PESHWA MADHAV RAO I
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BY

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PREFACE

In this book an attempt has been made to describe in some detail the career of that remarkable Maratha ruler whom Grant Duff calls 'the greatest of the Peshwas'. The materials have been collected from contemporary Marathi, Persian, English and Portuguese sources, published and unpublished. Whether any fresh light has been thrown upon a vitally important period of our national history, it is for my readers to judge.

A detailed account of his campaigns against Haidar Ali must occupy a very prominent place in any exhaustive account of Madhav Rao's career, for this enterprising young Peshwa is justly regarded as the most formidable antagonist whom the ruler of Mysore had to meet on the battle field. If the Marathas failed to utilise Madhav Rao's repeated victories in the Carnatic, it was due to the troubles which arose after 1772. A substantial portion of this book deals with the Carnatic affairs.

In Chapter VI, I have tried to give, from the Maratha point of view, a consistent account of the restoration of Maratha hegemony in Northern India after 1761. It will be seen that Grant Duff was not wrong in his famous remark: "...the plains of Panniput were not more fatal to the Mahratta empire, than the early death of this excellent prince".

The value of Madhav Rao's successes in the Carnatic and in Northern India cannot be properly assessed unless they are scrutinised against the background of his relations with Raghunath Rao, Janoji Bhonsle, Nizam Ali, and the English authorities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. From these quarters the Peshwa received nothing but opposition, open or veiled, which, on more
than one occasion, burst out into open war. Had he been free from these troubles, he might have done more for the extension and consolidation of the Maratha Empire.

The concluding chapter deals briefly with some aspects of Madhav Rao’s administrative system, as well as the contemporary social and economic condition of Maharashtra. Instead of drawing a general picture of Maratha life during the second half of the eighteenth century, I have confined myself to those data which relate strictly to my period.

In concluding his masterly survey of the third battle of Panipat Sir Jadunath Sarkar observes, “A new scene now opened in the tragic drama of Maratha history, with its ‘Theban horrors’ of murder, suicide and the untimely death of the young”. The present work covers the first act of the tragedy. I propose to submit to the public another volume dealing with the ‘Theban horrors’ which followed Madhav Rao’s death, culminating in the accession of the last of the Peshwas. This period of Maratha history is, indeed, writ in tears and sorrows and suffering, not only for the Maratha people, but for the Indian nation as a whole. But the national mind is best irrigated by tears, and suffering is a necessary prelude to re-birth.

I shall not mention those friends and well-wishers without whose assistance and encouragement I could not have undertaken the study of Indian history. But I must acknowledge my pleasant debt to Dr. N. K. Sinha, Lecturer in History, Calcutta University, who kindly provided me with many useful materials and made my work lighter by constant encouragement and advice.

A. C. Banerjee
To
The Maratha People
In Homage To Their Greatness

“It has always been allowed, and that too with just reason, that nothing can reduce the Maratha power but dissension among themselves, and it is fortunate for the other Powers in Hindustan that the Maratha Chiefs are always ready to take every advantage of each other.”

—Madras Military Consultations, April 30, 1770.
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ABBREVIATIONS

1. S.P.D. — Selections from the Peshwa Daftar.
3. B.S.C.P. — Bengal Select Committee Proceedings.
5. Grant Duff — History of the Marathas.
7. Rajwade — Marathanchya Itihasachin Sadhansen.
9. C.P.C. — Calendar of Persian Correspondence.

N.B.—In the case of Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, numbers of volumes and letters are cited, unless pages are specifically mentioned.
PESHWA MADHAV TAO I

CHAPTER I

REGENCY OF RAGHUNATH TAO

The third battle of Panipat, which took place on January 14, 1761, is generally regarded as one of the most important landmarks in the history of the Maratha people. As Kashiraj Pandit, an eyewitness of the terrible combat, declares, "One may say that it was verily Doomsday for the Maratha people." Among those who fell were the Peshwa’s eldest son Vishwas Rao, his cousin Sadashiv Rao Bhau, Tukoji Sindhia, Jankoji Sindhia and many other prominent generals. On the field of battle were found 32 distinct heaps of the slain, the number of dead bodies being nearly 28,000. In addition to these, the ditch round the Maratha camp was full of dead bodies. About 22,000 prisoners were reduced to slavery by the victorious Afghans. About 50,000 horses and 500 elephants were captured.

The news of this unexpected disaster reached Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, then on his way to the North, at Bhilsa on January 24. An intercepted banker’s letter contained the

1 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 348. This sentence does not occur in Brown’s ‘unreliable translation’ edited by Rawlinson.
2 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 346-349.
3 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 359.
following statement: "Two pearls have been dissolved, twenty-seven gold moburs have been lost, and of the silver and copper, the total cannot be cast up".\(^1\) The Peshwa gave up his plan of going to the assistance of an army that was no more, and slowly retreated towards Poona, where he succumbed to his fatal illness on June 23.\(^2\) "It was a dismal sunset to the glorious noon of his father's and his own reign".\(^3\) This melancholy event naturally 'contributed to increase the general gloom which overhung the country'.\(^4\)

In this unprecedented crisis\(^5\) of their national life the Marathas naturally rallied round Raghunath Rao.\(^6\) He was the eldest surviving member of the Peshwa family. He was the leader of the great expedition which had culminated in the occupation of the Punjab in 1758. He was, therefore, regarded as the natural leader of the Maratha Empire in its hour of distress. Madhav Rao, the second son of the late Peshwa, then in his seventeenth\(^7\) year, was placed on the gadi with the approval of the

5. The debt of the Maratha Government at the time of Balaji's death was about one and half crores. Retrenchment naturally followed, and the abolition of the Peshwa's Zoo was one of the measures adopted by Raghunath Rao. (Khare, I, 55).
7. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 576) says that Madhav Rao was born in August, 1744, but Sardesai (*Riyasat, Madhya*, IV, p. 1) says that he was born on February 16, 1745. No information is available about the Peshwa's boyhood. The fact that he was not the heir-
nominal King of Satara.\textsuperscript{1} Raghunath Rao became Regent. Aba Purandare was made minister and \textit{mutalik}.\textsuperscript{2} For the time being it appeared that the Marathas were determined to close their ranks and to make an honest attempt to recover their power and political prestige. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Raghunath's ambition, coupled with the weakness of his character and his incurable tendency to be guided by the advice of others, stood in the way of this happy consummation.\textsuperscript{3}

Of all the enemies of the Marathas, the first to take advantage of their weakness after Panipat was the ruler of Haidarabad. The terms imposed by the Marathas on the Nizam after the battle of Udgir\textsuperscript{4} were so severe that it was not unnatural for him to try to reverse them. In January, 1761, he refused to join the Peshwa in his expedition to the North.\textsuperscript{5} The disaster of Panipat, followed by the Peshwa's death, provided for him an unexpected opportunity.

Even before Balaji's death the Nizam had begun to nego-

\textsuperscript{1} Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 533) says that the investiture at Satara took place towards the end of September, but Sardesai (\textit{Riyasat, Madhya}, IV, p. 2) says that it took place on July 20.

\textsuperscript{2} Sardesai, \textit{Riyasat, Madhya}, IV, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{3} See Sardesai, \textit{Riyasat, Madhya}, IV, p. 3. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 533) says, "Raghunath Rao, naturally fond of power, contemplated, with no small satisfaction, the prospect of gratifying his favourite inclination, during the minority of his nephew".

\textsuperscript{4} S.P.D., xxxx, 128.

\textsuperscript{5} Sarkar, \textit{Fall of the Mughal Empire}, Vol. II, p. 359.
tiate with his neighbours—the English,\(^1\) Murar Rao Ghorpade,\(^2\) Hanumant Rao Nimbalkar, the rulers of Kurnul, Kadapa and Savanur,\(^3\) and Ram Chandra Jadhav.\(^4\) He had also sent a large army to devastate the Peshwa’s territories. After the Peshwa’s death Nizam Ali\(^5\) became bolder. In June he came to Bidar with about 15,000 troops.\(^6\) In July he established a postal system between Bidar and Karmala, with the intention of extending it up to Poona,\(^7\) and moved his camp towards the Bhima.\(^8\) In August orders were issued from Poona, asking Maratha chiefs of different districts to hurry up with their contingents to the capital.\(^9\) Gopal Rao Patwardhan was asked by Raghunath Rao to engage 8,000 troops.\(^10\) About 70,000 troops were expected to be available, besides those supplied by Malhar Rao Holkar and Janoji Bhonsle.\(^11\) Instructions were issued to the commanders of the different forts to be prepared for the advancing army of the Nizam.\(^12\) Raghunath himself

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1 To the English he granted a sanad for an estate worth 52,000 buns, in return for which they were expected to send 2,000 gardis.

2 A jagir was promised to Murar Rao if he agreed to oppose the Peshwa.

3 S.P.D., xxxviii, 9, 10, 27.

4 Khare, I, 36, 38. Ram Chandra demanded 19 districts as the price of his assistance.

5 Nizam Ali was Salabat Jang’s brother and Dewan. He “had already usurped the entire powers of the government”. (Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 533. Compare S.P.D., xxxviii, 64, 73).

6 Khare, I, 36.

7 S.P.D., xxxviii, 14.

8 S.P.D., xxxviii, 15.

9 S.P.D., xxxviii, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26.


11 Khare, I, 43.

12 S.P.D., xxxviii, 23
proceeded towards the Godavari and the young Peshwa started on the Dasahara day.¹

In October Nizam Ali marched towards Poona with about 60,000 troops. The Marathas tried to prevent his advance, and skirmishes followed.² In November about 125,000 Maratha troops³ were collected. Nizam Ali destroyed the Hindu temples at Toka, a village upon the Godavari, and plundered Pravara Sangam.⁴ But the skirmishes forced on him by the Marathas destroyed the morale of his troops.⁵ Though his Muslim soldiers celebrated the destruction of the Hindu temples at Toka as a triumph,⁶ yet it deprived him of the services of Maratha chiefs like Ram Chandra Jadav, who refused to tolerate this insult on their religion and joined the Peshwa.⁷ Corn was very dear in his camp.⁸ Circumstances became so unfavourable to Nizam

¹ Khare, I, 42.
² Khare, I, 45, 46, 49. S.P.D., xxxviii, 35. Raghunath wrote to Gopika Bai, the Peshwa's mother, on October 26, "We shall follow guerrilla tactics for two months. Then our troops will come and we shall give open fight". (Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, pp. 7-8).
³ Khare, I, 52. The number seems to be exaggerated. Khare (I, p. 62) gives 70,000 to 80,000.
⁵ Khare, I, 50, 52.
⁸ S.P.D., xxxviii, 50, 54.
Ali that heated discussions were held in his camp about the course to be pursued. Some of his officers favoured peace, but others insisted on war and recommended that Haidar Ali should be asked for help.¹

Early in December Nizam Ali came near Poona. People fled from the capital to the hill forts for protection. Treasure was despatched to Purandhar where it was expected to remain safe from the Muslim plunderers. Good care was taken to keep the King well-guarded in the fort of Satara.² In the meanwhile engagements were going on and the artillery of the Marathas made havoc in the ranks of the Nizam’s troops.³ Gopal Rao Patwardhan remained in charge of these operations. Suspecting the existence of hidden treasure at Sindhia’s residence at Srigonda⁴ Nizam Ali moved his camp there and ordered his men to search carefully.⁵ Skirmishes with Bhonsle’s forces followed, leading finally to a decisive battle in January, 1762. The Maratha army, about 80,000 strong, was larger than Nizam Ali’s army. Raghunath Rao led the attack on his left; the Peshwa and Babuji Naik fired on his right. Towards the close of the battle the Marathas chased him from the rear. Nizam Ali was decisively defeated. He lost about 800 men, and more than 1,000 were wounded.⁶ Nightfall proved a blessing to him. Then he came to Urli and made overtures for peace. Although Babuji Naik, Gopal Rao Patwardhan, Ram Chandra Jadav

¹ S.P.D., xxxviii, 31.  ² S.P.D., xxxviii, 37, 39, 42.  ³ S.P.D., xxxviii, 40, 41.  ⁴ S.P.D., xxxviii, 43, 44.  ⁵ S.P.D., xxxviii, 43, 44.  ⁶ Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 7.
and Janoji Bhonsle asked Raghunath Rao to take this opportunity of crushing the power of the Nizam, he was not willing to do so, for he was already anticipating a struggle for power with his young nephew. Sakharam Bapu advised him not to strengthen the young Peshwa by destroying the rivalry of Haidarabad. Raghunath Rao also knew that he could utilise Nizam Ali’s assistance in overcoming the opposition of sardars like Babuji Naik and Gopal Rao Patwardhan who were not favourably disposed towards him. So he decided to sacrifice the interest of the Maratha Empire to safeguard his own position. An accommodation took place between the parties in January, 1762.

The terms were so favourable to Nizam Ali that Babuji

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1 S.P.D., xxxviii, 29, 32. It seems that before this Janoji Bhonsle was inclined to join Nizam Ali. (S.P.D., xx, 122).
2 Compare S.P.D., xxxviii, 28, where the writer importunes the Peshwa to adopt stern measures against Nizam Ali and says, “If you conclude peace all sardars will rise against you, and you will lose your reputation”.
3 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 11.
4 Khare, I, pp. 73-74.
5 Khare, I, 48, says, “Raghunath says one thing in the morning and one thing in the evening. Sakharam Bapu wants that the Maratha State should be ruined”.
6 The terms cannot be definitely ascertained. In S.P.D., xxxviii, 59, we find that Nizam Ali agreed to make over to the Peshwa territory worth Rs. 124,000. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 536) says that “cessions to the amount of 27 lacks of rupees of annual revenue from Aurungabad and Beder, were relinquished by Rugonath Rao as the price of peace”. Sardesai (Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 9) says that the parties did not cede any territory to each other, although the Marathas agreed to give jagirs to Ram Chandra Jadav and Nasir Jang. The fort of Kopal was
Naik and Gopal Rao became extremely displeased.\(^1\) The former refused to serve the Peshwa as long as Sakharam Bapu remained chief minister. That astute minister characteristically tried to please both sides;\(^2\) but when he found that the young Peshwa was too shrewd to be deceived, he offered his resignation. This was nothing but a threat, for Sakharam believed that without his assistance the government could not be carried on.\(^3\) Raghunath Rao also expressed his desire to be relieved of his responsibility.\(^4\) Gopika Bai decided that Trimbak Rao Mama and Babu Rao Fadnis should act as ministers with Raghunath’s advice. The latter pretended that he was satisfied with this arrangement.\(^5\)

Although Raghunath Rao succeeded in defending the Peshwa’s dominions against so powerful an enemy at a moment of crisis in Maratha affairs, yet it must be recognised that he remained satisfied with a half-hearted campaign and an unfavourable peace. The military position was so favourable to him that in all probability he could have inflicted a severe defeat on Nizam Ali. In that case he could easily have secured considerable territorial concessions. It must also be remembered that Nizam Ali’s position at home was somewhat critical for he had actually handed over to the former. (Vad, I, 4). Jagirs were given to Murad Khan and Himat Khan, Nizam Ali’s officers. (Vad, I, 223).

1 Khare, I, 55, p. 74.
2 S.P.D., xix, 5. A partisan of Raghunath wrote to him, “Sakharam never understood that you are the elder between the two (Peshwas)”.
4 Khare, I, 54.
5 Khare, I, 56, p. 74.
not yet been able to eliminate Salabat Jang. Raghunath Rao undoubtedly betrayed the trust placed on him by refusing to take advantage of so good an opportunity. Khare says that his military success remained incomplete due to his lack of skill and weak leadership. This may have been the case, no doubt, although we may suspect that personal ambition to some extent crippled his military abilities. Khare emphasizes the importance of the rivalry between the Deshastha and Konkanastha Brahmins as a factor determining Raghunath’s policy. The facts at our disposal do not require to be explained in that way. It is enough to say that Raghunath wanted to secure a potential ally in his struggle for power at Poona, and tried to conciliate Nizam Ali by undeserved leniency.

The invasion of Nizam Ali synchronised with an important episode in the history of Anglo-Maratha relations. It was in the days of Baji Rao I that the officers of the East India Company at Bombay began to look upon the expansion of Maratha power with apprehension and jealousy. The repeated successes of Chinmaji Appa compelled the English factors ‘to tremble for their magazines’. They wrote to their friends in Bengal that the exploits of the Marathas involved ‘even our Hon’ble Masters’ island in danger’. The Portuguese invited the English

1 A Marathi letter dated July 27, 1761, refers to ‘severe friction’ between them. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 17).
2 Khare, I, pp. 63, 73-74.
3 Sardesai remarks, “It is said that during Madhav Rao and Narayan Rao’s regime, the Deshasthas and the Konkanasthas were at logger-heads, but this is not true at all. I can show members of both the castes ranging themselves strongly on opposite sides”. (Main Currents of Maratha History, p. 182).
to make common cause against 'the idolators and the common enemys to all European nations', but in vain. After the capture of Bassein by the Marathas the Bombay Council took measures to fortify the town of Bombay, and it is interesting to note that the principal merchants of the place, who thought that ‘a formidable power of the Marathas has subdued the neighbouring country and the invasion of this island is threatened’, subscribed the sum of Rs. 30,000 towards the expenses of this protective measure. Envoys were sent to Shahu as well as to Chimnaji Appa, and a treaty, conceeding to the English Company free trade in Maratha dominions, was signed on July 12, 1739. This understanding between the Marathas and the English was cemented in the days of Balaji Baji Rao, when measures were jointly taken by the two Powers for the suppression of ‘the pirate chief Angria’. Although the English politely refused Balaji Baji Rao’s request for help in his Carnatic and Northern expeditions, a new treaty¹ was concluded on October 12, 1756, which, besides securing certain commercial advantages, excluded the Dutch from the trade of the Maratha dominions and gave the English ten villages.² But the relations between the Peshwa and the English began to grow less and less cordial. In 1758 a Maratha envoy named Shambhaji Mangesh went to Bombay. We read in a Marathi letter that the ‘treacherous’ English gathered troops even when they were negotiating with

¹ Text of the treaty may be found in Aitchison’s Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnads, 1863, Vol. III, pp. 17-21.

him. 1 In 1759 an envoy was sent to the Peshwa from Bombay, but nothing came out of his mission inasmuch as the Peshwa refused to do anything unless the English helped him to take Janjira from the Siddi. 2 Towards the close of 1760 the Peshwa was informed by his agents that the English and the Dutch intended to join the Siddi against him. 3

The history of Peshwa Madhav Rao I's relations with the English should be studied against this background. The growing coolness between the Marathas and the English during the last years of Balaji Baji Rao naturally coloured the mutual relations of the two Powers even after his death. In July, 1762, Raghunath Rao wrote to Malhar Rao Holkar, "There are at present three great enemies to the state—Haidar Ali, Nizam Ali, and the English; but by God's grace, they will all be subdued". 4 It should be remembered in this connection that the successes won by the English in the Carnatic as well as in Bengal strengthened their position and made them more self-confident. On the other hand, the disaster of Panipat, the death of Balaji Baji Rao, the accession of a minor to the Peshwa's gadi, and Nizam Ali's invasion must have given the English factors a welcome impression about the future of the Maratha power. The Company's officers in Bombay were shrewd observers, and they were usually very well-informed about the strength and weakness of their neighbours. They observed in their Secret Consultation of December 14, 1761: "We well know that Nizam Ally is now near Poona, that the Bramins cannot raise a

1 S.P.D., xxxx, 109.
3 S.P.D., xxxx, 135.
4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 9.
force sufficient to oppose them, from the backwardness of their own officers (who look upon the situation of Nanna's family as desperate), and the low state of their finances; Tarra Boy (the Sow Rajah's widow) and all the Mahrattas at the bottom are against them, and would show it at a proper occasion".¹

Naturally the English merchants tried to exploit these difficulties of the Marathas as much as they could. The Marathas were compelled to act on the defensive, because Nizam Ali was near at hand. Raghunath Rao, 'being ill prepared to resist the expected invasion', tried 'to obtain from Bombay some European soldiers and guns'. An agreement was concluded on September 14, 1761, by the Bombay Government and Govind Shiv Ram on behalf of the Peshwa. It consisted of six articles.² Article 1 provided for the punishment of those Maratha officers who 'obstructed the business of the English by any impediments whatever'. Article 2 imposed on the Maratha Government the obligation of making 'ample satisfaction within two months from the date hereof, to all merchants trading under the Honourable Company's protection, who have suffered in their property by any unjust or illegal actions of the Maratha officers or subjects, in any place, shape or manner whatever', and of issuing 'rigid orders...that all assistance be afforded in future to any (English) vessel or vessels in distress'. Article III provided that all deserters from the service either of the British Crown or of the Com-

¹ Quoted by Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 535. Our information from Marathi sources, as referred to above, show that the factors took too dark a view about the position of the 'Bramins'.

² Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 534) wrongly says that it consisted of seven or eight articles.
pany should be 'immediately secured and returned to the nearest English Settlement', and that 'whatever people, Europeans of all nations excepted', who deserted from the service of the Peshwa should be similarly delivered up. Article IV provided for the restoration of the territory taken from the Siddi by Ramaji Pant, the Maratha Governor of the Konkan. Article V provided for the release of all prisoners taken by either side in the late engagement between the Siddi and Ramaji Pant. There was an additional article relating to the restoration of 'Underee Fort'. It is clear that this treaty embodied substantial concessions to the English and their ally (the Siddi), although the Marathas received nothing in return. So far as the attitude of the English is concerned, Grant Duff rightly describes this agreement as 'rather an assurance of civility and friendship than a definite treaty'. They merely sent an envoy to condole with Madhav Rao on his father's death; they did not agree to offset military aid.

Soon after the conclusion of this agreement Raghunath Rao sent Baji Gangadhar Pant to carry on negotiations with the Bombay Council. Madhav Rao himself wrote to the Council, "Send some Europeans in as short a time as possible". Baji Gangadhar Pant submitted the following proposals for the consideration of the Bombay Government:

3 Bombay Public Department Diary, Vol. 37, p. 672.
4 Bombay Public Department Diary, Vol. 37, pp. 720-721.
(1) The Bombay Government should send, on or before December 15, 1761, 2,000 European soldiers with 15 field pieces and all warlike stores required for their use. Every European soldier would receive Rs. 30 per month from the Maratha Government.

(2) On the arrival of 2,000 Europeans in Poona the Peshwa would present the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 to the Council.

(3) On the arrival of 2,000 Europeans in Poona the Peshwa would assign to the East India Company territories near Jambusir, yielding an annual revenue of Rs. 1,50,000.

(4) If the Peshwa succeeded in defeating the Haidarabad army, he would despatch the European troops to Bombay and present to the Council the sum of Rs. 2,00,000.

(5) If the Peshwa emerged victorious with the assistance of the European troops, he would cede to the East India Company territory worth Rs. 5,00,000 near Razbunder.

(6) The charges for carrying the field pieces should be paid out of Rs. 1,00,000 provided under clause 2.

(7) If peace was concluded between the Peshwa and the Nizam without fighting, the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 provided under clause 4 would be reduced to Rs. 1,00,000.

(8) The Peshwa would pay for powder, shots, etc., but if the number of European soldiers fell below 2,000, the sums provided as present would be reduced pro rata.

The members of the Bombay Council were convinced that without their assistance the Marathas would be ‘completely

Grant Duff does not give these details. He merely refers to the cession of Jambusir and ‘several other concessions’. (Vol. I, p. 535).
worsted' in the impending contest with Nizam Ali. So they pressed for the cession of Salsette and Bassein which, says Grant Duff,¹ were valuable 'not only on account of the advantages expected from the revenue, but as advanced positions essentially necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay.'² The Maratha Government sent the following reply through Ramaji Pant³:

1. If the Bombay Council sent 2,000 European troops and 15 field pieces with warlike stores and demanded no wages for them, and if these troops assisted the Peshwa in defeating Nizam Ali and in capturing Janjira, Salsette would be ceded to the Company.

2. 2,000 European troops, with guns, ammunition etc. should reach Poona within 15 days.

3. While in Maratha territory, European troops could kill fowls, goats, etc. for meat, but they should not meddle with other cattle.

4. One or two gentlemen of the Council should accompany the troops in order to take care that the artillery met with success.

5. The English would carry the guns at their own charge to the ghats, but the Maratha Government would provide carts and oxen.

6. If the European troops arrived before any decisive engagement took place, and met with success, the Maratha

² See Bombay Public Department Diary, Vol. 37, pp. 714, 768.
³ Bombay Secret and Political Department Diary, Vol. 7, pp. 121-123.
Government would comply with the promises made by Baji Gangadhar Pant.

(7) If the European troops arrived after the defeat of the Haidarabad army, the Maratha Government would only pay their wages from the day they set out from, to the day of their return to, Bombay.

(8) If the European troops returned to Bombay under the circumstances mentioned under clause 7, the Company should not expect anything from the Marathas.

(9) If Salsette was ceded, the English should not dismiss or obstruct the owners of land and the Deshmukhs and should allow their heirs to enjoy all the privileges conferred upon them in the Maratha regime.

(10) If the European troops took part in defeating the Haidarabad artillery, Salsette would be ceded to the Company.

Grant Duff describes these proposals as ‘extravagant and impertinent'.¹ The President of the Bombay Council refused even to consider them and expressed astonishment that an experienced and sincere friend of the Company like Baji Gangadhar Pant should have communicated them to him. Baji Gangadhar Pant admitted the justice of this mild rebuke and said that he was but an unwilling instrument for giving effect to his master’s wishes.²

About the same time the Bengal Council requested the Madras Council to support Nizam Ali against the Marathas. Letters were despatched from Calcutta to Salabat Jang and Nizam Ali, promising them British support against the Peshwa.³

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¹ Vol. I, p. 536. He does not mention the proposals.
² Bombay Political Department Diary, Vol. 7, pp. 121-123.
³ Bombay Political Department Diary, Vol. 8, p. 54.
The President of the Madras Council refused to accept this policy.¹

When Baji Gangadhar Pant communicated the sentiments of the Bombay Council to Poona, the Peshwa wrote to the President: "This year I having a great occasion for your help, you said that if I would give you Salsette, you would then come in. In this manner you wrote, which surprised me, because this could never be done. Though you are my friend, yet you desired the place which we have expended lakhs of rupees to get. It is well known that about Salsette lakhs of armies will go from hence."² Fortunately for the Marathas, they were able to avert Nizam Ali's attack without the assistance of English troops and guns. Madhav Rao wrote to the Bombay Council on January 17, 1762, "The Moghul is returned very distressed; peace is settled."³

After the conclusion of peace with Nizam Ali the young Peshwa accompanied his uncle in an expedition to the Carnatic. The history of this expedition will be narrated in the next chapter. After winning some successes against Haidar Ali the Peshwa returned to Poona during the rainy season of the year 1762. Even before the termination of the campaign disputes had arisen in the camp between Raghunath Rao and the ministers appointed by Gopika Bai, as a result of which the latter had returned to Poona. Gopika Bai tried to save the situation by keeping Babu Rao Fadnis near her and sending Trimbak Rao Mama to the camp. Raghunath Rao, determined not to co-

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¹ Bombay Political Department Diary, Vol. 8, p. 5.
² Bombay Political Department Diary, Vol. 9, p. 87.
³ Bombay Political Department Diary, Vol. 9, p. 87.
operate with him, returned to Poona, leaving the young Peshwa to manage affairs with the assistance of his mother’s nominee. At Poona Raghunath Rao began to mature his plans in consultation with Sakharam Bapu. These two veterans tried to strengthen themselves by attracting Malhar Rao Holkar to their side.¹

The young Peshwa was called upon to face this situation as soon as he returned from the Carnatic expedition. Grant Duff says that the quarrel between the Peshwa and his uncle was due to the former’s ‘desire to be admitted to a share in the administration’.² The Marathi evidence at our disposal clearly shows that Madhav Rao was determined not to offend his uncle.³ When Trimbak Rao Mama and Babu Rao Fadnis tried to make him promise that he should always support them against his uncle, he refused and said, “Raghunath Rao’s heart is clear, but he is ill-advised. That adviser should be removed”.⁴ That adviser was Sakharam Bapu.⁵ He was disliked by the Konkan party.⁶ Gopika Bai was anxious to secure for her son a legitimate share in the responsibility of administration.⁷ She knew that Sakhara-

¹ Khare, I, 59, 60, 61, 63.  
³ Khare (I, p. 91) says that he was too young and too weak to resist his mother, who wanted that he should play an active part in administration.  
⁴ Khare, I, 59. See also Khare, I, 55.  
⁵ He helped Raghunath in borrowing money, for the latter was in debt. (Khare, I, 55).  
⁶ Khare, I, 71, 73. In these letters the responsibility for the Panipat disaster is attributed to Sakharam, and he is compared to Sakuni, the notorious character in the Mahabharata.  
⁷ Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 537) says that there was ‘the strongest animosity’ between Gopika Bai and Anandi Bai (Raghunath’s wife)
ram was her greatest opponent, for the weak-minded Raghunath could do nothing without the assistance of this astute adviser. So she tried to curtail his influence with the help of some leaders of the Konkan party. Raghunath Rao naturally interpreted these efforts as a blow aimed against himself. An agreement between the two parties, concluded in June, 1762, proved unworkable. So in August he went to Wadgaon, taking Sakharam with him. In vain did Gopika Bai and her supporters try to bring him back.

The Rubicon was now crossed, and both sides prepared for an open conflict. Gopika Bai was supported by Trimbak Rao Mama, Babu Rao Fadnis, Gopal Rao Patwardhan, Ananda Rao Raste and Malhar Rao Holkar. The Poona treasury was full, nearly 50 lakhs of rupees having been accumulated. Troops were collected and ammunition was procured from the Patwardhan estate at Miraj. The moving spirit on the other side was

Taylor says that the hostility of Gopika Bai to Raghunath Rao arose primarily from the reproaches cast upon her by the latter in consequence of her addiction to licentious intrigues. (Forrest, *Selections from Bombay Records, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pt. ii*).

1 Khare, I, 48, 62.
2 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 537) says that, on the resignation of Sakharam and Raghunath, the Peshwa appointed Trimbak Rao Mama to act as Dewan, assisted by Gopal Rao Patwardhan, and Balaji Janardan (the famous Nana Fadnis) and Hari Pant Phadke to act as Karkuns.
3 S.P.D., xix, 6.
4 Khare, I, 68.
5 Khare, I, 68. Some chiefs, like Holkar, Visaji Pant and Ram Chandra Jadav, were secretly sympathetic to Raghunath. (Khare, I, p. 92).
6 Khare, I, 68.
7 Sakharam Bapu succeeded in seducing many troops, and his treachery infected even the Patwardhan contingent. (Khare, I, p. 92).
8 Khare, I, 74.
Sakharam Bapu who, finding that it was not possible for him to collect an army large enough to face the Peshwa’s supporters, tried to secure the assistance of Nizam Ali. Raghunath Rao thereupon went to Aurangabad and met Murad Khan, the governor of that city, in September. At this interview Sakharam Bapu, Naro Shankar and Vithal Shiv Deo were present. Nizam Ali sent troops and agreed to advance personally later on. Raghunath Rao proceeded towards Poona and looted Paithan. One of his commanders was sent with troops to Satara. Troops were, therefore, sent from Poona to protect the King and the fort. Janoji Bhonsle sympathised with Raghunath Rao and advanced with troops to assist him.

Towards the close of October the young Peshwa left the capital at the head of his troops and met his rebellious uncle on the banks of the Ghor river, where an engagement was fought on November 7. The result of the battle seems to have been unfavourable to the Peshwa, for he retreated and came to Alegaon on November 12. Raghunath Rao followed him and another battle ensued, in which the Peshwa could not avert defeat even by personal attendance and guidance. We are told

1 He imprisoned Salabat Jang in July, 1762, and murdered him about 15 months later. (Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 536).
2 S.P.D., xix, 7, 11.
3 S.P.D., xix, 13; xxxviii, 67.
4 Khare, I, p. 93.
5 Khare, I, 86.
6 Khare, I, 86, p. 133.
7 S.P.D., xx, 129-132.
8 Khare, I, 85, 89, p. 127.
9 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 538) says that the Peshwa’s army, ‘being very inferior, immediately gave way’. Khare (Vol. I, pp. 135-136) says that there were two engagements on the banks of the Ghor river, in the first of which Raghunath’s attack was repulsed with great effort.
that this defeat was due to the treacherous flight of some sardars seduced by Sakharam Bapu. At night the Peshwa crossed the Bhima. He was pursued and overtaken by Raghunath Rao. The Peshwa was suffering from fever. His troops had no food for two days.¹ Nizam Ali and Janoji Bhonsle were coming to support his opponent. As Grant Duff says, “every appearance indicated the probability of a great revolution in the Poona government”.² At this crisis the young Peshwa, “with remarkable foresight and decision, immediately resolved on throwing himself into the power of his uncle, as the only means of preventing a complete division in the state”.³ His supporters agreed with him, and in order to facilitate a reconciliation between the uncle and the nephew, Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Babu Rao Fadnis left the camp.⁴

A contemporary news-letter⁵ gives us a vivid picture of the meeting between Madhav Rao and Raghunath Rao. The former appeared in the latter’s tent with 200 guards, saluted, and placed his shoe on his head.⁶ The uncle’s heart softened, and he said, “Everything is yours. I do not want anything”. He only demanded four forts.⁷ Nothing, however, could conceal the fact

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¹ Khare, I, 90, 91, 92, 95.
⁴ Khare, I, 91.
⁵ S.P.D., xix, 14. See also Khare, I, 92.
⁶ Madhav Rao wrote to his mother, “With tears in my eyes I satisfied uncle.” (Khare, I, 94).
⁷ This contemporary account should be preferred to Grant Duff’s statement that the Peshwa was placed in confinement by Raghunath. (Vol. I, p. 538).
that the triumphant uncle had now become the supreme authority in the Maratha Empire.¹

In the mean while Nizam Ali had arrived and it was necessary to conciliate him. As the price of his alliance Raghunath had promised to cede to him territories yielding an annual revenue of 5½ lakhs, including the forts of Daulatabad, Shivneri, Asirgarh and Ahmednagar. Although Nizam Ali ‘affected great satisfaction’ at the reconciliation already effected, he was not prepared to surrender his claim. So Raghunath issued orders for the surrender of territories specified above, but eventually only the fort of Daulatabad changed hands.²

Raghunath then proceeded to punish those officers and sardars who had incurred his displeasure by supporting the Peshwa. Sakharam Bapu and Nilkantha Mahadeva Purandare were appointed principal ministers.³ The former received the fort of Simbagarh⁴ and a jagir of nine lakhs,⁵ while the latter received the fort of Purandhar⁶ which had for more than half a century been ‘carefully retained’ in the Peshwa’s family.⁷ Babu Rao Fadnis was dismissed⁸ and his post offered to Chinto Vithal.

¹ Khare, I, 94. The evidence of this contemporary letter seems to be more natural and reasonable than that of another contemporary letter (S.P.D., xix, 14) which states: “In the end Raghunath understood that he had been deprived of all power and took to snān-sāndhyā”. The incidents related below clearly show that the uncle had become the master of the situation.

⁴ Khare, I, 104.
⁶ Khare, I, 104.
⁸ Khare, I, p. 137.
Raghunath also dismissed Srinivas Gangadhar (more commonly known as Bhawan Rao) from the post of Pratinidhi and conferred that office on his own infant son Bhaskar Rao. Naro Shankar, one of his ardent supporters, became the infant’s Mutalik.\footnote{Grant Duff, Vol. I, pp. 538-539.} Bhaskar Rao died after three months; then Naro Shankar himself became Pratinidhi.\footnote{Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 122.} Grant Duff rightly says, “These changes occasioned much discontent”.\footnote{Vol. I, p. 539.} The feelings of the Poona society were reflected in a remarkable letter written to Raghunath by the Brahmans of the city.\footnote{Khare, I, 102.} They accused him of accentuating the family feud, bringing in the Yavana invader (i.e., Nizam Ali), putting Muslim guards in Gopika Bai’s house, giving territory to Nizam Ali, banishing loyal officers and listening to the evil counsel of Sakharam Bapu. No more elaborate charge-sheet could have been framed.

Raghunath’s next victim was Gopal Rao Patwardhan of Miraj, who had taken a prominent part in the struggle against him. Raghunath asked him to surrender his jagir. He refused to do so and prepared for resistance. He tried to find a shelter for his family in Haidar Ali’s dominions, but failed. Then he sent his family to Bankapur, which was under his own control. He collected troops. Civilians began to leave Miraj in apprehension of hostilities. With about 50,000 troops Raghunath came to Miraj and raised batteries against the fort. The Peshwa accompanied him.\footnote{Khare (I, pp. 211, 213, 215) says that the Peshwa heartily supported this attack on Gopal Rao, personally supervised the assaults.} The attack on the fort was repulsed by
Gopal Rao's aged father, Govind Hari Patwardhan. In the mean while Gopal Rao himself had been defeated by Aba Purandare, one of Raghunath's followers, who plundered his camp and occupied his posts in the Carnatic. Gopal Rao fled to Nizam Ali, who promised to send troops for the defence of Miraj. Gopal Rao conveyed the news to his father, who was resisting the Peshwa with only 1,200 men inside the fort. But Nizam Ali was not yet prepared for an open breach with the Poona authorities. Gopal Rao then sought for Janoji Bhonsle's intervention, but here also he was disappointed. Still he continued to send letters to his father, saying that he was coming with troops, and asking him to prolong resistance. But courage alone cannot save a besieged fortress. Day by day parts of the fort wall were being destroyed. At last the garrison refused to obey Govind Hari's orders. The helpless old man was then compelled to surrender the fort. The Peshwa promised to pay Gopal Rao's debt and appointed a new Killadar to take charge of the fort. Then the victorious army left Miraj.¹

At this stage it is necessary to turn our attention once again to the activities of Nizam Ali. Those Maratha chiefs who had suffered at Raghunath Rao's hands did not consider it unpatriotic to invoke the Muslim ruler's assistance. Vithal Sundar, Nizam Ali's Dewan, served as the intermediary in these negotiations. Gopal Rao Patwardhan, Bhawan Rao Pratinidhi, Piraji Naik

and once fasted in sorrow and anger because a severe attack had been repulsed.

¹ Khare, I, 105-179.
Nimbalkar,¹ Ram Chandra Jadav and Gamaji Yamaji² were the chief allies of Nizam Ali, and they were soon joined by Janoji Bhonsle.³ In February, 1763, an agreement⁴ was concluded. Janoji was to be made Regent for the King of Satara;⁵ all estates taken from the allied sardars by Raghunath were to be restored. In return Nizam Ali was to get back all territories on his side of the river Bhima and to receive 60 per cent. of the tribute realised in the campaign (the remaining 40 per cent. being given to Janoji Bhonsle). Nizam Ali, 'whose duplicity rendered him true to no plan', desired to have 'an eventual competitor' to Janoji Bhonsle 'in reserve', and carried on secret negotiations with Kolhapur.⁶

When all arrangements were complete, Nizam Ali proceeded⁷ along the banks of the Bhima towards the Sholapur district. He sent to the Peshwa a list of his demands: (1) restoration of all territories on the other side of the Bhima; (2) restoration of jagirs to sardars who were his allies; and (3) acceptance by the Peshwa of ministers nominated by him. The Peshwa had already

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¹ S.P.D., xxxviii, 75.
² Gamaji was a relative of Vithal Sundar. (Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 122).
³ Khare, I, p. 279. S.P.D., xxxviii, 79, 83. Janoji's explanation was as follows: "This year I had no money, but still I employed troops for the Peshwa's service. Then came the treaty with the Nizam, and I was disregarded. Now I have to pay the troops. So I have joined the Nizam".—S.P.D., xx, 136. See also S.P.D., xx, 137.
⁷ S.P.D., xxxviii, 77.
marched towards the Carnatic from Miraj. His intention was to suppress Haidar Ali, but Nizam Ali’s impertinent message compelled him to retrace his steps. There was a sincere reconciliation between the uncle and the nephew when they were confronted by so serious a crisis. Those sardars who had so long opposed the Peshwa and supported Raghunath now suspended their hostility to the former.²

The crisis was serious indeed. Nizam Ali was supported by Janoji Bhonsle and some powerful Maratha sardars, but the Peshwa and his uncle were quite unprepared, and about 25,000 Maratha troops had deserted to the other side. Malhar Rao Holkar³ and Damaji Gaikwad were present in the Peshwa’s camp. As the Peshwa’s army was not strong enough to give battle to Nizam Ali’s undivided force, it was decided to avoid an open engagement, to plunder the territories of the Nizam and Bhonsle, and thus to compel them to turn back.

According to this plan the Peshwa entered Berar towards the close of February, 1763. Nizam Ali had encamped at Aurangabad. Janoji Bhonsle requested him to prevent the Peshwa from plundering his dominions. Nizam Ali agreed and accompanied Bhonsle to Berar. But they could do nothing, for the swift army of the Peshwa deliberately avoided open engagements. Nizam Ali then returned to Aurangabad; he found to his cost

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¹ S.P.D., xxxviii, 83.
² Khare, I, pp. 280-281. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 540) says that Raghunath ‘derived the greatest assistance from his nephew’.
³ Holkar did not take any active part in the campaign before the Peshwa promised to give him a jagir worth 10 lakhs. (Khare, I, 184, 193, 205, 212, 213).
that it was impossible to pursue running Marathas. Advised by Janoji Bhonsle to ravage the Peshwa’s territories, he now decided to march towards Poona.¹

Nizam Ali’s army was now divided into three parties. One of them was taken by Nizam Ali himself towards Poona. Another, under the leadership of Gamaji Yamaji, proceeded towards Satara to take possession of the fort and the King.² Another remained behind.

Nizam Ali’s approach naturally created a panic in Poona. People fled in all directions, some going as far as Bombay.³ The Peshwa’s family and the State papers were sent to the fort of Simhagadh.⁴ One of Bhonsle’s officers “advanced so rapidly, that some of the property belonging to the fugitives was taken, the village below Singurh was set on fire by his troops and many manuscripts and State papers, illustrative of Mahratta history, were totally destroyed”.⁵ Vinayak Das, one of Nizam Ali’s commanders, plundered Nasik.⁶

Early in May, 1763, Nizam Ali encamped near Poona. Naro Appaji, one of the Peshwa’s officers, agreed to pay him one lakh of rupees if he spared the city. News arrived in the mean while that the Peshwa had plundered Haidarabad and burnt

² Khare, I, 229, 262, 263, 264, 268.
⁴ S.P.D., xxxviii, 85, 86, 96, 97. Vad, I, 79, 80. S.P.D., xxxviii, 111, says that Simhagadh saved itself by paying Rs. 1,35,000 to Vinayak Das. In Vad, I, 19, we find that Nizam Ali received Rs. 1,30,000 when he came near Simhagadh ‘for his leaving the country’.
⁶ Khare, I, 240, 249.
Bidar. Nizam Ali became angry and decided to retaliate on Poona.\(^1\) The city was plundered; many buildings, including temples, were broken.\(^2\) Nizam Ali then proceeded towards Purandhar and ravaged the country as far as the Bhima.\(^3\) He was joined by Gamaji Yamaji, who had come from Satara,\(^4\) and marched towards Aurangabad.\(^5\)

In the mean while the Peshwa and Raghunath had been ravaging the Nizam's territories.\(^6\) They were unable to plunder the city of Haidarabad which was protected by a strong wall, but a contribution of one lakh and eighty thousand rupees was exacted from the suburbs.\(^7\) The city of Bidar was burnt.\(^8\) Raghunath was extremely angry when he heard of the plunder of Poona and wanted to give battle openly. All the sardars, including Sakharam Bapu, protested against so risky a venture.\(^9\)

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\(^1\) He demanded money before burning Poona, but Gopika Bai refused to pay. (Khare, I, 251).


\(^3\) Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 541.

\(^4\) Gamaji besieged the fort of Satara but could not take it. He merely seized some rich men and took money from them. The Peshwa had taken measures for the defence of Satara and the King. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 102, 104. See Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, pp. 128-129).

\(^5\) Khare, I, p. 289.

\(^6\) S.P.D., xxxviii, 98, 103.


\(^8\) Khare, I, 266.

\(^9\) Khare, I, 284, 297. Raghunath angrily accused his advisers of cowardice. He finally changed his mind at the request of his private valet, who acted under instructions from Sakharam.
They argued that the Nizam's success was due in a very large measure to the support of the Maratha sardars; it was, therefore, considered necessary to take measures for winning them back.¹ Janoji Bhonsle was the first Maratha chief to listen to these proposals. He found that he had gained nothing from his alliance with the Nizam. His territories had been plundered. Mahadji Sindhia came from Rajputana to ravage them again. The Peshwa offered Bhonsle's gadi to Mudhoji Bhonsle. The Nizam no longer listened to Janoji's proposals. Confronted by dangers on all sides, he informed Malhar Rao Holkar that he was prepared to desert the Nizam if a jagir worth 32 lakhs was given to him. This offer was accepted.² The result of the negotiations with the other sardars was equally satisfactory. Bhawan Rao Pratinidhi was assured that his jagir would be restored. Gamaji Yamaji was offered concessions. Babu Rao Fadnis, who had deserted the Peshwa's cause, was offered re-appointment by Raghunath Rao.³ Gopal Rao was promised the restoration of Miraj.⁴ An agreement was also concluded with Basalat Jang,⁵ Nizam Ali's dissatisfied brother.⁶

During all these transactions Malhar Rao Holkar and Sakharam Bapu had with great difficulty restrained Raghunath from engaging in an open battle. The rainy season had already

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¹ Khare, I, p. 290.
³ Khare, I, 308, 313; pp. 284, 292.
⁵ Khare, I, 247, 286. Basalat Jang joined the Peshwa with 12,000 troops.—S.P.D., xxxviii, 93.
begun, and it was difficult for both the parties to move their troops. Nizam Ali pursued his route towards Aurangabad, and the Peshwa’s army followed him some marches in the rear. On arriving at the bank of the Godavari Nizam Ali crossed over with a part of the force; Vithal Sundar was left with the remainder at Rakshasbhuvan on the south bank of the river, the whole of the artillery stores and baggages being in his custody. Raghunath Rao decided to prevent him from crossing. At this juncture Janoji Bhonsle left Vithal Sundar on the pretence of not receiving money to pay his troops. Raghunath made a rapid march and attacked Vithal Sundar. This was the famous battle of Rakshasbhuvan (August 10, 1763). Vithal Sundar was severely defeated and killed. Another prominent commander on the Nizam’s side killed in the battle was Vinayak Das. The young Peshwa took a very prominent part in the engagement. He constantly moved through the ranks and encouraged the troops.

