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NADIR SHAH





NADIR SHAH

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NADIR SHAH

A Critical Study Based Mainly
Upon Contemporary Sources

By

L. LOCKHART, B.A., PH.D.

With a Foreword by

SIR E. DENISON ROSS, C.I.E., D.LITT., ETC.

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FOREWORD

I HAVE great pleasure in acceding to Dr. Lockhart's request that I should contribute a short Foreword to this volume.

Although the work itself, in view of its historical importance and the evidence it gives of much scholarly research, stands in no need of any introduction, it is perhaps fitting that I should say something about Dr. Lockhart himself, seeing that I have been closely associated with him in his studies for many years past. At Cambridge, after taking Honours in History, he studied Persian and Arabic under Professors Edward G. Browne, A. A. Bevan and R. A. Nicholson, and secured a first class in both parts of the Oriental Languages Tripos. At a later date, Fate having ordained that he should find employment in Iran, he took the opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with that country, its people and its language. From time to time, when he came to England, either on duty or on leave, he always devoted such leisure as he could find to working at the School of Oriental Studies.

When, a few years ago, he was transferred to London, he determined to take advantage of the accessibility of its important libraries and to turn to useful account the knowledge that he had acquired. It was then that he set about the examination of the sources in Persian and in European languages for the history of that amazing adventurer, Nadir Shah, and was finally to produce a thesis which gained for him the Ph.D. degree in the University of London. Since then, as he has explained in his Preface, he has pursued his researches still further and has been able to make full use of a Life of Nadir which existed in a unique copy in Leningrad. A debt of gratitude is due to the Soviet authorities, who at my request caused a photostat of this precious MS. to be made for the School of Oriental Studies.

It should, I think, be realised that Dr. Lockhart has only been able to devote his out-of-office hours to this work, and that he has not found time to examine any records further afield than London or Paris.

Nevertheless I doubt if he has left any stone unturned in his search for materials concerning Nadir Shah, and the present scholarly contribution to the history of this politically important period is, I feel, bound to achieve immediate recognition from students of Persian and Indian history and to hold its own as a standard authority.

E. DENISON ROSS.

TO THE MEMORY OF
EDWARD GRANVILLE BROWNE

PREFACE

My interest in Nadir Shah was first aroused when I examined two books, one in Spanish and the other in Portuguese, belonging to Sir Arnold Wilson; these books were, respectively, Le Margne's *Vida de Thamas Kouli-Khan* and de Voulton's *Verdadeira Noticia*, the first being a life of Nadir and the second an account of the happenings at Karnal and Delhi during Nadir's invasion of India.

Some years later, when I decided to study for the London Ph.D. degree, I chose Nadir's career as my subject. A few months after I had submitted my thesis, the School of Oriental Studies acquired from the Institut Vostokovedeniya, of Leningrad, a photostat copy of the unique MS. of Muhammad Kazim's history of Nadir's reign. Thanks to the generosity of the Librarian of the School of Oriental Studies, I have had this photostat copy of the MS. on loan for a considerable time. In the light of what I have found in this source and in other sources, not previously available, I have rewritten the greater part of my thesis; the result is the present book.

It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge here many acts of kindness. I have, in particular, to thank Professor Minorsky for his encouragement and for many most helpful suggestions. I am also much indebted to Sir E. Denison Ross for his valuable advice and for his kindness in consenting to write the Foreword of this book. I owe a great deal to my friend Mr. J. F. Baddeley, who has been most helpful in connection with certain of the Russian authorities consulted and who has generously allowed me to utilise his map of Daghistan in the preparation of my own map of that region. As regards Nadir's Indian campaign, I am very grateful to Sir Jadunath Sarkar for much most valuable advice and help and for lending me one of his manuscripts. I have also to thank Sir Edward Maclagan for his great kindness in placing at my disposal some extremely useful notes. A number of further acknowledgments are made in the book.

As regards the illustrations, Professor Arthur Upham Pope has been good enough to take specially for me some views of the shrine of the Imam Rida at Mashhad, showing Nadir's additions and embellishments, and the Institut Vostokovedeniya, of Leningrad, has very kindly furnished me with several photographic reproductions of the illustrations in the *Kitab-i-Nadiri* and *Nadir-Nama* of Muhammad Kazim. I must also

express my gratitude to the authorities of the India Museum for the photograph of the portrait of Nadir which is in their possession, and to my friends Sir Percy Sykes and Mr. G. T. Swann for their views of, respectively, Kubkan and the ruins of Old Qandahar. I am also most grateful to Mr. C. Sledger for the care and attention with which he has prepared the maps.

In conclusion, I must express my thanks to the University of London for making me a substantial grant from the Publication Fund, and I have likewise to give grateful acknowledgment to the Royal Central Asian Society for advancing me a further sum in aid of the publication of this book.

LAURENCE LOCKHART.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Bayan*.—*Bayan-i-Waqi*, by 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri.
B.M.—British Museum.
E.I.—*Encyclopædia of Islam*.
H. de la G.—*Histoire de la Géorgie*, by M. F. Brosset.
I.O.—India Office.
J.R.A.S.—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*.
J.R.A.S.B.—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*.
J.R.C.A.S.—*Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*.
K.N.—*Kitab-i-Nadiri*, by Muḥammad Kaẓim.
N.N.—*Nadīr-Nama*, by Muḥammad Kaẓim.
N.S.—New Style.
O.S.—Old Style.
S.P.—State Papers (at the Public Record Office).
Siyar.—*Siyaru'l-Mula'akhhirin*, by Ghulam Ḥusain Khan Tabatabai.
T.N.—*Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, by Mirza Muḥammad Mahdi, of Astarabad.
Z.T.—*Zubdatu't-Tawarikh*, by Muḥammad Muḥsin.

NOTE ON THE CHRONOLOGY

WHEREVER a Muhammadan date is given, the corresponding Christian New Style date is inserted after it in brackets ; unless otherwise stated, all Christian dates are New Style. The dates given in such sources as the *Gombroon Diary* and the despatches from the British diplomatic representatives at St. Petersburg and Constantinople are all Old Style ; when reference is made to these sources, both Old Style and New Style dates are given, thus : 14th/25th December, 1735 (the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars amounted to eleven days in the XVIIIth century).

NOTE ON THE TRANSLITERATION

THE system of transliteration employed in this book is similar to that in the late Professor Browne's *Literary History of Persia*. In the case of a few well-known names and words, such as Mosul, Muscat, Tehran and Sultan, the "popular" spelling has, however, been adopted.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ŠAFAVIS : THE AFGHAN, RUSSIAN AND TURKISH INVASIONS OF PERSIA.

A CHARACTERISTIC of the East has been the periodic bursting forth ("appearance" is too mild a word) there of great conquerors, who overran vast stretches of country, ravaging, killing and destroying. Such scourges of humanity were Chingiz Khan, Timur Lang and Nadir Shah. There are a number of points of similarity between the careers of Chingiz Khan and Timur, and there are still more between those of the latter and Nadir Shah. In fact, the parallels between Timur and Nadir are so numerous as to rule out mere coincidence, except in certain of the earlier cases. In other words, there is no doubt that Nadir deliberately modelled his career upon that of Timur.

Although it is impossible to overlook or to excuse Nadir's cruelty and the appalling loss of life and the terrible suffering which he caused, there can be no gainsaying that he was a very great man.¹ It was a remarkable achievement to rise from shepherd boy to Shah, but it was an even greater feat on his part not only to free Persia from the grip of powerful enemies, but also to raise her from the lowest depths to the proud position of being the foremost power in Asia.

In order to enable the reader to form an idea of the state of Persia at the time when Nadir first came into prominence, it is necessary to describe briefly the course of events there during the preceding quarter of a century.

It is beyond the scope of this book to go fully into the causes of the decline and fall of the Šafavi dynasty. The main reason for the disaster which ultimately overtook the dynasty was the deterioration in the character of the monarchs. This unfortunate development was the natural result of the pernicious policy which Shah 'Abbas I introduced of keeping the heir to the throne and his brothers immured in the harem where, shut off from the outside world, they received a most imperfect education. Within those walls, they could get no training in the arts of war or of

¹ Vambéry, in his *History of Bokhara* (London, 1873), p. 339, calls Nadir Shah the last great Asiatic conqueror.

peace; moreover, they generally fell under the baleful influence of the self-seeking eunuchs. Consequently, when at length the moment came for the heir to succeed to the throne, he was singularly unfitted for the duties of sovereignty, and was forced to rely for guidance upon the eunuchs and nobles. Amongst other causes of the decline of the Šafavis was the neglect of the army which, in consequence, became progressively less and less efficient as the years went by. When in 1694 the meek and pious but effete Sultan Husain became Shah, the doom of the Šafavi dynasty was sealed. His character was in strange contrast to those of the earlier members of his line. He was one of the gentlest of men, and held the shedding of even animal blood in the greatest abhorrence. He cared nothing for regal power and was entirely without ambition. In short, he was far more fitted for the cloister than he was for the throne.¹

The first few years of the new Shah's reign were peaceful in the extreme, but in 1699 signs of the coming storm appeared. In that year Baluch tribesmen carried out several forays into the province of Kirman. Two years later, a disturbance occurred in the province of Qandahar, but it was quelled with ruthless severity by the Georgian prince, Giorgi XI of Kartli, who was known to the Persians as Gurgin Khan.² After crushing this revolt, Gurgin Khan remained in Qandahar as Governor of the province; his garrison was largely composed of Georgians, whose cruelty to the Ghalzai tribesmen led to serious discontent amongst them. Well over a century before, the Ghalzais, together with the Abdalis, another large Afghan tribe, had migrated westward and south-westward from their mountain country and settled upon the more fertile plains of Qandahar and Zamindavar and the valleys of the Arghandab and Tarnak. Shah 'Abbas I, in consequence of a rising of the Abdalis, banished most of them to the neighbouring province of Herat; the Ghalzais were thus left by far the most powerful and influential community in Qandahar. By the beginning of the XVIIIth century, they had increased in numbers and importance; their chief was Mir Wais,³ the astute head of the Hotiki clan.

Goaded to desperation by the Georgians' behaviour, the Ghalzais at length rebelled, but Gurgin Khan defeated them, captured Mir Wais, and sent him under strong guard to Isfahan. On arrival at the capital, Mir Wais had no difficulty in deceiving the simple Shah Sulṭan

¹ In later years, however, Shah Sulṭan Husain grew extremely uxorious, besides becoming addicted to drink. Cornelius de Bruyn, who was in Isfahan in 1704, gave a most unfavourable account of his character in his *Travels into Muscovy, Persia and Part of the East Indies* (London, 1737), Vol. I, pp. 211 and 212.

² For a description of Gurgin Khan's character and qualities, see Vakhushṭ, in Brosset's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 178 and 179.

³ For Mir Wais's genealogy, real or supposed, see Muḥammad Hayat Khan's *Hayat-i-Afghani*, Urdu text (Lahore, 1867), pp. 257 and 262.

Husain and in poisoning the latter's mind against Gurgin Khan. The result was that the Shah not only released the Afghan chief, but later allowed him to return to Qandahar. On a suitable opportunity occurring, Mir Wais murdered Gurgin Khan; rousing his people to attack the Persian and Georgian garrison, he defeated them, killing a large number and driving the survivors out of the province.¹ When the news reached the court, a strong expedition under the command of Kai Khusrau Khan, a nephew of the late Gurgin Khan, was sent to restore the Shah's authority in Qandahar and to punish the rebels. Though successful in his first encounters with the Ghalzais, Kai Khusrau was ultimately defeated and killed, and only a remnant of his army returned. Several further expeditions were sent to subdue Mir Wais, but they all met with disaster. After being a virtually independent ruler for six years, Mir Wais died in 1715. He was succeeded by his brother 'Abdu'l-'Aziz, whose pacific nature and desire to submit to Isfahan soon rendered him unpopular. Incited by several of the principal Ghalzais, Mahmud, the elder son of Mir Wais, murdered his uncle in 1717, and became chief in his stead. Mahmud, although without the guile and necessarily without the experience of his father, soon proved himself to be a bold and resolute leader.

In the previous year (1716), the Abdalis, who were then more numerous than the Ghalzais,² had been encouraged by the success achieved by the latter to revolt. Taking advantage of a mutiny of the Persian garrison of Herat, the Popalzai Abdali chief 'Abdullah Khan Sadozai and his son Asadullah managed to escape from prison (into which the Governor of Herat had cast them on a charge of sedition), and headed a successful rising. The Shah's ministers made several attempts to subdue the Abdalis, but these efforts were ill-directed and met with the same fate as the expeditions against the Ghalzais. The contemporary Persian historian, Muhammad Muhsin, has given, in his *Zubdatu't-Tawarikh* ("Cream of the Histories"), a long and detailed account of these endeavours to crush the Ghalzai and Abdali revolts, and refers in scathing terms to the despicable conduct of the venal and incompetent ministers and nobles, who :

"by reason of vain personal objects and hypocrisy . . . veiled their eyes to what was expedient for the state. Every time that any of them wished to move (against the Afghans) each (of the others) would make an excuse and prevent anything from

¹ Only the barest outline of these events has been given above; fuller particulars are to be found in the Polish Jesuit Krosinski's *The History of the Revolution of Persia* (du Cerceau's English translation, London, 1728), Vol. I, and in La Marmé-Clairac's *Histoire de Persie depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle*, (Paris, 1750) Vol. I.

² This statement is made on the authority of Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan, of Astarabad, in his official biography of Nadir Shah known as the *Tarikh-i-Nadiri* (Bombay edition, 1849), p. 4.

being done. They postponed their departure and occupied themselves with pleasure. For three years (i.e., from 1717 to 1720) they stayed in Qazvin,¹ practising the selling of offices and receiving bribes. . . ."²

Even when hostilities broke out between the Ghalzais and Abdalis, the ministers took no advantage of the opportunity thus provided to re-establish the Shah's authority. The struggle between the two tribes was inconclusive; while the Ghalzais lost Farah, they defeated the Abdalis at Dilaram in a battle in which Asadullah Sadozai lost his life. Mahmud then made a feigned submission to the Shah, who, completely taken in, officially appointed him Governor of Qandahar. Mahmud soon showed that his loyalty was only a pretence, for, in 1720, he made a raid into Persia as far as Kirman; there, he was defeated and driven back by Lutf 'Ali Khan, the only brave and competent general in the Shah's service. Nevertheless, as he was soon to demonstrate, Mahmud's retreat was a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*; he had discovered how vulnerable the Safavi state had become.

In the meantime, serious developments had taken place in other parts of the empire, and more were to follow. While the storm clouds were banking up alarmingly in the east, they were also beginning to form in the north and west.

Earlier in the century, the turbulent Lazgi mountaineers of Daghistan, together with the inhabitants of their colonies at Jar and Tala in the Qaniq (Alazan) valley, on the further or south-western side of the Caucasian chain, had resumed their raids upon Georgia and Shirvan. Half a century before, Shah 'Abbas II had promised an annual subsidy to these Lazgis, on condition that they kept the peace. The subsidy was regularly paid until, under the lax control or rather lack of control of Shah Sultan Husain, the Persian ministers and officials misappropriated the money intended for the Lazgis.³ Besides suffering from the depredations of the Lazgis, the people of Shirvan, being mostly Sunnis, had to endure fierce persecution at the hands of the intolerant Shi'a clergy. Shah Sultan Husain was much under the influence of the *mullas*, who became very powerful during his reign. The famous but fanatical *mujtahid* Muhammad Baqir-i-Majlisi, the author of the *Biharu'l-Anwar*, a most celebrated work on Shi'a tradition, was a great persecutor of the Sunnis; he died at the close of the XVIIth century, but his successors continued his intolerant policy. In Shirvan, Sunni *mullas* were put to death, mosques were profaned and turned into stables, and religious

¹ Shah Sultan Husain and his court were at Qazvin from late in 1717 until 1720; he then moved it temporarily to Tehran before returning to Isfahan.

² Browne MS., No. G.15 (in the Cambridge University Library), fol. 205 (a).

³ Kruisinski, Vol. 1, p. 243.

works were destroyed.¹ In consequence of this treatment, the Sunnis of Shirvan appealed several times to the Sultan of Turkey to protect them, and many fled into Turkish territory; those who remained were inspired by no feelings of loyalty to Persia; they were, in fact, ripe for revolt.

The rising power of Russia, under the inspired guidance of that remarkable ruler, Peter the Great, constituted a danger to Persia from a new and unexpected quarter. The mission of Artemii Volynski to Isfahan, though its object was primarily commercial, furnished Peter with much information of a political nature, and went far to convince him that Persia was drifting towards disaster; Volynski, in fact, reported that unless Shah Sultan Husain were replaced by some more competent monarch, the ruin of the country was inevitable.² Peter, however, was unable at that stage (1717-18) to take active steps to profit by the Persian situation, as he was still deeply involved in the Northern War. He nevertheless prepared the ground for future action by sending emissaries to Daghestan and later to Georgia. In 1719 'Adil Girai, the Shamkhal³ of the Ghazi Qumuqs of Tarkhu, threw in his lot with Russia, and is said to have done much to encourage Peter in his designs against Persia.⁴

Turkey, like Russia, was an interested spectator of the trend of affairs in Persia. The Treaty of Passarowitz had been concluded in 1718; although Turkey was shorn by it of much of her European possessions, she was now free to turn her attention eastwards where the troubled state of Persia must have suggested to her the possibility of obtaining compensation there for her territorial losses in the west. She had doubtless not forgotten that from 1578 to 1607 she had been supreme in Adharbaijan, Georgia and Shirvan, and felt that the moment was not far distant when she could make a bid to seize those provinces again. With a view to obtaining reliable information as to the state of Persia, the Porte sent an envoy named Durri Efendi to the court at Tehran. Durri Efendi reached Tehran at the end of 1720; he found that his arrival had greatly perturbed the Persian ministers, who feared lest he had come to demand the cession

¹ Von Hammer-Purgstall's *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, J. J. Hellert's French translation (Paris, 1835-1843), Vol. XIV, p. 87.

² Schuyler's *Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia*, Vol. II, p. 382.

³ As the late Professor Barthold has explained in his article on Daghestan in the *Encyclopædia of Islam*, the Shamkhals were originally chiefs of the whole Ghazi Qumuq tribe. The Ghazi Qumuqs had gradually extended their influence from the mountains of Daghestan north-eastwards as far as the coast of the Caspian. In 1579 the lands of the Shamkhal Chuban were divided up amongst his sons, thus splitting up and greatly weakening the tribe. By degrees the mountain and coastal sections became separate entities, and from 1639 the Shamkhals ruled over no more than the Tarkhu coastal district. At the time when 'Adil Girai submitted to Russia, the leader of the mountain portion of the tribe was a man of strong character named Cholq Surkhai Khan, of whom much will be said hereafter.

⁴ Butkov's *Materiali dlia novoy Istorii Kavkaza, 1722-1803*, Vol. I, p. 15.

of certain provinces.¹ The presence at the court of a Russian consular official, Semeon Avramov by name,² must have given the Turkish envoy food for thought. After spending three months at Tehran, Durri Efendi returned to Constantinople and reported that Persia, though a prosperous, well-cultivated country, was apparently very near its end; he ascribed the cause of the troubles then besetting Persia to the lack of men of intelligence at the head of affairs.

The situation deteriorated even further after the departure of the Turkish envoy. Fath 'Ali Khan Daghistani, the P'timadu'd-Daula, the Shah's principal minister, was the victim of a plot hatched by his enemies, and was dismissed, imprisoned and blinded. His nephew, the capable general Lutf 'Ali Khan, was deprived of his command, while his army was disbanded; the sole military bulwark of any value was thus wantonly destroyed.

In the Persian Gulf the situation had been going from bad to worse. In 1717 or early in the following year the Imam Sulṭān ibn Saif II of Muscat, who possessed a powerful fleet, fitted out an expedition to the Bahrain Islands, which he seized without difficulty.³ The 'Omani Arabs do not appear to have remained long in Bahrain, which, on their departure, passed into the hands of Shaikh Jabbara of Tahiri, the head of the important Arab tribe of the Huwalas. Although nominally a Persian subject, Shaikh Jabbara was, to all intents and purposes, independent of the weak Government at Isfahan. On the mainland, the Baluch tribesmen became increasingly active, carrying out raids into the provinces of Kirman and Lar. In 1721, 4,000 Baluch horsemen attacked Bandar 'Abbas; after plundering the town, the marauders attempted to break into the English and Dutch factories there, but they were beaten off with heavy loss.⁴

In the interior of the country risings took place in Luristan and Kurdistan in 1720,⁵ and in the same year Malik Maḥmūd Sistani, the Governor of Tun, in north-east Persia, flouted the Shah's authority. Malik Maḥmūd was an ambitious man who belonged to the Kayani family of Sistan and claimed descent from the Ṣaffarids.⁶

¹ *Relation de Dourry Effendi* (Paris, 1810), p. 54. (This French translation was made by M. de Fienne in 1745; Krusinski's Latin translation from the original Turkish was published in 1734.)

² Peter the Great had made Avramov Consul at Resht in September, 1720; he was the first Russian consular official appointed to a post in Persia.

³ Badger's *History of the Imāms and Szyyids of Omān* (translated from the Arabic of Salih ibn Raziq), pp. xxix and 94.

⁴ Captain Alexander Hamilton's *A New Account of the East Indies* (Edinburgh, 1727), pp. 108 and 109.

⁵ Muḥammad Sharif's *Zuhdatu'l-Tawarikh-i-Sinundiji* (Browne MS., G. 18), fol. 204 (a).

⁶ Muḥammad Maḥdi Khan's *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, pp. 6 and 7 (as frequent reference will be made to this source, it will in future be denoted by the letters T.N.). Fath 'Ali Khan, the Ashagbashi Qajar chief of Astarabad, who was then Governor of Mashhad, was sent against Malik Maḥmūd

In the summer of 1721 the Sunnis of Shirvan could endure their torments no longer; under the leadership of a Sunni propagandist named Hajji Da'ud, they openly revolted. The rebels were joined by a strong contingent of the Ghazi Qumuqs, under their chief Cholaq Surkhai Khan,¹ and by many of the Qaraqaitaq (another powerful Daghistani tribe), under their Usmi or chief, Ahmad Khan.² Both the Ghazi Qumuqs and the Qaraqaitaqs were Sunnis, and the former wished not only to assist their co-religionists in Shirvan, but also to exact retribution for the Shah's treatment of their compatriot, Fath 'Ali Khan Daghistani.³ The combined forces, which were some 15,000 strong, besieged and took Shamakhi. A scene of terrible carnage ensued in which over 4,000 of the Shi'a inhabitants perished; the town was then pillaged. Some Russian merchants who were established in Shamakhi, although they escaped with their lives, lost goods valued at over £100,000.⁴ Volynski, who was Governor of Astrakhan at the time, at once reported the incident to Peter the Great. An ominous fact, so far as Persia was concerned, was that it was just at this time (August, 1721) that the treaty of Nystadt was concluded; this treaty, which ended the long struggle between Russia and Sweden, set Peter free to prepare actively for the realisation of his aims in the south-east.⁵

Equally ominous was the action of Turkey in regard to Shirvan; not only did she accede to a request for protection from the rebel leader Hajji Da'ud, but she also formally appointed him Khan of that province.⁶

All around Persia, and even within her own borders, the situation was now threatening in the extreme; the only question was from which quarter the gathering storms would first break. This question was soon answered.

whom he besieged for a month. On being wounded in the foot, Fath 'Ali Khan raised the siege of Tun and returned to Mashhad (*T.N.*, pp. 6 and 7). V. Böchner, in his article on Sistan in the *Encyclopædia of Islam*, Vol. IV, p. 459, doubts whether Malik Mahmud's claim to be descended from the Saffarids can be substantiated.

¹ Major J. G. Gärber (who was Russian Commissioner on the Russo-Turkish frontier delimitation in 1728) gives interesting particulars of Surkhai and Hajji Da'ud in his *Nachrichten*, in Vol. IV of G. F. Müller's *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte*.

² *T.N.*, p. 5.

³ Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie*, Vol. II, p. 577.

⁴ A first-hand account, by the French Jesuit Père Bachoud, of the taking of Shamakhi and of the scenes that followed is to be found in *Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses* (Paris, 1780), Vol. IV, p. 123. See also Soloviev's *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. XVIII, p. 37.

⁵ It has often been maintained that these aims are accurately set forth in the (so-called) Political Testament of Peter the Great. In a contribution to the *Slavonic Review* (January, 1936), I have ventured to challenge this view in so far as Persia is concerned. There is reason to believe that the "Testament" is no more than a Napoleonic forgery which was designed to prejudice European opinion against Russia.

⁶ Bernhard Dorn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker aus Morgenländischen Quellen, II. Geschichte Schirwans unter den Statthaltern und Chanen, von 1538-1820*, p. 410. See also von Hammer, *op. cit.*, Vol. XIV, pp. 87 and 88, and Gärber, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 and 71.

Late in 1721 Mahmud of Qandahar, having collected a fresh army, again invaded Persia. This time there was no Lutf 'Ali Khan to oppose him; after taking Kirman and sending off part of his forces to capture Shiraz, Mahmud marched to, but failed to take, Yazd. Not wishing to waste time besieging the town, he advanced boldly on Isfahan. At Gulnabad (or Gulunabad, as it is sometimes called), some twelve miles to the east of the capital, the small Afghan force gained a signal victory over the far more numerous and better equipped army of the Shah. This battle, which was fought on the 8th March, 1722, settled the fate of the Safavi dynasty as decisively as Qadisiyya had settled that of the Sasanians. After seizing Farahabad, a favourite resort of Shah Sultan Husain, and occupying the Armenian suburb of Julfa, Mahmud endeavoured to carry Isfahan by assault, but his men were driven off with severe loss. Having no cannon larger than *zanburaks* (light swivel-guns mounted on camels), the Afghans were unable to breach the walls with artillery fire; in view of this fact and of the smallness of his force,¹ Mahmud decided to blockade the city.

With the exception of one episode which has a considerable bearing upon subsequent events, there is no need to mention here the incidents of the siege and the terrible sufferings of the inhabitants in its later stages. When, after nearly three months had elapsed and there was no sign of the approach of any relieving force, the Shah and his ministers determined to bring one of the royal princes out of the harem, proclaim him the Vali-'ahd or Crown Prince, and then send him secretly through the enemy lines to Adharbaijan in order to collect an army with which he could march to the relief of the capital. Sultan Mahmud Mirza, the eldest son of Shah Sultan Husain, was accordingly brought out from the harem, and was placed with much pomp and ceremony on the royal throne. Having always been kept in seclusion, the young prince became nervous and alarmed at seeing so many people and at being the object of so much attention; as soon as the ceremony was over, he fled back to the *andarun* and refused to emerge from it again. In view of his behaviour, he was passed over in favour of Safi Mirza, the Shah's second son, but he likewise proved unsuitable after he had been Crown Prince for a few days. The third son, Tahmasp Mirza by name, was therefore made Crown Prince in his stead. Tahmasp, who was then about 18 years of age, had had, of course, the same upbringing as his elder brothers, but, as he showed

¹ There is much divergence between the various authorities as to the strength of Mahmud's forces. Both Mirza Mahdi and the much later historian Rida Quli Khan Hidayat (in his continuation of the *Roudat-e-Safa*, Vol. VIII) give the numbers of the Ghaznis as 8,000; Rida Quli Khan adds that Mahmud had a similar number of Baluch and Hazara tribesmen as auxiliaries. Fasa'i, in the *Fars-Nama-yi-Naziri* (Tehran, 1895), relates that some authorities give the numbers of the Afghans as 20,000, while others put them as high as 40,000; he does not specify these authorities by name.

himself to be less timorous than they were, he was confirmed in his position. On the 27th Sha'ban, 1134 (2nd June, 1722), Tahmasp, accompanied by 200 Tabrizis, left the city secretly and succeeded in running the gauntlet through the Afghan lines, and reaching Qazvin.¹ On arriving at that town, the prince, instead of using every endeavour to raise troops promptly, gave himself up to pleasure, and wasted much valuable time in debauches.² The result was that no serious effort was made to save the Shah and the capital.

On the 22nd October, 1722, the beleaguered inhabitants of Isfahan had come to their last gasp³; on that day the Shah and his ministers rode out to the Afghan camp at Farahabad, on horses borrowed from Mahmud (all those in the city having been eaten),⁴ in order to surrender. The East India Company's representatives reported⁵ that the Shah rode forth from his palace "without the least pomp or Regal Ornaments, Dressed like a Desponding and Miserable Man . . . he was attended with so Melancholy a Retinue, as made it appear a Solemn Obsequies (*sic*) to his Crown and Majesty, and so it proved." On reaching Mahmud, the Shah divested himself of his *jiga* or aigrette, the emblem of sovereignty, and with his own hands placed it on his conqueror's head. Three days later Mahmud entered Isfahan in triumph, and was formally enthroned as Shah.

When the news of these events reached Tahmasp at Qazvin, he proclaimed himself Shah there on the 14th Safar, 1135 (24th November, 1722).⁶ Although he had been made heir to the throne in the preceding June, it is very doubtful whether his claim to be regarded as Shah at this stage can be regarded as valid. In the first place, Mahmud had captured the capital and had conquered a far greater extent of territory than that over which Tahmasp held sway. Secondly, the crown had been formally conferred upon Mahmud by the ex-Shah.

¹ Muhammad Muhsin, *Zuhdatu't-Tawarikh*, fol. 210 (a) (as there will be frequent references to this work, the abbreviation *Z.T.* will henceforth be used in place of the full title).

² *Ibid.*, fol. 210 (a). Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Hazin, who was in general favourably inclined to the Safavis, confirms Muhammad Muhsin's remarks as to Tahmasp's love of pleasure and neglect of duty: see p. 132 of F. C. Belfour's translation of his *Tadhkira*.

³ Several first-hand accounts of the horrors of this siege have been preserved. The Jesuit Krusinski, the Isfahan representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies, Muhammad Muhsin and Shaikh Hazin all went through the siege, and have recorded their experiences. See (1) Krusinski, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 65-95, (2) Vol. XV of the India Office Records, Persia and the Persian Gulf Series, (3) H. Dunlop's *Persia* (Haarlem, 1911), pp. 242-257, and his English translation of Friar Alexander's account of the sack of the city, in the *J.R.C.A.S.*, October, 1936, (4) *Z.T.*, folio 207 (a) and 207 (b), and (5) *Tadhkira*, pp. 118-124.

⁴ Sir Harford Jones Brydges's *The Dynasty of the Kajars* (translated by him from the Persian text of the *Ma'athir-i-Sultaniyya* by 'Abdu'r-Razzaq ibn Najaf Quli), (London, 1833), p. lxxvii.

⁵ In a letter from Isfahan dated the 20th/31st October, 1722 (in Vol. XV of the India Office Records already referred to).

⁶ *Z.T.*, fol. 210 (b).

As soon as Maḥmud heard of Tahmasp's proclamation, he sent a force against him, which defeated his modest army, and occupied Qazvin, but the prince eluded the Afghans and escaped to Tabriz. The cruel behaviour of the Afghans at Qazvin provoked a rising of the inhabitants, who attacked their enemies with such spirit that they killed a large number of them and drove out the remainder in disorder.¹ When the fugitives reached Isfahan and reported to Maḥmud what had occurred, he feared a similar outbreak there. As a preventive measure, he put to death several of the Ṣafavi princes, and massacred 300 nobles and many of the ex-Shah's former bodyguard.

Whilst the siege of Isfahan was in progress, Peter the Great began his invasion. He had not, it is said,² intended to launch his Persian campaign until the following year (1723), but the trend of events in Persia and the Caucasus, and, above all, the interference of Turkey in the affairs of Shirvan, roused him to swift action. One of the main points of Peter's policy was that the Caspian was to be a Russian lake; for this reason it was essential to prevent any strong power like Turkey from gaining access to its shores.

Having embarked a strong force of cavalry and infantry,³ Peter sailed from Astrakhan in July, 1722, and landed a few days later at Agrakhan Bay, a little to the north of Tarkhu. The expedition then marched south through Tarkhu (where Peter was greeted by the Shamkhal 'Adil Girai) into Tabarsaran. There the Russians encountered and defeated the Qaraqaitags, under their chief the Usmi Aḥmad Khan.⁴ Alarmed by the Russian advance, the Ghazi Qumuq and Qaraqaitag tribes sent messages to the Sultan asking to be placed under his protection.⁵ Darband surrendered to Peter on the 3rd September, but he decided to advance no further that season. Leaving a strong garrison in Darband, Peter returned to Astrakhan. On reaching that town, he received an appeal from the people of Gilan for assistance against the Ghalzai Afghans; in response, he dispatched two battalions of troops to Enzeli⁶; these men were later reinforced by others under the command of General Levashev. In Georgia Peter had succeeded in winning over to his side Vakhtang VI of Kartli, a brother of the ill-fated Kai Khusrau Khan.⁷

The news of Peter's invasion of Persia nearly caused war to break out

¹ *T.N.*, p. 10.

² Butkov, Vol. I, p. 10.

³ Details of the composition of this force are given by Soloviev, Vol. XVIII, p. 41.

⁴ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 13; see also the *Memoirs of Captain P. H. Bruce* (London, 1782), p. 289.

⁵ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 89.

⁶ Soloviev, Vol. XVIII, p. 48; *T.N.*, p. 11.

⁷ Vakhusht, in Brosset's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 117.

between Russia and Turkey. Hostilities were, however, averted by the efforts of Nepluiev, the able Russian Resident at Constantinople, who allayed the fears of the Turks in some measure by repeated assurances of Peter's pacific intentions in so far as the Porte was concerned. In the spring of 1723, Turkey decided that it would be easier to prevent a further Russian advance into Persia by invading that country herself and so forestalling her rival, than it would by invading Russia. The Porte therefore declared war on Tahmasp, and the Turkish 'ulama thereupon issued strongly worded *fatwas* enjoining the faithful to fight against the heretical Persians. The Turks first attacked in the north-west; marching through Georgia, they seized Tiflis in June. On learning of this invasion, Tahmasp, acting on Avramov's advice,¹ sent his chief minister, Isma'il Beg by name, to Russia in order to negotiate a treaty of alliance. Whilst the Persian envoy was on his way, the Russian general Matiusshkin captured Baku.² Isma'il Beg nevertheless went on to Moscow and began the negotiations. On the 23rd September, 1723, the treaty was signed; Russia undertook to assist Tahmasp to pacify his country and to punish the rebels, while Tahmasp, in return for this assistance, agreed to cede to Russia the towns of Darband and Baku, with their adjoining districts, and the three coastal provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Astarabad. Lastly, each power was to regard as friends and enemies respectively the friends and enemies of the other.³ Tahmasp, at the time when he dispatched Isma'il Beg to Russia, also sent an envoy to Constantinople. The Porte informed this envoy that, as Darband and Baku had been seized by the Russians and as Isfahan had been taken by the Afghans, it was sending troops to occupy Tabriz and Erivan before these places could be occupied by Persia's foes; if, it continued, Tahmasp would cede Georgia and Adharbaidjan to Turkey, the Sultan would recognise him as Shah and give him military assistance.⁴ The Persian envoy, however, was not empowered to agree to such terms.

Meanwhile, the Russian capture of Baku had brought about another serious crisis between Russia and Turkey, which became even graver when the news reached Constantinople of the conclusion of the treaty of the 23rd September. War was only averted by the active mediation of the Marquis de Bonnac, the extremely capable French Ambassador to the Porte, who used every endeavour to restrain the Turks on the one hand and Nepluiev on the other (it was at that time the policy of France to prevent Turkey from embroiling herself with an important Power

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 41.

² Soloviev, Vol. XVIII, p. 80.

³ La Mamyre-Clairac, Vol. III, pp. 398 and 399.

⁴ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 99.

like Russia, because she felt that a strong Turkey would be an effective deterrent against Austrian aggression in the west).¹

Not content with their occupation of Georgia, the Turks also invaded Persia much further to the south, where the aged Hasan Pasha, the well-known Governor of Baghdad, following the route so often taken by previous invaders, captured Kirmanshah. Hasan Pasha halted at Kirmanshah for the winter, intending to advance to Hamadan in the spring. Death, however, claimed the old man early in 1724, but his plan was carried out by his still more capable son Ahmad, who succeeded him as Pasha of Baghdad and as commander of the Turkish troops on that front.

During the first few months of 1724 de Bonnac exerted all his diplomatic skill to bring about a *rapprochement* between Turkey and Russia. Despite most formidable obstacles, he managed to induce both sides to moderate their attitudes to such an extent that, on the 24th June, 1724, the two Powers signed a treaty which divided all northern and most of western Persia between them. In the preamble to the treaty was a brief reference to the cession to Russia of Persia's Caspian provinces under the terms of the Russo-Persian treaty of the previous year (which, however, Tahmasp had refused to ratify). In the treaty itself it was agreed that the frontier between Russia and Turkey should run southward through Daghistan and Shirvan, parallel to the coast and at a distance of 22 hours' ride from it, to a point east of Shamakhi, whence it went on to the point where the Kura and Araxes join one another. At the confluence of the two rivers the Turco-Persian frontier began; running due south to a point slightly to the west of Ardabil, it continued almost in the same straight line to Hamadan; from there it turned south-west to Kirmanshah. Both Russia and Turkey agreed to recognise Tahmasp as Shah and to assist him to restore order in his realm, provided that he, for his part, accepted the treaty.²

As von Hammer has rightly observed,³ the line of demarcation laid down by this treaty, which cut across all the provinces and followed no boundaries formed by rivers or mountains, was no more natural than the treaty itself was legitimate.

¹ Much might be written regarding the intricate history of Russo-Turco-Persian relations during this period, but nothing more than a summary can be given here. The principal authorities are:—

(1) de Bonnac's *Mémoires Historiques sur l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople* (Paris, 1894), (2) the State Papers at the Public Record Office (S.P. 97, Vol. XXV), (3) La Mamyre-Claire, (4) von Hammer, (5) Soloviev, and (6) Saint Priest's *Mémoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le Commerce des Français dans le Levant* (Paris, 1877).

The subject has been dealt with at some length in Dr. Mohammad Ali Hekmat's *Essai sur l'Histoire des Relations Politiques Irano-Ottomanes de 1722 à 1747* (Paris, 1937), which has been published since the above was written.

² Butkov, Vol. I, p. 38; La Mamyre-Claire, Vol. II, p. 194.

³ Von Hammer (Dochez's translation, Paris, 1844), Vol. III, pp. 400 and 401.

Khoi had fallen to the Turks before the treaty was concluded; afterwards, as Tahmasp showed no disposition to agree to the terms on which he was offered assistance, the Turks continued their advance. Ahmad Pasha, as stated above, marched on Hamadan, which he took after it had stubbornly resisted for over two months, and the Turkish forces operating in the north-west captured Nakhichevan and Erivan. An assault on Tabriz was, however, repulsed. In the following year (1725) the Turks, after taking Ganja, made a second, and this time a successful, attack on Tabriz. When Tabriz was threatened by the Turks, Tahmasp fled to Ardabil, but a Turkish advance on that place forced him to continue his flight to Qazvin and then to Tehran. The luckless prince was allowed but little breathing space even at Tehran, for he was soon to be threatened by a new enemy.

Whereas Russia had been quick to move at the outset of her Persian campaigns, Turkey had been the reverse. Later, however, when the Turks had got into their stride and were winning success after success, Russia became less and less active. The reason for the northern Power's lack of energy and enterprise was the death of Peter the Great, which occurred on the 8th February, 1725. Deprived of his genius and driving power, Russia ceased to be aggressive in Persia, although she remained for some time to come determined to retain the territory which he had won for her.

While Russia and Turkey were dismembering Persia in the north and west, Mahmud was extending his conquests in the south. To add to the distractions of Persia, an imposter belonging to the Karrani tribe who claimed to be Safi Mirza, the second son of the ex-Shah, appeared in the Bakhtiari country towards the close of 1724 and gathered together a number of adherents¹: it was not until three years later that he was defeated and slain. It is possible that the news of the appearance of this supposititious Safi Mirza may have been responsible for a terrible tragedy which occurred at Isfahan. Having heard a rumour that the real Safi Mirza had escaped from captivity, Mahmud, without waiting to verify the report, on the 7th February, 1725, slaughtered all the surviving male members of the Safavi royal family who were in his power, with the exception of the ex-Shah and two young princes.

Mahmud had been subject to attacks of melancholia for some time past, and had become intensely suspicious of those around him. His cousin Ashraf, the son of 'Abdu'l-'Aziz, was a capable military leader and had made himself very popular with the Afghan soldiery. Mahmud,

¹ T.N., p. 14. Mirza Mahdi gives particulars of six of these pretenders who appeared at different times. According to Shaikh Hazin (*op. cit.*, p. 135), there were no fewer than eighteen of them in all.

fearing lest Ashraf's popularity might lead him to revolt, threw him into prison. After the slaughter of the Šafavi princes, Maḥmud's mind became quite unhinged; physically, too, he degenerated rapidly, being afflicted with paralysis¹ or, according to some sources, with leprosy.²

His dreadful condition led to a conspiracy amongst the Afghans, who released Ashraf and asked him to become Shah in place of his cousin. Ashraf, nothing loth, agreed, and avenged the murder of his father and secured the throne of Persia for himself by beheading Maḥmud on the 22nd April, 1725. One of Ashraf's first acts after his accession was to put to death those persons who had been Maḥmud's chief supporters. He is said to have then offered the crown to the ex-Shah Sultan Husain, knowing full well that he would refuse it. Ashraf then endeavoured to inveigle Tahmasp into a trap by inviting him to meet him at some point between Qum and Tehran (where Tahmasp then was) and suggesting that both should be accompanied by only a few followers; Ashraf, of course, had no intention of observing this condition. Luckily for Tahmasp, some of his well-wishers at Isfahan warned him of Ashraf's real intentions.

When Ashraf realised that his plan had miscarried, he set out with a strong force for Tehran. At Shah 'Abdu'l-'Azim, six miles to the south of that place, he took Tahmasp's troops by surprise, and routed them; he then went on to Tehran, which he invested, but he did not advance quickly enough to prevent Tahmasp from escaping. Accompanied by only a few followers, the prince fled to Mazandaran. It appears that he escaped from Tehran about the 10th December, 1725.

After wandering through the Mazandaran forests for some time, Tahmasp came at length to the town of Sari, where he received an unexpected accretion of strength. Fath 'Ali Khan Qajar, of Astarabad, of whom mention has already been made,³ joined the prince there with 2,000 men.

The part played by Fath 'Ali Khan during the period from 1722 to 1725 is the subject of some controversy. The historians of the Qajar period, such as 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, Riḍa Quli Khan Hidayat, and Muḥammad Taqi (otherwise known by his title of Lisanu'l-Mulk and by his *takhallus* or pen-name of Sipihir) sought, as was not unnatural, to portray his character in as favourable manner as they could.⁴ According to them, Fath 'Ali Khan attempted to aid Shah Sultan Husain during the siege of Isfahan, but, on being falsely charged by the jealous ministers with aiming at the

¹ T.N., p. 10.

² Kruzinski, Vol. II, p. 302.

³ See above, p. 6, note 5.

⁴ Fath 'Ali Khan was the father of Muḥammad Hassan Khan, one of whose sons was Agha Muḥammad Shah, the first Qajar monarch; he was the great-grandfather (through another grandson) of Fath 'Ali Shah.

throne, he left Isfahan in disgust and retired to Astarabad.¹ This story, which is improbable, is not corroborated by the principal contemporary authorities.

It seems that when Tahmasp was at Tehran towards the close of 1725, either he² or the people of Ray³ appealed to Fath 'Ali Khan to assist them against the Afghans. The Qajar chief responded, and fought an indecisive action with the enemy near Varamin; he then advanced in the direction of Tehran, but he arrived too late to make contact with Tahmasp or to prevent the Ghalzais from taking the town. He thereupon retreated eastwards, and eventually joined Tahmasp at Sari, as already related. According to Muhammad Muhsin⁴ (whose testimony regarding Fath 'Ali Khan is not free from bias), he had been in active revolt during the winter of 1725-6; after sacking Damghan, he entered Mazandaran, where he defeated a body of Tahmasp's supporters. He then advanced to Sari, where he and some other Qajar chiefs went to Tahmasp "with swords in their belts and Qur'ans in their hands," saying that the prince's generals had been unworthy, as they had abandoned their country to the enemy. Fath 'Ali Khan then craved forgiveness for his previous behaviour, and offered his services and those of his men. The truth of the matter probably is that Fath 'Ali Khan, if not in actual revolt, had been for a long time quite independent of Tahmasp, owing to his distance from the prince and the disturbed state of the country.

While loyalty may have influenced Fath 'Ali Khan to some extent in arriving at his decision to join Tahmasp, it seems probable that self-interest and the instinct for self-preservation were additional motives. He had only 2,000 followers, while Malik Mahmud Sistani (who had, in 1723, taken advantage of the chaotic state of Khurasan to seize Mashhad and had set himself up there as an independent ruler)⁵ was vastly more powerful. Although Tahmasp's forces were negligible in point of numbers, his position as the sole surviving son of the ex-Shah made him the only possible rallying point for all those of his countrymen who remained loyal to the Safavi line.⁶ Fath 'Ali Khan, who was a man of much greater intelligence and foresight than Tahmasp, doubtless realised the value, from this point of view, of an association with the prince. He must have known that, with his much stronger personality, he could soon gain an ascendancy

¹ See, for example, the *Rauḍatū's-Safa*, Vol. VIII (as the pages of the lithographed edition are unnumbered, no precise reference can be given).

² *Fars-Nama*, p. 163.

³ Muhammad Taqi's *Nasikhū't-Tawarikh*, p. 8.

⁴ *Z.T.*, fol. 211 (b).

⁵ For Malik Mahmud's rise to power, his capture of Mashhad in 1723, and his defeat of Tahmasp's general, Rida Quli Khan, see the *Z.T.*, fol. 220 (a)-223 (a) and Vol. II, p. 337, of the *Mafidū'ih-Shams* by Muhammad Hasan Khan (Sani 'a' d-Daula).

⁶ They could hardly rally to the ex-Shah, because he was a prisoner in the hands of Ashraf.

over the prince, and so become in due course the real head of affairs. To a man of discernment like Fath 'Ali Khan, there were at last signs of improvement in Tahmasp's situation, or rather of deterioration in that of his foes. In March, 1726, Ashraf's arrogant pretensions had involved him in a war with Turkey.¹ Owing to this war, neither the Turks nor the Ghalzais would be able to pay much, if any, attention to Tahmasp for some time, and its effects would weaken both the combatant sides, particularly the Ghalzais. Ashraf could ill afford to lose men, as he was ruling by force of arms a people who greatly outnumbered his army and who detested the Ghalzais on both racial and religious grounds. Moreover, his murder of Mahmud had occasioned a feud between him and Husain, Mahmud's brother, who had made himself supreme at Qandahar; as a result, he could expect no reinforcements from that quarter. Russia had, as has already been stated, been much less aggressive since the death of Peter the Great, and, although she and Turkey had concluded the Partition Treaty, there was much jealousy and mistrust between the two Powers. The Abdalis, it was true, remained unsubdued, but they had been weakened by internal dissensions, and were not likely to take any offensive action for some time. Lastly, there was Malik Mahmud, but he was less formidable than the others, and would be unable to resist any popular movement on a big scale in favour of the Safavi claimant.

In company with his new supporter, Tahmasp proceeded to Astarabad, where efforts were made to obtain reinforcements. Tahmasp rewarded Fath 'Ali Khan for his services with the title of *Wakilu'd-Daula* ("Regent of the State"), and a number of other Qajar chiefs were given posts, all of which were necessarily little more than sinecures at the time.² Fath 'Ali Khan then persuaded Tahmasp to march against Malik Mahmud, hoping to collect reinforcements *en route*; with this object, he and the prince set out via Khabushan for Mashhad.

As Fath 'Ali Khan started on this expedition, he no doubt felt that, notwithstanding all the obstacles that would have to be surmounted, he was the man who would be able to take advantage of the disunion in the ranks of his country's enemies to effect her deliverance. He was not, however, destined to play this part, because it was shortly to be filched from him by a rival.

¹ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, pp. 145 and 146.

² Z.T., fol. 211 (b).

CHAPTER II

NADIR'S ORIGIN AND EARLY CAREER

WHEN inquiring into the early history of tribes in Persia and Central Asia, it is sometimes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a given tribe is of Turkish or of Mongol origin. There is an element of doubt in the case of Nadir's own tribe, the Afshars, but the evidence in support of the contention that they are of Turkish origin seems reasonably strong. The historian Rashidu'd-Din Faḍlullāh described the Afshars as "Turkish peoples dwelling in the plains," and said that Awshar (or Awushar), the eponymous founder of the tribe, fought on the right wing of the army of his grandfather Oghuz, the legendary ancestor of the Turks.¹ Abu'l-Ghazi stated that the word Awshar (from which Afshar is derived) meant "one who promptly finishes an affair."²

The Afshars are believed to have been driven westwards from Central Asia by reason of the advance of the Mongols in the XIIIth century A.D., and to have settled first in Adharbaijan; they afterwards became widely disseminated in Persia.³ Shah Isma'il I recruited his formidable army mainly from the Afshars and from six other Turkish (or Turco-Mongol) tribes, namely, the Shamlu, Rumlu, Ustajlu, Takallu, Dhu'l-Qadar and Qajar. One of the commanders of Shah Tahmasp I was Khalil Beg Afshar, who was chief of 10,000 families of his tribe and was Governor of the province of Kuhgilu.

Mirza Mahdi stated⁴ that the Qiriqlu or Qirikhlu ("Forty Peoples") branch of the tribe, to which Nadir belonged, had migrated to Khurasan in the time of Shah Isma'il I (1502-1524 A.D.), and that they had made their *yailaq* or summer camping ground by some springs known as Mayab Kubkan, just south of the Allahu Akbar range. Sayyid Ahmad Aqa Tabrizi says, however, that Shah 'Abbas I moved the Qiriqlu Afshars and the Chamishgazak Kurds to that district, in order to oust the Özbeks

¹ *Jami' u'l-Tawarikh*: see the *Sbornik Letopisei*, edited by N. Beresin (St. Petersburg, 1861), Vol. VII, p. 7. While the first statement may be regarded as accurate, the second is, of course, of no historical value. As to the alleged Mongol origin of the Afshars, see B. Nikitine's *Les Afshars d'Urumiyeh*, in the *Journal Asiatique*, January-March, 1929.

² *Shajarat-i Turk* (Turkish text), edited by Desmaisons (St. Petersburg, 1874), Vol. II, p. 28.

³ See the interesting articles on the Afshars by Sayyid Ahmad Aqa Tabrizi, in the Tehran periodical *Ayanda*, No. IV, 1304 (1926), No. IX, 1305 (1927), and Part II, No. VIII, 1306 (1928). Dr. M. Afshar, of Tehran, was kind enough to send me the above-mentioned copies of the *Ayanda*.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 17.

therefrom.¹ However that may be, it seems that there were Afshars in Khurasan from, at any rate, the beginning of the XVI century A.D., for Khwandamir² speaks of a certain Shahrukh Beg Afshar Yajujī being sent from Herat in 920 A.H. (1514-1515 A.D.) to the province of Qandahar, in order to subdue a rebel named Shuja' Beg there. There seems to be no means of ascertaining whether there was any connection between the Yajujī³ and the Qiriqlu Afshars.

As the village of Kubkan⁴ was situated in the *yailaq* or summer grazing ground of the tribe, and was therefore very cold in winter, the Qiriqlu Afshars were in the habit, every autumn, of crossing the Allahu Akbar range to the north and going down to the lower-lying and, therefore, warmer *qishlaq* or winter grazing ground in the district of Darragaz.⁵ In November, 1688, the habitual migration from Kubkan to the *qishlaq* took place. Among the migrating tribespeople were a poor peasant named Imam Quli Beg and his wife; when they had crossed the mountains and had reached the village of Dastgird (or Dastajird),⁶ in Darragaz, the wife gave birth to a son, the future Nadir Shah. This son was named Nadr Quli Beg, after Imam Quli Beg's father.⁷ Mirza Mahdi gives the date of Nadir's birth as the 28th Muharram 1100 A.H.⁸ (22nd November, 1688). 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri, the author of the *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, states that some (unspecified) persons gave the year of Nadir's birth as 1099, while others gave it as 1102 A.H.⁹ Mirza Mahdi's date, though

¹ Sayyid Ahmad Aqa Tabrizi, in the *Ayanda*, Part II, No. VIII, p. 601.

² *Habibu's-Siyar*, Vol. III, Part IV, p. 75.

³ It is possible that the epithet "Yajujī" (i.e., "of Gog") may have been applicable only to Shahrukh Beg himself.

⁴ The village of Kubkan, which is still in existence, is 80 miles N.W. of Mashhad and 50 miles E.N.E. of Khabushan. Sir Percy Sykes, who has visited the place, described it in his *Seventh Journey in Persia* (*Geographical Journal*, May, 1915, p. 364) as being "a picturesque village situated on the slope of a deserted fort which had had a covered way to the river."

⁵ The Turki terms for these tribal movements from summer to winter grazing grounds and vice versa are *qishlamishi* and *yailamishi* respectively.


⁶ Dastgird is 16 miles N.E. of Kubkan and 3 miles S.E. of Muhammadabad.

⁷ The MSS. of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, *Zubdatu't-Tawarikh*, *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, etc., which I have consulted, all give the name as Nadr Quli (Shaikh Hazin gives the form Nadhr Quli, but this seems to be an error). There therefore seems to be no doubt that this was Nadir's original name, but he used, at times, to call himself Nadir (with a long "a") 'Ali, e.g., in his *waqf-nama* or deed of bequest relating to his tomb at Mashhad and in the inscription on the gilt portico of the shrine of the Imam Riḍa in that city (see the *Maḥḥa'u'ch-Shams*, Vol. II, p. 20). In the *waqf-nama* (of which Professor Naḥīf, of Tehran, has been kind enough to send me a copy) Nadir's name and titles are given as follows:—Nadir 'Ali Khan Vali-yi-mamalik-i-Khurasan va farman-rava'i-yi-'arsa-yi-Iran, that is, Nadir 'Ali Khan, Governor of the regions of Khurasan and ruler (literally, "order-giver") of the land of Persia; the deed was drawn up on the 1st Muharram, 1145 (24th June, 1732). The "Golden Gate" was not constructed until after Nadir's coronation (on which occasion, it is to be noted, he took the title of Nadir Shah). For the sake of simplicity, I have used the form "Nadir" throughout the book; it would otherwise have been necessary to employ, at different times, a number of names and titles, such as Nadr Quli, Nadir 'Ali, Tahmasp Quli Khan, Vali Ni'mat, etc., which would be most confusing.

⁸ T.N., p. 17.

⁹ *Bayan*, fol. 101 (b).

NORTHERN KHURASAN.



it may not be absolutely correct, is doubtless less inexact than the others mentioned, but his statement that Nadir was born "in the castle of Dastgird" is certainly a fabrication designed to flatter and exalt his patron and sovereign. In all probability, Nadir was born in a tent; he afterwards erected a *maulud-khana* or "birthplace-house" on the site, which was situated just outside Dastgird.

Little is known of Imam Quli Beg, beyond the fact that he was poor and did not occupy any position of importance. He is variously described as having been a shepherd, skinner, agriculturalist or camel-driver.¹ The humble position of Nadir's parents is obvious from Mirza Mahdi's tactfully worded statements that a sharp sword owes its excellence to its temper rather than to the iron mine whence its raw material was taken, and that a royal jewel derives its beauty from its water and colour rather than from the ore (*şulb*) in which it was found.² Nadir himself, though he always took pride in his Turkish or Turkoman blood and thereby claimed affinity with the descendants of Timur, never sought to magnify the status of his parents and ancestors. He was wont to say that he was "the son of the sword."³

Persian and European sources alike contain but little information regarding Nadir's early years. It is to be presumed that he accompanied his parents on their annual movements between Kubkan and the district of Darragaz, and that, as soon as he grew old enough, he assisted his father to earn his scanty livelihood. Mirza Mahdi passes over this period in silence, merely saying that he "placed his foot upon the ladder of manhood,"⁴ when he reached the age of 15. Hanway relates⁵ that the Özbeks made a raid into Khurasan in 1704, killing many persons and carrying off a number of others as slaves. Amongst the latter were, he says, Nadir and his mother; while Nadir escaped in 1708, his mother died in captivity. This incident is not mentioned by any Persian authority, and its authenticity is extremely dubious.⁶ The statement by William Cockell⁷ that Nadir's father was not only chief of a clan of the Afshars, but was also in command of the fortress of Kalat is, like his story of Nadir's dispossession of his heritage by his uncle, devoid of fact. It can be re-

¹ See respectively, Bazin (*Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 279), Fasa'i's *Fars-Nama-yi-Naqiri*, p. 164, *Roudatu'ş-Şafa*, Vol. VIII, *Bayan*, fol. 101 (b).

² *T.N.*, p. 10.


³ Cf. Nadir's famous remark at Delhi when questioned as to the lineage of his son Nasrullah. (Mention will be made in due course as to the circumstances which gave rise to this remark.)

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 17.

⁵ Vol. IV, p. 4.

⁶ See Dr. Cook, *Voyages and Travels*, Vol. II, p. 447.

⁷ See James Fraser's *Nadir Shah*, p. 72. As will be explained in the bibliographical appendix at the end of this book, Fraser included in his work an "Account of Nadir Shah's first exploits" by Cockell (whom he did not, however, mention by name).



THE VILLAGE OF KUDKAN

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garded as certain that, had any of his relatives occupied a position of importance, the fact would have been stressed by Mirza Mahdi.

When Nadir was still a youth, he took the step that was destined to lead him to higher things. Being unwilling to follow permanently the humble vocation of his father, he entered the service of Baba 'Ali Beg Kusa Ahmadlu who was chief of the Afshars of the town of Abivard and was Dabit or Governor of that place. By dint of his ability and bravery, he speedily attracted the favourable notice of his master, and rose in time to be not only the commander of his guards, but also his son-in-law.¹ The Indian authority, 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri, states, possibly correctly, that Baba 'Ali Beg, after the death of Imam Quli Beg, married his widow, who was Nadir's step-mother. Being struck with the intelligence of the youthful Nadir, Baba 'Ali Beg gave him one of his daughters in marriage, thus providing him with his real start in life.²

On the 25th Jumadi I, 1131 (15th April, 1719), Riḍa Quli, Nadir's eldest son, was born. A few years later his wife died; soon afterwards, he married another of Baba 'Ali Beg's daughters, Gauhar Shad³ by name, who bore him two sons, Nasrullah and Imam Quli. According to Muḥammad Kazim of Merv,⁴ Nadir called his second son Murtaḍa Quli, but he changed this name to Nasrullah (meaning the "victory of Allah") after he had gained the battle of Karnal in 1739. The employment of characteristically Shi'a names like Riḍa Quli, Imam Quli (for Nadir's father and his third son) and Murtaḍa Quli suggests that his family was Shi'a and that he himself belonged to that sect when he was young; it has always been asserted hitherto that Nadir was born and brought up a Sunni, but there does not appear to be any definite proof that this was so.

The history of the next few years is obscure, and many improbable stories are recorded. It appears that Baba 'Ali Beg died in 1723, and that he left his property to Nadir; Sir John Malcolm's statement⁵ that Nadir murdered his father-in-law seems most improbable. For one thing, such an act would have led to a family feud. It is a well-established fact that Baba 'Ali Beg's three sons all entered Nadir's service, in which they attained eminent positions; had there been a feud, this could hardly have happened.

Owing to tribal opposition, Nadir was unable to succeed to his late father-in-law's position as chief of the Afshars of Abivard. After

¹ *Rauḍat-e-Safa*, Vol. VIII.

² *Dayan*, fol. 5 (a). 'Abdu'l-Karim, as will be explained in the bibliographical appendix, had exceptional opportunities of obtaining from Nadir's old companions in arms particulars of their leader's earlier career.

³ Mirza Mahdi mentions towards the end of the T.N. (p. 246) that Gauhar Shad was the mother of Nasrullah and Imam Quli.

⁴ *Kilab-i-Nadiri*, p. 430.

⁵ *The History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 47.

occupying himself for a time with the management of his properties, he went to Mashhad and entered the service of Malik Mahmud. Mirza Mahdi gives a most highly coloured and improbable account of Nadir's actions at this time, stating that, after he had become aware of the extent of the troubles with which the peoples of Persia were afflicted, he received a divine inspiration that he was to act as their deliverer.¹ Choosing Kalat, which "was a strong castle and a fortress created by God," as his headquarters, he collected the Afshars, Kurds and other tribes of the neighbourhood with the object of freeing Persia from her foes. Soon afterwards, however, the Afshars and Kurds, owing to "the whisperings of Satan,"² deserted him, some joining Malik Mahmud and others remaining aloof. Nevertheless, three to four hundred families of the Jalayir tribe, under Tahmasp Khan Wakil,³ joined Nadir and remained faithful to him. He then went to Mashhad and entered into relations with Malik Mahmud with a view to deceiving him and then bringing about his overthrow. It seems much more probable that Nadir, instead of being inspired by patriotic motives at this early stage, really wished to seek advancement in another sphere, as his further progress in the Abivard district was rendered impossible by local jealousy and opposition.

Nadir found two Afshar chiefs at Mashhad who, at first, were hostile to him. He won them over and, it is said, plotted with them to expel Malik Mahmud.⁴ It was agreed that the Afshar and Jalayir tribesmen who were friendly to Nadir should be in readiness for action "on the day of the Jarid,"⁵ when he would, while competing in the sport with Malik Mahmud, seize the bridle of the latter's horse. This action was to be the signal for the Afshars and Jalayir to rush up and kill Malik Mahmud and his followers. The plan miscarried, however, because Nadir, at the critical moment, failed to grasp the bridle of Malik Mahmud's horse. Malik Mahmud appeared to suspect nothing, and he, in company with Nadir and the others, returned to Mashhad. Nadir, having reason to suspect that the two Afshar chiefs were not being faithful to him, murdered them both when on a hunting expedition. Fearing retribution from Malik Mahmud, he then fled to Abivard, where he endeavoured to raise a force with which to oppose him.⁶

¹ T.N., p. 18.

² This is an allusion to Sura CXIV of the *Qur'an*.

³ He is often called Tahmasp Khan Jalayir.

⁴ T.N., p. 20.

⁵ For a description of the game of the jarid, see M. von Oppenheim's *Das Djerid und das Djerid-Spiel in Islamica*, 1927, pp. 390-617; the reference to the "Ginocchi di Canne" in Sir Thomas Herbert's *Travels in Persia* (London, 1928, p. 50) is likewise of interest. See also Sir H. Pottinger's description of the game as played in Baluchistan (*Travels in Beloochistan and Sindh*, London, 1816, p. 190).

⁶ T.N., p. 20. (I have not followed Mirza Mahdi's account very closely, as much of what he says seems to be most improbable).

Some horsemen, amongst them a certain Naṣir Aqa, responded to Nadir's appeal, and formed a band under his leadership which proceeded to pillage and raid in Khurasan.¹ The only determined opposition that this band met with in those anarchical times was from Malik Maḥmud and his partisans.

Malik Maḥmud, having summoned in vain the Chamishgazak Kurds of Khabushan to co-operate with him against Nadir, attacked them. Nadir marched to their assistance and forced Malik Maḥmud to retire; having no artillery, Nadir and his allies were unable to follow up this success by pursuing the enemy and laying siege to Mashhad. He then adopted the less onerous task of reducing several hostile tribal fastnesses in the Darragaz district and in the neighbourhood of Abivard.

It was at this juncture that Tahmasp, although quite unable to oust the Ghalzai usurper Maḥmud from Isfahan, sent his general Riḍa Quli Khan² to attack Malik Maḥmud. According to Mirza Maḥdi, Riḍa Quli Khan, having heard of Nadir's prowess as a military leader, wished to co-operate with him, but was dissuaded from doing so by some of the Kurds of Khabushan, who alleged that if he did so, and the operations were successful, Nadir would reap all the advantage and then discredit him.³ Riḍa Quli Khan then twice attacked Malik Maḥmud, but was unsuccessful on each occasion.⁴ In consequence of his failure, he was replaced by another Ṣafavi general, Muḥammad Khan Turkoman.

Encouraged by his defeat of Riḍa Quli Khan, Malik Maḥmud determined to add Nishapur to his domains; after an unsuccessful attempt by his nephew, he seized the place, despite efforts by Nadir and his brother Ibrahim to prevent him.⁵ Subsequently, Malik Maḥmud severely defeated Nadir, who is said to have reached Kalat accompanied by only two men.⁶

Muḥammad Khan Turkoman, Riḍa Quli Khan's successor, reached Khurasan at this stage, and, acting in conjunction with Nadir, defeated Malik Maḥmud outside Mashhad. Nadir was unable to follow up this victory, because of a Turkoman rising at Baghdad, to the north-east of Abivard. Having punished the Turkomans of Baghdad, he went to Merv, and later to Sarakhs, where he defeated Malik Maḥmud's adherents.

Nadir was next engaged in hostilities with a kinsman of his named 'Ashur Beg Babalu, who was allied with some of the Chamishgazak Kurds.

¹ Mirza Maḥdi naturally makes no mention of these activities of Nadir's, but from what 'Abdu'l-Karim, Bazin and other authorities have stated, there seems to be no doubt that he was for a time leader of a band of robbers. See also Hanway, Vol. I, p. 171 (Hanway met Naṣir Aqa at Astarabad on several occasions in December, 1743 and January, 1744).

² See note 5 on page 15 above. Riḍa Quli Khan Shamlu had been *Eshik-aghaz* or "master of the threshold" at the court of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain (see Muḥammad Muḥsin, fol. 209 (a)); he was a maternal uncle of Lutf 'Ali Beg, the author of the *Atash-Kada*.

³ T.N., p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Whilst he was besieging 'Ashur Beg in his fortress of Qurghan, he received an addition to his forces of 500 Özbek youths, whom Shir Ghazi of Khiva had sent to his assistance.¹ Much about the same time, that is, early in 1726, Tahmasp, having heard reports of Nadir's prowess, sent Hasan 'Ali Beg, the Mu'ayyiru'l-Mamalik (literally, the "assayer of the kingdoms"), to report upon him. Hasan 'Ali Beg was evidently favourably impressed with Nadir, for he (acting on Tahmasp's behalf) appointed him Deputy Governor of Abivard.² According to Mirza Mahdi, Nadir, when Hasan 'Ali Beg left him to return to Tahmasp, urged him to induce the prince to come to Khurasan with his army.³

After an expedition to Merv, where trouble had broken out between the local Qajars and the Turkomans, Nadir once more set out against Malik Mahmud. However, when he was nearing Mashhad, Hasan 'Ali Beg returned from Astarabad with a message from Tahmasp that he was on his way from that place and that he desired to see Nadir.⁴ Nadir accordingly abandoned his march on Mashhad and turned westwards towards Khabushan.

In the meantime Malik Mahmud, having heard that Tahmasp had left Astarabad for Khurasan, thought that he would take advantage of Nadir's absence at Merv to set out and annihilate the prince's forces before Nadir could return. Malik Mahmud, however, hurriedly returned to his capital on learning that Nadir was advancing on it from Merv.⁵

A day or two after Tahmasp and Fath 'Ali Khan had reached Khabushan, Nadir marched into that town at the head of a force of 2,000 Kurds and Afshars.⁶

¹ *T.N.*, p. 33. Shir Ghazi had formerly been hostile to Nadir, but he decided to join forces with him through fear of Malik Mahmud.

² *Z.T.*, fol. 212 (a).

³ *T.N.*, p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ *Z.T.*, fol. 212 (a).

⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 212 (b).

CHAPTER III

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN NADIR AND TAHMASP: THE CAPTURE OF MASHHAD AND MINOR CAMPAIGNS, 1726-1729

Nadir's adhesion to the cause of the prince was a matter of some consequence to the latter, but to Nadir himself it was of even greater moment, for it gave him the opportunity of achieving something more than merely local fame. It is the purpose of the present chapter to describe how he took advantage of the opening thus provided, and how, by ousting his rivals, by overcoming all opposition, and by adding to his military renown, he was able not only to secure, but also to consolidate, his position as Tahmasp's principal commander and adviser. The task was no easy one, because, in the first place, he had a most formidable rival in the person of Fath 'Ali Khan Qajar, whose aims were as ambitious as his own. Secondly, as Nadir was soon to discover, little or no reliance could be placed upon Tahmasp, who was no more than a weathercock, veering first one way and then another; he was, just as his father had been, a puppet in the hands of his ministers. In the third place, any aspirant to high position under Tahmasp would inevitably incur the enmity of these ministers who, though normally jealous of one another, would always unite in order to prevent some strong personality like Fath 'Ali Khan or Nadir from gaining too much influence over their weak master; they feared, not without reason, that if such a person succeeded in making himself indispensable to Tahmasp, their period of influence would abruptly come to an end.¹

Nadir, it was plain, could never hope to make much headway until he could recruit and train some regular troops who would be faithful to him alone and who, unlike most of the tribal levies which then constituted his forces, would not be liable to withdraw from his service at a moment's notice at their own whim or caprice or at that of some chief.

After a few days' halt at Khabushan, Tahmasp, in company with his two powerful supporters, left for Mashhad on the 22nd Muharram, 1139 (19th September, 1726)²; ten days later, they camped by the shrine of Khwaja Rabi',³ three miles north of Mashhad. On the march, acute

¹ It is clear that the abuse which Mirza Mahdi and Muhammad Muhsin heaped upon these ministers was not due to mere prejudice, as Shaikh Harin (who was distinctly pro-Safavi) had not a good word to say for them.

² *J.N.*, p. 36.

³ There is a description of this shrine in Colonel C. E. Yate's *Khorasan and Sistan*, pp. 338-340.

rivalry had developed between Nadir and Fath 'Ali Khan, but the former succeeded in persuading Tahmasp to give him instead of his rival command of the troops who were to deliver the attack upon the city.

Just as Mahmud had failed to take Isfahan by assault in 1722, so Nadir failed to force his way into Mashhad on this occasion. The reasons were the same, namely, strong defences, manned by a fairly large garrison, on the one side, and a relatively small attacking force, unprovided with artillery, on the other. Under the circumstances, Nadir had no alternative but to give up his assaults and besiege the city.

During the siege, the tension between Nadir and Fath 'Ali Khan developed into a life and death struggle for supremacy, the issue of which depended upon Tahmasp's attitude; whichever could make his influence prevail over the prince would be the victor. It appears that Tahmasp had been annoyed at Fath 'Ali Khan's behaviour, and that he was, therefore, more favourably inclined towards his rival. Nadir took advantage of the situation to persuade the prince that Fath 'Ali Khan was plotting to hand him over to Malik Mahmud, with the result that Tahmasp had Fath 'Ali Khan put to death on the 14th Šafar (11th October). Extremely conflicting accounts of this affair are given by Nadir's apologists (Mirza Mahdi and Muḥammad Muḥsin) on the one hand and by the Qajar historians on the other. While 'Abdu'r-Razzaq maintained that Nadir had traduced Fath 'Ali Khan and so caused him to suffer a martyr's death,¹ Mirza Mahdi alleged that Fath 'Ali Khan had been intriguing against Tahmasp even before Nadir's appearance on the scene. Tahmasp, he went on to say, wished to put the Qajar chief to death, but Nadir said that imprisonment would suffice; Tahmasp agreed, but nevertheless had the death sentence carried out without Nadir's knowledge.² Mirza Mahdi's version does not read at all convincingly, and there can be no doubt that Nadir's conduct was most blameworthy³; all that can be said in extenuation is that, had Fath 'Ali Khan's influence with Tahmasp been stronger than Nadir's, the last-named would almost certainly have suffered banishment, if not death.


His rival being removed from his path, Nadir had no difficulty in persuading the supine Tahmasp to allow him to take over the control of affairs; he then made or rather caused to be made a number of appointments.⁴ He himself became Qurchi-Bashi ("Master of the Ordnance"), and received the title of Tahmasp Quli ("Slave of Tahmasp") Khan, while Kalb 'Ali Beg, one of his brothers-in-law, was appointed Eshik-Aghasi.

¹ *The Dynasty of the Kajars*, p. 5.

² *T.N.*, p. 37.

³ Hanway was of opinion that Fath 'Ali Khan was innocent of the charge, and that Nadir instigated his murder; see his *Travels*, Vol. IV, p. 17.

⁴ For particulars of these appointments, see the *Z.T.*, fol. 212 (b).



VIEW OF THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE SHAH-N-KUBNA OF THE SHRINE OF THE IMAM RIDA AT MASHAHAD, SHOWING NADIR'S MISBART
AND GOLDEN GATE ON THE RIGHT

Photograph by Professor Pope. Reproduced by courtesy of the American Institute of Iranian Art and Archaeology

Nadir now gave his whole attention to the siege of Mashhad, but he was no more successful than before. Malik Mahmud, emboldened by the dissensions which broke out in Tahmasp's camp after Fath 'Ali Khan had been put to death, made a sortie.¹ A severe engagement was fought near Khwaja Rabi', which resulted in the defeat of Malik Mahmud and his retreat to the city.

Although Malik Mahmud did not venture outside his defences again, Nadir made no further attempt to take the city by assault, and it was only through the treachery of Pir Muhammad, Malik Mahmud's commander-in-chief, that he was able to enter it on the night of the 16th Rabi' II (10th-11th December, 1726).² Malik Mahmud, after vainly endeavouring to drive Nadir's troops out of Mashhad, surrendered; laying aside the Kayani crown which he had donned some three years before, he retired to a cell in the shrine of the Imam Rida.

In fulfilment of a vow which he had made before the capture of Mashhad, Nadir gave orders for the shrine to be repaired, the dome to be re-gilt and a second minaret to be erected.³ There is no means of ascertaining what were Nadir's actual motives in taking this action. He may still have been a Shi'a (if we assume that the hypothesis put forward on page 21 above is correct); it is, perhaps, more probable that he may merely have wished to curry favour with the *mujahids* and *mullas*, who were still very influential.

Nadir had not been long in Mashhad before he realised that his newly-won position was by no means assured. He had, it is true, won Tahmasp's favour, but he had, on the other hand, incurred the enmity of his ministers, who took every opportunity to poison the prince's mind against him. Tahmasp, in the words of Muhammad Muhsin, "by reason of his youth, and his reliance upon them, believed their baseless statements."⁴ Furthermore, Nadir's hold over many of the wild tribesmen of Abivard, Darragaz, Kalat and Khabushan was most precarious; he could only count with certainty upon some of the Afshars and upon the Jalayirs under Tahmasp Khan Wakil.

When Tahmasp went to Khabushan and left Nadir in Mashhad, the ministers redoubled their efforts to vilify Nadir, and at the same time intrigued with the Kurds of Khabushan. The prince was induced to sign orders to his Governors in Mazandaran, Astarabad and the Giraili districts to come to his assistance against the traitor Nadir. It is even

¹ T.N., p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38 and Z.T., fol. 212 (b).

³ This minaret stands on the southern side of the Sahn-i-Kuhna; the other minaret, which is on the northern side of the Sahn, was built by Shah Tahmasp I. M. Streck, in his article on Mashhad in the *E.I.* (Vol. III, p. 471) states that Nadir's minaret was erected in 1730; this was doubtless the date when it was completed.

⁴ Z.T., fol. 212 (b).

alleged that Tahmasp sought to win over Malik Mahmud to his side.¹

On learning of this dangerous development, Nadir left in haste for Khabushan, to which, on arrival, he laid vigorous siege. After defeating the Chamishgazak and Qarachorlu Kurds, who had sided with Tahmasp and his ministers, Nadir came to terms with the prince, who agreed to follow him to Mashhad. Nadir then proceeded to that city where he received Tahmasp with much ceremony on the *Nau Ruz* or New Year's Day, 1139 (21st March, 1727): the festivities and rejoicings lasted for a week.²

Scarcely had these celebrations come to an end when fresh risings of the Kurds took place. The forces of the insurgents were augmented by the Tatars of Merv and the Yamrili Turkomans. Sweeping across Darragaz, the rebel forces surrounded Nadir's brother, Ibrahim Khan.³

Nadir, in company with Tahmasp, relieved Ibrahim Khan, afterwards besieging and taking Khabushan. He thereupon crushed the rebels in Darragaz, but had to return to Khabushan to quell a fresh disturbance there. He then went back to Mashhad, but immediately his back was turned further trouble broke out at Khabushan, fomented, it is alleged, by Tahmasp. On this occasion, the Chamishgazak and Qarachorlu were joined by the Shadillu Kurds. Nadir, however, speedily broke up the confederacy, and proceeded to Nishapur, whither Tahmasp had gone. Meanwhile, the Tatars of Merv revolted again, at the instigation of Malik Mahmud. Nadir, having arranged for the quelling of this revolt, had Malik Mahmud and his nephew Malik Ishaq put to death.

Disturbances had also broken out in Qa'in where a Sistani chief named Husain Sultan, an ally of Malik Mahmud, had expelled the governor whom Nadir had appointed.⁴ On the 17th Dhu'l-Hijja, 1139 (5th August, 1727), Nadir and Tahmasp left Mashhad for Qa'in with 800 men, and soon forced Husain Sultan to submit; a son and nephew of Malik Mahmud, who had been with him, fled to Isfahan, where they joined Ashraf.

From Qa'in Nadir marched via Isfidin, in the Zirkuh district, and Madhinabad against the Afghans of Bihdadin.⁵ It was a trying march in the height of summer, and water was very scarce; furthermore, the cannon kept sinking into the sand near Madhinabad. Nadir took Bihdadin by assault, and then besieged Sangun⁶ which had also refused to submit.

¹ *T.N.*, p. 40. Mirza Mahdi states that Malik Mahmud informed Nadir of this action of Tahmasp. It is unfortunate that no unbiased account of these happenings is extant.

² *Z.T.*, fol. 213 (b).

³ Muhammad Kazim of Merv gives his full name as Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, but he was usually known as Ibrahim Khan.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 46. The text of the Bombay edition is very corrupt here.

⁵ This place is now known as Behdavin.

⁶ This place is now known as Sangun-i-Pa'in.

Here he narrowly escaped death when one of his cannon burst.¹ On the 1st October, he took Sangan by assault and put all the inhabitants to the sword because they had feigned submission some days before and had then reopened hostilities. News was then received that 7,000 to 8,000 Abdali Afghans from Herat had reached Niazabad, in order to assist the inhabitants of Sangan. Nadir at once marched off to meet these Afghans, whom he encountered near Sangan. Knowing that his troops were inexperienced and that the many defeats which the Afghans had inflicted upon the Persians had caused the latter greatly to fear them, he did not risk an open battle. Instead, he placed the bulk of his men in trenches while he, at the head of 500 trained cavalry, made a series of attacks upon the Afghans. Although the troops in the trenches wished to take part in the fighting, Nadir refused them permission. After four days of fighting and skirmishing, the Afghans "exchanged fight for flight,"² and retired towards Herat. Nadir, still feeling the need of caution because of the inexperience of his troops, refrained from pursuit, and returned to Mashhad. The time had not yet come for a real trial of strength with the formidable Abdalis.

Relations between Tahmasp and Nadir continued to be strained, the former's ministers seeking every opportunity to discredit the successful newcomer. Tahmasp is said to have urged Nadir repeatedly to march direct on Isfahan, but he always replied that it would be most imprudent to do so until the Abdalis of Herat, who were so near at hand, were subdued.³

It was at length agreed that Nadir and Tahmasp, starting respectively from Mashhad and Nishapur, should meet at Sultanabad (Turshiz), and march on Herat with their combined forces. Tahmasp, however, having been persuaded by his advisers not to co-operate, informed Nadir that he would go to Mazandaran, and requested him to lead the troops against the Abdalis. Nadir agreed, and duly set out; however, on discovering that his enemies among the ministers and nobles were sowing disaffection in the army, he abandoned his advance on Herat and returned to Mashhad.⁴ Shortly afterwards, an Abdali raid on the Biarjuman district (E.S.E. of Shahrud) caused him to hasten from Mashhad, in the hope of intercepting the Afghans. On reaching Qadamgah he heard that Tahmasp was attacking the Bughairi Turks, who were friendly to him. Nadir appealed to Tahmasp to desist and to co-operate with him against the

¹ T.N., p. 47.

² Ibid., p. 48. There is a play upon words in the Persian text which I have attempted to reproduce; the original reads: *harb-ra bi-harb badal sakhta*.

³ Ibid., p. 49.

⁴ Z.T., fol. 213 (b).

Afghans; Tahmasp replied by summoning him to Sabzavar. Realising that a serious crisis was developing, Nadir gave up his project of intercepting the raiders, and set out for Sabzavar. While *en route* for that place, he discovered that Tahmasp had sent messages to all parts of Khurasan stating that his (i.e., Nadir's) orders and those of his subordinates were to be disregarded.¹ On reaching Sabzavar, he found the gates shut in his face; after waiting in vain for the gates to be opened, he began to bombard the town, which soon surrendered. Tahmasp, having no alternative, then joined Nadir and swore to be friendly to him. That same night a number of Tahmasp's guards and retinue left for Mazandaran, with the object of fomenting trouble in that province. Two days later, Nadir sent the prince to Mashhad under virtual arrest. After vainly trying to cut off the Afghan raiders, he returned to Mashhad himself.

Almost immediately afterwards, Nadir was informed that the Turkomans inhabiting the plain between Durun and Astarabad were raiding the country round the former place. Calling upon the Chamishgazak and Qarachorlu Kurds to accompany him, he set out on a punitive expedition. The Kurds, however, refused to obey, and attacked and defeated Ibrahim Khan. In the meanwhile, Nadir had reached the mountain known as the Balkhan Dagh,² near which he met with and defeated the Turkomans. On his return march, Nadir learnt of the Kurds' defeat of his brother, so he advanced into their country and killed a large number of them.

Whilst these operations were in progress, one of Tahmasp's followers, Muhammad 'Ali Khan ibn Aşlan by name, had proceeded successively to Bisṭām and the provinces of Astarabad and Mazandaran, where he placed nominees of Tahmasp in positions of authority. Serious disturbances then broke out in the two provinces. Nadir immediately set out for Astarabad, but turned northwards at Kafshgari, crossed the Atrak, and crushed some rebellious Yamut Turkomans. He then went to Astarabad, where Tahmasp joined him. Nadir marched into Mazandaran with Tahmasp, and soon reduced the province to order; in the course of these operations Dhu'l-Fiqr, the leader of the party hostile to him, was killed. After taking measures to guard the passes leading from Mazandaran to the Tehran and Khar districts, which were in the hands of the Ghalzai Afghans, Nadir sent an envoy, in Tahmasp's name, to the court of Russia, to demand the restitution of Gilan.³

¹ Z.T., fol. 213 (b).

² This name is incorrectly given as Pul-i-Khas Daghi in the Bombay edition of the T.N., p. 53; Jones omits the name altogether.

³ T.N., p. 55. Butkov (Vol. I, p. 100) states that Tahmasp wrote to General Levashev, in December, 1728, that he would shortly be entering Gilan in company with Avramov (the Russian Consul at Resht). Regarding Tahmasp's envoys to Russia and Constantinople in 1727/8, see Stanyan's despatches from Constantinople: these are in the Public Record Office, S.P., 97, Vol. XXV.

Leaving Tahmasp at Sari, Nadir returned to Mashhad in February or early March, 1729¹; after Nau Ruz he began to prepare for his campaign against the Abdalis.

Nadir's determination to crush the Abdalis and to win back Herat before attempting to recover Isfahan from the Ghalzais is proof of his sound understanding of the situation. Though the Abdalis, owing to internal dissensions, had not made any attack on Khurasan on a big scale for several years, they were always a potential danger. In view of their position and their well-known fighting qualities, Nadir feared that, if he and Tahmasp and their forces were to absent themselves from Khurasan for any length of time, the Abdalis would compose their differences, and make a bold bid to take Mashhad, thus striking at the basis of Tahmasp's power. It could be regarded as practically certain that the majority of the fickle and unstable Kurds and other tribesmen of north-east Khurasan would, in that event, forget their vows, and ally themselves with the invaders or, at any rate, take advantage of their advent to throw off their allegiance.

During the previous ten years the Abdalis had experienced many vicissitudes. As already stated, they had successfully thrown off the Persian yoke and had defeated the punitive expeditions which the Shah had sent against them; they had, moreover, held their own against the Ghalzais.² Their internal affairs were, however, extremely troubled. In 1718 'Abdullah Khan Sadozai was murdered by a rival belonging to the same clan called Muhammad Zaman Khan, but the latter was soon afterwards dispossessed by another chief, Muhammad Khan Afghan by name. The new leader besieged Mashhad for four months during the winter of 1722-23, but failed to take it. On returning empty-handed to Herat, the unsuccessful chief was deposed in favour of Dhu'l-Fiqar, the elder son of Muhammad Zaman Khan (whose younger son Ahmad afterwards became famous as Ahmad Shah Durrani). In 1137 A.H. (1725-26) Rahman, a son of the murdered 'Abdullah Khan Sadozai, sought to avenge his father by attacking Dhu'l-Fiqar. This civil war was only terminated when the Abdalis sent Dhu'l-Fiqar to Bakharz and exiled Rahman to Qandahar. Allah Yar Khan, a brother of Muhammad Khan Afghan, was then elected chief, but his authority was soon challenged by Dhu'l-Fiqar.³

On the Abdalis hearing of Nadir's impending attack on them, the rival factions patched up their differences and combined forces, Allah Yar Khan becoming Governor of Herat and Dhu'l-Fiqar that of Farah.

¹ Z.T., fol. 214 (a).

² See pages 3 and 4 above.

³ For details of these events, see Sayyid Muhammad al-Musawi's *Kutab-i-tahqiq va ta'dad-i-Aqnam-i-Afghan* . . . (B.M. MS. OR. 1861) fols. 3 (a) to 6 (b).

Nadir, having finished his preparations, left Mashhad in company with Tahmasp on the 4th Shawwal, 1141 (3rd May, 1729),¹ and marched southwards, via Jam, Farmandabad² and Kariz.³ At the same time, the Abdalis, under Allah Yar Khan, advanced north-westwards from Herat.

Battle was joined between the Persian forces and the Abdalis at Kafir Qal'a,⁴ where the Abdalis under Muhammad Zaman Khan had signally defeated the Safavi general Safi Quli Khan, ten years before.

Nadir pursued the same cautious policy as before; restraining the ardour of his troops, he surrounded his infantry with his artillery, and posted a body of cavalry on the flank. The Abdalis were the first to attack and a desperate struggle took place. The Persian infantry were thrown into confusion by an Abdali charge, but Nadir retrieved the fortunes of the day by a cavalry attack, and himself cut down one of the enemy leaders. He then received a lance-thrust in the right foot.⁵ Night fell soon after, and both sides withdrew to their respective lines.

On the following day the Abdalis retired to the Hari Rud, with Nadir's army in pursuit.

Another battle was fought at Kusuya where, after a severe struggle, the Abdalis suffered a heavy defeat, and fell back precipitately on Herat, leaving their artillery, tents and baggage behind.

Nadir and his troops advanced rapidly on Herat via Tirlpul. Allah Yar Khan, having reorganised his forces, marched from Herat to oppose the Persians. The two armies met near Ribat-i-Parian, a village a few miles west of Herat. The battle lasted from early morning until midday, when the Abdalis retired, leaving over one thousand dead on the field. A dust storm, lasting for 48 hours, effectively prevented any further fighting. On the third day, a messenger from Allah Yar Khan reached the Persian camp with proposals for peace, but Nadir refused to listen to such proposals unless Allah Yar Khan and his fellow-chiefs came in person to make them. Allah Yar Khan was about to comply, but he reopened hostilities on receiving word that his erstwhile rival Dhu'l-Fiqar was marching to his assistance.

Nadir detached a body of men to repel Dhu'l-Fiqar and encamped with the bulk of his forces at Shakiban. Dhu'l-Fiqar, having evaded the


¹ T.N., p. 56.

² Now known as Farmanabad.

³ Kariz is 81 miles W.N.W. of Herat. It was the birthplace of Hashim ibn Hakim, otherwise known as *al-Hakimu'l-Muqanna'*, the "Veiled Prophet of Khurasan" (who died in A.D. 780).

⁴ As this place has recently been re-named Islam Qal'a, the stigma of infidelity has been removed from it.

⁵ T.N., p. 57. According to 'Abdu'l-Karim 'Alavi's *Ta'rikh-i-Ahmad* (Lucknow, 1850), page 4, Nadir was wounded by an Abdali named Hajji Mishkin, who had sworn to kill him or to die in the attempt. See also Muhammad 'Abdu'r-Rahman's *Ta'rikh-i-Ahmad Shah Durrani*.



troops sent against him, hid in ambush near Shakiban; when Allah Yar Khan launched an attack on Nadir from the east, Dhu'l-Fiqar and his men fell upon the Persian camp and began to plunder it. Detaching sufficient men to drive off Dhu'l-Fiqar, Nadir managed, with the remainder, to withstand Allah Yar Khan's attack. On the following day, he fought another obstinate battle with Allah Yar Khan in which he eventually obtained the victory. Once more the Abdali leader sent a messenger with peace proposals, but Nadir returned the same answer as before. Some of the Abdali chiefs then came in person to Nadir, and submitted to him; after offering excuses for their conduct, they offered not only to obey, but also to assist the Persians against the Ghalzais. Although Tahmasp and his ministers were opposed to accepting the Abdalis' offer, Nadir decided to do so. On the following day a large number of Abdali chiefs came to the camp bearing presents, and were rewarded with robes of honour. Several of the more notable chiefs entered

Tahmasp's service, and Allah Yar Khan was officially appointed Governor of Herat.¹

Nadir and Tahmasp started on their homeward march soon after, and reached Mashhad on the 4th Dhu'l-Hijja (1st July), having been absent for two months.

Although this campaign did not completely shatter the power of the Abdalis and prevent them from revolting later,² it was of importance in that it demonstrated the fact that the Afghans were not invincible, and that the Persians, when properly trained and led, could defeat them. The Persian army, after many years of neglect and lack of training and discipline,³ was at last being welded into a fighting force again, and was learning to have confidence not only in its leader but in itself.

¹ *I.N.*, p. 60.

² See p. 51, below.

³ Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid, in his interesting article entitled *Persia and its Military Resources* (in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. XXIII, 7th March, 1879), referred as follows to the state of the army under the later Safavis: "Both . . . Abbas II and his son Suliman made some attempt to restore the strength and efficiency of the army, but little progress was made . . . the service continued to deteriorate, and was a very poor one indeed under the later Safavian monarchs. In those days a state of peace was especially destructive to the morale of a soldier. Neither drill, discipline, garrison nor outpost duty was a serious matter, if at all heeded; the Persian *sarbaz* lived in his own house and had, it might be, no more work to perform for the State than to obey a yearly or half-yearly summons to parade with full equipment, and show his weapons to an inspecting officer."

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPULSION OF THE GHALZAIS

ALL danger of attack from the Abdalis having been, for some time at least, removed, Nadir and his army could now turn their attention to the more formidable task of expelling the Ghalzais from Persia and placing Tahmasp upon the throne.

In the opening chapter, it was stated that Ashraf's arrogant bearing towards Turkey had involved him in war with that country¹; he was also, for a time, at war with Russia, but no really serious fighting took place between the Ghalzais and the Russians.² Although greatly outnumbered by the Turks, Ashraf acquitted himself well for some time, but he was eventually forced to acquiesce in the loss of much territory to them. This struggle showed that, although the fighting qualities of the Ghalzais remained unimpaired, they could not make head against a powerful state like Turkey, which had a numerous and well-equipped army. As has been already pointed out, Ashraf, owing to his feud with his cousin Husain, could get no reinforcements from Qandahar.³

An innocent victim of the Turco-Afghan war was the unfortunate ex-Shah Sultan Husain. Late in 1726, when Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, who was in command of the Turkish forces, was marching against Ashraf, he sent a message to the latter that the Afghans were barbarians who were unworthy of ruling over a civilised kingdom, and that he was coming to place Shah Sultan Husain on the throne of Persia again. Ashraf immediately sent orders to Isfahan for the ex-Shah to be beheaded and for his head to be brought to the camp. These orders were duly carried out, whereupon Ashraf sent the gory head to Ahmad Pasha.⁴

In May and June, 1729, rumours were current in Isfahan that Husain Sultan of Qandahar was about to march against Ashraf. These rumours were succeeded by reports that Tahmasp and Nadir, having been victorious over the Abdalis, had begun to advance on Isfahan. Ashraf, in alarm, sent reinforcements to the Afghan garrison in Qazvin, and then, on the 13th

¹ See p. 16 above.

² Muhammad Saidal Khan made an unsuccessful attempt to wrest Gilan from the Russians towards the close of 1728; peace between Ashraf and Russia was concluded on the 24th February, 1729.

³ See p. 16 above.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 13 and *Rasdatu's-Safa*, Vol. VIII. Muhammad Muhsin (Z.T., fol. 220 (a)) also records the death of the ex-Shah on this occasion, but he says nothing regarding the sending of his head to Ahmad Pasha.

August, himself marched to Tehran with a train of artillery and all the troops that he could muster.¹

On hearing of Ashraf's northward march, Nadir, who had just returned to Mashhad from Herat, hurriedly set out against the Afghans. Muhammad Muhsin states that, before the army left Mashhad, Tahmasp and Nadir entered into an agreement whereby the former undertook, in return for Nadir's services, to grant to him in fief the provinces of Khurasan, Kirman and Mazandaran, after Isfahan had been retaken and the Afghans driven out from Persia.² Mirza Mahdi does not mention this agreement, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the accuracy of Muhammad Muhsin's statement.

On the 18th Safar, 1142 (12th September, 1729), Nadir and Tahmasp left Mashhad and marched via Nishapur and Sabzavar to relieve Samnan, which Ashraf was besieging.³ Ashraf, for his part, after detaching some of his force to continue the siege of Samnan, advanced eastwards to meet Nadir.

The Afghan advance guard, under Muhammad Saidal Khan, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Nadir's artillery at Bisām. Saidal then fell back as far as Mihmandust, 11½ miles E.N.E. of Damghan, where Ashraf joined him with the main part of the army.⁴

Nadir continued to advance until he reached the small river of Mihmandust, just to the east of the village of that name. At this spot, on the morning of the 6th Rabi' I (29th September), the battle opened.⁵ Nadir had formed his men into one body, encircled by his musketeers and artillery, and had given strict orders that no one was to move or to fire until he gave the command. The Afghans, following their usual practice, were in three divisions. They impetuously charged the Persian centre and then attacked the flanks. Nadir waited until the Afghans came within musket shot before giving the order to fire. Though many Afghans fell, the rest pressed on, but found, to their surprise, that the Persians were able not only to withstand the shock of their attack, but to take the offensive. Much havoc was caused by the Persian artillery, which destroyed the Afghan *zamburaks* and inflicted heavy casualties.⁶ On

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 4th/15th July and 13th/24th October, 1729 (based on letters from Cockell and Geekie, from Isfahan).

² *Z.T.*, fol. 225 (a). It seems evident, from Tahmasp's promise of Mazandaran to Nadir, that he now regarded as a dead letter the treaty which he had concluded with Russia in September, 1723, under the terms of which he had undertaken, *inter alia*, to cede that province to that country; it is to be noted that this treaty was never ratified.

³ *T.N.*, p. 61, Hazin, p. 192.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶ Mirza Mahdi speaks of the "artillery-men of Frankish (European) race" (*topchian-i-irangi-nishad*), but, as it is most unlikely that Nadir could have had any foreign artillery-men at this early stage, he must have merely used the term to imply that the Persian artillery-men were skilful (European artillery-men being then generally reputed to be the most skilled).

Ashraf's standard-bearer being killed by a cannon shot, the Afghans broke and fled. The Persians, it is said, wished to pursue the enemy, but Nadir, feeling that they were as yet insufficiently experienced, held them back.¹

Neither Mirza Mahdi nor Muḥammad Muḥsin gives the numbers of the opposing forces or the extent of their losses. Otter gives the strength of the Afghans as 50,000,² which seems on the high side, while Hanway estimates the Persian strength at 25,000.³ Cockell puts the Afghan losses at 12,000 and those of the Persians at 4,000.⁴

Unstinted praise must be accorded to Nadir not only for his generalship and bravery during the battle, but also (and, indeed, more particularly) for his careful training of the troops beforehand and his strict enforcement of discipline. The effects of Nadir's training of his troops and of his leadership were, in fact, almost miraculous. Instead of flying almost at the mere sight of an Afghan, the Persians not only stood their ground without flinching, but proved more than a match for their redoubtable adversaries. Like Cromwell and other great commanders, Nadir, besides having supreme faith in himself, had the gift of inspiring in others implicit confidence in his leadership.

After some interval had elapsed, Nadir and Tahmasp advanced to Damghan, whence an envoy was sent to Constantinople to demand the return of the provinces which the Turks had conquered; the envoy, however, died at Tabriz.⁵ From Damghan the army continued on its westward march; *en route*, Nadir had, it is said, occasion to tell some unpleasing truths to Tahmasp, who, in a rage, refused for a time to proceed.⁶ In the meantime, Ashraf had fallen back towards Varamin and had sent for reinforcements from Tehran; he then prepared an elaborate ambush for the Persians in a narrow defile in the Khar valley. Nadir, having received warning of this ambush from his scouts, sent out strong bodies of musketeers to attack the enemy on both flanks, while he marched straight against them. These tactics were completely successful; once more he routed the Afghans, who fled to Isfahan leaving their cannon and baggage behind.⁷

Before advancing any further, Nadir persuaded Tahmasp to go to Tehran (which the Afghans had evacuated), in order, as Mirza Mahdi put it, "to settle important affairs of the kingdom there."⁸ In reality,

¹ *T.N.*, p. 62.

² *Voyage en Turquie et en Perse*, Vol. I, p. 307.

³ Vol. IV, p. 27.

⁴ Fraser's *Nadir Shah*, p. 96. Shaikh Hazin (p. 193) states that the only Persian casualties were two men who were slightly wounded.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 63. Stanyan, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, reported, in a despatch to London, dated the 24th November/5th December, 1729 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXV) that another Persian envoy, who must have been sent previously, had reached Constantinople at the end of October.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Nadir, of course, wished the prince to be out of the way, so that he might have an absolutely free hand.

When Ashraf reached Isfahan after his series of defeats, he put no less than 3,000 of the 'ulama and other prominent inhabitants to death, while his men plundered and set fire to the bazaars. Fearing lest the employees of the English and Dutch East India Companies should escape to Nadir, Ashraf had them stripped and thrown into prison, where they remained for 17 days; they then escaped with the connivance of their guards.¹

Ahmad Pasha, of Baghdad, in response to an appeal for help from Ashraf, sent him some troops and, it is said, some cannon.² Ashraf then marched N.N.W. to the village of Murchakhur, near which he encamped.

Nadir, after being relieved of the presence of Tahmasp, marched towards Isfahan via Natanz,³ and was only a few miles east of Murchakhur at the time of Ashraf's arrival there. He did not venture to attack the Afghans, but made a feint towards Isfahan in the hope of luring the enemy from their position. The ruse was successful, as Ashraf advanced to the attack. Ashraf, in imitation of Nadir's tactics at Mihmandust, had formed his troops into one body, and placed his artillery on the flanks. The Persians wheeled round to face the oncoming Afghans, and attacked, their musketeers being on the van. The Persians' attack was so successful that many of the Afghan cannon were seized; severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued in which the Persians were victorious, despite furious flank and rear attacks by the enemy. The Persians pressed home their advantage and captured the remainder of the Afghan artillery and many prisoners, amongst whom were a number of Turks. Nadir is said to have treated these Turks kindly and to have set them free.

Ashraf reached Isfahan in the evening, and immediately made preparations for flight. Every available animal was collected for the conveyance of the women, children and treasures, and a start was made for Shiraz three days later (13th November).⁴

On learning of the Afghans' evacuation of Isfahan, Nadir marched from

¹ See the letter from John Horne, the Agent at Gombroon, to London, dated the 31st December, 1729/11th January, 1730 (Vol. XV of *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*), and the *Gombroon Diary* of the 9th/20th December.

