Ashdod, about 3½ miles SW of Ekron. The Jews as well as the Christians
and Mohammedans of Palestine believe that the Last Judgment will be held in the Kidron Valley, and just as the Kidron Valley, on the east side of Jerusalem, is supposed to be the scene of Doomsday, so the Valley of Hinnom, south of Jerusalem, is regarded as the place of the future punishment of the wicked: the name Gehenna is the Hebrew גֶּהֶנֶּ֥ה, Valley of Hinnom.

Armageddon, the place of the final battle, is derived from Rev. 16, 16: He gathered them together to a place called in the Hebrew tongue Armageddon (καὶ συνήγαγεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν τόπον τῶν καλοῦμενον Ἐφραίστι Αρμαγαδών). The Revised Version has Har-Magedon (Westcott-Hort reads Ἅρα Μαγαδών). Luther’s Bible gives the name with an initial h. The Vulgate has Armagedon. Luther’s Harmageddon is preferable to Armageddon, because the name undoubtedly represents the Hebrew Har-Megiddon, the Mount (or Hill) of Megiddo. Hommel’s conjecture (1890) that Harmageddon is a corruption of Har-Mō‘ed, the Mountain of the Assembly in Is. 14, 13 (i.e. the Babylonian Olympus on whose summit the gods dwell) does not commend itself, although it was endorsed by Siegfried in his review of the twelfth edition of Gesenius’ Hebrew lexicon (TLZ 20, 304). There is no mythological element in the name Armageddon.

The so-called eschatological passages as well as the alleged Messianic prophecies in the Old Testament have, as a rule, a definite historical background, but when the prophetic bills drawn on the future were not honored, they were afterwards extended to Doomsday. It is true that the poetic imagery in Messianic and eschatological sections reflects certain ancient mythological ideas, but we find the same influence in modern poetry. We may speak of a thunderbolt or of a jovial fellow without being conscious of the original mythological ideas. If a newspaper writer refers to Cupid, or old Sol, or Jupiter Pluvius, we need not suppose that his religious ideas are influenced by classical mythology. The day before yesterday was the second anniversary of the Titanic disaster—perhaps the greatest ocean tragedy which the world has ever known. A year ago a Baltimore newspaper said that on April 14, 1912 Neptune, in his wrath against the monsters of the deep that were slowly conquering him, arose, and within the space of a few short hours swallowed the giant Titanic. This sounds very
mythological, but it is merely pseudo-poetic imagery. If we want to understand the eschatological passages of the Bible we must know Orientah imagery and allegory. Nor can we adopt Jensen's view (quoted by Zimmerm in Gunkel's Schöpfung und Chaos, p. 389) that μαγευσιν is identical with μαγευσιν in Ἑσαξεγετα, the consort of Ἐρεξαγιαλ, i.e. the Babylonian goddess of Hades (KAT 637, n. 2).

When Roosevelt used the name Armageddon I dare say he had in mind, not the apocalyptic passage in the Book of Revelation, but the sixth stanza of Whittier's poem Rantoul. Robert Rantoul was a member of Congress from Massachusetts and one of the great opponents of slavery. He died at his post in Washington, six days before the forty-seventh anniversary of his birthday, on August 7, 1852. Whittier says of him:

We seemed to see our flag unfurled,
Our champion waiting in his place,
For the last battle of the world,
The Armageddon of the race.

J.W. Bull, of Baltimore, published, in 1859, two discourses by F.E. Pitts, of Nashville, Tenn. The first of these addresses, which was delivered in the great hall of the Capitol in February, 1857, is entitled: Defense of Armageddon; or, Our Great Country Foretold in the Holy Scriptures; and the title of the second discourse is: The Battle of Armageddon; or the World's Last Conflict between Civil and Religious Liberty on the One Side, and Political and Ecclesiastical Despotism on the Other. Charles Francis Adams lectured at the Johns Hopkins University, Feb. 17, 1914, on The Armageddon of Lancashire. An article, by Harold Kellock, in the Century Magazine for May, 1914, pp. 75-82, describing the war that is being waged in New England against the gipsy- and the brown-tailed moths, is entitled The Winged Armageddon. A clever (but untrustworthy) editorial in the New York World (reprinted in the Baltimore Sun, June 11, 1914, p. 6, col. 7) pretending that Hearst and Roosevelt are twin souls having almost everything in common concludes with the paragraph: Armageddon is big enough for both of them, and Mr. Hearst is not averse to battle for the Lord provided the gate receipts are equitably divided.

On August 9, 1912—I had just returned from Europe, after
having attended the Oriental Congress at Athens—the Editor of the Baltimore Evening Sun called me up over the telephone, asking me whether I had seen Roosevelt’s reference to Armageddon at the end of his speech in Chicago on August 5; he was especially anxious to know whether Roosevelt likened himself to King Josiah of Judah or to Pharaoh Necho of Egypt. I said, I had not read Roosevelt’s speech, but I should look it up, and let him know. After about an hour I gave the desired information, and the same evening the Sun published nearly a column stating, I had confessed that I had never heard of Armageddon, but that it might have been one of the great Babylonian battle-fields on the borders of Asia; the name probably meant The Mount of Magedom.—

Now Armageddon (or, more correctly, Har-Magedon) means, of course, The Mount of Mageddon, and Mageddon is the Septuagintal rendering of the Hebrew Megiido(m) which is one of the oldest cities in Palestine. It is referred to in the Amarna Tablets about 1400 B.C. In some reports of Egyptian officials, about B.C. 1500, contained in the new Petersburg papyrus recently published by Golenisheff,11 Megiido appears at the head of the Canaanite cities (OLZ 17, 105. 202; cf. Mic. 25, n. *). Megiido is the modern Lejjûn on the road from Jenin (at the southeastern end of the Plain of Jezreel) to Haifâ on the Mediterranean. The Mount of Megiido is the ancient citadel of Megiido, which is now known as Tell el-Mutesellim, i.e. The Hill of the Prefect. This site, which is about five minutes from el-Lejjûn, was excavated ten years ago (1903-5) under the auspices of the German Palestine exploration society.

Megiido is connected with the Heb. gadûd, troop, and means place of troops, military station, garrison. The modern Arabic name el-Lejjûn, which represents the Latin legio, legion, is a translation of the ancient designation, just as Tell el-Ḫâdît is a translation of Dan. Similarly Nazareth is a translation of the old name Hethlon (or rather Hittalôn = Ḥinnathôn; cf. ZDMG 63, 514, n. 10) and the ancient volcano which is called Sinai in the Old Testament is now known as el-Badr.12 Arab. badr means full moon, and Sinai is connected with the ancient Assyrian word for Moon, Šîn, which means originally change.13

Har-Mageddon was a place of great strategic importance: it commanded not only the road along the southern edge of
the Plain of Jezreel, from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, but also the entrance to the Plain from the region south of Mount Carmel. The road from Egypt to Babylonia ran through this pass. The region around Megiddo held thrilling memories of battles of bygone days. Thutmosis III, perhaps the greatest Pharaoh in the history of Egypt, captured Megiddo about 1500, after he had defeated the kings of Canaan. King Ahaziah of Judah, the son of Jehoram and Ahab’s daughter Athaliah, died at Megiddo after he had been hit by an arrow when he fled before Jehu about 840 B.C. King Josiah of Judah was defeated and slain at Megiddo when he ventured to oppose Pharaoh Necho II of Egypt in his expedition to the Valley of the Euphrates. Herodotus (2, 159) calls Megiddo Μαγιδωλος, with l for n; Josephus (Ant. 10, 5, 1) has Μεγίδων = מגדה (EB 2611, n. 2). Also Meroz and Merom are corruptions of Megiddo (see below, p. 419).

The Waters of Merom must be identified with the Waters of Megiddo, i.e. the Kishon which drains the whole of the Plain of Jezreel and empties into the Mediterranean about half an hour east of Haifa. Next to the Jordan it is the largest stream in Palestine. One of the principal branches of the Kishon, which is sometimes called the head of the river, flowed through Megiddo. The modern Arabic name of the Kishon is el-Mukattâ’. This does not mean The Ford (Arab. mukta’ or mukta’) but cut, i.e. divided, branched. Kishôn is dissimilation for Kushôn, just as the name of the first river of Paradise is Pison, Pishôn for Pûshôn (AJSL 26, 212, i). In post-Biblical Hebrew we find even nîmos for νυμᾶς. Kishôn = Kushôn is connected with Arabic kâys (Heb. késh-eth) bow and means bowed, bent, curved, tortuous.

Armageddon is mentioned in Rev. 16, 16 as the place of the last great battle against the kings of the world, not owing to its associations with the death of Ahaziah or the death of Josiah, but as the place of the great victory of the Israelites over the kings of Canaan, when the stars of heaven fought against Sisera. This battle began at Taanach by the Waters of Megiddo, about four miles SE of Megiddo. It is glorified in the great triumphal ode, preserved in the fifth chapter of the Book of Judges, which is generally held to be the oldest monument of Hebrew literature. It may have been composed about 1200 B.C. (IN 478).
The Israelites began to invade Palestine about 1400, whereas the ancestors of the Jews did not enter Palestine before 1100. The Israelites came from the northeast; the Jews from the south. The ancient Israelites, i.e. the forefathers of the Samaritans, were idolaters; Judah, on the other hand, is a collective name for the worshipers of JHVH. **King of Judah** is originally a title like the Mohammedan Commander of the Faithful. David forced the Israelites to adopt the worship of JHVH, but after the disruption of the empire (about 930) the Israelites relapsed again into idolatry.\(^\text{15}\)

The chief deity of the pre-Davidic Israelites was not the volcanic god JHVH, but the pastoral deity Jacob who was worshiped at Beth-el in the form of a bull.\(^\text{16}\) He is referred to in the Song of Deborah as the Abbir Isaël, the Bull of Israel; his bellow represents the thunder which frightened the steeds of the Canaanite chariots so that they became unmanageable, and perished with their charioteers in the floods of the Kishon which had been swelled by a cloud-burst turning the surrounding country into an impassable morass. The elements were in league with the Israelites, or as the ancient poet expresses it, the stars of heaven fought against Sisera. A similar catastrophe befell the Turks in the battle against the French, which was fought near Mount Tabor on April 16, 1799: many of them who attempted to pass the morass in their flight perished. We must read in vv. 22, 21 of the ode:

22 Then clattered the hoofs of the steeds at the bellow of Israel's Bull;
21 Kishon's stream swept them away, extinguished the lives of his strong ones.

Ley saw forty years ago that vv. 21 and 22 must be transposed,\(^\text{17}\) but hismetrical analysis of the poem was erroneous. He believed that the ode consisted of nine irregular stanzas, and that the lines were octametric. Even Professor Moore in his learned commentary on Judges (p. 136) states that the prevailing rhythm of the poem has four beats to the line (or rather hemistich). But the ode consists of seven stanzas, and each stanza has five lines with \(3 + 3\) beats. Apart from the introductory stanza, the poem falls into two sections: \(A = \) stanzas ii-iv, and \(B = \) stanzas v-vii. The last two stanzas should be transposed so that the anxiety of Sisera's mother is depicted
before the death of Sisera. This must have been the sequence when the final gloss was added:

So perish thine enemies all, but be thy friends as the sunrise!

This epiphenomena was originally addressed to Israel, not to JHVH; all the references to JHVH in the poem represent later additions, especially the description of JHVH’s departure from Seir (vv. 4 and 5). The three lines of this Judaic illustrative quotation have displaced three lines of the first stanza, viz. the initial line of the poem, which is preserved in v. 10, and the last two lines of the first stanza, which may have been: I’ll sing

Of the march of Israel’s myriads against Sisera, King of Megiddo;
Of the fight of the stars of heaven and fiery flashes of lightning.