Grant Duff rightly says that he “particularly distinguished

1 Khare, I, 297, 321. Nizam Ali seems to have been too confident of his strength. He said, “Only Bhau knew how to fight. If a lakh of troops come now, I will easily kill them”.—S.P.D., xxxviii, 100.

2 Khare, I, 333, 339.

3 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 542) calls it the battle of Taindulza.

4 Khare, I, 334. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 542) says that Vithal Sundar was accidentally hit by one of his own men before he received his fatal wound by a party of Marathas under Damaji Gaikwad. A party of Afghans, in Holkar’s service, then cut off his head and carried it in triumph on the point of a spear. In S.P.D., xxxviii, 105, we find that the heads of Vithal Sundar and Vinayak Das were sent to Nizam Ali. In Vad, I, 15, we find that Vithal Sundar’s head was brought to the Peshwa.

5 Khare, I, p. 295.
himself both by personal energy and the judicious support which
he sent...to different points of the attack”. Raghunath wrote to
Gopika Bai: “He surprised me. He had never before seen a
fight. I have confidence in his future management of respons-
ibility”. Both sides lost heavily; on the Nizam’s side about
ten thousand troops are said to have fallen in the field. The
Nizam’s guns, horses, camels and elephants fell to the victors.

Nizam Ali was a helpless ‘spectator of the destruction of
his troops, without the possibility of succouring them’. Appre-
hending that the victorious Marathas would pursue him, he
marched towards Aurangabad at midnight after the battle. He
destroyed all boats and the Godavari was in full flood; so pursuit
was not possible. Janoji Bhonsle came to see the Peshwa, who
reconciled himself with all the sardars who had joined the
Nizam. Murad Khan, governor of Aurangabad, who had been

2 Khare, I, 347.
4 Khare, I, 339. Grant Duff's description of the battle is wrong
on two principal points. He says that it 'continued for nearly two days',
but the Peshwa's letter to his mother shows that it continued for not
more than 3 or 4 hours. Secondly, Grant Duff says that Raghunath
'was completely surrounded and cut off from his troops', and was
rescued from this perilous position by the assistance of Sakhataram and
Madhav Rao. No printed news-letter gives this information. See
6 Khare, I, 342.
7 Khare, I, 331, 344.
8 Khare, I, p. 296.
captured in the battle, was then sent to Nizam Ali (who had reached Aurangabad) with a demand for territory worth one crore and ten lakhs of rupees and three forts. On Nizam Ali’s refusal to accept these terms the Maratha army advanced and besieged Aurangabad. For various reasons it became impossible for the Marathas to undertake a protracted siege. The troops were very anxious to go home during the rainy season. In the Carnatic Haidar had become very aggressive, but no expedition could be sent against him without conciliating the Nizam. Negotiations were, therefore, carried on during the month of September. Nizam Ali ‘laid all his errors to the fault’ of Vithal Sundar, and ‘so worked on the weakness and good nature’ of Raghunath that he became ready to cede territories to his vanquished foe. Some of the sardars, though ostensibly loyal to the Peshwa, did not want to weaken the Nizam. But Madhav Rao was not ready to show so much leniency to his persistent enemy. At last it was decided that the Nizam should restore those territories (worth 60 lakhs), which his predecessor had surrendered after the battle of Udgir, and which he had re-occupied after the death of Balaji Baji Rao, and that he should

1 Khare, I, 334, 353, 354.
2 S.P.D., xxxviii, 107.
3 S.P.D., xxxviii, 107.
7 Khare, I, 379.
8 Khare, I, 364, 379; p. 604.
cede new territories worth 22 lakhs. A treaty to this effect was signed on September 25, 1763.

Of the territories secured from the Nizam, districts worth 32 lakhs were given to Janoji Bhonsle, and the remaining portion was divided among different sardars. Miraj was restored to Gopal Rao. Bhawan Rao was restored to the office of Pratinidhi. Gamaji Yamaji was not satisfied. He continued to create disturbances till his death in 1764. Balaji Janardan was appointed to the office of Fadnis and came to be known henceforward as Nana Fadnis.

This treaty deserves to be regarded as a landmark in the history of the Marathas. So far as the relations between Poona and Haidarabad are concerned, the state of things inaugurated by it lasted up to the battle of Kharda (1795). Never again did the Nizam venture to invade the Peshwa’s dominions, and in the contest which came 32 years later victory lay with Madhav Rao’s successor. Secondly, as a contemporary news writer observed, this brilliant success of the Marathas impressed the Deccan as well as Hindusthan. This was, indeed, the first

1 Khare, I, p. 298. Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 60. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 543) says that Raghunath ceded to the Nizam territory worth ten lakhs. He says that this account is based on a comparison of Maratha evidence with Muslim accounts.

2 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 60. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 543) says that the treaty was concluded in October.

3 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 61. Khare (I, p. 300) says that the sardars took jagirs worth one crore from the Peshwa’s personal estate and thus weakened him.

4 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 123.

5 S.P.D., xxxviii, 106.
proclamation of Maratha revival after the disaster of Panipat. Finally, this victory brought about a very significant change in the domestic affairs of the Maratha Empire. It closed the period of Raghunath Rao’s Regency and marked the beginning of Madhav Rao’s independent career. It became clear to all that in spite of his lack of experience, this young ruler was great alike in war and in diplomacy and possessed to the fullest degree those qualities of leadership which his uncle totally lacked.1

1 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 62. Raghunath proposed to take a jagir worth 9 lakhs and five forts and to retire to Trimbakeswar (near Nasik) to devote himself to religious ceremonies. (Khare, I, 366). We find him at Trimbakeswar in July, 1764. (S.P.D., xix, 18). In Vad, I, 105, we find that districts worth Rs. 5,63,200 were assigned to Raghunath for his private expenses and Chinto Vithal was appointed Sir Subedar.
CHAPTER II

FIRST AND SECOND CARNATIC EXPEDITIONS

There is no doubt that the Maratha expeditions to Northern India culminating in the battle of Panipat and the hostilities of the Marathas with the Nizam during the years 1760-63 contributed in no small measure to the rise of Haidar Ali in Mysore\(^1\) and made it possible for him to extend his dominions.\(^2\) A Marathi news-letter\(^3\) written in January, 1759, suggests that "there could never be a more opportune time to complete the conquest of Mysore, torn and distracted as it is by civil feuds and risings all over the province, if a few more troops could be spared". But troops were badly needed for the grand Northern expedition and the contest with the Nizam; so the Carnatic was left to take care of itself. After Panipat Visaji Pant, who had been assisting Khande Rao against Haidar Ali, retired with three lakhs of rupees from the latter,\(^4\) leaving him quite free to take a terrible revenge\(^5\) on his weakened rival. Haidar ‘entirely divested the Hindu Raja of the management of his country’;\(^6\) "his usurpation was complete".\(^7\)

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1 For the history of Maratha operations in Mysore before Panipat, see N. K. Sinha, Haidar Ali, Vol. I, Chap. III.
2 S.P.D., xxxx, 116.
5 M.M.C., Vol. 15, p. 531. August 6, 1761.
One of the terms by which Haidar had purchased Visaji Pant’s retreat was the cession of Baramahal, but ‘symptoms of precipitancy’ betrayed by the Maratha general who had ‘just received his secret orders of recall’ led him to delay the delivery of any part of that district. When the news of Panipat reached Mysore Haidar plainly refused to give effect to his promise. This affront the Marathas were at that time not in a position to challenge.

Freed from all rivals at home, and encouraged by the temporary weakness of the Marathas, Haidar became aggressive and deliberately aimed at extending his frontier towards the Krishna. He found an ally in Basalat Jang, Nizam Ali’s disappointed brother, whose ambition was to form an independent kingdom in the Carnatic. About the month of June, 1761, Basalat planned the reduction of Sira, which was then in the possession of the Marathas. “He reconnoitred the citadel, but thought it most prudent to pass it. His military chest required more rapid supplies than were promised by its siege.”

2 It seems that before the attack on Sira he had taken some minor Maratha posts and engaged in hostilities with one Lakshman Venkaji. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 74).
Sira is a taluka in the Tumkur district, area 599 square miles. The town lies 33 miles north-north-west of Tumkur. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, pp. 197-198).
Mons. le. Maistre de la Tour says that Sira ‘gives the title to a Subaship’ and Basalat Jang thought that by occupying it he ‘would become of equal rank with his brother by acquiring the title of Suba’. (The History of Hyder Ali Khan, p. 51).
farther south and besieged Hoskote,¹ which was then garrisoned by 700 soldiers under Mukunda Sripat.² "The fortifications were in the rude style of village bulwarks", but the place "possessed the advantage from nature of being unassailable on one face". The garrison offered a determined resistance, and Basalat Jang was in despair. At this crisis Haidar thought it necessary to intervene. His envoy, Mir Faizulla Khan, came to Basalat’s camp and an agreement was concluded. For a nazar of three lakhs of rupees Basalat agreed to confer on Haidar the office of Nawab of Sira:³ "an office, a country, and a capital, which were yet to be conquered!......The right of the grantor seems to have been inferred from the act of granting, for no other source of right can be readily discovered...".⁴ It was decided that the artillery, ammunition and all articles which could be carried away should be appropriated by Basalat Jang and the place itself should be occupied by Haidar.⁵ This arrangement led to the conjunction of Haidar’s army with that of Basalat Jang in October, 1761, and to the capture of Hoskote.⁶ Then the allies took Dod Balapur,⁷ wrote for help to Haidar, who agreed, but later on was prevented by internal troubles from sending troops. Then Basalat gave up the plan of attacking the citadel.

¹ A taluka in the Bangalore district, area 271 square miles. The town lies on the left bank of the S. Pinakini, 16 miles east-north-east of Bangalore. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, pp. 72-74).
² Orme Ms., No. 72. Nishan-i-Haidari.
³ Khare (II, pp. 688-690) says that Haidar recognised Basalat as Nizam. Wilks does not say so.
⁵ De la Tour, The History of Hyder Ali Khan, p. 51.
⁷ A taluka in the Bangalore district, area 341 square miles. The
which was a dependency of Sira, and advanced towards Sira. It was captured after a siege lasting one month. Haidar's artillery, manned by Europeans, gave a very good account of itself.\(^1\) Sira was the chief Maratha depot of provisions and military stores in the Carnatic. "All this was seized by Haidar and applied to his own use, and without any delay, or the knowledge of any one, he buried underground all the heavy artillery and such stores as he wished to reserve for himself and throwing out four or five pieces of artillery damaged and split at the muzzles with a parcel of old and useless stores, he sent a letter with congratulations on the capture of the place to Basalat Jang".\(^2\)

About the beginning of the year 1762 Basalat Jang, thus cheated by his shrewd ally, returned to his capital Adoni (for he apprehended an attack from Nizam Ali, who had in the mean time made peace with the Marathas), and Haidar proceeded towards the south-west. Chik Balapur\(^3\) was captured from a town lies on the right bank of the Arkavati, 27 miles north-west of Bangalore. (Rice, *Mysore*, Vol. II, pp. 67, 69).

\(^1\) S.P.D., xxxvii, 10. Wilks says (Vol. I, p. 441) that Sira "made but a feeble resistance". Mons. le Maistre de la Tour says, "Hyder being arrived before the place with a well-disciplined army and a grand train of artillery served by Europeans, made his attack in a manner very different from that made use of by Busalutjung. By successful undermining, he blew up two bastions and the curtain, which forced the besieged to surrender at discretion..."—*The History of Hyder Ali Khan*, p. 52.


Poligar assisted by the troops of Murar Rao Ghorpade, the Maratha Chief of Gooti. As the Poligar had offered stubborn resistance, he was sent as a prisoner to Bangalore and his two sons were converted to Islam. Murar Rao shut himself up at Gooti and did not venture to meet Haidar in the field. "Haidar conquered that part of Murar Rao's dominions most convenient for his new acquisition of Sira amounting to three lakhs of pagodas yearly." He then extended his conquests to the north and took places like Kodikonda, Penukonda and Madaksira. All the Poligars dependent on Sira were invited to submit to him. The Poligars of Raidurg and Harpanhalli submitted without resistance, but the Poligar of Chittaldrug had to be subjugated by arms. The latter had to pay a fine of three lakhs besides the usual tribute.

Haidar Ali's aggressions in the Carnatic deprived the Maratha Government of tribute amounting to about 50 lakhs of rupees. After the conclusion of peace with Nizam Ali in January, 1762, an expedition was sent to the Carnatic. Of this

3 Anantapur district, Madras Presidency.
4 Nishan-i-Haidari.
5 Anantapur district, Madras Presidency.
6 Bellary district, Madras Presidency.
7 Bellary district, Madras Presidency.
8 A town 126 miles north-west of Bangalore, head quarters of the district of the same name. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 516).
10 Nishan-i-Haidari.
12 Wilks does not mention it.
expedition Raghunath Rao was naturally the leader;¹ he was accompanied by the young Peshwa and Trimbak Rao Pethe. The Peshwa had made himself conspicuous in the late campaign against the Nizam by his courage and good sense. He consoled and encouraged every one—so we are told—and every one loved him.² It was necessary for the ruler of the State to familiarise himself with the intricacies of war, diplomacy and administration.

Raghunath Rao’s aim was to advance as far as the Tungabhadra³ and to collect tribute from some of those districts which had recently shaken off the Maratha yoke. In February tribute was realised from the districts around Kolhapur⁴ and in March from Kittur.⁵ The Peshwa himself took a prominent part in the management of affairs. In April he realised tribute from Bidnur.⁶ In July there was an engagement with Haidar Ali,

¹ Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 536) does not refer to Raghunath but contemporary letters (S.P.D., xxxvii, 3, 4) are clear on the point.
² Khare, I, 52.
³ Grant Duff thinks (Vol. I, p. 536) that the Peshwa ‘did not go far beyond the Kistna, if he crossed that river at all’. The details collected here from contemporary news-letters clearly show that he is wrong.
⁴ S.P.D., xxxvii, 4.
⁵ Between Belgaum in the north and Dharwar in the south.
⁶ S.P.D., xxxvii, 5, 8. Wilks says (Vol. I, pp. 448-450), “The district of Bednore proper is situated on the summit of that range of western hills which overlooks the provinces of Canara and Malabar... The dominions of this state not only embraced the mountainous range...but extended to the west over the maritime provinces now named Canara, and to the east over a tract of more open country stretching to Santa Bednore, and Hoolulkera, within twenty miles of Chittledroog...”. At present the city of Bidnur is known as Nagar, a town in the Shimoga District. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 463).
who saved himself by retreating to a forest. His anxiety to avoid open engagements made it necessary for the Marathas to encamp in the Carnatic during the rainy season. Things were very dear, and the financial resources of the Peshwa’s camp were not satisfactory. So Raghunath wrote to Malhar Rao Holkar to send money to meet the expenditure of the campaign.¹ But the rains and Raghunath’s quarrel with Trimbak Rao made it impossible for the Peshwa to continue the operations; and he returned to Poona.

An interesting feature of this phase of the struggle between the Marathas and the rising autocrat of Mysore is the attitude adopted by the English factors of Bombay. In spite of the treaty concluded by Raghunath Rao they were very anxious to secure the friendship of this powerful enemy of the Marathas. On March 22, 1763, the Council laid down the policy that “from his being now in possession of the whole Carnatic dominions, it may be of the greatest consequence to our Hon’ble Masters’ affairs on this coast to improve a friendly correspondence with him.” It was also decided to gratify Haidar Ali’s request for ‘3 or 4 thousand musquets for soldiers’, although this was ‘a measure the Hon’ble Company are always averse to, and we have ever avoided as much as possible’. On August 2, 1763, the Council also allowed the Nawab of Arcot to build some fighting vessels in the English Marine Yard, because “his having a Marine force may be a good check on the Marathas”.²

While the Marathas were paralysed by internal strife and Nizam Ali’s second invasion, Haidar Ali extended his frontier

¹ S.P.D., xxxvii, 9.
at their cost. He conquered Bidnur and Sunda in 1763. He reconciled Nizam Ali to the conquest of Sira by offering him, through an envoy named Appaji Ram, public gifts and banker’s credit for ‘an amount considerably exceeding the consideration paid’ to Basalat Jang. Another envoy named Mehdi Ali Khan was sent to Poona ‘for the same purpose, and provided in the same manner’; but the Peshwa ‘was little disposed to acquiesce in the conquest of any part of his dominions’. Haidar was shrewd enough to understand that a formidable expedition would soon come against him from Poona. So he considered it necessary to ‘establish a sort of defensive cordon along the whole extent of his northern frontier’ by annexing the principalities of Savanur, Karnul and Kadapa.

The territory of the Nawab of Savanur occupied a position of great strategic importance, for it was situated between the rivers Tungabhadra and Malaprabha, in the direct line of all Maratha armies proceeding to Mysore. Naturally the ruler of this petty principality was courted on both sides. He was sub-

2 Wilks, Vol. I, pp. 447-456. Khare, II, 391, 415, p. 716. The ruler of Sunda was helped by the Portuguese as well as by Rudraji Rao Dhulap, chief of the Maratha navy, who acted under the Peshwa’s orders. Haidar recalled Mir Faizulla from Sunda in April, 1764, and the former ruler reoccupied his state.
4 Dharwar district, Bombay Presidency.
5 Karnul district, Madras Presidency.
6 Kadapa district, Madras Presidency.
ordinate to the Poona Government. In April, 1763, Haidar sent Mir Faizulla Khan to Savanur, with a view to secure the Nawab’s alliance ‘by the joint power of terror and persuasion’. On his way Mir Faizulla took Ratchalli and some other places, but he failed to secure the Nawab’s alliance. Abdul Hakim Khan, the then Nawab, refused to help Haidar Ali against the Marathas. On receipt of this news Haidar moved to form a junction with Mir Faizulla Khan and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Nawab. Abdul Hakim Khan became Haidar’s vassal and paid him a large military contribution. Haidar then took Bankapur, which was a part of the jagir of Gopal Rao Patwardhan of Miraj. After these successes Haidar returned to Bidnur in September, leaving Mir Faizulla to continue the operations in North Carnatic. In September, 1763, that enterprising general took Shirhati and in October he captured

5 Dharwar district, Bombay Presidency; 70 miles south-east of Dharwar and 36 miles south of Savanur.
6 Khare II, 286, 291.
8 Khare, II, 387. gives one lakh thirty thousand luns. Wilks (Vol. I, p. 460) says that two lakhs of rupees were agreed upon, but as the Nawab had no cash to pay, Haidar took valuables worth about eight lakhs. S.P.D., xxxviii, 107, mentions 2 1/2 lakhs.
9 Dharwar district, Bombay Presidency.
10 Khare, II, 343, 352. Peixoto, II, 83. Wilks does not refer to this.
11 Peixoto, II, 83.
Dharwar.¹ Gradually he carried his master’s authority nearly to the banks of the Krishna. His successes were partly due to the defect of the Maratha fortifications. “The apprehension of attack from the south had never entered into the contemplation of the Marathas; the places of strength were unprovided with the means of defence”.²

In the mean while Madhav Rao had become the master of his own dominions after the battle of Rakshasbhuvan. He was now in a position to attend to the affairs of the Carnatic. Instead of coming to Poona after the conclusion of the hostilities against the Nizam, this energetic young Peshwa proceeded towards the region desolated by Haidar Ali.³ He personally assumed charge of the expedition⁴ and Sakharam Bapu accompanied him as chief adviser. The Peshwa could not cross the

³ Khare, II, p. 708. A letter dated September 4, 1763, shows that within three weeks of the battle of Rakshasbhuvan the Peshwa was proceeding towards the Tungabhadra and demanding money from Vijaydurg and Suvarnadurg for the prosecution of the campaign. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 15).
⁴ Grant Duff says (Vol. I, p. 544), “Mahdoo Rao insisted on his right to command this army, whilst his uncle remained at Poona to conduct the government; Sukaram Bappoo joined in supporting the Peishwa’s pretensions, on this occasion, till at last Rugonath Rao yielded his consent, but quitted Poona in anger, and retired to Anundwelee near Nassuck”. Khare (II, 396, p. 708) says that the Peshwa entreated Raghunath to accompany him, but he was tired and preferred rest. As the uncle joined the Peshwa in the concluding stage of the campaign, Khare’s view seems to be more probable. But one of the Peshwa’s letters (Khare, II, 396) shows that he suspected his uncle.
Krishna before February, 1764.\(^1\) He had collected a large army and numerous guns.\(^2\)

Haidar Ali was not unaware of the Peshwa’s progress. He collected troops\(^3\) and tried to form an alliance with Nizam Ali.\(^4\) It seems that the Nizam agreed to help him and to divert the Peshwa’s attention by creating disturbances in Baglan, Khandesh and Nasik. His movements were suspected by the Marathas; but he did nothing although he took Haidar’s money.

Towards the close of April, 1764, Haidar left Bidnur,\(^5\)

1 S.P.D., xxxvii, 24. Peixoto, II, 84. According to Wilks (Vol. I, pp. 461-462), the Peshwa asked Gopal Rao Patwardhan to cross the Krishna and check the progress of Haidar’s troops until the main army should arrive. Gopal Rao accordingly gave battle to Mir Faizulla Khan in April, 1764, and suffered a severe defeat. This version is accepted by Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 544). Khare (II, p. 719) rejects this story, because in the Patwardhan Daftar there is no reference to any battle between Gopal Rao and Mir Faizulla in the year 1764. Khare’s conclusion is to some extent strengthened by Peixoto’s silence on the matter.

2 Peixoto (II, 84) gives 80,000 men (almost all horse) and 60 guns of all calibres, the largest being 36 pounders. Khare (II, p. 714) says that the Peshwa had 40,000 troops, besides infantry, gardis and Pindaris. In a letter dated March, 1764, the Peshwa says that he had 31,500 troops and 20 guns. (Khare, II, 416). See also Khare, II, 411.

3 In S. P. D., xxxvii, 20, we are told that he had 5,000 Kanarese rifles, 3,000 infantry, 2,000 Feringis and Kafris, 2,000 Turkish cavalry, 500 Poligars, 50 guns. Khare (II, p. 715) says that he had 62,000 troops and 50 guns; but Khare, II, 411, gives 30,000 infantry, 28,000 horse and 30-40 guns. At Ratehalli he had 60,000 troops. (Wilks, Vol. I, p. 462).

4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 16, 21, 23; xxxviii, 132, 135, 136, 144.

5 Peixoto, II, 83.
advanced towards Savanur, and took up a position near Ratehalli. "There, encamped on an eminence which overlooked an extensive plain in front, he was secured by the vicinity of the woods in his rear, which afforded a cover for his infantry against the very superior numbers of the enemy's cavalry".¹ For some days he watched the movements of the Marathas, who, in spite of their superiority in cavalry, infantry and artillery, refused to attack him in his chosen position. "He feared that if he did not give them battle, they would go and ravage his countries, the inhabitants of which would offer no resistance, on account of their having been lately subdued, but would rather receive them gladly".² This difficulty led Haidar to decide to "bring on a general action, and if possible still to lead the enemy by pursuit to attack him in his chosen position".³

The Peshwa had in the mean time taken Manoli⁴ and Hubli⁵ and secured the alliance of the Nawab of Savanur.⁶ The Nawab was glad to escape from Haidar's control, but he was afraid that as soon as the Peshwa left the Carnatic, Haidar would fall upon him again. So the Peshwa detached 2,000 troops for his protection. Then he decided to subjugate

⁵ Khare, II, 417, 419. Old Hubli was taken by the Peshwa himself and New Hubli by Gopal Rao. In Vad, I, 30, we find that the sum of Rs. 31,001 was realised from this place.
⁶ Khare, II, 420, 422. S. P. D., xxxvii, 30. The Nawab joined the Peshwa with more than 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry.
Chitradurg and Harpanhalli.¹ He required money; things were very dear, and the troops could not be provided with their daily expenses. Moreover, Haidar had taken shelter in the forests, which were impenetrable to the large and heavily equipped Maratha army.² Instead of waiting aimlessly the Peshwa crossed the Tungabhadra and proceeded towards Chitradurg, leaving instructions that he should be called back if Haidar left his unassailable shelter in the forests. Haidar, who had already decided to come out, was encouraged by the news of the Peshwa’s departure and began to wander fearlessly in the Savanur State.³ The Peshwa at once turned back, recalled Gopal Rao from Shirhati and asked him to draw Haidar to an open engagement.⁴

When each of the parties was thus determined to bring about a battle on a ground chosen by itself, Gopal Rao Patwardhan succeeded in making Haidar ‘the dupe of his own design’. On May 3 Haidar was informed by two spies that 20,000 Maratha horse were visible near his vanguard. He hurriedly marched out of his camp and put his troops in the usual order of battle. The Marathas were then found to be not more than 4,000 in number. Their leader was Gopal Rao. Haidar kept his cavalry in reserve and, coming close to the Marathas, ordered rockets to be thrown at them. They slowly retired. Haidar followed

¹ Khare, II, p. 722.
² S.P.D., xxxvii, 39.
³ Wilks (Vol. I, p. 463) says that he left the command of the camp (at Ratehalli?) to Mir Faizulla Khan and moved out on the plain with a select corps of 20,000 men.
and soon came face to face before a Maratha army 50,000 strong. Gopal Rao had sent news to the Peshwa, who had come with the entire army. Haidar was 'disquieted, although he did not show it much'. He was not only inferior in numerical strength; he had left his heavy artillery with Mir Faizulla Khan. His troops halted on a dry rivulet. The Marathas surrounded his camp, employed their artillery and intercepted the guns which he had sent for. The Peshwa himself remained at the front, keeping Gopal Rao to the right and Naro Shankar to the left; Vithal Shivdeo Vinchurkar guarded the rear. In spite of heavy assaults Mir Faizulla succeeded in breaking through the Maratha lines and joining his master with 3,000 foot. Haidar had only 40 field pieces, most of them being 3 or 4 pounders. He utilised these in beating off a Maratha attack before sunset. Once again the Marathas came upon him with great force and took one of his guns. Then they were driven back. The Marathas could not renew their attack owing to a severe dust-storm. Gopal Rao wanted to continue operations during the night, but the Peshwa did not agree. So Haidar retired to his camp. The operations lasted for about six hours (from noon to the sunset) and cost him more than 1,000 dead and the same number wounded (very few of whom survived). In his fury

1 The number is probably exaggerated.
2 Khare (II, p. 726) says that Haidar had good guns with a range longer than that of the Marathas, but these facts collected from Peixoto (who personally fought on Haidar's side) show that Haidar's guns were not better, although his gunners were superior to the Marathas. Khare also says that Haidar's gunners were better trained.
3 In S.P.D., xxxvii, 32, we are told that 150 Mussalmans were
he hanged the spies on whose information he had chased the Marathas. Well could the Peshwa write in exultation to his mother that from that battle Haidar took a terror of the Maratha name. On the Maratha side not more than 50 soldiers and 100 horses were killed and 200 soldiers wounded.¹

Haidar could not forget the lesson of this battle. Afraid to face the Marathas again he tried to protect himself by raising batteries around his camp. The Peshwa, however, decided to attack the camp and wrote to Haidar "that he had heard his name at Poona, where many of his heroic actions were related, and that he had come to seek him and fight him, for his father had advised him to cultivate friendship with all good soldiers and that was his own wish. But as he did not know whether all that was said was true, he had come himself to try him and he would expect that the Nawab would quit his entrenchments to-morrow, come to his camp, where he would find him ready. If on the contrary, this was not done, he would perceive that Haidar was no soldier and what was said of him was more than truth. He would visit his camp and batteries the next day and tell him of the delight with which he left Poona to come and engage with him".² Haidar laughed when he received this message, but his spies in the Maratha camp informed him that the Peshwa was in earnest, for he had ordered all his chiefs to take betel in ratification of their oath of loyalty. At that

killed and about 700 wounded. Peixoto, who lived in Haidar's camp, gives the numbers we have accepted.

² Peixoto, II, 100.
time Haidar had only 40,000 troops against the Peshwa’s 80,000, and his troops were still dispirited by their defeat in the first encounter. So he decided to avoid another contest with the Marathas. The Peshwa’s letter arrived after midnight. Haidar instantly marched with his whole army without the least noise to the entrenched fort at Anavatti. He arrived there next morning at 7 o’clock. The Marathas were unable to dislodge him from this position, for the road was too bad for horses and the fort was surrounded by hills. The rainy season being near, the Peshwa divided his troops among various forts under Gopal Rao and Sayaji Pant. Thus the month of May came to a close.¹

The Peshwa was not willing to return to Poona after so inconclusive a campaign. Although Haidar was out of his reach, and although the Maratha camp was suffering due to the shortage of provisions and fodder, yet he decided to encamp in the Carnatic during the rainy season.² He cantoned his troops in the neighbourhood of Dharwar.³

¹ S.P.D. contains no information relating to this period (i.e. days immediately following the battle of Ratehalli). Khare (II, 430, 434, pp. 727-729) says that there were some minor engagements between the Marathas and Haidar, who encamped at Maynhalli and took shelter in a forest. Wilks (Vol. I, p. 464) says that Haidar was again severely defeated in an unexpected engagement. Grant Duff is silent. Peixoto (II, 92-101) is very helpful.


³ S.P.D., xxxvii, 37. Khare, II, 434. Wilks says (Vol. I, p.464) that he encamped to the eastward of Savanur. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 545) says that he ‘fixed his headquarters at Nurrindra’ and adds, “This place is not to be found by that name in any map that I have seen’.
Wilks is hardly correct in saying that during the rains Haidar's army, "wretched, spiritless, and sickly...... looked with apathy or aversion to the renewal of active operations". 1 Haidar made barracks for the infantry, big enough to enable them to form in them and to fire, without marching out and exposing themselves to rain. 2 In June he sent a detachment under Lal Khan to ravage the Savanur territory. 3 This movement on his part was not unexpected. The Peshwa had already provided a contingent of 1,000 troops for the defence of Savanur and given Rs. 50,000 to the Nawab for enlisting new men. Gopal Rao had also remained within 20 miles of Savanur. 4 The Peshwa went to Sidnur 5 to collect tribute, but turned back as soon as the news of the intended attack on Savanur was conveyed to him. His arrival saved Savanur for the time being 6 but it was considered necessary to make some permanent arrangement for the defence of a territory so useful from the strategic point of view. Saktharam Bapu advised the Peshwa to entrust Gopal Rao with this difficult task. Probably the astute minister wanted to put the Patwardhan Chief into trouble, for he knew that Gopal Rao's resources in men and money were not equal to the task. Gopal Rao agreed to defend Savanur for 15 days if the Nawab paid him four annas per day for each horseman employed in the defence of his territory. The Nawab was so much afraid of Haidar that he refused to

3 Khare, II, 454. S.P.D., xxxvii, 36.
5 Khare (II, p. 731) has Mudgal.
6 S.P.D., xxxvii, 38.
leave the Peshwa's camp and to accompany Gopal Rao to his own capital.

On receipt of information from Lal Khan Haidar came to Hangal and decided to attack Gopal Rao's isolated force. He chose a ground near a stream running between Savanur and Bankapur, divided his troops into two groups, and waited for his enemies. His plan was to lead one of the groups to the attack and to bring in the other when the Marathas were exhausted. Gopal Rao, who had once befooled Haidar in this way, was too experienced and cautious to succumb to such a temptation. He sent 150 horsemen to try to make Haidar pursue them, but instructed them never to cross the stream. Haidar refused to follow them, and there was no engagement. He became so disgusted with himself that he did not speak a word that night. He retired to Bankapur and then went to Anavatti. A few days later the Peshwa sent Naro Shankar to assist Gopal Rao and personally proceeded towards Savanur.¹

In August Haidar began negotiations for peace through an envoy named Shyam Rao Gopal, but as he was not prepared either to cede territories or to pay tribute the Peshwa refused to suspend hostilities.² Janoji Dhulap was asked to attack Haidar from the sea and to occupy his posts in Sunda and Bidnur with the help of the Portuguese and the local Chiefs.³

It seems that both sides were trying to secure assistance from other Powers. We have already referred to Haidar Ali's

² Khare, II, 474, 475.
³ S.P.D., xxxvii, 42, 53.
negotiations with the Nizam. In August Raghunath Rao wrote friendly letters to Nizam Ali and instructed the Maratha agent at Haidarabad to ask for assistance in men and artillery. The Peshwa wrote to the President and Council of Madras for help, and his request was strongly supported by the Nawab of Arcot, who feared Haidar Ali much more than he feared the Marathas. The President pointed out to the Nawab "the many ill consequences that might result from our assisting the Marathas against Haidar, especially as neither he nor the Company could afford the expense and as it would be engaging in a war which it is impossible to say when it will end, and that in the mean time his country must be left exposed, that if we were obliged to give assistance to either of them, it would certainly be most expedient to give it to Haidar who might keep the Marathas at a distance as they are at best, very troublesome neighbours". The 'whole attention' of the President and Council being 'employed in maintaining peace in the Nawab's dominions', a courteous refusal was communicated to the Peshwa.

The English authorities in Bombay, however, were less peace-loving. Haidar approached them for assistance in men and stores. They refused to send troops, "but as we think it would not be for our masters' interests to suffer him

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1 It also appears that Haidar opened negotiations with Janoji Bhonsle. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 151).
3 M.M.C., Vol. 22A, p. 111.
4 M.M.C., Vol. 22A, p. 146.  5 M.M.C., Vol. 22A, p. 111.
to lose the Bednore and Sondha countries in which he has given us very valuable privileges, and as the supplying him with stores may possibly enable him to repel the invasion of the Marathas without our appearing to interfere in their disputes, we have sent him some cannons, gun powder and fire arms".1

In September the Marathas occupied Haveri2 and began the siege of Dharwar which capitulated early in November.3 That strong fort was courageously defended for two months by Mir Faizulla’s brother. Haidar sent Mir Faizulla with troops and guns to assist his brother, but Gopal Rao and Anand Rao Raste prevented him from effecting a junction with the besieged garrison. Finding that no assistance was available, the fort surrendered. (November, 1764). The Marathas fortified it. Only Bankapur remained under Haidar’s control.4 Haidar renewed his overtures for peace, but nothing came out of them.5

The Peshwa encamped near Anavatti on November 16, 1764. The remaining portion of this month was spent in numerous skirmishes between the two armies.6 On one occasion Haidar came out early in the morning with his troops and field artillery to reconnoitre. At about four o’clock in the afternoon he came in sight of the Marathas. His infantry could not compel the Maratha cavalry to fight in the plains. So he returned to his camp, where he ordered that every one should lie upon his arms and be ready to march at the first call. His

1 M.M.C., Vol. 22A, p. 113.
2 Khare, II, 486.
4 Khare, II, p. 744.
5 Khare, II, 522.
6 Peixoto, III, 4-17.
intention was to attack the Marathas at night; but his spies
told him that they were ready. So Haidar did not move. At
day break several divisions of the Maratha cavalry came near
his camp in order to note the best places for mounting their
artillery and the weakest points for attack. Haidar equipped a
very strong battery, which was defended by Mir Faizulla with
3,000 men, including a Portuguese detachment of gunners. Haidar
assigned different positions to his officers and told them that
they would receive no assistance even in the greatest distress.
They were ordered under pain of death and the ruin of their
families not to give up their posts. He himself marched with
Europeans and 2,000 chosen sepoys, taking only four field pieces.
On November 18 he ordered the signal to be fired, led his
troops to a plain and formed them in order of battle. Two
Maratha divisions pressed heavily on his left wing, but were
finally prevented by incessant fire from breaking through his
lines. The Marathas did not expect a serious engagement and
had left their artillery behind. Unable to stand the well-directed
fire of Haidar's guns they began to retreat. Next morning
they came again with their artillery and Haidar 'marched again
into the plains but not quite so far as on the day before'. Such
skirmishes followed for a few days.

On December 1 was fought the decisive engagement of
Jadi Hanwati. In this battle the Peshwa personally took the
leading part. The Marathas advanced against Haidar's camp
with 54 pieces of artillery and placed eight guns upon a small
hill on the right side of that camp. Ismail Khan, one of
Haidar's officers, captured those guns. Haidar then sent another
officer named Haji Muhammad to prevent the Marathas from
recapturing them. He also asked the Portuguese to stand with their backs to the woods and not march on to the plain. But the Marathas rushed towards the captured guns; Ismail Khan and the Portuguese commandant were cut to pieces with their men. Haidar lost about 2,000 men¹ and was himself wounded in the battle. "In order that he might escape being taken or known he took off all his clothes" and fled to his camp. The fight continued for about two hours. The victorious Marathas showed no mercy. As one of Haidar's officers says,² "In this battle the Marathas acted quite in opposition to their usual practice. I have seen them engaged many a time, but rarely to strike their enemy twice if he surrendered his arms. But on this day they were not contented with killing all they could but even after they were dead, they made the elephants trample upon them and set fire to the bodies".³

In the meanwhile the Peshwa had asked Raghunath Rao to come to the Carnatic and to assume the command of the expedition. Grant Duff says⁴ that this was "a remarkable instance of self-command in a general so young, and obviously proceeding from motives purely conciliatory, though at the same time more creditable to the heart of the individual than the judgment of the prince". The Peshwa's motive was undoubtedly conciliatory, but he was more shrewd than Grant Duff suspected him.

¹ S.P.D., xxxvii, 55; gives 1000-1500 killed, 6 guns and 100-150 horses captured. Khare (II, p. 747) gives 1500-1700 killed. Peixoto (III, 23) says that the Marathas lost many men, including a chief.
² Peixoto, III, 22.
to be. He knew that snān-sandhyā did not absorb the whole
attention of his uncle at Nasik.\(^1\) He knew that his mind was
being poisoned by interested persons. The best way to prevent
him from committing any mischief was to keep him under
observation.\(^2\) So Madhav Rao asked him to conclude a success-
ful expedition, and he came.

Raghunath collected troops\(^3\) and proceeded to the Carnatic.
He was accompanied by Narayan Rao, the Peshwa’s younger
brother, and Sayaji Rao, a son of Damaji Gaikwad. Janoji
Bhonsle did not come.\(^4\) Early in December Raghunath came
near Haidar’s camp.\(^5\) Haidar once again began negotiations,
but these were as fruitless as before.\(^6\) Hostilities commenced,
but no decisive engagement was fought.\(^7\)

In February, 1765, the Peshwa marched towards Bidnur.\(^8\) He

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1 Khare, II, 396.
2 Khare, II, pp. 741-743.
3 Peixoto, (III, 25) says that he came with 50,000 horse and 30
field pieces.
5 Peixoto, III, 25.
refers to a serious engagement which took place ‘about the beginning
of the year 1765’ and says “that the action terminated in a disorderly
rout in which he (Haidar) lost in killed alone 3,000 horse, and double
that number of infantry”. No contemporary account—neither Maratha
news-letters nor Peixoto’s book—refers to any such action in January,
1765. Probably Wilks refers to the battle of Hanwati, which, as we
have seen, took place on December 1, and not in January following.
Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 546) follows Wilks.
took Honnali, Kumsi, 1 Anantapur 2 and Chitradurg. 3 The activities of the Peshwa won the sincere praise of Raghunath, who wrote to Gopika Bai, “He has become very wise. He is managing everything and doing more than Nana Saheb Peshwa and Bhau Saheb ever did”. 4

Haidar was now in a desperate position. He had left Anavatti and shut up himself at Bidnur. His family and treasure had been sent to Seringapatam by a route through the woods. 5 He knew that Raghunath, Sakharam Bapu and Naro Shankar were disposed to deal leniently with him. 6 The Peshwa was also in difficulties. The English factors of Bombay created troubles on the Konkan coast, and troops had to be despatched there. 7 On the north Nizam Ali’s troops plundered Maratha territory as far as Nasik. 8 It was difficult for the Maratha cavalry to proceed towards Bidnur, for ‘the road led through woods terrible for cavalry’. 9

1 A town in the Shimoga district, 14 miles north-west of Shimoga. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 460). It surrendered after 3 days’ resistance.
2 A village in the Shimoga district. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 446). It surrendered after a siege of 4 days.
3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 59, 60, 62.
4 Khare, II, 552.
6 Khare, II, p. 756. Cf. Peixoto’s statement (II, 101) that some Maratha ministers “gave him information of everything that passed in consideration of considerable presents”.
7 Khare, II, 547, 554, 563. Probably Haidar’s English friends wanted to create a diversion in his favour.
8 Khare, III, 537.
9 Peixoto, III, 37. The Peshwa was, however, ready to advance and conquer Bidnur. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 63).
Early in March\(^1\) negotiations were completed and a definite agreement\(^2\) was arrived at. Haidar engaged to restore all territo ries taken from Murar Rao,\(^3\) to relinquish all claims on the Nawab of Savanur, and to pay 30 lakhs\(^4\) of rupees as tribute. There was some trouble about Bankapur and Basvapatna,\(^5\) which the Peshwa demanded and Haidar refused to cede. Bankapur was a very strong place, and Basvapatna was the key to Bidnur. Finally, Saktharam Bapu suggested that Bankapur should be taken and Basvapatna left with Haidar. To this compromise the Peshwa unwillingly agreed.\(^6\)

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1 Peixoto (III, 45) says that peace was concluded on May 23, 1765. Wilks (Vol. I, p. 466) says that peace was made about the end of February. This is in conflict with S.P.D., xxxvii, 60-63, and Khare, III, 564.


3 Khare (II, p. 756) says that Haidar agreed to restore all districts taken from the Marathas, but Wilks (Vol. I, p. 467) says, “Hyder’s occupation of Sera appears to have been tacitly admitted...... and all discussions relative to the Poligars of Chittledoog, Raidroog, Harponelly, &c. seem to have been studiously avoided by both parties.” There is nothing in our Marathi sources to indicate that Wilks is wrong.

4 Wilks (Vol. I, p. 466) gives 32 lakhs and Khare (II, p. 756) follows him. But Khare, III, 564, gives 30 lakhs; S.P.D., xxxvii, 62, gives 28 lakhs (with additional 2 lakhs for expenses); S.P.D., xxxvii, 60, gives 35 lakhs. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 546) says that in one Marathi Ms. he found 15 lakhs of tribute and the expenses of the war to be defrayed by Haidar.


6 Bankapur was not surrendered by Haidar till June. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 65, 67.)
Every one will unhesitatingly accept Wilks's comment that this treaty was 'an adjustment of extreme moderation, considering the desperate circumstances in which Hyder was placed'. The responsibility for showing so much leniency to so powerful and determined an enemy lies wholly on Raghunath Rao. He conducted the negotiations through his confidant Naro Shankar. Wilks says that among the terms "were without question some secret articles which were the foundation of that good understanding which ever afterwards subsisted" between Haidar and Raghunath Rao. Whether the Peshwa knew anything about these 'secret articles', it is impossible to say; but he must have felt uneasy at the concessions made to his defeated enemy. Probably he considered it unwise to protest against the selfish policy of his uncle. Grant Duff says that "having once granted full authority to his uncle, he adhered to the agreement, and made no objection where an attempt to remedy what was defective would have been a departure from good faith"; but at the same time he reminds us that the Peshwa 'was sensible' that his uncle could, at this period, obtain the aid either of Nizam Ali or of Janoji Bhonsle, and perhaps of both.

2. S.P.D., xxxvii, 60, 61.
CHAPTER III

REVOLTS OF JANOJI BHONSLÉ AND RAGHUNATH RAO

On his return from the Carnatic in 1765 Madhav Rao undertook an expedition against Janoji Bhonsle of Berar. Grant Duff suggests that the Peshwa wanted to avert an alliance between Janoji and the Nizam: "although Nizam Ally boiled with resentment against Janojee, on account of his treacherous defection, there was as yet no breach between them which could not have been speedily accommodated for purposes of mutual aggrandizement". 1 Apart from the probability of his concluding a new alliance with the Nizam, Janoji had on various grounds incurred the displeasure of the Peshwa. Even in the days of Balaji Baji Rao the Bhonsles were unwilling to recognise the Peshwa's right to levy Sardeshmukhi and Babti in Berar, which they regarded as their special watan. 2 It is obvious that such a claim to full-fledged autonomy could not be accepted by the head of the Maratha confederacy. Moreover, Janoji's conduct since 1761 had no excuse. He had openly fought


Marathi evidence clearly shows that Nizam Ali still resented Janoji's desertion on the eve of the battle of Rakshasbhuvan. Bhonsle wrote in February, 1764 (?), "The Nizam employed many troops, but could do nothing. For this he blames me". (S.P.D., xx, 140).

2 S.P.D., xx, 118, 142. In a letter to Emperor Shah Alam, Janoji Bhonsle complained that the Peshwa had invaded 'the patrimonial territories of His Majesty's bounden servant and vassal'. (B.S.C.P., March 21, 1769).
against the Peshwa as an ally of the Nizam, and allowed his Muslim partners to burn Poona.\(^1\) Although circumstances compelled the Peshwa to buy him off with territory yielding a revenue of 32 lakhs per year, yet no overlord could be pleased with such a vassal. Grant Duff says, “At the time of delivering the deeds by which Janojee was paid for his treachery, Mahdoo Rao openly reproached him for his duplicity to both parties, and vehemently condemned the unprincipled and unworthy motive by which he had been drawn in to become a tool for the subversion of a government, which had aggrandised his father’s house, and raised the Hindoos to the power they enjoyed”.\(^2\) Even after this reconciliation Janoji did not mend his ways. Instead of joining the Peshwa in his Carnatic expedition\(^3\) he intrigued with Haidar Ali.\(^4\) Madhav Rao had also reasons to suspect that Janoji was inclined to encourage and assist Raghunath in his ambitious projects.