² Mirza Mahdi (p. 65) states that Ahmad Pasha sent "several Pashas and a fitting number of men," and Shaikh Hasin adds that he also dispatched a brigade of artillery-men. Longrigg, in his *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (p. 135, note 3) says: "The statement in Jihan Gusha and in Jones that a formidable army of Turks, under the Governor of Hamadan, were with the Afghans is impossible to accept." The truth probably is that only a small contingent of Turks was actually sent.

³ The Natanz route, though longer than the road via Qulrud, was practicable for artillery, whereas the other was not.

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 24th December/4th January (on the authority of letters from Cockell and Geekie from Isfahan dated the 4th/15th and 9th/20th December). Mirza Mahdi, however, states, in *T.N.* (page 67) and the *Durra-yi-Nadiri* (pp. 75 and 76), that Ashraf left Isfahan on the same night that he arrived from Murchakhur. As Cockell and Geekie were on the spot, their testimony is to be preferred.

Murchakhur and entered the city on the 16th November. One of his first acts was to send word to Tahmasp of his success and to urge him to come to Isfahan.

Tahmasp accordingly left Tehran, and entered Isfahan on the 8th Jumadi I (29th November), nearly seven and a half years after his escape from it during the siege. Hanway relates that Tahmasp's joy at re-entering Isfahan was changed into grief when he saw his father's palace "exhibiting only naked walls," and that, when he entered the harem, "an old woman threw her arms about his neck in great transports of joy; as he knew that Ashraf had carried away his sisters and other relations, he was the more surprised to find this person to be his mother. This lady had, ever since the invasion of the Afghans, disguised herself in the habit of a slave and submitted to all the offices of drudgery, which are ordinarily imposed on persons in that situation."¹

Isfahan was, indeed, only the shadow of its former self²; it had suffered terribly during the siege of 1722, and many of the inhabitants who had survived that ordeal perished in subsequent massacres. Shaikh Hazin, who arrived in Isfahan soon after its recapture, said:

"I . . . beheld that great city, notwithstanding the presence of the King, in utter ruin and desertion. Of all that population and of my friends scarcely anyone remained."³

On Tahmasp's arrival, Nadir informed him that he wished to leave Isfahan for Khurasan with his men as soon as the coronation ceremony had taken place. It seems clear that, in reality, he had no intention of doing anything of the kind. He well knew that, though the Shah both disliked and feared him, he would be unable to dispense with his services until not only the Ghalzais, but also the Turks and Russians were expelled from Persian soil. Tahmasp, as Nadir had undoubtedly foreseen, pressed him to remain, and did so again on the following day, in the presence of all the army leaders. After long discussions, Nadir made a pretence of changing his mind, and announced that he would stay.⁴

The recovery of Isfahan and the establishment of Tahmasp upon the throne of his fathers were events of great importance. Although a vast amount remained to be done before all the invaders could be driven from Persian territory, these events augured well for the future, besides

¹ *Travels*, Vol. IV, p. 55.

² See the translation in *La Mamyie-Chairac* (Vol. III, pages 91 and 92) of a Turkish official's report; this official had been sent to Isfahan after its recapture, in order to report on conditions there.

³ *Afshar*, p. 205.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 68.

being pleasing to the national pride ; they were of particular value in that they served to aid the Persians to regain confidence in themselves. However, it was not Tahmasp, but Nadir who gained in power and prestige as a result of these developments, and it was not long before he took advantage of this fact.

In another respect, the recapture of the capital was of importance, because it brought Nadir for the first time into direct contact with Europeans.¹ At that time, the European community at Isfahan consisted of the French Consul (the Chevalier de Gardane, who had succeeded his brother, the Sieur de Gardane, two and a half years before), William Cockell, the Resident of the English East India Company, and his assistant, John Geekie, the Resident and other representatives of the Dutch East India Company, and a number of priests and missionaries, the majority of whom were French.²

During the six weeks that Nadir spent in Isfahan he met Cockell and Geekie on several occasions, and treated them at first very politely. After promising to make amends to the Company for the losses which it had suffered during the Afghan usurpation, Nadir gave Cockell a letter for John Horne, the Agent at Gombroon, in which he requested him to take measures to prevent the Afghans from escaping, and to act as Governor and *Shahbandar*³ at Gombroon, until Persians could be appointed to those positions.⁴ Tahmasp gave Cockell and Geekie an audience and treated them with great civility ; he likewise promised to reimburse the Company. The Gombroon Agent, in his own words :

"wrote Shaw Thomas's⁵ general a very complaisant letter congratulating him on His Majesty's happy Success. . . . (I) magnified the Assistance I gave to his people here (i.e., at Gombroon), and assured him of our readiness to promote His Majesty's Interest."⁶

Buoyed up with hope, Cockell gave valuable presents to the Shah and to Nadir. The Dutch, not to be outdone, gave still more costly presents.

Unfortunately, the rosy prospects which everybody entertained were

¹ Except for his meeting or meetings with the Greek traveller, Basil Batatzes, at Mashhad some time in 1728 (see p. 223 of E. Legrand's French translation of Batatzes's *Travels*, entitled *Voyages de Basile Vatace en Europe et en Asie*, Paris, 1886).

² Henceforward, the task of recording Nadir's achievements is rendered easier by the fact that one can supplement the material furnished by the Persian historians with first-hand information from European sources, although there is no continuous record from any one pen.

³ The *Shahbandar* was the official who collected the customs duties on all merchandise arriving at the port (see le Bruyn, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 206).

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 9th/20th December, 1729, quoting from letters from Isfahan.

⁵ This is the usual manner in which the E. I. Co's representatives wrote "Shah Tahmasp"; sometimes the order of the words was reversed which, as Curzon remarked, "has not a very regal sound".

⁶ Letter dated the 31st December, 1729/11th January, 1730, from John Horne to London (in Vol. XV of the *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*).

of short duration. As for the English and Dutch, a most unfortunate situation developed. Although the representatives of the two Companies were often on excellent terms with one another, there were times when serious disputes occurred and when the one Company intrigued against the other. On this occasion, according to the English records, the Dutch, wishing to discredit their competitors, alleged to Nadir that the English had been actively assisting the Afghans; the English responded with similar accusations. Nadir was quick to turn this incident to his own advantage. Affecting to believe that the Dutch allegations were true, he sent *muḥassils* (tax collectors) to the English factory to demand payment of 3,000 tomans (£7,000), of which 1,000 tomans were to be paid at once. Cockell and Geekie refused to pay anything, and were then informed that they would be beaten. Eventually, Nadir agreed to accept 300 tomans; when his *muḥassils* collected the money, they seized all the Company's horses and removed them as well.¹ Indignant at this high-handed treatment, Cockell and Geekie contemplated leaving Isfahan; they intended to remonstrate with Nadir personally, but he left for Shiraz before they could do so. After his departure they complained to the Shah of their treatment; he received them in private audience and assured them that

"he would not only return the sum forc'd from them but likewise make them reparation for the losses the Honble. Co. has sustained during the Ophgoon (Afghan) Rebellion."

After this audience, Cockell and Geekie decided to stay in Isfahan until they could ascertain whether or not "the Hopes and Promises given them were only to amuse them. . . ."²

The Shah, who was very friendly to Cockell and Geekie, in company with his ministers paid a visit to the Company's factory, where they were entertained with a display of fireworks:

"... among which was the Figure of Hoshroff (Ashraf) contrived to burn after the Europe Manner being a thing entirely new to the Persians and apropos; they were exceedingly delighted with it as indeed with their treatment in general."³

Tahmasp was described, on this occasion, as:

"a very young man who delights much in visiting and going to all Places he has not seen before who during his minority was shut up in the State Prison in his Father's Palace. . . ."

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 14th/25th February, 1730.

² *Ibid.*, 7th/18th March, 1730.

³ Letter from Gombroon to London, 2nd/13th April, 1731, in Vol. XV of *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*.

Although Tahmasp was now upon the throne of his ancestors, he found that he was Shah only in name. For some time Nadir prevented him from appointing any ministers or functionaries, on the grounds that the money that would have to be paid to them as salaries would be better employed as pay for his troops.¹ Nadir gave further evidence of his increasing pretensions when he married Rādiyya Begum, one of Tahmasp's sisters, without first obtaining the Shah's consent.² He had already obtained Tahmasp's agreement to the betrothal of his eldest son, Rīdā Qulī, to Faṭīma Sulṭān Begum, another of the daughters of the late Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain; this betrothal may have been arranged at Mashhad, at the time when, according to Muḥammad Muḥsin, Tahmasp agreed to grant to Nadir in fief the provinces of Khurasan, Kirman and Mazandaran.³

The joy of the populace at the expulsion of the Afghans and the restoration of the Ṣafavi monarchy was soon

"greatly eclipsed by the money that was ordered to be collected from all sorts of People to pay the naked and hungry Soldiery, which (money) has been raised in so violent and despotick a Manner that severall have been Drub'd to death and others quite ruin'd."⁴

Nadir's troops, in fact, behaved in a most cruel manner to the people of Isfahan, plundering their houses, and even seizing some of the inmates and selling them as slaves.⁵ It is not surprising that the people soon began to feel that they would have been better off under the Afghans.

Nadir purposely delayed his pursuit of Ashraf for two reasons. In the first place, he wished to take advantage of his military successes and his recovery of the capital to strengthen his own position; secondly, it was necessary to allow his troops to rest and to be properly clothed and equipped before setting out for the south in mid-winter.

It is of interest to record the impression made by Nadir upon the French Consul, the Chevalier de Gardane, at this time. The Chevalier described him as:

"... un homme d'environ quarante ans, élevé dès son enfance dans le métier des armes; valereux s'il en fut jamais; d'ailleurs homme d'entendement, franc et

¹ See the most interesting account by the Chevalier de Gardane of Nadir and his behaviour at this time. La Mamyé-Chairac published, in the third volume (pp. 105-109) of his *Histoire*, an extract from the Chevalier's *Relation*. This *Relation*, according to La Mamyé-Chairac, contained "un précis de ce qui s'est passé en Perse depuis la paix de 1727, jusqu'au mois de Mai, 1730"; this account was, he said, published in instalments in the *Gazette de Hollande* in December 1731 and January, 1732 (I have been unable to get access to these numbers of the *Gazette de Hollande*; they are not in the British Museum Library).

² *Gombroon Diary*, 30th April/10th May, 1730. According to Butkov (Vol. I, p. 114), Rādiyya Begum had formerly been the wife of a Georgian prince.

³ See p. 36 above.

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 14th/25th February, 1730.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5th/16th July, 1730.

sincère, récompensant bien ceux qui se portent vaillamment, et punissant de mort ceux qui se lâchent le pied dans les occasions où il y a moyen de résister. Il donna d'abord des preuves de sa capacité, de sa valeur et de sa fidélité dans diverses occasions où il fut employé, et quand il se vit bien avant dans les bons graces du Roi, il lui apprit à discerner les flatteurs et les traîtres, l'obligea à châtier les uns et à éloigner les autres."¹

Before Nadir's departure from Isfahan, the Shah, no doubt at his general's instigation, wrote to the Sultan of Turkey to inform him of the recovery of Isfahan; in the same letter Tahmasp requested the Sultan to give back the Persian provinces which he still held. He followed up this letter by sending Rida Quli Khan Shamlu, the former general of Shah Sultan Husain, as Ambassador to Constantinople. The consequences of this action will be described in the next chapter.

In the meantime, the Afghans at Kirman, having heard of the disasters suffered by Ashraf, abandoned the town on the 19th December, after blowing up the citadel.²

On the 24th December, Nadir, despite the severity of the weather, began the march from Isfahan to Shiraz. Travelling by Abarquh and Mashhad-i-Madar-i-Sulaiman (Pasargadæ), he reached Zarqan, 21 miles N.E. of Shiraz, where he found Ashraf awaiting him with 20,000 men. An obstinate battle took place, in which Ashraf displayed considerable tactical skill. In the end, Nadir's determined leadership and the steadfastness of his men won the day, and the Afghans fled in some confusion to Shiraz.³

On the following morning Ashraf sent Muhammad Saidal Khan and two other Afghan notables to Nadir's camp to ask for quarter. Nadir replied that he would grant quarter and receive Ashraf's submission if he would first deliver up the few remaining members of the family of Shah Sultan Husain, who were still prisoners in the Afghans' hands. These personages (who were, apparently, all females) were duly handed over, but Ashraf, acting on Saidal's advice, left Shiraz with such of his troops as were left, in the hope of escaping to Qandahar.

Nadir, seeing the dust raised by the Afghans, realised that he had been deceived, and started in pursuit. His advance guard, consisting of 500 Afshars and Qarachorlu Kurds, came up with the Afghan rearguard at the Pul-i-Fasa, ten miles S.E. of Shiraz. A fight took place, in which a number of Afghans were captured, while many others were driven into the river and drowned.⁴ Ashraf, however, made good his escape,

¹ La Mamyre-Clairac, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 105.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 19th/30th January, 1730 (on the authority of a letter from the Company's Armenian agent at Kirman).

³ According to the *Ruwanama* of Mirza Muhammad Shirazi (p. 6), 10,000 Afghans were taken prisoners. See also the *Fars-Nama*, p. 167.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 74.

and fled to Lar. Nadir himself pursued the fugitives for several *farsakhs*, but, being unable to overtake them, he returned to Shiraz, whence he issued orders for every route to be closed to them.

Some of the defeated Ghalzais, including Ashraf's brother and nephew, separated from Ashraf and the main body of his followers, and made their way to the coast near Bandar Rig. Ashraf's brother had with him some treasure and jewels with which to bribe the Arabs to rise in favour of the Afghans. Failing to meet with a favourable response from the Arabs, the fugitives wandered southwards to Charak, looking for a vessel in which to escape. Nadir had evidently expected such a move on the part of the Afghans, for he wrote to the Agent of the East India Co. at Gombroon, requesting him to dispatch the Company's "grab"¹ and other vessels to intercept any Afghans who might seek to escape by sea, and to notify the Arab shaikhs on the coast that :

"if any of them permit any Ophgoons to escape at their respective ports, they with their Wives and Familya shall be sold for Slaves."²

It is not recorded whether the Agent complied with this request ; if he did so, his efforts, as will be seen below, were ineffectual.

Meanwhile, Ashraf's brother and nephew and their companions had come, near Charak, to the stronghold of Shaikh Ahmad Madani, a most turbulent local chieftain. Although the Shaikh refused at first to help the fugitives, he later agreed to do so, as they, like himself, were Sunnis.³ Having obtained a vessel, the Afghans crossed over to Julfar (Rasu'l-Khaima), on the Arabian side of the Gulf. The unfortunate fugitives were attacked immediately by 'Omani Arabs, who killed many of them and enslaved the survivors. When Shaikh Hazin visited Muscat a few years later, he saw and conversed with Ashraf's nephew and another Ghalzai of rank who were then employed as *sagqas* or water-carriers.⁴ Shaikh Rashid of Basidu killed some other Afghans near Linga, when they were trying to escape by sea.

Ashraf, accompanied by over 2,000 men and many women, left Lar early in February, and continued his flight in an easterly direction. Later in the month a messenger of the East India Co., when on his way from Kirman to Gombroon, met Ashraf and his followers in the Sirjan district.⁵

¹ "Grab" is an English corruption of the Arabic word *ghurab*, which means ordinarily a "crow," but which was also used to denote a type of vessel much used by the Arabs. Olaf Torén, in his book, *A Voyage to Suratte, China, etc.* (London, 1771), p. 205, describes a "grab" as a two- or three-masted vessel, rigged in the European manner, with a low and sharp prow, like that of a galley.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 1st/12th February, 1730.

³ *Ibid.*, 13th/24th January. Shaikh Hazin states (p. 228) that the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf Coast belonged to the Shafi' sect.

⁴ Shaikh Hazin, p. 203.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 17th/28th February.

As they went on, their numbers dwindled rapidly, partly through hostile action, and partly through defection. The authorities differ as to where and in what manner Ashraf met his end. The hitherto most generally accepted account is that he and the two or three followers who were still with him were killed in Baluchistan or just within the borders of Sistan by one of the sons of 'Abdullah Khan, a powerful Brahōi chieftain.¹ On the other hand, Husain Sultan, of Qandahar, later informed Nadir that Ashraf had been put to death near Zard Kuh by a force which he had dispatched to intercept him.² This claim, besides being accepted by Mirza Mahdi, is supported by a report which Martin French, the Basra representative of the East India Company, sent to the London office of the Company on the 9th/20th September, 1730.³ French stated that an Afghan named Muhammad Khan, who had formerly been Ashraf's Master of the Ceremonies, had arrived at Basra a few days previously. Muhammad Khan said that he had accompanied his master on his flight towards Qandahar, and that, when two days' march from that city, they had encountered a body of Husain's troops. These men put Ashraf and several of his followers to death, but Muhammad Khan succeeded in escaping to the coast of Baluchistan, whence he had taken ship to Basra via Muscat. There thus seems but little doubt that it was Husain of Qandahar, and not 'Abdullah Khan, who terminated Ashraf's career.

With Ashraf's final defeat and the destruction of his army, the first of Nadir's major tasks was successfully accomplished; another formidable task now awaited him, namely, the humbling of the Turks.

¹ Shaikh Hazin (p. 203), who adds that 'Abdullah Khan sent Ashraf's head to Tahmasp, together with a valuable diamond which was found upon his person. See also M. Longworth Dames in *E.I.*, Vol. I, p. 637.

² *T.N.*, p. 78; see also Major H. G. Raverty's *Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan, Geographical, Ethnographical and Historical* (London, 1888), p. 609.

³ Vol. XV of *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*.

CHAPTER V

NADIR'S FIRST TURKISH CAMPAIGN AND HIS FINAL SUBJECTION OF THE AEDALIS

NADIR remained in Shiraz until shortly before the Nau Ruz ; during his stay, he gave orders for the town to be repaired, and himself contributed 1,500 tomans (£3,500) for restoring the Shah Chiragh mosque, besides presenting to it a set of gold candelabra and a quantity of gold from which a lamp was to be made.¹

Shiraz had suffered much during the last few years, and, in the course of the final struggle with the Afghans, a large part of the town and practically all the gardens had been destroyed. All the Indian *banyans* (Hindu merchants)² and many of the inhabitants had been killed by the Afghans in reprisal for an attack on them by the roughs of the town when the news of Ashraf's defeat at Murchakhur became known.³ Several days of continuous snowfall and rain had completed the devastation and destruction wrought by the Afghans.⁴ Muhammad 'Ali Khan ibn Aşlan Khan was made Governor of Fars at this time. He took energetic steps to lay out the gardens again ; at his orders, many thousands of trees were planted.⁵

Whilst Nadir was at Shiraz, he arranged for 'Ali Mardan Khan Shamlu, a man who was entirely in his interest,⁶ to be sent on a mission to Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, to announce the recapture of Isfahan, the accession of Tahmasp II, and the projected reconquest of Qandahar. In the letter from Tahmasp conveying this message, no date was fixed for this Qandahar campaign, but the Emperor was asked,

¹ *Ruznama* of Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, p. 7 ; this statement is reproduced in the *Fars-Nama*, p. 168.

² Le Bruyn, who was in Shiraz in March, 1705, estimated that there were 1,000 of these Indians in the city at that time (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 46).

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 3rd/14th December, 1729. The Shiraz representatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies were seized, stripped and driven out of the town, and the establishments of the Companies were plundered ; the losses of the English Company were assessed at nearly £17,000. Many particulars of these troubles are given by Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, pp. 4 to 6.

⁴ Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10. Large numbers of pines and plane trees, as well as fruit trees were planted at this time.

⁶ *Gombroon Diary*, 21st July/1st August, 1730. The Agent described 'Ali Mardan Khan as a "creature" of Nadir.

in the common interests of his realm and of that of Persia, to close his frontiers to all Afghan fugitives once the operations were begun.¹

According to Mirza Mahdi,² Nadir expressed his intention at this time of returning to Khurasan, but it may well be doubted whether he really wished to do so. He had tasted the fruits of success, he was at the head of a considerable army, and, as will be seen below, he had in all probability already formulated the design of dispossessing Tahmasp of the crown. His ambition was boundless, and it therefore seems most improbable that he could seriously have contemplated retiring into relative obscurity in Khurasan just at the time when his feet were firmly planted on the ladder that led to higher things. It was not the first time that he had made such a pronouncement,³ and it was not (as will be seen hereafter) by any means the last; his probable object was to endeavour to cloak his real designs until he deemed that the moment had come to throw all pretence aside. If such were the case, his efforts, even at this early stage, were futile, since, only two months or so later, both the Chevalier de Gardane and Cockell stated that, at Isfahan, it was believed that he was aiming at the throne. The Chevalier said of him :

"Les rares talens que ce Général a pour la guerre, le bonheur qui l'accompagne dans toutes ses expéditions, la confiance du soldat qui l'aime et le craint, tout cela joint ensemble l'a rendu redoutable chez les ennemis, et suspect dans la cour du Roi son Maître. . . . Ispahan le Peuple, la Cour, le Roi lui-même, tous craignent qu'il n'ait l'ambition de monter plus haut, et il ne sçaurait plus faire un pas en avant sans se saisir du Trône."⁴

Before saying anything further regarding Nadir and his movements, it is necessary to describe briefly the position of Turkey in relation to Persia at this time. In the first chapter it was shown how Turkey, like Russia, had taken advantage of Persia's troubles to seize much of her territory. As a result of the Turco-Afghan war, she had made further gains. Early in 1730 she held the whole of Georgia, Armenia, Adhar-baijan, part of Daghistān, and Shirvan (the rest of these two provinces being held by Russia), most of Persian 'Iraq, and all of Persian Kurdistan, Hamadan and Kirmanshah.

Tahmasp, in his desire to oust the Afghans, had made several requests to Turkey and Russia for aid. As late as October, 1729, a Persian

¹ T.N., p. 72. The text of this letter is given in full at the beginning of Vol. II of the *Ta'rikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar va Jalusi-Muhammad Shah*, by the Indian historian Muhammad Bakhtsh. In response to a request from Nadir, the Dutch gave 'Ali Mardan Khan a passage in one of their ships from Gombroon, but the captain later refused to take him beyond Muscat. The English Company then sought to regain their lost favour by sending a ship to Muscat to take the marooned envoy on to India.

² *Ibid.*

³ See p. 39 above.

⁴ La Marmye-Clairac, Vol. III, p. 107.

envoy reached Constantinople, but the Turks received him somewhat coldly, for fear of giving umbrage to Ashraf. Early in the following year a man named Muḥammad 'Alī Rafsinjani, who claimed to be Šafī Mirza,¹ arrived at the Turkish capital and was well received by the Porte, although denounced as an imposter by the Persian Minister. Early in April, 1730, rumours reached Constantinople of Ashraf's defeat and flight; later in the same month the Sultan received Tahmasp's letter officially informing him of the recapture of Isfahan and demanding back the provinces which Turkey had seized. In June Riḍa Qulī Khan Shamlu reached Constantinople and repeated this demand, threatening war if the Porte refused to comply.² Nevertheless, negotiations were entered into, and a treaty was signed which, so far as can be gathered, provided for the return of the occupied territory to Persia and for the payment by her of an annual sum to Turkey to reimburse the latter for the expense to which she had been put.³

Nadir decided not to wait until an answer could be received from the Porte to the above-mentioned letter and the message sent through Riḍa Qulī Khan. Leaving Shiraz on the 18th Sha'ban, 1142 (8th March, 1730), he marched to Dizful via Basht, Behbahan, Ram Hormuz and Shushtar. At Dizful he received Muḥammad Khan Baluch, whom Ashraf had sent as Ambassador to Constantinople in 1727. Muḥammad Khan Baluch had left Constantinople on his return journey in September, 1729; learning *en route* of Ashraf's overthrow and flight, he decided, after some hesitation,⁴ to hand over to Nadir the letters which the Sultan had entrusted to him for delivery to Ashraf. Nadir rewarded Muḥammad Khan Baluch by making him Governor of Kuhgilu.

From Burujird Nadir made a night march to Nihavand, where he surprised and defeated the Turkish garrison; he followed up this success by putting to flight a strong Turkish force at Malayir.⁵ On or about

¹ This man was the second pretender to the Persian throne to pose as Šafī Mirza. The first (see p. 13 above) had been killed some three years before. Muḥammad 'Alī had reached Shushtar, in darvish garb, in August, 1729, when he gave himself out to be Šafī Mirza, thereby claiming the throne. Although he managed to collect some followers from among the townspeople, the Governor of Shushtar forced him to fly across the Turkish frontier. The local Turkish authorities sent the supposititious Šafī Mirza on to Constantinople, as they thought that his presence there might be of use. Stanyan, in a despatch dated the 6th/17th February, 1730, reported "Šafī Mirza's" arrival, and added: "It is thought the Port (*sic*) will make some use of him in the adjustment of matters with whoever (*sic*) shall remain King of Persia." (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI.)

² See p. 43 above.

³ Stanyan, 2nd/13th July, S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI.

⁴ See the despatch of the 20th June/10th July, 1730 from the Earl of Kinnoull (who had just succeeded Abraham Stanyan as Ambassador at Constantinople), S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI. (George Hay, 7th Earl of Kinnoull, had been created a peer of Great Britain on the 31st December, 1711, with the title of Baron Hay of Pedwardine: for particulars of his career, see Douglas's *Peerage of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1813), Vol. II, pp. 48 and 49, and the *D.N.B.*)

⁵ T.N., pp. 75 and 76.

the 18th June, he occupied Hamadan¹ without meeting with any opposition, the Turkish commander and the garrison having hurriedly retreated to Sinandij and thence to Baghdad. Nadir remained for a month at Hamadan, during which time detachments of his army reoccupied the province of Ardalan and regained Kirmanshah. On the 1st Muharram, 1143 (17th July), he left Hamadan with the object of driving the Turks out of Adharbaijan.²

Meanwhile, news of Nadir's aggressive movements had reached Constantinople, and on the 24th July the Porte formally declared war on Persia. Notwithstanding this declaration of war and the extensive preparations that were being made, Ibrahim Pasha, the pacific Grand Vizier, sent an envoy to the Shah to urge the latter to accept the treaty signed on his behalf by Rida Quli Khan. Simultaneously, Ibrahim Pasha sent orders to Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad to make every effort to arrive at an understanding with Persia.³ These attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement were frustrated by Nadir's vigorous offensive measures.

Marching via Sinandij (where he received word from Husain Sultan of Ashraf's death),⁴ Nadir sought to attack a strong Turkish concentration of troops⁵ at Miyanduab, between Dimdim and Maragha. The Turks, according to Mirza Mahdi, set out from Miyanduab to oppose him, but, on sighting his forces, fled towards Maragha before a shot had been fired. He pursued the Turks for over 20 miles, killing and capturing large numbers and seizing all their artillery and baggage.⁶ In consequence of this success, the districts of Dimdim, Saujbulagh, Mukri and Maragha were restored to Persia.

After spending two days at Maragha, Nadir marched north-eastwards towards Deh Khariqan, a village near the shore of Lake Urumiya, where there was a small Turkish force. These Turks retreated to Tabriz, where a serious mutiny broke out almost immediately after their arrival. Many Turkish officers were killed by the mutineers, who then expelled the loyalists, under Mustafa Pasha, the commander-in-chief. On the morning after the disturbance, the Turkish mutineers marched out of the city, and both they and the loyal Turks were attacked by Nadir's forces. While the mutineers escaped to Erzeroum, Mustafa Pasha and his men were routed near Suhailan, between Tabriz and Sufian.⁷

¹ T.N., p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78. Before leaving Hamadan, Nadir took a *fal* or augury from Hafiz; this *fal* turned out to be very apt, for it read: '*Iraq va Fars girifti bi-shi'r-i-khush Hafiz, bi-ā hā naubat-i-Baghdad va vaqt-i-Tabriz ast.*' "Thou hast taken 'Iraq and Fars with thy fine poetry, Hafiz; come, for it is (now) the turn of Baghdad and of Tabriz."

³ See Lord Kinross's despatch of the 24th July/4th August, S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI.

⁴ See p. 45 above.

⁵ The local garrison had been reinforced by the arrival of strong contingents under Timur Pasha, the Governor of Van, and 'Ali Rida Pasha, the Governor of Mukri.

⁶ T.N., p. 79.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

On the following day (12th August) Nadir entered Tabriz. Another Turkish army, under Rustam Pasha, of Hashtarud, not knowing of the defeat of Muṣṭafa Pasha, now approached Tabriz with the object of reinforcing him. Rustam Pasha did not discover his mistake until it was too late, for Nadir hastened from Tabriz and inflicted a crushing defeat upon his force, capturing him and many of his officers. Nadir, it is said, treated Rustam Pasha kindly, set him and the other Turkish officers free and sent, through their intermediary, proposals of peace to the Grand Vizier.¹

In August reports of further Persian successes were received at Constantinople. A tense situation began to develop between Turkey and Russia, since the former suspected that the latter was secretly lending assistance to Persia. As a matter of fact there were definite grounds for these suspicions, because General Levashev, having received authorisation from St. Petersburg, sent several of his artillery and engineer officers, disguised as Persians, to assist a Persian force which was besieging Ardabil.² Levashev himself acted as intermediary for the surrender of the town which, after the Turkish evacuation, was held by Russia for a time.³

The news of Nadir's successes made a profound impression in Mesopotamia and Syria; the Chevalier de Gardane, who left Isfahan for France towards the end of May, 1730, and travelled through those countries, found that:

" depuis Basra jusqu'à Bagdad, et depuis Bagdad jusqu'aux portes d'Alep, tout tremble au seul nom de Tahmas-Couli-Kan."⁴

The Grand Vizier, who was under orders to take the field against Persia, lingered at Scutari, hoping that the diplomatic measures which he had taken would render it unnecessary for him to leave with the army for the front. September, however, brought the news of the Persian recapture of Hamadan, Kirmanshah and Tabriz, and of the mutiny that had preceded the evacuation of the last-named city. News also reached the capital that the Tabriz mutineers were approaching and that another mutiny had taken place at Erzeroum.

¹ T.N., p. 81. Mirza Mahdi here states incorrectly that it was at this time (12th-16th August) that Nadir heard of the deposition of Sultan Ahmad III, the accession of Mahmud his brother (sic), and the killing of Ibrahim Pasha the Grand Vizier; these events did not occur until the end of September, 1730.

² Manstein, *Mémoires Historiques, Politiques et Militaires sur La Russie*, Lyons, 1772, Vol. I, p. 96. Friction had already developed between the two powers because of incidents in Shirvan, where Cholag Surkal Khan (whom the Turks had made Khan of Shamakhi in 1728) had been pursuing an aggressive policy towards Russia.

³ Levashev obtained a safe conduct for the Turkish garrison which was thus enabled to reach Shamakhi.

⁴ La Mamyre-Clairac, Vol. III, p. 108.

The enemies of Ibrahim Pasha alleged that the fall of Tabriz was due to instructions which he had issued to Muṣṭafa Pasha, and pressed for his immediate despatch to the front, hoping that he would fail ignominiously and be disgraced.

The gathering discontent in Constantinople suddenly found expression in the rising led by the Albanian Patrona Khalil on the 28th September; owing to the weakness and irresolution of the Sultan and his ministers, the rising rapidly attained dangerous proportions, and resulted in the death of the Grand Vizier, the deposition of Aḥmad III, and the election to the throne of the latter's nephew Maḥmud, the son of Muṣṭafa II. The Turkish Government, being thrown into a state of great confusion by this upheaval, abandoned all thought of continuing the war against Persia.

As for Nadir, he had intended, after retaking Tabriz, to extend his conquests further, notwithstanding the fact that he had sent peace proposals to the Porte. The arrival of a courier from his son Riḍa Quli, who was then at Mashhad, with the news that civil war had broken out amongst the Abdalis, that the loyal element had been driven out of Herat, and that the rebels were marching on Mashhad, caused him to suspend operations against the Turks and to hasten off to Khurasan. No peace with Turkey was concluded, but a state of truce prevailed.

The instigator of the Abdali revolt was Husain Sulṭān of Qandahar. As he had reason to fear that Nadir would in due course attack him, he dispatched emissaries to Herat early in 1730, in the hope of inciting the Abdalis to rise and so distract Nadir's attention.¹ Allah Yar Khan, the Governor of Herat, remained loyal and rejected Husain Sulṭān's proposal, but many of the Abdalis revolted, and sent for Dhu'l-Fiqr Khan, Allah Yar Khan's old rival. Dhu'l-Fiqr, aided by the rebels in Herat, drove out Allah Yar Khan, and soon after marched on Mashhad, where Ibrahim Khan was in command. Allah Yar Khan, hearing of Dhu'l-Fiqr's advance on Mashhad, hastened from Maruchaq (whither he had gone from Herat) to the assistance of Ibrahim Khan, and reached the city just before his rival camped at Khwaja Rabi'.

Although Nadir had given his brother strict orders not to take the offensive under such circumstances, Ibrahim Khan, after some days of inaction, yielded to the bolder spirits amongst his men. He sallied out, but was driven back with heavy loss²; through shame at this reverse, Ibrahim did nothing further. It was at this juncture that Riḍa Quli sent the courier to his father with the news of what had occurred.

Before leaving Adharbaijan, Nadir ordered between 50,000 and 60,000

¹ *J.N.*, p. 82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84; see also the history of Raḍi'u'd-Din Tafrishi, BM. MS. Add 6787, fol. 187 (b).

families of tribespeople to be transferred from that province and from Persian 'Iraq and Fars to Khurasan ; amongst these were 12,000 families of Afshars (including 2,000 of the Qiriqu branch) ; these Qiriqu were sent to the district round Kubkan and the other Afshars to Kalat.

Nadir left Tabriz for Mashhad on the 16th August ; on reaching the Qizil Uzan, he received a further message from Rida Quli that the Abdalis, after spending a month in the neighbourhood of Mashhad, had returned to Herat. There being no such pressing need for haste, Nadir turned aside from Tehran, marched through Mazandaran and Astarabad, crossed the Atrak and attempted in vain to overtake and punish some Yamut rebels. He thereupon returned to Astarabad, whence he marched up the Gurgan valley and through Simalqan to Mashhad, where he arrived on the 11th November.

Great celebrations were held in the city in the following January when Nadir's eldest son, Rida Quli, was married to Faṭima Sulṭan Begum, to whom, as already stated,¹ he had been betrothed.² A great hunting party was then organised in the neighbourhood of Kalat and Abivard.

When Dhu'l-Fiqr Abdali heard of Nadir's arrival at Mashhad and of the preparations that were being made for the forthcoming campaign, he appealed to Husain Sulṭan, of Qandahar, for aid. Husain Sulṭan came in person to Isfaraz, where he met Dhu'l-Fiqr, but, for some unrecorded reason, they failed to agree. Husain Sulṭan then entered into negotiations with Nadir, and handed over two Ṣafavi princesses in exchange for Maḥmud's widows and children and some other persons. Soon afterwards Husain Sulṭan patched up his differences with Dhu'l-Fiqr, to whom he sent a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men under the celebrated Ghalzai general, Muḥammad Saidal Khan.

In order to render it difficult, if not impossible, for Husain Sulṭan to assist the Abdalis, Nadir sent word to 'Abdullah Khan Brahoi, who had been made Governor of Baluchistan, to attack Qandahar from the south. 'Abdullah Khan, however, could not obey these instructions, as he was then engaged in a struggle with Miyan Nur Muḥammad Khudayar Khan, the Kalhora chief of Sind.³ In a battle between the two at Gandava, 'Abdullah Khan was killed.

Leaving Mashhad immediately after the Nau Ruz festivities, Nadir

¹ See p. 42 above.

² The marriage contract, together with a preamble, is quoted in the *Durra-yi-Nadira*, but not in the T.N. ; it is reproduced in Schefer's *Chrestomathie Persane*, Vol. II, pp. 232-237.

³ Miyan Nur Muḥammad, the son of Naṣir Muḥammad, the chief of Sind, succeeded his father in 1708 ; in 1717, having sworn fealty to the Mughal Emperor, he was given the title of Khudayar Khan. See T. Postans, *Personal Observation on Sind*, London, 1843, p. 168. Sir H. Pottinger states, in his *Travels in Beloochistan and Sind*, London, 1876, p. 278, that 'Abdullah Khan was the aggressor, having seized part of Khudayar Khan's territory. See also Leech in *J.R.A.S.*, Vol. XII, pp. 483 and 484.

marched via Turuq and Turbat-i-Shaikh Jam to Nuqra, a small place seven miles west of Herat. A few days later, the Abdalis emerged from the city, and an indecisive battle was fought. That night Muhammad Saidal Khan, the Ghalzai general, made a surprise attack on the Persians and placed Nadir himself in great jeopardy. Nadir, with only eight men, was surrounded in a small tower for some time. Eventually, the Afghans were repelled, and he was relieved.¹ On the following day he made an unsuccessful attack on the Afghans who were holding the Takht-i-Safar, a garden on the lower slopes of the Kuh-i-Mulla Khwaja, three and a half miles N.N.W. of Herat. He was more successful a few days later when he met and heavily defeated Dhu'l-Fiqar outside the city. At this stage, Allah Yar Khan arrived from Maruchaq with reinforcements.

On the 4th May, Nadir decided to invest Herat on every side: leaving a strong force at Nuqra, he crossed to the south side of the Hari Rud and marched towards the bridge of Malan, three miles south of Herat. The Afghans attempted to stem his progress, but he hurled them back with severe loss, and on the following day he succeeded in seizing the bridge.

Whilst Nadir was at Malan the Abdali artillerymen, having noticed his magnificent tent, opened fire on it. A cannon shot destroyed the roof of the tent and struck the ground by the side of his couch, but fortunately left him unscathed.²

When Nadir's forces were completing the encirclement of Herat, Saidal Khan, with a force of Ghalzais and Abdalis, made a sortie, but was driven back with heavy loss.³ The encircling line was then drawn tighter round the city.

During the course of these operations, a Persian detachment carried out a successful raid on Maimana and Chachaktu, but a larger force, which had been sent against Farah, met with disaster.⁴

On the 17th Muharram, 1144 (22nd July), Dhu'l-Fiqar emerged from Herat with a large body of men and crossed the Hari Rud. Nadir at once sent troops to cut off the Afghans, while he delivered a frontal attack upon them. The Afghans were completely defeated, and Dhu'l-Fiqar narrowly escaped being drowned in the river. Saidal Khan, having become discouraged at this defeat and at the heavy casualties sustained by his Ghalzais, secretly left Herat one night and marched to Farah. The defeat inflicted by Nadir and the defection of Saidal caused the Abdali chiefs to make peace overtures through Allah Yar Khan, which Nadir accepted. The Abdalis, however, broke faith, thinking that the dust raised by an approaching Persian force under Ibrahim Khan was that of a relieving army from Qandahar. Nadir, in anger, ordered a renewal of hostilities, but the Abdalis, realising their error, humbly begged for

¹ T.N., p. 92.

² Ibid., p. 94.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 97.

forgiveness and asked for Allah Yar Khan to be made Governor of Herat. Nadir once more acceded to their request.

Dhu'l-Fiqar, who with his younger brother Ahmad had been exiled to Farah, joined forces with Saidal Khan at Isfaraz. On the strength of this news and of the rumoured approach of 40,000 Ghalzais, Allah Yar Khan, in September, renounced his allegiance to Nadir, sent out raiding parties to Badghis and elsewhere, and made an unsuccessful attack on the Persian forces. Nadir, in retaliation, seized Allah Yar's family at Maruchaq. At the end of December the Abdalis made fresh proposals of peace, but withdrew them again immediately after these had been accepted; Nadir, in great anger, vigorously renewed the siege operations, with the result that, on 1st Ramaḍān (27th February, 1732) Allah Yar Khan finally surrendered, and the Persian army at last occupied Herat. Nadir exiled Allah Yar Khan and his companions to Multan, and transferred 60,000 Abdalis to the districts of Mashhad, Nishapur and Damghan.¹ By thus transferring these Abdalis to Khurasan, he added materially to the already considerable concentration there of tribespeople of good fighting qualities (he had previously, as stated on page 52 above, sent 60,000 families of Afshars and other tribes to that province).

During the latter part of the siege of Herat, Ibrahim Khan had been investing Farah, which, despite the arrival of Saidal with 2,000 Ghalzais, he eventually took. Nadir set out from Herat on the 19th Ramaḍān with the intention of going to Farah, but returned almost at once on receipt of the news of Tahmasp's defeat by the Turks at Kurijan and of his conclusion of peace with them.²

The siege of Herat had occupied, in all, some ten months. The most remarkable feature of this siege was Nadir's clemency, despite the repeated tergiversations of the Abdalis. He was, apparently, determined to win them over by a display of moderation. He may already have conceived the idea (which he afterwards put into practice) of building up a non-Persian (and non-Shi'a) army upon which he could wholly depend under any circumstances. He doubtless felt that, being a Turk and an upstart, he could not rely absolutely upon the loyalty of his Persian troops in the event of a final trial of strength with Tahmasp. He had already enrolled a number of Turkomans in his ranks; with the addition to his forces of a large contingent of such excellent fighters as the Abdalis, he would obviously be much less dependent upon the goodwill of his Persian troops.

¹ Z.T., fol. 215 (b).

² T.N., p. 104. See pp. 56 and 57 below, for details of these events.

CHAPTER VI

TAHMASP'S DISASTROUS TURKISH CAMPAIGN AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DEPOSITION

WHILST Nadir was conducting his campaign against the Turks, Tahmasp remained in Isfahan. On receiving news of Nadir's hurried dash to Khurasan to counter the threatened Abdali attack on Mashhad, the Shah and his ministers, according to Muḥammad Muḥsin, gave themselves up to their pleasures, as in former times.¹ After spending several months in this fashion, Tahmasp was induced by some of his ministers and nobles to put himself at the head of his troops and to set out against the Turks, with the object of driving them out of the territory in the north-west of Persia, which they still held.² Tahmasp was no doubt persuaded that he would be able to complete the operations so successfully begun by Nadir, and so reap all the credit himself.

With this end in view, Tahmasp left Isfahan in January, 1731; on reaching Hamadan, he sent an envoy to congratulate Maḥmud, the new Sultan, on his accession, and also dispatched an emissary to Surkhai Khan at Shamakhi. Surkhai demonstrated his loyalty to the Porte by decapitating the unfortunate emissary and his suite and sending their heads to Constantinople.³

From Hamadan Tahmasp went to Tabriz where he dismissed the Governor (whom Nadir had appointed), and replaced him by one of his partisans; he then marched against Nakhichevan and Erivan with a force of 18,000 men.⁴

By this time Turkey had somewhat recovered from the paralysing effect of the revolution in the previous September. As Rida Quli Khan, the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, had received no reply from Isfahan to the communications which he had sent regarding the peace treaty, the Porte ordered its commanders on the Persian frontier to be on their guard, and granted Aḥmad Pasha, of Baghdad, full powers to make peace or to wage war. In March, 1731, Rida Quli Khan left Constantinople for Baghdad, but he was imprisoned at Mardin on the news being received of Tahmasp's advance on Erivan.

¹ Z.T., fol. 215 (a).

² Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 254. Mirza Mahdi (T.N., p. 105) merely says that Tahmasp took this action "in imitation of Nadir."

³ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 252.

⁴ T.N., p. 105.

At the outset of the campaign, fortune seemed to favour Tahmasp's arms. The Turks evacuated Nakhichevan and fell back on Erivan. Leaving Erivan unattacked, the Shah marched on north-eastwards to Echmiadzin, where he encountered and defeated a Turkish force.¹ He then faced round and attempted to take Erivan by assault. The garrison repulsed Tahmasp's troops who thereupon invested the town. After the siege had been in progress for eighteen days, news was received that another Turkish force had cut off the Persians' supplies. The Shah was, therefore, obliged to raise the siege and retire to Tabriz: he was unable to halt long there, however, because he learnt that 'Ali Pasha, the commander of the Turkish forces at Erivan, was advancing from that town, and that Ahmad Pasha was marching on Persian Iraq. He accordingly left Tabriz for Abhar.

Meanwhile, Ahmad Pasha, having met with no resistance, speedily captured Kirmanshah, overran the whole of Ardalán, and then advanced towards Hamadan. Tahmasp hastened south to avert the danger to Hamadan, and halted near the village of Kurijan, 20 miles N.E. of that town. Ahmad Pasha had by this time approached to within two stages of the Persian army, and sent an envoy with proposals of peace to Tahmasp; the latter dispatched an envoy in return. While a further Turkish envoy was on his way to Tahmasp, Ahmad Pasha's army advanced in battle order, but apparently without intending to fight. Thinking that he was about to be attacked, Tahmasp, in alarm, gave the order for his men to open fire on the Turks. They obeyed, and the battle began before the second Turkish envoy could deliver his message to the Shah. The Persian cavalry charged through the Turkish horse three times, and it seemed as if Tahmasp would win an easy victory. The Janissaries, however, overwhelmed the Persian infantry, who were mostly raw militiamen, and then defeated the Persian cavalry. Tahmasp, with 3,000 men, was almost surrounded, and only escaped with difficulty. Several thousands of his men lost their lives, and most of those who survived were so discouraged that they dispersed to their homes. The Turks captured all Tahmasp's baggage and artillery.² John Horne, the Agent at Gombroon, was of opinion that if Ahmad Pasha had marched on Isfahan directly after gaining this victory, he would easily have taken it. However, he contented himself with taking Hamadan.³

The Shah returned to Isfahan after this disaster; according to

¹ *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 210; Z.T., fol. 215 (a).

² This account of the battle of Kurijan is based mainly on a letter from John Horne, the Gombroon Agent to London, dated the 15th/26th March, 1732 (Vol. XV of the *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*). It agrees fairly closely with Mirza Mahdi's version of what occurred (T.N., p. 106), but is somewhat fuller. See also von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 254.

³ John Horne's letter of the 15th/26th March.

Muhammad Muhsin, he then gave himself up to pleasures and festivities to such an extent that "one would say that no defeat had occurred."¹ In this brief, but disastrous campaign, Tahmasp lost the greater part of the territories that Nadir had regained for him. Ahmad Pasha, after his victory, retook Hamadan and occupied Abhar, while 'Ali Pasha, marching via Khoi, Salmas and the southern end of Lake Urumiya, captured Maragha and Tabriz. In the south, another Turkish force invaded Khuzistan, and took Hawiza.

Peace negotiations were then opened, which resulted, on the 10th January, 1732, in the conclusion of a treaty between Tahmasp and the Turks on the basis that the former was to retain all the provinces which Nadir had recaptured south and east of the Aras, together with Tabriz, while Turkey was to hold Ganja, Tiflis, Erivan, Nakhichevan, the Georgian kingdoms of Kakheti and Kartli, and part of Shirvan and Daghestan. The handing back of Tabriz to Persia was very unpopular in Turkey, but the Government was convinced that it was better to conclude a speedy peace, at the price of Tabriz, than to protract the negotiations by insisting upon its retention; it feared that, if it adopted the latter course, it would soon be confronted with the forceful Nadir in place of the feeble Tahmasp. The Grand Vizier, who was the chivalrous and distinguished general Topal 'Osman Pasha,² believed that war with Persia was contrary to the true interests of Turkey, and was mainly responsible for the decision of the Porte to confirm the treaty; the Sultan, however, like several of his ministers and many of his subjects, disapproved of its terms. Unfortunately for Topal 'Osman, he had made a mortal enemy of the aged, but still very influential Hajji Bashir Agha, the Qizlar Agha, who was on the look-out for a pretext to bring about his fall³; he had already made—and unmade—a number of Grand Viziers. At the beginning of March, 1732, Topal 'Osman gave the Qizlar Agha and his other enemies the opening for which they had been waiting when he became involved in a quarrel with Lord Kinnoull, the British Ambassador, to whom he behaved with great rudeness.⁴ This affair, in which Topal 'Osman did not play a very creditable part, provided the astute Qizlar Agha with a pretext for per-

¹ Z.T., fol. 215 (b).

² Topal 'Osman, who was born in 1692, was of Greek extraction. For details of his adventurous career, see in particular A. de Clastre's *Histoire de Tahmas-Koulikhan* (Paris, 1743), pp. 225-247 (Hanway appears to have derived his information from this source).

³ The post of Grand Vizier was often unenviable and even dangerous. In the *Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au Marquis de Villeneuve* (which was given to the Marquis in August, 1728, before he left France to take up his duties at Constantinople), it was said: "... la place de vizir, si élevée, est environnée de tous côtés de précipices..." (This *Mémoire* is in the Turkish section of the Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.)

⁴ Von Hammer does not display his usual accuracy in describing this incident. I have endeavoured to set forth the facts (which are very curious) in an article which I contributed to the *Journal of the R.C.A.S.* in October, 1936 (Vol. XXIII, Part IV).

suading the Sultan to dismiss him¹; he was then virtually exiled to Trebizond, of which place he was made Governor. He was subsequently made Governor of Erzeroum and later of Erivan.

'Ali Pasha Hakimoghlu succeeded Topal 'Osman Pasha as Grand Vizier. The fall of Topal 'Osman served to allay popular feeling, but no attempt was made to abrogate the Persian treaty; as will be seen below, it was not long before Nadir rendered any such action by Turkey unnecessary.

Almost simultaneously with the conclusion of the Turco-Persian treaty, the treaty of Resht was signed by Russia and Persia. In October, 1730, the Empress Anna Ivanovna, alarmed at the heavy mortality from fever and plague of the Russian troops in Gilan, sent a letter to Tahmasp in which she laid down the principles on which Russia would evacuate that province.² In the following April her Ambassador, Baron Shafirov, arrived at Resht in order to negotiate, in company with General Levashev, a treaty with the Persians embodying these principles. In consequence of Tahmasp's Turkish campaign, these negotiations were much interrupted, and it was not until the 1st February, 1732, that the treaty of Resht was signed.³ Russia agreed to return to Persia, within the space of five months, all the territories occupied by her save those to the north of the Kura; these latter territories were to be held until the Turks were expelled from Armenia, Georgia and the other Persian provinces which they held. Freedom of trade was accorded to Russian merchants in Persia and to Persian merchants in Russia, and each power was to have a diplomatic representative at the court of the other.⁴

At this time a person claiming to be Isma'il Mirza, a younger brother of Tahmasp, reached Isfahan. He had, he said, escaped from Mahmud's clutches through the devotion of a servant, but had afterwards been captured and mutilated by the first pretender to take the name of Safi Mirza.⁵ The man's claims were investigated by the court, with the result that Tahmasp accepted him as his brother. Soon after, some of the ministers and eunuchs, and, it is said, even several of Tahmasp's women, plotted to depose the Shah and to replace him by Isma'il. The plot was dis-

¹ Topal 'Osman's dismissal was a severe blow to France, because he had always been extremely Francophile; during his tenure of the post of Grand Vizier he and the Marquis de Villeneuve had worked very closely and harmoniously together; in fact, as A. Vandal has remarked: "Jamais la France n'avait pénétré plus avant dans les conseils de la Porte" (*Une Ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV. La Mission du Marquis de Villeneuve, 1728-1741* (Paris, 1887), p. 172.

² See Butkov, Vol. I, p. 106.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 110. See also the despatch of the 7th/18th October, 1732, from Claudius Rondeau, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, S.P. 91, Vol. XIII.

⁴ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 113.

⁵ See p. 13 above.

covered by Tahmasp, who immediately put Isma'il and his fellow-conspirators to death.¹

It is not surprising that Nadir was indignant when he heard of Tahmasp's disaster and of the terms of the treaty with Turkey which followed it. The news reached him when he was on the march from Herat to Farah.² Abandoning the expedition, he hastened back to Herat, whence he sent word to the Sultan of Turkey that he must either relinquish all the Persian occupied territory or prepare for war³; he simultaneously informed Ahmad Pasha, by courier, that he would shortly be advancing on Baghdad, and bade him prepare for his reception.⁴

Having thus notified the Turks of his intentions, Nadir made his attitude plain to his own countrymen. After sending a strongly-worded message to the Shah's ministers, upbraiding them for their conduct in the matter of the peace treaty, he issued a remarkable manifesto to the "headmen, peoples and nobles of the kingdom," in which he called upon them all to know that, with divine aid, his sword had conquered cities and provinces, the Persian armies had been victorious, the Abdalis, having been defeated, were now well-disposed, and the Ghalzais had been subdued. He then referred to the peace treaty, saying :

"Verily this peace is, in the eyes of wisdom, naught but a picture upon water and a mere mirage (*sarab*); its fundamental object, namely, the deliverance of the Persian prisoners, was not accomplished, this important matter not being included in the treaty. . . . We wish to remove the evilness of transgressors from among Moslems and to cleanse the kingdom of all sources of evil. . . . The bearing of such a matter is far from honour and is repugnant to a proud nature. Since the frontiers (as laid down in the treaty) are contrary to the pleasure of the Divine Being and are opposed to what is expedient for the kingdom . . . we therefore did not sign (i.e. accept) it. . . ."

He went on to say that, after the 'Idu'l-Fitr (end of March, 1732) he would at once make war and would attain his object stage by stage, and concluded by stating that whoever did not join him would be :

"deprived of the attributes of honour and of the share of the bliss of the religious; his recompense shall be the curse of Allah and he shall be cast out from the community of Islam and numbered with the hosts of the Kharijites."⁵

It was evidently at this time that Nadir sent the letter to Muhammad

¹ T.N., p. 107. Cockell, in reporting this plot and its outcome to Gombroon, referred to Isma'il as a pretender (*Gombroon Diary*, 9th/20th May), but Mirza Mahdi regarded his claim as genuine.

² See p. 54 above.

³ T.N., p. 108, von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 283, *Asiatick Researches*, Vol. X, p. 536.

⁴ T.N., p. 108. Lord Kinnoull on the 3rd/14th June, announced the receipt at Constantinople of "very surprising news" from Ahmad Pasha, who had received a letter full of threats from Nadir. S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI.

⁵ The full text of the manifesto is given in the T.N., pp. 108-110. A verse from Hafiz is incorrectly quoted by Mirza Mahdi.

'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, which Sir John Malcolm has translated in *Asiatick Researches*.¹

In this letter Nadir denounced the Turkish treaty, and, in referring to his victories, spoke of "the happy auspices of the House of Haidar ('Ali) and the twelve holy Imams." He went on to say: "This day is big with ruin to their enemies and with joy to the sect of the Shiah, the discomfiture of the evil-minded is the glory . . . of the followers of 'Ali." He concluded by announcing his intention of resuming the Turkish war after the 'Idu'l-Fitr, and requesting the Beglarbegi to proceed to Isfahan and point out to the Shah why the treaty could not be respected.

In all probability it was Mirza Mahdi who drafted the manifesto and the above letter.

Although Nadir stigmatised the treaty to such an extent, it was not, however, so unfavourable to Persia as it might, under the circumstances, have been; in fact, as stated above, its provisions were regarded in Turkey as being definitely derogatory to that country.

Although it must have been galling to Nadir to see some of the fruits of his victories sacrificed by reason of Tahmasp's folly and incompetence, there can be but little doubt that, in reality, any annoyance which he felt on this score was outweighed by his satisfaction at being given such an opportunity for arraigning the Shah. He, in fact, could not have hoped for a better opening. The terms of his manifesto and of his letter to Muhammad 'Ali Khan show that he was expecting some opposition to the renewal of the Turkish war, and that he was determined to brook no interference from anyone. In fact, it is not going too far to say that his words were intended more as a challenge to Tahmasp and his supporters than as a threat to the Turks.² His references to the twelve Imams and his apparent championing of the Shi'a cause are of interest. It is difficult to believe, at this stage, that his words were inspired by any genuine enthusiasm for, and belief in, the Shi'a faith; it seems much more probable that he merely wished to excite and utilise Shi'a fanaticism for his own political ends; so long as the Shi'a ladder was of use to him in his upward progress, he would not kick it away. By wording his manifesto and letter as he did, Nadir aimed at rallying the majority of the Shi'a to his side against the Sunni enemy, and also at discrediting Tahmasp. If Tahmasp's followers refused to go to war against Turkey, they would be denounced as heretics; if they acquiesced in Nadir's policy, they would be acting against the wishes of their sovereign, and lowering his prestige.

After spending Nau Ruz at Herat, Nadir went to Mashhad whence he sent Hasan 'Ali Beg to Isfahan to give Tahmasp a further explanation

¹ Vol. X, pp. 533-539. Fasa'i quotes a few lines of this letter in the *Fars-Nama*, p. 170.

² See Sir J. Malcolm's remarks in *Asiatick Researches*, Vol. X, p. 527.

of his reasons for not accepting the treaty, and to request the Shah to meet him at Qum or Tehran in order to march jointly against the Turks.¹ With the object of strengthening his position, Nadir dismissed many provincial governors and replaced them with his own nominees.

Whilst at Mashhad, Nadir appointed an Abdali leader named 'Abdu'l-Ghani 'Ali Kuza'i² Governor of the tribe, and rewarded many other chiefs of that tribe; he then ordered them to be ready with horses, arms and provisions for the march to Persian 'Iraq. Having given orders for the circumambulation (*tawaf*) of the shrine of the Imam Riḍa and for the Imam's intercession to be invoked, he marched via Khabushan to Jajarm, whence, with a small force, he made a swift, but unsuccessful, dash northwards to the Balkhan Dagħ against the Turkomans. Whilst on this expedition he learnt that the Russians had completed their evacuation of Gilan. Rejoining his main army at Qusha (25 miles S.W. of Damghan), he went to Tehran, where he distributed the large sum of 50,000 tomans (£110,000) to his followers for the repair and renewal of their equipment.³ In the light of after-events, there can be no doubt that this lavish donation was in the nature of a bribe to the soldiery. It appears that Nadir had intended to march from Tehran via Farahan against the Turks, as already stated, he had sent a message to Tahmasp requesting him to join him either at Tehran or Qum. On Tahmasp refusing to leave Isfahan, Nadir marched straight to the capital, where he arrived on the 25th August.⁴ There are several versions of what subsequently occurred, which, although identical in essentials, differ in points of detail.

After Tahmasp and Nadir had exchanged ceremonial visits, the latter invited the Shah to a reception in the Hazarjarib garden. Nadir received Tahmasp with great respect, and conducted him to his private apartment. Thereupon Tahmasp:

"having summoned, as was customary, the lords and nobles of the state, expressed a desire for wine and musicians and called for the instruments of pleasure and the makers of joy (*arbab-i-tarab*). The Highness-with-the-rank-of-Alexander (Nadir),

¹ T.N., p. 111.

² He had been a partisan of Dhu'l-Fiqr, but had subsequently submitted to Nadir. See Sayyid Muhammad al-Musawi, *op. cit.*, fol. 7 (a).

³ T.N., p. 114.

⁴ *Ibid.* Mirza Mahdi adds that Tahmasp was acting in collusion with Ahmad Pasha, of Baghdad, but this is an exaggeration. What actually occurred is that Tahmasp wrote to Ahmad Pasha in regard to the threatened renewal of the war with Turkey, and excused himself by saying that he had no power "to govern Tamas Kuli Khan who with his victorious Army has power to do what he pleases, and will do what he pleases." Lord Kinnoull, who sent the gist of this letter to London, in his despatch of the 3rd/14th June, 1732 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI), added: "but this is only a political excuse in the Shah for breaking his last Treaty of peace with the Grand Sigr." Cockell reported to Gombroon on the 8th/19th July that Nadir intended "to break the peace with the Turks which His Majesty is entirely averse to, but to no purpose, having no power to Prevent his arbitrary Proceeding" (*Gombroon Diary*, 4th/15th August, 1732).

out of politeness, respect, and hospitality, obeyed, and prepared everything . . . and for three days and three nights His Majesty, in company with the worthless nobles, was occupied with drinking and pleasure. All the chiefs, cavalry leaders and commanders of the armies of 'Iraq and Khurasan obtained complete information as to what occurred. . . . His Majesty became intoxicated."¹

Nadir convened a great conference (*kingash*) of the Qizilbash and leaders, where the unsuitability of Tahmasp for his exalted position was emphasized. The people of Isfahan were then called upon to witness the condition of the Shah; thereupon, it is said,² all agreed to his deposition and the elevation of his infant son 'Abbas to the throne. There is no mention in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* of the Shah's drunkenness, but there seems, nevertheless, no reason to doubt not only that he took too much drink on this occasion, but that Nadir deliberately encouraged him to do so.³ The whole episode has the appearance of having been carefully planned beforehand.⁴

Cockell reported to Gombroon⁵ on the 19th/30th September that Nadir had proclaimed 'Abbas Mirza as Shah:

"under pretence of his Father having forfeited the Crown by his Lazy Indolent Management and his being a Sott and a Sodomite. That this struck such a Terror into the Nobility and Inhabitants that none had courage to oppose him. . . . Since which there has not been the least trouble and this unexpected Revolution has been brought to pass without any bloodshed."

According to Muḥammad Muḥsin's version, Tahmasp's deposition occurred six days after Nadir's arrival in Isfahan, that is, on the 31st August, 1732; Cockell, however, states that Nadir seized and imprisoned Tahmasp on the 22nd August (2nd September, N.S.), and had 'Abbas proclaimed Shah on the following day.⁶

Having successfully accomplished his *coup d'état*, Nadir sent Tahmasp, together with his harem and attendants, to Mashhad under strong guard on the 5th September.

It may well be asked why Nadir did not go one step further and mount the throne himself. Caution rather than modesty was doubtless the reason; he was not blind to the fact that there was still a strong feeling of loyalty throughout the country to the Ṣafavi dynasty, and therefore decided

¹ Z.T., fol. 215 (b) and 216 (a).

² *Ibid.*, fol. 216 (b).

³ Tahmasp probably needed but little encouragement, for the Carmelite monk, Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his *Persia ovvero Secondo Viaggio . . . dell'Oriente* (Rome, 1757), Vol. II, p. 155, said that he was "*molto dedito al vino*," a statement which is abundantly confirmed by other writers, such as Lutf 'Ali Beg, and by later authorities like Fasa'i, Mirza Muḥammad 'Ali (the author of the *Daura-yi-Mukhtasar-i-Ta'rikh-i-Iran*), etc.

⁴ Shaikh Hazin, p. 221.

⁵ Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th October.

⁶ *Ibid.*

that, strong though he was, it would be wiser to wait until he had still further increased the non-Persian element in his army before actually supplanting the ancient royal line.¹ After all, he had secured the substance of power, and was Shah in all but name; he could therefore well afford to wait until he could, without risk, make himself the *de jure* ruler of Persia.

On the 17th Rabi' I (7th September) the investiture of 'Abbas III took place at the Talar-i-Tawila palace. On the infant's cradle being brought forward, Nadir laid the *jiga* or aigrette of sovereignty by his head and placed a sword and shield beside him.² Homage was then rendered to the new monarch; for seven days and nights the drums sounded.

As the new Shah was only eight months old, the control of state affairs had obviously to be entrusted to a regent. It was no less obvious who the regent would be. Nadir, on taking this office, dropped the title of Tahmasp Quli Khan (by which he had been known since 1726), and adopted those of Wakilu'd-Daula and Na'ibu's-Saltana.

The news of the *coup d'état* was received at St. Petersburg with satisfaction, where Nadir was looked upon as having always been "a declar'd friend to Russia."³ Many at St. Petersburg believed that he would, as soon as he was firmly established, "find means to dispatch this young Sophy."⁴

Ambassadors were sent to Turkey, Russia and India to convey the tidings officially to the rulers of those countries. Muhammad 'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, who was appointed Ambassador to India, was instructed to repeat to the Emperor the request made through 'Ali Mardan Khan in 1730 for the Indian frontier to be closed to Afghan fugitives.⁵

In Constantinople the tidings of Tahmasp's deposition caused anxiety for the future.⁶ The Porte, besides preparing for a clash of arms in western Persia, determined to strengthen its influence in Daghistan and Shirvan, in order to threaten Nadir with attack from that quarter. Instructions were accordingly sent to Qaplan Girai, the Khan of the Crimea, to support the pro-Turkish elements in those provinces. Qaplan Girai therefore gave the titles of Vizier and Beglarbegi respectively to Surkhai Khan and his son Muhammad.⁷ On being pressed by the Porte to take more active steps, Qaplan Girai, early in 1733, dispatched his Qalgha,⁸

¹ In this connection, see Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 73.

² Z.T., fol. 216 (b). See also T.N., p. 116; Fraser (Cockell), pp. 108 and 109, and Rondeau, 2nd/13th December, 1732 (S.P. 91, Vol. X).

³ Rondeau, 30th December, 1732/10th January, 1733 (S.P. 91, Vol. X).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ T.N., p. 116.

⁶ Lord Kinnoull, 13th/24th December, 1732 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI).

⁷ Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, Part II, Division 1, p. 377.

⁸ The Qalgha or deputy of the Khan, was the highest dignitary in the Crimea, after the Khan himself. For further details, see Howorth, *op. cit.*, p. 610.

Fath Girai, with 20,000 Tatars, to Daghistan, with orders to raise the tribes there against Persia and to invade that country.¹ As Fath Girai, marching by the nearest route to Daghistan, crossed into Russian territory, great alarm was caused in St. Petersburg, and Nepluiev, the Russian Minister at Constantinople, lodged a vehement protest. Russo-Turkish relations entered a most critical phase when it became known that a battle had been fought in the Chechen territory between Fath Girai's army and 4,000 Russians under General Yeropkin, whom Count von Hesse-Homburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the Persian and Turkish frontier districts, had sent to oppose the Tatars. In this action the Russians were victorious, and forced the Tatars to retreat. Ultimately, Fath Girai and his men left Russian territory, and joined the Turkish forces in Adharbaijan and Georgia.²

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 218. Von Hammer's chronology is at fault in regard to the Khan of the Crimea; in this instance, he states that the Porte decided to create this diversion *after* Topal Osman's defeat and death in November, 1733. (See Vol. XIV, p. 311.)

² Rondeau, 11th/22nd August, S.P. 91, Vol. XV; Butkov, Vol. I, p. 121. Von Hammer is in error in stating, in his *Geschichte der Chane der Krim unter Osmanischer Herrschaft* (Vienna, 1856), p. 204, that Fath Girai, after reaching Eski Khodad, returned to the Crimea in obedience to orders received from the Porte.

CHAPTER VII

RESUMPTION OF THE WAR WITH TURKEY: NADIR'S MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

ALTHOUGH the supreme control of the affairs of the kingdom was now vested in Nadir, he was unable, owing to a revolt in the Bakhtiari country, to take the offensive against Turkey immediately.

This revolt was occasioned in the following way: the Governor of the Bakhtiari country, a local chieftain whom Nadir had appointed shortly before, put a man to death for insubordination. The tribesmen rose in large numbers to avenge the man's death, and killed the Governor. Some, fearing retribution, fled to the *garmsir* or hot country down by the Persian Gulf; their arrival there kindled a revolt by the Sunni Arabs of the coastal districts, who were led by that firebrand, Shaikh Ahmad Madani. For many months these rebels carried out raids in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbas, Cong, Basidu and elsewhere.²

Nadir, having given orders for the Bakhtiaris who had fled to the *garmsir* to be pursued and caught, left Isfahan for the Bakhtiari highlands on the 19th October. Marching via the sources of the Zayanda Rud and the Karun river, he traversed the heart of the Bakhtiari country; as he and his army advanced, the Bakhtiaris fell back before them and took refuge in their stronghold at Banavar. After enduring a siege lasting 21 days, the Bakhtiari defenders, in despair, made a sortie and bravely met their end, fighting to the last.³ Nadir, in pursuance of his usual policy, sent off 3,000 families of the Haft Lang branch of the Bakhtiaris to Khurasan.

Nadir then proceeded through Faili Luristan to Kirmanshah, which the Turks evacuated after a brief siege.⁴ During his halt at Kirmanshah he gave orders for the Zand tribe in the districts of Malayir and Qalamrau 'Ali Shakar to be severely punished for their continual depredations since the time of the Afghan invasion.⁵

Having been joined by his main forces, Nadir left Kirmanshah for the Turkish frontier on the 10th December. Hearing that Ahmad Pasha had fortified the frontier passes at Darna, Mandali and Badra and had

¹ T.N., p. 116. See also the *Tadhkira-yi-Shukhtariyya* (p. 67), by 'Abdullah ibn Nuri'd-Din.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 28th November/9th December, 1731. Shaikh Ahmad Madani, it will be recalled, had assisted Ashraf's brother and other fugitive Afghans to escape to 'Oman (see p. 44 above).

³ T.N., p. 116.

⁴ Z.T., fol. 216 (b), Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 76.

⁵ See Muhammad 'Adiq's *Ta'rikh-i-Giti-Gusha'i* (sometimes called the *Ta'rikh-i-Zandiyya*), B.M. MS., Add. 23524, fol. 4 (a).

posted strong forces at Zuhab and on the Taq-i-Girra, he resolved to surprise the Turks by attacking them from an unexpected direction. Striking north or north-east from the main road near Karind, he crossed the lofty Biwanij table-land into the Zimkan valley near Gahvarra, and, turning N.W. up the valley, went over the Gardana-yi-Yanakiz. During the ensuing night, he skirted the south and south-west flanks of the mountain immediately to the east of Zuhab and fell upon the Turks while it was still dark.¹ Many of the Turks were killed and their commander, Ahmad Pasha Bajilan, was amongst the captured.²

Having sent detachments to collect provisions from the neighbourhood of Buhriz and ordered his brother-in-law, Lutf 'Ali Beg Kusa Ahmadlu, the commander of the contingents from Adharbaijan, Ardalan and Hamadan, to cross the Turkish frontier further north and to join him on the Mesopotamian plain, Nadir, instead of marching direct on Baghdad, made a feint towards Kirkuk, in the hope of drawing Ahmad Pasha out of Baghdad. When a few miles beyond Tuz Khurmatli, he halted; after detaching 7,000 men to invest Kirkuk,³ he marched south to Qara Tappā where he was joined by Lutf 'Ali Khan and his army. He then proceeded via Tash Köprü towards Shahraban, crossing the Jabal Hamrin probably by the Saqal-Tutan pass. Having defeated 10,000 to 12,000 Turks near Shahraban, Nadir marched to Yangija, whence he endeavoured, during the night, to seize the bridge at Buhriz; in the darkness, however, he and his men went astray. On the following day the advance on Baghdad was resumed, and a reconnoitring Turkish force, under Muḥammad Pasha, was intercepted, many of the enemy being killed and wounded and the remainder captured.

On the 31st December 10,000 Persians crossed over to the west side of the Tigris at Samarra, in order to threaten Baghdad from that side. The main Persian force camped opposite the shrine of Kazimain, above Baghdad, on the 17th January, 1733, and three days later Nadir sent a body of *jazayirchis*⁴ to guard the shrine of Abu Ḥanifa at Mu'azzam; meanwhile, the Persians had seized the bridge at Buhriz.

Since the Turks had previously denuded the whole district of supplies and taken them to Baghdad, Nadir had to arrange for provisions for his forces to be brought from Tuz Khurmatli, Zuhab and Mandali.⁵

¹ This route is based largely on conjecture, some of the geographical details given by Mirza Mahdi (T.N., pp. 117 and 118) being incomprehensible.

² T.N., p. 118. There seems to be no evidence in support of von Hammer's statement (Vol. XIV, p. 284) that the Beg of Darna assisted Nadir on this occasion.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 119. Sulaiman Sa'igh, in his *Ta'rikhu'l-Maḥsil* (Cairo, 1923), p. 275, is incorrect in saying that Kirkuk was taken on this occasion. Von Hammer, following the Turkish historian Şubhi, is likewise in error in stating that Arbil was captured by Nadir's forces (Vol. XIV, p. 284). See Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, p. 138, note 1.

⁴ Infantry armed with the heavy musket known as the *jazayir*. ⁵ T.N., p. 121.

As the Turks had fortified the right bank of the Tigris opposite the Persian camp, Nadir determined to cross the river and turn their position. With the aid of a foreign engineer,¹ a floating bridge, consisting of palm-trunks laid upon inflated skins, was constructed and placed in position, apparently some distance upstream from Baghdad. On the 1st Ramaḍān (15th February) Nadir crossed over with 2,500 men and was followed the next day by another 1,500; the bridge then broke asunder. Without waiting for these 1,500 men, Nadir set out in the direction of Baghdad. Hearing of the Persian advance on the western side of the river, Aḥmad Pasha dispatched a strong body of Janissaries, with cavalry and artillery in support, to meet the enemy. When the two armies met, the Turkish infantry proved more than a match for the Qarachorlu Kurds and Göklān Turkomans whom Nadir had with him, but the Afghan troops stood firm. The position was becoming extremely critical when the 1,500 troops mentioned above most opportunely made their appearance, and enabled Nadir to rout the Turks. This victory gave him the mastery of the west bank of the Tigris and enabled him to draw his cordon tightly round Baghdad. The Turks opposite the Persian camp retired within the walls of the city, leaving their cannon and equipment there and at Old Baghdad² to the Persians.³ At Nadir's orders, detachments of his army occupied Samarra, Hilla, Karbala, Najaf and other places, to all of which Persian Governors were appointed.⁴

The fragments of the broken bridge were then collected, and floated down to Kazimain; there they were joined together and strengthened by means of boats which had been captured from the Turks.⁵

The city was now completely blockaded. The Persians, like the Ghalzais surrounding Isfahan in 1722, had no proper siege artillery, and although the city was bombarded with some vigour, the walls could not be breached sufficiently to enable an assault to be launched.⁶ Nadir therefore

¹ According to the Bombay edition of the *T.N.* (p. 121) this man had been sent on a mission to Nadir by "the Austrian (or German) King" (the adjective used is *Namsa*, which can mean either "Austrian" or "German"). There is no record in the Haus-, Hof- und Staats-Archiv at Vienna of any diplomatic mission having been sent to Persia at that time; it is most unlikely that any German mission would have been sent, and it is probable that the engineer was some European adventurer.

² Mirza Mahdi's *Kuhna Baghdad* ("Old Baghdad") is evidently the same as the area marked by Niebuhr as *Ruinen von Alt Baghdad*, just north of the portion of the city situated on the west bank of the Tigris; it is obviously distinct from the ruins of the Sasanian town of Daskara and the later Arab town of Dastajird which are now known as Eski Baghdad (See Niebuhr's *Reisebeschreibung*, Copenhagen, 1778, Vol. II, Table XLIV).

³ *T.N.*, p. 123.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123. Muḥammad Muḥsin, fol. 216 (b).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁶ Nadir's manner of conducting this siege was in marked contrast to that of Sultan Murad IV in 1638. Otter (Vol. I, p. 321) rightly described Nadir's operations as a blockade rather than a siege.

had to rely upon famine within the city rather than upon his cannon to make Aḥmad Pasha yield.

The Persians constructed extraordinarily elaborate fortifications. They built strong forts on each side of the Tigris nine miles above Baghdad, and ringed the city round with no less than 2,700 towers, each one a musket-shot from the other.¹

'Abdu'l-'Alī, the Shaikh of the Bani Lam Arabs, having joined Nadir, the latter arranged for him to co-operate with the Governor of Ḥawiza in an attack on Baṣra. A siege of the town was threatened for a time, but the troops designed for the purpose soon dispersed,² the Arabs, it is said, going back on their word, while the Persian troops were called away to suppress a rebellion in the province of Lar.³

According to the *Gombroon Diary*, Nadir, besides wishing to capture Baṣra, also intended for a time to send an expeditionary force against Muscat,⁴ but nothing came of this project at that time; as will be seen later, it was subsequently revived and put into execution.

The descriptions of the sufferings of the inhabitants of Baghdad recall those of the people of Isfahan in 1722; large numbers died from famine and disease.⁵ Hanway describes how Nadir derisively sent several cart-loads of water-melons into the city and how Aḥmad Pasha, in return, presented Nadir with a quantity of the best bread.⁶

Nadir, in order to discourage the defenders, caused, every fortnight or so, bodies of 10,000 to 12,000 of his troops to leave their lines quietly by night, make a short march into the desert, and rejoin the camp the next morning with colours flying, as though they had just arrived to reinforce the besiegers.⁷ By the end of Muḥarram, 1146 (13th July) the plight of Baghdad was such that Aḥmad Pasha had to send envoys to Nadir to arrange the terms for its surrender.

Deliverance for the besieged was, however, near at hand, for the Turkish relieving force, under Topal 'Osman Pasha, was approaching from the north. On realising that Baghdad was in great jeopardy, the Porte had

¹ Fuller particulars of these fortifications are given in the letter which Jean Nicodème, the French physician who accompanied Topal 'Osman Pasha, wrote to the Marquis de Villemur on the 10th August, 1733, after Topal 'Osman's victory over Nadir and his relief of Baghdad (see von Hammer, Vol. XIV, pp. 525 and 526).

² Letter from Martin French, the Baṣra representative of the East India Co., to the London office of the latter, 19th/30th March, 1733 (Vol. XV of the I.O. records). Muḥammad Muḥsin is incorrect in saying (Z.T., fol. 216 (b)) that Baṣra was captured.

³ T.N., p. 124. Shaikh Ahmad Madani went to the aid of these rebels.

⁴ See the entry on the 22nd April/3rd May, 1733, stating that the Agent had received a letter from Nadir requesting him to have shipping in readiness to transport a force to Muscat.

⁵ The Armenian Joseph Emin, who went through the siege when a child of 7, gives an account of his experiences in his *Life and Adventures*, London, 1792, p. 20.

⁶ Hanway, Vol. IV, pp. 82 and 83. See also the story recounted by Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁷ See the French translation of Aḥmad Pasha's despatch to the Porte, in La Mamye-Clairac's Vol. III, p. 301.

no hesitation in seeking out its most distinguished soldier, the disgraced ex-Grand Vizier Topal 'Osman (who was then Governor of Erivan); it gave him the rank of Sar'askar or Generalissimo, and placed him in command of a relieving force consisting of some 80,000 men, drawn mainly from the European provinces of Turkey. Topal 'Osman made rapid progress at first, but his advance became slower after passing Mosul, because of the numerous rivers to be crossed; furthermore, when he approached Kirkuk, the devastated state of the country rendered the victualling of his troops a difficult matter.

A day or so after Ahmad Pasha had opened the negotiations for the surrender of Baghdad, he received a message from Topal 'Osman to the effect that he was marching to his relief as quickly as he could. Ahmad Pasha read out in public the letter from Topal 'Osman, but the people refused to believe that it was genuine until they had been shown the seal and signature upon it.¹ It was doubtless the receipt of this message that caused Ahmad Pasha to prevaricate, and stipulate that the city should not be handed over to Nadir until the end of Šafar (11th August).

On leaving Kirkuk (which had managed to resist the force that Nadir had sent against it when he was about to march on Baghdad), Topal 'Osman made for the Tigris and marched along its banks, so as to protect the boats carrying his provisions, as well as to have water for his men. Nadir sent word to Topal 'Osman that he would be ready to give him battle whenever he pleased; the Sar'askar retained the messenger and sent no answer.

In order to meet the coming attack, Nadir dispatched all his army northwards, except for a skeleton force of 12,000 men. He ordered the withdrawal to be done in such manner that the besieged should not know that "one drop of that boundless ocean" had ebbed away.² He did not leave the Persian lines outside Baghdad until the evening of the 6th Šafar (18th July), and joined his army on the following morning, just before the battle began. The exact site of this battle is difficult to determine, as the names given by von Hammer and other authorities have undergone such mutilation; von Hammer states that the battle was fought at Douldjeilik, by the banks of the Tigris, thirty leagues from Baghdad,³ while, according to Martin French, it took place at Jadida.⁴

Topal 'Osman had stationed his men by the river, where they were

¹ *Ibid.*

² *T.N.*, p. 125.

³ Vol. XIV, p. 290. "Douldjeilik" suggests some place on the Tigris close to Dujail (the latter place, though at more or less the distance from Baghdad indicated by von Hammer, is some miles west of the river).

⁴ See French's letter from Basra to London dated the 6th/17th August, 1733. There is a village named Khan Jadida on the left bank of the Tigris 20 miles north of Baghdad.

strongly entrenched, with their cannon in position ; in numbers they were slightly superior to the Persians.

The battle began at 8 a.m., when the opposing advance-guards encountered each other ; soon after, the cannon of the Turkish rear-guard opened fire on a large body of Persians who had marched round and attacked from the north-east. The main attack was launched an hour later by Nadir, at the head of 50,000 men ; the Persian and Afghan infantry, who were in three divisions, forced the Turkish centre back, and captured some of their cannon ; the position of the Turks seemed highly critical when 2,000 of their Kurdish auxiliaries fled. Topal 'Osman, however, did his utmost to rally his troops and sent forward his reserve force, consisting of 20,000 men, with the result that the Persian attack was stemmed and the lost cannon recaptured. Nadir himself was in the thick of the fighting ; while leading the attack on the Turkish artillery, his horse was wounded and fell. He promptly mounted another horse and rode again into the fray.¹

The wind being from the north, the dust and smoke raised by the combat were blown in the faces of the Persians, and the July sun blazed fiercely down upon them. After several hours of desperate fighting all ranks were suffering terribly from thirst,² but no water was obtainable, as the Turks were in possession of the river bank.

On Nadir's second horse being wounded, it fell on its head and threw him to the ground. Though he was at once provided with another steed, many of his troops, on seeing him fall, imagined that he had been wounded or killed, and a panic ensued which the Persian officers were unable to check.³ Seeing that further efforts were useless, Nadir retreated from the field with such of the survivors of his army who had not fled. The casualties on the two sides are variously estimated ; the Persians appear to have lost over 30,000 killed, while 3,000 were taken prisoner.⁴ All Nadir's artillery,⁵ baggage and provisions were left in the hands of the Turks ; altogether, it was a signal triumph for Topal 'Osman, for the Persian army was shattered, and the way to Baghdad now lay open ; the victory, however, was not quite complete, for Nadir himself had escaped.

¹ *T.N.*, p. 126.

² Both Mirza Mahdi and Muḥammad Muḥsin speak of the agonies of thirst of the Persians. (See *T.N.*, p. 126, *Darra-yi-Nadira*, pp. 123-5 and *Z.T.*, folio 216 (b).)

³ *T.N.*, p. 127.

⁴ Nicodème, at one end of the scale, puts the Persian losses in killed at 40,000, while Mirza Mahdi, at the other, says that only 2,000 fell ! There can be no doubt that the Persian losses were very heavy, and 30,000 seems to be a reasonable figure. Many Persians were killed after the battle as they were quenching their thirst by the side of the Tigris.

⁵ Nicodème (von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 523) says that the Persians left all their cannon on the field, including four 30-pounders, six 15-pounders and eight 9-pounders. There were also 500 camels "avec des ambares" (? *zamburaks*). Almost all the Persians' horses and beasts of burden were taken.

The Turks had by no means escaped scatheless, as they lost some 20,000 men.

It cannot be denied that Nadir's generalship was very much at fault in this campaign. He would surely have been better advised either to wait within his fortified lines outside Baghdad, and make Topal 'Osman advance that much further and attack him there, or else to have left Baghdad at an earlier date and attacked the Sar'askar when he was crossing the Greater or the Lesser Zab. Instead of following either of these courses, Nadir gave battle at a spot that was very disadvantageous for himself and his men. One can only assume that he was over-confident on this occasion.

As soon as the news of Topal 'Osman's victory reached Baghdad, Ahmad Pasha made a sortie, and overwhelmed the 12,000 troops who were manning Nadir's fortifications; he then cut the bridge of boats and captured all the Persians' supplies. Many of the Persian troops were killed, but a number of survivors on the west side of the Tigris escaped by devious ways to Persia, their flight being facilitated by the Bani Lam.¹

Topal 'Osman, having spent the evening of the 19th July and the following two days resting his troops and attending to the wounded, resumed his march, and on the 23rd July he and his army camped within sight of the forts and towers erected by the Persians round Baghdad. Soon afterwards Ahmad Pasha arrived at the Turkish camp. On the following day, the 24th July, Topal 'Osman entered Baghdad. At the Sar'askar's request, no special honours were accorded him, since, as he said, "to God only is victory to be attributed." In the words of Nicodème, it seemed that Topal 'Osman and those with him were entering a tomb rather than a town; the dead lay piled up in heaps, and thousands of people were suffering from hunger or disease. It was said that 110,000 persons had perished during the siege.²

Such was the devastation wrought by the Persians in the country around Baghdad that Topal 'Osman, after a halt of eight days some seven miles from the city, had to withdraw the bulk of his troops to Kirkuk, in order to prevent them from dying of starvation.

Nadir and the remnants of his army made their way via Buhriz to Mandali, and were joined *en route* by some of the survivors of the skeleton besieging force which Ahmad Pasha had routed.³ The Persian soldiers were in a sorry plight, many being on foot and almost naked⁴; what happened to the wounded is not recorded.

Although Nadir's conduct of the siege of Baghdad and of the operations

¹ *T.N.*, p. 127.

² *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 127.

³ Nicodème (Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 527).

⁴ *Z.T.*, fol. 217 (a).

against Topal 'Osman is open to criticism, his behaviour after his defeat deserves the highest praise. The disaster, he said, had been ordained by Fate, at whose decrees it was useless to revile.¹ In this spirit he set about the stupendous task of reconstituting his army.

Nadir held a conference with his principal officers at Mandali, and gave his men leave to return to their homes to refit.² He issued urgent orders to all parts of the country for arms and equipment of all kinds, together with baggage animals, to be collected; the artillery and munitions were to be of better quality and greater in quantity than before.³ Instructions were issued to the provincial authorities to see to the refitting of their troops (who were to be at Hamadan in two months' time) and to enrol recruits.

On the 4th August, Nadir arrived at Hamadan, and attended in person to his great task. He ordered 200,000 tomans (approximately £440,000) to be distributed to the troops to compensate them for their losses and to enable them to purchase new equipment; every man who had lost a horse worth ten tomans was given one worth double that amount, and the same principle was followed in regard to camels, tents and arms.⁴

In the relatively short space of two months the gigantic work was accomplished, and, on the 22nd Rabi' II (2nd October), Nadir left Hamadan for the Turkish frontier with his reconstituted army.⁵ On reaching Kirmanshah, he heard that Fulad Pasha, of Adana, was stationed on the Diyala river, a few miles beyond Zuhab, in order to guard against an advance on Kirkuk. As on his previous march, Nadir left his baggage and artillery behind and, marching by mountain tracks, aimed at surprising the enemy. The attempt was less successful than on the previous occasion, but the Turks, after a skirmish had taken place, beat a retreat.

It was at this juncture that the news first reached Nadir⁶ that Muhammad Khan Baluch had revolted. Nadir's exactions had made him unpopular and his treatment of Tahmasp had outraged the feelings of many Persians who had not, however, hitherto dared to show their sentiments openly. It was reported in Isfahan in April, 1733,⁷ that Nadir had sent for Tahmasp with the object of reinstating him, but that he, after his defeat, changed his mind and ordered Tahmasp to be retained in Mashhad, because, under the altered circumstances, the ex-Shah's rule would have been "inexpedient

¹ *T.N.*, p. 128.

² *Tadhkira-yi-Shushtariyya*, p. 68.

³ *Z.T.*, fol. 217 (a).

⁴ *T.N.*, pp. 128-129.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130, and *Durr-i-Nadira*, p. 129.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132. It is stated in the *Gombroon Diary*, under the date 25th October/5th November, 1733, that reports had been current for some little time that Muhammad Khan Baluch had rebelled and had declared in favour of Tahmasp.

⁷ See the *Gombroon Diary*, 26th June/7th July, 1733.

and a hindrance."¹ It was, no doubt, Nadir's change of mind that caused many of the Safavi faction² to join Muhammad Khan Baluch.³

Nadir felt that this revolt was not of sufficient gravity to cause him to postpone his Turkish campaign and resolved to deal with it after he had finished with the Turks.

It is impossible to recount with any pretence to accuracy the course of events between the skirmish by the Diyala and the battle of Lailan, because the geographical data given by Mirza Mahdi and Hanway are vague and fanciful in the extreme.⁴ It seems that Nadir advanced towards Kirkuk much as he had done previously, but his object on this second occasion was entirely different. He was aiming not at luring Ahmad Pasha away from Baghdad, but at meeting with and crushing Topal 'Osman Pasha. If he could defeat Topal 'Osman, his lost prestige would be regained, and Baghdad in the south and Tabriz in the north would both be at his mercy.

Topal 'Osman was under no illusions as to his position. His losses in the battle of the 19th July had not been made good, despite repeated requests to Constantinople not only for reinforcements, but also for a younger man to take his place. Nadir, on the other hand, now had an army even more numerous and better equipped than before.

By the 24th October, Nadir had reached the plain of Lailan, a few miles S.E. of Kirkuk, and an engagement took place between detachments of his force and of Topal 'Osman's army; both sides claimed the victory, but the advantage rested, apparently, with the Turks.⁵ Topal 'Osman, however, kept his main force within its defences. Nadir thereupon marched off to the north-east and captured the fortress of Surdash, in the hope that Topal 'Osman would emerge from Kirkuk and march to its relief. Part of the Turkish forces fell into Nadir's trap, for scouts brought him word, when he was at a place called Qara Tappa,⁶ that Mamish Pasha, with 12,000 men, had entered the Aq Darband defile.⁷

Taking a route which was thought to be impracticable, Nadir marched his men over the hills and into the defile at a point above the Turkish position. On the following day (9th November), after sending some

¹ F.N., p. 130.

² The direct descent of the Safavi monarchs from 'Ali, through Husain and the Imam Musa al-Kazim, caused them to be much venerated by their Shi'a subjects. See Shaikh Hazin, p. 241.

³ Muhammad Khan was also joined by numbers of Baluch, Arabs and Khuzistan tribesmen. See Mirza Muhammad Shirazi's autobiography, p. 11.

⁴ See Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁵ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, pp. 291 and 292, Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 97.

⁶ Qara Tappa is not marked on existing maps; it is obviously distinct from the Qara Tappa just to the north of the Jabal Hamrin.

⁷ There is a description of this defile in C. J. Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, London, 1836, Vol. I, pp. 58-59.

jazayirchis to make a *détour* and to get across the Turks' line of retreat, he advanced to the attack.

Soon after the battle between the Persians and Mamish Pasha and his men had begun, the main Turkish force under Topal 'Osman arrived, and joined in the fray. For two hours a tremendous fire was kept up by both sides¹; then the Persian troops, being anxious to wipe out the memory of their previous defeat, made a furious charge and drove in the Turkish centre. Topal 'Osman thereupon left his litter, and, having mounted a horse, made a desperate endeavour to rally his men,² but a fierce flank attack by the Abdalis caused the Turks to give way again. The day was irretrievably lost when the brave Topal 'Osman was shot down. The unfortunate Sar'askar's head was then cut off, stuck on the point of a lance and taken in triumph to Nadir. The whole Turkish army was in flight by this time, and heavy casualties were inflicted upon the fugitives by the well-directed fire of the *jazayirchis* whom Nadir had previously detached for this purpose. At a conservative estimate, the Turks lost some 20,000 men in killed and prisoners.³

Nadir caused Topal 'Osman's body to be recovered and sent it, together with the head, to Baghdad for burial, in charge of a Turkish qađi named 'Abdu'l-Karim Efendi, who was one of the prisoners taken in the battle.

After the battle, Nadir ordered a force under Baba Khan Chaushlu, the Begiarbegi of Luristan, who was then near Samarra, to cross the Tigris, and reoccupy Hilla, Najaf and Karbala and prevent supplies from reaching Baghdad. As there was, apparently, no hope of relief for Ahmad Pasha, Nadir left enough troops to blockade Baghdad while he himself marched northwards to recover Tabriz. On reaching the town of Bana, he learnt that Timur Pasha, on hearing of the Turkish defeat at Aq Darband, had evacuated Tabriz and that a Persian force had re-occupied it.⁴ There being no longer any necessity to proceed to Adharbaijan, he marched southwards again in order to effect a junction with his forces that were blockading Baghdad. He was confident that the city would speedily fall into his hands, but, on reaching Tuz Khurmatli, he received disquieting news of Muhammad Khan Baluch's rebellion.⁵

¹ See the interesting letter which Nadir wrote to the Count of Hesse-Homburg regarding this battle; a French translation of this letter was sent by Lord Forbes and C. Rondeau from St. Petersburg to London on the 2nd/13th February, 1734 (S.P. 91, Vol. XVI). In this letter, which appears to have been written towards the end of Nov., 1733, the names and dates have suffered some distortion in the process of translation from Persian to Russian and from Russian to French.

² Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 98. Mirza Mahdi alleges that Topal 'Osman only mounted a horse in order to escape, but this does not seem in accordance with the Sar'askar's character.

³ No reliance can be placed upon Mirza Mahdi's figures; while, in the T.N. (p. 135), he states that 10,000 Turks were killed and 3,000 captured, he raises the number of killed to 20,000 in the *Durra-ye Nadira* (p. 137). Hanway's figure of 40,000 killed seems far too high.

⁴ T.N., p. 136, and Nadir's letter to Count von Hesse-Homburg.

⁵ For particulars of the progress of this revolt and its suppression, see pp. 77 to 79.

Nevertheless, he did not deem the situation in Khuzistan and Fars sufficiently critical for him to proceed there in person ; instead, he therefore sent orders to Tahmasp Khan Jalayir (who was then at Isfahan) and to Isma'il Khan Khazima, the new Governor of Kuhgilu,¹ and other provincial authorities and leaders to co-operate in crushing the revolt.

From Tuz Khurmatli Nadir marched to Samarra and thence to the Persian investment lines round Baghdad. On the 7th December, Ahmad Pasha sent a confidential messenger to Nadir ; this man, after showing Ahmad's authority to conclude a treaty of peace, delivered his offer to restore the conquered territories to Persia.

After negotiations extending over several days, Nadir and Ahmad Pasha reached agreement and signed the treaty on the 19th December, 1733. The provisions of this treaty were, briefly, as follows :

- (i) Turkey agreed to relinquish all the Persian territory conquered during the last ten years and to revert to the frontier laid down by the Turco-Persian treaty of 1639.
- (ii) The prisoners taken by both nations were to be released, and the captured cannon restored.
- (iii) Persian pilgrims visiting the holy places in Turkish territory in the vicinity of the frontier were to be accorded certain privileges.

It can be regarded as certain that, had it not been for the rebellion of Muhammad Khan Baluch, Nadir would have refused to agree to any terms that did not include the surrender of Baghdad.

In accordance with the provisions of this treaty, Ahmad Pasha forthwith sent orders to the Pashas of Ganja, Shirvan, Erivan and Tiflis to evacuate their respective territories and to set at liberty all their Persian prisoners. Nadir, in return, liberated all the Turkish prisoners in his hands.

Costly presents were exchanged between Nadir and Ahmad Pasha, and arrangements were made for the former to visit the shrines at Kazimain, Najaf and Karbala.²

Before leaving the vicinity of Baghdad, Nadir gave two letters for the Grand Vizier to the Qadi 'Abdu'l-Karim Efendi, who was to take the treaty to Constantinople for ratification ; in these letters he drew attention to the common origin of the Ottoman Turks and the Turkomans (he always regarded himself as one of the latter), and pointed out that this was a reason for concluding peace.³

Martin French reported to London from Basra that 90 days were allowed for the ratification of the treaty to be received from the Porte.

¹ Nadir, on hearing of Muhammad Khan's revolt, had dismissed him from this post, and had appointed Isma'il Khan Khazima in his stead.

² T.N., pp. 137-138.

³ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 335.

According to Lord Kinnoull, Aḥmad Pasha did not expect the Porte to ratify the treaty; in an explanation of the circumstances under which he had been compelled to sign it, he said that he only agreed to its terms as a means of gaining time, since he could not possibly have held out for another month.¹

The Qaḍi 'Abdu'l-Karim Efendi reached Constantinople in the middle of February, 1734. After several councils had been held to consider the treaty, the Porte rejected it on the grounds that it was dishonourable. Although the Sultan and his ministers approved of Aḥmad Pasha's conduct under such difficult circumstances, they nevertheless dismissed him from his post as Governor of Baghdad, doubtless because of the machinations of his arch-enemy 'Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier.² In accordance with the decision taken, the orders which Aḥmad Pasha had sent to the Pashas of Ganja, Shirvan, Erivan and Tiflis were disregarded, and more troops were sent to reinforce the Sar'askar 'Abdullah Köprülü (who had been raised to that rank on the death of Topal 'Osman) at Diarbakr. The Porte nevertheless sent no message to Nadir expressly denouncing the treaty; instead, it endeavoured for a time to make him believe that the question was still under consideration and that a lasting settlement would shortly be made.

The Russian court had followed with interest, and, at times, with anxiety, the course of the Turco-Persian campaign. The news of Nadir's defeat by Topal 'Osman caused considerable perturbation, it being feared that Persia would be forced to come to terms with Turkey and that the French Ambassador at Constantinople (the Marquis de Villeneuve) would then succeed in inducing the Porte to go to war with Russia.³ Russia was already deeply involved in the war of the Polish Succession, and would have been faced with a critical situation had Turkey been able to yield to the importunities of France and attack her; it was only the continuance

¹ Despatch dated the 18th February/1st March, 1734 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVII).

² Aḥmad Pasha was appointed Governor of Aleppo, but he was at his own request appointed to Urfa instead. See Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

³ French policy in relation to Turkey and Russia had undergone a complete change; whereas in 1723 and 1724, France had played the part of mediator (see p. 11 and 12 above), in 1733 she was just as actively engaged in endeavouring to fan into flame the increasing animosity between the two powers, because of the intervention of Russia in the war of the Polish Succession on the side of Augustus of Saxony. France had espoused the cause of Stanislaus Leszczyński, the father-in-law of Louis XV. (See F. Martens's *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Étrangères*, Vol. I, p. 70 and Vol. XIII, pp. 42-43). Great Britain, which in 1723 and 1724 had tried to embroil Russia and Turkey in war, now, on the other hand, played the rôle of peace-maker. Villeneuve used every endeavour to put fresh spirit into Turkey, and in this task he had an unofficial, but very efficient coadjutor in the person of that strange adventurer, Bonneval; the latter did a great deal to make the Turkish army more efficient. As A. Vandal has said (*op. cit.*, p. 175), the French adventurer "en peu de temps . . . accomplit le miracle d'habituer une troupe dont il ne connaissait point la langue à évoluer avec une précision qui eût fait envie au plus habile régiment de France ou d'Allemagne."

of the war with Persia which compelled Turkey to keep the peace with Russia. The march of Fath Girai to Daghistan, the resulting submission of many of the northern Caucasian tribes to Turkey, and the action with the Russian forces in the Chechen territory were additional causes of anxiety and tension. The situation was greatly eased as far as Russia was concerned when Nadir decisively defeated the Turks in the great battle in which Topal 'Osman lost his life. The Porte was thrown into the utmost consternation on receiving the news of this battle, and the hopes of the Marquis de Villeneuve for an early termination of the Turco-Persian war were completely shattered; the French Ambassador had been hoping, once peace with Persia was concluded, to bring about the reappointment of Topal 'Osman Pasha as Grand Vizier, and then to engage Turkey and Russia in war.¹ The Russian court was, as was natural, proportionately relieved when it received the news of Nadir's great victory.²

After Nadir had visited the shrines at Kazimain, Najaf³ and Karbala, he sent off his artillery to Isfahan via Khurramabad. Taking the desert route via Hawiza to Shushtar, he seized and put to death the Governor and imprisoned many of the inhabitants of the latter place because they had aided Muhammad Khan Baluch.⁴ He then proceeded to Ram Hormuz; leaving his baggage there, he marched light towards Behbahan. Hearing that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and the Beglarbegi of Kuhgilu had joined forces and were marching on Muhammad Khan Baluch, Nadir effected a junction with these commanders at Du Gunbadan, and pressed on towards the Shulistan defile, where the rebel leader, with 15,000 men, was reported to be.⁵ When the Persian advance guard appeared, Muhammad Khan, who had had no news of Nadir's coming, imagined that it was merely an isolated body of troops, and hastened to attack it. He was disillusioned when he saw the main Persian force arrive, and heard Nadir, in his voice of thunder, issuing orders to his men.⁶

¹ Lord Kinnoull, 1st/12th December, 1733 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVI).