In Hebrew:

The last hemistich is responsible for the tradition that the leader in the fight against Sisera was the wife of Lappidoth (Torches) and that she was aided by Barak (Lightning). The original poem contained no reference to Barak. Nor was there a prophetess Deborah. The fight against Sisera was led by Deborah, the modern Debüriye at the northwestern foot of Mount Tabor, which was one of the oldest towns in Israel, a mother in Israel like Abel-Beth-Maacha (2 S 20, 19). The modern Debüriye shows that the name of this place was not Daberath, but Deborath. The statement in Jud. 4, 5 that Deborah was wont to sit under Deborah’s palm between Ramah and Beth-el in the Highlands of Ephraim is due to a confusion with Deborah, the nurse of Rebekah (Gen. 35, 8).

Deborah was the ancient capital of Issachar. Issachar, north of the Plain of Jezreel, was aided by the Machirites in Ephraim, south of the Plain, and their Benjamite brethren in the southeastern corner of Ephraim, near the mouth of the Jordan. Ephraim is not a tribal name; also Gilead in the gloss, he dwelt in Gilead beyond the Jordan, is a geographical name indicating the territory of Reuben. Reuben, east of Ephraim, across the Jordan, held aloof, as did also the two half-Israelitish tribes in the north, Dan and Asher. Judah with the Simeonites and Levites is not mentioned at all; at the time of the battle by the Waters of Megiddo the
ancestors of the Jews had not entered Palestine. The references to Zebulun and Naphtali are later additions based on c. 4. According to the prose version, contained in that chapter, the Canaanites were defeated by 10,000 men from the tribes of Zebulun and Naphtali. C. 4 is later than c. 5 and, to some extent, based on misunderstandings of the ancient poem.

A third version is found in Josh. 11; here the leader of the Canaanites is called Jabin, as in Jud. 4, but the Israelish victory is gained under the leadership of Joshua, and the battle is said to have been fought near the Waters of Merom. This is not Lake Hûle, about ten miles north of the Sea of Galilee, but Merom is merely a corruption of Megiddo. The has Mephew, with n, for Merom, and the original form of Megiddo was Megiddon with final n, as we find it in the final chapter of the Book of Zechariah and in the apocalyptic Armageddon (Rev. 16, 16). In v. 23 of the Song of Deborah Megiddo has been corrupted to Meroz; the 7 corresponds to the 2, and the 7 to the 7. In GA we have Ma'ath instead of GV Mephew, and in GL: Mephew. Meroz was not a hamlet in the line of Sisera's flight, whose Israelish inhabitants suffered him to escape; it is nothing but a corruption of Megiddo, and this must have been Sisera's capital. The Israelites did not curse it, but they destroyed it; א is an archaic expression for לוהים הדור, to ban, to devote to destruction (EB 26, 685, below). The has לוהים הדור. Instead of the imperative א we ought to read the perfect א. The clause said the Angel of Jahveh is a misplaced gloss which belongs to the beginning of the third stanza: Awake, awake, O Deborah! The phrase Angel of Jahveh has often been substituted for the names of ancient Israelish deities (ZDMG 63, 507, l. 8). Wellhausen says in the translation of the Psalms, in the Polychrome Bible (p. 176, l. 36): Judaism has turned the heathen gods into angels commissioned by JHVH to govern the foreign nations.

Sisera may have been the successor of Shamgar. Both names seem to be Hittite. In the days of Shamgar the Canaanites blockaded the trade routes traversing the Great Plain so that the Israelites in the mountains were cut off from the Mediterranean, but the Israelish peasantry had ceased to march out for the fray; so we must supply after v. 7. V. 8b, No shield nor spear was seen among forty thousands of Israel, must be inserted between 7a and 7b, Till thou arosest, O Deborah. The
first part of v. 8, does not mean, They chose new gods, but God will select new ones, i.e. new leaders, when there is war at the gates. Instead of the meaningless we must read The pious glossator wanted to emphasize his conviction that, if the gates of Jerusalem should be beset, God would elect new prophetic leaders like Deborah of old. The glossator may have had in mind Isaiah at the time of Sennacherib's siege of Jerusalem. This gloss may be post-Exilic, and the line in v. 11, There they rehearsed Jahveh's deeds, His yeomanry's deeds in Israel, must be assigned to the same period, not only on account of the Aramaic verb but also in view of the theological term deeds, exploits, victories, lit. justifications, vindications.

The preceding hemisticgh should be read, i.e. the Issacharites marched to the gates of Megiddo (read: רודו אל שערי מגדו at the trumpeters' call (cf. 2 S 20, 1) from the banquets, lit. in consequence of the sound of the trumpeters between the drinking-places. In Joel's ancient poem on the locusts the catastrophe is announced to the wine-bibbers; the poet says:

Awake, ye tipplers, and weep! and howl, all bibbers of wine!

The ancient Israelites did not believe in abstinence; Amos (6, 4-6) speaks of the rich men in Samaria

Who lie on ivory sofas, and sprawl on their dining-couches,
Snapping the lute o'er the sound-hole, inditing words of song;
Who drink the purest wine, and use the choicest perfume.

4 וה=email in v. 11 of the Song of Deborah may have the same meaning. Arabic mis'ab denotes a skin-bottle. In Hebrew, means, as a rule, not to drink wine, but to draw water; nevertheless may mean drinking-bouts or large vessels from which the wine was dipped out and served to the guests. Milton (Paradise Lost 11, 718) says: from cups to civil broils.

As I stated above, the preceding verse (v. 10) contains the initial line of the ode. The poet begins: Ye who ride on red-

roan asses, and ye who walk on the road, Share! This does not mean Sing! but Attend! i.e. give attention, listen! After having addressed the Israelites, both high and low, the poet apostro-
phizes the Cananite kings and princes. V. 3 must precede v. 2; the preposition ב at the beginning of v. 2 depends on the verb ריחא, I will sing, at the end of v. 3, just as we have in Psalm 138, 5: יָשְׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, they will sing of the ways of Jahveh. Also in Arabic you say يَا بِنِي يُهُوُا. The clause I will chant Jahveh, Israel's God is a gloss. The poet wants to sing

בָּשְׁרֵי יְהוָה יִשְׂרָאֵל חֹדֶרְנֵי הנּוּסִים

i. e. of the locks that streamed in Israel, of the willingness of the people, viz. for war. We must supply at the end: לְלֹא. Also at the end of the last stanza but one we must read instead of the meaningless יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, two pieces of embroideries for the necks of the spoil, לְפָנָי, לְעַד חַג, for each of his warriors. The plural וּמְרַעְתָּה does not mean princes, although it is so explained in the gloss which we find in v. 9: My heart is for Israel's rulers, for the ardent among the people; מְרַעְתָּה means long hair: at the beginning of a campaign the men let their hair grow long. Also ראש מְרַעְתָּה, at the end of the Song of Moses in Deut. 32, 42, means the long-haired head of the foe. It has about the same meaning as קַלָּה שְׁפָרָה in Psalm 68, 22.26

Time will not permit me to discuss further philological details.27 I will only remark that we must read at the beginning of v. 13 instead of the meaningless יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, then he made a fugitive rule for the nobles, רבכּ שְׁרֹיאֵל אֶלְּאָרָויאֵם, the ranks attached themselves to the nobles, the ranks followed the leaders. In view of יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, loyally attached to thee and eager to follow thee in Ps. 110, 4 (JHUC, No. 114, p. 110) we might be tempted to read שְׁרֹיאֵל אֶלְּאָרָויאֵם; but שְׁרֹיאֵל אֶלְּאָרָויאֵם is an Assyrian loanword, which is found only in post-Exilic passages;28 so we cannot have it in this ancient poem. There is a difference between יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים and יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים. The latter means to be attached to, the former to attach oneself to. The suggestion that יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים was a transposition of יָשָׁרֵי הָאֱלֹהִים was made by Winckler, but this emendation has been rejected by all expositors. It is hardly necessary to add that we must resort to several emendations, transpositions, excisions, and additions; the received text can be explained only by those who do not know Hebrew.

I will give in conclusion a metrical translation of the genuine lines29 of the triumphal ode celebrating the Battle of Armageddon about 1250 B.C. The ancient Israelitish poet, who may have been a man of Deborah in Issachar, begins his psæan as follows:30
The Battle by the Waters of Megiddo.

i 10 "Ye who ride on red-roan asses, ye who walk on the road, attend!

3 Hear, O ye kings! Give ear
O ye chieftains! I will sing

2 Of the locks that streamed in Israel,
of the people's ardor for war;

32 Of the march of Israel's myriads
against Sisera, King of Megiddo;

33 Of the fight of the stars of heaven
and fiery flashes of lightning.

A ii 6 In the days of Shamgar ben-Anath

7a "Israel's yeomanry ceased
to march out for the fray:

8b [] No [shield] nor spear was seen
among forty thousands of Israel,

7b Till thou aroest, O Deborah,
aroest, a mother in Israel.

iii 12a Awake! Awake! O Deborah! awaken thy people's myriads!

15a Then "Deborah's people, Issachar, sent down to The Plain its footfolk;

14 From Ephraim, too, they descended, thy Benjamite brethren were with thee;
From Machir came truncheon-bearers,
from Issachar wielders of the staff;

13 The ranks followed the nobles, the people marched down as warriors.

iv 15b In Reuben's tribal branches
the great held back in doubt:

16 "They dwelt at the fire-places
to listen to pastoral flutes.

17 Dan "served on foreign ships,
and Zebulun dwelt near the shore.
But Issachar’s people recked not of life on the heights of the mounts:

At the trumpeters’ call from the banquet they marched to the gates of Megiddo.

The kings came and fought at Taanach by the Waters of Megiddo;

In heaven fought the stars from their courses against Sisera.

Then clattered the hoofs of the steeds at the bellow of Israel’s Bull,

Kishon’s stream swept them away, extinguished the lives of his strong ones.

They utterly banned Megiddo, they utterly banned her dwellers.

Through the lattice- oriel peered and pried the mother of Sisera:

“His train is long in coming, the steps of his chariots tarry.”

The wisest of her ladies answers, replies to her anxious question:

Behold, they will find spoil, a damsel or two for each head,

Spoil of dyed stuffs for Sisera, two broideries for each warrior.

Blessed above women is Jael, in the tents of the nobles:

Water he asked, she gave milk, curds in a bowl did she bring him;

Her hand she puts forth to the tent-pin, her right hand to the workmen’s hammer;

She hammered, shattered his head, battered and pierced his temples;

At her feet he sank, he fell.

(a) I at that time Deborah sang as follows  (b) 10 who sit on colts
(γ) 3 I to JHVH  (δ) I will chant JHVH, Israel’s God  (ε) 2 praise JHVH
(ζ) 9 My heart is for Israel’s rulers, for the ardent among the people.
(4) O JHVH, when from Seir Thou departest,
when from Edom's land Thou strodest,
Then earth *and heavens* quaked, *′*°
. the welkin showered water;
5 Before *Him* mountains[*] melted, []
before the God of Israel.

(5) New ones will God select at the time they beset the gates.

(6) Arise, O Barak *′*°! muster thy muster! *°*
thus Barak called Zebulun and Naphtali to Kedesh
(7) the princes of Issachar
(8) of Zebulun and Naphtali
as to Reuben's tribal branches, the great held back in doubt
why did *Him* 17 in Gilead, beyond the Jordan, dwell they
why did he *Him* of the great sea *°*
18 Zebulun and Naphtali
They rehearsed there JHVH's deeds.