All these reasons led the Peshwa to conclude an alliance with Nizam Ali for the suppression of Janoji. As Grant Duff

\(^1\) Janoji’s explanation was this: “Poona was burnt by the Nizam. On the very day of burning I quarrelled with him”. (S.P.D., xx, 168).

\(^2\) Vol. I, p. 543. In S.P.D., xx, 139, we find Raghunath Rao administering a very strong rebuke to Janoji Bhonsle for having joined the Nizam.

\(^3\) In 1764 the Peshwa asked Janoji to join him personally, but the latter excused himself on the ground of complications in Bengal, and sent some troops who were not found useful. (S.P.D., xx, 150). In 1765 he pleaded eye sore (S.P.D., xx, 153, 154) and financial difficulties. (S.P.D., xxxix, 55).

\(^4\) Janoji sent Mir Khalil to Haidar, who wrote letters and sent dresses. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 151).
REVOLT OF BHONSLE

says, the particulars of this "secret compact...........if ever com-
mittted to writing, have not been discovered but the objects of
it become tolerably obvious from a variety of facts".1 The
territory given to Janoji after the battle of Rakshasbhuvan was
to be taken from him and ceded to the Nizam.2

Madhav Rao started from Poona in October, 1765.3 He
had collected more than 15,000 troops.4 Raghunath started
with troops from Nasik and joined the Peshwa near Balapur.5
On the banks of the Godavari he was joined by Rukn-ud-daula,
the Nizam’s chief minister, and the Nizam himself advanced
towards Berar.6 Towards the close of January, 1766, the troops
of the Nizam came within a few miles of Nagpur.7 Janoji
was ill-prepared to face so formidable an attack. He could not
collect more than 6,000 or 7,000 troops.8 So he opened negoti-
ations for peace9 and personally saw the Peshwa.10 It was agreed
that out of the territory given to him after the battle of Rakshas-
bhuvan Janoji would be allowed to retain a portion worth 8 lakhs;

2 S.P.D., xx, 159, 168. Janoji said, "Why should the Peshwa
punish me by taking my territory and giving it to the Nizam? Should
he feed the snake with milk"?
3 Khare, III, 571, p. 1014. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 547) says
that the Peshwa’s secret compact with the Nizam was concluded about
the beginning of the year 1766.
4 S.P.D., xx, 161.
6 S.P.D., xx, 172.
7 S.P.D., xx, 164.
8 S.P.D., xx, 165, 166. S.P.D., xx, 168, says that he had
30,000 troops.
10 S.P.D., xx, 169, 170, 171.
a portion worth 9 lakhs was to be taken by the Peshwa, and the remainder (worth 15 lakhs) was to be ceded to the Nizam 'for the firm establishment of peace and friendship'. In a letter written by Raghunath Rao to Malhar Rao Holkar we are told that Janoji Bhonsle was not completely destroyed due to three reasons: he had humbled himself so much that it was not considered proper to inflict a more severe punishment; Holkar had recommended him to the Peshwa's favour; Raghunath himself was anxious to restore peace in order that he might proceed to Hindusthan immediately. Janoji agreed to accompany him with troops; later on, however, he supplied troops, but did not personally proceed to Hindusthan. Those Maratha sardars who had joined Janoji were punished by the Peshwa.

After the conclusion of hostilities Raghunath proceeded to Hindusthan and conducted an inconclusive campaign. While he was busy in the North the Peshwa led his third expedition to the Carnatic and compelled Haidar Ali to submit to his demands. Both of them returned home about the middle of the year 1767. Raghunath stationed himself at Anandavalli

2 S.P.D., xx, 184.
3 In the terms granted to him Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 548) finds 'a politic moderation' on the part of the Peshwa, 'who still left Janojee something to lose'.
4 S.P.D., xx, 185.
5 Khare, III, 581.
6 S.P.D., xx, 178, 179.
7 See Chapter VI.
8 See Chapter IV.
near Nasik and began to collect troops for an open contest with his nephew.\(^1\) He had never been able to reconcile himself to his exclusion from supreme authority. Soon after the conclusion of the second expedition against Haidar Ali (June, 1765) he demanded that the Maratha Empire should be divided into two parts, one of which should be given to him. The Peshwa naturally refused to accept this demand. The quarrel interfered with the efficiency of administration, and local officers hesitated to pay to either of the claimants the amounts due from them. Finally Raghunath yielded,\(^2\) but the atmosphere remained as uncomfortable as ever. When Raghunath was busy in the North he instigated\(^3\) one Naro Krishna to defy the orders of the Peshwa to deliver to one of his (Peshwa’s) officers the possession of the important fort of Burhanpur. The result was that the Peshwa captured it by force.\(^4\)

By the time Raghunath arrived at Anandavalli he had accumulated in his mind some other grievances against the

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1 Khare, III, p. 1246.
2 Khare, III, 573, 574.
3 S.P.D., xix, 52. This letter is so characteristic of Raghunath that a free translation of some sentences may be inserted here. He writes to one of his followers, “If Naro.......is strong enough, let him resist; but he should not allow others to think that he is acting with my consent..... He may have one plan in mind and give out another in public...... If you help Naro, every one will think that I have asked you to do so. If you can give secret help, do so. But the Peshwa collects accurate information through his secret agents who are good...... Join the Peshwa’s troops publicly and please him, but act against him in secret......Send a copy of this letter to Naro. I shall not openly begin a family feud and ruin the State. So I shall not send any help to Naro”.
4 S.P.D., xix, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43.
Peshwa. He thought that the Peshwa did not send him adequate assistance while he was fighting in Hindusthan. He did not take into consideration the fact that the Peshwa was fighting simultaneously in the Carnatic and was not in a position to help him with men and money.\(^1\) Raghunath also brooded over his disappointment in the case of succession to the Holkar State which he attributed, not without reason, to the Peshwa's interference.\(^2\) Unable to conceal his sentiments and tormented by his ambitious and unscrupulous wife,\(^3\) he half willingly prepared for a renewal of civil war.

The Peshwa was always eager for conciliation, so far as his uncle was concerned. He "intended to make a last effort to reclaim his uncle, to repeat his offer of conceding a principal share in the administration or to give him a handsome but moderate establishment in any part of the country where he might choose to reside".\(^4\) The Peshwa wanted to meet his uncle and arrive at an agreement by frank discussion; but Raghunath 'strongly suspected that there was a plan laid for seizing him'.\(^5\)

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1 The Peshwa's financial position after his return from the Carnatic was very unsatisfactory (S.P.D., xix, 46, 50) and presumably he was not well off during the campaign. Yet he had sent one lakh to Raghunath. (Khare, III, 638).
2 See Chapter VI.
5 Grant Duff, Vol. I, pp. 556-557. Mostyn, the envoy of the Bombay Government at the court of Poona, reported in December, 1767, that the Peshwa, 'instigated by his mother, certainly had intentions of seizing his uncle at that interview'. On this statement Grant Duff remarks,..."as he mentions this on hearsay evidence, respecting an intention, and that too relating to what had taken place prior to his
After some delay an interview was arranged by the mediation of Govind Shiv Ram,\(^1\) one of Madhav Rao’s principal officers. Negotiations continued during the months of August and September.\(^2\) The Peshwa advanced with officers and troops to meet Raghunath.\(^3\) They met at Katore in September and then went to Anandavalli.\(^4\) The Peshwa insisted that there should be a face to face talk, undisturbed by any intermediary.\(^5\) Raghunath expressed his desire to sever all connection with political affairs\(^6\) and agreed to give up the forts of Satara, Asirgarh, arrival at Poona, ... I have preferred the authority of the natives of the country, who concur in imputing such a wish to Gopika Bye, but no such design to Mahdoo Rao”.

\(^1\) S.P.D., xix, 49. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 556) quotes a statement of Mostyn to the effect that the interview was arranged by Sakharam Bapu, and remarks, “Sukaram, according to his usual duplicity, was intriguing with both parties, that he might at all events be able to retain his place. He would not incur the risk of interference in a reconciliation which he foresaw would only be temporary”. Khare (III, p. 1246) follows Grant Duff. On Sakharam’s attitude, see S.P.D., xix, 58. One of his letters to his family priest (S.P.D., xxxix, 61), written towards the close of 1765, gives us an interesting picture of his mind. He says that although he is inclined towards the uncle, he always acts for the good of the state. The Peshwa knows this and respects his ability. Neither Raghunath nor the Peshwa acts or speaks frankly.

\(^2\) S.P.D., xix, 55, 56.

\(^3\) Khare, III, 729, p. 1248.

\(^4\) S.P.D., xix, 56, 61.

\(^5\) S.P.D., xix, 56. Their conversation was angry, and they had separate kitchens. (S.P.D., xix, 57, 58). According to Grant Duff, (Vol. I, p. 557) the Peshwa said that the uncle ‘must either take the share of the administration which was proposed, or have no interference whatever in the government.’

\(^6\) S.P.D., xix, 67, 69.
Ahmednagar, Shivneri and Chandan. If the Peshwa promised to pay the arrears due to his troops on account of the Northern expedition and to make a suitable provision for his family and attendants. Madhav Rao agreed to pay his debts and to place at his disposal a large jagir containing several important forts. Those sardars who were loyal to Raghunath were to be confirmed in the possession of their jagirs, and the Peshwa was not to send them to any expedition without consulting him. It took about one month to bring about this agreement. Sakhamram Bapu played an important part as a negotiator. Raghunath

3 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 557) says that he agreed to pay 25 lakhs in three months. S.P.D., xix, 74, says that 15 lakhs were to be paid immediately. S.P.D., xix, 67, mentions 30/32 lakhs, but S.P.D., xix, 68, mentions 25 lakhs. On December 31, 1767, Mostyn noted in his diary that the Peshwa "is under engagements to pay (Raghunath) the whole of the amount stipulated in their late accommodation by the Divali, the balance of which is twenty lakhs".
4 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 557) says that it yielded 12 or 13 lakhs annually. Khare (III, p. 1260) says that it was worth 14 lakhs. He is supported by S.P.D., xix, 68. S.P.D., xix, 61, says that Raghunath received a jagir for 6 lakhs in addition to the territory already under his control. S.P.D., xix, 74, says that he retained a jagir worth 10 lakhs.
5 S.P.D., xix, 61, gives 20 forts. S.P.D., xix, 65, gives 8 forts. S.P.D., xix, 74, gives 6 forts. This statement is supported by Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 557).
6 S.P.D., xix, 74.
7 S.P.D., xix, 69.
8 S.P.D., xix, 59.
was dissatisfied, but his military inferiority compelled him to keep silent for some time.

Towards the close of October the Peshwa marched towards Poona. Raghunath at once began his intrigues and went to Trimbakeswar. He opened negotiations with Haidar Ali, Nizam Ali, Janoji Bhonsle and Damaji Gaikwad. An interesting account of his views and plans is found in the diary of Mostyn, who came to Poona as the envoy of the President and Council of Bombay to solicit the Peshwa's assistance in the war against Haidar Ali. If the Peshwa was found unwilling to render active assistance to the English, the envoy was instructed to induce him to remain neutral. In order to prevent the Peshwa from interfering in the war as an ally of Haidar Ali, Mostyn was directed to take full advantage of his quarrel with his uncle, and to 'encourage any advances' which might be made by the latter. He was also asked to send presents to Raghunath through his assistant, Brome, who was instructed 'very particularly to attend to any representation Raghoba may make to him'.

Mostyn arrived at Poona on November 29, 1767, and left for Bombay on February 27, 1768. He found that one of

1 S.P.D., xix, 71.
2 He had only 2,000 troops, while the Peshwa had 20,000. (S.P.D., xix, 68).
3 S.P.D., xix, 70.
4 S.P.D., xix, 71.
5 S.P.D., xix, 73.
6 Khare, III, 748, p. 1250.
7 Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series, Vol. I. See Chapter V.
the principal causes which prevented the Peshwa from joining the war was the suspicious movements of Raghunath. He says, "The chief motive given for this inactivity at so favourable a juncture for his (i.e., Peshwa's) getting possession of the Bednur country, now quite destitute of any force, is his apprehension of Raghoba creating some disturbance should he leave his capital for any time, whose late behaviour perplexes them a good deal, for he is marching about with his force, and various are the reports of his intentions; nay, so jealous are they of him, that it was five days after my application before I could procure the passports for Mr. Brome to go to Nasik". On December 31 Mostyn noted that the Peshwa "is under engagement to pay (to Raghoba) the whole of the amount stipulated in their late accommodation by the Divali, the balance of which is twenty lacs. Until he has done this he does not look upon himself at liberty to undertake anything". This was an opportunity not to be missed. Brome started for Nasik, where Raghunath was then residing, on December 19. He was instructed to adopt a friendly attitude and 'draw from him some proposals'.

On January 1, Gopal Chakradhar, Raghunath's vakil, saw Mostyn and assured him that 'it was Raghoba's sincere desire to be on the most amicable footing' with the English. He 'very openly' told the English envoy that Raghunath and the Peshwa "placed no confidence in each other, and that......Raghoba would not sit down quietly under the disgrace of having all the principal forts taken out of his hands and no share in the Govern-

ment; that he only waited to see if Madhavrao failed in any of his agreements with him, which, should he do in the least point, Raghoba would certainly make use of to foment matters and, at any rate", the English envoy "should see in six months what a disturbance he would create". He also said "in confidence that Raghoba had concerted measures for entering into a strict and lasting friendship with the English and intended sending a person to Madras on this account, but as Mr. Brome was now gone to him he would now defer it".

Gopal Chakradhar's exposition of Raghunath Rao's sentiments was confirmed by Brome's report to Mostyn, dated January 15. In his conversations with Brome, Raghunath Rao had expressed his desire "to engage the English on his side and receive help from them when he might take up arms, which after the rains he was fully resolved on"; "and he earnestly entreated they would assist him with guns and ammunition". Brome told him that the Company "would expect some advantages exclusive of the bare pay of their troops, and the amount of cost of such ammunition he might receive from their hands". When Raghunath asked for details, Brome tried 'to draw out such proposals as he was willing to agree to'; but Raghunath evaded a direct answer. At that time Raghunath had at his disposal 2,000 horse, 120 guns and 8 mortars mounted, of different sizes; he had other guns at another place, but the number Brome could not ascertain. A copy of Brome's report was sent to Bombay on January 25.²

The substance of these negotiations was probably known to the Peshwa, for Raghunath himself on a different occasion testified to the excellence of his secret service. At any rate, in his interview with Mostyn on February 11, Madhav Rao said that he 'expected and hoped the Hon’ble Company would not support or assist any of his enemies even though they were his relations'. Mostyn assured him that "so long as he remained firm in his friendship with them (i.e., the English) they would not think of supporting or assisting either his relations or any one else against him". The First Anglo-Maratha War was casting its shadow upon the ill-fated Maratha Empire.

During the winter season of 1767-68 Raghunath succeeded in dislocating the Peshwa’s plans in all directions. He could not take advantage of the Anglo-Mysore War to increase his influence in the Carnatic. He had to give up his project of attacking the Siddis of Janjira. He had to cancel his programme of sending an expedition to Hindusthan. He had to conciliate the Nizam. He carefully watched the movements of his uncle.

1 S.P.D., xix, 52.
2 Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 170. It appears that the President and Council of Bombay were not unprepared, even after this assurance, to help Raghunath. The President of Bombay wrote to the President of Madras on June 14, 1768, "...Raghoba ...... has sent very advantageous proposals to us in case of our assisting him with a detachment of Europeans and Sepoys, which the weakness of our force puts it out of our power to embrace. Though in hopes of profiting by this rupture, we have not told him so in direct terms, but endeavour to amuse him until we see what turn affairs are likely to take......." (Forrest, Selections, Home Series, Vol. II, p. 153).
3 Khare, III, pp. 1261-1262.
Raghunath collected troops and adopted a son named Amrit Rao to whom he might bequeath his claims. His principal supporters were Damaji Gaikwad, who sent him some troops under his eldest son Govind Rao, and Gangadhar Yavant Chandrachud, the former Dewan of the Holkar State. He could no longer be left undisturbed to mature his plans and to complete his preparations. So the Peshwa summoned loyal chiefs like Mahadji Sindhia, Tukoji Holkar and Gopal Rao Patwardhan and collected about 40,000 troops.

1 In May, 1768, he had 10,000 troops. (S.P.D. xix 76). 'Towards the end of the fair season', says Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 558), he had assembled a force of upwards of 15,000 men.

2 Khare, III, 768. S.P.D., xix, 77.

3 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 558) and Khare (III, pp. 1230, 1323) say that Gaikwad helped Raghunath, but in S.P.D., xix, 76, we find that Govind Rao joined the Peshwa.

4 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 558) says that Gangadhar was "not only a zealous partizan of Rugonath Rao, but entertained a personal pique against the Peshwa .....At a public Durbar in Poona, after Rugonath Rao had retired from the administration, Gungadhar Yeswunt took an opportunity of saying, in a contemptuous manner, 'that in the present affairs his old eyes could distinguish the acts of one who only saw with the eyes of a boy'; Mahdoo Rao, to the astonishment of all present, jumped from the musnud......and struck him a violent blow on the face"...This incident, if true, illustrates one aspect of Madhav Rao's character. But Gangadhar's 'pique' may have been due to the frustration of his plan against Ahalya Bai, which will be described in Chapter VI.

5 S.P.D., xix, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82. Khare, III, p. 1264. Holkar said that he would not fight for any party. (S.P.D., xix, 83). S.P.D., xix, 85, says that Tukoji fought for the Peshwa in the battle of Dhodap. S.P.D., xix, 92, says that Tukoji promised to fight for
Apprehending that Janoji Bhonsle would soon come to assist Raghunath, who had already marched to Dhodap, a fort in the Chandor Range, Madhav Rao advanced with his troops. When Raghunath found that the Peshwa had come near his camp, he tried to avoid hostilities. He said, "If the Peshwa kills me, he will be a parricide. If I kill him, I shall kill my son". He requested Gopal Rao to arrange a reconciliation. He also tried to proceed towards Berar in order to take shelter in Bhonsle’s territories. But the Peshwa was determined to fight, and took measures to prevent Raghunath from flying towards Berar. On June 10, 1768, a decisive battle was fought at Dhodap. The battle did not last long. One of Raghunath’s commanders was killed, another was wounded and captured, and his camp was plundered. On the Peshwa’s side the number of killed and wounded did not exceed 15.

Raghunath had taken shelter in the fort of Dhodap on the eve of the battle, and he remained there when the news of the defeat was conveyed to him. The Peshwa naturally besieged the fort. Raghunath knew that he could not defend it; so he began negotiations. Madhav Rao asked him to live at Poona, but he wanted money to go on pilgrimage. The Peshwa showed no inclination to yield even when Raghunath personally came to his camp. At last the uncle said, "I have become a prisoner; so I shall do what you ask me to do". The fort was surrendered Raghunath with 8,000 men, and took one lakh for expenses, but later on joined the Peshwa.

1 S.P.D., xix, 83.
2 S.P.D., xix, 84, 85.
3 S.P.D., xix, 87.
to the Peshwa, who left 3,000 troops to occupy Raghunath's 
jagir and marched to Poona.¹ Raghunath was confined in the 
Shanwar Wada at Poona² and even his personal attendances 
were nominated by the Peshwa.³

Of the accomplices of Raghunath, Gangadhar Yashvant 
suffered the most terrible punishment. He tried to leave Dhodap 
in disguise, but he was caught by Tukoji Holkar's troops and 
brought before the Peshwa.⁴ He was asked to pay a fine of 20 
lakhs. On his failure to pay the money he was confined and 
flogged.⁵ It appears that he remained in confinement till 1770.⁶ 
Kedarji Sindhia, who had helped Raghunath, was captured, beaten 
and handed over to Mahadji.⁷ Govind Rao Gaikwad was arrest-
ed and confined. He had to pay a fine of 23 lakhs.⁸

Madhav Rao now turned his attention to Janoji B hosele. 
Towards the middle of 1768 he collected troops. He had already 
entered into an agreement with the Nizam, who sent an army 
under Rukn-ud-daula to proceed against Berar. Janoji also collect-
ed troops,⁹ although he tried to avoid hostilities even in Septem-
ber. He sent Sabaji to Poona and requested Moroba Fadnis, a

¹ Khare, III, 773.
² S.P.D., xix, 98.
³ S.P.D., xix, 91. Brome wrote, "I found also Raghunath was 
prisoner in the palace, the whole of his servants, even his menial ones, 
discharged, and creatures of Madhav Rao placed in their room, a strong 
guard placed over him, and no one permitted to see or converse with 
him without the express leave of Madhav Rao himself". (B.S.C.P., 
December 13, 1768).
⁴ Khare, III, p. 1323.
⁵ S.P.D., xix, 91.
⁶ S.P.D., xix, 106.
⁷ S.P.D., xix, 92.
⁸ Khare, III, pp. 1323-1324.
⁹ S.P.D., xx, 194.
confidant of the Peshwa, to intercede on his behalf. He declared that his disloyalty to the Peshwa was due to the intrigues of his Dewan Divakar Pant and that for the next four years he would do nothing against the Peshwa. He said, “If there is no Peshwa the South will be full of Turks......In Peshwa’s welfare we realise our own welfare. In his absence we cannot keep our estates”. Both parties knew that these assurances did not mean anything. Janoji secured the assistance of Piraji Nimbalkar and collected about 14,000 troops. The Peshwa collected more than 30,000 troops and the Nizam personally came to Nander with 5,000 troops. Towards the close of December the Peshwa, accompanied by Rukn-ud-daula, proceeded towards Berar.

Finding that hostilities were inevitable, Janoji decided to embarrass his enemies by adopting the old Maratha system of guerrilla warfare, in which the Peshwa was “less experienced than in the half regular kind of warfare to which his attention had been directed. The artillery, the Arabs, and the infantry partially disciplined, the numerous tents, and the heavy equip-
ments of the Peishwa and Rookun-ud-dowlah, unfitted them for the active war of detachments which Janojee pursued.  

The combined armies of the Peshwa and the Nizam entered Berar by the route of Basim and Karanja. The first victim was Narhar Ballal, Janoji's governor in Berar, who was defeated and killed. Janoji avoided battles. The Peshwa plundered Nagpur and took the forts of Amner and Bhandara. The whole province lay at his mercy; he placed thanas in various districts and collected the revenue all over the country. Then he laid siege to the fort of Chanda. Now Janoji emerged out of his shelter and proceeded towards Chanda to assist the besieged garrison. He was opposed by Gopal Rao, who prevented him from cutting off the supplies and defeated him in a battle lasting for about five or six hours. Unable to relieve Chanda, Janoji decided to plunder the Peshwa's territory.

Early in February Janoji proceeded towards Poona with

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2 Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 560. Grant Duff puts Narhar's death at the beginning of the campaign. In S.P.D., xx, 215 (dated January 10, 1769), there is a reference to Narhar's death. But in some letters dated February (S.P.D., xx, 220, 221, 223, 224) Narhar is described as harassing the Peshwa's troops in Berar. It seems that here the reference is really to Narhar's nephew, Vithal Pant Ballal, and not to Narhar, who died in January according to Grant Duff and S.P.D., xx, 215. This assumption is confirmed by S.P.D., xx, 259.
3 S.P.D., xx, 211, 213, 216. Early in January he was somewhere near Ellichpur. Then he fled towards the wilds of Berar.
4 Khare, III, 784. S.P.D., xx, 216.
6 Khare, III, pp. 1328-1329. Grant Duff does not refer to Janoji's attempt to relieve Chanda.
about 20,000 horse. The Peshwa sent a detachment of 8,000 troops under Gopal Rao and Ram Chandra Ganesh to pursue him,\(^1\) while he himself remained behind to reduce Janoji’s forts.\(^2\) Vithal Pant Ballal, one of Janoji’s officers, created trouble in Khandesh and Berar, but he was defeated and killed in an engagement with a detachment sent by the Peshwa.\(^3\)

Janoji’s advance towards Poona created a difficult problem for the Peshwa. Janoji proceeded through Khandesh, crossed the Godavari near Dharmapuri and marched through the Nizam’s territory by way of Palas, Kona, Samudra, Lalem, Malupeth and Lingampeth. Though he was pursued, he could not be overtaken or prevented from plundering the Peshwa’s territories.\(^4\) Probably the pursuers, Gopal Rao and Ramchandra Ganesh, were not quite sincere in the part they were playing. They had some secret understanding with Janoji.\(^5\) Their designs were not unknown to the Peshwa. The situation was still more critical because Janoji intended to release Raghunath Rao from confinement and restore him to power.\(^6\) Madhav Rao knew that

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6. It appears from a letter written by the English Chief of Masulipatam to the Madras Council that in 1768 Janoji asked the Nizam to join him in “attacking Madhav Rao in favour of the party that adheres to his uncle Raghunath and for either placing Raghunath in
many sardars would openly rally round Raghunath if he could regain his freedom. He was also afraid that the English might help Janoji. So he ordered Nana Fadnis to remove Raghunath to the fort of Simlagath, raised the siege of Chanda and advanced towards his running enemy.

Early in March Janoji found it impossible to elude his pursuers. So he had to give up his plan of plundering Poona the Government of Poona or in failure thereof obliging Madhav Rao to submit to such regulations and terms as they should impose upon him. Nizam Ali was inclined to join Janoji if he was helped by the Company’s troops. (B.S.C.P., March 1, 1769).

1 Khare, III, pp. 1329-1330. In March Raghunath made an attempt to escape by collusion with his guards. The conspiracy was unearthed in time by Nana Fadnis, whom the Peshwa had left in charge of Poona. (S.P.D., xx, 211). Raghunath thereupon began a fast, which he stopped only when he heard that the Peshwa was returning to Poona. (Khare, III, 802. S.P.D., xx, 256; xix, 98).

2 In July, 1768, Colonel Barker reported to Calcutta that Janoji was willing to join the English if they proceeded against the Peshwa. (B.S.C.P., 1768 (I), pp. 423-457; 1768 (II), pp. 673-716). After the outbreak of hostilities with the Peshwa Janoji appealed to the English for help; but the Governor of Bengal (Verelst), unwilling to offend the Peshwa at a time when the war with Haidar Ali had reached a critical stage, replied that as hostilities between the Peshwa and Janoji were about to come to an end, there was hardly any need for the Company’s help. (C.P.C., II, 1388, 1393). Janoji was very much offended. (C.P.C., II 1633, 1708; III, 45).

3 Khare, III, 790.
5 S.P.D., xx, 239.
6 Khare, III, 796, 797, 798.
7 Most of the inhabitants of the city had fled in alarm. They now returned. The defence of the city was rendered easier by the arrival of Govind Rao Gaikwad with troops. (Khare, III, 791. S.P.D., xx, 241, 247).
and proceeded towards Nirmala. His army, consisting of about 25,000 men, was suffering from want of food and fodder. Nor was the position of his pursuers better. The Peshwa found that the Nizam’s troops were unwilling to march and anxious to go home. He encamped at Kanakapur on the north bank of the Bhima. Both sides were now tired of fighting, and negotiations were being carried on by Divakar Pant, Janoji’s Dewan. Janoji had passed the Peshwa’s army near Mahur and one of his officers had plundered a portion of the Peshwa’s baggage, but he was not in a position to continue the war. His territory had been ravaged so mercilessly that it could not be restored to normal conditions within less than five years. He heard with alarm that the Peshwa had entered into ‘some intrigues’ with his brother Muddhaji. On the other hand, the Peshwa had his own reasons to be anxious for peace.

In April there was an interview between the Peshwa and Janoji at Kanakapur and peace was concluded. Janoji returned to the Peshwa the entire territory (worth 8 lakhs) left to him in 1765 and also agreed to pay a tribute of five lakhs in five

1 Khare, III, p. 1331.  2 S.P.D., xx, 245, 249; xix, 97.
3 Khare, III, pp. 1331, 1334.
4 S.P.D., xx, 253.
5 S.P.D., xx, 250, 253, 257, 265, 267, 271; xix, 97.
7 S.P.D., xx, 257.
8 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 561) says that the agreement was signed on March 23 and adds, “The Bombay records mention the treaty...... as having taken place on 23rd April”. There is no reason to assume that the agreement was signed before the interview, which took place in April. (S.P.D., xx, 277-280, 283). Hence it seems that the date given in the Bombay records is correct.
annual instalments. He also renounced his old customary right of levying the tribute of Ghās Dānā from the Peshwa’s districts in Aurangabad; in lieu of such tribute due from any other district belonging to the Peshwa or Nizam Ali, a stipulated sum was to be fixed, and paid by an order upon the collectors. In case the Nizam’s officers refused to pay the amount, Janoji would be entitled to levy it by force. He was neither to increase nor to diminish his military force without the Peshwa’s permission; he was to attend whenever his services were requisitioned by the Peshwa; he was not to protect or encourage disaffected officers of the Peshwa’s army; he was to maintain no political correspondence with the Emperor of Delhi, the Ruhelas, the Nawab of Oudh, the English and the Nizam, although he could maintain agents with the English in Orissa and in the court of the Nizam for the regulation of revenue affairs. He was also allowed to send a force against the English in Orissa, provided his troops were not required for the service of the Peshwa. The Peshwa agreed not to molest Janoji’s territory by marching his forces towards Hindustan by any unusual route, to pay no attention to the pretensions of his relations so long as he did not disturb their just rights, and to assist him with troops in case of an invasion of his territories by any other power. The Nizam was given estates worth three lakhs and an estate worth one lakh was conferred on Rukn-ud-daula.¹

So long as Janoji Bhonsle was alive² he remained loyal to the Peshwa. In October, 1769, he received an envoy from

² He died in May, 1772. (S.P.D., xx, 300, 301).
Haidar Ali, who was then engaged in hostilities with the Peshwa, but he plainly refused to embarrass the Peshwa by attacking Poona.\(^1\) Even at that time he was uneasy about the Peshwa's intentions, for he suspected that he might turn against him in co-operation with one of his brothers.\(^2\) Still he remained loyal and wrote, "The Peshwa's enemy is our enemy".\(^3\)

Janoji Bhonsle's negotiations with the British authorities in Calcutta regarding the cession of Cuttack\(^4\) deserve a passing reference here. When Clive became Governor of Bengal for the second time, he tried to obtain Cuttack by peaceful negotiations. In 1766 Clive ordered Mr. T. Motte to proceed to Nagpur to carry the negotiations to a successful conclusion, but this plan had to be given up because, owing to his disputes with the Peshwa, Janoji was not at that time prepared to receive a British envoy. During the Governorship of Verelst the Calcutta authorities were very anxious to conclude a treaty with Janoji Bhonsle. The First Anglo-Mysore War was going on, and the Peshwa seemed inclined to join Haidar Ali against the Company.\(^5\) At this juncture an alliance with Nagpur might be utilised in keeping Madhav Rao busy at home. The Select Committee later on wrote to the Court of Directors, "Our principal object of bring-

\(^1\) S.P.D., xx, 287. The English authorities in Madras agreed to consider Haidar's plan for an alliance with him and Janoji Bhonsle against the Peshwa. (Letter from Madras to Bengal, July 1, 1769. B.S.C.P., 1769, pp. 404-412).
\(^2\) S.P.D., xx, 289.
\(^3\) S.P.D., xx, 292. He sent his brother with 5,000 horse to help the Peshwa against Haidar. (C.P.C., III, 45).
\(^4\) Nandalal Chatterji, Verelst's Rule in India, Chap. IV.
\(^5\) See Chapter V.
ing about a treaty with him (i.e., Janoji) was to divert Madhav Rao from entering the Carnatic to the assistance of Haidar Ali.” Moreover, Janoji’s friendship would enable the Calcutta authorities to render effective assistance to Madras through the Cuttack route. But the negotiations proved abortive, due mainly to Janoji’s lack of interest. In 1769 the Calcutta authorities heard that the Peshwa was determined to crush Janoji Bhonsle. They decided to wait for the final result of this contest before committing themselves in favour of the rebel. This policy found support in Madras. Shambhaji Ganesh, Janoji’s governor in Orissa, requested Verelst to assist his master ‘at this critical juncture’ and proposed to send an agent to Calcutta to negotiate on this matter, but the Company adopted a strictly neutral policy. Even after Janoji Bhonsle’s final submission Raghunath Rao could not reconcile himself to the restraints imposed upon him. He tried to escape from confinement in March, 1769, and began to fast, but the vigilance of Nana Fadnis frustrated his plan. After the Peshwa’s return to Poona from the Berar campaign he again fasted for ten days and his condition became serious. He demanded a jagir worth 5 lakhs and another jagir worth 2 lakhs for his adopted son. The Peshwa offered him a suitable allowance. At last it was decided that Raghunath would be given two lakhs for charity, his adopted son (whom

1 Letter to Court, April 6, 1769.
2 B.S.C.P., December 17, 1768.
4 Janoji also sent repeated appeals to Shah Alam. (B.S.C.P., March 21, 1769).
he wanted to keep near him at Poona) would be kept near Wadgaon, and those who had been imprisoned for complicity in his plan for escape would be released.¹ Even after this Raghunath intrigued with the Nizam and Haidar Ali,² but the Peshwa’s vigilance was too strong for him. A new agreement was concluded between the uncle and the nephew in March, 1772. Raghunath was to receive 5 lakhs for expenses and 10 to 15 lakhs for horses, camels etc. His officers and personal attendants were to be appointed by the Peshwa. His adopted son was not to be brought to Poona. Once a year he was to be allowed to go to the Krishna for bathing. Although he was released from confinement, a strict watch was kept over him and he was not allowed to interfere in political matters. During the last few months of Madhav Rao’s life Raghunath sincerely prayed and fasted for his recovery.³

¹ Khare, III, 808, pp. 1337-1338.
² S.P.D., xx, 198, 287.
³ Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, pp. 115-116, 240.
CHAPTER IV

THE THIRD CARNATIC EXPEDITION

When Madhav Rao returned to Poona on the conclusion of the second Carnatic expedition, he left Gopal Rao to protect Maratha territories against Haidar Ali's aggression. In this difficult duty the Patwardhan Chief was assisted by Murar Rao. Gopal Rao realised tribute from Chitradurg, Raidurg and Bellary. At the beginning of the rainy season of 1766 he returned to Miraj.\(^1\)

In the meanwhile the Peshwa had been trying to come to a friendly understanding with the Nizam, so that he might safely resume his unfinished operations against Haidar Ali.\(^2\) Dhondo Ram, the Maratha vakil at Haidarabad, tried hard to remove the misunderstanding in the minds of Nizam Ali and Rukn-ud-daula.\(^3\) The Peshwa personally met the Nizam and gave to him territories worth 15 lakhs.\(^4\) No definite agreement seems to have been concluded, although a general understanding about co-operation against Haidar resulted from the interview.\(^5\)

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1 Khare, III, 585, p. 1016.
2 We find in an English letter dated December 4, 1765, "Madhav Rao is going to attack and has sent orders to Murar Rao to join him".—M.M.C., Vol. 23B, p. 1033.
4 S.P.D., xxxviii, 159, 166, 167.
5 In January, 1767, Colonel Joseph Smith wrote from the Nizam's camp to Madras, "The Nizam has not yet made any terms with the Marathas, but proposes doing it when they join him after passage of
Haidar Ali was probably quite aware of these developments. He naturally tried to secure the active alliance of the English. In June, 1766, he wrote to the Madras authorities, “I have got a large force; the English have the same. If both be united, the Moguls (i.e. the Nizam) and the Marathas can do nothing”.

The Bombay authorities met Haidar half way by actually proposing a treaty of peace and friendship in July, 1766. They demanded the continuation of all rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under the former Chiefs in the region from ‘Cape Ramos to Penny South’. They also wanted freedom from molestation and commercial preference. Clause 12 of the proposed treaty provided that Haidar would not enter into any alliance prejudicial to the interests of the Company, nor would he attack either the Nawab of Arcot or the Raja of Travancore. Haidar tried to evade this clause, and in November, 1766, he expressed his demand in a clause which ran as follows: “Whenever the Hon’ble Company may be in want of troops I will furnish them with 10 or 15 thousand men from this Sircar, and on the contrary, should this Sircar be in such necessity, the Hon’ble Company are to supply me in like manner.” The tentative plan was as follows: “Each to recover what territory has been taken from him by Haidar, and money and contributions were to be equally divided”.

(M.M.C., Vol. 26A, p. 65). Compare Khare, III, 618. Khare, III, 602L, informs us that earlier there was an understanding between the Peshwa and the Nizam that no big expedition would be undertaken by either party without informing each other.

1 M.M.C., Vol. 25, p. 384.
manner as is consistent with our fair friendship, and is also the cause of dread to our enemies".?

But there were reasons which prevented the English from ranging themselves on the side of Haidar Ali. "The Court of Directors were desirous of seeing the Mahrattas checked in their progress, and would have beheld combinations of the other native powers against them with abundant satisfaction;" but they were unwilling to become "involved in hostilities, especially as principals, in any case short of absolute defence". Their territorial ambition in the Deccan was directed towards Salsette, Hog Island and Karanja in the neighbourhood of Bombay, and the Northern Circars on the eastern coast. The Marathas were not at all willing to surrender those islands; they were naturally jealous of the growing power of the Company, and "they attached peculiar value to these possessions as the fruits of their success against an European nation". Nizam Ali was formerly willing to farm the Northern Circars (except Guntur, which was included in Basalat Jang's jagir) to the Nawab of Arcot, but he positively refused to rent them to the English even though they offered six times more than he had ever before received. The Company was so anxious to obtain these districts that Lord Clive secured a grant of them from Emperor Shah Alam, and the Madras Government occupied Rajahmundry by force. Emboldened by his alliance with the Marathas Nizam Ali 'threatened the English with extirpation, and endeavoured to incite Hyder to invade the Carnatic'. Instead of conciliating

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Haidar the Madras Government now tried to court the Nizam. When the matter was reported to Lord Clive, he also recommended a connection with the Nizam. Nizam Ali now agreed to the proposals of the English,\(^1\) probably because he was particularly anxious to crush Haidar.\(^2\)

The result was General Calliaud’s treaty\(^3\) with the Nizam, dated November 12, 1766. By Article 2 the English secured a sanad for the five Circars (Ellore, Rajahmundry, Mustaphanagar, Siccacoli and Murtazanagar) and in return promised “to have a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness’s Government, in everything that is right and proper, whenever required, provided that they be at liberty to withdraw the whole or such part thereof as they may judge proper, whenever either the safety of their own Settlements or the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic be the least endangered”. It was distinctly understood that the English auxiliary force was to be employed for the suppression of Haidar Ali. The Nizam told General Calliaud that he would take the field in less than a month and

\(^2\) General Calliaud wrote to the President of Madras, “I found that the Subah’s designs in conjunction with the Marathas were the attack of Haidar... and that the assistance of our troops would be required on the occasion”. (B.S.C.P., January 16, 1767).

Probably Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 553) is correct in assuming that Nizam Ali intended “to reduce Hyder and to humble the Mahrattas;... but as he had already leagued himself with the Mahrattas against Hyder, he deemed it most advisable not to break with Mahdoo Rao, until he had effected the overthrow of the usurper of Mysore”.

expected to be joined by the English troops by the end of December, 1766.¹

Although the treaty placed the Northern Circars under the Company,² this arrangement was contrary to the advice of Lord Clive, who "had expressly suggested that any aid which might be afforded Nizam Ali, should be directed to restrain the formidable power of the Mahrattas, instead of co-operating for their aggrandizement. To check the growing ambition of Hyder in any direction which might affect the British interests, was in his judgment an object of legitimate policy: but to crush the only power in the South who had been able to oppose any respectable resistance to the aggressions of the Maratha States, and who formed, if his friendship could be secured, a barrier between them and the Company’s dominions, was in direct opposition to the views of that profound statesman".³ But Nizam Ali was unwilling to break with the Marathas ‘until he had effected the overthrow of the usurper of Mysore’, and the English were for many reasons very eager to secure his goodwill.⁴ As the Madras authorities wrote to the Court of Directors, "It was

1 B.S.C.P., January 16, 1767, p. 77.
2 For the military advantage derived by the Company from this treaty, see Wilson, History of the Madras Army, Vol. I, p. 11.
4 The Madras authorities wrote to Bombay on November 18, 1766, "We may be prevailed to assist (the Nizam) in reducing the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds and which we cannot but look upon as a favourable opportunity of checking the ambitious designs of a man from whose violence, immense conquests, riches and power the peace of the Nabob’s (i.e. Muhammad Ali’s) dominions is liable to be disturbed..."—M.M.C., Vol. 24, p. 615.
absolutely necessary to support the Nizam to secure an open communication between this place and Bengal, and to prevent the Marathas from overpowersing him in which case they would immediately become very troublesome on this side the Kistnah and to Bengal”.  

In December, 1766, the Peshwa wrote to Raghunath Rao that Haidar’s generals, Mir Faizulla and Mir Reza, were ravaging Maratha territory in the Carnatic and demanding tribute from Raidurg, Bellary, Harpanhalli, Chitaldrug and other important posts. The local rulers were appealing to the Peshwa for assistance, but he had no troops to spare. So he decided to march personally to the Krishna, expecting that Haidar might thereby be scared away. He asked Naro Shankar to send money and troops for the expedition. Before starting for the Carnatic he marched to Sholapur for suppressing Babuji Naik, who was in secret correspondence with Haidar Ali. His intention was to proceed to the Carnatic as soon as the trouble created by Babuji Naik was over.

1 Madras Record Office, Despatch to England, dated January 22, 1767. It is interesting to read the following criticism of this policy: “Against this man (Haidar), whose territories are the natural barrier between our Settlements and the Marathas, were we now to be engaged in war; an event, which ought to have been avoided at all hazards; nor was it more expedient to embrace the alliance of Madhav Rao... nevertheless the Presidency, blind to the almost evident consequences of so unnatural a conjunction, ordered Colonel Smith to join this expedition”.—Orme Mss., No. 71: Details of the war with Haidar Ali.  
—A letter from Madras.

3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 109.  
4 S.P.D., xix, 46.  
5 See Chapter VIII.  
6 S.P.D., xxxix, 73
Grant Duff\(^1\) doubts whether Madhav Rao was apprized of the ultimate design of the alliance between the Nizam and the English. His movements seem to betray his suspicion; at any rate, it is clear that he did not expect active co-operation from the Nizam.\(^2\) A large number of troops\(^3\) having been already collected, he crossed the Krishna in January, 1767, and occupied Jetgi, Kittoor, Kanchangarh, Godwal, Bellary, Shidnoor, Adoni\(^4\) and Devdurg within the month of January.\(^5\) In these operations the Nawab of Savanur did not loyally support the Peshwa.\(^6\) Haidar fortified Bangalore, Sira and Bidnur, and shut himself up with his troops at Seringapatam. Unprepared to confront the Marathas in the open field, he remained content only with devastating his own territory, so that the Marathas could get neither food nor drink.\(^7\)

3. Khare, III, 621, gives 30,000. Colonel Smith's report to Madras Council, January 22, 1767, says that the Peshwa had 13,000 horse, 7,000 plunderers, besides some people waiting for service. (M.M.C., Vol. 26A, p. 65).
4. Adoni was included in Basalat Jang's jagir. It was given out in the Nizam's camp that the Marathas had attacked it without Nizam Ali's leave or knowledge, but Colonel Smith, who was then accompanying him, says that "most people think it would not have been done without it". (M.M.C., Vol. 26A, p. 105).
This plan was not very successful. Wilks says, "However efficacious against a regular army, the prospect is mere theory against the overwhelming mass of genuine Maratha invasion, which covers the whole face of the country and almost divests of poetic fiction the Muhammadan illustration which compares them to a cloud of locusts. Such a plan may distress but cannot stop such an army". Haidar was probably conscious of this. So he sent an envoy to negotiate for peace, but no definite terms were offered. The Marathas thought that he would not yield until the province of Sira was over run.

So in February the Peshwa went to Sira. It was well-fortified, and had a good supply of troops and ammunition. Defeated by the Peshwa in an open battle in the plain, Mir Reza, governor of Sira, took shelter in the fort. The Peshwa at once laid siege to the fort and personally supervised the operations. Men and horses were killed on both sides, and engagements continued for days. At last Mir Reza, whose relations with Haidar were not very happy at this time, surrendered the fort.