² Lord Forbes's despatch from St. Petersburg of 8th/19th December, 1733 (S.P. 91, Vol. XV).

³ Dr. D. M. Donaldson, in his work *The Shi'ite Religion: A History of Islam in Persia and Iraq* (London, 1933), p. 62, states that a curious story was related to him in Najaf to the effect that Nadir, on hearing that wine would turn into vinegar on being brought into the city and that no dog would enter it, took a bottle of wine with him when approaching Najaf and also determined to make his dog enter the city. The dog, however, remitted so strongly all efforts to make him pass through the gate that he had to be killed, and Nadir found, after he himself had made his entry, that his wine had, in fact, turned to vinegar. It was said that Nadir, in consequence of these and other miracles, professed his belief in the Shi'a Imams and became convinced of the righteousness of their claims. Needless to say, this story has no basis in fact.

⁴ T.N., p. 138, *Durra-yi-Nadira*, pp. 139-140, *Tadhkira-y-Shushtariyya*, p. 69.

⁵ Baron de Bode, who passed through this district in January, 1841, stated in his *Travels in Luristan and Arabistan* (London, 1845), Vol. I, p. 239, that, close to Fahliyan, "is the Tepeh (*Tappa*), or hillock of Senjar-Muhammed Belu, on which the chief so named made a stand against Nadir Shah, for which piece of temerity . . . he forfeited his head."

⁶ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 111.

Muhammad Khan Baluch's army was entirely defeated, and fled from the field, leaving 3,000 dead. Though pursued by Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, Muhammad Khan escaped to Shiraz and thence to Jahrum and Lar. He was refused admittance into Lar, and hastened on to the *garmsir*.

When Nadir found that his quarry had slipped through his fingers, he sent messages to both the English and Dutch Agents at Gombroon to send vessels without delay to patrol the coast and prevent Muhammad Khan and his followers from escaping. The two Agents replied that the ports were so numerous that they could not keep watch over all with the scanty shipping available, but promised to send vessels to any specified place.¹

Meanwhile Tahmasp Khan Jalayir had pursued Muhammad Khan to Shaikh Ahmad Madani's stronghold near Charak, and had begun the siege of that fortress. At the beginning of May the place was taken by assault and Shaikh Ahmad was captured, but Muhammad Khan and a few others escaped to the island of Qais.²

It was at this juncture that a certain Latif Khan reached Gombroon and gave the English and Dutch Agents letters stating that Nadir had appointed him :

"His Admiral of the Gulph, with Orders to Purchase Shipping of the Europeans of Gombroon. He therefore required our Compliance with the Caun's Desires in sparing Two Ships for their service which they should be paid for. . . ."

This message is of decided interest, as it is the first indication of Nadir's desire to form a fleet. It is remarkable that he, an unlettered man of peasant stock, coming from a province remote from the sea, should so quickly have grasped the importance of sea power. No less noteworthy was the persistence with which he afterwards sought to bring his naval plans to fruition. The escape of some of the Ghalzais to 'Oman and of Muhammad Khan Baluch to Qais had brought home to him the impossibility of having the long stretch of coast from the head of the Gulf to Gwadar efficiently patrolled when, having no vessels of his own, he had to depend upon the occasional loan of European or Arab ships. As the English and Dutch almost invariably prevaricated when asked to lend their ships or to co-operate with the Persian land forces, and as the Arabs who possessed vessels were usually in sympathy with those against whom the Government wished to take action and were often in revolt themselves, Nadir certainly had a sound reason for wishing to have a fleet of his own. As will be explained in due course, Nadir's naval aims were of a more

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 3rd/14th February, 1734.

² *Ibid.*, 8th/19th May, 1734. and *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 141.

³ *Ibid.*, 7th/18th May, 1734.

ambitious order than mere patrolling of the coast ; how he carried out his plans will be described in the following chapter.

On this occasion, neither the English nor the Dutch would sell any vessels to Latif, but, after suggesting that the Persians might purchase ships at Surat,¹ they each lent a couple of vessels for the purpose of blockading Qais : Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and the powerful Huwala chief, Shaikh Jabbara of Tahiri and Bahrain, also provided ships. A close blockade of Qais ensued, and Muḥammad Khan Baluch was thereby prevented from escaping from the island ; he was eventually captured and sent in chains to Isfahan. On his arrival there, he was, at Nadir's orders, blinded and three days later he died² ; it is uncertain whether he took his own life or perished as a result of the treatment which he had received.

Tahmasp Khan put Shaikh Aḥmad Madani to death, and had many of the refractory Arab tribesmen of the Gulf ports (*banadir*) and of the Hawiza district transported to Khurasan and Astarabad. Further, he rased their fortresses to the ground, and made Shaikh Jabbara collect an indemnity of 10,000 tomans from Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and other Arab chiefs who had espoused, or been sympathetic to, the rebel cause. The power of these Arabs was thus entirely broken.³

¹ Surat-built ships were famous for their lasting qualities. An entry in the *Bombay Consultations*, dated the 31st May, 1734, states that ships built of teak in the Surat manner either at that place or at Bombay were far more durable and suited to the climate than any vessels built in Europe. Particulars of the durability of Surat ships and of the manner in which they were built are given by the Dutch Rear-Admiral J. S. Stavorinus in his *Voyages to the East Indies* (S. H. Wilcocks's English translation, London, 1798), Vol. III, pp. 17-23.

² *T.N.*, pp. 143 and 144.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 29th June/10th July, 1734.

CHAPTER VIII

NADIR'S CAMPAIGNS, 1734-6 : BEGINNINGS OF HIS NAVY

WHILST Tahmasp Khan Jalayir was completing his subjugation of the Gulf coastal districts, Nadir went to Shiraz, where he remained for over two and a half months ; during his stay there, he appointed Mirza Muhammad Taqi Khan Shirazi Deputy-Governor of Fars. This Mirza Muhammad Taqi Khan, who was *mustaufi* of Shiraz, was the son of Hajji Muhammad ; from generation to generation this family had had in their possession the post of *mir-ab* or chief of the water supply of Shiraz and Qumisha.¹ Taqi Khan, although not gifted as a military leader or as an administrator, afterwards made extraordinary progress, owing to the influence which, for some unexplained reason, he was able to acquire over Nadir.

On the 18th April, 1734, Nadir left Shiraz for Isfahan, and heard while he was on his way that a son had been born to Rida Quli and Fatima Sultan Begum on the 21st March.² The fact that this son was given the name of Shahrukh was, apparently, the first indication that Nadir was deliberately seeking to copy Timur. True, this Shahrukh was not his son, but his grandson, but, at the time when his own sons were born he was still an obscure individual, and he could not then have had any inkling of what fate had in store for him. At this time, however, he was well launched upon his career of conquest and aggrandizement. It is impossible to say when he first conceived this idea of modelling himself upon Timur, but the following combination of circumstances may have led him to do so. First, Nadir, like Timur, was of Turanian and not Persian origin (it will be recalled that, after he and Ahmad Pasha had concluded the treaty of December, 1733, he had written to the Sultan of Turkey drawing attention to the kinship between the Turks and the Turkomans, thereby clearly regarding himself as one of the latter)³ ; secondly, he had been brought up in the neighbourhood of Kalat, with which natural fortress Timur's name was closely associated⁴ ; in the third place, it so happened that his second wife's name was Gauhar Shad, the same as that of Timur's daughter-in-law, the wife of Shahrukh. In addition, both Timur and Nadir were men of little education (Nadir had practically none until he was past middle-age), but they each had unusually

¹ *Fars-Nama*, p. 175.

² *T.N.*, p. 141.

³ See p. 75 above.

⁴ Timur's forces captured Kalat after a long siege in 1382.

retentive memories. Both were intensely ambitious and adventurous and were possessed of real military genius; lastly, both were merciless to evil-doers. The parallel between these two remarkable men must not, however, be drawn too far, because, although there were such striking similarities, there were also important points of difference. Timur exerted himself to encourage trade and industry, and sought, by means of his conquests, to open up new trade routes, while Nadir, on the other hand, paid but little attention to commerce and had no thought for the economic welfare of his subjects. Secondly, Timur strove to further the spread of Islam, but Nadir took no such action; if he had any religion at all, he subordinated it to his political aims.

Nadir, on reaching Isfahan, was accorded a great reception; Geekie, the East India Company's representative there, reported that "the streets were covered at his Entry in the same Manner as for the King and the Illuminations and Fire Works on this Occasion lasted for some days."¹

During Nadir's stay in the capital the Qadi 'Abdu'l-Karim Efendi arrived from Constantinople bearing a letter for him from the Sultan which stated that 'Abdullah Pasha Köprülü, the Sar'askar or Generalissimo, had been empowered to conclude peace with Persia. Despite the ambassador's assurances that the Sultan's intentions were peaceful, Nadir was convinced that he was really hostile and was merely seeking to gain time.² He nevertheless treated 'Abdu'l-Karim courteously, and sent him back to Turkey with a message to 'Abdullah Pasha to the effect that all would be well if the Porte returned the occupied Persian territory; if it did not do so, war would recommence. His belief was, as it turned out, well-founded, for the Turkish 'ulama, on being consulted by the Grand Vizier, recommended that the war with Persia should be continued with the greatest vigour and that none of the conquered territory should be handed back to Persia until the Russians had been obliged to give up their conquests.

Almost immediately after Nadir had given the Turkish envoy his *congé*, a Russian mission under Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin arrived at Isfahan³; Golitzin was an experienced diplomat, having

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 15th/26th June, 1734 (quoting from a letter from Geekie).

² *T.N.*, p. 142. It will be noticed that the Porte did not speak of ratifying the treaty concluded between Nadir and Ahmad Pasha, but of concluding a new treaty.

³ Dr. Schneewitz, the surgeon accompanying the mission, wrote an account of the journey to Isfahan which was later published at the end of Dr. Lerch's *Nachricht von der Zweiten Reise nach Persien von 1745 bis 1747*, in Bösching's *Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie*, Vol. X, pp. 461 and 462. See also the *T.N.*, p. 154 (Mirza Mahdi always referred to Prince Golitzin as "Kannas," this being, presumably, his rendering of the Russian word *Knyaz*—prince; cf. Ibn Khurdadbeh's use of the word *qinnaz* to denote the king of the Slavs, on p. 17 of Vol. VI of the *Bibliotheca geographorum arabicorum*). Golitzin himself wrote an account of his journey and of his experiences when at Nadir's court and when accompanying him on his campaigns. The manuscript of this record, which should make most interesting

previously been sent as ambassador to Spain and Prussia.¹ The main objects of Golitzin's mission were to report fully to St. Petersburg on the situation in Persia and to induce Nadir to terminate the truce with Turkey. Golitzin, after being received by Nadir, reported that the latter's attitude was most difficult, as he was very much on his dignity and resented being asked to take any action; much tact and patience were therefore essential.²

Although Nadir agreed at first to Golitzin's request that, in the event of Turkey making war upon Russia, Persia would attack Turkey, he afterwards procrastinated and clouded the issue by making inquiries respecting other matters. When Golitzin said that Russia was prepared to assist Persia, Nadir thanked him, but said that he did not see how he could avail himself of this offer if the Russians would not go to Shamakhi or Baghdad. If circumstances arose that involved a rupture with Turkey, he hoped to deal with the Turks without help from abroad; if he succeeded, he would advance through Anatolia to Constantinople, and then Russia could attack Turkey from the other side.³ Golitzin further reported that Nadir was angry with Russia because she had not given up Darband and Baku, although Russia, under the terms of the 1732 treaty, was really within her rights in retaining those two places so long as the Turks remained in possession of Adharbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

As nothing further had been heard from Turkey respecting the ratification of the treaty and the restoration of the occupied territory, Nadir set out for the Turkish frontier on the 12th Muharram 1147 (14th June, 1734). Accompanied by Prince Golitzin and his suite, he marched via Gulpayagan to Hamadan; it seemed that, up to his arrival at the latter town, he had intended advancing on Baghdad via Kirmanshah.⁴ On leaving Hamadan, however, he marched to Sinandij and Maragha. The main, if not the only, reason for this change of plan was that, just before leaving he had received word from a Persian agent in Russia that the Russian court had ordered the Georgian ex-king Vakhtang and his son Bakar⁵ to go to Darband whence they were to set out and capture Shamakhi and conquer Kartli for Russia.⁶

reading, is contained in G. F. Müller's portfolio No. 348 (document 15), in the Moscow archives. See Professor M. A. Polievktov's *Evropeiskie Puteshestvenniki XIII-XVIII vv po Kavkazu* (European Travellers in the Caucasus from the XIIIth to the XVIIIth Centuries), Tiflis, 1935, p. 35 (I am indebted to my friend Mr. J. F. Baddeley for this last reference).

¹ Polievktov, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

² Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1332.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1333.

⁴ Vakhusht's *Histoire de Kartli, H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 130 and Schnese, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

⁵ For particulars of the chequered careers of Vakhtang and his son, see Brosset's *Matériaux pour servir à l'Histoire de la Géorgie*, St. Petersburg, 1841, pp. 212 and 213, and the same author's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 121 and 380 and 381.

⁶ Vakhusht, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 129. Brosset states, in a footnote, that the actual text of the instructions to Vakhtang and his son was reproduced in the *Polnoe Svoianie Zakonov*, Vol. IX, p. 317.

At Maragha a Turkish envoy came to Nadir, but it seems that he brought no message of importance. Nadir then dispatched his (paternal) uncle Bektash Khan Qiriqu and the soldiers under him to Tabriz, and ordered a number of tribal Governors to concentrate at Dimdim, where they were to wait until it was known whether there was to be peace or war with Turkey.¹

Nadir reached Ardabil on the 10th August,² where he received a message from 'Abdullah Pasha requesting him to postpone for two years his demand for the return of the occupied territory; if an envoy were then sent to the Ottoman court, the provinces would be handed over.³ This message showed him conclusively that the Turks had no intention of concluding peace on the terms agreed upon between him and Ahmad Pasha.

Nadir decided to strike the first blow, not at the Turks themselves, but at their vassal Surkhai, the Khan of Shirvan. In taking this decision, he had a fourfold object. First, he wished to capture Shamakhi before Vakhtang could seize it for Russia. Secondly, he felt that the presence of Persian troops so close to Baku and Darband would induce the Russians to expedite the conclusion of the treaty which Golitzin had for so long been negotiating. Thirdly, Nadir certainly had grounds for wishing to humble Surkhai. In the last place, by taking Shamakhi, he would be recovering part of Persia's lost territories.⁴

Surkhai, as Khan or Governor of Shirvan, had received orders from Ahmad Pasha to evacuate that province (see p. 75 above), but had disregarded them. When the Governor of Astara, at Nadir's request, wrote to remind Surkhai of these instructions, he replied: "With the swords of the Lazgi lions we have conquered Shirvan; what right has Ahmad of Baghdad or anyone else to interfere in this way?"⁵

When Nadir, on the 21st August, reached the Kura,⁶ Surkhai became alarmed and fled to the Daghestan mountains.⁷ Nadir thereupon crossed the Kura and occupied Shamakhi, apparently without meeting with any resistance⁸; after appointing a Governor, he levied a heavy tax upon the inhabitants.⁹

¹ *T.N.*, p. 144.

² Schneise, *op. cit.*, p. 464. According to the *T.N.*, Nadir did not reach Ardabil until the 19th Rabi' I (19th August).

³ *T.N.*, p. 144.

⁴ The Grand Vizier believed that Russia had prompted Nadir to take Shamakhi. See Lord Kinross's despatch of the 12th/23rd September, 1734 (*S.P.* 97, Vol. XXVII).

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 145.

⁶ Lerch in his *Auszug aus dem Tagebuch* in Büsching's *Magazin*, Vol. III, p. 21, gives the (O.S.) date as August 10th. According to the *T.N.* (p. 148), Nadir reached the Kura on the 29th Rabi' I (29th August).

⁷ *Durr-i-Nadira*, p. 143.

⁸ Butkov is incorrect in saying that Shamakhi was besieged for two months, and makes a further mistake in stating that Surkhai was killed on this occasion (Vol. I, p. 126).

⁹ Schneise, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

Whilst at Shamakhi, Nadir, through Golitzin, threatened Russia with war unless Baku and Darband were given up, his argument being that Turkey would not restore the provinces in her occupation so long as Russia retained any Persian territory. The Russian court then sent word to Nadir that, notwithstanding the treaty of Resht, its forces would evacuate all Persian territory, provided that Persia ratified the treaty and bound herself to regard Russia's enemies as her own. In October, 1734, General Levashev (who had succeeded the Count von Hesse-Homburg in the command of the Russian forces in Daghistan) received orders to evacuate all territory south of the Darband district, including the town of Baku, and to prepare for the handing over of Darband.¹

On the 15th September, Nadir left Shamakhi with half his army, numbering 12,000 men, and penetrated into the heart of the Ghazi Qumuq country, with the object of destroying Qumuq itself. Three days later Tahmasp Khan Jalayir set out with the remaining 12,000 men for the Qabala district, where Surkhai was reported to be. Tahmasp Khan encountered Surkhai at Deveh Batan, on the road from Shamakhi to Qabala. Surkhai had 20,000 men in all, including 8,000 Turks and Tatars from Ganja under Mustafa Pasha and the Qalgha Fath Girai. His preponderance of force would have been even greater if King Taimuraz of Kakheti² had not heavily defeated another Turkish army and forced it back to Tiflis. Despite his inferior numbers, Tahmasp Khan routed Surkhai's composite force; Surkhai fled towards Qumuq, and the Turks and Tatars retired to Ganja. Tahmasp Khan followed up this success by capturing and destroying Surkhai's fortress of Khachmaz.³

Meanwhile, Nadir was advancing with some difficulty in the Ghazi Qumuq country. Surkhai, after offering to submit, attempted resistance, but he suffered defeat again near Qumuq, and fled to Avaria. Nadir then destroyed Qumuq and seized Surkhai's treasures.

Khasş Fulad Khan, the son of 'Adil Girai,⁴ the former Shamkhal of Tarkhu, who was a personage of some importance in Daghistan, submitted to Nadir. Nadir revived the post of Shamkhal, and conferred it on Khasş Fulad.⁵

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 127. Baku was not, however, given up until the spring of 1735 (see p. 86 below).

² Taimuraz, who had succeeded his brother Constantine (Muhammad Quli Khan) as King of Kakheti in 1731, had sworn allegiance to Turkey. As the Turks failed to redress the wrongs of Kakheti, Taimuraz espoused the Persian cause; see Vakhushht, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 130 and 131.

³ T.N., p. 146.

⁴ 'Adil Girai had rebelled against Russia in 1725, but the Russian Government had suppressed the revolt, and exiled him to Kola, in the north of Lapland; at the same time, it abolished the Shamkhalate of Tarkhu.

⁵ T.N., p. 148. Nadir, it seems, wished to revive the Shamkhalate as it had been before the split took place between the Ghazi Qumuqs of the mountains and those of Tarkhu.

Nadir realised that, owing to the lateness of the season, it was impossible to pursue Surkhai, as the passes into Avaria would all be blocked with snow. After spending a week at Qumuq, he went to Akhti where he attacked and put to flight a number of hostile Lazgis. He then went on by a most difficult road via Khachmaz and Qutqashin to Qabala, where he heard of Taimuraz's victory over the Turks. Shortly after Taimuraz's triumph, the Turks received another set-back, for Giv Amilakhor, the Eristav of Ksan, captured the citadel of Gori.¹ Leaving Qabala on the 22nd October, Nadir crossed the Kura south of Aresh, and marched to Ganja, under the walls of which he camped on the 3rd November. He sent word to Vakhtang at Darband to come to his camp, but Vakhtang deemed it wiser not to obey; being unable to carry out his instructions from the Russian court, he then returned to Astrakhan.²

Nadir took elaborate measures for the prosecution of the siege of Ganja. The town having been evacuated by 'Ali Pasha, who had retired to the citadel, Nadir mounted cannon on top of one of its mosques, but the Turkish artillery soon silenced this battery. Attempts were then made to scale the walls of the citadel by means of lofty wooden stagings, but these were destroyed by the fire of the defenders. Active mining and counter-mining went on, and on one occasion six Persian mines, which were exploded simultaneously, did great damage to the walls and killed 700 Turks.³ In the course of the siege Nadir thrice narrowly escaped death; on one occasion a soldier by his side was decapitated by a cannon ball, and Nadir's face and clothing were spattered with the unfortunate man's brains and blood.⁴

The usual Persian weakness in siege artillery and the difficulty of campaigning actively in winter combined to render the siege long and arduous. The Turks, moreover, defended themselves with spirit and inflicted severe loss on the Persians.

Golitzin realised at an early date that for the above reasons the siege was likely to be a lengthy one. Feeling that the delay in the capture of Ganja would be harmful to Russian interests as well as to those of Persia, he offered to assist Nadir. The offer was gladly accepted, with the result that Levashev, in November, sent an engineer officer and four bombardiers, all clad in Persian garb, to the Persian camp; some heavy artillery was also sent.⁵ Nadir is said to have been inclined at first to underestimate the prowess of these Russians, but he was soon convinced of their ability.⁶

¹ Sekhnia Chkheidze, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 47 and 48.

² Vakhushht, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 130.

³ *T.N.*, p. 130.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵ Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1333; Lerch, *Büsching's Magazin*, Vol. III, p. 37.

⁶ Dr. J. Cook, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 465.

Notwithstanding the aid furnished by the Russians, Nadir felt that it would be impossible to carry the citadel by assault; he thereupon maintained the blockade with part of his forces, while he sent off the remainder, under a Khurasani Turk named Şafi Khan Bughairi, to besiege Tiflis in conjunction with the *mouravan va aznauran* ("prefects and those of illustrious birth") of the Georgians.¹

On the 27th December, Golitzin, acting on instructions from St. Petersburg, informed Nadir that the Empress, feeling assured that he would be able to expel the Turks, had agreed to return to Persia the territory still in Russian hands on condition that he undertook never to give up this territory to Turkey, to treat as his foes the enemies of Russia, and to confirm in writing his promise to Golitzin to do all in his power to withstand Turkey. Nadir was delighted at this message and promised to accede to these requests.²

The result of this development was the signature of the treaty of Ganja on the 10th/21st March, 1735. Russia undertook to evacuate Baku within a fortnight and Darband within two months from the date of signature of this treaty; Persia promised, in return, to be the perpetual ally of Russia, and never to surrender Baku and Darband to any other power.³ The Sulaq was agreed upon as the frontier between Russia and Persia, and each power bound itself not to negotiate a peace with Turkey without the knowledge and consent of the other.⁴

Russia surrendered Baku and Darband within the stipulated periods, and (although not obliged to do so by the terms of the treaty) dismantled and evacuated the fortress of the Holy Cross. Thus ended the Russian occupation of Northern Persia, which Peter the Great had begun 13 years before. The only real advantage which Russia had derived from this occupation was that Turkey had thereby been prevented from establishing herself on the shores of the Caspian Sea, but this advantage, important though it was, had been dearly bought. It had cost the lives of no less than 130,000 Russian soldiers, the majority of whom had perished from sickness in the unhealthy province of Gilan.⁵

As 'Abdullah Pasha, who was then at Qarş, made no move to relieve Ganja, Nadir, a few days after the Nau Ruz celebrations, sent a body of troops towards Qarş in the hope of making him "raise his head from the collar of obscurity" and so enable the Persians to attack him.⁶ He also dispatched troops to keep watch upon the warlike Jar and Tala Lazgis.

¹ T.N., p. 152 (in the Bombay edition *mouravan* is incorrectly given as *auravan*). Mirza Mahdi's use of these Georgian terms is of interest. For an explanation of the meaning of *mouravan* and *aznauran*, see Allen's *History of the Georgian People*, pp. 166 and 225 respectively.

² Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,333.

³ Butkov, Vol. I, pp. 130 and 131.

⁴ Manstein's *Mémoires*, p. 95.

⁵ T.N., p. 154.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

It was probably at this time that Nadir gave orders for the destruction of Shamakhi and for its inhabitants to move *en masse* to Aq Su, 15 miles to the W.S.W. As many new buildings had to be erected at Aq Su for the people of Shamakhi, Nadir sent Turkish prisoners of war to the former place to assist in the building of the new town. When all was complete and the evacuation had taken place, Aq Su was renamed New Shamakhi.¹ Nadir's pretext for this action was that the site of Shamakhi was too open to attack,² but Hanway is probably correct in saying that Nadir rased the town to the ground and slaughtered many of its inhabitants because of "the countenance which this city had given to the Lesgees."³

At the beginning of May, Nadir left his camp at Ganja for Qarş, after arranging for the blockade to be carried on in his absence. After making an unsuccessful attempt to intercept Timur Pasha, the Governor of Van, who was marching to the relief of Tiflis, Nadir tried to reach the fortress of Qazanchai by an extremely difficult mountain route, hoping that the threat to that fortress would rouse 'Abdullah Pasha from his lethargy. Thick snow on the mountains rendered the tracks impassable,⁴ so Nadir had to abandon his project and advance on Qarş via Lori. On the 24th May he camped three miles from Qarş. As 'Abdullah Pasha still remained inactive behind his walls, and as provisions were scarce in the neighbourhood of Qarş, Nadir retired to Abaran, where he very graciously received the Armenian Catholicos Abraham. He then proceeded to Erivan, which he besieged; a force which he sent against Bayazid succeeded in capturing that fortress.⁵

Nadir left enough troops to continue the siege of Erivan, and marched to Echmiadzin with his main force, so as to be ready to attack 'Abdullah Pasha, should the latter leave Qarş. After returning to Erivan to repel a sortie by the garrison, he went to Parakar where he received the welcome news that 'Abdullah and his forces had crossed the Akhurian river (Arpa Chai) and were advancing towards him.⁶

The Turkish army consisted of 30,000 Janissaries and 50,000 cavalry⁷;

¹ According to the *Fars-Nama*, p. 177, New Shamakhi was also known as Jaliliyyabad, but this name does not seem to have been widely used.

² *T.N.*, p. 154, *Z.T.*, fol. 217 (b), Butkov, Vol. I, p. 126, Dorn, *Geschichte Schirwan*, p. 413.

³ Vol. IV, p. 115.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 156. See also the Catholicos Abraham's *Mon Histoire et celle de Nadir, Chah de Perse*, in Brosset's *Collection d'Historiens Arméniens*, St. Petersburg, 1876, Vol. II, p. 267.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 157.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157, also the Catholicos Abraham, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

⁷ See the translation of a letter which Nadir sent to Prince Golitsin at Darband after the battle: this translation was enclosed in Rondeau's despatch of the 6th/17th September. (Just before the battle of Baghavard, Golitsin had started on his return journey to Russia, and was at Darband when this letter reached him; he was accompanied by Mirza Kafi Nagiri Khulafa, who was being sent as Persian Ambassador to St. Petersburg. On Golitsin's return, he was made Governor of Kazan, and it was there that he wrote the account of his experiences in Persia referred to on p. 81 above). Mirza Mahdi's figures, namely, 70,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, are much exaggerated.

the numbers of the Persians are given as only 15,000 by Mirza Mahdi and as 18,000 by the Catholicos,¹ but it seems that these numbers only relate to Nadir's advance guard and that his main force, which (as will be seen below) came into action later in the battle, consisted of some 40,000 men, making the Persian strength 55,000 in all.²

Leaving his baggage behind, Nadir hastened to meet the Turks. On the evening of the 18th June he and his men reached the village of Akhikandi, close to the Zanga Chai, and camped on a hill called Aq Tappä. Simultaneously, 'Abdullah Pasha's army arrived at Baghavard, two *farsakhs* away, on the further side of a plain.³

On the following morning the Turks, confident in the superiority of their numbers, took the offensive. Nadir, having first posted a large number of his men in ambush, charged down the hill with only three regiments and fell impetuously upon the Turks. What his men lacked in numbers, they more than made up for in courage. Nadir, with a number of *jazayirchis*, made for a small hill on the plain on which 'Abdullah Pasha had placed some of his artillery, and captured it, while another body of men advanced against the artillery on the Turks' left wing. Whilst these attacks were in progress the Turkish and Persian centres became engaged. The Persians' heavy artillery and *zanburaks* or camel-swivels poured a most destructive fire upon the Turkish centre, which was soon thrown into confusion and forced to retreat. At Nadir's command, the Persian cavalry, as well as the troops in ambush, then charged the Turks as they fell back, and converted the retreat into a rout. The Sar'askar himself, Saru Mustafa Pasha, a son-in-law of the Sultan, and several other Turkish officers of note, were amongst the slain, and a large number of Turks were taken prisoners.⁴ The remnant of the defeated army fled in various directions; between 3,000 and 4,000 Turks who were trying to reach Ashtarak were cut off by Armenians and then killed by the pursuing Persians. Nadir had every reason to be pleased with this great victory, and informed Prince Golitzin that he had never been so fortunate since he had begun to wage war.⁵

After the battle, Nadir had the corpse of 'Abdullah Pasha Köprülü recovered and, as he had done with Topal 'Osman's remains, sent it to the

¹ Catholicos Abraham, p. 270.

² This is the total given by Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 119.

³ *I.N.*, p. 157, *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 147.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 159. There is some divergence between the various authorities as to the date of this battle. While Mirza Mahdi gives the date as the 26th Muharram (18th June), the Catholicos gives it as the 8th/19th June, as do General Yeropkin (a copy of his report of the battle was given by Veshniakov to Lord Kinnoull in the following September—see S.P. 97, Vol. XVII) and Nadir himself in his letter to Golitzin. There seems no doubt that the 19th June is the correct date.

⁵ See Nadir's letter to Golitzin referred to in Note 7, on page 87.

Turks. He then dispatched some of the Turkish prisoners to Ganja, Erivan and Tiflis to inform their compatriots there of the victory.¹

When, on the 3rd July, the news of the Turkish disaster reached Constantinople, it caused the utmost dismay. The Grand Vizier, 'Ali Pasha Hakimoghlu, was blamed for the defeat and was dismissed, and Isma'il Pasha, the Governor of Baghdad, took his place as Grand Vizier. Ahmad Pasha was made Sar'askar, in succession to the defunct 'Abdullah Pasha, and was soon afterwards reinstated as Governor of Baghdad.²

When the Turkish prisoners brought the news of the battle of Baghavard to 'Ali Pasha, the Governor of Ganja, he at once asked for quarter, and surrendered the fortress on the 9th July, 1735: he had stubbornly defended it for eight and a half months. 'Ali Pasha and the Qalgha Fath Girai were kindly received by Nadir, who allowed 'Ali Pasha to go to Qars and Fath Girai to Tiflis. Ismaq Pasha, the Governor of Tiflis, soon followed 'Ali Pasha's example and surrendered on the 12th August.³ Erivan alone held out; as will be seen below (p. 91), it did not yield until the 3rd October.

For the second time Nadir proceeded to Qars, which he besieged for a month, cutting off the water-supply and ravaging the country from the Arpa Chai to Erzeroum.⁴

Before describing the concluding phase of the Turkish war, some mention must be made not only of the march of the Khan of the Crimea to Daghistan in the summer and autumn of 1735, but also of Nadir's naval aims and of the Persian attempt to capture Basra in April of that year.

In 1734, as in 1732, the Porte requested the Khan of the Crimea to march to Daghistan. The Khan excused himself on the grounds that funds were lacking and that his men were unwilling to go⁵; it appears that, in reality, he was loth to quit the vicinity of the Polish frontier, as he wished to intervene in the war of the Polish Succession on the side of Stanislaus Leszczyński.⁶ Early in May, 1735, the Porte issued stringent orders for the Khan to march with 80,000 men to Daghistan and thence into Shirvan, and this time it would brook no refusal. When Nepluev, the Russian Resident at Constantinople, and his assistant, Veshniakov, heard of these orders, they strongly protested to 'Ali Pasha,

¹ *T.N.*, p. 159.

² Otter, Vol. I, p. 32.

³ *T.N.*, p. 160. The Catholicos Abraham (p. 278) and Sekhnia Chkheidze (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 48) both give the same date as Mirza Mahdi.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 160 and Catholicos Abraham, p. 277: the latter states that Nadir transferred 6,000 Armenian families from the district of Qars to Khurasan.

⁵ *Tagebuch des Russisch-Kaiserlichen Generalfeld-Marschall Grafen von Münnich* (Leipzig, 1843), p. 131.

⁶ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 123 (Butkov is guilty of an anachronism here, as he states that Qaplan Girai started for Daghistan in November, 1733).

the Grand Vizier, but he informed them in reply that many of the leaders and 'ulama of Daghistan had appealed to the Sultan for assistance against Nadir, who had already defeated Surkhai and appointed a new ruler (i.e., Khass Fulad). The Grand Vizier added that the Porte had considered this petition and that it felt obliged, under the circumstances, to take the people of Daghistan under its protection and to send them military assistance; the orders to the Khan had therefore been issued and could not be rescinded.¹ The British, Austrian and Dutch representatives at Constantinople pointed out to the Grand Vizier the great danger of war with Russia that this march (like that of Fath Girai two years before) would entail, but 'Ali Pasha replied that the orders must stand, and that the Persian war could not be brought to an end unless the Khan marched to Daghistan; he added, however, that the Khan would be given strict orders not to enter Russian territory.²

It is beyond the scope of this work to describe the further attempts which were made by the British, Austrian and other diplomatic representatives (except the French Ambassador) at Constantinople to exert a moderating influence. All was in vain, and in July, 1735, Qaplan Girai set out with 53,300 men,³ and reached Daghistan in October. No actual military encounter with the Russians occurred during this march, but the Russian court, without declaring war on Turkey, sent General Leontov, with 20,000 regular troops and a force of Cossacks, to ravage the Crimea, with the double object of relieving the pressure on Nadir and of punishing the Crim Tatars for their frequent raids into Russian territory.⁴

Alarmed by the attitude of Russia and by Nadir's threat to Anatolia, Turkey decided to offer peace terms to Persia. Not only had Nadir recovered all the Persian provinces and towns (with the exception of Erivan, which was still holding out), but he had carried the war into Turkish territory.

Ahmad Pasha, who was at Erzeroum at this time and who had been empowered to negotiate the terms of the peace, sent an envoy to Nadir offering to deliver up Erivan and to conclude peace on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Nadir, however, was besieging Qars and demanded the cession of that fortress, an indemnity for all the losses suffered since the Turkish occupation of Persian territory began and the inclusion of Russia in the treaty.⁵ He soon afterwards dropped his demand for Qars,

¹ Lord Kinnoull, 24th May/4th June, 1735.

² *Ibid.* See also Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,328.

³ See Münnich, *op. cit.*, p. 133 for details of the composition of this force.

⁴ Butkov, Vol. I, pp. 123 and 124. See also Count Ostermann's statement to Rondeau which the latter reported in his despatch dated the 8th/19th November (S.P. 91, Vol. XVIII).

⁵ Lord Kinnoull, 20th/31st October, 1735 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVII).

whereupon Ahmad Pasha ordered Erivan to be surrendered, which accordingly opened its gates to the Persians on the 3rd October.¹ After the three fortresses had surrendered, Nadir decided to abandon the siege of Qarş and to settle the affairs of Georgia instead. He accordingly set out for Tiflis on the 6th October, and summoned Taimuraz, the latter's nephew 'Ali Mirza,² and the *tavadan* and the *aznauran* ("chiefs and those of illustrious birth") of Kartli and Kakheti.³ The Georgians obeyed, and came to him when he was a short distance from Tiflis. Nadir appointed 'Ali Mirza Governor of Kartli and Kakheti because he was a Moslem, although (as Mirza Mahdi himself admits) Taimuraz had far more claim to that position.⁴ Taimuraz was bitterly disappointed at being passed over in this way, and took an early opportunity of escaping to the country of the Pshavs and Circassia. As for 'Ali Mirza, his tenure of office was merely nominal, as Nadir set Şafi Khan Bughairi to keep watch on him.

On reaching Tiflis, Nadir was given a good reception, the streets through which he had to pass being strewn with carpets. He treated kindly the Georgians who had submitted, but banished to Khurasan 6,000 families of those who had opposed him.⁵

In the meanwhile, Nadir had been negotiating intermittently with the Turks. Kalushkin, Golitzin's successor,⁶ reported to Count Ostermann an interesting interview which he had had with Nadir at Tiflis; the Regent, he said, had decided to make peace with the Turks, but only on condition that Russia was included in the treaty. The Turks, however, were opposing the inclusion of Russia because, they maintained, she had been seeking a quarrel with them by her attack on Poland. Kalushkin went on to say that he had explained to Nadir the circumstances under which Russia had entered into the Polish war and the part played by France in regard to both Poland and to the Russo-Turkish situation.

¹ *T.N.*, p. 161, Catholicos Abraham, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

² 'Ali Mirza, or Alexander as he was otherwise known, was the son of Imam Quli Khan (David III) of Kakheti; his brother Muhammad had been killed in Mesopotamia in the disastrous battle of the 19th July, 1733.

³ *T.N.*, p. 162. It will be recalled that Mirza Mahdi had previously (see p. 86 above) used the Georgian terms *mouravan* or *aznauran*; in this case, he uses *tavadan* ("chiefs") in place of *mouravan* ("prefects"). For the etymology and meaning of *tavad*, see Allen, *op. cit.*; pp. 246-249.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁵ Sekhnia Chkheidze, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 49.

⁶ He had, apparently, arrived in Persia before Golitzin's departure (see Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,337). Muhammad Kazim, on p. 27 of the *Kitab-i-Nadiri*, refers to a passage in the previous volume (the missing one) in which he had described the arrival, apparently in 1735 or thereabouts, of the ambassadors of the *Aq Bannu*; ("the White Princess," i.e., the Empress Anna). These ambassadors, he said, had brought letters and presents from the *Aq Bannu*; one of the presents was a marvellous mechanical toy with which Nadir was delighted. He wrote in reply that, after the capture of Qandahar, he would have the honour of meeting the "White Princess" and of giving her his hand in marriage, "when the two kingdoms would become one." It is not clear whether this passage relates to Kalushkin's arrival or not.

"I see that you are right," exclaimed Nadir, when Kalushkin had finished, "may God not forgive me if I make peace with the Turks if the settlement does not include the Russians!" He then expressed his gratitude to the Empress Anna for the kindness which she had shown to him.¹

When Nadir had spent nearly three weeks in Tiflis, he heard that Qaplan Girai, the Khan of the Crimea, was marching on Darband. Although he knew that 'Ali Pasha, the former Governor of Ganja, was on his way to him in order to settle the frontier question on the former (1639) basis, and that the Sultan had instructed Qaplan Girai to return to the Crimea, he insisted on setting out to attack the Khan²; this move may, perhaps, have been intended as a gesture to Russia. He marched through the districts of Jar and Tala, where he killed many Lazgis and burnt a number of villages. He then went via Shekki to Shamakhi with the object of encountering the Khan, but on arrival there, he learnt that Qaplan Girai, having heard of his advance and having also received the Sultan's orders to return, had begun his return march to the Crimea. Before leaving Daghistan, Qaplan Girai made Eldar, a brother of the late 'Adil Girai,³ Shamkhal, and appointed Surkhai Governor of Shirvan, and Ahmad Khan, the Usmi of the Qaraqaitaq, Governor of Darband.⁴

Beyond immobilising a relatively small number of troops whom Nadir had detailed to watch his movements and giving some encouragement to the Lazgis, Qaplan Girai, during his stay in Daghistan, had done nothing, in a military sense, to affect the issue of the Turco-Persian war; on the other hand, his expedition aggravated the already tense situation between Russia and Turkey.

Before proceeding further with the narrative of events in the north, it is necessary to turn for a time to happenings in Southern Persia.

In the summer of 1734 Latif Khan, acting under orders from Nadir, was busily engaged in making Bushire into a suitable base for the nascent Persian fleet; up till that time, it had been no more than an unimportant fishing village. In order to strengthen the defences, Latif Khan put an old Portuguese fort there into a state of repair. Shortly afterwards, Bushire was renamed Bandar Nadiriyya.⁵

In the following October, Tahmasp Khan Jalayir arrived at Isfahan with *raqams* from Nadir for the English and Dutch East India Companies requesting them to furnish:

¹ Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,337.

² *T.N.*, p. 163.

³ Eldar was thus the uncle of Khass Fulad, whom Nadir had made Shamkhal. For the genealogy of this family, see I. Berezin's *Puteshestvie po Dagestanu i Zakavkazi*, Kazan, 1848, p. 77.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 164. See also Dorn's *Geschichte Schirwans*, pp. 413 and 414.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 5th/16th July, 1734.

"what number of ships he might want well armed and provided to go on any expedition he should please to send them and to be entirely at his disposal. Concluding (that) on these Conditions we might depend on his favour. The Sardar added a Refusal would incur Thomas Caun's displeasure. . . . Nothing the Resident (Geekie) could offer could convince the Sardar of the unreasonableness of this Demand."¹

Geekie wished to shut up the Company's factory at Isfahan and leave the city, but Tahmasp Khan refused to allow him to go. How the Dutch Resident fared is not recorded.

In December word was received at Gombroon that the masters of the brigs *Patna* and *Ruperall* had sold their vessels to Latif Khan at Bushire. In view of the Gombroon Agent's refusal to accede to the Khan's request to be allowed to buy vessels, this action put him in an awkward position, and led him to expect further requests from Latif Khan which it would be difficult to refuse. In an angry mood, he made the following entry in his Diary :

"We wish this wild Conduct of These two Scureless (*sic*) People may not involve us in great difficulties with the Caun as our Answers to him before on this Head were quite contrary."²

In April, 1735, Latif Khan, with a fleet consisting of three "grabs," 50 large trankeys and several smaller vessels, entered the Shattu'l-'Arab, with the object of capturing Basra. A Persian force of 8,000 men had been ordered to co-operate with him in the attack, but Latif Khan was too impatient to wait for this land force to arrive ; on being joined by a number of Arabs who were in revolt against the Turks, he proceeded upstream.

It so happened that two English ships, the *Royal George* and the *Dean*, were lying at anchor in the river off Basra at this time. When the Pasha of Basra heard of the approach of the Persian fleet, he requested Martin French, the representative of the East India Co., to hand over these two vessels. French protested, saying that :

"We were in Amity with the Persians amongst whom the Honble. Co. had their Servants and consequently we could not act against them without exposing ourselves and fellow servants to the resentment of the Persians, to which the Bashaw made a short answer that the necessity of affairs required it, and if he could not have the Ships by fair means, he would take them by force. . . ."

The Pasha thereupon seized the two vessels, placed 200 Turkish soldiers in each, and sent them off downstream against Latif Khan. They encountered the Persian fleet at a narrow part of the river five leagues below Basra, where the Persians had erected two batteries. The crews of the

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 10th /21st November (quoting from a letter from Geekie dated the 22nd October).

² *Ibid.*, 2nd /13th December, 1734.

English vessels delayed engaging the enemy as long as they could, but on the 3rd June, the Turks forced them to attack. Fighting continued for three days and ended in the rout of the Persians. Only two men were killed and one wounded in the British ships, although they

"received above fifty shot in their Hulls, besides ye damage done their Masts and Yards. . . . The Bashaw has transmitted an account of this Action with great incommiums to the Port, and has likewise wrote to the Earl of Kinnoull about it, the action was doubtless very brisk, but I could wish it were against some other Nation, tho' I believe they (i.e., the Persians) will do us the justice to think that nothing less than an absolute necessity cou'd ingage us to Act against them."¹

The Agent and Council at Gombroon took a very serious view of the matter, which, they feared, would aggravate still further the bad relations subsisting between the Company and Nadir, and they were so apprehensive of the punishment that Nadir might inflict upon them that they at first contemplated evacuating the factory at Gombroon and taking to their vessels. Urgent messages were sent to Whittwell, the representative at Kirman, to settle up the Company's affairs there, and to come to Gombroon. Nadir was, in fact, angry when he received the news, but his wrath was not directed solely against the Company. He dismissed Latif Khan from his post, saying that he should not have attacked the Turks until the land force of 8,000 men was ready to co-operate with him. As regards the Company, the affair was ultimately smoothed over because Nadir was extremely anxious to obtain more shipping from it or through its intermediary, and it did what it could to accommodate him; soon after, as will be explained in due course, he made preparations to recover Bahrain from the Huwala Arabs, and a still more ambitious project was to mature later.

When Nadir received word that the Khan of the Crimea had started on his homeward march, he recommenced his operations against the Lazgis, despite the lateness of the season. Marching from Shamakhi via Alti Aghach and Darrakandi, he punished the inhabitants of Buduq and Khinaluq and took measures to intercept the fugitives. He then went via Gilyar to the north of Darband where he camped on the 21st November; here he learnt that Eldar, the "anti-Shamkhal," Surkhai and the Usmi Ahmad Khan had joined forces at Ghazanish, in order to attack Khaṣṣ Fulad. He thereupon went to Majalis where he heavily defeated Khan Muḥammad, the son of Ahmad Khan. From Majalis he and his forces proceeded through the mountain country to Gubden, in Khaṣṣ Fulad's

¹ Letter from French to London, dated the 5th/16th June, 1735. See also the *Gombroon Diary*, 18th/20th June.

territory, killing the tribespeople and plundering and burning their villages as they went. On the 17th Sha'ban (2nd January, 1736) Nadir left Gubden for Qumuq with Khaṣṣ Fulad.¹ Surkhai had gathered together all the available tribesmen whom he stationed in a strong position in the valley of the Ghazi Qumuq Qoisu, through which the Persian army would have to pass; in addition, he had fortified the mountain tops.

Nadir ordered his *jazayirchis* to attack the enemy and sent the Afghans to carry their mountain positions. The operations were successful, and Surkhai had to retreat,² while Eldar, who was on his way to join him, was also defeated. Nadir then marched on to Qumuq, where he received the submission of the chiefs, except for Surkhai, who, as in the previous year, had fled to Avaria, whither he had sent his family some time before. As nothing further could then be done against Surkhai, Nadir marched towards Quraish, a fortress belonging to the Usmi. Ahmad Khan sent his daughter³ to Nadir, together with a number of his principal followers, and asked for pardon. Nadir agreed to pardon the Usmi, on condition that the Lazgis of Doquz-Para gave him 1,000 horses and sent their principal families as hostages. The headmen of Tabarsaran then submitted on these terms. In this way he settled the affairs of Daghistan; he rewarded Khaṣṣ Fulad and the other loyal Daghistani leaders and gave them leave to return to their homes, while he dispatched to Darband the hostages furnished by the Lazgis. He then set out for the Mughan plain (Chul-i-Mughan).

¹ *T.N.*, p. 165.

² *Ibid.*

³ According to Rondeau, she was reputed to be "the finest woman in the East." 'Abbas Quli, in his *Gulistan Iram* (p. 238), states that Nadir handed the girl over to Husain 'Ali, the Khan of Qubba.

CHAPTER IX

NADIR'S CORONATION

HAVING defeated the Afghans and Turks, subdued the Lazgis and other rebels, and recovered, except for Qandahar, all the territory which had been lost, Nadir decided that the time had come to make himself Shah *de jure* as well as *de facto*. With his powerful army, which now contained a large proportion of Afghans and Turkomans, all of whom were Sunnis, he had little or nothing to fear from Tahmasp's partisans. In order to give his action some show of legality, he determined to have the crown conferred upon him at the declared wish of all the leading military, civil and religious personages of the Empire. He had already, as far back as July or August, 1735, taken the significant step of sending *raqams* to all parts of the kingdom stating that, up till that time, his efforts to reconquer the lost territories had prevented him from establishing "a certain rule of government."¹ One of these *raqams* was received at Gombroon early in September. It was stated therein that Nadir, after taking Erivan, would go to Tabriz or Qazvin, and that the Governors, Deputy Governors, Kalantars, Kadkhudas and other persons of note were to be in readiness to meet him at whichever of these two places he afterwards directed "when he will establish a Rule of Government to be observed over the whole Kingdom, and then retire to Chorazoon (Khurasan)."²

Somewhat later, he followed up this step by issuing special orders (*faramin-i-muta'a*)³ to all parts of the country bidding the army commanders, governors of provinces and towns, *qadis*, *'ulama* and nobles to assemble on the Mughan plain where a *qurulta'i*⁴ or national council was to be held for the purpose of conferring the crown of Persia upon the person whom the council considered to be most worthy to receive it.

The site selected for the *qurulta'i* was close to Javad, on the piece of land bounded on the north by the Kura and on the east by the Aras, immediately to the west of the point of their confluence. Nadir gave orders for 12,000 buildings of wood and reeds, together with mosques,

¹ Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th September, 1735.

² *Ibid.* Strangely enough, Mirza Mahdi makes no mention of these *raqams*.

³ T.N., p. 167; Z.T., fol. 217 (b). Muhammad Kazim states that these *raqams* were drafted by Mirza Mahdi (see the *Kitab-i-Nadiri*, p. 9; as frequent reference will be made to this book, it will henceforth be denoted by the letters K.N.).

⁴ Howarth defines this old Turkish word as "a general assembly of princes of the blood and the military chiefs"; it is here used in a wider sense.

rest-houses, bazaars and baths, to be erected at this place. Splendid apartments for himself, his harem and his suite were also to be built,¹ and large numbers of splendid robes of honour and girdles were to be prepared.²

Marching as rapidly as possible via Hasan Qal'asi and New Shamakhi (Aq Su), Nadir reached the camp on the Mughan plain on the evening of the 22nd January, 1736.³ The Catholicos Abraham, whom Nadir had specially invited, arrived the next day, and was followed two days later by Nadir's brother, Ibrahim Khan, Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, Pir Muhammad of Herat, Shah Quli Khan Qajar of Merv, and other persons of note.⁴ At the end of the month, Ganj 'Ali Pasha, who had been appointed Governor of Mosul, came to the camp in order to conclude the peace negotiations; with him was his *mihmandar* or "host," 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan Zangana, the Governor of Kirmanshah.⁵

Most elaborate measures were taken for guarding the camp and for the preservation of order in it. Nadir's own quarters were protected by a body of 6,000 *kashikchis* or special guards; elsewhere, discipline was strictly enforced by the *nasagchis*, part of Nadir's bodyguard who acted as a kind of military police. The zeal and efficiency of these men aroused the admiration of the Catholicos.⁶

During the period whilst the dignitaries were arriving, Nadir held his *divan* every day, listening to petitions, dispensing justice, and transacting other matters of a routine nature. The *divan* lasted for at least four hours; when it was over, he would spend an hour or so conversing and drinking wine with his intimate companions, Mirza Zaki, Hasan 'Ali Khan, Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and Muzaffar 'Ali Khan.⁷

By the 20th Ramadan (3rd February) all the delegates had arrived; they numbered in all some 20,000.⁸ In the official record a total of 100,000 is given, but this seems a gross exaggeration unless it is to be taken as including all the troops, camp-followers and servants.

As the dignitaries were far too numerous to be received simultaneously, they were divided up into batches, each batch being given a separate audience in the *divan-khana*. The Catholicos Abraham and 'Ali Pasha were amongst the notables received on the first day of the *'Idu'l-Fitr* (1st Shawwal = 14th February). The Catholicos, although too frightened (as he himself admitted) to count correctly, estimated that 1,000 were present in the audience hall. Rose-water, perfumes and sherbet were

¹ T.N., p. 167. Z.T., fol. 217 (b).

² T.N., p. 167; Catholicos Abraham, p. 282.

³ T.N., p. 167.

⁴ Catholicos Abraham, p. 286. See also the Z.T., fol. 217 (b).

⁵ K.N., p. 10.

⁶ Z.T., fol. 217 (b). Bazin (*Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 287) puts the total as low as 15,000.

⁷ K.N., p. 9.

⁸ K.N., p. 9.

distributed to everyone, whilst a band consisting of 22 musicians played.¹ On the next day a further assembly was held; on this occasion a committee appointed by Nadir, which consisted of Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and six other persons, announced on his behalf to those present that he, with his sharp sword, had defeated Persia's enemies, restored her military glory and re-established peace within her borders. He was now, however, old and worn out by his campaigns, and all that he wished for was to retire to his fortress of Kalat. The concluding words of Nadir's message, according to Muḥammad Kazim, were as follows:

"Having withdrawn my hand from tumult and the leadership of armies, I am occupied with worship at the shrine of the Eternal . . . Choose Tahmasp as your Shah; if your choice does not fall upon him, then select another of the Šafavis as your monarch."²

The insincerity, and, indeed, the absurdity of these last words must have been apparent to the vast majority of those present, but Nadir had carefully prepared the ground beforehand, and the delegates knew what was expected of them.³ They immediately exclaimed:

"For us there is no Shah but Nadir. The Turks, Afghans, Franks (i.e. Russians), and Lazgis held all parts of Persia, but now, thanks to Allah, not one of these enemies (*mu'anidin*) remains; he (Nadir) has killed and captured all, and has cleared the page of the kingdom of their pollution. The people are (now) contented, secure, and in easy circumstances."⁴

For three or four days this scene was repeated. Nadir thereupon gave orders for his great tent to be erected. This tent was supported by twelve poles, each of which was surmounted by a golden cupola; the silken tent-ropes were of seven colours. Carpets and rugs were spread on the floor, and the throne, which was of gold set with jewels, was placed in the centre.⁵

When all was prepared, Nadir summoned the *umara* or leaders to attend; on their arrival, the *eshik-aghasis* or ushers (literally, "masters of the threshold") conducted each one to his appointed place. Nadir then entered and took his place on the throne, while musicians played and dancers and jugglers performed.

After wine had been served and (as Muḥammad Kazim put it) "the heads of the guests had become warm" with it, Nadir consulted the leading

¹ Catholicon Abrahani, p. 298.

² K.N., p. 27.

³ Hanway (Vol. IV, p. 124) did not exaggerate when he said: "There was hardly a sensible man in the assembly, but saw through the thin disguise of these propositions; and many saw it with indignation, who had not virtue enough to declare their real sentiments."

⁴ K.N., p. 27.

⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

notables regarding the settlement of the question of the monarchy. Their response was, of course, to the same effect as before :

"Thou alone art our Qibla and our Ka'ba, and we do not wish to follow anyone but thee. We will give our lives to thy service and sacrifice our fortunes for thee as Shah."

When it was clear that the heads of those present were confused with wine, Nadir gave them leave to depart. For four days and nights this scene was repeated ; according to Muḥammad Kazim, Nadir wished to discover whether any of the leaders, when heedless through the effects of drink, expressed preference for the Ṣafavis ; none, however, were rash enough to do so, and all were emphatic in their protestations of loyalty to him. Nevertheless, Mirza Abdu'l-Ḥasan, the Mulla-Bashi or Chief Mulla, when, as he imagined, in the privacy of his tent, remarked : "Everyone is for the Ṣafavi dynasty." Spies overheard these words and reported them to Nadir, with the result that the Mulla-Bashi was strangled in his presence on the following day.¹

Nadir now felt that the time had come when he could safely give up the pretence of not wishing to accept the crown. He accordingly convened another assembly, to which he announced, through the medium of Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, his willingness to become Shah, upon the following conditions :

- (1) No one should abandon Nadir and support any son of the ex-Shah.
- (2) The Sunni faith should be adopted in place of the Shi'a, whose obnoxious and heretical practices must cease. The Shi'a faith had been adopted by Shah Isma'il and had occasioned much bloodshed between Persia and Turkey. "... if the people of Persia desire that we (Nadir) should reign, they must abandon this doctrine which is opposed to the faith of the noble predecessors and the great family of the Prophet, and (they must) follow the religion of the Sunnis. Since the Imam Ja'faru's-Ṣadiq was descended from the Prophet ... the faith (*tariqa*, literally the 'road') of the people of Persia is clearly this religion. They should make him the head of their sect."
- (3) No act of treason should be committed against Nadir or his son. All should be submissive to them.

All those present signified their acceptance of these conditions without demur ; having witnessed the tragic fate of the Mulla-Bashi, they well knew what the slightest manifestation of opposition or disapproval would entail. When the decision of the assembly was conveyed to Nadir, he made all present sign a muster-roll (*mahḍar-nama*).²

Nadir's slaughter of the Mulla-Bashi and his substitution of the Sunni

¹ K.N., p. 20.

² K.N., p. 21.

doctrine for that of the Shi'a have given rise to much comment.¹ It seems evident that, while the first action was due to his determination to set an example that would strike terror into the hearts of his opponents, the second was carried out merely for political ends. Although he may have been a Shi'a in his earlier days and although he certainly had at times shown some zeal or, at any rate, respect for the Shi'a faith, there can be no doubt that, if he ever had any religious beliefs at all, they were neither deep-seated nor sincere. Consequently, he had no scruple whatever in subordinating religion to political expediency. It appears in the highest degree improbable that Nadir, although he now publicly espoused the Sunni faith, was, in so doing, actuated by any genuine religious conviction; his later career, as will be described in due course, affords proof to the contrary.

It may be regarded as certain that one of Nadir's immediate objects in effecting this change was to facilitate a temporary² settlement with Turkey. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that he may have had an ulterior motive of a much more far-reaching kind; might not his real aim in seeking to unite the Moslem world have been to make himself ultimately the head of it? His ambition knew no bounds, and, as he is known to have cherished the design of marching to Constantinople, he may have considered that it would not be difficult to go one step farther and wrest the Caliphate from the Sultan. An additional reason for the change was almost certainly the fact that the Shi'a doctrine had always been so closely identified with the Šafavi dynasty; that line had owed much of its strength to its warm espousal of the Shi'a tenets, and the zeal which it had shown for these had naturally made the Shi'a priesthood its fervent supporters.³ It therefore appears highly probable that Nadir felt that the Shi'a *'ulama*, if left undisturbed and unweakened by him, might at any time use their considerable influence with the people to work for the restoration of Tahmasp or his son 'Abbas. Nadir's action must have been pleasing to the large numbers of Sunnis in his army, and it is certain that he would not have dared to make so drastic a change if he had not had so many belonging to that sect in his service.

Having secured the unanimous approval of his nobles, military leaders and other notables to his elevation to the throne on the conditions laid down by him, he had a *fatwa* drawn up and issued as an official record of what had occurred.

The Catholicos states that, even after this *fatwa* had been issued, Nadir, in appearance at least, continued to refuse the crown, but

¹ In this connection, see Otter, Vol. I, p. 334.

² As will be explained later, he wished merely to suspend his operations against Turkey until such time as he could obtain sufficient resources to enable him to beat her to her knees.

³ For some further remarks on this question, see p. 279 below.

that he yielded at length to the entreaties of the nobles and other dignitaries.¹

In the meantime, Nadir's representatives and Ganj 'Ali Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, had been discussing the terms of settlement between Persia and Turkey. It appears that Nadir, from the time when he left Qas in October, 1735, until 'Ali Pasha's arrival at the Mughan camp, had been negotiating intermittently with Ahmad Pasha and 'Ali Pasha through the intermediary of messengers. Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg, in December or January, that the Turkish Ambassador was making lavish presents to influential persons at the Persian court and that the people were longing for peace with Turkey.²

Before his coronation, Nadir made the deputies agree to his sending an embassy to the Sultan in order to negotiate a peace on the following basis³:

- (1) The Persian, shaving given up their former beliefs and chosen the religion of the Sunnis, were to be recognised as a fifth sect, to be known as the Ja'fari.⁴
- (2) Since each of the Imams of the four existing sects had a column (*rukn*) in the Ka'ba assigned to them, a fifth column was to be provided for the Imam Ja'far.
- (3) A Persian Amirul-Hajj (leader of the Pilgrimage), with a position equivalent to that of the Amirs of the Syrian and Egyptian pilgrims, should be appointed, and be allowed to conduct the Persian pilgrims to Mecca.
- (4) The prisoners on both sides were to be exchanged, and none of them was to be allowed to be bought or sold.⁵
- (5) Each country was to maintain a representative at the court of the other.

Although Nadir had now obtained the "consent" of everyone to his accession, there was, nevertheless, some delay in arranging for his coronation. The reason for this delay was twofold; in the first place, the engraving of the new royal seal had not been completed and the dies for the new money were not yet ready. Secondly, the astrologers, on being ordered to discover an auspicious date for the ceremony, fixed upon the 24th Shawwal, 1148 (8th March, 1736).⁶

Numbers of the Khans and other dignitaries now took their departure, without waiting to attend the coronation. The Catholicos Abraham left

¹ Catholicos Abraham, p. 302.

² Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1334.

³ T.N., pp. 168-169.

⁴ For further remarks on the Ja'fari sect, see p. 279 below.

⁵ Jones (Vol. XI, p. 362) has mistranslated the last part of this clause: instead of saying that the prisoners were not to be bought or sold, he stated that trade between the two nations was to be free.

⁶ T.N., p. 169.

on the 23rd February/5th March, because of the cold and of the shortage of bread.¹

On the following day 'Ali Pasha left for Constantinople, to communicate to the Porte Nadir's peace proposals in the form indicated above²; he was accompanied by 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan whom Nadir had appointed Ambassador to Turkey. 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan was instructed to convey to the Sultan the news of Nadir's accession (although Nadir was not actually Shah at the time of his departure), and had full powers to conclude peace. With 'Abdu'l-Baqi were Mirza 'Abdu'l-Qasim Kashani, the Šadr or Shaikhu'l-Islam of Persia, and Mulla 'Ali Akbar, the new Chief Mulla³; the ecclesiastical members of this mission were to discuss with the Turkish 'ulama the religious points that were likely to arise in connection with the Ja'fari sect and the erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka'ba. The mission bore a letter⁴ from Nadir to the Sultan which set out, at considerable length, the former's views on this subject and his reasons for urging the recognition of the Ja'fari sect. A special envoy was also sent to St. Petersburg to notify the Empress of Nadir's accession; this envoy reached St. Petersburg early in July, 1736.

On the 7th March, Nadir's eldest son, Rida Quli, whom his father had just appointed Vali of Khurasan, left the Mughan camp for Mashhad to take up his new duties.⁵ Nadir instructed his son to reduce to obedience 'Ali Mardan Khan Afshar, the Governor of Andkhud, and he later ordered him to take similar action against Abu'l-Hasan Khan, the Governor of Balkh, who had refused to attend the ceremony on the Mughan plain.⁶

As the astrologers had recommended, the coronation ceremony was held on the 24th Shawwal, 1148 (8th March, 1736), "at eight hours and 20 minutes after sunrise."⁷

Those khans and other persons of consequence who still remained at

¹ Catholicos Abraham, p. 310. It is probable that many of the Khans left for the same reason. The Catholicos states that there was a great scarcity of bread not only at Mughan, but also throughout the Tahriz district, Ganja, Erivan and elsewhere. The rest of the Catholicos's description of the proceedings at Mughan and of the coronation ceremony is based on information which he received from an Armenian priest named Ter Thouma, who remained at Mughan. Ter Thouma was housed in Mirza Mahdi's tent and was therefore very close to Nadir's place of residence.

² Catholicos Abraham, p. 310.

³ T.N., p. 170. Mirza Mahdi is misleading here, as it appears from his account that 'Al Pasha and the Persian Embassy left the Mughan plain after the coronation ceremony. The Catholicos, however, explicitly states that they left 2 days before, i.e., on the 24th February/6th March.

⁴ See the *Maktab-i-Nadiri* in the *Armaghān* (Tehran, October, 1929), pp. 449-453.

⁵ Catholicos Abraham, p. 313.

⁶ K.N., p. 63. For particulars of the measures taken against these Governors, see Chapter XVI.

⁷ T.N., p. 169 and *Durra-yi-Nadira*. The 24th Shawwal, which is the date given by Mirza Mahdi, agrees exactly with that of the Catholicos Abraham, viz., 26th February (O.S.) or 8th March (N.S.). Hanway is in error in stating that the coronation took place on the 11th/22nd March; he is also incorrect in saying (Vol. IV, p. 127) that "the Armenian patriarch, who was in the camp, performed part of the ceremony, by buckling on his sabre."

the camp assembled in Nadir's audience-hall at the appointed time, all clad in their robes of honour. The golden crown, which the Armenian priest Ter Thouma describes as being shaped like a helmet and adorned with precious stones and magnificent pearls, was placed on Nadir's head by Mirza Zaki. All those present knelt down and prayed, save the deputy Chief Mulla, who intoned the prayer. Whilst this prayer was being uttered, all kept their arms above their heads; afterwards, whilst the *Fatiha* or opening chapter of the Qur'an was being read, they bowed down, with their faces to the ground. When the *Fatiha* was finished, everyone seated himself in his appointed place, according to his rank.¹ Then followed a scene similar to that which had taken place at Nadir's reception on the first day of the *'Idu'l Fitr* (see pp. 97 and 98 above).

Before taking their leave, all present bowed down before the new Shah.²

From the time of his coronation, Nadir ceased to be known as the Wakilu'd-Daula, Na'ibu's-Saltana or Vali Ni'mat. Instead, he took the title of Nadir Shah,³ thus changing his own name Nadr into Nadir.

The poet Qawamu'd-Din made the Arabic chronogram

Al-khair fi ma waqa'a

"The best is in what has occurred."

This chronogram was reproduced on the coins struck at this time and later.⁴ Some of the wits of the time, by transposing the first two letters, reversed the meaning of the phrase without altering its numerical value, which is 1148 (1736).⁵ Further, some poet of Persian 'Iraq, who was pro-Şafavi in his views, wrote the following verse:

*Buridim az mal va az jan tam'
Bi-ta'rikh al-khair fi ma waqa'a.*

"We have cut off all desire
for property and life
At the date 'The best is
in what has occurred.'"⁶

Muhammad Kazim relates that Nadir, on hearing of these lines, put several poets to death.⁷

¹ Catholicos Abraham, p. 311. Mirza Mahdi omits these details, simply saying that Nadir was crowned "with the splendour of Faridun and the pomp of Solomon."

² Catholicos Abraham, p. 311.

³ Shalikh Hazin, p. 270.

⁴ Catholicos Abraham, p. 330. See also R. Stuart Poole's *The Coins of the Shaks of Persia* (London, 1887), p. 72 and plate VII.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 170 and *K.N.*, p. 22.

⁶ Shalikh Hazin, p. 271.

⁷ *K.N.*, p. 22.

On the same day, after the ceremony, Nadir made Mirza Mu'min chief of the *raqam* writers and calligraphists, in place of Mirza Mahdi; in order to console the last-named, Nadir appointed him his historiographer.¹

The day closed with more music, this time provided by drums, cymbals and trumpets; for three days and nights this music continued without a pause.²

As for the youthful 'Abbas III, Nadir sent him, after his deposition, to join his father Tahmasp in Khurasan,³ where he remained until Rida Quli put him and his father and younger brother, Isma'il Mirza,⁴ to death in 1740.

Nadir appointed his brother Ibrahim commander-in-chief of the whole of Adharbaijan, and ordered all the Governors "from the borders of Qaplan Kuh to the Arpa Chai and the limits of Daghistan and Georgia" to obey him.⁵

After the Nau Ruz festivities, Nadir discussed with his commanders the projected Qandahar campaign, and questioned the Afghans in his service as to the state of the country there.

Some days were then devoted to feasting,⁶ and it was not until the 14th April that Nadir and his army left the Mughan camp for Qazvin.⁷ Before his departure he sent back the Kartlian representatives with orders to raise the sum of 3,300 tomans (£7,260) and to provide a garrison of 500 men at Tiflis. This order provoked a revolt in Upper Kartli which was headed by Giv Amilakhor, Vakhusht Abashidze, Shanshi and other Georgian leaders. This revolt was stamped out later in the year by Şafi Khan Bughairi,⁸ the Governor of Georgia.

¹ Catholicoe Abraham, p. 312.

² *Ibid.*, p. 313. It will be recalled that, after the accession of the infant Shah 'Abbas III, the drums were played for a whole week (see p. 63 above).

³ See Shaikh Hazin, p. 272, and the *Bayan*, fol. 14 (b). Hanway is in error in stating (Vol. IV, p. 123) that 'Abbas died early in 1736, and that "some art was used" to bring about his death.

⁴ According to Muhammad Kazim (*R.N.*, p. 468), the young prince's name was Isma'il Mirza, but Shaikh Hazin gives him the name of Sulaiman.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 170.

⁶ Kalushkin reported that, after the coronation, there was much drunkenness and, in consequence, considerable disorder in the camp. See Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,356.

⁷ *T.N.*, p. 171.

⁸ For particulars of this revolt, see Sekhnia Chkheidze, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 50 and 51.

CHAPTER X

THE TRUCE BETWEEN PERSIA AND TURKEY: NADIR'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: CAPTURE OF BAHRAIN: BAKHTIARI OPERATIONS

As related in the previous chapter, 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan and Ganj 'Ali Pasha left the Mughan camp for Constantinople on the 4th March, 1736. As yet unaware of this fact and of the nature of the Persian peace proposals, the Porte, on the 20th April, sent full powers to Ahmad Pasha to conclude the treaty; it expressed satisfaction at his reports respecting the abandonment of the Shi'a doctrine, but it definitely stated that it would never consent to the inclusion of Russia in the treaty.¹

'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan and 'Ali Pasha reached Constantinople on the 6th August, having been five months on the way; the former, on his arrival, "received Honours which are never paid to the Ministers of any Christian Princes. . . ."²

At the first meeting between the Persian and Turkish negotiators, the Shah's letter to the Sultan was read, together with his letters to the Grand Vizier and the Mufti. In the discussions that followed, agreement was reached without much difficulty respecting the exchange of prisoners, the reciprocal appointment of ambassadors and the nomination of a Persian *Amirul-Hajj*³; the case was entirely different, however, in regard to Nadir's religious points. These points were discussed on the Persian side, by the Šadr, Mirza Abu'l-Qasim Kashani and the Mulla-Bashi, 'Ali Akbar; the Turkish negotiators were Laili Ahmad Efendi, the acting Chief Qadi of Anatolia, Masihzada 'Abdullah Efendi, the nominal occupant of that position, 'Abdullah Pasha, the head of the *fatwa* records, and Ahmad Efendi, the former Qadi of Constantinople.⁴ 'Ali Akbar, the very capable Mulla-Bashi, is said to have taken a prominent part in these discussions and to have caused the Turkish representatives considerable embarrassment by his dialectical skill.⁵

The Turks flatly refused to accede to Nadir's religious proposals;

* See Rondeau's despatch of the 22nd June/3rd July, 1736 (S.P. 91, Vol. XVIII), in which a translation of the power of authority to Ahmad Pasha was enclosed (Sir E. Fawcener, the new British Ambassador at Constantinople had evidently forwarded the translation to Rondeau). Obviously, the Porte had not yet learnt of Nadir's proposals regarding the Ja'fari sect, etc.

* Sir E. Fawcener, 7th/18th August (S.P. 97, Vol. XXVIII).

* Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 344.

* *Ibid.*, p. 343.

* Otter, Vol. I, p. 134.

as neither side would give way over the two points involved, it was decided to draw up a treaty embodying the first three points only, and to send an embassy to the Shah to inform him of the situation. 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan agreed to accept the treaty thus truncated, subject to its being confirmed by his sovereign, and he and the Turkish representatives signed it on the 28th September. On the 17th October, 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, Abu'l-Qasim Kashani and 'Ali Akbar were invited to a meeting of the Council, where they were officially given the treaty. In the preamble Nadir was officially recognised as Shah; then followed three articles each dealing with one of the three points on which agreement had been reached; lastly, it was provided, in an annexe, that the frontiers between the two powers were to be identical with those laid down in the treaty of Zuhab of the 7th May, 1639.¹

The state of war between Persia and Turkey was thus officially suspended, pending a solution of the religious difficulties and the receipt of Nadir's views.

When 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan returned to Persia, the Porte dispatched at the same time, as its Ambassador, Mustafa Beg, together with Masihzada 'Abdullah Efendi and the Qadi of Adrianople to assist him on the religious questions.² The Turkish embassy left Constantinople on the 23rd November, 1736, and was followed the next day by 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan and his suite.³ The results achieved by this Turkish mission will be described in Chapter XI.

Whilst the Turco-Persian peace negotiations were in progress, the Russo-Turkish situation steadily deteriorated. War between the two powers had been practically inevitable ever since the march of Qaplan Girai to Daghestan and Leontov's invasion of the Crimea. At Constantinople the situation was aggravated by the efforts of the French Ambassador to incite Turkey to attack Russia. On the Russian side, the repeated urgings of Nepluev and Veshniakov to their Government to attack "the barbarians" when they were, apparently, being forced to their knees by Nadir, more than counteracted the moderating influence which the British, Austrian and Saxon Ministers at St. Petersburg strove to exert.

When Russia at length decided to go to war, she was no doubt influenced by the belief that Nadir would not only make no separate peace, but would actively co-operate with her against Turkey. Nadir, as has been seen,

¹ Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 348. Sir E. Fawkes reported, on the 24th September/5th October, that the Porte had ordered all persons having Persian slaves in their possession to deliver them up to the courts of justice in the places where they resided. In the course of a month between two and three thousand Persian slaves were given up.

² Von Hammer, Vol. XIV, p. 346.

³ See Otter, Vol. I, p. 37: he accompanied 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan to Persia. The Armenian Tambour Aroutine was a member of the Turkish Ambassador's suite (see the *Bulletin de l'Institut Egyptien*, Cairo, 1914, Vol. VIII, p. 174).

had made more than one attempt to persuade Turkey to include Russia in the projected peace treaty, but the terms of the Turks' repeated refusals must have made it plain to him that they would never agree to do so.

On the 28th May, 1736, Russia declared war on Turkey, and Kalushkin shortly afterwards received orders to inform Nadir of this and to notify him of the siege of Azov; he was, further, to point out that this was the moment for Persia to take action against Turkey, when the latter power was being forced to use every effort to repel the Russian onslaught. Nadir's gaze, however, was by now directed eastwards instead of westwards, which caused him to reply that, while he would not undertake any hostile operations against the Turks, he would delude them with proposals of peace, and would not come to terms with them unless Russia were also a party to the settlement.¹ Kalushkin retorted that it was strange that the Shah, who had by his insistence embroiled Russia with Turkey, should now abandon his ally and seek a new friend in one who really desired nothing more than to ruin Persia. Nadir replied that the Russian military operations were all of a minor nature; Persia had no need of Azov, just as Russia had no need of Baghdad. The real point was whether or not Russia would undertake a campaign against Constantinople; the Empress, he said, should lead or send her armies thither. There was, however, no hurry, as Russia and Persia would first have to settle the plan of campaign; he concluded by saying that he would not make peace till he received the Empress's answer. In reporting these conversations to St. Petersburg, Kalushkin stated that the Persian nobles became noticeably colder to him whenever he urged a Persian attack upon Turkey. Persia could not, he added, in fact, resume the Turkish war, as she was in a dangerous condition, the country and people having become terribly impoverished.²

The Persian envoy who reached St. Petersburg at the beginning of July, 1736, after officially notifying the Empress of Nadir's accession, assured her and her ministers that the Shah would make no separate peace; he received in return the promise that Russia would likewise refuse to make peace with Turkey unless Persia were included.³

The news of the signature of the Constantinople treaty came, therefore, as a shock to the Russian court. Nadir, however, had not, technically at any rate, broken his word to Russia, as the settlement effected at Constantinople was, in reality, little more than a truce; moreover, it was never ratified by him.

Nadir remained for three months at Qazvin. Whilst there, he issued an edict to give effect to the religious changes which he had announced at the Mughan assembly. This edict forbade the use of the words.

¹ Soloviev, Vol. XX, p. 1,356.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

"Ali the Friend of God" in prayer, as being contrary to orthodox usage. He also ordained the omission, after the *Fatiha* and *Takbir*, of the words "May the King, from whom all our fortune flows, live for ever," on the grounds that mortal man could not be perpetuated.¹

Cockell states² that Nadir went through another coronation ceremony at Qazvin, "where the Ceremony of Inauguration of the Persian Monarchy is performed. Having girt on the Royal Scymitar, and put the Imperial Crown on his Head, he took the usual Oath . . ." etc., etc. Neither Mirza Mahdi nor any other contemporary Persian authority, so far as the writer is aware, mentions a second coronation at Qazvin, and it therefore seems most improbable that it took place; the investiture on the Mughan plain was surely sufficient. It appears, moreover, unlikely that Nadir would have followed a Şafavi precedent by being crowned at Qazvin.

When Nadir was at Qazvin, the news arrived of the recapture of Bahrain. For some little time Latif Khan (who had, not long before, been reinstated by Nadir as "Admiral of the Gulf") had been making preparations at Bushire for an expedition to Bahrain.³ One of his ships was the *Northumberland*, an East Indiaman, which he had forced the Captain to sell for 5,000 tomans. When the Agent upbraided the captain of the *Northumberland* for selling his vessel, the captain explained that Latif Khan had taken him at a disadvantage, when much of his cargo had been landed and he himself was ashore; he said, however, that though he had sold the vessel under duress, he had got "a great price" for her.⁴

Precise details of the Bahrain expedition are lacking, but it appears that it set out from Bushire in March or early April, 1736, when it was known that Shaikh Jabbara was performing a pilgrimage to Mecca.⁵

The Shaikh's deputy resisted for a time in the fortress, but was forced by superior numbers to yield. On returning to Bushire,⁶ Latif Khan sent the keys of this fortress to Muhammad Taqi Khan,⁷ who, in turn, sent them to Nadir. Nadir thereupon rewarded Muhammad Taqi Khan

¹ See Fraser, pp. 123-127, who quotes (on the authority of Cockell) what purports to be a translation of this edict. It was issued some time in the month of Şafar, 1149 (12th June/9th July, 1736).

² Fraser, p. 127. Otter (Vol. I, p. 335) also mentions this coronation, but he probably copied Fraser.

³ Relations between the Persians and Shaikh Jabbara had of late become very strained. *Gombroon Diary*, 17th/28th June, 1736.

⁴ See *T.N.*, p. 172 and *al-Tuhfat al-Nabhamiyyat fi Ta'rikhi'l-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah* (Cairo, 1929) 30, p. 113, by Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh Khalifa ibn Hamadi'n-Nabhan. The latter writer (whose account contains a number of mistakes) states that the fort now known as the Qal'atu'd-Diwan, in the south of the island of Manama, is believed to have been built at Nadir's command.

⁵ Bushire was renamed Bandar Nadiriyya at or about this time, but this name does not seem to have been widely used.

⁶ According to Fassi (p. 180), Muhammad Taqi Khan went in person on this expedition to Bahrain, but this is incorrect.

and added Bahrain to the province of Fars. This successful expedition led, as will be explained in a later chapter, to a more ambitious project, namely, the conquest of 'Oman and the establishment of Persian naval supremacy in the Persian Gulf.

In the previous year, at the time when 'Abdullah Pasha was marching to his doom at Baghaverd, 'Ali Murad, a young chief of the Chahar Lang section of the Bakhtiari, had revolted.¹ After being defeated in the Isfahan district, he retired to the Bakhtiari mountains where he raised some 20,000 men, including numbers of Lurs from the Khurramabad district and some of the Haft Lang Bakhtiari.² Up to a point, 'Ali Murad's aims were similar to those of Muhammad Khan Baluch, that is, he declared himself in favour of the ex-Shah Tahmasp, but he intended to take part of the kingdom himself, as the price of his support. He is said to have addressed his supporters as follows :

"After destroying the rule of Nadir Shah, I shall set foot in Khurasan and rescue Shah Tahmasp from his prison there ; I shall (then) place power in his hands. Royalty is a great name, and many will rally swiftly to me. Shah Tahmasp will be content with (Persian) 'Iraq and Khurasan, while I shall have Hamadan, Fars and Kirman."³

This speech met with a favourable reception, and facilitated his preparations for the coming struggle.

News of these developments reached Nadir at Qazvin, and caused him extreme annoyance. He issued orders to the Governors of Isfahan, Shushtar and the Kuhgilu province to collect their forces and march into the Bakhtiari country by converging routes and prevent 'Ali Murad from escaping, while he himself entered it from the north, at the head of the main forces. Nadir's wrath was increased when he learnt that the rebels had seized and carried off into their mountains a sum of 10,000 tomans which was being brought to him from Fars.⁴

The Shah after passing through Khunsar, left his baggage at Charpas, whence he penetrated into the heart of the Bakhtiari mountains. His forces soon met with and defeated the rebels who thereupon scattered and fled to their fastnesses. One of their principal fortresses, according to Mirza Mahdi, was called Liruk ; it was, apparently in the very mountainous country E.N.E. of Dizful.⁵ For over two months Nadir and his men searched for 'Ali Murad, but they could find no trace of him, although

¹ *R.N.*, p. 42. The late Sardar Zafar, who had devoted much time to the study of the history of the Bakhtiari, informed me that 'Ali Murad belonged to the Chahar Lang.

² *R.N.*, p. 44. According to Sardar Zafar, most of the Haft Lang (to which he himself belonged) remained loyal to Nadir and co-operated with his troops in quelling the rebellion.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 175.

they inflicted heavy losses upon his followers and forced the survivors to submit.¹ At length, one of Nadir's patrols, when halting near a well close to Gurkash, in the neighbourhood of the Bakhtiari fortress of Banavar, saw a woman descend from a near-by mountain and draw water from the well. Two days later, when she came again to draw water, the leader of the patrol had her seized and questioned. She denied all knowledge of 'Ali Murad at first, but, after she had been cruelly tortured, she admitted that the rebel chief and his family were in hiding in a cave on the side of the mountain. The troops immediately climbed up to this cave and took up their position in front of the entrance. When 'Ali Murad saw that his hiding-place was discovered and that there was no means of escape, he killed his wives and daughters and then bravely defended himself. After keeping his enemies at bay for three days, he was forced to surrender through lack of food and water, and was then bound and sent to Nadir at Shushtar. The Shah was in a stern mood, and gave orders for the wretched man to have his ears, nose, hands and feet cut off and for his eyes to be put out. After lingering for two days "in a pool of blood," the unfortunate 'Ali Murad expired.²

Having dealt in this summary fashion with the ringleader, Nadir proceeded to punish the Bakhtiaris by banishing 10,000 families of the Chahar Lang and Haft Lang to the district of Jam, in Khurasan.³ Being impressed with the good fighting qualities of the Bakhtiaris, he enrolled a large number of them in his army; these men afterwards showed great bravery during the siege of Qandahar.

Nadir's name is not yet forgotten in the Bakhtiari country; the fortress of Diz-i-Shahi (ten and a half miles N.E. of Dizful) is also known as the Sangar-i-Nadiri.

Having thoroughly crushed the Bakhtiaris, Nadir marched through the Karkunan district (where the Karun and the Zayanda Rud have their head waters) to Isfahan, which he reached on the 9th Jumadi II, 1149 (15th October, 1736). In honour of his arrival, the city was lavishly decorated, and at night was illuminated with innumerable lamps.⁴

Nadir took up his abode in the palace in the Hazarjarib garden where he gave audience to some envoys from the Sultan; a few days later, after presenting gifts to these envoys, he gave them leave to return to Turkey⁵; their mission does not appear to have been one of any conse-

¹ *K.N.*, pp. 45 and 46; see also the *T.N.*, p. 175 and the *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 158. The last-mentioned work states that the royal troops had to traverse extremely difficult country:—*farsang dar farsang jua sang va kharsang*.

² From *farsang* to *farsang* (there was) nothing but stones and boulders.

³ *K.N.*, p. 49; see also the *T.N.*, p. 176 and the *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 159.

⁴ *K.N.*, p. 51.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 176; the details regarding Nadir's reception are taken from the *K.N.*, p. 52.

⁶ *K.N.*, p. 53 and 54.

quence ; the important embassy, under Mustafa Pasha, left Constantinople for Persia on the 23rd November (see page 148 above), and did not reach Isfahan until long after Nadir had set out for Qandahar.¹ Having given the Turkish envoys their *congé*, Nadir began actively to prepare for his long-projected campaign against Husain Sulṭān of Qandahar.

¹ See p. 121 below.

CHAPTER XI

THE RECONQUEST OF QANDAHAR

FROM the time when he ejected the Ghalzais from central and southern Persia in the winter of 1729-1730, Nadir always had in his mind the desire to reconquer the city and province of Qandahar and to remove once and for all the danger of attack from that quarter.

Events elsewhere, however, continually interfered with Nadir's plans. First, there was the war with Turkey in 1730; then came the Abdali campaign. He would probably have marched against Husain Sultan in the summer or autumn of 1732, had not Tahmasp's disastrous Turkish campaign diverted his energies to the west. Thereafter, until the autumn of 1736, he was occupied successively with the Turkish war, Muhammad Khan Baluch's revolt, the Lazgi campaign, the Turkish campaign of 1735, the Mughan assembly and the coronation and, lastly, the Bakhtiari revolt.

With the conclusion of the truce with Turkey and the outbreak of the war between that country and Russia, all fear of invasion from the west and north-west was removed, at any rate for some time to come. The Lazgis had been chastened,¹ and the Bakhtiaris had been thoroughly subdued. Rida Quli Mirza had been sent in the early spring to punish the Governors of Balkh and Andkhud and to maintain order in the north-east of Khurasan, while measures were in contemplation for bringing about the submission of the Baluchis.

Whilst still engaged on his Bakhtiari campaign Nadir had sent orders to the Governor of Isfahan to make a levy of 18,000 tomans as a contribution to the cost of the coming expedition to Qandahar. At the same time the Shah's agents were busy at Gombroon requisitioning provisions for the troops, and carried out their duties so rigorously that the inhabitants were reduced to the utmost misery. Besides being forced to supply provisions, the merchants and other inhabitants were made to pay 72,000 rupees, "a sum so extravagant that it has near Completed the ruin of Everyone."² In the province of Kirman Nadir so denuded the people of supplies that there was a famine there for seven or eight years afterwards.³ What was done at Isfahan, Gombroon and in Kirman was no doubt carried out with equal ruthlessness elsewhere.

¹ As subsequent events were to prove, they were not, however, thoroughly quelled.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 18th/29th August, 1736.

³ N. de Khanikoff, *Mémoire sur la Perse Méridionale de l'Asie Centrale*, Paris, 1861, p. 192.

Nadir decided to march to Qandahar via Kirman and Sistan. Since much of the country to be traversed was desert, he gave orders for large quantities of provisions to be sent on in advance to the various halting places. In order to provide the necessary transport, the Government authorities commandeered large numbers of draught animals, including those that were conveying a consignment of the East India Co.'s wool from Kirman to Gombroon. The Shah's agents even stopped caravans on the roads, commandeered the animals and left by the roadside the goods which they had been carrying.¹

Before leaving Isfahan, Nadir rewarded his officers with coats of honour and with money presents graded according to their rank, and gave each of the rank and file 12 tomans in respect of pay and as much again as a bonus.² At length, after a stay of five weeks in the capital, Nadir set out for Qandahar on the 17th Rajab, 1149 (21st November, 1736), at the head of 80,000 men, of whom the majority were cavalry³; there were large numbers of Khurasanis (including the Chamishgazak Kurds and Giraili and Bughairi Turks), Abdalis, and a strong contingent of Bakhtiaris. He took with him, as hostages rather than as volunteers, several prominent Georgians, among whom were King Taimuraz, Giv Amilakhor, and Bardzim, the Eristav of the Aragvi.⁴

Simultaneously with the departure from Isfahan, Pir Muhammad, the Beglarbeg of Herat, and Asilmas Khan (otherwise known as Khan Jan) left for Makran and Baluchistan at the head of several thousand men, with the object of reducing to obedience Muhabbat Khan and Ilyas Khan (otherwise known as Imtiyaz Khan), two of the sons of the late 'Abdullah Khan Brahvi. On completing that task, they were to rejoin Nadir at Qandahar.

The Shah and the main forces reached Kirman late in December and halted there for a few days⁵; after dispatching *chapers* (mounted messengers) to Sistan to order Fath Ali Khan Kayani (or "Sistani," as he was sometimes called), a son of Malik Mahmud, to join the royal army on the borders of the province of Qandahar with the forces of

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 18th/29th August and 23rd August/3rd September, 1736 and J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers*, p. 49.

² *K.N.*, p. 56.

³ Fraser, p. 128 and *Fars-Nama*, p. 181. According to the former, Tahmasp Khan Jalayir joined Nadir shortly afterwards with another 40,000 men. Hanway (Vol. IV, p. 146) gives a similar figure, but he is in error in stating that Nadir marched via Khurasan.

⁴ Vakhshat, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 132, and Sekhuis Chkheidze, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 52.

⁵ Henry Savage (who had succeeded Whittwell at Kirman) reported that he had been forced to make Nadir a present to the value of 160 tomans, "the Dutch having led the way with a more considerable one." (*Gombroon Diary*, 1st/12th January, 1737). In February, 1737, Savage stated that "the King has sent orders to seize all the beasts again to carry Powder and Shott and draw Cannon to Candahar"; this, he said, would make it impossible for him to forward any wool to Gombroon for some time.

Zabulistan,¹ Nadir proceeded via Bam, Tum-i-Rig and Gurg to Sistan²; it crossed the Sistan-Qandahar border on the 2nd Shawwal (3rd February, 1737), and reached Girishk on the 18th of the month, after passing through Farah, Dalhak and Dilaram. Girishk was held by a Ghalzai force, but this place speedily surrendered on a bombardment being opened. Whilst at Girishk, Nadir sent his brother-in-law, Kalb 'Ali Khan, with part of his forces to subdue the fortress and district of Zamindavar and the town of Bust.³

After a halt of three days at Girishk, the march was resumed via Shah Maqṣud (a small town 30 miles N.W. of Qandahar) to the Arghandab river, close to the west bank of which camp was pitched.

Husain Sultan, having learnt through his scouts of the presence of the Persian army on the further side of the Arghandab, sent his commander-in-chief, Muḥammad Saidal Khan, and another of his leaders named Yunus Khan to deliver a surprise attack that night upon the Persians.⁴ Each of these commanders was at the head of 8,000 picked horsemen. Unfortunately for the Afghans, not only did they lose touch with one another in the darkness, but they had also not kept their plans sufficiently secret. 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan, the Abdali leader, had heard of the impending attack, and had sent out a strong body of his men to parry it. These Abdalis, on coming into contact with Yunus Khan's men in the darkness, pretended to be Saidal's troops, and called out to the Ghalzais in Pashtu. Yunus Khan and his men were completely taken in, and had begun fraternising with the Abdalis when the latter suddenly assailed them and inflicted very heavy casualties. Hearing the fighting, Saidal hastened to the rescue, but was unable to retrieve the situation, and sustained such losses that he eventually had to withdraw to Qandahar; he lost many more men from drowning when fording the Arghandab.⁵

On the following morning Nadir and his troops crossed the Arghandab at Kokaran, a village seven miles to the west of Qandahar, and then advanced towards the Qaitul ridge on which the north-western defences of Qandahar were situated. Despite cannon fire from the fort on the lofty Kuh-i-Laka, at the south-western end of the ridge, the Persian army


¹ K.N., p. 63.

² T.N., p. 176, and *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 160. Sir F. Goldsmid, on p. 250 of his *Eastern Persia: an Account of the Journey of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870-71-72* (London, 1876), states that he found a ruined gate 29 miles from Gurg which was said to be a relic of Nadir's passage. N. de Khanikoff, who travelled along this route in 1858, mentions that Nadir had to have the pass over the ridge widened by means of the axes carried by his men, so that his artillery could pass. This pass consequently became known as Gardana-yi-Tabarkand (see de Khanikoff, *op. cit.*, p. 164).

³ T.N., p. 178.

⁴ K.N., p. 64; according to Mirza Mahdi (who may be correct), Husain himself took part in this attack (T.N., p. 178).

⁵ K.N., pp. 64-67; see also the T.N., p. 178 (Muḥammad Kazim's account is very much more detailed than that of Mirza Mahdi).



crossed a projecting spur of this mountain, and, after skirting the southern walls of the city, encamped on the plain to the east of it.¹

On the 9th April, Nadir moved his camp a short distance to Surkh Shir, a place two miles to the S.E. of Qandahar, where he caused a whole city to be built, complete with walls and citadel, bazaars, mosques, baths and rest houses²; according to 'Abdu'l-Karim, he ordered each of his men to build a house there.³ To this new city he gave the name of Nadirabad.

Meanwhile, the Persian forces had begun the siege of Qandahar. As Aurangzib and, later, his brother Dara Shukuh, had found to their cost in the middle of the previous century, the city was so strongly fortified as to be impregnable unless the besiegers had heavy and efficient artillery. It was protected on the north-west by the Qaitul ridge and on its other sides by enormously strong walls, made of dried mud strengthened with chopped

¹ T.N., p. 178.

² Ibid., p. 179. See also *Durr-i-Nadira*, p. 169.

³ *Bayan*, folio 14 (b).

straw and stones¹; in places, these walls were no less than thirty feet thick.²

As Nadir was, as usual, deficient in siege artillery, he was forced to adopt blockading methods similar to those which he had employed during the siege of Baghdad. A ring of strong forts was built round Qandahar; between these forts, towers were placed at intervals of 100 yards, and others were afterwards added.

Since Husain Sultan had received ample warning of Nadir's intention to besiege Qandahar, he had laid in large quantities of provisions, so the siege was likely to prove a long one. Nadir, however, had one great advantage over Aurangzib in that his army, which consisted largely of hardy mountaineers and men from the uplands of Khurasan, was far better able to withstand the rigours of a winter campaign than Aurangzib's Indian troops had been; he was thus able to contemplate a siege of several months' duration with comparative equanimity. The only serious problem was the provisioning of his large army, which required far more food than the country surrounding Qandahar could supply. Reference has already been made to the privations which the inhabitants of Kirman had to undergo as a result of the depletion of their resources in order to provide supplies for the army; this was not all that the unfortunate people of that province had to endure, for draught animals became so scarce that, in February, 1738, men and women were compelled to act as porters from the Kirman district to Qandahar, the men having to carry fifteen, and women seven, Tabrizi maunds (some 97 and 45 lbs. respectively) of grain.³ Provisions were also obtained from Sistan.

In May news of the capture of Bust was received at the camp, and the town of Safa fell soon after. Imam Verdi Beg Qiriqlu then advanced against Qal'at-i-Ghalzai, which fell after a siege lasting over two months, when one of Husain Sultan's sons named Muhammad, his general Saidal and a number of other Ghalzai leaders were captured and brought to Nadirabad. Nadir had Saidal deprived of his sight, because he looked upon him as a dangerous man.⁴

On the 11th Muharram, 1150 (11th May, 1737), Nadir dispatched Muhammad Khan Turkoman, the former Safavi general, on a mission to Muhammad Shah. The reason for this mission was that, when a Persian detachment had defeated some Ghalzais a few *farsakhs* beyond Qal'at-i-Ghalzai, and the survivors had fled over the Indian frontier,

¹ The Emperor Shah Jahan had given Aurangzib, in 1649, positive orders to attempt no assault on the fortress until these walls could be breached: so strong were they, however, that Aurangzib's artillery could not make any appreciable impression upon them.

² Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan* (translated by Captain W. Jesse), London, 1856, p. 317.

³ *Gombroon Diary* (Volume V, 1st/12th March, 1736).

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 181.

the Mughal authorities, despite the repeated requests that had been made to them, made no attempt to stop the fugitives.¹ Muhammad Khan Turkoman had orders not to stay for more than 40 days at the Mughal Court, but, as will be seen later, he remained there for over a year.

Muhammad Kazim describes in great detail the operations of Pir Muhammad and Asilmas Khan in Baluchistan. Marching by way of Bandar 'Abbas and the Makran coast, these leaders and their men entered Baluchistan, and soon after encountered and defeated Muhabbat Khan, the eldest son of the late 'Abdullah Khan. The two commanders then proceeded to Shal (Quetta), whence they pressed on towards Qalat (Kalat); on this march the men suffered greatly from thirst, but they nevertheless defeated Muhabbat Khan's forces a second time. The Khan then fled to his fortress of Mustang and, after consulting his brother Ilyas, abandoned further resistance; the two brothers thereupon went to Qandahar and submitted to Nadir. The Shah received them kindly, took Muhabbat Khan into his service, and appointed him Governor of Baluchistan.²

The submission of these two leaders by no means ended the resistance of the Baluch tribes, and Pir Muhammad and Asilmas Khan had much further fighting. After a long siege, they took the fortress of Jalq, which was, apparently, near Shal. Differences then arose between Pir Muhammad and Asilmas Khan, owing, it seems, to the former chafing at the control which his companion sought to maintain over him. Pir Muhammad's enemies took advantage of this quarrel to report to Nadir that he was planning to rebel, with the result that the Shah had him beheaded. When it became apparent later that Pir Muhammad had been falsely accused, Nadir is said to have felt much remorse.³

After the execution of Pir Muhammad, Asilmas Khan was relieved by Nadir's brother-in-law, Fath 'Ali Khan, who, in the course of another three months or so, reduced the whole of Baluchistan to obedience.

All this time the Persian forces which Nadir had detached at Girishk had been endeavouring to subdue the Afghans in the Zamindavar district; they met with such determined resistance that it was not until the end of January, 1738, that they completed their task.⁴

By the beginning of 1738 the greater part of Baluchistan and the districts of Zamindavar and Qal'at-i-Ghalzai had been thoroughly subdued, thus rendering available for the siege of Qandahar a large proportion of the troops who had been operating in those parts. Until reinforced

¹ *T.N.*, p. 190.

² *K.N.*, p. 92; see also *T.N.*, p. 132.

³ *K.N.*, pp. 120-125.

⁴ Nadir's brother-in-law Kalb 'Ali Khan was in command of these operations, but he was so unsuccessful and sustained such losses that Nadir dismissed him and had him hanged.

by these men, Nadir had made no attempt to force his way through the formidable defences of Qandahar. He was now able to adopt more vigorous measures.

On the 9th Shawwal, 1150 (30th January, 1738), Nadir's troops attacked the defences at several points, and met with a certain measure of success. A number of the outer bastions and towers on the plain were taken; simultaneously, another body of men scaled the north-eastern end of the Qaitul ridge near the steps known as the Chihil Zina,¹ where they took a strong stone tower. The Persians then, with the greatest difficulty, hauled cannon and mortars up to this commanding position, whence they were able to bombard much of the fortress, including an extremely strong tower further to the south-west known as the Burj-i-Dada.²

Although the fire of these cannon caused considerable damage to the fortifications, the defenders worked so zealously every night repairing the breaches that the walls remained, apparently, as strong as ever.³

As the Bakhtiari contingent had repeatedly urged Nadir to allow them to deliver an assault, he at length gave them permission to do so: accordingly, on the 13th March, 900 volunteers, of whom one-third were Bakhtiaris and the remainder Abdalis and Chamishgazak Kurds, advanced to the attack. Husain, however, had received warning beforehand, and had concentrated his men at the threatened point; the result was that the assailants were repulsed with the loss of 200 killed and wounded.⁴

It was probably at this stage (if Muḥammad Kazim is to be believed) that a man named Dad (or Dayad) Khan came to one of Nadir's commanders and offered to enter Qandahar and glean particulars of the state of the defences. As this man had previously served under Husain and had complained to him of Nadir's ways, he would, he said, have no difficulty in gaining access to the Ghalzai leader and obtaining much valuable information. On Dad Khan's offer being accepted, he departed on his mission. He was well received by Husain, and succeeded in obtaining all the data that he required. Alleging that he was going to assassinate Nadir, he then made his way back to the Persian lines. He reported to Nadir that there were sufficient provisions in the city to last for three or four years. The walls, he continued, were enormously strong, but a way through could nevertheless be forced if a resolute attack were launched on the Burj-i-Dada and the lines behind it on a

¹ For a description of the Chihil Zina and of the Emperor Babur's inscription in the chamber cut in the rock there, see Bellevue's *Journal of a Mission to Afghanistan in 1857*, p. 233.

² *T.N.*, p. 185, *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 162.

³ *K.N.*, pp. 144 and 145.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 186, *Durra-yi-Nadira*, p. 162; Jones (Vol. XI, p. 406) incorrectly states that the attacking force numbered 300 in all.