(9) Then *Him* through the window *°*
(10) why is *Him* a divide
*°*
(11) spoil of dyed stuffs
(12) one *°*
or
(13) gain of silver they took not
(14) the wife of the Kenite Heber
above women 26 Sisera
(15) when he sank *°*
(16) he fell
(17) So perish thine enemies all, *°*
but be thy friends as the morning!

(a) 1 and Barak ben-Abinoam
(b) praise JHVH
(c) 4 showered
(d) 5 JHVH (e) that is Sinai
(f) JHVH (g) 12 ben-Abinoam
(h) 14 to the Plain (i) 17 and dwelt at its creeks
(k) 11 JHVH's people
(l) 23 to the help of JHVH as fighters
(m) 30 dyed stuffs
(n) 31 O JHVH
(o) 31 in its power (p) then the land was secure for forty years

Sisera and the allied kings of Canaan succumbed to Israel in the great battle by the Waters of Megiddo. The same fate will befall the kings of the earth *gathered to the battle of that great day of God Almighty*

For the last battle of the world,
The Armageddon of the race.

Notes.

(1) Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Oriental Society, Boston, April 16, 1914.
(2) That is, the inhabitants of Maon (1 S 25, 2) which is represented by the modern Khirbet Ma'in (south of Hebron). See my paper Bean and Amathitis in Actes du Seizième Congrès international des Orientalistes (Athens, 1912) p. 64.

(4) The older (Philoxenian) Syriac version (508 A.D.) has מָרָע; the later (Harclean) version (616 A.D.) מָרָע (cf. EB 23, 212*).


(6) TLZ = Theologische Literaturzeitung. For the other abbreviations (EB, EB 11, IN, JHUC, KAT, OLZ, WZKM, &c.) see this Journal, vol. xxxii, p. 10, n. 11; cf. vol. xxviii, p. 112 and OLZ 16, 488.

(7) Contrast Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos (Göttingen, 1895) pp. 263-266.

(8) See Haupt, The Book of Micah (Chicago, 1910) p. 50; cf. JAOS 32, 120.


(10) Cf. the letter of Dr. Elbridge C. Price in the Baltimore Evening Sun, Aug. 15, 1912.


(12) Cf. E. Oberhummer in Mitt. k. k. Geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien, 1911, Heft 12, p. 637. This sacred mountain, which was visited by A. Musil (Mic. 57, 4) on July 2, 1910, is situated at about 27° N, 37° E, about a day’s journey SW of the station Dâr-al-Hamârâ of the Hejaz Railway, about four days journey SE of Tebûk. A preliminary report of Professor Musil, who was accompanied by Dr. Leopold Koser, of the Geological Institute of the University of Vienna, was published in the Anzeiger of the philological-historical class of the Vienna Academy, May 17, 1911. Musil’s explorations were briefly described in a cablegram from Vienna, printed in the Baltimore American, Dec. 11, 1910, also in the Berlin weekly Das Echo, July 6, 1911. According to Musil, the Hebrews followed a great trade route from Elath (ZDMG 63, 506, 1, 12; 511, 41; 512, 8; 513, 2) in a southeastern direction. The stations of this route may be easily traced. They lead to a large and well-watered plateau, bounded on the east by the Harrat al-Rhâ. From this plateau there rises a long table-mountain of sandstone.
with a high, pitch-black volcano on its flattened summit. Below this extinct volcano there are two narrow lava-streams less than 4,000 years old. This table-mountain is entirely isolated. At the foot of the northern side of the mountain there are twelve large blocks of sandstone, known as al-madābih, Heb. mizbehōth, sacrificial altars. Similar blocks are found at the western end. On the southern side are The Caves of the Servants of Moses, Arab. mağā'ir 'abīd Mūsā. From this region the Edomite ancestors of the Jews proceeded northward, afterwards invading Palestine from the south. Cf. my paper The Burning Bush and The Origin of Judaism in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. xlviii, No. 193 (Philadelphia, 1909), pp. 360. 361. 364-366. Oberhummer (loc. cit. 633) has called attention to the fact that the statement in Baedeker's Palästina (1910) p. 197 with regard to the Jabal Barghīr or Jabal an-Nūr in the neighborhood of Elath is incorrect. Contrast Kittel's Gesch. Isr. (Gotha, 1912) p. 510, n. 3.

(13) Cf. ZDMG 63, 517, l. 37; AJSL 22, 256; 26, 9.
(16) Cf. Haupt, Micah, p. 19, n. 17. The horns of the altar are a survival of the pre-Davidic Israelitish bull-worship (DB I, 77a; 342a; EB 124, 5; 631). Ps. 118, 27b, which should be inserted after v. 20, means: With palm-branches join the procession, aye, up to the horns of the altar! Cf. הָרָשִׁים, reunion, social gathering, Succ. 45b. See my paper in ZAT 35, part 2.
(18) See my paper on Leah and Rachel in ZAT 29, 286; cf. also JAOS 32, 17; ZA 28, 241, 1. 5; contrast JBL 32, 33; Zapletal, op. cit. p. 10. For illustrative quotations cf. BL 26; Mic. 28, 28; 34, 28; 40, 40.
(20) The text, it may be supposed, read originally Zebulun instead of Asher; cf. Gunkel's 'Genesis' 483. The suggestion that the original text may have been יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבָלָה אֶזְרָה נָ is gratuitous. See also Gressmann, Gunkel, &c, 'Die Schriften des AT in Auswahl übersetzt', Part 24 (Göttingen, 1913) p. 178.

(21) For the meaning of the term Levites see ZAT 29, 284, A. 6, und 286. There is no etymological connection between Levi and Leah (JBL 32, 47).

(22) See my paper Micah's Capriciade (JBL 29) p. 86, below, and The Book of Micah (AJSL 27) p. 23; cf. ibid. p. 14, nn. 4, 5; p. 29, n. 33.

(23) Cf. Mic. 36, 36, also ZAT 22, 168, cited by Zapletal, op. cit. p. 30. Syr. Ὀμοίωσις means both justification (acquittal, innocence) and victory.

(24) See my translation in the paper cited above, n. 3. The Hebrew text (in Hebrew characters, not in transliteration) is given in the Boston Jewish Voice, Nov. 28, 1913.


(26) See my translation of this Maccabean pæan in AJSL 23, 223, x.

(27) See my remarks on the Hebrew text of Jud. 5 in the Wellhausen Festschrift (Giessen, 1914) pp. 216-223; cf. the article Zum Deborahliede in ZAT 34, pp. 229—231.

(28) Cf. my explanation of Ps. 110 in ZAT 35, part 2.

(29) At the January meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society Sir Charles J. Lyall discussed the relations between ancient Arabic poetry and ancient Hebrew songs in the OT (TLZ 39, 254). I stated in my paper The Religion of the Hebrew Prophets, in the Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, vol. i (Oxford, 1908) p. 272, that, if the glosses of an illustrative or theological character were eliminated, the genuine prophecies of Amos read like ancient Arabic poems; see also my Bibl. Liebestlieder (Leipzig, 1907) p. liii.

(30) The metrical reconstruction of the Hebrew text is given on pp. 225 and 224 of the Wellhausen Festschrift.
Stage-emendations in the Uttara-Rāma-charita.—By Shri-
pad Krishna Belvalkar, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Mass.

For the last two years or so I have been engaged in pre-
paring for the Harvard Oriental Series an edition of Bhavabhūti's 
Uttara-Rāma-charita. The work is to be in three volumes. 
The first volume, which contains a general introduction and 
an English translation, will be out in three or four months. 
The second contains—besides the text in Sanskrit and Prākrit, 
an index to first lines, and a glossary of Prākrit words with 
their Sanskrit equivalents—some five appendices giving among 
other things the results of the application of certain verse 
tests to the three extant plays of Bhavabhūti with a view to 
determine their chronological sequence. The last volume is 
devoted to notes, variant readings, and critical apparatus, and 
a few more appendices discussing topics such as 'text-tradition 
of the play', 'stage-conditions in ancient India', and so forth. 
The last two volumes are being printed in the Nirmaya Sagar 
Press of Bombay, and although more than half the text is 
already in type, still owing to the distance at which the work 
has to be carried on, it will be some time next year before 
these volumes are actually published. The subject matter of 
the following paper is taken from two appendices in the third 
volume.

Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum lists some eighty five 
manuscripts of the Uttara-Rāma-charita (text and commen-
taries), and in the lists of manuscripts published since 1903 
I have noted some thirty new manuscripts; so that, even after 
allowing for repetitions in the lists and for loss of manuscripts, 
the number of manuscripts that are available for constituting 
the text of the play is well over a hundred. Of course not 
all these manuscripts would be ultimately valuable, but it is 
at least necessary to examine them, if it be merely to discard
them later; and I intended to do so before actually publishing my edition. However this is a task that may easily take years, and since, strangely enough, in spite of the fact that there are some twelve Indian editions of the play, no Occidental edition of it has so far appeared, I was advised to put forth at first a tentative edition of the play, going back to it and preparing a second definitive edition as early as I could. The present edition accordingly is based on only eight manuscripts.

The selection of these particular eight manuscripts was made for various reasons. In the first place, I tried to get together manuscripts from parts of India widely different from each other, such as Madras and Nepal, Poona and Calcutta, Guzerat and Vizagapatam. Secondly, the manuscripts are written in four different characters: Nevarī, Devanagari, Grantha, and Telugu, only the first two of which slightly resemble each other in the form of their letters. Lastly, the manuscripts belong to different ages, ranging from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, and at least four of these eight manuscripts have independent value. Hence the results yielded by a careful collation of these manuscripts, although admittedly tentative, may at least be regarded as sufficiently plausible. I shall give a few significant illustrations.

The 27th stanza of the fifth act of the Uttara-Rāma-charita runs as follows:

Ajitam punyam ūrjasvi kakutsthasyeva te mahaḥ
Śreyase śāsvato Devo Varāhaḥ parikalpatām.

Instead, the commentator Virarāghava and three of the eight manuscripts used for my edition give a prose passage identical with the above stanza in the beginning and end. One of these manuscripts is the oldest extant manuscript of the play, being dated Saṁvat 309 of the Nepal era, which corresponds to the year 1196 of the Christian era. This fact therefore gives us a line of manuscripts genetically descended from an original exemplar of the twelfth century or earlier. Owing to a fracture or a peeling off of the leaf at this particular place, the original exemplar apparently had a lacuna which in a conscientious copy would be indicated by a blank. This later came to be filled in by the insertion of a few words which along with

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1 The identical portions are un-italicized.
the beginning and the end could give some sort of a meaning to the whole passage such as we find it in the printed editions of the play with Virarāghava's commentary. Manuscripts which give the original stanza intact I call A manuscripts; those which give the substitute prose passage I call B manuscripts.

In addition to the case above described there are a number of other cases—over seventy-five—where manuscripts of class A give consistently readings different from those of class B; and while some of these variations can conceivably be explained away as scribal errors, there are others where a deliberate change of some sort seems to be in evidence. I shall cite only one instance, which comes from the prologue at the beginning of the play. All A manuscripts read the first half of the second stanza thus:

_Yam Brahmānam iyaṁ Devī Vāg vaśyevānuvartate,_

while the B manuscripts read:

_Yam Brahmānam iyaṁ Devī Vāg vaśyevānurvartata_;

where there is a deliberate change of tense—from ‘anuvartate’, present, to ‘anuvartata’, imperfect. The original reading described Bhavabhūti as one ‘on whom the Goddess of Speech attends as a submissive handmaid’; while the other reading—presumably introduced after the poet’s death—describes him as one ‘on whom the Goddess of Speech attended as a submissive handmaid’.

Other cases of variation were in the same fashion submitted to a careful scrutiny, and as a result I am able to group the changes under the following headings.