2 The Peshwa demanded (1) 75 lakhs as tribute, (2) the province of Sira, (3) important posts like Raidurg, Chitradurg, etc., and (4) an assurance that Murar Rao would be left undisturbed. Haidar's envoy offered only 12 lakhs. Later on Haidar agreed to pay 21 lakhs and to accept all other conditions except the cession of Sira. The Peshwa came down to 70 lakhs. (Khare, III, 638, 658, 673, 674, 680; pp. 1053-1054, 1056).
3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 122.
4 Peixoto says (V, 9) that Mir Reza was "afraid to come to Haidar and submit his accounts. So he decided to avoid danger by treating for peace". See the story given by Mons. le Maistre de la Tour, The History of Hyder Ali Khan, pp. 116-120.
and accepted service under the Peshwa. He was given Gurumkonda on condition that he should keep 2,000 men for the Peshwa's service. Hoskote and other places under his control were surrendered. The capture of Sira was a great political and personal triumph for the Peshwa. All local chiefs found that his power was irresistible.¹

In March the Peshwa took Madgiri,² a well-fortified fort surrounded by high cliffs on three sides. Here he found the former Raja and Queen-Mother of Bidnur, imprisoned by Ha'idar³ in 1763. He took them under his protection.⁴ Different detachments were sent to Chik Balapur and Madaksira.⁵ The Peshwa himself advanced to Channarayadurga⁶ and captured it.⁷ Gopal Rao took Dod Balapur and Chik Balapur.⁸ Haidar, unable to offer any resistance to the rapid progress of the Maratha army, continued negotiations for peace. He seems to have been extremely anxious to retain the fort of Madgiri, for he agreed to pay 35 lakhs as tribute if the Peshwa surrendered it. But the

⁵ S.P.D., xxxvii, 148.
Peshwa refused to return this important fort and demanded 40 lakhs.¹

In April the Peshwa took some important places, including Dewanhalli,² Hoskote, Nandigara³ and Kolar.⁴ The Nizam was advancing to join the Peshwa.⁵ This alarmed Haidar,⁶ and made him anxious for peace more than ever. He shrewdly proposed to the Peshwa through Gopal Rao a joint expedition against Muhammad Ali and the English. The Peshwa replied that the Nizam, and through him the English, were his friends. He added that the Marathas would march to Bangalore and the Nizam would take Seringapatam.⁷ In spite of this bold reply the Peshwa found it necessary to return home. He had no money to meet the expenses of the camp. The rains had already set in and the Marathas had no boats to cross the rivers.⁸ Moreover, he was naturally unwilling to allow the Nizam to enjoy

¹ S.P.D., xxxvii, 144, 153.


⁵ S.P.D., xxxvii, 155.

⁶ Khare, III, p. 1062. Peixoto (V, 3, 4) says that Nandi Raja was intriguing with the Marathas for being restored to the throne. Khare, III, 754, shows that Gopal Rao was connected with these intrigues, but he was restrained by the Peshwa. This was another difficulty on Haidar’s side.

⁷ Khare, III, 701.

the fruits of victories to which he had contributed nothing. Both sides being thus anxious for peace, the task of the negotiators—Appaji Ram on behalf of Haidar and Gopal Rao on behalf of the Peshwa—became easier.

The terms of the treaty, concluded towards the close of April or early in May, were the following:—(1) The Peshwa retained Channarayadurga, Madgiri, Dod Balapur and Hoskote. (2) Sira, Kolar, Chik Balapur and Nandigaram were to be returned to Haidar. (3) Kadaba and Gurumkonda were to be left to Mir Reza. (4) Haidar agreed to pay to the Peshwa 31 lakhs in different instalments. (5) Haidar agreed to pay to the Nizam 6 lakhs per year for three years. The Peshwa started for Poona early in May, leaving Murar Rao with a detachment to protect the newly annexed territory.

It is necessary at this stage to refer to the movements of the Nizam. In December, 1766, he proceeded to the Carnatic with about 30,000 troops. He was accompanied by Colonel

1 The Peshwa insisted that a distance of 40 miles must be maintained between the Maratha camp and the Nizam’s camp and said that the treaty with Haidar should be concluded before the Nizam’s arrival. (Khare, III, 706).


3 A letter dated May 3 mentions some of the terms. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 158).


Smith, but the English subsidiary troops had not yet arrived. Colonel Smith suspected that he would not cross the Krishna till the English troops joined him. Nizam Ali proposed to settle his terms with the Marathas after crossing that river. In the mean while he carried on negotiations with the Peshwa and received presents from Haidar’s envoy, who was offering ‘any sum of money’ as the price of his neutrality. Nizam Ali’s ministers, probably bribed by Haidar’s envoy, represented to him that the season was too far advanced and advised him to postpone operations till the next year. Colonel Smith suspected that he was inclined to agree with them; at any rate, he had not formed any plan of operations even towards the close of February.

In March the Nizam went to Anegundi and Chitradurg; in April he advanced towards Madgiri. On the eve of the conclusion of hostilities Rukn-ud-daula came to see the Peshwa and dined with him. The Nizam was not satisfied with the provision made for him by the Peshwa in the treaty with Haidar. He thought that Haidar should be made to pay more; but the Peshwa rightly refused to violate the spirit of a treaty just concluded, and requested the Nizam to

1 Orme Mss., No. 71.
2 M.M.C., Vol. 26A, p. 65. There was a meeting between the Peshwa and the Nizam in January, but nothing was settled. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 129).
3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 109, 122.
5 M.M.C., Vol. 26A, p. 223.
6 S.P.D., xxxvii, 146, 151, 155.
7 S.P.D., xxxvii, 158, 159.
return to Haidarabad.¹ When Colonel Tod went to the Peshwa to demand a share of the spoil for the Nizam, his application was treated with 'broad ridicule'.² General Calliaud was not wrong in expecting that the alliance between the Peshwa and the Nizam would not last long. He wrote in November, 1766, "I even foresee by their having joined in this expedition the seeds of contention and dispute which I shall venture to wish may not break out sooner than we should have them".³

¹ S.P.D., xxxvii, 161. Peixoto, V, 16.
³ B.S.C.P., January 16, 1767.
CHAPTER V

THE MARATHAS AND THE FIRST ANGLO-MYSORE WAR

We have now to turn to a very important phase in the history of Peshwa Madhav Rao's relations with the English. Nizam Ali had secured a promise for 18 lakhs without fighting. Probably Haidar did not pay this amount to the Nizam, for two years later the Nizam proposed an alliance with the Peshwa against Haidar Ali for the realisation of the amount agreed to in 1767. So far as the English are concerned, the most important fact to notice is that the war conferred no advantage on the Company. The power of the Peshwa increased; Haidar Ali was not crushed; Nizam Ali proved a false friend and soon entered into an alliance with Haidar Ali against the

1 S.P.D., xxxvii, 168. Wilks says (Vol. II, p. 15): Nizam Ali "resolved to make a few marches in advance, for the purpose of accelerating the determination of Hyder, who had repeatedly urged him to accept 20 lacs, and the promise of a fixed tribute of six, but who since his adjustment with Madoor Rao, had observed a profound silence on the subject of money..."

2 It is interesting to note that inspire of Colonel Smith's vigorous reports the English authorities in Madras for some time professed to discredit the existence of an hostile confederacy between Nizam Ali and Haidar Ali. (Wilks, Vol. II, pp. 17-18). They fondly believed that even their treaty with the Nizam would be looked upon by Haidar "in the same light as he did formerly that of the French who frequently attended the Subah in his expeditions to Mysore, yet Haidar Ali continued friendship with Pondicherry". (M.M.C., Vol. 26A, pp. 16-26).
Company. The Court of Directors observed in a letter to the Madras authorities, “When the Marathas and Haidar were at war, it was our interest......to see the power of the Marathas, if not of both contending parties, weakened, but by no means to interfere in the dispute. Every Maratha that fell in the contest might almost be considered as one of our enemies slain. But you have diverted Haidar”.¹

Even before the definite breach with the Nizam, the English had tried to come to an agreement with the Marathas. In March, 1767, Colonel Smith was asked by the Madras authorities to persuade the Nizam to undertake serious operations against Haidar Ali; if he found that Nizam Ali was determined to return to Haidarabad, he was asked to “hint (provided you can learn before that the Marathas will readily embrace the proposal) that you hope His Highness, though it is not convenient for him to remain with his whole army, will leave a part to act in conjunction with us, and in that case we shall endeavour by means of the Marathas to accomplish the end proposed by the expedition”. He was instructed to touch on the matter ‘in a light manner’, and if he found that the proposal evoked distrust, he was to offer ‘the strongest assurances that we never mean to lose sight of our connection with the Nizam’. In case Colonel Smith found it prudent to open negotiations with the Marathas, he was asked to obtain possession of Salsette and Bassein if he could, for the Bombay authorities were very anxious to secure those posts.²

Colonel Smith found the Nizam extremely displeased with the conduct of the Marathas. He was told by Rukn-ud daula that the Peshwa had deceived his ally.\(^1\) We do not know whether he actually submitted to the Nizam the Madras plan of co-operating with the Marathas against Haidar Ali. It may be assumed that he found the Court too unfavourable to receive such a proposal.

Nor was the atmosphere in the Maratha Court more favourable to the English. In April, 1767, an English military officer named Tod went to see the Peshwa. He reported that he was treated with ‘contempt’.\(^2\) Towards the middle of 1767 the Peshwa sent a vakil to Madras. He “talked in a very high strain, demanding long arrears of chauth from the Nawab (of Arcot) and in default thereof seemed to threaten the Carnatic with future troubles”. He also said that the Peshwa was very jealous of the British alliance with the Nizam and expressed surprise that so many British troops should be sent to his assistance without informing the Poona Court. The President told him that the Nawab was too impoverished to pay the

\(^1\) M.M.C., Vol. 26B, p. 289. Grant Duff says (Vol. I, p. 554), “...it could not have escaped the observation of Mahdoo Rao, that the English in the war against Hyder voluntarily appeared as auxiliaries to one of the two contracting parties, and that, upon the subjugation of Hyder, Nizam Ali, by the English aid, could dictate... in any partition of his territories. This proceeding, therefore, on the part of Mahdoo Rao, which has been alluded to (by Wilks) as ordinary Maratha artifice to anticipate the plunderer, was a measure perfectly justifiable for the purpose of effecting an important political object and disconcerting the plan of his enemies”.

\(^2\) M.M.C., Vol. 26B, p. 361.
chauth and that the British army was strong enough to defend his territories. He also pointed out that the British alliance with the Nizam was not a measure hostile to the Marathas, for it was directed against a common enemy.¹

The outbreak of the First Anglo-Mysore War² (August, 1767) made the Marathas the decisive factor in south Indian politics. The Peshwa was courted by the English and Muhammad Ali on the one side and by Nizam Ali and Haidar on the other.³ The Bengal authorities wrote to Madras on August 31, 1767, “We recommend that some importarnt stroke should be levelled before the enemies gather strength by our delay and the Marathas shall have leisure to determine to which side they will unite themselves. We are inclined to believe the Marathas have already privately acceded to the (Nizam-Haidar) alliance”⁴. The Madras authorities apprehended that the Peshwa might “come on the Carnatic for a demand of chauth or at least to be required to be well paid for his forbearance”. They suggested that Madhav Rao should be kept engaged in family disputes or internal revolts.⁵ If no such convenient weapon was available, even an alliance with the Marathas was to be preferred.

¹ M.M.C., Vol. 26B, p. 294.
² The best account of this war will be found in N. K. Sinha, Haidar Ali, Vol. I, pp. 92-156.
⁴ B.S.C.P., September 21, 1767.
⁵ “It has always been allowed, and that too with just reason, that nothing can reduce the Maratha power but dissension among themselves, and it is fortunate for the other Powers in Hindustan that the Maratha Chiefs are always ready to take every advantage of each other”. (M.M.C., April 30, 1770, Vol. 36, p. 113).
At this moment the Madras authorities seem to have been more afraid of Haidar than of the Marathas. They wrote to Calcutta that Haidar must be ‘fixed as a friend or overthrown as an enemy’. They cited with approval Lord Clive’s famous letter of October 17, 1766, in which that oracle of Anglo-Indian imperialism had observed, “The chief strength of the Marathas is horse, the chief strength of Haidar infantry, cannon and small arms. From the one we have nothing to apprehend but ravages, plundering and loss of revenues for a while, from the other extirpation”. He had also recommended an alliance with the Marathas for the destruction of Haidar, for “whatever power may be added to the Marathas by lessening that of Haidar, may be recovered by an alliance with the Soubah of the Deccan”. The Madras authorities were prepared to purchase the Peshwa’s alliance by allowing him to annex Bidnur; Mysore was to be restored to the Hindu Raja under British protection and subject to the payment of chauth to the Marathas.¹

Soon, however, the attitude of the Marathas made the Madras authorities less anxious for an alliance with them. The proposals submitted by a Maratha vakil to the Nawab of Arcot included ‘the entire extirpation of Nizam Ali and the whole family of Nizam-ul-Mulk from the Subahship of the Deccan’ and the establishment of one of Shah Alam’s sons at Haidarabad. The Madras authorities were not prepared to weaken Haidarabad. They thought that “the government of the Deccan should (if possible) be kept entire—otherwise it must fall to the Marathas and increase their power and make them dangerous neighbours

¹ B.S.C.P., September 21, 1767.
to the Company’s possessions both in Bengal and on this Coast”.¹ The authorities in Bengal also took an unfavourable view about the proposal for Maratha alliance. They wrote, “Whatever specious appearances the Marathas may carry towards you while the issue of the war is in suspense, we are persuaded their alliance will bring you no solid advantage and that you will find it a more difficult task to rid yourselves of such importunate and aspiring friends than of your present troublesome enemy. The opportunity is now above all times unfavourable for soliciting their assistance, since it cannot be done without a plain confession of our own weakness. They will at least rise in their terms in proportion to your necessities and they may possibly resolve to play a more secure game by throwing themselves into the opposite scale at a juncture when a small difference they may imagine will turn the balance”.²

After the defeats suffered by the confederate army of Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali at Changama and Trinomali (September, 1767) the authorities in Calcutta and Madras³ seriously took up the proposal for dethroning the Nizam, but for reasons different from those suggested by the Marathas. If the ruler of Haidarabad was to act as a barrier between the Marathas and the English, it was natural for the Company’s servants to make him as submissive to them as possible. But, as the Madras authorities remarked, Nizam Ali was not likely to “submit to such a dependence on the Company which must be insisted on whoever is placed in the Subaliship as a means of maintaining

¹ B.S.C.P., October 3, 1767.
² B.S.C.P., October 24, 1767.
³ B.S.C.P., December 20, 1767.
in the Deccan an effectual barrier against the Marathas...... For the grand power we ought to aim at, is to have the Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan under the influence of our power, that no disputes or jealousies may henceforth arise between the several governing powers and that we may be able by this system to lay the foundation of internal tranquillity in the countries and form an effectual barrier against the Maratha encroachments". The Calcutta authorities favoured the same plan on different grounds. They wanted to make the Nizam steady in his attachment to the British and proof against the seductions of the French. A blank farman was obtained from the helpless Emperor Shah Alam by the President of Fort William, but the difficulty of finding a reliable substitute for Nizam Ali, the problem of supplying the military assistance which the puppet Nizam was sure to require for the consolidation of his position, and the conclusion of peace by Nizam Ali in March, 1768, compelled the Madras authorities to keep this unique document 'with all possible privacy'.

1 The Court of Directors characterised this proposal as 'wild' and observed, "Much has been wrote from you and our servants in Bengal on the necessity of checking the Marathas which may in some degree be proper, but it is not for the English East India Company to take the part of umpire in Indostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power amongst themselves and their quarrels would have left you at peace".—Company's General Letter to Madras, May 13, 1768.

2 B.S.C.P., October 27, 1767, pp. 331-335.

While these plans were being matured, the Bombay authorities sent to Poona an envoy named Thomas Mostyn 'for the purpose of ascertaining the Peshwa’s views, and of using every endeavour......to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder and Nizam Ali'. The instructions with which Mostyn started clearly reveal the motives and plans of the Company. He was asked to put forward English claims upon the Maratha Government for depredations made by their subjects and ‘the unwarrantable detention of our merchants’ property in some of their ports’. On representations being made to Madhav Rao by the late President of Bombay, the Peshwa had ordered Visaji Pant to make good these losses to the Company; but Visaji Pant had not given effect to the Peshwa’s order. The President and Council anticipated that Madhav Rao would ‘probably urge the detention of Angria’s sons as a plea for his order not having been complied with’. In that case Mostyn was asked to remind the Peshwa that the Angrias had ‘thrown themselves’ upon the Company and could not, therefore, be given up. The Peshwa might also refer to ‘our sending Mr. Fletcher with the ‘Success’ ketch and ‘Fox’ gallivat to Janjira’. Mostyn was then to point out that the Company could not ‘suffer any one but Siddi Yacoob to possess that fort’.

But the envoy had ‘more interesting objects in view’. He was reminded that “the growing power of the Marathas is a subject much to be lamented” and that the Company was very

3 See Chapter VIII.
reluctant to 'contribute in any shape to increase their growing power'; but most unfortunately 'the treacherous and deceitful conduct' of Nizam Ali in joining his forces with those of Haidar Ali, with a view to invade the Carnatic, compelled the English 'to cultivate an alliance' with the Marathas, 'at least for the present'. The English required the military assistance of the Marathas if they wanted to attack Haidar Ali's possessions upon the western coast. On the other hand, if Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali succeeded in effecting a junction with the Marathas, they would be able to 'threaten very dangerous consequences to our Hon'ble Masters' affairs, especially on the other coast'. If anything was likely to prevent the Peshwa from 'going upon any distant expedition', or if he was unwilling or unable to help the Madras Presidency with cavalry 'on immediate application', Mostyn was asked to be 'less anxious about entering into an alliance with him'.

In return for the proposal of military alliance Mostyn was asked to offer Bidnur and Sunda, provided the Peshwa agreed to assign over to the Company Bassein and Salsette with its dependencies and the Maratha share of the revenues of Surat, to "permit of our keeping possession of Purhill fort with its districts and dependencies, and houses and warehouses any where else we may think proper in that and the Sounda country", and to "grant us likewise an exclusive right to the

1 The want of cavalry on the English side was one of the principal factors leading to these negotiations.
2 See Chapter VI.
pepper, sandalwood and cardamom produced there, also liberty
to export annually from Mangalore to Tellicherry or Bombay,
three hundred cargoes of rice free from duty called adlarny, in
the same manner as we now enjoy from Hyder Ali". Bidnur
and Sunda were not to be relinquished to the Peshwa if he
did not agree to surrender Salsette: "The possession of Salsette
is the first and grand object we have in view". ¹

Mostyn was also instructed, as we have seen, to take
full advantage of the quarrel between Madhav Rao and Raghunath Rao, and to 'encourage any advances' which might be
made by the latter.² If he found that the Peshwa had already
sent troops to co-operate with Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali, he
was to 'set forth in the strongest terms the bad consequences
which may ensue to his affairs in this neighbourhood by such
a conduct', and to indicate that "it is in our power to deprive
him at any time of a considerable revenue".

With these instructions Thomas Mostyn left Bombay on
November 19, 1767, and arrived at Poona on November 29.
He left Poona on February 27, 1768, and arrived at Bombay

¹ The critical position of the Company at this time is clearly
revealed by this offer about Bidnur and Sunda. John Stracey wrote
to the President of Bombay: "... it would be the most unlucky thing
that would happen to the Company's commercial interests on the
Mallabar Coast that the Marathas should ever have a foot of land
more than they have there ... I shall always think ... that so strong
and fine a country as that of Bednure should never be given to the
² See Chapter III, pp. 69-72.
on March 3.\textsuperscript{1} Valuable presents were offered to the Peshwa\textsuperscript{2} and Raghunath Rao.\textsuperscript{3}

The Peshwa intimated that the English being his friends, he wanted to see the envoy on a lucky day. Accordingly, the first meeting was held on December 3, but no business was transacted. Mostyn sent a report to the Bombay Government on December 6, in which he observed, "The Maratha court is, from all I can learn, undetermined what part they shall act, and are laying by to see what turn affairs in the Karanatak will take before they come to any resolution". He also stated that the Peshwa intended visiting his forts on the sea coast from Surat to Gheria; he suspected that the Peshwa's principal motive is Janjira, "for I have heard he is much chagrined at the disappointment he has met there". Mostyn also referred to Trimbak Rao Mama's letter to the Peshwa, proposing an alliance with the English and Shuja-ud-daula, Nawab of Oudh, for the expulsion of 'the Jats, Rohillas and other petty Rajas to the Northward'. He may have expected that this

\begin{enumerate}
\item Forrest, \textit{Selections, Maratha Series}, Vol. I, pp. 144, 145, 175. The only reference to this embassy in Marathi documents occurs in S.P.D., xxxxxv, 33. We are informed that clothes were presented to Mostyn and his retinue on his arrival at the Peshwa's court. The document bears the date March 16, 1768.

Marathi documents are very unsatisfactory sources of information with regard to Anglo-Maratha relations.


\end{enumerate}
plan of conquests in the North would divert the Peshwa's attention from the Carnatic.¹

The next meeting between Madhav Rao and Mostyn was held on December 11. The envoy wanted to know what the Peshwa had to say; but the latter, instead of giving a direct answer, referred to the affairs in the Carnatic and said that he had four days ago received letters from Madras and the Nawab of Arcot requesting his assistance, and that they had sent an agent named Nagoji Rao to confer with him regarding the matter. The Peshwa also remarked that "although he was upon the most amicable footing with the English at Bombay and bound thereto by treaty, yet no regard is paid thereto by the English at the other two Presidencies". He plainly told Mostyn that until Nagoji Rao arrived he would defer saying anything definite. When Mostyn referred to the despatch of a large Maratha force under the command of Gopal Rao towards the Carnatic,² the Peshwa assured him that they were only sent as usual to collect the revenues, which could not be done without a force. The English envoy accepted this explanation as true.³

On December 12 Mostyn paid a visit to Govind Shivram "purposely to find out if possible the views of the Darbar". He was told 'very openly' that "they should come to no resolution

² Gopal Rao, Anand Rao Raste and Visaji Pant were sent to Miraj to collect an army of 24,000 horse and then go to Sira and Madgiri and there wait for further orders.
until not only Nagojirav arrived but also the agents from the Nizam and Hyder Ali, and those proposals that appeared most for their interest they should without hesitation accept of". Three courses were open to the Marathas—to join the Nizam and Haidar Ali; to join Muhammad Ali and the English; to persuade the Nizam to remain neutral and join Muhammad Ali and the English against Haidar Ali. Govind Shivram's conversation led Mostyn to think that, owing to the doubtful attitude of the Nizam\(^1\) and the open hostility of Haidar Ali, the Marathas would 'gladly accept of our terms'.\(^2\)

On December 14 Mostyn noted in his Diary: "The Nizam and Hyder Ali's friendship seems to be upon a slippery footing, and there is a probability...that Mahomed Alli will be able to draw off the Nizam. In such case our alliance with the Marathas will be the less necessary".\(^3\)

On December 17 Mostyn received a letter from Bombay, dated December 11, in which he was instructed to prevail on the Peshwa at least to remain neutral, if he could not persuade him to assist the Company. Here the Bombay Government were echoing the views of the Madras Government. In their instructions to Nagoji Rao,\(^4\) which were communicated to the Bombay Government and by them to Mostyn, the Madras Government asked their envoy to tell the

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1 Govind Shivram said that "though the Nizam was in friendship with them, yet he had in part broken it by supporting their professed enemy" Haidar Ali.


Peshwa that the English would co-operate with the Marathas to 'root out the disturber' of Mysore\(^1\), "provided Madhavrao will, at the same time, attack and conquer the country of Bednur jointly with the English from Bombay". Such an alliance would involve the following conditions: In the first place, the Raja's family should be restored to Mysore and the chaunth should regularly be paid to the Marathas. Secondly, the English should be reimbursed the expenses they may meet. Thirdly, the Marathas should renounce all claim of chaunth on 'the countries of Dindagul and other places formerly belonging to the Karnatak'. Finally, the Peshwa should grant the islands of Salsette and Bassein to the Company. Those objects being accomplished, the field of co-operation might be extended, and "by the blessing of God the English and Marathas together may be the means of establishing Shah Allum at Delhi and driving out the Jats and Abdallis". If the Peshwa's attitude proved unfavourable, he might be given to understand that "the Raja of Berar has been soliciting the friendship of the English at Bengal and of this court, and that they will doubtless give them their friendship if Madhavrao does not engage it". Finally, Nagoji Rao was asked to remember that "it is not so much the Peshwa's assistance the English want as that he should not assist" Haidar Ali or the Nizam.

Mostyn saw the Peshwa for the third time on December 19. Madhav Rao asked him what demands he had to make. The envoy then set forth the four following articles, desiring they might be immediately complied with. In the

\(^1\) This is described as a "Glorious undertaking".
first place, the ketch "Lively" was unjustifiably detained in Chaul harbour. Secondly, the compensation money for the losses suffered by the English merchants from the depredations committed by the officers of the Peshwa’s fleet was not paid. Thirdly, the owners of the boats that were seized at the time of the Orpar affair were still molested by Maratha officers. Fourthly, several slaves belonging to the Company’s officers at Bombay were not delivered. The Peshwa said that the “Lively” would be released,¹ but the compensation money could not be paid until he received a reply to his letter addressed to Governor Crommellin. The conversation was cut short by the arrival of some letters from the Nizam. Mostyn went away with the impression that the Peshwa had something in reserve to say with respect to Haidar Ali or Janjira.²

It is remarkable that neither party wanted to ‘open’ itself; each tried to ‘draw’ everything from the other. Mostyn was prevented from ‘opening’ himself by his instructions; moreover, he did not consider it necessary to show his cards, because there was ‘no appearance at present’ of the Peshwa’s taking part with the Nizam and Haidar Ali. Many reasons led Mostyn to think so.³ In the first place, the Marathas knew that Haidar Ali was their declared enemy, and would whenever possible disturb them: therefore it was clear that they would not, in

¹ The Peshwa’s order for the release of the “Lively” was received by Mostyn on December 30. (Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 159).
point of policy, support him. Secondly, the Jats, "with the Marwar Raja and others joining in Hindustan,¹ will oblige them to be on their guard and not trust too large a part of their force at so great a distance". Thirdly, "Raghoba is also as ever a check upon them notwithstanding their late reconciliations² and they are under some perplexity at his present behaviour, as he is of their intentions". Fourthly, the state of the Peshwa's finances was very unsatisfactory. On January 10, Mostyn noted that "he has sent his people and orders for the whole amount of the revenues of the different countries to be paid into his treasury without any deductions for maintaining a certain number of troops to attend him immediately on summons as usual". Finally, the Peshwa discharged 1500 bigaris, 400 men belonging to his train, and some thousand horse, showing thereby that he was not likely to take the field himself in the near future.

On December 28 Mostyn noted in his Diary that the English and Muhammad Ali being 'much too powerful' for the Nizam and Haidar Ali, the latter had 'sent pressingly to Madhavram for assistance'.³

1 In his letter dated December 25 Mostyn reported to Bombay as follows: "...... Joarsing the Jat Raja and Bijaysing the Marwar Raja have entered into an alliance and are endeavouring to persuade Madhavising of Junagad and the Raja of Bundikot to accede to it ......".

2 In his report dated December 22 Mostyn says that "though Madhavram may be under no apprehensions from him (i.e. Raghoba) for the present, yet it is believed to be a principal reason for his not taking the field this year himself".

On December 31 a certain Muhammad Ali paid Mostyn a visit and conveyed to him the substance of his conversation with the Peshwa. The Nizam had written Madhav Rao pressingly for his assistance; in case he could not come himself, he was requested to send even an officer with ten thousand horse and to "send orders to Gopaltarav, the Commander of his forces in those parts, not to molest Hyder Ali’s country for such part of last year’s revenue as might be due". Giving these details the Peshwa asked Muhammad Ali’s opinion "(that as he himself is determined not to go anywhere this year) whether he should comply with the Nizam’s request for ten thousand horse?"

In reply, Muhammad Ali represented the conduct and prospects of the Nizam and Haidar Ali in an unfavourable light. On the whole he left the Peshwa with the impression that the latter would not either go himself or lend Haidar Ali any assistance. Thus the conclusion which Mostyn had formed as early as December 19 was confirmed.

On January 2, 1768, Mostyn came to know that the vakils of the Nizam and Haidar Ali would reach Poona within a day. He concluded that these agents would immediately make their proposals with very large offers. So he wrote to Bombay for instructions whether he should speak plainly to the Marathas, for it was clear that they would not ‘open’ themselves. To this letter a reply was received on January 10, in which the Bombay Government observed as follows: ".........we must acquiesce in

1 He must not be confused with the Nawab of the Carnatic. He was ‘a Poona resident, rather influential at the Maratha Court’. (Gensc and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 383).
your speaking first whenever a suitable opportunity offers; but we shall rely on your doing it with the caution and reserve necessary in all transactions with these people...”

Before receiving this letter Mostyn had interviewed the Peshwa for the fourth time on January 5 and supped with him. The conversation related to ‘indifferent matters with regard to Europe and India’. Although the instructions from Bombay authorised Mostyn to ‘open’ first, he decided to wait a few days to use his ‘endeavours privately to induce Madhavrao to open first’. He knew that the terms offered to the Peshwa by the agents of the Nizam and Haidar Ali would far exceed anything he was empowered to give. He also knew that it was not in the Peshwa’s power to take the field that year.

Some minor matters placed Mostyn in an uncomfortable position. The detention of Angria’s sons and the affair of Janjira were embittering Anglo-Maratha relations. Siddi Abdul Rahim reoccupied Mudgur through the assistance of Visaji Pant. This naturally offended Siddi Yakub Khan, the English protege, who wrote to the Peshwa to enquire whether Visaji Pant had acted with his approbation.

In the mean while Brome had gone to Nasik and was carrying on conversations with Raghunath Rao. Both sides were cautious and unwilling to conclude a formal agreement.

On January 17, 1768, Mostyn heard that Nizam Ali had

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4 For details see pp. 78-79.
concluded peace with the Nawab of Arcot and ordered his Dewan Rukn-ud-daula and his brother Basalat Jang to leave Haidar Ali with their troops. On the next day Mostyn had a talk with Govind Shivram about the Orpar affair. On January 20 he heard that Nagoji Rao had arrived at Parvati two days ago in an ill state of health. These incidents were, as usual, reported to Bombay.²

On January 27 Mostyn was again received by the Peshwa, who desired that he should talk with Govind Shivram and Ramaji Chitnis about the articles presented by him on December 19. Govind Shivram and Ramaji Chitnis agreed to pay the amount of losses the English merchants had sustained, as settled three years ago, but regarded the detention of Angria’s sons as an infringement of the treaty concluded on September 14, 1761. Mostyn said that the English did not look on Angria’s children as coming under any one of the articles of that treaty. He argued that it was ‘lucky’ for the Peshwa that “they again fell into our hands; for had they gone to any other power, from their connections and influence in the country, they might have given them (i.e. the Marathas) much trouble, from which they were now secured”. When Govind Shivram and Ramaji Chitnis expressed the apprehension that the English

1 The President of Madras wrote a letter to the Peshwa about this peace in April, 1768, in which he promised to pay regularly the chauth for the districts given by the Nizam to the Company. The Peshwa’s vakil Dooteram (Dhond Ram?) Pandit signed the treaty on behalf of his master ‘as security thereto’.

would give protection to "any of their (i.e. Maratha) officers, or even any of their own family (alluding to Raghoba’s disaffection)" if he fled to Bombay, the envoy merely gave the vague assurance that the Marathas 'might depend upon our abiding by our treaties'. Govind Shivram and Ramaji Chintis then referred to "the loss they suffered by our vessels giving convoy to foreign boats, by which means they evaded taking their pass, also the detriment they suffered by our not permitting their Chowkis about Surat to remain in the customary places". Mostyn then promised to lay these complaints before the Bombay Government.¹

On February 9 Mostyn went to see Nagoji Rao, who was 'so ill as not to be able to go abroad'. The former said that the situation had greatly changed since Nagoji Rao had left Madras: "Since the Nizam had left Hyder Ali there was little to be apprehended from the latter alone; therefore the forming a junction with the Marathas appeared the less necessary, more especially as the jealousies and disputes between Madhav Rao and his uncle Raghoba would ...prevent their joining Hyder Ali or giving us any material assistance, at least before the rains".²

A letter from Bombay, dated February 5, received by Mostyn on February 9, informed him that an English expedition was being sent against Haidar Ali’s fleet and possessions on the western coast.³ The Bombay authorities were

³ This expedition failed, Haidar and Tipu succeeding in driving the English to the sea.
giving out that the expedition was directed “against fort Augustus to compel the Rani to make good that part of the ransom money now due”, and Mostyn was asked to “make necessary use of this hint in case any question should be asked you at the Darbar”. Mostyn utilised this ‘hint’ on February 19, when the Peshwa asked him ‘the reason of the armament preparing at Bombay and whither destined’. On February 21 he received a letter from Bombay, dated February 18, in which he was informed of the departure of the expedition. He was instructed to request the Maratha Government not to ‘interfere or in any shape obstruct us in our operations’, and to welcome their co-operation. Mostyn interviewed the Peshwa, Sakharam Bapu, Nana Fadnavis, Govind Shivram, Moroba Fadnavis and Muhammad Ali Khan on February 22. In reply to the Peshwa’s enquiry he told them that the expedition was proceeding against Haidar Ali and that the Bombay Government would gladly listen to any reasonable proposal the Marathas wanted to make for the reduction of Haidar Ali. The Peshwa and his advisers ‘seemed to be thunderstruck’; they had imagined that the Bombay Government ‘were in perfect peace’ with Haidar Ali, and that the expedition was going down to Malwan. However, the Peshwa ‘had no objections to our punishing Hyder Ali’; but he claimed Bidnur and Sunda, and wanted the English to surrender any part of them which they might take. He also proposed that the Marathas and the English should act jointly for punishing Haidar Ali. Mostyn advised him to send a proper person to Bombay to carry on negotiations.¹

We have anticipated events in order to give a connected account of Mostyn’s negotiations about the naval expedition against Haidar Ali. Before these negotiations were complete Mostyn had an interview with the Peshwa on February 11. Madhav Rao said that he “expected and hoped the Hon’ble Company would not support or assist any of his enemies even though they were his relations”. Mostyn assured him that “so long as he remained firm in his friendship with them (i.e. the English) they would not think of supporting or assisting either his relations or any one else against him”.¹

In his letter to Bombay, dated February 14, Mostyn observed that it had then become unnecessary to form a junction with the Marathas.² On February 25 he had his last interview with the Peshwa, who told him that Ramaji Chitnis would be sent to Bombay. Mostyn’s letter to Bombay, dated March 3, shows that the articles submitted by him on December 19 were decided by the Peshwa to the satisfaction of the English.³

It is necessary to indicate in brief the importance assigned


A Marathi letter dated September 17, 1765, contains orders to restore half the value of the shipwrecked property of an English merchantman that foundered near Anjanwel. Another letter, dated October 20, 1765, instructs Shankarji Keshab to pay the English about Rs. 31,000 as indemnity for the losses suffered by their merchantmen, provided they are willing to abide strictly by the terms of the treaty. On May 29, 1766, an English officer, Major Govil, was given a kincoh worth Rs. 53. A Marathi document dated March 16, 1768, records that clothes were presented to Mostyn and his retinue. (S.P.D., xxxv, 30, 31, 33).
to Bidnur in these negotiations. We have already referred to the fact that in March, 1767, the Peshwa captured Madgiri and took under his protection the former Raja and Queen-Mother of Bidnur who had been imprisoned in that fort by Haidar Ali in 1763. When they were being brought to Poona the Queen-Mother died on the way, and the 'young Raja' came with the Peshwa to Poona. We have also seen that the Bombay authorities were prepared, under certain circumstances, to allow the Peshwa to annex Bidnur and Sunda. In his interviews with Mostyn, the Peshwa claimed these two districts 'in the most formal manner'. The 'young Raja' informed Mostyn that the Peshwa and his ministers were willing to assist him in recovering his territory provided their chauth could be secured to them 'without the trouble they now labour under of recovering it by force'.

The Raja obviously expected assistance from the English. In his letter to Bombay, dated December 25, Mostyn observes: "He has several times sent his man to me, requesting I would interest myself in his behalf, and provided the Hon'ble Company would reinstate him in his Government, has promised to reimburse them their charges and give them any stronghold on the sea coast with an exclusive right to the pepper and sandalwood trade. But this desirable end I was convinced cannot be accomplished without a strong land force. I therefore said, as the Raja was now in the hands of the Marathas, it would be impossible for him to enter into any treaty without their consent...I told him... if he would prevail on Madhavraj to speak to me about it, I would

give Madhavrav an answer, and do all in my power to assist the Raja". On January 2, 1768, Mostyn reported to Bombay that the Peshwa had refused to assist the Raja ‘this year’.  

In the mean while the Bombay authorities were looking for ‘a proper person’ whom they could establish at Bidnur if they succeeded in expelling Haidar Ali from that district. In their letter to Mostyn, dated February 5, they enquired whether ‘the young Raja’ would suit them; but they did not like to publish their intentions to the Marathas. Mostyn reported in favour of the ‘young Raja’ and observed, “..... no objection occurs to me at present why he should not be openly demanded of the Marathas, nor do I think they can be disgusted at it, provided they are guaranteed for payment of their Chauth without trouble”. A few days later the Peshwa “laid claim to the whole of the countries of Bednur and Sunda, not only on account of their being already in possession of part and intentions of taking the whole as opportunities offered, but the Raja of the former being under his protection”.

We have dealt in some detail with the history of Mostyn’s embassy because, although unproductive of any immediate result, it reveals clearly the deep-seated jealousies which governed south Indian politics in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was an age of shifting alliances and treacherous friendships. There were four strong powers—the Marathas, Haidar Ali, the

3 “The young Raja is about sixteen or seventeen years old, a sprightly, sensible young man...”
Nizam and the English—each bent upon self-aggrandisement at the cost of the other. The fate of the princes of Bidnur shows how the smaller chiefs were treated in those days by their great neighbours.

As we go through Mostyn's vivid and interesting Diary, we find how commanding, and at the same time how weak, the position of Peshwa Madhav Rao I really was. His friendship was courted on all sides; envoys from the English and their enemies (Haidar Ali and the Nizam) came to him simultaneously from different directions. His intervention in the war would certainly have proved decisive. But domestic difficulties stood in his way, and the issue was decided without his intervention. The Jats, the Rubelas and the Rajputs had raised their heads in the North, and Janoji Bhonsle was intriguing in the South; but the most deadly enemy of the Peshwa was his uncle, whose ambition he succeeded in curbing for the moment with difficulty, but who invited ruin to the Marathas within two years of his great nephew's death.

After Mostyn's departure from Poona a Maratha agent went to Bombay and demanded Mysore, Bidnur and Sunda,

1 An English officer reported from Allahabad in January, 1768, when Mostyn was at Poona, that the Peshwa had sent a detachment of 15,000 horse towards Haidarabad, and "that the march of this detachment is publicly reported to be for the plundering of the Nizam's dominions; but if my intelligence is to be depended upon, and it comes through a very probable channel, Haidar has engaged security to Madhav Rao for a sum exceeding 20 lakhs of rupees..." This officer proposed to detain as hostages some prominent Maratha chiefs who had gone to Allahabad as pilgrims. This report seems to have been based upon nothing more substantial than a rumour. (B.S.C.P., February 10, 1768).
saying that any place the English might take in those countries should be delivered up to the Peshwa. This was 'peremptorily refused'. The Bombay authorities suspected that the real intentions of the Marathas were 'to restore the former Hindu princes to their dominions and to have their chauth from these countries secured to them'. They wrote to Madras on April 5, 1768, "......as this will not only fully answer our design but be most agreeable to the country in general, we shall exert our best endeavour for bringing it out, and in case of Madhavraj's agreeing to it, do all in our power in conjunction with him for restoring the Rajahs......But in recompense for this important service to the Marathas in acquiring to them so very considerable a revenue without any further trouble, we shall previously stipulate for such advantages to the Company as they may want at this Settlement......".  

About the middle of the year 1768 the Nizam was reported to be repentant for making peace. 2 Suspecting that Rukn-ud-daula had been bribed by the English to advocate peace, he made plans for murdering the minister. It was believed that the Maratha vakil in Haidarabad was one of the principal instigators behind this dispute between the Nizam and Rukn-ud-daula. 3 The Madras authorities wrote to Calcutta on June 28, 1768, "...there is too much reason to apprehend that the Soubah may

1 M.M.C., Vol. 30A, p. 633.  
again be induced...to quarrel with us. If that should happen and Madhavrao, as his vakil has promised, should assist the Soubah against us, we imagine that a junction may be formed with Janoji Bhonsle by your Presidency which will afford Madhavrao no small trouble and alarm him for the safety of his country and we shall also in that case recommend it to the gentlemen at Bombay to endeavour to assist his uncle against him".¹ The reply from Calcutta was discouraging: "To prevail on Raghunath or Janoji to attack Madhavrao would be no easy task unless we engage to support them with a body of our own troops, which the present situation of our affairs will by no means enable us to do".²

But the Madras authorities were alarmed by various reports. Rukn-ud-daula went to Poona; "it is pretty evident that the design of his mission is to fix the plan of (anti-British) operations". Raja Saheb, son of Chanda Saheb, who had been for some time with the Peshwa, went to Haidar’s assistance with some troops.³ The despatches of Brome, the envoy of the Bombay authorities at the court of Poona, gave enough cause to apprehend that the Peshwa was ready to join Haidar Ali. He wrote that Haidar’s vakil had "so well played his cards as to gain over to his master’s interest the whole of the ministry by making them large promises and presents". Before Brome’s arrival at Poona the vakil had made the following formal offers to the Peshwa: (1) If the Peshwa agreed to assist Haidar, the sum of 30 lakhs, being the amount of tribute due for the last two

¹ B.S.C.P., July 20, 1768.  
² B.S.C.P., August 10, 1768.  
³ B.S.C.P., October 6, 1768.
years, would be paid to him. (2) The sum of 17 lakhs would be paid as soon as 15,000 horse under Gopal Rao and Nander (Anand?) Rao Raste marched towards Haidar's territories. (3) The remaining sum of 13 lakhs would be paid when they joined Haidar. (4) In addition to these 30 lakhs, an allowance of half a rupee per day for each horse would be paid for expenses. These promises, Brome observed, "would have had the desired effect.....had not Madhavrai firmly persisted in not giving his ultimate answer until my arrival, thinking from the Governor and Council having thought proper to send me here, that I had some proposals to make for his joining us against Haidar ..." Govind Shivram told the English envoy that the Peshwa had a demand from the Nawab of the Carnatic of the sum of four and half lakhs. Brome replied that "if his demand was a just one,... it would immediately be paid without the necessity of taking up arms, but on the contrary he must expect the English would never submit to his committing hostilities in the Carnatic without their assisting the Nawab to the utmost of their power". On the whole, Brome concluded that the Marathas were then 'on the very brink of breaking' with the English.¹

¹ B.S.C.P., December 13, 1768. In order to nullify the effect of Haidar's offer Brome was authorised to offer Bidnur to the Peshwa. (B.S.C.P., December 13, 1768). On October 15, 1768, the Madras authorities wrote to Bombay, "We should avoid entering into any certain engagements with him (i.e. the Peshwa); at least such a measure should be postponed as long as possible, as we apprehend nothing but country will satisfy him, which would be adding to the Maratha power, and this should be our attention not to increase" (Forrest, Selections, Home Series, Vol. II, p. 159).
In November, 1768, he reported that Haidar’s envoy had paid 12 lakhs to the Peshwa and left Poona. The Peshwa took precautions for the defence of his territories on the Malabar coast, for he anticipated that his alliance with Haidar would involve him in hostilities with the English authorities at Bombay. Brome looked upon this as “another convincing argument that Madhavrav’s intentions are actually to break with us”. Gopal Rao advanced towards Kolar and the Peshwa himself followed him. Once more the Madras authorities wrote to Bengal for money and expressed the apprehension that, if the Peshwa invaded the territories of the Nawab of Arcot, they would be inevitably deprived even of the small resources they received from the revenues of the Carnatic.

In the mean while Rukn-ud-daula had arrived at Poona and concluded an agreement. The Peshwa agreed to give to the Nizam the forts of Ansem and Badaney and a jagir worth 12 lakhs. A combined expedition was to be directed against the Nawab of Arcot; of the territories taken from him, one-fourth would be retained by the Peshwa, and the rest would go to the Nizam. The position of the Madras authorities was so

1 B.S.C.P., January 25, 1769. The Peshwa told Brome that he looked upon the English Settlements of Bombay and Madras as ‘entirely separate’ and expected that hostilities with one would not involve hostilities with the other. Brome told him that the resources of the three Presidencies would be employed against any one who injured any of them.

2 B.S.C.P., January 25, 1769.

3 In Vad, I, 227, we find that the Nizam received territory worth 3 lakhs.

4 B.S.C.P., January 25, 1769.
desperate in January, 1769, that they were anxious for making peace with Haidar 'on almost any terms'. They wrote to Calcutta on January 28, 1769, 'There being no room to doubt of Madhavram's intentions of hostilities,' and considering the state of our treasury and resources, it appears evident almost to

1 Two curious incidents deserve to be noticed. (1) A vakil from Ibrahim Beg, one of the Nizam's officers in Warangal, came to Smith, Chief of Masulipatam, and proposed that an anti-Maratha coalition should be formed by the Nizam, the English and Janoji Bhonsle, and attempts should be made 'for either placing Raghunath in the Government of Poona or in failure thereof obliging Madhavram to such regulations and terms as they (i.e. the allies) should impose upon him'. This vakil had no papers signed by the Nizam or Rukn-ud-daula. Smith reported the matter to Madras. The Madras authorities apparently regarded the proposal as genuine, for they wrote to Calcutta as late as July 1, 1769, 'We shall studiously avoid...disgusting the Soubah by a positive refusal and endeavour...to protract the negotiations, but should we after all be under the necessity of giving a categorical answer, we must then avail ourselves of the saving clause in the treaty and declare that the situation of our affairs will not admit of our engaging in any distant operations'. (B.S.C.P., March 1, and August 11, 1769). (2) It appears that the Peshwa offered to assist the Madras authorities with a detachment of cavalry if they were ready to pay the expenses. They resolved, 'It appears that Madhavram seems disposed to assist the Nawab and us. We have great reason to believe it is but seeming and not really so, but were it real, his conditions are such as it is not in our power to comply with'. They wrote to the Peshwa that they were prepared to pay 5 lakhs in the following manner: one lakh to be paid two months after the troubles were at an end, 2 lakhs to be paid within the next two months, and 2 lakhs to be paid at the end of two other months. The Peshwa's reply, if he sent any, is not on record. (M.M.C., February 11, 1769, Vol. 33, p. 81.)
demonstration that in a very little time, far from being able
to maintain an army in the field, we should not even have the
means of paying our forces in garrison". They expected that
Haidar's apprehension of Maratha designs would restrain his
anti-British feelings in the future. They wrote, "He is not less
apprehensive of the Marathas than we are. Certain it is
that the increase of their power is as dangerous to him as to us,
and it is from this mutual danger that we build our hopes of
being undisturbed by him for sometime......his treasures are
exhausted and by thus weakening himself he becomes more
exposed to the power of the Marathas, who certainly never
meant seriously to support him, but in all probability taking
advantage of our quarrel tried to obtain what they could from
him and then to do the same by the Carnatic". The old
theory of utilising Haidar as a 'barrier' against Maratha expan-
sion was revived: "Haidar is the best barrier to the Carnatic
against the Marathas with whom he ever has been and ever
must be at variance and probably never will pay the chauth
but when they can demand it at the head of a superior force".¹

In March, 1769, the authorities in Calcutta wrote to Madras
that they were prepared to conclude a defensive and offensive
treaty with Janoji Bhonsle, "but that we might not in so doing
engage in distant enterprises with that chief unless the exigency
of the Company's affairs required such a step, we reserved a
clause in the proposed treaty of assisting him with troops,
provided our own possessions or the security of our allies conve-
niently admit of such assistance".² Sometime later it was reported

¹ B.S.C.P., March 1, 1769. ² B.S.C.P., March 1, 1769.
to Calcutta that the Peshwa had 'directed his operations towards the province of Berar, and seemed seriously intent on crushing the power and influence of Janoji'. It was felt, therefore, that the proposal for making an alliance with Janoji Bhonsle might be suspended for the time being, to be resumed, if at all, when the Peshwa again threatened the territories of the Nawab of Arcot.'