Friday; on that day the bulk of the defenders always attended service in the mosques and left only a skeleton force to hold the walls.¹

On the strength of this information, Nadir planned to attack the Burj-i-Dada in great force on Friday, the 2nd Dhu'l-Hijja (23rd March, 1738). Great preparations for the attack were made, and the men to form the spear-head of the assault were selected from among a large number of volunteers. To these men Nadir promised 1,000 *nadiris*² (rupees) each and the spoils of the fortress in the event of success, but added sternly: "If any of you turn your heads from the fray, I have ordered my *nasaqchis* to behead you and to make your bodies the food of flies and dogs!" One of the volunteers was a Bakhtiari *mulla* named Adina Mustaufi. Nadir, in surprise, said to him: "You are a *mulla* and a scribe, and fighting is not your task." Mulla Adina replied: "May I be your sacrifice! . . . If God will, you will have proof of my courage."³

During Friday night⁴ the troops took up their appointed positions, and on the following morning the signal for the attack was given from above the Chihil Zina. Instantly, the Bakhtiari and other volunteers rushed forward with scaling ladders and placed them against the Burj-i-Dada; the first man to reach the top was Mulla Adina. The attackers sustained heavy losses, but, the defenders being but few in number owing to so many being absent in the mosques, the Persians captured the tower and pressed on. When Husain realised what had occurred, he made desperate efforts to drive the Persians back, but it was too late. Tower after tower fell to the assailants, and at length Husain and his bodyguard were forced back to the Qaitul citadel, where they were besieged.⁵

On Nadir bringing his heavy cannon to bear on the citadel, Husain decided to surrender; on the following day he sent his sister Zainab, in company with a number of Ghalzai chiefs, to ask for quarter, this action being in accordance with the Afghan custom of *nannawat*.⁶ Nadir

¹ *K.N.*, p. 145-153. There may be some truth in this story of Dad Khan, although it is not mentioned in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* (Nadir's official historiographer may have deemed it prudent to omit anything that would tend to minimise the extent of his sovereign's achievement in taking Qandahar). Rumours that the fall of Qandahar was due to treachery were certainly widespread, though they differed from Muhammad Kazim's story and indeed from one another; see, for example, the *Tadhkira* of Anand Ram Mukhlis, fol. 163(a) and Otter, Vol. I, p. 336 (Otter's account is too improbable to be regarded seriously).

² Ordinarily, as in this case, the *nadiri* was equivalent to a rupee, but, according to the *T.N.*, (p. 183), there was another kind of *nadiri* (which, apparently, was never minted), that was equivalent to 3½ *tomans*.

³ *K.N.*, p. 155.

⁴ As the Muhammadan day begins at sunset, this would be *Thursday* night according to our reckoning.

⁵ *K.N.*, pp. 160-165; *T.N.*, pp. 187-188.

⁶ Mirza Mahdi described this custom as being equivalent to the Arab *dakhil* (the phrase *ana dakhila fulan* means "I am under the protection of so-and-so"). See also Elphinstone's explanation of *nannawat* in his *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (London, 1839), Vol. I, p. 295.

respected this custom, and granted Husain and his family and followers their lives, but sent them as prisoners to Mazandaran.

Nadir found imprisoned in Qandahar his former foe, Dhu'l-Fiqar Khan, the Abdali leader, and his younger brother, Ahmad (who was then between 14 and 16 years of age). Some years before, the two brothers had fled from Herat to Qandahar, but Husain had seized them and thrown them into prison. Nadir treated the brothers with great kindness, gave them a grant from his treasury for their sustenance, and sent them to Mazandaran.¹

Nadir rewarded his troops, as he had promised, by giving them the spoils of the city, and handed to Mulla Adina, the bold Bakhtiari priest, a purse containing a large sum in gold.²

Nadir made the inhabitants of Qandahar move to Nadirabad, which he made the capital of the province of Qandahar, and then gave orders for the Ghalzai fortress to be rased to the ground; the fortifications were so solidly constructed, however, that this order could only be partially carried out.³ 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan was made Governor of the province, and other Abdali chiefs were appointed Governors of Girishk, Bust and Zamindavar. The Abdali tribesmen in Nishapur and elsewhere in Khurasan were brought *en masse* to Qandahar (where they had formerly lived) and were given the lands of the Hotiki Ghalzais (the clan to which Husain belonged), while the latter were transferred to Khurasan and settled on the lands vacated by the Abdalis. Several thousand young Ghalzais were enrolled in Nadir's bodyguard instead of being sent to Khurasan.⁴

With the capture of Qandahar, Nadir not only wiped out the stain of the defeat which the Ghalzais under Mahmud had inflicted upon Persia sixteen years before, but also completed his task of restoring the territory that had been lost during the disastrous reign of Shah Sulṭān Husain. Having very successfully acted as the saviour of his country, Nadir was now about to essay the rôle of world conqueror. His striking military successes must have encouraged the belief that the mantle of Alexander or of Timur had fallen upon him.

Nadir remained at Nadirabad for two months after the fall of Qandahar; during this period he was busy completing his preparations for the Indian expedition, the reasons for which will be examined in the next chapter.

In response to a summons from the Shah, Muṣṭafa Pasha, the Turkish

¹ F.N., p. 188, see also 'Abdu'l-Karim 'Alavi's *Tārīkh-i-Aḥmad*, p. 4.

² F.N., p. 165.

³ When my friend Mr. G. T. Swann visited the site of Old Qandahar in 1934, he found that some of the walls and part of the citadel were still standing.

⁴ F.N., p. 188. George Forster, in Volume II, p. 81 of his *Journey from Bengal to England* (London, 1798), gives the number of these Ghalzai recruits as 4,000, but omits to quote his authority.



RUINS OF THE CITADEL OF QANDAHAR (HUSAINABAD)



VIEW FROM THE CITADEL, LOOKING NORTH

Photograph by Mr. G. T. Swann

Ambassador, and his suite, who had reached Isfahan at the end of July, 1737, left for Nadirabad at the beginning of February, 1738, accompanied by 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan; the two Ambassadors reached Nadirabad on the 19th May.¹ On being received by Nadir, Mustafa Pasha delivered a letter from the Sultan in which he offered excuses for his inability to recognise the Ja'fari sect² or to agree to the erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka'ba; the Sultan also stated that the sending of the Persian pilgrims to Mecca via Syria might give rise to trouble. He concluded by begging Nadir to excuse his acceptance of the first two points. In regard to the third point, he suggested that the Persian pilgrims should proceed to Mecca via Najaf; if they would use this route, measures would be taken for their protection and well-being.

Nadir in reply informed Mustafa Pasha and his advisers that the questions of the Ja'fari sect and the fifth pillar for the Ka'ba, were, in his view, the most important part of the treaty, and that the matter required further elucidation. He, therefore, appointed 'Ali Mardan Khan Shamlu, the former envoy to the Mughal Emperor, Ambassador to Turkey, and instructed him to accompany Mustafa Pasha back to Constantinople, where the points at issue were to be fully discussed.³ According to Otter, the Shah, when giving his last audience to Mustafa Pasha, charged him to give a faithful account to his sovereign of all that he had seen, and to assure the Sultan that he would have news of him as soon as he returned from India.⁴

Nadir's diplomacy is worthy of notice on this occasion. He had no wish to cause a definite breach with the Sultan at that particular time, but, on the other hand, he would not submit to dictation from Turkey. He, therefore, damped, but did not extinguish the fire of religious controversy, so as to be able to fan it into flame directly it suited his purpose to do so.

¹ T.N., p. 180.

² The Turks doubtless objected to this term, because of its ambiguous nature; for its use to designate a sect of the Shi'a, see p. 279 below.

³ T.N., p. 189.

⁴ Vol. I, p. 225.

CHAPTER XII

THE INVASION OF INDIA : QANDAHAR TO KARNAL

WHEN Nadir became Shah of Persia in the spring of 1736, Muḥammad Shah had been Emperor of Mughal India for seventeen years. The Mughal line, like that of the Safavis, had sadly degenerated in the course of time, and Muḥammad Shah compared no more favourably with Babur or Akbar than Shah Sulṭān Husain had done with Shah Isma'il or Shah 'Abbas I. The dissolution of the Mughal Empire had begun towards the end of the long reign of Aurangzib (1658-1707), and in the dozen years that immediately followed his death three wars of succession hastened the rate of decline. An additional cause of weakness was the emergence, in the reign of Bahadur Shah (1707-1712), of the Turanian (Trans-oxianan or Central Asian), Persian and Hindustani factions. In 1719 Raushan Akhtar, a grandson of Bahadur Shah, was elevated to the throne, and took the title of Muḥammad Shah. During his reign of twenty-nine years he "watched, rather than contested, the progress of disintegration, while his court was the scene of intrigue between various factions."¹ It was unfortunate for India that, at the time when Nadir Shah decided upon his invasion, she had as Emperor such a man as Muḥammad Shah, and that his court was divided against itself.

It will be recalled that the Persian court had on several occasions requested the Mughal Emperor to close his frontiers to Afghan fugitives, and that the Emperor had replied that he would do so. Nothing, however, had been done, as was found at an early stage of the campaign in Afghanistan.² Nadir, in anger, thereupon dispatched Muḥammad Khan Turkoman to Delhi to complain of the failure of the Mughal forces to close the frontier: he gave the envoy strict orders not to remain at the Mughal court for more than forty days. When, in due course, Muḥammad Khan Turkoman delivered this letter, the Emperor and his Ministers were much perplexed; if they replied, by what title should they address Nadir?³ Instead of deciding this question immediately, they resolved to return no answer until the result of the siege of Qandahar became

¹ *A Short History of India* (London, 1936), p. 267, by W. H. Moreland and Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee. The state of India at this time was very similar, in some respects, to what it had been 340 years before, when Timur was about to launch his attack; then, as in 1738/9, the country was much weakened by the struggles of rival factions for power.

² See p. 117 above.

³ Shaikh Ḥazim, p. 286; *Siyarū'l-Muta'āhhirin*, p. 470; *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, fol. 15(a).

known. Moreover, despite the remonstrances of Muḥammad Khan, they refused to give him leave to depart.¹ A whole year thus passed, and when, after the fall of Qandahar, there was still no reply from Delhi and no news of Muḥammad Khan, Nadir sent him emphatic orders to return at once and to bring whatever reply the Emperor might wish to give.²

Without waiting for an answer to this message, Nadir set out from Nadirabad for Ghazna on the 21st May, 1738, and crossed the Indian frontier, apparently at or near Mukur,³ a few days later. Thus began the invasion of India.

Nadir nevertheless kept up the semblance of friendship with the Emperor for some time to come, and excused his violation of the frontier on the grounds that he merely wished to punish the Afghan fugitives. It is highly probable, however, that his expressed desire to punish the Afghans was only a pretext, and that he had for some time harboured the design of conquering India. The almost continual campaigns of the past few years had caused famine in Persia and had brought her to the verge of bankruptcy, besides rendering it difficult, if not impossible, for Nadir to obtain within her borders sufficient recruits to replace casualties and wastage. He had doubtless realised that, under such circumstances, he could not hope to succeed in his design of marching to the Bosphorus. As Persia could not meet his requirements, he must look elsewhere; he could recruit the man-power he wanted from among the warlike Afghans and Ōzbegs, but it was impossible to maintain mercenaries without money. The conquest of India, it must have seemed, offered the only solution to the problem. The ambassadors whom Nadir had sent on several occasions to that country must, on their return, have informed him of the enormous wealth, as well as the increasing weakness, of the Mughal Empire.⁴ With the spoils of India, he could raise and pay more Afghan and Ōzbeg levies, and so renew the war with Turkey; besides, by invading the Panjab, he would be following the example of Alexander the Great, Mahmud of Ghazna and Timur, and thereby merit the title of "World Conqueror."

Another reason for the invasion, according to a number of contemporary

¹ T.N., p. 190: the Indian historian Muḥammad Bakhsh ("Ashub"), *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 31, alleged that the reason for Muḥammad Khan Turkoman's prolonged stay in the Indian capital was that he had become infatuated with a dancing girl there. This statement is not confirmed by other authorities.

² T.N., p. 190.

³ The T.N. [p. 191] gives the name of the place where the frontier was crossed as Chashma-yi-Makmur, which cannot now be identified.

⁴ Anand Ram, in his *Tadhkira* (Vol. 163(b)), says that "the train had long been laid and from these negotiations (i.e., the various missions from Nadir to Muḥammad Shah) sprang the spark that fired it." He adds that the above was merely the apparent motive for the invasion, and that the true reason was the weakness of the Mughal monarchy.

historians and writers, both Indian¹ and European,² is that Nadir entered India at the invitation of the Nizamu'l-Mulk, the veteran Viceroy of the Deccan; it has also been asserted that Sa'adat Khan, the Subadar of Oudh, was jointly responsible with the Nizamu'l-Mulk for inviting Nadir to come.³ It is certainly possible that either or both of these nobles may have been guilty of treason. Chin Qilich Khan, the Nizamu'l-Mulk, was of Central Asian extraction, and Sa'adat Khan was a Persian by birth⁴; consequently, neither may have had any deep feeling of loyalty to the Mughal state. On the other hand, the charge against them has never been, and now probably never will be, proved; the only way that that could be done would be to produce the incriminating letters that are alleged to have been exchanged.

Hanway, it appears, was fully justified in remarking⁵: "It appears to me highly probable that Nadir did not stand in need of such instruments (i.e., the Nizamu'l-Mulk) for the execution of his ambitious designs."

After crossing the Indian frontier, the Persian army halted for a few days at Qarabagh, 37 miles south-west of Ghazna. When the Governor of Ghazna heard of the Shah's arrival at Qarabagh, he abandoned his post and fled to Kabul; the *qadis*, *'ulama*, and notables of the town, however, came in a body to Qarabagh, and submitted to Nadir.⁶

Ghazna was reached on the 22nd Šafar (11th June), and from there the army went on towards Kabul. Soon after leaving Ghazna, Nadir sent the following message to the *Kotwal* of Kabul:

"We are not concerned with the Kingdom of Muhammad Shah, but since these

¹ See, in particular, the *Jauhar-i-Samsam* of Muhammad Muhsin Siddiqi; the writer was, however, a zealous supporter of Samsamu'd-Daula Khan Dauran, the Amiru'l-Umara or Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal army and one of the leaders of the Hindustani party. Khan Dauran was very hostile to the Nizamu'l-Mulk who was a prominent member of the rival Turanian or Central Asian faction at the Court (feeling between these two parties was very intense). The accusation is also made in Rustam Ali's *Ta'rikh-i-Hindi* (H.M. MS. OR. 1628, fol. 281 (b)), but it is qualified by the words "it is said that" . . . See also the *Halat-i-Nadir Shah* by Amira Chandiri (I.O. MS. 4008), *Nadir Var* (a ballad on Nadir's invasion) by Nijabat, a Haral Rajput (see the paper read by R. B. Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul before the Panjab Historical Society on the 26th September, 1916), and Tilok Das's Hindi poem (see W. Irvine's annotated translation in the *J.R.A.S.B.*, 1897, Vol. LXVI).

² Fraser, pp. 129-133; Otter, Vol. I, p. 355; Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 142. Belief in the Nizamu'l-Mulk's guilt was certainly widespread; that it was by no means confined to India is evidenced by a remark made to Otter in 1743 by the Kiahya of Mosul. Wishing to imply that Ahmad Pasha was in collusion with Nadir, the Kiahya said: "N'y auroit-il pas parmi nous un second Nizam ul-Mulk qui trahit le Grand Seigneur, et fait venir le Roi (Nadir) contre nous" (See Otter, Vol. II, p. 365). Dr. Jadunath Prasad, in his (unpublished) thesis entitled *The Life and Career of Mir Qamaru'd-Din, Nizamu'l-Mulk Asaf Jah I*, is, however, convinced of his innocence.

³ *Risala-yi-Muhammad Shah* (B.M. MS. OR. 180, fol. 106(b)-107(b)); the anonymous author of this work was (like Muhammad Muhsin Siddiqi) a warm supporter of Khan Dauran.

⁴ For Sa'adat Khan's antecedents, see the *Imadu's-Sa'adat*, fol. 6 (a), and the recent work by Dr. Srivastava, entitled *The First Two Nawabs of Oudh* (Lucknow, 1933), pp. 5-30.

⁵ Vol. IV, p. 142.

⁶ T.N., p. 191.

regions (literally, "frontiers" = *ḥudūd*) are like a mine (*ma'dan*) of Afghans and numbers of fugitives have also joined them, it is (our) intention to extirpate these people. Be not anxious for yourselves, but undertake the obligations of hospitality."¹

Naṣir Khan, the Ṣubadar of Kabul and Peshawar, when faced with the task of repelling the invaders, appealed to Delhi for money to pay his troops. In the words of Anand Ram, Naṣir Khan wrote to Delhi that :

"... he himself was but a rose-bush withered by the blasts of autumn, while his soldiery were no more than a faded pageant, ill-provided and without spirit; he begged that, of the five years' salary due to him, one year's salary might be paid, that he might satisfy his creditors and have some little money at his command."²

This appeal fell upon deaf ears, and nothing was done to support Naṣir Khan. According to the historian Ghulam Ḥusain, Khan Dauran, the Amīr-ul-Umara of the Mughal forces, was primarily to blame for the neglected state of the defences of the province of Kabul; had he attended to his duties, Nadir would not have wished to come to India or he would not, at any rate, have had such facility in coming.³

When Nadir's army arrived within two stages of Kabul, a deputation, consisting of the notables of the city, came out and made their submission to him. However, Sharza Khan, the commander of the citadel, offered resistance, and held out until the end of June.⁴

On the 14th July, Nadir sent an envoy to Muḥammad Khan with a long message complaining of his behaviour and stating that he (Nadir) had come to Kabul with the sole object of punishing the Afghans; the people of Kabul having resisted him, he had been obliged to punish them. He concluded by expressing his friendship for the Emperor.⁵ The envoy left for Delhi in company with some notables of Kabul; when the party reached Jalalabad, they were stopped by the Governor and the envoy was slain; the Kabulīs were, however, sent on to Peshawar.⁶

Since provisions were scarce at Kabul, Nadir took his army some forty miles northwards to the fertile district of Charikar, in the Kuhistan, where food and fodder were to be had in abundance.⁷ After a halt of twenty-two days in this district, the army left for Gandamak on the 5th September; on reaching that place, Nadir stormed the mountain fast-

¹ Shaikh Ḥazin (Persian text), p. 187.

² *Tadhkirā*, fol. 163 (b); this passage has been published in Elliot and Dowson's *History*, Vol. VIII, p. 71.

³ *Siyarū'l-Muta'akhhirin*, p. 469.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 192.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 194. Shaikh Ḥazin states (pp. 288 and 289) that Nadir sent a trooper accompanied by ten horsemen on this errand. At Jalalabad they were set upon by a mob and all but one were killed; the survivor managed to escape to Kabul.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 194. The town of Charikar stands on the site of Alexandria, which was founded by Alexander the Great in the spring of 329 B.C.

nesses of the local tribesmen.¹ A punitive expedition was then sent on in advance, to Jalalabad, where it avenged the murder of the Persian envoy.

Nadir and his main force thereupon advanced to Bahar Sufia²; a few miles S.W. of Jalalabad, where Riḍa Quli, in response to a summons from his father, joined the latter on the 7th November, having travelled from Balkh via the Qunduz (Badakhshan) district.³

In the previous year (1737) the young prince had carried out his father's instructions to subdue the rebellious Governors of Andkhud and Balkh; he had then, without any authority from Nadir, crossed the Oxus and, after punishing some hostile tribesmen, boldly marched in the direction of Bukhara and laid siege to the town of Qarshi and the fortress of Shulluk. Abu'l-Faiḍ, the weak and degenerate ruler of Bukhara, assisted by numerous Özbeg and other Central Asian tribesmen, marched to the relief of Qarshi, but was defeated. Riḍa Quli's forces succeeded in taking Shulluk and were still besieging Qarshi when orders arrived from Nadir to raise the siege and return at once to Balkh. At the same time Nadir sent word to Abu'l-Faiḍ that he recognised his sovereign rights over Bukhara and that he had ordered his son to cease making war upon him.⁴ Riḍa Quli obeyed his father's orders and returned to Balkh, where he remained until he was summoned to Bahar Sufia in order to confer with his father regarding the defence of Khurasan which (as will be explained in Chapter XVI) was then threatened with invasion by Ilbars of Khwarizm. Nadir, apparently, first received news of Ilbars's hostile intentions when he was at Kabul, and it was then that he resolved to invade Khwarizm on his return from India.

After reviewing the troops whom Riḍa Quli had brought from Balkh, Nadir made the young prince Viceroy of Persia "with power to appoint and dismiss Governors and (other) persons of authority." A few days later he placed the diadem on the head of his second son Naṣrullah and gave orders that he and his other sons should, "in the manner of kings," wear the *jīqa* or aigrette of royalty on the right side of the head, instead of on the left.⁵ On the 3rd Sha'ban (17th November, 1738), Riḍa Quli took leave of his father and returned to Persia to take up his vice-regal duties. On the following day Nadir and his army set out for Jalalabad, where, in due course, they camped; provisions at this place were very scarce.⁶

¹ Mirza Mahdi omits the names of these tribes. It is stated by Anand Ram (fol. 164 (b)) that the Saffi Afghans offered much resistance to Nadir; see also Ashub, p. 55.


² Bahar Sufia is, apparently, identical with Bahar Pa'in.

³ T.N., p. 195.

⁴ Fuller particulars of Riḍa Quli's Turkistan campaign are given in Chapter XVI.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See Brosset's translation of a letter which Kalushkin received from an Armenian correspondent from Jalalabad (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 369).



On leaving Jalalabad, Nadir sent forward an advance guard 12,000 strong, with orders to keep two stages ahead of the main force.

In the meantime Nasir Khan, the Governor of Kabul, had, entirely by his own exertions, collected 20,000 Afghans of the Peshawar and Khaibar districts whom he stationed in the Khaibar Pass in order to bar the Persians' progress.¹

Spies having reported the presence of this hostile force close to the eastern end of the Khaibar Pass, Nadir resolved to adopt his favourite device of making a *détour* by an unfrequented and difficult route and falling upon the foe from an unexpected quarter. Having obtained the services of a reliable guide, he left his main forces and baggage at the village of Barikab, twenty miles east of Jalalabad, and turned off to the S.S.E., at the head of 30,000 cavalry, towards the small village of Siah Chob.²

¹ *Siyar-i-Muta'akhirin*, p. 471.

² Mirza Mahdi makes no mention of a guide, but Tambouri Aroutine, p. 188, says that, when

No further place names on this route are given by any of the contemporary authorities consulted, but it seems that Nadir and his men went on from Siah Chob in an east-south-easterly direction towards the Tsatsobi Pass.¹ Irakli of Kakheti, who, with a number of Georgians, accompanied Nadir on his Indian expedition, relates that, starting in the morning, they covered four *aghach*² before halting in the evening, probably at some point near China, four and a half miles N. W. of the Tsatsobi Pass. On the Shah arriving soon after, they went on again by moonlight, and soon entered a pass (the Tsatsobi) where the cold was very severe. Owing to the narrowness of the defile and the roughness of the track, there was great confusion, and it took five hours for the troops to traverse the pass, which was half an *aghach* in length.³

Nadir continued his march into the Bazar valley and must have passed through or near the village of Chora, 12 miles S.E. of the Tsatsobi Pass. From Chora he followed the trend of the valley east and then north-east until within a few miles of Jamrud; it appears that he entered the Khaibar Pass either at its eastern end or else a mile or two further west, by scaling the intervening ridge between it and the Chora-Jamrud route. Whichever he did, he and his men, though they must have been much fatigued by their long march of some 48 miles,⁴ came up to Naṣir Khan's position, and attacked it so fiercely that the Indo-Afghan force, after suffering heavy losses, was driven back to Jamrud and Peshawar, leaving Naṣir Khan and a number of other officers and men prisoners in the hands of the Persians.

The advance on Peshawar was resumed three days after this battle, by which time the main portion of the army and the baggage and artillery had had time to join Nadir via the Khaibar Pass. Dismayed by the defeat

Nadir was wondering how he was going to traverse the Khaibar Pass in the face of opposition from Naṣir Khan, a spy offered to guide the army by a difficult alternative route which would bring Nadir and his men to a point an hour and a half or two hours' march beyond the place where Naṣir Khan and his force were awaiting him. See also Major H. R. James's *Report on the Settlement of the Peshawar District* (Lahore, 1865, p. 36) and the article entitled *Friends and Foes* in the *Pioneer Mail* (of Allahabad) of 23rd August, 1885.

¹ Mirza Mahdi gives scarcely any geographical details, merely saying that on the route via Seh Chubā (*sic*) there was a high mountain and that the road was very difficult to traverse, owing to its steepness.

² The Turkish *aghach* (or *yigach*) is equivalent to the *farsakh*.

³ See the letter from Irakli II of Kakheti to his sister Anna (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 355). Irakli had joined Nadir at Qandahar shortly before his father Taimuraz had been allowed to return to Georgia (for further details, see Brosset's translation of Irakli's *Life* by Oman Kherkhoulidze, in *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 206 and 207.)

⁴ Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 196) gives the length of this march as 30 *farsakhs* which, taking into account the shortness of the *farsakh* in mountainous country, is very much the same. For the variability of the *farsakh* see General A. Houtum-Schindler's *Notes on the Length of the Farsakh*, in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, Vol. X, pp. 584-588, and Dr. C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's review, in the *Gnomon*, June, 1928 (Vol. IV, Part VI, pp. 246 and 247), of Segl's *Vom Kentrius bis Trapezunt*.



NADIR SHAH ENTERING PESHAWAR

Reproduced from the MS. of the *Kitab-i-Nadiri* by kind permission of the Institut Vostokovedeniya, Leningrad

and capture of Naṣir Khan, the people of Peshawar offered no resistance to Nadir's forces.

Nadir remained for nearly four weeks at Peshawar; whilst he was there, he received the unwelcome news of the death of his brother Ibrahim Khan at Kakh, in Shirvan, at the hands of the Lazgis of Jar and Tala. Particulars of Ibrahim Khan's last campaign and of the manner in which he met his end will be given in Chapter XVI.

Before continuing on his way, Nadir dispatched a strong force to ravage the country between Peshawar and the Indus and to construct a bridge of boats over that river at Attock. On receiving word that this bridge was completed,¹ he left Peshawar on the 25th Ramaḍan (6th January, 1739)² and had reached the further bank of the Indus with all his forces by the 4th Shawwal (15th January). From this point the Persian army headed for Wazirabad, and crossed the Jhelum (which, like the other rivers of the Panjab, was low at that season) without difficulty.³

Near the small fortress of Kunja Mazra,⁴ situated 12 miles N.W. of Wazirabad, at a road-junction, the Persian advance was opposed by 5,000 to 6,000 men of the Lahore forces, under the command of Qalandar Khan, but the Indians were driven back to the fortress, which was then taken; Qalandar Khan and many of his men were killed.

The Persian advance was then resumed, and the Chenab was crossed in safety. The Persian army advanced upon, and sacked, Wazirabad and it inflicted the same fate upon Yaminabad (Eminabad) and other places on the line of march.⁵ The lot of the inhabitants of the Panjab was indeed pitiable; not only did they suffer severely at the hands of the invading Persians, but they were also preyed upon by thousands of highway robbers

¹ Daniel Moginié (S. H. Maubert de Gouvest), in his book *L'Illustre Faisan* (Lausanne, 1754), p. 160, asserts that a French engineer named Bonal (who had, he says, joined Nadir at Tiflis in 1735) constructed this bridge. Moginié's work, however, is so highly imaginative in places that one hesitates to accept as correct any of his statements (such as this) which are not corroborated by other authorities. Sir Alexander Burnes, in his *Travels to Bokhara*, Vol. I, pp. 267-268, states that these floating bridges over the Indus could be completed in from three to six days; such bridges could only be thrown across the Indus from November to April.

² Anand Ram, fol. 166 (a). According to the Bombay edition of the *T.N.* (p. 197), Nadir left Peshawar on the 15th Ramaḍan; Anand Ram seems more likely to be correct, because 33 days appears rather an undue amount of time for his army to take to get from Peshawar to the further side of the Indus.

³ *T.N.*, p. 197.

⁴ The text of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* is obscure here (p. 197); it gives the name of the fortress as Kachha Mirza "on that (i.e. the east) side of the river of Wazirabad" (i.e. the Chenab). No fortress called Kachha Mirza can be traced; Sir J. Sarkar, in a personal letter to me, expresses the view that "Kachha Mirza" is a mistake for Kunja Mazra; as to the words *an Jaraf-i-ah-i-Wazirabad* ("that side of the Wazirabad river") he considers either that *an* ("that") should read: *in* ("this") or that the account was written at Delhi, when *an Jaraf* ("that side") would mean the western side of the Chenab. This explanation seems better than the one which I had previously had in mind, namely that Kachha Mirza was at a point somewhere near Kachha Sarai which, according to the *Manzil-i-Futuḥ* (fol. 8 (b)), was to cross from Yaminabad, on the road to Wazirabad.

⁵ Anand Ram, fol. 167 (b).

who made their appearance in those troubled times.¹ Moreover, those people who fled to the hills for safety were there set upon and despoiled by the Sikhs.²

From Yaminabad Nadir marched to the Degh Nala, which he may have crossed by the Shah Daula bridge.³ It was here that he heard that Zakariya Khan, the Governor of Lahore, had made a strongly fortified position on the banks of the Ravi to the north of the city, on the direct line of his approach.⁴ Nadir, instead of marching direct on Lahore, turned due east for a time, in order to outflank the Indian position on the Ravi. At Mulkpur (or Mubarakpur)⁵ the Persian sighted and then engaged a strong body of Indian troops under the Zamindar of Adinanagar⁶ who were marching to the assistance of Zakariya Khan. The Indians were defeated, but a number succeeded in reaching Lahore. The Persian army crossed the Ravi near Lakodehr.⁷ Soon after, battle was joined with the forces of Zakariya Khan, which, according to Shaikh Hazin, consisted of 14,000 to 15,000 cavalry and a number of militia.⁸ Yahya Khan, the Governor's eldest son, managed to cut his way through the Persian ranks, and hastened to the Emperor's camp with the news.⁹ In this fighting an old Indian warrior named Mirza 'Aziz Beg is said to have greatly distinguished himself.¹⁰ On the following day (22nd January), the battle was resumed, but Zakariya Khan, because of the inadequacy

¹ Shaikh Hazin, p. 292.

² Malcolm's *Sketch of the Sikhs*, in *Asiatic Researches* (Calcutta, 1810), Vol. XI, p. 238, and J. Browne's *History of the Origin and Progress of the Sikhs in his India Tracts* (London, 1788).

³ See Note 5 below.

⁴ Anand Ram fol. 167 (b) and *Siyar-ul-Mula'akhhirin*, p. 472.

⁵ Mirza Mahdi states that Mulkpur was 6 coss from Lahore. Professor Sarkar considers that Mulkpur should read "Mubarakpur," which is a place 9 miles north of Lakodehr. If this is correct, it seems unlikely that Nadir crossed the Degh Nala by the Shah Daula bridge; it is probable that, in that event, he crossed the river further upstream.

⁶ This name is given as Adinagar by Mirza Mahdi (p. 197); but it is evidently Adinanagar (now called Dinanagar, 75 miles E.N.E. of Lahore and 8 miles N.N.E. of Gurdaspur).

⁷ According to Anand Ram, Nadir wheeled to the right, after crossing the Degh Nala and outflanked the Indians by marching to the west of their position. In view of what has been said above, this could not have been the case. In this connection, see Irakli's letter to his sister (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 357), and Sir Alexander Burnes's *Travels to Bokhara*, Vol. II, p. 16.

⁸ Shaikh Hazin, p. 293. Muhammad Muhsin Siddiqi, in the *Jauhar-i-Sam'ani*, fol. 6 (a), states that Zakariya Khan had 40,000 horsemen. With his usual bias, he adds that Zakariya Khan, owing to his understanding with the Nizam-ul-Mulk, made no serious attempt to bar Nadir's progress (see also Otter, Vol. I, p. 374). Shakir Khan, in his *Tadhkira*, fol. 41 (a), makes a similar allegation, adding that Sa'adat Khan was jointly responsible with the Nizam-ul-Mulk for giving the instructions to Zakariya Khan not to oppose Nadir.

⁹ Anand Ram, fol. 167 (b).

¹⁰ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 132-134. This author states that 'Aziz Beg's deeds were recorded in a poem called the *Nadir Shah-Nama* that Muhammad 'Ali Beg (who wrote under the name of Mulla Firdausi) composed at Nadir's request; Ashub quotes some couplets from this poem on p. 133 and again on p. 441; I have been unable to ascertain whether the whole poem is extant or not. It is of interest to note that the poet Nadiri, of Mashhad, who is still alive and who is descended from Nadir through the female line, has written a poem in his ancestor's honour entitled the *Shah-Nama-yi-Nadiri*; this poem has not yet been published.

of his forces and the failure of the Emperor's generals to afford him any support, soon realised that he could not resist any longer, and asked for quarter. Nadir returned a favourable answer, and ordered 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, on the 23rd January, to meet Zakariya Khan and to conduct him to his presence.¹ On the Governor's arrival, Nadir treated him with great honour and respect. Two days later he again received Zakariya Khan; on this occasion the latter handed over to the conqueror 20 lakhs of rupees in gold, several elephants and other gifts.² By making his submission and paying this ransom, Zakariya Khan was enabled to save Lahore from being sacked.³

Nadir remained for twelve days in Lahore, where he behaved as though he were already master of India. He allowed Zakariya Khan to retain his position as Governor of Lahore, and he gave orders for the reinstatement of Fakhru'd-Daula, the ex-Governor of Kashmir, who, after being driven out of his province by a rebellion, had been deprived of office and was living in poverty in Lahore. Furthermore, he confirmed Naṣir Khan, his former opponent, as Ṣubadar of Kabul and Peshawar.⁴

During Nadir's stay in Lahore news was received of the Emperor's efforts to gather together an army to oppose him. He thereupon wrote to the Emperor,⁵ assuring him that he had nothing but friendly feelings in his mind; referring to the Afghans, he said that, as India had suffered even more than Persia at their hands, it would seem natural that the Indian ministers should wish to punish them. He repeated his statements regarding the Emperor's treatment of his envoys, and concluded by warning Muḥammad Shah that, if the Indian Army opposed him, it would feel the full strength of his arms; if, however, the survivors submitted, he would pardon them.

Nadir left Lahore on the 26th Shawwal (6th February, 1739), and marched to Sirhind, where, on his arrival ten days later,⁶ he heard that Muḥammad Shah had reached Karnal with an army of 300,000 men, 2,000 elephants and a large number of cannon.⁷ According to Ashub,

¹ Anand Ram, fol. 168 (a).

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* Tilok Das, however, asserts that Lahore was sacked, but his poem cannot be regarded as possessing any real historical value; it is clear from Anand Ram's account and also from that of Ashub (Vol. II, p. 137) that the city did not suffer this fate.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 197.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 198. This letter is not in Jones's translation or in my MS. Shaikh Haxia (p. 295) states: "Twice or thrice from Lahor also, before he came up with the Indian army, Nadir Shah sent a message to Mohammed Shah to expedite the return to him of his ambassador Mohammed Khan. But although they carried his ambassador along with them on their march, they would not grant him his *congé*; and at that time it did not appear what their design could be in keeping him."

⁶ *T.N.*, p. 198. See also Ghulam 'Ali Khan's *Muqaddama-yi-Shah 'Alam Nama*, fol. 59 (b) (B.M. MS. Addl. 24028).

⁷ *T.N.*, p. 199.

Nadir took measures before his departure to prevent spies leaving Lahore for the Emperor's camp with news of his movements.¹

It is now necessary to describe what had, in the meanwhile, been happening at the Mughal court. When the news of Nadir's capture of Kabul reached Delhi, "no one listened to a word or if he listened, he did not understand."² However, on reports being received of Nadir's continued progress, the Emperor summoned the Nizamu'l-Mulk from the Deccan to advise him. When the Nizamu'l-Mulk reached the Court, he found that his enemy Khan Dauran, the leader of the Hindustani party, was all-powerful, being in command of the army and possessing much influence over the feeble Emperor; consequently, any advice which the Nizamu'l-Mulk offered received but scant attention, and little or nothing was done.³ There was much talk of setting out to repel the invader, but no attempt was made to send assistance to Zakariya Khan. At the beginning of Ramadan (13th December, 1738) Khan Dauran, Qamaru'd-Din Khan (the I'timadu'd-Daula), and the Nizamu'l-Mulk marched out of Delhi at the head of the army, but they proceeded no further than the Shalimar gardens where they camped for the rest of the month.⁴ Khan Dauran, it is true, wrote to Sawai Jai Singh and other Rajput leaders,⁵ on whose bravery he set much store, but, as Sir J. Sarkar has pointed out:

"Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzib's time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming at political salvation by declaring their independence and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming."⁶

The Emperor even went so far as to appeal to Baji Rao, the Peshwa of the Marathas, but reliance upon the Marathas, even if seriously contemplated, proved like leaning on a broken reed.⁷ A summons was then sent to Sa'adat Khan Burhanu'l-Mulk, the Subadar of Oudh, who, in

¹ Vol. II, p. 139.

² *Siyar*, p. 471. While Muhammad Kazim cannot be looked upon as a reliable authority for the Indian campaign, his information regarding it is nevertheless of some interest; as he obtained it from Persians of his acquaintance on their return from India, his statements doubtless reflect fairly accurately the opinions that these men had of the Indians. On his hearing of Nadir's invasion, Muhammad Kazim states (*K.N.*, pp. 399 and 400) that Muhammad Shah, on hearing of Nadir's impending invasion, summoned all the qalandars, dervishes, diviners and witches in his realm and told them of the Shah's terrible ways. The soothsayers and witches then busily prepared spells to repel the invaders. One wizard said: "we shall bind the hands of the enemy firmly at the time of battle"; another said "we shall recite a spell and Nadir Sahib-Quran will then be brought bound hand and foot to the Emperor's court."

³ Rustam 'Ali (fol. 282 (a)) states that when Khan Dauran suggested any plan, the Nizamu'l-Mulk opposed him, and *vice versa*.

⁴ Anand Ram, fol. 168 (b).

⁵ *Siyar*, p. 472.

⁶ *Nadir Shah in India*, p. 31.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

response thereto, set out to join the Emperor in the third week of January, 1739.¹

At the beginning of Shawwal (12th January), when the news reached Delhi of the arrival at the Indus of the force which Nadir had sent on in advance, the Mughal army at last set out, but its progress was so leisurely that it took a month to cover the four stages from the Shalimar gardens to Karnal.² In response to urgent requests by the Nizamu'l-Mulk and Khan Dauran, the Emperor himself left Delhi on the 18th Shawwal (29th January, 1739), and reached Panipat, twenty miles south of Karnal, on the 27th of that month (7th February)³; he arrived at Karnal a few days later. It had originally been intended to advance further, but, as the plain just to the north of Karnal was a suitable camping-ground, being plentifully provided with water by the 'Ali Mardan canal and protected by thick jungle to the north, and as it was deemed expedient to await the arrival of Sa'adat Khan and the contingent from Oudh,⁴ the Indian commanders proceeded no further. A mud wall was constructed round the camp, the eastern side of which was bounded by the 'Ali Mardan canal. Guns were mounted at intervals on the wall round the camp, which is said to have been fourteen miles in circumference.⁵

The numbers of combatants in the Indian camp are variously given, ranging from only 80,000 to the fantastic figure of 1,200,000⁶; it is probable that the former figure is close to the truth. If, however, the numbers of non-combatants are taken into account, the total may, as Sir J. Sarkar suggests, have been nearly a million all told.

From Sirhind, Nadir sent out a force of 6,000 Kurdish cavalry, under Hajji Khan, to reconnoitre the Indian position.⁷ On the next day the army set out for Ambala via Raja Sarai. Leaving his baggage and harem at Ambala, Nadir marched to Shahabad, thirty-five miles north of Karnal, on the 19th February. That same night the Kurdish patrols whom Nadir had sent out from Sirhind came into contact with the Indian forces,

¹ Dr. A. L. Srivastava, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

² *Siyar*, p. 472.

³ Anand Ram (fol. 168 (b)) states that when the news was received that Nadir Shah had reached the Indus, the Indian commanders urged the Emperor to advance against the invaders.

⁴ *Siyar*, p. 472.

⁵ *Journal of Mirza Zaman* (Fraser, p. 152). Hanway (Vol. IV, p. 159) states that "some writers mention it as twelve miles."

⁶ Mirza Mahdi, as stated on p. 131 above, gives the strength of this Indian host as 400,000 men. Sir J. Sarkar (*Nadir Shah in India*, p. 34), reduces this figure to 75,000 combatants. The French adventurer de Voulton, in his *Verdadeira e exacta Noticia* (which the present writer translated from the Portuguese and published, together with an introduction and notes, in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, Vol. IV, Part II, pp. 223-245), states that the Mughal army, after the battle of Karnal, consisted of 400,000 horsemen and 800,000 infantry. There is no doubt, however, that the number of camp-followers was exceptionally large, and that some writers, like de Voulton, may have erroneously included their numbers in the total of the fighting force.

⁷ T.N., p. 199; see also Fraser, p. 153.

and a number of Indian troops were killed and others captured.¹ The Kurdish patrols then fell back to Sarai 'Azimabad, a village twenty-three miles south of Shahabad and twelve miles north of Karnal; from this village they sent Nadir their report, together with some of the prisoners. The Shah thereupon ordered these patrols to reconnoitre both to the east and to the west of the enemy position.²

On the 12th Dhu'l-Qa'da (21st February) Nadir moved forward and, marching via Tirawari, arrived at Sarai 'Azimabad early in the morning of the 13th; here the Governor of Ambala put up a show of resistance for a time.³

Nadir learnt from his scouts and from Indian prisoners of the strength of the Emperor's position, as well as of the existence, south of Sarai 'Azimabad, of a belt of jungle, traversed by only one narrow road, extending for eight miles in the direction of Karnal. He then realised that the only practicable course open to him was to make a détour to the east of that place, which would enable him not only to outflank the enemy but also to avoid this belt of jungle. If Muḥammad Shah issued forth from his lines, he would give him battle on the plain, some seven miles in width, stretching eastwards from Karnal to the Jumna; if, on the other hand, the Emperor elected to remain inactive behind his fortifications, he would march on to Panipat and thence to Delhi.⁴

No further advance was made on the 13th Dhu'l-Qa'da, but on the next morning (Monday, the 23rd February), Nadir left Sarai 'Azimabad, led his troops across the 'Ali Mardan canal and, marching south-east for some miles, camped at a point apparently just to the north of the village of Kunjpura, which is situated five and a half miles E.N.E. of Karnal and a mile and a half west of the Jumna. The Shah, at the head of some of his bodyguard, rode up close to the Indian camp; after taking a careful note of the disposition of the enemy, he returned to his own camp.⁵

In the evening Persian scouts reported that Sa'adat Khan, the Subadar of Oudh, who was on his way to reinforce the Emperor with 30,000 men, had reached Panipat.⁶ Nadir immediately dispatched a strong force to intercept Sa'adat Khan and his men.⁷

¹ T.N., p. 199. The Indian commanders are said to have been most negligent as regards sending out patrols.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 200.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. See also Sir J. Malcolm's translation of Nadir's letter to Rida Quli Mirza in *Asiatick Researches*, Vol. X, p. 542 (for reasons which will be given later, this letter has to be used with care as an authority.) According to this translation, the letter was written at Delhi on the 29th Dhu'l-Qa'da 1115 (sic) (obviously a misprint for "1151").

⁷ T.N., p. 200. In the *Risala-yi-Muḥammad Shah*, fol. 106 (b), it is stated that Sa'adat Khan secretly sent word to Nadir of his coming, but this seems improbable.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INVASION OF INDIA : KARNAL

ON the morning of the fateful 15th Dhu'l-Qa'da (24th February), Nadir split up his army into three divisions. He ordered Naṣrullah Mirza, who at that time was in command of the left wing, to advance from the Jumna towards Karnal,¹ while he himself, with a number of men, marched southwards between the Jumna and the 'Ali Mardan canal in order to reconnoitre the enemy position and to inspect the field of battle. Whilst he was so engaged, the troops whom he had dispatched the previous evening to intercept Sa'adat Khan returned, saying that the Ṣubadar had managed to elude them by making a détour and that he and his troops had reached the Emperor's camp at midnight²; they had, however, pursued him and captured a number of his men, besides taking much booty.

On hearing this news, Nadir halted, his position then being some three and a half miles to the east of the Indian camp³; here he was joined by Naṣrullah and his troops.⁴

In the meantime, Sa'adat Khan had gone to pay his respects to Muḥammad Shah. During his audience, word was brought to Sa'adat Khan that the Qizilbash troops were plundering his baggage.⁵ Infuriated by this news, he took a hurried leave of the Emperor; despite all endeavours to restrain him, he called his men to arms, and rushed off to try and recover his baggage. His troops, who had been continually on the march for a whole month and who were unused to forced

¹ *T.N.*, p. 200. Mirza Mahdi says that Nadir ordered Naṣrullah to advance towards Karnal "from the north side of the river Jumna." Sir J. Sarkar (*Nadir Shah in India*, p. 37) takes this as meaning that the young Prince had crossed the Jumna, which, as he rightly observes, was unlikely. The explanation may be that Naṣrullah and his men had been advancing to, or were posted at, some point close to where the village of Khirajpur (1 mile E.N.E. of Kunjpura) now stands; for a mile or so to the S.E., and S. of Khirajpur, the Jumna flows from east to west before turning south again; thus, Naṣrullah, when at or near Khirajpur, would have been north of the Jumna.

² *T.N.*, p. 201. 'Abdu'l-Karīm (*Bayan*, fol. 16 (a)), Ashmū and other authorities confirm that Sa'adat Khan reached the Emperor's camp at this time. Rustam 'Alī (fol. 283 (a)) gives the strength of his force as only 20,000 men. Owing to a wound received three months before, Sa'adat Khan was unable to ride a horse, and had either to be carried on a portable chair or to ride on an elephant.

³ *T.N.*, p. 201.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Bayan*, fol. 16 (b); see also Harcharan Das's *Chakar Guldhar Shuja'i*, fol. 82 (a). Harcharan Das states (fol. 81 (a)) that Muḥammad Shah had doubts as to Sa'adat Khan's loyalty, and made him swear on the Qur'an that he would be faithful.

marches, were much fatigued, and but few responded to his call; some of his men, it is said, believed that he was still with the Emperor, while others, putting the care of their horses before everything else, refused to stir. Sa'adat Khan nevertheless pressed impetuously on, although followed only by 1,000 cavalry and some hundreds of his infantry.¹

When Sa'adat Khan and his small force emerged from the Indian lines, they encountered some Persian patrols who were advancing from the opposite direction. These Persians immediately feigned flight, in the hope of luring Sa'adat Khan and his men further away from their lines.² The ruse succeeded, for Sa'adat Khan hastened after the retreating foe, sending urgent appeals to the camp for reinforcements to enable him (as he imagined) to follow up his success. The Emperor wished to go in person to Sa'adat Khan's assistance, but the Nizamu'l-Mulk and Khan Dauran dissuaded him, saying that it would be a mistake to fight that day.³

The Emperor then asked the Nizamu'l-Mulk for his advice, who replied that, as Khan Dauran was in command of the right wing and therefore nearest to Sa'adat Khan, he should go to the assistance of the last-named.⁴ The Emperor agreed, and Khan Dauran accordingly set out, at the head of between 8,000 and 9,000 cavalry.⁵ Ashub, who was at Karnal, asserts that Khan Dauran's men imagined that the battle would be similar to the faction fighting in the streets and bazaars of Delhi.⁶ They were speedily disillusioned. Nadir, who, as Mirza Mahdi remarks, "had longed for such a day,"⁷ donned a coat of mail and a helmet, and put himself at the head of 1,000 picked Afshar horsemen, in readiness to ride from place to place and direct the operations.⁸ When he heard of the advance of Sa'adat Khan and Khan Dauran, he placed 3,000 of his men in ambush, and sent out two bodies of *jazayirchis*, each 500 strong, with orders to draw the enemy into the trap.⁹

Hanway states that Nadir, in order to frighten the elephants of the

¹ Bayan, fol. 17 (a). Anand Ram (fol. 169 (b)) says that Sa'adat Khan "with a headlong impetuosity misplaced in a commander, flew to the scene of action accompanied by only the few horsemen who were with him, without collecting his artillery or waiting to form his men in any kind of order."

² Bayan, fol. 17 (a).

³ Ibid., fol. 17 (b).

⁴ Ibid., fol. 18 (a). According to Anand Ram (fol. 169 (b) and 170 (a)), Khan Dauran, on receiving this order, said that the army had not expected to fight that day and that it would be better to wait till the morrow, when the artillery could be placed in the front. The Emperor was displeased at this answer, whereupon Khan Dauran, "who had the good of his master at heart," mounted his elephant and set out. Ashub tells a different story: Khan Dauran, he says (Vol. II, p. 179) was very jealous of Sa'adat Khan. When he heard reports that his rival was successfully engaging the enemy, he thought that his own prestige would suffer if Sa'adat Khan won a striking victory; he therefore decided to advance in order to take part in the engagement and secure as much of the glory as possible for himself.

⁵ Bayan, fol. 18 (a).

⁶ Ashub, Vol. II, p. 181.


⁷ T.N., p. 201. See also *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. X, p. 543.

⁸ Fraser (quoting Mirza Zaman's *Journals*), p. 157.


⁹ Ibid.

THE BATTLE OF KARNAL

OPENING PHASE



SECOND PHASE



Indians, ordered stagings to be carried by pairs of camels; on these stagings he had naphtha and other combustible materials placed, which were to be set on fire during the battle.¹

It was one o'clock in the afternoon when the battle began. Sa'adat Khan and his scanty force, who formed the Indian right wing, became heavily engaged with the Persians at Kunjpura. The *jazayirchis*, who were under the command of Fath 'Ali Khan Kayani, had been posted behind the walls and buildings there, and poured in a destructive fire.² A little later on, Khan Dauran's division, which now constituted the Indian centre, came into action with the Persian centre under Naṣrullah. A wide gap separated Khan Dauran's division from that of Sa'adat Khan and a similar gap existed between the former and the Indian left wing. For this reason, none of the Indian leaders had any knowledge of what the others were doing, and there was thus a complete lack of cohesion and co-ordination on their side.³ Moreover, so hurriedly had the Indian commanders advanced to the attack that they had little or no artillery with them.

Sa'adat Khan's men were the first to give ground, though they only did so after sustaining heavy casualties. He himself, surrounded by some of his followers, bravely continued the fight until his elephant was charged by that of his nephew, Shir Jang, which had been maddened by a wound.⁴ Sa'adat Khan's elephant then got out of control, and bore him into the Persian ranks, where he was made prisoner.⁵

The Indian centre, under Khan Dauran, fought on bravely, but they, like Sa'adat Khan's men, were mown down by the rapid and accurate fire of the *jazayirchis*, as well as by that from the *zanburaks*. The swordsmanship, of which the Indians were so proud, was of little avail against such methods of fighting; as 'Abdu'l-Karim remarked: "An arrow cannot answer a *jazayir*."⁶ When the Emperor realised that Khan Dauran

¹ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 166. Timur, according to ibn 'Arabshah, used this device to scare the Indian elephants in 1398 A.D. (see J. H. Sanders's translation, London, 1936, p. 98); as Nadir was well versed in Timur's history, he may have copied him upon this occasion. It is not without interest to compare Firdausi's description of the manner in which Alexander the Great terrified the elephants in Fur's (i.e., Porus's) army (see *The Shahnama of Firdausi*, translated by A.G. and E. Warner, London, 1912, Vol. VI, pp. 115 and 116).

² Father J. Tiefenthaler's *Beschreibung des Feldzuges des Thamas Kulichan*, in J. Bernoulli's *Historisch-Geographische Beschreibung von Hindustan*, Berlin, 1783-1787, Vol. II, Part II, p. 50.

³ *Bayan*, fol. 18 (b).

⁴ *Ashub*, pp. 182-184, *Bayan*, fol. 19 (b), Ghulam 'Ali Naqavi's *Imadu's Sa'adat*, fol. 31 (a), and 31 (b).

⁵ For the manner in which Sa'adat Khan was captured, see the *Siyar*, p. 473, and Irakli's letter to his sister, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 359.

⁶ *Bayan*, fol. 18 (b). A vivid, but fanciful, account of the battle is given by Nijabat in his ballad *Nadir Var* (see Kaul's translation in the *Journal of the Panjab Historical Society*, Vol. VI, lines 659-682); see also Tilok Das's poem (W. Irvine's translation in *J.R.A.S.*, Vol. LXVI, Part I). Neither of these poetical descriptions can be regarded as having any historical value.

was in serious danger, he sent an urgent message to the Nizamu'l-Mulk asking why he had not gone to the aid of the Commander-in-Chief and requesting him to go without further delay. The Nizam, however, put personal enmity before patriotism, and sat calmly on his elephant drinking coffee instead of obeying his sovereign's orders.¹

The end came when Khan Dauran, who had already been wounded, received a mortal wound from a musket shot and fell unconscious in his *howda*²; his brother and son and many other *umara* were among the slain.³ Bereft of their leader, the few survivors of the Indian centre were speedily overcome, and at five o'clock the battle was over. Khan Dauran's servant, at great personal risk, succeeded in bringing his master back to the Indian camp.⁴

Though so successful in the field, Nadir was too prudent to attempt an attack on the Emperor's position⁵; as will be seen later, he had other expedients in view for bringing about the subjection of Muhammad Shah and his army.

The points that are chiefly remarkable in respect to this engagement are, in the first place, the marked contrast between Nadir's generalship and that of the Indian leaders; in tactics, as in strategy, Nadir was immeasurably superior; moreover, the Indian commanders, as has been seen, were unable to forget their personal quarrels and jealousies and unite in defence of their country. Secondly, the numbers actually engaged on both sides formed but a small proportion of the whole. On the Indian side many of the divisions under Khan Dauran and Sa'adat Khan did not advance to the attack, while the whole of the left wing, owing to the Nizamu'l-Mulk's refusal to fight, remained passive throughout the battle (all that they did was to advance a short distance from their lines and take up a position by the side of the 'Ali Mardan canal).

The casualties sustained by the Indians have been much exaggerated by some writers, such as Mirza Mahdi, who put their losses in killed alone as high as 30,000.⁶ In all probability, the Indians may have lost some 10,000 men⁷; they could not have lost many more, since the total

¹ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 186-188. See also the *Jauhar-i-Shamsam*, fol. 34 (a).

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 189.

³ For lists of the *umara* killed and wounded, see Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 190-192, *Bayan*, fol. 19 (a) and 19 (b), *Siyar*, p. 473, Fraser, p. 158, etc.

⁴ Ashub, Vol. II, p. 192.

⁵ T.N., p. 203.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 202. Nadir himself also exaggerated the Indian losses; in his letter to Rida Quli, he stated that the enemy lost upwards of 20,000 in killed, and a much greater number captured (*Asiatick Researches*, Vol. X, p. 544); as Nadir concluded his letter with the words "Make copies of this our royal mandate and disperse them over our empire, that the well-wishers of our throne may be happy and rejoice . . ." it is obvious that he deliberately magnified his success in order to give heart to his supporters. The letter contains some other particulars of the battle which cannot (evidently for the above reason) be reconciled with accounts by other writers.

⁷ De Voulton, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

number engaged on the Indian side was not greatly in excess of that figure. According to a contemporary letter quoted by Fraser,¹ the losses on the Persian side were 2,500 killed and 5,000 wounded, but these figures seem on the high side.

Nadir, it is said, prostrated himself after the battle in thanksgiving to Allah; he then congratulated and rewarded his commanders; if the information supplied through the medium of Muhammad Kazim can be credited, it was on this occasion that Nadir named his second son Nasrullah ("Victory of Allah"), in place of his previous name of Murtaḍa Qulī.²

In the evening, the Nizamu'l-Mulk, the I'timadu'd Daula and the eunuchs of the Imperial harem went to see Khan Dauran. The wounded commander-in-chief, who had recovered his senses in the meanwhile, said to them, in tones that were almost inaudible through weakness:

"We have completed our business. . . . Do not let the Emperor meet Nadir Shah or take Nadir to Delhi, but remove this calamity (*bala*) from here by any means in your power."³

That same evening, Sa'adat Khan was brought before Nadir. After answering tactfully some questions which Nadir put to him respecting the resources of the Emperor, Sa'adat Khan recommended the Shah to summon the Nizamu'l-Mulk and to discuss the terms of peace with him.⁴ Nadir followed this advice, with the result that the Nizamu'l-Mulk, having been invested by the Emperor with power to negotiate, went to the Persian camp, where he arrived after nightfall on the 25th February.⁵

After being received by the Shah, the Nizamu'l-Mulk discussed the terms of settlement with 'Abdu'l Baqi Khan, and it was agreed that Nadir should inflict no further injury on India and return to Persia in consideration for an indemnity of 50 lakhs of rupees,⁶ payable in instalments.

¹ Fraser, p. 158. Hanway repeats these figures. Shaikh Hāzin (p. 299) goes to the other extreme by asserting that the Persians lost only 3 men killed and a score wounded (cf. his statement that their casualties at the battle of Mihmandust only amounted to a couple of men, who were slightly wounded).

² K.N., p. 430. This story of Nasrullah's name may be true (as Nadir had given Shi'a-sounding names to his other two sons, namely, Rida Qulī and Imam Qulī), but if it is, it is strange that no other authority should have mentioned the episode or have ever referred to him as Murtaḍa Qulī.

³ *Siyar*, p. 473. According to Otter (Vol. I, p. 382), the Nizamu'l-Mulk insulted Khan Dauran as he lay moribund and helpless, and so revenged himself for a number of rude remarks which the Commander-in-Chief had made in regard to him at the Court (Khan Dauran is said by Tilok Das and others to have likened the Nizamu'l-Mulk to a monkey).

⁴ *Imadu's-Sa'adat*, fol. 31 (b).
⁵ Shukir Khan was with the Nizamu'l-Mulk on this occasion and has described the meeting with Nadir (see the translation of the relevant passage in the *Tadhkira* in Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VIII, pp. 232-4).

⁶ The amount is given as 1 crore by Ashub (p. 233) and as 2 crores by Ghulam 'Ali (*Siyar*, p. 473) and Otter, Vol. I, p. 384, but Sir J. Sarkar (*Nadir Shah in India*, p. 50) puts the amount at only 50 lakhs. According to the *Bayan* (fol. 20 (b)), the amount of the indemnity was left unsettled, but this seems unlikely.

Having requested the Nizamu'l-Mulk to invite the Emperor to lunch on the following day, Nadir gave the Indian statesman leave to return.

Notwithstanding the death-bed advice of Khan Dauran, Muhammad Shah accepted Nadir's invitation. Mirza Mahdi states that the Emperor, on the 17th Dhu'l-Qa'da (26th February), formally abdicated and that, after removing the crown from his head, he set out for the Persian camp.¹ It is curious that, while this author mentions the Emperor's abdication, he omits to say whether Muhammad Shah formally handed his crown over to Nadir on this or any subsequent occasion. It is obvious from what occurred later than the Emperor did, in fact, abdicate, and that Nadir assumed for a time the crown of India, but nothing appears to be on record as to any official ceremony of investiture having taken place.

Muhammad Shah, on reaching the Persian lines, was received by Nasrullah Mirza whom Nadir had sent to meet him and conduct him to the tent of audience. When the Emperor drew near, Nadir himself emerged, and greeted his imperial guest in the customary manner,² much stress being laid on the fact that they were both of Turkoman origin. Nadir then took Muhammad Shah by the hand, led him into the tent and seated him on the throne by his side. After some conversation together (which was conducted in Turki),³ the Shah and Emperor were served with food. Nadir, in order to show his guest that the food had not been poisoned, exchanged dishes at the beginning of the meal.⁴ The meeting between the two monarchs passed off without the slightest hitch or unpleasantness; "nothing that courtesy and friendship required was omitted during the whole conference, which lasted a quarter of the day."⁵ The Emperor was then escorted back to his own camp; it is said that the successful outcome of the meetings between Nadir Shah, the Nizamu'l-Mulk and the Emperor restored the peace of mind of the Indian troops, who now had hopes of being allowed to return to their homes.

Ever since the evening after the battle, however, Nadir had kept the Indian camp closely invested; no one was suffered to leave, and no

¹ T.N., p. 203. M. de Bussy, in his *Remarques sur l'Histoire de Nader Cha, Roy de Perse* (see the Orme MSS. in the India Office, Vol. XXIII, p. 32), says that Nadir had intended to seat himself on the throne of India, but that the Nizamu'l-Mulk dissuaded him from doing so, on the grounds that he would not be able to hold so large a country in subjection (de Bussy claims to have obtained the above and other information relating to Nadir from Persians who remained in India after the Shah's departure).

² Anand Ram, fol. 171 (a) says: "When they (i.e., Muhammad Shah and Nasrullah) drew near, the Shah himself came forward, and the usual etiquette between the Persian and Mughal Courts followed." See also Nadir's letter to Rida Quli Mirza, in *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. X, p. 345.

³ The Nizamu'l-Mulk had previously informed the Emperor that he would have to converse with Nadir in Turki (Harcharan Das, fol. 87 (a)).

⁴ Harcharan Das, fol. 87 (b).

⁵ Anand Ram, fol. 171 (b).

provisions were allowed to be brought in.¹ He knew that by this means he could ensure prompt compliance with his terms.

Khan Dauran having died on the day after the battle,² the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Paymaster-in-Chief which he had held, became vacant. Under circumstances which it is unnecessary to describe here,³ the Nizamu'l-Mulk obtained the post of Mir Bakhshi (Paymaster-in-Chief), a position which Sa'adat Khan, it is said, had been hoping to obtain himself. When Sa'adat Khan found that the Nizamu'l-Mulk had forestalled him, he became beside himself with rage.⁴ In this state, he rushed off to Nadir Shah and sought to undo the work of his successful rival by inducing the Shah not to rest content with such a small indemnity as that provided for in the treaty made with the Nizamu'l-Mulk. He pointed out that, if the Shah were to march to Delhi, he would be able to obtain an incalculable amount of gold, jewellery, and other valuables from the Emperor's treasuries and from the houses of the nobles and merchants.⁵ Sa'adat Khan added: "There is now no one of note at the Imperial Court except Asaf Jah, who is a trickster and a philosopher. If this trickster is snared, everything will happen as your Majesty desires."⁶ Nadir showed pleasure at Sa'adat Khan's words and determined to follow his advice.

After purposely waiting a few days, Nadir, on the 24th Dhu'l-Qa'da (5th March), summoned the Nizamu'l-Mulk again, and ordered him to request the Emperor to revisit the camp. The Nizamu'l-Mulk protested that this procedure would not be in conformity with the treaty, but the Shah, after saying that his purpose was not to abrogate the treaty or to act to the detriment of the Emperor, insisted that a further interview was necessary.⁷

The blockade of the Indian camp not having been relaxed, the lack of food there had become so acute⁸ that the Nizamu'l-Mulk had no option but

¹ *T.N.*, p. 203; de Voulton, p. 230.

² There is much disagreement between the authorities as to the date of Khan Dauran's death. I have selected the 25th February, since that is the date given by Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 203), Ashub, Vol. II, p. 193, Anand Ram, fol. 170 (b), and Nadir himself (see *Asiatick Researches*, Vol. X, p. 543.) Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 161) and *Siyar* give, respectively, the 27th and 28th February.

³ For these particulars, see Harcharan Das, fol. 88 (a), also *Siyar*, pp. 473-4 and Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 275-276. The Nizamu'l-Mulk also obtained the post of Amiru'l-Umara, and it is known that Sa'adat Khan had had designs on that as well (see *Siyar* p. 474; and Dr. Srivastava, *op. cit.*, p. 69).

⁴ *Siyar*, p. 474; Rustam 'Ali, fol. 286 (a).

⁵ *Siyar*, p. 474; Ashub, Vol. II, p. 278.

⁶ Harcharan Das, fol. 88 (b).

⁷ *Siyar*, p. 474.

⁸ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 167); De Voulton (p. 231) states that 4,000 Indian troops were killed when trying to obtain provisions and fodder outside their camp. He adds that the scarcity of food was such that "the measure of wheat and rice which used to cost the tenth part of a rupee was sold at ten rupees or 100 sous." See also Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 266-270.

to comply. He accordingly wrote to the Emperor in the sense demanded by Nadir Shah. On receiving this letter, Muhammad Shah, despite the remonstrances of some of his nobles, who advised a further appeal to arms,¹ proceeded to the Persian camp on the 26th Dhu'l-Qa'da (7th March), accompanied by a retinue of 2,000 persons.²

Though Nadir outwardly treated the Emperor with respect and ordered 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan to attend to his wants,³ Muhammad Shah was, in reality, a prisoner,⁴ as were also the nobles in his entourage. After the Emperor's arrival, Qizilbash troops were sent to his camp who seized all the artillery and arrested those of the leaders and nobles who were still there.⁵ The Indian rank and file were then informed that they were at liberty to remain at Karnal or to proceed to Delhi or to their homes.⁶ Bereft of all their leaders, and weakened by famine, the Indian soldiers endeavoured as best they could to escape to their homes, but large numbers were killed *en route* by roving bodies of Qizilbash cavalry and by robber bands, as well as by the peasantry.⁷

On the 1st Dhu'l-Hijja (12th March) the Shah and the Emperor left Karnal for Delhi, Muhammad Shah keeping a *coss* (approximately two miles) behind Nadir.⁸

Previous to his departure, Nadir had dispatched in advance Sa'adat Khan, whom he had appointed *Wakilu'l-Mutlaq* ("Deputy of the Absolute") of India, and Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, with an escort of 4,000 cavalry. They bore with them a royal order (*shiqqa*) from the Emperor to the Governor Lutfullah Khan for the handing over to Tahmasp Khan of the keys of the city, and also an edict (*raqam*) from Nadir confirming Lutfullah Khan in his position.⁹

¹ Anand Ram, fol. 173 (a).

² Bayan, fol. 22 (a).

³ T.N., p. 203.

⁴ Anand Ram, fol. 173 (a).

⁵ De Voulton, p. 236. Ashub (Vol. II, p. 288) states that Nadir ordered the Indian cannon to be sent to Qandahar. See also *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. X, p. 546.

⁶ Siyar, p. 474.

⁷ Hazin, p. 296, and de Voulton, p. 231. Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 280-281.

⁸ T.N., p. 203; Fraser, p. 177.

⁹ Bayan, fol. 22 (a). Ashub, Vol. II, p. 289. Shakir Khan, fol. 43 (a). Fraser, p. 173.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INVASION OF INDIA: DELHI

WHEN the news of the battle of Karnal reached Delhi, the capable Kotwal of the city, Hajji Fulad Khan, took effective measures to prevent any panic or outbreaks of lawlessness, and endeavoured to put the city into a state of defence.¹

When Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and Sa'adat Khan reached the gates of Delhi, they found them closed against them. They thereupon sent to the Governor, Lutfullah Khan, the *shiqqa* or order from the Emperor and Nadir's *raqam*, with the result that Lutfullah Khan opened the gates and delivered up to Tahmasp Khan the keys of the fortress and those of the treasuries and store-houses.²

Preparations were then begun for the reception of the Emperor and Nadir Shah.

Meanwhile the two monarchs were on their way to the capital; travelling via Panipat, Sonapat and Narela, they reached the Shalimar gardens, just outside Delhi, on the 7th Dhu'l-Hijja (18th March). On the following day, the Shah "gave leave" to the Emperor to enter the city, in order to enable him to prepare for his reception.³ Nadir himself remained in the Shalimar gardens till the 9th Dhu'l-Hijja (20th March), when he made his entry into Delhi in great state. The streets were lined with troops,⁴ and the Shah's procession was headed by 100 elephants on each of which several *jazayirchis* were mounted. Nadir himself was on horseback, and when he reached the fortress and dismounted, the cannon thundered forth a salute.⁵

The Emperor received Nadir with great pomp and ceremony and gave him costly presents. Mirza Mahdi gives an exaggerated and distorted account of what occurred. The Emperor, according to him, "spread the table of humility for the feast of hospitality."⁶ Nadir, in return, thanked the Emperor for his attentions and informed him that he was,

¹ Anand Ram, fol. 172 (b). The letter from Surat which was published in the London *Daily Post* of 13rd November, 1739, states that "the traitor Saadul-Cawn (*sic*) was sent with an army of 24,000 men to Dilly where they shut the gates against him, but he, with his usual perfidy, telling them that the Mogul . . . had beaten Nadir Shah and was in pursuit of him, gained admittance." In the *Jauhar-i-Shamsam* (fol. 53 (b)), Nasrullah is said to have been sent to Delhi with 5,000 horsemen, under the guidance of Sa'adat Khan who "being a fellow-countryman, had become a friend of the enemy and increased his dignity."

² *Siyar*, p. 474.

³ *T.N.*, p. 203; Fraser, p. 178.

⁴ *Irakli*, (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 360.)

⁴ *Ashub*, Vol. II, p. 295.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 204.

in virtue of the treaty concluded at Karnal, once more in possession of his kingdom.¹ In recognition of Nadir's magnanimity, Muḥammad Shah then offered his guest all the royal treasures and jewels. "Although all the treasures of the (other) kings of the earth were not equal to a tenth part of a tenth part" of these gifts, he refused for a long while to accept them, and only gave way after the Emperor had repeatedly urged him to do so.² Needless to say, this reluctance on Nadir's part was merely feigned.

After his reception and entertainment by the Emperor, Nadir took up his quarters in the palace built by Shah Jahan, near the Divan-i-Khaṣṣ,³ while Muḥammad Shah occupied a building close to the Asad Burj or Lion Tower.⁴ As for the Qizilbash troops, some were quartered in and around the fortress and others were billeted in the city itself.⁵

On the morning of Saturday the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja (21st March), which, besides being the Persian Nau Ruz, was also the Muḥammadan festival of the 'Idu'd-Duḥa (Feast of Sacrifice), the *khuṣṣa*, in accordance with instructions already given, was read in Nadir's name and in the Sunni manner in all the mosques of the city; moreover, in the Delhi mint coins were struck bearing the inscription: "The Sultan over the Sultans of the Earth is Nadir the King of Kings, Lord of the fortunate conjunction."⁶ On that day Nadir held the usual Nau Ruz reception and gave robes of honour to his principal officers.

That same day Sa'adat Khan died; some difference of opinion exists as to whether he died from his wounds or committed suicide. On the whole, it seems more probable that he died from the effects of poison which he is said to have taken in a fit of depression or chagrin, after Nadir had spoken roughly to him.⁷

¹ T.N., p. 204. These were (if uttered) but empty words, for Nadir, as will be seen below, did not reinstate Muḥammad Shah until just before his departure from Delhi.

² *Ibid.*

³ Tieffenthaler (on the authority of Diogo Mendes), p. 56.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Ashub, Vol. II, p. 296. The Persian wording is:

⁶ *Ibid.*

"*Hast Sultan bar salatin-i-Jahan
Shah-i-Shahan Nadir Shah-qiran.*"

The use of the term *shah-qiran*, one of Timur's epithets, is significant. See also Fraser (p. 120) who mentions a coin with this wording on the obverse; on the reverse was written in Arabic:

"*Khalada Allahu mulhaku quriba fi Ahmadabad 1152.*"

("May Allah cause his kingdom to endure; struck at Ahmadabad, 1152").

⁷ Dr. Srivastava (*op. cit.*, p. 78) believes in the theory of suicide, and quotes in support of this view an entry in the *Dulki Chronicle* of the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja that Sa'adat Khan had taken poison and died. Rustam 'Ali (fol. 289 (a)) says that the Nizamu'l-Mulk suggested to Sa'adat Khan, after Nadir had spoken roughly to him at the public Darbar or Court, that they should both take poison. Sa'adat Khan, "since he was a soldier and had no knowledge of the guile of this old man, drank a cup of poison and died, whereas the Nizamu'l-Mulk quaffed a glass of *sharbat* and slept peacefully until the next morning." On the other hand 'Abdu'l-Karim (*Bayan* fol. 22 (b)) stated that the Khan had suffered much from his foot on the previous day, while it is said in the *Siyar* (p. 475) that he died of gangrene (literally, *sarafan* = cancer) in the foot.

In the afternoon of the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja Nadir went to the Emperor's quarters, to return his visit of the day before. Towards the close of the day, after the Shah had returned to his own palace, wild rumours became current in the city that he had met with an untimely end; other reports were that he had been seized and imprisoned by order of the Emperor.¹ No one took the trouble to see whether there was any foundation for these rumours,² which spread with the rapidity of lightning through the crowded streets and bazaars. Mobs speedily collected and, carried away by excitement, began to attack those of the Qizilbash troops who were in the town. These rumours and disturbances, which were to have such appalling consequences, are said to have arisen in the following way³: at noon that day Tahmasp Khan Jalayir dispatched some mounted *nasagchis* to the Paharganj granaries, which are situated to the south-west of the city, with orders to open them and to settle the price at which the corn was to be sold. The *nasagchis* duly carried out their orders, but the price which they fixed, namely, ten *sirs* for one rupee, so exasperated the corn-dealers that they caused a mob to assemble. This mob then attacked and killed the *nasagchis* together with some other Persian soldiers who had come to purchase corn. The instigators of the attack then spread a report that Nadir had been cast into prison, and others said that he had been poisoned. In their progress through the city, these reports became more and more distorted and fantastic, and "foolish persons with arms and equipment having collected together, created a disturbance."⁴ Many of the Qizilbash troops, walking singly or in pairs in the narrow streets, were taken entirely by surprise and fell an easy prey to their assailants. The Indian writer Muhammad Bakhsh "Ashub") was having his evening meal in his house near the Kabul gate when he heard "a noise like the tumult of the Last Day"; on mounting to the roof to see what was happening, he witnessed Qizilbash soldiers being set upon and cut down by bands of men belonging to Sa'adat Khan's army, most of whom came from Kabul and Peshawar, who were seeking to avenge the slaughter of their fellow-countrymen at Karnal.⁵ When the Persian

¹ It is said in the *Siyar* (pp. 474 and 475) that some Indians asserted that Nadir had died, and others stated that he had been killed by two of the Emperor's Qalmaq women guards. According to de Voiniton (*op. cit.*, p. 237) "four young *Omhras* (i.e., *Umara*) of ordinary rank (*de nobreza ordinaria*), having become intoxicated at eight in the evening, spread the rumour that the Emperor had killed Nadir Shah with a blow." See also Anand Ram, 174 (a).

² Shaikh Hazin, p. 298.

³ Mirza Zamun, in Fraser, pp. 180-181. It is also stated in the *Bayan*, fol. 24 (b), that the disturbance began in the Paharganj quarter.

⁴ *Siyar*, p. 474. According to Ashub, the disturbance began when "three or four *gharis* of the day remained," i.e., between one hour and 12 minutes and one hour and 36 minutes before sunset. (A *ghari* is equivalent to 24 minutes).

⁵ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 299-303.

soldiery heard the reports of Nadir's death, their consternation was so extreme that their ability to resist was much lessened.¹

While it has never been suggested that the Emperor² or any of his leading nobles was in any degree responsible for instigating or fomenting this attack, none of them took any steps to restrain the mob once the trouble had begun; moreover, some Indian notables, on hearing the rumour that Nadir had been murdered, slaughtered the Persian guards whom he, at their express request, had sent to protect their households.³

The estimates of the numbers of the Persians who lost their lives on this occasion vary from merely a few hundred to as much as 7,000⁴; it seems probable that some 3,000 actually perished.⁵

During the disturbance, some Indian nobles, of whom the most prominent were Sayyid Niyaz Khan, a son-in-law of Qamaru'd-Din Khan, and Shah Nawaz Khan, having collected together some 500 men, raided the royal elephant stables, killed the superintendent and removed the elephants. They then left the city and took possession of a fort situated just outside it.⁶

When the first report of the disturbance reached Nadir, he refused to believe it, and angrily exclaimed that some of his soldiers had falsely accused the inhabitants of stirring up trouble, so as to provide themselves with an excuse to pillage the city.⁷ He then ordered one of his *yasauls* to go and ascertain the true state of affairs and then report to him. This man, on emerging from the fort, was killed almost immediately by the mob, and a second *yasaul*, whom Nadir sent after him, suffered the same fate. Realising then that the trouble was of a serious nature, Nadir dispatched a body of 1,000 *jazayirchis* to quell the rioters, but, owing

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 22 (b).

² Mirza Mahdi expressly exonerates Muhammad Shah (*T.N.*, p. 203). It is also to be noted that no one has ever alleged that Nadir or his men deliberately provoked the disturbance in order to provide themselves with an excuse for sacking the city (in this connection, see the *Bayan*, fol. 22 (b)).

³ Shaikh Hazin, p. 299; Fraser (quoting from Mirza Zaman's *Journal*), p. 182; Ashub, Vol. II, p. 333.

⁴ The estimates given by the principal authorities are as follows:

Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 185)	400
Surat representatives of E.I.Co.	500
<i>Siyar</i> , p. 475	700
<i>Bayan</i> , fol. 22 (b)	3,000
Rustam 'Ali, fol. 287 (b)	}
De Voulton, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 238	
Père Salignes (<i>Lettres Edifiantes</i> , Vol. IV, p. 253)	5,000 to 6,000
Shaikh Hazin, p. 299	7,000

The estimate of the Surat representatives of the East India Company is taken from the *Bombay Government Consultations* for the 3rd April, 1739. In the entry on that date it is also said that the trouble was due to "a party of the late Mughal's forces having raised a quarrel in Delhi on account of some religious debate."

⁵ I follow Sir J. Sarkar, who accepts 'Abdu'l Karim's figure of 3,000 as the most probable one.

⁶ *T.N.*, p. 206.

⁷ *Bayan*, fol. 22 (b).

to the darkness and the smallness of their numbers, they failed to restore order.¹ The Shah then ordered his men to remain under arms all night, to defend themselves if attacked, but to take no further action without sanction from him.²

At sunrise the next morning Nadir mounted his horse and, with a strong escort, rode through the streets to the golden-domed Raushanu'd-Daula mosque, in the middle of the Chandni Chok quarter.³ It is said that when he was approaching this mosque, someone fired a shot at him from a balcony or window. The bullet missed Nadir, but killed an officer beside him.⁴ On reaching the mosque, Nadir mounted to the roof; after having ascertained in what quarters of the city the attacks on his men had been perpetrated, he ordered his soldiers to leave no person alive wherever a Qizilbash had been killed.⁵ At nine a.m. the Persian troops began their dreadful task. After the streets had been cleared of the rebels, the soldiers forced their way into the shops and houses in the doomed portions of the city, killing the occupants and laying violent hands on anything of value.⁶ The money-changers' bazaars and the shops of the jewellers and merchants were all looted, and large numbers of buildings were set on fire and destroyed, all the occupants perishing in the flames. No distinction was made between innocent and guilty, male and female, or old and young.⁷

Nadir remained in the mosque, his drawn sword by his side, whilst the work of death and destruction went on.⁸ When the massacre had been in progress for some hours, the Emperor sent the Nizamu'l-Mulk and Qamaru'd-Din Khan to the Shah, to implore him to be merciful.⁹ After listening to their pleadings, Nadir commanded the Kotwal, Hajji Fulad Khan, to go through the streets with a body of Persian *nasaghis*, and to convey to his soldiers the order to refrain from further action.¹⁰ The fact that this order was instantly obeyed is proof of the completeness of Nadir's control over his men. 'Abdu'l-Karim regarded their prompt obedience as "one of the most wonderful things in the world."¹¹ The massacre ceased at 3 p.m., after having been in progress for six hours.

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 23 (a). Harcharan Das, fol. 90 (b).

² *T.N.*, p. 205.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 183).

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 205. See also Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 307-313, Hazin, p. 300, *Siyar*, p. 475.

⁶ Anand Ram, fol. 173 (a).

⁷ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 313-315.

⁸ Tieffenthaler, p. 36.

⁹ *T.N.*, p. 206. See also de Voulton (p. 238), who says that the Nizamu'l-Mulk went alone to Nadir, whom he found eating sweetmeats. According to Ashub, however, Qamaru'd-Din Khan went alone to plead with Nadir.

¹⁰ Anand Ram, fol. 174 (b).

¹¹ *Bayan*, fol. 24 (b).

Nadir then commanded his troops to restore to their families the prisoners whom they had taken.¹

How many persons, the vast majority of whom were guiltless of any crime against the Persians, lost their lives on this terrible occasion will never be accurately known; the estimated totals range from 8,000 to the fantastic figure of 400,000.² Sir J. Sarkar considers that, having regard to the relatively small area affected and the short duration of the havoc, the number of those put to the sword was probably not in excess of 20,000.³ To this figure must be added the several hundred persons (mostly women) who committed suicide.

Nadir's next step was to send a force under 'Azimullah Khan and Fulad Khan to apprehend the two Indian nobles named Sayyid Niyaz Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan, and their followers, who, as stated above, had taken up their position in a fort outside the city after raiding the elephant stables on the previous night. This fort was duly attacked, and the two Indian leaders and their followers were captured; later in the day they were put to death.⁴

According to Mirza Zaman,⁵ Nadir also took vigorous punitive measures against the people of the Sarai of Ruhullah Khan and the Tatar Mughals of Mughal Pura because they had killed some Persian troops whom he had previously sent to the Sarai to seize the cannon there.

Having re-established order in the city and surroundings, Nadir confirmed Hajji Fulad Khan in his position as Kotwal.⁶

For some days after this massacre, the streets remained littered with

¹ *T.N.*, p. 206; Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 187) states that these prisoners were not released until the next day (12th Dhu'l-Hijja = 23rd March).

² As in the case of the killing of the Persian troops, there is much divergence between the authorities regarding the total number of victims:

'Abdu'l-Karim (according to the MS. belonging to Sir J. Sarkar)	8,000
Ashub, Vol. II, p. 351..	.. nearly 16,000
'Abdu'l-Karim (according to B. M. MS. fol. 23 (b))	.. 20,000
Mirza Mahdi, <i>T.N.</i> , p. 206 30,000
Rustam 'Ali, fol. 288 (a) nearly one lakh
Harcharan Das, fol. 91 (a) }
Tieffenthaler, p. 56 100,000
Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 177. (Hanway says that another 10,000 committed suicide)	.. 110,000
Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 185) 120,000 to 150,000
Surat letter (in <i>Daily Post</i> of 23rd November, 1739) 200,000
Otter, Vol. I, p. 393 225,000
Maratha letters 50,000 to 400,000

³ *Nadir Shah in India*, p. 66. The limits of the area destroyed on this occasion are given by 'Abdu'l-Karim (*Bayan*, fol. 24 (b)) and by Anand Ram (fol. 174 (a)). Two Christian churches and the house of a devout Christian lady were destroyed (Père Saignes, *Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 260); two Portuguese Jesuits named Matthias Rodriguez and Francisco da Cruz escaped injury by taking refuge in a house in a remote part of the city. (Tieffenthaler, p. 57, Saignes, p. 260).

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 206. According to Ashub (Vol. II, p. 333), Niyaz Khan was also guilty of the murder of Qizilbash guards who had been placed in his house in order to protect it.

⁵ Fraser, p. 187.

⁶ *Ibid.*

corpses ; at length, in the interests of public health, Nadir ordered the Kotwal to collect and burn the bodies. Timber from the wrecked houses provided fuel for the funeral pyres, on which the bodies of Muhammadans and Hindus were piled and burnt without distinction of creed or caste.¹ Many thousands of corpses were collected and thrown into the Jumna.

Having taken his toll of human lives, Nadir now began to exact his tribute of money and jewels. The possessions of Khan Dauran and Muzaffar Khan were seized, and a strong body of Qizilbash was dispatched to Oudh to confiscate and bring to Delhi the effects of Sa'adat Khan.² Later, Nadir appointed a commission, under Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, to assess the contributions of the nobles and of the merchants and citizens.

All this while a cordon of Persian troops surrounded the city, and forcibly prevented anyone from leaving, though they allowed persons to enter.³ Further, the granaries were kept under seal and were guarded by Persian troops ; these measures were evidently intended to expedite the collection of the tribute.

The terrible happenings at Delhi had a tremendous effect throughout India. As Anand Ram has said,⁴ Delhi had not experienced such a catastrophe since it had been sacked by Timur's troops (in December, 1398 ; after a rising by the inhabitants, his army had pillaged the city and massacred many thousands of the inhabitants). In 1739 history grimly repeated itself. Ashub has remarked that it is in the nature of the Turanians to shed blood, and that Nadir, with all his slaughtering, was the pupil (*shagird*) of Chingiz Khan and Timur.⁵ Even to-day, as Sir Percy Sykes has pointed out, Nadir's massacre is still remembered ; in the Delhi bazaar a *Nadir Shahi* signifies a massacre.⁶ Trade in the city, as the Surat factors reported to Bombay, was at a standstill.⁷

The Peshwa Baji Rao, who had failed to respond to the Emperor's appeal for aid when the Persians were still far away, became greatly alarmed on hearing of the result of the battle of Karnal and of the occupation and sack of Delhi. Making a truce with his foes in Central India, the Peshwa remarked : "There is now but one enemy in Hindustan." It seemed for a time as though Nadir's presence in India might result in the Portuguese obtaining a much needed respite from attack in the Konkan, where they were being hard pressed by a Marathi force under Chimnaji Appa. The Peshwa sent orders to Chimnaji Appa to desist from his campaign against the Portuguese and to join him as speedily as possible, in order to resist the Persians (who were then rumoured to be advancing southwards from Delhi). Chimnaji Appa, however, refused to obey Baji

¹ *Siyar*, p. 475, Hazin, p. 300.

² *Mirza Zaman* (Fraser, p. 188).

³ Vol. II, pp. 356 and 357.

⁴ *Bombay Government Consultations*, 3rd April, 1739.

⁵ *Mirza Zaman* (Fraser, p. 188), and *T.N.*, p. 207.

⁶ *Tadhkira*, fol. 174 (b).

⁷ *History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 262.

Rao's instructions until after he had taken all the Portuguese strongholds ; by that time Nadir had left Delhi on his homeward march.¹

On the 16th Dhu'l-Hijja (27th March) Nadir dispatched a *farman* by *chapar* to Persia exempting all the provinces of that country from taxation for three years. At the same time, he richly rewarded his officers, and gave his soldiers their arrears of pay, together with a gratuity ; he also gave presents to the camp-followers and servants ranging from 60 to 100 rupees in amount, according to their status.²

While the people of Delhi were still mourning their dead, Nadir demanded for his son Naṣrullah the hand of an Indian princess, a daughter of Yazdan Bakhsh and great-granddaughter of the Emperor Aurangzib. Sir John Malcolm, quoting from a Persian MS., has related that, in accordance with Mughal etiquette, Naṣrullah was required to give an account of his male ancestors for seven generations. Nadir thereupon exclaimed : "Tell them that he is the son of Nadir Shah, the son of the sword, the grandson of the sword ; and so on, till they have a descent of seventy instead of seven generations."³ The marriage took place on the 27th Dhu'l-Hijja (6th April). In honour of the occasion, Nadir ordered illuminations, displays of fireworks and lavish entertainments.⁴ On the night of the wedding fifteen or twenty Qizilbash troops danced and sang in Turki, and recited part of the *marthiya* (threnody) of Ḥusain. Nadir, on learning of this, was greatly angered, saying, "For several years I have given orders forbidding passion-plays (*ta'ziyas*) and threnodies . . . these soldiers have disregarded the Qur'an and the Traditions and have not observed the festival of my son's wedding. There is no remedy for this save death." On the following day these unfortunate men were seized and were then executed outside one of the gates of the city ; their bodies were left there for a month, as a warning⁵ (as Muḥarram was about to begin, Nadir was anxious to prevent any Shi'a manifestations by his men).

The work of assessing, and then of collecting, the levy on the citizens occupied some time. Emissaries of the Kotwal, together with Persian *nasaghis*, went from house to house enforcing the appearance of the owners and making inventories of all that they possessed, in order to calculate their individual contributions in accordance with their means⁶ ; in the

¹ J. C. Grant Duff's *A History of the Marathas* (revised edition, London, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 403-405.

² *T.N.*, p. 207. The date, which is omitted by Mirza Mahdi, is given by Mirza Zaman ; the latter states that Nadir gave his troops all their arrears of pay and a gratuity equivalent to six months' pay.

³ *History of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 46 and 47 (Sir John Malcolm does not give the name of the author or the title of this MS.).

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 206. Ashub worked for 4 days organising the illuminations and fireworks, and lighted the rockets himself. Nadir was much pleased with his work and gave him 20 rupees as a reward (Vol. II, pp. 377-380 and 387).

⁵ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 382-386 ; see also Mirza Zaman's *Journal* (Fraser, p. 199).

⁶ Anand Ram, fol. 175 (b).

case of some rich men, the assessment was as high as 50 per cent.¹ Nadir is said to have given orders that the townspeople should be preserved from violence and treated with lenity during the carrying out of this work.

When all the returns were complete, Delhi was assessed at two *crores*, and the Nizamu'l-Mulk, Sarbuland Khan and three other nobles were ordered by Nadir to collect the money. For this purpose Delhi was divided into five sections, and each of these nobles was made responsible for the collection of the money in one of these sections.² While Sarbuland Khan carried out his disagreeable task as humanely as he could,³ some of the other nobles acted very harshly, with the result that many families were entirely ruined and numbers of persons, being driven to desperation, committed suicide. In some instances torture was employed to enforce payment.⁴

The aggregate value of all the money, jewels and other objects of value which Nadir obtained from the Emperor, his nobles and people must have been at least 70 *crores* (700,000,000) of rupees⁵; as Anand Ram remarked,⁶ "the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed owners in a moment." Next to the peacock throne, the most famous and valuable of Nadir's spoils was the great Koh-i-Nor diamond.⁷

On the 3rd Šafar, 1152 (12th May), Nadir held a great *darbar* or court, to which he invited the Emperor and his principal nobles, and, with his own hands, placed the crown of Hindustan on the head of Muḥammad Shah, and handed him a belt and a sword set with jewels; he then gave splendid coats of honour to the nobles.⁸

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 25 (b).

² Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 201). Ashub (Vol. II, p. 368) states that Delhi was assessed at 2 *crores* and 12 *lahhs*.

³ Fraser, p. 217.

⁴ Anand Ram fol. 176 (b) and 177 (b); Anand Ram himself had to pay 5 *lahhs*. Ashub (Vol. II, pp. 369 *et seq.*) gives particulars of the tortures employed.

⁵ Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 207) values the gifts, including the peacock throne, which Nadir received from the Emperor and nobles at 15 *crores*, together with jewels "beyond enumeration." Anand Ram (fol. 175 (a)) says that these jewels were worth 50 *crores*. Muḥammad Kaḥim (*K.N.*, p. 445) puts the total value in cost and in kind at 26 *crores*: speaking of the jewels, etc., he said: "the mind is incapable of imagining them." Mirza Zaman (Fraser, pp. 220-221) and Otter (Vol. II, p. 90) both estimate the total value of the spoils at 70 *crores*; Otter adds that the booty taken by the officers and soldiers was worth 10 *crores*. 'Abdu'l-Karim (*Bayan*, fol. 26 (a)) gives the figure of 80 *crores*, while de Voulton's list of the items amounts to the undoubtedly exaggerated total of 111 *crores* (pp. 242-243).

⁶ *Tadhkira*, fol. 175 (a). It was actually 351 lunar years from the time when Timur sacked Delhi in December, 1398.

⁷ The family of Rana Vikramaditya had presented this diamond to Babur's eldest son Humayun in 1526, in token of gratitude for his protection. On Nadir's death in 1747, the stone passed into the hands of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the possession of whose family it remained until his grandson Shah Shuja' gave, or was forced to give, it to Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of Lahore. When the British annexed the Panjab in 1849, the East India Co. obtained possession of the diamond, which it presented to Queen Victoria in the following year.

⁸ *T.N.*, p. 208.

According to Mirza Mahdi,¹ Muhammad Shah, in gratitude for his reinstatement as Emperor, then pressed Nadir to accept all the territories of the Empire situated to the west of the Indus "from the frontier of Tibet and Kashmir to the place where that river flows into the ocean, together with the provinces of Thatta and the ports and fortresses belonging to them." Mirza Mahdi goes on to say :

"since the greater part of the countries to the north and west of the river Indus . . . had always been regarded as being within the territory of Khurasan, His Majesty agreed to their being added . . . and an instrument² was drawn up by Muhammad Shah and was delivered to that exalted Government (i.e., Nadir), and is preserved in the imperial treasury."

Nadir thereupon, it is said, gave Muhammad Shah some advice on the art of government, and exhorted the Indian nobles to obey their master³ ; he concluded by saying that, if the Emperor were ever in need of his assistance, he would send a force and that he himself could reach him in 40 days from Qandahar. According to Mirza Zaman,⁴ Nadir advised Muhammad Shah to keep a standing army of 60,000 cavalry, to confiscate the *jagirs* (fiefs or domains) of the nobles, and to forbid them to maintain forces of their own.

The Emperor's name was now substituted for that of Nadir in the *khutba*, as well as on the coinage. Muhammad Shah was thus once more a sovereign, but his kingdom had shrunk, and his commander-in-chief and many thousands of his soldiers and subjects had been slain. Further, his jewels were gone, his treasuries were empty, and his prestige, which his own indolence and pusillanimity had done so much to injure, had been still further impaired.

Having accomplished all that he had set out to do, Nadir decided to depart from Delhi ; in fact, the advent of summer rendered imperative an early start on the homeward march, and he had, moreover, other aims in view.

¹ T.N., p. 208. It is in such euphemistic terms that Mirza Mahdi refers to what was obviously a forced cession of territory.

² This is evidently the deed or treaty of cession which is quoted by Ashub (Vol. II, pp. 413-416), and which, as he remarks, Nadir compelled the Emperor to write (cf. Sir J. Malcolm's statement in his *History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 79 that this document was "no doubt dictated by the conqueror." There is some doubt as to the actual date of this treaty : Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 405-412 gives the 29th Safar 1151, which is evidently too late ; in the translations given by Fraser (pp. 223-226) and others, the date 4th Muharram is given, which seems to be too early, unless, of course, the instrument was drawn up and signed long before the investiture ceremony took place (Nadir may well have deferred this ceremony until the collection of the indemnity had been completed).

³ T.N., p. 208. Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 208), Otter, Vol. II, p. 90. J. C. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 405, states that Nadir wrote to Baji Rao that he had reinstated Muhammad Shah, and that although he (Baji Rao) was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had done nothing to assist the Emperor. Now, all must obey the Emperor ; if they did not he himself would come with his army and punish them.

⁴ Fraser, pp. 206-207.

Before leaving Delhi, Nadir dispatched a number of Indian boat-builders and carpenters to the river Oxus, via Kabul and Balkh, in order to build boats for the transport of his army in the Turkistan campaign. In addition, he engaged numbers of other carpenters, as well as stone-cutters, masons, goldsmiths and other craftsmen,¹ his intention being to erect in Persia a city on the model of Delhi.² Some Indians of higher rank and attainments were also enrolled in the Shah's service; the most important of these was 'Alavi Khan, the Hakim-Bāshi or Chief Physician, whom Nadir engaged to cure him of a dropsical complaint that he had contracted before his invasion of India.³ Khwaja 'Abdu'l-Karim ibn 'Aqibat Maḥmud of Kashmir, who subsequently wrote the *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, also entered his service this time.

An immense baggage train consisting of mules and camels was prepared for the transport of all the treasures, and several hundred elephants and a large number of horses were included in the spoils.⁴ On the 7th Šafar (16th May) all at length was ready, and Nadir, mounted on an 'Iraqi horse, rode through the streets of Delhi to the Kabul Gate. Ashub was one of the throng of spectators in the streets, and obtained an excellent view of the Shah as he passed. Nadir had on his head a red cap in which a jewelled aigrette was placed; a white Kashmir shawl was wound round the cap. Ashub states that Nadir looked young, was strongly built and held himself very erect; his beard and moustache were dyed black. He rode through the streets holding his head high and looking straight before him. When the people acclaimed him, he flung rupees to them with both hands.⁵

On reaching the Shalimar gardens he halted until the following day. The long return march then began in earnest.

¹ T.N., p. 208.

² Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 197. See also Otter, Vol. I, p. 402, who says that Nadir intended to erect this city near Hamadan, and that it was to be called Nadirabad.

³ *Bayan*, fol. 66 (b).

⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 30(b). Mirza Zaman (Fraser, p. 221) puts the number of elephants at 1,000, while 'Abdu'l-Karim gives 500; Hanway is probably right in saying that there were not more than 300 (which is the figure given by Rustam 'Alī, fol. 291 (a)).

⁵ Ashub, Vol. II, pp. 401 and 402.

CHAPTER XV

THE INVASION OF INDIA : DELHI TO NADIRABAD

FROM the Shalimar gardens Nadir proceeded as far as Sirhind by the route which he had followed on his outward march. The long and richly-laden baggage train proved an irresistible bait to the more daring of the peasants, who on several occasions attacked and looted the rear end of the train ; it is said that Nadir lost 1,000 baggage animals and their loads in this way before he reached Thanesar.¹ Enraged by these exploits of the peasants, he ordered massacres wherever they had occurred, and thus added to the devastation and havoc wrought by his men on the way to Delhi.

The heat on the plains was already so considerable that the soldiers and camp-followers suffered greatly. In order to reach the foothills more rapidly and so escape to some extent from the heat, Nadir turned to the north at Sirhind, and marched via Sialkot to Akhnur on the Chenab river.² An additional reason for this change of route was that the countryside between Sirhind and Lahore had been so ravaged on the outward march that sufficient provisions for the troops and fodder for the animals would not have been available.³

Just after his departure from Delhi, Nadir had dispatched Hayatullah Khan, the eldest son of Zakariya Khan, to Lahore, in company with 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, with orders to collect a *crore* of rupees from that city. As soon as Zakariya Khan was informed of this order, he raised more than the sum demanded, and took it in person to Nadir, whom he met somewhere to the N.E. of Lahore. Zakariya Khan then accompanied Nadir as far as the Chenab.⁴

Akhnur was reached on the 27th Šafar (5th June) ; here the troops were able to refresh themselves by bathing in the cold waters of the Chenab ; their sufferings from the great heat had been much aggravated by their heavy clothing, and many deaths had occurred every day.⁵

Copious rains in the mountainous country to the north had caused the

¹ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 199.

² T.N., p. 208, *Bayan*, fol. 27 (b), Anand Ram, fol. 179 (a).

³ *Bayan*, fol. 27 (a) and 27 (b).

⁴ Anand Ram, fol. 178 (b).

⁵ *Bayan*, fol. 27 (b), T.N., p. 208. Irakli II also speaks of the terrible heat and of the numbers of men who succumbed to it. (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 362).

river to rise considerably, and the current was very strong. The troops began to cross by the bridge of boats at Akhnur, but this bridge proved unequal to the strain imposed upon it by the great strength of the current and by the unusually heavy load. When only a portion of the army had reached the further bank, the bridge broke asunder, and 2,000 men were drowned in the swirling waters.¹ According to 'Abdu'l-Karim, the bridge was broken in the following way: When the inhabitants of the Akhnur district received warning of Nadir's approach, they retired to the hills where they cut down large numbers of trees. They then cast the tree-trunks into the Chenab which bore them swiftly down to Akhnur and dashed them with such force against the bridge there that the chains connecting the boats snapped in two.² As it was impossible either to repair this bridge or to build another one near-by, Nadir gave orders for the remainder of the troops and the baggage and artillery to be ferried across at Kullowal, thirty miles downstream from Akhnur; this passage by ferry proved a lengthy process, and it was not until the 7th Rabi' II (14th July) that it was completed.³

Knowing that his men had amassed much plunder at Delhi, Nadir, before the crossing was begun, issued an order that every man was to surrender all except a limited part of his loot. Many obeyed and were rewarded, but, as Nadir knew that many others had disregarded his order, he posted some trustworthy men at the crossing-place who searched each man as he passed. Some men buried their valuables, in the hope that they would be able to return later and recover them, but in this they were disappointed; others are said to have been so enraged that they threw their jewels and money into the river.⁴

Before leaving the further (western) bank of the Chenab, Nadir set free his Indian prisoners and ordered Zakariya Khan to assist them to return to their homes; he then gave the Khan leave to go back to Lahore.⁵

It was, apparently, at this time that Nadir sent orders to Muhammad Taqi Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, to bring reinforcements by sea to Sind. These orders reached Muhammad Taqi Khan at the end of

¹ Anand Ram, fol. 179 (a).