1. **Omissions.** I shall mention three of the most significant places where A manuscripts give the passage and B manuscripts omit it. The passages are: act vii, stanza 38; act i, stanza 31 and the three speeches immediately preceding; and act iii, the whole passage from stanza 21 to the end of Rāma’s speech following stanza 24. This last omission covers four stanzas, and fourteen lines of prose. Now it is of course possible to explain omissions as due to errors of vision or the accidental loss of an intervening leaf. But this explanation does not readily commend itself in a place where the passages omitted happen to be just the passages that we would like

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^ My references are to the Nirmaya Sagar edition of the play with Virarāghava’s commentary.
to see omitted, or, at any rate, such as a company of actors wishing to stage the play would inevitably omit as being not necessary to the action of the play. The three cases selected are of this nature.

2. Alterations both in the order and the wording of a passage. These occur quite frequently and, in many cases, the two or more available variants are equally good. Some of the changes are of such a radical nature and are often such distinct improvements that one is led to ask whether it is Bhavabhūti himself revising and perfecting the earlier form of the work. Such a procedure would be just in the manner of the poet.

3. Insertions and modifications in the stage-directions and other minor changes calculated to assist the actor in interpreting his part correctly, or to produce dramatic vividness. Of the former kind, I have been able to put together some twenty or twenty-five instances where the B manuscripts usually give a stage-direction or a form of address more precise or more exactly corresponding to the character and the occasion. Of the latter kind I will mention just one instance. Act iii, stanza 26, reads as follows (I give the English translation):

‘Thou art my life, my second heart; thou art the moonlight to my eyes, and to my body the immortal ambrosia’: with these and a hundred other words of endearment her simple and loving soul thou didst beguile; and her now—alas! why utter the rest?

At the conclusion of the stanza the speaker, Vāsanti, goes into a swoon. Now if Vāsanti was going to swoon at all, the best opportunity for it was of course the word ‘alas’. Instead she waits to complete the stanza, saying ‘I shall not talk any more’ (but go quietly into a swoon)! In a case like this the acting version would certainly omit the last words of the stanza, ‘why utter the rest?’—and this is just what some manuscripts of class B do.

I shall not inflict any further details upon you, but merely state my conclusion. The Uttara-Rāma-charitā has come down to us in two sufficiently distinct text-traditions, and one of these gives us a number of characteristic divergences which are best explained as successive stage-emendations, most of them introduced after Bhavabhūti’s death and in the course
of the later stage-history of the play, although a few of them may well have come from the poet himself. That the Uttara-Rāma-charita had a stage-history I infer from a passage in the Prithvīrāja-vījaya, a poem of the twelfth century which has survived to us in only one incomplete manuscript written on birch-bark, and which I am at present editing for the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta.

Assuming the truth of this result I draw from it two further corollaries. The first I should rather state as a problem. We know that Kālidāsa’s Śākuntala has come down to us in two or three or four recensions, and scholars are still disputing as to which of them is genuine. Now would it not be possible, I wonder, after a scientific study of all the available manuscript material, to come down to two ultimate recensions of the play, the differences between them being not necessarily greater than those between the first and the second quarto of Hamlet? In that case both would be genuine, one being the acting version of the other, possibly prepared by Kālidāsa himself. I have already found out some evidence in support of such a theory, but the whole problem is so intricate as well as interesting that I hope sometime to study it in a thorough manner and with the help of all the available material.

My second corollary is this: If in this manner we find reason to believe in the existence in ancient India of some sort of regular companies of actors who gave in a particular locality plays written for them by a more or less limited group of dramatists, then, in the very nature of the case, it is to be expected that the form, history, and development of drama would be different for different localities. A court-poet like Kālidāsa, for instance, would write dramas exclusively dealing with the life at court and especially in the harem. Open-air performances given at fairs—such as those of Bhaṭbhāṭi—would differ from them not only in the theme selected, but also in the stage-conditions, by which I mean not merely the stage-properties but also the nature of the audience, which would have a deciding influence on the form of the drama. Viewed in this light the ten rūpakas of Hindu dramatists, some of which under a more or less disguised form exist in India even to the present day, would acquire quite a new significance. In any case these considerations will at least
teach us caution in making any sweeping generalizations regarding the Indian drama. In India no less than in Greece or Mediaeval Europe the drama as an institution came into existence in answer to a felt demand on the part of the people, and the different forms which it probably assumed in different Provinces were due to differences of environment. Hindu drama was not, as is sometimes thought, a form of literary exercise in a dead language. Sanskrit for that matter is not even now in any real sense of the term a dead language. Often it happens to be the only available means of communication between scholars in different parts of India. Even now at times there are revivals of old Sanskrit plays such as the Śākuntala or the Mudrā-Rākshasa: I have myself seen the former given by a regular professional company. To understand a play rightly we must therefore study the stage-conditions, partly with the help of direct statements as given in Bharata’s Nātya-śāstra and partly in the light of such indirect testimony as the extant dramas afford us. I may announce here in passing that I have at present on hand a critical edition of Bharata’s Nātya-śāstra to be published under the auspices of the Harvard Oriental Series.
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY
AT ITS
MEETING IN BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
1914

The annual meeting of the Society, being the hundred twenty-sixth occasion of its assembling, was held in Boston and Cambridge, Mass., on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday of Easter Week, April 16th, 17th, and 18th, 1914.

The following members were present at one or more of the sessions:

Abbott  Cunningham  Kellner  Quackenbos
Anesaki  Dennis, J. T.  Kent, R. G.  Ropes
Arnold  Edgerton  Lanman  Schoff
Asakawa  Fisher  Lyon  Sprengling
Atkinson  Haas  Missirian  Steele
Barret  Haupt  Moore, G. F.  Thompson
Barton  Hopkins  Moore, Mrs.  Warren, W. F.
Bates, Mrs.  Hussey, Miss  Nies, J. B.  Werren
Belvalkar  Jackson  Ogden, C. J.  Winslow
Channing, Miss  Jackson, Mrs.  Oliphant  Woods
Chester  Jastrow  Price  Worrell

Total: 45.

The first session was held in the House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 28 Newbury Street, Boston, beginning at 11 a.m., the President, Professor Paul Haupt, being in the chair.
The reading of the minutes of the meeting in Philadelphia, March 25th, 26th, and 27th, 1913, was dispensed with, because they had already been printed in the Journal (vol. 33, part 4, pages i-xi).

The Committee of Arrangements presented its report, thru Professor Lanman, in the form of a printed program. The succeeding sessions were appointed for Thursday afternoon at three o’clock, Friday morning at half past nine, Friday afternoon at three, and Saturday morning at half past nine. It was announced that there would be an informal meeting of the members on Thursday evening; that the members of the Society were invited to be the guests of the resident members at luncheon at half past twelve on Friday, the men at the Harvard Club and the women at the College Club; that the session on Friday afternoon would be devoted to papers dealing with the historical study of religion and to those of a more general character; and that the annual subscription dinner would take place on Friday at half past six at the Colonial Club, Cambridge.

REPORT OF THE CORRESPONDING SECRETARY.

The Corresponding Secretary, Professor A. V. Williams Jackson, presented the following report:

During the past year the correspondence of the Society has been fully as large as in previous years, if not actually larger. The majority of the communications received naturally came from different parts of America and Europe, but some came from the Orient itself, Japan, India, Persia, and other parts of Asia being represented.

A memorandum that may interest the Society came from Capt. Cornelius C. Smith, of the U. S. Army, who was for a number of years in the Philippines, but is now stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He writes (Feb. 8, 1914) that he is engaged on a book to be entitled ‘Mindanao and its People’, which will be appropriately illustrated and will deal not only with the Moros and the pagan wild tribes, but also with the fauna and flora of the island.

Two notes worth mentioning came from Mr. Benjamin Burges Moore, now traveling in Central Asia and Persia, who has been proposed for election to membership at this meeting. At Samarkand he took pains to examine and carefully measure the Koko Tash, or coronation-stone, which Tamerlane and his successors mounted when they were crowned. This historic stone has been described by several travelers, notably by Schuyler, and was inspected also by me in 1910. Mr. Moore notes that there are no arabesque inscriptions on it, as is sometimes stated, but only an ornamental design; the stone itself, a gray composite, is 0.65 m. in height and rests upon a base of two blocks, each 0.13 m. in height. Mr. Moore’s journey across Northern Persia from Mashhad to Teheran was a severe
one thru heavy snows and took 17 days. He notes that at Damghan 'they are finding prehistoric bodies and remains'. He 'was taken into the mosques at Semnan and took photographs'.

The Corresponding Secretary attended the annual meeting of the American Year Book Corporation in January as representative of the Society. The American Year Book, besides being valuable as a general record, gives appropriate space to Oriental matters and to Oriental scholarship in America, and it is to be hoped that the members of the Society will lend their support to this undertaking by subscribing for the volume each year.

Two members have been taken from us by death during the past year.

The Rev. Samuel Rolles Driver, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, and canon of Christ Church since 1883, died Feb. 26, 1914, at the age of 68 years. As teacher, author of numerous treatises on Biblical and Hebraic subjects, and member of the Old Testament Revision Company from 1876 to 1884, he rendered signal service to Oriental scholarship. He was elected an honorary member of the Society in 1909.

The Rev. John L. Scully, Rector of St. Mary's Church, Lawrence Street, New York City, died March 11, 1914. He had been a member of the Society since 1908.

In concluding this report the Secretary wishes to express once again his appreciation of the continued co-operation of all those who are associated with him in the work of the Society.

Professor Jastrow spoke of the scholarly work of Professor Driver; Professor Barton, after adding to this tribute, referred to the achievements of Professor Wellhausen and moved that a committee of three be appointed to send him a congratulatory letter on the occasion of his 70th birthday. This motion was unanimously carried, and the chair appointed Professors Barton, Moore, and Jastrow.

REPORT OF THE TREASURER.

The annual report of the Treasurer, Professor F. W. Williams, was presented by Professor Jackson, as follows:


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Expenditures

Printing of the Journal, Volume 33 .................. $ 1325.25
Sundry printing and addressing .......... 61.10
Account book .................................. 2.25
Cataloguing .................................. 92.76
Editors' honoraria .................................. 200.00
Subvention to Oriental Bibliography .......... 285.61
Subvention to Dictionary of Islam .......... 50.25
Interest written off (Savings Banks) ...... 266.19 2283.41
Balance to new account .................. 511.99

$ 2795.40

Statement

1912 1913

Bradley Type Fund .................................. $3178.21 $3337.95
Cotheal Fund (with accumulated interest) .... 1380.38 1496.12
National Savings Bank deposit .................. 225.51 234.61
2 Ch., R. I. & Pacific Ry. bonds (approx.) .... 1787.50 1780.00
1 Virginian Railway bond (approx.) ............ 990.00 1000.00

$ 7561.60 $ 7788.68

REPORT OF THE AUDITING COMMITTEE.

The report of the Auditing Committee, Professors Torrey and Oertel, was presented by Professor Jackson, as follows:

We hereby certify that we have examined the account book of the Treasurer of this Society and have found the same correct, and that the foregoing account is in conformity therewith. We have also seen the Society's bonds in his possession and compared the entries in the cash book with the vouchers and bank and pass books, and have found all correct.

NEW HAVEN, Conn., April 8, 1914. CHARLES C. TORREY
HANNS OERTEN} Auditors.

REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN.