All speculations came to an end when Haidar dictated the terms of peace (April 2, 1769). The second article of the treaty laid down "that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall from their respective countries mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out". Haidar wanted to be sure of British assistance against the Marathas. "So he strenuously pressed that the alliance should be made both offensive and defensive". The Madras authorities observed, "The offensive part we absolutely rejected and tried to decline the defensive as far as could be done without absolutely breaking off the treaty, as we were fully sensible of the difficulties in which we might be thereby involved. But no peace could be expected without it, and it was with the utmost difficulty that Haidar would consent to the article even in its present form".

We have tried to construct, so far as possible, a coherent narrative of these complicated negotiations on the basis of contemporary English documents which are not unoften contradictory and obscure. So far as the history of the Marathas is concerned, the most important fact that emerges is the failure

1 B.S.C.P., March 23, 1769.
2 M.M.C., Vol. 33, p. 231.
of the Peshwa to take advantage of the troubles of his enemies and rivals. Haidar Ali was hard-pressed by the English, the Nawab of Arcot and the Nizam; but the Peshwa could neither get money by helping him nor acquire territory by helping his enemies. It is regrettable that he could not secure the rich districts of Bidnur and Sunda. For this failure to exploit an advantageous situation the blame rests not on the Peshwa but on Raghunath Rao and Janoji Bhonsle, whose unpatriotic revolts diverted his attention from expansion to internal consolidation.
CHAPTER VI

REVIVAL OF MARATHA POWER IN THE NORTH

Although historians are not agreed as to the ultimate effects of the battle of Panipat on the destiny of the Marathas, there is no doubt that its immediate result was the eclipse of Maratha power in the North. Sir Jadunath Sarkar observes that the annihilation of the Maratha army was followed by a revolt against Maratha domination everywhere in Hindustan,—in the Gangetic Doab, Bundelkhand, Rajputana and Malwa alike. “Everywhere the dispossessed or humbled original chieftains, and even petty landlords, raised their heads and talked of shutting the southern invaders out of their country in future”.¹ Contemporary Marathi letters contain a graphic picture of the disturbances which followed the sudden and unexpected dissolution of Maratha authority in those regions. Many parts of the Doab were plundered and ravaged by bold zamindars. The roads became unsafe. Bundela chiefs like Hindupat and Khet Singh renounced Maratha allegiance. Petty chieftains created trouble in Jhansi. In Rajputana all the princes turned against the Marathas. Maratha officers repeatedly asked for assistance from the Central Government.²

Nor was the anti-Maratha movement confined to humble chieftains. Shuja-ud-daula was casting a covetous

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¹ Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 502-503.
² S.P.D., xxix. 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 24, 25, 81.
eye upon Bundelkhand. The Ruhelas were trying to expel the Marathas from the Doab. Madho Singh of Jaipur stopped payment to the Marathas and invaded their territory. Najib Khan, who was more responsible than any Northern chieftain for the Maratha disaster at Panipat, became the Mir Bakshi of the imperial army, the Faujdar of Delhi and the Mukhtar of the imperial administration. Suraj Mal Jat, who was ‘now by far the most powerful prince in India, with absolutely unimpaired forces and an overflowing treasury’, allied himself with Imad-ud-mulk, the Wazir of the Empire, and wanted to extend his territories at the cost of the Ruhelas, the Bangash and the Nawab of Oudh. Only Ahmed Shah Abdali was inclined to be friendly, ‘for his sole interest in India was to get his tribute punctually year after year, without having to send an Afghan army for its collection’; but his attempt to conclude peace with the Peshwa failed due to the intrigue of Imad-ul-mulk and Gangadhar Tatya (Holkar’s Dewan).

For some years the Marathas found it impossible to resume their activities in the North. The premature death of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, the invasions of Nizam Ali, the question of succession to Jankoji Sindhia, the intrigues and rebellions of Raghunath Rao, the revolts of Janoji Bhonsle, and the long struggle with Haidar Ali naturally kept the Marathas away from the stormy North. It was only towards the close of his brief but glorious administration that Madhav Rao found it possible

1 S.P.D., xxix, 24, 5, 10, 18, 21, 22.
to make a serious, and successful, attempt to recover Maratha authority in Hindustan.

The task of restoring Maratha authority in Rajputana and Malwa immediately after Panipat fell upon Malhar Rao Holkar. In May, 1761, a Maratha officer named Krishnaji Tandev recaptured Rampura (in Malwa), a place in Malhar’s jagir, from a Chandrawat zaminder who had seized it. In June Malhar himself captured Gagroni² (in Malwa) from Abhay Singh Rathor, an officer of the Maharao of Kota.³ He then turned his attention to Madho Singh, who had been trying to set up an anti-Maratha coalition consisting of Najib Khan, Yaqub Ali (Ahmed Shah Abdali’s agent in Delhi) and the exiled Emperor Shah Alam II. He was also joined, or was likely to be joined, by petty Rajput chiefs, like the rulers of Sopar, Bundi, Kota, Karauli and Khichi. Malhar could not deal with this menace during the rainy season of 1761; so he returned to Indore. In October Madho Singh sent 10,000 troops to besiege Nerve, which was at that time held by a Maratha officer named Sadashiv Gopal. Malhar left Indore and was joined at Bariya (in Kota State) by 3,000 Kota troops. He defeated the Jaipur army in the battle of Mangrol (November 29, 1761).⁴ This

₁ S.P.D., xxvii, 271.
₂ Or Ganguri, 120 miles north of Indore.
₃ S.P.D., xxvii, 267, 269, 271.
₄ S.P.D., II, 5, 6, 57; xxi, 91-94; xxvii, 276; xxix, 20, 22, 27.

For a detailed description of the battle, see Sarkar’s Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 506-508. Tod’s account of the battle (Rajasthan, Annals of Haravati, Chap. VI) is, as Sir Jadunath Sarkar shows, quite unacceptable. Mangrol lies on the east bank of the river Banganga (35 miles north-east-east of Kota).
decisive victory destroyed Madho Singh’s fond hope of uprooting Maratha power from the North and restored Maratha prestige throughout Hindustan. He fled to Jaipur, took measures for the defence of the capital against the apprehended Maratha attack, and removed his family to Amber for safety. His Dewan Kaniram opened negotiations with Malhar, who had in the meanwhile come to Manoharpur (40 miles north of Jaipur). Jaipur was temporarily saved from Holkar’s incursion as his attention was diverted due to the invasion of Bundelkhand by Shah Alam II and Shuja-ud-daula.¹

Shah Alam was at this time living as a protégé of Shuja-ud-daula, who had undertaken to escort him to Delhi. After the rainy season of 1761, they started for the expulsion of the Marathas from Bundelkhand. The weakness of the Marathas, the disobedience of the local chiefs and the treason of Maratha officers like Ganesh Sambhaji (who joined the imperial army)² made it easy for Shah Alam and Shuja to conquer a portion of Bundelkhand. Shuja crossed the Jamuna at Kalpi (Jalaun district, U.P.) in January, 1762. Within a month he captured Kalpi, Mot (Jhansi district, U.P.) and Jhansi.³ The Bundela chiefs of Urchha and Datia made peace by paying tribute. Shuja, however, failed to subjugate Raja Hindupat of Mahoba

¹ Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire. Vol. II, pp. 508-509.
Madho Singh’s failure to take advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas was due to his ‘lack of character, quarrels with his feudal barons, and above all, his chronic antagonism to Bijay Singh of Marwar, the only other Rajput prince that counted for anything’.
² S.P.D., xxix, 22, 37, 45, 46.
³ S.P.D., xxix, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38.
(Hamirpur district, U.P.). He then crossed the Jamuna and returned to his own dominions.\textsuperscript{1}

Unable to resist this invasion the Maratha officers in Bundelkhand had appealed for assistance to Malhar Rao. He was, therefore, compelled to leave Jaipur and started for Jhansi. On his way he heard that Jhansi had already fallen. So he turned back and went to Indore. He had received a serious wound at Mangrol. It made him very weak and almost confined him to bed for three months.\textsuperscript{2} His return to his own territories saved Madho Singh and left the Marathas defenceless in the North.

While Malhar was trying to crush Madho Singh and his allies, other Maratha sardars were busy in north Malwa. Vithal Shivdev restored Maratha authority in Gohad and the neighbouring districts. There were troubles in Ahirwada. Gopal Rao Barve suppressed them during the early months of 1761, but soon after his departure the Ahirs rose again in alliance with Izzat Khan and the Khichis. Nothing could be done during the rainy season. In November, 1761, Maratha officers in Ahirwada invited Malhar to come to their assistance. He came as far as Sanganer (February, 1762), but his wound prevented him from advancing to the scene of action. In December, 1761, Vishwas Rao was asked by his father, Naro Shankar, to capture Jhansi with the co-operation of Izzat Khan and Govind Kalyan. The latter was asked by the Poona Government to settle the

\textsuperscript{1} Sarkar, \textit{Fall of the Mughal Empire}, Vol. II, pp. 544, 509.
\textsuperscript{2} S.P.D., II, 7: xxix. 33, 34, 37.
affairs of Aahirwada and to recover the fort of Bhilsa, seized by the Nawab of Bhopal.\footnote{S.P.D., xix, 12, 22, 37, 43; xxxix, 3. Rajwade, I, 296.}

During the years 1762-1764 the Marathas could pay no attention to the affairs of Malwa, Bundelkhand and Rajputana. The invasion of Nizam Ali and the civil war between the Peshwa and his uncle absorbed their energy. Malhar Rao, gradually sinking due to old age and ill-health, could not venture into the scene of his former triumphs. Mahadji Sindhia was busy with the question of succession, and the Poona Government as yet showed no desire to profit by his abilities.\footnote{When he left Poona for Malwa in 1764, measures were taken to intercept his journey. (S.P.D., xxix, 62, 64, 67).} “Inactivity and lack of a vigorous policy weakened the Maratha power in Malwa”.\footnote{S.P.D., xxix, Introduction, p. 1.}

Two incidents seem to show that by the year 1764 the position of the Marathas in Northern India had somewhat improved. Ahmed Shah Abdali ratified a formal peace with them in that year.\footnote{R. Sinh, Malwa in Transition, p. 316.} This was a much-needed relief, and at the same time it was an indirect recognition of their still surviving power. The second incident is more interesting. We read in the East India Company’s general letter to Madras, dated May 13, 1768, “When our servants after the Battle of Buxur planned the extirpation of Shuja from his dominions and the giving the same up to the King,” Lord Clive soon discerned the King would have been unable to maintain them and that it would have destroyed the strongest barrier against the Marathas and

\footnote{Shah Alam.}
the northern powers and therefore wisely restored Shuja to his dominions". If Lord Clive considered it necessary in 1765 to maintain a strong barrier against the Marathas, their prospects in Hindustan must have been favourable indeed.

In October, 1764, Malhar Holkar came to Jobner (13 miles east of Sambhar) in order to compel Madho Singh of Jaipur to clear his dues. Then he proceeded, in response to advice from Poona, to assist the Jat Raja Jawahir Singh against Najib Khan. But Malhar had no intention of seriously weakening his 'foster son', and his lukewarmness compelled the Jat Raja to make peace with Najib in February, 1765. Malhar’s next adventure was directed against the East India Company. He met the English at Kora on May 3, 1765, as an ally of Shuja-ud-daula, but he was defeated by Sir Robert Fletcher and

1 B.S.C.P., December 13, 1768. Madras to Bengal, November 11, 1768.
2 It appears that he tried to persuade the Peshwa to go to Hindustan. (S.P.D., xxxix, 24).
3 In May we find him at Ujjain. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 144).
   For a detailed history of the struggle between Najib Khan on the one hand and Suraj Mal and Jawahir Singh on the other, during the period 1761-1765, see Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 444-468.
5 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 573) says that Najib "by means of that secret understanding which always subsisted between him and Holkar, induced the Marathas to abandon the alliance”.
6 Probably Malhar was bribed. (C.P.C., I, 2348, 2524A).
compelled to fly.\textsuperscript{1} Then he recovered Jhansi (December, 1765),\textsuperscript{2} resumed his operations against the Rana of Gohad and hastened a rupture with Jawahir Singh. Before bringing these operations to a satisfactory conclusion he died on May 20, 1766. His alliance with the Jat Raja had one good effect, for it intimidated Madho Singh, who agreed to make a satisfactory arrangement for the payment of his tribute. He paid five lakhs in cash, and issued orders on bankers for the balance. Mahadji Sindhia, who had in the mean while come to Northern India, adopted a less conciliatory policy than Holkar and pressed Madho Singh for arrears.\textsuperscript{3}

The annual subsidy promised by the Rana of Udaipur to Peshwa Baji Rao in 1736 was never regularly paid. During the years 1761-1764 complications in the Deccan, Malwa and Jaipur prevented the Marathas from making any attempt to put pressure on that prince. In July, 1765, Mahadji Sindhia settled the tribute of Kota at 15 lakhs, and left his Dewan Achyut Rao to collect tribute from Udaipur, Shahpura and Rupnagar.\textsuperscript{4} Rana Ari Singh II of Udaipur agreed in 1766 to pay a total sum of Rs. 26,30,221, which was to be realised in quarterly instalments in four years.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} General Carnac wrote to the Select Committee of Bengal that Holkar's defeat had filled the neighbouring states with consternation. (B.S.C.P., 1765 (x), pp. 130-131). The Maratha version of the incident is found in Khare, III, 573, 575. We are told that Holkar defeated the English, but later on his troops fled as the result of an unexpected attack.\textsuperscript{2} S.P.D., xxix, 103.
\textsuperscript{3} S.P.D., xxix, 99, 107, 108, 102.
\textsuperscript{5} Vad, I, pp. 266-269. Tod says that in 1764 Malhar Holkar
We have already referred to Malhar Holkar’s rupture with Jawahir Singh. The Jat Raja had become so angry at Malhar’s collusion with Najib Khan that on the conclusion of peace he refused to pay the balance of 12 lakhs still due out of the promised 22 lakhs.¹ The outbreak of a civil war in the Jat State provided a welcome opportunity to the Marathas. Nahar Singh, Suraj Mal’s beloved son and Jawahir’s disappointed rival for the throne, renewed his claim to succession under Malhar’s protection. The Marathas knew that there was in India no other place for money like Bharatpur,² and they gladly prepared themselves to play the same mercenary part in this fratricidal struggle as they had previously played in the case of Jaipur. A detachment of 15,000 horse was sent by Malhar (who was then fighting against the Jat Rana of Gohad)³ to plunder Jat villages on the other side of the Chambal. Jawahir came to an understanding with the Sikhs.⁴

At this stage a passing reference may be made to the relations between the Sikhs and the Marathas during this period. It is well-known that in the course of his fatal Northern campaign Sadashiv Rao Bhau did not make any attempt to secure the support of the Sikhs. For a haughty general who neglected even the Jats and the Rajputs, it was but natural to adopt an invaded Mewar and compelled the Rana to agree to pay 51 lakhs. This is inaccurate. See Sarkar’s Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 517-518.

¹ Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 468.
² S.P.D., xxix, 177.
³ The Rana of Gohad was independent of Bharatpur, but in his hostilities against the Marathas he was encouraged by Jawahir Singh.
⁴ S.P.D., xxix, 102.
attitude of proud contempt to the Sikh plunderers. A Marathi letter dated November 27, 1760, informs us that, after the capture of Kunjpura, the Bhau had a mind to win the co-operation of the Sikhs; but his calculations were upset by the sudden news of Abdali’s having crossed over the Jamuna at Baghpat. The Sikhs, however, knew that Ahmed Shah was their chief enemy. When Abdali isolated the Marathas on all sides, and provisions were running short in their camp, Alha Singh of Patiala ‘cleverly managed to send convoys of grain to the Marathas in return for large sums of money’. As soon as Abdali got scent of this he sent a detachment against Alha Singh, which eventually succeeded in securing from him a tribute of four lakhs.

The third battle of Panipat closed the gates of the Punjab to the Marathas. “Ten years after Panipat when the Marathas came back to Delhi, they found the Sikhs too securely established in the Land of the Five Rivers to be ousted by them”.3

The Marathas as well as the Sikhs participated in the war waged by Jawahir Singh against Najib-ud-daula. When the latter was besieged by the Jats in Delhi towards the close of the year 1764, the Sikhs plundered his unprotected estates in Saharanpur, Meerut, Bijnor and adjoining districts.4 Jassa Singh Ahluwalia crossed the Jamuna at Buriya Ghat, entered the Gangetic Doab, and met with only nominal resistance from Hafiz Rahmat Khan. Jawahir Singh had already become sus-

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1 S.P.D., xxxi, 197.
2 H. R. Gupta, History of the Sikhs, pp. 138-139.
3 H. R. Gupta, History of the Sikhs, p. 146.
picious of Malhar Rao's lukewarmness. He secured the assistance of the Sikhs by promising to give them a large sum of money. A large number of Sikhs (12,000, 15,000 or 20,000, according to different versions) was also taken in his pay.¹ The Sikhs joined the Jats in January, 1765, and took part in some battles in Delhi against Najib-ud-daula. In the meantime Abdali had come back to Lahore (December, 1764). As soon as the Sikhs heard this they retreated towards the Punjab, even without asking leave of Jawahir Singh. The Jat ruler was thus forced to conclude peace with Najib-ud-daula in February, 1765.

In order to strengthen himself against Malhar Rao Holkar and Nahar Singh, Jawahir overlooked the previous bad conduct of the Sikhs. He paid them seven lakhs in cash in order to bring their plundering activities² to an end, and hired 25,000 horsemen to fight against the Marathas.³ (January-February, 1766). Wendel gives a graphic picture of Jawahir's position in the following words: "His own country is the prey of the enemy (the Marathas) who followed him close and he must either make an inglorious peace or risk all his fortune in a new war. Obstinately he has chosen the latter course, taken at a vast expense a corps of 20,000 or 25,000 Sikhs who had at that time come to his own country to ravage it; —blind obstinacy of the Raja: He has been previously obliged to pay an advance of seven lakhs to these barbarous allies for desolating two of his entire provinces; the expedition will end in his openly falling out with them and he will at last have the Sikhs as well as the

¹ Wendel's History of the Jats. Tazkira-i-Tahmasp Miskin.
² They had already begun to plunder Jat territory near Delhi.
³ S.P.D., xxix, 102, 177, 121, 197.
Rajputs on his hands. Thus his father's treasures are taking wing!"

Jawahir Singh at first tried to divert the attention of the Marathas by plundering the territory of their vassal, Raja Madho Singh of Jaipur. The Sikhs plundered Rewari. Several other towns and villages of Jaipur were ravaged by the Jats and the Sikhs. Madho Singh appealed to the Marathas for immediate relief, promising to pay them a daily allowance of Rs. 5,000 by way of expenses. Mahadji Sindhia's troops were at once sent against the Jats, while the Sikhs were bought off by Madho Singh. Jawahir was thus compelled to conclude a hasty peace with Jaipur. The Sikhs accompanied him in his retreat.¹

In the mean while Malhar Rao had established his camp at Dholpur, the appanage of Nahar Singh. His troops frequently ravaged Jawahir's territory. The Sikhs also grew restless at the irregularity of payment, and sometimes plundered the districts of their ally. Jawahir decided to put an end to his troubles with a bold step. He conciliated the Sikhs, left his camp at Shahgarh, and attacked the Marathas near Dholpur (March 13-14, 1766). The combined Jat-Sikh army defeated the Marathas, captured some Maratha generals and occupied Dholpur.² The captured Maratha generals were released in December next in accordance with a treaty concluded by Naro Shankar. Jawahir Singh could have crossed the Chambal and defeated Malhar Rao himself—then a dying man—but for the refusal of his Sikh horsemen to follow him in the terrible sum-

¹ S.P.D., xxix, 99, 102, 121, 127, 197.
² S.P.D., xxix, 126, 127, 204.
mer heat through a grassless and waterless tract. The Sikhs returned to the Punjab. Nahar Singh was abandoned by the Marathas and committed suicide (December, 1766).

Towards the close of 1765 Raghunath Rao made preparations for leading an expedition to the North.¹ He advanced to Malwa, took tribute from Bhopal,² and was joined by Mallhar Holkar and Mahadji Sindhia near Bhandar in April, 1766.³ Mallhar died a month later. Raghunath tried to finish the contest begun by him against Gohad.⁴ The misunderstanding which had arisen between Raghunath and Mahadji Sindhia over the question of succession to the Sindhia State rendered it impossible for them to work in sincere co-operation.⁵ Moreover, the Rana of Gohad was being assisted openly by the victorious Jawahir Singh. Raghunath laid siege to Gohad, but at every stage he was confronted with difficulties. His supplies were looted, and his troops starved. He had no money with him, and no loan was available even at high interest.⁶ Some Maratha

¹ S.P.D., xxix, 97. He had 40,000 troops. (Khare, III, 581, 582).
² S.P.D., xxix, 120, 128; xix, 36. Khare, III, 599.
³ S.P.D., xxix, 131, 136, 137, 139, 140.
⁴ For the early history of this principality, see Khare, Vol. II, p. 1242.
⁵ According to Holkar Kaifiat and Natu's Life of Mahadji Sindhia, Raghunath's plan of attack was betrayed to the Rana of Gohad by Mahadji. Khare disbelieves this story, as it does not occur in Patwardhan Daftar. There we find that Mahadji lent his troops and showed personal valour, for which Raghunath gave him a new jagir worth 10 lakhs. See Khare, III, p. 1242; also letter no. 633. Raghunath accused Chinto Vithal of treachery. (Khare, III, p. 1242).
⁶ See S.P.D., xix, 44. The Peshwa sent one lakh of rupees. (Khare, III, 638).
chiefs, including Holkar and Gaikwad, left the camp against Raghunath's orders. Jawahir Singh encamped on the other side of the Chambal with 15,000 or 20,000 troops. Yet Raghunath tried to capture Gohad by assault. He personally stood behind the batteries. The attack was repulsed, and many Maratha troops were killed. The Gohad troops came out and burnt Maratha flags. Two more attacks were repulsed, and the Maratha cause appeared hopeless.

The following interesting account of the operations occurs in a letter written by the Rana of Gohad to the Governor of Bengal: "Malhar for years kept on ruining my country, destroying forts and plundering ryots. Raghunath Rao, with a powerful army and artillery invaded my country, and having destroyed the forts situated on the frontiers, laid siege to Gohad, which is the writer's capital and birth place. The writer, taking courage, came out of the fort with 25,000 foot and 4,000 horse and at a distance of one quarter mile from the fort engaged Raghunath Rao. The battle lasted till sunset, when the writer entrenched himself outside the fort. The siege went on, and day and night battles were fought in which thousands were killed. As God was on the writer's side, he offered a stubborn resistance to Raghunath Rao. The latter, who considered himself mightier than the Hand of Destiny, after five months became hopeless of success and raised the siege".

1 It seems that "the discovery of a treasonable collusion of his valued Gosain generals with the Marathas" prevented him from taking a more aggressive attitude. (Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 473).
2 C. P. C., II.
At Mahadji Sindhi’s mediation the Rana agreed to pay 15 lakhs and the siege was withdrawn in December, 1766. 1 Raghunath then intended to proceed against Jawahir Singh, who, however, concluded peace 2 by surrendering the Maratha commanders captured in March, 1766. A meeting arranged between Raghunath and the Jat Raja was ineffective owing to the former’s suspicion of his Gosain generals who had taken shelter with the Marathas. 3

At this stage a revival of the Abdali menace led Raghunath to retrace his steps to the Deccan. 4 It seems after the settlement

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2 S.P.D., xxix, 159. C.P.C., II, 12A, 12B. One of the terms of the peace was as follows: “A small part of the country inhabited by Rajputs had for a considerable length of time belonged to the Marathas, and they accordingly received stipulated quit-rents from the inhabitants. But for some years past the latter have not paid any rents and have been living upon plunder and rapine. Their places of abode being almost inaccessible, whenever they suspected an attack from the Marathas, they immediately crossed the river into Jawahir Singh’s territories, nor could they ever be so reduced as to pay the most trifling sum. On this consideration, Raghunath Rao has agreed to a cession of that territory and granted sanads for that purpose to Jawahir Singh, as it lies contiguous to the latter’s possessions. Jawahir Singh is to collect and receive the rents of the same, exclusively and independently of any other power. It is said that he has agreed to pay for the country five lakhs of rupees; and as a compensation for the ravages committed there, Raghunath Rao is to receive the sum of ten lakhs from Malhar Rao”.

3 S.P.D., xxix, 164. C.P.C., II, 12C.

with Jawahir Singh he intended to proceed towards Rajputana. He captured Bhilsa and marched towards Kota.\footnote{Khare, III, 704.} We are told that Madho Singh collected troops and made preparations to resist the Marathas at Dasak where they usually crossed the river. The Jaipur ruler was probably alarmed at the report that Raghunath would insist on strict payment from the Rajput princes as he had in his possession the valuation of the rents.\footnote{C.P.C., II, 12B.} But Raghunath’s plan remained unexecuted. Ahmed Shah Abdali had in the mean while appeared in the Punjab and “written to Raghunath in a proud and haughty manner threatening him with war and rapine”.\footnote{C.P.C., II, 207.} The Peshwa’s uncle considered it imprudent to meet him and hurriedly left Hindustan. He left Bahlro Anant and Vithal Shivdev in Bundelkhand and proceeded to Indore via Ujjain. In vain did Shuja-ud-daula and the English\footnote{For an exhaustive account of the “Abdali menace to Bengal”, see Dr. Nandalal Chatterji’s Verelst’s Rule in India, Chap. I. His views have been criticised by Dr. A. L. Srivastava in Calcutta Review, July, 1940.} ask him to remain where he was. Shuja sent an envoy to bring him back, but “he pleaded rains and went home”. The disappointed Nawab wrote to the Peshwa, “If he had come, what might not he have done with help from the English and myself?”\footnote{C.P.C., II, 622.} The Governor of Bengal wrote to Raghunath that he was prepared, in alliance with the Nawab of Oudh, to support the Marathas against Ahmed Shah Abdali, and asked him to return to the North ‘lest Abdali should think he was
running away to the Deccan in fear.¹ Nana Fadnis wrote from Poona to Shuja-ud-daula and the Governor of Bengal, asking for a defensive alliance against Abdali.² Nothing, however, could bring Raghunath back to the North.³ Within a short time Ahmed Shah wrote to him that he had no intentions against the Marathas and was resolved to march directly to Poona.¹ Then he returned to Lahore to punish the Sikhs,⁵ leaving the Marathas free to prosecute their operations—an opportunity which Raghunath did not utilise.

Raghunath’s motive in going to Indore was to settle the question of succession to Malhar Holkar’s State. Malhar’s successor, Male Rao, died early in 1767,⁶ without leaving any issue. Gangadhar Yashvant Chandrachud, the old minister of the Holkar State,⁷ was a partisan of Raghunath. They decided that Ahalya Bai, Male Rao’s mother, should adopt a child related to the Holkar family and leave the management of affairs to the minister.⁸ Ahalya Bai refused to accept this arrangement, and enlisted the support of some military chiefs.

¹ C.P.C., II, 207. ² C.P.C., II, 224, 255. ³ “Alliance with English and Shuja not having taken place the Marathas marched back to save themselves”.—C.P.C., II, 213. ⁴ C.P.C., II, 265. ⁵ C.P.C., II, 294. ⁶ Malcolm says that “his death occurred nine months after his elevation”. (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 157). ⁷ He “held his station of Dewan, or Minister, to the Holkar family from the Paishwah. He had been nominated by Bajerow to that office with Mulhar Raro, when the latter was first promoted to high command”. (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 160). ⁸ The minister proposed to give a considerable present to Raghunath. (Malcolm, Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 161).
and their troops. When Raghunath "was making preparations to compel her to compliance, she sent him a message, earnestly advising him not to make war on a woman, from which he might incur disgrace, but could never derive honour". Mahadji Sindhia and Janoji Bhonsle "refused to unite with him, and an ungrateful minister, to subvert the independence of the Holkar family". Finally, the Peshwa himself decided in favour of Ahalya Bai. She undertook the charge of civil administration and entrusted the command of her troops to Tukoji Holkar. Gangadhar was dismissed. Raghunath himself went to Mhysir, where he was 'most hospitably entertained' by Ahalya Bai. "The divided authority established in the Holkar State, from the day of Tukajee's elevation,......remained for above 30 years undisturbed by jealousy or ambition".

Raghunath then proceeded to Gujarat to punish Damaji Gaikwad, who had offended the Poona authorities by his failure to join the second expedition against Haidar Ali and his

1 Malcolm says that Ahalya Bai probably "used some of the contents of her full treasury" to gain the friendship of these Chiefs. (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 161).

2 Malcolm says that he was "a chief of the same tribe, but in no way related to Mulhar Row". (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 163). Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 555) holds the same view. Tukoji paid 16 lakhs as nazan on his succession. (Vda. I, 175, 176).

3 Really for 28 years—till Ahalya Bai's death in 1795.


5 S.P.D., xxxix, 84.

6 Damaji Gaikwad had excused himself from joining this expedition on the ground of troubles within his dominions. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 70).
(Raghunath's) expedition to Hindustan. 1 Although he wrote a letter to Gopika Bai, 2 saying that he had compelled the disloyal Gaikwad to pay a fine and to surrender some districts, yet we have no clear account of what he did. This letter seems to have been written to deceive Gopika Bai, for Raghunath does not appear to have taken any steps against Gaikwad, who was one of his partisans and helped him against the Peshwa in the civil war that followed. 3 From Gujarat Raghunath came to Anandavalli and began to collect troops for a new contest with his nephew. 4

A Marathi letter 5 dated in 1767 and addressed to Raghunath Rao contains a suggestion for the capture of Surat by the Marathas. 6

Surat was a very rich city. "Communicating easily with some of the richest provinces of the Mogul Empire, it was conveniently situated not only for the traffic of the western coast of India, but, what was at that time of much greater

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1 S.P.D., xx, 185. Towards the close of 1766 the Peshwa wrote to his uncle that he had directed Gaikwad to proceed to Hindustan. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 109).
2 Khare, III, 715.
3 Khare, III, p. 1230; also letter no. 748. In a letter dated April 6, 1766, we find that Raghunath asked a man (whose name is not given) to suppress Gaikwad. That man wrote, "I am trying my best. If you come here, you will get 40 or 50 lakhs". (S.P.D., xix, 35).
4 See pp. 65-75.
5 S.P.D., xxxix, 95.
6 In 1766-67 "Visaji Krishna was sent to the province of Sorat with directions to subjugate the posts and Mawashis and was ordered to pay the expenses of the Sansthanies and Jamidars of Gujarath who might come to his assistance". (Vad, I, 54).
importance, the trade of the Persian and Arabian gulfs. As it was the post from which a passage was most conveniently taken to the tomb of the prophet, it acquired a peculiar sacredness in the eyes of the Mussalmans, and was spoken of under the denomination of one of the gates of Mecca. It acquired great magnitude, as well as celebrity; for, even after it had confessedly declined, it was estimated in 1796 at 800,000 inhabitants. 1

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Siddis encroached upon the rights of the Nawab, and the Marathas secured the privilege of collecting chauth in Surat. Two collectors of chauth were stationed there, one on behalf of the Peshwa and one on behalf of Damaji Gaikwad. 2 They "interfered with every act of administration, and contributed to increase the misgovernment of the city". The high-handedness of the Siddis compelled the Nawab to appeal for aid to the English factors of Bombay. In 1759 the English concluded a formal treaty with the Nawab and compelled the Siddis to surrender their rights. The Emperor of Delhi invested the Company with the command of the castle and the fleet of Surat, and the Nawab became a vassal. The Marathas were naturally uneasy.

In the letter referred to above, the writer, Raghu Anant, speaks of the growing power and prosperity of the English merchants in Surat and their interference in local politics. There was a dispute between Siddi Jafar and the English; and the former, determined to expel the latter from Surat, invited Damaji

2 Each received one-sixth of the revenue. In 1759 the Maratha share amounted to £12,750. (Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. II, p. 136).
Gaikwad to help him. Damaji asked one of his officers, Rudraji Girmaji, to deal with Surat. Rudraji sent his agent to the Peshwa to arrange matters, but the Peshwa ordered Narottamdas to take charge of Surat. Narottamdas wanted to have his appointment confirmed by Raghunath Rao, and went to Northern India to see him for that purpose. Nothing was done in the mean while to help Siddi Jafar. So Raghu Anant requests Raghunath Rao to capture Surat in the Peshwa’s name. He assures the latter that the defences of Surat are very weak: “The wall surrounding Surat is as low as a man’s height. The fort is old, and its wall is broken in many places. There are 12 doors, with only 15 or 20 men for watching each of them. There is no strong gun, and the trench is not very deep”. Unfortunately Raghu Anant’s appeal went in vain.

Raghunath’s inconclusive campaign¹ did not restore Maratha power in the North. Jawahir Singh at once became aggressive. He sent an envoy named Padre Don Pedro to Calcutta for an alliance against the Marathas; but this gentleman could not reach his destination as he was ‘recalled owing to an internal revolt in the Jat State’.² Towards the middle of 1767 the Jat Raja’s position was strong indeed. His rival, Nahar Singh, was dead. He had crushed his disloyal Gosain troops. Encouraged by Raghunath’s retreat³ he occupied Maratha domains from Bhind (20 miles west and south-west of Etawa) to Kalpi. Balaji Govind Kher, the Maratha officer in charge of Kalpi, was treacherously attacked and compelled to fly across the Betwa.

¹ Sardesai says that he ‘woefully mismanaged’ the campaign. (S.P.D., xix, Introduction).
² C.P.C., II, 642, 854.
³ Raghunath reached Sironj in May, 1767.
Only Gwalior and Jhansi remained under Maratha control. The Jat Raja established his authority in the Kalpi district, levied tribute from Datia and Seondha, advanced up to the bridge of Narwar, and formed an alliance with the rulers of Picchor and Gohad. In December, 1767, Jawahir won a “Pyrrhic victory” over Jaipur troops in the battle of Maonda (60 miles north of Jaipur). A contemporary writer observes, “The fortune of the Jats has been shaken and the result has been fatal to them. They have returned home pillaged, stupefied and overthrown; and Jawahir......has since then only gone backwards”.

While the Jat Raja was pursuing a policy of aggrandisement, the ambitious Nawab of Oudh had not been sitting idle. He wanted to occupy Bundelkhand and asked the Governor of Bengal to exercise British influence in his favour. The Governor recommended a policy of caution. Bundelkhand, he wrote, “is large and extensive, surrounded by Maratha districts, and favourite object of their attention. If you take it, there may be jealousy or open rupture. If Marathas go to war with you, it will be absolutely impossible for the English to help you without violating their alliance with the Marathas on the coast”. So

1 Probably S.P.D., xxxix, 60, refers to this period. We are told that the Jats were advancing towards Jhansi, but returned to Gwalior when they saw that the fort of Jhansi was strong in men and supplies. “Like mad elephants the Jats think of striking a lion’s den”.
3 S.P.D., xxix, 192. For details, see Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 476-479.
4 Wendel, quoted in Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, P. 479.
the Nawab was asked to wait, and a half-hearted assurance followed: “The late advices from the coast indicate so little permanency to the alliance of the English with the Marathas and the Nizam, and show so much duplicity and treachery in their conduct that it is not unlikely for the alliance to be ultimately broken off”. The English were obviously unwilling to venture far into the den of the Marathas even to strengthen their barrier. But Shuja-ud-daula was not to be easily set aside. He suggested that the Ruhelas, Ahmed Khan Bangash and the Jats might enter into an alliance and form a barrier against the Marathas. The Governor of Bengal approved this plan and asked the Nawab to carry on anti-Maratha negotiations with those powers, although the Peshwa had, “far from disturbing the English, sent a vakil with voluntary offers of co-operation against the Nizam and Haidar”. Fortunately for the Marathas, their enemies were too jealous of each other to combine against them.

The temporary eclipse of Maratha influence due to Raghunath Rao’s hasty retreat did not last long. Maratha officers in Bundelkhand succeeded in recapturing many posts occupied by the Jats. Their position was further improved by internal dissensions in the Jat Kingdom. Jawahir Singh was assassinated in July, 1768, by a soldier whom he had disgraced. His

1 C.P.C., II, 524.  
2 C.P.C., II, 597.  
3 C.P.C., II, 599.  
4 S.P.D., xxix, 75. Colonel Smith reported from Allahabad to Calcutta on October 28, 1767, that Jawahir Singh had evacuated the fort of Kalpi which had been re-occupied by the Marathas. (B.S.C.P., 1767 (I), pp. 409-410; 1767 (II), pp. 386-387).  
successor, Ratan Singh, was murdered by a Brahmin monk\(^1\) in April, 1769. His infant son, Kesari Singh, was then placed on the throne, the management of affairs being entrusted to Dan Shah, Nawal Singh’s brother-in-law. Dan Shah seems to have been an able man, and he had already participated in some encounters against the Marathas in Bundelkhand.\(^2\) But his authority was disputed by Nawal Singh and Ranjit Singh, Ratan Singh’s brother, who did not agree to submit to the rule of an outsider. Dan Shah was besieged by them at Dig and forced to surrender on condition of exile from the Jat Kingdom. Then a quarrel broke out between Nawal Singh and Ranjit Singh. As Shah Alam wrote to the Governor of Bengal, “There is scarcely an individual (in the Jat State) whose head is not turned with ambitious schemes”.\(^3\) Ranjit Singh took possession of the fortress of Dig with all the treasures and stores hoarded there,\(^4\) and defied his brother.

In the mean while the Marathas had reappeared in the North. Jawahir Singh’s aggressions had led the Peshwa to decide that an army under Mahadjee Sindhia\(^5\) and Tukoji Holkar

3 C.P.C., II, 1301.
5 The following episode narrated by Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 563) shows how the young Peshwa exacted obedience from his servants: “When ordered to Hindoostan...after all the commanders had obtained their audience of leave, Mahadjee Sindhia continued to loiter in the neighbourhood of Poona. Mahdoo Rao, who at all times exacted strict obedience from his officers, ... observed Sindhia's camp still standing... He sent instantly to Mahadjee Sindhia, expressing astonishment at
should be sent to Hindustan in order to deal with the growing menace of the Jats. These two Chiefs accordingly proceeded to the North;¹ but before dealing with the Jats they invaded Mewar.² Rana Ari Singh II had offended many powerful nobles of his court, who had thereupon set up a rival for the throne in the person of Ratan Singh, falsely reputed to be a son of Rana Raj Singh II. The cause of this infant was espoused by Bijay Singh of Jodhpur and Prithvi Singh of Jaipur.³ In May, 1769, Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar appeared near Udaipur to support the cause of Ratan Singh. Differences, however, soon arose between the two Chiefs, as a result of which Tukoji Holkar returned to Kota in June. Mahadji remained idle and took no steps to deliver an assault on Udaipur. He found that it was better to give up the cause of Ratan Singh, who had no money, and to support Ari Singh, who was prepared to pay. Ari Singh agreed⁴ to pay 64 lakhs as contribution and 5 lakhs as present to Sindhia, and to alienate 1¼ lakhs worth of jagir his disobedience and presumption ... Mahadajee took his departure promptly....”

¹ Colonel Smith reported from Allahabad to Calcutta on December 1, 1767, that the Marathas had not yet determined to enter Hindustan.

² S.P.D., xxxix, 97 (date: 1767, month uncertain) shows that the Peshwa asked his generals (including Tukoji Holkar) to stop ravaging the territory of the Rana, and to leave his dominions, as he was paying his tribute regularly.

³ S.P.D., xxxviii, 185.

⁴ “Although Ari Singh could be placed on the throne (by the Marathas), he would be dethroned by Prithvi Singh and Bijay Singh as soon as the Marathas withdrew”. (S.P.D., xxxviii, 185).
in favour of Ratan Singh. 33 lakhs were given immediately; for the balance some districts were left to be jointly administered by Rajput and Maratha officers. 1 "The attempt to take 64 lakhs of Rupees in cash from the kingdom of Mewar in its then condition was as hopeful of success as a plan to draw blood out of stone. It only left a sore perpetually open between the Maharana and the house of Sindhiya". 2

On his return from Mewar Tukoji Holkar besieged Raghugarh. 3 Mahadji Sindhiya joined him (September, 1769) after the conclusion of peace with Ari Singh. Then they advanced to the Karauli territory in order to put pressure for tribute on Jaipur. 4 Before this purpose could be accomplished, they were lured away by the envoys of Ranjit Singh to take part in the civil war which was then desolating the Jat Kingdom:

A great Maratha army had already arrived in the North 5

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1 S.P.D., xxix, 87 (wrong date ?), 233, 234, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245. The Rajput version is different. See Tod, Annals of Mewar, Chap. XVI, and Ojha, Rajputana Ka Itihas, part III, pp. 962-967.
2 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 521.
3 S.P.D., xxix, 245.
4 C.P.C., III, 128.
5 The following itinerary of Ramchandra Ganesh has been collected from Peshwa's Diaries:—

May 8, 1769 .......... Burhanpur.
May 25, 1769 .......... Narmada, south bank.
July 16, 1769 .......... Arun (in Malwa).
August 22, 1769 .......... Raghugarh.
December 12, 1769 .......... Lakheri (in Bundi).
December 26, 1769 .......... Lalsot (in Jaipur).
March 28, 1770 .......... Kumbher.
(S.P.D., xxix, Introduction, p. 2).
to strengthen the force acting under Sindhia and Holkar. Its leader was Ramchandra Ganesh, a distinguished soldier. He was assisted by his Dewan, Visaji Krishna.

Early in March, 1770, about 30,000 Maratha troops encamped outside the fort of Kumbher and began negotiations with Ranjit Singh. When they found that the Jat Chief was unable or unwilling to pay the stipulated sum of money, they ravaged the territories of both Jat rulers (Ranjit Singh and Nawal Singh) without distinction. Nawal Singh remained encamped with his army under the walls of Dig; it was uncertain whether he would fight or buy off the Marathas. For some time he merely watched the movements of the Marathas, who utilised the interval in contracting an alliance with Najib-ud-daula.

The question of this alliance created dissensions in the Maratha camp. This able and proud Ruhela Chief had resigned his government to his son Zabita Khan in March, 1768; but

1 Sir Jadunath Sarkar (Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. III, p. 7) says that the objects of the expedition were to realise the war indemnity due from the Jat Kingdom according to the treaty of May 26, 1754, (total money to be paid to the Marathas and Imad-ul-Mulk—2 crores and 30 lakhs) and to recover the lands in the Doab assigned by the Delhi Government during Imad-ul-Mulk’s wazirship as the price of Maratha armed help up to 1754.

We find that in 1769-70 the rulers of Bundi and Kota were asked to pay Rs. 130,000 and Rs. 3,90,001 respectively. (Vad, I, 303, 304). It may be conjectured that this was due to the arrival of Ramchandra Ganesh.