² Bayan, fol. 27 (b).

³ T.N., p. 208.

⁴ Bayan, fol. 28 (a). K.N., p. 466. In February, 1740, some merchants arrived at Gombroon from Nadir's camp, which, they said, was "excessively rich in Money and Jewels. But the latter he (Nadir) engrosses to himself, having forbid the soldiers retaining Diamonds or other Stones. . . . On their coming to any Pass, he had their Baggage brought before him and examined to prevent their concealing such . . ." (*Gombroon Diary*, 22nd February, 1740). In his *History of Persia* (Vol. II, p. 86), Sir J. Malcolm, after mentioning this order of Nadir's, says: "I have heard many Persian noblemen, when speaking on this subject, refer the conduct of Nadir more to policy than avarice. He feared, they affirmed, his soldiers would be spoiled by wealth."

⁵ Bayan, fol. 28 (b), T.N., p. 209.

October or early in November¹; the manner in which he carried them out, or rather in which he attempted to do so, will be described in Chapter XVIII.

In heavy rain the army advanced from the Chenab to the Jhelum; having crossed the latter river by a bridge,² the army continued its march via Rawal Pindi to Hasan Abdal.³ Whilst at Hasan Abdal, Nadir dispatched impressive embassies to Constantinople and St. Petersburg in order to announce his conquest of India. Each of the Ambassadors, who started on their lengthy journeys on the 20th Rajab (23rd October), took gifts of great value, as well as a number of elephants, to present to the ruler to whom he was accredited.⁴

At the end of Rajab (4th November, 1739) Nadir received word from Khurasan that Ilbars and his Özbek horde were at last on the march towards that province (Mirza Mahdi is incorrect in stating that the districts of Abivard and Nasa were invaded).⁵ This news made Nadir more determined than ever to invade Turkistan.

On leaving Hasan Abdal, Nadir bore westwards towards the Indus.⁶ He was now in the country of the warlike Yusufzais, who offered much resistance. After some heavy fighting had taken place, Nadir came to terms with these resolute tribesmen, and enlisted a large number of them in his army; had he not reached this understanding with them, much delay would have resulted, and he would have been unable to reach the high country round Kabul before the advent of the winter snow rendered the roads impassable.⁷

After crossing the Indus, Nadir went to Peshawar and thence through the Khaibar Pass and Jalalabad to Kabul, where he arrived on the 1st Ramaḍān (2nd December).⁸ All the Afghan leaders and notables of the province came to pay homage to him at Kabul. No less than 40,000 Afghans of Peshawar, Kabul, the Hazarajat and other districts enrolled themselves in his army and were sent to Herat where they were to await his arrival.⁹

Some time previously, Nadir had summoned Miyan Nur Muḥammad Khudayar Khan, the powerful Governor of Sind, to meet him at Kabul and to do homage to him there, but the Kalhora chief disregarded this

¹ It appears from the *T.N.* (p. 211) that Nadir only issued these orders when at Kabul in December, 1739, but this is impossible; it is clear from the Gombroon records that they reached the Beglarbegi late in October or early in November, so they must have been dispatched several months before (See *Gombroon Diary*, 5th November, 1739).

² See Irakli's letter, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 363.

³ *T.N.*, p. 209, *Bayan*, fol. 29 (b).

⁴ *Ibid.* Further details of these embassies will be given subsequently.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 210. For what actually occurred, see Chapter XVI.

⁶ The route which Nadir followed is probably the same as that briefly described by Muḥammad Ja'far Shamla in his *Manazil-i-Futūḥ*, fol. 7 (a) and 7 (b).

⁷ *T.N.*, p. 210, *Bayan*, fol. 29 (a) and 29 (b).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

order.¹ Being at such a distance and feeling that Nadir would not march his tired troops so far to the south, Khudayar Khan had no misgivings. It is characteristic of Nadir that he refused to brook this flouting of his authority. Though it was nearly mid-winter and the cold was intense, he started southwards from Kabul on the 8th Ramadan (9th December) in order to punish Khudayar Khan.² The elephants did not accompany the army on this southward march, because it would have been impracticable to take them. They were, instead, sent to Persia via Ghazna, Qandahar and Herat.

Details are lacking in regard to the route followed by Nadir between Kabul and the Kurram valley. He doubtless marched south for fifteen miles to Zahidabad; here he may have branched off to the south-east and crossed into the upper Kurram valley via 'Ali Khel and Ahmad Khel. Alternatively, he may have marched on southwards from Zahidabad to Khak Hazara, three stages from Kabul; from Khak Hazara the route runs almost due east to Hazar Darakht, near the headwaters of the Kurram. Of the two routes, the latter is the more practicable in winter, and is therefore the one which he probably took. There is a tradition to the effect that he marched still further south before turning east, and entered the Bannu country via the Daur valley.³ It is said that Nadir so thoroughly subdued the Daur tribe that they paid an annual tribute of Rs. 12,000 to the Kabul authorities until the time of Zaman Shah Durrani.⁴ References in other authorities to the traversing of the Bangashat⁵ and the length of time spent by the Persian army in the Kurram valley seem to prove, however, that it went that way and not by the Daur valley, but it is nevertheless possible that Nadir may have sent some of his troops by the latter route.

The march in these parts was trying in the extreme, and many of those who had survived the stifling summer heat of the plains now succumbed to the cold of the high country in mid-winter. The army and the long

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 31 (b). According to Leech's *Brief History of Kalat* (J.R.A.S., Vol. XII, p. 484), Muhabbat Khan, the eldest son of 'Abdullah Khan Brahui, mindful of a promise which Nadir had made during the siege of Qandahar to assist him against Khudayar Khan, the slayer of his father, reminded Nadir of this promise when the army reached the Indus. For the feud between Khudayar Khan and 'Abdullah Khan, see p. 52 above.

² According to Otter (Vol. II, pp. 97 and 98), Nadir, after leaving Kabul for Qandahar, dispatched 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, with 5,000 men, to receive the submission of Khudayar Khan. On receiving word from 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan of Khudayar Khan's refusal to submit and of his preparations for resistance, Nadir, who was then "very close to Qandahar," "retraced his steps in order to bring Khudayar Khan to reason." This statement (which is copied by Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 202) is clearly devoid of foundation.

³ *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 628, and S. S. Thorburn, *Bannu; or Our Afghan Frontier*, London, 1876, p. 24. Sir E. D. MacLagan has very kindly informed me of a local tradition that the fountain of Zwob, between the Tochi and the Baran passes at the mouth of the Daur valley, was polluted by the numbers of Nadir's soldiers and camels that fell into it.

⁴ *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 418.

⁵ See the *Bayan*, fol. 31 (b) and 32 (a), T.N., p. 211.

baggage train had to cross the swift Kurram river no less than twenty-two times ; so many baggage animals were carried away and drowned during these crossings that one-quarter of the spoils of India was lost.¹

At last, on the 1st Shawwal (1st January, 1740) the army emerged from the grim and forbidding defiles of the Kurram, called by the men the " valley of the demon " ; on entering the lower country, they were delighted to see green fields and to breathe the warmer air.²

Although the soldiers rejoiced when they left the Kurram valley behind, their troubles were by no means at an end. The local *zamindars* retired to their strongholds and offered resistance,³ and certain of the Bannuchi tribesmen attacked the Persian columns.⁴ It is said, however, that some of the Bannuchis were terrified at the sight of the Persians, who were all clad in red and had tents of the same colour. Nadir dealt ruthlessly with the tribesmen who attacked him ; the Garri clan is stated to have been 1,000 strong when he came, but only two remained after he had gone.⁵

Large numbers of baggage animals had, as stated above, been drowned in the Kurram ; many more died through lack of fodder, and transport consequently became very scarce. Further to the south, it was found that the tribespeople had, at the orders of Khudayar Khan, taken away and hidden as much of the grain as they could carry and had burnt the rest ; parties of troops had, therefore, to be sent far afield to obtain sufficient supplies.⁶

It seems that Nadir, when near Bazar Ahmad Khan, struck southwards from the Kurram to the Tochi river, and that he passed through or close to the towns of Bharth and Kaki and traversed the district of Nar⁷ and

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 32 (a).

² *Ibid.*, and 32 (b).

³ *Ibid.*, fol. 32 (b).

⁴ Sir E. D. MacLagan informs me that, according to local tradition, the townspeople of Kaki and Bharth mistook the Persian advance guard for a company of merchants travelling in the manner of the Powindahs, and delivered an attack. They paid dearly for their mistake, for Nadir had them all put to the sword. As the Powindahs always travelled fully armed and in large bodies when in dangerous country, it is not altogether strange that the Bannuchis should have mistaken the Persian advance guard for a company of them.

⁵ *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 628.

⁶ *Bayan*, fol. 33 (a).

⁷ Sir E. MacLagan states : " The natives have a strange story about a poor Bannuchi in Nar who, on Nadir's approach, fled up a very large tree ; the place beneath this tree was selected by Nadir's *Khalasis* as the spot on which the tents of the harem should be pitched ; the ladies espied the poor man in the tree, and when the Shah himself came out, the poor wretch fell down in abject terror, but Nadir, instead of punishing him, said with a sort of princely contempt that, as the harem was now of no value, he might take it all, and the Bannuchi ploughman found himself saddled with an emperor's harem and all its servants and accoutrements. He was only too pleased to accept a few rupees from the ladies and to let them return to Khurasan." These local traditions are of interest, but implicit reliance must not be placed on them. For example, Sir H. B. Edwards (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 20) relates that the people of Multan believed that the fine groves of date-palms surrounding the city owed their origin to date stones left on the ground by Nadir's soldiers, " a legacy of wealth and beauty such as conquest seldom leaves behind." It is, however, known for certain that Nadir did not march through Multan.

the Marwat desert.¹ He must have gone over the Pezu Pass, between the Bhattani and Marwat ranges, and then marched southwards to Dera Isma'il Khan, where he arrived on the 5th Shawwal (5th January, 1740).² Šadiq Khan, the chief of the Da'udputra tribe,³ came to pay homage to Nadir at Dera Isma'il Khan, and promised to assist him against Khudayar Khan. Not long before, the increasing power and affluence of the Daudputras had aroused the jealousy of Khudayar Khan; he had then attacked them and so incurred their enmity.⁴

At Dera Isma'il Khan Nadir embarked the greater part of his army in boats and proceeded by river to Dera Ghazi Khan which he reached on the 15th Shawwal (15th January).⁵ From this town he sent a further summons to Khudayar Khan, but the Khan again returned no answer.

Having reduced to obedience all the tribes in the neighbourhood, Nadir set out southward again, and reached Larkana on the 14th Dhu'l-Qa'da (12th February); here he received word that Khudayar Khan had fled in the direction of Gujerat. Leaving his baggage at Larkana, the Shah hastened in pursuit.⁶ On arriving at Shahdadpur he found awaiting him some presents and a petition from the Khan⁷; the latter, however, had fled across the desert to his fortress of 'Umarkot (Akbar's birthplace), where he ensconced himself in fancied security.

On the 28th Dhu'l-Qa'da (26th February) Nadir left Shahdadpur and made a forced march for thirty *farsakhs* across the desert to 'Umarkot, where he arrived on the following day. Burying his treasures, the Khan prepared for a further flight, but found that it was too late.⁸ He thereupon offered to submit, on condition that the lives of himself and his family were spared; Nadir readily consented, for he could not afford to delay since his troops were without water or supplies.⁹

Various stories are told of the interview between Nadir and Khudayar Khan and of the manner in which the latter was made to disgorge his treasures. According to 'Abdu'l-Karim, a number of objects of value that had formerly belonged to the Šafavi monarchs were discovered amongst them; on enquiries being made, it was found that the Ghalzai Afghans of Qandahar, on being subdued by Nadir, had scattered their Persian spoils in all directions, and that some of these spoils had been purchased by

¹ Thorburn, *op. cit.*, p. 24, states that Nadir completely cowed the Marwats as well as the Bannuchis, and that he levied heavy tribute from both tribes.

² *T.N.*, p. 212.

³ For the origin and history of the Da'udputras see Fir Ibrahim Khan's *History of Bahawalpore*, London, 1848, p. 24 and Mohun Lal's *A Brief Account of the Origin of the Daudputras and of the Power and Birth of Bahawal Khan, their Chief*, in *J.R.A.S.B.*, Vol. VII.

⁴ Fir Ibrahim Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 212.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, Anand Ram, fol. 183 (a), *Bayan*, fol. 34 (a).

⁹ *Bayan*, fol. 34 (a).

Khudayar Khan.¹ The value of all the gold, jewels and pearls which the Khan was forced to hand over amounted to over a *crore* of rupees.²

After spending a few days at 'Umarkot, Nadir returned to Larkana, taking Khudayar Khan with him in chains. Five days after reaching Larkana, he celebrated Nau Ruz there with great pomp and magnificence.³

It was at this time, apparently, that Zakariya Khan, in response to a summons from Nadir, arrived at Larkana, where the Shah treated him with even more courtesy and consideration than before.⁴

Since Nadir was pleased with Khudayar Khan's bearing and behaviour after his submission, he forgave him, and made him Khan of Thatta and part of Sind, which formed approximately one-third of his former dominions; Nadir also conferred on him the title of Shah Quli ("Slave of the Shah") Khan. In return, Khudayar Khan had to undertake to pay an annual tribute of 10 *lakhs* of rupees and to furnish a contingent of 2,000 cavalry under the command of one of his sons.⁵ Nadir then divided up the remainder of Khudayar Khan's territories; he gave Kachhi, the portion of Sind adjoining Baluchistan, to Muhabbat Khan, the Governor of that province, and rewarded Sadiq Khan, the chief of the Da'udputras, by granting him the district of Shikarpur and the high plateau of Sind.

Whilst Nadir was at Larkana, an ambassador arrived from Muhammad Shah⁶ bearing a letter and costly gifts. Nadir returned a suitable reply, and sent the Emperor a present of some fine horses and 200 camel-loads of Balkh melons—a trivial return for the peacock throne and the other treasures of India which he had been "given"!⁷

After enjoining upon Zakariya Khan and his son Hayatullah the need for serving the Emperor faithfully, Nadir gave them both leave to depart.⁸

Having dispatched instructions to Rida Quli Mirza (who was then at Tehran) to proceed to Herat,⁹ Nadir left Larkana for Nadirabad on the

¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 34 (b). See also the somewhat different accounts given by Leech, in his *Brief History of Kalat* in *J.R.A.S.B.*, Vol. XII, p. 485, and Sir H. Pottinger's *Travels in Beloochistan*, pp. 352 and 353.

² *T.N.*, p. 213. Postans, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

³ *Bayan*, fol. 34 (b).

⁴ Anand Ram, fol. 183 (b).

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 215. See also Leech, in *J.R.A.S.B.*, Vol. XVII, p. 485.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 215. *Bayan* 35 (a). Muhammad Shah is said to have become alarmed on receiving news of Nadir's campaign in Sind and of his summons to Zakariya Khan, fearing lest a second invasion of India might be impending.

⁷ Mirza Mahdi may have been conscious of the relatively insignificant value of Nadir's presents to Muhammad Shah, for he devotes some space to describing how Nadir delighted above all in the water melons of Balkh and Herat and in a beautiful horse (*T.N.*, p. 215), the moral drawn being, of course, that he sent to the Emperor the two things in which he himself took most delight.

⁸ *T.N.*, p. 214.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

13th Muḥarram, 1153 (10th April), taking two of Khudayar Khan's sons with him as hostages.¹ The route taken was via Gandava and Sibi, then over the 54-mile Bolan Pass, the dreaded Dasht-i-Bi-Daulat desert, Shal (Quetta) and Fushanj (Pishin); Nadir and his army arrived at Nadirabad on the 7th Šafar (4th May),² just over two (lunar) years from the time when he had set out from there for the conquest of India.

¹ *T.N.*, p. 215. *Bayan*, fol. 35 (a).

² *Ibid.*, p. 215. The *Bayan* gives this date as the 3rd Šafar (30th April).

CHAPTER XVI

RIDA QULI MIRZA'S INVASION OF TURKISTAN : IBRAHIM KHAN'S LAST CAMPAIGN

WHILE Nadir was absent on his Afghan and Indian campaigns, several events of importance occurred in Khurasan, Turkistan, Adharbaijan and the Persian Gulf.

As already mentioned,¹ Nadir had, just before his coronation in March, 1736, appointed his eldest son Rida Quli Mirza Governor of Khurasan, and had ordered him to go to Andkhud and punish its contumacious Governor, 'Ali Mardan Khan Afshar. Rida Quli duly went to Mashhad in the spring of 1736, but he did not set out for Andkhud for another twelve months, presumably because his troops at first were insufficiently trained. In the meantime he had received orders from Nadir to go on from Andkhud to Balkh, as the Governor of the latter place, Abu'l-Hasan Khan by name, had also rebelled.²

When Rida Quli left Mashhad on this expedition, he was accompanied by Tahmasp Khan Jalayir in whom Nadir, in view of his son's youth (he was then only seventeen) and impetuous nature, had vested control of the military operations³: Baba Khan Chaushlu, another commander of high rank, accompanied the expedition. At Maruchaq the prince's forces were strengthened by the arrival of a contingent from Herat.

When Rida Quli's army arrived at Andkhud, some of the local Afshars deserted the Governor, 'Ali Mardan Khan, although he belonged to their tribe, but he managed nevertheless to resist for nearly six weeks before being obliged to surrender.⁴ After appointing a new Governor in place of 'Ali Mardan (who was sent to Herat and executed there), and having subjugated the Chachaktu and Shibarqan (Marco Polo's "Sapurgan") districts, Rida Quli and his army advanced on Balkh. Having defeated an Özbek force near Aghcha and taken that town, the army went on towards Balkh, the outskirts of which it reached on the 3rd Rabi' I (1st July, 1737).⁵ Abu'l-Hasan, the Governor, who was a degenerate descen-

¹ See p. 102 above.

² *K.N.*, p. 226.

³ According to Muhammad Kazim (*K.N.*, p. 197), Nadir sent these orders to Rida Quli at the time when he was leaving Isfahan for Qandahar.

⁴ *K.N.*, pp. 197-201. Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 183) states that the town surrendered after a siege of no more than three days; as Muhammad Kazim's account of this campaign is so much fuller and is so obviously based on a far better knowledge of the facts, I have no hesitation in following his version rather than that of Mirza Mahdi whenever there is any divergence between the two.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 182.

dant of Chingiz Khan, wished to submit immediately, but an Özbeg chief named Sayyid Khan insisted on resisting. After a short but sharp engagement the Persians routed the Özbegs with heavy loss and then forced their way through the defences of Balkh. Abu'l-Husan after holding out for a short while in the citadel, submitted to Rida Quli, who treated him well because of his lineage, but sent him, together with other leaders and notables of the place to Nadir at Qandahar.¹

Rida Quli sent Shah Quli Beg Qajar, the commander of the Merv contingent, in pursuit of Sayyid Khan and his men; the Qajar chief caught up with and inflicted heavy loss upon the Özbegs and then pursued them again. As there was a possibility of Sayyid Khan being strongly reinforced by other Özbeg chiefs, Baba Khan Chaushlu and several thousand men were sent to join Shah Quli Beg; Sayyid Khan thereupon fled to the Qunduz district, where he managed to elude his pursuers, who, baulked of their prey, eventually returned to Balkh.²

Meanwhile, Rida Quli had called upon Daniyal Beg, the chief of the Qungrat³ tribe to submit, but he merely returned an evasive answer. In some perplexity, the prince consulted Tahmasp Khan, who counselled vigorous measures. "Conquest," he said, "is by striving and effort."⁴ Rida Quli acted on this advice, and set out with part of his forces, but without artillery, for the Oxus, in company with Tahmasp Khan; after crossing the river, they marched for forty-eight hours to the Qungrat encampments and quickly compelled Daniyal Beg to submit.⁵

Rida Quli, although not authorised by his father to undertake any operations on the further side of the Oxus, then boldly marched on Qarshi, after sending orders to Balkh for his artillery to be dispatched to him.⁶

Muhammad Rahim Bi, the Hakim Ataliq, who was the principal minister and adviser⁷ of Abu'l-Faid, the King of Bukhara, had received word of the Persians' operations in Transoxiana and of the threatened attack on Qarshi. He collected a considerable force and succeeded in reaching Qarshi before Rida Quli and his army could do so. When the Persians appeared, a severe engagement took place outside the town, in which the Özbegs were worsted, many of their leaders being killed. The Hakim Ataliq immediately sent word to Bukhara that, unless rein-

¹ K.N., pp. 207 and 208.

² Ibid., pp. 208-212.

³ The Qungrat are a clan or subdivision of the Qazaqs (see M. A. Czaplicka's *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day*, p. 38).

⁴ K.N., p. 214.

⁵ Ibid., p. 216.

⁶ Ibid., p. 216; T.N., p. 183.

⁷ He belonged to the well-known Mangit (or Manqit) family, and (like so many of the prominent men of those parts) was a descendant of Chingiz Khan. Abu'l-Faid Khan, the weak King of Bukhara, was a mere puppet in his capable hands (see A. Vámbéry's *History of Bokhara*, London, 1873, p. 338).

forcements were dispatched, the town would fall. Abu'l-Faiḍ at once summoned the tribesmen of the Andijan, Samarqand, Khojend, Tashkend and other districts to send assistance, and appealed to Ilbars, the Khan of Khwarizm,¹ to do likewise. He also requested the Qaraqalpaqs and Qazaqs to send men.

When he deemed his forces to be sufficiently strong, Abu'l-Faiḍ left his capital and succeeded in penetrating the Persian lines round Qarshi and entering the town. A few days later the Bukharan army emerged to give battle.

Seeing that his men were alarmed, Rida Quli summoned his commanders to a council (*kingash*), and said: "For a few to fight so many is far from wise; let us return to Balkh." Tahmasp Khan thereupon pointed out that if they retreated, the Özbegs would pursue and inflict serious losses on them; if Nadir were there, he said, he would attack, despite the heavy odds. The prince acted upon Tahmasp Khan's advice as soon as his cannon arrived from the Oxus, but it was Tahmasp Khan and not the prince who directed the operations, because Nadir had ordered that the former was to have supreme authority in military matters.²

The battle went at first in favour of the Özbegs, but the Persians, though driven back, did not lose heart. When, at length, their cannon came into play and caused much havoc in the enemy ranks, the tide turned. Adina Beg, the leader of the Aq Yalan tribesmen and chief of Khojend and Tashkend, was killed, together with many other men of note, and the whole Özbek army was forced back to Qarshi, the siege of which was resumed.³ Leaving sufficient men to keep Qarshi closely invested, Rida Quli, Tahmasp Khan and Baba Khan Chaushlu marched to the neighbouring fortress of Shulluk,⁴ which fell after a siege lasting over a month. During this siege the Persians sustained a serious loss when an Özbek marksman killed Baba Khan Chaushlu.⁵

In the meantime, Ilbars of Khwarizm, who had come somewhat tardily to Abu'l-Faiḍ's assistance, had reached the outskirts of Bukhara, but found that the King had already left for Qarshi. The treacherous chief then conceived the idea of seizing Bukhara for himself, in Abu'l-Faiḍ's absence.

¹ Ilbars (or Yollbars, as he was sometimes called) Khan Qazaq, like Abu'l-Faiḍ, claimed descent from Chingiz Khan; he, as will be seen below, was vain, ambitious and treacherous.

² K.N., p. 226.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 225-232. Mirza Mahdi also mentions this battle (T.N., pp. 183 and 184), but he is not so well informed as Muḥammad Kazim. He praised the bravery of Rida Quli, quoting (doubtless with a view to pleasing Nadir) the Arabic phrase: *as-shiblu yakhbarn 'an al-asad* ("the cub takes after the lion").

⁴ The ruins of the ancient town of Nakhshab surround the hill named Shulluk-tappa, two and a half *farisakhs* from Qarshi, which, as Barthold has shown in his *Turkistan*, p. 136, derives its name from a palace (*qarshi* in Mongol or Uighur means "palace") that the Chaghatai Khan Kabak built there in the XIVth century, A.D.

⁵ K.N., pp. 235 and 236; T.N., p. 184.

He accordingly send word into the city that the King had been captured by the Qizilbash who were on the point of advancing to take Bukhara ; he therefore craved permission to enter the city, so as to be able to aid the inhabitants to defend it. A rumour was then spread, however, that the Persians were advancing, whereupon Ilbars, in alarm, abandoned his design and hastened back to Khiva.¹

Having succeeded in taking Shulluk, Riḍa Quli returned to Qarshi on the capture of which he set much importance. In the meantime, however, Nadir had received word first of the operations against the Qungrat tribe and then of those against Qarshi and Shulluk. He feared that, as Turkistan was a vast kingdom which had always produced large numbers of fighting men ever since the days of Chingiz Khan and Timur, all the Özbegs might combine and then overwhelm and massacre his son's relatively scanty forces before they could reach the Oxus.² He therefore wrote at once to Riḍa Quli rebuking him for his conduct and ordering his immediate withdrawal to Balkh, where he was to stay pending further instructions. Nadir wrote in the following terms to Tahmasp Khan :

"O senile pimp (*qallaban-i-fariṭ*)! I ordered thee, after thou hadst taken Balkh, to remain there . . . but thou didst harbour thoughts of conquest instead. And thou hast led into evil and vain thoughts my beloved son, Riḍa Quli Mirza, who from early youth has been far removed from prudence and is renowned for his fearlessness, and thou hast brought thyself and my son and the victorious armies into the ocean of calamity. . . . May God prevent the armies of the Özbegs, Qazaqs, Qalmuqs, Chaghatais, Russians (*sic*) and Alans from joining together and desiring to give battle to the small number of the victorious troops who are under thy command. . . . On receipt of this order thou art without delay to return to Qubbatu'l-Islam (Balkh), and I shall order that thy head, on being severed from thy body, shall be sent to the world-adorning court."³

Simultaneously, Nadir, according to Mirza Mahdi, sent a message to Abu'l-Faiḍ that he recognised his sovereignty, as a descendant of Chingiz Khan and as a Turkoman, over Bukhara, and that he had ordered his son to cease making war upon him.⁴

The couriers bearing these messages arrived at Qarshi just when the Ḥakim Ataliq had given up hope of being able to resist any longer. As was natural, he was as elated at this news as Riḍa Quli and Tahmasp Khan were downcast : thinking that Nadir's order to his son to withdraw had been occasioned by a defeat which he (Nadir) had sustained, he prepared to attack the Qizilbash as soon as they began to retreat. Tahmasp

¹ *K.N.*, p. 232.

² *Ibid.*, p. 240.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 241 and 242.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 184. (Muḥammad Kazim does not mention this message from Nadir to Abu'l-Faiḍ.)

Khan, foreseeing that such an attack would be attempted, stayed at the rear and, when it was delivered, made such a vigorous counter-thrust that he drove the Özbeks back to the gates of Qarshi. The army then marched unmolested to the Oxus, but the men suffered much from the severe cold (it was then the winter of 1737-38). After crossing the river, they reached Balkh in safety.¹

Rîdâ Qulî and Tahmasp Khan then marched into the Qunduz district, because the Governor, at the instigation of the Özbek leader Sayyid Khan, had rebelled. The operations were successful, and resulted in the death of both the rebel Governor and Sayyid Khan.² The prince, having settled the affairs of Qunduz, allowed his rashness to prevail and entered Badakhshan, but, when he had reached Kulab, in the western part of that district, he and Tahmasp Khan received orders from Nadir to return to Balkh at once and to stay there pending further instructions; they had perforce to obey.³

When, in the previous year, Rîdâ Qulî had left Mashhad for Andkhud and Balkh, his cousin 'Alî Qulî Khan, the eldest son of Ibrahim Khan, had been made Governor of Mashhad. 'Alî Qulî, who was the same age as Rîdâ Qulî, was a profligate youth who devoted himself far more to his pleasures than to his official duties.⁴

As so many men had been called up for service with Nadir and with Rîdâ Qulî, only a small number was available for the defence of Khurasan. Muhammad Amin Mihtar, a high official in the service of Ilbars, happened to visit Mashhad at this time, and took note not only of the character of 'Alî Qulî Khan, but also of the scanty garrisons in Khurasan. On returning to Khiva, this official reported fully to Ilbars, who, as a result, resolved to raise a large force and then seize Khurasan. After his return to Khiva from Bukhara, Ilbars summoned all the troops from the five fortresses (the Besh Qal'a) of Khwarizm, and called upon the Qazaq, Aral, Tekké, Yamut, Sarii, Ersari and other Turkoman tribes to send contingents. When he had collected a very large force (according to Muhammad Kazim, 100,000 strong, but this seems an exaggeration), he boasted that he would conquer Khurasan, defeat Nadir in India and then add that country to his domains.⁵

Spies arriving from Khiva informed 'Alî Qulî of Ilbars's intentions, but he refused at first to credit them. Further reports, however, convinced 'Alî Qulî and his advisers of the imminence of the danger, and he then

¹ *K.N.*, pp. 244 and 245.

² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 249 and 250.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 272. Nadir had appointed some trustworthy officials to assist and guide the young man.

⁵ *K.N.*, pp. 273 and 274.

sent word to Nadir. The Shah, on hearing the news, dispatched messengers to Rīḍa Qulī and Tahmasp Khan at Balkh to bid them join him immediately in order to arrange for the defence of Khurasan; at the same time, he determined to punish Ilbars on his return from India. The prince and Tahmasp Khan, as already related, travelling via Qunduz and Kabul, reached Nadir at Bahar Sufiā. The Shah received his son very kindly, but completely ignored Tahmasp Khan, who feared lest the threatened beheading might, after all, take place. Nadir later summoned Tahmasp Khan to his presence and upbraided him severely for his conduct, but, on seeing that Tahmasp was genuinely sorry for what he had done, he pardoned him.¹

Then followed Rīḍa Qulī's appointment as Viceroy of Persia. In honour of the occasion, a great reception was held, at which coats of honour were given to the principal personages. After the reception, Nadir took Rīḍa Qulī to his quarters and gave him, in private, the following instructions and advice:

"when thou dost reach the kingdom of Persia, thou art to appoint the guards of Shah Tahmasp, who is imprisoned in the town of Sabzavar, from among those who are well-disposed to thee and thou shalt prevent the rest of the people from having access to him, and elsewhere in the country, wherever we have appointed governors, mayors and deputy-governors, thou shalt show them attention and not make any change or substitution; thou shalt pay such attention as is necessary to the dwellers on the plain (*sahra-nishin*; i.e., the Ozbegs). And if—which God forbid—armies from Turkistan, Turkey or Europe should reach Persia, thou shalt take counsel with the elders and tribal chiefs regarding the waging of war upon them, and in such matters take their advice, and be not foolish enough to go to war whilst thou canst have peace. Extirpate thieves, ruffians and scoundrels, and treat well merchants and caravans from abroad so that the fame of thy justice, generosity and magnificence may become spread throughout the world. Be not prodigal with money . . . but if calamity threaten the kingdom, do not hesitate to make gifts from the treasury to the soldiers. Hold it not lawful to show attention and kindness to the Safavi family and Shah Tahmasp. . . ."²

Before concluding this admonition, Nadir bade his son behave in the manner indicated "even though—which God forbid—there is no trace or sign of us for six months." On another occasion he ordered Rīḍa Qulī to keep on the defensive instead of attacking Ilbars, and to report fully "so that I may punish him and make him an example to all rebels and evil-doers." Soon after, the prince took his leave and travelled with all speed to Herat, where he was joined by 6,000 men who had been destined for Balkh. Having sent word to 'Alī Qulī Khan at Mashhad to join him, he marched to the Tejen river in order to see whether there

¹ *K.N.*, pp. 265 and 267.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 270 and 271 (Muhammad Kazim does not explain how he was able to reproduce what purported to be the *ipsissima verba* which Nadir addressed to his son in private).

was any sign of Ilbars and his men (who seem to have been unaccountably slow in launching their attack). On scouts reporting the approach of the Ōzbegs in great force, Rīdā Qulī, after consulting his commanders as he had been bidden, retired to Abivard. When Ilbars reached the Tejen, he consulted his leaders, and decided to split up the army and make simultaneous attacks on Mashhad and a number of other places. A dispute, however, arose at this stage between the Qaraqalpaqs and the Aral Turkomans on the one hand and the Tekkés on the other, which Ilbars only managed to settle with great difficulty. Whilst this dispute was at its height, messengers arrived from Khwarizm with the news that a Qazaq chief named Toqtamish Khan was about to take advantage of Ilbars's absence to raid his country. These tidings caused Ilbars to abandon all thought of the invasion of Khurasan and to hurry back to his own dominions.¹ Rīdā Qulī at once sent couriers to India to inform Nadir of the removal of the threat to Khurasan, and then proceeded from Abivard to Mashhad.

Before relating how Rīdā Qulī acquitted himself of his vice-regal duties during the remainder of his period of office, it is necessary to turn for a time to events in north-west Persia and to describe how Ibrahim Khan met his death there.

Ibrahim Khan held a position in north-west Persia analogous to that of his nephew Rīdā Qulī in the north-east; Ibrahim, however, by reason of his age and experience, had supreme control of the military forces in his area.

There was no danger of north-west Persia being invaded by either the Turks or the Russians, as they were at each other's throats throughout Ibrahim's term of office; there was little risk of a rising by the Georgians, as Nadir had subdued them and Šafī Khan Bughairi, the commandant at Tiflis, had seized Taimuraz and other prominent Georgians and sent them to the Shah as hostages. The only real menace was from the Lazgis; although many of their leaders had submitted, these turbulent people were always ready to seize an opportunity of raiding their richer neighbours to the south-east and south.

A Lazgi raid took place in October, 1736, but a combined Georgian and Persian force drove the marauders back.²

Some time in the autumn or early winter, one of Ibrahim's wives died; she was a daughter of Shah Sultān Husain and had, apparently, been married to Ibrahim some five years previously.³ Ibrahim Khan ordered

¹ *R.N.*, pp. 281-284.

² *Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 51.

³ Ibrahim Khan may have married her in December, 1730, when Nadir married Radiyya Begum, or just over a year later, when the marriage of Rīdā Qulī Mirza and Faṭīma Begum took place (see pp. 42 and 52 above).

Muhammad Kazim's father, who was "one of his sincere friends,"¹ to take the body to Mashhad for burial. He carried out his task, and brought back his son Muhammad Kazim with him to Adharbaijan; Ibrahim treated the youth kindly and appointed him, at his own request, one of his *yasauls*.

During the same winter Ibrahim, at Nadir's request, sent his eldest son, 'Ali Quli Khan to Mashhad, of which place, as already stated, he was made Governor. Soon after, Taimuraz's daughter Kethewan was also sent to Mashhad, where she was married to 'Ali Quli with much pomp and ceremony.²

Politically, 1737 was a quiet year on the north-west, but it was, nevertheless, a year of tragedy, for plague broke out near Ganja and spread with alarming rapidity. Ibrahim, who had a great horror of plague, left immediately for Tiflis, but learnt when approaching that city that the disease had already appeared there; he thereupon set out for Erivan, but was again forestalled by the disease. Muhammad Kazim, who was with Ibrahim, gives a terrible account of the ravages of the plague in Nakhichevan, near which place they had camped.³ In the hope of escaping from the scourge, they then returned to Tabriz; soon after arriving there, Muhammad Kazim's father died very suddenly, but not, apparently, of plague. Ibrahim remained for some time in Tabriz enjoying himself, but he hurriedly departed when the dread disease made its appearance in that city (according to Muhammad Kazim, no less than 47,000 persons died there in two months). After spending some time at Ardabil, Ibrahim returned to Tabriz when it was reported to be free of plague (this was, apparently, early in 1738).⁴

In the spring or early summer of 1738, Ibrahim received news of Rida Quli's military exploits in Turkistan, which awoke in him the spirit of emulation. Speaking of Rida Quli's campaign, he said: "He, in youth, has taken the whole of Ma wara an-Nahr (Transoxiana); we must go and take the kingdom of Daghistan."⁵ Orders were accordingly issued to the tribal leaders in Adharbaijan and the neighbouring districts to assemble at Tabriz with their men. When these troops arrived, Ibrahim went to Qarabagh where contingents from Shirvan, Erivan, Georgia and elsewhere joined him; amongst the Georgians was Taimuraz of Kakheti, who had just returned from Qandahar. Marching via Barda'a, Ibrahim crossed the Araxes and the Kura, and summoned the "Little Usmi"


¹ K.N., p. 310: *az jumi'a-yi ahl-i-kishan*.

² According to Muhammad Kazim (K.N., p. 316), she had an escort of 2,500 Georgian soldiers; this author is, however, very ill-informed in regard to the manner of her betrothal, for which Vakhush't (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 193) should be consulted.

³ K.N., pp. 324 and 325.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 337 and 338.



MARRIAGE OF "ALI QULI KHAN AND THE PRINCESS KETHEWAN

Reproduced from the MS. of the Kitab-i-Nadiri by kind permission of the Institut Vostokovedeniya, Leningrad.

(the chief of the Kakh and Qaniq districts), the "Great Usmi," Ahmad Khan (of the Qaraqaitaq), the Shamkhal (apparently, Surkhai and not Khass Fulad is meant), Surkhai's son Murtada 'Ali, who had inherited his father's turbulent spirit, and other tribal leaders to come to him. With the exception of the "Little Usmi," all refused, and Murtada 'Ali openly revolted.¹

Ibrahim, who was now at the head of 32,000 men, having crossed the Agri Chai, went to Kakh, where he held a conference with his commanders. It was decided to build a strong fort at Kakh in which the heavy baggage was to be left; the bulk of the army would then march westwards to a place called Aq Burj ("White Tower"),² where Shah 'Abbas had built a residence. A further fort was to be constructed at Aq Burj, which would serve as an advanced base for the operations against Jar and Tala.³

At this stage two couriers arrived from Nadir bearing orders for the Merv leaders and troops to be given leave; similar orders were dispatched to other parts of the country. Muhammad Kazim, being a zealous young man, nevertheless proposed remaining on with Ibrahim, who accepted his offer. It was then arranged that the Merv men, some sixty in all, should leave on the next day. That night Muhammad Kazim dreamt that the Lazgis were attacking and defeating the Persians and that he saw Ibrahim's flag "blackened" and the Khan himself, together with his horse, covered with mud and earth. Taking this dream as a bad omen, he went to Ibrahim Khan the next morning, and, without mentioning his dream, said that, as all his companions were returning to their homes, he could not face life without them. Seeing that the youth was distressed, Ibrahim gave him a present and allowed him to go with the others.⁴ Travelling via Tabriz, where his father's body had been temporarily interred, Muhammad Kazim was able to take the corpse with him as far as Mashhad and bury it there.

Ibrahim Khan then proceeded to Aq Burj, where the fort was speedily built and preparations for the attack on Jar and Tala were made. Meanwhile, the Lazgis had had warning of Ibrahim Khan's intentions; besides collecting all the available men in the neighbourhood, they sent urgent appeals for aid to the Lazgis and Qaraqaitaqs in Daghestan, 20,000 of whom rallied to their support. Two Jari Lazgis named Ibrahim Divana and Khalil, who were in command of the combined forces, posted men in the defiles through which the Persians would have to pass. Ibrahim Khan sought to counter this move by sending Shirvani and Georgian troops into the mountains to take these men in the flank or rear. Very

¹ K.N., pp. 339 and 340.

² I have been unable to identify this place, but it was evidently close to Jar.

³ K.N., p. 342.

⁴ K.N., pp. 344 and 345.

heavy fighting ensued, in which the issue was in the balance until a converging movement by the Khurasani *jazayirchis* turned the scale against the mountaineers. The Persians then made a successful raid on the Lazgis' baggage, but an attempt to storm a strong position on a hill-top held by Ibrahim Divana and Khalil was repulsed with heavy loss. Ibrahim Khan wished to deliver a frontal attack in force, but was dissuaded by his commanders, who said that the position was impregnable. A move was, therefore, made to reach the enemy by another route which involved the crossing of a high ridge by a steep path on each side of which was thick forest. Hearing of Ibrahim Khan's intentions, the Lazgi leaders called for volunteers and posted them in ambush on either side of this path. When Ibrahim's forces appeared, the Lazgis held their fire until the Shirvani, Kurdish and Georgian contingents had passed, and then poured in devastating volleys at point blank range upon Ibrahim Khan, his staff and his escort of *jazayirchis*. The Persians, being unable to see their foes, and being taken by surprise, were at a great disadvantage, and suffered very heavy casualties. Ibrahim Divana, who was with the Lazgi volunteers, recognised Ibrahim Khan and fired at him, wounding him in the head; the Persian standard bearer was shot dead, as was also Oghur Khan, the Governor of Ganja, when pleading with Ibrahim to hasten on and escape from the ambushade. Seeing that the Persians were in confusion, Ibrahim Divana and Khalil and their men charged. Ibrahim Khan was struck by another bullet which shattered his arm; almost immediately after, Ibrahim Divana fired at him once more, killing him almost instantly. Desperate hand to hand fighting followed, and but few of those who had been with Ibrahim were able to escape and take the news to the rest of the army.¹ On the death of Ibrahim Khan, the command devolved upon Muhammad Khan Afshar, a relative of Nadir, who succeeded, but not without difficulty, in reaching the Araxes; Taimuraz, having been with his Georgians, was one of the survivors.²

Although Ibrahim's body was at first treated with respect and was placed in a coffin, it was afterwards taken out by some Jari Lazgis, who suspended it from a tree and burnt it.³ When it is realised how the Lazgis

¹ The above description of Ibrahim Khan's death is a condensed translation of Muhammad Kazim's version of the affair (*K.N.*, pp. 351-353); although he does not state the source of his information, his account is so vivid and detailed as to leave little or no doubt as to its accuracy. The other authorities give very meagre information; Sekhnia Chkheidze states (*H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 53) that Ibrahim left Tabriz in 1738, summoned the Kartlians to meet him at Kakh, and then, when they had done so, devastated the Jar and Tala district. While Ibrahim and his army were on their way back, the Lazgis attacked and routed them, killing Ibrahim, Oghoudi (Oghur) Khan and many others.

² Sekhnia Chkheidze, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 53.

³ *K.N.*, pp. 355-357. N. F. Dubrovin, in his *Istoriya voyny i vladichestva Russkikh na Kavkaze* (Vol. I, p. 582), mentions a tradition current in that part of the country to the effect that a *Asuregan* is to be found there which contains the remains of Ibrahim Khan, who was burnt by the people of Jaro-Bielokan.

treated his brother's body, Nadir's fierce hatred of these people and his strong desire for revenge can be more readily understood.

Ibrahim Khan, although not lacking in bravery, had none of his brother's genius ; as a commander, he was only mediocre. Judged by the standards of those times, he was not wantonly cruel, though at times unjust. His behaviour towards Muhammad Kazim shows that he was kind to his subordinates. On the other hand, he was, like Taqi Khan Shirazi, avaricious and fond of receiving presents ; once, when the Governor of Shirvan sent him gifts consisting of 100 tomans in cash, several horses and some fine wearing apparel, and promised to send a more considerable present before long, Ibrahim immediately dispatched a messenger to collect this further gift, much to the Governor's consternation.¹

It has not been possible to establish the exact date of Ibrahim's death ; according to Muhammad Kazim,² the tragedy occurred in the month of Sha'ban, 1151 . . (the last figure is omitted, but it must be intended for 1151). This would mean that his death took place between the 14th November and the 12th December, 1738, which, even if it happened at the beginning of Sha'ban, seems to leave but little time for the news to have reached Nadir at Peshawar early in the following January. It therefore appears probable that Ibrahim was killed some time in October.

¹ *K.N.*, p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, p. 353. The news also reached Gumbroon in January, 1739.

CHAPTER XVII

THE VICEROYALTY OF RIDA QULI MIRZA

THE circumstances under which Rida Quli Mirza received his appointment as Viceroy and the measures which he took to ward off the threatened attack by Ilbars on Khurasan have already been described in Chapter XVI.

After it had been established beyond doubt that Ilbars and his heterogeneous horde had abandoned their idea of invading Khurasan and that they were returning to Khwarizm, Rida Quli left Abivard for Mashhad and dispatched messengers to his father with the news.

Making Mashhad the seat of his government, the prince soon began to show signs that much of his father's advice to him had fallen upon deaf ears. In considering Rida Quli's behaviour during the period of his viceroyalty, it is important to bear the following facts in mind. In the first place, he was responsible to no one save his father, who was many hundreds of miles on the further side of the Hindu Kush. Nadir, it is said, had, when making Rida Quli Viceroy, arranged that his brother Ibrahim should have some measure of control over him,¹ but Ibrahim, as the Shah and his son were soon to learn, was already dead when this arrangement was made. Secondly, the young prince was, as has been seen, impulsive and at times injudicious. Lastly, there were long periods when he was completely without authentic news of his father; the longest of these periods lasted, it is said,² for no less than ten months, namely, from May, 1739, until March, 1740, but this seems scarcely credible.

During the first three months of his residence in Mashhad, Rida Quli formed a special corps, 12,000 strong, of Khurasani *jazayirchis*, whom he equipped with gorgeous uniforms of cloth of gold and with arms inlaid with gold and silver: all these men, as Muhammad Kazim quaintly but expressively put it, were "adorned like a Chinese picture-gallery."³

The vice-regal court was by no means free of mischief-makers and place-seekers who, by means of flattery, sought to curry favour with the prince

¹ This statement is made on the authority of V. Bratishchev who at that time was serving as interpreter to Kalushkin, the Russian Resident; see his *Nachricht von denen Traurigen Begebenheiten, die sich zwischen dem Persischen Schachs Nadir und dessen Aeltesten Sohne Reza-Kuli-Mirza in den Jahren 1741 und 1742 zugetragen haben*, in G. F. Müller's *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte* (St. Petersburg, 1763), Vol. VIII, p. 465.

² *R.N.*, p. 482.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 284; the Persian wording is: *chun zurat-ahana-yi-Chin arasta*. Muhammad Kazim had just arrived at Mashhad and entered the prince's service, so his statements regarding Rida Quli's actions at this time may be relied upon.

and so achieve their ends. Rida Quli was too inexperienced to realise that sound advice could not be expected from such men, and when they suggested to him that the governors whom his father had appointed might revolt if they were without news of him for long, he lent too ready an ear to them. He thereupon dismissed a number of these officials and replaced them with his own nominees.¹ In addition, he became most arbitrary and autocratic, and frequently inflicted the death penalty for trivial offences.² Hanway,³ in writing of the prince's behaviour at this time, said that he :

"... by practising all the acts of cruelty and extortion, soon incurred the hatred of the people. In order to cover his rapacious avarice, he took the specious name of a merchant."

Hanway then proceeded to mention Rida Quli's monopoly of the silk trade. Elton and Graeme⁴ (who, as will be related in Appendix I, arrived in Gilan in June, 1739, with a trial consignment of goods belonging to certain members of the Russia Company) stated that Rida Quli had, by his :

"Kupecheens⁵ become, in a manner, the sole Merchant or Trader in all Persia, as none but the Schah's Kupecheens could buy any Goods imported. And as to Raw Silk, not only the Product of the Province of Gilan, but of all the other Provinces that produce Silk, was wholly engrossed by the Schah. Hence we, amongst the rest, were obliged to tender our Goods to the Schah's Kupecheen."

Elton and Graeme, however, subsequently state that it was not Rida Quli, but a merchant of Isfahan (whom he had made his Treasurer) who "engrossed" to himself all the European imports.⁶ Notwithstanding these restrictions upon trade, the prince, in response to a petition from Elton and Graeme, gave them considerable trading privileges in August, 1739.⁷ They expressly state :

"that he (Rida Quli) is ready to redress Grievances, and encourage trade, we could produce several Instances; witness the Decree . . . he so readily granted us, and that, it is said, he lately granted to the Armenians, which impowers them to carry their Goods to any Market in Persia, without regard to the Schah's Kupecheens, that it is to be hoped the Treasurer's Projects are near to an end."⁸

Further, it is to be noted that this trading monopoly, if it existed at all in

¹ K.N., p. 483.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

³ *Travels*, Vol. IV, p. 180.

⁴ See Elton and Graeme's *A Journey through Russia into Persia by Two English Gentlemen who went in the year 1739 from Petersburg, in order to make a Discovery how the Trade from Great Britain might be carried on from Astracan over the Caspian*, London, 1742, pp. 26 and 27.

⁵ "Kupecheen" is a corruption of the Russian word *Kupchina* meaning "merchant".

⁶ Elton and Graeme, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

the centre and south of the country, did not conflict with the trading privileges of the East India Company.

Although he was, at times, both cruel and unjust, Rida Quli could on occasion show that he had some thought for the interests and welfare of the people. When, some time in 1739, Taqi Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, ordered the *Kalantar* (mayor) of Kirman to collect and forward to him 1,500 tomans in respect of taxes,¹ the official made representations to Rida Quli, with the result that the Prince gave instructions for the order to be cancelled. Meanwhile, however, the Beglarbegi had forced the *Kalantar* to raise the money; the luckless official, being unable to obtain more than a fraction of the amount from the populace, had to borrow the balance from the representatives of the English and Dutch companies at Kirman. The *Kalantar* thereupon made further representations to Rida Quli, who immediately ordered the Beglarbegi to refund the money, out of which the Europeans were to be repaid all that they had advanced.²

This was not the only occasion on which Rida Quli intervened to annul some high-handed action by Taqi Khan. In the autumn of 1738 the Beglarbegi performed some unspecified action to the detriment of the East India Company. The Gombroon Agent referred the matter to the President at Bombay, who thereupon wrote to Nadir complaining of the Beglarbegi's conduct. This letter reached Persia during the Shah's absence, and was dealt with by Rida Quli. The prince:

"in answer thereto wrote the Agent that He had signified our Complaint to the Beglerbeggy who would do Us justice: they (i.e., the Agent and Council at Gombroon) are well informed the Beglerbeggy is much exasperated at this Letter."³

In October, 1739, Taqi Khan's son was at Isfahan, on his way to Rida Quli's court. It is said that the prince, at the instigation of some of the Beglarbegi's enemies, had the son deprived of his equipage, horses and arms. There can be no doubt that Rida Quli and Taqi Khan greatly disliked one another, and it is possible that the Beglarbegi may later have used his influence with Nadir to the young prince's detriment.

The outstanding event during Rida Quli's tenure of the office of Viceroy

¹ Volume X of the *Bombay Government Public Consultations* quotes a letter from Gombroon of the 20th March, 1739, which states that the Beglarbegi had just informed the Agent of his intention to raise 20,000 tomans, to reimburse himself for the expenses to which he had been put in connection with the Muscat expedition.

² The particulars given above are taken from the *Bombay Government Public Consultations*, Vol. XI, 1740, the entry in which is based on a letter from Gombroon of the 28th February, 1740. The *Gombroon Diary* gives no details of this incident, but makes (on the 23rd February, 1740) the following comment upon Rida Quli's action: "It is no unpleasant Prospect of what his future Reigu may be, to find this Prince interest himself so much in favour of his Subjects."

³ *Bombay Government Public Consultations*, Vol. X, 1739.

was the execution of the luckless ex-Shah Tahmasp and his family. This cruel act, for which the prince must be held directly responsible, is undoubtedly a great stain upon his character.

As early as the spring of 1739 it was reported in Persia that disaster had befallen the army in India and that the Shah himself had perished,¹ and other rumours to the same effect were afterwards repeatedly in circulation; in the absence, often for long periods, of reliable news, these reports were widely believed.² A particularly persistent report of Nadir's death reached Persia late in 1739. Several months had already elapsed since reliable news of Nadir had been received, and Muḥammad Ḥusain Khan, of the Yokharibash Qajars of Astarabad, who was in the prince's service, urged him, as a precautionary measure, to put the ex-Shah Tahmasp and his two sons to death, on the grounds that, if the reports of Nadir's death were confirmed, there would probably be a rising at Sabzavar in favour of the imprisoned Šafavis; such a rising, he maintained, might spread, and so have most dangerous consequences for him. Some other leaders like Raḥim Sultān of Merv supported Muḥammad Ḥusain Khan's recommendation, and the prince, after deliberating for two days, finally gave his assent. Muḥammad Ḥusain Khan then set out for Sabzavar to give effect to this decision. When he arrived at the building where the ex-Shah and his family were confined, Tahmasp, it is said, guessed what his intentions were, and entered his harem where cries and lamentations soon filled the air. Muḥammad Ḥusain thereupon forced his way into the harem, seized Tahmasp and strangled him with a piece of rope that he had brought. Tahmasp's son 'Abbas, who was then a boy of eight, flung himself on the corpse in a paroxysm of grief, whereupon the execrable Qajar killed him too, and then flung the younger son Isma'il into a well. Someone rescued Isma'il from the well, but he, instead of attempting to escape, rushed to where his father lay dead, and, as his brother 'Abbas had done, cast himself weeping upon Tahmasp's inanimate body. The heartless murderer then seized the boy and cut off his head.³ There is

¹ When this rumour reached Isfahan, Otter's Persian friends, fearing the outbreak of disturbances, advised him to leave the country. Otter acted on their advice, and left Isfahan for Baghdad on the 12th/23rd April, 1739 (Vol. II, p. 2). Bratishchev states (*op. cit.*, p. 470) that the Indians in Persia deliberately disseminated false news.

² Bratishchev, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

³ The above is an abridgement of Muḥammad Kazim's version of the tragedy (see the *K.N.*, pp. 484-488). His account is by far the fullest that is on record and it is, apparently, the most accurate (as the author was at Mashhad at that time, in close contact with the prince, he must have been in a position to know the facts). As regards the ex-Shah 'Abbas, no credence can be attached to the story related by Muḥammad Mahdi ibn Muḥammad Rida, of Isfahan, in his *Nisfi-jahan fi ta'rikh-i-Isfahan* (Browne OR. MS. 1.3, in the Cambridge University Library), foll. 194 (a)-199 (b), to the effect that he did not perish on that occasion, but was hidden for twelve years in a place of safety; he was then, according to this author, taken to Isfahan where he made himself known to his aunts (Tahmasp's sisters), establishing his identity by means of a mole on his shoulder.

said to have been much grief in Sabzavar at these dreadful events ; the death of Isma'il¹ was particularly regretted as he was a handsome boy and had made himself very popular with the people. The bodies of the victims were then taken to Mashhad for burial.

Riḍa Quli appears to have been completely reassured by the death of Tahmasp and his sons, and, being encouraged by the flatterers around him, conceived the design of setting himself up as Shah. However, this bubble was speedily pricked, for messengers suddenly arrived from Delhi with news of Nadir's victories and the occupation of the Indian capital.²

Muḥammad Kaẓim states that Riḍa Quli, on hearing this news, repented of his unseemly conduct, and that he, having given orders for the streets and bazaars of Mashhad to be decorated and illuminated, spent several days in feasting and enjoyment.³ The same authority further relates that Faṭima Sulṭān Begum, Riḍa Quli's wife, at first knew nothing of the death of her brother and nephews. During the rejoicings she noticed that her old nurse was weeping ; on questioning her as to the reason for her tears, she learnt the truth. She was so grief-stricken that she took her own life either by hanging herself or by poison which was contained in one of her rings. When Riḍa Quli learnt of his wife's suicide, he was overcome with grief and buried her by the side of her brother in the shrine of the Imam Riḍa⁴ ; a few days later, he went to Tehran, where he held his Nau Ruz assembly. It therefore seems probable that the murder of Tahmasp and his two sons took place towards the end of February, 1740.⁵

Previous to the holding of the assembly, the prince, doubtless on receipt of instructions from his father, issued a proclamation at Iṣfahan (and probably at every other place of importance)⁶ :

"whereby Every body is required to bring into the King's Mints all Silver Coins that were formerly Current, such as abassees, mamoodies and nadirrees and to receive in lieu of them rupees being of the same value with those he (Nadir) Stamped in India and which are to pass for ten shahees Silver each."

¹ Tahmasp's son Isma'il is not to be confused with the puppet Shah Isma'il III whom the Bakhtiari chief 'Ali Mardan Khan raised to the throne some twelve years later. Isma'il III, who was only eight years old when he was made Shah, was a great-grandson of Shah Sulṭān Husain through the female line (see the *Fars-Nama*, p. 205).

² *E.N.*, p. 489. It is astonishing that this news should have taken so long to reach Mashhad.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 492-495. Muḥammad Kaẓim's account of the death of Faṭima Begum seems more likely to be true than the fantastic story told by Bratishchev (*op. cit.*, p. 468), namely, that when she heard of her brother's murder, she reproached Riḍa Quli so vehemently that he "cut short the stream of her words with his sword" (Bratishchev quotes what purports to be the actual words, though they were uttered—if at all—in the privacy of the harem!).

⁵ The first mention of the tragedy by the Gombroon Agent was in a letter to London dated the 3rd/14th June, 1740.

⁶ *Gombroon Diary*, 5th/16th February, 1740 (on the authority of a letter from Joseph Hermet, the Company's "linguist" at Iṣfahan).

The Gombroon Agent expressed the view that this change would have a good effect upon trade, if the exchange continued to fall there.¹ He went on to say that he had not yet heard of any alteration in the gold coin, "nor do we find any of the other become so plenty (*sic*) as to be in every Body's hands."

At Isfahan and elsewhere exaggerated reports were circulating as to the prince's object in holding the assembly, it being said that² :

"he had summoned all the Cauns and Governors of Persia to attend him (at Tehran) as Nadir at Chulamagon (Chul-i-Mughan) and was then by order of his Father to take upon himself the Absolute Sovereignty as Monarch of Persia. . . ."³

However, it was afterwards ascertained that Rida Quli's object was merely to go through the annual accounts.

In the spring of 1740, it was believed in Basra that Ahmad Pasha had hopes of securing the throne of Persia in the event of the oft-repeated rumours of Nadir's death proving to be well-founded.⁴ It is not known whether there was any real basis for this belief, but, as Ahmad Pasha was a very ambitious man and had conquered much of western Persia in the troubled period following the Afghan invasion, he may well have thought that he could repeat his exploits in the disturbances that would be almost certain to follow Nadir's death, and form a kingdom for himself covering the Persian provinces of Kirmanshah, Ardalan and Hamadan, as well as the two Turkish *vilayets* of Baghdad and Basra.

Although Nadir sent orders more than once to Rida Quli to attend his court at Herat (where he was due to arrive early in June, 1740), the prince deferred obeying the summons for some time, on the grounds that affairs of state at Tehran still necessitated his presence there; it is difficult to determine whether this was a genuine excuse or whether, as has been suggested,⁵ it was merely a pretext to postpone the meeting with his redoubtable parent. When Rida Quli at length set out from Tehran, he was injudicious enough to travel in great style, accompanied by his "Chinese picture-gallery" corps; moreover, he had delayed leaving Tehran for so long that he was too late to meet Nadir at Herat, and had to cut across his father's line of march from Herat to Maruchaq. The meeting took place at Qara Tappā, in Badghis, on the 26th June, 1740.⁶

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 5th/16th February, 1740: (on the authority of the letter from Joseph Hermet, referred to in Note 6 on page 178).

² *Ibid.*, 23rd December, 1739/3rd January, 1740.

³ *Ibid.*, 1st/12th April, 1740 (on the authority of a letter from Joseph Hermet).

⁴ Letter from Thomas Dorrill, the Company's Resident at Basra, to London, dated the 5th/16th March, 1740.

⁵ Bratishchev, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

⁶ *K.N.*, p. 510: Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 217) gives the date (1st Rabi' II) and place of the meeting, and mentions that Nadir reviewed his son's troops, but provides no further details. Bratishchev (*op. cit.*, p. 478) states that Nadir received his son "more with the severity (*Ernsthaftigkeit*) of a powerful sovereign than with the kindness of a father."

Muhammad Kazim, who had accompanied the Shah from Herat, states that he was mounted on an elephant and that Rida Quli and his officers dismounted when they had come within fifty paces of him. Nadir, he said, then reviewed the prince's bodyguard and was amazed at their gorgeous uniforms and accoutrements, but he hid his astonishment and greeted his son kindly. He felt, nevertheless, that there must be some truth in the reports that he had received of the prince's behaviour during his absence in India and of his designs on the throne, and, after summoning his commanders, gave the order for his son's magnificent corps to be disbanded immediately; in half an hour Rida Quli, instead of being at the head of 12,000 men, had no more than thirty or forty attendants.¹

The prince was much upset at the disbandment of his cherished corps. In the late afternoon Nadir summoned him to his tent, questioned him regarding his affairs and strove to console and comfort him, but he then went on to say:

"I was troubled in mind at hearing of the raising of this army. Since the people of Persia are unable to see two royal courts, we have made one, and this government, this army and this pomp and magnificence are not for thee. Arrange thy mode of life . . . so that no one can say ill of thee."

Nadir then expressed great annoyance at the killing of Shah Tahmasp. Afterwards, he said to his commanders and nobles:

"My mind has been troubled by my son's killing of Shah Tahmasp and for this reason I have dismissed him from the government (*ayalat*) of Persia."²

After appointing Nasrullah as Viceroy in place of Rida Quli, he sent the former, together with Imam Quli and his harem, to Mashhad, but kept Rida Quli with him on the march to Turkistan,³ as will be related in Chapter XIX.

Of the lot of the common people and peasantry during this period there is not a great deal on record, but what there is makes pathetic reading. In the south the exactions of Taqi Khan occasioned much misery, and many of the young recruits enrolled or rather impressed for the 'Oman expedition (see the ensuing chapter) never saw their homes again. As regards the centre and west, there is Otter's interesting account of his journey from Isfahan to Baghdad via Kangavar and Kirman-shah in April and May, 1739. Otter draws a gloomy picture of the condition of the peasantry; their state had been by no means enviable when he had travelled to Isfahan with 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan in 1737, but, when

¹ *K.N.*, p. 511.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Bayan*, fol. 38 (b).

returning to Baghdad two years later, he found that it had deteriorated a good deal more.¹

On the 12th/23rd March, 1740, the Gombroon Agent referred in his *Diary* to the :

"Ease enjoyed by the People from the Suspension of Taxes by Shaw Nadir and the Flattering Expectations they are in of the Young King's Government from several Acts of Justice he has shewn."

The people were soon, alas ! to be disappointed, insofar as the taxes were concerned ; as for Rida Quli, his period of office was then drawing to a close.

¹ Otter, Vol. II, pp. 13 and 14.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FIRST 'OMAN CAMPAIGN AND OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1737-1740.

THE inception and early exploits of the Persian navy have been described in Chapters VII, VIII and X. The navy, after failing to take Basra, had made atonement by capturing Bahrain, and Latif Khan, its ambitious commander, was anxious to show that, if given the opportunity, it could accomplish a great deal more. The hoped-for chance was not long in arising, for some time in 1736, the Imam Saif ibn Sulṭān of 'Oman, having provoked a rebellion of his subjects by reason of his licentious ways, was compelled to appeal to Nadir for aid.¹ Latif Khan, on hearing of this development, persuaded Nadir to take advantage of the situation in 'Oman to send a combined naval and military expedition, ostensibly to assist the Imam, but in reality to conquer his country.² Nadir could have needed but little inducement to agree, for, with Muscat and the whole of the 'Oman coast in his hands, in addition to Bahrain, the establishment of Persian naval supremacy in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 'Oman would be an easy matter.

On the 14th March, 1737, the Persian fleet, consisting of four ships (two of which had been purchased from the English), two "grabs" and some smaller craft, reached Gombroon from Bushire under the command of Latif Khan "who hoists his flag, being a white ground with a red Persian Sword in the middle."³ Having embarked 5,000 men and 1,500 horses, the fleet sailed, on the 12th April, for Khor Fakkan, a deep bay with a safe anchorage on the 'Oman coast 74 miles south of Ras Musandam; it arrived at Khor Fakkan four days later.⁴ The Admiral, after landing some of his troops there, sailed back northwards, rounded Ras Musandam, and landed the remainder of the men at Julfar (Rasu'l-Khaima), where he met the Imam. In company with Saif ibn Sulṭān, Latif Khan marched inland and at Falju's-Samini defeated Bal'arab ibn Himyar al-Ya'riba, who, although a relative of Saif, was the leader of the rebels.⁵ The Persians and the Imam's adherents then occupied the towns of al-Jauf

¹ See Badger's translation of Saif ibn Raziq's *History of the Imāms and Seyyids of 'Omān*, p. 13.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 2nd/13th February, 1738.

³ Letter from the Gombroon Agent and Council to London, dated 6th/17th May, 1737 (the Persian flag had not changed during the preceding sixty years, for Dr. Fryer described it as being "A Bloody Sword with a double Point, in a white Field"; see his *Travels into Persia*, London, 1698, p. 356.)

⁴ C. Guillain's *Documents sur l'Histoire, la Géographie, et le Commerce de l'Afrique Orientale*, (Paris, 1856), Vol. I, p. 529.

⁵ Guillain, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 529.

and 'Ibra, but at the latter place dissension broke out between Saif and Latif Khan because the Persians had begun to act as if they were already masters of the whole country. The alliance between the Imam and the Persians was therefore broken off, and Latif Khan and his men returned to Julfar.¹

No further steps to establish control over 'Oman were made during the summer and autumn of 1737, but in November Taqi Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, received peremptory orders from Nadir to prosecute the campaign.

In January, 1738, the Beglarbegi and Latif Khan, after commandeering all the English and Dutch trankeys at Gombroon, sailed for Julfar with 6,000 men. Taqi Khan embarked with considerable misgivings, and quarrelled with Latif Khan because the latter had persuaded Nadir to undertake the venture. However, the Beglarbegi and the Admiral smoothed over their differences, and joined forces with Saif ibn Sulṭān, whose lack of success against his rebellious subjects had forced him once more to seek Persian aid. The combined armies again defeated Bal'arab ibn Himyar, and after occupying the towns of Bahla and Nazwa,² advanced to Muscat. The Persians occupied the town without difficulty, but could not secure possession of the eastern and western forts,³ although they besieged them for five weeks. The Imam quarrelled with Taqi Khan at Muscat, doubtless because of the Persian attempt to seize these forts. Saif ibn Sulṭān then withdrew with his fleet and troops and made terms with Bal'arab, who promised to assist him against the Persians.

Taqi Khan, being unable to take the Muscat forts, went to Barka at the end of May, but likewise failed to obtain possession of the forts there. At Barka dissensions once more broke out between Taqi Khan and Latif Khan, with the result that the former poisoned the Admiral.⁴ Thus perished Nadir's most promising naval commander, who seemed to have inherited much of the seafaring spirit of the old Persian navigators of Siraf.

Taqi Khan and his men were then, it appears, reduced to great straits, and, after an unsuccessful attempt to seize the town of Ṣoḥar, they were forced to take to their ships and sail to Julfar. In the meantime, disaster had befallen the Persian garrison at Bahla.

The Beglarbegi, having no Latif Khan to check him, then proceeded to treat the Arab seamen (most of whom were Huwalas) in niggardly fashion; by failing to pay them and give them adequate rations, he brought on a serious mutiny which resulted in the Persians losing for a time the

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 21st July/1st August, 1737.

² Saif ibn Raziq, *op. cit.*, p. 142, Guillaín, Vol. I, p. 529, *Gombroon Diary*, 8th/19th April, 1738.

³ These forts were known respectively as al-Jalāl and Marāni; they had been built by the Portuguese.

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 26th June/7th July, 1738.

command of the Gulf. The mutineers and their allies, the Huwala and 'Omani Arabs, raided Basidu and then attacked Bahrain, where they besieged the garrison, and their control of the sea was such that provisions for the troops at Julfar had for a time to be sent in English vessels.

The Arabs, however, were never able to agree for long among themselves, and a feud which broke out between two factions towards the close of 1738 enabled the Persians to recover three ships, a brigantine, a couple of "grabs" and several trankeys. At the end of January, 1739, a naval action took place in the course of which the Arab admiral was blown up; the mutineers and rebels thereupon became dispirited and broke off the engagement.¹

In March the Beglarbegi arrived at Gombroon "with positive orders to level Muscatt to the ground,"² but the outbreak of a revolt in the Kuhgilu province called him away before he could take any action in 'Oman. After Taqi Khan had subdued the Kuhgilu rebels, he received, in October or early in November, the orders to proceed to Sind which Nadir had dispatched when delayed at the Chenab.³

Having obtained the loan of a large Dutch vessel and purchased stores from the English, Taqi Khan left Gombroon on the 3rd December for Sind by land via Makran, at the head of 2,000 cavalry. The fleet, which had taken on board several thousand Persian troops, sailed the same day.⁴ A rendezvous was made at Gwadar, whence Taqi Khan marched inland to Kesh, where, some time in February, 1740, he was heavily defeated by the Baluch tribes of Makran, led by Malik Dinar.⁵ Provisions ran short both on shore and in the fleet, with the result that many men died of starvation. On the 5th/16th April, Taqi Khan returned to Gombroon from his disastrous expedition "wherein the greatest want of Conduct imaginable has appeared."⁶ Two days later, the Admiral, Mir 'Ali Khan, arrived, looking "greatly dejected"; he reported many deaths owing to lack of water and food. Towards the end of April, Taqi Khan received a curt summons from Nadir to proceed to Nadirabad, where he was shortly to arrive. By the 1st/12th May the whole fleet had assembled again at Gombroon, but it was reported to be "unfit for any Enterprise," and fears were even entertained of an attack by the Arabs.⁷

As for Taqi Khan, he was, on arrival at the court, severely reprimanded and deprived for some time of his post.

The history of the second 'Oman campaign and subsequent operations in the Persian Gulf will be given in Chapter XXI.

¹ Letter from Gombroon to London, dated 31st March/11th April, 1739.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 19th/30th November, 1739. See also Otter, Vol. II, pp. 87 and 88.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 214.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 5th/16th April, 1740.

⁶ See p. 156 above.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1st/12th May, 1740.

CHAPTER XIX

THE TURKISTAN EXPEDITION

NADIR, as already related, is said to have decided, when leaving Kabul for Delhi, that he would invade Turkistan on his return from India. In arriving at this decision, he was actuated partly by his desire to punish Ilbars of Khwarizm for his insolence and partly by sheer love of conquest ; there is no evidence to show that he had already conceived the idea (which he afterwards held) of extending his empire far to the east and north-east, at the expense not only of the Central Asian potentates like Ilbars, Abu'l-Faiḍ and the Khans of Tashkend and Khojend, but also of the Chinese Empire. If he had any such scheme in mind, he preferred to defer its execution until he had avenged his brother's death by punishing the Lazgis and had, in the second place, overwhelmed the Ottoman Turks. It therefore seems that Nadir's objective in Turkistan was only a limited one on this occasion.

As regards Ilbars, there was quite a long score to settle. Early in 1735, whilst Nadir was engaged in his task of expelling the Turks from Adhar-baijan, Ilbars had sent two bodies of Yamut Turkomans to raid and pillage the north-west of Khurasan. Though the local Kurds repulsed the marauders with heavy loss, Nadir did not forget the incident.¹ Then, some three years later, came Ilbars's large-scale expedition against Khurasan during the Shah's absence in India ; this expedition, as has been seen, ended in a fiasco, but the fact that Ilbars had threatened to invade Persia—in particular, Nadir's own province of Khurasan—was more than sufficient to made the Shah determined to seek revenge.

There was not, on the other hand, any real cause for complaint against Abu'l-Faiḍ of Bukhara, who had surely been within his rights in opposing Riḍa Quli and Tahmasp Khan Jalayir when they made their unauthorised attack upon his realm. Moreover, when he had heard of the preparations that were being made for Nadir's Turkistan campaign, he had sent a humble message to the Shah offering to submit and drawing attention to his ancient lineage ; he was, he said, unable to offer resistance, and trusted that Nadir would be his guest.²

As was stated at the close of Chapter XV, Nadir reached Nadirabad on the 4th May, 1740. During his brief stay of eight days at that place, he instructed 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan, the Beglarbegi of the province, to

¹ *T.N.*, p. 135.

² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

proceed at the beginning of the autumn to Shirvan, in order to exact retribution from the Lazgis for the killing of Ibrahim Khan. The Abdali chief was to advance against the Lazgis as soon as the winter snows on the mountains blocked their way of escape into Avaria. Nadir's brother-in-law, Fath 'Ali Khan and 15,000 men of the Khurasan army were to proceed with 'Abdu'l-Ghani to Shirvan, where they were to co-operate with the military and civil authorities of Adharbaijan and Georgia in the campaign.¹

Soon after leaving Nadirabad, the Shah issued orders to the governors, deputy governors, mayors and elders of Khurasan to meet him in Herat, where he welcomed them on his arrival on the 10th June. Amongst these dignitaries was Kalb 'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Merv Shahijan, to whose retinue Muḥammad Kaẓim had become attached.²

Nadir gave orders for his great tent to be erected in Herat. Muḥammad Kaẓim relates that when this tent was being pitched, a sudden gust of wind blew it down, despite the efforts of the several thousand men whose task it was to erect it; on the following day the same thing occurred again.³ When, at length, the tent was pitched, the peacock throne and other treasures from India were displayed in it, and the public of Herat, the troops and any travellers passing through the city were allowed to enter and examine them.⁴

A few days after Nadir's arrival, his nephew 'Ali Quli and his grandson Shahrukh (who was then aged six) reached Herat. On receiving 'Ali Quli, Nadir condoled with him over the loss of his father and promised that he would go to Daghistān and avenge his death as soon as he returned from Turkistān.⁵ In honour of Shahrukh, Nadir had money struck in the Herat mint in his name, just as, 300 years earlier, coins had been struck there bearing that of his namesake, the third son of Timur.

After a halt of fifteen days in Herat, Nadir set out on his march to Turkistān; after meeting his son Riḍa Quli, at Qara Tāppā, as related in Chapter XVII, he proceeded in company with him to Balkh via Maruchaq,⁶ Chachaktu and Andkhud. When only a few stages out from Herat, the Shah had a fort constructed; on someone inquiring as to the

¹ *T.N.*, p. 216.

² *K.N.*, p. 498.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 499 and 500.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 505 and 506; see also the *T.N.*, p. 216 and the *Bayan*, foll. 37 (a)-38 (b). 'Abdu'l-Karim gives a very detailed description of this tent, which was most lavishly ornamented with the jewels and pearls brought from Delhi. At Nadir's orders, an imitation of the peacock throne was made (*T.N.*, p. 216).

⁵ *K.N.*, p. 508.

⁶ George Thompson, a factor of the Russia Company, who, with a colleague named Reynold Hogg, visited Khiva in the winter of 1740/1, passed through Maruchaq in September of the latter year; he described it as "A very strong place, surrounded by a double wall, and governed by a khan; it has a garrison of 500 men, and is defended by several pieces of cannon." (*Hanway*, Vol. I, p. 354).

reason why this fort was being built when all Persia, Afghanistan and India were in his power, he replied: "I do this in case an enemy should come . . . an enemy from within is more dangerous than one from without."¹

In accordance with the orders which he had received from India, the officer in command of the garrison at Balkh had had 1,100 boats, each from two to three thousand maunds ($5\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{1}{2}$ tons burden), built on the banks of the Oxus by the Indian carpenters and shipwrights whom Nadir had sent out for this purpose.² When the royal army reached the banks of the Oxus at a point opposite the small town of Kilif, this flotilla was waiting in readiness, and the stores and corn, as well as the cannon, were placed on board. Part of the army was ferried across the Oxus to Kilif, and, when the main body began to march downstream along the left bank, this detachment kept pace with it on the further side. The army reached Kerki on the 27th Jumadi I (20th August, 1740) and arrived at Charjui ten days later.³ After sending 12,000 *jazayirchis* across the river on rafts and in boats, Nadir had a strong bridge of boats constructed, over which the rest of the army and the baggage animals crossed. Strong forts were then constructed at each end of this bridge.⁴

When Abu'l-Faïd of Bukhara learnt that Nadir and his army had reached the banks of the Oxus, he became terror-stricken and sent Muḥammad Raḥim Bi, the Ḥakim Ataliq, to do homage to the conqueror on his behalf; if, stated the envoy, the Shah would deign to go as far as Qarakul, Abu'l-Faïd would be his host and would conclude a treaty of union with him. Nadir listened to these words with seeming pleasure, but, when the Ḥakim Ataliq had concluded, he remarked: "The essence of peace is that the King-with-the-pomp-of-Afrasiab (Abu'l-Faïd) should come here to my court."⁵

When the Ḥakim Ataliq returned to Abu'l-Faïd and delivered this message, the king left Bukhara to meet Nadir, but went back to the city on hearing that many thousands of tribesmen from the districts of Miyan Kal, Aq Yalu, Khojend, Andijan, Qungrat and elsewhere, being desirous of avenging those of their countrymen who had died when fighting against Riḍa Quli Mirza, were coming to his assistance. When the tribal leaders arrived, they urged Abu'l-Faïd not to submit to Nadir, but to resist him; although the prudent Ḥakim Ataliq advised against this course, the king resolved to adopt it. Accordingly, Abu'l-Faïd and his allies marched two stages from Bukhara, and awaited the arrival of the Persian forces there.⁶

After waiting for two days in vain for a message from the Ataliq, Nadir sent out scouts to ascertain what was happening; when these men re-

¹ K.N., p. 509.

² K.N., p. 514.

³ T.N., p. 217.

⁴ Ibid., p. 515.

⁵ Ibid., p. 218.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 516 and 517.

turned with the news that Abu'l-Faiḍ had received large reinforcements and was bent on war, he made immediate preparations for battle. On the following day the battle began. The Ōzbek forces charged, but recoiled in alarm when the Persian cannon and *zaphuraks* opened fire on them, as many of them had never heard or seen artillery before. They rallied, however, and charged repeatedly. On Nadir making a vigorous counter-attack, the chief of the Aq Yalu became alarmed and fled from the field with his men. His defection disheartened Abu'l-Faiḍ, who thereupon retreated to his capital; large numbers of Ōzbeks fell in the battle and many more were killed and wounded during the retreat from the battlefield.¹

Bitterly regretting that he had not followed the wise Hakim Ataliq's advice, Abu'l-Faiḍ summoned him to his presence and bade him go once more to Nadir and endeavour to placate him. The Hakim Ataliq succeeded in his mission, and Abu'l-Faiḍ, just as Muḥammad Shah had done after Karnal, came to Nadir at Qarakul to make his submission. Nadir is said to have treated Abu'l-Faiḍ kindly and to have made him a number of valuable gifts. Nevertheless, Nadir behaved as he had done in India, and, on reaching Bukhara, had the *khutba* read, and coins struck, in his name. The king and the people of Bukhara were made to provide daily rations for the Persian troops, but these, on the other hand, were not allowed to pillage or otherwise molest the populace; at Nadir's orders, bodies of *nasaqchis* patrolled the city and neighbourhood to see that these instructions were obeyed.² It is said that Nadir, having become possessed of the wealth of India, looked with contempt upon the paltry possessions of the Bukharans.³

The whole of Transoxiana to the east and north-east of Bukhara to Samargand and beyond was now in Nadir's hands. At the suggestion of the Hakim Ataliq, he sent his brother-in-law, Luṭf 'Alī Khan, with 2,000 men to Samargand district to subdue the Yuz tribe, who, the Ataliq said, were turbulent people and were always a menace to Bukhara. After subduing the Yuz, Luṭf 'Alī Khan, acting under instructions from Nadir, removed from Samargand and took to Mashhad the tombstone of Timur and the bronze gates of the Madrasa.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 517-522. This battle is not mentioned by Mirza Mahdi.

² *Ibid.*, p. 527.

³ *Bayan*, fol. 42 (b).

⁴ *K.N.*, pp. 532 and 533. Muḥammad Kaẓim states that the tombstone was in one block of agate (or jasper; *yashm* has both meanings). Vámbéry, in his *Travels in Central Asia* (London, 1864), pp. 207 and 208, says that in the Turbat-i-Timur at Samargand there are "under the dome . . . two tombs placed lengthwise, with the head in the direction of Mecca. One is covered with a very fine stone of a dark green colour, two and a half spans broad and ten long, and about the thickness of six fingers. It is laid flat, in two pieces, over the grave of Timur; the other . . . is the tomb of Mir Seid Berke, the teacher and spiritual chief of Timur." According to 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri (*Bayan*, fol. 45 (b)), the stone

طالع کشته و از صدمه و شگفتی هرگز آهنگ در هر زمان هزار خونین بکریک کرد
 و این بزرگ و تو را نیان - بهم بر کشد همچو با و خزان - بهار را بباران
 نه خون چو سیل هماران شده - ز بس تر دین شده جایگزین - چو کشته شد
 تیر - زره را کمانهای بخسیرده - بزدان بیکان کشا و کرده - چو در گشتش
 آمد زوال - عقابان کین را زور بخت ال - کمانها فکند و شمشیر تیر نهاده
 هم ز روی شیر - شد از پاک شمشیر کاشکاف - چو پای شیر فرق در مصاف
 کچکاک شمشیر زنده فوق - زمین را بر پای خون کرد غرق - غریب و ناهوده بر آمد
 چنان - کافا داره شمشیر ای سندن - بر آمد خوش خرم و خوش - بهر
 بر دوشش از دماغ هر دوش - لب خون که از مارک ابل روس - پادشاه و پادشاه
 قی خونش - ز بس مرده و خفته بخون سپرد - شده روی مهر ابراز بیخ و نرد



NADIR SHAH DEFEATS THE ÖZBEGS

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While Lutf 'Ali Khan was absent on this expedition, Nadir enrolled 30,000 Özbegs in his army and placed them under the command of a son of the Ataliq.¹

On the 15th Rajab (6th October, 1740) Nadir presented Abu'l-Faïd with a magnificent robe and himself replaced the Bukharan crown upon his head, and gave him the title of Shah. At the same time, however, he formally annexed Charjui and all other Bukharan territory south of the Oxus.² He then summoned the Hakim Ataliq and the Qushbegi³ and requested them to inform Abu'l-Faïd that he wished him to give one of his daughters in marriage to Riḍa Quli and another to his nephew 'Ali Quli. Compliance being the only course possible, the king gave his consent, whereupon Nadir sent several ladies of his harem to the palace at Bukhara formally to ask for the two princesses in marriage, the elder for Riḍa Quli and the younger for his cousin. When these ladies returned, they said that the younger daughter of the King of Turan was "unequaled for intelligence, perfection, eloquence and beauty"; Riḍa Quli, hearing the younger daughter thus praised, asked the matrons to request the Shah to let him wed the younger daughter instead of the elder one. When Nadir was informed of this request, he said that it would be impolite to Abu'l-Faïd to make any change and that Riḍa Quli must marry the elder daughter. When Riḍa Quli was notified of this decision, he was displeased, partly because he was ill-disposed towards his cousin 'Ali Quli; he is reported to have exclaimed:

"If the matter is such that I have no position, God will have compassion upon me. I would soon arrange to wed the daughter of the King of Khitai."

When the matrons reported these words to Nadir, he was greatly angered, and once more believed that his son was aspiring to the throne. Openly, he said that if Riḍa Quli refused to marry the elder of the two princesses, he would wed her himself, and suited his action to his word.⁴

Whilst at Bukhara, Nadir, at Abu'l-Faïd's suggestion, sent an envoy,

was split in two in the process of removal. The removal of this tombstone was recorded in the *Gombroon Diary* on the 27th January/7th February, 1741. Besides removing this tombstone, the soldiery took away with them many of the leaves of the enormous Qur'an which Baisonghur Ghiyathu'd-Din, Shahrukh's son, had written and then deposited on his grandfather's grave (Baisonghur, who died in A.D. 1433, was a good calligraphist and illuminator). J. B. Fraser, when in Khabushan, found a number of these leaves (which measured some 12 feet by 8) in the *Imamzade* or shrine of Ibrahim ibn 'Ali there (*Narrative of a Journey into Khorassan in the years 1821 and 1822*, p. 574). In 1883, at Nasiru'd-Din Shah's orders, two of these leaves were removed from this shrine to the museum in Tehran.

¹ K.N., p. 533.

² T.N., p. 219.

³ Next to the Ataliq, the Qushbegi was the most important minister of the King of Bukhara.

⁴ K.N., pp. 533-535.

in company with two Khwajas of Juibar,¹ to Ilbars of Khwarizm, with a letter summoning him to come and ask pardon for his wrongdoing. When Ilbars received this message, he was so enraged that he put the envoy and the two Khwajas to death.²

Three days after his marriage and that of 'Ali Quli, Nadir sent the latter with Naṣrullah Mirza and the harem back to Mashhad. At or about the same time he appointed Tahmasp Khan Jalayir Governor and Commander-in-Chief of his Indian possessions and ordered him to go and quell some disturbances that had broken out near Shikarpur.³

After promising to send troops to Abu'l-Faiḍ's assistance, should need arise, Nadir and his army left Bukhara for Charjui *en route* for Khwarizm. Hearing that Ilbars had dispatched a strong Özbek and Turkoman force from Khiva with the object of destroying the forts and the bridge of boats at Charjui before he could arrive there, he hastened on in advance of the main portion of the army, at the head of a picked body of troops. Reaching Charjui before the Özbeks and Turkomans could do so, he crossed over to the left bank of the river and prepared for battle; when the Khwarizm forces appeared on the following day, he attacked them vigorously and speedily put them to flight.⁴ A halt of several days was made at Charjui to enable the rest of the army and the baggage train to arrive and to cross the Oxus. Whilst at Charjui, Nadir gave his son Riḍa Quli leave to go to Mashhad. Taqi Khan Shirazi, who had been summoned to the court in disgrace because of his incompetent leadership of the Makran expedition, had succeeded in securing his reinforcement as Beglarbegi of Fars; at Charjui he received further marks of Nadir's favour, and was then sent to Mashhad, whence he later proceeded to Fars. In view of his hatred of Riḍa Quli, it is possible that he may have used his strange influence with Nadir to the prince's detriment.


Having laden the river craft with stores and cannon and sent these on down stream, Nadir left Charjui for the Deveh Boyun ("Camel's neck") gorge, where the river is constricted to one-third of its normal width. On this march the army was in four divisions; one of these divisions preceded the baggage train, while another followed it, and the other two guarded the flanks. Further, 6,000 cavalry kept close by the river in order to protect the flotilla. It is said that the dust raised by the marching troops

¹ See Khanikov's *Bukhara, its Emir and its People* (London, 1845), p. 234, for a description of the Khwajas of Juibar (who formed one of the two religious classes of Bukhara).

² 'Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari, p. 48.

³ *T.N.*, p. 219. Fir Ibrahim Khan (*op. cit.*, pp. 27-30) states that Tahmasp Khan, when endeavouring to quell a rising of the Da'udputras, was defeated by them and lost the bulk of his army.

⁴ *K.N.*, pp. 538-542, *T.N.*, p. 221. It is stated in the *Bayan* (fol. 47 (b)) that the Qizilbash troops suffered very severely from thirst on this occasion, and that, when the Shah was informed of this, he had the noses of the two chief water-carriers cut off, because they had not carried out their duties properly.



was so thick that nothing could be seen, and that many men developed eye-trouble because of it.¹ On reaching Deveh Boyun, Nadir made a fortified dépôt for his baggage, and then, towards the end of October, 1740, he and his men set out for Fitnak. Near that place the Persians encountered Ilbars's forces and a fierce battle resulted. A body of 6,000 Yamut Turkomans fought with great bravery, but they and the other troops on the Özbek side proved unable to withstand a series of charges led by Nadir in person.² Ilbars and his men were compelled to fall back and take refuge in the strong fortress of Hazarasp, situated 13 miles to the north-west of Fitnak; the Khan had previously given orders for the low-lying land surrounding the fortress to be flooded from the numerous canals. The result was that when Nadir approached Hazarasp, he found

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 51 (b).

² *R.N.*, pp. 544 and 545; it is stated in a marginal note on p. 544 that this battle was fought on the 11th Sha'ban (1st November, 1740).

that he could not get his cannon within effective range¹; it being impracticable to deliver a frontal assault under such conditions, he blockaded the fortress, after defeating another body of Yamut Turkomans. As Hazarasp was known to be well stocked with provisions, a long and difficult siege seemed to be in prospect, especially as the winter was setting in. Fortunately for Nadir, he heard that Ilbars's family and treasures were at Khanqa, a fortress situated five miles west of the Oxus and 20 miles east by north of Khiva. He promptly marched his army off to Khanqa, hoping that this move would induce Ilbars to emerge and hasten to protect his family and treasures. This design succeeded, for Ilbars left Hazarasp the same night, and, by swift marching, reached Khanqa just as the Persian army was approaching it from the other side.² Gathering his forces together once more, he attempted to take the offensive, but he was defeated and then besieged in Khanqa. The garrison resisted bravely for two or three days, but when, on the 24th Sha'ban (14th November), the Persians, after exploding some mines under the walls, were preparing to deliver a general assault, Ilbars became so terrified that he asked for quarter; on Nadir agreeing to pardon him, he surrendered. The Shah gave Ilbars a tent next to that of Fath 'Ali Khan and then summoned the *inaqs*³ and chiefs; having presented them with coats of honour and other gifts, he requested them to assure the people of Khanqa that they would not be harmed.⁴

Hearing that Nadir had promised to pardon Ilbars, the relatives of the two murdered Khwajas of Juibar came to him and asked for the Khan to be executed.⁵ Notwithstanding his promise, the Shah then sent for Ilbars and (to quote Hanway):

"challenged him with the murder of his ambassadors: he excused himself, alledging that it was done by the Ousbegs without his knowledge. To this the Persian king replied; 'If you have not abilities to govern the few subjects who inhabit your territories, you do not deserve to live; and for the affront shewn me in the murder of my ambassadors, you have no title to die like men; you shall die like dogs.' He then ordered the executioners to cut the throat of the Khan and about thirty of his chief attendants, a punishment esteemed the most ignominious among the Persians. Upon the news of the fate of this Khan, all the town and villages surrendered except the capital."⁶

¹ *K.N.*, p. 547, *T.N.*, p. 221, *Bayan*, fol. 52 (a). After the flooding of the surrounding country, the only means of access to Hazarasp was by one narrow road.

² *K.N.*, p. 551.

³ The *inaqs* were senior members of the tribe and military chiefs (Barthold's article on Khwarizm in the *E.I.*, Vol. II, p. 910). Vámbéry states that the *inaqs* of Khwarizm were four in number, two being the nearest relatives of the Khan, and the other two being also of his family, but not so closely related; one of the former two was always Governor of Hazarasp (*Travels in Central Asia*, p. 335).

⁴ *K.N.*, pp. 554-556.

⁵ 'Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari, p. 49.

⁶ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 306 (on the authority of Thompson and Hogg).

As at Bukhara, Nadir forbade his troops to molest the inhabitants, and put to death several of his officers and men who had caused a disturbance in the town.¹

Having settled affairs at Khanqa, Nadir marched to Khiva, which, as stated above, was 20 miles distant. Thompson and Hogg, who were in Khiva at this time, described it in their journal as :

"situated on a rising ground, it has three gates, and is defended by a strong wall of earth, very thick, and much higher than the houses: it has turrets at small distances, and a broad deep ditch full of water. The place is large, but the houses are low, the greatest part of them being built with mud: the roofs are flat, and covered with earth. It commands a pleasing prospect of the adjacent plains, which, by the industry of the inhabitants, are rendered very fertile."²

When Ilbars had at length realised that he was in real danger, he had sent to Abu'l-Khair Khan, the chief of the Little Horde of the Qazaqs, for aid. In response to this appeal, Abu'l-Khair, with a mixed force of Qazaqs and Aral Özbegs, marched to Khiva and entered the city. Having decided to send an envoy to Nadir, he selected for this purpose a Russian engineer officer named Muravin whom, it is said, he trusted more than any of his own chiefs.³ Muravin, on being conducted into Nadir's presence, informed him that the Qazaq chief offered to submit and that he wished to become Khan of Khiva. The Shah treated Muravin graciously and charged him to request Abu'l-Khair to come in person to his court where he would be received and rewarded as a subject of the Empress of Russia, with whom he (Nadir) wished to remain on friendly terms. Muravin returned with this reassuring message to Abu'l-Khair, but the latter, either because he feared to trust to Nadir's word or because of a plot hatched by the people of Khiva, fled back to his horde on the Qazaq steppes.⁴

Despite the flight of Abu'l-Khair, the Khivans, encouraged by their commander, 'Abdu'r-Rahman Beg, the Qushbegi, determined to resist, and refused to parley when Nadir sent emissaries to them. The Shah's forces thereupon invested the city, which they proceeded to bombard with eighteen cannon and sixteen mortars; the Khivans, on the other hand, had only a few field pieces which they had seized some twenty-three

¹ K.N., p. 557.

² Hanway, Vol. I, p. 351.

³ See p. 194 of Ferry de Pigny's French translation of A. Levshin's *Opisanie Kirgiz-Kazachikh, ili, Kirgiz-Kaisatshikh Ord i Stepai*. Muravin and two other Russian engineer officers named Gladishev and Nazimov had been sent by the Russian Government, at the request of Abu'l-Khair, to examine a site for a fortress at the mouth of the Sir Daria (Jaxartes); see Howorth's *History of the Mongols*, Vol. II, pp. 913 and 914. A map reproduced in *Central Asia* (Calcutta, 1873), Section I, Part VI, shows Muravin's route from Orsk to Khiva and his survey of the eastern side of the Sea of Aral.

⁴ Levshin, pp. 194 and 195.

years before from the ill-fated Bekovich Cherkasski. After draining away the water from the moat surrounding the place, the Persians made several breaches in the walls by means of mines, and on the third day of the siege they prepared to launch a general assault. Realising that further resistance would be futile, the Khivans repented of their obduracy and surrendered.¹

In the city of Khiva and elsewhere in Khwarizm Nadir discovered no less than 12,000 Khurasanis² imprisoned or enslaved; he liberated all these people and ordered them to be provided with horses, baggage animals, food and money, and assigned to them as their place of residence a new town situated at Chashma-yi-Khalanjan³ (15 miles due south of Abivard) which he had ordered his Indian builders and craftsmen to erect on the model of Delhi, but on a much smaller scale⁴; this town was afterwards re-named Khivaqabad.⁵ It is said that he sent many of the people of Khiva as slaves to that place, so that they might experience the same treatment that they had meted out to their Persian captives.⁶

Nadir caused an inventory to be taken of everything in Khiva, and ordered all foreigners to be brought before him. Among these were Thompson and Hogg; Hanway⁷ states that:

"Nadir Shah enquired of them what their business was. Being informed they were merchants, he told them they were at liberty to trade through all his dominions; and if any wrong was done them, and they were not redressed by his officers, they should apply to him; they were then dismissed, and a passport was given them. These persons reported, that many, even of the meaner soldiers in the Persian army, had cloaths of rich silk, and plenty of Indian money."⁸

Besides these two Englishmen, ten Russians were found, all of whom were slaves. Nadir liberated these men and gave each of them 50 roubles and a horse to enable them to return to their own country; they ultimately reached Samara in safety, under the leadership of a Russian Tatar named Zhanaiev.⁹

¹ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 207 (on the authority of Thompson and Hogg). See also the *T.N.*, p. 223, and the *K.N.*, pp. 558 and 559.

² *T.N.*, p. 223. According to Thompson and Hogg, Nadir took away with him from Khiva nearly 20,000 Persians whom he had liberated.

³ The correct reading of this name is difficult to establish; it is given as above in my MS., as "Khilijan" in the Bombay edition of the *T.N.* (p. 223), and as "Gelenjiah" by Jones (Vol. XII, p. 28).

⁴ Bayan, fol. 57 (b). This city was to be only a quarter the size of Delhi.

⁵ The name is sometimes written as Khiva-abad (it is from a misreading of the form Khivaqabad that Gladwin gets his "Jieyookabad"). E. O'Donovan, who visited the ruins of Khivaqabad in 1880, gives a description of them in his book *The Mere Oasis*, Vol. II, pp. 78 and 80.

⁶ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 207.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ This statement shows that the Persian troops, when searched for valuables at the Chanab (see p. 156 above), had been allowed to retain a not inconsiderable amount of their spoils.

⁹ Levshin, p. 195; this authority states that Zhanaiev wrote a report on the siege of Khiva which is (or was) to be found in the archives of the Orenburg Frontier Commission.

Nadir spent a fortnight in Khiva, during which time he made arrangements for the government of Khwarizm after his departure. Having made a show of consulting the *inaqs* and chiefs of the country, he appointed as Khan of Khwarizm a descendant of Chingiz Khan named Tahir Beg, who had formerly resided in Herat and who had accompanied him on the Turkistan expedition. When some of the Özbek chiefs refused to acknowledge Tahir Beg as their ruler and attempted armed resistance, Nadir forced them to submit and swear fealty to their new ruler, after some blood had been shed.¹ He detached a force of only moderate strength to support Tahir Beg; according to Mirza Mahdi, the reason why he did not leave a stronger force was that he considered that the people of Khwarizm would be unable to bear the burden of maintaining it.²

No further action in Khiva being necessary, the Shah and his army started on their homeward march on the 9th December, 1740, Tahir Beg and the *inaqs* and chiefs accompanying him as far as Fitnak. Nadir took with him, probably as a hostage, Abu'l-Ghazi Khan, Ilbars's young son.³

Reaching Charjui on the 4th Shawwal (23rd December), Nadir took the desert route to Merv; as water was extremely scarce along this route, he had previously made elaborate arrangements for adequate supplies to be available.⁴

At Merv, Nadir behaved with some severity. He dismissed the Governor, Muhammad Rida Khan Qiriqlu, and appointed in his stead the local Qajar leader, Shah Quli Khan; several persons were put to death, one of these being Rahim Sultan, who had, it was alleged, encouraged Rida Quli Mirza to aim at the crown.⁵

Leaving Merv on the 16th Shawwal, 1153 (4th January, 1741), Nadir went to Abivard and thence to his birthplace at Dastgird, where he had his *maulud-khana* (literally, "place-of-birth-house") erected; 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri described this building as having a lofty dome surmounted by a golden sword.⁶ From Dastgird the Shah went to Kalat, where he deposited his Indian treasures and had a tomb of black stone built for himself. Large blocks of marble were sent all the way from Maragha for this tomb. At his orders, much had been done to improve the interior of the great natural fortress, the water supply being increased and gardens being

¹ K.N., pp. 560 and 561. Except on this occasion, Nadir did not behave with harshness during his stay in Khiva.

² T.N., p. 224. Thompson and Hogg stated in their journal that trade in Khiva was on a small scale; the only local products were cotton, lamb skins of poor quality and a small quantity of raw silk.

³ K.N., p. 562.

⁴ Details of these arrangements are given in the *Bayan*, fol. 48 (a).

⁵ K.N., pp. 565 and 566. Rahim Sultan had also been one of those who had urged Rida Quli to murder Tahmasp and his sons (see p. 177 above).

⁶ *Bayan*, fol. 57 (b). 'Abdu'l-Karim has confused Dastgird with Khivaqabad.

laid out. He then visited Khivaqabad, and gave large quantities of clothes, food and money to the newly arrived inhabitants.¹ From Khivaqabad Nadir returned to Abivard, and went on from there to Mashhad, where he arrived at the end of Shawwal (17th January, 1741).

¹ *K.N.*, pp. 569-571.

CHAPTER XX

THE DAGHISTAN CAMPAIGN

For nearly two months Nadir remained in Mashhad, which he now unquestionably regarded as his capital¹; with the great extension of his empire eastwards, it was far more centrally situated than Isfahan, and it was, moreover, the chief city of his own province of Khurasan. Furthermore, Mashhad was freer from Šafavi associations than Isfahan was. For some time past, Nadir had been at pains to add to the importance of the city, and it was at this time in a very flourishing condition; it has been estimated that it then contained 60,000 houses and between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants.² George Thompson, who arrived there from Bukhara in September, 1741, stated³:

"in time of peace it is a place of great trade, caravans are employed daily from Bokhara, Balkh, Biddukhshan, Kandahar, and India; as well as from all parts of Persia. The Bazars, or market-places, are large and well built, filled with rich merchandize, and frequented by great numbers of people of different nations. There are computed about ninety caravanserais in this city, all in good repair. Great numbers of people were sent hither by Nadir Shah from all parts of Persia, as well as from the new-conquered dominions; and all other means used to make it a flourishing city."