The Librarian, Professor Albert T. Clay, presented the following report:

In addition to the acknowledging of serial publications and accessioning of new books, the work of classifying and cataloguing the library has gone forward. The scheme of classification, which is brief, but adapted to the needs of the Library, is based on that of the Oriental Bibliography. We have classified and catalogued the books in Oriental science, Oriental history, geography, etc., linguistics, general and comparative, the Ural-Altaic group, the Indo-Chinese group, except Chinese (the cataloguing of which is now being done) and Japanese. The Semitic group is being arranged preparatory to final work, and the other groups will be classed in their turn.
The catalog of serial publications is being rapidly revised and the entries brought up to date, about two-thirds of the titles now being in the new catalog. It is our purpose to publish during the coming year a catalog of serial publications, as well as an index to the MSS. In this way the Library will be made accessible to the members of the Society. As soon as this has been accomplished it is our purpose to publish as a second part a catalog of the balance of the Library.

In this connection it gives me pleasure to mention the fact that I received on April 12th a check for $200. from Professor J. R. Jewett for the work of the Library, this being his subscription for last year and this year. It has been turned over to the Treasurer for the Library fund.

Among the new books received within the year are the following:
Bergsträsser, G. Ḥunain ibn Ishāq und seine Schule. 1913.
Bharucha, S. D. Pahlavi-Pāzand-English glossary. 1912.
Budge, E. A. W., ed. Syrian anatomy, pathology and therapeutics, or "The book of medicines". 1913. 2v.
Chatterji, J. C. The Hindu realism. 1912.
Collected Sanskrit writings of the Parsis. pt. 3, Mainyoi Khard. 1912.
Conant, C. E. The Pepet law in Phillipine languages. 1913.
Dinshaw, V. The date and country of Zarathushtra. 1912.
Friedlander, I. Die Chadirlegende und der Alexanderroman. 1913.
Gerini, G. E. Siam and its productions, arts, and manufactures. 1912.
Kerestedjian, B. Quelques matériaux pour un dictionnaire étymologique de la langue turque. 1912.
König, E. Das antisemitische Hauptdogma. 1914.
Kuka, M. N. The antiquity of the Iranian calendar and of the era of Zoroaster. 1913.
Modi, J. J. Anthropological papers. 1912.
Moulton, J. H. Early Zoroastrianism. 1913.
Porta linguarum orientalium. pars 16. Brünnow, R. E. Arabische Christo-
mathie. 2. Aufl. 1913.
The sacred laws of the Arys. v. 3. The Prayaschitta Adhyaya. 1913.
Studies in Jewish literature in honor of Kaufmann Kohler. 1913.
Tate, G. P. Seistan. 1910—12. 2v.
Tehmuras Dinshaw Anklesaria. The social code of the Parsees in Sas-
nanian times. 1912.
Thierry, G. J. De religieuze beteekenis van het aegyptische koningschap. 1. De titulatuur. 1913.
Thompson, R. C. A new decipherment of the Hittite hieroglyphics. 1913.
Vararaj Vamsāvatara. The history of Siam from A. D. 1350—1809. 1913. 3v.
Zimmermann, R. Die Quellen der Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad. 1913.

REPORT OF THE EDITORS.

The report of the Editors of the Journal, Professors Oertel and Torrey, was presented by Professor Lanman, as follows:

A few slight typographical changes will be made in the next volume. The volume-number and date will hereafter be printed in Arabic numerals. The abbreviated title, together with the number of volume and part, will be printed on the back of each instalment. The separate paging of the Proceedings will be discontinued. Signatures will be added to each sheet, as a guide for the binder. It will be necessary to print the first and second parts of the new volume as one double number, to appear in July. This arrangement will make it possible to print two lengthy papers without a break.

All of the foregoing reports were severally accepted as presented.

ELECTION OF MEMBERS.

The following persons, recommended by the Directors, were elected members of the Society (for convenience the names of those elected at a subsequent session are included in this list):

HONORARY MEMBER

Professor C. Snouck-Hurgronje

CORPORATE MEMBERS

Mr. Arsène Aftandil
Prof. Masaharu Anesaki
Mr. Shirripad K. Belvalkar
Mr. Pierre A. Bernard
Mr. Henry J. Cadbury
Mr. Clarence S. Fisher
Mr. Kingdon Gould
Mr. Philip S. Henry
Prof. Jacob Hoschander

Prof. Robert Ernest Hume
Rev. Frederic C. Meredith
Rev. John Miller
Mr. Garabed M. Missirian
Mr. Benjamin Burges Moore
Mr. Edward Theodore Newell
Mr. Paul Bowman Popenoe
Dr. Israel Schapiro
Rev. Henry Swift

ELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR 1914-1915

The committee appointed to nominate officers for the year 1914—1915, consisting of Professors Hopkins, R. G. Kent, and Ropes, reported thru Professor Ropes, as follows:

President—Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of Philadelphia.
Vice-Presidents—Professor Hanns Oertel, of New Haven; Professor George A. Barton, of Bryn Mawr; Professor Richard J. H. Gottheil, of New York.

Corresponding Secretary—Professor A. V. Williams Jackson, of New York.

Recording Secretary—Dr. George C. O. Haas, of New York.

Treasurer—Professor Frederick Wells Williams, of New Haven.

Librarian—Professor Albert T. Clay, of New Haven.

Directors—The officers above named, and Professor Charles R. Lanman, of Cambridge; Professor Maurice Bloomfield, of Baltimore; Professor Robert F. Harper, of Chicago; Dr. William Hayes Ward, of New York; Professor Charles C. Torrey, of New Haven; Professor James H. Woods, of Cambridge; Professor Leroy Carr Barret, of Hartford.

The Committee desires to express its conviction that in introducing into the Board of Directors several new members they are meeting adequately a situation which has gradually grown up without intention, but which it would be advisable to change. They desire also to express the opinion that in their judgment it would be desirable in future to retire each succeeding President without election to the Board of Directors for a term of three years at least.

The officers thus nominated were thereupon duly elected.

After a recess of five minutes, the President delivered the annual address, the subject being ‘Armageddon.’ At 12:20 p.m. the Society took a recess until three o’clock.

SECOND SESSION.

The afternoon session was opened at 3:02 p.m., President Haupt being in the chair. The Society proceeded to the hearing of communications, in the following order:

Professor G. A. Barton, of Bryn Mawr College: A cylinder inscription from Nippur of the time of the dynasty of Agade. — Remarks by Professor Jastrow.

Rev. Dr. J. B. Nies, of Brooklyn: On the origin of the Sumerian signs $dub$, $dubbin$, $anar$, and $lil$.

Professor K. Asakawa, of Yale University: Some problems of the origin of the feudal land-tenure in Japan.

Dr. W. H. Worrell, of Hartford Theological Seminary: An investigation of Arabic $h$ and $h$ with the Röntgen apparatus. (Illustrated with lantern slides.)

Mr. S. K. Belvalkar, of Poona, India: Studies in Bhavabhūti’s Uttararāmacarita. — Remarks by Professor Lanman, Dr. Abbott, and Professor Jackson. In reply to a question by Dr. Ogden, the author added some remarks on the Prakrit text of the drama.

Mr. F. A. Cunningham, of Merchantville, N. J.: The Sothic cycle used by the Egyptians. — Remarks and a question by Rev. Dr. Winslow and reply by the author. Further remarks by Professor Haupt.

Professor F. Edgerton, of the University of Pennsylvania: Progress of the Corpus of Vedic Variants.
Proceedings.

Professor F. Edgerton: Vedic notes — 1. AV. 4. 27. 4; 2. AV. 4. 6. 3, apaskambha; 3. AV. 4. 5. 7. — Remarks by Professor Lanman and Dr. Ogden.

At six o'clock the Society adjourned for the day.

THIRD SESSION.

The members reassembled on Friday morning at 9:52 a.m. for the third session. The President, Professor Haupt, was in the chair. The reading of papers was resumed, as follows:

Professor E. W. Hopkins, of Yale University: The priest and the frogs. — Remarks by Professor Edgerton.

Professor E. W. Hopkins: The decapitation of Viṣṇu.

Dr. M. Sprengling, of Harvard University: Lexicographical notes on the Aramaic papyri from Elephantine.

Professor A. V. W. Jackson, of Columbia University: Indo-Iranian notes. — Remarks by Professor Hopkins and Dr. Ogden.

Professor R. G. Kent, of the University of Pennsylvania: Note on Atharva-Veda 20. 127. 10. — Remarks by Professor Edgerton, Dr. Ogden, and Professor Lanman.

Dr. C. J. Ogden, of Columbia University: Notes on the chronology of the Behistân inscription of King Darius. — Remarks by Professor Jackson.

Professor S. G. Oliphant, of Grove City College: The Vedic dual — Part 2: The dual in similes. — Remarks by Professor Barrett.

Professor G. A. Barton, of Bryn Mawr College: Religious conceptions underlying Sumerian proper names. — Remarks by Professor Jastrow and (later) by Professor Clay.

Rev. Dr. J. E. Abbott, of Summit, N. J.: On an ancient sword from Tibet. — Remarks by Dr. Nies and Professor Haupt.

Professor M. Anesaki, of the University of Tokio: On two stones with Buddhist carvings and inscriptions. — Remarks by Professor Edgerton and Professor Hopkins.

Professor L. C. Barrett, of Trinity College: The Kashmirian Atharva-Veda, Book 4.

Professor F. Edgerton, of the University of Pennsylvania: The Kashmirian Atharva-Veda, Book 6. — Remarks by Professor Lanman.

The President reported for the Directors that the next annual meeting would be held at New York on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday of Easter Week, April 8th, 9th, and 10th, 1915. He reported further that the Directors had reappointed Professors Oertel and Torrey as Editors of the Journal for the ensuing year.

After the election of Professor Snouck-Hurgronje as an honorary member and of two additional corporate members (included in the list above), the President announced the following appointments:
Committee of Arrangements for 1915: Professors Gottheil and Prince, and the Corresponding Secretary.
Committee on Nominations: Professor Barton, Dr. Nies, and Professor Edgerton.

Auditors: Professors Torrey and Hopkins.

Professor Barton (at the request of the Directors) presented a communication from the Asiatic Institute regarding the destruction of antiquities in China. After some discussion it was voted that a committee consisting of Professors Williams, Hirth, and Clay consider the matter and report next year to the Directors.

On motion the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

The American Oriental Society desires to express its thanks to the Board of Directors of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for their hospitable welcome, to the President and Fellows of Harvard University for courtesies extended at the session held at the University, to the Harvard Club and the College Club for the privileges so generously offered, and to the Committee of Arrangements for the thoughtful provision made for the entertainment of the members.

At 12:35 p.m. the Society took a recess until three o'clock.

FOURTH SESSION.

The Society met for the fourth session at three o'clock in Brooks House, Harvard University, Cambridge. The President, Professor Haupt, was in the chair. The reading of papers was resumed, in the following order:

Mrs. D. M. Bates, of Cambridge: On some satin scraps inscribed with the vows of Buddhist nuns. — Remarks by Professor Lanman.

Mr. W. H. Schopp, of Philadelphia: Some features of the overland Oriental trade at the Christian era. — Remarks by Professor Edgerton and Dr. Nies.

Professor C. R. Lanman, of Harvard University: Yoga-bhāṣya quotations. — Remarks by Professor Woods and Dr. Ogden.

Rev. Dr. A. Yohannan and Professor A. V. W. Jackson, of Columbia University: Some wandering quatrains of Omar Khayyam. (Presented briefly by Professor Jackson.)

Professor P. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins University: The Sumerian names of Egypt and Nubia.

Professor M. Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania: Medicine and magic in Babylonian and Assyrian incantations and ritual texts.

The Society adjourned at 4:25 p.m., to meet in New York on April 8, 1915 (the projected fifth session being omitted).

The following communications were presented by title:

Dr. F. R. Blake, of Johns Hopkins University: Apparent interchange between He and Aleph in Semitic.
Dr. E. W. Burlingame, of the University of Pennsylvania: Critical study of the Dhammapada Commentary.