2 Grant Duff (Vol. I, pp. 562, 570) says that Visaji Krishna was the chief in command.

3 C.P.C., III, 161.

4 C.P.C., III, 161.

5 S.P.D., xxix, pp. 302-305.
the prospect of Maratha revival in Hindustan compelled him to emerge out of seclusion. He was welcomed as an ally by Tukoji Holkar, who was anxious to continue the tradition established by Malhar Rao. Ramchandra Ganesh supported him, and fondly believed that Najib’s co-operation would enable him to win over the par-Ruhelas. Only Mahadji knew that Najib could never be a friend of the Marathas; he could not forget that “the blood of three and a half persons of his family” was on his head. He was, however, over-ruled by the Peshwa himself. The Peshwa “so far concurred in Sindhia’s opinion, that Nujeeb-ud-dowlah could never be a friend to the Mahrattas; but as they were endeavouring to induce the Emperor to withdraw from the protection of the English, in which Nujeeb-ud-dowlah’s assistance might be useful”, the policy of entering into an alliance with him was approved. We shall see how this alliance proved injurious to the Maratha cause and how Najib-ud-daula’s death in October, 1770, prevented the Marathas from utilising him as an instrument for the restoration of Shah Alam. For the moment, however, his adhesion to the Maratha cause alarmed the Jats. A formal alliance was concluded between him and the Marathas. He was asked to capture the Jat territories in the middle Doab, while the Marathas decided

1 Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 573) says, “Visajee Kishen listened to the overtures of Nujeeb-ud-dowlah with complacency; but Ramchundur Gunnesh and Mahadajee Sindhia called for vengeance on the Rohillas”.
2 Dattaji, Jankoji and Sabaji were slain and Mahadji was left half dead at Panipat.
4 Shah Alam.
to confine their operations in the Jat Kingdom west of the Jamuna.¹

Nawal Singh now found that if he waited any longer under the walls of Dig, he would lose his Doab possessions. So he left his shelter and met the Maratha army near Sonkh (a place midway between Kumbhet and Mathura) on April 6, 1770. The Jats suffered a disastrous defeat.² Nawal Singh’s position became desperate. “Finding himself in a tight corner, Nawal Singh threw away his ornaments lest he should be recognised by the enemy, and with a few attendants” fled for safety. He took refuge first in Aring (13 miles east of Dig) and later in Dig, where he collected his defeated troops. The gates of this fort were barricaded, but the Marathas did not venture within the range of its guns.³ In the mean while Najib-ud-daula had encamped at Chandausi and his troops had taken the Jat fort of Nohjhil and the Jat parganas of Jewar, Dankaur, Tappal, and Dabahi.⁴

The Marathas halted at Mathura, and dissensions at once arose regarding the policy to be pursued. It was a very favourable opportunity for the restoration of Maratha influence in the North, for “no strong enemy was left in the region west of British-protected Oudh”, but personal jealousy and lack of statesmanship once more stood in the way of success. Ramchandra

1 S.P.D., xxix, 246, 254-262.
2 For details, see Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. III, pp. 8-12.
4 S.P.D., xxix, 246, 254-262.
Ganesh and Visaji Krishna were so jealous of each other that they could never act in sincere co-operation. Holkar was surrounded by ministers who "played the rascally game of continuing Malhar's policy and jealously thwarting every step advocated by Mahadji solely because he was a Sindhia." Thus, from the very outset the Maratha camp became sharply divided into two warring factions—Sindhia contradicting Holkar, and when Ramchandra sided with Sindhia, Visaji joined Holkar simply because the last-named was opposed to the supreme chief". Naturally, therefore, the four Chiefs failed to agree about their course of action after the victory of Sonkh. Mahadji Sindhia wanted to make peace with Nawal Singh in return for a moderate sum of money, to conquer the territories of the Ruhela and Bangash Chiefs in the Doab, and to punish Najib, the bitterest enemy of the Marathas in Hindustan. Ramchandra Ganesh, on the other hand, wanted to squeeze as much money as possible from Nawal Singh and to conquer his territories in the Doab with Najib's assistance. He was unwilling to offend Najib, lest he should oppose the Marathas at the head of a powerful Muslim confederacy consisting of the Ruhela and

1 They had begun to quarrel even before their march to Hindustan. The Peshwa was so much displeased that he gave orders for confiscating their saranjam. (S.P.D., xx, 278).

2 Sindhia and Holkar had begun to view each other with suspicion even before their march to Hindustan. (S.P.D., xx, 271).


4 Malcolm says, "It was thought best to take advantage of the good disposition evinced by Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, lest proceeding to extremities against so brave and popular a chief might again unite the Mahomedans; and it was further foreseen, that peace with him would
Bangash Chiefs as well as the Nawab of Oudh. The Peshwa supported Ramchandra Ganesh.¹

Najib had already encamped on the east bank of the Jamuna. Tukoji Holkar visited Najib on April 17, 1770, and Najib came to see the Maratha Chiefs two days later. He tried to soothe Mahadji Sindhia by excuses, “but soreness of heart remained between the two sides, and affectionate speeches were not made”.² After these preliminary negotiations the entire Maratha army, about 70,000 strong, left Mathura, crossed over to the east bank of the Jumuna, and encamped near Najib (April 25, 1770). The Ruhela Chief occupied Jat parganas like Shukohabad and Sadabad. The Marathas also occupied some posts and ravaged the country. A Jat force came to defend the Doab, but could not resist the triumphant allies. The alliance, however, did not last long. Tukoji Holkar secretly warned Najib that Sindhia was planning treachery against him.³ On May 10 Najib marched towards Aligarh. The Marathas fell on his baggage, but could not take anything.⁴

Najib’s departure did not restore unity in the Maratha camp. Sindhia and Holkar continued to advocate contradictory policies regarding Nawal Singh. While the former wanted to enable them to levy, undisturbed, tribute on the Jats and Rajpoorts, and increase their resources for future operations”. (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 169).

² Quoted in Sarkar’s Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 411.
³ Whether this charge was true, or an invention of Holkar to discredit Sindhia, is uncertain.
accept the indemnity offered by the Jat Raja (65 lakhs), the latter demanded 80 lakhs. No settlement could be made, and the Marathas renewed their depredations against the Jat villages in the Doab.\footnote{S.P.D., xxviii, 214; xxiv, 246, 255-260.} Towards the end of May they raided the Bangash territory in Farrukhabad. In June a Maratha detachment from Kalpi captured some villages in the Etawa district from the Ruhelas.\footnote{C.P.C., III, 255, 307.} Then the rainy season came in, and the Marathas took shelter in cantonments in the Aligarh district.\footnote{S.P.D., xxvii, 214. Ramchandra Ganesh was at Kol near Aligarh on July 22, 1770. (S.P.D., xxix, Introduction, p. 2).}

During the rainy season the folly of treating Najib-ud-daula as an ally became abundantly clear.\footnote{S.P.D., xxiv, 246.} He did not surrender to the Marathas the Jat territories occupied by him in the Doab,\footnote{On July 4, 1770, Captain Harper reported from Fyzabad to Calcutta that Najib had given up entirely to the Marathas the parganas conquered from the Jats. But five days later he reported that a rupture between him and the Marathas had become inevitable. (B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 562-567). If Najib really gave up those districts, why should the Marathas quarrel with him?} nor did he exercise his influence over the Bangash and Ruhela Chiefs in order to procure territorial or monetary concessions for his allies.\footnote{On some occasions at least Najib seems to have sincerely served the cause of the Marathas. In the middle of 1770 Dundi Khan asked him for help against the Marathas, but Najib advised him to surrender to their demands instead of opposing them. (B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 650, 678-679, 713-714).} Thus ended the fond dream indulged in by Ramchandra Ganesh. To his dismay he found, in one of Najib's
secret letters to the trans-Ganges Ruhelas, that his ally was trying to form an anti-Maratha coalition consisting of the Ruhelas and the Jats. The Maratha troops were starving. So he hastened to make the best of a bad bargain by taking as much money as possible from Nawal Singh. The Jat Chief agreed to pay 65 lakhs in three years, and an annual tribute of 11 lakhs. Ranjit Singh was given a jagir worth 25 lakhs a year.

After the conclusion of peace with the Jats, the Marathas tried, by negotiation, to secure the restitution of the Maratha jagirs usurped by the trans-Ganges Ruhelas after Panipat. The usurpers plainly refused to surrender lands unless compelled by superior force. Thus baffled, the Marathas openly quarrelled with Najib-ud-daula at a conference. The angry Ruhela Chief cried, "Even when I am dead and buried in the ground, I can eat you all up with only 10,000 men". He was pacified with great difficulty. The Marathas could not move without his advice. He advised them to send 10,000 troops to annex the Jat territory near Delhi, and promised to assist them with 5,000 men. Thus the shrewd Ruhela Chief succeeded in diverting the attention of the Marathas from the Afghans to the Jats. On August 29, 5,000 Maratha horse advanced towards the Ganges, but the climate compelled them to halt. Najib, who had been ailing for some time, felt that his end was near. On October

1 C.P.C., III, 323.
2 C.P.C., III, 323.
4 S.P.D., xxvii, 214.
5 B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 766-769.
6 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 413-414.
7 S.P.D., xxix, 246.
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5 B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 766-769.  
6 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, pp. 413-414.  
7 S.P.D., xxix, 246.
8 he concluded peace between Nawal Singh and the Marathas. He died at Hapur on October 31.

Freed from Najib-ud-daula and at peace with the Jats, the Marathas proceeded against the Bangash and Ruhela Chiefs. The districts of Etawa, Shukohabad and Kanouj were ravaged and some posts were captured from the Afghans. A contemporary letter says, "The Marathas are practically governing the country". In December, 1770, Ramchandra Ganesha laid siege to the fort of Etawa, which was then held by Kabir Khan, an officer of Hafiz Rahmat Khan. After resisting the assault for two weeks Kabir Khan surrendered the fort on being granted his life and property. After capturing Etawa the Marathas turned their attention towards Farrukhabad. These successes of the Marathas alarmed the Nawab of Oudh, who had offended them by intriguing with the English with a view to help the Ruhelas. He apprehended an attack and sent his son with a strong force to Cawnpore. He also requested the Governor of Bengal to

2 Dundi Khan wrote to the Select Committee of Bengal that the Marathas, flushed with their success over Nawal Singh, had crossed the Jamuna, and enquired how public tranquillity was to be restored. (B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 446-449).
3 C.P.C., III, 505. Ahmed Khan Bangash offered 22 lakhs if the Marathas spared Etawa, but they refused. Hafiz Rahmat Khan preferred fight to payment.
4 C.P.C., III, 505, 517.
6 C.P.C., III, 562.
7 B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 574-576, 583-585.
8 C.P.C., III, 517.
9 C.P.C., III, 562.
send some troops from Patna to the Kora district. The Emperor asked the English to send two battalions of sepoys from Buxar for the defence of Kora. The officers of the East India Company were anxious for the safety of the Emperor and of Patna itself. The Marathas, however, had no desire to proceed towards the East. A desultory war continued between them and the troops of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Ahmed Khan Bangash and Dundi Khan.

After Najib-ud-daula's death his son Zabita Khan introduced fresh complications in Maratha politics. He wanted to succeed to his father's post of Mir Bakshi and Shuja-ud-daula supported his claim. Tukoji Holkar, loyal to the memory of Najib-ud-daula, became his champion, but Visaji Krishna and Mahadji Sindhia demanded 25 lakhs of rupees as the price of succession. When Zabita Khan refused to pay, Visaji and Mahadji compelled Holkar to dismiss him from his camp. In the meantime Ahmed Khan Bangash had been trying to enlist Maratha support in favour of his own claim to the office of imperial Mir Bakshi. He was ready to pay. Hence the Marathas came to terms with the Afghans. On January 26, 1771, a treaty was concluded, by which Hafiz Rahmat Khan

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2 C.P.C., III, 562, 564, 577.
3 C.P.C., III, 593. 4 C.P.C., III, 571.
5 On March 5, 1771, Captain Harper reported from Lucknow to Calcutta that the Nawab had offered to the Marathas five lakhs of rupees to deliver Delhi to Zabita Khan.
6 C.P.C., III, 605.
7 C.P.C., III, 614. 8 C.P.C., III, 605.
agreed to pay 22 lakhs and Ahmed Khan Bangash 10 lakhs. These terms were arranged by the famous Wazir Ghazi-ud-din, who had been trying for some time past to conciliate the Marathas. Ramchandra Ganesh and Mahadji Sindhia were satisfied, but Tukoji Holkar, who was an enemy of Ghazi-ud-din, disagreed and impeded the adjustment of affairs by insisting on fighting. Ghazi-ud-din left the Maratha camp in disgust and proceeded to Ajner. Holkar was told by Zabita Khan that the Ruhelas had a large force, and that if they could be gained over, great deeds could be performed with their assistance in Hindustan. So war was renewed and the Marathas ravaged the territory subordinate to the fort of Farrukhabad, which Hafiz Rahmat Khan took steps to reinforce.

By this time the quarrel between the Maratha Chiefs had reached its climax. Ramchandra Ganesh left the camp in disgust with his own contingent and started to proceed to the Deccan, but a compromise induced him to stay. He had, however, lost all influence. A news-letter from the Doab contains the following statement: “All the officers of the Maratha army are Visaji’s friends and they consider Ramchandra Ganesh a fool. All this is due to the instigation of Mahadji Sindha”. Under the joint leadership of Visaji Krishna and Mahadji Sindhia the Marathas now decided to take possession of Delhi.

2 C.P.C., III, 571.
3 C.P.C., III, 605. B.S.C.P., 1771, pp. 82-84.
4 C.P.C., III, 199.
The Emperor Shah Alam was at this time living as an English pensioner at Allahabad. He had comfort as well as security, but "it was impossible for him to cease hankering for a return to Delhi, as a visible symbol of his full sovereignty". As early as May 26, 1761, the English had promised to help him with troops. This promise was almost annually renewed, but never fulfilled. In a long letter written to the Governor of Bengal on May 9, 1770, the helpless Emperor described in detail the reasons which had induced him to decide in favour of proceeding to Delhi. He wrote, "First, the honour of the Royal House will be saved...... Secondly, His Majesty's going......will greatly strengthen the hands of Najib-ud-daula and the other sardars. Thirdly, the present is the most favourable time for His Majesty to reconquer the dominions of his ancestors". Najib-ud-daula, who had been protecting the city of Delhi and some members of the imperial family (specially Shah Alam's mother and son, Zinat Mahal and Jawan Bakht) for the last few years, was not very popular in the capital. Najib himself was unwilling to bear the burden of protecting the imperial family. He wrote to Shah Alam, "Let your Majesty in your Royal Person advance

1 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, p. 548.
2 C.P.C., III, 199.
3 "Numbers of discontented people in that mighty city (Delhi) repined at the prevalence of the Afghan administration, under which no office was given to any but to a Rohillah, and they were this long while brooding upon their own discontent. All these......took care to applaud his (Shah Alam's) resolution, and to inform him that the Marathas were the only people in the world capable of promoting his designs". —Siyar-ul-Mutakbirin, R. Cambray’s edition, Vol. IV, p. 36.
to your capital and yourself defend your own honour". This application was supported by the Queen-Mother, who repeatedly asked her son to return to the capital. The problem became more pressing after Najib-ud-daula's death (October, 1770). Although Zabita Khan continued to hold Delhi and to protect the imperial family, yet Shah Alam could not rely on so young and inexperienced a substitute for the wise and crafty Najib. Moreover, the Emperor was afraid lest his delay should lead either the Marathas or the Sikhs to place some other member of the imperial family on the vacant throne. The Sikhs had already extended their authority over Hariana and the Upper

3 C.P.C., III, 503.
4 The following letter written by Shah Alam to the Governor of Bengal in 1765 speaks for itself:

"Malhar, who, being defeated by the General, fled in disgrace, is still in the Bundelkhand country preparing for war. He has sent for his troops from every part of the Deccan, and has hostile schemes in view. If after his forces are assembled, he marches from Bundelkhand towards Dega and Cummeer and brings with him the zamindars and rajas of those parts together with Jawahir Singh, and if the Sikhs also are invited to join them, Najib-ud-daulah will be under the necessity of entering into the same alliance, as his country and family are in the neighbourhood of Shahjahanabad. And if these people, agreeable to their intentions, place upon the throne some one of the Royal family and march with their united forces towards Allahabad, the Rohillas and Ahmed Khan will also join them, and such a disturbance will be raised as it will be difficult to put down. His Majesty's safety depends at present upon the safety of the Governor, the General, and the English chiefs". (C.P.C., I, 2688).
Doab, and there was nothing to prevent them from capturing Delhi and setting up a new Emperor.\(^1\) Ghazi-ud-din, Shah Alam’s mortal enemy, was intriguing with the Marathas; who could fathom his evil intentions?

It was natural for the Emperor to turn for assistance to the English, from whom he had received so many sweet promises in the past. But the English officers advised him to incite the people of Hindustan\(^2\) to oppose the Marathas and not to risk his person and fortunes by going to Delhi.\(^3\) The Emperor appealed to Shuja-ud-daula, but that faithful ally of the Company was not prepared to help his fugitive sovereign.\(^4\) In his despair the Emperor turned to the Marathas. He was suspicious of their motives;\(^5\) he was alarmed at their intimacy with his enemy

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1 After the failure of Raghunath Rao’s plan the Sikhs tried to play the role of King-makers by offering to escort Shah Alam to Delhi. The Emperor felt it unsafe to depend on the Sikhs. In a letter written to the famous Sikh Chief, Sardar Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, he observed that, due to the lack of unity among the Sikhs, every one among them wanted to be the King-maker. (C.P.C., I, 2735, 2735A; II, 846, 847, 849, 1101).

2 Both Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-daula knew that no reliance could be placed on the Chiefs of Hindustan (C.P.C., III, 232, 250) and on one occasion the Governor of Bengal expressed the same view. (C.P.C., III, 263). Yet the Emperor was told that these Chiefs were “not wholly degenerate, and one day they will rise as one man and push the Marathas back”. (C.P.C., III, 329).


4 C.P.C., III, 330. For a different view, see Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1942, pp. 332-335.

5 He wrote to the Governor of Bengal, “The words of the Marathas have never coincided with their deeds, and never will”. (C.P.C., III, 232).
Ghazi-ud-din. But they alone could restore him to his ancestral throne, and they were ready to do so.

In 1766 Raghunath Rao had made certain definite proposals for the Emperor's acceptance. He wrote as follows:

"(1) It is necessary that all dismissals from or grants of offices should be left to his (i.e., Raghunath's) discretion.

(2) In order to defray the expenses of his troops certain lands should be assigned to the writer and the produce of them appropriated for that purpose.

(3) Formerly the lands and dependencies of Antarbad were in the possession of the writer, but for some time past, they have become the property of others. These, as soon as evacuated, should revert to the writer.

(4) The English sardars and the writer are now entirely well disposed and allied to each other. No molestation shall be offered them on his side.

(5) Let the Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula with all cheerfulness and vigour unite in every undertaking with the writer, and he on his part will never harbour any hostile or adverse measures against the Nawab.

(6) Besides the countries His Majesty now possesses, whatever addition may be made to them, one half should become His Majesty's property, and other half be made over to the writer for the expenses of his troops. One half of the revenues collected in specie should also be made over to him.

(7) There are several grants and immunities respecting

1 B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 391-394. 2 C.P.C., II, 107B.
the religion of the Hindus, which they have been enjoying for some time. Those immunities should now be formally assented to”.

Raghunath was not unaware of the influence exercised by the English on the court of Allahabad. So he wrote to the Governor of Bengal asking for his co-operation in ‘regulating the affairs of the Empire’, and sent an envoy to Calcutta. The Governor replied that the English never had any intention of escorting Shah Alam to Delhi and that they were solely engaged in protecting their own territories and those of Shuja. Colonel Barker was directed to proceed with the whole of his brigade to the banks of the Karmnasa in order to watch the movements of the Marathas, to discover their intentions, and even to cross the river in case they invaded Shuja’s dominions. The Governor wrote to the Emperor, pointing out the inexpediency of forming an alliance with the Marathas, and adding that he was free to go to Delhi in union with them, but no English army could accompany him, although he would receive the stipulated tribute wherever he might be. It was apprehended that an alliance between the Emperor and the Marathas would produce disturbances even in Oudh, and in order to avert such an emergency a league was sought to be established between Shuja-ud-daula, the Ruhelas and the Jats. A conference was held by Lord Clive and General Carnac with Shuja and other powers at Chapra.

1 B.S.C.P., 1766, pp. 81-82. C.P.C., II, 78.
Although the hostility of the English prevented the Emperor from accepting Raghunath's offer in 1766, circumstances already referred to compelled him to yield to the Marathas in 1771. He could not wait for ever in expectation of British assistance. He "was now in a sore dilemma; he could not trust the Marathas, who had his bitterest foe Ghazi-ud-din Khan in their camp; nor could he refuse their invitation to march to Delhi, as they threatened to place some one else on the throne in that case. Added to this fear were the entreaties of the queen-mother, who urged him to march to the capital with all haste, as without his protection her very life was in danger". At last the perplexed Emperor made his decision. Encouraged by a secret letter from Mahadji Sindhia, he sent an envoy named Saif-ud-din Muhammad Khan to the Maratha camp. (December 27, 1770).

An agreement was concluded.

The Marathas left the environs of Farrukhabad in January, 1771, and arrived at Patparganj (opposite Delhi) on February 5. Two days later Saif-ud-din Muhammad Khan left the

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1 On November 30, 1770, General Barker reported that the Emperor would trust himself to the Marathas if he did not receive an escort from the English. On March 31, 1771, he wrote that the Emperor had declared his intention of entrusting his cause to the Marathas. (B.S.C.P., 1770, pp. 789-792; 1771, pp. 152-156).


3 As early as 1768 Sindhia negotiated with the Emperor. He wrote, "Myself and Tukoji Holkar are ready to give a new aspect to His Majesty's affairs. With a powerful army we will attend your presence... If it is His Majesty's sacred pleasure to illumine the sublime throne, now is the time ...". (C.P.C., II, 1007).

4 C.P.C., III, 480, 548.
Maratha camp and appeared in Delhi. There he proclaimed Shah Alam and assured the citizens that they had nothing to fear from the Marathas. But the Emperor’s mother prevented Zabi Khan’s Qilâdâr Qasim Ali from surrendering the fort. On February 9 the Marathas bombarded Delhi from four sides and compelled Qasim Ali to capitulate. A Maratha detachment of 5,000 horse occupied the city (February 10, 1771), and Zabi Khan’s troops were expelled. From this enterprise Ramchandra Ganesh and Tukoji Holkar had kept aloof. The spoils naturally went to their rivals, who became the masters of the situation. Prince Jawan Bakht appointed Visaji Krishna collector of the districts round Delhi, which had long been held by Najib-ud-daula. Sometime later an agreement was concluded between the Marathas on the one hand and Saif-ud-din Muhammad Khan and Prince Jawan Bakht on the other. The Marathas agreed to escort Shah Alam to Delhi, provided the Emperor paid them 25 lakhs in cash, assigned to them some mabals including Meerut, and ceded the districts of Kara (Jahanabad) and Kora. The Maratha Chiefs were also to enjoy the privilege of appointing all imperial officials below the Wazir. These terms were approved by Shah Alam from Allahabad. Delhi fort was handed over to Saif-ud-din Muhammad Khan by the Marathas on August 2, on payment of a part of the promised sum.

2 C.P.C., III, 663. These activities of the Marathas created an alarm in the suspicious mind of the Emperor, who wrote to the Governor of Bengal, “This disgraceful deed of the Marathas has mortified His Majesty, who can hardly bear to contemplate such a catastrophe as his family’s falling into the hands of his enemies”.
3 S.P.D., xxix, 89.
4 C.P.C., III, 717.
The English naturally tried their best to prevent the Marathas from getting hold of the Emperor. They tried to organise an alliance between Shuja-ud-daula and the Ruhelas. For this purpose the Nawab of Oudh granted an interview to General Barker at Benares.\(^1\) Nothing came out of this plan. The Governor of Bengal repeatedly wrote to Shah Alam against the Marathas.\(^2\) One of the letters\(^3\) may be quoted: "What guarantee is there that the Marathas will give up their old ways and surrender to His Majesty the conquests which they have been accustomed to divide among themselves? ... They are the old enemies of the house of Timur and ... they have risen on the ruins of the Mughal Empire. It is not their interest alone that is opposed to the re-establishment of the Empire, their religion is also opposed to it. ... His Majesty should not plunge into the sea of troubles". When it was found that the Emperor could not be shaken, he was informed that the English would "neither stand in the way of the Royal resolution nor support it".\(^4\) No troops were sent to escort him to Delhi. Shuja-ud-daula sent his son to accompany the Emperor up to Shahijahanabad\(^5\) and supplied 12 lakhs in cash and 10,000 troops.

The Emperor started from Allahabad in April, 1771. On his way he demanded tribute from the son and successor of Ahmed Khan Bangash, who had died recently. The chief minister of the Bangash State collected troops to oppose him. The Emperor sent for Mahadji Sindhia, who advanced with a

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\(^1\) C.P.C., III, 647, 658, 1039.
\(^2\) C.P.C., II, 1400, 1467; III, 204, 314, 329, 503, 504, 686, 693.
\(^3\) C.P.C., III, 314.
\(^4\) C.P.C., III, 698.
\(^5\) C.P.C., III, 746, 810.
large army. This was enough to intimidate the minister, who made peace with the Emperor by paying 2 lakhs and promising to pay 4 lakhs more. Shah Alam then halted at Nabiganj (19 miles south-west of Farrukhabad) for the rains. The march to the capital was resumed in November. At last the exiled Emperor reached the imperial city on January 6, 1772.¹

We must now return to the story of the Maratha Chiefs after the capture of Delhi. The Marathas in the Deccan were naturally proud of this great success. It was recognised that this happy culmination was due to the courage and wisdom of Visaji Krishna and Mahadji Sindhia. So the Peshwa recalled Ramchandra Ganesh² and entrusted the supreme command to Visaji Krishna. The Peshwa’s orders were received in Delhi on April 26, 1771.³ Ramchandra Ganesh started for the Deccan, but he consented to stay when Sindhia and Holkar entreated him to do so.⁴

Ramchandra Ganesh was now supported by both Holkar and Sindhia, who wanted to restore him to the supreme command. Visaji Krishna was now isolated, but he succeeded in retaining his control over Delhi.⁵ He complained to the Peshwa that Sindhia and Holkar were violating his order by supporting

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² C.P.C., III, 810.
³ On March 10, 1771, the Bengal Select Committee informed the Madras authorities of the assumption by Visaji of the chief command of the Maratha forces. (B.S.C.P., 1771, pp. 110-113).
⁴ C.P.C., III, 810.
Ramchandra Ganesh. The Peshwa repeated his previous order. Ramchandra Ganesh left Delhi in September, 1771.\(^1\) Visaji became the undisputed leader of the Marathas in the North,\(^2\) but he found it impossible to control Sindhia and Holkar, each of whom pursued the policy that suited him best. Sindhia supported Shah Alam, Holkar supported Zabita Khan,\(^3\) and Visaji himself merely tried to confirm his own authority over the region north of Delhi.\(^4\) None cared for the interests of the Maratha Empire.

On his return to Delhi Shah Alam found that Zabita Khan was unwilling to render him homage and to pay him any money. He found it necessary to punish the bold Ruhela Chief, for “the pay of the royal army had fallen into arrears and the soldiers were clamouring to be let loose on the Ruhela lands as the only means of relieving their distress”.\(^5\) So an expedition was sent against him. The imperial troops were led by Mirza Najaf Khan, who was accompanied by a Maratha force under Visaji Krishna, Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar. Zabita Khan put his treasure and family in Pathargarh, the strong stone fort of

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1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. III, p. 34.
2. In the Persian records he is designated by the curious title of ‘Peshwa’. (Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. III, p. 34).
3. Malcolm says that a few weeks before Najib retired to his capital to die, “he placed the hand of his son Zabita Khan in that of Tukajee, and requested his protection, anticipating the ruin that was soon to overwhelm his family”. (Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 169-170).
4. He amassed a fortune, which he spent for Raghunath Rao during the First Anglo-Maratha War.
5. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. III, p. 49.
Najibabad, kept about 4,000 troops with himself at Shakartal and
distributed the bulk of his army along the eastern bank of the
Ganges, from Shakartal to Hardwar (about 38 miles). On
February 23, 1772, the Marathas and Najaf Khan attacked
Zabita Khan’s troops at Chandi ghat (below Hardwar) and
secured a decisive victory. Zabita Khan fled to the Tarai hills,
and other Afghan Chiefs, including Hafiz Rahmat Khan and the
sons of Dundi Khan, followed his example.¹ The Marathas
then laid siege to Pathargarh, which surrendered after a fortnight
(March 16, 1772).²

A quarrel between the Marathas and the Emperor followed,³
each accusing the other of taking an unduly large share of the
spoils. At last Mahadji Sindhia effected a compromise; of the
spoils one half was given to the Emperor, one-fourth to the
Peshwa and one-fourth to the Maratha sardars.⁴ Mahadji

¹ When Zabita’s troops heard of the Maratha victory, “without
seeing an enemy or even a couched spear, or a drawn sabre, they all
fled from their camp, but still retained so much of the Rohillas in their
very flight as to fall mercilessly upon each other, and to make booty of
whatsoever they could lay their hands upon”. (Siyar-ul-Mutakbirin,

² Interesting details of this siege are given in S.P.D., xxxxiv, 42.
Khare (IV, p. 1888) says that all the Maratha women captured by the
Ruhelas from the Bhan’s camp at Panipat were now liberated, but Sir
Jadunath Sarkar remarks that this statement “finds no support in any
contemporary record in Persian or Marathi”. (Fall of the Mughal

³ The Emperor probably wanted to throw himself upon the

⁴ The elephants, cash and jewellery were not divided. It appears
from some Marathi documents that the total capture included ten lakhs
promised to induce Shuja-ud-daula to perform his duties as Wazir in person,¹ and in return secured Anupshahar and Karnal from the Emperor.

Zabita Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan took shelter with the Nawab of Oudh, who began to negotiate for peace on their behalf with the Marathas.² Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan promised to pay 40 lakhs and Shuja-ud-daula stood security for them. The Marathas then left Rohilkhand. Zabita Khan received back his father’s estates in Najibabad and Shaharanpur.³ Mahadji refused to approve these terms, and a violent quarrel with Visaji Krishna ensued. The result was that the Marathas

in cash, 2298 horses (of which 1043 were given to Shah Alam), 3 large cannon, 1842 cannon-balls, 530 maunds of powder, etc. (S.P.D., xxix, 270; pp. 337-340, 343).

The following remarks of the Bengal Government (Letter to the Court of Directors, November 10, 1772) are hardly justified: “Their insolence was now immoderate. Their success had been equal to their most sanguine expectations, and seemed to pave the way for further depredations to the southward; they were in possession of the person of the King, whose authority they condemned, and whose name and mandates they regarded solely as the instruments of their own aggrandizement; and so far were they in re-establishing him in his government, that they positively refused to perform their engagements of sharing with him the spoils of the vanquished, and he was left almost destitute, in the midst of a rich and plentiful camp, of the common necessaries required to support at least an appearance of dignity”.

¹ A quarrel with Visaji Krishna prevented Sindhia from keeping his promise. (S.P.D., xxix, 270, 276, 277, 285).

² B.S.C.P., 1772, pp. 140-142. For the activities of Shuja-ud-daula during this period, see Strachey, Hastings and the Robilla War, pp. 45-53.

³ C.P.C., IV, 60.
failed to realise any money and all their political arrangements were thrown into confusion. The imperial army and the Marathas began their return journey from Rohilkhand in May, 1772.

Another result of the Rohilkhand expedition was Shuja-ud-daula’s famous treaty with the Ruhelas. The ambitious Nawab of Oudh had so long been observing with satisfaction the gradual weakening of the Ruhelas by the Marathas, for he intended to occupy the fertile tracts ruled by these Afghans. But the remarkable success secured by the Marathas alarmed him. As Strachey says, “The Marathas now seemed to have become as formidable as before the disaster of Panipat. They made no secret of their intention, when they had finished the occupation of Rohilkhand, to carry their operations into Oudh, where they would find not only full satisfaction for their lust for plunder, but ample opportunity of retaliation on the Vizier for past injuries.” The occupation of Rohilkhand would give the Marathas easy access into Oudh, for there is no natural boundary between the two provinces. The breach between Shuja-ud-daula and the

1 S.P.D., xxix, 276.
In a letter dated January 28, 1772, Sir Robert Barker observed, “His Excellency (Shuja-ud-daula) ... openly confessed his inclination and wish at one time to reduce those powers (i.e., the Ruhelas). Since the death of Dundi Khan, for whom he had an utter aversion, he has been more reconciled, and he now discovers it is highly necessary for political reasons to protect them ...” (Fifth Report, Appendix 21).
3 Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 45.
4 Oudh, says Hamilton in his Historical Relation of the Rohillas, “is invulnerable to those marauders (i.e., the Marathas), excepting through
Marathas was widened by the intrigue of Sir Robert Barker, who was a companion of the Nawab at the time of his negotiation with the Marathas on behalf of the Ruhelas.\(^1\) Under the circumstances it was natural for the Nawab and the Ruhelas to unite their forces against the common enemy. On June 17, 1772, Shuja-ud-daula, eagerly assisted by Sir Robert Barker,\(^2\) concluded a treaty with the Ruhelas. The most important clause of the treaty ran as follows: "... if any enemy ... should make an attempt against us (i.e., the Ruhelas) and the Vizier, we the Rohilla Sardars and the Vizier of the empire shall use our joint endeavours to oppose him". The Ruhelas agreed to pay the sum of 40 lakhs of rupees if the Nawab marched 'as far as may be necessary to enable the families of the Rohillas to leave the jungle, and return to their habitations'.\(^3\)

The Marathas had left Rohilkhand before the conclusion of this treaty, and the Ruhelas re-occupied their territory without opposition. But 'fatal dissensions' now broke out in Rohilkhand\(^4\); the former country (i.e., Rohilkhand), as their numerous bodies of horse have no sure means of advance and retreat but by the shallows of the Ganges during the dry season; their desultory method of carrying on war not suiting with the construction of bridges, and other tedious and expensive military works, such as might give them a command of the passage of unfordable rivers, nor their mode of fighting calculated for the defence of them".


\(^2\) "Without the active intervention and persuasion of Sir Robert Barker no such arrangement between the Rohillas and the Vizier would have been made ..."—Strachey, \textit{Hastings and the Robilla War}, p. 55.


to make matters worse for the Ruhelas, Zabita Khan came to an understanding with Tukoji Holkar and Visaji Krishna. The Marathas now "made a show of revenging themselves upon Shuja-ud-daula, and demanded of him, if he would ensure his own tranquillity at the conclusion of the rains, to cede to them the provinces of Kora, Allahabad and Benares, to deliver into their hands the settlement he had made with the Rohillas, to discharge all sums for which the king (i.e., Shah Alam) now stood indebted to them, and to unite with them against every opponent". The Nawab at once requested the Bengal Government to be ready to send a large force to his assistance at the beginning of the winter, for he believed that the Marathas would invade Oudh after the rainy season. He wrote: "My enemy speaks plainly, and demands my country". Warren Hastings replied that the English were not bound to help him in ambitious schemes of conquest and declined to join him in an offensive war with the Marathas, but at the same time the Nawab was assured of assistance against Maratha aggression. The Governor wrote to the Maratha leaders in Northern India, "acquainting them of our extreme dissatisfaction at the hostile appearance which they had for some time carried towards the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula, and that however we might on our own part be pacifically inclined, we considered ourselves as firmly

1 See p. 178.
2 Bengal Letter to Court of Directors, November 10, 1772.
3 Letter received by Warren Hastings on July 17, 1772, quoted in Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 65.
4 Strachey, Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 65.
bound by treaty to defend his territories against every invader".\footnote{1} In September, 1772, Shuja-ud-daula repeated his request for assistance. Warren Hastings dealt with the matter in a minute, in which he observed that the Nawab should be helped with troops against Maratha aggression on condition that they should not be moved beyond his frontiers unless orders were received from the Directors in favour of a less cautious policy.\footnote{2} This attitude of his ally did not satisfy the trembling ruler of Oudh. He was alarmed to hear that the Emperor had been advised by Visaji Krishna and Tukoji Holkar to go to Allahabad in order to demand his dues from Oudh\footnote{3} and Bengal. Having given up all hopes of English assistance, he fortified Fyzabad under the directions of a Frenchman.\footnote{4}

On his return to Delhi Shah Alam was pressed for money by the Marathas, for a portion of the sum of 40 lakhs promised to them by the Emperor before his restoration still remained unpaid. Knowing quite well that he had no money to spare, Tukoji Holkar and Visaji Krishna advised him to confer the office of \textit{Mir Bakshi} upon Zabita Khan, who, they argued, was the only person capable of supplying the Emperor's needs. Zabita Khan promised to pay the Marathas ten lakhs in cash if they succeeded in installing him in his father's office. Mahadji Sindhi was irreconcilably opposed to the promotion of Zabita

\footnote{1} Bengal Letter to Court of Directors, November 10, 1772.  
\footnote{3} B.S.C.P., 1772, pp. 223-225, 244-250.  
\footnote{4} B.S.C.P., 1772, pp. 256-257.
Khan's interests. Shah Alam refused to accept Holkar's advice.\(^1\) Holkar and Visaji thereupon attacked Delhi\(^2\) (December 17, 1772) and compelled the Emperor to submit. The Marathas obtained an imperial sanad for Kora and Allahabad.\(^3\) Zabita Khan was appointed Mir Bakshi and restored to his father's estates in Rohilkhand, Saharanpur and Meerut. In the mean while Madhav Rao had died (November 18, 1772).

It is impossible in this brief survey to refer to all the complications of North Indian politics during the eventful period covered by this chapter. We have naturally concentrated our attention on the efforts made by the Marathas to recover that authority and influence over Malwa, Bundelkhand, Rajputana and the Doab which they had lost as a result of their rout at Panipat. In estimating the extent of their success in this difficult enterprise we must not forget either the dangers which they had to confront in the Deccan or the number of enemies they had to deal with in


Mostyn's Diary, December 27, 1772: "The Commanding Officers, Madjee Scindy, Toocajee Holker and Visaji Punt Benewallah, are disputing about the Chief Command; the two latter have invited the Rohilla, Japta Caun, promising to make him Duan or Visir of Dhilly, in hope of getting by that means twenty or thirty Lacks of Rupees from him. The former opposes this measure. The king is also averse to it". The same dispute is referred to in Mostyn's Diary, December 9, 1772. (Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 47, 54).


\(^3\) For the history of the Maratha claim on Kora and Allahabad, see Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, pp. 417-421.
the North. In spite of these difficulties they succeeded in re-occupying Malwa and Bundelkhand, in exacting tribute from the leading Rajput Princes, in almost crushing the Jats and the Ruhelas, and, finally, in occupying Delhi and establishing the fugitive Emperor on his ancestral throne. Their success would certainly have been more spectacular had their leaders not been preoccupied with personal interests and mutual jealousy.¹ The great Peshwa was not present in the field to restore unity in a house divided against itself. Even after his death his generals lingered on in the North with a view to consolidate their position by fresh victories,² but domestic troubles,³ culminating in the murder of Narayan Rao, compelled them to return to the Deccan in 1773. More than a decade later Mahadji Sindhia found himself free to turn to Hindustan again, and established his authority on so strong a basis that nothing but English guns, aided by the foolishness of his successor, could shatter it.

¹ S.P.D., xxix, 269.
³ See S.P.D., xxix, 280-282.
CHAPTER VII

THE FOURTH CARNATIC EXPEDITION

After the conclusion of hostilities with Janoji Bhonsle in 1769 Madhav Rao made arrangements for leading another expedition against Haidar Ali, who had evaded his demands for the payment of arrears of tribute and levied contributions upon some of the Poligars tributary to the Marathas.¹ In February the Nizam proposed that his forces should join the Marathas and fight against Haidar for realising the amount which he had agreed to pay in 1767.² It appears that the Peshwa advanced as far as Devarayadurga³ within April. He decided to leave in the Carnatic a detachment under an experienced general to deal with Haidar’s aggressive activities and personally to return to Poona. But to his surprise he found that neither Gopal Rao nor Trimbak Rao Mama was willing to remain there; they feared that they would not be supported by an adequate force to cope with so formidable an enemy. Other commanders also made excuses. The rains had already set in, and the treasury of the camp was exhausted.⁴ The Peshwa returned to Poona; it seems he could not make any satisfactory arrangement for checking Haidar during the rainy season.

³ A "fortified hill 9 miles east of Tumkur, situated amidst wild and picturesque scenery and extensive forest". (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 177).
⁴ S.P.D., xxxvii, 170.
Haidar naturally took advantage of the Peshwa’s departure to renew his aggressions.¹ Mir Reza, who had accepted the Peshwa’s service in 1767, re-joined Haidar and expelled a Maratha officer named Mahimaji Sindhia from Bagepalli.² Mahimaji retreated towards Kadapa, but, finding that no assistance was available from the Nawab of that district, he went to Gooty. No help was available there, too; so he moved to Anantapur, the ruler of which had formerly promised assistance. In the mean while Mir Reza besieged Talpula. Rakhamaji Bhonsle resisted him for about a month. Haidar himself came there and his Hindu envoy persuaded Rakhamaji to visit him in his camp. Haidar treacherously arrested him and beheaded some of his attendants. Leaving a post at Talpula, Haidar and Mir Reza advanced towards Kadapa. The ruler of Anantapur was now alarmed and refused to give assistance to Mahimaji. He proceeded to Harihar, where he received a letter from the Peshwa asking him to make preparations for resisting Haidar. This energetic officer tells us that Haidar’s intention was to recover Hoskote, Balapur, Channarayadurga, Madgiri, Sira and the territory of Murar Rao.³

¹ He probably felt strengthened by the defensive alliance he had concluded with the English.


In a letter to Gopal Rao Haidar observed, "The Qilladar of Balapur, Mahimaji Sindhia, was taking into his service some of our dissatisfied men and was fomenting trouble in our own territory. Hence I drove him out". (S.P.D., xxxvii, 172).

³ S.P.D., xxxvii, 172.
Murar Rao had incurred Haidar’s displeasure by assisting the English in the First Anglo-Mysore War. In September, 1769, Haidar advanced against him. Gopal Rao warned Murar Rao not to see Haidar or submit to him. Murar Rao disregarded this warning and purchased peace by promising to pay Rs. 50,000 as tribute.\(^1\) As Wilks\(^2\) says, “The deep and determined animosity of these rival adventurers was veiled by an intercourse of pretended reconciliation, and confirmed by a personal interview, and an interchange of costly presents”. Haidar then realised tribute by force from Chitaldrug, Harpanhalli and other places. The Maratha officer in charge of Harihar placated him. Sometime later the Nawab of Savanur also pacified Haidar by secretly paying him a large sum. This transaction did not remain unknown to the Marathas.\(^3\) According to Wilks,\(^4\) Haidar did not take stronger measures against the Nawab because “the forces of that chief were too superior in number and in quality to admit of open competition in that plain country, and Hyder had once before suffered by the experiment of resisting him in the woods of Bednore”.

Although Haidar was thus encroaching upon the Maratha sphere on all sides,\(^5\) he was simultaneously trying to prevent by negotiations the Peshwa’s arrival in the Carnatic. The Peshwa demanded 40 lakhs as tribute, in addition to the money realised

\(^1\) Khare, III, 814, 815, 818, 827.  \(^2\) Vol. II, p. 131.  
\(^5\) Wilks (Vol. II, p. 129) says that during this period Haidar levied “such contributions, as should prepare his military chest for the heavy demands which it must sustain in the succeeding year”, for he knew that the Peshwa’s visit was “not relinquished but deferred”. 
by Haidar from Maratha vassals like the ruler of Chitaldrug. He also demanded the surrender of Mir Reza and the jagir of Gurum-konda which had been given to him in 1767. In August Appaji Ram, Haidar’s envoy, offered to pay 10 lakhs immediately, to surrender Mir Reza as hostage for 16 lakhs, and to pay 14 lakhs next year. Madhav Rao refused to accept these terms, dismissed the envoy and continued his preparations for war.

Haidar tried to create troubles for the Peshwa by instigating Raghunath Rao and Janoji Bhonsle to revolt against him. But on this occasion he was disappointed; Raghunath was a closely guarded prisoner, and Janoji refused to fall in the trap.

Gopal Rao, who had already collected troops at Miraj, advanced southward and encamped at Nalgund. The Peshwa left Poona in October and proceeded directly towards Seringapatam. A detachment of 10,000 troops was placed under Gopal Rao and Anand Rao Raste to watch Haidar’s movements. It seems that the large Maratha army was made up of about 75,000 troops and 50 guns.

Wilks says, “The military talents of Madoo Row were certainly of a high order; and Hyder did homage to those talents” by refusing to confront him in the open field. He followed his

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1 Khare, III, pp. 1377-1378. See the discussion of the curious basis of these claims in Wilks, Vol. II, pp. 133-134. He says that Haidar offered only 12 lakhs.
2 Khare, III, 596.
3 S.P.D., xx, 287, 288, 289.
4 Khare, III, 806, pp. 1378-1379.
5 S.P.D., xxxvii, 174, 175.
6 S.P.D., xxxvii, 182, 184, 185, 187.
7 Khare, III, p. 1383.
old plan of devastating his own territory. He went to Anavatti
and the forest of Udagani with his troops and guns. About
25,000 troops were distributed among his generals; about 20,000
troops were scattered in different forts. Tipu was sent to Seringa-
patam “to collect all the straw and wood that was possible and
to burn all that could not be removed, to fill up the wells and
ponds and to give notice to the people to retire from the villages
into the larger towns”.1

The proceedings of the Peshwa, says Wilks,2 “seemed to
abandon the ordinary routine of Mahratta plunder, and to point
to the fixed conquest of the whole country. Among other
arrangements he was accompanied by garrisons regularly organized
and independent of his field force, for the occupation of the prin-
cipal posts”.3 A contemporary Marathi letter informs us that the
Peshwa’s object was to humble Haidar completely.4 The English
authorities had the same impression, for they wrote on March 10,
1771, “From the present conduct of the Marathas both in the
North and the South, and from the genius, spirit and ambition
of Madhav Rao, we are inclined to suspect that their designs are
not confined to the mere collection of chauth but extend to the
subjection of the whole Peninsula”.5

3 All important forts in occupied territory were garrisoned by the
Marathas, but the unimportant forts were dismantled in order to prevent
Haidar from utilizing them. The Peshwa did not pillage; so many
forts surrendered voluntarily.(Peixoto, VI, 45).
4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 194. Cf. S.P.D., xxxvii, 198
5 B.S.C.P., March 10, 1771.
As the Peshwa proceeded he occupied many posts — Budihal, Kandikere, Handikere, Chiknayakanhalli, Bhairabdurga, Nagmangal, Balapur, Nandigarh, and others. All these successes were won in two months — January and February, 1770. The Peshwa’s infantry served him well, and he personally supervised the operations in many cases.