On this occasion Nadir, notwithstanding his anti-Shi'a policy, did much to embellish the shrine of the Imam Riḍa; amongst his gifts to it were a number of silken carpets and fourteen lamps of the purest gold (*tamam-i-ʿiyar*).⁴ In the courtyard of the Šaḥn he erected a fountain made of a solid block of white marble some three feet high and eighteen feet in circumference. According to a story in the *Glory of the Shia World*,⁵ he arranged with a contractor for the block of stone to be brought from Herat in twelve days. The man succeeded in bringing the block in nine days and went to the Shah to announce the fact, hoping to be lavishly

¹ Although Mashhad was Nadir's favourite city, he was not content even there; he always chafed when compelled by the exigencies of state affairs to spend his time in cities. As Muḥammad Mahdi ibn Muḥammad Riḍa has well put it: "In truth, the real capital of his empire was the seat of a saddle and the back of a horse"; see his *Nisf-i-Jahan fi Ta'rikh-i-Izfahan*, fol. 193 (a); the Persian wording is: *walakin dar haqiqat daru's-salṭanat-i-u khana-yi-zin va pusht-i-asb bud.*

² See Malcolm, Vol. II, p. 218 and G. Stratil-Sauer's *Mesched: eine Stadt baut am Vaterland Iran* (Leipzig, 1937), p. 140.

³ Thompson's *Journal*, in Hanway, Vol. I, pp. 356 and 357.

⁴ *R.N.*, p. 572.

⁵ Sykes (Sir P. M.) and Bahadur Ahmad Din Khan, London, 1910, p. 248.

rewarded. Instead of recompensing the man, Nadir had him blinded, on the grounds that he had not kept to the terms of the contract.

Although Nadir had given instructions for a magnificent tomb for himself to be built at Kalat, he had another erected at Mashhad, in the Khiaban-i-Bala or Upper Avenue. It is related that when this second tomb was completed, some wit wrote on its wall : " Thy note is in every key ; the world is full of thee, but thy proper place is empty." These lines caused much amusement, but they were quickly erased lest the Shah should hear of them and order a massacre.¹

By this time Timur's tombstone and the gates of the Madrasa had arrived from Samarkand. Nadir had evidently intended to place them in this Mashhad mausoleum, but when he looked upon Timur's tombstone he reflected awhile. Respect for his great predecessor and prototype gained the upper hand, and caused him to order Timur's tombstone to be taken back to Samarkand and replaced over his grave ; the gates of the Madrasa were also sent back.²

It being his custom to make periodical examinations of the provincial accounts, Nadir went carefully through the Khurasan accounts during his stay in Mashhad. He evidently found much that was unsatisfactory, for he put a number of the treasury officials to death.³ In Nadir's time a revenue official's post was no sinecure ; the taxes had to be rigorously collected and accounted for, and if any mistakes or faults were discovered, the severest penalties were inflicted upon the person responsible.

When Nadir had completed his affairs in Mashhad, the urge to avenge his brother's death asserted itself. Entrusting the government of Khurasan to Nasrullah, the Shah, in company with Rida Quli and his third son, Imam Quli, left Mashhad on the 26th Dhu'l-Hijja (14th March, 1741), and celebrated Nau Ruz in the Khabushan district a week later. When the festivities were over, he and his army marched via Simalqan through the Giraili country, and then, in pouring rain, down the valley of the Gurgan. Here conditions were very similar to those previously experienced in the Kurram valley ; the Gurgan had to be crossed no less than twenty-three times, and, as before, there were many deaths from drowning. One day the river suddenly came down in flood and swept away several thousand men and baggage animals to their doom ; the waters rose until they were lapping against the side of the royal tent, which was pitched in the middle of the valley. Several tents on either side and numbers of servants and guards were carried away by the waters, but Nadir, although his courtiers implored him to move to higher ground, refused to do so ; seated in solemn state upon the Takht-i-Nadiri, he calmly contemplated the menacing floods. As if awed by the imperial

¹ *Bayan*, fol. 60 (a)

² *K.N.*, p. 573.

³ *Ibid.*

gaze, the waters rose no higher, and then slowly began to recede¹; Nadir had triumphed where Canute had failed.

The march was resumed as soon as the floods had subsided sufficiently, and in due course Astarabad was reached, whence Nadir continued his journey through Ashraf, Sari, 'Aliabad and Zirab towards the Gaduk Pass. On the 28th Šafar, 1154 (15th May, 1741), he was proceeding along a narrow road through the thickly-wooded Savad Kuh district, accompanied by his harem and the *quruqchis* (harem guards); the troops, as was usual, were some distance away. Suddenly, a marksman hidden behind a tree some twenty paces from the road fired at the Shah as he passed; the bullet, after grazing his hand and wounding him in the thumb, embedded itself in his horse's neck. The animal fell to the ground, bringing the Shah down with it; it is said that he, with great presence of mind, lay still on the ground, feigning death, and so escaped a second shot. For a moment all was confusion, but, when it was seen that he was not seriously hurt, the eunuchs and *quruqchis*, headed by Riḍa Quli Mirza (who had hastened up with the rearguard), made a prolonged search in the adjacent forests. No trace of the would-be assassin could, however, be found,² and the march was resumed after a brief delay.

Well would it have been for Persia and also for Nadir's reputation if that bullet had found its intended mark. He was then at the culminating point of his career. Besides delivering his country from the yoke of the Afghans, he had humbled the Turks, caused the Russians to give up all the Persian territory remaining in their power after their voluntary evacuation of Gilan, and had subdued the Bakhtiari, Abdalis and Ghalzais; further, he had despoiled India, and conquered Turkistan, while his troops had seized part of Arabia, and his fleet, despite some vicissitudes, was becoming supreme in the Persian Gulf. His ambition, however, was boundless, and each new triumph merely whetted his appetite for more. Hitherto, fortune had been, on the whole, most benign, but a change was about to set in, and Nadir, during the remainder of his reign, was destined to bring terrible troubles upon his people and ultimately disaster upon himself in his endeavours to achieve his aims.

From the Gaduk pass Nadir proceeded to Tehran where he gave audience to Kalushkin, the Russian Resident, who had just received orders from St. Petersburg, to assure him of Russia's friendly intentions. This action was necessary, because Khulafa, the Persian Ambassador at St. Petersburg,

¹ K.N., pp. 381 and 382; see also the T.N., pp. 226 and 227, and the Bayan, fol. 61 (b).

² T.N., p. 228. I have adopted Mirza Mahdi's version in preference to that of Muḥammad Karīm which, being based on hearsay only (as he was engaged on a minor campaign in the Qungrat country at the time), seems somewhat fanciful and is clearly incorrect in certain respects (e.g., the place where the attempt was made was, according to him, between Sari and Ashraf). 'Abdu'l-Karīm Kashmīrī who, like Mirza Mahdi, was with Nadir's army, states (fol. 64 (a)) that there were two would-be assassins.

had, it appears, been sending to his court false reports that were very unfavourable to Russia. Kalushkin was also instructed to ascertain and report upon Nadir's real intentions.¹

Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg that the Shah was very independent and that it was much more difficult to speak to him than it had formerly been. He said :

"The new Nebuchadnezzar has been rendered quite mad by his triumphs. He says : 'It was not difficult for me to conquer all India. . . . If I move with only one leg I take India ; if I move with both legs, I shall conquer the whole world !' "

Although Kalushkin found that Nadir was hostile to Turkey, he could not be sure that he would always remain friendly to Russia.²

After a brief halt in Tehran, Nadir went on to Qazvin. It is noteworthy that Rida Quli did not accompany his father beyond the former place. Mirza Madhi, writing very guardedly, merely said that the prince was ordered to remain in Tehran, "of which province the revenues were to be his"³ ; this was evidently a euphemistic way of indicating that Rida Quli was in disgrace. It is not clear whether the Shah already suspected his son of having instigated, or been privy to, the attempt upon his life or whether he merely wished to punish him for his injudicious behaviour as Viceroy and on certain subsequent occasions.

While Nadir was at Qazvin, Giv Amilakhor and another Georgian chief arrived with the news that the Lazgis had ravaged Kartli ; Nadir was greatly enraged and became, if possible, even more determined than ever to punish the Lazgis. He reappointed Giv Amilakhor Eristav of Ksan, and dispatched a strong force of Afghans and other troops to that district, where heavy fighting ensued.⁴

During his stay in Qazvin, Nadir was obliged (in fulfilment of a promise made at Delhi) to allow his capable Indian physician, 'Alavi Khan, to leave his service, in order to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca ; 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri, the author of the *Bayan*, left the Shah's service at the same time and accompanied his countryman. Deprived of 'Alavi Khan's medical skill and his restraining influence, Nadir's physical condition and mental state soon noticeably deteriorated, and his ferocious outbursts of rage, which for some time had occurred only at rare intervals, became regrettably frequent.⁵

¹ Soloviev, Vol. XXI, pp. 84 and 85.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

³ *T.N.*, p. 229. Bratishchev (*op. cit.*, p. 487) relates that Nadir treated his son kindly at Tehran and that he gave him no post and left him behind ostensibly because he wished to free him from the toils of the forthcoming campaign. The Shah, however, ordered two of his most reliable eunuchs to remain with the prince, in order that they might, to outward seeming, look after his health, but in reality, spy upon him.

⁴ Papouna Orbelian, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 55-61.

⁵ *Bayan*, foll. 66 (b) and 99 (b).

Fifteen days after his arrival in Qazvin, Nadir left for Daghistan via Qaraja Dag, Barda'a and the district of Qabala.

It will be recalled that when Nadir was at Nadirabad in May, 1740, he ordered the Abdali chief 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan and his own brother-in-law, Fath 'Ali Khan, to go to Shirvan and to co-operate with the army commanders in Georgia and Adharbaijan in suppressing the Lazgis of Jar and Tala during the autumn and winter.¹ For some unrecorded reason, 'Abdu'l-Ghani Khan and the other commanders did not launch their attack on the Lazgis until March, 1741. The Abdali chief, a much more skilled and experienced commander than Ibrahim Khan, was more than a match for the Jar and Tala Lazgis; having inflicted heavy losses upon them, he forced large numbers to submit.

When Nadir reached Shirvan, many Lazgis came to offer their submission. The salutary lesson just given to the tribesmen of Jar and Tala, followed by the advent of the Shah at the head of his army of some 150,000 men,² doubtless induced these Lazgis to take this course.

Nadir marched on northwards, and by the 1st Jumadi I (14th August) he had penetrated to the town or village of Ghazi Qumuq, in the heart of Daghistan. It was at this place that he received a report (which afterwards proved to be exaggerated) that a mixed force of Özbegs, Aral Tatars and Qazaqs had invaded Khwarizm, captured Khiva and put Tahir Beg and his supporters to death.³ Tahir Beg, however, was not killed until later.⁴

At the beginning of Rajab (12th September), Nadir left Ghazi Qumuq with the intention of reconnoitring the borders of Avaria. In view of the lateness of the season, it seems doubtful whether he seriously contemplated forcing his way through the mountains at that time and occupying the whole country. However that may be, the severity of the weather, together with the obstinate resistance of the mountaineers, forced him to give up all idea of advancing further northwards and compelled him to turn eastwards and make for the Caspian coast.⁵ Had Nadir begun his march on Avaria a month or so earlier, it is possible that he might have forced his way through the formidable mountain barrier to Khunzakh, the Nutzal's capital; by so doing, he would have had the key of Daghistan

¹ See p. 186 above.


² Bazin, who was at Darband in October, 1741, when Nadir arrived there, gives the strength of his arm, then as 150,000. He states that it was composed mainly of Indians, Özbeg Tatars and Afghans and that there were but few Persians. Bazin thus comments on the small number of Persians: "il (i.e., Nadir) sçavoit que les peuples naturellement attachés à leurs Souverains, ne suivent qu'à regret un Usurpateur, et qu'ils ont pour le trahir l'exemple que lui-même leur a donné." (See *Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 288).

³ T.N., p. 229.

⁴ See p. 211 below.

⁵ T.N., p. 230, Bratishchev, p. 489. Butkov does not mention this attempt to reach the Avar country in 1741.

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in his hands. With the Shamkhal Khaṣṣ Fulad, Surkhai, and the Usmi and other chiefs all in chastened mood, and the strength of his army still unimpaired by the hardships and losses of a protracted campaign in exceedingly difficult country, he would have stood a much better chance of success than he did in the following year. The consequences of an early settlement of the Daghistan problem might well have been of vital importance. With his military reputation unblemished and his army intact and flushed with successes in India, Turkistan and Daghistan, Nadir would have proved an even more formidable opponent to the Turks than he did in 1743. It is quite possible that, if he had suddenly attacked Russia at this stage, he might have succeeded in wresting Kizliar and Astrakhan from her¹; Russia, being taken by surprise, with many of her troops withdrawn from the southern frontiers in order to strengthen her forces then engaged in the war with Sweden, might well have had serious difficulty in parrying a sudden thrust by him. He, as will be seen below, afterwards seriously contemplated an attack on his northern neighbour, but by that time the opportunity of doing so with a reasonable chance of success had passed.

When Nadir was at Chiragh, on his way back to the Caspian coast, he heard that the Qaraqaitaq tribesmen had attacked some of his troops in the thick forest country, killing many of them and capturing part of their baggage.² The bold Tatars also hovered around his own force, skirmishing and attacking the convoys; one night they even raided Nadir's own quarters and carried off some of his women.³ His rage at this incident was such that he had a number of his own officers and men put to death⁴; he then swore that he would not quit Daghistan until all the rebels had been forced to submit.⁵

Nadir reached Darband on the 5th Sha'ban (16th October); leaving his baggage in the town, he hastened off to attack the Qaraqaitaq tribesmen. In order to counteract the Lazgi raids, he had forts built throughout the Shamkhal's territory, stationed from two to three *farsakhs* apart.⁶ On the 10th Ramaḍan (19th November) he returned from this expedition, having apparently failed to achieve his object.⁷ As there was plenty of water

¹ Kahushkin had already made some disquieting reports to St. Petersburg regarding Nadir's attitude towards Russia; in this connection, see p. 200 above.

² *T.N.*, p. 230. Bazin (p. 290) states that the Lazgis had at first only thought of submission; when, however, they saw that, after submitting, their folk were exiled to Khurāsān and were stripped of all their possessions, and that their families were ruthlessly slaughtered by Nadir if his suspicions were aroused, they resisted him with the courage of despair.

³ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 224.

⁴ Bazin, p. 290.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 230.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ As Mirza Mahdi is silent as to the result, one is perhaps justified in inferring that it was unfavourable.

and forage available at Dasht-i-Kafari, three *farsakhs* north-west of Darband, the Shah established his winter quarters there.¹

The provisioning of so large an army in a country that consisted, for the most part, of forests and mountain crags presented serious difficulties. Little food was procurable in the neighbouring province of Shirvan, because of the repeated ravaging to which it had been subjected, and Kartli² and Kakheti were in a similar state. The only solution was to procure supplies by sea. Having already a fleet on the Persian Gulf, Nadir determined to have one on the Caspian as well; the great difficulty, of course, was to obtain the vessels. There were already some Persian vessels in service, but these were small and of primitive design and build.³ Furthermore, the Persians were almost entirely unskilled in navigation. Nadir is said to have sent to Surat for shipbuilders and sailors, in order to remedy this deficiency.⁴

Until he could get ships of his own, Nadir had, therefore, to depend almost entirely on Russian traders for his sea-borne supplies; many of these traders made vast profits.⁵ When Kalushkin informed the Shah of the accession of Elizabeth Petrovna, after the *coup d'état* of the 6th December, 1741, he replied that he was very glad to hear the news, since the throne of Russia belonged to her by right, as the daughter of Peter the Great. Nadir then gave Kalushkin a coat of honour and a thousand roubles, and requested him to arrange for the loan of ten Russian vessels, some of which would be used in his operations against the Daghestan rebels and some for the transport of supplies from Astrakhan. Kalushkin, in transmitting this request, warned his Government that, if Nadir were lent these vessels, he would never return them, as he was most anxious to have a fleet of his own. In consequence of Kalushkin's warning, the Government refused to accede to Nadir's request.⁶ However, as

¹ T.N., p. 230, Butkov, Vol. I, p. 212.

² Papoua Orbelian states that so heavy a tax was levied on Kartli in 1741 that many persons fled to Turkey, while others wilfully devastated their own lands. *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 57 and 58.)

³ Captain Woodroffe's *Journal*, in Hanway, Vol. I, p. 149. Such vessels as the Persians possessed had been built, for the most part, by Russian deserters or renegades. John Bell of Antermony, who had visited Persia a quarter of a century earlier, stated that: "The navigation of the Caspian belongs solely to the Russians, the Persian and other borderers having nothing but fishing boats" (*Travels from St. Petersburg in Russia to Divers Parts of Asia*, London, 1764, p. 47).

⁴ See Hanway's hitherto unpublished letter from Astrakhan to his principals, dated the 7th/18th November, 1744, and the Memorial from the Russia Company to Lord Carteret, dated the 13th/24th January, 1744 (S.P., 91, Vol. XXXVI). In the Memorial it is stated that Nadir took this action "long before Mr. Elton ever was in Persia" (i.e., before, presumably, Elton arrived in Persia for the second time, in June, 1742).

⁵ Hanway appears to be in error in asserting (Vol. IV, p. 225) that these Russian merchants were not allowed by law to sell supplies to the Shah, as Butkov (Vol. I, pp. 212 and 510) says that the Russian Government only permitted merchants of Russian nationality to dispatch food supplies to the Persian ports on the Caspian.

⁶ Soloviev, Vol. XXI, p. 200.

will be seen below, he was able later to obtain the nucleus of his Caspian fleet from an unexpected quarter.

The festival of Nau Ruz was celebrated at the camp in the customary fashion.

According to Mirza Mahdi, Nadir, at this time, fully intended to abdicate in favour of one of his sons and to retire to Kalat, as soon as he had come to a final settlement with Turkey.¹

Before opening his campaign in the spring of 1742, Nadir sent his agents northwards to Enderi and Kostek, in the country of the Qumiqs, to purchase supplies and horses, but these tribespeople angered the Shah by charging exorbitant prices, and by taking part in robberies, as well as helping the Lazgis.²

At the end of May, 1742, Nadir marched against the rebels of Tabarsaran, whom he attacked in considerable force on three occasions, but in each case he was unsuccessful, and on the last occasion he barely escaped with his life.³ Surkhai and the Shamkhal Khaṣṣ Fulad were with the Shah most of the time, and "in the performance of their service made no fault"⁴; the Usmi Aḥmad Khan, on the other hand, renounced his allegiance, and retreated to his strong castle of Quraish.

It was in July, 1742, that the connection began between Captain Elton and the Persian Government which was destined to have such unfortunate consequences for the Russia Company and to end in disaster and death for Elton himself.

At the end of June in that year the vessel which Elton had just built at Kazan for the conveyance of the British merchants' goods between Astrakhan and the Persian ports on the Caspian arrived at Enzeli on her maiden voyage.⁵ She carried a composite crew of Russian and British seamen and was commanded by Captain Woodroffe; Captain Elton was also on board. When her cargo of English goods had been discharged at Enzeli, for disposal in Persia, the vessel was taken into the service of the Persian Government, and was used on two occasions in 1742 for the conveyance of rice to Darband; the troubles that arose with the Russians in consequence of these voyages and of Elton's other actions will be described in Appendix I. By utilising this British vessel for the transport of rice from Persia, Nadir was able, to some extent, to break through the monopolistic ring formed by the Russian traders for the conveyance of foodstuffs by sea to his forces in Daghistan; this was

¹ *T.N.*, p. 234. It is difficult to say whether Nadir seriously intended to do this.

² Butkov, Vol. I, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 213. See also Soloviev, Vol. XXI, p. 200.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 235.

⁵ The circumstances under which the trade connection between Great Britain and Persia via Russia was established are described in Appendix I.

undoubtedly the initial reason for the development of the crisis between the Russian Government and the Russia Company, and was the cause of Elton and Woodroffe meeting with such hostility from Russian officials at Resht and Darband in 1742.

In consequence of repeated attacks by the Daghistanis, Nadir, in July, 1742, made an entrenched camp in the north of Tabarsaran, near Gubden, where, it is said, he intended to found a town.¹ It was only with the greatest difficulty that provisions could be brought to this camp; besides being short of food, the Persian troops and convoys were subjected to frequent attacks by the Lazgis, Qaraqaitaqs and other hostile tribesmen. In consequence of the sufferings of his men and their heavy losses through casualties and wastage, Nadir cynically called his new camp "Iran Kharab" or "ruined Persia."² The great heat and the badness of the water there caused some form of plague to break out, which particularly affected the Afghan troops; so serious did this outbreak become that Nadir transferred the sufferers to another camp some thirty miles to the north, near Buinaq, and forbade anyone to mention the epidemic.³

Kalushkin had repeatedly endeavoured to convince the Shah that the Daghistan campaign would have evil consequences for Persia,⁴ but he paid no heed to these words. Being apprehensive lest he should violate Russian territory, Kalushkin urged his Government to reinforce its troops on the frontier; the Russian Government did as he recommended, thereby, as will be seen below, causing Nadir to modify his aims. Soon after making this recommendation, Kalushkin died; he was succeeded as Resident by his interpreter, Vasili Bratishchev.⁵

By degrees the Persian troops obtained the ascendancy over the tribesmen in Tabarsaran, and Nadir therefore decided to make another attempt to conquer Avaria and also to punish the Qumiqs, although the latter step would involve crossing the Russian frontier. Hearing that a strong force of Russians had reached Kizliar, he abandoned his idea of attacking the Qumiqs, but he persisted in his design against the Avars.⁶

After an initial defeat, the Persians captured Aq Qusha in August, 1742, and advanced on Avaria and the towns of Kafir Qumuq and Ghazanish.⁷ An advance-guard 6,000 strong was ambushed by the Lazgis in a defile, and was compelled to retreat after sustaining heavy loss.

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 213.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 213. Lerch, in Bösching's *Magazin* Vol. X, p. 399.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 213 and 214.

⁴ Hanway quotes the following Persian proverb: "If any Persian king is a fool, let him march against the Lesgees" (Vol. IV, p. 223).

⁵ Soloviev, Vol. XXI, p. 201.

⁶ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 220. Bratishchev reported that Nadir was less truculent after he had heard of the arrival of Russian reinforcements on the frontier (see Soloviev, Vol. XXI, p. 201).

⁷ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 215. For an explanation of how Kafir Qumuq received its opprobrious name, see Barthold's article on Daghistan in *E.I.*, Vol. I, p. 890.

The Shah, in a paroxysm of rage, gave orders for several of the officers of the defeated force to be put to death. In September, he himself led the advance, and employed no less than 3,000 men with axes to clear a track through the jungle.¹ At one village, which was, apparently, near the Avar-Qoisu, the Persians met with a severe check, and were compelled to retreat.² Avaria continued unconquered, and, consequently, the key to Daghistan remained beyond Nadir's reach. It was, apparently, at this juncture that another Persian force climbed the mountain on which the Usmi's stronghold of Quraish was situated, and in three days carried the fortress by assault. Ahmad Khan, however, escaped before his stronghold fell, and fled to Avaria.³ The Qaraqaitaq tribe, having lost their main fortress and being deprived of their leader, submitted to the Persians.⁴

In October, Nadir retreated from the borders of Avaria, and marched via Tarkhu and Bashli to Iran Kharab, where he made his winter quarters.

It was, apparently, at Iran Kharab⁵ that an event took place in the autumn of 1742 which was destined to cast a gloom over the last few years of Nadir's life; this event was the blinding of Rida Quli Mirza because of his alleged instigation of the attempt upon his father's life in Mazandaran in the previous year.

A number of writers, both contemporary and of later date, have endeavoured to set out the history of this tragic affair; while some of these authorities maintain that the prince was innocent, others assert that he was guilty, and they also differ in other, but less essential, respects. In the account given below, the data have been taken as far as possible from those sources which seemed most worthy of credence.

For some time after the attempt was made, all efforts to track down the would-be assassin and bring him to justice were unsuccessful, but the man was at length found near Oba, in the province of Herat. His name was Nik Qadam, and he had been a guard in the service of Dilavar Khan of Tayimani.⁶ After his arrest, he was sent in custody to Daghistan and reached the royal camp some time during the summer of 1742. When he was brought before Nadir, the latter examined him in private; according to 'Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari, the man, when pressed by the Shah to disclose the identity of the person who had induced him to fire the shot, boldly replied that no one had done so, and said that he had fired because

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 215.

² This may possibly have been the village of Arakani where, Mr. J. F. Baddeley has informed me, there is a local tradition that Nadir was never able to advance beyond that point, owing to the brave resistance of the inhabitants.

³ T.N., p. 235.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See Barin, p. 292, and Lerch's *Nachricht* (in Büsching's *Magazin*, Vol. X, p. 400). According to Bratishchev's *Nachricht*, p. 495, however, the blinding was carried out at Bashli.

⁶ T.N., p. 231.

he wished to rid the world of a tyrant. According to Muḥammad Kazim, however, Nadir, at the beginning of the private interview, promised the man his life if he would state who had prompted him to fire; Nik Qadam thereupon named Riḍa Quli. He had, he explained, been one of the prince's bodyguard and his prowess as a marksman had often attracted Riḍa Quli's notice; one day, when the prince was in the company of Muḥammad Husain Khan Qajar and Raḥim Sultan of Merv, he asked Nik Qadam whether he would attempt to shoot the Shah. Nik Qadam agreed to do so, and went specially to Herat for that purpose in June, 1740, but no opportunity of doing the deed arose. After the disbandment of Riḍa Quli's bodyguard at Qara Tāppā, he again urged Nik Qadam to kill his father, and the man lay in wait repeatedly, but it was not until the Shah was marching from Sari to Ashraf that he was able to fire; his shot, however, missed its mark. The prince's enemies had already repeatedly alleged that he had been responsible for the deed, and these allegations had, as had been intended, come to Nadir's ears; he was, as was natural, much upset at hearing that these allegations were (apparently) confirmed, and he determined to send for Riḍa Quli and tax him with the crime. As for Nik Qadam, he kept his promise that the man's life should be spared, but he deprived him of his sight.¹

The above account sounds plausible, but one must bear in mind that Muḥammad Kazim was in Turkistan at the time, and that he, therefore, had no first-hand knowledge of the matter. He was incorrect (as has already been pointed out) in stating that the attempt on Nadir's life was made between Sari and Ashraf, and he does not explain how he was able to reproduce, as he purports to do, the actual conversation between Nadir and Nik Qadam at the *private* interview.² He was likewise wrong in stating that Nik Qadam had been in Riḍa Quli's service.

It is, of course, possible that Nik Qadam did, in fact, accuse the prince, but it by no means follows that, if he did so, he was speaking the truth. In the chapter of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* relating to events in Daghestan between 1741 and 1743, Mirza Mahdi makes no mention of the blinding of the prince, but, in the concluding portion of his book, which he wrote after Nadir's death, when he no longer had any motive for withholding or distorting the truth, he clearly stated that the Shah's mind had been poisoned against his son by the "evil whisperings and imputations" (*wasawis wa tarwahumat*) of malicious persons³; earlier in his book he

¹ *K.N.*, pp. 583-588.

² Cf. his record of Nadir's confidential advice to Riḍa Quli at Bahar Sufla (see p. 168 above).

³ *T.N.*, p. 263. Malcolm (Vol. II, p. 97) stated that Nadir "is believed to have had no evidence of his son's guilt but his own suspicions"; in a footnote on the same page he said: "I have conversed with the descendants of several of Nadir's chief *amirahs* (i.e., *umara*), who all concurred in the truth of Mirza Mahdi's statement of this fact."

had stated that the instigator of the attempt was Aqa Mirza, a son of Dilavar Khan, of Tayimani.¹ Père Bazin² and Dr. Lerch,³ both of whom should have been well informed and who could have had no reason to misrepresent what had occurred, firmly believed in the prince's innocence.

When Nadir at length came to the conclusion that Rida Quli was guilty, he summoned him from Tehran and accused him of the crime. The prince repeatedly denied that he was guilty, but his pleas were disregarded. After reflecting for some time and consulting his advisers, Nadir decided to punish his son by blinding him. The sentence was carried out in his presence and of that of a number of his nobles, many of whom he afterwards put to death because they had not offered to undergo the punishment in place of the prince.⁴ Nadir is said to have been so overcome with grief after this terrible scene that he retired to his tent and did not reappear for three days. Malcolm, quoting from some unspecified MS., states that Nadir, after his son had been blinded, informed him that his crimes had brought this terrible punishment upon him. The prince bitterly retorted: "It is not my eyes that you have put out, but those of Persia."⁵

To sum up, one is, it would seem, justified in believing that Rida Quli was, in reality, innocent; his extremely foolish behaviour, however, had undoubtedly lent some colour to the insinuations and allegations against him, and it was his misfortune that his trial (if so it may be termed) took place at a time when Nadir was greatly embittered by reason of his reverses at the hands of the Lazgis, and when there was no 'Alavi Khan at hand to exert a restraining influence. Had Nik Qadam been caught red-handed immediately after he had fired at Nadir, it is possible that the prince might have escaped punishment and that he might not even have been accused at all.⁶

When Rida Quli had sufficiently recovered, he was, at his own request, sent to Mashhad.

In November, 1742, Nadir set out for the north, with the intention,

¹ T.N., p. 230.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 292; Bazin, after asserting his belief in Rida Quli's innocence, said: "Mais au Tribunal d'un Usurpateur le soupçon vaut la preuve."

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 400. Hanway (Vol. IV, p. 210), Bratishchev (pp. 477 and 478), 'Abdu'l-Karim Bukhari (p. 49) and (as seen above) Muhammad Kazim believed that the prince was guilty.

⁴ Bazin, p. 292. According to Muhammad Kazim (K.N., p. 611), Nadir, after secluding himself for two days, mounted his throne, summoned his leaders and violently upbraided them for not having endeavoured to intercede on behalf of his son. "There is not," he cried, "any (good) quality or any feeling of religion or nobility in the tribe of the Persians. . . . When I was overcome with anger, I ordered three or four of you to be put to death, but the shame will always remain."

⁵ Malcolm, Vol. II, p. 97, and the *Mafta'u'sh-Shams*, Vol. II, p. 17. Muhammad Kazim has a slightly different version: some days after the blinding had been carried out, Nadir visited his son. Both wept; then Rida Quli said: "Although thou hast removed my eyes from their sockets, be not heedless of the fact that thou hast plucked out thy own eyes and ruined thy career."

⁶ It is stated in the *Bayan* (fol. 99 (b)) that Nadir was perfectly calm after the attempt on his life, and that he resolved to punish no one until after a full investigation had been made.

apparently, of crossing the frozen Terek and marching on Kizliar, to which place he laid claim on the grounds that it had formerly belonged to Persia.¹ In taking this decision, he was influenced by messages which he had just received from the ruler of the Chechens, stating that he wished to become a Persian subject and offering to show him routes by which he could invade Russia. He also, it appears, had the design of forcing his way through to the Crimea² via Kabarda and Kuban.

It seemed for a time as if war between Persia and Russia was inevitable.³ Bratishchev, in reporting to St. Petersburg the warlike intentions of the Shah, said that Elton had offered to lend his vessel to him in the event of war breaking out.⁴

Having for some time past been apprehensive of a hostile move by Nadir, Russia had considerably strengthened her troops on the southern frontier. Furthermore, since Turkey and Persia wished to attack each other by marching through the southern Caucasus, Russia took special measures to cultivate the friendship of the people of Kabarda.⁵ However, the menacing attitude of Turkey towards Persia prevented the latter from attacking Russia. The Shah had already received several reports of the movement of large Turkish forces towards the Persian frontier, and the arrival of a Turkish embassy at the Persian camp early in 1743, with a message from the Sultan in which he categorically refused to recognise the Ja'fari sect or to agree to the erection of the additional column or pillar in the Ka'ba, caused him to renounce his idea of invading Russia and to decide on war with Turkey instead.⁶ On the 15th Dhu'l-Hijja,

¹ Butkov, Vol. I, p. 220. According to a letter from St. Petersburg, dated the 2nd February, 1743, which was published in the London paper, the *Daily Post*, on the 21st of that month, news had been received at the former capital that Colonel Selenski, the Commandant of the fortress of Kizliar, had been brought in irons to Moscow because he had "given assistance to the Rebels of Daghestan against Schach Nadir, which was the Occasion of that Monarch's advancing towards our Frontiers, and threatening to break with this Court unless satisfaction was given to him on that Head."

² Butkov, Vol. I, p. 220, says that Nadir ordered the route from Enderi to the Cherkass country and the Crimea to be surveyed.

³ In Lord Carteret's despatch of the 15th/26th February, 1743, to Sir Cyril Wich, it is stated *inter alia*: "The French flatter themselves there must be a war with Persia (i.e., between Persia and Russia), and rejoice much in it. They have a notion that the present Sophy has long had an Eye to the Russian Dominions and did formerly demand the present Empress, when Princess, in Marriage, for himself or Son, but being refused and so disappointed of coming to the Succession that way, He will try to obtain his end by conquest" (S.P. 91, Vol. XXXIV); in regard to Nadir's alleged proposal of marriage to the Empress Anna (not Elizabeth), see Note 6 on p. 91 above.

⁴ Soloviev, Vol. XXI, p. 202. Neither Woodroffe nor Hanway mentions this offer, but it is possible that it may have been made. Elton at that time (December, 1742/January, 1743) had certainly reason to complain of the treatment to which Woodroffe and he had been subjected by the Russian officials in Persia.

⁵ For particulars of these measures, see Butkov, Vol. I, p. 224.

⁶ T.N., p. 236. The Shah's decision naturally came as a great relief to the Russian Court. On the 12th/23rd March, 1743, Sir C. Wich reported to Whitehall: "Proof of the Russian Court's being not apprehensive in that the nine regiments sent towards Astrakhan are now ordered back to Petersburg." (S.P. 91, Vol. XXXIV.)

1155 (10th February, 1743), he set out on his southward march.¹ He left the Abdali chief 'Abdu'l-Ghani in command of the Darband garrison.²

The brave mountaineers of Daghistan, aided by their forests and mountain ranges, had proved more than a match for the conqueror and his veterans. All that he had been able to do was to subdue the lowlands of Daghistan and capture a few isolated fortresses such as Quraish. The cost to Nadir in terms of man-power, as well as in material resources, was tremendous, and his prestige naturally suffered greatly from his failure to achieve any real success.

In blizzards and extreme cold, the Persian host dragged its way southwards towards the Mughan steppes. The troops suffered terribly from hunger as well as from cold, and were even reduced to the extremity of eating pies made of human flesh. So many men and animals died on the road from the Samur to Shabaran that it was strewn with bodies and carcasses.³ The difficulties encountered and the hardships suffered on this terrible march are evidenced by the fact that it took no less than forty days for the army to go from Darband to the Kura.⁴

Meanwhile, serious trouble had occurred in Khwarizm, where a certain Nur 'Ali Khan, having quarrelled with Tahir Beg, had sought refuge with the Aral Turkomans and had induced them to attack his enemy. Assisted by these Turkomans and by his partisans in Khwarizm, Nur 'Ali, after capturing Yengi (New) Urgench and the city of Khiva, besieged Tahir Beg in the citadel of the latter place. Tahir Beg sent urgent appeals for help to Nasrullah at Mashhad, but the prince was unable to come to his assistance. After a siege of several weeks, Tahir Beg was forced to surrender, and was then put to death by Nur 'Ali in revenge for Ilbars's execution. Nur 'Ali Beg thereupon mounted the throne of Khwarizm.⁵ Thus it was that in both the extreme north-west and extreme north-east of his empire Nadir had suffered a reverse, but his lack of success was more conspicuous in Daghistan and his far heavier losses there were much more damaging to his reputation than were the defeat and death of Tahir Beg.

¹ T.N., p. 236.

² Butkov, Vol. I, p. 226.

³ Ibid. p. 227.

⁴ T.N., p. 237.

⁵ K.N., pp. 625-628. Owing to a severe famine which broke out six months later, Nur 'Ali was deserted by his Turkoman allies and was then expelled from Khiva by the loyalist section of the community. Nasrullah, who had in the meantime proceeded to Merv, marched from there to Khiva and, acting on Nadir's orders, placed Ilbars's son Abu'l-Ghazi, then a youth of fourteen, on the throne, and made an *iray* named Irtaq Inaq his chief minister.

CHAPTER XXI

OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1740-1747, AND THE SECOND 'OMAN EXPEDITION

IN Chapter XVIII the history of the Persian operations in the Persian Gulf and in 'Oman was given up to the beginning of May, 1740, when the fleet had reassembled off Gombroon after the abortive Makran expedition.

At this time the Arab seamen were in a very discontented state, as their pay had once more fallen into arrears and they were not receiving sufficient rations. Matters came to a head early in September, 1740, when a general mutiny broke out at Laft, where the fleet then was; the mutineers killed the Admiral, Mir 'Ali Khan, and all the other Persians who offered resistance, and then removed the entire fleet to Khor Fakkan¹; some of the vessels were afterwards taken to the island of Qais. The Gombroon Agent thus commented on this mutiny:

"... unless the Arabs are brought back to Obedience We believe it has entirely Frustrated his Majestie's great Scheme of a Fleet, since these are the People who could only have been brought to accomplish his purpose, the Persians being entirely Averse to, as well as Ignorant of, Sea Affairs which indeed the Scituation and Nature of their Country, not productive of any one Requisite for the Purpose, seems to disallow..."²

A few days later the new Admiral, Mahmud Taqi Khan by name, arrived at Gombroon. After requesting the Agent to arrange for the sale of a large ship, the Admiral wrote to the ringleader of the mutineers urging him and his associates to submit to the East India Company; the Agent also wrote to the same effect, and the trankey conveying these letters sailed under English colours.³

Without waiting for a reply, the Admiral forced the Dutch to lend him two of their ships which were then anchored off Gombroon. The Admiral boarded one of these ships and sailed off, in company with the other, as well as some smaller vessels, to attack the Arabs. An engagement took place between this fleet and two large Arab ships, a brigantine and a number of trankeys. After both sides had fired some shots, the Arabs attempted to board one of the Dutch ships, but they were beaten off; the

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 26th August/6th September, 1740; Otter, Vol. II, p. 130.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 14th/25th September, 1740.

other Dutch ship, with the Admiral on board, kept at a distance and exchanged fire with the Arabs at long range. When night fell both the Dutch ships and the smaller craft sailed away, pursued by the Arabs.¹ Neither the Admiral nor the Dutch had any reason to be proud of the part they had played in this engagement, but there was more excuse for the Admiral than there was for the Dutch, for he had never been at sea before.

Later in the month the Admiral quarrelled with the Dutch, and placed armed guards on their ships. Meanwhile, the Huwala Arabs and the mutineers roved and raided where they pleased in the Gulf; in November, they appeared off Cong, and in the following month they made a further attempt to take Bahrain.

When Nadir heard of the mutiny and the Huwala revolt, he sent orders for 6,000 men to be collected and 15,000 tomans to be raised, and endeavoured to purchase more vessels at Surat; he is said to have ordered no less than eleven ships from there in 1741²; one of these new ships arrived from Surat in May, 1741. Meanwhile, the Arabs had, as usual, fallen out amongst themselves, and some of them had opened negotiations with the Government authorities. There was thus a definite improvement in the situation in the Gulf.

In the summer of 1741, Nadir evolved and speedily sought to put into execution a new project, namely, the building of his own warships at Bushire. In the absence of definite information, one can only conjecture what Nadir's reasons were for taking this decision. It is probable that his primary aim was to make Persia self-sufficing as regards shipbuilding; his love of independence and absolute authority must have rendered it irksome to him to be beholden to the East India Company, which, besides expecting cash for each vessel supplied, generally demanded, as an additional *quid pro quo*, the grant of some new privilege or the restoration of some former one. In the second place, he may have imagined that, by using his own labour and materials, he would be able to obtain his ships at a much lower cost than he could by purchase; Surat ships, as has already been stated, were very expensive.³ Unfortunately for himself, Nadir, when formulating this scheme, did not take into account the enormous difficulties that would be met with as soon as endeavours were made to put it into practice.

¹ An English gunner who was on board a Persian ketch witnessed this engagement (though his vessel does not appear to have taken part in the fighting); on his return to Gombroon, he made a full report to the Agent of what had occurred (see *Saidanika's Selections from State Papers*, p. 55 and the *Gombroon Diary*, 12th/23rd October, 1740).

² See H. Dodwell's reference, in *A Calendar of the Madras Records, 1740-1744* (Madras, 1917), p. 235, to a letter from Stephen Law, at Bombay, to Fort St. George, dated 9th Dec., 1741.

³ Furthermore, it is possible that Nadir may have felt that there would be more control over the disbursement of public funds at Bushire than at Surat; shortly before this time, according to Muhammad Kazim (*K.N.*, p. 370), the Persian agents at Surat had misappropriated 8,000 tomans that had been remitted there for the purchase of a ship.

One of the most formidable obstacles to be overcome was the complete lack of suitable timber on the Gulf coast; Nadir, in characteristic fashion, sought to solve this problem by having his timber cut in the Mazandaran forests and sending it right across the country to Bushire, a distance of over 600 miles. Early in September, 1741, it was reported that he had ordered carts to be made for the transport of this timber,¹ but in actual practice it had to be carried on men's shoulders for the greater part of the way, owing to the lack of roads and the mountainous country that had to be traversed; the transport of timber in this fashion caused as much suffering to Nadir's unfortunate subjects as did the conveyance of the huge blocks of marble from Maragha to Mashhad and Kalat. After receiving a request from Nadir for the loan of carpenters and the supply of stores and materials, the Gombroon Agent made the following comment upon the Shah's ambitious project:

"But what probability there is of such mighty Affairs being accomplished may in part be guessed by the means they are obliged to use for procuring Timber Bringing it near Sixty Days on Men's Shoulders from Mazanderoon, and They must come at every other material with equal difficulty."²

Time was to prove the wisdom of these words.

It was stated in the *Gombroon Diary* on the 27th November/8th December, 1741, that Nadir had ordered several ships to be built at Bushire:

"... of one hundred Guz Shaw³ or upwards of Three hundred English feet length by the Keel and proportionate Dimensions; one particularly is to have 500 (*sic*—? 50) guns and to bear his (i.e., Nadir's) Name, and they are to be supplied with Workmen and Stores from the Europeans."

For the provision of the armament, a cannon foundry was erected at Gombroon, where it was intended to cast 300 cannon; two copper cannon

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 25th August/5th September, 1741. See also Bazin, p. 318, and the *K.N.*, p. 308; it is stated in the latter work that Nadir ordered the governors of Resht, Lahijan, Mazandaran, Fars, the Garmsirat, etc. to send "to the sea of Qulzum (presumably the Persian Gulf) skilled carpenters who could build "grabs" and other types of vessel.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 27th November/8th December. The Agent stated that Nadir's *raqam* ordered the Company to supply:

"three knowing Men, Carpenters to Effect a purpose he has of building Ships at Boucheir, and That we also supply the People with what Stores they may want on a receipt given us for which We are to be paid their Value by the Beglerbeggy. . . . But if We fail in this Service, He shall let us feel his Displeasure."

A similar *raqam* was addressed to the Dutch.

³ "Guz Shaw" is intended for *gas-i-shah* or *shah gas* (more correctly, *gas*): a *gas* or *shah gas* was equivalent to about 41 inches. There is an obvious mistake in these figures, because it was never found practicable, even in western shipyards, to build wooden vessels of such a length as this, as the hulls could not be made rigid enough. My friend, Admiral Ballard, has informed me that two mid-Victorian frigates, the *Orlando* and *Merrsey*, were 300 feet long, but that, "though built of the best oak on the soundest principles of naval architecture, they sagged so badly from the natural elasticity of long timber structures that they were total failures on service."

were cast there in September, 1741.¹ In the following month the Company's "linguist" at Isfahan reported the arrival there of the first consignment of Mazandaran timber; it is believed to have reached Bushire later in the year or at the beginning of 1742. The unfortunate peasants had to transport this material themselves, and large numbers perished of exhaustion.² The manner in which this material was utilised will be described later in this chapter.

In June, 1741, Imam Verdi Khan, the Sardar or General of the Gar-mirat, who took precedence over the Admiral, quarrelled with the latter and imprisoned him at Cong. The Sardar later had some conversations with the English Agent, in the course of which he "talked of the mighty Designs to be prosecuted with this Fleet, but in a way that showed his Ignorance of such matters."³ In October, Imam Verdi Khan asked the Dutch Agent to lend him two ships that were then off Gombroon to take part in another expedition against the rebel Arabs. The Dutch Agent made such difficulties that the Sardar at length seized the two ships, sent the two Dutch captains and their officers and men ashore, and sailed off to attack the enemy at Qais. After the Persian fleet had landed some 500 men on the island, the Arab ships appeared and opened fire.

The Sardar's ship engaged and sank one of the mutineers' vessels with heavy loss of life, and then proceeded to engage another ship. Being apparently dissatisfied with the short range of his guns, Imam Verdi Khan ordered one of them to be doubly charged; the result was that, when the gun was fired, it burst, killing a score of men and mortally wounding the Sardar himself. Although he knew but little of naval matters, he certainly knew how to die. "Do not let the enemy know!" he said and died soon afterwards.⁴ Both sides having suffered severely, then broke off the battle; the advantage rested with the Arabs, because of the loss of the Sardar and of most of the men whom the Persians had landed on the island of Qais before the action began.

At the beginning of January, 1742, two new 14-gun ships arrived at Gombroon from Sind, and, much to the annoyance of the English Agent, another vessel was acquired at Bushire by "unauthorised purchase" from a private individual named Peacock.⁵ It was at this time that Taqi Khan Shirazi, having been reinstated in his former position of Beglarbegi, arrived at Gombroon. In the following month the keel of a large ship

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 13th/24th September.

² Bazin, p. 319.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 25th July/5th August, 1741.

⁴ *K.N.*, p. 367, and *Gombroon Diary*, 26th October/6th November; according to Muhammad Kazim, Imam Verdi Khan had a maund (6½ lbs.) of flesh torn off when the gun exploded. Otter (Vol. II, pp. 156 and 157) mentions this battle, but is incorrect in saying that it was the Persian admiral who perished on this occasion.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 27th January/7th February, 1741.

was laid at Bushire¹; at this time the Persian navy consisted of fifteen ships (a few of which were still at Surat or on their way from that place).

Events in 'Oman were now once more to lead to Persian intervention. After the Persians had, as related in Chapter XVIII, been forced to retire from Muscat to Julfar in 1738, the Imam Saif ibn Sulṭān was supreme for a time. His licentious ways, however, soon outraged the feelings of many of his subjects, with the result that in February, 1742, they again broke into open revolt,² deposed Saif and conferred the Imamate on his cousin, Sulṭān ibn Murshid.³ Saif, as before, appealed to the Persians for aid, and Taqī Khan sent a favourable reply. The opposition, however, seemed likely to be strong, because the Huwala Arabs had joined the supporters of Sulṭān ibn Murshid.

As the Huwala Arabs had seized Khasab, near Ras Musandam, the Persian garrison at Julfar marched on the Huwalas there in April, 1742, and inflicted a crushing defeat on them. Shaikh Rama, one of the principal Huwala leaders, was killed in the battle, and over 500 Arabs were captured.⁴ On the 10th/21st June the Persian fleet sailed for Julfar, carrying reinforcements and stores⁵; but it was not until the following November that Kalb 'Alī Khan (who had become Sardar of the Garmsirat after the death of Iman Verdi Khan) crossed over to the Arabian shore. He was followed three weeks later by Taqī Khan himself. By this time the Persian fleet had been further strengthened by the arrival of four new ships from Surat.

Taqī Khan, on meeting Saif ibn Sulṭān at Julfar, concluded a treaty whereby he undertook to restore him to the Imamate if he would, in return, recognise the suzerainty of Persia. The allies then proceeded to attack Sulṭān ibn Murshid and his adherents.⁶ While a portion of the Persian army, under Kalb 'Alī Khan, laid siege to Ṣoḥar, the Beglarbegi and Saif ibn Sulṭān proceeded by sea to Muscat, which was still held by partisans of the ex-Imam.⁷ The Persian troops were able to go where they wished in the town, but Saif ibn Sulṭān refused them access to the forts of al-Jalali and Marani. Taqī Khan then resolved to get possession of these forts

¹ Letter from the Gombroon Agent to London, dated the 18th February/1st March, 1742.

² According to Shaikh Abu Sulaiman (see Guillaín, Vol. I, p. 535), the date of Sulṭān ibn Murshid's elevation to the Imamate was the 10th Dhu'l-Hijja, 1154 (16th February, 1742). Saif ibn Raziq is obviously wrong in saying (p. 145) that Sulṭān ibn Murshid became Imam in 1151 (1738/9); it is clear from the *Gombroon Diary* that the revolution took place early in 1742, because the Agent of the E.I.Co. received a letter at the beginning of April of that year from the Beglarbegi asking for ships to take troops across to the assistance of Saif ibn Sulṭān. See also Otter, Vol. II, p. 163.

³ Sulṭān ibn Murshid's mother was a daughter of Saif ibn Sulṭān I (Guillaín, Vol. I, p. 535).

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 19th/30th April, 1742; Otter, Vol. II, p. 169.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10th/21st June, 1742; Otter, Vol. II, p. 168, says that Taqī Khan, on this occasion, sent 6,000 men to Julfar in response to the deposed Imam's appeal for assistance.

⁶ Guillaín, Vol. I, p. 536, Otter, Vol. II, p. 163.

⁷ Guillaín, Vol. I, p. 537.

by foul means if he could not do so by fair. Knowing the weakness of Saif ibn Sulṭān for drink, he had brought a cask of Shiraz wine from Persia. When invited, with some of his officers, to a banquet in Marani fort, Taqi Khan brought this cask of wine with him, and succeeded in making Saif and his officers completely drunk; this, it appears, was no difficult proceeding insofar as Saif was concerned. Whilst Saif and his officers were lying insensible, Taqi Khan and the Persians with him secured possession of the fort without difficulty or bloodshed. The Beglarbegi then stole Saif's seal and affixed it to an order which he had had written in the latter's name charging the commander of the fort of al-Jalali to admit the Persian troops. The Arab commander, suspecting nothing, obeyed the order. When Saif recovered his senses, he found, to his dismay, that both forts were in the possession of the Persians.¹

It being useless to attempt to regain the forts, Saif decided to continue the war against Sulṭān ibn Murshid.

Ṣoḥar was very ably defended by the Governor, Aḥmad ibn Sa'id, who, as will be seen below, later founded the Al-Bu Sa'id dynasty of Muscat. Taqi Khan and Saif ibn Sulṭān advanced against Sulṭān ibn Murshid, who, finding his forces out-numbered, retired towards Ṣoḥar, where he hoped to be able to break through the Persian lines and join Aḥmad ibn Sa'id. Sulṭān ibn Murshid succeeded, apparently, in entering Ṣoḥar, but he was killed soon after, when leading a sortie.² Aḥmad, however, continued bravely to resist the Persians until July, when, having begun to run short of food and munitions, he deemed it expedient to come to terms.³ The siege had lasted for seven or eight months, and had cost the Persians over 3,000 men.⁴

Shortly after the death of Sulṭān ibn Murshid, Saif ibn Sulṭān, being overcome with grief at witnessing the state to which his own behaviour and acts had reduced his country, left the Persians and retired to Rustaq, where he died a few days later. In such inglorious fashion the Ya'riba dynasty of 'Oman came to an end.⁵

It is to be noted that, if Saif ibn Sulṭān had succeeded, with the help

¹ This is the story as given by Niebuhr, in his *Beschreibung von Arabien* (p. 300); Guillaumin gives a slightly different version. The Agent of the E.I.Co. at Gombroon received a letter from the Persian Government on the 18th February, 1743, stating that the Beglarbegi had captured Muscat. Reports of Taqi Khan's subterfuge must have been spread abroad, for the Agent added that it was supposed that the place had been taken "by dealing under-hand with the Imam's slaves to deliver him the forts."

² Guillaumin, Vol. I, p. 538. Some uncertainty exists as to whether Sulṭān ibn Murshid was killed in this way or whether he perished when attempting to force his way through the Persian lines.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 21st July, 1743. The news of the capitulation was received in Gombroon by trankey from Ṣoḥar on that day. See also Niebuhr's *Beschreibung*, p. 301.

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 21st July. Saif ibn Raziq's account of the siege (p. 140) is grossly exaggerated, and Otter's statements (Vol. II, p. 181) are incorrect.

⁵ Guillaumin, Vol. I, 538.

of the Persians, in securing his reinstatement as Imam and if he had then accepted, as he had agreed to do, the suzerainty of Persia, Zanzibar and the dependencies of 'Oman on the African mainland would *ipso facto* have likewise formed, in theory at least, part of Nadir's empire.¹

The astute Ahmad ibn Sa'id managed to ingratiate himself with Taqi Khan to such an extent that he not only obtained confirmation of his position as Governor of Sohar, but also had Barka added to his domains.²

It is stated in the *Gombroon Diary* that 3,500 recruits were to be sent over to Arabia, to replace those who had lost their lives at Sohar and elsewhere :

"the King having ordered that when they were Masters of the Sea-Shore to march inland and it is supposed his Designs are to conquer the whole Country, but while he is doing this he is destroying his Own, and Nothing but Misery, Tyranny and Oppression are to be seen or heard in these Parts, the People being daily tax'd (so) that before Time is given for collecting one Another is laid on."³

Meanwhile, the war between Persia and Turkey, which had been threatening for so long, at last broke out. Nevertheless, Nadir did not order the withdrawal of his forces from 'Oman, with the exception of some vessels at Sohar which, it appears, he intended to use in the combined land and river operations against Basra.⁴

For some time past there had been serious friction between Taqi Khan and Kalb 'Ali, and each sent to Nadir accusations against the other. The Shah was greatly displeased, and ordered both to be recalled ; he appointed Muhammad Husain Khan Qiriqlu, who had just returned from a mission to Russia, to succeed Kalb 'Ali as Sardar of the Garmsirat.⁵ Early in October the new Sardar passed through Gombroon on his way to Sohar.

Taqi Khan, with part of the fleet, arrived at Gombroon on the 20th November/1st December, and was followed a few days later by Kalb 'Ali Khan ; the latter secretly informed the Company's "linguist" that Taqi Khan had actually revolted and that he had spent several days trying to persuade him (Kalb 'Ali) to join in the revolt. Taqi Khan had the ex-Sardar strangled a few days later and caused his body to be thrown down a well⁶ ; he then publicly raised the standard of revolt and marched off

¹ The internal troubles in 'Oman had, however, led to a weakening of the 'Omani authority in East Africa, which resulted in the loss of Mombasa (which the Portuguese temporarily regained) in 1733 ; see O. Kersten's *Tabelarische Uebersicht der Geschichte Ostafrikas*, pp. 17 and 28, in Vol. III of Baron von der Decken's *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, Leipzig, 1879.

² Guillaum, Vol. I, p. 538, Niebuhr, p. 301, Salil ibn Raziq, pp. 149 and 150.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 21st July/1st August, 1743.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 24th August/4th September. These vessels must have arrived too late to participate in the initial operations (for particulars of the siege of Basra, see the ensuing Chapter).

⁵ *Autobiography of Mirza Muhammad Shirazi*, p. 16.

⁶ *Gombroon Diary*, 30th December, 1743/10th January, 1744.

to Shiraz. The measures which Nadir took to quell this revolt will be given in Chapter XXIV; all that is necessary to say here is that Nadir was so occupied in suppressing it that he was unable to pay any attention to 'Oman. When he had overcome Taqi Khan, he became so taken up with the prosecution of the Turkish war that he was likewise unable to concern himself with affairs in 'Oman. In consequence, the Persian garrison there received no reinforcements. The able Ahmad ibn Sa'id took advantage of this situation. One of the conditions of his settlement with the Persians at Sohar had been that he was to pay them tribute regularly, but, after Taqi Khan's departure, he failed to make his payments on the appointed dates, alleging that he had no means of sending the money to Muscat. As a result, the commanders at that place became short of money and were unable to pay their troops, many of whom consequently deserted.¹ Having invited these commanders to Barka, on the pretext of arranging for the payment of the tribute due, Ahmad seized them and the soldiers who had accompanied them; he then proceeded to Muscat and summoned the Persians there to surrender, offering them money if they yielded of their own accord, but threatening them with imprisonment if they did not. Being deprived of their leaders and short of provisions, and having no hope of being able to resist, the majority surrendered. It is said that Ahmad put some of these troops to death, but allowed the others to return to Persia.² In this way, he became master of the coast from Muscat to Sohar, and he later extended his sway over the whole country, with the exception of Julfar and a small strip of adjacent territory which the Persians managed to retain for some years.³ Having expelled the invaders and restored order in 'Oman, he had no difficulty in inducing the chief Qadi to arrange for his election as Imam, thus founding the Al-Bu-Sa'id dynasty, which rules in Muscat to this day. The election of Ahmad to the Imamate is said to have taken place in the latter part of 1744.⁴

Insofar as Persia was concerned, the 'Oman campaigns had proved a costly failure. At least 20,000 men had perished either in battle or from the ravages of disease,⁵ but this heavy sacrifice brought no commensurate advantage. Like the Daghistan campaigns, but on a lesser scale, the 'Oman operations imposed a prolonged and useless drain upon Nadir's

¹ Niebuhr's *Beschreibung*, p. 302, Guillaum, Vol. I, p. 539.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303. Salih ibn Raziq's account (pp. 153 and 154) of Ahmad's treachery to the Persians and his subsequent massacre of them seems much exaggerated.

³ Entries in the *Gombroon Diary* show that, as late as 1748, ships carrying men and provisions were sent over from time to time to Julfar.

⁴ Guillaum, Vol. I, p. 542, and Kersten's *Tabellarische Uebersicht*, p. 18. Salih ibn Raziq states (p. 152) that Ahmad ibn Sa'id became Imam in 1154 A.H. (1741/1742), but this is clearly incorrect.

⁵ There are several references in the *Gombroon Diary* to heavy wastage from disease in the Persian armies in 'Oman.

resources, and the efforts to provide men and material to carry them on caused much privation and suffering in Southern Persia.

Nevertheless, success would certainly have been attained if Nadir, instead of entrusting the supreme command to the corrupt and inefficient Taqi Khan, had given it to some honest and capable military leader like Tahmasp Khan Jalayir.

For 'Oman the results were vastly different. Although the Persian invasions entailed for a time much loss and hardship to the inhabitants, they brought about the union of the conflicting interests and led directly to the supersession of the decadent Ya'riba dynasty by that of the Al-Bu Sa'ids.¹

Throughout this period Nadir persisted in his efforts to build up his fleet, partly by purchase and partly by building his own vessels. For a time, endeavours were made to make progress with the construction of the ship at Bushire, but little could be accomplished without a competent person in charge of the work. In order to surmount this difficulty, Nadir, being apparently under the impression that all Europeans must have a knowledge of shipbuilding, decided to entrust the supervision of the operations to a Fleming named de la Porterie, who was then resident in Isfahan. What ensued is best told in the words of Monsieur A. Martineau, who discovered the particulars in the archives of the Compagnie Française des Indes at Pondichery² :

" Il (Nadir) s'imagina que cet homme (de la Porterie) devait tout savoir et il l'incita à descendre à Bouchir pour presider à la construction du navire. La Potterie (*sic*) ne connaissait rien aux affaires navales et s'excusa sur son incompétence. Ses excuses ne furent pas admises ; bon gré, mal gré il dut venir à la côte, et le voilà ingénieur. L'incident eût été simplement burlesque, si le malheureux n'était mort à la peine. Les tribulations qu'il éprouva pour accomplir ce travail improvisé altérèrent profondément sa santé. Lorsqu'on lui permit de retourner à Isfahan, il était trop tard. La Potterie mourut en route à Chiraz, au mois d'août 1742 . . . "

Poor de la Porterie's labours proved to be all in vain, because Nadir ordered work on the ship to be stopped in August, 1743, owing, it appears, to those in charge of the work after de la Porterie's departure having been found guilty of embezzlement.³ Work on this ship was never resumed, and the unfinished hulk was to be seen at Bushire for many years after-

¹ R. Sald Ruete, in his lecture to the Central Asia Society in 1929, pointed out that the Al-Bu Sa'id dynasty achieved power by driving out the Persians just as the Ya'riba dynasty had previously done by expelling the Portuguese. See the *Journal of the C.A.S.*, Vol. XVI, part IV, p. 419.

² See his article entitled *Le Premier Consulat de France à Bassora (1739/1745)*, in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises* (Paris) 1917, Vol. V, pp. 411 and 412. M. Martineau gives this man's name as la Potterie, but there are amongst Otter's correspondence a number of letters addressed to him as M. de la Porterie.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 24th August/4th September, 1743.

wards.¹ The results of Nadir's shipbuilding policy would doubtless have been very different if he had secured the services of a man like Captain John Elton² or one of the Parsee master-builders of Surat to supervise the work at Bushire.

Appreciating the impracticability of adding to his fleet in this way, Nadir fell back on the expensive, but effective, system of purchase from Surat, and he was able in this way to build up a navy consisting of no less than thirty ships and a large number of smaller craft in the Gulf.³ Early in 1745, the Gombroon Agent reported to London that ⁴:

"H.M. still seems to continue his Resolution of having a large Fleet for the support of which he has lately entered into a Scheme of Trade and has ordered two ships annually (which are now getting ready) with cargoes of the choicest Persian Goods to the amount of 5,000 Tomaunds to be sent to Surat, for purchasing Stores and Building two other Ships. The Goods they have taken of the Merchants at their own Prices by which his Majesty must be a considerable gainer, that we wish it may not encourage him to enter further into Trade."

Part of the fleet at this time was at Gombroon, embarking troops for Julfar; the remainder was at Bushire.

During the remainder of his reign Nadir was so preoccupied with the Turkish war and with the revolts that repeatedly broke out in Persia that he was obliged to neglect his navy. Several ships were lost through shipwreck, while the condition of the others steadily deteriorated and discipline became more and more relaxed as time went on.⁵ It seems that a year or so after his assassination the fleet ceased to exist as a fighting force.⁶

Nadir's bid for sea-power in the Gulf, like his attempts to conquer 'Oman, ended in ultimate failure. Nevertheless, the energy and persistence with which he strove to revive the ancient Persian mastery of the sea⁷

¹ The remains of this hulk were still visible when Sir William Ouseley landed at Bushire in March, 1811 (see his *Travels in Various Countries of the East, more particularly Persia*, London, 1819, Vol. I, p. 188).

² Some mention of this remarkable Englishman has already been made (see Chapters XVII and XX); details of his efforts to build a fleet for Nadir on the Caspian Sea will be found in Appendix I.

³ Letter from Gombroon to London, dated the 20th February/3rd March, 1745.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Two Persian ships were at Bombay at the beginning of 1747; see the *Bombay Government Consultations* for the 19th January of that year, in which it is stated: "As the common people belonging to Nadir Shah's two ships have been lately very troublesome to the poorer sort of the inhabitants, the President acquaints the Board that to prevent the ill consequences that might otherwise ensue, he has given orders forbidding these people to go out of the town gates." It is evident from the above passage that there was but little discipline on board the two ships.

⁶ Nevertheless, the fleet was still able to maintain communication between the Persian ports and Julfar in 1748; see p. 219 above.

⁷ The subject of Persian seafaring in later Sasanian and early Muhammadan times has been dealt with by Professor Hadi Hasan in his work *A History of Persian Navigation* (London, 1928), and by Monsieur G. Ferrand in his article *L'Élément Persan dans les Textes Nautiques Arabes*, in Vol. CCIV of the *Journal Asiatique*, April/June, 1924.

afford proof of his breadth of vision and his other remarkable gifts. However, in the course of a few short years not even an autocrat like Nadir, powerful though he was, could turn into seamen a people who, at that time, were neither by inclination nor training in the least seaminded. In order to man his ships, he had to fall back upon Arabs, and, to a lesser extent, Baluchis and Indians, none of whom had any real feeling of loyalty to him or to Persia ; that is the real reason why, in the end, his great endeavour achieved no lasting success. One wonders what the effect would have been if he had sent Elton to the Persian Gulf in 1743, in order to look after his navy there. Had he done so, he would have had no Caspian fleet, but his ships on the waters of the Gulf would have been most efficiently supervised ; further, the friction between the Russian Government and the British merchants engaged in the transit trade venture to Persia via Russia would have been avoided.¹ Nevertheless, the final result would have been the same ; in the chaotic period that followed Nadir's assassination in 1747, not even Elton could have prevented the fleet from lapsing into decay.²

¹ For particulars of Nadir's Caspian fleet and of the British trade with Persia via Russia, see Appendix I.

² The concluding remarks of the above chapter have been taken almost *verbatim* from a lecture on Nadir Shah's navy which I delivered to the Iran Society on the 9th December, 1936.

CHAPTER XXII

THE TURKISH WAR : THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

TURKEY, like Russia, and indeed Persia itself, received but little authentic news of Nadir during his absence in India. The relations between Turkey and Persia remained in the same anomalous state as they had done since 1736. Juridically speaking, there was no real peace ; there was merely a prolonged suspension of hostilities, because the truncated treaty of the 28th September, 1736, had never been ratified.¹ It was natural that the Sultan and his advisers should feel some anxiety lest Nadir, if he returned victorious from India, should renew the war ; they were well aware that he would not scruple, if occasion arose, to use the failure to reach agreement on the religious questions as a pretext for reopening hostilities. However, whilst the Shah was so far away, and particularly when persistent rumours arrived of his defeat and death, the Porte felt that the danger, if not entirely removed, had become remote. The relief felt by the Porte in this respect was reflected in its relations with Russia and Austria. The Treaty of Belgrade had been signed on the 18th September, 1739, but, when difficulties arose in connection with the fulfilment of certain of the terms of settlement, Turkey's behaviour was anything but conciliatory. However, a sudden improvement in the attitude of the Porte towards Russia and Austria was noticeable when it became known in Constantinople that Nadir was at length on his way back from India, and, as a result, the difficulties with the two Christian Powers were smoothed over.²

In January, 1741, the Persian Ambassador, Hajji Khan Chamishgazak, with an enormous retinue, made a most imposing entry into Aleppo.³ Three months later he reached Constantinople, where he was received by the Grand Vizier. Hajji Khan's "haughty and contemptuous carriage" on this occasion and his obstinate refusal to discuss the objects of his mission with anyone but the Sultan gave great offence.⁴

After being given an audience by the Sultan, the Ambassador discussed

¹ See pp. 106 and 121 above.

² Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 36.

³ See *A Relation of what passed at Aleppo on the occasion of the Arrival of Hadji Khan, the Persian Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte*, in S.P. 97, Vol. XXXI.

⁴ For details, see Sir E. Fawcener's despatch of the 23rd March/3rd April, 1741, and the *Daily Post* of 26th May.

the religious questions with the Turkish ministers and *'ulama*. The views of the Porte remained unchanged in this respect, but it was not deemed prudent, at this juncture, to refuse outright to accede to Nadir's demands. The Porte therefore replied evasively that action would be taken in accordance with the precepts of the true law.¹

As the Ambassador had not been given full powers and as it was not altogether clear from the messages which he brought whether Nadir desired peace or war, it was decided to arrive at no settlement with him, but to send an embassy to Persia. The ambassadors selected were Munif Efendi, a high official of the Treasury, and Nazif Mustafa Efendi, the director of the Constantinople Customs.² This embassy reached Nadir's camp (some eleven miles north of Darband) in January, 1742.³ The Turkish envoys delivered a message from the Sultan in which the latter made excuses for his inability to accede to the Persian religious demands. Nadir replied that he wished that the Sultan would recognise the Ja'fari sect, since his (Nadir's) fundamental object was to tighten the cords of friendship. He went on to say that, as the matter of this fifth sect contained the elements for the pacification of the Muslim state, and as the Sultan was Caliph of Islam, he would go in person to Turkey in order to reach finality regarding the question. "I am hoping that, if Allah wills, the matter may be arranged there on my arrival."⁴ With this threat he concluded his reply.

Feeling that it would not be amiss to give his religious policy the semblance, at any rate, of hieratic approval, Nadir convened an assembly of the *'ulama*, under the presidency of the Mulla-Bashi, 'Ali Akbar. The *'ulama* knew what was expected of them, and obediently confirmed the *fatwa* of 1736 regarding the establishment of the Ja'fari sect, the erection of the fifth pillar in the Ka'ba and the abjuration of the Shi'a heresy.⁵

Although he had thus flung down the gauntlet to Turkey, Nadir was unable, for some thirteen months, to put his threats into execution, owing to his being kept fully occupied by the Lazgis and their allies in Daghistan.

Notwithstanding the repeated reports of Persian reverses in Daghistan, the Porte was alarmed when, early in April, 1742, Munif Efendi and Nazif Efendi returned to Constantinople with Nadir's reply and their information as to his threatening attitude. Reports from the Turkish commanders on the frontier confirmed the information brought back by the ambassadors, and active preparations for war were made.

¹ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³ *T.N.*, p. 231. Nazif's name is wrongly given as Latif in the Bombay edition.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 232 and 233.

When informing Whitehall of the above developments, Sir E. Fawcener added that there was a great lack of provisions near the frontiers.

"This war," he said, "is on all accounts very unseasonable for it finds the Turks still panting under the fatigues of the last with the Christians, and with the remembrances still fresh of the difficulties and hazards of the past Persian Campaigns, the Country yet feels the heavy effects of them, and is so exhausted as to be very ill-provided for the subsistence of Armies. There is also such an indisposition in all sorts of People to go that way, that it will be no easy matter to draw together an Army of any consequence. . . ."¹

As the year wore on, further news was received of Nadir's difficulties in Daghistan, with the result that the Porte became rather less apprehensive.

Muhammad Kazim states, in his *Nadir-Nama*,² that when the Lazgis captured some Persian troops in Daghistan and sent them to Trebizond and Constantinople, the Turks deemed this to be a sign of Nadir's weakness. In consequence, they began to levy heavier tolls on the Persian merchants and caravans in Turkish territory, and they punished, tortured and sent back to Persia the officials appointed by the Persian Government to look after those of its nationals who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. When Nadir learnt of this action by the Turks, he became more determined than ever to recommence hostilities.

A curious incident is recorded in the *Gombroon Diary*, in which it was stated, on the 24th May/4th June, 1742, that :

"Shaw Nadir would send an Embassadour to the King of England in order to engage a firm alliance with him, that He, the King, was informed Our King (whom it seems he mistook for the Emperor) had had some Part of his Territories wrested from him by the Turks, Wherefore he would join with us against them and wanted to know whether we thought our King would be induced to hearken to his Propositions."

The Agent replied that this matter was "an Affair of Kingdoms and foreign to our Purpose," that it concerned another ruler, and that the Turks, moreover, were the friends of the British. The Agent concluded, "We find they (i.e., the Persians) are entirely strangers to what lyes without them."³

The Porte held grave doubts as to the loyalty of Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, and it is said that his enemy, 'Ali Pasha, did his best to blacken his character.⁴ The truth of the matter was that Nadir certainly had a

¹ Sir E. Fawcener's despatch of the 8th/19th April, 1742.

² *Nadir-Nama*, p. 11, (as repeated references will be made to this work, the third and concluding volume of his history of Nadir, it will henceforth be referred to as the *N.N.*).

³ Nevertheless, Nadir, by means of his numerous embassies, was very well informed of the situation in both Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

⁴ Otter, Vol. II, p. 359.

great regard for Ahmad Pasha,¹ which the latter reciprocated, but there is no proof that Ahmad would really have betrayed his country and become a henchman of Persia²; he was too fond of his position as Pasha of Baghdad, where he ruled almost as a sovereign, many days' journey from Constantinople; under Nadir, the authority of the Crown at Baghdad would have been a reality instead of a mere shadow.

Many Turks and Arabs in Mesopotamia did not scruple to make large sums of money by supplying Persian agents with horses, mules and camels, although they must have realised that these animals would be of great use to the Persians when at length hostilities with Turkey began again.³

Early in 1743, just before Nadir's departure from Daghistan, a further Turkish embassy arrived at his camp, and delivered a letter from the Sultan, in which the last-named excused himself once more for his inability to agree to recognise the Ja'fari sect and to authorise the erection of the fifth pillar in the Ka'ba. In reply, Nadir, informed the Sultan of the impending advance of his "world-conquering army."⁴

Then followed the terrible march to the Mughan plain,⁵ where a halt for twenty days was made to enable the men and baggage animals to recover. After this respite, the march was resumed via Hashtarud and Qara Chaman; passing within four *farsakhs* of Tabriz, the army continued southwards to Merivan, where the princes Naṣrullah, Imam Quli and Shah-rukh joined it from Mashhad on the 24th Rabi' II (18th May). An ambassador from Muḥammad Shah arrived in company with the princes, and brought with him a number of costly gifts. After a brief halt at Merivan, Nadir resumed his march to Sinandij.

The renewed threat of war with Persia made Turkey more inclined to be friendly with, or at any rate, less hostile to, Russia. The news of the sending of the Russian reinforcements to Astrakhan and Kizliar had, for a time, alarmed Turkey, as it feared at first that these forces were to be used against her, in conjunction with Nadir's hosts. This fear

¹ Otter, Vol. II, p. 184; Otter states that he was informed by an Persian that Nadir once asked some of his courtiers who, in their opinion, was greater than he was. The courtiers replied that they knew of no one who was even his equal. Nadir then said "You are wrong. Ahmad Khan, the Governor of Baghdad, is assuredly greater than I, since he has maintained himself for so long between two enemies as strong as myself and Sultan Mahmud, and he does what he wishes with us."

² Longrigg, in his *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (p. 161), states that there is, in recorded facts, "no justification for the odious nickname of 'Nidhamu'l-Mulk' bestowed by his detractors." (Otter, on p. 365 of his second volume, says that the Kahya of Mosul, when in conversation with him in June, 1743, referred to Ahmad Pasha as "a second Nizamul-Mulk," and alleged that the Pasha was the true author of all the troubles that were then about to afflict the country).

³ Otter states (Vol. II, pp. 247 and 248) that all the time that he was at Isfahan and Basra, that is for some 6 years, this traffic had been in progress.

⁴ T.N., p. 237.

⁵ See p. 211 above.

proved groundless, but Turkey continued to act with circumspection insofar as Russia was concerned.¹

Nadir, before leaving Daghestan, had sent envoys to Ahmad Pasha demanding the surrender of Baghdad. The Pasha, on receiving this message, sought to gain time by replying through his Kahya, Muhammad Aqa, that he wished to maintain friendly relations with him, but that he could not surrender Baghdad until the end of his term of office; the Sultan had appointed him, and he had to do his duty. He concluded by asking for a respite.²

Muhammad Aqa delivered this message to Nadir at Sinandij; the Shah received it in good part, but dispatched several bodies of troops to seize Samarra, Hilla, Najaf, Karbala, and other places in Mesopotamia. At the same time, he appointed Qoja Khan Shaikhanlu, of the Chamish-gazak tribe, commander of the forces that were to besiege Basra, and ordered the Governors of Shirvan, Hawiza, Shushtar and Dizful and the Arabs in those parts to co-operate with him.³ The siege of Basra by these forces will be described later in this chapter.

On the 1st July, Nadir sent Nasrullah and the other princes to Hamadan. He then gave the Mughal Ambassador leave to return, and handed to him many gifts for the Emperor.

Since Nadir contemplated going in due course into winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, he gave instructions for quantities of corn to be collected in the Shahrizur district for dispatch later to his camp.⁴

There is some element of doubt respecting Nadir's movements at this stage. It appears from Mirza Mahdi's official record that he, on leaving Sinandij, marched back whence he had come as far as Merivan, and that he then struck westwards and, after crossing the Turkish frontier near Panjvin, entered the rich and fertile Shahrizur district⁵; this appears to

¹ Stanhope Aspinwell (who became Chargé d'Affaires on Sir E. Fawkener's departure on leave from Constantinople in November, 1742) reported on the 8th/19th July, 1743, that the Turks dare not alarm Russia, "much less hold a stiff or threatening style with her, lest she might be provoked to retaliate it upon them, in the end, by joining the Persians, an apprehension which has been long thought here more than chimerical" (S.P. 97, Vol. XXXII).

² T.N., p. 239. Sulaiman Sa'igh states, in his *Ta'rikhu'l-Mausil* (Cairo, 1923), p. 278, that Ahmad Pasha resolved to adopt a cunning policy, and sent word to Nadir that he should in the first place conquer Mosul and that he would, on his return, find the gates of Baghdad open. According to von Hammer (Vol. XV, p. 57), Ahmad Pasha wrote to one of Nadir's advisers that he had proposed to the Porte that two eminent lawyers should be appointed to find a solution of the difficult question of the Ja'fari sect: if Ahmad Pasha actually made any such proposal, he doubtless did so with the knowledge that it would be rejected; all that he wished to do for the moment was to gain enough time to gather in the harvest and accumulate stocks of provisions.

³ T.N., p. 239.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

be what actually occurred, but Muḥammad Kaẓim states¹ that Nadir, before entering Mesopotamia, went to Kirmanshah, where he laid the foundations of a large new fortress and arsenal and then reviewed his army; according to this authority, the troops, who were drawn from all parts of the empire, numbered 375,000.² Muḥammad Kaẓim further states that Nadir bade his generals prepare for a three years' struggle with the Turks.

Khalid Pasha,³ the Governor of the Shahrizur district, fled as soon as the Persian army entered his territory. Nadir continued his march westwards, and on the 14th Jumadi II (5th August, 1743) he appeared before Kirkuk. The garrison abandoned the town, but retired to the citadel, where they prepared to resist. As this citadel was strongly fortified, Nadir made no attempt to take it by assault without a preliminary bombardment. When his heavy artillery arrived a week later, he fiercely cannonaded the citadel from all sides, with the result that the garrison surrendered before nightfall.⁴

Mirza Mahdi states⁵ that Nadir had resolved not to go beyond Kirkuk, in the hope that the messages which had been sent to the Porte through the intermediary of Aḥmad Pasha and his Kahya would meet with a favourable answer and so render any further advance unnecessary. This hope

¹ *N.N.*, p. 11. Muḥammad Kaẓim was not an eye-witness of these events, and he may have been led into error because, in the first place, Nadir had doubtless intended to go via Kirmanshah, when he had had Baghdad as his immediate objective; secondly, he sent his heavy artillery via Kirmanshah and Zuhāb (*T.N.*, p. 240).

² There seems no reason to doubt that this review was held, but it is more likely that it took place at Sinandij than at Kirmanshah. Muḥammad Kaẓim states (*N.N.*, p. 12) that he got the details of the numbers of the army from an army clerk (*laskhar-navis*); these details are as follows:

Troops from Khurasan	65,000
" " Persian Iraq	45,000
" " Luristan, Bakhtiari country, Khuzistan and Fars	50,000
" " Adharbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Shirvan, etc.	60,000
" " Hamadan and Kirmanshah	25,000
" " Turkistan and the Turkoman steppes	60,000
" " Ghazna, Kabul, Peshawar, Kashmir, Lahore, etc.	70,000
Total	375,000

These numbers seem exaggerated (unless non-combatants were included), but the relative proportions may be correct. The large number of non-Persian troops is noteworthy.

³ *T.N.*, p. 239. Khalid Pasha belonged to the well-known Baban family; Nadir appointed his cousin Salim Beg Governor of the Shahrizur in his stead.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 239. According to another account the garrison held out for two days after the bombardment began. See M. H. Pognon's French translation, entitled *Chronique Syrienne Relative au Siège de Mossoul par les Persans en 1743*, of a Syriac MS., the original of which was written by a certain Habèche (? Habash) in 1746. The Syriac text, together with M. Pognon's translation, was published in the *Florilegium Melchior de Vogüé*, Paris, 1909, pp. 489-503.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 239.

was doomed to disappointment, however, because Nadir received a letter from the Sultan whilst he was at Kirkuk stating that the Shaikhul-Islam had issued a *fatwa* which declared lawful the killing or capturing of Persians, whose religion, it was stated, was contrary to Islam. Simultaneously, the Porte had ordered Hajji Husain Pasha,¹ of Mosul, to put that city into a state of defence.

Owing to the provocative terms of the Sultan's letter, Nadir left Kirkuk on the 3rd September with the object of taking Mosul. Arbil attempted resistance, but the Persian artillery speedily forced it to yield. Nadir then pressed on towards Mosul, his troops plundering and destroying the villages and devastating the countryside; amongst the places destroyed was Karamles, the former Karmelis,² where Alexander the Great had so signally defeated Darius Codomannus in 331 B.C. No distinction was made between Muslims and Christians, and in some villages churches and monasteries were rased to the ground and the priests and monks made prisoners.³

On nearing Altun Köpri, the inhabitants came out to greet Nadir and offer their submission; they informed him that there was a tribe of devil-worshippers,⁴ who were evilly disposed. Nadir sent 12,000 men under his nephew, 'Ali Quli Khan, against these Yazidis, who had collected all their available fighting men. A battle ensued, in which the tribesmen fought very bravely, but were at length overborne by the trained Khurasani and other troops. After this battle, 'Ali Quli marched against and carried by assault a mountain stronghold of the Yazidis, who were not thoroughly crushed, however, before another pitched battle had been fought. 'Ali Quli and his men thereupon returned to the main army.⁵

In the meanwhile, Husain Pasha of Mosul was busy preparing for the impending siege; the numbers of his garrison were raised to 30,000 men when his namesake, the Governor of Aleppo, arrived with his troops. Encouraged by this timely reinforcement, Husain Pasha firmly refused to yield when messengers from Nadir summoned him to do so, and sent his brother, 'Abdu'l-Fattah Beg, with part of his forces to oppose the Persian advance guard. This Turkish force encountered the Persians under

¹ Husain Pasha's grandfather, 'Abdu'l-Jalil, who was a Christian, had been for long in the service of the Pasha of Mosul. For details of the Jalili family, see Niebuhr's *Reisebeschreibung*, Vol. II, pp. 362 and 363, and Longrigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 138 and 347.

² It was known in Aramaic as Gangamala, meaning "Camel's Neck" (cf. the Turkish *devek boyun*).

³ Habèche, p. 499, and Sulaiman Sa'igh, p. 278.

⁴ The Persian term used is *Shaitan-parast*, which means literally "devil-worshipper," and is evidently intended to denote the Yazidis; it is to be noted, however, that these people are in reality Devil-propitiators rather than Devil-worshippers.

⁵ *N.N.*, pp. 20-40.

'Ali Quli east of the Tigris ; it was soon routed, and narrowly escaped being cut off when retreating to Mosul.

On the 25th Rajab (14th September) Nadir and his army camped at Yarimja, close to the tomb of the Prophet Jonah ; at the Shah's orders bridges were thrown across the Tigris both above and below Mosul, and numbers of men were sent across to the western side of the river in order to complete the encirclement of the town.

News of Nadir's invasion of Mesopotamia and of his threat to Baghdad and capture of Kirkuk produced consternation at Constantinople. Fears of an uprising by the populace caused the Qizlar Agha to secure the dismissal of the 'Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the appointment of Hasan Pasha, an ex-Janissary, to the post. There seems to be no doubt that 'Ali Pasha was made a scapegoat, and that Hasan Pasha was chosen because his appointment would meet with the approval of the army.¹ There was further alarm in the Turkish capital when reports arrived of the siege of Mosul ; the Turks turned for advice to Count Bonneval, who undertook to bring the Persian War to a successful conclusion in one campaign, but his plan was not adopted.²

To return to the siege of Mosul. Having entirely surrounded the city, the Persians constructed redoubts, and placed in position fourteen batteries in which 160 cannon and 230 mortars were mounted.³ The bombardment from these batteries was opened on the 8th Sha'ban (27th September), and for eight days and nights it continued without a break.⁴ The walls were breached in several places, but the defenders, working with desperate energy, always managed to repair them before the Persians could force their way through. Much mining and counter-mining went on,⁵ and no fewer than seven general assaults and five subsidiary attacks were delivered by the besiegers. Once, when a wide breach in the walls had been made by a mine, the Persians rushed impetuously forward to the attack, carrying with them 1,700 scaling ladders, but the defenders, with the courage of despair, drove them off with heavy loss.⁶ The Christian element of the population played a most important part in the defence

¹ Stanhope Aspinwell to Whitehall, 5th/16th October, 1743 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXXXII), and von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 69.

² Letter from the Constantinople correspondent of the *Daily Post*, published in that paper on the 30th November, 1743.

³ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, pp. 70 and 71.

⁴ The number of cannon balls and bombs fired into Mosul during the siege is estimated by Niebuhr (*Reisebeschreibung*, Vol. II, p. 367) at 40,000, by the Turkish official account at 60,000 and by Sulaiman Sa'igh (*op. cit.*, p. 284) at no less than 100,000.

⁵ Owing to their lack of skill, the Persian engineers did, on the whole, considerably more harm to their own side than they did to the Turks, as the majority of their mines exploded backwards. The Turks are said to have had the services of a capable engineer from Constantinople (see C. J. Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan and of the Site of Ancient Nineveh*, London, 1836, Vol. II, p. 46).

⁶ Turkish official account.

of the city, and were afterwards given special privileges in reward for their services.¹ A legend was afterwards current that the Persian forces were dispersed by the miraculous interposition of St. George, St. Matthew and the Prophet Jonah, "who suddenly appeared among them armed and mounted."²

On the 22nd Sha'ban (11th October) Nadir received the serious news that a pretender of obscure origin who called himself Sam Mirza³ and Muhammad, the son of Surkhai, with a force of Lazgis, had captured and afterwards put to death the Governor of Shirvan, between Shamakhi and Shabaran.⁴ Soon after hearing of this uprising, he received the further disquieting news that another pretender, the self-styled "Şafi Mirza" (alias Muhammad 'Ali Rafsinjani), whose cause the Turks had espoused, was marching from Erzeroum via Qarş to the Persian frontier.⁵

It was, apparently, while the siege of Mosul was in progress that messengers arrived at the Persian camp from Turkistan stating that merchants from Tashkend and others from China (*Chin va Ma-Chin*) had reached Charjui with the news that "Mangu Qa'an, the King of China," having heard of the rise and progress of Nadir, was collecting troops and preparing for war against him.⁶ The King, they said, was sending messages to the rulers of Khotan and Khitai requesting them to prepare to resist Nadir, should he attempt to enter their territories. As Nadir had, according to Muhammad Kazim, the intention of invading Khitai after having effected the conquest of Turkey, he ordered vast quantities of war material of all kinds⁷ to be collected and sent to Merv, so as to be in readiness for the Khitai expedition when the appropriate time came.

The news of the activities of Sam Mirza and Şafi Mirza, together with the knowledge that his troops were becoming disheartened by their heavy losses and lack of success, caused Nadir to make overtures to Husain

¹ Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 361, Sulaiman Şa'igh, p. 289.

² Rich, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 46.

³ This pretender claimed to be one of the numerous progeny of Shah Sultan Husain, but Muhammad Muhsin does not mention any son of that monarch bearing the name of Sam in the extensive genealogical data of the later Şafavis which he gives in his *Zubdatu'l-Tawarikh*.

⁴ For details of this revolt, see the ensuing chapter.

⁵ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 71. For the antecedents of this pretender, see p. 48 above.

⁶ N.N., p. 49. Professor Minorsky, whom I have consulted as to this passage of the *Nadir-Nama*, is of opinion that "Mangu Qa'an" stands for T'ien-Tzu, "the Son of Heaven" (= Chien-lung), who reigned from 1735 until his abdication 60 years later. As Muhammad Kazim states in the next sentence that the Emperor was sending messages to the rulers of Khotan and Khitai, it is evident that China was not at that time at war with them (it was not until 1758 that the Chinese entered Dzungaria, and four years elapsed before their occupation of the country was complete).

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 49 and 50. Large quantities of lead for making shot and a number of loads of copper for the casting of cannon and mortars were amongst the material ordered. There being no fuel for the foundry in the Merv district, charcoal was to be brought from the Upper Murghab and from Maruchaq.

Pasha for a cessation of hostilities.¹ The Turkish commander at first rejected these proposals, but on fresh overtures being made, he agreed to negotiate. Costly gifts were then exchanged, and Nadir agreed to raise the siege if Husain Pasha would forward his peace proposals to Constantinople. At this juncture, Muhammad Aqa arrived with a letter from the Sultan stating that he placed no reliance upon Nadir's friendship and brotherly feeling because of his violation of the Turkish frontier; if, however, he would retire to the borders of Persia, he could there discuss with Ahmad Pasha the questions at issue.²

Agreeing to this proposal, Nadir and his army left Mosul for Kirkuk and Qara Tappā on the 2nd Ramaḍan (20th October); once more he had displayed his weakness in siege operations. Leaving the bulk of his army and all his baggage at Qara Tappā, he set out with only a small escort to visit the holy shrines of Mesopotamia.³ Thus began another phase of the extraordinary relations between Persia and Turkey during this period; all this while, as will be seen below, the siege of Baṣra was in progress.

After being met by Muhammad Aqa and other notables, who brought him presents from Ahmad Pasha, Nadir proceeded to Kaḏimain, where he visited the shrines of the Imams Musa al-Kaḏim and Muhammad Taqī,⁴ so venerated by the Shi'a. He then re-crossed the Tigris, in a barge of state furnished by Ahmad Pasha, and went to the tomb of Abu Ḥanifa, at Mu'azzam.⁵ On the 1st Shawwāl (18th November) he proceeded to Karbala, where he performed the circumambulation (*ḥawāf*) of the shrine. His wife, Rāḏiyya Begum, a daughter of Shah Sulṭān Husain, gave 20,000 *nadiris* for the repairing of the sacred building.⁶

Later in the month Nadir journeyed to Najaf via Hilla, where he convened a great assembly of the 'ulama of Persia, Afghanistan, Balkh and Bukhara on the one hand, and of the Holy Cities of Mesopotamia on the other, in order to discuss and settle the religious question.⁷ In order,

¹ According to Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 241), Husain Pasha, in despair of holding out longer, was the first to make overtures, but this appears to be incorrect.

² *T.N.*, p. 241. 'Abdullah ibn Husain as-Suwaidi of Baghdad (who was a contemporary of Nadir), in his *Kitāb al-Hujjaj al-Qar'iyya li ittiḥāq al-Firaq al-Islamiyya* (which was published in Cairo in 1906), mentions this message and adds that the Sultan said that the claim for the Ja'fari sect must be dropped. See Professor A. E. Schmidt's *12 Istoriia Sunnitsko-Shiitskikh Otnoshenii* in V. V. Barthold's *Festschrift*, entitled 'Iqdu'l-Juman', Tashkend, 1927, p. 83.

³ *T.N.*, p. 241.

⁴ The seventh and ninth, respectively, of the Shi'a Imams.

⁵ *T.N.*, p. 241.

⁶ According to Mirza Mahdi, Nadir visited Karbala on the 1st Shawwāl, after having been at Najaf (*T.N.*, p. 245), but, as it is stated by as-Suwaidi (Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 95) that the meeting of 'ulama at Najaf took place on the 24th Shawwāl, the visit to Karbala must have preceded the meeting.

⁷ *T.N.*, p. 241.

no doubt, to predispose the local divines in his favour, he gave orders for the dome of the shrine of 'Ali at Najaf to be gilded.¹

By far the fullest and most interesting account of these religious discussions is that given by the Turkish-Arabian divine, 'Abdullah ibn Husain as-Suwaidi. Ahmad Pasha sent 'Abdullah to Nadir in order to assist in the task of reconciling the conflicting religious elements in Persia.² 'Abdullah, on being received by Nadir, conversed with the Shah in the Turkoman dialect (presumably, Turki or Eastern Turkish). Nadir requested 'Abdullah to render assistance in removing "disloyalty" (i.e., nonconformity with the Sunni code), and requested him not to take part as a disputant, but to act as umpire, to take note of everything and to report fully thereon to Ahmad Pasha. On the conclusion of the audience, 'Abdullah met 'Ali Akbar, the Persian Mulla-Bashi, with whom he had a long informal discussion on the text of the Qur'an and the traditions. 'Abdullah, who was a staunch Sunni, found 'Ali Akbar irreconcilable on certain doctrinal points. On the following day (24th Shawwal = 12th December, 1743) the 'ulama assembled; there were 70 Persian clergy and a group of Afghans and another of Bukharans. 'Abdullah as-Suwaidi, as arranged, was umpire, and 'Ali Akbar and a Bukharan *mulla* were the chief spokesmen. It soon became clear that Nadir had carefully arranged matters beforehand with 'Ali Akbar and the other Persians, because, when the Mulla-Bashi was cross-questioned as to the alleged Persian "disloyalty," he was most deferential and gave expression to completely orthodox views. Finally, agreement was reached between the Persians and the two groups of Bukharan and Afghan divines. On the next day all the 'ulama, together with those of Najaf, signed a document setting forth the terms of the Persians' undertaking, and 'Abdullah as-Suwaidi then signed and sealed it in his capacity as umpire. In this document the religious policy of Shah Isma'il and his successors was deplored, the legitimacy of the first three Caliphs was recognised, as was also the true descent of Ja'faru's-Ṣādiq from the Prophet. Lastly, the right of the Persians to recognition as belonging to the Ja'fari sect was affirmed.³

After the 'ulama had completed their deliberations and issued their

¹ According to Muḥammad Kaẓim (N.N., p. 72), Nadir wished to adorn the dome of 'Ali's shrine at Najaf in the same manner as that of the Imam Riḍa at Mashhad. The work of regilding the dome was not completed when William Beawes visited Najaf in August, 1745. "He regarded as surprising the conduct of the Turks of this place who, tho' at war with Persia and always abominating that sect (the Shi'a), have nevertheless thro' fear or superstition refrained from any attempt on this unguarded deposit of riches. The King of Persia has here a Chan as well in reverence to the holy place as to inspect the work, which is not as yet finished. . . ." See Beawes's *Narrative of a Journey from Aleppo to Basra in 1745* (Hakluyt Society, London, 1928. No. LXIII, p. 23).

² Professor Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-100.

³ T.N., p. 246.

manifesto, Nadir's wife, Gauhar Shad, the mother of the princes Naṣrullah and Imam Quli, gave the sum of 100,000 *nadiris* for the repairing of the walls and tilework of the shrine, and presented a jewelled censer and another of gold for use therein.¹

In the meanwhile, Nadir and Aḥmad Pasha had been discussing the terms of peace, and had reached agreement on its terms at the end of November or beginning of December.² The full text of this treaty does not appear to have been preserved, but there seems to be no doubt that it showed no abatement of Nadir's religious demands; on the other hand, Mirza Mahdi states that it provided for the return to Turkey of Kirkuk, Arbil, Qurna and other fortresses that had fallen into the Persians' hands. One can only conjecture what Nadir's real intentions were when he drew up this treaty with Aḥmad Pasha; it seems most probable that his main object was merely to "amuse" the Porte and so gain time until the rising in north-west Persia had been suppressed, when he would fling his full weight against the Turks on the borders of Anatolia. In view of his previous experience of the Turkish attitude on the question of the Ja'fari sect, he could have had little or no expectation that the treaty would be acceptable in its entirety to the Porte. The manner in which the treaty was received in Constantinople and the subsequent action by Turkey will be described in Chapter XXV.

Having arrived at his provisional settlement with Aḥmad Pasha, Nadir gave instructions forthwith for the siege of Baṣra to be raised; a description of this siege must now be given.

The operations in the south of Mesopotamia were not conducted with the same vigour as those in the north. When Nadir had started on his march against Kirkuk and Mosul, he had, as already mentioned, appointed Qoja Khan Shaikhanlu, of the Chamishgazak tribe, to the command of the forces which were to advance on Baṣra.⁴ Qoja Khan, together with the Governor of Ḥawiza and Salman (who was also known as Sulaiman), the well-known chief of the Ka'ab Arabs⁵ (who had recently moved into Persian territory round Dauraq, and had become Persian subjects), prepared to make a joint advance on Baṣra from Ḥawiza.

¹ *T.N.*, p. 246.

² *Ibid.*, p. 247.

³ This expression is taken from Stanhope Aspinwell's despatch from Constantinople to Whitehall, dated the 14th/25th January, 1744: reports had already reached the Turkish capital that there had been "some Parley between the Shaugh and Achmet Bashaw . . . which has ended in the Shaugh's consenting to enlarge the Blockade (of Baghdad) and retire a little, which the Bashaw required of him as a kind of preliminary on his Part towards an Accommodation. . . ." (*S.P.* 97, Vol. XXXII).

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 239.

⁵ See Sayyid Aḥmad Kasrawi's *Ta'rikh-i-Panj Sad Sala-yi-Khuzistan* (Tehran, 1931/1932), p. 119. In 1740 the Ka'ab tribe had migrated into purely Persian territory, in the neighbourhood of Dauraq and the Jarrahi river, where they occupied lands which had, up till then, been in the hands of the Khuzistan branch of the Afshar tribe.

On the 16th July two messengers from the Governor of Hawiza reached Basra, with a demand for the surrender of the town, failing which the Persian forces would come and carry out a general massacre.¹ Rustam Aqa, the Mutasallim (Deputy Governor), after conferring with his advisers for some days, rejected this demand, whereupon the Persian forces began their advance towards the frontier. Their approach to Turkish soil encouraged the Muntafiq and Bani Lam Arabs, who for years past had been in intermittent revolt against the Turks, to rebel and join forces with the enemy. Rustam Aqa dispatched a galley and some trankeys to prevent the Persians and their allies from crossing to the west bank of the Shatt'u'l-'Arab, but the invaders nevertheless succeeded in crossing in boats which they had had built at Hawiza.² On the 28th August/8th September the Persians began the siege of the town.³

As soon as Thomas Dorrill, the Resident of the East India Co. at Basra, heard of the threatened Persian attack, he ordered a small brigantine belonging to the Company that was then anchored off the town to slip away quietly by night and go to Qatif. He feared that, if the vessel remained, the Turks would seize her and employ her against the Persians, as they had done in the case of the two Company ships at Basra in 1735. When the Mutasallim discovered that the brigantine had gone, he accused Dorrill of being in league with the Persians. Unluckily, the crew (who were mostly Basra lascars) of the vessel mutinied before she had proceeded far, and forced the master to bring her back. The Mutasallim was as delighted at this turn of events as Dorrill was the reverse, and demanded the handing over of the vessel. On Dorrill refusing, Rustam Aqa had him seized and placed for forty-eight hours in a tent situated on the walls of the town, under a guard of Janisaries, and then spread stories of Dorrill's sympathy with the Persians, with the result that his life and that of his assistant, Danvers Graves, were in great danger from the exasperated soldiery.⁴ Dorrill, feeling that death would assuredly be their portion unless he agreed to surrender the vessel, at last gave his consent, but he managed to convey a message to the master that he must destroy her at all hazards. The master accord-

¹ Letter from Thomas Dorrill, the Resident at Basra, to the East India Co., London, dated the 20th/31st August, 1743.

² T.N., p. 239.

³ This is the date given by Dorrill in a further letter to London dated the 7th/18th April, 1744. M. Martineau, on the authority of documents in the Pondichery archives, gives the date as the 29th August (Old Style), while the record of the Basra Carmelites puts it four days further back (see the *Continuatio domestica Bassorensis historia ab anno 1733*, in the *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum Discalceatorum*, Vol. VIII, Fasc. I, p. 66. (Rome, 1933).