Professor C. E. Conant, of the University of Chattanooga: (a) Notes on the phonology of the Palau language (Caroline Islands); (b) R. L. assimilation in certain Philippine languages.

Dr. A. Ember, of Johns Hopkins University: (a) Are the 'Apurin of the Egyptian inscriptions identical with the Hebrews? (b) The phonetic values of the signs for 'hand' and 'bolt' in the Egyptian alphabet; (c) Hermapios's translation of an Egyptian obelisk in Ammianus Marcellinus.

Professor E. W. Fay, of the University of Texas: Indo-Iranian word-studies, 2.

Professor R. Gottheil, of Columbia University: (a) Syriac folk-medicine; (b) A Hebrew inscription from Egypt.

Professor P. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins University: Some Assyrian etymologies.

Professor E. W. Hopkins, of Yale University: The dynasties of the Kali age.

Mr. W. S. Kupper, of Columbia University: Some questions relative to the Kautiliya Arthaśāstra.

Professor M. L. Margolis, of Dropsie College: The problem of quantity in the Hebrew vowel-system.

Professor J. D. Prince, of Columbia University: Striking phenomena in Sumerian.

Mr. G. P. Quackenbos, of the College of the City of New York: The Sanskrit poet Mayūra as viewed by other Indian writers.

Professor C. C. Torrey, of Yale University: Some less-known traditions from the prophet Mohammed.
LIST OF MEMBERS.

The number placed after the address indicates the year of election.

I. HONORARY MEMBERS.

M. AUGUSTE BARTH, Membre de l'Institut, Paris, France. (Rue Garanceière, 10.) 1898.

Dr. RAMKRISHNA GOPAL BHANDARKAR, C. I. E., Dekkan Coll. Poona, India 1887.

JAMES BURGESS, C. I. E., LL. D., 22 Seton Place, Edinburgh, Scotland. 1899.

Prof. CHARLES CLERMONT-GANNEAU, 1 Avenue de l'Alma, Paris. 1909.


Prof. BERTHOLD DELBRÜCK, University of Jena, Germany. 1878.

Prof. FRITZ STENZEL, University of Berlin, Germany. 1893.

Prof. ADOLPH ERMAN, Berlin-Steglitz-Dahlem, Germany, Peter Lennéstr. 72. 1908.

Prof. RICHARD GÄRKE, University of Tübingen, Germany. (Biesinger Str. 14.) 1902.

Prof. KARL F. GELDNER, University of Marburg, Germany. 1905.


Prof. IGNAZIO GUIDI, University of Rome, Italy. (Via Botteghe Oscure 24.) 1893.

Prof. HERMANN JACOB, University of Bonn, 59 Niebuhrstrasse, Bonn, Germany. 1909.

Prof. HENDRIK KERN, 45 Willem Barentz-Straat, Utrecht, Netherlands. 1893.

Prof. GASTON MASPERO, Collège de France, Paris, France. (Avenue de l'Observatoire, 24.) 1898.

Prof. EDUARD MEYER, University of Berlin, Germany. (Gross-Lichterfelde-West, Mommsenstr. 7.) 1908.

Prof. THEODOR NÖLDEKE, University of Strassburg, Germany. (Kalbsgasse 16.) 1878.

Prof. HERMANN OLDENBERG, University of Göttingen, Germany. 1910. (27/29 Nikolausberger Weg.)

Prof. EDUARD SACHAU, University of Berlin, Germany. (Wormserstr. 12, W.) 1887.
List of Members.

Émile Senart, Membre de l'Institut de France, 18 Rue François Ier, Paris, France. 1908.
Prof. C. Snouck Hurgronje, University of Leiden, Netherlands. (Witte Singel 84 a.) 1914.
Prof. Julius Wellhausen, University of Göttingen, Germany. (Weberstrasse 18a.) 1902.
Prof. Ernst Windisch, University of Leipzig, Germany. (Universitätsstrasse 15.) 1890.

[Total: 25]

II. CORPORATE MEMBERS.

Names marked with * are those of life members.

Dr. Cyrus Adler, 2041 North Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa. 1884.
Ronald C. Allen, 148 South Divinity Hall, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1912.
Miss May Alice Allen, Northampton, Mass. 1906.
Prof. Masaharu Anesaki, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 1914.
Prof. Kanichi Asakawa, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn. 1904.
Hon. Simon E. Baldwin, LL.D., 44 Wall St., New Haven, Conn. 1898.
Prof. Leroy Carr Barret, Trinity College, Hartford, Conn. 1903.
Prof. George A. Barton, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 1888.
Prof. L. W. Batten, 418 West 20th St., New York. 1894.
Prof. Harlan P. Beach (Yale Univ.), 346 Willow St., New Haven, Conn. 1898.
Shripad K. Belvalkar, care of Prof. Lanman, 9 Farrar St., Cambridge, Mass. 1914.
Prof. Harold H. Bender, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., 1906.
Pierre A. Bernard, 662 West End Avenue, New York, N. Y. 1914.
Prof. George R. Berry, Colgate University, Hamilton, N. Y. 1907.
Prof. Julius A. Bewer, Union Theological Seminary, Broadway and 120th St., New York, N. Y. 1907.
Dr. William Sturgis Bigelow, 60 Beacon St., Boston, Mass. 1894.
Dr. George F. Black, Public Library, Fifth Ave. and 42d St., New York, N. Y., 1907.
Dr. Frank Ringgold Blake, Windsor Hills, Baltimore, Md.
Dr. Frederick J. Bliss, Syrian Protestant College, Beirut, Syria. 1898.
Francis B. Blodgett, General Theological Seminary, Chelsea Square, New York, N. Y. 1906.
Prof. Carl August Blomgren, Augustana College and Theol. Seminary, Rock Island, Ill. 1900. (825, 35th St.)
Prof. Maurice Bloomfield, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1881.
List of Members.

Dr. Alfred Boissiere, Le Rivage près Chambéry, Switzerland. 1897.
Dr. George M. Bolling (Catholic Univ. of America), 1784 Corcoran St., Washington, D. C. 1896.
Rev. Dr. Dan Freeman Bradley, 2905 West 14th St., Cleveland, Ohio. 1911.
Prof. James Henry Breasted, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1891.
Pres. Francis Brown (Union Theological Sem.), Broadway and 120th St., New York, N. Y. 1881.
Prof. Rudolph E. Brünnow (Princeton Univ.) 49 Library Place, Princeton, N. J. 1911.
Prof. Carl Darling Buck, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1892.
Hammond H. Buck, Division Sup’t. of Schools, Alfonso, Cavite Provinces, Philippine Islands. 1908.
Granville Bureus, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1912.
Prof. Howard Crosby Butler, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 1908.
Dr. Paul Carus, La Salle, Illinois. 1897.
Rev. John S. Chandler, Madura, Southern India. 1899.
Miss Eva Channing, Hemenway Chambers, Boston, Mass. 1883.
Dr. F. D. Chester, The Bristol, Boston, Mass. 1891.
Walter E. Clark, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1906.
Prof. Albert T. Clay (Yale Univ.) 401 Humphrey St., New Haven, Conn. 1907.

*George wetmore Colles, 62 Fort Greene Place, Brooklyn, N. Y. 1882.
Prof. Hermann Collitz, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1887.
Prof. C. Everett Conant, Chattanooga, Tenn. 1905.
Rev. William Merriam Crane, Richmond, Mass. 1902.
Francis A. Cunningham, 508 W. Maple St., Merchantville, N. J. 1912.
Dr. Harold S. Davidson, 1700 North Paysan St., Baltimore, Md. 1908.
Prof. John D. Davis, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. 1888.
Prof. Alfred L. P. Dennis, Madison, Wis. 1900.
James T. Dennis, Woodbrook, Md. 1900.
Mrs. Francis W. Dickins, 2015 Columbia Road, Washington, D. C. 1911.
Rev. Wm. Haskell Du Bose, University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn. 1912.
Dr. Harry Westbrook Dunham, 5 Kilcoy Road, Brookline, Mass. 1894.
Dr. Franklin Edgerton, Univ. of Penna., Philada. Pa. 1910.
List of Members.

WILLIAM T. ELLIS, Swarthmore, Pa. 1912.
Prof. LEVI H. ELWELL, (Amherst College), 5 Lincoln Ave., Amherst, Mass. 1888.
Dr. AARON EMMER, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1902.
Rev. Prof. C. P. FAGNIANI, 606 W. 122nd St., New York, N. Y. 1901.
Prof. EDWIN WHITFIELD FAY (Univ. of Texas), 200 West 24th St., Austin, Texas. 1888.
Prof. HENRY FERGUSON, St. Paul's School, Concord, N. H. 1876.
Dr. JOHN C. FERGUSON, Peking, China. 1900.
Dr. HENRY C. FINKEL, District National Bank Building, Washington, D. C. 1912.
Prof. CLARENCE S. FISHER, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 1914.
Rev. Dr. FONCK, Instituto Biblico Pontifico, Via del Archeletto, Roma, Italia. 1913.
Rev. THEODORE FOOTE, Rowland Park, Maryland. 1900.
Dr. LEO J. FRUCHTENBERG, Hartley Hall, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1907.
Prof. JAS. EVERETT FRAME (Union Theological Sem.), Broadway and 120th St., New York, N. Y. 1892.
Dr. HERBERT FRIEDENWALD, 356 2nd Ave., New York, N. Y. 1909.
Prof. ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER (Jewish Theological Sem.), 61 Hamilton Place, New York, N. Y. 1904.
Dr. WM. HENRY FURNESS, 3d, 1906 Sansom St., Philadelphia, Pa. 1913.
ROBERT GARRET, Continental Building, Baltimore, Md. 1903.
Miss MARIE GELBACH, Prospect Terrace, Park Hill, Yonkers, N. Y. 1909.
EUGENE A. GELLOT 290 Broadway, N. Y., 1911.
Prof. BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1858.
Prof. ALEXANDER R. GORDON, Presbyterian College, Montreal, Canada. 1912.
Prof. RICHARD J. H. GOTTHEIL, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1886.
KINGDON GOULD, 165 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 1914.
Prof. ELIHU GRANT, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. 1907.
Dr. LOUIS H. GRAY, 76 Devonshire Road Aberdeen, Scotland. 1897.
Mrs. LOUIS H. GRAY, 76 Devonshire Road Aberdeen, Scotland. 1907.
Miss LUCIA C. GRAEME GRIEVE, Martindale Depot, N. Y. 1894.
Prof. LOUIS GROSSMANN (Hebrew Union College), 2212 Park Ave., Cincinnati, O., 1890.
Rev. Dr. W. M. GROTON, Dean of the Protestant Episcopal Divinity School, 5000 Woodlawn Ave., Philadelphia, Pa. 1907.
*Dr. GEORGE C. O. HASS, 518 W. 140th St., New York, N. Y. 1903.
Miss Luise HAESLER, 100 Morningside Drive, New York, N. Y. 1909.
Mrs. IDA M. HANCHETT, care of Omaha Public Library, Omaha, Nebraska. 1912.
NEWTON H. HARDING, 110 N. Pine Ave., Chicago, Ill. 1912.
Prof. SAMUEL HART, D. D., Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Conn. 1879.
Prof. PAUL HAUPT (Johns Hopkins Univ.), 215 Longwood Road, Roland Park, Baltimore, Md. 1883.
PHILIP S. HENRY, 1402 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D. C. 1914.
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Prof. Hermann V. Hilprecht, München, Leopoldstr. 8. 1887.
Rev. Dr. William J. Hinke, 28 Court St., Auburn, N. Y. 1907.
Prof. Friedrich Hirth (Columbia Univ.), 401 West 118th St., New York, N. Y. 1903.
*Dr. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle, 8 Northmoor Road, Oxford, England. 1893.
Rev. Dr. Hugo W. Hoffmann, 306 Rodney St., Brooklyn, N. Y. 1899.
*Prof. E. Washburn Hopkins (Yale Univ.), 299 Lawrence St., New Haven, Conn. 1881.
Prof. Jacob Hoschander, Dropsie College, Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa. 1914.