Haidar, however, remained apparently undisturbed even after the loss of so many posts. Towards the close of January he left Udagni, went to Turuvekere, and then marched towards Seringapatam under cover of darkness. In order to elude the Marathas his troops marched without baggage. His real intention was to deliver a night attack on the Marathas. Peixoto gives a long account of an engagement between Haidar and a Maratha detachment led by Gopal Rao, Murar Rao and Anand Rao Raste.

3 A taluka in the Tumkur district, area 532 square miles. The town lies 40 miles west-north-west of Tumkur. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, pp. 176-177).
4 A taluka in the Mysore district, area 401 square miles. The town lies 39 miles north of Mysore. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, 284, 286).
5 Khare, III, p. 1392.
6 Peixoto (V, 174) says, "The Marathas took many forts, yet Haidar did not seem angry". Haidar’s detachments surprised the Maratha garrison at Chiknayakanhalli and Mir Reza was a constant source of trouble to the Marathas. (Khare, IV, Introduction).
7 Peixoto, V, 174, 175, 183, 185-196. S.P.D., xxxvii, 198, refers to this engagement. Khare, III, pp. 1393-1397. Peixoto says that Haidar lost only 3 men. According to Khare, the Marathas lost 55 horses killed, and about 150 men wounded.
The Maratha force consisted of 15,000 horse; Haidar had 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot. The Marathas had no artillery; Haidar had 16 small pieces. The night attack was a surprise to the Marathas. As soon as they found Haidar’s army advancing towards them, they tried to retreat, leaving their camp and many of the worst horses behind. Next morning the Marathas came within pistol shot of Haidar’s advanced battalions. Haidar’s Portuguese commandant of artillery ordered the field pieces to play, and thus compelled the Marathas to retreat. Then Haidar himself came to the field and gave orders for the whole of the artillery to fire with a high elevation. When the Marathas retreated, their camp was plundered. Haidar allowed his troops to take rest for a few hours and then continued his journey to Seringapatam. The Marathas followed him and made several attempts to cut him off, but once again Haidar’s artillery proved too strong for them.

Throughout January and February Haidar carried on half-hearted negotiations for peace; the terms he offered were not acceptable to the Peshwa. After the night attack on Gopal Rao’s camp Haidar retired to Seringapatam: he was not willing to be caught between the two Maratha armies, led by the Peshwa and Gopal Rao respectively. Mir Reza and Tipu, who had been creating diversions for the Marathas, joined him. At Seringapatam Haidar collected all his treasures from other forts. As Peixoto says, “No other fort in Haidar’s dominions has a neighbourhood so fit as this for the encampment of a powerful army that requires many necessities for its subsistence, particularly the three essential ones—provisions, water, forage. Provisions for 12

1 S.P.D., xxxvii, 187, 190, 192, 196.
2 Peixoto, VI, 11, 12, 14. S.P.D., xxxvii, 199.
years are laid up here. There is no lack of water, for the Kaveri runs close by the walls and the fort is in an island". Here Haidar waited for the coming of the rainy season. As the Madras authorities wrote to Calcutta on March 24, 1770, "Madhav Rao is still in the Mysore country but has not hitherto been able to gain any material advantage over Haidar who has maintained his ground and seems likely to do so until the season will oblige Madhav Rao to repass the Kistna or to determine to continue on this side the whole year".

In the mean while the Peshwa, so successful in his military operations, was encountering many difficulties. There was no water. The Peshwa's health was gradually giving way. He found Seringapatam and Bangalore too strong for attack. So in April he decided to return to Poona. An atmosphere of despair prevailed in his camp; everybody felt that no general—not even Gopal Rao—could fill up the vacant place and teach Haidar a lesson that he would remember.

1 Peixoto, VI, 46. 2 B.S.C.P., April 15, 1770.
3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 200, 201. Kharc, III, p. 1398. Haidar wrote to Madras on July 9, 1770, that the Peshwa "being reduced to great straits, owing as well to a scarcity of food and forage, as the taking of thousands of his horses, was obliged to return to his own country". (M.M.C., Vol. 38, p. 271). 4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 201.
5 S.P.D., xxxvii, 201. Peixoto, VI, 44.
6 It seems that there was some uncertainty about his return, for the Madras authorities wrote to Calcutta on May 16, 1770, "Madhav Rao is not likely to return this year to Poona.....as the season is.....too far advanced for him to cross the rivers, we apprehend that he has good reason to promise himself success in the Mysore country or that he would not venture to be so long absent from his own dominions". (B.S.C.P., June 9, 1770). 7 S.P.D., xxxvii, 201.
In April the strong forts of Devarayadurga and Nijgal\(^1\) were captured.\(^2\) The Peshwa himself had to take much trouble for the capture of this place, and his brother Narayan Rao was slightly wounded during the operations. After this success the Peshwa started for Poona,\(^3\) leaving Trimbak Rao in the Carnatic to continue the operations. He might have concluded the expedition by taking tribute from Haidar, but he was determined to crush his enemy.\(^4\)

Trimbak Rao was left at the head of a large army,\(^5\) but he was not allowed to dictate his requirements.\(^6\) For two years he carried on operations\(^7\) against Haidar with conspicuous bravery and success. His ablest lieutenant was Gopal Rao.

Peixoto\(^8\) gives us a good account of the relative positions of the two powers in 1770: “The Marathas have not only the

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3 Peixoto (VI, 81) says that he took with him 21 chiefs of cavalry as prisoners on suspicion of treacherous agreement with Haidar.
4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 209.
5 S.P.D., xxxvii, 210, gives 25,000. Peixoto (VI, 81) says that 80,000 horse were left at three principal stations—30,000 at Anantapur; 20,000 at Bankapur, Dharwar and Savanur; 30,000 at Sita. After crossing the Krishna the Peshwa sent another detachment of 15,000. (Peixoto, VI, 84).
6 S.P.D., xxxvii, 209.
7 Details in Khare, IV, 986, 1039, 1045, 1068, 1069, 1074, 1075, 1080, 1087, 1088, 1093, 1097, 1102, 1103, 1124, 1136, 1166, 1167, 1171, 1174.
8 VI, 101.
greatest force on their side, but the prayers of all the people, who everywhere without exception are robbed and harassed (by Haidar) and under a weight of contribution that it is not possible for them to bear. The Nabob\(^1\) has a large force but not to be compared with that of the Marathas. It consists of 15,000 men with fire arms, 12,000 horse and 2,000 rocket boys. He has 60,000 matchlock-men, but these are necessary to guard the forts and are troops used to fight behind walls or in woods. But the Marathas can bring into the field 300,000 horse, besides their infantry, who are considerable in number. In artillery the Nabob has not, as yet, the advantage, for the Marathas have much more. The Nabob’s advantage is that all his troops are better disciplined. But if he resolves to give battle in the plains or to retire into any stronghold, he is ruined\(^2\).

The first exploit of the Marathas after the departure of the Peshwa seems to have been the capture of Chik Balapur.\(^3\) Trimbak Rao captured Gurumkonda in October after a long siege of about ten weeks. The place was then in charge of Saidu Mian, Mir Reza’s nephew, who offered stubborn resistance to the Marathas. Gopal Rao prevented the arrival of re-inforcements from Seringapatam. Haidar and Mir Reza waited helplessly at the capital.\(^3\) Gopal Rao defeated three Mysore generals, Chandroji

\(^1\) Haidar Ali.

\(^2\) It is difficult to be definite about this point. We have followed Khare. S.P.D., xxxvii, 211, shows that the Chief of Chik Balapur saw the Peshwa in May and agreed to pay an annual tribute of one lakh besides military assistance. Peixoto (VI, 84) says that one of Haidar’s commanders defeated the besiegers.

Jadav, Balaji Pant and Syed Muhammad at Punganuru. He also captured important places in the Kolar district. Gopal Govind occupied Yelvanti and advanced towards Talkal. A Maratha officer named Trimbak Suryaji undertook to wrest the Canara district from Haidar.

In the mean while the Peshwa was not sitting idle. He established a new gun factory at Poona. He employed new European gunners and gardis. He engaged wood-cutter in order to prevent Haidar from taking shelter once more in the forests of Bidnur. He personally proceeded towards the Carnatic, but ill health compelled him to return to Poona.

The beginning of the year 1771 found Haidar (who was still at Seringapatam) surrounded by the Marathas on two sides. Trimbak Suryaji was creating troubles in the Canara region on the west. Gopal Rao was ravaging the Bellary district. Trimbak was advancing with the main army towards Seringapatam. Madhav Rao was coming with more troops and guns. Haidar once more tried to save himself by paying tribute. Appaji Ram went to the Maratha camp, but his offer was not acceptable.

Towards the close of January, however, the position of the Marathas became less favourable. The Peshwa was compelled by ill health to return to Poona, leaving 10,000 troops and 10 guns

1 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 87.
2 S.P.D., xxxvii, 217.
4 Vad, I, 368.
5 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, IV, p. 87.
8 He reached there on January 20. (B.S.C.P., May 17, 1771).
to re-inforce Trimbak Rao.\(^1\) Gopal Rao died on February 7;\(^2\) his troops joined Trimbak Rao.\(^3\) Murar Rao, who had left Haidar at the beginning of this expedition, was suffering from rheumatism. Trimbak himself, though experienced, loyal and courageous, was very unpopular owing to his irritable temperament.\(^4\)

Trimbak Rao proceeded slowly\(^5\) through the districts of Shimoga\(^6\) and Tumkur, capturing forts on the way.\(^7\) Towards the close of February or early in March he appeared near Seringapatam. "Hyder, whether feeling himself relieved from the superior genius of Modoo Row, or more confident in his strength from having completed the equipments of his army, resolved to make trial of his good fortune and military skill against Trimbuc Mama".\(^8\) Probably one of his motives in leaving the protection of Seringapatam was to prevent the Maratha invasion of Bidnur. With a Mysore army in the rear, Trimbak Rao could not advance towards the west. From Tumkur he went to Hebbur.\(^9\)

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2 S.P.D., xxxvii, 223.
4 Sardesai, Riyasat, Madhya, pp. 87-89.
5 The Madras authorities expected that he would not be able to reduce Haidar before the rains. (B.S.C.P., March 10, 1771).
6 A letter dated February 10 says that he was going to Bidnur. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 224). The Peshwa wanted him to invade Bidnur. (Khare, IV, 1069).
The result was the important battle of Moti Talab¹ (March 5, 1771).

Moti Talab is a large tank at Tonnur in Seringapatam taluka (about 10 miles north-west of Seringapatam city). It is formed by an embankment carried across a gap between two rocky hills, which stems the water of some mountain torrents that there unite streams. A few miles to the north lies the town of Melukote, built on rocky hills overlooking the Moti Talab and the Kaveri valley.²

When Trimbak Rao came to Hebbur,³ Haidar suddenly appeared with a large army (about 8,000 horse, 15,000 gardis and Feringhi rifles, 10,000 Kanarese infantry, 45 guns and many rockets)⁴ at Magadi.⁵ A distance of about 16 miles separated the two armies. Haidar's plan was to make a surprise attack on the Marathas. One night he advanced a few miles towards Hebbur, and, preparing about 2,000 torches, tied them to the horns of

¹ We have two authentic accounts of this battle—(1) a letter written by Trimbak Rao himself two days after the battle (S.P.D., xxxvii, 226); (2) an extract (written by one who took part in the battle on Haidar's side) in Orme MSS., No. 8, pp. 51-54. Here the date of the battle is given, erroneously, as "the last of April". The description of the battle as given in the Nishan-i-Hydari agrees substantially with what we gather from these two sources, although the Muslim writer says that this battle took place after Madhav Rao's death.


³ His army consisted of 40,000 horse, 10,000 foot and he had 30 heavy guns.

⁴ This is the Maratha account. According to Orme MSS., No. 8, Haidar had 6,000 horse, 14,000 infantry, and 50 field pieces.

⁵ A town in the Bangalore district, near the boundary of the Tumkur district. (Rice, Mysore, Vol. II, p. 82).
bulls. He expected that the Marathas would mistake these bulls for his troops and follow them. But Maratha spies revealed the secret, and Haidar, baffled in his attempt, took shelter in the forest of Magadi. When Trimbak Rao continued his march towards Seringapatam, Haidar left his shelter, marched by way of Nagmangal and came to Melukote. Here he took shelter in a forest, and for some time the Marathas tried in vain to bring him out. After a rear-guard action forced by the Marathas, Haidar moved a little to the west of Melukote to Machi. Trimbak Rao encamped near the forest in which Haidar had taken shelter, and finding it difficult to attack him there, the Maratha cavalry encircled the forest and cut off Haidar’s supplies. Trimbak Rao’s artillery, placed at a high elevation on the hills to the east of Melukote, constantly fired. For eight days the Marathas continued this process of harassment. Wilks says, “The annoyance was without an interval and, however slovenly, was extremely harassing and not ill-adapted to the single object of driving him from the position, without risking an action or exposing a point of attack”. Haidar’s position became so difficult that he decided to come out. One evening he ordered fires to be lighted and began to march towards Seringapatam, placing the baggage in the front and forming the army in a single line for conveniently passing the defiles leading out of the forest.

1 Mysore district.
3 Grant Duff says (Vol. I, p. 568), “...such was his impression, whether from having been formerly beaten by the Mahrattas, or from want of confidence in his army, a circumstance rare in a good officer, this man, who had fought with skill and bravery against British troops, did not dare to risk a battle, and at last fled, in the most dastardly and
It was about dawn when Haidar's army came out of the forest. To his dismay he saw a party of the Maratha horse encamped on his right. They had found out his secret. So he prepared for a battle in the open field, which he had so long successfully tried to avoid. "He disposed his army as follows: baggage ordered to collect themselves in as square a body as they could; the cavalry formed about them; the infantry formed about the cavalry; in this manner a grand square was formed." He gave orders to the cavalry that, should any sepoy leave his rank, he should be cut down without any questions.

Early in the morning the whole Maratha army under the personal command of Trimbak Rao appeared in Haidar's rear. Haidar fired upon the Marathas, compelled them to halt, and continued his march. At about 8 o'clock the Marathas began to divide in small parties and approached in full gallop Haidar's running troops. At about 9 o'clock 4,000 picked Maratha horsemen attacked Haidar's rear with great fury; although Haidar's artillery compelled them to retreat with a heavy loss, they killed 'more than half the front rank of the rear face'. At about 11 o'clock about 12,000 Maratha horsemen again attacked Haidar's disorderly manner towards his capital". Here Grant Duff pays a well-deserved compliment to the military skill of the Marathas, but we find no evidence to show that Haidar Ali fled 'in the most dastardly and disorderly manner'. He conducted a well-planned and orderly retreat.

\[1\] It is difficult to ascertain how the secret was found out. According to Orme Mss., No. 8, some Mysore troops fired on some Maratha troops at some distance from the defile. Wilks says that Narayan Rao, one of Haidar's officers, fired a gun which the Marathas heard, and suspects treachery. Trimbak Rao says in a letter that the unusual calm in Haidar's camp excited his suspicion. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 226).
rear; once again they were repulsed. Two hours later the Maratha artillery arrived (30 pieces not less than 42 or 32 pounders). Both sides now began heavy cannonade, upon which the fate of the battle seemed to rest. Haidar had 50 field pieces and 2 18-pounders. "The artillery of the Marathas did vast execution as Haidar’s army was so close together, but Haidar’s artillery, being better served, had also its advantages." The cannonade continued for about half an hour. "By this time Haidar had very nearly reached the skirts of a hill which he seemed all the morning to be pushing for, as he never halted except during the two attacks." The Marathas clearly saw the advantage this hill would give him. They divided into three bodies, the largest of which moved slowly on to Haidar’s rear, the next galloped to his right, and the third to his left. A general charge followed. Haidar’s left was very weak, for the worst of the sepoys were placed there. Unable to resist the Marathas, they fled for safety up the hill. Haidar’s cavalry, alarmed at the flight of the sepoys, turned their back upon the Marathas and rode over the sepoys on the right to make their escape. The rear, now attacked on both sides, could no longer stand.

"Thus victory declared for the Marathas and a dreadful slaughter began as the enemy refused to give quarter. Hyder left his horse and ran immediately to the hill and fell in with a party of his own horse who flew with him to his capital.¹ The Marathas, after a slaughter of two hours, were left masters of the field with all Hyder’s artillery, baggage and treasure, many

¹ Trimbak Rao says that Haidar fled in the guise of a monk or beggar.
principal officers\(^1\) and fifty Europeans. In this action 30 thousand men were said to have fallen, but I think there was not above 12,000 (sic.), 4 on the side of Hyder and 6 on that of the Marathas\(^2\). So writes one who fought on Haidar's side in this decisive battle. Trimbak Rao claims that 45 guns, about 8,000 horses, 20 or 25 elephants, treasure and jewellery were captured.

These details collected from unimpeachable sources\(^3\) make it difficult for us to agree with Colonel Wilks\(^4\) in holding that "this was no battle; and that although the day was lost by Hyder, it was not won by the Mahrattas". Civilians naturally hesitate to differ on purely military matters with a historian who was himself a military officer and had excellent opportunities\(^5\) of forming a reasonable judgment. But he himself says that contemporaries differed from him; he refers to the battle as one "on which the Mahrattas ground so much of their military fame, and which is the subject of general conversation among Indians of every sect".\(^6\) An engagement which excited so much interest among 'Indians of every sect' can hardly be described as 'no battle'. Nor is it easy to see why the Marathas, who killed 4,000

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1 Among them was Mir Reza.
2 It is not clear how the loss was heavier to the Marathas who carried on a 'slaughter for two hours'.
3 There is no divergence between the versions given by Trimbak Rao and the writer of the extract in the Orme MSS.
5 He went over "the ground which was the scene of all these operations, accompanied by men of observation and intelligence, who witnessed them in situations of high rank in Hyder's army". (Vol. II, p. 146).
soldiers, captured many officers, guns, horses and elephants and compelled Haidar himself to run away, should not be credited with a remarkable victory.

So far as the ultimate effect of this battle is concerned, we may accept the verdict of the first historian of Mysore. The Marathas failed to secure any permanent advantage from this victory. Being “more intent on plunder than improving the successes of the day”, they “suffered the unarmed fugitives to reach Seringapatam on the same night,” and gave to Hyder the long interval of ten days (in which they were absorbed in the division and disposal of spoil) to collect, arm, and re-form a sufficient number of men for the defence of Seringapatam, “which had been left absolutely without the means of resistance, if the panic of Chercoolee” had been followed up by a great and vigorous effort on the capital.” De la Tour says, “As it is not customary in India to make prisoners of common soldiers or even subaltern officers, the greatest part returned to him (Haidar), though without horses or arms; but by means of his resources, Haidar established his army, in a short time, in a better state than before. It will scarcely be credited that he purchased again of the Marathas themselves the greatest part of the arms and horses they had taken from him; but this arises from the nature of their government, which is purely feudal, every man having a right to dispose of his share of the plunder as he thinks.”

1 Trimbak Rao says, “We took their weapons and left them alive”. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 226).
2 Or Chinkurali. Wilks designates the battle of Moti Talab by this name.
4 History of Haidar Shab and Tipu Sultan, p. 250.
When Haidar had to some extent recovered from the shock and losses of the defeat, Trimbak Rao came to Seringapatam and "continued, according to his fashion of warfare, to cannonade the fort every day, from the nearest heights, and to withdraw his heavy guns at night". A strong fort like Seringapatam could not be captured by "this miserable and ridiculous semblance of what he called a siege". These half-hearted operations gave Haidar a respite which he utilised in consolidating his broken army. He also carried on negotiations for peace, but the Marathas put forward so many extravagant demands that nothing could be settled.

Towards the middle of April Trimbak Rao changed his policy. He found that the half-hearted cannonade on the fort made no impression on Haidar. He also found it difficult to procure sufficient corn and fodder for his large army. The Peshwa had been urging him to give up the siege of Seringapatam and to

1 S.P.D., xxxvii, 227.  
4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 227. Haidar was willing to pay 50 lakhs, but Anand Rao Raste demanded one crore and the cession of Bidnur, Sunda, and all districts "taken from us and the Poligars".

5 Internal dissensions weakened the Maratha camp. Trimbak Rao's long-continued operations created misgiving in the minds of his colleagues. Parasarum Bhau wrote that he was prolonging the war for his own convenience, for he was enjoying a semi-royal position, listening to music and exercising command over 40,000 men. (Khare, IV, 1166).

6 "Various reasons have been assigned for this sudden motion but we impute it to the want of forage and provisions"—Madras to Calcutta, May 20, 1771. (B.S.C.P., June 4, 1771).
proceed against Bidnur.\textsuperscript{1} So he decided to keep a detachment of 10,000 horse at Seringapatam and to send other detachments to occupy other forts and savage Haidar’s territory.\textsuperscript{2} As the Madras authorities wrote to England, Seringapatam was invested till the end of April when the Marathas “suddenly decamped, most probably for want of provender which occasioned a great mortality. They have since been employed in reducing many forts leading from Seringapatam towards Bednore country and Haidar is employed in recruiting troops”.\textsuperscript{3}

During the rainy season Haidar Ali tried, not without success, to cut off the supplies of the Marathas and to attack different Maratha posts. The Marathas suffered much due to the want of provision and fodder.\textsuperscript{4} Haidar’s fleet, under the command of Raghuvij\textsuperscript{,} the rebel son of Tulaji Angria, advanced towards Vijaydurg, but the precautionary measures taken by the Peshwa frustrated this attempt.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} Khare, IV, 1124.
\textsuperscript{2} S.P.D., xxxvii, 227. Wilks, Vol. II, p. 149. Haidar’s territory was so mercilessly devastated that “not a root of green herb or blade of grass remained in the earth”. (Miles, The History of Hyder Naik, p. 209).
\textsuperscript{3} Despatch dated July 20, 1771.
\textsuperscript{4} S.P.D., xxxvii, 228, 229, 230. Wilks, Vol. II, pp. 149-151. The Nishan-i-Hyda\textsuperscript{i} gives many details about Maratha skirmishes with Tipu Sultan and one of Haidar’s commanders named Muhammad Ali. The chronology is so defective that it is difficult to determine, in the absence of corroborative Maratha evidence, how far these details are reliable.
\textsuperscript{5} See S. N. Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and Other Papers, pp. 54-56.
\textsuperscript{6} S.P.D., xxxvii, 231.
All the while negotiations were going on, and in August the Madras authorities reported to Calcutta that "an accommodation between Haidar and the Marathas seems likely to take place".\(^1\) Trimbak Rao, who was passing the rainy season at Belur,\(^2\) demanded the payment of 60 lakhs and Haidar's co-operation in an expedition against the Nawab of Arcot. He agreed to restore the territory around Seringapatam, but for the restoration of important posts like Chik Balapur and Nandigath he advised Haidar's vakil, Appaji Rao, to approach the Peshwa. Haidar refused to take these proposals seriously, for he knew that the Peshwa was ill.\(^3\)

About this time the Maratha ruler of Tanjore\(^4\) appealed to Trimbak Rao for assistance against the Nawab of Arcot. Trimbak Rao left Vaman Rao Patwardhan at Mysore at the head of 35,000 troops, and advanced towards Tanjore. Before his arrival there Muhammad Ali and the Madras Government compelled the Maratha Raja to make peace. Trimbak Rao realised four lakhs from the Raja and an unspecified amount from the Nawab.\(^5\) He then realised tribute from the Baramahal region and plundered Coimbatore (September, 1771—February, 1772). Then he returned and joined Vaman Rao at Dod Balapur. He made preparations for an attack on Bidnur and began to devastate such portions of Mysore as were still in Haidar's possession.

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1 B.S.C.P., September 9, 1771.
3 Khare, IV, 1151.
4 For the history of the Marathas of Tanjore, see Hickey, *The Tanjore Maratha Principality*.
5 B.S.C.P., April 15, 1772.
Towards the close of 1771 a detachment of 20,000 horse came from Poona under the command of Narayan Rao, the Peshwa’s brother.¹ Both the Marathas and Haidar sent vakils to Pondichery with proposals for a body of troops to be furnished by the French, but the French refused to participate in their quarrel. The Madras authorities wrote to the Court of Directors on February 28, 1772, “It is certain that a good body of Europeans and especially artillery to act with the Marathas, would greatly facilitate the execution of the plan it is generally believed they have formed of subduing all Hindustan. By their numerous and superior cavalry they can ravage and lay waste the countries they invade with little opposition; but they find it difficult to reduce forts of strength; for which reason they are very desirous of obtaining the assistance of Europeans. We have lately received intelligence that Madhav Rao has it in his intention to send an agent to the Court of France; the agent’s name is Abdul Guffoor, an inhabitant of Constantinople who was lately at Poona”.²

Whether the Peshwa ever sent any agent to France, we do not know. His illness had become serious. In April, 1772, he asked Trimbak Rao to conclude peace by whatever means possible. The Poona treasury was exhausted, and no more money could be spared for the Carnatic expedition.³ Trimbak Rao was instructed to take from Haidar 25 lakhs in cash and a bond for 25 lakhs and

¹ B.S.C.P., January 10, 1772.
² Military Department Despatch to England, February 28, 1772.
³ During the period of two years (after the Peshwa’s departure in the summer of 1770) Trimbak Rao spent one crore and twenty-nine lakhs. (S.P.D., xxxvii, 234).
to surrender some forts.¹ Haidar was "wearied with a hopeless warfare, and mourning over the destruction of his resources";² but the news of the Peshwa's illness emboldened him.³ Trimbak Rao's position was thus not at all enviable. He took 25 lakhs in cash and 6 lakhs in jewellery, and Haidar agreed to pay 19 lakhs more in three years.⁴ The Marathas retained Sita, Madgiri, Gurumkonda, Dod Balapur, Kolar and Hoskote with their dependencies;⁵ but Trimbak Rao regretted the necessity of surrendering places like Nandigarh, Chik Balapur and Devarayadurga. "These places", he wrote to the Peshwa, "were taken by you, and they will never again come to us. Haidar will now fortify these places, and play treachery in our territory which lies near these forts".⁶

The Maratha army began its march to Poona in June.⁷ The expedition—the longest of Madhav Rao's Carnatic expeditions—cannot be described as unsuccessful. As Wilks points out,

³ S.P.D., xxxvii, 233.
⁴ S.P.D., xxxvii, 233. According to Khare, IV, 1171, Haidar promised to pay 60 lakhs; he paid 24 lakhs in cash, 5 lakhs in jewels, and gave bankers' securities for the remainder. Wilks (Vol. II, p. 151) says that Haidar paid 20 lakhs in cash (including 5 lakhs for Durbar expenses) and agreed to pay 15 lakhs afterwards. We follow the account given in Trimbak Rao's letter to the Peshwa. Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 570) rejects the version of Wilks on the basis of certain figures collected from Maratha account books and says that Haidar "agreed to pay 36 lacks of rupees, as arrears and expenses, and 14 lacks, as the annual tribute, which he in future promised to remit with regularity".
⁷ Madras letter to the Court of Directors, June 20 and July 7, 1772.
Haidar's northern boundary was reduced within narrower limits than those which had been possessed by the Hindu prince of Mysore at the beginning of the century. Still greater successes could have been won if Trimbak Rao had not failed to exploit the situation arising out of the battle of Moti Talab. The Peshwa's fatal illness, and the chronic financial difficulties of the Marathas, furthered Haidar's cause no less than his ingenuity and his disciplined troops.

It is necessary now to refer to the part played by the East India Company in this war. At the very commencement of the hostilities both the parties appealed for assistance to the Madras authorities. Haidar naturally cited the second article of the treaty of 1769. The Marathas, though successful in their operations, found it difficult to reduce Haidar's strongholds. Moreover, they "saw the time rapidly approaching, when the exhausted state of the country would compel them to retire for want of the means to support their army". But the Madras authorities decided to remain neutral. As they wrote to Calcutta in a letter dated February 13, 1770, "Were we to assist Haidar, we could not hope to reduce the power of the Marathas, and we should thereby inevitably expose the Carnatic to their ravages, and on the other hand were we to afford them assistance, they might probably be enabled to reduce Haidar entirely, which could only tend to aggrandize their power and render them more dangerous than they are at present, or in case Haidar should accommodate matters with them...he would not fail taking the

2 Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chap. IV, p. 69.
first opportunity of avenging himself upon the Carnatic and the Company. We must therefore temporise with both in the best manner we are able”.  

It was also apprehended that the Marathas “would demand the chauth of the Carnatic if they were disengaged from the war with Haidar and they would detach a party of horse to enter the Carnatic if they were not apprehensive that such a step would induce us to join our forces to Haidar”.

The policy of “keeping alive the hopes and fears of both parties by not determining in favour of either and without assuring assistance to the one or the other” could not be pursued indefinitely. If the Marathas gained any signal advantage over Haidar, he might submit to their terms, and then they might turn their arms against the Nawab of Arcot. If, on the other hand, Haidar succeeded in driving away the Marathas, “his pride would be so exalted and his spirits raised that it is to be doubted whether resentment against us for not assisting him might not induce him to disturb us”. If the two parties remained equal, they might unite to invade the Carnatic, “perceiving that we amused both without designing to assist either”. In order “to raise fresh doubts, new fears and new hopes in both parties as well as to be prepared” for Maratha incursions into the Carnatic, it was decided that the troops at Vellore and Trichinopoly should be ordered to hold themselves in readiness to take the field.

1 B.S.C.P., 1770.
2 M.M.C., Vol. 36, p. 49. See the substance of Madras Consultations, April 30, 1770, quoted in Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chap. IV, pp. 69-70.
3 M.M.C., Vol. 36, p. 49.
In spite of these nice calculations the Madras authorities obviously found it difficult to explain away the second article of their treaty with Haidar. They told Haidar that they considered him to be the aggressor.  

They argued that the treaty was "an act of necessity". They reminded Haidar that "the impossibility of our engaging to furnish any certain quota of troops when demanded was fully explained" to him. They had to recognise, however, that "although we in some measure reserved to ourselves the option of assisting Haidar or not, in case he were attacked, as it suited our own convenience, we certainly cannot without a certain manifest violation of the treaty take part with the Marathas against him". Nor was it desirable to allow the Marathas to impose their authority on Mysore, "as we should in that case from their vicinity be constantly exposed to their ravages and devastations".

The Marathas negotiated with the Madras authorities through the Nawab of Arcot, who supported their claim for assistance. The Nawab had a strong personal antipathy to Haidar Ali. He was induced by the Marathas to believe that he would receive some new districts if he helped them. He wanted exemption from the payment of chauth. Finally, he expected,

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1 M.M.C., Vol. 36, p. 49. When the Madras authorities found that "excuses would avail us no longer, we represented that...we would afford him assistance whenever he should be in danger of being overpowered by the Marathas, but he has always represented his situation in the most favourable light". Here is sophistry indeed! (M.M.C., Vol. 38, p. 271).

2 M.M.C., Vol. 36, p. 113.
3 B.S.C.P., June 9, 1770.
4 M.M.C., Vol. 36, p. 49.
5 Madras letter to England, April 6, 1770.
according to the opinion of the President and Council of Madras, “to place the English government by means of the alliance with the Marathas in a state of dependence upon himself; and that was what he valued above all other things”. So he refused to co-operate with the Madras authorities in any plan they proposed “for the safety of his own and the Company’s possessions”. This attitude naturally embarrased the Madras authorities. “Once engaged in a war”, said they, “we are at the Nabob’s mercy, for we have no certain means of our own”.

In December, 1770, the President had an interview with Madarow (? ) Sadashiv, the Maratha vakil, at the Nawab’s house, at which the Nawab and his two sons were present. The Maratha vakil read a long memorandum in which he accused the Madras authorities of carrying on insincere negotiations with the Peshwa during the First Anglo-Mysore War and complained that in the treaty of 1769 the Peshwa’s name was not so much as mentioned. In his reply the President said that in that war the Peshwa “had actually resolved to take part against us and in consequence thereof actually advanced a few marches, which encouraged Haidar to march immediately with his whole force into the Carnatic, and compelled our army” to make peace. “It is amazing”, he said, “that he who was the cause of our making that peace should now blame it”. Against this interpretation of the Peshwa’s movements the Maratha vakil protested and pointed out that he had taken no measures hostile to the English. The President replied that the Peshwa could not

1 Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chap. IV, p. 70.
2 B.S.C.P., June 9, 1770; February 7, 1771.
3 Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chap. IV, p. 70.
carry into execution his plan of attacking the Carnatic because Janoji Bhonsle had created troubles in Berar.¹

Sometime later another interview was held. The Maratha vakil merely said that he would disclose his offer when the Company should declare its intention to join the Peshwa. He also remarked that the King and people of England were desirous of helping the Marathas. This statement was obviously inspired by secret negotiations with Sir John Lindsay,² the British King’s representative in India, who encouraged the Nawab of Arcot to adopt a pro-Maratha attitude, and tried his best to discredit the Company’s servants.³ Although Lindsay and the Nawab pressed the Madras authorities to engage in an offensive alliance with the Marathas, they refused to do so. Ultimately they were supported by the London authorities.⁴

As the position of Haidar Ali became more and more critical, the Madras authorities drifted to the conclusion that he should be assisted; but, they wrote to Calcutta on January 5, 1771, "We are prevented by the Nabob’s opposition from giving him any other assistance than that of withholding our aid from the Marathas. So much is the Nabob’s inclination to favour the designs of the Marathas against Haidar, that he has declined to bear any part of the charges of field operations against them

¹ M.M.C., Vol. 38, p. 370.
² Madras Records, Despatch to Court of Directors, February 6, 1771.
³ See Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chapter IV, pp. 59-60, 71.
⁴ Madras Records, Despatch to Court of Directors, July 20, 1771. Despatch from Court of Directors, April 10, 1771.
should they enter the Carnatic......The Nabob’s dependence now is in the Crown and not on the Company”. ¹ In June they wrote, “Haidar continues to press us for assistance, which we have it not in our power to grant, as it is impossible for us to attempt anything without the revenues and resources of the Carnatic, which are entirely under the control of the Nabob, who on the other hand earnestly presses us to a junction with the Marathas to subdue Mysore. In this system, he is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay......We have told them plainly that we can never acquiesce in a plan which appears to us so dangerous in itself, so inconsistent with our engagements and the views of the Company’s other settlements”. ²

Towards the close of 1771 the Madras authorities suspected that the Marathas intended ‘to invade this province with a view to compelling us into a junction with them against Mysore’. The main body of their army was advancing towards the Carnatic, and some straggling parties actually plundered some of the Nawab’s villages, apparently without the knowledge or approval of the Peshwa.³ Faced with the prospect of a very formidable invasion, pressed by the Nawab⁴ and Sir John Lindsay to espouse the cause of the Marathas, the Madras

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¹ B.S.C.P., Feburary 7, 1771. “We are chained to the Nabob who...we understand from Sir John Lindsay, is taken especially under the protection of the Crown by the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris”.—Madras to Bengal, June 27, 1771. (B.S.C.P., July 27, 1771).
² B.S.C.P., June 4, 1771.
³ Madras letter to England, April 6, 1770.
⁴ The Nawab even wanted to join the Marathas with his own forces, but the Madras authorities stood in his way. (Madras letter to England, February 28, 1772).
authorities decided to hold themselves in readiness, but to 'take no hostile step unless the Carnatic should be attacked'.\(^1\) They refused to help the Marathas unless they were ordered by the Court of Directors to do so. They went further: "In order to keep Haidar's spirits and to prevent his concluding a peace with the Marathas, we have desired he will inform us what supplies of money and what provisions he can furnish, should the orders we expect soon to receive from Europe authorise us to assist him". The Bombay authorities also made similar enquiries through Sibbald, their Resident at Onore.\(^2\) Grant Duff says\(^3\) that the Bombay Government found it impossible to assist Haidar because his demands were 'out of all proportion'. He demanded too large a subsidy and the cession of Mangalore and Pargurh on the west coast; moreover, he "artfully endeavoured to make them principals in the war, by requiring them to attack Salsette, which at once put an end to the negotiation".

The situation became so serious that the Government of Madras thought it necessary to take precautionary measures for

\(^1\) B.S.C.P., January 10, 1772.
\(^2\) B.S.C.P., February 3, 1772. Wilks (Vol. II, p. 215) finds a partial justification for the policy of the Madras Government in the attitude adopted by the Nawab of Arcot and Sir John Lindsay. "The Government", he says, "feeling the impossibility of executing the treaty (of 1769) in opposition to the Nawab and the representative of His Majesty, and resolved not to destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend, evaded the whole question, by representing both to Haidar and the Marathas the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference which they had made on the subject to their superiors in England".

\(^3\) Vol. I, p. 569.
defence against the threatened Maratha invasion. In December, 1771, the Madras Council wrote to Bengal, "We cannot expect long to remain in peace, and as it appears to us that a diversion in your part of India might favour our operations against the Marathas, should we be attacked by them, we should be glad to be informed how far it might be practicable to encourage the Powers in your neighbourhood to act against them". A discouraging reply came from Calcutta. If troops were sent to disturb the Maratha possessions in Northern India, the Marathas could devastate Oudh and even enter into the interior of the British territories. The ruling Chiefs of Northern India were 'divided, irresolute, and incapable of taking any effectual measure to avert the impending danger'.

Early in 1772 the Nawab of Arcot sent a vakil to the Marathas, in order to prevent them from attacking his territories. The vakil succeeded in his mission and the Maratha army returned to Balaghat. Mill observes, "The Mahrattas, notwithstanding their threats, had not, it would appear, any serious intention of invading the Carnatic; for in the month of January, 1772, the Nawab and Sir Robert Harland, finding the Presidency inflexible

1 B.S.C.P., February 3, 1772. 2 B.S.C.P., February 3, 1772. 3 B.S.C.P., March 15, 1772. Previously the Nawab had told the Madras authorities that he would not be able to supply them with money if the Marathas invaded the Carnatic. (B.S.C.P., January 10, 1772). 4 It seems that the arrangement was really made in February. On February 7, 1772, the Madras authorities wrote to Calcutta that "matters will soon be accommodated". (B.S.C.P., March 15, 1772). 5 Sir John Lindsay's successor as King's representative. He had also adopted a pro-Maratha attitude.
against their project of alliance, found the means of prevailing upon them to promise a cessation of hostilities till the pleasure of the British king should be known. The Mahrattas were afraid of provoking the English to join Hyder Ali”.¹ The conclusion of peace between Haidar Ali and the Marathas in May-June, 1772, removed all causes of British intervention in Maratha affairs in the Deccan. Wilks bitterly says, “.....the English...... acquired by their infraction of the treaty of 1769 (with Haidar Ali), in refusing the stipulated succour, the portentous contact of the Mahratta frontier to the province of Arcot, along the whole extent of the ghauts, from the great pass of Damalcherry, to that of Peddanaickdoorgum”.² Nor was this all. There is no doubt that Haidar’s alienation from the English and his alliance with the Marathas, culminating in the Second Anglo-Mysore War, were due in a large measure to the shifting diplomacy of the Madras Government during the years 1769-1772.³

¹ “That they gave money and gave largely, appears plainly from a letter in Rous’s Appendix, p. 952”.—Mill, History of British India, Book V, Chapter IV, p. 73.
CHAPTER VIII

MINOR INCIDENTS; ADMINISTRATION; SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS
AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN MAHARASHTRA

In the previous chapters we have given a rapid survey of the
main political events of Madhav Rao’s crowded reign. It is
convenient in this concluding chapter to refer briefly to some
minor incidents.

After the battle of Panipat “the Perkin Warbecks and
Lambert Simmels cropped up by scores. All the prominent
leaders who had fallen at Panipat reappeared at various parts of
the kingdom. Jankoji Sindhia and the brother of Hari Ballal
Phadke were both popular roles; but the most popular role of
all was that of Sadashivrao”. Those daring impostors who assumed
his name “obtained credence the more readily that his widow
Parvatibai maintained to her death that the body found on the
field of Panipat was not her husband’s and that he had escaped
and was living somewhere in hiding”.¹

III, p. 117.

Parbati Bai steadily ‘refused to go through the religious ceremonies
made on the occasion of a woman’s incipient widowhood’. Her credul-
ity was not shared by the Peshwa, Raghunath Rao and the Ministers.
In his will Madhav Rao stated that the misfortunes of the Peshwa
family were due to ‘the anger of the gods impatient with Parbati Bai’s
disregard of the religious ceremonies’ and directed that Parbati Bai should
have her head shaved. Parbati Bai refused to obey this order. She
acknowledged her mistake when she was confronted with the impostor

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One of these impostors, who created much trouble, seems to have been an inhabitant of the Gwalior region, for he spoke the dialect of that district. He first appeared at Jaipur as an ascetic. He certainly had some physical resemblance with Sadashiv Rao. Some credulous persons recognised in him the beloved leader of the Marathas. At first he refused to accept the position imposed upon him. Soon, however, he changed his mind and declared that he was the real Bhau Saheb. He refused to write with his own hand and procured a letter in Sadashiv Rao’s handwriting in order to imitate it. He also collected troops. Some prominent Maratha officers assisted him. Stern measures were adopted by the Peshwa; the pretender was captured and imprisoned. Even after this there was a conspiracy to release him.  

Another trouble, not quite negligible, came from the Kolis of Purandhar. By an order of Rajaram, dated September 10, 1691, they had secured certain rights on that fort. Those rights were never interfered with by the Peshwas. In 1763 Raghunath Rao gave the fort to his loyal follower, Aba Purandare.

mentioned on page 218 in 1772. (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 416).

1 S.P.D., xix, 3, 4, 16, 19, 22, 25, 27, 33, 34, 48, 94, 96; xxxix, 102. This impostor escaped from prison after Madhav Rao’s death. In Bombay his story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay Government, to whom he very soon sent vakils and addressed letters, received the overtures of Sadoba, as they called him, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour. Mostyn seems to have believed in the truth of the impostor’s story. (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 311). The impostor was re-captured and beheaded in 1776.
The Kolis, probably instigated by Gopika Bai, refused to obey this new governor. Aba Purandare thereupon drove away the Kolis and engaged new men in their place. The Kolis organised themselves and occupied the fort in May, 1764. Raghunath suspected that they were secretly supported by the Peshwa, who, however, denied the charge. At last an amicable arrangement was made. Aba Purandare was dismissed, the fort was taken under the direct control of the Government, and the ancient privileges of the Kolis were restored.¹

We have already referred to the settlement made with Bhawan Rao Pratinidhi in 1763.² He had some important hill forts under his control. He had some influence on the King of Satara. He had intimate relations with Janoji Bhonsle. When the Peshwa and Gopal Rao Patwardhan were busy in the Carnatic in 1764, Bhawan Rao remained behind and created disturbances in Miraj. Gopal Rao complained to the Peshwa. In January, 1765, Madhav Rao made a new agreement with Vasudev Anant, Bhawan Rao's Mutalik, by which the Mutalik assumed responsibility for the Pratinidhi's conduct. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory. So in May, 1765, the Peshwa dismissed Bhawan Rao and conferred the office of Pratinidhi on his cousin Bhagwant Rao. A civil war then followed between the two cousins. Ramchandra Ganesh was sent by the Peshwa against Bhawan Rao. Early in 1766 Bhawan Rao submitted to the Peshwa and agreed to live at Poona. The Peshwa granted

² See pp. 23, 29, 33.
the Pachras as encroachments upon his sphere of authority.
1768 Mahan Rao found out that he kept secret correspondence
with Nadar Ali and supplied him with men and mares. He was
confronted with his accusers and his guilt was brought home
and he had to surrender Shikarpur and the entire
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MINOR INCIDENTS

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another fort in his possession. A陂ably professing sunder.
him a *jagir* for his expenses, but the office of *Pratinidhi* was not withdrawn from Bhagwant Rao.¹

Tulaji Angria had been confined by Balaji Baji Rao. He somehow contrived to plot a rising on the day of Balaji's death. About 8,000 disciplined infantry entered Poona unperceived; but at the last moment a letter from Angria was betrayed into Raghunath Rao's hands. He disarmed the conspirators and confined Tulaji with greater strictness than ever.² During Madhav Rao's reign Tulaji Angria was confined in strong forts like Ahmednagar, Daulatabad and Purandhar.³ His son fled from fort Visapur⁴ and found shelter in Bombay. The Peshwa demanded his surrender when Mostyn came to Poona, but the English envoy refused.⁵

Disturbances of a far more serious nature were created by Babuji Naik Joshi, a near relation of the Peshwa family. He had played an important part under Baji Rao and Balaji Baji Rao, but he had always been a rival of the Peshwas for the possession of the Carnatic. Shahu treated the Carnatic as one of his personal estates. In 1743 he assigned it to Babuji Naik on the condition that he should pay a fixed amount as annual tribute.⁶ Henceforth Babuji Naik probably regarded the Carnatic expeditions of

³ S.P.D., xix, 96; xxxix, 101. Vad, I, 128-137. For the monthly ration granted to him, see Vad, I, 128.
⁵ See pp. 105, 116.
the Peshwas as encroachments upon his sphere of authority. In 1766 Madhav Rao found out that he kept secret correspondence with Haidar Ali and supplied him with men and mares. He was confronted with his accusers and his guilt was brought home to him. In consequence he was asked to surrender Sholapur and another fort in his possession. While outwardly professing submission Babuji Naik instructed his men not to deliver the forts and managed to escape secretly from the Peshwa’s camp. Then he shut himself up in the fort of Sholapur. The Peshwa sent Ramechandra Ganesh to pursue and capture him. After a few months’ siege Babuji Naik was compelled to surrender. His property was confiscated; only a jagir worth one and a half lakhs was given to him. His associates and servants were punished. “This ruin of the famous Baramati family was completed later by Bajirao II, so that little is now left at that place of its former splendour”.