⁴ Dorrill and Graves, in a letter to Gombroon dated the 7th/18th December, 1743, said that when the Persian Sardar and the Begiarbegi heard of the ill-treatment to which they were being subjected, they ordered their soldiers to call out to the Mutasallim "if he was not ashamed to treat strangers in such a manner who came into their country as Merchants and not to fight" (*Gombroon Diary*, 17th/28th January, 1744).

ingly bored holes in the bottom of the brigantine, and pretended that she had sprung a leak. When the Turks perceived that the vessel was in a sinking condition, they consented to her being run ashore. Dorrill was then released, but his troubles were by no means over because he and the other Europeans in Basra were made to furnish arms, levy soldiery and provide horses at their own expense.

The Persians, who were from 12,000 to 15,000 strong,¹ erected a number of batteries round the town, but they were handicapped at first because they had no heavy artillery. They applied to Nadir for some cannon of heavier calibre, but these did not arrive until the 27th November.² Some attacks on a small scale were launched, but all failed, and a more serious assault was repulsed on the 18th October. Some damage was done by the artillery fire, and a few cannon-balls struck the French Consulate and the Carmelites' caravanserai; during the last eleven days of the siege, when the Persians had their heavy artillery, the town was bombarded day and night. On the night of the 6th December the cannonade was further intensified, and the Persians made another attack, but the Turks were again successful in withstanding them.³ The Carmelites were of opinion that the place would have fallen if a really determined assault had been made,⁴ and the same result might have been achieved if the Persian fleet could have co-operated with the land forces.⁵

On the evening of the 8th December messengers arrived from Nadir and Ahmad Pasha ordering the fighting to cease, as a treaty had been signed. The gates of Basra were then flung open, and compliments and presents passed between the Turkish commanders and officials on the one hand, and the Sardar (Qoja Khan) and the Governor of Hawiza on the other. The Governor of Hawiza sent a "Complaisant Message" to Dorrill "for his suffering so much on their Account," and asked him and Graves to visit the Persian camp, but Dorrill thought it politic to offer excuses and to send a present instead.⁶ On the 16th December the Persian army marched away to Hawiza, while the commanding officers went to Najaf, to report to Nadir.⁷

¹ Dorrill's letter to London of the 7th/18th April, and Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 422. The Carmelite chronicle, however, states that the Persians numbered 30,000, "non numeratis tribus valisimis (sic) Montefic ac Beni Lam nationibus."

² Letter from Dorrill to Gombroon, dated the 7th/18th December, 1743 (quoted in the *Gombroon Diary* in full ten days later).

³ Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

⁴ *Continuatio domestica Bassorensis historiae*, pp. 66 and 67.

⁵ Nadir is said to have wished to employ his fleet in the attack on Basra (see Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 422); it is not known whether he actually sent orders for the fleet, or at any rate part of it, to leave Sohar where it then was. If such orders were sent, they were disregarded by Taqi Khan who was then on the verge of revolt (see Chapter XXIV).

⁶ Dorrill's letter to London of the 7th/18th April.

⁷ *Gombroon Diary*, 17th/28th January, 1744.

Having come to terms with Ahmad Pasha and sent orders to his commanders in the south to raise the siege of Basra, Nadir proceeded to Shahraban with the apparent intention of waiting there until the Porte made known its attitude towards the treaty. Ahmad Pasha had sent his *Kahya* Muhammad Aqa to Constantinople with the document as soon as it had been signed, but before he could reach his destination (he arrived at the Turkish capital in the middle of February, 1744), Nadir received alarming reports of revolts in various parts of Persia. The Shah therefore decided to cross the frontier without further delay, and left Shahraban for Mahidasht and Kirmanshah on the 30th January.¹

¹ *T.N.*, p. 249.

CHAPTER XXIII

REVOLTS IN PERSIA, 1743-1744

NADIR made a terrible mistake when, instead of drawing upon his vast treasures at Kalat for the financing of his wars against the Lazgis and the Turks, he revoked the three years' tax immunity that he had granted to his long-suffering people and then proceeded to grind money and provisions out of them even more relentlessly and ruthlessly than before. Moreover, the drain upon his people was not only financial and economic ; it had also to be reckoned in terms of human lives. Such sacrifices had gladly been made so long as Nadir was waging a war of liberation for his people, but a change naturally occurred in their feelings when he, having restored all the lost Persian territory, continued to fight merely to satisfy his ambition.

In the long and arduous Daghistan campaign, many thousands of Persians had perished without any tangible result being attained. Then came the resumption of the Turkish war which entailed the raising of vast sums of money and which bade fair to cost the lives of many thousands more of Nadir's people. It is difficult to conceive of any Persian feeling the slightest enthusiasm for that purely artificial creation, the Ja'fari sect, which was the chief bone of contention between the two countries ; what the people wanted was peace, in order that they might recover from their war-weariness and resume their agricultural and commercial pursuits. It is not therefore in the least surprising that the long-slumbering discontent at last broke out into flame in 1743 and the following year, manifesting itself in a series of outbreaks in different parts of the country.

The first revolt to break out occurred in the turbulent districts of Darband and Tabarsaran. Some time previously the pretender, Sam Mirza,¹ had appeared in Ardabil, but his attempts to gather supporters had been speedily frustrated by Nadir's nephew, Ibrahim Khan,² the commander of the troops in Adharbaijan at that time, who had captured the pretender, and, having cut off his nose, had set him free ; Sam had then fled to Daghistan.

¹ See p. 231 above.

² He was originally called Muḥammad 'Alī Beg, but Nadir, after his brother's death in 1738, gave him the name of Ibrahim ; see the *N.N.*, p. 257, and the *T.N.*, p. 247. Hanway, in recounting these events, mistakes the younger Ibrahim for his father ; see Vol. IV, p. 241, of his *Travels*.

As the Shah's *muhassils* had been particularly active in the north-western provinces in the spring and early summer of 1743, discontent was both serious and widespread there. Feeling that his moment had come and believing, no doubt, that his pretended Safavi lineage would gain him many adherents, Sam emerged from his hiding-place and strove to incite the people of Darband and Tabarsaran to rebel; he also wrote to the disaffected elements in Shirvan, urging them to join him. Muhammad 'Ali Khan, the Governor of Darband, reported Sam's activities to Nadir, who ordered Haidar Khan, the Governor of Shirvan, to march northwards to Muhammad 'Ali Khan's assistance. Meanwhile, Sam had been joined by Surkhai's son Muhammad, who had been in hiding in Avaria; the two leaders then marched against Haidar Khan, whom they encountered near Shabaran before he could effect a junction with Muhammad 'Ali Khan's forces. The rebels were victorious, and succeeded in capturing Haidar Khan, whom they put to death; they then seized Aq Su, the administrative centre of Shirvan.¹ This success led, as was natural, to an extension of the rising, and Sam and Muhammad were soon at the head of some 20,000 men. Encouraged by this news, some Mughanli soldiers, who formed part of the garrison of Qubba, murdered the loyal troops (who were Afshars), and handed over the place to Sam and Muhammad.² On these serious developments being reported to Nadir, he ordered 'Ashur Khan Afshar, the commander of the Adharbaijan forces, to co-operate with the Governors of Urumiya and Ganja in suppressing the rebellion, and instructed his son Nasrullah and his brother-in-law, Fath 'Ali Khan, also to march against the rebels. The formidable concentration of forces under these leaders encountered the rebels at Bagh-i-Shah near Shamakhi on the 4th Dhu'l-Qa'da, 1156 (20th December, 1743), and heavily defeated them. The royal army captured over a thousand men and all the rebels' cannon, but Muhammad, though wounded, managed to escape to Daghistan, while Sam fled to Georgia.³ In the meanwhile, Muhammad 'Ali Khan had taken effective measures against the Mughanlis of Qubba; he killed many of them and, having captured and blinded the survivors, sent them to their homes as a warning.⁴ On completing the subjugation of Shirvan and the Darband district, Nasrullah set out to join his father; when the prince was passing

¹ *T.N.*, pp. 247 and 248; *N.N.*, pp. 257-263.

² *T.N.*, p. 247. The Mughanlis were a tribe inhabiting the Qaniq district, in close proximity to Jar and Tala.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 248 (in the Bombay edition, the month is wrongly given as Dhu'l-Hijja). See also the *N.N.*, p. 266.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248. Muhammad Kazim states (*N.N.*, p. 261) that Muhammad 'Ali Khan sent the wretched men's eyes, weighing 14 Tabrizi maunds (91 lbs.) with them, as an additional warning to their fellow tribespeople not to rebel.

through the Qarabagh district, one of the followers of Surkhai's son Muhammad made an unsuccessful attempt on his life.⁴

Whilst this revolt was in progress, Giv Amilakhor, the Eristav of Ksan, rebelled. Georgia, like Shirvan and indeed all the other provinces of Persia, was in a very disturbed state,⁵ and Giv Amilakhor had little difficulty in collecting a large number of malcontents; he was also joined by Circassian and Ossetian tribesmen from the northern Caucasus. For some little time Giv and his followers seriously menaced Tiflis, but, luckily for Nadir, Taimuraz and his son Irakli remained loyal, and took the field against Giv. A few days after his disaster at Bagh-i-Shah, the fugitive Sam Mirza reached the Georgian rebels, but his ill-luck still pursued him, for, on the 14th Dhu'l-Qa'da (30th December, 1743), Taimuraz defeated Giv and his followers at Akhal-Kalaki ("New Town"), in Upper Kartli, and captured the pretender when he was trying to escape to the Turks⁶; what occurred to him subsequently will be described in the ensuing chapter.

When Nadir reached Qasr-i-Shirin on his march from Shahraban to Kurdistan, *chapers* reached him from Khwarizm with the news that serious trouble had broken out there. As already stated, Nadir had appointed the youthful Abu'l-Ghazi, Ilbars's son, ruler of Khwarizm, and had made Irtaq Inaq his chief minister.⁷ For a time all was peaceful, but the Yamut Turkomans, whom Nadir had severely defeated, and who had fled to Manqishlak and the Qipchaq plains, later made their way back to Khwarizm and proceeded to attack the Özbegs. Irtaq Inaq marched against the Yamuts and managed to arrive at an understanding with them; as the danger seemed over, he gave leave to many of his Arali supporters, whereupon the treacherous Yamuts, having gained access to Abu'l-Ghazi, poisoned his mind against his chief minister. At this juncture, the Salor Turkomans rebelled, and they also strove to sow dissension between Abu'l-Ghazi and Irtaq Inaq; the result was that the credulous youth ordered his Qalmuq guards to murder the minister.⁸ Great disorders then broke out in Khwarizm, as the Salor and Yamut leaders strove for supremacy; although the local Özbegs joined the Salors, they were unable to prevent the Yamuts from ravaging the country and raiding Khiva, Khanqa, Hazarasp and Yengi Urgench. It being

⁴ N.N., p. 263.

⁵ Having endured the ravages of the Lazgis, the Georgians then had to yield up to Nadir's pitiless *mubassils* most of their few remaining possessions.

⁶ Papouas Orbelian (in *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, p. 80); T.N., p. 251; N.N., p. 266. Muhammad Kazim seems to have taken most of his information from the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, because there is a striking similarity between the corresponding passages of the two works.

⁷ See p. 211, note 6, above.

⁸ N.N., pp. 85-87. Muhammad Kazim adds (pp. 87 and 88) that two officials in Abu'l-Ghazi's service informed him that Irtaq Inaq was murdered after a drunken orgy in Abu'l-Ghazi's palace.

impossible for agriculture or indeed any other pursuit to be carried on, Abu'l-Ghazi was constrained to appeal to Nadir for aid. The Shah ordered his nephew 'Ali Quli Khan to go from Mashhad, where he then was, to Abu'l-Ghazi's assistance.¹ As it was not until the following year (1745) that 'Ali Quli Khan was able to restore order in Khwarizm, particulars of his operations there will be given subsequently.²

Far more serious than the revolt in Daghistan and Shirvan and the upheaval in Khwarizm was the rebellion of Taqi Khan Shirazi. The Beglarbegi is said to have become puffed up with pride after his capture of Muscat³; he knew that the Shah was displeased with him and suspected him, and when the order came for his recall from 'Oman, he decided to revolt. He believed that, with the influence which he imagined that he possessed in Fars and the Gulf coast, together with the support of the fleet, he would be strong enough to resist his formidable master.

It has already been stated how Taqi Khan, on reaching Gombroon from Muscat early in December, 1743, murdered Kalb 'Ali Khan after the latter had refused to take part in the rebellion.⁴ He then endeavoured to win over Rustam Khan, the commander of the portion of the fleet then lying off Gombroon (which had just been augmented by the arrival of eight new ships from Surat), but the commander declined to throw in his lot with him and sailed away.⁵

On the 16th January, 1744, Taqi Khan, having openly rebelled, set out from his camp near Gombroon for Shiraz, at the head of 2,500 men.⁶ On the news of the revolt becoming known in Fars, the tribespeople rose, killed Nadir's *muhassils* wherever they could lay hands upon them, and flocked to join Taqi Khan.

When Nadir received word of this rebellion, he urgently recalled Muhammad Husain Khan Qiriqlu, the commander of the Persian forces in 'Oman. Having collected such troops as he could, Muhammad Husain Khan hastened after Taqi Khan, and at Fasa managed to overtake him; however, instead of attacking the rebels, the Sardar fell back to Kazarun, presumably because he found that he was out-numbered by them.⁷ The way being clear, Taqi Khan marched on to Shiraz where he set himself up as an independent ruler.

In the meantime, troops whom Nadir had hurriedly dispatched to the south had reached Muhammad Husain Khan, while others soon joined

¹ *N.N.*, p. 91.

² See p. 245 below.

³ Niebuhr's *Beschreibung*, p. 301.

⁴ See p. 218 above.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 20th/31st December, 1743.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 30th December, 1743/10th January, 1744.

⁷ Mirza Muhammad Shirazi's *Ruznama*, p. 18.

him from Khuzistan, Kirman and Khurasan¹; these reinforcements included many *jazayirchis*, and had with them a number of cannon and *zanburaks*, so that the Sardar was before long at the head of a very formidable force, numbering, it is said, over 40,000 men.²

It is related that Nadir, despite his anger at Taqi Khan's murder of his brother-in-law and his subsequent recourse to arms, sent Mirza Muhammad 'Ali, the Şadru'l-Mamalik, to endeavour to conciliate him, the explanation of this move being that Nadir had once sworn not to take his life.³ As these conciliatory tactics proved to be of no avail, Muhammad Husain Khan proceeded to invest Shiraz closely. The rebels defended themselves bravely, and, although greatly outnumbered by the besiegers, held out for four and a half months. According to Muhammad Kazim, the besiegers launched a very determined attack on the 20th Jumadi I, 1157 (21st June, 1744), and forced the rebels to capitulate⁴; the town was then sacked, every house being pillaged and many of the inhabitants being put to the sword. Two towers of human heads were erected, and the lovely gardens surrounding the town were devastated; to add to these horrors, plague broke out after the siege and carried off 14,000 people.⁵

In the confusion that followed the entry of the royal forces into Shiraz, Taqi Khan and his eldest son managed to escape, but they were soon captured and sent, together with the rest of his family, under strong guard to Isfahan.⁶ Muhammad Kazim relates that, at Nadir's orders, a mock *istiqlal*⁷ was staged when the prisoners reached the outskirts of Isfahan; Taqi Khan was mounted on an ass and had a fox's brush fastened to his head, and he and his family were met by a mob beating drums and uttering derisory cries.⁸

But for his vow, Nadir would doubtless have put Taqi Khan to death immediately; as it was, his treatment of his former favourite was infinitely more terrible. He sent orders to Isfahan for three of the Khan's sons and one of his brothers to be killed and for the members of their families

¹ Henry Savage, the East India Company's representative at Kirman, wrote to Gombroon on the 25th March/5th April, 1744, that 3,000 troops from "Corasoon" (Khurasan) had passed through the town on their way to join the royal forces besieging Shiraz. Savage added that the country round Kirman was thrown into great confusion by the revolt, and that the roads were so infested by robbers that his messengers feared to venture out; see the *Gombroon Diary*, 4th/15th April, 1744.

² Mirza Muhammad Shirazi's *Ruznama*, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19. Hanway (Vol. IV, p. 244) also states that Nadir had taken an oath not to put Taqi Khan to death.

⁴ *N.N.*, p. 122.

⁵ Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 and 20; this authority was an eye-witness of these events.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ The ceremony of setting forth from a town to meet a distinguished visitor.

⁸ *N.N.*, pp. 132 and 133.

صاحب خستیدار فارس و محمد حسین خان قزوکی که سابق ذکر آن شد
 مملکت فارس سزافزار و الله و ردی خان همی خان را ارسال و خود
 بعد از مضموره عازم رکاب ظفر آشتاب کرد و نظر فرمان و جب
 الاو خان بنده کان شهنشاهی ارسال احمدنشان و در منزل یکدیگر در سخن
 احمدنشان حسب الامر و تفریح خان مجب که حکم انجام و چنین مقرر شده بود
 که خیال و اطفال تفریح خان مجب انشان بنده کان شهنشاهی قبل از این
 شده بود که در انشان سپید و در آن روز بدین چادر و مقصد استقبال تفریح



بدو راه رود و دجل و سرتا بسا و او را در دو قلعه خازیا و اولش و اثر او

THE MOCK ISTIQBAL OF TAQI KHAN SHIRAZI AND HIS SON AT ISFAHAN, AFTER
 THEIR DEFEAT AND CAPTURE

Reproduced from the MS. of the Nadir-Nama by kind permission of the Institut
 Vostochnoaziatskii, Leningrad

to be sold as slaves. The unfortunate man was then castrated and deprived of the sight of one of his eyes, and his favourite wife was given over to the soldiery in his presence; he had doubtless been left the sight of one eye so that he might witness this crowning insult.¹ What is most astonishing is that Taqi Khan was able before very long to reassert his mysterious influence over Nadir and to win his way back into the royal favour, with the result that he was appointed Mustaufi al-Mamalik (Treasurer-General of the Kingdom) and Beglarbegi of the province of Kabul, while the surviving members of his family were released from slavery.²

As Muhammad Husain Khan's troops had not received any pay for several months, money had to be raised as promptly as possible to pay them. Couriers were dispatched from Shiraz to Gombroon with instructions to collect 4,000 tomans there within three days. These men "immediately went to drubbing the Banians and Merchants that refused the Tax laid upon them,"³ and many persons fled from the town in order to escape from this persecution. There were similar exactions at Isfahan, and the "linguist" and broker of the East India Company there were imprisoned, and the broker was forced to give a bond for 2,000 tomans. The *muḥassils* then demanded 3,000 tomans from Peirson, the Company's Resident there, and threatened him with imprisonment if he refused to pay; in the end he managed to avoid arrest by paying 460 tomans. Similar pressure was put upon the Dutch, while the Armenians were compelled to pay 1,000 tomans.⁴ Peirson subsequently reported that these onerous exactions so impoverished the community that it became most difficult to collect money owing to the Company; its merchants had had, he said, to hand over no less than 4,500 tomans to the *muḥassils*.⁵

Practically at the same time as Taqi Khan rebelled, the Ashaqbash Qajar Muhammad Hasan Khan, who was one of the sons of the late Fath 'Ali Khan, headed a revolt in the province of Astarabad. Aided by 1,000 Yamut Turkomans and by some 2,000 Qajars and others who rose in his favour, he gained possession of the town of Astarabad on the 28th January, 1744.⁶ Muhammad Zaman Khan, the Deputy Governor,

¹ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 243; Mirza Muhammad Shirazi, *op. cit.*, p. 20; Niebuhr's *Beschreibung*, p. 302.

² *N.N.*, pp. 132 and 133; see also Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 1st/12th July, 1744.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6th/17th July (quoting from a letter from Peirson from Isfahan, dated the 11th/22nd June).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5th/16th October (quoting from an Isfahan letter of the 24th August/4th September).

⁶ The particulars of this revolt are taken in the main from the very full and interesting first-hand account given by Hanway, who had the misfortune to arrive in Astarabad a few days before the outbreak occurred. Although not badly treated by Muhammad Hasan Khan and the other rebel leaders, he was in danger of being carried off as a slave by the Yamut Turkomans, and all his goods were seized. After spending some days in great uncertainty as to his fate, Hanway managed to leave Astarabad and made his way with difficulty to Gilan, where he met Elton and some other Europeans.

who was a son of the Yokharibash Qajar chief, Muhammad Husain Khan, fled from the town on finding that his forces were incapable of resistance. If he had fallen into Muhammad Hasan Khan's hands, he would almost certainly have been put to death, because his father had played a prominent part in the murder of Fath 'Ali Khan in 1726.

The rebels had previously been in touch with the Governor of the neighbouring province of Mazandaran, but this man, when asked to take up arms in support of the rising in Astarabad, informed the rebels in reply "that they might sleep in the bed which they had made."¹ Hanway states that Muhammad Hasan Khan had also been in correspondence with Sam Mirza, but this led to nothing, because the pretender was defeated and captured before the Astarabad revolt broke out.²

On receiving word of the Astarabad rebellion, Nadir instructed Behbud Khan, the Sardar of the Atak (the district bordering on the mountains running from near Kalat to Ashqabad), to take immediate steps to suppress it. Behbud Khan, who had only 1,500 men at his disposal, was reluctant to obey this order, but Nasir Aqa, who had been a companion of Nadir in his brigand days, and who, in company with Muhammad Zaman Khan, had fled from Astarabad, prevailed upon him to set out. Behbud Khan's force encountered the rebels a few stages to the east of Astarabad; at the outset the royal army was severely repulsed, but the day was lost for the rebels when one of the Qajar chiefs whom they had forced to join them went over to Behbud Khan with all his men. Muhammad Hasan Khan, with a hundred of his Qajar followers and the majority of the Turkomans, escaped to the desert to the north.³ Behbud Khan and Muhammad Husain Khan, the father of Muhammad Zaman Khan, who had meanwhile reached Astarabad, wreaked a bloody revenge upon those of the rebels who were unfortunate enough to fall into their hands.⁴ As at Shiraz, two pillars of human heads were erected; Hanway, who passed these pillars very shortly after they had been built, described them as being:

"of stone whitened over, and made full of niches: these pyramids were about sixteen or twenty feet diameter at the basis, rising gradually to a point to near forty feet; at the top of each was a single head. This being towards the close of the execution, the greatest part of the niches were filled with human heads, of which several had beards, and being set a little projecting, added to the horror of this object."⁵

¹ Hanway, Vol. I, p. 202. One of the rebel leaders penetrated later into Mazandaran and seized Barfurush, but his success was merely ephemeral.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 301, and Vol. IV, p. 245.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 302 and 303. See also the *N.N.*, pp. 136-140; Muhammad Kazim's account must be read with caution, because it contains a number of inaccuracies, and he grossly exaggerates the numbers of the rebels and of Behbud Khan's men in the battle.

⁴ Hanway, Vol. I, pp. 297-303. Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 249) states that Muhammad Husain Khan punished innocent and guilty alike, because of the existence of a feud between him and the rival Ashaqbash Qajars.

⁵ Hanway, Vol. I, p. 295; opposite this page is an engraving showing these two pillars.

Some months later, Muḥammad Ḥasan Khan appeared in Khwarizm, whither he had gone with some of his Yamut allies in order to stir up trouble in that already disturbed country. Nadir's nephew, 'Ali Quli Khan, assisted by Behbud Khan and some other experienced leaders, was then engaged in subduing the unruly tribesmen in those parts.¹ In a battle with the royal forces, Muḥammad Ḥasan Khan engaged Behbud Khan in single combat and wounded his adversary; for a time the Yamuts had the better of the fight, but the Merv contingent eventually routed them. Muḥammad Ḥasan Khan was again forced to fly for his life, and remained a wanderer in the deserts until after Nadir's death.²

'Ali Quli then sent some of his men against the Qaraqalpaqs and the Aral Özbegs; these operations were successful, and from these tribesmen's territories and from Khwarizm the royal troops liberated between 500 and 600 families of Khurasanis, some of whom were sent to Khivaqabad. Overawed by 'Ali Quli's display of force, the rebels who had been responsible for the death of Tahir Beg and for the subsequent disorders submitted, and were then pardoned. After appointing Haras Inaq, a brother of the late Irtaq Inaq, Ataliq of Khwarizm, in order that Abu'l-Ghazi might have the benefit of his experience in the government of the country, 'Ali Quli returned to Khurasan towards the close of 1745.³

These threats to Nadir's supremacy all failed, partly because there was no co-ordination between the rebel leaders and partly because none of these leaders possessed sufficient popularity and influence to rally round him enough men successfully to contend with the very powerful forces that were still at Nadir's disposal. It must not be overlooked that, although dissatisfaction with his rule had become so widespread in Persia, the larger part of his army was composed of Afghans and Turkomans, who had little or no sympathy with the Persian population.

These revolts, besides embittering the Shah and further increasing the ferocity of his temper, served to turn him more and more against his Persian subjects.

¹ See p. 241 above.

² For particulars of Muḥammad Ḥasan Khan's wanderings in the desert and of Nadir's efforts to capture him, see pp. 9 and 10 of the *Ta'rikh-i-Qajariya*, by Mirza Taqi Sipahr (Lisānu'l-Mulk).

³ Muḥammad Kaşim gives in great detail the record of these operations in Khwarizm; see the *N.N.*, pp. 146-165. This authority states (p. 165) that 'Ali Quli poisoned one of his commanders named Allah Verdi when near Merv on the return march. 'Ali Quli, it was rumoured, had been contemplating rebellion and had asked Allah Verdi to join him; on the commander refusing, he murdered him.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE RESUMPTION AND CONCLUSION OF THE TURKISH WAR, 1744-1746

At the close of Chapter XXIII it was stated that Nadir, after waiting for some weeks at Shahraban, left that place for Persia at the end of January, 1744, owing to the alarming news which he kept receiving of the risings in various parts of the country. Marching via Mahidasht, Kirmanshah and Kangavar, he halted for a time just to the north of Hamadan.¹ Von Hammer, on the more than doubtful authority of two French reports which Penkler, the Austrian Resident at Constantinople, sent to Vienna, states that two Turkish armies, each 100,000 strong, the one commanded by the Sar'askar of Baghdad (Ahmad Pasha) and the other by the Sar'askar (*sic*) of Mosul (Husain Pasha), attacked Nadir's forces near Sinandij, and heavily defeated them.² It seems most improbable that any large-scale attack took place at this time; Ahmad Pasha, in view of his treaty with Nadir, would surely not have taken hostile action then, and Husain Pasha and his relatively small army would hardly have ventured to take the offensive alone. It is possible that some Kurdish attack on the Persian advance guard or outposts may have been magnified into a major engagement.

In Chapter XXIII the view was expressed that Nadir's probable object in proposing terms to the Porte which he must have known would prove unacceptable was merely to gain time until the situation in Persia had improved. It is perhaps significant that, even when the dangerous revolt broke out in the south, he did not go in person to suppress it, but remained within striking distance of the Turkish frontier.

Muhammad Aqa, Ahmad Pasha's *Kahya*, delivered the treaty to the Porte in the middle of February, 1744. Although the Turks desired peace, they found that they could not in honour comply with Nadir's religious demands; they therefore refused to ratify the treaty, but they nevertheless made no immediate declaration that the war must be resumed.³ Towards the end of February, the Porte sent Muhammad

¹ Hanway, who visited the camp at this place, stated (Vol. I, p. 240) that Hamadan was about a league to the south of it.

² Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 71.

³ Stanhope Aspinwell to Whitehall, 10th/21st February, 1744. (S.P. 97, Vol. XXXII.)

Aqa back to Baghdad with a message that it could not accept the treaty and that it doubted Nadir's sincerity. Once more, Ahmad Pasha's loyalty was questioned in Constantinople, but in March he was, nevertheless, appointed Sar'askar of the southern forces.¹ Orders were sent to the Pasha of Qars to give further support to the Şafavi pretender, the self-styled Şafi Mirza; in compliance with his instructions, the Pasha sent numbers of letters to tribal chiefs and other notables on the further side of the Persian frontier, urging them to rise in favour of the pretender.²

Nadir celebrated the Nau Ruz in his camp near Hamadan; Jonas Hanway, who arrived at the camp at the end of March in order to obtain redress for his losses in the Astarabad rebellion, has given a most interesting account of it.³ As to the strength of the Shah's forces, Hanway said⁴:

"... he had with him but 30,000 effective men, though with the servants of the soldiers, and attendants upon the camp, they were in the whole near thrice that number; a large body of forces was left towards Erivan; near 30,000 men were in Shirvan; 25,000 in Shiras, besides a body of forces in Khorasan, and a formidable army on the banks of the Indus. The numerous rebellions then on foot called on Nadir for the utmost attention, and he had taken measures for the suppression of them all at one and the same time."

From this camp Nadir proceeded to Abhar, where he heard of the action which the Pasha of Qars was taking on behalf of Şafi Mirza; he sent an enquiry to him, through the Governor of Erivan, as to why he was conducting such propaganda whilst peace negotiations were in progress. The Pasha answered that he had no knowledge of such negotiations and that he had received orders to support Şafi Mirza. The Shah sent an angry reply to the Pasha that he would soon set out to meet him and the pretender.⁵

It being now obvious to Nadir that the Porte had no intention of ratifying the treaty, he started on his north-westward march towards the Turkish frontier. Whilst *en route*, he received the welcome tidings that Taimuraz and Irakli had captured Sam Mirza. He thereupon ordered one of the pretender's eyes to be removed, and had him sent, in company with some Turkish prisoners, to the Pasha of Qars, with the message that, "as Şafi Mirza is also there, the unknown brothers may look upon one another."⁶ On reaching Gori, Nadir heard the further agreeable news that Taimuraz and Irakli, together with some Persian troops under 'Ali Khan, the Governor of Tiflis, had heavily defeated a Turkish force commanded by Yusuf Pasha of Akhal-Tsikhé ("New Castle") at Ruis, on the Liakvi; a large sum of money which the Turks were conveying

¹ *Ibid.*, 24th March/4th April.

² See Vol. I, pp. 240-259.

³ *T.N.*, p. 250.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 250. See also p. 231 above.

⁵ Vol. I, p. 242.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 251; *N.N.*, p. 266.

to the Lazgis fell into the Georgians' hands.¹ Nadir was highly gratified at this additional success, and rewarded his Georgian allies by granting Kartli to Taimuraz and Kakheti to his son.²

From Gori Nadir set out for Qarş, and camped just south of that fortress at the end of May. The Turkish garrison, which consisted of picked troops, strove hard to dislodge the Persian forces, but they met with a repulse after several hours of severe fighting.³ The Persians then moved nearer to the fortress, round which they constructed fortifications; for a month 4,000 workmen whom Nadir had brought from Tiflis endeavoured to divert the stream from which Qarş obtained its water supply, but the Turks frustrated this design.⁴ Almost continual skirmishing went on until, on the 24th August, a battle was fought, but the result was indecisive.⁵

In his customary manner, Nadir had for some time been making peace proposals to the Sar'askar, who refused to respond until after the above-mentioned battle. Ahmad Efendi Kesrieli, one of the envoys from Qarş, persuaded the Shah to treat direct with the Sultan (probably because the Sar'askar had not been authorised to negotiate), and, in company with some other Turkish delegates, conveyed Nadir's peace proposals to Constantinople.⁶ Notwithstanding this arrangement, Nadir continued the siege of Qarş with vigour until the cold weather heralding the approach of winter compelled him to raise the siege on the 9th October.⁷

While this siege was in progress, an envoy from Muhammad Shah reached Constantinople bearing a letter for the Sultan with the suggestion that the two countries should enter into an alliance against Persia. The Sultan, in reply, merely gave the Emperor vague assurances of friendship.⁸

On leaving Qarş, Nadir marched to the Arpa Chai and thence to Akhal-Kalaki; from here he sent out raiding parties into the Turkish district of Akhal-Tsikhé.⁹ In the meanwhile, winter quarters were being prepared for his army at Barda'a, and on the 6th December he reached that place.¹⁰

¹ Muhammad Kazim states (*N.N.*, p. 268) that the Turks were taking presents to the Usmi Ahmad Khan, Surkhal's son Muhammad, and the chiefs of the Avars and the Tabarsaran tribes, in order to induce them to join Safi Mirza.

² *T.N.*, p. 251; *N.N.*, p. 268; Vakhush, in *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 198.

³ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 82; it is impossible to reconcile completely the version given in the *T.N.* (p. 252).

⁴ Papouna Orbelian, in *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 89; see also von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 86.

⁵ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 83 (on the authority of the Turkish historian 'Izzi); Mirza Mahdi does not mention this engagement.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, pp. 83 and 84; this authority states that the murmurings of the garrison and the intrigues of Kesrieli induced the Sar'askar to negotiate.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 86; *T.N.*, p. 252.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 87. Von Hammer considers that this Indian mission may have been the result of one of Bonneval's intrigues, as he had, some three years before, suggested to the French Ambassador at Constantinople the advisability of arranging for an alliance between India and Turkey against Persia.

⁹ Papouna Orbelian, *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 91, see also the *T.N.*, p. 252.

¹⁰ *T.N.*, p. 252.

However, instead of remaining at Barda'a for the winter, he left for Daghistan three weeks later in order to punish the Lazgis once more. Having crossed the Kura by the bridge at Javad, he divided his men into four bodies, and led them rapidly northwards despite the severity of the weather. The Lazgis, being taken by surprise, submitted, after the Persians had captured large numbers of their cattle and sheep.¹ On the day of the Adha festival (10th Dhu'l-Hijja, 1157 = 14th January, 1745), Nadir went to Darband, whence he returned to Barda'a, but, finding that the water and food were more plentiful in the country north of the Kura, he marched three weeks later via Aresh to Shekki.² For three months, that is, from March to June, Nadir remained at Shekki, and then proceeded to Gökcha, in the *yailaq* of Erivan. Whilst on the way to Gökcha, he was taken seriously ill, and had to be conveyed in a litter for several stages. He was skilfully tended by his physicians, and soon recovered.³

On the Turkish side, Yegen Pasha, the new Sar'askar on the northern front, went to Qarş via Erzeroum in the summer of 1745. He had orders to remain on the defensive, but it appears that the danger of famine and the threat of mutiny amongst his men if he remained inactive compelled him to leave Qarş and cross the Persian frontier; his forces consisted of 100,000 cavalry and some 40,000 Janissaries. At first all went well; Yegen Pasha defeated several small bodies of Persians, and he was encouraged by these minor successes to march on Erivan. In the meantime Nadir had decided to attack Qarş once more, and on the 3rd August he set out from Gökcha for that fortress. On the 9th Rajab, 1158 (7th August, 1745), having heard of the approach of the Turks, he marched from Erivan to Murad Täppä (formerly known as Baghavard), and camped on the spot where he had inflicted such a crushing defeat upon the army led by 'Abdullah Köprülü ten years before.⁴ At noon on the following day the Turkish army, advancing from the opposite direction, halted a couple of *farsakhs* away from the Persian position; the Turks spent the rest of the day fortifying their camp.

¹ T.N., p. 253.

² *Ibid.* In the previous year the malcontents of Shekki, under the leadership of Hajji Chelebi ibn Qurban, had opposed the Persian troops in that district, and the fortress of Gäläsän-Göräsän had successfully withstood a siege by the royal forces.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 253. Peirson wrote from Isfahan to Gombroon on the 5th/16th October, 1745, that Nadir was then being tended by a Jesuit physician; this Jesuit may have been Père Damien, of Lyons, who, according to Père des Vignes (*Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 401) had previously treated the Shah for some form of liver complaint.

⁴ T.N., p. 254; N.N., pp. 288 and 289. In describing the movements of the Persians and Turks before the battle, Muhammad Kaşim has taken whole sentences bodily from the T.N.; when stating that Nadir left Erivan for Murad Täppä on the 9th Rajab, he gives the year as 1157 instead of 1158 (N.N., p. 288). Von Hammer makes two errors here; he states, in the first place, that the first battle took place twelve years before, and secondly, that the general who was defeated on that occasion was Topal Osman. He evidently confused the first battle of Baghavard with the one fought at Aq Darband in 1733.

A most obstinate battle took place on the 11th August, both sides making repeated attacks and counter-attacks.¹ According to Muḥammad Kaẓim, the Turks drew up their troops and fought in the European manner in this battle²; if this was so, it is doubtless to be ascribed to Bonneval's training. It appears that the issue was decided when Nadir suddenly threw his reserves, numbering some 40,000 men, on the Turkish flank³; Yegen Pasha's men suffered so severely from this attack that they had to fall back to their fortified camp. Nadir made no attempt to dislodge the Turks from this position, but some days later, on hearing of a striking success which his son Naṣrullah had gained over the Turks near Mosul, he sent a messenger to Yegen Pasha with the news.⁴ Just as this messenger was nearing the Turkish camp he heard a great tumult in it; the Turkish troops, as was soon discovered, had mutinied, and the unfortunate Yegen Pasha lost his life. It is uncertain whether he was killed by one of the mutineers or whether he died of chagrin at his defeat.⁵ The Turkish army had by now become very demoralised and it fled in great confusion after its commander's death, leaving all its artillery and baggage behind. The Turks' casualties in the battle and in their subsequent flight amounted to some 28,000 men, of whom between 10,000 and 12,000 were killed; among the dead were three pashas and many officers of lesser rank.⁶ The field of Baghavard was certainly an ill-omened one for Turkey.

Nadir showed great moderation after this striking victory; he probably realised that, victorious though he was, his country was becoming too exhausted to enable him to carry the war into Turkish territory with any reasonable prospect of success. The triumph which he had just obtained would, on the other hand, enable him to secure an honourable peace.

The Shah gave orders for those of the Turkish prisoners who were wounded and helpless to be freed and sent to Qarṣ⁷; at the same time, he dispatched messengers to Ḥajji Aḥmad Pasha, the Turkish Sar'askar there, with fresh peace proposals in which, for the first time, there was no insistence on the recognition of the Ja'fari sect or on the setting up of the fifth column in the Ka'ba at Mecca. On the other hand, he still demanded the cession of Van, Turkish Kurdistan, Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala and Baṣra.⁸

¹ *T.N.*, p. 254.

² *N.N.*, p. 290.

³ This move by Nadir is mentioned in an account of the battle (evidently from Turkish sources) which Aspinwell forwarded to Whitehall on the 30th August/10th September, 1745 (*S.P.* 97, Vol. XXXII); Mirza Mahdi is silent in regard to it, but Muḥammad Kaẓim (*N.N.*, p. 295) speaks of flank attacks by the Abdalis.

⁴ Nadir, having heard that another Turkish army was marching eastwards via Diyarbakr and Mosul, had sent his son Naṣrullah against it; the prince obtained a great victory over the Turks near Mosul (see the *T.N.*, pp. 254 and 255).

⁵ Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 255) states that Yegen Pasha was murdered; von Hammer (Vol. XV, pp. 96 and 97) says that he died either of chagrin at his defeat or at the hands of a mutineer.

⁶ See the account of the battle referred to in note 2 above.

⁷ *T.N.*, p. 256.

⁸ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 98.

As the Porte found these proposals unacceptable, it began actively to prepare for a fresh campaign. 'Ali Pasha Hakimoghlu was appointed Sar'askar of Qarş in place of Hajji Ahmad Pasha, and endeavours were made to secure the active co-operation of Surkhai and the Usmi Ahmad Khan in Daghistan.¹

Whilst these preparations were in progress, a Persian ambassador named Fath 'Ali Khan Turkoman arrived unexpectedly at Constantinople; he had travelled via Baghdad where he had been detained for some time.² The Sultan issued an order (*khatt-i-sharif*) for the proposals which Fath 'Ali Khan had brought to be discussed at a full council; this was accordingly done on the 1st February, 1746. It was found that, although the Shah was no longer adamant on the religious issues, his territorial demands were still exorbitant. The council nevertheless declared that from the moment when Nadir had abandoned his religious claims the essential conditions of peace were fulfilled; it stated, however, that no Turkish territory could be given up to Persia. After much discussion, it was agreed that Nazif Efendi, the former Ambassador to Persia, should proceed there on another mission in order to discuss the terms of peace. The Ambassador had instructions to insist on the specific renunciation of all claims respecting the Ja'fari sect and the fifth pillar in the Ka'ba; as to the frontiers, he was empowered to agree to a reversion to the demarcation laid down by treaty of Zuhab in 1639.³

Nadir in the meantime had left Adharbaijan and had proceeded by easy stages, via Hamadan and Farahan, to Isfahan, which he reached on the 28th December, 1745. Whilst *en route* he received envoys from the rulers of Khitai and Khotan, who brought him gifts of musk, ambergris, camphor, etc. (these presents were in return for gifts which he had dispatched to these rulers during the Turkistan expedition).⁴

Nadir's sojourn in Isfahan proved to be a period of trial and tribulation, particularly for those of the inhabitants who were rich; it is said that he had lists prepared of all those at Isfahan and elsewhere who had any wealth.⁵ From the Governor of the city he demanded 10,000 tomans and gave orders for him to be bastinadoed:

"The King ordered him to cry out, when under Punishment, that such and such Armenians were indebted to him, who were immediately sent for and Mossels (*muhassils*) set on them to take the money without any examining into the Matter."⁶

There was no redress whatever. A little later a tax was placed on

¹ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 99.

² Aspinwell's despatch to Whitehall, 9th/20th January, 1746 (S.P. 97, Vol. XXXII).

³ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 102.

⁴ N.N., pp. 314 and 315; see also the T.N., p. 256.

⁵ Gombroon Diary, 28th January/8th February, 1746.

⁶ *Ibid.*

goats, but many of those who owned these animals destroyed them in order to avoid payment of the tax.

Peirson, the Resident of the East India Company, gave the Shah a handsome present and at the same time submitted a petition to him for the restoration of all the Company's former privileges. Nadir graciously accepted the present, but refused to restore any of the privileges, on the grounds that those already granted or renewed through the intermediary of Mirza Mahdi and the "talligaws" (*taliqas*) of Taqi Khan which conferred customs exemption were sufficient.¹

On the 10th Muharram, 1159 (2nd February, 1746), Nadir left Isfahan for Khurasan; travelling via Ardkan and Tabas, he reached Hasanabad, in the district of Mashhad, early in the following month. Wherever he halted on this march, he behaved with great severity and cruelty to the officials; after examining their accounts and questioning them, he accused the majority of treason, and had them tortured and mutilated, and in some cases put to death. At Hasanabad he accused Shah Quli Khan Qajar, the Governor of Merv, of having intrigued with Muhammad Hasan Khan Qajar, dismissed him from his post, and had him placed first in the pillory and then in the stocks. On examining the Merv accounts, the Shah grew angry and ordered the chief of the treasury officials of that place to be blinded; he then dispatched *muhassils* there with orders to collect a very large sum "to the last *dinar*."²

From Hasanabad Nadir went to Mashhad, where he received the Governors and lesser officials of Herat, Tun, Tabas, Qa'in and other towns, all of whom he punished. The officials and notables of the Holy City suffered very severely, no less than 100 of them being executed at the royal command. Nadir gave orders that the sum of one *alf* (500,000 tomans) was to be raised by the citizens within the period of a year.³

Muhammad Kazim, who was then in charge of the accounts of the arsenal and ordnance at Merv, received a summons to the dreaded presence of the Shah, but (to use his own words)⁴:

"By the favours of the Divine and Eternal One which the intelligence is incapable of imagining, one of the (other) officials and scribes, who had a small account of ten tomans, on coming into the calamitous gaze of that Presence, became the object of the royal anger and punishment, but the accounts of this contemptible one, which amounted to over 500,000 tomans, were, by the grace and assistance of the Creator, approved."

This authority relates that whenever an official emerged safe and sound

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 8th/19th March, 1746 (quoting from a letter from Peirson dated the 31st January/11th February).

² *N.N.*, p. 334.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

from one of these perilous audiences, he would recite to himself a verse expressing his joy at escaping alive.¹

Nadir, after expressing his approval of Muhammad Kazim's accounts, gave orders for the preparation of the artillery at Merv to be continued, "because, if Allah wills, after I have returned from the journey to 'Iraq, I shall go to Turkistan."²

Nau Ruz was celebrated with customary magnificence at Mashhad; it is said that 12,000 coats of honour, ranging in value from ten to one hundred tomans, were given to the military leaders and notables; however, for every person thus honoured, many were punished.³

It was at this time that a rebellion broke out in Sistan which was destined to have very serious consequences. The leader of the rebels was Fath 'Ali Khan Sistani (or Kayani), the Governor of the province. Fath 'Ali Khan, after enrolling himself in Nadir's Army, had rendered good service in Afghanistan and India; in consequence, Nadir had treated him well, and had later made him Governor of his own province of Sistan. During the winter of 1745-6, Fath 'Ali Khan received a *raqam* from the court ordering him to collect and dispatch to the royal treasury so large a sum of money that it was impossible to raise it in full; all that he could do was to send off as much as he could extort from the already impoverished inhabitants. When the royal *muhasils* noticed that this sum fell very short of the full amount, they alleged to Nadir that the Governor was deliberately keeping back the balance. In great anger, Nadir summoned Fath 'Ali Khan and several notables of Sistan to his court, and bade them bring the rest of the assessed amount with them. Knowing that no more money could be obtained and being in no doubt as to what their fate would be if they arrived empty-handed at the court, they saw that there was no alternative to rebellion.⁴

The revolt began in March, as stated above; besides large numbers of Sistanis, many Baluch tribesmen joined Fath 'Ali Khan, and there were rumours that the people of Qandahar and Kabul would also revolt. At first, all went well for the rebels, for they captured one of Nadir's caravans from India, and made a successful raid on Bam.⁵ Encouraged by the large numbers of his adherents and by these successes, Fath 'Ali Khan conceived the idea of setting himself up as the independent ruler of Sistan and of much of the surrounding country.⁶ The later phases of this revolt

¹ N.N., p. 336.

² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 479-481; Muhammad Kazim states that "the drum of revolt was beaten" in the month of Dhu'l-Qada, 1159 (November/December, 1746), but this is incorrect, as it is clear from entries in the *Gombroon Diary* in May, 1746, based on letters from Kirman, that the revolt must have broken out in March or possibly even earlier.

⁵ *Gombroon Diary*, 30th April/11th May and 15th/26th May, 1746.

⁶ N.N., p. 480.

and its results, both direct and indirect, will be described in the next chapter.

For precisely similar reasons to those which had caused the Sistan revolt, a rebellion broke out in Kirman in June, 1746, but, as it was on a much smaller scale, it was speedily suppressed.¹

From Mashhad, Nadir went to Kalat, where he stayed for several days inspecting the buildings which his Indian workmen had erected there for the housing of his treasures. Enormous blocks of Maragha marble, some weighing as much as 50 and 60 *kharvars* (14½ and nearly 17½ tons respectively) were used in the construction of these buildings and of some at Mashhad. Muhammad Kazim states that there were three particularly large blocks which were known as *Iran-i-kharab* ("ruined Persia"), *kharaj-i-'alam* ("tribute of the world") and *'alam-i-kharab* ("ruined world").²

Money in gold and silver coins, to the value of nine *crores* of rupees or 4,500,000 tomans (equivalent at that time to some £9,000,000) was placed in the treasure-house. Jewels, carpets and other objects of value were stored separately. It is related that Nadir, after going over the main treasure-house with some of the overseers of the workmen and several eunuchs, feared lest one of these persons should afterwards disclose the whereabouts of the treasures; he therefore put to death two or three of the overseers and all the eunuchs.³

At his orders, much was done to add to the natural strength of the fortress by erecting walls and watch-towers and by smoothing the already steep face of the surrounding cliffs, and so rendering them even more difficult to climb.⁴

Nadir then visited Abivard and the Darragaz district; when at Dastgird he inspected his *maulud-khana* ("birthplace house"), and was extremely pleased with it; possibly for this reason, he treated the poor of that part with kindness.⁵

The Shah then returned to Mashhad, but he set out from there almost immediately afterwards for Persian 'Iraq, in order to meet the Turkish Ambassador.

Shortly after Nadir had arrived at Kurdan, a place in the Sauj Bulagh

¹ As in Sistan, it was the Governor who headed the revolt, because he was unable to collect in full the tax levied on the town and district. The loyal members of the garrison retired to the citadel, and expelled the local Afshars who were disaffected and who proceeded to join the rebel Governor. Savage and Graves, the local representatives of the East India Company, after hiding their books and cash, left their house secretly and took refuge in a fort some distance from the town, where they remained until reinforcements arrived and assisted the garrison to restore order. See the *Gombroon Diary*, 10th/21st July, 1746.

² *N.N.*, pp. 339 and 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 342. In this connection, see Curzon, Vol. I, p. 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

district some 37 miles W.N.W. of Tehran, Nazif Efendi and his suite arrived at the royal camp, where they were received with impressive ceremonial and pomp; when Nadir received the Ambassador, he was seated on the peacock throne and wore his magnificent jewels.¹ Discussions then ensued between Nazif Efendi and the Persian ministers, and agreement on every point was reached after five conferences had been held. On the 17th Sha'ban, 1159 (4th September, 1746), the treaty was signed at Kurdan, and so officially brought to a close the long period of strife between Persia and Turkey.²

The treaty, which consisted of a preamble, three articles and a supplement, contained the following provisions:

Preamble. The terms of the treaty of peace concluded (at Zuhab) in the time of Sultan Murad IV (in 1630) were to be observed, and the frontier between the two states was to be as laid down in that instrument. In the second place, each country was to abstain "from those matters, which excite resentment (*kadurat*) and which are detrimental to the conclusion of peace."

Article I. The Turkish authorities undertook to allow Persian pilgrims to go to Mecca via Baghdad or Syria and to protect them *en route*.

Article II. Each state was to send an ambassador to the court of the other every three years.

Article III. All prisoners on both sides were to be set free and to be allowed to return to their homes, and the buying or selling of prisoners as slaves was declared unlawful.

Supplement. (i) The governors of the frontier provinces were to abstain from acts detrimental to friendship. (ii) The Persian peoples, having abandoned "those unseemly opinions which were created in the times of the Safavis, and having in their fundamental beliefs followed the path of the *Sunnat*," were thenceforward to treat the Orthodox Caliphs (i.e., Abu Bakr, 'Omar and 'Othman) with respect. In the future these peoples were to go through Turkish territory to and from Mecca, Madina and the countries of Islam in the manner of the Turkish pilgrims and of the peoples of the other Islamic countries; they were likewise to be able to visit the Holy Cities in Mesopotamia. So long as these pilgrims carried no merchandise, the Governor and officials of Baghdad were not to levy any tax upon them. (iii) Similar privileges were to be accorded to Turkish pilgrims in Persian territory. (iv) It was provided, in conclusion, that the treaty should always remain in force.³

When Nazif Efendi returned to Constantinople with the treaty, he took with him a letter from Nadir to the Sultan. In this letter, which began with a doxology and praise of Muhammad and the Orthodox Caliphs, Nadir referred to the heresies of Shah Isma'il, the evils which they had brought upon Persia and the troubles which they had stirred up between

¹ Von Hammer, Vol. XV, pp. 117 and 118.

² *Ibid.*, p. 118; *T.N.*, p. 258.

³ *T.N.*, pp. 260 and 261; Gabriel Efendi Noradounghian gives a French translation of the treaty (from the Turkish text) in his *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1897), Vol. I, pp. 306-308.

that country and Turkey ; after repeating that he had accepted the crown of Persia on condition that the Persians abjured the Shi'a faith, he expressly gave up his demand for the recognition of the Ja'fari sect, and concluded by renouncing all claim to one of two portions of territory which had been transferred to Turkey in the time of Shah Isma'il.¹

When the Porte received the news that the treaty had been concluded and that its terms were satisfactory, it dispatched an embassy of unexampled magnificence to the Persian court. Ahmad Pasha Kesrieli was appointed as Ambassador ; his suite consisted of no less than 1,000 persons, while he took with him gifts which surpassed in sumptuousness and value those which the Porte had hitherto sent to any Asiatic or European sovereign.² This mission was not, however, destined to fulfil its task, because Nadir, as will be described in the following chapter, was assassinated before it could reach his court.

Nadir, for his part, sent as Ambassadors to the Porte his intimate companion and adviser, Mustafa Khan, and his historiographer, Mirza Mahdi ; they took with them, as gifts for the Sultan, a golden throne set with jewels (doubtless one of the spoils of Delhi), pearls from 'Oman, and two dancing elephants (*fil-i-raqqas*).³

¹ T.N., pp. 259 and 260 ; it is not specified either in this letter or in the treaty to which of these two areas the renunciation applied.

² Von Hammer, Vol. XV, pp. 119 and 120 ; he gives the value of these presents as 700 purses.

³ T.N., p. 259.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CULMINATING TRAGEDY

ALTHOUGH the signature of the Turkish treaty meant the final abandonment of Nadir's dream of marching to the Bosphorus or of taking Baghdad, he nevertheless felt relieved that a settlement with the Turks had at last been effected; to celebrate the event, he spent several days in feasting and drinking. His rejoicing, however, was cut short by the arrival of disturbing reports of the Sistan rebellion and of local outbreaks in Khurasan.

The internal situation of Persia had been serious enough in 1743 and 1744, when several isolated revolts had occurred, but by this time the people had become further embittered by the terribly repressive measures that had been taken to quell the revolts and by the Shah's increasing lust for blood and money. Sullen resentment was, in fact, being replaced by savage desperation.

In consequence of the disquieting news from the east, Nadir decided to return to Mashhad via Isfahan and Kirman. He reached Isfahan early in December, 1746, and remained there for seven weeks. Whilst in that city, he gave signs of increasing mental derangement; to quote Hanway¹:

"From an incessant fatigue and labour of mind, attended with some infirmities of body, he had contracted a disposition, which in the generality of mankind is called by the name of peevishness, but in him was a diabolical fierceness, with a total insensibility of human sufferings. His avidity, as common to sickly minds, increased with his years; and in order to indulge it, he seemed resolved to perform some master-stroke of cruelty. During his stay at Isfahan, he committed barbarities beyond any of the former years of his reign."

The Jesuit Père Bazin, who at that time was appointed chief physician to the Shah through the instrumentality of Peirson, the Resident of the East India Company,² described Isfahan as resembling a city which, having been taken by assault, had then been given up to the fury of the conquerors. Whenever he emerged from the palace he would see the corpses of twenty-five to thirty men who had been strangled at Nadir's

¹ Vol. IV. p. 258.

² For further details, see Appendix I.

orders or murdered by the soldiery. One day, when an inventory of the palace furniture was made, a small carpet was found to be missing; the keeper of the royal jewels was accused of its theft, and was immediately bastinadoed. While being beaten, the man cried out that he himself was innocent, and that his predecessor had sold the carpet to eight merchants, four of whom were Jews and the others Armenians and Indians. On the names of these men being given, they were all seized, and then, without even the semblance of a trial, they each suffered the loss of an eye; they were thereupon cast in chains into a fire. Bazin relates that all those who witnessed this terrible scene, including the executioners, were aghast.¹

It was, apparently, while Nadir was at Isfahan that he sent his nephew, 'Ali Quli Khan, to Sistan in order to complete the subjugation of the rebels. For several months Fath 'Ali Khan Sistani had successfully withstood every attempt to defeat him, but eventually a force from Khurasan under a commander named Muhammad Rida had overwhelmed his men and taken him prisoner. Muhammad Rida then sent Fath 'Ali Khan in chains to Nadir; the rebel leader's fate is not recorded, but it is not difficult to imagine what it was. However, Muhammad Rida's triumph was not complete, for many of the Sistani and Buluch rebels escaped; they then rallied round one of Fath 'Ali Khan's commanders named Mir Kuchik, who led them to the old Arsacidan fortress of Kuh-i-Khwaja,² which was very strongly situated on an isolated bluff at the western end of the Hamun. It was against Mir Kuchik and his followers that Nadir sent 'Ali Quli Khan; he also dispatched Tahmasp Khan Jalayir to assist him³; what ensued will be described later in this chapter.

Meanwhile, the Shah had been imposing enormous taxes or rather contributions upon the people not only of Isfahan, but of practically every part of his empire; even the members of his own family were not exempt, as will be seen below. He impounded the property of his nephew Ibrahim Khan, and sent orders to 'Ali Quli in Sistan to pay 100,000 tomans; Tahmasp Khan Jalayir was assessed at half that amount.⁴ Peirson and Blandy, the Isfahan representatives of the East India Company, reported to London that in consequence of these terrible exactions⁵:

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 300; see also the *T.N.*, p. 264 and Lutfi 'Ali Beg's *Atash-Kada*.

² Professor Herzfeld has described the Kuh-i-Khwaja in his *Archaeological History of Iran*, pp. 50 and 58/74; this work also contains several photographs and diagrams of the fortress.

³ The above particulars are taken from the *T.N.*, pp. 480/489; according to Muhammad Karim, 'Ali Quli Khan made so little progress with the siege of the Kuh-i-Khwaja that Nadir grew impatient and dispatched Tahmasp Khan to expedite the operations. It appears from the *T.N.*, however, that Tahmasp Khan accompanied 'Ali Quli. (*T.N.*, p. 205.)

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 265.

⁵ Letter from Isfahan to London, dated the 16th/27th May, 1747.

"No bound is had to Usury and many Places have revolted hereupon, for nobody is exempt and the King has likewise imposed large sums upon his Sons and Nephews which with his intolerable Cruelties in killing to the amount of forty to fifty People every Day and other outrages gives every Reason to fear he is out of his senses."

The effects of this insane policy in Sistan and Kirman in the previous year have already been described. In Georgia, where crushing taxation had been imposed, Taimuraz and his son Irakli prepared for armed resistance, but the former, instead of revolting, decided on the bolder course of going in person to the Shah in order to remonstrate and to plead for a reduction in the amount demanded. In May, 1747, Taimuraz set out for the royal court, but Nadir's assassination took place before he could arrive there.¹ In Adharbaijan the exasperated populace revolted and proclaimed the pretender, Sam Mirza Shah, at Tabriz when he appeared there.²

On the 10th Muharram, 1160 (23rd January, 1747), Nadir left Isfahan for Yazd and Kirman; wherever he halted, he had many people tortured and put to death, and had towers of their heads erected. He was particularly severe at Kirman, because of the revolt that had occurred there in the previous summer. Captain Possiet, a member of Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitzin's mission to Persia,³ who had travelled on in advance and was in Kirman at this time, saw two lofty towers of heads there.⁴ The interpreter of the Dutch factory was beaten to death, because it had been alleged that some Persian notable had deposited a large sum of money with him⁵; the English did not escape, for they were forced to give the Shah a large draft on Isfahan.⁶

The Nau Ruz festival was held just outside Kirman, but it must have been an occasion for lamentation rather than rejoicing. At the end of March Nadir left for Mashhad and marched across the terrible Dasht-i-Lut, where many of his men perished of hunger and thirst, while others were swallowed up by the treacherous ground.⁷

At Tabas, the first town to be reached on the further side of the desert, Nadir received his sons and grandsons, sixteen in number, whom he had

¹ Papouna Orbelian, in *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 117 and 118 and 119-123.

² *Ibid.* See also p. 10 of Gulistana's *Das Mujmil et-Tarikh-i-Ba'dud-dirtja* (Leiden edition, edited by Oskar Mann).

³ This Prince Golitzin was a relative of Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin, who had been Russian Ambassador to Persia from April, 1734, until June, 1735. Particulars of Prince M. M. Golitzin's mission are given by Lerch (*Büsching's Magazin*, Vol. X, pp. 367 et seq.), Dr. J. Cook (*Voyages and Travels through the Russian Empire, Tartary and part of the Kingdom of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 242-260), and Hanway, Vol. I, Chapters LIV to LVIII. Golitzin and the other members of his embassy arrived at Resht in April, 1747, and were on their way to Nadir's camp when they received the news of his assassination.

⁴ Lerch, *op. cit.*, p. 421, and Cook, Vol. II, p. 499. Captain Possiet was Lerch's brother-in-law.

⁵ Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 259.

⁶ See Appendix I.

⁷ Bazin, pp. 307 and 308.

summoned to meet him there. After regarding them for some time, he offered his crown to each of the three eldest in turn, but the youths, fearing a trap, all refused, pleading their incapacity, extreme youth and inexperience.¹

On reaching Mashhad at the end of April, Nadir behaved, if possible, in an even more brutal and inhuman manner than he had done at Isfahan and Kirman. With the Shah in this frenzied state, nobody could feel secure; all feared not only for their fortunes, but also for their lives. Impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, everybody, including even Nadir's own relations, entered into plots and sought to join in the revolts that were already in progress or on the point of breaking out.²

In Sistan, messengers arrived almost daily at 'Ali Quli's camp bringing news of fresh exactions and executions by the Shah. When 'Ali Quli heard of the seizure of his brother's property and of the levy of 100,000 tomans on himself, he decided to revolt. Tahmasp Khan, despite the news of the levy of 50,000 tomans upon himself, remained loyal to Nadir, and strove to dissuade 'Ali Quli Khan from rebelling; when 'Ali Quli refused to listen to him, he showed him a warrant from Nadir for his execution; 'Ali Quli retorted by producing another order, bearing the royal seal, for the Khan to be put to death.³ Although the sight of his own death warrant seems for a time to have caused Tahmasp Khan to waver in his loyalty to Nadir, he ultimately, as will be seen below, proved faithful to him.

'Ali Quli's first action on revolting was to make common cause with Mir Kuchik and his men who had all this time been successfully resisting him. The universal terror that Nadir had inspired rather than affection for 'Ali Quli caused large numbers of Sistani, Baluch and Afghan tribesmen to join in the revolt. Encouraged by the widespread nature of his support, 'Ali Quli began to entertain hopes of the throne; with ever-increasing forces, he marched from Sistan to Herat, where he arrived in the middle of Rabi' II (26th April, 1747); here he received many chieftains from the surrounding districts, who all swore to aid him against Nadir. Once more Tahmasp Khan endeavoured to restrain 'Ali Quli, but the latter again refused to listen to him, and, when the Khan persisted, he silenced him for ever with a dose of poison.⁴

The news of 'Ali Quli's revolt spread rapidly and gave a great impetus to the growing opposition to Nadir's intolerable tyranny. Among those to rise in favour of 'Ali Quli were the Kurds of Khabushan, who signalled

¹ Bazin, p. 308. Muhammad Kazim states (*N.N.*, p. 501) that Nadir had five sons and fifteen grandsons (see the genealogical tree which forms Appendix II).

² *Ibid.*, p. 309.

³ *N.N.*, pp. 488-490.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 491.

their revolt by raiding the royal stud farm at Radkan.¹ Nadir, who had been greatly upset by the rebellion of his nephew 'Ali Quli, for whom he had done so much in the past, was enraged by this Kurdish raid on Radkan, and set out from Mashhad at the head of 16,000 men to punish the perpetrators. He seems to have been aware of the rapidly growing danger to himself, and his family, since he took the precaution of sending his sons and his grandson Shahrukh to Kalat for safety before he left Mashhad for Khabushan.²

On the approach of the Shah, some of the Kurds shut themselves up in the citadel at Khabushan and prepared for a siege, while others fled to the Ala Dagh mountains. On the evening of the 19th June, Nadir and his army camped on rising ground³ at Fathabad, two *farsakhs* from Khabushan; Bazin, who was in attendance upon the Shah, relates⁴ that he :

"seemed to have some presentiment of the evil which was awaiting him at this spot. For some days he had kept in his *haram* a horse saddled and bridled. He attempted to escape to Kalat. His guards surprised him, pointed out the evils which his flight would entail, proclaimed that they were his faithful servants, that they would fight for him against all his enemies and that not one of them would abandon him. He then allowed himself to be persuaded, and returned. He clearly perceived that for some time a number of plots against his life had been woven. Of all the nobles at his court, Muhammad Quli Khan, his relation, and Salih Khan were the most discontented and the most active. The first was in command of the guards and the second the superintendent of his household. The latter caused him less fear because his post gave him no authority over the troops; but he dreaded the former, (who was) a man of swift action (*expédition*), esteemed for his bravery, and (who was) on good terms with his officers. It was on him that suspicion fell. He (Nadir) resolved to forestall him.

"He had in his camp a corps of 4,000 Afghans; these foreign troops were entirely devoted to him and hostile to the Persians. On the night of the 19th/20th June he summoned all their chiefs. 'I am not satisfied with my guards,' he said to them. 'Your loyalty and your courage are known to me. I order you to arrest all their officers to-morrow morning and to place them in irons. Do not spare any of them if they dare to resist you. It is a question of my personal security, and I entrust the preservation of my life to you alone.'"⁵

The commander of the Afghans was Ahmad Khan Abdali, the second son of Muhammad Zaman Khan Sadozai: he was then a young man of between twenty-three and twenty-five⁶; he owed his rapid advancement

¹ *T.N.*, p. 265; according to Muhammad Kazim (*N.N.*, p. 495), the Kurds rose because Nadir had sent his *muhajjirs* to the Khabushan district to collect the sum of 1,400 *ahs* (i.e., 7,000,000 tomans), which seems an incredibly large amount.

² Bazin, p. 311.

³ This eminence was afterwards known as Nadir Tappā.

⁴ Bazin, p. 311-313.

⁵ It is clear from other accounts that Nadir meant to massacre the Persian officers.

⁶ He had been aged between fourteen and sixteen when Nadir freed him from captivity on taking Qandahar in 1738.

to his military ability and zeal, which had attracted Nadir's notice and gained him the royal favour. Ahmad Khan and his officers, after promising to carry out Nadir's orders, retired, and took immediate steps to prepare their men for their dreadful task. A spy, however, had overheard the Shah's discussion with the Afghan leaders, and divulged the secret to Muhammad Quli Khan, who passed it on to Salih Khan. The two men then made a compact "not to abandon each other and to kill that very night the common enemy who had resolved to put them to death on the following day."¹ To use a Persian expression, they determined "to breakfast off him ere he should sup off them."²

Muhammad Quli Khan and Salih Khan took into their confidence only those of their companions whom they knew to be entirely trustworthy. After some discussion, it was agreed that Muhammad Quli Khan, Salih Khan, Muhammad Khan Qajar, of Erivan, Musa Beg, of the Eyerlu Afshars, Qoja Beg Gunduzlu, of the Afshars of Urumiya, and some seventy others were to murder the Shah that night, before he could give the order for the massacre of the Persians to begin.³

Some hours after nightfall the conspirators cautiously made their way to the tent of Chuki, the daughter of Muhammad Husain Khan Qajar, with whom Nadir was passing the night. So great was their terror of Nadir that the majority of the conspirators did not dare to enter the tent, and only Muhammad Khan Qajar, Salih Khan and one other resolute man had courage enough to proceed, after strangling the guard who was on duty at the entrance. Their movements aroused Chuki, who, on noticing the dim form of Salih Khan approaching, awakened the sleeping Shah. Nadir sprang up from the bed in angry astonishment, and heaped abuse upon Salih Khan as he advanced upon him; drawing his sword, he then rushed upon the assassin, but tripped over one of the tent ropes and fell to the ground; before he could get up, Salih Khan struck at him with his sword and cut off one of his hands. After striking this blow, Salih Khan became suddenly stricken with terror and stood as if rooted to the ground; Muhammad Khan Qajar, however, retained his courage and, following up the attack with a well-directed blow, cut off Nadir's head.⁴

The assassins and their accomplices thereupon seized whatever of Nadir's possessions they could lay their hands on, and then entered the women's quarters and seized their valuables, but did not otherwise molest them. From the harem they hastened to the tents of the three ministers

¹ Gulistana, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

² This quotation is taken from Professor E. G. Browne's *Persian Literature in Modern Times*, p. 137.

³ Gulistana, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

who had enjoyed Nadir's particular favour; they killed two of these ministers, but spared the third.¹

These deeds were followed by a scene of terrible confusion and horror in the camp. Ahmad Khan and his 4,000 Afghans could not believe at first that Nadir was really dead; hastening towards the royal quarters in order, as they thought, to protect him, they found their way barred by 6,000 Qizilbash guards, who were joined soon after by another body 4,000 strong. Although greatly outnumbered, the Afghans hewed their way through their opponents' ranks and entered Chuki's tent. When they saw Nadir's headless trunk lying in a pool of blood, they were overcome with horror. After giving expression to their grief, they retired, and, although attacked by the Qizilbash, they again fought their way through and in due course reached Qandahar in safety; on their way they intercepted and captured a treasure convoy from Nadir's camp.²

Having hastened from Herat to Mashhad, 'Ali Quli Khan felt that his chances of securing and retaining the crown would be slender so long as any of Nadir's sons remained alive; he therefore dispatched a strong force of Bakhtiaris, under a Georgian named Suhrab Khan, to take the fortress of Kalat to which, as stated above, Nadir had sent the princes for safety. After a siege of sixteen days, the Bakhtiaris succeeded in entering the fortress by means of a ladder which the defenders, either through negligence or by design, had left one night standing against the cliff.³

When the Bakhtiaris entered Kalat, Naṣrullah, Imam Quli, Shahrugh and the other princes took horse and fled in the direction of Merv, but they were immediately pursued and were soon overtaken. Naṣrullah resisted most bravely, but he was overpowered, and he and his brothers and nephew were then taken back to Kalat. At 'Ali Quli's orders, the unfortunate Riḍa Quli and fifteen of his relatives were put to death at Kalat, and Naṣrullah and Imam Quli were slaughtered after being taken to Mashhad, while their remaining brothers (Chingiz Khan, aged three, and Muḥammad Allah Khan, who was an infant) were poisoned.⁴

So determined was 'Ali Quli to extirpate Nadir's line that he even put to death those of his widows and women who were with child.⁵ Shahrugh,

¹ Bazin, p. 323; this authority omits the names of the two ministers who were killed; one of these was probably Mirza Zaki. Bazin gives the name of the one who was spared as "Mayer Kan"; this was presumably Hasan 'Ali Khan Mu'ayyir-i-Mamalik (it is known that he survived).

² Bazin, p. 324; *T.N.*, p. 265; *Gulistana*, pp. 20 and 21; it must have been on this occasion that Ahmad Khan obtained possession of the Koh-i-Nor diamond (see p. 152 above).

³ Mirza Mahdi (*T.N.*, p. 266) states that some of the garrison, after fetching water one night from a stream outside the fortress, negligently left their ladder standing against the otherwise unscalable cliff; Muḥammad Kazim also states (*N.N.*, p. 300) that they were negligent. Bazin (p. 328), however, suggests treachery.

⁴ *T.N.*, p. 266. Chingiz Khan was probably the son of Abu'l-Faid's daughter whom Nadir had married at Bukhara (see p. 189 above); in this connexion, see also Appendix II.

⁵ Bazin, p. 329.

Nadir's grandson, alone was spared. Gulistana states that 'Ali Quli (or 'Adil Shah, as he styled himself on his accession) did not put him to death because he considered that the people of Persia might wish to have one who belonged to the ancient Safavi line as their monarch.¹

As for Nadir's remains, his head and body were eventually brought to Mashhad and interred in the tomb which he had had built there in the Khiaban-i-Bala several years before; the body of Rida Quli was later placed in the same tomb. Agha Muhammad Shah, on ascending the throne, had Nadir's remains (and those of Karim Khan as well) exhumed and brought to Tehran, where they were laid under the threshold of his palace, so that "whenever he went abroad he might trample upon the dust of the great persecutor of himself and his family."²

In such ignominious fashion were the remains of one of the greatest figures of Persian history treated. It is satisfactory to note that, of recent years, something has been done to do honour to Nadir's memory in the city which he made his capital. Owing mainly to the zeal of Prince Afsar, who was in charge of public education in Mashhad some twenty years ago, the houses and shops that had sprung up on the site of Nadir's tomb were demolished and as much as possible of the material used for the original building was recovered; it being impossible to reconstruct the mausoleum on the same scale and in the same manner as before, a more modest edifice was erected and the rest of the site was laid out as a garden. Some three years ago, the recruiting authorities—appropriately enough—were using this building as an office.

Before concluding this chapter, a few words must be said regarding 'Adil Shah ('Ali Quli Khan) and his immediate successors. 'Adil Shah had been the figure-head, rather than the leader, of the movement against Nadir, and he proved himself to be unequal to the task of restoring order and tranquillity to his much harassed country. When he had reigned barely a year, he was deposed and blinded by his brother Ibrahim, who, in his turn, was subsequently defeated and killed by the partisans of Shahrukh, Nadir's grandson; 'Adil Shah was also put to death on this

¹ Gulistana, *op. cit.*, p. 24; T.N., p. 266; see also the N.N., p. 500. Shahrukh, being the son of Fatima Begum, was Shah Sultan Husain's grandson.

² Curzon, Vol. I, p. 165. (Curzon is wrong in stating, on the same page, that Agha Muhammad, "mindful of the source to which he owed his calamity, raised Nadir's tomb to the ground." In the first place, it was 'Adil Shah, and not Nadir, who was responsible for Agha Muhammad's misfortune. Secondly, Nadir's tomb was demolished by the *mujtahids* of Mashhad in 1802, after the execution of Nadir Mirza, who was one of the sons of Shahrukh, and therefore a great-grandson of Nadir (Nadir Mirza, together with his brother Nasrullah, had aroused the animosity of the *mujtahids* by despoiling the shrine of Imam Rida, and he had later incurred their mortal enmity by murdering one of them). Curzon, in this second instance, has made the same mistake as James Baillie Fraser (*Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan in the Years 1821 and 1822*, p. 462, and de Khanikoff, *op. cit.*, p. 107).

occasion. Shahrukh was then crowned, but he was soon after deposed and blinded by Muḥammad Mirza, who claimed descent from Shah Sulaiman through the female line. Two months later, the usurper was defeated and slain, and Shahrukh was placed on the throne once more. Aḥmad Khan Abdali then invaded Khurasan and deposed Shahrukh, only to restore him shortly afterwards as ruler of that province under Afghan suzerainty. Meanwhile Karim Khan Zand was consolidating his power in the rest of Persia, and it was his firm yet merciful rule that gave the country the respite from turmoil and bloodshed for which it had craved for so long.

CHAPTER XXVI

NADIR'S ATTAINMENTS AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

THE purpose of this chapter is to appraise Nadir's qualities as a military leader and ruler, and to describe his personal characteristics and his attitude towards religion and the arts.

Nadir as a Military Leader.

As Nadir was first and foremost a soldier, it is only fitting that his attainments as a military leader should be the first to be considered.

It is abundantly clear from the various accounts that have come down to us that he was a real military genius. Of obscure origin and quite unlettered, his knowledge of the science of war was, as it were, innate; his upbringing in the disturbed border districts of Abivard and Darragaz, where tribal fighting and Turkoman forays were of frequent occurrence, initiated him into warfare at an early age. His merits as a soldier secured him rapid advancement, and, when he obtained the supreme command, he proceeded to conduct a series of important campaigns with the skill and assurance of a master. The change which he wrought in the fortunes of his country in the course of a few years was little short of miraculous, and Curzon did not exaggerate when he said¹:

"Less than twenty years after this disaster (i.e., Mahmud's overthrow of the Safavi dynasty in 1722) we are confronted with the spectacle of a Persian conqueror overrunning Central Asia, upsetting kingdoms and empires, and in the eighteenth century presenting the phenomenon in Asia that Europe owed to Napoleon in the nineteenth."

It is inevitable that Nadir should be likened to Napoleon, with whom, indeed, he had several characteristics in common, and he has frequently been compared with Alexander the Great,² particularly by eastern writers; such comparisons are by no means unmerited, yet a far closer parallel can be established between him and Tamerlane.³ Further, Nadir may

¹ *Persia*, Vol. I, p. 575.

² See J. P. de Bougainville's *Parallèle de l'Expédition d'Alexandre dans les Indes, avec la Conquête des mêmes Contrées par Tahmas-Kouli-Khan* (Paris, 1752). Bougainville's work, being based mainly on Otter's imperfect account, does not do sufficient justice to Nadir.

³ See pp. 80 and 81 above, where the two conquerors are contrasted.

be said to resemble his younger contemporary, Frederick the Great, in his position of master strategist of his state, in his extensive recruiting beyond the borders of his own country, his careful training of his men, and his firm belief in the importance of mobility.

As a strategist, Nadir was far superior to the majority of the leaders to whom he was opposed. It is known that, in general, he thought out his important campaigns beforehand to the last detail.¹ Nevertheless, on a few occasions, he showed himself to be lacking in foresight; his first campaign against Topal 'Osman Pasha, which ended so disastrously, was not well planned; possibly, as has already been suggested,² he failed because he was over-confident. Secondly, his judgment was at fault in his later Lazgi campaigns; although he seemed to have grasped the fact that, unless he could conquer Avaria, he would never have Daghistan completely at his mercy, he always deferred until too late in the season his endeavours to force his way through the formidable mountain barrier that protected Khunzakh.

The kind of tactics in which Nadir excelled was the swift cavalry attack, delivered, generally, with crushing effect, from some totally unexpected quarter; his defeat of the Indian forces guarding the Khaibar Pass by his forced march via the Tsatsobi Pass and the Bazar valley was a masterpiece. But although he was primarily a cavalry leader, he appreciated to the full the essential nature of the rôle of the foot soldier. He used, in fact, his infantry to great effect, and his fine corps of *jazayirchis*, with their strict discipline and their accurate marksmanship, proved on several occasions to be more than a match for the much vaunted Janissaries.

In battle, Nadir was astonishingly quick in grasping the situation; William Cockell, speaking from personal knowledge, said that it was³:

"... scarce credible how quick he is in discerning the Odds on either Side, and how active in succouring his Troops. If any of his General Officers give Ground without being greatly over-powered, he rides up and kills him with a Battle-ax (which he always carries in his Hand) and then gives the Command to the next in Rank."

In his major engagements, he generally handled his reserves skilfully, throwing them in at the right moment just at the point where his adversary was weakest.

Like Hannibal and Wellington, Nadir was not, on the whole, successful with his sieges; he failed to take Baghdad, Mosul, Qarş and Başra. He did, it is true, capture Ganja and Qandahar, as well as a number of fortresses of secondary importance, like Erivan and Kirkuk, but it was partly through Russian aid that Ganja fell, and it seems that treachery

¹ Bazin, p. 316.

² See p. 71.

³ Fraser, pp. 233 and 234.

played a part in the fall of Qandahar. The reasons for this comparative failure were, in the first place, that Nadir's heavy artillery was deficient both in quality and quantity; the vast distances that he traversed when campaigning and the lack of roads made the transport of heavy artillery a most difficult matter. Secondly, the Persian military engineers were not a highly trained body of men, and were certainly less highly skilled than those in the Turkish service. In the third place, during a siege Nadir could rarely utilise his most striking gift as a soldier, namely, his ability to make effective use of shock tactics and of the element of surprise by means of his cavalry. Another factor that must be taken into account was the great strength of the fortresses of those days; the means of defence were then very strong as compared with the weapons of attack.

Although his heavy siege trains were mediocre, Nadir's medium and lighter artillery, when compared with the standards of his predecessors and, indeed, with those of his eastern contemporaries, was really extremely good. It was due very largely to the assistance and advice of some French officers in his service that he was able to make the Persian artillery more formidable than it had ever been before; in fact, a military authority has stated that Persia possessed no real artillery before Nadir's time.¹

Nadir was much more than a mere commander; he was a splendid organiser and trainer, and he was able, by the sheer force of his personality, to impose his will upon the seemingly unwarlike man-power that he had at his disposal in his earlier days, and to transform it into excellent fighting material. Little by little, he instilled new life into the Persian soldiery, and not only restored the morale which they had lost under a series of incompetent commanders, but also inspired in them the same high degree of confidence in his leadership that he himself possessed. By his infusion of large numbers of Afghans and Özbegs into his ranks, he raised still higher the efficiency of his army, and by his rigid enforcement of discipline and his insistence upon drill, he welded the whole into a most formidable fighting machine.² The remarkable extent to which he could control his heterogeneous forces is graphically illustrated by their instant obedience when he ordered them to cease from massacring and plundering the people of Delhi, and, later, when he made his men surrender part of their Indian spoils.

Nadir's amazing memory was of great value to him as a commander; Cockell said that he could³:

¹ Colonel G. Drouville's *Voyage en Perse* (Paris, 1828), Vol. I, p. 142. This statement is rather too sweeping, for the Sherley brothers had done much to improve the Persian artillery in the time of Shah 'Abbas the Great.

² Sir F. Goldsmid's *Persia and its Military Resources*, in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. XXIII, p. 155 (7th March, 1879). See also Drouville, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 85, and J. B. Fraser's *Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan in the years 1821 and 1822*, p. 229.

³ J. Fraser, p. 233.

"readily call all the principal officers in his numerous Army by their Names. He knows most of the private Men who served under him any Time, and can recollect when and for what he punished and rewarded any of them."

A number of Nadir's contemporaries have mentioned his remarkably loud voice which enabled him to make his commands easily heard above the din of battle and which on several occasions struck terror into the enemy.¹

If we judge Nadir by the effects of his military achievements, what is the result? As regards Persia, he certainly freed her from foreign domination, but his intolerable tyranny rendered nugatory the value of this boon. In the west, his long campaigns against the Turks greatly weakened them, thereby benefiting both Russia and Austria and influencing to some extent the trend of events in south-east Europe. In the east, his invasion of India shook the Mughal Empire to its foundations and accelerated the decline that had already set in; where Nadir had led, Ahmad Shah Durrani followed, and their invasions so sapped the Mughal power that the establishment of British supremacy was greatly facilitated.

In conclusion, one may say that Nadir was the greatest soldier of his day, and that he raised his country from the lowest depths of degradation to the proud position of the foremost military power in Asia. It was most unfortunate for Persia that his triumphs, instead of bringing her lasting benefits, merely conferred upon her an evanescent glory at the cost of incalculable suffering and terrible loss of life.

Nadir as a Statesman and Ruler.

Nadir was essentially a warrior, and was at his best when leading his army; it would be idle to pretend that he was successful as a ruler. Whilst he was at war, he subordinated everything to its prosecution, and when peace came he busied himself preparing for his next campaign; peace to him, in fact, was nothing more than an irksome, but sometimes necessary, interlude.

But for his overmastering passion for war, Nadir might, nevertheless, have made an excellent king, for Bazin said of him²:

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 227. Sir John Malcolm, in his *Sketches of Persia* (London, 1861), pp. 35 and 36, tells an amusing story of how the Sultan of Turkey, knowing that Nadir prided himself upon his exceptional voice, sent as his envoy to Persia a porter of extraordinary physical strength and most powerful lungs. When this envoy was received by the Shah, they had a shouting match, in which the porter-ambassador was clearly the winner. Nadir was angered at first at his humiliation, but at length smiled and admitted that the man had merit. He is stated to have said to the envoy, when giving him leave to depart: "Tell Mahmood I am glad to find he has one man in his dominions, and has had the good sense to send him here, that we may be satisfied of the fact."

² Bazin, p. 316.

" Malgré la bassesse de son extraction, il sembloit né pour le trône. La nature lui avoit donné toutes les grandes qualités qui font les héros, et une partie même de celles qui font les grands Rois. On aura peine à trouver dans l'Histoire un Prince d'un génie plus vaste, d'un esprit plus pénétrant, d'un courage plus intrépide. Ses projets étoient grands, les moyens bien choisis, et l'exécution préparée avant même que l'entreprise éclatât ; ses regards se portoient sur toutes les provinces de son Royaume, rien ne lui étoit inconnu, et il n'oublioit rien. Les travaux ne l'abattoient point ; il ne s'effrayoit pas des dangers. Les obstacles mêmes et les difficultés entroient dans l'ordre de ses projets."

Had he chosen, he might perhaps have gained the love, as he had already won the admiration, of his people, but his mind, instead of being fixed upon the government of his realm, was obsessed by dreams of conquest. Despite the lustre which his military exploits gave to Persia, he soon became hated by the majority of his subjects because of his arbitrary ways, his crushing taxation, his supersession of the Şafavi line and his supplanting of the Shi'a religion.

Except on rare occasions (e.g., when he settled at Khivaqabad the liberated Persians from Khwarizm and provided for their wants), he seemed to have had but little regard for the welfare of his subjects,¹ and he made no serious effort to build up the material resources of his empire ; he looked upon his people not as human beings, but merely as furnishers of man-power, money and supplies for his enormous army. The long wars with the Abdalis and Turks, following upon the period of Afghan domination, had, by the time he ascended the throne, terribly impoverished and exhausted the country. When he returned from India with spoils worth many millions of pounds, he had a unique opportunity of giving his sorely tried people a respite from taxation for a number of years. Nadir, however, hoarded his treasures, and soon resumed his exactions in a manner far more harsh and thorough than before. Merchants were taxed almost out of existence, while agriculturalists fared even worse, for, besides being heavily taxed, they frequently had their man-power and their crops requisitioned. It is strange that a man so endowed with intelligence should not have realised that, by acting as he did, he was killing the goose that laid the golden eggs ; his abnormal mental condition during his later years may have been responsible for this obtuseness.

To his credit, it must be said that he restored order and freedom from attack in many parts of his realm ; he did much to secure his north-east frontier against the devastating raids of the Turkomans and Ōzbegs by moving Afshars, Bakhtiari, Kurdish and other warlike tribesmen to the border districts there ; this policy had the additional advantage of

¹ Nevertheless, as Hanway has said (Vol. I, p. 248), Nadir " often enquired into the price of necessaries, and reduced them as he thought proper, fining the market-people upon every transgression."

splitting up and weakening these powerful tribes, and at the same time it increased the population and added to the importance of Khurasan.

In many respects, Nadir sought to break away as far as possible from the ways and customs of his Safavi predecessors. The most important of these changes was the substitution of the Sunni for the Shi'a religion, the reasons for which have already been given. Secondly, he made Mashhad the capital of his kingdom in place of Isfahan. In the third place, he abandoned the pernicious practice of keeping the royal princes immured in the harem until the time came for them to rule; the lamentable results of this policy were clearly shown on the accession of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain and of his son Tahmasp II. Nadir, on the other hand, gave his sons military and other appointments at an early age, a fact which led the Gombroon Agent to make the following comment¹:

"It is no small Proof of his Superior Sense and Judgement that can depart from a bad Custom so long and cruelly maintain'd by his Predecessors and all other Eastern Princes of immuring their Children with Eunuchs and Women in a Seraglio till by their Father's Deaths they are called in to the World, Monsters to Govern."

In the autumn of 1740, while Nadir was absent in Turkistan, it was reported in Isfahan that he²:

"... intends to change the Persian habit, his Subjects to shave their Beards and to put on Turkish Dress as also to destroy all Places that were built (by) or bear the Name of Shaw Abas and erect others in their stead, likewise to bring a River some days distant from Isfahan to water the City."³

This report proved to be nothing but a rumour, but it is noteworthy that he had already changed the headdress of his subjects, having (as we learn from Otter),⁴ invented and forced them to wear a four-cornered hat round which a woollen shawl or scarf was wound.

Although Nadir did not succeed in founding an enduring dynasty, he, like Henry VIII in England, added very considerably to the property of the crown by his wholesale confiscation of religious lands and endowments.

Nadir administered his kingdom through the Beglarbegis, or Governors-General, who in his time were three in number⁵; under them were the

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 6th/17th November, 1739.

² *Ibid.*, 19th/30th November, 1740.

³ Nadir was by no means the initiator of this scheme (known as the Karkunan), which was to divert the head waters of the Karun into the Zayanda Rud by means of a tunnel or cutting. The work was begun by Shah Tahmasp I, and was continued on a different basis by 'Abbas the Great and, later, by 'Abbas II. (See Herbert's *Travels*, p. 135 and Sir W. Foster's note thereon; also, Curzon's *Persia*, Vol. II, p. 316.)

⁴ Otter, Vol. I, pp. 39 and 40. An interesting modern parallel is the creation of the Pahlavi hat by H.I.M. Shah Reza Pahlavi.

⁵ Hanway, Vol. I, p. 336.

Governors, Deputy Governors and lesser officials. All were appointed by the Shah who, by his elaborate system of spies, kept himself closely informed of what they were doing.¹ He closely supervised the finances of the provinces and, indeed, of the whole kingdom; on arriving at any important place, he would, if time permitted, go carefully through the accounts of the local *mustaufi* or treasury official, whom woe betide if any mistake or irregularity were found.

In his foreign policy Nadir certainly showed much skill, but in this, as in everything else, he thought more of the furtherance of his own aims than of the interests of his people.

In conclusion, it may be said that Nadir ruled Persia as an absolute monarch, but that he was himself the slave of his own inordinate ambition.

Nadir's Personal Appearance, Character and Tastes.

Mirza Mahdi gives but little information regarding Nadir's personal appearance, character and tastes, possibly because he considered such details as unnecessary or even out-of-place in his official record; fortunately, this omission can be made good from other contemporary sources.

William Cockell, in his interesting "Personal Description of Nadir" at the end of Fraser's book, states that he was²:

"... about fifty-five Years, upwards of six Foot high, well proportion'd, of a very robust Make and Constitution, his Complexion sanguine and inclining to be fat, but the Fatigue he undergoes prevents it; he has fine large Black-eyes and Eye-brows; and, in short, is one of the most comely Men I ever beheld. The Injury the Sun and Weather have done to his Complexion only gives him a more manly Aspect."

In his earlier days, Nadir's bodily strength and powers of endurance were very great, and, when he was campaigning, he would undergo the same hardships and live on the same simple fare as the common soldiers.³

Muhammad Bakhsh noticed, in May 1739, that Nadir had already taken to dyeing his beard and moustache black, but remarked upon his youthful appearance and erect bearing; he was then just over fifty.⁴ The portrait which is now at the India Office (see p. 277) below) is presumably a good likeness of him at that time. Nearly five years later, 'Abdullah ibn Husain as-Suwaidi, who was received by Nadir at Najaf, stated that his face showed the marks of age and senility, that several of his front teeth were missing, that he appeared to be eighty years of age, and that his eyes were jaundiced; he was, however, still handsome.⁵

¹ Fraser, p. 228.

² *Ibid.*, p. 229.

³ See Professor Schmidt's *Is Istoriia sunnitsho-shiitshikh otmoshenii*, p. 90.

⁴ Fraser, p. 227.

⁵ See p. 154 above.

As-Suwaïdî (who was somewhat biased against Nadir) was doubtless exaggerating when saying that he looked as though he were an octogenarian. Bazin, who was in intimate contact with him during the last few months of his life, described him as follows¹:

"Sa barbe, peinte en noire, contrastoit avec ses cheveux qui étoient tout blancs. Il étoit d'un tempérament fort et robuste, d'une taille très haute, et d'une grosseur proportionnée; il avoit le visage basané, moins arrondi qu'allongé, sans l'être pourtant trop; le nez aquilin, la bouche assez bien fendue, la lèvre inférieure un peu excédente, les yeux petits et perçans, le regard vif et pénétrant, la voie (*sic*) rude et forte, mais dont il sçavoit adoucir les sons, selon que le caprice ou l'intérêt le demandoient."

Of Nadir's character, enough has already been said to show that he was a man of iron will. But harsh and violent though he was, he had a gentler side, as he was genuinely fond of his mother² and had a great affection for his grandson Shahrukh. The terrible change in his character which was wrought by his physical condition and by the reverses of fortune which he suffered in his later years will be discussed later in this chapter.

He was a very hard worker, but, when the business of the day was done, he would retire to a private apartment:

"... where, unbending himself at once from Business, he sups with three or four Favourites, and drinks a Quart, or at most three Pints of Wine, behaving all the Time in the freest and most facetious Manner. In this private Conversation no Person is allowed to mention any Thing relating to public Business; nor, at other Times, must they presume upon this Intimacy to behave with more Familiarity than their Equals. Two of his Evening-Companions happening to transgress in that Point, by taking the Liberty to advise him in Public, he immediately ordered them to be strangled, saying: 'Such Fools were not fit to live, who could not distinguish between Nadir Shah and Nadir Kuli.'"³

Cockell, from whose *Personal Description* the above passage is taken, further stated that Nadir drank wine with moderation, but that "he is extremely addicted to Women, in which he affects great Variety, yet never neglects his Business on their Account."⁴ According to Hanway,⁵ Nadir had, in his later days, thirty-three women in his harem, exclusive of their attendants.

Mirza Mahdi states that the things (apart from fighting) in which Nadir

¹ Bazin, pp. 315 and 316.

² Bazin (p. 318) states that he seemed genuinely afflicted at her death and that he had a fine mosque built over her tomb.

³ Fraser, pp. 230 and 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227. Malcolm (Vol. II, p. 85 footnote) states, however, that "a chief of the Affshâr informed me that his father (who was one of Nadir's generals) used often to praise the great continence of that monarch, who never, he said, had more than two wives with him when in the field, and was displeased with any leader who was accompanied by more than one."

⁵ Vol. IV, pp. 268 and 269.

took most delight in life were, first, the melons of Balkh and Herat and, secondly, a good horse.¹ In the matter of attire, his tastes were simple, but he developed a love of jewels which he was able fully to satisfy after he had despoiled India.²

Nadir showed at times that he had a sense of humour, though it was apt to be of rather a macabre order. 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri relates³ that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, who was short, stout and very swarthy, was once knocked over and very nearly killed by a wild boar. When Nadir heard of this incident, he laughed very heartily and remarked: "Little Brother was playful with Big Brother, nay rather, he was rude to him!" It is related that when Nadir was at Delhi, he was told that the Indian I'timadu'd-Daula, Qamaru'd-Din Khan, had no less than 850 women in his harem; he thereupon gave orders for another 150 women to be given to the Minister in order that he might qualify for the military rank of *mim-bashi* or chiliarch.⁴

When speaking, Nadir preferred to use Turki (Chaghatai or Eastern Turkish), but he must have been thoroughly conversant with the Persian language as well; it does not appear to be on record whether he had any knowledge of Arabic: as he had no bent for theology or literature, it is unlikely that he knew that language well.

Nadir's Health.

During his youth and middle age Nadir enjoyed excellent health, but from his fiftieth year (or possibly a little earlier) he had recurrent physical troubles which had a most unfortunate effect upon his temperament and behaviour. 'Abdu'l-Karim related that he had, before his invasion of India, contracted a dropsical complaint which was accompanied at times by severe melancholia and splenetic outbursts of rage.⁵ This disease may have been occasioned or, at any rate, aggravated by the fact that he had lost all his molar teeth; further, he may have contracted malaria during his campaigns in Mazandaran and his march through Sistan. Lastly, the hardships which he had undergone during his many campaigns must have had some deleterious effect upon his constitution, robust though that had been at the outset.

As Nadir could get no relief from the ignorant and incompetent Persian physicians, he engaged, when he was at Delhi, the very capable Indian

¹ T.N., p. 225 (see p. 161 above).

² As-Suwaidi gives a detailed description of the jewels which Nadir was wearing when he received him at Najaf (see *Is tūstī*, etc., p. 89); see also von Hammer, Vol. XV, p. 117, and Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 268.

³ *Bayan*, fol. 39 (b) and 40 (a).

⁴ *Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 85 and 86.

⁵ *Bayan*, fol. 66 (b); the text is very corrupt, as the following words *bi-maraq-i-maraq va istifār* should read *bi-maraq-i-maraq va istiqsa* in order to make sense.

doctor 'Alavi Khan as his chief physician. 'Alavi Khan did not limit his treatment to mere drugs and dieting, but also employed "words that were more bitter than the remedy"¹: in other words, he ventured to admonish Nadir for his outbursts of temper. Nadir was pleased at the doctor's frankness, and followed his treatment, with the result that his state of mind as well as his bodily condition greatly improved; in fact, "for fifteen or twenty days (at a time) he would not order anyone to be beaten to death."²

Unfortunately for Nadir, and even more so for his subjects, 'Alavi Khan left his service in July, 1741; when deprived of the Indian doctor's treatment and influence, he soon reverted to his former condition, and by the autumn of that year he was performing the most atrociously cruel actions.³ A year later there occurred the tragic blinding of Rida Quli Mirza; had Nadir been in his normal state during the preceding few months, he might never have condemned his son to this fate and the whole concluding part of his career might have been very different in consequence. As it was, his whole nature was changed by this event and his health suffered much as a result.⁴

Some time between 1742 and early in 1744, Father Damien, of Lyons, a Jesuit with a knowledge of medicine, treated Nadir for some form of liver complaint.⁵ In June or July, 1745, he was taken seriously ill when near Miyanduab and had to be carried in a litter for several stages⁶; either then or shortly after he was again tended by a Jesuit, but it is not recorded whether it was this Père Damien.⁷ In December, 1746, his health was once more a subject of concern, and he feared that a serious illness was imminent. Being profoundly dissatisfied with his own physicians, he requested Peirson, the chief representative of the East India Company at Isfahan, to procure a European doctor for him. Peirson was much perplexed, as he did not know where he could find one, but, on his attention being drawn to Père Bazin, he introduced him to the Shah. Nadir was pleased with the Jesuit, and made him his chief physician. Bazin, on examining Nadir, found that he was suffering from dropsy in an early stage (*une hydropisie commencée*), and that he had frequent attacks of vomiting, accompanied by severe constipation and liver trouble.⁸

It may have been on the strength of Bazin's diagnosis that Byron afterwards wrote the following lines⁹:

¹ Bayan, fol. 99 (b).

² Ibid.

³ Bazin, p. 290.

⁴ Mirza Mahdi (T.N., p. 263) and Muhammad Kazim (N.N., p. 493).

⁵ Père des Vignes, p. 407.

⁶ See p. 249 above.

⁷ Gombroon Diary, 5th/16th October, 1745.

⁸ Bazin, p. 304.

⁹ Don Juan, Canto No. IX, xxxiii. The edition of Byron's works that was published in London in 1833 has, in Vol. XVI, p. 289, the following footnote relating to the lines quoted above: "He (Nadir) was slain in a conspiracy, after his temper had been exasperated by his extreme costivity to a degree of insanity."

"Oh! ye who build up monuments defiled,
 With gore, like Nadir Shah, that costive sophy,
 Who, after leaving Hindostan a wild,
 And scarce to the Mogul a cup of coffee
 To soothe his woes withal, was slain, the sinner!
 Because he could no more digest his dinner!"


Bazin began his medical treatment when Nadir was at Kirman, at the beginning of 1747. He almost succeeded in effecting a cure, but Nadir recommenced his cruelties on reaching Mashhad¹; Bazin fails to make it clear whether Nadir's renewed brutalities were due to his discontinuing the treatment or whether the news of the various revolts, together with the fatigue caused by the trying march across the desert, proved too much for his already very unstable mental condition.

Whilst it would be going too far to assert that Nadir's frenzied outbursts were *always* due to physical causes, there seems to be no doubt that, during his later years, his bodily condition rendered him liable to become unduly affected mentally by happenings of an unpleasant nature. On comparing the data furnished by 'Abdu'l-Karim, des Vignes and Bazin, one is, it seems, justified in assuming that Nadir's intestinal troubles and the accompanying lack of mental equilibrium had not only continued, but had grown progressively worse, during the last few years of his life. His bodily ailments affected his mind, and, as already stated, when he was so afflicted by the Rida Quli incident, his mind, in turn adversely affected his body; it was indeed a vicious circle. Nadir's attacks of frenzy became, as time went on, periods of actual insanity which recurred with increasing frequency, and there is no doubt that he was completely out of his mind during the last month or two of his life. Consideration of Nadir's case tempts one to suggest that an interesting study might be made of the extent to which the course of history has been influenced by the effect of the health of great men upon their temperaments and consequently upon their actions.

Nadir and the Arts.

The arts, save for that of war, did not flourish in Nadir's time; it was a period when the sword was far mightier than the pen. Luṭf 'Ali Beg, who was born in 1711, remarked, in his work the *Atash-Kada* ("Fire-temple"), upon the great dearth of men of letters during the years from 1722 to 1772. In the portion of his book entitled the *Aḥwāl-i-Mu'aṣṣir* ("Conditions of Contemporaries"), Luṭf 'Ali Beg, after giving an historical outline of the half-century preceding the advent of Karim Khan, mentions a number of his contemporaries who wrote poetry.


¹ Bazin, p. 310.



MASHHAD: SHRINE OF THE IMAM RIDA—NADIR'S GOLDEN GATE

This magnificent portico is the most imposing feature of the Shrine.

Photograph by Professor Poppe. Reproduced by courtesy of the American Institute of Iranian Art and Archaeology.