Wilson S. Howell, Box 437, Pleasantville Station, N. Y. 1911.
Henry R. Howland, Natural Science Building, Buffalo, N. Y. 1907.
Dr. Edward H. Hume, Changsha, Hunan, China. 1909.
Prof. Robert Ernest Hume, 606 West 122d St., New York, N. Y. 1914.
*Dr. Archer M. Huntington, 15 West 81st St., New York, N. Y. 1912.
S. T. Hurwitz, 217 East 69th St., New York, N. Y. 1912.
Miss Mary Ina Hussey, Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. 1913.
*James Hazen Hyde, 18 rue Adolphe Yvon, Paris, France. 1909.
Prof. Henry Hyvernat (Catholic Univ. of America), 3405 Twelfth St., N. E. (Brookland), Washington, D. C. 1889.
Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1885.
Mrs. A. V. Williams Jackson, care of Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1912.
Prof. James Richard Jewett, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 1887.
Rev. Dr. C. E. Keiser, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. 1913.
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*Prof. Charles Rockwell Lanman (Harvard Univ.), 9 Farrar St., Cambridge, Mass. 1876.
Dr. Berthold Lauffer, Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago, Ill. 1900.
H. Linsfield, 52 Middle Divinity Hall, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1912.
Prof. Enno Littmann, Hainholzweg 44, Göttingen. 1912.
Percival Lowell, 58 State St., Boston, Mass. 1893.
Dr. Daniel D. Luckenbill, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1912.
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Dr. Albert Howe Lyttel, Urbana, Ill. 1909.


Albert Morton Lythgoe, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, N. Y. 1899.

Prof. Duncan B. Macdonald, Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn. 1893.

C. V. McLean, Port Perry, Ontario. 1912.

Prof. Herbert W. Magoun, 70 Kirkland St., Cambridge, Mass. 1887.

Prof. Henry Malter, Dropsie College, Broad & York St., Philadelphia, Pa. 1913.

Prof. Max L. Margolis, 1519 Diamond St., Philadelphia, Pa. 1890.

Prof. Allan Marquand, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 1888.

Prof. Winsfred Robert Martin, Hispanic Society of America, West 156th St., New York, N. Y. 1889.


Rev. Frederic C. Meredith, 32 Kita-kuruwa Cho, Maebashi, Jōchū, Japan, 1914.


Martin A. Meyer, 2109 Baker St., San Francisco, Calif. 1906.


Mrs. Helen Lovell Million, Hardin College, Mexico, Mo. 1892.

Prof. Lawrence H. Mills, 218 Ifley Road, Oxford, Engld. 1881.


Prof. J. A. Montgomery (P. E. Divinity School), 6806 Greene St., Germantown, Pa. 1903.

Benjamin Burges Moore, 109 East 38th St., New York, N. Y. 1914.

Prof. George F. Moore (Harvard Univ.), 3 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 1887.

*Mrs. Mary H. Moore, 3 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 1902.

Prof. Edward S. Morse, Salem, Mass. 1894.


Mrs. Albert H. MusseU, 65 Middlesex Road, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 1908.

Dr. William Muss-Arnolt, Public Library, Boston, Mass. 1887.


Rev. Jas. B. Nies, Hotel St. George, Clark St., Brooklyn, N. Y. 1906.


Dr. Felix, Freiherr von Oexle, 326 E. 58th St. New York, N. Y. 1913.

Prof. Hans Oertel (Yale Univ.), 2 Phelps Hall, New Haven, Conn. 1890.

Dr. Charles J. Ogden, 628 West 114th St., New York, N. Y. 1906.
List of Members.

Miss Ellen S. Ogden, Hopkins Hall, Burlington, Vt. 1898.
Prof. Samuel G. Olyphant, Grove City College, Grove City, Penn. 1906.
Prof. Albert TenEyck Olmstead, 911 Lowry St., Columbia, Mo. 1909.
Prof. Paul Ottramare (Univ. of Geneva), Ave. de Bosquets, Servette, Genève, Switzerland. 1904.

Prof. Lewis B. Paton, Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn. 1894.

Dr. Charles Peabody, 197 Brattle St., Cambridge, Mass. 1892.
Prof. George A. Peckham, Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio. 1912.
Prof. Ismar J. Peritz, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 1894.
Prof. Edward Delavan Perry (Columbia Univ.), 542 West 114th St., New York, N. Y. 1879.

Rev. Dr. John P. Peters, 225 West 99th St., New York, N. Y. 1882.
Walter Petersen, Bethany College, Lindsborg, Kansas. 1909.
Prof. David Philemon (Hebrew Union College), 3947 Beechwood Ave., Rose Hill, Cincinnati, O. 1889.

Dr. Arno Poebel, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1912.
Paul Bowman Popenoe, 511 Eleventh St., Washington, D. C. 1914.
Dr. William Popper, University of California, Berkeley, Cal. 1897.
Prof. Ira M. Price, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1887.
Prof. John Dykesey Prince (Columbia Univ.), Sterlington, Rockland Co., N. Y. 1888.

George Payn Quackenbous, 331 West 28th St., New York, N. Y. 1904.
Ramakrishna Pillai, Thottakadu House, Madras, India. 1913.
Dr. Caroline L. Ransom, Metropolitan Museum of Art, 5th Ave. and 82d St., New York, N. Y. 1912.
G. A. Reichling, 466 Nostrand Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y. 1912.
Dr. Joseph Reider, Dropsie College, Philadelphia, Pa. 1913.
Prof. George Andrew Reisner, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 1891.

Prof. Philip M. Rhinelander (Episcopal Theological Sem.), 26 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 1908.

J. Nelson Robertson, 294 Avenue Road, Toronto, Canada. 1913.
Rev. Dr. George Livingston Robinson (McCormick Theol. Sem.), 4 Chalmers Place, Chicago, Ill. 1892.

Prof. James Hardy Ropes (Harvard Univ.), 13 Follen St., Cambridge, Mass. 1893.

Dr. William Rosenau, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1897.
Miss Adelaide Rudolph, 417 West 120th St., New York, N. Y. 1894.
Mrs. Janet E. Ruzitz-Rees, Rosemary Cottage, Greenwich, Conn. 1897.
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GEORGE V. SCHICK, 1045 Schick St., Fort Wayne, Ind. 1909.
Prof. NATHANIEL SCHMIDT, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 1894.
MONTGOMERY SCHUYLER JR., Department of State, Washington D. C. 1913.
Dr. GILBERT CAMPBELL SCOGGIN, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo. 1906.

Dr. CHARLES P. G. SCOTT, 49 Arthur St., Yonkers, N. Y. 1895.
*Mrs. SAMUEL BRYAN SCOTT (née Morris), 124 Highland Ave., Chestnut Hill, Philadelphia, Pa. 1903.
Rev. JOHN L. SCULLY, Church of the Holy Trinity, 312-332 East 88th St., New York, N. Y. 1908.
Rev. Dr. WILLIAM G. SEIPLE, 1227 Madison Ave., Baltimore Md. 1902.
Prof. CHARLES N. SHEPARD (General Theological Sem.), 9 Chelsea Square, New York, N. Y. 1907.
CHARLES C. SHEPARD, 614 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y. 1904.
*John R. Slatery, 14 bis rue Montaigne, Paris, France. 1903.
Major C. C. Smith, Fourth Cavalry, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. 1907.
Prof. HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, (Union Theological Seminary), Broadway and 120th St., New York, N. Y. 1877.
Prof. JOHN M. P. SMITH, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1906.
Prof. EDWARD H. SPIEKER, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 1884.
MARTIN SRENGLING, 18 Divinity Hall, Cambridge. 1912.
Rev. Dr. JAMES D. STEELE, 15 Grove Terrace, Passaic, N. J. 1892.
Rev. ANSON PHELPS STOKES, D.D., Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 1900.

Prof. GEORGE SVERDRUP, Jr., Augsburg Seminary, Minneapolis, Minn. 1907.
Rev. HENRY SWIFT, Plymouth, Conn. 1914.
Prof. WM. C. THAYE, 59 Market St. Bethlehem, Pa. 1913.
DANIEL THOMAS, 6407 Inglese Ave., Chicago, Ill. 1912.
EVEN FRANCIS THOMPSON, 311 Main St., Worcester, Mass. 1896.
Prof. HENRY A. TODD (Columbia Univ.), 824 West End Ave., New York, N. Y. 1895.

*Prof. CHARLES C. TORREY, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 1891.
Prof. CRAWFORD H. TOY (Harvard Univ.), 7 Lowell St., Cambridge, Mass. 1871.
Rev. SYDNEY N. USSHER, St. Bartholomew's Church, 44th St. & Madison Ave., N. Y. 1909.
Rev. HENRY BOARDMAN VANDERBORGART, Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Conn. 1911.
Rev. Dr. FREDERICK AUGUSTUS VANDERBURGH, 55 Washington Sq., New York, N. Y. 1908.
AUGUSTIN VANNAGE (Yale Univ.), 121 High St., New Haven, Conn. 1863.
Miss SUSAN HAYES WARD, The Stone House, Abington Ave., Newark, N. J. 1874.
Rev. Dr. WILLIAM HAYES WARD, 119 W. 40th St., New York, N. Y. 1869.
Miss CORNELIA WARREN, Cedar Hill, Waltham, Mass. 1894.
Prof. WILLIAM F. WARREN (Boston Univ.), 131 Davis Ave., Brookline, Mass. 1877.
Rev. Le Roy Waterman, Meadville Theological School, Meadville, Pa. 1912.
Prof. J. E. Werren, 1667 Cambridge St., Cambridge, Mass. 1894.
Prof. Jens Iverson Westengard Asst. Gen. Adviser to H.S.M. Govt.,
Bangkok, Siam. 1903.
Arthur J. Westermayr, 100 Lenox Road, Brooklyn, N. Y. 1912.
Pres. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, University of California, Berkeley, Cal. 1885.
Prof. John Williams White (Harvard Univ.), 18 Concord Ave., Cambridge,
Mass. 1877.
John G. White, Williamson Building, Cleveland, Ohio. 1912.
* Miss Margaret Dwight Whitney, 227 Church St., New Haven, Conn. 1908.
Hon. E. T. Williams, U. S. Legation, Peking, China. 1901.
Prof. Frederick Wells Williams (Yale Univ.), 135 Whitney Ave., New
Haven, Conn. 1895.
Dr. Talcott Williams, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1884.
Rev. Dr. William Copley Winslow, 525 Beacon St., Boston, Mass. 1885.
Rev. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, 23 West 90th St., New York, N. Y. 1894.
Prof. John E. Wishart, So. Pasadena, California. 1911.
Henry B. Witton, 290 Hess St., South, Hamilton, Ontario. 1885.
Dr. Louis B. Wolfenson, 1620 Madison St., Madison, Wis. 1904.
William W. Wood, Shirley Lane, Baltimore, Md. 1900.
Prof. James H. Woods (Harvard Univ.), 179 Brattle St., Cambridge, Mass.
1900.
Dr. William H. Worrell, 152 Whitney St., Hartford, Conn. 1910.
Dr. S. C. Ylvisaker, Luther College, Decorah, Ia. 1913.
Rev. Dr. Abraham Yohannan, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 1894.
Rev. Robert Zimmermann, S. J., St. Xavier's Coll., Cruickshank Road,
Bombay, India. 1911.
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CHICAGO, ILL.: Field Museum of Natural History.
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Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
E. Steiger and Co.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.: American Philosophical Society.
Free Museum of Science and Art, Univ. of Penn.
WASHINGTON, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution.
Bureau of American Ethnology.
Archaeological Institute of America.
WORCESTER, MASS.: American Antiquarian Society.