During his reign Madhav Rao had to decide four very important questions of succession. We have already referred to his decision about the question of succession to the Holkar State. The case of the Sindhia State was more complicated. In March, 1763, Kedarji Sindhia was recognised as Jankoji Sindhia’s successor. In September, 1764, Manaji Sindhia Phadke, a distant relation of the Sindhia family, was recognised by Raghunath Rao as joint ruler of Jankoji’s State. Kedarji and Manaji were ordered

1 S.P.D., xxxvii, 99.
2 S.P.D., xxxvii, 75, 77, 79-82, 89, 91, 100, 102, 126; xxxix, 68, 74.
3 S.P.D., xxxvii, 76, 88, 95, 97, 118.
4 S.P.D., xxxvii, 78, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 92, 100.
5 S.P.D., xxxvii, Introduction.
6 See pp. 147-148.
to work jointly. This arrangement overlooked the claim of Mahadji Sindhia, an illegitimate son of Ranoji Sindhia, and the only surviving member of his family. This unjust decision was over-ruled by Madhav Rao.¹

The third dispute arose on the death of Damaji Gaikwad in 1768. It culminated in a prolonged war of succession which, in its later stages, merged into the First Anglo-Maratha War. As the head of the Maratha Empire the Peshwa naturally asserted and enforced his claim to regulate succession in the constituent principalities. This claim was not accepted without demur by the old nobility.² But Madhav Rao tried to unify the discordant elements within the Maratha Empire under the banner of Poona. Hence his long contest with Janoji Bhonsle and his interference in disputed successions.

Damaji Gaikwad left four sons—Sayaji Rao, Govind Rao, Manaji Rao and Fatesingh Rao.³ Govind Rao was the son of Damaji Rao's first and eldest wife, but Sayaji Rao, born of a younger wife, was actually the elder of the two. Sayaji Rao was almost an imbecile. In Damaji Rao's lifetime he had taken part in military operations, but he was not strong enough to enforce

¹ S.P.D., xxxix, 32, 33, 93.
² Some modern writers seem to regard this interference as unwarranted. For instance, Gense and Banaji (The Gaikwads of Baroda. Vol. II, Introduction) remark, “Govindrao, Sayajirao and Fatesing were divided among themselves and Raghoba, Madhavrao and the English East India Company profited thereby to further their own interests”. It is certainly strange that the Peshwa and the English should be placed on the same footing so far as the Baroda State is concerned.
³ See Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 376-377.
his claim to succession. His claim was, however, championed by his younger full brother, Fatesingh Rao, "who was undoubtedly the most capable of Damaji Rao’s sons; he was a man of many parts; shrewd, active and ambitious, a soldier and a politician. He was clear-headed, and possessed the ability to save the state from the dangers which surrounded it on all sides".\(^1\) He hoped to govern the state in the name of his weak elder brother. He was opposed by Govind Rao.

It was difficult for the Peshwa to give a decision. The customary right of the eldest son to succeed to his father’s possessions was not fully recognised in those days. Some authorities supported the right of the first wife’s son, whether he was the eldest or not. From this point of view Govind Rao had a better claim than Sayaji Rao. But Govind Rao had offended the Peshwa by supporting Raghunath Rao at the battle of Dhodap.\(^2\)

Govind Rao was a prisoner in Poona at the time of his father’s death. He opened negotiations with the Peshwa’s Durbar and succeeded in securing Madhav Rao’s nomination. He had to pay 23 lakhs as fine for his alliance with Raghunath Rao, 20 lakhs as a present for the official confirmation of the title of Sena Khaskhel, 1 lakh for the new conquest from the Babis,\(^3\) 5½ lakhs as arrears of tribute, and Rs. 50,000 for Durbar expenses.

Fatesingh Rao did not submit to this decision. He was present in Gujarat at the time of his father’s death. He promptly

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\(^2\) See p. 75.

\(^3\) The *paraganas* of Patan, Badnagar, Bisanagar, Sitapur Khiralis etc. (Vad, I, 142).
occupied Baroda in the name of Sayaji Rao and began to strengthen his party at home. In 1771 he went to Poona and induced the Peshwa to reverse his former decision. It is said that Peshwa Madhav Rao was influenced by Ram Sastri's opinion in favour of Sayaji Rao. Whatever the reason, Sayaji Rao was proclaimed Sena Khaskhel and Fatesingh Rao was appointed his Mutalik or deputy. He paid 41½ lakhs—2½ lakhs as fine, 20 lakhs as nazar and Rs. 50,000 as Durbar expenses. An agreement was concluded between the Peshwa and Sayaji Rao, of which the following are the chief clauses:

1. Sayaji Rao would pay to his brothers and other relations the allowances fixed in the time of Damaji Rao.

2. If Gujarat was attacked by any 'foreign force', the Peshwa would 'send assistance' to, and 'protect', Sayaji Rao.

3. If Sayaji Rao's subjects complained against him when he enforced his 'just demands', the Peshwa would not attend to them.

4. There were unsubdued places belonging to the Mughals and others in Gaikwad's share of Gujarat. If Sayaji Rao subdued them, the Peshwa would not advance any claim to them.

5. The old arrangement about the administration of the city of Ahmedabad was to be continued.²

6. The Peshwa would not support Sayaji Rao's brothers if they defied or opposed him. He would, if necessary, assist Sayaji Rao in suppressing them.

² "The administration of the city of Ahmedabad is equally divided; let both parties manage the collections with the participation of my officer according to former treaties".
7. Sayaji Rao would immediately repay the debts owed by the Gaikwad State to those bankers who possessed the Peshwa’s guarantee.

8. Instead of attending to complaints from Sayaji Rao’s ‘relations, servants, or agents’, the Peshwa would make them over to him.

9. Govind Rao would take the village of Pandra and, in addition to this, receive two lakhs per year.

10. Fatesingh Rao would ‘administer the whole state’.

11. The old arrangement about the port of Surat was to continue.¹

12. In time of peace Sayaji Rao would serve the Peshwa with 3,000 horse every year; in time of war the number would be increased to 4,000. One person of the Gaikwad family would remain in winter quarter with the troops, if necessary.

This arrangement did not long survive Madhav Rao’s death.² Towards the close of 1773 Raghunath Rao found his position threatened by the growing opposition of the ministerial party. He, therefore, strengthened himself by recognising his old ally, Govind Rao, as Sena Khaskhel. Fatesingh Rao thereupon joined the ministerial party. The story of the Gaikwad contest henceforth becomes an episode in the long drawn drama of the First Anglo-Maratha War. Govind Rao was deserted in 1775 by

¹ Half of the collections belonged to the Peshwa and half to Gaikwad. See p. 150.

² Before Mostyn went to Poona for the second time, Fatesingh Rao requested the Bombay Government to enter into an alliance with him. (Gence and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 3-4).
Raghunath Rao, who thereupon concluded a treaty with Fatesingh Rao and recognised Sayaji Rao as Sena Khaskhel. In 1778 the ministerial party conciliated Fatesingh Rao and formally recognised him as Sena Khaskhel. Sayaji Rao remained the nominal head of the family, although he ceased to be the de jure head of the state. Govind Rao received from the Peshwa a jagir worth two lakhs. Thus the ablest of Damaji Rao’s sons secured the final victory after a desperate struggle for ten years (1768-1778).

Janoji Bhonsle died in May, 1772.\(^1\) As he had no children, he had adopted his nephew Raghujji, Mudaji’s son, and had appointed Mudaji the boy’s guardian. After Janoji’s death the boy’s claim was contested by Sabaji, and his unjust claim was supported by the Poona Durbar.\(^2\) This decision was “probably, at least partially, inspired by the opposition at the Poona Court to Raghoba.”\(^3\) Grant Duff says, “Moodajee, unfortunately for himself and his son, had hitherto retained a connection with Rugonath Rao; and his pretensions not being supported by Narrain Rao or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his

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\(^1\) See p. 81. Grant Duff (Vol. II, p. 3) is wrong in saying that he was at Teur at the time of Madhav Rao’s death.

\(^2\) Mostyn’s Diary for December 27, 1772, contains the following statement: “Jonajee Bouncello’s Brothers, Moodajee and Sabajee, are contending for the Government; the latter has received the Sirpaw from this Durbar in the name of the Rajah, but which the former Disputes on Acct. his son having been adopted by Jonajee, who had no children of his own”. (Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 54). Whether the decision given after Madhav Rao’s death was in accordance with his instructions, we do not know.

\(^3\) Gense and Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, p. 290.
cause by force of arms”.

The contest ended with Mudaji’s victory in 1775.

Madhav Rao’s relations with Jija Bai of Kolhapur were not very happy. After Sambhaji’s death in December, 1760, his younger wife gave birth to a daughter, but Jija Bai concealed the girl, brought out a boy and declared him to be her co-wife’s issue. In February, 1762, the Peshwa met Jija Bai at Kolhapur. The Queen admitted that the boy was an impostor. The Peshwa wanted to unite the kingdoms of Kolhapur and Satara, but at Jija Bai’s earnest request allowed her to adopt a son. He also assisted Jija Bai to take possession of Manauli.

Madhav Rao made two agreements with Amarat Martabat (?) Khan Azam Yaqut Khan, the Siddi Chief of Janjira. In 1767 the Peshwa agreed to restore to him the fort of Matgad (which had been placed in the Peshwa’s possession to prevent its capture by Tulaji Angria); in return, the Siddi Chief agreed not to demand any duty on revenue in kind carried by Maratha ships. In 1771 provision was made for the regular payment of dues by each party to the other.

In 1767 the Portuguese of Goa were asked to surrender the fort of Mardangarh and some other places.

We have already referred in some detail to Mostyn’s first embassy to Poona (November, 1767—December, 1768). His second embassy covered a longer period (September, 1772—

1 Vol. II, p. 3.
2 Khare, II, 72, 201, 208, 343, 404, 409, 411, 484, 507.
4 Vad, I, 265.
5 See Chapter V.
February, 1774). He arrived at Poona on February 9, 1772. The Peshwa was then in his death bed.\textsuperscript{1} This embassy originated with the authorities in England. Mostyn went to England in 1768 and returned to India in 1772. He came with instructions from the Court of Directors "that he should be sent immediately to negotiate with Madhoo Rao, the Peshwa, for certain advantages for the settlement in Malabar and also for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay."\textsuperscript{2}

Mostyn's second embassy is particularly important because it was intended by the Bombay Government to serve 'as an introduction to our having a fixed Resident at Poona."\textsuperscript{3} This expectation was not fulfilled; the first British Resident at the Peshwa's Court was Sir Charles Malet, appointed in 1787.

Mostyn was instructed by the Bombay Government to penetrate into any design of the Marathas which might affect the Company's possessions in Bengal or the Carnatic, to obtain the cession of Salsette, Bassein and Karanja, in exchange, if necessary, for the cession of Fort Victoria and a promise not to oppose the annexation of Rajpuri\textsuperscript{4} by the Marathas, to secure possession of the Maratha share of the Surat revenue,\textsuperscript{5} and, in general, to

\textsuperscript{1} Gense and Banaji, \textit{The Third English Embassy to Poona}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{3} Gense and Banaji, \textit{The Third English Embassy to Poona}, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{4} The island fortress of Rajpuri, also known as Danda-Rajpuri, lies about 27 miles south of Bombay. For a description of the fort, written in 1628, see Foster's \textit{English Factories in India, 1624-1629}, pp. 252-253.
\textsuperscript{5} See pp. 150, 225.
promote friendly relations between the Company and the Peshwa.¹

On his arrival at Poona Mostyn was met by Ramaji Chitnis and a vahil of the Nawab of Arcot. The Peshwa was then at Teur,² his ‘life being in danger’. Narayan Rao and all the principal ministers were there. On October 13 Ramaji Chitnis informed Mostyn that, the Peshwa being too ill to see him, he would be received at the Durbar by Narayan Rao. The reception took place on October 16. On the following day Ramaji Chitnis saw Mostyn and discussed the affairs of Janjira.³ On

¹ Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 2-4.
² A village, 13 miles from Poona.
³ See pp. 11, 13, 72, 105, 115, 150. In 1772 Siddi Abdul Rahim Khan was put by the English in possession of Danda-Rajpuri in subordination to Siddi Yaqut Khan, and was also promised the right of succession to Janjira. (For details, see Banaji’s Bombay and the Sidis). It appears from the records of Mostyn’s second embassy that Siddi Rahim violated this treaty, expelled Siddi Yaqut and occupied Janjira. In his conversation with Mostyn on October 17, 1772, Ramaji Chitnis mildly disapproved Siddi Rahim’s conduct and tried to ascertain whether the Company would support the usurper if the Marathas attacked him. Mostyn said, “...as at the time I left Bombay, we were not certain how the Revolution was brought about, I could not to be a judge which of them was right or wrong”. He did not inform Ramaji Chitnis that the English were prepared to acquiesce in the Maratha occupation of Danda-Rajpuri if the Peshwa ceded Salsette, Bassein and Karanja to the Company. He wrote to Bombay: “My giving them the least intimation of our Intentions now...would be of no service; for they will come to no determination without the approbation of Madah Row, who is too ill at present to attend to much business”. (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 12-13). It appears that Siddi Yaqut died soon after his deposition, and Siddi Rahim continued to rule Janjira.
October 18 Mostyn dined with Narayan Rao. On October 19 he was informed by Saktharam Bapu that the Maratha Government 'readily consented' to receive him as 'Resident for the Company'. On October 21 Mostyn reported these incidents to Bombay and observed, "From the best information I can procure, the Morattahs will not this year undertake any expedition, at least not until the recovery or demise of Mahad Row..." The Peshwa's continued illness detained all the ministers at Teur, and 'nothing very material' happened during the last days of his life.

The helpless King of Satara remained, as before, a prisoner. As Dr. S. N. Sen observes, "Perhaps the meanest of the Maratha Sardars would not have liked to change place with him. An organic part of the state, he had not the ordinary right of an ordinary man of dismissing and appointing his servants". Even his menials were appointed at and sent from Poona. He had no garden for growing green vegetables; he had no pasture ground for his horses. Madhav Rao seems to have been specially indulgent to the King. Not only did he provide for his necessities more liberally than his father and successors; he also allowed him 'to live a prisoner at large in the town of Satara' and to appoint agents for the management of his personal estates. This till his death in 1784. (Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XI, p. 448).

1 Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 19.
2 Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 27.
3 Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 190-191.
4 Vad, II, 74.
6 Vad, II, 76, 78.
5 Vad, II, 76.
7 Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 532.
prisoner was, however, a person of great political importance. He still sanctioned the appointment of the Peshwa and other hereditary officers of the State. In 1763 the Maratha sardars who had joined the Nizam tried to take hold of the King’s person.¹ In 1766 the partisans of Raghunath tried to liberate him.²

Early in 1770 Madhav Rao began to feel the approach of the terrible disease which took him away in his youth. He had probably inherited it from his father; but we may surmise that it was hastened by over-work and anxiety. Neither prayer, nor medicine, nor change of place effected any permanent improvement. The sharp and far-sighted young ruler understood that his end was near. Anxious for the future of the State, he took measures for training Narayan Rao in the affairs of government. In 1767-68 he had asked him to enquire into complaints against a local officer;³ in 1769 he had left him in charge of the Huzur Daftar at Poona.⁴ In August, 1770, Narayan Rao was made Dewan, and Sakharam Bapu became his Mutalik. Narayan Rao was too young to bear the burden of the great empire; nor did he possess his illustrious brother’s eminent qualities. Madhav Rao was anxious for him; once he declared with prophetic insight that the word rājya was not written on his forehead.⁵ In August, 1771, he gave his final instructions: Narayan Rao was asked to be friendly with Nana Fadnis, to respect Rama Bai (Madhav Rao’s wife), and to be reconciled with Raghunath Rao. The dying Peshwa knew that his uncle would be the greatest enemy of his young successor. So he reconciled himself with Raghunath

¹ See pp. 25-27.  
² S.P.D., xxxix, 76.  
³ Vad, II, 60.  
⁴ Vad, I, 93.  
⁵ Khare, Adhikar Yog, p. 7.
and secured from him a promise that he would act rightly by Narayan Rao. 1 His last days were extremely painful; 2 once he wanted a dagger to commit suicide in order that he might escape from his terrible suffering. He expired on November 18, 1772, in the morning, 3 with the word ‘Gajānan’ on his lips.

There are some very interesting Marathi documents which afford us a glimpse into the character of the Peshwa. He was very much devoted to his mother. In September, 1764, when he was fighting against Haidar Ali in the Carnatic, he was so anxious for his mother’s health that he wrote to a clerk, asking him to take care of her and to see that she did not ruin her health by fast. 4 Liberal allowances were provided for her and special officers were appointed to look after her comfort. 5 The Peshwa was fond

1 Mostyn’s Diary for October-November, 1772, contains some interesting references to Raghunath Rao’s activities during the last days of the Peshwa’s life. It seems that even after the agreement of March, 1772, referred to on page 84 above, Raghunath organised a plot ‘to raise ten thousand horse, with an intent, as it’s said, to surprise Poona, seize his nephews, and take the government into his own hands’. His partisans were arrested and confined in some forts. He was brought to Teur, where the Peshwa lay in his death bed. (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 8-10).

2 Mostyn’s Diary for October 24, 1772, contains the following statement: ‘…Madah Row is very ill, in so much that He is (according to the Custom of the Gentoos, who never suffer a Man to expire on a Cot) laid upon the Ground…In the afternoon intelligence is brought me that Madah Row is better…” (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 19-20).

3 Mostyn says that he expired about 11 o’clock in the morning. (Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, p. 31).

4 Khare, II, 483.

5 Vad, I, 85, 87, 89. Gopika Bai seems to have been a pious lady,
of physical exercises, and accustomed to take exercises from his boyhood. In his devotion to religion he was a true Brahmin. Once, we are told, he began to spend so much time in his religious exercises that the venerable Ram Sastri had to direct his attention to his duties as the ruler of the State. When the Peshwa argued that he was merely doing his duty as a Brahmin, Ram Sastri said, "It is only so, provided you entirely renounce worldly advantages. As Brahmins have departed from the ordinances of their faith, and assumed the office of Rajas, it becomes them to exercise power for the benefit of their subjects, as the best and only apology for having usurped it." The Peshwa 'acknowledged the justness of the rebuke' and henceforth never sacrificed his political duties for religious observances. But his sincere faith in rituals did not diminish. We find him, for instance, granting an inam to a Brahmin learned in the Vedas in fulfillment of a vow to that effect taken by him during an eclipse of the sun. We find him advising some one to perform certain rites in order to invoke divine aid to destroy the enemy. This is quite in keeping with his aversion to luxury. While Raghunath Rao writes for a supply of pretty and well-trained dancing girls, his Puritancial nephew refuses to wear gaily coloured clothes. It is hard to believe Wilks' statement that such a man "like most Asiatic chiefs was addicted to

and there is no evidence in support of Taylor's accusation against her character, quoted on page 19 above. See Gense and Banaji, The Third English Embassy to Poona, pp. 403-405.

3 Vad, II, 679. 4 S.P.D., xxxiii, 76.
loose conversation, and pleased with the impure wit arising from such discussions”. Wilks probably heard a story from Haidar’s followers and included it in his book merely to create an atmosphere against ‘Asiatic Chiefs’. Grant Duff is perhaps more justified in saying that Madhav Rao had ‘an irritable temper, not always under command, which was his greatest defect’.

The ‘usurpation’ by the Peshwa of the headship of the Maratha State was completed during the regime of Balaji Baji Rao. This significant change had two important effects. In the first place, it led to the abolition of Shivaji’s Ashta Pradhan Council and made the Peshwa autocratic. Secondly, “it created two distinct classes of Sardars in the Maratha Empire” The old nobility—the Gaikwads, the Dabhades, the Bhonsles of Nagpur—claimed to hold their possessions by virtue of Shahu’s sanads and regarded themselves as equals of the Peshwas. The new nobility, on the other hand,—the Sindhis, the Holkars, the Rastes, the Phadkes, the Patwardhans, the Bundeles, the Purandares,—“regarded the Peshwa as the master whose bread they ate and whom they were bound to serve”. Gradually, however, the example of the old nobility influenced them, and all sardars came to think of themselves as independent rulers of their own principalities. Thus the Maratha Empire was converted from an ‘organic whole into an inorganic mass’. Though the sardars joined together on great occasions, like the wars against Mysore,

3 Scott-Waring, History of the Marathas, p. 169.
4 Sen, Administrative History of the Marathas, p. 204.
the Nizam and the English, "the old solidarity of interest became a thing of the past", and this "loose confederacy of ambitious feudal chiefs" naturally "failed to evoke that spirit of patriotic co-operation which had achieved such wonderful results" in the past.¹ Traces of this degeneration are clearly visible during Madhav Rao’s regime.

All authorities agree in describing Madhav Rao as a great administrator. He did not introduce any institutional change; for this failure, however, he deserves no blame. His reign was too brief and too tempestuous to provide that leisure and calmness which administrative reforms demand. Moreover, "he had to contend with violent prejudices, and with general corruption".² So the Peshwa tried to make the existing machinery work well, and for the accomplishment of this purpose he was prepared to take infinite pains. His attention to details excites our surprise and admiration. He inquires into a petty grievance suffered by Ali Bahadur’s family. He inquires about the construction of unauthorised buildings near the palace at Poona. He scrutinises a list showing the number and pay of some attendants. He takes measures to prevent clerks from taking bribes.³ He inquires about arrangements for supplying fodder to horses and cattle attached from Babuji Naik’s estate.⁴ He was specially careful about expenses. His diary contains references to very small items

¹ Ranade, Introduction to Shahu Chhatrapati and the Peshwas’ Diaries, pp. 5-6.
³ S.P.D., xxxix, 21, 26, 78, 80. Karkuni was a recognised source of income to Government officers. (S.P.D., xxxix, 80; xxxiv, 39, 40).
⁴ S.P.D., xxxvii, 95.
of expenditure—Re. 1,18/- spent for lamp oil supplied to a certain clerk, for example. He issues orders to make payment for certain dresses sent to the Portuguese of Goa. He makes arrangements for the payment of personal expenses to an envoy. An officer says that he cannot spend Rs. 4 without the Peshwa’s order. All cases of embezzlement were specially examined. While engaged in an arduous campaign against Janoji Bhonsle, the Peshwa orders the famous betel plants of Ramtek to be taken to Poona for cultivation there. When we remember that these cases are illustrative, not exhaustive, and that the Peshwa conducted so many campaigns within so brief a period, we must admit that he was far above his contemporaries as a civil administrator.

Such a ruler must have given much trouble to his officers. The watans of oppressive officers were attached. Officers were sent to inspect the accounts and conduct of local officers. Local officers had to send their accounts to Poona. One of them complains to another, “The Peshwa looks only to money; he does not look to men. Complaints are lodged even against loyal servants of 10 or 20 years’ standing. Even petty sums are realised by putting officers into trouble—that is the policy of the Durbar. Full accounts of different districts are kept. Even small mistakes are not condoned...Officers cannot keep a single rupee for personal profit; the whole sum (realised) is to be paid

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1 S.P.D., xxxix, 36, 43, 73, 169.
2 Khare, III, 592, 600; pp. 1013, 1042.
3 S.P.D., xx, 288.
4 Vad, II, 651.
to the Government... Detailed enquiry is made about supplies. No one is happy". There is no doubt that the official routine was strictly and regularly observed and disloyal officers were promptly punished. The position of the old sardars was specially precarious. Even a loyal and favourite officer like Haripant Phadke almost trembles at the prospect of receiving any letter containing anything disliked by the Peshwa, and Nana Fadnis himself is troubled to think that the Peshwa may suspect him. The Peshwa’s espionage was so efficient that everything came to his notice. Accidents, riots and disturbances of various kinds were frequently and fully reported to him by local officials.

Madhav Rao was always particularly careful about the interests of the ryots. He ordered that they should not be molested by the marching troops. Once the Peshwa paid compensation to villagers for the loss they had suffered when he himself encamped in their field. It was an old custom to force the villagers to carry baggage; he abolished it. When Visaji Pant violated this order, the baggage conveyed by forced labour was confiscated and the villagers were remunerated. In course of his tours the Peshwa personally enquired into the grievances of the ryots. Remission of revenue was granted in case of poli-

1 S.P.D., xxxix, 163.
2 S.P.D., xxxviii, 186, 192; xxxix, 4, 54.
3 S.P.D., xxxix, 79.
4 S.P.D., xxxix, 100, 64.
6 S.P.D., xxxix, 134.
7 S.P.D., xix, 24; xx, 203; xxxviii, 46; xxxix, 23, 135.
8 S.P.D., xxxiii, 137. Vad, II, 420, 422, 424, 432.
10 S.P.D., xxxix, 115.
tical disturbances or scarcity of rain. The sanction of the Government was required for the sale and transfer of land by the cultivators.

Some interesting details about the revenue system under Madhav Rao may be collected from contemporary documents. The rent charged for each bigha of first class land was Rs. 5, for second class land Rs. 4, and for third class land Rs. 3. Revenue might be paid in cash or in kind. Land was regularly surveyed, even in outside provinces like Gujarat, and one-fifth of the surveyed area was deducted from assessment. Sometimes pariganas were farmed and a portion of the revenue was realised in advance from the officers, who, however, received interest on the sum so advanced. Care was taken to ensure that the tax farmers did not realise more than the fixed assessment from the ryots. Officers were appointed to check the accounts of the tax farmers. Dams and canals were constructed for purposes of irrigation. Private persons were also encouraged to erect dams; it was the practice to grant ten bighas in inam to any person who erected a dam and turned 100 bighas into ‘garden land’. Oppressive taxes were abolished or reduced. Special favour was shown to the Brahmins. Apart from land revenue taxes were imposed on, amongst others, unauthorised grazing, fishing in salt water lakes, grain sold at Poona, thatch, palm tree, cocoanut tree, etc. There were import and export duties, to which the farming system was often extended. The Government also realised debts on behalf of individual creditors and charged a certain percentage. Other fees connected with judicial administration will be noted below.

Another source of income was the mint. The mints were in private hands, but a license had to be taken from the Government, which realised a royalty for this favour. Madhav Rao tried to abolish debased coins by establishing a rigid control over private mints.¹

A good account of the government of Poona under Madhav Rao is found in a document issued for the guidance of a newly appointed Kotwal of that city in 1767-68. It was his duty (1) to settle important disputes, (2) to fix the prices of goods, (3) to supply labourers as required by the Government from among the inhabitants of the city, (4) to supervise the sale and purchase of land and to receive the fees due to the Government, (5) to take the census and to keep a record of all persons coming into and leaving the city, (6) to report to the Government on the necessity of amending old rules and introducing new rules, (7) to dispose of all disputes relating to roads, lanes and houses, and (8) to see that none but professional gamblers were allowed to gamble, and to realise fees from the professional gamblers.²

Military saranjams³ were granted, as before, and in many cases they were hereditary.⁴ We have some specific instances in

² Vad, II, pp. 233-236.
³ Saranjam—a Persian word signifying ‘beginning-ending’, and used in India to mean apparatus, goods and chattels, etc. But in the Deccan it is applied specially to grants of land or assignments of revenue for special objects, such as the maintenance of a military contingent for service, or, in the case of civil officers, for the maintenance of their state, or for charitable purposes. (Yule’s Hobson-Jobson, Crooke’s edition, s.v. ‘Surrinjaum’).
⁴ Vad, I, 354.
Madhav Rao’s reign. In one case the grantee was asked to “render detailed accounts of the territory assigned to him..., to continue the alienation of land and cash existing therein, to make enquiries about its revenues, and to try to increase the revenue as far as possible. With regard to the keeping up of the detachment, the instructions were that the horses and men to be entertained should be fit and strong, each horse being of a value of Rs. 300 or Rs. 400, and that they should be produced for inspection whenever required by the Huzur”.

Sometimes adventurous commanders were asked to conquer districts annexed by other Powers (like the Nizam). If they succeeded in doing so, their expenses were paid by the Government and the districts concerned were granted to them for at least two years. The following conditions were prescribed:

1. The expense of the troops to be paid by Government only in case of the above persons succeeding in capturing the villages.
2. The Mamlat of the above villages to be continued to the above persons for at least two years.
3. The above persons to surrender detailed accounts and to remit the revenue to government deducting therefrom the expenses of the troops.

2 Vad, I, 190.
3 Vad, I, 11, 12. On another occasion a sardar was asked to capture some parganas seized by Haidar Ali. “The Kamavis of the Parganas was entrusted to him. The expenses of the army were ordered to be defrayed out of the revenue of the province, the surplus being remitted to Government”. (Vad, I, 14).
4. No advance money to be required from the said persons on account of the Mamlat for the first year. An advance to be, however, taken for the second year, at the usual rate of interest."

Arms and ammunition for the use of the army were usually bought from Europeans,¹ but Madhav Rao took measures to make his Government less dependent in this respect. He took special interest in the manufacture of ammunition and the repair of guns and some of his letters reveal his personal knowledge about these intricate matters.² Factories for the manufacture of guns and cannon balls were established at Ambegavan near Otur, Bagalkot and Poona.³

Since the days of Balaji Baji Rao the importance of gardis had been increasing and, consequently, the army was becoming more and more mercenary. The result was that "the martial instincts of the neglected Infantry and Cavalry forces underwent a change for the worse, so that when General Wellesley and Lord Lake broke down the strength of the battalions opposed to them, there was no power left in the country which could resist the conquest that followed as a matter of course".⁴ In Madhav Rao’s time Arabs, Abyssinians, Siddis and Sikhs were employed in large numbers. A few days after his death Narayan Rao ordered that each gardi should get Rs. 13 per month and should not be dismissed within eight months of appointment; there

¹ S.P.D., xxxix, 115, 127.
² S.P.D., xxxix, 70, 108.
³ Vad, I, 366, 368. S.P.D., xxxix, 126.
⁴ Ranade, Introduction to Shahu Chhatrapati and the Peishwas’ Diaries, p. 10.
should be two *jamadars* over 300 *gardis*, and the salary of each *jamadar* should not exceed Rs. 50 per month. Other documents show that Arabs, Abyssinians and Siddis used to get Rs. 15 or Rs. 16 per month. Soldiers employed in forts used to get Rs. 8 per month. The salary of Muhammadan gunners ranged from Rs. 85 to Rs. 13 per month. In one case a *saranjām* worth Rs. 6,25,000 was given to a person for the maintenance of 2,500 horse; thus the rate was Rs. 250 for each *sowar* per annum.¹ Special grants of money were made to officers and men wounded in battle and to their dependents, and the funeral expenses of officers and men killed in action were paid by the Government. It is interesting to note that ration was not provided for horses, camels and elephants in the army on *ekādasī* days, and that during the monsoon horses and camels were given ghee.²

Forts served chiefly as State granaries and State prisons. Ranade says that they were useless against artillery and allowed to go into dis-repair.³ We, however, find Madhav Rao carefully repairing forts. Here is a typical illustration showing how the smaller forts were managed: "Villages estimated to yield Rs. 9,000 were assigned for the expenses of the fort.⁴ The officer was told to extend cultivation in the villages and increase the revenue as far as possible. It was further directed that detailed

¹ Vad, I, 341. In another case the rate was higher: a *saranjām* worth Rs. 2,12,412 was given for 708 horse. (Vad, I, 346). Cf. Vad, I, 347, 348, 369.


³ *Introduction to Shahu Chhatrapati and the Peshwas' Diaries*, p. 12.

⁴ The name of this fort is Bahula.
accounts of the villages should be furnished at the end of the year, that a muster should be kept of the men in the fort, that they should not be paid their full pay till the end of the year, that no pay should be allowed for periods of absence, that service should be taken only from persons named in the nominal roll bearing the Government seal and signature, that no substitute should be permitted to serve, and that the fort should be well guarded. The entertainment of scavengers, torch bearers, etc., as might be necessary was also permitted, and sanction was accorded to the usual expenditure on account of the fair, oil for lighting a lamp before a deity, food for dogs in the fort and grain allowance to the female servants".  

As in the sphere of civil administration, the Peshwa personally controlled every part of the military machine. We find him supervising from Poona the details of military operations in distant Rohilkhand. Strict discipline was maintained in the army.  

One of the characteristic features of the Maratha military system was the encouragement given officially to irregular troops known as the Pindaris. They were allowed to reside in the general's camp on payment of a tent-tax (Rs. 5 for each tent). They had to give up to the Government all elephants, palanquins, drums or flags which they secured by plunder. They were expert plunderers, and succeeded in earning their livelihood by plunder alone.  

The suppression of the Angrias resulted in the weakening of the Maratha naval power. No remarkable exploit can be

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3 Vad, I, 350, 351, 373.
credited to the Maratha Navy during Madhav Rao’s reign. There are some good instances of his interest in the navy. He took steps for repairing damaged ships. He rewarded naval officers and men for good service.\footnote{Vad, I, 379, 382.} For the better regulation of naval administration he appointed an officer known as the Amin of the Navy. “While the Admiral was the military head of the navy, the Amin was its civil head”.\footnote{Sen, Administrative History of the Marathas, p. 435.} He had to check the daily account sheets, the daily muster roll, orders regarding leave and return from leave, the lists of new recruits, and all sales and purchases. He had to inspect all seamen at the beginning of the year and report about their efficiency to the Government.\footnote{Vad, I, 381. His salary was Rs. 2,000 per year. (Vad, I, 380).}

Fortunately we are in possession of official records which enable us to form a vivid idea about the administration of justice in those days. Here also the Peshwa’s personal activity occupies an important place. He personally enquires even into cases of petty theft.\footnote{S.P.D., xxxix, 140.} But the most important personality in this department was Ram Sastri, whose name is still a living memory in Maharashtra. His learning, impartiality and purity of character have made him one of the most remarkable figures in Maratha history. He was not only the Nyāyādhish of the State; he was almost the guru of the Peshwa.\footnote{For his career, see Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Calcutta Session, 1939.}

The procedure adopted by this celebrated judge was extremely informal. “Sometimes he consulted a common friend of
the disputants; but on the whole he conducted the business with an attitude of strict justice". It is interesting to find that in one case at least the litigant did not hesitate to accuse Ram Sastri of partiality; the Peshwa directed another judge to hear his case.2

So far as criminal cases are concerned, there are some instances of mutilation. One hand and one foot of the guilty persons were cut off. The offences punished in this way were murder, arson, dacoity, escape from jail and rebellion. Sometimes the _watans_ of murderers were confiscated. In some cases rebels and their families were imprisoned. Sometimes fine or social boycott was the punishment inflicted upon murderers. In the case of Brahmin offenders civil penalties of a comparatively mild nature were supplemented by penance. Those who helped a murderer were fined. Adultery was punished with fine or imprisonment. Relatives of the culprits were sometimes punished along with them. A husband was fined because his wife had committed suicide. Instances of fire ordeal and water ordeal are recorded. Difficult cases were summoned to the _Huzur_ if local officials were unable to deal with them satisfactorily. Lunatics were kept confined in different forts.3

Political prisoners naturally suffered more than ordinary offenders. The cases of Tulaji Angria, Gangadhar Yashvant Chandrachud and Kedarji Sindhia have been mentioned before.

1 Sen, _Administrative System of the Marathas_, p. 370.
2 S.P.D., xxxiii, 132.
Kedarji’s wife and her female servants were imprisoned in the fort of Lohgath. Some persons had tried to release Tulaji Angria; their houses and lands were attached, and their families imprisoned. The same punishment was inflicted on the family of a man who had assisted Tulaji’s son in escaping from the fort of Visapur. One person was heavily fined for lending money to Raghunath Rao in 1768. In the case of some political prisoners, their irons were not removed except at dinner time; but an exception was made in the case of women.¹

Civil cases were generally decided by the Panchayets. Grant Duff says that in spite of frequent corruption and injustice, they were popular, “and their defects lay less in the system itself than in the habits of the people”.² Sometimes the decisions of the Panchayets were not enforced without the Peshwa’s sanction. Kamavisdars sometimes acted as judges in civil disputes; their decisions were subject to confirmation by the Peshwa. We have already said that disputes relating to roads, lanes and houses in the city of Poona were decided by the Kotwal. Disputes relating to religious matters were sometimes decided by the Brahmin community. Sometimes the Peshwa personally decided disputes regarding marriage. Social penalties (performance of penance, etc.) were sometimes added to civil penalties.³

The Government derived a fair amount of revenue from judicial business. A nazma was often realised from the successful party in a dispute. Fees (amounting to one-fourth, one-sixth or

¹ Vad, I, 117, 138, 178, 182; II, 578, 638.
³ Vad, II, 532, 533, 535, 536, 536(a), 545, 553, 561, 564.
one-tenth of the sum) were taken for partitioning family property, for recovering debts on behalf of private persons and for recovering stolen goods from thieves. Some portions of the property left by a person dying without issue were confiscated by the Government, the remainder being left to his mother and widow.\footnote{Vad, II., 529, 537, 542, 544, 545, 547, 548, 553, 556, 560, 562, 606.}

To modern eyes the Maratha system of judicial administration appears defective in many respects. As Elphinstone says, "There was no regular administration of justice: no certain means of filing a suit: and no fixed rule of proceeding after it had been filed."\footnote{A Report on the Territories Conquered from the Peishwa, p. 65.} The lack of settled procedure was certainly responsible for many cases of failure of justice,\footnote{See S. N. Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 376-377.} but on the whole it may be said that substantial justice was generally available. Elphinstone himself admitted this when he recommended the continuation of the Panchayet system after the conquest.

Marathi documents enable us to construct a vivid picture of Maratha society in the eighteenth century. For Madhav Rao's reign, however, the available documents are not very numerous. One of the most interesting features of his policy was the prohibition of liquor traffic. Prohibition was originally introduced by Sadashiv Rao Bhau, and it was continued with strictness during Madhav Rao's regime.\footnote{S.P.D., xxxii, 206; xxxxxiii, 36.} An exception was made only in the case of some labourers who complained that without liquor they were unable to do their work. A Brahmin who used to drink
wine was asked to give up the habit and to purify himself by penance.  

There was a wide-spread belief in witchcraft.  

Slavery was not unknown; both male and female slaves are often referred to.  

Male dancers were employed.  

Armenian physicians were in demand.  

Early marriage was prevalent. Narayan Rao was married at nine. There is a record showing that a girl of eight was married to a man of thirty-five.  

Various penances were prescribed for the violation of social customs and religious regulations.  

In some cases Hindus converted to Islam were re-admitted into the Hindu fold, but the process seems to have been growing gradually less and less liberal.  

A kidnapped wife was sometimes taken back by her husband.  

Ranade rightly observes that “the point to be regarded in all these instances is not to be estimated by the actual success achieved, but by the fact that these native rulers interested themselves in these matters and showed considerable liberality in the orders issued by them to correct existing social evils”.

We do not know what sort of education men and women

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1 Vad, II, 452. S.P.D., xxxiii, 159.  
4 S.P.D., xxxii, 50.  
5 S.P.D., xxxii, 140.  
6 Khare, I, 212, 252.  
7 S.P.D., xxxix, 137; xxxiii, 11, 12, 29, 44.  
8 S.P.D., xxxiii, 8, 25, 140.  
9 S.P.D., xxxiii, 161.  
10 Introduction to Shahu Chhatrapati and the Peishwas’ Diaries, p. 29.
received at that time. Madhav Rao had a library.\textsuperscript{1} Saguna Bai, who became a widow at the age of ten, devoted her life to the study of religious books. We have a long list of manuscripts in her possession.\textsuperscript{2} Anandi Bai, Raghunath Rao’s wife, seems to have been literate at least, for she required embroidered cloth for keeping pens and stationery.\textsuperscript{3}

Closely connected with social life was religion. The Marathas, including the Peshwa, took great interest in pilgrimage, observance of religious festivals\textsuperscript{4} and feeding of Brahmins.\textsuperscript{5} The services of astrologers were in great demand.\textsuperscript{6} Men spent more on charity than on medicine when they were ill.\textsuperscript{7} Raghunath Rao’s domestic establishment in 1771 included 5 pandits, 4 Putaniks, 4 astrologers and 3 reciters of the Vedas.\textsuperscript{8} In some localities a small tax was imposed on every householder to provide for the expenses of repairing temples and keeping up poor houses.\textsuperscript{9} Once some prostitutes were fined for having gone into a temple, and the priests of that temple were fined for giving them prasād.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{1} S.P.D., xxxii, 39. \\
\textsuperscript{2} S.P.D., xxxii, 42.  \\
\textsuperscript{3} Vad, I, 111. \\
\textsuperscript{4} S.P.D., xxxii, 8, 26, 193, 208; xxxix, 143, 169, 115; xxxixii, 75. Rs. 19,976 were spent for Narayan Rao’s sacred thread ceremony. Rs. 1,872 were spent on Balaji Baji Rao’s death anniversary. (Vad, I, 94). The expenses of Madhav Rao’s funeral and Rama Bai’s performance of Sati amounted to Rs. 1,58,613, besides grain, clothes, ornaments and animals given away. (Vad, I, 101). \\
\textsuperscript{5} S.P.D., xxxii, 181, 186. A \textit{dakshinā} of one pice per head was given on a certain occasion.  \\
\textsuperscript{6} S.P.D., x xxxiiii, 80.  \\
\textsuperscript{7} Khare, III, 442.  \\
\textsuperscript{8} Vad, I, 119.  \\
\textsuperscript{9} Vad, II, 492.  \\
\textsuperscript{10} Vad, II, 752.
The Peshwas continued Shivaji's tradition of toleration to their non-Hindu subjects. Madhav Rao confirmed the possession of certain *wattans* in the Poona *prant* by some Muhammadans whose ancestors had occupied them by virtue of Aurangzib's *sanads*; it is still more interesting to note that the grantees were directed by the Peshwa to carry on their duties according to Muhammadan usages.¹ When a Qazi died without leaving a son, his *watan* and grain allowance were continued to a descendant of his daughter.² Similar liberality was shown to Portuguese Christians. On one occasion stone pillars of a broken temple were given to a Portuguese priest for the purpose of building a church.³ Madhav Rao also decided disputes between Portuguese priests.⁴

Interesting details about the economic condition of Maharashtra⁵ may be gathered from official documents. The rate of

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¹ Vad, II, 499.  
² Vad, II, 498.  
³ Vad, II, 769.  
⁴ Vad, II, 760, 766.  
⁵ Grant Duff says that at Madhav Rao's time "the Maratha country, in proportion to its fertility, was probably more thriving than any other part of India". (Vol. I, p. 581). S. M. Edwards remarks that this statement is 'somewhat surprising' and refers to Sir Jadunath Sarkar's view that the Maratha Government neglected the economic development of the country. (Shivaji, pp. 396-397). It may be observed that Grant Duff's statement refers to a period when very large areas in different parts of India were desolated by constant warfare and plunder. During that troubled period, when most of the Indian rulers were following the dangerous economic policy attributed by Sir Jadunath Sarkar to the Marathas, Maharashtra may well have been 'more thriving than any other part of India'. In 1769 Bengal was visited by the most terrible famine recorded in modern Indian history, but in Maharashtra articles of consumption were very cheap. The evidence of Jervis, referred to by
interest was high; the Peshwa himself had to pay 12 p.c. Articles of consumption were not dear: 13 seers of milk, and 13/4 seers of butter could be purchased for one rupee. In the city of Poona prices of commodities were fixed by the Kotwal. There were officers called Inspector of weights and Amin of weights. Madhav Rao encouraged artisans to settle at Poona by granting them exemption from taxation for five years.¹

We have tried to describe in some detail the career and character of Peshwa Madhav Rao I. We have drawn our materials from the Poona archives, from the family papers of Maratha Chiefs like the Patwardhans of Miraj, from the writings of the Muslim admirers of Nizam Ali and Haidar Ali, and from the huge mass of documents accumulated by British officers in Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, New Delhi, and London. The Peshwa's character and activities have been surveyed from many points of view, and not unoften have we looked at him from his enemies' camps. An eighteenth century ruler whose reputation can survive so close a scrutiny was no ordinary man. A bare enumeration of his exploits in war is a great testimony to his capacity for leadership, ability for organisation and military skill. It is remarkable that Haidar Ali, whose military genius was a terror to British generals, was defeated in all the campaigns led against him by the Peshwa. Within a brief space of eleven years, Madhav Rao succeeded in extending his authority

Edwardes, "shows that the economic condition of the people at the time of the dissolution of Maratha rule was very miserable". Without examining the value of this evidence, we may exclude it from our survey of a period long before 'the dissolution of Maratha rule'.

from Delhi to Seringapatam. And these exploits were accompanied by the suppression of serious internal revolts and a minute supervision of administrative affairs. The Peshwa’s private life was blameless, and offers a striking contrast to that of his contemporaries.¹ His devotion to religion was exemplary. He was never guilty of treachery even towards his enemies.

Could such a ruler have averted the downfall of the Maratha Empire? That catastrophe was due to the slow and silent operation of many factors, political, military, social and economic. It is difficult to see how an individual, however gifted, could have stood as a barrier against the forces of disintegration bursting out from within, and the ruthless might and diplomacy of the West knocking from without. Yet there may be some truth in Grant Duff’s famous observation that “the plains of Panniput were not more fatal to the Mahratta empire, than the early end of this excellent prince”.² Had Madhav Rao lived to his sixtieth year, Shah Alam would have remained a protégé of the Poona Durbar, Haidar Ali and Tipu would not have been able to reign unmolested, and there would have been no treaty of Bassein. So much we can say, although we do not know whether Poona would have remained the capital of India to this day. A wise modern historian³ has recognised “in the development of

¹ Haidar Ali’s harem consisted of 4,000 women.
³ H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe, Preface. Fisher says, “Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern ... I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave ... the historian ... should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen”.
human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen'. The early deaths of Baji Rao and Balaji Baji Rao, of Chimnaji Appa and Sadasiv Rao Bhau, the premature death of Madhav Rao, the murder of Narayan Rao, the premature death of Madhav Rao Narayan—here, indeed, is 'one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave': here is 'the play of the contingent and the unforeseen'.
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IV. PORTUGUESE


Peixoto was an officer in Haidar Ali’s army and gives detailed and reliable accounts of military operations. I have found no remarkable case of divergence between his account and Marathi versions. He was not an educated man. Proper names are often mix-spelt.

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