MASHHAD—SHRINE OF THE IMAM RIDA—NADIR'S GOLDEN GATE

Photograph by Professor Pope. Reproduced by courtesy of the American Institute of Iranian Art and Archaeology.

None of these poets, except Shaikh 'Ali Ḥazin, achieved any lasting fame ; one was Aqa Taqi Sahba, who was also Nadir's court physician, but he seems to have been as mediocre in the field of poetry as he was in that of medicine.

If we exclude Luṭf 'Ali Beg (who did not begin the compilation of the *Atash-Kada* until thirteen years after Nadir's death), the two chief literary figures of the day were Mirza Mahdi and Shaikh Ḥazin, of whom more will be said in Appendix III.

Nadir seems to have had but scant liking for literature, yet, unlettered though he was, he was one of the two most generous donors to the library of the Ṣaḥn of the Imam Rīḍa at Mashhad, to which he presented 400 manuscripts.¹ Further, it must not be overlooked that it was at his orders that the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* was written, and that he also commissioned the Indian poet Muḥammad 'Ali Beg to compose the poem known as the *Nadir Shah-Nama*.² The only poet for whom Nadir appeared to have any regard was Ḥafiz, but it is possible that his interest in the famous *ghazals* may have been confined to the drawing of *fals* or auguries from them.

In the construction of towns and buildings Nadir was much more active. Mention has already been made of his building of New Shamakhi, Nadirabad and Khivaqabad, of his additions to the shrine of the Imam Rīḍa at Mashhad, and of the erection of his *maulud-khana* at Dastgird and his treasure houses at Kalat. Shiraz benefited for a time at his behest, and it was not his fault that most, if not all, of his improvements were undone in consequence of Taqi Khan's revolt. He did practically nothing for Isfahan, but at Qazvin he erected a new palace, of which Hanway has given a description. At Ashraf, in Mazandaran, he built a palace known as the Chihil Sutun, which Sir William Ouseley has described and depicted in his *Travels*.³

Whilst Nadir was at Delhi, he had several portraits of himself painted, one of which an Indian named Ghulam Muhi'u'd-Din presented to Richard Benyon, the Governor at Madras in March, 1740.⁴

There are two portraits of Nadir in London, one being at the India Office, and the other at the India Museum, South Kensington ; although it is known that they are both by XVIIIth century Persian artists, it is impossible to say whether they are really contemporary. Mr. Henry Vansittart, who was Governor of Fort William from 1760 to 1767, acquired the portrait that is now in the India Office ; it was reputed, in his time,

¹ De Khanikoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 and 101.

² See p. 130, note 10 above.

³ Vol. III, p. 270 and plate No. LXXI. Shah 'Abbas had erected a palace called the Chihil Sutun there, but it was accidentally burnt down in Nadir's time ; he thereupon built this new palace in its place.

⁴ Dodwell's *A Calendar of the Madras Records, 1740-1744*, p. 30.

to be an original. His son, the Rt. Hon. Nicholas Vansittart, presented this picture to the East India Company in February, 1822.¹ The history of the India Museum portrait (No. I.M. 20-1919) cannot be traced as far back; it is said to have been brought from India in 1800 or possibly a little earlier; it was for a long time in the possession of the Willoughby family, and was presented to the India Museum by G. F. Welsford, M.D., in 1919. The head in this portrait is similar in every detail to that in the India Office picture. Mr. C. Stanley Clarke, of the Victoria and Albert Museum, in a letter to Mr. (now Sir) W. Foster dated the 3rd June, 1919, stated that "Both paintings are Persian of bad period—strongly European influenced."²

To return to Nadir. In 1743, or perhaps later, he engaged, through the medium of Captain John Elton, a young painter named Cassel or Cassels,³ who painted eight battle pictures for him.⁴

Nadir's Attitude towards Religion.

While uncertainty exists whether Nadir was Shi'a or Sunni to start with,⁵ there seems no doubt that, in his later years at any rate, he had no real religious convictions. Bazin, who was certainly as well qualified as anyone to judge, said *:

"Il seroit difficile de décider de quelle Religion il étoit. Plusieurs de ceux qui croyent l'avoir mieux connu, prétendent qu'il n'en avoit aucune. Il disoit quelquefois assez publiquement qu'il s'estimoit autant que Mahomet et Ali; qu'ils n'étoient si grands que parce qu'ils étoient bons guerriers; et qu'après tout, il croyoit avoir atteint le degré de gloire qu'ils avoient acquise par les armes."

Nadir had many faults, but religious fanaticism was not one of them; it is true that he persecuted the Shi'a, but he did so for purely secular reasons.

A good deal has already been said respecting Nadir's attempt to fuse the Sunnis and the Shi'a into one body by forcibly making his Shi'a subjects

¹ See the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Paintings, Statues, etc., in the India Office*, by Sir William Foster.

² I am indebted to Mr. W. T. Ottewill, the Superintendent of Records at the India Office, for this information. The India Museum authorities have most kindly allowed me to use a reproduction of the portrait there as the frontispiece of this book.

³ The Russia Company, in a memorandum dated the 13th/24th January, 1744, on the subject of the Russian charges against Elton, stated: "None of the people who were with Mr. Elton are entered into the service of the Shah, excepting one Cassel, a German Painter, to whom he gives a salary of 1,000 Roubles per annum to paint his Battles." For details of the manner in which Cassel (who was half-English and half-Prussian) is alleged to have behaved to Elton, see Cook, Vol. II, p. 314.

⁴ It is possible that some of these pictures were afterwards housed in the palace which Agha Muhammad Shah built at Sari, which, according to Curzon (Vol. I, p. 379), "contained pictures of the battles of Shah Ismail and Nadir Shah."

⁵ For the reason for suggesting that Nadir may have been originally a Shi'a, see p. 21 above.

* Bazin, p. 318.

abjure their faith. This policy was a complete reversal of that of Shah Isma'il and his successors, who had fully appreciated the essential nature of the rôle played by the Shi'a doctrine in welding the various peoples of Persia into a nation. But Nadir was international rather than national in his outlook, and his dreams of dominion extended far beyond the confines of the Şafavi empire. Consequently, as already indicated, he may have conceived the project of making himself the head of a united Moslem world.

Nadir's adoption of the term Ja'fari to designate the fifth sect of the Sunnis which the Persian people were to form is somewhat mystifying; his action made the word ambiguous, because it was still in use in his time in a purely Shi'a connexion. Ja'faru's-Şadiq, the sixth of the Imams, who had been a great exponent of Shi'a jurisprudence (*fiqh*), had founded a sect (*madhhab*), in opposition to the four orthodox divisions of the Sunnis, which was called Ja'fari after him.¹ Nadir may have intended the term Ja'fari to be sugaring for the Sunni pill which the majority of his Persian subjects would otherwise have found even more difficult to swallow; on the other hand, he and his advisers must have realized that this term, by reason of its strong Shi'a association, would be displeasing to such rigid Sunnis as the Ottoman Turks.

Nadir was most tolerant towards his Christian subjects, with whose freedom of worship he never interfered; the Armenian Catholicos Abraham spoke in the highest terms of his good treatment at the hands of Nadir, who even attended service in the cathedral at Echmiadzin. The Catholicos subsequently received a special invitation to the great assembly on the Mughan plain, where, on his arrival, he "was the object of particular attention," and was given, at Nadir's orders, a daily subsistence allowance.² Nadir scandalized the more rigid of the Shi'a by settling a large number of Armenians from Nakhicheven at Mashhad, where, to the horror of pious Muslims like Muḥammad Kaẓim, they were allowed openly to practise their religion and to open wine shops.³

Nadir raised no objection to the presence of foreign missionaries in Persia; there were a number of Jesuits and Carmelites at Isfahan, and

¹ Eugène Aubin's article, *Le Chiisme et la Nationalité Persane*, in the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (March, 1908), p. 463. It is to be noted that, according to the *Qisṣat-ul-Ulama*, a Shi'a theologian of the Buwayhid period named Sayyid Murtaḍa sought to persuade the Caliph to allow the Shi'a to be regarded as a fifth division of the *Ijma'*, to be termed the Ja'fari, thus ranking them with the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi' and Hanbali schools, in order that they should no longer have to resort to dissimulation (*taqiyya*). Sayyid Murtaḍa was unable to raise more than half the sum demanded by the Caliph as the price of his compliance, and the project therefore fell through (Dr. Donaldson, *op. cit.*, p. 207, on the authority of Muḥammad ibn Sulaiman, of Tunikabun). It is not known whether there is any foundation for this story or, if there were, whether Nadir's religious advisers or indeed the Turkish 'ulama had any cognisance of it.

² Catholicos Abraham, p. 270.

³ *N.N.*, p. 336.

several others (mostly, if not all, Jesuits) were in Gilan. Mention has already been made of the Shah's employment of Pères Damien and Bazin as his physicians.

Père des Vignes, writing from Julfa in May, 1744, stated that there were no less than twenty-two Orthodox ("schismatique," according to him) and four Catholic churches there; the population of the suburb was 10,000 at that time.¹

It was, apparently, during Nadir's Indian expedition that his interest was aroused by Sura XLVIII (Suratu'l-Fath) of the Qur'an, where, in verse 29, reference is made to the Pentateuch (*Taurat*) and the Gospels (*Injil*).² He asked the Mulla-Bashi ('Ali Akbar) if the Pentateuch and Gospels were extant; on receiving an affirmative reply, he ordered Mirza Mahdi to arrange for a Persian translation of both to be made. The preliminary steps must have been made by letter from India, because the Gombroon Agent received a letter from the Isfahan "linguist," early in June, 1740, to the effect that:

"Shaw Nadir . . . has appointed Moolahs to make a Translation of the Bible, Jewish Talmud and Mahumetan Alkoran, who were for coming to be in our house (at Isfahan) but he (the 'linguist') prevented them."³

Père des Vignes states that Nadir sent a *mulla* to Isfahan with orders to collect such Jews, Armenians and "Franks" as were considered necessary for the work of translation.⁴ According to the same authority, the work began in May, 1740, and lasted for six months.⁵ Two Roman Catholic missionaries and two Armenian Catholics, two Orthodox Armenian monks and two priests undertook the translation of the New Testament, while Jewish rabbis translated the Old Testament. Some disagreement arose between the Catholic and Orthodox collaborators; as to this, Père des Vignes wrote:

"we had the consolation of seeing that in almost all these disputes the Muhammadan (i.e., the *mulla* in charge of the work), guided solely by reason, decided in favour of the Catholic statements. . . ."

The Qur'an was also translated into Persian.

¹ *Lettres Edifiantes*, Vol. IV, p. 364.

² For an English translation of this verse, see Rodwell's *The Koran*, London, 1911, p. 463.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 4th/15th June, 1740. 'Abdu'l-Karim (*Bayan*, fol. 65 (b) and 66 (a)) says that Nadir first became interested in the matter during the Turkistan expedition, but this is impossible: it is clear from the *Gombroon Diary* (and, as will be seen, from Père des Vignes's account) that the instructions for the translations to be made were received in Isfahan before the start of the expedition to Bukhara and Khiva.

⁴ Père des Vignes, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-404.

⁵ A copy of the Persian translation of the Gospels, made under the supervision of Père Lagarde in Gilan in 1746, is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, in Paris. See Blochet's *Catalogue des Manuscrits Persans*, . . . Vol. I, p. 6, No. 7.

When at length the work was completed, the translators were summoned to appear before the Shah at Qazvin. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Isfahan, two Catholic missionaries and four Armenian bishops, together with the *mulla* in charge, proceeded to that town, where Nadir received them graciously and paid them for their expenses *en route*. He stated, however, that he had no time to examine their work and that, as there was only one God, there could be only one Prophet. These words greatly disappointed the pious translators who had hoped that much good would accrue to the Christian faith in Persia by reason of their work.¹

Muhammad Mahdi ibn Muhammad Rida, of Isfahan, relates that Nadir once had a conversation with a holy man regarding Paradise. After the holy man had described its wonders and delights, the Shah asked: "Are there such things as war and the overcoming of one's enemy in Paradise?" On the holy man replying in the negative, Nadir remarked: "How then can there be any delights there?"² Although this story may be apocryphal, it certainly sounds *ben trovato*.

¹ Père des Vignes, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-404; see also the somewhat different and less well-informed account by the Carmelite friar, Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his *Persia Ovvero Secondo Viaggio dell'Oriente*, Rome, 1757, Vol. II, p. 222. According to other authorities, Nadir, on receiving the translators, ridiculed alike the Christian, Jewish and Muhammadan faiths and declared that, if God vouchsafed him life, he would give mankind a much better religion than all those which had been known up till that time (see, in this connection, Hanway, Vol. IV, pp. 216-219, and Otter, Vol. II, p. 153). In this connection, it is of interest to note that, according to Rambaud's *Histoire de la Russie*, p. 431, the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, when speaking to Lord Hyndford, the British Ambassador, referred as follows to Frederick of Prussia: "Il tourne en ridicule les choses saintes; il ne va jamais à l'église: c'est le Nadir Shah de la Prusse."

² *Nisf-i-Jahan fi Ta'rikh-i-Isfahan*, fol. 193 (a).

APPENDIX I

THE BRITISH IN PERSIA, 1729-1747

During Nadir's period of power, Great Britain had not, despite her fairly considerable commercial interests in Persia, any diplomatic or consular representatives in the country.¹ While the Dutch were also, strangely enough, unrepresented in this way, the Russians maintained, for the greater part of the time, a Resident at the Court, as well as a Consul in Gilan. France, whose stake in the country was smaller than those of the three powers mentioned above, had a Consul at Isfahan until May, 1730.²

Nadir's first contact with the British was, as will be seen below, in November, 1729. Hanway relates that he more than once remarked of the English that "they are bold, and appear like men of business."³

Save for Dr. Cook at the end of Nadir's reign and for sundry officers and men of the Mercantile Marine who belonged to independently owned vessels, no persons of British nationality other than those in the service of, or connected with, the East India and Russia Companies visited Persia during the period under review.

Since the Russia Company did not actively concern itself with Persia until 1739, the affairs of the East India Company will be dealt with first.

PART I

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

It would be easy to fill at least one volume with the record of the East India Company's affairs in Persia between 1729 and 1747. Space, however, only permits of a brief summary being given.

During the period under review, the Company maintained establishments at Gombroon, Isfahan (for part of the time on a greatly reduced scale), Kirman and Shiraz. It was, on the whole, a most unfavourable time for trading in Persia. The invasions by the Afghans, Turks and Russians and the state of insecurity prevailing in many parts had brought about severe economic depression. When, through Nadir's military exploits, the invaders were driven out and Tahmasp was established on his throne in Isfahan, the hopes

¹ Captain Elton recommended, probably in 1743, that one of the British subjects in Gilan should be appointed British Consul there, but the British Government took no action. (See Hanway, Vol. II, p. 28.)

² The establishment of a French Consul at Isfahan and of a Persian Consul at Marseilles dated from the close of the reign of Louis XIV, and resulted from the treaty which a French envoy named Michel had negotiated at Isfahan in 1708.

³ Vol. I, p. 258.

of the Company, as of the community at large, for the coming of a more settled and prosperous era were aroused. Unfortunately, such hopes were vain, for Nadir was no economist, and soon showed that he had little or no regard for the encouragement of trade, whether Persian or foreign. All that he wanted was the unfailing provision of men, money and supplies, in order that he might carry out his martial aims. As has already been pointed out, he seemed to have no conception that his extortionate ways were rapidly ruining the country.

Although he was, at the outset, friendly to the Isfahan representatives of the Company, it was not long before his attitude completely changed.¹ In general, the English and Dutch Companies were on bad terms with each other, and it was therefore easy for him to play off one concern against the other.

It was customary, and in fact necessary, in those times for the companies to make periodical gifts to influential ministers, governors and lesser officials. In this respect, the Dutch Company had a considerable advantage over its rival, because, owing to its being almost a national enterprise, it had more funds at its disposal. Consequently, it nearly always led the way with presents and, by their more lavish scale, it was sometimes able to secure concessions that were denied to its poorer rival. Moreover, the English Agent frequently got reprimanded by Bombay and London for making presents at all, although, under the then existing conditions, little or nothing could be accomplished without this means of securing the good will of influential persons.² It was the misfortune of the Company that, for nearly ten years, it had to conduct most of its business with the Government through the medium of Muhammad Taqi Khan Shirazi, the corrupt Beglarbegi of Fars.³

The Company was extremely anxious to secure from the Government the renewal of certain privileges which it had lost⁴; the most important of these were the right of being customs-free at Gombroon and, secondly, the grant of one-half of the customs receipts at that port. Further, there was its claim for the repayment of a loan of 3,000 tomans to Shah Sultan Husain, as well as for compensation for sundry losses.

Shah Tahmasp showed himself very favourably inclined towards the Company, and promised to make amends for its losses, but it soon became evident that he was in no position to carry out his undertakings.

It was in the matter of shipping that Nadir sought to make most use of the Dutch and English Companies; he made it clear to them both that they could expect no redress of their grievances unless they met his wishes in this

¹ See p. 41 above.

² Letter Book No. 26 of the East India Co. contains a letter from London to Gombroon dated the 13th/24th March, 1743, which, after inveighing against extravagance and threatening to make the Agent and Council personally responsible for any excess of expenditure over the authorised figure, "whether for Presents to obtain Rogums (*ragams*), except for being Customs Free, which otherwise are of no Value to Us, nor indeed ever have been," concluded with the usual quaint formula of "Your loving friends."

³ Otter (Vol. II, p. 86) well described Taqi Khan as "un homme de mauvaise foi et avide de présents." See also the letter dated the 18th/29th November, 1739, which Otter wrote to Beaumont, the Agent of the Compagnie des Indes at Gombroon, fol. 48 (a) of MS. 5385 (*Nouvelles acquisitions françaises*) in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

⁴ For an excellent account of these privileges as originally granted, see Sir W. Foster's *England's Quest of Eastern Trade* (London, 1933), p. 312.

respect. The English Company, like the Dutch, often found it most inconvenient, for purely commercial reasons, to lend its ships to the Persian Government. Moreover, it feared that, if it did so, its vessels might be used against the Turks. As it had a factory at Basra, it was apprehensive lest the Turks should seize its effects and maltreat its representatives there, in retaliation for such use. For similar reasons, it was averse to its shipping being employed against the Arabs of Muscat and elsewhere.

The Company adopted, as an alternative, the sale of ships to Nadir. Then followed a long contest between the Company and the Shah, the former promising ships in return for the restoration of its former privileges and the latter stating that he would do nothing in this respect unless his naval requirements were met. Needless to say, he always found some excuse to defer granting all that the Company wanted. In return for its services for procuring ships, the Company recovered certain of its privileges, notably the payment for a time of 1,000 tomans a year out of the customs receipts at Gombroon, and was later granted in lieu thereof one-third of the customs on freight borne by its own vessels,¹ but it never obtained its chief desideratum, namely, that of being customs-free at Gombroon. It was not deemed to be in the Company's interests that Nadir should have a strong fleet in the Gulf,² and measures were taken to prevent "unauthorised" sales of vessels to the Persians, because such sales had naturally had an adverse effect upon its bargaining powers.

The unfortunate naval affair during the siege of Basra in May, 1735, seemed at first certain to precipitate a crisis between Nadir and the Company, but the pressing needs of the Shah for additions to his fleet caused him to show no resentment.³

Meanwhile, in March, 1735, the Company's factory at Isfahan had been practically closed down. Geekie, the Resident there, was withdrawn, and the establishment was left in charge of Hermet, the "linguist."⁴ The main reason for this step was the decline in trade and the growing difficulty in recovering debts owing to the Company, due to the increasing impoverishment of the inhabitants (at a later date, Nadir's choice of Mashhad as his capital caused the star of Isfahan to wane still further). Further, the Company's troubles with the Government, which were largely occasioned by the latter's exactions, were an additional reason for the withdrawal. The provisioning of the Qandahar expeditionary force, as already related,⁵ interfered seriously

¹ *Gombroon Diary*, 12th/23rd March, 1737.

² See the summary of a letter from the Bombay Presidency dated the 21st November, 1741, in H. H. Dodwell's *A Calendar of the Madras Records, 1740-1744*, p. 230. In order to prevent these sales, as well as to keep the Persian navy from becoming too strong, the Bombay Presidency, in 1741, decided to permit no vessel to proceed to a Persian port until the owner had given a bond not to sell her to the Persians without permission, under a penalty of 40,000 Rs. (See Dodwell, *op. cit.*, page 230). Despite these measures, a vessel named the *Robert* was disposed of at Bushire in January, 1742, without authorisation by the Company; the owner sold the vessel for 1,000 tomans, but Taqi Khan retained 150 tomans as his commission.

³ See p. 94 above. The Company was, of course, entirely blameless in the matter, but Taqi Khan threatened the Agent that Nadir would, if the reports of the incident proved correct, "put a Ring in our Ears which We Shall remember to the Day of Judgement." (*Gombroon Diary*, 16th/27th July, 1735.)

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 28th March/8th April and 2nd/13th April, 1735.

⁵ See p. 113 above.

with the Company's transport arrangements, consignments of wool from Kirman to Gombroon being greatly delayed owing to the lack of camels and mules.

In February, 1742, Taqi Khan gave fresh proofs of his dishonesty. The Company had, shortly before, delivered two vessels to the Government, for which it had received 8,000 tomans on account; another 1,300 tomans remained to be paid. Taqi Khan privately requested the Company not only to forgo any further payment, but to give him a receipt (to be forwarded to Nadir) for 10,000 tomans. As the Agent considered that a complaint to Nadir would not only be useless,¹ but would merely result in arousing the Beglarbegi's enmity, he compromised by agreeing to receive another 800 tomans and to waive all claim to the remaining 500.²

The attempt by certain members of the Russia Company (see Part II of this Appendix) to establish themselves in Northern Persia and to secure a share of the trade in woollen goods, caused the East India Company to take up the challenge, and it sent two European factors to Isfahan in the early summer of 1742, to reopen the factory there on the former basis.³ It was also proposed to open a factory at Mashhad, but this project was not approved by the London management.

Peirson, the new Resident at Isfahan, sent Hermet to the Shah's camp in July, 1743, in order to make a further attempt to secure the renewal of the Company's privileges; this step was taken partly because of the endeavours of the Russia Company merchants to secure privileges from the Shah. When Hermet reached the camp, he was interviewed by Mirza Mahdi, who said that it would not only be useless, but also most injudicious for him to appear before Nadir unless he could make him a suitable present. When he found that Hermet was not in a position to make any present to the Shah, he advised him to return to Isfahan; although Hermet offered Mirza Mahdi 100 tomans, the latter refused to take any action, and he was honest enough not to take the bribe.⁴

The 'Oman campaign, by reason of the requisitioning of supplies and heavy taxation which it occasioned, had a bad effect upon trade in southern Persia. The revolt of Taqi Khan in 1744 caused a further set-back to trade. It is stated in the *Gombroon Diary*⁵ that the Dutch, in concert with the Shahbandar of Gombroon, drew up and sent to Nadir a document charging the East India Company with complicity in Taqi Khan's revolt. The Agent, on the old "tu quoque" principle, retaliated by making a counter-charge against the Dutch.

Trading conditions were most unfavourable during the concluding years of Nadir's reign, as his extortionate ways became more burdensome than

¹ Nadir's toleration of Taqi Khan's misdemeanours was remarkable. It is stated in the *Gombroon Diary* (13th/24th March, 1742) that it was discovered, after Taqi Khan's dismissal from his post in 1740, that he had embezzled 1,500 tomans. On this matter being reported to Nadir, he merely ordered Taqi Khan to pay up the sum in question.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 20th February/3rd March, 1742. See also Otter, Vol. II, pp. 162-3 (he gives, however, an incomplete account of this incident, as he was not in possession of all the facts).

³ See the reference, in the *Gombroon Diary* of the 6th/17th August, 1743, to Peirson's letter from Isfahan of the 16th/27th July.

⁴ *Gombroon Diary*, 20th/31st December, 1743.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10th/21st April, 1744.

ever.¹ When he was at Kirman in the early part of 1747, he forced Graves, the Company's representative there, to give him a draft on the Isfahan office for 1,100 tomans, which he sent to the Isfahan authorities for collection. When the draft was presented for payment, Peirson had insufficient funds in hand to meet it, and was forced to borrow in order to make up the required total. In reporting the matter to Gombroon, he stated that he had had very great difficulty in arranging this loan. It is a proof of the insecurity of those times that the *minimum* rate at which money was then available on loan at Isfahan was 15 per cent. *per mensem*.²

The Shah's conduct was so unreasonable and trading conditions were so bad that the Company more than once contemplated the complete abandonment of its Persian business. It nevertheless persevered, and, in due course, it weathered the storm.

As for the Dutch, they fared no better than their British rivals during these troubled times. The French Compagnie des Indes, in pursuance of Dupleix's policy of expansion,³ made a most ill-timed endeavour to re-establish its trade at Gombroon in 1740.⁴ After suffering severely at the hands of Taqi Khan (who on one occasion confiscated a French vessel and held the captain to ransom),⁵ and losing its Agent and his assistant through illness,⁶ the Company appointed a new Agent, Duplessis by name, who endeavoured, but without success, to secure a share in the Kirman wool trade. Realising the futility of continuing the factory under the then existing conditions,⁷ the Company recalled Duplessis, who left Gombroon in July, 1743. Although the factory there was closed, French vessels continued to call at irregular intervals and to carry on some trade with the merchants at Gombroon and Bushire.

PART II

THE RUSSIA COMPANY

After Peter the Great had conquered the littoral of Daghistan and Shirvan and had occupied Gilan, he endeavoured to stimulate trade and industry in his new dominions by inviting the English to revive their former trade with Persia through Russia.⁸ Although nothing came of this project during Peter's

¹ Dorrill informed London on the 5th/16th December, 1745, that "the Name of Trade is forgot . . . in Persia," owing to the continued revolts and disturbances.

² Letter from Peirson and Blandy to London dated the 16th/27th May, 1747.

³ H. Castonnet des Fosses, *Les Relations de la France avec la Perse*, Angers, 1889, p. 30.

⁴ Otter (Vol. II, pp. 86 and 87) strongly advised the Company's representative not to proceed with the project.

⁵ Otter, Vol. II, p. 156.

⁶ A. Martineau, *Le Premier Consulat de France à Bassora* . . . p. 69. *Gombroon Diary*, 19th/30th October, 1740.

⁷ *Ibidem*. In Martineau's words, the French "étaient obligés de subir tous les caprices des autorités locales. Ces caprices étaient souvent déraisonnables, pourtant ils allaient rarement jusqu'à la persécution." See also R. Vadala, *Le Golfe Persique*, Paris, 1920, p. 110.

⁸ Hanway, Vol. I, p. 13. See also W. Tooke's *View of the Russian Empire under Catherine II* (London, 1800), Vol. III, p. 446.

lifetime, a most important step towards its realisation was taken in 1734, when the commercial treaty between Great Britain and Russia was concluded. In clause VIII of this treaty provision was made for British merchants to send their goods in transit through Russia to Persia or *vice versa* on payment of a duty of 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.¹

It was not until that "enterprising but indiscreet Englishman,"² Captain John Elton, paid his first visit to Persia in 1739, that advantage was taken of the above privilege. Elton, whilst employed by the Russian Government on the Orenburg expedition, had made several vain attempts to travel from the Yaiyq (Ural) river to the Sea of Aral and thence on to Khiva and Bukhara. The primary object of his journey to Persia in 1739, with the young Scotsman Mungo Graeme, was to open up trade with "the Bucharies" (as he termed Bukhara and Khiva) via Astarabad. Reference has been made in Chapter XVIII to the trading privileges which Rida Quli Mirza accorded to Elton and Graeme in August, 1739, and (in Chapter XIX) to the journey of Thompson and Hogg to Khiva and Bukhara in 1740-41. Leaving Graeme behind in Persia, Elton returned to St. Petersburg, where he arrived at the end of January, 1740. He gave glowing accounts to the British merchants at St. Petersburg of the prospects of the trade with Persia, and in July, 1740, he wrote a long memorandum in which he set forth the privileges which, he considered, should be secured from the Russian Government in order that the transit trade might be carried on. He wrote another memorandum for the information of Edward Finch, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, in which he gave particulars of his scheme and drew attention to the advantages which the British traders would enjoy.³ He pointed out the importance of Mashhad, which Nadir had made his capital, but stated that its trade was of less importance than that with "the Bucharies," Kabul, Qandahar, India and even Tibet, which could be carried on through Mashhad. It was, he said, essential for the success of the project that the British merchants should have their own vessels on the Volga and Caspian. The costs involved in sending British woollen goods by the Russian route would, he continued, be certainly far less than the freight on such goods when sent via India or Turkey. In Persia itself the position was eminently favourable; Rida Quli had thoroughly subdued the troublesome Turkoman and Özbek tribesmen on the north-east frontier. As to trade rivals, the East India Company had had to withdraw from Isfahan some years before, and the Dutch, although they remained there, were doing but little business. Lastly, much profit could be made out of Gilan silk.

Finch forwarded copies of these memoranda to London, together with a translation of Rida Quli Mirza's decree⁴ in favour of the British merchants, and on the 9th August, 1740,⁵ he reported that the Russian Government "entertains a good opinion of the Undertaking and seems likely to encourage it."

¹ The text of this clause is given by Hanway, Vol. I, pp. 47 and 48.

² Malcolm, Vol. II, p. 102.

³ For the text see *The Gentleman's Magazine*, Vol. XII (1742), pp. 21-25. (This memorandum is the "pompos memorial" which Hanway quotes in his Vol. I, pp. 35-42.)

⁴ A translation of this decree is given in *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 1742, Vol. XII, pp. 25 and 26.

⁵ See also Hanway, Vol. I, pp. 30-33.

⁶ S.P. 91, Vol. XXIV.

The Russia Company in London was favourably impressed with Elton's arguments. Since the establishment of trade on the lines which he proposed would involve an infringement of the rights of the Levant Company, the Russia Company entered into negotiations with the Board of Trade,¹ with the result that, in 1741, an Act of Parliament² was passed which regularised the matter, despite the opposition of the Levant Company.

In the meantime, Thompson and Hogg had left St. Petersburg for Khiva and Bukhara. They reached Khiva safely, but were detained there during Nadir's siege of the town in November, 1740. Thompson went on to Bukhara in the following year. He stated that in both Khiva and Bukhara "no foreign commodity bears a price proportionate to the risque of bringing it to market."³

Particulars have already been given of how Elton and Woodroffe, after being entrusted with a cargo of goods by certain of the British merchants at St. Petersburg (it is important to note that the Russia Company did not trade in its corporate capacity with Persia), reached Persia in June, 1742, and of how Russian animosity was aroused by their carrying cargoes of rice from Enzeli to Darband for the Persian troops in Daghestan.⁴ The Russian authorities were alarmed when Elton made a survey for the Shah of the south-east coast of the Caspian.⁵ Then came reports of Elton having entered the Shah's service and of his shipbuilding activities on Nadir's behalf.

The Russian Government protested against Elton's conduct, but the Company believed at first that the charges against him were based upon false and malicious reports by Armenian and Russian merchants. On further protests being made, some of the British merchants in St. Petersburg who were interested in the Persian trade sent Jonas Hanway to Persia on a mission of investigation.⁶ Others of the merchants remained, however, firm believers in, and supporters of, Elton.⁷ Hanway has described in great detail his experiences in Persia and his discussions with Elton and others. It seems clear from a hitherto unpublished letter⁸ which he wrote to London from Astrakhan when on his way back from Persia that he then (November, 1744) entertained a more favourable idea of Elton and his activities than he afterwards allowed to appear in his published record.

Notwithstanding Russian opposition, some progress was made with the Persian trade venture. A factory was established at Mashhad, and the

¹ For details of the conferences held at the Board of Trade, see the *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations*, January, 1734/5 to December, 1741, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 346-356 and 376 and 377 (London, 1930).

² This Act authorised the merchants of the Russia Company to import raw silk or other Persian goods via Russia "provided that they had been purchased by the barter of cloth or other English commodities, and not by the export of gold or silver bullion" (see Dr. A. C. Wood's *A History of the Levant Company*, p. 146).

³ See the *Journal of Thompson & Hogg in Hanway*, Vol. 1, pp. 351 and 354.

⁴ See pp. 205 and 206 above.

⁵ See Woodroffe's *Journal* (in Hanway, Vol. I, Chapter XX).

⁶ In February, 1743, Hanway had accepted a partnership in the St. Petersburg firm of Dingley and Klencke (see S.P. 91, Vol. XLIII, and Hanway, Vol. I, p. 83).

⁷ Cook, Vol. II, p. 510.

⁸ This letter was dated the 7th/18th November, 1744: a copy is to be found in S.P. 91, Vol. XXXVI.

woollen goods imported through Russia and Gilan began competing in central Persia with those of the East India Company.¹

Difficulties in Persia itself, as well as in Russia, were not slow in arising. Early in 1743 goods to the value of some 3,500 tomans were seized by the Government in Gilan.² In November of the same year Mungo Graeme was murdered by robbers at Samnan when returning from Mashhad to Resht.³ Further, the climate, particularly in Gilan, caused much illness and some mortality amongst the British factors; Hanway states that five (out of a total of sixteen) died between 1740 and 1744.⁴

Moreover, the manner in which the transit duty was calculated in Russia raised it to 7 per cent. in the current Russian money, instead of the 3 per cent. stipulated.⁵

As time went on, the complaints of the Russian Government grew more and more vehement, particularly after Elton had completed his first vessel for Nadir.⁶ Although Hanway had failed to persuade Elton to sever his connection with the Persian court, further efforts were made through Lord Tyrawley to induce him to do so.⁷ He was even offered a pension of £400 a year (to be levied on the Persian trade), with the alternative of a commission in the British Navy.⁸ Elton, when pressed once more to return to England, produced a decree from Nadir, dated the 21st November, 1745, stating that "the properest of the Christians" was not permitted to leave Persia, as it was necessary for him to attend the court at the next Nau Ruz and "to settle our naval affairs on a right foundation."⁹

Bakunin, who had succeeded Arapov as Russian Consul at Resht, sent to St. Petersburg in 1745 and 1746 two long reports containing accusations against Elton. Copies of these reports, couched in very Russified German, were communicated by the Russian Government to Lord Tyrawley and his successor, the Earl of Hyndford.¹⁰ Lord Hyndford formed the opinion that the agitation against Elton was engineered largely by the enemies of Bestuzhev (who had been responsible, on the Russian side, for the conclusion of the 1734 treaty).¹¹ However that may have been, the situation went from bad to worse.

¹ See p. 285 above.

² *Gombroon Diary*, 4th/15th January, 1743. The Agent remarked, with a certain satisfaction, that "paying Customs (in Persia) proves no Exemption from Impositions, and it is not Our Masters that suffer only in such Calamitous Times."

³ Hanway, Vol. II, p. 24. See also the letter from Gombroon to London (apparently written early in 1744), in Vol. XV of the Persia and Persian Gulf Records.

⁴ Hanway, Vol. I, p. 221.

⁵ This duty was payable in rix-dollars (*reichsthalers*). See the Petition from the Russia Company to the King in Council, a copy of which was sent by Whitehall to St. Petersburg on the 30th July, 1742 (S.P. 91, Vol. XXXI).

⁶ Lerch, when at Darbānd, saw an 18-gun frigate which Elton had built. Elton was then (1745), Lerch said, an admiral, but he was, nominally at any rate, under the "Over-Admiral," Mirza Muḥammad Khan, who was also Governor of Baku. At that time, two frigates and four smaller vessels were said to be finished, while other ships were under construction. (*Beschreibung's Magazin*, Vol. X, p. 404.)

⁷ James O'Hara, Baron Tyrawley, was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg from 1743 to 1745.

⁸ Hanway, Vol. II, p. 34.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 47.

¹⁰ Lord Hyndford, in his despatch of the 22nd November/3rd December, 1745, forwarded these reports to London, where they were examined by the Russia Company.

¹¹ See Lord Hyndford's despatch referred to above.

At the request of the Russian Government, the two British ships on the Caspian were sold to Russian merchants and sailed thereafter under the Russian flag. The next step was far more drastic; by a decree issued in November, 1746, the Empress withdrew the transit privileges accorded by the treaty of 1734 and requested the British Ambassador to inform the British merchants concerned that they should consign no more goods to Persia and that they should immediately liquidate their affairs there and withdraw their servants and effects.¹

The British Government protested at this decree, and pointed out that it was most unfair to penalise those British merchants engaged in the Persian trade who were not associated with Elton; the Russian Government, however, remained adamant. Notwithstanding this ban on their trade, some merchants and factors remained in Persia, in the hope that the decree might be rescinded. However, in the disturbances that broke out in Persia after Nadir's death, everything was lost, goods to the value of £80,000 being stolen.² By 1751 all the British, save Elton, had left northern Persia. As for Elton, he was murdered in Gilan in April, 1751.³ Although the Russian charges against him were, in many respects, grossly exaggerated, and in some cases actually false, the basic fact remains that it was his injudicious conduct in entering Nadir's service and in assisting him to found a navy on the Caspian which, by arousing the fears of Russia, brought about the collapse of the enterprise. As Hanway very truly remarked: "... unless we could convey our merchandize through the Russian empire with the good will of that nation, there could be no conveyance at all."⁴ It was unfortunate that Elton did not use his undoubted talents in such a manner as not to prejudice the interests of the Russia Company merchants. It has already been suggested that if he could have persuaded Nadir to place him in charge of the Persian navy in the Persian Gulf, he would have had ample scope for his abilities, without giving Russia any grounds for offence.

When all is said and done, however, it is clear that, even if Elton had done nothing to alienate the good will of Russia, the venture would have ended in failure, owing to the course that events took in Persia.

¹ Hanway, Vol. II, pp. 74-78. The extent to which Elton's actions were resented in Russia may be gauged from the fact that, as long afterwards as December, 1762, when the Earl of Buckingham was endeavouring to negotiate another commercial treaty in Moscow, he reported that, on touching upon the question of British trade with Persia, he found: "Mr. Elton's misconduct has made an impression which it will be very difficult to get the better of." See *The Despatches and Correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buckingham, Ambassador to the Court of Catherine II, 1762-1765* (London, 1900), p. 113.

² Hanway, Vol. II, p. 90.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 120. According to Lerch (*Büsching's Magazin*, Vol. X, p. 460), Elton was murdered in 1750.

⁴ Hanway, Vol. II, p. 39.

APPENDIX III

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL PARTICULARS

The quantity of documentary information on the subject of Nadir Shah is, at first sight, quite bewildering in its immensity; it is, moreover, all the more formidable by reason of its polyglot character. However, when one analyses this huge mass of material one can whittle it down appreciably by discarding such works (and they are not a few) as are mere paraphrases of those of earlier writers.

This Appendix contains information regarding the principal authorities whom I have, for the sake of convenience, divided into two groups, namely, Oriental and European. Authorities of lesser importance are mentioned in the Bibliography.

I have endeavoured, whenever possible, to utilise contemporary sources, both Oriental and European; when these were not available, I have had to fall back upon the works of later writers like Sir John Malcolm, Soloviev, Brosset, etc., who have drawn upon earlier works that are either no longer extant or not readily available.

A.—ORIENTAL AUTHORITIES

I. MIRZA MUHAMMAD MAHDI KAUKABI ASTARABADI.

Notwithstanding the late Professor Barthold's view that Muhammad Kazim's history¹ of the Nadir period will in the future be regarded as even more important than Mirza Mahdi's *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, I am, for reasons which I shall develop later, giving pride of place to the author of the latter.

Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Kaukabi Astarabadi, to give him his full name, was, as is evident, a native of Astarabad. Beyond the fact that his father was named Muhammad Naṣir, nothing is known of his family. We are likewise without knowledge of the date of his birth, but it is probable that he was born towards the close of the XVIIth century.

In consequence of his northern origin and upbringing, he acquired a profound knowledge of Turki (Chaghatai or Eastern Turkish). He states, in the preface to his Turki grammar and dictionary (called, respectively, the *Mabani'l-Lughat* and the *Sanglakh*), that from his early youth he took a keen delight in the Turki poems of Mir 'Ali Shir Nava'i and that he "was possessed of an inexpressible desire to understand their purport; and since this desire had in a manner been fulfilled, he determined to collect together all the difficult

¹ See p. 298 below.

words, and out of them to make a dictionary."¹ Mirza Mahdi certainly showed good taste in his admiration for Nava'i's poetry, for he had been in his time (844-906 A.H. = A.D. 1440/41-1500/01) a most noted poet as well as a prose writer in both the Turki and Persian languages, but particularly in the former.²

Mirza Mahdi does not record when he first met Nadir or on what date he entered his service. As he was an Astarabad man, he may, originally, have been in the employ of Fath 'Ali Khan, the chief of the local Ashaqbash Qajars, whom he may have accompanied to Sari, when the Qajar chief met Tahmasp there in the spring of 1726; in that case, Mirza Mahdi would have come into contact with Nadir for the first time in the following autumn at Khabushan; all this, however, is merely conjectural. From the intimate knowledge which Mirza Mahdi displays of state affairs in those times, it seems evident that he obtained some post at Tahmasp's court in 1726 or shortly afterwards.

He was, perhaps from the very beginning of his royal service, in the office of the *raqam* (royal order) writers and calligraphists or royal secretariat, of which he later became head, with the title of Munshi al-Mamalik or Secretary of State (the literal meaning is "Secretary of the Kingdoms"). It was he who, in January, 1731, composed the preamble to the contract of marriage between Rida Quli, Nadir's eldest son, and Fatima Sultan Begum, one of Shah Sultan Husain's daughters.³

It was not until Nadir's coronation day (8th March, 1736) that Mirza Mahdi was appointed official historiographer.⁴ The Catholicos Abraham describes him as being "un homme sage et modeste, intelligent, de mœurs douce, et porté à la condescendance."⁵ He was well qualified for his new post, because he had, in his previous capacity, made himself familiar with everything of importance that occurred at the court, and he must have had almost unique opportunities of ascertaining the facts of Nadir's early life. The East India Company's representatives in Persia, who had numerous dealings with him in connection with the Company's endeavours to secure the restoration of its privileges, found him helpful and honest.

Mirza Mahdi was by no means exclusively occupied with his historiographical work; he had also to carry out secretarial and other duties at the court. Despite his manifold official duties, he managed, as he himself states, to find time and energy to work at his *Sanglakh*.⁶

In all probability, Mirza Mahdi would have perished in the disturbances that followed Nadir's assassination in 1747 had he been in Persia at the time, but, fortunately for himself, he had, as already related, been sent on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople in the previous year and did not return to Persia until the troubles had subsided.

¹ See Mr. (now Sir) E. Denison Ross's editorial introduction to his edition of the *Mabani'l-Lughat* (Calcutta, 1910), p. ii.

² Nava'i, who was the minister of the Timurid ruler Abu'l-Ghazi Husaini of Herat, "did more than any other man to raise the Chaghatay Turki to the dignity of a literary language" (Browne's *Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion*, p. 453); moreover, Nava'i, like his contemporary Jami, exercised a profound influence upon Ottoman poetry in the XVth century. Besides being a famous literary figure himself, he was a generous patron of such men as the poet Jami and the artist Bihzad.

³ See p. 52 above.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁵ Catholicos Abraham, p. 312.

⁶ *Mabani'l-Lughat*, p. lii.

The date of his death, like that of his birth, is not known; there is evidence to show that he was still living in 1172 or 1173 A.H. (A.D. 1758-59 or 1759-60).¹

He is to be carefully distinguished from two other (more or less) contemporary writers, each of whom was also known as Mirza Mahdi Khan. One of these was Abu'l-Mufakhiir Nizamu'd-Din Muhammad Hadi al-Husaini as-Safavi, the author of (i) the *Diya' al-Uyun*, a treatise on the mystical peculiarities of Muhammad's prophetic seal and on the magic power and influence of certain passages and letters of the Qur'an,² and (ii) the *Majmu'a-yi-Mahdi Khani*, a short history of the Timurids of India compiled in 1142 A.H. (1729-30). The father of this Mahdi Khan was Mir Mahdi Khan (see fol. I (b) of the India Office MS. No. 2272), and it is stated in the Bodleian copy of this work (Bodleian MS. No. 1563) that it was composed at Haidarabad in 1114 A.H. (A.D. 1702-3). This Mahdi Khan was evidently a considerably older man.

The other Mahdi Khan (whose first name was Muhammad) was a native of Tabriz; curiously enough, like his namesake of Astarabad, he wrote, in Persian, a grammar, together with a vocabulary, of the Turki language. His work, however, dealt with the Turki spoken in Adharbaijan and elsewhere in Persia, and it is known that he compiled it subsequently to 1198 A.H. (A.D. 1783-84)³; he was therefore much younger than the author of the *Sanglahh* and *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*.

The *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, as Mirza Mahdi Astarabadi's official history of Nadir is generally known,⁴ is the only detailed and really well-informed contemporary record in existence that covers the whole of Nadir's career. It describes with a wealth of detail the numerous campaigns and other important happenings, and it is fairly lavishly supplied with dates which are, with a few exceptions, accurate. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that the work is the only sure foundation upon which a critical study of Nadir's life and activities can be based. Nevertheless, the book is not free from blemishes. As official historian, Mirza Mahdi could not write of things as they actually were, but as his master would like them to appear; he had to be eulogistic and not critical, and it is not, therefore, surprising that his book contains a number of exaggerated statements and distortions of the truth; moreover, some episodes of importance are omitted altogether. Owing, doubtless, to the circumstances under which it was written, it gives but little information of a personal nature regarding Nadir, and it throws no light

¹ There are two chronograms at the end of the *Sanglahh*, each of which, apparently, purports to give the date of the completion of that work; one of these chronograms gives the year as 1172 and the other as 1173 A.H.; it is not known which is the correct date (see Rieu's *Catalogue of the Turkish Manuscripts in the British Museum*, London, 1888, p. 265).

² See Ethé's notice of the work in the *L.O. Catalogue of Persian MSS.*, No. 2272.

³ See Rieu's *Catalogue of the Persian MSS. in the British Museum*, p. 988. Sir Denison Ross, on p. vi of his editorial introduction to Mirza Mahdi Astarabadi's *Mabani'l-Lughat*, states that this grammar and the accompanying dictionary, the *Sanglahh*, are much superior to the above-mentioned work.

⁴ The work itself bears no title, but it has been known ever since Mirza Mahdi's day as the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, as his contemporary Muhammad Kazim called it by that title. It is occasionally called the *Ta'rikh-i-Jahan-gushai-yi-Nadiri* (e.g., in the *Ta'rikh-i-Zandiya*, B.M. Add. MS. 26, 198). It is not to be confused with the Persian translation of James Fraser's *History of Nadir Shah* by Abu'l-Qasim Khan Nasiru'l-Mulk, which is also called the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, or with 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri's *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, which is sometimes given that title. (See Professor Storey's *Persian Literature: a Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, Section II, Fasc. 2, pp. 326 and 329).

whatever upon the veritable nature of his religious beliefs. Fears of his master's displeasure could hardly, however, have been the reason why Mirza Mahdi had so little to say respecting the origin, growth and exploits of Nadir's navy; his failure to deal adequately with this interesting matter is a mystery. Lastly, his accounts of some of Nadir's campaigns are marred by vague and, in some cases, clearly incorrect geographical data, which make them extremely difficult to follow (e.g., his description of Nadir's route from Kirmanshah to Zuhab and Tuz Khurmathi and thence on towards Baghdad in December, 1732)¹; the difficulties to which this defect have given rise are aggravated, in the Bombay and Tabriz lithographed editions, by the large number of mistakes in the place names. It is to be regretted that no carefully edited and well-printed text of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* exists.²

Mirza Mahdi completed the work after his return from Constantinople in 1747; during his absence, Nadir had been assassinated, and he could, therefore, write at last without restraint. In his concluding pages, he graphically describes the terrible change in Nadir's character and behaviour after the blinding of Rida Quli Mirza (which he had hitherto omitted to mention), and the horrors of the last few years of the reign. It is a matter for regret that he did not completely rewrite his book; he seems, however, to have devoted himself almost exclusively to the compilation of the *Sanglakh*.³

Despite an occasional over-indulgence in hyperbolic expressions (notably when describing the annual Nau Ruz festival) and a wearisome repetition of flowery epithets when referring to Nadir and his troops, Mirza Mahdi's style, in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, is not unpleasing. His vocabulary is vast, and it is interesting to note, from his use of a number of Mongol and Turco-Mongol military expressions, that these terms were still in use in Persia in his time. He also, on more than one occasion, quoted Georgian words. There can be no doubt that he was an accomplished linguist, being well-versed in Persian, Turki and Arabic.⁴

Before leaving the subject of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, mention must be made of Sir William Jones's French translation of it.⁵ One is apt, at first, to criticise

¹ See p. 66.

² For a list of the principal MSS. of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* and of the lithographed Persian editions and translations into French, German, etc., see Professor Storey's *Persian Literature: a Bibliographical Survey*, Section II, Fasciculus 2, pp. 322-324.

³ It was probably for the same reason that Mirza Mahdi never (so far as is known) carried out his intention of writing a history of the period following Nadir's death; he stated at the end of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* that he intended to do so, but he did no more than describe briefly the short and troubled reign of 'Adil Shah.

⁴ Abu'l-Hasan ibn Ibrahim Qazvini, on fol. 192 (a) of the *Fawa'id-i-Safaviyya* (British Museum MS. No. Add. 16698), makes the following extraordinary criticism of Mirza Mahdi: "The authorship of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* is by Mirza Mahdi and (its) correction by 'Ali 'Askar. Mahdi was without any knowledge of Arabic and he followed the secular path (i.e., he was without religion), and the *Durra-yi-Nadiri* (etc) is also of his composition." As Sir Denison Ross has pointed out (see page vii of his introduction to the *Mabani'l-Lughat*), it is hard to imagine how a man who knew no Arabic could have written the *Durra-yi-Nadiri*; even in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* there are a number of Arabic phrases and quotations. The charge of atheism seems to be equally baseless, as does the statement regarding 'Ali 'Askar (whose name I have never come across elsewhere).

⁵ This translation, entitled the *Histoire de Nader Chah, traduite du Persan par ordre de sa Majesté le Roi de Dannemark*, was first published in London in 1770. When Carsten Niebuhr, the Danish traveller and writer, visited Shiraz in 1765 he purchased a MS. copy of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*; on his return to Denmark, he presented this MS. to the Kongelige Bibliotek at Copenhagen, where it still is. It was from this MS. that Jones made his French translation.

Jones severely for the vast number of mutilated names which disfigure his translation, as well as for his extremely incorrect conversion of the majority of the Muhammadan dates. It must, however, be borne in mind that, apart from the fact that the task of translating the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* was forced upon Jones and that it was distasteful to him,¹ he had no personal knowledge of Persia. Moreover, there were not, at that time, any really accurate maps of that country, and books of reference were but few in number. Even to-day, with all the facilities which now exist, it would be impossible to make a translation of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* that would be reasonably free from error, the main reason being that a number of the names mentioned cannot now be identified. As to the dates, there was no conversion table like that of Wüstenfeld in existence in Jones's times.

He published, in 1773, an abridged English version of his French translation; in the same year, T. S. Gadebusch published his German translation of Jones's French text at Greifswald, and, at a later date, the Tsarevich David (the son of Giorgi XII, the last Georgian king) made a Georgian translation of it (see B. Dorn's *Catalogue des Manuscrits et Xylographs Orientaux de la Bibliothèque Publique de St. Petersbourg*, 1852, p. 293).

Mirza Mahdi's second work on Nadir Shah, the *Durra-yi-Nadira*, although a monument to his erudition, is also a manifestation of his bad taste. It is written throughout in the objectionable artificial style which Waṣṣaf originated in the 4th century A.H. The text is so overloaded with recondite Arabic words as to be almost unintelligible, even to well-educated Persians; how this work could have made any appeal to an illiterate man like Nadir is a mystery. If one may imitate one of Mirza Mahdi's metaphors, he gave, in this book, free rein to the high-mettled steed (*lausan*) of his verbosity and pedantry; in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* the author mercifully kept his steed in check, except for an annual Nau Ruz gallop.

The *Durra-yi-Nadira* contains but little that is not to be found in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*²; it is, however, of some use for the purpose of checking the place-names and dates given in the latter work. It seems in the highest degree unlikely that it will ever be translated into any European language; it would be a singular waste of effort and time to do so.

Some other specimens of Mirza Mahdi's writings exist. It is known that he composed the letter in which Nadir gave his son Rida Quli news of the victory at Karnal; it was probably his pen which drafted Nadir's letter to Muhammad 'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars (see p. 60 above), and there can be but little doubt that he was responsible for the drawing up of the drastic treaty which Nadir compelled Muhammad Shah to sign at Delhi (see p. 153 above). The *Munsha'at-i-Mahdi*, which was published at Tehran in 1285 A.H. (1868-69), consists of a number of other letters written by Mirza Mahdi.

II. MUHAMMAD KAZIM OF MERV.

Apart from the autobiographical details which Muhammad Kazim gives

¹ See pp. 316-320 of Jones's preface to his *Introduction to the History of the Life of Nadir Shah*, in Volume XII of his works, London, 1807.

² The preamble to Rida Quli Mirza's contract of marriage which, as stated on p. 52 above, is in the *Durra-yi-Nadira*, is not contained in the official biography.

from time to time in the course of his work, we have no information regarding him; he is not mentioned by any of his contemporaries or by any later Persian writers, so far as is known.

As he states that he was 16 years old in 1149 A.H., he was born in 1133 (1720/1). His father was one of the trusted followers and companions of Nadir's brother, Ibrahim Khan; the circumstances under which Muhammad Kazim entered the Khan's service in Adharbaijan when only 16 have already been related, as has also the manner in which he escaped Ibrahim's fate in 1738. Muhammad Kazim's father having died in Adharbaijan during his period of service there, he took the body back with him to Khurasan when he returned, and buried it at Mashhad before proceeding to Merv. From this fact and from other statements elsewhere in his book, it is evident that he was a Shi'a.

On reaching Merv, he entered the service of the Beglarbegi. When that dignitary, in answer to the summons which Nadir issued for all the principal officials and notables of the kingdom to meet him at Herat on his return from India, proceeded to that city, Muhammad Kazim was one of his suite. From Herat he accompanied Nadir on the expedition to Bukhara and Khwarizm; he states that when he was at Khanqa he was kept so busy in the *daftar-khana* (secretariat) that he was unable to go out. Instead of going with Nadir to Daghistān, he accompanied an expedition against the Qungrat tribe, and, on returning to Merv, he was appointed *wazir* of the arsenal, ordnance department and the camel and mule stables there. In consequence of the active preparations which were then, at Nadir's orders, being made for a military expedition to Eastern Turkistan, Khoqand and possibly Kashgaria, the post was of considerable importance. He describes graphically the trepidation which he, in common with every other official, felt on entering Nadir's presence, but he was one of the fortunate few to earn the tyrant's approbation instead of his wrath. He accompanied Behbud Khan on his expedition to Samarkand and beyond in 1747, and relates that he wrote thirty out of the seventy letters which the commandant dispatched from there to the cities of Turkistan. The concluding portion of Muhammad Kazim's third (and final) volume describes the remainder of this expedition and the retreat of the army to Persia after the news of Nadir's death had become known; this part of the narrative is by the author's son, who must have been very young at the time. The date of Muhammad Kazim's death does not appear to be known. The MS. is dated the 2nd Šafar, 1171 (16th October, 1757) when, if he was still living, he would have been no more than 37.

To turn to the book itself, the first volume is, unfortunately, missing, but it is known that it covered Nadir's career from his birth up to the beginning of 1736; in the second volume, which is known as the *Kitab-i-Nadiri*, there are occasional references to, and what are apparently quotations from, this first volume. The data for this volume and for part of the second must have been collected by Muhammad Kazim's father.

So far as is known, the only MS. in existence of the second and third volume (known respectively as the *Kitab-i-Nadiri* and the *Nadir-Nama*) is the one in the possession of the Institut Vostokovedeniya (Oriental Institute) at Leningrad. The Director and the Librarian of the School of Oriental Studies have been kind enough to lend me a photostat copy of this Leningrad MS.

According to Professor Barthold, the MS. was evidently purchased from a Jewish dealer, because the pagination of the second volume is in the Jewish fashion.¹

The *Kitab-i-Nadiri*, consisting of 327 folios or 654 pages, begins with an account of the assembly on the Mughan plain and Nadir's coronation there in 1736, and, after describing his Bakhtiari, Afghan, Indian, Turkistan and Daghistan campaigns and the viceroyalty of Rida Quli Mirza, concludes when he was about to attack the Turks in the spring of 1743.

The *Nadir-Nama*, which contains 251 folios or 502 pages, begins where the preceding volume left off; it records Nadir's Mesopotamian campaign, the revolts in Khwarizm, Fars (Taqi Khan's rebellion) and Astarabad, the assembly of the 'ulama at Najaf, the concluding stage of the Turkish war, the change in Nadir's health and mental condition, his appalling cruelties, Behbud Khan's expedition to Samargand, the Sistan rebellion and the defection and revolt of 'Ali Quli Khan, and, lastly, the murder of Nadir and his sons in 1747.

The outline of Muhammad Kazim's life given above will show that he was well qualified to record events in Khurasan, Turkistan, Transoxiana and (for a short while only) in Adharbaijan. Professor Barthold has expressed the view that his history of Nadir's reign would surpass all other sources, not excepting Mirza Mahdi's official biography.² With all due deference to Professor Barthold, I cannot but feel that this statement goes rather too far. Some of Muhammad Kazim's work is unquestionably of the greatest value and interest, but the fact remains that the quality of the whole is unequal. When describing events of which he had first-hand or even second-hand information, he often throws a flood of light upon points that other writers have left obscure, such, for example, as the behaviour of Rida Quli Mirza during his vice-royalty and the reasons for his disgrace, and the murder of the ex-Shah Tahmasp and his two sons. On the other hand, his treatment of events that had occurred at a considerable distance frequently leaves a great deal to be desired. His account of Nadir's Indian campaign is inaccurate and, in places, fantastic; as he did not get nearer to India than Herat, he must have gleaned all his data from officers and men of his acquaintance, and his version of what happened is therefore of the "camp-fire" variety. As Sir Jadunath Sarkar has well put it in a letter to me, this part of Muhammad Kazim's book shows us "*Clio en déshabillé*, while the Muse of History appears in her stiff official robes in the pages of Mahdi." In regard to occurrences in the Persian Gulf and Daghistan, Muhammad Kazim is often very inaccurate. Further, his work suffers from the fact that it contains but few dates (a number of these, moreover, are incorrect), and the arrangement of the subject matter is at times haphazard and therefore difficult to follow. Lastly (but this not Muhammad Kazim's fault), his first volume is missing. After a careful weighing of the merits and demerits of the two works, I have decided in favour of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, though I fully admit that in certain respects the *Kitab-i-Nadiri* and its continuation are superior.

¹ See Professor Barthold's article *O mehotorikh vostochnikh rukopisykh*, in the *Izvestiya Akademiiy Nauk*, Petrograd, 1919, Vol. II, p. 927.

² Barthold, *op. cit.*, p. 927.

It is very evident that Muḥammad Kazim made use of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri* when compiling his own work; he referred indeed to it specifically, and on several occasions he borrowed (generally without acknowledgment) whole passages; some of these he inserted *verbatim*, while he slightly paraphrased others.

Muḥammad Kazim took evident pleasure in witnessing the performances of jugglers, conjurers and acrobats. He has given, in the *Kitab-i-Nadiri* (pp. 490-492), a lengthy description of the marvellous feats of a tight-rope walker at Mashhad, during an entertainment given by Rida Quli Mirza when he was Viceroy; he has also described how, several years later, when Nadir was entertaining the Russian Ambassador, a trick was performed which seems, from his account, to have been very similar to the Indian rope trick (*Nadir-Nama*, p. 329).

His style is ornate, but it is less so than that of Mirza Mahdi in the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*. His descriptions of battles are conventional and lack variety, and one gets weary of reading of scenes of appalling carnage, when rivers of blood always flowed and mountains of corpses were invariably piled up. At times he breaks into verse, in the style of Firdausi, using the *mutaqarib* metre. His orthography (or that of his copyist) is by no means perfect, particularly in the case of Arabic words. There can be no doubt that Mirza Mahdi was the better scholar and linguist. But, all things considered, Muḥammad Kazim's work is of prime importance, and it is a fortunate thing that a copy of it has now become available in this country.

III. MUḤAMMAD MUḤSIN.

Muḥammad Muḥsin, 'Amil-i-Divan, of Isfahan, was a *mustaufi* or treasury official in the service of Nadir Shah. In the preface to his general history, entitled the *Zubdatu't-Tawarikh* ("Cream of the Histories"), he states that Nadir ordered him to compile the work for the use of his eldest son, Rida Quli Mirza. The work was composed in 1154 A.H. (1741/1742), after Nadir's return from Bukhara and Khwarizm and not long before the unfortunate Prince was blinded.

The *Zubdatu't-Tawarikh* begins with Adam, but it does not become really detailed until the era of the later Safavis is reached. Rieu is certainly justified in saying that the latter part of the chapter on the Safavis is "of special importance as being a contemporary record of the decline of the Safavi dynasty and of the rise of Nadir Shah down to the time of his assumption of the royal title."¹

Although not so complete as the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, the *Zubdatu't-Tawarikh* nevertheless contains certain particulars which are not to be found in the former work, and the portion respecting the relations between Shah Tahmasp II and Nadir merits close attention.

¹ See his *Supplementary Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum*, London, 1898, pp. 24 and 25.

The chronology, owing, perhaps, to careless copyists, is frequently faulty,¹ and the haphazard arrangement of some of the chapters or sections is confusing.² The author makes a surprising blunder when he states that Baghdad surrendered to Nadir when he besieged it for the second time, after the defeat and death of Topal 'Osman Pasha.³ Notwithstanding these defects, this work is one of the most important contemporary sources for Nadir's early career, and it is to be regretted that it stops short with his accession to the throne in 1736. It has the appearance of having been written quite independently of the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*.

IV. SHAIKH MUHAMMAD 'ALI HAZIN.

The *Tadhkiratu'l-Ahwal*⁴ of Shaikh Hazin is an important contribution to the history of the era of Nadir Shah, as the author was one of the few men of culture and literary taste who lived in, and survived, those troubled times.⁵

The Shaikh has much to say of the devastation and ruin which Nadir brought upon the country of which he had been, at first, the saviour. It was, in fact, his distress at seeing the manner in which the Persian people were oppressed that made him decide to leave Persia for India in 1734.⁶ Although a partisan of the legitimate Safavi line, he praised Nadir's prowess as a military leader, and his version of the Indian invasion is not unfair to the conqueror. The Shaikh's descriptions of Nadir's battles are not of the slightest value. He did not witness any of the fighting of which he wrote; being anything but a warrior, he always found some excuse to absent himself whenever a clash of arms seemed imminent.

No biographical details of Shaikh Hazin are given here, because they can be found in F. C. Belfour's English translation of the *Ahwal*. 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri, the author of the *Bayan-i-Waqi'* (see Section V below) and Sayyid Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai, who wrote the *Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, have utilised the *Ahwal* to some extent in the preparation of their respective works.

¹ Several of the dates relating to the Afghan wars are two or even three years out, and in some places, in the late Professor Browne's manuscript (No. G. 15 in *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS. belonging to the late E. G. Browne*, . . . Cambridge, 1932) blanks have been left where dates should have been inserted. This MS. is far more legible than the one in the British Museum (O.R. 3498).

² For example, a detailed account of the revolt of Mir Wais and the Afghan wars follows the chapter devoted to the assembly on the Mughan plain and Nadir's accession.

³ See fol. 217 (b).

⁴ The Persian text was edited by F. C. Belfour and published in London in 1831.

⁵ Latifi 'Ali Beg Adhar, the author of the *Atash-Nada*, in the portion of that work entitled *Ahwal-i-Mu'asirin* (*Conditions of Contemporaries*), remarks upon the lack of literary men and poets during this epoch: he says, "The suspicion of the soul and the disordered state (of affairs) are such that no one is in the mood to read poetry or to write it."

⁶ See F. C. Belfour's English translation of the *Ahwal*, entitled *The Life of Shaikh Mohammed Ali Hazin*, page 251. Belfour, in the preface to his translation, quotes (on pages v and vi) some lines from 'Abdu'l-Karim's *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, which he translates as follows: "An illustrious person has observed that the language of the Sheikh on this subject is not worthy of attention, because they (Nadir Shah and he) were enemies to each other, and the venerable Sheikh from fear of him (Nadir Shah), honoured India as the place of his retirement." The identity of this "illustrious person" is not disclosed.

V. KHWAJA 'ABDU'L-KARIM KASHMIRI.

'Abdu'l-Karim, the son of 'Aqibat Mahmud, of Kashmir, the author of the *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, before recounting, in that work, his personal experiences when in the service of Nadir Shah, devotes a number of pages to the origin of the conqueror and his exploits up to the time of the Indian invasion.¹ Whilst this portion of the *Bayan* is not based on first-hand observation and knowledge, it is, nevertheless, of very considerable value. The author, having no reason to fear Nadir's resentment, writes freely and without exaggeration of his humble start in life; he gives, moreover, some anecdotes and interesting personal details regarding him which are not to be found in Mirza Mahdi's official biography. 'Abdu'l-Karim states that he obtained his information from old companions of the Shah; if, he says, there are any errors in his narrative, it is their fault, and not his own²; some of his information is derived from the *Ahwat* and other writings of Shaikh Hazin.

The portion of the *Bayan* which is based on the author's personal observation and experiences begins with an account of Nadir's stay in Delhi, where 'Abdu'l-Karim was at that time. Being desirous of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, he entered the Shah's service, and accompanied the Persian army on its return march to Persia and on the Turkistan campaign; on reaching Qazvin he obtained permission from the Shah to resign and to proceed to Mecca.

'Abdu'l-Karim furnishes a number of particulars of the return of the army to Persia and of the conquest of Bukhara and Khwarizm which are omitted by Mirza Mahdi and other writers, while his description of the hardships of the troops when passing through the Kurram valley in December, 1739, and their similar experiences in that of the Gurgan some fifteen months later, does much to amplify the official account.³ From the capable Indian physician, 'Alavi Khan (whom Nadir had taken into his service at Delhi), he learnt much of the Shah's physical and mental condition, and his remarks on this subject are of decided interest.⁴

No complete English translation of the *Bayan-i-Waqi'* has yet appeared. In 1798 Francis Gladwin published, in Calcutta, his *Memoirs of Khojeh Abdulkureem*, but his translation (in which there is room for improvement) begins with Nadir's departure from Delhi, all the earlier portion of the work being omitted. Lieutenant H. G. Pritchard translated this early part, together with much that Gladwin had already done, for Sir H. M. Elliot,⁵ but only a comparatively small portion of Pritchard's translation has been published.⁶

VI. MIRZA MUHAMMAD SHIRAZI.

Mirza Muhammad, the son of Abu'l-Qasim, of Shiraz, wrote his *Ruznama* or autobiography in 1200 A.H. (1785/1786), when he was an old man. Professor

¹ See foll. 4 (a)-15 (a) of the Persian MS. Add. 8909 at the British Museum.

² Fol. 101 (b).

³ Foll. 32 (a) and 61 (b) respectively.

⁴ See foll. 66 (b) and 99 (b).

⁵ Pritchard's translation (in manuscript) is contained in the British Museum MS. Add. 30782, foll. 64-112.

⁶ Extracts from it are given in Elliot and Dowson's *The History of India as told by its own Historians*. London, 1877, Vol. VIII; these relating to Nadir are on pages 126-132.

Sa'id Naficy, of Tehran, possesses a MS. of this autobiography, of which he has been kind enough to send me a typewritten copy.

The first twenty-one pages of this typewritten copy are concerned with the trials and adventures of the author and his family during the Afghan period and that of Nadir's supremacy. He gives much prominence to events in Fars, and, above all, in Shiraz, and his account of Nadir's expulsion of the Afghans from that city is of interest. He relates that, with the return of security at the beginning of Nadir's reign, the havoc wrought by the Afghans in and around Shiraz was in due course repaired, and the gardens and fertile land in the vicinity were cultivated afresh.

As is natural, Mirza Muhammad has much to say regarding the revolt of Muhammad Taqi Khan Shirazi in 1744. Fasa'i, the author of the *Fars-Namayi-Nasiri*,¹ cites Mirza Muhammad as one of his authorities for his description of this uprising. Mirza Muhammad deplores the terrible fate of Shiraz and its gardens in consequence of this revolt, but he regards as excessive the punishment which Nadir meted out to Taqi Khan.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Sir John Malcolm, in his *History of Persia*, gives translations of passages from a number of Persian MSS, some apparently contemporary or nearly so, that relate to Nadir; unfortunately, he does not in all cases give the names of the authors. It would be of interest to know whether these MSS. are still in existence, and if so, where they are.

Space does not permit me to give separate notices here of the numerous Indian authors (except 'Abdu'l-Karim Kashmiri) who have written on the subject of Nadir. The majority of these writers confine their attention to Nadir's invasion of India; references have been made in the footnotes to a number of these writers, who will, moreover, be mentioned in the Bibliography.

B.—EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES

I. THE STATE PAPERS AT THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

The correspondence exchanged between Whitehall and the British diplomatic representatives at Constantinople and St. Petersburg during the years 1729-1747,² although concerned for the most part with affairs in Turkey and Russia respectively, nevertheless contains many references to Nadir Shah.³ The despatches from Constantinople frequently had, as enclosures, official *communiqués* (in Italian) from the Porte to the foreign diplomatic corps at that city respecting the wars with Persia, while those from St. Petersburg

¹ See page 193 of the Tehran lithographed edition, published in Dhu'l-Qa'da, 1312 A.H. (April/May, 1895).

² A complete list of these representatives, with the dates of their appointments to and transfers from the Russian and Turkish capitals, will be found in D. B. Horn's *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689-1789*, published by the Camden Society, London, 1932, pp. 111-113 for Russia and 152-153 for Turkey.

³ The St. Petersburg despatches (and many of the replies from London) are contained in the series S.P. 91, Volumes X to XLVI (1728-1748), while the Constantinople despatches are in the series S.P. 97, Volumes XXV to XXXIII.

were sometimes accompanied by translations of reports from Kalushkin, the Russian Minister at the court of Nadir Shah, and of letters from Russian commanders on the frontiers of Persia and Turkey. Further, the despatches themselves, by describing the reactions of the Turkish and Russian Courts to the reports which they received of the ebb and flow of Nadir's fortunes, supplement the valuable accounts to be found in the pages of von Hammer-Purgstall and Soloviev.¹

In the correspondence between the Northern Department and the representatives at St. Petersburg much space is devoted to the British trade with Persia via Russia, and a large proportion of this space is taken up with the Elton controversy and the difficulties of the Russia Company. There are, for example, memoranda by Elton himself, copies of the accusations against him by Bakunin, the Russian Consul at Resht, a hitherto unpublished letter on the subject written by Jonas Hanway at Astrakhan in November, 1744, and many other documents of interest. The material regarding this question of the British transit trade with Persia is, in fact, so abundant that only a relatively small proportion of it can be utilised in a work dealing primarily with Nadir Shah. This subject of the British trade connection with Persia via Russia is one which merits separate treatment.

II. THE RECORDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

The archives of the East India Company at the India Office are a rich mine of information respecting the period of Nadir Shah. Not only is much of this information not to be found elsewhere, but the bulk of it has never been utilised before. The most important of these records, insofar as the subject of Nadir Shah is concerned, is the *Gombroon Diary*, wherein the Agent in Council at Gombroon recorded the day-to-day activities and transactions of the Company at that place, besides mentioning many events that occurred elsewhere. Volumes IV (1728-1737), V (1737-1746) and VI (1746-1752) of the *Persia—Persian Gulf* series of the India Office Records contain the portions of the Diary that deal with the period under review. Volume XV of the same series (covering the period 1729-1752) contains a large number of letters from the Agent in Council at Gombroon and from the representatives of the Company at Isfahan, Basra, etc., which supplement the data contained in the *Diary* and to some extent bridge the occasional gaps in that record. These gaps were caused through certain portions of the *Diary* being lost when pirates captured the vessels that were conveying these portions from Gombroon to Bombay.²

Further data are to be found in the Bombay records of the Company, but, as these are very voluminous and naturally relate mainly to India, it is no easy matter to extract the relevant material. J. A. Saldanha, in his *Selections from State Papers* (Calcutta, 1908), has drawn upon the Bombay records to some extent, but his work, besides being very incomplete, is marred

¹ See the separate notes regarding these two historians.

² The periods so affected are 27th July, 1738-16th August, 1739 and 31st July, 1744-17th August, 1745.

by an astonishingly large number of misprints. Some additional information is to be found in the *Surat Commercial Diary and Consultations*.

The *Gombroon Diary* and the letters contained in Volume XV throw much light upon the relations of the Company with the Persian Government, the naval policy of Nadir Shah, and the course of events in the Persian Gulf, as well as happenings at Isfahan, Kirman, Shiraz and Basra, where the Company had representatives. There are, for example, most graphic descriptions of the Persian attempts to capture Basra in 1735 and 1743, and much valuable data respecting the relations between the Persian Government and the Gulf Arabs, the campaigns in 'Oman and Nadir's great bid to establish Persian naval supremacy in the Gulf. These records make at times pathetic reading; the staff often had to undergo severe hardships, and to run terrible risks. A number lost their lives from illness and one employee was murdered during a disturbance.

Although these records contain so much that is of value in respect to affairs that came within the orbit of the Company's representatives, they have, nevertheless, to be used with some caution when they deal with events in other parts of Persia or Turkey.

There is doubtless a vast amount to be gleaned from the archives of the Dutch East India Company; I much regret that I have been unable to examine these Dutch records.

III. JAMES FRASER, OF REELIG.

W. Irvine, in his brief article entitled *Some Notes on James Fraser*,¹ describes Fraser's *Nadir Shah*² as "a first-hand contribution to the history of the period, important not only by reason of its early date, but because of the number of original documents it has preserved, documents not to be found elsewhere." The only word to which one might take some exception in the above passage is "first-hand," because Fraser was never in Persia, and, although he was in India during Nadir's invasion of that country, he did not come into personal contact with the conqueror.

So far as can be ascertained, Fraser was employed as a Writer in the Surat, Cambay and Ahmadabad factories of the East India Company from 1730 to 1740.³

Fraser states, in his preface (page iv), that during the last three years of his (first) stay in India (i.e., from 1737 to 1740), he "held a Correspondence with

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, 1899, pp. 214-220.

² It appears, from the *Gentleman's Magazine* for January, 1742 (p. 56), that the first edition appeared in that month; the price was 4s. The second edition was published in March, 1742.

³ *Dictionary of National Biography*. I have been unable to discover, in the Surat records, any reference either to Fraser's arrival there in 1730 or to his departure ten years later (he returned to England in 1740 in order to arrange for the publication of his book); it is known, however, that he was at Surat during much of that period. He did not become a member of the Council of Surat until after his return there in October, 1743; his appointment thereto is mentioned in a letter from Surat to London dated the 31st October of that year (see the India Office Volume 1B entitled *Bombay Letters Received—20th January, 1735-8th April, 1758*). He returned from India in 1750 or 1751, and resided at Reelig, Inverness-shire, of which place he became laird on his father's death; he died in 1754.

some Persians and Moghols there (at Patna), and that frequently on the subject of Nadir Shah's Expedition." He goes on to say:

"The Account¹ of Nadir Shah's first Exploits I have been favoured with from a Gentleman now in England, who resided several years in Persia, speaks that Language, and has been frequently in Company with that Conqueror.

The Journal² of his Transactions in India, with the Letters and Cession of the Provinces, were transmitted from Dehli, by the Secretary of Sirbulind (Sarbuland) Khan, whom Nadir Shah had appointed to be one of the Commissioners for levying the Contributions to Mirza Moghol, Son to Ali Mahommed Khan at Ahmedabad, who being my intimate Friend gave it to me."

Fraser omits to give the name of the author of the "Account" referred to above, but he states (p. 128) that this individual left Persia for India in February, 1737. It being obvious that the person in question must have been in the service of the East India Company, I consulted the *Gombroon Diary*, where I discovered that William Cockell, the Agent at Gombroon, left that place for Bombay on the 9th/20th February, 1737³; no other employee of the Company left Persia for India in that month. Having regard to these facts, as well as to Cockell's position and qualifications, there can be no doubt that he was Fraser's informant. He was Resident of the Company at Isfahan during the latter part of Ashraf's reign and throughout that of Shah Tahmasp II. He came into personal contact with Nadir, as well as with Shah Tahmasp on several occasions. In May, 1733, he was appointed Agent at Gombroon (Bandar 'Abbas), where he remained until his transfer to Bombay in February, 1737. After reaching India, Cockell was given a seat on the Council of the Bombay Presidency, and it was doubtless during his stay in Bombay that he met, or at any rate entered into correspondence with, Fraser.

Although it might be supposed that Cockell's *Account* would be a really reliable source of information regarding Nadir's early career, one finds, on examining it closely, that it is by no means free from errors. In fact, one discovers repeatedly, when carefully analysing such records of Nadir Shah, that their authors are very liable to make incorrect statements or to omit important facts unless they are describing incidents of which they themselves had first-hand knowledge or are quoting the *ipsissima verba* of some reliable eye-witness. It must be borne in mind that Persia is a country where high mountains or vast expanses of desert separate many of the principal centres, such as Isfahan and Mashhad; in Nadir's days, communications between such centres was often slow and uncertain, particularly in times of crisis. It was consequently extremely difficult for anyone in, say, Isfahan, to obtain accurate information of the course of events in Mashhad, or *vice versa*.⁴ Wild

¹ See pp. 71 to 128 of Fraser's work.

² See pp. 152 to 213 of Fraser's work. I have been unable to ascertain what has become of the original MS. from which Fraser made his translation. It is not amongst Fraser's MSS. which are now in the Bodleian Library, and it is possible that he may have given it to his friend, Dr. Mead.

³ *Gombroon Diary*, 9th/20th February, 1737, in Volume IV of the *Persia and the Persian Gulf* records of the East India Company, at the India Office.

⁴ Cf. the comment of the Agent at Gombroon on some astonishing rumour that was current in that town in October, 1739: "It is certainly impossible to allow of the Truth of any Report in this Country without Visible Proof" (*Gombroon Diary*, 20th-31st October, 1739).

rumours were often current, and these were not infrequently accepted as statements of fact.

Since Nadir spent but little time in Isfahan between 1729 and 1733, it is probable that Cockell had to compile his *Account*, in part at any rate, from statements by persons who were, in fact, but ill-qualified to give him information. It is unlikely that he derived much, if indeed any, data from Nadir himself; during his tenure of office at Isfahan, the relations between him and Nadir were, except at the outset, not of a cordial nature.

But though one is bound to comment somewhat adversely upon Cockell's *Account*, one can accept as absolutely reliable and of great interest and value his *Personal Description and Character of Nadir Shah* which is also included in Fraser's book.¹ It is of interest to compare this delineation of Nadir's personal appearance and character with that furnished by the Chevalier de Gardane, who was French Consul at Isfahan from 1727 to 1730.²

Of Fraser's translations³ of the various letters in Persian and of the *Journal* of Mirza Zaman Khan it is unnecessary to say more here than that they afford some additional information of the Indian campaign, and of the events at Delhi during Nadir's stay there in 1739.

IV. JEAN OTTER.

Otter's *Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, avec une Relation des expéditions de Tahmas Koulikhan*, was published in Paris in 1748, the year in which he died; it is not, apparently, known whether the book appeared before or after his death, which occurred on the 26th September.⁴

Otter states in his preface that he derived his information for the historical part of his work from MS. memoirs and from conversations which he had had with "well-informed persons." From 'Abdu'l-Baqi Khan, the Persian Ambassador to the Porte and members of his suite (in whose company Otter travelled from Constantinople to Persia in 1736/7), as well as from persons in Isfahan and elsewhere, he obtained a number of details regarding the life of Nadir Shah. He claims that his account of Nadir's expeditions, particularly that to India, was based upon the statements of actual eye-witnesses, and was, moreover, confirmed by "une Relation en Langue Persane écrite à Dilli l'an 1153 de l'hégire" (this 'Relation' cannot now be traced). Otter's description of Nadir's origin, his being dispossessed of Kalat by his uncle, his first military success and subsequent disappointment, etc., follows Cockell's account in Fraser's *Nadir Shah* so closely that (although he does not acknowledge it) much of it must have been taken from that book.⁵

¹ See pp. 227-234.

² See the remarks in Section V below on La Mairie-Clairac and his authorities.

³ As regards Fraser's knowledge of Persian, the following extract from the *Surat Diary and Consultations*, Vol. XXIV, p. 59 (dated 31st December, 1739), is of interest: "The Chief having requested of Mr. Fraser who is well versed in the Persian Language to translate our Phirmand (farman) as very often in transacting Business at the Durbar we are at a loss for a just Explanation of some things, the Translates of which were before in the Office not being so exact as this which Mr. Fraser has now translated . . ." (the text of his translation is then given).

⁴ *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, Paris, 1862, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 953.

⁵ See Fraser, pp. 71-83, and Otter, Vol. I, pp. 298-302.

This part of Otter's work, like his description of the Indian expedition, is neither very accurate nor of much interest. The most valuable portion of his book is his description of what he actually saw and heard himself. He relates in a graphic way his experiences on the journey from Turkey to Isfahan, his stay for over a year and a half in that city, his journey to Basra and his return to France through Mesopotamia. Being an accomplished linguist, he could talk freely to all the people with whom he came into contact; his conversations with the peasants in Persia reveal the terrible state of misery to which, even at that time (1739), Nadir's ceaseless exactions had reduced them. He has much to say in regard to Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, his methods of keeping the Arab tribes in check, and his relations with Nadir Shah.

Except as regards Basra and the vicinity, Otter's published work is of decidedly less importance as a source of information respecting the Gulf than the *Gombroon Diary* and the letters of the East India Company's representatives.

The Bibliothèque Nationale possesses two copies of Otter's *Journal* and a number of other documents in manuscript, which are quite distinct from his published work; these MSS. contain some further information of value regarding Nadir Shah, the history of the Persian Gulf at that time, and the affairs of the *Campagne des Indes*.

On Otter's return from the East in 1744, he was given the post of interpreter at the Bibliothèque du Roi and that of Professor of Arabic at the Académie des Inscriptions. J. P. de Bougainville, the author of the *Parallèle* between Alexander and Nadir Shah, had a high opinion of Otter, whose work he utilised largely when compiling his own. Interesting details of Otter's career are given by Monsieur Omont in his *Missions Archéologiques françaises en Orient aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1902), pp. 680-683, 760-766 and 786.

V. LA MAMYE-CLAIRAC.

The *Histoire de Perse, depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle* by Louis André de la Mamye-Clairac (Paris, 1750) is a remarkably well-arranged and carefully prepared work. Although the author was never nearer Persia than Constantinople (where he was from 1724 to 1727), he obtained through the friends whom he made there and through French diplomatic and consular officials¹ of his acquaintance a large amount of data relating to Persia.² The greater part of his book is concerned with the Afghan revolt and invasion and other occurrences previous to Nadir's rise into prominence; the author's actual narrative comes to an end with the year 1730, so that there is but little therein respecting Nadir. In the latter part of his third volume, entitled *Mémoires pour la Continuation de cette Histoire*, he publishes, however, a number of letters and reports which he had obtained through the good offices of his diplomatic and other friends; these documents bring his record of events (with some gaps) up to the year 1739. One of the most interesting of these documents is the

¹ He knew, amongst others, that astute diplomatist the Marquis de Bonnac, M. d'Andrezel, the Marquis de Villeneuve and the brother of the last-named.

² La Mamye-Clairac also utilised a number of works such as du Cercean's version of Krusinski's *Memoirs*, the *Relation* of Père Reynald, the *Relazioni della Rivoluzione di Persia* (which I have not seen), by the Sieur Joseph, a Georgian who was interpreter at the French Consulate at Isfahan, etc.

*Extrait de la Relation de M. le Chevalier de Gardane.*¹ De Gardane, like Cockell, came into contact with Nadir after the last-named had driven out the Afghans from Isfahan and had occupied the city for Shah Tahmasp. The Chevalier gives, in this *Extrait*, a most favourable account of Nadir's character and attainments, which should be read in conjunction with that given by Cockell.²

Amongst the other documents may be mentioned:—

- (i) Lettre sur Tahmas-Kouli-Kan, écrite de Constantinople le 8 Septembre 1736. This letter gives a brief and not inaccurate outline of Nadir's humble origin and of his rise to prominence, besides mentioning his friendly attitude towards some French Capucin monks; the information in this letter was, it is stated, obtained from an Armenian merchant who knew Nadir personally.³
- (ii) Sundry reports and letters relating to the campaign in Mesopotamia in 1733, including translations of reports by Ahmad Pasha and Topal Osman Pasha.⁴
- (iii) An account of the conquest of India, based upon a French translation of the *Verdadeira Noticia*,⁵ by a French adventurer named de Voulton,⁶ as well as on some letters from that individual.

La Mamyé-Clairac took great pains to indicate his sources, prefacing every section of his work with bibliographical details.

La Mamyé-Clairac died on the 6th May, 1750, the year in which his *Histoire de Perse* was published. Despite his interest in Persia, he wrote no other book regarding it, his time being, it seems, fully occupied with his duties as a military engineer and with the preparation of works on that subject.⁷

VI. JONAS HANWAY.

Hanway has long been regarded as the principal English authority on the subject of Nadir Shah,⁸ and his *Travels*⁹ has been quoted very extensively by subsequent writers, both British and foreign.

¹ Vol. III, pp. 105-109 (see p. 42 note 1, and p. 47 above).

² See Fraser, pp. 227-234.

³ Vol. III, pp. 339-347.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 300-311.

⁵ I contributed to the *Bulletin* of the School of Oriental Studies, Vol. IV, Part II, pp. 223-245, an annotated translation of the Portuguese text (published in Lisbon in 1740) of de Voulton's *Noticia*; according to that text, the original was in Persian. When I made that translation I did not know that La Mamyé-Clairac had utilised the *Noticia*.

⁶ Cultru, in his *Dupleix : ses Plans, Politiques ; sa Disgrâce : Etude d'Histoire Coloniale*, Paris, 1901, p. 175, gives some details of de Voulton's interesting career; further information on the subject is to be found in a letter from Robert Orme to Lord Holderness dated the 11th March, 1755 (see p. 274 of the Orme MSS, in the India Office Library).

⁷ Only the first part of one of these works appears to have been published. It appeared seven years after the author's death, and was entitled *L'Ingénieur de Campagne, ou Traité de la Fortification Passagère* (Paris, 1757); death supervened before La Mamyé-Clairac could complete the second part. An English translation of the completed portion of *L'Ingénieur de Campagne* was subsequently published in London.

⁸ Dr. Samuel Johnson, however, had no great opinion of Hanway. After the appearance of Hanway's penderous book, *An Eight Days' Journey from London to Portsmouth*, the Doctor remarked: "Jonas acquired some reputation by travelling abroad, but lost it all by travelling at home" (Boswell's *Johnson*, Vol. II, 122). Johnson's animosity had really been aroused by Hanway's *Essay on Tea* (the Doctor was not altogether consistent, for he had a great admiration for the well-known Scottish physician and wit, Dr. John Arbuthnot, who, like Hanway, looked upon tea-drinking as pernicious).

⁹ First published in London in 1753 in four volumes. The references in this book are to the first edition.

When one subjects Hanway's work to careful analysis, one finds, however, that it is unequal in quality. While all that he writes of his own personal experiences and his citations from the journals and statements of others, recording what they themselves underwent or witnessed, are most worthy of attention, the same cannot in every case be said of many of his statements which were founded on previous works or on information which he had obtained orally from other persons.

He writes most graphically of his adventures during the Astarabad rebellion,¹ and his description of Nadir's camp, which he afterwards visited in order to seek redress for his losses, is most interesting. He never, however, held converse with Nadir, of whom he only caught a fleeting glimpse on one occasion.²

It is most fortunate that Hanway thought fit to give extracts in his work from the journals of Elton, Woodroffe, Thompson and van Mierop, as it is highly probable that, had he not done so, little or none of their contents would have been preserved.

Hanway devotes nearly the whole of his third volume to the history of the twenty years preceding Nadir's rise to prominence, but this account, far from being the result of original research, is merely an abridged translation of what La Mamyre-Clairac had already written³; moreover, much of the usefulness of the French original has been sacrificed by the suppression of the greater part of the bibliographical notes. Considering the extent to which Hanway made use of La Mamyre-Clairac's *Histoire*, his acknowledgment to that writer seems most inadequate.⁴

Hanway's principal sources for Nadir's career up to the end of the Indian campaign are Fraser (or rather Cockell) and Otter. For the years 1741 to 1744 he gleaned much valuable data from Elton, Bazin and other Europeans whom he met in Persia, and he likewise obtained some information from Persians. For the last three years of Nadir's life, he probably obtained most of his data from those of his associates who remained in Persia after his departure. Some of his information was derived from Dr. John Cook, of Edinburgh, who was attached to the embassy under Prince M. M. Golitzin, which the Empress Elizabeth sent to Persia in 1746.⁵

Despite the fact that his book contains a number of mistakes and that it was not based upon any reliable Oriental source like the *Ta'rikh-i-Nadiri*, it is a remarkable piece of work. He punctuates his narrative with many shrewd remarks, and gives what is, on the whole, a very just appreciation of Nadir's character. He is a most important authority for the history of the

¹ *Travels*, Vol. I, pp. 192-219.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 243.

³ In Hanway's third volume. Parts II to V correspond to the first volume of La Mamyre-Clairac's *Histoire*, while Parts VI to VIII correspond to the second volume of that work.

⁴ See p. xii of his introduction, in Vol. I.

⁵ Dr. Cook lent Hanway his journal, extracts from which Hanway published in his first Volume (see pp. 360 to 378 and 385 to 391). Cook, in his subsequent work, *Voyages and Travels through the Russian Empire, Tartary and part of the Kingdom of Persia* (Edinburgh, 1770), Vol. II, pp. 299-301, severely criticises Hanway, particularly the latter's attitude towards Elton. Though some of Cook's criticisms are justified, he goes, on the whole, too far; the chief reason for his rancour was that Hanway, after including much of his (Cook's) journal, had added " Jesuitical fables " (i.e., statements by Bazin). As Cook put it, Hanway " ought to have considered the difference there is between a man of honour, who hates a lie, and a Jesuit, a man whose principles are subversive of society."

British trade with Persia via Russia, but his bias against Elton must be taken into account. His chronology, though not perfect, is far superior to that of Jones.

VII. PERE BAZIN, S.J.

Louis Bazin was born at Avranches on the 24th May, 1712. In January, 1731, he entered upon his noviciate, and, four years later, having completed his theological studies and obtained some knowledge of medicine, he left France for Persia.¹ From 1741 Bazin followed Nadir's career with close attention. Hanway met him at Resht in February, 1744,² and again at Lahijan in the following August; on the latter occasion Bazin gave Hanway some medical treatment.³ In December, 1746, he was appointed chief physician to Nadir, and remained with him until his assassination. In February, 1751, he was at Bandar 'Abbas, waiting for a ship to take him to France. In 1767 he went to China; he died at Peking on the 15th March, 1774.

Two letters which Bazin wrote at Bandar 'Abbas on the 2nd February, 1751, to Père Roger, the Procureur-Général des Missions du Levant, have been published in the *Lettres Edifiantes*⁴ and also in the *Missions du Levant*. In the first of these letters he described rather briefly Nadir's career up to the beginning of the Lazgi campaign in 1741; from that point onwards his narrative is far more detailed, and, in view of his special position at the court during the last six months of Nadir's life, it is of great interest and value for that period. Bazin's tent was pitched next to the one in which the Shah was sleeping on the night of the 20th June, 1747, and the Jesuit narrowly escaped with his life in the turmoil that followed Nadir's assassination. A sketch-plan by Bazin of Nadir's camp is reproduced in the *Lettres Edifiantes*. In his second letter, he described subsequent events in Persia up to the execution of 'Adil Shah in 1749.

Although Bazin was unquestionably an important authority for Nadir's reign, he has been severely criticised not only by Cook, but also by the learned Langlès; the latter accused him of extreme partiality towards Nadir and of passing over without a word the Shah's horrible intention of putting the Persians in his army to death; Langlès concluded his remarks by saying:

"Le silence de ce missionnaire ne peut balancer les autorités que je viens de citer (Hanway, Mirza Mahdi and 'Abdu'l-Karim); il sert seulement à caractériser l'esprit jésuitique et sacerdotale."⁵

While Langlès is justified in calling attention to Bazin's omission of any reference to Nadir's terrible project, he ignores the fact that he, elsewhere in his account, did not hesitate to mention some acts of appalling cruelty of which

¹ These scanty details are taken from Volume I of the *Catalogue de la Compagnie de Jésus* by the Fathers Augustin and Aloys de Backer.

² Hanway, Vol. I, p. 225.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 325.

⁴ Published in Vol. IV, pp. 277-333 (Paris, 1780).

⁵ See Langlès's *Notice Historique de la Perse*, on p. 124 in Vol. II, of *Voyages de la Perse dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1788.

Nadir was guilty. As for Cook, his animus against the Jesuit was actuated merely by religious bigotry.

VIII. SERGEI SOLOVIEV.

Although Soloviev belongs to a much later age than that of Nadir, his inclusion in this Appendix is amply justified by the large amount of contemporary material which he found in the Russian official archives and utilised in the compilation of those portions of his *Istoriya Rosii* that relate to Russo-Persian relations during the period under review.

Soloviev carefully studied the mass of reports from the Russian diplomatic, consular and military representatives stationed in Persia or on its borders. Of especial interest are the numerous reports from Kalushkin, who succeeded Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin as Russian Resident at Nadir's court in 1735.

Soloviev's history is also of importance in regard to the British trade with Persia via Russia and the Elton controversy.

IX. MARIE-FÉLICITÉ BROSSET.

Brosset, like Soloviev, belonged to a later generation, but he also worked in the official archives at Moscow and made much use of contemporary material. His chief claim to fame, of course, is his great *Histoire de la Géorgie*, in which the translations of the histories of Sekhnia Chkheidze, the Tsarevich Vakhush, and Papouna Orbelian are, *inter alia*, given. These histories contain a great deal of information respecting the Georgian connection with Persia during Nadir's period. Brosset also includes a translation of the interesting letter regarding Nadir's invasion of India which Irakli of Georgia wrote to his sister Anna when on his way back from Delhi in 1739¹; and there are some details of Nadir's relations with King Taimuraz and Irakli in Brosset's translation of Oman Kherkhoulidze's *Life of Irakli*,² and in his *Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la Géorgie*.³

Lastly, mention must be made of Brosset's translation of the most valuable first-hand account by the Armenian Catholicos, Abraham of Crete, of the events immediately preceding Nadir's coronation and of the coronation ceremony itself.⁴

X. VON HAMMER-PURGSTALL.

The excellence of von Hammer's *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* needs no emphasizing in these pages. Thanks to von Hammer, the accounts by the official Turkish historiographers and other writers of Nadir's campaigns

¹ See *H. de la G.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 354-363.

² See *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 205-210.

³ Published at St. Petersburg in 1841, in *Mémoires, Sciences et Politiques*, VIth series, Vol. V, pp. 165-315.

⁴ See Brosset's *Collection d'Historiens Arméniens*, St. Petersburg, 1876, Vol. II, pp. 239-338.

against Turkey and his diplomatic relations with that country, have been made easily accessible to European readers. Von Hammer's exhaustive researches have resulted in the assembling of a fairly complete mosaic of the history of the period, as seen, for the most part, from the Turkish angle. It is natural that, not having access to many Persian and other non-Turkish sources which are now available, von Hammer should fall into some errors,¹ but these are, comparatively speaking, very few and far between.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS.

In addition to the contemporary European sources mentioned above, a considerable number of articles and books respecting Nadir appeared in Europe during his life-time, some of which were based upon a very flimsy foundation of fact, while others were sheer fantasy. The German writer, who called himself "Pithander von der Quelle," states that stories were current between 1734 and 1736 that Nadir was, variously, French, German, English and Brabançon by origin,² while others made out that he was Scottish or Irish (his then title of Tahmasp Quli Khan led one ingenious person to suppose that he was originally an Irishman named Thomas O'Kelly who had, on going to Persia, changed his name to "Tahmas Kuli").³

Mention is made in the Bibliography of the books on Nadir by de Claustre, du Cerceau, Le Margne and others.

One of the first Europeans to meet Nadir was the Greek traveller, Basil Batatzes, who claimed to have had several "secret conversations" with the future conqueror at Mashhad, apparently in 1728. Batatzes states that when he left Mashhad, Nadir handed him a *farman* and a sum of money to defray his travelling expenses, and gave him some messages for General Levashev, the commander of the Russian forces in Gilan at that time.

Batatzes abstains from giving any detailed description of Nadir, and his exploits, because, he says, he has already done so in a detailed biography. This work has now, however, disappeared; it was read by D. D. Philippides in 1809, who, seven years later, published his recollections of it in his *Ἱστορία τῆς Ρουμανίας* with the sub-title: *Τὰ μνημονεύοντα τῆς ἡδὴ προ ἔστα ἱκανῶν ἀναμνηστικῆς ἡμῶν Ἱστορίας τοῦ σιαχ Nadir συντεθείσης παρὰ τοῦ βατatzῆ βιβαντιοῦ.*⁴

It is a mystery why Philippides waited seven years before committing these recollections to paper, and why, when he did do so, he included them in a history of Roumania.

I have not been able to examine Philippides's recollections,⁵ but Professor Minorsky, who has done so at the Bibliothèque Nationale, assures me that they are of little value.

¹ e.g., his confusion between the expedition of the Qalgha Fath Girai to Daghestan in 1733 and that of the Khan of the Crimea to the same country two years later.

² *Herkunft, Leben und Thaten des Persianischen Monarchen, Schach Nadyr Vormalis Kouli-Chan Ghanat*, Leipzig, 1738. This is the earliest complete work of any size on the subject of Nadir that I have been able to trace. As it is of no real importance as a source, I have not given its author a separate notice.

³ See *Nadir Shah*, the Stanhope Essay for 1885, by H. J. (now Sir Herbert J.) Maynard, Oxford, 1885, p. 11.

⁴ Published at Leipzig in 1816. See Vol. I, 2nd Part, 2nd Supplement, p. 22.

⁵ There is no copy of his *Ἱστορία τῆς Ρουμανίας* in the British Museum Library.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

A great deal of work yet remains to be done before it can be claimed that our knowledge of Nadir Shah and his times is reasonably complete.

There is a large amount of material in the archives and libraries at Moscow, Leningrad, Constantinople, Vienna and Paris that would well repay examination, but this would be a lengthy and arduous task; there may also be some material in Tehran and elsewhere in Persia.

Secondly, there are the records of the Dutch East India Company's representatives in Persia; these records, which are at The Hague, would enable one to supplement the valuable data contained in those of the English East India Company. So far as I am aware, these Dutch records have not, up to the present, been utilised as a source for Nadir's history.

Lastly, there may still be much to be gleaned in the contemporary press of various European countries. I have discovered a number of interesting references to Nadir in the London papers¹ from 1731 onwards, and there are, no doubt, similar discoveries to be made in the foreign press of the time. I have come across, but have not been able to follow up, references to articles in the *Gazette de Hollande*.

¹ *The Daily Post, The General Advertiser, The Daily Courant, The Daily Journal*, etc. I have had insufficient time to explore thoroughly the copies of these papers in the British Museum.

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¹ As the editor of the *Continuatio* has pointed out on p. 47 of Fasc. I of Vol. VIII of the *Analecta*, the late Sir H. Gollancz was in error in stating that his MS. of the earlier portion of the *Chronicle* was unique.

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
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



MAP SHOWING NADIR'S CAMPAIGNS

ROUTES FOLLOWED BY NADIR'S FORCES ON AFGHAN, INDIAN
AND TURKISTAN CAMPAIGNS SHOWN THUS



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