II. EUROPE.

AUSTRIA, VIENNA: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften.
K. u. K. Direction der K. u. K. Hofbibliothek (Josephs-
platz 1.)
Anthropologische Gesellschaft.
Geographische Gesellschaft.
PRAGUE: Königlich Böhmische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
DENMARK, ICELAND, REYKJAVIK: University Library.
FRANCE, PARIS: Société Asiatique. (Rue de Seine, Palais de l’Institut.)
Bibliothèque Nationale.
Musée Guimet. (Avenue du Trocadéro.)
Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
École des Langues Orientales Vivantes. (Rue de Lille, 2.)
École Française d’extrême Orient (28, rue Bonaparte).
Ministère de l’Instruction Publique.
Revue Biblique Internationale (Librairie V. Lecoffre, rue
Bonaparte 90).
Revue de l’Orient Chrétien (care of Prof. Nau, 10, rue
Litté).
H. Welter, 4, rue Bernard-Palissy.

GERMANY, BERLIN: Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Königliche Bibliothek.
Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen. (Am Zeughaus 1.)
DARMSTADT: Großherzogliche Hofbibliothek.
GÖTTINGEN: Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
(Friedrichstrasse 50.)
Naturwissenschaftlicher Verein für Sachsen und Thü-
ringen.
KIEL: Universitäts-Bibliothek.
GERMANY, LEIPZIG: Königlich Sächsische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. Leipziger Semitistische Studien. (J. C. Hinrichs.)
F. A. Brockhaus (Querstrasse 16).
TÜRINGEN: Library of the University.
GREAT BRITAIN, LONDON: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. (22 Albemarle St., W.)
Library of the India Office, (Whitehall, S.W.)
Society of Biblical Archaeology. (37 Great Russell St., Bloomsbury, W.C.)
Philological Society. (Care of Dr. F. J. Furnivall, 3 St. George's Square, Primrose Hill, N.W.)
Arthur F. Bird (22 Bedford St., Strand).
E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, (46 Great Russell St.).
Indian Text Series (care of J. Murray, Albemarle St.).
B. F. Stevens & Brown (4 Trafalgar Square).
CAMBRIDGE: Bowes & Bowes (1 Trinity St.).
edinburgh: James Thin (54 South Bridge).
GLASGOW: James Maclehose & Sons (61 St. Vincent St.).
ITALY, BOLOGNA: Reale Accademia delle Scienze dell' Istituto di Bologna.
FLORENCE: Società Asiatica Italiana.
ROME: Reale Accademia dei Lincei.
Istituto Biblico Pontificio.
NETHERLANDS, AMSTERDAM: Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen.
Vereeniging "Kolonial Instituut".
LEYDEN: Curatorium of the University.
RUSSIA, HELSINGFORS: Société Finno-Ougrienne.
Akademiska Bokhandeln.
ST. PETERSBURG: Imperatorskaja Akademija Nauk.
Archéologii Institut.
Bibliotheca Buddhica.
SWEDEN, UPSALA: Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet.

III. ASIA.

CHINA, SHANGHAI: China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
TOSKIN: l'École Française d'Extrême Orient (Rue de Coton), Hanoi.
INDIA, BOMBAY: Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
The Anthropological Society. (Town Hall.)
CALCUTTA: The Asiatic Society of Bengal. (57 Park St.)
The Buddhist Text Society. (86 Jaun Bazar St.)
Sanskrit College.
DELHI: Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Education.
LAHORE: Library of the Oriental College.
INDIA, MADRAS: Manuscripts Library. Presidency College.
SIMLA: Office of the Director General of Archaeology. (Benmore, Simla, Punjab.)
SIAM, BANGKOK: Siam Society.
Vagirāṇa National Library.
CEYLON, COLOMBO: Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JAPAN, TOKYO: The Asiatic Society of Japan.
JAVA, BATAVIA: Bataviasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen.
KOREA: Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Seoul, Korea.
NEW ZEALAND: The Polynesian Society, New Plymouth.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, MANILA: The Ethnological Survey.
Philippine Library.
SYRIA: The American School (care U. S. Consul), Jerusalem.
Revue Biblique, care of M. J. Lagrange, Jerusalem.
Al-Machriq, Université St. Joseph, Beirut, Syria.
HAWAI, HONOLULU: Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum.

IV. AFRICA.
EGYPT, CAIRO: The Khedivial Library.

V. EDITORS OF THE FOLLOWING PERIODICALS.
The Indian Antiquary (Education Society’s Press, Bombay, India).
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes (care of Alfred Hölder, Rothenthurmstr. 15, Vienna, Austria).
Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung (care of Prof. E. Kuhn, 3 Hess Str., Munich, Bavaria).
Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft (care of Prof. D. Karl Marti, Marienstr. 25, Bern, Switzerland).
Beiträge zur Assyriologie und semitischen Sprachwissenschaft. (J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, Germany.)
Archives orientales (care of Prof. J.-A. Lundell, Upsala, Sweden).
Orientalische Bibliographie (care of Prof. Lucian Scherman, 18 Ungererstr., Munich, Bavaria).
The American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal, 433 East 57th St., Chicago, Ill.
Transactions of the American Philological Association (care of Prof. F. G. Moore, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.).
Le Monde Oriental (care of Prof. K. F. Johansson, Upsala, Sweden).
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Harvard University Library.
Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, O.
Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Ind.
Johns Hopkins University Library, Baltimore, Md.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Minneapolis Athenæum, Minneapolis, Minn.
New Hampshire State Library, Concord, N. H.
New York Public Library.
New York State Library, Albany, N. Y.
Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.
Rochester Theological Seminary, Rochester N. Y.
Yale University Library.
Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
OF THE
AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

With Amendments of April, 1897.

CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE I. This Society shall be called the AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

ARTICLE II. The objects contemplated by this Society shall be:
1. The cultivation of learning in the Asiatic, African, and Polynesian languages, as well as the encouragement of researches of any sort by which the knowledge of the East may be promoted.
2. The cultivation of a taste for oriental studies in this country.
3. The publication of memoirs, translations, vocabularies, and other communications, presented to the Society, which may be valuable with reference to the before-mentioned objects.
4. The collection of a library and cabinet.

ARTICLE III. The members of this Society shall be distinguished as corporate and honorary.

ARTICLE IV. All candidates for membership must be proposed by the Directors, at some stated meeting of the Society, and no person shall be elected a member of either class without receiving the votes of as many as three-fourths of all the members present at the meeting.

ARTICLE V. The government of the Society shall consist of a President, three Vice Presidents, a Corresponding Secretary, a Recording Secretary, a Secretary of the Section for the Historical Study of Religions, a Treasurer, a Librarian, and seven Directors, who shall be annually elected by ballot, at the annual meeting.

ARTICLE VI. The President and Vice Presidents shall perform the customary duties of such officers, and shall be ex-officio members of the Board of Directors.

ARTICLE VII. The Secretaries, Treasurer, and Librarian shall be ex-officio members of the Board of Directors, and shall perform their respective duties under the superintendence of said Board.

ARTICLE VIII. It shall be the duty of the Board of Directors to regulate the financial concerns of the Society, to superintend its publications, to carry into effect the resolutions and orders of the Society, and to exercise a general supervision over its affairs. Five Directors at any regular meeting shall be a quorum for doing business.

ARTICLE IX. An Annual meeting of the Society shall be held during Easter week, the days and place of the meeting to be determined by the Directors, said meeting to be held in Massachusetts at least once in three years. One or more other meetings, at the discretion of the Directors,
may also be held each year at such place and time as the Directors shall
determine.

**Article X.** There shall be a special Section of the Society, devoted to
the historical study of religions, to which section others than members of
the American Oriental Society may be elected in the same manner as is
prescribed in Article IV.

**Article XI.** This Constitution may be amended, on a recommendation
of the Directors, by a vote of three-fourths of the members present at an
annual meeting.

**BY-LAWS.**

I. The Corresponding Secretary shall conduct the correspondence of
the Society, and it shall be his duty to keep, in a book provided for the
purpose, a copy of his letters; and he shall notify the meetings in such
manner as the President or the Board of Directors shall direct.

II. The Recording Secretary shall keep a record of the proceedings of
the Society in a book provided for the purpose.

III. a. The Treasurer shall have charge of the funds of the Society;
and his investments, deposits, and payments shall be made under the
superintendence of the Board of Directors. At each annual meeting he
shall report the state of the finances, with a brief summary of the receipts
and payments of the previous year.

III. b. After December 31, 1896, the fiscal year of the Society shall
 correspond with the calendar year.

III. c. At each annual business meeting in Easter week, the President
shall appoint an auditing committee of two men—preferably men residing
in or near the town where the Treasurer lives—to examine the Treasurer's
accounts and vouchers, and to inspect the evidences of the Society's prop-
erty, and to see that the funds called for by his balance are in his hands.
The Committee shall perform this duty as soon as possible after the New
Year's day succeeding their appointment, and shall report their findings
to the Society at the next annual business meeting thereafter. If these
findings are satisfactory, the Treasurer shall receive his acquittance by a
certificate to that effect, which shall be recorded in the Treasurer's book,
and published in the Proceedings.

IV. The Librarian shall keep a catalogue of all books belonging to the
Society, with the names of the donors, if they are presented, and shall at
each annual meeting make a report of the accessions to the library during
the previous year, and shall be farther guided in the discharge of his
duties by such rules as the Directors shall prescribe.

V. All papers read before the Society, and all manuscripts deposited
by authors for publication, or for other purposes, shall be at the disposal
of the Board of Directors, unless notice to the contrary is given to the
Editors at the time of presentation.

VI. Each corporate member shall pay into the treasury of the Society
an annual assessment of five dollars; but a donation at any one time of
seventy-five dollars shall exempt from obligation to make this payment.

VII. Corporate and Honorary members shall be entitled to a copy of
all the publications of the Society issued during their membership, and
Constitution and By-Laws.

shall also have the privilege of taking a copy of those previously published, so far as the Society can supply them, at half the ordinary selling price.

VIII. Candidates for membership who have been elected by the Society shall qualify as members by payment of the first annual assessment within one month from the time when notice of such election is mailed to them. A failure so to qualify shall be construed as a refusal to become a member. If any corporate member shall for two years fail to pay his assessments, his name may, at the discretion of the Directors, be dropped from the list of members of the Society.

IX. Members of the Section for the Historical Study of Religions shall pay into the treasury of the Society an annual assessment of two dollars; and they shall be entitled to a copy of all printed papers which fall within the scope of the Section.

X. Six members shall form a quorum for doing business, and three to adjourn.

SUPPLEMENTARY BY-LAWS.

I. For the Library.

1. The Library shall be accessible for consultation to all members of the Society, at such times as the Library of Yale College, with which it is deposited, shall be open for a similar purpose; further, to such persons as shall receive the permission of the Librarian, or of the Librarian or Assistant Librarian of Yale College.

2. Any member shall be allowed to draw books from the Library upon the following conditions: he shall give his receipt for them to the Librarian, pledging himself to make good any detriment the Library may suffer from their loss or injury, the amount of said detriment to be determined by the Librarian, with the assistance of the President, or of a Vice President; and he shall return them within a time not exceeding three months from that of their reception, unless by special agreement with the Librarian this term shall be extended.

3. Persons not members may also, on special grounds, and at the discretion of the Librarian, be allowed to take and use the Society's books, upon depositing with the Librarian a sufficient security that they shall be duly returned in good condition, or their loss or damage fully compensated.
"A book that is shut is but a block"

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